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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, October 21, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 205

                            Headlines

ADOLPH KIEFER: Website Not Blind-accessible, Delacruz Claims
ADVISORS MORTGAGE: Harvey Suit Remanded to California Super. Court
ALBUQUERQUE, NM: Bid to Enforce Interim Order in McClendon Denied
ALLERGAN PLC: Appeals Class Certification Ruling to 2nd Circuit
ASPEN HOME: Court Extends Time to Complete Class Discovery in Eder

BANK OF AMERICA: Certiorari Petition Filed in Fund Liquidation Suit
BEND MEMORIAL: Court Extends Discovery & PTO Deadlines in Fulkerson
CAFE TKJ: Faces Choa Wage-and-Hour Class Suit in S.D. New York
COCA-COLA CONSOLIDATED: Bid to Strike Jones Reply Tossed
CONSUMER CELLULAR: Geary FLSA Suit Seeks to Certify CSR Class

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY: 9th Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Selane Suit
COTTONWOOD FINANCIAL: Greenwood Slams Excessive Interest Rates
DEL TACO: Discovery in Meal Break Related Suit Ongoing
EARGO INC: Fazio Slams Share Price Drop
GENERAL MOTORS: W.D. Washington Narrows Claims in Nauman Class Suit

GOOGLE LLC: Court Dismisses Taylor Class Suit With Leave to Amend
HALSTED FINANCIAL: Bailey Seeks Extension of Class Cert. Bid Filing
HAMILTON CTY, TN: Jarnagin Bid for Class Certification Nixed
HARTING INC: Hanus Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
HEWLETT ASSOCIATES: Appeals Denial of Bid to Dismiss Quinatoa Suit

HOME RUN: Weaver Files Suit to Recover Proper Wages
HORNE LLP: Lochren Sues Over Failure to Pay Proper Overtime Wages
INTEL CORPORATION: Court Narrows Claims in Tsur Suit
JOHNSON HEALTH TECH: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
JOSE M GRACIA: Agri-workers Sue Over Unpaid Wages, Exploitation

KEYSTONE CREDIT: Barclift Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
KIRSCHENBAUM & PHILLIPS: Lovelady Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. New York
KOKUMAH EVERYDAY: Aderibigbe Sues to Recover Unpaid Wages
KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Goins Files Suit in N.D. Oklahoma
KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Manna Suit Transferred to W.D. Pennsylvania

KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Oldigs Suit Transferred to W.D. Pennsylvania
LIBERTY HOMECARE: Headly Refiles Conditional Certification Bid
LIFELINE HOMECARE: Scheduling Order in Thompson Class Suit Entered
LIGHTHOUSE INSURANCE: Seeks Denial of Bond Class Certification Bid
LOWE'S HOME: Quintero Suit Removed to C.D. California

MANHATTAN MEDICAL: Fischler Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
MARATHON PETROLEUM: Carpenter Files Suit in D. Minnesota
MAYBOURNE HOTELS: Alonzo Files ADA Suit in C.D. California
NATIONAL HEALTH: Eubanks Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
NATIONAL HOOD: Pantelic Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages

NELSON PARTNERS: Parziale Appeals Securities Suit Dismissal
NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal Filed in Gulino Suit re Burgess-Dilbert
NEW YORK: Davis Appeals Order in NYPD Stop & Frisk Suit to 2nd Cir.
NEW YORK: Second Cir. Appeal Filed in Gulino Suit re Poncedeleon
O'BRIEN SERVICES: Shortchanges Workers' Wages, Fritsch Says

ONE WEST BANK: Coffaro Files Suit in S.D. New York
PANERA BREAD: E.D. Missouri Vacates Denial of Bid to Remand Ahmad
PARKMOBILE LLC: Weaver Suit Moved From California to N.D. Georgia
PAUL J. DOUGHERTY: Zeman Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
PFIZER INC: Jacobson Slams Carcinogen in Anti-Smoking Drug

PFIZER INC: Webb Sues Over Carcinogen in Quit-smoking Drug
PHILIPS RS: Bleakney Suit Removed to W.D. Pennsylvania
PROBUILD CO: $1.4MMClass Deal in Sengvong Suit Wins Final Approval
RASH CURTIS: Distribution of $75.6M Deal in Perez Suit Partly OK'd
RECORE KNOXVILLE: FLSA Certification in Ingram Suit Endorsed

SAUNDRA THURMAN-CUSTIS: Court Certifies Lacaprucia Settlement Class
SKYWEST INC: Meek Suit Seeks to Certify Class Action
SNAP FINANCE: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in Wesley TCPA Suit
SOUTH CAROLINA: Loses Summary Judgment Bid vs. Kenny, et al.
ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE: Claims in Croce's First Amended Suit Narrowed

ST. LOUIS, MO: Court Amends Case Management Order in Cody Suit
STAR PAPA: Willich Sues Over Delivery Drivers' Unpaid Wages
TARVALD ANTHONY SMITH: Court Certifies Class in Ryan Suit
TEAM INDUSTRIAL: C.D. California Consolidates Thai & Esqueda Suits
TEAM INDUSTRIAL: California Court Consolidates Esqueda W/ Thai Suit

TOTAL LIFE: Nov. 8 Extension to File Class Cert. Bid Sought
TRAVELERS CASUALTY: Ninth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Mudpie Suit
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Appeals Ruling in Philliben Suit to 9th Cir.
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Bid to Dismiss Claims in Boston Suit Denied
UNITED STATES: Court Amends Trial & Pre-trial Sched in Class Suit

UNITED STATES: Judgment for HHS & CMS in Northport Suit Affirmed
UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT: Patel/Gladstone Dismissal Won't Be Revisited
XPRESSPA AT TERMINAL: $432K Class Deal in Chen Suit Wins Final OK

                            *********

ADOLPH KIEFER: Website Not Blind-accessible, Delacruz Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
EMANUEL DELACRUZ, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER PERSONS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs v. ADOLPH KIEFER & ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-08191-JPC (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 4, 2021)
arises from the Defendants' failure to design, construct, maintain,
and operate its website https://www.kiefer.com/ to be fully
accessible to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other
blind or visually impaired people in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the
New York City Human Rights Law.

Mr. Delacruz alleges that the Defendant has engaged in acts of
intentional discrimination due to the inaccessibility of its
website, and seeks a permanent injunction to cause Defendant to
change its corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
its website will become and remain accessible to blind and visually
impaired consumers.

Adolph Kiefer & Associates Inc. designs, markets, and distributes
goggles, lifeguard, water polo, competition accessories, safety,
and rescue equipment. Kiefer markets its products online and
through its own retail outlets in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
          E-mail: Michael@Gottlieb.legal
                  Jeffrey@Gottlieb.legal
                  Dana@Gottlieb.legal

ADVISORS MORTGAGE: Harvey Suit Remanded to California Super. Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRIAN HARVEY, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. ADVISORS MORTGAGE GROUP, LLC; and
DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 21-CV-1048 TWR
(AGS) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Todd W. Robinson of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California:

    (i) grants Plaintiff Harvey's Motion to Remand Action to
        State Court; and

   (ii) denies as moot Defendant Advisors' Motion to Compel
        Arbitration or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss for
        Failure to State a Claim.

Background

On April 30, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a putative class action
Complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego.
In his Complaint, the Plaintiff generally alleges that the
Defendant, his former employer, systematically violated
California's Labor Laws and Industrial Welfare Commission Wage
Orders. He brings the action on behalf of "all California citizens
currently or formerly employed by Defendants as nonexempt employees
in the State of California at any time between November 3, 2016 and
the date of class certification."

The Plaintiff brings seven causes of action for (1) failure to pay
minimum wages; (2) failure to pay overtime; (3) failure to provide
meal periods; (4) failure to permit rest breaks; (5) failure to
provide accurate itemized wage statements; (6) failure to pay all
wages due upon separation of employment; (7) violation of
California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Cal. Bus & Profs. Code
Sections 17200, et seq.

On June 2, 2021, the Defendant filed a Notice of Removal in the
Court, alleging diversity subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a). Specifically, it alleges that the
"Plaintiff's Complaint asserts claims between citizens of different
states and puts in controversy, individually with respect to the
Plaintiff, an amount that exceeds $75,000."

On June 23, 2021, the Defendant filed its Motion, seeking an Order
compelling arbitration and dismissing the action pursuant to the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. ch. 1, and the Loan Officer
Assistant Employment Agreement that the Plaintiff signed.
Alternatively, the Defendant seeks dismissal of the Plaintiff's
claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand on June 25, 2021,
asking the Court to send this action back to state court because
the Defendant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

Discussion

Although the Plaintiff filed a putative class action, the Defendant
removed the Plaintiff's Complaint from Superior Court on the basis
of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a), rather
than under CAFA. Through the instant Motion, the Plaintiff seeks to
remand his action to Superior Court. The Plaintiff does not contest
that there is complete diversity of citizenship among the Parties;
rather, he contends that the Defendant has failed to meet its
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

Because it is not facially evident from the Plaintiff's Complaint
that more than $75,000 is in controversy, the burden is on the
Defendant to establish -- by a preponderance of the evidence --
that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Judge Robinson
concludes that the Defendant has failed to meet its burden.

First, Judge Robinson finds that the Defendant is incorrect that
the Plaintiff must introduce his own evidence to prevail on his
Motion to Remand. Because the Plaintiff contests the sufficiency of
the evidence underlying the Defendant's assumptions, he need not
introduce his own affirmative evidence to demonstrate that
Defendant has failed to meet its burden.

Second, the Defendant contends that the amount in controversy for
the Plaintiff should be calculated based on the putative class
period beginning Nov. 3, 2016, rather than the considerably shorter
period during which Defendant actually employed the Plaintiff. But
the Defendant itself introduces evidence that it employed the
Plaintiff from Aug. 27, 2019, to April 23, 2021. On the record
before the Court, amounts from any other time periods clearly are
not "in controversy" with respect to the Plaintiff individually.

Third, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's claims for failure
to pay minimum wage and failure to pay overtime are not duplicative
and therefore should both be included in the amount-in-controversy
calculation. Although the Defendant attempts to distinguish Vasquez
v. Randstad US, L.P., No. 17-CV-04342-EMC, 2018 WL 327451 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 9, 2018), Judge Robinson finds its reasoning persuasive.
On the record, he concludes that the estimated unpaid minimum wages
would be duplicative of the estimated unpaid overtime wages.
Accordingly, Judge Robinson excludes the estimated unpaid minimum
wages from the amount-in-controversy calculation.

This brings Judge Robinson to the Defendant's amount-in-controversy
computation. The Defendant first calculates the unpaid minimum
wages at issue as $38,400. He concludes that the Defendant has
failed to meet its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the
evidence that any amount is in controversy with respect to the
unpaid minimum wage claim.

Regarding the overtime claim, the Defendant contends that $34,680
to $43,080 is at issue, with $15,570 at issue for the period during
which Plaintiff was actually employed by the Defendant. The
Plaintiff, however, contests Defendant's assumed violation rates.
Given the Defendant's failure to introduce any evidence supporting
a 95% violation rate, Judge Robinson concludes that the Defendant
has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
$4,000 is at issue for Plaintiff's claim for failure to provide
accurate wage statements.

Even accepting the Defendant's calculations based on the
Plaintiff's actual base wage and prorated for the period the
Defendant actually employed the Plaintiff, the amount in
controversy comes only to $32,000, well below the $75,000
jurisdictional threshold. The Defendant contends, however, that
"the attorneys' fees incurred in an individual California wage and
hour suit typically exceed $75,000." Although he could identify
several deficiencies with the calculation, Judge Robinson need not
undertake this fruitless exercise -- even assuming the Defendant's
maximum prorated fee award of $37,000, the total amount in
controversy comes to only $69,000, which falls below the $75,000
threshold.

Conclusion

In sum, Judge Robinson concludes that the Defendant has failed to
meet its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Nonetheless, he
says, the Defendant requests the opportunity to serve
jurisdictional discovery. In the Ninth Circuit, however, whether to
allow jurisdictional discovery is committed to the district court's
discretion, and such discovery is not required unless Defendant
will suffer "actual and substantial prejudice," citing Abrego
Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 691 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430
n.24 (9th Cir. 1977)).

The Defendant makes no argument regarding prejudice except that
"allowing this discovery prevents unfairly prejudicing its right of
access to the Court or wasting resources." First, the Defendant has
no right of access to the Court unless it meets its burden of
demonstrating that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction, which
it has failed to do. Second, the Defendant had the opportunity to
engage in discovery in the Superior Court prior to removing the
action. It reflexively removed the Plaintiff's "broad and vague"
Complaint within 30 days of its receipt. Any resultant prejudice is
therefore of the Defendant's own making, particularly given "the
importance of 'guarding against premature and protective removals
and minimizing the potential for a cottage industry of removal
litigation.'"

Accordingly, Judge Robinson concludes that remand is appropriate.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Robinson grants the Plaintiff's
Motion to Remand and remands the action to the Superior Court of
California, County of San Diego. Accordingly, he denies as moot the
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3wv7m8s7 from Leagle.com.


ALBUQUERQUE, NM: Bid to Enforce Interim Order in McClendon Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JIMMY (BILLY) McCLENDON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY
OF ALBUQUERQUE, et al., Defendants, E.M., R.L. W.A. D.J., P.S. and
N.W. on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Intervenors, Case No. CIV 95-0024 JB/KBM (D.N.M.),
Magistrate Judge Karen B. Molzen of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Mexico granted the opposed Joint Motion for
Enforcement of the Interim Order Regarding Access to the MDC.

The motion was filed by the Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors on
July 23, 2021.

Background

The Plaintiffs brought the class action lawsuit in 1995 to address
conditions of confinement in the Bernalillo County jail system,
initially the Bernalillo County Detention Center ("BCDC") in
downtown Albuquerque, New Mexico and later on, the Metropolitan
Detention Center ("MDC"). The case is now governed by the
Settlement Agreement and its three Check-Out Audit Agreements
approved by Senior Judge James A. Parker on June 27, 2016. Those
agreements are found on the Court's docket as Doc. 1222-1 through
Doc. 1222-4.

In the Settlement Agreement, the parties set out eight subjects
("Domains") for monitoring and settled on a method to demonstrate
initial compliance for each of the eight domains that are set out
in the Check-Out Audit Agreements. Specifically, "at the completion
of the self-monitoring period, the Court-appointed experts must
conduct 'Check-Out Audits' as to each domain and make a finding of
compliance, partial compliance, or non-compliance using the
standards set out in each Check-Out Audit Agreement."

The requirements for compliance with the general conditions of
confinement are set forth in Check-Out Audit Agreement 3. The
instant Motion implicates Check-Out Audit Agreement 3's Domain 7
requirements that address "Sexual Misconduct."

Also implicated is the so-called "Interim Access Order" located at
Doc. No. 754. In 2009, a dispute arose as to the level of access
Plaintiffs' counsel should have to the MDC facility and its records
in monitoring Defendants' efforts to comply with the Settlement
Agreement. Then-assigned referred Magistrate Judge Alan C.
Torgerson (who now serves as the special master in the case)
resolved the issues with his entry of the Interim Access Order on
Sept. 27, 2009.

In response to Plaintiffs' objections to the Judge Torgerson's
Order, Judge James A. Parker upheld its terms as enforceable. He
expressly found that the Interim Access Order clarified the
language "reasonable and unimpeded" used by previously-presiding
District Judge Martha Vazquez in her July 2003 Order as allowing
reasonable restrictions on access to the MDC facility and its
records.

Analysis

The parties agree that Check-Out Audit Agreement 3 sets forth the
agreed-upon requirements to demonstrate compliance for addressing
"Sexual Misconduct." The Plaintiffs contend that they need access
to all MDC reports alleging violations of the Prison Rape
Elimination Act ("PREA") to properly assess whether Defendants are
complying with these obligations as to Domain 7 in the Settlement
Agreement. They assert that the emphasized phrase "and other
incidents" includes all allegations in a report asserted as
violative of the PREA despite an ultimate finding by MDC that the
allegations fall outside the mandates of the PREA.

The Defendants maintain that the Court has never held the
Plaintiffs must be given all documents that are relevant to
compliance with a Court provision, but instead only those are
necessary for their monitoring.

With this proposition, Judge Molzen agrees. Thus, the question
presented: Are the requested PREA documents merely relevant to
compliance or are they necessary for the Plaintiffs' counsel to
monitor and assess compliance with the check-out audit requirements
for Domain 7?

Judge Molzen finds that if reports containing allegations involving
sexual harassment or other prohibited conduct under the PREA are
sometimes improperly closed as "non-PREA" incidents, this
constitutes information clearly needed by counsel to fulfill their
monitoring obligations to the Class. She says, the Plaintiffs
persuasively argue that they require access to all PREA reports in
assessing "whether the facility's investigations themselves are
deficient, or whether investigators are misapplying PREA's standard
of proof. In that sense, it is the unsubstantiated reports (and the
non-PREA determinations) that are most informative."

Moreover, Judge Molzen holds that the Defendants fail to show undue
burden in producing all PREA reports alleging violations occurring
within the MDC facility. Based on the Defendants' representations
to the Court, this would require production of approximately 50
PREA reports and non-PREA determinations per quarter, all of which
exist in an electronic database. Finally, Judge Molzen finds
unavailing the Defendants' "size of the fishbowl" arguments
relating to increased compensation to the Plaintiffs' counsel for
document review.

Order

In light of the foregoing, the Defendants provide access to the
Plaintiffs' counsel of all reports containing allegations of
violations of the PREA within the MDC facility.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/srpnbdwh from Leagle.com.


ALLERGAN PLC: Appeals Class Certification Ruling to 2nd Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants ALLERGAN PLC, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit styled IN RE ALLERGAN PLC SECURITIES
LITIGATION, Case No. 18 Civ. 12089 (CM)(GWG), in the U.S District
Court for the Southern District of New York.

The case was filed on Dec. 20, 2018.

On March 21, 2019, the Court appointed Boston Retirement Services
("BRS") to serve as the Lead Plaintiff. The Court imposed one
condition on the appointment of BRS as the Lead Plaintiff: that is
be represented by just one law firm, not by two. The Court ordered
BRS to select between Pomerantz LLP and the Thornton Law Firm; the
following day, BRS submitted a letter designating Pomerantz as the
Lead Counsel.

Pomerantz filed the Consolidated Amended Complaint ("CAC") -- the
operative complaint in the action -- on April 19, 2019, alleging
two counts against Allergan and seven individual defendants
affiliated with Allergan: (1) violation of Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and the corresponding SEC Rule 10b-5 against all
defendants; and (2) violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act
against the Individual Defendants.

On Sept. 20, 2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part
Defendants' motion to dismiss. There is one surviving allegation --
that Allergan's statements in the lead up to the ANSM recall "gave
investors a false impression that Allergan's implants were no more
linked with BIA-ALCL than other implants" manufactured by other
companies.

On Jan. 31, 2020, BRS moved to certify the class. However, through
the filings on the motion, the Court learned that not only had
Thornton remained involved in the litigation (under the guise of
"additional counsel"), but that it had effectively played the role
of co-lead counsel with Pomerantz -- to the point that BRS's
designated class representative testified that Thornton had been
fully involved in every aspect of the case.

Concluding that her order had been disregarded, Judge McMahon
determined that BRS could not "fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class," because "either BRS did not really
acquiesce in her directive, or it is incapable of controlling its
lawyers when they prove unwilling to abide by rulings of the Court
concerning who could serve as lead counsel." For that reason and
that reason alone, the Judge denied the first motion for class
certification.

On Dec. 7, 2020, the Court appointed DeKalb County Pension Fund as
the new Lead Plaintiff and its counsel, Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP as the
Lead Counsel.

DeKalb filed a motion for class certification on Feb. 22, 2021. The
newly appointed Lead Plaintiff sought  certification of a class
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) consisting of:
"All individuals and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired
Allergan preferred stock or common stock between Jan. 30, 2017 and
Dec. 19, 2018, inclusive, and who were damaged thereby."

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sept. 27, 2021, Judge
Colleen McMahon granted DeKalb's motion to certify a class.

The Defendants now seek a review of the said order.

The questions presented are:

(1) Whether this Court should review the district court's order
finding that Defendants failed to demonstrate a lack of price
impact, where that order did not consider Defendants' evidence,
failed to weigh that evidence against the contrary evidence offered
by Plaintiff, and adopted an impossibly high standard under which
even "convincing evidence of an absence of price impact" would be
insufficient, contrary to the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Goldman?  

(2) Whether this Court should review the district court's
erroneous adoption of numerous presumptions in favor of class
certification, notwithstanding the explicit rejection of such
presumptions by several other Circuits?

The appellate case is captioned as DEKALB COUNTY PENSION FUND,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Respondents v. ALLERGAN PLC, BRENTON L. SAUNDERS, MARIA
TERESA HILADO, MATTHEW M. WALSH, FRANCES DESENA, MARK MARMUR, PAUL
BISARO, AND WILLIAM MEURY, Defendants-Petitioners, Case No.
21-02309, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, filed on Sept. 21, 2021.[BN]

Defendants-Petitioners ALLERGAN PLC, BRENTON L. SAUNDERS, MARIA
TERESA HILADO, MATTHEW M. WALSH, FRANCES DESENA, MARK MARMUR, PAUL
BISARO, AND WILLIAM MEURY are represented by:

          Roger A. Cooper, Esq.
          Jared Gerber, Esq.
          CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP
          One Liberty Plaza
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212)-225-2000

ASPEN HOME: Court Extends Time to Complete Class Discovery in Eder
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as NANCY EDER v. ASPEN HOME
IMPROVEMENTS, INC., et al., Case No. 8:20-cv-01306-SDM-JSS (M.D.
Fla.), the Hon. Judge Stephen D. Merryday entered an order granting
the parties' joint motion to extend time in which to complete class
discovery and to move for class certification:

   -- class discovery must be completed not later than December
      31, 2021;

   -- a party may move for class certification not later than
      January 31, 2022; and

   -- not later than November 8, 2021, the parties must propose
      a joint slate of deadlines for the remainder of this
      action. If the parties cannot agree, an order will require
      each party to participate in a scheduling conference
      before the magistrate judge.

Aspen Home is a window installation contractor.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 7, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3p9TUjP at no extra charge.[CC]

BANK OF AMERICA: Certiorari Petition Filed in Fund Liquidation Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Bank of America Corporation, et al., filed with the
Supreme Court of United States a petition for a writ of certiorari
in the matter styled BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, ET AL.,
Petitioners v. FUND LIQUIDATION HOLDINGS LLC, as assignee and
successor-in-interest to FrontPoint Asian Event Driven Fund L.P.,
on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, SONTERRA
CAPITAL MASTER FUND, LTD., ET AL., Case No. 21-505.

Response is due on November 4, 2021.

Bank of America Corporation, et al., petition for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case titled FUND LIQUIDATION
HOLDINGS LLC, AS ASSIGNEE AND SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO FRONTPOINT
ASIAN EVENT DRIVEN FUND, L.P., ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, SONTERRA CAPITAL MASTER FUND, LTD.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, FRONTPOINT ASIAN EVENT DRIVEN FUND, LTD.,
FRONTPOINT ASIAN EVENT DRIVEN FUND, L.P., Plaintiffs v. BANK OF
AMERICA CORPORATION, BANK OF AMERICA, N.A, ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND
PLC, THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP PLC, RBS SECURITIES JAPAN
LIMITED, UBS AG, UBS SECURITIES JAPAN CO., LTD., ING GROEP N.V.,
ING BANK N.V., BNP PARIBAS, S.A., BNP PARIBAS NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
BNP PARIBAS SECURITIES CORP., BNP PARIBAS PRIME BROKERAGE, INC.,
OVERSEA-CHINESE BANKING CORPORATION LTD., BARCLAYS PLC, BARCLAYS
BANK PLC, BARCLAYS CAPITAL INC., DEUTSCHE BANK AG, CREDIT AGRICOLE
CORPORATE AND INVESTMENT BANK, CREDIT AGRICOLE S.A., CREDIT SUISSE
GROUP AG, CREDIT SUISSE AG, STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, STANDARD
CHARTERED PLC, DBS BANK LTD., DBS GROUP HOLDINGS LTD., DBS VICKERS
SECURITIES (USA) INC., UNITED OVERSEAS BANK LIMITED, AUSTRALIA AND
NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP, LTD., BANK OF TOKYO-MITSUBISHI UFJ,
LTD., THE HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LIMITED, HSBC
BANK USA, N.A., HSBC HOLDINGS PLC, HSBC NORTH AMERICA HOLDINGS
INC., HSBC USA INC., MACQUARIE BANK LTD., MACQUARIE GROUP LTD.,
COMMERZBANK AG, ING CAPITAL MARKETS LLC, CREDIT SUISSE
INTERNATIONAL, ANZ SECURITIES, INC., UOB GLOBAL CAPITAL, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees, CITIBANK, N.A., CITIGROUP INC., JPMORGAN
CHASE & CO., JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., JOHN DOES, NOS. 1-50,
Defendants, Case No. 19-2719-cv.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter, two Cayman Islands
investment funds filed a class action complaint in 2016 against
numerous banks, alleging that the Banks had conspired to manipulate
certain Singapore-based benchmark interest rates. It was not until
a year later that the Banks discovered that the two Plaintiff funds
had been dissolved years earlier, and that the case was actually
being prosecuted by a separate entity, Fund Liquidation Holdings
LLC, which asserts that it was assigned the dissolved entities'
claims.

The global financial system relies on a series of floating
benchmark interest rates, many of which reflect the average cost
that a bank incurs when borrowing money from one of its peers. The
most well-known example is the London Interbank Offered Rate, more
commonly referred to as "LIBOR."  In recent years, many of the
world's largest financial institutions have been accused of
manipulating several of these benchmarks in their favor. The
implications of such manipulation can be staggering as these rates
are used as reference points in countless financial instruments
across the world and affect transactions collectively worth
trillions of dollars.

The case concerns an alleged conspiracy by the Banks and others to
manipulate two such benchmark rates: the Singapore Interbank
Offered Rate ("SIBOR") and the Singapore Swap Offered Rate ("SOR").
The two rates are calculated by a trade group, the Association of
Banks in Singapore, which is composed of various banks (including
some of the Defendant banks in the case). Each day, an agent of
that association calculates the two rates based, in part, on
interest rate quotes submitted by a panel of banks that, again,
include several of the Defendants in the case.

Three years later, on July 5, 2016, an initial class action
complaint was filed against the Banks (and others) in the names of
FrontPoint Asian Event Driven Fund, L.P. and Sonterra Capital
Master Fund, Ltd. ("Dissolved Funds"), two Cayman Islands
investment funds that claimed to have held financial instruments
that relied on the manipulated benchmark rates.

On Oct. 31, 2016, a first amended complaint was filed, which added
additional claims under the Sherman Act, the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), and common law. As before,
this complaint made no mention of Fund Liquidation and referred to
the Dissolved Funds in the present tense as if they were still in
existence.

On Sept. 18, 2017, a second amended complaint was filed. It was
only in this pleading that, for the first time, the Plaintiffs
clarified that the Dissolved Funds were no longer in operation.

On Oct. 4, 2018, within weeks of certain agreements being signed,
the district court dismissed with prejudice the RICO claims and the
antitrust claims asserted against certain defendants, but again
permitted the Plaintiffs to proceed on the common law claims and
antitrust claims brought against those Defendants who were members
of the Panel.

A few weeks later, on Oct. 26, 2018, Fund Liquidation filed a third
amended complaint, naming as Plaintiff "Fund Liquidation Holdings
LLC, as assignee and successor-in-interest to FrontPoint." The
substantive allegations in this complaint were effectively
identical to those in the second amended complaint, with the
exception that Fund Liquidation added additional facts concerning
the pre-suit assignment it received from FrontPoint.

On July 26, 2019, the district court adopted the Banks' nullity
argument and dismissed the third amended complaint with prejudice
on the grounds that the court had lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over the action from its outset, something, the
district court concluded, that could not be cured.  According to
the district court, because the Dissolved Funds lacked capacity to
sue, there was no real 'case or controversy' before the court and,
consequently, no subject-matter jurisdiction."  For similar
reasons, the court refused to approve the two settlement agreements
that Fund Liquidation had signed with several of the defendants.

On March 17, 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit overturned the decision of the district court
dismissing Fund Liquidation Holdings, LLC v. Bank of America
Corporation, et al., and remanded the case for further proceedings.
In so doing, the Second Circuit revived the antitrust class action
claims against the banks.

Contrary to the District Court's ruling, the Second Circuit
determined that, although the Cayman Funds did not
exist at the time of filing, this did not deprive the court of
jurisdiction, and that on remand the District Court should consider
whether to allow the plaintiff to further amend the complaint in
order to add new, more appropriate plaintiffs.

The question now presented before the U.S. Supreme Court in the
petition for a writ of certiorari is: Whether a district court
lacking Article III jurisdiction can create such jurisdiction by
adding a new plaintiff via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17?
[BN]

Defendants-Petitioners Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited,
et al., are represented by:

          Pratik Arvind Shah, Esq.
          AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD, LLP
          2001 K Street N.W.
          Washington, DC 20006
          E-mail: pshah@akingump.com

BEND MEMORIAL: Court Extends Discovery & PTO Deadlines in Fulkerson
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned Fulkerson, et al., v. Bend
Memorial Clinic, et al., Case No. 6:20-cv-01579 (D. Or.), the Hon.
Judge Ann L. Aiken entered an order granting stipulated motion for
extension of discovery & PTO deadlines as follows:

   -- Joint Alternate Dispute Resolution Report is due by
      Nov. 10, 2021.

   -- Pretrial Order is due by Nov. 10, 2021.

   -- Class certification discovery shall be completed by Jan.
      13, 2022.

   -- Expert reports as to class certification are due by Jan.
      19, 2022.

   -- Depositions of class certification experts shall be
      completed by March 30, 2022.

   -- Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification/Defendants'
      Motion for Summary Judgment shall be filed by March 14,
      2022.

   -- Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Class
      Certification/Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to
      Summary Judgment shall be filed by May 19, 2022.

   -- Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in support of class
      certification/Defendants' Reply to Motion for Summary
      Judgment shall be filed by June 8, 2022.

   -- Non-dispositive motions, excluding trial and trial related
      motions shall be filed by July 28, 2022.

   -- Dispositive Motions are due by Sept. 15, 2022.

The suit alleges violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.


Bend Memorial Clinic is a medical group practice located in
Redmond, Oregon that specializes in cardiology and nephrology.[CC]


CAFE TKJ: Faces Choa Wage-and-Hour Class Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPHA CHOA, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CAFE TKJ INC (D/B/A SUKI) and KELLY CHO,
Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-08173 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 4, 2021) seeks
to recover unpaid minimum and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law, including
applicable liquidated damages, interest, attorneys' fees and
costs.

The complaint alleges that the Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff
and Class members appropriate minimum wages and overtime
compensation, failed to provide spread of hours pay, and failed to
furnish written wage notices and appropriate wage statements.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a waitress from
approximately July 2019 until September 15, 2021.

The Defendants own, operate, or control a Japanese restaurant in
New York under the name "Suki."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620

COCA-COLA CONSOLIDATED: Bid to Strike Jones Reply Tossed
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned CHEYENNE JONES et al., v.
COCA-COLA CONSOLIDATED INC., et al., Case No. 3:20-cv-00654-FDW-DSC
(W.D.N.C.), the Hon. Judge Frank D. Whitney entered an order:

   1. denying rhe Defendants' motion to strike Declaration and
      Portions of Plaintiffs' Reply without prejudice as the
      Court has granted Defendants leave to depose Dr. Buetow
      and file a surreply;

   2. directing the Plaintiffs to make Dr. Buetow available for
      deposition by Defendants within 21 days of this Order;

   3. directing Defendants to have an additional 14 days after
      such deposition to file a surreply.

   4. setting a hearing on Plaintiffs' motion to certify class
      will take place at some time between December 6, 2021 and
      December 17, 2021, in Courtroom 5B of the Charles R. Jonas
      Building, 401 W. Trade Street, Charlotte, North Carolina.

Coca-Cola Bottling is the largest independent Coca-Cola bottler in
the United States. The company makes, sells and distributes
Coca-Cola products along with other beverages, distributing to a
market of 65 million people in 14 states.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3aPpKtL at no extra charge.[CC]


CONSUMER CELLULAR: Geary FLSA Suit Seeks to Certify CSR Class
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned Diana Geary, individually and
on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, v. Consumer
Cellular, Inc., Case No. 2:21-cv-00699-DLR (D. Ariz.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order granting her motion for
conditional certification and court-authorized notice in its
entirety to the following Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Class:

   "All current and former Customer Service Representative
   employees, and/or other job titles performing the same or
   similar job duties, who worked for Consumer Cellular, Inc.,
   at any time in the last three years and were not subject to
   an arbitration agreement."

The Plaintiff does not bring this action on behalf of any current
and former Customer Service Representative employees who executed
an arbitration agreement.

Consumer Cellular is a wireless carrier that provides no-contract
cellphones and service plans primarily to those 50+. The Defendant
operates customer service call centers in Arizona and Oregon.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant engaged in an unlawful
pay-practice of refusing to pay her and the Class for certain
pre-shift work requiring employees to boot up and log in to their
work computers.

The Plaintiff Geary is a resident of Apache Junction, Arizona who
worked for Defendant from February 2018 to April 2019. Geary worked
in one of Defendant's Arizona call centers as a Customer Associate
Advisor performing the same or similar job duties as all CSRs,
which included answering calls from Defendant's clients, retaining
customers, providing troubleshooting guidance, and resolving
customer issues and billing inquiries.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Oct. 8,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3G1VqdG
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jacob R. Rusch, Esq.
          Timothy J. Becker, Esq.
          Zackary S. Kaylor, Esq.
          JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar Street, Suite 1800
          Saint Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1801
          E-mail: jrusch@johnsonbecker.com
                  tbecker@johnsonbecker.com
                  zkaylor@johnsonbecker.com

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY: 9th Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Selane Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the case, SELANE PRODUCTS, INC., on
behalf of itself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 21-55123 (9th Cir.).

After state and local orders resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic
required Selane and other class members to suspend their business
operations, those businesses sought coverage under their policies
with Continental. Continental denied the claims, concluding that
the presence of SARS-CoV-2--the virus that causes COVID-19--did not
cause "direct physical loss of or damage to" property.

Selane filed the putative class action lawsuit, alleging that
Continental improperly denied its claims. Continental moved to
dismiss, arguing that Selane did not allege any "direct physical
loss of or damage to" its property. The district court agreed and
dismissed the complaint.

The Ninth Circuit reviews de novo a district court's order granting
a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).

To establish coverage under the Business Income and Extra Expense
endorsements, Selane must allege it suffered from some "direct
physical loss of or damage to" its property. As established in the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Mudpie, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty
Insurance Co. of America, No. 20-16858, ___ F.4th ___ (9th Cir.
Oct. 1, 2021), California courts would construe "direct physical
loss of or damage to" as requiring an insured to allege a physical
alteration of its insured property.

In the case, Selane did not plausibly allege that its property
sustained any physical alterations for two reasons. First, Selane
did not allege that SARS-CoV-2 was present on its property to cause
any damage. Second, Selane alleged that the stay-at-home orders
caused it to suspend its operations, but it did not plausibly
allege that the stay-at-home orders caused its property to sustain
any physical alterations. Thus, there is no coverage under the
Business Income and Extra Expenses endorsements.

Selane also argues that the Policy's microbe exclusion establishes
that microscopic organisms could cause physical loss or damage to
property and, therefore, by extension so could viruses. The Ninth
Circuit is are not persuaded. But even if it were, this argument is
unavailing because Selane did not allege that SARS-Cov-2 was
present on its property to cause any damage.

Additionally, Selane failed to plausibly allege coverage under the
Civil Authority endorsement. Under this provision, Selane must
prove three requirements: (1) there must be "direct physical loss
of or damage to" property at locations, other than the insured
premises; (2) a civil authority action was required because of that
physical loss or damage; and (3) the civil authority action
prohibited access to Selane's property. As noted, Selane has not
alleged any direct physical loss of or damage to property.
The Ninth Circuit also holds that the district court did not err in
excluding Selane's extrinsic evidence. Although the district court
did not analyze the extrinsic evidence, the evidence Selane
proffered is irrelevant to proving the meaning of "physical loss of
or damage to" property as used in this Policy.

It was not error for the district court not to address Selane's
mitigation claim. Under California insurance law, an insurer is
liable if a loss is caused by efforts to rescue the thing insured
from a peril insured against. In the case, because the "peril" --
SARS-CoV-2 -- was not "insured against," this provision is not
applicable.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit holds that the district court did not
err in dismissing the remainder of Selane's claims because they all
required that the presence of SARS-CoV-2 caused "physical loss of
or damage to" property. As noted, there was no allegation of
"physical loss of or damage to" Selane's property.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/xtp4w3kv from Leagle.com.


COTTONWOOD FINANCIAL: Greenwood Slams Excessive Interest Rates
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jamie Greenwood, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Cottonwood Financial Ltd,
Cottonwood Financial Wisconsin LLC, Cottonwood Financial Arizona,
LLC Cottonwood Financial Austin CSO, LLC, Cottonwood Financial
Colorado, LLC, Cottonwood Financial Idaho, LLC, Cottonwood
Financial Illinois, LLC, Cottonwood Financial Kansas, LLC,
Cottonwood Financial Michigan, LLC, Cottonwood Financial Missouri,
LLC, CF New Mexico, LLC, Cottonwood Financial Ohio, LLC, Cottonwood
Financial Oklahoma, LLC, Cottonwood Financial Texas, LLC,
Cottonwood Financial Utah, LLC, Cottonwood Financial Virginia, LLC
And Cottonwood Financial Washington, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
21-cv-02459 (N.D. Tex., October 6, 2021), seeks redress for unfair
consumer lending and collection practices that violate the Military
Lending Act (MLA) and the Wisconsin Consumer Act.

Cottonwood Financial is one of the largest privately-held retail
consumer finance companies in the consumer finance industry,
operating across the country and with more than 300 company-owned
locations operating under Cottonwood Financial's "Cash Store"
brand.

Sergeant First Class Jamie Greenwood obtained a loan while a member
of the uniformed services on active duty as a member of the U.S.
Army National Guard.

On January 4, 2021, Cottonwood filed a small claims collection
complaint against Greenwood in Wisconsin Circuit Court, Racine
County and sought recovery of an alleged consumer loan between
Greenwood and Cottonwood Financial dated February 21, 2020. At the
time, Greenwood was having a difficult time making payments because
her basement had flooded, causing approximately $25,000 in damage
for which her insurer had not reimbursed her.

Greenwood requested a reduction in the interest rate of the loan
based on the Service members' Civil Relief Act when she realized
that her loan agreement stated that her interest would accrue at an
Annual Percentage Rate of 520.00% which is well above MLA's 36% per
annum cap.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      John D. Blythin, Esq.
      Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
      ADEMI LLP
      3620 East Layton Avenue
      Cudahy, WI 53110
      Tel: (414) 482-8000
      Fax: (414) 482-8001
      Email: jblythin@ademilaw.com
             jfruchter@ademilaw.com


DEL TACO: Discovery in Meal Break Related Suit Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------
Del Taco Restaurants, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 18, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended August 31, 2021, that discovery is ongoing
in the purported class action suit initiated by a former employee
of the company related to meal breaks and failure to pay wages to
its California hourly employees.

In March 2014, a former Del Taco employee filed a purported class
action complaint alleging that Del Taco has not appropriately
provided meal breaks and failed to pay wages to its California
hourly employees.

On March 24, 2021, Del Taco filed its motion to oppose the
plaintiff's motion for class certification. Discovery remains in
process and Del Taco intends to assert all of its defenses to this
threatened class action and the individual claims.

Del Taco has several defenses to the action that it believes could
prevent the certification of the class, as well as the potential
assessment of any damages on a class basis.

Del Taco said, "Legal proceedings are inherently unpredictable, and
the Company is not able to predict the ultimate outcome or cost of
the unresolved matter. However, based on management’s current
understanding of the relevant facts and circumstances, the Company
does not believe that these proceedings give rise to a probable or
estimable loss and should not have a material adverse effect on the
Company's financial position, operations or cash flows. Therefore,
Del Taco has not recorded any amount for the claim as of September
7, 2021."

Del Taco Restaurants, Inc. operates a chain of fast-food
restaurants. The company consists of two separate Mexican fast-food
groups, 79 Del Taco units and 36 Taco Villa restaurants. The
company offers Mexican food items, such as tacos, burritos,
quesadillas, burgers, French fries, and soft drinks. The company
was incorporated in 1983 and is based in Atlanta, Georgia. Del Taco
Restaurants operates as a subsidiary of W.R. Grace & Co.


EARGO INC: Fazio Slams Share Price Drop
---------------------------------------
Joseph Fazio, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Eargo, Inc., Christian Gormsen and Adam
Laponis, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-07848, (N.D. Cal., October 6,
2021), seeks damages, prejudgment and post-judgment interest,
reasonable attorneys' fees, expert fees and other costs and such
other and further relief under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

Eargo is a medical device company that manufactures hearing aids.
On August 12, 2021, after the market closed, Eargo revealed that
claims submitted to its largest third-party payor, which accounted
for 80% of Eargo's accounts receivable, had not been paid since
March 1, 2021. On this news, its share price fell $8.00, or over
24%, to close at $24.70 per share on August 13, 2021, on unusually
heavy trading volume. Further, on September 22, 2021, after the
market closed, Eargo disclosed that it is the target of a criminal
investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice related to
insurance reimbursement claims it has submitted on behalf of
customers covered by federal employee health plans. As a result of
the foregoing, Eargo withdrew its full year financial guidance. On
this news, its share price fell $14.81, or over 68%, to close at
$6.86 per share on September 23, 2021, on unusually heavy trading
volume.

Fazio alleges that Eargo had failed to disclose to its investors
that it had improperly sought reimbursements from certain
third-party payors that led to regulatory scrutiny; that, as a
result and because the reimbursements at issue involved its largest
third-party payor, Eargo's financial results would be adversely
impacted.

Fazio purchased Eargo securities and suffered damages as a result
of the federal securities law violations.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
      Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
      Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
      GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
      1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
      Los Angeles, CA 90067
      Telephone: (310) 201-9150
      Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
      Email: rprongay@glancylaw.com
             clinehan@glancylaw.com
             prajesh@glancylaw.com


GENERAL MOTORS: W.D. Washington Narrows Claims in Nauman Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TIM NAUMAN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, Defendant,
Case No. C21-5150 BHS (W.D. Wash.), Judge Benjamin H. Settle of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, Tacoma,
grants in part and denies in part GM's motion to dismiss and to
strike class allegations.

Background

Plaintiff Nauman filed the class action complaint individually and
on behalf of Washington and Nationwide Class members, each of whom
purchased or leased one or more model year 2011-2014 GM vehicles
fitted with GM's defective Generation IV 5.3 Liter V8 Vortec 5300
LC9 engines. He alleges that his 2011 Chevrolet Silverado, and the
other Class vehicles delineated in the complaint, consume an
excessive amount of oil as a result of defective piston rings
within the Generation IV Vortec 5300 engines. The Plaintiff alleges
that that GM knew about the oil consumption defect prior to the
sale of his vehicle but did not disclose it to the Plaintiff or the
members of the putative Washington Class.

The Plaintiff brings claims on individually and on behalf of the
Washington class for violations of the Washington Consumer
Protection Act, RCW Section 19.86, et seq., breach of express
warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, fraudulent
omission, and unjust enrichment. He also brings claims individually
and on behalf of a Nationwide Class for violations of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), 15 U.S.C. Section 2301, et
seq. Id. at 60-62.

Further, the Plaintiff asserts that his allegations are materially
identical to those asserted in Sloan, et al. v. Gen. Motors LLC,
No. 16-cv-07244-EMC, 2020 WL 1955643 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020)
(Order on Motion for Summary Judgment). The plaintiffs in Sloan,
representing classes for owners or lessees in California, New
Jersey, North Carolina, and Texas, brought claims arising from the
sale of vehicles with the alleged oil consumption defect. S 2-3.

The Sloan court concluded that, under Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cnty., 137 S.Ct. 1773 (2017), it was
improper for the court to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction
over the claims of out-of-state plaintiffs who lacked an
independent relationship to California. The Sloan court then
dismissed the claims of the plaintiffs from Illinois, New York,
Oregon, and Washington. Id. The Washington plaintiff from Sloan
then filed an action in this District. The Court dismissed the
complaint without prejudice. The original Washington plaintiff from
Sloan has since voluntarily dismissed his claims, and the Plaintiff
in the instant action now seeks to represent the Washington Class
affected by alleged the oil consumption defect.

On May 17, 2021, GM filed the instant motion to dismiss and motion
to strike class allegations, seeking to dismiss all of the
Plaintiff's claims and to strike the nationwide MMWA allegations.
On June 14, the Plaintiff responded. On July 2, 2021, GM replied.

Discussion

A. Breach of Express Warranty

GM argues that the Plaintiff's alleged design defect is not covered
by GM's limited warranty, which it asserts only covers defects in
material or workmanship. As alleged, GM expressly warranted that it
would "cover repairs to correct any vehicle defect, not slight
noise, vibrations, or other normal characteristics of the vehicle
related to materials or workmanship occurring during the warranty
period."

The Plaintiff, in response, argues that the warranty covers repairs
to correct any vehicle defect. He asserts that it "plainly reads,
under standard English grammar, as covering any vehicle defect
except 'slight noise, vibrations, or other normal characteristics
of the vehicle related to materials or workmanship occurring during
the warranty period.'" The Plaintiff urges the Court to interpret
the warranty "under standard English grammar" and deny GM's
motion.

Judge Settle agrees with GM. While other district courts have found
the Plaintiff's argument to have merit, Judge Settle does not find
a reading of the express warranty to include design defects and
exclude manufacturing defects. Rather, a reading of the express
warranty supports the opposite: That the warranty only covers
materials or workmanship and not design defects. Therefore, GM's
motion is granted, and the Plaintiff's claim for breach of express
warranty is dismissed with prejudice.

B. Breach of Implied Warranty

GM seeks dismissal of the Plaintiff's breach of implied warranty
claims on several grounds. First, GM argues that because the
Plaintiff purchased his 2011 Silverado from an independent
dealership, he cannot allege privity with GM, which is required for
a breach of implied warranty claim in Washington. GM additionally
argues that the Plaintiff has failed to allege that his vehicle was
unmerchantable at the time of sale and that his claim is untimely.
The Plaintiff does not respond to these arguments.

Except for motions for summary judgment, if a party fails to file
papers in opposition to a motion, such failure may be considered by
the court as an admission that the motion has merit. Judge Settle
thus agrees with GM that the Plaintiff has not alleged a breach of
implied warranty claim for the reasons delineated in GM's motion.
GM's motion is therefore granted, and the Plaintiff's claim for
breach of implied warranty is dismissed without prejudice.

C. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

GM next moves to dismiss the Plaintiff's MMWA claim, arguing that
he has failed to plead viable state law warranty claims and that,
in addition, he has failed to name the statutorily required 100
plaintiffs. The Plaintiff again does not respond to these
arguments.

Judge Settle has concluded that the Plaintiff has not pled a viable
breach of express warranty claim, and the Plaintiff cannot maintain
a class action MMWA claim with fewer than 100 named plaintiffs. The
Plaintiff's failure to respond to GM's arguments only further
supports the Court's conclusion on this issue. GM's motion is
therefore granted, and the Plaintiff's Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
claim is dismissed without prejudice. Having dismissed the
Plaintiff's underlying MMWA claim, Judge Settle denied as moot GM's
motion to strike the Plaintiff's Nationwide Class allegations.

D. Fraudulent Omission

The parties agree that the Plaintiff's fraudulent omission claim is
governed by Rule 9(b). Under Rule 9(b), "a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." GM
argues that the Plaintiff has failed to allege GM's knowledge of
the alleged defect at the time of sale, GM's duty to disclose, or
his reliance on any GM omission.

The Plaintiff argues that GM knew of the oil consumption defect
through (1) GM's eventual redesign of the engine at issue, (2) the
numerous consumer complaints regarding the defect, and (3) GM's
Technical Service Bulletins, which Plaintiff alleges address the
defect.

Judge Settle concludes that at the pleading stage, the Plaintiff
has alleged sufficient allegations to support a plausible inference
of GM's knowledge. He also concludes that the Plaintiff has
adequately alleged GM's knowledge, and therefore the Plaintiff has
adequately alleged GM's duty to disclose. Finally, the Plaintiff
has adequately alleged a fraudulent omission claim. His allegations
support a plausible inference that GM had knowledge of the oil
consumption defect, which in turn triggered their duty to disclose.
GM's motion to dismiss is therefore denied as to this claim.

E. Washington Consumer Protection Act

Because the Plaintiff's Washington Consumer Protection Act ("CPA")
claim sounds in fraud, it too must meet the Rule 9(b) pleading
standard. To state a CPA claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) an
unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) occurring in trade or
commerce; (3) a public interest impact; (4) an injury to plaintiff
in his or her business or property; and (5) causation.

GM argues that the Plaintiff's CPA claim fails because he has not
adequately pled deceptive conduct, causation, or injury. It
additionally argues that the Plaintiff's CPA claim fails because he
has not alleged that he relied on any particular statement or
advertisement made by GM.

Judge Settle has concluded that the Plaintiff has adequately
alleged GM's knowledge of the oil consumption defect, which in turn
adequately alleges GM's unfair or deceptive conduct. Further, in
omission-based cases, a plaintiff does not need to specify reliance
and may assert a presumption of reliance, which is ultimately
encompassed in causation.

In sum, the Plaintiff has adequately alleged a CPA claim.
Therefore, GM's motion is granted as to the Plaintiff's CPA claim
for injunctive relief and denied as to the Plaintiff's CPA claim.
The Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief under the CPA is
dismissed without prejudice.

F. Unjust Enrichment

Finally, GM moves to dismiss the Plaintiff's unjust enrichment
claim. It argues that Washington law prohibits unjust enrichment
claims where there is an express contract and that the Plaintiff's
claim is not viable because he did not confer any benefit onto GM.
The Plaintiff in response asserts that he may assert an alternative
claim regardless of consistency.

Judge Settle holds that the parties do not dispute the existence of
a contract, i.e. the written GM warranty covering the Plaintiff's
vehicle, rather they dispute whether the express warranty covers
the alleged defect. He agrees with GM that the Plaintiff's
contractually based remedies are limited to those available through
the express warranty, which is inapplicable in the case. Hence,
GM's motion is granted and the Plaintiff's claim for unjust
enrichment is dismissed with prejudice.

G. Leave to Amend

In the event the Court finds that dismissal is warranted, it should
grant the Plaintiff leave to amend unless amendment would be
futile. Judge Settle has concluded that the Plaintiff cannot
maintain an express warranty or unjust enrichment claim. However,
he says, the Plaintiff may be able to state a claim for breach of
implied warranty, violations of the MMWA, and a claim for
injunctive relief under the CPA. If he so chooses, Plaintiff may
amend his complaint as to these claims.

Order

Therefore, Judge Settle grants in part and denies in part GM's
motion to dismiss and to strike class allegations. The Plaintiff
may file an amended complaint within 30 days of the Order as to his
breach of implied warranty, MMWA, and CPA injunctive relief
claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/hhfrnfj6 from Leagle.com.


GOOGLE LLC: Court Dismisses Taylor Class Suit With Leave to Amend
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSEPH TAYLOR, et al., Plaintiffs v. GOOGLE LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-07956-VKD (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge
Virginia K. Demarchi of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, grants Google's motion
to dismiss the complaint with leave to amend.

The Plaintiffs sue Google LLC ("Google"), individually and on
behalf of a putative class of Android mobile device owners, for
conversion and quantum meruit based on alleged "passive" data
transfers performed by Google over its Android operating system
without consent. Google moves pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the
complaint. The Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

Background

According to the complaint's allegations, Plaintiffs Joseph Taylor,
Edward Mlakar, Mick Cleary, and Eugene Alvis are non-California
residents who own Android mobile devices that they use with a
monthly cellular data plan purchased from various service
providers, including T-Mobile, Verizon and U.S. Cellular. Messrs.
Taylor, Mlakar, and Cleary each have unlimited data plans. Mr.
Alvis has a limited data plan he purchased from one service
provider, as well as an unlimited data plan he purchased from
another service provider.

The Plaintiffs allege that Google "designed the Android operating
system to collect vast amounts of information about users, which
Google uses to generate billions in profit annually by selling
targeted digital advertisements." Much of this
information-gathering activity, say plaintiffs, takes place
"secretly," is "not initiated by any action of the user" and is
"performed without their knowledge," including at times when their
devices are seemingly idle. Indeed, according to the complaint,
"Google deliberately designed and coded its Android operating
system and Google applications to indiscriminately take advantage
of the Plaintiffs' data allowances and passively transfer
information at all hours of the day -- even after the Plaintiffs
move Google apps to the background, close the programs completely,
or disable location-sharing."

In performing these so-called "passive" data transfers, the
Plaintiffs allege that Google "secretly appropriates Android users'
cellular data allowances," even though the transfers are "not
time-sensitive and could be delayed until the Plaintiffs are in
Wi-Fi range to avoid consuming their cellular data allowances." The
Plaintiffs further allege that they never consented to these data
transfers, and that Google's various policies and terms of service
are contracts of adhesion that do not in any way provide users with
notice of these passive data transfers. Instead, say the
Plaintiffs, mobile device users only consent to Google's use of
their cellular data when they are actively using Google's
products.

Claiming that they have property interests in their cellular data
allowances, the Plaintiffs contend that the alleged passive data
transfers "deprive them of data for which they, not Google, paid"
and benefit "Google's product development and lucrative targeted
advertising business" at the Plaintiffs' expense.

As noted, the Plaintiffs assert claims for conversion and quantum
meruit for themselves and on behalf of a proposed class of "all
natural persons in the United States (excluding citizens of the
State of California) who have used mobile devices running the
Android operating system to access the internet through cellular
data plans provided by mobile carriers."

The complaint asserts jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d), on the grounds that the
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, exclusive of interest and
costs, there are 100 or more class members, and the parties are
minimally diverse. The Plaintiffs seek an injunction "directing
Google to stop using cellular data purchased by consumers without
their consent," as well the "fair market value of the cellular data
converted by Google," the "reasonable value of the cellular data
used by Google to extract and deliver information that benefited
Google," and fees and costs.

Google moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),
arguing that the Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims
because they have not alleged facts indicating that they have
suffered any injury. Even if the Plaintiffs have standing, Google
moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that (1) the
Plaintiffs' conversion claim fails because the complaint does not
allege a cognizable property interest, interference, or damages and
because they consented to the alleged data use and (2) the
Plaintiffs' quantum meruit claim fails because it is merely
derivative of their conversion claim.

Discussion

A. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss

Google argues that the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their
claims because they have not alleged an injury-in-fact. Google
argues that the complaint merely speculates about harms that other
Android device users may have experienced, and fails to allege
facts demonstrating that the plaintiffs themselves have suffered
any injury.

Because Google's arguments focus on the sufficiency of the
complaint's allegations, Judge Demarchi construes the present
motion as a facial attack on the Plaintiffs' standing. She finds
that the Plaintiffs do not have a property interest in their
cellular data allowances that was harmed by Google's alleged
conduct, and therefore do not state a claim for conversion or for
quantum meruit. Although standing in no way depends on the merits
of the Plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal,
it often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted." It
is clear from the parties' arguments that the issue of the
Plaintiffs' Article III standing turns on the parties' fundamental
disagreement about whether the Plaintiffs' cellular data allowances
properly are the subject of a conversion claim or a claim for
quantum meruit, and that the questions of standing and failure to
state a claim are intertwined.

B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

Rule 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." This means
that the "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level." However, only plausible claims
for relief will survive a motion to dismiss. A claim is plausible
if its factual content permits the court to draw a reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.
A plaintiff does not have to provide detailed facts, but the
pleading must include "more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."

1. Conversion Claim

The parties dispute whether the Plaintiffs have a property interest
in their cellular data allowances that provides a cognizable basis
for a conversion claim under California law. Google argues that the
Plaintiffs cannot state a conversion claim because they do not have
personal property rights in their cellular data allowances. As
alleged in their complaint, the Plaintiffs assert a property right
in "their purchased data allowances" created by contract with their
respective service providers.

Judge Demarchi concludes that the Plaintiffs have not alleged facts
demonstrating that their cellular data allowances are "personal
property" capable of exclusive possession or control that properly
may support a claim for conversion. Accordingly, Google's motion to
dismiss the conversion claim is granted on that ground, and Judge
Demarchi finds it unnecessary to address whether the Plaintiffs
satisfy the remaining requirements for a conversion claim.

2. Quantum Meruit Claim

Google argues that the Plaintiffs' quantum meruit claim must be
dismissed on that ground that it is a common count derivative of
their conversion claim. In any event, Google contends that the
complaint does not plead sufficient facts to support a standalone
claim for quantum meruit. The Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that the
quantum meruit claim is distinct that in that it is also based on
"recovery of the reasonable value of their personal information"
that Google allegedly collects and exploits for its own benefit.

Judge Demarchi concludes that the Plaintiffs' have failed to state
a claim for quantum meruit. She finds that nowhere in their
complaint do the Plaintiffs plead facts stating what that "personal
information" is, how it is used, or any other facts that might
support a plausible claim for relief. The laintiffs did not address
this purported basis for their quantum meruit claim in their
written opposition to Google's motion to dismiss. When probed by
the Court at oral argument about the basis for the personal
information portion of their claim (apart from the one sentence in
paragraph 75 of the complaint), the Plaintiffs simply referred to
general allegations concerning the alleged purpose of the passive
data transfers. They have therefore provided no basis for the Court
to conclude that there are additional facts could be alleged to
state a plausible claim for relief. Hence, Google's motion to
dismiss this claim is granted.

C. Leave to Amend

The Plaintiffs have not articulated any additional facts that could
be alleged on an amendment to support a plausible claim for
conversion. For the reasons stated, Judge Demarchi doubts whether
they can do so. Nevertheless, as the law generally favors resolving
matters on the merits, she will permit the Plaintiffs to amend
their conversion claim. She also gives the Plaintiffs leave to
amend their quantum meruit claim to the extent they believe they
plausibly can assert such a claim based on their cellular data
allowances.

However, Judge Demarchi does not give the Plaintiffs leave to amend
their quantum meruit claim based on the alleged use of "personal
information," as to which they have not only failed to articulate
additional facts that could be asserted on amendment, but have also
not explained why they did not plead those allegations in their
original complaint.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Judge Demarchi grants Google's motion to
dismiss the complaint with leave to amend the claims for conversion
and quantum meruit, consistent with the rulings in her Order. The
Plaintiffs' amended complaint was due Oct. 18, 2021. The Court will
separately address a case schedule and will provide notice if it
believes a further case management conference is necessary.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/eht2cdby from Leagle.com.


HALSTED FINANCIAL: Bailey Seeks Extension of Class Cert. Bid Filing
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned GLORIA BAILEY, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, v. HALSTED FINANCIAL
SERVICES, LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-00686-UA-JLW (M.D.N.C.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order granting her request
relief from the 90 day deadline for filing motion for class
certification and the Court set deadline after receipt of Joint
Rule 26(f) report.

The Plaintiff commenced action against Defendant Halsted Financial
Services, LLC for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act and North Carolina Debt Collection Act, that was removed to
this Court on September 3, 2021.

On September 4 and October 6, 2021, Counsel for Plaintiff contacted
Counsel for Defendant for consent to the Court modifying the 90-day
period in LR 23.1(b).

Halsted Financial is a debt collection agency.

A copy of the the Plaintiff's motion dated Oct. 8, 2021 is
available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3APbHPn at no
extra charge.[CC]

The Attorney for the Plaintiffs and putative classes are:

          Scott C. Harris, Esq.
          Patrick M. Wallace, Esq.
          S. Michael Dunn, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON
          PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          900 W. Morgan Street
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Telephone (919) 600-5000
          Facsimile (919) 600-5035
          E-mail: sharris@milberg.com
                  pwallace@milberg.com
                  michael.dunn@milberg.com

Rule 83.1 Counsel for Plaintiffs are:

          Adam H. Cohen, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON
          PHILLIPS GROSSMAN PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: 212-594-5300
          E-mail: acohen@milberg.com

HAMILTON CTY, TN: Jarnagin Bid for Class Certification Nixed
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned SHANDLE MARIE RILEY, v.
HAMILTON COUNTY GOVERNMENT, DANIEL WILKEY, individually and in his
capacity as deputy sheriff for Hamilton County Government, and
JACOB GOFORTH, individually and in his capacity as deputy sheriff
for Hamilton County Government, Case No. 1:20-cv-00044-TRM-CHS
(E.D. Tenn.), the Hon. Judge entered an order denying Jarnagin's
motion for class certification.

The Court said, "This is not a circumstance where there are
numerous claims arising out of the same event. The alleged
unconstitutional searches occurred on different days, at different
locations, and involve different pretextual reasons for the stops
and searches. These varying circumstances also render each
plaintiff’s claims subject to different defenses. For example,
because some inappropriate searches took place before others, some
plaintiffs’ claims may be subject to statute-of-limitations
defenses. Further, some of these incidents involved other officers,
and many individual plaintiffs who would be potential class members
have sued additional parties whom Jarnagin did not sue.
Additionally, some of the plaintiffs in other cases have alleged
repeated harassment and inappropriate searches. All of these
considerations lead the Court to conclude that Jarnagin's claims
are not typical of the class claims."

The Plaintiff Maxwell Jarnagin's seeks an order certifying a class
consisting of:

   "people who were physically and inappropriately searched by
   Officer Daniel Wilkey in a public place where the search
   included inappropriate and unconstitutional touching of the
   person's body limited to those individuals whose searches
   were captured on video."

On December 17, 2019, Jarnagin filed suit against Defendants Daniel
Wilkey and Hamilton County, Tennessee, in the Circuit Court for
Hamilton County, Tennessee.

Jarnagin's claims against Wilkey arise from a traffic stop and
alleged unconstitutional search that occurred in Hamilton County,
Tennessee, on March 30, 2019. During that traffic stop, Jarnagin
alleges that Wilkey ordered him out of the car, handcuffed him, and
"searched" him by inappropriately and unlawfully touching his
genitals.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/30IvkfX at no extra charge.[CC]

HARTING INC: Hanus Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------
Michelle Hanus, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. Harting, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-05289, (N.D.
Ill., October 5, 2021) seeks declaratory judgment, monetary
damages, liquidated damages, costs and a reasonable attorneys'
fees, as a result of failure to sufficiently pay overtime wages
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and overtime provisions of the
Illinois Minimum Wage Law.

Harting's primary business is to develop, manufacture and sell
electrical connectors. It employed Hanus as a salaried Customer
Service Representative from November of 2019 until August of 2021.
Hanus has been allegedly misclassified by Harting as exempt from
overtime, despite regularly working more than 40 hours per week.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Josh Sanford, Esq.
      SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
      Kirkpatrick Plaza
      10800 Financial Centre Pkwy., Suite 510
      Little Rock, AR 72211
      Telephone: (501) 221-0088
      Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
      Email: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


HEWLETT ASSOCIATES: Appeals Denial of Bid to Dismiss Quinatoa Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant HEWLETT ASSOCIATES, LP filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit styled STELLA QUINATOA and ANA
CABRERA, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated v.
HEWLETT ASSOCIATES, LP, Defendant, Case No. 151132/2018, in the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York.

Plaintiffs Stella Quinatoa and Ana Cabrera have sued on behalf of
themselves and the other residents of the Trafalgar Building in
Flushing, Queens. Defendant Hewlett Associates is the owner and
landlord of Trafalgar. The complaint asserts that the Defendant
violated the New York Rent Stabilization Laws and Administrative
Code Section 26-509. The Defendant received J-51 benefits starting
in 2008. Although this legally subjected all apartments in the
building to rent regulation, the Defendant did not register "nearly
a hundred units at the Trafalgar Apartments." The complaint further
asserts that Defendant and its employees "affirmatively deceived
tenants at the Trafalgar Apartments concerning the building's
rent-regulated status," telling the tenants "that the Trafalgar
Apartments were deregulated, an assertion they knew to be false."

The Defendant now seeks a review of the Court's Decision and Order
dated March 24, 2021, denying its motion to dismiss the proposed
class action complaint.

The appellate case is captioned as STELLA QUINATOA and ANA CABRERA,
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated v. HEWLETT
ASSOCIATES, LP, Defendant, Case No. 2021-03641, in the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, First
Department, filed on October 5, 2021.[BN]

Defendant-Appellant HEWLETT ASSOICATES, LP is represented by:

          Jeffrey R. Metz, Esq.
          ADAM LEITMAN BAILEY, P.C.  
          One Battery Park Plaza, 18th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 825-0365

HOME RUN: Weaver Files Suit to Recover Proper Wages
---------------------------------------------------
Cayla Weaver, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. Home Run, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-00344, (E.D.
Tenn., October 5, 2021) seeks declaratory judgment, monetary
damages, liquidated damages, costs and a reasonable attorneys'
fees, as a result of failure to pay sufficient overtime wages under
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendant owns and operates multiple Papa John's franchises
throughout Tennessee. It employed Weaver as an hourly-paid Delivery
Driver from approximately April of 2015 until February of 2020.
Home Run allegedly paid Weaver less than minimum wage per hour for
all hours worked outside of the restaurant making deliveries and
took advantage of tip credit so they could pay less than the
mandated minimum wages. Weaver maintains her own car to deliver
pizza and other food items and incurs and/or pay job-related
expenses, including but not limited to automobile costs and
depreciation, gasoline expenses, automobile maintenance and parts,
insurance, financing, cell phone costs, and other equipment
necessary for delivery drivers to complete their job duties. She
claims that these expenses are not properly accounted for thus
making her take-home pay less than the mandated minimum wage. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Josh Sanford, Esq.
      SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
      Kirkpatrick Plaza
      10800 Financial Centre Pkwy., Suite 510
      Little Rock, AR 72211
      Telephone: (501) 221-0088
      Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
      Email: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

             - and -

      Jesse D. Nelson
      NELSON LAW GROUP, PLLC
      10263 Kingston Pike
      Knoxville, TN 37922
      Telephone: (865) 383-1053
      Facsimile: (865) 383-1054
      Email: jesse@NLGattorneys.com


HORNE LLP: Lochren Sues Over Failure to Pay Proper Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
GERALDINE LOCHREN and TOMEKA WOODS, on their own behalf and on
behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. HORNE LLP,
Defendant, Case No. 6:21-cv-01640 (M.D. Fla., Oct. 4, 2021) is a
class action brought by the Plaintiff for unpaid overtime
compensation, liquidated damages, declaratory relief and other
relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Ms. Lochren worked for the Defendants as a quality
assurance/quality control specialist from February 12, 2021 to June
1, 2021.

Ms. Woods worked for the Defendants as an eligibility analyst since
March 3, 2021.

Horne LLP offers clients accounting services, business valuation,
compliance auditing, employee benefits administration, financial
services, general consulting, information technology, staffing,
litigation support, disaster relief management, and tax planning
services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          C. Ryan Morgan, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          20 North Orange Ave, 15th Floor
          Orlando, FL 32801
          Telephone: (407) 420-1414
          Facsimile: (407) 245-3401
          E-mail: Rmorgan@forthepeople.com

               - and -

          Pausha Taghdiri, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          20 North Orange Ave, 15th Floor
          Orlando, FL 32801
          Telephone: (689) 219-2027
          Facsimile: (689) 219-2127
          E-mail: ptaghdiri@forthepeople.com

INTEL CORPORATION: Court Narrows Claims in Tsur Suit
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned RON TSUR v. INTEL
CORPORATION, Case No. 3:21-cv-00655-SI (D. Or.), the Hon. Judge
Michael H. Simon entered an order:

   1. granting in part and denying in part Intel's partial
      motion to dismiss; and

   2. denying Intel's motion to strike.

The Court said, "Intel moves to strike all allegations that
occurred outside the limitations periods as immaterial to Tsur's
remaining claims. Tsur, however, may use such evidence to support
his remaining claims. Although the time-barred events are not
actionable, they may nevertheless inform discriminatory animus
relevant to Tsur's age-based disparate treatment and impact claims
or provide other relevant information. The Court denies Intel's
motion to strike."

Intel is an American multinational corporation and technology
company headquartered in Santa Clara, California.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3lVHidW at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shanti S. Lewallen, Esq.
          LEWALLEN LAW LLC
          65 SW Yamhill Street, Suite 300
          Portland, OR 97204

The Defendant is represented by:

          Helen M. McFarland, Esq.
          Christopher DeGroff, Esq.
          Sharde Skahan, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
          999 Third Avenue, Suite 4700
          Seattle, WA 98104

JOHNSON HEALTH TECH: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Johnson Health Tech
North America, Inc., et al. The case is styled as Emanuel Delacruz,
on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated v.
Johnson Health Tech North America, Inc., Johnson Health Tech
Retail, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-08493 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 14, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

The Johnson Health Tech family --
https://www.johnsonhealthtech.com/ -- manufactures fitness
equipment and includes multiple fitness and wellness brands that
serve all major sales channels and markets around the world.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


JOSE M GRACIA: Agri-workers Sue Over Unpaid Wages, Exploitation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Lucia Gonzalez-Rodriguez and Nazaria Lara-Martinez, on behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs v.
Jose M. Gracia and Jose M. Gracia, Harvesting, Inc., Defendants,
Case No. 21-cv-00406 (E.D. N.C., October 5, 2021), asserts claims
for unpaid wages, including minimum wages and breach of their
employment contract under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the North
Carolina Wage and Hour Act, the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act, North Carolina Human Trafficking Act and North
Carolina common law.

Plaintiffs left Mexico and travelled to work in North Carolina
farms. Defendants, farm labor contractors, procured massive
contracts to furnish labor to various North Carolina farms seeking
the benefits of an H-2A Visa workforce to harvest their crops
without the costs of direct H-2A program participation. They
allegedly compelled Plaintiffs to work against their will in labor
camp kitchens by exploiting their indebtedness, confiscating their
identity and immigration documents and cultivating a climate of
fear through threats and deception. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Holly N. Thompson, Esq.
      LEGAL AID OF NORTH CAROLINA
      P.O. Box 1728
      Pittsboro, NC 27312
      Email: hollyt@legalaidnc.org


KEYSTONE CREDIT: Barclift Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Keystone Credit
Services, LLC. The case is styled as Paulette Barclift, on behalf
of herself and others similarly situated v. Keystone Credit
Services, LLC, Case No. 5:21-cv-04335-JFL (E.D. Pa., Oct. 1,
2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Keystone Credit Services, LLC -- https://keystonecredit.net/ -- is
a full-service collection agency offering a variety of collection
services to companies of every size.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eric J. Landes, Esq.
          LANDES LAW, LLC
          419 OAKTREE CT
          SANATOGA, PA 19464
          Phone: (610) 334-1463
          Email: eric.landes@landeslaw.us


KIRSCHENBAUM & PHILLIPS: Lovelady Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Kirschenbaum &
Phillips, P.C. The case is styled as Tishon Lovelady, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Kirschenbaum &
Phillips, P.C., Case No. 7:21-cv-08464 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 13, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Kirschenbaum & Phillips, P.C. is third party, debt collection law
firm and collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Uri Horowitz, Esq.
          HOROWITZ LAW, PLLC
          14441 70th Road
          Flushing, NY 11367
          Phone: (718) 705-8706
          Fax: (718) 705-8705
          Email: uri@horowitzlawpllc.com


KOKUMAH EVERYDAY: Aderibigbe Sues to Recover Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
Elizabeth Aderibigbe, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Kokumah Everyday Grace One Incorporation,
and Does 1 through 50, Defendants, Case No. 21STCV36852 (Cal.
Super., October 6, 2021), seeks unpaid wages and interest thereon
for failure to pay for all hours worked and minimum wage rate,
statutory penalties for failure to provide accurate wage
statements, waiting time penalties in the form of continuation
wages for failure to timely pay employees all wages due upon
separation of employment, injunctive relief and other equitable
relief, reasonable attorney's fees, costs and interest under
California Labor Code, Unfair Competition Law of the California
Business and Professions Code and applicable Industrial Welfare
Commission Wage Orders.

Aderibigbe was employed by Kokumah Everyday Grace One in Los
Angeles, California as a non-exempt, hourly employee. She claims
not to have received final wages at the time of her termination,
worked without meal and rest periods, nor compensation in lieu,
thereof, worked in excess of eight hours per workday or in excess
of forty hours per workweek without receiving compensation at a
rate of one and one half the regular rate of pay, received
inaccurately itemized and deficient wage statements, and was not
paid in a timely manner pertaining to waiting time penalties. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Roman Otkupman, Esq.
      OTKUPMAN LAW FIRM, A LAW CORPORATION
      5743 Corsa Ave., Suite 123
      Westlake Village, CA 91362
      Telephone: (818) 293-5623
      Facsimile: (888) 850-1310
      Email: Roman@OLFLA.com


KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Goins Files Suit in N.D. Oklahoma
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Koninklijke Philips
N.V., et al. The case is styled as Timothy Goins, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Koninklijke Philips
N.V., Philips North America LLC, Philips RS North America LLC, Case
No. 4:21-cv-00444-CVE-JFJ (N.D. Okla., Oct. 14, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Contract Product Liability.

Koninklijke Philips N.V. -- https://www.philips.com/global -- is a
Dutch multinational conglomerate corporation that was founded in
Eindhoven.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Darrell Wayne Downs, Esq.
          Logan Joseph Hathcoat, Esq.
          R Stratton Taylor, Esq.
          TAYLOR FOSTER MALLETT DOWNS RAMSEY & RUSSELL
          P O BOX 309
          CLAREMORE, OK 74018
          Phone: (918) 343-4100
          Fax: (918) 343-4900
          Email: ddowns@soonerlaw.com
                 lhathcoat@soonerlaw.com
                 carabb@soonerlaw.com


KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Manna Suit Transferred to W.D. Pennsylvania
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Nick Manna, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Koninklijke Philips N.V., Philips North
America LLC, Philips Holdings USA, Inc., Philips RS North America
LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-11017 was removed from the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts to the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on
Oct. 14, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:21-cv-01380-JFC to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Contract Product Liability.

Koninklijke Philips N.V. -- https://www.philips.com/global -- is a
Dutch multinational conglomerate corporation that was founded in
Eindhoven.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph P. Guglielmo, Esq.
          Erin Green Comite, Esq.
          SCOTT & SCOTT, ATTOTNEYS AT LAW, LLP
          230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10169
          Phone: (212) 223-6444
          Fax: (212) 223-6334
          Email: jguglielmo@scott-scott.com
                 ecomite@scott-scott.com

              - and -

          Sean K. McElligott, Esq.
          David S. Golub, Esq.
          Ian W. Sloss, Esq.
          Steven L. Bloch, Esq.
          SILVER GOLUB & TEITELL LLP
          184 Atlantic Street
          Stamford, CT 06901
          Phone: (203) 325-4491
          Email: smcelligott@sgtlaw.com
                 dgolub@sgtlaw.com
                 isloss@sgtlaw.com
                 sbloch@sgtlaw.com

              - and -

          Alex M. Outwater, Esq.
          SCOTT & SCOTT, ATTOTNEYS AT LAW, LLP
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 3300
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone: (619) 233-4565
          Fax: (619) 233-0508
          Email: aoutwater@scott-scott.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Daniel S. Savrin, Esq.
          Emma D. Hall, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          One Federal Street
          Boston, MA 02110
          Phone: (617) 951-8674
          Email: daniel.savrin@morganlewis.com
                 emma.hall@morganlewis.com

              - and -

          Franco A. Corrado, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS
          1701 Market Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103-2921
          Phone: (215) 963-4824
          Fax: (215) 963-5001
          Email: franco.corrado@morganlewis.com


KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Oldigs Suit Transferred to W.D. Pennsylvania
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Carlos Oldigs, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA LLC formerly
known as: PHILIPS ELECTRONICS NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION,
KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS ELECTRONICS N.V., DOES 1-50, Case No.
1:21-cv-11078 was removed from the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts to the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania on Oct. 14, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:21-cv-01383-JFC to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Contract Product Liability.

Koninklijke Philips N.V. -- https://www.philips.com/global -- is a
Dutch multinational conglomerate corporation that was founded in
Eindhoven.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ari Y. Basser, Esq.
          Jordan L. Lurie, Esq.
          POMERANTZ, LLP
          1100 Glendon Avenue, 15th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Phone: (310) 432-8492
          Email: abasser@pomlaw.com
                 jllurie@pomlaw.com

              - and -

          Daryl DeValerio Andrews, Esq.
          ANDREWS DEVALERIO
          P.O. Box 67101
          Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
          Phone: (617) 999-6473
          Email: daryl@andrewsdevalerio.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Daniel S. Savrin, Esq.
          Emma D. Hall, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          One Federal Street
          Boston, MA 02110
          Phone: (617) 951-8674
          Email: daniel.savrin@morganlewis.com
                 emma.hall@morganlewis.com

              - and -

          Franco A. Corrado, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS
          1701 Market Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103-2921
          Phone: (215) 963-4824
          Fax: (215) 963-5001
          Email: franco.corrado@morganlewis.com


LIBERTY HOMECARE: Headly Refiles Conditional Certification Bid
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned Phyllis Headly, individually,
and on behalf of others similarly situated, v. Liberty Homecare
Options, LLC, and Lucia Devivo Catalano, Case No. 3:20-cv-00579-JAM
(D. Conn.), the Plaintiff submits re-filed motion for conditional
certification pursuant to the Court's order.

   "All Personal Care Assistants ("PCAs") Defendants employed as
   domestic service workers in Connecticut who worked at least
   one 24-hour shift during the period of January 15, 2017,
   until the date of final judgment in this matter who
   Defendants assigned to their clients."

Liberty Homecare is a non-medical agency providing home and
community based services.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Oct. 8, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2Z44ldy at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nitor V. Egbarin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF NITOR V. EGBARIN, LLC
          100 Pearl Street, 14th Floor
          Hartford, CT 06103-3007
          Telephone: (860) 249-7180
          Facsimile: (860) 408-1471
          E-mail: NEgbarin@aol.com

LIFELINE HOMECARE: Scheduling Order in Thompson Class Suit Entered
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned NORITA THOMPSON, et al., v.
LIFELINE HOMECARE, INC., et al., Case No. 3:21-cv-00402-GNS-CHL
(W.D. Ky.), the Hon. Colin H. Lindsay Judge entered a scheduling
order as follows:

   1. Initial disclosures required of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)
      shall be completed no later than October 15, 2021.

   2. The Parties have agreed to a bifurcated discovery plan. No
      later than March 1, 2022, the parties shall complete Phase
      One discovery, concerning issues related to conditional
      class certification.

   3. No later than March 30, 2022, plaintiffs shall file their
      Motion to Conditionally Certify an FLSA collective action.  
      No later than May 2, 2022, Defendant shall file any
      response in opposition.

   4. All other limitations set forth in the Report of Parties’
      Planning Meeting, to the extent they are not inconsistent
      with this Order, are incorporated herein.

   5. The parties are advised that this action is not stayed,
      and even in light of COVID-19, the Court directs the
      parties to keep this action moving forward. Counsel should
      consider and plan ahead for any logistical difficulties
      that will result from themselves, their support staff, or
      their clients working from home.

   6. The parties are also advised that though the undersigned
      is conducting settlement conferences primarily via Zoom at
      this time, the undersigned will consider requests to have
      an in-person settlement conference on a case-by-case
      basis.

Lifeline Homecare is a Kentucky based company providing quality
non-medical, in-home care for the elderly and their families.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ASnk8b at no extra charge.[CC]

LIGHTHOUSE INSURANCE: Seeks Denial of Bond Class Certification Bid
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned JOSEPH BOND AND NICOLE
THOMPSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. LIGHTHOUSE INSURANCE GROUP, LLC, Case No.
1:20-cv-00677-JPC (N.D. Ohio), the Defendant asks the Court to
enter an order denying Plaintiffs' motion for class certification
in its entirety.

The Plaintiffs have brought claims against LIG for violations of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), based
on allegations that:

   (1) Bond, on three occasions back in 2017, received calls
       from LIG which he believes to have been autodialed calls,
       and for which he believes he never provided consent to
       LIG; and

   (2) Thompson, on four occasions back in 2020, received calls
       from LIG which she believes featured a "pre-recorded
       voice", and for which she believes she never provided
       consent to LIG.

The Plaintiffs' Complaint defines its alleged classes as follows:

   -- Autodialed No Consent Class:

      "All persons in the United States who from four years
      prior to the filing of the initial complaint in this
      action to the present: (1) Defendant, or a third person
      acting on behalf of Defendant, called; (2) on the person's
      cellular telephone; (3) using the same equipment that was
      used to call the Bond; (4) for the purpose of selling
      LHIG's products and services; and (5) for whom Defendant
      claims it obtained prior express consent in the same
      manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior
      express consent to call Bond;" and

   -- Pre-recorded No Consent Class:

      "All persons in the United States who (1) Defendant, or a
      third person acting on behalf of Defendant, called; (2) on
      the person's telephone; (3) for the purpose of selling
      Defendant's products and services; (4) using the same pre-
      recorded voice technology that was used to call Thompson;
      and (4) for whom Defendant claims it obtained prior
      express consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it
      obtained prior express consent to call Thompson."

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Oct. 8, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2YX38F4 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Christopher B. Congeni, Esq.
          Douglas G. Walters, Esq.
          Annamarie E. Braga, Esq.
          MATASAR JACOBS LLC
          1111 Superior Avenue, Suite 1355
          Cleveland, OH 44114
          Telephone: (216) 453-8180
          Facsimile: (216) 282-8600
          E-mail: ccongeni@matasarjacobs.com
                  dwalters@matasarjacobs.com
                  abraga@matasarjacobs.com

               - and -

          Matthew R. Duncan, Esq.
          BRENNAN, MANNA & DIAMOND, LLC
          75 East Market Street
          Akron, OH 44308
          Telephone: (330) 253-5060
          Facsimile: (330) 253-9160
          E-mail: mrduncan@bmdllc.com

LOWE'S HOME: Quintero Suit Removed to C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Eduardo Quintero, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated v. Lowe's Home Centers, LLC, Does 1 to
100 inclusive, Case No. 21STCV33485 was removed from the Los
Angeles County Superior Court to the United States District Court
for the Central District of California on Oct. 13, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:21-cv-08151 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Labor.

Lowe's Home Centers Inc. -- https://www.lowes.com/ -- retails home
improvement, building materials, and home appliances.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


MANHATTAN MEDICAL: Fischler Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
----------------------------------------------------------------
BRIAN FISCHLER, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MANHATTAN MEDICAL ARTS PLLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-08217 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 5, 2021) EMANUEL
DELACRUZ, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiffs v. ADOLPH KIEFER & ASSOCIATES, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 1:21-cv-08191-JPC (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 4, 2021) arises from the
Defendants' failure to design, construct, maintain, and operate its
website https://www.manhattanmedicalarts.com/ to be fully
accessible to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other
blind or visually impaired people in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the
New York City Human Rights Law.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant has engaged in acts of
intentional discrimination due to the inaccessibility of its
website, and seeks a permanent injunction to cause Defendant to
change its corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
its website will become and remain accessible to blind and visually
impaired consumers.

Manhattan Medical Arts PLLC is a primary care and multi-specialty
facility located in New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas B. Lipsky, Esq.
          Christopher H. Lowe, Esq.
          LIPSKY LOWE LLP
          420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1830
          New York, NY 10017-6705
          Telephone: (212) 392-4772
          E-mail: doug@lipskylowe.com
                  chris@lipskylowe.com

MARATHON PETROLEUM: Carpenter Files Suit in D. Minnesota
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Marathon Petroleum
Corporation, et al. The case is styled as Martin Carpenter, Jaclyn
Ott, on Behalf of Themselves and all Others Similarly Situated v.
Marathon Petroleum Corporation, St. Paul Park Refining Co. LLC
doing business as: Marathon St. Paul Park Refinery, Case No.
0:21-cv-02268-PJS-ECW (D. Minn., Oct. 13, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Torts to Land.

Marathon Petroleum Corporation --
https://www.marathonpetroleum.com/ -- is an American petroleum
refining, marketing, and transportation company headquartered in
Findlay, Ohio.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Amanda M. Williams, Esq.
          Daniel E. Gustafson, Esq.
          Ling Shan Wang, Esq.
          David A. Goodwin, Esq.
          GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC
          120 South Sixth Street, Suite 2600
          Minneapolis, MN 55401
          Phone: (612) 333-8844
          Fax: (612) 339-6622
          Email: awilliams@gustafsongluek.com
                 dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com
                 lwang@gustafsongluek.com
                 dgoodwin@gustafsongluek.com


MAYBOURNE HOTELS: Alonzo Files ADA Suit in C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Maybourne Hotels
Limited. The case is styled as Thuy Than Alonzo, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Maybourne Hotels
Limited, a United Kingdom private limited company, Does 1 to 10,
inclusive, Case No. 2:21-cv-07876-FLA-MRW (C.D. Cal., Oct. 1,
2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Maybourne Hotel Group -- https://www.maybourne.com/ -- is an Irish
and Qatar owned British luxury hotel operator, which owns and
manages The Berkeley, Claridge's and The Connaught hotels in
London.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Binyamin I. Manoucheri, Esq.
          Jasmine Behroozan, Esq.
          Thiago Merlini Coelho, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Boulevard 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Phone: (213) 381-9988
          Fax: (213) 381-9989
          Email: binyamin@wilshirelawfirm.com
                 jasmine@wilshirelawfirm.com
                 thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com


NATIONAL HEALTH: Eubanks Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Maegan Eubanks, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. National Health Corporation, a Tennessee
Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 3:21-cv-00761 (M.D. Tenn., Oct. 4,
2021) arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act for NHC's failure
to pay Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees all earned
minimum and overtime wages.

The Plaintiff was employed by NHC as an hourly management employee
at its facility located at 1653 Mooresville Highway, Lewisburg,
Marshall County, Tennessee from May 27, 2021 through September 27,
2021.

National Health Corporation is a nationwide long-term healthcare
provider which owns and operates 75 skilled nursing centers, 24
assisted living communities, a behavioral health hospital, five
retirement communities, and 35 homecare agencies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anne Bennett Hunter, Esq.
          Heather Moore Collins, Esq.
          Ashley Shoemaker Walter, Esq.
          COLLINS & HUNTER PLLC
          7000 Executive Center Drive
          Building Two, Suite 320
          Brentwood, TN 37027
          Telephone: (615) 724-1996
          Facsimile: (615) 691-7019
          E-mail: anne@collinshunter.com
                  heather@collinshunter.com
                  ashley@collinshunter.com

               - and -

          James L. Simon, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF SIMON & SIMON
          5000 Rockside Road
          Liberty Plaza - Suite 520
          Independence, OH 44131
          Telephone: (216) 525-8890
          E-mail: james@bswages.com

NATIONAL HOOD: Pantelic Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ljubomir Pantelic, individually and for others similarly situated
v. NATIONAL HOOD EXHAUST & FIRE GROUP, LLC f/k/a APEX HOOD EXHAUST
& FIRE GROUP, LLC; and BRYAN PAINTER, Case No. 2:21-cv-01371-WSH
(W.D. Pa., Oct. 13, 2021), is brought under the Pennsylvania
Minimum Wage Act and Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law
to recover unpaid wages and other damages from the Defendants.

The Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members regularly worked more
than 40 hours a week. But despite having been sued in the past for
failing to pay overtime as required by law, the Defendants did not
pay the Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members overtime. Instead,
the Defendants paid the Plaintiff and the Putative Class members
the same hourly rate for all hours worked, including those hours
over 40 in a week (or, "Straight Time for Overtime"). The
Defendants also failed to pay for certain compensable hours
altogether, improperly reducing the number of regular and overtime
hours it paid the Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members. The
Plaintiff brings this collective action to recover unpaid wages,
including unpaid overtime wages, and other damages the Defendants
owes to these workers, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff Pantelic worked for the Defendants as an hourly
employee from March 2021 to July 2021.

National Hood is in the business of commercial kitchen maintenance
and provides a variety of commercial and residential exhaust hood
cleaning and fire protection services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Rochelle D. Prins, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Phone: 713-352-1100
          Facsimile: 713-352-3300
          Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                 adunlap@mybackwages.com
                 rprins@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025
          Houston, TX 77046
          Phone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com

               - and -

          Joshua P. Geist, Esq.
          William F. Goodrich, Esq.
          GOODRICH & GEIST PC
          3634 California Ave.
          Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15212
          Phone: 412-766-1455
          Facsimile: 412-766-0300
          Email: josh@goodrichandgeist.com
                 bill@goodrichandgeist.com


NELSON PARTNERS: Parziale Appeals Securities Suit Dismissal
-----------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Sandra Parziale filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled SANDRA PARZIALE, as co-trustee of the
Parziale Family Trust, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PATRICK NELSON; NELSON PARTNERS,
LLC; NP SKYLOFT ST, LLC; NP SKYLOFT JV, LLC; ACO SKYLOFT MANAGER,
LLC; AXONIC CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES MASTER FUND, LP; AXSPV LLC SERIES
NB CRE LENDER; AXSPV LLC SERIES SBL CRE LENDER; AXSPV LLC SERIES
ACO CRE LENDER; AXONIC CAPITAL, LLC; CLAYTON DEGIANCINTO; and DOES
1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-01803, in the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Los
Angeles.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on March 4, 2021, the
lawsuit is a class action against the Defendants for violations of
federal securities law and California securities law, fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to commit fraud.

The case arises from the Defendants' failure to disclose material
information concerning the offering of beneficial interests in NP
SkyLoft, DST, a Delaware statutory trust, pursuant to a
Confidential Private Placement Memorandum (PPM) dated December 19,
2018 and the Supplement to the PPM dated March 2, 2019. The
Supplement failed to disclose that on February 26, 2019, the Axonic
Preferred Equity Providers were admitted as special members into NP
Skyloft JV, LLC, which is the managing member of the Trustee of the
Trust, and thus had management control over the Trust pursuant to a
Limited Liability Agreement. As a result, Axonic Preferred Equity
Providers have the ability to take control of the Trustee and Trust
and force the sale of the Trust Property in their sole and absolute
discretion, the suit says.

The Plaintiff and the Class have allegedly lost their entire
investment of $75.5 million in the Trust, resulting from the
exercise of the rights of certain of the Defendants that were
concealed from the investors in the offering of the interests.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of the Court's Order dated
September 17, 2021, granting Defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to join an indispensable party, and dismissing the action.

The appellate case is captioned as Sandra Parziale v. Patrick
Nelson, et al., Case No. 21-56084, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on Oct. 5, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Sandra Parziale Mediation Questionnaire was due on
Oct. 12, 2021;

   -- Transcript shall be ordered by November 3, 2021;

   -- Transcript is due on December 3, 2021;

   -- Appellant Sandra Parziale opening brief is due on January 12,
2022;

   -- Appellees ACO Skyloft Manager, LLC, AxSPV LLC Series ACO CRE
Lender, AxSPV LLC Series NB CRE Lender, AxSPV LLC Series SBL CRE
Lender, Axonic Capital LLC, Axonic Credit Opportunities Master
Fund, LP, Clayton Degiancinto, Does, NP Skyloft JV, LLC, NP Skyloft
St, LLC, Patrick Nelson and Nelson Partners, LLC answering brief is
due on February 11, 2022; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief. [BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant SANDRA PARZIALE, as co-trustee of the Parziale
Family Trust, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, is represented by:

          Robert W. Brownlie, Esq.
          Ryan Hansen, Esq.  
          BROWNLIE HANSEN LLP
          10920 Via Frontera, Suite 550
          San Diego, CA 92127
          Telephone: (858) 357-8001

Defendants-Appellees PATRICK NELSON, a resident of California;
NELSON PARTNERS, LLC, a limited liability company; NP SKYLOFT ST,
LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; NP SKYLOFT JV, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company; ACO SKYLOFT MANAGER, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company; AXONIC CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES
MASTER FUND, LP, a Cayman Islands, limited partnership; AXSPV LLC
SERIES NB CRE LENDER, a Delaware limited liability company; AXSPV
LLC SERIES SBL CRE LENDER, a Delaware limited liability company;
AXSPV LLC SERIES ACO CRE LENDER, a Delaware limited liability
company; AXONIC CAPITAL LLC, a Delaware limited liability company;
and CLAYTON DEGIANCINTO, a resident of New York are represented
by:

          Matthew I. Kaplan, Esq.
          TUCKER ELLIS & WEST, LLP
          515 South Flower Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 430-3400

               - and -

          John G. Burgee, Esq.
          BURGEE & ABRAMOFF, P.C.
          20501 Ventura Bouelvard
          Woodland Hills, CA 91364
          Telephone: (818) 264-7575

               - and -

          Bernard R. Given, II, Esq.
          LOEB & LOEB, LLP
          10100 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 2200
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 282-2000

NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Appeal Filed in Gulino Suit re Burgess-Dilbert
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's Judgment
dated August 18, 2021, entered in the lawsuit styled GULINO, ET AL.
v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK, Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in the
New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant, the
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New
York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
Section 2000e et seq., by requiring Plaintiffs to pass certain
racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to obtain a
license to teach in New York City public schools. Judge Constance
Baker Motley, to whom the case was originally assigned, certified
the plaintiff class on July 13, 2001, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).

On December 5, 2012, the Court decertified the Plaintiff class to
the extent it sought damages and individualized injunctive relief
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011). The class survived, however, to
the extent Plaintiffs sought relief that may be awarded under Rule
23(b)(2), including a declaratory judgment regarding liability and
class-wide injunctive relief.

The Defendant seeks a review of the Court's Judgment, classifying
Tami Burgess-Dilbert as a member of the Plaintiff class in this
action, and holding that the Plaintiff is entitled to monetary and
injunctive relief from Defendant as compensation for the injuries
she suffered as a result of what the Court found to be the
Defendant's discrimination.

The appellate case is captioned as In re: New York City Board of
Education, Case No. 21-2421, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, filed on Sep. 21, 2021.[BN]

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the City School District
of the City of New York is represented by:

          Georgia Mary Pestana, Esq.
          INTERIM CORPORATION COUNSEL
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-2400

Plaintiff-Appellee Tami Burgess-Dilbert is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

NEW YORK: Davis Appeals Order in NYPD Stop & Frisk Suit to 2nd Cir.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Kelton Davis filed an appeal from a court ruling entered
in the lawsuit styled KELTON DAVIS, WILLIAM TURNER, ALTAGRACIA
HERNANDEZ, EDWIN LARREGUI, ROMAN JACKSON, KRISTIN JOHNSON, ELEANOR
BRITT, ANTHONY ANDERSON, LASHAUN SMITH, SHAWNE JONES, HECTOR
SUAREZ, ADAM COOPER, ANDREW WASHINGTON, P.L. BY HIS PARENT LISA
PIGGOTT, DAVID WILSON, AND GENEVA WILSON, individually and on
behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
THE CITY OF NEW YORK and NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY,
Defendants, Case No. 10-cv-699, in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (New York City).

The lawsuit contends that Defendants, the City of New York and the
New York City Housing Authority, operating through and in
conjunction with the New York City Police Department, have
implemented and continue to conduct, enforce and sanction an
unlawful vertical patrol and trespass arrest policy which has
resulted in a pattern and practice of illegal stops, seizures,
questioning, searches, and false airests of residents of, and
authorized visitors to, NYCHA residences.

Allegedly, NYPD has a long history of conducting high numbers of
stop-and-frisks in New York City neighborhoods largely populated by
racial minorities. The NYPD's efforts to aggressively police
"high-crime" areas have included stop-and-frisks resulting in
repeated litigation and close scrutiny of policing practices.

The arrested Plaintiffs are African-American and Latino NYCHA
residents or family members, guests or visitors of NYCHA residents,
who were or will be unlawfully stopped, seized, questioned,
searched and/or falsely arrested for trespass in or around a NYCHA
residence without any reasonable, articulable suspicion or probable
cause that they were engaging in criminal activity and on the bases
of their race, ethnicity, and/or national origin.

The Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
now seeks a review from the Decision and Order of the Honorable
Analisa Torres entered on July 30, 2021, granting the Motion to
Seal filed by the Federal Court Monitor in this matter, Peter
Zimroth, and denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Monitor to
provide access to information.

The appellate case is captioned as Davis v. The City of New York,
Case No. 21-2237, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, filed on Sept. 16, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Kelton Davis is represented by:

          Corey Stoughton, Esq.
          THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY
          199 Water Street
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (646) 884-2316

Defendant-Appellee The City of New York is represented by:

          Georgia Mary Pestana, Esq.
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-2400

NEW YORK: Second Cir. Appeal Filed in Gulino Suit re Poncedeleon
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's Judgment
dated August 18, 2021, entered in the lawsuit styled GULINO, ET AL.
v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK, Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in the
New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant, the
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New
York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
Section 2000e et seq., by requiring Plaintiffs to pass certain
racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to obtain a
license to teach in New York City public schools. Judge Constance
Baker Motley, to whom the case was originally assigned, certified
the plaintiff class on July 13, 2001, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).

On December 5, 2012, the Court decertified the Plaintiff class to
the extent it sought damages and individualized injunctive relief
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011). The class survived, however, to
the extent Plaintiffs sought relief that may be awarded under Rule
23(b)(2), including a declaratory judgment regarding liability and
class-wide injunctive relief.

The Defendant seeks a review of the Court's Judgment, classifying
Yvette Poncedeleon as a member of the Plaintiff class in this
action, and holding that the Plaintiff is entitled to monetary and
injunctive relief from Defendant as compensation for the injuries
she suffered as a result of what the Court found to be the
Defendant's discrimination.

The appellate case is captioned as In re: New York City Board of
Education, Case No. 21-2364, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, filed on Sep. 21, 2021.[BN]

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the City School District
of the City of New York is represented by:

          Georgia Mary Pestana, Esq.
          INTERIM CORPORATION COUNSEL
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-2400

Plaintiff-Appellee Yvette Poncedeleon is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com  

O'BRIEN SERVICES: Shortchanges Workers' Wages, Fritsch Says
------------------------------------------------------------
Julie Fritsch, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. O'Brien Services, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
21-cv-01152 (E.D. Wis., October 6, 2021), seeks unpaid overtime
compensation, compensation for missed breaks, liquidated damages,
costs, attorneys' fees, declaratory and/or injunctive relief and/or
any such other relief pursuant to Wisconsin's Wage Payment and
Collection Laws and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

O'Brien Services is a privately-owned security services company
where Fritsch worked as an hourly-paid, non-exempt plain clothes
loss prevention officer. She claims that O'Brien Services
shaved-off time from her time-card for hours worked and/or work
performed, failed to compensate her for daily rest breaks that
lasted less than twenty consecutive minutes in duration, and did
not relieve her of duty during her meal periods. [BN]

Plaintiffs are represented by:

      James A. Walcheske, Esq.
      Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
      David M. Potteiger, Esq.
      WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
      235 N. Executive Drive, Suite 240
      Brookfield, WI 53005
      Phone: (262) 780-1953
      Fax: (262) 565-6469
      Email: jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com
             sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com
             dpotteiger@walcheskeluzi.com


ONE WEST BANK: Coffaro Files Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against One West Bank, FSB,
et al. The case is styled as Nicolo Coffaro, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. One West Bank, FSB, The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver for Indy Mac
Federal Bank, FSB, Case No. 7:21-cv-08432-PMH (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 13,
2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Real Property.

OneWest Bank, a division of CIT Bank, N.A. --
https://www.onewestbank.com/ -- is a regional bank with over 60
retail branches in Southern California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Steven Bennett Blau, Esq.
          BLAU LEONARD LAW LLC
          23 Green Street, Suite 105
          Huntington, NY 11743
          Phone: (631) 458-1010
          Email: sblau@blauleonardlaw.com


PANERA BREAD: E.D. Missouri Vacates Denial of Bid to Remand Ahmad
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MAHASIN AHMAD, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PANERA BREAD COMPANY, Defendant,
Case No. 4:21 CV 311 CDP (E.D. Mo.), Judge Catherine D. Perry of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,
Eastern Division, granted Ahmad's Motion for Reconsideration of
Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and vacated the
Memorandum and Order dated June 2, 2021.

On June 2, 2021, Judge Perry denied Ahmad's motion to remand the
matter to state court, finding that the Defendant sufficiently
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in
controversy exceeded $5 million, thereby satisfying the
jurisdictional threshold for the Court to exercise jurisdiction
over the removed action under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA),
28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d), 1453. Ahmad now requests that Judge
Perry reconsiders the June 2 Memorandum and Order, and specifically
the portion that extrapolated class damages to include a period of
years before September 2020.

Because Panera admits in response to Ahmad's motion to reconsider
that the program Ahmad challenges in the lawsuit began in the fall
of 2020 and not before, Judge Perry agrees with Ahmad that her
analysis of damages for an extrapolated period that predated the
program was based on a clear factual error. She will therefore
grant Ahmad's motion to reconsider. Because her decision to deny
Ahmad's motion to remand was based almost exclusively on this
erroneously determined period of class damages, she will vacate her
June 2 Memorandum and Order and reconsider Ahmad's motion to
remand.

Accordingly, Judge Perry granted Ahmad's Motion for Reconsideration
of Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. She vacated the
Memorandum and Order dated June 2, 2021.

The action is stayed pending Judge Perry' reconsideration of the
Plaintiff's motion to remand. No additional briefing on the motion
to remand is required or will be permitted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/e9zc54by from Leagle.com.


PARKMOBILE LLC: Weaver Suit Moved From California to N.D. Georgia
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Charles R. Breyer of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California transferred the case, JACK WILLIAM WEAVER on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
PARKMOBILE, LLC and PARKMOBILE USA, INC., Defendants, Case No.
3:21-cv-05096-CRB (N.D. Cal.), to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia.

On July 1, 2021, Plaintiff Weaver filed a Complaint against
Defendants ParkMobile, LLC and ParkMobile USA, LLC.

On Sept. 17, 2021, ParkMobile filed a Motion to Transfer Case or
Stay Proceedings and a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. The
Plaintiff's deadline to file opposition papers to ParkMobile's
motion to transfer and motion to dismiss is currently Oct. 1, 2021.
ParkMobile's replies in support of its two motions are currently
due on Oct. 8, 2021; and the hearing on ParkMobile's motions is set
for Nov. 19, 2021.

Following ParkMobile's filing of its Motion to Transfer Case or
Stay Proceedings, the Parties met and conferred. As part of that
process, the Parties now agree that the case should be transferred
from the Court to the Northern District of Georgia where
earlier-filed and related cases (Baker, et al. v. ParkMobile, LLC,
No. 1:21-cv-02182-SCJ and Demos v. ParkMobile, LLC, No.
1:21-cv-03595-MHC) are currently pending. The Plaintiffs' counsel
in the instant action are the same counsel as the counsel for the
plaintiffs in the Baker and Demos matters.

Baker and Demos are assigned to the Honorable Steve C. Jones of the
Northern District of Georgia. The Parties agree that the instant
case should be consolidated before Judge Jones because he already
is hearing the related actions. The Baker Plaintiffs intend to file
a first amended consolidated class action complaint within 30 days
after Weaver is transferred to Judge Jones.

In light of the agreed desire to transfer this action to the
Northern District of Georgia and Mr. Weaver's counsel's intent to
file a first amended consolidated class action complaint in that
court, ParkMobile has agreed to withdraw the pending motion to
dismiss if the motion to transfer is granted. ParkMobile will
answer or otherwise respond to the first amended consolidated class
action complaint within 30 days after it is filed, as further
agreed upon by the parties in a motion currently before the
Northern District of Georgia.

To allow the Court enough time to consider the motion to transfer
the instant case to the Northern District of Georgia, the Parties
further agree that the Plaintiff's deadline to file opposition
papers to ParkMobile's motion to transfer and motion to dismiss
will be extended to Oct. 29, 2021, and ParkMobile's replies in
support of its two motions will be due on Nov. 5, 2021. The hearing
on ParkMobile's motions will remain on calendar for Nov. 19, 2021,
pending transfer of the case to the Northern District of Georgia by
order of the Court. ParkMobile will withdraw the pending motion to
dismiss when the case is transferred.

The Parties in the action have previously filed the following
stipulations for extension of time: (i) stipulation for extension
of time to respond to complaint; and (ii) stipulation with proposed
order regarding briefing deadlines for motion to dismiss and motion
to transfer.

By and between the Parties, through their counsel of record, and
subject to the Court's approval, that the action will be
transferred to the Northern District of Georgia, where it can be
consolidated with the Baker and Demos matters before Judge Jones.
Further, the Plaintiff's deadline to respond to ParkMobile's
motions to dismiss and transfer is extended from Oct. 1, 2021, to
Oct. 29, 2021, and ParkMobile's deadline to file reply briefs in
support of the two motions is extended from Oct. 8, 2021, to Nov.
5, 2021. The hearing on ParkMobile's motions remains on calendar
for Nov. 19, 2021.

Pursuant to the Parties' stipulation, and good cause showing, Judge
Breyer orders that the Stipulation is granted. He orders the
following:

     a. The case is transferred to the Northern District of Georgia
for consolidation with the related Baker and Demos matters; and

     b. ParkMobile's motion to dismiss and transfer are now moot
and the Nov. 19, 2021 hearing date is off calendar.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/u3fpdeuu from Leagle.com.

Tammy B. Webb -- tbwebb@shb.com -- SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P., in
San Francisco, California.

Elisabeth A. Hutchinson -- ehutchinson@shb.com -- (pro hac vice
pending) SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P., in Denver, Colorado,
Attorneys for Defendants ParkMobile, LLC and ParkMobile USA, Inc.

MaryBeth V. Gibson -- MGibson@thefinleyfirm.com -- (pro hac vice
forthcoming) THE FINLEY FIRM, P.C., in Atlanta, Georgia.

Todd D. Carpenter -- tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com -- in San Diego,
California, Attorneys for the Plaintiff.

Gary F. Lynch , CARLSON LYNCH, LLP, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Arthur M. Murray , Caroline T. White, MURRAY LAW FIRM, in New
Orleans, Louisiana.

Joseph Guglielmo -- jguglielmo@scott-scott.com -- Erin Green
Comite, Anja Rusi, SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP, in New York
City.

Karen Hanson Riebel -- khriebel@locklaw.com -- Kate M. Baxter-Kauf,
LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN, P.L.L.P, in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Brian C. Gudmundson -- brian.gudmundson@zimmreed.com -- Michael J.
Laird, ZIMMERMAN REED LLP, in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

James Pizzirusso -- jpizzirusso@hausfeld.com -- (pro hac vice
forthcoming) HAUSFELD LLP, in Washington, D.C.

Steven M. Nathan -- snathan@hausfeld.com -- (pro hac vice
forthcoming) HAUSFELD LLP, in New York City.

Bryan L. Bleichner -- bbleichner@chestnutcambronne.com -- CHESTNUT
CAMBRONNE PA, in Minneapolis, Minnesota.


PAUL J. DOUGHERTY: Zeman Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Paul J. Dougherty MD,
Inc. The case is styled as Julia Zeman, individually and on behalf
of other members of the general public similarly situated v. Paul
J. Dougherty MD, Inc. d/b/a DLV Vision, a California Corporation,
Case No. 21STCV37681 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., Oct. 13,
2021).

The case type is stated as "Other Commercial/Business Tort."

Paul J. Dougherty MD -- https://www.doughertylaservision.com/ -- is
among the nation's most experienced laser and lens-based vision
correction surgeons.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James Kawahito, Esq.
          KAWAHITO LAW GROUO APC
          222 N Pacific Coast Hwy., Ste. 2222
          El Segundo, CA 90245-5614
          Phone: 310-746-5300
          Fax: 310-593-2520
          Email: jkawahito@kawahitolaw.com


PFIZER INC: Jacobson Slams Carcinogen in Anti-Smoking Drug
----------------------------------------------------------
James Jacobson, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Pfizer, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
21-cv-07961 (C.D. Cal., October 5, 2021), seeks economic damages
and other relief for breach of express and implied warranties,
fraud, unjust enrichment, negligence and for violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and various state consumer protection
laws.

Jacobson accuses Pfizer of selling adulterated, misbranded, and
unapproved varenicline-containing drugs under the brand name
Chantix(R), known generically as varenicline and is a partial
nicotine agonist which is a first-line therapy in the treatment to
aid in smoking cessation. N-nitroso-varenicline is a probable human
carcinogen, notes the complaint.

On September 16, 2021, Pfizer recalled Chantix. Jacobson has been
purchasing Chantix long before the recall,  the complaint says.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Gillian L. Wade, Esq.
      Sara D. Avila, Esq.
      Marc A. Castaneda, Esq.
      MILSTEIN JACKSON FAIRCHILD & WADE, LLP
      10990 Wilshire Blvd., 8th Floor
      Los Angeles, CA 90024
      Tel: (310) 396-9600
      Fax: (310) 396-9635
      Email: gwade@mjfwlaw.com
             savila@mjfwlaw.com
             mcastaneda@mjfwlaw.com

             - and -

      Ruben Honik, Esq.
      David J. Stanoch, Esq.
      HONIK LLC
      1515 Market Street, Suite 1100
      Philadelphia, PA 19102
      Tel: (267) 435-1300
      Email: ruben@honiklaw.com


PFIZER INC: Webb Sues Over Carcinogen in Quit-smoking Drug
----------------------------------------------------------
SHANNON WEBB, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PFIZER, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:21-cv-08244 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 6, 2021) is a class action seeking
economic damages for those who paid for or made reimbursements for
generic varenicline-containing drugs (VCDs) that were illegally and
willfully manufactured, distributed, and/or introduced into the
market by Defendant Pfizer, Inc.

The lawsuit arises from adulterated, misbranded, and unapproved
VCDs that were designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed,
packaged, and/or ultimately sold by the Defendant, in the United
States under the brand name Chantix(R). These VCDs are allegedly
non-merchantable, and are not of the quality represented by the
Defendant. The Defendant VCDs were adulterated and/or misbranded
through contamination with a probable human carcinogen known as
n-nitroso-varenicline. The Defendant's wrongful acts resulted in
persons who sought to use smoking products less end up with a
Chantix pill that contained a carcinogen, says the suit.

Pfizer Inc. is an American multinational pharmaceutical and
biotechnology corporation headquartered on 42nd Street in
Manhattan, New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter Samberg, Esq.
          PETER SAMBERG ATTORNEY AT LAW
          100 Ardsley Ave.
          West P.O. Box 73
          Ardsley on Hudson, NY 10503
          Telephone: (914) 391-1213
          E-mail: psamberg@gmail.com

               - and -

          Ruben Honik, Esq.
          David J. Stanoch, Esq.
          HONIK LLC
          1515 Market Street, Suite 1100
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (267) 435-1300
          E-mail: ruben@honiklaw.com
                  david@honiklaw.com

PHILIPS RS: Bleakney Suit Removed to W.D. Pennsylvania
------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Roxxanne Bleakney, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Philips RS North America LLC, Case
No. GD-21-011259 was removed from Allegheny County to the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on
Oct. 13, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:21-cv-01375-NR to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Personal Injury: Health
Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability.

Philips RS North America LLC -- https://www.usa.philips.com/ --
manufactures and markets medical devices.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chandler Steiger, Esq.
          Kevin Abramowicz, Esq.
          Kevin W. Tucker, Esq.
          Stephanie Moore, Esq.
          EAST END TRIAL GROUP, LLC
          6901 Lynn Way, Suite 215
          Pittsburgh, PA 15208
          Phone: (412) 223-5740
          Fax: (412) 626-7101
          Email: csteiger@eastendtrialgroup.com
                 kabramowicz@eastendtrialgroup.com
                 ktucker@eastendtrialgroup.com
                 smoore@eastendtrialgroup.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          John P. Lavelle, Jr., Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS
          1701 Market Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103-2921
          Phone: (215) 963-4824
          Fax: (215) 963-5001
          Email: john.lavelle@morganlewis.com


PROBUILD CO: $1.4MMClass Deal in Sengvong Suit Wins Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, OTINA SENGVONG, on behalf of himself, and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PROBUILD COMPANY LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:19cv2231-MMA-JLB (S.D. Cal.), Judge Michael
M. Anello of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California grants:

    (i) the Plaintiff's motion for final approval of the class
        settlement; and

   (ii) in substantial part the Plaintiff's motion for attorneys'
        fees, costs, and an incentive award.

Plaintiff Sengvong brings the putative wage and hour class action
against the Defendants. The Defendants are suppliers of structural
and related building products for new residential construction,
including lumber, windows, pre-hung doors, and other general
construction tools and supplies. In California, they operate 15
retail locations. The Plaintiff resides in San Diego, California.
The Defendants first employed the Plaintiff on Jan. 25, 2018 to
work as a materials handler at their Dixieline Lumber & Home
Centers in San Diego, California. He continuously worked for the
Defendants from the time of his hire until approximately Feb. 6,
2019, when his employment ended.

On Aug. 5, 2019, the Plaintiff on behalf of himself and other
aggrieved employees, sent a written notice by certified mail to the
California Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") and the
Defendants of the specific California Labor Code provisions to have
been allegedly violated by the Defendants.

On Oct. 15, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a putative class action
complaint in the Superior Court of the State of California for the
County of San Diego against the Defendants alleging the following
causes of action: (1) Failure to provide meals periods; (2) Failure
to provide rest periods; (3) Failure to compensate for all hours
worked; (4) Failure to Indemnify; (5) Failure to provide accurate
written wage statements; (6) Waiting time penalties; (7) Unfair
competition; and (7) Civil Penalties.

On Nov. 25, 2019, the Defendants removed the action under relevant
provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") to the Court.
On Sept. 3, 2020, the parties attended and participated in
settlement discussions at a mediation session with Marc Feder,
Esq., an experienced professional mediator, and reached agreement
on the material terms of a proposed individual and class action
settlement that would fully resolve the dispute.

The Settlement Class consists of all persons employed by the
Defendants in California as non-exempt employees at any time during
the Settlement Class Period (Oct. 15, 2015 through Oct. 3, 2020).
There are 1894 Settlement Class Members with two opt-outs. The
Defendant will pay a total sum of $1.4 million ("Gross Settlement
Amount") in full settlement of all claims. The parties have agreed
that no portion of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to the
Defendant.

After deductions for: (a) Court-approved attorneys' fees and costs
to the class counsel; (b) a $30,000 PAGA payment to the California
LWDA; (c) Court-approved fees and costs of the Settlement
Administrator; and (d) a Court-approved incentive award to the
Plaintiff, the resulting "Net Settlement Amount" will be
distributed to the Settlement Class Members by way of individual
settlement payments. The payments will be pro rata shares of the
Net Settlement Amount, based on the number of weeks a Settlement
Class Member worked during the Class Period divided by the total
number of weeks worked by all Settlement Class Members during the
Class Period.

The individual settlement payments are estimated to range from
under a dollar to more than $1,000, with the Plaintiff receiving an
individual settlement payment in the middle of that range. The
Settlement Administrator's costs are approximately $14,000. The
Defendants joined the Plaintiff's previous motion for preliminary
approval of the Settlement and there are no objections to the
Settlement.

Discussion

The Plaintiff moves for final approval of a class settlement
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) and for an award
of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Rule 23(h), as well as a
class representative incentive payment. The Plaintiff seeks and
award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to California Labor
Code Sections 1194, 2699(g), 2802(c). He requests fees in the
aggregate amount of $466,666, which is 33.33% of the $1.4 million
Gross Settlement Amount. The Plaintiff requests reimbursement for
$8,581.33 in litigation costs expended by the Class Counsel.
Finally, the Plaintiff requests an incentive award of $15,000 for
his service as the Class Representative in the action. The
Defendants do not oppose the Plaintiff's motions and the Court
preliminarily approved the class settlement.

The Court held a final approval hearing on these matters pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2).

Upon due consideration of the factors set forth, Judge Anello finds
that the Class Settlement is on balance "fair, reasonable, and
adequate" under Rule 23(e)(2) and grants the Plaintiff's motion for
final approval of the settlement. He also finds that an appropriate
fee award in the case is 25% of the Gross Settlement Amount, or a
2.5 performance multiplier of the lodestar figure, and will award
the Class Counsel $350,000 in attorneys' fees. And, because the
Class Counsel's out-of-pocket costs were reasonably incurred in
litigating the action and were advanced by the counsel for the
benefit of the Class, Judge Anello approves reimbursement of
litigation costs in the full amount requested.

Finally, Judge Anello approves the Plaintiff's request for a
$15,000 incentive award. He agrees that a substantial incentive
award is appropriate in light of the time and effort the Plaintiff
expended on the litigation, the benefit obtained for the class, and
the risks associated with bringing a class action lawsuit against a
former employer.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Judge Anello grants the Plaintiff's motion
for final approval of the class settlement and grants in
substantial part the Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees, costs,
and an incentive award.

Judge Anello certifies the Settlement Class for the purposes of the
Settlement. He approves the Settlement as fair, reasonable, and
adequate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). He
orders the parties to undertake the obligations set forth in the
Settlement Agreement that arise out of the Order.

Judge Anello awards (i) attorneys' fees to the Class Counsel in the
amount of $350,000 and costs in the amount of $8,581.33; and (ii)
the Plaintiff an incentive payment for work performed as the class
representative in the amount of $15,000.

Judge Anello directs the Clerk of Court to enter a separate
judgment of dismissal in accordance therewith, and to close the
case.

Without affecting the finality of the Order, the Court maintains
jurisdiction over the matter for purpose of enforcing the
Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ckxtr5pm from Leagle.com.


RASH CURTIS: Distribution of $75.6M Deal in Perez Suit Partly OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IGNACIO PEREZ, Plaintiff, v. RASH CURTIS & ASSOCIATES,
Defendant, Case No. 4:16-cv-03396-YGR (N.D. Cal.), Judge Yvonne
Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California issues an order granting in part the
proposed part of distribution of settlement proceeds, including an
award of attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses and service award for
the class representative.

Following a one-week trial, a jury found in favor of Plaintiff
Ignacio Perez, individually, and the class members, and against
Defendant Rash Curtis, awarding over $267 million ("Perez I"). The
size of the award was the result of a mathematical calculation
assessing statutory damages of $500 for each call made in violation
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. sections 227,
et seq. ("TCPA").

With such an obviously enormous award, at the close of trial, the
Court encouraged the parties to attempt to settle the matter given
the prospect of significant post-trial work, including appeals.
Ultimately, Plaintiff Perez and the Defendant, through its
bankruptcy counsel, agreed to an assignment of the Defendant's bad
faith claim against its insurer. Based thereon, Plaintiff Perez
filed suit in Perez v Indian Harbor Insurance Company, et al.,
19-cv-7288-YGR ("Perez II") in his fiduciary capacity. That case is
also pending before the Court and an appeal of the judgment in
Perez I proceeded.

The Plaintiffs have now entered into a settlement agreement with
the Defendant insurance company in Perez II to resolve the action
for payment of $75.6 million. The Plaintiff thus seeks an order (1)
confirming the Court's prior approval of the Assignment; (2)
approving Perez's entry into the Perez II Settlement Agreement as
fiduciary and class representative for the class was authorized and
fair, reasonable, and equitable; (3) approving the selection of an
Administrator for distribution of the recovery; (4) approving the
plan for distribution of the recovery as fair, reasonable and
adequate; (5) determining that the Final Judgment in Perez I will
be deemed satisfied upon the Administrator's receipt of payment;
and (6) dismissing the Perez II lawsuit with prejudice upon the
Administrator's receipt of payment, per the Agreement.

The Ninth Circuit issued a limited remand to the Court to address
these issues giving the Court jurisdiction to do so.

Having tried the underlying action, having presided over the
incredibly litigious pretrial process, including having written
numerous orders discussing the issues giving rise to the judgment
in the case and Perez II, having read and considered the instant
motion, and good cause appearing, Judge Rogers issues her findings
and orders.

A. The Assignment

Judge Rogers affirms the Court's prior approval of the Assignment.

B. Perez II Settlement

With respect to the settlement of Perez II, even though it is not a
class action, but was brought by Plaintiff Perez in his fiduciary
capacity, Judge Rogers evaluates the settlement using the same core
principles it would apply with any class action settlement. She
finds the Perez II Settlement Agreement fair, reasonable, and
equitable, and therefore, appropriate for the Plaintiff to execute
as an authorized fiduciary and class representative. Accordingly,
Judge Rogers finds the Settlement Amount will be held in trust by
Perez through the Administrator for the benefit of the class
members.

C. Selection of an Administrator

After a competitive process, the Plaintiffs recommend Digital
Settlement Group, LLC to serve as Administrator.

Judge Rogers has reviewed the proffer and approves of the
Administrator who intends to facilitate the collection of class
members' data to transmit to class counsel; create and host a
website containing detailed information about the recovery,
including important dates, deadlines, and Frequently Asked
Questions; facilitate payments to class members; and assist in
facilitating the tax reporting process. She finds that these
actions are likely to reach as many class members as is reasonably
likely.

She appoints Digital Settlement Group, LLC as the Administrator to
hold, administer and disburse the Settlement Amount, to report
periodically to the Court and the parties about the status of the
distributions including one within 30 days of the anticipated
second distribution, and to file a final accounting within 60 days
of the final distribution in accordance with the District's
Guidelines for Class Settlements.

D. Plan of Distribution

The plan of distribution has five components: (1) distribution of
funds to class members; (2) payment of an incentive award; (3)
payment of administration fees; (4) payment of litigation expenses;
(5) payment of attorneys' fees.

1. Distribution of Funds to Class Members

Judge Rogers has reviewed the plan set forth in the Aug. 19, 2021
declaration of Mark Schey and finds it fair, adequate, and
reasonable, including that the intent is to not require a cy pres
recipient, instead favoring, and anticipating, a second round of
distributions. To the extent any funds remain after a second round
of distributions pursuant to the Plan of Distribution, Plaintiff
Perez will make an application to the Court for the appointment of
an appropriate cy pres recipient. No reversion will be made.

2. Payment of an Incentive Award

The Plaintiff came forward to represent the interests of 61,705
class members, with very little personally to gain, as the
Plaintiff's individual alleged damages were $1,149.26. He
participated fully through discovery and throughout trial,
including testifying. He also then participated in a second
lawsuit. Because the laws are not self-enforcing, it is appropriate
to give incentives to those who come forward with little to gain
and at personal risk and who work to achieve a settlement that
confers substantial benefits on others, Judge Rogers holds. Thus,
she approves the requested disbursement of $25,000 to Plaintiff
Perez as a service award for his participation and role as class
representative in Perez I and his efforts as a fiduciary for the
class members in Perez II.

3. Payment of Administration Fees

The Plaintiffs seek disbursements for Administration expenses as
incurred up to a cap of $650,000 but estimates the actual cost of
administration to be $392,680. This constitutes approximately 0.86
percentage of the Settlement Fund. Again, Judge Rogers has reviewed
the plan and finds it reasonable in order to reach the 61,705 class
members and distribute the funds to them, including a likely second
round of distributions. She finds the amount reasonable.

4. Payment of Litigation Expenses

The Plaintiffs seek disbursements for expenses of $5,856,525.80
which constitutes: $556,525.80 in expenses incurred in litigating
Perez I ($277,416.28) and Perez II ($279,109.52); $300,000 class
counsel payment to Fincorp for brokering a litigation funding
agreement; and $5,000,000 class counsel payment to Omni Net
Expense, effectively as its investment share for funding the
litigation by providing $10 million in funding.

Judge Rogers finds that traditional litigation expenses are
appropriate generally but not those related to litigation
financing. She has reviewed the submission with respect to the
request for $556,525.80 and finds these amounts to be reasonable
expenses to Bursor & Fisher, P.A., which will be reimbursed the
same. With respect to the reimbursement of monies expended for
litigation financing, Judge Rogers finds on principal that those
amounts should not be charged to the class. Thus, sheis not
inclined to approve costs which fundamentally relate to the cost of
doing business.

5. Payment of Attorneys' Fees

In the Court's prior order, it found that payment of fees in the
amount of one-third were fair and reasonable and confirms that
finding here without repeating the analysis. Judge Rogers does note
that the class counsel's billings for both cases total
$5,830,155.00. A fee award of 33.33% of the recovery given the
Settlement Amount would result in a distribution of $25.2 million
representing a multiplier of 4.32 over the base lodestar.

Given the recovery to the class, Judge Rogers will authorize
distribution of thirty-seven percent of the Settlement Amount to
account for the fact that one of the two cases did in fact go to
trial and under the agreement with Plaintiff Perez, the class
counsel could have sought authorization of 40% for that matter.
Thirty-seven percent totals $27,972,000 which increases the class
counsel's lodestar to 4.8 and will address, in part, the class
counsel's independent decision to enter into a litigation funding
agreement.

Conclusion

As the Administrator, DSG will distribute the Settlement Funds
consistent with the contents of the Order including (i) payment of
$25,000 to plaintiff Perez as an incentive award; (ii)
reimbursement to class counsel of $556,525.80 for authorized
expenses; (iii) payment of attorneys' fees to the class counsel in
the amount of 37 percent of the Settlement Funds or $27,972,000.
The balance of $46,421,474.20 will be paid pro rata per call
representing $86.82 per call out of the statutory award of $500 per
call.

Within five business days of the Administrator's receipt of payment
of the Settlement Funds, the class counsel will file a notice in
Perez I indicating that judgment has been satisfied and file a
dismissal with prejudice in Perez II.

The Order terminates Docket Number 451.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/jdsecau6 from Leagle.com.


RECORE KNOXVILLE: FLSA Certification in Ingram Suit Endorsed
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BYRON INGRAM, and STEVEN DUNLAP, individually, and on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated current and
former employees, Plaintiffs v. RECORE KNOXVILLE, LLC, ROCORE
THERMAL SYSTEMS, LLC, and KELVION, INC., a/k/a/ KELVION COMPANY,
Defendants, Case No. 3:20-cv-00423-TAV-DCP (E.D. Tenn.), Magistrate
Judge Debra C. Poplin of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee, Knoxville, recommends that the Plaintiffs'
Motion for FLSA Conditional Certification be granted to the extent
outlined in the parties' Stipulation and that the parties' proposed
Order be entered.

The case is before Judge Poplin pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636,
the Rules of the Court, and the referral Order of the District
Judge. Now before the Court is the Plaintiffs' Motion for FLSA
Conditional Certification.

After the Plaintiffs moved for conditional certification, the
parties filed a Stipulation on Plaintiffs' Motion for Fair Labor
Standards Act Conditional Certification. A plaintiff alleging a
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") violation can bring a
representative action for similarly situated persons if the
plaintiffs meet two requirements: "1) the plaintiffs must actually
be 'similarly situated,' and 2) all plaintiffs must signal in
writing their affirmative consent to participate in the action."

"The district court may use its discretion to authorize
notification of similarly situated employees to allow them to opt
into the lawsuit." Typically, courts have utilized a two-phase
process in determining whether the proposed plaintiffs are
similarly situated. The first phase takes place at the beginning of
discovery, and the second phase occurs after opt-in forms have been
disbursed and returned and discovery has been completed.

Judge Poplin finds that the instant case is at the first stage of
certifying a representative class. The purpose of the first stage,
or conditional certification, is to provide notice to potential
plaintiffs and to present them with an opportunity to opt in."
During the first stage, the standard for certification is "fairly
lenient" and requires only "a modest factual showing" that the
plaintiff is similarly situated to the other employees they seek to
notify. While "lead plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the
opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated to the lead plaintiffs,"
requests for conditional certification "typically result in
'conditional certification' of a representative class."

In the instant matter, the Stipulation states that the parties have
agreed to conditional certification and the issuance of
Court-approved notice to all individuals Defendants employed as
hourly-paid employees at the Knoxville, Tennessee, facility from
July 30, 2018, until the present. The parties also filed their
stipulated Notice to Potential Class Members and Consent to Join
Collective Action as an exhibit to the Stipulation.

Judge Poplin has reviewed the parties' Stipulation, proposed Order,
Notice, and Consent and finds them well taken. Accordingly, given
the parties' Stipulation, she recommends that the Plaintiffs'
Motion for FLSA Conditional Certification be granted to the extent
outlined in the parties' Stipulation and that the parties' proposed
Order be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Report &
Recommendation is available at https://tinyurl.com/557rjmet from
Leagle.com.


SAUNDRA THURMAN-CUSTIS: Court Certifies Lacaprucia Settlement Class
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned SUE LACAPRUCIA, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly-situated, v. SAUNDRA
THURMAN-CUSTIS, et al., Case No. 4:20-cv-00849-BCW (W.D. Mo.), the
Hon. Judge Brian C. Wimes entered an order:

   1. granting the Plaintiffs' renewed motion for preliminary
      settlement approval;

   2. certifying the proposed settlement class, which is defined
      as follows:

      "All persons employed by Crystal Enterprises, Inc., at
      Whiteman Air Force Base, performing work under the CBA in
      effect between Crystal Enterprises and UNITE-HERE,from
      October 1, 2009, through September 30, 2010, who did not
      have TRICARE health benefits and therefore were subject to
      payment of health and welfare contributions into a 401(k)
      Plan;"

   3. approving that notice is to be sent to Class Members; and

   4. setting a Final Fairness Hearing for Thursday, January 6,
      2022, at 9:00 am via telephone conference.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3pdXY2w at no extra charge.[CC]

SKYWEST INC: Meek Suit Seeks to Certify Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned CODY MEEK, JEREMY BARNES, and
CORYELL ROSS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, v. SKYWEST, INC. and SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC., Case No.
3:17-cv-01012-JD (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter
an order, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, for
certification of a class action on the following claims and the
appointment of Class Counsel.

  -- Shift Trade Overtime Claim (Count III):

     The Plaintiffs seek certification of their claims for
     unpaid overtime wages when they traded shifts with a co-
     worker and worked in excess of eight hours in a day or 40
     hours in a week but were not paid overtime wages pursuant
     to SkyWest's payroll policies, thereby violating the Cal.
     Lab. Code sections 510, 511, 514, and 1194.

  -- San Francisco QSP Minimum Wage Claim (Count VII):

     The Plaintiffs seek certification of their claims for
     Frontline Employees on behalf of a Subclass (the "SFO QSP
     Subclass") who worked at least one shift at the San
     Francisco International Airport ("SFO") during the Class
     Period when the Frontline Employee's hourly wage rate fell
     below the minimum wage rate required by the Quality
     Services Program ("QSP") set by the San Francisco Airport
     Commission, thereby violating Cal. Lab. Code section 1197.

  -- Meal Break Claim (Count II):

     The Plaintiffs seek certification on behalf of Frontline
     Employees who worked for more than five hours during at
     least one shift and (1) did not receive a meal period that
     began before the end of the fifth hour of work and/or who
     worked for more than ten hours on a shift and did not
     receive a second meal period that began before the end of
     the tenth hour of work; (2) had a meal period shortened
     less than the 30 minutes required; and/or (3) had an
     untimely meal period delayed after the fifth hour of work,
     and for which SkyWest uniformly failed to pay missed meal
     break premium wages as required by Cal. Wage Order 9-2001
     section 11(A)-(B), and Cal. Lab. Code sections 226.7(c) and
     512.

  -- Rest Break Claim (Count II):

     The Plaintiffs seek certification on behalf of Frontline
     Employees who worked at least one shift in which they
     either (1) did not receive at least ten minutes of rest
     time for each four hours of work in violation of Cal. Wage
     Order 9-2001 section 12(A); (2) had a rest period shortened
     from the ten minutes required; and/or (3) had an untimely
     rest period that were delayed so that rest periods were not
     taken near the middle of each four-hour block of their
     shift, for which SkyWest uniformly failed to pay one hour
     of compensation for each workday that the rest period was
     not provided as required by Cal. Wage Order 9-2001 section
     12(B), Cal. Lab. Code 18 sections 226.7(c).

  -- Grace Period Claim (Count I):

     The Plaintiffs seek certification on behalf of Frontline
     Employees who worked at least one shift in the State of
     California during the Class Period during which they were
     unpaid for all time from punch-in to punch-out as a result
     of SkyWest's uniform policy of paying wages according to
     employees' scheduled hours. Plaintiffs seek certification
     of to pursue claims for (1) failure to pay all minimum and
     overtime wages due, (2) unfair business practices (Count
     V), and (3) waiting time penalties (Count VI).

  -- Derivative Claims (Count V and VI):

     As is common in wage and hour class actions, when a claim
     for a substantive violation of law is certified, Plaintiffs
     also seek certification of the "Derivative Claims" arising
     from: (1) the failure to pay all wages due and owing at the
     time of termination that entitles Frontline Employees to
     waiting time penalties consisting of up to 30 days of wages
     under Cal. Lab. Code sections 201, 202, and 203; and (2)
     certification of a claim under California's Unfair
     Competition Law ("UCL"), Bus. & Prof. Code sections 17200,
     et seq., which entitles aggrieved employees to obtain a
     four-year look back on the statute of limitations
     applicable to their claims.


In the Plaintiffs' consolidated class action complaint ("CAC"), the
proposed Class members consist of:

     "all individuals currently or formerly employed by the
     Defendants SkyWest Airlines, Inc. and SkyWest, Inc.
     ("SkyWest") as Frontline Employees who worked on the ground
     and were paid on an hourly basis ("Frontline Employees")
     for at least one shift in the State of California at any
     time from February 27, 2013 through October 18, 2020 (the
     "Class Period")."

The Plaintiffs Cody Meek, Jeremy Barnes, and Coryell Ross, each of
whom were employed by SkyWest as Frontline Employees at various
airports in California, seek appointment as representatives of the
Class. Based on data produced to date, the Plaintiffs believe the
number of Class members is approximately 1700 persons. If
necessary, the Plaintiffs alternatively seek certification of a
certain subclass should the Court deem that appropriate pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(5).

SkyWest. is the holding company for SkyWest Airlines, a North
American regional airline, and an aircraft leasing company and is
headquartered in St. George, Utah.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Oct. 8,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2YXHfWI
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gregory F. Coleman (pro hac vice)
          Lisa A. White (pro hac vice)
          GREG COLEMAN LAW PC
          First Tennessee Plaza
          800 S. Gay Street, Suite 1100
          Knoxville, TN 37929
          Telephone: (865) 247-0080
          Facsimile: (865) 522-0049
          E-mail: greg@gregcolemanlaw.com
                  lisa@gregcolemanlaw.com
                  gcolemanlaw.com

               - and -

          Mitchell M. Breit, Esq.
          Thien An Vinh Truong, Esq.
          SIMMONS HANLY CONROY LLC
          112 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016-7416
          Telephone: (212) 784-6400
          Facsimile: (212) 213-5949
          E-mail: mbreit@simmonsfirm.com
                  atruong@simmonsfirm.com

               - and -

          Laurence D. King, Esq.
          Matthew B. George, Esq.
          Mario M. Choi, Esq.
          KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
          1999 Harrison Street, Suite 1560
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (415) 772-4700
          Facsimile: (415) 772-4707
          E-mail: lking@kaplanfox.com
                  mgeorge@kaplanfox.com
                  mchoi@kaplanfox.com

SNAP FINANCE: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in Wesley TCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant SNAP FINANCE LLC filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled BRANDI WESLEY, on behalf of herself
and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SNAP FINANCE LLC,
Defendant. SNAP FINANCE LLC, Third-Party Plaintiff v. DERRICK DEON
JACKSON, JR., a/k/a DERRICK JOHNSON, Third-Party Defendant, Case
No. 2:20-cv-148-RJS-JCB, in the United States District Court for
the District of Utah - Salt Lake City.

Plaintiff Wesley brings the action against Defendant Snap, seeking
class-wide relief under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. Section 227. The TCPA prohibits placing
certain calls to a number assigned to a cellular telephone service
using an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) and/or
artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without
consent.

Snap is a financial services company located in West Valley City,
Utah. Wesley alleges Snap started placing calls to her cellular
telephone number in November 2019. From Nov. 6, 2019 through Feb.
7, 2020, Wesley alleges Snap placed at least 60 calls to her
cellphone number. During that time, Snap left at least eight
artificial or prerecorded voice messages on Wesley's cellphone
voicemail.   

Ms. Wesley filed the lawsuit on March 6, 2020. On Dec. 4, 2020,
Wesley filed an Amended Complaint. In it, Wesley brings one claim
against Snap under the TCPA alleging two alternative theories of
liability: first, that Snap violated the TCPA through its use of an
automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS), and second, that Snap
violated the TCPA by use of artificial or prerecorded voice.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Oct. 4, 2021, Judge
Robert J. Shelby of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Utah (i) denied the Defendant's Motion to Exclude the Testimony of
Wesley's Class Notice Expert; and (ii) granted the Plaintiff's
Motion to Certify a Class.

The Defendant seeks a review of this order.

The appellate case is captioned as Snap Finance v. Wesley, Case No.
21-600, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, filed on Oct. 5, 2021.[BN]

Defendant-Petitioner SNAP FINANCE LLC is represented by:

          Martin Christopher Bryce, Jr., Esq.
          Jenny Nicole Perkins, Esq.
          BALLARD SPAHR
          1735 Market Street, 51st Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 665-8500

               - and -

          Melanie J. Vartabedian, Esq.
          BALLARD SPAHR
          201 South Main Street, Suite 800
          Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2221
          Telephone: (801) 531-3000

Plaintiff-Respondent BRANDI WESLEY, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Jason Greene, Esq.
          Jared D. Scott, Esq.
          ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
          50 West Broadway, Suite 600
          Salt Lake City, UT 84101
          Telephone: (801) 534-1700

               - and -

          Michael L. Greenwald, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL
          7601 North Federal Highway, Suite A-230
          Boca Raton, FL 33487

               - and -

          Curtis R. Hussey, Esq.
          HUSSEY LAW FIRM
          82 Plantation Pointe Road # 288
          Fairhope, AL 36532  

               - and -

          Alexander D. Kruzyk, Esq.
          Aaron D. Radbil, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL
          106 East Sixth Street, Suite 913
          Austin, TX

SOUTH CAROLINA: Loses Summary Judgment Bid vs. Kenny, et al.
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned Kenny, et al., v. Wilson, et
al. Case No. 2:16-cv-02794-MBS (D.S.C.), the Hon. Judge Margaret B.
Seymour entered an order:

   1. dismissing the Plaintiffs Kenny and Nesmith from this
      action;

   2. denying the Defendant's motion for summary judgment;

   3. granting Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment;

   4. permanently enjoining the State's enforcement of S.C. Code
      Ann. section 16-17-530 as to elementary and secondary
      school students in South Carolina while they are attending
      school;

   5. permanently enjoining the State from retaining the records
      of the Disorderly Conduct Law Sub-Class and the Disturbing
      Schools Law Sub-Class, relating to being taken into
      custody, charges filed, adjudication, or disposition under
      S.C. Code Ann. Section 16-17-420, prior to May 17, 2018,
      and under S.C. Code Ann. section 16-17-530, except as
      would be permissible following expungement under S.C. Code
      Ann. section 17-1-40;

   6. retaining jurisdiction over this action for the purpose of
      addressing issues that should arise with respect to
      implementation of the Injunctions and to enforce the
      Injunctions.

The Plaintiffs Kenny, Nesmith, D.S., S.P., and D.D. are or were
enrolled in the South Carolina public school system. The Plaintiff
Girls Rock Charleston, Inc. is a nonprofit organization "whose
members are directly impacted by and face ongoing risk of arrest or
referral under S.C. Code section 16-17-420." Together, the
Plaintiffs asserted a challenge pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sections 1983
that the Disturbing Schools Law, codified at S.C. Code Ann. section
16-17-420, is unconstitutional on its face and the Disorderly
Conduct Law, codified at S.C. Code Ann. section 16-17-530, is
unconstitutional as applied to children in public school grades
K-12.

The Defendant Alan Wilson is sued in his official capacity as
Attorney General of South Carolina.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3BZGOt2 at no extra charge.[CC]


ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE: Claims in Croce's First Amended Suit Narrowed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JENNIFER CROCE, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF and ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE NEW YORK,
Defendant, Index No. 610886/2020 (N.Y. Sup.), Judge Carmen Victoria
St. George of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, granted in part
and denied in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the First
Amended Complaint.

Background

The action arises from the global coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic
of 2020 that caused our way of life to be radically altered. Aside
from the terrible toll that the virus has taken on humanity, the
virus simultaneously led to the sweeping and sudden closure of
businesses and institutions, including higher education
institutions such as colleges and universities, and even our
courts, in order to stem the tide of person-to-person transmission.
Rapid adjustments were made to online platforms so that the
business and activities of the world could continue to function to
some degree. Generally speaking, colleges and universities ceased
providing in-person instruction and advised students to leave
campuses in mid-March 2020. The Defendant in the action was no
exception to that required pivot, in light of the pandemic.

The Plaintiff commenced the putative class action suit on Aug. 18,
2020. The First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleges three causes of
action sounding in breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and
conversion. At its core, the Plaintiff's first amended complaint
seeks to recover compensatory damages, and to disgorge "the
ill-gotten gains derived by defendant from its misconduct"
allegedly resulting from the Defendant's implementation of its
online only learning program that started on or about March 11,
2020, which is also the date that the defendant confirmed its first
case of COVID-19.

There is no dispute that the defendant properly implemented its
online learning platform in accord with the Governor's Executive
Order declaring a state of emergency on March 7, 2020, in response
to the pandemic. The gravamen of the Plaintiff's complaint is that
she seeks a pro rata refund of tuition and certain fees
proportionate to the amount of time that the college was closed to
in-person learning and transitioned to online learning on or about
March 11, 2020, because the "Defendant failed to provide the
in-person and on-campus services that were bargained for, promised
and agreed to."

The spring 2020 semester commenced on Jan. 21, 2020 and ended on
May 5, 2020. Accordingly, the last seven to eight weeks of the
semester were conducted online. The Court notes that the Plaintiff
was a senior in the spring 2020 semester, and that she graduated
and was awarded a degree in or about May 2020, having
satisfactorily completed her studies at the Defendant's institution
of higher learning.

Presently, the Defendant seeks dismissal of the entire complaint
pursuant to CPLR Section 3211(a)(7). Having been charged with
determining this motion, the Court set out to discover whether
there is any precedent arising from similar circumstances resulting
from the pandemic, and discovered that that there has been no
shortage of litigation commenced by college and university students
seeking refunds of tuition and fees since the onset of the pandemic
that, understandably, led to online learning.

Discussion

A. The Breach of Contract Claim Concerning Tuition

The FAC alleges that average yearly tuition was "around $14,295.00
for undergraduate students, and mandatory fees for each semester of
approximately $305 including a college fee of $125, a parking
permit fee of $5, a student activities fee of $75, and a technology
fee of $100 ('Mandatory Fees')," and that the tuition was paid to
receive a "first-rate education and on-campus, in-person,
educational experiences," while the mandatory fees were paid for
services and facilities that were simply not provided.

Judge St. George holds that the Plaintiff's breach of contract
claim as to tuition is insufficiently pled because she fails to
identify any specific language indicating or even suggesting a
promise of in-person instruction. "A promise must be written and
specific for that promise to be enforced as a term of the implied
educational contract between student and university." The Plaintiff
has not adequately alleged a claim for breach of contract as to
in-person instruction, and so that claim is dismissed.

B. The Breach of Contract Claim Concerning Mandatory Fees

In the context of this motion, and at this early stage of the case,
Judge St. George holds that the Plaintiff has adequately set forth
a claim with respect to at least some of the fees paid. She notes
that the Defendant acknowledges that it has already reversed the
parking fee on the Plaintiff's account. The student activities
referred to in the FAC encompass fees for participation in various
organizations, including athletic activities through involvement in
sports (intramural and inter-collegiate), cultural life (lectures,
theatre productions, dance performances), Greek life, and
intramural and recreational activities. It is reasonable to
conclude that the sporting activities, Greek life, intramural
activities, and cultural activities could not, and did not, take
place due to the pandemic since those activities would likely have
involved person-to-person contact. Accordingly, as to the $75
Student Activity fee, the Plaintiff has plausibly stated a claim
for breach of contract.

As to the $125 College Fee and the $100 Technology Fee, the FAC
makes no factual allegation as to any alleged promise by the
Defendant, how the Defendant would apply these fees, or that the
Defendant breached any promise in connection with these fees, other
than to seek reimbursement in whole or in part for them. The
Defendant offers in support of its motion that the College Fee is
applied to maintain student records, which would have had to be
accomplished whether or not instruction was delivered in-person or
online.

Judge St. George further notes that the Plaintiff graduated from
the Defendant College; therefore, the Defendant apparently
maintained the appropriate records reflecting that the Plaintiff
was entitled to the award of a degree. As to the Technology Fee,
there is no allegation in the FAC that the Defendant failed to
provide technological services or breached some other promise in
connection with this specific fee; rather, it appears that the
defendant must have provided those technological services since the
Plaintiff was able to successfully complete her course of study.

C. The Unjust Enrichment Claim

The FAC alleges that, "in the alternative, the Plaintiff brings
this claim for unjust enrichment," summarily averring that the
Defendant "has been unjustly enriched," and that the Defendant's
"acts were unjust for them to keep money for services they did not
render." however, the allegations made in paragraphs 87 through 96
are duplicative of the claims asserted in connection with the
breach of contract claim.

In the FAC, Judge St. George holds that the Plaintiff fails to
allege any facts showing that "equity and good conscience" require
a refund of any of her tuition or of the fees for which she has
failed to state a breach of a contractual obligation: the
Defendant's actions were not arbitrarily undertaken, but were
mandated pursuant to the New York Governor's Executive Orders; the
Plaintiff continued to attend her classes in an online format, and
she was awarded a degree in May, 2020, thereby receiving the
benefit of the course credits.

As to the plausibly-stated claim for breach of contract concerning
the $75 Student Activity Fee, the unjust enrichment claim cannot
lie because it is duplicative of the breach of contract claim
(Goldman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 5 N.Y.3d 561
[2005]). Accordingly, the cause of action for unjust enrichment is
dismissed in its entirety.

D. The Claim for Conversion

Judge St. George notes that the FAC allegations for this claim
plead an "express understanding that the Defendant would provide
in-person educational experiences, opportunities, and services,"
which is the same harm alleged in her breach of contract cause of
action, warranting dismissal on this basis. "A conversion claim may
only succeed if a plaintiff alleges wrongs and damages distinct
from those predicated on a breach of contract." The FAC does not
allege any wrongful act that is separately actionable.

Judge St. George also notes that the Plaintiff makes no allegation
whatsoever in this regard, and her argument in opposition merely
asserting that, the "Plaintiff has pled each of these elements by
alleging that the Defendant wrongfully retained and refused to
refund her tuition and fees" is nothing more than circular
reasoning that is conclusory and unpersuasive.

E. FAC Request for Class Certification

Judge St. George declines to certify the class naming the Plaintiff
as representative at this juncture, without prejudice to the
Plaintiff making a separate motion for that relief.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge St. George granted in part and
denied in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss as follows: (i)
the unjust enrichment and conversion claims are dismissed; (ii) the
Plaintiff's breach of contract claim related to the Student
Activity Fee ($75) survives, but not the claims related to the
College Fee ($125) or the Technology Fee ($100); and (iii) the
Plaintiff's breach of contract claim related to tuition is
dismissed. The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the
Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/sym5wvn2 from Leagle.com.

Michael Alexander Tompkins, Esq., Leeds Brown Law, P.C., at 1 Old
Country Road, Suite 347, in Carle Place, New York 11514, for the
Plaintiff.

Dianna D. McCarthy, Esq. -- dmccarthy@kbrlaw.com -- Kaufman
Borgeest & Ryan LLP, at 120 Broadway, 14th Floor, in New York City,
New York 10271, for the Defendant.


ST. LOUIS, MO: Court Amends Case Management Order in Cody Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned JAMES CODY, et al., v. CITY
OF ST. LOUIS, Case No. 4:17-cv-02707-AGF (E.D. Mo.), the Hon. Judge
Audrey G. Fleissig entered an order:

   1. granting in part Defendant's motion to amend case
      management order;

   2. amending case management order as follows:

      -- Any further motions for summary judgment or motions for
         judgment on the pleadings must be filed no later than
         21 days after the Court rules on Plaintiffs' pending
         motion for class certification on their damages claims

      -- Responses shall be filed no later than 28 days after
         the motion is filed, and any reply may be filed no
         later than 14 days thereafter.

      -- Except as amended herein, the Case Management Order
         shall remain in effect.

St. Louis is a major city in Missouri along the Mississippi River.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3vonlzL at no extra charge.[CC]

STAR PAPA: Willich Sues Over Delivery Drivers' Unpaid Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT WILLICH and JENNIFER MORAN, each individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. STAR PAPA, LP, Case No.
6:21-cv-01044-ADA-JCM (W.D. Tex., Oct. 6, 2021) arises from the
Defendant's failure to pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated
minimum wages and overtime premiums pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Mr. Willich and Ms. Moran were employed by the Defendant as
hourly-paid delivery drivers from March of 2016 until present and
from 2019 until February of 2021, respectively.

Star Papa LP owns and operates multiple Papa John's pizza
restaurant franchises throughout Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Kirkpatrick Plaza
          10800 Financial Centre Pkwy, Suite 510
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

TARVALD ANTHONY SMITH: Court Certifies Class in Ryan Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned JOSHUA RYAN, et al, v.
TARVALD ANTHONY SMITH, et al., Case No. 3:20-cv-00843-SDD-SDJ (M.D.
La.), the Hon. Judge Shelly D. Dick entered an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "All individuals who are detained after their arrests and
      who will be subjected to the initial bail callout hearings
      by Judge Tarvald Smith, Judge Ronald Johnson, Judge Eboni
      Johnson Rose, and Commissioner Nicole Robinson;" and

   2. appointing Plaintiffs as class representatives; and

   3. appointing their counsel of record as class counsel
      pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g).

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3DRFl8H at no extra charge.[CC]



TEAM INDUSTRIAL: C.D. California Consolidates Thai & Esqueda Suits
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL THAI, Plaintiff v. TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES,
INC. et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-03319-FLA (GJSx) (C.D.
Cal.), Judge Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha of the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California:

     (1) denies the Plaintiff Thai's Motion to Remand;

     (2) denies the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to First a First
         Amended Complaint; and

     (3) consolidates the action with the related case styled
         Alex Esqueda v. Team Industrial Services, Inc., et al.,
         Case No. 2:21-cv-03321-FLA (GJSx).

The Plaintiff filed the action against the Defendant in Los Angeles
Superior Court on June 24, 2019.

In the class action Complaint, the Plaintiff brings the following
causes of action: (1) Unfair Competition in Violation of California
Business and Professions Code Section 17200, et seq.; (2) Failure
to Pay Minimum Wages in Violation of California Labor Code Sections
1194, 1197, and 1197.1; (3) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages in
Violation of California Labor Code Section 510, et seq.; (4)
Failure to Provide Required Meal Periods in Violation of California
Labor Code Sections 226.7 and 512 and the Applicable IWC Wage
Order; (5) Failure to Provide Required Rest Periods in Violation of
California Labor Code Sections 226.7 and 512 and the Applicable IWC
Wage Order; (6) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Statements in
Violation of California Labor Code Section 226; (7) Failure to
Provide Wages When Due in Violation of California Labor Code
Sections 201, 202, and 203; (8) Violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act for Failure to Make Proper Disclosures as Required
Under 15 U.S.C. Section 1681, et seq.; (9) Violation of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act for Failure to Obtain Proper Authorization as
Required Under 15 U.S.C. Section 1681, et seq.; and (10) Violations
of the Private Attorney's General Act, California Labor Code
Section 2698, et seq.

The Defendant removed the action to federal court on April 16,
2021. In its Notice of Removal, the Defendant argues the Court has
jurisdiction over the action under the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d), because on March 17,
2021, the Plaintiff stated for the first time in a mediation brief
that the number of class members includes 2,000 employees and
generates over $225 million in potential damages. In response, the
Plaintiff argues that reliance on the confidential mediation brief
for removal purposes is improper.

On June 25, 2021, the Court ordered the parties to submit
supplemental briefing on three issues: (1) the reasonable estimate
of the Plaintiff's total class damages, including attorney's fees,
against the Defendant; (2) whether any confidentiality agreement
between the parties and/or evidentiary privilege applies to the
Plaintiff's damages estimate in its mediation brief, and whether
any legal authority bars the Court from considering that estimate
for the limited purpose of determining CAFA amount-in-controversy
jurisdiction; and (3) whether the action should be consolidated
with the related Esqueda action. Both parties submitted
supplemental briefs on July 9, 2021.

Discussion

A. Motion to Remand

1. Timeliness

The Defendant alleges removal is timely under 28 U.S.C. Section
1446(b)(3) because the notice of removal was filed on April 16,
2021, which was within 30 days of service of the Plaintiff's March
17, 2021 mediation brief, in which the Defendant learned for the
first time that jurisdiction pursuant to CAFA is proper. The
Plaintiff argues the Defendant's removal was untimely because the
Defendant could have ascertained the potential amount in
controversy from information in its possession before the Plaintiff
served the mediation brief, and asserts it is "disingenuous" for
Defendant to claim that it learned the amount in controversy from
the Plaintiff's brief.

Judge Aenlle-Rocha disagrees and finds the Defendant's removal was
timely. First, he says, if the face of the Complaint does not
reveal the case is removable, the Defendant does not have an
affirmative obligation to calculate the amount in controversy to
determine whether CAFA jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1446(b)(1). The Defendant, therefore, did not have any
obligation to provide its own estimate of the amount in controversy
and remove the case to federal court within 30 days of service of
the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1446(b)(1).

Second, removal was proper under 28 U.S.C. Section 1446(b)(3). The
Defendant had 30 days to remove the case after receipt of the
Plaintiff's mediation brief containing the damages estimate of over
$225 million. It removed the action on April 16, 2021, which was
within 30 days of being served the mediation brief. Accordingly,
removal was timely.

2. Amount-in-Controversy

As the parties do not contest CAFA's jurisdictional requirements of
minimum diversity and class numerosity, the sole remaining dispute
is whether CAFA's requirement that the amount in controversy exceed
$5 million is met. The Defendant submitted evidence on July 9,
2021, independent of the Plaintiff's mediation brief, demonstrating
that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. Specifically, it
estimates that the amount in controversy for the putative class
action is at least $20,677,697.70. It calculates this figure based
on the Plaintiff's 10 causes of action, the estimated class sizes
for each, the applicable limitation periods and statutory damages,
and average hourly pay rates.

The Plaintiff acknowledges the Defendant is in possession of "all
payroll information to provide a reasonable damages analysis to
support removal." Notably, he does not affirmatively disavow
damages meeting or exceeding $5 million, despite having alleged
that the aggregate amount in controversy is under this sum.

After reviewing the parties' papers, Judge Aenlle-Rocha is
satisfied that the Defendant's calculation is based on reasonable
assumptions, e.g., that putative class members experienced one-half
hour of unpaid overtime per workweek or were denied a meal break
once per workweek. He, therefore, concludes Defendant has met its
burden to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction under
CAFA.

The Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, therefore, is denied. Having
denied the motion on this basis, Judge Aenlle-Rocha need not
address the parties' arguments whether the Plaintiff's estimate
from his mediation brief supports federal jurisdiction under CAFA.

3. Plaintiff's Request to Strike

The Plaintiff requests the court strike the Declaration of Michael
Cross  because the statements (1) were improperly introduced and
are statutorily protected by the California mediation and
settlement privilege, and (2) are inadmissible hearsay. As Judge
Aenlle-Rocha did not rely on the Cross Declaration in resolving the
instant Motion to Remand, the request is denied as moot.

B. Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint

The Plaintiff also requests leave to file a First Amended Complaint
to add a breach of contract claim. He contends the Defendant
breached two non-disclosure agreements on April 16, 2021, when it
filed its notice of removal and relied on the damages estimate in
the Plaintiff's mediation brief for CAFA jurisdiction purposes.

The Plaintiff's proposed allegations concern the Defendant's
alleged noncompliance with confidentiality agreements entered into
during this litigation, and raise separate and distinct claims that
do not have any relationship to the existing claims for Labor Code
violations. The Plaintiff's proposed breach of contract claims are
more appropriately heard in state court as a separate lawsuit.
Accordingly, Judge Aenlle-Rocha denies the Plaintiff's Motion for
Leave to File a First Amended Complaint.

C. Consolidation

Judge Aenlle-Rocha finds that neither party opposes the
consolidation of the action with the related Esqueda action. Given
the overlapping questions of law and fact, he consolidates the two
actions for all purposes including, but not limited to, discovery,
pretrial proceedings, and trial. No further filings will be made or
accepted in the Esqueda action, and the file will be
administratively closed. All pleadings therein will maintain their
legal relevance. Any further pleadings or other filings received by
the Clerk of Court for Case No. 2:21-cv-03321-FLA (GJSx) will be
filed in the consolidated action bearing Case No. 2:21-cv-03319-FLA
(GJSx).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Aenlle-Rocha (1) denies the
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, (2) denies the Plaintiff's Motion for
Leave to File a First Amended Complaint, and (3) consolidates the
action with the Esqueda action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/6zjye6yx from Leagle.com.


TEAM INDUSTRIAL: California Court Consolidates Esqueda W/ Thai Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALEX ESQUEDA, Plaintiff v. TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES,
INC. et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-03321-FLA (GJSx) (C.D.
Cal.), Judge Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha of the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California:

    (i) denies the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand; and

   (ii) consolidates the action with the related case styled
        Michael Thai v. Team Industrial Services, Inc., et al.,
        Case No. 2:21-cv-03319-FLA (GJSx).

Background

The Plaintiff filed the action against the Defendant in Los Angeles
Superior Court on Aug. 26, 2020. In the class action Complaint, the
Plaintiff brings the following causes of action: (1) Failure to Pay
Wages Including Overtime as Required by California Labor Code
Sections 510 and 1194; (2) Failure to Provide Meal Periods as
Required by California Labor Code Sections 226. 7 and 512; (3)
Failure to Provide Rest Periods as Required by California Labor
Code Sections 226.7 and 512; (4) Failure to Pay Timely Wages as
Required by California Labor Code Section 203; (5) Failure to
Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements as Required by California
Labor Code Section 226; and (6) Violation of Business & Professions
Code Section 17200 et seq.

The Defendant removed the action to federal court on April 16,
2021. In its Notice of Removal, it argues the Court has
jurisdiction over the action under the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d). Specifically, the
Defendant argues removal is proper because on March 17, 2021, the
Plaintiff stated for the first time in a mediation brief in the
related Thai action that the number of class members includes 2,000
employees and that potential damages exceed $225 million. According
to the Defendant, the Plaintiff's claims here are "similar, if not
identical, to those brought by the Thai Plaintiff," and the
mediation brief was submitted on behalf of both Plaintiffs Thai and
Esqueda. In response, the Plaintiff argues that reliance on the
confidential mediation brief for removal purposes is improper.

On June 25, 2021, the Court ordered the parties to submit
supplemental briefing on three issues: (1) the reasonable estimate
of Plaintiff's total class damages, including attorney's fees,
against the Defendant; (2) whether any confidentiality agreement
between the parties and/or evidentiary privilege applies to the
Plaintiff's damages estimate in his mediation brief, and whether
any legal authority bars the Court from considering that estimate
for the limited purpose of determining CAFA amount-in-controversy
jurisdiction; and (3) whether the action should be consolidated
with the related Thai action. Both parties submitted supplemental
briefs on July 9, 2021.

Analysis

1. Timeliness

The Defendant alleges removal is timely under 28 U.S.C. Section
1446(b)(3) because the notice of removal was filed on April 16,
2021, which was within 30 days of service of the Plaintiff's March
17, 2021 mediation brief, in which the Defendant learned for the
first time that jurisdiction pursuant to CAFA is proper. The
Plaintiff argues the Defendant's removal was untimely because it
could have ascertained the potential amount in controversy from
information in its possession before the Plaintiff served the
mediation brief, and asserts it is "disingenuous" for Defendant to
claim that it learned the amount in controversy from the
Plaintiff's brief.

Judge Aenlle-Rocha disagrees and finds that the Defendant's removal
was timely. First, if the face of the Complaint does not reveal the
case is removable, the Defendant does not have an affirmative
obligation to calculate the amount in controversy to determine
whether CAFA jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. Section
1446(b)(1). Second, removal was proper under 28 U.S.C. Section
1446(b)(3).

2. Amount-in-Controversy

As the parties do not contest CAFA's jurisdictional requirements of
minimum diversity and class numerosity, the sole remaining dispute
is whether CAFA's requirement that the amount in controversy exceed
$5 million is met. In response to the Court's order for
supplemental briefing in the action, the Defendant submitted
evidence on July 9, 2021, independent of the Plaintiff's mediation
brief, demonstrating that the amount in controversy exceeds $5
million. Specifically, it estimates that the amount in controversy
for the putative class action is at least $23,311,735.90. It
calculates this figure based on the Plaintiff's six causes of
action, the estimated class sizes for each, the applicable
limitation periods and statutory damages, and average hourly pay
rates.

The Plaintiff does not affirmatively disavow damages meeting or
exceeding $5 million, despite having alleged in the Complaint that
the aggregate amount in controversy is under this sum.

After reviewing the parties' papers, Judge Aenlle-Rocha is
satisfied that the Defendant's calculation is based on reasonable
assumptions, e.g., that putative class members experienced 1.5
hours of unpaid overtime per workweek or were denied a meal break
once per workweek. He, therefore, concludes the Defendant has met
its burden to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction under
CAFA.

The Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, therefore, is denied. Having
denied the motion on this basis, Judge Aenlle-Rocha need not
address the parties' arguments whether the Plaintiff's estimate
from his mediation brief supports federal jurisdiction under CAFA.

3. Plaintiff's Request to Strike

The Plaintiff requests the court strike the Declaration of Michael
Cross because the statements (1) were improperly introduced and are
statutorily protected by the California mediation and settlement
privilege, and (2) are inadmissible hearsay. As Judge Aenlle-Rocha
did not rely on the Cross Declaration in resolving the instant
Motion to Remand, he denied as moot the request.

3. Consolidation

Neither party opposes the consolidation of this action with the
related Thai action. Given the overlapping questions of law and
fact, Judge Aenlle-Rocha consolidates the two actions for all
purposes including, but not limited to, discovery, pretrial
proceedings, and trial. No further filings will be made or accepted
in this action, and the file will be administratively closed. All
pleadings therein will maintain their legal relevance. Any further
pleadings or other filings received by the Clerk of Court for Case
No. 2:21-cv-03321-FLA (GJSx) will be filed in the consolidated
action bearing Case No. 2:21-cv-03319-FLA (GJSx).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Aenlle-Rocha (1) denies the
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, and (2) consolidates the action with
Thai.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/8busfmff from Leagle.com.


TOTAL LIFE: Nov. 8 Extension to File Class Cert. Bid Sought
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned ASHLEY MILLER, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. TOTAL LIFE
CHANGES, LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-00095-JRH-BKE (S.D. Ga.), the
Parties ask the Court to enter an order extending the deadline for
the plaintiff to file her motion for class certification through
and including November 8, 2021.

Total Life offers health, wellness, and beauty products.

A copy of the Parties's motion dated Oct. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3lPIJe6 at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chloe A. Raimey, Esq.
          NICHOLAS KASTER, PLLP
          4700 IDS Center 80 South 8th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402

The Defendant is represented by:

          Travis Martin Cashbaugh, Esq.
          FREEMAN MATHIS & GARY, LLP
          100 Galleria Parkway, Suite 1600
          Atlanta, GA 30339
          Telephone: (770) 818-0000
          Facsimile: (770) 937-9960

TRAVELERS CASUALTY: Ninth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Mudpie Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MUDPIE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant v. TRAVELERS
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee, Case No.
20-16858 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirms the district court's order dismissing Mudpie's
claims against Travelers.

Background

Mudpie operates a children's store located in San Francisco that
sells clothing, toys, books, and other goods. It alleges that it
purchased a comprehensive commercial liability and property
insurance policy from Travelers, and made a claim pursuant to the
Policy's "Business Income" and "Extra Expense" coverage in 2020
after state and local authorities in California issued several
public health orders in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Mudpie
claimed the orders prevented it from operating its store. Travelers
denied the claim. Mudpie filed a putative class action seeking
declaratory relief and asserting claims for breach of contract and
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

On March 4, 2020, Gov. Gavin Newsom declared a state of emergency
in California in response to the threat posed by COVID-19. Governor
Newsom issued an executive order on March 12, 2020, that "all
California residents are to heed any orders and guidance of state
and local public health officials, including but not limited to the
imposition of social distancing measures, to control the spread of
COVID-19."

The City and County of San Francisco issued a "Shelter in Place
Order" on March 16, 2020. This order required residents to remain
at their place of residence unless performing "essential
activities." The Shelter in Place Order also declared that "all
businesses with a facility in the County, except Essential
Businesses, are required to cease all activities at facilities
located within the County except Minimum Basic Operations." Failure
to comply with San Francisco's Shelter in Place Order was deemed a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine, imprisonment, or both.

On March 19, 2020, Governor Newsom in conjunction with the State
Public Health Officer ordered "all individuals living in the State
of California to stay home or at their place of residence except as
needed to maintain continuity of operations of the federal critical
infrastructure sectors." Mudpie alleges that it complied with the
local and state orders (collectively, the Stay at Home Orders) and
as a result, was not able to operate its store after March 16,
2020.

Mudpie filed a claim with Travelers under the Policy on April 27,
2020. In its letter denying the claim, Travelers stated that
"because the limitations on Mudpie's business operations were the
result of the Governmental Order, as opposed to 'direct physical
loss or damage to property at the described premises' his Business
Income and Extra Expense coverage does not apply to its loss."
Travelers further stated that the Policy's coverage excluded "'loss
or damage caused by or resulting from any virus' -- such as the
COVID-19 virus."

Mudpie filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California on behalf of itself and a putative class of
"all retailers in California that purchased comprehensive business
insurance coverage from Travelers which includes coverage for
business interruption, filed a claim for lost business income
following California's Stay at Home order, and were denied
coverage."

Mudpie's complaint asserted three causes of action: (1) a claim for
declaratory relief that "its business income losses are covered and
not precluded by exclusions or other limitations" in the Policy;
(2) a claim for breach of contract; and (3) a claim for a breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Mudpie did not
allege that COVID-19 was present in its storefront premises during
the relevant period.

Travelers filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The motion argued that Mudpie was not
entitled to Business Income or Extra Expense coverage because
Mudpie had "not alleged any facts demonstrating that it suffered a
'direct physical loss of or damage to' insured property," and
because the Policy included a Virus Exclusion. Mudpie countered
"that its inability to operate and occupy its storefront following
the government closure orders was a direct physical loss of
property covered by the Policy."

The district court granted Travelers' motion, ruling that Mudpie
"failed to allege any intervening physical force beyond the
government closure orders" and thus was "not entitled to Business
Income or Extra Expense coverage" pursuant to the Policy. The
district court declined to consider Travelers' argument that the
Virus Exclusion barred Mudpie's recovery. The court dismissed the
complaint without prejudice but gave Mudpie leave to amend. Mudpie
responded by filing a notice advising "it would not be amending its
Complaint, as permitted by the Court's Order." The court then
dismissed the complaint with prejudice, and Mudpie timely
appealed.

Discussion

The parties dispute whether Mudpie adequately alleged a "direct
physical loss of or damage to" property under the Policy, and they
offer competing interpretations of that phrase. California courts
require that the Ninth Circuit interprets an insurance policy
according to the "clear and explicit" meaning of the terms as used
in their "ordinary and popular sense." California courts have
interpreted coverage provisions similar to the Policy's "direct
physical loss of or damage to property" term.

Mudpie contends that under California law "direct physical loss of
or damage to" property does not require actual damage to the
property but merely requires that the property no longer be
suitable for its intended purpose.

The Ninth Circuit concludes that interpreting the phrase "direct
physical loss of or damage to" property as requiring physical
alteration of property is consistent with other provisions of
Mudpie's Policy. To interpret the Policy to provide coverage absent
physical damage would render the "period of restoration" clause
superfluous. The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that California courts
would construe the phrase "physical loss of or damage to" as
requiring an insured to allege physical alteration of its property
is consistent with conclusions reached by other courts.

For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit affirms the district court's
ruling that Mudpie's claimed losses are not covered by the Policy.
The district court did not err by dismissing Mudpie's claims for
declaratory relief, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.

The Ninth Circuit also concludes that the Policy's Virus Exclusion
bars coverage for Mudpie's claimed losses. Mudpie argues that its
losses are not subject to the Policy's Virus Exclusion because the
losses were caused by Stay at Home Orders that restricted Mudpie's
use of its property, not directly by the virus. Travelers contends
that this exclusion bars coverage for all of Mudpie's claimed
losses because it was the virus that prompted state and local
authorities to issue the Stay at Home Orders in the first place.

The Ninth Circuit opines that Mudpie's complaint does not allege an
attenuated causal chain between the virus and Mudpie's losses. Nor
does Mudpie dispute that the Stay at Home Orders that impacted
Mudpie's business were issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
and the point is not debatable. The state authorities' March 19
Stay at Home Order explained that COVID-19 had "rapidly spread
throughout California" and "a State of Emergency existed in
California as a result of the threat of COVID-19."

Based on these findings, Californians were ordered to remain at
home or at their place of residence except for purposes deemed
essential. Though Mudpie argues it was the government orders that
most directly caused its injury, Mudpie does not plausibly allege
that "the efficient cause," i.e., the one that set others in
motion, was anything other than the spread of the virus throughout
California, or that the virus was merely a remote cause of its
losses. Accordingly, the Policy's Virus Exclusion bars coverage for
Mudpie's claims.

Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/yzekk6b2 from Leagle.com.

Andre M. Mura  -- amm@classlawgroup.com --(argued), Eric H. Gibbs,
and Amanda M. Karl, Gibbs Law Group LLP, in Oakland, California;
Victoria S. Nugent and Geoffrey Graber, Cohen Milstein Sellers &
Toll PLLC, in Washington, D.C., for the Plaintiff-Appellant.

Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. -- tboutrous@gibsondunn.com -- (argued),
Richard J. Doren, and Deborah L. Stein, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP,
in Los Angeles, California; Stephen E. Goldman -- sgoldman@rc.com
-- and Wystan M. Ackerman -- wackerman@rc.com -- Robinson & Cole
LLP, in Hartford, Connecticut, for the Defendant-Appellee.

Gabriel K. Gillett -- ggillett@jenner.com -- John H. Mathias Jr.,
David M. Kroeger, and Michael F. Linden, Jenner & Block LLP, in
Chicago, Illinois; Angelo I. Amador, Restaurant Law Center, in
Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Restaurant Law Center.

Jeffrey R. White, Counsel; Tobias L. Millrood, President; American
Associate for Justice, in Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae
American Association for Justice.

David B. Goodwin -- dgoodwin@cov.com -- and Breanna K. Jones,
Covington & Burling LLP, in San Francisco, California; Jad H.
Khazem , Covington & Burling LLP, in Washington, D.C., for Amicus
Curiae United Policyholders.

Laura A. Foggan -- lfoggan@crowell.com -- Crowell & Moring LLP, in
Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae American Property Casualty
Insurance Association and National Association of Mutual Insurance
Companies.


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Appeals Ruling in Philliben Suit to 9th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Objector Jennifer Hinojosa filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled Matthew Philliben, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, and Byron McKnight,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, and Rasier, LLC, a
Delaware Limited Liability Company, Case No. 4:14-cv-05615, in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
Oakland.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit alleges that
the Defendant made false and misleading representations on its
website and other marketing materials that it conducts industry
leading background checks on its drivers and that its service is
safer than a taxi, when in fact its background check procedures and
safety measures are woefully inadequate and fall well short of what
is required for other commercial providers of transportation.

The Plaintiffs bring eight claims for relief: (1) breach of implied
contract under California law; (2) breach of implied contract under
Illinois law; (3) breach of implied contract under Massachusetts
law; (4) violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"),
Cal. Civ. Code Section 1750, et seq.; (5) unlawful business
practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code
Section 17200, et seq.; (6) unfair business practices in violation
of section and (8) false advertising in violation of California
Business and Professions Code section 17500, et seq.  They seek
monetary relief as well as equitable relief enjoining Uber from
continuing the alleged harmful conduct.

Ms. Hinojosa now seeks a review of the Court's Order dated
September 2, 2021, granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs'
motions for attorney's fees and costs; and granting Objector Gordon
Morgan's motion for consideration of expert testimony.

The appellate case is captioned as Byron McKnight, et al. v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., et al., Case No. 21-16623, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on Oct. 4, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Jennifer Hinojosa Mediation Questionnaire was due
on October 12, 2021;

   -- Transcript shall be ordered by November 3, 2021;

   -- Transcript is due on December 3, 2021;

   -- Appellant Jennifer Hinojosa opening brief is due on January
12, 2022;

   -- Appellees Nate Coolidge, Byron McKnight, Ernesto Mejia,
Julian Mena, Rasier, LLC, Todd Schreiber and Uber Technologies,
Inc. answering brief is due on February 14, 2022; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

Objector-Appellant JENNIFER HINOJOSA is represented by:

          N. Albert Bacharach, Jr., Esq.
          N. ALBERT BACHARACH, JR. P.A.
          4128 NW 13th Street
          Gainsville, FL 32609-1807
          Telephone: (352) 378-9859

Plaintiffs-Appellees BYRON MCKNIGHT, JULIAN MENA, TODD SCHREIBER,
NATE COOLIDGE, and ERNESTO MEJIA, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Robert Rafael Ahdoot, Esq.
          AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
          2600 W. Olive Avenue, Suite 500
          Burbank, CA 91505
          Telephone: (310) 474-9111

               - and -

          Alfredo Torrijos, Esq.
          ARIAS SANGUINETTI STAHLE & TORRIJOS, LLP
          6701 Center Drive West, 14th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90045
          Telephone: (310) 844-9696
          E-mail: atorrijos@aogllp.com    

Defendants-Appellees UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Delaware
Corporation; and RASIER, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company,
are represented by:

          A. Matthew Ashley, Esq.
          Andra Barmash Greene, Esq.
          IRELL & MANELLA, LLP
          840 Newport Center Drive
          Newport Beach, CA 92660-6324
          Telephone: (949) 760-0991
          E-mail: mashley@irell.com
                  agreene@irell.com

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Bid to Dismiss Claims in Boston Suit Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BOSTON RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Plaintiff, v. UBER
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-06361-RS
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Richard Seeborg of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California denied the Defendants' motion
to dismiss the New Plaintiffs' claims from the Second Amended
Complaint.

Background

The putative class action alleges violations of the Securities Act
of 1933 in relation to Uber's May 2019 initial public offering
("IPO"). The Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint in May
2021, adding four new proposed class representatives as named
plaintiffs (referred to as the "New Plaintiffs").

Recounting the status of this proceeding requires addressing three
separate proceedings: (1) the case (the "Boston Retirement Service
Action"), (2) a state court proceeding, In re Uber Technologies,
Inc., Securities Litigation, which involved a consolidated class
action complaint filed by a different set of plaintiffs (the "State
Messinger Action"), and (3) the subsequent filing of a federal
class action, Messinger v. Uber Technologies, by some of the State
Messinger Action plaintiffs in this court (the "Federal Messinger
Action"). All the New Plaintiffs in the Boston Retirement Service
Action, were plaintiffs in the Messinger Actions.

The Plaintiffs filed the putative class action in October 2019. The
Court appointed Boston Retirement Service as Lead Plaintiff in
January 2020, pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act ("PSLRA"). The Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended
Complaint, and the court denied that motion in August 2020. Boston
Retirement Service initially filed a motion for class
certification, seeking appointment as the sole lead plaintiff and
class representative for the proposed class, in September 2020.

While proceedings were pending before the court, the State
Messinger Action was proceeding in California state court. The
State Messinger Action Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the
Defendants in San Francisco Superior Court in September 2019. In
November 2020, the California Superior Court dismissed the case
without prejudice. The Superior Court relied on the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision in Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102
(Del. 2020), which upheld under Delaware law the validity of
federal forum selection clauses, and the presence of such a clause
in Uber's bylaws. The State Messinger Action Plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed their appeal in state court.

The Messinger Plaintiffs then filed a class action lawsuit, the
Federal Messinger Action, 3:20-cv-08610-RS, in the Court in
December 2020. On Jan. 25, 2021, the Court consolidated the Federal
Messinger Action with the instant action pursuant to stipulation.
On May 3, 2021, the Court issued an order allowing the Lead
Plaintiff in the Boston Retirement Service Action to file a Second
Amended Complaint and a revised motion for class certification
without motion for leave to amend, pursuant to stipulation by the
parties.

On May 14, 2021, the Plaintiffs in the action filed their Second
Amended Complaint. The complaint included four of the named
Messinger plaintiffs as new proposed class representatives: David
Messinger, Ellie Marie Toronto ESA, Joseph Cianci, and Irving S.
and Judith Braun.

The Defendants now move to dismiss the New Plaintiffs' claims from
the Second Amended Complaint. The claims in the Second Amended
Complaint are identical to the claims in the prior operative
complaint; the Defendants only challenge the addition of the New
Plaintiffs, not the substance of the claims themselves.

Discussion

In litigating the motion, neither party disputes that absent the
application of tolling or the doctrine of relation back, claims
brought in the Federal Messinger Action would be barred by the
Securities Act's one-year statute of limitations. The Plaintiffs
focus their argument on whether they satisfy the requirements of
the Rule 15 relation back doctrine, while the Defendants focus
their arguments on China Agritech.

The Defendants argue that their addition is barred by the Supreme
Court's decision in China Agritech v. Resh, 138 S.Ct. 1800 (2018),
which disallowed tolling for successive class actions filed after
the expiration of the relevant statute of limitations. The
Defendants also argue that the addition of the New Plaintiffs
circumvents federal securities laws and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Judge Seeborg holds that the Plaintiffs satisfy the requirements to
relate the New Plaintiffs' claims back to the original complaint,
and China Agritech has no bearing on the outcome of the motion. He
explains that at issue in this motion is the addition of new
plaintiffs to an existing class action, not the filing of a new
class action. The motion is therefore governed by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15 and the doctrine of relation back, not the
holding in China Agritech. As multiple Courts of Appeals have now
held, nothing in China Agritech indicates that a new plaintiff
cannot join an existing class action, which is what the New
Plaintiffs seek to do in this litigation. The motion to dismiss the
claims of the New Plaintiffs is therefore denied. Pursuant to Civil
Local Rule 7-1(b), the motion is suitable for disposition without
oral argument, and the hearing set for Oct. 7, 2021, is vacated.

Conclusion

As the addition of the New Plaintiffs relates back to the original
pleading, Judge Seeborg denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss
the New Plaintiffs' claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/448dvsdc from Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: Court Amends Trial & Pre-trial Sched in Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned YARIBEL RABELO-RODRIGUEZ, et
al., v. UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Case No.
1:21-cv-23213-BB (S.D. Fla.), the Hon. Judge entered an order:

   1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Clarification of Scheduling Order,
      is granted in part and denied in part.

   2. Plaintiffs shall file their motion for class
      certification, should they choose to do so, on or before
      October 12, 2021.

   3. Plaintiffs may pursue joinder of additional plaintiffs
      under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.

   4. The Scheduling Order and Order of Referral to Magistrate
      Judge for All Pretrial Proceedings, is amended as follows:

      -- October 12, 2021:   Deadline for the Plaintiffs to file
                             motion for class certification.

      -- November 29, 2021:  Deadline for the Plaintiffs to file
                             summary-judgment motion. The Court
                             imposes a 30-page limit on this
                             motion.

      -- December 30, 2021:  Deadline for the Defendant to file
                             a combined response brief and
                             cross-summary-judgment motion.

      -- January 19, 2022:   Deadline for the Plaintiffs to file
                             a response brief to the Defendant's
                             cross-summary-judgment motion.

      -- May 18, 2022:       Anticipated date for issuance of
                             report and recommendation.

      -- June 1, 2022:       Deadline to file objections to the
                             Magistrate Judge's Report and
                             Recommendations.

The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the U.S.
federal executive department responsible for public security.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 8, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3pk1I2v at no extra charge.[CC]

UNITED STATES: Judgment for HHS & CMS in Northport Suit Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Northport Health Services of Arkansas, LLC, doing
business as Springdale Health and Rehabilitation Center, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants v. U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services; Xavier Becerra, in his official capacity as Secretary of
the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services; Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services; Chiquita Brooks-LaSure, in her
official capacity as the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services Defendants-Appellees. Public Citizen Amicus on
Behalf of Appellee(s), Case No. 20-1799 (8th Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirms the district court's
order granting summary judgment.

The summary judgment was entered in favor of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS)(collectively, the government).

The other Plaintiffs-Appellants are NWA Nursing Center, LLC, doing
business as The Maples; Ashland Place Health and Rehabilitation,
LLC; Aspire Physical Recovery Center at Cahaba River, LLC; Aspire
Physical Recovery Center at Hoover, LLC; Aspire Physical Recovery
Center of West Alabama, LLC; Athens Health and Rehabilitation, LLC;
Civic Center Health and Rehabilitation, LLC; Columbiana Health and
Rehabilitation, LLC; Cordova Health and Rehabilitation, LLC;
Crossville Health and Rehabilitation, LLC; Florala Health and
Rehabilitation, LLC; Georgiana Health and Rehabilitation, LLC; Gulf
Coast Health and Rehabilitation, LLC; Hunter Creek Health and
Rehabilitation, LLC; Huntsville Health and Rehabilitation, LLC;
Jacksonville Health and Rehabilitation, LLC; Legacy Health and
Rehabilitation of Pleasant Grove, LLC; Lineville Health and
Rehabilitation, LLC; Luverne Health and Rehabilitation, LLC;
Moundville Health and Rehabilitation, LLC; Northport Health
Services of Arkansas, LLC, doing business as Covington Court Health
and Rehabilitation Center, doing business as Fayetteville Health
and Rehabilitation Center, doing business as Springdale Health and
Rehabilitation Center, doing business as Legacy Health and
Rehabilitation Center, doing business as Paris Health and
Rehabilitation Center; Northport Health Services of Florida, LLC,
doing business as Crystal River Health and Rehabilitation Center,
doing business as Ocala River Health and Rehabilitation Center,
doing business as Daytona Beach Health and Rehabilitation Center,
doing business as St. Augustine Health and Rehabilitation Center,
doing business as West Melbourne Health and Rehabilitation Center;
Northport Health Services of Missouri, LLC, doing business as
Joplin Health and Rehabilitation Center, doing business as Webb
City Health and Rehabilitation Center, doing business as Carthage
Health and Rehabilitation Center, doing business as Warsaw Health
and Rehabilitation Center, doing business as Pleasant Hill Health
and Rehabilitation Center; Northway Health & Rehabilitation, LLC;
Oak Knoll Health and Rehabilitation, LLC; Opp Health and
Rehabilitation, LLC; Ozark Health and Rehabilitation, LLC; Palm
Gardens Health and Rehabilitation, LLC; Park Manor Health and
Rehabilitation, LLC; Prattville Health and Rehabilitation, LLC;
South Haven Health and Rehabilitation, LLC; South Health and
Rehabilitation, LLC; Sumter Health and Rehabilitation, LLC;
Tallassee Health and Rehabilitation, LLC; Valley View Health and
Rehabilitation, LLC; Wetumpka Health and Rehabilitation, LLC; AFNC,
Inc., doing business as Eaglecrest Nursing and Rehab; Beebe
Retirement Center, Inc.; BNNC, Inc., doing business as Alcoa Pines
Health and Rehabilitation; BVNC, Inc., doing business as Alcoa
Pines Health and Rehabilitation; CNNC, Inc., doing business as
Corning Therapy and Living Center; FPNC, Inc., doing business as
Twin Lakes Therapy and Living; GVNC, Inc., doing business as
Gassville Therapy and Living; HBNC, Inc., doing business as
Southridge Village Nursing and Rehab; HLNC, Inc., doing business as
Heritage Living Center; HSNC, Inc., doing business as Village
Springs Health and Rehabilitation; JBNC, Inc., doing business as
Ridgecrest Health and Rehabilitation; Jonesboro Care and
Rehabilitation Center, LLC, doing business as St. Elizabeths Place;
JRNRC OPS, Inc., doing business as James River Nursing and
Rehabilitation; Linco Health, Inc., doing business as Gardner
Nursing and Rehabilitation; MHCNC, Inc., doing business as Care
Manor Nursing and Rehab; MLBNC, Inc., doing business as Pioneer
Therapy and Living; MMNC, Inc., doing business as The Lakes at
Maumelle Health and Rehabilitation; MSNRC OPS, Inc., doing business
as Magnolia Square Nursing and Rehab; Nashville Nursing & Rehab,
Inc.; Northwest Health and Rehab, Inc., doing business as North
Hills Life Care and Rehab; OCNC, Inc., doing business as Silver
Oaks Health and Rehabilitation; OR OPS, Inc., doing business as Oak
Ridge Health and Rehabilitation; PM OPS, Inc., doing business as
Dierks Health and Rehab; RTNC, Inc., doing business as Rector
Nursing and Rehab; Salco NC, Inc., doing business as Evergreen
Living Center at Stagecoach; Salco NC 2, Inc., doing business as
Amberwood Health and Rehabilitation; SCNC, Inc., doing business as
Spring Creek Health & Rehab; Senior Living Management Group, LLC,
doing business as Birch Pointe Health and Rehabilitation; SLNC,
Inc., doing business as Southfork River Therapy and Living; SRCNC,
Inc., doing business as The Crossing at Riverside Health and
Rehabilitation; Timberlane Care and Rehabilitation Center, LLC,
doing business as Timberlane Health & Rehabilitation; TXKNC, Inc.,
doing business as Bailey Creek Health & Rehab; WCNC, Inc., doing
business as Katherines Place at Wedington; Westwood Health and
Rehab, Inc.; Windcrest Health and Rehab, Inc.; WRNC, Inc., doing
business as Chapel Woods Health and Rehabilitation; Apple Creek
Health and Rehab, LLC; Ashton Place Health and Rehab, LLC; Atkins
Care Center, Inc.; Belvedere Nursing and Rehabilitation Center,
LLC; Bradford House Nursing and Rehab, LLC; Briarwood Nursing and
Rehabilitation Center, Inc.; Cabot Health and Rehab, LLC; Chapel
Ridge Nursing Center, LLC; Colonel Glenn Health and Rehab, LLC;
Dardanelle Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, Inc.; Nursing and
Rehabilitation Center at Good Shepherd, LLC; Greenbrier Care
Center, Inc.; Greystone Nursing and Rehab, LLC; Heather Manor Care
Center, Inc.; Hickory Heights Health and Rehab, LLC; Innisfree
Health and Rehab, LLC; Jamestown Nursing and Rehab, LLC; Johnson
County Health and Rehab, LLC; Country Club Gardens, LLC; Lakewood
Health and Rehab, LLC; Legacy Heights Nursing and Rehab, LLC;
Lonoke Health and Rehab Center, LLC; Oak Manor Nursing and
Rehabilitation Center, Inc.; Perry County Care Center, Inc.; Quapaw
Care and Rehabilitation Center, LLC; Robinson Nursing &
Rehabilitation Center, LLC; Russellville Car Center, Inc.; Salem
Place Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, Inc.; Sherwood Nursing and
Rehabilitation Center, Inc.; Shiloh Nursing and Rehab, LLC; Stella
Manor Care Center, Inc.; Superior Health & Rehab, LLC; Eufaula Care
Center, Inc.; Cherokee County Nursing Center, Inc.; Parks Edge Care
Center, Inc.; Hendrix Health Care Center, Inc., doing business as
Hendrix Health & Rehabilitation; and Glen Haven Health and
Rehabilitation, LLC.

Background

Northport Health Services of Arkansas, LLC, and other similarly
situated long-term care (LTC) facilities (collectively, Northport)
appeal the decision of the district court's granting summary
judgment in favor of the government). Northport argues that a
regulation promulgated by CMS through notice and comment rulemaking
is unlawful and should be set aside for violating the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. Section 706, the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. Section 1 et seq., and the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq.

The federal government subsidizes eligible individuals' health care
through two large programs: Medicare and Medicaid. Medicare and
Medicaid provide coverage for long-term residents of nursing homes,
commonly referred to as LTC facilities. Participating LTC
facilities must comply with the requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C.
Section 1395i-3 (Medicare) and 42 U.S.C. Section 1396r (Medicaid),
as well as the regulations promulgated thereunder. The Plaintiffs
in the matter are "dually-certified" LTC facilities, meaning they
provide long-term care under both the Medicare and Medicaid
programs.

In 2015, CMS initiated notice and comment rulemaking to
comprehensively revise the requirements for LTC facilities to
participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. CMS proposed
certain limitations on LTC facilities' use of arbitration
agreements. In addition, reflecting a more general concern
regarding the use of such agreements by LTC facilities, CMS stated
it was considering and soliciting comments on "whether binding
arbitration agreements should be prohibited" in the case of nursing
home residents.

On Oct. 4, 2016, after an extended comment period, CMS published
the final version of the rule (Original Rule) in the Federal
Register. In a shift from the proposed rule, the final rule
prohibited LTC facilities from entering into pre-dispute, binding
arbitration agreements with residents or their representatives.

Several weeks later, before the Original Rule was to take effect on
Nov. 28, 2016, a group of Mississippi nursing homes sued to
preliminarily and permanently enjoin enforcement of the rule's
arbitration provision -- Am. Health Care Ass'n v. Burwell, 217
F.Supp.3d 921, 926 (N.D. Miss. 2016). Similar to this case, the
nursing homes claimed that the rule's blanket prohibition of LTC
facilities' use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements violated the
APA, the FAA, and the RFA. Finding that the nursing homes were
likely to prevail, the district court granted a nationwide
preliminary injunction of the challenged provision of the Original
Rule.

Rather than appeal the district court's decision, CMS initiated
another round of notice and comment rulemaking several months later
to revise the enjoined portion of the Original Rule. CMS proposed
removing the requirement that precluded LTC facilities from
entering into pre-dispute, binding arbitration agreements. It
nevertheless acknowledged some concerns about the use of
arbitration agreements in LTC facilities and proposed strengthening
some requirements "to ensure the transparency of arbitration
agreements in LTC facilities" and to strike the "best policy
balance."

After the comments period concluded, CMS published the final
version of the rule (Revised Rule) in the Federal Register, to go
into effect on Sept. 16, 2019.

On Sept. 4, 2019, Northport filed the lawsuit challenging multiple
aspects of the Revised Rule: (i) the requirement that a binding
arbitration agreement not be made a condition for the admission to,
or the continuation of care in, an LTC facility, 42 C.F.R. Section
843.70(n)(1); (ii) the requirement that residents be granted a
right to rescind a binding arbitration agreement within 30 days of
signing, id. Section 843.70(n)(3); (iii) the requirement that any
arbitration agreement (a) be explained to the resident so he or she
understands it and (b) explicitly state that signing it is not a
condition of admission to the LTC facility, id. Section
843.70(n)(2)(i)-(ii), (4); and (iv) the requirement that the LTC
facility retain copies of the signed arbitration agreement and any
final arbitration decisions for five years, id. Section
843.70(n)(6).

Northport moved to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of the
Revised Rule or, in the alternative, to stay enforcement pending
judicial review. While that motion was pending, the parties agreed
to stay enforcement of the Revised Rule until the district court
ruled on the merits of the case, and they cross-moved for summary
judgment based on the administrative record.

On April 7, 2020, the district court denied Northport's motion for
summary judgment and granted the government's motion for summary
judgment, upholding the Revised Rule. The court reasoned that the
rule (i) did not violate the FAA, 9 U.S.C. Section 2; (ii) was a
permissible exercise of HHS's statutory authority under the
Medicare and Medicaid statutes; (iii) was not "arbitrary and
capricious" under the APA, 5 U.S.C. Section 706(2)(A); and (iv) was
promulgated in compliance with the RFA, 5 U.S.C. Section 605(b).

Northport now appeals, and the Eighth Circuit has granted a stay of
the Revised Rule's enforcement pending resolution of this appeal.

Discussion

Northport revives its four challenges to the Revised Rule on
appeal. The Eighth Circuit may set aside agency action under the
APA if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law"; "in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right"; or "without observance of procedure required by law."

A. Conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act

Northport first argues that the Revised Rule violates the FAA and
is therefore "not in accordance with law," because it subjects
arbitration agreements to "disfavored treatment." Enacted in 1925
"in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements," the FAA provides that the terms of a written
arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract." As described by the Supreme
Court in Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P'ship v. Clark, 137 S.Ct.
1421, 1424, 1426 (2017), this provision "establishes an
equal-treatment principle," requiring "courts to place arbitration
agreements 'on equal footing with all other contracts.'"

The Eighth Circuit finds that Northport expansively argues that the
FAA established "a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements," that is frustrated by the Revised Rule's regulation of
nursing homes' use of arbitration agreements. However, "courts do
not apply federal policies; they apply federal statutes, and the
FAA speaks only to the validity, irrevocability and enforceability
of arbitration agreements." Because the Revised Rule does not, in
words or effect, render arbitration agreements entered into in
violation thereof invalid or unenforceable, it does not conflict
with the FAA.

B. HHS' Statutory Authority Under the Medicare and Medicaid
Statutes

Next, Northport argues that the Revised Rule should be set aside
because it exceeds HHS' statutory authority under the Medicare and
Medicaid statutes to promulgate regulations (i.e., that it is ultra
vires). The Eighth Circuit reviews such a claim using the familiar
Chevron framework. Under that framework, it asks whether the
statute is ambiguous and, if so, whether the agency's
interpretation is reasonable." The two-step Chevron framework "is
premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an
implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the
statutory gaps."

Then Eighth Circuit holds that the Revised Rule "represents a
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is
entitled to deference." Reviewing the provisions of the Revised
Rule, it concludes that they are reasonable interpretations of the
Medicare and Medicaid statutes. In its view, it is reasonable for
CMS to conclude that regulating the use of arbitration agreements
in LTC facilities furthers the health, safety, and well-being of
residents, particularly during the critical stage when a resident
is first admitted to a facility. Likewise, it thinks that the
Revised Rule is a reasonable exercise of CMS' authority to protect
residents' rights. For these reasons, the Eighth Circuit affirms
the district court's conclusion that it is not ultra vires.

C. Northport's Challenge to the Rule as Arbitrary and Capricious

Next, Northport argues that the Revised Rule should be set aside
because it is "arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion."
It raises two arguments as to why the Revised Rule is arbitrary and
capricious. First, it suggests that the rule was "based on sheer
speculation" because CMS relied principally on anecdotal evidence
rather than quantitative social science evidence to support the
rule. Second, Northport argues that CMS did not adequately explain
the rule's alleged departure from the agency's historical support
for the use of arbitration agreements by LTC facilities.

The Eighth Circuit concludes that the Revised Rule reflects CMS'
reasoned judgment in light of competing considerations. Having
reviewed the regulatory record of both the Original Rule and the
Revised Rule, it is satisfied that the evidence CMS relied upon is
sufficient to support the Revised Rule. To the extent the Revised
Rule departs from these prior policies, the Eighth Circuit finds
that CMS has provided a sufficiently reasonable explanation for
doing so. Lastly, the availability of arbitration and any
associated cost savings are largely unaffected by the Revised Rule,
and LTC facilities can continue to rely on historical economic
models. But even setting that aside, the Eighth Circuit finds that
CMS reasonably explained the departure from CMS's prior policy in
spite of those reliance interests. Accordingly, it affirms the
district court's conclusion that the Revised Rule is not arbitrary
or capricious.

D. Compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act

Finally, Northport argues that the promulgation of the Revised Rule
violated the RFA. Enacted in 1980 as a "response to the complaints
of small business about the burdens of federal regulation," the RFA
requires an agency undergoing informal rulemaking to prepare and
publish a regulatory flexibility analysis that details, among other
things, the rule's "significant economic impact on small entities"
and the steps the agency has taken to minimize that impact. The
parties agree that the Secretary of HHS certified that the Revised
Rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. But Northport argues that CMS failed to
provide the requisite factual basis for that certification.

Looking to the Revised Rule and the certification provided therein,
the Eighth Circuit concludes that CMS failed to comply with the
procedural requirements of the RFA. However, it concludes that such
an error is harmless. Failure to comply with the RFA may be, but
does not have to be, grounds for overturning a rule." In granting
relief for a violation of the RFA, the Eighth Circuit may take
corrective actions, including "remanding the rule to the agency" to
conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis under Section 604(a) or
to properly certify that such an analysis is unwarranted under
Section 605(b). But such a remedy is unnecessary because, as a
factual matter, the Revised Rule unquestionably has less of an
economic impact than the Original Rule had.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Eighth Circuit affirms the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of HHS and CMS.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/byhnjpsm from Leagle.com.


UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT: Patel/Gladstone Dismissal Won't Be Revisited
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NILAY KAMAL PATEL, RACHEL A. GLADSTONE, ELIJAH BLOW,
and AVERY ARROYO, Plaintiffs v. UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT AND STATE
AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE, Defendant, Case No. 5:20-cv-61 (D. Vt.),
Judge Geoffrey W. Crawford of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Vermont denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration and to enter partial final judgment as to Mr. Patel
and Ms. Gladstone.

Background

The COVID pandemic arrived on American shores in earnest in March
2020 with consequences for most of our residents. In the case of
colleges and universities, these consequences included the
widespread use of remote learning. This development disappointed
many who preferred to be on-campus, learning in live classrooms. In
the weeks following university decisions to reduce or eliminate
on-campus instruction, students and their counsel filed lawsuits
across the United States seeking refunds of tuition payments and
other expenditures. The lawsuit, filed in April 2020, is no
exception.

The case has passed through two early phases. The Court has
previously ruled that the contract language in the student handbook
and similar materials bars a claim for refund of room and meal
charges. At the same time, it declined to dismiss the claim for
tuition refunds and allowed that part of the case to go forward.

After this ruling, the parties and the Court learned that the two
named Plaintiffs -- Mr. Patel and Ms. Gladstone -- had not actually
paid tuition. Mr. Patel was an exchange student from the University
of Leeds in Britain. UVM has a reciprocal agreement with Leeds
permitting exchange students to attend without paying tuition to
the host institution. Ms. Gladstone received scholarships and
grants in excess of the tuition for her final spring semester. She
graduated successfully in May 2020.

The news that the named Plaintiffs had not actually paid tuition
did not end the case. They were quickly joined by two more students
who did pay tuition. These students seek to serve as class
representatives in a class action aimed at collecting tuition
refunds for thousands of UVM students. Issues concerning the terms
of the implied contract between the university and its students and
the application of these terms to a pandemic emergency as well as
the suitability of the class action vehicle remain for later
decision.

The Court granted the motion to dismiss Mr. Patel and Ms. Gladstone
from the lawsuit on standing grounds. In its view, they lacked
constitutional standing to seek the return of tuition they had not
actually paid. They have filed a timely motion for reconsideration.
UVM has filed an opposition and the Plaintiffs filed a reply on
Aug. 26, 2021.

Judge Crawford turns to the five issues raised by the Plaintiffs.
He considers these issues in the context of the usual standard for
reconsideration.

Discussion

I. Need for Discovery

In ruling on the standing question, Judge Crawford relied upon one
core fact: Neither Mr. Patel nor Ms. Gladstone paid tuition at UVM
during the spring semester of 2020. This is hardly a fact that lies
within the exclusive knowledge of one party or another. Nor is it
disputed. Hence, Judge Crawford concludes that the details of Mr.
Patel and Ms. Gladstone's tuition payments are sufficiently known
to both sides that no discovery on these issues is necessary or
appropriate.

II. The Relief Sought and the "Educational Malpractice" Doctrine

The Court followed the Plaintiffs' lead in identifying the relief
sought as a refund of tuition. That is how the Amended Complaint is
drawn. The Plaintiffs argue in their motion for reconsideration
that it seeks something different from a refund: "consequential
damages." They point to paragraph 31 of the Amended Complaint,
which seeks "an amount representing the difference in value of live
in-person instruction versus online distance learning, as well as
the value of the unused portion of housing and meal costs and
student fees." That request is incorporated into each of the six
counts in the pleading.

Judge Crawford finds that the simple recitation of the damage
formula illustrates the impossibility of applying it to the type of
breach alleged. The restitution measure of damages presents
doctrinal difficulties as well. Judge Crawford finds that it is a
measure of damages that authorizes the return of money wrongfully
held by the Defendant. But before one can receive a refund of the
tuition or other payments, one has to pay it. There can be no
restitution order for someone who has incurred no cost of
performance.

III. Nominal Damages; Injury-In-Fact

As an alternative, the Plaintiffs now seek a nominal award. The
Supreme Court has recently held that nominal damages can redress a
past injury in Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S.Ct. 792, 796 (2021).
But the Amended Complaint makes no claim for nominal damages and
the boilerplate request for "such other relief as may be just and
proper" is not a request for nominal damages, Judge Crawford
finds.

In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547
(2016), the Supreme Court examined the constitutional requirement
of injury-in-fact. To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must
show that he or she suffered 'an invasion of a legally protected
interest' that is 'concrete and particularized' and 'actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'"

First, UVM does not appear to argue that the Plaintiffs have failed
to allege this prong of the injury-in-fact element. Second, the
Plaintiffs' difficulty on the injury-in-fact prong stems from the
"concreteness" requirement. Judge Crawford concludes that the harm
claimed is not concrete since it never happened. Because they paid
no tuition, a refund -- whether described as "disgorgement" or
"consequential damages" -- cannot take place. On reconsideration,
Judge Crawford adjusts the standing analysis to identify the
shortcoming in the claims of these two plaintiffs to include a lack
of injury-in-fact because the "concreteness" requirement is not
satisfied.

IV. Interlocutory Appeal

The Plaintiffs seek entry of final judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b) as to their claims only so that they may take an immediate
appeal as of right. Judge Crawford will not enter final judgment at
this time with respect to the claims of Mr. Patel and Ms.
Gladstone. He says, it is not a case in which the Court can
determine that there is "no just reason for delay." To the
contrary, a piecemeal appeal of the claims of two students who paid
no tuition would not advance the progress of the litigation at all.
As in the case of an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. Section
1292 (which the Plaintiffs do not seek), an appeal will likely
result in the suspension of the preparation of the main case until
the district court knows the outcome. Instead, any appeal will
occur in the normal course at the end of the case after entry of
final judgment as to all claims.

Conclusion

The Motion for Reconsideration and to enter partial final judgment
as to Mr. Patel and Ms. Gladstone is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Decision is available
at https://tinyurl.com/3n87rpbr from Leagle.com.


XPRESSPA AT TERMINAL: $432K Class Deal in Chen Suit Wins Final OK
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, XIAO LING CHEN, et al., Plaintiffs v. XPRESSPA AT
TERMINAL 4 JFK LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 15 CV 1347 (CLP)
(E.D.N.Y.), Chief Magistrate Judge Cheryl L. Pollak of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York approves the
parties' settlement as fair and reasonable; attorney's fees and
costs; service awards; and administration fees.

Background

On March 16, 2015, the Plaintiffs commenced the class and
collective action on behalf of themselves and other similarly
situated employees against XpresSpa and 34 other XpresSpas located
in various airport terminals around the country, seeking damages
under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Sections
206(a), 207(a), 216(b), and the New York Labor Law ("NYLL") Section
190 et seq. and Section 650 et seq., for unpaid minimum wages,
unpaid overtime compensation, unpaid spread of hours wages, and for
violations of the requirements to provide wage notices and accurate
wage statements under Sections 195(1) and 195(3) of the NYLL.

The Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees were employed
by the Defendants as spa technicians, performing massages,
manicures, and other spa treatments for travelers in the 19
airports across the country where the XpresSpas were located. They
allege that they were misclassified as independent contractors,
paid on commission, not paid minimum wages or overtime compensation
for hours worked over 40 in a week, not paid spread-of-hours pay as
required under the NYLL, were required to travel to and from spas
located in various terminals for which they received no travel time
compensation, and that they were also required to perform other
work for which they received no compensation. They also alleged
that were never provided with the requisite wage notices or wage
statements required by the NYLL.

On Sept. 15, 2017, the parties indicated that they had reached a
proposed settlement and filed a motion with the Court requesting an
Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed settlement as
set forth in the original Settlement Agreement and Release. The
Court denied the request and raised a number of concerns regarding
the Original Agreement, including the procedures for determining
each Class and Collective Member's awards, the mechanism for
providing notice, the fairness of the proposed service awards, and
the proposed cy pres recipient.

On April 25, 2018, the Court held a hearing, after which the
parties submitted a revised Settlement Agreement and Notice. In a
Memorandum and Order dated Aug. 21, 2019, the Court denied the
request to approve the parties' proposed Revised Agreement. On Aug.
10, 2020, the parties filed a motion seeking preliminary approval
of the Settlement Agreement and Release dated Aug. 7, 2020;
appointing the Lee Litigation Group, PLLC as the Class Counsel;
approving the proposed Notice of Proposed Settlement; and approving
Advanced Litigation Strategies, LLC as the Claims Administrator.

On March 30, 2021, the Court approved the appointment of the Lee
Firm as the Class Counsel, approved the Notice of Settlement
subject to modifications, and preliminarily approved the Settlement
Agreement. After the Court first denied approval of Advanced
Litigation Strategies, LLC, and later Arden Claims Services as
Claims Administrator, the Court approved Simpluris, Inc. as the
Claims Administrator. The Court then set a hearing pursuant to
Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir.
2015), for Sept. 23, 2021.

The terms of the settlement were memorialized in the Third
Settlement Agreement and Release, dated Aug. 6, 2020. On June 22,
2021, notices regarding the settlement were mailed to the 740 Class
members. There are 439 opt-in FLSA Class members and 385 Rule 23
Class members. However, many Class members qualify as both FLSA and
Rule 23 Class members. Of the 740 notices, 105 were returned as
undeliverable without forwarding addresses and 100 were
subsequently re-mailed once Simpluris found alternate addresses.
All 100 were successfully delivered; only 5 notices remain
undeliverable, resulting in a delivery rate of 99.32%. Only one
Class member has opted out of the Settlement. Approval will result
in a per capita award of $583.78 before fees and expenses are
deducted; the highest settlement payment will be approximately
$1,330.76 and the average will be approximately $319.37. Any
unclaimed amount will be applied to a cy pres donation to the
Chinese Staff and Workers Association.

The Plaintiffs have also filed unopposed motions for attorney's
fees, administration fees, and service fees. The Third Settlement
Agreement creates a common fund of $432,000, which covers the Rule
23 Class members' awards and Collective Class members' awards; with
$23,00020 representing the cost of settlement administration;
service awards in the amount of $16,000, representing an award of
$2,000 each for the eight opt-in plaintiffs; attorney's fees in the
amount of $144,000, representing one-third of the Fund; and costs
in the amount of $12,987.50.

Discussion

I. Class Certification

When the Court preliminarily certified the Class on March 30, 2021,
the Defendants did not oppose conditional certification of the
Class for settlement purposes only. Judge Pollak finds that not
only have the parties stipulated to the Class, but the Court has
already found that the Class satisfies all of the elements of Rule
23. As there have been no objections from any Class members to
final certification, Judge Pollak confirms as final its
certification of the Class for settlement purposes.

Additionally, the proposed settlement also encompasses the FLSA
claims of the Plaintiffs. As with a Rule 23 class action, Judge
Pollak must make a preliminary determination as to whether there is
a sufficient basis to grant conditional certification of an FLSA
collective. She made the requisite findings and granted
certification in February 2016. She sees no reason to disturb that
finding.

II. Standard for Approval of Class Settlement

In Cheeks, the Second Circuit held that before a settlement and
stipulation of dismissal relating to a plaintiff's FLSA claims may
take effect, the parties must obtain approval of the settlement
from the district court. This requirement applies to both
individual claims and FLSA claims of members of a class.

In the Order granting preliminary approval of the Settlement
Agreement, the Court found that the Settlement was substantively
and procedurally fair. Judge Pollak finds no reason to disturb its
preliminary finding of substantive fairness. She also finds the cy
pres designation appropriate in the case. Chinese Staff and Workers
Association approximates the interest of the Class and is related
to the purpose of the lawsuit; many of the Class members are
Chinese, and although the Association is based in New York, its
goals include "bringing together workers across trades to fight for
change in the workplace as well as the community at large."

In accordance with the foregoing, Judge Pollak grants final
approval of the Settlement Agreement and Release, finds that the
settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate in all respects, and
that it is binding on the Class members who did not timely opt out
pursuant to the procedures set forth in the 3/30/2021 Order. She
now turns to the three additional forms of relief requested: The
request for attorney's fees, the approval of the service awards for
the named opt-ins, and the request for administration fees.

III. Attorney's Fees

As noted, the Court already approved the appointment of Lee
Litigation Group as the counsel for the putative class but found it
"premature" to rule on the attorney's fees award. In considering
the fee request, the Court looks to: (1) counsel's time and effort
in connection with the litigation; (2) the quality of the
representation; (3) the complexity of the litigation; (4) the risks
of litigation; (5) the relationship of the fee to the settlement;
and (6) public policy concerns.

The counsel for the Plaintiffs seeks an award of attorney's fees of
$144,000, representing 33.33% of the settlement fund and $12,987.50
for reimbursement of their litigation expenses.

Judge Pollak grants the Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees;
their counsel is awarded their requested fees of one-third of the
settlement fund as well as reimbursement of their litigation
expenses, both of which she finds to be fair and reasonable.

IV. Service Awards

The Plaintiffs also seek final court approval for service awards in
the amount of $16,000, representing an award of $2,000 each for the
eight opt-in Plaintiffs: Kathy Dickelman, Darryl Tompkins, Kimberly
McCants, Antranae Lee, Kimberly Peek, Freida Knox, Zenida Lozada
and Tiara Robinson. Having considered the efforts expended by the
eight named individuals, Judge Pollak finds that a service award of
$2,000 each is appropriate and grants the request.

V. Administrator Fees

Finally, as stated during the Fairness Hearing and as provided in
the addendum to the Settlement Agreement, the Plaintiff seeks an
administrator's fee of $23,000 as compensation for the services of
Claims Administrator Simpluris. Based on its experience with
similar settlements, Judge Pollak finds the $23,000 fee to be
reasonable, particularly as the Class will receive $236,012.50.

Conclusion

For the reasons she set forth, Judge Poolak grants final approval
of the Class Settlement, awards the Class Counsel attorney's fees
and costs as requested, approves the service awards, and approves
the administrator's fee. The parties are ordered to submit a status
report confirming that the checks have been distributed to the
Class no later than Nov. 1, 2021. If the administrator is unable to
distribute the awards within 30 days, the parties are instructed to
submit a letter to the Court requesting a telephone conference as
soon as possible so that the Court and parties can discuss the
timeline for distributing the settlement award.

The Clerk is directed to send copies of the Order to the parties
either electronically through the Electronic Case Filing system or
by mail.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 1, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/t6cp5k8b from Leagle.com.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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