/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/211101.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, November 1, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 212

                            Headlines

365N LA CIENEGA: Denied Workers Overtime Pay, De Jesus Says
3M COMPANY: Coates Files Suit Over Exposure to AFFF Products
7HBF NO. 2: Court Grants Bid to Certify Class in Gibbs v. Stinson
ADVANCED DRAINAGE: Loschiavo Seeks Pay for Missed Breaks, Overtime
AIR METHODS: Wagner et al. Seek to Redefine Class & Approve Deal

AMAZON.COM INC: Interim Co-Lead, Class Counsel Named in Garner Suit
AMERICAN CORADIUS: Shoval Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. Florida
AMERICAN FIRST: Facio Sues Over Deceptive Business Practices
AMERICAN SOLAR: Sharlene O'Shea Appointed as Class Representative
AMPLIFY ENERGY: Beyond Business Files Suit in C.D. California

AMPLIFY ENERGY: East Meets West Sue Over Oil Spill
ANDERSON COUNTY, SC: Green v. Jail Is Subject to Summary Dismissal
APPLE INC: McTyere Hits Overpriced Digital Content
ARCADIA RECOVERY: Neuburger Files FDCPA Suit in D. New Jersey
ARKANSAS: Phillips Files Certiorari Petition in Felony Suit

ARROW SENIOR: Seeks to Stay Briefing for Conditional Cert. Bid
AT&T MOBILITY: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss or Stay Razo Class Suit
ATRIA SENIOR: George Stickles Seeks to Certify Rule 23 Class
BANK OF AMERICA: Bid to Continue Class Cert. Hearing Sought
BANK OZK: Response to Class Certification Bid Due November 12

BEEKMAN 1802: Williams Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BETTS COMPANY: Orozco Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
BEVERAGES & MORE: Garner Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
BLACKBAUD INC: Court Narrows Claims in Data Breach Suit
BOWDEN BARLOW: Klein Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Florida

BRENTLINGER ENTERPRISES: Class Cert Bid Filing Due August 19, 2022
CALIFORNIA: Saddozai May Amended Complaint Against CDCR, Others
CASSAVA SCIENCES: Rao Sues Over False and Misleading Statements
CHARLES BAKER: Roe Sues Over Violation of Substantive Rights
CHARLESTON COUNTY, SC: Butler Says Road Fees Illegal, Seeks Refund

CHASE DENNIS: Samora Bid for Class Certification Stricken
CHESAPEAKE ENERGY: Class Deal in Leaseholders Suit Wins Final Nod
CLASSIC VACATIONS: Balabanoff Suit Removed to N.D. California
CLIF BAR: Appeals Files Appeal in Milan Mislabeling Suit to 9th Cir
COAST PROFESSIONAL: Court Explains Dismissal of Oakley Class Suit

COCA-COLA CONSOLIDATED: Class Cert. Hearing Set for Dec. 7
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY: Final Order & Judgment Entered in Cates Suit
CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Rawls Sues to Recover Overtime Wages
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Rough Appeals Class Cert. Bid Denial to 9th Cir.
CROSS POINT: Lozano Seeks to Certify Classes

DASMEN RESIDENTIAL: Bid to Certify for Appeal in Akeem Suit Denied
DATTO INC: Dinnerman Files Suit in C.D. California
DELTA DENTAL: Bowman Sues Over Failure to Pay Compensation
DIGNITY HEALTH: Cal. App. Affirms Dismissal Judgment in Gray Suit
EVEREST RECEIVABLE: Montgomery FDCPA Suit Remanded to State Court

EVOLENT HEALTH: PCRA, OPPRS Seek to Certify Class Action
FACEBOOK INC: Ngian Sues Over False and Misleading Statements
FCA US: Bid for Reconsideration Tossed in Tomassini Class Suit
FCA US: Court Narrows Claims in Bakhtiar's 3rd Amended Complaint
FEDEX GROUND: Wins Summary Judgment Bid vs Dolan

FEDEX OFFICE: Zupetz Suit Removed to W.D. Kentucky
FERMENTED SCIENCES: Sued Over False, Misleading Marketing Practices
FLOWERS FOODS: Richard Loses Bid for Class Certification
FORD MOTOR: Chalos, Zohdy Appointed as Class Counsel in Miller
GAS GATHERING: Lyman Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages

GAVA INTERNATIONAL: Morales Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
GC SERVICES: Cohen Suit Transferred to M.D. Florida
GEICO INDEMNITY: McCoy Seeks to Certify Class
GENERAL MOTORS: Shea Suit Over Oil Consumption Defect Dismissed
GENESIS HEALTHCARE: Class Status Bid Filing Due Feb. 9, 2022

GOAUTO INSURANCE: To Submit Expedited Briefing on Turner's Petition
GOLDMAN SACHS: Faces Florio Securities Suit in N.Y.
GOLDMAN SACHS: Merson Sues Over Unlawful Trades
GRAND CANYON: Stipulation for Class Cert. Briefing Schedule Filed
GREAT AMERICAN: Hooks Suit Removed to W.D. Pennsylvania

HARLEY DAVIDSON: Arledge Files TCPA Suit in W.D. Texas
HATFIELD QUALITY: Reynoso Seeks Pay for Off-the-Clock Work
HEALTH PROVIDERS: Class Action Deal Gets Final Nod in Askar Suit
HEALTHSPARK FOUNDATION: Judgment in Harley Suit Affirmed in Part
HOEGH LNG: Sanchez Sues Over Decline in Securities Market Value

HORIZON HOUSE: Jones Sues Over Cyberattack and Data Breach
IB HOSPITALITY: DeSalvo's Individual Claims Tossed With Prejudice
IQVIA INC: Court Enters Revised Scheduling Order in Lyngaas Suit
JELD-WEN INC: Rivera Suit Removed to S.D. California
JUUL LABS: Lincoln Schools Sue Over Questionable Marketing Tactics

JUUL LABS: Marcellus Schools Sue Over Shady Marketing Tactics
JUUL LABS: North Adams Schools Balk at Shady Marketing Tactics
KEVYN AUCOIN: Graciano Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Mercure Suit Transferred to W.D. Pennsylvania
KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Thomas Suit Transferred to W.D. Pennsylvania

KS STATEBANK: $775K Class Deal in Saliba TCPA Suit Wins Final Nod
L BRANDS: Court Enters Preliminary Pretrial Order in Allison Suit
LAKESIDE RESTAURANT: Malone Seeks Unpaid Overtime, Minimum Wages
LIBRARY SYSTEMS: Khaled Seeks Final OK of Class Action Deal
LOBSTER LLC: Denied Workers OT Pay and Reimbursements, Says Wixom

LONOKE COUNTY, AR: Clem May Amend Complaint v. Detention Center
LOUISIANA HEALTH: Filing of Class Status Bid Due June 14, 2022
LUXOTTICA RETAIL: Bid to Seal/Redact in Allegra Suit Partly Granted
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Ct. Amends Scheduling Order in Hall Suit
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Settlement Deal in Martin Gets Final Nod

MCGRIFF INSURANCE: Vonderwerth Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
MCKESSON CORPORATION: Court Decertifies Class in True Health Suit
MERCER UNIVERSITY: Parties Must Submit Revised Scheduling Order
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION: Warsame's Class Deal in Has Prelim. OK
MIDLAND CREDIT: Bid to Dismiss Sam Suit Granted With Leave to Amend

MIDLAND CREDIT: Kumer Files FDCPA Suit in D. New Jersey
MINDFINDERS INC: Court Grants in Part $152K Settlement in Dew Suit
MOMOTARO APOTHECA: Graciano Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MONARCH HEALTHCARE: Quay FLSA Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Nurses
MORTGAGE LENDERS: Charbonneau Suit Has $1.43M Attys.' Fees & Costs

MUNSON HEALTHCARE: Appeals Court Affirms Dismissal of Rakyta Suit
MY CHOICE FOUNDATION: Hanna Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
NEW LIMITS: Rios Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
NORTHEAST TREATMENT: Court OK's $340K Accord in Devine FLSA Suit
NORTONLIFELOCK INC: Reinhardt Files Suit Over Avast Acquisition

NRT LLC: Court Vacates Class Certification Hearing in Chinitz Suit
OAKLAND, CA: Bid for Class Certification Nixed w/o Prejudice
ORLANDO MED: Morales Slams Retaliation, Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay
PALMS ASSOCIATES: Joint Bid to Modify Scheduling Order OK'd
PENNSYLVANIA INTERSCHOLASTIC: Class Cert Filing Bid Due Jan. 3

PENSHURST TRADING: Graciano Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
PFA INSURANCE: Class Cert Hearing Bid Set for Feb. 22, 2022
PFIZER INC: MSP Recovery Sues Over Carcinogen in Quit-Smoking Meds
PHH MORTGAGE: Giannasca Suit Removed to D. Massachusetts
PLATINUM RESTAURANTS: Extension to Reply to Decertification Sought

PROGRESSIVE SPECIALTY: Drummond Files Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
R&L INTERIOR: Ct. Certifies Collective Action in Duran FLSA Suit
RALEIGH RESTAURANT: Koval Files Suit to Recover Proper Wages
REALIZATION CENTER: Counselors File Labor Suit, Seek Overtime Pay
RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE: Brooks Files FDCPA Suit in W.D.N.C.

RICE DRILLING: Class Certification Bid Filing Due December 1
RLH FIRE PROTECTION: Newlen Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
ROBINHOOD FINANCIAL: Dec. 30 Opposition to Class Cert Bid Sought
RSP EXPRESS: Class Certification Bid Filing Extended to Nov. 18
SADDLE PEAK: Court Tosses Class & Collective Claims in Clark Suit

SALERNITANI LTD: Ortega Files FLSA Suit in S.D. New York
SCRAPPY THOMAS: Chancy Files Suit Over Denied OT Pay, Meal Breaks
SHUTTERFLY LIFETOUCH: Can Compel Arbitration in Ross Class Suit
SQUARE INC: Sabatini Sues Over Securities Exchange Act Violation
STOKES HEALTHCARE: Settlement in Pet Parade Suit Gets Initial Nod

STRADA SERVICES: Reyes Seeks Rehearing of Class Cert. Bid
SUNRISE FOODS: Lopez Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime
SYMETRA ASSIGNED: Bid for Class Certification Due December 10
T-MOBILE USA: Precour Sues Over Data Breach
T-MOBILE USA: Song Sues Over Failure to Maintain Security

TARGET CORPORATION: Bayne Must File Class Status Bid by Oct. 14
TOKYO II STEAK: Jiang Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
TREADMAXX TIRE: Parties in Powell Suit Seek FLSA Class Status
TRIBESMEN GROUP: Chavez Collective Action Gets Initial Nod
TWOMAGNETS INC: Lawson Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.

UNITED HEALTHCARE: Seeks Denial of Omega Filing Extension Bid
UNITED STATES: Murray Suit Over Speedy Trial Rights Breach Tossed
UNITED STATES: Navy Personnel Sues Over COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate
UNITED STATES: Welch Suit Over Speedy Trial Rights Breach Tossed
UT-BATTELLE LLC: Bilyeu Sues Over Pattern of Discrimination

VILLAGE SUPER: Mendez Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
VIRGINIA BAPTIST: Merriman Files FLSA Suit in E.D. Virginia
WALMART INC: Class Certification Bid Filing Due April 15, 2022
WASTE CONNECTIONS: Sunshine Children's Suit Removed to S.D. Florida
WELLPET LLC: Discovery Plan & Scheduling Order Entered in Brown

WESTCHESTER PARKWAY: Edgar Suit Wins Conditional Certification Bid
WESTERN REFINING: Schmidtberger Appeals Ruling in Labor Suit
WEXFORD HEALTH: Milligan Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Wages
WILD CARD: Reitman Sues Over Discrimination and Unpaid Wages
WILMINGTON TRUST: Final OK of Settlement Deal Nixed in Fink Suit

WRITERS GUILD: Martel Seeks to Certify Class of WGA Members
WYNN LAS VEGAS: Bids to Stay Discovery in Schrader Suit Granted

                            *********

365N LA CIENEGA: Denied Workers Overtime Pay, De Jesus Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
Denise De Jesus, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. 365N La Cienega Beverly Hills and Does 1 to
100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 21STCV38671 (Cal. Super.,
October 20, 2021), seeks unpaid wages and interest thereon for
failure to pay for all hours worked and minimum wage rate,
statutory penalties for failure to provide accurate wage
statements, waiting time penalties in the form of continuation
wages for failure to timely pay employees all wages due upon
separation of employment, injunctive relief and other equitable
relief, reasonable attorney's fees, costs and interest under
California Labor Code, Unfair Competition Law of the California
Business and Professions Code and applicable Industrial Welfare
Commission Wage Orders.

365N La Cienega Beverly Hill operates several strip clubs
throughout California where De Jesus worked as hourly-paid and/or
non-exempt employee. [BN]

Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Kevin Mahoney, Esq.
      MAHONEY LAW GROUP, APC
      249 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 814
      Long Beach, CA 90802
      Telephone: (562) 590-5550
      Facsimile: (562) 590-8400
      Email: kmahoney@mahoney-law.net

             - and -

      Amir Seyedfarshi, Esq.
      EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS LAW GROUP, APC.
      1180 South Beverly Drive, Suite 610
      Los Angeles, CA 90035
      Telephone: (424) 777 - 0964
      Email: amir@employmentrightslawgroup.com


3M COMPANY: Coates Files Suit Over Exposure to AFFF Products
------------------------------------------------------------
Drew Coates and Melinda Coates, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. 3M Company, ACG Chemicals
Americas, Inc.; Amerex Corporation; Archroma US, Inc.; Arkema,
Inc.; BASF Corporation; Buckeye Fire Equipment Company; Carrier
Global Corporation; Chemdesign Products Inc.; Chemguard, Inc.;
Chemicals, Inc.; Clariant Corporation; Corteva, Inc.; Chubb Fire,
Ltd; Deepwater Chemicals, Inc.; Du Pont De Nemours, Inc.; Dynax
Corporation; E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Company; Kidde-Fenwal,
Inc.; Kidde P.L.C., Inc.; Nation Ford Chemicalcompany; National
Foam, Inc., The Chemours Company; The Chemours Company FC, LLC;
Tyco Fireproducts, LP; United Technologies Corporation and  UTC
Fire & Securities Americas Corporation, Inc., Defendants, Case No.
21-cv-03387, (D. S.C., October 15, 2021), seeks redress for
personal injury damages resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals
collectively known as per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).

3M is a multinational conglomerate corporation whose common stock
trades on the New York Stock Exchange. It produces per- and
polyfluoroalkyl substances used in industrial and consumer
products, including non-stick cookware, water-repellent clothing,
camping gear, shoes, stain resistant fabrics, textiles and carpets,
cosmetics, surfactants for electronics manufacturing, and products
that resist grease, water, and oil, such as coated papers for
fast-food takeout.

Defendants allegedly designed, marketed, developed, manufactured,
distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional
materials, promoted, sold, and/or otherwise released into the
stream of commerce, AFFF with knowledge that it contained highly
toxic and bio persistent PFAS, which would expose end users of the
product to the risks associated with PFAS, including firefighters.

Drew Coates regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to,
AFFF in training and to extinguish active fires during his working
career as a military and/or civilian firefighter. He claims to be
diagnosed with prostate cancer as a result of his alleged exposure
to AFFF.

Melinda Coats, Drew's spouse brings this action for the loss of
consortium and services directly resulting from her husband's
injuries and damages sustained as a result of his exposure to AFFF
products. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Spencer T. Speed, Esq.
      Charles R. Houssiere, III
      HOUSSIERE, DURANT & HOUSSIERE, LLP
      1990 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 800
      Houston, TX 77056-3812
      Telephone: (713) 626-3700
      Facsimile: (713) 626-3709
      Email: choussiere@hdhtex.com
             sspeed@hdhtex.com


7HBF NO. 2: Court Grants Bid to Certify Class in Gibbs v. Stinson
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
Richmond Division, grants the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification in the lawsuit styled DARLENE GIBBS, et al., on
behalf of themselves and all individuals similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. MICHAEL STINSON, et al., Defendants, Case No.
3:18cv676 (E.D. Va.).

The Motion for Class Certification was filed by Named Plaintiffs
Sherry Blackburn, Stephanie Edwards, Darlene Gibbs, George Hengle,
Patrick Inscho, Lawrence Mwethuku, Tamara Price, and Lula Williams.
Defendants 7HBF NO. 2, Stephen Sharper, Startup Capital Ventures,
L.P., Linda Stinson, Michael Stinson, Haynes Investments, LLC, L.
Stephen Haynes, and Sovereign Business Solutions, LLC responded,
and the Plaintiffs replied.

District Judge M. Hannah Lauck notes that the matter is ripe for
disposition. The Court dispenses with oral argument because the
materials before it adequately present the facts and legal
contentions, and argument would not aid the decisional process. The
Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331
and 1367(a).

Factual Background

As described in the September 2019 Memorandum Opinion, the
controversy arises out of the Defendants' involvement in an
allegedly unlawful lending operation. The lending operation
allegedly involved loans made through tribal entities to the
Plaintiffs at exorbitant interest rates. According to the
Plaintiffs, the Defendants participated in this scheme as
"founders, funders, or closely held owners of Think Finance, LLC,"
a company that serviced the high-interest loans made by certain
tribal lending entities. Those tribal entities include Great Plains
Lending LLC, Plain Green LLC, and Mobiloans LLC.

The Nature and Composition of the Proposed Class

In the Motion for Class Certification, the Plaintiffs seek to
certify the following class ("Virginia Class"):

     All individuals who resided in Virginia at the time he or
     she obtained any loan: (i) from Great Plains Lending,
     (ii) from Plain Green prior to June 1, 2016, or (iii) from
     MobiLoans prior to May 6, 2017, who made any payment on the
     loan.

According to RSM US LLP, a company appointed to serve as settlement
administrator in three related nationwide class action lawsuits
involving Think Finance, 43,598 consumers belong to the Virginia
Class. These 43,598 Virginia borrowers paid a total of
$172,639,754.45 to Great Plains, Plain Green, or Mobiloans. Of this
total amount, $68,494,967.09 represents interest payments exceeding
the annual 12% statutory maximum allowable under Virginia law.
Indeed, the record suggests that all the loans Great Plains, Plain
Green, and Mobiloans originated assigned annual interest rates
exceeding 24%.

RSM bases its estimates related to the nature and composition of
the Virginia Class on consumer-level account information that the
company received from Think Finance. The dataset Think Finance
provided RSM pertains to loans made to consumers in the names of
Great Plains, Plain Green, Mobiloans, or the First Bank of
Delaware. The dataset contains nationwide information on 1,877,050
loans for 1,045,248 consumers.

Each Named Plaintiff--except for Sherry Blackburn--belongs to the
Virginia Class. Although all Named Plaintiffs used a Virginia
address to obtain a loan from Great Plains, Plain Green, or
Mobiloans, Sherry Blackburn's loans fell outside the specified
class period.

Notwithstanding this error concerning Blackburn, each Named
Plaintiff has remained active throughout this litigation. They have
regularly communicated with Counsel, reviewed copies of the
pleadings, responded to written discovery, produced documents, and
attended depositions. They have also sustained this level of
involvement not only in the present lawsuit, but also in two other
related nationwide class actions involving Think Finance. And as
with the remaining members of the Virginia Class, the Named
Plaintiffs have an interest in obtaining the relief sought from the
Defendants.

The Six Class Claims at Issue

The Named Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief,
damages, and attorney's fees and costs from the Defendants arising
from the following six class counts:

   * Count I: 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(a). The Plaintiffs allege
     that the Defendants received "income derived, directly and
     indirectly, through collection of unlawful debt," and used
     and reinvested parts of such income to acquire interests in
     and to further establish and assist the operations of the
     enterprise;

   * Count II: 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(b). The Plaintiffs allege
     that the Defendants acquired and maintained interests in
     and control of the enterprise involved in the unlawful
     collection of debt;

   * Count III: 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c). The Plaintiffs allege
     that the Defendants violated Section 1962(c) through the
     collection of unlawful debt;

   * Count IV: 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(d). The Plaintiffs allege
     the Defendants entered into several agreements to violate
     Sections 1962(a)-(c);

   * Count V: Virginia Usury Laws. The Plaintiffs allege the
     loans violate Virginia's usury laws because the interest
     rates exceed 12%. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants
     unlawfully received revenues collected on the loans; and

   * Count VI: Unjust Enrichment. The Plaintiffs allege they
     conferred a benefit on Defendants when they repaid the
     allegedly unlawful loans; that the Defendants knew or should
     have known about the benefit; and that the Defendants have
     been unjustly enriched through their receipt of any amounts
     in connection with the unlawful loans.

Procedural Background

On Feb. 12, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed the Motion for Class
Certification. The Defendants timely filed their response, and the
Plaintiffs timely filed their reply. During the pendency of the
Motion for Class Certification, the Plaintiffs, and the Defendants,
filed three Motions to File Supplemental Authority, which the Court
granted. Neither Party requested a hearing on the Motion for Class
Certification.

Analysis

Upon consideration of the applicable requirements under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court will grant the
Motion for Class Certification. Before providing its "close look"
at each class certification requirement, the Court must address two
preliminary issues: (1) whether, following this Court's September
2019 Memorandum Opinion, the Virginia Class can include Virginia
consumers who obtained a loan from Mobiloans; and (2) whether the
Plaintiffs waived their right to pursue a class action based on the
arbitration agreements they entered into with the tribal lenders.

The Defendants maintain that both issues present "insurmountable
hurdles" to certifying the proposed class. However, the Court
concludes that these issues do not impede class certification.

Judge Lauck finds that the Defendants fail to demonstrate that two
preliminary issues preclude certification of the proposed class.
First, the Defendants assert that the Court's September 2019
Memorandum Opinion forecloses Mobiloans consumers from
participating in this class action. Second, the Defendants contend
that the class action waivers in the Plaintiffs' loan agreements
preclude class certification.

Neither issue defeats the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification, Judge Lauck holds. She opines that the Court's
September 2019 Memorandum Opinion does not prevent the proposed
class from including consumers who obtained loans from Mobiloans.
She adds that the Defendants' second preliminary argument similarly
does not bar class certification.

Each tribal lending entity included a class action waiver in its
loan agreements. The Great Plains and Plain Green loans contained a
waiver as part of their Waiver of Jury Trial and Arbitration
Agreement.

Judge Lauck explains that the whole Great Plains and Plain Green
Arbitration Agreements, including the class action waivers, are
unenforceable. The waivers, therefore, do not preclude class
certification. Despite finding the Mobiloans Arbitration Agreements
enforceable in the September 2019 Memorandum Opinion, the Court
concludes that the prospective waiver doctrine renders
unenforceable the class action waiver provisions within those
agreements.

Having concluded that neither of the two preliminary issues raised
by the Defendants prohibit class certification, the Court turns to
the Rule 23 requirements. Judge Lauck finds that the Plaintiffs
satisfy the requirements under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3), so the
Court will grant the Motion for Class Certification and certify the
Virginia Class. The Judge finds, among other things, that a class
action is superior to other available methods to fairly and
efficiently adjudicate the lawsuit.

Conclusion

For these foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs
meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The
Court will grant the Motion for Class Certification, certify the
Virginia Class, appoint the Plaintiffs' Counsel as Class Counsel,
and appoint the Named Plaintiffs as Class Representatives.

An appropriate Amended Order will be issued.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated Oct. 14,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2txee7rj from
Leagle.com.


ADVANCED DRAINAGE: Loschiavo Seeks Pay for Missed Breaks, Overtime
------------------------------------------------------------------
Ronnie Loschiavo and Shawn Selby, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Advanced Drainage
Systems, Inc. (ADS), Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-05069 (S.D. Ohio,
October 15, 2021), seeks redress for Defendant's failure to pay
employees proper wages. They seek all available relief under the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage
Standards Act and the Ohio Prompt Pay Act.

ADS is a manufacturer of corrugated pipes, and services the storm
and water waste industry through a global network of domestic and
international manufacturing plants and distribution centers
offering a complete line of fittings and other products, including
sanitary sewer pipe, storm water chambers, and drainage structures.
Loschiavo worked for ADS as a machine/line operator while Selby
worked as a yard loader. They claim that ADS deducted 30 minutes
for a meal break regardless of whether they actually took an
uninterrupted 30-minute meal break. They also claim to have worked
more than 40 hours in given workweek without being paid overtime.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
      Adam C. Gedling, Esq.
      Kelsie N, Hendren, Esq.
      COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
      1550 Old Henderson Road, Suite 126
      Columbus, OH 43220
      Phone: (614) 949-1181
      Fax: (614) 386-9964
      Email: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com
             agedling@mcoffmanlegal.com
             khendren@mcoffmanlegal.com

             - and -

      Daniel I. Bryant, Esq.
      BRYANT LEGAL, LLC
      1457 S. High St.
      Columbus, OH 43207
      Telephone: (614) 704-0546
      Facsimile: (614) 573-9826
      Email: dbryant@bryantlegalllc.com

             - and -

      Matthew B. Bryant, Esq.
      BRYANT LEGAL, LLC
      3450 W Central Ave., Suite 370
      Toledo, OH 43606
      Telephone: (419) 824-4439
      Facsimile: (419) 932-6719
      Email: Mbryant@bryantlegalllc.com


AIR METHODS: Wagner et al. Seek to Redefine Class & Approve Deal
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TOM WAGNER et al. v. AIR
METHODS CORPORATION, a Colorado Corporation, Case No.
1:19-cv-00484-RBJ (D. Colo.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter
an order redefining the class and for preliminary approval of
amended class action settlement:

   (1) asserts jurisdiction over the implementation and
       administration of the Settlement Agreement;

   (2) approves notice of the Settlement as set forth in the
       Settlement Agreement as the Settlement falls within the
       range of reasonableness, and may be adjudicated to be
       fair, reasonable, and adequate within the meaning of Fed.
       R. Civ. P. 23 and the CAFA, upon final consideration
       thereof at the Final Approval Hearing;

   (3) approves the Individual Settlement Payments listed on the
       Payout Sheet;

   (4) approves, as to form and content, the Settlement Notice,
       and authorizes the first-class mailing of a Settlement
       Notice to all members of the Settlement Class;

   (5) approves and appoints Rust Consulting as the third-party
       Settlement Administrator who will administer this
       Settlement;

   (6) sets a 30 calendar day deadline (from the date the
       Settlement Notice is postmarked to members of the
       Settlement Class) for the execution and return of
       requests for exclusion and/or objections; and

   (7) sets the final approval hearing for a date no earlier
       than 60 calendar days after preliminary approval is
       granted by this Court.

The Court initially granted certification of a class defined to
include:

   "All persons employed by AMC as flight paramedics or flight
    nurses in [Michigan] [New Mexico] [Illinois] from February
    19, 2016 to the present."

As of the filing of the Motion for Class Certification, information
provided by AMC reflected a total of 634 employees in such a class.
However, when AMC provided information to the Class Administrator
for the mailing of required Notices, it was discovered that 668
employees might be included in such a class; therefore, 668 Notices
were mailed. Thereafter, 34 employees who received Notices opted
out, leaving 634 employees in the designated class. The parties
have recently agreed, after an exhaustive analysis of all relevant
records, that only 519 of those employees are owed overtime during
the Class Period, and thus entitled to participate in the
settlement. This is because there are 115 employees who met the
definition of the Class as certified, and who did not opt out, but
also either did not work any overtime during the Class Period, or
were already compensated for any overtime worked.

On August 16, 2021, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed Motion for
preliminary approval of a settlement for this class action. That
Motion was granted by the Court on August 17, 2021, and the parties
began taking the required next steps to administer the settlement.
As AMC assembled the information necessary to provide to the
settlement administrator, confusion arose surrounding members of
the class who had not previously opted out, but who would receive
nothing under the approved settlement  because they either had not
worked overtime during the class period, or they had already been
properly compensated for any overtime worked.

Air Methods is an American privately owned helicopter operator. The
air medical division provides emergency medical services to between
70,000 and 100,000 patients every year. It operates in 48 states
and Haiti, with air medical as its primary business focus.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3jCS3AE at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J. Robert Cowan, Esq.
          COWAN LAW OFFICE, PLC
          2401 Regency Road; Suite 300
          Lexington, KY 40503
          Telephone: (859) 523-8883
          Facsimile: (859) 523-8885
          E-mail: kylaw@cowanlawky.com

               - and -

          Christopher D. Miller, Esq.
          Charles W. Arnold, Esq.
          ARNOLD MILLER LAW
          121 Prosperous Place, Suite 6B
          Lexington, KY 40509
          Telephone: (859) 381-9999
          Facsimile: (859) 389-6666
          E-mail: cmiller@arnoldmillerlaw.com
                  carnold@arnoldmillerlaw.com

AMAZON.COM INC: Interim Co-Lead, Class Counsel Named in Garner Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KAELI GARNER, et al., Plaintiffs v. AMAZON.COM, INC.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-00750-RSL (W.D. Wash.), Judge
Robert S. Lasnik of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Seattle, granted the parties' stipulated
motion for appointment of interim co-lead counsel and class
counsel.

Between June 7, 2021, and July 16, 2021, multiple putative
class-action complaints were filed against Defendants Amazon.com,
Inc. and Amazon.com Services LLC (collectively, "Amazon" or
"Defendants"), including the case, generally alleging illegal
wiretapping under various federal and state statutes.

On July 27, 2021, the original parties to the action filed a
stipulated motion with the Court to, among other things: (1)
consolidate this case with the other five related cases pending in
the District; (2) set a deadline for the consolidated Plaintiffs to
file a Consolidated Complaint; (3) set a schedule for the
Defendants to answer or otherwise move with respect to the
Consolidated Complaint.

On Aug. 3, 2021, the Court so-ordered the stipulated motion.

On Sept. 2, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed their Consolidated
Complaint. The Defendants' deadline to answer or otherwise move
with respect to the Consolidated Complaint is on Oct. 18, 2021.

To ensure efficiency in the case, the parties believe it is
important for the Court to appoint a leadership group and interim
class counsel to represent the Plaintiffs and the putative class
under Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION Sections 10.22 and 21.11 (4th ed.
2021).

The Defendants believe that class certification under Rule 23 will
be inappropriate and intend to preserve all arguments with respect
to any future motion for class certification or appointment of
permanent class counsel, but do not oppose appointment of interim
class counsel during the proceeding.

The Plaintiffs have agreed, and the Defendants do not oppose, Judge
Lasnik's appointment of the following individuals to serve on an
interim basis in the following capacities on behalf of the
Plaintiffs and the putative class:

     1. Michael P. Canty (Labaton Sucharow LLP (New York, NY)): Mr.
Canty is a partner at Labaton, serving as General Counsel to the
Firm and as head of the Firm's Consumer Cybersecurity and Data
Privacy group.

     2. Stuart A. Davidson (Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP (Boca
Raton, FL)): Mr. Davidson is a partner at Robbins Geller, the
largest class-action firm in the world. Mr. Davidson leads many of
the firm's consumer, privacy, and data breach class actions.

     3. Guillaume Buell (Thornton Law Firm LLP (Boston, MA)): Mr.
Buell is a partner at Thornton Law and leads the firm's class
action practice. A seasoned litigator with a diverse litigation and
trial background, his practice focuses on representing investors
and consumers in securities and consumer lawsuits pending in state
and federal courts across the country.

     4. L. Timothy Fisher (Bursor & Fisher, P.A. (Walnut Creek,
CA)): Mr. Fisher has been actively involved in numerous cases that
resulted in multi-million-dollar recoveries for consumers and
investors. Mr. Fisher has handled cases involving a wide range of
issues including nutritional labeling, health care,
telecommunications, corporate governance, unfair business practices
and consumer fraud.

     5. Brian C. Gudmundson (Zimmerman Reed LLP (Minneapolis, MN)):
Mr. Gudmundson has led and litigated numerous MDL and consolidated
actions, including many data privacy actions in recent years.

     6. Robert K. Shelquist (Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P.
(Minneapolis, MN)): Mr. Shelquist has prosecuted national class
actions to verdict in two cases. He has been active in class
action, consumer fraud, product liability, and other complex
litigation.

The parties propose that, in their capacity as the Co-Lead Class
Counsel, Messrs. Canty and Davidson shall, in coordination with
each other and at their discretion, and in consultation with the
Interim Class Counsel as may be appropriate, be responsible for
coordinating the Plaintiffs' pretrial activities and shall:

     (a) Determine and present (in briefs, oral argument, or such
other fashion as may be appropriate personally or by a designee) to
the Court and the Defendants the position of plaintiffs on all
matters arising during pretrial proceedings;

     (b) Coordinate the initiation and conduct of discovery on
behalf of the Plaintiffs consistent with the requirements of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26, including the preparation of interrogatories and
requests for production of documents and coordinate the examination
of witnesses in depositions;

     (c) Coordinate discovery efforts with co-counsel to ensure
that discovery is conducted in an efficient, orderly, and
non-duplicative manner;

     (d) Conduct and coordinate settlement negotiations;

     (e) Delegate specific tasks to other counsel in a manner to
ensure that pretrial preparation is conducted efficiently and
effectively;

     (f) Enter into stipulations with opposing counsel as necessary
for the conduct of the litigation;

     (g) Prepare and distribute periodic status reports to the
parties as may be necessary;

     (h) Maintain adequate time and disbursement records covering
services for all the Plaintiffs' counsel in the action;

     (i) Monitor the activities of co-counsel to ensure that
schedules are met and duplicative efforts and unnecessary
expenditures of time and funds are avoided;

     (j) Perform such other duties as may be incidental to proper
coordination of the Plaintiffs' pretrial activities or authorized
by further order of the Court; and

     (k) Appoint additional committees, as necessary, including,
but not limited to expert, discovery, trial, and settlement
committees.

Based on the parties' stipulation, Judge Lasnik appointed Michael
P. Canty of Labaton and Stuart A. Davidson of Robbins Gellers as
the Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel. Guillaume Buell of Thornton Law,
L. Timothy Fisher of Bursor & Fisher, Brian C. Gudmundson of
Zimmerman Reed LLP, and Robert K. Shelquist of Lockridge Grindal
Nauen P.L.L.P. are appointed as the Interim Class Counsel.

As the Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel, Messrs. Canty and Davidson
shall, in coordination with each other and at their discretion, be
responsible for coordinating the Plaintiffs' pretrial activities as
stipulated.

The Order is made without prejudice to Amazon's opposition to any
future motion for class certification filed by the Plaintiffs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/33788e73 from Leagle.com.


AMERICAN CORADIUS: Shoval Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. Florida
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against American Coradius
International LLC. The case is styled as Sigal Shoval, on behalf of
Roei Shoval, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. American Coradius International LLC, Case No.
0:21-cv-62233-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Oct. 27, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

American Coradius International LLC --
http://www.americancoradiusinternational.com/-- is a full service
financial service agency representing banks and finance companies
on a national level.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin E. Zeig, Esq.
          ZEIG LAW FIRM, LLC
          3475 Sheridan Street, Suite 310
          Hollywood, FL 33024
          Phone: (754) 217-3084
          Email: justin@zeiglawfirm.com


AMERICAN FIRST: Facio Sues Over Deceptive Business Practices
------------------------------------------------------------
Larry Facio, individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. American First Finance, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 21-cv-08184, (N.D. Cal., October 20, 2021) seeks
declaratory judgment, monetary damages, liquidated damages, costs
and a reasonable attorneys' fees, as a result of violations of the
Consumers Legal Remedies Act and California's Unfair & Deceptive
Business Practices.

American First Finance (AFF) provided loans to California residents
for the purchase of consumer goods at affiliated retail stores.
However, AFF continues to operate as an unlicensed lender in
California. Facio purchased goods and services from AFF and claims
that he was not informed of the proper disclosure of the financing
terms and that his personal information was shared with AFF without
permission and their undisclosed terms included an allegedly
exorbitant interest rate. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Robert S. Green, Esq.
      James Robert Noblin, Esq.
      Evan M. Sumer, Esq.
      GREEN & NOBLIN, P.C.
      2200 Larkspur Landing Circle, Suite 101
      Larkspur, CA 94939
      Tel: (415) 477-6700
      Fax: (415) 477-6710
      Email: gnecf@classcounsel.com

             - and -

      Alicia L. Hinton, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF A.L. HINTON
      1616 W. Shaw Avenue, Suite B7
      Fresno, CA 93711
      Tel: (559) 691-6900
      Fax: (559) 421-0373
      Email: alicia@alhintonlaw.com

             - and -

      James C. Sturdevant, Esq.
      THE STURDEVANT LAW FIRM, APC
      4040 Civic Center Drive, Suite 200
      San Rafael, CA 94903
      Tel: (415) 477-2410
      Fax: (415) 492-2810
      Email: alicia@alhintonlaw.com


AMERICAN SOLAR: Sharlene O'Shea Appointed as Class Representative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as THE ESTATE OF KERRY
O'SHEA, through SHARLENE O'SHEA, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, v. AMERICAN SOLAR SOLUTION, INC., Case No.
3:14-cv-00894-L-RBB (S.D. Cal.), the Court entered an order
granting plaintiff's renewed joint motion to substitute the estate
of Kerry O'Shea for the named and deceased class representative
Kerry O'Shea.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Sharlene O'Shea acting through
the Estate of Kerry O'Shea satisfies the requirements of both Rule
25(a) and the typicality and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a).

This case is a class action alleging American Solar violated the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), by using an automatic
telephone dialer system ("ATDS") to place telemarketing calls to
cell phones. The Defendant is in the business of selling solar
energy equipment to residential and commercial customers. To market
its products and services, the Defendant used a ViciDial predictive
dialer to contact phone numbers uploaded into the 2 dialer.
Defendant purchased these telephone numbers from several different
companies that sell lists of phone numbers that connect to members
of a population meeting certain demographic criteria.

Per Plaintiff's expert’s report, Defendant made 897,534 calls to
220,007 different cell phone numbers. Defendant has no evidence
indicating any of the alleged call recipients provided prior
express consent to receive these calls.

The Defendant placed fifteen calls to named Plaintiff Kerry
O'Shea's ("Plaintiff") cell phone. The Plaintiff was appointed
class representative of this litigation on March 2, 2017. On the
same day, class certification was granted by this Court for the
following class:

   "All individuals in the United States who were called by or
   on behalf of Defendant; using the ViciDial predictive dialer;
   on a cellular telephone number, between November 22, 2012 and
   August 22, 2015."

American Solar operates as a solar energy equipment company.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 15, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3jFTKNs at no extra charge[CC]

AMPLIFY ENERGY: Beyond Business Files Suit in C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Amplify Energy
Corporation, et al. The case is styled as Beyond Business
Incorporated doing business as: Big Fish Bait and Tackle,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v. Amplify
Energy Corporation doing business as: Beta Offshore, a Delaware
Corporation; Beta Operating Company, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company; San Pedro Bay Pipeline Company, a California
Company; Case No. 8:21-cv-01714-DOC-JDE (C.D. Cal., Oct. 14,
2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Torts to Land.

Amplify Energy Corp. --
https://www.amplifyenergy.com/home/default.aspx -- is an
independent oil and natural gas company engaged in the acquisition,
development, exploitation and production of oil and natural gas
properties.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          David C. Wright, Esq.
          James G Perry, Esq.
          McCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP - Ontario, CA
          18565 Jamboree Road Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Phone: (909) 557-1250
          Fax: (909) 557-1275
          Email: rdm@mccunewright.com
                 dcw@mccunewright.com
                 jgp@mccunewright.com

               - and -

          Rick Lloyd Richmond, Esq.
          Stephen Gerard Larson, Esq.
          Steven E Bledsoe, Esq.
          LARSON LLP
          600 Anton Boulevard Suite 1270
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Phone: (949) 516-7250
          Fax: (949) 516-7251
          Email: rrichmond@larsonllp.com
                 slarson@larsonllp.com
                 sbledsoe@larsonllp.com


AMPLIFY ENERGY: East Meets West Sue Over Oil Spill
--------------------------------------------------
East Meets West Excursions, Mike Owens, Michael Jensen, Patrick
Mahoney, Jolynn Mahoney, Steven Rosansky, Gina Rosansky, John
Pedicini and Marysue Pedicini, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Amplify Energy Corporation, Beta
Operation Company LLC and San Pedro Bay Pipeline Company,
Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-01725 (C.D. Cal., October 18, 2021),
seeks to recover business and/or commercial losses and other
damages resulting from the oil spill allegedly caused by the
Defendants.

Plaintiffs are businesses, individuals and representatives of
individuals in Orange County that were affected by the oil spill.

The Beta Field is an oil reservoir located about nine miles off the
coast of Huntington Beach, California. The oil pipeline transports
oil from the Beta Field to a pump in Long Beach, California.
Sometime in October 1 or 2, 2021, oil began gushing just four miles
from shore originating from a broken pipeline which connects to an
offshore oil platform. Said platform is owned and operated by Beta,
a subsidiary of Amplify. The pipeline is owned and operated by San
Pedro Bay, also a subsidiary of Amplify. Over 144,000 gallons of
oil have so far spilled into the Pacific Ocean beginning on or
around early October 2021 and the present.

Amplify is an energy company which handles oil and gas acquisition,
production, and development throughout the United States. [BN]

Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Wylie A. Aitken, Esq.
      Darren O. Aitken, Esq.
      Michael A. Penn, Esq.
      Megan G. Demshki, Esq.
      AITKEN AITKEN COHN
      3 MacArthur Place, Suite 800
      Santa Ana, CA 92808
      Tel: (714) 434-1424
      Fax: (714) 434-3600


ANDERSON COUNTY, SC: Green v. Jail Is Subject to Summary Dismissal
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Robert H. Green, Plaintiff v. Major Vaughn, Sheriff
Chad McBride, A. Belk, and T. Kerr, Defendants, C/A No.
1:21-3259-JFA-SVH (D.S.C.), Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges of the
U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina issued an
Order holding that the case is subject to summary dismissal.

Introduction

Plaintiff Green, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed the
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging violations
of his constitutional rights while incarcerated at the Anderson
County Detention Center. He sues Major Vaughn, Sheriff Chad
McBride, A. Belk, and T. Kerr. In the cover letter to his
complaint, the Plaintiff requests his complaint be filed with three
other complaints as a class action. He may not represent other
inmates in a class action and may not litigate on behalf of other
persons.

Factual Background

In the form complaint the Plaintiff completed, in the section in
which he is instructed to explain how each Defendant is liable, he
states: "Fire hazard, medical malpractice, deliberate indifference,
cruel and unusual punishment, unsanitary conditions, negligence,
over population." When asked to state the facts of his case, the
Plaintiff states "I contracted staph infections, rashes, illnesses,
and Covid-19 without medical case. No sprinkler system in jail.
Building not in code or ordinance. Over-crowdedness." The Plaintiff
states he requests the following relief: "Building to be in code.
New facility, damages. Defendants to be held accountable, corrected
or to be released."

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B) and
Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), Judge Hodges is authorized
to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and
recommendations to the district judge.

Analysis

The Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in
federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of
proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of
this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a
case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. A finding of
frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact. A claim based on a meritless legal theory
may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B).

1. Insufficient Allegations

To state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983,
an aggrieved party must sufficiently allege that he was injured by
"the deprivation of any of his or her rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the United States Constitution and laws" by a
"person" acting "under color of state law." To assert a viable
Section 1983 claim against a state official, the Plaintiff must
allege a causal connection or affirmative link between the conduct
of which he complains and the official sued.

Judge Hodges finds that the Plaintiff asserts no factual
allegations against the Defendants, and their names are not used
beyond being listed on the first few pages of the complaint.
Therefore, the case is subject to summary dismissal.

2. Conclusory Claims

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Although the court
must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States
Supreme Court has made it clear that a plaintiff must do more than
make conclusory statements to state a claim. Rather, the complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need
only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its
legal conclusions. Judge Hodges finds that the Plaintiff's
complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations of
constitutional wrongdoing or discriminatory actions attributable to
the Defendants.

3. No Supervisory Liability Under Section 1983

The doctrine of supervisory liability is generally inapplicable to
Section 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not
liable for the acts of his employees, absent an official policy or
custom that results in illegal action. The Supreme Court explains
that "because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and
Section 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official's own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Because the
Plaintiff fails to allege any specific actions or inactions against
any Defendant, Judge Hodges holds that they are entitled to summary
dismissal.

Notice Concerning Amendment

The Plaintiff may attempt to correct the defects in his complaint
by filing an amended complaint, along with any appropriate service
documents. He is reminded an amended complaint replaces the
original complaint and should be complete in itself. If the
Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Judge Hodges will conduct
screening of the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1915A. If the Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or fails
to cure the deficiencies identified, he will recommend to the
district court that the claims specified be dismissed without leave
for further amendment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/e23yxr5r from Leagle.com.


APPLE INC: McTyere Hits Overpriced Digital Content
--------------------------------------------------
Trenise McTyere and Lucille Clark, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Apple Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-01133 (W.D. N.Y., October 18, 2021),
asserts, among other things, a claim for unjust enrichment over the
Defendants' false and misleading representations over the "sale" of
digital content.

Apple is a computer and phone manufacturer and retailer. It offers
the option for consumers to "Rent" or "Buy" movies, television
shows, music and other media content for a fee via its "iTunes"
store and related applications. Such content sold on iTunes is
licensed to Apple by the owner of the content. Accordingly, when a
licensing agreement terminates for whatever reason, Apple is
required to retract said content without prior warning to the
consumer. Despite of this, Apple charges just as much for it as (or
even more than) the store that actually passes title of the content
to consumers, which access can never be revoked, according to the
complaint.

Plaintiffs allege that such agreement misleads consumers into
believing that the Defendant is "selling" them digital content, but
in actuality it is only providing them with a license which they
can never own. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have been damaged by
Defendant's misconduct in that they overpaid for Digital Content.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Carlos F. Ramirez, Esq.
      Michael R. Reese, Esq.
      Charles D. Moore, Esq.
      100 West 93rd Street, 16th Floor
      New York, NY 10025
      Telephone: (212) 643-0500
      Facsimile: (212) 253-4272
      Email: mreese@reesellp.com
             cramirez@reesellp.com
             cmoore@reesellp.com

             - and -

      George V. Granade, Esq.
      REESE LLP
      8484 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 515
      Los Angeles, CA 90211
      Telephone: (310) 393-0070
      Email: ggranade@reesellp.com

ARCADIA RECOVERY: Neuburger Files FDCPA Suit in D. New Jersey
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Arcadia Recovery
Bureau, LLC. The case is styled as Ashley Neuburger, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Arcadia Recovery
Bureau, LLC, Case No. 2:21-cv-19365 (D.N.J., Oct. 27, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Arcadia Recovery Bureau -- https://www.arcadiarecovery.com/ -- is a
debt collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Raphael Y. Deutsch, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: rdeutsch@steinsakslegal.com


ARKANSAS: Phillips Files Certiorari Petition in Felony Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Petitioner Corelanius Toriano Phillips filed with the Supreme Court
of United States a petition for a writ of certiorari in the matter
styled In re Corelanius Toriano Phillips, a natural person, THE
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST and as THE PROPER PARTY and INJURED PARTY,
individually, and on behalf of similarly situated persons,
Petitioners v. STATE OF ARKANSAS; THE SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS,
i.e., The Hon. John D. Kemp, individually and in his official
capacity as Chief Justice for the Arkansas Supreme Court, The Hon.
Robin F. Wynne, The Hon. Courtney Rae Hudson, The Hon. Shawn A.
Womack, The Hon. Karen R. Baker, The Hon. Ronda K. Wood and The
Hon. Barbara W. Webb, each individually and in their official
capacity as associate justices for the Arkansas Supreme Court, and
The Bradley County Circuit Court, Tenth Judicial District,
Respondents, Case No. 21-5946.

Response is due on November 12, 2021.

Mr. Phillips petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in the case titled
Phillips v. Culclager, Case No. CV-20-725.

The question presented is: Whether criminal defendants denied Due
Process of Law entitle them to remedy where (1) The trial court
empanelled an illegally constituted jury in violation of the Sixth
Amendment where (a) the denial constitutes a Structural Defect and
(b) Implicates the trial court's Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, so as
to render the judgment void ab initio and subject to collateral
attack; (2) Petitioner was provided with ineffective assistance of
counsel where (a) Counsel failed to advise him of inviolate right
to be tried before a twelve-person jury and (b) Appellant counsel
failed to present known meritorious issue that required automatic
reversal of conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of
Arkansas; and (3) The Supreme Court of Arkansas' modification of
its Rules for Waiver of Trial by Jury is violative of the United
States and Arkansas Constitution(s) where (a) It violates the
Separation of Powers and (b) It exceeds the Court's Authority
conferred under the Arkansas Constitution?

According to the complaint, Petitioner Corelanius T. Phillips was
convicted by an illegally constituted jury for the crime of Capital
Felony Murder. Phillips was sentenced to life without a parole in
prison by the circuit court of Bradley County, Arkansas, on
November 11, 1992. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the
conviction and sentence imposed on other grounds.

Phillips did not receive notification of the mandate being issued
in his direct appeal from the Supreme Court of Arkansas clerk or
his State appointed appellate counsel Robert P. Remet.

On October 18, 2000, Phillips filed a petition for error coram
nobis in the Supreme Court of Arkansas seeking to have jurisdiction
reinvested in the trial court. That petition was denied.

On April 4, 2005, Phillips then filed a state habeas corpus
pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. Section 16-112-101 et seq., in the
circuit court of Lee County, Arkansas. The petition was denied by
written order entered on June 22, 2005 and timely appeal was taken
and denied (November 3, 2005) by the Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Phillips then filed a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the
Eastern District of Arkansas on December 5, 2005 as to the
aforementioned claims; however, that petition was denied (March 2,
2007) and dismissed, with prejudice.

On October 15, 2007, Phillips sought a Writ of Certiorari with the
court that was also denied. Phillips again sought relief in the
federal court under Rule 60 (b), to reopen the case after this
Court rendered its decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132 S.
Ct 1309, 182 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2012); indicating the bar to federal
review may be lifted, if the "prisoner can demonstrate cause for
the procedural default in state court and actual prejudice as a
result of the alleged violation of federal law." The petition was
construed by the District Court as a second habeas action and
denied (June 28, 2012) without prejudice, so that Phillips could
seek authorization from the Eighth Circuit, pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
Section 2244(b)(3)(A), to file a successive habeas petition.
Phillips appealed to the Eighth Circuit (Case No. 12-2738) and
sought a Certificate of Appealability which was denied November 26,
2012.

Phillips filed for a rehearing en banc. The Court denied the
request January 11, 2013. Thereafter, the mandate was issued on
January 25, 2013.

Phillips then appealed (Phillips v. Culclager, [CV 20-725] January
21, 2020) to the Supreme Court of Arkansas. That Court also
declined to entertain the constitutional issue(s) in the
Declaratory Judgment portion of the appeal; however, the Court in
its Opinion for the habeas corpus conceded Phillips's claim as a
Due Process violation and Cognizable either on direct appeal or in
a post-conviction petition.

Although the Supreme Court of Arkansas has conceded an error
exists, it has failed and refused to provide an adequate remedy to
Phillips, says the complaint.

This petition for Writ of Certiorari comes from the Supreme Court
of Arkansas' Opinion affirming the appeal.

Petitioner, Corelanius Toriano Phillips, who is currently confined
in the Cummins Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction,
appears pro se.[BN]

ARROW SENIOR: Seeks to Stay Briefing for Conditional Cert. Bid
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KENDALL OLIN-MARQUEZ, on
behalf of herself and others similarly situated, v. ARROW SENIOR
LIVING MANAGEMENT, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-00996-EAS-CMV
(S.D. Ohio), the Defendant asks the Court to enter an order to stay
briefing and adjudication of Plaintiff's motion for conditional
certification while their motions, which raise the threshold
questions of personal jurisdiction and venue, are decided.

The Plaintiff's Complaint, First Amended Complaint and Second
Amended Complaint asserted claims on behalf of Named Plaintiff and
a nationwide, putative class of allegedly similarly situated
Plaintiffs under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). On October 5,
2021, following the Sixth Circuit's decision in Canaday v. The
Anthem Companies, Inc., 9 F.4th 392 (6th Cir. 2021), which held
that federal courts cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over the
claims of nonresident plaintiffs who join FLSA collective actions
when their claims are not connected to the defendant's activities
in the forum state, Plaintiff filed her Third Amended Complaint,
limiting the scope of this action to Ohio.

That same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Conditional
Certification seeking to conditionally certify a collective action
class of Ohio plaintiffs. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss) and Motion
to Transfer stand to dispose of this matter in the Southern
District of Ohio. Consequently, judicial economy and preservation
of party resources dictate that briefing and adjudication of
Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification be stayed until
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Transfer are
decided.

A copy of the Defendant motion's dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2Zyhjkz at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Monica L. Lacks, Esq.
          Rebecca J. Bennett, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH
          SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          Key Tower
          127 Public Square, Suite 4100
          Cleveland, OH 44114
          Telephone: (216) 241-6100
          Facsimile: (216) 357-473
          E-mail: rebecca.bennett@ogletree.com
                  monica.lacks@ogletree.com

AT&T MOBILITY: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss or Stay Razo Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LUOS M. SALAS RAZO, on his own behalf and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AT&T MOBILITY SERVICES,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-00172-NONE-HBK (E.D. Cal.), Judge
Dale A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of California denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss or stay the
action in its entirety.

Introduction

The case proceeds on Plaintiff Luis Razo's second amended class
action complaint ("SAC"), which alleges generally that Defendant
AT&T underpaid him, issued him unlawful wage statements, and
withheld wages it owed him after his employment ended, all in
violation of various provisions of the California Labor Code. The
Plaintiff seeks to represent a class and sub-class made up of
similarly situated employees of the Defendant.

Before the court for decision is the Defendant's Aug. 13, 2020
motion to dismiss or to stay the action. The Plaintiff filed an
opposition to the motion, and the Defendant replied. The matter was
taken under submission on the papers pursuant to Local Rule
230(c).

On Aug. 2, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a notice of supplemental
authority informing the court of a relevant California Supreme
Court decision.

Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

a. Unpaid Wages Claims

i. Failure to properly calculate overtime rates

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant routinely failed to
properly calculate overtime and double time pay rates because it
failed to include his total compensation (including bonuses and
commissions) when calculating the regular rate for purposes of
determining overtime wages owed. The Defendant moves to dismiss
this claim, arguing that the Plaintiff's own wage statements
contradict his allegations of wrongdoing. It asserts that the
relevant wage statements may be considered in the context of the
motion to dismiss because they have been incorporated by reference
into the complaint.

Judge Drozd finds that the Defendant's motion to dismiss does not
merely rely on the content of the incorporated wage statements. The
Defendant's briefs are filled with the counsel's own factual
assertions and interpretations of the wage statements that are
unsupported by any evidence, let alone evidence that can be
considered by the Court at this stage of the case. The motion to
dismiss this aspect of the Plaintiff's failure to pay wages claim
will therefore be denied.

ii. Failure to list all hours worked

The Plaintiff also alleges that the wage statements fail to
properly list all hours worked, providing one example of a wage
statement that shows line items adding up to 106.08 hours while
indicating only 81.98 total hours were worked. He asserts that this
resulted in a failure to pay wages for all hours worked at
appropriate rates.

In support of dismissing this claim, the Defendant cites to the
decision in Hernandez v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., No. CV 11-9484
SVW SSX, 2012 WL 12272348 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2012), aff'd, 554 F.
App'x 661, 662 (9th Cir. 2014). There, the district court
considered allegedly defective wage statements in the context of a
motion for summary judgment. The wage statements in question in
that case contained two line-items for overtime that split the 150%
pay owed into two component parts: A line accounting for the 100%
"base" pay and a line for the 50% "premium" pay added to the base
pay.At first glance, this caused the total hours worked for all
line items to double count any time spent working overtime. But the
wage statement in Hernandez also included an obvious line that
showed the total hours worked, which did not double count the time
spent working overtime. The district court concluded the wage
statement in that case was sufficient as a matter of law because
the statement showed the total hours worked during the pay period.

Judge Drozd states that the wage statements at issue have some
similarities to those in Hernandez but are noticeably more
complicated. For example, the June 1, 2018 statement has more than
a dozen line items. If only the "regular" and "overtime base" line
items are added together, the hours in those line items equal the
total hours worked listed at the top of the statement. But, as the
Plaintiff correctly points out, if all of the hours listed in the
line items are added together, they total far more than the listed
"total hours worked."

Although Judge Drozd could make educated guesses as to why certain
line items are or are not included in the total hours worked,
nothing before him clearly explains the nature of each category.
Again, the Court is not permitted to consider the counsel's
explanations and arguments as to why the total provided is
correctly reflected by the line items. It is not moved by the fact
that Hernandez approved on summary judgment wage statements with
somewhat similar, but much less complicated, double-counting
issues. The motion to dismiss this claim will therefore also be
denied.

b. Unlawful Wage Statements Claim

The Plaintiff next alleges that on a routine basis defendant failed
to provide wage statements compliant with California Labor Code
Section 226 because hours and rates were not properly shown. The
Defendant argues that these claims are untimely in light of
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 340, which sets forth a
one-year statute of limitations applicable to any action seeking
statutory damages. According to the Defendant, because the SAC
alleges that the Plaintiff ended his employment in June 2018, the
Plaintiff had until June 2019 to file an action for penalties owed
due to any allegedly unlawful wage statements.

The Plaintiff responds in two ways. First, he points out that the
SAC indicates that the Plaintiff continued to receive wage payments
and statements as late as August 2018. Second, the Plaintiff
suggests that the one-year statute of limitations period does not
apply in the case at all because he is seeking damages, not just
statutory penalties.

Judge Drozd holds that to the extent the Defendant is moving to
dismiss any claims premised upon the wage statement for the Oct. 5,
2018 pay period, that motion will be denied. He finds that nothing
properly before the Court explains what the "MISC PAYMENT" was for
or why it should or should not reflect an underlying hourly wage.
Moreover, the relevant wage statement cause of action specifically
requests only "penalties according to proof." To the extent the SAC
is unclear about the Plaintiff's intent to seek damages in
connection with his wage statement claim, leave to amend would be
appropriately granted at this early stage of the proceedings --
where class discovery has not yet even begun. Judge Drozd permits
the Plaintiff an opportunity to clarify his prayer for relief in an
amended pleading.

c. Meal Period Premium Claim

The Plaintiff asserts that meal period premiums were not paid at
the proper rate. The Defendant moved to dismiss this claim, arguing
that the claim is premised upon a "nonactionable theory" rejected
by the California Court of Appeals in Ferra v. Loews Hollywood
Hotel, LLC, 40 Cal. App. 5th 1239, 1252 (2019), which held that
employers are only obligated to compensate employees with a full
extra hour for missed meal/rest breaks at their base hourly rate.
However, that appellate decision was overruled by the California
Supreme Court on July 15, 2021, Ferra v. Lowes Hollywood Hotel,
LLC, 11 Cal. 5th 858 (2021), which concluded unanimously that meal
and rest break premiums must be calculated at the same "regular
rate of pay" used to calculate overtime pay, a calculation that
encompasses all nondiscretionary payments, not just hourly wages.
The California Supreme Court's decision in Ferra requires denial of
this aspect of defendant's motion to dismiss.

d. Waiting Time Claim

Finally, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendant failed to timely
pay him wages due at termination of employment as required by
California Labor Code Section 201 (or alternatively within 72 hours
of resignation as required by Section 202) and therefore that the
Defendant owes waiting time penalties under Section 203. The SAC
specifically alleges that the Plaintiff's last day of work was in
June 2018 but that he continued to receive payments as late as
August 2018, more than 30 days after his employment ended. The
Defendant argues that this claim should be dismissed because the
payments on which the Plaintiff bases his own waiting time claim
were only calculable after his termination.

Judge Drozd holds that the SAC highlights five types of payments
that the Plaintiff allegedly received late: "[1] Cash Awards, [2]
Commission, [3] Taxable non-cash Awards, [4] Misc. Payment, and [5]
recalculation of overtime differential pay." The Defendant asserts
that "each, on their face, represents payments that cannot be made
at termination." While this may be self-evident to counsel, it is
not to the Court. There is simply no record upon which the court
could decide at this stage of the proceedings that the five
categories of payments listed were not calculable at termination.
The Defendant has not cited, and the Court has not located, any
authority suggesting that it is the Plaintiff's burden to
affirmatively allege at the pleading stage that payments he
received well after termination were in fact calculable at the time
of termination. The Defendant's motion to dismiss the waiting time
claim will therefore also be denied.

B. Motion to Stay Pending Resolution of Ayala.

The Defendant next moves to stay the case pending the conclusion of
an earlier-filed, similar lawsuit pending in the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California: Ayala v. AT&T
Mobility Services, LLC, et al., No. 2:18-cv-08809-SVW-MRW. It
requests that the Court exercises its discretion under the "first
to file" rule to stay the case.

Judge Drozd the record now reveals that defendant has settled yet
another class action case raising claims similar to those presented
here and in Ayala. That case was apparently settled on March 29,
2021 but was not filed until June 22, 2021 in San Bernardino County
Superior Court (Wallack et al. v. AT&T Mobility, No. CIVSB2117915).
Meanwhile, in May 2021, the Defendant refused to produce class wide
discovery in the case, while never mentioning that it had already
settled a parallel class action.

Generally, plaintiff Razo contends that there are indications of
collusion between the defendant and the class counsel in Wallack.
Although the fairness of the settlement in Wallack is not before
the Court, the plaintiff's counsel in the instant case has moved to
be appointed class counsel on an interim basis to facilitate
counsel's intervention in the Wallack case. Staying the action at
this time would have the effect of significantly impeding the
plaintiff's efforts to be heard in Wallack, Judge Drozd holds.
Although he expresses no opinion on the merit of the Plaintiff's
contentions about the Wallack settlement, Judge Drozd does believe
that the San Bernardino County Superior Court likely will want to
be made aware of the Plaintiff's concerns.

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the reasons explained, Judge Drozd denied the
Defendant's motion to dismiss or to stay. The Plaintiff is granted
leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of
entry of the Order to address the issue of a prayer for damages in
connection with his wage statement claim.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4parkzzr from Leagle.com.


ATRIA SENIOR: George Stickles Seeks to Certify Rule 23 Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as GEORGE STICKLES and
MICHELE RHODES, individuals on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated,v. ATRIA SENIOR LIVING, INC.; ATRIA MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, LLC; and DOES 1 to 10 inclusive, Case No.
3:20-cv-09220-WHA (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff George Stickles asks
the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), the following
      California-wide class with respect to the first through
      sixth claims against the Defendants for unpaid overtime,
      failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and
      permit rest breaks, failure to furnish accurate itemized
      wage statements, unfair business practices, and waiting
      time penalties:

      "All persons employed by Defendants in the position of
      Community Sales Director in California and classified as
      exempt from December 18, 2016 through December 31, 2019
      who did not execute an arbitration agreement with
      Defendants;"

   2. In the alternative, certifying, pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4),
      the above class with respect to the issue of whether
      Defendants misclassified Community Sales Directors as
      exempt "outside salespersons";

   3. appointing him as representative of the class;

   4. appointing Matthew B. Hayes, and Kye D. Pawlenko of Hayes
      Pawlenko LLP as class counsel; and

   5. directing the parties to meet and confer on a proposed
      notice of certification and submit the proposed notice
      and/or any disputes thereon to the Court within two weeks
      of the order granting class certification.

Atria Senior is a senior living management company.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Oct. 20,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3modrLB
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew B. Hayes, Esq.
          Kye D. Pawlenko, Esq.
          HAYES PAWLENKO LLP
          1414 Fair Oaks Ave., Unit 2B
          South Pasadena, CA 91030
          Telephone: (626) 808-4357
          Facsimile: (626) 921-4932
          E-mail: mhayes@helpcounsel.com
                  kpawlenko@helpcounsel.com

BANK OF AMERICA: Bid to Continue Class Cert. Hearing Sought
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KRISTEN SCHERTZER, MEAGAN
HICKS, BRITTANY COVELL, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., CARDTRONICS, INC.,
FCTI, INC., CASH DEPOT, LTD., N.A., and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Case
No. 3:19-cv-00264-JM-MSB (S.D. Cal.), the Parties agree and ask the
Court to enter an order continuing:

   a) the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification
      to January 10, 2022 or any date thereafter of the Court's
      convenience;

   b) the deadline for BANA to file its Opposition to November
      22, 2021; and

   c) the deadline for Plaintiffs to file their Reply to
      December 22, 2021.

The Bank of America Corporation is an American multinational
investment bank and financial services holding company
headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. The bank was founded in
San Francisco, and took its present form when NationsBank of
Charlotte acquired it in 1998.

A copy the Parties' motion dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3bePP5L at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by

          Todd D. Carpenter, Esq.
          (Eddie) Jae K. Kim, Esq
          Scott G. Braden (CA Bar No. 305051)
          CARLSON LYNCH LLP
          1350 Columbia St., Ste. 603
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 762-1900
          Facsimile: (619) 756-6991
          E-mail: tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com
                  ekim@carlsonlynch.com
                  sbraden@carlsonlynch.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey D. Kaliel, Esq.
          Sophia Gold, Esq.
          KALIEL PLLC
          1875 Connecticut Ave., NW, 10th Floor
          Washington, D.C. 20009
          Telephone: (202) 350-4783
          E-mail: jkaliel@kalielpllc.com
                  sgold@kalielpllc.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Amanda L. Groves, Esq.
          Shawn R. Obi, Esq.
          WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
          333 South Grand Avenue, 38th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-1543
          Telephone: (213) 615-1700
          Facsimile: (213) 615-1750
          E-mail: agroves@winston.com
                  sobi@winston.com

BANK OZK: Response to Class Certification Bid Due November 12
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Strathclyde Pension Fund
v. Bank OZK, et al., Case No. 4:18-cv-00793 (E.D. Ark.), the Hon.
Judge D.P. Marshall Jr. entered an order lifting stay as follows

   -- Bank OZK defendants' response to Strathclyde's motion for
      class certification due by November 12, 2021; and

   -- Strathclyde's reply due by December 15 2021.

The suit alleges violation of the Securities Exchange Act.

Bank OZK is a regional bank headquartered in Little Rock, Arkansas
with more than 250 locations in ten states: Arkansas, Georgia,
Florida, Texas, North Carolina, South Carolina, California, New
York and Mississippi and $23.55 billion in assets as of December
31, 2019.[CC]


BEEKMAN 1802: Williams Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Beekman 1802, Inc.
The case is styled as Milton Williams, on behalf of himself and all
other persons similarly situated v. Beekman 1802, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-08762 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 26, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Beekman 1802 -- https://beekman1802.com/ -- is one of the largest,
independently owned & financed beauty brands.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18th St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


BETTS COMPANY: Orozco Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Betts Company, et al.
The case is styled as Amy Orozco, on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Betts Company, a California corporation, Does 1-50,
Case No. 34-2021-00309846-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento
Cty., Oct. 15, 2021).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited."

Betts Company -- https://www.betts1868.com/ -- is a sixth
generation family-owned manufacturer and supplier of springs and
heavy-duty truck parts in Fresno, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Larry W. Lee, Esq.
          1110 Franklin St. Ste. 6
          Oakland, CA 94607-6528
          Phone: (415) 779-2888
          Fax: (415) 738-7873
          Email: larry@ysleelaw.com


BEVERAGES & MORE: Garner Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Garner, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, and the general public v. BEVERAGES & MORE, INC., a
Delaware corporation; BEVMO GC SERVICES LLC, a California limited
liability company; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No.
21STCV39667 (Cal. Super. Ct., Oct. 27, 2021), is brought against
the Defendants for alleged violations of the Labor Code as a result
of the Defendant failure to pay the Plaintiff minimum and overtime
wages.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants have failed to provide
the Plaintiff and all other similarly situated individuals with
meal periods; failed to provide them with rest periods; failed to
pay them premium wages for missed meal and/or rest periods; failed
to pay them premium wages for missed meal and/or rest periods at
the regular rate of pay; failed to pay them at least minimum wage
for all hours worked; failed to pay them overtime wages at the
correct rate; failed to pay them double time wages at the correct
rate; failed to pay them overtime and/or double time wages by
failing to include all applicable remuneration in calculating the
regular rate of pay; failed to pay them for all vested vacation
pay; failed to reimburse them for all necessary business expenses;
failed to provide them with accurate written wage statements; and
failed to pay them all of their final wages following separation of
employment, says the complaint

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as an hourly, non-exempt
employee during the applicable statutory period.

The Defendant is a Delaware corporation doing business in the State
of California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shaun Setareh, Esq.
          David Keledjian, Esq.
          Shane R. Farley, Esq.
          SETAREH LAW GROUP
          9665 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 430
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Phone (310) 888-7771
          Facsimile (310) 888-0109
          Email: shaun@setarehlaw.com
                 david@setarehlaw.com
                 shane@setarehlaw.com


BLACKBAUD INC: Court Narrows Claims in Data Breach Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit RE: BLACKBAUD, INC., CUSTOMER DATA
BREACH LITIGATION, Case No. 3:21-cv-02461-JMC (D.S.C.), the Hon.
Judge J. Michelle Childs entered an order granting in part and
denying in part Blackbaud's motion to dismiss.

Specifically, the court:

   -- Denies Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs'
      negligence and gross negligence claims; and

   -- Grants Blackbaud's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs'
      negligence per se and unjust enrichment claims.

Blackbaud is a publicly-traded cloud software company incorporated
in Delaware and headquartered in Charleston, South Carolina.

The company provides data collection and maintenance software
solutions for administration, fundraising, marketing, and analytics
to social good entities such as non-profit organizations,
foundations, educational institutions, faith communities, and
healthcare organizations.

Blackbaud's services include collecting and storing Personally
Identifiable Information ("PII") and Protected Health Information
("PHI") from its customers' donors, patients, students, and
congregants.

In this action, Plaintiffs represent a putative class of
individuals whose data was provided to Blackbaud's customers and
managed by Blackbaud. Thus, Plaintiffs are patrons of Blackbaud's
customers rather than direct customers of Blackbaud.

The Plaintiffs assert that, from February 7, 2020 to May 20, 2020,
cybercriminals orchestrated a two-part ransomware attack on
Blackbaud's systems.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2Zst2AW at no extra charge.[CC]

BOWDEN BARLOW: Klein Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Florida
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bowden Barlow Law,
P.A. The case is styled as Stephanie Klein, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Bowden Barlow Law,
P.A.., Case No. 8:21-cv-02505 (M.D. Fla., Oct. 25, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Bowden Barlow Law -- http://bowdenbarlow.com/-- is a Florida based
law firm that has been representing clients in the areas of
Collection Law, Business Law, Landlord Tenant Law, and Estate
Planning for over 30 years.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jason Tenenbaum, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JASON TENENBAUM, P.C.
          585 Stewart Avenue, Suite L50
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Phone: (516) 242-8185
          Fax: (516) 414-2869
          Email: jason@jtnylaw.com


BRENTLINGER ENTERPRISES: Class Cert Bid Filing Due August 19, 2022
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as AUSTIN BINDER v.
BRENTLINGER ENTERPRISES, Case No. 2:21-cv-00136-MHW-KAJ (S.D.
Ohio), the Hon. Judge Kimberly A. Jolson entered a scheduling order
as follows:

   -- Initial Disclosures due by Dec. 6, 2021;

   -- Joinder of Parties & Motions to Amend due by May 15, 2022;

   -- Class Certification Motion due by Aug. 19, 2022;

   -- Discovery due by Nov. 1, 2022;

   -- Protective Order or Clawback Agreement due by Dec. 6,
      2021;

   -- Dispositive motions due by Dec. 1, 2022; and

   -- Case is referred to Mediation in June 2022.

Brentlinger manufactures automobile. The Company operates in the
United States.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3nFe1El at no extra charge.[CC]

CALIFORNIA: Saddozai May Amended Complaint Against CDCR, Others
---------------------------------------------------------------
District Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California issued an order dismissing
amended complaint with leave to amend in the lawsuit styled SHIKEB
SADDOZAI, Plaintiff v. M.B. ATCHLEY, et al., Defendants, Case No.
20-07534 BLF (PR) (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff, a state inmate, filed the instant pro se civil
rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against prison
staff and officials at Salinas Valley State Prison ("SVPS"), as
well as the Director of the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation ("CDCR").

The Court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend, for the
Plaintiff to correct various deficiencies. The Plaintiff filed an
amended complaint in which he includes the names of other inmates
as plaintiffs, and asserts new claims based on different incidents
from those alleged in the original complaint.

Discussion

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a plaintiff must
allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2)
that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under
the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988).

As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses the Plaintiff's naming
of other inmates as plaintiffs in this action. The Plaintiff is
proceeding pro se and is not an attorney, thus, he may not
represent other litigants, District Judge Beth Labson Freeman
holds.

Alternatively, although less clear, the Plaintiff may have intended
to file this case as a class action, naming himself and two other
plaintiffs as class representatives along with other unnamed
inmates, Judge Freeman notes. The Plaintiff is also prohibited from
prosecuting a class action on behalf of other similarly situations
because pro se prisoner plaintiffs are not adequate class
representatives able to fairly represent and adequately protect the
interests of the class. If they desire to pursue any claims on
their own, Judge Freeman says they must do so by each filing a
separate action.

Plaintiff's Claims

As mentioned, the Plaintiff attempts to bring this action on behalf
of several plaintiffs, and, therefore, throughout the amended
complaint refers to himself and others generally as "plaintiff(s)."
The amended complaint alleges that from June through December 2020,
and January through June 20201, the "plaintiff(s)" filed several
letters, prisoner inmate requests, and grievances against
Defendants "S. Tomlinson, D. Farmer, L. Farley, M. B. Atchley, and
Director of CDCR" regarding the following: "law library access,
services, resources, paging, such as, for example; Case-law
citations, legal research materials needed to file prison
grievances; legal book-check-outs; discovery evidence; legal manila
envelopes; writing materials-pens/draft paper; that are need by
plaintiffs to initiate, maintain, and prosecute prison grievances,
appeals, court ordered deadlines for various cases."

The Plaintiff asserts that these requests were repeatedly ignored,
destroyed and denied. The Plaintiff adds, among other things, that
on various dates in April, May, and July 2021, Defendant Tomlinson
and staff in charge of prison law library services and resources
repeatedly read the Plaintiff's confidential legal pleadings
without consent. The amended complaint also asserts supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims but fails to identify or explain
any specific state law claim.

Judge Freeman holds that the allegations in the amended complaint
are problematic because the factual allegations are not
individualized but rather asserted generally as to all
"plaintiff(s)." Therefore, it is impossible for the Court to
ascertain which allegations specifically involve Mr. Saddozai, who
is the only plaintiff in this matter, and which allegations should
be stricken as involving other prisoner/plaintiffs who have been
dismissed from this action. Accordingly, the Court has no choice
but to dismiss the amended complaint with leave to amend for Mr.
Saddozai to file a second amended complaint containing allegations
solely involving the deprivation of his constitutional rights.

In filing a second amended complaint, Judge Freeman states that the
Plaintiff should be mindful of the deficiencies in his original
complaint discussed by the Court in the "Order of Dismissal with
Leave to Amend." The Plaintiff is also reminded that although he
may include state law claims, he must specifically identify the
state law claims he is raising rather than assert generally that
the Court may take supplemental jurisdiction over them.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court orders as follows:

   1. All class claims are dismissed. The alleged claims of newly
      named plaintiffs are also dismissed without prejudice to
      each filing individual and separate actions. The matter
      will proceed with Mr. Saddozai as the sole plaintiff in
      this action. All other individuals named as plaintiffs will
      be terminated from this action;

   2. The amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.
      Within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this order is
      filed, the Plaintiff will file a second amended complaint
      to attempt to correct the deficiencies discussed. The
      second amended complaint must include the caption and civil
      case number used in this order, Case No. 20-07534 BLF (PR),
      and the words "SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT" on the first page.
      If using the court form complaint, the Plaintiff must
      answer all the questions on the form in order for the
      action to proceed.

      The second amended complaint supersedes the original and
      the amended complaints, which will be treated thereafter as
      non-existent. Consequently, claims not included in the
      second amended complaint are no longer claims and
      the Defendants not named in the second amended complaint
      are no longer defendants; and

   3. Failure to respond in accordance with this order in the
      time provided by filing a second amended complaint will
      result in the dismissal of this action with prejudice for
      failure to state a claim, without further notice to the
      Plaintiff.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 14, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3crthh78 from Leagle.com.


CASSAVA SCIENCES: Rao Sues Over False and Misleading Statements
---------------------------------------------------------------
Manohar K. Rao, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. CASSAVA SCIENCES, INC., REMI BARBIER, and ERIC J.
SCHOEN, Case No. 1:21-cv-00971 (W.D. Tex., Oct. 26, 2021), is
brought on behalf of persons and entities that purchased or
otherwise acquired Cassava securities, and/or sold (wrote) Cassava
put options, between September 14, 2020 and August 27, 2021,
inclusive. The Plaintiff pursues claims against the Defendants
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as a result of the
Defendants' materially false and/or misleading statements which
resulted in the precipitous decline in the market value of the
Company's shares.

According to the complaint, the Cassava lead therapeutic product
candidate is called simufilam (formerly PTI-125) developed as a
treatment for Alzheimer's disease ("AD"). Simufilam purportedly
targets an altered form of a protein called filamin A ("FLNA") in
the Alzehimer's brain and reverts it to its native, healthy
conformation, thereby countering the downstream toxic effects of
altered FLNA.

On August 24, 2021, after the market closed, reports emerged about
a citizen petition submitted to the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") concerning the accuracy and integrity of
clinical data for simufilam. The petition requested that the FDA
halt Cassava's clinical trials pending a thorough audit of the
publications and data relied upon by the Company. On August 25,
2021, before the market opened, Cassava issued a response to the
petition, claiming that the allegations regarding scientific
integrity are false and misleading. Among other things, the Company
claimed that the clinical data, which the citizen petition stated
had been reanalyzed to show simufilam was effective, had been
generated by Quanterix Corp., an independent company, suggesting
that the reanalysis was valid. On this news, the Company's share
price fell $36.97, or 32%, to close at $80.86 per share on August
25, 2021, on unusually heavy trading volume.

On August 27, 2021, before the market opened, Quanterix issued a
statement denying the Company's claims, stating that it "did not
interpret the test results or prepare the data" touted by Cassava.
The same day, Cassava responded to Quanterix's statement, stating
that "Quanterix's sole responsibility with regard to this clinical
study was to perform sample testing, specifically, to measure
levels of p tau in plasma samples collected from study subjects."
On this news, the Company's share price fell $12.51, or 17.6%, to
close at $58.34 per share on August 27, 2021, on unusually heavy
trading volume.

Throughout the Class Period, the Defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects. Specifically, the Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that data underlying the foundational research for
Cassava's product candidates had been manipulated; (2) that
experiments using post-mortem human brain tissue frozen for nearly
10 years was contrary to a basic understanding of neurobiology; (3)
that biomarker analysis for patients treated with simufilam had
been manipulated to conclude that simufilam was effective; (4) that
Quanterix, an independent company, had not interpreted the test
results or prepared the data charts for the biomarker analysis for
patients treated with simufilam; (5) that, as a result of the
foregoing, there was a reasonable likelihood that Cassava would
face regulatory scrutiny in connection with the development of
simufilam; and (6) that, as a result of the foregoing, the
Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's shares,
Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered significant losses
and damages, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased Cassava securities and sold Cassava put
options during the Class Period.

Cassava is a clinical stage biotechnology company.[BN]

          Sammy Ford IV, Esq.
          Jordan Warshauer, Esq.
          AHMAD, ZAVITSANOS, ANAIPAKOS, ALAVI & MENSING P.C.
          1221 McKinney Street, Suite 2500
          Houston, TX 77010
          Phone: 713-655-1101
          Facsimile: 713-655-0062
          Email: sford@azalaw.com
                 jwarshauer@azalaw.com

               - and -

          Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
          Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160


CHARLES BAKER: Roe Sues Over Violation of Substantive Rights
------------------------------------------------------------
Nancy Roe, as Parent and Natural Guardian of A.R., and
Individually; Amy Maranville, as Parent and Natural Guardian of
P.M. and Individually, Maria Popova, as Parent and Natural Guardian
of S.P. and Individually; and and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. CHARLES BAKER, in his official capacity as Governor,
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION;
BROOKLINE PUBLIC SCHOOLS; SOMERVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS; WELLESLEY
PUBLIC SCHOOLS; JEFFREY C. RILEY, in his official capacity; DR.
JAMES MARINI, in his official capacity as Interim Superintendent;
MARY SKIPPER, in her official capacity as Superintendent; DR. DAVID
LUSSIER, in his official capacity as Superintendent, Case No.
1:21-cv-11751-RGS (D. Mass., Oct. 26, 2021), is brought under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, The Special Education
Regulations of Massachusetts, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations ("RICO") Act of 1970, and the concomitant
implementing regulations, case law and public policy.

On March 15, 2020, Massachusetts Governor Charles Baker issued an
order that "all public and private elementary and secondary (K-12)
schools in the Commonwealth, excluding residential day schools for
special needs students, shall suspend all normal, in-person
instruction and other educational operations at the end of the
school day on Monday, March 16, 2020, and shall not re-open for
normal operations before Monday, April 6, 2020."

The Plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring that the unilateral change
of class members' educational placement for more than ten days
cumulatively in the 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 school years,
respectively, triggered the IDEA's stay-put provision that required
return to the Plaintiffs' status quo, in-person instruction and
services; and that Defendants herein violated the procedural
safeguards of IDEA and discriminated against Plaintiffs under the
Laws. The Plaintiffs also seek an injunction to prevent Governor
Baker, the DESE, the named LEAs, and other similarly situated LEAs
from repeating this conduct; specifically, unilaterally changing
the Plaintiffs' educational placement for more than ten days in the
2021-2022 school year and beyond, in the event of any future school
closures without further Order of this Court or otherwise, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiffs are children with disabilities and the parents of
those children, who were denied their rights.

Charles Baker is the governor of Massachusetts.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Nakul M. Havnurkar, Esq.
          BRAIN INJURY RIGHTS GROUP
          300 East 95th Street, Suite 130
          New York, NY 10128
          Phone: (646) 850-5035
          Email: nakul@pabilaw.org


CHARLESTON COUNTY, SC: Butler Says Road Fees Illegal, Seeks Refund
------------------------------------------------------------------
Jasmine Y. Butler, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Charleston County and Charleston
County Council, Defendants, Case No. 2021CP1004804 (Comm. Pleas,
S.C., October 19, 2021) asserts unjust enrichment and violation of
the South Carolina Code Section 6-1-300, and seeks a refund of any
and all road fees charged by Charleston County.

Charleston County has enacted an ordinance which requires the owner
of every vehicle registered in Charleston County to pay $40.00 fee
each year to the Charleston County Tax Collector for the purpose of
road maintenance.

Butler claims that this road fee constitutes an improper conversion
of property, and the county's unauthorized assumption in the
exercise of the right of ownership over personal funds of the
vehicle owners. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

       T. Ryan Langley, Esq.
       Charles J. Hodge, Esq.
       HODGE & LANGLEY LAW FIRM, PC
       229 Magnolia St.
       Spartanburg, SC 29306
       Telephone: (864) 585-3873
       Facsimile: (864) 585-6485
       Email: rlangley@hodgelawfirm.com

CHASE DENNIS: Samora Bid for Class Certification Stricken
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JULIE SAMORA, v. CHASE
DENNIS EMERGENCY MEDICAL GROUP, INC, et al., Case No.
5:20-cv-02027-BLF (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Beth Labson Freeman
entered an order striking plaintiff's motion for class
certification.

The Plaintiff may submit a revised motion that conforms to all
applicable rules and the Court's standing order no later than
October 21, 2021, Judge Freeman Says.

Chase Dennis Emergency Medical Group Inc is a provider established
in Santa Rosa, California specializing in emergency medicine.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3pHyYB9 at no extra charge.[CC]


CHESAPEAKE ENERGY: Class Deal in Leaseholders Suit Wins Final Nod
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORPORATION, Civil Action No.
H-21-1215 (S.D. Tex.), Judge Lee H. Rosenthal of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, granted
the MEC and the Non-MEC motions for certification of the settlement
class, final approval, and award of attorneys' fees and costs.

Background

On Aug. 23, 2021, the Court issued a memorandum opinion and order
in the case. The Court withdraws that memorandum opinion to correct
clerical errors, none of which change its underlying analysis. The
Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order supersedes the memorandum and
order issued on Aug. 23, 2021.

Oil-and-gas leaseholders in Pennsylvania, the bankruptcy claimants,
filed three class-action lawsuits in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania against Chesapeake Energy Corp. for improperly
calculating royalties owed under their leases. The Pennsylvania
Attorney General also sued Chesapeake for improperly calculating
royalties.

In the first lawsuit, Demchak Partners Ltd., et al., v. Chesapeake
Appalachia, LLC, No. 13-2289 (M.D. Pa. 2013), the plaintiffs
alleged that Chesapeake improperly deducted postproduction costs in
calculating the royalties due. The plaintiffs in the Demchak class
have leases with market-enhancement clauses, which preclude
Chesapeake from "deducting postproduction costs incurred to
transform leasehold gas into marketable form," but allow Chesapeake
to "deduct a pro-rata share of postproduction costs incurred after
the gas is marketable if they enhance the value of the marketable
gas."

In the second and third lawsuits, Brown v. Access Midstream
Partners, LP, No. 14-00591 (M.D. Pa. 2014) and Suessenbach v.
Access Midstream Partners, LP, No. 14-01197 (M.D. Pa. 2014), the
plaintiffs alleged that Chesapeake underpaid royalties by
improperly inflating the postproduction costs it deducted from
royalty payments, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c)-(d).). The
leases involved in the Brown and Suessenbach cases do not have
market-enhancement clauses. Chesapeake and the Brown and
Suessenbach plaintiffs settled in August 2018 in Pennsylvania. The
settlement was awaiting preliminary court approval when the
bankruptcy filing intervened.

The Pennsylvania lawsuits had proceeded for nearly seven years when
Chesapeake filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of Texas
in June 2020. After roughly nine months in the bankruptcy court and
mediation, the leaseholders, the Pennsylvania Attorney General, and
Chesapeake reached three proposed settlements.

In February 2021, Chesapeake reached a preliminary settlement with
the Pennsylvania Attorney General. That settlement is not before
the Court. The parties asked the bankruptcy court for preliminary
certification of the two other settlement classes and preliminary
approval of the settlement terms.

The terms of that settlement are as follows:

       a. Pennsylvania oil-and-gas leaseholders may choose whether
to have their royalties calculated based on the in-basin index
price or the netback price. The in-basin index price is the average
of two oil-and-gas price indexes, without deducting postproduction
costs. The netback price is the average sales price Chesapeake
receives for its production month sales to third parties minus a
proportionate share of postproduction costs.

       b. Chesapeake will pay Pennsylvania $5.3 million, which the
state will distribute to Pennsylvania leaseholders.

The leaseholders and Chesapeake have moved to have the two
settlement classes certified and the class settlements finally
approved. The counsel for both classes have also moved for approval
of attorneys' fees, costs and expenses, and incentive awards for
the named plaintiffs in one of the classes. Along with the proposed
settlements, the settling parties submitted affidavits from the
counsel for the proposed classes and valuations of the proposed
settlements. The objectors challenge the motions for final
approval.

A month later, Chesapeake reached a preliminary settlement with the
Demchak, Brown, and Suessenbach plaintiffs. The Demchak plaintiffs
entered what is identified as the MEC settlement, and the
Brown-Suessenbach plaintiffs entered into the Non-MEC settlement.
These settlements were negotiated jointly and "resolve all
royalty-related litigation and disputes in Pennsylvania."

The MEC Settlement

      a. Chesapeake will pay $5 million to the class members.

      b. The class members may choose each month whether to have
their royalties calculated based on the higher of the in-basin
index or netback price.

The Non-MEC Settlement

      a. Chesapeake will pay $1.25 million to the class members.

      b. The class members may choose how to have their royalties
calculated going forward, using either the in-basin index or
netback price. But they can only make their election once, not each
month.

Together, the two settlements make roughly $6.25 million available
for Pennsylvania leaseholders with underpaid-royalty claims. The
settlements also allow the Pennsylvania leaseholders to choose
between "the higher of a calculated in-basin price or the netback"
price. The MEC plaintiffs may choose the higher valuation each
month, while the Non-MEC plaintiffs may choose their valuation
method once. All three settlements offer opt-out rights.

These settlement terms differ from the terms reached in
Chesapeake's prebankruptcy proposed settlements with the Demchak
and Brown-Suessenbach classes. In the prebankruptcy Demchak
proposed settlement, the plaintiffs were to receive roughly $17
million, but without the right to choose monthly whether to have
their royalties calculated based on the higher of the in-basin
index or netback price. The prebankruptcy Brown-Suessenbach
proposed settlement would have given the plaintiffs $7.75 million
and the option of having their royalties calculated based on either
the in-basin index or netback price.

The bankruptcy court certified the MEC and Non-MEC settlement
classes and preliminarily approved the settlements. The bankruptcy
court denied objections, the objectors appealed, and the Court
affirmed the bankruptcy court, holding that the two settlement
classes should be preliminarily certified and the settlements
approved.

Discussion

The objectors appealed the bankruptcy court's preliminary approval.
The Court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling and preliminarily
certified the MEC and Non-MEC classes and approved the class
settlements. The MEC and Non-MEC plaintiffs have moved to have the
classes finally certified and the class settlements finally
approved. The counsel for both classes have also moved for approval
of attorneys' fees, costs and expenses, and incentive awards for
the named plaintiffs in one of the classes. Two objectors challenge
the motions for final approval.

On July 27, 2021, the Court held a final fairness hearing and heard
from counsel for the MEC and Non-MEC classes, Chesapeake, and the
objectors.

While the immediate cash relief is lower than in the two
settlements that were proposed in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania -- which preliminarily approved the settlement for
leaseholders with market-enhancement clauses -- Judge Rosenthal
opines that the record shows that it is appropriate to finally
certify the two proposed classes and approve the proposed class
settlements. The majority of the leaseholders did not file proofs
of claims in the bankruptcy court and will effectively be unable to
recover without the settlements. The class counsel, Chesapeake's
counsel, the named Plaintiffs, and the Pennsylvania Attorney
General approve both settlements. The litigation proceeded for
nearly seven years before the bankruptcy. The settlements were
reached after arm's-length negotiations and mediation. Finally,
Chesapeake's bankruptcy likely eliminated the possibility of a
larger immediate recovery for the class members. The record shows
that the injunctive relief guaranteed by the settlements will
provide immediate and long-lasting benefits to the Pennsylvania
leaseholders, benefits that the lawsuits sought in the first
place.

Based on the record, the briefing, and the arguments of counsel
presented at the final fairness hearing, Judge Rosenthal will grant
the motions for certification of the two settlement classes, final
approval of the proposed class settlement agreements, and for an
award of attorneys' fees, costs and expenses, and incentive awards.
The objections are overruled.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Lee granted the MEC and Non-MEC
motions for certification of the settlement class, final approval,
and award of attorneys' fees and costs. The MEC and Non-MEC
settlement classes are certified. The MEC and Non-MEC settlements
are approved in all respects.

Judge Rosenthal granted the request (i) of MEC class counsel for
fees in the amount of $2 million; (ii) of Non-MEC class counsel for
fees in the amount of $412,500; (iii) of MEC class counsel for
reimbursement of costs and expenses in the amount of $292,362.33;
(iv) of MEC class counsel for reimbursement of costs and expenses
in the amount of $182,812; and (v) for service awards for each
Non-MEC named plaintiff in the amount of $5,000.

The parties will take the necessary steps to implement the MEC and
Non-MEC settlements. The Court will retain jurisdiction for
purposes of enforcing the settlements.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Amended Memorandum
Opinion & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/4ptnj9te from
Leagle.com.


CLASSIC VACATIONS: Balabanoff Suit Removed to N.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Sasha Balabanoff, on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated v. Classic Vacations, LLC, a Nevada
limited liability company; Expedia, Inc., a Washington Corporation;
Expedia Group, Inc.; Classic Custom Vacations, an entity of unknown
form; Case No. 21CV386966 was removed from the Superior Court for
the County of Santa Clara to the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California on Oct. 27, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:21-cv-08362 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Labor.

Classic Vacations -- https://www.classicvacations.com/ -- is a
provider of premier vacation packages around the world, including
to Hawaii, the Caribbean, Mexico, Europe and the South
Pacific.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

The Defendants are represented by:

          Kate Gilbreath Hummel, Esq.
          K AND L GATES
          10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 8th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: (310) 552-5000
          Fax: (310) 552-5001
          Email: kate.hummel@klgates.com


CLIF BAR: Appeals Files Appeal in Milan Mislabeling Suit to 9th Cir
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant CLIF BAR & COMPANY filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled Ralph Milan; Sarah Aquino and
Elizabeth Arnold, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Clif Bar & Company, Defendant,
Case No. 3:18-cv-02354-JCS, in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California.

The Plaintiffs brought this action on April 19, 2018, asserting
class claims under California and New York law for consumer fraud
relating to Defendant Clif labeling of "classic" or "original" Clif
Bars and Clif Kid ZBars. The Plaintiffs assert that Clif markets
these bars with labeling and packaging claims that convey a health
and wellness message and say these claims are deceptive because
they are incompatible with the dangers of the excessive sugar
consumption to which the products contribute.

The Plaintiffs sought certification, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a) and 23(b)(3), of a Class comprised of the following four
Subclasses:

   -- The California Clif Bar Subclass

      "All persons in California who, between April 19, 2014
      and the date the Class is notified of certification,
      purchased Original Clif Bars in packaging bearing the
      phrase "Nutrition for Sustained Energy";"

   -- The New York Clif Bar Subclass:

      "All persons in New York who, between April 19, 2015
      and the date the Class is notified of certification,
      purchased Original Clif Bars in packaging bearing the
      phrase "Nutrition for Sustained Energy";"

   -- The California Clif Kid ZBar Subclass:

      "All persons in California who, between April 19, 2014 and
      the date the Class is notified of certification, purchased
      Clif Kid ZBars other than in 24-, 36-, or 42-bar
      packages;" and

   -- The New York Clif Kid ZBar Subclass:

      "All persons in New York who, between April 19, 2015 and
      the date the Class is notified of certification, purchased
      Clif Kid ZBars other than in 24-, 36-, or 42-bar packages.

On September 27, 2021, the Court granted class certification.

The Defendant now files an appeal captioned as RALPH MILAN and
ELIZABETH ARNOLD on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs-Respondents v. CLIF BAR & COMPANY,
Defendant-Petitioner, Case No. 21-80106, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on Oct. 12, 2021.[BN]

Defendant-Petitioner CLIF BAR & COMPANY is represented by:

          Jay T. Ramsey, Esq.
          SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON, LLP
          333 S Hope Street, 43rd Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-1448
          Telephone: (310) 228-2259

Plaintiffs-Respondents RALPH MILAN and ELIZABETH ARNOLD, on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Jack Fitzgerald, Esq.
          Trevor Flynn, Esq.
          Paul K. Joseph, Esq.
          FITZGERALD JOSEPH, LLP
          2341 Jefferson Street, Suite 200
          San Diego, CA 92110
          Telephone: (619) 215-1741
          E-mail: jack@jackfitzgeraldlaw.com
                  trevor@jackfitzgeraldlaw.com
                  paul@pauljosephlaw.com

COAST PROFESSIONAL: Court Explains Dismissal of Oakley Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled CARLA OAKLEY, Plaintiff v. COAST
PROFESSIONAL, INC., PERFORMANT FINANCIAL CORP., and PERFORMANT
RECOVERY, INC. Defendants, Case No. 1:21-00021 (S.D.W. Va.), the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia,
Bluefield, issued a Memorandum Opinion setting forth its reasoning
for granting PFC's motion to dismiss.

On Sept. 30, 2021, the Court entered an order (1) granting without
prejudice the motion to dismiss of Defendant Performant Financial
Corp. ("PFC") for lack of personal jurisdiction; (2) denying the
motion to dismiss of Defendants PFC and Performant Recovery, Inc.
("PRI"); and (3) denying the motion to dismiss of Defendant Coast
Professional, Inc. In this Memorandum Opinion, the Court sets forth
its reasoning for granting PFC's motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.

Background

The case is a putative class action alleging deceptive debt
collection practices by the Defendants in violation of West
Virginia law. The Plaintiff says the Defendants violated the West
Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act ("WVCCPA") when they
sent her a letter regarding her defaulted student loan. She says
that the letter was deceptive and misleading under the WVCCPA
because it represented that the collection agency's contingency fee
was due and owing as part of the "current balance" even though the
agency had not yet earned the contingency fee by collecting the
debt. The contingency fee was listed under the category "Fees and
Costs" and was computed assuming that there would be a full
recovery of the principal and interest then due on the defaulted
loan. There was a false implication, says the Plaintiff, that the
contingency fee (in the amount listed) was "unavoidable" and
"fixed."

The Plaintiff says that the Defendants compounded the deception by
using language in the body of the letter that attached the U.S.
Department of Education's imprimatur to the amount due, and
further, by attempting to qualify the "Fees & Costs" with an
asterisk and cryptic note (on the back of the letter) suggesting
that the amount listed may not be due presently after all, and may
change. The Plaintiff also points to language on the front page of
the letter stating that the amount ultimately due may be greater
than the current balance but failing to acknowledge that the amount
due may be less (because the contingency fee is ultimately less).

The Plaintiff has named three Defendants in her First Amended
Complaint ("FAC"): Coast, PFC, and PRI. Coast allegedly contracted
with the Department of Education to collect the debt and then
subcontracted with PRI, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of PFC.
PRI sent the collection letter at issue. The letter states that PRI
sent it while acting on behalf of Coast. Although PFC is not
mentioned in the letter, the Plaintiff alleges that PFC and PRI
sent the letter jointly. Moreover, the Plaintiff alleges that PFC
operates as a single business with a single management team that
reports to its CEO.

Discussion

Senior District Judge David A. Faber finds that the allegations
here do not establish a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction
over PFC. While the Plaintiff contends that every allegation
against PRI is an allegation against PFC, the reason that the
Plaintiff can reasonably duplicate the allegations is her view that
the two entities are really one and the same. Thus, the Plaintiff's
case for personal jurisdiction against PFC rises or falls based on
the alter ego theory of personal jurisdiction.

While the Plaintiff's opposition memorandum catalogues facts in
support of the alter ego theory, the only allegation in the FAC in
support of the alter ego theory is that PFC operates as a single
entity. This is too threadbare, Judge Faber finds. But because
amendment does not appear futile, the Court grants leave to amend.

A party may establish personal jurisdiction over a parent
corporation that does not otherwise have sufficient minimum
contacts when (1) there is personal jurisdiction over the parent's
subsidiary; and (2) the subsidiary is the parent's alter ego, Judge
Faber states, citing Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City
Vision, Inc., 650 F.3d 423, 433-34 (4th Cir. 2011).

The Court looks to West Virginia law to determine whether PRI is
the alter ego of PFC. To ask whether there exists an alter ego
relationship between a parent corporation and its subsidiary is to
ask whether it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil between
them, Judge Faber notes, citing Virtual City, 650 F.3d at 434
(looking to Virginia law of piercing the veil on question of alter
ego jurisdiction theory).

Judge Faber states that it is natural that these questions are the
same because the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is one of
the "alter ego doctrines," citing S. Elec. Supply Co. v. Raleigh
Cty. Nat. Bank., 320 S.E.2d 515, 521-22 (W. Va. 1984). Accordingly,
the basic inquiry here is whether the allegations are sufficient to
show that the corporate veil between PFC and PRI should be pierced
under West Virginia law.

The Court says that it must pause here and note that, when the
issue is jurisdictional veil piercing (as opposed to substantive
veil piercing), a different, smaller set of factors may inform the
analysis. In Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Maynard, the court appeared to
adopt a set of 11 factors that had been used in the District of
Minnesota, including (1) Whether the parent corporation owns all or
most of the capital stock of the subsidiary; (2) Whether the parent
and subsidiary corporations have common directors and officers; and
(3) Whether the parent corporation finances the subsidiary.

Judge Faber notes that Norfolk Southern was decided several years
after the debut of the 19 factors in Dailey v. Ayers Land Dev.,
LLC, 825 S.E.2d 351, 360 (W. Va. 2019). Thus, the Court appears to
have made a conscious choice to treat jurisdictional veil piercing
differently. Such a choice would be consistent with persuasive
federal authority suggesting that when the question is whether to
pierce the veil for jurisdictional purposes only, courts should
temper the typically quite exacting test to pierce the veil for
substantive liability.

The Court will assume that the Norfolk Southern factors guide the
analysis here. Moreover, the Court is mindful that although the
Plaintiff still bears a substantial burden to show that the veil
should be pierced for jurisdictional purposes, the full weight of
the burden of showing substantive alter ego liability does not rest
on the Plaintiff at this juncture.

The Plaintiff's opposition brief begins with this epigraph:
"Defendant Performant Financial Corp. manages and operates its
company as one business, with a single management team that reports
to the Chief Executive Officer." The Plaintiff goes on to note that
there is information suggesting the two entities are not separate
and distinct, and she sets forth this information as she marches
through the Norfolk Southern factors.

But the epigraph features the only fact that the Plaintiff actually
pleaded in support of jurisdictional veil piercing, Judge Faber
finds. PFC seizes upon this reality and contends that the
allegations of the FAC are, first and foremost, what count here,
and that they are insufficient to make a prima facie case for alter
ego personal jurisdiction.

The Court agrees with PFC. Standing alone, the epigraph's
allegation is insufficient. Judge Faber holds that it is also
somewhat conclusory. The Court cannot assert personal jurisdiction
without more.

The Plaintiff offers more in her opposition brief. Judge Faber
points out that that does not resolve the pleading deficiency. It
does, however, suggest that the Plaintiff may be able amend the
operative complaint to bridge the gap and make a prima facie case
for alter ego personal jurisdiction.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court granted PFC's motion to dismiss with
leave to amend. The Plaintiff has fourteen days to amend, should
she choose to do so. Finally, the Court clarifies that discovery
remains stayed as to PFC but is no longer stayed as to Coast and
PRI.

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of the Memorandum Opinion to
counsel of record.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated Oct. 14,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/3xs6jn2k from
Leagle.com.


COCA-COLA CONSOLIDATED: Class Cert. Hearing Set for Dec. 7
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CHEYENNE JONES et al., v.
COCA-COLA CONSOLIDATED, INC. et al., Case No. 3:20-CV-00654-FDW-DSC
(W.D.N.C.), the Hon. Judge Frank D. Whitney entered an order that a
hearing on Plaintiffs' pending motion to certify class will take
place on Tuesday, December 7, 2021, at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom No.
5B of the Charles R. Jonas Federal Building, 401 W. Trade Street,
Charlotte, North Carolina.

Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consolidated, headquartered in Charlotte,
North Carolina, is the largest independent Coca-Cola bottler in the
United States. The company makes, sells and distributes Coca-Cola
products along with other beverages, distributing to a market of 65
million people in 14 states.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3GsvHeS at no extra charge.[CC]




COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY: Final Order & Judgment Entered in Cates Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge George B. Daniels of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York entered Final Approval Order and Judgment in
the case, CHANDRA CATES, et al., Plaintiffs v. THE TRUSTEES OF
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant, Case No.
1:16-cv-06524-GBD (S.D.N.Y.).

In accordance with the Court's Order Granting Preliminary Approval,
Settlement Notice was timely distributed by electronic or
first-class mail to all the Class Members who could be identified
with reasonable effort, and Settlement Notice was published on the
Settlement Website maintained by the Class Counsel. In addition,
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1711,
et seq., notice was provided to the Attorneys General for each of
the states in which a Class Member resides, the Attorney General of
the United States, and the United States Secretary of Labor.

The form and methods of notifying the Settlement Class of the terms
and conditions of the proposed Settlement Agreement met the
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), any other applicable law,
and due process, and constituted the best notice practicable under
the circumstances; and due and sufficient notices of the Fairness
Hearing and the rights of all the Class Members have been provided
to all people, powers and entities entitled thereto. 4. All
requirements of the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U. S. C. Section
1711, et seq., have been met.

The Class Members had the opportunity to be heard on all issues
regarding the resolution and release of their claims by submitting
objections to the Settlement Agreement to the Court. Each and every
objection to the Settlement is overruled with prejudice.

Judge Daniels granted the Motion for Final Approval of the
Settlement Agreement, the Settlement of the Litigation is approved
as fair, reasonable, and adequate to the Plans and the Settlement
Class, and the Settling Parties are directed to take the necessary
steps to effectuate the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The
operative complaint and all claims asserted therein in the
Litigation are dismissed with prejudice and without costs to any of
the Settling Parties and Released Parties other than as provided
for in the Settlement Agreement.

Each Class Member will hold harmless the Defendant, the Defense
Counsel, and the Released Parties for any claims, liabilities,
attorneys' fees and expenses arising from the allocation of the
Gross Settlement Amount or Net Settlement Amount and for all tax
liability and associated penalties and interest as well as related
attorneys' fees and expenses.

The Settlement Administrator will have final authority to determine
the share of the Net Settlement Amount to be allocated to each
Current Participant and each Authorized Former Participant.

With respect to payments or distributions to Authorized Former
Participants, all questions not resolved by the Settlement
Agreement will be resolved by the Settlement Administrator in its
sole and exclusive discretion.

With respect to any matters that arise concerning the
implementation of distributions to Current Participants (after
allocation decisions have been made by the Settlement Administrator
in its sole discretion), all questions not resolved by the
Settlement Agreement will be resolved by the Plan administrator or
other fiduciaries of the Plans in accordance with applicable law
and the governing terms of the Plans.

Within three calendar days following the issuance of all settlement
payments to Class Members, the Settlement Administrator will
prepare and provide to the Class Counsel and the Defense Counsel a
list of each person who was issued a settlement payment and the
amount of such payment.

Upon entry of the Order, all the Class Members will be bound by the
Settlement Agreement (including any amendments) and by the Final
Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Final Approval Order
& Judgment is available at https://tinyurl.com/ykajwbwa from
Leagle.com.


CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Rawls Sues to Recover Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
Quneshia Rawls, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING, INC., Case No. 3:21-cv-00303
(S.D. Tex., Oct. 26, 2021), is brought to recover overtime wages
and liquidated damages brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act, and other applicable penalties.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has enforced a uniform
company-wide policy wherein it improperly required its hourly
call-center employees--the Plaintiff--to perform work
"off-the-clock" and without pay. The Defendant's illegal
company-wide policy has caused the Plaintiff to have hours worked
that were not compensated and further created a miscalculation of
their regular rate(s) of pay for purposes of calculating their
overtime compensation each workweek. Although the Plaintiff
routinely worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek, the Plaintiff
was not paid overtime of at least one and one-half their regular
rates for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. The
Defendant knowingly and deliberately failed to compensate the
Plaintiff for all hours worked each workweek and the proper amount
of overtime on a routine and regular basis during the relevant time
period, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defedant from August 2015 until
April 2020 as a non-exempt call-center employee.

Convergent is a global customer engagement and contact center that
provides customer services, technical support services, and sales
and marketing support to its business clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Phone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          Email: clif@a2xlaw.com
                 austin@a2xlaw.com


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Rough Appeals Class Cert. Bid Denial to 9th Cir.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Megan Rough filed an appeal from a court ruling entered
in the lawsuit styled MEGAN ROUGH, individually and on behalf of
all similarly situated current and former employees of the
DEFENDANTS in the State of California, v. COSTCO WHOLESALE
CORPORATION, Delaware corporation; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Case
No. 2:19-cv-01340, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Eastern California, Sacramento.

Plaintiff Megan Rough, individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situated employees, filed a class action complaint
against Costco in the Superior Court of California, County of
Solano, for violations of the California Labor Code and the
Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders. The Defendant
subsequently removed the case to federal court pursuant to the
Class Action Fairness Act.

The Plaintiff brings the present action on behalf of herself and
all current and former non-exempt, hourly-paid employees who worked
for the Defendant within California and who worked one or more
closing shifts during the period from four years preceding the
filing of the Complaint to final judgment.  The Defendant employed
the Plaintiff as a front-end associate in its warehouse store
located in Woodland, California, from December 2017 to January
2018, and in another warehouse located in Vacaville, California,
from March 2018 to April 2019.

The Plaintiff alleges that she and other similarly situated
employees continued to work after business hours at the Defendant's
stores. More specifically, after the stores' doors were closed to
customers and locked, the Defendant required the Plaintiff and the
other similarly situated employees to clock out and then walk to a
designated exit location. The employees then had to call and wait
for a manager to meet them at the designated exit location. When
the manager arrived, he or she would inspect the employees' bags
for store merchandise. After checking the employees' bags, the
manager would radio the stores' security guards to ensure the
parking lot was safe before the exit doors were opened.

The Plaintiff currently seeks a review of the Court's Order dated
Sept. 2, 2021, denying her motion for class certification pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f).

The appellate case is captioned as Megan Rough v. COSTCO, Case No.
21-80108, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, filed on Oct. 13, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner MEGAN ROUGH, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated current and former employees of DEFENDANTS in
the state of California, is represented by:

          Nathan Reese, Esq.
          GRAHAMHOLLIS APC
          3555 Fifth Avenue, Suite 200
          San Diego, CA 92103
          Telephone: (619) 876-2091

Defendant-Respondent COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION is represented
by:

          David D. Jacobson, Esq.
          David D. Kadue, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW, LLP
          2029 Century Park, E, Suite 3500
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-3021
          Telephone: (310) 277-7200

CROSS POINT: Lozano Seeks to Certify Classes
--------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MISHELLE LOZANO LOCKERBY,
v. CROSS POINT NC PARTNERS, LLC d/b/a SARDIS PLACE AT MATTHEWS, and
CORTLAND MANAGEMENT, LLC, Case No. 3:19-cv-00717-MOC-DCK
(W.D.N.C.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying the following Classes:

      -- Collection Letter Class

         "All natural persons who, during the Relevant Time
         Period, (a) resided in any of the properties in North
         Carolina owned and/or managed by Cortland Management,
         LLC ("Cortland"), and (b) were sent a Collection Letter
         threatening to charge Eviction Fees.

      -- Eviction Fee Class

         "All natural persons who, during the Relevant Time
         Period (a) resided in any of the properties in North
         Carolina owned and/or managed by Cortland, (b) were
         charged, and (c) paid Eviction Fees."

         Excluded from the Classes are: (a) any Judge or
         Magistrate presiding over this action and members of
         their families; (b) Defendants and any entity which
         Defendants have a controlling interest, or which has a
         controlling interest in Defendants and its legal
         representatives, successors and assigns; and (c) all
         persons who properly execute and file a timely request
         for exclusion;"

   2. appointing her counsel as Class Counsel; and

   3. appointing her as Class Representative.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify classes dated Oct. 18,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2ZsBIro
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott C. Harris, Esq.
          Patrick M. Wallace, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON
          PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          900 W. Morgan Street
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Telephone: (919) 600-5000
          Facsimile: (919) 600-5035
          E-mail: sharris@milberg.com
                  pwallace@milberg.com

               - and -

          Edward H. Maginnis, Esq.
          Karl S. Gwaltney, Esq.
          MAGINNIS HOWARD
          7706 Six Forks Road, Suite 101
          Raleigh, NC 27615
          Telephone: (919) 526-0450
          Facsimile: (919) 882-8763
          E-mail: emaginnis@maginnishoward.com
                  kgwaltney@maginnishoward.com

DASMEN RESIDENTIAL: Bid to Certify for Appeal in Akeem Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
denies the motion to certify for immediate appeal the Court's July
7, 2021 and Aug. 20, 2021 orders in the lawsuit captioned as JOSHUA
AKEEM, et al. v. DASMEN RESIDENTIAL, LLC, et al. SECTION M (3)
Pertains to all cases, Case Nos. 19-13650, c/w No. 19-13673, No.
19-13705., 19-14634, 19-14636, 19-14637, 20-187 (E.D. La.).

Before the Court is a motion by Defendant Latter & Blum Property
Management, Inc. for entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to this Court's July 7,
2021 and Aug. 20, 2021 orders that resulted in the dismissal of all
claims against Latter & Blum. Latter & Blum argues that the motion
should be granted because all claims against it have been dismissed
and, if the motion is not granted, Latter & Blum will be compelled
to remain as a party to the class action until the entire
litigation is resolved. The Plaintiffs did not file an opposition
to the motion.

Rule 54(b) is an exception to the general rule that a final
judgment is appealable only after the adjudication of the rights
and liabilities of all parties to a proceeding. To certify an
otherwise interlocutory order for immediate appeal, a district
court must make two separate findings under Rule 54(b): First, the
court must determine that the order constitutes a "final judgment"
as to one or more "claims or parties"; and second, the court must
determine that "there is no just reason for delay."

As to the first of the two requirements for certification, the
district court can certify an order as a Rule 54(b) judgment only
if the order has disposed of one or more claims or parties. Here,
the first requirement is met, District Judge Barry W. Ashe holds.
Taken together, the July 7, 2021 and August 20, 2021 orders dispose
entirely of Latter & Blum as a party in this litigation.

As to the second requirement for a Rule 54(b) certification,
however, Latter & Blum has not demonstrated that an immediate
appeal would avoid dangers of hardship or injustice, or that any
hardship it faces outweighs judicial administrative interests in
avoiding piecemeal appeals, Judge Ashe holds.

Latter & Blum contends that it would be required to remain in a
complex class action if the orders are not certified for immediate
appeal. This argument does not demonstrate the hardship or
injustice required by the rule, Judge Ashe opines, citing Menard v.
LLOG Expl. Co., 2017 WL 1426968, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 21, 2017).
First, Latter & Blum has been dismissed from the litigation and,
thus, has no reason to participate. Further, this Court has now
denied the Plaintiffs' motion to certify the class, which means
Latter & Blum would not be a party to a complex class action in any
event.

Moreover, having lost the motions, the Plaintiffs would have been
the party to appeal this Court's orders, not Latter & Blum, Judge
Ashe notes. Additionally, the substance of those orders applies as
well to other Defendants, who are still in the case. Thus, appeal
of such orders at this juncture would not permit full and complete
adjudication of the issues they addressed, and certifying an
immediate appeal of those orders with respect to only Latter & Blum
would certainly create the risk of piecemeal appeals, the Judge
points out.

Considering these factors, the Court cannot certify that there is
no just reason for delay.

Accordingly, for these reasons, it is ordered that Latter & Blum's
motion to certify for immediate appeal the Court's July 7, 2021 and
Aug. 20, 2021 orders is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order & Reasons dated Oct. 14,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/95brbrva from
Leagle.com.


DATTO INC: Dinnerman Files Suit in C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Datto, Inc., et al.
The case is styled as Joshua David Dinnerman, Paul Feinberg,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated;
Pacific Information Technologies, an Arizona corporation; Pacific
Business KK, a Tokyo Japan corporation; Technology Design Systems,
LTD, a Hong Kong corporation v. Datto, Inc., a Connecticut
Corporation, as such has a regional office in Irvine CA; Open Mesh,
Inc., an Oregon corporation; Case No. 8:21-cv-01771-JVS-DFM (C.D.
Cal., Oct. 25, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract for the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

Datto, Inc. -- https://www.datto.com/ -- is an American
cybersecurity and data backup company.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gary R. Carlin, Esq.
          Steven Thomas Romeyn, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF GARY CARLIN APC
          301 East Ocean Boulevard Suite 1550
          Long Beach, CA 90802
          Phone: (562) 432-8933
          Fax: (562) 435-1656
          Email: gary@garycarlinlaw.com
                 steven@garycarlinlaw.com


DELTA DENTAL: Bowman Sues Over Failure to Pay Compensation
----------------------------------------------------------
Cristal Bowman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. DELTA DENTAL OF CALIFORNIA, a California Non-Profit
Corporation; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda
Cty., Oct. 15, 2021), is brought to recover civil penalties and
address Defendants' violations of the California Labor Code and the
IWC Wage Orders as a result of the Defendants' failure to pay wages
owed.

In this case, the Defendants violated various provisions of the
California Labor Code and IWC Wage Order. The Defendants'
violations include: failure to pay wages owed, including minimum
wages and overtime; failure to provide lawful meal periods; failure
to authorize and permit rest periods; failure to timely pay wages
owed upon separation from employment; failure to reimburse
necessary expenses; and failure to provide accurate lawful itemized
wage statements, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed as a salaried employee in the position
of Billing Analyst for Delta Dental of California from November
2019 until March 12, 2021.

Delta Dental of California provides a dental insurance for local
communities.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James R. Hawkins, Esq.
          Christina M. Lucio, Esq.
          JAMES HAWKINS APLC
          9880 Research Drive, Suite 200
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Phone: (949) 387-7200
          Facsimile: (949) 387-6676
          Email: James@Jameshawkinsaplc.com
                 Christina@Jameshawkinsaplc.com


DIGNITY HEALTH: Cal. App. Affirms Dismissal Judgment in Gray Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GORDON GRAY, Plaintiff and Appellant v. DIGNITY
HEALTH, Defendant and Respondent, Case No. A158648 (Cal. App.), the
Court of Appeals of California for the First District, Division
One, affirms the trial court's order sustaining Dignity's demurrer
to Gray's complaint without leave to amend and entered a judgment
of dismissal.

Introduction

After Plaintiff Gray received emergency medical care at St. Mary
Medical Center (owned and operated by defendant Dignity Health), he
received a bill that included an "'ER LEVEL 2 W/PROCEDU'" charge
(ER Charge). Gray maintains Dignity's failure to disclose, prior to
providing emergency medical treatment, that its bill for emergency
services would include such a charge -- either by posting "signage
in and around" the emergency department or "verbally during the
patients' registration process" -- is an unfair business practice
under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and unlawful under the
Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). He seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief requiring specific disclosure of this particular
charge to all persons presenting at any Dignity-operated emergency
department "in advance of providing treatment that would trigger"
an ER Charge.

Mr. Gray's attorney acknowledged that each of his causes of action
was grounded solely on Dignity's failure to separately and
specifically disclose its ER Charge prior to providing emergency
medical care -- "on signage posted in or around" the emergency
department, or "verbally during the patients' registration
process." Gray claims this one specific charge must be disclosed
prior to the rendition of any emergency medical care, because "if
known about prior to treatment," the charge "would be a substantial
factor in a patient's decision to remain at the Hospital and
proceed with treatment."

It is important to point out what Gray does not claim. He does not
claim that by including an ER Charge in its billing, Dignity is in
violation of any of the extensive state and federal statutory and
regulatory law governing the disclosure of hospital billing
information and the treatment of persons presenting for treatment
at an emergency department. Nor does he take issue with the
hospital's "chargemaster" amount for the Level 2 ER Charge (and
which his medical insurance largely covered). Rather, his UCL,
CLRA, and declaratory relief claims are based solely on his
assertion Dignity must, prior to providing emergency medical care,
disclose that this specific charge will be included in its
billing.

Mr. Gray also brings the case as a putative class action on behalf
of "all individuals who, within the last four years, received
treatment at a Dignity Health emergency room in California, and who
were charged an emergency room fee which is billed on top of the
charges for the individual items of treatment and services
provided."

Dignity interposed a demurrer, which the trial court sustained
without leave to amend, relying largely on Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal. App. 4th 1401, 1408, which affirmed
the dismissal of a UCL case based on allegations Cedars-Sinai had
not "specifically, separately, and individually disclosed" an
administrative charge prior to the plaintiff receiving services
from a physician at a hospital medical facility.

Discussion

A. The UCL Claim

Mr. Gray asserts two bases for his UCL claim. He generically
alleges that Dignity's failure to disclose that it would include an
ER Charge in its billing prior to providing emergency medical
services was "unfair" because the COA did not "mention" the charge,
there was no "signage in the emergency room" disclosing this
charge, and there was no "verbal" disclosure to him "during
registration." He additionally alleges Dignity's failure to
disclose, prior to providing emergency medical services, that its
bill for such service would include an ER Charge is both an
"unfair" and "unlawful" business practice because the hospital
"bills patients amounts in violation of the CLRA" and therefore his
UCL "claim is tethered to a legislatively declared policy.

The Court of Appeals finds that while Gray is correct that conduct
not expressly prohibited by statute may nevertheless be found to be
an "unfair" business practice under the UCL, the alleged conduct
must nevertheless meet the substantive definition of an "unfair"
practice to be actionable, which the failure to disclose Gray
complains of in the case, does not for the reasons the Court of
Appeals has discussed.

In sum, the Court of Appeals concludes that even giving Gray's
allegations their full due, the fact that Dignity did not disclose,
prior to providing emergency medical treatment, that its billing
for such services would include an ER Charge does not identify a
practice that "'violates established public policy,'" or is
"'immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous.'" It therefore
turns to Gray's CLRA claim, which he urges provides a "tether" for
his UCL claim.

B. CLRA Claim

Mr. Gray relies specifically on subdivisions (a)(5) and (a)(14) of
the CLRA. Subdivision (a)(5) of Civil Code section 1770 prohibits
"representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval,
characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that
they do not have." Subdivision (a)(14) of Civil Code section 1770
prohibits "representing that a transaction confers or involves
rights, remedies, or obligations that it does not have or involve,
or that are prohibited by law." Respectively, these subdivisions
prohibit "the furnishing of goods or services through
misrepresentations" and the "imposition of illegal obligations."

First, even assuming, without deciding, that Gray adequately
alleged standing to assert his CLRA claim, the Court of Appeals
finds that he has not alleged a claim under either subdivision
(a)(5) and (a)(14) of Civil Code section 1770. While Gray is
correct that a Civil Code section 1770, subdivision (a)(5)
"misrepresentation" claim can be based on failure to disclose, this
is so in only a specific context -- where the defendant has an
obligation to disclose a material fact. Thus, where the plaintiff
fails to allege that the defendant "was 'bound to disclose'" the
nondisclosed fact or facts showing the defendant "ever gave any
information of other facts which could have the likely effect of
misleading the public 'for want of communication' of the fact"
allegedly not disclosed, a misrepresentation claim under Civil Code
section 1770, subdivision (a)(5) has not been stated.

For all the reasons it has discussed in connection with Gray's
"unfair" business practice claim, the Court of Appeals holds that
Dignity did not owe Gray the duty he claims was owed in the case --
to disclose, prior to providing any medical emergency treatment,
that its billing for such treatment would include an ER Charge. It
further observes that Dignity did disclose all hospital pricing
required by statute and regulation, and that its ER Charges were
included in those disclosures.

Second, the Court of Appeals holds that Gray does not allege any
collateral oral misrepresentation by Dignity that is at odds with
the terms of the hospital's COA. Nor does he allege that Dignity's
COA contains any term prohibited by law. The only allegation Gray
makes with respect to the hospital's COA is that "under Hospital's
Contract," he is assertedly "not required to pay" the "undisclosed"
ER Charge. At most, he has alleged a breach of contract, which,
alone, is not sufficient to state a claim under Civil Code section
1770, subdivision (a)(14). In sum, Gray's assertion that Dignity
failed to disclose, prior to providing any medical emergency
treatment, that its billing for such treatment would include an ER
Charge, does not, under either Civil Code section 1770, subdivision
(a)(5) or (a)(14), state a CLRA claim.

C. Declaratory/Injunctive Relief Claim

Mr. Gray's claim for declaratory and injunctive relief has no
independent vitality apart from his UCL and CLRA claims. Rather, it
is a request for particular forms of equitable relief. Since his
UCL and CLRA claims fail, so too does his request for declaratory
and injunctive relief.

Disposition

In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment. The Respondent to recover costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ctruyay3 from Leagle.com.

Carpenter Law, Gretchen A. Carpenter -- gretchen@gcarpenterlaw.com;
Law Offices of Barry L. Kramer, Barry Kramer -- kramerlaw@aol.com
-- for the Plaintiff and Appellant.

Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, Barry S. Landsberg --
blandsberg@manatt.com -- Harvey L. Rochman -- hrochman@manatt.com
-- Joanna Sobol McCallum -- jmccallum@manatt.com -- for the
Defendant and Respondent.


EVEREST RECEIVABLE: Montgomery FDCPA Suit Remanded to State Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled PATRICIA MONTGOMERY, on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. EVEREST RECEIVABLE
SERVICES, INC., and DNF ASSOCIATES, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 21 C
3535 (N.D. Ill.), District Judge Gary Feinerman of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, grants the Plaintiff's motion to remand her case back to
state court.

Patricia Montgomery brought this putative class action in state
court against Everest Receivable Services, Inc., and DNF
Associates, LLC, alleging that collection emails they sent her
violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15
U.S.C. Section 1692, et seq., and Illinois law. The Defendants
removed the suit to federal court, and Montgomery moves to remand
it back to state court--the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois.

Background

Ms. Montgomery allegedly failed to pay a debt that she had incurred
on a Celtic Bank credit card account. DNF purchased the alleged
debt and hired Everest to attempt to collect it from Montgomery.

Everest sent Montgomery a collection email identifying DNF
Associates LLC as the current creditor, "Indigo MasterCard/Celtic
Bank" as the original creditor, and an outstanding balance of
$603.43. Less than a week later, Everest sent Montgomery another
collection email, which again identified DNF Associates LLC as the
current creditor and listed an outstanding balance of $603.43, but
which identified "Indigo MasterCard" as the original creditor.

Discussion

In an uncommon twist on a common theme, Montgomery argues that she
lacks Article III standing to pursue her claims in federal court,
and therefore that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this removed
suit, because she does not allege that she took specific action to
her detriment that cost her money or otherwise caused her specific
out-of-pocket damages due to the Defendants' false and confusing
statements.

In addition, invoking 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c), Montgomery seeks
to recover the costs and attorney fees she incurred due to the
assertedly improper removal. Advancing a position usually taken by
FDCPA plaintiffs, the Defendants respond that Montgomery has
Article III standing given that (a) she alleges that Everest's
emails created the impression that there could be multiple accounts
allegedly due and owing, which gave rise to an appreciable risk of
harm that she would overpay her debt, and (b) she seeks actual
damages.

I. Article III Standing

The "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing consists of
three elements. The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in
fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision" (Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 136 S.Ct.
1540, 1547 (2016)).

Whatever injury Montgomery suffered was caused by Everest's sending
the collection emails, and a favorable judicial decision could
redress that injury through an award of statutory damages under the
FDCPA, Judge Feinerman states. And because the emails were sent
specifically to Montgomery, her injury was "particularized," as
they affected her in a personal and individual way. So, the only
open question here is whether Montgomery's alleged injury is also
concrete, Judge Feinerman points out.

The Defendants argue that Montgomery's allegation that Everest's
emails gave the impression that there could be multiple accounts
allegedly due and owing since they refer to different "Original
Creditor" fields, alleges an appreciable risk of harm--sufficient
to confer Article III standing--that she would overpay her debt.

Judge Feinerman holds that tThat argument is foreclosed by Nettles
v. Midland Funding LLC, 983 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2020). The plaintiff
in Nettles alleged that the defendants violated the FDCPA by
sending her a dunning letter that overstated her unpaid balance by
$104. As the plaintiff put it, the defendants were attempting to
collect more money than what she owed. The Seventh Circuit
nonetheless held that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing,
reasoning that her complaint does not allege that the statutory
violations harmed her in any way or created any appreciable risk of
harm to her. That is, because the plaintiff did not allege that she
was at risk of overpaying the debt, she failed to allege the
requisite appreciable risk of harm.

The same result obtains here, Judge Feinerman holds. Montgomery's
complaint alleges that Everest sent her two emails attempting to
collect on the same $603.43 debt, one with the original creditor
listed as "Indigo MasterCard/Celtic Bank," and the other with the
original creditor listed as "Indigo MasterCard."

The complaint further alleges that the two emails gave the
impression that there could be multiple accounts allegedly due and
owing since they refer to different "Original Creditor" fields. The
emails, thus, suggested, at least implicitly, that Montgomery owed
more than her actual debt--$1,206.86 ($603.43 times two), rather
than $603.43.

But as in Nettles, Montgomery's complaint does not allege that the
emails gave rise to the risk that she would overpay her debt, Judge
Feinerman opines. It follows that Montgomery, like the plaintiff in
Nettles, failed to allege an "appreciable risk of harm to her"
sufficient to confer Article III standing.

In pressing the opposite result, the Defendants observe that the
Supreme Court has instructed courts to look at historical practice
and Congress's judgment to determine whether an intangible injury
is "concrete" for standing purposes (citing TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 141 S.Ct. 2190, 2204-05 (2021)), and submit that Congress
intended to protect consumers from receiving misleading information
about a creditor's identity.

The Defendants add that there is a recent undercurrent of
concurring opinions in the Seventh Circuit suggesting that the
circuit's standing requirements in FDCPA cases are too restrictive.
But as a district court in the Seventh Circuit, Judge Feinerman
opines that the Court is bound by Nettles and Markakos v.
Medicredit, Inc., 997 F.3d 778, 779-81 (7th Cir. 2021), which
foreclose the Defendants' argument that Montgomery's allegations
suffice to establish Article III standing.

Finally, the Defendants maintain that the request in Montgomery's
complaint for actual damages is sufficient to confer standing at
this stage of the litigation. Judge Feinerman holds that that
argument is defeated by Seventh Circuit precedent holding that
where a complaint does not describe any concrete harm that the
plaintiffs had suffered from the defendant's alleged misconduct, a
mere reference to actual damages in the complaint's prayer for
relief does not establish Article III standing, citing Collier v.
SP Plus Corp., 889 F.3d 894, 895-96 (7th Cir. 2018).

Because Montgomery's complaint fails to describe a concrete harm
resulting from the Defendants' alleged FDCPA violation, her
complaint's request for "actual damages" does not establish Article
III standing, Judge Feinerman holds.

II. Attorney Fees and Costs

Ms. Montgomery's suggestion that fees and costs are justified here
because the Defendants either removed the case without any
understanding of current caselaw, or in a cynical attempt to cause
additional costs and delay, fails to persuade, Judge Feinerman
holds. As discussed, a plaintiff alleging that an FDCPA violation
presented an appreciable risk of harm to the underlying concrete
interest that Congress sought to protect has Article III standing.

Judge Feinerman opines that Nettles draws a rather fine line
between alleging that Everest's two emails gave the impression that
there could be multiple accounts allegedly due and owing--which is
insufficient to establish standing--and alleging that the emails
created an "appreciable risk" that Montgomery would pay the same
debt twice--which suffices to establish standing. That the
Defendants mistakenly failed to appreciate that line does not rise
to the level of objective unreasonableness for purposes of Section
1447(c), the Judge points out.

Conclusion

Ms. Montgomery's motion to remand is granted, but her request for
attorney fees and costs is denied. This case is remanded to the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated
Oct. 14, 2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/n2tcb4xn from
Leagle.com.


EVOLENT HEALTH: PCRA, OPPRS Seek to Certify Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as PLYMOUTH COUNTY RETIREMENT
SYSTEM and OKLAHOMA POLICE PENSION AND RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v.
EVOLENT HEALTH, INC., FRANK WILLIAMS, NICHOLAS MCGRANE, SETH
BLACKLEY, CHRISTIE SPENCER, and STEVEN WIGGINTON, Case No.
1:19-cv-01031-RDA-TCB (E.D. Va.), the Lead Plaintiffs Plymouth
County Retirement Association and Oklahoma Police Pension and
Retirement System ask the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying this action as a class action pursuant to Rules
      23(a) and (b)(3);

   2. appointing Lead Plaintiffs as Class Representatives
      pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(3); and

   3. appointing Lead Counsel Saxena White P.A. as Class Counsel
      and Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC as Liaison Counsel
      for the Class.

Plymouth County Retirement System provides retirement, disability,
and survivor benefits to approximately 11500 participants.

Evolent Health is a population health management services
organization (MSO) that integrates the technology, tools and
on-the-ground resources.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Oct. 19,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Gxiykw
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Steven J. Toll, Esq.
          Daniel S. Sommers, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS
          & TOLL PLLC
          1100 New York Avenue, Suite 500
          Washington, D.C. 20005
          Telephone: (202) 408-4600
          Facsimile: (202) 408-4699
          E-mail: stoll@cohenmilstein.com
                  dsommers@cohenmilstein.com

               - and -

          Maya Saxena, Esq.
          Joseph E. White III, Esq.
          Lester R. Hooker, Esq.
          Brandon T. Grzandziel, Esq.
          SAXENA WHITE P.A.
          7777 Glades Road, Suite 300
          Boca Raton, FL 33434
          Telephone: (561) 206-6708
          E-mail: msaxena@saxenawhite.com
                  jwhite@saxenawhite.com
                  lhooker@saxenawhite.com
                  brandon@saxenawhite.com

               - and -

          Steven B. Singer, Esq.
          Sara DiLeo, Esq.
          Joshua H. Saltzman, Esq.
          10 Bank Street, 8th Floor
          White Plains, NY 10606
          Telephone: (914) 437-8551
          E-mail: ssinger@saxenawhite.com
                  sdileo@saxenawhite.com
                  jsaltzman@saxenawhite.com

FACEBOOK INC: Ngian Sues Over False and Misleading Statements
-------------------------------------------------------------
Wee Ann Ngian, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. FACEBOOK, INC., MARK ZUCKERBERG, AND DAVID M. WEHNER,
Case No. 1:21-cv-05976 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 27, 2021), is brought on
behalf of all persons and entities who purchased the publicly
traded securities of Facebook between November 3, 2016 and October
4, 2021, both dates inclusive, to recover compensable damages
caused by the Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as a result of the
Defendants materially false and misleading statements; and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities.

Specifically, the Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Facebook
misrepresented its user growth; (2) Facebook knew, or should have
known, that duplicate accounts represented a greater portion of its
growth than stated, and it should have provided more detailed
disclosures as to the implication of duplicate accounts to
Facebook's user base and growth; (3) Facebook did not provide a
fair platform for speech, and regularly protected high profile
users via its Cross Check/XCheck system; (4) despite being aware of
their use of Facebook's platforms, the Company failed to respond
meaningfully to drug cartels, human traffickers, and violent
organizations; (5) Facebook has been working to attract preteens to
its platform and services; and (6) as a result, Defendants' public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times.

On September 13, 2021, during trading hours, The Wall Street
Journal ("WSJ") published an article titled "Facebook Says Its
Rules Apply to All. Company Documents Reveal a Secret Elite That's
Exempt." It would be the first of nine articles published by the
WSJ based on documents provided by a then-unknown whistleblower. On
this news, Facebook shares dropped by $5.17 to close at $376.51 on
September 13, 2021. On September 28, 2021, during market hours, the
WSJ published an article titled, "Facebook's Effort to Attract
Preteens Goes Beyond Instagram Kids, Documents Show." On this news,
Facebook share prices dropped $7.32 to close at $340.65 on
September 28, 2021.

On October 3, 2021, CBS News aired a television segment on 60
Minutes interviewing the Whistleblower, revealed to be Frances
Haugen, on her findings during her time at Facebook. On October 4,
2021, CBS News published an article titled, "Whistleblower's SEC
Complaint: Facebook Knew Platform Was Used to 'Promote Human
Trafficking and Domestic Servitude'", containing the whistleblower
complaints against Facebook filed with the SEC. There were eight
complaints shared in the CBS article. As a result of the October 3
and 4 revelations, Facebook's share price dropped $16.78 per share,
or approximately 4.9%, from closing at $343.01 on October 1, 2021,
the prior trading day, to close at $326.23 on October 4, 2021.

From the first WSJ article published on September 13, 2021, to the
final disclosure on October 4, 2021, Facebook share prices fell by
$55.45, or over 14%, damaging investors. As a result of the
Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the precipitous
decline in the market value of the Company's securities, Plaintiff
and other Class members have suffered significant losses and
damages, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased Facebook's securities during the Class
Period.

Facebook is the world's largest online social network, with 2.5
billion monthly active users.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Phillip Kim, Esq.
          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          275 Madison Ave., 40th Floor
          New York, New York 10016
          Phone: (212) 686-1060
          Fax: (212) 202-3827
          Email: pkim@rosenlegal.com
                 lrosen@rosenlegal.com


FCA US: Bid for Reconsideration Tossed in Tomassini Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ROBERT TOMASSINI, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, v. FCA US LLC,
Case No. 3:14-cv-01226-MAD-ML (N.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Mae A.
D'Agostino entered an order:

   1. denying the Defendant's motion for reconsideration; and

   2. directing the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this
      Memorandum-Decision and Order on the parties in accordance
      with the Local Rules.

The Court said, "The Defendant's motion to reconsider has failed to
present controlling decisions or data that the Court overlooked
resulting in a manifest injustice. Thus, Defendant's motion for
reconsideration is denied."

On September 8, 2014, the Plaintiff Tomassini commenced this
putative class action in state court, and Defendant FCA US LLC
removed to the Northern District of New York on October 8, 2014.

On January 25, 2018, Plaintiff Tomassini moved for class
certification on his claim for deceptive business practices under
New York General Business Law Section 349.

On August 17, 2020, the Defendant filed a motion to remand this
action to state court. Soon thereafter, Plaintiff accepted
Defendant's offer of judgment.

On October 30, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys'
fees and bill of costs. On March 26, 2021, the Court awarded
Plaintiff $125,882.78 in Attorneys' fees and $4,699.30 in taxable
costs.

FCA US designs, engineers, manufactures, and sells vehicles. The
Company offers passenger cars, utility vehicles, mini-vans, and
trucks.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 15, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3GpYkcH at no extra charge[CC]


The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel C. Calvert, Esq.
          Jordan L. Chaikin, Esq.
          PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
          27300 Riverview Center Boulevard, Suite 103
          Bonita Springs, FL 34134

               - and -

          Elmer R. Keach, III, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF ELMER
          ROBERT KEACH, III, P.C.
          One Pine West Plaza, Suite 109
          Albany, NY 12205

               - and -

          Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
          Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
          MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
          412 H Street NE, Suite 302
          Washington, DC  20002

               - and -

          Gary S. Graifman, Esq.
          Jay I. Brody, Esq.
          KANTROWITZ, GOLDHAMMER &
          GRAIFMAN, P.C.
          747 Chestnut Ridge Road, Suite 200
          Chestnut Ridge, NY 10977

               - and -

          Gary E. Mason, Esq.
          WHITEFIELD BRYSON & MASON, LLP
          5101 Wisconsin Avenue, NW, Suite 305
          Washington, DC 20016

The Attorneys for the Defendant, are:

          Alan J. Pope, Esq.
          COUGHLIN, GERHART LAW FIRM
          P.O. Box 2039
          99 Corporate Drive
          Binghamton, NY 13902-2039

               - and -

          Kathy A. Wisniewski, Esq.
          Sharon B. Rosenberg, esq.
          Stephen A. D'aunoy, Esq.
          Thomas L. Azar, Jr., Esq.
          THOMPSON, COBURN LAW FIRM
          One U.S. Bank Plaza
          St. Louis, MO 63101

FCA US: Court Narrows Claims in Bakhtiar's 3rd Amended Complaint
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EBBY BAKHTIAR, individually and Case 2116 on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. FCA US LLC; SANTA
MONICA CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE AND RAM; and MOPAR MOTORS, Defendants,
Case No. 2:20-cv-06522-ODW (JEMx) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Otis D.
Wright, II, of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
motion to dismiss all claims asserted against it in Bakhtiar's
Third Amended Complaint.

Introduction

Plaintiff Bakhtiar filed the putative class action in the Superior
Court of California, County of Los Angeles against Defendants FCA
US, LLC; Santa Monica Chrysler Jeep Dodge and Ram ("SaMo
Chrysler"); and Mopar Motors. The Defendants removed the case to
the Court under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C.
Section 1332(d)(2). FCA, the only remaining Defendant, now moves to
dismiss all claims asserted against it in Bakhtiar's (TAC").

Background

On May 21, 2015, Bakhtiar purchased a 2015 Dodge Viper from a
nonparty dealership. FCA is the manufacturer of the Dodge Viper. On
June 28, 2017, before his original warranty lapsed, Bakhtiar
purchased a vehicle warranty extension plan from FCA called the
Mopar Vehicle Protection Plan for $2,600. FCA marketed the Plan as
an extension of the manufacturer's warranty and another way for
Viper owners to essentially receive wrap around protection of their
vehicle. Under the Plan, FCA agreed to "pay the total costs (parts
and labor) less a deductible per visit, to correct certain
mechanical failures" that might arise with Bakhtiar's vehicle.

Sometime in 2019, Bakhtiar contacted SaMo Chrysler regarding three
issues with his 2015 Viper. SaMo Chrysler told Bakhtiar it "would
not honor the Plan because it would not receive any compensation
for the work from FCA, and even if it wanted to, SaMo Chrysler
could not do the service because it did not have 'Certified Viper
Techs' that could work on repairs." Bakhtiar then "spent numerous
hours speaking with SaMo Chrysler as well as making inquiries to
other Dodge dealerships to locate a 'Certified Viper Dealer' and/or
'Viper Techs' in the greater Los Angeles area."

"Because FCA imposed a requirement that only Certified Viper Techs
could service the Plaintiff's vehicle and did not require its FCA
Dealers to employ the services of Certified Viper Techs to honor
the terms of the Service Contract, the repairs to the Plaintiff's
vehicle were never made." The approximate cost of all necessary
repairs is $3,100, and Bakhtiar alleges he has been harmed in this
amount due to SaMo Chrysler's refusal to service the vehicle. In
the alternative, Bakhtiar alleges his damages are the $2,600 he
paid for the Plan.

Based on these allegations, Bakhtiar proposes a class action with a
plaintiff class consisting of all those who purchased a Mopar
Vehicle Protection Plan for a Dodge Viper from Jan. 1, 2010, to the
present. On behalf of himself and the class, Bakhtiar asserts four
causes of action against FCA and the other Defendants for: (1)
breach of contract, (2) breach of express warranty under the
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, (3) violation of California's
Unfair Competition Law, California Business & Professions Code
sections 17200-17210, and (4) violation of the Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, California Civil Code sections 1750-1784.

The Court dismissed SaMo Chrysler from the action with prejudice
pursuant to its unopposed motion to dismiss. Upon FCA's motion, the
Court dismissed the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), dismissing
Bakhtiar's tort causes of action without leave to amend and
granting leave to amend the others. Bakhtiar thereafter filed the
operative TAC. Most recently, the Court dismissed Mopar Motors
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 4(m), leaving
FCA as the sole Defendant.

FCA now moves to dismiss each claim in the TAC under Rule 12(b)(6).
It also moves to dismiss all nationwide class allegations on the
grounds that Bakhtiar included the nationwide class in error and
that the proposed class is intended to be limited to California
residents.

Discussion

A. Breach of Contract

FCA moves to dismiss Bakhtiar's first claim for breach of contract.
A breach of contract claim consists of "(1) the existence of the
contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance,
(3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the
plaintiff." FCA contends, as before, that Bakhtiar's breach of
contract claim fails because he alleges neither breach nor
damages.

Preliminary, Judge Wright holds that the TAC satisfactorily
addresses certain deficiencies the Court previously described in
dismissing the breach of contract claim from the SAC. The Court
previously noted that, in the SAC, Bakhtiar had "merely alleged
that he contacted SaMo Chrysler sometime in 2019 'regarding certain
complaints he had concerning his 2015 Viper.'" This was
insufficient to state a claim because Bakhtiar failed to allege
facts showing "for instance, that the repairs he sought should have
been covered under the Plan." Bakhtiar has cured this deficiency by
alleging the specific repairs he sought and that those repairs
would be covered under the Plan.

1. Breach

With regard to FCA's role, Bakhtiar alleges that he ultimately
contacted FCA's customer assistance department, which "failed to
resolve Plaintiff's concerns." According to Judge Wright, tThis
allegation, taken along with the remaining allegations regarding
FCA's promises and the general characteristics of the
manufacturer-authorized dealer relationship, is sufficient to
plausibly implicate FCA in the breach.

2. Damages

The damages issue in the case turns on the interpretation of the
written terms of the Plan. Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is
inappropriate when a contract is susceptible to multiple reasonable
interpretations, one or more of which favors the plaintiff. In
dismissing the breach of contract claim from the SAC, the Court
examined the Plan and concluded that, by way of the Plan, FCA
"promised Bakhtiar he could obtain servicing of his vehicle, for
any repairs covered under the Plan, from any authorized FCA
dealership in the countries listed." This finding was, of course,
limited to the allegations and the context of the now-inoperative
SAC.

For the purpose of the TAC and the present Motion, Judge Wright
goes this far and no further: There is a reasonable reading of the
Plan under which FCA promised Bakhtiar he would be able to receive
service at any authorized FCA dealership in the countries listed.
Hence, Bakhtiar plausibly alleges that FCA breached the Plan's
terms, and the Motion is accordingly denied as to the breach of
contract claim.

B. Breach of Express Warranty under Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty
Act

FCA moves to dismiss Bakhtiar's second claim for breach of express
warranty under California's Song-Beverly Act. The Song-Beverly Act
provides in relevant part that "any buyer of consumer goods who is
damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation under a service
contract" may bring suit.

Judge Wright holds that without the replacement/restitution remedy,
the remedies available for the alleged Song-Beverly Act violation
are largely duplicative of those available for breach of contract.
But the Song-Beverly Act provides additional remedies a state-law
breach of contract claim does not, such as attorneys' fees, making
dismissal at this stage inappropriate. Accordingly, the Motion is
denied as to the third claim inasmuch as Bakhtiar seeks damages
other than the Song-Beverly Act's replacement/restitution remedy.

C. UCL

California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), codified at Business
and Professions Code section 17200-17210, prohibits "any unlawful,
unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice." The Court
previously dismissed Bakhtiar's UCL claim on the overlapping
grounds of damages and standing.

For the reasons discussed, Judge Wright finds that Bakhtiar has
sufficiently alleged damages in the form of diminution to the value
of his vehicle resulting from FCA's failure to ensure the vehicle
could be repaired at authorized service centers. The remaining
issues are (1) UCL standing and (2) whether Bakhtiar has alleged
unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent practices on FCA's part.

1. UCL Standing

Judge Wright determines that Bakhtiar has sufficiently alleged
that, in purchasing the Plan, he surrendered more or acquired less
than he otherwise would have. Bakhtiar paid a certain amount for
the Plan, and there is a reasonable reading of the Plan under which
Bakhtiar did not receive all the benefits he was promised. Thus,
Bakhtiar received a Plan that was less valuable than the Plan he
was promised. The difference between the value of the Plan as
promised and the value of the Plan as received is Bakhtiar's "lost
money," which gives him standing under the UCL. Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code Section 17204.

In the alternative, Bakhtiar sufficiently alleged that a present
property interest was diminished. His vehicle currently has issues
which it would not have if FCA had ensured its dealerships were
able to accept his Viper for repairs as promised. As a result, his
vehicle's value is lower than it otherwise would be, a form of
diminished property interest.

Accordingly, Bakhtiar's allegations are sufficient to establish
standing under the UCL.

2. "Unfair" prong

Aside from standing, Bakhtiar has pled, at minimum, a UCL claim
under the "unfair" prong. Courts' decisions since the adoption of
the current form of the UCL in 1972 have repeatedly affirmed that
the UCL covers a wide variety of wrongful business conduct.

Given this standard, Bakhtiar has plausibly alleged that FCA
engaged in unfair behavior by inducing him into a service contract
that (under one reasonable reading) promised repairs at any
authorized dealer, and then later failing to deliver on that
promise, Judge Wright holds. For FCA to accept a fee from consumers
and not provide them with the services promised is "unfair"
behavior -- both to the consumers who are harmed by the practice
and to other competing manufacturers and service providers who
provide vehicle owners with the full set of benefits promised by
their service contracts.

D. CLRA

FCA moves to dismiss Bakhtiar's fourth claim for violation of the
California Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"). The CLRA
"declares unlawful a variety of unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices used in the sale or lease of
goods or services to a consumer." Bakhtiar seeks relief under the
CLRA pursuant to two specific categories of prohibited conduct:
Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as
advertised, Cal. Civ. Code Section 1770(a)(9), and representing
that a transaction confers or involves rights, remedies, or
obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are
prohibited by law.

At minimum, Judge Wright holds that Bakhtiar sufficiently alleges a
CLRA claim under the latter. There is a reasonable reading of the
Plan under which FCA, by way of the written terms of the Plan,
represented to Bakhtiar that he could present his vehicle to any
authorized service center for covered repairs. As alleged, FCA
failed to ensure that SaMo Chrysler took in the vehicle for the
requested repairs. In other words, as alleged, FCA's failure
deprived Bakhtiar of a right FCA promised Bakhtiar's purchase would
provide him. The allegations therefore plausibly support a CLRA
violation, and Judge Wright denies the Motion as to the portion of
Bakhtiar's CLRA claim seeking injunctive relief.

Mr. Bakhtiar avoids dismissal of this claim because his allegations
of a section 1770(a)(14) violation are well pleaded. Thus, Judge
Wright need not determine at this time whether Bakhtiar has also
stated a CLRA claim under section 1770(a)(9).

E. Claims by Nationwide Class

Finally, in the moving papers, FCA represents that Bakhtiar
erroneously included nationwide class allegations in the TAC, and
that Bakhtiar has conceded that the class in this matter is limited
to California residents. This representation comports with the TAC,
and Bakhtiar failed to address it in any way in his Opposition.
Accordingly, Judge Wright dismisses the TAC without leave to amend
and without prejudice to the extent its allegations are made on
behalf of a nationwide class.

Conclusion

FCA's Motion is granted in part and denied in part. Bakhtiar's
Song-Beverly Act claim is DISMISSED without leave to amend to the
extent it is predicated on replacement or restitution under the
Song-Beverly Act. Bakhtiar's CLRA claim is dismissed with leave to
amend to the extent it is predicated on any remedy other than an
injunction. The entire TAC is dismissed without leave to amend and
without prejudice to the extent its allegations are made on behalf
of a nationwide class. The Motion is otherwise denied.

The leave granted by the Court as to the CLRA claim is narrow;
Bakhtiar either did or did not provide pre-suit notice before
asserting his CLRA claim. Accordingly, Bakhtiar must file a Fourth
Amended Complaint, if any, within seven days of the date of the
Order. The only change permitted is to add allegations regarding
pre-suit notice under the CLRA.

If Bakhtiar timely files an amended complaint, FCA must file its
response in accordance with Rule 15(a)(3). If Bakhtiar does not
timely amend, then FCA will file its Answer within 14 days of the
date the Fourth Amended Complaint would have been due.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/upcet7ps from Leagle.com.


FEDEX GROUND: Wins Summary Judgment Bid vs Dolan
------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as PHILIP DOLAN, v. FEDEX
GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC., et al., Case No. 5:18-cv-06934-BLF
(N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Beth Labson Freeman entered an granting
FedEx's motion for summary judgment.

The Court said, "The motion for summary judgment was brought on
behalf of Defendant FedEx only. The Defendant Josemite IV has not
responded to the operative complaint, although counsel has appeared
on its behalf. The Plaintiff appears to concede that, as its plain
terms state, the Agreement precludes claims against Josemite IV
too. Accordingly, the Court requests a stipulation of dismissal of
Josemite IV no later than October 29, 2021. Following receipt of
the stipulation, the Court will enter judgment in favor of FedEx.
If no stipulation is received by that date, the Court will dismiss
claims against Josemite IV without prejudice without further notice
for failure to prosecute, and then enter judgment in favor of
FedEx."

The Plaintiff's lawsuit arises out of his employment as a driver
for Josemite IV, an entity with which FedEx Ground contracted for
package delivery. Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of
overtime and minimum wages under California law, premium pay for
missed meal and rest periods, relief under derivative claims for
penalties related to separation pay, penalties for non-complaint
wage statements, and reimbursement of business expenses.

He brings eight California statutory claims and seeks to represent
the following class:

   "All individuals who were employed as pick-up and delivery
   truck drivers, or in other similar positions, by Josemite IV,
   Inc., a contracted service provider that contracted to
   provide pickup and delivery services for FedEx Ground Package
   System, Inc., in California during the relevant time period."

Fedex provides package delivery services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3jKHlb7 at no extra charge.[CC]


FEDEX OFFICE: Zupetz Suit Removed to W.D. Kentucky
--------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Jane Zupetz, on behalf of herself and a class of
similarly situated persons v. FedEx Office and Print Services,
Inc., Case No. 21-C-027374 was removed from the Jefferson Circuit
Court to the United States District Court for the Western District
of Kentucky on Oct. 25, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:21-cv-00652-DJH to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract for Breach of
Contract.

FedEx Office Print & Ship Services Inc. --
https://www.fedex.com/en-us/office.html -- is an American retail
chain that provides an outlet for FedEx Express and FedEx Ground
shipping, as well as copying, printing, marketing, office services
and shipping.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua Taylor Rose, Esq.
          ABELL ROSE LLC
          108 S. Madison Avenue
          Louisville, KY 40243
          Phone: (502) 450-5611
          Fax: (502) 450-5612
          Email: jrose@abellroselaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Philip E. Cecil, Esq.
          R. Kenyon Meyer, Esq.
          DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP - Louisville
          101 S. Fifth Street, Suite 2500
          Louisville, KY 40202
          Phone: (502) 581-8027
          Fax: (502) 585-2207
          Email: philip.cecil@dinsmore.com
                 kenyon.meyer@dinsmore.com


FERMENTED SCIENCES: Sued Over False, Misleading Marketing Practices
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Katie Kuciver, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Fermented Sciences, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-05668
(S.D.N.Y., Oct. 22, 2021), seeks damages and an injunction to stop
the Defendant's false and misleading marketing practices with
regards to its "Hard Seltzer" and "Hard Kombucha," promoted as
containing "Antioxidant Vitamin C," "Antioxidants," "Real
Botanicals," and "Crafted With Live Probiotics," among other
attributes, under the Flying Embers brand.

The front label of Defendant's hard seltzer and hard kombucha
emphasize "Antioxidant Vitamin C" and "Live Probiotics." The front
label of the Hard Kombucha Products states, "Fermented With
Botanical Adaptogens," and "Live Probiotic[s]," while the back
label lists other attributes and components. The promotional
materials for the Hard Kombucha Products describe it as "Brewed
With Benefits," with a list of its features.

The Defendant touts the "live probiotics" of the Products. Even
outside of the context of alcoholic beverages, the promotion of a
food or beverage as containing probiotics would be misleading.
However, where the products are alcoholic beverages, the promotion
of probiotics is highly deceptive. The word "probiotic" consists of
"pro," which means "to support" and "biotic," which relates to
life. However, consumption of alcohol, even in modest amounts, has
been proven to have a detrimental effect on life expectancy and
quality of life. The promotion of "live probiotics" is also
misleading because there is no recognized or accepted number,
amount or colony forming units ("CFU") of probiotics with which the
amount and/or type of probiotics in the Products can be compared.

A reasonable consumer would expect that the Products are a
healthful source of nutrients and dietary ingredients, such that
these additions outweigh any negative effects otherwise associated
with alcohol consumption. Consumers do not expect that products
contain labeling which expressly violates the policies and
regulations of this state and nation. By labeling the Product in
this manner, Defendant gained an advantage against other companies,
and against consumers seeking to purchase a product which contained
ingredients whose positive effect outweighed the negative effects
from consuming alcohol.

The value of the Products that plaintiff purchased was materially
less than its value as represented by defendant. The Defendant sold
more of the Products and at higher prices than it would have in the
absence of this misconduct, resulting in additional profits at the
expense of consumers. Had Plaintiff and proposed class members
known the truth, they would not have bought the Products or would
have paid less for it. The Products is sold for a price premium
compared to other similar products, no less than approximately
$16.49 for a six-pack of 12 oz cans, a higher price than it would
otherwise be sold for, absent the misleading representations and
omissions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased the Product on at least one occasion within
the statutes of limitations for each cause of action.

Fermented Sciences, Inc. manufactures, labels, markets, and sells
"Hard Seltzer" and "Hard Kombucha," promoted as containing
"Antioxidant Vitamin C," "Antioxidants," "Real Botanicals," and
"Crafted With Live Probiotics," among other attributes, under the
Flying Embers brand.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 Cuttermill Rd., Ste. 409
          Great Neck NY 11021-3104
          Phone: (516) 268-7080
          Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com


FLOWERS FOODS: Richard Loses Bid for Class Certification
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANTOINE RICHARD, ET AL.,
v. FLOWERS FOODS, INC., ET AL., Case No. 6:15-cv-02557-SMH-CBW
(W.D. La.), the Hon. Judge S. Maurice Hicks, Jr. entered an order:

   1. denying the motion for class certification to certify the
      class of Plaintiffs under the Louisiana Wage Payment Act;

   2. granting the Motion for Decertification to decertify the
      conditional class under the Fair Labor Standards Act;

   3. dismissing without prejudice the claims of the opt-in
      plaintiffs (only), with the decertification ruling
      remaining intact; and

   4. certifying the instant Memorandum Order under 28 U.S.C.
      1292(b) because the order involves a controlling question
      of law as to which there is substantial ground for
      difference of opinion and an immediate interlocutory
      appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of
      the litigation.

Flowers Foods, headquartered in Thomasville, Georgia, is a producer
and marketer of packed bakery food. The company operates 47
bakeries producing bread, buns, rolls, snack cakes, pastries, and
tortillas.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2XOGrTn at no extra charge.[CC]

FORD MOTOR: Chalos, Zohdy Appointed as Class Counsel in Miller
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as VANESSA MILLER, et al., as
individuals and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. FORD
MOTOR COMPANY, Case No. 2:20-cv-01796-TLN-CKD (E.D. Cal.), the Hon.
Judge Troy L. Nunley entered an order granting plaintiffs' motion
for appointment of interim class counsel.

The Court appoints (1) Mark P. Chalos of Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP, and (2) Tarek H. Zohdy of Capstone Law APC, as
Interim Lead Class Counsel, with duties and responsibilities to
efficiently manage and direct all aspects of the litigation on
behalf of Plaintiffs and the putative classes.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3mjG24M at no extra charge.[CC]

GAS GATHERING: Lyman Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------
William Lyman, individually and for others similarly situated v.
GAS GATHERING SPECIALISTS, INC., Case No. 0:21-cv-02386 (D. Minn.,
Oct. 27, 2021), is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) lawsuit to recover the unpaid overtime wages and other
damages owed to the Plaintiff by the Defendant.

The Plaintiff and the other GGS employees regularly work more than
40 hours in a week. But the Defendant does not pay them overtime
for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek.
Instead of paying overtime, the Plaintiff received a daily rate
with no overtime compensation, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff Lyman worked for the Defendant as a welding inspector
from May 2019 until December 2020.

GGS provides inspectors for operators throughout the United States
to inspect pipelines and storage facilities for the transportation
and storage of natural gas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michele R. Fisher, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
          4700 IDS Center, 80 S. 8th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Phone: (612) 256-3200
          Fax: (612) 215-6870
          Email: Fisher@nka.com

               - and -

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Richard M. Schreiber, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Phone: 713-352-1100
          Facsimile: 713-352-3300
          Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                 rschreiber@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025
          Houston, TX 77046
          Phone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com


GAVA INTERNATIONAL: Morales Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
Jose A. Morales, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Gava International Freight Consolidators
(USA), Inc. and Massimo Cacace, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-23669
(S.D. Fla., October 19, 2021), seeks to recover money damages for
retaliation and unpaid regular and overtime wages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

Gava International is an international freight forwarder providing
logistics services where Morales worked as a warehouse worker. He
claims to have worked more than 40 hours during one or more weeks
without being properly compensated. He also claims to have worked
through his lunch breaks. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
     ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
     9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
     Miami, FL 33156
     Telephone: (305) 446-1500
     Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
     Email: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


GC SERVICES: Cohen Suit Transferred to M.D. Florida
---------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Carmit Cohen, individually and on behalf of a
class of similarly situated persons, Petitioner v. GC Services
Limited Partnership, Respondent, Case No. 0:21-cv-61970 was
transferred from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida to the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida on
Oct. 27, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 8:21-cv-02521-WFJ-AEP to
the proceeding.

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.

GC Services -- https://www.gcserv.com/ -- is the largest
privately-held outsourcing provider of call center management and
collection agency services in North America.[BN]

The Petitioner is represented by:

          Ely Robert Levy, Esq.
          Omar Mauricio Salazar, II, Esq.
          MILITZOK & LEVY, PA
          3230 Stirling Rd, Suite 1
          Hollywood, FL 33021
          Phone: (954) 727-8570
          Fax: (954) 241-6857
          Email: elevy@mllawfl.com
                 omar@mllawfl.com

The Respondent is represented by:

          Adam Harrison Settle, Esq.
          KAUFMAN DOLOWICH & VOLUCK, LLP
          Four Penn Center
          1600 John F. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 1030
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Phone: (484) 841-7107
          Email: asettle@kdvlaw.com


GEICO INDEMNITY: McCoy Seeks to Certify Class
---------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DIANE MCCOY, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. GEICO INDEMNITY
COMPANY, Case No. 3:20-cv-05597-ZNQ-TJB (D.N.J.), the Plaintiff
asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. granting certification of a Class of All persons:

      "(a) who insured a vehicle for physical damage coverage
      under a New Jersey automobile insurance policy issued by
      GEICO Indemnity Company, (b) who made a claim under the
      policy for physical damage, (c) whose claim was adjusted
      as a total-loss between May 6, 2014, to January 1, 2020,
      and (d) who were paid no title and registration transfer
      fees or less than $64.50 in title and registration
      transfer fees;"

   2. appointing her as class representative; and

   3. appointing her counsel as counsel for the Class.

GEICO operates as an insurance company. The Company provides
vehicle, property, business, and life insurance services.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Oct. 19,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3beTn8d
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark A. DiCello, Esq.
          Adam J. Levitt, Esq.
          Daniel R. Ferri, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC
          Western Reserve Law Building
          7556 Mentor Avenue
          Mentor, OH 44060
          Telephone: (440) 953-8888
          E-mail: madicello@dicellolevitt.com
                  alevitt@dicellolevitt.com
                  dferri@dicellolevitt.com

               - and -

          Jacob Phillips, Esq.
          Amy L. Judkins, Esq.
          NORMAND PLLC
          62 West Colonial Street, Suite 209
          Orlando, FL 32814
          Telephone: (407) 603-6031
          E-mail: Jacob.phillips@normandpllc.com
          Amy.judkins@normandpllc.com

               - and -

          Andrew Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 N.E 1st Ave, Ste. 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: 305-479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Rachel Edelsberg, Esq.
          DAPEER LAW, P.A.
          3331 Sunset Avenue
          Ocean, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (305) 610-5223
          E-mail: rachel@dapeer.com

GENERAL MOTORS: Shea Suit Over Oil Consumption Defect Dismissed
---------------------------------------------------------------
District Judge Damon R. Leichty of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, grants the
Defendant's motion to dismiss all claims in the lawsuit captioned
as RON SHEA and ROBERT KELLY, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 3:21-CV-86 DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind.).

Plaintiffs Ron Shea and Robert Kelly each purchased vehicles
manufactured by General Motors LLC and fitted with Generation IV
Vortec engines. They claim their engines consume an excessive
amount of oil--what they call an "oil consumption defect." They sue
GM for violations of the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act
(IDCSA), breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, fraudulent omissions, unjust enrichment, and
violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA).

On June 8, 2009, GM acquired the assets of General Motors
Corporation, referred to as "old GM." For model years 2010-2014, GM
continued manufacturing and selling Chevrolet and GMC vehicles
equipped with the Generation IV Vortec 5300 engines. According to
the complaint, the piston rings within these engines fail to keep
oil in the crankcase.

These two vehicle owners also claim that the systems within these
engines contribute to the excessive oil consumption defect. The Oil
Life Monitoring System in GM vehicles with these engines doesn't
advise drivers of insufficient oil in their vehicles until the oil
level is critically low. The oil pressure gauge in these vehicles
doesn't indicate when the oil pressure is low enough to damage
internally lubricated parts or cause engine failure. The oil
canister symbol doesn't illuminate until well past time when the
vehicles are critically oil starved.

The two owners allege that the oil consumption defect can damage
critical engine components and cause drivability problems, such as
lack of power from misfire, spark plug fouling, excessive engine
noise, abnormal vibration or shaking, piston cracking, head
cracking, and ultimately, engine seizure. These problems could
potentially cause the engine to catch fire or the vehicle to
unexpectedly shut down. Beginning with certain of its model year
2014 vehicles, GM scrapped the Generation IV Vortec 5300 engine and
replaced it with the Generation V Vortec 5300 engine, which was
redesigned to fix this problem.

Discussion

The Court (sitting in diversity) applies Indiana's choice of law
rules. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Ruiz v.
Blentech Corp., 89 F.3d 320, 323 (7th Cir. 1996). Both sides cite
Indiana law; and, given no reason to depart from this choice, the
Court follows. See McCoy v. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., 760 F.3d
674, 684 (7th Cir. 2014); Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798,
805 (Ind. 2004).

A. Express Warranty

The vehicle owners claim that GM breached its limited warranty. The
limited warranty "covers repairs to correct any vehicle defect, not
slight noise, vibrations, or other normal characteristics of the
vehicle related to materials or workmanship occurring during the
warranty period." They say GM breached this warranty because the
oil consumption defect is a uniform "design defect" related to
"materials." GM says its warranty doesn't cover design defects.

In deciding whether the warranty covers the alleged defect, the
Court reviews the limited warranty as a whole, attempting to
construe the warranty's language so as not to render any words,
phrases, or terms ineffective or meaningless.

The Court has previously held that a warranty covering "materials"
or "workmanship" omits coverage for design defects (Smith v. Nexus
RVs, LLC, 468 F.Supp.3d 1012, 1021-22 (N.D. Ind. 2020)). The plain
language of GM's warranty leaves that conclusion undisturbed, Judge
Leichty notes. He adds that this view proves consistent with
several other courts who likewise have found this warranty to cover
defects in materials and workmanship but not design
defects--thereby excluding the oil consumption defect.

The owners nonetheless argue that, without a comma separating
"vehicle" from "related to materials or workmanship," the limited
warranty covers any vehicle defect (including design defects), with
the exceptions of "slight noise, vibrations, or other normal
characteristics of the vehicle related to materials or workmanship
occurring during the warranty period." In other words, they read
"related to materials or workmanship" to apply only to the
exceptions, not to the warranty's coverage. Their position isn't
without support, Judge Leichty finds, citing Martell v. General
Motors LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87903, 16-28 (D. Or. May 7,
2021).

Given this split of authority, and the reasonable interpretations
the cases reflect, this provision proves ambiguous, Judge Leichty
states. Because any ambiguity in a contract must be construed
against the drafter, the Court won't favor GM's interpretation of
the warranty and dismiss the express warranty claims on this
basis.

That said, to proceed on their express warranty claims, the owners
must show they sought and were denied repairs during the warranty
term, Judge Leichty says.

The Plaintiffs concede that the oil consumption defect was present
at the time of sale, but they say they couldn't have known to take
their vehicles in for repair during the warranty period because the
vehicles suffered from a defect that was only going to get
progressively worse. This isn't really an argument that the limited
remedy failed its essential purpose, but instead a complaint that
the warranty period wasn't long enough, Judge Leichty holds. That
doesn't make the limited remedy fail its essential purpose. The
bargain here was only for a five-year warranty period.

The vehicle owners really offer but a hypothetical--that if they
had sought repairs during the warranty period, GM wouldn't have
repaired the defect, Judge Leichty notes. The Court decides only
actual controversies, not hypotheticals. The Court dismisses their
express warranty claims.

B. Implied Warranty of Merchantability

Messrs. Shea and Kelly claim that GM breached the implied warranty
of merchantability. Under Indiana law, "a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale,"
Ind. Code Section 26-1-2-314(1).

GM says these vehicles were merchantable as a matter of law because
the owners drove them for years and tens of thousands of miles
before experiencing any alleged excess oil consumption. The owners
say the excessive oil consumption is an inherent defect that is far
from ordinary. Even were the Court to consider the complaint's
implied warranty theory as plausible, it remains untimely.

GM says Mr. Kelly's claim is time barred because the written
warranty limited any implied warranty claim to the duration of the
express warranty, and the express warranty expired before he
purchased the vehicle in 2018. GM says Mr. Shea's implied warranty
claim is time barred because he purchased his vehicle in 2013 but
didn't file his complaint until February 2021. Mr. Shea argues his
claim was tolled due to GM's fraudulent concealment of the defect.

The law bars the implied warranty of merchantability claims by both
owners, so the court grants the motion to dismiss.

C. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

The owners agree that their MMWA claims rise and fall with their
express and implied warranty claims. Because the Court has
dismissed the underlying express and implied warranty claims, the
Court also dismisses the MMWA claims. Loss of these federal claims
leaves the Court's subject matter jurisdiction nonetheless intact
because the owners have pleaded diversity jurisdiction.

D. Fraudulent Omission

The two owners next bring fraudulent omission claims against GM.
Indiana law recognizes a claim for actual fraud and a claim for
constructive fraud. The owners haven't alleged that GM intended to
deceive them but rather that GM was aware of the oil consumption
defect and had a duty to disclose it to them but didn't. Their
fraudulent omission claims sound in constructive fraud.

Mr. Kelly generally alleges that he "did not receive any
notification from GM, either directly or via the dealership,
regarding the Oil Consumption Defect, and he could not have
reasonably known of the oil consumption defect prior to the engine
failure in 2020." He avers that had GM disclosed the Oil
Consumption Defect, he would not have purchased his 2012 Chevrolet
Suburban, or certainly would have paid less for it.

Judge Leichty notes that Mr. Kelly doesn't allege who at GM took
the purported actions or omissions, and doesn't identify when or
where the alleged actions took place, what GM specifically did, or
how GM accomplished its allegedly wrongful conduct. The complaint
includes many allegations discussing specific advertisements from
which the oil consumption defect was omitted, but he doesn't allege
that he saw or relied on any such advertisements. Because he hasn't
plausibly, much less particularly, pleaded his fraudulent omission
claim, the Court must dismiss it.

Mr. Shea's allegations fare only slightly better, Judge Leichty
notes. He says prior to purchasing his 2013 Sierra, he spoke with a
sales representative at Expressway Chevrolet Buick GMC, saw
commercials for the 2013 Chevrolet Silverado that promoted the
truck's reliability and durability, and saw a Monroney sticker on
the vehicle at the time of purchase. Like Mr. Kelly, he says had GM
disclosed the Oil Consumption Defect, he would not have purchased
his 2013 Sierra, or certainly would have paid less for it.

Mr. Shea generally acknowledges a sales representative--but he
doesn't allege the identity of that sales representative nor does
he allege any statements that the representative made to him. Also,
because he didn't see that sticker until the time of purchase, it
doesn't seem that he relied on it in making his purchase decision.
Judge Leichty holds that these allegations don't meet the
particularity requirement of Rule 9, or plausibly support a fraud
claim. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Mr. Shea's fraudulent
omission claim.

E. Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act

Messrs. Shea and Kelly claim that GM violated the IDCSA. The IDCSA
prohibits the use of deceptive acts in connection with a consumer
transaction, Ind. Code Section 24-5-0.5-3(a). The owners allege
that GM committed incurable deceptive acts. An intent to defraud or
mislead is a required element of an incurable deceptive act. The
heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) applies to these claims.

The owners leave this claim unadorned with the particularity that
the law demands, Judge Leichty observes. The owners allege that GM
misrepresented these vehicles in brochures, advertisements, and
other marketing materials, but not with specifics. The owners never
sufficiently allege they relied on these materials in making their
purchases.

Though argued by the parties, whether GM had knowledge of the
alleged oil consumption defect at the time of sale is then beside
the point, Judge Leichty notes. GM must have intended to deceive
these owners and done so based on representations that these owners
in fact relied on to their detriment. This complaint insufficiently
advances such a claim, the Judge holds.

F. Unjust Enrichment

Messrs. Shea and Kelly bring unjust enrichment claims. They concede
that they have pleaded these claims as alternatives to their breach
of warranty claims.

Neither side has disputed the existence or validity of the express
warranty in this case. Because the alleged conduct underlying this
theory and the express warranty claims is the same, the Court
dismisses the unjust enrichment claims.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court grants GM's motion to dismiss and dismisses
the complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion & Order dated Oct. 14,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/ywd7t62n from
Leagle.com.


GENESIS HEALTHCARE: Class Status Bid Filing Due Feb. 9, 2022
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Uana Olivos Valdez,
individual, DANILLIE WILLIE, an individual, PATRICIA THEUS, an
individual, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, and as aggrieved employees under the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004, v. GENESIS HEALTHCARE LLC, a
Delaware Corporation; GENESIS ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company; ALEXANDRIA CARE CENTER, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company; THE REHABILITATION CENTRE OF
BEVERLY HILLS, a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 100
inclusive, Case No. 2:19-cv-00976-DMG-JC (C.D. Cal.), the Hon.
Judge Jacqueline Chooljian entered an modified order granting
stipulation to amend class certification deadline and setting class
certification briefing schedule as follows:

   -- Plaintiffs' deadline to submit their reply to Defendants'
      opposition is set for February 9, 2022.

   -- Defendants' deadline to submit their opposition to
      Plaintiffs' motion is set for January 10, 2022.

   -- Plaintiffs' deadline to file their class certification
      motion is set for February 9, 2022.

   -- Plaintiffs shall notice their class certification motion
      for hearing before the District Judge (who hears civil
      motions on Fridays at 9:30 a.m.) in accordance with the
      Local Rules and any pertinent orders of the District
      Judge.

Genesis HealthCare is a provider of short-term post-acute,
rehabilitation, skilled nursing and long-term care services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3jCertR at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Matthew J. Matern, Esq.
          Launa Adolph, Esq.
          Kayvon Sabourian, Esq.
          Shooka Dadashzadeh, Esq.
          MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
          1230 Rosecrans Ave, Suite 200
          Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
          Telephone: (310) 531-1900
          Facsimile: (310) 531-1901
          E-mail: matthewjmatern.mlg@gmail.com
                  ladolph@maternlawgroup.com
                  ksabourian@maternlawgroup.com
                  shooka@maternlawgroup.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Curtis A. Graham, Esq.
          James E. Payer, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          633 West 5th Street, 63rd Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 443-4300
          Facsimile: (213) 443-4299
          E-mail: cagraham@littler.com
                  jpayer@littler.com

GOAUTO INSURANCE: To Submit Expedited Briefing on Turner's Petition
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT MARK TURNER v. GOAUTO INSURANCE COMPANY, Civil
Action No. 21-557-BAJ-RLB (M.D. La.), Magistrate Judge Richard L.
Bourgeois, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Louisiana granted in part the Plaintiff's Motion for Expedited
Consideration of Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice and Sua
Sponte Remand and, alternatively, Expedited Hearing of Plaintiff's
Motion for Remand filed on Oct. 12, 2021.

Plaintiff Turner initiated the class action on Jan. 28, 2019, by
filing a Petition for Damages in the 19th Judicial District Court
of East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. The Plaintiff moved for
leave to file an Amended Petition for Damages on Dec. 1, 2020, and
the State Court judge signed an Order granting the motion on Dec.
7, 2020. The Plaintiff asserts that a class certification hearing
was scheduled to take place on Nov. 4, 2021.

On Sept. 29, 2021, GoAuto removed the action, purportedly based on
information received in the Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support
of Class Certification. In the Notice of Removal, the Defendant
asserts that the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction under the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(d), because the lawsuit is a class action in which there is
minimal diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million.

In support of a finding that there is minimal diversity of
citizenship, the Defendant asserts that the operative pleading in
the action is the Plaintiff's Amended Petition for Damages.

The Paragraph 104 of the Amended Petition defines the purported
class as follows: "The class of all residents of Louisiana who were
insured by GoAuto for the total loss of their vehicle, who suffered
damage to their vehicle during the GoAuto policy period, and who
were paid by GoAuto for their total loss based upon a valuation
that was reduced by a condition adjustment deducted from the stated
values of the comparison vehicles used to calculate GoAuto's
payment for the total loss vehicle."

The Defendant asserts that while it is a citizen of Louisiana, some
"Louisiana resident policyholders are not Louisiana citizens"
because, in the process of asserting claims, those policyholders
"have provided GoAuto last known addresses outside the State of
Louisiana." It submits declarations by Jason Burge and Kerry Berry
in support of the proposition that certain purported class members
under the Amended Petition are not citizens of Louisiana, and,
therefore, there is minimal diversity under CAFA.

The foregoing assertion of minimal diversity under CAFA is premised
on the Plaintiff's Amended Petition being the operative pleading at
the time of removal. The Defendant asserts the following in
Footnote 1 of its Notice of Removal: The "Plaintiff subsequently
filed a Motion for Leave to File Second Supplemental and Amending
Petition on Sept. 7, 2021, but the order granting the motion for
leave was not executed as of the date this Notice of Removal was
filed, hence the Amended Petition remains the operative petition."
The Defendant submits a copy of the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to
File Second Supplemental and Amending Petition, which includes an
unsigned proposed order.

On Oct. 12, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand; Motion to
Strike the Declaration of Jason Burge and the attached Exhibits
A-H; Motion to Strike Declaration of Kerry Berry; Motion for
Judicial Notice and Sua Sponte Remand; and the instant Motion for
Expedited Consideration.

Among other things, the Plaintiff asserts that the State Court
judge granted Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second
Supplemental and Amending Petition on Sept. 27, 2021, making it the
operative pleading in the action prior to removal on Sept. 29,
2021. The Plaintiff submits a copy of a signed version of the
proposed order and pleading.

The Plaintiff's Second Supplemental and Amending Petition creates
two purported classes, both of which are alleged to be "citizens"
of Louisiana, as opposed to "residents" of Louisiana. In Paragraph
1, the Plaintiff alleges that "both classes are limited to
Louisiana citizens who were insured under GoAuto policies issued in
Louisiana."

Paragraph 140 of the Plaintiff's Second Supplemental and Amending
Petition defines the purported "Condition Adjustment" class as
follows: The class of all citizens of Louisiana insured by GoAuto
for the total loss of a vehicle and who were paid by GoAuto for
their total loss based upon a valuation that was reduced by a
condition adjustment deducted from the stated values of a
comparison vehicle used to calculate the value of the totaled
vehicle.

Paragraph 162 of Plaintiff's Second Supplemental and Amending
Petition defines the purported "Tax, Title and License" class as
follows: All Louisiana citizens insured by GoAuto Insurance Company
for the total loss of a vehicle, who suffered insured damages to a
vehicle that GoAuto determined to be a total loss, and who were not
paid the retail cost of a comparable replacement vehicle that
included the cost of the sales tax, title and license fees. This
class is limited to Louisiana citizens insured under GoAuto
policies issued in Louisiana.

The Plaintiff now seeks expedited consideration of his Motions to
Remand on the basis that this "case was wrongly removed based upon
erroneous allegations of minimum diversity," and to ensure remand
prior to the scheduled Nov. 4, 2021 class certification hearing in
State Court.

Having considered the record, Judge Bourgeois finds good cause to
grant the Plaintiff's Motion for Expedited Consideration in part by
requiring the Defendant to submit expedited briefing on the issue
of whether the Plaintiff's Second Supplemental and Amending
Petition was, in fact, the operative pleading at the time of
removal and, if so, whether that filing destroys the minimal
diversity required under CAFA.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Bourgeois granted in part the
Plaintiff's Motion for Expedited Consideration as provided by the
terms of his Order. The Defendant shall file a memorandum, not to
exceed 10 pages, asserting whether the Plaintiff's Second
Supplemental and Amending Petition was, in fact, the operative
pleading at the time of removal and, if so, whether that pleading
satisfies the minimal diversity required under CAFA. If necessary,
the Court will issue any other appropriate orders after receipt of
this memorandum. Unless otherwise ordered, briefing on any other
issues raised in the Motion to Remand or other motions filed by the
Plaintiff shall be due within the times set forth in the Court's
local rules.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/cywbeezp from Leagle.com.


GOLDMAN SACHS: Faces Florio Securities Suit in N.Y.
---------------------------------------------------
Travis Florio, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan
Stanley, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-08618 (S.D. N.Y., October 20,
2021), seeks to recover compensable damages caused by violations of
the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Florio accuses Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley of the unlawful use
of material non-public information and collectively avoided
billions in losses by selling shares of Gaotu Techedu Inc., a
leading online discount retailer for brands in China. Florio
acquired Gaotu shares contemporaneously with Defendants from March
22, 2021 through and including March 29, 2021.

Defendants sold a large chunk of Gaotu shares during the week of
March 22, 2021 while in possession of material, non-public
information where they unloaded large block trades consisting of
shares of Archegos Capital Management bets, including billions
worth of Gaotu securities, late Thursday, March 25, 2021, before
the Archegos story reached the public, sending Gaotu's stock into a
complete tailspin. Defendants are prohibited from trading based on
confidential market-moving information.

Morgan Stanley is a global financial services institution. It
served as one of Archegos' prime brokers, helping it make trades
and lending it capital in the form of margin lending. Archegos
utilized the leverage provided by its swaps strategy to gain
exposure to more than $50 billion worth of securities, asserts the
complaint.

Florio acquired Gaotu's American Depository Shares. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Thomas L. Laughlin, Esq.
      Rhiana L. Swartz, Esq.
      Jonathan M. Zimmerman, Esq.
      SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
      The Helmsley Building
      230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
      New York, NY 10169
      Telephone: 212-223-6444
      Facsimile: 212-223-6334
      Email: tlaughlin@scott-scott.com
             rswartz@scott-scott.com
             jzimmerman@scott-scott.com

             - and -

      David W. Hall, Esq.
      Armen Zohrabian, Esq.
      Arun Ravindran, Esq.
      Four Embarcadero Center, Suite 1400
      San Francisco, CA 94104
      Telephone: (415) 766-3534
      Facsimile: (415) 402-0058
      Email:  dhall@hedinhall.com
              azohrabian@hedinhall.com
              aravindran@hedinhall.com

              - and -

      Brian J. Schall, Esq.
      THE SCHALL LAW FIRM
      2049 Century Park East, Suite 2460
      Los Angeles, CA 90067
      Telephone: (310) 301-3335
      Facsimile: (310) 388-0192
      Email: brian@schallfirm.com


GOLDMAN SACHS: Merson Sues Over Unlawful Trades
-----------------------------------------------
Michael Merson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC. and MORGAN STANLEY, Case No.
1:21-cv-08752 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 26, 2021), is arising from the
unlawful use of material non-public information by Defendants
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, who collectively avoided billions
in losses by selling shares of Tencent Music Entertainment Group, a
leading online music and audio entertainment platform in China, to
Plaintiff and other unsuspecting and unwitting public shareholders,
after confidentiality learning that Archegos Capital Management, a
family office with $10 billion under management, failed (or was
likely to fail) to meet a margin call, requiring it to liquidate
its position in the Company; and is brought on behalf of all those
investors who purchased or otherwise acquired Tencent shares
contemporaneously with Defendants' unlawful trades from March 22,
2021 through and including March 29, 2021, pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Defendants sold a large number of Tencent shares during the
week of March 22, 2021, while in possession of material, non-public
information. According to subsequent media reports, Defendants
unloaded large block trades consisting of shares of Archegos'
doomed bets, including billions worth of Tencent securities, late
Thursday, March 25, 2021, before the Archegos story reached the
public, sending Tencent's stock into a complete tailspin. As a
result of these sales, Defendants avoided billions in losses
combined. The Defendants knew, or were reckless in not knowing,
that they were prohibited from trading based on this confidential
market-moving information, but traded anyway, disposing to
Plaintiff and other members of the Class their Tencent stock before
the news about Archegos was announced and Tencent's shares
plummeted. As a result, Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged
from Defendants' violations of U.S. securities laws, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff acquired Tencent American Depository Shares during
the Class Period.

Goldman Sachs is a global financial services institution.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thomas L. Laughlin, IV, Esq.
          Rhiana L. Swartz, Esq.
          Jonathan M. Zimmerman, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          The Helmsley Building
          230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10169
          Phone: 212-223-6444
          Facsimile: 212-223-6334
          Email: tlaughlin@scott-scott.com
                 rswartz@scott-scott.com
                 jzimmerman@scott-scott.com

               - and -

          David W. Hall, Esq.
          Armen Zohrabian, Esq.
          Arun Ravindran, Esq.
          HEDIN HALL LLP
          Four Embarcadero Center, Suite 1400
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Phone: 415-766-3534
          Facsimile: 415-402-0058
          Email: dhall@hedinhall.com
                 azohrabian@hedinhall.com
                 aravindran@hedinhall.com

               - and -

          Brian J. Schall, Esq.
          THE SCHALL LAW FIRM
          2049 Century Park East, Suite 2460
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: 310-301-3335
          Facsimile: 310-388-0192
          Email: brian@schallfirm.com


GRAND CANYON: Stipulation for Class Cert. Briefing Schedule Filed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Carson Little, v. Grand
Canyon University, Case No. 2:20-cv-00795-SMB (D. Ariz.), the
Parties submit joint stipulation regarding briefing schedule on
plaintiff's amended motion for class certification and appointment
of class representative and class counsel as follows:

   1) The Defendant's opposition brief regarding Plaintiff's
      Amended Motion for Class 18 Certification and Appointment
      of Class Representative and Class Counsel is due on or 19
      before November 3, 2021; and

   2) The Plaintiff's reply brief regarding Plaintiff's Amended
      Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Class
      Representative and Class Counsel is due on or before
      November 17, 2021.

Grand Canyon University is a private for-profit Christian
university in Phoenix, Arizona.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Oct. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3CiFoKi at no extra charge.[CC]

The Counsel for Plaintiff and Proposed Classes are:

          Matthew S. Miller, Esq.
          MATTHEW S. MILLER LLC
          77 West Wacker Drive, Suite 4500
          Chicago, IL 60601
          E-mail: mmiller@msmillerlaw.com

               - and -

          Adam J. Levitt, Esq.
          Amy E. Keller, Esq.
          Laura E. Reasons, Esq.
          DiCELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC
          Ten North Dearborn Street, Sixth Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          E-mail: alevitt@dicellolevitt.com
                  akeller@dicellolevitt.com
                  lreasons@dicellolevitt.com

          Robert D. Ryan,Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF
          ROBERT D. RYAN, P.L.C.
          343 West Roosevelt Street, Suite 220
          Phoenix, AZ 85003
          E-mail: rob@robertdryan.com

The Attorneys for the Defendant Grand Canyon University, are:

          Sean P. Healy, Esq.
          Kathryn Honecker, Esq.
          Jon p. Kardassakis, Esq.
          LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP
          Phoenix Plaza Tower II
          2929 North Central Avenue, Suite 1700
          Phoenix, AZ 85012-2761
          Telephone: (602) 385-1040
          Facsimile: (602) 385-1051
          E-mail: Sean.Healy@lewisbrisbois.com
                  Kathryn.Honecker@lewisbrisbois.com
                  Jon.Kardassakis@lewisbrisbois.com

GREAT AMERICAN: Hooks Suit Removed to W.D. Pennsylvania
-------------------------------------------------------
George Hooks and Jerome Dowe, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly-situated v. GREAT AMERICAN WELDING COMPANY, LLC
and RILEY POWER GROUP, LLC,, Case No. GD-21-010100 was removed from
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania to the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania on Oct. 14, 2021, and assigned Case No. 2:21-cv-1387.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants did not compensate
Plaintiffs for time allegedly compensable under Pennsylvania law.
Specifically, the Plaintiffs claim that they were not, and should
have been compensated overtime for time spent traveling to and from
off-site parking lots and waiting to don and doff personal
protective equipment ("PPE").[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Tamara S. Grimm, Esq.
          Lynn E. Roberts III, Esq.
          O'HAGAN MEYER, PLLC
          3 Logan Square
          1717 Arch Street, Suite 3910
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Phone: (215) 461-3300
          Facsimile: (215) 461-3311

               - and -

          Vijay K. Mago, Esq.
          Katherine M. Rockwell, Esq.
          O'HAGAN MEYER, PLLC
          411 E. Franklin St., Suite 500
          Richmond, VA 23219
          Phone: (804) 403-7106
          Email: vmago@ohaganmeyer.com
                 krockwell@ohaganmeyer.com


HARLEY DAVIDSON: Arledge Files TCPA Suit in W.D. Texas
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Harley Davidson
Financial Services, Inc. The case is styled as Candace D. Arledge,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Harley Davidson Financial Services, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-00974
(W.D. Tex., Oct. 27, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.

Harley-Davidson Financial Services, Inc. -- https://www.myhdfs.com/
-- provides financing services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Marwan Rocco Daher, Esq.
          SULAIMAN LAW GROUP, LTD.
          2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200
          Lombard, IL 60148
          Phone: (331) 307-7646
          Fax: (630) 575-8188
          Email: mdaher@sulaimanlaw.com


HATFIELD QUALITY: Reynoso Seeks Pay for Off-the-Clock Work
----------------------------------------------------------
Ysa Santana Reynoso, individually and on behalf of all persons
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Hatfield Quality Meats, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 211001322 (Comm. Pleas, Pa., October 18, 2021),
seeks unpaid overtime compensation and unpaid wages and prejudgment
interest, liquidated and statutory damages, litigation costs,
expenses and attorneys' fees and such other and further relief
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Pennsylvania Minimum
Wage Act.

Hatfield Quality Meats is a processor and distributor of fresh
beef, pork and turkey, as well as cooked and marinated meats with
processing plants, distribution centers and sales offices
throughout the world, including a plant in Hatfield Township,
Pennsylvania, from which Hatfield processes and distributes meat
products to various business operations.

Reynoso worked as a production worker for Hatfield from
approximately May 2019 through approximately November 2020. She was
required to arrive at the facility to undergo a COVID screening
process prior to work, thus had report to work earlier. Reynoso
claims that this waiting time was uncompensated and that this extra
time was taken off her lunch break.

Reynoso typically worked at least 42 hours or more per week but
claims to be not paid for those hours in excess of 40 hours in that
week. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Sarah R. Schalman-Bergen, Esq.
      Krysten Connon, Esq.
      LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
      729 Boylston Street, Suite 2000
      Boston, MA 02116
      Tel: (267) 256-9973
      Email: ssb@llrlaw.com
             kconnon@llrlaw.com

             - and -

      Peter Winebrake, Esq.
      WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC
      715 Twining Road, Suite 211
      Dresher, PA 19025
      Phone: (215) 884-2491
      Facsimile: (215) 884-2492
      Email: pwinebrake@winebrakelaw.com

             - and -

      Marielle Macher, Esq.
      DeJonna Bates, Esq.
      Community Justice Project
      118 Locust Street
      Harrisburg, PA 17101
      Tel: (717) 236-9486, ext. 214
      Email: mmacher@cjplaw.org
             dbates@cjplaw.org


HEALTH PROVIDERS: Class Action Deal Gets Final Nod in Askar Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MAHA ASKAR, v. HEALTH
PROVIDERS CHOICE, INC., Case No. 5:19-cv-06125-BLF (N.D. Cal.), the
Hon. Judge Beth Labson Freeman entered an order that:

   (1) Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
       Settlement is granted;

   (2) Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees, Costs, Service
       Award, and Settlement Administrator Expenses is granted;
       and

   (3) Plaintiff shall file with the Court a list of the members
       of the Settlement Class who have cashed their FLSA checks
       and "opted-in" to the Fair :Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
       collective within 30 days of the expiration date of the
       FLSA checks.

The Plaintiffs define the collective as:

"All non-exempt hourly employees employed by Defendant in
California at any time from September 26, 2015 through the date the
Court enters an order granting preliminary approval of the
Settlement who worked one or more workweeks in which they were paid
overtime and received per diem pay and/or a monetary bonus."

The Plaintiff seeks an award of $22,500 in attorneys' fees,
$2,754.56 in costs, a $1,000 service award, and $3,500 in
settlement administration expenses.

The Plaintiff Maha Askar filed this action on September 26, 2019,
asserting violations of the California Labor Code, California
Business & Professions Code, and the FLSA, on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated.

The Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Health Providers Choice, Inc.,
employed numerous non-exempt hourly health care professionals for
travel assignments at health care providers across the country. HPC
allegedly paid those traveling health care professionals a weekly
per diem in addition to their hourly pay, but failed to include
that per diem in the regular rates of pay when calculating overtime
and double time.

The Plaintiff sought to certify a class of all non-exempt hourly
employees employed by HPC in California who worked one or more 28
workweeks in which they were paid overtime and received per diem
pay.

The Defendant answered the complaint on November 11, 2019. The
Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint, which Defendant also
answered, The Parties notified the Court of a settlement on
September 23, 2020. On March 4, 2021, the Court granted preliminary
approval to the Parties' settlement.

Health Providers provides supplemental healthcare staffing
services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3pYuwy7 at no extra charge.[CC]

HEALTHSPARK FOUNDATION: Judgment in Harley Suit Affirmed in Part
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, PATRICIA M. HARLEY R.N., MARTHA MOODY R.N., HOLLY
DICARLO R.N. AND WENDY POYNOR R.N. FOR THEMSELVES AND AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellants v.
HEALTHSPARK FOUNDATION (F/K/A NORTH PENN COMMUNITY HEALTH
FOUNDATION) AND DAVID T. SHANNON JOSH SHAPIRO, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Intervenor, et al., Case Nos. 2405 EDA 2019, 2407 EDA 2019, 2408
EDA 2019, 2409 EDA 2019, 2512 EDA 2019, 2618 EDA 2019, 2619 EDA
2019, 2620 EDA 2019, 3191 EDA 2019, 3195 EDA 2019, 3197 EDA 2019
(Pa. Super.), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirms in part
and reverses in part the trial court's verdict in favor of all the
subclasses on their breach of contract claims but awarded damages
only to Subclass One.

The other cases are PATRICIA M. HARLEY R.N., MARTHA MOODY R.N.,
HOLLY DICARLO R.N. AND WENDY POYNOR R.N. FOR THEMSELVES AND AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellants, v.
HEALTHSPARK FOUNDATION (F/K/A NORTH PENN COMMUNITY HEALTH
FOUNDATION) AND DAVID T. SHANNON JOSH SHAPIRO, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Intervenor, PATRICIA M. HARLEY R.N., MARTHA MOODY R.N., HOLLY
DICARLO R.N. AND WENDY POYNOR R.N. FOR THEMSELVES AND AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellants, v.
HEALTHSPARK FOUNDATION (F/K/A NORTH PENN COMMUNITY HEALTH
FOUNDATION) AND DAVID T. SHANNON JOSH SHAPIRO, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Intervenor, PATRICIA M. HARLEY R.N., MARTHA MOODY R.N., HOLLY
DICARLO R.N. AND WENDY POYNOR R.N. FOR THEMSELVES AND AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellants, v.
HEALTHSPARK FOUNDATION (F/K/A NORTH PENN COMMUNITY HEALTH
FOUNDATION) AND DAVID T. SHANNON JOSH SHAPIRO, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Intervenor, PATRICIA M. HARLEY R.N., MARTHA MOODY R.N., HOLLY
DICARLO R.N., AND WENDY POYNOR, R.N. FOR THEMSELVES AND AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellant, v.
HEALTHSPARK FOUNDATION (F/K/A NORTH PENN COMMUNITY HEALTH
FOUNDATION), AND DAVID T. SHANNON JOSH SHAPIRO, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Intervenor, PATRICIA M. HARLEY R.N., MARTHA MOODY R.N., HOLLY
DICARLO R.N., AND WENDY POYNOR, R.N., Appellants, v. HEALTHSPARK
FOUNDATION (F/K/A NORTH PENN COMMUNITY HEALTH FOUNDATION), AND
DAVID T. SHANNON JOSH SHAPIRO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, Intervenor,
PATRICIA M. HARLEY R.N., MARTHA MOODY R.N., HOLLY DICARLO R.N., AND
WENDY POYNOR, R.N., Appellants, v. HEALTHSPARK FOUNDATION (F/K/A
NORTH PENN COMMUNITY HEALTH FOUNDATION), AND DAVID T. SHANNON JOSH
SHAPIRO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, Intervenor, PATRICIA M. HARLEY R.N.,
MARTHA MOODY R.N., HOLLY DICARLO R.N., AND WENDY POYNOR, R.N.,
Appellants, v. HEALTHSPARK FOUNDATION (F/K/A NORTH PENN COMMUNITY
HEALTH FOUNDATION), AND DAVID T. SHANNON JOSH SHAPIRO, ATTORNEY
GENERAL, Intervenor, PATRICIA M. HARLEY, R.N., MARTHA MOODY, R.N.,
HOLLY DICARLO, R.N. AND WENDY POYNER, R.N., FOR THEMSELVES AND AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, v. DAVID T. SHANNON,
AND HEALTHSPARK FOUNDATION (F/K/A NORTH PENN COMMUNITY HEALTH
FOUNDATION), JOSH SHAPIRO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, APPEAL OF: JOSH
SHAPIRO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, PATRICIA M. HARLEY, R.N., MARTHA MOODY,
R.N., HOLLY DICARLO, R.N. AND WENDY POYNER, R.N., FOR THEMSELVES
AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, v. HEALTHSPARK
FOUNDATION AND DAVID T. SHANNON, JOSH SHAPIRO, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
and APPEAL OF: HEALTHSPARK FOUNDATION AND DAVID T. SHANNON,
PATRICIA M. HARLEY, R.N., MARTHA MOODY, R.N., HOLLY DICARLO, R.N.,
AND WENDY POYNER, R.N., FOR THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. HEALTHSPARK FOUNDATION AND DAVID T.
SHANNON JOSH SHAPIRO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, APPEAL OF: HEALTHSPARK
FOUNDATION AND DAVID T. SHANNON.

Background

The appeal is based upon the claim of class action Appellants,
former employees of Appellee North Penn Hospital ("NPH"), on their
claim that NPH violated the Wage Payment Compensation Law ("WPCL"),
43 P.S. Section 260.1, et seq., and common law by failing to
compensate Appellants for leave benefits that Appellants claimed
they "earned" during the course of 2001. Defendants David T.
Shannon and HealthSpark Foundation (f/k/a North Penn Community
Health Foundation ("NPCHF") (collectively, "Appellees"), and
Intervenor Josh Shapiro, Pennsylvania Attorney General ("OAG"),
have each filed separate cross-appeals.

NPH employed the Appellants as nurses at its hospital in Lansdale,
PA. As employees of NPH, NPH provided the Appellants with leave
benefits based on Appellants' individual status as part-time or
full-time employees, whether they worked hourly or were salaried,
their seniority, and the hours they worked in the previous year.
NPH communicated its benefits policy to its employees in two ways:
(1) in its employee handbook; and (2) through its vacation benefits
policy ("Policy"), as set forth in "Administrative Policies and
Procedures No. 14-8."

At its core, the case concerns the parties' differing
interpretation of the fringe benefits policy pertaining to vacation
and personal leave offered to Appellants by NPH. The Appellants
claimed that, pursuant to NPH's benefits policies, they earned
leave benefits over the course of 2001, but did not obtain the
right to use them until Jan. 1, 2002 ("2002 Benefits"), and were
not compensated for them before NPH sold its assets at the end of
2001. NPH argued, to the contrary, that the Appellants did not
"earn" leave benefits during the course of 2001 because the NPH's
benefits policies provided that an employee "earned" leave benefits
on January 1 of a particular year. The Appellees concluded that
since NPH had terminated the employment of the Appellants before
Jan. 1, 2002, the Appellees were not contractually obligated to
compensate the Appellants for the 2002 Benefits.

On Oct. 19, 2001, NPH entered into an agreement to sell its assets
("APA") to Universal Health System, a for-profit entity. The APA
provided that the transfer of assets was to occur at 12:01 AM on
Jan. 1, 2002. The APA also provided that NPH would terminate the
employment of all NPH employees, including Appellants, at 11:59 PM
on Dec. 31, 2001. It further provided that NPH employees could
apply for employment at Universal to commence on Jan. 1, 2002.
Universal would then provide the former employees of NPH with 2002
personal leave benefits according to Universal's personal leave
policies.

On Nov. 14, 2001, NPH filed a Petition to Approve the Sale of
Assets in the Orphan's Court. Following a hearing, on Dec. 28,
2001, the Orphan's Court entered an Order approving of the sale,
effective Jan. 1, 2002.

On Oct. 10, 2003, the Appellants filed individual Amended
Complaints alleging that Appellees failed to compensate the
Appellants for their 2002 Benefits and, thus, had violated the
Appellants' rights under the WPCL and common law. According to the
Appellants, the Policy and the Handbook provided that NPH employees
"earned" leave benefits during the course of one year. Appellants
asserted that, to the extent that the Handbook and Policy referred
to January 1, that date was relevant to determine when the employee
could "use" the leave benefits.

Based on this interpretation of the Policy and the Handbook,
Appellants concluded that when NPH terminated the employment of the
class members on Dec. 31, 2001, it failed to compensate the class
members for leave benefits that the class members had "earned" in
2001, either by reimbursing the class members for those benefits or
by requiring Universal to allocate those benefits to the class
members for use in 2002. The Appellants further concluded that, as
a result, Appellees breached its employment contract with the class
members and violated the WPCL.

Almost a decade later, on Nov. 5, 2013, the Appellants' attorney
filed a Motion for Class Certification, and, at a hearing on the
Motion, presented evidence in support of four sub-classes. The
Appellees opposed class certification. Nevertheless, the trial
court approved class certification and divided the class into four
subclasses according to, generally, the Appellants' employment
status (full-time or part-time) and number of hours worked in 2000.
The court appointed Plaintiffs Harley, DiCarlo, and Poyner, all
former part-time hourly employees, to represent Subclasses One and
Two. It appointed Plaintiff Moody, a former full-time hourly
employee, to represent Subclasses Three and Four. In total, the
classes represented 586 former NPH employees.

Of most significance to the appeal, the trial court, on Feb. 5,
2019, interpreted the Policy and Handbook as providing as a matter
of law that the Appellants "earned" their 2002 Benefits during
2001. In particular, the trial court held that "the benefits at
issue were 'earned' by reason of performance, i.e., services
rendered, prior and up to the time of termination at 11:59 PM on
Dec. 31, 2001."

On Feb. 27, 2019, the jury trial commenced. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of all subclasses on their breach of contract
claims but awarded damages only to Subclass One. The trial court
explained that the jury awarded damages only to Subclass One
because "while the amount of damages may have been clear in the
Appellants' Counsel's mind, they were not clearly presented to the
jury either by the Appellants' expert or by their Counsel as to
what each individual class was seeking, with the exception of
Subclass One."

The jury also rejected the Appellants' claim for liquidated damages
under Section 260.10 of the WPCL, concluding that the Appellees had
established a good faith basis for not compensating the Appellants
for their 2002 Benefits.

All parties filed post-trial motions. Relevantly, the Appellees
requested that the trial court enter judgment notwithstanding the
verdict ("JNOV") in its favor with respect to the claims involving
Subclass One and/or a new trial on liability and damages. On July
15, 2019, the trial court denied all post-trial motions. The lower
court clerk entered Judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict,
and these cross-appeals followed. All parties and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Discussion

The Appellees, HealthSpark Foundation and David T. Shannon, raise
the following issues in their cross-appeal:

      1. Whether, in a class action claiming breach of contract for
fringe benefits, this Court should vacate the judgment in favor of
one of four subclasses and enter JNOV for the Appellees where: (i)
the Appellants did not prove that they, or the class, were offered
and accepted an offer for the fringe benefits they claim; (ii) the
trial court clearly erred by misinterpreting the only writings the
Appellants introduced to prove an offer; (iii) the Appellants did
not prove that the Appellees breached a contract for benefits; (iv)
the Appellants failed to introduce any foundation for their
expert's calculation of damages; and (v) the Appellants received
all of the benefits to which they were entitled in every year of
employment, and hence failed to prove that they sustained a loss?

      2. Whether the Appellants waived any claim for JNOV, and if
not, whether any claim for JNOV should be denied as a matter of
law?

      3. Whether the trial court's admission of limited defense
evidence establishing that the Appellants suffered no loss was an
abuse of discretion requiring a new trial?

      4. Whether the Appellants waived any claim for attorneys'
fees by not making a timely request, and were properly denied such
fees, prejudgment interest and liquidated damages where the jury
made no finding that the Appellees breached the WPCL, but found the
Appellees acted in good faith, and the trial court concluded
[Appellees] caused the extraordinary 16n-year delay in the case?

The Appellants raise the following issues on appeal:

      1. Where the entire class sustained damages due to Defendant
employers' failure to pay for unused benefits earned for work
performed in 2001, did the trial court err and abuse its discretion
in its rulings on the Appellants' Motions in Limine and in allowing
the Defendants to present pervasive evidence and argument that the
damages sustained were mitigated or offset by class members'
receipt of comparable or greater benefits for work performed in
subsequent employment with a new employer in 2002?

      2. Did the trial court err in failing to schedule an
evidentiary hearing or any other procedure for receipt of evidence
on the Appellants' timely request for Attorney's Fees/Costs, and
then failing to award any legal fees/costs at all?

      3. Did the trial court err in failing to award pre-judgment
interest to Subclass One?

      4. Were the Appellant class members entitled to judgment NOV
regarding their right to liquidated damages under the WPCL, 43
P.S.

The OAG raises the following two issues in its cross-appeal:

      1. Inasmuch as this controversy is directly related to, and a
result of an earlier-filed Orphans' Court matter approving an asset
purchase agreement involving charitable non-profit entities, was
this case wrongly brought and litigated in the trial division of
the court of common pleas?

      2. Did the complete failure of the Appellants to notify the
OAG about this litigation, involving charitable non-profit
entities, for over 15 years improperly impair the OAG's ability to
petition to transfer the case to Orphans' Court and otherwise
safeguard the public interest as the proceedings went forward.

A. Appellees' Cross-Appeal

In their first issue, the Appellees, as the Cross-Appellants,
assert that the trial court erred as a matter of law in
interpreting the Handbook and the Policy in the Appellants' favor
and in affirming the jury's verdict in favor of Subclass One by
denying the Appellees' motion for JNOV. They argue that, as a
result of this legal error, the jury erroneously found that the
Appellants had "earned" their 2002 Benefits in 2001 and that NPH,
therefore, had breached its contract with Appellants by terminating
the Appellants' employment in 2001 without compensating Appellants
for their "earned" 2002 Benefits. The Appellees conclude that they
are entitled to JNOV.

The Superior Court agrees. It finds that the trial court erred as a
matter of law when it determined and informed the jury that
Appellants "earned" their 2002 Benefits in 2001. Also, the
Appellants' common law and statutory breach of contract claims
based on the Appellees' failure to pay 2002 Benefits fail as a
matter of law and the trial court erred by denying the Appellees'
Motion for JNOV.

In sum, the Superior Court concludes that the trial court erred in
denying Appellees' Motion for JNOV with respect to the verdict in
favor of Subclass One. Thus, it reverses the Order denying the
Appellees' Motion for JNOV, vacate the judgment in favor of
Subclass One, and remands for entry of JNOV in favor of Appellees
as to Subclass One's claims.

B. Appellants' Appeal

In their appeal, the Appellants challenge the trial court's
admission of testimony the Appellants characterize as "mitigation
or offset" evidence, and the trial court's denial of the
Appellants' claims for attorney's fees, pre-judgment interest, and
statutory damages. The Appellants' challenges are based on the
assumption that the trial court correctly found that Appellants
"earned" 2002 Benefits in 2001.

Because it has concluded that the trial court erred as a matter of
law in finding that Appellants "earned" 2002 Benefits in 2001, and
in not entering judgment in favor of the Appellees, the Superior
Court finds the Appellants' challenges moot. In other words,
whether the trial court erred in its evidentiary ruling is
irrelevant because it erred in not entering judgment in favor of
the Appellees as a matter of law. Similarly, because the Appellants
cannot establish as a matter of law that they had a contractual
right to leave benefits, the Appellants have no claim to attorney's
fees, pre-judgment interest, and statutory damages.

The Superior Court agrees with the trial court that, because the
Appellants' Complaint raised claims of breach of contract and
violations of the WPCL and did not directly raise any issues
regarding the corporate affairs of a non-profit, the trial court
properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over this action.
Accordingly, the OAG is not entitled to the relief it seeks.

In light of its conclusion that the Appellees are entitled to JNOV
with respect to the verdict in favor of Subclass one, the Superior
Court finds second issue -- the OAG challenges the propriety of the
verdict in favor of Subclass One -- moot. In its second issue, the
OAG challenges the propriety of the verdict in favor of Subclass
One, asserting that the Appellants' failure to notify it of the
pendency of the matter for over fifteen years impaired its ability
to safeguard the public's interest.

Conclusion

The Superior Court concludes that the policies at issue clearly and
unambiguously provide that an employee "earned" her leave benefits
for any given year on January 1 of that year and not during the
course of the prior year. Because NPH terminated the Appellants'
employment before Jan. 1, 2002, NPH policies did not obligate the
Appellees to compensate Appellants for 2002 Benefits and NPH had no
ongoing contractual obligation to compensate Appellants for 2002
Benefits. Thus, after careful review, the Superior Court affirms in
part and reverses in part.

With respect to Subclass One, the Superior Court reverses the trial
court's Order denying the Appellees' Motion for JNOV as to the
verdict in favor of Subclass One and remands for entry of JNOV in
favor of the Appellees as to Subclass One's claims. With respect to
Subclasses Two, Three, and Four, the Superior Court affirms the
jury's verdict and the trial court's denial of the Appellees'
Motion for JNOV as to those subclasses.

The Superior Court affirms the trial court's denial of Appellants'
and OAG's Motions for JNOV in all respects. Accordingly, it directs
the trial court to enter judgment for the Appellees and against the
Appellants as to Subclass One's claims and not to disturb the
judgment as to Subclasses Two, Three, and Four.

Judgment reversed in part and affirmed in part; case remanded for
entry of JNOV in favor of Appellees as to the claims asserted by
Subclass One. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/6fytbcxn from Leagle.com.


HOEGH LNG: Sanchez Sues Over Decline in Securities Market Value
---------------------------------------------------------------
Guillermo Sanchez, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. HOEGH LNG PARTNERS LP, SVEINUNG J. S. STOHLE,
HAVARD FURU, and STEFFEN FOREID, Case No. 2:21-cv-19374 (D.N.J.,
Oct. 27, 2021), is brought on behalf of persons or entities who
purchased or otherwise acquired publicly traded Partnership
securities between August 22, 2019 and July 27, 2021, inclusive, to
recover compensable damages caused by the Defendants' violations of
the federal securities laws under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 as a result of the Defendants materially false and misleading
statements; and the precipitous decline in the market value of the
Company's securities.

Hoegh LNG Partners LP (the "Partnership") was formed by Hoegh LNG
Holdings Ltd., a leading floating liquefied natural gas ("LNG")
service provider. The Partnership's purported strategy is to own,
operate, and acquire floating storage and regasification units
("FSRUs") and associated LNG infrastructure assets under long-term
charters. The Partnership has interests in five FSRUs, including
the PGN FSRU Lampung based in Indonesia. Through agreements and
business structures briefly described below, the Partnership has a
100% economic interest in the PGN FSRU Lampung.

On July 27, 2021, the Partnership issued a press release which
announced that: (i) the Partnership had reduced its quarterly cash
distribution to $0.01 per common unit, down from a distribution of
$0.44 per common unit in the first quarter of 2021; (ii) the
refinancing of the PGN FSRU Lampung credit facility, which had been
scheduled to close by the end of the second quarter of 2021, was
not yet completed due to the failure by the charterer of the PGN
FSRU Lampung to consent to and countersign certain customary
documents related to the new credit facility; (iii) the PGN FSRU
Lampung charterer stated that it will commence arbitration to
declare the charter null and void, and/or to terminate the charter,
and/or seek damages in relation to the operations of the vessel and
its charter; (iv) the revolving credit line of $85 million from
Hoegh LNG will not be extended when it matures on January 1, 2023;
and (v) Hoegh LNG will have very limited capacity to extend any
additional advances to the Partnership beyond what is currently
drawn under the facility. On this news, the Partnership's common
unit price fell $11.57 per common unit, or 64%, to close at $6.30
per common unit on July 28, 2021, on unusually heavy trading
volume, damaging investors.

Specifically, the Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) the Partnership was
facing issues with the PGN FSRU Lampung charter; (2) as a result,
the PGN FSRU Lampung charterer would state that it would commence
arbitration to declare the charter null and void, and/or to
terminate the charter, and/or seek damages; (3) the Partnership
would need to find alternative refinancing for its PGN FSRU Lampung
credit facility; (4) the PGN FSRU Lampung credit facility matured
in September 2021, not October 2021 as previously stated; (5) the
Partnership would be forced to accept less favorable refinancing
terms with regards to the PGN FSRU Lampung credit facility; (6)
Hoegh LNG would not extend the revolving credit line to the
Partnership past its maturation date; (7) Hoegh LNG would reveal
that it "will have very limited capacity to extend any additional
advances to the Partnership beyond what is currently drawn under
the facility"; (8) as a result of the foregoing, the Partnership
would essentially end distributions to common units holders; (9)
the COVID-19 pandemic was not the sole or root cause of the
Partnership's issues in Indonesia, in 2019, before the pandemic,
there were already a very low amount of demand in Indonesia for the
Partnership's gas; (10) the auditing, tax, nor maintenance of PGN
FSRU Lampung were not the sole or root cause(s) of the
Partnership's issues in Indonesia; and (11) as a result,
Defendants' statements about its business, operations, and
prospects, were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a
reasonable basis at all relevant times, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased Partnership securities during the Class
Period and was economically damaged thereby.

The Partnership is a limited partnership formed by Hoegh LNG. The
Partnership has a 100% economic interest in the PGN FSRU
Lampung.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          One Gateway Center, Suite 2600
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Phone: (973) 313-1887
          Fax: (973) 833-0399
          Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com


HORIZON HOUSE: Jones Sues Over Cyberattack and Data Breach
----------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Jones, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. HORIZON HOUSE, INC., Case No. 211001767 (Pa. Ct. of
Common Pleas, Philadelphia Cty., Oct. 22, 2021), is arising out of
the recent cyberattack and data breach on Horizon House's network
that resulted in unauthorized access and exfiltration of highly
sensitive and personal patient and employee data ("Data Breach").

According to the complaint, as a result of the Data Breach,
Plaintiff and approximately 27,823 Class Members suffered present
injury and damages in the form of identity theft, the loss of the
benefit of their bargain, out-of-pocket expenses and the value of
the time reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate the effects of
the unauthorized access, exfiltration, and subsequent criminal
misuse of their sensitive and highly personal information.

In addition, Plaintiff's and Class Members' sensitive personal
information—which was entrusted to Horizon House—was
compromised, unlawfully accessed, and exfiltrated by the Data
Breach. Information compromised in the Data Breach includes
patients' and employees' full names, address, Social Security
number, driver's license numbers, state identification number,
employment passport number, and medical information ("Private
Information") The healthcare-specific data compromised is protected
health information ("PHI") as defined by the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), and
information such as the Plaintiff's Social Security number is
deemed personally identifiable information ("PII").

The Defendant maintained the Private Information in a reckless
manner. In particular, the Private Information was maintained on
Defendant's computer system and network in a condition vulnerable
to cyberattacks, including the targeted email phishing attack
perpetrated here. The mechanism of the cyberattack and potential
for improper disclosure of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private
Information was a known risk to the Defendant, and thus the
Defendant was on notice that failing to take steps necessary to
secure the Private Information from the risk of compromise from a
data breach that left that property in a dangerous condition. The
Plaintiff's and Class Members' identities are now at considerable
risk because of the Defendant's negligent conduct since the Private
Information that Horizon House collected and maintained is now in
the hands of data thieves, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff had a contract of employment with Horizon House as a
Counselor from June 2017 through June 2018.

Horizon House of Pennsylvania is a non-profit organization
providing behavioral health, community-based treatment, employment,
education, outpatient, residential treatment, rehabilitation,
intellectual and developmental disabilities, homeless, and
supported living services in the states of Pennsylvania and
Delaware.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan M. Jagher, Esq.
          FREED KANNER LONDON & MILLEN LLC
          923 Fayette Street
          Conshohocken, PA 19428
          Phone: 610.234.6486
          Fax: 224.632.4521
          Email: jjagher@fklmlaw.com
               - and –

          Gary E. Mason, Esq.
          David K. Lietz, Esq.
          MASON LIETZ & KLINGER LLP
          5101 Wisconsin Ave NW, Suite 305
          Washington, DC 20016
          Phone: (202) 429-2290
          Email: gmason@wbmllp.com
                 dlietz@masonllp.com

               - and –

          Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
          MASON LIETZ & KLINGER LLP
          227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 2100
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Phone: (202) 429-2290
          Email: gklinger@kozonislaw.com


IB HOSPITALITY: DeSalvo's Individual Claims Tossed With Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled BRETT DESALVO, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, Honorable Judge
Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr. v. IB HOSPITALITY INC. d/b/a NORAH a
Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case
No.: 2:21-cv-01096-SB-PVC (C.D. Cal.), the U.S. District Court for
the Central Northern District of California issued a class action
order granting stipulation of dismissal of the case with
prejudice.

District Judge Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., ruled that Plaintiff
DeSalvo and Defendant IB Hospitality's joint request that the Court
enters a dismissal with prejudice as to the Plaintiff's individual
claims in their entirety and without prejudice as to the claims of
absent putative class members in the action, is granted in full.
Each party will bear his or its own fees and costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 14, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/7tckca4a from Leagle.com.


IQVIA INC: Court Enters Revised Scheduling Order in Lyngaas Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BRIAN J. LYNGAAS, D.D.S.,
P.L.L.C., v. IQVIA, INC., Case No. 2:20-cv-02370-NIQA (E.D. Pa.),
the Hon. Judge Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro entered a revised
scheduling order as follows:

   1. All fact discovery shall be completed by December 10,
      2021.

   2. All expert reports shall be due by January 17, 2022.

   3. Any rebuttal expert reports are due by February 14, 2022.

   4. All expert depositions shall be completed by March 14,
      2022.

   5. Any motion for class certification shall be filed by April
      11, 2022, and any response thereto shall be filed within
      30 days of the filing of the motion.

   6. Any dispositive motions shall be filed within sixty (60)
      days of the issuance of this Court's ruling on any motion
      for class certification.

   7. Any response to the dispositive motions shall be filed
      within 21 days of the filing of the motion.

Any failure to comply with this Order may result in sanctions,
Judge Alejandro says.

IQVIA Inc. provides healthcare research services. The Company
offers data science cloud and portfolio management capabilities.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 15, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2ZrF4uo at no extra charge[CC]

JELD-WEN INC: Rivera Suit Removed to S.D. California
----------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Patrick Rivera Jr., Christopher Gonzalez, Aris
Guerrero, Ashden Russell, Jessee Ramos, individually, and on behalf
of other members of the general public similarly situated v.
Jeld-Wen Inc., a Delaware corporation; Does 1 through 100,
inclusive; Case No. 37-02021-00033938-CU-OE-CTL was removed from
the Superior Court, San Diego County to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California on Oct. 26, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:21-cv-01816-AJB-AHG to
the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Labor.

JELD-WEN -- https://www.jeld-wen.com/ -- designs, produces and
distributes interior and exterior doors, wood, vinyl and aluminum
windows, wall systems, shower enclosures, closet systems and other
components used in the new construction, as well as repair and
remodel of residential homes and non-residential buildings.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
          LAWYERS FOR JUSTICE, PC
          410 West Arden Avenue, Suite 203
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Phone: 818-265-1020
          Fax: 818-265-1021
          Email: edwin@lfjpc.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Jack Steven Sholkoff, Esq.
          Jennifer L. Katz, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART PC
          400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Phone: (213) 239-9800
          Fax: (213) 239-9045
          Email: jack.sholkoff@ogletree.com
                 jennifer.katz@ogletree.com


JUUL LABS: Lincoln Schools Sue Over Questionable Marketing Tactics
------------------------------------------------------------------
Lincoln Consolidated Schools, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated v. JUUL LABS, INC.; ALTRIA GROUP, INC.; PHILIP
MORRIS USA, INC.; ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC; ALTRIA GROUP
DISTRIBUTION COMPANY; JAMES MONSEES; ADAM BOWEN; NICHOLAS PRITZKER;
HOYOUNG HUH; and RIAZ VALANI, Case No. 3:21-cv-08249 (N.D. Cal.,
Oct. 22, 2021), is brought to seek damages or other relief as a
result of personal injuries allegedly attributable to the Plaintiff
as a result of the Defendants' conduct in bringing about the public
nuisance affecting the Plaintiff by directly marketing their JUUL
products to youth and continuing these marketing practices after it
was evident that children were using JUUL products in large numbers
and were specifically using these products in schools, JLI and the
Management Defendants directly facilitated the spread of the youth
e-cigarette crisis.

The swift rise in a new generation of nicotine addicts has
overwhelmed parents, schools, and the medical community (including
county public health departments) on the front lines dealing with
this crisis, drawing governmental intervention at nearly every
level—but it's too little, too late. This public health crisis is
no accident. What had been lauded as progress in curbing cigarette
use, JUUL Labs Inc.'s (JLI) co-founders Adam Bowen and James
Monsees viewed as opportunity. Seizing on the decline in cigarette
consumption and the lax regulatory environment for e-cigarettes,
Bowen, Monsees, and investors in their company sought to introduce
nicotine to a whole new generation, with JLI as the dominant
supplier. To achieve that common purpose, they knew they would need
to create and market a product that would make nicotine cool again,
without any of the stigma associated with cigarettes. With help
from their early investors and board members, who include Nicholas
Pritzker, Riaz Valani, and Hoyoung Huh, they succeeded in hooking
millions of youth, and, of course, earning billions of dollars in
profits.

Three tactics were central to decades of cigarette industry market
dominance: product design to maximize addiction; mass deception;
and targeting of youth. JLI and its co-conspirators adopted and
mastered them all. First, JLI and Bowen designed JUUL products to
create and sustain addiction, not break it. JLI and Bowen were the
first to design an e-cigarette that could compete with combustible
cigarettes on the speed and strength of nicotine delivery. Second,
JLI and the Management Defendants, just like cigarette companies
before them, targeted kids as their customer base. One of JLI's
"key needs" was the need to "own the 'cool kid' equity." JUUL
products were designed to appear slick and high-tech like a cool
gadget, including video-game-like features like "party mode." JLI
offered kid-friendly flavors like mango and cool mint, and
partnered with Altria to create and preserve the market for
mint-flavored products—all because Defendants knew that flavors
get young people hooked. Under the guise of youth smoking
prevention, JLI sent representatives directly to schools to study
teenager e-cigarette preferences. Third, JLI, the Management
Defendants and Altria engaged in a campaign of deceit, through
sophisticated mass media and social media communications,
advertisements and otherwise, about the purpose and dangers of JUUL
products. JUUL products' packaging and advertising grossly
understates the nicotine content in its products. Advertising
campaigns featured JUUL paired with food and coffee, positioning
JUUL as part of a healthy meal, a normal part of a daily routine,
and as safe as caffeine.

JLI and the Management Defendants reached their intended
demographic through a diabolical pairing of notorious cigarette
company advertising techniques (long banned for cigarettes because
they cause young people to start smoking) with cutting-edge viral
marketing campaigns and social media. They hired young models and
advertised using bright, "fun" themes, including on media long
barred to the cigarette industry, such as billboards, on children's
websites such as "Nick Junior" and Cartoon Network, and on websites
providing games and educational tools to students in middle school
and high school.
JLI and the Management Defendants also employed young social-media
"influencers" and celebrities popular with teenagers.   

At the heart of this disastrous epidemic are the concerted efforts
of JLI, its co-conspirators, and all those in JUUL's supply and
distribution chain to continuously expand their market share and
profits by preying upon a vulnerable young population and deceiving
the public about the true nature of the products they were selling.
Nicotine is not benign like coffee, contrary to what many JUUL
users believe. Nor is the aerosol as harmless as puffing room air.
Worse, the flavors in JUUL products are themselves toxic and
dangerous, and have never been adequately tested to ensure they are
safe for inhalation.

According to the most recent scientific literature, JUUL products
cause acute and chronic pulmonary injuries, cardiovascular
conditions, and seizures. Yet JUUL products and advertising contain
no health risk warnings at all. Many smokers, believing that JUUL
would help them "make the switch," ended up only further trapped in
their nicotine addiction. Older adults who switch to JUUL are more
susceptible to cardiovascular and pulmonary problems, and CDC data
shows that older patients hospitalized due to vaping lung-related
conditions had much longer hospital stays than younger patients.
And a generation of kids is now hooked, ensuring long-term survival
of the nicotine industry because, today just as in the 1950s, 90%
of smokers start as children, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff Lincoln is a unified school district organized and
operating pursuant to the laws of the State of Michigan.

JLI designs, manufactures, sells, markets, advertises, promotes and
distributes JUUL e-cigarettes devices, JUUL pods and
Accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James Frantz, Esq.
          William B. Shinoff, Esq.
          FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
          402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone: (619) 233-5945
          Fax: (619) 525-7672
          Email: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com


JUUL LABS: Marcellus Schools Sue Over Shady Marketing Tactics
-------------------------------------------------------------
Marcellus Community Schools, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated v. JUUL LABS, INC.; ALTRIA GROUP, INC.; PHILIP
MORRIS USA, INC.; ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC; ALTRIA GROUP
DISTRIBUTION COMPANY; JAMES MONSEES; ADAM BOWEN; NICHOLAS PRITZKER;
HOYOUNG HUH; and RIAZ VALANI, Case No. 3:21-cv-08248 (N.D. Cal.,
Oct. 22, 2021), is brought to seek damages or other relief as a
result of personal injuries allegedly attributable to the Plaintiff
as a result of the Defendants' conduct in bringing about the public
nuisance affecting the Plaintiff by directly marketing their JUUL
products to youth and continuing these marketing practices after it
was evident that children were using JUUL products in large numbers
and were specifically using these products in schools, JLI and the
Management Defendants directly facilitated the spread of the youth
e-cigarette crisis.

The swift rise in a new generation of nicotine addicts has
overwhelmed parents, schools, and the medical community (including
county public health departments) on the front lines dealing with
this crisis, drawing governmental intervention at nearly every
level—but it's too little, too late. This public health crisis is
no accident. What had been lauded as progress in curbing cigarette
use, JUUL Labs Inc.'s (JLI) co-founders Adam Bowen and James
Monsees viewed as opportunity. Seizing on the decline in cigarette
consumption and the lax regulatory environment for e-cigarettes,
Bowen, Monsees, and investors in their company sought to introduce
nicotine to a whole new generation, with JLI as the dominant
supplier. To achieve that common purpose, they knew they would need
to create and market a product that would make nicotine cool again,
without any of the stigma associated with cigarettes. With help
from their early investors and board members, who include Nicholas
Pritzker, Riaz Valani, and Hoyoung Huh, they succeeded in hooking
millions of youth, and, of course, earning billions of dollars in
profits.

Three tactics were central to decades of cigarette industry market
dominance: product design to maximize addiction; mass deception;
and targeting of youth. JLI and its co-conspirators adopted and
mastered them all. First, JLI and Bowen designed JUUL products to
create and sustain addiction, not break it. JLI and Bowen were the
first to design an e-cigarette that could compete with combustible
cigarettes on the speed and strength of nicotine delivery. Second,
JLI and the Management Defendants, just like cigarette companies
before them, targeted kids as their customer base. One of JLI's
"key needs" was the need to "own the 'cool kid' equity." JUUL
products were designed to appear slick and high-tech like a cool
gadget, including video-game-like features like "party mode." JLI
offered kid-friendly flavors like mango and cool mint, and
partnered with Altria to create and preserve the market for
mint-flavored products—all because Defendants knew that flavors
get young people hooked. Under the guise of youth smoking
prevention, JLI sent representatives directly to schools to study
teenager e-cigarette preferences. Third, JLI, the Management
Defendants and Altria engaged in a campaign of deceit, through
sophisticated mass media and social media communications,
advertisements and otherwise, about the purpose and dangers of JUUL
products. JUUL products' packaging and advertising grossly
understates the nicotine content in its products. Advertising
campaigns featured JUUL paired with food and coffee, positioning
JUUL as part of a healthy meal, a normal part of a daily routine,
and as safe as caffeine.

JLI and the Management Defendants reached their intended
demographic through a diabolical pairing of notorious cigarette
company advertising techniques (long banned for cigarettes because
they cause young people to start smoking) with cutting-edge viral
marketing campaigns and social media. They hired young models and
advertised using bright, "fun" themes, including on media long
barred to the cigarette industry, such as billboards, on children's
websites such as "Nick Junior" and Cartoon Network, and on websites
providing games and educational tools to students in middle school
and high school.
JLI and the Management Defendants also employed young social-media
"influencers" and celebrities popular with teenagers.   

At the heart of this disastrous epidemic are the concerted efforts
of JLI, its co-conspirators, and all those in JUUL's supply and
distribution chain to continuously expand their market share and
profits by preying upon a vulnerable young population and deceiving
the public about the true nature of the products they were selling.
Nicotine is not benign like coffee, contrary to what many JUUL
users believe. Nor is the aerosol as harmless as puffing room air.
Worse, the flavors in JUUL products are themselves toxic and
dangerous, and have never been adequately tested to ensure they are
safe for inhalation.

According to the most recent scientific literature, JUUL products
cause acute and chronic pulmonary injuries, cardiovascular
conditions, and seizures. Yet JUUL products and advertising contain
no health risk warnings at all. Many smokers, believing that JUUL
would help them "make the switch," ended up only further trapped in
their nicotine addiction. Older adults who switch to JUUL are more
susceptible to cardiovascular and pulmonary problems, and CDC data
shows that older patients hospitalized due to vaping lung related
conditions had much longer hospital stays than younger patients.
And a generation of kids is now hooked, ensuring long term survival
of the nicotine industry because, today just as in the 1950s, 90%
of smokers start as children, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff Marcellus is a unified school district organized and
operating pursuant to the laws of the State of Michigan.

JLI designs, manufactures, sells, markets, advertises, promotes and
distributes JUUL e-cigarettes devices, JUUL pods and
Accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James Frantz, Esq.
          William B. Shinoff, Esq.
          FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
          402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone: (619) 233-5945
          Fax: (619) 525-7672
          Email: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com


JUUL LABS: North Adams Schools Balk at Shady Marketing Tactics
--------------------------------------------------------------
North Adams Jerome Public Schools, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated v. JUUL LABS, INC.; ALTRIA GROUP, INC.;
PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.; ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC; ALTRIA GROUP
DISTRIBUTION COMPANY; JAMES MONSEES; ADAM BOWEN; NICHOLAS PRITZKER;
HOYOUNG HUH; and RIAZ VALANI, Case No. 3:21-cv-08238 (N.D. Cal.,
Oct. 22, 2021), is brought to seek damages or other relief as a
result of personal injuries allegedly attributable to the Plaintiff
as a result of the Defendants' conduct in bringing about the public
nuisance affecting the Plaintiff by directly marketing their JUUL
products to youth and continuing these marketing practices after it
was evident that children were using JUUL products in large numbers
and were specifically using these products in schools, JLI and the
Management Defendants directly facilitated the spread of the youth
e-cigarette crisis.

The swift rise in a new generation of nicotine addicts has
overwhelmed parents, schools, and the medical community (including
county public health departments) on the front lines dealing with
this crisis, drawing governmental intervention at nearly every
level—but it's too little, too late. This public health crisis is
no accident. What had been lauded as progress in curbing cigarette
use, JUUL Labs Inc.'s (JLI) co-founders Adam Bowen and James
Monsees viewed as opportunity. Seizing on the decline in cigarette
consumption and the lax regulatory environment for e-cigarettes,
Bowen, Monsees, and investors in their company sought to introduce
nicotine to a whole new generation, with JLI as the dominant
supplier. To achieve that common purpose, they knew they would need
to create and market a product that would make nicotine cool again,
without any of the stigma associated with cigarettes. With help
from their early investors and board members, who include Nicholas
Pritzker, Riaz Valani, and Hoyoung Huh, they succeeded in hooking
millions of youth, and, of course, earning billions of dollars in
profits.

Three tactics were central to decades of cigarette industry market
dominance: product design to maximize addiction; mass deception;
and targeting of youth. JLI and its co-conspirators adopted and
mastered them all. First, JLI and Bowen designed JUUL products to
create and sustain addiction, not break it. JLI and Bowen were the
first to design an e-cigarette that could compete with combustible
cigarettes on the speed and strength of nicotine delivery. Second,
JLI and the Management Defendants, just like cigarette companies
before them, targeted kids as their customer base. One of JLI's
"key needs" was the need to "own the 'cool kid' equity." JUUL
products were designed to appear slick and high-tech like a cool
gadget, including video-game-like features like "party mode." JLI
offered kid-friendly flavors like mango and cool mint, and
partnered with Altria to create and preserve the market for
mint-flavored products—all because Defendants knew that flavors
get young people hooked. Under the guise of youth smoking
prevention, JLI sent representatives directly to schools to study
teenager e-cigarette preferences. Third, JLI, the Management
Defendants and Altria engaged in a campaign of deceit, through
sophisticated mass media and social media communications,
advertisements and otherwise, about the purpose and dangers of JUUL
products. JUUL products' packaging and advertising grossly
understates the nicotine content in its products. Advertising
campaigns featured JUUL paired with food and coffee, positioning
JUUL as part of a healthy meal, a normal part of a daily routine,
and as safe as caffeine.

JLI and the Management Defendants reached their intended
demographic through a diabolical pairing of notorious cigarette
company advertising techniques (long banned for cigarettes because
they cause young people to start smoking) with cutting-edge viral
marketing campaigns and social media. They hired young models and
advertised using bright, "fun" themes, including on media long
barred to the cigarette industry, such as billboards, on children's
websites such as "Nick Junior" and Cartoon Network, and on websites
providing games and educational tools to students in middle school
and high school.
JLI and the Management Defendants also employed young social-media
"influencers" and celebrities popular with teenagers.   

At the heart of this disastrous epidemic are the concerted efforts
of JLI, its co-conspirators, and all those in JUUL's supply and
distribution chain to continuously expand their market share and
profits by preying upon a vulnerable young population and deceiving
the public about the true nature of the products they were selling.
Nicotine is not benign like coffee, contrary to what many JUUL
users believe. Nor is the aerosol as harmless as puffing room air.
Worse, the flavors in JUUL products are themselves toxic and
dangerous, and have never been adequately tested to ensure they are
safe for inhalation.

According to the most recent scientific literature, JUUL products
cause acute and chronic pulmonary injuries, cardiovascular
conditions, and seizures. Yet JUUL products and advertising contain
no health risk warnings at all. Many smokers, believing that JUUL
would help them "make the switch," ended up only further trapped in
their nicotine addiction. Older adults who switch to JUUL are more
susceptible to cardiovascular and pulmonary problems, and CDC data
shows that older patients hospitalized due to vaping lung-related
conditions had much longer hospital stays than younger patients.
And a generation of kids is now hooked, ensuring long-term survival
of the nicotine industry because, today just as in the 1950s, 90%
of smokers start as children, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff North Adams is a unified school district organized
and operating pursuant to the laws of the State of Michigan.

JLI designs, manufactures, sells, markets, advertises, promotes and
distributes JUUL e-cigarettes devices, JUUL pods and
Accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James Frantz, Esq.
          William B. Shinoff, Esq.
          FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
          402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone: (619) 233-5945
          Fax: (619) 525-7672
          Email: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com


KEVYN AUCOIN: Graciano Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Kevyn Aucoin Beauty
Inc. The case is styled as Sandy Graciano, on behalf of himself and
all other persons similarly situated v. Kevyn Aucoin Beauty Inc.,
Case No. 1:21-cv-08758 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 26, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Kevyn Aucoin Beauty -- https://kevynaucoinbeauty.com/ -- is a
cosmetic company that offers beauty and makeup products for
women.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18th St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Mercure Suit Transferred to W.D. Pennsylvania
------------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as John Mercure, Lori Ann Westbrook, Janice Sue
Miller, Harold Swann, Darcey S. Leis, William D. Leis, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Koninklijke
Philips N.V., Philips North America LLC, Philips RS North America
LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-04016 was transferred from the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, to the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on
Oct. 21, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:21-cv-01442-JFC to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Personal Injury: Health
Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability.

Koninklijke Philips N.V. -- https://www.philips.com/global -- is a
Dutch multinational conglomerate corporation that was founded in
Eindhoven.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeff P. Shiver, Esq.
          3340 Peachtree Rd., Ste. 950
          Atlanta, GA 30326
          Phone: (404) 593-0020
          Email: jeff@shiverhamilton.com

               - and -

          Kyle G.A. Wallace, Esq.
          SHIVER HAMILTON, LLC
          One Securities Centre
          3490 Piedmont Road, Suite 640
          Atlanta, GA 30305
          Phone: (404) 593-0020
          Fax: (888) 501-9536
          Email: kwallace@shiverhamilton.com


KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Thomas Suit Transferred to W.D. Pennsylvania
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Marty Thomas, M.D., on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Koninklijke Philips N.V., Philips
North America LLC, Philips RS North America LLC, Case No.
2:21-cv-02396 was transferred from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas to the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania on Oct. 21, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:21-cv-01471-JFC to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Contract Product Liability.

Koninklijke Philips N.V. -- https://www.philips.com/global -- is a
Dutch multinational conglomerate corporation that was founded in
Eindhoven.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Andrea Barient, Esq.
          24110 EDEN ST
          PLAQUEMINE, LA 70765
          Phone: (225) 975-0150
          Email: abarient@pbclawfirm.com

               - and -

          John M. Deakle, Esq.
          PO BOX 2072
          HATTIESBURG, MS 39403
          Phone: (601) 544-0631
          Fax: (601) 544-0666
          Email: jmd@deaklelawfirm.com

               - and -

          Patrick W. Pendley, Esq.
          24110 EDEN ST
          PO DRAWER 71
          PLAQUEMINE, LA 70764
          Phone: (225) 687-6396
          Fax: (225) 687-6398
          Email: pwpendley@pbclawfirm.com

               - and -

          Rex A. Sharp, Esq.
          Ruth Anne French-Hodson, Esq.
          SHARP LAW, LLP
          4820 West 75th Street
          Prairie Village, KS 66208
          Phone: (913) 901-0505
          Fax: (913) 901-0419
          Email: rsharp@midwest-law.com
                 rafrenchhodson@midwest-law.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Matthew W. Geary, Esq.
          DYSART TAYLOR COTTER MCMONIGLE & BRUMITT, PC
          4420 Madison Avenue, Suite 200
          Kansas City, MO 64111
          Phone: (816) 931-2700
          Fax: (816) 931-7377
          Email: mgeary@dysarttaylor.com


KS STATEBANK: $775K Class Deal in Saliba TCPA Suit Wins Final Nod
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Ricci Saliba, Plaintiff v. KS Statebank Corporation,
Defendant, Case No. CV-20-00503-PHX-JAT (D. Ariz.), Judge James A.
Teilborg of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona
granted the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of
Class Action Settlement and the Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys'
Fees.

Background

The Defendant is a bank that, among other things, offers various
loan products to consumers. From Oct. 18, 2019, through Jan. 16,
2020, the Defendant's employee sent approximately 3,900 marketing
text messages to the Plaintiff and approximately 360 individuals.

The Plaintiff filed suit, claiming that these messages violated the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and that the Defendant was
vicariously liable for their employee's alleged violations. The
Defendant denied any wrongdoing.

After actively litigating the action, the Parties reached a
proposed settlement agreement in January 2021. The settlement
agreement establishes a $775,000 Settlement Fund to be distributed
on a pro rata basis to the class members. The class members stand
to receive approximately $198 per text message received.

On May 25, 2021, the Court granted preliminarily approval of the
settlement agreement. The Plaintiff now seeks Final Approval of the
Class Settlement. Additionally, the Plaintiff's counsel seeks an
award of fees in the amount of 28% or $217,000 of the common fund
and reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses of $12,638.89.
Finally, the Plaintiff seeks an incentive award of $10,000.

Discussion

I. Motion for Final Approval of Agreement

A. Settlement Class Meets Requirements for Class Certification
under Rule 23(a) and (b).

The Court previously preliminarily certified the Settlement Class
for settlement purposes only. Because nothing has changed to affect
the propriety of certification of the Settlement Class, Judge
Teilborg's analysis is largely the same as set forth in its May 25,
2021 Order. He holds that Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied because the
common legal and alleged factual issues presented by the settlement
agreement predominate over individualized issues, and resolution of
the common issues for the members of the Settlement Class in a
single, coordinated proceeding is superior to hundreds of
individual lawsuits addressing the same legal and factual issues.
In conclusion, Judge Teilborg reconfirms the Court's Order
certifying a class.

B. The Settlement Agreement Meets the Requirements for Final
Approval

Having certified the settlement class, Judge Teilborg next
determines whether the proposed settlement is "fair, reasonable,
and adequate" pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). He
finds that there is nothing before the Court to suggest that the
settlement agreement is anything but "fair, reasonable, and
adequate."

C. The More Probing Inquiry is also Satisfied

The settlement agreement must also meet the requirements of Rule
23(e)(2). Rule 23(e)(2) requires the court to consider "the terms
of any proposed award of attorney's fees" and scrutinize the
settlement for evidence of collusion or conflicts of interest
before approving the settlement as fair.

Judge Teilborg holds that the settlement provision in the case
provides direct monetary relief to the class who received text
messages. The fee award provided in the case will be distributed to
the class except for the fees to go to Attorneys. Because the class
counsel fees come from the class fund, the counsel "were
incentivized to negotiate the largest fund possible." Likewise,
there is no other evidence of collusion. There is no clear-sailing
provision in the agreement under which defendant agrees not to
object to the attorneys' fees sought. Additionally, any fees not
awarded do not revert to the Defendant but instead go to the common
fund. Finally, the settlement was the result of arms-length
negotiations with a mediator. All the evidence supports the
conclusion that the settlement was not a result of collusion
between the Parties. Accordingly, Judge Teilborg grants the
Plaintiff's motion for approval of settlement.

II. Petition for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of
Expenses

The class counsel requests an award equal to approximately 28% of
the Settlement Fund and costs of $12,638.89. The Plaintiff asks for
a $10,000 incentive award for her work on the case.

Judge Teilborg finds that (i) the class counsel's substantial
experience support the requested fee award; (ii) the class
counsel's request for costs is fair, adequate, and reasonable; and
(iii) considering the Plaintiff's involvement in the manner, the
Incentive Award in the amount of $10,000 should be granted.

Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, Judge Teilborg granted the
Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval and the Plaintiff's Motion
for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, Expenses, and an Incentive Award.
Having approved the parties' settlement resolving the matter, the
parties will file a status report regarding whether this case can
be closed within 30 days.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ruvrhe29 from Leagle.com.


L BRANDS: Court Enters Preliminary Pretrial Order in Allison Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DONNA ALLISON v. L BRANDS,
INC., et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-06018-EAS-CMV (S.D. Ohio), the Hon.
Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. entered a preliminary pretrial order as
follows:

   -- Class Certification Motion due by March 4, 2022.

   -- Response in Opposition due April 4, 2022.

   -- Reply to Response to Motion due May 4, 2022.

   -- Joinder of Parties & Motions to Amend due by Jan 5, 2022.

   -- Discovery (Fact) due by Sept. 2, 2022.

   -- All fact-witness depositions shall be completed by, and
      discovery shall close on, Oct. 12, 2022.

   -- Dispositive motions due by May 31, 2023.

   -- Plaintiff Primary Expert due by Nov. 4, 2022.

   -- Plaintiff Rebuttal Expert due by Dec. 5, 2022.

   -- All expert-witness deposition due by Jan. 14, 2023.

   -- Daubert motions due by Feb. 17, 2023.

   -- Settlement Demand due by Nov. 12, 2021.

   -- Response to Settlement Demand due by 1/3/2022.

   -- Mediation Deadline: Oct. 2022.

L Brands engages in the retail of women's intimate and other
apparel, personal care, beauty, and home fragrance products.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3EmRbYO at no extra charge.[CC]

LAKESIDE RESTAURANT: Malone Seeks Unpaid Overtime, Minimum Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Donna Malone, on her own behalf and on behalf of other similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff, v. Lakeside Restaurant Associates,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-00759 (W.D. Mo., October 18, 2021),
seeks unpaid minimum wage, overtime compensation, and related
penalties and damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Missouri Minimum Wage Law.

Lakeside operated restaurants under the common names "Summit
Grill," "South of Summit Taqueria & Tequila" and "Third Street
Social." Malone works as a server at their Kansas City location
from approximately February 2020 to the present.

Malone claims to be denied overtime compensation at a rate of not
less than one-and-one-half times the minimum wage, for work
performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. She also claims to
be denied minimum wages because of tip credit violations, including
that Defendant requires servers to spend more than 20 percent of
their time engaged in non-tip-producing activities. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     John J. Ziegelmeyer III, Esq.
     Brad K. Thoenen, Esq.
     Kevin Todd, Esq.
     HKM EMPLOYMENT ATTORNEYS LLP
     1501 Westport Road
     Kansas City, MO 64111
     Tel: (816) 875-9339
     Email: jziegelmeyer@hkm.com
            bthoenen@hkm.com
            ktodd@hkm.com


LIBRARY SYSTEMS: Khaled Seeks Final OK of Class Action Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ELIZABETH KHALED, on
behalf of herself, and all others similarly situated,
and as an "aggrieved employee" on behalf of other "aggrieved
employees" under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of
2004, v. LIBRARY SYSTEMS AND SERVICES, LLC, a Maryland limited
liability company; and DOES 1 through Submitted Herewith Under
Separate 50, inclusive, Case No. 5:19-cv-01478-JGB-KK (C.D. Cal.),
the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. finally approving the joint Stipulation of Class
      Settlement and Release Between Plaintiff and Defendants
      ("Settlement") agreed to by Plaintiff and Defendants
      Library Systems and Services, LLC;

   2. confirming the certification of the Class solely for
      settlement purposes pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
      Procedure 23 ("Rule 23");

   3. confirming the appointment of David Spivak of The Spivak
      Law Firm and Walter Haines of United Employees Law Group
      as Class Counsel;

   4. confirming the appointment of Plaintiff as class
      representative; and

   5. granting final approval to an allocation of $10,000.00 for
      claims for civil penalties under the Labor Code Private
      Attorneys General act of 2004, Labor Code sections 2698,
      et seq. ("PAGA Payment"), of which $7,500.00 will be paid
      to the Labor and Workforce Development agency ("LWDA") and
      $2,500.00 of which will be included within the Net
      Settlement Amount to be made available for distribution to
      Settlement Class Members; and (6) directing that
      [Proposed] Final Approval Order and Final Judgment
      submitted herewith be entered as called for under the
      Settlement.

      The "Settlement Class" consists of:

      "all persons employed by Defendants in California as non-
      exempt employees at any time during the Settlement Class
      Period.

      The "Settlement Class Period" is from June 4, 2015 through
      May 14, 2021.

This Motion is made on the following grounds that: (1) the Class
meets all the requirements for class certification for settlement
purposes only under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; (2)
Plaintiff and his counsel are adequate to represent the Class for
settlement purposes only as required by Rule 23(a)(4) and (g); (3)
the Settlement reflects a fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise
of all disputed claims in view of Defendants' potential liability
exposure as compared against the 4 risks of continued litigation;
(4) the notice process performed by the Claims Administrator
comports with all relevant due process requirements and Rule
23(c)(2)(B) requirements; and (5) based on the foregoing, the
[Proposed] Final Approval Order and Final Judgment submitted
herewith should be entered, the lawsuit says.

Library Systems & Services is a private for-profit company that
manages municipal libraries on an outsourced basis. It is the
largest library outsourcing company in the United States. It runs
20 library systems in 80 locations. Its headquarters are in
Rockville, Maryland and it also operates in the UK.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2ZsyzHH at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David G. Spivak, Esq.
          Gregory B. Wilbur, Esq.
          THE SPIVAK LAW FIRM
          16530 Ventura Blvd., Suite 203
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (213) 725-9094
          Facsimile: (213) 634-2385
          E-mail: david@spivaklaw.com
                  greg@spivaklaw.com

               - and -

          Walter Haines, Esq.
          UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP
          4276 Katella Ave., No. 301
          Los Alamitos, CA 90720
          Telephone: (562) 256-1047
          Facsimile: (562) 256-1006
          E-mail: whaines@uelglaw.com

LOBSTER LLC: Denied Workers OT Pay and Reimbursements, Says Wixom
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Wixom, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. The Lobster LLC, Defendant, Case No.
21STCV3S669 (Cal. Super., October 19, 2021), seeks unpaid wages and
interest thereon for Defendant's failure to pay for all hours
worked at the minimum wage rate.  The lawsuit also seeks statutory
penalties for failure to provide accurate wage statements, waiting
time penalties in the form of continuation wages for failure to
timely pay employees all wages due upon separation of employment,
reimbursement of necessary business expenses, injunctive relief and
other equitable relief, reasonable attorney's fees, costs and
interest under California Labor Code, Unfair Competition Law of the
California Business and Professions Code and applicable Industrial
Welfare Commission Wage Orders.

The Lobster employed Wixom as hourly-paid and/or non-exempt
employee at their Santa Monica location. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Timothy J. Gonzales, Esq.
      D. Aaron Brock, Esq.
      Danielle L. Gruppchang, Esq.
      BROCK & GONZALES, LLP
      6701 Center Drive West, Ste. 610
      Los Angeles, CA 90045
      Tel: (310) 294-9595
      Fax: (310) 961-3673

LONOKE COUNTY, AR: Clem May Amend Complaint v. Detention Center
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NEIL CLEM, #25946-009, Plaintiff v. JOHN STALEY, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 4:21CV00887-DPM-JTK (E.D. Ark.),
Magistrate Judge Jerome T. Kearney of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Arkansas, Central Division, gives the
Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint to cure the defects found.

Introduction

Plaintiff Clem is an inmate at the Lonoke County Detention Center.
He filed the pro se action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against
Lonoke County Sheriff John Staley and Lonoke County Detention
Center Administrator Kristi Flud. The Court granted the Plaintiff's
Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis on Oct. 12, 2021. Judge Kearney
now screens the Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA").

Background

The Plaintiff sued the Defendants in their official capacities
only. He alleges unlawful conditions of confinement. He alleges
that inmates are not being given toothpaste, a toothbrush,
deodorant, soap, or clean linens. The Plaintiff also claims inmates
"are being forced to live with an inadequate number of working
toilets or sinks." He claims one toilet has "toxic sludge" in it,
and "sewer gas coming out of it." According to the Plaintiff,
inmates are forced to inhale the sewer gas, "making them sick."

The Plaintiff further alleges the meal trays retain water in holes
and are never drained; the stagnant water contaminates inmates'
food. He claims that as a result of the water contaminating food,
two inmates have been sent to the hospital with hepatitis A.

According to the Plaintiff, inmate personal and legal mail "is
stacking up and not being sorted and passed out." The Plaintiff
says that on Sept. 26, 2021, inmates are receiving mail postmarked
Aug. 30, 2021.

Lastly, the Plaintiff complains that "there is no grievance
procedure here at the Jail." More precisely, he says there is no
"neutral officer" at the Detention Center to deal with inmate
issues, and that any grievance appeals go to the same person who
considered the grievance initially -- Defendant Flud. The Plaintiff
states that if inmates have a problem, "nobody of power ever gets
the grievance, it never goes over Defendant Flud's head." He
specified that the "Sheriffs" never receive inmate complaints.

The Plaintiff "wants a class action law suit" and damages, among
other relief.

Discussion

A. Class Action

As mentioned, the Plaintiff wishes for the lawsuit to proceed as a
class action. Pro se litigants are not authorized to represent the
rights, claims and interests of other parties in any cause of
action, including a class action lawsuit. To the extent the
Plaintiff brought claims on behalf of a class, those claims fail,
Judge Kearney holds.

B. Sheriff John Staley

The Plaintiff named John Staley as a Defendant, but made no
allegations against him. On the contrary, in his Complaint, the
Plaintiff stated that "the Sheriffs" never learn of inmate issues.
Because the Plaintiff not only made no factual allegations against
Defendant Staley, but represented that Defendant Staley has no
knowledge of the issues facing inmates, Judge Kearney holds that
the Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Staley fail to state
a claim on which relief may be granted.

C. Delayed Mail

The Plaintiff alleges inmates' legal and personal mail is "stacking
up and not being sorted out." He has not alleged any restrictions
on mail, censorship of mail, etc. -- only delay.

To state a First Amendment claim, a plaintiff must allege actual
injury -- in an access to the courts claim the injury would be "the
hindrance of a nonfrivolous and arguable meritorious underlying
legal claim." Judge Kearney finds that the Plaintiff has not
alleged any harm from the purported delay in receiving mail.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff failed to state a First Amendment claim
in connection with his delayed mail.

D. Grievance Policy

The Plaintiff complains that the grievance procedure at the
Detention Center is ineffective. There is, however, no
constitutional right to a grievance procedure. As such, no claim
lies when a grievance receives no response or yields no result.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff's allegations concerning the grievance
procedure fail to state a claim.

E. Conditions of Confinement

The Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, which provides a
cause of action for a "party injured" by certain unlawful acts of a
person acting under the color of state law. Generally, "a plaintiff
may only assert his own injury in fact and cannot rest his claims
to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." To
establish standing, "plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly
traceable to the defendant's alleged unlawful conduct."

The Plaintiff's allegations regarding hygiene products, floor mats,
plumbing, and contaminated food are pled in terms of "we,"
"inmates," and "us." But it is not clear from the Plaintiff's
Complaint if the Plaintiff himself suffered any harm. Without
personal injury, the Plaintiff's claims cannot proceed.

F. Superseding Amended Complaint

The Plaintiff may amend his Complaint to cure the defects
explained. If he decides to amend, the Plaintiff should submit to
the Court, within 30 days of the entry date of the Order, a
superseding Amended Complaint that contains in a single document
his claims against all the Defendants he is suing. The Plaintiff is
cautioned that an Amended Complaint renders his original Complaint
without legal effect. Only claims properly set out in the Amended
Complaint will be allowed to proceed.

Therefore, the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should: 1) name each
party he believes deprived him of his constitutional rights and
whom he wishes to sue in the action; 2) provide specific facts
against each named Defendant in a simple, concise, and direct
manner, including dates, times, and places if possible; 3) indicate
whether he is suing each Defendant in his/her individual or
official capacity, or in both capacities; 4) explain the reasons
for an official capacity claim, if he makes one; 5) explain how
each Defendant's actions harmed him personally; 6) explain the
relief he seeks; 7) state if he was a pretrial detainee at the time
of the incident; and 8) otherwise cure the defects explained above
and set out viable claims.

If the Plaintiff does not submit an Amended Complaint, Judge
Kearney may recommend that the Plaintiff's Original Complaint be
dismissed without prejudice.

Conclusion

If the Plaintiff wishes to submit an Amended Complaint for the
Court's review, he will file the Amended Complaint consistent with
the instructions within 30 days from the date of the Order. If he
does not submit an Amended Complaint, Judge Kearney may recommend
that his Original Complaint be dismissed without prejudice.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail the Plaintiff a blank 42
U.S.C. Section 1983 Complaint form. Upon the filing of the Amended
Complaint, the Clerk will resubmit the action to the Court for
review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e).

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2sf3kt6e from Leagle.com.


LOUISIANA HEALTH: Filing of Class Status Bid Due June 14, 2022
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SADIE BENNETT and MELISSA
MANNINO, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, v. LOUISIANA HEALTH SERVICE & INDEMNITY COMPANY (doing
business as BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF LOUISIANA), Case No.
3:19-cv-00185-SDD-RLB (M.D. La.), the Hon. Judge Richard L.
Bourgeois, Jr. entered an order granting second joint motion to
extend discovery deadlines and for proposed scheduling order as
follows.

   -- Discovery due by March 2, 2022.

   -- Plaintiff`s Expert Witness List due by Feb. 14, 2022.

   -- Defendant's Expert Witness List due by March 16, 2022.

   -- Plaintiff`s Expert Reports due by Feb. 14, 2022.

   -- Defendant's Expert Reports due by March 16, 2022.

   -- Discovery from Experts due by May 17, 2022.

   -- Deadline to file a motion for class certification as well
      as any appropriate dispositive motions and Daubert Motions
      shall be filed by June 14, 2022.

Louisiana Health operates as an insurance company.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3mmF8UZ at no extra charge.[CC]

LUXOTTICA RETAIL: Bid to Seal/Redact in Allegra Suit Partly Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York grants
in part and denies in part the Defendant's motion to seal or redact
in the lawsuit styled THOMAS ALLEGRA, YESENIA ARIZA, MARIANA ELISE
EMMERT, STUART ROGOFF, GRACELYNN TENAGLIA, and MELISSA VERRASTRO,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs
v. LUXOTTICA RETAIL NORTH AMERICA d/b/a LensCrafters, Defendant,
Case No. 17-CV-05216 (PKC) (RLM) (E.D.N.Y.).

Before the Court is the motion of Defendant Luxottica Retail North
America, doing business as LensCrafters, to seal or redact certain
documents and information submitted with the parties' class
certification and Daubert briefing. The Plaintiffs oppose
LensCrafters' motion.

On May 14, 2018, the Court so ordered a joint Protective Order
proposed by the parties. Pursuant to the Protective Order, the
parties may designate as "Confidential" any information, document,
or thing, or portion thereof, that, inter alia, contains trade
secrets, competitively sensitive technical, marketing, financial,
sales or other confidential business information.

LensCrafters now seeks to keep confidential two categories of
information that they argue were contemplated by this provision of
the Protective Order. First, "manufacturing-related information,
including Luxottica's proprietary Quality Manufacturing Standards
as well as the results of capability studies that analyzed
confidential output data from eyeglasses manufactured in the normal
course of business." Second, "internal, confidential business
communications discussing LensCrafters' product development and
testing, employee training, customer experience and sales
strategies, advertising strategies, and marketing claim support."

In support of the request for redactions and sealing, LensCrafters
provides the sworn declarations of two Luxottica employees, David
Persinger and Jason Jones, who declare, in sum, that the documents
and information at issue are confidential and proprietary, and that
disclosure "could be capitalized upon by Luxottica's competitors,
causing harm to Luxottica."

Discussion

Before determining whether disclosure of the documents and
information identified in LensCrafters' motion is required, the
Court must determine whether these documents are, in fact,
"judicial documents," citing United States v. Erie County, N.Y.,
763 F.3d 239-40 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of
Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2006)).

The Court concludes that they are because they are offered in
support of the parties' class certification and Daubert briefs. As
such, these documents are highly relevant to the judicial function
and useful to the judicial process in probing behind the pleadings
to determine whether the Plaintiff's suit meets the special
criteria set forth in Rule 23 for class certification, District
Judge Pamela K. Chen explains.

Next, the Court finds that under both common law and the First
Amendment these documents are afforded a strong presumption of
public access. The weight of this presumption is not based on the
extent to which the Court may reference or rely on any of these
documents in deciding the class certification and Daubert motions.
Rather, the strength of the presumption arises from the public's
interest in monitoring the judiciary's exercise of its powers under
Article III, and exists even in private business disputes, and
particularly where the documents relate to matters of public
concern.

The Court finds that here, in the context of a class action
alleging deceptive advertising about a consumer good, there is a
strong presumption of public access to the documents filed in
support of the parties' briefs.

Finally, the Court weighs the strong presumption of access against
competing concerns about the disclosure of the documents and
information.

I. Confidential and Proprietary Manufacturing Information

LensCrafters seeks to seal or redact three categories of
purportedly confidential and proprietary manufacturing
information.

A. Luxottica's Internal Quality Manufacturing Standards

LensCrafters seek to keep under seal its technical Quality
Manufacturing Standards and to redact references to Luxottica's
internal manufacturing tolerances. In support of this request,
David Persinger, who is Director of Engineering at Luxottica
America, Inc., explains that these standards and tolerances, "which
govern Luxottica's fabrication of prescription eyeglasses sold to
customers," are "proprietary to Luxottica and are not industry
standards and tolerances."

Thus, the Court finds that despite the strong presumption of
disclosure that attaches to this information, sealing the Quality
Manufacturing Standards and redacting references to Luxottica's
internal manufacturing tolerances is justified.

B. Results of Internal Machine Capability Studies

LensCrafters also seeks to redact (1) the results of capability
studies conducted by its expert Allyn Hummel that purport to
demonstrate that Luxottica's machines are capable of and do
manufacture to 0.1mm, and (2) the corresponding results of the
responsive analysis performed by the Plaintiffs' expert Dan Riall.
Persinger explains that Luxottica does not publish the results of
its machine capability studies; that such information is not
intended to be shared outside of Luxottica; and that Luxottica's
competitors could use the results of these studies regarding
Luxottica's use of a "specific machine" "to alter and improve their
own manufacturing processes and derive a competitive advantage
against Luxottica."

Here, Judge Chen finds, LensCrafters has failed to make a
particular and specific demonstration of fact showing that
disclosure would result in an injury sufficiently serious to
warrant protection and, therefore, has not overridden the strong
presumption of disclosure that attaches to this information.

The request to redact the results of Hummel's study and the
corresponding results of Riall's analysis is denied.

C. Percentage of In-Store Versus Central Labs Manufacturing

For similar reasons, the Court also denies LensCrafters' request
for limited redactions to the deposition testimony of Jay McDonald,
Director of In-Store Projects at Luxottica, stating the estimated
percentage of LensCrafters' prescription eyeglasses manufactured in
its in-store laboratories versus Luxottica's regional, central
labs.

Without reference to any specific facts or examples, Persinger
states that this information is not published or intended to be
shared outside of Luxottica, and that if competitors learned this
information, they could use it "to alter and improve their own
manufacturing processes and derive a competitive advantage against
Luxottica."

Judge Chen opines that Persinger's conclusory statements do not
suffice. The Court is not convinced that any theoretical harm from
the disclosure of this information regarding the approximate
percentage split in manufacturing location overrides the strong
presumption in favor of disclosure. The request to make limited
redactions to McDonald's testimony is denied.

II. LensCrafters' Strategic Business Communications

Next, LensCrafters seeks to redact in full several emails that it
argues contain "confidential business information related to
product development and testing, employee training, customer
experience and sales strategies, advertising and marketing
strategies, and marketing claim support."

In support of its requests to redact, LensCrafters provides the
declaration of Jason Jones, Director of EyeCare Systems at
Luxottica of America, Inc. d/b/a LensCrafters, who states generally
that Luxottica does not make such information public because "it
could be capitalized upon by Luxottica's competitors, causing harm
to Luxottica."

The first email, Exhibit 3 to the Plaintiffs' class certification
motion, is a 2010 email between two Luxottica employees. Jones
explains that the email contains information that is "confidential
and proprietary because it relates to LensCrafters' product
development and testing, including discussion of LensCrafters'
measurement error studies for its AccuFit system as part of its
marketing claim support process."

The disclosure of this type of information, including sales
training materials, internal marketing strategies, company
marketing plans, and internal emails regarding marketing tests may
expose a party to competitive injury that is sufficient to overcome
the presumption of disclosure, Judge Chen notes. That the policies,
practices, or strategies discussed in years-old documents have been
fully implemented, such that they are known to competitors and the
public, counsels against finding those documents to still be
sensitive.

While Exhibit 3 to the Plaintiffs' class certification motion
appears to include information about the development and testing of
the AccuFit system and related marketing, which arguably
constitutes confidential business information, the Court is
skeptical that this information remains sensitive more than a
decade since the email was sent and AccuFit, with its attendant
marketing claims, were made public.

Judge Chen finds that Jones does not provide specific facts or a
particularized explanation of how this stale information could be
capitalized on by Luxottica's competitors to harm Luxottica now or
in the future, and for that reason, LensCrafters cannot overcome
the public's strong interest in disclosure. This interest is
particularly strong here as the email contains information about
the basis for LensCrafters' marketing claims about AccuFit, which
undeniably go to the heart of this class action lawsuit.

For these reasons, LensCrafters' request to redact in full Exhibit
3 to the Plaintiffs' class certification motion is denied.

The second email that LensCrafters seeks to redact, Exhibit 4 to
the Plaintiffs' class certification motion, is a 2010 email sent by
a Luxottica employee to himself regarding "AccuFit Conference Call
w/7 stores." According to Jones, the information in this email is
"confidential and proprietary" because it contains "notes
reflecting internal discussions on LensCrafters' product
development and AccuFit pilot testing, LensCrafters' employee
training, discussions of customer experience and sales strategies,
and specific feedback from store associates."

For the same reasons the Court found that LensCrafters failed to
demonstrate that Exhibit 3 should be redacted in full, the Court
also concludes that LensCrafters has not met its burden with
respect to Exhibit 4. Jones does not provide specific facts or a
particularized explanation of how this information could be
capitalized on by Luxottica's competitors more than a decade after
AccuFit's launch to harm Luxottica.

For that reason, LensCrafters cannot overcome the public's strong
interest in disclosure, Judge Chen holds. She adds that the
public's interest in this email is especially strong as it contains
statements that also go to the heart of this case, namely whether
LensCrafters' representations amount measurements to 0.1mm were
deceptive.

The third email that LensCrafters seeks to redact, Exhibit 34 to
the Plaintiffs' class certification motion, is a 2014 email
communication between Luxottica employees that Jones explains is
"confidential and proprietary because it discusses LensCrafters'
marketing claim support processes, as well as confidential business
information regarding LensCrafters' advertising practices."

To start, the email does not discuss, but merely references the
existence of a marketing claim support process, which the Court
does not find, in and of itself, to be confidential or proprietary
information, Judge Chen notes. Next, the Court rejects
LensCrafters' contorted argument that this email should be redacted
because the Plaintiffs' misleadingly quote a portion of it without
providing the attachment that both, reveals the full context, and
contains a substantial amount of confidential claim support
information.

The purportedly confidential attachment is not the subject of
LensCrafters' pending motion, and reference to it, does not sway
the Court's view that the cover email does not contain sensitive
information that should be protected from public disclosure.
Jones's declaration offers no specific facts or explanation to the
contrary, Judge Chen holds. LensCrafters' request to redact in full
Exhibit 34 to the Plaintiffs' class certification motion is
denied.

The final email that LensCrafters seeks to redact, Exhibits 35 and
47 to the Plaintiffs' class certification motion, is from 2012 and
includes communication between LensCrafters executives. According
to Jones, this email contains "confidential business strategy on
marketing claim support, and discusses sensitive information
related to litigation between Luxottica's Australian retailer OPSM
and one of its competitors, as well as product development and
marketing claim support strategy related to LensCrafters' AccuFit
system."

First, the Court rejects LensCrafters' contorted argument that
purportedly confidential attachments, which are not included with
the exhibit nor the subject of its motion, somehow confer
confidentiality on the cover email. Next, to the extent that
LensCrafters references litigation between OPSM and a competitor,
it does not invoke any sort of work product or attorney-client
protection (nor does it appear that any such protection applies
here). Finally, while this email contains confidential information
about Luxottica's' "strategy on marketing claim support," as well
as its "product development and marketing claim support strategy
related to LensCrafters' AccuFit system," the information is more
than nine years old and relates to a product and marketing campaign
that have already been implemented.

Judge Chen opines that Jones fails to show that this information is
not stale with a particularized showing of harm from disclosure.
Rather, he offers general, conclusory statements that do not
explain how this information could be capitalized on by Luxottica's
competitors nearly a decade after the launch of AccuFit and its
attendant marketing campaign.

Thus, the Court concludes that LensCrafters cannot overcome the
public's strong interest in disclosure of this email, which is
pronounced because the email includes information that is highly
relevant to the deceptive marketing claims in this class action
lawsuit. LensCrafters' request to redact in full Exhibits 35 and 47
to the Plaintiffs' class certification motion is denied.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the Court grants in part and denies in part
LensCrafters' motion to seal. The Court grants LensCrafters'
request to keep its Quality Manufacturing Standards under seal and
to redact specific references to its internal manufacturing
tolerances. The Court denies LensCrafters' request with respect to
the results of capability analyses conducted by Hummel and Riall;
deposition testimony regarding the percentage of in-store versus
central labs manufacturing; and Exhibits 3, 4, 34, 35, and 47.

The parties are directed to comply with the Court's Oct. 27, 2020
Order requiring the parties to file redacted versions of the
completed class certification and Daubert briefing. All redacted
versions of the briefing with supporting material and exhibits must
be filed on the public docket by Nov. 19, 2021.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum & Order dated Oct. 14,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/syeb5rtb from
Leagle.com.


MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Ct. Amends Scheduling Order in Hall Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TODD HALL, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al., v. MARRIOTT
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Case No. 3:19-cv-01715-JLS-AHG (S.D. Cal.),
the Hon. Judge Allison H. Goddard entered an order
granting joint motion to amend the scheduling order as follows:

   1. Fact and class discovery are not bifurcated, but class
      discovery must be completed by December 1, 2021.

      "Completed" means that all discovery requests governed 28
      by Rules 30-36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
      and discovery subpoenas under district court website.

   2. The Plaintiff(s) must file a motion for class
      certification by January 18, 2022.

   3. Within three days of a ruling on the motion for class
      certification, the 22  must jointly contact the Court via
      email (at efile_goddard@casd.uscourts.gov) to arrange a
      further case management conference.

Marriott International, Inc. is an American multinational company
that operates, franchises, and licenses lodging including hotel,
residential, and timeshare properties.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3vPZUzH at no extra charge.[CC]

MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Settlement Deal in Martin Gets Final Nod
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CYRIL MARTIN, et al., v.
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-00494-JAO-RT
(D. Hawaii), the Hon. Judge Jill A. Otake entered an order granting
(1) the plaintiffs' motion for final approval of class settlement
and entry of order and final judgment; (2) the Defendant's motion
for final approval of class action settlement; and (3) the
plaintiffs' motion for award of attorneys' fees, reimbursement of
costs and expenses, and class representative service awards.

The Court orders as follows:

   (1) The requirements of FRCP 23(e) have been satisfied and
       the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and
       adequate.

   (2) The Court certifies the Settlement Class, as described in
       Section 1.33 of the Settlement Agreement.

   (3) James J. Bickerton and Bridget G. Morgan-Bickerton of
       Bickerton Law Group LLLP, are finally appointed as class
       counsel for purposes of the settlement.

   (4) The parties and counsel are directed to implement the
       Settlement Agreement according to its terms and  
       provisions.

   (5) The Court approves $547,630.64 in attorneys' fees plus
       general excise tax and $42,290.09 in costs. These amounts
       shall be paid from the settlement fund.

   (6) The Settlement Agreement, this Order, and the final
       judgment will be binding on, and have res judicata and
       preclusive effect in, all pending and future lawsuits or
       other proceedings encompassed by Plaintiffs' releases
       and/or that are based, in whole or in part, on the
       released claims.

   (7) This case (including all individual claims and class
       claims presented) is dismissed on the merits with
       prejudice with the parties to bear their own attorneys'
       fees and costs, except as provided herein.

   (8) Without affecting the finality of the final judgment for
       purposes of appeal, the Court retains jurisdiction
       regarding all matters relating to the administration,
       consummation, and enforcement of the Settlement Agreement
       and for any other necessary purpose relating to the
       settlement.

   (9) Plaintiffs and all class members are barred and
       permanently enjoined from filing lawsuits or
       participating in actions based on or relating to the
       claims falling within the scope of the Settlement
       Agreement.

  (10) The Court directs the Clerk's Office to enter final
       judgment and close the case.

Marriott International is an American multinational company that
operates, franchises, and licenses lodging including hotel,
residential, and timeshare properties.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3mkjkt5 at no extra charge.[CC]

MCGRIFF INSURANCE: Vonderwerth Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jenny Vonderwerth, on behalf of and herself all others similarly
situated v. MCGRIFF INSURANCE SERVICES, INC., a North Carolina
Corporation, DOES 1-20, inclusive, Case No. 21CV389069 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Santa Clara, Cty., Oct. 22, 2021), is brought to seek
compensation for unpaid rest periods, interest thereon, related
penalties, injunctive and other equitable relief, and reasonable
attorneys' fees and litigation costs pursuant to, inter alia, the
California Code of Regulations, California Business and Professions
Code, California Code of Civil Procedure, and various provisions of
the California Labor Code.

The Defendant has had a consistent policy of mischaracterizing
non-exempt sales executive as exempt employees, thereby, among
others: unlawfully failing to provide the Plaintiff with minimum
wage and overtime premiums for all hours worked in excess of either
in a fay or 40 in a week during periods when they were non-exempt;
unlawfully failing to separately pay the Plaintiff for rest periods
wages, willfully failing to provide the Plaintiff with accurate
semi-monthly itemized wage statements; willfully failing to pay
compensation owed in a prompt and timely manner to the Plaintiff
whose employment with the Defendants has terminated; and violating
the California Unfair Competition Law; and willfully paying earned
PTO wages as an offset and in-lieu of earned commissions, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as an HR and Employee
Benefits Consultant.

MCGRIFF INSURANCE SERVICES, INC. did business in the County of
North Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Drew Lewis, Esq.
          Richard Lambert, Esq.
          DREW LEWIS, PC
          2999 Douglas Blvd., Ste. 180
          Roseville, CA 95661
          Phone: (833) 600-7400
          Email: Rafi@PollockCohen.com
                 Adam@PollockCohen.com
                 Agatha@PollockCohen.com


MCKESSON CORPORATION: Court Decertifies Class in True Health Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TRUE HEALTH CHIROPRACTIC
INC, et al., v. MCKESSON CORPORATION, et al., Case No.
4:13-cv-02219-HSG (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Haywood S. Gilliam,
Jr. entered an order decertifying "Stand-Alone Fax Machine Class"
after carefully considering the entire record in this case.

The Court understands the desire of Plaintiffs (and their counsel)
to resolve these claims via a class action lawsuit. However,
Amerifactors changed the landscape for TCPA litigation, and under
Ninth Circuit precedent, this Court must follow the FCC's
interpretation. In the Court's view, whether Amerifactors in fact
controls here is determinative of the viability of this case as a
class action. The Plaintiffs can and no doubt will argue on appeal
that Amerifactors is not binding, and the 20 Court and the parties
will get critical guidance from any ruling by the Ninth Circuit on
that issue.

On September 29, 2021, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to show cause
why the class should not be decertified. In the OSC, the Court told
the parties that they should cite any relevant legal authority
supporting their respective positions. The Court incorporates the
legal standards and analysis set forth in the Order to Show Cause,
and adds the analysis below based on the parties’ responses to
the OSC.

The Plaintiffs filed their Response to the Order to Show Cause on
October 4, 2021. The Defendants submitted a Response to Plaintiffs'
Response on October 6, 2021. On October 8, 2021, the Court heard
oral argument regarding the OSC.

McKesson Corporation is an American company distributing
pharmaceuticals and providing health information technology,
medical supplies, and care management tools.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 15, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3GludCZ at no extra charge[CC]


MERCER UNIVERSITY: Parties Must Submit Revised Scheduling Order
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as OLIVIER WILLIAMS, and all
others similarly situated, v. THE CORPORATION OF MERCER UNIVERSITY,
Case No. 5:20-cv-00361-LAG (M.D. Ga.), the Hon. Judge Leslie A.
Gardner entered an order directing the Parties to submit a revised
proposed scheduling and discovery order within 21 days of this
Order as it would be inefficient to bifurcate discovery in this
matter.

After review of the Parties' briefs, the Court finds that
bifurcation of discovery is not appropriate in this matter.
Plaintiff has indicated that she will seek class certification, and
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires Plaintiff
to prove her theory of damages as a condition of class
certification as damages are an element of her breach of contract
claim.

Pursuant to the Court's Rules 16 and 26 Order, the Parties
conferred and submitted their Proposed Scheduling and Discovery
Order on September 10, 2021. The Parties, however, were unable to
agree on proposed dates and whether discovery should be bifurcated.


On September 16, 2021, the Court held a discovery scheduling
conference and ordered the Parties to brief whether discovery
should be bifurcated, such that damages related discovery be
conducted at a later date.

On September 27, 2021, Plaintiff submitted her Brief Supporting
Bifurcation. On October 1, 2021, Defendant submitted its Brief
Opposing Bifurcation.

Mercer University is a private research university with its main
campus in Macon, Georgia. Founded in 1833 as Mercer Institute and
gaining university status in 1837.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3vUkPkR at no extra charge.[CC]


METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION: Warsame's Class Deal in Has Prelim. OK
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Noridin Warsame, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, and the proposed Minnesota Rule 23
Class, Plaintiff v. Metropolitan Transportation Network, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-1318 (ECW) (D. Minn.), Magistrate Judge
Elizabeth Cowan Wright of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Minnesota granted the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Class and
Conditional Certification and for Preliminary Approval of
Settlement.

Pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for
purposes of settlement only, Judge Wright certifies the claims in
the lawsuit under the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act (MFLSA),
Minn. Stat. Section 177.21, et seq., and the Minnesota Payment of
Wages Act (MPWA), Minn. Stat. Section 181.101, et seq., against
Metropolitan as a class action on behalf of the settlement group
(which consists of 625 school bus drivers for whom the Plaintiff
alleges damages based on the Defendant's payroll data): "All
persons who worked as school bus drivers for Metropolitan
Transportation Network, Inc. at any time from June 5, 2017 to July
7, 2021."

Pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b), for purposes of
settlement only, Judge Wright also certifies the lawsuit as a
collective action for unpaid overtime on behalf of the following
settlement group (which consists of 625 school bus drivers for whom
Plaintiff alleges damages based on the Defendant's payroll data):
"All persons who worked as school bus drivers for Metropolitan
Transportation Network, Inc. at any time from June 5, 2017 to July
7, 2021."

Judge Wright has conducted a preliminary review of the details of
the proposed settlement and preliminarily finds that the settlement
is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Having considered the factors set forth in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(g)(1), and having found Michele R. Fisher and Kayla M.
Kienzle of the law firm of Nichols Kaster, PLLP, to be adequate and
qualified to represent the class, she appoints Michele R. Fisher
and Kayla M. Kienzle of Nichols Kaster, PLLP, and their firm as the
Class Counsel to represent the Eligible Settlement Class Members.

Judge Wright approves distribution of the Notice via U.S. Mail and
text message as provided in the forms proposed in the motion and
provided at Exhibits 3 and 5 to the Declaration of Kayla M.
Kienzle.

Within five days of the Order, the Defendant will provide the
Settlement Administrator with information for each Eligible
Settlement Class Member that identifies his/her name, last-known
address, cell phone number, and last-four digits of social security
number. Within seven days of receipt of the Class List, the
Settlement Administrator will distribute the Notice to Eligible
Settlement Class Members by U.S. Mail. Within 14 days of receipt of
the Class List, the settlement administrator will send a notice of
settlement to Eligible Settlement Class Members by text.

Because of the structure of the settlement, the class and the
collective members who do not wish to be included in the settlement
class need not submit any statement of exclusion. They may opt out
by declining to cash the settlement check they receive in the mail.
However, any class or collective member who wishes to object to the
proposed settlement, request exclusion, or be heard at the final
approval hearing and show cause why the proposed settlement should
not be approved as fair, adequate, reasonable and in the settlement
groups' best interests or why the Court should not enter final
judgment may do so according to the following procedure:

     a. The individual must send notice of intent to object to the
settlement or request exclusion to the Settlement Administrator.
The notice must contain name, address, case name (Noridin Warsame,
et al. v. Metropolitan Transportation Network, Inc., Case No.
20-CV-01318 (ECW)) and the individual's specific objection or
request for exclusion.

     b. The notice of intent to object to the settlement or request
exclusion must be submitted to Settlement Administrator in writing
at the following address on or before the 60-day period specified
in the notice of settlement: Michele R. Fisher Kayla M. Kienzle
Nichols Kaster, PLLP 4700 IDS Center, 80 South Eighth Street
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402 Email: forms@nka.com Phone: (612)
256-3200 Fax: (612) 215-6870

Any person who fails to object in the above-described manner will
be deemed to have waived any objections. The Class Counsel will
submit the requests for exclusion and the objections to the Court
and the Defendant's counsel on or before 14 days prior to the final
approval hearing. United States Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Cowan
Wright will hold a final approval hearing in Courtroom 3C of the
U.S. Courthouse, 316 N. Robert Street, St. Paul, Minnesota, or
alternatively, by video conference via Zoom for Government on Feb.
7, 2022, at 9:30 a.m.

The deadline for the Plaintiff to file the Motion for Final
Settlement Approval is 14 days prior to the final approval hearing.
The proposed Final Approval Order will be submitted to the Court
simultaneously with the Motion for Final Settlement Approval and
Dismissal.

Within 55 days of the expiration of the 90-day check cashing
period, the parties will file a stipulation of dismissal with
prejudice for those who timely cashed their settlement checks and
without prejudice for those who did not.

The parties will take all reasonable steps to comply with the
deadlines set forth in the Settlement Agreement and the Order and
the following timeline:

     a. The Defendant provides list for Notice - Within 5 days of
Order

     b. Settlement Administrator to send receipt of list by mail -
Within 7 days of Notice

     c. Settlement Administrator to send notice of settlement by
text massage - Within 14 days of receipt of list

     d. Objections and requests for exclusion - Within 60 days of
Notice mailing due to Settlement Administrator

     e. Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") Notice Responses mailing
- Within 90 days of CAFA Notice

     f. Requests for exclusion and objections due to Defendant and
the Court - Within 14 days prior to final approval hearing and the
Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval due to Court

     g. Final approval hearing - Feb. 7, 2022, at 9:30 a.m.

     h. Stipulations of Dismissal - 55 days after expiration of
90-day check cashing period

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/s6yvcra from Leagle.com.


MIDLAND CREDIT: Bid to Dismiss Sam Suit Granted With Leave to Amend
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARK SAM, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 15-CV-1029-LJV-HKS (W.D.N.Y.), Judge
Lawrence J. Vilardo of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of New York accepts and adopts Magistrate Judge H. Kenneth
Schroeder's recommendation to grant C&S' motion to dismiss but
grants Sam's request for leave to amend.

Background

On July 29, 2014, the Plaintiff, Mark Sam, commenced a putative
class action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. Section 1692 et seq. That case
was consolidated into the instant matter on Sept. 11, 2019. On
April 28, 2020, Sam filed a second amended complaint against
Defendants Cohen & Slamowitz and three Cohen & Slamowitz attorneys
(collectively, "C&S") and Midland Credit Management, Inc., Midland
Funding, LLC, and Encore Capital Group, Inc. (collectively,
"Midland entities").

In the second amended complaint, Sam alleged that C&S violated the
FDCPA when it "failed to conduct a meaningful review" or "vacate
the default judgment" against Sam after the Second Circuit's
decision in Hess v. Cohen & Slamowitz LLP, 637 F.3d 117 (2d Cir.
2011). In Hess, the Second Circuit considered the reach of the
FDCPA's venue provision, which requires that debt collectors file
suit against consumers "only in the judicial district or similar
legal entity" where the "consumer signed the contract sued upon" or
where the consumer "resides at the commencement of the action." Sam
also alleged that C&S violated the FDCPA when C&S signed and
delivered the consent to change attorney form to Eltman without
informing Eltman of the alleged venue issue in the Dunkirk City
Court action.

On May 12, 2020, C&S moved to dismiss the second amended complaint
on the ground that Sam's claims are time barred. On May 26, 2020,
Sam responded to C&S' motion to dismiss, and on June 2, 2020, C&S
replied. In the meantime, on June 1, 2020, the case was referred to
U.S. Magistrate Judge H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr., for all
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). And on
June 15, 2021, Judge Schroeder issued a Report, Recommendation and
Order ("RR&O") finding that C&S's motion should be granted.

On June 29, 2021, Sam objected to the RR&O, arguing that Sam is
entitled to relief from the limitations period either due to
equitable tolling or under a fraud-based discovery rule and that
his claims therefore are timely. On July 20, 2021, C&S responded to
Sam's objection, and on Aug. 7, 2021, Sam replied.

Discussion

I. The Effect of the Second Amended Complaint

Sam first contends that the RR&O "ignored the presumption of
validity of the Second Amended Complaint" that purportedly attached
when this Court granted Sam's unopposed motion to file the second
amended complaint. He argues that "in granting that relief" -- that
is, giving Sam leave to amend his complaint -- the Court
"necessarily determined that the pleading would be sufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss."

Judge Vilardo finds that the authority for this proposition is,
perhaps unsurprisingly, missing from Sam's objection. He says,
although "a motion for leave to amend a complaint may be denied
when amendment would be futile," the converse has no legal
support—at least that this Court can find. So while a court may
deny a motion for leave to amend where "the proposed claim could
not withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6)," that does not mean that granting a motion to amend
protects a complaint from a later motion to dismiss. To the extent
that Sam's cursory, citation-free attempt to rewrite the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is a properly raised objection to the
RR&O, it is without merit, Judge Vilardo holds.

II. The Timeliness of Sam's FDCPA Claim

More substantively, Sam objects to the RR&O on the ground that the
second amended complaint sufficiently alleges that C&S engaged in a
"decade-long scheme to defraud both consumers and the courts." Even
if the second amended complaint does not "allege a fraudulent
scheme between C&S and the particular process server" from the
Dunkirk City Court action, Sam reasons, these allegations are
sufficient to establish that his claim is not time barred through
the application of either equitable tolling or a fraud-based
discovery rule. In response, C&S argues that the RR&O fully
considered the allegations in the second amended complaint, found
them lacking, and therefore dismissed Sam's FDCPA claim.

Judge Vilardo holds that the RR&O correctly concluded that Sam's
FDCPA claim was barred by the statute of limitations and not saved
by either equitable tolling or a fraud-based discovery rule. He
finds that the allegations in the second amended complaint fall
well short of other cases where courts equitably tolled untimely
FDCPA claims based on allegations that the defendants provided
false affidavits or arranged for "sewer service" upon the
plaintiffs themselves. Sam's allegations that C&S employed bad
process servers in other debt-collection cases thus do not make his
claims in the case timely under either a fraud-based discovery rule
or equitable tolling doctrine. Nor does C&S' alleged FDCPA venue
violation itself suggest that C&S engaged in fraud or fraudulently
concealed Sam's FDCPA claim.

Nevertheless, Judge Vilardo grants Sam's request for leave to amend
his complaint to demonstrate that his claims are not time barred.

III. Sam's Remaining State Law Claims

Although Judge Schroeder recommends that the Court dismisses Sam's
state law claims as untimely, Judge Vilardo need not wade into New
York law at this time, and he therefore declines to do so. If Sam
does not amend his complaint to correct the deficiencies outlined
above, he will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Sam's remaining state law claims.

Conclusion

Judge Vilardo has carefully and thoroughly reviewed the RR&O; the
record in the case; the objection, response, and reply; and the
materials submitted to Judge Schroeder. Based on that de novo
review, he accepts and adopts Judge Schroeder's recommendation to
grant C&S' motion to dismiss but grants Sam's request for leave to
amend.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6yyh387 from Leagle.com.


MIDLAND CREDIT: Kumer Files FDCPA Suit in D. New Jersey
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Midland Credit
Management, Inc., et al. The case is styled as Levi Kumer,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Midland Credit Management, Inc., John Does 1-25, Case No.
2:21-cv-19349 (D.N.J., Oct. 27, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Midland Credit Management, Inc. -- https://www.midlandcredit.com/
-- is a specialty finance company providing debt recovery solutions
for consumers across a broad range of assets.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Raphael Y. Deutsch, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: rdeutsch@steinsakslegal.com



MINDFINDERS INC: Court Grants in Part $152K Settlement in Dew Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Chief District Judge Beryl A. Howell of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia granted in part the Plaintiffs'
consented-to motion to approve a settlement agreement in the
lawsuit titled EBONY DEW, et al., Plaintiffs v. MINDFINDERS, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 20-2930 (BAH) (D.D.C.).

The settlement agreement is between the Named Plaintiffs Ebony Dew
and Krystal Owens, opt-in Plaintiff Amya Gaymon, and Defendant
Mindfinders, Inc.

The Plaintiffs are former hourly-paid employees of Defendant
Mindfinders, Inc., a Washington D.C. corporation with its
headquarters in Washington, D.C. Plaintiff Ebony Dew was employed
by the Defendant from approximately August 2018 through September
2020. Plaintiff Krystal Owens was employed by the Defendant from
approximately April 2017 through August 2019. Plaintiffs Dew and
Owens filed this suit on Oct. 13, 2020, bringing claims under the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 201, et seq. ("FLSA");
the D.C. Minimum Wage Act, D.C. Code Section 32-1001, et seq.
("DCMWA"); the D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law, Section
32-1301, et seq. ("DCWPCL"); and the D.C. Accrued Safe and Sick
Leave Act.

The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendant: (1) failed to pay the
Plaintiffs and other hourly workers in Washington, D.C., minimum
wages for all hours worked; (2) failed to pay them and other hourly
workers overtime wages for hours that they worked in excess of 40
per workweek; (3) failed to timely pay all wages to them and other
hourly workers; (4) failed to provide paid sick leave to plaintiffs
and other hourly workers who worked in Washington, D.C.; and (5)
retaliated against plaintiff Dew for bringing a claim for unpaid
wages.

The case was brought as a collective action under FLSA, 29 U.S.C.
Section 216(b), on behalf of similarly situated hourly employees
("Collective Members"), and as a putative class action with respect
to the D.C. Code causes of action. Amya Gaymon was added as an
opt-in Plaintiff to this case on Oct. 23, 2020.

The Defendant was served on Dec. 20, 2020, but by Jan. 19, 2021,
still had not filed an answer, which was due on Jan. 10.
Consequently, the Plaintiffs filed an affidavit requesting that the
Clerk enter default. On Jan. 22, 2021, the Clerk entered default
against the Defendant. On Feb. 12, 2021, the Plaintiffs moved for
default judgment, and, after the Defendant failed to respond within
the required two weeks, the Court ordered the Defendant to show
cause as to why that motion should not be granted.

A week later, on March 9, 2021, the Defendant's counsel entered an
appearance, and the parties filed a joint response to the Court's
order to show cause. The parties moved to vacate the Clerk's Entry
of Default, withdraw the Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment,
and refer the case for mediation. The parties' motion was granted,
and the case referred to Judge Martin Teel for mediation. Prior to
mediation, the parties exchanged informational discovery. The
parties engaged in a day-long mediation on July 30, 2021, and these
discussions resulted in the Settlement Agreement for which the
parties now seek judicial approval.

A. Proposed Settlement Agreement

On Sept. 14, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for
approval of the proposed Settlement Agreement. Under the proposed
agreement, the Defendant would pay a fixed gross settlement amount
of $152,000 to settle the pending action and fully resolve the
Plaintiffs' claims. This gross amount would go towards (1) service
payments to named plaintiffs and opt-in plaintiff; (2) settlement
checks to eligible individuals, (3) attorneys' fees and costs, and
(4) any settlement administrator costs.

From the gross settlement amount, the proposed Agreement allocates
up to $62,500 in attorneys' fees and $1,000 in litigation costs
from the gross settlement amount. It further provides $2,000 in
service payments to the named Plaintiffs, Dew and Owens and opt-in
Plaintiff Gaymon. The Plaintiffs estimate that $3,000 of the gross
settlement will be paid to a Settlement Administrator.

The remaining funds--the "Net Settlement Fund"--would be divided on
a pro rata basis among identified collective members who choose to
participate in the settlement. Each settlement member's share would
be calculated by dividing each member's total owed wages by the
total owed wages for all members of the settlement group, all
determined from time and pay records produced by the Defendant.

The proposed agreement permits additional eligible Collective
Members to opt-in to the settlement. The agreement defines those
additional employees eligible to participate in the settlement as
employees who worked for the Defendant between Oct. 13, 2017, and
Sept. 30, 2020. Apart from the named Plaintiffs and opt-in
Plaintiff, the parties have identified 37 other individuals who
meet these criteria.

Under the proposed agreement, the Defendant will provide the
settlement administrator with the name, identifying information,
and last known address of each eligible collective member. The
settlement administrator will determine the payroll taxes and
communicate the total amount with a detailed explanation of the
calculations to the Defendant. Fourteen days after the Defendant
has fully deposited the gross settlement amount, including
additional payroll tax amounts, the settlement administrator will
issue checks to the eligible collective members. Eligible members
then have 120 days from the mailing of the settlement checks to
negotiate their settlement checks.

In return for these payments, Collective Members who timely cash
their settlement checks release the Defendant from all claims or
causes of action for unpaid wages under state and federal law for
work performed on the Defendant's contract with the D.C. Department
of General Services between Oct. 13, 2017, and Sept. 30, 2020, as
well as any claims for unpaid sick leave. This release, of course,
does not apply to Collective Members who do not timely negotiate or
cash their checks. The funds from any settlement checks that remain
uncashed after 120 days will be returned to the Defendant within 30
days.

Discussion

The two requirements for assessing whether to approve the proposed
FLSA Settlement Agreement are addressed in turn, followed by the
Plaintiffs' requested relief that extends beyond the scope of
judicial evaluation of such an agreement.

A. The Settlement Agreement Resolves a Bona Fide Dispute

First, the Court must find that the proposed settlement resolves a
bona fide dispute. This requirement is easily met in the case,
Judge Howell holds.

The Plaintiffs initiated these proceedings by filing a lawsuit
seeking unpaid wages. After the Defendant submitted schedule and
payroll data, a number of material factual and legal disputes
arose, and the parties engaged into mediation. The parties
disagreed over "(1) whether the unpaid wages at issue were the
result of a coding error or part of defendant's general policies or
practices; (2) the extent to which overtime was unpaid; (3) whether
defendant should be held liable for liquidated damages; and (4)
whether defendant failed to raise the company's hourly wages to
comply with D.C.'s minimum wage increase." Consequently, the
fundamental issue of the wages owed to the Plaintiffs and the
appropriate damages are contested, thereby, presenting a bona fide
dispute for the Settlement Agreement to resolve.

B. The Settlement is Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate

The Court is satisfied that the Settlement Agreement represents a
fair and reasonable compromise between the parties, upon
consideration of the entirety of the circumstances surrounding the
agreement. As to the first factor--whether the settlement is a
result of employer "overreaching"--the parties have not provided
the exact estimate of the total amount of money the plaintiffs
claim to be owed, making independent evaluation of where the
settlement amount falls between the Plaintiffs' position and the
Defendant's impossible.

The Plaintiffs have, however, indicated that the gross settlement
amount provides over 100 percent of unpaid wages and liquidated
damages under FLSA, and that the Plaintiffs will recover 100
percent of what they could have recovered under the FLSA in
litigation. Comparing the gross settlement amount to the
Plaintiffs' estimated FLSA damages, this is not an overreach, Judge
Howell holds.

The second factor--whether the agreement is a result of arm's
length negotiation--weighs heavily in favor of approving the
settlement. The parties engaged in negotiations while represented
by counsel with significant experience in litigating FLSA claims.
Importantly, the parties' negotiations culminated in mediation
supervised by an experienced and respected mediator.

As for the third factor--accounting for the difficulty of
collecting any judgment--the Plaintiffs assert that even if they
could have recovered more in contested litigation, the value of
immediate recovery outweighs the potential for recovery,
considering the cost of continued litigation, the risk of no
recovery at all, and the delay that would be caused by an appeal
after a judgment. Given the factual and legal disputes between the
parties, the Court is satisfied that the settlement appropriately
considers the potential benefits and risks of proceeding to trial.

C. Other Issues

The Plaintiffs also request express judicial approval of the
service awards, the attorneys' fees and costs, and the
administrator's fees and costs, and to incorporate in an order all
terms of the Settlement Agreement, including a provision enjoining
the Plaintiffs and those absent Collective Members, who negotiate
their settlement checks, from filing a released claim against the
Defendant.

The Court need not approve any of these terms, and will not impose
an injunction, since judicial review of a proposed FLSA settlement
is properly limited only to those terms precisely addressing the
compromised monetary amounts to resolve pending wage and overtime
claims. The various fees contemplated in the Settlement Agreement
are relevant insofar as they do not decrease the net settlement
fund so much as to be unreasonable, but they need not individually
be found reasonable by the Court to approve the Settlement
Agreement.

Accordingly, insofar as the Plaintiffs' motion seeks an order
beyond this limited purpose, the Court simply does not opine. The
Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, as the
Plaintiffs request.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Approval of
Settlement, Service Payments, and Attorneys' Fees and Costs is
granted in part.

An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered
contemporaneously.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated Oct. 14,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/tv3d9f5y from
Leagle.com.


MOMOTARO APOTHECA: Graciano Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Momotaro Apotheca
LLC. The case is styled as Sandy Graciano, on behalf of himself and
all other persons similarly situated v. Momotaro Apotheca LLC, Case
No. 1:21-cv-08759 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 26, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Momotaro Apotheca -- https://momotaroapotheca.com/ -- is a
certified organic and cruelty-free sexual wellness line that
supports the body's natural ability to heal.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18th St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


MONARCH HEALTHCARE: Quay FLSA Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Nurses
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as APRIL QUAY, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. MONARCH
HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT LLC., Case No. 0:21-cv-01796-JRT-TNL (D.
Minn.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. conditionally certifying a class of:

      "all non-exempt Nurses who were subject to an automatic
      meal period deduction while working for Monarch Healthcare
      Management LLC, anywhere in the United States, at any time
      from August 5, 2018 through the final disposition of this
      matter" pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),
      29 U.S.C. section 216(b);

   2. approving the form of Plaintiff's proposed Notice;

   3. setting a 60-day notice period;

   4. authorizing Plaintiff's counsel to mail, e-mail, and text-
      message the Notice at the beginning of the 60-day notice
      period;

   5. authorizing Plaintiff's counsel to send a reminder Notice
      30 days prior to the notice deadline;

   6. directing the Defendant, Monarch Healthcare Management, to
      post the Court-approved Notice in a conspicuous location
      next to the time clocks at Monarch worksites for the
      duration of the 60-day opt-in period; and

   7. directing Monarch to produce a list of all Putative Class
      Members, in a computer-readable format (such as Excel), at
      any time in the last three years through the final
      disposition of this matter, including each Putative Class
      Members' contact information (including their (1) full
      name, (2) job title, (3) last known address, (4) last
      known personal email address, (5) telephone number; (6)
      dates of employment, (7) location of employment, and (8)
      employee identification number) within 10 days of the
      Order; and (8) toll the statute of limitations from the
      date this motion was filed until the end of the 60 day
      opt-in period.

Monarch Healthcare is located in Mankato, Minnesota, and is part of
the nursing care facilities.

A copy of the the motion to certify class dated Oct. 19, 2021 is
available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3bhBpSj at no
extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  austin@a2xlaw.com

               - and -

          Michele R. Fisher, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
          4600 IDS Center, 80 South 8th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone (612) 256-3200
          Facsimile (612) 215-6870
          E-mail: fisher@nka.com

MORTGAGE LENDERS: Charbonneau Suit Has $1.43M Attys.' Fees & Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BEAU CHARBONNEAU, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MORTGAGE LENDERS OF AMERICA
L.L.C., et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-02062-HLT (D. Kan.),
Judge Holly L. Teeter of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Kansas awards $1,298,006.13 in attorneys' fees and $131,128.15
in costs and expenses for a total award of $1,429,134.28.

Background

The case is a Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") case that the
parties settled after three years of contentious litigation.
Plaintiff Charbonneau filed the lawsuit in February 2018 against
Defendant Mortgage Lenders of America ("MLOA") alleging that: (1)
he and other Team Leads were unlawfully classified as FLSA "exempt"
and unlawfully denied overtime pay, and (2) he and other Loan
Officers were unlawfully denied overtime pay for off-the-clock
work. He also alleged wage and contract claims under Kansas law.
Throughout the lawsuit Davis George Mook, LLC ("DGM") represented
the Plaintiffs and staffed the case with partners Brett Davis,
Tracey George, and Nick Walker.

There was some initial motion practice. The then-assigned judge
denied MLOA's partial motion to dismiss and granted Charbonneau's
contested motion to conditionally certify two FLSA collectives.
Charbonneau then used a third-party administrator to send the
notices to approximately 450 employees. Twenty-five employees
consented to join the Team Lead collective and an additional 142
employees consented to join the Loan Officer collective. Thus,
there were 167 total plaintiffs.

The parties then started discovery. They initially disputed the
scope of discovery. MLOA requested discovery from all the
Plaintiffs while Plaintiffs proposed representative discovery. The
magistrate judge authorized written discovery to all the Plaintiffs
but on a smaller scale than requested by MLOA. The parties then
engaged in written discovery and depositions.

The following facts about discovery are notable:

     a. The Plaintiffs added Bradley Ives and Philip Kneibert as
defendants based on MLOA's discovery responses.

     b. The Plaintiffs served about 1,800 requests for admission
targeting the Defendants' affirmative defenses.

     c. The Plaintiffs received over 432,000 documents (or 2.5
million pages) after the parties negotiated electronic discovery
search terms, which required the Plaintiffs to use a hosting
service.

     d. The Plaintiffs' counsel responded to individualized
interrogatories and requests for production and reviewed time, pay,
and personnel records and documents for about 160 employees.

     e. The Plaintiffs retained and disclosed an expert economist.

     f. The Plaintiffs took the deposition of seven defense
witnesses and a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition.

     g. The Defendants took 10 depositions (Charbonneau, eight
other Plaintiffs, and an expert economist).

The parties also engaged in more motion practice. This motion
practice included Charbonneau's motion for Rule 23 class
certification for the state-law claims (denied as moot), the
Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the state-law claims
(granted), the Plaintiffs' partial summary-judgment motion
(granted), the Defendants' motion to amend answer (denied), the
Defendants' motion to decertify the FLSA claims (denied), and the
Defendants' motion to exclude Plaintiffs' expert (denied). The
Court resolved the motions, and the parties prepared for and
attended the final pretrial conference and later participated in a
status conference with the undersigned.

The Court did several things at the status conference. It moved
trial to June 2021 and ordered mediation with a magistrate judge
because the parties had previously engaged in two failed rounds
with a private mediator. The parties participated in a mediation
with Chief Magistrate Judge O'Hara in March 2021 and made
significant settlement progress. They later settled, and the Court
approved the settlement in June 2021. The settlement agreement
states that Defendants will pay a collective gross total of over
$3.9 million, which includes payments to all 167 plaintiffs and
explains that the Court will determine the Plaintiffs' attorneys'
fees and costs. Thus, the sole remaining issue is attorneys' fees
and costs.

As noted, the parties agree in the settlement agreement that the
Defendants should pay the Plaintiffs' reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs, but they disagree on that amount. The Plaintiffs thus
move for an award of about $2.2 million in attorneys' fees and
about $131,000 in costs. The Defendants contend the proper amount
is less than $1 million in attorneys' fees and about $30,000 in
costs.

Discussion

Judge Teeter carefully considered the evidence and is cognizant of
the contingency-fee nature of the representation (which injected
some risk and delayed potential payment for several years), the
results achieved, and the time and labor required to litigate the
protracted case. She likewise does not question the reputation or
skill of Davis, George, and Walker. But she finds that the
Plaintiffs have not justified the requested rates. She instead
finds that these lawyers would receive the following rates if
selling their services in the market: $600/hour for Davis,
$550/hour for George, and $475/hour for Walker. Judge Teeter finds
these rates to be on the high-end of a reasonable range even though
lower than the requested rates.

Judge Teeter commends the Plaintiffs and the counsel for their
success in the case. She says, they undoubtedly secured a victory
for their clients after a hard-fought case. But, Judge Teeter is
charged with awarding a reasonable fee. And she finds that a
reasonable fee based on the record, the arguments, and the law is
$1,298,006.13.

As to the costs and expenses, Judge Teeter states that the main
dispute between the parties is whether Section 1920 includes ESI
hosting costs. She finds that neither party does an exceptional job
briefing this issue. They do not analyze the statutory language or
provide detailed argument or analysis. And Judge Teeter is not
inclined to undertake this rigorous analysis when the parties did
not see fit to do so. The Plaintiffs at least cite some cases
indicating that this type of cost is recoverable in an FLSA case.
In contrast, the Defendants fail to cite a single case. On this
record, Judge Teeter concludes that the Plaintiffs' requested cost
for ESI hosting is taxable, is reasonable, and is supported by the
documentary evidence. She thus awards $131,128.15 in costs and
expenses.

Conclusion

Judge Teeter has carefully reviewed the record and law. She finds
the Plaintiffs are entitled to $1,298,006.13 in attorneys' fees and
$131,128.15 in costs and expenses for a total award of
$1,429,134.28.

Therefore, she grants in part the Plaintiffs' motion. She awards
$1,298,006.13 in attorneys' fees and $131,128.15 in costs and
expenses. She denies the Plaintiffs' request for a hearing as she
finds the record is sufficiently developed and a hearing would not
meaningfully advance resolution.

The Defendants' motion for leave is granted. Judge Teeter
considered the sur-reply in resolving the Plaintiffs' motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4ekwzad8 from Leagle.com.


MUNSON HEALTHCARE: Appeals Court Affirms Dismissal of Rakyta Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled KIM RAKYTA, and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v. MUNSON HEALTHCARE,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 354831 (Mich. App.), the Court of
Appeals of Michigan affirms the dismissal of the underlying class
action case.

In the class action lawsuit arising from a digital security breach,
the Plaintiff appeals by right the trial court's order dismissing
her claims against the Defendant under Michigan Court Rule ("MCR")
2.116(C)(8). On appeal, the Plaintiff argues that the trial court
erred when it determined that she failed to allege damages that
were cognizable under Michigan law. She also argues that the trial
court erred when it determined that the Defendant's collection of
patient information was reasonable as a matter of law.

I. Basic Facts

Beginning in July 2019 and continuing through October 2019, unknown
attackers gained unauthorized access to 24 e-mail accounts assigned
to some of the Defendant's employees by tricking them into sharing
access to their account information. The attackers ultimately used
the security breach to obtain access to information associated with
approximately 75,202 patients. The information included names,
dates of birth, addresses, financial account numbers, social
security numbers, insurance details, treatment information,
diagnostic data, and other information commonly used to commit
identity theft (confidential information).

The Defendant first realized that its digital security may have
been compromised in October 2019. The Defendant hired a
cybersecurity firm to investigate the attack and, in January 2020,
the firm issued a report in which it confirmed that the unknown
attackers had had access to the confidential information of the
Defendant's patients. The Defendant started notifying patients, who
were affected by the digital security breach in February 2020.

In May 2020, the Plaintiff sued the Defendant on her own behalf,
and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated to her, for
claims arising from the Defendant's alleged breach of its duty to
protect the confidential information entrusted to it. The Plaintiff
alleged six separate claims in her complaint. The Plaintiff alleged
that the Defendant breached its duty to take reasonable steps to
protect its patients' confidential information, which included
failing to monitor its system, failing to timely detect the breach,
and failing to timely notify its patients of the breach (Count I).
The Plaintiff further alleged that the Defendant's failure to
protect its patients' confidential data amounted to an intrusion
into the patients' seclusion and an invasion of their privacy
(Count II).

The Plaintiff also alleged two contract claims: she alleged that
the Defendant breached its explicit agreement to protect its
patients' confidential data (Count III), and, in the alternative,
that the Defendant breached an implied contract to protect its
patients' confidential data (Count IV). For her fifth claim, the
Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant's failure to protect its
patients' confidential information breached several statutorily
imposed duties, which amounted to negligence per se (Count V).
Finally, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant's deficient
handling of the confidential information and data breach amounted
to a breach of the fiduciary duties that it owed to its patients
(Count VI).

The Defendant moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's claims under MCR
2.116(C)(8) because she failed to state any claims upon which
relief could be granted. It argued that the Plaintiff failed to
allege that she or any potential class member suffered an actual
injury. To the contrary, the Defendant maintained that the
Plaintiff alleged only that she and the other potential class
members might suffer some future injury, which was speculative. It
further argued that, under Michigan law, a plaintiff cannot
demonstrate that he or she suffered an injury by showing that he or
she took prophylactic measures to ameliorate the risk of future
harm.

For these propositions of law, the Defendant relied on the Michigan
Supreme Court's decision in Henry v The Dow Chem Co, 473 Mich. 63;
701 N.W.2d 684 (2005), and the Court's decisions in Nyman v Thomson
Reuters Holdings, Inc., 329 Mich.App. 539; 942 N.W.2d 696 (2019),
and Doe v Henry Ford Health Sys, 308 Mich.App. 592; 865 N.W.2d 915
(2014). It also maintained that emotional damages are only
cognizable when occasioned by an underlying actual injury. It
asserted that it was entitled to summary disposition of all the
Plaintiff's claims because she failed to allege that she or any
class members suffered any injuries that caused them damages beyond
speculative damages premised on prophylactic measures.

In response to the Defendant's motion, the Plaintiff argued that
she adequately pleaded damages. She noted, among other things, that
the Defendant's actions provided persons with "opportunities" to
commit fraud, had "increased" the risk of actual harm to her and
the potential class members, and placed her and the class members
at "risk of injury."

The trial court held a hearing on the Defendant's motion. Citing
the decisions in Henry, Nyman, and Doe, the trial court agreed that
the Plaintiff had not alleged damages for any of her claims that
were cognizable under Michigan law. Accordingly, it granted the
Defendant's motion and dismissed all of the Plaintiff's claims. The
appeal followed.

II. Summary Disposition: Failure to Plead Damages

On appeal, the Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in
several respects when it determined that she had not pleaded
damages for her claims that were cognizable under Michigan law. She
argues that Michigan law recognizes an imminent risk of future harm
as a present injury capable of supporting a claim for damages. The
Plaintiff further argues that the allegation that someone actually
viewed the confidential information devalued her information, which
further constituted an actual injury causing damages.

The Appeals Court disagrees.

A. Standard of Review

This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision to dismiss a
claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8). When reviewing the motion, the Appeals
Court accepts all well pleaded factual allegations as true and
construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant. This Court also reviews de novo whether the trial court
properly interpreted and applied Michigan's common law (Roberts v
Salmi, 308 Mich.App. 605, 612; 866 N.W.2d 460 (2014)).

B. Analysis

To establish a claim premised on negligence, the Plaintiff had to
plead--and later be able to prove--that the Defendant, in relevant
part, breached its duty of care and caused her to suffer damages.
Although Michigan courts have not always carefully distinguished
between the concepts of injury and damages, those concepts are
distinct. Economic losses can constitute damages, but not all
economic losses will establish the element of damages; only damages
that arise from an actual, present injury, are cognizable under
Michigan law. Accordingly, in order to establish the damages
element of a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege that he
or she suffered damages from an actual, present injury.

In her complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant's
failure to adequately protect its patients' confidential
information resulted in losses that were "incurred to remedy or
mitigate the effects of the attack." More specifically, she alleged
that she and the potential class members were "exposed to a
heightened and imminent risk of fraud and identity theft," which
forced them to "closely monitor their financial accounts to guard
against identity theft."

The Plaintiff alleged that she and the other class members suffered
damages, but she did not allege that those damages were from a
present, actual injury. She alleged that she and the potential
class members were placed in imminent, immediate, and continuing
increased risk of harm from fraud and identity theft. They were
also, she alleged, forced to expend time dealing with the effects
of the Data Breach.

The Appeals Court holds that allegations of this nature are
inadequate to state a cause of action for negligence under the rule
stated in Henry.

In this case, the Plaintiff alleged that unauthorized persons had
access to the confidential information, but she did not state
allegations that--if true--showed that the unauthorized viewing
caused a present injury, the Appeals Court notes. Rather, she
framed her allegations as each involving the risk of future harm
from identity theft and similar future harms, and alleged that she
and the other potential class members had suffered damages in the
form of lost time and expenditures to reduce the risk of future
harm.

The Appeals Court holds that those allegations did not establish
damages arising from a present injury, but instead all involved a
potential future injury. As the trial court correctly concluded,
allegations of damages involving future injuries are not cognizable
under Michigan law. Consequently, the trial court did not err when
it dismissed the Plaintiff's negligence claims under MCR
2.116(C)(8).

The trial court also did not err when it dismissed the Plaintiff's
other claims on the same basis, the Appeals Court adds.

The Plaintiff did not allege that she suffered cognizable damages
as a result of a breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract,
breach of implied contract, invasion of privacy, or intrusion upon
seclusion, the Appeals Court notes. The Plaintiff alleged that
unknown third parties saw her confidential information, which she
alleged amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty, breach of express
or implied contract, and an invasion of privacy or intrusion upon
her seclusion, but she did not allege that the unknown third
parties did anything with that information that injured her.

The Appeals Court holds that it will not presume damages. The only
actual damages--as opposed to conclusory allegations of
damages--that the Plaintiff alleged were damages involving
prophylactic measures to mitigate the losses from potential future
harms, which are not cognizable under Michigan law. Similarly, the
Plaintiff's allegations that she and the other potential class
members might suffer future injuries are too speculative to
establish the damage elements of her claims.

Because the Plaintiff did not allege damages that were recoverable
under Michigan law, the trial court did not err when it dismissed
all her claims under MCR 2.116(C)(8), the Appeals Court finds. It
adds that the Plaintiff failed to allege a present injury that gave
rise to cognizable damages. Consequently, the trial court properly
dismissed all her claims on that basis.

III. Intrusion Upon Seclusion

The Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred as a matter of
law when it held that merely collecting data was not an intrusion
upon seclusion. The trial court did briefly discuss whether the
Defendant's collection of confidential information was offensive,
but it did not dismiss the Plaintiff's claim on the ground that it
was not offensive as a matter of law.

The trial court stated that it was dismissing the invasion of
privacy and intrusion upon seclusion claim because the Plaintiff
failed to allege damages that were cognizable under Michigan law.
Therefore, the Plaintiff has not identified an error for this Court
to review. In any event, the trial court did not err when it
dismissed that claim on that basis.

Affirmed. As the prevailing party, the Defendant may tax its costs.
MCR 7.219(A).

A full-text copy of the Court's Decision dated Oct. 14, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/szj559r5 from Leagle.com.


MY CHOICE FOUNDATION: Hanna Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against My Choice Foundation,
et al. The case is styled as Wakeem K. Hanna, an individual and as
a representative of a class of all others similarly situated v. My
Choice Foundation, a California corporation, Eric Brown, Gary
Montgomery, Danielle Robertson, Tracy Stein, Tracy Stein Management
Services Inc, a California corporation, Does 1-10, Case No.
34-2021-00309844-CU-CO-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty., Oct.
15, 2021).

The case type is stated as "Other Contract - Civil Unlimited."

My Choices Foundation -- https://mychoicesfoundation.org/ -- aims
to give women, children and families choices to live lives free
from violence, abuse and sexual exploitation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark A Skapik, Esq.
          SKAPIK LAW GROUP
          5861 Pine Ave A-1
          Chino Hills, CA 91709
          Phone: 909-398-4404
          Fax: 909-398-1883
          Email: mskapik@skapiklaw.com


NEW LIMITS: Rios Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
Carlos Antonio Rios, Jose Manuel Ramirez Tejada, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated v. NEW LIMITS RESTORATION
CORP., d/b/a NEW LIMITS, NEW LIMITS CONSTRUCTION CORP., d/b/a NEW
LIMITS, and JUAN VILLALBA,, Case No. 1:21-cv-05961 (S.D.N.Y., Oct.
26, 2021), is brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the New York Labor Law, that they is entitled to recover from the
Defendants: unpaid wages, unpaid overtime premium, unpaid wages,
including overtime, due to time shaving, unpaid spread of hours
premium, unreimbursed tools of trade, frequency of payment,
statutory penalties, liquidated damages, and attorney's fees and
costs.

The Plaintiffs regularly worked over 40 hours per week. However,
the Plaintiffs were not compensated their overtime premiums at any
time during their work. The Plaintiffs were required to work over
10 hours per day. However, they never received any spread of hours
premium for working such shifts, as required under NYLL. The
Plaintiffs had to buy and provide their tools and working
materials, such as helmets, boots, instruments, and tools to
perform work for the Defendants. The Defendants did not reimburse
the Plaintiffs for any of the costs associated with buying and
maintenance of their safety tools and construction instruments. The
Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a
policy of not paying wages for all hours worked and the proper
overtime rate thereof to the Plaintiffs, FLSA Collective
Plaintiffs, and Class Members in violation of FLSA and NYLL, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiffs were hired by the Defendants to work as Scaffold
Mechanics for the Defendants' Brooklyn construction site.

The Defendants collectively own and operate a restoration and
construction company under the trade name "New Limits."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Anne Seelig, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24th Street, Eighth Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Phone: 212-465-1180
          Fax: 212-465-1181


NORTHEAST TREATMENT: Court OK's $340K Accord in Devine FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
District Judge Eduardo C. Robreno of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania approves the proposed
settlement agreement in the lawsuit titled Katherine Devine, et
al., Plaintiffs v. Northeast Treatment Centers, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 20-02417 (E.D. Pa.).

The Plaintiffs are employees of the Defendant. The parties disagree
over the amount of overtime pay due the Plaintiffs under the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act
("PMWA").

On Nov. 5, 2020, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b), the Court
conditionally certified the matter as a collective action on behalf
of all individuals, who, during any week since Nov. 1, 2017, were
employed by the Defendant as Case Managers or Aftercare Workers.
Notices were sent to approximately 200 putative members of the
collective action, with 49 individuals opting into the collective
action.

The parties have since settled the action. Before the Court is a
motion to approve the settlement agreement.

Background

The Defendant is a nonprofit organization that provides services in
coordination with Philadelphia's Department of Human Services
("DHS"). As part of the Defendant's relationship with DHS, the
Defendant employs Case Managers which oversee the cases of children
in foster care. The Plaintiffs in this case were employed by
Defendant as Case Managers. Between the period from May 22, 2017,
and June 20, 2019, the Defendant paid the Plaintiffs an average
salary of approximately $44,000 per year. During this time period,
Plaintiffs were classified as overtime-exempt professionals under
the FLSA and PMWA. On June 21, 2019, Defendant re-classified
Plaintiffs as overtime eligible.

This suit concerns overtime pay the Plaintiffs are allegedly owed
under the FLSA and PMWA for two distinct time periods. First, the
Plaintiffs contend that they are owed overtime for the period
between May 22, 2017, and June 20, 2019, when they were allegedly
misclassified as overtime exempt. Second, the Plaintiffs allege
that the Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiffs for all overtime
hours worked after the Plaintiffs were re-classified as overtime
eligible.

The Plaintiffs submit this unopposed motion to approve a collective
action settlement following a settlement conference with Magistrate
Judge Wells. Forty-eight of the forty-nine Plaintiffs that have
opted into this suit have signed settlement release forms.

Discussion

With respect to the settlement agreement, Judge Robreno finds that
there is a bona fide dispute, the settlement is fair and
reasonable, approving the settlement would not frustrate the
purpose of the FLSA, and the proposed attorneys' fees and service
awards are reasonable.

A. Bona Fide Dispute

There is a bona fide dispute about whether the Plaintiffs were
entitled to overtime pay, Judge Robreno finds. He notes that the
agreement involves a bona fide dispute if there are factual issues
"rather than 'legal issues such as the statute's coverage and
applicability,'" citing Howard v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 197
F.Supp.3d 773, 777 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Creed v. Benco Dental
Supply Co., No. 12-01571, 2013 WL 5276109, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept.
17, 2013).

Here, Judge Robreno notes, there is a dispute about whether the
Plaintiffs were entitled to overtime compensation between the
period of May 22, 2017, and June 20, 2019. There is additionally a
dispute as to the amount of overtime compensation the Plaintiffs
were entitled to after June 2019. This is an issue of fact that is
precisely the kind of dispute that qualifies as a bona fide
dispute, Judge Robreno holds.

The Defendant has denied liability in its answer to the Plaintiffs'
complaint and throughout the proceedings. There is also a denial of
liability clause in the proposed settlement agreement. This
constitutes further evidence of the Defendant's rejection of the
Plaintiffs' claims and is sufficient to find that there is a bona
fide dispute, Judge Robreno points out.

B. Fair and Reasonable

In determining whether an FLSA collective action is fair and
reasonable, courts in the Third Circuit apply the factors laid out
in Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975), which are used to
evaluate the fairness of Rule 23 class action settlements. The
relevant Girsh factors include: (1) the complexity, expense and
likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to
the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of
discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing liability; (5)
the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks of maintaining the
class action through trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to
withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of
the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; and (9)
the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible
recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation.

Based on these factors, Judge Robreno finds that the settlement is
fair and reasonable. The first factor weighs in favor of approval.
As the Plaintiffs explain in their motion, absent settlement, this
litigation would entail a series of complex litigation events,
including resolving the Defendant's anticipated decertification and
summary judgment motions and, if summary judgment were denied,
pretrial motions addressing the proper scope of representative
evidence and an extensive trial. Thus, the complexity and potential
expense of this case weighs in favor of the Court approving the
proposed agreement.

The second factor attempts to gauge whether members of the class
support settlement. This weighs in favor of approval as 48 of the
49 forty-nine Plaintiffs that have opted into this suit have signed
settlement release forms, Judge Robreno holds. The third factor
requires the Court to consider the stage of the proceedings and the
amount of discovery completed. Here, the parties have already
completed substantial written discovery including over 7,000 pages
of documents. Additionally, the Plaintiffs' counsel examined the
relevant timekeeping and payroll data at issue in this case. Thus,
the Court can conclude that the parties had an adequate
appreciation of the merits of the case before negotiating.

The fourth and fifth factors consider the risks of establishing
liability and proving damages. The Plaintiffs argue that litigation
would pose a significant risk to the Plaintiffs because they may
not ultimately recover. At this point, Judge Robreno holds that it
would be premature for the Court to weigh the risk of litigation as
no dispositive motions have been filed in this case. Thus, these
factors remain neutral.

With respect to the sixth factor, the risk of maintaining the
collective group through trial, the Plaintiffs agree that at this
point, the risk of maintaining this action through trial is not
high. Thus, this factor, while not very significant in this case,
weighs against approving the action.

The seventh factor contemplates "the ability of the defendants to
withstand a greater judgment." This factor remains neutral because
the parties do not allege that Defendant has any degree of
financial instability as a justification for the settlement's
amount, Judge Robreno holds.

The eighth and ninth factors require the court to consider whether
the settlement represents a good value for a weak case or a poor
value for a strong case. The Plaintiffs maintain that they are
getting an excellent value in the settlement. The settlement seeks
to distribute payment to the 49 Plaintiffs based on the number of
weeks they worked as Case Managers. The total settlement pool is
$340,000.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs understood that they were to
receive a salary for all time worked during the period between May
22, 2017, and June 20, 2019. Thus, it is appropriate for the Court
to accept the fluctuating workweek method as a reasonable method
under the circumstances.

Finally, with respect to the Plaintiffs' allegation that the
Defendant failed to pay them all overtime hours worked following
June 21, 2019, because the Plaintiffs were paid an hourly rate
during this time period, the Defendant applied a time-and-a-half
theory required by section 207(a) of the FLSA. The time-and-a-half
theory is appropriate here, Judge Robreno holds. The Court agrees
that this calculation is reasonable and, thus, appropriate.

Again, the settlement provides that the Plaintiffs will earn a
$91.08/week payout under the settlement. This amount assumes that
the Plaintiffs worked overtime each week. Overall, given the
potential risks involved if the litigation were to go forward, the
Court finds that the settlement value is reasonable. Thus, the
eighth and ninth Girsh factors support the settlement.

Because the Girsh factors, on balance, support settlement, the
Court finds that the amount of the settlement is fair and
reasonable.

As part of its analysis, the Court must consider whether the
attorneys' fees are reasonable. The agreement provides for $87,500
in attorneys' fees and costs to be paid of the $340,000 settlement
fund. The Plaintiffs' counsel requests a fee award of $87,500,
which is 24.72% of the proposed total settlement amount of
$340,000.

When evaluating the appropriateness of an attorneys' fee award
under the percentage-of-recovery method, the Court considers the
following factors: (1) the size of the fund created and the number
of persons benefitted; (2) the presence or absence of substantial
objections by members of the class to the settlement terms and/or
fees requested by counsel; (3) the skill and efficiency of the
attorneys involved; (4) the complexity and duration of the
litigation; (5) the risk of nonpayment; (6) the amount of time
devoted to the case by plaintiffs' counsel; and (7) the awards in
similar cases (Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195
n.1 (3d Cir. 2000)).

Judge Robreno finds that these factors overwhelmingly point toward
an approval of this award. Finally, although it is not dispositive,
the requested amount is less than the lodestar cross-check amount.
Thus, the requested attorneys' fees will be approved.

C. Frustration of FLSA

Approving the settlement agreement would not frustrate the purpose
of the FLSA, Judge Robreno notes. In this case, the proposed
confidentiality and settlement agreements are limited enough such
that they do not frustrate the FLSA's purpose.

D. Approval of the Service Awards is Warranted

The settlement agreement provides that the originating Plaintiffs,
Katherine Devine and Lavar Turner, will each receive a $5,000
service award which will be paid out of the settlement fund.

Plaintiffs Devine and Turner brought the case to counsel without an
agreement or the expectation of receiving compensation outside of
membership in the collective action. As originators of the action,
Devine and Turner faced potential reputational harm from the
Defendant and future employers. As representatives of the
collective action, Devine and Turner have been advocates for their
coworkers, have been in regular contact with counsel, and attended
the settlement conference and discussed the case with Magistrate
Judge Wells.

Finally, the requested service award is a reasonable percentage of
the settlement fund, Judge Robreno finds. This service award
accounts for less than three percent of the total settlement fund.
Thus, the service award is appropriate.

Conclusion

The Court finds that there is a bona fide dispute, the settlement
agreement is fair and reasonable, and that the settlement would not
frustrate the purposes of the FLSA. It also finds that the
requested attorneys' fees and proposed service award are
reasonable. For the foregoing reasons, the settlement agreement is
approved.

An appropriate order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum dated Oct. 14, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/9jjvrfxe from Leagle.com.


NORTONLIFELOCK INC: Reinhardt Files Suit Over Avast Acquisition
---------------------------------------------------------------
Charles Reinhardt, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Nortonlifelock Inc., Susan P.
Barsamian, Eric K. Brandt, Frank E. Dangeard, Nora M. Denzel, Peter
A. Feld, Kenneth Y. Hao, Emily Heath, Vincent Pilette and Sherrese
M. Smith, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-08232 (N.D. Cal., October 18,
2021), seeks to enjoin Defendants and all persons acting in concert
with them from proceeding with, consummating or closing the
acquisition of Avast PLC by NortonLifeLock's subsidiary Nitro Bidco
Limited. The lawsuit further seeks rescissory damages, costs of
this action, including reasonable allowance for plaintiff's
attorneys' and experts' fees and such other and further relief
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Avast is a global cybersecurity provider offering security software
under the Avast and AVG brands, in the form of both free and
paid-for products.

Under the terms of the Merger Agreement, Avast shareholders will be
entitled to elect to receive either $7.61 in cash and 0.0302 of a
share of NortonLifeLock common stock or $2.37 in cash and 0.1937 of
a NortonLifeLock share.

Reinhardt alleges that the Proxy Statement filed in connection with
the transaction omitted NortonLifeLock's and Avast's adjusted
EBITDA, adjusted net income, and adjusted unlevered free cash flow,
material information needed for shareholder to make an intelligent
vote on the merger. It also lacked the data and inputs underlying
the financial valuation analyses that support the fairness opinion
provided by NortonLifeLock's financial advisor Evercore Group LLC.
The Proxy Statement also failed to disclose quantification of the
number of fully diluted shares of Avast and quantification of
Avast's net debt and quantification of the inputs and assumptions
underlying the discount rates ranging from 8.0% to 9.0%, asserts
the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joel E. Elkins, Esq.
      WEISSLAW LLP
      611 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 808
      Los Angeles, CA 90017
      Telephone: (310) 208-2800
      Facsimile: (310) 209-2348.
      Email: jelkins@weisslawllp.com

             - and -

      Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
      1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
      New York, NY 10036
      Telephone: (212) 682-3025
      Facsimile: (212) 682-3010

NRT LLC: Court Vacates Class Certification Hearing in Chinitz Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Chinitz v. NRT LLC, Case
No. 3:19-cv-03309 (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Judge James Donato
entered an order that:

   1. The parties are directed to meet and confer about dates
      for filing an amended opposition and amended reply to the
      motion for class certification to account for any
      arguments related to the supplemental declaration and
      dates for the hearing on class certification, and are
      directed to file by November 8, 2021, a joint statement
      advising the Court of their agreement.

   2. The hearing on class certification set for November 4,
      2021, is vacated pending further order.

The nature of suit states other statutory actions -- restrictions
of use of telephone equipment.

NRT LLC is a residential real estate brokerage company in the
United States of America. A subsidiary of the Realogy Corporation,
its headquarters are located in Madison, New Jersey.[CC]


OAKLAND, CA: Bid for Class Certification Nixed w/o Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANTI POLICE-TERROR
PROJECT, et al., v. CITY OF OAKLAND, et al., Case No.
3:20-cv-03866-JCS (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Joseph C. Spero
entered an order denying motion for class certification without
prejudice.

The Court said, "The Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify the same
proposed class under Rule 23(b)(3) as a damages class as it asks
the Court to certify under Rule 23(b)(2). In light of Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011), in which the
Supreme Court held that "individualized monetary claims belong in
Rule 23(b)(3)" rather than (b)(2), the Court finds that this sort
of hybrid certification is likely to confuse class members, who
would be permitted to opt out of the same class under (b)(3) that
they would be precluded from opting out of under (b)(2), even
assuming the proposed definition satisfies both Rule 23(b)(2) and
(b)(3). At a minimum, the classes Plaintiffs Rule 23(b)(3) ask the
Court to certify should be separate injunctive relief and damages
subclasses. Further, because of problems relating to predominance
and manageability, the Court finds that the proposed class does not
satisfy the requirements of (b)(3)."

Following the settlement conference scheduled for November 3, 2021,
the parties are requested to provide, within one week, a status
report that includes a proposed briefing schedule on a renewed
motion for class certification should Plaintiffs elect to file one,
says Judge Spero.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3GAQwoy at no extra charge.[CC]

ORLANDO MED: Morales Slams Retaliation, Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dayaima Diaz, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Orlando Med Transportation LLC, Federico
Martinez and Maylen Velazquez, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-01758
(M.D. Fla., October 20, 2021), seeks to recover minimum wages, any
unpaid overtime hours, retaliatory damages, liquidated damages, and
any other relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Orlando Med Transport provides patient transportation services in
Orlando, Florida where Diaz worked as a full-time, non-exempted,
hourly-paid driver. She claims to have worked more than 40 hours
during one or more weeks without being properly compensated. She
also claims to be terminated for complaining. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
     ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
     9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
     Miami, FL 33156
     Telephone: (305) 446-1500
     Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
     Email: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


PALMS ASSOCIATES: Joint Bid to Modify Scheduling Order OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JESSICA JOHNSON, on behalf
of herself and all other similarly situated, v. PALMS ASSOCIATES,
LLC, and DURHAM MEWS, LLC, f/k/a ) DURHAM SECTION I ASSOCIATES,
LLC, Case No. 1:20CV1049 (M.D.N.C.), the Hon. Judge Joe L. Webster
entered an order granting the joint motion to modify scheduling
order as follows:

   a. The date for completion of all discovery, general and
      expert, shall be January 15, 2022.

   b. The deadline for completion of mediation shall be March
      15, 2022.

   c. The deadline for plaintiff to move for class certification
      shall be March 15, 2022.

   d. The deadline for filing of potentially dispositive motions
      shall be March 15, 2022.

All other deadlines and terms contained in the Joint Rule 26(f)
Report (Docket Entry 14) and adopted by the Court without
modification (Docket Entry 15), shall remain in effect.

The parties should not anticipate any further extension of said
deadlines.

Palms Associates engages in construction, property management and
asset management services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3vSQVh5 at no extra charge.[CC]

PENNSYLVANIA INTERSCHOLASTIC: Class Cert Filing Bid Due Jan. 3
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ALEX BROWN and TRENT
CLAYTON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. PENNSYLVANIA INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,
INC., Case No. 2:21-cv-01119-DSC (W.D. Pa.), the Hon. Judge David
Stewart Cercone entered a case management order as follows:

   -- Post Discovery Status Conference to be scheduled upon
      motion of the parties.

   -- The parties shall move to amend pleadings or add new
      parties by Nov. 15, 2021.

   -- Fact discovery on Rule 23 class certification and the
      initial phase of fact discovery on substantive issues in
      the case shall be completed by Dec. 13, 2021.

   -- Plaintiffs motion for Class Certification and supporting
      submissions shall be filed on or before Jan. 3, 2022;

   -- Defendants responsive submissions shall be filed on or
      before Jan 24, 2022.

   -- Plaintiffs Pretrial Statement due by Feb. 24, 2022.

   -- Defendants Pretrial Statement due by March 25, 2022.

   -- Pretrial Stipulation due by April 4, 2022.

   -- Motions for Summary Judgment due by May 4, 2022.

The Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association, Inc. is one
of the governing bodies of high school and junior high school
sports for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3pJTfpA at no extra charge.[CC]

PENSHURST TRADING: Graciano Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Penshurst Trading
Inc. The case is styled as Sandy Graciano, on behalf of himself and
all other persons similarly situated v. Penshurst Trading Inc.,
Case No. 1:21-cv-08761 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 26, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Penshurst Trading Inc., doing business as Juliska Inc. --
https://www.juliska.com/ -- wholesales home furnishings.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18th St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal



PFA INSURANCE: Class Cert Hearing Bid Set for Feb. 22, 2022
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit RE PFA INSURANCE MARKETING LITIGATION,
Case No. 4:18-cv-03771-YGR (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Yvonne
Gonzalez Rogers entered an order granting joint stipulation
adjusting schedule as follows

   -- Close of Expert Discovery due by Nov. 12, 2021.

   -- Daubert/Dispositive Motion due by Dec. 6, 2021.

   -- Replies due by Jan. 18, 2022.

   -- Responses due by Jan. 6, 2022.

   -- Motion for Class Certification Hearing set for Feb. 22,
      2022 02:00 PM via Zoom Webinar Videoconference.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3jJFDqJ at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel C. Girard, Esq.
          Jordan Elias, Esq.
          Adam E. Polk, Esq.
          GIRARD SHARP LLP
          601 California Street, Suite 1400
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 981-4800
          Facsimile: (415) 981-4846
          E-mail: dgirard@girardsharp.com
                  jelias@girardsharp.com
                  apolk@girardsharp.com

The Attorney for Defendant Premier Financial Alliance, Inc., is:

          Michael J. Hassen, Esq.
          REALLAW, APC
          1981 N. Broadway, Suite 280
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 359-7500
          Facsimile: (925) 557-7690
          E-mail: MJHassen@reallaw.us

The Attorneys for the Defendant Life Insurance Company of the
Southwest, are:

          Robert D. Phillips, Jr., Esq.
          Thomas A. Evans, Esq.
          Tania L. Rice, Esq.
          ALSTON & BIRD LLP
          560 Mission St., Suite 2100
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          E-mail: bo.phillips@alston.com
                  tom.evans@alston.com
                  tania.rice@alston.com

PFIZER INC: MSP Recovery Sues Over Carcinogen in Quit-Smoking Meds
------------------------------------------------------------------
MSP Recovery Claims Series 44, LLC, and MSP Recovery Claims, Series
LLC, Plaintiff, v. Pfizer, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-23676,
(S.D. Fla., October 19, 2021) seeks economic damages and other
relief for breach of express and implied warranties, fraud, unjust
enrichment, negligence and for violation of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act and various state consumer protection laws.

MSP accuses Pfizer of selling adulterated, misbranded, and
unapproved varenicline-containing drugs under the brand name
Chantix(R), known generically as varenicline and is a partial
nicotine agonist which is a first-line therapy in the treatment to
aid in smoking cessation. N-nitroso-varenicline is a probable human
carcinogen.

On September 16, 2021, Pfizer recalled Chantix. MSP's assignors has
been purchasing Chantix long before the recall. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Andrés Rivero, Esq.
      Jorge A. Mestre, Esq.
      Alan H. Rolnick, Esq.
      David L. Daponte, Esq.
      RIVERO MESTRE LLP
      2525 Ponce de Leon Blvd., Suite 1000
      Miami, FL 33134
      Telephone: (305) 445-2500
      Facsimile: (305) 445-2505
      E-mail: arivero@riveromestre.com
              jmestre@riveromestre.com
              arolnick@riveromestre.com
              ddaponte@riveromestre.com
              npuentes@riveromestre.com


PHH MORTGAGE: Giannasca Suit Removed to D. Massachusetts
--------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Anthony Giannasca, on behalf of himself and all
others so similarly situated v. PHH Mortgage Corporation, Deutsche
Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee of the Indymac Indx
Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-AR33, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2005-AR33 Under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement Dated,
Case No. 2181CV01998 was removed from the Middlesex Superior Court,
to the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts on Oct. 25, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:21-cv-11741 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Real Property: Foreclosure.

PHH Mortgage Corporation -- https://www.phhmortgage.com/ --
provides mortgage financing solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

The Defendants are represented by:

          Kevin W. Manganaro, Esq.
          HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP
          53 State Street, 27th Floor
          Boston, MA 02109
          Phone: (516) 241-5521
          Email: kmanganaro@hinshawlaw.com


PLATINUM RESTAURANTS: Extension to Reply to Decertification Sought
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LAUREN GREEN, et al., v.
PLATINUM RESTAURANTS MID-AMERICA LLC d/b/a EDDIE MERLOT'S PRIME
AGED BEEF AND SEAFOOD, Case No. 3:14-cv-00439-RGJ-RSE (W.D. Ky.),
the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order granting them a 14
day extension to respond to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, and Defendant's Motion in the Alternative to Decertify
Class and Collective Action Claims.

On October 1, 2021, the defendant filed Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, and Defendant's Motion in the Alternative to
Decertify Class and Collective Action Claims.

According to Local Rule 7.1(c), the plaintiffs' responses are due
not later than 21 days after the defendant's motion, which is
Friday, October 22, 2021.

The plaintiffs have worked diligently to prepare their responses
but require additional time to prepare a thorough response to both
motions.

The factual record and issues raised by the defendant's motions are
sufficiently complex and time consuming to require the requested 14
day extension in order to be able to adequately prepare and file
the plaintiffs' responses.

Therefore, the plaintiffs respectfully request that the current
deadline be extended by 14 days so that the plaintiffs' responses
are due no later than November 5, 2021.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3pHJXdQ at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          H. Wallace Blizzard, Esq.
          WIGGINS, CHILDS, PANTAZIS,
          FISHER & GOLDFARB, LLC
          The Kress Building
          301 19th Street North
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 314-0593

               - and -

          Garry R. Adams, Esq.
          ADAMS LANDENWICH & WALTON, PLLC
          517 West Ormsby Avenue
          Louisville, KY 40203
          Telephone: (512) 561-0085

PROGRESSIVE SPECIALTY: Drummond Files Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Progressive Specialty
Insurance Company, et al. The case is styled as Leon Drummond, Lee
Wlliams, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
v. Progressive Specialty Insurance Company, Progressive Advanced
Insurance Company, Case No. 5:21-cv-04479-EGS (E.D. Pa., Oct. 12,
2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Insurance Contract for Breach of
Contract.

Progressive Specialty Insurance Company --
https://www.progressive.com/ -- operates as an insurance firm. The
Company offers property, casualty, life, and health insurance
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ruben Honik, Esq.
          HONIK LLC
          1515 Market St., Ste. 1100
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Phone: (267) 435-1300
          Email: ruben@honiklaw.com


R&L INTERIOR: Ct. Certifies Collective Action in Duran FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Nelson Duran, v. R&L
Interior Renovations and Construction Corp, et al., Case No.
1:20-cv-09344-AJN (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Alison J. Nathan
entered an order that:

   1. granting conditional certification of this case as a
      collective action consisting of:

      "current and former non-managerial assistants, laborers,
      and/or those in similar positions, who performed work for
      R&L at any time during the relevant FLSA period;"

   2. directing R&L, within 14 days of this Order, to produce to
      Plaintiffs a computer-readable data file containing the
      names, last known mailing addresses, all known home and
      mobile telephone numbers, all known email addresses, dates
      of employment, and primary languages spoken of all
      potential collective action members who worked for R&L
      from November 6, 2017, to the present;

   3. directing the Plaintiffs to disseminate notice of this
      action;

   4. directing R&L to post the notice at 3315 Hull Avenue,
      Bronx, New York, in a place at that location that is
      visible to potential collective action members, and
      provide an affidavit attesting to their compliance and
      swearing that the notice will remain posted and
      unobstructed during the entire 60-day opt-in period;

   5. tolling the statute of limitations for all putative
      collective members' FLSA claims from the date this motion
      was filed, March 19, 2021, to the date of this Order; and

   6. directing the parties, by November 1, 2021, to submit a
      joint letter and proposed case management plan as detailed
      in the Court's Order dated November 19, 2020.

The Court said, "The Plaintiffs' motion for conditional
certification was filed on March 19, 2021, about five months after
Plaintiffs timely filed the complaint. The motion has pended for
nearly seven months since it was filed. The Court finds that it is
appropriate, and consistent with the FLSA's remedial nature, to
toll the statute of limitations from March 19, 2021, to the date of
this Order.

The Plaintiff Duran brings claims on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated against R&L, for failure to pay overtime wages,
a minimum wage, and other violations of state and federal labor
laws.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3jIpRw5 at no extra charge.[CC]

RALEIGH RESTAURANT: Koval Files Suit to Recover Proper Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
Bethany Koval, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Raleigh Restaurant Concepts, LLC, Lowrie
Management LLLP, Sean Baker, Troy Lowrie, Doe Managers 1 through 3
and Does 4 through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-00423,
(E.D. N.C., October 15, 2021) seeks redress for the Defendants'
denial of mandatory minimum wage and overtime provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, for illegally absconding with Plaintiff's
tips and demanding illegal kickbacks including in the form of
"House Fees."

Defendants operate an adult-oriented entertainment facility located
in Raleigh, North Carolina where Koval worked as a dancer. She
claims to be denied minimum wage payments and denied overtime pay
for being misclassified as an independent contractor. She was
compensated exclusively through tips from customers but was
required to share her tips with other non-service employees who do
not customarily receive tips, including disk jockeys and security
personnel, says the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Randall J. Phillips, Esq.
      CHARLES G. MONNTETT III & ASSOCIATES
      6842 Morrison Boulevard, Suite 100
      Charlotte, NC 28211
      Telephone: (704) 376-1911
      Fax: (704) 376-1921
      Email: rphillips@carolinalaw.com

             - and -

      John P. Kristensen, Esq.
      KRISTENSEN LLP
      12540 Beatrice Street, Suite 200
      Los Angeles, CA 90066
      Telephone: (310) 507-7924
      Fax: (310) 507-7906
      Email: john@kristensenlaw.com

             - and -

      Jarrett L. Ellzey, Esq.
      HUGHES ELLZEY
      1105 Milford Street
      Houston, TX
      Telephone: (713) 554-2377
      Fax: (888) 995-3335
      Email: jarrett@hughesellzey.com


REALIZATION CENTER: Counselors File Labor Suit, Seek Overtime Pay
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Katie Lawson, Taina Camacho and Blaise Prince, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Realization
Center, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 613219/2021, (N.Y. Sup., October
19, 2021), seeks to recover unpaid wages for overtime work for
which Plaintiffs did not receive overtime premium pay, liquidated
damages and reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs of this action
under New York labor laws.

Plaintiffs worked as counselors for Realization Center and claim
that they were misclassified as exempt from overtime and were paid
a salary despite working over 40 hours per week without receiving
premium overtime pay for all the hours they worked. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Troy L. Kessler, Esq.
      Garrett Kaske, Esq.
      Tana Forrester, Esq.
      KESSLER MATURA P.C.
      534 Broadhollow Road, Suite 275
      Melville, NY 11747
      Telephone: (631) 499-9100
      Email: tkessler@kesslermatura.com
             tforrester@kesslermatura.com
             gkaske@kesslermatura.com


RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE: Brooks Files FDCPA Suit in W.D.N.C.
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Receivables
Performance Management LLC, et al. The case is styled as Tonia
Brooks aka Graham, individually and on behalf all others similarly
situated v. Receivables Performance Management LLC, John Does 1-25,
Case No. 3:21-cv-00579 (W.D.N.C., Oct. 27, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Receivables Performance Management --
http://www.receivablesperformance.com/-- is a national leader in
accounts receivable management.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C. Randolph Emory, Esq.
          THE EMORY LAW FIRM, P.C.
          11020 David Taylor Drive, Suite 102
          Charlotte, NC 28262
          Phone: (704) 371-4333
          Fax: (704) 371-3015
          Email: emorylawecf@gmail.com


RICE DRILLING: Class Certification Bid Filing Due December 1
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as J&R PASSMORE, LLC, et al.,
v. RICE DRILLING D, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-01587-ALM-KAJ
(S.D. Ohio), the Hon. Judge Kimberly A. Jolson entered an order:

   1. directing the Plaintiffs to produce the unredacted
      materials Ms. Passmore used to prepare for her deposition
      by October 18, 2021;

   2. directing the Plaintiffs' counsel, Craig Wilson, to comply
      with the subpoena served upon him by October 22, 2021; and

   3. amending deadlines as follows:

      -- Fact/Class discovery due by November 14, 2021;

      -- Class Certification Motion due by December 1, 2021;

      -- Response due by January 13, 2022; and

      -- Reply due by February 13, 2022.

The Court notes that while it has been preparing a ruling on these
disputes, the parties have continued to raise additional discovery
concerns. The parties are reminded that, pursuant to Local Rule
37.1, they are required to meaningful confer about disputes and
"exhaust among themselves all extrajudicial means for resolving
their differences."

Rice Drilling was founded in 2011. The company's line of business
includes providing oil and gas services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 15, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3vSEbqH at no extra charge[CC]


RLH FIRE PROTECTION: Newlen Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against RLH Fire Protection,
Inc. The case is styled as Kandice Newlen, an individual, on behalf
of herself and others similarly situated v. RLH Fire Protection,
Inc., Case No. BCV-21-102503 (Cal. Super. Ct., Kern Cty., Oct. 25,
2021).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment – Civil Unlimited."

RLH Fire Protection -- https://www.rlhfp.com/ -- is a construction
firm dealing in installation, design and repair of fire protection
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Liane L. Katzenstein Ly, Esq.
          KINGLSEY & KINGLSEY APC
          16133 Ventura Blvd., Ste. 1200
          Encino, CA 91436
          Phone: 818-990-8300
          Fax: 818-990-2903
          Email: liane@kingsleykingsley.com


ROBINHOOD FINANCIAL: Dec. 30 Opposition to Class Cert Bid Sought
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit Re: Robinhood Outage Litigation, Case
No. 3:20-cv-01626-JD (N.D. Cal.), the Parties stipulated and
agreed, subject to the order of the Court, that:

   1. The Defendants' opposition to the motion for class
      certification shall be due December 3, 2021; and

   2. The Plaintiffs' reply in support of the motion for class
      certification shall be due December 22, 2021.

Robinhood Financial LLC operates as an institutional brokerage
company.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Oct. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3mnGuPA at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Anne Marie Murphy, Esq.
          Mark C. Molumphy, Esq.
          Noorjahan Rahman, Esq.
          Tyson C. Redenbarger, Esq.
          Julia Q. Peng, Esq.
          COTCHETT, PITRE & McCARTHY, LLP
          San Francisco Airport Office Center
          840 Malcolm Road, Suite 200
          Burlingame, CA 94010
          Telephone: (650) 697-6000
          Facsimile: (650) 697-0577
          E-mail: amurphy@cpmlegal.com
                  mmolumphy@cpmlegal.com
                  nrahman@cpmlegal.com
                  tredenbarger@cpmlegal.com
                  jpeng@cpmlegal.com

               - and -

          Matthew B. George, Esq.
          Kathleen A. Herkenhoff, Esq.
          Laurence D. King, Esq.
          KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
          1999 Harrison Street, Suite 1560
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: 415-772-4700
          Facsimile: 415-772-4707
          E-mail: mgeorge@kaplanfox.com
                  kherkenhoff@kaplanfox.com
                  lking@kaplanfox.com

The Attorneys for the Defendants Robinhood Financial LLC,
Robinhood Securities, LLC and Robinhood Markets, Inc., are:

          C. Brandon Wisoff, Esq.
          FARELLA BRAUN + MARTEL LLP
          235 Montgomery Street, 17th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 954-4400
          Facsimile: (415) 954-4480
          E-mail: bwisoff@fbm.com

               - and -

          Maeve L. O'Connor, Esq.
          Elliot Greenfield, Esq.
          DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP
          Brandon Fetzer (pro hac vice)
          919 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 909-6000
          E-mail: mloconnor@debevoise.com
                  egreenfield@debevoise.com
                  bfetzer@debevoise.com

RSP EXPRESS: Class Certification Bid Filing Extended to Nov. 18
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MIRELA USELMANN, D/B/A
SAPPHIRE TRUCKING, INC., GABRIEL BICLEA, D/B/A MB TRUCKING, INC.,
ION GUTU, D/B/A GPA TRUCKING, INC., and DUMITRU MARIUS RENDENCIUC,
D/B/A DMR EXPRESS, INC., v. RAZVAN POP, MARIA POP, R.S.P. EXPRESS,
INC., NA TRUCK REPAIR, LLC and JOHN DOE CORPORATION ONE and JOHN
DOE CORPORATION TWO, Case No. 2:19-cv-13652-GAD-DRG (E.D. Mich.),
the Hon. Judge Gershwin A. Drain entered a stipulated scheduling
order as follows:

   -- Class Certification Motions Due:        November 18, 2021

   -- Discovery Cut-off (Class & Merit):      February 18, 2022

   -- Dispositive Motion Cut-off:             March 18, 2022

   -- Case Evaluation (without sanctions):    March 2022

   -- Settlement Conference:                  April 2022

There will no further adjournments of the scheduling order date
will be given, says Judge Gershwin.

The Court said, "The parties have been in the process of exchanging
information and documents. As part of that process, Defendants have
identified a large number of banker boxes (over 100) containing
documents that are potentially responsive to Plaintiffs’
discovery requests. Given the voluminous nature of the discovery
being produced for inspection as well as additional discovery that
is outstanding over Defendants’ computer systems, the parties
require additional time. Further modification of the Scheduling
Order is necessary in this case to allow both parties enough time
to finish discovery given this litigation’s complicated factual
and legal issues, including discovery that is necessary to file and
respond to a motion for class certification."

R.S.P. Express Inc. provides transportation services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Bqr8Od at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Keith D. Flynn, Esq.
          Bruce A. Miller, Esq.
          MILLER COHEN, P.L.C.
          7700 Second Avenue, Suite 335
          Detroit, MI 48202
          Telephone: (313) 964-4454
          Facsimile: (313) 964-4490
          E-mail: kflynn@millercohen.com

               - and -

          Melvin Butch Hollowell, Esq.
          Angela L. Baldwin, Esq.
          THE MILLER LAW FIRM, P.C.
          950 W. University Dr., Ste. 300
          Rochester, MI 48307
          Telephone: (248) 841-2200
          E-mail: mbh@millerlawpc.com
                  alb@millerlawpc.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Ray Carey, Esq.
          GASIOREK, MORGAN, GRECO,
          McCAULEY & KOTZIAN, P.C.
          Attorneys for Defendant
          30500 Northwestern Hwy., Ste. 425
          Farmington Hills, MI 48334
          Telephone: (248) 865-0001
          E-mail: Rcarey@gmgmklaw.com

SADDLE PEAK: Court Tosses Class & Collective Claims in Clark Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James M. Moody, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas, Central Division, dismissed without
prejudice all of Clark's class and collective action claims in the
case, PATRICIA CLARK, individually and on behalf Of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SADDLE PEAK, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 4:21CV000668 JM (E.D. Ark.).

The Defendant has filed a motion to compel arbitration and to
dismiss the Plaintiff's class action complaint. The Plaintiff has
responded and agrees that an enforceable arbitration agreement
exists between Clark and the Defendant.

The Plaintiff seeks to voluntarily dismiss all the class and the
collective action claims contained in the Complaint. Her motion for
voluntary nonsuit of the class and collective action claims is
granted. All the class and the collective action claims are
dismissed without prejudice.

The remaining claims of the Plaintiff against the Defendant will be
administratively stayed pending arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/jthx2528 from Leagle.com.


SALERNITANI LTD: Ortega Files FLSA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Salernitani LTD. The
case is styled as Manuel Ortega Ortega, on behalf of other
similarly situated employees v. Salernitani LTD. doing business as:
San Matteo Pizzeria and Espresso Bar, Case No. 1:21-cv-08748
(S.D.N.Y., Oct. 26, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act for Denial of Overtime Compensation.

Salernitani LTD. doing business as San Matteo Pizzeria and Espresso
Bar -- https://www.sanmatteopanuozzo.com/ -- is a little pizzeria
serving Neapolitan-style pies straight from the wood-burning
oven.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


SCRAPPY THOMAS: Chancy Files Suit Over Denied OT Pay, Meal Breaks
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Randy W. Chancy, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Scrappy Thomas, Inc. and Brian T. Lewis,
Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-02467 (S.D. Fla., October 20, 2021),
seeks to recover money damages for retaliation and unpaid regular
and overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Scrappy Thomas is a scrap metal recycling company in Mulberry, FL
where Chancy worked as a non-exempted, full-time employee from
approximately July 1, 2019 to July 30, 2021 as a welder, recycling
and cleaning employee. He claims to have worked more than 40 hours
during one or more weeks without being properly compensated. He
also claims to have worked through his lunch breaks. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
     ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
     9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
     Miami, FL 33156
     Telephone: (305) 446-1500
     Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
     Email: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


SHUTTERFLY LIFETOUCH: Can Compel Arbitration in Ross Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELLEN ROSS, on behalf of herself, the general public
and those similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SHUTTERFLY LIFETOUCH,
LLC and SHUTTERFLY, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-06040-BLF (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Jose Division, granted the
Defendants' renewed motion to compel arbitration.

Background

The case is a putative consumer class action arising out of the
marketing of school pictures by Defendant Shutterfly and its
subsidiary, Defendant Lifetouch. Plaintiff Ross claims that the
Defendants' practice of taking unsolicited photos of school
children pursuant to their Family Approval Program, and sending
those photos home with instructions for payment, violates
California law.

Ms. Ross and another putative class representative, Don Cullen,
filed the action on Aug. 27, 2020, asserting claims against the
Defendants arising out of their Family Approval Program, through
which the Defendants provide school picture services to numerous
schools. Cullen has been dismissed from the action. The operative
FAC, brought by Ross on behalf of herself, the general public and
those similarly situated, alleges the facts set forth.

Shutterfly is a Delaware limited liability company headquartered in
California. In 2018, Shutterfly acquired Lifetouch, a Minnesota
limited liability company that is headquartered in Minnesota.
"Lifetouch is a professional photography company that has been
taking and selling school photographs for over 80 years." It
provides school picture services twice per year, in fall and
spring, working with schools to hire photographers, take the
photos, and deliver marketing materials to families via
schoolchildren. Shutterfly oversees Lifetouch's activities and
manages the digital sales, marketing, and manufacturing of the
school photos.

For fall photos, parents order photo packages before school
pictures are taken, and parents have the option of choosing not to
have pictures taken of their children. For spring photos, however,
the Defendants take unsolicited photos of school children pursuant
to their Family Approval Program. The photos are sent home with
instructions directing parents to pay for photos they keep and
return all other photos to the school. The parents are not given an
opportunity to opt out of having the photos taken and sent home.
They feel pressure to pay for these unsolicited photos or to return
them to the school.

Ms. Ross has four children who attended school in Modesto,
California from 2001 to the present. During that period, she
received unsolicited photos of her children from the Defendants.
Ross consistently purchased the Family Approval Program packages
for all of her children from 2001 until approximately 2019.
According to Ross, the Defendants' conduct violated California law.
She alleges that she "would not have paid for any of the
unsolicited photo packages had the Defendants not misrepresented
her obligation to pay for or return the photos of her children."

Ms. Ross asserts claims for: (1) unjust enrichment; (2) violation
of California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), Cal. Civ.
Code Section 1750 et seq.; (3) violation of California's false
advertising law ("FAL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17500 et
seq.; (4) common law fraud, deceit, and/or misrepresentation; (5)
violation of California's unfair competition law ("UCL"), Cal. Bus.
& Prof. Code Section 17200 et seq.; and (6) violation of Cal. Civil
Code Section 1584.5. She seeks to litigate these claims on behalf
of a nationwide class of persons who received unsolicited Family
Approval Program photo packages from Defendants, as well as several
subclasses.

The Defendants move to compel individual arbitration of Ross'
claims pursuant to an arbitration provision included in the Terms
of Service ("TOS") that appear on Lifetouch's website. The Court
denied the Defendants' prior motion to compel arbitration of Ross'
claims based on Lifetouch's online TOS, finding that the Defendants
had failed to show either than Ross purchased school pictures
online or that the paper order forms sent home from school gave
adequate notice that ordering photos would bind her to Lifetouch's
online TOS.

The Defendants now submit evidence that Ross purchased school
pictures through Lifetouch's website on Oct. 1, 2020, and April 21,
2021. Based on that evidence, the Defendants have filed the present
renewed motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
provision in Lifetouch's online TOS or, in the alternative, for
reconsideration of the order denying the Defendants' prior motion
to compel arbitration.

Discussion

The Defendants' prior motion to compel arbitration of Ross' claims
was denied by the Court on May 19, 2021. In that order, the Court
determined that the Defendants had not met their burden to show
that Ross agreed to the arbitration provision included in
Lifetouch's online TOS, because the Defendants had not submitted
evidence that Ross purchased school pictures online or that the
paper order forms sent to the home were sufficient to put Ross on
notice that the online TOS applied.

The Defendants now bring a renewed motion to compel arbitration or,
in the alternative, for reconsideration of the Court's prior order
based on evidence that Ross did purchase school pictures online. In
opposition to the motion, Ross contends that the Defendants cannot
show the diligence necessary to warrant reconsideration of the
Court's prior order and that in any event the Defendants' arguments
fail on the merits.

Judge Freeman finds that the Defendants have shown that
reconsideration of the prior order is warranted and that their
renewed motion to compel arbitration is meritorious. She says that
the Defendants have met their burden to prove the existence of an
arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. She also
finds that Ross' challenges to the enforceability and scope of the
arbitration agreement have been delegated to the arbitrator.

Order

Accordingly, the Defendants' renewed motion to compel arbitration
is granted. In light of her order compelling arbitration, Judge
Freeman terminated the Defendants' pending motion to dismiss. This
terminations without prejudice to renewal of the motion should the
arbitrator determine that the arbitration agreement is
unenforceable or does not encompass Ross' claims.

The litigation is stayed pending arbitration. The Clerk will
administratively close the case. This is an internal procedure that
does not affect the substantive rights of the parties. The parties
may request that the case be reopened, if appropriate, upon the
completion of arbitration proceedings. Upon the completion of
arbitration proceedings, the parties will file a joint status
update advising the Court whether any party will seek to reopen the
case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/h7kwebbd from Leagle.com.


SQUARE INC: Sabatini Sues Over Securities Exchange Act Violation
----------------------------------------------------------------
Eric Sabatini, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. SQUARE, INC., RANDY GARUTTI, MARY MEEKER, LAWRENCE
SUMMERS, DARREN WALKER, JACK DORSEY, DAVID VINIAR, PAUL DEIGHTON,
ANNA PATTERSON, ROELOF BOTHA, JAMES MCKELVEY, AMY BROOKS, and SHAWN
CARTER, Case No. 1:21-cv-01482-UNA (D. Del., Oct. 22, 2021), is
brought against Square, Inc. and the members of Square's Board of
Directors for their violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, arising out of
their attempt to acquire Afterpay Limited through Square's
subsidiary Lanai (AU) 2 Pty Ltd. ("Merger Sub") (the "Proposed
Transaction").

On August 1, 2021, Square announced that it had entered into a
Scheme Implementation Deed pursuant to which, each share of
Afterpay common stock will be converted into the right to receive
either: (i) 0.375 shares of Square Class common stock ("New Square
Shares"), or (ii) 0.375 CHESS Depositary Interests ("New Square
CDIs") representing ownership interest in shares of Square Class A
common stock issued by Square pursuant to a Deed Poll to be
executed by Square and Merger Sub in favor of all Afterpay
shareholders.

On October 5, 2021, Square filed a Schedule 14A Definitive Proxy
Statement (with the SEC. The Proxy is materially deficient and
misleading because, inter alia, it fails to disclose material
information regarding: (i) the financial analyses performed by the
Company's financial advisor Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC ("Morgan
Stanley"); and (ii) the background of the Proposed Transaction.
Without additional information, the Proxy is materially misleading
in violation of the federal securities laws.

The stockholder vote to approve the Proposed Transaction is
forthcoming. Under the Merger Agreement, following a successful
stockholder vote, the Proposed Transaction will be consummated. For
these reasons, the Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the Defendants from
conducting the stockholder vote on the Proposed Transaction unless
and until the material information is disclosed to the holders of
the Company common stock, or, in the event the Proposed Transaction
is consummated, to recover damages resulting from the Defendants'
violations of the Exchange Act, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a continuous stockholder of Square.

Square was founded in 2009 to enable businesses to accept card
payments, an important capability that was previously inaccessible
to many businesses.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          LONG LAW, LLC
          3828 Kennett Pike, Suite 208
          Wilmington, DE 19807
          Phone: (302) 729-9100
          Email: BDLong@longlawde.com

               - and -

          Alexandra B. Raymond, Esq.
          BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE, P.C.
          810 Seventh Avenue, Suite 620
          New York, NY 10019
          Phone: (646) 860-9158
          Fax: (212) 214-0506
          Email: raymond@bespc.com


STOKES HEALTHCARE: Settlement in Pet Parade Suit Gets Initial Nod
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as PET PARADE, INC., on
behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, v. STOKES
HEALTHCARE, INC., a foreign company, doing business as EPICUR
PHARMA, Case No. 1:20-cv-24279-KMW (S.D. Fla.), the Hon. Judge
Chris McAliley entered a preliminary approval order as follows:

   1. The Class, Representative, and Class Counsel

      -- The Court therefore preliminarily certifies the
         following class:

         "All persons identified on Epicur's Master Fax List who
         (1) during the four-year period prior to the filing of
         this action through the date of preliminary approval,
         (2) were sent a telephone facsimile message advertising
         the commercial availability or quality of any property,
         goods, or services by or on behalf of Epicur, (3) that
         did not display an opt-out notice on the first page
         stating that the recipient may make a request to the
         sender of the advertisement not to send any future
         advertisements to a telephone facsimile machine or
         machines and that failure to comply, within 30 days,
         would be unlawful."

         This class specifically excludes persons in the
         following categories: (A) individuals who are or were
         during the Class Period officers or directors of Stokes
         Healthcare, Inc. or any of its respective affiliates;
         (B) the district judge and magistrate judge presiding
         over this case, and the judges of the United States
         Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, their
         spouses, and persons within the third degree of
         relationship to either of them; and (C) all persons
         who file a timely and proper request to be excluded
         from the Settlement Class in accordance with Section
         III(D) of the Agreement.

      -- The Court recognizes that Defendant reserves all of its
         defenses and objections against and rights to oppose
         any request for class certification in the event that
         the proposed does not become Final for any reason. The
         Parties reserve and retain all of their rights in the
         event the Settlement does not become Final for any
         reason.

      -- For settlement purposes only, the Court preliminarily
         appoints Plaintiff Pet Parade, Inc. as Class
         Representative.

      -- For settlement purposes only, the Court appoints the
         following persons and firms as Class Counsel for the
         Settlement Class:

              Seth M. Lehrman, Esq.
              EDWARDS POTTINGER, LLC
              425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2
              Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301

                   - and -

              Joshua H. Eggnatz, Esq.
              Michael J. Pascucci, Esq.
              EGGNATZ | PASCUCCI
              7450 Griffin Road, Suite 230
              Davie, FL 33314

      -- The Court preliminarily approves the Settlement,
         together with all revised exhibits thereto, as fair,
         reasonable and adequate. The Court finds that the
         Settlement was reached in the absence of collusion, is
         the product of informed, good-faith, arm's-length
         negotiations between the Parties and their capable and
         experienced counsel. The Court further finds that the
         Settlement, including the revised exhibits thereto, is
         within the range of reasonableness and possible
         judicial approval, such that: (a) a presumption of
         fairness is appropriate for the purposes of preliminary
         settlement approval; and (b) it is appropriate to
         effectuate notice to the Settlement Class, as set forth
         below and in the Settlement, and schedule a Final
         Approval Hearing to assist the Court in determining
         whether to grant Final Approval to the Settlement and
         enter a Final Approval Order.

   2. Notice to class members

      -- The Court adopts and approves the Claim Form in
         substantially the same form as he Claim Form attached
         to the Agreement.

   3. Exclusion requests

      Any member of the Settlement Class who wishes to opt-out
      or exclude himself or herself from the Settlement Class
      must submit an appropriate, timely request for exclusion
      to the Settlement Administrator at the address on the
      Class Notice and to be postmarked or submitted online no
      later than 45 days after dissemination of the Mail Notice.

   4. Objections

      Any Settlement Class Member who does not properly and
      timely submit an opt-out request and who wishes to object
      to the fairness, reasonableness, or adequacy of the
      Agreement or the proposed Settlement or who wishes to
      object to the Attorneys' Fee Award or potential Service
      Award must file with the Court and serve on Class Counsel
      and Defendant's Counsel, postmarked no later than the Opt-
      Out and Objection Deadline.

Healthcare, Inc. is an online health insurance company providing a
data-driven shopping platform that helps consumers enroll in
individual health insurance.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3GDDJ4K at no extra charge.[CC]

STRADA SERVICES: Reyes Seeks Rehearing of Class Cert. Bid
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RICHARD REYES,
individually and On behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
STRADA SERVICES INC. d/b/a Strada Electric and Security, Case No.
8:21-cv-00976-VMC-TGW (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff Reyes and the opt
in plaintiffs asks the Court to enter an order reconsidering and/or
rehearing their motion for conditional certification including the
review of the corporate representative deposition testimony of
Defendant, and consider whether there has been a misapprehension or
misunderstanding of facts.

The Plaintiffs request oral argument if permitted by the Court. If
this motion is denied, Plaintiff respectfully requests the
alternative relief requested including an additional 30 days time
for the opt in plaintiffs to file their individual complaints
without the SOL running.

The Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification
on grounds that the Plaintiffs were not similarly situated.

Strada Electric is doing business in the home services industry.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Oct. 18,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3mgKsJu
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Benjamin Lee Williams, Esq.
          WILLIAMS LAW P.A.
          464 Sturdivant Avenue
          Atlantic Beach, FL 32233
          Telephone: 904-580-6060
          Facsimile: 904-417-7494
          E-mail: bwilliams@williamslawjax.com

               - and -

          Mitchell L. Feldman, Esq.
          FELDMAN LEGAL GROUP
          6916 W. Linebaugh Avenue, Suite 101
          Tampa, FL 33625
          Telephone: 813-639-9366
          Facsimile: 813-639-9376
          E-mail: mfeldman@flandgatrialattorneys.com

SUNRISE FOODS: Lopez Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime
------------------------------------------------------
Hector Lopez, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. SUNRISE FOODS, LLC dba JACK IN THE BOX a California
limited liability company, and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive,  Case No.
21STCV37647 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., Oct. 12, 2021), is
brought under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004,
California Labor Code, to recover civil penalties and any other
available relief on behalf of Plaintiff, the State of California as
a result of the Defendants' failure to pay overtime for all
overtime hours worked.

Specifically, as to Plaintiff and others similarly situated, the
Defendants have: failed and continue to fail to pay overtime for
all overtime hours worked; failed and continue to fail to authorize
or permit all meal periods; failed and continue to fail to
authorize or permit all rest breaks; Failed to reimburse business
expenses; failed to timely furnish accurate itemized wage
statements; Failed to pay final wages in a timely manner pursuant
to Labor Code; failed to provide wage theft act notice; and failed
and continue to fail to provide reporting time pay pursuant to
Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders and in violation of Labor
and the Applicable Wage Order, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as a "Team Member" at
various Jack in the Box Restaurants in Los Angeles County,
California from March 2020, through August 17, 2020.

Sunrise Foods LLC is a California Limited Liability Company doing
business as Jack in the Box Restaurants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Marcus Bradley, Esq.
          Kiley Grombacher, Esq.
          Lirit King, Esq.
          BRADLEY/GROMBACHER, LLP
          31365 Oak Crest Drive, Suite 240
          Westlake Village, CA 91361
          Phone: (805) 270-7100
          Facsimile: (805) 270-7589
          Email: mbradley@bradleygrombacher.com
                 kgrombacher@bradleygrombacher.com
                 lking@bradleygrombacher.com

               - and -

          Mark Ozzello, Esq.
          Mao Shiokura, Esq.
          Brandon Brouillette, Esq.
          Joseph Hakakian, Esq.
          CAPSTONE LAW, APC
          1875 Century Park East, Suite 1000
          Los Angeles CA 90067
          Phone: (310) 556-4811
          Facsimile: (310) 943-0396
          Email: mark.Ozzello@capstonelawyers.com
                 mao.shiokura@capstonelawyers.com
                 brandon.Brouillette@capstonelawyers.com
                 joseph.Hakakian@capstonelawyers.com


SYMETRA ASSIGNED: Bid for Class Certification Due December 10
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RENALDO WHITE and RANDOLPH
NADEAU, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. SYMETRA ASSIGNED BENEFITS SERVICE COMPANY and SYMETRA
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 2:20-cv-01866-MJP (W.D. Wash.),
the Hon. Judge Marsha J. Pechman entered an order that:

   -- The deadline for class action discovery is extended to
      November 5, 2021.

   -- The briefing schedule for Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
      Certification is as follows:

      Plaintiffs' Motion for         December 10, 2021
      Class Certification

      Defendants' Opposition         January 14, 2022

      Plaintiffs' Reply 22           February 4, 2022

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3buEa33 at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Esq.
          Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Esq.
          Adele A. Daniel, Esq.
          Alison E. Chase, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98101-3052
          Telephone: (206) 623-1900
          Facsimile: (206) 623-3384
          E-mail: lsarko@kellerrohrback.com
                  gcappio@kellerrohrback.com
                  adaniel@kellerrohrback.com
                  achase@kellerrohrback.com

               - and -

          Jerome M. Marcus, Esq.
          Jonathan Auerbach, Esq.
          MARCUS & AUERBACH LLC
          1121 N. Bethlehem Pike, Suite 60-242
          Spring House, PA 19477
          Telephone: (215) 885-2250
          Facsimile: (888) 875-0469
          E-mail: jmarcus@marcusauerbach.com
                  auerbach@marcusauerbach.com

               - and -

          Daniel C. Simons, Esq.
          MARCUS & MARCUS, PLLC
          P.O. Box 212
          Merion Station, PA 19066
          Telephone: (215) 664-1184
          E-mail: dsimons@marcuslaw.us

               - and -

          Edward Stone, Esq.
          EDWARD STONE LAW P.C.
          175 West Putnam Avenue, 2nd Floor
          Greenwich, CT 06830
          Telephone: (203) 504-8425
          Facsimile: (203) 348-8477
          E-mail: eddie@edwardstonelaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Medora A. Marisseau, Esq.
          KARR TUTTLE CAMPBELL
          701 Fifth Ave., Ste. 3300
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 223-1313
          Facsimile: (206) 682-7100
          E-mail: mmarisseau@karrtuttle.com

               - and -

          Maeve L. O'Connor, Esq.
          Susan Reagan Gittes, Esq.
          DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP
          919 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 909-6000
          E-mail: mloconnor@debevoise.com
                  srgittes@debevoise.com

T-MOBILE USA: Precour Sues Over Data Breach
-------------------------------------------
Jack Precour, William Captain Reed, Cesar Lopez, Tomasina Enoch,
Marshall P. Jones, Jr. and Cornelia Clay Fulghum, on behalf of
themselves and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
T-Mobile USA, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-01415 (W.D. Wash.,
October 15, 2021), seeks to recover damages and other relief
resulting from a data breach, including but not limited to,
compensatory damages, reimbursement of costs and declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief resulting from negligence, breach of
express and implied contract, breach of fiduciary duty and
violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act and various states'
consumer protection acts.

T-Mobile USA, Inc. is a nationwide telecommunications company
headquartered in Bellevue, Washington and is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom AG, headquartered in Bonn, Germany.
T-Mobile collects a significant amount of data from its current and
former customers, often including sensitive personal information
such as Social Security numbers, addresses, telephone numbers,
dates of birth, bank account numbers, credit card numbers,
financial transaction records, credit ratings and driver's license
numbers.

On August 19, 2021, T-Mobile announced a "Notice of Data Breach" on
its website that it had learned on August 17, 2021.

Plaintiffs alleges that T-Mobile failed to safeguard the
confidential information of millions of current and former T-Mobile
USA, Inc. customers. The confidential information stolen appears to
be encompass names, birthdays, Social Security numbers, driver's
license numbers, phone numbers, and account PINs, among other
Personal Identifying Information. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Kim D. Stephens, Esq.
      Jason T. Dennett, Esq.
      Kaleigh N. Powell, Esq.
      TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS, PLLC
      1200 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1700
      Seattle, WA 98101
      Tel: (206) 682-5600
      Fax: (206) 682-2992
      Email: jdennett@tousley.com
             kstephens@tousley.com
             kpowell@tousley.com

             - and -

      Amy E. Keller, Esq.
      James A. Ulwick, Esq.
      DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC
      Ten North Dearborn Street, Sixth Floor
      Chicago, IL 60602
      Tel: (312) 214-7900
      Fax: (312) 253-1443
      Email: akeller@dicellolevitt.com
             julwick@dicellolevitt.com

             - and -

      William A. Kershaw, Esq.
      Ian J. Barlow, Esq.
      KERSHAW, COOK & TALLEY PC
      401 Watt Avenue
      Sacramento, CA 95846
      Tel: (916) 779-7000
      Fax: (916) 244-4829
      Email: bill@kctlegal.com
             ian@kctlegal.com

             - and -

      Tyler H. Fox, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF TYLER H. FOX
      135 Antrim St., Unit #2
      Cambridge, MA 02139
      Tel: (857) 260-3105
      Email: tylerfox@verizon.net


T-MOBILE USA: Song Sues Over Failure to Maintain Security
---------------------------------------------------------
Linda Song, Rachel Gurley, Andrew Luna, Mario Gordon, and Melani
Gordon, individually and on behalf of classes of similarly situated
individuals v. T-MOBILE USA, INC., Case No. 2:21-cv-01460 (W.D.
Wash., Oct. 27, 2021), is brought to seek compensation under the
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA) and principles of
common law negligence, unjust enrichment, breach of implied
contract, and breach of confidence, for their damages and those of
fellow class members as a result of the Defendant's failure to
implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices
appropriate to the nature of the information to protect its
customers' personal information.

"Not all data breaches are created equal. None of them are good,
but they do come in varying degrees of bad. And given how regularly
they happen, it's understandable that you may have become inured to
the news. Still, a T-Mobile breach that hackers claim involved the
data of 100 million people deserves your attention…." WIRED
Magazine, The T Mobile Data Breach is One You Can't Ignore, August
16, 2021. On the same day that article was printed, T-Mobile
confirmed that hackers using the Twitter handle @und0xxed had in
fact gained unauthorized access to T-Mobile data through T-Mobile
servers (the "Data Breach").

According to the hackers, the stolen personal identifying
information ("PII") includes customers' names, addresses, social
security numbers, drivers license information, phone numbers, dates
of birth, security PINs, phone numbers, and, for some customers,
unique IMSI and IMEI numbers (embedded in customer mobile devices
that identify the device and the SIM card that ties that customer's
device to a telephone number)—all going back as far as the
mid-1990s. The hackers also claim to have a database that includes
credit card numbers with six digits of the cards obfuscated.

T-Mobile has confirmed that a breach occurred, recommending that
all T-Mobile postpaid customers proactively change their PIN and
take advantage of Account Takeover Protection capabilities and
trickling out notices to affected individuals starting in late
August of 2021 and continuing as recently as October 11.
Unfortunately, it is too late: according to the hackers, they have
already sold a first batch containing hundreds of thousands of
records and are shopping the bulk of the stolen PII directly to
buyers.

As the target of many data breaches in the past, T-Mobile knew its
systems were vulnerable to attack. Yet it failed to implement and
maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate
to the nature of the information to protect its customers' personal
information, yet again putting millions of customers at great risk
of scams and identity theft. Its customers expected and deserved
better from the second largest wireless provider in the country,
says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs are customers of T-Mobile.

T-Mobile USA, Inc., is a Delaware corporation headquartered in
Bellevue, WA.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kim D. Stephens, Esq.
          Jason T. Dennett, Esq.
          Kaleigh N. Powell, Esq.
          TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
          1200 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1700
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Phone: (206) 682-5600
          Fax: (206) 682-2992
          Email: jdennett@tousley.com
                 kstephens@tousley.com
                 kpowell@tousley.com

               - and -

          Daniel J. Mogin, Esq.
          MOGINRUBIN LLP, Esq.
          Daniel J. Mogin, Esq.
          Jennifer M. Oliver, Esq.
          Timothy Z. LaComb, Esq.
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 3300
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone: (619) 687-6611
          Facsimile: (619) 687-6610
          Email: dmogin@moginrubin.com
                 joliver@moginrubin.com
                 tlacomb@moginrubin.com

               - and -

          Jonathan L. Rubin, Esq.
          1615 M Street, NW, Third Floor
          Washington, D.C. 20036
          Phone: (202) 630-0616
          Fax: (877) 247-8586
          Email: jrubin@moginrubin.com

               - and -

          Norman E. Siegel, Esq.
          Barrett J. Vahle, Esq.
          J. Austin Moore, Esq.
          STUEVE SIEGEL HANSON LLP
          460 Nichols Road, Suite 200
          Kansas City, MO 64112
          Phone: (816) 714-7100
          Email: siegel@stuevesiegel.com
                 vahle@stuevesiegel.com
                 moore@stuevesiegel.com

               - and -

          James Pizzirusso, Esq.
          HAUSFELD LLP
          888 16th Street N.W., Suite 300
          Washington, DC 20006
          Phone: 202-540-7200
          Email: jpizzirusso@hausfeld.com

               - and -

          Steven M. Nathan, Esq.
          HAUSFELD LLP
          33 Whitehall St., 14th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Phone: (646) 357-1100
          Email: snathan@hausfeld.com


TARGET CORPORATION: Bayne Must File Class Status Bid by Oct. 14
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MIEKE BAYNE and ALYSSA
HART, individually on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, v. TARGET CORPORATION, Case No. 1:21-cv-05938-AJN
(S.D.N.Y.),  the Hon. Judge Alison J. Nathan entered a civil case
management plan and scheduling order as follows:

   -- Plaintiffs' motion for class       October 14, 2022
      certification

   -- Defendant's opposition to class    December 14, 2022
      certification

   -- Defendant's evidentiary motion,    January 14, 2023
      including all challenges to
      Plaintiffs' class
      certification-based experts
      and/or other class
      certification-based evidence

   -- Plaintiffs' reply in support of    January 14, 2023
      motion for class certification

   -- Plaintiffs' opposition to          January 14, 2023
      Defendant's evidentiary motion

   -- Defendant's opposition to          February 14, 2023
      Plaintiffs' evidentiary
      motion

   -- Defendant's reply in support of    February 14, 2023
      evidentiary motion

   -- Plaintiffs' reply in support of    February 28, 2023
      evidentiary motion

Target Corporation is an American retail corporation. The
eighth-largest retailer in the United States, it is a component of
the S&P 500 Index.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2XO14Pp at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Max S. Roberts, Esq.
          888 Seventh Avenue, Third Floor
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: mroberts@bursor.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          David J. Carrier, Esq.
          LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP
          90 South 7th Street, Suite 2800
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 428-5000
          Facsimile: (612) 428-5001
          E-mail: david.carrier@lewisbrisbois.com

TOKYO II STEAK: Jiang Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Chun Lin Jiang, on his own behalf and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. TOKYO II STEAK HOUSE, INC. d/b/a Tokyo Japanese Steak
House; KOBE JAPANESE STEAKHOUSE, INC. f/k/a Tokyo Steak Hose Inc
d/b/a Tokyo Japanese Steak House; SHOGUN JAPANESE STEAK HOUSE, INC
d/b/a Bisuteki Tokyo d/b/a Bisuteki Tokyo Japanese Steak House; and
TOKYO III STEAK HOUSE, INC d/b/a Tokyo Japanese Steak House;
GUANGLONG LIN a/k/a Guang Long Lin a/k/a David Lin, XIONGWEN LI
a/k/a Xiong Wen Li, and ZILAN ZHANG a/k/a Zi Lan Zhang, Case No.
1:21-cv-11732 (D. Mass., Oct. 22, 2021), is brought against the
Defendants for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the Massachusetts General Law (MGL), arising from the
Defendants' various willful, malicious, and unlawful employment
policies, patterns and practices, and to recover from the
Defendants: unpaid minimum wage, unpaid overtime wages, liquidated
damages, prejudgment and post-judgment interest; and/or attorney's
fees and cost

The complaint alleges that the Defendants have willfully,
maliciously, and intentionally committed widespread violations of
the FLSA and Massachusetts General Law (MGL) by engaging in pattern
and practice of failing to pay its employees, including the
Plaintiff minimum wage for each hour worked and overtime
compensation for all hours worked over 40 each workweek, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants to work as a Master
Teriyaki Chef.

TOKYO II STEAK HOUSE, INC. d/b/a Tokyo Japanese Steak House is a
domestic business corporation organized under the laws of the State
of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Tiffany Troy, Esq.
          TROY LAW, PLLC
          41-25 Kissena Boulevard Suite 103
          Flushing, NY 11355
          Phone: (718) 762-1324


TREADMAXX TIRE: Parties in Powell Suit Seek FLSA Class Status
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MONDRE POWELL,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, v.
TREADMAXX TIRE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Case No. 1:21-cv-03062-SDG (N.D.
Ga.), the Plaintiffs and Defendant submit stipulation and joint
motion for conditional certification of a collective action under
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The named plaintiff Powell filed suit against Treadmaxx, for
alleged owed overtime wages under the FLSA), on behalf of himself
and other similarly situated employees.

The Defendant has at all times denied all of the allegations in
this lawsuit.

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. sec216(b), the Defendant consents to
conditional certification of this matter as a Collective Action on
the FLSA claims for alleged owed overtime compensation to:

   "all "drivers" or "Route Drivers" employed by Treadmaxx at
   any of its 14 warehouse locations in Alabama, Texas, Georgia,
   Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Ohio who: (1)
   worked at least 37.5 hours in any workweek while employed by
   Treadmaxx; (2) are not subject to a binding arbitration
   agreement; and (3) worked for Treadmaxx at any of its
   warehouses as a driver or Route Driver from July 29, 2018 to
   the present."

While the Parties have agreed to a three-year period for purposes
of the notice, they recognize that the statute of limitations on
any plaintiff or opt-in plaintiff's claim under the FLSA is two
years unless it is established that the claim arose out of a
"willful violation," of the FLSA, in which case the statute of
limitations on that claim is three years.

Treadmaxx is a tire wholesale distributor.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2XR2yIQ at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Dustin L. Crawford, Esq.
          John L. Mays, Esq.
          PARKS CHESIN & WALBERT PC
          75 14th Street, 2600
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: 404-873-8000
          E-mail: jmays@pcwlawfirm.com
                  dcrawford@pcwlawfirm.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Matthew W. Clarke, Esq.
          SMITH, GAMBRELL & RUSSELL, LLP
          1105 West Peachtree St. NE, Suite 1000
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone (404) 815-3767

TRIBESMEN GROUP: Chavez Collective Action Gets Initial Nod
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MIKE S. CHAVEZ, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, v. TRIBESMEN GROUP,
INC., and ENDY LALLY, Case No. 1:21-cv-01981-BMC (E.D.N.Y.), the
Hon. Judge Brian M. Cogan entered an order that:

   1. The Plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval of a
      collective action is granted.

   2. Within 14 days of entry of this Order, the defendants
      shall produce a computer-readable data file including the
      full names, last known mailing addresses, telephone
      numbers, email addresses, and primary language of the
      putative collective;

   3. Within 7 days of issuance of this Order, the parties are
      to meet and confer in good faith, and submit a revised
      proposed Notice of Pendency and Consent to Join Form that
      complies with the directives set forth here;

   4. Within 21 days of its approval by the Court, plaintiff
      shall cause a copy of the Notice of Pendency and Consent
      to Join form to be disseminated to the putative
      collective.

Judge Cogan said, "The Plaintiff’s evidence is adequate with
respect to manual laborers. In his declaration, plaintiff states
that he "worked with and observed at least eight other carpenters
and manual workers who performed the same and/or similar duties as
I did." He goes on to name these employees, seven of whom he
identifies by both first and last name. He avers that he personally
observed that all these employees "were all paid in the same
manner" and "worked the same or similar hours" as he did. This is
enough to meet his modest burden. Therefore, I will conditionally
approve the collective to include both carpenters and manual
laborers whose duties were similar to those of plaintiff."

According to the complaint, plaintiff was scheduled and paid to
work approximately 51 1⁄2 to 59 1⁄4 hours a week throughout his
employment, depending on the season. Although plaintiff was paid
for all hours worked his regular hourly rate, he alleges that he
was denied time and a half compensation for all hours worked in
excess of 40, despite numerous complaints to Lally.

Mr. Chavez has sued his former employer Tribesman and its alleged
owner, Endy Lally, asserting violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA"), and the New York Labor Law.

Tribesman, a Brooklyn-based construction company specializing in
carpentry, employed plaintiff as a carpenter from November 2015 to
October 2020.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3BxH8OR at no extra charge.[CC]

TWOMAGNETS INC: Lawson Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Twomagnets Inc. The
case is styled as Lakisha Lawson, Nahrain Karam, on behalf of
herself and others similarly situated v. Twomagnets Inc., Case No.
BCV-21-102508 (Cal. Super. Ct., Kern Cty., Oct. 26, 2021).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment – Civil Unlimited."

Twomagnets Inc., doing business as Clipboard Health --
https://clipboardhealth.com/ -- is an online marketplace offering
no-commitment staffing for healthcare facilities and on-demand
shifts for healthcare professionals.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Ashkan Y. Shakouri, Esq.
          SHAKOURI LAW FIRM
          11601 Wilshire Blvd., Fl. 5
          Los Angeles, CA 90025-1995
          Phone: 310-575-1827
          Fax: 310-575-1890
          Email: ash@shakourilawfirm.com


UNITED HEALTHCARE: Seeks Denial of Omega Filing Extension Bid
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as OMEGA HOSPITAL, LLC, v.
UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., and UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF
LOUISIANA, INC., Case No. 3:16-cv-00560-JWD-EWD (M.D. La.), the
Defendants ask the Court to enter an order denying Omega's motion
for an extension of time to file motion for class certification.

The Defendants contend that Because the Court is familiar with the
history of Omega's string of extension requests, United seeks to
conserve judicial resources by incorporating by reference its prior
arguments and description of the discovery history in this case.
United briefly states the following to demonstrate that Omega has
not demonstrated good cause for an additional extension, and that
its Motion should accordingly be denied.

Omega notably fails to explain how United's deeply burdensome
production of an additional 1.5 million pages of documents would
aid it in establishing commonality or typicality. Its extension
motion further fails to acknowledge that United offered these
significant stipulations. Indeed, United has seen no indication
that Omega even read United's October 10, 2021 response letter,
since Omega has not responded concerning any of United's offered
stipulations, and has refused to state which of the 44 alleged
discovery deficiencies that Omega's deficiency Letter purported to
identify were resolved by United's detailed response, the
Defendants add.

Omega Hospital is a leading specialty surgical hospital serving
Greater New Orleans and Gulf South.

United Healthcare was founded in 1974. The company's line of
business includes providing hospital, medical, and other health
services.

A copy of the Defendants' motion dated Oct. 18, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3jEWPgI at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Errol J. King, Jr., Esq.
          Katherine Cicardo Mannino, Esq.
          PHELPS DUNBAR LLP
          II City Plaza
          400 Convention Street, Suite 1100
          Baton Rouge, LA 70801
          Telephone: (225) 381-9197

               - and -

          Gregory F. Jacob, Esq.
          Amanda L. Genovese, Esq.
          Kevin D. Feder, Esq.
          O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
          1625 Eye Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 383-5300

UNITED STATES: Murray Suit Over Speedy Trial Rights Breach Tossed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GREGORY MURRAY, Plaintiff v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 21-4903 (JMV) (MF) (D.N.J.),
Judge John Michael Vazquez of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey issued an Opinion:

   a. dismissing with prejudice the Plaintiff's claims against
      the United States, the United States Department of Justice,
      the United States Marshals Service, the United States
      District Court for the District of New Jersey, the claims
      against Chief Judge Wolfson for monetary relief, and the
      claims against Governor Murphy in his official capacity for
      monetary relief; and

   b. dismissing the remainder of the Plaintiff's federal claims
      without prejudice and declines to exercise the Court's
      supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.

Background

The Plaintiff, a federal pretrial detainee, is proceeding pro se
with an Amended Complaint asserting claims under various federal
statutes and related state law claims. The case arises from the
Plaintiff's federal pretrial detention at the Essex County
Correctional Facility, in Newark, New Jersey.

The Plaintiff sues (1) the United States of America; (2) the United
States Marshals Service; (3) the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey; (4) the United States Department of
Justice; (5) Chief Judge Freda Wolfson; (6) Governor Phil Murphy;
(7) Essex County; (8) Director Alfaro Ortiz; (9) Warden Guy
Cirello; and (10) CFG Medical Services, as Defendants in the
matter.

The Complaint is one of numerous, nearly identical amended
complaints, from pretrial detainees at the Essex County
Correctional Facility, seeking to proceed as a class action --
e.g., McClain v. United States, No. 21-4997, 2021 WL 2224270, at *1
(D.N.J. June 2, 2021); Middlebrooks v. United States, No. 21-9225,
2021 WL 2224308, at *1 (D.N.J. June 2, 2021).

The Plaintiff, like the other detainees, lists a myriad of federal
claims, but the thrust of the Complaint alleges that the Government
violated his speedy trial rights through Chief Judge Wolfson's
COVID-19 pandemic related standing orders. In those orders, Chief
Judge Wolfson held that the pandemic warranted the exclusion of
various periods of time from the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.
Section 3161(h)(7)(A). The Plaintiff also complains about various
pandemic related restrictions at the jail such as limited
visitation, religious services, discovery access, legal research
time, and medical care, as well as slow mail, lockdowns, extreme
quarantines, and a lack of access to attorneys.

The Plaintiff, however, offers no details on how he believes that
any particular Defendant violated his individual rights. Moreover,
apart from Chief Judge Wolfson's standing orders, Plaintiff only
alleges that Governor Murphy issued unspecified "Covid-19 emergency
orders," and that Director Ortiz issued unspecified "emergency
declarations," that somehow violated the Plaintiff's rights. Beyond
these three references, the Complaint does not specify which
Defendants were involved in which violations, and simply concludes
that all of the Defendants were responsible in some way.

In March of 2021, the Plaintiff filed the initial complaint, and in
April of 2021, he filed the operative Complaint in the matter. In
terms of relief, the Plaintiff seeks monetary, injunctive, and
declaratory relief. In particular, he seeks to vacate unspecified
pandemic related orders and declarations and requests four days of
jail credit for every day in detention "during the period of March
15, 2020 to present."

Discussion

The Plaintiff brings the action pursuant to (1) Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971); (2) the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sections
1346(b), 2671 et seq.; (3) the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c), (d); (4) the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000bb et
seq.; (5) the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,
42. U.S.C. Section 2000cc et seq.; (6) 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983,
1985, 1986; and (7) the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C.
Section 702.

Judge Vazquez first addresses the issue of immunity, as it appears
from the face of the Complaint that the Plaintiff has sued a number
of Defendants that are immune from suit.

A. Immune Defendants

The Third Circuit ruled in Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712,
717-18 (3d Cir. 1979), that sovereign immunity bars claims against
the United States and its federal agencies and officials, unless
the United States explicitly waives its immunity. Stated
differently, "the United States is not subject to suit for
constitutional torts, including the civil rights claims the
Plaintiff seeks to raise, and is entitled to absolute sovereign
immunity in the matter." Similarly, federal agencies and entities,
like the United States Department of Justice, the United States
Marshals Service, and the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, are also immune from suit in civil rights
matters, because they have not explicitly waived sovereign
immunity.

As to the Plaintiff's state law claims, absent an explicit waiver
of sovereign immunity, he cannot sue the federal government.
Sovereign immunity not only protects the United States from
liability, it deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction over
claims against the United States. Consequently, the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over these claims, and Judge Vazquez
dismisses with prejudice the Plaintiff's claims against the United
States, the United States Department of Justice, the United States
Marshals Service, and the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey.

Judge Vazquez dismisses with prejudice the Plaintiff's claims
against Chief Judge Wolfson for monetary relief and dismisses
without prejudice his claims against her for injunctive and
declaratory relief. Injunctive relief is not available against
Chief Judge Wolfson because the Plaintiff has not properly pleaded
that she violated any declaratory decree or that declaratory relief
is unavailable. And without information specific to the Plaintiff's
individual circumstances, the Complaint fails to state a claim for
declaratory relief regarding his speedy trial rights.

Governor Murphy is a state official, and the Plaintiff has sued him
in his official capacity. Consequently, he is entitled to sovereign
immunity from the Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages, and
Judge Vazquez dismisses those claims with prejudice.

B. Federal Tort Claims Act

As to the Plaintiff's Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") claim
against the United States, the FTCA operates as a limited waiver of
the United States' sovereign immunity. Under the FTCA, the United
States is liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances." An incarcerated FTCA
plaintiff may sue only the United States, may seek only monetary
damages, and may not recover for mental or emotional damages in the
absence of physical injury.

In the present case, Judge Vazquez opines that the Complaint fails
to make any reference to a notice of tort claim, a demand for sum
certain, or that Plaintiff has otherwise exhausted his FTCA claim.
Accordingly, he dismisses without prejudice the Plaintiff's FTCA
claim against the United States "for failure to sufficiently allege
the jurisdictional basis" for his claim.

C. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act Claims

Next, the Plaintiff broadly claims that all of the Defendants are
liable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c), (d). Under that Act, Section
1962(c) makes it unlawful "for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly
or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity." On the other hand, Section
1962(d) makes it unlawful "for any person to conspire to violate
Section 1962(c)." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "To plead
a RICO claim under Section 1962(c), 'the plaintiff must allege (1)
conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of
racketeering activity.'"

In the present case, Judge Vazquez holds that the Plaintiff fails
to sufficiently plead the elements of a RICO claim. The Complaint
only alleges that the "Defendants acted as a criminal enterprise
that is run as a business with a pattern of illicit conduct
exceeding two predicate acts that equate to fraud, corruption,
violence, and activity in furtherance of human trafficking and
slavery." The Plaintiff fails to elaborate on how he believes the
Defendants formed an enterprise, what conduct he specifically
believes violated RICO, and what predicates acts he believes were
racketeering activities.

Additionally, the Plaintiff failed to plead cognizable RICO losses.
The Plaintiffs may only use a civil RICO claim "to recover
`concrete financial loss' in the form of an injury to property or
business, personal injury or emotional harm are not proper bases
for a RICO claim." In the case, Judge Vazquez finds that all of the
Plaintiff's claims stem from constitutional violations which caused
personal injuries, which are not proper RICO losses.

Yet, even if the Plaintiff had pleaded proper losses, his bare
conclusions are insufficient to state a claim for relief. He cannot
rely on "naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement"
and "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported merely by conclusory statements." Accordingly, Judge
Vazquez dismisses the Plaintiff's RICO claims without prejudice for
failure to state a claim.

D. Religious Claims

Judge Vazquez next turns to the Plaintiff's claims under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. Section
2000bb et seq., and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42. U.S.C. Section 2000cc, et seq. The RFRA
"prohibits the Federal Government from taking any action that
substantially burdens the exercise of religion unless that action
constitutes the least restrictive means of serving a compelling
government interest." RLUIPA, among other things, "allows prisoners
'to seek religious accommodations pursuant to the same standard as
set forth in RFRA.'"

In the instant case, the Plaintiff fails to plead any facts
regarding his personal religious beliefs or tenets. He merely
alleges that pandemic restrictions have generally hindered certain
religious practices at the facility. Without specific allegations
as to his personal religious beliefs, the Complaint in its current
form fails to state a claim. Consequently, Judge Vazquez dismisses
without prejudice the Plaintiff's RLUIPA and RFRA claims.

E. Supervisory Liability

Next, it appears that the Plaintiff wishes to pursue supervisory
liability claims against Governor Murphy, Director Ortiz, and
Warden Cirillo. As a general rule, however, government officials
are not liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.

Judge Vazquez opines that the Complaint fails to explain how
Governor Murphy, Director Ortiz, and Warden Cirillo personally
violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. The Plaintiff makes
only one brief reference to unspecified policies and customs, and
then alleges that all of the Defendants in the case are somehow
responsible. The Plaintiff fails to describe what these policies or
customs are, and how they specifically caused or contributed to his
injuries, or if he had personally suffered any injuries at all. The
Plaintiff styled the Complaint as a class action, and does not
specify what, if any, injury is relevant to the Plaintiff. He does
allege numerous claims against the Defendants collectively, but
generally fails to specify the individual actions of any Defendant
or the circumstances surrounding their alleged failures.

Finally, to the extent the Plaintiff contends that these Defendants
are liable simply for being supervisors, Judge Vazquez disagrees.
Once again, government officials are not liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of
respondeat superior. In simpler terms, a supervisor is not liable
for the unconstitutional conduct of their employees solely because
he or she is a supervisor.

Ultimately, the Plaintiff's supervisory liability claims are a
collection of legal conclusions, which are insufficient to state a
claim for relief. Accordingly, Judge Vazquez dismisses without
prejudice the supervisory liability claims against Governor Murphy,
Director Ortiz, and Warden Cirillo.

F. Remaining Federal Claims

The Plaintiff's remaining federal claims, his claims under 42
U.S.C. Sections 1983, 1985, 1986, and the Administrative Procedures
Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 702, fail to state a claim. One of the flaws
in the Complaint is that it often alleges that the Defendants acted
in unison, without delineating the actions of each Defendant or
explaining under what circumstances they acted or failed to act.
Alternatively, the Plaintiff often states that someone's rights
have been violated, without specifying which Defendant or
Defendants committed the wrong, and then concludes that all of the
Defendants were somehow responsible.

Judge Vazquez holds that the Plaintiff cannot rely solely on legal
conclusions; the Complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter"
to show that his claims are facially plausible. In other words, the
Plaintiff cannot simply conclude that Defendants committed a myriad
of wrongs, without adequately explaining the factual circumstances
underlying each claim. His claims also fail to sufficiently allege
what his claims are against each Defendant and fail to provide fair
notice of the grounds on which he intends to rest his claims. State
differently, such claims "would not provide any meaningful
opportunity for the remaining Defendants to decipher or answer the
vague allegations levied against them." Accordingly, Judge Vazquez
dismisses without prejudice the Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C.
Sections 1983, 1985, 1986, and 5 U.S.C. Section 702, for failure to
state a claim.

Finally, as no federal claims remain in the case, Judge Vazquez
declines to exercise the Court's supplemental jurisdiction over the
Plaintiff's remaining state law claims, including any claims under
the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.

G. Request for Jail Credits

Although the discussion above is sufficient to resolve the case,
Judge Vazquez briefly address the Plaintiff's request for extra
jail credits. In his Complaint, the Plaintiff seeks four extra jail
credits for every day spent in detention during the pandemic for
unspecified detainees. Detainees may not, however, use a civil
rights complaint to "challenge the fact or length of their
detention." Rather, detainees must raise any claim "which would
impugn or otherwise overturn the fact or length of detention via a
criminal motion or a habeas petition." As a result, Judge Vazquez
would dismiss the Plaintiff's request for additional jail credits
for that reason as well.

Conclusion

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Vazquez dismisses with
prejudice the Plaintiff's claims against the United States, the
United States Department of Justice, the United States Marshals
Service, the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, the claims against Chief Judge Wolfson for monetary relief,
and the claims against Governor Murphy in his official capacity for
monetary relief. He dismisses the remainder of the Plaintiff's
federal claims without prejudice and declines to exercise the
Court's supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. An
appropriate Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/3n33vb4j from Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: Navy Personnel Sues Over COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate
----------------------------------------------------------------
Unnamed U.S. Navy uniformed personnel, employees and civilian
contractors, for themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. Joseph R. Biden, in his official capacity as
President of the United States, Lloyd Austin, in his official
capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Defense
and Alejandro Mayorkas, in his official capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security, Defendants, Case No.
21-cv-02429 (M.D. Fla., October 15, 2021), seeks a temporary
restraining order over the Federal COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate, which
violates of the emergency use authorization provisions of the
federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution and the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act.

Plaintiffs are United States Armed Forces service members, federal
employees and federal civilian contractors who face a deadline
under the Federal COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate to receive a COVID-19
vaccine. They claim that such mandate violates their sincerely held
religious beliefs, and that they have been refused any religious
exemption or accommodation.

Biden issued an executive order mandating vaccinations for all
federal employees. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Mathew D. Staver, Esq.
      Horatio G. Mihet, Esq.
      Roger K. Gannam, Esq.
      Daniel J. Schmid, Esq.
      Richard L. Mast, Esq.
      LIBERTY COUNSEL
      P.O. Box 540774
      Orlando, FL 32854
      Phone: (407) 875-1776
      Facsimile: (407) 875-0770
      Email: court@lc.org
             hmihet@lc.org
             rgannam@lc.org
             dschmid@lc.org
             rmast@lc.org


UNITED STATES: Welch Suit Over Speedy Trial Rights Breach Tossed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LAKIESTE WELCH, Plaintiff v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 21-10866 (JMV) (ESK) (D.N.J.),
Judge John Michael Vazquez of the U.S. District Court for the
District New Jersey issued an Opinion:

   a. dismissing with prejudice the Plaintiff's claims against
      the United States, the United States Department of Justice,
      the United States Marshals Service, the United States
      District Court for the District of New Jersey, the claims
      against Chief Judge Wolfson for monetary relief, and the
      claims against Governor Murphy in his official capacity for
      monetary relief; and

   b. dismissing the remainder of the Plaintiff's federal claims
      without prejudice and declines to exercise the Court's
      supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.

Background

The Plaintiff, a federal pretrial detainee, is proceeding pro se
with a Complaint asserting claims under various federal statutes
and related state law claims. The case arises from the Plaintiff's
federal pretrial detention at the Essex County Correctional
Facility, in Newark, New Jersey.

The Plaintiff sues (1) the United States of America; (2) the United
States Marshals Service; (3) the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey; (4) the United States Department of
Justice; (5) Chief Judge Freda Wolfson; (6) Governor Phil Murphy;
(7) Essex County; (8) Director Alfaro Ortiz; (9) Warden Guy
Cirello; and (10) CFG Medical Services, as Defendants in the
matter.

The Complaint is one of numerous, nearly identical amended
complaints, from pretrial detainees at the Essex County
Correctional Facility, seeking to proceed as a class action --
e.g., McClain v. United States, No. 21-4997, 2021 WL 2224270, at *1
(D.N.J. June 2, 2021); Middlebrooks v. United States, No. 21-9225,
2021 WL 2224308, at *1 (D.N.J. June 2, 2021).

The Plaintiff, like the other detainees, lists a myriad of federal
claims, but the thrust of the Complaint alleges that the Government
violated his speedy trial rights through Chief Judge Wolfson's
COVID-19 pandemic related standing orders. In those orders, Chief
Judge Wolfson held that the pandemic warranted the exclusion of
various periods of time from the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.
Section 3161(h)(7)(A). The Plaintiff also complains about various
pandemic related restrictions at the jail such as limited
visitation, religious services, discovery access, legal research
time, and medical care, as well as slow mail, lockdowns, extreme
quarantines, and a lack of access to attorneys.

The Plaintiff, however, offers no details on how he believes that
any particular Defendant violated his individual rights. Moreover,
apart from Chief Judge Wolfson's standing orders, Plaintiff only
alleges that Governor Murphy issued unspecified "Covid-19 emergency
orders," and that Director Ortiz issued unspecified "emergency
declarations," that somehow violated the Plaintiff's rights. Beyond
these three references, the Complaint does not specify which
Defendants were involved in which violations, and simply concludes
that all of the Defendants were responsible in some way.

In May of 2021, the Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint. In terms
of relief, the Plaintiff seeks monetary, injunctive, and
declaratory relief. In particular, he seeks to vacate unspecified
pandemic related orders and declarations and requests four days of
jail credit for every day in detention "during the period of March
15, 2020 to present."

Discussion

The Plaintiff brings the action pursuant to (1) Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971); (2) the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sections
1346(b), 2671 et seq.; (3) the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c), (d); (4) the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000bb et
seq.; (5) the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,
42. U.S.C. Section 2000cc et seq.; (6) 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983,
1985, 1986; and (7) the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C.
Section 702.

Judge Vazquez first addresses the issue of immunity, as it appears
from the face of the Complaint that the Plaintiff has sued a number
of Defendants that are immune from suit.

A. Immune Defendants

The Third Circuit ruled in Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712,
717-18 (3d Cir. 1979), that sovereign immunity bars claims against
the United States and its federal agencies and officials, unless
the United States explicitly waives its immunity. Stated
differently, "the United States is not subject to suit for
constitutional torts, including the civil rights claims the
Plaintiff seeks to raise, and is entitled to absolute sovereign
immunity in the matter." Similarly, federal agencies and entities,
like the United States Department of Justice, the United States
Marshals Service, and the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, are also immune from suit in civil rights
matters, because they have not explicitly waived sovereign
immunity.

As to the Plaintiff's state law claims, absent an explicit waiver
of sovereign immunity, he cannot sue the federal government.
Sovereign immunity not only protects the United States from
liability, it deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction over
claims against the United States. Consequently, the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over these claims, and Judge Vazquez
dismisses with prejudice the Plaintiff's claims against the United
States, the United States Department of Justice, the United States
Marshals Service, and the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey.

Judge Vazquez dismisses with prejudice the Plaintiff's claims
against Chief Judge Wolfson for monetary relief and dismisses
without prejudice his claims against her for injunctive and
declaratory relief. Injunctive relief is not available against
Chief Judge Wolfson because the Plaintiff has not properly pleaded
that she violated any declaratory decree or that declaratory relief
is unavailable. And without information specific to the Plaintiff's
individual circumstances, the Complaint fails to state a claim for
declaratory relief regarding his speedy trial rights.

Governor Murphy is a state official, and the Plaintiff has sued him
in his official capacity. Consequently, he is entitled to sovereign
immunity from the Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages, and
Judge Vazquez dismisses those claims with prejudice.

B. Federal Tort Claims Act

As to the Plaintiff's Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") claim
against the United States, the "FTCA operates as a limited waiver
of the United States' sovereign immunity." Under the FTCA, the
United States is liable "in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances." An incarcerated
FTCA plaintiff may sue only the United States, may seek only
monetary damages, and may not recover for mental or emotional
damages in the absence of physical injury.

In the present case, Judge Vazquez opines that the Complaint fails
to make any reference to a notice of tort claim, a demand for sum
certain, or that Plaintiff has otherwise exhausted his FTCA claim.
Accordingly, he dismisses without prejudice the Plaintiff's FTCA
claim against the United States "for failure to sufficiently allege
the jurisdictional basis" for his claim.

C. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act Claims

Next, the Plaintiff broadly claims that all of the Defendants are
liable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c), (d). Under that Act, Section
1962(c) makes it unlawful "for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly
or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity." On the other hand, Section
1962(d) makes it unlawful "for any person to conspire to violate
Section 1962(c)." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "To plead
a RICO claim under Section 1962(c), 'the plaintiff must allege (1)
conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of
racketeering activity.'"

In the present case, Judge Vazquez holds that the Plaintiff fails
to sufficiently plead the elements of a RICO claim. The Complaint
only alleges that the "Defendants acted as a criminal enterprise
that is run as a business with a pattern of illicit conduct
exceeding two predicate acts that equate to fraud, corruption,
violence, and activity in furtherance of human trafficking and
slavery." The Plaintiff fails to elaborate on how he believes the
Defendants formed an enterprise, what conduct he specifically
believes violated RICO, and what predicates acts he believes were
racketeering activities.

Additionally, the Plaintiff failed to plead cognizable RICO losses.
The Plaintiffs may only use a civil RICO claim "to recover
'concrete financial loss' in the form of an injury to property or
business, personal injury or emotional harm are not proper bases
for a RICO claim." In the case, Judge Vazquez finds that all of the
Plaintiff's claims stem from constitutional violations which caused
personal injuries, which are not proper RICO losses.

Yet, even if the Plaintiff had pleaded proper losses, his bare
conclusions are insufficient to state a claim for relief. He cannot
rely on "naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement"
and "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported merely by conclusory statements." Accordingly, Judge
Vazquez dismisses the Plaintiff's RICO claims without prejudice for
failure to state a claim.

D. Religious Claims

Judge Vazquez next turns to the Plaintiff's claims under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. Section
2000bb et seq., and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42. U.S.C. Section 2000cc et seq. The RFRA
"prohibits the Federal Government from taking any action that
substantially burdens the exercise of religion unless that action
constitutes the least restrictive means of serving a compelling
government interest." RLUIPA, among other things, "allows prisoners
'to seek religious accommodations pursuant to the same standard as
set forth in RFRA.'"

In the instant case, the Plaintiff fails to plead any facts
regarding his personal religious beliefs or tenets. He merely
alleges that pandemic restrictions have generally hindered certain
religious practices at the facility. Without specific allegations
as to his personal religious beliefs, the Complaint in its current
form fails to state a claim. Consequently, Judge Vazquez dismisses
without prejudice the Plaintiff's RLUIPA and RFRA claims.

E. Supervisory Liability

Next, it appears that the Plaintiff wishes to pursue supervisory
liability claims against Governor Murphy, Director Ortiz, and
Warden Cirillo. As a general rule, however, government officials
are not liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.

Judge Vazquez opines that the Complaint fails to explain how
Governor Murphy, Director Ortiz, and Warden Cirillo personally
violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. The Plaintiff makes
only one brief reference to unspecified policies and customs, and
then alleges that all of the Defendants in the case are somehow
responsible. The Plaintiff fails to describe what these policies or
customs are, and how they specifically caused or contributed to his
injuries, or if he had personally suffered any injuries at all. The
Plaintiff styled the Complaint as a class action, and does not
specify what, if any, injury is relevant to the Plaintiff. He does
allege numerous claims against the Defendants collectively, but
generally fails to specify the individual actions of any Defendant
or the circumstances surrounding their alleged failures.

Finally, to the extent the Plaintiff contends that these Defendants
are liable simply for being supervisors, Judge Vazquez disagrees.
Once again, government officials are not liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of
respondeat superior. In simpler terms, a supervisor is not liable
for the unconstitutional conduct of their employees solely because
he or she is a supervisor.

Ultimately, the Plaintiff's supervisory liability claims are a
collection of legal conclusions, which are insufficient to state a
claim for relief. Accordingly, Judge Vazquez dismisses without
prejudice the supervisory liability claims against Governor Murphy,
Director Ortiz, and Warden Cirillo.

F. Remaining Federal Claims

The Plaintiff's remaining federal claims, his claims under 42
U.S.C. Sections 1983, 1985, 1986, and the Administrative Procedures
Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 702, fail to state a claim. One of the flaws
in the Complaint is that it often alleges that the Defendants acted
in unison, without delineating the actions of each Defendant or
explaining under what circumstances they acted or failed to act.
Alternatively, the Plaintiff often states that someone's rights
have been violated, without specifying which Defendant or
Defendants committed the wrong, and then concludes that all of the
Defendants were somehow responsible.

Judge Vazquez holds that the Plaintiff cannot rely solely on legal
conclusions; the Complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter"
to show that his claims are facially plausible. In other words, the
Plaintiff cannot simply conclude that Defendants committed a myriad
of wrongs, without adequately explaining the factual circumstances
underlying each claim. His claims also fail to sufficiently allege
what his claims are against each Defendant and fail to provide fair
notice of the grounds on which he intends to rest his claims. State
differently, such claims "would not provide any meaningful
opportunity for the remaining Defendants to decipher or answer the
vague allegations levied against them." Accordingly, Judge Vazquez
dismisses without prejudice the Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C.
Sections 1983, 1985, 1986, and 5 U.S.C. Section 702, for failure to
state a claim.

Finally, as no federal claims remain in the case, Judge Vazquez
declines to exercise the Court's supplemental jurisdiction over the
Plaintiff's remaining state law claims, including any claims under
the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.

G. Request for Jail Credits

Although the discussion above is sufficient to resolve the case,
Judge Vazquez briefly address the Plaintiff's request for extra
jail credits. In his Complaint, the Plaintiff seeks four extra jail
credits for every day spent in detention during the pandemic for
unspecified detainees. Detainees may not, however, use a civil
rights complaint to "challenge the fact or length of their
detention." Rather, detainees must raise any claim "which would
impugn or otherwise overturn the fact or length of detention via a
criminal motion or a habeas petition." As a result, Judge Vazquez
would dismiss the Plaintiff's request for additional jail credits
for that reason as well.

Conclusion

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Vazquez dismisses with
prejudice the Plaintiff's claims against the United States, the
United States Department of Justice, the United States Marshals
Service, the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, the claims against Chief Judge Wolfson for monetary relief,
and the claims against Governor Murphy in his official capacity for
monetary relief. He dismisses the remainder of the Plaintiff's
federal claims without prejudice and declines to exercise the
Court's supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. An
appropriate Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 13, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/6f7sb5jm from Leagle.com.


UT-BATTELLE LLC: Bilyeu Sues Over Pattern of Discrimination
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jeffrey Bilyeu, Jessica Bilyeu, Stephanie Bruffey, Mark Cofer,
Gregory Sheets, and William Webb, on their own behalf and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. UT-BATTELLE, LLC, Case No.
3:21-cv-00352-CEA-HBG (E.D. Tenn., Oct. 12, 2021), is brought to
remedy UT-Battelle's pattern of discrimination against employees
who requested religious or medical accommodations from
UT-Battelle's mandate that its employees receive the COVID-19
vaccine.

Rather than complying with its obligations under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
the Defendant responded by informing the requesting employees that
they would be effectively terminated. The Defendant's actions have
left the Plaintiffs with the impossible choice of either taking the
COVID-19 vaccine, at the expense of their religious beliefs and
their health, or losing their livelihoods. In doing so, the
Defendant has violated Title VII and the ADA by failing to engage
in the interactive process and provide reasonable accommodations,
and also by retaliating against employees who engaged in protected
activity, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs are employed by the Defendant.

UT-Battelle administers, manages, and operates the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, a multiprogram research laboratory of the U.S.
Department of Energy located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Melissa B. Carrasco, Esq.
          EGERTON, MCAFEE, ARMISTEAD & DAVIS, P.C.
          900 S. Gay Street, Suite 1400
          Knoxville, TN 37902
          Phone: 865-546-0500
          Facsimile: 865-525-5293
          Email: mcarrasco@emlaw.com

               - and -

          Mark R. Paoletta, Esq.
          Gene C. Schaerr, Esq.
          Brian J. Field, Esq.
          Nicholas P. Miller, Esq.
          Annika M. Boone, Esq.
          SCHAERR | JAFFE LLP
          1717 K Street NW, Suite 900
          Washington, DC 20006
          Phone: (202) 787-1060
          Facsimile: (202) 776-0136
          Email: mpaoletta@schaerr-jaffe.com


VILLAGE SUPER: Mendez Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Yoe Rodriguez-Mendez, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated v. VILLAGE SUPER MARKET, INC. (d/b/a SHOPRITE, d/b/a
SHOPRITE OF GALLOWAY, d/b/a VILLAGE SHOPRITE 473, d/b/a SHOPRITE
247, d/b/a STIRLING SHOPRITE 443); VILLAGE SUPER MARKET OF NY LLC
(d/b/a SHOPRITE OF BRUCKNER BLVD; VILLAGE SUPER MARKET OF NJ L P,
d/b/a SHOPRITE); SHOPRITE SUPERMARKETS, INC. (d/b/a SHOPRITE, d/b/a
SHOPRITE 26, d/b/a SHOPRITE 225, d/b/a SHOPRITE OF ENGLISH CREEK,
d/b/a SHOPRITE 191, d/b/a SHOPRITE OF HILLSBOROUGH, d/b/a SHOPRITE
296, d/b/a SHOPRITE OF MILLBURN, d/b/a SHOPRITE OF OLD BRIDGE 200,
d/b/a SHOPRITE 435); WAKEFERN FOOD CORP. (d/b/a SHOPRITE UNION,
d/b/a SHOPRITE #643, d/b/a SHOPRITE SPRINGFIELD 294); WILLIS STEIN
& PARTNERS MANAGEMENT III, LLC (d/b/a SHOPRITE); VSM GOURMET LLC
(d/b/a GOURMET GARAGE); and VSM NY HOLDINGS LLC (d/b/a FAIRWAY
MARKET OF 74TH STREET, d/b/a FAIRWAY MARKET OF 86TH STEET, d/b/a
FAIRWAY MARKET OF CHELSEA, d/b/a FAIRWAY MARKET OF KIPS BAY, d/b/a
FAIRWAY MARKET OF PELHAM), Case No. 1:21-cv-08671 (S.D.N.Y., Oct.
22, 2021), is brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the New York Labor Law, that he is entitled to recover from the
Defendants: unpaid overtime premiums, statutory penalties,
liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs.

Throughout his employment with the Defendants, the Plaintiff was
scheduled to work for 6 days each week, for 36 hours per week. In
addition, Plaintiff frequently was required to stay about 2 hours
past his scheduled shift 3 to 4 times per week. As a result, the
Plaintiff actually worked about 42 to 44 hours each week. FLSA
Collective the Plaintiffs and Class members suffered from similar
off-the-clock violations. The Plaintiff was not properly
compensated his overtime premiums. Whenever the Plaintiff worked on
Sundays the Defendants would not calculate the hours into as
overtime hours. As a result, the Plaintiff was paid his overtime
hours at a straight time rate instead of the proper rate of one and
one-half times the regular rate. The Defendants knowingly and
willfully operated their business with a policy of not compensating
the Plaintiff, FLSA Collective the Plaintiffs and Class members the
FLSA overtime rate (of one-and-one half) or the New York State
overtime (of one-and-one half), says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendants to work as a meat
department worker at the Defendants' ShopRite supermarket located
in Bronx, New York.

The Defendants owns and operates 29 Shop Rite supermarkets in New
York, New Jersey, Maryland and Pennsylvania, and 3 Gourmet Garage
and 5 Fairway Market in New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Anne Seelig, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24th Street, Eighth Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Phone: 212-465-1180
          Fax: 212-465-1181


VIRGINIA BAPTIST: Merriman Files FLSA Suit in E.D. Virginia
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Virginia Baptist
Children's Home and Family Services, et al. The case is styled as
Chelsea Merriman, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Virginia Baptist Children's Home and Family
Services doing business as: Hopetree Family Services, Jon Morris,
Herbert Browning, Johnnie Nash, Lori Mullen, Case No.
3:21-cv-00672-HEH (E.D. Va., Oct. 25, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Virginia Baptist Children's Home and Family Services
doing business as HopeTree Family Services --
https://hopetreefs.org/ -- offers a wide range of ministries for
at-risk children and youth and their families across Virginia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Curtis Daniel Cannon, Esq.
          GOLDBERG & FINNEGAN LLC
          8401 Colesville Road, #630
          Silver Spring, MD 20910
          Phone: (301) 589-2999
          Fax: (301) 589-2644
          Email: ccannon@goldbergfinnegan.com



WALMART INC: Class Certification Bid Filing Due April 15, 2022
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DEBBIE MCCOY, v. WALMART,
INC. et al., Case No. 18-03256-CV-S-BP (W.D. Mo.), the Hon. Judge
Beth Phillips entered amended scheduling order and trial order as
follows:

   -- Class Certification Motion due April 15, 2022.

   -- Discovery due by Nov. 11, 2022.

   -- Dispositive Motions due by Dec. 20, 2022.

   -- Teleconference set for April 21, 2023 10:00 AM.

   -- Pretrial Conference set for May 5, 2023 10:00 AM via
      teleconference.

   -- Jury Trial set for May 15, 2023, 8:30 AM in Courtroom 2,
      Springfield (VJC).

Walmart is an American multinational retail corporation that
operates a chain of hypermarkets, discount department stores, and
grocery stores from the United States, headquartered in
Bentonville, Arkansas.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3vQ6HJH at no extra charge.[CC]

WASTE CONNECTIONS: Sunshine Children's Suit Removed to S.D. Florida
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Sunshine Children's Learning Center, LLC, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly situated v. Waste
Connections of Florida, Inc., Case No. CACE-21-017107 was removed
from the 17th Judicial Circuit Court to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida on Oct. 12, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 0:21-cv-62123-BB to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

Waste Connections -- https://www.wasteconnections.com/ -- is an
integrated solid waste management services company that provides
waste collection, transfer, waste disposal, and recycling services
in the US and Canada.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Herbert Zebersky, Esq.
          Mark S. Fistos, Esq.
          ZEBERSKY PAYNE SHAW LEWENZ LLC
          110 Southeast 6th Street, Suite 2150
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Phone: (954) 989-6333
          Fax: (954) 989-7781
          Email: ezebersky@zpllp.com
                 mfistos@zpllp.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Casey T. Clausen, Esq.
          BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, P.C.
          600 University Street, Suite 1601
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Phone: (206) 315-4805
          Email: cclausen@bdlaw.com

               - and -

          Desislava K. Docheva, Esq.
          3307 Port Royale Drive South, Apt. 307
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33308
          Phone: (954) 470-3164
          Email: ddocheva@bakerdonelson.com

               - and -

          Eric L. Klein, Esq.
          BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, P.C.
          155 Federal Street, Suite 1600
          Boston, MA 02110
          Phone: (617) 419-2316
          Email: eklein@bdlaw.com

               - and -

          James B. Slaughter, Esq.
          BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, P.C.
          1900 N. St. N.W., Suite 100
          Washington, DC 20036
          Phone: (202) 789-6040
          Email: jslaughter@bdlaw.com

               - and -

          Megan R. Brillault, Esq.
          BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, P.C.
          477 Madison Avenue, 15th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Phone: (212) 702-5400
          Email: mbrillault@bdlaw.com

               - and -

          Samuel Lanier Felker, Esq.
          BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWIRZ, P.C.
          1600 West End Avenue, Ste. 2000
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Phone: (615) 726-5558
          Fax: (615) 744-5558
          Email: samfelker@bakerdonelson.com


WELLPET LLC: Discovery Plan & Scheduling Order Entered in Brown
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JAMES BROWN, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, v. WELLPET, LLC, Case
No. 3:21-cv-00576-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind.), the Hon. Judge Michael G.
Gotsch, Sr. entered a scheduling order and adopting the parties
amended discovery plan as follows:

   -- The parties will exchange the information required by Fed.
      R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), limited to class certification, by
      Nov. 1, 2021;

   -- The parties to move to amend the pleadings or add new
      parties, limited to class certification, are due by Jan.
      14 2022;

   -- Reports from retained experts are due from plaintiff(s) by
      April 29, 2022 and from defendant(s) by June 29, 2022;

   -- Completion of all discovery due by Aug. 1, 2022;

   -- Any discovery-related non dispositive motion related to
      class certification are due by July 1, 2022;

   -- The deadline for Plaintiff to file any motion for class
      certification is Aug. 31, 2022, with any response due on
      Sept. 30, 2022, and any reply due Oct. 14, 2022.

   -- The parties shall meet and confer within 14 days after the
      Court rules upon Plaintiff's motion for class
      certification regarding a schedule moving forward,
      including the merits of this litigation and any potential
      Rule 23(f) appeal.

   -- The parties shall file their Phase 2 Report of Parties
      Planning within 21 days after the Court rules upon
      Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

   -- The Court hereby vacates the Preliminary Pretrial
      Conference scheduled for Oct. 22, 2021, at 11:30 a.m.

WellPet is a pet food company formed by the combination of Wellness
Natural Pet Food, Holistic Select Natural Pet Food, Eagle Pack
Natural Pet Food and Old Mother Hubbard Natural Dog Snacks,
purchased by Berwind Corporation.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3jKBzX8 at no extra charge.[CC]

WESTCHESTER PARKWAY: Edgar Suit Wins Conditional Certification Bid
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JAMES EDGAR, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated, v. WESTCHESTER PARKWAY
CONSULTING LLC dba SOLIVITA HEALTH, Case No. 2:21-cv-00533-MHW-KAJ
(S.D. Ohio), the Hon. Judge Michael H. Watson entered an order:

   1. granting the Parties' joint motion for conditional
      certification and approving the parties' proposed notice
      and consent; and

   2. approving the notice of unpaid overtime wage lawsuit and
      consent to join forms attached to the parties' joint
      motion and directing their distribution in the manner
      described in the motion.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3pIW9ed at no extra charge.[CC]

WESTERN REFINING: Schmidtberger Appeals Ruling in Labor Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Delmar Schmidtberger filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled Delmar Schmidtberger v. Western
Refining Retail, LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-04300-VAP-SK, in the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California, Los
Angeles.

Plaintiff Schmidtberger initiated this action by filing a putative
class action Complaint against Defendant Western Refining Retail,
LLC on May 17, 2019. Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint on
June 11, 2019. The Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC)
on June 18, 2019.

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges the following claims: (1) failure to
provide meal periods; (2) failure to authorize and permit rest; (3)
failure to maintain required records; and (4) failure to furnish
accurate itemized wage statements.

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges he "brings this action on behalf of
himself and the following similarly situated class of individuals:
all current and former 9 -exempt employees of [Defendant] in the
State of California at any time within the period beginning four
years prior to the filing of this action and ending at the time
this action settles or proceeds to final judgment."

The Plaintiff moved to strike the Bennett, Boyd, Brommer, Delgado,
Delgadillo, Espanada, Felton, Gerardo, Harborth, Hencon, Leon, and
McDonald Declarations, filed by Defendant in opposition to the
Motion for Certification.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Oct. 8, 2021, the Hon.
Judge Virginia A. Phillips entered an order
denying Motions to strike filed by the parties on August 20, 2021
and August 30, 2021; and denying motion for class certification
filed by Plaintiff Delmar Schmidtberger on April 23, 2021.

The Plaintiff seeks a review of the Court's ruling in an appellate
case captioned Delmar Schmidtberger v. western Refining Retail,
LLC, Case No. 21-80107, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, filed on Oct. 13, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner DELMAR SCHMIDTBERGER, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Launa Adolph, Esq.
          Matthew J. Matern, Esq.
          MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
          1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
          Manhattan Beach, CA 90266

Defendant-Respondent WESTERN REFINING RETAIL, LLC is represented
by:

          Mark D. Campbell, Esq.
          Matt Light, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON, LLP
          2049 Century Park, E Suite 3000
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (424) 324-3412

               - and -

          William C. Martucci, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON LLP
          2555 Grand Boulevard
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 474-6550

WEXFORD HEALTH: Milligan Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Courtney Milligan, Individually and for Others Similarly Situated
v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., Case No. 2:21-cv-01411-PLD (W.D.
Pa., Oct. 15, 2021), is brought against the Defendant who has
failed to pay the Plaintiff and other workers like her, overtime as
required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

The Defendant paid the Plaintiff and its other Putative Class
Members a shift differential during certain shifts. These hourly
premiums are primarily for the benefit and convenience of the
Plaintiff and the Defendant's other hourly employees. The FLSA
requires this type of compensation be included in the calculation
of Putative Class Members' regular rates for overtime purposes.
Because the shift differential was not included in calculating
these workers' regular rates of pay, the Plaintiff was not properly
compensated at a rate of one-and-one-half times their regular
rates–as defined by the FLSA–for all hours worked in excess of
40 hours in a single workweek.

The Defendant automatically deducted 30 minutes from the
Plaintiff's shifts despite remaining on duty during that time.
Wexford Health does not provide bona fide meal periods for its
hourly employees who are responsible for direct patient care. The
Defendant's hourly employees are required to remain responsible for
patient care throughout their shift. Under this policy, non-exempt
employees involved in direct patient care were not completely
relieved of duties during meal periods and were denied pay for
those on-duty meal periods. The Defendant continues to require
hourly employees responsible for direct patient care to remain on
duty and subject to interruptions during meal breaks. The Defendant
also failed to pay for certain compensable hours altogether,
improperly failing to pay the Plaintiff and the Putative Class
Members for hours worked off-the-clock, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was an hourly registered nurse of Wexford Health from
June 2018 until April 2020.

Wexford Health is a healthcare services company headquartered in
Green Tree, Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Carl A. Fitz, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Phone: 713-352-1100
          Facsimile: 713-352-3300
          Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                 adunlap@mybackwages.com
                 cfitz@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025
          Houston, TX 77046
          Phone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com

               - and -

          Joshua P. Geist, Esq.
          William F. Goodrich, Esq.
          GOODRICH & GEIST PC
          3634 California Ave.
          Pittsburgh, PA 15212
          Phone: 412-766-1455
          Facsimile: 412-766-0300
          Email: josh@goodrichandgeist.com
                 bill@goodrichandgeist.com


WILD CARD: Reitman Sues Over Discrimination and Unpaid Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
Heather Reitman, an individual, on behalf of herself and other
current and former aggrieved employees v. WILD CARD MEDIA, LLC, a
California Limited Liability Company; 3 AM CREATIVE GROUP, LLC a
California Limited Liability Company; and DOES 1-20, Inclusive,
Case No. 21STCV37781 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., Oct. 12,
2021), is brought against the Defendant for failure to pay overtime
compensation in violation of the California Labor Code and for
discrimination against a person with disability and medical
condition.

Servicing three C-suite executives, as well as the 3 AM team at a
busy and successful production studio, was necessarily
time-consuming. The Plaintiff's typical schedule was 9:30 a.m. to
6:30 p.m., but due to her three bosses and the extended team's
needs, she frequently was in the office until 7 p.m. or later. She
also was expected to review and respond to work emails before
coming to work and after hours. However, she was never compensated
for overtime, or advised that she had the right to off-duty meal
and rest periods, due to her being misclassified as an exempt
employee.

Despite the demands on her time and the stress of the position, the
Plaintiff her job and she was good at it. This is despite suffering
from a serious disability or medical condition known as myasthenia
gravis (MG), a degenerative auto-immune disorder that had been in
remission but which around mid-2019 came out of remission and
became active. In or around May 2020, the Plaintiff began to
experience increased physical exhaustion caused by her condition,
especially at the end of a long workday. The Plaintiff'S medical
provider recommended that she receive monthly infusions arrest the
worsening symptoms of MG. the Plaintiff told Ms. Temple that she
would be receiving infusions. On July 30 and 31, 2020, the
Plaintiff received her first regimen of scheduled monthly
infusions. The regimen was two sessions of 5 hours each. It was at
that point that the Plaintiff became aware that the Defendants were
actively taking work away from her desk and delegating that work to
other personnel. On August 27, within a week following the
Plaintiff's second infusion, Ms. Temple abruptly told her that
"we're going to make some changes." Ms. Temple didn't explain what
she meant. She instructed the Plaintiff to fill out a job
description. She said, "This role is going to morph into something
else."

Rather, on October 21, 2020, just as the Plaintiff's extended
CFRA/FMLA period about to take effect, the Plaintiff was invited to
a call with H.R. Generalist Julie Oca and Chief Talent Officer
Ramiro Medina. The Plaintiff's husband was also present. Mr. Medina
said, "Effective immediately, your position is being eliminated."
No other reason was given for her termination. When the Reitmans
asked about the reason, Mr. Medina repeated, "It's a position
elimination." about to take effect, the Plaintiff was invited to a
call with H.R. Generalist Julie Oca Ms. Medina said, "Effective
immediately, your position is being eliminated." No other reason
was given for her termination. When the Reitmans asked about the
reason, Mr. Medina repeated, "It's a position elimination."

However, the Plaintiff is informed and believes that her position
was not eliminated at all and that, in fact, the Defendants
advertised for her position on August 31, 2020, including by
posting an "Executive Assistant" position via The Help Company,
seeking an "exceptional lovely" candidate. The position was to
provide support for the CEO, and Founder/CCO of an entertainment
company. The Plaintiff is informed and believes that the position
that was advertised was her own position, and that - unbeknownst to
the Plaintiff - the Defendants had been searching for a permanent
replacement for her at least two months before she was terminated.


Moreover, the Plaintiff is informed and believes that her position
was filled by a new hire in October 2020, the same month that the
Plaintiff was terminated. The Plaintiff asserts that the rationale
given her (job elimination) is false or pretextual, and that
actually she was terminated due to her disability or medical
condition, and/or her having taken protected leave in order to
receive treatment for her condition, and/or another unlawful
reason. In addition, on information and belief, the new hire was
significantly younger than Complainant, who had just turned 50
years old at the time of her termination, and the new hire did not
suffer from a medical condition that adversely affected her
physical appearance, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendants in the position of
"Executive Assistant/3am Coordinator" starting on or about June 11,
2018. Her position was also referred to interchangeably as "Chief
of Staff," although her job duties were mostly clerical.

Wild Card Media, LLC is and was a California limited liability
company doing business in the County of Los Angeles,
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Benjamin Davidson, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF BENJAMIN DAVIDSON, P.C.
          8383 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 830
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211
          Phone: (323) 713-0010
          Facsimile: (323) 488-6888
          Email: bdavidson@bendavidsonlaw.com


WILMINGTON TRUST: Final OK of Settlement Deal Nixed in Fink Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KRISTINA FINK, on behalf
of the Nation Safe Drivers Employee Stock Ownership Plan, and on
behalf of a class of all other persons similarly situated, v.
WILMINGTON TRUST, N.A., ANDREW SMITH, MICHAEL . SMITH, and FRANK
MENNELLA, Case No. 1:19-cv-01193-CFC (D. Del.), the Hon. Judge Colm
F. Connolly entered an order that the Plaintiffs unopposed motion
for final approval of settlement and plaintiffs unopposed motion
for attorneys' fees, litigation expenses and class representative
service award are denied with leave to file amended motions.

The parties have agreed to settle this class action for a payment
of $5,500,000 into a common fund for the benefit of settlement
class members. Fink's attorneys argue that this payment will result
in vested class members receiving $25,000 on average and non-vested
class members receiving $50. Fink's attorneys request a fee award
of 30% of the recovery amount. Thus, the actual vested class member
recovery will only be, on average, $17,500. As I indicated at the
hearing on September 15, 2021, I am willing to approve the proposed
settlement agreement but have concerns regarding the requested
attorneys' fees.

Wilmington Trust is a premier provider of wealth and institutional
services for M&T Bank.

A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Bh3yUg at no extra charge.[CC]

WRITERS GUILD: Martel Seeks to Certify Class of WGA Members
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JAY MARTEL, an individual,
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, v. WRITERS
GUILD OF AMERICA WEST, INC., a California corporation; VIACOM MEDIA
NETWORKS, a Delaware corporation; COMEDY PARTNERS LLC, a New York
limited liability company; CENTRAL PRODUCTIONS LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company; LRF DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., a
California corporation; HELLO DOGGIE, INC., a Delaware corporation;
and DOES 1-10, Case No. 2:21-cv-02389-PA-GJS (C.D. Cal.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order certifying case as a
class action for the following class under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 as this case fulfills all of the Rule's requirements:

   "All WGA members, their successors in interest, assigns,
   heirs, executors, trustees, and administrators, whose claims
   for streaming residuals due from Viacom Media Networks,
   Comedy Partners LLC, Central Productions LLC, LRF Development
   Company, Inc., and/or Hello Doggie, Inc., were settled and
   released in the February 3, 2020 settlement agreement
   negotiated by the WGA."

The Writers Guild of America is the joint efforts of two different
US labor unions representing TV and film writers: The Writers Guild
of America, East, headquartered in New York City and affiliated
with the AFL-CIO The Writers Guild of America West, headquartered
in Los Angeles.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Oct. 18,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3befbRf
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Neville L. Johnson, Esq.
          Douglas L. Johnson, Esq.
          Daniel B. Lifschitz, Esq.
          JOHNSON & JOHNSON LLP
          439 North Canon Drive, Suite 200
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: 310-975-1080
          Facsimile: 310-975-1095
          E-mail: njohnson@jjllplaw.com
                  djohnson@jjllplaw.com
                  dlifschitz@jjllplaw.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey A. Koncius, Esq.
          Kevin D. Zipser, Esq.
          KIESEL LAW LLP
          8648 Wilshire Boulevard
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211
          Telephone: (310) 854-4444
          Facsimile: (310) 854-0812
          E-mail: koncius@kiesel.law
                  zipser@kiesel.law

               - and -

          Daniel L. Warshaw, Esq.
          Bobby Pouya, Esq.
          PEARSON, SIMON & WARSHAW LLP
          15165 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 400
          Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
          Telephone: (818) 788-8300
          Facsimile: (818) 788-8104
          E-mail: dwarshaw@pswlaw.com
                  bpouya@pswlaw.com

WYNN LAS VEGAS: Bids to Stay Discovery in Schrader Suit Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Brenda Weksler of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nevada grants the Defendants' motions to stay discovery
in the lawsuit captioned as Brenna Schrader, Plaintiff v. Wynn Las
Vegas, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02159-JCM-BNW (D.
Nev.).

Before the Court are two motions to stay discovery. Defendant Alan
Wynn filed a motion to stay discovery. Defendant Maurice Wooden
joined this motion. The Plaintiff opposed the motion, and Mr. Wynn
replied. Entity Defendants Wynn Resorts, Limited (WRL) and Wynn Las
Vegas, LLC (WLV) also filed a motion to stay discovery. The
Plaintiff opposed the motion, and the Entity Defendants replied.

Background

This case is a putative class action in which the Plaintiff seeks
to represent nine subclasses of Plaintiffs. The Plaintiff generally
alleges as follows: the Defendants engaged in decades of sexual
misconduct at WLV and WR and covered up this conduct. Many current
and former female employees, including the Plaintiff, were sexually
harassed, sexually assaulted, and forced into sexual servitude.
More specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that she and others were
forced to perform sex acts on Mr. Wynn and VIP clients at WR and
WLV. This, and other conduct, created a hostile work environment.
It also had the effect of denying these female employees the same
terms and conditions of employment as male employees.

As a result of this conduct, the Plaintiff filed suit. The
Defendants moved to dismiss. The Defendants simultaneously sought
to stay discovery, which the Plaintiff did not oppose. Accordingly,
the Court granted the Defendants' motion and stayed discovery. The
Court ordered the parties to file a scheduling order within 14 days
after the motions to dismiss were decided.

The Plaintiff then moved to amend her complaint. The Court
recommended that certain claims not be allowed to proceed and
ordered other claims to proceed. The Defendants objected. The
district judge assigned to the case reviewed the objections,
sustaining some and overruling others. Ultimately, the following
claims survived: (1) the Plaintiff's Title VII claim against the
Entity Defendants; (2) the Plaintiff's Nevada RICO claim against
all Defendants; (3) the Plaintiff's intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED) claim against the Entity Defendants and
Mr. Wynn; and (4) the Plaintiff's civil conspiracy claim against
Mr. Wynn. The district judge also denied the motions to dismiss as
moot.

Once the amended complaint was filed, the Defendants again moved to
dismiss certain claims. Messrs. Wynn and Wooden each moved to
dismiss all remaining claims against them. The Entity Defendants
moved to dismiss the Nevada RICO claim against them, conceding that
the Title VII and IIED claims would proceed.

Because there are several motions to dismiss pending, the
Defendants moved to continue the stay of discovery. The Defendants
make two general arguments regarding why discovery should be
stayed. First, the Defendants argue that under Kor Media Group, LLC
v. Green, 294 F.R.D. 579 (D. Nev. 2013) and similar cases, a
discovery stay is appropriate because dispositive motions are
pending that are likely to succeed. Second, the Defendants argue
that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, a continuation of the
discovery stay is appropriate based on the complexity and current
procedural posture of this case.

The Plaintiff opposed both motions to stay discovery in a joint
response brief. The Plaintiff also references the test laid out in
Kor Media and argues that the Defendants' motions should be denied
because the Court cannot be convinced that the Plaintiff cannot
state a claim. Additionally, the Plaintiff argues that discovery is
related to the dispositive motions because the Plaintiff could
potentially amend her complaint upon the discovery of additional
facts. Finally, though the Plaintiff acknowledges that in deciding
a motion to stay discovery the Court is guided by Rule 1 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, she does not address the
Defendants' arguments about the complexity of this case.

Analysis

The Defendants move to stay discovery based on the preliminary peek
test and based on the complexity of the case. As discussed, the
Court is not convinced that the Plaintiff cannot state a
claim/Defendants will be successful on their motions to dismiss.
However, the Court is persuaded that good cause exists to stay
discovery given the complexity of the case and the current, unique
procedural posture.

First, the Court reviewed the parties' briefs on the motion to stay
discovery and took a preliminary peek at the Defendants'
dispositive motions. Having conducted this preliminary peek, the
Court is not convinced that the Plaintiff will be unable to proceed
with the claims the Defendants seek to dismiss. The Court will not,
however, provide an in-depth analysis of its evaluation of the
motions to dismiss.

Second, the Court reviewed the parties' briefs and heard argument
on the complexity of the matter. The Court finds that the
Defendants demonstrated harm or prejudice will result if discovery
proceeds now, and as such, good cause exists to continue the stay
of discovery. As the Defendants argue, this is a complex case. It
is a putative class action with nine, broadly defined subclasses.
The allegations span multiple decades and implicate dozens of
witnesses. Likely, a large volume of documents will need to be
reviewed and produced.

Additionally, Judge Weksler notes, three dispositive motions are
pending, which have the potential to simplify, or at least
solidify, the parties, claims, and scope of discovery in this case.
If the dispositive motions are granted, the two Individual
Defendants and the Nevada RICO claim will be dismissed (leaving
only Title VII and IIED claims against the Entity Defendants). As
counsel argued at the Oct. 12, 2021 hearing, beginning discovery
now will likely lead to unnecessary or duplicative discovery (if
claims are dismissed or discovery is bifurcated until the motions
to dismiss are decided).

As such, the Court finds it would be prejudicial to the Defendants
to proceed with discovery now. Good cause exists to stay discovery
pending the determination of the pending dispositive motions.

Conclusion

It is, therefore, ordered that the Defendants' motions to stay
discovery are granted.

It is further ordered that the parties are to file a joint,
proposed discovery plan and scheduling order within 14 days after
ECF Nos. 98, 99, and 103 are decided.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 14, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/w3uks6mp from Leagle.com.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***