/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/211130.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, November 30, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 233

                            Headlines

1908 BRANDS: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
21ST MORTGAGE: Price Consumer Suit Removed to D. Maryland
ABCO GROUP: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ACAI ROOTS: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
AHAVA NA: Duncan Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York

AHMC SAN GABRIEL: Braswell Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
AIT WORLDWIDE: Chavez Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Wages
AKERVALL TECHNOLOGIES: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ALL AMERICAN: Perrong FTSA Class Suit Removed to M.D. Florida
AMAZON.COM INC: Gateguard Sues Over Improper Business Practices

AMAZON.COM: GateGuard Sues Over Unlawful Tampering of Intercom
AMERICA'S CRATE: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
AMITY CAR: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Chacon Suit Claims
ANCHOR BEVERAGES: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ANIMOTO INC: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

ANNIE'S PUBLISHING: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ARCE FUNERAL: Calcano Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ARROW SENIOR: Roberts Sues to Recover Overtime Wages
ASTRO GALLERY: Martinez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
ATH SPORTS: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

AZWC 1 LLC: Contreras Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BAKER'S BACON: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BARRETT BUSINESS: Sagona Sues Over Failure to Pay Proper Wages
BAY AREA TOLL: Gregorio Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
BAYER HEALTHCARE: Sunscreen Contains Benzophenone, Truss Alleges

BEAUNIQ LLC: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BELLA + CANVAS: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BETHANY HOME: Galeas Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
BIG FRIG: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BIG ISLAND: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

BIG LOTS INC: Devey Sues Over Mislabeled Coffee Products
BIKINI.COM LLC: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BLACKOXYGEN ORGANICS: Faces Class Action Over Toxic Ingredients
BLOOMFIELD HILLS: Faces $150MM Racial Discrimination Class Action
BLOOMFIELD HILLS: H.S. Parents Share Emotions Behind $150M Suit

BLOOMFIELD HILLS: Student Files $150M Racial Discrimination
BLUE CROSS: Fuog Files Suit in Fla. Cir. Ct.
BOMBAY AND CEDAR: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BOSTON MARKET: Fitzpatrick Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BRIAN NORAN: Pauley Files Suit in W.D. Virginia

BRINK'S INCORPORATED: Cruz Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB: Bernstein Sues Over Drop in Share Price
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB: Kuznicki Law Discloses Securities Class Suit
BRODOFICATION LLC: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BRYXEN INC: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

C&H CLUBS: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CACTUS SPORTS: Contreras Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CAPITAL VISION: Court Denies Bid to Strike Wood's Class Claims
CAR-MART INC: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CASEY'S GENERAL: Faces Suit Over Drivers' Unreimbursed Expenses

CELEBRITY RESORTS: Chavez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
CENTERFOLD ENTERTAINMENT: Land Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
CENTURY CARRIERS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Henriquez Claims
CHANGE.ORG PBC: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CIRCLE 9: Gore Files FLSA Suit in W.D. Oklahoma

CITRIX SYSTEMS: Bernstein Litowitz Discloses Class Action Lawsuit
CLASSIC FOOD INC: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Galvez Suit Alleges
CLOTHING SHOP: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
COLLABORATIVE BOATING: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
COLLECTIBLES INSURANCE: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D.N.Y.

COLONIAL LIFE: Castro Sues Over Wage-and-Hour Violations in Cal.
COLUMBIA PROPERTY: Proposed Merger Lacks Info, Coffman Alleges
COMFORTRESEARCH LLC: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D.N.Y.
CONSOL COAL: Monteverde & Associates Reminds of January 3 Deadline
CORDAROY'S WHOLESALE: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D.N.Y.

CORE DIGITAL: Aussieker Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
CRITICAL TELEPHONE: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CROWN RESORTS: Settles Shareholder Class Action for $125 Million
CULTURE CARTON: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DATTO INC: Faces Class Action Over Fraud, Consumer Laws Violations

DATTO INC: Gary R. Carlin APC Files Consumer Class Action Lawsuit
DAVITA INC: Fails to Pay Proper Wages to Nurses, Bowling Alleges
DECHOCKER LLC: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DECORATED INC: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DELTA AIR: Gurzenski Suit Remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court

DELUVIA INC: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DIET DIRECT: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Collins Sues Over Unpaid Hazard Premiums
DOGFISH HEAD: Contreras Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DONZELLA LTD: Sosa Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

DOW JONES: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DRAFTKINGS INC: Rodriguez and Hoorn Securities Suits Consolidated
DSMB PARTNERS: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DYEHAED FAN: Contreras Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
E THING: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

EARGO INC: Kessler Topaz Reminds of December 6 Deadline
ECZEMA HONEY: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ELDERSCAN LLC: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ELSE NUTRITION: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
EMCOD INC: Figueroa Sues Over Failure to Pay Compensations

ENPHASE ENERGY: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
EOS USA: Heppinstall Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Pennsylvania
ERIE INSURANCE: Illinois Court Dismisses EBCF Suit With Prejudice
ETERNAL SUNSHINE: Faces Santos Suit Over Unpaid Wages for Bakers
EVANGELICAL COMMUNITY: Court Narrows Claims in Antitrust Class Suit

FEIN SUCH: Barone Files FDCPA Suit in D. New Jersey
FICOSOTA MARKETING: Slade Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
FIDELITY NATIONAL: Denial of Fees to Villanueva's Attys. Affirmed
FINISHLINE EXPRESS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Austin Suit Says
FIRST NBC: Court Grants Ryan's Bid to Stay Kinzler Class Suit

FLORIDA: Appeals Court Dismisses ACLU Class Action Challenge
FLUIDMASTER INC: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
FOGO DE CHAO: Court Extends Class Cert. Bid Filing to Dec. 22
FOR DAYS INC: Slade Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
FORWARDLINE FINANCIAL: Denial of Arbitration in Ahlmann Suit Upheld

FREEDOM MORTGAGE: Fails to Answer RFI, Steve RESPA Suit Claims
FURTHER INC: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
FUTURE OF LATINX: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
GARRETT FRIDAY: Norwood Files FDCPA Suit in N.D. Mississippi
GENERAC POWER: Contreras Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

GENERAL MOTORS: Airko Must File Class Cert Bid by Jan. 14, 2022
GENERAL MOTORS: Springfield Consumer Suit Goes to C.D. California
GIFTING GROUP: Duncan Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
GIS FIELD SERVICES: Davis Sues Over Field Inspectors' Unpaid Wages
GOLDMAN SACHS: Pomerantz Law Reminds of December 27 Deadline

GOOGLE LLC: Survives Class Action as Lawyers Predict Drop in Claims
GRASS ADVANTAGE: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
GREEN EARTH: Myrick Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Wages
HABEMATOLEL POMO: Denial of Arbitration Bids in Hengle Suit Upheld
HALCYON PUBLISHING: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

HALES GALLERY: Murphy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
HANNAFORD BROS: Prinzo Wage-and-Hour Suit Goes to D. Massachusetts
HDR INC: Faces Davis Suit Over Violation of the Wiretap Act
HEARST COMMUNICATIONS: Lopez Sues Over Unlawful Use of Names
HELEN OF TROY: Antiperspirant Contains Benzene, Fahey Alleges

HELWASER FINE: Murphy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
INTERNATIONAL FOLLIES: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Diggs Alleges
J.M. SMUCKER: Folgers Coffee Label "Deceptive," Smith Suit Says
JAL CHEMICAL: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Casseus Suit Alleges
JARDINE LLOYD: Insurance Class Action Ruling May Take Months

JBS SA: $13 Million Settlement Approved in Pork Antitrust Lawsuit
JMT RESTAURANT CORP: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Asencio Alleges
JUUL LABS: Logan Votes to Join 400 School Districts in Vaping Suit
KOVITZ SHIFRIN: Court Denies Summary Judgment Bids in Wahlert Suit
LIBERTY OILFIELD: Court Sets Class Certification Briefing Sched

LINKEDIN CORP: California Court Narrows Claims in ERISA Class Suit
MAN SE: Truck Cartel Class Action Group Hits 125 Members
MANITOBA: 2011 Lake Flood Class Action Suit Settlement Discussed
MAPLEWOOD, MO: Webb Class Certification Bid Partly OK'd
MAZDA MOTOR: Suit Filed Over Fuel Pump Problems, Engine Stall Risks

MDL 2323: Court Orders Disbursement of Costs to Counsel in NFL Suit
MDL 2323: Zimmerman Gets Attys.' Fees in NFL Concussion Injury Suit
MDL 2670: Summary Judgment Bids in Antitrust Suit Granted in Part
MERCK KGAA: Zamora Sues Over Chemical Packing Operators' Unpaid OT
MICHIGAN: Court Grants Bid for Summary Judgment in Kensu v. MDOC

MICHIGAN: Governor Sued Over Failure to Notify Lead in Water
MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Opposes Remand in Home Internet Expense Suit
MINE SAFETY: Marcum Consumer Suit Removed to S.D. West Virginia
MINE SAFETY: Morgan Consumer Suit Goes to S.D. West Virginia
MISSOURI GAMING: ERISA Class & Subclass Certified in Williams Suit

MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY: Online Education Class Suit Can Proceed
NATHANSON LAW: Kaur Seeks to Certify Class Action
NEW YORK, NY: Court Dismisses Union Square Suit Over Price Gouging
NEW YORK: Faces Largest-Ever Lawsuit Payout to NYC Teachers
NEWELL BRANDS: Court Certifies Benson's Multi-State Class, Subclass

NOVAVAX INC: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of January 18 Deadline
NUIX LTD: Faces Class Action Over IPO Disclosure Obligations
NUVE MIGUEL: Conditional Certification of Santos' FLSA Class Denied
OIL PATCH: Palczynsky Sues Over Unpaid OT for Flowback Operators
PACIFIC FERTILITY: Court Denies Bid for Partial Summary Judgment

PAR-A-DICE HOTEL: Pruitts Seek Certification of BIPA Class Action
PETROQUEST ENERGY: Bid to Extend Class Cert. Reply Deadline Filed
PINE RIDGE FARMS: Plant Stench Problems Persist Despite Settlement
PIONEER EXPLORATION: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Chavera Alleges
PREMIER MEDICAL: Seeks to Stay Sharfman Case

PROCTER & GAMBLE: Antiperspirant Contains Benzene, Aviles Alleges
PSI SYSTEMS: Wins Bid to Dismiss Claims in Person Class Suit
PURPLE LIFE: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
REFINERY SPECIALTIES: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Rooks Claims
ROSA'S CAFE: Faces Valdez Suit Over Cafe Employees' Unpaid Wages

RUSSELL SECURITY: December 20 Settlement Approval Hearing Set
SHORELINE CHARTERS: Targeted by BIPA Lawsuit Over Fingerprint Scans
SHUN LEE PALACE: Must Oppose Class Cert. Bid by Dec. 29, 2021
SIMPLEFASTLOANS: Warren Terzian Investigates Potential Class Suit
SIRIUS XM RADIO: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Potts Suit Alleges

SNAP INC: Faces Black Suit Over Alleged Drop in Share Price
SOCIETY INSURANCE: Faces Suit Over Denial of Insurance Claims
SPECTRANETICS CORP: Court Vacates Dec. 2 Class Status Hearing
ST. VINCENT SALEM: Dismissal of Taylor's Judgment Claim Affirmed
STATE FARM: Time Extension for Class Cert. Bid Filing Sought

STONECO LTD: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Fraud Lawsuit
STRATEGIC DELIVERY: Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective Action
SUBARU OF AMERICA: Ct. Enters Scheduling Order in Nunez Suit
SUMMIT FINANCIAL: Firm Director Found Guilty of Contravening NCR
TAKEDA PHARMA: Court Extends Class Cert. Deadlines in "Painters"

TENET FINTECH: Rosen Law Firm Reminds of January 18 Deadline
TENNCARE: Must Reply to Renewed Class Cert. Bid by Jan. 4, 2022
TENNCARE: Seeks Jan. 10, 2022 Extension of Class Cert. Response
TEXAS: Seeks Dec. 3 Extension of Class Cert Response in Wilson
TJX DIGITAL: Parties in Harris Suit Seek FLSA Collective Cert.

TPA TIRES: Mieles Sues Over Retaliation and Unpaid OT Wages
TRADITIONAL LOGISTICS: Bid to Dismiss Anderson's Claims Denied
TRANSAMERICA CORP: Court Approves Settlement Deal in Karg Suit
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Wins Summary Judgment Bid in Two Class Suits
UNITED STATES: Calixto, et al., File Renewed Bid for Class Status

UNITED STATES: Pines Can't Intervene in National Veterans Suit
VICTORIA'S SECRET: Body Sprays Contain Benzene, Toribio Suit Says
VIMEO.COM INC: Tavarez Seeks Blind's Access to Video Sharing Site
WALMART INC: Guzman Wage-and-Hour Suit Goes to N.D. California
WALMART INC: Van Der Steeg Sues Over Adulterated Antiperspirants

WASHINGTON: Faces Class Action Over New Long-Term Care Tax
WELLS FARGO: Parties in Thompson Class Suit Seek Briefing Sched
WELLS FARGO: Thompson Must File Class Cert. Bid by Feb. 16, 2022
WOODVALLEY CONTRACTORS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Clark Alleges
ZHANGMEN EDUCATION: Robbins Geller Reminds of January 18 Deadline

ZILLOW GROUP: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of January 18 Deadline
ZOOSK INC: Filing of Class Status Bid Extended to Jan. 24, 2022
[*] Australia Puts on Hold Class Action Litigation Funding Bill
[*] Australian Gov't Committee Backs Class Action Law Reform
[*] Herbert Smith Attorneys Discuss Collective Actions in UK

[*] Nonprofits Can Represent Individuals in DPA Class Actions
[*] Quebec Private Schools Face Suit for Going Virtual During COVID
[*] Webb City, Mo. Joins Class Action Against Opioid Companies

                            *********

1908 BRANDS: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against 1908 Brands, Inc. The
case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. 1908 Brands, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-09791 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

1908 Brands, Inc. -- https://1908brands.com/ -- manufactures,
manages, and markets natural product brands. The Company offers
product brands such as non-toxic cleaning supplies, snacks, family
recipes, and energy bars.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com


21ST MORTGAGE: Price Consumer Suit Removed to D. Maryland
---------------------------------------------------------
The case styled DEBORAH PRICE and WILLIAM PRICE, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. 21ST MORTGAGE
CORPORATION, Case No. 24-C-21004553, was removed from the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City, Maryland, to the U.S. District Court for
the District of Maryland on November 24, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the District of Maryland assigned Case No.
1:21-cv-03017-ELH to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violation of
Maryland's Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions by
improperly charging origination fees, late fees, and insurance
premiums to the Plaintiffs in connection with their financing of a
manufactured home purchase through 21st Mortgage.

21st Mortgage Corporation is a mortgage lender in Knoxville,
Tennessee. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:          
         
         Brian L. Moffet, Esq.
         MILES & STOCKBRIDGE, P.C.
         100 Light Street
         Baltimore, MD 21202
         Telephone: (410) 385-3656
         E-mail: bmoffet@milesstockbridge.com

                 - and –
  
         Lauren Fleming, Esq.
         MILES & STOCKBRIDGE, P.C.
         100 Light Street
         Baltimore, MD 21202
         Telephone: (410) 385-3657
         E-mail: lfleming@milesstockbridge.com

ABCO GROUP: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against ABCO Group, Inc. The
case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. ABCO Group, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-09799-MKV (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

ABCO -- https://www.abcogroup.ca/ -- provides office furniture and
moving solutions to thousands of Ontario businesses.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com


ACAI ROOTS: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Acai Roots. The case
is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Acai Roots, Case No. 1:21-cv-09765
(S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Acai Roots -- https://acairoots.com/ -- is a delicious line of
organic acai berry products perfected by native Brazilians.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 11201
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: jmizrahi@mizrahikroub.com


AHAVA NA: Duncan Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ahava N.A., LLC. The
case is styled as Eugene Duncan, and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated v. Ahava N.A., LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-06567
(E.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Ahava Dead Sea Laboratories, Limited -- https://www.ahava.com/ --
is an Israeli cosmetics company that manufactures skin care
products made of mud and mineral-based compounds from the Dead
Sea.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM PC
          175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: brad@markslawfirm.net


AHMC SAN GABRIEL: Braswell Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against AHMC San Gabriel
Valley Medical Center, LP, et al. The case is styled as Ruthie
Braswell, On Behalf of Herself, the State of California, and Others
Similarly Situated and Aggrieved v. AHMC San Gabriel Valley Medical
Center, LP, AHMC Healthcare, Inc., San Gabriel Healthcare, Inc.,
SGVMC Healthcare, LP., AHMC Anaheim Regional Medical Center LP.,
AHMC Seton Medical Center, LLC, AHMC Monterey Park Hospital, LP,
AHMC Greater El Monte Community Hospital LP, AHMC Garfield Medical
Center LP, AHMC Whittier Hospital Medical Center LP, Does 1 to 100,
Inclusive, Case No. 21STCV42872 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty.,
Nov. 19, 2021).

AHMC San Gabriel Valley Medical Center, LP --
https://www.sgvmc.com/ -- is a general hospital in San Gabriel,
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zachary Crosner, Esq.
          CROSNER LEGAL, P.C.
          9440 Santa Monica Blvd. Suite 301
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Phone: (310) 496-5818
          Fax: (310) 510-6429
          Email: zach@crosnerlegal.com


AIT WORLDWIDE: Chavez Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
Eric Chavez, on behalf of the general public as private attorney
general v. AIT WORLDWIDE LOGISTICS, INC., an Illinois Corporation;
REAL TIME STAFFING SERVICES, LLC doing business as SELECT STAFFING,
a California Limited Liability Company; and DOES 1-50, inclusive,
Case No. 21STCV41522 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., Nov. 10,
2021), is brought for recovery of penalties under the Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004 against the Defendants who violated
various provisions of the California Labor Code by failing to
accurately pay wages including overtime wage.

The Defendants implemented policies and practices which led to
unpaid wages resulting from Defendant's: failure to accurately pay
wages including overtime wage, failure to provide meal periods for
every work period exceeding more than 10 hours per day and failure
to pay an additional hour's of pay or accurately pay an additional
hour's of pay in lieu of providing a meal period; failure to
authorize and permit rest breaks for every four hours or major
fraction thereof worked and failure to pay an additional hour's of
pay or accurately pay an additional hour's of pay in lieu of
providing a rest period; failing to pay all wages earned and owed
upon separation from Defendant's employ, failing to provide
accurate itemized wage statements, for issuing payment of wages in
the form of a non-Labor Code-compliant instrument, and failure to
reimburse business expenses. As a result Plaintiff seeks penalties
under Labor Code on behalf of the general public as private
attorney general and all other aggrieved employees, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants in October 2020 as a
Non-Exempt Employee and worked at the Defendants' warehouse as a
General Laborer and Forklift Operator during the liability period
until his separation from the Defendants' employ in March 2021.

AIT WORLDWIDE LOGISTICS, INC., operates as a freight and logistics
company throughout the United States including California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James R. Hawkins, Esq.
          Gregory Mauro, Esq.
          Michael Calvo, Esq.
          Jeanne Sarmiento, Esq.
          JAMES HAWKINS APLC
          9880 Research Drive, Suite 200
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Phone: (949) 387-7200
          Fax: (949) 387-6676
          Email: James@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                 Greg@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                 Michael@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                 Jeanne@jameshawkinsaplac.com


AKERVALL TECHNOLOGIES: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Akervall
Technologies, Inc. The case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Akervall
Technologies, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-09895 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23,
2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Akervall Technologies -- http://akervalltechnologies.com/-- is a
provider of boomerang-shaped hunk of technology by offering more
protection and less mouthguard.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com


ALL AMERICAN: Perrong FTSA Class Suit Removed to M.D. Florida
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled ANDREW PERRONG, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. ALL AMERICAN POWER AND GAS PA, LLC,
Case No. 21001070CA, was removed from the Twentieth Judicial
Circuit Court in and for Charlotte County, Florida, to the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Florida on November 24,
2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Middle District of Florida assigned Case
No. 2:21-cv-00883 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violation of the
Florida Telephone Solicitation Act by making telephonic sales calls
to the Plaintiff and Class members without prior express written
consent.

All American Power and Gas PA, LLC is an energy company based in
Florida. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:          
         
         Josh Migdal, Esq.
         Yaniv Adar, Esq.
         MARK MIGDAL & HAYDEN
         80 S.W. 8th Street, Suite 1999
         Miami, FL 33130
         Telephone: (305) 374-0440
         E-mail: josh@markmigdal.com
                 yaniv@markmigdal.com
                 eservice@markmigdal.com

AMAZON.COM INC: Gateguard Sues Over Improper Business Practices
---------------------------------------------------------------
GATEGUARD, INC., individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. AMAZON.COM, INC.; AMAZON.COM SERVICES, INC.;
AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC; AMAZON LOGISTICS, INC., Defendants, Case
No. 1:21-cv-09321 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 10, 2021) is an action resulting
from Amazon's illegal pattern of tampering with intercom and access
control devices in multifamily residential buildings in New York
and across the nation, while lying to low-level building personnel
and deceiving property owners about its authority to install its
own access devices.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that Amazon has interfered
with the Plaintiff's contractual relations and prospective economic
advantage, committed computer fraud, misappropriated and converted
property to its own use, unjustly enriched itself -- all as part of
a broader scheme that attempts to monopolize the e-commerce
delivery market. The Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Amazon from taking
any further action to tamper with any intercom devices installed in
multifamily residential buildings in New York without the consent
of the device owner and the building owner/manager.

Allegedly, Amazon has operated in a ruthless, cut-throat manner,
pushing growth at all costs and signing up new buildings at
breakneck speed, often without consent and by deceiving building
superintendents that they have obtained management or ownership
approval.

AMAZON.COM, INC. is an online retailer that offers a wide range of
products. The Company products include books, music, computers,
electronics and numerous other products. Amazon offers personalized
shopping services, Web-based credit card payment, and direct
shipping to customers. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eden P. Quainton, Esq.
          QUAINTON LAW, PLLC
          2 Park Ave., 2nd Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 419-0575

AMAZON.COM: GateGuard Sues Over Unlawful Tampering of Intercom
--------------------------------------------------------------
GateGuard, Inc., for itself and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. AMAZON.COM, INC., AMAZON.COM SERVICES, INC., AMAZON.COM
SERVICES, LLC, AMAZON LOGISTICS, INC., Case No. 1:21-cv-09321
(S.D.N.Y., Nov. 10, 2021), is brought for damages, documented with
photographic and video evidence, resulting from Amazon's illegal
pattern of tampering with intercom and access control devices in
multifamily residential buildings in New York and across the
nation, while lying to low-level building personnel and deceiving
property owners about its authority to install its own access
devices.

According to the complaint, Amazon has interfered with GateGuard's
contractual relations and prospective economic advantage, committed
computer fraud, misappropriated and converted property to its own
use, unjustly enriched itself—all as part of a broader scheme
that attempts to monopolize the e-commerce delivery market.
GateGuard is also seeking an injunction permanently enjoining
Amazon from taking any further action to tamper with any intercom
devices installed in multifamily residential buildings in New York
without the consent of the device owner and the building
owner/manager.

One of GateGuard's primary offerings is its "AI Doorman" intercom
device, which was first released in 2016. GateGuard's intercoms
offer unique features and capabilities that enable building
managers to autonomously track everyone who enters, buzzes, or uses
a guest code. These features alert building managers to forbidden
activities such as illegal subletting, use of residential
apartments as dormitories, unauthorized or non-compliant group
activities and other threats to the safety and property of
residents and landlords alike. GateGuard's intercoms also generate
real-time logs of these activities managers can view, filter, and
print from any mobile phone, tablet, or computer, which are
accessible via built-in cellular modems that connect the units to
the internet. GateGuard thus constitutes a valuable repository of
client data of great interest to a business such as Amazon.
Property managers and tenants rely on GateGuard to keep their
buildings safe.

Amazon is not only destroying GateGuard's business: It is
compromising the safety of New York City residents – and breaking
the law. Specifically, N.Y. Multiple Dwelling Law requires every
apartment building in New York State be equipped with a working
intercom system. The statute imposes criminal liability on anyone
"who shall willfully destroy, damage, or jam or otherwise interfere
with the proper operation of" such intercoms.

At numerous buildings throughout New York City and in this
District, Amazon installed its own devices without permission of
building management and has destroyed, damaged, and interfered with
the proper operation of GateGuard's intercoms either making the
devices appear to be defective, or actually damaging the proper
functioning of GateGuard's devices in order to return to the
building and propose a security "upgrade" to unsuspecting property
managers and owners who did not know of Amazon's initial
installation.

Amazon has operated in a ruthless, cut-throat manner, pushing
growth at all costs and signing up new buildings at breakneck
speed, often without consent and by deceiving building
superintendents that they have obtained management or ownership
approval. GateGuard has brought this issue to Amazon's attention
repeatedly, even directly to its founder Jeff Bezos, starting in
October 2020. Yet Amazon refuses to take responsibility for its
conduct or even to change its deceptive and unlawful practices,
despite being on notice that its activities compromise the safety
of building residents—including Amazon's own customers. Left with
no other choice, GateGuard brings this suit to hold Amazon
accountable for the damage it has caused and to prevent Amazon from
monopolizing the e-commerce delivery market and further damaging
GateGuard and other victims of its anti-competitive conduct, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiff GateGuard is a startup company that develops,
manufactures and sells security technology for multi-tenant
apartment buildings.

Amazon.com, Inc. is a Delaware corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eden P. Quainton, Esq.
          QUAINTON LAW, PLLC
          2 Park Ave., 2nd Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Phone: (212) 419-0575


AMERICA'S CRATE: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against America's Crate 1776
LLC. The case is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. America's Crate 1776
LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-09866 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Americas Crate 1776 LLC -- https://www.americascrate.com/ -- is in
the Electronic Shopping business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


AMITY CAR: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Chacon Suit Claims
----------------------------------------------------------
HUMBERTO CHACON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. AMITY CAR WASH, INC. d/b/a AMITY CAR WASH
AND DETAIL CENTER and CRAIG DELUCA, as individual, Defendants, Case
No. 2:21-cv-06201 (E.D.N.Y., November 8, 2021) is a collective
action complaint brought against the Defendants to recover damages
for their alleged egregious violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants from in or around
August 2014 to July 2021 to perform his primary duties as a car
wash worker and car cleaner, while performing other miscellaneous
duties.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked approximately 50
hours or more per week during his employment with the Defendants.
However, the Defendants denied him of his lawfully earned overtime
compensation at the rate of one and one-half times his regular rate
of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. The
Defendant also failed to post notices of the minimum wage and
overtime wage requirements in a conspicuous place at the location
of their employment as required by both the FLSA and NYLL.
Moreover, the Defendants has failed to keep payroll records, says
the suit.

Amity Car Wash, Inc. d/b/a Amity Car Wash and Detail Center
provides car wash services. Craig Deluca owns and operates the
Corporate Defendant. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, PC
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Tel: (718) 263-9591
          Fax: (718) 263-9598

ANCHOR BEVERAGES: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Anchor Beverages,
Inc. The case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Anchor Beverages, Inc., Case
No. 1:21-cv-09793 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Anchor Beverages, Inc. doing business as Capital Teas --
https://capitalteas.com/ -- is a leading American tea brand.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com


ANIMOTO INC: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Animoto Inc. The case
is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Animoto Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-09860-ER (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Animoto -- https://animoto.com/ -- is a cloud-based video creation
service that produces video from photos, video clips, and music
into video slideshows, and customized web-based presentations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


ANNIE'S PUBLISHING: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Annie's Publishing,
LLC. The case is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Annie's Publishing,
LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-09862 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Annie's -- https://www.annies-publishing.com/ -- is a craft and
nostalgia publishing division of DRG.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


ARCE FUNERAL: Calcano Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Arce Funeral Home,
Inc. The case is styled as Marcos Calcano, on behalf of himself and
all other persons similarly situated v. Arce Funeral Home, Inc.
d/b/a D'Bari Funeral Home, Case No. 1:21-cv-09591 (S.D.N.Y., Nov.
19, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Arce Funeral Home, Inc. doing business as D'Bari Funeral Home --
http://www.dbarifuneralhome.com/-- is a funeral home in New York
City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dana Lauren Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (917) 796-7437
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: danalgottlieb@aol.com


ARROW SENIOR: Roberts Sues to Recover Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------
Deborah Roberts and Jadan Cook, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated v. ARROW SENIOR LIVING MANAGEMENT, LLC,
Case No. 4:21-cv-01370 (E.D. Mo., Nov. 19, 2021), is brought to
recover overtime wages, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and
costs pursuant to the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 and the Missouri Wage Act.

The Plaintiffs worked 40 or more hours for the Defendant as hourly,
non-exempt healthcare employees. The Defendant maintains
companywide policies and/or practices of 1) deducting a 30-minute
meal break from its hourly, non-exempt healthcare employees' daily
hours worked when they did not receive their full, uninterrupted
30-minute meal break, and 2) not including all forms of additional
remuneration in the calculation of hourly, non-exempt healthcare
employees' regular rate of pay for purposes of calculating their
overtime compensation. These companywide policies and/or practices
have resulted in the Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members not
being paid all of their overtime compensation. The Defendant knew
or should have known that these companywide policies and/or
practices have resulted in the Plaintiffs and the Putative Class
Members not being paid all of their overtime compensation, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff Roberts was employed by Defendant as an hourly,
non-exempt Care Partner and the Plaintiff Cook was employed by
Defendant as an hourly, non-exempt Med-Tech.

The Defendant owns, operates and manages 28 senior living
communities across the Midwest.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Rd., Suite #126
          Columbus, OH 43220
          Phone: 614-949-1181
          Fax: 614-386-9964
          Email: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com

               - and -

          Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
          Hans A. Nilges, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          7266 Portage Street, N.W., Suite D
          Massillon, OH 44646
          Phone: (330) 470-4428
          Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
          Email: sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com
                 hans@ohlaborlaw.com



ASTRO GALLERY: Martinez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Astro Gallery of
Gems, Inc. The case is styled as Pedro Martinez, individually and
as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons v.
Astro Gallery of Gems, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-06530 (E.D.N.Y., Nov.
23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Astro Gallery of Gems -- https://astrogallery.com/ -- is a rock
shop in New York City, a spacious store with colorful, museum-like
displays of fine & rare gems, fossils, minerals & jewelry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
          Scarsdale, NY 10583
          Phone: (917) 373-9128
          Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


ATH SPORTS: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against ATH Sports Nutrition
L.L.C. The case is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. ATH Sports Nutrition
L.L.C., Case No. 1:21-cv-09864 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

ATH -- https://www.athsport.co/ -- manufactures sports supplements
made from real ingredients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


AZWC 1 LLC: Contreras Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against AZWC 1, LLC. The case
is styled as Yensy Contreras, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. AZWC 1, LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-09684
(S.D.N.Y., Nov. 22, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

AZWC 1, LLC is a company in Tucson, Arizona.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jarrett Scott Charo, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: jcharo@mizrahikroub.com


BAKER'S BACON: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Baker's Bacon LLC.
The case is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Baker's Bacon LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-09865 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Baker's Bacon -- https://bakersbacon.com/ -- is a highly curated
selection of meat products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


BARRETT BUSINESS: Sagona Sues Over Failure to Pay Proper Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kelly Sagona, an individual, on behalf of herself, and all others
similarly aggrieved v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC., a Maryland
corporation; SCRIPTDROP, INC., a Delaware corporation; PROFESSIONAL
COURIER & LOGISTICS, INC. dba PCL STAFF, a California corporation;
and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Case No. 21STCV43062 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Nov. 23, 2021), is brought under the Private Attorneys General Act
of 2004 and for violations of the California Labor Code by failing
to pay proper compensations.

According to the complaint, the Defendants clocked the Plaintiff
out for thirty minutes to an hour for a meal period, when the
Plaintiff was still making deliveries and not relieved of all
duties or employer control. the Plaintiff was consistently unable
to take timely, off duty, thirty-minute, uninterrupted meal
periods, often being forced to take late meal periods and/or work
through part or all of the Plaintiff's meal periods due to the
nature and constraints of the Plaintiff's job duties and or
commentary from the Defendants pressuring the Plaintiff to take
non-compliant breaks or skip breaks completely to take additional
deliveries. Nevertheless, the Defendants implemented a policy and
practice of automatically deducting thirty minutes to an hour per
shift for these missed/improper meal periods, despite having actual
and/or constructive knowledge that the Plaintiff did not receive
compliant meal periods.

The Defendants rounded the start and end times of employee meal
periods and start and end time of employee shifts resulting in the
Plaintiff not being paid for all time worked. the Plaintiff is
further informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant
had actual or constructive knowledge that its time-rounding and
auto-deduction policies and practices resulted in the denial of
lawful meal periods to the Plaintiff and the underpayment of wages
owed the Plaintiff, in violation of California's minimum wage and
meal period laws. the Defendants never paid the Plaintiff an
additional hour of wages at her regular rate of pay for each
workday a proper meal period was not provided, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a non-exempt,
pharmacy delivery driver from November 2020 to January 2021.

BBSI is a Maryland corporation that was authorized to do business
within the State of California and is doing business in the State
of California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zachary Crosner, Esq.
          Michael Crosner, Esq.
          J. Kirk Donnelly, Esq.
          CROSNER LEGAL, P.C.
          433 N. Camden Dr., Suite 400
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Phone: (310)496-5818
          Facsimile: (818) 700-9973
          Email: zach@crosnerlegal.com
                 mike@crosnerlegal.com
                 kirk@crosnerlegal.com


BAY AREA TOLL: Gregorio Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against BAY AREA TOLL
AUTHORITY, et al. The case is styled as Maria Gregorio,
individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated
v. BAY AREA TOLL AUTHORITY, GOLDEN GATE BRIDGE HIGHWAY &
TRANSPORTATION, DISTRICT, DOES 1-100, Case No. CGC21596537 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Francisco Cty., Nov. 9, 2021).

The case type is stated as "BUSINESS TORT."

The Bay Area Toll Authority --
https://mtc.ca.gov/about-mtc/authorities/bay-area-toll-authority-bata
-- was created by the California State Legislature in 1997 to
administer the auto tolls on the San Francisco Bay Area's seven
state-owned toll bridges.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yeremey O. Krivoshey, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, PA
          1990 N. California Blvd., Ste. 940
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596-3745
          Phone: 925-300-4455
          Fax: 925-407-2700
          Email: ykrivoshey@bursor.com


BAYER HEALTHCARE: Sunscreen Contains Benzophenone, Truss Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
BARBARA TRUSS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BAYER HEALTHCARE PHARMACEUTICALS INC., BAYER
HEALTHCARE LLC, BAYER AG, BEIERSDORF, INC., BEIERSDORF NORTH
AMERICA, INC., and BEIERSDORF AG, Defendants, Case No.
7:21-cv-09845 (S.D.N.Y., November 23, 2021) is a class action
against the Defendants for violation of New York General Business
Laws, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and
unjust enrichment.

The case arises from the Defendants' false, deceptive, and
misleading advertising, labeling, and marketing of Coppertone Water
Babies (SPF 50) sunscreen product. The Defendant represented the
product as safe and tested. However, the Defendant failed to
disclose that the octocrylene in the product degrades over time and
results in an accumulation of benzophenone. Had the Plaintiff known
about the existence and accumulation of benzophenone in the
product, she would not have purchased the product or would have
paid significantly less for it, says the suit.

Bayer HealthCare Pharmaceuticals Inc. is a pharmaceutical company,
with its principal place of business in Whippany, New Jersey.

Bayer Healthcare LLC is a manufacturer of healthcare and medical
products, with its principal place of business in Whippany, New
Jersey.

Bayer AG is a multinational pharmaceutical and life sciences
company located in Germany.

Beiersdorf, Inc. is a global skin care company, with its principal
place of business in Wilton, Connecticut.

Beiersdorf North America, Inc. is a global skin care company, with
its principal place of business in Wilton, Connecticut.

Beiersdorf AG is a manufacturer and retailer of personal-care
products and pressure-sensitive adhesives, headquartered in
Germany. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Mitchell M. Breit, Esq.
         Blake Hunter Yagman, Esq.
         MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
         405 East 50th Street
         New York, NY 10022
         Telephone: (212) 594-5300
         E-mail: mbreit@milberg.com
                 byagman@milberg.com

                - and –

         Jennifer Czeisler, Esq.
         MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
         800 S. Gay Street, Suite 1100
         Knoxville, TN 37929
         Telephone: (865) 247-0080
         Facsimile: (865) 522-0049
         E-mail: jczeisler@milberg.com

                - and –

         Nick Suciu, III, Esq.
         MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
         6905 Telegraph Rd., Suite 115
         Bloomfield Hills, MI 48301
         Telephone: (313) 303-3472
         Facsimile: (865) 522-0049
         E-mail: nsuciu@milberg.com

                - and –

         Virginia Ann Whitener, Esq.
         Russell Busch, Esq.
         MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
         800 S. Gay Street, Suite 1100
         Knoxville, TN 37929
         Telephone: (865) 247-0080
         Facsimile: (865) 522-0049
         E-mail: gwhitener@milberg.com
                 rbusch@milberg.com

BEAUNIQ LLC: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Beauniq LLC. The case
is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Beauniq LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-09792
(S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Beauniq -- https://beauniq.com/ -- is a US-located, family-owned
store specializing in fine jewelry who hand-pick jewelry they
offer, selecting only best quality and most intriguing
designs.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com


BELLA + CANVAS: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bella + Canvas, LLC.
The case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Bella + Canvas, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-09877 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Bella + Canvas -- https://www.bellacanvas.com/ -- offers wholesale
blank tee shirts perfect for custom printing, ranging from
t-shirts, tanks, polo shirts, hoodies, fleece, tri blend, and
Heathers in all popular colors.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 11201
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: jmizrahi@mizrahikroub.com


BETHANY HOME: Galeas Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bethany Home Society
of San Joaquin, Inc. The case is styled as Blanca Galeas,
individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated v. Bethany Home Society of San Joaquin, Inc., a
California corporation, Case No. STK-CV-UOE-2021-0010793 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Joaquin Cty., Nov. 19, 2021).

The case type is stated as "Unlimited Civil Other Employment."

Bethany Home -- https://bethanyripon.org/ -- is the area's most
loved provider of senior housing and health care.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
          LAWYERS FOR JUSTICE, PC
          410 Arden Avenue, Suite 203
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Phone: 818-265-1020
          Fax: 818-265-1021


BIG FRIG: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Big Frig, LLC. The
case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Big Frig, LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-09789
(S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Big Frig -- https://bigfrig.com/ -- specializes in customized
rotomolded coolers and customized vacuum sealed stainless steel
tumblers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com


BIG ISLAND: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Big Island Bee
Company, LLC. The case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated v. The Big Island Bee
Company, LLC Case No. 1:21-cv-09790 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

The Big Island Bee Company -- https://bigislandbees.com/ -- is a
honey farm in the Hawaiian Paradise Park, Hawaii.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com


BIG LOTS INC: Devey Sues Over Mislabeled Coffee Products
--------------------------------------------------------
AMY DEVEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BIG LOTS, INC., Defendant, Case No.
6:21-cv-06688 (W.D.N.Y., Nov. 11, 2021) alleges that the Defendant
mislabeled its Arabica Medium-Dark Roast Colombian Coffee under its
Fresh Finds private label brand ("Product").

According to the complaint, the Defendant manufactures, labels,
markets, and sells 100% Arabica Medium-Dark Roast Colombian
(ground) Coffee in cans of 24.2 oz (686g) under its Fresh Finds
private label brand which claims to make up to 210 servings of 6 fl
oz ("Product"). The back part of the label, which contains brewing
instructions, tells purchasers that the Product makes up to 210
suggested strength 6 fl oz servings.

Reasonable consumers, like the Plaintiff, viewed this information,
and expected that when these directions were followed, the Product
would make 210 cups. However, the representation that the Product
makes "Up To 210 CUPS" when the directions were followed is false,
deceptive, and misleading. When consumers, like the Plaintiff,
followed the Product's directions for use, they could not brew
anywhere close to 210 cups, alleges the suit.

The Plaintiff followed the instructions for use provided on the
Product and could not brew anywhere close to 210 cups. By labeling
the Product in this manner, Defendant gained an advantage against
other companies, and against consumers seeking to purchase a
product that made the number of cups promised, or a small number
above or below this figure.

BIG LOTS, INC. is a broadline closeout retailer that operates
stores across the United States. The Company's stores offer an
assortment of merchandise, including consumables, seasonal
products, furniture, housewares, toys, and gifts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
           Sheehan & Associates, P.C.
           60 Cuttermill Rd Ste 409
           Great Neck NY 11021
           Telephone: (516) 268-7080
           Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com

BIKINI.COM LLC: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bikini.com, LLC. The
case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Bikini.com, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-09786 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Bikini.com -- https://www.bikini.com/ -- offers the latest swimwear
from over 200 emerging designers across the world.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com


BLACKOXYGEN ORGANICS: Faces Class Action Over Toxic Ingredients
---------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Seiden, writing for WSB-TV, reports that an Atlanta-based
attorney has filed a federal lawsuit against a popular supplement
company after he received complaints from numerous people with
concerns that the product is not the miracle substance the company
says it is, and after independent lab results confirmed his fears.

Matt Wetherington says he's suing the Canadian-based company
BlackOxygen Organics on behalf of Georgia customers and anyone else
in the country who purchased the company's pills and powders.

"We begin to receive inquiries and calls on our website with people
having problems and issues," said Wetherington. "Ultimately, we
sent the products out for independent testing, and then when that
came back and showed that there were toxic heavy metals at an
unsafe level, that's when we knew we had to act."

According to the complaint, the supplements at issue contain
dangerously high levels of toxic heavy metals that render them
unsafe and unfit for their intended use.

"They want you to eat it. They want you to bathe in it. They want
you to give it to your children, and they want you to eat it while
you're nursing and pregnant," he added. "They say it's a 'cure-all'
for all kinds of health issues, but they're marketing to vulnerable
people who already have health problems."

"At the end of the day, this product is literally dirt," he added.

On its website, BlackOxygen Organics, or "BOO," describes its
process, writing that it starts with extracting the mud from a bog
that is rich in fulvic acid, then they dry it and distribute it to
their sales reps who sell the pills and powders to their
customers.

Channel 2 Action News reached out to the company for comment, but
our calls and emails haven't been returned.

In the meantime, former customers, like Amy Roberts, who is not a
plaintiff on the lawsuit, are warning others about their awful
experiences.

The 50-year-old self-proclaimed fitness guru says she was looking
for something to take away her shoulder pain, but after using the
products for four weeks, she found herself in even worse pain.

"Severe, severe stomach pains," she said. "I was doubled over in
bed. I had extreme fatigue and was also vomiting."

Right now, there are no active recalls in the U.S., but in
September, Canadian health officials issued a recall, claiming
"these products are being marketed as fulvic acid supplement(s);
however, this use and the quantity of fulvic acid provided by these
products has not been evaluated or authorized by Health Canada."

"This is about money. This is about greed. This is about selling
literal dirt that you found in a bog to try and get as much money
as quickly as possible," Roberts said.

BlackOxygen Organics released a statement on Nov. 21 that reads:

BlackOxygen Organics ("BlackOxygen") has recently been made aware
of a lawsuit brought by a Georgia attorney and his clients who are
attempting to file a class action lawsuit by falsely claiming that
certain BlackOxygen products contain "unsafe levels" of "toxic
heavy metals." The allegations in the lawsuit are entirely false
and appear to arise from false and defamatory statements published
on social media platforms by disgruntled former BlackOxygen Brand
Partners. Notably, the lawsuit fails to state the level of metals
purportedly detected in BlackOxygen products, nor does the lawsuit
provide any description of the manner in which the products are
purportedly tested by the plaintiffs or their attorney. Metals,
like other naturally occurring elements, are present in drinking
water and many foods that are consumed daily. Prior to the sale of
any product, BlackOxygen receives a Certificate of Analysis from
the manufacturer certifying that the raw materials used to
manufacture BlackOxygen products are completely safe for human
consumption. BlackOxygen believes that the lawsuit is a "nuisance"
action seeking to obtain a monetary settlement prior to litigating
the merits of the allegations in the lawsuit. BlackOxygen has
engaged legal counsel and it intends to vigorously contest the
false allegations and, if appropriate, assert claims for damages
against the responsible parties for defamation and damage to
BlackOxygen's reputation. BlackOxygen is confident that it will
prevail by presenting the true facts about BlackOxygen products and
by proving that the allegations in the lawsuit are false and
malicious. [GN]

BLOOMFIELD HILLS: Faces $150MM Racial Discrimination Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Craig T. Lee, writing for BET, reports that a student and her
parents have filed a $150 million lawsuit against the Bloomfield
Hills School District in Michigan, Detroit after several instances
of alleged racial discrimination went unaddressed.

According to Local 4 News Detroit, the unnamed, 15-year-old minor
of Bloomfield High School and parents (Cedric McCarrall and Carmen
Davidson-McCarrall) filed the federal class-action lawsuit Thursday
(Nov. 18) against the Bloomfield Hills School District. The lawsuit
also names the superintendent Patrick Watson and high school
principal Charlie Hollerith for failing to address multiple
instances of alleged racial discrimination. The lawsuit was filed
on behalf of the parents and "all those similarly situated."

"As students of color, Plaintiffs and their parents have
experienced racist, unfair, hurtful and at times dangerous
interactions at BHHS at the hands of both white staff and
students," wrote the family's attorney.

Evidence of discrimination listed in the lawsuit include a photo
showing a red-lipped, black babydoll with a noose around its neck,
dangling down from the school's second floor. Another photo
displays racist writings on a wall, with one message reading "kill
all n***as" and another reading "all the n***as should be
extinguished."

The lawsuit charges that the school district is not properly
handling any of the incidents. Bloomfield authorities have been
investigating the graffiti writing and other social media posts
named in the lawsuit.

"Despite being notified of race discrimination and related
injustices by students and parents, Defendant has failed and
continues to fail to take steps reasonably calculated to stop the
discrimination and ensure Plaintiff's safety," the lawsuit
continued.

A community forum held Tuesday (Nov. 16) allowed many students and
parents to air their concerns.

On Thursday night (Nov. 18), a meeting was held by the district's
school board, where parents made their issues and concerns for
their children as clear as possible. Local 4 News Detroit also
reported on Nov. 12, a large group of Bloomfield High students
walked out that Friday afternoon. The students were frustrated with
how the administrative staff had handled the racial incidents
brought to their attention.

"They've been telling the same story for a long time," said one
parent. "The administration has heard this before. It remains to be
seen if things are gonna change." [GN]

BLOOMFIELD HILLS: H.S. Parents Share Emotions Behind $150M Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Susan Vela at hometownlife.com reports that Mom Carmen
Davidson-McCarrall wept as her husband told of their daughter's
last year at Bloomfield Hills High School and the $150 million
class-action lawsuit they're pursuing because of their family's
pain.

Those tears became audible sobs as Cedric McCarrall detailed the
the school's response to the dangling of a black doll on a rope in
one of the school's main hallways.

Students created videos of the dangling doll, circulated the
footage on social media and the McCarralls' 15-year-old daughter
went to a counselor, who apparently told the teen that the doll was
part of a science project.

"I'm a fair-minded individual," Cedric McCarrall said. "(However),
I'm trying to understand the mindset of that teacher. He's a white
male, taking a black doll, putting a rope around a black doll's
neck, dropping it over a second-floor banister (and) calling it a
science project."

The McCarralls, like other Black parents in the high school
community, fear for their child's life because of recent disturbing
incidents that include the black doll and bathroom graffiti
ordering "kill all (n-words)."

The couple went before a Zoom camera during the Nov. 19 press
conference their attorney Leonard Mungo hosted regarding their
lawsuit filed in U.S. District Court against the school district,
Superintendent Patrick Watson and Principal Charlie Hollerith.

Their lawsuit potentially could envelop all Black students at the
high school if the lawsuit is officially given a class-action
status.

District officials declined to comment on the pending litigation
but offered a lengthy statement.

"Within the past two weeks, our Bloomfield Hills High School
community has been impacted by deplorable incidents of racism and
hate speech," the statement reads. "In response, we have been
actively listening to the concerns of our students, families, and
community.

"The topic of equity and inclusion will continue to be a top
priority for Bloomfield Hills Schools, as it has for the past
several years. The district will emerge stronger and better as a
result of these conversations, undeterred from its commitment to
all students and facilitate a school environment of safety and
support for every student."

Students have publicly protested their district's handling of the
racial incidents, staging a recent walkout. District officials have
apologized for their management, hosted a community forum and
promised an update by winter break. They are working with student
groups, reviewing questionnaires, and formulating a plan of action.
They've also called upon the Bloomfield Township Police
Department's to aid in their investigation.

During the press conference, Davidson-McCarrall removed herself
from the camera's lens while her husband continued, saying that
teachers have explained recent disturbing incidents at the school
as "black satire."

The McCarralls have said in their lawsuit the incidents also have
included white students getting away with racial epithets and
social media posts expressing racial hatred.

Meanwhile, their daughter, they said, enrolled at the high school
in June 2020, during the pandemic. They said she has been denied
access to curriculum and education resources and treated
differently as the only Black member on the school's equestrian
team, causing her embarrassment and humiliation.

While her mother has been emotional, the teen has been receiving
failing grades and having nightmares and sleeping problems. She
also is scared to go to school because of the racial climate.

"As students of color, plaintiffs and their parents have
experienced racist, unfair, hurtful and at times dangerous
interactions at BHHS at the hands of both white staff and
students," reads their lawsuit, citing 14th Amendment equal
protection offenses and Title VI rules that prohibit discrimination
when federal funds are involved. "Despite being notified of race
discrimination and related injustices by students and parents,
defendant has failed and continues to fail to take steps reasonably
calculated to stop the discrimination and ensure plaintiffs'
safety."

Mungo said he plans to host a forum so that other high school
students and their parents can share their experiences and "put
their testimony on the record" for the U.S. Department of Justice.
He also would like students to be evaluated by therapists to reveal
any physiological and psychological damage.

"At some point, you have to say enough," McCarrall said. "We're
tired of marching. Black folks are tired of having conversations
about the same thing. We're tired of holding hands and singing the
old Negro songs. We're tired. We want action. We want our child -
not just our child but every child in this school district and
other school districts where Black and brown kids are the minority
- to feel safe when they go to school."

Bloomfield Hills is one of metro Detroit's wealthier communities.
The high school is about 10% Black, with whites being the majority.
The lawsuit could apply to about 200 students.

Other Black parents have threatened litigation, including Derek
Albert.

"My wife and I could afford to send our kid to any private school
in this country. Our children wanted to go here," he said. "We're
not destitute. We're not on free lunch. We're not on anything like
that. We are professional people.

"At the end of the day, if my tax dollars are not working for me
right, with the administrators and the school board members that
are selected, then we can replace them, sue the district and do
what we have to do to make sure there is safety in our schools.
This is unacceptable." [GN]

BLOOMFIELD HILLS: Student Files $150M Racial Discrimination
-----------------------------------------------------------
clickondetroit.com reports that a student and their parents are
suing the Bloomfield Hills School District for millions of dollars
over alleged racial discrimination following a string of racist
incidents reported at the high school.

A 15-year-old Bloomfield Hills High School student and her parents
filed a $150 million federal class-action lawsuit Thursday against
the school district, as well as superintendent Patrick Watson and
high school principal Charlie Hollerith, alleging racial
discrimination after several incidents of racism reportedly went
largely unaddressed.

"As students of color, Plaintiffs and their parents have
experienced racist, unfair, hurtful and at times dangerous
interactions at BHHS at the hands of both white staff and
students," the family's attorneys wrote.

The instances of racism reported at the high school were laid out
in the lawsuit, with several photos taken from students' social
media accounts included as evidence.

One photo shows a Black doll with a noose around its neck, hanging
from the second floor down to the first floor.

Other photos depict racist writing on bathroom walls in the school.
One message read "kill all (n-word)," while another read "all the
(n-word) should be dead."

There's also a Snapchat photo from a student in the lawsuit,
showing writing that reads "I hate (n-word), they need to be
extinguished."

The lawsuit claims that the school district and its administrators
are not handling the situation at all.

"Despite being notified of race discrimination and related
injustices by students and parents, Defendant has failed and
continues to fail to take steps reasonably calculated to stop the
discrimination and ensure Plaintiff's safety," the lawsuit reads.

You can read the entire lawsuit below. Attorneys for the family
suing the school district are expected to hold a press conference
at 10:30 a.m. Friday to discuss the lawsuit.

The district's school board held a meeting, in which other parents
made their concerns about the issue very clear.

"I can't believe that there were direct threats made against Black
people at the high school -- to 'kill all (n-word)' -- and you guys
did nothing about it," one parent said.

". . . and then I find out later that there are threats that all
Black people should be killed? I can't make a credible assessment
if my children are safe. What should I do? That has to change,"
another parent said.

A large number of Bloomfield High School students staged a walkout
from the school to protest the recent racist incidents. The
students said that the school administration is not doing enough to
address the incidents -- an issue that they say has been happening
for years -- and they are afraid to go to school.

"I don't know what I've ever done to any of the students here to
make them feel like we are so inferior that we must die, or that we
must leave the school, or something like that," said freshman
Madison Williams. "It's just really hurtful and I'm in fear for my
life, honestly."

The district held a community event earlier to publicly address the
racist incidents at the high school. Both superintendent Watson and
principal Hollerith apologized at the meeting, while listening to
frustrated parents and students share how they feel about the
situation.

At the meeting, students told the administration that the incidents
are common and that they do not feel safe at school. Parents say
that what the students are experiencing and decrying is nothing
new.

"They've been telling the same story for a long time," said parent
Samuel Walker. "The administration has heard this before. It
remains to be seen if things are gonna change." [GN]

BLUE CROSS: Fuog Files Suit in Fla. Cir. Ct.
--------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Florida, Inc. The case is styled as Edith Fuog, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Florida, Inc., Case No. 16-2021-CA-006044-XXXX-MA (Fla.
Cir. Ct., Duval Cty., Nov. 10, 2021).

The case type is stated as "Circuit Civil."

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. also known as Florida
Blue -- http://www.floridablue.com/-- operates as a non-profit
organization. The Organization offers health care reforms, medicare
plans, wellness screenings, and medical insurance services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott David Hirsch, Esq.
          SCOTT HIRSCH LAW GROUP, PLLC
          6810 N. State Road 7
          Coconut Creek, FL 33073-4304
          Phone: 561-569-7062
          Email: scott@scotthirschlawgroup.com


BOMBAY AND CEDAR: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bombay and Cedar,
LLC. The case is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Bombay and Cedar, LLC,
Case No. 1:21-cv-09861-LJL (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Bombay & Cedar -- https://bombayandcedar.com/ -- is a luxury
lifestyle subscription box that features full sized products
including aromaI therapy, beauty, wellness and discovery.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


BOSTON MARKET: Fitzpatrick Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Boston Market Corp.
The case is styled as Thomas Fitzpatrick, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Boston Market Corp.,
Case No. 1:21-cv-09618 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 19, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Labor.

Boston Market Corporation, known as Boston Chicken until 1995 --
https://www.bostonmarket.com/ -- is an American fast casual
restaurant chain headquartered in Golden, Colorado.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


BRIAN NORAN: Pauley Files Suit in W.D. Virginia
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Brian Noran, et al.
The case is styled as Cheryl A. Pauley, on behalf of deceased
biological son Tavon Pauley, and others next-of-kin, interested,
and similarly situated, and friend of this court, et al. v. Brian
Noran, Virginia Secretary of Public Safety, subordinates,
subsidiaries, et al.; Harold W. Clarke, VDOC's Director,
Subordinates, Subsidiaries, et al.; Dr. Steve Herrick, VDOC
Offender Health Services Director, Subordinates, and medical units
levels 1 to 6 subsidiaries, et al.; Case No. 1:21-cv-00046-JPJ-PMS
(W.D. Va., Nov. 22, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Personal Inj. Med. Malpractice for
Medical Malpractice.

Brian Joseph Moran is an American politician and a member of the
Democratic Party. He has served as Virginia Secretary of Public
Safety and Homeland Security since 2014, and was a member of the
Virginia House of Delegates from 1996 until 2008, representing
Northern Virginia's 46th district.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.



BRINK'S INCORPORATED: Cruz Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled JOSE ANGEL CRUZ, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. BRINK'S INCORPORATED and DOES 1 to 10
inclusive, Case No. 21STCV36696, was removed from the Superior
Court of California for the County of Los Angeles to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California on November
24, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Central District of California assigned
Case No. 2:21-cv-09225 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California's Business and Professions
Code including failure to pay all wages, failure to provide
compliant meal periods, failure to provide rest periods, failure to
timely furnish accurate itemized wage statements, waiting time
penalties, and unfair business practices.

Brink's Incorporated is an American private security and protection
company headquartered in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:          
         
         Spencer C. Skeen, Esq.
         Tim L. Johnson, Esq.
         Jesse C. Ferrantella, Esq.
         Jennifer P. Suberlak, Esq.
         OGLETREE, DEAI TS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
         4370 La Jolla Village Drive, Suite 990
         San Diego, CA 92122
         Telephone: (858) 652-3100
         Facsimile: (858) 652-3101
         E-mail: spencer.skeen@ogletree.com
                 tim.johnson@ogletree.com
                 esse.ferrantella@ogletree.com
                 jennifer.suberlak@ogletree.com

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB: Bernstein Sues Over Drop in Share Price
-------------------------------------------------------------
HOWARD BERNSTEIN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO.; MARK J.
ALLES; GIOVANNI CAFORIO, M.D.; SANDRA LEUNG, ESQ.; CHARLES
BANCROFT; KAREN M. SANTIAGO; VICKI L. SATO, PH.D.; PETER J.
ARDUINI; ROBERT BERTOLINI; MATTHEW W. EMMENS; MICHAEL GROBSTEIN;
ALAN J. LACY; DINESH C. PALIWAL; THEODORE R. SAMUELS; GERALD L.
STORCH; and KAREN H. VOUSDEN, PH.D, Defendants, Case No.
UNN-L-003887-21 (N.J. Super., Union Cty., Nov. 12, 2021) is a class
action on behalf of all persons who acquired Bristol-Myers common
stock and Contingent Value Rights ("CVRs") pursuant or traceable to
the S-4 registration statement and prospectus (collectively, the
"Registration Statement") issued in connection with Bristol-Myers'
November 2019 acquisition of and merger with Celgene (the "Merger"
or "Acquisition").

According to the complaint, on November 2019, in connection with
the Acquisition, Bristol-Myers issued approximately 714.9 million
new shares of BMY common stock and 714.9 CVRs directly to former
shareholders of Celgene as follows: Each former share of Celgene
common stock issued and outstanding before the Acquisition was
automatically converted into the right to receive (1) $50.00 in
cash, without interest; (2) one share of BMS common stock; and (3)
one CVR. Each of these new shares of Bristol-Myers common stock and
CVRs were issued pursuant to the Registration Statement.

Allegedly, the Registration Statement contained untrue statements
of material fact and omitted to state material facts both required
by governing regulations and necessary to make the statements made
not misleading. Foremost, it failed to disclose that Bristol-Myers
was already implementing operational irregularities and drafting
aberrant regulatory filings that diverged from industry practice,
contravened ongoing FDA guidance, and that would slow-roll the FDA
approval process for a Liso-cel and thereby avoid a $6.4 billion
payment promised to CVR holder.

With these misrepresentations and omissions in the Registration
Statement, Defendants were able to complete the Acquisition. But as
the truth began to emerge, the price of Bristol-Myers common stock
and CVRs shares suffered sharp declines, Bristol-Myers unjustly
profited by avoiding approximately $6.4 billion in payouts owed to
CVRs investors, and as a result Plaintiff and other former Celgene
shareholders suffered severe losses, added the suit.

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO.is a global biopharmaceutical company. The
Company develops, licenses, manufactures, markets, and sells
pharmaceutical and nutritional products. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter S. Pearlman, Esq.
          Audra DePaolo, Esq.
          COHN LIFLAND PEARLMAN
          HERRMANN & KNOPF LLP
          Park 80 West - Plaza One
          250 Pehle Avenue, Suite 401
          Saddle Brook, NJ 07663
          Telephone: (201) 845-9600
          Facsimile: (201) 845-9423
          Email: psp@njlawfirm.com
                 ad@njlawfirm.com

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB: Kuznicki Law Discloses Securities Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The securities litigation law firm of Kuznicki Law PLLC issues this
alert to shareholders of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company ("BMS" or
"the Company") (NYSE: BMY), if they received Contingent Value
Rights ("CVRs") (NYSE: BMY.RT) in exchange for their shares of
Celgene Corporation (NASDAQ: CELG) pursuant to BMS' acquisition of
Celgene on November 20, 2019. Shareholders have until December 6,
2021 to file lead plaintiff applications in the securities class
action lawsuit.

Shareholders are encouraged to contact us at
https://kclasslaw.com/cases/securities/nyse-bmy/, by calling
toll-free at 1-833-835-1495 or by email (dk@kclasslaw.com).

Kuznicki Law PLLC is committed to ensuring that companies adhere to
responsible business practices and engage in good corporate
citizenship. The firm seeks recovery on behalf of investors who
incurred losses when false and/or misleading statements or the
omission of material information by a Company lead to artificial
inflation of the Company's stock. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes. [GN]

BRODOFICATION LLC: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Brodofication LLC.
The case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Brodofication LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-09796 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Brodofication -- https://www.brodo.com/ -- offers slow-simmered
bone broth from organic poultry, 100% grass-fed beef and fresh
organic vegetables.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 11201
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: jmizrahi@mizrahikroub.com


BRYXEN INC: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bryxen, Inc. The case
is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Bryxen, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-09874
(S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Bryxen -- https://bryxen.com/ -- provide the marketing Tools needed
to create compelling professional videos that can be shared with
the world.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


C&H CLUBS: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against C&H Clubs USA, Inc.
The case is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. C&H Clubs USA, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-09879 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

C&H Clubs USA, Inc. doing business as MonthlyClubs.com --
https://www.monthlyclubs.com/ -- is a family-owned business in the
United States. They offer six high-quality club program
subscriptions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


CACTUS SPORTS: Contreras Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cactus Sports, Inc.
The case is styled as Yensy Contreras, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Cactus Sports, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-09686 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 22, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Cactus Sports -- https://cactussports.com/ -- is a seller
specializing in Arizona State University clothing & gifts, from
hoodies to hats.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jarrett Scott Charo, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: jcharo@mizrahikroub.com


CAPITAL VISION: Court Denies Bid to Strike Wood's Class Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL WOOD, Plaintiff v. CAPITAL VISION SERVICES,
LLC, MYEYEDR. OPTOMETRISTS, LLC, MYEYEDR. OPTOMETRY OF ILLINOIS,
LCC, Defendants, Case No. 20 C 4584 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Virginia M.
Kendall of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, denied the Defendants' motion to strike
Wood's class allegations.

Background

Plaintiff Wood brings the suit on behalf of himself and a putative
class against Defendants Capital Vision Services, LLC, MyEyeDr.
Optometrists, LLC, and MyEyeDr. Optometry of Illinois, LLC
(collectively, "Defendants") alleging violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

Plaintiff Wood alleges that on July 14, 2020, he received a
prerecorded voicemail message from the Defendants. The Plaintiff
contends he did not consent to receive that voicemail. The
Defendants may have obtained the Plaintiff's cell phone number when
he purchased non-prescription sunglasses in 2017, but the Plaintiff
alleges that any consent given at that time was not for the type of
call and voicemail he received from the Defendants in 2020. The
Plaintiff subsequently brought suit under the TCPA on behalf of
himself and a putative class.

The Plaintiff proposes two classes in his Second Amended
Complaint:

      a. Telemarketing Class: All persons in the United States: (1)
whose cellular telephone number, on or after five years prior to
the filing of this action; (2) CVS, MyEyeDr., MyEyeDr.-IL, called
or caused to be called, using a prerecorded voice message; (3)
where such message encouraged the recipient to purchase eye exam
services from Defendants; (4) where recipient had not previously
received an eye exam from CVS, MyEyeDr. or MyEyeDr.-IL.

      b. Robocall Class: All persons in the United States: (1)
whose cellular telephone number, on or after five years prior to
the filing of this action; (2) CVS, MyEyeDr., MyEyeDr.-IL or
someone on their behalf called using the same or similar artificial
or prerecorded voice used to call Plaintiff; (3) where such calling
occurred without the person's permission.

The Defendants now move to strike the class allegations on the
grounds that (1) the Plaintiff is an atypical and inadequate class
representative; (2) the class is overbroad; (3) individualized
inquiries predominate over common issues of fact or law; (4) the
Plaintiff's Robocall Class is an impermissible failsafe class; and
(5) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over at least some
class members.

Discussion

I. Adequacy and Typicality

Rule 23(a) requires the Plaintiff to demonstrate that "the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class" and that "the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." The
Defendants argue that because the Plaintiff's claim is "whether
MyEyeDr.'s sole message fell within the scope of consent that
Plaintiff provided during his earlier transaction" that the
circumstances surrounding his claim are too individualized to
support adequacy and typicality.

Judge Kendall opines that while there are some questions
surrounding the Plaintiff's consent in the case, no discovery has
taken place and the class itself does not require any issue of
consent to be decided on its face. The Plaintiff is alleging that
he received a voicemail encouraging him to purchase eye exam
services and had not previously received an exam from Defendants.
Typicality under Rule 23(a)(3) "should be determined with reference
to the company's actions, not with respect to particularized
defenses it might have against certain class members." The class
definition does not differentiate between putative class members
who may have provided consent to Defendants (in a different
context) and those who have not. The fact that the Plaintiff may
have provided some consent, and what that consent entailed, is not
fatal to his class allegations at this stage of the proceedings.
Because the issues surrounding class certification are factual,
striking the class allegations prior to class-wide discovery on
these grounds would be premature.

II. Overbreadth

Next, the Defendants contend that if the Plaintiff's individual
TCPA claim requires a fact-based inquiry, then a similar fact-based
inquiry is required for each and every putative class member. They
rely on the existence of the Healthcare Treatment Exemption and an
"emergency purposes" exception to TCPA liability to argue that the
class definition is facially overbroad.

Judge Kendall holds that the Defendants have not identified any
authority that supports striking class allegations where the
existence of exceptions to TCPA liability might attach and have
further not identified how many -- if any -- individuals might fall
within these exceptions. This is precisely the type of question
that may be addressed more fully during class discovery. At this
stage, with no information about the applicability of these
exceptions to the putative class, it would be premature and
speculative to strike the allegations.

III. Predominance

The Defendants also ask that the class allegations be stricken
because determining the application of certain health care
exceptions to the TCPA and other issues of consent would
predominate over the common issues of law or fact. They argue that
the Healthcare Treatment Exemption and "emergency purposes"
exception to the TCPA require individualized inquiries that
preclude class treatment.

Judge Kendall opines that the Defendants have not presented any
specific evidence that these issues of individualized consent will
predominate. Without "specific evidence -- as opposed to mere
speculation -- that a purportedly individualized issue predominates
over common issues," Judge Kendall cannot conclude that
individualized factual questions predominate at this stage.
Accordingly, she denies the Defendants' motion to strike the class
allegations based on predominance.

IV. Fail-Safe Class

The Defendants argue that the "Robocall Class" pled by Wood is an
impermissible fail-safe class because it requires class members to
have been contacted "without the person's permission." A fail-safe
class "is defined so that whether a person qualifies as a member
depends on whether the person has a valid claim." Such a class
definition is improper because a class member either wins or, by
virtue of losing, is defined out of the class and is therefore not
bound by the judgment." The Plaintiff concedes that the Robocall
Class "may be conditioned on liability because it only includes
individuals called 'without permission,'" but asks that he be
permitted to refine the class definition instead of having the
allegations stricken.

Courts in this district have generally allowed a fail-safe class to
be refined when considered on an early motion to strike. Therefore,
the Plaintiff may amend his class definition, either at this time
or when he moves for class certification, to rectify the fail-safe
problem identified.

V. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Finally, the Defendants contend that the Court is deprived of
subject matter jurisdiction for nearly all of the proposed classes'
claims and ask that the claims be stricken on that basis. Their
argument rests on the recent decision in Barr v. American
Association of Political Consultants, Inc. 140 S.Ct. 2335 (2020),
where the Supreme Court held in a plurality that the TCPA's
automated-call ban was an unconstitutional content-based
restriction when combined with the government-debt exception. The
government debt exception was severed and the ban survived. The
question is then whether the automated call ban's
unconstitutionality precludes subject matter jurisdiction over any
TCPA claim for automated calls made between 2015 (when the ban was
enacted) and July 2020 (when the government debt exception was
severed). The Seventh Circuit has not yet decided this issue.

Judge Kendall explains that in Lindenbaum v. Realgy, LLC, 13 F.4th
524 (6th Cir. 2021), the district court found that there was no
subject matter jurisdiction because the statute was
unconstitutional at the time of the alleged violations. Reversing,
the Sixth Circuit explained that severance is not a remedy, so a
legislative act would be required in order for application to be
prospective only. The majority of district courts considering this
issue have agreed with the Sixth Circuit. Judge Kendall follows the
majority view that the robocall provision remained constitutional
during the relevant period and thus she is not deprived of subject
matter jurisdiction over prospective class members on that basis.

Conclusion

For the reasons she stated, Judge Jendall denied the Defendants'
Motion to Strike Class Allegations.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 12, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/dsnatn4 from Leagle.com.


CAR-MART INC: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Car-Mart, Inc. The
case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Car-Mart, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-09801
(S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Car-Mart -- https://www.car-mart.com/ -- operates 152 automotive
dealerships in twelve states and is one of the largest publicly
held automotive retailers in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com


CASEY'S GENERAL: Faces Suit Over Drivers' Unreimbursed Expenses
---------------------------------------------------------------
Clark Kauffman, writing for Iowa Capital Dispatch, reports that a
second lawsuit that alleges Iowa pizza-delivery drivers are being
shortchanged on their wages has been filed in U.S. District Court.

Recently, a lawsuit was filed alleging Iowa delivery drivers
working for Domino's Pizza were effectively earning 35 cents an
hour because the company wasn't fairly compensating the workers for
the use of their own vehicles. The new lawsuit is aimed at Casey's
General Store.

Unlike Domino's, the lawsuit alleges, Casey's pays its drivers a
flat rate of $2 per delivery. Casey's allegedly doesn't track
drivers' actual vehicle expenses or make any attempt to reimburse
drivers for gas and other specific expenses tied to the use of
their cars.

According to the lawsuit, the flat-rate payment plan shortchanges
the Casey's drivers at a rate of 23 cents per mile - a calculation
that is based on a $2 payment for delivery runs that tend to
average six miles. The payment equates to 33 cents per mile, which
is 23 cents less than the IRS standard mileage rate of 56 cents per
mile, the lawsuit claims.

Assuming the Casey's drivers average three six-mile deliveries each
hour, they are, in effect, "kicking back" to their employer $4.14
per hour from their own earnings ($1.38 per delivery, multiplied by
three deliveries per hour), the lawsuit claims.

The drivers' hourly pay is roughly equal to the federal minimum
wage of $7.25 an hour, the lawsuit alleges, and so the effect of
the "kickback" is that the drivers' net pay is significantly less
than the minimum wage.

The lawsuit was filed on Nov. 18 in U.S. District Court on behalf
of Jolene Greever of Davis County, a Casey's delivery driver who
has worked for the company since 2019, and all other similarly
situated employees of the company.

Casey's has yet to filed a response to the lawsuit.

In the Domino's case, Alexia Stevens, a former driver who worked
for two years in North Liberty, is suing Pizza Brake Inc., a
company that does business throughout Iowa as Domino's Pizza. That
lawsuit is filed on behalf of Stevens and all other drivers who
have worked for Pizza Brake, which is owned by Stuart Bjerke of
Ottumwa.

Stevens alleges the company's reimbursement rate for the use of
drivers' personal vehicles is so low that it reduces the worker's
net hourly pay to 35 cents an hour.

The federal minimum wage has been $7.25 per hour since July 2009.
Stevens claims she was paid $7.25 per hour, plus 20 cents per mile,
while making deliveries for Domino's between 2019 and 2021.

The lawsuit alleges Stevens was shortchanged 34 cents for every
mile driven compared to the federal mileage rate. Because she
averaged two or more deliveries per hour, with each trip averaging
10 miles, every hour she worked as a driver decreased her net wages
by approximately $6.90, giving her a net hourly wage of roughly 35
cents an hour, the lawsuit claims.

Plaintiffs in both the Casey's lawsuit and the Domino's case are
seeking certification of "collective action" status - similar to
class-action status - under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act,
as well as actual damages for unpaid wages, plus interest and
attorneys' fees.

Similar lawsuits have recently been filed in other jurisdictions
around the United States, including New Jersey, New York and the
state of Washington.

The defendants in the two Iowa cases have yet to file responses to
the lawsuits. Bjerke has declined to comment on the Domino's case.
[GN]

CELEBRITY RESORTS: Chavez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Celebrity Resorts of
Brigantine Beach, LLC. The case is styled as Kenneth T. Chavez, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Celebrity
Resorts of Brigantine Beach, LLC, Celebrity Resorts Of New Jersey
Management LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-06490 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 21, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Celebrity Resorts Brigantine Beach is a hotel set on the beach on
Brigantine Island, five miles from the world-famous Atlantic City
Boardwalk.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mitchell Segal, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF MITCHELL SEGAL P.C.
          1010 Northern Boulevard, Suite 208
          Great Neck, NY 11021
          Phone: (516) 415-0100
          Fax: (516) 706-6631
          Email: msegal@segallegal.com


CENTERFOLD ENTERTAINMENT: Land Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
-------------------------------------------------------------
Tierra Land, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. CENTERFOLD ENTERTAINMENT CLUB, INC., and JESSIE ORRELL,
Case No. 6:21-cv-06153-SOH (W.D. Ark., Nov. 23, 2021), is brought
against the Defendant for violations of the minimum wage provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act
as a result of the Defendant's failure to pay proper overtime
compensations under the FLSA and the AMWA.

The complaint alleges that the Defendant set its own policies and
rules and has complete control over the venue. The Plaintiff was
required to follow the Defendant's policies and rules. The
Defendant made decisions on advertising Defendant's business
without the Plaintiff's and other Dancers' input. The Defendant
failed to pay the Plaintiff the applicable minimum wage for hours
worked up to 40 each week. The Defendant did not pay tge Plaintiff
an hourly or salary rate. The Plaintiff was paid &10 per drink she
sold. The Plaintiff was paid $10 to $50 per dance she performed.
The Plaintiff received tips from the Defendant's customers. The
Plaintiff was required to share their rips with the Defendant,
managers, DJs and other employees who did not "customarily and
regularly receive tips." The Defendant knew or showed reckless
disregard for whether, the way they paid the Plaintiff and other
Dancers violated the FLSA and AMWA, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a dancer from
August of 2017 until September 2020.

The Defendant owns and operates a nightclub in Hot Springs.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Kirkpatrick Plaza
          10800 Financial Centre Pkwy, Suite 510
          Little Rock, AK 72211
          Phone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          Email: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


CENTURY CARRIERS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Henriquez Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
FRANCISCO CABALLERO HENRIQUEZ, on behalf of himself and all other
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CENTURY CARRIERS, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-06205 (E.D.N.Y., November 8, 2021) is a
class action complaint brought against the Defendant to recover
statutory damages for its alleged violations of the New York Labor
Law.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as an hourly-paid
warehouse worker at the Defendant's warehouse located in
Farmingdale, New York from in or 2006 to in or about May 24, 2021.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and other similarly
situated warehouse workers, rivers and helpers spent more than 25
percent of their hours worked each week performing manual works,
the Defendant failed to pay them "on a weekly basis and not later
than seven calendar days after the end of the week in which the
wages are earned." Instead, the Defendant paid them on a bi-weekly
basis pursuant to its payroll policy in violation of the NYLL
Section 191. Moreover, although they regularly worked more than 40
hours per week, the Defendant denied of their lawfully earned
overtime compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half
times the statutory minimum wage for hours worked in excess of 40
hours in a single workweek, the suit asserts.

Century Carriers, Inc. is a full-service transportation company
specializing in the transport, installation, and removal of
sensitive, high-end electronics such as medical, telephone, and
office equipment, as well as white-glove home deliveries. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter A. Romero, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF PETER A. ROMERO PLLC
          490 Wheeler Road, Suite 250
          Hauppauge, NY 11788
          Tel: (631) 257-5588
          E-mail: promero@romerolawny.com

CHANGE.ORG PBC: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Change.org, PBC. The
case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Change.org, PBC, Case No.
1:21-cv-09795 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Change.org -- https://www.change.org/ -- is the largest network of
online petition supporters.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200


CIRCLE 9: Gore Files FLSA Suit in W.D. Oklahoma
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Circle 9 Resources
LLC. The case is styled as David Gore, individually on behalf of
others similarly situated v. Circle 9 Resources LLC, Case No.
5:21-cv-01112-G (W.D. Okla., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act for Denial of Overtime Compensation.

Circle 9 Resources LLC -- http://www.circle9llc.com/-- is an
Oklahoma City based energy company engaged in the acquisition and
development of oil and natural gas resources in East Central
Oklahoma.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Philip Bohrer, Esq.
          Scott E. Brady, Esq.
          BOHRER BRADY LLC
          8712 Jefferson Highway, Suite B
          Baton Rouge, LA 70809
          Phone: (225) 925-5297
          Fax: (225) 231-7000
          Email: phil@bohrerbrady.com
                 scott@bohrerbrady.com


CITRIX SYSTEMS: Bernstein Litowitz Discloses Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Today, prominent investor rights law firm Bernstein Litowitz Berger
& Grossmann LLP ("BLB&G") filed a class action lawsuit for
violations of the federal securities laws in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Florida against Citrix Systems,
Inc. ("Citrix" or the "Company") and certain of its current and
former senior executives (collectively, "Defendants") on behalf of
investors in Citrix common stock between January 22, 2020 and
October 6, 2021, inclusive (the "Class Period").

BLB&G filed this action on behalf of its client, City of Hollywood
Police Officers' Retirement System, and the case is captioned City
of Hollywood Police Officers' Retirement System v. Citrix Systems,
Inc., No. 21-cv-62380 (S.D. Fla.). The complaint is based on an
extensive investigation and a careful evaluation of the merits of
this case. A copy of the complaint is available on BLB&G's website
by clicking here.

Citrix's Alleged Fraud

Headquartered in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Citrix is a software
company that provides users with secure remote access to computer
networks. Historically, Citrix's technology was located
"on-premise," installed directly onto computer servers owned and
operated by its customers. Customers purchased licenses through a
perpetual license model, meaning a purchaser would pay upfront for
lifetime access and support, with the cost of the licenses based on
the number of users each customer supported. In 2019, Citrix began
a two-pronged transition of its business model. First, the Company
began to transfer its software platform from the on-premise model
to a cloud-based model. In the cloud model, Citrix hosts its
software on servers owned and maintained by Citrix, rather than on
customers' servers. Second, Citrix transitioned to a
subscription-based payment system: instead of paying once per user
for a license, Citrix's subscription model required customers to
pay a yearly subscription cost.

The complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, Defendants
repeatedly, falsely assured investors that the transition from
on-premise to the cloud product was going smoothly. In addition, in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the shift to remote work,
Citrix created a shorter duration, on-premise subscription license
(the "Business Continuity Licenses") that the Company offered at a
discounted rate, and which Defendants claimed would transition to
cloud accounts after the one-year license expired. As a result of
Defendants' misrepresentations, Citrix common stock traded at
artificially inflated prices during the Class Period.

The truth about Citrix's difficulties transitioning to the cloud
was revealed through a series of disclosures. First, on April 29,
2021, Citrix announced lower than expected license conversions of
the Business Continuity Licenses. Specifically, the Company
explained that the Business Continuity Licenses did not transition
to long-term cloud contracts as expected. Instead, many customers
"rolled to another short-term" on-premise license, citing the
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. [GN]

CLASSIC FOOD INC: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Galvez Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
ALBERTO GALVEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CLASSIC FOOD INC. d/b/a SIDO FALAFEL & MORE;
and EMILE AKLEH, Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-09400 (S.D.N.Y., Nov.
14, 2021) seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid wages and
overtime compensation, interest, liquidated damages, attorneys'
fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Mr. Galvez was employed by the Defendants as delivery person.

Classic Foods, Inc. is a family owned manufacturer of branded snack
foods distributed throughout the United States and Canada.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jacob Aronauer, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF JACOB ARONAUER
          225 Broadway, 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 323-6980
          Email: jaronauer@aronauerlaw.com

CLOTHING SHOP: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Clothing Shop Online,
LLC. The case is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Clothing Shop Online,
LLC., Case No. 1:21-cv-09869 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Clothing Shop Online -- https://www.clothingshoponline.com/ --
offers clothes in a wide variety of colors, styles, and
brands.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


COLLABORATIVE BOATING: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Collaborative
Boating, Inc. The case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated v. Collaborative
Boating, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-09788 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Collaborative Boating, Inc. operates an online marketplace for
renters and private boat owners.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com


COLLECTIBLES INSURANCE: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D.N.Y.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Collectibles
Insurance Services, LLC. The case is styled as Carmen
Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. Collectibles Insurance Services, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-09806 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Collectibles Insurance Services (CIS) -- https://collectinsure.com/
-- offers the best collectibles insurance services no matter what
customers consider valuable, from guns, firearms, sports
memorabilia, to comic books, and more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


COLONIAL LIFE: Castro Sues Over Wage-and-Hour Violations in Cal.
----------------------------------------------------------------
RENE CASTRO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. COLONIAL LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE CO. and
DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 21LBCV00618
(Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., November 23, 2021) is a class
action against the Defendants for violations of the California
Labor Code and the Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders
including misclassifying employees as independent contractors;
failing to pay, or reimburse work-related expenses; failing to
provide a proper written commission agreement; failing to pay
overtime; failing to provide uninterrupted off duty meal periods
and/or required penalties; failing to provide uninterrupted off
duty rest periods and/or required penalties; failing to maintain
adequate records; failing to furnish accurate wage statements; and
failing to timely pay all wages due upon termination.

Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co. is an American insurance
company based in Columbia, South Carolina. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         David B. Nusz, Esq.
         BLACKAND ROSE, LLP
         18301 Von Karman Ave., Suite 300
         Irvine, CA 92612
         Telephone: (949) 435-4260
         Facsimile: (949) 435-4265

COLUMBIA PROPERTY: Proposed Merger Lacks Info, Coffman Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
CATHERINE COFFMAN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. COLUMBIA PROPERTY TRUST, INC.;
CARMEN M. BOWSER; JOHN L. DIXON; DAVID B. HENRY; MURRAY J. MCCABE;
E. NELSON MILLS; CONSTANCE B. MOORE; MICHAEL S. ROBB; THOMAS G.
WATTLES; and FRANCIS X. WENTWORTH, JR., Defendants, Case No.
3:21-cv-08761 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 11, 2021) is an action brought by
the Plaintiff against Columbia Property Trust, Inc. ("Columbia" or
the "Company") and the members of Columbia's Board of Directors
(the "Board" or the "Individual Defendants") for their violations
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, seeking to enjoin the vote
on a proposed transaction, pursuant to which Columbia will be
acquired by investment funds managed by Pacific Investment
Management Company LLC ("PIMCO" and such funds, the "PIMCO Funds")
through the PIMCO Funds' affiliates Panther Merger Parent, Inc.
("Parent") and Panther Merger Sub, LLC ("Merger Sub") (the
"Proposed Transaction").

According to the complaint, on October 6, 2021, Columbia filed a
Schedule 14A Definitive Proxy Statement (the "Proxy Statement")
with the SEC. The Proxy Statement, which recommends that Columbia
stockholders vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, allegedly
omits or misrepresents material information concerning, among other
things: (i) the Company's financial projections; and (ii) the data
and inputs underlying the financial valuation analyses that support
the fairness opinion provided by the Company's financial advisor
Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC ("Morgan Stanley"). The Defendants
authorized the issuance of the false and misleading Proxy Statement
in violation of the Exchange Act.

Unless remedied, Columbia's public stockholders will be irreparably
harmed because the Proxy Statement's material misrepresentations
and omissions prevent them from making a sufficiently informed
voting decision on the Proposed Transaction, says the suit.

COLUMBIA PROPERTY TRUST, INC. operates as a real estate investment
trust. The Company focuses on the acquisition, development,
ownership, leasing, and operation of office properties. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joel E. Elkins, Esq.
          WEISSLAW LLP
          611 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 808
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (310) 208-2800
          Facsimile: (310) 209-2348
          Email: jelkins@weisslawllp.com

COMFORTRESEARCH LLC: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D.N.Y.
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against ComfortResearch,
L.L.C. The case is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. ComfortResearch,
L.L.C., Case No. 1:21-cv-09859-JMF (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Comfort Research LLC -- http://www.comfortresearch.com/-- designs
and manufactures furniture. The Company offers chairs, patio,
floats, video lounger, and bean bags.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


CONSOL COAL: Monteverde & Associates Reminds of January 3 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------------
Notice is hereby given that Monteverde & Associates PC has filed a
class action lawsuit in the United States District Court the
Western District of Pennsylvania, Case No. 2:21-cv-01504, on behalf
of public common shareholders of CONSOL Coal Resources LP ("CCR" or
the "Company") who held CCR securities as of the record date on
November 29, 2020, and were harmed by CCR and its board of
directors (the "Board"), alleging violations of Sections 14(a) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")
in connection with the merger of CCR with CONSOL Energy, Inc.
("CEIX") (the "Transaction").

Under the terms of the Transaction, CCR acquired CEIX, with former
CCR stockholders receiving 0.73 shares of CEIX per share of CCR
they owned (the "Exchange Ratio"). The complaint alleges that the
Merger Consideration was inadequate and that the Registration
Statement on Form S-4 provided stockholders with materially
incomplete and misleading information with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of
the Exchange Act. The merger completed on December 30, 2020.

Mr. Juan Monteverde is available to personally discuss this case
with you and if you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move
the Court no later than January 3, 2022. Any member of the putative
class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel
of their choice or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent
class member.

Monteverde & Associates PC is a national class action securities
and consumer litigation law firm that has recovered millions of
dollars for shareholders and is committed to protecting investors
and consumers from corporate wrongdoing. Monteverde & Associates
lawyers have significant experience litigating Mergers &
Acquisitions and Securities Class Actions, whereby they protect
investors by recovering money and remedying corporate misconduct.
Mr. Monteverde, who leads the legal team at the firm, has been
recognized by Super Lawyers as a Rising Star in Securities
Litigation in 2013, 2017-2019 an award given to less than 2.5% of
attorneys in a particular field. He has also been selected by
Martindale-Hubbell as a 2017-2020 Top Rated Lawyer. Our firm's
recent successes include changing the law in a significant victory
that lowered the standard of liability under Section 14(e) of the
Exchange Act in the Ninth Circuit. Thereafter, our firm
successfully preserved this victory by obtaining dismissal of a
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted at the United States
Supreme Court. Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
Also, over the years the firm has recovered or secured over a dozen
cash common funds for shareholders in mergers & acquisitions class
action cases. [GN]

CORDAROY'S WHOLESALE: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D.N.Y.
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cordaroy's Wholesale,
Inc. The case is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Cordaroy's Wholesale,
Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-09872 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Cordaroy's Wholesale -- https://cordaroys.com/ -- offers the most
comfortable & versatile chair in the world.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com



CORE DIGITAL: Aussieker Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Core Digital
Marketing, et al. The case is styled as Mark Aussieker,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Core
Digital Marketing, Does 1 - 100, Case No. CGC21596611 (Cal. Super.
Ct., San Francisco Cty., Nov. 23, 2021).

The case type is stated as "Business Tort."

Core Digital Marketing -- https://coredm.com/ -- is a marketing
agency in Ohio.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jacob Harker, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF JACOB HARKER
          268 Bush St # 3732
          San Francisco, CA 94104-3503
          Phone: 415-624-7602
          Fax: 415-684-7757
          Email: harkerjacob@gmail.com

               - and -

          Daniel L. Balsam, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL BALSAM
          2601C Blanding Ave # 271
          Alameda, CA 94501-1507
          Phone: 415-869-2873
          Fax: 415-869-2873
          Email: calbar@danbalsam.com


CRITICAL TELEPHONE: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Critical Telephone
Applications, Inc. The case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Critical
Telephone Applications, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-09805 (S.D.N.Y.,
Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Critical Telephone Applications, Inc. --
https://www.liquorapps.com/ -- offers liquor apps including Vine &
Barrel, Liquor Bank, Brandon's Package Store, and many more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com


CROWN RESORTS: Settles Shareholder Class Action for $125 Million
----------------------------------------------------------------
Paulinet Tamaray, writing for Australasian Lawyer, reports that
Crown Resorts has reached a $125m settlement in a class action
lawsuit filed by shareholders after revelations that the resort's
staff members were detained in China in 2016 caused the company's
share price to plunge.

The class action was based on the company's alleged obligation to
inform its shareholders of the business risks involved and the
threats it posed to its revenue streams. The case was set to go to
trial when Crown Resorts announced the settlement.

"Crown's board of directors determined that the agreement to settle
the proceeding was a commercial decision made in the best interests
of Crown and its shareholders," the company said.

"The class action [alleged] contraventions of the [Australian
Securities and Investments Commission Act] and the Corporations
Act, in seeking to establish that Crown engaged in misleading or
deceptive conduct and/or breached its continuous disclosure
obligations with respect to its operations in China," said Maurice
Blackburn, which worked with the investors, in a post on the firm's
website.

In a statement published by the Sydney Morning Herald, senior
associate Michael Donelly described Crown's alleged failures in the
case as "part of what has become one of the most serious and
comprehensive breakdowns in corporate governance in Australian
history."

Company shares dropped 14% in October 2016 after Crown Resorts'
public confirmation that several of its employees were detained in
China on suspicion of engaging in the illegal marketing of its
gambling services.

"Almost 20 employees had been arrested in China for marketing
gambling trips to Macau. While gambling is legal in the southern
Chinese territory, it is illegal on the mainland," Reuters
explained in a 2017 report.

The detention was reportedly for activities designed to court
Chinese VIP gamblers. The employees pleaded guilty to the
commission of gambling offences and were convicted by the Baoshan
District Court in June 2017. [GN]

CULTURE CARTON: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Culture Carton LLC.
The case is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Culture Carton LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-09876 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Culture Carton -- https://www.culturecarton.com/ -- is a
subscription box for men who want to improve themselves.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


DATTO INC: Faces Class Action Over Fraud, Consumer Laws Violations
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action filed in US District Court for the Central District
of California, on October 27, 2021 alleges that Datto purposefully,
willfully, and knowingly committed consumer fraud and violated
multiple consumer protection laws.

Datto purchased Open Mesh. Open Mesh induced customers and
distributors to buy networking hardware with a promise of a free
"Lifetime Cloud License" for the cloud-based network controller
platform "CloudTrax" which the hardware requires to operate. This
included maintenance, automatic firmware updates, and support.  

Datto allegedly defrauded consumers and distributors out of the
value of their purchases by disabling the free automatic firmware
updates, maintenance, and support for the hardware.

Removing this functionality of the hardware renders it useless for
the purposes it was advertised for and sold to distributors and
consumers to use it in their businesses, for example, hotels,
apartments, retail stores, restaurants, small and medium sized
business, and just about anywhere else.

Datto then offered consumers and distributors to move their Open
Mesh hardware to Datto's CloudTrax, to regain this functionality if
they pay a monthly fee. Datto's CloudTrax is essentially the same
as Open Mesh CloudTrax.

The lawsuit also alleges that Datto failed to provide duty of care
to the customers and distributors, violated the unfair business
practice act, violated the consumer legal remedies act, breached
their contracts, breached implied warranty of merchantability,
intentionally misrepresented themselves, and caused harm to their
customers and distributors when their ability to use the product
they purchased was forcefully taken away from them.

Plaintiffs and class members suffered a loss of economic gain and
subsequently also suffered other financial loss due to Datto's
alleged false advertising and deception.

The case is Dinnerman et al v. Datto, Inc et al,
8:21-cv-01771-JVS-DFM.

The plaintiffs, Joshua Dinnerman and Paul Feinberg, are represented
by the Law Offices of Gary R. Carlin APC, a Long Beach, CA based
law firm.

If you have suffered losses or damages by Datto's practices and
would like to join the Datto class action, or if you have any
questions, please contact the Law Offices of Gary R. Carlin APC by
email at info@dattoclassaction.com, or through their website at
dattoclassaction.com. [GN]

DATTO INC: Gary R. Carlin APC Files Consumer Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
industryanalysts.com reports that a class action filed in US
District Court for the Central District of California, on October
27, 2021 alleges that Datto purposefully, willfully, and knowingly
committed consumer fraud and violated multiple consumer protection
laws.

Datto purchased Open Mesh. Open Mesh induced customers and
distributors to buy networking hardware with a promise of a free
"Lifetime Cloud License" for the cloud-based network controller
platform "CloudTrax" which the hardware requires to operate. This
included maintenance, automatic firmware updates, and support.

Datto allegedly defrauded consumers and distributors out of the
value of their purchases by disabling the free automatic firmware
updates, maintenance, and support for the hardware.

Removing this functionality of the hardware renders it useless for
the purposes it was advertised for and sold to distributors and
consumers to use it in their businesses, for example, hotels,
apartments, retail stores, restaurants, small and medium sized
business, and just about anywhere else.

Datto then offered consumers and distributors to move their Open
Mesh hardware to Datto's CloudTrax, to regain this functionality if
they pay a monthly fee. Datto's CloudTrax is essentially the same
as Open Mesh CloudTrax.

The lawsuit also alleges that Datto failed to provide duty of care
to the customers and distributors, violated the unfair business
practice act, violated the consumer legal remedies act, breached
their contracts, breached implied warranty of merchantability,
intentionally misrepresented themselves, and caused harm to their
customers and distributors when their ability to use the product
they purchased was forcefully taken away from them.

Plaintiffs and class members suffered a loss of economic gain and
subsequently also suffered other financial loss due to Datto's
alleged false advertising and deception.

The case is Dinnerman et al v. Datto, Inc et al,
8:21-cv-01771-JVS-DFM.

The plaintiffs, Joshua Dinnerman and Paul Feinberg, are represented
by the Law Offices of Gary R. Carlin APC, a Long Beach, CA based
law firm.

If you have suffered losses or damages by Datto's practices and
would like to join the Datto class action, or if you have any
questions, please contact the Law Offices of Gary R. Carlin APC by
email at info@dattoclassaction.com, or through their website at
dattoclassaction.com. [GN]

DAVITA INC: Fails to Pay Proper Wages to Nurses, Bowling Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
JAMES BOWLING, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DAVITA, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:21-cv-03033 (D. Colo., Nov. 10, 2021) is an action against the
Defendants for unpaid regular hours, overtime hours, minimum wages,
wages for missed meal and rest periods.

Plaintiff Bowling was employed by the Defendant as nurse.

DAVITA, INC. provides a variety of health care services. The
Company provides kidney dialysis services for patients suffering
from chronic kidney failure. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ricardo J. Prieto, Esq.
          Melinda Arbuckle, Esq.
          SHELLIST LAZARZ SLOBIN LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1515
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 621-2277
          Facsimile: (713) 621-0993
          Email: rprieto@eeoc.net
                 marbuckle@eeoc.net

DECHOCKER LLC: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dechoker LLC. The
case is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Dechoker LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-09871 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

The Dechoker -- https://www.dechoker.com/ -- is an anti-choking
device which is lightweight, easy to use, and engineered to save
lives in a choking emergency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


DECORATED INC: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Decocrated, Inc. The
case is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Decocrated, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-09873 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Decocrated -- https://www.decocrated.com/ -- curates home decor to
freshen up homes for each season.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


DELTA AIR: Gurzenski Suit Remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ZACHARY GURZENSKI, an individual, on behalf of himself
and all other similarly situated non-exempt current and former
employees, Plaintiff v. DELTA AIR LINES, INC., a Delaware
corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
2:21-cv-05959-AB (JEMx) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Andre Birotte, Jr. of
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.

The Court ordered the Clerk of Court to remand the matter to the
Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los
Angeles.

Background

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a non-exempt Ramp
Agent, and seeks to represent a class of all current and former
Ramp Agents at any of the Defendant's locations at Los Angeles
International Airport ("LAX") during the class period. According to
the Plaintiff, the Defendant violated California labor law because
it "routinely required the Class Members to purchase and use their
own mandatory personal protective equipment, mandatory safety
equipment and tools, and personal cell phone data and minutes as a
direct consequence of the discharge of their employment duties."
The Defendant did not compensate Class Members for this equipment.
The equipment Class Members purchased for themselves consisted of
protective steel-toed boots, safety vests, earmuffs, marshaling
wands, and knee pads. The Defendant also required the Class Members
to use their personal cell phones for work purposes and did not
compensate them for this.

Based on these allegations, the Complaint alleges the following
three (3) causes of action: (1) Failure to Indemnify Employees for
Necessary Expenditures Incurred in Discharge of Duties (Cal. Lab.
Code Section 2802); (2) Failure to Pay All Wages Due to Discharged
and Quitting Employees (Cal. Lab. Code Section 203); and (3) Unfair
and Unlawful Business Practices (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section
17200, et seq.).

The Plaintiff contends that he pled only these three claims to
avoid passing CAFA's $5 million amount in controversy threshold. He
argues that the Defendant has not established that these three
claims satisfy the threshold, contending that the Defendant's
estimate of about $5.1 million -- barely surpassing CAFA's minimum
-- is inflated because it double-counts some damages and uses
unreasonable assumptions.

Discussion

The parties do not dispute that the Plaintiff's class exceeds 100
members and that the parties are minimally diverse. The only
dispute is whether the amount in controversy is satisfied: The
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that "the amount in controversy for
the aggregate claims of the Plaintiff and the class he seeks to
represent is under $5 million," while the Defendant contends that
it exceeds $5 million.

As noted, the Complaint alleges that the amount in controversy does
not exceed $5 million. In its Notice of Removal, Defendant
estimates the amount in controversy to be at least $5,897,910. In
his Motion, the Plaintiff explains why the Defendant's estimate is
inflated and calculates the amount to be about $3.6 million.

In its Opposition, the Defendant estimates an amount in controversy
of $5,100,112, about $800,000 less than the amount alleged in the
NOR. In his Reply, the Plaintiff explains why even Defendant's
$5,100,112 estimate is inflated. Both sides filed evidence to
support their calculations.

Having considered the arguments and evidence, Judge Birotte finds
that the Defendant has not satisfied its burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million. He says, some of the Defendant's key evidence
is inconsistent and is plausibly refuted by the Plaintiff's
evidence, that the Defendant's cell phone calculation relies on an
unreasonable assumption, and that the attorneys' fee calculation is
unreasonable. Applying more reasonable estimates yields an amount
in controversy below $5 million. Therefore, the Defendant has not
met its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
amount in controversy is satisfied.

In sum, Judge Birotte holds that the Defendant presented no
evidence of what a lodestar fee would be. The Plaintiff presented
evidence that the counsel could spend up to 1,000 on a class action
case. This amount of time seems generous for case like this, but
the Court accepts it. At counsel's $650 hourly rate, the maximum
lodestar is $650,000. Even accepting all of the Defendant's other
calculations as correct, a $650,000 attorneys' fee would yield a
total amount in controversy of only $4,730,090.26. This amount is
below CAFA's $5 million threshold. Judge Birotte, therefore, finds
that the amount in controversy is not satisfied and the case must
be remanded.

Conclusion

Judge Birotte concludes that each of the faults in the Defendant's
estimate of the amount in controversy independently causes the
amount in controversy to fall below CAFA's $5 million threshold.
Accordingly, the Defendant has not met its burden of establishing
by a preponderance of the evidence that that threshold is
satisfied. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over the case. Judge Birtote granted the Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand and ordered the Clerk of Court to remand the matter to Los
Angeles County Superior Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 12, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/rd8tcsfw from Leagle.com.


DELUVIA INC: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Deluvia, Inc. The
case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Deluvia, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-09815
(S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Deluvia Inc. -- https://deluviausa.com/ -- is a cosmetics company
based out of Clearwater, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com


DIET DIRECT: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Diet Direct, Inc. The
case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Diet Direct, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-09773 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Diet Direct -- https://www.dietdirect.com/ -- is a leading online
retailer of health, wellness and weight management products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 11201
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: jmizrahi@mizrahikroub.com


DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Collins Sues Over Unpaid Hazard Premiums
--------------------------------------------------------------
JASON COLLINS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (A Municipal
Corporation) Fire And Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Department,
Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-02941 (D. Columbia, November 8, 2021)
brings this complaint as a collective action against the Defendant
for its alleged failure to pay overtime compensation in violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff is a firefighter working for the Defendant.

The Plaintiff claims that although the Fire and EMS Chief signed a
special order about the hazard pay for the employees who reported
for all their regularly scheduled tours of duty during a pay period
were eligible for the full $140 in premium pay, he and other
similarly situated employees were not paid hazard premiums  when
they have regularly worked in excess of 42 hours during the time
period beginning March 16, 2020 and extending through the end of
the Public Health Emergency on July 25, 2021.

On behalf of himself and all other similarly situated employees,
the Plaintiff seeks a complete accounting of all the compensation
they are owed, as well as back pay and an equal amount in
liquidated damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, litigation
costs and expenses together with reasonable attorneys' and expert
fees, and other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department
is an administrative division of the District of Columbia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
          Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
          MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
          412 H St., NE Suite 302
          Washington, DC 20002
          Tel: (202) 470-3520
          Fax: (202) 800-2730
          E-mail: jrathod@classlawdc.com
                  nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com

DOGFISH HEAD: Contreras Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dogfish Head
Companies LLC. The case is styled as Yensy Contreras, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Dogfish Head
Companies LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-09695 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 22, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Dogfish Head -- https://www.dogfish.com/ -- is a brewing company
based in Milton, Delaware founded by Sam Calagione.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jarrett Scott Charo, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: jcharo@mizrahikroub.com


DONZELLA LTD: Sosa Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Donzella, Ltd. The
case is styled as Yony Sosa, on behalf of himself and all other
persons similarly situated v. Donzella, Ltd., Case No.
1:21-cv-09851 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Donzella -- https://www.donzella.com/ -- is a curated gallery space
that has specialized in post-war design since its inception in the
early 1990s.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: nyjg@aol.com
                 michael@gottlieb.legal


DOW JONES: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dow Jones & Company,
Inc. The case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Dow Jones & Company, Inc.,
Case No. 1:21-cv-09784 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Dow Jones & Company, Inc. -- https://www.dowjones.com/ -- is an
American publishing firm owned by News Corp and led by CEO Almar
Latour.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com


DRAFTKINGS INC: Rodriguez and Hoorn Securities Suits Consolidated
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, KENT J. RODRIGUEZ, Individually and On Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. DRAFTKINGS INC. f/k/a
DIAMOND EAGLE ACQUISITION CORP., JASON D. ROBINS, JASON K. PARK,
JEFF SAGANSKY, and ELI BAKER, Defendants. MICHIEL TEN HOORN,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff v. DRAFTKINGS INC. f/k/a DIAMOND EAGLE ACQUISITION CORP.,
JASON D. ROBINS, JASON K. PARK, JEFF SAGANSKY, and ELI BAKER,
Defendants, Case Nos. 21 Civ. 5739 (PAE), 21 Civ. 6497 (PAE)
(S.D.N.Y.), Judge Paul A. Engelmayer of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York issued an Opinion and Order:

   a. consolidating the two actions;

   b. appointing Walter Marino as the Lead Plaintiff; and

   c. appointing Marino's counsel, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
      LLP, as the lead counsel.

Background

In July 2021, the above two putative class actions were filed on
behalf of purchasers of certain securities of DraftKings, Inc.,
formerly known as Diamond Eagle Acquisition Corp., between Dec. 23,
2019, and June 15, 2021, inclusive ("Class Period"). The Plaintiffs
in each case allege that DraftKings and the individual defendants
(each a DraftKings officer) made false and misleading statements
about, and/or failed to disclose, that a company with which
DraftKings had merged, SB Tech (Global) Limited ("SBTech"), had a
history of unlawful operations.

The Plaintiffs allege that SBTech's transgressions left DraftKings
exposed to dealings in black-market gaming, which exposed
DraftKings to regulatory and criminal risks and meant that some of
its revenues derived from unlawful conduct. As a result, the
Plaintiffs allege, various public statements by DraftKings were
materially false and misleading, causing its shares to trade at
artificially inflated prices during the Class Period. However, the
Plaintiffs allege, on June 15, 2021, Hindenburg Research published
a report exposing SBTech's history and alleging that the merger
with SBTech exposed DraftKings to black-market gaming. After the
report, DraftKings shares fell 4.17%.

Pending before the Court are two sets of motions. One, unopposed,
is to consolidate the actions. The other consists of motions from
six individual investors, each seeking appointment as lead
plaintiff and appointment of their respective attorneys as lead
counsel. These movants are: (1) Tim Kaintz; (2) Robert Downs; (3)
Marino; (4) Stephen Goering; (5) Robert Mendoza; and (6) Mario E.
Ernst. Goering, Mendoza, and Ernst have since conceded that they
lack the largest financial interest in the litigation, and have
filed notices of non-opposition. The Court's choice is, therefore,
between Kaintz, Downs, and Marino (collectively, "Movants").

Discussion

A. Consolidation

Each Movant seeks consolidation, and consolidation is clearly
merited. Both actions sue DraftKings and its officers under the
Exchange Act on behalf of all persons and entities that "purchased
or otherwise acquired DraftKings securities between Dec. 23, 2019
and June 15, 2021," inclusive. Both center on the same allegations:
That DraftKings and its officers unlawfully failed to disclose
SBTech's black-market dealings; that these violations led to
artificially inflated share prices, and that, after the truth was
revealed, these collapsed to the financial detriment of the
proposed class. In fact, the majority of each complaint contains
the identical allegations, largely verbatim. The Defendants in the
two suits are also identical: They include DraftKings and four
officers, Jason D. Robins, Jason K. Park, Jeff Sagansky, and Eli
Baker. The lawsuits, therefore, are overwhelmingly similar.

Judge Engelmayer opines that courts routinely consolidate
securities class actions arising from the same allegedly actionable
statements. He finds that all relevant factors support
consolidation. Accordingly, he consolidates these actions.

B. Selecting the Lead Plaintiff

Judge Engelmayer opines that the candidate for lead plaintiff with
the next-highest financial stake in the litigation is Marino, whom
he has found to satisfy the Rule 23 factors for purposes of the
PSLRA analysis. As such, Marino is the "most adequate plaintiff."
No movant, even Kaintz, has put forth any reason that Marino would
be ill-suited to adequately represent the putative class. Judge
Engelmayer therefore appoints Marino as the Lead Plaintiff.

C. Appointing Lead Counsel

The most adequate plaintiff may retain counsel to represent the
class, subject to the Court's approval. Marino has selected the law
firm of Robins Geller Rudman & Downs LLP as lead counsel. Having
reviewed the firm's submissions as to its pertinent background and
experience, including its experience litigating securities class
actions, Judge Engelmayer finds the firm qualified to serve as lead
counsel. Accordingly, he appoints Robins Geller as the lead
counsel.

Conclusion

For the reasons he set out, Judge Engelmayer grants Marino's motion
for appointment as the Lead Plaintiff, and appoints Robins Geller
as the Lead Counsel.

The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the
motions pending at docket entries 9, 12, 15, 17, 18, and 24.

Judge Engelmayer directs the parties to meet and confer and, to
file a joint letter setting out an efficient proposed schedule for
next steps in the case, including proposed dates for the filing of
(1) a consolidated amended complaint and (2) the Defendants'
response. If the Defendants anticipate that their response will
take the form of a motion to dismiss, the parties will include
proposed dates for the opposition and reply briefs as well.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 12, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/8mjev2de from Leagle.com.


DSMB PARTNERS: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against DSMB Partners, LLC.
The case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. DSMB Partners, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-09771-ER (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

DSMB Partners, LLC doing business as Activated You --
https://activatedyou.com/ -- is a line of supplements.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 11201
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: jmizrahi@mizrahikroub.com


DYEHAED FAN: Contreras Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dyehard Fan Supply,
LLC. The case is styled as Yensy Contreras, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Dyehard Fan Supply, LLC,
Case No. 1:21-cv-09682 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 22, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Dyehard Fan Supply -- https://dyehardfansupply.com/ -- is a turnkey
sports retail solutions provider for some of America's top sporting
events, venues and brands.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jarrett Scott Charo, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: jcharo@mizrahikroub.com


E THING: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against E Thing, Inc. The
case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. E Thing, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-09823
(S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

E Thing, Inc. have been selling on Walmart Marketplace since
2020.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 11201
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: jmizrahi@mizrahikroub.com


EARGO INC: Kessler Topaz Reminds of December 6 Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP informs
investors that a securities class action lawsuit has been filed
against Eargo, Inc. ("Eargo") (NASDAQ:EAR). The action charges
Eargo with violations of the federal securities laws, including
omissions and fraudulent misrepresentations relating to the
company's business, operations, and prospects. As a result of
Eargo's materially misleading statements, Eargo investors have
suffered significant losses.

LEAD PLAINTIFF DEADLINE: December 6, 2021
CLASS PERIOD: October 15, 2020 through September 22, 2021
CONTACT AN ATTORNEY TO DISCUSS YOUR RIGHTS: James Maro, Esq. (484)
270-1453 or Toll Free (844) 887-9500 or Email at info@ktmc.com

EARGO'S ALLEGED MISCONDUCT
Eargo, headquartered San Jose, California, is a medical device
company that specifically manufactures and sells hearing aids
through online platforms. The hearing aids sold by Eargo function
to improve hearing loss by allowing natural bass sounds to flow
more freely into the ear canal.

On October 16, 2021, Eargo conducted its initial public offering
("IPO"), selling more than 9 million shares of Eargo common stock
at $18.00 per share, generating over $160 million in gross
proceeds. On August 12, 2021, when reporting its second-quarter
2021 financial results, Eargo revealed that its largest third-party
payor, an insurance company, was conducting a claims audit on the
company. Then, on September 22, 2021, Eargo reported that the U.S.
Department of Justice ("DOJ") was conducting a criminal
investigation into the company regarding Eargo's insurance
reimbursement claims that it submits on behalf of its customers
when they purchase the company's connected hearing aids. Eargo also
stated that in light of the investigation by the DOJ, the company
would be withdrawing its financial guidance for the fiscal year
ending December 31, 2021.

Following this news, Eargo's stock plunged, and on September 23,
2021, the stock closed at $6.86 per share, falling by as much as
65%.

WHAT CAN I DO?
Eargo investors may, no later than December 6, 2021, seek to be
appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class through
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP or other counsel, or may choose
to do nothing and remain an absent class member. Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP encourages Eargo investors who have suffered
significant losses to contact the firm directly to acquire more
information.

WHO CAN BE A LEAD PLAINTIFF?
A lead plaintiff is a representative party who acts on behalf of
all class members in directing the litigation. The lead plaintiff
is usually the investor or small group of investors who have the
largest financial interest and who are also adequate and typical of
the proposed class of investors. The lead plaintiff selects counsel
to represent the lead plaintiff and the class and these attorneys,
if approved by the court, are lead or class counsel. Your ability
to share in any recovery is not affected by the decision of whether
or not to serve as a lead plaintiff.

ABOUT KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP prosecutes class actions in
state and federal courts throughout the country and around the
world. The firm has developed a global reputation for excellence
and has recovered billions of dollars for victims of fraud and
other corporate misconduct. All of our work is driven by a common
goal: to protect investors, consumers, employees and others from
fraud, abuse, misconduct and negligence by businesses and
fiduciaries. At the end of the day, we have succeeded if the bad
guys pay up, and if you recover your assets. The complaint in this
action was not filed by Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP. For
more information about Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP please
visit www.ktmc.com.

CONTACT:
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP
James Maro, Jr., Esq.
280 King of Prussia Road
Radnor, PA 19087
(844) 887-9500 (toll free)
info@ktmc.com [GN]

ECZEMA HONEY: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Eczema Honey Co.,
LLC. The case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Eczema Honey Co., LLC, Case
No. 1:21-cv-09822 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Eczema Honey -- https://eczemahoneyco.com/ -- offers soothing
products safe, non-toxic and super effective.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com



ELDERSCAN LLC: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Elderscan, LLC. The
case is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Elderscan, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-09812 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Elderscan LLC doing business as Eversafe -- https://eversafe.net/
-- offers portable fire extinguishers are available in 45 countries
worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


ELSE NUTRITION: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Else Nutrition USA,
Inc. The case is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Else Nutrition USA,
Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-09824 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Else Nutrition Holdings Inc. -- https://elsenutrition.com/ --
operates as a baby food company. The Company offers plant-based
nutrition products for the infant, toddler, children, and
adult.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


EMCOD INC: Figueroa Sues Over Failure to Pay Compensations
----------------------------------------------------------
Miguel Figueroa, and other similarly situated aggrieved employees
v. EMCOD, INC.; SCOTT DRUCKER; and DOES 1 to 25, inclusive, Case
No. 21STCV43225 (Cal. Super. Ct., Nov. 23, 2021), is brought
against the Defendants for violations of the California Labor Code
by failing to pay the Plaintiff proper compensations.

EMCOD did not provide Plaintiff and other aggrieved employees with
compensation for all hours worked and did not pay Plaintiff and
others the minimum wages to which they were entitled for work
performed "off the clock" pursuant to California Labor Code.
Furthermore, EMCOD had a policy of rounding down the hours worked
by Plaintiff and other aggrieved employees which translated to
Plaintiff and others not being paid for all hours worked, including
minimum wages. In addition, management would at times manually
change employees' working hours on the timeclock system. EMCOD also
violated Labor Code §510 because it failed to pay Plaintiff and
other similarly situated aggrieved employees overtime, even though
they worked more than 8 hours per day and/or 40 hours per week
throughout their employment. Plaintiff and other similarly situated
aggrieved employees worked more than 8 hours per day and/or 40
hours per week, however, they were not compensated for their
overtime hours due to being forced to clock out and continue
working "off the clock" as described above. Moreover, when
Plaintiff worked on the weekends, he was paid cash, but did not
actually receive overtime pay. As such, the company paid workers
cash instead of actually paying employees overtime and reporting it
on their paystubs, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was the "warehouse manager" and was classified as an
hourly, non-exempt employee.

EMCOD, INC. is a California Corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Harout Messrelian, Esq.
          MESSRELIAN LAW INC.
          500 N. Central Ave., Suite 840
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Phone: (818) 484-6531
          Facsimile: (818) 956-1983


ENPHASE ENERGY: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Enphase Energy, Inc.
The case is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Enphase Energy, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-09843 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Enphase -- https://enphase.com/ -- is a global energy management
technology company that provides residential and commercial solar
plus storage solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


EOS USA: Heppinstall Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Pennsylvania
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against EOS USA, Inc. The
case is styled as Eric Heppinstall, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. EOS USA, Inc. d/b/a EOS CCA, Case
No. 3:21-cv-01995-RDM (M.D. Pa., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

EOS -- https://www.eos-usa.com/ -- is one of America's largest
customer care and receivables management companies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott H. Bernstein, Esq.
          SKOLNICK LEGAL GROUP, P.C.
          103 Eisenhower Parkway, Ste. 305
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Phone: (203) 246-2887
          Email: scott@skolnicklegalgroup.com


ERIE INSURANCE: Illinois Court Dismisses EBCF Suit With Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EBCF ENTERPRISES, INC., ANGELO PALIVOS, and CHRISTINA
PALIVOS, Plaintiffs v. ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Defendant, Case No.
20 C 5476 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Jorge Alonso of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,
granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss, and dismissed the
Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice.

Background

After their automobile insurance company (Defendant Erie) sent them
a rebate worth 30% of two months' premium, Plaintiffs EBC, Angelo,
and Palivos filed a first amended complaint asserting that the
Defendant's failure to provide a larger rebate breached their
insurance contracts, violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("ICFA") and constituted unjust
enrichment.

The Plaintiffs believe the Defendant obtained a windfall when the
COVID-19 pandemic reduced driving and, hence, automobile accidents,
thereby increasing the Defendant's profits. The following facts are
from the Plaintiffs' first amended complaint, and the Court takes
them as true.

The Plaintiffs allege "auto insurance rates, including those set by
Erie, are intended to cover the claims and expenses that insurance
companies expect to occur in the future, extrapolated from
historical data." They allege that when Illinois Governor J.B.
Pritzker issued "stay-at-home" orders during the spring of 2020 in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, it resulted in fewer people
driving, which resulted in fewer automobile accidents. At that
point, according to the Plaintiffs, the premiums they had already
paid for automobile insurance during that time "became
unconscionably excessive." They allege that "in spring 2020, Erie
promised to pay dividends amounting to 30% of two months'
premiums," but, according to the Plaintiffs, that refund "was and
is inadequate to compensate for the excessive premiums that its
customers have paid as a result of COVID-19."

The Plaintiffs allege that they purchased automobile insurance from
Erie. Specifically, Plaintiff EBCF purchased a policy that was in
effect from Sept. 23, 2019 through Sept. 23, 2020. Erie renewed the
policy for the period of Sept. 23, 2020 through Sept. 23, 2021.
Similarly, Plaintiffs Angelo and Christina Palivos purchased a
policy in effect from Feb. 1, 2020 through Feb. 1, 2021. They
renewed the policy for the period of Feb. 1, 2021 through Feb. 1,
2022.

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiffs assert claims for breach
of contract, unjust enrichment and violation of ICFA. The Defendant
moves to dismiss.

The Defendant attached to its motion to dismiss a copy of each
Plaintiff's policy. The Court may consider those documents without
converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment,
because the policies are referred to in the Plaintiffs' complaint
and are central to the Plaintiffs' claims.

Discussion

A. Illinois Consumer Fraud Act

In Count II, the Plaintiffs assert that the Defendant violated
ICFA, 815 ILCS 505/1, et seq. They allege Erie's conduct "is
immoral, unethical and unscrupulous because Erie has taken
advantage of the global COVID-19 pandemic for its own financial
gain." The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs have not plausibly
alleged an unfair practice within the meaning of the ICFA.

Judge Alonso opines that the Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged
and cannot allege that the Defendant's rate decisions in connection
with the decrease in driving caused by the pandemic are against
Illinois public policy. The Plaintiffs have also failed to allege
plausibly that the Defendant's rebate decision was immoral,
unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous. In short, the Plaintiffs
have not plausibly alleged a practice that was immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous.

Finally, Judge Alonso opines that the Plaintiffs have failed to
state a claim under the ICFA. The defects are not curable.
Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted as to
Count II. Count II is dismissed with prejudice.

B. Unjust enrichment

In Count III, the Plaintiffs seek relief for unjust enrichment.
They assert that Erie was unjustly enriched by the retention of the
excessive premiums.

The Seventh Circuit has held (and the Plaintiffs concede), that
where a party fails to state a claim under the ICFA, that party
necessarily fails to state a claim for unjust enrichment. Thus,
Count III is also dismissed with prejudice.

C. Breach of Contract

Finally, in Count I, the Plaintiffs assert that "Erie's insurance
contracts give it discretion to adjust premiums if the information
on which those premiums are based changes or becomes incorrect."
They allege Erie "breached the insurance contracts by exercising
its contractual discretion in violation of the covenant of fair
dealing and good faith." According to the Plaintiffs, the Defendant
took advantage of the Plaintiffs by "profiting from the
uncontemplated and unforeseeable COVID-19 pandemic."

It is clear the Plaintiffs have not alleged a claim for breach of
the terms of the contract, Judge Alonso finds. He says, both
policies (EBCF's policy and the Palivos's policy) provide that the
policyholder could request a change. The Plaintiffs have not
plausibly alleged and cannot allege that the parties' objectively
reasonable expectations required the Defendant to issue a larger
rebate. This defect cannot be cured by amendment. Count I is
dismissed with prejudice.

Conclusion

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Alonso granted the Defendant's
motion to dismiss. The Plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed with
prejudice. The civil case is terminated.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 12, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/7bf79bj8 from
Leagle.com.


ETERNAL SUNSHINE: Faces Santos Suit Over Unpaid Wages for Bakers
----------------------------------------------------------------
EDGAR SANTOS CARDENAS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ETERNAL SUNSHINE CAFE, LLC and
MICHAEL PELLEGRINO, Defendants, Case No. 7:21-cv-00205-D (E.D.N.C.,
November 23, 2021) is a class action against the Defendants for
unpaid minimum wages and overtime wages in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as a baker.

Eternal Sunshine Cafe, LLC is an owner and operator of a restaurant
in Wilmington, North Carolina. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Andrew Hanley, Esq.
         Nathanial Ulmer, Esq.
         CROSSLEY McINTOSH COLLIER HANLEY & EDES, PLLC
         5002 Randall Parkway
         Wilmington, NC 28403
         Telephone: (910) 762-9711
         Facsimile: (910) 256-0310

EVANGELICAL COMMUNITY: Court Narrows Claims in Antitrust Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE EVANGELICAL COMMUNITY HOSPITAL HEALTHCARE
WORKERS ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Case No. 4:21-CV-00196 (M.D. Pa.),
Judge Matthew W. Brann of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' joint motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
and, alternatively, to strike class allegations.

Background

On March 18, 2021, Plaintiffs Nichole Leib, Kevin Brokenshire,
Diane Weigley, and Jessica Sauer filed their First Amended
Complaint individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated. The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Geisinger Health
and Evangelical Community Hospital agreed not to poach each other's
healthcare workers in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act of
1890 and Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law.

On May 17, 2021, the Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim and, alternatively, to strike class
allegations.

Geisinger Health is the largest health system in Central
Pennsylvania. And Evangelical Community Hospital is Central
Pennsylvania's largest independent community hospital. Together,
these Defendants employ 70% to 75% of hospital healthcare workers
in Central Pennsylvania.

At least as early as 2010, the Defendants agreed to not poach each
other's physicians, nurses, psychologists, therapists, and other
healthcare professionals in Central Pennsylvania. The Defendants'
senior executives periodically reaffirmed, monitored, and policed
this no-poach agreement. For example, after learning that Geisinger
had been recruiting Evangelical's nurses, Evangelical's CEO emailed
Geisinger to "please ask that this stop." The Geisinger executive
then forwarded this email to Geisinger's Vice President of Talent
Acquisition, instructing her to "ask your staff to stop this
activity with Evangelical."

The Defendants also concealed their no-poach agreement. Instead of
placing this agreement in writing, the Defendants trained new
executives about it orally. And when one of their healthcare
workers applied to work for the other Defendant, both Defendants
communicated about the applicant without the applicant's
knowledge.

The Defendants intended that this no-poach agreement reduce
competition for healthcare workers in Central Pennsylvania. Indeed,
this agreement suppressed job ability and wages for the Plaintiffs,
whom the Defendants employed. Without the no-poach agreement, the
Defendants would have competed for the Plaintiffs' labor, thus
resulting in higher wages.

Analysis

1. Sherman Act Section 1

a. Article III Standing

First, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs lack Article III
standing because they have not plausibly alleged an actual injury.
For Article III standing, plaintiffs must plead an "injury in fact"
that is "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'"
This injury must be "causally connected and traceable to an action
of the defendant."

In the case, the Plaintiffs allege that the no-poach agreement
artificially reduced their wages. They also allege that absent the
no-poach agreement, the Defendants would compete for each other's
employees, thus increasing pay and job mobility. The Defendants
counter that the Plaintiffs cannot show injury because they do not
allege that they sought work at other hospitals.

Judge Brann opines that the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged an
Article III injury at the pleading stage. At the pleading stage, he
says, the allegations plausibly show an injury for Article III
standing.

b. Antitrust Standing

The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs lack antitrust
standing because they have not shown an antitrust injury. An
antitrust injury "is attributable to an anti-competitive aspect of
the practice under scrutiny." It "stems from a competition-reducing
aspect or effect of the defendant's behavior." "If antitrust injury
is not found, further inquiry is unnecessary." The Plaintiffs
allege that the Defendants' no-poach agreement was intended to and
did suppress their wages and job mobility. They further allege that
absent the no-poach agreement, the Defendants would compete for
each other's employees, thereby increasing pay and job mobility.

This adequately alleges an antitrust injury, Judge Brann finds. He
says, the Plaintiffs do not allege injuries resulting from harm to
another party. Instead, they allege that they personally suffered
lower wages as a direct and proximate result of the Defendants'
no-poach agreement. Because the Plaintiffs allege that their
injuries are a direct result of the no-poach agreement, they have
adequately pled antitrust standing.

c. Conspiracy

Next, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs do not plausibly
allege a conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The
pleading a Section 1 claim "requires a complaint with enough
factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was
made." "An agreement exists when there is a unity of purpose, a
common design and understanding, a meeting of the minds, or a
conscious commitment to a common scheme." The Defendants further
argue that a civil enforcement action by the United States
Department of Justice does not salvage the Plaintiffs' Complaint.

Again, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants are competitors
who agreed not to poach each other's physicians, nurses,
psychologists, therapists, and other healthcare professionals in
Central Pennsylvania at least as early as 2010. They further allege
that the Defendants periodically monitored and policed this
no-poaching agreement.

Judge Brann opines that the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a
no-poaching agreement. Their specific allegations regarding a
no-poach agreement and the efforts to police it are sufficient at
this stage. So the Plaintiffs' Complaint does not need salvaging.
The Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied as to the Plaintiffs'
Sherman Act claim.

d. Class Allegations

The Defendants also move to strike the Plaintiffs' class
allegations because they do not meet predominance,
ascertainability, and typicality requirements. In the circuit,
class allegations are stricken prior to a motion for certification
only when class certification is a clear impossibility. Indeed, the
Third Circuit has held that the complaint itself demonstrates that
the requirements for maintaining a class action cannot be met" in
only a "rare few" cases.

Judge Brann opines that it is not one of the rare cases in which
the complaint demonstrates that class certification is impossible.
When the Plaintiffs move to certify a class, the Defendants may
challenge predominance, ascertainability, and typicality again. But
at this point, the Defendants' motion to strike class allegations
is denied.

2. Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law

Finally, the Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing and
otherwise fail to state a claim under Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law. Indeed, the Plaintiffs
explicitly abandon this claim in their response brief. The
Plaintiffs' state law claim is therefore dismissed.

Conclusion

The Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is
denied as to the Plaintiffs' first claim for relief under the
Sherman Act. The federal antitrust claim survives. The Defendants'
motion to strike class allegations is also denied.

The Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is
granted with prejudice as to the Plaintiffs' second claim for
relief, which alleges a violation of Pennsylvania law. Leave to
amend is not granted. "Among the grounds that could justify a
denial of leave to amend are undue delay, bad faith, dilatory
motive, prejudice, and futility." A complaint is "futile" if it
would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted even
as amended. Amendment would be futile because the Plaintiffs'
response brief explicitly abandons their state law claim.

An appropriate Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2021 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/cspk8y6p from Leagle.com.


FEIN SUCH: Barone Files FDCPA Suit in D. New Jersey
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Fein, Such, Kahn &
Shepard P.C., et al. The case is styled as Robyn Barone, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated v. Fein, Such, Kahn &
Shepard P.C., John Does 1-25, Case No. 2:21-cv-19919-JXN-AME
(D.N.J., Nov. 10, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Fein, Such, Kahn & Shepard P.C. (FSKS) -- https://feinsuch.com/ --
is a Business & Corporate law firm with extensive industry
experience.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph K. Jones, Esq.
          JONES, WOLF & KAPASI, LLC
          375 Passaic Avenue, Suite 100
          Fairfield, NJ 07004
          Phone: (973) 227-5900
          Fax: (973) 244-0019
          Email: jkj@legaljones.com


FICOSOTA MARKETING: Slade Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ficosota Marketing
New York LLC. The case is styled as Linda Slade, individually and
as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons v.
Ficosota Marketing New York LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-09756 (S.D.N.Y.,
Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Ficosota Marketing New York LLC -- https://ficosota.com/ -- is
located in New York City and is part of the Management, Scientific,
and Technical Consulting Services Industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
          Scarsdale, NY 10583
          Phone: (917) 373-9128
          Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


FIDELITY NATIONAL: Denial of Fees to Villanueva's Attys. Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MANNY VILLANUEVA, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant, Case
Nos. H041870, H042504 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of
California for the Sixth District issued an Opinion:

   a. reversing the judgment in case No. H041870, and remanding
      to the superior court with directions to vacate:

      (1) the judgment and enter a new judgment dismissing the
          action; and

      (2) the order granting injunctive relief; and

   b. affirming the postjudgment order denying Villanueva's
      motion for attorney's fees in case No. H042504.

Background

The Insurance Code includes provisions regulating the business of
title insurance in California. Among other things, the Insurance
Code requires all title insurers to file a schedule of their rates
with the Insurance Commissioner. In the context of title insurance,
a "rate" is the charge made to the public by a title insurer or
title company for title insurance services. The Insurance Code
generally prohibits title insurers and title companies from
charging rates that have not been filed with the Insurance
Commissioner.

In the case, Plaintiff Villanueva alleged in his complaint against
Defendant Fidelity that it had unlawfully charged Villanueva and
his wife, Sonia Villanueva, unfiled rates for certain escrow
services when Fidelity handled the escrow for the refinancing of
their home mortgage. The trial court granted Villanueva's motion to
certify a class of similarly situated consumers. By the time of the
court trial in the matter, the only cause of action remaining for
trial was violation of the unfair competition law (UCL), Business
and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.

In a combined statement of decision and judgment, the trial court
ruled that Fidelity did not have statutory immunity under section
12414.26. The court also ruled that Fidelity had violated the UCL
by unlawfully charging unfiled rates for certain title services,
including delivery by third party vendors. As to the remedies for
Fidelity's UCL violation, the trial court determined that the class
was not entitled to restitution because Villanueva did not suffer
an economic injury due to Fidelity's violation of the UCL. However,
the trial court granted injunctive relief, enjoining "Fidelity from
charging for the service of delivery unless its rate filing
includes the charge or a statement that the rate will be the amount
charged by the third party vendors for delivery fees." The
Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 1021.5 was denied.

On appeal, Villanueva, individually and as class representative,
argued in case No. H041870 that the trial court had erred in
failing to award restitution under the UCL and by granting judgment
on the pleadings on their breach of fiduciary duty claim. In case
No. H042504, the Plaintiffs contended that the trial court erred in
denying their postjudgment motion for attorney's fees under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1021.5.

Fidelity cross-appealed, contending that the judgment should be
reversed because (1) Fidelity was immune from suit under section
12414.27; (2) Villanueva lacked standing as the named class
representative because he was not the borrower; (3) alternatively,
the Insurance Code did not require Fidelity to file a rate for
delivery services provided by a third party vendor or for excess
charges; and (4) the trial court erred in granting injunctive
relief for past acts unlikely to be repeated.

In Villanueva v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th
1092 (Villanueva I), the court reversed the judgment, holding that
"this civil action is barred by the immunity in section 12414.26
and is subject to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Insurance Commissioner because it challenges Fidelity's
ratemaking-related activity."

The California Supreme Court granted review of Villanueva I. In
Villanueva v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 104
(Villanueva II), the Supreme Court held that "[t]he statutory
immunity for 'acts done pursuant to the authority conferred'
(Section 12414.26) by the rate-filing statutes does not shield
title insurers from suit for charging unauthorized rates, and the
Insurance Commissioner does not have exclusive jurisdiction over
such claims."

The States Supreme Court further determined in Villanueva II that
"the Insurance Code required Fidelity to file its rates with the
Insurance Commissioner before charging consumers, but it failed to
do so. Charging an unfiled rate is not an 'act done pursuant to the
authority conferred by' section 12401 et seq. (Section 12414.26).
It is a violation of the express terms of the Insurance Code, for
which Fidelity enjoys no statutory immunity from suit under section
12414.26. Nor does any aspect of other provisions in the chapter
regulating title insurance grant to the Commissioner exclusive
jurisdiction to address consumer challenges to unfiled rates.
Section 12414.13 supplies an administrative remedy, but it is not
exclusive of other remedies otherwise available in the courts. The
superior court therefore did not err in ruling on the merits of
Villanueva's UCL action challenging the imposition of unfiled
rates. It reverses the Court of Appeal's judgment and remand for
further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion."

In conformity with the Supreme Court's holdings in the case and its
remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings (Villanueva
II), the Court of Appeals now issues a new decision evaluating the
issues raised on appeal that the Supreme Court did not address in
its decision.

Discussion

I. Case No. H041870

On appeal in case No. H041870, the Plaintiffs argue the trial court
erred by failing to award restitution under the UCL and by granting
judgment on the pleadings on their breach of fiduciary duty cause
of action.

Fidelity cross-appeals, contending that the judgment should be
reversed because (1) Fidelity was immune from suit under section
12414.27; (2) Villanueva lacked standing as the named class
representative because he was not the borrower; (3) alternatively,
section 12414.27 did not require Fidelity to file a rate for
delivery services provided by a third party vendor; (4) section
12401.8 did not require rate filing for draw deed and delivery
services for the Gap Period Plaintiffs since those were excess
charges; and (5) the trial court erred in granting injunctive
relief for past acts unlikely to be repeated.

A. Fidelity's Cross-Appeal: UCL Cause of Action

On appeal, Fidelity argues that Villanueva lacks standing to bring
an action under the UCL because he was not the borrower on the
refinance loan, and therefore he could not challenge the fees
charged by Fidelity that were paid by the actual borrower, his wife
Sonia Villanueva. For that reason, Fidelity contends that the
judgment is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals concludes that Villanueva lacks standing,
either as an individual or in a representative capacity, to bring
an action under the UCL seeking the remedies of restitution and
injunctive relief. Accordingly, it determines that the trial court
did not err in denying restitution, and it will direct the trial
court to vacate its order granting Villanueva injunctive relief.
Having reached this conclusion, the Court of Appeals need not
address the remaining issues raised in the parties' briefing on
appeal.

B. Plaintiffs' Appeal: Breach of Fiduciary Duty Cause of Action

The Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting
Fidelity's motion for judgment on the pleadings on their cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty. Villanueva argues that he
sufficiently alleged a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty
by Fidelity because he alleged that Fidelity violated the Insurance
Code by charging unfiled rates and he paid the unlawful charges.
According to Villanueva, Fidelity had a fiduciary duty not to
charge unfiled rates in violation of the Insurance Code, and this
duty was "incorporated as a matter of law into the escrow
instructions."

Fidelity responds that the trial court properly granted judgment on
the pleadings because the cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty "was not premised on any common law fiduciary duty that
Fidelity owed to the Plaintiffs. Rather, it was premised solely on
Fidelity's alleged violation of the Insurance Code, which provides
no private right of action

The Court of Appeals concludes that the trial court did not err in
granting Fidelity's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Having also concluded
that Villanueva lacks standing to bring an action under the UCL, it
will therefore reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to
vacate the order granting injunctive relief and to enter a judgment
of dismissal.

II. Case No. H042504

In case No. H042504 both parties appeal from the May 14, 2015
postjudgment order on attorney's fees and costs. Villanueva
contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
attorney's fees on the ground that his UCL action did not satisfy
the criteria for an award of attorney's fees under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1021.5. Fidelity argues the trial court erred
when it awarded costs to the Plaintiffs, denied Fidelity's motion
to strike or tax Plaintiffs' costs, and granted the Plaintiffs'
motion to tax Fidelity's costs in their entirety.

Since the Court of Appeals has reversed the judgment in case No.
H041870, Villanueva cannot be considered the prevailing party for
purposes of an award of attorney's fees under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1021.5. Consequently, the Court of Appeals will
affirm the trial court's order denying Villanueva's motion for
attorney's fees without addressing the party's arguments on the
merits as set forth in their briefing on appeal.

However, because the record on appeal is incomplete regarding the
litigation of the parties' motions to tax costs, the Court of
Appeals will remand the matter to the trial court to rule in the
first instance on Villanueva's motion to tax Fidelity's costs and
to determine the amount of the costs award, if any.

Disposition

In case No. H041870 the judgment is reversed. The cause is remanded
to the superior court with directions to (1) vacate the judgment
and enter a new judgment dismissing the action; and (2) vacate the
order granting injunctive relief.

In case No. H042504 the postjudgment order denying Villanueva's
motion for attorney's fees is affirmed. The postjudgment order
denying Fidelity's motion to tax Villanueva's costs, awarding
Villanueva his costs of suit, and granting Villanueva's motion to
tax Fidelity's costs is vacated. The trial court is directed, upon
appropriate motion, to conduct a hearing on Villanueva's motion to
tax Fidelity's costs.

The parties will bear their own appellate costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 12, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/mkdtuwac from Leagle.com.


FINISHLINE EXPRESS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Austin Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
DWAYNE AUSTIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FINISHLINE EXPRESS LLC; and DHL EXPRESS
(USA) INC. d/b/a DHL EXPRESS, Case No. 2:21-cv-02100-KJM-DB (E.D.
Cal., Nov. 12, 2021) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid
regular hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal
and rest periods.

Plaintiff Austin was employed by the Defendants as driver.

FINISHLINE EXPRESS LLC provides mail services. The Company offers
addressed letters, parcels, air and ocean freight. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sophia Rios, Esq.
          BERGER MONTAGUE PC
          401 B Street, Suite 2000
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 489-0300
          Email: srios@bm.net

FIRST NBC: Court Grants Ryan's Bid to Stay Kinzler Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ERIC R. KINZLER, Plaintiff v. FIRST NBC BANK HOLDING
COMPANY, ET AL., SECTION: "E" (1), Defendants, Civil Action No.
16-4243 (E.D. La.), Judge Susie Morgan of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted the motion to stay
filed by Defendant Ashton J. Ryan, Jr.

Background

The case is one of several cases arising out of the circumstances
leading to the collapse of First NBC Bank. Defendant First NBC Bank
Holding Co. ("First NBC") was a publicly traded bank holding
company. Its wholly owned subsidiary, First NBC Bank, offered
financial services in New Orleans.

On April 8, 2016, First NBC announced that its financial statements
for the years ending on Dec. 31, 2011 through 2014, and interim
periods within the years ending on Dec. 31, 2013 to 2015, needed to
be restated and should no longer be relied upon. On May 6, 2016,
the Lead Plaintiffs, shareholders of First NBC, filed the class
action against First NBC, along with its President and CEO Ryan and
its CFO -- and later Treasurer -- Mary Beth Verdigets, alleging
they committed securities fraud.

On Feb. 17, 2017, the Defendants filed motions to dismiss under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6). The Court
granted the motions to dismiss on April 28, 2017 for failure to
plead scienter and failure to plead a false statement. It entered a
judgment in favor of the Defendants on May 11, 2017. The Lead
Plaintiffs appealed.

While on appeal, on Jan. 28, 2021, the Lead Plaintiffs requested an
indicative ruling from the Court under Rule 62.1 as to whether it
would grant relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) to allow the Lead
Plaintiffs to amend their complaint in light of new information
brought to light since the original complaint was filed. The Court
"stated that, if remanded, the Court would find the Rule 62.1
motion has raised substantial issues with respect to whether the
Lead Plaintiffs should be granted relief from the judgment of
dismissal under Rule 60(b)(6) and be allowed to amend their
complaint to include allegations that First NBC, Ryan, and
Verdigets acted with the required state of mind or scienter to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud" under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act. In light of the Court's indicative ruling,
on Sept. 28, 2021, the Fifth Circuit remanded to this Court for
further proceedings, which issued as mandate on Oct. 20, 2021.

While the appeal was pending, on July 10, 2020, a Grand Jury
indicted Ryan and two other First NBC Bank executives for their
actions leading up to the collapse of First NBC Bank. Verdigets was
not indicted. Seven other civil cases involving Ryan or other
parties involved with First NBC have been stayed pending the
outcome of the criminal prosecutions. Ryan now moves to stay the
case pending the outcome of the criminal charges against him.

Discussion

Courts in the Fifth Circuit generally consider the following
factors in determining whether a stay in a civil action is
warranted due to a parallel criminal proceeding: (1) the extent of
the overlap between the criminal case and the civil case; (2) the
status of the criminal case, including whether the defendant has
been indicted; (3) the interests of the plaintiff in proceeding
expeditiously, weighed against the prejudice to the plaintiff
caused by the delay; (4) the interests of and the burden on the
defendant; (5) the interests of the courts; and (6) the public
interest.

I. A Stay is Warranted Pending the Outcome of the Criminal Charges
Against Ryan.

The first factor, the extent to which the civil and criminal cases
overlap, weighs in favor of a stay, Judge Morgan holds. She finds
that the similarity of issues in the underlying civil and criminal
actions is considered the most important threshold issue in
determining whether to grant a stay. In their motion for an
indicative ruling, the Lead Plaintiffs referenced the allegations
of wrongdoing made in the indictment against Ryan as new evidence
warranting relief from judgment and leave to file an amended
complaint. In fact, they concede there is substantial overlap.
Therefore, Judge Morgan finds the first factor weighs in favor of a
stay.

The second factor, the status of the criminal case and whether the
defendant has been indicted, weighs in favor of a stay. In a
criminal case where the defendant has already been indicted, there
is a higher likelihood that a defendant could make incriminating
statements. It is undisputed that Ryan has been indicted for the
same acts underlying the allegations of this case. Therefore, Judge
Morgan finds the second factor weighs in favor of a stay.

The third factor, the interests of the plaintiff in proceeding
expeditiously, weighs in favor of a stay. In evaluating the
plaintiff's burden resulting from the stay, courts may insist that
the plaintiff establish more prejudice than simply a delay in his
right to expeditiously pursue his claim." Courts have held the mere
possibility that the defendant may have fewer assets from which the
Plaintiff may recover to be too "speculative" to warrant denying a
stay.

In the case, the only prejudice that the Lead Plaintiffs have
identified is that "the Defendants' insurance policies that apply
to this case are wasting policies and a stay of the action would
cause great harm to the Class in terms of potential recoveries if
Ryan and other former officers and directors continue to draw down
from those policies." Judge Morgan finds this argument to be
speculative. The Lead Plaintiffs represent that roughly $17 million
of a total of $60 million in coverage in various director and
officer policies has been expended. Of the roughly $43 million
remaining, Lead Plaintiffs contend there may be issues recovering
from a $35 million portion due to alleged misrepresentations Ryan
made when acquiring that coverage.

The Lead Plaintiffs' argument is premised on contingencies upon
contingencies. For them to have no possible recovery, Ryan would
have to expend the $8 million in unobjected-to coverage, then a
court would have to determine the remaining $35 million coverage
was obtained fraudulently, and then Ryan would have to be otherwise
insolvent. Accordingly, Judge Morgan finds factor three weighs in
favor of a stay.

The fourth factor, the interests of and the burden on the
defendant, weighs in favor of a stay. The Lead Plaintiffs and
Verdigets argue the Private Securities Litigation and Reform Act in
15 U.S.C. Section 78u-4(b)(3)(B) precludes discovery until after
the resolution of a motion to dismiss, and the parties may litigate
motions to dismiss without any prejudice to Ryan.34 However, this
proposed solution only pushes the issue down the road. If the Court
allows the Lead Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint, after the
Court rules on any hypothetical motions to dismiss, Ryan would then
be forced to choose between answering the complaint and his right
to silence.35 The burden on Ryan is the same. Accordingly, Judge
Morgan finds factor four weighs in favor of a stay.

The fifth factor, the interests of the Court, weighs in favor of a
stay. The Court has interests in judicial economy and expediency,
and conducting the criminal proceedings first advances the judicial
economy. While a stay will cause a delay in an already
five-year-old case, the Court has a significant interest in seeing
that justice is done in an efficient manner without trampling the
constitutional rights of the litigants. Although the Court has a
strong interest in seeing that the matter is heard and resolved
expeditiously, it has an equally strong interest in safeguarding
the rights of all parties. Therefore, Judge Morgan finds the fifth
factor weighs in favor of a stay.

The sixth factor, the public interest, weighs in favor of a stay.
The public has a well-deserved interest in seeing that criminal
matters are handled thoroughly and expeditiously, without being
compromised by concurrent civil matters. While the public has an
interest in seeing the resolution of civil matters that may have
resulted from the bank's collapse, the public has an even stronger
interest in seeing that anyone criminally responsible be held
accountable for those actions. Any interest in seeing civil matters
resolved quickly is appreciable "only to the extent that the
integrity of the defendant's rights can be maintained." Therefore,
Judge Morgan finds the sixth factor weighs in favor of a stay.

II. The Stay Encompasses All Claims in This Case.

Defendant Verdigets argues the Court should stay only the claims
against Ryan and allow the Lead Plaintiffs' claims against her to
proceed. Verdigets argues a stay on the claims against her would
cause her prejudice because, during the stay, Ryan and other
officers will continue to draw down on the directors and officers
insurance they are all using to fund their defenses, leaving
Verdigets with fewer funds to defend herself.

Judge Morgan holds that the claims against Ryan and Verdigets are
closely intertwined. Ryan's testimony would likely be useful to
explain documents or actions relevant to the claims against
Verdigets. Staying only part of the case would result in
duplicative discovery and motion practice. Moreover, because of the
interlocking acts leading to the claims in this case, Ryan and
Verdigets may rely on each other's actions as defenses. Allowing
the claims against Verdigets to go forward may prejudice Ryan's
criminal defenses. On the other hand, the resolution of the
criminal proceeding may in fact resolve many issues in this case
and narrow the claims against Verdigets. The only prejudice
Verdigets points to is the possibility that her directors and
officers insurance may be depleted. As explained above, this
argument is too speculative to weigh strongly against a stay.
Accordingly, Judge Morgan will stay the case in its entirety.

Conclusion

Judge Morgan granted Defendant Ryan's motion to stay. She stayed
the case in its entirety until the criminal charges against Ryan
are adjudicated or otherwise resolved.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 12, 2021 Order & Reasons is
available at https://tinyurl.com/unjdymvx from Leagle.com.


FLORIDA: Appeals Court Dismisses ACLU Class Action Challenge
------------------------------------------------------------
Tony Marrero at tampabay.com reports that an appeals court has
dismissed a class action petition filed by the ACLU of Florida on
behalf of 11 people held in Manatee and Sarasota county jails on
what the civil rights group calls unaffordable bail amounts.

A three-judge panel of the Second District Court of Appeal on
dismissed a petition filed a day earlier on behalf of 11 people
being held in the two county jails. The petition, which named the
state of Florida and the sheriffs in each county as respondents,
said that in each case, the state failed to clearly show that no
alternative conditions of release to the unaffordable bail amounts
were workable.

That's a violation of the petitioners' rights to due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the petition said.

The petition asked the court to certify Manatee and Sarasota
classes and permit the respective class representatives and the
ACLU Foundation of Florida to represent them. According to the
petition, at any given time, the proposed Manatee class includes
roughly 75 people and the Sarasota class about 40 to 50 people.

The three appeals court judges - Darryl C. Casanueva, Craig C.
Villanti and Daniel H. Sleet - concurred in dismissing the suit
"for each petitioner to file a separate petition," according to the
order.

"Although this option possibly means 11 separate resolutions of 11
separate petitions, we are reviewing our options about how best to
bring this systematic problem to the appellate court," Benjamin
Stevenson, an attorney with the ACLU, said in a statement after the
ruling.

By the end of the day Wednesday, the ACLU had filed separate
petitions for each of the 11 people, according to a spokesperson
for the organization.

Spokespeople for Sarasota Sheriff Kurt Hoffman and Manatee Sheriff
Rick Wells previously referred the Times to Attorney General Ashley
Moody's office, which responds to such petitions. A spokesperson
for Moody's office has not responded to two emails.

The cash bail system has been a frequent target of social justice
reformers and legal scholars, who say the system criminalizes
poverty, bloats jail populations and disproportionately affects
people of color. [GN]

FLUIDMASTER INC: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Fluidmaster, Inc. The
case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Fluidmaster, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-09882 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Fluidmaster -- https://www.fluidmaster.com/ -- is the #1 brand of
toilet repair parts worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 11201
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: jmizrahi@mizrahikroub.com


FOGO DE CHAO: Court Extends Class Cert. Bid Filing to Dec. 22
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CHRISTIAN GARCIA-ALVAREZ,
on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, v. FOGO DE CHAO
CHURRASCARIA (PITTSBURGH) LLC, et al., Case No. 4:21-cv-00124-ALM
(E.D. Tex.), the Hon. Judge Amos L. Mazzant entered an order
granting the unopposed motion to extend deadline to file motion for
class certification.

The deadline to file the Motion for Class Certification in the
above-styled action shall be extended up to and including December
8, 2021, making the Defendants response due on or before December
22, 2021, Judge Mazzant says.

A copy of the Court's order dated Nov. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3qZgug5 at no extra charge.[CC]

FOR DAYS INC: Slade Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against For Days, Inc. The
case is styled as Linda Slade, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons v. For
Days, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-09757 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

For Days, Inc. -- https://fordays.com/ -- operates as a clothing
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
          Scarsdale, NY 10583
          Phone: (917) 373-9128
          Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


FORWARDLINE FINANCIAL: Denial of Arbitration in Ahlmann Suit Upheld
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRANDON AHLMANN, Plaintiff and Respondent v.
FORWARDLINE FINANCIAL, LLC, et al., Defendants and Appellants, Case
No. B304367 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the
Second District, Division Three, affirmed the order denying
Defendants ForwardLine Financial, LLC, and ForwardLine Payment
Services, LLC's motion to compel arbitration.

Background

The Defendants appeal an order denying their motion to compel
arbitration of Plaintiff Ahlmann's claim to recover civil penalties
under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code,
Section 2698 et seq.). The Plaintiff's operative first amended
complaint asserts a single cause of action, on behalf of the
Plaintiff and other aggrieved ForwardLine employees, for the
recovery of civil penalties under PAGA, based on ForwardLine's
alleged violation of the Labor Code's wage-and-hour provisions. The
complaint alleges the Plaintiff notified the Labor and Workforce
Development Agency (LWDA) -- the agency that enforces California's
labor laws -- of his intent to seek PAGA penalties, and the LWDA
did not intervene within the 65-day notice period.

ForwardLine moved to compel arbitration of the claim under an
arbitration clause in the Plaintiff's signed offer letter.

The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding
the operative complaint alleged "only 'public' claims for civil
remedies pursuant to PAGA," and concluding such a claim "may not be
sent to arbitration pursuant to a pre-litigation arbitration
clause."

ForwardLine timely appealed.

Discussion

ForwardLine contends the trial court's ruling is premised on a
misreading of the Supreme Court's holding in Iskanian v. CLS
Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348. In
ForwardLine's view, the trial court (and a consistent line of Court
of Appeal opinions) erroneously interpreted Iskanian to hold
agreements to arbitrate PAGA claims are unenforceable, when in fact
the high court held only that employment agreements requiring the
outright waiver of PAGA claims could not be enforced. ForwardLine
also argues Iskanian cannot be interpreted to preclude the
arbitration of PAGA claims, because the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) would preempt a state law rule that did so.

The Court of Appeals need not reach these contentions, however,
because ForwardLine failed to satisfy its threshold burden to
present a valid agreement to arbitrate the Plaintiff's PAGA claim.
It finds that the arbitration clause in the Plaintiff's offer
letter applies only to disputes "between the Plaintiff and the
Company," while a claim for civil penalties under PAGA is a
representative action to resolve a dispute between an employer and
the state. Moreover, because the arbitration clause expressly
precludes the parties from pursuing arbitration "as a
representative in any purported representative proceeding," the
clause cannot be construed to cover a representative PAGA action
without running afoul of the Iskanian rule prohibiting PAGA
waivers. Because the arbitration clause does not cover
representative PAGA claims, the trial court properly denied
ForwardLine's petition to compel arbitration.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeals concludes that because the arbitration clause
in the Plaintiff's offer letter does not evidence an agreement to
arbitrate a representative PAGA claim, ForwardLine failed to meet
its threshold burden to prove the existence of a valid agreement to
arbitrate. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to address ForwardLine's
other contentions regarding the arbitrability of representative
PAGA claims and FAA preemption. The trial court properly denied the
petition to compel arbitration.

The order is affirmed. Plaintiff Ahlmann is entitled to his costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 12, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/7zs2rsnz from Leagle.com.

Dykema Gossett and Becky S. James -- BJames@dykema.com; The Torrey
Firm and Rebecca L. Torrey -- rebecca@torreyfirm.com -- for the
Defendants and Appellants.

Justice Law Corporation, Douglas Han -- dhan@justicelawcorp.com --
Shunt Tatavos-Gharajeh -- statavos@justicelawcorp.com -- and Talia
Lux -- tlux@justicelawcorp.com -- for the Plaintiff and
Respondent.


FREEDOM MORTGAGE: Fails to Answer RFI, Steve RESPA Suit Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
ANDRE ST. STEVE KIFFIN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-24123 (S.D. Fla., November 23, 2021) is
a class action against the Defendant for violations of the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act and the Truth in Lending Act of
1968 by failing to provide a written response and/or acknowledgment
to the Plaintiff's Qualified Written Request (QWR) or Request for
Information (RFI) and failing to provide the Plaintiff with contact
information for the alleged owner of his mortgage loan.

Freedom Mortgage Corporation is a mortgage loan servicer, with its
principal place of business in Mount Laurel, New Jersey. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Scott David Hirsch, Esq.
         SCOTT HIRSCH LAW GROUP
         6810 N. State Road 7
         Coconut Creek, FL 33073
         Telephone: (561) 569-7062
         Email: scott@scotthirschlawgroup.com

                - and –

         Jessica L. Kerr, Esq.
         THE ADVOCACY GROUP
         100 S. Biscayne Blvd, Suite 300
         Miami, FL 33131
         Telephone: (954) 282-1858
         Facsimile: (954) 282-8277
         E-mail: jkerr@advocacypa.com

FURTHER INC: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Further, Inc. The
case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Further, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-09774
(S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

FURTHER -- https://furtherinc.com/ -- is a team of event and media
creators and producers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 11201
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: jmizrahi@mizrahikroub.com


FUTURE OF LATINX: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Future of Latinx
Beauty Inc. The case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. The Future of Latinx
Beauty Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-09787 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

The Future of Latinx Beauty Inc. is a cosmetics company in New York
City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com


GARRETT FRIDAY: Norwood Files FDCPA Suit in N.D. Mississippi
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Garrett, Friday &
Garner, P.L.L.C. The case is styled as Shinrick Norwood,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Garrett, Friday & Garner, P.L.L.C., Case No. 4:21-cv-00154-DMB-JMV
(N.D. Miss., Nov. 19, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Garrett, Friday & Garner, P.L.L.C. --
https://www.garrettfridayandgarner.com/ -- provides assistance and
legal advice in the appeals process for clients across
Mississippi.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael T. Ramsey, Esq.
          SHEEHAN AND RAMSEY, PLLC
          429 Porter Ave
          Ocean Springs, MS 39564
          Phone: (228) 875-0572
          Email: mike@sheehanramsey.com



GENERAC POWER: Contreras Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Generac Power
Systems, Inc. The case is styled as Yensy Contreras, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Generac Power
Systems, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-09690 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 22, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Generac Holdings Inc., commonly referred to as Generac --
http://www.generac.com/-- is a Fortune 1000 American manufacturer
of backup power generation products for residential, light
commercial and industrial markets.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jarrett Scott Charo, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: jcharo@mizrahikroub.com


GENERAL MOTORS: Airko Must File Class Cert Bid by Jan. 14, 2022
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as AIRKO, INC. and LISA MAE
JENNINGS individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, Case No. 1:20-cv-02638-PAB (N.D.
Ohio), the Hon. Judge Pamela A. Barker entered an order that the
class certification schedule be re-set as follows:

  -- The Plaintiff's class certification motion to be filed on
     or before January 14, 2022;

  -- The Defendant's response to be filed on or before March 14,
     2022; and

  -- The Plaintiff's reply to be filed on or before April 14,
     2022. Plaintiff's counsel has conferred with counsel for
     Defendant, and Defendant does not oppose this motion.

Ms. Jennings requests modification of the class certification
briefing deadlines previously entered in this case. Under the
current schedule, the Plaintiff's class certification motion is due
on November 26, 2021. The Defendant's response is due no later than
January 25, 2021. Plaintiff's reply is due no later than March 11,
2021.

General Motors is an American multinational automotive
manufacturing company headquartered in Detroit, Michigan, United
States.

A copy of the Court's Order dated Nov. 22, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3l7eK0e at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff Jennings is represented by:

          Justin J. Hawal, Esq.
          Mark A. DiCello, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC
          Western Reserve Law Building
          7556 Mentor Avenue
          Mentor, OH 44060
          Telephone: (440) 953-8888
          E-mail: madicello@dicellolevitt.com
                  jhawal@dicellolevitt.com

               - and -

          Adam J. Levitt, Esq.
          John E. Tangren, Esq.
          Daniel R. Ferri, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC
          Ten North Dearborn Street, Sixth Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 214-7900
          E-mail: alevitt@dicellolevitt.com
                  jtangren@dicellolevitt.com
                  dferri@dicellolevitt.com

               - and -

          W. Daniel "Dee" Miles, III, Esq.
          H. Clay Barnett, III, Esq.
          J. Mitch Williams, Esq.
          BEASLEY, ALLEN, CROW,
          METHVIN, PORTIS & MILES, P.C.
          272 Commerce Street
          Montgomery, AL 36104
          Telephone: (334) 269-2343
          E-mail: Dee.Miles@Beasleyallen.com
                  Clay.Barnett@BeasleyAllen.com
                  Mitch.Williams@Beasleyallen.com

GENERAL MOTORS: Springfield Consumer Suit Goes to C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled LATONYA DAWSON SPRINGFIELD, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. GENERAL MOTORS FINANCIAL
COMPANY, INC., Case No. 21STCV38925, was removed from the Superior
Court of California for the County of Los Angeles to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California on November
23, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Central District of California assigned
Case No. 2:21-cv-09180-SB-MAA to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, and violations of the California's Unfair
Competition Law and the California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act by
collecting and failing to refund unearned fees from Guaranteed
Asset Protection Waiver Addendums.

General Motors Financial Company, Inc. is a financial services
company headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:          
         
         David A. Klein, Esq.
         KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
         2049 Century Park East, Suite 3700
         Los Angeles, CA 90067
         Telephone: (310) 552 4200
         Facsimile: (310) 552 5900
         E-mail: david.klein@kirkland.com

GIFTING GROUP: Duncan Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Gifting Group,
LLC. The case is styled as Eugene Duncan, and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated v. The Gifting Group, LLC, Case
No. 1:21-cv-06562 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

The Gifting Group -- https://aldercreekgiftbaskets.com/ -- offers
online sales of gourmet gift baskets including baby, birthday, get
well, chocolate, coffee and tea, nuts and fruit and gourmet
cheese.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM PC
          175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: brad@markslawfirm.net


GIS FIELD SERVICES: Davis Sues Over Field Inspectors' Unpaid Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
KIMBERLY DAVIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GIS FIELD SERVICES, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 3:21-cv-03076-TLB (W.D. Ark., Nov. 15, 2021) seeks to recover
from the Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation,
interest, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff Davis was employed by the Defendant as field inspector.

GIS FIELD SERVICES, INC. is a mortgage field inspection firm based
in Dallas, TX. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Kirkpatrick Plaza
          10800 Financial Centre Pkwy, Suite 510
          Little Rock, Arkansas 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          Email: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

GOLDMAN SACHS: Pomerantz Law Reminds of December 27 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley on behalf of
investors in Tencent Music Entertainment Group ("Tencent" or the
"Company") (NYSE: TME). The class action, filed in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and
docketed under 21-cv-09564, is on behalf of all those investors who
purchased or otherwise acquired Tencent shares contemporaneously
with Defendants' unlawful trades from March 22, 2021 through and
including March 29, 2021 (the "Class Period"), pursuant to Sections
20A, 10(b), and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. Sec 78t-1, 78j(b), and 78t(a).

If you are a shareholder who purchased Tencent's securities during
the Class Period, you have until December 27, 2021 to ask the Court
to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class. A copy of the
Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com. To discuss this
action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at newaction@pomlaw.com or
888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 7980. Those who
inquire by e-mail are encouraged to include their mailing address,
telephone number, and the number of shares purchased.

Archegos Capital Management ("Archegos"), a family office
investment fund, was founded and run by Sung Kook Hwang ("Hwang"),
a former portfolio manager of Tiger Asia Management, a hedge fund
he also founded.

Goldman Sachs is a global financial services institution. Goldman
Sachs served as one of Archegos' prime brokers, helping it make
trades and lending it capital in the form of margin lending.

Morgan Stanley is a global financial services institution. Morgan
Stanley served as one of Archegos' prime brokers, helping it make
trades and lending it capital in the form of margin lending.

Archegos described itself as focused on public stocks in the U.S.,
China, Japan, South Korea, and Europe. Its assets of approximately
$10 billion included the likes of ViacomCBS Inc. ("ViacomCBS"),
Vipshop Holdings Ltd., Discovery Inc., Farfetch Ltd. ("Farfetch"),
Gaotu Techedu, Inc., Baidu Inc. ("Baidu"), iQIYI Inc., and
Tencent.

Archegos took big, concentrated positions in these companies
through financial instruments called "total return swaps," whereby
the underlying securities (stocks) are held by banks that broker
the investments. The swaps allow investors such as Archegos to bet
on stock price moves, often with high levels of leverage, without
owning the underlying securities. Instead, banks buy and hold the
stocks and give the fund a performance-related return. The fund
secures the trades by giving the bank collateral, such as cash or
equities.

These swaps also allow investors to take huge positions while
posting limited funds up front, in essence borrowing from the bank,
which, in turn, also enables investors the ability to maintain
anonymity, even as Archegos, for example, was estimated to have had
exposure to the economics of more than 10% of multiple companies'
shares. Since investors holding more than 10% of a company's
securities are deemed to be company insiders and are subject to
additional regulations around disclosures and profits, these swaps
were particularly beneficial to Hwang.

Moreover, Archegos utilized the leverage provided by its swaps
strategy to gain exposure to more than $50 billion worth of
securities. Again, this strategy was designed in part to allow
Hwang a means to avoid margin limits and regulatory disclosure
requirements.

Unbeknownst to investors and regulators, several large brokerage
banks, including Defendants, each had simultaneously allowed
Archegos to take on billions of dollars of exposure to volatile
equities through swaps contracts, dramatically elevating the risk
posed by these concentrated positions.

Hwang's swaps strategy began backfiring in March as the stock price
of companies in which Archegos had significant exposure, including
Baidu, which saw its shares dropping in value more than 20% from
its February highs, and Farfetch, which experienced a 15% decline,
began to sell off.

However, it was a March 23, 2021 announcement by ViacomCBS that
ultimately swept out the rug from under Archegos. On that day, in
what was perceived to be an effort to take advantage of its
meteoric stock price rally, ViacomCBS announced a new $3 billion
offering to help fund investments in its streaming service,
Paramount+, which had launched earlier in the month.

According to later reports citing people familiar with the matter,
this announcement put significant stress on Archegos, since news of
the deal sparked a slide in ViacomCBS's share price, adding to
Archegos' mounting losses. In fact, according to the same report in
The Wall Street Journal (published April 6, 2021), the fund had
already started selling some of its position in ViacomCBS to try to
offset losses, which only added pressure on the stock.

On March 24, 2021, ViacomCBS priced that offering. 20 million
shares of its Class B common stock were going to be made available
at $85 a share and 10 million shares of its 5.75% mandatory
convertible preferred stock were going to be made available at $100
a share. In addition, the underwriters, led by Defendants (among
others), were going to receive an option to purchase up to an
additional 3 million Class B shares and up to an additional 1.5
million shares of mandatory convertible preferred stock. All told,
ViacomCBS expected to raise $3.06 billion if both options were
exercised.

Unfortunately, not all were convinced that ViacomCBS deserved such
a lofty valuation. For example, on March 25, 2021, one of Wall
Street's most influential research firms, MoffettNathanson,
published a report questioning the company's value, downgrading the
stock to a "sell," and setting a price target of only $55 per
share, compared to the company's $85 offer. "We never, ever thought
we would see Viacom[CBS] trading close to $100 per share," read the
report, which was written by Michael Nathanson, a co-founder of the
firm. "Obviously, neither did ViacomCBS's management," it
continued, citing the new stock offering.

In the wake of that report, ViacomCBS's stock cratered, losing more
than half its value in less than a week. Indeed, by the close of
trading on March 26, 2021, ViacomCBS was worth $48 per share.

This proved to be extremely problematic for Archegos, which had
traded ViacomCBS on margin (i.e., with borrowed money). Because
Archegos had to maintain a certain amount of collateral to satisfy
its lenders, and since the value of ViacomCBS stock drastically
declined, Archegos needed enough collateral to cover, or else a
margin call (where the lender can force a sell-off of the stock to
bring the investor back into compliance with margin requirements),
could be triggered.

On March 27, 2021, it was reported that Archegos failed to cover
and, as a result, had to liquidate more than $20 billion of its
leveraged equity positions on March 26, 2021.

Archegos' fallout received wide media coverage in the days and
weeks following the firm's remarkable liquidation for a number of
reasons, including the fact that it dragged some of the world's
most esteemed financial institutions into the mud alongside it.

The complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, Defendants
sold a large number of Tencent shares during the week of March 22,
2021, while in possession of material, non-public information.
According to subsequent media reports, Defendants unloaded large
block trades consisting of shares of Archegos' doomed bets,
including billions worth of Tencent securities, late Thursday,
March 25, 2021, before the Archegos story reached the public,
sending Tencent's stock into a complete tailspin.

As a result of these sales, Defendants avoided billions in losses
combined.

Defendants knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that they were
prohibited from trading based on this confidential market-moving
information, but traded anyway, disposing to Plaintiff and other
members of the Class their Tencent stock before the news about
Archegos was announced and Tencent's shares plummeted.

As a result, Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged from
Defendants' violations of U.S. securities laws.

Pomerantz LLP, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
Paris, and Tel Aviv, is acknowledged as one of the premier firms in
the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust class litigation.
Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the dean of the
class action bar, Pomerantz pioneered the field of securities class
actions. Today, more than 85 years later, Pomerantz continues in
the tradition he established, fighting for the rights of the
victims of securities fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and
corporate misconduct. The Firm has recovered numerous
multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of class members. [GN]

GOOGLE LLC: Survives Class Action as Lawyers Predict Drop in Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court has ruled in favour of  Google in a GBP3 billion
lawsuit brought on behalf of over four million iPhone users, in a
judgment that lawyers say could slow the move towards US-style
class actions in the UK.

Richard Lloyd, the former director of consumer rights group Which?
had brought a landmark claim against the search engine giant that
was backed by litigation funder Therium.

The claim was based on the allegation Google secretly tracked the
internet activity of millions of iPhone users in England and Wales,
and used the data collected without the users' knowledge or consent
for commercial purposes.

READ Mastercard loses GBP14bn class action appeal at UK's Supreme
Court

Google paid a civil penalty of $22.5m in August 2012 to settle
charges brought by the US Federal Trade Commission based on the
allegation. Google also paid $17m in November 2013 to settle
consumer class actions brought against it in the US.

Lloyd sought to bring a GBP750 claim on behalf of every individual
affected by Google's actions in England and Wales, which could have
resulted in a payout of more than GBP3bn.

However, the Supreme Court ruled on 10 November that the unlawful
processing of an individual's data was not enough for them to claim
compensation under the Data Protection Act 1998. The individual
would need to suffer damage such as financial loss or mental
distress to be entitled to a payout, the court added.

It also decided that in order to recover compensation, each
individual had to prove what unlawful processing of their personal
data occurred.

READ Sign up for FN Law -- our weekly newsletter on the City's
legal sector

Richard Beaty, a data protection expert at law firm Kennedys, said:
"Businesses and insurers across the UK will be breathing a sigh of
relief at today's judgment."

"[The verdict] should help to stem the tide of litigated claims
where claimants did not need to prove that they had suffered from
any form of consequential financial or distress based or loss," he
added. "The ruling also slows the move towards allowing US-style
opt out cases in the UK which will come as welcome news to
insurers."

"This claim was related to events that took place a decade ago and
that we addressed at the time. People want to know that they are
safe and secure online, which is why for years we've focused on
building products and infrastructure that respect and protect
people's privacy," a Google spokesperson said.

Pinsent Masons acted for Google and claimant law firm Milberg
London represented Richard Lloyd.

Therium and Milberg were contacted for comment. [GN]

GRASS ADVANTAGE: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Grass Advantage, LLC.
The case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Grass Advantage, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-09769 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Grass Advantage doing business as Amazing Grass --
https://www.amazinggrass.com/ -- is engaged in producing and
distributing organic alfalfa, barley and wheat grasses.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 11201
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: jmizrahi@mizrahikroub.com


GREEN EARTH: Myrick Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------
William Myrick, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. THE GREEN EARTH FARMACIE, INC., d/b/a, EMBERZ., d/b/a
ARTIFACTZ, a California Corporation; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Case
No. 21STCV41420 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., Nov. 10, 2021),
is brought for recovery of penalties under the Private Attorneys
General Act of 2004 against the Defendants who violated various
provisions of the California Labor Code by failing to accurately
pay wages including overtime wage.

The Defendants implemented policies and practices which led to
unpaid wages resulting from the Defendant's: failure to pay wages
including overtime, failure to provide meal periods for every work
period exceeding more than 10 hours per day and failure to pay an
additional hour's of pay or accurately pay an additional hour's of
pay in lieu of providing a meal period; failure to provide rest
breaks for every four hours or major fraction thereof worked and
failure to pay an additional hour's of pay or accurately pay an
additional hour's of pay in lieu of providing a rest period;
failing to pay all wages earned and owed upon separation from the
Defendant's employ, failing to provide accurate itemized wage
statements, and failure to indemnify necessary business expenses.
As a result Plaintiff seeks penalties under Labor Code on behalf of
the general public as private attorney general and all other
aggrieved employees, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants during the liability
period as a Non-Exempt Employee and worked during the liability
period for the Defendants as a driver.

THE GREEN EARTH FARMACIE, INC., d/b/a, EMBERZ., d/b/a ARTIFACTZ
operates as a cannabis dispensary in California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James R. Hawkins, Esq.
          Gregory Mauro, Esq.
          Michael Calvo, Esq.
          JAMES HAWKINS APLC
          9880 Research Drive, Suite 200
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Phone: (949) 387-7200
          Fax: (949) 387-6676
          Email: James@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                 Greg@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                 Michael@jameshawkinsaplc.com


HABEMATOLEL POMO: Denial of Arbitration Bids in Hengle Suit Upheld
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirms the
district court's judgment on each of the four issues raised in the
interlocutory appeal, including denial of arbitration bids, in the
cases, GEORGE HENGLE; SHERRY BLACKBURN; WILLIE ROSE; ELWOOD
BUMBRAY; TIFFANI MYERS; STEVEN PIKE; SUE COLLINS; LAWRENCE
MWETHUKU, on behalf of themselves and all individuals similarly
situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. SHERRY TREPPA, Chairperson of the
Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake Executive Council, in her official
capacity; TRACEY TREPPA, Vice-Chairperson of the Habematolel Pomo
of Upper Lake Executive Council, in her official capacity; KATHLEEN
TREPPA, Treasurer of the Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake Executive
Council, in her official capacity; CAROL MUNOZ, Secretary of the
Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake Executive Council, in her official
capacity; JENNIFER BURNETT, Member-At-Large of the Habematolel Pomo
of Upper Lake Executive Council, in her official capacity; AIMEE
JACKSON-PENN, Member-At-Large of the Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake
Executive Council, in her official capacity; VERONICA KROHN,
Member-At-Large of the Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake Executive
Council, in her official capacity, Defendants-Appellants, and SCOTT
ASNER; JOSHUA LANDY, Defendants; et al., Case Nos. 20-1062,
20-1063, 20-1358, 20-1359 (4th Cir.).

The other cases and parties are STATE OF NEW MEXICO; HABEMATOLEL
POMO OF UPPER LAKE CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY
COMMISSION; NATIVE AMERICAN FINANCE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL
CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS; NATIONAL CENTER FOR AMERICAN INDIAN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING ASSOCIATION;
ASSOCIATION ON AMERICAN INDIAN AFFAIRS, Amici Supporting
Appellants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Amicus Supporting Affirmance.
GEORGE HENGLE; SHERRY BLACKBURN; WILLIE ROSE; ELWOOD BUMBRAY;
TIFFANI MYERS; STEVEN PIKE; SUE COLLINS; LAWRENCE MWETHUKU, on
behalf of themselves and all individuals similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees v. SCOTT ASNER; JOSHUA LANDY,
Defendants-Appellants, and SHERRY TREPPA, Chairperson of the
Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake Executive Council, in her official
capacity; TRACEY TREPPA, Vice-Chairperson of the Habematolel Pomo
of Upper Lake Executive Council, in her official capacity; KATHLEEN
TREPPA, Treasurer of the Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake Executive
Council, in her official capacity; CAROL MUNOZ, Secretary of the
Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake Executive Council, in her official
capacity; JENNIFER BURNETT, Member-At-Large of the Habematolel Pomo
of Upper Lake Executive Council, in her official capacity; AIMEE
JACKSON-PENN, Member-At-Large of the Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake
Executive Council, in her official capacity; VERONICA KROHN,
Member-At-Large of the Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake Executive
Council, in her official capacity, Defendants. STATE OF NEW MEXICO;
HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES
REGULATORY COMMISSION; NATIVE AMERICAN FINANCE OFFICERS
ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS; NATIONAL CENTER
FOR AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING
ASSOCIATION; ASSOCIATION ON AMERICAN INDIAN AFFAIRS, Amici
Supporting Appellants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Amicus Supporting
Affirmance. GEORGE HENGLE; SHERRY BLACKBURN; WILLIE ROSE; ELWOOD
BUMBRAY; TIFFANI MYERS; STEVEN PIKE; SUE COLLINS; LAWRENCE
MWETHUKU, on behalf of themselves and all individuals similarly
situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. SCOTT ASNER; JOSHUA LANDY,
Defendants-Appellants, and SHERRY TREPPA, Chairperson of the
Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake Executive Council, in her official
capacity; TRACEY TREPPA, Vice-Chairperson of the Habematolel Pomo
of Upper Lake Executive Council, in her official capacity; KATHLEEN
TREPPA, Treasurer of the Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake Executive
Council, in her official capacity; CAROL MUNOZ, Secretary of the
Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake Executive Council, in her official
capacity; JENNIFER BURNETT, Member-At-Large of the Habematolel Pomo
of Upper Lake Executive Council, in her official capacity; AIMEE
JACKSON-PENN, Member-At-Large of the Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake
Executive Council, in her official capacity; VERONICA KROHN,
Member-At-Large of the Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake Executive
Council, in her official capacity, Defendants. STATE OF NEW MEXICO;
HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES
REGULATORY COMMISSION; NATIVE AMERICAN FINANCE OFFICERS
ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS; NATIONAL CENTER
FOR AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING
ASSOCIATION; ASSOCIATION ON AMERICAN INDIAN AFFAIRS, Amici
Supporting Appellants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Amicus Supporting
Affirmance. GEORGE HENGLE; SHERRY BLACKBURN; WILLIE ROSE; ELWOOD
BUMBRAY; TIFFANI MYERS; STEVEN PIKE; SUE COLLINS; LAWRENCE
MWETHUKU, on behalf of themselves and all individuals similarly
situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. SHERRY TREPPA, Chairperson of the
Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake Executive Council, in her official
capacity; TRACEY TREPPA, Vice-Chairperson of the Habematolel Pomo
of Upper Lake Executive Council, in her official capacity; KATHLEEN
TREPPA, Treasurer of the Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake Executive
Council, in her official capacity; CAROL MUNOZ, Secretary of the
Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake Executive Council, in her official
capacity; JENNIFER BURNETT, Member-At-Large of the Habematolel Pomo
of Upper Lake Executive Council, in her official capacity; AIMEE
JACKSON-PENN, Member-At-Large of the Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake
Executive Council, in her official capacity; VERONICA KROHN,
Member-At-Large of the Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake Executive
Council, in her official capacity, Defendants-Appellants, and SCOTT
ASNER; JOSHUA LANDY, Defendants. STATE OF NEW MEXICO; HABEMATOLEL
POMO OF UPPER LAKE CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY
COMMISSION; NATIVE AMERICAN FINANCE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL
CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS; NATIONAL CENTER FOR AMERICAN INDIAN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING ASSOCIATION;
ASSOCIATION ON AMERICAN INDIAN AFFAIRS, Amici Supporting
Appellants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Amicus Supporting
Affirmance.

Background

The named Plaintiffs in the case, all Virginia consumers, received
short-term loans from online lenders affiliated with a federally
recognized Native American tribe. Eventually the borrowers
defaulted and brought a putative class action against tribal
officials and two non-members affiliated with the tribal lenders to
avoid repaying their debts, which they alleged violated Virginia
and federal law.

The Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake (the Tribe) is a federally
recognized Native American tribe in northern California. Through
its Tribal Executive Council, the Tribe started an online lending
business consisting of four incorporated lending portfolios: Golden
Valley Lending, Inc., Silver Cloud Financial, Inc., Mountain Summit
Financial, Inc., and Majestic Lake Financial, Inc. (collectively,
the Tribal Lenders). The Tribal Lenders were allegedly operated by
non-tribal companies owned by non-tribal Defendants Scott Asner and
Joshua Landy on non-tribal land in Overland Park, Kansas.
Eventually, Upper Lake Processing Service, Inc. (ULPS) -- a tribal
entity -- acquired the Tribal Lenders, although ULPS allegedly
continues to operate out of Overland Park, Kansas, employing
non-tribal employees and distributing most of its revenues to
non-tribal entities and individuals.

The Tribal Lenders extend low-dollar, high-interest loans that must
be repaid on a short timeline. The Plaintiffs are Virginia
consumers who each received an online loan from one of the Tribal
Lenders while living in Virginia. Although Virginia usury law
generally prohibits interest rates over 12%, the law of the Tribe
contains no usury limit. The interest rates on the Plaintiffs'
loans -- which varied in principal amounts from $300 to $1,575 --
ranged from 544% to 920%.

To obtain their loans, the Plaintiffs each electronically signed a
"Consumer Loan and Arbitration Agreement." The "Governing Law"
provision of the loan agreement stipulates that the agreement
"shall be governed by applicable tribal law, including but not
limited to the Habematolel Tribal Consumer Financial Services
Regulatory Ordinance."

The loan agreements each also contain a materially identical
"Arbitration Provision," under which borrowers waive their right to
resolve disagreements in court and agree to submit "all disputes,
including the scope and validity of this Arbitration Provision," to
an arbitrator. But in addition to selecting the arbitral forum and
specifying the procedures to be used therein, the arbitration
provision also contains its own choice-of-law clauses.

After receiving their loans from the Tribal Lenders, the
Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a putative class of
similarly situated individuals, brought suit in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against Asner, Landy,
and the members of the Tribal Executive Council in their official
capacity (the Tribal Officials), alleging violations of RICO and
Virginia usury and consumer finance laws. From the Tribal
Officials, Plaintiffs sought only prospective declaratory and
injunctive relief. From Asner and Landy, the Plaintiffs sought
prospective and monetary relief.

In response, all the Defendants moved to compel arbitration.
Alternatively, both the tribal and non-tribal Defendants moved to
dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against them on numerous grounds. As
relevant to this appeal, all the Defendants argued that Tribal law,
rather than Virginia law, applied to the loan agreements, therefore
the interest rates were not usurious and the loans were not
unlawful debts for purposes of RICO. The Tribal Officials
separately asserted that sovereign immunity precluded the
Plaintiffs' claims against them and that, in any event, RICO did
not permit private plaintiffs to seek prospective injunctive
relief.

The district court denied the Defendants' motions to compel
arbitration. The court acknowledged that the arbitration provision
delegates threshold questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator,
but it found the delegation clause unenforceable because the
arbitration provision prospectively waives federal and state law
defenses to arbitrability. Assessing the validity of the
arbitration provision as a whole, the court concluded that it
similarly accomplished an impermissible waiver of otherwise
available statutory claims, including RICO claims. Because it found
the offending provisions inseverable, the district court held the
arbitration provision unenforceable in its entirety.

Moving to the various motions to dismiss, the district court held
that the loan agreement's selection of tribal law violated
Virginia's compelling public policy against the unregulated lending
of usurious loans. Applying Virginia's choice-of-law rules, the
court determined that Virginia law applies to the loan agreements,
therefore the Plaintiffs stated a plausible claim that the loans
violate Virginia usury law and constitute an unlawful debt under
RICO. The district court also rejected the Tribal Officials'
assertion of sovereign immunity, holding that the Tribal Officials
were subject to suits for prospective injunctive relief. But the
court dismissed the RICO claim against the Tribal Officials,
reasoning that RICO authorizes private plaintiffs to sue only for
money damages, not injunctive or declaratory relief. The court
certified its RICO and choice-of-law rulings for interlocutory
appeal.

Discussion

The Plaintiffs have specifically challenged the validity of the
delegation clause -- and the arbitration provision as a whole -- as
a prospective waiver of their right to pursue federal substantive
statutory remedies. So the Fourth Circuit must assess the
enforceability of the delegation clause before it may compel
arbitration under its terms.

A.

The Fourth Circuit opines that the choice-of-law clauses of the
arbitration provision, which mandate exclusive application of
tribal law during any arbitration, operate as prospective waivers.
In effect, it says, those clauses would require the arbitrator to
determine whether the arbitration provision impermissibly waives
federal substantive rights without recourse to federal substantive
law. As a result, the delegation clause is unenforceable as a
violation of public policy. The entire arbitration provision is
similarly invalid as a prospective waiver of the Plaintiffs' rights
to pursue federal statutory remedies.

By preventing the arbitrator from applying federal law, the
arbitration provision necessarily restrains the arbitrator from
considering federal law defenses to arbitrability, thereby
precluding the Plaintiffs from effectively vindicating their
federal statutory rights. The delegation clause is therefore
unenforceable as a violation of public policy.

B.

Because the delegation clause is unenforceable, the Fourth Circuit
must address the Plaintiffs' challenge to the validity of the
arbitration provision as a whole. It agrees with the district court
that the choice-of-law clauses previously discussed operate as a
prospective waiver of the borrowers' federal statutory rights and
remedies. Therefore, the entire arbitration provision is
unenforceable.

The Defendants emphasize that the disputes subject to arbitration
explicitly include "all tribal, federal or state law claims" and
"all claims based upon a violation of any tribal, state or federal
constitution, statute or regulation." Thus, they urge, the
arbitration provision contemplates arbitration of federal claims.
The Defendants further argue that the arbitration provision's
invocation of tribal law cannot be interpreted to displace federal
law because the Tribe's Consumer Financial Services Ordinance
incorporates federal law in many respects.

The Fourth Circuit concludes that a claimant proceeding under
tribal law would be unable to assert a RICO claim against
individuals associated with a tribal lender and certainly could not
pursue RICO's treble damages remedy. As the district court
correctly determined, the Ordinance "precludes consumers from
vindicating their federal statutory rights by replacing the
remedial and deterrent remedies selected by Congress with the
Tribe's own remedial scheme -- the exact concern that gave rise to
the prospective waiver doctrine."

Finally, the Fourth Circuit rejects the Defendants' plea to compel
arbitration on the premise that estoppel will prevent them from
arguing to the arbitrator that federal law does not apply. The
Tribal Lenders drafted an invalid contract that strips borrowers of
their substantive federal statutory rights; the Fourth Circuit
cannot save that contract by revising it on appeal. It has refused
similar invitations in previous cases, and it does so again in the
case.

C.

The question then becomes whether the Fourth Circuit can sever the
errant clauses and enforce the remainder of the arbitration
provision. The arbitration provision contains a severability clause
stating that "if any of this Arbitration Provision is held invalid,
the remainder will remain in effect." But the existence of a
severability clause cannot save an arbitration provision if the
invalid terms are integral to the agreement.

Read as a whole, the Fourth Circuit finds that the arbitration
provision communicates an intent to require arbitration of all
disputes, including those arising under federal law, while
depriving borrowers of any remedy under federal law. That forbidden
purpose to squelch federal claims in contravention of public policy
goes to the core of the agreement to arbitrate. The Fourth Circuit
accordingly cannot sever the invalid clauses and, as a result, the
entire arbitration provision is unenforceable.

D.

The Fourth Circuit moves next to the question of tribal sovereign
immunity. The Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the Tribal Officials under Virginia law and RICO, which, as
relevant in the case, defines "unlawful debt" by reference to state
law. In the district court, the Tribal Officials moved to dismiss
the Plaintiffs' claims against them for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, contending that they enjoy the same immunity from
suit as the Tribe and such immunity extends to suits seeking to
enjoin violations of state law. This presents a question of first
impression in the Circuit.

The Fourth Circuit opines that substantive state law applies to
off-reservation conduct, and although the Tribe itself cannot be
sued for its commercial activities, its members and officers can
be. The Supreme Court has explicitly blessed suits against tribal
officials to enjoin violations of federal and state law. The Fourth
Circuit therefore affirms the district court's ruling that tribal
sovereign immunity does not bar the Plaintiffs' claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief against the Tribal Officials.

E.

All the Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint because the
Plaintiffs' claims depend on Virginia usury law, while the
governing-law clause of the loan agreements elects tribal law to
govern the loans. The district court held the governing-law clause
unenforceable as a violation of "Virginia's compelling public
policy against the unregulated lending of usurious loans." Because
the complaint stated a plausible claim that the loans violate
Virginia's usury statute and are an "unlawful debt" under RICO, the
court denied the Defendants' motions to dismiss on this ground. The
district court certified for interlocutory review the question of
law whether enforcement of the governing-law clause would violate
Virginia's compelling public policy.

The parties agree that Virginia's choice-of-law rules direct the
Fourth Circuit's inquiry. At least one Virginia court has held that
Virginia's "long-recognized public policy against allowing usury by
unregulated lenders" rendered a Utah choice-of-law provision
unenforceable. The Fourth Circuit's review likewise leads it to
conclude that the Supreme Court of Virginia would not enforce the
governing-law clause because it violates Virginia's compelling
public policy against unregulated usurious lending. It acknowledges
that contractual choice-of-law clauses should be enforced absent
unusual circumstances, but the circumstances in the case --
unregulated usurious lending of low-dollar short-term loans at
triple-digit interest rates to Virginia borrowers -- unquestionably
"shocks one's sense of right" in view of Virginia law.  The Fourth
Circuit accordingly affirms the district court's judgment declining
to enforce the governing-law clause.

F.

The Plaintiffs also seek prospective injunctive relief against the
Tribal Officials pursuant to RICO. The district court granted the
Tribal Officials' motion to dismiss the RICO claims against them,
ruling that RICO does not give private plaintiffs a right to
injunctive relief. Sister circuits are evenly divided on this
question, which presents an issue of first impression for the
Fourth Circuit -- Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 833 F.3d 74, 138-139
(2d Cir. 2016) (holding that equitable relief is available); Nat'l
Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 697 (7th Cir.
2001), rev'd on other grounds, 537 U.S. 393 (2003) (same); Dixie
Carriers, Inc. v. Channel Fueling Serv., Inc., 843 F.2d 821,
829-830 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that equitable relief is not
available); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076,
1084 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).

The Fourth Circuit opines that although it agrees with those courts
that Congress has not authorized private RICO plaintiffs to seek
injunctive relief, it does so based on the text of the statute and
without considering these failed legislative proposals, which "are
'a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest'" statutory
interpretation. Congress' intention is revealed in the text of the
statute it enacted, and Section 1964 does not authorize private
RICO plaintiffs to sue for prospective injunctive relief.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Fourth Circuit affirms the district
court's judgment on each of the four issues raised in the
interlocutory appeal. It opines that the arbitration provision's
delegation clause and the provision as a whole are unenforceable
under its precedent because they prospectively waive the
Plaintiffs' substantive federal statutory rights. Tribal sovereign
immunity does not shield the Tribal Officials from the Plaintiffs'
claims to enjoin violations of state law. Under Virginia law, the
district court cannot enforce the loan agreement's choice of tribal
law to govern these loans because tribal law's authorization of
triple-digit interest rates on low-dollar, short-term loans
violates Virginia's compelling public policy against unregulated
usurious lending. And the district court correctly dismissed the
Plaintiffs' RICO claim against the Tribal Officials because RICO
does not authorize private plaintiffs to sue for injunctive
relief.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/z8u9ax7w from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Rakesh N. Kilaru -- rkilaru@wilkinsonstekloff.com --
WILKINSON STEKLOFF LLP, in Washington, D.C.; Matthew E. Price,
JENNER & BLOCK, LLP, in Washington, D.C., for the Appellants.

Matthew W. H. Wessler -- matt@guptawessler.com -- GUPTA WESSLER
PLLC, in Washington, D.C., for the Appellees.

ON BRIEF: James Rosenthal -- jrosenthal@wilkinsonstekloff.com --
Kosta Stojilkovic, Beth Wilkinson, Matthew Skanchy , Betsy
Henthorne, Jaclyn Delligatti, WILKINSON STEKLOFF LLP, in
Washington, D.C., for Appellants.

Leonard Anthony Bennett -- Lenbennett@clalegal.com --, CONSUMER
LITIGATION ASSOCIATES, P.C., in Newport News, Virginia; Kristi
Cahoon Kelly, Andrew J. Guzzo, Casey Shannon Nash, KELLY GUZZO PLC,
in Fairfax, Virginia, for the Appellees.

Brian C. Rabbitt, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Teresa A.
Wallbaum, Assistant Chief, Organized Crime and Gang Section,
Criminal Division, Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Assistant Attorney
General, Eric Grant, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Brian C.
Toth , Environment and Natural Resources Division, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, in Washington, D.C., for Amicus United
States of America. Hector Balderas, Attorney General, Tania
Maestas, Chief Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF NEW MEXICO, Santa Fe, New Mexico; William H. Hurd,
TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Amicus State of New
Mexico. Bruce A. Finzen, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Brendan V.
Johnson, Timothy W. Billion, ROBINS KAPLAN LLP, Sioux Falls, South
Dakota; Sarah J. Auchterlonie, BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK LLP,
Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake
Consumer Financial Services Regulatory Commission. Jonodev
Chaudhuri, Washington, D.C., E. King Poor, Chicago, Illinois,
Nicole Simmons, QUARLES & BRADY LLP, Phoenix, Arizona, for Amici
The Native American Finance Officers Association, National Congress
of American Indians, National Center for American Indian Economic
Development, National Indian Gaming Association, and Association on
American Indian Affairs.


HALCYON PUBLISHING: Tavarez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Halcyon Publishing
LLC. The case is styled as Victoriano Tavarez, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Halcyon Publishing LLC, Case
No. 1:21-cv-09776 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

In God We Must -- https://www.igwm.co/ -- offers a rowdy and
stylish blend of clothing, coin jewelry & accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Downes, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: wdownes@mizrahikroub.com


HALES GALLERY: Murphy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hales Gallery LLC.
The case is styled as James Murphy, for himself and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated v. Hales Gallery LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-09692 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 22, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Hales Gallery -- https://www.halesgallery.com/ -- is a contemporary
art gallery with an international roster of established and
emerging artists across galleries in London and New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN ALEXANDER ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 229-2249
          Fax: (212) 229-2246
          Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com


HANNAFORD BROS: Prinzo Wage-and-Hour Suit Goes to D. Massachusetts
------------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled JUDITH PRINZO, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. HANNAFORD BROS. CO., LLC, Case No.
2183CV00323, was removed from the Superior Court of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Plymouth County, to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts on November 23,
2021.

The Clerk of Court for the District of Massachusetts assigned Case
No. 1:21-cv-11901 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged failure to compensate
the Plaintiff and similarly situated department managers overtime
pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek in
violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act.

Hannaford Bros. Co., LLC is an American supermarket chain based in
Scarborough, Maine. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:          
         
         Christopher M. Pardo, Esq.
         Elizabeth L. Sherwood, Esq.
         HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
         60 State Street, Suite 2400
         Boston, MA 02109
         Telephone: (617) 648-2800
         Facsimile: (617) 433-5022
         E-mail: cpardo@HuntonAK.com
                 esherwood@HuntonAK.com

HDR INC: Faces Davis Suit Over Violation of the Wiretap Act
-----------------------------------------------------------
CAROL DAVIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HDR, INC., Defendant, Case No.
2:21-cv-01903-SPL (D. Ariz., Nov. 11, 2021) alleges violation of
the Federal Wiretap Act.

The Plaintiff allege in the complaint that the Defendant wiretapped
the electronic communications of members of the following private
Facebook groups (the "Group Members"): Ahwatukee411 and Protecting
Arizona's Resources & Children (PARC) ("PARC") (collectively, the
"Private Facebook Groups").

Plaintiff Davis is a member of the Private Facebook Groups,
Ahwatukee411 and PARC. Plaintiff Davis communicated with other
Group Members in the Private Facebook Groups, and her
communications were monitored, captured, and analyzed by
Defendant.

The wiretaps are allegedly used by the Defendant to secretly
observe and monitor Group Members' electronic communications and
confidential postings in the Private Facebook Groups, through the
use of monitoring tools, automated software, and dedicated
employees with backgrounds in signals intelligence and
communications intelligence. As such, the Defendant has violated
the Federal Wiretap Act.

HDR, Inc. is an employee-owned design firm, specializing in
engineering, architecture, environmental, and construction
services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gerald Barrett, Esq.
          WARD, KEENAN & BARRETT, P.C.
          3838 N. Central Avenue, Suite 1720
          Phoenix, AZ 85012
          Telephone: (602) 279-1717
          Facsimile: (602) 279-8908
          Email: gbarrett@wardkeenanbarrett.com

               -and-

          Neal J. Deckant, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          1990 North California Boulevard, Suite 940
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 300-4455
          Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
          Email: ndeckant@bursor.com

               -and-

          Joshua D. Arisohn, Esq.
          Alec M. Leslie, Esq.
          Max S. Roberts, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          Email: jarisohn@bursor.com
                 aleslie@bursor.com
                 mroberts@bursor.com

HEARST COMMUNICATIONS: Lopez Sues Over Unlawful Use of Names
------------------------------------------------------------
Magda Lopez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. HEARST COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Case No. 1:21-cv-09334-LGS
(S.D.N.Y., Nov. 11, 2021), is brought against the Defendant for its
knowing and plainly unlawful use of its customers' names and
likenesses in reckless disregard of their statutorily protected
rights under the Puerto Rico's Right of Publicity Act.

The complaint alleges that the Defendant sold and rented, and
continues to sell and rent, subscriber mailing lists containing
Plaintiff's and the other Class members' names and likenesses,
along with other highly sensitive personal information, to various
parties on the open market, including to data miners, data
aggregators, data appenders, data cooperatives, list brokers,
aggressive marketing companies, and various other third parties.
The lists the Defendant sold and rented identified, by name,
address, and other personal attributes, Plaintiff and every other
Puerto Rico subscriber to its various magazine publications,
including Good Housekeeping magazine, to which Plaintiff
subscribed. the Defendant's monetization of Plaintiff's and its
other Puerto Rico subscribers' names and likenesses in this way was
done in direct violation of PRRPA.

The Defendant's practices of monetizing its subscribers' names and
other personally identifying attributes for commercial purposes
without authorization is not only unlawful, it is also dangerous
because it allows any member of the public willing to purchase or
rent this data to target particular subscribers, including
vulnerable members of society, using their identities, interests
and other demographic data. So, while the Defendant profits
handsomely from the use of its customers' names and other
personally identifying attributes in this way, it does so at the
expense of its Puerto Rico customers' statutory rights of
publicity, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff subscribed to Hearst's Good Housekeeping magazine
while residing in, a citizen of, and was physically present in
Puerto Rico.

Hearst Communications, Inc., is a publisher, a Delaware corporation
with its headquarters and principal place of business in New York
City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph P. Guglielmo, Esq.
          Erin G. Comite, Esq.
          Thomas L. Laughlin, IV, Esq.
          Sean T. Masson, Esq.
          Carey Alexander, Esq.
          The Helmsley Building
          230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10169
          Phone: 212-223-6444
          Fax: 212-223-6334
          Email: jguglielmo@scott-scott.com
                 ecomite@scott-scott.com
                 tlaughlin@scott-scott.com
                 smasson@scott-scott.com
                 calexander@scott-scott.com


HELEN OF TROY: Antiperspirant Contains Benzene, Fahey Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------
ANDREA FAHEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HELEN OF TROY LIMITED, Defendant, Case
2:21-cv-14441-DMM (S.D. Fla., Nov. 15, 2021) is a class action
lawsuit regarding the Defendant's manufacturing, distribution, and
sale of Sure antiperspirant aerosol and spray products (the
"Products") that contain dangerously high levels of benzene, a
carcinogenic impurity that has been linked to leukemia and other
cancers.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendant did not
disclose the actual or potential presence of benzene in its
antiperspirant products on the Products' labeling, or in any
advertising or website promoting the Products. Allegedly, the
Defendant did not disclose the presence of benzene in the Products
to the Plaintiff or Class members at the point of sale or at any
time before the point of sale.

If the Plaintiff and Class members had been informed that the
Defendant's Products contained or may contain benzene, she would
not have purchased or used the Products at all, or would have paid
significantly less for the Products, making such omitted facts
material to them, says the suit.

Helen of Troy Limited designs, produces, and markets brand-name
hair dryers, curling irons, hair setters, women's shavers, brushes,
combs, hair accessories, mirrors, and comfort products. The
Company's products are sold through mass merchandisers, drug
chains, warehouse clubs, and grocery stores. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sarah N. Westcot, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          701 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1420
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 330-5512
          Facsimile: (305) 676-9006
          Email: swestcot@bursor.com

               -and-

          Andrew J. Obergfell, Esq.
          Max S. Roberts, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          Email: aobergfell@bursor.com
                 mroberts@bursor.com

HELWASER FINE: Murphy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Helwaser Fine Art,
Inc. The case is styled as James Murphy, for himself and on behalf
of all other persons similarly situated v. Helwaser Fine Art, Inc.,
Case No. 1:21-cv-09758 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Helwaser Gallery -- https://helwasergallery.com/ -- specializes in
Post-war and Contemporary art.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN ALEXANDER ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 229-2249
          Fax: (212) 229-2246
          Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com


INTERNATIONAL FOLLIES: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Diggs Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
MEGAN DIGGS individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. INTERNATIONAL FOLLIES, INC. d/b/a THE
CHEETAH LOUNGE/ALLUVIA RESTAURANT; and JACK BRAGLIA, Defendants,
Case No. 1:21-cv-04718-TCB (N.D. Ga., Nov. 15, 2021) seeks to
recover from the Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation,
interest, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff Diggs was employed by the Defendants as waitress.

INTERNATIONAL FOLLIES, INC. operate an adult entertainment club and
restaurant in Atlanta, Georgia, known as "The Cheetah Lounge/
/Alluvia Restaurant." [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Arnold J. Lizana, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF ARNOLD J. LIZANA III
          1175 Peachtree Street NE, 10th Floor
          Atlanta, GA 30361
          Telephone: (470) 207-1559
          Facsimile: (470) 231-0672
          Email: alizana@attorneylizana.com

               -and-

          Taft L. Foley II, Esq.
          The FOLEY LAW FIRM
          3003 South Loop West, Suite 108
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (832) 778-8182
          Facsimile: (832) 778-8353
          Email: taft.foley@thefoleylawfirm.com

J.M. SMUCKER: Folgers Coffee Label "Deceptive," Smith Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARK SMITH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. THE J.M. SMUCKER COMPANY and THE FOLGER
COFFEE COMPANY, Defendants, Case No. 4:21-cv-00828-LMC (W.D. Mo.,
November 23, 2021) is a class action against the Defendants for
breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
unjust enrichment/quasi-contract, and violation of Missouri's
Merchandising Practices Act.

The case arises from the Defendants' false and deceptive labeling
and advertising of their Folgers ground coffee products. The
Defendants have grossly misrepresented the number of cups of coffee
that the products can make. The products do not contain enough
ground coffee to make the number of servings represented or even
close to it. Had the Plaintiff and other consumers known the truth,
they would have paid less for them, or would not have purchased
them at all. As a result, the Plaintiff and other consumers have
been deceived and have suffered economic injury, says the suit.

The J.M. Smucker Company is a packaged goods company, with its
headquarters located at One Strawberry Lane, Orrville, Ohio.

The Folger Coffee Company is a company that retails packaged
coffee, with its headquarters located at One Strawberry Lane,
Orrville, Ohio. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Tim E. Dollar, Esq.
         DOLLAR BURNS BECKER & HERSHEWE, L.C.
         1100 Main Street, Suite 2600
         Kansas City, MO 64105
         Telephone: (816) 876-2600
         Facsimile: (816) 221-8763
         E-mail: timd@dollar-law.com

JAL CHEMICAL: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Casseus Suit Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------
VANITE CASSEUS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. JAL CHEMICAL CO., INC.; DBA TEPH SEAL AUTO
APPEARANCE; and ANDREW KOSTANTINIDIS, Defendants, Case No.
9:21-cv-82059-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Nov. 11, 2021) seeks to recover from
the Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest,
liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Plaintiff Casseus was employed by the Defendants as auto detailer.

JAL CHEMICAL CO., INC. owns and operates various auto detailing
facilities
throughout the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Maguene D. Cadet, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DIEUDONNE CADET, P.A.
          2500 Quantum Lakes Drive, Suite 203
          Boynton Beach, FL 33426
          Telephone: (561) 853-2212
          Facsimile: (561) 853-2213
          Email: Maguene@DieudonneLaw.com

JARDINE LLOYD: Insurance Class Action Ruling May Take Months
------------------------------------------------------------
InsuranceNEWS.com.au reports that a judgment on the class action
trial over NSW local government insurance mutuals could take
months, lawyers say.

Richmond Valley Council began the NSW Supreme Court action on
behalf of 12 councils in 2018, alleging JLT breached its broker
duties and arranged cover "at less advantageous rates than were
available".

JLT says it didn't act as an insurance broker for the group and
"when fairly looked at" cover arranged was not less advantageous
and councils suffered no loss or damage.

Justice Kate Williams heard evidence over almost a month, but
reserved judgment.

JLT, now part of Marsh & McLennan, declined to comment following
the conclusion of the hearing.

Law firm Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, which is acting for the
municipalities, says a similar class action on behalf of Victorian
councils is set to proceed to trial following the conclusion of the
NSW case. [GN]

JBS SA: $13 Million Settlement Approved in Pork Antitrust Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JBS SA crept closer to exiting antitrust litigation over an alleged
industrywide scheme to fix pork prices, when a federal judge in
Minneapolis approved the second of its three class action
settlements, a $12.75 million deal with restaurants and retailers.

Judge John R. Tunheim signed off on the agreement, about five
months after giving his blessing to a $24.5 million settlement
between the Brazilian meatpacking giant and wholesalers bringing
parallel claims in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Minnesota. He also awarded $3.9 million in legal fees to counsel
for the "commercial and institutional indirect purchasers."

In approving the deal, Tunheim "considered the complexity, expense,
and likely duration of the litigation," among other factors, he
wrote. "The settlement was attained following an extensive
investigation of the facts. It resulted from vigorous arm's-length
negotiations, which were undertaken in good faith by counsel with
significant experience litigating antitrust class actions."

The judge previously gave his preliminary approval to a third JBS
settlement - a $20 million deal with consumers - which, if it
becomes final, would complete the company's exit from the sprawling
case. He has also signed off tentatively on an $83 million
agreement between wholesalers and Smithfield Foods Inc.

The consolidated lawsuit - which includes a trio of class actions
and individual suits by wholesalers, retailers, and restaurants -
is part of a wave of cartel litigation involving livestock and
protein, including chicken, beef, turkey, tuna, salmon, and eggs.
The poultry and tuna industries have been particularly hard hit so
far, with executives from both sectors facing-or serving-prison
time.

Like most of the other cases, the pork suit accuses the meatpackers
of laundering secret information through farm sector databases
published by Agri Stats Inc., which is also named as a defendant.
It also claims they coordinated on price by publicly touting the
need for herd cutbacks.

Tunheim, who's also overseeing the beef cartel case, let the pork
price-fixing suit move forward in October 2020. He cited "a
massively atypical jump in the price of pork" accompanying a sudden
decrease in supply "after nearly a decade of sustained growth."

His opinion memorializes a Nov. 3 bench ruling, according to the
court docket.

Larson King LLP and Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca LLP are lead counsel for
the restaurants and retailers. JBS is represented by Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan LLP.

The case is In re Pork Antitrust Litig., D. Minn., No. 18-cv-1776,
11/18/21.

To contact the reporter on this story: Mike Leonard in Washington
at mleonard@bloomberglaw.com

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Rob Tricchinelli
at rtricchinelli@bloomberglaw.com; Patrick L. Gregory at
pgregory@bloomberglaw.com [GN]

JMT RESTAURANT CORP: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Asencio Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
SAUL ASENCIO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. JMT RESTAURANT CORP., d/b/a LOUIE'S
PIZZERIA; and JOHN M. TUCCILLO, Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-06326
(E.D.N.Y., Nov. 15, 2021) seeks to recover from the Defendants
unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest, liquidated
damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Plaintiff Asencio was employed by the Defendant as cook.

JMT RESTAURANT CORP., d/b/a LOUIE'S PIZZERIA is a New York
corporation that operates an Italian restaurant or pizzeria located
at Carle Place, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew C. Weiss, Esq.
          Alexander T. Coleman, Esq.
          Michael J. Borrelli, Esq.
          BORRELLI & ASSOCIATES, P.L.L.C.
          910 Franklin Avenue, Suite 200
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 248-5550
          Facsimile: (516) 248-6027

JUUL LABS: Logan Votes to Join 400 School Districts in Vaping Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Logan City School District voted to join over 400 school districts
across the country to become part of the litigation effort against
Juul Labs.

LCSD Business Administrator Jeff Barben said the district had been
approached by an attorney with Kirton McConkie but LCSD
Superintendent and he were skeptical.

"We looked at it and weren't sure," Barben said. "I've just seen a
lot of these lawsuits that end up the attorneys make a lot but
individuals, the plaintiff, don't end up with much."

Barden said he kept in touch with the attorney and was able to get
more information. He thought it would be beneficial for LCSD to
join with about 41 school districts in Utah.

We are serious about the health effects of vaping on our students

"I feel like it'll probably be beneficial that we join the
lawsuit," Barben said. "I think it will also send the message that
we are serious about the health effects of vaping on our
students."

The lawsuit claims Juul downplayed health risks of vaping and used
questionable marketing practices to target minors and young
adults.

The lawsuit is leans on a lawsuit filed against Juul by North
Carolina Attorney General Josh Stein which settled for $40 million
in June.

LCSD Education Board Vice President Frank Stewart motioned to join
the lawsuit with the contingency that any proceeds that result from
the lawsuit be used in anti-smoking education and prevention.

LCSD Education Board Member Ann Geary suggested using some of the
funds to invest in vaping detectors to place in school restrooms
and locker rooms.

The detectors register chemical vaping aerosol, then send an email
or text alert to school officials, according to Wired.

Juul Labs has tried to have the lawsuit dismissed but haven't been
successful. If no settlement is reached, a trial would begin in
March 2022. [GN]

KOVITZ SHIFRIN: Court Denies Summary Judgment Bids in Wahlert Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, J.G. WAHLERT on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. KOVITZ SHIFRIN NESBIT, a
professional corporation, KALMAN MANAGEMENT, INC., and LOCH LOMOND
PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, Defendants, Case No. 17 C 8055 (N.D.
Ill.), Judge Robert W. Gettleman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a
Memorandum Opinion and Order:

   a. denying KSN's motion for summary judgment on count VI;

   b. denying Kalman and LLPOA's motion for summary judgment on
      counts II to V, and

   c. granting the Defendants' motion to strike without
      prejudice.

Introduction

Plaintiff Wahlert, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, brought a six count amended putative class action
complaint against Defendants Kovitz, Shifrin, Nesbit ("KSN"),
Kalman, and the Loch Lomond Property Owners Association, ("LLPOA").
Count I asserts a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("ICFA"), 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq.
against all three defendants. Counts II and III, also brought
against all three defendants, allege claims for "tortious
interference" and private nuisance. Count IV is brought against
LLPOA and KSN for slander of title. Count V alleges trespass to
easement against Kalman and LLPOA, while count VI is brought solely
against KSN for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA").

Kalman answered the amended complaint, while KSN and LLPOA moved to
dismiss the counts brought against them. On Feb.y 7, 2019, the
Court dismissed counts I-IV as to KSN, leaving only count VI (for
violating the FDCPA) against KSN. The Court also granted LLPOA's
motion as to count I only, leaving counts II-V against it.

KSN has now moved for summary judgment on count VI, and Kalman and
LLPOA have moved for summary judgment on counts II to V.

Background

In the 1950s, Arthur T. McIntosh & Co. developed property in
Mundelein, Illinois for the purpose of selling homes around a
man-made lake it called Loch Lomond Lake and two parks. The company
recorded three documents entitled "Declaration of Restrictions and
Easements," in 1954, 1955, and 1956.

Each of those recorded documents listed restrictions on each lot in
the subdivision that were to be construed as covenants that ran
with the land until 1980, at which time "any and all such
restrictions may be extended to continue in effect beyond Jan. 1,
1980, by the owner or owners of two-thirds in number of said lots
in the subdivision." Those restrictions basically dealt with the
types of buildings that could be built on the land. The three
recorded documents also listed rights and easements granted to
owners of the lots. Finally, all three recorded documents granted
the developer or its successors or assigns the "right to convey the
Lake or Parks or any part or parts thereof, to any association or
group of property owners organized for the purpose of acquiring and
holding title to the Lake or Parks. Any such conveyance shall be
made subject to the easements and rights declared, granted and
reserved in this instrument.

In 1957, the LLPOA was chartered and incorporated by 10 of 561 lot
owners. As listed in the Articles of Incorporation, its purpose was
"to promote the civic, education, patriotic, economic, social and
charitable purposes of the community known as Loch Lomond, to bring
together the members of said community to the end that the strength
of their common efforts and unity will result in greater benefit to
all."

Four years later, in 1961, McIntosh Co. transferred title to the
lake and parks to the LLPOA, subject to the same rights and
easements in the original declarations. There were no changes to
those rights and easements, no mention of Home Owner Association
("HOA") fees, assessments, or new restrictions or regulations.
McIntosh retained the right to take back title if the LLPOA
authorized or permitted use of the premises or any part by any
person other than the owners and occupants of the lots and parcels
of real estate described in the declarations. From 1963 through
1979, the LLPOA filed annual reports with the Illinois Secretary of
State without claiming that it was an HOA or that it was
maintaining the lake or parks.

In 1980 the LLPOA recorded an "Agreement to Extend the Declaration
of Restrictions and Easements." The agreement was not signed by all
property owners and contained no language purporting to add any
additional restrictions on the use of the lake or parks.
Specifically, the agreement contained nothing about HOA fees or
assessments.

Nonetheless, sometime after the 1980 recording, the LLPOA began to
attempt to collect assessments from the property owners. It also
created a welcome letter sent to new owners, indicating that the
title to the lake belongs to the LLPOA "with conditions which were
set up by the Arthur T. McIntosh Company when this subdivision was
developed. A principal condition was that title would continue to
belong to the Association so long as the lake is properly
maintained. However, no such condition to maintain the lake was
ever placed on the LLPOA. In fact, the declarations specifically
indicated that the owner had no duty to maintain the lake.

In 1986 the LLPOA recorded a document titled "Loch Lemond Property
Owners Association Public Notice of Annual Assessment." This
document indicated that the current By-Laws of the LLPOA provided
that "Beginning with the 1983 assessment, when property is sold by
a property owner not in good standing because of non payment of
assessment, the payment of the 1983 assessment and subsequent
assessments as they become due shall be a condition to access to
and use of the Association's real property and appurtenances
thereto by the new owner." By the recording, the LLPOA purported to
give notice that it owned the lake, beach and park areas and that
"access to, use of and enjoyment of said lake, parks and beaches,
is restricted only to those whose assessments are currently paid,
and therefore are members in good standing of the LLPOA."

The Plaintiff purchased his property in the Lake Lomond subdivision
in 1991. At the time he purchased the property he was told by
someone purporting to be an official of the LLPOA that all property
owners were automatically members of the LLPOA and had to pay $220
in annual dues because the LLPOA was maintaining the lake. His deed
to his home provides that he purchased his property "subject to
covenants and conditions of record." At that time the original
declarations, the 1980 Extension, and the 1986 Notice of Public
Assessment had all been recorded.

By 2008, the Plaintiff had paid approximately $4,600 in assessments
from 1981 to 2008, and had access to and use of the lake and parks.
Starting in 2008, he stopped paying assessments, believing that
there had been a fraud by the LLPOA because it had no right to
collect assessments.

On Jan. 12, 2001, the LLPOA recorded a document entitled "Bylaws of
Loch Lomond Property Owners Association." These bylaws indicate
that the LLPOA's charted purpose was to "administer and enforce"
any "covenants, restrictions, easements, charges, and liens," and
to "maintain the Lake." This was not part of its original chartered
purpose, and there was, at that time, no recorded document
providing that the LLPOA had any right or duty to enforce the
covenants.

In 2011, the Plaintiff sued the LLPOA in the Circuit Court of Lake
County, Illinois, seeking a declaration that the LLPOA is a
voluntary membership association and is not empowered to assess
dues against him or obstruct his exercise of his easement rights or
threaten to or file liens against his property for failure to pay
dues. That case was ultimately voluntarily dismissed.

Finally, in 2015, the LLPOA recorded a document prepared by KSN and
titled "Amended and Restated Declaration of Restrictions and
Easements for Loch Lomond Property Owners Association." This
document, which forms the basis of the Plaintiff's present claims,
adds new covenants and purports to declare that every owner of a
dwelling or lot to be a member of the LLPOA, that the provisions
are mandatory, and that and that no owner shall have the right or
power to disclaim, terminate or withdraw from membership in the
LLPOA or any of his obligations as such member. Contrary the notice
sent to homeowners in the 2008 newsletter, the document was not
signed by all homeowners.

Discussion

The Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all counts.
Summary judgment is proper where there is "no dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if "the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party." The party seeking summary judgment has the
burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact. In determining whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists, the court must construe all facts and reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. But
the nonmovant "is only entitled to the benefit of inferences
supported by admissible evidence, not those 'supported only by
speculation or conjecture.'"

LLPOA/Kalman Motion

The Plaintiff has brought four state law property claims against
these Defendants: Trespass; Tortious Interference; Private
Nuisance; and Slander of Title. The Defendants first argue that
these claims are barred by the applicable five year statute of
limitations. Judge Gettleman opines that the Court rejected this
argument when ruling on the motion to dismiss and rejects it again
for the same reasons. Specifically, the Plaintiff's property claims
are premised on the recording in 2015 of the "Amended and Restated
Declaration of Restrictions and Easements for LLOPA." This amounts
to a new violation which has occurred within the applicable
limitations period.

Next, the Defendants argue that the undisputed facts show that the
LLPOA is a "common interest community association" or mandatory
HOA, either because of the express terms of the recorded
declarations, or impliedly, giving it the power to impose
assessments and enact and enforce the rules about which the
Plaintiff complains.

Jidge Gettleman disagrees. He says, the original declarations
contained express restrictions that ran with the land. None of
those restrictions required maintenance of the lake or parks, or
imposed any burdens on the land-owners. Importantly, the
declarations provided that the restrictions could be extended, but
did not provide for alteration or additions. The declarations also
provided easements to the land-owners for use of the lake and parks
and that title to the lake and parks could be transferred to any
group or association of property owners organized for the purpose
of acquiring such title, but that the conveyance would be subject
to the easements and rights granted. Further, the declarations
specifically state that the owner of the lake and parks, whether
that owner is the original developer or the association organized
to take title, is not required to maintain the lake or parks.

The Defendants also argue that the Court should regard the LLPOA to
be a common interest community association by implication, citing
the Restatement (Third) of Property Section 6.2 (2000). That
sections provides that there may be an implied obligation to
contribute to the maintenance of commonly held property without
regard to usage. The section does not apply, however, because the
original declarations did not expressly call for the creation of an
association that would hold title; they simply provided that title
could pass to such an association. And while the declarations
allowed the owner of the lake and parks to impose reasonable
restrictions on their use, as noted above, nothing in those
declarations allowed for the creation of new covenants. Nothing
indicates that it was the intention of the developer to allow 2/3
of the lot owners to impose dues on individual lot owners at some
time in the future.

Finally, the Defendants argue that each claim has individual
deficiencies. For example, the Defendants argue that the tortious
interference with easement claim fails because it is unclear that
Illinois law provides for such a claim. Not true, says Judge
Gettleman.

Consequently, Judge Gettleman denies LLPOA and Kalman's motion for
summary judgment.

KSN Motion

In count VI, the Plaintiff alleges that KSN violated the FDCPA by
sending him a collection letter in 2016 on behalf of the LLPOA
because the LLPOA lacked authority to assess the fees. KSN argues
that it did not violate the FDCPA because the LLPOA acted
properly.

This argument fails because Judge Gettleman has determined above
that the LLPOA had no authority to add new covenants. KSN's
reliance on Zito v. Gerken, 225 Ill.App.3d 79 (1st Dist. 1992), to
distinguish Lakeland, is misplaced. In Zito, the developer
incorporated the association to serve as the regulating and
controlling body of the subdivision and empowered it to act for the
benefit of the homeowners, and to have all such powers necessary to
effectuate the desires of its membership. The developer recorded
two restrictive covenants establishing a comprehensive scheme of
regulation of the subdivision. Both restrictive covenants permitted
the developer to amend them at any time.

In the instant case, unlike in Zito, the LLPOA was not incorporated
by the developer when it owned all the lots. And the original
declarations did not provide for either amending the covenants or
creating new ones. Consequently, Zito is inapposite, and Judge
Gettleman denies KSN's motion for summary judgment.

Conclusion

For the reasons he described, Judge Gettleman denied Kalman's and
LLPOA's motion for summary judgment and KSN's motion for summary
judgment. The Defendants' motion to strike is granted without
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 12, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yu4496h4 from
Leagle.com.


LIBERTY OILFIELD: Court Sets Class Certification Briefing Sched
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Joseph v. Liberty Oilfield
Services, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-00946 (D. Colo.), the Hon.
Judge Nina Y. Wang entered an order granting the Parties'
stipulated motion to set schedule for class certification
briefing:

   -- The Defendants shall file their oppositions to class
certifications and submit any expert reports by Jan. 14, 2022.

   -- The Plaintiffs shall file their reply in support of class
certification and any expert rebuttal reports by 2/14/2022.

   -- No further extensions will be granted absent extraordinary
circumstances.

The nature of suit states Other Statutes -- Securities Fraud.

Liberty Oilfield operates as an oilfield service company.[CC]


LINKEDIN CORP: California Court Narrows Claims in ERISA Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE LINKEDIN ERISA LITIGATION, Case No.
5:20-cv-05704-EJD (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose
Division:

    (i) granted in part and denied in part LinkedIn's motion to
        dismiss with leave to amend; and

   (ii) denied its motion to stay discovery.

Introduction

Plaintiffs Douglas Bailey, Jason Hayes, and Marianne Robinson filed
the putative class action against Defendants LinkedIn Corp', its
Board of Directors, its 401(k) Committee, and Does 1-20 who are
members of the Board or Committee or are otherwise fiduciaries of
the LinkedIn Corporation 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan and Trust,
asserting the following claims: (1) breach of fiduciary duties
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.; (2) failure to monitor
fiduciaries and co-fiduciary breaches under ERISA; and, in the
alternative, (3) knowing breach of trust.

Background

LinkedIn is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Mountain View,
California. The Plaintiffs are former LinkedIn employees and
current and former participants in the Plan. The Plan is a
participant-directed 401(k) plan which permits participants to
direct the investment of their contributions into various
investment options the Plan offered, including various mutual
funds, a collective investment trust, and a self-directed brokerage
account. From Aug. 14, 2014 to the present, Fidelity Management
Trust Co. served as the Plan trustee for Plan assets.

The Plaintiffs allege that LinkedIn violated its fiduciary duties
in multiple ways. First, they assert that LinkedIn should not have
offered as investment options certain target date funds ("TDFs") in
the Fidelity Freedom Fund suite from Fidelity Management & Research
Co. In particular, the Plaintiffs say that LinkedIn acted
imprudently by selecting and retaining the actively managed Freedom
Funds ("the Active Suite"). Actively managed funds employ a manager
who decides which and how many securities to buy and sell, and
consequently are riskier and charge higher fees in comparison to
passively managed index funds, which merely track market indices.
In contrast, Plaintiffs say that, instead of the Active Suite,
LinkedIn should have offered the Freedom index funds ("the Index
Suite"), which are less risky, less expensive, and better
performing.

In addition to the Freedom Active Suite, the Plaintiffs allege that
LinkedIn offered another imprudent investment option, the actively
managed American Funds AMCAP Fund Class R4 and R6 ("the AMCAP
Fund"). The Plaintiffs say that the AMCAP Fund consistently and
significantly underperformed its benchmark, the S&P 500 Index, and
that it did not provide returns to justify its expense ratio. Given
that the Plan included an index fund that tracked the AMCAP Fund's
stated benchmark, the Plaintiffs assert that inclusion of the AMCAP
Fund was unnecessary and imprudent.

Finally, the Plaintiffs allege that LinkedIn violated its fiduciary
duties by offering excessively expensive investment options. They
say that LinkedIn failed to ensure that the Plan's investment
options charged only reasonable investment management fees, and
that the Plan paid management fees that were higher than average
compared to other similarly sized 401(k) plans. The Plaintiffs also
allege that LinkedIn failed to monitor the Plan's investment
options to ensure that the options were in the least expensive
available share class with respect to the American Beacon Small Cap
Value Investment Fund.

In sum, the Plaintiffs contend that as a result of LinkedIn's
actions or inactions, the value of their accounts is less than it
otherwise would have been, and that LinkedIn is liable for all
losses. The suit followed. On Nov. 4, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed
the operative Amended Complaint. On Jan. 4, 2021, LinkedIn filed
the motion to dismiss now before the Court.

Discussion

I. Motion to Dismiss

A. Article III Standing

As a threshold matter, LinkedIn contends that the complaint should
be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because the Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged
Article III standing. In an apparent facial challenge, LinkedIn
argues that the Plaintiffs have not alleged that any of them
actually invested in any of the challenged funds and therefore fail
to allege concrete facts demonstrating an injury-in-fact under
Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 140 S.Ct. 1615 (2020).

The Plaintiffs have asserted two main theories of liability for
breach of fiduciary duties: Offering imprudent and underperforming
investments such as the Freedom Fund Active Suite and AMCAP Fund,
and imprudently offering overly expensive investment options with
excessive and unreasonable management fees. The parties do not
dispute that none of the Plaintiffs have alleged that they
personally invested in the Freedom Active Suite or the AMCAP Fund
-- in fact, there is no information in the complaint about any of
the Plaintiffs' investments.

Accordingly, to the extent the Plaintiffs' claims are based on
offering imprudent investment options, Judge Davila holds that the
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated Article III standing. To the
extent the Plaintiffs' claims are based on excessive management
fees, the Plaintiffs need not plead their individual investment in
any particular fund if those management fees were charged to all
Plan participants regardless of participants' specific investments.
As currently pled, the complaint does not provide facts
demonstrating that the Plaintiffs have suffered a concrete injury
to their accounts that would provide standing to pursue a plan-wide
mismanagement theory based on excessive management fees.
Accordingly, Judge Davila dismisses the complaint for lack of
standing.

B. Failure to State a Claim

Judge Davila now turns to whether the Plaintiffs have failed to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

1. Request for judicial notice

LinkedIn requests the Court takes judicial notice of the following
documents: (1) disclosures issued to participants in the Plan,
dated Oct. 14, 2014, Oct. 13, 2015, Oct. 10, 2016, Sept. 11, 2017,
Sept. 10, 2018, and Sept. 9, 2019; (2) investment and share class
change notices issued to Plan participants dated November 2015,
August 2017, and January 2019; (3) excerpts from the May 30, 2020
Fidelity Freedom Index Institutional Premium Fund prospectus; (4)
excerpts from the Feb. 28, 2018 American Beacon Small Cap Value
Fund prospectus; and (5) the publicly available American Funds
AMCAP R-6 Fund Summary from Dec. 9, 2020.

The Plaintiffs do not appear to object to LinkedIn's request.
Accordingly, Judge Davila grants LinkedIn's request for judicial
notice. However, he does not take judicial notice of any disputed
facts contained in these documents. And, throughout their
opposition brief, the Plaintiffs likewise rely on extraneous
documents, but they do not appear to request judicial notice of
those documents. Judge Davila therefore does not consider the
documents attached to the Declaration of Kolin Tang submitted in
support of the Plaintiffs' opposition brief.

2. Breach of fiduciary duty

The Plaintiffs assert that LinkedIn breached its fiduciary duties
of prudence and loyalty by: (1) selecting and retaining the Freedom
Active Suite, (2) retaining the AMCAP Fund, (3) offering investment
options with excessively expensive management fees, and (4) failing
to monitor the Plan's investment options to ensure that they were
in the least expensive available share class.

a. Duty of prudence

Under ERISA, a plan fiduciary "shall discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries" and must do so "with the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims.

Judge Davila finds that (i) the Plaintiffs have adequately stated a
claim for breach of prudence based on the inclusion and retention
of the Freedom Active Suite; (ii) the Plaintiffs may have stated a
claim for a breach of prudence based on the Freedom Active Suite,
but that does not free them from the requirement of pleading
sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for a breach of
prudence based on the AMCAP Fund; (iii) the Plaintiffs have not
alleged sufficient facts from which a claim for breach of prudence
based on a failure to offer the American Beacon Small Cap Value
institutional share class instead of the investor share class may
be inferred; and (iv) the Plaintiffs have adequately pled breach of
prudence based on excessive management fees as to the Freedom
Fidelity Active Suite only.

In sum, Judge Davila denies LinkedIn's motion to dismiss the claim
for breach of prudence with respect to the Freedom Active Suite. He
grants the motion to the extent the breach of prudence claim is
predicated on the AMCAP fund's alleged underperformance, the
American Beacon Small Cap Value share class, and excessive
management fees.

b. Duty of loyalty

ERISA's duty of loyalty requires a fiduciary to act "solely in the
interest" of the Plan's participants and for the "exclusive
purpose" of providing benefits and defraying reasonable plan
administration expenses. To state a claim for breach of the duty of
loyalty, the complaint must allege facts from which it plausibly
can be inferred that the Plan's fiduciaries subjectively intended
to benefit themselves or a third party at the expense of the Plan's
participants.

Judge Davila holds that to the extent the Plaintiffs' breach of
loyalty claim is based on their breach of prudence claim, Judge
Davila holds that the Plaintiffs have stated a breach of loyalty
claim for the reasons it has stated a breach of prudence claim.
However, to the extent the Plaintiffs' breach of loyalty claim is
based on a theory that LinkedIn sought to enrich Fidelity Research
at the expense of Plan participants, the Plaintiffs have not pled
adequate facts from which the Court may infer such a theory.
Accordingly, Judge Davila finds that the Plaintiffs have adequately
pled a claim for breaches of the duties of prudence and loyalty
based on the Freedom Fidelity Active Suite allegations only.

3. Failure to monitor fiduciaries and co-fiduciary breaches;
knowing breach of trust

The parties do not dispute that the Plaintiffs' second and third
claims for failure to monitor fiduciaries and co-fiduciary breaches
and knowing breach of trust are predicated on their first claim for
breach of fiduciary duty. Because Judge Davila has determined that
the Plaintiffs have stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty,
dismissal of the Plaintiffs' other derivative claims would not be
appropriate.

C. Leave to Amend

In the event that a motion to dismiss is granted, "a district court
should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the
pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not
possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Because Judge
Davila cannot say that the defects described cannot possibly be
cured by the allegation of other facts, he grants the Plaintiffs
leave to amend to add facts that would establish standing. The
Plaintiffs may also amend to add facts -- to the extent they can --
that would support their theories of a breach of the duty of
prudence based on the AMCAP Fund's underperformance, the American
Beacon Small Cap Value share class, and excessive management fees,
as well as a breach of the duty of loyalty based on recordkeeping
fees paid to Fidelity entities. The Plaintiffs should ensure that
their second amended complaint complies with Civil Local Rule
3-4(c)(2)(B).

II. Motion to Stay Discovery

LinkedIn seeks a stay of discovery pending the Court's ruling on
its motion to dismiss. Judge Davila has now ruled on LinkedIn's
motion and therefore denies as moot the motion for a stay.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Davila granted in part and denied
in part LinkedIn's motion to dismiss, with leave to amend the
deficiencies described. The Plaintiffs will file their second
amended class complaint by Dec. 16, 2021. LinkedIn's motion to stay
discovery is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3dpe36h5 from Leagle.com.


MAN SE: Truck Cartel Class Action Group Hits 125 Members
--------------------------------------------------------
With growing interest in the European trucks cartel claim against
truck manufacturers, Edwin Coe is delighted to announce that its
class action group has hit 125 members, equating to a claim value
of over GBP100m. Edwin Coe, the pioneering class action firm in
Britain with a track record of successful actions for over 30
years, first issued a Trucks Cartel claim on behalf of clients in
the High Court in 2018.

Class Action specialist, Zahira Hussain, an Edwin Coe Partner, said
"Edwin Coe is once again at the forefront of the battle against
cartels. We are litigating these claims in both the High Court and
the Competition Appeal Tribunal and now over 125 businesses, large
and small, have come to us to use our expertise in this area of the
law, from small enterprises to major breweries, to renowned high
street names, all of which claim losses of tens of millions pounds
at the hands of the cartel. As well as relying on our peerless
experience fighting cartels, our clients have the benefit of
insurance that gives a guaranteed return on damages awarded,
without any risk. No wonder businesses are fighting their way to
the Edwin Coe door."

"As a result of the cartel, any business which purchased, leased or
outsourced trucks weighing six tonnes or more between 1997 and 2011
is likely to have overpaid for its trucks. Edwin Coe is seeking
damages from the truck manufacturers on behalf of clients."

"We are delighted that we are already assisting so many clients on
a no win, no fee basis, with the ability to continue doing so for
future claimants. Our website carries a wealth of further
information on the action, and I would be delighted to discuss it
further with anyone who has an interest in signing up to this class
action."

Contact us
Edwin Coe's Trucks Cartel team is able to advise on all aspects of
the claim across Europe. If you or your business used trucks
(whether bought, rented or leased) in the period, please contact
Zahira Hussain in order to discuss the matter further.

Background
Five truck manufacturers, MAN, Volvo/Renault, Daimler, Iveco and
DAF, have admitted to the European Commission that they
participated in a price fixing cartel against purchasers of their
trucks from 1997 until 2011. There has also been a finding against
a sixth manufacturer, Scania, by the European Commission.

In 2018, Edwin Coe issued a first claim on behalf of clients in the
High Court. The firm recently issued two more claims in the High
Court on behalf of further clients in November 2020.

The team dealing with the claims is considering making further
claims on behalf of clients. If you or your business bought, leased
or outsourced trucks weighing 6 tonnes or more, here or in Europe,
between 1997 and 2011 (the cartel period), you will have a claim.

Edwin Coe has funding in place, which means you can pursue your
claim without cost or risk, subject to assessment of the claim.

Edwin Coe's Class Action Team
Edwin Coe is at the forefront of the growing field of class
actions. We are one of a handful of UK firms specialising in this
type of work, bringing cases against entities whose actions have
caused damage to small or large groups of people. We advise on the
stages involved in pursuing a class action and the various options
for funding. [GN]

MANITOBA: 2011 Lake Flood Class Action Suit Settlement Discussed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Background

On March 15, 2013, a lawsuit was commenced in the Manitoba Court of
Queen's Bench alleging that the Government of Manitoba caused
damage to areas surrounding Lake Manitoba by way of causing
flooding through the operation of provincial water control works in
2011. The Court certified the lawsuit as a class proceeding, rather
than having each class member bring a separate lawsuit. Following
trial and judgment, but prior to any appeal, the parties entered
into negotiations and have reached a settlement of the lawsuit.

Settlement Approval

The settlement must be approved by the Court before any settlement
benefits can be paid to Class Members. If the settlement is
approved by the Court, another notice will be published with
details on how to make a claim for settlement benefits. The
Settlement Approval Hearing is scheduled to occur in the Manitoba
Court of Queen's Bench on January 13, 2022 at 10:00 a.m. via video
hearing.

Class members interested in attending the Settlement Approval
Hearing may do so subject to the COVID-19 restrictions and
protocols set out in the Pre-Approval Notice (Long Form), which can
be accessed at the website of Class Counsel, DD West LLP at
https://www.ddwestllp.com/.

Settlement Summary

Without admitting any wrongdoing, the Government of Manitoba has
agreed to pay $85.5 million to settle the lawsuit. This amount
includes a contribution towards lawyer ("Class Counsel") fees and
expenses as well as toward the costs of administering the
settlement.

All members of the Class are eligible to make claims for settlement
benefits. Details of the type of claims that are eligible and the
manner in which those claims will be assessed can be accessed at
the website of Class Counsel, DD West LLP at
https://www.ddwestllp.com/ and at the website of the Claims
Administrator at: www.exg.ca/LakeManitobaSettlement2021.

Because payments under the settlement will be based on the total
amount of the claims submitted and approved, it is not possible to
estimate the amounts that eligible Class Members may receive. Any
amounts that Class Members have received under any provincial
financial assistance programs will be deducted from any eligible
claim.

Information on the timing and the process for making a claim and
receiving payment under the settlement will be made available in
another notice if the settlement is approved by the Court.

What you need to do:

Do Nothing. By doing nothing, you will be entitled to participate
in the settlement, if it is approved by the Court and if you are an
eligible Class Member.

You have the right to submit comments in writing on the proposed
settlement, including the amount of proposed legal fees and
disbursements payable to Class Counsel, for consideration by the
Court at the Settlement Approval Hearing. If you wish to make a
written comment, you must submit it to Class Counsel (DD West LLP)
no later than December 31, 2021, either by email to one of the
addresses listed below, or by mail to the address below with a
postmarked date no later than December 31, 2021.

Learning More

The Court office will not be able to answer any questions about the
matters in this Notice. [GN]

MAPLEWOOD, MO: Webb Class Certification Bid Partly OK'd
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CECELIA ROBERTS WEBB, et
al., v. THE CITY OF MAPLEWOOD, MISSOURI, Case No. 4:16-cv-01703-CDP
(E.D. Mo.), the Hon. Judge Catherine D. Perry entered an order:

   1. granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs'
      motion for class certification;

   2. appointing the named plaintiffs Cecelia Roberts Webb,
      Darron Yates, Anthony Lemicy, and Frank Williams as Class
      Representatives to represent the Injunctive Class, defined
      as follows:

      "All persons, whether or not such person has ever been
      jailed, who have paid or currently owe warrant bonds to
      the City of Maplewood arising from cases in the Maplewood
      court;"

   3. appointing the plaintiffs Cecelia Roberts Webb and Darron
      Yates as Class Representatives to represent the Narrowed
      Paid Fines Class, defined as follows:

      "All persons who paid to the City of Maplewood fines,
      costs, and/or fees that were assessed without an inquiry
      into their ability to pay, and who paid such fines, costs,
      and/or fees after being arrested and jailed on Maplewood
      municipal warrants issued for failure to pay or for
      failure to appear;"

   4. appointing plaintiffs Cecelia Roberts Webb, Darron Yates,
      and Anthony Lemicy as Class Representatives to represent
      the Jailed Class, defined as follows:

      "All persons who have been jailed by the City of Maplewood
      for nonpayment of fines, fees, costs, or surcharges,
      including warrant bonds arising from cases in the
      Maplewood court, and who (1) were not provided an
      opportunity to prove indigence prior to jailing; (2) were
      not considered a danger to the community by notation in
      Maplewood's file; and (3) were not designated as a flight
      risk at the time of jailing;" and

   5. appointing the following counsel as Class Counsel:


      John Waldron, Esq.
      Nathaniel Carroll, Esq.
      Blake Strode, Esq.
      ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, INC.
      440 N. 4th Street, Suite 390
      St. Louis, MO 63102

           - and -


      Andrea R. Gold, Esq.
      Tyco & Zavareei LLP
      1828 L Street NW, Suite 1000
      Washington, DC 20036

           - and -

      Ryan Keane, Esq.
      Keane Law LLC
      7777 Bonhomme Ave., Suite 1600
      St. Louis, MO 63105

On November 1, 2016, the plaintiffs Cecelia Roberts Webb, Darron
Yates, Anthony Lemicy, and Frank Williams filed this putative
class-action Complaint under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging that
various of their constitutional rights were violated by defendant
City of Maplewood’s policies, practices, and procedures of
arresting individuals on warrants for failure to appear or failure
to pay on minor ordinance violations, and making these individuals
pay warrant bonds or jail them without an inquiry into or a
determination of their ability to pay such bonds or fines.

The Plaintiffs claim that some of these warrants were "sham"
warrants issued without a judicial finding of probable cause. The
Plaintiffs also claim that they were denied fair access to court
because of the threat of imprisonment if they appeared without
money to pay bond on the warrants.

The Plaintiffs claim that these policies, practices, and procedures
violated their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. They also bring a
claim of unjust enrichment under Missouri law.

A copy of the Court's order dated Nov. 18, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3DHMqJq at no extra charge.[CC]

MAZDA MOTOR: Suit Filed Over Fuel Pump Problems, Engine Stall Risks
-------------------------------------------------------------------
aboutlawsuits.com reports that following a recent recall of more
than 120,000 Mazda vehicles that contain a defective fuel pump,
which may cause the vehicles to suddenly stall, a proposed class
action lawsuit claims Mazda and the parts supplier Denso concealed
known safety risks from consumers to avoid costly repairs.

The complaint was filed by Zachery Haines and Townsend Vance on
November 11, in the U.S. District Court Central District of
California, seeking class action status to pursue damages on behalf
of vehicle owners, claiming that information about the Mazda fuel
pump problems were known for more than a year, yet consumers were
not informed and a safety recall was not immediately issued.

On November 12, the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) announced a Mazda recall impacting
approximately 121,038 vehicles, due to the potential for the
impeller inside of the low-pressure fuel pump to prematurely deform
and crack.

According to the recall notice, officials warned customers that if
the pumps become deformed or cracked the vehicles could fail to
start or suddenly stall while in motion, increasing the risk of an
auto accident. However, the complaint filed against Mazda outlines
additional hazards presented by the failing fuel pumps, warning
that a faulty fuel pump may also present crash risks to drivers due
to inconsistent or delayed acceleration.

Although Mazda North America Operations issued the safety recall,
Haines and Vance claim Mazda knew of the safety defects from the
Denso-supplied fuel pumps for more than a year, and attempted to
avoid issuing a recall to avoid costly repairs, leaving customers
responsible for costly repair bills. The automaker issued a recall
for vehicles equipped with the same fuel pump in China, Japan,
Malaysia, Vietnam and Mexico more than a year ago.

Plaintiff's indicate Mazda not only failed to issue a timely recall
of a known defect to avoid costly repairs, but also failed to
identify the scope of the vehicles impacted by the defect and
failed inform its customers of an issue with the fuel pumps that
could cause crash hazards. Vance and Haines claim the same
defective fuel pumps provided by Denso have been used in models as
far back as 2013, citing fuel pump defects complaints to the
NHTSA.

Denso Corporation is also the supplier of nearly 6 million faulty
low-pressure fuel pumps installed on vehicles made by Acura, Ford,
Honda, Lexus, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Subaru, and Toyota.

A Toyota and Lexis fuel pump recall announced on January 15,
impacted about 696,000 vehicles equipped with similar Denso fuel
pumps, which were prone to cracking and causing the engines to
stall without any advanced notice. However, following an internal
investigation, Toyota ultimately issued two fuel pump recall
expansions this year, bringing the total number of affected
vehicles to more than 1.5 million. [GN]

MDL 2323: Court Orders Disbursement of Costs to Counsel in NFL Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS' CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. Kevin Turner and Shawn Wooden, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. National
Football League and NFL Properties, LLC, successor-in-interest to
NFL Properties, Inc., Defendants. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO Locks
Law Firm v. SPID 950000313 (R.S.) Attorney Lien Dispute (Lien Case
No. 01585), Case No. 2:12-md-02323-AB, MDL No. 2323 (E.D. Pa.),
Magistrate Judge David R. Strawbridge of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued Memorandum Opinion
directing the Claims Administrator to disburse:

   * $13,981.48 to Locks Law Firm for its costs;

   * $3,937.99 to Langfitt Garner PLLC for its costs; and

   * any remaining withheld funds to the Player.

Introduction

Presently before the Court in the National Football League Player's
Concussion Injury Litigation is the assertion of an Attorney Lien
by Locks against the Award granted to their former client,
Settlement Class Member No. 950000313, R.S. ("Player"), in the
litigation that became part of the class action, In re: National
Football League Players' Concussion Injury Litigation, No.
12-md-2323 (E.D. Pa.). By its lien, Locks Law seeks reimbursement
of its costs and payment of attorneys' fees of 22% of the Award
that has been authorized for Player. By his current counsel,
Langfitt, the Player challenges the Lien, given that Langfitt also
seeks a contingent fee for its work in representing him. That work,
which Player agreed would be compensated with a contingent fee of
20% of any monetary award he received, involved the filing of the
claim that ultimately resulted in approval of a monetary award.

Background

The Player entered into a CFA with Locks on Feb. 13, 2012 for
litigation against the NFL for alleged cognitive deficiencies
resulting from injuries sustained while playing in the NFL. Under
the terms of the fee agreement, and contingent upon the Player
obtaining a recovery, Locks would charge a fee of 33.33% of the net
recovery. Apparently even before securing a signed contingent fee
agreement with the Player, the firm filed a short form complaint in
this district on his behalf in January 2012. The firm also arranged
for the Player to undergo prompt neuropsychological testing in
March 2012 and thereafter provided the neuropsychologist with the
Player's medical records in order to best understand Player's
diagnosis. Locks included the Player's claim in a Master
Administrative Class Action Complaint for Medical Monitoring filed
in June 2012.

For the next several years, Locks was heavily involved in work on
behalf of the class, in addition to monitoring the MDL docket and
individual filings for its individual clients. It regularly issued
communications to update its client base concerning developments in
the litigation and eventual settlement. The NFL and the counsel for
the proposed class of retired NFL players ultimately reached a
settlement, and following court approval and resolution of appeals,
a claims process was established for those players who did not opt
out of the settlement.

As the class action settlement wound its way through the appeals
process, Locks arranged for the Player to undergo a brain scan and
consult with a neurologist to evaluate his eligibility for what
might be particular qualifying diagnoses under the Settlement. It
also became important to understand the etiology of his symptoms,
as it was learned that the Player had suffered two previous
strokes. He was evaluated by neurologist Jon D. Peters, M.D., in
February 2016 and referred for an amyloid PET scan, which was
undertaken in July 2016. The PET scan did not reveal indicia of
Alzheimer's disease.

Around this same time, Locks assisted the Player in his pursuit of
benefits under the NFL's "88 Plan," a benefit program unrelated to
the class action litigation that provides former players with
funding for medical and custodial care resulting from dementia,
Alzheimer's disease, ALS, and/or Parkinson's disease. In September
and October 2016, Locks consulted with a different neurologist, who
ordered a brain MRI. He found that Player met the clinical criteria
for vascular dementia and possible CTE. Locks then submitted an
application on the Player's behalf for the 88 Plan benefits, which
was approved in December 2016.

When registration in the Settlement Program opened in February
2017, Locks promptly registered the Player. It did not, however,
immediately submit a claim, presumably in light of what it refers
to as "the issues surrounding the Player's diagnosis," and so that
it would ultimately be able to file a "successful" claim. In late
2018, it arranged for the Player's records to be reviewed by
another specialist, Andrea Casher, Psy.D. It did not file a claim,
although it states that it "would have" had Player tested through
the MAF.

On June 7, 2019, the attorney who principally handled the Player's
representation, David Langfitt, left Locks and formed his own firm,
Langfitt Garner. The Player was notified of this development and on
Oct. 16, 2019 entered into a CFA with Langfitt that provided for a
20% attorney's fee for representation in this settlement claims
process. In light of its termination as counsel in a case in which
it had not yet collected a fee, Locks promptly filed a Notice of
Lien seeking reasonable attorney's fees and costs for its work on
behalf of Player. At the time of this change in representation,
however, the Player did not have a claim actively pending with the
Claims Administrator.

Mr. Langfitt scheduled the Player for an examination through the
MAF program and provided Player's full medical history to a new
pair of experts: Joseph S. Lubeck, D.O., who examined Player on
Dec. 11, 2019, and Frazin Irani, Ph.D., who administered testing on
Jan. 15, 2020. Dr. Lubeck ultimately authored a report on April 23,
2020 justifying his finding that Player met the criteria for a
Level 1.5 Neurocognitive Impairment.

Mr. Langfitt filed a claim on Player's behalf in June 2020 seeking
an award for Level 1.5 Neurocognitive Impairment. The Claims
Administrator required further information upon its Preliminary
Review, as the neuropsychology report "showed dementia that did not
qualify under the strict terms of the Settlement," which specifies
the number of criteria at which the class member needs to attain a
particular score. Langfitt secured a response from Dr. Lubeck and
facilitated contact between the Claims Administrator and the
affiant of a third-party statement in support of the Player's
claim. A Monetary Award was approved in February 2021 based on the
qualifying diagnosis of Level 1.5 Neurocognitive Impairment
rendered by Dr. Lubeck as of Dec. 11, 2019. The award was subject
to a 75% offset under the terms of the Settlement Agreement due to
a medically-diagnosed stroke having occurred prior to the
Qualifying Diagnosis. The NFL did not file an appeal.

In light of the attorney lien and the contingency fee agreements of
record, the Claims Administrator withheld from the Player's award
funds for payment of attorney fees in an amount equal to 22% of the
Monetary Award. This percentage reflects the presumptive cap on
attorney's fees imposed by the Court's April 5, 2018 Opinion and
Order. Of the attorney fee withholding, a portion reflecting 5% of
the Award was separately deposited into the Attorneys' Fees
Qualified Settlement Fund ("AFQSF") pursuant to the Court's June
27, 2018 Order Regarding Withholdings for the Common Benefit Fund.
Those funds may be distributed at a later date upon further
order(s) of Judge Brody. The Claims Administrator also withheld
funds for reimbursement of attorney costs based upon assertions
made by counsel up to that point.

Pursuant to a briefing schedule, the Court issued through the
Claims Administrator, and in accordance with the Lien Rules, both
law firms submitted simultaneous Statements of Dispute on Aug. 25,
2021 concerning their entitlement to a fee in light of the other
firm's CFA or attorney lien. Each submitted a Response to the
other's filing on Sept. 10, 2021. Pursuant to Lien Rule 17, the
Record of Dispute was then referred to the Court for a
determination as to the appropriate distribution for the attorney
fees currently available for disbursement (representing 17% of
Player's Award) and the allocation of those funds that are
currently held in the AFQSF (representing 5% of the Player's
Award), if those funds, or a portion thereof, are distributed by
the Court at a future date. The Court also addresses the question
of how the funds withheld for reimbursement of attorney costs may
be allocated.

Discussion

Mr. Langfitt contends that it should be paid "the far larger share"
of the attorney's fees approved in the case in light of "its
successful work, the known risks it understood despite a looming
stroke, its minimization of costs, and its willingness to shepherd
through a claim that it knew would be difficult because it did not
strictly satisfy BAP standards." It argues that "Locks advanced
$14,000 in expenses but never filed a claim on the Player's behalf
and obtained no useful medical records that could contribute to the
eventual award."

Judge Strawbridge agrees with Langfitt in part but concludes that
the work performed by Locks nonetheless warrants a share of the fee
derived from Player's award. He concludes that the work performed
by Locks during the claim development and filing stages did not
yield a diagnosis that enabled it to file a claim on the Player's
behalf before Attorney Langfitt left in 2019 and set up the
Langfitt firm. At the same time, Locks had not done anything to
jeopardize the PPlayer's ability to obtain new documentation and
file a claim in the future. Given Attorney Langfitt's familiarity
with the development of the PPlayer's condition from the time he
spent at Locks, Langfitt Garner was primed to assist the PPlayer.
Some advocacy was still required, as the claim filed by Langfitt
went through a Preliminary Review requiring further supporting
explanations.

Inasmuch as it was the claim filed by Langfitt that ultimately
created the fund and achieved the successful result for Player,
Judge Strawbridge will set the total fee according to the CFA that
Player entered into with Langfitt. Thus, the total fee to be
divided between counsel represents 20% of the Monetary Award,
rather than the 22% sought by Locks. As alluded to, Judge
Starwbridge has concluded that a fair resolution of this dispute is
to divide the fee such that 25% of the fee is allocated to Locks
and 75% is allocated to Langfitt.

Disposition

Judge Strawbridge directs the Claims Administrator to reduce the
disbursements in light of the 5% holdback and will apportion the
holdback funds between Locks Law, Langfitt Garner, and the Player
according to the proportion set forth. The Claims Administrator
will also disburse $13,981.48 to Locks for its costs and $3,937.99
to Langfitt for its costs. Any remaining withheld funds must be
disbursed to the Player.

An appropriate Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 12, 2021 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4e34anyy from Leagle.com.


MDL 2323: Zimmerman Gets Attys.' Fees in NFL Concussion Injury Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS' CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. Kevin Turner and Shawn Wooden, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. National
Football League and NFL Properties, LLC, successor-in-interest to
NFL Properties, Inc., Defendants. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO
Zimmerman Reed LLP v. SPID 950004136 (D.W.) Attorney Lien Dispute
(Lien Disp. No. 00400), Case No. 2:12-md-02323-AB, MDL No. 2323
(E.D. Pa.), Magistrate Judge David R. Strawbridge of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued a
Memorandum Opinion awarding Zimmerman Reed LLP an attorney lien
equal to 8% of the Award issued to the Player.

Introduction

Presently before the Court for in the National Football League
Player's Concussion Injury Litigation is the assertion of an
Attorney Lien by Zimmerman against the Award granted to their
former client, Settlement Class Member ("SCM") SPID 950004136
("Player"), in the litigation that became the class action, In re:
National Football League Players' Concussion Injury Litigation, No.
12-md-2323 (E.D. Pa.). By its lien, the firm sought payment of
attorneys' fees of 20% of the Award issued to the Player pursuant
to the contingency fee agreement ("CFA") that he entered into with
them on Sept. 1, 2012. The Player, now proceeding pro se,
challenges the lien. He believes that Zimmerman does not "deserve
to be paid any portion of the settlement percentage" because it did
not assist him regarding his case by setting up any screenings or
testing.

As Judge Strawbridge set out in a Report and Recommendation ("R&R")
filed on Jan. 7, 2019, his evaluation of these positions involves a
consideration of the CFA between Player and his former counsel and
an assessment of the reasonableness of the requested fees in light
of the five factors enumerated by the Third Circuit in McKenzie
Constr., Inc. v. Maynard, 758 F.2d 97, 100 (3d Cir. 1985)
("McKenzie I") and McKenzie Constr., Inc. v. Maynard, 823 F.2d 43,
45 (3d Cir. 1987) ("McKenzie II")). This approach will require
Judge Starwbridge to scrutinize the reasonableness of the CFA at
the time of the signing of the contracts and then determine if the
circumstances compel a different evaluation of the CFA at the time
Zimmerman, as lienholder, seeks to enforce it. He will then examine
the results obtained, the quality of the representation provided by
Zimmerman, and whether the efforts of Zimmerman substantially
contributed to the result.

Background

On Sept. 1, 2012, the Player signed a document entitled "Agreement
for Legal Services," which reflected that he agreed to have
Zimmerman represent him in connection with the damage he asserted
he suffered due to head injuries incurred from his career in the
NFL. Under the terms of the agreement, if recovery were made,
Zimmerman was entitled to a fee distribution in the amount of 33
1/3% of the net recovery as the legal fee.

Zimmerman promptly began to gather from the Player details of his
medical and playing history, information on his NFL career, history
of head injuries, and any symptoms of cognitive deficits. Following
review of the information that Zimmerman obtained from the Player,
the firm filed an individual short form complaint in the MDL on the
Player's behalf on Jan. 10, 2013. The firm kept the Player apprised
of the status of the litigation and the proposed settlements and
legal challenges thereto.

In 2016, Zimmerman shared with the Player its assessment that he
did not then have a Qualifying Diagnosis under the terms of the
Settlement Agreement that had been approved by the Court and was
going through the appeals process. Zimmerman offered to the Player
to participate in an online cognitive testing program that would
identify cognitive decline. It also spoke to him about obtaining a
baseline evaluation through the BAP program when it became
effective. However, the Player did not give Zimmerman the chance to
pursue those options. On Oct. 25, 2016, he notified Zimmerman that
he terminated the relationship and that he had obtained other
counsel.

The record before the Court from the Claims Administrator indicates
that the Player's registration form was submitted by Howard and
Associates, P.A. on March 15, 2017 and that a claim form was
submitted on April 18, 2019 by Shenaq PC. In light of the pending
claim, the Claims Administrator provided notice to Shenaq on April
30, 2019 that Zimmerman had filed a lien in this matter shortly
after it was terminated in 2016. At some time not apparent in the
record, Zimmerman and Shenaq negotiated a resolution of Zimmerman's
attorney lien.

On April 27, 2020, the Player's claim was finally approved. The
Notice of Monetary Award Claim Determination reflected that the
Player had been approved for a Monetary Award based upon the
qualifying diagnosis of a Level 1.5 Neurocognitive Impairment
rendered on Feb. 25, 2019. The Notice of Award also reflected the
Claims Administrator's understanding that the Player was
represented at that time by Shenaq.

At some time not apparent in the record, the Player terminated
Shenaq. Shenaq has not filed a lien on the Player's award and no
further information is in the Lien Dispute Record concerning the
terms of any fee agreement between the Player and Shenaq or between
Player and Howard, who completed the Player's registration in the
Program.

On July 29, 2021, the Claims Administrator issued a Schedule of
Document Submissions concerning the Zimmerman lien. Zimmerman
reports that it attempted to resolve the lien with the Player and
contacted him by phone but that the Player returned the calls of
the firm representative only once and did not leave a message or
make any further response. On Aug. 30, 2021, Zimmerman submitted
its Lienholder Statement of Dispute, and the Player provided an
email communication on Aug. 31, 2021 setting forth his position.

In light of the unresolved lien based upon Zimmerman's contingency
fee agreement, the Claims Administrator withheld from the Player's
award funds for payment of attorneys' fees in an amount equal to
20% of his Award, as asserted in Zimmerman's Notice of Lien. Of
that attorney fee withholding, a portion reflecting 5% of Player's
Award was separately deposited into the Attorneys' Fees Qualified
Settlement Fund pursuant to the Court's June 27, 2018 Order
Regarding Withholdings for Common Benefit Fund counsel. Those funds
may be distributed at a later date upon further order(s) of Judge
Brody.

This leaves the Court to determine the appropriate distribution for
the attorneys fees currently available for disbursement
(representing 15% of the Player's Award) and the allocation of
those funds that are currently held in the Attorneys' Fees
Qualified Settlement Fund (representing 5% of the Player's Award),
if those funds, or a portion thereof, are distributed by the Court
at a future date.

Pursuant to a briefing schedule issued by the Court through the
Claims Administrator and in accordance with the Lien Rules, the
parties submitted simultaneous Statements of Dispute concerning
Zimmerman's entitlement to a fee. Neither party submitted a
response to the other's Statement nor requested that the Court hold
an evidentiary hearing. Pursuant to Lien Rule 17, the Record of
Dispute was then transferred to the Court. Judge Strawbridge does
not find it necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing before
evaluating the dispute and resolving it. The matter is ripe for
review.

Discussion

Judge Strawbridge notes that circumstances changed significantly
from the time of the Player's initial contracting with Zimmerman to
the time that Zimmerman sought to enforce its contract. Based upon
his evaluation of the remaining three prongs of the McKenzie test,
however, he is satisfied that Zimmerman provided quality
representation and made contributions to the ultimate Award
received in the case, taking into account that it must not be
credited with work done by other counsel who chose not to assert
liens. He will therefore approve Zimmerman's fee request in part
and provide for the refund of remaining withheld fees to go
directly to the Player.

Conclusion

Judge Strawbridge concludes that Zimmerman's IRPA contribution to
the Player's ultimate Award is sufficient to support a fee of 8%,
although this amount must be reduced by the Common Benefit Fee
deduction currently applicable to all Awards. Accordingly, the
Claims Administrator should distribute the funds as follows:

     1) Disburse from the currently withheld funds, representing
17% of the Player's monetary award: To Zimmerman - 8/22nds of the
funds; and to the Player - 14/22nds of the funds;

      2) Disburse to the Player any funds currently withheld for
reimbursement of IRPA costs; and

      3) At such time as the Court rules upon the 5% holdback
request, disburse from those currently set aside funds: To
Zimmerman - 8/22nds of the funds released for payment to IRPAs; and
to the Player - 14/22nds of the funds released.

An appropriate order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 12, 2021 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/55xabatf from Leagle.com.


MDL 2670: Summary Judgment Bids in Antitrust Suit Granted in Part
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: PACKAGED SEAFOOD PRODUCTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION.
This Document Relates To: Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v.
Bumble Bee Foods LLC et al., case no. 18cv1014-JLS-MDD. Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc. et al. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC et al., case no.
16cv17-JLS-MDD. End Payer Class Actions. Commercial Food Preparer
Class Actions. Direct Purchaser Class Actions, Case No. 15-MD-2670
DMS (MDD) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Dana M. Sabraw of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California granted in part and
denied in part the partial motions for summary judgment against
certain Defendants as to liability based on the Defendants'
criminal convictions and admissions in parallel criminal
proceedings.

Introduction

Pending before the Court in the multidistrict litigation are
partial motions for summary judgment against certain Defendants as
to liability based on the Defendants' criminal convictions and
admissions in parallel criminal proceedings. Specifically,
Plaintiffs Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., Associated Wholesale Grocers,
Inc. ("AWG"), and W. Lee Flowers & Co. (collectively "Direct Action
Plaintiffs" or "DAPs") filed a motion for partial summary judgment
against StarKist Co.; and End Payer Plaintiffs ("EPPs") filed a
motion for partial summary judgment against StarKist and Bumble Bee
Foods, LLC. A number of other Plaintiffs joined in the DAP and EPP
Motions. StarKist filed a consolidated opposition to both motions.
The Moving Parties filed reply briefs.

Background

Several Plaintiffs initiated multiple civil actions in 2015,
alleging an antitrust conspiracy by the Defendants to fix and
maintain packaged tuna prices above competitive levels in violation
of state and federal antitrust laws. On Dec. 9, 2015, various
parallel civil actions based on the same conspiracy were
consolidated in a multidistrict litigation for pretrial proceedings
before the Court.

The Court divided the Plaintiffs into four tracks: (1) DAPs are
direct purchasers proceeding individually against the Defendants;
(2) DPPs are direct purchasers who, unlike DAPs, are proceeding on
behalf of a putative class; (3) CFPs are indirect purchasers
proceeding on behalf of a putative class; and (4) EPPs are
consumers proceeding on behalf of a putative class (collectively
"Plaintiffs"). The Defendants are the three largest domestic tuna
brands and their parent companies: (1) Tri-Union Seafoods LLC d/b/a
Chicken of the Sea International ("COSI") and Thai Union Group PCL
("TUG"); (2) Bumble Bee, Lion Capital LLP, Lion Capital (Americas),
Inc. and Big Catch Cayman LP; and (3) StarKist and Dongwon
Enterprises Co. Ltd. AWG also filed claims against Bumble Bee's
former President and CEO Christopher Lischewski.

In July 2015, prior to the filing of these civil actions, the U.S.
Department of Justice ("DOJ") announced its investigation into the
packaged tuna industry. Criminal charges were filed against COSI,
Bumble Bee, and StarKist, as well as a number of their executives
for violating the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1, a felony. In
exchange for self-reporting its participation in the conspiracy and
a pledge of full cooperation with the investigation, the DOJ
Antitrust Division issued a conditional leniency letter to COSI
pursuant to the Corporate Leniency Program and the Antitrust
Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1 et
seq. ("ACPERA").

In 2017, Walter Scott Cameron, Bumble Bee's Senior Vice President
of Sales, Kenneth Worsham, Bumble Bee's Senior Vice President of
Trade Marketing, and Stephen L. Hodge, StarKist's Senior Vice
President of Sales, pleaded guilty to participating in the
conspiracy with representatives of other major
packaged-seafood-producing firms with the purpose to fix, raise,
and maintain the prices of shelf-stable tuna in violation of the
Sherman Act.

Bumble Bee pleaded guilty to the same conspiracy on Aug. 4, 2017.
On May 16, 2018, Lischewski was indicted for his role in the same
conspiracy. He was found guilty on Dec. 3, 2019, after a jury
trial. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. The Court of Appeals
found there was "overwhelming evidence that Lischewski participated
in a scheme to fix prices in the canned tuna market." StarKist
entered its guilty plea for the same conspiracy on Nov. 14, 2018.

The Moving Parties request summary adjudication that StarKist
participated in a conspiracy to fix prices of packaged tuna until
July 1, 2015. EPPs also seek a finding that the conspiracy began as
early as June 1, 2011, and DAPs request a finding that it started
in December 2007. StarKist opposes, arguing that the scope and
significance of its Plea Agreement and the conspiracy itself are
much more limited.

Discussion

A. Federal Antitrust Claims

The antitrust laws of the United States aim to protect consumers by
maintaining competitive markets. The Sherman Act "prohibits
agreements that unreasonably restrain trade by restricting
production, raising prices, or otherwise manipulating markets to
the detriment of consumers." Unlike the Sherman Act, which provides
for criminal liability, the Clayton Act provides a private right of
action by allowing "any person who will be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
to sue" in federal court for damages.

1. Plea Period: "Period Beginning at Least as Early as November
2011 and Continuing Through at Least as Late as December 2013"

The Moving Parties contend that StarKist's guilty plea collaterally
estops it from relitigating in this proceeding its participation in
a price-fixing conspiracy with its competitors for the time period
admitted in the Plea Agreement. StarKist opposes the DAP and EPP
Motions to the extent the Moving Parties request summary
adjudication of issues outside the scope of the Plea Agreement.

Judge Sabraw concludes that StarKist's guilty plea establishes
knowing participation in a price-fixing conspiracy with its
competitors for the purpose of fixing, raising, and maintaining
prices of canned tuna products for the period at least as early as
November 2011 and continuing through at least as late as December
2013. Preclusive effect of the guilty plea is not limited to 5 oz.
tuna cans or isolated collusive actions admitted in StarKist's
responses to interrogatories. The Plea Agreement does not preclude
the Plaintiffs from introducing evidence and arguing for a greater
scope of conspiracy. Although actual effect on the market is
presumed in a price-fixing conspiracy such as the conspiracy
admitted by StarKist, to the extent the Moving Parties seek summary
adjudication of the impact of the conspiracy on them, their motion
is denied.

2. Period Starting June 1, 2011

The Moving Parties request a finding that the price-fixing
conspiracy started before November 2011. DAPs contend StarKist
should be found liable for the conspiracy starting December 2007,
while EPPs argue for liability starting June 1, 2011. Another
pending summary judgment motion addresses liability for any damages
arising from purchases of StarKist products prior to May 30, 2011.
Two other motions raise statute of limitations defenses.
Accordingly, neither StarKist's liability arising from purchases
prior to May 30, 2011, nor statute of limitations defenses raised
by the Defendants are addressed. The Order addresses StarKist's
participation in the conspiracy from June 1, 2011.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to StarKist and
drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, Judge Sabraw holds
that StarKist has presented insufficient evidence to raise a
genuine issue of fact. The Moving Parties provided more than merely
evidence of neutral conduct which could be consistent with
permissible competition. They provided specific and direct evidence
of StarKist's active participation in price fixing agreements.
Accordingly, Mecs' conclusory denial is insufficient to create a
genuine issue of fact, particularly when coupled with the admission
that he had not conferred with any StarKist personnel involved in
the matter.

To the extent the Moving Parties request summary adjudication that
StarKist was participating in the conspiracy as of and from June 1,
2011, their motions are granted. Judge Sabraw need not address the
alternative issue raised in the DAP Motion that StarKist can be
held liable for participation in the conspiracy prior to November
2011 based on co-conspirator liability theory.

3. Period After December 2013

The Moving Parties argue that in the absence of StarKist's showing
that it withdrew from the conspiracy or that the conspiracy ended,
StarKist remains liable beyond the time frame it admitted in its
Plea Agreement. They request summary adjudication of StarKist's
participation in the conspiracy from January 2014 through July
2015, when the media first reported the DOJ investigation.

Drawing all reasonable inferences in StarKist's favor, Judge Sabraw
holds that StarKist's evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine
dispute regarding its withdrawal from the conspiracy after December
2013. The Moving Parties' motions are therefore denied as to this
issue.

B. State Law Claims

EPPs' operative consolidated class action complaint alleges claims
under the antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment
laws of 32 states. EPPs argue that all of the state laws alleged in
their complaint prohibit price fixing, and that this justifies
summary adjudication of each of them. With the exception of the
Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 16700 et seq., EPPs
do not provide any analysis but attach an appendix listing the
elements of each of the state law claims. AWG filed a notice of
joinder in the EPP Motion arguing that to the extent the Court
grants the Moving Parties' motions with regard to the federal
antitrust claim, AWG is entitled to summary judgment on its claim
alleging violation of the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act, K.S.A.
50-101.

Judge Sabraw finds that neither EPPs nor AWG provide any
explanation or analysis connecting the evidence with the elements
of each of the other state law claims. Further, the state law
claims are the subject of the Defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Certain State Law Claims, among others. Given
the dearth of legal analysis regarding the state law claims, and
given other pending motions directly addressing these claims, the
EPP Motion is denied without prejudice on the state law claims.
However, to the extent the findings made in the Order correspond to
any elements of the state law claims, they will apply to those
claims as well.

C. Motions to Seal

Pending before the Court are four renewed motions to seal which
partly relate to the EPP and DAP Motions addressed in the Order.
The original versions of these motions to seal were filed
concurrently with the summary judgment motions and were denied
without prejudice. Judge Sabraw's Order addresses the Motions to
Seal only insofar as they cover any filings associated with the
briefing on the EPP and DAP Motions.

Initially the briefing of the EPP and DAP Motions was subject to
heavy redacting and related requests to seal. This includes the
moving, opposition, and reply briefs, and the related statements of
undisputed facts, oppositions, and responses thereto. The pending
Motions to Seal do not request the sealing of any of these
filings.

Initially the parties also requested to seal nearly all of the
exhibits filed in relation to the EPP and DAP Motions. However,
upon consideration of the EPP and DAP Motions only the quoted
portion of the Minutes is the subject of the pending Motions to
Seal. The legal standard for sealing and its application to the
facts of the MDL are discussed in the Order Denying Renewed Motions
to File Documents Under Seal and are incorporated herein by
reference.

StarKist requests to seal all 46 pages of the Minutes. In its
motion to seal it argues for the secrecy of non-public financial
information, information about its relationship and transactions
with Dongwon, as well as information about customer and supplier
relationships and strategic plans. The quoted paragraph does not
disclose this kind of information. It discusses StarKist's
intentions regarding its collusion and/or competition with Bumble
Bee as of August 2014. Judge Sabraw finds that this information
does not fall within any category of the information StarKist
addresses in its pending motion to seal. This information is now
seven years old, and the fact of collusion between StarKist and
Bumble Bee has been the subject of extensive testimony in
Lischewski's trial. StarKist has not provided a compelling reason
to seal the quoted portion of the Minutes. Accordingly, StarKist's
motion to seal the subject paragraph is denied.

Conclusion

Judge Sabraw granted in part and denied in part the DAP and EPP
Motions against StarKist. To the extent the EPP Motion is asserted
against Bumble Bee, it is denied without prejudice.

For the reasons she stated, Judge Sabraw finds as follows:

     a. StarKist's guilty plea establishes knowing participation in
a price-fixing conspiracy with its competitors. As a participant in
the conspiracy, StarKist engaged in the fixing, raising, and
maintaining of prices of canned tuna products for the period from
at least as early as November 2011 and continuing through at least
as late as December 2013. Preclusive effect of the guilty plea is
not limited to 5 oz. tuna cans or isolated collusive actions
admitted in StarKist's responses to interrogatories. The Plea
Agreement does not preclude the Plaintiffs from introducing
evidence and arguing for a greater scope of conspiracy. The guilty
plea establishes as a matter of law that the conspiracy had an
actual effect on the market. The guilty plea on its own does not
establish injury to any particular Plaintiff.

     b. StarKist was participating in the conspiracy as of and from
June 1, 2011. The time before June 1, 2011, is not addressed in the
Order because other pending motions specifically cover that time
frame. The Order does not dispose of any statute of limitations
defenses asserted in other pending motions.

     c. There is a genuine dispute regarding StarKist's withdrawal
from the conspiracy after December 2013.

     d. The EPP Motion is denied to the extent it seeks summary
judgment on any state law claims. To the extent the findings made
in the Order with regard to the federal antitrust claims correspond
to the elements of any state law claim, they will apply to the
state law claims as well.

The foregoing findings apply to all parties who joined in the DAP
and EPP Motions.

StarKist and the Moving Parties will file unredacted versions of
their briefs (ECF nos. 1993-1, 2035, 2129, 2193, 2221) and related
statements of undisputed facts, oppositions, as well as the
response thereto (ECF nos. 2008, 2036, 2129-1, 2129-2, 2193-1).
They will identify these documents on the docket as "unreadacted"
versions of their prior filings and in each instance reference the
docket number of the previous "redacted" version.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3hp23622 from Leagle.com.


MERCK KGAA: Zamora Sues Over Chemical Packing Operators' Unpaid OT
------------------------------------------------------------------
ELIZABETH ZAMORA, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MERCK KGAA d/b/a MILLIPORESIGMA,
Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-01359 (E.D. Wis., November 23, 2021) is
a class action against the Defendant for its failure to compensate
the Plaintiff and similarly situated workers overtime pay for all
hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek in violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Wisconsin Wage Payment and
Collection Laws.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendant as a chemical packing
operator at Merck's facility, located at 6000 North Teutonia Avenue
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin from October 2019 until February 2021.

Merck KGaA is a pharmaceutical company, with its principal offices
located at 250 Frankfurter Strasse, Darmstadt, Germany. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
         Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
         ADEMI LLP
         3620 East Layton Avenue
         Cudahy, WI 53110
         Telephone: (414) 482-8000
         Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
         E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                 bslatky@ademilaw.com

MICHIGAN: Court Grants Bid for Summary Judgment in Kensu v. MDOC
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TEMUJIN KENSU, Plaintiff v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, ET AL., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-10175 (E.D. Mich.),
Judge Gershwin A. Drain of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Southern Division, granted MDOC Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Background

On Jan. 16, 2018, Plaintiff Kensu initiated the civil rights action
against the Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC"), Patricia
Caruso, Dan Heyns, Heidi Washington, Patricia Willard, Steve Zubek,
Dr. Jeffrey Stieve, Dr. William Borgerding, and Lia Gulick. The
Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Class Action Complaint on Nov.
2, 2018, alleging the food served in MDOC facilities is
nutritionally "inadequate to sustain normal health" and that the
Defendants failed to provide medically necessary diets to inmates
suffering from various medical conditions.

Thus, the Plaintiff brings claims for cruel and unusual punishment
and conspiracy under the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and 42 U.S.C Section 1983. He also brings disability
discrimination claims under Title II and/or Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act.
The Plaintiff also seeks a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 2201.

Presently before the Court is the MDOC Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. The motion is fully briefed, and the Court held a
hearing on Oct. 26, 2021.

Discussion

A. Plaintiff's Action is Barred by Claim Preclusion

1. Plaintiff's failure to respond to Defendant's claim preclusion
argument amounts to a concession or waiver of the issue.

The Defendants argue the Plaintiff's action is barred against all
the MDOC defendants by the doctrine of claim preclusion.
Specifically, they argue the Plaintiff has filed several Eighth
Amendment cases against prison officials in the last eight years,
and the parties and claims in those lawsuits "show that the claims
in the present case share a commonality with the claims and the
Defendants that have been or could have been litigated in his other
cases."

The Plaintiff does not defend against the claim preclusion argument
in his response brief. Instead, the Plaintiff responds with a
single sentence in the summary of his argument: "The issues in this
case have not been addressed in other cases." When asked about
claim preclusion during the hearing, the Plaintiff's counsel
responded that the doctrine was inapplicable because the instant
case concerns Plaintiff not receiving the diet to which he is
entitled while the previous cases focused on his medical
conditions. The Plaintiff's counsel did not cite any authority in
support of his argument.

Judge Drain finds that the Plaintiff has effectively conceded that
his claims are barred by issue preclusion by not defending against
the Defendants' argument in his response. The Plaintiff's failure
to address the Defendants' claim preclusion argument was not
mitigated during the hearing because the Plaintiff did not
sufficiently develop his counterargument, and it is thus waived. To
the extent the Plaintiff has defended against the claim preclusion
argument, he has done so "in the most skeletal way." Thus, Judge
Drain finds he has conceded this issue and his claims are barred.

2. Plaintiff's action would be barred by claim preclusion even if
he had not conceded the issue.

Judge Drain finds that the Plaintiff's claims would be barred by
claim preclusion even if he had not conceded or waived the issue.
Claim preclusion prevents parties from litigating matters that
"should have been advanced in an earlier suit." In addition, the
Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence that actions by
these parties in their nonofficial capacities would raise colorable
Eighth Amendment, Section 1983, ADA, or Rehabilitation Act claims.
The Court should not allow the Plaintiff to continue this
repetitive litigation simply by finding some official that has not
yet been sued, and trying to blame what he claims was systemic
group mistreatment of him on that one person individually.
Therefore, the Plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants
in their individual capacities are also barred.

B. Plaintiff Failed to Properly Exhaust

Additionally, and in the alternative, Judge Drain finds that the
action must be dismissed because the Plaintiff has not satisfied
the exhaustion requirement. He explains that the MDOC
administrative remedy process requires inmates to include the
"dates, times, places, and names of all those involved in the issue
being grieved." He finds that the Plaintiff has not done so, as
grievance RGC-15-01-0057-09d raises different issues from the
allegations the Plaintiff makes in the instant case.

In particular, Judge Drain notes that this grievance does not
include any mention of reduced portions, subpar substituted
ingredients, or the adequacy of Plaintiff's prescribed diet. The
Court also notes that the subject of this grievance -- Aramark --
has already been dismissed from the lawsuit, and none of the
current Defendants in the case are named. Thus, the Plaintiff has
not complied with MDOC policy, and this grievance cannot satisfy
the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, let alone support a continuing
violation theory.

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the reasons he articulated, Judge Drain granted
the Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 12, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/s8r4zsk5 from Leagle.com.


MICHIGAN: Governor Sued Over Failure to Notify Lead in Water
------------------------------------------------------------
DORETHA BRAZIEL, individually and as Next Friend for minors,
RONESHA BRAZIEL-minor 1, DEANA BRAZIEL-minor 2, DaKARRI
REAMER-minor 3; KEESHA JONES, individually and as Next Friend for
minors, KENDESHA JONES-minor-4; DaKEAESH JONES-minor 5, TIESHA
CARTHAN-minor 6, TRISTAN CARTHAN-minor 7, and KENDRALL BATES-minor
8; IEASHA JONES, individually; MICHAEL D. BRIGHAM, individually;
REBECCA BRANSCUMB, individually; STACEY BRANSCUMB, individually;
STACEY BRANSCUMB, JR., individually; EMMA KINNARD, individually;
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. GOVERNOR GRETCHEN WHITMER, individually and in her
official capacity; STATE OF MICHIGAN-ENVIRONMENT, GREAT LAKES &
ENERGY; and DIRECTOR LIESI CLARK, individually and in her official
capacity; and DRINKING WATER UNIT DIRECTOR ERIC OSWALD,
individually and in his official capacity; MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES and its DIRECTORS ROBERT GORDON and
ELIZABETH HERTEL; in their individual and official capacities;
MAYOR MARCUS MUHAMMAD, individually and in his official capacity;
and MICHAEL O'MALLEY, individually and in his official capacity as
Water Plant Operator; and CITY MANAGERS DARWIN WATSON and ELLIS
MITCHELL, individually and in their official capacities; CITY OF
BENTON HARBOR, a Municipal Corporation, through the BENTON HARBOR
WATER DEPARTMENT; and EINHORN ENGINEERING COMPANY; and F&V
OPERATIONS AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendants, Case No.
1:21-cv-00960 (W.D. Mich., Nov. 10, 2021) alleges the Defendant's
deliberate misconduct, and active decision making to not enforce
the U.S. and State of Michigan Safe Drinking Water Act when it did
not notify or warn the public the extreme lead toxicity of water
running through its lead service pipes into their homes, schools,
hospitals, workplaces and public places.

The Plaintiffs alleges in the complaint that the Defendant
deliberately deprived the Plaintiffs and the Class of the rights
and guarantees secured by the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution, in that they deprived the Plaintiffs of life, liberty
and property, without due process of law because they had knowledge
that there was lead in the water, beginning in 2018, that exceeded
the action level under the United States Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) Lead and Copper rule under the Safe Drinking Water
Act, yet failed to notify and warn the Plaintiffs that the water
was and is poison and unsafe to drink, cook, wash, or bathe.

The Defendants who made the decision to continue to extend the
deadline for various violations to be abated or repaired, yet did
not advise Benton Harbor residents, created further use of toxic
water, thereby violating the constitutional rights of the
Plaintiffs members and caused their bodily integrity by acting to
stop using the lead laced water through ingestion in drinking,
cooling and oral hygiene, added the suit.

Michigan is a state in the Great Lakes region of the upper
Midwestern United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alice B. Jennings, Esq.
          Carl R. Edwards, Esq.
          EDWARDS & JENNINGS, P.C.
          3031 West Grand Blvd., Ste. 435
          Detroit, MI 48202
          Telephone: (313) 961-5000
          Email: ajennings@edwardjennings.com
                 cedwards@edwardsjennings.com

               -and-

          Kevin S. Hannon, Esq.
          MORGAN and MORGAN
          1641 North Downing Street
          Denver, CO 80218
          Telephone: (303) 861-8800
          Email: khannon@hannonlaw.com

MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Opposes Remand in Home Internet Expense Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
lawstreetmedia.com reports that according to a opposition, a
plaintiff employee's attempt to return their case to California
state court is merely a "frivolous" attempt to avoid dismissal. The
former Micron Technology Inc. employee's suit asserts that the
company failed to reimburse him and other workers for internet and
phone service expenses incurred while working remotely during the
COVID-19 pandemic.

Micron's motion to dismiss emphasized that the plaintiff used the
pandemic and corresponding government-issued stay-at-home orders as
the basis for his California labor law claims. As such, Micron
defended that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for
reimbursement of expenses incurred on his own behalf because "(1)
home internet expenses incurred to comply with government mandates
are not required to be reimbursed under Section 2802; and (2)
Micron did not directly cause Plaintiff to incur the internet
expenses for which he seeks reimbursement."

Now, the Silicon Valley company argues that it properly removed the
case to federal court on the bases of both diversity jurisdiction
and under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). According to the
plaintiff, remand is required because Micron improperly included
California Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) penalties to meet
the amount-in-controversy requirements of diversity jurisdiction
and CAFA.

The opposition calls the motion for remand "fatally flawed,"
contending that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 even
without the PAGA penalties. Micron asserts that the plaintiff never
questioned Micron's grounds for removal. In addition, the company
claims that "it is beyond dispute that any reasonable estimate of
attorneys' fees to be incurred by Plaintiff litigating his
individual claim for reimbursement of home internet expenses will
far exceed $75,000."

Micron adds that though the court need not reach the question, it
properly included the class PAGA penalties to satisfy the amount in
controversy under CAFA. "[W]here a PAGA claim is brought on a class
basis (as is the case here), PAGA penalties are appropriately
included in establishing the amount in controversy," the filing
says.

The ex-employee is represented by Ladva Law Firm and Micron by
Jones Day. [GN]

MINE SAFETY: Marcum Consumer Suit Removed to S.D. West Virginia
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled WADE H. MARCUM AND EDITH MARCUM, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. MINE SAFETY
APPLIANCES COMPANY, LLC; 3M COMPANY; AMERICAN OPTICAL CORPORATION;
CABOT CSC LLC F/K/A CABOT SAFETY CORPORATION; AEARO TECHNOLOGIES
LLC; RALEIGH MINE AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, INC.; and EASTERN STATES
MINE SUPPLY CO., Case No. 21-C-110, was removed from the Circuit
Court of Mingo County, West Virginia, to the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia on November 24, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
assigned Case No. 2:21-cv-00616 to the proceeding.

According to the complaint, the Defendants committed a massive
fraud by duping several specialized federal agencies and preventing
them from detecting the noncompliance of the Defendants'
respirators with federal certification requirements or
regulations.

Mine Safety Appliances Company, LLC is a safety equipment
manufacturer based in Pennsylvania.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, health care,
and consumer goods, headquartered in Minnesota.

American Optical Corporation is a manufacturer of optical products,
headquartered in Illinois.

Cabot CSC LLC, formerly known as Cabot Safety Corporation, is a
specialty chemicals and performance materials company,
headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts.

Aearo Technologies LLC is an energy-control technology company
based in Indiana.

Raleigh Mine and Industrial Supply, Inc. is a mining company in
West Virginia.

Eastern States Mine Supply Co. is a home and construction company
in West Virginia. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:          
         
         Bryant J. Spann, Esq.
         Robert H. Akers, Esq.
         Elizabeth L. Taylor, Esq.
         THOMAS COMBS & SPANN, PLLC
         P.O. Box 3824
         Charleston, WV 25338-3824
         Telephone: (304) 414-1800
         Facsimile: (304) 414-1801
         E-mail: bspann@tcspllc.com
                 rakers@tcspllc.com

MINE SAFETY: Morgan Consumer Suit Goes to S.D. West Virginia
------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled DAVID MORGAN and STEPHANIE MORGAN, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. MINE SAFETY
APPLIANCES COMPANY, LLC; 3M COMPANY; AMERICAN OPTICAL CORPORATION;
CABOT CSC LLC F/K/A CABOT SAFETY CORPORATION; AEARO TECHNOLOGIES
LLC; RALEIGH MINE AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, INC.; and EASTERN STATES
MINE SUPPLY CO., Case No. 21-C-112, was removed from the Circuit
Court of Mingo County, West Virginia, to the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia on November 24, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
assigned Case No. 2:21-cv-00617 to the proceeding.

According to the complaint, the Defendants committed a massive
fraud by duping several specialized federal agencies and preventing
them from detecting the noncompliance of the Defendants'
respirators with federal certification requirements or
regulations.

Mine Safety Appliances Company, LLC is a safety equipment
manufacturer based in Pennsylvania.

3M Company is an American multinational conglomerate corporation
operating in the fields of industry, worker safety, health care,
and consumer goods, headquartered in Minnesota.

American Optical Corporation is a manufacturer of optical products,
headquartered in Illinois.

Cabot CSC LLC, formerly known as Cabot Safety Corporation, is a
specialty chemicals and performance materials company,
headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts.

Aearo Technologies LLC is an energy-control technology company
based in Indiana.

Raleigh Mine and Industrial Supply, Inc. is a mining company in
West Virginia.

Eastern States Mine Supply Co. is a home and construction company
in West Virginia. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:          
         
         Bryant J. Spann, Esq.
         Robert H. Akers, Esq.
         Elizabeth L. Taylor, Esq.
         THOMAS COMBS & SPANN, PLLC
         P.O. Box 3824
         Charleston, WV 25338-3824
         Telephone: (304) 414-1800
         Facsimile: (304) 414-1801
         E-mail: bspann@tcspllc.com
                 rakers@tcspllc.com

MISSOURI GAMING: ERISA Class & Subclass Certified in Williams Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GINA R. LIPARI-WILLIAMS, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. THE MISSOURI GAMING
COMPANY, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-06067-SRB (W.D.
Mo.), Judge Stephen R. Bough of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Missouri, Western Division, granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification of ERISA Claim.

Background

The Defendant operates 41 casinos in 19 states and employs
approximately 18,000 individuals. At all relevant times, the
Defendant sponsored a group health plan and gave all employees an
opportunity to participate in it. The Plan qualifies as an employee
welfare benefit plan and must comply with the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").

Beginning in 2015, the Defendant implemented and imposed a tobacco
surcharge for all group health participants that used tobacco
products. For plan years 2016 through 2020, Defendant deducted $50
per month from the wages of each covered individual using tobacco
products. Defendant learned about tobacco use by requiring all
participants to execute a tobacco user affidavit through a website
during open enrollment.

Plaintiffs Marissa Hammond and Lucinda Layton were employed by the
Defendant, participated in the Plan, and paid the tobacco
surcharge. On March 31, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit
against the Defendant. Count VII of the Third Amended Class and
Collective Action Complaint alleges that the tobacco surcharge
violates ERISA and that the Defendant thus breached its fiduciary
duty to participants. Plaintiffs seek various forms of relief,
including damages and equitable relief.

The Plaintiffs now move for class certification of a class and
subclass of participants who had a tobacco surcharge deducted from
their wages. As further discussed in Section III, the Plaintiffs
allege that: (a) in plan years 2016-2020, the Defendant issued
uniform documents that wrongfully failed to notify participants of
an alternative way to avoid the tobacco surcharge; and (b) in plan
years 2019 and 2020, the Defendant issued uniform documents that
wrongfully informed participants they could not receive a
retroactive reimbursement of a prior tobacco surcharge.

The Plaintiffs seek certification of the following proposed Class
and proposed Sub-Class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a),
(b)(1)(B), (b)(2), and (b)(3):

     (1) Nationwide ERISA Class - Failure to Provide Notice of a
Reasonable Alternative Standard: All participants in Defendant's
group health plan for plan years 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020
who had a tobacco surcharge deducted from their wages (the proposed
Class).

     (2) Nationwide ERISA Sub-Class - Failure to Provide a
Reasonable Alternative Standard or Notice of the Same: All
participants in Defendant's group health plan for plan years 2019
and 2020 who had a tobacco surcharge deducted from their wages (the
proposed Sub-class).

The Defendant opposes class certification.

Discussion

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant's tobacco surcharge
violated two requirements under ERISA.

A. The Nature of Plaintiffs' Claims

First, the Plaintiffs contend that the Defendant violated ERISA's
so-called non-discrimination provision. This provision prohibits a
group health plan from charging a premium based on a participant's
health status-related factor. The Plaintiffs' proposed Class and
proposed Sub-class assert two types of claims under ERISA. The
first claim alleges the Defendant breached its fiduciary duty and
duty of loyalty by "collecting tobacco surcharges in violation of
ERISA and using those funds for its own benefit." The second claim
is for equitable relief. The Plaintiffs request that the "unlawful
tobacco surcharge deductions be returned to participants.

B. Standing

Having framed "the nature of the Plaintiffs' claims," Judge Bough
must now determine whether they are "suitable for class
certification." As a threshold issue, the Defendant argues that the
Plaintiffs and the putative class members lack Article III standing
to pursue their claims. It contends there is no evidence "that the
Plaintiffs -- let alone every putative class member -- have
suffered any harm, or that the harm was caused by any alleged
disclosure violations a failure to provide statutorily-required (or
here, regulatorily required) information does not, by itself,
establish a concrete injury, let alone causation."

The Defendant argues the proposed Sub-class is similarly flawed
because the "Plaintiffs admitted that they have never even seen the
2019 and 2020 communications at issue, and thus could not have been
harmed by them." It further argues the 2019 and 2020 documents did
not cause any harm because "no the Plaintiff or the putative class
member has completed a tobacco cessation program or alternative
standard and had their tobacco premium eliminated prospectively,
but not retroactively."

Upon review, Judge Bough holds that the Defendant's standing
arguments are rejected. The Plaintiffs have alleged and presented
facts showing that the Defendant imposed a tobacco surcharge on
them and on the putative class members in violation of ERISA and
its implementing regulations. A statutory right not to be charged
causes a particularized injury that affects the class members in a
personal and individual way. Paying a fee they should not have been
charged is also a concrete injury, not an abstract one that does
not "actually exist." The standing requirement is satisfied because
the Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendant caused them monetary
loss by imposing a fee that was unlawful.

C. Plaintiffs' Reliance on Regulations

The Defendant also attacks the Plaintiffs' overarching legal theory
as "fundamentally" flawed. Specifically, it contends that the
Plaintiffs rely on regulations that are inconsistent with the plain
language of Section 1182(b). As discussed, Section 1182(b)(2)(B)
provides that "nothing in the nondiscrimination prohibition,
Section 1182(b)(1) will be construed to prevent a group health plan
from establishing premium discounts or rebates in return for
adherence to programs of health promotion and disease prevention."

Upon review, Judge Bough rejects the Defendant's argument. The
plain language of Section 1182(b)(2) allows "premium discounts or
rebates." However, the tobacco surcharge at issue does not appear
to be a discount or a rebate. Judge Bough agrees with the
Plaintiffs that "in their ordinary usage, both 'discount' and
'rebate' refer to a reduction in cost, whereas the Defendant's
tobacco surcharge imposes an increase in cost on tobacco users
above the baseline price." For purposes of the class certification
analysis, he finds that the tobacco surcharge is not a "discount"
or "rebate," and thus does not fall under Section 1182(b)(2)'s
exception.

Even if "discount" or "rebate," could be construed as ambiguous,
Judge Bough finds that 29 C.F.R. Section 2590.702(f) does not
impermissibly conflict with Section 1182(b)(2). The regulation does
not "prevent a group health plan" from establishing discounts or
rebates as allowed by Section 1182(b)(2). Instead, the regulation
simply explains the parameters under which discounts and rebates
may be offered under the statute. For these reasons, and for the
additional reasons stated by the Plaintiffs, Judge Bough finds that
the regulations relied upon by the Plaintiffs are not inconsistent
with Section 1182(b).

D. Requirements Under Rule 23(a)

Under Rule 23(a), a proposed class must satisfy four elements: (1)
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable (numerosity); (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class (commonality); (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative party are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class (typicality); and (4) the representative party will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the absent class
members (adequacy).

Judge Bough finds that the class satisfies the requirements under
Rule 23(a). He finds that (i) the Defendant does not dispute the
numerosity element; (ii) the Plaintiffs' theory of liability is
based on common, class-wide tobacco surcharge documents that were
distributed and/or available to all participant; (iii) the
Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the proposed
classes; and (iv) there does not appear to be any conflict of
interest between the interests of the Plaintiffs and the proposed
classes.

E. Requirements Under Rule 23(b)

If Rule 23(a) is satisfied, the party seeking certification "must
also satisfy through evidentiary proof at least one of the
provisions of Rule 23(b)." The Plaintiffs move for class
certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), Rule 23(b)(3), and
Rule(b)(2).

a. Rule 23(b)(1)(B)

The Plaintiffs argue Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is satisfied because
adjudication of their claims would be dispositive of the interests
of other Plan participants' claims. Upon review, Judge Bough
agrees. He finds that (i) the Plaintiffs' claim for breach of
fiduciary duty on behalf of the Plan would likely be dispositive of
the claims of other class members; (ii) for all intents and
purposes, the Defendant is the Plan, and in its role as plan
administrator and as the Plan is subject to ERISA's
non-discrimination provisions; and (iii) the breach of fiduciary
duty claim is appropriate for Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification
because it will facilitate resolution on a plan-wide basis.

b. Rule 23(b)(3)

The Plaintiffs also move for class certification under Rule
23(b)(3).

Judge Bough finds the predominance factor is satisfied for the
proposed Class and Sub-class. He says, any individualized inquiries
do not override the predominate commonality of the class-wide
documents the Defendant distributed and/or made available to all
participants. Because the Plaintiffs and the putative class members
also allegedly paid the tobacco surcharge, the nature of the relief
sought also predominates over any individual questions. Even if the
action "will necessitate a degree of individual inquiries into the
harm suffered by the class members, Judge Bough holds that common
issues relating to the Defendants' adoption, implementation, and
enforcement of the tobacco surcharge still predominate.

Judge Bough also finds that the superiority requirement is
satisfied. On an individualized basis, the monetary amounts of the
tobacco surcharge would not likely be worth the filing of separate
lawsuits. Further, the Plaintiffs' claims raise common questions
and will involve the same or similar class-wide evidence for all
affected participants. A class action would allow participants to
join together and pursue Defendant's alleged ERISA violations.
Conversely, if class certification is not granted, class members
would have to engage in repetitive discovery and the presentation
of common evidence.

Judge Bough also cannot discern any difficulties in managing the
class action. Because common questions predominate individual
questions, "certification will not generate any complexities from a
case management perspective." Under these circumstances, a class
action is the superior method for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the claims brought by the proposed Class and the
proposed Sub-class.

For all these reasons, Judge Bough finds the proposed Class and
proposed Sub-class satisfy Rule 23(b)(3).

c. Rule 23(b)(2)

Finally, the Plaintiffs also seek certification under Rule
23(b)(2). This rule requires a finding that "the party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally
to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole."
The Plaintiffs request "an equitable remedy -- whether that be
constructive trust, surcharge, disgorgement, etc. -- that would
require the Defendant to disgorge these ill-gotten and unlawful
tobacco surcharge deductions and return them to participants." The
Defendant argues that Rule 23(b)(2) is not satisfied because the
Plaintiffs only seek monetary, not injunctive or declaratory
relief.

Judge Bough finds that the Plaintiffs have shown class
certification is warranted under this rule. Courts have held that a
putative ERISA class seeking monetary damages may be certified
under Rule 23(b)(2). Additionally, the Defendant's alleged conduct
applies generally to the proposed Class and the proposed Sub-class.
Under these facts, Judge Bough finds that class certification is
warranted under Rule 23(b)(2).

F. Notice Requirements

Under Rule 23(c)(2), once a class is certified notice must be given
to class members. The Plaintiffs request the Court "instruct the
parties to meet and confer regarding a notice plan pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)." The Defendant's brief
does not discuss the notice requirement.

Judge Bough finds that the current record does not provide a basis
to determine the best practicable notice to the class members.
Consequently, he orders the parties to meet and confer to determine
agreed upon proper notice procedures.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Bough granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification of ERISA Claim. He certifies the following Class and
Sub-class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(1)(B),
(b)(2), and (b)(3):

      (1) Nationwide ERISA Class - Failure to Provide Notice of a
Reasonable Alternative Standard: All participants in Defendant's
group health plan for plan years 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020
who had a tobacco surcharge deducted from their wages.

      (2) Nationwide ERISA Sub-Class - Failure to Provide a
Reasonable Alternative Standard or Notice of the Same: All
participants in Defendant's group health plan for plan years 2019
and 2020 who had a tobacco surcharge deducted from their wages.

The parties will meet and confer to agree on the proposed notice to
the potential class members pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(c)(2). They will also meet and confer to agree upon a
new proposed amended scheduling order in light of the Order. The
notice and proposed amended scheduling order will be filed within
14 days of the filing of the Order. The Court will contact the
parties to schedule a hearing regarding the notice and scheduling
changes.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/6rf9dch7 from Leagle.com.


MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY: Online Education Class Suit Can Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Jaschik, writing for Inside Higher Ed, reports that a Montana
judge has ruled that a suit against Montana State University over
the shift to online education in March of 2020 can proceed to a
trial, The Bozeman Daily Chronicle reported.

The "complaint is not one for educational malpractice, but rather
for breach of contract, and defendants have failed to prove that he
cannot present a set of facts for breach of an express contract,"
said Judge Michael McMahon in his order. The university did not
resume in-person classes until August of 2020.

The suit -- which seeks to become a class action -- demands
reimbursement for a share of tuition and fees that were
specifically for in-person education.

The university said there was no evidence of a contract being
broken.

Many similar cases in other states have been dismissed. [GN]

NATHANSON LAW: Kaur Seeks to Certify Class Action
--------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Gursimran Kaur,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. The
Nathanson Law Firm, LLP and Mitchell Nathanson, Case No.
2:21-cv-02142-JMA-JMW (E.D.N.Y.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
enter an order certifying this case to proceed as a class action,
and ranting preliminary approval of the settlement, on behalf of
the following class:

   "All persons to whim NLF sent a collection letter, to any
   address, to the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for the period
   covering April 21, 2020 to June 1, 2021."

The Plaintiff filed this class action lawsuit pursuant to the Fair
Debt Collection Practices (FDCPA), which alleges that NLF and MAN
violated the FDCPA by sending consumers written collection
communications that were false, misleading and deceptive. The
Defendants dispute these claims.

Nathanson Law is a New York Law Firm focused on collections, debtor
and creditor, and real estate.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Nov. 22,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3p0JTE5
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David M. Barshay, Esq.
          BARSHAY, RIZZO & LOPEZ, PLLC
          445 Broadhollow Road, Suite CL 18
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (631) 210-7272
          Facsimile: (516) 706-5055
          E-mail: dbarshay@brlfirm.com

               - and -

          Robert L. Arleo, Esq.
          1345 Avenue of the Americas, 33rd Floor
          New York, NY 10105
          Telephone: (212) 551-1115
          Facsimile: (518) 751-1801
          E-mail: robertarleo@gmail.com

NEW YORK, NY: Court Dismisses Union Square Suit Over Price Gouging
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Denise Cote of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted the motion of the City of New York and
several of its agencies and officials to dismiss the case, UNION
SQUARE SUPPLY INC., individually and on behalf of a class of all
other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MAYOR BILL DE
BLASIO, CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AND
WORKER PROTECTION, LORELAI SALAS, as Commissioner of the New York
City Department of Consumer and Worker Protection, OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIALS & HEARINGS, JONI KLETTER, as Commissioner and
Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Office of Administrative
Trials and Hearings, INSPECTOR DAVI, and INSPECTOR JOHN DOE(S) AND
INSPECTOR JANE DOE(S), to be identified later, Defendants, Case No.
21cv2390 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y.).

Background

Plaintiff Union Square Supply has brought the putative class action
alleging that New York City's rule against price gouging was
adopted and enforced in ways that violate its federal and state
constitutional rights.

New York City has adopted a consumer protection law that prohibits,
among other things, "unconscionable trade practices."
"Unconscionable trade practices" are defined as, inter alia, "any
act or practice in connection with the sale or offering for sale of
any consumer goods which results in a gross disparity between the
value received by a consumer and the price paid, to the consumer's
detriment." Violations are punishable by a civil penalty of up to
$350 per violation, or a civil penalty of up to $500 per knowing
violation.The Commissioner of the City's Department of Consumer and
Worker Protection ("DCWP") is authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations that further define unconscionable trade practices and
take enforcement action against violators, so long as the
regulations comport with the statutory definition of an
unconscionable trade practice.

In response to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the DCWP
adopted on March 18, 2020 an emergency rule prohibiting price
gouging. The DCWP adopted the Price Gouging Rule as a permanent
rule on June 26, 2020, to be applicable during any declared state
of emergency in the City.

The Price Gouging Rule prohibits, as an unconscionable trade
practice, merchants from "selling or offering for sale covered
goods or services at an excessive price during a declared state of
emergency in the City of New York." "Excessive price" is defined as
"10% or more above the price at which the same or similar good or
service could have been obtained by a buyer in the City of New York
30-60 days prior to the declaration of a state of emergency", and
"covered goods or services" are defined as "goods or services that
are essential to health, safety, or welfare", including "staple
consumer food items," products "used for emergency cleanup,"
"emergency supplies, medical supplies such as medications or
medical masks," or motor fuels. Each sale or offer for sale
constitutes a separate violation.

There are two exceptions provided in the Price Gouging Rule. A
merchant may increase its price for a covered good or service to an
excessive one if its supplier has increased its price, "provided
that the increase charged to the buyer is comparable to the
increase incurred by the merchant." Alternatively, a merchant may
offer a covered good or service for sale at an excessive price
during an emergency if the merchant sold the covered good or
service at an excessive price prior to the emergency and does not
increase its price during the emergency.

Employees of the DCWP inspect New York merchants to confirm
compliance with the Rule. If a DCWP inspector determines that a
merchant has violated the Rule, she may issue a summons for an
administrative hearing before a hearing officer of the City Office
of Administrative Trials and Hearings ("OATH"). Hearing officers
receive evidence regarding the alleged violation before issuing
written decisions.

If a merchant is found to have violated the Rule, the hearing
officer may impose a civil penalty of up to $350 per violation (or
$500 per knowing violation) in accordance with N.Y.C. Admin. Code
Section 20-703. Penalties imposed may be appealed to the OATH
Appeal Tribunal. Upon exhaustion of administrative remedies, a
merchant may then, pursuant to Article 78 of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules, challenge in New York state court a penalty
imposed for a Rule violation.

Union Square Supply operates a store in Manhattan. On July 13,
2020, Union Square Supply received a summons from DCWP alleging
that it had violated the Price Gouging Rule. The summons charged
Union Square Supply with 88 violations of the rule for selling face
masks, hand sanitizer, rubber gloves, and other cleaning supplies
at an excessive price as defined by the Rule. At some point prior
to that date, an inspector employed by DCWP had conducted an
inspection at Union Square Supply. During that inspection, the DCWP
inspector did not inquire as to the price at which Union Square
Supply had purchased the goods it offered for sale at an ostensibly
excessive price.

After Union Square Supply was held in default, which was
subsequently vacated, it participated in a hearing before an OATH
hearing officer on Jan. 12, 2021. At the hearing, Union Square
Supply submitted evidence that the price of the covered goods had
increased due to price increases by its suppliers, and DCWP
submitted evidence showing that Union Square Supply charged
excessive prices in violation of the Rule. The OATH hearing officer
adjourned the hearing to allow Union Square Supply to review DCWP's
evidence, and the hearing concluded on February 17.

On February 25, an OATH hearing officer issued a decision finding
that Union Square Supply had violated the Rule and imposed a
$21,000 penalty. The hearing officer concluded that DCWP had proven
60 violations and that the other alleged violations were either
withdrawn or not proven. Thus, the hearing officer imposed a
penalty of $350 for each violation.

Union Square Supply timely appealed the OATH hearing officer's
decision on March 31, 2021. The OATH Appeal Tribunal largely
rejected Union Square Supply's appeal. Union Square Supply did not
challenge the administrative decision via an Article 78
proceeding.

Union Square Supply commenced the action on March 18, 2021,
alleging that the Price Gouging Rule and the City's enforcement of
it violated its constitutional rights and those of a class of
similarly situated merchants. The complaint seeks both money
damages and injunctive relief. In conjunction with its complaint,
Union Square Supply moved for a temporary restraining order
preventing the City from exacting the fine imposed against Union
Square Supply for its alleged violation of the Price Gouging Rule
or taking any further steps to enforce the Price Gouging Rule,
contending that any further enforcement action would violate its
due process rights.

At a conference held on March 23, Union Square Supply's request for
a temporary restraining order was denied on the record. The Court
concluded that Union Square Supply had not shown it was likely to
succeed on the merits or experience irreparable harm, as required
to secure a temporary restraining order, and that it had not shown
a temporary restraining order would be in the public interest.

Because Union Square Supply could take an administrative appeal of
the OATH decision imposing a fine and, if unsuccessful, challenge
the imposition of the fine in state court via an Article 78
proceeding, the Court also held that Union Square Supply was
unlikely to succeed on the merits of its due process claim. And
because Union Square Supply's only obligation under the allegedly
unconstitutional Price Gouging Rule was to pay a fine, it had not
shown irreparable harm. Finally, the public interest in preventing
price gouging during a pandemic weighed against granting the
requested relief.

After the temporary restraining order was denied, the City moved to
dismiss on June 1. Union Square Supply then served an amended
complaint on June 22. The City moved again to dismiss on July 13,
and the Plaintiff opposed on August 3. The motion to dismiss became
fully submitted on August 17.

Discussion

In resolving a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), "the court's task is to assess the legal feasibility of
the complaint." In other words, a court must determine "whether the
complaint's allegations, taken as true and afforded all reasonable
inferences, state a plausible claim for relief." To survive a
defendant's motion to dismiss, the complaint "must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." "A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged." The complaint must offer more
than "naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement," and
a court is not "bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation."

I. Void for Vagueness

Union Square Supply alleges that the Price Gouging Rule is
unconstitutionally vague. Union Square Supply's vagueness challenge
faces strong headwinds. Because the Price Gouging Rule does not
implicate Union Square Supply's First Amendment rights, it may only
challenge the application of the Price Gouging Rule to its specific
conduct. And because the Price Gouging Rule is an economic
regulation that carries only civil penalties, it is "subject to a
relaxed vagueness test" relative to a criminal law.

Judge Cote opines that Union Square Supply has failed to state a
void-for-vagueness claim as to the application of the Price Gouging
Rule to its specific conduct. The language of the Rule provides
sufficient guidance to prospective enforcers. Moreover, even if the
Rule suffers from some ambiguity, Union Square Supply's conduct
falls in the heartland of what the Rule was intended to prohibit.
Union Square Supply's arguments to the contrary are unavailing. To
the extent that Union Square Supply wishes to object to OATH's
decision on the grounds that City inspectors and OATH hearing
officers are disregarding the Rule's requirements, the correct
procedural mechanism to do so was an Article 78 proceeding in state
court. While Union Square Supply may disagree with the City's
choice to adopt a Rule that does not allow merchants to maintain
consistent profit margins during emergencies, that disagreement
does not render the Rule void for vagueness.

II. Procedural Due Process

To the extent that Union Square Supply pleads a claim that the
enforcement of the Price Gouging Rule violates its procedural due
process rights, its claim fails, Judge Cote finds. In a Sectionm
1983 suit brought to enforce procedural due process rights, a court
must determine (1) whether a property interest is implicated, and,
if it is, (2) what process is due before the plaintiff may be
deprived of that interest." The parties do not dispute that,
because the Price Gouging Rule carries a monetary fine, the Rule
implicates a property interest. The only relevant question for
analyzing Union Square Supply's procedural due process claim, then,
is whether the City provides adequate process prior to exacting a
fine for entities accused of violating the Rule. Judge Cote holds
that the due process protections provided for entities facing
sanctions under the Rule pass constitutional muster. In light of
the Government's significant interest in deterring price gouging
during an emergency, the City's mechanism of enforcing the Rule
satisfies due process.

III. Excessive Fines

Union Square Supply claims that a maximum fine of $350 per unit of
each good sold at a price that violates the Price Gouging Rule is
unconstitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive
Fines Clause.

Judge Cote holds that the Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim is
unavailing. She finds that Union Square Supply has failed to state
a claim for a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause. It has not
alleged any facts suggesting that the $21,000 penalty will deprive
it of its ability to continue to operate. Union Square Supply's
arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. It has failed to allege
specific "examples of instances of the imposition of impermissibly
cumulative penalties," its "bare allegations are inadequate to
state a plausible claim that the" penalties imposed under the Rule
"are disproportionate to the gravity of the offenses they are
designed to punish, much less `grossly' disproportionate."

IV. State Law

Finally, Union Square Supply alleges that New York City has adopted
regulations for the enforcement of the Price Gouging Rule and
enforces the Rule in a manner that violates the separation of
powers and nondelegation principles of the New York Constitution,
as interpreted by the New York Court of Appeals. This state-law
claim invokes the Court's supplemental jurisdiction. Because this
state constitutional claim "raises a novel or complex issue of New
York law" and the Court "has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction," Judge Cote declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over this claim and dismisses it without
prejudice to renewal in state court.

Conclusion

Judge Cote granted the City's motion to dismiss. Because Union
Square Supply has had an opportunity to amend its complaint in
response to the City's motion to dismiss, has failed to address the
complaint's deficiencies, and has not requested further leave to
amend, the dismissal of Union Square Supply's federal claims is
with prejudice. The state law claims are dismissed without
prejudice to renewal in state court. The Clerk of Court will enter
judgment for the Defendants and close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mn2mb3da from Leagle.com.

For Plaintiff Union Square Supply, Inc.: Robert J. La Reddola --
rjl@llalawfirm.com -- La Reddola Lester & Associates, LLP, in
Garden City, New York.

For the Defendants: Darren Trotter Office of the Corporation
Counsel of the City of New York, New York.


NEW YORK: Faces Largest-Ever Lawsuit Payout to NYC Teachers
-----------------------------------------------------------
Sophia Chang at gothamist.com reports that a massive decades-long
lawsuit against New York City over the use of two teaching
certification tests is winding to a conclusion, with nearly $660
million and pension benefits in damages awarded to plaintiffs in
the class action lawsuit claiming the tests were discriminatory
against Black and Latino teachers and prevented them from achieving
full seniority, pay and benefits.

The city could be further liable for hundreds of millions of
dollars more in damages yet to be determined, with an estimated
maximum payout of about $1.8 billion for the 4,700 plaintiffs in
the Gulino v Board of Education class action suit - in what city
officials say is the highest amount of damages that New York City
has ever paid.

In 1996, three teachers filed the lawsuit against the city and
state education departments, claiming that the mandated
certification tests-the National Teacher Examination (NTE) and its
successor the Liberal Arts & Sciences Test (LAST)-had a "disparate
impact on African-American and Latino test takers."

White test-takers passed the tests 83.7% of the time while Black
test takers passed at 43.9% and Latino test takers passed at 40.3%
of the time, according to the complaint.

No matter what subject a New York City teacher taught-whether it
was preschool, special education, or athletics-they were required
to pass these certification tests, which have been described as
covering "scientific, mathematical, and technological processes;
historical and social scientific awareness; artistic expression and
the humanities; communication and research skills; and written
analysis and expression."

"The test obviously didn't test anything relevant to the jobs that
people were doing or being hired to do. But the city used it in
many cases to demote people," said Joshua Sohn, the plaintiffs'
lead lawyer.

Teachers who didn't pass were paid less, denied full pension, and
many were relegated to substitute status, according to a court
brief filed with the Second Circuit of Appeals in 2007: "Even
though they never achieved a passing score on the LAST, many
teachers continued teaching full-time in the City's schools for
many years, albeit at salaries well below that of their certified
colleagues. And those teachers who ultimately achieved a passing
score, remained at a salary step level far below that of their
colleagues with equivalent seniority in the City school system. In
practice then, the City and State used the LAST not to determine
whether teachers should be allowed to teach, but rather to
determine their level of compensation and benefits."

The state eventually stopped requiring the tests as part of teacher
certification process after a district court found that the LAST
had not been properly validated.

"It is time to bring this longstanding case to a close and we are
pleased the parties have agreed on a schedule for payments," said
Nicholas Paolucci, spokesperson for the city's Law Department, in a
statement. The damages are based on calculations of backpay, he
said.

The judgments determining specific damages for the first round of
individual hearings for nearly 350 plaintiffs became final in
mid-September after the city declined to appeal, Sohn said.

The state was dismissed from the lawsuit in 2006, leaving the city
solely liable as the employer under federal discrimination laws.
Still, city officials said the tests were developed by the state
which then required that New York City administer these
certification tests or "it would have faced State enforcement
action and stood to lose billions in state education funding. (The
city) had no choice but to comply with the state's certification
requirement," according to the Law Department.

The impact of these tests meant that "generations of Black and
brown New York City public school teachers, they were sort of
denied access to the profession," Sohn said.

The teachers who never passed the certification tests "have been
sort of per diem teachers for the last 20 years, you know- making
exponentially less money and having no benefits, no health
insurance, no pension, no nothing from the city, but still teaching
more or less full time," Sohn added. "And others who wanted to be
teachers their whole lives found that they couldn't do it and had
to change careers." [GN]

NEWELL BRANDS: Court Certifies Benson's Multi-State Class, Subclass
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHELLY BENSON and LISA CAPARELLI, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. NEWELL
BRANDS, INC. and NUK USA LLC, Defendants, Case No. 19 C 6836 (N.D.
Ill.), Judge Ronald A. Guzman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

Background

The case is a putative class action for consumer fraud and unjust
enrichment. Plaintiffs, Shelly Benson and Lisa Caparelli, allege
that Defendants Newell Brands, Inc. and its subsidiary NUK USA LLC,
engaged in false and misleading advertising of their NUK brand
pacifiers.

Before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.
The Plaintiffs request that the Court certifies their proposed
class and subclass; appoint Shelly Benson and Lisa Caparelli as the
class representatives; and appoints Melissa Weiner of Pearson,
Simon & Warshaw, LLP and Edwin Kilpela Jr. of Carlson Lynch, LLP as
the class counsel.

Discussion

To be certified, a proposed class must satisfy each requirement of
Rule 23(a) as well as one of the three requirements of Rule 23(b).
The Rule 23(a) requirements are numerosity, typicality,
commonality, and adequacy of representation. After those four
requirements are satisfied, proponents of the class seeking
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) -- the provision on which the
Plaintiffs rely -- must also show that (1) questions of law or fact
common to the members of the proposed class predominate over
questions affecting only individual class members ("predominance");
and (2) a class action is superior to other available methods of
resolving the dispute ("superiority").

The Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that their proposed class satisfies the Rule 23
requirements.

The Plaintiffs, who purchased the Defendants' pacifiers at Walmart
stores located in Illinois, assert that the Defendants' packaging
and marketing materials for their NUK pacifiers uniformly and
deceptively describe the pacifiers as "orthodontic." The pacifiers
are also labeled for three different age ranges: 0-6 months, 6-18
months, and 18-36 months, the second and third of which correspond
to a progressively larger, but similarly shaped, pacifier. The
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants' use of the term
"orthodontic" falsely conveys to consumers that NUK pacifiers are
beneficial for oral development and alignment, and the age-based
labels falsely convey to consumers that the pacifiers are
beneficial for the dental health of children over the age of 24
months. Furthermore, they allege that the Defendants deceptively
omitted in their advertising the material fact that prolonged
pacifier use by children over the age of 24 months significantly
increases the risk of developing dental malocclusions
(misalignments).

The Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs' theory cannot be proven
on a class-wide basis. Its position is that the term "orthodontic"
"describes the shape of NUK's pacifier nipple, which differs from
round pacifiers," and the age labels "refer to the size of the
pacifier." According to the Defendants, their market research
"shows that consumers broadly understood these things as well."

The Plaintiffs' remaining claims in the action are for violation of
the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
and unjust enrichment. They seek to represent a class of consumers
who purchased NUK pacifiers in Illinois or nine other states with
"similar state statutes."

The Plaintiffs define their proposed class (to which they refer as
the Multi-State Consumer Protection Class and to which the Court
will refer as the "Multi-State Class" or the "Class") as follows:
"All persons who purchased in the State of Illinois or any state
with similar laws any of the NUK-branded Orthodontic Pacifiers,
within the applicable statute of limitations, until the date notice
is disseminated."

The Plaintiffs also propose a Multi-State Consumer Protection
Subclass (the "Multi-State Subclass" or the "Subclass"), which is
defined as follows: "All persons who purchased in the State of
Illinois or any state with similar laws any of the NUK-branded
Orthodontic Pacifiers, within the applicable statute of
limitations, for use by a child 24 months or older until the date
notice is disseminated."

The Plaintiffs further specify that the states they consider to be
those "with similar laws" to that of Illinois are California,
Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey,
New York, and Washington. Thus, the proposed Class and Subclass
would encompass individuals who made purchases in those 10 states.
As alternatives to the proposed Multi-State Class and Multi-State
Subclass, the Plaintiffs propose an Illinois Class and Illinois
Subclass, with the same definitions as the Multi-State Class and
Subclass except with the elimination of the phrase "or any state
with similar laws."

The Defendants oppose the Plaintiffs' motion on a variety of
grounds, but they do not dispute that the Plaintiffs easily satisfy
Rule 23(a)(1)'s numerosity requirement, given that defendants'
sales data reveal that the proposed Class and Subclass include
hundreds of thousands of members.

Judge Guzman opines that the nature of the scientific evidence that
the Plaintiffs intend to present about the effects of pacifiers on
oral development is common to the class. Hence, the Plaintiffs have
demonstrated commonality.

Judge Guzman further opines that the Plaintiffs have established
typicality and adequacy. Typicality is satisfied because the
Plaintiffs and the proposed class members are subject to the same
alleged practice -- the Defendants' uniform labeling of their
pacifiers -- and their claims are based on the same legal theory
that the labeling was deceptive. As for adequacy, Benson and
Caparelli are members of the putative class and have the same
interest and injury as other class members, and there is no
indication that they are subject to defenses unique to them.
Furthermore, Judge Guzman concludes that the class counsel is
qualified to conduct the litigation. The Defendants' contentions
with regard to typicality and adequacy are perfunctory and
therefore waived.  
Turning to Rule 23(b)(3), under which the Plaintiffs must
demonstrate predominance and superiority, Judge Guzman finds that
the central issue in the case is whether the Defendants' packaging
and marketing was likely to mislead a reasonable consumer. Proving
the Plaintiffs' allegations of consumer fraud will be complex and
costly; it will require expert testimony on the effect of pacifier
use on children's oral development. That proof, of which no
rational individual plaintiff would be willing to bear the cost,
can be offered on a class-wide basis. The Plaintiffs also
demonstrate that they can prove materiality on a class-wide basis;
the claims of every class member will rise or fall on the
resolution of the question of whether the Defendants' packaging was
likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.

Moving on to the matter of ascertainability, Judge Guzman opines
that this requirement is satisfied because the Class and the
Subclass are not defined vaguely or in terms of success on the
merits, and they are not based on subjective criteria; they
identify a particular group of people (purchasers of NUK pacifiers)
allegedly harmed in a particular way (defrauded by the Defendants'
labels and marketing materials) during a specific time period in
particular geographic areas.

Ultimately, Judge Guzman concludes that class-wide resolution would
substantially advance thie case. The final disputed issue is the
geographical scope of the class. The Plaintiffs contend that while
the consumer-protection laws of Illinois, California, Florida,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York,
and Washington are not identical, they are sufficiently similar to
allow for certification of a Multi-State Class and Subclass. They
submit a chart outlining various aspects of the 10 states' laws in
which they note that each state's law provides a private right of
action, uses a reasonable-consumer standard, and allows for
remedies in the form of actual damages or monetary relief. The
chart includes columns pertaining to reliance, materiality, and
scienter. The Plaintiffs also cite decisions in which these states'
consumer-protection laws were found to have sufficient common
characteristics as to liability such that multi-state class
treatment was appropriate.

The Defendants contend that variations in these states' laws will
render the Multi-State Class unmanageable, and they submit a chart
of the statutes that contains more detail than the Plaintiffs'. The
chart includes additional information such as the specific
prohibited conduct, as well as statutory features like causation,
required injury, and miscellaneous requirements. The Defendants
also present a laundry list of what they deem
"outcome-determinative" variations among the statutes. This list is
unhelpful because defendants do not explain why the variations are
material; it is simply stated in a conclusory fashion that they
"render class certification entirely improper here."

Judge Guzman is not persuaded. For instance, the Defendants state
that in California, a presumption of reliance by absent class
members does not arise "if class members were exposed to different
information." But the Plaintiffs have demonstrated that class
members were exposed to largely uniform product packaging and
labeling. The Defendants also conclusorily assert that the statutes
"vary" as to materiality standards, "vary widely" in defining
deceptive conduct, and "vary substantially" as to remedies and the
statute of limitations. These variations appear to be distinctions
without a difference, and Judge Guzman declines to construct any
legal arguments for the Defendants on the materiality of these
differences. What is important for class-certification purposes,
and what the Plaintiffs have demonstrated, is that all of the ten
states' statutes require proof (which is common in the case) that
the deceptive conduct at issue was likely to mislead a reasonable
consumer. If it turns out down the road that there is a certain
unique statutory feature that requires purchasers in that state to
be treated separately, that issue can be handled by creating
another subclass. But the Defendants have not demonstrated at this
juncture that any particular state-based subclass is warranted.

For clarity, Judge Guzman thinks it best to revise the definitions
of the Multi-State Class and Subclass to substitute the actual
states for the phrase "or any state with similar laws."

Therefore, the Multi-State Class, as certified, is as follows: "All
persons who purchased in the State of Illinois, California,
Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey,
New York, or Washington any of the NUK-branded Orthodontic
Pacifiers, within the applicable statute of limitations, until the
date notice is disseminated."

The Multi-State Subclass, as certified, is as follows: "All persons
who purchased in the State of Illinois, California, Florida,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York,
or Washington any of the NUK-branded Orthodontic Pacifiers, within
the applicable statute of limitations, for use by a child 24 months
or older until the date notice is disseminated."

Conclusion

Judge Guzman granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification. A telephonic status hearing is set for Dec. 8, 2021,
at 10:45 a.m. to discuss the next steps in the case. The Clerk of
Court is directed to amend the case caption to correct the spelling
of the second plaintiff's name to Lisa Caparelli.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/zksfzh3h from
Leagle.com.


NOVAVAX INC: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of January 18 Deadline
--------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, reminds investors of the deadline to file a lead plaintiff
motion no later than January 18, 2022 in a securities class action
lawsuit that has been filed on behalf of investors who purchased or
acquired the securities of Novavax, Inc. ("Novavax") (NASDAQ: NVAX)
between March 2, 2021 and October 19, 2021, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). The lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland and alleges violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Novavax securities, and/or
would like to discuss your legal rights and options, please visit
Novavax Inc. Shareholder Class Action Lawsuit or contact Joe
Seidman toll free at (877) 779-1414 or seidman@bernlieb.com.

Novavax is a biotechnology company that focuses on the discovery,
development, and commercialization of vaccines to prevent serious
infectious diseases and address health needs. The Company's product
candidates include, among others, NVX-CoV2373, which is in
development as a vaccine for COVID-19. Prior to the start of the
Class Period, Novavax announced that it planned to complete
Emergency Use Authorization ("EUA") submissions for NVX-CoV2373
with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") in the second
quarter of 2021.

According to the complaint, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and, among other things, failed to disclose that: (i)
Novavax overstated its manufacturing capabilities and downplayed
manufacturing issues that would impact its approval timeline for
NVX-CoV2373; (ii) Novavax was unlikely to meet its anticipated EUA
regulatory timelines for NVX-CoV2373; and (iii) the Company
overstated the regulatory and commercial prospects for
NVX-CoV2373.

On May 10, 2021, The Washington Post reported that Novavax's EUA
filing "was delayed by manufacturing regulatory issues, until June
at the earliest, according to four people who had recently been
briefed on the company's plans." Later that day, during
after-market hours, on a call that Novavax hosted with investors
and analysts to discuss the Company's first quarter 2021 financial
and operational results (the "1Q21 Investor Call"), Novavax
confirmed that it was unlikely to seek an EUA for NVX-CoV2373 in
the U.S. until July 2021 at the earliest- i.e., the third quarter
of 2021. On this news, Novavax's shares fell $15.50 per share, or
8.81%, to close at $160.50 per share on May 10, 2021. Moreover,
following the Company's 1Q21 Investor Call, Novavax's stock price
continued to fall an additional $22.32 per share, or 13.91%, to
close at $138.18 per share on May 11, 2021, damaging investors.

On August 5, 2021, Novavax issued a press release reporting its
financial results and operational highlights for the second quarter
of 2021. Among other news, Novavax reported that it expected to
file for NVX-CoV2373's EUA in the fourth quarter of 2021, rather
than the third quarter of 2021. On this news, Novavax shares fell
$46.31 per share, or 19.61%, to close at $189.89 per share on
August 6, 2021.

Finally, on October 19, 2021, Politico published an article
entitled "'They rushed the process': Vaccine maker's woes hamper
global inoculation campaign". The Politico article reported, in
relevant part, that Novavax "faces significant hurdles in proving
it can manufacture a shot that meets regulators' quality standards"
with respect to NVX-CoV2373. The Politico article cited anonymous
sources as stating that Novavax's "issues are more concerning than
previously understood" and that the Company could take until the
end of 2022 to resolve its manufacturing issues and win regulatory
authorizations and approvals. On this news, Novavax's stock price
fell $23.69 per share, or 14.76%, to close at $136.86 per share on
October 20, 2021 further damaging investors.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than January 11, 2022. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased Novavax securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit
https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/novavaxinc-nvax-shareholder-lawsuit-class-action-fraud-stock-455/
or contact Joe Seidman toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
seidman@bernlieb.com.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING.(c) 2021 Bernstein Liebhard LLP. The law firm
responsible for this advertisement is Bernstein Liebhard LLP, 10
East 40th Street, New York, New York 10016, (212) 779-1414. The
lawyer responsible for this advertisement in the State of
Connecticut is Michael S. Bigin. Prior results do not guarantee or
predict a similar outcome with respect to any future matter. [GN]

NUIX LTD: Faces Class Action Over IPO Disclosure Obligations
------------------------------------------------------------
Sasha Karen, writing for ARN, reports that beleaguered local
software vendor Nuix is facing a class action over alleged
misrepresentations or omission in its initial public offering
prospectus (IPO) and market disclosures.

Filed by Shine Lawyers on 19 November, class actions practice
leader Craig Allsopp claimed the firm's investigation found the
"company's prospectus and financial forecasts may have
misrepresented or omitted financial information and potential
risks, which was misleading and deceptive to investors".

The allegations relate to a report by The Sydney Morning Herald,
which claimed an investigation by the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (ASIC) looked into whether Nuix's primary
backer Macquarie Group overstated the company's sales forecasts
ahead of its listing.

Following this, the vendor's former CEO, Rod Vawdrey, and then CFO,
Stephen Doyle, stepped down in June.

"This inflated forecast has ultimately cost shareholders hundreds
of millions of dollars," Allsopp said.

"Our class action aims to recover these losses for the thousands of
investors impacted by Nuix Limited's alleged misconduct."

The amount of damages sought is yet to be determined. In response
to the class action, the vendor said that it rejected the
accusation.

"Nuix disputes the allegations and will be defending the claim,"
Nuix's official statement said.

The filing of the IPO is the latest instalment in Nuix's turbulent
last six months, with the vendor cutting consultancy ties with
co-founder Anthony Castagna following investigations by the
Australian Federal Police over possible breaches of the
Corporations Act.

In June, its office was searched by authorities seeking documents
in relation to an investigation into the affairs of an unnamed
"individual".

Later that month, the vendor's chair, Jeffry Bleich, said he was
genuinely disturbed" by allegations concerning Doyle on suspected
contraventions of the Corporations Act in relation to financial
statements for the periods ending 30 June 2018, 2019 and 2020
lodged with ASIC.

Then in August, Nuix reported its profits for 2021 sunk by 107 per
cent, ending the financial year with a $1.6 million loss.

However, in September it acquired all the shares of Boston-based
natural language processing (NLP) software maker Topos Labs, paying
US$5 million up front, with a potential US$20 million extra on the
table. [GN]

NUVE MIGUEL: Conditional Certification of Santos' FLSA Class Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARGARITO HERNANDOZ SANTOS, on behalf of himself, FLSA
Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class, Plaintiffs v. NUVE MIGUEL
CORP. d/b/a KEY FOODS, LUIS H. URGILES, Defendants, Case No.
21-CV-1335 (JPO)(RWL)(S.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Robert W.
Lehrburger of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York denied the Plaintiff's motion for an order:

   (1) conditionally certifying the FLSA claims as a collective
       action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b);

   (2) approving his proposed form and manner of notice to
       potential opt-in members to the collective action; and

   (3) requiring the Defendants to provide the Plaintiff with a
       list containing contact information of all individuals
       employed by the Defendants for the last six years.

Background

The Plaintiff filed the action against a supermarket and its owner,
claiming violations of wage and hours laws under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") and the New York Labor Law ("NYLL").
Defendant Luis H. Urgiles owns and operates Defendant Nuve, which
does business as the supermarket Key Foods, located at 755
Amsterdam Avenue in New York City. From June 2006 until about May
2020, Santos was employed at Key Foods as a stock person in the
produce department. According to Santos, the Defendants shaved time
off of Santo's hours worked by having him work through part or all
of lunch and for a short time after clocking out. As a result,
Santos claims he was not paid for all time he worked and did not
receive overtime pay as he should have for hours worked in excess
of 40 hours per week. Santos further claims that all other
non-managerial employees of the Defendants were subject to the same
treatment.

Mr. Santos's declaration states that he regularly observed and
spoke with his non-managerial co-workers regarding their wages.
Based on his "personal observations and conversations with
co-workers," Santos claims to "know that all employees employed by
Defendants were subject to the same wage and hour policies." He
identifies three such co-workers by their first name and position
or department. Specifically, Santos refers to a porter named
"Martin," "Oscar" in Dairy, and "Victor" in Grocery.

Mr. Santos states that he and his co-workers "routinely complained
about working past their shifts and through their lunch breaks
while off the clock." Santos's declaration elaborates further with
respect to only "Martin."

The Second Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants had a
policy of shaving time from employee's pay and forced them to do
unpaid off-the-clock work in violation of both the NYLL and FLSA.
Santos seeks to recover damages and other relief as permitted by
the labor statutes. Santos also seeks certification of the case as
both a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
and as a collective action pursuant to the FLSA that would include
all non-managerial employees of the Defendants for the relevant
time period, including but not limited to stockers, porters,
cashiers, counter employees, and baggers.

Mr. Santos filed the instant motion on Aug. 27, 2021 to
conditionally certify a collective action for his FLSA claims. The
motion includes a Memorandum Of Law In Support, as well as
declarations from Santos and Luis Arnaud, who provides a Spanish
translation of Santos' "affidavit" and affirms that he translated
the document for Santos. In opposition, the Defendants filed a
Memorandum Of Law along with the Declarations of Klever Urgiles --
the owner and general manager of Key Foods; Martin Garcia -- the
"Martin" referred to by Santos (Dkt. 32), and Oscar Vergara -- the
"Oscar" referred to by Santos. The Plaintiff filed a Reply
Memorandum Of Law on Sept. 27, 2021, at which point the motion was
fully briefed. The case has been referred to me for general
pre-trial purposes, including non-dispositive motions such as the
instant application.

In addition to moving for conditional certification of an FLSA
collective action, Santos requests that the Court approves the
form, content, and distribution of notice and "opt-in" form to be
sent to prospective members of the collective. The Defendants
contend that no notice should be issued because the case does not
qualify for certification as a collective action, but even if it
did, the notice and methods of distribution proposed by Santos
should be modified in several respects.

Discussion

Because Judge Lehrburger concludes that no collective action is
warranted, he addresses only that issue. He explains that to
demonstrate that a collective should be conditionally certified,
"the burden on plaintiffs is not a stringent one, and the Court
need only reach a preliminary determination that potential
plaintiffs are 'similarly situated.'" The Plaintiffs can meet their
burden at the conditional certification stage by "relying on their
own pleadings, affidavits, declarations, or the affidavits and
declarations of other potential class members."

Mr. Santos seeks conditional certification of a collective of all
of Key Foods' "current and former non-exempt employees (including
but not limited to cashiers, stock persons, counter employees, and
baggers) employed by the Defendants" for the six-year period before
filing of the Complaint."

Quite simply, Santos' motion must be denied because he does not
meet even the low burden required to show that other employees are
similarly situated so as to warrant conditional certification,
Judge Lehrburger finds. First, Santos does not identify any other
employee who, like him, was a stock person. He identifies a
different position, porter, held by "Martin" and does not even
indicate the position or duties of the other two employees he
mentions, "Oscar" and "Victor," instead noting only the departments
in which they worked (respectively, Dairy and Grocery).

Second, Santos repeatedly offers only general allegations and
unsupported assertions. Similarly, Santos fails to provide any
detail about when and where he had the conversations he claims to
have had or observations he claims to have made, instead relying on
the conclusory, generalized statement that the conversations took
place "at work when managers were out of earshot and also when they
socialized outside of work.

In short, Santos' statements are devoid of any detail that would
enable the Court to make an informed determination that he and
Martin or any other employees are similarly situated.

Mr. Santos argues that since he was employed for 14 years at Key
Foods, he provides "more value towards his personal observations of
the circumstances of other employees." He does describe an anecdote
where "one day" Martin complained about an instance of having
worked six days while being compensated for only five days.

Moreover, Santos once again fails to provide any supporting
details, Judge Lehrburger holds. For instance, he does not provide
a time frame that would place the event in the relevant statutory
limitations period, which, at maximum under the FLSA, is three
years, rather than during the eleven preceding years of his
employment. He does not say where any conversation took place. He
does not say whether Martin told him directly or whether he instead
heard someone else relate the incident. And Santos's statement that
"this also happened to me on a few occasions," similarly is the
type of conclusory, unsupported allegation that does not support
conditional certification.

Finally, although an affidavit from a single employee may be
sufficient to establish a basis for collective certification, "the
absence of supporting affidavits from any other employees
distinguishes the case from those in which declarations from
multiple plaintiffs supported the conclusion that an employer
likely had a practice of requiring off-the-clock work." The absence
of any sworn, corroborating statements from Santos's co-workers
further "undermines his assertion that the Defendants had a
practice or policy of requiring off-the-clock work."

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Lehrburger concludes that Santos
has not met his burden for conditional certification of a
collective action. Having found that conditional certification is
not warranted, he does not address Santos's remaining requests,
including but not limited to those pertaining to notice, tolling,
and collective contact information. He denied the Plaintiff's
motion to conditionally certify an FLSA collective action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2021 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/e56rnab7 from Leagle.com.


OIL PATCH: Palczynsky Sues Over Unpaid OT for Flowback Operators
----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSHUA PALCZYNSKY and ALFREDO MONTES, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. OIL PATCH GROUP, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-01125 (D.N.M., November 23, 2021) is a
class action against the Defendant for its failure to compensate
the Plaintiffs and similarly situated flowback operators overtime
pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New Mexico
Minimum Wage Act.

The Plaintiffs worked for the Defendant as flowback operators in
New Mexico.

Oil Patch Group, Inc. is an oilfield rental and service company
doing business in New Mexico. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Melissa Moore, Esq.
         MOORE & ASSOCIATES
         440 Louisiana, Ste. 1110
         Houston, TX 77002
         Telephone: (713) 222-6775
         Facsimile: (713) 222-6739
         E-mail: melissa@mooreandassociates.net

                - and –

         Curt Hesse, Esq.
         MOORE & ASSOCIATES
         440 Louisiana, Ste. 1110
         Houston, TX 77002
         Telephone: (713) 222-6775
         Facsimile: (713) 222-6739
         E-mail: curt@mooreandassociates.net

                - and –

         Chris R. Miltenberger, Esq.
         THE LAW OFFICE OF CHRIS R. MILTENBERGER, PLLC
         1360 N. White Chapel, Suite 200
         Southlake, TX 76092-4322
         Telephone: (817) 416-5060
         Facsimile: (817) 416-5062
         E-mail: chris@crmlawpratice.com

PACIFIC FERTILITY: Court Denies Bid for Partial Summary Judgment
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: PACIFIC FERTILITY CENTER LITIGATION. This
Document Relates to: No. 3:20-cv-05047 (A.J. and N.J.) No.
3:20-cv-04978 (L.E. and L.F.) No. 3:20-cv-05030 (M.C. and M.D.) No.
3:20-cv-04996 (O.E.) No. 3:20-cv-05041 (Y.C. and Y.D), Case No.
18-cv-01586-JSC (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott
Corley of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California denied the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
judgment.

Introduction

The Plaintiffs prevailed at trial on their product liability and
failure to recall claims against Chart Industries and judgment was
entered in their favor on Aug. 13, 2021. There are over 130 other
consolidated related cases which are a part of the In re: Pacific
Fertility Litigation. The next five cases are set for trial Jan.
31, 2022.

Background

The Plaintiffs in In re: Pacific Fertility Litigation all obtained
fertility services from Pacific Fertility Center (PFC), and in
particular, as relevant, cryopreservation of their eggs and
embryos. On March 4, 2018, PFC's laboratory director, Dr. Joseph
Conaghan, discovered that Tank 4 which contained 2,500 embryos and
1,500 eggs -- including the Plaintiffs' eggs and embryos -- had
lost liquid nitrogen.

As a result of this incident, Plaintiffs A.B., C.D., E.F., G.H.,
and I.J. filed a putative class action against Chart alleging
manufacturing and design defects, as well as negligent failure to
recall. The Court denied class certification and Plaintiffs A.B.,
C.D., E.F., G.H., and I.J.'s claims proceeded to trial in May and
June 2021. On June 10, 2021, the jury returned a verdict in the
Plaintiffs' favor on all claims.

On Aug. 13, 2021, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) and the Clerk entered judgment
in their favor. On Nov. 8, 2021, the Court denied Chart's motion
for a new trial and motion for judgment as a matter of law under
Rule 50(b).

The next set of Plaintiffs' claims -- those of Plaintiffs A.J.,
N.J., L.E., L.F., M.C., M.D., O.E., Y.C., and Y.D (hereafter
"Plaintiffs") -- are set for trial on Jan. 31, 2022. In connection
with that trial, the parties have filed motions for summary
judgment and motions to exclude expert testimony.

Discussion

The Plaintiffs contend that certain factual issues were resolved at
the jury trial of Plaintiffs A.B., C.D., E.F., G.H., and I.J.'s
claims and that the jury's findings on these issues should be given
preclusive effect under the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
otherwise known as issue preclusion. In particular, the Plaintiffs
seek to preclude Chart from relitigating: (1) Whether Tank 4 was
misused or modified after it left Chart's possession; (2) Whether
Tank 4 contained a manufacturing defect when it left Chart's
possession; (3) Whether a manufacturing defect was a substantial
factor in causing the March 4th Incident; (4) Whether Tank 4
contained a design defect when it left Chart's possession; (5)
Whether a design defect was a substantial factor in causing the
March 4th incident; (6) Whether Chart negligently failed to recall
or retrofit Tank 4's controller; (7) Whether the failure to recall
or retrofit was a substantial factor in causing the March 4th
incident; and (8) What percentage of responsibility Chart has for
the March 4th incident.

The Court's judgment to which the Plaintiffs seek to apply issue
preclusion is based upon diversity jurisdiction. Therefore, in
deciding whether issue preclusion applies, the Court applies
California preclusion law. Under California preclusion law, a
judgment is not final "while open to direct attack, e.g., by
appeal." In the case, it is undisputed that all appeals from the
judgment have not been exhausted and therefore under California law
issue preclusion does not yet apply. Summary judgment must
therefore be denied.

Judge Corley holds that the Plaintiffs' insistence that in
California the federal rule of finality for federal question
jurisdiction judgments applies to federal diversity jurisdiction
judgments is unpersuasive. The Plaintiffs are asking the Court to
apply a different preclusive rule to a dismissal ordered by a state
court than a dismissal ordered by a federal court sitting in
diversity. Even if federal common law would adopt a state
preclusion rule that applied a different preclusion rule to a state
court judgment than to a federal diversity jurisdiction judgment,
Judge Corley says, the Plaintiffs have not shown that California
law makes that distinction.

Judge Corley is also not persuaded by the Plaintiffs' suggestion
that even if California preclusion law applies, under Semtek
International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508
(2001)'s carve out for "situations in which the state law is
incompatible with federal interests" the Court could still consider
its judgment final for purposes of issue preclusion. The Plaintiffs
argue that "federal courts have a legitimate interest in affording
their judgments with immediate preclusive effect, particularly when
doing so will conserve judicial resources and avoid duplicative
litigation in another forum."

Under Semtek, the Court must follow California's preclusion rules
regarding finality. Further, to hold otherwise would hardly
conserve judicial resources or avoid duplicative litigation; if the
Ninth Circuit reverses the judgment, then the first trial and any
subsequent cases which were tried after the application of issue
preclusion would have to be retried. And if the Ninth Circuit
affirms the jury's verdict in whole or in part then the judgment
becomes final and issue preclusion will likely apply and thus
shorten the trials of the remaining cases.

Accordingly, Judge Corley concludes that California law governs all
aspects of the issue preclusion analysis including the question of
finality. Because the judgment entered following the jury's verdict
is not final under California law, issue preclusion does not apply
at this time.

Conclusion

For the reasons she stated, Judge Corley denied the Plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment. As she stated at oral
argument, there is an issue as to whether it makes sense to go
forward with the second trial before the first judgment becomes
final under California law.

Accordingly, the parties are ordered to file separate statements by
Dec. 1, 2021, indicating their position regarding whether these
consolidated related actions should be stayed pending Chart's
appeal of the judgment in the first action. The Court sets a
further video status conference for Dec. 7, 2021, at 9:30 a.m.

The Order disposes of Docket No. 908.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 12, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ysme9zbs from Leagle.com.


PAR-A-DICE HOTEL: Pruitts Seek Certification of BIPA Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANTHONY SCOTT PRUITT and
AUDREY PRUITT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. PAR-A-DICE HOTEL CASINO, BOYD GAMING CORPORATION, and
any and all other affiliated or subsidiary entities, Case No.
1:20-cv-01084-JES-JEH (C.D. Ill.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
enter an order:

   1. certifying Plaintiffs' Biometric Information Privacy Act
      (BIPA) claims as a class action on behalf of:

      "All individuals who had their facial geometry scans
      collected or possessed by Defendants at the Par-A-Dice
      Hotel Casino at any time from July of 2019 to the
      present;"

   2. appointing Named Plaintiffs Anthony Scott Pruitt and
      Audrey Pruitt as Class Representatives;

   3. appointing Stephan Zouras, LLP and Steven Smith Law as
      Class Counsel; and

   4. authorizing court-facilitated notice of this action to
      class members.

The Defendants use hundreds of security and surveillance cameras
and related biometric software within its Peoria, Illinois casino
and hotel that collect visitors' facial geometry. In 2019, the
Defendants implemented a new, multi-million-dollar digital
surveillance system at PAD, and purchased over 600 surveillance
cameras and software licenses from a third-party artificial
intelligence ("AI") technology vendor, Avigilon, a subsidiary of
Motorola Solutions, that manufactures and sells devices and
software systems with advanced AI technology applications, such as
"Appearance Search and "Facial Recognition. Through its use of
these biometric cameras, software and networked databases,
Defendants have collected the biometric identifiers and biometric
information (collectively, "biometric data) of hundreds of
thousands of visitors for surveillance purposes, to identify cheats
and/or criminals, and/or recognize rewards program members, amongst
other things.

The Plaintiffs Audrey Pruitt and Anthony Scott Pruitt ("Plaintiffs)
are long-time PAD visitors and members of Defendants' casino and
hotel rewards program. Since approximately January of 2020 -- that
is, shortly after Defendants implemented the new Avigilon cameras
and systems at PAD -- the Defendants collected and obtained
Plaintiffs' biometric identifiers (i.e., scans of their facial
geometry) and biometric information when Plaintiffs visited PAD and
were recorded by Defendants' surveillance cameras at the entrance
to, and all throughout, the casino.

In doing so however, the Defendants failed to comply with the
simple requirements of the BIPA. Specifically, the Defendants
failed to inform them and other PAD visitors of the purposes for
Defendants' collection and obtainment, or to whom their biometric
data was disclosed; and failed to gain informed written consent
prior to their collection and obtainment, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated Nov. 19, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3CH2glZ at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Ryan F. Stephan
          James B. Zouras
          Catherine T. Mitchell
          S TEPHAN Z OURAS , LLP
          100 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 2150
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 233-1550
          Facsimile: (312) 233-1560
          E-mail: rstephan@stephanzouras.com
                  jzouras@stephanzouras.com
                  cmitchell@stephanzouras.com

               - and -

          Steven Smith, Esq.
          STEVEN SMITH L AW G ROUP
          5555 N Sheridan Road, Suite 708
          Chicago, IL 60640
          Telephone: (312) 622-5545
          E-mail: Stevesmithlaw88@gmail.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          John C. Ellis, Esq.
          ELLIS LEGAL P.C.
          200 W. Madison Street, Suite 2670
          Chicago, IL 60606
          E-mail: jellis@ellislegal.com

               - and -

          J. Gregory Deis, Esq.
          Matthew D. Provance, Esq.
          Nathan A. Rice, Esq.
          Mayer Brown, Esq.
          71 S. Wacker Drive
          Chicago IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 782-0600
          E-mail: gdeis@mayerbrown.com
                  mprovance@mayerbrown.com
                  nrice@mayerbrown.com

               - and -

          Tiffany Cheung, Esq.
          Camille Framroze, Esq.
          MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
          425 Market Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 268-7000
          E-mail: tcheung@mofo.com
                  cframroze@mofo.com

PETROQUEST ENERGY: Bid to Extend Class Cert. Reply Deadline Filed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as PHILIP LEE, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, v. PETROQUEST ENERGY,
L.L.C., et al., Case No. 6:16-cv-00516-RAW (E.D. Okla.), the
Parties ask the Court to enter an order extending the Plaintiff's
reply brief deadline from December 6, 2021, to January 14, 2022.

The Plaintiff filed his First Motion to Compel on August 20, 2021.
The Court issued its Order granting the Motion to Compel on
November 17, 2021, and ordered that Defendants are required to
supplement certain discovery responses and produce certain
documents as set forth in the Order on or before December 17, 2021.


The Court further explained that "after Defendants supplement the
information or documents, if deemed necessary by Plaintiff, he may
seek appropriate relief from Judge White if any supplemental
information and/or documents pertain to his previously filed motion
for class certification."

The Plaintiff's deadline to file his reply brief in support of
class certification, however, is currently December 6, 2021, which
predates the discovery compliance date issued by the Court in
ruling on the Motion to Compel.

PetroQuest Energy operates as an energy company.

A copy of the Parties' motion to certify class dated Nov. 23, 2021
is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3CKsjZK at no
extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Reagan E. Bradford, Esq.
          Ryan K. Wilson, Esq.
          BRADFORD & WILSON PLLC
          431 Main Street, Suite D
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102
          Telephone: (405) 698-2770
          Facsimile: (405) 234-5506
          E-mail: reagan@bradwil.com
                  ryan@bradwil.com

The Defendants are represented by

          Michele R. Blythe, Esq.
          NEXT ERA ENERGY RESOURCES , LLC
          700 Universe Blvd.
          Juno Beach, FL 33408
          Phone: (561) 691-7207
          Facsimile: (561) 691-7103
          E-mail: Michele.Blythe@nexteraenergy.com

               - and -

          John J. Griffin, Jr., Esq.
          L. Mark Walker, OBA #10508
          CROWE & DUNLEVY
          324 North Robinson Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102
          Telephone: (405) 235-7718
          Facsimile: (405) 272-5225
          E-mail: john.griffin@crowedunlevy.com
                  mark.walker@crowedunlevy.com

               - and -

          Michael D. Morfey, Esq.
          HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
          600 Travis Street, Suite 4200
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 220-4200
          Facsimile: (713) 220-4285
          E-mail: MichaelMorfey@HuntonAK.com

PINE RIDGE FARMS: Plant Stench Problems Persist Despite Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------------
Cott McFetridge, writing for Associated Press, reports that parts
of downtown Des Moines have been so transformed in the past decade
by new apartments, trendy shops and microbreweries, it's sometimes
hard to reconcile the present with the not-so-distant past.

But one strong reminder of the city's heritage remains: the stench.
A pungent smell of rancid meat regularly wafts through all the
shiny new development, a reminder of the region's less polished
history as a pork processing center.

"You can't escape it," said Brandon Brown, president of the Des
Moines Downtown Neighborhood Association, calling it "very
frustrating."

Many cities eager for new investment and vitality have welcomed
urban housing and entertainment venues into older sections of town
that housed grittier industries, only to be stumped by what happens
when someone like Brown, who moved into an upscale downtown
apartment, actually wants to enjoy a latte or meal at an outdoor
patio.

After decades of downplaying or simply ignoring the problem, Des
Moines officials recently began a comprehensive study that will
lead to tighter regulations on some smelly manufacturing plants to
finally clear the air.

Similar difficulties are cropping up in other cities with smelly
businesses, especially rendering plants that are common in
agricultural regions and even some big cities. Angry residents are
deluging officials with complaints and filing lawsuits, while some
leading companies are installing new equipment, making payments to
neighbors or even closing down.

No one tracks such disputes, but Iowa State University professor
Jacek Koziel, who studies air quality and livestock odors, said he
thinks the conflicts may be increasing. Sometimes, as in Des
Moines, it's because more noses are nearer the bad smells, but in
other spots, it's that residents are simply pushing harder for
changes.

"It's very common in this juncture of animal agriculture in general
and meat packing plants or feed processing plants," Koziel said.
"It's very tough. For us engineers, we know there are technologies
to minimize the impact but then come all the fiscal realities of
doing that."

In Des Moines, residents and workers have for decades complained
about the smells from an industrial area little more than a mile
from downtown, describing the scent as putrid or akin to animal
waste. Brown takes a more charitable view, labeling the smell
"yeasty."

People typically blame two companies: pork processor Pine Ridge
Farms and rendering plant Darling Ingredients. Although the city
created an odor board and odor hotline, its efforts were
ineffective and largely abandoned until recently, when people who
moved into expensive apartments that had replaced warehouses and
scrap yards complained of nauseating smells periodically settling
over their neighborhoods.

City officials agree there's a problem, but say they need more data
before deciding what to do.

"You've got to know what is the truth that's out there, and then
make the plans work for each of the industries," said SuAnn
Donovan, deputy director of Des Moines' Neighborhood Services
Department. The new study will take air samples and figure out a
baseline for air quality.

Iowa is an agricultural powerhouse and Donovan is quick to note
that the city wants to work with Pine Ridge, Darling and other
companies.

Darling didn't respond to an inquiry about its Des Moines
operations.

Pine Ridge Farms is owned by meat industry giant Smithfield, which
said in a statement that its pork plant, which employs about 1,000
people, opened in 1937 and slaughters about 4,000 hogs daily. As
more people moved nearby, the company said, it had invested
millions of dollars on new technology, such as air treatment
equipment, to reduce odors.

"We also follow a rigorous daily cleaning schedule during and after
each production run," the statement said. "At the end of each week,
we perform a top-to-bottom deep cleaning to keep odor to a
minimum."

Even with efforts to reduce smells, rendering is an especially
pungent business. The plants use heat, centrifuges and other
techniques to convert waste animal tissue into fats and proteins
for many uses, including as animal feed, fertilizer and cosmetics.
There are more than 200 plants in the U.S. and Canada, according to
recent estimates.

In Fresno, California, a citizens group filed a lawsuit against a
Darling rendering plant that produced a stench so strong that
residents complained of health problems. Last year, the company
agreed to close the plant. Another rendering plant near the
Sacramento suburb of Rancho Cordova that had operated for more than
50 years also opted to close after concluding it couldn't coexist
with new nearby housing.

Rendering plants in an industrial area of Los Angeles have been
ordered to abide by strict new rules. And in Denver, where new
urban development has been especially extensive, there have been
sharp clashes between new residents and old industries.

"People moving in are savvy and they're not afraid to complain,"
said Greg Thomas, the city's director of environmental quality.

Residents in South St. Paul, Minnesota, filed a class action
lawsuit over fumes from a rendering plant, and neighbors received
up to $1,000 payments as part of a $750,000 settlement.

Still, though, smells of rancid meat remain.

"The lawsuit didn't seem to make a difference," said Chris
Robinson, who lives less than a mile from the plant. "Just last
night, my husband couldn't sit out on the deck. It's still really
bad."

Brown, of Des Moines, said with new outdoor projects underway, from
a soccer stadium to a whitewater rafting course, the city has
little option but to clear the air.

"You don't want the smell to contaminate the experience," Brown
said. [GN]

PIONEER EXPLORATION: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Chavera Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
ENRIQUE CHAVERA; and MAURO PEREZ JR., individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. PIONEER EXPLORATION
LLC; ATLAS OPERATING LLC; and YOUNAS CHAUDHARY, Defendants, Case
No. 4:21-cv-03712 (S.D. Tex., Nov. 11, 2021) seeks to recover from
the Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest,
liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Plaintiff Cahvera was employed by the Defendants as tool pusher
while Plaintiff Perez was employed as floor hand.

PIONEER EXPLORATION LLC is in the business of operating oil and gas
field properties.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Melissa Moore, Esq.
          Curt Hesse, Esq.
          MOORE & ASSOCIATES
          440 Louisiana Street, Suite 1110
          Houston, TX 77002-1063
          Telephone: (713) 222-6775
          Facsimile: (713) 222-6739
          Email: melissa@mooreandassociates.net
                 curt@mooreandassociates.net

PREMIER MEDICAL: Seeks to Stay Sharfman Case
---------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MARC IRWIN SHARFMAN, M.D.,
P.A., a Florida corporation, individually and as the representative
of a class of similarly-situated persons, v. PREMIER MEDICAL, INC.,
a South Carolina corporation, Case No. 6:20-cv-01278-WWB-LRH (M.D.
Fla.), the Defendant asks the Court to enter an order staying this
action pending the en banc decision of the Appellate Court as to
whether a violation of a federal statute gives rise to Article III
standing and jurisdiction to the Court to hear the case and
controversy.

When a decision is made, the parties should be ordered to provide a
report to the Court within 30 days, the Defendant says.

The Plaintiff's Complaint in this action alleges a single-page
facsimile advertisement was received on July 16, 2019 in violation
of a federal statute. The Defendant filed a Motion to Strike
Plaintiff's Class Allegations and Claims and Deny Class
Certification on July 16, 2021.

The Court has not ruled on the Motion. The Motion makes the same
claim and argument of a lack of Article III standing as made in
Hunstein that is being reheard en banc by the Appellate Court.

The Defendan contends that its motion for Stay is not made for
purposes of delay. The Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by a stay,
the Defendant adds.

Premier Medical is a molecular diagnostics lab.

A copy of Defendant's motion dated Nov. 23, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3nXSOa5 at no extra charge.[CC]

PROCTER & GAMBLE: Antiperspirant Contains Benzene, Aviles Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
EILEEN AVILES; SHELBY COOPER; TANYA COOPER; JACOB COOPER; and
PATRICIA DONADIO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY,
Defendant, Case No. 2:21-at-01093 (E.D. Cal., Nov. 12, 2021)
alleges that the Defendant's deodorant to contain the chemical
benzene, a known carcinogen.

According to the complaint the Defendant sells and manufactures the
Secret Powder Fresh or Secret Cool Light & Airy Smooth Feel
antiperspirants ("Secret Antiperspirants"), and Old Spice Pure
Sport antiperspirant, Old Spice Below Deck Powder Spray deodorant,
or Old Spice Sweat Defense, Stronger Swagger antiperspirant ("Old
Spice Deodorants") (collectively, the "Products").

Contrary to the representations of the Defendant, the Products are
allegedly defective because they each contain the chemical benzene,
a known carcinogen that offers no therapeutic deodorant or
antiperspirant benefit.

If the Plaintiff had been aware of the existence of benzene in the
Product, she would not have purchased the Product or would have
paid significantly less. The Defendant represents that the Products
are safe for its intended use. In reality, the Products contain
significant concentrations of benzene, a harmful carcinogen, the
suit added.

THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY manufactures and markets consumer
products in countries throughout the world. The Company provides
products in the laundry and cleaning, paper, beauty care, food and
beverage, and health care segments. Procter & Gamble products are
sold primarily through mass merchandisers, grocery stores,
membership club stores, drug stores, and neighborhood stores. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alex R. Straus, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON
          PHILLIPS GROSSMAN PLLC
          280 S. Beverly Drive
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (917) 471-1894
          Facsimile: (310) 496-3176
          Email: astraus@milberg.com

PSI SYSTEMS: Wins Bid to Dismiss Claims in Person Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARL E. PERSON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PSI SYSTEMS, INC., ENDICIA,
HARRY WHITEHOUSE, and JOHN DOE 1-100 whose names and addresses and
states of incorporation or principal place of business are unknown
but use PSI Systems, Inc. to ship unordered wristwatches for them,
and/or use one or more of the following telephone numbers and
merchandise descriptions when making unauthorized charges on the
credit cards of the persons being victimized: POWERPERFECTSKINCREAM
833-226-5287 CA ABSOLUTEGOLDESKINCREAM 833-207-5625 CA
BUYPLATINUMMAXSUPTESTO 888-828-6305 CA BOOSTERTONE.COM 833-661-9930
CA, Defendants, Docket No. 651885/2020, Motion Seq. No. 001 (N.Y.
Sup.), Judge Robert Reed of the U.S. Supreme Court, New York
County, issued Decision + Order:

   (i) denying the Plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a
       default judgment against Defendant PSI, for pre-action
       discovery and for an extension of time to serve Defendant
       Whitehouse; and

  (ii) granting Defendant PSI's cross motion to dismiss the
       complaint.

Introduction

The putative class action stems from the alleged unwanted and
unauthorized mailings of packages containing wristwatches to the
Plaintiffs by a licensee(s) of Defendant PSI, which has resulted in
unauthorized charges to their credit cards. Plaintiff Person, an
attorney representing himself and the purported class, moves,
pursuant to CPLR 3215, for leave to enter of a default judgment on
liability against PSI.

Upon granting the motion, the Plaintiff seeks an award of actual
damages, pre-judgment interest, a preliminary and permanent
injunction and punitive damages on the first cause of action for
fraud; an injunction and an award of reasonable attorneys' fees on
the second cause of action under General Business Law Section 396;
an injunction and an award of reasonable attorneys' fees on the
third cause of action under General Business Law Section 349(h);
and pre-action discovery on its fourth cause of action brought
under CPLR 3102(c), including an order directing PSI to disclose
the residence and business addresses, telephone numbers for and the
name of defendant Harry Whitehouse's (Whitehouse) employer.

The Plaintiff also moves, pursuant to CPLR 306-b, for an extension
of time to serve Whitehouse and the John Doe defendants. PSI
opposes the motion and cross-moves, pursuant to CPLR 3013, 3016,
and 3211(a)(1) and (a)(7), to dismiss the complaint.

Background

The Plaintiff is a resident of New York County. PSI is a California
corporation registered to do business in New York where it had
operated under the name "Endicia Insurance Services." PSI and
Defendant Endicia (together, PSI) are owned or affiliated with
"Stamps.com." Whitehouse is a founder and co-owner of PSI and is a
member of Endicia's executive team. He had invented a series of
patents related to mailing systems and has transferred those
patents to PSI.

Beginning August 2019, PSI and the other Defendants have used the
United States Postal Service (USPS) to mail to the Plaintiff and
others "under Endicia imprint and USPS license number 071 VD
1328177 unordered cheap, $5 wristwatches in black boxes in mailing
package envelopes providing no shipper or seller name or physical
address, with unauthorized credit card charges being made to the
recipients' credit cards in the amounts ranging between $90.01 and
$99.99.

In addition, the shipper of the unordered merchandise is a licensee
of PSI by reason of its use of the Endicia mark on its mailings, by
use of metered postage applied by the shipper, and by use of one or
more of the patents owned by PSI. Each package bore a return
address of "Shipping Department, P.O. Box 40189, Houston TX
77240-0189," which is alleged to be PSI's postal address. The
failure to provide the name of the shipper or seller is an alleged
violation of USPS, PSI and "Stamps.com" rules and regulations. The
complaint alleges that "PSI had the duty of terminating its
licenses to the shipper, or stop itself from the repeated unlawful
activities, but has failed to do so."

The Plaintiff commenced the action on behalf of himself and the
class on May 25, 2020 by filing a summons and complaint asserting
four causes of action for: (1) common-law fraud; (2) a violation of
General Business Law Section 396;(3) a violation of General
Business Law Section 349(h); and (4) pre-action discovery under
CPLR 3102(c). He now moves for a default judgment on liability
against PSI and for an extension of time to serve Whitehouse and
the John Doe Defendants. PSI opposes the motion and cross-moves to
dismiss the complaint.

Discussion

A. Plaintiff's Motion for a Default Judgment

The Plaintiff submits that he served PSI with the summons and
complaint in accordance with Business Corporation Law Section 306,
and that he "intends to mail a copy of the motion papers" to PSI at
P.O. Box 40189, Houston, Texas 77240-01891. As to the merits, he
submits that the unauthorized credit card charges support the
second cause of action under General Business Law Section 396 and
that he has adequately pled the requirements to sustain a cause of
action under General Business Law Section 349(h).

PSI contends that the motion is premature since it was made one day
before its time to answer expired and that it has both a reasonable
excuse and a meritorious defense to the action. The Plaintiff, in
response, submits that after PSI's counsel alerted him to this
defect, he served an amended notice of motion by mail on Aug. 6,
2020. He argues that PSI still waited until Aug. 12, 2020 to appear
in the action when it executed a stipulation to adjourn the
motion.

Judge Reed finds that the Defendants have demonstrated the
Plaintiff has not suffered any prejudice from the short delay and
that its delay was not willful. PSI has furnished the Court with
email correspondence dated July 15, 2020 from Sara Kani, a Senior
Corporate Counsel at nonparty Stamps.com Inc., to the Plaintiff
acknowledging receipt of the complaint and requesting an
opportunity to speak with him. The counsel for PSI also submits
copies of his email correspondence with the Plaintiff between July
20, 2020 and Aug. 3, 2020 regarding his law firm's representation
of PSI.

As to the merits, Kani avers that PSI has been a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Stamps.com since 2015 and that Endicia is a "trade
name" used by PSI. Stamps.com is an approved, independent licensed
vendor of USPS. She explains that PSI is engaged in the business of
providing "software-as-a-service," an online platform that provides
customers with interne mailing solutions. Customers using this
service "weigh the needed postage, input data to the online
Platform to print shipping labels, choose a shipping date and then
pay for the needed postage from various public and private entities
including USPS and United Postal Service ('UPS')." The shipping
information may be printed directly onto an envelope or onto a
label to be affixed to the parcel. Kani avers that PSI does not
inspect the envelopes or parcels shipped by its customers. She also
states that PSI's teens and conditions governing the use of its
services require all customers to comply with all USPS laws and
regulations and prohibit harassing conduct. Moreover, PSI customers
are not provided with a license, only the right to use PSI's
services to purchase postage and related products in accordance
with its terms and conditions.

As the complaint does not allege that PSI is the "shipper" of the
unwanted merchandise or the "seller billing the Plaintiff for the
unauthorized credit card purchases, Judge Reed holds that PSI has
demonstrated that it has a meritorious defense to the action.

B. Plaintiff's Request for Pre-Action Discovery

To the extent the moving papers can be read to request pre-action
discovery from PSI, Judge Reed denies the motion. He says, CPLR
3102(c) provides that "before an action is commenced, disclosure to
aid in bringing an action, to preserve information or to aid in
arbitration, may be obtained, but only by court order." The
Plaintiff complains that PSI conceded this issue by failing to
address it in its opposition. However, "pre-action disclosure may
only be obtained under CPLR 3102(c) before an action is commenced."
The Plaintiff has already commenced the action against PSI. Thus,
he has not demonstrated that relief under CPLR 3102(c) is
available.

C. Plaintiff's Request for an Extension of Time

The Plaintiff moves to extend his time to serve Whitehouse. He
alleges that Whitehouse is the founder of Redbrick 247 Inc., a
company located at 247 High Street, Palo Alto, California 94301. A
process server in California has returned an affidavit of
nonservice stating that he had made five attempts to serve
Whitehouse at that Palo Alto address between June 5, 2020 and July
6, 2020 but was unsuccessful.

Judge Reed finds that the Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he
was reasonably diligent in attempting to effectuate service. On the
first attempt on June 5, 2020, the process server learned that "Red
Juice Capital/Energy Tech Partners" occupied the building at the
Palo Alto address. On the fifth and last attempt made on July 6,
2020, the process server confirmed that Redbrick 247., Inc. was not
located in the building. The Plaintiff does not state whether he
made any other attempts to ascertain Whitehouse's home or business
address after this last attempt at service. Instead, he blames his
inability to serve Whitehouse upon PSI's default which has
prevented him from obtaining the necessary information to serve
Whitehouse and to identify the other Defendants. As such, the
Plaintiff has not established good cause for an extension.
Accordingly, the motion insofar as it seeks an extension of time to
serve Whitehouse with the summons and complaint is denied.

D. PSI's Cross Motion to Dismiss

PSI cross-moves to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3013, 3016 and
3211(a)(1) and (a)(7). First, PSI posits that the complaint
improperly groups all the Defendants together without pleading
specific tortious conduct undertaken by each Defendant. Second, the
complaint fails to plead fraud with particularity. The allegations
in support of the General Business Law Section 349 claim are also
conclusory. As for the cause of action under General Business Law
Section 396, PSI submits that the statute does not provide an
express private right of action. In response, the Plaintiff argues
that the complaint satisfies CPLR 3013 as he has pled the facts
then known to him. He also submits that the complaint adequately
pleads causes of action for fraud and for violations of General
Business Law Sections 349 and 396.

1. The First Cause of Action for Common-Law Fraud

To state a cause of action for common-law fraud, the Plaintiff must
plead "a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was
false and known to be false by the Defendant, made for the purpose
of inducing the other party to rely upon it, justifiable reliance
of the other party on the misrepresentation or material omission,
and injury." The circumstances of the alleged fraud must be pled
with particularity.

Judge Reed holds that the complaint fails to plead a cause of
action for fraud with the requisite particularity. As an initial
matter, the complaint fails to distinguish between each Defendant
before attributing the allegedly fraudulent conduct to all of them,
collectively. Such group pleading is improper. Also, the complaint
alleges in a wholly conclusory fashion that PSI had knowledge of
the falsity of the alleged misrepresentation. Crucially, the
complaint fails to plead specific facts to plausibly infer that
PSI, a business that provides postage and mailing services,
participated in a fraudulent scheme to charge for and ship unwanted
merchandise to the Plaintiff. Nor does the complaint adequately
allege that plaintiff justifiably relied upon an alleged
misrepresentation, namely the improper credit card charges, because
the Plaintiff avers that he has disputed the unauthorized charges
and canceled the credit card. Accordingly, the first cause of
action for common law fraud is dismissed.

2. The Second Cause of Action under General Business Law Section
396

General Business Law Section 396 governs unlawful selling
practices. Although the complaint does not plead which subsection
Plaintiff is proceeding under, the Plaintiff submits that General
Business Law Section 396(2)(a) applies. The Plaintiff contends that
the statute allows him to bring an action to enjoin the violation.
He, however, ignores General Business Law Section 396(3). The
language in General Business Law Section 396(3) "suggests that
recognition of an implied private right of action would be
inconsistent with the legislative scheme." The second cause of
action is dismissed.

3. The Third Cause of ction under General Business Law Section 349

Under General Business Law Section 349(a), "deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in
the furnishing of any service in the state are hereby declared
unlawful." A deceptive act or practice is "a representation or
omission likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably
under the circumstances." The statute expressly carves out a
private cause of action for "any person who has been injured by
reason of any violation of this section."

Judge Reed finds that the complaint fails to plausibly allege a
deceptive act or practice on the part of PSI. The documentary
evidence also refutes the allegation that PSI deliberately or
purposefully withheld the name of the seller or the shipper on the
shipping labels, as several sections in PSI's terms and conditions
discuss how PSI's customers may print their own labels. Critically,
the complaint also does not allege how the shipping labels
purportedly generated on PSI's online platform have caused the
Plaintiff's injuries. Hence, the third cause of action is
dismissed.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Reed denied the motion of Person for leave to
enter a default judgment against PSI for pre-action discovery and
for an extension of time to serve Defendant Harry Whitehouse. He
granted the cross motion of PSI to dismiss the complaint, and
dismissed the complaint in its entirety as against said Defendant,
with costs and disbursements to said Defendant as taxed by the
Clerk of the Court. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment
accordingly in favor of said Defendant.

The action is severed and continued against the remaining
Defendants.

The caption be amended to reflect the dismissal and that all future
papers filed with the court bear the amended caption.

The  counsel for the moving party will serve a copy of the Order
with notice of entry upon the Clerk of the Court (60 Centre Street,
Room 141B) and the Clerk of the General Clerk's Office (60 Centre
Street, Room 119), who are directed to mark the Court's records to
reflect the change in the caption therein.

Such service upon the Clerk of the Court and the Clerk of the
General Clerk's Office will be made in accordance with the
procedures set forth in the Protocol on Courthouse and County Clerk
Procedures for Electronically Filed Cases (accessible at the
"E-Filing" page on the court's website at the address
www.nycourts.gov/supctmanh).

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2021 Decision + Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3xfdwk2a from Leagle.com.


PURPLE LIFE: Tavarez-Vargas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Purple Life
Laboratories, LLC. The case is styled as Carmen Tavarez-Vargas, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Purple Life
Laboratories, LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-09847 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 23,
2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Purple Life Laboratories -- https://purps.com/ -- offers organic
energy drinks with zero calories and zero sugar in environmental
packaging.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, Ste. 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


REFINERY SPECIALTIES: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Rooks Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case, KURTIS ROOKS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. REFINERY SPECIALTIES,
INCORPORATED, Defendant, Case No. 4:21-cv-03665 (S.D. Tex.,
November 8, 2021) arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Portal-to-Portal Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a service technician
from in or around May 2018 through in or about August 2021.

According to the complaint, the Defendant misclassified the
Plaintiff and other similarly situated service technicians as
exempt from overtime pay. Despite frequently working over 40 hours
in a workweek, the Defendant allegedly did not pay them overtime
premium pay at the rate of one and one-half times their regular
rate pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek.

Refinery Specialties, Incorporated formulates, manufactures, and
provides technical service for the use of process and production
treating chemicals for the oilfield, industrial, and water
industries, including production, pipeline, refinery, and gas
plants. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ricardo J. Prieto, Esq.
          Melinda Arbuckle, Esq.
          SHELLIST LAZARS SLOBIN LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1515
          Houston, TX 77046
          Tel: (713) 621-2277
          Fax: (713) 621-0993
          E-mail: rprieto@eeoc.net
                  marbuckle@eeoc.net

ROSA'S CAFE: Faces Valdez Suit Over Cafe Employees' Unpaid Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
ERNESTO VALDEZ, JR., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ROSA'S CAFE & TORTILLA FACTORY,
LTD., Defendant, Case No. 4:21-cv-01296-O (N.D. Tex., November 23,
2021) is a class action against the Defendant for unpaid minimum
wages and overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendant as an assistant manager at
Rosa's Cafe since approximately May 2020.

Rosa's Cafe & Tortilla Factory, Ltd. is an owner and operator of a
cafe, headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Clif Alexander, Esq.
         Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
         ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
         819 N. Upper Broadway
         Corpus Christi, TX 78401
         Telephone: (361) 452-1279
         Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
         E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                 austin@a2xlaw.com

                - and –

         J. Forester, Esq.
         FORESTER HAYNIE, PLLC
         400 North Saint Paul Street, Suite 700
         Dallas, TX 75201
         Telephone: (214) 210-2100
         E-mail: jay@foresterhaynie.com

RUSSELL SECURITY: December 20 Settlement Approval Hearing Set
-------------------------------------------------------------
Angelica Dino, writing for Law Times, reports that a settlement has
been reached in a proposed class action for unpaid wages, with the
employer, Ontario-based private security firm, Russell Security,
agreeing to make policy changes and pay $725,000 to class members.

The class action was brought on behalf of security guards and the
class covers all guards employed since January 1, 2017, except
those who worked at sites that were subject to a collective
agreement.

"This case is significant in employment class actions as it's
another example of classes of non-unionized employees negotiating
employer policy changes as part of class action settlements," says
Joshua Mandryk, a lawyer with Goldblatt Partners. He represented
class-members along with Goldblatt colleagues Geetha Philipupillai,
Christine Davies and Charles Sinclair.

"It's really a great example of continuing to expand the use of
class actions to provide access to justice to low income and
precarious workers," says Mandryk.

The class members alleged that Russel Security required them to
report for work and to prepare for duty at least 15 minutes before
the official start of their shift. This policy is expressly stated
in the company's security guard handbook, but the class members
said Russell Security did not compensate them for the 15-minute
pre-shift period, in violation of the Employment Standards Act and
employment contract.

In the proposed settlement, Russell Security agreed to the
certification of the class action and to pay $725,000 to the class
members. The company also consented to update its handbook to
stipulate that the employees are expected to report for duty at the
commencement of their scheduled shift and any additional time
worked for the briefing process may be compensated.

"Behavior modification is one of the key pillars underlying class
actions. It's one of the key goals of class actions," says Mandryk.
"And so, to be able to negotiate these changes, going forward, in
the employment context, we think is a perfect example of behavior
modification in class actions at its very best."

The Russell Security settlement comes just short of a year after
the Ontario Superior Court approved a settlement agreement in
another class action brought by security guards against their
employer. In Horner v. Primary Response Inc. et al., Goldblatt
acted for the class members who alleged Primary Response, which is
owned by Garda Canada Security Corporation, also required guards
show up for an unpaid 15 minutes before their shift, was unlawfully
averaging overtime pay, deducting from wages the cost of uniforms
and not paying guards for the time spent training them for the job.
The settlement amounted to $2.9 million, spread across those four
categories, says Mandryk.

"We see employment class actions as a tool in the toolkit for
non-unionized workers to try and improve and enforce their rights
at work," he says.

The Russel Security settlement was reached following a mediation
between the parties with mediator, William Kaplan. Settlement funds
will be distributed to the class members after court approval. The
certification and settlement approval hearing will be held on
December 20. [GN]

SHORELINE CHARTERS: Targeted by BIPA Lawsuit Over Fingerprint Scans
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Bilyk at cookcountyrecord.com reports that the company
that operates many of Chicago's famed architecture river tours, and
other popular sightseeing excursions, has become one of the latest
employers targeted by a class action lawsuit under Illinois'
biometrics privacy law.

On Nov. 12, attorney James X. Bormes, of Chicago, filed a lawsuit
in Cook County Circuit Court against the company that operates
Shoreline Charters and Shoreline Sightseeing Cruises.

The complaint was filed on behalf of named plaintiff James Nieto,
identified as an Illinois resident who worked for Shoreline from
2016-2017.

According to its website, Shoreline operates Chicago's largest
fleet of sightseeing boats and water taxis. The company boasts that
its Chicago architecture tours were voted the "Most Popular Tour in
America" on Tripadvisor from 2017-2020.

Nieto's complaint accuses Shoreline of violating the Illinois
Biometric Information Protection Act during the time Nieto worked
there, in the way Shoreline required its workers to scan their
fingerprints to verify their identity when punching in and out of
work shifts.

According to the complaint, Shoreline allegedly failed to secure
written consent from workers before requiring the fingerprint
scans, and also did not provide workers with notices the plaintiffs
claim is required by the BIPA law, concerning how the scanned
fingerprint data would be stored, shared, used and ultimately
destroyed.

The complaint further accuses Shoreline of sharing the fingerprint
data with its payroll processor vendor, which the plaintiffs claim
also violated the BIPA law.

The BIPA law has been used by a growing cadre of trial lawyers in
Illinois to launch class action suits against thousands of
companies doing business in Illinois. Cook County's courts have
been particularly popular destinations for such lawsuits.

While the suits have targeted tech giants like Facebook and Google,
they have mostly been aimed, so far, at Illinois employers who have
required workers to scan their fingerprints on so-called biometric
punch clocks, to accurately track their work hours and prevent
so-called "punch fraud" on jobsites.

Since the first such BIPA class actions were launched in 2015, more
and more businesses have opted to settle, rather than risk
potentially catastrophic damages that businesses have argued could
cripple their operations.

Under the BIPA law, plaintiffs are allowed to demand damages of
$1,000-$5,000 per violation. Attorneys on both sides have defined
individual violations as each time each employee scans a
fingerprint, for instance. When multiplied over an entire
workforce, such potential damages could leave employers holding the
bag on judgments worth millions, or even billions of dollars,
depending on the number of workers a business may employ, should
such cases go to trial.

Courts have also routinely denied employers nearly every avenue of
legal defense attempted to date to sidestep such class action
lawsuits, or at least reduce their potential exposure to damages.

Rather than risk such massive legal bills, many employers have
opted to settle in recent months, with settlements ranging from
payouts worth hundreds of thousands of dollars to $25 million.

The complaint against Shoreline estimates the company may employ
more than 100 workers who could qualify to be part of the class
action. [GN]

SHUN LEE PALACE: Must Oppose Class Cert. Bid by Dec. 29, 2021
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Wang et al. v. Shun Lee
Palace Restaurant, Inc. et. al., Case No. 1:17-cv-00840-VSB
(S.D.N.Y.), the Hon Judge Vernon S. Broderick entered an order
granting one-month extension of time (until December 29, 2021) from
the current deadline, for Defendant to oppose Troy Law's motion for
class certification.

This is Defendants' first request for an extension of time to
oppose the class certification motion. Additional time is needed
given the Thanksgiving holiday, previously scheduled time-off, and
to meet with various witnesses whose primary language is Chinese
(necessitating extra time fortranslation), the Defendants' counsel
says.

Troy Law does not consent to Defendants' request and has provided
Defendants with no explanation regarding their refusal to consent.
Defendants note that Troy Law has previously refused to consent to
extension requests sought by Defendants, including: (1) on August
31, 2021 when Defendants sought an extension of time to respond to
Troy Law's purported charging liens, (2) on July 1, 2021 when
Defendants sought a stay of discovery while Defendants' motion to
dismiss was pending; and (3) on February 6, 2020 when Defendants
sought a one week extension of time to respond to the consolidated
amended complaint (due to Mr. Freedberg being in a car accident and
taking time to recuperate), the counsel adds.

A copy of the the Court's Order dated Nov. 18, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3l2dkEe at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Eli Z. Freedberg, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, PC
          900 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10022.3298
          Telephone: (212) 583-2685
          Facsimile: (212) 954-5011
          E-mail: efreedberg@littler.com

SIMPLEFASTLOANS: Warren Terzian Investigates Potential Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Warren Terzian LLP is investigating a potential class action
against SimpleFastLoans.

Persons who took out certain loans from SimpleFastLoans may not owe
any money on their loans—you may even get money back.

California law establishes interest rate caps on the loans issued
by lenders like SimpleFastLoans. But it's believed that
SimpleFastLoans' loans may exceed those caps.

SimpleFastLoans is attempting to exploit a loophole that should
not—and in our view, does not—exist. And California law should
invalidate the loans in entirety.

If you are interested in trying to invalidate your loans and not
making any more payments (and getting money back), please complete
this form.

Legal Background
California law caps the maximum interest rate on loans issued by
certified finance lenders. SimpleFastLoans is such a lender.

That law (California Financial Code Section 22304.5) went into
effect on January 1, 2020.

Under that law, the maximum interest rate on loans from $2,500 to
$9,999 is about 36%. Another law caps the interest rate of loans
under $2,500 at no more than 25%.

Related laws invalidate loans that exceed those interest rates.

Not Just California
Other states have interest rate caps similar to California's. Those
states may include Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi,
Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and
Washington. [GN]

SIRIUS XM RADIO: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Potts Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
JESSICA POTTS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SIRIUS XM RADIO INC.; PANDORA MEDIA, LLC;
and DOES 1 TO 50, Defendants, Case No. 21STCV41969 (Cal. Super.,
Los Angeles Cty., Nov. 15, 2021) is an action against the
Defendants for failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation,
authorize and permit meal and rest periods, provide accurate wage
statements, and reimburse necessary business expenses.

Plaintiff Potts was employed by the Defendants as office manager.

SIRIUS XM RADIO INC. is an American broadcasting company
headquartered in Midtown Manhattan, New York City that provides
satellite radio and online radio services operating in the United
States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Melmed, Esq.
          Kyle D. Smith, Esq.
          MELMED LAW GROUP P.C.
          1801 Century Park East, Suite 850
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 824-3828
          Facsimile: (310) 862-6851
          Email: jm@melmedlaw.com
                 ks@melmedlaw.com

               -and-

          Daniel B. Swerdlin, Esq.
          ALL BRIDGES LEGAL, P.C.
          1388 Haight Street #58
          San Francisco, CA 941117
          Telephone: (415) 235-1751
          Facsimile: (415) 551-1220
          Email: daniel@allbridgeslegal.com

SNAP INC: Faces Black Suit Over Alleged Drop in Share Price
-----------------------------------------------------------
KELLIE BLACK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SNAP INC.; EVAN SPIEGEL; DEREK ANDERSEN;
JEREMI GORMAN; and REBECCA MORROW, Defendants, Case No.
2:21-cv-08892 (C.D. Cal., Nov. 11, 2021) is a class action on
behalf of persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired
publicly traded Snap securities between July 22, 2020 and October
21, 2021, inclusive (the "Class Period"), the Plaintiff seeking to
recover compensable damages caused by the Defendants' violations of
the federal securities laws under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

According to the complaint, the Defendants' report with the
Securities and Exchange Commission were materially false and
misleading because they misrepresented and failed to disclose the
following adverse facts pertaining to the Company's business,
operational and financial results, which were known to the
Defendants or recklessly disregarded by them. Specifically, the
Defendants made false and misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) Apple's privacy changes would have, and were
having, a material impact on the Company's advertising business;
(2) Snap overstated its ability to transition its advertising with
Apple's privacy changes; (3) Snap knew of, but downplayed, the
risks of the impact that Apple's privacy changes had on the
Company's advertising business; (4) Snap overstated its commitment
to privacy; and (5) as a result of the foregoing, Defendants'
public statements and statements to journalists were materially
false and misleading at all relevant times.

On October 22, 2021, Snap filed its third quarter 2021 report for
the period ending September 30, 2021 with the SEC on From 10-Q (the
"3Q21 Report"), disclosing the Company's weaker-than-expected
revenue and weaker-than-expected guidance because of its
advertising business, including due to Apple's privacy changes.
Further, the 3Q21 Report disclosed the risks of heighted
restrictions on the Company's access and use of user data due to
Apple's privacy update. On this news, Snap's stock price fell
$19.97 per share, or 26%, to close at $55.14 per share on October
22, 2021, damaging investors, says the suit.

As a result of the Defendants' alleged wrongful acts and omissions,
and the decline in the market value of the Company's securities,
Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered significant losses
and damages.

SNAP INC. provides technology and social media services. The
Company develops mobile camera application products and services
that allow users to send and receive photos, drawings, text, and
videos. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2450
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 785-2610
          Facsimile: (213) 226-4684
          Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com

SOCIETY INSURANCE: Faces Suit Over Denial of Insurance Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
CALABRESE & SONS, INC. (d/b/a) ZIA'S TRATTORIA; DEACON REVIVAL,
INC. (d/b/a) BEACON TAP; and ZIA'S LAGO VISTA, INC., Plaintiffs v.
SOCIETY INSURANCE, A MUTUAL COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
1:21-cv-06031 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 10, 2021) Illinois Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Practices Act.

The Plaintiffs allege in the complaint that even though the
Defendant has accepted the Plaintiffs' insurance premium payments,
the Defendant has summarily denied the Plaintiffs' claims for
coverage arising from government-ordered interruption and complete
or partial closure of their business operations, in breach of the
Defendant's contractual obligations under the Policies. The
Defendant denied the Plaintiffs' claims with cursory letters sent
in substantially similar form to all of the Defendant's insureds,
without any reasonable explanation or individualized investigation
or consideration, alleges the suit.

The Plaintiffs have been forced to file the class action in
response to the Defendant's misconduct and refusal to meet its
obligations under the Policies, and to establish that the
Plaintiffs are entitled to receive the benefit of the insurance
coverage they purchased.

SOCIETY INSURANCE, A MUTUAL COMPANY is an insurance firm. The
Company offers property and casualty insurance services. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          William E. Meyer, Jr., Esq.
          Lucas M. Fuksa, Esq.
          Lema A. Khorshid, Esq.
          Vincent P. Formica, Esq.
          Elzbieta Michalowska, Esq.
          FUKSA KHORSHID, LLC
          200 W. Superior, Suite 410
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 266-2221
          Facsimile: (312) 266-2224
          Email: william@fklawfirm.com
                 lucas@fklawfirm.com
                 lema@fklawfirm.com
                 vince@fklawfirm.com

SPECTRANETICS CORP: Court Vacates Dec. 2 Class Status Hearing
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SHELLY LOUANGAMATH v. THE
SPECTRANETICS CORPORATION, Case No. 4:18-cv-03634-JST (N.D. Cal.),
the Hon. Judge Jon S. Tigar entered an order vacating class
certification hearing.

Before the Court is Plaintiff's third motion to certify class for
settlement purposes only and motion for preliminary approval of
class action settlement.

Pursuant to Federal Rule 15 of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil
Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds the matter suitable for
disposition without oral argument.

The hearing on this matter, currently scheduled for December 2,
2021, is hereby vacated, says Judge Tigar.

Spectranetics develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes its
technology for interventional cardiovascular therapy.

A copy of the Court's order dated Nov. 22, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3CMldDX at no extra charge.[CC]

ST. VINCENT SALEM: Dismissal of Taylor's Judgment Claim Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Julia Taylor, Appellants-Plaintiffs v. St. Vincent
Salem Hospital, Inc., Appellee-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
21A-MI-655 (Ind. App.), the Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed
the judgment of the trial court dismissing the part of Taylor's
complaint seeking a declaratory judgment.

Background

Ms. Taylor was under suspicion for Operating While Intoxicated and
was arrested on Aug. 28, 2015. Toxicological services were rendered
by St. Vincent Salem Hospital at the request of the Salem Indiana
Police Department (SPD). Later, Taylor received invoices from the
Hospital seeking payment for those toxicological services.

On March 23, 2016, Taylor filed a class action complaint alleging
that charging her and others similarly situated for the Hospital's
services, which were conducted at the behest of SPD and other law
enforcement agencies in Washington County, was contrary to law.
Taylor alleged in her complaint that she was not the only person
who had been charged directly by the Hospital for services
requested by those law enforcement agencies, and it was the
Hospital's policy to do so.

Ms. Taylor asked the court to certify the action as a class action
for all persons who were charged for testing conducted at the
request of law enforcement in Washington County from March 23, 2014
until the present. She also requested an order finding her not
financially responsible for the testing and sought reimbursement
for any fees that were already paid.

Ms. Taylor later amended to include others similarly situated,
largely seeking: 1) certification of the matter as a class action;
2) an order finding that she and the class were not responsible for
payment of the invoices from the Hospital; 3) reimbursement to the
members of the class for any fees already paid; and 4) injunctive
relief to prevent the Hospital, going forward, from seeking payment
directly from individuals for those toxicology services.

The trial court found that a class was sustainable, meeting all the
criteria of Indiana Trial Rule 23(A), but that the action was moot
because there was no "palpable harm not previously addressed by
statute." The court then dismissed the part of Taylor's complaint
seeking a declaratory judgment and stated that the Hospital must
follow Indiana Code section 36-2-13-18(g) (2011) when seeking
reimbursement for the cost of services conducted at the request of
law enforcement. The court further found that Rule 23(B)(2)1 did
not extend to cases where the "appropriate final relief relates
primarily, principally, and predominantly to monetary damages." The
court's final judgment was entered on March 18, 2021.

Ms. Taylor now appeals and the Hospital cross-appeals.

On cross-appeal, the Hospital raises this potentially dispositive
issue: Did the court err by refusing to conclude that the doctrine
of defensive collateral estoppel was a bar to Taylor's complaint?

Ms. Taylor raises the following issue for the Court of Appeals'
review: Was the court's rationale for dismissing Taylor's request
for a declaratory judgment erroneous?

Ms. Taylor presents the additional following issue for our review
in her cross-appellee/reply brief: Did the court err by concluding
that Taylor was responsible for the costs of the toxicological
testing because she was convicted?

Discussion

Ms. Taylor argues on appeal that the court erred by holding that a
declaratory judgment was inappropriate, challenging the court's
rationale for its decision. The trial court entered specific
findings of fact and conclusions of law sua sponte. When the trial
court does so, the specific findings control only as to the issues
they cover, and a general judgment standard applies to any issues
upon which the court has not found. A two-tiered standard of review
is used when reviewing specific findings.

First, the Court of Appeals determines whether the evidence
supports the findings and then whether the findings support the
judgment. In deference to the trial court's proximity to the
issues, it will reverse a judgment only when it is shown to be
clearly erroneous. A judgment is clearly erroneous when it is
unsupported by the findings of fact and conclusions entered on the
findings. Although it defers substantially to the trial court's
findings of fact, the Court of Appeals does not do so as to the
conclusions of law. It evaluates questions of law de novo and owes
no deference to the trial court's legal determinations.

A. Application of the Law to Taylor's Case

Examining whether the evidence supports the findings, the Court of
Appeals finds that the record reflects that Taylor and the class
failed in their proof of damages. The Hospital was acting under the
direction and authority of SPD. The evidence did not support a
finding of culpable or malicious behavior on the part of the
Hospital. Taylor's medical insurance paid the allowable amount for
the services and the remainder of the charge was written off,
leaving her with a balance of zero. Others included in the class
may not have been convicted, may not have paid the Hospital's bill,
others may have discharged the "debt" in bankruptcy, others may
have had insurance coverage similar to Taylor's, while still others
may have voluntarily paid. Because Indiana Code section
36-2-13-18(g) already establishes financial responsibility for
medical services in situations involving arrestees, the Court of
Appeals cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by
concluding that declaratory relief was inappropriate. The order
would have reiterated what the statute already says.

Additionally, under the general judgment standard, the Court of
Appeals notes that the substance of the Charles Darnell v. St.
Vincent Salem Hospital, Inc., 88C01-1702-MI-87, court's order,
which was before the court but ignored, emphasized that "the
Hospital had indicated it was no longer pursuing payment on bills
previously issued and had changed its policy to cease billing
individuals directly, instead billing the law enforcement agency or
the prosecutor's office." This is further evidence to support the
court's determination that declaratory judgment was unnecessary
because the dispute had been resolved.

The trial court included in its order that the Hospital must not
directly bill individuals brought in for testing by law enforcement
but must seek payment as outlined in the court's order, i.e., from
the county or requesting agency. An issue becomes moot when "the
principal questions in issue have ceased to be matters of real
controversy between the parties." Under the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act, cases which may be considered by the courts must not
be moot and must not call for merely advisory opinions." Taylor
obtained the relief she sought in the court's order albeit not as a
declaratory judgment.

The court had the discretion to deny or issue a declaratory
judgment. Under the facts and arguments presented, the Court of
Appeals concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
and its order denying declaratory relief was not clearly
erroneous.

B. Financial Responsibility

Ms. Taylor argues in her cross-appellee/reply brief that the trial
court erred by stating in its order that she and those in the class
"who have been found in violation of the law for driving while
impaired by alcohol or illegal substances must stand their costs as
they apply."

The Court of Appeals finds that the issue was not raised in
Taylor's opening brief. The law is well settled that grounds for
error may only be framed in an appellant's initial brief and if
addressed for the first time in the reply brief, they are waived.
Additionally, in the case of cross-appeals, "the appellant's reply
brief will address the arguments raised on cross-appeal."

Ms. Taylor's opening brief addressed whether the trial court abused
its discretion by failing to issue a declaratory judgment. The
Hospital's brief raised a cross-appeal issue, arguing that the
trial court erred by failing to find that res judicata applied. The
Hospital also responded to Taylor's declaratory judgment arguments,
contending that the court did not err.

Ms. Taylor's argument is not in response to the cross-appeal
argument and is raised for the first time in a reply brief. Hence,
her argument is waived.

Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 12, 2021 Memorandum Decision
is available at https://tinyurl.com/59au32dz from Leagle.com.

Bart M. Betteau, in New Albany, Indiana, Attorney for the
Appellant.

Stacy L. Hanefeld -- shanefeld@dsvlaw.com -- Melanie A. Kalmbach --
mkalmbach@dsvlaw.com -- Drewry Simmons Vornehm, LLP, in Carmel,
Indiana, Attorneys for the Appellee.


STATE FARM: Time Extension for Class Cert. Bid Filing Sought
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LAUREN CROSS, in her
capacity as executrix of the estate of Zona Jones, and on behalf of
others similarly situated, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 1:20-cv-01047-SOH (W.D. Ark.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order extending the deadline
for moving for class certification to March 31, 2022.

This class action alleges that the Defendant State Farm caused
nonconsensual, autodialed text messages to be sent to cell phones
in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

On August 17, 2021, the Court issued its Initial Scheduling Order,
which set the deadline for Plaintiff's motion for class
certification for 90 days after the parties' Rule 26(f) conference.


The parties completed their Rule 26(f) conference on September 3,
2021, which makes Plaintiff's motion for class certification due on
December 2, 2021.

On September 21, 2021, the parties submitted a Joint Fed.R.Civ.P.
26(f) Report, with competing proposals for a new class
certification deadline.

Farm filed a motion to stay discovery pending the Court's ruling on
its motion to dismiss that was filed on August 12, 2021.

The Plaintiff opposed the stay, but understood that State Farm
would not respond to discovery while its motion to stay was
pending.

State Farm is a group of insurance companies throughout the United
States with corporate headquarters in Bloomington, Illinois.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Nov. 22, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3oYmx1H at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alexander H. Burke, Esq.
          BURKE LAW OFFICES, LLC
          909 Davis Street, Suite 500
          Evanston, IL 60201
          Telephone: (312) 729-5288
          E-mail: aburke@burkelawllc.com

               - and -

          Christopher D. Jennings, Esq.
          JOHNSON FIRM
          610 President Clinton Ave., Suite 300
          Little Rock, AR 72201
          Telephone: (501) 372-1300
          E-mail: chris@yourattorney.com

               - and -

          William "Billy" P. Howard, Esq.
          THE CONSUMER PROTECTION FIRM, PLLC
          401 E. Jackson St., Suite 2340
          SunTrust Financial Center
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 500-1500
          E-mail: billy@theconsumerprotectionfirm.com

STONECO LTD: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Fraud Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM"), announces that it has filed a
class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York captioned Ray v. StoneCo Ltd., et
al., (Case No. 21-cv-9620) on behalf of persons and entities that
purchased or otherwise acquired StoneCo Ltd. ("StoneCo" or the
"Company") (NASDAQ: STNE) between March 11, 2021 and November 16,
2021, inclusive (the "Class Period"). Plaintiff pursues claims
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act").

Investors are hereby notified that they have 60 days from this
notice to move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff in this
action.

If you suffered a loss on your StoneCo investments or would like to
inquire about potentially pursuing claims to recover your loss
under the federal securities laws, you can submit your contact
information at www.glancylaw.com/cases/stoneco-ltd/. You can also
contact Charles H. Linehan, of GPM at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at
888-773-9224, or via email at shareholders@glancylaw.com or visit
our website at www.glancylaw.com to learn more about your rights.

On August 30, 2021, after the market closed, StoneCo announced its
second quarter 2021 financial results in a press release, reporting
an 8.1% year-over-year decrease in revenue "mainly due to
adjustments in credit fair value and significantly lower credit
disbursements." The Company stated that it had "implemented some
prudent actions, like temporarily stopping the disbursement of
credit and increasing coverage for potential future losses, which
impacted [StoneCo's] reported results for the quarter."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $2.96, to close at
$46.54 per share on August 31, 2021, on unusually heavy trading
volume.

Then, on October 26, 2021, PAX Global Technology Ltd's Florida
offices were raided by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the Department of Homeland Security, and several other agencies as
part of a federal investigation. As a Viceroy Research report on
October 27, 2021 pointed out, Stone states that PAX "is no longer
[its] sole provider of POS services, [but the Company is] still
substantially dependent on it to manufacture and assemble a
substantial amount of [its] POS devices." Moreover, another company
replaced its PAX terminals "because it did not receive satisfactory
answers from PAX regarding its POS devices connecting to websites
not listed in their supplied documentation."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $2.64, or 7%, to close
at $33.81 per share on October 27, 2021, thereby injuring investors
further.

Then, on November 16, 2021, StoneCo announced that it would "start
retesting our original [credit] product, which is short-term loans,
between the fourth quarter of '21 and the first quarter of '22."
The Company could not provide specific guidance about when credit
volumes would return to levels before StoneCo had halted
origination of credit.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $10.96, or 34%, to
close at $20.70 per share on November 17, 2021, thereby injuring
investors further.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that StoneCo was experiencing difficulties in
implementing its credit product; (2) that StoneCo faced significant
risks via its point-of-sale vendor, PAX Global Technology Ltd.; (3)
that, as a result of the foregoing, the Company's financial results
would be adversely impacted; and (4) that, as a result of the
foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired StoneCo securities during
the Class Period, you may move the Court no later than 60 days from
this notice to ask the Court to appoint you as lead plaintiff. To
be a member of the Class you need not take any action at this time;
you may retain counsel of your choice or take no action and remain
an absent member of the Class. If you wish to learn more about this
action, or if you have any questions concerning this announcement
or your rights or interests with respect to these matters, please
contact Charles Linehan, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park East,
Suite 2100, Los Angeles California 90067 at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free
at 888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit
our website at www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email please
include your mailing address, telephone number and number of shares
purchased.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules. [GN]

STRATEGIC DELIVERY: Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Christian Zambrano, et
al., v. Strategic Delivery Solutions, LLC, et al., Case No.
1:15-cv-08410-ER (S.D.N.Y.), the Plaintiffs Blanca Alulema and
Maria Tacoaman ask the Court to enter an order:

   1. conditionally certifying a collective action under the
      Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. section 216(b);

   2. directing disclosure of contact information of similarly-
      situated individuals; and

   3. approving notice to be sent to those similarly-situated.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Nov. 18,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3DKjv7i
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Hugh Baran, Esq.
          Patricia Kakalec, Esq.
          KAKALEC LAW PLLC
          195 Montague Street, 14 th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (212) 705-8730
          E-mail: Hugh@KakalecLaw.com
                  Patricia@KakalecLaw.com

               - and -

          Jose Cristobal Gutierrez, Esq.
          Make the Road New York
          92-10 Roosevelt Avenue
          Jackson Heights, NY 11372
          Telephone: (718) 565-8500
          Cristobal.Gutierrez@maketheroadny.org

SUBARU OF AMERICA: Ct. Enters Scheduling Order in Nunez Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CRISTIAN NUNEZ,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et
al., v. SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC., et al., Case No.
1:19-cv-18303-JDW-ETH (D.N.J.), the Hon. Judge Joshua D. Wolson
entered an order as follows:

   1. On or before December 3, 2021, the Parties shall meet and
      confer to set aside dates to hold open for depositions
      before the close of discovery;

   2. Affirmative expert reports, if any, are due by April 22,
      2022;

   3. Rebuttal expert reports, if any, are due by May 20, 2022;

   4. A party intending to offer lay witness opinion testimony
      must disclose the name of any witness who will offer such
      an opinion and a brief summary of each such opinion at the
      same time the expert reports are exchanged;

   5. The Parties shall complete all discovery by June 10, 2022;
      and

   6. Motions for class certification and summary judgment, if
      any, shall be filed by July 1, 2022. Responses to the
      motions shall be filed by July 29, 2022, and replies shall
      be filed by August 19, 2022.

Subaru of America, Inc., based in Camden, New Jersey, is the United
States-based distributor of Subaru's brand vehicles, a subsidiary
of Subaru Corporation of Japan.

A copy of the Court's order dated Nov. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3r1RIfb at no extra charge.[CC]

SUMMIT FINANCIAL: Firm Director Found Guilty of Contravening NCR
----------------------------------------------------------------
The National Consumer Tribunal has found Clark Gardner, a director
of Stellenbosch debt counselling firm Summit Financial Partners,
guilty of contravening the National Credit Act and his conditions
of registration as a debt counsellor. Gardner is one of the key
players in a class action against allegedly unfair practices in the
credit industry and has been outspoken in his criticism of the
National Credit Regulator (NCR).

According to a press release on the website of the NCR, the
judgment by the tribunal follows an investigation of complaints
against Gardner by the NCR. The tribunal found Gardner guilty of
contraventions related to, among others:

-- Failing to make determinations on whether consumers were
over-indebted;
-- Failing to inform consumers of the consequences of applying for
debt review;
-- Failing to update the records of consumers relating to debt
review;
-- Failing to notify credit providers and credit bureaus that
consumers had applied for debt review;
-- Failing to perform debt counselling functions personally;
-- Receiving payments from consumers who applied for debt review at
the commencement of the debt review process; and
-- Using misleading and deceptive advertisements offering debt
repayment reductions of up to 50% and free debt counselling
services when his services were not free.

The tribunal imposed an administrative fine of R500 000 on Gardner,
according to the NCR press release. Further, it ordered Gardner to
appoint an independent auditor to audit his consumer files dating
back three years in order to identify, among other things,
consumers who had been overcharged. The auditors' report must be
given to the NCR once completed, and Gardner has been ordered to
refund consumers identified by the auditors as having been
overcharged.

CLASS ACTION

The outcome of the investigation is seemingly at odds with news
reports over the last few years on Gardner's efforts, together with
the Stellenbosch Law Clinic, in pursuing a class action on behalf
of indebted consumers regarding the abuse of garnishee orders and
high debt collection costs.

In December 2019, Personal Finance's sister publication, Business
Report, reported that Summit Financial and the Stellenbosch Law
Clinic, representing 10 indebted clients, had won a ground-breaking
judgment in the Cape High Court that would "put a cap on the
outstanding garnishee order amounts owed, and the unregulated and
unfair way in which debt collection costs had prejudiced the poor
in the past".

The court case listed no less than 49 respondents, including the
National Credit Regulator, Banking Association of South Africa,
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services, Minister of Trade
and Industry, Council for Debt Collectors, National Forum on Legal
Profession, Law Society of South Africa, most of the major banks,
South African Human Rights Commission, Consumer Goods Council and
some of the major retailers such as The Foschini Group, Truworths,
Mr Price Group, Edcon and Lewis Group.

The report quoted Gardner as saying about 1.3 million consumers
were paying debts via garnishee orders on their salaries, while
about 1.5 million were likely to have paid off or contributed to
paying towards those orders in the past three years.

Criticism Of Regulator

Gardner subsequently criticised the NCR for not doing more to
protect consumers. In a Personal Finance Rands and Sense opinion
piece on January 20, 2020, "Is the NCR fulfilling its mandate to
protect consumers?", he wrote: "Despite [a] framework, which
clearly requires that the regulator protect the interests of
consumers, in particular those whose situation in life means that
they are unlikely to be able to fend for themselves against big
business, it appears that the NCR has chosen rather to uphold the
interests of the corporate world at the expense of the vulnerable
consumers.

"This assertion arises from the fact that the NCR has been
noticeably absent from the efforts a number of parties have made to
act against those in the debt collection industry, including
certain attorneys, who are engaging in practices that go against
the law and which see them milking the poorest in our society for
fees to which they are not actually entitled. In fact, the NCR
stands out for upholding the interests of those who charge fees in
contravention of what the law allows, rather than intervening to
protect the rights of debtors in South Africa."

Response

Gardner says he will be appealing the judgment. He issued the
following statement this week:

"We are disappointed with the recent judgment against me personally
and take the Tribunal's ruling on this matter seriously.

"The context in which the complaint by the National Credit
Regulator was made does, perhaps, requires some exposition. I have
been open about my criticism of the NCR and their lacklustre
approach in addressing the abuses prevalent in both our formal and
informal consumer credit industry. As a result, Summit's
relationship with the NCR has been precarious for some time.

"As a result of the NCR's failure to act, Summit has opted to take
on some of the consumer fights ourselves and we have already
referred several matters to court. Our most recent case, Bayport
Securitisation v University of Stellenbosch Law Clinic, in which we
request ask the court to confirm the limit placed on legal fees by
the National Credit Act's ultra in duplum rule, was opposed by the
NCR. As was our case brought against Lewis Stores for charging
first-time credit consumers a compulsory delivery fee, a practice
we submit is prohibited by the National Credit Act.

"Summit has attracted over 150 000 consumer cases in the past few
years. Most of whom seeking relief from their credit burden, or the
garnishee orders related thereto. In turn, Summit has saved or
refunded over R850m for these consumers who access the service via
employer agreements. Of these 150 000 plus consumers, a mere 4 500
consumers required debt counselling solutions, as we favour other,
less cumbersome, and invasive alternatives. In the judgment, 36 of
these cases were found to have breached our processes and the NCR's
regulations.

"Debt counselling is a complicated process, requiring on average
140 touch points with credit providers, consumers, or the courts.
We make use of three different systems being our debt counselling
software, the NCR's Debt Help system, and the Tribunal's NCT filing
application. Our processes were designed to comply with the tight
deadlines and onerous requirements but disappointingly a few got
past the proverbial goalie. The Act also doesn't allow for a debt
counsellor to make use of systems and processes in order to reach
far residing employees and expects me personally to speak to each
debt counselling client. This will be a significant disturbance to
an industry where the top five debt counsellors (of which I am not
one) manage over 80% of cases.

"The debt counselling industry has matured significantly over the
last decade. The Debt Review Task Team Agreements released in 2015
and endorsed by the NCR, changed the debt review process
significantly. We believe there is a need for these natural
evolutionary changes in the debt counselling process to be
addressed. Perhaps this is something our High Courts will have an
appetite for.

"We ask that any discussion around the merits of the judgment be
reserved until our appeal process has run its course." [GN]

TAKEDA PHARMA: Court Extends Class Cert. Deadlines in "Painters"
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES
DISTRICT COUNCIL 82 HEALTH CARE FUND, a third-party healthcare
payor fund, ANNIE M. SNYDER, a California consumer, RICKEY D. ROSE,
a Missouri consumer, JOHN CARDARELLI, a New Jersey consumer,
MARLYON K. BUCKNER, a Florida consumer, and SYLVIE BIGORD, a
Massachusetts consumer, on behalf of themselves and ALL others
similarly situated, v. TAKEDA PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY LIMITED, a
Japanese corporation; TAKEDA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, Inc., an Illinois
corporation (fka TAKEDA PHARMACEUTICALS NORTH AMERICA, Inc.); and
ELI LILLY & COMPANY, an Indiana corporation, Case No.
2:17-cv-07223-JWH-AS (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge John W. Holcomb
entered an order extending the Class
Certification Deadlines as follows:

  -- Deadline for filing Plaintiffs'        November 19, 2021
     Reply in Support of Class
     Certification

  -- Deadline for filing any response       November 23, 2021
     to Defendants' Daubert motions;
     and any Daubert motions related
     to Defendants' class certification
     experts

  -- Deadline for filing Defendants'        December 21, 2021
     Reply in Support of any Daubert
     Motions; and any response to
     Plaintiffs' Daubert motions

  -- Deadline for filing Plaintiffs'        December 27, 2021
     Reply in Support of any Daubert
     motions

  -- Hearing date for Plaintiff's           January 14, 2022
     Motion for Class Certification
     and any Daubert Motions

The Takeda Pharmaceutical Company is a Japanese multinational
pharmaceutical company, with American and British roots.

A copy of the Court's order dated Nov. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3HPQ8mv at no extra charge.[CC]


TENET FINTECH: Rosen Law Firm Reminds of January 18 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------
WHY: Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, on Nov. 21
disclosed that it has filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of
purchasers of the securities of Tenet Fintech Group Inc. f/k/a Peak
Fintech Group Inc. (OTC: PKKFF) (NASDAQ: TNT) between September 2,
2021 and October 13, 2021, both dates inclusive (the "Class
Period"). A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you
wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later
than January 18, 2022.

SO WHAT: If you purchased Tenet Fintech securities during the Class
Period you may be entitled to compensation without payment of any
out of pocket fees or costs through a contingency fee arrangement.

WHAT TO DO NEXT: To join the Tenet Fintech class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-2169.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action. A class
action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve as lead
plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than January 18, 2022.
A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf of
other class members in directing the litigation.

WHY ROSEN LAW: We encourage investors to select qualified counsel
with a track record of success in leadership roles. Often, firms
issuing notices do not have comparable experience, resources, or
any meaningful peer recognition. Many of these firms do not
actually litigate securities class actions. Be wise in selecting
counsel. The Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the
globe, concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm has achieved the
largest ever securities class action settlement against a Chinese
Company. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1 by ISS Securities Class
Action Services for number of securities class action settlements
in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the top 4 each year since 2013
and has recovered hundreds of millions of dollars for investors. In
2019 alone the firm secured over $438 million for investors. In
2020, founding partner Laurence Rosen was named by law360 as a
Titan of Plaintiffs' Bar. Many of the firm's attorneys have been
recognized by Lawdragon and Super Lawyers.

DETAILS OF THE CASE: According to the lawsuit, defendants
throughout the Class Period made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose: (1) Tenet Fintech did not own 51% of
Asia Synergy Financial Capital Ltd. ("ASFC") through Wuxi Aorong;
(2) Tenet Fintech did not disclose its actual ownership structure
of ASFC, an undisclosed and potentially problematic nominee
shareholder agreement; (3) Huayan did not own the Heartbeat
platform; (4) the Heartbeat platform did not exist prior to the
alleged acquisition; (5) Tenet Fintech faced imminent delisting
from NASDAQ due to non-compliance with known regulations; (6) the
"recent disclosure guidance" was in fact published on November 23,
2020, nearly a full nine months prior to Tenet Fintech's uplisting;
(7) as such, Tenet Fintech knew or should have known that its 40-F
submission was deficient; (8) Cubeler historically failed to make
even minimum loan repayments to Tenet Fintech; (9) Tenet Fintech,
instead of exercising its right on the assets, decided to purchase
Cubeler; (10) in light of the foregoing, and in consideration of
the fact that Cubeler is owned by several Tenet Fintech insiders,
the Company's acquisition of Cubeler is not based on legitimate
business interests; (11) there is no evidence Huayan ever owned the
Heartbeat platform or that it transferred the asset to Huike; (12)
the largest ASFC shareholder had his shares frozen due to court
sanctions; and (13) the creation of ASFC itself was likely a
related-party transaction. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

To join the Tenet Fintech class action, go
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-2169.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

No Class Has Been Certified. Until a class is certified, you are
not represented by counsel unless you retain one. You may select
counsel of your choice. You may also remain an absent class member
and do nothing at this point. An investor's ability to share in any
potential future recovery is not dependent upon serving as lead
plaintiff.

Attorney Advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a similar
outcome.

Contact Information:

Laurence Rosen, Esq.
Phillip Kim, Esq.
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Tel: (212) 686-1060
Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
Fax: (212) 202-3827
lrosen@rosenlegal.com
pkim@rosenlegal.com
cases@rosenlegal.com
www.rosenlegal.com [GN]

TENNCARE: Must Reply to Renewed Class Cert. Bid by Jan. 4, 2022
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as A.M.C., et al., v. STEPHEN
SMITH, in his official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Finance
and Administration and Director of the Division of TennCare, Case
No. 3:20-cv-00240 (M.D. Tenn.), the Hon. Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw,
Jr. entered an order partly granting the Defendant's motion for
extension of time.

Accordingly, the Defendant shall file responses to Plaintiffs'
Renewed Motion for Class Certification and Motion for Preliminary
Injunction no later than January 4, 2022. The Plaintiffs may file a
reply to each response no later than January 11, 2022, says Judge
Crenshaw.

TennCare is the state Medicaid program in the U.S. state of
Tennessee. TennCare was established in 1994 under a federal waiver
that authorized deviations from the standard Medicaid rules.

A copy of the Court's order dated Nov. 22, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2ZjF9QS at no extra charge.[CC]



TENNCARE: Seeks Jan. 10, 2022 Extension of Class Cert. Response
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as A.M.C., by her next
friend, C.D.C., et al., v. STEPHEN SMITH, in his official capacity
as Deputy Commissioner of Finance and Administration and Director
of the Division of TennCare, Case No. 3:20-cv-00240 (M.D. Tenn.),
the Defendant asks the Court to enter an order granting an
extension of time for him to respond to Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion
for Class Certification and Motion for Preliminary Injunction to
January 10, 2022.

Specifically, the Defendant requests a 31-day extension of the
response deadlines from December 10, 2021, to January 10, 2022.

The Plaintiffs' counsel has stated that Plaintiffs would consent to
a 5-day extension to December 15 but oppose an extension to January
10.

The Plaintiffs filed their Renewed Motion for Class Certification
and Motion for Preliminary Injunction, on November 12, 2021.

Under an Order entered on September 20, 2021, Doc. 136, Defendant's
brief in opposition and accompanying exhibits and affidavits are
due by December 10, 2021.

The lawsuit in which Plaintiffs seek class certification and a
preliminary injunction alleges that Tennessee's Medicaid program,
TennCare, uses policies and practices that systemically violate the
Due Process Clause, provisions of the Medicaid Act, and Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act.

There are currently thirty-four active named Plaintiffs who seek to
represent a Plaintiff Class of "[a]ll individuals who meet the
eligibility criteria for TennCare coverage and who, since March 19,
2019, have been or will be disenrolled from TennCare," except those
who requested withdrawal from the program.

Six of the named Plaintiffs also seek to represent a Disability
Subclass of "Plaintiff Class members who are ‘qualified
individuals with a disability' as defined in 42 U.S.C. section
12131(2)."

TennCare is the state Medicaid program in the U.S. state of
Tennessee. TennCare was established in 1994 under a federal waiver
that authorized deviations from the standard Medicaid rules.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Nov. 19, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3r04bzU at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Herbert H. Slatery III, Esq.
          Sue A. Sheldon, Esq.
          Meredith Bowen, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          P.O. Box 20207
          Nashville, TN 37202
          Telephone: (615) 741-1366
          E-mail: meredith.bowen@ag.tn.gov

               - and -

          Michael W. Kirk, Esq.
          Nicole J. Moss, Esq.
          William V. Bergstrom, Esq.
          COOPER & KIRK, PLLC
          1523 New Hampshire Avenue, NW
          Washington, D.C. 20036
          Telephone: (202) 220-9600
          E-mail: mkirk@cooperkirk.com
                  nmoss@cooperkirk.com
                  wbergstrom@cooperkirk.com

TEXAS: Seeks Dec. 3 Extension of Class Cert Response in Wilson
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DAMON JAMES WILSON, for
himself and all others similarly situated, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS,
ET AL., Case No. 1:21-cv-00943-RP-JES-JVB (W.D. Tex.), the
Defendants asks the Court to enter an order extending their
deadline to file a response to Plaintiff's Motion for Certification
of Class Action up to and including December 3, 2021.

A copy of the Defendants' motion dated Nov. 18, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3HGxc9P at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          William T. Thompson, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          P.O. Box 12548 (MC-009)
          Austin, TX 78711-2548
          Telephone: (512) 463-2100
          Facsimile: (512) 457-4410
          E-mail: patrick.sweeten@oag.texas.gov
                  will.thompson@oag.texas.gov

TJX DIGITAL: Parties in Harris Suit Seek FLSA Collective Cert.
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MARTERRIO HARRIS,
Individually, and on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, v. TJX DIGITAL, INC., a Delaware Corporation, and TJX
DIGITAL MEMPHIS MERCHANTS, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability
Company, Case No. 2:21-cv-02262-MSN-tmp (W.D. Tenn.), the Parties
ask the Court to enter an order approving their joint stipulation
of conditional certification pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA"):

   "All current and former hourly-paid Coach Trainers employed
   by Defendant TJX Digital Memphis Merchants, LLC and who
   worked in Defendants' Memphis, Tennessee Fulfillment Center
   at any time during the period of November 10, 2018 to [Date
   of Court's Order Granting Stipulated Conditional
   Certification] (the "FLSA Collective Members")."

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Nov. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3nKeAOs at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gordon E. Jackson, Esq.
          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Robert E. Turner, IV, Esq.
          Robert E. Morelli, III, Esq.
          JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER, HOLT,
          OWEN & BRYANT
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754-8001
          Facsimile: (901) 754-8524
          E-mail: gjackson@jsyc.com
                  rbryant@jsyc.com
                  rturner@jsyc.com
                  rmorelli@jsyc.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Matthew G. Gallagher, Esq.
          Kaitlyn A. Hansen, Esq.
          Lisa A. Schreter, Esq.
          Richard W. Black, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          3725 Champion Hills Drive, Suite 3000
          Memphis, TN 38125
          Telephone: (901) 795-6695
          Facsimile: (901) 881-4333
          E-mail: mgallagher@littler.com
                  khansen@littler.com
                  lschreter@littler.com
                  rblack@littler.com

TPA TIRES: Mieles Sues Over Retaliation and Unpaid OT Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------
DINO MIELES, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TPA TIRES AND WHEELS, LLC, a Florida Limited
Liability Company, Defendant, Case No. 8:21-cv-02622 (M.D. Fla.,
November 8, 2021) brings this complaint as a collective action
against the Defendant to recover unpaid overtime wages and
liquidated damages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a full time mechanic
from approximately 2015 until his retaliatory termination on or
around May 2, 2021.

The Plaintiff claims that throughout his employment with the
Defendant, he regularly worked more than 40 hours per week as
required by the Defendant. However, the Defendant did not pay him
overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times his
regular rate of pay for all hour he worked in excess of 40 per
workweek. Moreover, when he injured his back while on the job in or
around early May 2021 and asked the Defendant for workers'
compensation information for several weeks so he could initiate a
claim, the Defendant informed him that he was no longer needed an
terminated his employment on or about May 22, 2021. Thus, the
Plaintiff also brings this complaint to seek redress for his
illegal termination.

TPA Tires and Wheels, LLC is in the automotive tires business.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Miguel Bouzas, Esq.
          Wolfgang M. Florin, Esq.
          FLORIN, GRAY, BOUZAS, OWENGS, LLC
          16524 Pointe Village Drive, Suite 100
          Lutz, FL 33558
          Tel: (727) 254-5255
          Fax: (727) 483-7942
          E-mail: miguel@fgbolaw.com
                  gina@fgbolaw.com
                  wolfgang@fgbolaw.com

TRADITIONAL LOGISTICS: Bid to Dismiss Anderson's Claims Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SAMUEL DANIELS, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND A CLASS OF
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED; AND LETICIA ANDERSON, Plaintiffs v.
TRADITIONAL LOGISTICS AND CARTAGE, LLC, A KENTUCKY LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY; et al; Defendants, Case No. 4:20-00869-CV-RK
(W.D. Mo.), Judge Roseann A. Ketchmark of the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Missouri, Western Division, denied the
Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff Anderson's Title VII
claims.

Background

Plaintiffs Daniels and Anderson allege putative class action race
discrimination claims against Traditional Logistics and Cartage,
LLC ("TLC"), RCS Transportation, LLC ("RCS"), and Valiant
Management and Holdings, LLC ("Valiant") (jointly "Defendants"),
who the Plaintiffs allege are their joint employers and/or a common
enterprise. The Plaintiffs are black.

TLC provides drive away services for Ford Motor Company at its
Claycomo, Missouri, manufacturing facility. It categorizes the
people it employs to perform drive away services as either casual
drivers or full-time drivers. The Plaintiffs began their employment
with TLC in approximately early 2018 as casual drivers. Casual
drivers are only called into work on an as-needed basis; do not
receive the same benefits that full-time drivers receive; and are
not eligible to join the union.

Approximately once each year, TLC goes through a "hiring" process
at Ford Motor Company's Claycomo, Missouri, facility in which
casual drivers are transitioned to full-time drivers. The
Plaintiffs allege that the "hiring" process used by the Defendants
is a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination against
black employees pervasive throughout the enterprise, and/or is a
pattern or practice that results in discrimination against black
employees. For example, although the Plaintiffs have received
positive performance reviews at all relevant times, TLC has never
offered either Plaintiff a position as a full-time driver. TLC has
repeatedly "hired" less qualified non-black casual drivers with
less seniority over more qualified, more senior black casual
drivers.

Plaintiff Daniels dually filed an amended charge of discrimination
against the Defendants with the Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission ("EEOC") and a complaint with the Missouri Commission on
Human Rights ("MCHR"). Both were timely filed. On the EEOC charge
form, Plaintiff Daniels checked boxes for "race" and "sex"
discrimination. On July 30, 2020, the EEOC sent Plaintiff Daniels a
letter stating it was terminating its processing of his charge and
notifying him that he had a right to sue in court.

On Oct. 28, 2020, Plaintiff Daniels filed the present lawsuit in
the Court, a putative class action alleging race discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C.
Section 1981. On Aug. 18, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint, adding Plaintiff Anderson. Thereafter, the Defendants
filed this motion to dismiss, arguing Plaintiff Anderson's Counts
I, II, V, and VI (Title VII race discrimination claims) in the
amended complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, because she failed to exhaust administrative remedies,
which is a prerequisite to seeking judicial relief.

Discussion

The Defendants argue Plaintiff Anderson failed to exhaust
administrative remedies on her Title VII race discrimination claims
because Daniels' amended charge was plainly directed at and is
limited to alleged discrimination against black males and did not
contemplate discrimination against black females. The Defendants
argue the amended charge amounted to a complaint of discrimination
based on race plus sex, and the EEOC investigated the matter as
such.

Judge Ketchmark finds the race box being checked on the amended
charge, the narrative section's many references to "black"
employees, the Class Allegations section alleging the pattern or
practice having a disparate impact on "black" employees who had
equal or superior seniority or job performance compared to other
"non-black" employees, as well as the statement that the class
members are similarly situated in that "all are black,"
sufficiently gave the Defendants "notice of all claims of
discrimination." She finds that although the claim in the amended
charge could have been more specific given its additional numerous
complaints as to "black males," her reading of the amended charge
to include race claims is not so liberal as to constitute
"inventing, ex nihilo, a claim which simply was not made."
Plaintiff Anderson's Title VII claims are, at least, "like or
reasonably related to the substance" of Plaintiff Daniels' amended
charge timely brought before the EEOC, Land no broader than "the
scope of the EEOC investigation which reasonably could be expected
to result from" Daniels's amended charge.

Accordingly, Judge Ketchmark believes an EEOC investigation into
race discrimination reasonably could be expected to result from the
timely filed amended charge, and she is not persuaded that the
Defendants were not on adequate notice of a race discrimination
claim from the amended charge.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Ketchmark denied the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 12, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/fbhrdtsj from Leagle.com.


TRANSAMERICA CORP: Court Approves Settlement Deal in Karg Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JEREMY KARG; MATTHEW R.
LAMARCHE; CYNTHIA K. MARSHALL; SHIRLEY RHODES; and JEANINE E. VEGA,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, v.
TRANSAMERICA CORPORATION; TRUSTEES OF THE AEGON USA, INC. PROFIT
SHARING TRUST; and DOES 1–40, Case No. o. 18-CV-134-CJW-KEM (N.D.
Iowa), the Hon. Judge C.J. Williams entered an order approving
class action settlement, Attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards
as follows:

   1. finding that no Class Member filed objections to the
      Settlement;

   2. approving the Settlement Agreement as fair, reasonable,
      and adequate, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e);

   3. approving service awards of $15,000 each for the
      plaintiffs Jeremy Karg, Matthew R. Lamarche, Cynthia K.
      Marshall, Shirley Rhodes, and Jeanine E. Vega; and

   4. approving Class Counsel's request for attorneys' fees in
      the amount of $1,950,000.00 and reimbursement of
      litigation expenses in the amount of $393,833.59.

The Plaintiffs, on their own behalf and on behalf of the Class and
the Plan, and defendants have entered into a Settlement Agreement
dated June 22, 2021, that provides for a complete dismissal with
prejudice of all claims asserted in the Action against defendants
by the Class on the terms and conditions set forth in the
Settlement Agreement.

The Transamerica Corporation is an American holding company for
various life insurance companies and investment firms operating
primarily in the United States, offering life and supplemental
health insurance, investments, and retirement services.

A copy of the Court's orderdated Nov. 22, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3DRKYnQ at no extra charge.[CC]

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Wins Summary Judgment Bid in Two Class Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the two class action lawsuits against UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
et al., the Hon. Judge Freda L. Wolfson entered an order:

   1. granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment;

   2. compelling the parties to arbitrate their dispute under
      the Federal Arbitration Act; and

   3. denying as moot the Plaintiffs' motion for class
      certification.

The two class action lawsuits are captioned as:

   "JASWINDER SINGH, on behalf of himself and all those
   similarly situated, v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Case No. 16-
   3044-FLW (D.N.J.);" and

   "JAMES CALABRESE, GREGORY CABANILLAS, and MATTHEW MECHANIC,
   individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated,
   v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., and RASIER, LLC, Case No. 19-
   18371-FLW (D.N.J.).

Uber Technologies, Inc., commonly known as Uber, is an American
mobility as a service provider based in San Francisco, with
operations in over 900 metropolitan areas worldwide.

A copy of the Court's order dated Nov. 23, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/32qQGPv at no extra charge.[CC]


UNITED STATES: Calixto, et al., File Renewed Bid for Class Status
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LUCAS CALIXTO, et al., v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, et al., Case No.
1:18-cv-01551-PLF (D.D.C.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter
an order certifying the following class:

   1. All soldiers who enlisted in the U.S. Army (including
      Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve/DTP and Regular
      Army/DEP soldiers) through the Military Accessions Vital
      to the National Interest ("MAVNI") program on or prior to
      September 30, 2016, and

   2. Are the subject of an administrative discharge action by
      the U.S. Army (including the U.S. Army Recruiting Command
      and/or the U.S. Army Reserve Command, collectively, the
      "Army"), where such discharge or separation was not or
      will not be characterized by the Army (including
      "uncharacterized" and "entry level" discharges or
      separations), and

   3. Where such action is taken without the soldier first being
      afforded the process due under applicable Army and U.S.
      Department of Defense ("DOD") regulations and the law --
      at a minimum, notice, an opportunity to respond, and
      (because such discharges are being treated by the
      government as other than honorable) an opportunity for a
      proceeding before a board of officers or like proceeding.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to enter an order to appoint
their attorneys as class counsel.

The Plaintiffs contend that:

   -- the proposed Plaintiff class meets the numerosity
      standard;

   -- the claims of the proposed class members share common
      facts and the case raises central legal questions that are
      common to each class member, including questions arising
      out of the Defendants' practice of taking
      "uncharacterized" discharge action against MAVNI soldiers
      -- which for foreign-born soldiers is harmful and
      stigmatizing - without adequate process;

   -- their claims are typical of the claims of the proposed
      class; and

   -- they and their counsel will adequately represent the class
      and are prepared to vigorously prosecute this action on
      behalf of the proposed class.

The Plaintiffs are Wanjing Li, Jingquan Qu, Xiongzhou Zhang, Xi
Zhang, Chenhao Qian, Sansiri Suangchomphan, Lei Liu, Wen Si,
Yunzheng He, Wendpagnagde Yabre, Sen Li, Fang Lu, Anton Tate, Yue
Yin, Sai Krishna Uppugandla, Zehua Bian, Hyunsung Kim, Chengping
Yuan, Gunay Miriyeva, Sandeep Mahat, and Shengfan Yang.

The United States Department of the Army is one of the three
military departments within the Department of Defense of the U.S.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Nov. 22,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ls2lVd
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jennifer M. Wollenberg, Esq.
          Douglas W. Baruch, Esq.
          Bernard J. Garbutt III, Esq.
          Colin C. West, Esq.
          Taylor C. Day, Esq.
          Megan A. Suehiro, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20004-2541
          Telephone: (202)739-5313
          Facsimile: (202)739-3001
          E-mail: jennifer.wollenberg@morganlewis.com
                  douglas.baruch@morganlewis.com
                  bernard.garbutt@morganlewis.com
                  colin.west.@morganlewis.com
                  taylor.day@morganlewis.com
                  megan.suehiro@morganlewis.com

UNITED STATES: Pines Can't Intervene in National Veterans Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NATIONAL VETERANS LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM, et al.,
Plaintiffs v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant, Civil Action No.
16-0745 (PLF) (D.D.C.), Judge Paul L. Friedman of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order:

   a. denying Plaintiff-Intervenor Michael T. Pines' pro se
      Motion for Intervention and for Leave to File Complaint in
      Intervention, Motion to Modify Class Certification Order,
      and for Sanctions;

   b. denying as moot Mr. Pines' Motion for Pretrial Conference
      and to Appoint a Special Master;

   c. denying as moot Mr. Pines' Emergency Motion for Order to
      Reactivate PACER Account; and

   d. granting Mr. Pines' Application to Proceed in District
      Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs.

Background

The Court has before it a pro se Motion for Intervention and for
Leave to File Complaint in Intervention, Motion to Modify Class
Certification Order, and for Sanctions, filed by Mr. Pines. Mr.
Pines has also submitted via email to the Clerk's Office several
additional requests for relief, which he suggests are related to
the case.

The case is proceeding as a class action on behalf of lain
individuals and entities who have paid fees for the use of PACER
between April 21, 2010, and April 21, 2016, excluding the class
counsel in the case and federal government entities. The United
States confirms that Mr. Pines paid PACER fees during the class
period and therefore is a member of the class. The Plaintiffs
represent that the "class notice was successfully sent to the email
address associated with Michael Pines' PACER account on May 19,
2017," and that Mr. Pines did not opt out by the deadline provided
in that notice.

Mr. Pines asserts that he learned of the class action sometime in
August of 2020. He seeks to intervene because, he says, he "was
precluded from negotiations so any settlement based on previous
discussions would be improper as not negotiated fairly," and "the
class action attorneys will not even allow him to participate in
discussions outside of court or cooperate in other ways." He
expresses concern that if the Court approves a class settlement, he
may face "questions regarding res judicata and the scope of the
class release" if he "raises similar claims -- or claims based on
similar facts -- in a subsequent case." Mr. Pines asserts that he
is entitled to intervene as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in the alternative, that the
Court should authorize permissive intervention pursuant to Rule
24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Mr. Pines also seeks to modify the class certification order,
arguing that a class action is not "superior to other types of
actions" in the case, because "the obvious way to calculate damages
in light of court rulings to date," "would not result in the class
members receiving appropriate compensation." He further argues that
"potential Plaintiffs may have all kinds of claims against the
government related to the operation of Pacer, and there is not even
a way to calculate the type of damages the class action seeks."

Finally, Mr. Pines asks the Court to award $25,000 in sanctions
"against both the Plaintiff and the defense counsel," because he
was not "given the opportunity to participate when he demanded it
in August 2020," and as a result, "he will have to spend large
amounts of time" getting up to speed on the case.

Discussion

A. Intervention of Right

Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants a
right of intervention to a party who, upon timely motion, "claims
an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the
subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's
ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately
represent that interest." Courts consider four factors in deciding
whether a party has a right to intervene: (1) the timeliness of the
motion; (2) whether the party claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action; (3) whether disposition of the action
without the party may impair or impede the applicant's ability to
protect that interest; and (4) whether the party's interest is
adequately represented by the existing parties.

When a class member moves to intervene in a class action, the issue
is "correctly framed as whether the would-be intervenors are
adequately represented." To prevail, therefore, Mr. Pines must show
that "the named Plaintiffs cannot adequately represent his
interests," either because they "have antagonistic or conflicting
interests with the unnamed members of the class" or because they do
not "appear able to vigorously prosecute the interests of the class
through qualified counsel."

Judge Friedman opines that Mr. Pines has not made such a showing.
Nothing in Mr. Pines' submissions indicates that the named
plaintiffs are in any way failing to fulfill their role on behalf
of the class. The fact that Mr. Pines may disagree with class
counsel's approach does not mean that class representation is
inadequate, because a class action by its nature entails delegating
certain litigation functions to the class representatives and the
class counsel. The fact that the class counsel have not pursued
other arguments that go beyond the certified claim does not suggest
that their representation is deficient.

Even if Mr. Pines could show that the class counsel and the named
Plaintiffs do not adequately represent his interests in the case,
Judge Friedman finds that Mr. Pines' motion is not timely. Mr.
Pines hould have been aware of the class action more than four
years before he moved to intervene. Even if Mr. Pines could show
that he was not properly notified on May 19, 2017, he still allowed
a year to elapse before seeking to intervene on Aug. 11, 2021. He
suggests that when he "heard nothing" from counsel, he "decided to
take a new legal approach," implying that he moved to intervene
after it became apparent that he would not achieve his desired
result by contacting the class counsel.

Judge Friedman concludes that Mr. Pines is not entitled to
intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) because he has not
demonstrated that his interests are inadequately represented and
because his motion to intervene is not timely.

B. Permissive Intervention

Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a court has discretion to permit a party to intervene
upon timely motion where the intervening party "has a claim or
defense that shares with the main action a common question of law
or fact."  A court's decision pursuant to Rule 24(b) is
discretionary and a district court may "deny a motion for
permissive intervention even if the movant establishes" all three
of these requirements. In exercising its discretion, "the court
must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights."

Judge Friedman concludes that permissive intervention is not
warranted under Rule 24(b). First, Mr. Pines' motion is not timely
for the reasons set forth. Second, while Mr. Pines' submission may
share some "questions of law or fact in common with the main
action," he also raises numerous issues and arguments that that go
far beyond the scope of the class claim.

In addition, allowing Mr. Pines to intervene could seriously
disrupt the settlement discussions, which may resolve the case, and
therefore could derail a final resolution of the parties' rights.
Mr. Pines "has already shown willingness to delay the proceedings,"
including by moving to decertify the class, seek sanctions, and
raise factual issues and legal arguments outside the scope of the
class claim.

Given the advanced posture of the case, the nature of the
intervention that Mr. Pines states that he intends to pursue, and
the fact that Mr. Pines has not established that he is inadequately
represented, Judge Friedman concludes that the "balance between
keeping class litigation manageable and allowing affected parties
to be adequately heard," weighs against intervention. He therefore
will deny Mr. Pines' request.

C. Modification of Class Certification Order, Sanctions, and Other
Relief

Because he concludes that Mr. Pines may not intervene in the case,
Judge Friedman will deny as moot his requests to modify the class
certification order and for sanctions.

Mr. Pines also submitted via email to the Clerk's Office a Motion
for Pretrial Conference and to Appoint a Special Master, an
Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or
Costs, and an Emergency Motion for Order to Reactivate PACER
Account, which the Court granted leave to be filed on the docket.
Because he denies Mr. Pines' motion to intervene, and Mr. Pines
therefore is not a party to the case, Judge Friedman also denies as
moot the motion for pretrial conference and to appoint a special
master, and the motion to reactivate PACER account.

Judge Friedman will grant Mr. Pines' application to proceed without
prepaying costs and will direct the Clerk's Office to file that
application on the docket. That application would not be moot if
Mr. Pines seeks to appeal the Order. In addition, Judge Friedman
finds that Mr. Pines has shown that he is unable to pay the filing
fees in the court of appeals.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Friedman denied Mr. Pines' pro se
Motion for Intervention; denied as moot his Motion for Pretrial
Conference and Emergency Motion for Order to Reactivate PACER
Account; and granted Mr. Pines' Application to Proceed in District
Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs. The Clerk of the Court is
directed to file that application on the docket in the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 16, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/vzyu6puh from
Leagle.com.


VICTORIA'S SECRET: Body Sprays Contain Benzene, Toribio Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TEODORO TORIBIO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. VICTORIA'S SECRET & CO. and VICTORIA'S
SECRET STORES BRAND MANAGEMENT, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
1:21-cv-06577-MKB-RLM (E.D.N.Y., November 24, 2021) is a class
action against the Defendants for violation of New York General
Business Law, breach of express warranty, breach of implied
warranty of merchantability, fraudulent concealment, medical
monitoring, and unjust enrichment.

According to the complaint, the Defendants are engaged in false,
deceptive, and misleading advertising, labeling, and marketing of
Victoria's Secret body spray products. The Defendants failed to
disclose that the products contain benzene, a known human
carcinogen. As a result of the Defendants' alleged
misrepresentations, the Plaintiff and Class members have been
exposed to the carcinogen benzene.

Victoria's Secret & Co. is an American lingerie, clothing, and
beauty retailer, headquartered in Ohio.

Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Management, LLC is a women's
clothing retail company based in Ohio. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Jason P. Sultzer, Esq.
         Joseph Lipari, Esq.
         Daniel Markowitz, Esq.
         THE SULTZER LAW GROUP P.C.
         270 Madison Avenue, Suite 1800
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: (845) 483-7100
         Facsimile: (888) 749-7747
         E-mail: sultzerj@thesultzerlawgroup.com
                 liparij@thesultzerlawgroup.com
                 markowitzd@thesultzerlawgroup.com

                - and –

         David C. Magagna Jr., Esq.
         Charles E. Schaffer, Esq.
         LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN
         510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
         Philadelphia, PA 19106
         Telephone: (215) 592-1500
         E-mail: dmagagna@lfsblaw.com
                 cschaffer@lfsblaw.com

VIMEO.COM INC: Tavarez Seeks Blind's Access to Video Sharing Site
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CARMEN TAVAREZ-VARGAS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. VIMEO.COM, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 1:21-cv-09913 (S.D.N.Y., November 24, 2021) is a class action
against the Defendant for violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the New York City Human Rights Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has failed to design,
construct, maintain, and operate its website to be fully accessible
to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired persons. The Defendant's website,
www.magisto.com, contains access barriers which hinder the
Plaintiff and Class members to enjoy the benefits of its online
goods, content, and services offered to the general public through
the website. These access barriers include, but not limited to: (a)
the screen reader abruptly stops functioning in the middle of a
sentence or speech; (b) the screen reader fails to describe images;
(c) the screen reader reads items not included on the website; and
(d) the screen reader fails to read social media icon links.

The Plaintiff and Class members seek permanent injunction to cause
a change in the Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that the Defendant's website will become and remain
accessible to blind and visually-impaired individuals.

Vimeo.com, Inc. is a company that operates as a video sharing site,
headquartered in New York, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
         William J. Downes, Esq.
         MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
         200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
         New York, NY 10281
         Telephone: (212) 595-6200
         Facsimile: (212) 595-9700
         E-mail: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com

WALMART INC: Guzman Wage-and-Hour Suit Goes to N.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled SALVADOR GUZMAN and JAMES MARSHALL, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. WALMART INC.,
WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC., WAL-MART STORES, INC., and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Case No. CIV-21CV388734, was removed from
the Superior Court of California for the County of Santa Clara to
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on
November 24, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of California assigned
Case No. 5:21-cv-09133 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California's Business and Professions
Code including failure to pay meal period premiums, failure to pay
reporting time pay, failure to pay overtime, failure to pay minimum
wages, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and
unfair business practices.

Walmart Inc. is an operator of a chain of hypermarkets, discount
department stores, and grocery stores from the United States,
headquartered in Bentonville, Arkansas.

Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. is a retail company, headquartered in
Bentonville, Arkansas.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. is a retail company, headquartered in
Bentonville, Arkansas. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:          
         
         Paloma P. Peracchio, Esq.
         OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
         400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200
         Los Angeles, CA 90071
         Telephone: (213) 239-9800
         Facsimile: (213) 239-9045
         E-mail: paloma.peracchio@ogletree.com

                 - and –

         Mitchell A. Wrosch, Esq.
         Alis M. Moon, Esq.
         OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
         Park Tower, Fifteenth Floor
         695 Town Center Drive
         Costa Mesa, CA 92626
         Telephone: (714) 800-7900
         Facsimile: (714) 754-1298
         E-mail: mitchell.wrosch@ogletree.com
                 alis.moon@ogletree.com

WALMART INC: Van Der Steeg Sues Over Adulterated Antiperspirants
----------------------------------------------------------------
DAWN VAN DER STEEG, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. WALMART INC., Defendant, Case No.
0:21-cv-62395-AHS (S.D. Fla., November 23, 2021) is a class action
against the Defendant for breach of express warranty, breach of
implied warranty, fraud, unjust enrichment, and violation of the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.

The case arises from the Defendant's manufacturing, distribution,
and sale of Equate antiperspirant aerosol and spray products that
contain high levels of benzene. The Defendant did not disclose the
actual or potential presence of benzene in its antiperspirant
products' labeling, or in any advertising or website promoting the
products. Had the Plaintiff and Class members known about the truth
that the Defendant's products contained or may contain benzene,
they would not have purchased or used the products at all, or would
have paid significantly less for them, the suit added.

Walmart Inc. is an American multinational retail corporation that
operates a chain of hypermarkets, discount department stores, and
grocery stores from the United States, headquartered in
Bentonville, Arkansas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Sarah N. Westcot, Esq.
         BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
         701 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1420
         Miami, FL 33131
         Telephone: (305) 330-5512
         Facsimile: (305) 676-9006
         E-mail: swestcot@bursor.com

WASHINGTON: Faces Class Action Over New Long-Term Care Tax
----------------------------------------------------------
Helen Smith, writing for KING 5 Staff, reports that Washington's
new long-term care tax is up against a class-action lawsuit and a
new initiative seeking to make the program optional.

What is the Washington Cares Fund? What's behind the class action
lawsuit and Initiative 1436, seeking to modify, or halt the tax
altogether?

Washington state passed a first-of-its-kind long-term care tax in
2019 intended to help pay for long-term care expenses as the
state's population gets older. Residents will start paying into the
funding beginning in 2022.

However, the tax has sparked opposition from some groups, who argue
the act violates federal law or that taxpayers should have the
option to opt out. Lawmakers say they intend to act on several
"common sense" fixes to the act in the 2022 legislative session.

Below is a closer look at the Washington Cares Fund, including what
it does, its intended benefits, how the law could change in the
future and what opponents are saying about the long-term care act.


What is the Washington Cares Fund?
Starting in January 2022, Washington workers will pay 0.58 percent
of every $100 earned into the Washington Cares Fund.

The fund ensures taxpayers who have contributed for 10 years
receive $36,500 over their lifetime to help pay for long-term care
needs, like in-home care, nursing home care, hearing aids, trained
support for caregivers, home-delivered meals, memory care,
necessary home renovations and many other services, according to
the WA Cares Fund website.

The fund will begin paying out benefits in 2025. The benefit level
will adjust with inflation over the years.

The fund was created to address gaps in private long-term care
insurance and to provide for older residents with no insurance or
ability to pay for long-term care costs, which otherwise fall to
Medicaid.

A survey conducted by AAPR of Washington found 50 percent of
65-year-olds have no money in retirement savings. The same survey
found 75 percent of respondents wrongly believed private insurance
would pay for a stay at a nursing home, and 78 percent of
respondents wrongly believed private insurance would pay for a home
visit by a paid caregiver.

"While families are far and away the main providers of long-term
care, when more help is needed it's Medicaid that bears the cost,"
said Dan Murphy, executive director of the Northwest Regional
Council Area Agencies on Aging. "So WA Cares helps protect Medicaid
from a cost explosion as the age wave crests."

Although private long-term care insurance is available, it can
exclude certain people based on pre-existing conditions and can
cost more for women than men, Murphy said. People also have to keep
paying into private insurance, while payments into the WA Cares
Fund stop when someone retires.

The deadline to opt out of the state's long-term care tax passed on
Nov. 1, 2021. Those wanting to opt out had to prove to the
Employment Security Department that they acquired private long-term
care insurance.

How could WA Cares change in the 2022 legislative session?
Washington legislators say they intend to make "common sense" fixes
to the law in the upcoming legislative session.

As the law stands, workers who live in other states but work in
Washington cannot opt-out of the long-term care tax. Members of the
Long Term Services and Supports Trust Commission also recommended
the legislature allow military spouses and veterans and temporary
non-immigrant permit work holders be allowed to opt-out of the tax.


The commission is also looking into the possibility of allowing
residents to take their long-term care tax funds with them if they
leave Washington state. Washington State Representative Nicole
Marci (D-Seattle) said the issue was complicated because long-term
care services vary from state to state, "but we do think that there
is work that can be done here," she said.

Investing the WA Cares funds into a higher yield portfolio, like
the state has done with state employee pension funds and funds in
the paid family leave trust, would require a constitutional
amendment which legislators are hoping to put on the ballot in the
future.

Washington Cares faces class-action lawsuit
In early November, three companies and six individuals filed a
lawsuit against Gov. Jay Inslee and other state officials, alleging
the Washington Cares Fund violates federal law.

The lawsuit argues the tax violates the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, which forbids the state from passing a law
requiring employees to participate in a plan that provides sickness
or medical benefits, according to Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, the
firm that filed the complaint.

None of the individuals represented in the suit purchased private
long-term care insurance before the Nov. 1 deadline, meaning they
will have to pay into the fund starting in January.

One plaintiff plans to retire before reaching the required 10-year
contribution deadline. Another plaintiff lives across the border in
Eagle Point, Oregon.

Proponents of the tax claim the lawsuit is an effort to push
private long-term care insurance policies at the expense of more
accessible long-term care options.

"It's not surprising to us that given the deep pockets of the
opposition they're that they're launching a legal attack as part of
their strategy to ultimately make long-term care less affordable
and less accessible to Washington seniors and people with
disabilities," said Madeleine Foutch with Washingtonians for a
Responsible Future.

Initiative 1436
A new initiative proposed by State Representative Jim Walsh
(R-Aberdeen) would allow people to opt-out of the Washington Cares
Fund. The initiative is currently in the signature-gathering phase,
spearheaded by the group Reform Washington.

According to the state's Employment Security Department, 279,465
individuals have applied for exemptions. So far, 33.7% have been
processed, with 93,039 of those individuals granted exemptions.
More than 1,000 of the applications of those hoping to opt out of
the fund are considered incomplete.

Proponents of the Washington Cares Fund argue the initiative will
make it harder for the most vulnerable to pay for long-term care
costs.

"It is an initiative to the legislature that will make it harder
for Washington families to afford and access long term care, by
threatening the viability of WA Cares," Foutch said. "We're taking
this threat to WA Cares very seriously, and ultimately if brought
before the legislature we believe that the legislature should
reject this pathway and will reject this pathway."

If enough signatures are turned in by the end of the year for the
initiative to reach the Legislature, lawmakers would have three
options: make the program optional, send the issue to the voters
next November, or offer an alternative to the initiative to voters.
[GN]

WELLS FARGO: Parties in Thompson Class Suit Seek Briefing Sched
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ERICA M. THOMPSON,
individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, v. WELLS
FARGO BANK, N.A., Case No. 2:20-cv-00532-RCY-DEM (E.D. Va.), the
Parties asks the Court to enter an order granting their joint
motion to establish a briefing schedule for plaintiff's motion for
class certification.

Wells Fargo operates as a bank.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Nov. 19, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3nEsi5b at no extra charge.[CC]

Counsel for Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ,are:

          Alexandria E. Cuff, Esq.
          K. Issac deVyver, Esq.
          Karla L. Johnson, Esq.
          MCGUIRE WOODS LLP
          Gateway Plaza
          800 East Canal Street
          Richmond, VA 23219
          Telephone: (804) 775-1000
          Facsimile: (804) 775-1061
          E-mail: acuff@mcguirewoods.com
                  kdevyver@mcguirewoods.com
                  kjohnson@mcguirewoods.com

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kristi C. Kelly, Esq.
          Andrew J. Guzzo, Esq.
          J. Patrick McNichol, Esq.
          KELLY GUZZO, PLC
          3925 Chain Bridge Road, Suite 202
          Fairfax, VA 22030
          E-mail: kkelly@kellyguzzo.com
                  aguzzo@kellyguzzo.com
                  pat@kellyguzzo.com

               - and -

          Leonard A. Bennett, Esq.
          Craig C. Marchiando, Esq.
          CONSUMER LITIGATION ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          763 J. Clyde Morris Blvd., Ste. 1-A
          Newport News, VA 23601
          E-mail: lenbennett@clalegal.com
                  craig@clalegal.com

WELLS FARGO: Thompson Must File Class Cert. Bid by Feb. 16, 2022
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ERICA M. THOMPSON,
individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, v. WELLS
FARGO BANK, N.A., Case No. 2:20-cv-00532-RCY-DEM (E.D. Va.), the
Hon. Judge Douglas E. Miller entered an order that:

  -- The Plaintiff shall file her motion for class certification
     and a supporting brief by February 16, 2022.

  -- The Defendant shall file its opposition brief within 30
     days of the filing of Plaintiffs opening brief.

  -- The Plaintiff shall file her reply brief within 14 days of
     the filing of Defendant's opposition brief.

The parties in this action filed a Joint Motion to Establish a
Briefing Schedule for Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification. It
appearing to the Court that there is good cause to allow this
extension of time, says Judge Miller.

Wells Fargo is a provider of banking, mortgage, investing, credit
card, and personal, small business, and commercial financial
services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Nov. 22, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3l6x2Px at no extra charge.[CC]


WOODVALLEY CONTRACTORS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Clark Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
LAQUAN CLARK, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. WOODVALLEY CONTRACTORS CORP.; and VICENZO
ALFIERI, Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-06302 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 12,
2021) is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay
minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize and permit meal and
rest periods, provide accurate wage statements, and reimburse
necessary business expenses.

Plaintiff Clark was employed by the Defendants as landscaper.

Woodvalley Contractors Corp. owns and operates roll-off dumpsters,
and offers junk removal services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J. Farnworth, Esq.
          Peter A. Romero, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF PETER A. ROMERO PLLC
          490 Wheeler Road, Suite 250
          Hauppauge, NY 11788
          Telephone: (631) 257-5588
          Email: mfarnworth@romerolawny.com

ZHANGMEN EDUCATION: Robbins Geller Reminds of January 18 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP filed a class
action lawsuit seeking to represent purchasers of Zhangmen
Education Inc. (NYSE: ZME) American Depositary Shares ("ADSs") in
or traceable to Zhangmen Education's initial public offering
conducted on or about June 8, 2021 ("IPO"), pursuant to the IPO
prospectus (the "Prospectus") and Form F-1 registration statement,
as amended (together with the Prospectus, the "Registration
Statement"). The Zhangmen Education class action lawsuit charges
Zhangmen Education, certain of its top executives, and the
underwriters of the IPO with violations of the Securities Act of
1933. The Zhangmen Education class action lawsuit was commenced on
November 19, 2021 in the Southern District of New York and is
captioned Banerjee v. Zhangmen Education Inc.

The plaintiff is represented by Robbins Geller, which has extensive
experience in prosecuting investor class actions including actions
involving financial fraud.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff of the Zhangmen Education
class action lawsuit, please provide your information by clicking
here. You can also contact attorney J.C. Sanchezof Robbins Geller
by calling 800/449-4900 or via e-mail at jsanchez@rgrdlaw.com. Lead
plaintiff motions for the Zhangmen Education class action lawsuit
must be filed with the court no later than January 18, 2022.

CASE ALLEGATIONS: Zhangmen Education provides personalized online
tutoring services to K-12 students in the People's Republic of
China ("PRC"). The rapid rate of growth in PRC's online education
market has led to a sharp rise in fraudulent activity, including
false advertising, fabrication of teacher qualifications,
exaggerated student performance, and price fraud. In response to
these scandals, the Chinese government sought to clean up the
industry by adopting stringent new regulations shortly before the
Zhangmen Education IPO. But as the Zhangmen Education class action
lawsuit alleges, the true scope and effect of these proposed
measures were known to but undisclosed by defendants prior to the
IPO and were reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on
Zhangmen Education's business and future operating results.

Specifically, the Zhangmen Education class action lawsuit alleges
that the IPO's Registration Statement failed to disclose that: (a)
PRC authorities were in the process of implementing sweeping new
regulatory reforms on the private education industry in China
including, among others, prohibitions on: (i) profit-making by
private education companies, (ii) engaging in core-curriculum
tutoring on weekends and vacations, and (iii) capital-raising by
companies like Zhangmen Education; (b) the known risks, events, and
uncertainties noted in the Registration Statement were reasonably
likely to have a material adverse effect on Zhangmen Education's
business; and (c) based on the foregoing, the statements in the
Registration Statement concerning Zhangmen Education's historical
financial performance, market demand, and industry trends were
materially incomplete, inaccurate, and misleading.

On July 23, 2021 - less than two months after the IPO - PRC
unveiled a sweeping overhaul of its education sector, banning
companies that teach the school curriculum from making profits,
raising capital, or going public. These drastic measures
effectively ended any potential growth in the for-profit tutoring
sector in PRC.

Then, on July 26, 2021, Zhangmen Education issued a release
providing an update on the new PRC policies, admitting among other
things that Zhangmen Education expected "the Guidelines to have
material impacts on our existing business operations, financial
condition and corporate structure."

Thereafter, on August 25, 2021, Zhangmen Education issued a press
release providing a further update on similar policies implemented
by the Shanghai government and the implications for Zhangmen
Education's business, stating for example that: (a) "No new
provider of after-school tutoring services on academic subjects in
China's compulsory education system ('Academic AST') will be
approved, while existing Academic AST providers shall be subject to
review and re-registration as non-profit organizations"; (b)
"Tuition fees for Academic AST shall follow the guidelines from the
government to prevent any excessive charging or excessive
profit-seeking activities"; and (c) "AST advertising shall be
subject to enhanced oversight."

Finally, on November 19, 2021, Zhangmen Education announced that
its auditor, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Certified Public Accountants
LLP, had voluntarily resigned.

Subsequent to the IPO, the price of Zhangmen Education ADSs
plummeted. As of the filing of the Zhangmen Education class action
lawsuit, Zhangmen Education ADSs trade more than 80% below the IPO
price.

THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROCESS: The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 permits any investor who purchased Zhangmen
Education ADSs in or traceable to the IPO pursuant to the
Registration Statement to seek appointment as lead plaintiff in the
Zhangmen Education class action lawsuit. A lead plaintiff is
generally the movant with the greatest financial interest in the
relief sought by the putative class who is also typical and
adequate of the putative class. A lead plaintiff acts on behalf of
all other class members in directing the Zhangmen Education class
action lawsuit. The lead plaintiff can select a law firm of its
choice to litigate the Zhangmen Education class action lawsuit. An
investor's ability to share in any potential future recovery of the
Zhangmen Education class action lawsuit is not dependent upon
serving as lead plaintiff.

ABOUT ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP: With 200 lawyers in 9
offices nationwide, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP is the largest
U.S. law firm representing investors in securities class actions.
Robbins Geller attorneys have obtained many of the largest
shareholder recoveries in history, including the largest securities
class action recovery ever -- $7.2 billion -- in In re Enron Corp.
Sec. Litig. The 2020 ISS Securities Class Action Services Top 50
Report ranked Robbins Geller first for recovering $1.6 billion for
investors last year, more than double the amount recovered by any
other securities plaintiffs' firm. Please visit
http://www.rgrdlaw.comfor more information.

Attorney advertising.
Past results do not guarantee future outcomes.
Services may be performed by attorneys in any of our offices.

Contact:
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP
655 W. Broadway, San Diego, CA 92101
J.C. Sanchez, 800-449-4900
jsanchez@rgrdlaw.com [GN]

ZILLOW GROUP: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of January 18 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, reminds investors of the deadline to file a lead plaintiff
motion no later than January 18, 2022 in a securities class action
lawsuit that has been filed on behalf of investors who purchased or
acquired the securities of Zillow Group, Inc. ("Zillow") (NASDAQ:
Z, ZG) between February 10, 2021 and November 2, 2021, inclusive
(the "Class Period"). The lawsuit was filed in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington and alleges
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Zillow securities, and/or
would like to discuss your legal rights and options, please visit
Zillow Group Inc. Shareholder Class Action Lawsuit or contact Joe
Seidman toll free at (877) 779-1414 or seidman@bernlieb.com.

Zillow is a real estate company that purports to offer customers
"an on-demand experience for selling, buying, renting or financing
with transparence." The Company's "Zillow Offers" business "buys
and sells homes directly in dozens of markets across the country,
allowing sellers control over their timeline."

According to the complaint, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and, among other things, failed to disclose that: (1)
despite operational improvements, Zillow experienced significant
unpredictability in forecasting home prices for its Zillow Offers
business; (2) such unpredictability, as well as labor and supply
shortages, led to a backlog of inventory; and (3) as a result of
the foregoing, the Company was reasonably likely to wind-down its
Zillow Offers business, which would have a material adverse impact
on its financial results.

On October 18, 2021, the Company announced that Zillow Offers
suspended signing of new contracts through 2021 and would focus on
its current inventory, citing "a backlog in renovations and
operational capacity restraints." Zillow claimed that "[p]ausing
new contracts will enable us to focus on sellers already under
contract with us and our current home inventory." On this news,
Zillow's Class A share price fell $8.84, or 9.4%, to close at
$85.46 per share on October 18, 2021, and Zillow's Class C share
price fell $8.97, or 9.4%, to close at $86.00 per share on October
18, 2021.

Then, on November 2, 2021, after the market closed, Zillow
announced that it would wind-down Zillow Offers because "the
unpredictability in forecasting home prices far exceeds what we
anticipated and continuing to scale Zillow Offers would result in
too much earnings and balance-sheet volatility." As a result,
Zillow's third quarter 2021 financial results included "a
write-down of inventory of approximately $304 million within the
Homes segment as a result of purchasing homes in Q3 at higher
prices than the company's current estimates of future selling
prices." Moreover, the "company further expects an additional $240
million to $265 million of losses to be recognized in Q4 primarily
on homes it expects to purchase in Q4." The "wind-down is expected
to take several quarters and will include a reduction of Zillow's
workforce by approximately 25%." Zillow's Class A share price fell
$19.62, or 23%, to close at $65.86 per share on November 3, 2021,
on unusually heavy trading volume. Zillow's Class C share price
fell $21.73, or 25%, to close at $65.47 per share on November 3,
2021, on unusually heavy trading volume.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than January 18, 2022. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Zillow securities, and/or
would like to discuss your legal rights and options please visit
https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/zillowgroupinc-z-zg-shareholder-lawsuit-class-action-fraud-stock-457/
or contact Joe Seidman toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
seidman@bernlieb.com.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

ATTORNEY ADVERTISING.(c) 2021 Bernstein Liebhard LLP. The law firm
responsible for this advertisement is Bernstein Liebhard LLP, 10
East 40th Street, New York, New York 10016, (212) 779-1414. The
lawyer responsible for this advertisement in the State of
Connecticut is Michael S. Bigin. Prior results do not guarantee or
predict a similar outcome with respect to any future matter. [GN]

ZOOSK INC: Filing of Class Status Bid Extended to Jan. 24, 2022
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JUAN FLORES-MENDEZ, an
individual and AMBER COLLINS, an individual, and on behalf of
classes of similarly situated individuals, v. ZOOSK, INC., a
Delaware corporation, Case No. 3:20-cv-04929-WHA (N.D. Cal.), the
Hon. Judge William Alsup entered an order that:

   1. The Plaintiffs' motion for class certification deadline is
      extended to January 24, 2022;

   2. The Defendant's response is due February 7, 2022;

   3. The Plaintiffs' reply is due February 14, 2022;

   4. The hearing on Plaintiffs' motion for class certification
      is March 28, 2022. March 10, 2022.

   5. All other scheduled dates and deadlines in this matter
      shall remain as currently provided by the Court's prior
      Orders.

A copy of the Court's order dated Nov. 22, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3p1EEnm at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Marcus J. Bradley, Esq.
          Kiley L. Grombacher, Esq.
          Lirit A. King, Esq.
          BRADLEY/GROMBACHER, LLP
          31365 Oak Crest Drive, Suite 240
          Westlake Village, CA 91361
          Telephone: (805) 270-7100
          Facsimile: (805) 270-7589
          E-Mail: mbradley@bradleygrombacher.com
                  kgrombacher@bradleygrombacher.com
                  lking@bradleygrombacher.com

               - and -

          Douglas Harlan Meal, Esq.
          ORRICK HERRINGTON &
          SUTCLIFFE, LLP
          222 Berkeley Street, Suite 2000
          Boston, MA 02116-3740
          Telephone: (617) 880-1801
          E-mail: dmeal@orrick.com

               - and -

          Zachary M. Crosner, Esq.
          Michael R. Crosner, Esq.
          CROSNER LEGAL P.C.
          433 N. Camden Dr., Suite 400
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 496-4818
          Facsimile: (310) 510-6429
          E-mail: zach@crosnerlegal.com
                  mike@crosnerlegal.com

               - and -

          John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
          Ryan McGee, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
          201 N Franklin St., 7th Floor
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223-5505
          E-mail: jyanchunis@forthepeople.com
                  rmcgee@forthepeople.com

[*] Australia Puts on Hold Class Action Litigation Funding Bill
---------------------------------------------------------------
Phillip Coorey, writing for Financial Review, reports that the
federal government has put on hold all contested legislation --
including a crackdown on class-action litigation funding -- because
two Coalition senators refuse to pass any bills in protest at
state-imposed vaccine mandates.

Despite Prime Minister Scott Morrison appealing directly to the
senators -- Gerard Rennick of Queensland and Alex Antic of South
Australia -- and on Nov. 22 urging all state governments to mandate
vaccines only for frontline health and quarantine workers, the two
have refused to budge on the issue.

Senators Antic and Rennick were among five Coalition senators who
crossed the floor on Nov. 22 to vote for a One Nation vaccine
anti-discrimination bill that would have overridden state
government vaccine mandates that apply to workers and customers in
retail and hospitality, the services industry, sport, health and
quarantine.

The bill was crushed by 44 votes to five, and the other three
Coalition senators who supported the bill - Matt Canavan, Concetta
Fierravanti-Wells and Sam McMahon - indicated to the party they
would not hold other pieces of legislation hostage.

But Senators Rennick and Antic continued to insist the government
legislate to override state government vaccine mandates. The
government refused.

"Each vote that comes before the Parliament ought to be considered
on their merits, not held ransom to other matters," said frustrated
Government Senate leader Simon Birmingham.

With just two weeks of Parliament left for the year, and an
election due early next year, the government is focusing for now on
legislation that has Labor's support.

The bills on hold
Otherwise, bills that would cap court costs for class-action
lawyers and funders, impose voter identification at polling booths
and codify religious freedoms, and the possible introduction of
legislation to establish a federal anti-corruption commission,
remain in limbo.

Sources said Mr Morrison had spoken directly to both senators, to
no avail. However, publicly he played down the setback.

"In the Liberal Party, in the National Party, we don't run it as an
autocracy. We don't kick people out of our party if they happen
from time to time to disagree on issues on which they feel
strongly," he said.

At the same time, Mr Morrison broadened his appeal to the states to
apply vaccine mandates only to the health, aged care, the
disability sector and to quarantine, and otherwise to leave it to
individual businesses to make their own decisions.

Mr Morrison was accused of hypocrisy for singling out the
Queensland Labor government for not allowing unvaccinated people to
have a cup of coffee in a public venue when the NSW Liberal
government had imposed similarly strict rules.

Right to demand vaccination
On Nov. 22, he directed his message to all state governments,
regardless of their political hue.

"If venues, businesses, airlines, other places of work seek to
require of their employees to be vaccinated, they have that right
under the law," he said.

"But it is not the Commonwealth government's policy that they
should be told to do that, wherever that is in the country.″⁣

Senator Birmingham said although the Coalition allowed members to
cross the floor, it was a right that should be exercised sparingly,
and he accused them of putting themselves before the government's
re-election prospects.

The stand-off exacerbates an already messy end to the year for the
government, hampering attempts to generate sorely needed momentum
ahead of the federal election, due by May next year.

In Parliament on Nov. 22, the Prime Minister's past returned to
haunt him when Labor, which is trying to portray him as a liar,
asked why his office had lied to journalists in December 2019 about
whether Mr Morrison had gone on a holiday to Hawaii as the bushfire
crisis intensified.

Morrison corrects the record
Mr Morrison responded by saying that from the plane to Hawaii, he
had texted Labor leader Anthony Albanese "and told him where I was
going, and he was fully aware of where I was travelling with my
family".

Mr Albanese countered, saying Mr Morrison had told him no such
thing.

"That is not true. On the December 15, 2019, at 9.44pm, the Prime
Minister did text me saying he was going on leave. He did not tell
me where he was going. He said he was going with his family," he
said.

Subsequently, Mr Morrison said he had told Mr Albanese where he was
going and that he was "on leave". "I told him I was taking leave,"
he said.

Later, Mr Morrison returned to the House to clarify that Mr
Albanese had been correct.

"I did not tell him the destination of where I was going on leave
with my family. I simply communicated to him that I was taking
leave," he said.

Prime Minister Scott Morrison has joined other Coalition MPs in
criticising Labor's response to the GFC.

"When I was referring to 'he knew where I was going and was fully
aware I was travelling with my family', what I meant was that we
were going on leave together.

"I know I did not tell him where we were going because that is a
private matter where members take leave.″⁣

Mr Albanese said Mr Morrison had been exposed as a pathological
liar.

"The problem for this Prime Minister is that he has this character
trait whereby he says whatever is convenient at the time,
regardless of what the facts are," the Labor leader said. [GN]

[*] Australian Gov't Committee Backs Class Action Law Reform
------------------------------------------------------------
Adele Ferguson, writing for Australian Financial Review, reports
that it's make or break time for the Morrison government's bill to
reform the billion-dollar class action and litigation funding
industry.

On Nov. 19 a 68-page report was tabled out of session by the
government-controlled parliamentary committee, which is chaired by
Andrew Wallace, the likely next speaker of the house. Not
surprisingly, the committee supported the bill.

The government's argument for the change in law was that "in many
cases litigation funders appear to be making windfall profits that
are disproportionate to the costs incurred and the risks
undertaken".

It sounds reasonable at face value, but the way it has gone about
it, and the unintended consequences particularly for vulnerable
Australians, if the ability to run class actions is curtailed, has
raised more than a few eyebrows.

For starters, for such important legislation, the truncated
consultation process, including four days of consultation on the
draft legislation, one week to make submissions on the final
legislation and a day for a public hearing, left many frustrated
and concerned at the haste.

This continued with the release of the final report on Nov. 19.
Non-government committee members were given less than a day to read
the final report, digest it and respond, despite former
solicitor-general Justin Gleeson, SC, and the powerful Law Council
warning that the bill might not be constitutional.

The plan is to put the report before the chamber on Nov. 22, where
it will be debated, then moved to the Senate in the afternoon for
further debate, time permitting, then voted on in the last sitting
week of Parliament.

But given the strong language used in the dissenting reports from
Labor and the Greens, who have joined forces to block it, and
warnings about the bill's constitutional validity, it may not be a
done deal. And if it is, it may come back to bite the government.

The report acknowledges there are "widely divergent views" and says
the best way forward is to pass the bill subject to the deletion of
the word "only".

One of those "divergent" views by law firm Phi Finney McDonald,
which was quoted in Labor's dissenting report, gives a taste of the
level of industry anger at the way it has been handled: "That the
Government is seeking to present this reform as a consumer
protection measure is Orwellian gaslighting."

Labor recommends the withdrawal of the bill. But it says if it
proceeds it should not do so until the bill has been subject to a
proper inquiry and the Attorney-General's department has addressed
in writing the concerns raised by Justin Gleeson, SC, and others
about its constitutional validity.

One of the members of the committee, Senator Deborah O'Neill, put
it in a nutshell when she questioned whether the legislation was
fit for purpose to deliver fairness.

"The goal is clear, but there is critique of the way in which the
legislation is constructed by those who are saying: 'Don't pass it
yet. Really, take the time to look at it. Really, give it proper
consideration'," she said.

"There are concerns about the way this piece of legislation is
constructed."

From the perspective of getting the numbers, its fate rests with
the crossbenchers, including Pauline Hanson's One Nation, Jacqui
Lambie, Rex Patrick and Stirling Griff.

Senator Patrick, who will be one of the crucial votes in
determining whether the bill lives or dies, says for him it is
about access to justice. "My default position is to support access
to justice, which means my inclination is I wouldn't support the
bill."

It means there will be a lot of behind-the-scenes arm twisting of
crossbenchers between now and voting day.

The bill aims to restrict the payout of litigation funders on class
actions to a maximum of 30 per cent, leaving the rest for the
members of the class action, to stem "disproportionate" returns.

According to consulting giant PwC, which was commissioned by
Australia's largest litigation funder, Omni Bridgeway, to conduct
research into the proposed changes, a 30 per cent cap would render
a large number of class actions financially unviable, which would
impact Australians' access to justice.

The research was based on 20 years of class actions and found that
36 per cent of matters would not have covered the legal costs of
running the case, let alone adequate returns to the funder.

Class actions have long been a thorn in the side of business.
During the global pandemic last year business lobbyists finally got
the cut-through they had been seeking for years.

It began with then Attorney-General Christian Porter announcing a
parliamentary inquiry into class actions and litigation funders.
Then on May 22, Treasurer Josh Frydenberg announced a series of
measures for litigation funders and, on May 25, followed it up with
a temporary easing of continuous disclosure provisions to "make it
harder to bring actions against companies and officers during the
coronavirus crisis and while allowing the market to continue to
stay informed and function effectively".

Those temporary changes became permanent in August, which means a
continuous disclosure breach can only occur when a company fails to
update the market in a way that is intentional, reckless or
negligent.

As my colleague James Thomson argued in a column at the time, it
makes it that much harder for shareholder class actions against
companies to get up.

Indeed, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission wrote
in a submission: "The continuous disclosure obligations are
critical to protecting shareholders, promoting market integrity and
maintaining the good reputation of Australia's financial markets."

It said the economic significance of fair and efficient capital
markets dwarfed any exposure to class action damages.

In other changes, the government introduced a licensing regime for
litigation funders, which is overseen by the corporate regulator
and requires them to comply with the rules for managed investment
schemes.

Changing the business model is the next step in the squeezing of
class actions.

There is no question there needed to be an examination of the class
action regime given some scandalous cases, including the failed
management scheme company Timbercorp and Great Southern, which was
a disgrace.

Stated objective
More lately was the case of Banksia Securities, which collapsed in
2012, and had a court-sanctioned third party, known as a
contradictor, appointed to investigate fees of almost $20 million
taken from a $66 million settlement.

It culminated in a jaw-dropping, 969-page judgment, which resulted
in two barristers being struck off the practice role and a referral
to the Director of Public Prosecutions for further investigation.

As egregious as it was, Banksia showed that the courts already have
the power to examine the pay structure through the appointment of a
contradictor. It is something that should be used more.

Labor's dissenting report says the bill fails to achieve its stated
objective, which is to protect the interests of plaintiffs in class
actions, as the overwhelming evidence was that it would leave
plaintiffs significantly worse off.

"The real - though unstated - objective of the bill is to protect
the interests of powerful defendants by making it more difficult
for people to bring class actions in the first place," the
dissenting report says.

Like Labor, the Greens' dissenting report doesn't pull its
punches.

"The purpose of this bill is at the macro level," it says. "It is
designed to attack the business model of litigation funders to
reduce the quantum of class actions. Access to justice and fair
remedy are of no concern.

"The intention is pure and simple: to protect the power and wealth
of the government's corporate mates."

Politics aside, the risk of constitutional challenges is real. In
its submission the Law Council says in the timeframe provided for
submissions, it didn't have the opportunity to consider
constitutional issues in depth. It recommends Parliament give
significant consideration before the bill proceeds.

"Should the bill be enacted, it is likely that a significant level
of litigation will result in order to determine the
constitutionality issues. That is an undesirable outcome." [GN]

[*] Herbert Smith Attorneys Discuss Collective Actions in UK
------------------------------------------------------------
Kim Dietzel, Esq., Stephen Wisking, Esq., James White, Esq., Andrew
North, Esq., and Ruth Allen, Esq., of Herbert Smith Freehills, in
an article for global Competition Review, report that the United
Kingdom has long been a forum of choice for private enforcement of
competition law, collectively or otherwise,[2] and claimants
seeking to bring collective actions (that is joint claims by
parties that are not related) in the United Kingdom[3] have had a
number of possible procedural routes available to them. Where a
number of unrelated claimants have similar claims, the possible
routes for collective action range from: 'informal' claims
aggregation (by simply naming multiple claimants on a standard
claim form) and joint case management of similar cases; through to
more formal routes such as representative actions, group litigation
orders (GLOs) pursuant to Part 19 of the Civil Procedure Rules
(CPR) and the competition-specific collective proceedings regime
set out in the Competition Act 1998 (as amended by the Consumer
Rights Act 2015).

Before 2003, in cases involving large numbers of claimants who had
each suffered a relatively small loss as a result of a competition
law breach, the more formal routes of representative actions and
GLOs were considered unsuitable or unpopular in practice.[4] To
address this, a specific method for collective redress for damage
caused by competition law breaches was first introduced in 2003.
Initially, the regime allowed a consumer representative
organisation designated by the Secretary of State to bring
'follow-on'[5] damages claims in competition cases on behalf of
consumers (on an 'opt-in' basis[6] only). However, just one case
was brought under this very narrow regime (the case settled, with
costs understood to have far outweighed the ultimate settlement).
In October 2015, the scope of the competition collective actions
regime was dramatically expanded by the Consumer Rights Act 2015.
The expanded regime allows collective claims to be brought by
businesses as well as consumers, in stand-alone[7] as well as
follow-on cases, and - following much debate - on an 'opt-out'
basis[8] as well as an 'opt-in' basis. The regime thus heralds a
step-change in collective enforcement of competition law in the
UK.

At the time of writing, 13 applications for a collective
proceedings order (CPO) have been made to the Competition Appeal
Tribunal (CAT) under the expanded regime. On 18 August 2021, the
CAT approved the first application for a CPO under the competition
class action regime introduced in 2015, in Walter Hugh Merricks CBE
v Mastercard Incorporated and others.[9] The application was
initially turned down by the CAT in 2017 but was remitted to it
following a series of appeals, to be reconsidered against the
principles set out by the Supreme Court in its ruling of 11
December 2020 (discussed in more detail below). The Supreme Court's
landmark ruling in Merricks v Mastercard[10] has clarified
important aspects of the legal framework governing CPO applications
and takes a more permissive approach to certification than had
initially been suggested in the CAT's initial certification
judgments. As a result, the Supreme Court's judgment may lead to
more class actions being brought, and it has unlocked a number of
potential claims that had been stayed pending the Supreme Court's
judgment. There are now a further 11 CPO applications before the
CAT, several of which were recently heard and are awaiting
certification decisions over the coming months.

This chapter considers the current trends in collective or class
actions and claims aggregation in the UK, and highlights some of
the key issues that have arisen in recent cases. While much of the
focus is on the expanded opt-out collective actions regime before
the CAT, it also considers trends and key issues arising in claims
brought by multiple claimants via the other routes mentioned above,
namely representative actions, GLOs, and informal claims
aggregation and joint case management before both the High Court
and the CAT.[11] Finally, this chapter briefly touches on the issue
of settlement, which has its own dynamics in the context of
collective claims, whichever of the procedural routes is originally
followed when bringing the claim.

Competition collective actions before the CAT

Overview
A competition law-specific collective procedure was first
introduced in the UK with effect from 20 June 2003, by way of the
former Section 47B of the Competition Act 1998 (CA98).[12] This
allowed bodies designated by the Secretary of State to bring
follow-on competition law claims on behalf of consumers in the
specialist CAT, on an opt-in basis. However, between 2003 and 2015,
this procedure was used only once, in a claim brought by the
Consumers' Association, Which?, in relation to overcharging for
football shirts.[13] In that case, only 130 claimants opted in,
which was less than 1 per cent of those estimated to have been
affected by the competition infringement in question, and the case
ultimately settled. Which? - the sole body then designated to bring
claims on behalf of consumers - indicated that it would not bring
another claim so long as the mechanism remained opt-in in
nature,[14] and the procedure was widely perceived as a failure.

A new lease of life was given by the Consumer Rights Act 2015, as
part of a far-reaching overhaul of the competition law private
actions regime in the UK. With effect from 1 October 2015, Section
47B CA98 was amended[15] to be much broader in scope: collective
claims can now be brought by businesses as well as consumers, in
stand-alone as well as follow-on cases, and -- most significantly
-- on an opt-out basis as well as an opt-in basis. The class
representative is no longer limited to designated organisations; it
can be either a class member or a representative individual or
body, subject to authorisation from the CAT.

The gateway to bringing collective proceedings pursuant to Section
47B is an application to the CAT for a CPO. The CAT must then
review the application and decide whether to certify the claim and
allow it to proceed. Section 47B CA98 together with Rules 78 and 79
of the CAT Rules 2015[16] set out the procedural regime for the
granting of a CPO. The high-level requirements are that:

   -- the claims raise the same, similar or related issues of fact
or law and are suitable to be brought in collective
proceedings;[17] and
   -- the CAT considers that it is just and reasonable for the
proposed class representative to act as the representative in the
proceedings.[18]

The new regime got off to a slow start: in the first year, there
were only two CPO applications, and both were effectively rejected
by the CAT at the certification stage.[19] However, there are signs
of increasing momentum within the new regime, with 11 further CPO
applications having been lodged since May 2018, all bar one of
which are seeking certification on an opt-out basis.[20]

Moreover, the CAT's rejection of the second CPO application, in
Merricks v. Mastercard,[21] was overturned on appeal by the Court
of Appeal and on a further appeal by the Supreme Court, which
confirmed the less restrictive approach taken by the Court of
Appeal to the question of certification. In its ruling of 11
December 2020,[22] the Supreme Court acknowledged the CAT's
important role as the 'expert gatekeeper', with a wide discretion
to decide whether a competition collective action should be
certified to proceed, but considered that the CAT had made errors
of law when refusing to certify the claim in this case. Following
the Supreme Court's ruling the CAT had been expected to certify the
claim on remittal, based on the principles set out by the Supreme
Court. In its ruling of 18 August 2021[23] the CAT decided that Mr
Merricks should be authorised as the class representative and that
the CAT will make a CPO on an opt-out basis, provided that a
suitable undertaking as to liability for costs is given by the
funder in case an award of costs were to be made in favour of
Mastercard.

Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Merricks there have, at the
time of writing, been four applications for CPOs registered with
the CAT (Justin le Patourel v BT Group PLC, Consumers' Association
v Qualcomm Incorporated, Dr Rachel Kent v Apple Inc. and Apple
Distribution International Ltd and David Courtney Boyle & Edward
John Vermeer v Govia Thameslink Railway Limited & Others). A
further claim is being brought by Liz Coll, former head at
Consumers International, on behalf of 19.5 million UK Android phone
users against Google, for restricting consumer access to other app
distributors by pre-installing Google's proprietary apps including
the Google Play Store and charging a 30 per cent commission on
every digital purchase.

The claim has been announced in the press but was at the time of
writing not yet published on the CAT's register.

Against that background, this section highlights the key issues and
trends from the CPO applications made to date. We touch on the
types of cases in which CPOs have been sought, the approach taken
by the CAT, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court to the
eligibility of the claims for inclusion in collective proceedings,
and the suitability of the proposed class representative. We also
briefly consider the extent of the right of appeal against CAT
decisions on the issue of certification.

Types of cases in which CPO applications have been made
The 13 CPO applications that have been made to date suggest that
this mechanism will - as intended at the time of its introduction -
be used in a broad range of cases, involving both consumer and
business claimants covering a range of alleged competition law
infringements and on both a stand-alone and follow-on basis.

All but one of the CPO applications made to the CAT so far have
sought certification to proceed on an opt-out basis.[24] This is
unsurprising, and it is expected that this trend will continue,
particularly for claims where the loss suffered by each individual
claimant is relatively small, and the costs of bringing the action
are being covered either partly or wholly by third-party litigation
funding.

Another unsurprising trend is that the majority of cases have
involved (although they may not be limited to) follow-on claims,
namely, they are based on an underlying infringement decision by
the UK or EU competition authorities. In follow-on claims, there is
no need to prove the existence of the infringement; instead, the
claimant only has to show that the infringement caused them loss
and the amount of that loss. However, it is notable that a number
of CPO applications have also been made on a stand-alone basis,
including applications in respect of alleged illegal overcharges
paid by millions of rail passengers for rail travel to or from the
outer boundaries of Transport for London's fare zones,[25] an
application in respect of alleged leverage of a dominant position
in the supply of LTE chipsets with the alleged result that
smartphone manufacturers paid supra-competitive royalties for
patents[26] as well as the claims against Apple[27] and Google[28]
for alleged overcharging by imposing a 30 per cent commission on
digital purchases in the Apple App Store and Google Play Store.
These cases are also some of the first CPO applications to involve
an alleged abuse of dominance and not an infringement of the
prohibition on anticompetitive agreements.[29]

The claims brought to date have involved a roughly equal split
between claims brought on behalf of consumers and those brought on
behalf of businesses.[30] With regard to business claims, it is
notable that these involve potentially large businesses as well as
smaller businesses: for example, in the notice of application
published in respect of the opt-out action lodged by Michael
O'Higgins FX Class Representative Ltd in July 2019 in respect of
the European Commission's Forex infringement decisions,[31] the
proposed definition of the class of claimants is stated to be
'intended to capture all the varieties of "main customers" of FX
traders referred to in the Commission's press release of 16 May
2019, namely 'asset managers, pension funds, hedge funds, major
companies and other banks'. The second CPO application brought in
relation to the Forex infringements by Mr Phillip Evans also
includes a near-identical description of the types of businesses
intended to be captured within the claimant classes.[32] That said,
larger companies may of course choose to actively opt-out of any
collective action and bring their claims directly (either
individually or jointly with a smaller number of other similarly
affected companies). The ongoing litigation following on from the
Trucks and Forex infringements provides a good illustration of this
in practice: in addition to the pending CPO applications, a number
of larger companies have already initiated follow-on claims
separately, both before the CAT and in the High Court (see further
the section below on 'informal' claims aggregation).

Eligibility of claims
For claims to be eligible for inclusion in collective proceedings,
the CAT has to consider that: they raise the same, similar or
related issues of fact or law (often referred to as 'the
commonality requirement'); and they are suitable to be brought in
collective proceedings (often referred to as 'the suitability
requirement'). In determining the question of suitability, Rule 79
of the CAT Rules 2015 provides that the CAT may take into account
all matters it thinks fit and sets out a non-exhaustive list of
potentially relevant factors. These include the size and nature of
the class, whether it is possible to determine in respect of any
person whether that person is or is not a member of the class,
whether the claims are suitable for an aggregate award of damages,
and the costs and benefits of continuing the collective
proceedings.

This section focuses in particular on the two cases in which
certification hearings have taken place and judgments have been
given: Gibson v. Pride[33] and Merricks v. Mastercard.[34] By way
of brief summary of the factual background and context for those
cases:

Gibson v. Pride involved an opt-out claim for approximately GBP3
million brought by Ms Gibson, the General Secretary of the National
Pensioners Convention (NPC), against a manufacturer and supplier of
mobility scooters, on behalf of approximately 30,000 UK purchasers
between 1 February 2010 and 29 February 2012. The claim followed on
from a decision by the UK Competition and Markets Authority that
found that Pride Mobility Products Ltd and eight retailers had
infringed competition law by entering into agreements and concerted
practices aimed at prohibiting the online advertising of prices for
certain models of Pride mobility scooters below Pride's recommended
retail prices (i.e., a form of resale price maintenance). The
essence of the claim was that class members had overpaid for
mobility scooters as a result of the infringement.
Merricks v. Mastercard involves an opt-out claim for GBP14 billion
brought by Mr Merricks (the former Chief Ombudsman of the Financial
Ombudsman Service) against Mastercard, on behalf of approximately
46 million customers who purchased goods and services from
businesses in the UK that accepted Mastercard payment cards between
May 1992 and June 2008 (even if the purchase in question was not
actually made using a Mastercard). The claim (purportedly)[35]
follows on from the European Commission's infringement decision
relating to multilateral interchange fees (MIFs) (fees charged
between banks in relation to transactions involving the use of a
Mastercard card). The essence of the claim is that the MIF
overcharge was passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices
for goods and services.

The commonality and suitability requirements
The requirement of commonality of issues between all of the claims
has so far proven to be a major stumbling block in CPO applications
heard by the CAT. While the CAT has indicated that it does not
require all significant issues to be deemed common issues for a
claim to be suitable for a CPO,[36] or for the common issues to
predominate over the individual issues, there must still be
sufficient commonality to enable the CAT to conclude that the claim
is suitable to be brought in collective proceedings. A lack of such
commonality was the fundamental reason that the CAT rejected the
CPO applications in Gibson v. Pride and in the 2017 Merricks v.
Mastercard decision.

Difficult questions have arisen as to whether the loss suffered by
the claimants can be treated as a 'common issue' and established on
a class-wide basis, and the degree of precision with which a CPO
applicant must be able, at the time of the certification hearing,
to calculate a fair approximation of that loss. Establishing
sufficient commonality in this regard will generally require the
involvement of economic experts to propose a methodology for
calculating loss, and this becomes additionally complex where the
extent to which an overcharge has been 'passed on' to the claimants
is also a contested issue.

In Gibson v. Pride, the proposed claimant class included purchasers
of any new Pride mobility scooter during the specified period,
including both models subject to the online price advertising
restrictions identified in the underlying infringement decision and
other models, and models purchased in physical stores as well as
online (such that four sub-classes of claimant were identified in
the CPO application). Ms Gibson argued that a fair approximation of
the estimated individual loss on a common basis within the
sub-classes of claimants could be calculated, and relied on an
expert economist report setting out a proposed methodology for
doing so. However, that methodology did not distinguish between the
eight retailers identified in the underlying infringement decision
and other retailers of Pride mobility scooters. The CAT considered
that this was incorrect, given that the claim had been framed
solely as a follow-on claim,[37] and as such was limited to the
boundaries of the infringement identified in the underlying Office
of Fair Trading decision. The alleged losses suffered by the
members of the proposed claimant class were so diverse (and, in
some cases, outside the scope of the infringement decision from
which the claim arose) that the CAT concluded that there was
insufficient commonality of issues between each of the individual
claims to certify the claim to proceed by way of collective
proceedings. The CAT invited Ms Gibson to reformulate her claim and
amend the proposed methodology to focus on the effects of the
agreements that were the subject of the underlying infringement
decision, but the claim was ultimately withdrawn.

In Merricks v. Mastercard, demonstrating commonality of interest
between the claims proved problematic before the CAT largely due to
difficulties in determining how much of the alleged overcharge had
been passed on to each proposed claimant by the relevant retailers:
in practice, there was likely to be significant variation in
pass-on of the alleged overcharge between different kinds of goods
and services and different kinds of retailers. While the CAT
accepted that damages could, in principle, be calculated on an
aggregate basis using a weighted average pass-on percentage, it
concluded that the methodology proposed by Mr Merricks for doing so
was inadequate owing to a lack of evidence as to the availability
of the data that would be required to apply the proposed
methodology on a sufficiently sound basis. In reaching this
conclusion, the CAT looked to the judgment of the Canadian Supreme
Court in Pro-Sys Consultants v. Microsoft Corporation,[38] which it
had previously also considered in Gibson v. Pride. In that case,
the Canadian court held that the proposed methodology 'must offer a
realistic prospect of establishing loss on a class-wide basis', and
'cannot be purely theoretical or hypothetical, but rather must be
grounded in the facts of the particular case in question'. In
addition, 'there must be some evidence of the availability of the
data to which the methodology is to be applied'.[39] In the
circumstances, the CAT concluded that pass-through cannot be
described as a common issue.

The CAT also expressed concern that the proposed distribution of
damages envisaged by Mr Merricks would not reflect the governing
principle of damages for breach of competition law being
compensatory in nature, as it was not linked to a calculation of
individual loss. Section 47C(2) CA98 clearly states that the CAT
may make an aggregate award of damages in collective proceedings
'without undertaking an assessment of the amount of damages
recoverable in respect of the claim of each represented person'.
Nonetheless, the CAT concluded that the absence of any plausible
means of calculating the loss of individual claimants so as to
devise an appropriate method of distributing any aggregate award of
damages meant that the claims were not suitable for an aggregate
award of damages, and therefore should not be permitted to proceed
as collective proceedings.

However, on appeal, both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court
reached a different conclusion in regard to commonality and
suitability. On the issue of calculating the overcharge, the Court
of Appeal held that the CAT's approach to the expert evidence was
based on a misdirection. It considered that the appropriate test
should have been whether the CAT was satisfied that the proposed
methodology is capable of or offers a realistic prospect of
establishing loss to the class with no need for the proposed
representative to be able to produce all the evidence and data
available to operate that methodology at the certification stage.
In the circumstances, the Court of Appeal concluded that pass-on
was an issue common to all individual claims as a necessary step in
establishing loss by the class as a whole and that this was
sufficient to satisfy the commonality requirement. On the issue of
distribution of damages, the Court of Appeal held that the CAT had
been wrong to consider that the aggregate award of damages had to
be distributed on a compensatory basis according to what each
individual claimant had lost. It considered that distribution is a
matter for the trial judge to consider following the making of an
aggregate award, rather than the CAT at the certification stage.

Similarly, the Supreme Court concluded that the CAT had erroneously
applied the certification criteria in the Merricks case. In doing
so, the Supreme Court considered that the CAT made five errors of
law.

Identification of common issues
The CAT had concluded that the overcharge (to retailers) was a
common issue, and that this was sufficient to meet the 'common
issues' hurdle for collective proceedings (there being no
requirement for all significant issues in a claim to be common
issues in order to qualify for collective proceedings). However,
the Supreme Court nevertheless held that the CAT erred in law in
failing to recognise that the issue of 'passing on' of the loss by
retailers to consumers was also a common issue. The CAT had held
that there would be significant variations in pass on across the
class of claimants, but the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of
Appeal that in fact this was a common issue.

The Supreme Court considered that in failing to recognise that both
the main issues in the case were common issues, the CAT wrongly
started its balancing exercise from the premise that there was only
a low level of commonality, rather than viewing the presence of
common issues as 'a major plus factor'. In the Supreme Court's
view, correct recognition of the greater degree of common issues
would have been a powerful factor in favour of certification.

Suitability for aggregate damages just one factor
The Supreme Court held that the CAT's judgment placed too great a
weight on its conclusion that the claim was not suitable for
aggregate damages: while this is one of many relevant factors in
the suitability assessment, it is not a 'hurdle' (i.e., a
precondition to eligibility) that must be surmounted before
certification can be granted. This is not to say that unsuitability
for aggregate damages could not still be a key reason - indeed,
even a decisive reason - for denying certification of a particular
claim. However, the Supreme Court emphasised that where the CAT
regards a factor that is not a statutory hurdle to be decisive in
refusing certification, this must be made expressly clear.

Relative suitability of collective proceedings versus individual
claims
The Supreme Court considered in some detail whether the statutory
requirement for claims to be 'suitable to be brought in collective
proceedings' should be interpreted as meaning 'suitable in the
abstract', or 'suitable in a relative sense', that is, more
suitable to be brought in collective proceedings, with an aggregate
award of damages, than through individual proceedings with
individual damages. Drawing on the Canadian approach, the Supreme
Court concluded that the second of these options, relative
suitability, is the correct approach: this means that the key
question becomes whether it is preferable to bring the claim in
collective proceedings, as an alternative to multiple individual
claims, taking into account the fact that the purpose of collective
proceedings is to address aspects of the individual claim procedure
which make it unsuitable for the obtaining of redress at the
individual consumer level.

The Supreme Court concluded that in the Merricks case the prospect
of individual proceedings by over 46 million consumers would be a
'practical impossibility', such that collective proceedings would
clearly be preferable. However, outside the context of 'pure'
consumer claims involving large numbers of claimants each suffering
a relatively small individual loss, it is less clear that the same
conclusion should be reached - particularly where the proposed
class of claimants involves large corporate organisations, higher
value individual losses, or where there is evidence of individual
claims already having been lodged in parallel with a CPO
application.

Difficulties with quantification of loss not a reason to deny
certification
The Supreme Court emphasised that, in ordinary civil proceedings, a
claimant is not deprived of a trial merely because of 'forensic
difficulties in quantifying damages'. It concluded that the
well-established 'broad-axe' principle, which requires the court to
'do its best on the evidence available', is 'fully applicable in
competition cases', and not 'watered down' in any way in collective
proceedings.

The Supreme Court acknowledged that there were 'undoubted forensic
difficulties and shortcomings in the likely availability of data'
in the Merricks case, which affected quantification of the loss
suffered. However, given that these difficulties would not prevent
an individual consumer's claim going to trial (assuming it
disclosed a triable issue), the Court considered that they should
not, in principle, be treated as preventing the claims being
brought collectively. The Supreme Court concluded that the CAT
therefore erred in law when it regarded difficulties relating to
quantification of loss as a good reason to refuse certification. In
reaching this conclusion, it considered that it did not matter that
data may turn out to be incomplete and difficult to interpret, or
that the assembly of the relevant data may involve burdensome and
expensive disclosure processes.

Compensatory principle not essential in distribution of aggregate
damages
The Supreme Court held that section 47C of the Competition Act 1998
expressly removes the ordinary requirement for the separate
assessment of each claimant's loss. As a result, the CAT erred in
law when it required there to be a plausible way of estimating
individual loss at the damages distribution stage (the CAT had done
so on the basis of the general principle that damages for breach of
competition law must be compensatory).

The Supreme Court considered that the only implied requirement is
that distribution should be just in the sense of being fair and
reasonable. In some cases it may be appropriate to distribute the
award in line with individual loss, but there will also be cases
where this method would be so difficult and disproportionate that
another method would be more reasonable, fair and just. One of the
main reasons for the introduction of the power to award aggregate
damages in collective actions is precisely to avoid the need for
individual assessment of loss.

It is important to note that the Supreme Court's ruling does not
amount to any determination of the CPO application in the Merricks
case nor of the merits of the claim. Instead, it provides clear
principles against which the CPO application is to be reconsidered
by the CAT. The claim was remitted back to the CAT for
reconsideration of the question of certification. The application
was reconsidered by the CAT in March 2021 and the CAT handed down
its ruling on 18 August 2021.[40] Following the Supreme Court's
ruling in December 2020 the CAT agreed to certify the claim on
remittal, based on the principles set out by the Supreme Court.
Mastercard had also dropped its opposition to certification of the
claims as eligible for inclusion in collective proceedings
following the Supreme Court's ruling.

The CAT was left to determine two further issues, as to whether
Merricks could amend the claim form to extend the class to include
persons who died before the claim form was issued and whether the
collective proceedings could include a claim for compound
interest.

On the deceased persons issue, the CAT rejected the argument that
claims by deceased persons could be included on the basis of the
class definition in the existing claim form, as it expressly
excluded deceased persons. Merricks therefore submitted a draft
amended claim form, seeking to make a number of changes and
amending the estimated size of the class from 46.2 million to 59.8
million. The CAT agreed that, as a matter of policy, it should be
possible to include deceased person in collective proceedings, but
the normal way to do so would be for the claim to be brought by
their estate through those authorised to represent it. That was
however not the position taken in the draft amended claim, which
treats deceased persons as individuals within the class, and the
CAT therefore dismissed the application for amendment.

On the compound interest issue, Merricks had argued that compound
interest should be applied as any member of the class would at
least at some point during the relevant period have borrowed or
saved money, and the overcharge could have returned interest or
reduced debt interest payments. Mastercard submitted that the CPO
should exclude claims for compound interest as this was not a
common issue across the class and no plausible or credible method
had been put forward for calculating the loss suffered. The CAT
held that compound interest constitutes a distinct head of loss,
which must be separately established and cannot be presumed. In the
absence of a credible or plausible method of estimating what loss
was suffered by way of compound interest on an aggregate basis,
this head of claim was not suitable for an aggregate award and
could not be fairly resolved in collective proceedings.

Suitability of the proposed class representative
The CAT enjoys a wide degree of discretion when determining the
suitability of a proposed class representative. Rule 78 of the CAT
Rules provides that the CAT may authorise an applicant to act as
the class representative in collective proceedings whether or not
the applicant is a class member, provided that it considers that it
is 'just and reasonable' for the applicant to act as the class
representative.[41] In the first two CPO applications in which
judgments have been given by the CAT, objections were raised as to
the proposed class representative, but this issue did not prove to
be a significant stumbling block. That said, the suitability of the
class representative is likely to remain a bone of contention in
future cases, in particular in relation to the representative's
ability to pay the defendant's costs if the action is
unsuccessful.

In Gibson v. Pride, Ms Gibson was not a member of the proposed
claimant class. Rather, she was the General Secretary of the NPC,
and the majority of the 30,000 class members she sought to
represent were pensioners. Pride Mobility objected to her acting as
the class representative on general suitability grounds and also on
the basis that she would be unable to pay their recoverable costs
if ordered to do so. The CAT rejected these objections. It held
that there was no reason to think that Ms Gibson would be unable to
understand the legal advice given to her, or that (in consultation
as appropriate with the National Council or Executive Committee of
the NPC) she would not be able to take appropriate decisions about
the litigation in the interests of the represented class. Notably,
the CAT also expressly commented that it did not regard the fact
that the impetus for the collective proceedings came from Ms
Gibson's solicitors as objectionable. On the issue of Ms Gibson's
ability to pay Pride's recoverable costs if the action was
unsuccessful, the CAT noted that Ms Gibson had arranged, through
third-party litigation funders, an after-the-event (ATE) insurance
policy to cover any liability to pay Pride's costs up to GBP1.08
million and her own disbursements in the event that the claim was
unsuccessful. It concluded that the question of her ability to pay
Pride's recoverable costs was therefore not a basis for refusing to
authorise Ms Gibson to act as class representative at that stage
(while noting that this particular aspect of Pride's objections
could be considered further at the renewed application for a CPO,
which ultimately never took place).

In Merricks v. Mastercard, Mastercard's objections in relation to
the suitability of the proposed class representative did not relate
to Mr Merricks (a qualified solicitor with a long and distinguished
career in consumer protection) personally, but to the terms of the
funding agreement in place with Burford Capital, a third-party
litigation funder that had agreed to make GBP40 million available
to fund the action. The funding agreement provided for the return
to be paid out of undistributed proceeds and any costs ordered to
be paid by Mastercard to Mr Merricks, equal to the greater of:
GBP135 million; or 30 per cent of undistributed proceeds up to GBP1
billion plus 20 per cent of undistributed proceeds in excess of
GBP1 billion (total investment return). If the CAT made any
'negative commentary' on the contemplated transactions the funder
could terminate the agreement. In addition, there was a GBP10
million limit on the funder's liability for Mastercard's costs. In
summary, Mastercard raised three objections:

the funding agreement would not enable Mr Merricks to fund the
litigation or pay Mastercard's recoverable costs (if so ordered),
since it could be terminated by the funder;
the GBP10 million limit on the funder's liability for Mastercard's
costs was inadequate (and therefore Mr Merricks did not meet the
statutory requirement that he 'will be able to pay the defendant's
recoverable costs if ordered to do so'); and
the arrangement gave rise to a conflict of interest.
The CAT rejected these objections, once certain modifications had
been made to the funding agreement at the hearing.[42] In
particular, in an assessment that will also be of importance for
future claims, it concluded that the funder's return could be paid
out of the undistributed proceeds if the claim was successful, on
the basis that the concept of 'costs or expenses' in Section 47C(6)
CA98 covers a liability to pay the charge of a third-party funder.

On remittal of the application to the CAT, following the Supreme
Court's ruling in December 2020, the CAT carefully considered the
terms of a new litigation funding agreement in place with a new
litigation funder, Innsworth Capital Ltd. The CAT was satisfied
with the increased amount of funding available under the new
agreement, but expressed concern that, in relation to the
termination of the agreement, too much discretion was left with the
funder, who was under no obligation to take independent advice
prior to terminating the agreement. The funder subsequently amended
the agreement to include a requirement for independent legal and
expert advice to be provided to it when making a decision as to
whether to terminate the agreement. On the issue of Merricks'
ability to pay in case costs are awarded in favour of Mastercard,
Mastercard was seeking an undertaking by Innsworth Capital that it
would discharge a liability for costs ordered against Merricks. The
CAT concluded that Mr Merricks should be authorised as the class
representative provided that a suitable undertaking as to liability
for costs is given by the funder in case an award of costs were to
be made in favour of Mastercard.

One further as yet unresolved question is how the CAT will deal
with a scenario where there are two competing class representatives
seeking certification of collective proceedings. This is a live
issue in both the CPO applications made in respect of the Trucks
infringements (where an opt-out application has been made by UK
Trucks Claim Ltd and an opt-in application has been made by the
Road Haulage Association) and the CPO applications made in respect
of the Forex infringements (where both applications have been made
on an opt-out basis). At a case management conference held on 12
December 2018 regarding the Trucks applications, Roth J made clear
that the CAT did not consider there to be anything as a matter of
law to prevent two competing CPOs from proceeding where either both
applications are made on an opt-in basis or, as in the Trucks
cases, one is made on an opt-in basis and one on an opt-out basis.
In either of those scenarios, choosing between the two actions will
be a matter for the individual claimant.[43] However, the position
is different where two opt-out applications have been made on
behalf of the same or overlapping classes. The CAT Guide to
Proceedings 2015 makes clear that in this scenario, the CAT must
decide which application may proceed, if either. In the Forex
applications, the CAT held on 6 March 2020 that the two competing
applicants must go 'head to head' for the right to represent the
potential class in one single substantive hearing (the hearing took
place 12 to 16 July 2021), which will also determine whether a CPO
is made at all.[44] In reaching this conclusion, the CAT rejected
the approach taken in other jurisdictions with well-established
class action regimes, such as Canada, where 'carriage disputes' are
usually heard as preliminary issues prior to class certification.
The Canadian approach was favoured by both competing CPO applicants
in this case, and a number of the respondents, who were seeking an
early resolution of the carriage dispute to save costs. However,
the CAT held that the carriage dispute was not necessarily a
discrete matter capable of being determined as a preliminary issue
ahead of the CPO application hearing. Therefore, it ordered a
single substantive hearing to determine both whether to grant a CPO
at all, and if so which CPO applicant will prevail.[45]

Right of appeal against CAT decisions on certification
Following the CAT's 2017 decision to refuse certification in
Merricks v. Mastercard, the CAT also refused Mr Merricks'
application for permission to appeal against that decision. It
considered that the Court of Appeal did not have jurisdiction to
hear an appeal because there was no provision in the relevant
legislation relating to appeals against decisions of the CAT to
grant or reject CPOs.[46]

However, Mr Merricks subsequently applied to both the Court of
Appeal for permission to appeal and the Administrative Court for
judicial review. On 13 November 2018, the Court of Appeal ruled
that there is in fact a right to seek permission to appeal against
CAT rulings refusing an application for a CPO, on the basis that
such a decision constitutes a decision 'as to the award of damages'
within the meaning of Section 49(1A) CA98.[47] Giving the unanimous
judgment of the court, Patten LJ concluded that:

a refusal of a CPO is likely to prevent individual members of the
represented class who have suffered loss from obtaining any
compensation. It is therefore the end of the road for a class
action of this kind and, as such, a decision as to the award of
s.47C(2) damages. The fact that class members are left with their
individual claims is nothing to the point.[48]
There is a further right to seek permission to appeal against a
Court of Appeal judgment on certification to the Supreme Court on
questions of law, as illustrated by the grant of permission on 25
July 2019 for Mastercard to appeal the Court of Appeal's judgment
in Merricks v. Mastercard to the Supreme Court.[49]

Now that the existence of a statutory right to apply for leave to
appeal against CAT decisions to refuse certification of collective
proceedings has been established, it seems likely that applications
to challenge such decisions will become commonplace in cases where
significant amounts of damages are at stake.

Formal aggregation options before the High Court
Representative actions
Rule 19.6 of the CPR permits a representative to bring a claim on
behalf of other persons where the representative and the other
persons have 'the same interest' in the claim.[50] A judgment in a
representative action is binding on all persons represented in the
claim, notwithstanding that the persons represented in the claim
are not named parties. However, the requirement that the
representative and all the represented persons have 'the same
interest' has traditionally been applied narrowly: the class
members must all have the same interest in one cause of action, and
all seek the same remedy.

In the competition law context, in Emerald Supplies v. British
Airways,[51] the Court of Appeal upheld a decision by the English
High Court to strike out an attempt by Emerald Supplies to use this
form of action to claim damages on behalf of itself and all other
direct and indirect purchasers of air cargo services from British
Airways allegedly affected by a price-fixing cartel.[52] The Court
considered that Emerald Supplies could not satisfactorily identify
whether a represented person would qualify for damages (and
therefore have 'the same interest' in the claim at all stages in
the proceedings as other members of the represented class) until a
decision was made on the issue of whether or not competition law
had been infringed.[53] It also identified an additional difficulty
in concluding that the representative and all the represented
persons had the same interest in the claim where there was scope
for dispute within the class as to whether there was and the extent
of passing on (as the claim involved both direct and indirect
purchasers).[54] As a result, the claim could not be brought within
the scope of the representative action procedure.

Following on from this judgment, we understand that this form of
representative action has not been used again in a competition law
context for the purpose of bringing a damages claim on behalf of
multiple claimants. It remains to be seen whether the more
permissive approach recently adopted by the Court of Appeal to the
use of representative actions pursuant to Rule 19.6 of the CPR in
Lloyd v. Google (in a non-competition law context) 're-opens the
door' to the use of this form of collective action for competition
claims (currently on appeal to the Supreme Court).[55]

Group litigation order
A less restrictive alternative to the representative action under
CPR Rule 19.6 is to bring a claim involving multiple claimants
pursuant to a group ligitation order (GLO), a procedure introduced
in May 2000,[56] which provides a system of case management for
claims based on 'common or related issues of fact or law'.[57] To
conduct proceedings within the GLO case management framework, it is
necessary to first obtain court approval in the form of a GLO.[58]
All claimants wishing to join the group must then actively opt in
by applying to be entered onto a group register by a date specified
by the court. The common or related issues of fact or law are
designated 'GLO issues', and a judgment in relation to any GLO
issue is then binding on all parties to the claims being managed
under the GLO.[59]

While GLOs have been made in a broad variety of cases,[60] they
have not proven popular for competition claims (although a GLO was
suggested as a potential alternative route at first instance in the
Emerald Supplies case discussed above).[61] Indeed, the list of
GLOs maintained by the UK government indicates that only one GLO
has ever been issued in a competition case (Prentice v. Daimler
Chrysler),[62] out of 112 GLOs in total.[63]

Informal aggregation and joint case management (High Court and
CAT)
In addition to the more formal means of aggregating claims (or
certain aspects of claims) in a single set of proceedings, it is
also possible simply to name multiple claimants when initiating a
competition claim. In the High Court, Rule 7.3 of the CPR allows
claimants to take this approach in respect of 'all claims which can
be conveniently disposed of in the same proceedings'. In practice,
the CAT also adopts a similar approach for claims initiated in the
CAT.

In this way, for example, multiple claimants (whether related or
not) can jointly commence an action for damages for infringements
of competition law. In addition, even where claims are not
initiated jointly, they can be consolidated to be heard jointly,
or, more commonly, jointly case-managed, allowing common or similar
issues to be heard and dealt with together. In practice, these
various forms of informal claims aggregation have proven to be a
popular way of bringing joint claims or aggregating similar
claims.

A further recent trend is increased use of the transfer mechanisms
that allow for claims relating to similar underlying facts to move
between the High Court and the CAT, paving the way for subsequent
joint case management.[64] As well as ensuring efficient case
management by a specialist tribunal, this approach reflects the
courts' desire to avoid the risk of inconsistent outcomes where
multiple claims relating to similar underlying facts are heard in
different forums, as occurred in the interchange fee damages
litigation, where differing judgments were reached on key issues in
different first instance courts.[65] The Court of Appeal expressly
stated in its judgment on the Interchange Fees cases that it was in
favour of transfer to the CAT for all claims for damages based on
infringement of UK or EU competition law, in light of the
specialist nature and other advantages enjoyed by the CAT.[66]

It is notable that the popularity of these informal methods of
aggregating claims has continued notwithstanding the introduction
of the expanded competition-specific collective actions regime.
There are a number of reasons for this. Clearly, not all
competition damages claims involving (or potentially involving)
multiple claimants will be suitable for a CPO, and claimants may
not wish to go through the extra hurdle of CPO certification in
circumstances where this is not essential to the advancing of the
claims. In practice, the Section 47B CA98 regime is most suited to
claims involving large numbers of consumers or small
businesses,[67] that have each suffered a relatively small loss,
where it would be unattractive (both in terms of cost and the
amount of work involved) to bring an individual claim. Moreover,
even where the CPO route is a possibility, larger companies
pursuing claims for significant sums may prefer to maintain direct
control over the conduct (and potential settlement) of the claim,
rather than delegating authority to an independent class
representative.

Assignment of claims to special-purpose vehicles
The assignment of damages claims to special-purpose vehicles (SPVs)
has become a feature of the competition litigation landscape in a
number of jurisdictions, most notably the Netherlands,[68] and
Germany (albeit subject to a recent setback in the Financialright
Claims case).[69] This route has not yet been used in the UK for
competition damages claims, except in the context of a number of
recent CPO applications in which a limited company has been
established for the purpose of making the CPO application and
bringing the proposed collective proceedings (for reasons including
limitation of liability, succession and maintenance of separate
accounts).[70] However, in those cases, the special purpose vehicle
is acting as a (proposed) class representative, on behalf of the
(proposed) class of claimants, rather than the relevant claims
being assigned to the SPV and bundled together to be brought
directly by it.

The unpopularity of assignment of damages claims to SPVs in the UK
stems largely from the fact that, for many years, it was considered
that such an approach would be impermissible under historic rules
prohibiting third parties from supporting an unconnected party's
litigation, known as the doctrines of maintenance and
champerty.[71] While those rules have been relaxed in recent years,
and third-party litigation funding is now generally permitted (and
indeed becoming a critical feature of the competition litigation
landscape - see further below), it seemed clear until relatively
recently that the rules would be applied more strictly where claims
were assigned to a third party to pursue in its own name. It was
thus expected that the courts would refuse to recognise, on the
grounds of public policy, the assignment of a bare right to
litigate (i.e., where the assignee does not have an interest
sufficient to justify pursuit of proceedings for his or her own
benefit).[72]

However, the cases of JEB Recoveries LLP v. Binstock[73] and
Casehub Ltd v. Wolf Cola Ltd[74] suggest that there may be scope
for the UK courts to adopt a more flexible approach. In both those
cases, claims that had been assigned to a third party were
permitted to proceed and were held not to infringe the rules of
maintenance and champerty. The Casehub judgment is particularly
interesting, in that the business model pursued by the claimant -
described by the court as 'a company which builds consumer group
actions online' - appears similar to the practice seen in other
jurisdictions of SPVs 'bundling' assigned damages claims.

That said, these judgments do not appear to have led to a
significant increase of assignment of claims to third parties in
the UK, and at the time of writing this route has not been pursued
in the context of a competition damages claim (other than the use
of an SPV to act as a proposed class representative for the purpose
of collective proceedings, as discussed above). Each case will turn
on its facts, and it would certainly be dangerous to interpret the
JEB Recoveries and Casehub decisions as giving carte blanche to the
practice of assigning claims to an SPV where they are to be pursued
in the English courts. Furthermore, seeking to bring a competition
claim in this way is arguably largely unnecessary in light of the
other options available to victims of competition law infringements
before the UK courts.

Growth of third-party litigation funding
The historical restrictions on third-party litigation funding on
the basis of the doctrines of maintenance and champerty have been
significantly relaxed, and the market for third-party litigation
funding in the UK is growing at pace. Claims for damages based on
breaches of competition law are one of a number of different areas
where such funding is now increasingly commonplace: litigating
competition law claims can be very complex and costly, involving
extensive expert economic evidence, such that bringing individual
actions may not be economically viable, in particular for consumer
or small business claimants. Unsurprisingly, third-party funding
has therefore proven particularly important in the context of
opt-out collective actions commenced under the expanded Section 47B
CA98 regime, where the class representative is exposed to
significant costs risks.[75] Indeed, all of the CPO applications
made at the time of writing are known to have involved third-party
litigation funding to some extent (although little detail about the
arrangements is publicly available, with the exception of the
arrangements in Merricks v. Mastercard, which were considered in
some detail by the CAT - see above).[76]

When the 2015 collective actions reforms were first introduced,
concerns were raised about a perceived lack of incentives for
funders, given the default position under Section 47C(5) CA98 that
any unclaimed damages in an opt-out collective action (likely to be
substantial in practice)[77] are paid to a prescribed charity,
currently the Access to Justice Foundation (subject to the power of
the CAT to order that all or part of such funds is paid to the
class representative in respect of all or part of the costs or
expenses it incurred in connection with the proceedings).[78]
However, in Merricks v. Mastercard, the CAT confirmed that
third-party funders could be paid from any unclaimed damages[79]
and also dismissed objections to the funding agreement entered into
with Burford Capital in that case (once certain modifications had
been made to the agreement).[80] As a result, the trend for the
involvement of third-party funders in competition collective
proceedings is expected to continue (and is likely to be
fundamental to the future development of the regime).

Settlement dynamics in collective claims
In practice, competition claims in the UK are often settled before
trial. This trend is supported by the wide range of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms available in the UK (including
mediation, adjudication and expert determination) and the UK
courts' encouragement thereof. In claims involving multiple
claimants, the dynamics of possible settlement of the claim can be
particularly complex and a number of issues require careful
consideration.

As with any multi-party settlement, it is critical to ensure that
the parties to any settlement agreement are properly identified, so
there is no room for doubt as to which parties are bound by it. In
terms of settlement strategy, in some cases there may be advantages
for defendants in entering into multiple different settlement
agreements, playing off the various claimants against each other,
and potentially settling with some earlier than others, or on
different terms. In other cases, it may be preferable to insist on
settling with all claimants (for 'global peace') or not at all, on
the basis that it is not worthwhile from the defendant's
perspective to settle any of the claims if it will still have to
spend time and money defending the remaining claim.

Consideration will also need to be given to the risk of additional
claims 'coming out of the woodwork' at a later date; in practice,
this may mean that it is difficult to agree a settlement until the
relevant limitation period for the claims has expired. From the
claimants' perspective, determining how long to hold out before
settling will depend not only on the strength of the claim, but
also on factors such as costs, the existence or indeed absence of a
coordinated settlement strategy with the other claimants, and the
amount of damages being sought compared to the amount being offered
by way of settlement. Differences between claimants can materialise
in these situations.

For claims in respect of which an opt-out CPO has been (or could
be) issued by the CAT, specific rules apply to collective
settlement of the claim, giving the CAT the power to review and
approve the terms of the settlement.[81] The detailed procedure is
beyond the scope of this chapter. However, in summary, where an
opt-out CPO has been made, the CAT may make a collective settlement
approval order[82] where it is satisfied that the terms of the
settlement are 'just and reasonable'.[83] Where no CPO has been
made, but could have been, the CAT has similar powers to review and
approve any proposed collective settlement, but the parties must
first apply for a collective settlement order (analogous to a CPO
application but made by the proposed settlement representative and
would-be defendant), followed by an application for a collective
settlement approval order.[84]

This collective settlement procedure does not apply to opt-in
collective proceedings, although the CAT's permission is required
to settle such proceedings if the date specified in the CPO for
opting in to the claim has not yet expired at the time of the
settlement.[85]

Conclusion
The competition litigation landscape in the UK is at a particularly
interesting stage of its development in respect of collective
actions. Long recognised as a dynamic and 'claimant-friendly' forum
for competition damages claims more generally, the UK now also has
an expanded competition-specific opt-out collective actions regime
that is really 'getting off the ground', alongside an established
alternative route for claims aggregation and joint case management
for cases involving multiple claimants where a CPO application is
not considered suitable.

Notwithstanding the clarifications provided by the Supreme Court in
Merricks, important questions remain as to how the legal test for
CPO certification will be applied in practice. These questions are
now starting to be answered, with the first certification decision
by the CAT adopted on 18 August 2021. The CAT's determination in
this case of the further issues relating to the deceased persons
and to the compound interest issues shows that, despite the more
permissive approach to certification taken by the Supreme Court,
the CAT will continue to carefully consider and scrutinise all
issues in CPO applications in its certification process. A number
of CPO certification judgments are expected to be handed down in
the latter part of 2021 and will no doubt provide further
clarification on a host of issues. This will open up the next phase
in the development of competition collective proceedings in the UK,
to be closely watched by potential claimants and defendants alike.
[GN]

[*] Nonprofits Can Represent Individuals in DPA Class Actions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Marie Feyche of U. Pittsburgh School of Law, writing for
Jurist.org, reports that Democratic Reps. Ann Eshoo and Zoe
Lofgren, both from Silicon Valley, reintroduced on Nov. 18 the
Online Privacy Act, a bill that creates user data rights, limits
companies' collection and use of user data, and establishes the
Digital Privacy Agency (DPA) to enforce privacy laws.

The Online Privacy Act aims to protect individuals, encourage
innovation, and restore trust in technology companies. Eshoo and
Lofgren previously introduced the Online Privacy Act in 2019. The
revised bill keeps prior provisions for data subject rights. The
bill grants users the right to "access, correct, or delete their
data," and it creates the right for users to decide how long
companies can keep their data. The bill places clear limits on the
amount of data companies collect, process, disclose and maintain.
Companies are prohibited from using data in discriminatory ways,
and consent must be received from users in plain, simple language.

The revised bill also keeps prior provisions for the creation of
the Data Privacy Agency (DPA) to enforce users' privacy rights and
to ensure companies follow the law. The DPA would be an independent
federal agency with funding for up to 1,600 employees. The DPA
could impose damages up to the same maximum amount as the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC). "I believe that the FTC lacks the staff,
the expertise and the culture to take [this on]," Eshoo said. "This
is a monumental task of protecting privacy."

The revised bill includes new provisions, including a provision for
an Office of Civil Rights within the Data Privacy Agency. Further,
it authorizes privacy regulators and state attorneys general to
enforce violations of the bill alongside the agency. Individuals
are allowed to appoint nonprofits to represent them in private
class action lawsuits.

"Americans' right to privacy is being grossly disregarded in the
digital age. Too often, our private information online is stolen,
abused, used for profit, or grossly mishandled," said Eshoo. "Our
legislation will restore and protect the American people's right to
privacy by ensuring every person has control over their own data,
companies are held accountable for privacy intrusions, and the
government provides tough but fair enforcement."

"Recent revelations about tech company abuses make clear that
Congress must take action. We need to target the most widespread
problems online," said Lofgren. "The Online Privacy Act solves
problems by protecting the data of users and setting clear, firm
standards for online companies. This bill prevents the abusive
collection and retention of personal information. If companies
can't collect data, they can't use that data to manipulate
Americans for profit." [GN]

[*] Quebec Private Schools Face Suit for Going Virtual During COVID
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Chelsey St-Pierre at The Suburban reports that a class action
lawsuit is taking place against 113 private schools for going
virtual during the first wave of the pandemic. Some parents
involved by default were shocked to learn that their children's
schools were involved in the suit as they did not sign up as
participants in the suit.

The complaint before the courts mostly involves schools that are
located in Montreal and surrounding suburb areas, that did not
provide the full services promised in their contracts after the
government ordered them to move online in March 2020.

The private educational institutions targeted by the lawsuit
include French, English and religious community schools.

Parents with children attending the schools affected by the lawsuit
may receive a partial refund, according to the plaintiffs which may
amount to about 40 per cent of the school fees for the 2020-2021
school year.

The lawsuit was submitted in summer 2020. Initially, two parents
from Longueuil confronted their childrens' private school - Charles
Lemoyne - that did not issue refunds that spring. With the support
of parents who agreed that refunds should be issued, the case
morphed into a class action lawsuit with approximately 47,000
members.

The issue for some parents, is that they were only recently made
aware of their involvement by default with the suit by association
with the school attended by their children. It is not specified how
many of the estimated 47,000 parents are in fact supportive of the
lawsuit and actually want money back. Some parents have clearly
communicated their disagreement with the lawsuit.

To opt out of the lawsuit, parents must produce a letter via
regular mail addressed to the Longueuil courthouse, or provide a
statement in person, by December 10th, 2021.

"I don't even know where to begin," said Claire Trottier, the
mother of two children who attend one of the schools involved in
the lawsuit, told media. "I think the people who are doing this
have some entitlement issues. It is a little bit tone-deaf."

According to court documents, the parents who launched the case
argued that it is not just a matter of quality of education during
that time, but also the deprivation of usual hours where children
are under supervision allowing parents to go to work.

The consideration of the direction that the case may move in should
many people opt out if they object to the actions taken is unclear,
however it has been mentioned as a factor. "It remains unclear who
among this group of 47,000 people complained about the provision of
educational services from March 13, 2020," Judge Pierre-C. Gagnon
of Quebec Superior Court specified in his authorization ruling last
July.

Judge Gagnon also specified that the schools inundated the Court
with sworn statements and documents indicating that the vast
majority of parents claimed that they were satisfied with how the
defendants (schools) performed during the first wave.

The estimated 47,000 willing and defacto participants was estimated
solely by the number of kids attending the targeted 113 private
schools affected by the lawsuit.

Early arguments by the defendants' lawyers state that although the
decree altered the contracts, parents had the option to cancel the
contracts as a result, at any time. [GN]

[*] Webb City, Mo. Joins Class Action Against Opioid Companies
--------------------------------------------------------------
Webb city is looking to throw their support behind a class action
lawsuit against the opioid companies.

Recently, the three largest opioid distributors in the country
agreed to a settlement to pay for damages caused by the opioid
epidemic. Webb City is now hoping to get some of that settlement.

City Administrator Carl Francis says they will present it to
council, where they will vote on it.

Francis says the amount they would receive would be minimal, but
it's more about throwing support for those who suffered from opioid
abuse.

"We are requesting for our council to show support for the class
action lawsuit, to join in with other communities to show that we
are aware of the damage of this drug abuse. And we are working to
solve the problem. But, we can't do that with, with the drug being
rampant on the street," said Francis.

Francis says any money awarded from the lawsuit will go towards
drug prevention and awareness in the community. [GN]


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