---

              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, January 7, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 0

                            Headlines

217 BOURBON: Bancroft, Sharone Seek to Certify Collective Action
AGILIS ENGINEERING: Powers Sues Over Illegal "No Poach Agreement"
AHOLD USA: Court Narrows Claims in Valcarcel Class Suit
AHOLD USA: S.D. New York Narrows Claims in Valcarcel's Class Suit
AMAZON.COM SERVICES: 9th Cir. Certifies Question to Supreme Court

AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Rizvanovic Suit Removed to E.D. California
AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Swearingen Bid for Class Status Partly OK'd
AMERICA'S PIZZA: Underpays Delivery Drivers, Worrell Suit Claims
AMERICAN HONDA: Court Certifies Three Subclasses in Quackenbush
AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY: Time Extension for Class Cert. Bid Sought

AMYRIS INC: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in Mulderrig Securities Suit
ASSET MARKETING: Appeals Arbitration Bid Denial in Culver Suit
ATRIA SENIOR: Sales Directors Win Class Status in Stickles Suit
BAE SYSTEMS: Cabrales Wage-and-Hour Suit Removed to S.D. Cal.
BOEING CO: 5th Cir. Stays Earl RICO Suit Pending Rule 23(f) Appeal

BRADFORD O'NEIL: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Clemons' TCPA Suit
BRINKER INTERNATIONAL: Hale Labor Suit Goes to N.D. California
CARBONITE INC: 5th Cir. Flips Construction Industry Suit Dismissal
CASA SYSTEMS: Hook Files Appeal in Securities Class Suit
CENTURYLINK INC: Bultemeyer Seeks to Certify Rule 23 Class

CHARLES SCHWAB: Wright Class Status Bid Filing Due June 20
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Class Status Hearing Set for Jan. 24
CHEFS' WAREHOUSE: Faces Paz Suit Over Delivery Drivers' Unpaid OT
CHICAGO, IL: Court Allows Bill of Costs for $40.2K in Yates Suit
CLEVELAND-CLIFFS INC: Ct. Enters Rule 16 Sched Order in Crocker

CLIENT SERVICES: Seeks 3rd Cir. Review of Ruling in Rhee FDCPA Suit
COLLECTO INC: Parties Seek May 20 Class Cert Filing Extension
CORNUCOPIA LOGISTICS: Tiemtore Sues Over Illegal Retention of Tips
COUNTYWIDE MECHANICAL: Nava Labor Suit Removed to S.D. California
CUSTER RESOURCES: Faces Vajdos Suit Over Landmen's Unpaid Overtime

CUSTOMCARE LLC: Underpays Personal Care Attendants, Turnmire Claims
DANIEL GLADSTONE: May Class Certification Bid Junked
DAWN TO DUSK: Pereira Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
DENTAL EQUITIES: Scoma's Class Certification Bid Granted in Part
DESERT STATES: $7.95MM Class Settlement in Koch Suit Wins Final OK

DESERT STATES: Koch Attorneys Entitled to $2.1MM in Fees & Costs
DESKTOP METAL: Faces Luongo Suit Over Share Price Drop
DOMINO'S PIZZA: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Carmona Suit Upheld
E&R SERVICES: Santos Wins Bid to Certify Hourly-Paid Workers Class
EMERGENT BIOSOLUTIONS: Palm Tran, Roth & Weiss Suits Consolidated

ESSENTIA HEALTH: W.D. Wisconsin Narrows Claims in Hills Class Suit
EUFAULA, AL: Willson Sues Over Unpaid Overtime for K-9 Officers
FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Seeks to Extend Class Cert. Bid Response
FLORIDA: Class Settlement in Gayle v. Meade Wins Final Approval
FORD MOTOR: Bid to Exclude Rebuttal Reports in Simmons Suit Granted

FORD MOTOR: Court Denies Bid to Exclude Simmons' Experts' Opinions
FOUNDATIONS HEALTH: Seeks Jan. 17 Class Cert Response Extension
FUNCTION(X) INC: Mule Appeals Ruling in Fiduciary Breach Suit
GDB INTERNATIONAL: Supervised Notification to Collective Sought
GOLDMAN SACHS: Su Yan Sues Over Sale of Doomed iQIYI Securities

GOOGLE LLC: Bid for Class Certification Extended in Privacy Case
GOOGLE LLC: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss 2 of Brown's 7 Claims
HV GLOBAL: Ramirez Employment Suit Removed to N.D. California
INDEPENDENT BANK: Seeks to Narrow Scope of Prospective Classes
KANSAS: District Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Tyler v. Schnurr, HCF

KBR INC: Cal. App. Affirms in Part Dismissal Order in Lee Suit
LABORATORY CORPORATION: Poole Suit Removed to E.D. California
LEO'S BAGELS: Fails to Provide Proper Wages, Penate Suit Says
MAJOR ENERGY: Appeals Arbitration Bid Denial in Glikin Suit
MARS PETCARE: Court Grants Moore's Bid for Partial Summary Judgment

MATTERPORT INC: John Stemmelin Seeks to Certify Two Classes
METLIFE INC: Extension of Case Management Order Deadlines Sought
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Browne Class Suit
NATWEST MARKETS: Faces Suit Over Manipulation of Treasury Futures
OREGON: Snider Seeks Feb. 14 Extension for Class Cert. Filing

OUTBACK INC: Gil Wage-and-Hour Suit Removed to E.D. California
PERSOLVE RECOVERIES: Seeks Extension to File Class Cert. Response
PLANNED PARENTHOOD: Fails to Protect Patient' Info, T.S. Suit Says
PROCORE LLC: Norris Sues Over Security Guards' Unpaid Wages
RAYMOND JAMES: Loses Bid to Dismiss Nguyen's 2nd Amended Complaint

SHARPSPRING INC: Faces Morse Suit Over Misleading Proxy Statement
SOUTH BROWARD: American Plan's Bid to Quash Moved to S.D. Florida
SOUTHERN STATES: Class Certification Appeal in Stanley Suit Tossed
SOUTHWEST CREDIT: Summary Judgment Order in Persinger Suit Affirmed
STARBUCKS CORP: C.D. California Enters Protective Order in Myers

SUBCONTRACTING CONCEPTS: Court Compels Ross to Arbitrate Claims
T-MOBILE USA: Savick Suit Transferred to W.D. Mo.
T-MOBILE USA: Simaan Suit Transferred to W.D. Missouri
T-MOBILE USA: Song Suit Transferred to W.D. Missouri
T-MOBILE USA: Strenfel Suit Transferred to W.D. Missouri

T-MOBILE USA: Villalon Suit Transferred to W.D. Missouri
TARGET CORP: Almonrode of Miller Law Named Chen's Interim Counsel
TD AMERITRADE: Loses Bid to Compel Arbitration in Klein Class Suit
TOURNAMENT PLAYERS: Perkins Sues Over Unpaid Minimum and OT Wages
U.S. CITIZENSHIP: Muradyan et al., Lose Class Status Bid

UNITED STATES: Bid to Certify Class in Tony N. v. USCIS Denied
UNITED STATES: Court Denies in Part Bid to Dismiss Campo's Claims
UNITED STATES: Federation Appeals Ruling in Miller Suit to 5th Cir.
UNIVERSAL LOGISTICS: Faine Seeks Extension of Class Cert. Filing
VANDA PHARMS: Teamsters Seeks Extension to Serve Class Cert Reply

VI-JON LLC: Moreno Appeals Dismissal of 2nd Amended Consumer Suit
WAL-MART STORES: Henderson Appeals ADA Suit Dismissal to 4th Cir.
WASHINGTON: Court Seeks Pro Bono Counsel in Penwell v. Strange
WELLS FARGO: Hollis Appeals Denial of Motion to Set Aside Judgment
ZOOSK INC: Seeks to Amend Class Certification Briefing Dates


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Court Rules Global Re to Pay Litigation Costs
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Montana S.C. Affirms $98MM NIC Judgement


                            *********

217 BOURBON: Bancroft, Sharone Seek to Certify Collective Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BRITTANY BANCROFT and
ARIEL SHARONE, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, v. 217 BOURBON, LLC and JESSE WADE YEOMANS, Case No.
2:21-cv-00545-BWA-JVM (E.D. La.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
enter an order certifying the case as a collective action under 29
U.S.C. section 216(b), to challenge the Defendants' common policy
and practice of failing to pay minimum wage and compensate their
employees properly for overtime hours worked.

The Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, allege that the Defendants employed an illegal
company-wide scheme and/or common policy of failing to pay their
employees minimum wage for hours worked, and failing to pay for
hour worked in excess of 40 in a workweek at one and one-half times
their regular hourly rate, and manipulation and destruction of
records related to hours worked, in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

A copy of Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Dec. 27, 2021
is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/31r4NEx at no
extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Daniel A. Meyer, Esq.
          Joseph M. Bruno, Esq.
          Daniel A. Meyer, Esq.
          BRUNO & BRUNO, L.L.P.
          855 Baronne Street
          New Orleans, LA 70113
          Telephone: (504) 525-1335
          Facsimile: (504) 562-6775
          E-mail: dmeyer@brunobrunolaw.com

AGILIS ENGINEERING: Powers Sues Over Illegal "No Poach Agreement"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL D. POWERS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. AGILIS ENGINEERING, INC.; BELCAN LLC;
CYIENT, INC.; PARAMETRIC SOLUTIONS, INC.; QUEST GLOBAL SERVICES-NA,
INC.; AND RAYTHEON TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, PRATT AND WHITNEY
DIVISION, Defendants, Case No. 3:21-cv-01691 (D. Conn., December
20, 2021) is an antitrust class action brought on behalf of a
proposed class of engineers and other high skilled workers in the
aerospace industry whose wages were suppressed by Defendants'
agreement to restrict hiring or "poaching" of one another's high
skilled workforce in violation of Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants' own characterization of
the No Poach Agreement confirms its purpose and effect: their
"general aim [wa]s NOT to recruit from the local 'competition'
because no one wins; salaries rise, the workforce gets unstable,
and our margins all get hurt." The Defendants' own words also
confirm that, but for their No Poach Agreement, competition for
high skilled workers would "drive the[ir] price structure up"
causing "salaries to increase."

The Plaintiffs seek to recover their damages, trebled, flowing from
the Defendants' No Poach Agreement.

The Defendants are aerospace engineering firms. All Defendants
employ aerospace, mechanical, and civil engineers and other high
skilled workers, such as, but not limited to, engineering
technicians, instrumentation technicians, quality technicians,
machinists, welders, and mechanics.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William M. Bloss, Esq.
          KOSKOFF, KOSKOFF & BIEDER, P.C.
          350 Fairfield Avenue
          Bridgeport, CT 06604
          Telephone: (203) 336-4421
          E-mail: bbloss@koskoff.com

               - and -

          Bonny Sweeney, Esq.
          HAUSFELD LLP
          600 Montgomery St. #3200
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 633-1908
          E-mail: bsweeney@hausfeld.com

               - and -

          Hilary K. Scherrer, Esq.
          HAUSFELD LLP
          888 16th Street NW, Suite 300
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone:  (202) 540-7200
          E-mail: hscherrer@hausfeld.com

               - and -

          Gary I. Smith, Jr., Esq.
          HAUSFELD LLP
          325 Chestnut Street, Suite 900
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: (215) 985-3270
          E-mail: gsmith@hausfeld.com

AHOLD USA: Court Narrows Claims in Valcarcel Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as IDALIA VALCARCEL, v. AHOLD
U.S.A., Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-07821-JSR (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge
Jed S. Rakoff entered an order as follows:

   -- denying Ahold's motion to dismiss Valcarcel's claims under
      Sections 349 and 350 of the GBL; and

   -- granting with prejudice Ahold's motion to dismiss all
      other claims and her request for injunctive relief.

The Court said, "Ahold moves to dismiss the complaint in its
entirety for failure to state a claim.  The Court holds that
Valcarcel's consumer protection claims have been adequately
pleaded, but that her other claims fail. Additionally, the Court
holds that she lacks standing to seek injunctive relief.
Accordingly, Ahold's motion to dismiss is granted in part and
denied in part."

Ahold manufactures, labels, markets, and sells cinnamon-flavored
crackers under its "Stop and Shop brand" that are described as
"graham crackers" on the front label.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 22, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3qSel4e at no extra charge.[CC]




AHOLD USA: S.D. New York Narrows Claims in Valcarcel's Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IDALIA VALCARCEL, Plaintiff v. AHOLD U.S.A., Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-07821 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Jed S.
Rakoff of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted in part and denied in part Ahold's motion to dismiss
the complaint its entirety.

Background

To paraphrase Justice Holmes, a graham of history is worth a pound
of logic. Rising to prominence in the 1830s, Sylvester Graham
believed that a high-fiber, vegetarian diet -- particularly when
combined with cold baths and hard mattresses -- could stave off a
whole litany of diseases, from cholera to alcoholism to premature
aging. But his most famous recommendation was that a thick,
homemade bread, made from the whole of the wheat and coarsely
ground, should be the mainstay of every American's diet. Indeed, it
has been said that his harsh condemnation of commercial white bread
once incited the bakers of Boston to riot.

Somewhat more recently, in January or February of 2021, Plaintiff
Valcarcel purchased at her local Stop and Shop supermarket a box of
crackers, labeled on its face with the word "GRAHAM" in large, all
capital letters, expecting that they would be made predominantly
with graham -- that is, whole wheat -- flour. But they were not. As
a result, Valcarcel brings the suit against Stop and Shop's parent
company, Defendant Ahold, which manufacturers, labels, markets, and
sells the product in question, alleging that she was deceived by
the product's packaging.

On Sept. 18, 2021, Valcarcel filed suit against Ahold asserting
claims for violations of Sections 349 and 350 of the New York
General Business Law ("GBL"), breach of express warranty, breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability, violation of the Magnuson
Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 2301, et seq., negligent
misrepresentation, fraud, and unjust enrichment.

In her complaint, Valcarcel seeks monetary and injunctive relief on
behalf of herself and a putative class of consumers, alleging a
number of legal theories, including violations of New York State
consumer protection laws, fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
breach of express and implied warranties, unjust enrichment, and
breach of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 2301,
et seq.

The complaint also asserts claims on behalf of a putative class of
"all persons in the State of New York who purchased the Product
during the statutes of limitation for each cause of action
alleged." The complaint seeks both damages and injunctive relief.

Ahold filed the present motion to dismiss the complaint its
entirety on Nov. 11, 2021, for failure to state a claim.

Discussion

I. The Court Cannot Conclude Valcarcel's Claims are Preempted by
Federal Law Given the Current Procedural Posture.

Ahold argues that Valcarcel's claims, including her GBL claims, are
preempted by the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"). It
argues that Valcarcel's claims are preempted insofar as they are
premised on the theory that compliance with state law requires
labeling the crackers in question in some manner other than as
"graham crackers," which Ahold argues is the "common and usual
name," as established by "common usage," of crackers such as
these.

According to Ahold, "products like the Defendant's Product -- a
flat, rectangular, perforated, sweet, crunchy cracker -- have been
sold under the common, usual name 'graham crackers' for decades."
In support of this position, Ahold relies on the Central District
of California's decision in Painter v. Blue Diamond Growers, 2017
WL 4766510, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2017), aff'd, 757 F. App'x 517
(9th Cir. 2018), which held that "Almond milk" was not a deceptive
label because it was found by the court to be consistent with the
"common or usual name" regulations set out in 21 C.F.R. Section
102.5(a).

Judge Rakoff holds that at the pleading stage, preemption
constitutes grounds for dismissal only 'if the statute's barrier to
suit is evident from the face of the complaint.' Ahold's argument
for preemption, however, rests on factual assertions regarding the
"common usage" of the term "graham cracker" that go beyond the
allegations of the complaint. Indeed, while it may be possible in
some cases to ascertain how a term is commonly used on a motion to
dismiss, Ahold's argument invites the Court to define a "graham
cracker" in terms of its shape and taste on the basis of what would
essentially be speculation. This Judge Rakoff cannot do.
Accordingly, he cannot conclude, given the current posture, that
Valcarcel's claims are preempted by federal law.

II. Valcarcel Has Adequately Pleaded a Violation of New York
General Business Law Sections 349 and 350

Ahold next argues that even if Valcarcel's claims were not
preempted, they fail on the merits. It argues that Valcarcel's GBL
claims fail on two of these three elements: (1) failure to
plausibly allege that the product made materially misleading
statements and (2) failure to adequately plead injury. Each is
addressed in turn.

Judge Rakoff concludes that neither provides a basis for dismissing
the GBL claims at this stage in the proceedings. First, he holds
that at the motion to dismiss stage, "the Court may not resolve
questions regarding 'the background knowledge, experience, and
understanding of reasonable consumers' as a matter of law." It may
well be that "survey, expert testimony, and other competent
evidence" ultimately proves Ahold's position to be the correct one,
but such factual inquiry and inference is improper given the
present procedural posture.

Second, Judge Rakoff finds that Valcarcel has adequately pled
injury resulting from the alleged GBL violations. While there are
cases suggesting that such facts must be pleaded, that position was
explicitly rejected by the Second Circuit, which stated that a
plaintiff's "failure to identify the prices of competing products
to establish the premium that she paid is not fatal to her claim"
at the motion to dismiss stage.

Having concluded that Valcarcel has adequately pled violations of
GBL Sections 349 and 350, Judge Rakoff will deny Ahold's motion to
dismiss those claims.

III. Valcarcel's Other Common Law Claims Fail as Matter of Law

In addition to the claims under the GBL, Valcarcel asserts a number
of state common law claims (and one derivative federal statutory
claim), all premised on the allegedly deceptive packaging. Judge
Rakoff will grant the motion to dismiss as to all of these claims.

A. Fraud

To state a claim for fraud under New York law, a plaintiff must
allege (1) a material misrepresentation or omission of fact; (2)
which the defendant knew to be false; (3) which the defendant made
with the intent to defraud; (4) upon which the plaintiff reasonably
relied; and (5) which caused injury to the plaintiff.

Judge Rakoff finds that Valcarcel does neither. Indeed, Valcarcel's
only allegation going to fraudulent intent is her conclusory
allegation that Ahold acted with "knowledge that the Product was
not consistent with its representations." "But the simple knowledge
that a statement is false" is insufficient to plead a strong
inference of fraudulent intent. Valcarcel does not argue otherwise,
and her counsel properly withdrew this claim at oral argument.
Accordingly, the fraud claim will be dismissed.

B. Negligent Misrepresentation

To recover for negligent misrepresentation in the commercial
context, there must be "a special relationship of trust or
confidence between the parties." In her papers, Valcarcel argues
that such a special relationship has been pled here because the
complaint states that Ahold operates a "supermarket with an
established reputation for quality, as promised through the front
label seal," referring to the seal on the front of the product's
packaging "promising a '100% Quality & Trust Guarantee.'"

But, Judge Rakoff finds that Valcarcel cite no support for the
notion that a supermarket's generally favorable reputation can
render a sale something "more than an arms-length commercial
transaction." And, while courts have recognized that a label
"containing language suggesting some level of medical or scientific
backing for its claim" can support a negligent misrepresentation
claim in certain instances, the non-specific assertion of a
"quality" and "trust" guarantee cannot not plausibly be interpreted
as a representation of expertise in this context. At oral argument,
therefore, the Plaintiff's counsel withdrew this claim.
Accordingly, Judge Rakoff will grant the motion to dismiss the
negligent misrepresentation claim.

C. Breach of Warranty

In order to asset a claim for breach of an express or implied
warranty under New York law, "a buyer must provide the seller with
timely notice of the alleged breach." Valcarcel responds by noting
that "a minority of New York State cases suggest an exception to
the notice requirement in retail sales." However, "the exception
appears to be exclusively applied where a party alleges physical,
in addition to economic, injury." Valcarcel has not alleged any
physical injury, rendering the exception -- to the extent one
exists -- inapplicable.

Moreover, because Valcarcel failed to allege pre-suit notice in a
non-equivocal manner, the complaint fails to state a claim for
breach of warranty under New York law. Furthermore, because
Valcarcel has not stated a breach of warranty claim under New York
law, her claim under the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA") fails
as well.

Therefore, Ahold's motion to dismiss Valcarcel's breach of warranty
claims is granted.

D. Unjust Enrichment

To state a claim for unjust enrichment under New York law a
Plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant was enriched; (2) at the
expense of the plaintiff; and (3) that it would be inequitable to
permit the defendant to retain that which is claimed by plaintiff."
"However, 'unjust enrichment is not a catchall cause of action to
be used when others fail.'" An unjust enrichment claim "will not
survive a motion to dismiss where plaintiffs fail to explain how
their unjust enrichment claim is not merely duplicative of their
other causes of action."

In the case, Judge Rakoff finds that Valcarcel has offered no
explanation of how its unjust enrichment claim differs from its
other causes of action, "which seek relief from the same conduct."
As such, the motion to dismiss Valcarcel's unjust enrichment claim
will be granted.

IV. Valcarcel Lacks Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief

Valcarcel argues that she has standing to pursue injunctive relief
because she is unable to rely on the accuracy of the product's
front label in the future, which causes her to avoid purchasing the
product, even though she would otherwise like to do so. However, in
Berni v. Barilla S.p.A., 964 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2020), the
Second Circuit rejected that such an allegation can support
injunctive relief in cases involving past purchasers of consumer
products. As the Circuit explained, past purchasers who have "been
deceived by the product's packaging once" will not again be
deceived because the "next time" those purchasers buys the product
they "will be doing so with exactly the level of information that
they claim they were owed from the beginning," and, as such, cannot
identify a likely harm.

Valcarcel attempts to distinguish Berni because the ruling was
issued in the context of a motion for class certification rather
than a motion to dismiss." But, as other courts to address this
issue have held, "the reasoning behind the Circuit's decision in
Berni applies equally" to the motion to dismiss context."
Therefore, Judge Rakoff will grant Ahold's motion to dismiss
Valcarcel's request for injunctive relief on behalf of herself and
on behalf of the putative class.

Conclusion

Judge Rakoff concludes that Valcarcel's consumer protection claims
have been adequately pleaded, but that her other claims fail.
Additionally, he holds that Valcarcel lacks standing to seek
injunctive relief.

For these reasons, Judge Rakoff denied Ahold's motion to dismiss
Valcarcel's claims under Sections 349 and 350 of the GBL. He
granted Ahold's motion to dismiss all other claims and her request
for injunctive relief with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is
directed to close document number 15 on the docket in the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Memorandum Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8vaukh from Leagle.com.


AMAZON.COM SERVICES: 9th Cir. Certifies Question to Supreme Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LINDSEY BUERO, Individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES,
INC., DBA Amazon Fulfillment Services, Inc., a foreign corporation;
AMAZON.COM, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendants-Appellees, Case
No. 20-35633 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit issued an Order certifying a question to the Oregon Supreme
Court pursuant to section 28.200 of the Oregon Revised Statutes.

The question is: Under Oregon law, is time that employees spend on
the employer's premises waiting for and undergoing mandatory
security screenings compensable?

Background

The Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against Amazon.com
Services, Inc. and Amazon.com, Inc., alleging that the Defendants'
failure to compensate employees for time spent waiting for and
passing through mandatory security screenings violates Oregon's
wage and hour laws.

The Defendants constitute a major multinational technology and
retail operation focusing on e-commerce and cloud computing. They
require their employees to go through a security screening at the
end of each shift and before exiting for offsite meal breaks. The
employees must "punch out" before going through the security
screening, and they are not paid for the time spent waiting for and
going through the security screening, which can include bag checks
and x-rays of personal belongings. The Defendants require these
screenings as a loss-prevention practice to avoid theft of
products. The Plaintiff alleges the required security screenings
take anywhere from two to fifteen minutes per shift and that the
Defendants did not make any adjustment in their timekeeping system
to account for the time it takes to complete security screenings.

Plaintiff Buero filed the action on May 22, 2019, alleging an
individual claim for unpaid wages and penalty wages. The penalty
wage claim is for the untimely final payment of wages following the
end of Buero's employment on Dec. 22, 2018. The Plaintiff further
alleges class claims for two putative classes: (1) the Plaintiffs
claiming unpaid wages that accrued during their term of employment
(i.e. the "unpaid-wages class") pursuant to sections 652.120 and
653.010 of the Oregon Revised Statutes; and (2) the Plaintiffs
claiming untimely final pay upon termination of their employment
(i.e., the "late-payment class") pursuant to section 652.140 of the
Oregon Revised Statutes. For both the individual and class claims
arising from the late payment of final wages in violation of
section 652.140, the Plaintiff additionally seeks penalty wages
under section 652.150 and mandatory attorney fees and cost
reimbursement under section 652.200 of the Oregon Revised
Statutes.

The Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on
all claims except the Plaintiff's individual late-payment claim.
Defendants argued that Oregon has incorporated the Portal-to-Portal
Act amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and that
the Supreme Court's decision in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc.
v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27 (2014), defeats the Plaintiff's state-law
claims.

In Busk, the Supreme Court held that employees' time spent passing
through security screenings at Amazon.com fulfillment centers was
not compensable under the FLSA as amended by the Portal-to-Portal
Act. The district court granted the Defendants' motion on Jan. 31,
2020, concluding that Oregon wage and hour law tracks federal law
and therefore incorporates the standard in the Portal-to-Portal
Act. The district court then entered final judgment on the
dismissed claims and certified the Plaintiff's interlocutory
appeal.

Analysis

The key issues in the case are whether: (1) Oregon's wage and hour
laws track the FLSA and may be interpreted under federal law; and
(2) the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Portal-to-Portal Act,
29 U.S.C. Section 254, in Busk applies to the Plaintiff's claims.

The Plaintiff's claims turn on whether time spent undergoing
mandatory security screenings before leaving the workplace premises
constitutes "hours worked" under Oregon law. The Bureau of Labor
and Industries (BOLI) has defined "hours worked" as: All hours for
which an employee is employed by and required to give to the
employer and includes all time during which an employee is
necessarily required to be on the employer's premises, on duty or
at a prescribed work place and all time the employee is suffered or
permitted to work. Hours worked includes work time as defined in
ORS 653.010(11).

Neither party argues that the Oregon legislature has expressly
adopted the Portal-to-Portal Act, but the Defendants cite an Oregon
administrative rule that provides: Preparatory and concluding
activities are considered hours worked if the activities performed
by the employee are an integral and indispensable part of a
principal activity for which the employee is employed.

The Plaintiff argues that Oregon's wage and hour laws do not
incorporate the FLSA, and that Oregon "sought to distinguish,
rather than to adopt," the Portal-to-Portal Act as evidenced by the
following facts: "(1) there is no express textual reference to the
Act in Oregon's statutes or rules;" and (2) "the express exclusions
from compensability for specified activities under the Act can be
found nowhere in Oregon law." Meanwhile, the Defendants contend
that "Oregon courts have repeatedly noted that the state's
wage-and-hour law is `patterned after' or 'modeled on' its federal
counterpart," and that Oregon's regulation defining preparatory and
concluding activities, Oregon Admin. R. 839-020-0043, uses the same
text as the Supreme Court's language interpreting the
Portal-to-Portal Act. According to the Defendants, this adoption
suggests that Oregon has incorporated the federal scheme.

Pursuant to section 28.200 of the Oregon Revised Statutes, the
Ninth Circuit states that a certified question must be one that
"may be determinative of the cause;" and it must appear to the
certifying court that there is no controlling precedent in the
decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court or the Oregon Court of
Appeals. Both criteria are met in the case, he says.

First, because the Supreme Court has clearly ruled that comparable
security screenings are not compensable under the Portal-to-Portal
Act, the outcome of the case turns on whether Oregon law follows
the federal scheme. Second, the Oregon Supreme Court has not yet
addressed whether Oregon has adopted the federal "hours worked"
standard. We seek guidance from the Oregon Supreme Court in this
instance because it is not clear to us whether the similarities
between Or. Admin. R. 839-020-0043 and the Portal-to-Portal Act
should be construed as an incorporation of the federal standard.

The Ninth Circuit respectfully certifies the following question to
the Oregon Supreme Court pursuant to section 28.200 of the Oregon
Revised Statutes and Oregon Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.20:
Under Oregon law, is time that employees spend on the employer's
premises waiting for and undergoing mandatory security screenings
compensable?

Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit does not intend its framing of this question to
restrict the Oregon Supreme Court's consideration of any issues
that it deems relevant. It has previously acknowledged both the
Oregon Supreme Court's ability to "reformulate the relevant state
law questions as it perceives them to be in light of the
contentions of the parties," and "its obligation to abide by that
court's determination of the state law questions presented." If the
Oregon Supreme Court resolves this question, the Ninth Circuit will
resolve the issue in its case according to its answer.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to immediately transmit to the
Oregon Supreme Court, under official seal of the Ninth Circuit, a
copy of the Order and request for certification and all relevant
briefs and excerpts of record pursuant to section 28.200 of the
Oregon Revised Statutes and Oregon Rule of Appellate Procedure
12.20.

Further proceedings in the Ninth Circuit on the certified question
are stayed pending the Oregon Supreme Court's decision whether it
will accept review, and if so, its receipt of the answer to the
certified question. The Clerk is directed to administratively close
this docket, pending further order. The case is withdrawn from
submission, in pertinent part, until further order from the Ninth
Circuit. The panel will resume control and jurisdiction on the
certified question upon receiving an answer to the certified
question or upon the Oregon Supreme Court's decision to decline to
answer the certified question.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/sfe6tkc7 from Leagle.com.

Lisa T. Hunt -- lthunt@lthuntlaw.com -- Law Office of Lisa T. Hunt
LLC, Lake Oswego, Oregon; David A. Schuck -- dschuck@wageclaim.org
-- Schuck Law LLC, in Vancouver, Washington, for the
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael E. Kenneally -- michael.kenneally@morganlewis.com -- and
David B. Salmons -- david.salmons@morganlewis.com --  Morgan Lewis
Bockius LLP, in Washington, D.C.; Richard G. Rosenblatt --
richard.rosenblatt@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP,
in Princeton, New Jersey, for the Defendants-Appellees.


AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Rizvanovic Suit Removed to E.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled MICHELLE RIZVANOVIC, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC and DOES
1 through 10, inclusive, Case No. BCV-21-102647, was removed from
the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Kern, to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California on
December 22, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of California assigned
Case No. 1:21-at-01135 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the
California Government Code, the California Public Policy, and the
California Business and Professions Code including disability
discrimination; failure to prevent discrimination; failure to
provide a reasonable accommodation; failure to provide a timely,
good faith, interactive process; retaliation; wrongful termination;
and unfair business practices.

Amazon.com Services, LLC is an electronic commerce company based in
Washington. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:          
         
         Walter F. Brown, Esq.
         PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
         535 Mission Street, 24th Floor
         San Francisco, CA 94105
         Telephone: (628) 432-5111
         E-mail: wbrown@paulweiss.com

                  - and –

         Liza M. Velazquez, Esq.
         David W. Brown, Esq.
         PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
         1285 Avenue of the Americas
         New York, NY 10019-6142
         Telephone: (212) 373-3000
         E-mail: lvelazquez@paulweiss.com
                 dbrown@paulweiss.com

AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Swearingen Bid for Class Status Partly OK'd
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KRISTIN SWEARINGEN, v.
AMAZON.COM SERVICES, INC. and AMAZON.COM INC., Delaware
corporations, and, AMAZON.COM.DEDC, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company, Case No. 3:19-cv-01156-JR (D. Or.), the Hon.
Judge Marco A. Hernandez entered an order:

   1. adopting Magistrate Judge Russo's Findings and
      Recommendation; and

   2. partly granting the Plaintiff's motion for class
      certification.

The Court has considered Plaintiff’s and Defendants' objections
and concludes that there is no basis to modify the Findings &
Recommendation. The Court has also reviewed the pertinent portions
of the record de novo and finds no error in the Magistrate Judge's
Findings & Recommendation.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3FW2ckN at no extra charge.[CC]

AMERICA'S PIZZA: Underpays Delivery Drivers, Worrell Suit Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
ANDREW WORRELL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. AMERICA'S PIZZA COMPANY, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 5:21-cv-00182 (W.D.N.C., December 20, 2021) is a
collective action complaint brought against the Defendant seeking
declaratory judgment, monetary damages, liquidated damages, costs,
and a reasonable attorneys' fee, as a result of its alleged willful
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as an hourly-paid
delivery driver from approximately January 2021 until March 2021.

The Plaintiff claims that he and other similarly situated delivery
drivers at the Defendant's restaurants work "dual jobs".
Specifically, they work inside the store completing nontipped
duties after delivering food to the Defendant's customers. However,
the Defendant pay them less than minimum wage per hour for all
hours worked outside of the restaurant making deliveries because
the Defendant allegedly failed to reimburse them at the IRS
standard business mileage rate for the expenses they incurred while
delivering food for the Defendant's customers. In addition, they
were not properly paid overtime compensation despite regularly
working more than 40 hours in a week, says the Plaintiff.

America's Pizza Company, LLC owns and operates multiple Pizza Hut
franchises throughout North Carolina. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kristin Oakley, Esq.
          RICCI LAW FIRM, P.A.
          2221 Stantonsburg Road
          Greenville, NC 27834
          Tel: (252) 752-7785
          Fax: (252) 752-1016
          E-mail: kgoakley@riccilawnc.com

                - and –

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Kirkpatrick Plaza
          10800 Financial Centre Pkwy, Suite 510
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Tel: (501) 221-0088
          Fax: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

AMERICAN HONDA: Court Certifies Three Subclasses in Quackenbush
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MARY QUACKENBUSH, GHERI
SUELEN, ANNE PELLETTIERI, MARISSA FEENEY, and CARYN PRASSE, on
behalf of themselves and all similarly situated, v. AMERICAN HONDA
MOTOR COMPANY, INC., et al., Case No. 3:20-cv-05599-WHA (N.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge William Alsup entered an order:

   1. certifying the three subclasses without the California and
      Illinois implied warranty claims:

   2. appointing Mary Quackenbush, Anne Pelletieri, and Marissa
      Feeney as class representatives; and

   3. appointing Greenstone Law, APC and Glancy Prongay &
      Murray, LLP as co-class counsel.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3mWiV04 at no extra charge.[CC]

AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY: Time Extension for Class Cert. Bid Sought
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOSEPH SHOEMAKER, RICHARD
GINDIN, DEMYA JOHNSON, KIMBERLY STARLING, and MATTHEW MCCORMICK,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
RICHARD ZEITLIN, AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY SERVICES, LLC, UNIFIED DATA
SERVICES, LLC, COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, LLC, WIRED 4 DATA, LLC, and
JOHN DOES 1-10, corporate entities and individuals presently
unknown, Case No. 1:21-cv-01668-CCC (M.D. Pa.), the Plaintiffs ask
the Court to enter an order that their time to file their Motion
for Class Certification be enlarged and that the date for the
filing of the Motion be determined by this Honorable Court after
the conclusion of the Initial Case Management Conference held
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 and L.R. 16.1.

On September 27, 2021, Plaintiffs commenced this civil action by
filing their Class Action Complaint with this Honorable Court.

As the Complaint was designated as a "Class Action" at the time of
filing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) requires this Honorable Court to
issue an order determining whether to certify the action as a
"class action" at "an early practicable time after a person sues
…" as a class representative.

A copy of Plaintiff' motion dated Dec. 24, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3zlIfl6 at no extra charge.[CC]



AMYRIS INC: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in Mulderrig Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Amyris Inc. filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in the
lawsuit entitled Shane Mulderrig and Rony Devorah, Individually and
On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. AMYRIS,
INC., JOHN G. MELO, and KATHLEEN VALIASEK, Defendants, Case No.
4:19-cv-01765-YGR, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, Oakland.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit is
a class action on behalf of persons and entities that purchased or
otherwise acquired Amyris securities between March 15, 2018 and
March 19, 2019, inclusive, seeking to pursue remedies under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On November 13, 2018, the Company reported poor financial results
for third quarter 2018, with $14.9 million revenue compared to
$22.5 million revenue in the prior year period, and attributed the
performance to the "volatility of the Vitamin E market". On this
news, the Company's share price fell $1.76, or nearly 30%, to close
at $4.14 per share on November 14, 2018, on unusually heavy trading
volume. On March 19, 2019, the Company disclosed that it would be
unable to timely file its annual report due to "significant time
and resources that were devoted to the accounting for and
disclosure of the significant transactions with Koninklijke DSM
N.V. that closed in November 2018". On this news, the Company's
share price fell $0.78, or nearly 20%, to close at $3.10 per share
on March 20, 2019, on unusually heavy trading volume.

The complaint asserts that the Defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that the Company lacked sufficient resources to
accurately account for certain transactions; (2) that, as a result,
there was a material weakness in the Company's internal controls
over financial reporting; (3) that, as a result, the Company would
be unable to timely file its annual report; and (4) that, as a
result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis, says the complaint.

On July 30, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a motion to certify class.

On December 8, 2021, Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers entered an order
granting in part Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

The Defendant seeks a review of this order.

The appellate case is captioned as Shane Amyris, Inc., et al. v.
Mulderrig, et al., Case No. 21-80130, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on December 22, 2021.[BN]

Defendants-Petitioners AMYRIS, INC., JOHN G. MELO, and KATHLEEN
VALIASEK are represented by:

          Daniel R. Adler, Esq.
          Alexander Kosta Mircheff, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP
          333 S Grand Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197
          Telephone: (213) 229-7634

               - and -

          Michael D. Celio, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP
          1881 Page Mill Road
          Palo Alto, CA 94304
          Telephone: (650) 849-5326
          E-mail: mcelio@gibsondunn.com

               - and -

          James N. Kramer, Esq.
          ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE, LLP
          405 Howard Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 773-5700

               - and -

          Jacob T. Spencer, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP
          1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20036-5306
          Telephone: (617) 921-2105

Plaintiff-Respondent RONY DEVORAH, individually and on behalf of
and all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          William B. Federman, Esq.
          Amanda Brooke Murphy, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 North Pennsylvania Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Telephone: (405) 235-1560
          E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com
                  abm@federmanlaw.com   

               - and -

          Robert S. Green, Esq.
          GREEN & NOBLIN, P.C.
          2200 Larkspur Landing Circle, Suite 101
          Larkspur, CA 94939
          Telephone: (415) 477-6700
          E-mail: gnecf@classcounsel.com

ASSET MARKETING: Appeals Arbitration Bid Denial in Culver Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Asset Marketing Services, LLC filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled William Culver, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Asset Marketing Services, LLC
doing business as: GovMint.com, Case No. 0:21-cv-01237-SRN, in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota.

The Plaintiff alleges that AMS engaged in a scheme to defraud by
intentionally misrepresenting the quality and value of coins that
it sold. He asserts claims of violation of Minnesota's Prevention
of Consumer Fraud Act, Minnesota's Uniform Trade Practices Act,
Minnesota's Deceptive Acts Perpetrated Against Senior Citizens,
unjust enrichment, injunctive relief, and negligence per se.

On August 13, 2021, the Defendant filed a motion to compel
arbitration and stay proceedings. On December 8, 2021, Judge Susan
Richard Nelson entered an order denying this motion.

The Defendant appeals from this order.

The appellate case is captioned as Asset Marketing Services, LLC v.
William Culver, Case No. 21-3917, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, filed on December 22, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Transcript is due on or before January 31, 2022;

   -- Appendix is due on February 10, 2022;

   -- BRIEF APPELLANT, Asset Marketing Services, LLC is due on
February 10, 2022; and

   -- Appellee brief is due 30 days from the date the court issues
the Notice of Docket Activity filing the brief of appellant.[BN]

Defendant-Appellant Asset Marketing Services, LLC, doing business
as govmint.com, is represented by:

          Cassandra B. Merrick, Esq.
          Stephen M. Premo, Esq.
          Mack H. Reed, Esq.
          MADEL PA
          800 Hennepin Avenue
          Minneapolis, MN 55403
          Telephone: (612) 605-0632
          E-mail: cmerrick@madellaw.com
                  spremo@madellaw.com
                  mreed@madellaw.com  

Plaintiff-Appellee William Culver, on behalf of himself and all
other similarly situated, is represented by:

          Bryan L. Bleichner, Esq.
          Jeffrey D. Bores, Esq.
          Christopher Paul Renz, Esq.
          CHESTNUT & CAMBRONNE, P.A.
          100 Washington Avenue, S.
          Minneapolis, MN 55401
          Telephone: (612) 339-7300
          E-mail: bbleichner@chestnutcambronne.com
                  jbores@chestnutcambronne.com
                  crenz@chestnutcambronne.com    

               - and -

          Austin Paul Smith, Esq.
          Bruce Steckler, Esq.
          STECKLER & WAYNE
          12720 Hillcrest Road, Suite 1045
          Dallas, TX 75230
          Telephone: (972) 387-4040
          E-mail: austin@swclaw.com
                  bruce@swclaw.com

ATRIA SENIOR: Sales Directors Win Class Status in Stickles Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as GEORGE STICKLES and
MICHELE RHODES, v. ATRIA SENIOR LIVING, INC. and ATRIA MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, LLC, Case No. 3:20-cv-09220-WHA (N.D. Cal.), the Hon.
Judge William Alsup entered an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      Community Sales Directors (CSDs) who did not sign
      arbitration agreements and whom the defendants classified
      as exempt outside salespersons from the date plaintiff
      Stickles began his employment with defendants through
      September 29, 2019;"

      For now, certification applies solely to this issue:
      whether defendants properly classified CSDs as exempt
      outside salespersons;

   2. appointing George Stickles as representative of the class;

   3. appointing Hayes Pawlenko LLP as counsel for the class;

   4. directing the parties, within two weeks of this order, to
      file a joint proposed class notice together with a plan of
      distribution and timeline for opt out.

The Plaintiffs George Stickles and Michele Rhodes each worked as
CSDs for the defendants THe Plaintiff Stickles worked for
defendants from April 2018 to August 2018, and plaintiff Rhodes
worked for defendants from October 2019 to April 2020.

The Defendants were affiliated entities that operated 46 senior
living communities throughout California. Defendants leased living
spaces at their communities to senior citizens.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3mTmpQH at no extra charge.[CC]

BAE SYSTEMS: Cabrales Wage-and-Hour Suit Removed to S.D. Cal.
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled FEDERICO CABRALES, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. BAE SYSTEMS SAN DIEGO SHIP REPAIR,
INC. and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No.
37-2021-00045673-CU-OE-CTL, was removed from the Superior Court of
the State of California, County of San Diego, to the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California on December 23,
2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Southern District of California assigned
Case No. 3:21-cv-02122-JAH-KSC to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California Business and Professions
Code including failure to provide required meal periods, failure to
provide required rest periods, failure to pay overtime wages,
failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay all wages due to
discharged and quitting employees, failure to maintain required
records, failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements,
failure to indemnify employees for necessary expenditures incurred
in discharge of duties, and unfair and unlawful business
practices.

BAE Systems San Diego Ship Repair, Inc. is a provider of ship
repair, modernization, conversion, and overhaul services,
headquartered in California. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:          
         
         Mary C. Dollarhide, Esq.
         Taylor Wemmer, Esq.
         DLA PIPER LLP (US)
         4365 Executive Drive, Suite 1100
         San Diego, CA 92121-2133
         Telephone: (858) 677-1400
         Facsimile: (858) 677-1401
         E-mail: mary.dollarhide@dlapiper.com
                 taylor.wemmer@dlapiper.com

BOEING CO: 5th Cir. Stays Earl RICO Suit Pending Rule 23(f) Appeal
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Damonie Earl, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated; Linda Rugg, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated; Alesa Beck, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated; Timothy Blakey, Jr.; Stephanie
Blakey; Marisa Thompson, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated; Muhammad Muddasir Khan; John Rogers,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated;
Valerie Mortz-Rogers, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated; James LaMorte; Brett Noble, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated; Ruben Castro, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Fritz Ringling,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Litaun
Lewis, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated;
Lance Hogue, Jr., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. The Boeing Company;
Southwest Airlines Company, Defendants-Appellants, Case No.
21-40720 (5th Cir.), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
granted the Appellants' motion to stay trial court proceedings
pending disposition of the Rule 23(f) appeal.

Background

The case is a class action lawsuit against Boeing and Southwest for
allegedly conspiring to conceal design defects in Boeing's 737 MAX
8 aircraft (the "MAX") and thereby defrauding airline ticket
purchasers. The Plaintiffs allege that Boeing and Southwest were
able to inflate the prices of airline tickets by concealing defects
in the MAX. Widespread public knowledge of the MAX's defects would
have lowered the demand for air travel on airlines flying the MAX,
the theory goes, so prices would have decreased and the Plaintiffs
would have paid less for their tickets. The Plaintiffs seek damages
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. Section 1962.

On Sept. 3, 2021, the district court certified four classes of the
Plaintiffs. These classes encompassed persons who purchased or
otherwise bore the economic burden for tickets on Southwest or
American Airlines between Aug. 29, 2017, and March 13, 2019, for
routes where MAX aircraft were in use. Boeing and Southwest
petitioned for permission to bring an interlocutory appeal of the
class-certification decision. The Fifth Circuit granted Boeing and
Southwest permission to appeal on Sept. 30, 2021.

Boeing and Southwest then moved the district court to stay
discovery pending the Rule 23(f) appeal. On Nov. 19, 2021, the
district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part.
The district court stayed discovery pertaining to the class
membership during the pendency of the appeal. But the district
court allowed all other discovery to proceed, including discovery
on the merits. Boeing and Southwest then filed the instant motion
in the Fifth Circuit, asking it to stay all discovery until the
Rule 23(f) appeal is resolved.

Discussion

In Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009), to decide whether to
grant a stay, the Fifth Circuit considers four factors: (1) whether
the movant makes a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on
the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured
without a stay; (3) whether other interested parties will be
irreparably injured by a stay; and (4) where the public interest
lies.

The Fifth Circuit finds that even under a deferential standard of
review, Boeing and Southwest have shown that all four Nken factors
favor a stay of discovery during the pendency of their Rule 23(f)
appeal. On the likelihood of success on the merits, it says, Boeing
and Southwest have made a strong showing that the Fifth Circuit is
likely to reverse the class-certification decision. The substantial
predominance questions raised by Boeing and Southwest's Rule 23(f)
petitions give Boeing and Southwest a significant likelihood of
success on appeal. On irreparable harm, Boeing and Southwest again
have made a strong showing. They have shown that denying a full
stay will subject them to irreparable harm.

The Fifth Circuit now considers the final two stay factors: Whether
a stay would irreparably harm other interested parties, and where
the public interest lies. It finds that the Plaintiffs have not
plausibly alleged that they or any other parties will be
irreparably injured by delaying further discovery until the
conclusion of the Rule 23(f) appeal. The upshot of a full stay is
that there will be one exhaustive round of discovery post-appeal,
rather than two distinct rounds of discovery pending- and
post-appeal. Finally, the public interest supports staying district
court proceedings to avoid potentially wasteful and unnecessary
litigation costs where, as in the case, the Appellant has shown a
substantial likelihood of success on appeal.

Disposition

For these reasons, the Fifth Circuit granted the Appellants' motion
to stay trial court proceedings pending disposition of the Rule
23(f) appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yc2pjarj from Leagle.com.


BRADFORD O'NEIL: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Clemons' TCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHERRY L. CLEMONS, Plaintiff v. BRADFORD O'NEIL
AGENCY, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 4:21-cv-00678-SRC (E.D. Mo.),
Judge Stephen R. Clark of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Eastern Division, denied the Agency's motion
to dismiss Clemons' Complaint.

Background

Ms. Clemons' Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendant, the
Agency, is a company that sells State Farm insurance policies, and
that, to sell policies to consumers, the Agency makes telephone
solicitations. Around January 2019, Clemons claims to have received
a phone call from the Agency in which a caller attempted to sell
her insurance products. On that call, Clemons claims to have
informed the caller that she was not interested in buying insurance
and advised that she did not want to be called again, but despite
this request, Clemons continued to receive calls from the Agency.
Clemons alleges that even though she called the Agency later that
month and spoke with the owner who promised to remove her from the
calling list, she continued to receive phone calls about once every
month thereafter. The Court notes that Clemons has somewhat
inconsistently pleaded the precise dates on which the alleged
telephone solicitations took place.

Ms. Clemons claims that she received these calls from the Agency on
the cell phone that she uses for "personal residential purposes,"
and that the number associated with her cell phone has been listed
on the National Do Not Call List for many years. Furthermore,
Clemons claims to have never provided consent to receive telephone
solicitations from the Agency.

This past spring, Clemons filed the putative class-action lawsuit
in state court, alleging that the Agency violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("the Act"), 47 U.S.C. Section 227, by
initiating telephone solicitations to residential telephone
subscribers who have registered their telephone numbers on the
National Do Not Call Registry. The lawsuit seeks class-action
certification, money damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys'
fees and costs.

After removing the case to the Court, the Agency moved to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
claiming that Clemons's prior, inconsistent allegations render her
claims implausible, and that Clemons has not pleaded a violation of
the Act because the Act's do-not-call provisions only protect
landline, residential phones and not cell phones. Alternatively,
the Agency has moved to strike Clemons's demand for attorneys'
fees, arguing that the demand has no basis in law.

Discussion

The Agency first contends that the Court need not take Clemons's
allegations in her Amended Complaint as true because contradictions
in her pleadings in the case and a related case render Clemons's
allegations implausible. Second, the Agency argues that Clemons's
claim fails as a matter of law because 47 U.S.C. Section 227(c)
applies only to landlines and not cell phones. Finally, the Agency
asks the Court to strike Clemons' request for attorney's fees as
without legal basis.

A. For purposes of the motion, the Court accepts the allegations in
the Amended Complaint as true regardless of previous inconsistency

The Agency asks the Court to ignore Clemons' allegations about the
Agency's calls because she has inconsistently pleaded when those
calls occurred. In so arguing, the Agency relies on out-of-circuit
precedent allowing courts to disregard amendments to complaints
when the amendments contradict prior pleadings.

Judge Clark finds that Clemons represents to the Court that
differences between the original and amended complaints regarding
the dates of particular phone calls between the Agency and Clemons
were "a mistake." He takes this representation at face-value and
notes that "the purpose of Rule 15(a) is to reinforce the principle
that cases should be tried on their merits rather than the
technicalities of pleadings." Furthermore, the Agency does not
assert that Clemons's Amended Complaint contains false or sham
allegations. Therefore, for the purpose of considering this motion,
Judge Clark assumes the truth of all of Clemons' well-pleaded
allegations in her Amended Complaint.

As other in-circuit courts have noted, the precedent the Agency
cites "is not persuasive," when one considers that it is
well-established that an amended complaint supercedes an original
complaint and renders the original complaint without legal effect.
Moreover, the cases the Agency cites are either no longer good law
or have no applicability to the case because the Agency makes no
claim that Clemons' allegations in her Amended Complaint are
nonsensical or fraudulent.

B. The do-not-call regulations apply to cell phones

The Agency next argues that Clemons' claim fails as a matter of law
because the do-not-call regulations implementing the Act do not
apply to cell phones. Judge Clark concludes that, in light of the
clear regulatory language, a "cell phone user can qualify as a
residential telephone subscriber under 47 C.F.R. Sections
64.1200(c) and (d)." Absent a Supreme Court holding to the
contrary, the Court must follow the Eighth Circuit in M.M. ex rel.
L.R. v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 512 F.3d 455, 459 (8th Cir.
2008), and lacks the jurisdiction to consider the validity of the
regulations.

As a final parry, the Agency argues that even if the Court finds
that a call to a cell phone can violate 47 C.F.R. Section
64.1200(c), the Court should nevertheless dismiss the case because
Clemons' allegation that her cell phone is used for personal and
residential purposes is merely conclusory and does not satisfy the
pleading requirements of Rule 8. This argument lacks merit, Judge
Clark holds. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only
'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief,' in order to give the defendant fair notice
of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' While
the question of whether Clemons uses her cell phone for personal
and residential purposes has important legal consequences for the
case, Clemons' allegation is a factual one and in no way
conclusory. Clemons' pleading places the Agency on notice that one
of the issues in the case is whether Clemons uses her cell phone
for residential purposes. Rule 8 requires nothing more.

C. Because Clemons has filed her lawsuit on behalf of a putative
class, the Court denies the Agency's motion to strike Clemons's
request for attorneys' fees.

Finally, the Agency has moved to strike Clemons's request in her
prayer for relief for attorneys' fees "as permitted by law." Both
parties acknowledge that the Act does not have a fee-shifting
provision and that Clemons would not be entitled to fees if she
proceeded in this lawsuit solely on her own behalf. However,
Clemons has filed her lawsuit on behalf of a putative class and has
clarified that her attorneys would seek fees and costs only from a
common fund associated with a class-action judgment. Acknowledging
this, the Agency asks the Court to require Clemons to amend her
complaint to clarify that she does not seek "fees from O'Neil
Agency," but rather a potential common fund.

Since the parties agree that there is a "possible legal basis for a
fee award," Judge Clark denies the Agency's motion to strike.
Further, he will not direct Clemons to amend her Complaint because
Clemons's attorneys have made clear that they seek attorneys' fees
and costs only from a potential class-action judgment, which he
notes would be paid into by the Agency. Clemons's prayer,
therefore, clearly sets out the relief she seeks.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Clark denied the Agency's Motion
to Dismiss and denied its previously filed Motion to Dismiss as
moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/23edaxbj from Leagle.com.


BRINKER INTERNATIONAL: Hale Labor Suit Goes to N.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled AMANDA HALE, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. BRINKER INTERNATIONAL, INC., BRINKER
INTERNATIONAL PAYROLL COMPANY, L.P., BRINKER RESTAURANT
CORPORATION, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 21CV002855,
was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California,
County of Alameda, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California on December 23, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of California assigned
Case No. 3:21-cv-09978 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California Business and Professions
Code including failure to provide meal periods, failure to provide
rest periods, failure to pay hourly and overtime wages, failure to
indemnify, failure to provide accurate written wage statements,
failure to pay all final wages, and unfair competition.

Brinker International, Inc. is an American multinational
hospitality industry company, headquartered in Coppell, Texas.

Brinker International Payroll Company, L.P. is a restaurant company
based in Dallas, Texas.

Brinker Restaurant Corporation is a subsidiary of Brinker
International, Inc. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:          
         
         Kevin D. Reese, Esq.
         Marina I. Garcia, Esq.
         JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
         50 California Street, 9th Floor
         San Francisco, CA 94111-4615
         Telephone: (415) 394-9400
         Facsimile: (415) 394-9401
         E-mail: Kevin.Reese@jacksonlewis.com
                 Marina.Garcia@jacksonlewis.com

CARBONITE INC: 5th Cir. Flips Construction Industry Suit Dismissal
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY AND LABORERS JOINT PENSION
TRUST, Plaintiff, Appellant, RUBEN A. LUNA, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated; VALERIE COSGROVE,
derivatively on behalf of CARBONITE, INC.; WILLIAM FENG,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated;
MICHAEL RANDOLPH, derivatively on behalf of CARBONITE, INC.,
Plaintiffs v. CARBONITE, INC.; MOHAMAD S. ALI; ANTHONY FOLGER,
Defendants, Appellees, LINDA CONNLY; MARINA LEVINSON; TODD KRASNOW;
SCOTT A. DANIELS; CHARLES F. KANE; STEPHEN MUNFORD; DAVID FRIEND,
Defendants, Case No. 20-2110 (5th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court
granting the motion to dismiss.

Background

Lead Plaintiff Construction Industry and Laborers' Joint Pension
Trust and other holders of common stock of Defendant Carbonite,
brought the securities fraud class action alleging that Carbonite
and certain current and former officers misled investors by touting
a new product that they knew did not even work.

Carbonite is a software company headquartered in Boston that offers
cloud-based backup and data protection services. The events leading
to this suit took place during a specified Class Period, beginning
with Carbonite's October 18, 2018 launch of a new data-backup
product called "Server VM Edition" ("VME") and concluding with the
July 25, 2019 announcement that VME was being withdrawn from the
market.

The Plaintiff seeks recovery under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b), as
implemented by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5,
codified at 17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5. The Plaintiff also seeks
recovery under section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, codified at 15
U.S.C. Section 78t(a).

The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing both that it
failed to allege facts raising a strong inference of scienter and
that it alleged no actionable material misrepresentations or
omissions. The district court agreed that the Plaintiff had
insufficiently pleaded scienter, so the court granted the motion to
dismiss without reaching the Defendants' second argument.

The Plaintiff appealed.

Discussion

The appeal turns on the viability of the section 10(b) claim. The
Plaintiff does not contend that its section 20(a) claim survives
even if the section 10(b) claim does not. And the Defendants do not
provide any basis for sustaining the dismissal of the section 20(a)
claim should we reverse the dismissal of the section 10(b) claim.

To successfully make out a section 10(b) claim, plaintiff was
required to plead six elements: "(1) a material misrepresentation
or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with the purchase or
sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation." IOnly the first two elements of the Plaintiff's section
10(b) claim -- material misrepresentation or omission and scienter
-- are at issue in the appeal.

In determining whether a securities fraud complaint satisfies these
requirements, the Fifth Circuit reviews de novo the district
court's dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6)." In so doing, it accepts well-pleaded factual allegations
in the complaint as true and, while cognizant of the requirements
for pleading scienter, it views all reasonable inferences in the
Plaintiff's favor.

The Plaintiff alleged that 12 statements made by the Defendants
during the Class Period were "materially false and misleading."
Most prominently on appeal, it points to the November 1 and
November 15 statements made by Ali and Folger, respectively.
Otherwise, the Plaintiff mentions but places less weight on an
October 2018 statement and nine statements made between February
and June of 2019, each of which speak more generally about
Carbonite's products or financial prospects and do not mention VME
by name. The Plaintiff does not contend that the less pointed
statements might be actionable if the November statements are not.
Nor do the parties describe any scenario in which the less pointed
statements might affect the extent of liability if the November
statements are sufficient to establish liability. Like the parties,
the Fifth Circuit therefore trains its attention on the two
November statements that directly discuss VME.

In contesting the adequacy of the complaint vis a vis those
statements, defendants advance three basic arguments, each of which
would independently support dismissal: (1) the challenged
statements were not material misrepresentations because they were
not false statements of fact; (2) any misrepresentations were not
material; and, (3) in any event, the complaint fails to allege
facts eliciting a strong inference of scienter.

A.

The Defendants argue that the November 2018 statements were merely
optimistic opinions that are not actionable as misstatements
because they may have been "genuinely held when made."

Mr. Ali's Nov. 1, 2018 statement that VME "improves our performance
for backing up virtual environments and makes us really
competitive" could be reasonably construed in context as a
statement of fact, at least to the extent that it plainly implied
some better "performance for backing up virtual environments." As
such, it would be false as compared to the complaint's contention
that as of November 1 VME could not back up virtual environments.

Mr. Folger's November 15 statement, by contrast, was presented in
the form of a statement of belief: "We have put something out that
we think is just completely competitive and just a super strong
product." Nonetheless, the statement plausibly conveyed at least
three facts: First, that Folger actually believed VME to be
"completely competitive" and "super strong"; second, that his
opinion "fairly aligned with the information" that Folger possessed
at the time; and third, that his opinion was based on the type of
reasonable inquiry that an investor in context would expect to have
been made.  The complaint's description of the state of the VME
product plausibly alleges that at least one and possibly all three
of these facts must be false. It thereby sufficiently alleges that
Folger misled investors.

The Fifth Circuit opines that the complaint adequately alleges that
Ali and Folger each made a misleading statement.

B.

The Defendants argue that even if the challenged statements made by
Ali and Folger were misleading, they were not material.

This argument fares no better, the Fifth Circuit opines. As
described in the complaint, VME was an important product for
Carbonite -- the Fifth Circuit need only take CFO Folger's word for
it: "We've got a new offering out, Carbonite Server Virtual Edition
which I think is a really important product for us, and I think it
will help us address a pretty big segment of the market." Carbonite
described VME's simultaneous launch with Carbonite's flagship
console as "the culmination of one of our largest cross-functional
efforts."

CEO Ali bolstered the product's importance by stating that VME
"significantly improves our performance for backing up virtual
environments and makes us extremely competitive going after that
market." And this is a market that Folger had described as one "we
haven't been particularly strong in, in the past, we've been okay."
That Carbonite's most senior officers promoted this new product to
investors as shoring up one of the company's weaker market segments
further reinforces the conclusion that the complaint adequately
alleges that the product's basic inability to function would have
been viewed by investors as a significant part of the total mix of
information in valuing Carbonite.

C.

The Fifth Circuit turns finally to the element of scienter. The
Defendants argue, and the district court found, that the Plaintiff
failed to meet this statutorily enhanced threshold for successfully
pleading scienter.

The Fifth Circuit disagrees. It finds that the complaint alleges
facts raising a strong inference that Ali and Folger either
inquired about VME before deciding to promote it to investors or
were reckless in failing to do so. Further, the complaint alleges
facts that, if true, make it clear that the Carbonite employees
familiar with the product knew that it did not work yet. Finally,
nothing in the alleged facts renders less than sufficiently
compelling the conclusion that Ali and Folger would have known of
the product's status had they inquired.

Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit finds that the complaint sufficiently pleads that
the statements of Ali and Folger on Nov. 1 and 15, 2018, were
material misrepresentations made with scienter. There being no
other claimed basis for dismissing the complaint, the Fifth Circuit
therefore reversed the judgment of the district court granting the
motion to dismiss, and remanded for further proceedings in accord
with its Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ycx8v6h4 from Leagle.com.

Andrew S. Love, with whom Samuel H. Rudman -- srudman@rgrdlaw.com
-- David A. Rosenfeld -- drosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com -- Robert D. Gerson
-- rgerson@rgrdlaw.com -- Philip T. Merenda -- pmerenda@rgrdlaw.com
-- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Theodore M. Hess-Mahan --
thess-mahan@hutchingsbarsamian.com -- and Hutchings Barsamian
Mandelcorn, LLP, were on brief, for the Appellant.

Alisha Q. Nanda -- alisha.nanda@skadden.com -- with whom James R.
Carroll -- james.carroll@skadden.com -- Immanuel R. Foster --
immanuel.foster@skadden.com -- and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP were on brief, for the Appellees.


CASA SYSTEMS: Hook Files Appeal in Securities Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Donald Hook filed an appeal from a court ruling entered
in the lawsuit entitled DONALD HOOK, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. CASA SYSTEMS,
INC., WEIDONG CHIEN, LUCY XIE, JOE TIBBETTS, BILL STYSLINGER, BRUCE
R. EVANS, GARY HALL, JERRY GUO, MORGAN STANLEY & CO. LLC, MACQUARIE
CAPITAL (USA) INC., LLC, RAYMOND JAMES & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
NORTHLAND SECURITIES, INC., AND SUMMIT PARTNERS, the Defendants,
Case No. 654548/2019, in the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on November 18, 2021, the
appeals taken by the plaintiffs in the Shen-Baig and Hook lawsuits
against Casa Systems, Inc. from the order dismissing their
complaints remain pending.

On August 9, 2019, Donald Hook filed a putative shareholder class
action lawsuit in the Supreme Court of the State of New York,
County of New York, Donald Hook, et al., v. Casa Systems, Inc. et
al., Index No. 654548/2019, against the defendants named in the
Shen and Baig matters.

The complaint, as later amended on November 22, 2019, purports to
be brought on behalf of all purchasers of the Company's common
stock in and/or traceable to the Company's IPO and generally
alleges that (i) each of the defendants violated Section 11 and/or
Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act because documents related to
the Company's IPO including its registration statement and
prospectus were materially misleading by containing untrue
statements of material fact and/or omitting to state material facts
necessary to make such statements not misleading and (ii) the
individual defendants and Summit Partners acted as controlling
persons within the meaning and in violation of Section 15 of the
Securities Act.

"Plaintiff sought, among other things, compensatory damages, costs
and expenses, including counsel and expert fees, rescission or a
rescissory measure of damages, disgorgement, and equitable and
injunctive relief," the Company said.

On August 30, 2021, the court granted motions to dismiss filed by
the defendants.

The appellate case is captioned as DONALD HOOK vs. CASA SYSTEMS,
INC. et al., Case No. 2021-04752, in the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, filed on December
22, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner Donald Hook, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Guillaume Orson Buell, Esq.
          THORNTON LAW FIRM LLP
          1 Lincoln Street
          Boston, MA 02111
          Telephone: (617) 720 1333
          Facsimile: (617) 720 2445
          E-mail: gbuell@tenlaw.com

CENTURYLINK INC: Bultemeyer Seeks to Certify Rule 23 Class
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LYDIA BULTEMEYER, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, v.
CENTURYLINK, INC., Case No. 2:14-cv-02530-SPL (D. Ariz.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying this action as a class action;

   2. appointing her as class representative; and

   3. appointing her counsel as class co-counsel pursuant to
      Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23).

CenturyLink allegedly violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)
by obtaining Ms. Bultemeyer's -- and all other class members' --
credit report in a specific, systematic manner and without a
permissible purpose.

The Plaintiff moves the Court to certify a class of individuals
against Defendant for violations of the FCRA, defined as follows:

   "Every individual in the United States about whom CenturyLink
    obtained a consumer credit report prior to such individual
    submitting an order for CenturyLink's services, using the
    personal information entered into CenturyLink's ecommerce
    website, from November 14, 2012 through the present."

Lumen Technologies, Inc. (formerly CenturyLink) is an American
telecommunications company headquartered in Monroe, Louisiana, that
offers communications.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Dec. 23,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3pRoQoR
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Russell S. Thompson, IV, Esq.
          THOMPSON CONSUMER LAW GROUP, PC
          11445 E Via Linda, Ste. 2 No. 492
          Scottsdale, AZ 85259
          Telephone: (602) 388-8898
          Facsimile: (866) 317-2674
          E-mail: rthompson@ThompsonConsumerLaw.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Brown, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF ANDREW J. BROWN
          501 W. Broadway, Ste. 1490
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 501-6550
          E-mail: andrewb@thebrownlawfirm.coms

CHARLES SCHWAB: Wright Class Status Bid Filing Due June 20
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ROBERT WRIGHT, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, v. CHARLES SCHWAB &
CO., INC., Case No. 3:20-cv-05281-LB (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge
Laurel Beeler entered an order modifying the existing case schedule
and setting the following deadlines:

  -- Motion for Class Certification:         June 20, 2022

  -- Opposition to Class Certification:      August 15, 2022

  -- Reply in Support of Class               September 19, 2022
     Certification:

The Charles Schwab Corporation is an American multinational
financial services company. It offers banking, commercial banking,
an electronic trading platform, and wealth management advisory
services to both retail and institutional clients.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 22, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3eJI7m1 at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy G. Blood, Esq.
          Thomas J. O'Reardon, Esq.
          James M. Davis, Esq.
          BLOOD HURST & O’REARDON, LLP
          501 West Broadway, Suite 1490
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 338-1100
          Facsimile: (619) 338-1101
          E-mail: tblood@bholaw.com
                  toreardon@bholaw.com
                  jdavis@bholaw.com

               - and -

          Kevin A. Seely, Esq.
          Mario D. Valdovinos, Esq.
          ROBBINS LLP
          5040 Shoreham Place
          San Diego, CA 92122
          Telephone: (619) 525-3990
          Facsimile: (619) 525-3991
          E-mail: kseely@robbinsllp.com
                  mvaldovinos@robbinsllp.com

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Class Status Hearing Set for Jan. 24
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LIONEL HARPER, DANIEL
SINCLAIR, HASSAN TURNER, LUIS VAZQUEZ, and PEDRO ABASCAL,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated and all
aggrieved employees, v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, Case No.
2:19-cv-00902-WBS-DMC (E.D. Cal.), the Court entered an order as
follows:

  1. hearings on motion for partial              Feb. 7, 2022
     summary judgment, and motion
     to dismiss set for:

  2. modiying the briefing and hearing           Jan. 24, 2022
     scheduled for Plaintiffs' Class
     Certification Motion by:

  3. Deadline to file a response due by:         Feb. 23, 2022

  4. Deadline to file a reply by:                March 11, 2022

Charter offers traditional cable video programming, high-speed
Internet access, and telephone services.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/32OfKAE at no extra charge.[CC]


CHEFS' WAREHOUSE: Faces Paz Suit Over Delivery Drivers' Unpaid OT
-----------------------------------------------------------------
FERNANDO PAZ, ARMANDO BERMUDEZ, ANDRES S. IRIZARRY, AND JESSE SOTO,
on behalf of themselves and all other plaintiffs similarly
situated, known and unknown, Plaintiffs v. THE CHEFS' WAREHOUSE
MIDWEST, LLC, A/K/A THE CHEFS' WAREHOUSE MID-WEST LLC, AND MICHAEL
STANLEY, INDIVIDUALLY Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-06786 (N.D.
Ill., December 21, 2021) is a class action brought under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, and the Chicago
Minimum Wage Ordinance arising from the Defendants' failure to
provide overtime pay for hours worked over 40 per work week.

The Plaintiffs are former delivery drivers working for the
Defendants.

The Chefs' Warehouse Midwest, LLC, a/k/a The Chefs' Warehouse
Mid-West, LLC, owns and operates a wholesale food and beverage
supply business located in Chicago, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John William Billhorn, Esq.
          Samuel D. Engelson, Esq.
          BILLHORN LAW FIRM
          53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 401
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 853-1450

CHICAGO, IL: Court Allows Bill of Costs for $40.2K in Yates Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEIA YATES, LEONARDO RODRIQUEZ, and JOHNNY JIMMERSON,
as representative of that class of individuals working as Aviation
Security Officers of the City of Chicago, Department of Aviation,
Plaintiffs v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant, Case No. 18 C 2613 (N.D.
Ill.), Judge Robert W. Gettleman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, allowed the
Defendants' Bill of Costs.

Background

Plaintiffs Keia Yates, Leonardo Rodriquez and Johnny Jimmerson, on
behalf of themselves and other similarly situated individuals
working as Aviation Security Officers ("ASOs") of the City of
Chicago, Department of Aviation, brought a four count putative
class action complaint against Defendants State of Illinois and
Brent Fischer as Executive Director of the Illinois Law Enforcement
Training and Standards Board ("ILETSB") (jointly, the "State
defendants"), and the City of Chicago and Ginger Evans as
Commissioner of the City of Chicago Department of Aviation ("CDA")
(jointly, the "City defendants"), claiming that the Defendants
stripped them of their histories as law enforcement officers.

Counts I and II were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and
alleged violations of the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause respectively. Counts III
and IV were state law claims for fraudulent inducement and
promissory estoppel. All claims were brought against all
Defendants.

The State Defendants and the City Defendants brought separate
motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim. The Court granted the State Defendants' motion in
full, and granted the City Defendants' motion in part, dismissing
Counts I and III, leaving the Plaintiffs' due process and
promissory estoppel claims against the City Defendants.

The Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint against the City
only, re-asserting their Fourteenth Amendment and promissory
estoppel claims. Thereafter, on Sept. 25, 2021, the Court granted
the City's motion for summary judgment, entered judgment for the
City, and closed the case.

The Plaintiffs appealed the Court's decision, and that appeal is
pending before the Seventh Circuit. The City has filed a Bill of
Costs with a supporting memorandum and affidavit, seeking
$40,214.30 in fees and costs. The Plaintiffs have filed an
objection.

Discussion

Fed. R. Civ. 54(d)(1) provides that costs, other than attorney's
fees, should be allowed to the prevailing party. There is a strong
"presumption that the prevailing party will recover costs, and the
losing party bears the burden of an affirmative showing that taxed
costs are not appropriate." In evaluating an application for costs,
the Court first determines whether the claimed expenses are
recoverable and then determines whether they are reasonable. The
Court has wide discretion in determining an award of reasonable
costs.

Recoverable costs are listed in 28 U.S.C. Section 1920 and include:
1) fees of the clerk; 2) fees for printed or electronically
recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; 3)
fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; 4) fees for
exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials
where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case; 5)
docket fees; and 6) compensation of court appointed experts and
interpreters.

A. Service of Summons and Subpoena Costs and Fees

The City seeks $1021.57 in costs related to service of subpoenas
and associated witness fees incurred in deposing and obtaining
documents from putative class members. The costs for service were
calculated either at the U.S. Marshal's Service rate, or are
accompanied by a process server invoice, both of which the court
finds reasonable. Judge Gettleman allows the $1,021.57 in costs.

B. Deposition Transcripts and Court Reporter Costs

The City seeks $29,111.55 for court reporter and transcript fees
for depositions. These amounts were calculated at the standard rate
of $3.65 per page along with a court reporter attendance fee of
$110 for a half day and $220 for a full day and are supported by
invoices. The City claims that where any deposition cost exceeded
those standards, it seeks only the portion that aligns with the
standards. The City also seeks reasonable overtime costs associated
with a court reporter's attendance.

The Plaintiffs object to the overtime costs as unreasonable, but
Judge Gettleman disagrees. He says, such costs are recoverable,
citing Druckzentrum Harry Jung GmbH & Co. KG v. Motorola, Inc.,
2013 WL147014 at * 2 (N.D. Ill. January 11, 2013). As in
Drunkzentrum, it is likely that if the depositions were continued
for an extra day other related and acceptable fees, such as the
court reporter's appearance fee would be incurred.

The Plaintiffs also object to videographer costs added to
stenographer costs. They argue that the videorecording of the
depositions was unnecessary because the Defendants submitted the
stenographic transcripts in support of their motion for summary
judgment. Judge Gettleman concludes that the videorecording fees
are recoverable and reasonable.

The Plaintiffs next object to the City's deposition exhibit costs.
Gettleman finds that the depositions were conducted remotely, and
were necessary for their orderly conduction. The costs for the
deposition exhibits, and related incidental costs are therefore
recoverable and reasonable.

The Plaintiffs next object to the City's request to recover the
costs for a rough draft of Ginger Evan's deposition transcript,
arguing that such costs are not permitted. The City explains that
it needed the rough draft to prepare for two key depositions
noticed by plaintiffs for the following week. Thus, the City did
not have time to order a transcript at the regular rate and needed
the transcript on an expedited basis. Judge Gettleman finds this
explanation reasonable and awards the cost of the rough draft.

C. Hearing Transcript Costs and Fees

The City seeks $1,942.30 in costs for transcripts of seven court
hearings before Magistrate Judge Wiseman and two hearing in the
Illinois Labor Relations Board. The Plaintiffs argue that the City
has failed to demonstrate that the court hearing transcripts were
for anything other than its counsel's convenience.

Judge Gettleman disagrees. He says, the transcripts contained
discussions of the discovery process and oral rulings by the court
that were not necessarily put into written orders. The City was
reasonable in acquiring the transcripts to be sure that both
parties were complying with the court's orders. Judge Gettleman
also agrees with the City that it acted reasonably in ordering
expedited transcripts for six of the hearings. Finally, he
concludes that the City's request for the transcripts before the
Illinois Labor Relations Board is also reasonable and recoverable.
The City relied on those transcripts in its successful motion for
summary judgment.

D. Document Costs and Fees

The City seeks $8,138.88 in costs related to photocopying,
printing, and delivering documents. Such costs are recoverable
under Section 1920(3-4) if reasonable. The City seeks $917.00 in
costs for copying and printing documents. Rates of $.20 per page
for copying and printing have been held reasonable. Teague v.
Miehle, 2019 WL 1253985 at * 2 (N.D. Ill. March 19, 2019). Here,
the City did all copying in-house at a $.10 per page rate. The
court finds this reasonable and awards copying and printing costs
in the amount of $917.00.

Next, plaintiffs object to the City's request for $648.66 in
mailing and messenger fees costs. Judge Gettleman finds the City
has demonstrated that it had to review, copy, and send to the
counsel numerous documents maintained strictly in hard copy format
and that transmission of these documents was reasonable.
Consequently, he awards $648.66 in copying and messenger costs.

Finally, the City seeks $6,573.22 in costs required to convert
extensive ESI discovery into a searchable and production-friendly
format. The Plaintiffs object to the costs incurred to render the
raw data searchable, but without that function the production of
the ESI to them would likely be useless. Judge Gettleman holds that
converting ESI into a word searchable format is recoverable under
Heckler v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir. 2009).
Consequently, he concludes that the costs are reasonable and
recoverable.

Conclusion

For the reasons he discussed, Judge Gettleman ordered that costs
are taxed in the amount of $40,214.30.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p96jwvy from
Leagle.com.


CLEVELAND-CLIFFS INC: Ct. Enters Rule 16 Sched Order in Crocker
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Louis Crocker, et al., v.
Cleveland-Cliffs, Inc., Case No. 2:21-cv-11937-VAR-CI (E.D. Mich.),
the Hon. Judge Victoria A. Roberts entered a Rule 16 Scheduling
Order (Phase I) as follows:

                     Event                       Date

  Deadline for the parties to move         February 17, 2022
  to amend the pleadings or add new
  parties:

  Status Conference by Zoom.               May 5, 2022
  Attorneys will receive Zoom
  connection information prior to
  the conference:

  The Plaintiffs' deadline for             May 27, 2022
  disclosing expert(s),
  providing all required expert
  disclosures, and producing
  expert report(s):

  The Defendant's deadline to              June 24, 2022
  depose Plaintiff’s expert(s):

  The Defendant's deadline for             July 15, 2022
  disclosing expert(s), providing
  all required expert disclosures,
  and producing expert report(s):

  Plaintiffs' deadline to depose           August 12, 2022
  Defendant's expert(s):

  Deadline for completing all              August 26, 2022
  discovery on class certification
  issues:

  Plaintiffs' deadline to move for         September 30, 2022
  class certification:

  Defendant's deadline to file             October 28, 2022
  opposition to motion for
  class certification.

  Plaintiffs' deadline to file             November 11, 2022
  reply to Defendant's opposition
  to class certification:

Cleveland-Cliffs Inc., formerly Cliffs Natural Resources, is a
Cleveland, Ohio-based company that specializes in the mining,
beneficiation, and pelletizing of iron ore, as well as steelmaking,
including stamping and tooling.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 22, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3HuYLC8 at no extra charge.[CC]

CLIENT SERVICES: Seeks 3rd Cir. Review of Ruling in Rhee FDCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Client Services, Inc. filed an appeal from a court ruling entered
in the lawsuit entitled HIESEOK RHEE, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, v. CLIENT SERVICES, INC., Case No.
2:19-cv-12253-JMV-MAH, in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey.

After receiving a debt collection letter from Defendant for a debt
that Plaintiff allegedly owed, Plaintiff filed this putative class
action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act. The Defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint.

On July 21, 2020, the Court granted in part and denied in part
Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Court concluded that Plaintiff
had standing to assert his claims and a single FDCPA violation
claim. The Court, however, dismissed two other FDCPA claims
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

On October 16, 2020, Defendant served Plaintiff with an offer of
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. The
Plaintiff purportedly did not respond to the offer of judgment,
thus the offer "is considered withdrawn."

The Plaintiff then filed a motion to certify a class on April 14,
2021. On May 4, 2021, the Court administratively terminated the
motion because of ongoing discovery disputes that could potentially
impact class certification. The Plaintiff, however, did not re-file
his motion to certify a class. Instead, on July 23, 2021, Defendant
served Plaintiff with a second offer of judgment.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on November 29, 2021, the
Hon. Judge John Michael Vazquez entered an order (1) granting the
Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs; (2) awarding the
Plaintiff $71,267.50 in attorneys' fees and $500 in costs; and (3)
awarding a total judgment, along with the offered judgment amount,
in the amount of $72,768.50.

The Defendant seeks a review of this order entered by Judge
Vazquez.

The appellate case is captioned as Client Services, Inc. v. Hieseok
Rhee, Case No. 21-3332, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, filed on December 21, 2021.[BN]

Defendant-Appellant CLIENT SERVICES, INC. is represented by:

          Sean M. O'Brien, Esq.
          LIPPES MATHIAS WEXLER FRIEDMAN LLP
          50 Fountain Plaza, Suite 1700
          Buffalo, NY 14202
          Telephone: (518) 669-0813
          E-mail: sobrien@lippes.com

Plaintiff-Appellee HIESEOK RHEE, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, is represented by:

          Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
          SANDERS LAW GROUP
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 203-7600
          E-mail: csanders@barshaysanders.com

COLLECTO INC: Parties Seek May 20 Class Cert Filing Extension
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BRENDA DAVIS and CLARENCE
DAVIS, individually, and on behalf of all other similarly situated
individuals, v. COLLECTO, INC. d/b/a EOS CCA, Case No.
3:21-cv-00044 (S.D.w.Va.), the parties ask the Court to enter an
order extending time for the Plaintiffs to move for class
certification.

On January 15, 2021, the Defendant removed this Action to this
Court. On March 11, 2021, the Court entered the operative
Scheduling Order, which set deadlines of (i) November 12, 2021 for
Plaintiffs to file their motion for class certification; (ii)
discovery requests to be completed by January 21, 2022; and (iii)
dispositive motions to be filed by August 8, 2022.

On October 28, 2021, the Court granted the parties' Joint Motion to
Extend Time for Plaintiffs to File their Motion for Class
Certification to January 21, 2022 (DE 33).

The Plaintiffs contend that an extension of approximately 120 days
until May 20, 2022, to file their motion for class certification,
will allow them the necessary time to complete the discovery
necessary to support their motion.

Collecto operates as a debt management and recovery resource
company.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Dec. 22, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3FR7QEQ at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Patricia M. Kipnis, Esq.
          Jonathan R. Marshall, Esq.
          BAILEY & GLASSER LLP
          923 Haddonfield Rd., Suite 300
          Cherry Hill, NJ 08002
          Telephone: (856) 324-8219
          E-mail: pkipnis@baileyglasser.com
                  jmarshall@baileyglasser.com

               - and -

          Benjamin M. Sheridan, Esq.
          KLEIN & SHERIDAN, LC
          3566 Teays Valley Road
          Hurricane, WV 25526
          Telephone: (304) 562-7111
          E-mail: ben@kleinsheridan.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Lawrence J. Bartel, III, Esq.
          Katlin C. Zarisky, Esq.
          GORDON REES SCULLY & MANSUKHANI
          Three Logan Square, Suite 610
          1717 Arch Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          E-mail: kzarisky@grsm.com

CORNUCOPIA LOGISTICS: Tiemtore Sues Over Illegal Retention of Tips
------------------------------------------------------------------
IBRAHIM TIEMTORE, on his own behalf and on behalf of those
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. CORNUCOPIA LOGISTICS, LLC,
AMAZON.COM, INC., a Foreign for Profit Corporation; AMAZON
LOGISTICS, INC., a Foreign for Profit Corporation, Defendants, Case
No. 1:21-cv-06999 (E.D.N.Y., December 20, 2021) brings this
complaint as a class/collective action against the Defendants for
disgorgement of tips, liquidated damages, declaratory relief and
other relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendants as a delivery driver
from approximately January 1, 2021 through November 26, 2021.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants improperly retained all
or some of the tips received by him and other similarly situated
delivery drivers. Thereby, the Defendants have acted willfully in
failing to pay them proper tip share in accordance with the law,
says the Plaintiff.

The Corporate Defendants are delivery companies that provide
delivery services. They jointly employed the Plaintiff and other
similarly situated delivery drivers. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew R. Frisch, Esq.
          Paul M. Botros, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          8151 Peters Road, Suite 4000
          Plantation, FL 33324
          Tel: (954) WORKERS
          Fax: (954) 327-3013
          E-mail: afrisch@forthepeople.com


COUNTYWIDE MECHANICAL: Nava Labor Suit Removed to S.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled MOISES NAVA and DEVIN VESTER, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. COUNTYWIDE MECHANICAL
SYSTEMS, INC. and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No.
37-2021-00049164-CU-OE-CTL, was removed from the Superior Court of
the State of California, County of San Diego, to the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California on December 22,
2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Southern District of California assigned
Case No. 3:21-cv-02118-CAB-MDD to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California Business and Professions
Code including failure to pay overtime wages, failure to pay meal
period premiums, failure to pay rest period premiums, failure to
pay minimum wages, failure to provide accurate wage statement,
failure to timely pay final wages, failure to reimburse expenses,
and unfair business practices.

Countywide Mechanical Systems, Inc. is an air conditioning
contractor, with its headquarters in El Cajon, California. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:          
         
         Danielle Hultenius Moore, Esq.
         Patrice C. Nagle, Esq.
         Lauren Bushman, Esq.
         FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP
         4747 Executive Drive, Suite 1000
         San Diego, CA 92121
         Telephone: (858) 597-9600
         Facsimile: (858) 597-9601
         E-mail: dmoore@fisherphillips.com
                 pnagle@fisherphillips.com
                 lbushman@fisherphillips.com

CUSTER RESOURCES: Faces Vajdos Suit Over Landmen's Unpaid Overtime
------------------------------------------------------------------
The case, JOHN VAJDOS, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CUSTER RESOURCES AND ASSOCIATES,
LLC and LEN ELWOOD CUSTER III, individually, Defendants, Case No.
5:21-cv-01265 (W.D. Ill., December 20, 2021) arises from the
Defendants' alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a landman from
August 2008 through October 22, 2021.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and other similarly
situated landmen were improperly classified by the Defendants as
independent contractors to avoid the overtime requirements of the
FLSA. Despite consistently working more than 40 hours per workweek,
the Defendants did not pay them overtime compensation at the rate
of one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all hours
worked in excess of 40 per workweek.

Moreover, the Defendants allegedly hired and fired their landmen.
The Plaintiff was physically assaulted by Defendant Custer. Prior
to punching him three times in the stomach, Defendant Custer
screamed at him telling him to get his ass out and that he was
fired.

Custer Resources and Associates, LLC negotiate with landowners on
behalf of oil and gas companies to acquire leases for the
exploration and development of oil and gas resources. Len Elwood
Custer III is the owner of the Corporate Defendant. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas B. Welmaker, Esq.
          MORELAND VERRETT, P.C.
          700 West Summit Dr.
          Wimberley, TX 78676
          Tel: (512) 782-0567
          Fax: (512) 782-0605
          E-mail: doug@morelandlaw.com

CUSTOMCARE LLC: Underpays Personal Care Attendants, Turnmire Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------------
KAREN TURNMIRE and ERIN TURNMIRE, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. CUSTOMCARE, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 0:21-cv-02738 (D. Minn., December 23, 2021) is
a class action against the Defendant for its failure to compensate
the Plaintiffs and similarly situated personal care attendants
overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a
workweek in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiffs Karen and Erin Turnmire have worked for the Defendant as
personal care attendants since March 2021 and June 2021,
respectively.

CustomCARE, LLC is an agency that provides health care staffing
services to individuals with illnesses and disabilities, with its
principal place of business in Edina, Minnesota. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Michele R. Fisher, Esq.
         Kayla Kienzle, Esq.
         NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
         4700 IDS Center
         80 South Eighth Street
         Minneapolis, MN 55402
         Telephone: (612) 256-3200
         Facsimile: (612) 215-6870
         E-mail: fisher@nka.com
                 kkienzle@nka.com

DANIEL GLADSTONE: May Class Certification Bid Junked
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LAWRENCE A. MAY, et al.,
v. DANIEL S. GLADSTONE, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-02312-DSF-ADS
(C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Dale S. Fischer entered an order:

   1. granting the Defendants' motion to deny class
      certification; and

   2. denying Request for Sanctions.

The proposed class includes:

   "All past, current, and potential physicians, domiciled
   within the United States, who received a nonemergency call
   from the Defendants on their cellular telephone, without
   their prior express consent, either via an automatic
   telephone dialing system ("ATDS") or as a prerecorded
   message, and/or received an email to their private email
   address, that references and advertises Longeviti's concierge
   support services."

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 22, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3HxN8KJ at no extra charge.[CC]

DAWN TO DUSK: Pereira Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
JUAN PEREIRA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. DAWN TO DUSK LANDSCAPING, INC. and ALBERT
AMBROGI, THOMAS AMBROGI and ROBERTO CASTRO, as individuals,
Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-07006 (E.D.N.Y., December 20, 2021)
seeks to recover damages for Defendants' egregious violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law by failing
to pay overtime wages and failing to provide written wage notices
and wage statements to Plaintiff and class members.

Mr. Pereira was employed by the Defendants from May 2018 until
September 2021. His primary duties were as a painter and landscaper
while performing other miscellaneous duties.

Dawn to Dusk Landscaping, Inc.  is a landscaping company with a
principal executive office in Greenlawn, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: (718) 263-9591
          Facsimile: (718) 263-9598

DENTAL EQUITIES: Scoma's Class Certification Bid Granted in Part
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Fort
Myers Division, grants in part the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification in the lawsuit titled SCOMA CHIROPRACTIC, P.A., a
Florida corporation, FLORENCE MUSSAT M.D., S.C., an Illinois
service corporation, and WILLIAM P. GRESS, an Illinois resident,
individually and as the representatives of a class of
similarly-situated persons, Plaintiffs v. DENTAL EQUITIES, LLC,
FIRST ARKANSAS BANK & TRUST, MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED,
a Delaware corporation, and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants, Case No.
2:16-cv-41-JLB-MRM (M.D. Fla.).

The lawsuit is a junk fax case brought pursuant to the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, as amended by the Junk Fax
Prevention Act of 2005, 47 U.S.C. Section 227 ("the TCPA"). The
Plaintiffs have moved for class certification, and Defendant
Mastercard International Inc. has responded in opposition.

After careful consideration, and with guidance from the Eleventh
Circuit's recent decision in Cherry v. Dometic Corp., 986 F.3d 1296
(11th Cir. 2021), the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is
granted in part and denied in part. The Court certifies one class:
those who received unsolicited faxes from their standalone fax
machines from Defendant advertising its "DoctorsClub" Mastercard
credit card. The Court denies Plaintiffs' request to certify a
class containing those who received those unsolicited faxes from
Defendant through a third-party online fax service.

Background

The Plaintiffs allege that faxes advertising the "DoctorsClub"
Mastercard credit card were sent to fax numbers without prior
permission from the recipients. Plaintiffs Scoma Chiropractic, P.A.
and Dr. William Gress received the faxes on traditional stand-alone
fax machines, and Plaintiff Florence Mussat, M.D., S.C., received
the fax via an online fax service. In 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a
class action complaint under the TCPA.

Following the Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint but prior to the
Plaintiff's first motion for class certification, Mastercard moved
to stay proceedings pending a decision by the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") on a petition filed by
AmeriFactors Financial Group, LLC. The issue raised by that
petition was whether internet-based fax equipment constitutes a
"telephone facsimile machine" under the TCPA. Finding that the
issue could substantially affect the claims of Mussat and the class
it sought to represent, the Court stayed proceedings pending the
decision.

In a 2019 Declaratory Ruling, the Consumer and Governmental Affairs
Bureau, acting on delegated authority from the FCC, determined that
the TCPA does not apply to online fax services. The stay was then
lifted, the Plaintiffs refiled their motion for class
certification, and--more than four years after the initial
complaint was filed--the case was reassigned to the current judge,
District Judge John L. Badalamenti.

In recommending that the renewed motion for class certification be
denied, the Magistrate Judge determined that: (1) online fax
services fall outside the scope of the TCPA; (2) absent Article III
or "statutory standing," individuals who received the fax via an
online service could not raise a TCPA claim; and (3) the
Plaintiffs' proposed method to identify class members who used a
stand-alone fax machine was not administratively feasible and did
not satisfy predominance and superiority under Rule 23(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Four days later, the Eleventh Circuit held that "administrative
feasibility is not a requirement for certification under Rule 23,"
Cherry, 986 F.3d at 1304. In light of Cherry, the report and
recommendation was vacated, and the Plaintiffs were permitted to
refile their motion for class certification.

Relief Requested

The Plaintiffs move under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to certify and be appointed class representatives
of this class:

      All persons or entities who were successfully sent a
      facsimile on or about December 18-23, 2015, stating Happy
      Holiday and inviting recipients to apply for an Exclusive
      Doctors Club World Elite MasterCard credit card, where the
      fax either (a) contains no opt-out notice explaining how to
      stop future faxes; or (b) contains an opt-out notice
      stating: Recipient may Opt Out of any future faxes by
      emailing a request to OptOut@TheDrClub.com or by calling
      949.202.1777. (All Fax Recipients Class)

Alternatively, if the Court finds it necessary to distinguish
between faxes received on a stand-alone fax machine and faxes
received via online fax service, the Plaintiffs seek to certify
these two classes:

      All persons or entities who were successfully sent a
      facsimile on a stand-alone telephone facsimile machine on
      or about December 18-23, 2015, stating Happy Holiday and
      inviting recipients to apply for an Exclusive Doctors Club
      World Elite MasterCard credit card, where the fax either
      (a) contains no opt-out notice explaining how to stop
      future faxes; or (b) contains an opt-out notice stating:
      Recipient may Opt Out of any future faxes by emailing a
      request to OptOut@TheDrClub.com or by calling 949.202.1777.
      (Stand-Alone Fax Machine Class); and

      All persons or entities who were successfully sent a
      facsimile via an online fax service on or about
      December 18-23, 2015, stating Happy Holiday and inviting
      recipients to apply for an Exclusive Doctors Club World
      Elite MasterCard credit card, where the fax either (a)
      contains no opt-out notice explaining how to stop future
      faxes; or (b) contains an opt-out notice stating: Recipient
      may Opt Out of any future faxes by emailing a request to
      OptOut@TheDrClub.com or by calling 949.202.1777. (Online
      Fax Service Class).

The Plaintiffs request that Scoma and Dr. Gress be appointed to
represent the Stand-Alone Fax Machine Class and Mussat represent
the Online Fax Service Class. They also request that the Court
appoint the law firms of Anderson + Wanca ('A+W'), and Edelman,
Combs, Latturner & Goodwin ('ECLG'), and Curtis C. Warner
('Warner') as class counsel.

Mastercard opposes the motion on several grounds. First, Mastercard
contends that the Court should determine at this stage that the
TCPA does not apply to faxes received via online fax services. As a
result, Mastercard reasons, the All Fax Recipients and Online Fax
Service Classes include members who lack both constitutional and
"statutory" standing and the classes cannot be certified. As to the
Stand-Alone Fax Machine Class, Mastercard contends that, even if
administrative feasibility is not required, the Plaintiffs have not
established predominance or superiority under Rule 23(b)(3).

Discussion

Judge Badalamenti finds that certification of the All Fax
Recipients and Online Fax Service Classes is inappropriate. First,
it is likely that many of the putative members, who received the
fax via an online fax service lack Article III standing. Second,
the question of whether the TCPA covers receipt of a fax via an
online fax service bears on the predominance inquiry under Rule
23(b)(3) and must be answered.

The Court finds that receipt of such faxes through online fax
services is not covered by the TCPA. Accordingly, individual issues
of whether a member received a fax via an online fax service will
predominate over any common issues as to the All Fax Recipients
Class, and individual issues of Article III standing will
predominate as to both classes.

As to the Stand-Alone Fax Machine Class, Judge Badalamenti holds
that the Plaintiffs have met Rule 23's requirements, and
certification of that subclass is appropriate. Scoma and Dr. Gress
are appointed as class representatives, and the Plaintiffs' counsel
is appointed class counsel.

I. Standing

The Court begins its analysis with Article III standing. To have
Article III standing, a plaintiff must have "(1) suffered an injury
in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of
the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a
favorable judicial decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct.
1540, 1547 (2016).

The Article III standing of Scoma and Dr. Gress is not at issue,
Judge Badalamenti notes. The Court agrees that, at the very least,
it appears that "a large portion" of the All Fax Recipients
class--namely, members that received the fax via an online fax
service--do not have standing.

Judge Badalamenti opines that individualized inquiries would be
required to identify those members and determine whether they have
Article III standing, and those individualized inquiries would
predominate over any common issues. The same is true for the Online
Fax Service class, which is comprised only of those who received
faxes via an online fax service.

In summary, Judge Badalamenti explains, because individualized
inquiries into whether members of the All Fax Recipients and Online
Fax Service Classes possess Article III standing would predominate
over any common questions, the classes cannot be certified.

II. It is necessary to determine whether a fax received via an
online fax service falls under the TCPA.

Mastercard asks the Court to determine that receipt of a fax via an
online fax service falls outside the scope of the TCPA and that,
therefore, Mussat and putative class members who received the fax
via an online fax service do not have a valid TCPA claim.
Mastercard reasons that the question of whether the fax was sent to
a "telephone facsimile machine" would, thus, predominate over any
common questions of law or fact under Rule 23(b)(3).

Perhaps recognizing this issue with the All Fax Recipients Class,
the Plaintiffs alternatively propose two separate classes "if the
Court finds it necessary to distinguish between faxes received on a
'stand-alone' fax machine and faxes received via 'online fax
service.'"

The Court agrees with Mastercard that, as to certification of the
All Fax Recipients Class, this question of law bears on
predominance. Indeed, if the Court determines that receipt of a fax
via an online fax service does not fall under the TCPA, individual
proof would be required to establish whether each member of the
class received the fax via a stand-alone machine or online fax
service.

Conversely, if the Court determines that receipt of a fax via an
online fax service does fall under the TCPA, it would be
unnecessary to make the individual inquiry and the element--that
the fax was sent to a "telephone facsimile machine"--could be
proven on a classwide basis, for example, by the transmission log
of successfully sent faxes.

Accordingly, because the question bears on predominance, the Court
must answer it. See Comcast Corp., 569 U.S. at 34.4

III. The TCPA does not apply to receipt of a fax via online fax
service.

The Court agrees with the well-reasoned analysis of the Magistrate
Judge and several other courts in finding that receipt of a fax via
an online fax service does not support a TCPA claim. First, the
Bureau's decision in In the Matter of Amerifactors Fin. Grp., LLC
Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling, No. 05-338, 2019 WL
6712128 (OHMSV Dec. 9, 2019) ("AmeriFactors") is entitled to
deference under the Chevron doctrine. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Palm Beach Golf
Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 1245,
1257 n.12 (11th Cir. 2015).

Second, the FCC's determination is based on a permissible
construction of the statute. In determining that online fax
services fall outside the scope of the TCPA, the FCC sought
comments from the community, reviewed an extensive record, and
concluded that Congress intended to protect against harms
associated with the use of equipment that had the capacity to
print. The Court finds this determination based on a permissible
construction of the statute.

Next, because the faxes here were received before AmeriFactors was
decided, it is necessary to determine whether the decision applies
retroactively. As noted by the previously assigned judge, the
decision's retroactivity depends on whether the decision is
rulemaking or a clarification, Judge Badalamenti holds.

Upon review and in consideration of AmeriFactors, the Court finds
that the TCPA does not cover receipt of a fax via an online fax
service.

IV. The All Fax Recipients and Online Fax Service Classes cannot be
certified because common issues do not predominate over individual
issues.

To satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), the
Plaintiffs must show that the issues in the class action that are
subject to generalized proof and, thus, applicable to the class as
a whole, must predominate over those issues that are subject only
to individualized proof.

As to the All Fax Recipients and Online Fax Service Classes,
although the members' claims relate to similar fax transmissions,
the common issues do not predominate, Judge Badalamenti finds. As
to the All Fax Recipients, individualized inquiries would be
required to determine whether each member received a fax via a
stand-alone machine or online fax service.

Judge Badalamenti opines that such inquiries would be necessary for
two independent reasons: (1) as a threshold question of whether
each member has Article III standing; and (2) because only those
who received a fax via a stand-alone machine could potentially have
a valid TCPA claim, and thus the element of receipt on a "telephone
facsimile machine" would not be subject to classwide proof.

The Article III standing inquiry would require further analysis of,
among other things, whether the member read the fax, how long it
took that member to read the fax, and whether there were any other
potential bases to support an injury in fact, Judge Badalamenti
opines. These potentially complex individualized inquiries would
dwarf the common issues among the class. As to the Online Fax
Service Class, the same individualized standing analysis would
predominate over the common issues. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs
have not established predominance as to either class, and the
classes cannot be certified.

V. Certification of the Stand-Alone Fax Machine Class is
appropriate.

As to the Stand-Alone Fax Machine Class, Mastercard does not
dispute, and the Court agrees, that the Plaintiffs have satisfied
Rule 23(a)'s prerequisites. As to Rule 23(b), the Plaintiffs seek
certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires predominance and
superiority.

Judge Badalamenti finds that here, the putative members of the
Stand-Alone Fax Machine Class are ascertainable. In other words,
the class is defined by objective criteria, and the members are
identifiable. Further, as it relates to Rule 23(b)(3)(D)'s
manageability factor, which is but one factor in a balancing
analysis, the Court finds that any difficulties in identifying
membership of the Stand-Alone Fax Machine Class do not outweigh the
factors that countenance in favor of class certification.

Common issues of fact and law as to the Stand-Alone Machine class
predominate, Judge Badalamenti also finds. The overriding common
question, which can be decided classwide, is whether Mastercard
sent the faxes as prohibited by the TCPA.

In summary, and following the Eleventh Circuit's guidance in
Cherry, the Court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members.

The Plaintiffs have also shown that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy, Judge Badalamenti holds. In summary, the Plaintiffs
have satisfied Rule 23(a) and (b)(3), and certification as to the
Stand-Alone Fax Machine Class is, thus, warranted.

VI. Appointment of Class Counsel

Having found certification of the Stand-Alone Fax Machine Class
appropriate, the Court turns to the Plaintiffs' request for
appointment as class counsel. Upon careful consideration of the
relevant factors, the Court appoints the Plaintiffs' counsel, A +
W, ECLG, and Mr. Warner as class counsel. Upon review of the
relevant factors, A + W, ECLG, and Mr. Warner are appointed class
counsel of the Stand-Alone Machine Class.

VII. Dissemination of Notice

Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires the Court to direct to class members the
best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort.

Although the Plaintiffs have proposed a method to disseminate
notice, the Court finds that the better course of action is to
allow the parties to confer before the Plaintiffs submit their
proposal.

Accordingly, the parties are directed to confer as to the content,
timing, and method of notice to be given to the class. After
conferring with defense counsel, but no later than thirty days from
the date of this Order, the Plaintiffs will provide for the Court's
approval a proposed form and method of dissemination of notice.

Conclusion

The Plaintiffs' Second Amended Motion for Class Certification is
granted in part and denied in part. The Plaintiffs' request to
certify the All Fax Recipients and Online Fax Service Classes is
denied. Their request to certify the Stand-Alone Fax Machine Class
is granted. Scoma and Dr. Gress are appointed as class
representatives, and A + W, ECLG, and Mr. Warner are appointed as
class counsel. Following conferral with defense counsel and within
thirty days from the date of this Order, the Plaintiffs will file a
proposed form and method of dissemination of notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Dec. 23, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/rfd39wyp from Leagle.com.


DESERT STATES: $7.95MM Class Settlement in Koch Suit Wins Final OK
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Robert Koch, Plaintiff v. Desert States Employers &
UFCW Unions Pension Plan, et al., Defendants, Case No.
CV-20-02187-PHX-DJH (D. Ariz.), Judge Diane J. Humetewa of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Arizona issued an Order:

   a. granting the Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class
      Action Settlement Agreement; and

   b. granting in part the Plaintiff's Motion for a Case
      Contribution Award and Attorneys' Fees, Costs.

Background

In 2018, named Plaintiff Robert Koch, filed a class action lawsuit
to remedy alleged violations of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") by the Defendants Desert States
Employers and UFCW Unions Pension Plan and its fiduciary Trustees.
Therein, the Plaintiff alleged that these violations resulted in
the forfeiture and underpayment of pension benefits to the
Plaintiff and hundreds of putative class members. That case was
subject to the district court's Mandatory Initial Disclosure Pilot
("MIDP") program.

On Jan. 28, 2019, the Parties filed a Tolling Agreement and
Stipulation of Dismissal without Prejudice. Therein, the Parties
explained that they agreed to pursue mediation to resolve the
Plaintiff's claims and to avoid further litigation. They further
agreed that any claims asserted in the Plaintiff's Complaint would
be tolled for a specified time period. The Court approved the
Stipulation and dismissed the case without prejudice.

After dismissal of the lawsuit, according to Ms. Martin, the
Parties undertook extensive discovery, including a review of Plan
documents and amendments, notices, records of the Defendant's
actuary's calculations for Plan participants, and participant
benefit files. Thereafter, the Parties met multiple times, engaged
in a day long mediation session, with several follow-up
discussions. The mediator, Daniel Feinberg, a nationally recognized
and experienced mediator in ERISA, produced a Term Sheet that was
accepted by both parties on April 2, 2021.

On Nov. 13, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint ("the instant
case") essentially realleging the same ERISA violations against the
same Defendants. After ordering an extension of time for the
Defendants to Answer, and to continuing the Rule 16 Settlement
Conference, the Parties engaged in arms-length negotiations and
entered into a Class Action Settlement Agreement. No Answer has
been filed to the Complaint.

On Sept. 23, 2021, the Court preliminarily approved a Class Action
Settlement. Pursuant to that Order, on Nov. 30, 2021, the Court
conducted a Fairness Hearing where it considered the "Plaintiff's
Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement Agreement."
Also before the Court is the "Plaintiff's Motion for a Case
Contribution Award and Attorneys' Fees, Costs." Both motions are
supported by the Declaration of Named Plaintiff Robert Koch, the
Declaration of Bea Sainz, the Declaration of Plaintiff's counsel
Susan Martin, and accompanying exhibits. The Court took both
motions under further advisement and now issues its respective
rulings.

Discussion & Order

I. Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement Agreement

The Settlement Agreement identified two sub-classes of individuals
who were similarly situated as Named Plaintiff, those in an
Actuarial Class and those in a Suspension Class.

The pertinent provisions of the Settlement provides:

     a. Defendant Plan will pay $7.95 million in an aggregate value
to a Settlement Fund and no Individual Settlement Award will revert
to the Defendants;

     b. The Settlement Fund includes Settlement Benefits and Class
Counsel's Fee Award and Case Contribution Award;

     c. After adjustment for the Fee Award and Case Contribution
Award, all of the Settlement Fund will be paid to Class Members and
their eligible beneficiaries as set forth in the Agreement and Plan
of allocation;

     d. The Settlement Agreement provides that the Individual
Settlement Award is automatically paid to Class Members pursuant to
the Plan of Allocation without need for the individual to do
anything more;

     e. Named Plaintiff Robert Koch is to receive a Case
Contribution Award in the amount of $20,000 for his role in the
case, the amount of time, effort, risk he expended in initiating
the case, being involved in the discovery process and for
representing the Class Members interests. This award will be
deducted from the Settlement Fund and payment will be made to Named
Plaintiff within 14 days of the Effective Date as set for in the
Settlement Agreement;

     f. Named Plaintiff Robert Koch will also receive an Individual
Settlement Award as a member of the Actuarial Class and as a Member
of the Suspension Class;

     g. The Defendants will take all reasonable and diligent steps
to pay all eligible Settlement Class members by the Initial Payment
Date in accord with the Settlement Agreement;

     h. Named Plaintiff and each Class Member (except for anyone
who opted out) will be (a) conclusively deemed to have, and by
operation of the Final Order will have, fully, finally and forever
settled, released, relinquished, waived and discharged all Released
Claims, and (b) barred from suing Defendants or the Released
Parties in any action or proceeding alleging any of the Released
Claims; and

     i. Finally, neither the Parties nor their counsel will be
liable to any person for any determination made by the Class
Counsel on the Plan of allocation or for any mistakes, incorrect or
incomplete data relied upon by Plaintiffs in preparing and
producing the Plan of Allocation.

After considering the foregoing, all papers filed and proceedings
had therein, including the counsels' comments during the Fairness
Hearing, the Settlement Agreement, and due and adequate notice
having been given to the Settlement Class members as required in
the Preliminary Approval Order, Judge Humetewa finds that the
Settlement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests
of the named Plaintiff and Settlement Class. Sharon Ebach, a class
member who made timely request for exclusion, is excluded from the
class and settlement and is not bound by the Order. No objections
were lodged at the Final Fairness Hearing.

Accordingly, Judge Humetewa, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), certified
the matter as a class action on behalf of individuals represented
by Named Plaintiff. She certified Plaintiff Robert Koch as the
Class Representative and Susan Martin, Jennifer Kroll and Michael
M. Licata, of Matin & Bonnett, P.L.L.C., as the Class Counsel for
the Class Members.

The individual and class releases set forth in the Settlement
Agreement are approved.

The Named Plaintiff will be awarded $20,000 for his efforts on
behalf of himself and the Class.

The Court will retain exclusive jurisdiction over this matter, and
with respect to effectuating and supervising the interpretation,
implementation and enforcement of the Settlement Agreement and any
disputed questions of law or fact related thereto.

Judge Humetewa granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of
Class Action Settlement.

II. Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs

Also pending before the Court is the Plaintiff's Motion for a Case
Contribution Award and Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The Plaintiff's
Motion proposes an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of 30% of
the Settlement Fund ($2,385,000) and out-of-pocket costs and
expense reimbursement of $89,892.96, for a total of $2,474,892.96
in attorneys' fees and costs to be paid out of the Settlement
Fund.

Although the Court approved the Settlement Agreement and the
service award at the Final Fairness Hearing, it took Plaintiff's
Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs under advisement. After
further review of the Motion, Judge Humetewa finds the amount
requested in attorneys' fees is too high. Instead of the 30% of the
common fund requested by the Class Counsel, she will award 27%.

Given the market rates for attorneys in Phoenix, Judge Humetewa
finds the hourly rates of $825 for a senior partner, $690 for a
partner, and $550 and $347 for associates are excessive. Decreasing
the hourly fees of the Class Counsel to reflect the market rates,
she would calculate the lodestar to be 20% less than the Class
Counsel's calculation, i.e., approximately $530,000. Awarding an
upwards adjustment of 27%, or approximately $2.1 million,
represents a triple multiplier of the lodestar as proposed by the
Class Counsel and approximately a 4 multiplier of the Court's
calculated lodestar.

For the reasons stated in the Court's Order approving the
Settlement Agreement and therein, a 4 multiplier of the Court's
calculated lodestar is appropriate for the Class Counsel in this
particular case and even exceeds the multiplier requested by the
Class Counsel. Accordingly, Judge Humetewa granted in part the
Plaintiff's Motion for Case Contribution Award and Attorneys' Fees
and Costs. The Plaintiffs' counsel will be entitled to 27% of the
Gross Settlement Amount ($2,146,500) plus reimbursement of out of
pocket costs and expenses of $89,982.96.

The Clerk is respectfully directed to terminate the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yc5wtbeu from Leagle.com.


DESERT STATES: Koch Attorneys Entitled to $2.1MM in Fees & Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Robert Koch, v. Desert
States Employers & UFCW Unions Pension Plan, et al., Case No.
2:20-cv-02187-DJH (D. Ariz.), the Hon. Judge Diane J. Humetewa
entered an order granting in part the Plaintiff's Motion for Case
Contribution Award and Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

  -- The Plaintiffs' counsel shall be entitled to 27% of the
     Gross Settlement Amount ($2,146,500.00) plus reimbursement
     of out of pocket costs and expenses of $89,982.96.

In 2018, Plaintiff Koch, filed a class action lawsuit to remedy
alleged violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 ("ERISA") by the Defendants Desert States Employers and
UFCW Unions Pension Plan ("Plan") and its 8 Trustees.

The Plaintiff alleged that these violations resulted in the
forfeiture and underpayment of pension benefits to Plaintiff and
hundreds of putative class members. That case was subject to the
district court's Mandatory Initial Disclosure Pilot ("MIDP")
program. On January 28, 2019, the Parties filed a Tolling Agreement
and Stipulation of Dismissal without Prejudice.

Desert States Employers & UFCW Unions Pension Plan operates as an
employee retirement income plan.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 22, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3HssFqs at no extra charge.[CC]



DESKTOP METAL: Faces Luongo Suit Over Share Price Drop
------------------------------------------------------
NICHOLAS LUONGO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DESKTOP METAL, INC., RIC FULOP, JAMES HALEY,
and ALI EL-SIBLANI, Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-12099 (D. Mass.,
December 21, 2021) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff, on
behalf of persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired
Desktop Metal securities between March 15, 2021 and November 15,
2021, inclusive, pursuing claims against the Defendants under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Desktop Metal purports to offer additive manufacturing technologies
focused on the production of end use parts. Its platforms include:
Production System, a manufacturing platform using the Company's
proprietary Single Pass Jetting technology enabling production
quantities of up to millions of parts per year; Shop System, an
affordable turnkey binding jetting platform to bring metal 3D
printing to machine and job shops; Studio System, an
office-friendly metal 3D printing system; and Fiber, a desktop 3D
printer using the Company's proprietary Micro Automated Fiber
Placement.

On February 16, 2021, the Company acquired EnvisionTEC, Inc. and
certain of its affiliates, a provider of volume production
photopolymer 3D printing solutions for end use parts.

Throughout the Class Period, the Defendants allegedly made
materially false and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to
disclose material adverse facts about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to
disclose to investors: (1) that there were deficiencies in
EnvisionTEC's manufacturing and product compliance practices and
procedures; (2) that the foregoing deficiencies presented a
material risk to the commercialization of EnvisionTEC's products;
and (3) that, as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive
statements about the Company's business, operations, and prospects
were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, the suit added.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Glen DeValerio, Esq.
          Daryl Andrews, Esq.
          ANDREWS DEVALERIO LLP
          P.O. Box 67101
          Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
          Telephone: (617) 999-6473
          E-mail: glen@andrewsdevalerio.com
                  daryl@andrewsdevalerio.com

               - and -

          Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
          Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
          Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160

DOMINO'S PIZZA: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Carmona Suit Upheld
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled EDMOND CARMONA, Plaintiff-Appellee, and
ABRAHAM MENDOZA; ROGER NOGUERIA, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. DOMINO'S PIZZA, LLC, a
Michigan Corporation, Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 21-55009 (9th
Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirms the denial of the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration.

Three delivery drivers sued Domino's Pizza, LLC, on behalf of
themselves and a putative class, asserting violations of various
California labor laws. Domino's moved to compel arbitration
pursuant to its contracts with the drivers. The district court
denied the motion, finding that the drivers are a class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, and are, therefore,
exempt from the requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")
under 9 U.S.C. Section 1.

I

Domino's sells pizza to the public primarily through franchisees.
Domino's buys various goods, such as mushrooms, that are used by
its franchisees in making pizzas, from suppliers outside of
California. Those goods are then delivered by third parties to the
Domino's Southern California Supply Chain Center ("Supply Center").
At the Supply Center, Domino's employees reapportion, weigh,
package, and otherwise prepare the goods to be sent to franchisees.
Domino's franchisees in Southern California order the goods either
online or by calling the Supply Center, and the plaintiff drivers
("D&S drivers"), who are employees of Domino's, then deliver the
goods to the franchisees.

Edmond Carmona and two other D&S drivers filed this putative class
action against Domino's in 2020, alleging violations of California
labor law. The three lead plaintiffs each had agreements with
Domino's providing that any claim, dispute, and/or controversy
between the parties would be submitted to and determined
exclusively by binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration
Act.

In response to the D&S drivers' complaint, Domino's moved to compel
arbitration. The district court denied the motion, finding the
Plaintiffs exempt from the FAA under 9 U.S.C. Section 1
notwithstanding their contracts with Domino's because they are
transportation workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
Domino's timely appealed.

II

The FAA provides that arbitration agreements evidencing a
transaction involving commerce will be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract. Section 1 of the FAA, however,
exempts from the arbitration mandate contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce. The clause setting out that last
category, the one relevant here, is sometimes referred to as the
"residual clause." The residual clause is afforded a "narrow
construction" to further the FAA's purpose of overcoming judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements.

Circuit Judge Andrew D. Hurwitz, writing for the Panel, notes that
the "critical factor" in determining whether the residual clause
exemption applies is not the nature of the item transported in
interstate commerce (person or good) or whether the plaintiffs
themselves crossed state lines, but rather the nature of the
business for which a class of workers performed their activities,
citing Grice, 974 F.3d at 956. The exemption applies if the class
of workers is engaged in a single, unbroken stream of interstate
commerce that renders interstate commerce a "central part" of their
job description.

Domino's does not dispute that the third parties, who delivered
goods to the Supply Center, are engaged in interstate commerce. But
it contends that the D&S drivers, who deliver goods to individual
Domino's franchisees in California, are not so engaged because the
franchisees, all located in California, place orders with the
Supply Center in the state, and the goods delivered are not in the
same form in which they arrived at the Supply Center. The Court of
Appeals disagrees.

Judge Hurwitz opines that the Court of Appeals' recent opinion
addressing the residual clause, Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971
F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2020), is instructive. In Rittmann, the Court of
Appeals held that Amazon package delivery drivers were engaged in
"a continuous interstate transportation" of goods because they
picked up packages that had come across state lines to Amazon
warehouses and then transported them "for the last leg" to their
eventual destinations. Amazon coordinated the deliveries from
origin to destination, and the packages were not transformed at the
warehouses. The Court of Appeals emphasized that "Amazon's business
includes not just the selling of goods, but also the delivery of
those goods."

Like Amazon, Domino's is directly involved in the procurement and
delivery of interstate goods; the D&S drivers, like the Amazon
package delivery drivers, transport those goods "for the last leg"
to their final destinations, Judge Hurwitz notes. Like Amazon,
Domino's is involved in the process from beginning to the ultimate
delivery of the goods to their destinations and its "business
includes not just the selling of goods, but also the delivery of
those goods."

To be sure, there are some factual differences between this case
and Rittmann, Judge Hurwitz states. But this is a distinction
without a difference. The issue is not how the purchasing order is
placed, but rather whether the D&S drivers operate in a "single,
unbroken stream of interstate commerce" that renders interstate
commerce a "central part" of their job description. As with the
Amazon drivers, the transportation of interstate goods on the final
leg of their journey by the D&S drivers satisfies this requirement.
Although some of the goods delivered to the Supply Center are from
California suppliers, that does not change the outcome, Judge
Hurwitz points out.

Nor does the alleged "alteration" of the goods at the Supply Center
change the result, Judge Hurwitz holds. Although some of the goods
are transformed into pizza dough at the Supply Center, items, such
as mushrooms are simply reapportioned, weighed, packaged, and
stored before being delivered to franchisees by the D&S drivers.
This case is, thus, different than A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), upon which Domino's relies.

Schechter Poultry held that live poultry was no longer in the
stream of interstate commerce after being processed at
slaughterhouses and then sold locally to retail dealers and
butchers, who in turn sold directly to consumers. Here, Judge
Hurwitz holds, the relevant goods are not transformed into a
different form and were procured out-of-state by Domino's to be
sold to a Domino's franchisee, not to an unrelated third party.

Affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Dec. 23, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/47frs3mx from Leagle.com.

Norman M. Leon -- norman.leon@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP (US),
in Chicago, Illinois; Steve L. Hernandez --
steve.hernandez@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP (US), in Los Angeles,
California; Taylor Wemmer -- taylor.wemmer@dlapiper.com -- DLA
Piper (US) LLP, in San Diego, California, for the
Defendant-Appellant.

Aashish Y. Desai -- aashish@desai-law.com -- and Adrianne De Castro
-- adrianne@desai-law.com -- Desai Law Firm P.C., in Costa Mesa,
California, for the Plaintiff-Appellee.


E&R SERVICES: Santos Wins Bid to Certify Hourly-Paid Workers Class
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled OSCAR SANTOS, et al., Plaintiffs v. E&R
SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. DLB-20-2737 (D. Md.),
Judge Deborah L. Boardman of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland grants the Plaintiffs' motion for
court-approved notice and conditional certification.

Plaintiffs Oscar Santos, Otoniel Morales, and Isidro Flores filed
this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated
individuals against their former employers, E&R Services, Inc. and
Emilio Rodriguez (together, "E&R"), alleging violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 201, et seq. ("FLSA") and
related state laws based on the failure to pay overtime and minimum
wages. The Plaintiffs, former construction workers for E&R, a
residential and commercial construction company, assert the FLSA
claims as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b), and
they have moved for court-approved notice to potential plaintiffs
and conditional certification of the action.

The Plaintiffs also filed a motion for leave to amend the
complaint. The Defendants oppose both motions, which the parties
fully briefed. In addition, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend
the scheduling order and a request to compel the Defendants'
responses to their requests for time and payment records for four
opt-in plaintiffs. The Defendants opposed the request for
discovery. Finally, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for equitable
tolling, which is unopposed.

I. Factual Background

Between Fall 2016 and Summer 2020, Plaintiffs Santos, Morales, and
Flores worked for E&R in Prince George's County, Maryland. Emilio
Rodriguez is the chief executive officer and owner of the Company.
The three Plaintiffs performed different roles for E&R in its
commercial construction division.

The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants paid them and other
similarly situated employees by the hour. They claim E&R did not
pay its hourly employees for all hours worked or one-and-one-half
times the employees' hourly rates for all overtime hours worked.
The Plaintiffs allege, among other things, that the Defendants
required them and those similarly situated to work off the clock.

The Plaintiffs seek conditional certification of the collective
action on behalf of hourly-paid workers that performed construction
work for E&R in its commercial construction division for the
three-year period preceding the entry of this conditional
certification Order.

II. Motion for Conditional Certification

The FLSA generally requires that non-exempt employees receive at
least the federal minimum hourly wage and, for those who work more
than 40 hours in a week, overtime pay at the rate of
one-and-one-half times their regular pay rate. When assessing
whether an FLSA claim should proceed as a collective action, all
district courts in this circuit traditionally have employed a
two-stage process, Judge Boardman notes, citing Lancaster v. FQSR,
No. TDC-19-2632, 2020 WL 5500227, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 11, 2020), et
al.

In the first stage, usually initiated pre-discovery and often
referred to as the notice stage, the court makes a threshold
determination of whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that
potential plaintiffs are similarly situated, such that
court-facilitated notice to putative class members would be
appropriate. In the second stage, which typically follows the
conclusion of discovery and begins with a motion for
decertification, the court engages in a more stringent inquiry to
determine whether the plaintiff class is in fact "similarly
situated" in accordance with the requirements of Section 216, and
renders a final decision regarding the propriety of proceeding as a
collective action.

At this stage, the Court recognizes that "the record is sparse" and
applies a relatively lenient standard.

The Defendants ask the Court to break from 20 years of precedent
applying the two-stage certification process in FLSA cases and
instead follow the approach adopted earlier this year by the Fifth
Circuit in Swales v. KLLM Transp. Servs., L.L.C., 985 F.3d 430 (5th
Cir. 2021). In Swales, the Fifth Circuit rejected the two-stage
approach to collective action certification.

The Court declines the Defendants' invitation to depart from the
two-stage certification process stating that the Fifth Circuit
decision in Swales is not binding on this Court. Moreover, the
facts that gave rise to the Fifth Circuit's rejection of the
two-stage certification approach are quite different than the facts
here.

Therefore, the Court finds that following the two-stage
certification process here will promote the efficient adjudication
of claims and lower the costs of litigation for the Plaintiffs.

Judge Boardman also finds that the Plaintiffs have made a threshold
showing that the potential plaintiffs are "similarly situated"
employees.

The Court applies a "lenient standard" to the pleading requirements
for willfulness at this stage. The Plaintiffs sufficiently allege a
willful violation of the statute. Beyond the complaint, the
Plaintiffs offer evidence that the Defendants recorded when the
Plaintiffs arrived and departed the worksites and tallied their
hours in a way that shaved 15 to 60 minutes off the hours worked
each day. Judge Boardman adds that the Plaintiffs also offer
evidence that the Defendants paid them for fewer than the
already-reduced hours recorded on their time sheets.

The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs that the conditional
certification period should extend to the date of the conditional
certification order.

The Defendants challenge the contents of the notice to potential
plaintiffs. They contend the notice should inform potential
plaintiffs that they could be liable for the Defendants' costs in
defending the action and that they have the right to consult
independent counsel.

Judge Boardman notes that the Defendants have not identified any
other case in which a court approved a conditional certification
notice with the advisement that potential plaintiffs may be liable
for defendants' costs in defending the action. Nor do they explain
how notifying potential plaintiffs about the small possibility that
they might be liable for defendants' cost would advance the
purposes of court-approved notice. In fact, the requested language
likely would deter potential plaintiffs from joining the lawsuit,
which in turn would undermine, not advance, the purposes of a
collective action and court-ordered notice.

Hence, the Defendants' requests to revise the notice are denied.
The Court finds the proposed notice, as revised, is sufficient. The
Plaintiffs will revise the notice accordingly.

III. Motion to Amend

The Plaintiffs sought leave to amend the complaint to add five
opt-in plaintiffs as named plaintiffs, to augment and revise their
allegations based on discovery to date, and to add "a Rule 23 Class
Action pursuant to the Maryland Wage and Hour Law, Maryland Wage
Payment and Collection Law and Maryland Workplace Fraud Act[] that
relates back to the date of the filing of this lawsuit."

The Plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to amend the complaint
on Aug. 31, 2021, two days before the deadline for filing a motion
to amend and join new parties. Because the Plaintiffs' motion to
amend the complaint was filed before the deadline for filing a
motion to amend, the relaxed standard of Rule 15, not the good
cause standard of Rule 16, applies, Judge Boardman holds, citing
Nourison Rug Corp. v. Parvizian, 535 F.3d 295, 298 (4th Cir.
2008).

The Defendants argue that adding the opt-in plaintiffs as named
plaintiffs would be futile because the two-year statute of
limitations bars some of their claims. Because the Plaintiffs have
sufficiently alleged willfulness, they may allege statutory
violations within a three-year limitations period, Judge Boardman
holds. Therefore, this amendment is not futile.

The Defendants also contend that adding a Rule 23 class action
would be futile. They insist that the number of employees is too
small to satisfy the numerosity requirement of a class action and
that the commonality requirement cannot be met.

Judge Boardman finds that based on the Plaintiffs' allegations and
the Defendants' testimony, joinder would be impracticable and the
Plaintiffs would meet the numerosity requirement. Further, the
Defendants provide no support for their assertion that the
Plaintiffs cannot establish commonality. There likely is
commonality because the Plaintiffs have alleged a class of
construction workers in the Defendants' commercial construction
division, who performed manual labor and did not receive their
statutorily-required wages. Therefore, amendment to add a Rule 23
class action is not futile, Judge Boardman holds.

The Defendants also argue that adding the opt-in plaintiffs and a
Rule 23 class action would be prejudicial because discovery has
closed and the parties would need to brief the issue of class
certification. In addition, they argue that they are prejudiced by
the Plaintiffs' delay in bringing a Rule 23 class action.

The Plaintiffs filed their motion to amend two days before the
discovery deadline, Judge Boardman notes. Dispositive motions have
not been filed, trial has not been set, and a motion to amend the
scheduling order is pending. Further, the proposed additional named
plaintiffs opted in several months before the Sept. 2, 2021 fact
discovery deadline, allowing the Defendants ample time to pursue
discovery regarding their claims. Finally, any class action
complaint raises the issue of class certification; the need to
brief the issue is not a basis for barring such a claim, Judge
Boardman points out.

Accordingly, the Court will not deny leave to amend based on
prejudice to the Defendants. The Plaintiffs' motion for leave to
amend is granted.

IV. Other Pending Motions

Also pending are the Plaintiffs' motion to amend the scheduling
order and compel the Defendants' responses to their requests for
time and payment records for the opt-in plaintiffs. The Defendants
argued in correspondence to the Court and on a Sept. 14, 2021 call
with the Court that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to discovery
regarding the opt-in plaintiffs until after certification.

Now that the Court has granted the Plaintiffs' motion for notice to
potential plaintiffs and conditional certification, the Defendants'
argument in opposition is moot. The Plaintiffs' request to compel
discovery is granted. The Plaintiffs' motions to amend the
scheduling order is granted, as well. The parties will meet and
confer and propose an amended scheduling order by Jan. 17, 2022.

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to toll the statute of limitations
from the June 4, 2021 filing of their motion for notice and
conditional certification until the date notice issues. The
Defendants do not oppose this motion.

Judge Boardman finds that the six-month delay between the filing of
the motion for notice and conditional certification and this
decision granting the motion was outside the potential plaintiffs'
control. Therefore, the motion for equitable tolling is granted in
part. The statute of limitations for any opt-in plaintiffs is
tolled from June 4, 2021, through the date of the conditional
certification order.

V. Conclusion

The Plaintiffs' motion for notice to potential plaintiffs and
conditional certification is granted. The Plaintiffs' unopposed
motion for equitable tolling is granted in part. The statute of
limitations is tolled from June 4, 2021, through the date of the
conditional certification order.

The Court conditionally certifies an FLSA collective action of all
hourly-paid workers, who performed construction work for E&R
Services, Inc.'s commercial construction division between Dec. 23,
2018, and the date of this memorandum opinion and accompanying
order. Additionally, the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an
amended complaint is granted, and the amended complaint is accepted
as filed.

The Plaintiffs' request to compel discovery is granted. The
Defendants will produce the requested time and payment records for
the opt-in plaintiffs by Jan. 14, 2022. The Plaintiffs' motion to
amend the scheduling order is granted. The parties will submit a
proposed amended scheduling order for the remainder of discovery by
Jan. 17, 2022.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated Dec. 23,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4nvsdswz from
Leagle.com.


EMERGENT BIOSOLUTIONS: Palm Tran, Roth & Weiss Suits Consolidated
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Southern
Division, consolidated these three securities cases: PALM TRAN,
INC. - AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION LOCAL 1577 PENSION PLAN,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff v. EMERGENT BIOSOLUTIONS INC., et al., Defendants. ALAN
I. ROTH, Plaintiff v. EMERGENT BIOSOLUTIONS INC., et al.,
Defendants. STEPHEN M. WEISS, Plaintiff v. EMERGENT BIOSOLUTIONS
INC., et al., Defendants, Case Nos. PWG-21-955, PWG-21-1189,
PWG-21-1368 (D. Md.).

The three federal securities class action lawsuits are brought
against Emergent BioSolutions Inc. ("Emergent") and Individual
Defendants--Robert G. Kramer, Sr., Richard S. Lindahl, and Syed T.
Husain--for violations of Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. The Complaints in the
three actions allege that Emergent and certain of its officers
defrauded investors in violation of the Exchange Act, and the
disclosure of the alleged fraud caused the prices of Emergent
securities to fall sharply, resulting in the Plaintiffs' losses.

Factual Background

Emergent is a Maryland-based biopharmaceutical company that
provides products and solutions to address public health threats,
including manufacturing services for vaccines and antibody
therapeutics.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States government funded
Operation Warp Speed to encourage rapid development, manufacturing,
and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, and Emergent was awarded
approximately $628 million to reserve manufacturing space and
upgrade its facilities at its Baltimore site. Emergent also signed
agreements with Johnson & Johnson ("J&J") and AstraZeneca worth a
combined $875 million to provide large-scale manufacturing
facilities to support the rapid supply of their vaccine doses to
the public once they had been developed and approved. Upon the
announcements of these deals, Emergent's stock soared to new
levels, peaking at over $134 per share on Aug. 13, 2020. Emergent
touted its manufacturing expertise and its emphasis on quality
control.

However, the Plaintiffs allege that Emergent failed to disclose
myriad issues at its Baltimore facility that would detrimentally
affect its ability to manufacture the vaccine. An FDA inspection
revealed a host of problems. On March 31, 2021, a media report
revealed that Emergent employees had "mixed up" ingredients
resulting in the contamination of up to 15 million doses of the J&J
vaccine. It also was reported that millions of AstraZeneca vaccine
doses had to be discarded due to spoilage by contamination. Reports
also revealed that these were not isolated incidents, but part of a
history of issues at the Baltimore plant. In response, the
government placed J&J in charge of the plant, prohibited it from
producing the AstraZeneca vaccine, and as of April 2021, no doses
of COVID-19 vaccines produced were released by the FDA for
distribution.

Unsurprisingly, as a result of this news, Emergent's stock price
fell from a close of $92.91 per share on March 31, 2021, to close
at $78.62 on April 5, 2021. These lawsuits followed, alleging that
Emergent and various executives had made false or misleading
statements with material omissions.

Procedural Background

On April 19, 2021, Palm Tran, Inc. - Amalgamated Transit Union
Local 1577 Pension Plan, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, filed suit against Emergent, its President and
CEO, Robert Kramer Sr., its CFO, Richard Lindahl, and its Senior
Vice President and Head of the Company's CDMO business unit, Syed
Husain, Case No. PWG-21-955. On May 14, 2021, Alan Roth, a Kentucky
investor, filed a putative class action suit against the same
Defendants, Case No. PWG-21-1189. And on June 2, 2021, an Emergent
stockholder from Florida, Stephen Weiss, filed a putative class
action suit against the same Defendants, Case No. PWG-21-1368.

On June 18, 2021, Grand Slam Asset Management, LLC, moved to
consolidate the three related actions, and proposed that it be the
lead plaintiff. On the same day, Mr. Weiss also moved to
consolidate the three cases, and proposed himself as lead
plaintiff. Three more motions were filed on June 21, 2021,
requesting consolidation and appointment of a lead plaintiff. The
movants and proposed lead plaintiffs were Lawrence Edlund, the
group of Nova Scotia Health Employees' Pension Plan and the City of
Fort Lauderdale Police & Firefighters' Retirements System ("NS-FL
Group") and the group Western Pennsylvania Funds, comprised of
Western Pennsylvania Electrical Employees Insurance Trust Fund and
Western Pennsylvania Electrical Employees Pension Fund.

Following the filing of the NS-FL Group's and Western Pennsylvania
Funds' motions, Mr. Weiss withdrew his motion, and Grand Slam Asset
Management and Mr. Edlund both filed notices of non-opposition to
the competing motions. The two remaining competing movants for lead
plaintiff—NS-FL Group and Western Pennsylvania Funds--responded
to each other's motions and they are now fully briefed and ready
for review.

Discussion

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the "PSLRA") dictates
the procedures a court must follow in resolving these motions.
Under the statute, the court's first task is to address any motions
for consolidation. After that, the court may appoint a lead
plaintiff (an action the statute directs the court to take as soon
as practicable) and approve the selection of counsel.

I. Consolidation

The principles governing the consolidation of securities fraud
suits are found not in the PSLRA, but in Rule 42 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, citing In re MicroStrategy Inc. Secs.
Litig., 110 F.Supp.2d 427, 431 (E.D. Va. 2000). The PSLRA also
contemplates consolidation where more than one action on behalf of
a class asserting substantially the same claim or claims arising
under this chapter has been filed.

Five separate motions were filed seeking consolidation of the three
cases, and there have been no filed responses in opposition to
consolidation. The three actions assert claims against the same
Defendants and involve common questions of both law and fact.

District Judge Paul W. Grimm notes that the consolidation of these
cases will avoid unnecessary delay in administering and litigating
the same issues, and promote judicial economy to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of each action. It will also
eliminate the unavoidable additional cost and delay that proceeding
with multiple lawsuits involving such clearly related factual and
legal issues would impose on the parties. While there are some
minor differences in class periods, such differences do not defeat
consolidation, especially where, as here, the securities fraud
actions are based on the same public statements and reports.

Additionally, since no putative class members have raised concerns
that consolidation might prejudice them, Judge Grimm finds no
reason to keep the suits separate. Therefore, Judge Grimm
consolidates the three actions.

II. Appointment of Lead Plaintiff

The PSLRA instructs the district court to appoint as lead plaintiff
the member or members of the purported plaintiff class that the
court determines to be most capable of adequately representing the
interests of class members.

Here, two movants remain in contention for lead plaintiff: the
Western Pennsylvania Funds and the NS-FL Group. Both filed motions
in response to the PSLRA notice. What remains to be determined is
which of the two has the largest financial interest in the relief
sought by the class, and whether that person or group otherwise
satisfies the Rule 23 requirements.

At this stage of proceedings, courts generally adopt the longest
and most inclusive of the possible class periods for the purposes
of assessing financial interest and appointing a lead plaintiff.
Accordingly, Judge Grimm will use the class period defined in the
Roth and Weiss cases, i.e., April 24, 2020, through April 16,
2021.

The Western Pennsylvania Funds--Western Pennsylvania Electrical
Employees Insurance Trust Fund and Western Pennsylvania Electrical
Employees Pension Fund--assert that although they are two legally
distinct entities, they are essentially one person for purposes of
the Reform Act (citing Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F.Supp.2d
1146, 1157 n.11 (N.D. Cal. 1999)). They submitted a single
Certification executed by a single individual, certifying that they
suffered $237,384 in losses, which they assert represents the
largest financial interest. The Western Pennsylvania Funds argue
that the competing NS-FL Group is an artificial group and should be
disqualified from appointment because they had no pre-existing
relationship, are based in two different countries, and combine for
the sole purpose of aggregating their claims.

Post-briefing, the Western Pennsylvania Funds also brought a recent
case to the Court's attention that they argue supports their motion
because the court in that case declined to appoint as lead
plaintiff a group of smaller institutional investors who sought to
aggregate their financial interests so as to claim the largest
financial interest, and instead appointed the institutional
investor with the single largest loss (citing Koffsmon v. Green Dot
Corp., Case No. CV 19-10701 DDP (Ex), 2021 WL 3473975, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 6, 2021)).

The NS-FL Group--Nova Scotia Health Employees' Pension Plan and the
City of Fort Lauderdale Police & Firefighters' Retirement
System--argue that they are sophisticated institutional investors
that have formed a cohesive partnership that is typical of groups
routinely appointed to lead PSLRA actions, and they assert that
their collective incurred losses were $285,632, which is greater
(but not by much) than the Western Pennsylvania Funds' losses. The
NS-FL Group asserts that they also have the largest number of
retained shares--17,137 compared to Western Pennsylvania Funds'
5,330. They further argue that both groups are comprised of
distinct legal entities, and if no groups are recognized, Nova
Scotia Health Employees' Pension Plan, individually, has the
greatest financial interest with losses of $190,726.

Accordingly, Judge Grimm finds that the NS-FL Group has the largest
financial interest, and now proceed to review whether it has stated
a prima facie case of typicality and adequacy as required by Rule
23(a). In assessing the NS-FL Group's entitlement to the
presumption, Judge Grimm limits the review to the pleadings that
have been filed, the movant's application, and any other
information that the court requires to be submitted.

There does not appear to be any question that the NS-FL Group's
claims are typical of the class's claims, Judge Grimm notes. The
sole question, then, is whether the NS-FL Group will fairly and
adequately protect the class's interests.

Certainly, Judge Grimm says, NS-FL Group has the same incentive as
any other putative class member does to vigorously represent the
class's claims. There is no conflict between the group's claims and
those asserted on behalf of the class. The two members of the NS-FL
Group submitted a joint declaration attesting to their discussions
with one another and with counsel regarding their joint motion,
their understanding of their responsibilities, and their readiness
to take on those responsibilities.

Because NS-FL Group is a group of unrelated investors, Judge Grimm
must consider whether it will be able to function cohesively to
monitor counsel and make critical litigation decisions. Here, each
of the two members of the group is a sophisticated institutional
investor that had a pre-litigation relationship with their counsel
even if not with each other.

Judge Grimm adds, among other things, that not having a
pre-litigation relationship does not disqualify a group, and the
parties here represent that they chose to work together based on
their mutual shared interests in maximizing the Class's recovery.

Accordingly, Judge Grimm concludes that NS-FL Group has made the
necessary prima facie showing of typicality and adequacy and is
entitled to the presumption that it is the most adequate
plaintiff.

Under the PSLRA, the presumption that a movant is the most adequate
plaintiff may be rebutted only upon proof by a member of the
purported class that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff (aa)
will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class;
or (bb) is subject to unique defenses that render such plaintiff
incapable of adequately representing the class.

Judge Grimm finds that the Western Pennsylvania Funds have not met
the burden of proof on this point. Its primary argument--that the
two members of NS-FL Group are unrelated--has already been dealt
with above in the discussion on adequacy. Judge Grimm notes that
both competing candidates appear well qualified to serve as lead
plaintiff. But the record before the Court contains no proof that
the NS-FL Group, as presumptive lead plaintiff, will not protect
the class's interests or that it is subject to unique defenses that
would make it incapable of providing adequate representation.
Therefore, Judge Grimm will grant NS-FL Group's motion to serve as
lead plaintiff.

III. Selection of Lead Counsel

The PSLRA entitles the "most adequate plaintiff" to select and
retain class counsel subject to the approval of the court.

The NS-FL Group has selected Pomerantz LLP as Lead Counsel and
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC as Liaison Counsel for the
putative class. Both firms are experienced in securities litigation
and class actions.

Accordingly, Judge Grimm is satisfied that selected counsel well
suits the needs of the class, and NS-FL Group's choice of Pomerantz
as Lead Counsel and Cohen Milstein as Liaison Counsel is approved.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court rules as follows:

   1. Motion of the Nova Scotia Health Employees' Pension Plan
      and the City of Fort Lauderdale Police & Firefighters'
      Retirement System for Consolidation, Appointment as Lead
      Plaintiffs and Approval of Counsel is granted;

   2. Motion for Consolidation of Related Actions, Appointment as
      Lead Plaintiff, and Approval of Selection of Counsel is
      granted in part and denied in part; the Motion is granted
      with respect to consolidation of related actions but denied
      with respect to appointment as lead plaintiff and approval
      of selection of counsel;

   3. Motion of Grand Slam Asset Management, LLC for (1)
      Consolidation of the Related actions; (2) Appointment as
      Lead Plaintiff and (3) Approval of Selection of Counsel
      is granted in part and denied as moot in part; the Motion
      is granted with respect to consolidation of related
      actions, but denied as moot with respect to appointment as
      lead plaintiff and approval of selection of counsel based
      on its Notice of Non-opposition to competing motions;

   4. Motion of Plaintiff Stephen M. Weiss for Appointment as
      Lead Plaintiff and Approval of his Selection of Lead and
      Liaison Counsel is denied as moot based on his withdrawal
      of the motion;

   5. Motion of Lawrence Edlund to: (1) Consolidate Related
      Actions; (2) Appoint Lead Plaintiff; and (3) Approve Lead
      Plaintiff's Selection of Counsel is granted in part and
      denied as moot in part; the Motion is granted with respect
      to consolidation of related actions, but denied as moot
      with respect to appointment as lead plaintiff and approval
      of selection of counsel based on his Notice of
      Non-opposition to competing motions;

   6. The group of Nova Scotia Health Employees' Pension Plan and
      the City of Fort Lauderdale Police & Firefighters'
      Retirement System (NS-FL Group) is appointed as Lead
      Plaintiff for the putative class;

   7. Pomerantz LLP is appointed as Lead Counsel for the putative
      class;

   8. Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC is appointed as Liaison
      Counsel for the putative class; and

   9. A separate order will follow.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated Dec. 23,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/44hnxxxe from
Leagle.com.


ESSENTIA HEALTH: W.D. Wisconsin Narrows Claims in Hills Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MARY HILLS, individually and on behalf of a
class of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ESSENTIA HEALTH,
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff v. CIOX HEALTH, LLC, Third-Party
Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-907-wmc (W.D. Wis.), the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin denied in part and
granted in part Essential Health's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's complaint.

Following complaints of price gouging, the Wisconsin Legislature
placed caps on certain fees that a health care provider may charge
for providing copies of a patient's health care records. At issue
in this case in particular, Wisconsin law prohibits a health care
provider from charging a "retrieval" or "certification" fee should
patients (or persons authorized by a patient) request their medical
records, although a provider may still charge for other fees
expressly enumerated by the statute, including shipping costs or a
copy charge per page.

Despite this prohibition, Plaintiff Mary Hills claims that: (1) she
authorized her attorney to request a copy of her medical records
from Defendant Essentia Health's Spooner, Wisconsin, clinic; and
(2) she was unlawfully charged a $15.95 retrieval fee for copies of
her records. Hills also seeks to represent a class of similarly
situated individuals, who were also allegedly charged unlawful fees
by Essentia under Wisconsin law.

Essentia in turn filed a third-party complaint against Ciox Health,
LLC, on the grounds that Ciox may be responsible for some of the
fees allegedly unlawfully charged to putative class members.

Pending before the Court are Essentia's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be given, and Ciox's motion to dismiss the third-party
complaint filed against it. The Plaintiff has also moved to certify
a Rule 23 class.

Allegations of Fact

A. Plaintiff's Operative Complaint

A Minnesota corporation with its principal place of business in
Duluth, Defendant Essentia is described as "an integrated health
system serving patients in Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, and
Idaho." Among other facilities, the Plaintiff alleges that Essentia
owns and operates the Essentia Health-Spooner Clinic in Spooner,
Wisconsin, an arrangement of facilities, equipment, services and
personnel capable of providing or assuring health care services,
including appropriate referral, treatment and follow-up services.

Domiciled in Wisconsin, Plaintiff Hills was injured in an accident
and treated at Spooner Clinic. After her accident and treatment,
she retained Herrick & Hart, S.C., to process her personal injury
claim, and subsequently authorized in writing the release of
medical information to her attorneys. Pursuant to this authority,
Hills' attorneys sought her certified health records in March of
2014. According to the Plaintiff, all requests were addressed to
Essentia at its address in Spooner; no requests were ever directed
to Essentia at any address in Minnesota.

In responding to the request, Essentia charged a $15.95 "chart
retrieval fee," which Hills' attorneys paid in order to obtain the
records necessary to pursue her legal claim. The Plaintiff alleges
that Essentia knew that under Wisconsin Statute Section 146.83 it
was illegal to charge this retrieval fee, yet still knowingly and
willfully charged the fee.

In the alternative, the Plaintiff alleges that Essentia negligently
charged the fee. The Plaintiff originally filed this lawsuit in the
Circuit Court for Washburn County, Wisconsin, on Sept. 18, 2019, on
behalf of herself and a putative class, alleging that Essentia's
charge of the $15.95 chart retrieval fee was unlawful under
Wisconsin law. In addition to bringing a statutory claim for which
she seeks actual and exemplary damages up to $25,000 under Section
146.83, Hills also asserts two equitable claims for unjust
enrichment and conversion.

The Plaintiff's proposed class is defined in relevant part as:

   All persons in Wisconsin:

     (i) who were a patient of any ESSENTIA healthcare provider
         in Wisconsin and requested their own health care records
         or authorized another person in writing to obtain the
         patient's health care records from ESSENTIA; and

    (ii) were charged a request, basic, retrieval, certification
         or other fee by ESSENTIA, directly or indirectly, in
         violation of Wis. Stat. Section 146.83(3f)(b)(4) - (5);

   (iii) during the 6 year period preceding the commencement of
         this action through the date of trial.

Subsequently, the Plaintiff agreed that this class would have to
exclude "anyone who has recovered the fee at issue as a member of
any class in Moya v. Healthport."

On Nov. 11, 2019, Essentia removed this lawsuit to federal court
under 28 U.S.C. Sections 1332 and 1441 as a putative class action
with (a) proposed class members numbering at least 100, (b) a
member of the class being a citizen of a different state than the
defendant, and (c) the total amount in controversary of the
aggregated class members' claims exceeding $5 million dollars,
exclusive of interests and costs.

B. Third-Party Complaint

Defendant Essentia's subsequent, third-party complaint names Ciox
as a third-party defendant. Essentia alleges that it contracted
with Ciox to process many of the health care records requests at
issue in this case. The Defendant further alleges that: (1)
Essentia gave Ciox the right to retain any fees billed to
requesters; and (2) Ciox agreed to bill requesters in compliance
with state and federal law.

Based on these allegations, to the extent that Essentia may be held
liable for any unlawful fees charged by Ciox, it asserts claims for
breach of contract, implied indemnity, equitable indemnity, and
contribution against Ciox. Even so, the specific $15.95 charge at
issue in Hills' original, individual claim and apparently some
other putative class members were not charged by Ciox or any of its
predecessors in interest.

Opinion

I. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint

As previously explained, the Plaintiff's claim is premised on
Wisconsin Statute Section 146.83(3f), which specifies the types of
fees that a health care provider can charge when a person requests
copies of their medical records.

The Court agrees that the complaint has not adequately alleged that
Essentia itself is a "health care provider" within the meaning of
Wisconsin Statute Section 146.81(1). The Plaintiff alleges only
that Essentia is a Minnesota non-profit corporation comprised of a
"network" of clinics and hospitals. Thus, she fails to allege that
Essentia is a hospital or other covered entity, much less that it
has been licensed or approved by the Wisconsin Department of Health
Services to operate as such under Wisconsin law.

District Judge William M. Conley finds that the Plaintiff neither
alleges that Essentia is licensed by the Wisconsin Department of
Health Services, nor does she allege that it is capable of
providing or assuring health care services.

As for the Plaintiff's alternative argument that Essentia's
ownership of Wisconsin health care providers, including the Spooner
Clinic and any other Wisconsin licensed health care facility, makes
it a health care provider under Wis. Stat. Section 146.81(1),
nothing in the statute or Wisconsin law suggests that an owner of a
health care provider is itself a health care provider, Judge Conley
holds. To the contrary, the legal distinction between two
corporations is not one to be lightly disregarded in Wisconsin as
well as in most other jurisdictions, Judge Conley holds, citing
Consumer's Co-op. of Walworth v. Olson, 142 Wis.2d 465, 474
(1988).

Judge Conley holds that, among other things, Essentia is not a
"health care provider" under Wisconsin law simply because it
allegedly owns an entity that falls under that definition.

Thus, while the Court will permit the Plaintiff to proceed on her
statutory claim under Wisconsin Statute Section 146.83, her claims
for unjust enrichment and conversion must be dismissed.

II. Rule 23 Motion

The Court next turns to the Plaintiff's motion to certify a class
of those similarly situated to assert a claim under Section
146.83.

The Plaintiff specifically seeks to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class.
To do so, she must initially meet the four threshold requirements
of Rule 23(a) -- numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequacy
of representation -- then the requirements of predominance and
superiority under Rule 23(b)(3).

The Defendant does not challenge that the numerosity requirement is
satisfied; instead, it focuses on commonality and related
requirements. Whatever the exact numbers at stake, therefore, the
Court agrees that joinder of all members is impracticable.

The Plaintiff contends that this case presents a number of common
questions, beginning with whether or not the Defendant charged
illegal fees when Wisconsin citizens requested copies of their
medical records. In response, the Defendant contends that there are
no common questions except for its "fail safe," self-defining
clause purporting to include all persons in Wisconsin who "were
charged a request, basic, retrieval, certification or other fee by
Essentia directly or indirectly, in violation of Wis. Stat. Section
146.83(3f)(b)(4)-(5).

As currently proposed, therefore, the Court agrees that the class
definition is improper.

Individually, the Defendant suggests that the Plaintiff is not
typical because she was charged directly by Essentia rather than a
third-party agent like Ciox or its predecessor IOD Incorporated.
Assuming the Plaintiff can address her commonality/preponderance
problem, this argument is meritless, Judge Conley holds. First, as
the Defendant acknowledges, the Plaintiff's class definition
excludes these Essentia patients, who were part of past class
actions concerning Ciox's overcharges.

Second, if anything, narrowing the class to those meeting Hills'
claim parameters would appear to solve both commonality and
typicality problems. Third, as the Defendant acknowledges, even if
Hills' claim were only typical of some members of the class, this
might still be addressed by creation of subclasses.

Finally, plaintiffs must show that they will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class, Judge Conley notes. In its
opposition brief, the Defendant does not even purport to challenge
the adequacy of Hills as a proposed class representative, except to
the extent it argues she is not typical of the currently proposed
class. Further, the Defendant offers no challenge to the
Plaintiffs' evidence of the adequacy of their proposed class
counsel, and the Court finds no basis to question class counsel's
ability to manage a class action of this kind.

While the Court will postpone any discussion of the superiority of
a class action pending the Plaintiff's proposal of a new class
definition, if any, additional comments as to the predominance
question are warranted since this was the focus of the Defendant's
objection to class certification and the Plaintiff's failure to
meet it is an even more glaring deficiency in the Plaintiff's
current proposed class than the requirement of commonality.

Judge Conley also finds that some of proposed class members' claims
may be governed by Minnesota law, while others may be governed by
Wisconsin law, and ascertaining which law applies will necessitate
individualized inquiries. Accordingly, just as with commonality,
the predominance prong has not been met, and the Court must deny
certification of the Plaintiff's currently proposed class.

III. Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint

Finally, the court must briefly address third-party Defendant
Ciox's motion to dismiss the complaint against it. There is no
dispute that the charge at issue in Hills' individual claim was not
charged by Ciox or its predecessors in interest. Plus, as the Court
understands it, the Plaintiff appears to concede exclusion of any
overcharges of Ciox or IOD on Essentia's behalf.

Thus, unless the Plaintiff promptly proposes a revised class
definition not fraught with the same commonality and predominance
issues identified above and somehow retaining at least some claim
against Essentia for Ciox's alleged overcharges on its behalf,
there would appear no plausible third-party claim against Ciox in
this case.

IV. Order

The Court ordered that:

   1) Plaintiff Mary Hill's motions to supplement are granted;

   2) Defendant Essential Health's motion to dismiss is denied in
      part and granted in part. The Plaintiff will be permitted
      to proceed on her Wis. Stat. Section 146.83 claim, but her
      unjust enrichment and conversion claims are dismissed;

   3) The Plaintiff's motion to certify a class under Federal
      Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is denied, although she may have
      until Jan. 31, 2022, to amend its motion for class
      certification consistent with this opinion and the
      Defendants may have until Feb. 22, 2022, to respond; and

   4) Unless the Plaintiff timely moves to amend her class
      definition consistent with this opinion, third-party
      Defendant's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint
      will be granted. Otherwise, the Court will deny that motion
      without prejudice to renewal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Dec. 23,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p9a2c6j from
Leagle.com.


EUFAULA, AL: Willson Sues Over Unpaid Overtime for K-9 Officers
---------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN WILLSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CITY OF EUFAULA, Defendant, Case No.
2:21-cv-00817-SMD (M.D. Ala., December 13, 2021) is a class action
against the Defendant for its failure to compensate the Plaintiff
and similarly situated K-9 officers overtime pay for all hours
worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

Mr. Willson has worked for the Defendant as a K-9 unit sergeant
from May 2019 until the present.

City of Eufaula is a municipality in Alabama. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:          
         
         Courtney Lowery, Esq.
         SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
         Kirkpatrick Plaza
         10800 Financial Centre Pkwy., Suite 510
         Little Rock, AR 72211
         Telephone: (501) 221-0088
         Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
         E-mail: courtney@sanfordlawfirm.com

FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Seeks to Extend Class Cert. Bid Response
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as AMBER KASTERN, on behalf
of herself and others similarly situated, v. FINANCIAL RECOVERY
SERVICES, INC., Case No. 3:21-cv-00273-jdp-slc (W.D. Wisc.), the
Defendant asks the Court to enter an order granting the extension
of time to respond to plaintiff's motion for class certification.

As per the Court's Scheduling Order, the Defendant's opposition to
Plaintiff's motion for class certification is due January 7, 2022
and Plaintiff's reply is due January 21, 2022.

Counsel for Plaintiff does not oppose the requested extension and
joins in the request. This is the first request for an extension of
time to Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

Financial Recovery provides debt collection services.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Dec. 23, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3qKyJnM  at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Michael S. Poncin, Esq.
          MOSS & BARNETT, PA
          150 South Fifth Street, Suite 1200
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 877-5290
          Facsimile: (612) 877-5056
          E-mail: Mike.Poncin@lawmoss.com

FLORIDA: Class Settlement in Gayle v. Meade Wins Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PATRICK GAYLE, et al., Petitioners v. MICHAEL W.
MEADE, et. al., Respondents, Case No. 20-21553-Civ-COOKE/GOODMAN
(S.D. Fla.), Judge Marcia G. Cooke of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Florida granted the Joint Motion for
Approval of the Settlement Agreement.

The matter is before the Court upon Magistrate Judge Jonathan
Goodman's Report and Recommendation on the proposed settlement of
the class action lawsuit involving claims arising from the
Plaintiffs' allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement in
three Florida immigration detention facilities during the
still-ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, which Judge Goodman issued on Dec.
3, 2021. In his Report, Judge Goodman recommends that Judge Cooke
grants final approval of the Settlement Agreement, retains
jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement, and enters final
orders and judgments in accordance with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.

The Parties were permitted to file objections to Judge Goodman's
Report within five days from the date of being served with a copy
of Judge Goodman's Report. No such objections were filed. Judge
Cooke, however, notes nine Motions styled as Emergency Motions for
Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction
for Proposed Class were filed by detainees at the three Florida
Immigration detention facilities. These Emergency Motions appear to
be exact word for word replicas of each other. Judge Cooke
construed the Emergency Motions as objections and recognizes, as
does Judge Goodman's Report, that the Emergency Motions are not
actually objections, but rather, complaints about some specific
current conditions, which the Settlement Agreement addresses.
Moreover, whatever the merits of those complaints, rejecting the
Settlement Agreement and forcing the parties to take the case to
trial would not alleviate them.

Furthermore, Judge Cooke finds Judge Goodman's Report to be clear,
cogent, and compelling. Accordingly, she affirmed and adopted Judge
Goodman's Report as the Order of the Court. The Joint Motion for
Approval of the Settlement Agreement is granted. By separate order,
Judge Cooke will enter a final order of dismissal through which she
will retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2p8rdvcv from Leagle.com.


FORD MOTOR: Bid to Exclude Rebuttal Reports in Simmons Suit Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CLARENCE SIMMONS, et al., Plaintiffs v. FORD MOTOR
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 18-CV-81558-RAR (S.D. Fla.), Judge
Rodolfo A. Ruiz, II, of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida granted the Defendant's Motion to Exclude
Plaintiffs' Rebuttal Experts and Rebuttal Reports of Previously
Disclosed Experts.

Background

On Nov. 14, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed their Class Action Complaint
alleging that "Ford Mustang-, Ford Expedition-, and Ford
Explorer-branded vehicles, model years 2013-2018, with aluminum
hoods were delivered to consumers by Ford with an identical and
inherent defect in the Class Vehicles' design and/or manufacturing
process. The defect causes the Class Vehicles' aluminum panels to
corrode and the exterior paint on the aluminum body parts to
bubble, flake, peel, rust and/or blister (the 'Corrosion
Defect')."

The Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class Certification on Feb.
11, 2021. They included expert reports from Anderson (design);
Stockton (damages for the alleged design defect); and Kleckner
(warranty evaluation). On April 22, 2021, Ford submitted its
response and included reports from its experts -- Taylor, Befurt,
Harless, O'Guinn, and Simonson.

The Plaintiffs served their reply in support of class certification
and rebuttal expert reports on June 16, 2021. They reply in support
of class certification was timely. However, none of the Court's
four scheduling orders, which were adopted versions of the parties'
own proposed orders, provided for the Plaintiffs' rebuttal experts.
Further, the Plaintiffs, in their multiple requests to modify the
deadlines related to the briefing schedule for their Motion for
Class Certification, did not mention their intent to file rebuttal
expert reports or request the ability to do so.

Analysis

The cause comes before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to
Exclude Plaintiffs' Rebuttal Experts and Rebuttal Reports of
Previously Disclosed Experts. The Defendant alleges that the
Plaintiffs' rebuttal expert reports are untimely under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(D)(ii). The Plaintiffs counter that
said Rule does not apply to class certification experts, only
experts to be used at trial.

Although the Eleventh Circuit does not appear to have definitively
addressed the applicability of the Rule to expert reports submitted
in support of class certification, the language of Rule
26(a)(2)(D)(ii) -- coupled with the practical implications of
failing to abide by the Rule outside of the trial context --
mandate its application in the instant case.

Judge Ruiz explains that the time limit imposed by the Rule --
which requires that a rebuttal expert report be disclosed within 30
days after the opposing party's disclosure -- applies to expert
reports in support of class certification. And in the case, it is
undisputed that the Plaintiffs' rebuttal expert reports were filed
outside of this time limitation, to wit, on June 16, 2021 -- 55
days after the Defendant's disclosure. Moreover, even if the Rule
were found to be inapplicable, the simple fact remains that the
Court's scheduling order did not permit a rebuttal to the
Defendant's rebuttal experts, rendering the Plaintiffs' additional
expert reports akin to an unauthorized sur-reply.

In sum, the Plaintiffs' rebuttal export reports submitted with
their reply in support of class certification must be stricken
under Rule 37(c)(1).

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Judge Ruiz granted the Defendant's Motion
to Exclude Plaintiffs' Rebuttal Experts and Rebuttal Reports of
Previously Disclosed Experts. The Plaintiffs' Expert Reports and
Rebuttal Report of Previously Disclosed Experts will not be
considered for purposes of adjudicating the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4hj4jf68 from Leagle.com.


FORD MOTOR: Court Denies Bid to Exclude Simmons' Experts' Opinions
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CLARENCE SIMMONS, et al., Plaintiffs v. FORD MOTOR
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 18-CV-81558-RAR (S.D. Fla.), Judge
Rodolfo A. Ruiz, II, of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida denied the Defendant's Omnibus Motion to
Exclude Plaintiffs' Experts' Opinions.

I. Background

The lawsuit is a Class Action suit brought by the Plaintiffs on
behalf of themselves and similarly situated members of a purported
Nationwide Class and multiple State Classes against Ford Motor
Company alleging design defects of Ford Mustang-, Expedition-, and
Explorer-branded vehicles. In the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class
Action Complaint, the alleged defect causes "the Class Vehicles'
aluminum panels to corrode and the exterior paint on the aluminum
body parts to bubble, flake, peel, rust and/or blister."

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification is presently before
the Court. In support of their Motion for Class Certification, the
Plaintiffs offer three expert witnesses: Erik Anderson (design
defect), Edward Stockton (damages), and Kirk Kleckner (warranty
valuation).

The Defendant filed the instant Motion requesting that the Court
strikes all three of the Plaintiffs' class certification experts
pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 410, 402, and 702, as well as
the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

II. Analysis

The Defendant's Motion impermissibly tows the line between a
challenge to class certification, a challenge to the overall merits
of the Plaintiffs' case, and a challenge to the reliability and
helpfulness of their experts -- despite being stylized as solely
the latter. The Defendant appears to conflate the requirements of
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013) with the standards the
Supreme Court laid out for evaluating the admissibility of expert
testimony in Daubert.

In Comcast, the Supreme Court held that a "district court may not
certify a class without establishing with admissible evidence that
damages can be measured on a class wide basis and are consistent
with a plaintiff's liability case." However, the inability of a
single expert to satisfy class certification requirements through
their testimony alone is not an appropriate indicum of the
admissibility of the expert's testimony under Daubert. In
challenging the Plaintiffs' experts, the Defendant cites several
cases that relate solely to the standards for class certification
as opposed to the standards that establish the admissibility of
expert testimony.

Judge Ruiz addresses whether the three challenged experts'
testimony is admissible under Daubert, not if their testimony is
sufficient to establish class certification or whether the
Plaintiffs could succeed on the merits through the testimony of
these experts alone.

A. Erik Anderson

The Defendant's Motion seeks to exclude the opinions of Erik
Anderson. Anderson is a proposed mechanical engineering and vehicle
design expert who has opined on the alleged design defects of the
Class Vehicles -- which the Plaintiffs maintain results in
increased susceptibility to early-onset filiform corrosion
initiating at the trim end of the outer panel of the hood of said
vehicles.

Mr. Anderson has a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering
from the University of Michigan and spent 16 years working for
Nissan and then Honda. At both Nissan and Honda, he was responsible
for designing hoods and other body parts to minimize the potential
for corrosion. However, the Defendant does not challenge Anderson's
qualifications. Instead, the Defendant claims Anderson's opinions
are unreliable and unhelpful because "(1) errors on critical issues
pervade his report, (2) he ignores all aspects of the design of
Class Vehicles except one, (3) he never tested his opinions in any
appropriate way, and (4) his opinions are not relevant because he
has no idea how Class Vehicles perform relative to other vehicles
class members might have purchased."

Although the Defendant seems to confuse reliability and helpfulness
throughout its Motion, the first three criticisms constitute an
attack on Anderson's reliability while the fourth goes to
helpfulness. However, Judge Ruiz finds that Anderson's opinions
meet the standards for both reliability and helpfulness under
Daubert. Thus, the Anderson Report warrants consideration at the
class certification stage.

B. Edward Stockton

The Defendant's Motion similarly seeks to exclude the expert
opinions of Edward Stockton. Stockton is a proposed damages expert
who has opined on the existence and extent of the damages; assisted
the Plaintiffs in developing methods for quantifying and allocating
those damages; and has given an opinion on whether it is possible
to execute those methods on a class-wide basis.

Mr. Stockton has a Bachelor of Arts in Economics from the
University of Western Michigan as well as a Master of Science in
Agricultural and Resource Economics from the University of Arizona.
For the past 23 years, Stockton has served in various roles in The
Fontana Group, a consulting firm that provides economic consulting
services and expert testimony regarding the retail motor vehicle
industry. Stockton presently serves as the Vice President and
Director of Economics Services of the Fontana Group and has
consulted in some capacity on over 200 representative client
assignments, many of which involved design defects in automobiles.
However, once again, the Defendant does not challenge Stockton's
qualifications. In its Motion, the Defendant parses Stockton's
report into two opinions: "1) giving everyone in the class the cost
to replace the hoods on their vehicles will give everyone the
'benefit of their bargain' and (2) he will be able to calculate
(but has not yet calculated) the cost of replacing the hoods."

The Defendant challenges Stockton's opinion on three grounds: 1)
"Stockton's 'benefit of the bargain' model of damages ignores the
actual bargain struck by consumers;" 2) "Stockton's model is
contrary to the economic theory on which he purports to rely;" and
3) "Stockton's cost of repair method of measuring benefit of the
bargain damages is irrelevant and contrary to applicable law."
Judge Ruiz finds that the first two criticisms are essentially an
attack on the reliability of Stockton's testimony, while the third
questions its helpfulness. However, he finds that Stockton's
opinions meet the standards for both reliability and helpfulness
under Daubert. Thus, the Stockton Report warrants consideration at
the class certification stage.

C. Kirk Kleckner

Finally, the Defendant's Motion seeks to exclude the opinions of
Kirk Kleckner. Kleckner is a Certified Public Accountant and a
proposed damages expert who has opined on his ability to calculate
the value of the warranty for specific vehicle components under
Ford's warranties and the valuation methodologies underlying these
hypothetical calculations.

Mr. Kleckner has a Bachelor of Arts in Accounting and Business
Administration from Wartbug College as well as a Master of Business
Administration from the University of Minnesota. His experience
includes seven years as the Chief Financial Officer of an
automotive dealership group; 19 years with an accounting firm,
including roles as shareholder, Chief Operating Officer, and
Director of Business Valuation and Litigation Support Services; and
performing services for hundreds of companies in a wide array of
industries, including retail car dealerships, property and casualty
insurance, warranty insurance, and distribution.  Kleckner has
served as an expert in four major automotive warranty related class
action settlement valuation determinations.

However, once again, Judge Ruiz holds that the Defendant does not
challenge Kleckner's qualifications. The Defendant instead
criticizes what they believe is "Kleckner's only conclusion that
available methodologies exist to determine the value of a warranty
for a vehicle component and those methodologies are applicable in
this particular case." The Defendant argues that, because the
Kleckner Report makes no mention of overpayment or ineffective
repairs, his opinion "does not advance the question in dispute for
which the opinion is proffered" -- hence, "there is no 'fit' and
the opinion should be excluded."

Additionally, the Defendant criticizes the Plaintiffs'
characterization of Kleckner's testimony in their Motion for Class
Certification. Under the requirements of Rule 702, there is no
requirement that Kleckner calculate class wide damages or show
precisely how they will be calculated. The ability to calculate
class-wide warranty damages is clearly at issue and thus,
Kleckner's testimony is helpful under Daubert. Moreover, the
sufficiency of his testimony to establish class certification has
no bearing on admissibility; any averred weaknesses in the Kleckner
Report will be properly considered during the Court's review of the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Ruiz denied the Defendant's
Omnibus Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs' Experts' Opinions.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3h5etxtv from Leagle.com.


FOUNDATIONS HEALTH: Seeks Jan. 17 Class Cert Response Extension
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as NIKIESHA CLEVELAND, v.
FOUNDATIONS HEALTH SOLUTIONS, INC., Case No. 1:21-cv-01713-CAB
(N.D. Ohio), the Defendant asks the Court to enter an order
granting an additional 14 days, until January 17, 2022, to respond
to Plaintiff's December 21, 2021 Motion for Conditional
Certification.

Foundations Health operates as a non-profit organization. The
Organization provides long term care services such as skilled
nursing.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Dec. 22, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/34jsf7L at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Kristina Leach, Esq.
          SALSBURY & SALSBURY, LPA
          5611 Hudson Drive, Suite 400
          Hudson, OH 44236
          Telephone: (330) 655-5760
          Facsimile: (330) 655-0526
          E-mail: kleach@salsburylaw.com

FUNCTION(X) INC: Mule Appeals Ruling in Fiduciary Breach Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Andrew Mule filed an appeal from a court ruling entered
in the lawsuit entitled ANDREW MULE, On Behalf of Himself and All
Others Similarly Situated v. ROBERT F.X. SILLERMAN, PETER C. HORAN,
MICHAEL MEYER, MITCHELL J. NELSON, BIRAME SOCK and FUNCTION(X),
INC., Case No. 654984/2016, in the New York Supreme Court Appellate
Division - First Department.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit is
brought on behalf of the public shareholders of Function(x) against
the Company's Board of Directors for alleged breaches of fiduciary
duties as a result of a series of transactions designed to benefit
Robert F. X. Sillerman.

Mr. Sillerman is the Company's Executive Chairman, Chief Executive
Officer, majority shareholder with 65.9% of the Company's common
stock and senior creditor.  The other Individual Defendants are
directors and officers of the Company.

The transactions include the Company's entry into an agreement with
Mr. Sillerman on July 8, 2016, to exchange his $34.8 million face
amount of debt and 3,000 shares of the Company's Series C
Convertible Redeemable Preferred Stock owned by him into Common
Stock at a conversion price $0.26 per share.

The appellate case is captioned as Andrew Mule v. Yann Geron, Ch 7
Trustee for Robert F.X. Sillerman, Case No. 2021-04773, in the New
York Supreme Court Appellate Division, First Judicial Department,
filed on December 22, 2021.[BN]

Defendant-Respondent Yann Geran, Ch 7 Trustee for Robert F.X.
Sillerman, is represented by:

          Michael Burrows, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
          One Vanderbilt Ave.
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 801-9200
          E-mail: burrowsm@gtlaw.com

GDB INTERNATIONAL: Supervised Notification to Collective Sought
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as VICENTE MARTINEZ LOPEZ,
RICARDO GALINDO NAZARIO, EPIGMENIO RUIZ MARTINEZ, and ELEUTERIA
ARELLANEZ RAMIREZ, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, v. GDB INTERNATIONAL, INC., Case No.
3:21-cv-05923-MAS-TJB (D.N.J.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
enter an order granting supervised notification to members of the
collective action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. section 216(b).

The Defendant offers paint products such as flat white paints,
latex mistints, bulk drums and totes, aerosols, rolling covers and
paint applicators.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Dec. 23,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/32WtEjS
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Louis Pechman, Esq.
          Vivianna Morales, Esq.
          Galen C. Baynes, Esq.
          PECHMAN LAW GROUP PLLC
          488 Madison Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 583-9500
          E-mail: pechman@pechmanlaw.com
                  morales@pechmanlaw.com
                  baynes@pechmanlaw.com

GOLDMAN SACHS: Su Yan Sues Over Sale of Doomed iQIYI Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
SU YAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC. and MORGAN STANLEY,
Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-10999 (S.D.N.Y., December 22, 2021) is
a class action against the Defendants for violations of Sections
20A, 10(b), and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The case arises from the Defendants' unlawful use of material
non-public information to collectively avoided billions in losses
by selling shares of iQIYI, Inc., an online entertainment company
in China, to the Plaintiff and other public shareholders, after
confidentiality learning that Archegos Capital Management, a family
office with $10 billion under management, failed or was likely to
fail to meet a margin call, requiring it to fully liquidate its
position in iQIYI. The Defendants knew, or were reckless in not
knowing, that they were prohibited from trading based on this
confidential market-moving information, but traded anyway,
disposing to the Plaintiff and other Class members their iQIYI
shares before the news about Archegos was announced and iQIYI's
shares plummeted. As a result of the Defendants' alleged
misconduct, the Plaintiff and Class members suffered losses.

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. is a global financial services
institution, with its headquarters at 200 West Street, New York,
New York.

Morgan Stanley is a global financial services institution, with its
headquarters at 1585 Broadway, New York, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
         J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
         James M. LoPiano, Esq.
         POMERANTZ LLP
         600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: (212) 661-1100
         Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
         E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                 ahood@pomlaw.com
                 jlopiano@pomlaw.com

GOOGLE LLC: Bid for Class Certification Extended in Privacy Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit RE GOOGLE ASSISTANT PRIVACY LITIGATION,
Case No. 5:19-cv-04286-BLF (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Beth Labson
Freeman entered an order granting the Parties' stipulation to
extend time for motion for class certification as follows:

   1. The Plaintiffs' deadline to file a motion for class
      certification is March 28, 2022;

   2. The Defendants' deadline to file an opposition to
      Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is May 16,
      2022; and

   3. The Plaintiffs' deadline to file a reply in support of the
      motion for class certification is June 13, 2022.

Google is an American multinational technology company that
specializes in Internet-related services and products, which
include online advertising technologies, a search engine, cloud
computing, software, and hardware.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 22, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ELb4sg at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark N. Todzo, Esq.
          Eric S. Somers, Esq.
          LEXINGTON LAW GROUP
          503 Divisadero Street
          San Francisco, CA 94117
          Telephone: (415) 913-7800
          Facsimile: (415) 759-4112
          E-mail: mtodzo@lexlawgroup.com
                  esomers@lexlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Hayley Reynolds, Esq.
          GUTRIDE SAFIER LLP

The Defendants GOOGLE LLC and ALPHABET INC are represented by:

          Bobbie J. Wilson, Esq.
          Sunita Bali, Esq.
          PERKINS COIE LLP
          505 Howard Street, Suite 1000
          San Francisco, CA 94105-3204
          Telephone: (415) 344-7000
          Facsimile: (415) 344-7050

GOOGLE LLC: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss 2 of Brown's 7 Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHASOM BROWN, et al., Plaintiffs v. GOOGLE LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 20-CV-03664-LHK (N.D. Cal.), Judge Lucy H. Koh
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
San Jose Division, denied Google's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and violation of the
California Unfair Competition Law.

I. Background

Plaintiffs Chasom Brown, William Byatt, Jeremy Davis, Christopher
Castillo, and Monique Trujillo, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, bring the instant case against Defendant
Google. The Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint asserts seven
claims against Google under federal and California law.

To access a website on the internet, an individual must use
"web-browsing software." Specifically, the user must type the
website's Uniform Resource Locator ("URL") into the browser's
address bar. Entering a URL causes the browser to send a "GET
request" to the website's server. A GET request tells the server
"what information is being requested" and instructs the server "to
send the information back." The browser then displays the requested
information for the user.

Google provides services and products both to website publishers
and to internet users. Google provides advertising and data
analytics services to website publishers. More than 70% of website
publishers in the United States use at least one of these services.
Google provides internet users with a browser called "Google
Chrome." Chrome, like other popular browsers, offers a "private
browsing mode." Chrome's "private browsing mode" is called
"Incognito Mode."

The instant case arises from Google's practice of using its
advertising and data analytics services to collect data from
internet users who visit websites while in "private browsing mode."
The Plaintiffs are Google account holders "whose internet use was
tracked by Google while browsing the internet from a browser in a
private browsing mode." Specifically, each Plaintiff "visited
several major websites using Chrome, in Incognito Mode," and Google
"tracked and intercepted their communications with those Websites."
The Plaintiffs allege that Google's data collection practice was
unlawful because, among other reasons, Google represented that
using "private browsing mode" would prevent Google from collecting
the Plaintiffs' data.

On June 2, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Alphabet,
Inc. and Google alleging that Google had unlawfully collected their
data while they used "private browsing mode." The Plaintiffs
asserted four claims: (1) unauthorized interception under the
Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 2510 et seq.; (2) violation of the
California Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA"), Cal. Penal Code
Sections 631 and 632; (3) invasion of privacy; and (4) intrusion
upon seclusion.

Additionally, the complaint sought class action relief on behalf of
two alleged classes: (1) "All Android device owners who accessed a
website containing Google Analytics or Ad Manager using such a
device and who were (a) in `private browsing mode' on that device's
browser and (b) were not logged into their Google account on that
device's browser, but whose communications, including identifying
information and online browsing history, Google nevertheless
intercepted, received, or collected from June 1, 2016 through the
present" and (2) "All individuals with a Google account who
accessed a website containing Google Analytics or Ad Manager using
any non-Android device and who were (a) in 'private browsing mode'
in that device's browser, and (b) were not logged into their Google
account on that device's browser, but whose communications,
including identifying information and online browsing history,
Google nevertheless intercepted, received, or collected from June
1, 2016 through the present."

On Sept. 21, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint
("FAC") in lieu of opposing the motion to dismiss. In addition to
the four claims from the original complaint, the FAC asserted a
claim for violation of the California Computer Data Access and
Fraud Act ("CDAFA"), Cal. Penal Code Section 502. On Oct. 6, 2020,
the Court denied as moot the Aug. 20, 2020 motion to dismiss.

On Oct. 21, 2020, Google filed a motion to dismiss the FAC. Among
other arguments, Google argued that all of the Plaintiffs' claims
should be dismissed because the Plaintiffs consented to Google's
collection of their data. On Nov. 18, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed an
opposition to Google's motion to dismiss the FAC. On Dec. 7, 2020,
Google filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss the FAC,
and a filed reply in support of its request for judicial notice.

On March 12, 2021, the Court issued an order granting both parties'
requests for judicial notice, denying Google's administrative
motion for leave to file a reply in support of the arguments raised
in Google's affidavits, and denying Google's motion to dismiss the
FAC.

On April 14, 2021, the parties stipulated to allow the Plaintiffs
to file a second amended complaint ("SAC"). In addition to the five
claims asserted by the FAC, the SAC asserts two new claims against
Google: (1) breach of contract; and (2) violation of the California
Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Sections
17200, et seq. ("SAC"). On April 15, 2021, the Court granted the
parties' stipulation.

On May 17, 2021, Google filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
claims for breach of contract and violation of the UCL. In
connection with its motion to dismiss, Google filed a request for
judicial notice.

On June 15, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Google's
motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and
violation of the UCL. In connection with their opposition, the
Plaintiffs filed a request for judicial notice. On June 29, 2021,
Google filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and violation of the
UCL.

II. Discussion

A. Requests for Judicial Notice

Google requests that the Court takes judicial notice of 24
documents, which include three versions of Google's Terms of
Service, 16 versions of Google's Privacy Policy, three versions of
Google's Chrome Privacy Notice, and two publicly available Google
webpages. The Plaintiffs request that the Court take judicial
notice of the current version of Google's Chrome Privacy Notice. As
the Court previously has explained, these documents appear on
publicly available websites and are thus proper subjects of
judicial notice.

B. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Google moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim
and UCL claim. Judge Koh begins with Google's arguments regarding
the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim and then discusses
Google's arguments regarding the Plaintiffs' UCL claim.

i. Plaintiffs Have Adequately Stated a Breach of Contract Claim
Based on Google's Data Collection Practice

The Plaintiffs allege that their relationship with Google was
governed by a contract consisting of the "Google Terms of Service,
the Google Chrome and Chrome OS Additional Terms of Service, and
the Chrome Privacy Notice." Additionally, they allege that this
contract incorporated at least three additional documents --
Google's Privacy Policy, the "Search & Browse Privately" page, and
the Incognito Splash Screen -- such that these additional documents
are part of the contract as well.

Google concedes that the Chrome Privacy Notice governed, and
continues to govern, Google's relationship with the Plaintiffs. It
also concedes that the Privacy Policy and "Search & Browse
Privately" page governed Google's relationship with the Plaintiffs
until March 31, 2020. However, Google argues that, because the
Incognito Splash Screen was never part of Google's contract with
the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim may not
rely on the Incognito Splash Screen.

First, Judge Koh holds that a reasonable user could read Google's
contract with the Plaintiffs as incorporating the Incognito Splash
Screen. Accordingly, she need not address the Plaintiffs'
alternative argument that, even if the Incognito Splash Screen was
not part of the contract, the Screen should be used to interpret
the contact.

Second, Judge Koh further holds that a reasonable Chrome user could
conclude that Google's Privacy Policy continued to be part of
Google's contract with the Plaintiffs after March 30, 2020. Because
the Chrome Privacy Notice "call[ed] out" Google's Privacy Policy,
"provide[d] a link to it," and "encouraged the user to read it," a
reasonable user could conclude that the Chrome Privacy Notice
incorporates Google's Privacy Policy. In turn, because the Terms of
Service direct users to follow "service-specific additional terms"
in the event of a conflict, a reasonable user could conclude that
the Chrome Privacy Notice, not the Terms of Service, is binding
with respect to Google's Privacy Policy. Thus, Plaintiffs may rely
on the March 31, 2020 version of Google's Privacy Policy to support
their breach of contract claim.

Third, given the Court's previous conclusion regarding each of
these individual statements, a reasonable user, reading Google's
contract with the Plaintiffs as a whole, could easily conclude that
Google promised the Plaintiffs that using "private browsing mode"
would prevent Google from collecting the Plaintiffs' data. Indeed,
even if some of the individual statements in the contract are
ambiguous, reading the contract as a whole, with "each clause
helping to interpret the other," clarifies any ambiguities. A
reasonable user could conclude that Google's repeated affirmative
assertions that "private browsing mode" provides internet users
with "privacy" and "control" were meant to emphasize to users that
Google would provide users with the maximum amount of data privacy.
Accordingly, a reasonable user could read Google's representations
about Chrome to mean that Google designed Chrome not to send Google
data while in "private browsing mode."

For these reasons, Judge Koh will deny Google's motion to dismiss
the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim.

ii. Plaintiffs Have Adequately Stated a UCL Claim Based on Google's
Data Collection Practice

The Plaintiffs allege that Google's business practice of collecting
the Plaintiffs' data while they were using "private browsing mode"
was "unlawful" and "unfair" because it constituted a "violation of
the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 2510, et seq.; the
California Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code Sections 631
and 632; the California Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, Cal.
Penal Code Section 502, eq seq.; Invasion of Privacy; Intrusion
Upon Seclusion; Breach of Contract; and California Business &
Professions Code Section 22576." The Plaintiffs further allege that
they "have suffered injury-in-fact, including the loss of money
and/or property as a result of the unauthorized disclosure and
taking of their personal information which has value as
demonstrated by its use and sale by Google." Specifically, they
"have suffered harm in the form of diminution of the value of their
private and personally identifiable data and content."

Google argues that the Plaintiffs' UCL claim should be dismissed
for two reasons and argues that, even if their UCL claim is not
dismissed, the Plaintiffs should be limited to seeking injunctive
relief.

Judge Koh holds that the Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that
they "lost money or property as a result of the unfair
competition." She says the Plaintiffs have not alleged that their
UCL claim relies on misrepresentations or omissions. The Plaintiffs
allege only that their UCL claim is based on Google's "violation of
the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 2510, et seq.; the
California Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code Sections 631
and 632; the California Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, Cal.
Penal Code Section 502, eq seq.; Invasion of Privacy; Intrusion
Upon Seclusion; Breach of Contract; and California Business &
Professions Code Section 22576."

Moreover, Google provides no legal or factual support for its
conclusory argument that an allegation of reliance is required for
the Plaintiffs' UCL claim. Indeed, Google's only argument on this
issue is a summary assertion in its reply brief that "all of the
Plaintiffs' claims indisputably are based on Google's alleged
'misrepresentations or omissions' in the Incognito Screen and other
disclosures."

However, as one example, the Wiretap Act, as amended by the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), generally prohibits
the interception of "wire, oral, or electronic communications" and
makes no mention of fraud, misrepresentation, or reliance. 18
U.S.C. Section 2511(1). Thus, on this record, Judge Koh cannot
conclude that the Plaintiffs were required to allege reliance.
Accordingly, she will deny Google's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' UCL claim.

Google contends that the Plaintiffs may not seek damages for their
UCL claim because "they do not allege that Google took any money
from them" and do not "identify any `property' that could be
'returned' to them." Accordingly, Google contends, the "Plaintiffs
seek only nonrestitutionary disgorgement," which is 'not available'
under the UCL."

Judge Koh agrees with Google that the Plaintiffs may not seek
disgorgement as a remedy. However, she cannot conclude at this
stage that the Plaintiff does not have a cognizable theory of
restitution. Indeed, the Plaintiffs have alleged that Google's
conduct caused a "diminution of the value of their private and
personally identifiable data and content." Google fails to explain
why, if the Plaintiffs can quantify this diminution in value, the
Plaintiffs would not be entitled to restitution. Thus, the "only
monetary remedy the Plaintiffs may seek is restitution."

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Koh denied Google's motion to
dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3tcnj4se from Leagle.com.


HV GLOBAL: Ramirez Employment Suit Removed to N.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled NELSON RAMIREZ, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. HV GLOBAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, HV
GLOBAL GROUP, INC., and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No.
21CV003513, was removed from the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of Monterey, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California on December 22, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of California assigned
Case No. 5:21-cv-09955 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California Business and Professions
Code including failure to pay overtime wages, failure to pay meal
period premiums, failure to pay rest period premiums, failure to
pay minimum wages, failure to provide accurate wage statement,
failure to timely pay final wages, failure to timely pay wages
during employment, failure to keep requisite pay records, failure
to reimburse expenses, and unfair business practices.

HV Global Management Corporation is a real estate company with its
principal place of business in Florida.

HV Global Group, Inc. is a real estate company with its principal
place of business in Florida. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:          
         
         Barbara I. Antonucci, Esq.
         Nicholas B. Morrell, Esq.
         CONSTANGY, BROOKS, SMITH & PROPHETE, LLP
         601 Montgomery Street, Suite 350
         San Francisco, CA 94111
         Telephone: (415) 918-3000
         Facsimile: (415) 918-3034
         E-mail: bantonucci@constangy.com
                 nmorrell@constangy.com

                 - and –

         Kenenth D. Sulzer, Esq.
         Angela L. Rapko, Esq.
         CONSTANGY, BROOKS, SMITH & PROPHETE LLP
         2029 Century Park East, Suite 1100
         Los Angeles, CA 90067
         Telephone: (310) 909-7775
         Facsimile: (424) 465-6630
         E-mail: ksulzer@constangy.com
                 arapko@constangy.com

INDEPENDENT BANK: Seeks to Narrow Scope of Prospective Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Jamila Grice, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, v. Independent Bank,
Case No. 7:20-cv-01948-JD (D.S.C.), the Defendant asks the Court
granting partial summary judgment limiting the scope of the
prospective classes to individuals residing in South Carolina or
individuals whose claims "arises" in South Carolina pursuant to the
South Carolina Door Closing Statute.

The Plaintiff's Complaint attempts to assert a nationwide class
action for breach of contract in the District of South Carolina
against Independent, a Michigan-based regional bank and
Michigan-based corporation. However, the nationwide class
allegations are expressly barred by the South Carolina Door Closing
Statute, which prohibits claims by nonresident plaintiffs against
nonresident defendants when those claims do not arise in this
State.

The Plaintiff brings this nationwide class action on behalf of
herself and all other similarly situated customers against
Independent based on Independent's allegedly improper practices of
assessing various overdraft, insufficient funds, and ATM fees.

The Complaint alleges a single cause of action for breach of
contract based on three distinct practices: (1) Independent's
alleged practice of charging overdraft fees ("OD Fees") on
transactions referred to in the Complaint as "Authorize Positive,
Purportedly Settle Negative Transactions" ("APPSN Transactions"),
(2) Independent's alleged practice of charging multiple
non-sufficient funds fees ("NSF Fees") on what Plaintiff describes
as a single transaction or item; and (3) Independent's assessment
of two out-of-network ATM fees ("OON Fees") on out-of-network ATM
withdrawals preceded by a balance inquiry.

Based on this sole cause of action, the Plaintiff defines three
separate proposed nationwide classes -- one for each type of
allegedly improper fee:

  -- the "OD Fees Class".

     "All accountholders who, during the applicable statute of
     limitations, were charged OD Fees on APPSN Transactions on
     an Independent checking account;"

  -- the "Multiple Fees Class"

     "All accountholders who, during the applicable statute of
     limitations, were charged multiple NSF Fees on the same
     item on an Independent checking account;"

  --  the "OON Fees Class"

     "All accountholders who, during the applicable statute of
     limitations, were charged two OON Fees by Independent for a
     single cash withdrawal at an out of network ATM."

Independent is a Michigan state-chartered bank that maintains its
headquarters in Grand Rapids, Michigan.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Dec. 22, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3pR5jF8 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Thomas William McGee, III, Esq.
          Jonathan M. Knicely, Esq.
          NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH LLP
          1320 Main Street / 17th Floor
          Post Office Box 11070 (29211-1070)
          Columbia, SC 29201
          Telephone: (803) 799-2000
          E-Mail: billy.mcgee@nelsonmullins.com
                  jonathan.knicely@nelsonmullins.com

KANSAS: District Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Tyler v. Schnurr, HCF
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled WILLIAM A. TYLER, III, Plaintiff v. DAN
SCHNURR, et al., Defendants, Case No. 20-CV-03242-EFM-KGG (D.
Kan.), the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas grants
the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment.

Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff William A. Tyler, III, sues Dan
Schnurr, in his official capacity as warden of the Hutchinson
Correctional Facility ("HCF"), as well as six other HCF employees
for violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983.

Factual and Procedural Background

At the time he filed suit, Tyler was an inmate in the Hutchinson
Correctional Facility. Tyler asserts three claims against the
various defendants. First, Tyler alleges he has been subjected to
living conditions that violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. He asserts that he was placed in administrative
segregation at HCF, specifically in what is known as an "MRA
cell"--meaning a "more restricted area." According to Tyler, MRA
cells are 8-feet by 5-feet and have an added cinderblock front
porch, a slam-cell steel door, and disconnected toilets. He further
asserts that the MRA cells have no natural light, effectively
turning the cells "into sensory deprivation torture chambers."

Mr. Tyler asserts that over the course of two years, he has been
held in MRA cells for 6.5, 10.5, and 3.5 month intervals. He
asserts that Defendants Schnurr, Major Van Hoos, Lieutenant
Stiggins, and Unit Team Manager Bell exhibited deliberate
indifference to his right to be free of cruel and unusual
punishment by leaving him on MRA status knowing about the lack of
natural light and the "unsanitary, inhumane environment caused by
the unhooked toilet."

Next, Mr. Tyler asserts that three unknown HCF employees used
excessive force against him, causing him serious injury, in
violation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
and his right to due to process of law. He asserts that on Aug. 13,
2019, he was approached by Lieutenant Stiggins for a cell move, to
be placed back in an MRA cell after approximately two months out of
the MRA cell. He admits that he refused to move. He asserts that he
was then sprayed with O.C. pepper spray by three unknown HCF
employees, followed by a spray of a weaponized vapor. The three
employees then stormed into Tyler's cell, using a "shock shield"
and stunned him unconscious.

The employees allegedly beat Tyler on his head, body, and face. As
a result of the incident, Tyler's face was blackened top to bottom
on one side and his left eye never fully healed. He experienced
scarring from cuts on his lips and face, and a concussion. He never
filed a complaint regarding this incident, reporting that he feared
reprisals or legal retribution. Tyler asserts that several inmates
have been beaten by the "black suits" in a "common and unchecked
theme at HCF" and that he feared he would be beaten for making such
a complaint. He also asserts that feared that he would be charged
in Reno County Court with assault on the officers or with other
crimes if he made a report. He alleges that inmates are often
beaten and then charged with battery at HCF.

Finally, Tyler asserts that Schnurr, Van Hoos, Stiggins, and Bell
prevented him from receiving adequate mental health care, in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Tyler is
diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Tyler alleges that he was a member
of a behavioral therapy group at HCF while not on MRA status. He
asserts that he greatly deteriorated during his two years on MRA
status, including experiencing increased paranoia and suicidal
ideation.

Mr. Tyler was released from HCF in August 2021.

Analysis

A. Sovereign Immunity Bars Tyler's Claims for Monetary Damages
Against Defendants in Their Official Capacities

The Defendants first argue that sovereign immunity bars Tyler's
claims against them in their official capacities. Tyler brings
official capacity claims against all Defendants and personal
capacity claims against Van Hoos, Stiggins, Bell, and the three
unknown correctional officers.

The Eleventh Amendment grants immunity to the States from "any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted" by their own citizens.
This includes actions for damages against state agencies and
officials acting in their official capacities. The defense of
sovereign immunity is, therefore, applicable unless Kansas has
waived the defense or Tyler seeks only prospective injunctive or
declaratory relief against state officials for an ongoing violation
of federal law. Kansas has not waived sovereign immunity against
Section 1983 claims in federal district court and Section 1983 does
not abrogate a state's sovereign immunity.

The Court, therefore, lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
Tyler's claims for monetary damages against the Defendants in their
official capacities. Sovereign immunity does not bar Tyler's
request for injunctive relief against the Defendants in their
official capacities, however.

B. Tyler's Request for Injunctive Relief Against Defendants Is
Moot

Turning to Tyler's request for injunctive relief, he asks that the
Court order the Defendants to upgrade HCF's facilities to
constitutional standards and to declare a class.

Chief District Judge Eric F. Melgren notes that Tyler was released
from HCF in August 2021. Tyler, therefore, no longer has a legally
cognizable interest in the standards maintained at HCF, making his
request for injunctive relief against the Defendants in their
official capacities moot. Further, Tyler lacks standing to bring a
class action on behalf of inmates remaining in HCF.

The Court, therefore, lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
Tyler's request for injunctive relief. Tyler's release does not
moot his remaining claims for monetary damages against the
Defendants in their personal capacities, however.

C. Tyler Failed to Exhaust His Claims Regarding the Size of His MRA
Cell and the Incident with the Unidentified HCF Employees

Because his official capacity claims are either barred by sovereign
immunity or moot, Tyler's only remaining claims are those for
monetary damages against the Defendants in their personal
capacities. His claims are as follows: (1) Defendants Van Hoos,
Stiggins, and Bell exhibited deliberate indifference to his right
to be free of cruel and unusual punishment by leaving him on MRA
status; (2) three unknown HCF employees used excessive force
against him, causing him serious injury in violation of his right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his right to due
process of law; and (3) Van Hoos, Stiggins, and Bell prevented him
from receiving adequate mental health care in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The Defendants now argue that Tyler failed to exhaust his claims
regarding the size of his MRA cell and the incident with the
unidentified HCF employees.

Judge Melgren finds that Tyler failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies regarding his MRA cell size. Tyler's Complaint states that
all MRA issues were exhausted on grievances and cites to Exhibit B
to his Complaint. Although Exhibit B includes Tyler's filed
grievance regarding the MRA cells, his grievance did not contain
complaints regarding the cell-size issue. Thus, it appears from the
face of the Complaint and attached exhibits that Tyler did not
exhaust his complaint regarding the size of the MRA cells as
required by K.A.R. 44-15-102. The Court, therefore, dismisses
Tyler's argument regarding the size of the MRA cells without
prejudice.

Judge Melgren also finds that Tyler failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies regarding the incident with the
unidentified HCF employees. Tyler has failed to allege facts
sufficient to meet this burden. Tyler makes only conclusory
allegations regarding "reprisals" as a "common and unchecked theme
at HCF." Although Tyler states that he could "name several inmates
who've been beaten," he fails to do so.

Because Tyler has failed to plausibly allege that prison officials
inhibited him from filing a grievance, the Court dismisses his
claim against the three unidentified HCF employees without
prejudice.

D. Tyler Has Failed to State a Claim for Violation of His
Constitutional Rights

Now remaining are Tyler's personal capacity claims against
Defendants Van Hoos, Stiggins, and Bell for exhibiting deliberate
indifference to his right to be free of cruel and unusual
punishment by leaving him on MRA status and preventing him from
receiving adequate mental health care in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.

Judge Melgren notes that plaintiffs may bring federal civil causes
of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution under Section 1983 of the
U.S. Code. But, state defendants may incur personal liability only
if they participated in the alleged constitutional violation.

Judge Melgren holds that Tyler's allegations regarding the living
conditions in MRA cells are not sufficiently serious to state a
constitutional claim. Judge Melgren adds that Tyler's claim for
lack of adequate mental health care does not state a claim under
the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. Construing Tyler's pro se
pleadings liberally, the Court finds no support for claim of
disparate treatment. Tyler's claim for violation of the Equal
Protection clause is also dismissed.

The Court, therefore, ordered that the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment is granted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order dated Dec. 23,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/5fhwceb7 from
Leagle.com.


KBR INC: Cal. App. Affirms in Part Dismissal Order in Lee Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FREIDA LEE, Plaintiff and Appellant v. K.B.R., INC.,
et al., Defendant and Respondent, Case No. A159980 (Cal. App.), the
Court of Appeals of California for the First District, Division
Two, reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial court's order
denying Lee's motion for leave to amend and granting KBR's motion
for summary adjudication on one claim.

Introduction

The appeal arises out of a long-running dispute between Freida Lee
and KBR based on a credit report indicating that KBR reported Lee's
same debt twice and failed to mark the debt as disputed. Lee first
filed an individual action asserting two claims. After the trial
court denied Lee's motion for leave to amend and granted KBR's
motion for summary adjudication on one claim, Lee voluntarily
dismissed the other claim and appealed the trial court's rulings.

The same day of the voluntary dismissal, Lee filed a class action
against KBR asserting six claims. In July 2014, Lee moved to
consolidate the instant class action with a pending consolidated
class action she had previously filed against Equifax Information
Solutions, LLC based on the same credit reporting for which she had
sued KBR. In August 2014, the motion was granted for all purposes
except trial.

Ms. Lee then filed a first amended class action complaint, alleging
KBR had reported the same debt twice and failed to note Lee's
dispute of the debt on her credit report. The complaint asserted
six causes of action. The first three causes of action alleged KBR
violated section 1785.25(a) of the CCRAA because it had "furnished
information incompletely and/or inaccurately" to credit reporting
agencies by (1) "suggesting that Rash Curtis had a right or ability
to credit report accounts of which it had no ownership or other
right as to herself and a similarly situated class," (2) "reporting
the same debt in a duplicate fashion in the name of both Rash
Curtis and PRS," and (3) "reporting the debt in issue without
noting plaintiff's dispute." For each of these causes of action,
Lee alleged she "did not learn of the routine and systematic nature
of these acts until February of 2014."

The fourth cause of action alleged KBR violated the Consumer Legal
Remedies Act (Section 1750 et seq.) (CLRA) "by and through its
furnishing of information to credit reporting agencies." The fifth
cause of action alleged KBR violated the Unfair Competition Law
(Bus. & Prof. Code, Section 17200 et seq.) (UCL) because its
actions were unlawful, fraudulent, and unfair. Through this UCL
cause of action, Lee sought injunctive relief "necessary to prevent
the use or employment by KBR of the practices alleged therein."

Ms. Lee also asserted a sixth cause of action for declaratory
relief to determine whether KBR "may permissibly furnish credit
reporting agencies information in the name of entities who have no
ownership or other right to report such accounts" and "duplicate
report the same account and/or fail to notify credit reporting
agencies of consumer disputes."

KBR then filed a demurrer to the complaint. The trial court
sustained KBR's demurrer without leave to amend as to the first
four claims, and KBR filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
(MJOP) seeking to abate the two remaining claims while the appeal
in the individual action was pending because both actions involved
the same "primary rights." The trial court granted the MJOP and
subsequently dismissed all claims against KBR.

On appeal, Lee challenges the trial court's rulings on demurrer and
MJOP, as well as the dismissal order itself.

Discussion

I. Jurisdiction

Before turning to the merits of the appeal, the Court of Appeals
first addresses KBR's argument that it lacks jurisdiction to decide
it because the appeal is untimely. Specifically, KBR suggests that
Lee's appeal from the February 2020 dismissal order is insufficient
to challenge the demurrer and MJOP rulings because she did not
appeal those prior orders.

Not so, the Court of Appeals holds. It says, an order sustaining a
demurrer without leave to amend is not appealable; an appeal lies
only from the subsequently entered judgment. An order granting MJOP
is similarly not appealable, and any appeal must be taken from the
subsequent judgment.

While notice of entry of the original judgment of dismissal was
filed on June 15, 2015, that judgment was vacated on Aug. 3, 2015,
before the applicable 60-day deadline to appeal had expired. The
trial court subsequently entered the February 2020 dismissal order,
which is an appealable judgment. Lee filed her notice of appeal on
March 16, 2020, well within any deadline to appeal the order.

II. Standard of Review

The standard of review governing an order sustaining a demurrer
without leave to amend is "long-settled." On appeal, the Couty of
Appeals reviews the trial court's sustaining of a demurrer without
leave to amend de novo, exercising its independent judgment as to
whether a cause of action has been stated as a matter of law and
applying the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the trial
court's denial of leave to amend."

As Ms. Lee challenges the rulings on demurrer that her CCRAA and
CLRA claims fail as a matter of law, the Court of Appeals' review
is de novo. Lee bears the burden of proving the trial court erred
in sustaining the demurrer on these claims. Moreover, the Court of
Appeals "must affirm if the trial court's decision to sustain the
demurrer was correct on any theory." In other words, "it does not
review the validity of the trial court's reasoning but only the
propriety of the ruling itself." As an MJOP is equivalent to a
demurrer, the same de novo standard of review applies to an appeal
from the granting of an MJOP.

III. Demurrer

Ms. Lee argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the
demurrer on both her CCRAA and CLRA causes of action. As to her
CCRAA claims, Lee contends the ruling was in error for two
reasons.

Neither is persuasive, the Court of Appeals opines. It concludes
that the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer on the
CCRAA and CLRA causes of action. First, it finds that the delayed
discovery rule is inapplicable because Lee does not have "other's
claims" that can be asserted independently from her own time-barred
individual claim." Moreover, even if Lee was not time-barred by her
individual action, she has not satisfied the requirements of the
delayed discovery rule. Second, the Court of Appeals says Lee's
voluntary dismissal of her individual action precludes application
of equitable tolling to her consolidated putative class action.
KBR's credit reporting to third-party agencies is far removed from
the transaction between EBMUD and Lee that resulted in EBMUD's
provision of utility services and accordingly does not fall within
the specific proscriptions of the CLRA.

IV. MJOP

Lee argues next that the trial court erred in granting the MJOP on
her UCL and declaratory relief causes of action. She contends there
are three reasons that the ruling was in error.

Again, the Court of Appeals disagrees. It concludes that the trial
court did not err in granting the MJOP on the UCL and declaratory
relief causes of action. First, it finds no basis to conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion in considering KBR's request
for abatement in its MJOP. Second, Lee's individual and class
actions both invoked the same harm and thus the same primary right:
The right to be free from inaccurate or incomplete credit
reporting. Third, there is no basis to conclude that the UCL claim
Lee asserted in the class action invoked any primary right that was
separate from any primary rights invoked in the individual action.

V. Dismissal Order

Finally, Lee argues that the trial court erred in entering the
February 2020 dismissal order because there was no basis to dismiss
the UCL and declaratory relief claims.

The Court of Appeals agrees. As described, the primary rights
doctrine can be invoked by either (1) a plea of abatement or (2) an
argument that the res judicata effect of the judgment in the first
action bars the subsequent action. Where, as in the case, the
defendant asserts a plea of abatement, "the appropriate remedy is
the entry of an interlocutory judgment postponing trial, rather
than dismissal of the action."

Ms. Lee's individual action was not determined on the merits
because she voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice. For
the purposes of res judicata, a dismissal without prejudice is not
a final judgment on the merits. Accordingly, the UCL and
declaratory relief claims could not be dismissed under the primary
rights doctrine. The Court of Appeals sees no other basis for
dismissal of these two claims. The trial court in Lee's initial
action did not resolve the CCRA claim on the merits, and Lee's
voluntary dismissal of the complaint in that case did not operate
as res judicata to bar Lee's assertion of claims based on the same
primary rights. Abatement, rather than dismissal, was thus the
proper remedy with respect to the UCL and declaratory relief causes
of action.

Disposition

The Court of Appeals holds that while it concludes the trial court
did not err in sustaining the demurrer in part or granting the
MJOP, it agrees that the entry of the dismissal order was in error
as to Lee's remaining two claims and reverses on that basis. These
claims were properly abated while the appeal of the first action
was pending. Once that appeal had been resolved, however, the
primary rights doctrine afforded no basis to dismiss Lee's
remaining two claims in the second action.

For these reasons, the Feb. 21, 2020 order of dismissal is reversed
as to the UCL and declaratory relief causes of action, and the case
is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to address
those claims. The order is otherwise affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/3ene452a from Leagle.com.


LABORATORY CORPORATION: Poole Suit Removed to E.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled BRIAN LOYD POOLE, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. BCV-21-102295, was removed
from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Kern,
to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
on December 23, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of California assigned
Case No. 1:21-at-01137 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California Business and Professions
Code including failure to pay lawful wages, failure to provide
lawful meal periods or compensation in lieu thereof, failure to
provide lawful rest periods or compensation in lieu thereof,
failure to reimburse employee expenses, failure to pay correct sick
pay wages, failure to timely pay wages during employment, failure
to timely pay wages at termination, knowing and intentional failure
to comply with itemized employee wage statement provisions, and
unfair competition.

Laboratory Corporation of America is an operator of clinical
laboratory networks, with its principal place of business in North
Carolina. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:          
         
         Christopher J. Kondon, Esq.
         Saman M. Rejali, Esq.
         Kate G. Hummel, Esq.
         K&L GATES LLP
         10100 Santa Monica Boulevard, Eighth Floor
         Los Angeles, CA 90067
         Telephone: (310) 552-5000
         Facsimile: (310) 552-5001
         E-mail: christopher.kondon@klgates.com
                 saman.rejali@klgates.com
                 kate.hummel@klgates.com

LEO'S BAGELS: Fails to Provide Proper Wages, Penate Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
GUSTAVO ADOLFO PENATE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. LEO'S BAGELS HANOVER SQUARE LLC
d/b/a LEO'S BAGELS, and ADAM POMERANTZ and MAHFUJUR RAHMAN, as
individuals, Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-10934 (S.D.N.Y., December
21, 2021) arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law for their
failure to provide proper minimum and overtime wages and failure to
furnish written wage notices and wage statements.

Mr. Penate was employed by the Defendants from January 2020 until
October 2021 whose primary duties include as delivery man, food
preparer and dishwasher while performing other miscellaneous
duties.

Leo's Bagels Hanover Square LLC, d/b/a Leo's Bagels, is a New
York-based bagel shop.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: (718) 263-9591

MAJOR ENERGY: Appeals Arbitration Bid Denial in Glikin Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Major Energy Electric Services filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit entitled Angela Glikin, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated v. Major Energy Electric Services
LLC, Case No. 21-cv-356, in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (White Plains).

The lawsuit is a class action against the Defendant for breach of
contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, unfair and deceptive acts and practices, fraud by
concealment, unjust enrichment, and violations of the New York
General Business Law.

The case arises from the Defendant's fraudulent and bad faith
conduct while supplying electricity to residential consumers across
the United States. The average variable rates that the Defendant
charged to the Plaintiff and the Class were higher than the average
rate among its energy service company competitors in Maryland and
do not reflect changes in market conditions for the energy it
supplies to its retail customers. The Defendant breached its
agreement with the Plaintiff and the Class by exploiting the lack
of transparency and regulatory oversight over its actual pricing
practices to artificially inflate its rates so high that its
variable rate methodology is rendered meaningless. Consumers expect
to pay Major Energy competitive prices for their residential energy
and they did not expect Major Energy to profiteer off of consumers
in excess of commercially reasonable profits.

On December 13, 2021, Judge Vincent L. Briccetti entered an order
denying Defendant's motion to compel arbitration. The motion to
transfer the case from the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland was granted.

The Defendant now seeks a review of the order entered by Judge
Briccetti.

The appellate case is captioned Major Energy Electric Services v.
Glikin, Case No. 21-3097, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, filed on December 22, 2021.[BN]

Defendant-Appellant Major Energy Electric Services LLC is
represented by:

          Kevin P. Allen, Esq.
          DUANE MORRIS LLP
          600 Grant Street
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 497-1037

Plaintiff-Appellee Angela Glikin, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Douglas Gregory Blankinship, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN, BLANKINSHIP, FREI-PEARSON
           & GARBER, LLP
          1 North Broadway
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 298-3290
          E-mail: gblankinship@fbfglaw.com

MARS PETCARE: Court Grants Moore's Bid for Partial Summary Judgment
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TAMARA MOORE, et al., Plaintiffs v. MARS PETCARE US,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-07001-MMC (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Maxine M. Chesney of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, filed Oct. 28, 2021.

Background

The Plaintiffs are six California pet owners who purchased
prescription pet food manufactured by the Defendants. In the
operative complaint, the Second Amended Class Action, the
Plaintiffs allege the Defendants' "self-created requirement of a
veterinarian's signed prescription as a condition precedent to the
purchase" of their prescription pet food "misleads purchasers and
consumers by communicating to them that such food is approved by"
the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), "has been subject to
government inspection and testing, and has medicinal and drug
properties that legally require a prescription for sale," thereby
causing consumers to "overpay and make purchases they otherwise
would not have made in the absence of" the prescription
requirement.

Based on the above allegations, the Plaintiffs assert, individually
and on behalf of a putative class, three state law causes of
action, specifically, "Violation of California's Unfair Competition
Law," "Violation of California's False Advertising Law," and
"Violation of California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act."

In their answers to the SAC, the Defendants assert affirmative
defenses based, respectively, on "federal preemption" and
California's "safe harbor" doctrine. In particular, as relevant to
the instant motion, the Defendants rely on their asserted
compliance with the FDA's "Consumer Policy Guide" ("CPG"), which
"lists the factors the FDA intends to consider in determining
whether to exercise enforcement discretion with regard to animal
drug approval requirements for dog and cat food diets that claim to
treat or prevent disease."

Before the Court is the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Defendants Mars Petcare U.S., Inc., Royal Canin U.S.A.,
Inc. (collectively, "Mars Defendants"), and Hill's Pet Nutrition,
Inc. have filed opposition, to which the Plaintiffs have replied.

Judge Chesney deems the matter suitable for decision on the
parties' respective written submissions. She vacates the hearing
scheduled for Jan. 7, 2022.

Discussion

In the instant motion, the Plaintiffs argue that the CPG "does not
create a safe harbor or preempt their claims," and that the
"Defendants' alleged compliance with the CPG is not a defense to
said claims." Judge Chesney agrees.

As an initial matter, the Defendants contend the instant motion
"should be denied as premature under the one-way intervention
rule." Under the "one-way intervention rule," district courts
"generally do not grant summary judgment on the merits of a class
action until the class has been properly certified and notified."
The rule "exists in part to protect defendants from unfair 'one-way
intervention,' where the members of a class not yet certified can
wait for the court's ruling on summary judgment and either opt in
to a favorable ruling or avoid being bound by an unfavorable one."

As the Plaintiffs point out, however, where, as in the case, a
motion seeks only "to clarify a legal question" and "will not
resolve the merits of any of the Plaintiffs' claims," the one-way
intervention rule does not apply. Accordingly, Judge Chesney next
addresses the questions raised by the instant motion.

First, with respect to preemption, Judge Chesney says that although
"an agency regulation with the force of law can preempt conflicting
state requirements," the CPG is not a regulation, nor does it
"qualify as informal regulatory activity. Next, with respect to the
"safe harbor" doctrine, the Ninth Circuit, as the Plaintiffs point
out, has expressly found the CPG does not "specifically authorize
the Defendants' prescription requirement, prescription label, and
related marketing representations." Although, as stated in the CPG,
the "FDA is less likely to initiate an enforcement action" against
pet food manufacturers "when all of the listed factors are
present," the CPG "does not establish any legally enforceable
responsibilities, and is not binding on either the FDA or the
public."

Disposition

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, to the extent the Mars
Defendants' Eighth Defense and Hill's Pet Nutrition's Eighth
Affirmative Defense assert the Plaintiffs' claims are preempted by
the CPG, Judge Chesney granted the Plaintiffs' motion for partial
summary judgment. To the extent Hill's Pet Nutrition's Ninth
Affirmative Defense asserts the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by a
safe harbor provided by the CPG, she granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for partial summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2p9fkck4 from Leagle.com.


MATTERPORT INC: John Stemmelin Seeks to Certify Two Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOHN STEMMELIN, on behalf
of himself and all other persons similarly situated, v. MATTERPORT,
INC., a Delaware corporation; RJ PITTMAN; DAVE GAUSEBECK; MATT
BELL; CARLOS KOKRON; PETER HEBERT; JASON KRIKORIAN; and MIKE
GUSTAFSO Case No. 3:20-cv-04168-WHA (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff asks
the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying the following National Class as to Plaintiff's
      claims under California's Unfair Competition Law, the
      California's False Advertising Law, the California's
      Seller-Assisted Marketing Plan Act:

      "All persons in the United States who purchased
      Matterport's Pro, Pro2, or Pro2 Lite 3D Cameras and
      Matterport's "Cloud Service Plan," andbecame a Matterport
      Service Partner ("MSP") within the applicable limitations
      period;"

   2. certifying the following Illinois Class as to Plaintiff's
      claims under the Illinois Business Opportunity Sales Law
      ("BOSL"), and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
      Business Practices Act ("ICFA"):

      "All persons in Illinois who purchased Matterport's Pro,
      Pro2, or Pro2 Lite 3D Cameras and Matterport's "Cloud
      Service Plan," and became a Matterport Service Partner
      ("MSP") since December 2, 2016;"

      Excluded from the National Class and Illinois Class are:
      (1) the Defendants and Defendants' agents; (2) the Judge
      to whom this case is assigned and the Judge's immediate
      family; (3) any person who executes and files a timely
      request for exclusion from the National Class or Illinois
      Class; (4) any persons who have had their claims in this
      matter finally adjudicated and/or otherwise released; and
      (5) the legal representatives, successors and assigns of
      any such excluded person;

   3. appointing him as Class Representative;

   4. appointing the law firm of Cohelan, Khoury & Singer and
      Zimmerman Law Offices, P.C. as Class Counsel; and

   5. approving notice to the Classes in accordance with Federal
      Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B).

Matterport operates as a software company.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Dec. 23, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3zojwfN at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy D. Cohelan, Esq.
          Isam C. Khoury, Esq.
          J. Jason Hill, Esq.
          Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr., Esq.
          Sharon A. Harris, Esq.
          COHELAN KHOURY & SINGER
          605 "C" Street, Suite 200
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 595-3001
          Facsimile: (619) 595-3000
          E-mail: tcohelan@ckslaw.com
                  ikhoury@ckslaw.com
                  jhill@ckslaw.com
                  tom@attorneyzim.com
                  sharon@attorneyzim.com

METLIFE INC: Extension of Case Management Order Deadlines Sought
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Masten v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co., Case No. 1:18-cv-11229-RA-OTW (S.D.N.Y.), the
Parties ask the Court to enter an order extending the deadlines in
Section 4 of Case Management Plan and Scheduling Order relating to
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

Specifically, the Parties request that Section 4 of the
Scheduling Order be amended as shown below:

                        Current Scheduling     Parties' Proposed
                        Order                  Amended
                                               Scheduling Order

  Plaintiffs' Motion    Jan. 7, 2022           Feb. 21, 2022
  for Class
  Certification

  Defendants'           March 25, 2022         May 9, 2022
  Opposition  

  Plaintiffs' Reply     April 22, 2021         June 6, 2022

MetLife is a global provider of insurance, annuities, and employee
benefit programs.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Dec. 22, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3JGhMDq at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert A. Izard, Esq.
          Douglas P. Needham, Esq.
          IZARD, KINDALL & RAABE, LLP
          29 South Main Street, Suite 305
          West Hartford, CT 06107
          E-mail: dneedham@ikrlaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Myron D. Rumeld, Esq.
          Russell L. Hirschhorn, Esq
          Proskauer Rose LLP
          Eleven Times Square
          New York, NY 10036
          E-mail: rhirshhorn@proskauer.com

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Browne Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LESROY E. BROWNE, on behalf of himself and those
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN
TRUST; and JOHN DOES 1 to 15, Defendants, Civ. No. 21-11871 (KM)
(JSA) (D.N.J.). Judge Kevin McNulty of the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's claims.

Background

In 2007, Lesroy E. Browne cosigned the student loan of Evandey
Browne. That loan was issued by JP Morgan Chase Bank. At some point
around 2017, the loan was assigned to a National Collegiate Student
Loan Trust (NCSLT 2007-1). Upon being informed of the assignment,
Browne duly continued to make payments to the Trust until the loan
was paid in full in 2020. NCSLT, named as a defendant, is portrayed
as some sort of umbrella organization; the Plaintiff served process
on 16 different individual Trusts thereunder.

The Defendants claim that the Trusts are "Delaware statutory trusts
formed for the narrow purpose of acquiring and servicing student
loans and issuing notes pursuant to an indenture" and that they do
not do any business themselves, but act only through limited agents
and contractors. The various Trusts are named after the year that
they were formed; thus, for example, Browne made loan payments to
NCSLT 2007-1, formed in 2007.  The Trusts are not licensed under
New Jersey's Consumer Finance Licensing Act ("CFLA").

The complaint contains three interrelated Counts. First, the
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that defendants violated the
CFLA by collecting debts in New Jersey without a license. Then,
based on the premise that the Trusts were subject to licensure
requirements, Count 2 alleges that the Trusts violated the CFA by
collecting debts without being properly licensed. Finally, Count 3
alleges that the Trusts were unjustly enriched by the payments of
Browne (and other putative class members), and must disgorge those
payments.

The Plaintiff filed the putative class action in New Jersey
Superior Court, Law Division, Hudson County, on April 21, 2021. On
May 27, 2021, the Defendants removed the case to the Court. On July
30, 2021, they moved jointly to dismiss, arguing that he lacks
standing and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. The Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition and the
Defendants filed a reply. The motion is now fully briefed and ripe
for decision.

Discussion

A. Standing

Article III of the Constitution requires that a plaintiff have
standing to assert his or her claims. To prove standing, a
plaintiff must establish (1) an injury-in-fact, which is an
invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of; and (3) that it must be likely, as opposed
to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.

Judge McNulty opines that Browne has not alleged that he suffered
any concrete harm, or any risk of concrete harm. All he has alleged
is that at some point while paying back the student loan, he began
to pay NCSLT 2007-1 rather than JP Morgan Chase. He does not allege
that this change caused him to pay a single penny more than he
would otherwise have paid, or that it delayed his repayment of the
loan, or that it harmed his credit rating, or that it even caused
him distress, confusion, or wasted time. If JP Morgan Chase had
kept the loan on its own books until it was paid off, the Plaintiff
would have paid back the exact same amount of money and finished
paying off the loan at the exact same time, and he would occupy the
very same status with respect to the loan that he occupies today.
NCSLT 2007-1's non-licensure, in this context, is exactly the type
of "bare procedural violation" that does not confer standing
without evidence of concrete harm.

Because Browne has not suffered any concrete harm, the case cannot
proceed in federal court and must be dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds for lack of standing.

B. CFLA

In the alternative, however, and because the standing-based
dismissal is without prejudice to amendment, Judge McNulty briefly
discusses some aspects of the merits for the guidance of the
parties.

Browne asserts that there is conflicting authority on whether the
CFLA provides a private right of action. The Defendants cite three
cases from the district asserting that the CFLA does not confer a
private right of action -- MacDonald v. CashCall, Inc, 2017 WL
1536427, at *11 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2017), aff'd, 883 F.3d 220 (3d
Cir. 2018); Jubelt v. United N. Bankers, Ltd., 2015 WL 3970227, at
*14 (D.N.J. June 30, 2015); and Veras v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2014 WL
1050512, at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014)). Like the other judges who
have examined this question, Judge McNulty finds convincing Judge
Kugler's thorough analysis in Veras of why a private right of
action should not be implied in the CFLA.

Because he holds that the CFLA does not confer a private right of
action, Judge McNulty says, the first Count for a declaratory
judgment under the CFLA, even if standing could be found, would not
state a claim. The merits of the entire case depend on whether
Browne can prevail on Count 1 -- i.e., obtain a declaratory
judgment holding that NCSLT 2007-1 violated the CFLA by virtue of
its failure to be licensed. The merits of the other two Counts
would stand, or in the case fall, with those of Count 1.

Conclusion

For the reasons he set forth, Judge McNulty granted the Defendant's
motion to dismiss for lack of standing, without prejudice. A
separate order will be issued.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ypbrpjrp from Leagle.com.


NATWEST MARKETS: Faces Suit Over Manipulation of Treasury Futures
-----------------------------------------------------------------
M&N TRADING LLC, KOHL TRADING LLC, PORT 22 LLC, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. NATWEST
MARKETS SECURITIES INC., NATWEST MARKETS PLC, NATWEST GROUP PLC,
and JOHN DOES 1-20, Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-06831 (N.D. Ill.,
December 22, 2021) is a class action against the Defendants for
unjust enrichment and violations of the Commodity Exchange Act and
the common law.

The case arises from the Defendants' unlawful and intentional
manipulation of U.S. Treasury futures contracts and options on U.S.
Treasury futures contracts, traded on United States-based exchanges
including the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) during the period from
at least January 1, 2008 through May 31, 2014. The Defendants
manipulated the prices of Treasury futures using a manipulative
device known as spoofing. The Defendants placed orders for Treasury
futures with the intent, at the time the orders were placed, to
cancel those orders before they could be executed. By doing so, the
Defendants sent false and illegitimate supply and demand signals to
an otherwise efficient market. As a result, the Defendants caused
Treasury futures prices to be artificial throughout the Class
Period to benefit themselves financially, at the expense of other
investors, including the Plaintiffs and the Class, the suit
alleges.

M&N Trading LLC is a boutique trading firm headquartered in
Chicago, Illinois.

Kohl Trading LLC is a trading company headquartered in Chicago,
Illinois.

Port 22 LLC is a high speed algorithmic trading company based in
Chicago, Illinois.

NatWest Group Plc is a bank holding company based in Edinburgh,
Scotland.

NatWest Markets Plc is a banking company based in Edinburgh,
Scotland.

NatWest Markets Securities Inc. is a U.S. broker-dealer subsidiary
of NatWest Markets Plc, headquartered in Stamford, Connecticut.
[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Anthony F. Fata, Esq.
         Alexander J. Sweatman, Esq.
         CAFFERTY CLOBES MERIWETHER & SPRENGEL LLP
         135 South LaSalle Street, Suite 3210
         Chicago, IL 60603
         Telephone: (312) 782-4882
         E-mail: afata@caffertyclobes.com
                 asweatman@caffertyclobes.com

                    - and –

         Karen M. Lerner, Esq.
         David E. Kovel, Esq.
         Anthony E. Maneiro, Esq.
         KIRBY McINERNEY LLP
         250 Park Avenue, Suite 820
         New York, NY 10177
         Telephone: (212) 371-6600
         E-mail: klerner@kmllp.com
                 dkovel@kmllp.com
                 amaneiro@kmllp.com

OREGON: Snider Seeks Feb. 14 Extension for Class Cert. Filing
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CASEY SNIDER, et al., on
behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated persons,
known and unknown, v. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, an agency
of the State of Oregon, et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-00510-MK (D. Or.),
the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order extending the time
in which the parties are to complete pre-certification discovery
and move for class certification.

The Plaintiffs request a 90-day extension. The parties require this
extension due to unresolved issues of search terms for
electronically stored information. Obtaining this information is
necessary to prepare the plaintiffs' motion for class
certification. The parties have been diligent in conducting other
discovery in the meantime. The Plaintiffs have taken four
depositions and the parties have exchanged significant paper
discovery, the lawsuit says.

The current deadline was set as November 15, 2021. The Plaintiff
moves the court to extend the deadline to February 14, 2022.

The Plaintiffs include SCOTT FRAZIER; DARREL CARLSON; HECTOR
CARRASCO MONTIEL; ROCKY ROBISON; BOBBY SWEARINGEN; JERRY ANDERSON;
ESTEBAN VALLEJO; JUSTIN DENNEY; LELAND NICHOLSON; JOSHUA WILLIS;
JOSEPH LOOMIS; MARCUS HATRIDGE; and TREVOR TROLLOPE.

The Defendants include COLETTE PETERS, MIKE GOWER, TROY BOWSER,
TYLER BLEWETT; SUE WASHBURN; MARK NOOTH; NAIMA CHAMBERS-SMITH;
THERESA SWART; SPYDER CHAPMAN; STEVEN BOSTON; HEATHER CHRISTIAN;
ABRAHAM CAMPOS; PATRICK MCDONOUGH; GEORGE EDDY; RENE ROBERTS; ADAM
ARCHER; PHALINE MAYS; DAVID LINDHOLM; JASON DUCHEK; WILLIAM POWELL;
JOSE ARGUELLO; VICTOR PITNER; STEVEN HONG; BRYAN SUNDQUIST; STEVEN
RANSOM; THOMAS OLDS; HAROLD CANNON; JAMY BARTELL; and JEFFREY
BATEMAN.

The Oregon Department of Corrections is the agency of the U.S.
state of Oregon charged with managing a system of 14 state prisons
since its creation by the state legislature in 1987.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated Dec. 22, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/333Fau0 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Carl Post, Esq.
          John Burgess, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL SNYDER
          1000 S.W. Broadway, Suite 2400
          Portland, OR 97205
          Telephone: (503) 241-3617
          Facsimile: (503) 241-2249
          E-mail: carlpost@lawofficeofdanielsnyder.com
                  johnburgess@lawofficeofdanielsnyder.com

OUTBACK INC: Gil Wage-and-Hour Suit Removed to E.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled JESSE GIL, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. OUTBACK, INC. and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive,
Case No. 21CECG03273, was removed from the Superior Court of the
State of California, County of Fresno, to the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of California on December 22, 2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of California assigned
Case No. 1:21-cv-01803-DAD-EPG to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California Business and Professions
Code including failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay
overtime wages, failure to provide meal period, failure to provide
rest period, failure to provide accurate wage statement, failure to
timely pay final wages, failure to reimburse expenses, and unfair
competition.

Outback, Inc. is a construction company in California. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:          
         
         William M. Woolman, Esq.
         Charles P. Hamamjian, Esq.
         SAGASER, WATKINS & WIELAND, PC
         5260 North Palm Avenue, Suite 400
         Fresno, CA 93704
         Telephone: (559) 421-7000
         Facsimile: (559) 473-1483

PERSOLVE RECOVERIES: Seeks Extension to File Class Cert. Response
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ALLECIA SINKFIELD, v.
PERSOLVE RECOVERIES, LLC, Case No. 9:21-cv-80338-RKA (S.D. Fla.),
the Defendant files an unopposed Motion for extension of time to
file a response to the Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

On December 10, 2021, the Plaintiff served her motion for clas
certification and appointment of lead counsel.

A response to the Motion is due on or before December 24, 2021. The
Plaintiff requests an extension of 20 days to respond to Motion.

The parties have spent significant time and energy attempting to
reach a settlement in this matter and have resolved almost all
issues related to settlement. Defendant is confident that the
settlement will be reached prior to expiration of the 20 days.

The new response date would be January 13, 2022, the Plaintiff
requested.

Persolve is a full service legal recovery and collection firm.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Dec. 22, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ERzMqP at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Michael A. Gold, Esq.
          Joel W. Walters, Esq.
          WALTERS LEVINE PARISI & DEGRAVE
          601 Bayshore Boulevard, Suite 720
          Tampa, FL 33606 Phone:
          Telephone: (813) 254-7474
          Facsimile: (813) 254-7341
          E-mail: jwalters@walterslevine.com
                  mgold@walterslevine.com
                  cmanganiello@walterslevine.com

PLANNED PARENTHOOD: Fails to Protect Patient' Info, T.S. Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
T.S., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. PLANNED PARENTHOOD LOS ANGELES, Defendant, Case No.
21STCV46384 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., December 20, 2021)
arises out of Planned Parenthood's failure to secure the highly
sensitive personal information of its patients, including those who
visited Planned Parenthood for reproductive or sexual health
services, following an alleged data breach, in violation of the
California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, the
California Customer Records Act, and the Unfair Competition Law.

According to the complaint, between approximately October 9, 2021,
and October 17, 2021, an unauthorized party or parties accessed
Planned Parenthood's computer network, installed ransomware, and
exfiltrated patient files (the "Data Breach"). On October 17,
Planned Parenthood learned of the breach and that the files
extracted contained patient names, dates of birth, addresses,
insurance identification numbers, and clinical data, such as
diagnosis, treatment, or prescription information. Over 400,000
patients' personally identifiable information and personal health
information was compromised in the attack, says the suit.

The Plaintiff, by this action, seeks compensatory and statutory
damages, together with injunctive relief to remediate Planned
Parenthood's deficient cybersecurity protocols and provide identity
theft insurance to protect her and the other breach victims from
identity theft and fraud.

Plaintiff T.S. is a citizen and resident of Riverside, California.
The Plaintiff is using her initials in this litigation to protect
her privacy, and if required by the Court, will seek permission to
proceed under this pseudonym.

Planned Parenthood is an affiliate of Planned Parenthood Federation
of America. PPFA is a nonprofit organization that delivers
reproductive health care, sex education, and information to
millions of people worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam E. Polk, Esq.
          Simon Grille, Esq.
          Jessica Cook, Esq.
          GIRARD SHARP LLP
          601 California Street, Suite 1400
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 981-4800
          Facsimile: (415) 981-4846
          E-mail: apolk@girardsharp.com
                  sgrille@girardsharp.com
                  jcook@girardsharp.com

PROCORE LLC: Norris Sues Over Security Guards' Unpaid Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------
ALGIE NORRIS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. PROCORE LLC and JACK BROWN, Defendants,
Case No. 1:21-cv-07014 (E.D.N.Y., December 20, 2021) is brought by
the Plaintiff due to the Defendants' alleged violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law by failing to pay
overtime, failing to timely pay wages, and failing to furnish wage
statements.

Ms. Norris is employed by the Defendants as a security guard since
January 22, 2021.

Procore LLC operates as a security guard company which provides
security personnel for non-profit homeless and mental health
shelters as well as other businesses.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Amit Kumar, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM CAFARO
          108 West 39th Street, Suite 602
          New York, NY 10018
          Telephone: (212) 583-7400
          E-mail: AKumar@CafaroEsq.com

RAYMOND JAMES: Loses Bid to Dismiss Nguyen's 2nd Amended Complaint
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa
Division, denies the Defendant's motion to dismiss the second
amended complaint filed in the lawsuit captioned as KIMBERLY
NGUYEN, Plaintiff v. RAYMOND JAMES & ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 8:20-cv-195-CEH-AAS (M.D. Fla.).

The Defendant argues that the complaint is pleaded in shotgun form,
fails to state claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence,
and that the claims are barred by the independent tort doctrine and
precluded from being asserted as class action claims by the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act.

Background

The Plaintiff, Kimberly Nguyen, has been a client of Defendant
Raymond James & Associates, Inc., since June 2015. Raymond James
operates as a registered broker-dealer with the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and as a registered investment advisor
firm with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). It engages in most aspects of securities distribution and
investment banking, and operates as a wealth management firm,
offering portfolio management, financial planning, and advisory
services. It offered commission-based accounts for which it charged
clients a modest fee per trade and fee-based accounts, which
attracted an annual fee based on a percentage of the assets in the
client's account.

According to the Plaintiff, she and the putative class members'
assets were originally placed in commission-based accounts by
Raymond James. The Plaintiff's investment strategy was to buy and
hold, and she paid modest commissions for the few trades that were
executed. In January 2016, Raymond James' registered
representative, without conducting any suitability analysis,
advised the Plaintiff to transfer her assets, including shares in
various mutual funds, into a fee-based account. This was done even
though the registered representative knew the Plaintiff's
investment strategy, and at no time was she advised that the
fee-based account was not suitable for her. Raymond James' policies
and practices were designed to strongly encourage its registered
representatives to solicit and recommend that clients transfer to
fee-based accounts, and transitioning smaller clients to Freedom
Accounts was profitable for registered representatives.

Based on the advice of the registered representative, the Plaintiff
executed a Client Freedom Account Agreement. After the Agreement
was executed, the Plaintiff chose a portfolio model. Raymond James
then liquidated the assets in her commission-based account,
transferred the funds to her fee-based Freedom Account, and
reinvested the funds. The Plaintiff did not base her decision to
enroll in the Freedom Account program on the purchase or sale of a
particular security.

As is the case with the Plaintiff, Raymond James transferred the
assets of members of the putative class without conducting any
suitability analysis. After switching the Plaintiff's and putative
class members' assets to the Freedom Account, Raymond James
maintained those assets in the fee-based accounts without
monitoring the accounts to determine--via an account suitability
analysis--whether it should transfer the assets back into a
commission-based account in view of the limited trading activity.
It also did so without supervising its broker-dealers to ensure the
required monitoring was being performed.

In failing to conduct account-type suitability analyses before
transferring clients into fee-based accounts and having processes
and procedures in place to do so, and in allowing the assets to
remain in those accounts without proper monitoring, Raymond James
was negligent and breached its fiduciary obligations to the
Plaintiff and putative class members, as well as duties under state
law.

As a result of the switch in account types, the Plaintiff and
putative class members were charged far higher fees than the modest
per-transaction commissions for commission-based accounts and
Raymond James profited significantly at their expense. Following
its class-wide transfer of assets, Raymond James reported
significant increases in the value of assets in fee-based accounts.
Its stock doubled from $41 per share to more than $90 per share due
to its growth in fee-based accounts over the relevant time period.

The Lawsuit

The Plaintiff commenced the action against Raymond James on Jan.
24, 2020. The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Raymond James
breached its fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the Plaintiff
and class members by transferring their assets from
commission-based accounts to fee-based accounts without conducting
any suitability analysis (Count I) and by failing to conduct any
ongoing suitability analysis or otherwise monitoring these accounts
after the transfer of assets to ensure that fee-based accounts were
still suitable (Count II). The Plaintiff also alleges that Raymond
James was negligent in failing to conduct suitability analysis
prior to recommending and transferring clients' assets from
commission to fee-based accounts and in failing to have supervisory
measures and procedures in place to do so (Count III). Lastly, the
Plaintiff alleges that Raymond James' failure to monitor or
otherwise conduct suitability reviews of fee-based accounts and
failure to have procedures in place to do so after the transfer of
assets fell below the standard of care expected and was negligent
(Count IV).

According to the complaint, the standards of care expected of
broker-dealers such as Raymond James are set forth in the rules of
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Those rules
impose a number of obligations on broker-dealers, including duties
to: undertake reasonable diligence to ascertain the customer's
investment profile; have a reasonable basis to believe that a
recommended transaction or investment strategy involving securities
is suitable for the customer; and make only those recommendations
that are consistent with the customer's best interest.

Raymond James has moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It argues that
the complaint is a legally incoherent shotgun pleading, fails to
state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty or negligence, and
states class action claims that are precluded by the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 78bb(f)(1)
("SLUSA" or "the Act"). It also contends that the claims asserted
are subject to dismissal based on the independent tort doctrine.

Discussion

a. Shotgun Pleading

The Defendant argues that the complaint should be dismissed as a
shotgun pleading. It identifies the following reasons as to why the
complaint is a shotgun pleading: (i) complete overlap between the
paragraphs incorporated into Counts I and III and those
incorporated into Counts II and IV; (ii) every Count incorporates
the new "scheme" allegations in paragraphs 59-93 without regard to
pre-transfer and post-transfer distinctions; and (iii) Counts III
and IV each cover multiple purported grounds for relief; and (iv)
that inconsistent theories, which are not pleaded in the
alternative, pervade the complaint and cannot simultaneously be
true.

In opposition, the Plaintiff explains that the complaint asserts
two categories of claims distinguished by periods of time--before
and after transfer of assets--and that factual allegations have
been separated based on the two relevant timeframes and
incorporated into appropriate claims. She contends that this is
permitted by the Federal Rules and provides Raymond James "adequate
and fair notice" of the claims against it and the grounds upon
which each claim rests. She also contends that the Federal Rules
permit the pleading of alternative claims based on the same facts
and that the same facts form the bases for both its negligence and
breach of fiduciary duty claims.

District Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell opines that the arguments
raised by the Defendant as to shotgun defects lack merit. First, as
the Plaintiff points out, the complaint alleges claims based on two
relevant time periods--prior to transfer of the Plaintiff's and
putative class members' assets to fee-based accounts and after
transfer to these accounts. The resulting separation of
allegations, based on relevant time period, and incorporation into
counts based on the time period at issue does not run afoul of the
rules of pleading.

In fact, Judge Honeywell explains, it makes it clear that the
Plaintiff is asserting claims based on what the Defendant did or
did not do both before and after the transfer of assets and change
in accounts. Additionally, the incorporation of the "new scheme
allegations in paragraphs 59-93" does not muddle the claims, nor
does it diminish the clarity of the claims asserted.

Next, the fact that each negligence claim is premised on a failure
to conduct suitability analyses and/or have procedures in place to
determine the suitability of fee-based accounts does not render
those claims improperly pleaded, Judge Honeywell finds. This does
not raise two separate claims as the Defendant suggests. Instead,
it sets forth two means of proving the Defendant's negligence in
switching the Plaintiff and putative class members to fee-based
accounts.

Lastly, the Court agrees with the Plaintiff that pleading in the
alternative is allowed by the Federal Rules, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(d)(2). The Court, therefore, rejects the arguments presented by
the Defendant as to why the complaint is a shotgun pleading.

b. Preclusion by Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act

Raymond James argues that the Plaintiff cannot bring the claims as
class action claims as they are barred by the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act. The Act grew out of concerns that plaintiffs
and their attorneys, in order to avoid the hurdles of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, were bringing securities
fraud class actions under state law, often in state court. As such,
the Act contains the following core provision: Class action
limitations. No covered class action based upon the statutory or
common law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in
any State or Federal court by any private party alleging:

   (A) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in
       connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
       security; or

   (B) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or
       deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the
       purchase or sale of a covered security.

Raymond James argues that both subsections apply to preclude the
Plaintiff's claims because the state claims are predicated on
material misstatements or omissions and the complaint alleges that
the transition between accounts is part of an institutional,
undisclosed deceptive scheme aimed at increasing Raymond James'
profits at the expense of its clients.

The Plaintiff responds that Raymond James' attempt to recast her
common law claims as statutory securities claims is wrong, and that
regardless, the Act does not apply because a lack of suitability
analysis that affects the choice of account type is not "material"
or "in connection with" the purchase or sale of covered
securities.

Judge Honeywell notes that there is no dispute that the complaint
alleges a covered class action and asserts state law claims, as
Raymond James contends, thus, satisfying two of the elements for
SLUSA preclusion. The issue presented is whether the allegations
bring the lawsuit within the scope of either subsection (A) or (B)
of the Act.

Raymond James argues that the most obvious omission alleged by the
complaint is that it failed to inform customers that it was not
determining whether the account was suitable, either before or
after transferring the customer's assets into a fee-based account.
However, Judge Honeywell finds, the allegation cited does not
support Raymond James' contention. Instead, that allegation states
that the registered representative knew that the Plaintiff's
investment strategy was buy-and-hold, did not conduct the
suitability analysis, advised the Plaintiff to transfer assets, and
did not advise the Plaintiff that the account was not suitable for
her. The Court will not infer, from this allegation, that Raymond
James did not inform the Plaintiff that it was not conducting a
suitability analysis.

Raymond James also argues that the complaint alleges that it
falsely represented in the Freedom Agreement that it would conduct
an "assessment of suitability" upon transferring clients into the
Freedom Account. Judge Honeywell finds that Raymond James fails to
identify which paragraph of the Second Amended Complaint contains
the allegation that it made misrepresentations to the Plaintiff.
Rather, it cites to the Freedom Agreement, which is attached to its
motion to dismiss. Hence, Raymond James has failed to show that the
purported misrepresentation is of a material fact.

The Court agrees with Raymond James that the complaint alleges a
deceptive device or contrivance. The complaint alleges that Raymond
James had a practice of strongly encouraging its registered
representatives to transfer clients into fee-based Freedom Accounts
and that transitioning smaller clients to Freedom Accounts was more
profitable for the registered representative. After switching
accounts, upon the advice of the Raymond James representative, the
Plaintiff and putative class members paid substantial fees to
Raymond James, and it profited significantly at the expense of its
clients. The complaint essentially alleges a scheme by Raymond
James to transfer clients to fee-based accounts, in order to
increase its profits, at the clients' expense.

Judge Honeywell also finds that the complaint pleads a deceptive
scheme that affected the Plaintiff's and the putative class
members' choice as to the vehicle for investing their assets. That
securities in the Plaintiff's commission-based accounts were sold
upon her transfer to the fee-based account, and then new securities
were subsequently purchased for that account, is too remote a
connection to satisfy the requirements of SLUSA. As such, the
complaint does not allege a connection between the deceptive scheme
and the sale or purchase of securities.

c. Application of the Independent Tort Doctrine

Raymond James then argues that all four counts are barred by the
independent tort doctrine as each depends entirely on the
Plaintiff's contracts with Raymond James. The Court, however, does
not agree. Under Florida's independent tort doctrine, it is well
settled that a plaintiff may not recast causes of action that are
otherwise breach-of-contract claims as tort claims, Judge Honeywell
holds, citing Altamonte Pediatric Assocs., P.A. v. Greenway Health,
LLC, No. 8:20-CV-VMC-JSS, 2020 WL 5350303, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept.
4, 2020) (quoting Spears v. SHK Consulting and Dev., Inc., 338
F.Supp.3d 1272, 1279 (M.D. Fla. 2018)).

The claims raised in this action do not depend on the contract
between Raymond James and its clients, Judge Honeywell notes.
Rather, they hinge on industry standards and practices, evidenced
by FINRA rules, which set the obligations imposed on Raymond James
in its capacity as a broker-dealer to clients including Plaintiff
and putative class members.

Allegations specific to each of the four counts are also consistent
with the theory of liability, i.e., that the claims are grounded in
duties that go beyond any contract with Raymond James, Judge
Honeywell finds. Based on the Plaintiff's allegations, the claims
are grounded in facts that go beyond the parties' agreement and
thus not barred by the independent tort doctrine.

d. Failure to State Claims

Raymond James presents two additional arguments as to why the
claims are not legally sufficient. First, it argues that the
Plaintiff cannot state a claim for violation of a fiduciary or
common-law duty based on alleged differences in the accounts' costs
to the Plaintiff.

Second, Raymond James argues that the claims are implausible
because they are inconsistent with the Client Agreement and Freedom
Agreement.

The Court agrees with the Plaintiff that such fact-based arguments
should not be considered at this stage of the litigation. Whether
the Plaintiff and putative class members paid higher fees for
additional benefits and whether Raymond James conducted a
suitability analysis through use of client questionnaires may be
relevant at the summary judgment stage. Such issues are not
properly before the Court at this time, as the Court must accept
the well-pleaded factual allegations in the Second Amended
Complaint.

Taking the allegations as true, the Plaintiff has plausibly alleged
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence, Judge Honeywell
holds. Sufficient facts have been alleged as to Raymond James'
duty, the source of that duty, and its relationship with its
clients, so as to render the claim plausible.

Judge Honeywell adds that upon review of the Second Amended
Complaint, the Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly
state a claim based on Raymond James' failure to engage in certain
acts and employ the use of certain safeguards in its role as
broker/dealer.

Conclusion

In sum, the Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded causes of actions
for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence against Raymond James.
The claims are not barred by the independent tort doctrine as they
are grounded in facts that go beyond the parties' agreement.
Additionally, they are not precluded from being litigated as class
action claims by SLUSA, as the Second Amended Complaint does not
allege that the acts at issue are material or in connection with
the purchase or sale of covered securities.

Accordingly, it is ordered:

   1. Defendant Raymond James & Associates, Inc.'s Motion to
      Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and Incorporated
      Memorandum of Law is denied; and

   2. The Defendant will answer the Second Amended Complaint in
      accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Dec. 23, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3v4yajwb from Leagle.com.


SHARPSPRING INC: Faces Morse Suit Over Misleading Proxy Statement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BRADFORD MORSE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SHARPSPRING, INC., RICHARD CARLSON, STEVEN
HUEY, SCOTT MILLER, SAVNEET SINGH, and JASON COSTI, Defendants,
Case No. 1:21-cv-00209-RH-GRJ (N.D. Fla., December 20, 2021) is
brought by the Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all similarly
situated former public stockholders of SharpSpring, Inc., against
SharpSpring and the former members of the Company's board of
directors for violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff's claims arise from the
all-cash sale of SharpSpring to Constant Contact, Inc., an online
marketing tech company owned by private equity sponsors Clearlake
Capital Group, L.P. and Siris Capital Group, LLC for $17.10 per
share.

On July 29, 2021, Defendants solicited shareholders into approving
the unfair merger by issuing a proxy statement that contained
materially false and misleading statements, notes the complaint.
Despite fully recognizing the inadequacy of the merger
consideration, the Board allegedly misled shareholders into
approving the unfair merger by (i) directing Company management to
downwardly revise SharpSpring's Plan Projections, which had been
prepared in the ordinary course business, to create the
unreasonably low Fairness Opinion Projections that would achieve
support for the desired fairness opinion; (ii) ordering
SharpSpring's financial advisor, JMP Securities LLC, to use the
Fairness Opinion Projections to perform the valuation analyses
underlying its fairness opinion; and (iii) including the material
statements in the proxy that (a) falsely represented the
reasonableness of the Fairness Opinion Projections and (b) misled
SharpSpring shareholders regarding the fair value of their shares.

SharpSpring, Inc. provides cloud-based marketing solutions. The
Company offers email automation, customer relationship management,
call tracking, social platform, and analytical solutions.
SharpSpring serves customers in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alan S. Wachs, Esq.
          Richard D. Rivera, Esq.
          SMITH, GAMBRELL & RUSSELL, LLP
          50 N. Laura Street, Suite 260
          Jacksonville, FL 32202
          Telephone: (904) 598-6110
          Facsimile: (904) 598-6210
          E-mail: awachs@sgrlaw.com
                  rrivera@sgrlaw.com

               - and -

          Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
          MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
          The Empire State Building
          350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4405
          New York, NY 10118
          Telephone: (212) 971-1341
          Facsimile: (212) 202-7880
          E-mail: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com

SOUTH BROWARD: American Plan's Bid to Quash Moved to S.D. Florida
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, AMERICAN PLAN ADMINISTRATORS, Petitioner v. SOUTH
BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT, Respondent, Case No. 21-MC-2663 (KAM)
(TAM) (E.D.N.Y.), Magistrate Judge Taryn A. Merkel of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted the
Respondent's motion to transfer the Petitioner's motion to quash a
subpoena to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida.

Background

On May 21, 2020, the Respondent filed a putative class action
lawsuit against ELAP Services, LLP and Group & Pension
Administrators, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. On Aug. 31, 2021, the Respondent served the
subpoena in question upon the Petitioner, a non-party to the class
action. According to the Petitioner, the subpoena seeks the
production of personal information and personal health information
of individuals from across the country.

On Sept. 15, 2021, the Petitioner filed a motion to quash in the
Eastern District of New York, arguing, among other things, that the
subpoena is overly broad, contains confidential health information
for thousands of patients, would disclose Movants' confidential
business information and trade secrets, presents an unfathomable
burden of compliance to a non-party, and is not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in the
underlying Florida-venued lawsuit, and primarily serves solely as a
means of harassment.

In response, on Oct. 20, 2021, the Respondent filed a motion to
transfer the Petitioner's motion to quash to the Southern District
of Florida. On Nov. 3, 2021, the Petitioner responded, after which
the Respondent filed a reply in support of their motion to
transfer. The Court held a motion hearing on Dec. 1, 2021.

Analysis

A. Rule 45(f) Motion to Transfer

In light of the six similar motions filed across the country, Judge
Merkel analyzes the Respondent's motion to transfer first. The
Respondent requests that the Court transfers the Petitioner's
motion to quash to the Southern District of Florida, where the
underlying action is pending, for several reasons. The Respondent
argues that the "exceptional circumstances" required for a transfer
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(f) are present because
there are identical motions to quash filed across the country,
transfer of the motion to quash would promote judicial economy, and
the Respondent's interest in transfer outweighs any interest
Petitioner has in the local resolution of the motion to quash.

While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(f) states that a motion
may be transferred under "exceptional circumstances," it is the
Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 45(f) that provide concrete
guidance as to when those "exceptional circumstances" are present
and transfer is warranted. Judge Merkel finds that the factors
discussed in the Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 45(f) are
present in the case and transfer of the motion to quash to the
Southern District of Florida is appropriate.

B. The Southern District of Florida Has Already Ruled on Issues
Presented by the Motion to Quash

The Advisory Committee's notes observed that "transfer may be
warranted when the transferee court has already ruled on issues
presented by the motion." As noted, the Southern District of
Florida is where the underlying class action lawsuit is pending.
That court has already entered a HIPAA-Qualified Protective Order
that may address Petitioner's concerns that the instant subpoena
inappropriately seeks protected, personal health information.
Additionally, the Southern District of Florida court has entered a
Confidentiality Agreement and Protective Order that addresses how
parties and non-parties may designate material, such as the
documents requested by the instant subpoena, as confidential. Judge
Merkel thus finds that the Southern District of Florida "has
already ruled on issues presented by the motion."

C. The Same Issues Have Already Arisen in Other Districts

The Advisory Committee's notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
45(f) further observe that "transfer may be warranted when the same
issues are likely to arise in discovery in many districts." To
date, six almost identical motions to quash have been filed in six
federal district courts. In the case, it is not just that the "same
issues are likely to arise" -- they have already arisen. Hence, the
interests of judicial economy and consistency weigh in support of
granting the Respondent's transfer motion.

D. Transfer Will Not Burden Petitioner

The Advisory Committee's notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
45(f) explain that when deciding a motion to transfer, "the prime
concern should be avoiding burdens on local nonparties subject to
subpoenas."

Based on the current record, Judge Merkel finds no evidence
indicating that transfer of the motion to quash to the Southern
District of Florida would result in any burden to the Petitioner or
the Petitioner's employees or witnesses that would be any greater
than that imposed by litigating the motion here in the Eastern
District of New York, where the Court is conducting matters such as
these by telephone or video due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.
The burden of litigating the case in Florida would likely be
identical, as the record shows that the Petitioner and the
Petitioner's employees or witnesses will be able to attend hearings
in the Southern District of Florida via telephone or video. There
is no evidence that Petitioner or any witness would have to travel
to Florida to litigate the motion to quash. Accordingly, Judge
Merkel finds that the Petitioner will not be unduly burdened by
litigating the motion to quash in the Southern District of
Florida.

E. The Interests in Transferring Outweigh the Interests of the
Petitioner in Obtaining Local Resolution

Finally, the Advisory Committee's notes to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 45(f) indicate that "transfer is appropriate only if such
interests outweigh the interests of the nonparty served with the
subpoena in obtaining local resolution of the motion." During the
Dec. 1, 2021 Motion Hearing, the Petitioner argued that its
interest in obtaining resolution of the motion to quash in the
Eastern District of New York stems, in part, from wanting a New
York court to determine New York-specific issues as related to the
motion to quash. However, when asked whether there are material
differences between New York privacy laws and federal HIPAA
protections, which the Southern District of Florida would and
should apply, the counsel for the Petitioner was not able to
specify any material differences. The Petitioner also failed to
identify any reason the Southern District of Florida judges could
not interpret and apply New York law if necessary.

In the case, for all of the reasons discussed, Judge Merkel holds
that the interests of judicial economy and adjudicating related and
similar issues in the same court outweigh the Petitioner's
interests in obtaining local resolution of the motion to quash.

Conclusion

Because the "exceptional circumstances" contemplated by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 45(f) exist in the case and transfer to the
Southern District of Florida is warranted, Judge Merkel finds no
need to engage in an analysis of the merits of the Petitioner's
motion to quash the instant subpoena. For the foregoing reasons,
the Court grants the Respondent's motion to transfer the motion to
quash. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to transfer the
Petitioner's Motion to Quash to the Southern District of Florida.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mpu4n2xn from Leagle.com.


SOUTHERN STATES: Class Certification Appeal in Stanley Suit Tossed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Donald Stanley and Sean Reiter, Individually and as
Class Representatives, Respondents v. Southern States Police
Benevolent Association, Inc., Appellant, Opinion No. 5882 (S.C.
App.), the Court of Appeals of South Carolina dismissed the
Appellant's appeal from an order certifying a class action lawsuit
against it.

The order certifies as a class certain South Carolina PBA members
for the purpose of determining the scope of their rights to legal
representation PBA provides. PBA claims the trial court's class
certification order should be reversed because it improperly
impairs PBA's business activities and wrongly certified a damages
class. The Court of Appeals opines that it cannot address these
issues because they are not immediately appealable. Where, as in
the case, a Rule 23, SCRCP, class certification order does not
address the merits, it is interlocutory and may not be appealed
until after final judgment.

Believing it has found a path around this precedent, PBA points to
the following portion of the certification order: "Any notices
required by the law and the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
will be given to the class in a form and manner to be determined by
the Court upon application by Plaintiffs or Defendants. In the
interim, no party will communicate with the class members regarding
this class action and the allegations contained herein." According
to PBA, this provision amounts to an injunction, triggering S.C.
Code Ann. Section 14-3-330(4) (2017), which provides an
interlocutory order granting an injunction is immediately
appealable.

PBA further asserts the order runs afoul of Eldridge and Gulf Oil
Co. v. Bernard, which require that orders restraining
communications with class members must "be based on a clear record
and specific findings reflecting a weighing of the need for a
limitation and the potential interference with the parties'
rights."

The Court of Appeals questions whether the communication order in
the case, which was designed by the skilled circuit judge to
evaporate once the class notice was issued, is a true injunction of
the type envisioned by Eldridge. It finds that the order at issue
there only applied to the plaintiff, and was entered before the
class was certified. Several courts and commentators have cautioned
that procedural orders in class action cases that in no way provide
substantive relief or address the merits of a case are not
appealable as injunctions under the federal final judgment
statute.

The Court of Appeals is also concerned that an overly generous view
of what constitutes an injunction for purposes of appealability may
sap the efficiency of class actions by allowing for immediate
appeal of what in reality may be an interlocutory procedural
ruling. If any routine phrase in a class certification order may be
interpreted as an immediately appealable injunction, it says, the
entire class action -- premised as it is on the idea that the
advantages of economy of scale might help both sides and streamline
the litigation -- could be brought to a halt by a party bent on
delay.

But the Court of Appeals does not have to confront these questions
about what constitutes an "injunction" in the case. It finds that
the provision of the trial court's order limiting communication was
not discussed before the order was issued. PBA did not object to or
mention the provision in its Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion and raises
the issue for the first time on appeal. The Court of Appeals
therefore find the issue unpreserved.

When a party receives an order containing relief that was not
requested or contemplated, the party must present its objections to
the issue to the trial court in a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to
preserve the issue for appeal. This gives the trial court the
opportunity to consider and rule upon the issue in the trial
setting after it has been refined by fact-finding and sharpened by
argument. This in turn allows the Court of Appeals to provide the
meaningful consideration only a complete record provides. As an
appellate court, "we are a court of review, not of first view."

Because PBA's challenge to the communication limitation is
unpreserved and none of PBA's other issues are immediately
appealable, PBA's appeal is dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/pxsf93dk from Leagle.com.

James Andrew Yoho, of Boyle, Leonard & Anderson, P.A., of
Charleston; James Edward Bradley, of Moore Bradley Myers, PA, of
West Columbia; and Barry Goheen, of Atlanta, Georgia, all for the
Appellant.

Andrew John Savage, III -- andy@savlaw.com -- of Savage Law Firm,
of Charleston; Eric Steven Bland , of Bland Richter, LLP, of
Columbia; Daniel Francis Lynch, IV, and Carl Everette Pierce, II,
both of Pierce, Sloan, Wilson, Kennedy & Early, LLC, of Charleston;
Scott Michael Mongillo and Ronald L. Richter, Jr., both of Bland
Richter, LLP, of Charleston; and Joseph C. Wilson, IV, of Joseph C
Wilson Law Firm LLC, of Folly Beach, all for the Respondents.


SOUTHWEST CREDIT: Summary Judgment Order in Persinger Suit Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BROOKE PERSINGER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SOUTHWEST
CREDIT SYSTEMS, L.P., Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 21-1037 (7th
Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's order granting summary judgment to Southwest.

Introduction

In 2017, a bankruptcy court discharged Brooke Persinger's debts. A
few months later, Southwest began collection efforts on a
pre-petition debt of Persinger's, including by acquiring a type of
credit information called her "propensity-to-pay score." Alleging
that this information had been secured without a permissible
purpose, Persinger sued Southwest under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. Section 1681, et seq.

Background

Ms. Persinger and her husband jointly filed for bankruptcy in 2017.
Their bankruptcy petition listed each creditor to which they
individually, or jointly, owed a debt. One such creditor was
Southwest, who was servicing an AT&T debt incurred by Persinger's
husband in 2014. This was the only debt for which Southwest was
listed as a creditor.

The bankruptcy court ordered a discharge of the Persingers' debts
under 11 U.S.C. Section 727. The discharge order listed Brooke
Persinger's four former names, including, as relevant in the case,
Brooke Casey. Following the discharge order, the bankruptcy court
notified all known creditors, including Southwest, of its ruling.

When Southwest received this notice, it scanned its system for
affected accounts. Per company policy, Southwest closes accounts
subject to bankruptcy. But by the time Southwest received notice of
the Persingers' 2017 bankruptcy, it had already closed the AT&T
account.

Bankruptcy notices are not the only way Southwest learns about
discharged debts. Upon receiving a new account, Southwest orders a
"bankruptcy scrub" from LexisNexis--a process by which LexisNexis
searches for bankruptcy information connected to that account. If
matching bankruptcy data is discovered, it is immediately returned
to Southwest. If no immediate match is discovered, LexisNexis
stores the account information, continuously searches for matches,
and forwards any bankruptcy data it later finds. As with bankruptcy
notices, if a bankruptcy scrub reveals that an account is subject
to bankruptcy, Southwest closes the account.

In January 2018, Southwest received a delinquent account in Brooke
Persinger's former name, Brooke Casey, for a debt owed to Viasat
Residential. This debt, though delinquent since 2014, was not
listed on Persinger's 2017 bankruptcy petition. Southwest, as a
matter of course, ordered a bankruptcy scrub. Because LexisNexis
did not immediately return any bankruptcy results, Southwest
proceeded in its collection efforts.

To form a collection strategy, Southwest orders a
"propensity-to-pay score" from a consumer credit reporting agency.
This is not a full credit report but rather a form of "soft pull"
indicating the likelihood of repayment on a scale of 400 to 800.
Unlike a "hard pull," a soft pull is not visible to third parties
and does not affect one's credit score. Because the bankruptcy
scrub did not return any bankruptcy data, Southwest ordered
Persinger's propensity-to-pay score. Several months later, though,
LexisNexis updated Persinger's account with information about her
2017 bankruptcy. Upon receiving this update, Southwest closed the
account.

After learning that Southwest accessed her credit information,
Persinger filed a class-action complaint against Southwest,
alleging violations of the FCRA. Following discovery, the parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment; the district court
granted Southwest's motion and denied Persinger's motion. On
appeal, Persinger challenges the grant of summary judgment to
Southwest.

Discussion

Before proceeding to the merits, the Seventh Circuit must answer
the jurisdictional question of whether Persinger has standing to
sue. Although the district court did not address Southwest's
argument that Persinger lacked standing, the Seventh Circuit has an
"independent obligation" to inspect, and remain within,
jurisdictional boundaries." The Article III standing inquiry
remains open to review at all stages of the litigation." But the
plaintiff's "burden to demonstrate standing changes as the
procedural posture of the litigation changes." Where, in the
instant case, the procedural posture is summary judgment, the
Plaintiff must "set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific
facts, which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be
taken to be true."

Federal jurisdiction "extends only to 'Cases' and 'Controversies,'"
citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 337 (2016) (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. III, Section 2). In TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141
S.Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021), standing doctrine enforces this limitation
by ensuring that courts only adjudicate disputes in which the
plaintiff has a "personal stake." Standing consists of three
elements: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. The case
concerns the first element -- injury in fact -- which means the
injury must be both "concrete and particularized," and "actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."

In sum, the Seventh Circuit holds that history and precedent compel
a simple result: Persinger has standing to sue. She testified that
Southwest invaded her privacy when it reviewed her credit
information. Under Spokeo and Ramirez, this is a concrete injury
because it is analogous to the common law tort of intrusion upon
seclusion. Thus, Persinger has standing to seek damages under 15
U.S.C. sections 1681n-o.

Now, the Seventh Circuit turns to the merits. It reviews the
district court's summary-judgment order de novo and construes the
record in the light most favorable to Persinger -- the nonmoving
party. The FCRA provides a private right of action for injured
consumers. A negligent violation entitles a consumer to actual
damages. A willful violation entitles a consumer to actual damages
or statutory damages, with punitive damages left to the court's
discretion. Persinger advances both a negligence theory and a
willfulness theory.

A.

For Persinger to survive Southwest's motion for summary judgment on
her negligence theory, she was required to proffer evidence showing
Southwest impermissibly accessed her propensity-to-pay score
causing her pecuniary or nonpecuniary harm. She failed to do so. As
to pecuniary harm, she disavowed any loss of credit, housing,
employment, money, or insurance. When asked if invasion of privacy
was the only harm caused by Southwest's actions, she answered,
"Yes." According to Persinger, this invasion of privacy caused her
"stress" and "anger." But damages for emotional distress must be
proved with more than conclusory statements.

In short, the Seventh Circuit holds that Persinger's testimony not
only failed to support her claim for actual damages but also
disproved it. With respect to negligence, then, summary judgment
for Southwest was appropriate because no reasonable juror could
conclude that the inquiry into Persinger's propensity-to-pay score
resulted in actual damages.

B.

Even if a plaintiff cannot prove actual damages, she may still
recover statutory or punitive damages by proving that the defendant
willfully violated the FCRA. To prevail under Section 1681n,
Persinger must show that Southwest not only violated the FCRA but
did so willfully. She points to two predicate actions: Southwest's
handling of the 2017 bankruptcy notice and Southwest's bankruptcy
scrub procedure. Viewed as a whole, Southwest's procedures --
whether for handling bankruptcy notifications or ordering
bankruptcy scrubs -- were reasonable compliance efforts, not
willful violations of the FCRA.

In sum, the Seventh Circuit finds that there is no genuine dispute
that Southwest first learned of Persinger's 2017 bankruptcy on May
22, 2018, when LexisNexis returned bankruptcy information. At this
point, Southwest promptly closed the account. The record
demonstrates, without any genuine dispute, that Southwest had a
procedure by which it submitted a consumer's information to
LexisNexis, and if LexisNexis did not return bankruptcy
information, it continued its collection activities. Southwest also
processed incoming bankruptcy notices and closed affected accounts.
To be sure, Persinger's debt was discharged by the time Southwest
obtained her propensity-to-pay score -- for this, there was no
permissible purpose under the FCRA. But Southwest lacked actual
knowledge of the bankruptcy, and it did not recklessly disregard
the possibility that debt had been discharged. The evidence shows
that it had a reasonable basis for relying on its procedures.

Conclusion

For the reasons it described, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment to Southwest.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2wumjapm from Leagle.com.


STARBUCKS CORP: C.D. California Enters Protective Order in Myers
----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Shashi I. Kewalramani of the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California, Eastern Division, issues a
Stipulated Protective Order in the case, LORI MYERS, Plaintiff v.
STARBUCKS CORPORATION, MARS WRIGLEY CONFECTIONARY US, LLC; THE
QUAKER OATS COMPANY; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
5:20-cv-00335-JWH-SHK (C.D. Cal.).

Disclosure and discovery activity in the action are likely to
involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private
information for which special protection from public disclosure and
from use for any purpose other than prosecuting the litigation may
be warranted. Accordingly, the parties stipulated to and petitioned
the Court to enter the Stipulated Protective Order. The parties
acknowledged that the Order does not confer blanket protections on
all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection
it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the
limited information or items that are entitled to confidential
treatment under the applicable legal principles.

The protections conferred by the Stipulation and Order cover not
only Protected Material, but also (1) any information copied or
extracted from Protected Material; (2) all copies, excerpts,
summaries, or compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any
testimony, conversations, or presentations by Parties or their
Counsel that might reveal Protected Material. However, the
protections conferred by the Stipulation and Order do not cover the
following information: (a) any information that is in the public
domain at the time of disclosure to a Receiving Party or becomes
part of the public domain after its disclosure to a Receiving Party
as a result of publication not involving a violation of this Order,
including becoming part of the public record through trial or
otherwise; and (b) any information known to the Receiving Party
prior to the disclosure or obtained by the Receiving Party after
the disclosure from a source who obtained the information lawfully
and under no obligation of confidentiality to the Designating
Party. Any use of Protected Material at trial will be governed by a
separate agreement or order.

Even after final disposition of the litigation, the confidentiality
obligations imposed by the Order will remain in effect until a
Designating Party agrees otherwise in writing or a court order
otherwise directs. Final disposition will be deemed to be the later
of (1) dismissal of all claims and defenses in the action, with or
without prejudice; and (2) final judgment therein after the
completion and exhaustion of all appeals, rehearings, remands,
trials, or reviews of the action, including the time limits for
filing any motions or applications for extension of time pursuant
to applicable law.

A Receiving Party may use Protected Material that is disclosed or
produced by another Party or by a Non-Party in connection with the
case only for prosecuting, defending, or attempting to settle the
litigation. Such Protected Material may be disclosed only to the
categories of persons and under the conditions described in the
Order. When the litigation has been terminated, a Receiving Party
must comply with the provisions of section 15.

If a Receiving Party learns that, by inadvertence or otherwise, it
has disclosed Protected Material to any person or in any
circumstance not authorized under the Stipulated Protective Order,
the Receiving Party must immediately (a) notify in writing the
Designating Party of the unauthorized disclosures, (b) use its best
efforts to retrieve all unauthorized copies of the Protected
Material, (c) inform the person or persons to whom unauthorized
disclosures were made of all the terms of the Order, and (d)
request such person or persons to execute the "Acknowledgment and
Agreement to Be Bound."

Within 60 days after the final disposition of the action, each
Receiving Party must return all Protected Material to the Producing
Party or destroy such material. As used in this subdivision, "all
Protected Material" includes all copies, abstracts, compilations,
summaries, and any other format reproducing or capturing any of the
Protected Material. Whether the Protected Material is returned or
destroyed, the Receiving Party must submit a written certification
to the Producing Party (and, if not the same person or entity, to
the Designating Party) by the 60-day deadline that (1) identifies
(by category, where appropriate) all the Protected Material that
was returned or destroyed and (2) affirms that the Receiving Party
has not retained any copies, abstracts, compilations, summaries or
any other format reproducing or capturing any of the Protected
Material.

Notwithstanding this provision, the Counsel are entitled to retain
an archival copy of all pleadings, motion papers, trial,
deposition, and hearing transcripts, legal memoranda,
correspondence, deposition and trial exhibits, expert reports,
attorney work product, and consultant and expert work product, even
if such materials contain Protected Material. Any such archival
copies that contain or constitute Protected Material remain subject
to the Protective Order as set forth in Section 6.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Stipulated Protective
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yhykkehe from
Leagle.com.

SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP, A Limited Liability
Partnership Including Professional Corporations SASCHA HENRY --
shenry@sheppardmullin.com -- ROBERT J. GUITE --
rguite@sheppardmullin.com -- in Los Angeles, California.

SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP, A Limited Liability
Partnership, Including Professional Corporations, ABBY H. MEYER --
ameyer@sheppardmullin.com -- in Costa Mesa, California, Attorneys
for Defendant STARBUCKS CORPORATION.


SUBCONTRACTING CONCEPTS: Court Compels Ross to Arbitrate Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
Southern Division, issued an Opinion and Order in the lawsuit
entitled MARK ROSS, individually and on behalf of similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff v. SUBCONTRACTING CONCEPTS, LLC,
AUTO-WARES, LLC, and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants, Case No. 20-12994
(E.D. Mich.):

   (1) granting the Defendants' motions to dismiss and compel
       arbitration; and

   (2) denying the Plaintiff's motion for conditional
       certification.

The lawsuit arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29
U.S.C. Section 201, et seq. On Nov. 6, 2020, the Plaintiff filed
this action on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals
alleging that the Defendants misclassified him as an independent
contractor to circumvent the protections of federal and state wage
laws. The Plaintiff alleges two violations of the FLSA in his
Complaint: unpaid overtime (Count 1) and unpaid minimum wage (Count
II).

On Jan. 19, 2021, Defendant Subcontracting Concepts, LLC ("SCI")
filed a "Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Compel Arbitration, and
Enforce the Class Action Waiver Provision." On the same date,
Defendant Auto-Wares, LLC ("Auto-Wares") filed a "Motion to Dismiss
and Compel Arbitration." The motions are based on a contract
between the Plaintiff and SCI.

The Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the lawsuit, enforce the
class action waiver, and compel the Plaintiff to arbitrate his
claims as, the Defendants argue, his contract with SCI requires.
The motions are fully briefed. In addition, the Defendants filed
supplemental briefs in support of their motions.

On July 26, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a "Motion for Conditional
Certification and Notice Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b)." This motion
is also fully briefed. On Dec. 3, 2021, the Court conducted a
motion hearing. At the end of the hearing, the Court indicated that
supplemental briefing was unnecessary.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff is a delivery driver, and he brings this action on
behalf of himself and other similarly situated individuals who
provided delivery services for the Defendants. SCI provides
employment services and hires individuals to perform delivery
services for their customers and contracts with Auto-Wares and
other Doe Defendants. Auto-Wares operates multiple warehouses and
shops throughout the state of Michigan, including Maxi Automotive
('Maxi'), from which it uses the Plaintiff and other collective
members to deliver automobile parts.

The Complaint defines the proposed collective class as "[a]ll
individuals who contracted with SCI as last-mile delivery drivers
using their own personal vehicles in the United States from three
years prior to the filing of this Action who were classified as
independent contractors ('the FLSA Collective')."

According to the Plaintiff, the Defendants are aware that Plaintiff
and collective members work overtime but fail to pay an overtime
premium for hours over 40. The Plaintiff also alleges that the
Defendants have misclassified him and other similarly situated
individuals as independent contractors, which has resulted in
overtime pay and minimum wage violations.

In lieu of an answer, the Defendants filed the motions presently
before the Court. Attached to SCI's motion is the "Owner/Operator
Agreement" ("Agreement") between the Plaintiff and SCI. The
Agreement has a New York choice of law provision and a severability
clause.

The Agreement also contains the following language directly above
the signature block: "THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS A BINDING ARBITRATION
PROVISION AND CLASS-ACTION WAIVER WHICH AFFECTS YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS
AND MAY BE ENFORCED BY THE PARTIES." The Plaintiff signed the
Agreement and initialed each page on June 1, 2015. The Plaintiff
does not dispute that he signed the Agreement.

II. Applicable Law and Analysis

When considering a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), the Court has four tasks: (1) to determine
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; (2) to determine the scope
of any agreement to arbitrate; (3) if federal statutory claims are
asserted, decide whether Congress intended those claims to be
nonarbitrable; and (4) if some of the claims fall outside the scope
of the arbitration agreement, decide whether to stay the remaining
proceedings pending arbitration, citing Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228
F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2000).

Regarding the second factor, the Agreement covers any dispute,
claim, question, or disagreement arising from or relating to this
agreement or the breach thereof, or service arrangement between
Owner/Operator and SCI's clients. As such, the Plaintiff's claims
fall within the scope of the arbitration clause of the Agreement.

A. Whether the Parties Agreed to Arbitrate

District Judge Linda V. Parker states that it is undisputed that
the Agreement is between SCI and the Plaintiff, but the remaining
question is whether Auto-Wares, as a non-signatory to the
Agreement, may invoke the arbitration clause. Auto-Wares argues
that New York law governs the Agreement and that under New York
law, a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement may compel a
signatory to abide by that agreement and arbitrate a dispute. The
Plaintiff does not address the issue or argue otherwise in its
briefing.

A court in this district found that under both New York and
Michigan law, a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement may
compel a signatory to abide by that agreement and arbitrate a
dispute, Judge Parker notes, citing Southerland v. Corp. Transit of
Am., Case No. 13-14462, 2014 WL 4906891, 2014 WL 4906891 at 41(E.D.
Mich. Sept. 30, 2014). In Southerland, the plaintiffs were delivery
drivers who signed, as here, an Owner/Operator Agreement with SCI.
A non-signatory logistics broker filed a motion to compel
arbitration based on the agreement and the court granted the
motion. The court relied on the undisputed fact that the logistics
broker and SCI were closely related, that the plaintiffs foresaw
the involvement of a logistics broker in their relationship with
SCI, and finally that "most, if not all, of the issues raised by
the plaintiff are explicitly addressed by the SCI Agreement."

The Court finds the same here. Accordingly, Auto-Wares may invoke
the arbitration clause of the Agreement.

B. Congressional Intent to Make Claims Nonarbitrable

As to the third factor, the Plaintiff alleges federal statutory
claims of violations of FLSA. Judge Parker opines that Congress did
not intend FLSA claims to be nonarbitrable, citing Floss v. Ryan's
Fam. Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 313 (6th Cir. 2000).

However, the Plaintiff argues that Congress intended for his claims
to be nonarbitrable because he and similarly situated individuals
are exempt transportation worker under Section 1 of the FAA.
Despite the liberal policy in favor of arbitration and the broad
scope of Section 2 of the FAA, the FAA excludes from coverage
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. The
United States Supreme Court recently discussed the FAA's exclusion
for "contracts of employment" of certain transportation workers in
New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S.Ct. 532, (2019).

While the Plaintiff is indeed a delivery driver, he does not
perform last-mile services, Judge Parker opines. For these reasons,
the Court holds that the Plaintiff and putative class members are
not interstate transportation workers exempt from arbitration under
Section 1 of the FAA. As such, the arbitration agreement is valid
and enforceable.

C. Whether the Court is required to stay the remaining proceedings
pending arbitration

Upon concluding that plaintiff's claims are subject to arbitration,
a district court may dismiss the action or, if requested by a
party, stay the action.

The Court has found that all of the Plaintiff's FLSA claims are
referrable to arbitration. SCI argues that the case should,
therefore, be dismissed. Auto-Wares requests if the Court is not
inclined to dismiss the Complaint, that it stay proceedings pending
resolution of the arbitration. The Plaintiff does not argue that
the claims are not within the scope of the Agreement or request
that the Court stay the action.

The Court further holds that the Agreement contains a valid class
action waiver, providing that neither the Plaintiff nor SCI will be
entitled to join or consolidate claims in arbitration by or against
other individuals or entities, or arbitrate any claim as a
representative member of a class or in a private attorney general
capacity. Accordingly, the Court denies the Plaintiff's "Motion for
Conditional Certification and Notice Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section
216(b)."

Accordingly, it is ordered that the Defendants' motions to dismiss
and compel arbitration are granted; and the Plaintiff's Motion for
Conditional Certification is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Dec. 23,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/zc37kdh4 from
Leagle.com.


T-MOBILE USA: Savick Suit Transferred to W.D. Mo.
-------------------------------------------------
The case styled as NORMA SAVICK AND MARK SAVICK, individually and
on behalf of all similarly situated persons and on behalf of the
general public, Plaintiffs v. T-MOBILE USA, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 4:21-cv-00878-BCW, was transferred from the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey to the United States
District Court for the Western District of Missouri on December 21,
2021.

The Clerk of Court for the Western District of Missouri assigned
Case No. 3:21-cv-16005 to the proceeding.

The lawsuit arises from the Defendant's failure to make the
necessary investments to implement important and adequate security
measures to protect their customers' and employees' data following
data breach that occurred on August 14-15, 2021, the fourth breach
of T-Mobile's systems since early 2020, and the third in less than
a year.

T-Mobile is an American wireless network operator partly owned by
German telecommunications company Deutsche Telekom AG.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Reade William Seligmann, Esq.
          ALSTON & BIRD LLP
          90 Park Ave Fl. 12
          New York, NY 10016-1387
          Telephone: (212) 210-9453
          E-mail: reade.seligmann@alston.com

T-MOBILE USA: Simaan Suit Transferred to W.D. Missouri
------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Daniel Simaan, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. T-Mobile USA Inc., Case No.
2:21-cv-01181, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, to the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Missouri on Dec. 16, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:21-cv-00896-BCW to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

T-Mobile US, Inc. -- https://www.t-mobile.com/ -- is an American
wireless network operator partly owned by German telecommunications
company Deutsche Telekom, which has a 43.2% share.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jason T. Dennett, Esq.
          Kaleigh N.B. Powell, Esq.
          Kim D. Stephens, Esq.
          TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS
          1200 FIFTH AVE STE 1700
          SEATTLE, WA 98101
          Phone: (206) 682-5600
          Fax: (206) 682-2992
          Email: jdennett@tousley.com
                 kpowell@tousley.com
                 kstephens@tousley.com

               - and -

          Jason Hartley, Esq.
          HARTLEY LLP
          101 W BROADWAY STE 820
          SAN DIEGO, CA 92101
          Phone: (619) 400-5822
          Email: hartley@hartleyllp.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Kristine McAlister Brown, Esq.
          ALSTON & BIRD LLP (GA)
          1201 W PEACHTREE ST
          ONE ATLANTIC CTR
          ATLANTA, GA 30309-3432
          Phone: (404) 881-7584
          Email: kristy.brown@alston.com

               - and -

          Kathleen M O'Sullivan, Esq.
          Lauren Jeffers Tsuji, Esq.
          Steve Y. Koh, Esq.
          PERKINS COIE (SEA)
          1201 3RD AVE STE 4900
          SEATTLE, WA 98101-3099
          Phone: (206) 583-8888
          Fax: (206) 583-8500
          Email: KOSullivan@perkinscoie.com
                 LTsuji@perkinscoie.com
                 SKoh@perkinscoie.com


T-MOBILE USA: Song Suit Transferred to W.D. Missouri
----------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Linda Song, Rachel Gurley, Andrew Luna, Mario
Gordon, Melani Gordon, individually and on behalf of classes of
similarly situated individuals v. T-Mobile USA Inc., Case No.
2:21-cv-01460, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, to the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Missouri on Dec. 20, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:21-cv-00908-BCW to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I.

T-Mobile US, Inc. -- https://www.t-mobile.com/ -- is an American
wireless network operator partly owned by German telecommunications
company Deutsche Telekom, which has a 43.2% share.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jason T Dennett, Esq.
          Kaleigh N.B. Powell, Esq.
          Kim D. Stephens, Esq.
          TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS
          1200 FIFTH AVE STE 1700
          SEATTLE, WA 98101
          Phone: (206) 682-5600
          Fax: (206) 682-2992
          Email: jdennett@tousley.com
                 kpowell@tousley.com
                 kstephens@tousley.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Kristine McAlister Brown, Esq.
          ALSTON & BIRD LLP (GA)
          1201 W PEACHTREE ST
          ONE ATLANTIC CTR
          ATLANTA, GA 30309-3432
          Phone: (404) 881-7584
          Email: kristy.brown@alston.com

               - and -

          Kathleen M O'Sullivan, Esq.
          Lauren Jeffers Tsuji, Esq.
          Steve Y. Koh, Esq.
          PERKINS COIE (SEA)
          1201 3RD AVE STE 4900
          SEATTLE, WA 98101-3099
          Phone: (206) 583-8888
          Fax: (206) 583-8500
          Email: KOSullivan@perkinscoie.com
                 LTsuji@perkinscoie.com
                 SKoh@perkinscoie.com


T-MOBILE USA: Strenfel Suit Transferred to W.D. Missouri
--------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Daniel Strenfel, individually and on behalf of a
Class of similarly situated individuals v. T-Mobile USA Inc., Case
No. 2:21-cv-01208, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Washington, to the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Missouri on Dec. 17, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:21-cv-00900-BCW to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud for the Federal Trade
Commission Act.

T-Mobile US, Inc. -- https://www.t-mobile.com/ -- is an American
wireless network operator partly owned by German telecommunications
company Deutsche Telekom, which has a 43.2% share.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Alexis M Wood, Esq.
          Ron Marron, Esq.
          Kas Gallucci, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF RONALD A. MARRON APLC
          651 Arroyo Drive
          San Diego, CA 92103
          Phone: (619) 696-9006
          Fax: (619) 564-6665
          Email: alexis@consumersadvocates.com
                 ron@consumersadvocates.com
                 kas@consumersadvocates.com

               - and -

          Amanda Grace Fiorilla, Esq.
          Christian Levis, Esq.
          Margaret C. MacLean, Esq.
          LOWEY DNNENBERG, P.C.
          44 South Broadway, Suite 1100
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Phone: (914) 997-0500
          Fax: (914) 997-0035
          Email: afiorilla@lowey.com
                 clevis@lowey.com
                 mmaclean@lowey.com

               - and -

          Manish Borde, Esq.
          BORDE LAW PLLC
          600 STEWART ST, SUITE 400
          SEATTLE, WA 98101
          Phone: (206) 905-6129
          Email: mborde@bordelaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Kristine McAlister Brown, Esq.
          ALSTON & BIRD LLP (GA)
          1201 W PEACHTREE ST
          ONE ATLANTIC CTR
          ATLANTA, GA 30309-3432
          Phone: (404) 881-7584
          Email: kristy.brown@alston.com

               - and -

          Kathleen M O'Sullivan, Esq.
          Lauren Jeffers Tsuji, Esq.
          Steve Y. Koh, Esq.
          PERKINS COIE (SEA)
          1201 3RD AVE STE 4900
          SEATTLE, WA 98101-3099
          Phone: (206) 583-8888
          Fax: (206) 583-8500
          Email: KOSullivan@perkinscoie.com
                 LTsuji@perkinscoie.com
                 SKoh@perkinscoie.com


T-MOBILE USA: Villalon Suit Transferred to W.D. Missouri
--------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Ania Villalon, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. T-Mobile USA Inc., Case No.
2:21-cv-01148, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, to the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Missouri on Dec. 15, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:21-cv-00890-BCW to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

T-Mobile US, Inc. -- https://www.t-mobile.com/ -- is an American
wireless network operator partly owned by German telecommunications
company Deutsche Telekom, which has a 43.2% share.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Shub, Esq.
          SEEGER WEISS, LLP
          1515 Market Street, Suite 1380
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Phone: (215) 564-2300
          Fax: (215) 851-8029
          Email: jshub@seegerweiss.com

               - and -

          Beth E. Terrell, Esq.
          TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
          936 N 34TH ST., STE. 300
          SEATTLE, WA 98103-8869
          Phone: (206) 816-6603
          Fax: (206) 319-5450
          Email: bterrell@terrellmarshall.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Kristine McAlister Brown, Esq.
          ALSTON & BIRD LLP (GA)
          1201 W PEACHTREE ST
          ONE ATLANTIC CTR
          ATLANTA, GA 30309-3432
          Phone: (404) 881-7584
          Email: kristy.brown@alston.com

               - and -

          Kathleen M O'Sullivan, Esq.
          Lauren Jeffers Tsuji, Esq.
          Steve Y. Koh, Esq.
          PERKINS COIE (SEA)
          1201 3RD AVE STE 4900
          SEATTLE, WA 98101-3099
          Phone: (206) 583-8888
          Fax: (206) 583-8500
          Email: KOSullivan@perkinscoie.com
                 LTsuji@perkinscoie.com
                 SKoh@perkinscoie.com


TARGET CORP: Almonrode of Miller Law Named Chen's Interim Counsel
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Shukai Chen, Christina Lira-Porcho, Rita Civil
Manning, Keppie Moore, Yike Xue, John Turek, Jack Garthwaite, Robin
Prebe, Jewel Mitchell, Beverly Sikora, Darrell Sandifer, Thelma
Brown, Patricia Logsdon, Lisa Dannolfo, Scott Dunham, Laurie
Williams, Sabrina Jackson, Tammy Gower, Shirley Wiley, Kim
McCullough, Robert Diehl, Stephanie Baker, Jiyoung Kim, Curtis
McMaster, Raymond Lewis, Caleb Rogers, Lindsey Arotin, Angela
Wilczynski, Shanequa Morris, Katrina Bailey, and Tori Gouge, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs
v. Target Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 21-1247 (DWF/DTS) (D.
Minn.), Judge Donovan W. Frank of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota granted the Plaintiffs' motion to appoint
counsel, and appointed Sharon S. Almonrode, Esq., of The Miller Law
Firm, P.C., as Interim Lead Counsel.

Background

The Plaintiffs, in a putative class action, allege that the
Defendant knowingly sold consumers Apple iTunes Gift Cards that had
been tampered with before the Defendant sold the Gift Cards.
Specifically, the Plaintiffs contend that the Defendant knew the
Gift Cards it was selling to consumers were unsecure and
susceptible to tampering by third parties to deplete consumers'
funds after consumers had purchased the Gift Cards from the
Defendant's retail stores. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant
knew or should have known that third parties were obtaining the
concealed activation code on the Gift Cards and using the codes to
steal funds that consumers loaded onto the Gift Cards upon
purchase. They further allege that the Defendant failed to take
adequate and reasonable measures to: (1) ensure that the Gift Cards
they were selling were safe, secure, and free from tampering, and
(2) warn and disclose to consumers the material fact that it was
possible the Gift Cards had been tampered with.

The Plaintiffs now move to appoint Sharon S. Almonrode of the
Miller Law Firm, P.C. as Interim Lead Counsel for the Plaintiffs
and the putative class. They further request that the Court
appoints Almonrode as Chair of an Interim Plaintiff's Steering
Committee ("PSC") consisting of David Cialkowski of Zimmerman Reed
LLP, Craig Heidemann of Douglas, Haun, & Heidemann PC, and Bilal
Essayli of Essayli & Brown LLP (collectively, the "Proposed
Leadership Team").

The Plaintiffs contend that appointment at this stage in the
proceedings is necessary to protect their and the potential class
members' rights in the event that additional counsel file separate
lawsuits based on the same course of conduct by the Defendant and
will eliminate any confusion as to who represents the putative
class. They further assert that the Proposed Leadership Team has
the requisite expertise and is appropriately diverse to represent
the putative class fairly and adequately.

The Defendant argues that appointment is premature because: (1)
there is no apparent reason to protect the class when there is no
rivalry or uncertainty among the counsel who filed the action; and
(2) there is no confusion about who represents the class when there
is only one case pending and it is purely speculative that
additional cases will be filed. It contends that "should the
situation arise where separate competing actions are filed with new
counsel vying to represent the putative class, the Court can then
address the necessity of appointing interim class counsel with the
benefit of having all facts before it."

Discussion

Having carefully considered each party's position, Judge Frank
finds no downside to appointing interim class counsel at this stage
in the proceedings. Moreover, he finds that appointment at this
time will maximize efficiency by ensuring the consolidation of
filings by current plaintiffs.

Judge Frank also finds that the proposed class counsel satisfies
the factors set forth in Rule 23(g)(1)(A). He specifically observes
that: (1) each member of the Proposed Leadership Team and their
firms have devoted substantial time and resources investigating the
claims at issue in this litigation; and (2) each proposed member
possesses the requisite experience and knowledge to provide
adequate and fair class representation. He also notes that the
Proposed Leadership Team appropriately reflects the diversity of a
purported nationwide class.

Conclusion

For these reasons, Judge Frank granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to
appoint interim class counsel pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(3).
Whether or not a class is ultimately certified, he finds no
downside to appointment at this time. Moreover, he finds that each
member of the Proposed Leadership Team satisfies the criteria for
class counsel under Rule 23(g)(1)(A).

Order

Based upon the foregoing, and the files, records, and proceedings
therein, Judge Frank granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Appoint
Counsel. Sharon S. Almonrode of The Miller Law Firm, P.C. is
appointed as the Interim Lead Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the
putative class. She will serve as Chair of an Interim Plaintiffs'
Steering Committee consisting of David Cialkowski of Zimmerman Reed
LLP, Craig Heidemann of Douglas, Haun & Heidemann PC, and Bilal
Essayli of Essayli & Brown.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/mw8vc34t from
Leagle.com.

Bilal Essayli, Esq. -- hello@essaylibrown.com -- David Andrew
Brown, Esq., Essayli & Brown; Craig Richard Heidemann, Esq.,
Douglas, Haun & Heidemann, P.C.; David M. Cialkowski, Esq. --
david.cialkowski@zimmreed.com -- Ian F. McFarland, Esq. --
ian.mcfarland@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed, PLLP; Sharon S.
Almonrode, Esq., Dennis A. Lienhardt, Jr., Esq., and E. Powell
Miller, Esq., The Miller Law Firm, P.C., counsel for the
Plaintiffs.

Ellen B. Silverman, Esq. -- esilverman@hinshawlaw.com -- Jennifer
Weller, Esq. -- jweller@hinshawlaw.com -- and Margaret Ann Santos,
Esq. -- asantos@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP,
counsel for the Defendant.


TD AMERITRADE: Loses Bid to Compel Arbitration in Klein Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska denied without
prejudice the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration in the
lawsuit captioned as GERALD J. KLEIN, and RODERICK FORD, on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. TD
AMERITRADE HOLDING CORPORATION, TD AMERITRADE, INC., and FREDRIC
TOMCZYK, Defendants, Case No. 8:14CV396 (D. Neb.).

The case is a putative class action for violations of Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
Section 78a, et seq., and the Securities and Exchange Commission's
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5.

The action was remanded from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
for further proceedings after reversal of the Court's order
certifying a class. The Plaintiffs have filed a renewed motion for
class certification, which remains pending and is not yet ripe for
decision.

Senior District Judge Joseph F. Bataillon notes that on a motion to
compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), the
Court does not determine the merits of the substantive issues, but
simply whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular
grievance to arbitration, citing Express Scripts, Inc. v. Aegon
Direct Mktg. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2008).

The Defendants submit that the Plaintiffs agreed to be bound by an
arbitration provision in their client agreement with TD Ameritrade
that is broad in scope and plainly encompasses the claims in this
lawsuit. The provision covers "any controversy" with TD Ameritrade
"arising out of or relating to this Agreement, our relationship,
any Services provided by you, or the use of the Services."

The arbitration clause further provides, however, that: "No person
will bring a putative or certified class action to arbitration, nor
seek to enforce any predispute arbitration agreement against any
person who has initiated in court a putative class action; or who
is a member of a putative class who has not opted out of the class
with respect to any claims encompassed by the putative class action
until: (1) the class certification is denied; (2) the class is
decertified; or (3) the client is excluded from the class by the
court, Such forbearance to enforce an agreement to arbitrate will
not constitute a waiver of any rights under this Agreement except
to the extent stated herein."

The Defendants' motion might be well-taken if it addressed an
individual action, Judge Bataillon notes. With respect to putative
class action complaints, however, the arbitration provision does
not come into play until class certification is denied or the class
is decertified.

The Defendants argue that class certification has been denied, by
virtue of the Eighth Circuit reversal. They contend that the Eighth
Circuit's opinion left no room for any conceivable class to be
certified. To the contrary, Judge Bataillon finds, nothing in the
Eighth Circuit opinion precludes a renewed class certification
motion. The Eighth Circuit did not state that a class could ever be
certified, only that the methodology applied by the plaintiffs'
expert (a proposed algorithm) was not sufficient to establish
economic loss for the class of plaintiffs in a manner consistent
with the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) (Filing No. 268,
Eighth Circuit Opinion at 6-7).

The Eighth Circuit did not address the propriety of an injunctive
class under Rule 23(b)(2) or an issues class under Rule 23(c)(4),
Judge Bataillon notes, citing Filing No. 280, the Plaintiff's
Renewed Motion at 2 (moving to certify injunctive and issues
classes). The action was remanded for further proceedings, not with
directions to dismiss.

Because the Plaintiff has filed a renewed motion for class action
certification, the action is a putative class action until the
class certification issue is resolved, Judge Bataillon holds.
Accordingly, the Court finds the motion to compel arbitration is
premature at this time and it will be denied without prejudice to
reassertion if the renewed motion for class certification is
denied.

Judge Bataillon also holds that the Defendants have not shown, at
this stage of the litigation, that a valid and applicable agreement
to arbitrate covers the dispute. This disposition renders the
Defendants' motion to stay moot.

Therefore, it is ordered that (1) the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration is denied, without prejudice, as it is premature; and
(2) the Defendant's motion to stay is denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order dated Dec. 23,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/bddz8dj3 from
Leagle.com.


TOURNAMENT PLAYERS: Perkins Sues Over Unpaid Minimum and OT Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
FELICIA PERKINS, individually and on behalf of herself and all
other similarly situated current and former employees, Plaintiffs
v. TOURNAMENT PLAYERS CLUB AT SOUTHWIND, INC., d/b/a TPC Southwind,
a Tennessee Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-02797-SHM-cgc
(W.D. Tenn., December 21, 2021) is a collective action brought by
the Plaintiff under the Fair Labor Standards Act to recover unpaid
minimum wages, overtime compensation and other damages owed to her
and other similarly situated current and former tipped employees of
the Defendant.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as an hourly-paid
tipped employee at Defendant's golf and country club from May 2015
until November 2019.

TPC Southwind is a Tennessee for-profit Corporation. TPC Southwind
is a private golf and country club and is a member of the
Tournament Players Club network operated by the PGA Tour.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gordon E. Jackson, Esq.
          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Robert E. Turner, IV, Esq.
          Robert E. Morelli, III, Esq.
          JACKSON SHIELDS YEISER HOLT OWEN & BRYANT
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754-8001
          Facsimile: (901) 759-1745
          E-mail: gjackson@jsyc.com
                  rbryant@jsyc.com
                  rturner@jsyc.com
                  rmorelli@jsyc.com

U.S. CITIZENSHIP: Muradyan et al., Lose Class Status Bid
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TONY N., KAREN M., JACK
S., HEGHINE MURADYAN, and DAYANA VERA DE APONTE, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v. U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, et al., Case No. 3:21-cv-08742-MMC (N.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Maxine M. Chesney entered an order denying
the plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunction and for class
certification.

The Court said, "The plaintiffs rely on Rule 23(b)(2), which
requires a showing that "the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so
that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole." "Rule 23(b)(2)
applies 20 only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment
would provide relief to each member of the class." In the instant
case, the Court, to determine the merits of plaintiffs' claims, as
well as those of putative class members, must, as discussed above,
balance the TRAC factors. Of those factors, the third and fifth
factors, namely, harm and prejudice, are subject to determination
on an individual basis, and the first factor is, in part, namely,
the length of delay, likewise subject to determination on such
basis. Although, in cases where the other TRAC factors all weigh in
favor of the relief requested, a showing of any amount of harm,
prejudice, or delay might warrant issuance of an injunction
applicable to the entire class. Consequently, an individual
evaluation would be necessary in order to determine if a class
member is entitled to injunctive relief."

On November 10, 2021, the plaintiffs, five individuals who have
applied for asylum, filed their Complaint in which they allege the
following events have occurred. Each plaintiff has received an
Employment Authorization Document ("EAD") from United States
Citizenship & Immigration Services ("USCIS"), allowing such
plaintiff, during the pendency of his/her asylum application, to
work for a period of two years, and has applied for renewal of
his/her EAD before the expiration date. The Plaintiffs further
allege they "will suffer or have suffered irreparable harm" from
the failure to adjudicate their respective applications for
renewal.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 22, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3HzgWXc at no extra charge.[CC]


UNITED STATES: Bid to Certify Class in Tony N. v. USCIS Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TONY N., KAREN M., JACK S., HEGHINE MURADYAN, and
DAYANA VERA DE APONTE, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs v. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVICES, et al., Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-08742-MMC (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Maxine M. Chesney of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California denied:

   (1) the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
       Provisional Class Certification; and

   (2) the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, both filed
       Nov. 11, 2021.

Background

On Nov. 10, 2021, the Plaintiffs, five individuals who have applied
for asylum, filed their Complaint in the titled action, in which
they allege the following events have occurred. Each Plaintiff has
received an Employment Authorization Document ("EAD") from United
States Citizenship & Immigration Services ("USCIS"), allowing such
Plaintiff, during the pendency of his/her asylum application, to
work for a period of two years, and has applied for renewal of
his/her EAD before the expiration date. Each Plaintiff has received
from USCIS a 180-day extension of the expiration date of his/her
EAD, and, as of Nov. 10, 2021, the date on which the Plaintiffs
filed the action, none of the Plaintiffs' respective applications
for renewal had been granted, with four of the five Plaintiffs'
180-day extension periods having expired before the instant action
was filed and the remaining Plaintiff's 180-day extension expiring
shortly after such filing. The Plaintiffs further allege they "will
suffer or have suffered irreparable harm" from the failure to
adjudicate their respective applications for renewal.

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiffs, on their own behalf and
on behalf of a putative class, assert two causes of action. In
Count One, the Plaintiffs seek relief under the Mandamus Act, 28
U.S.C. Section 1361, under a theory that USCIS has a "ministerial,
nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate the applications of asylum
applicants to renew their EADs within the 180-day automatic
extension period." In Count Two, they seek relief under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Sections 701-06, under a
theory that USCIS' "failure to adjudicate the petitions" within the
180-day extension period "constitutes an unreasonable delay." As to
both causes of action, the Plaintiffs seek a declaration that
USCIS's "delayed adjudication of their and the class members'
applications to renew their EADs is unreasonable" and an order
compelling USCIS to "adjudicate the Plaintiffs' and the class
members' applications to renew their EADs within the 180-day
automatic extension period."

Discussion

The Plaintiffs have applied for asylum and seek permission to
continue to work during the pendency of their asylum applications.
They seek a preliminary injunction and an order certifying a
class.

A. Preliminary Injunction

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1]
that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely
to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
[3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an
injunction is in the public interest.

The Plaintiffs seek issuance of a preliminary injunction requiring
USCIS to adjudicate renewal applications within the referenced
180-day extension period, and, with regard to applicants whose
180-day extension periods have expired, to adjudicate the
applications within 14 days of issuance of an order granting the
preliminary injunction.

At the outset, Judge Chesney notes that the renewal applications of
three of the five named Plaintiffs, specifically, Tony N., Jack S.,
and Heghine Muradyan, were adjudicated prior to the Dec. 17, 2021,
hearing. Accordingly, to the extent the motion for preliminary
injunction is brought on behalf of those three Plaintiffs, the
motion will be denied as moot, in that they have obtained the
relief sought, and, given that their newly-issued EADs will remain
valid for a period of 30 months, have not shown their claims
qualify for the "capable of repetition, yet evading review"
exception to mootness.

The renewal applications of Plaintiffs Karen M. and Dayana Vera de
Aponte, however, remain pending. Accordingly, Judge Chesney next
turns to the merits of the motion for a preliminary injunction, as
brought on their behalf, and, in particular, whether the Plaintiffs
have made the requisite showing as to the listed four elements.

a. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

(1) First Factor: Rule of Reason

Judge Chesney holds that although the Defendants' showing may not
be enough to deny relief where a delay beyond the expiration of the
180-extension period is of a more significant length, in this
instance, where the period of time in which Karen M. and Dayana
Vera de Aponte have been waiting is just over one month, she finds
the first factor weighs against granting a preliminary injunction.

(2) Second Factor: Congressional Timetable

Judge Chesney finds the second factor weighs against granting a
preliminary injunction. No statute or other congressional
declaration sets forth "a timetable or other indication of the
speed," by which USCIS expects applications seeking renewal of EADs
to be adjudicated. Although the Plaintiffs rely on 8 U.S.C. Section
1571, which states "the processing of an immigration benefit
application should be completed not later than 180 days after the
initial filing," that statute is essentially "precatory" rather
than mandatory in nature. Moreover, Section 1571 does not include
applications for EADs, which are not "immigration benefits," and,
in any event, where Section 1571 has been held applicable, courts
have found delays of several years are not unreasonable.

(3) Third and Fifth Factors: Interest of Plaintiffs

The parties discuss the third and fifth factors together, as will
Judge Chesney. As noted, greater weight is afforded where the
resulting harm is to health and welfare rather than to financial
circumstances. In the case, Judge Chesney finds that the harm
identified by both Karen M. and Dayana Vera de Aponte is, at
present, primarily economic loss. Each, however, has identified
other harm that may occur if the period of delay were to extend in
a significant manner. Accordingly, Judge Chesney finds the third
and fifth factors weigh in favor of granting a preliminary
injunction.

(4) Fourth Factor: Effect of Expediting Action on Agency

As noted, the Plaintiffs seek an order requiring USCIS to
adjudicate their renewal applications with 14 days of the issuance
of an order granting a preliminary injunction.

As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, relief under the TRAC factors
is inappropriate where, despite other TRAC factors weighing in
favor of relief, "a judicial order putting the petitioner at the
head of the queue would simply move all others back one space and
produce no net gain." Although the Plaintiffs attempt to avoid this
concern by noting they seek injunctive relief on behalf of a class,
even assuming class certification, Judge Chesney holds that the
relief requested would move one category of aliens, namely, asylum
seekers who have received a 180-day extension, over all other
categories of aliens who have applied for EADs. Accordingly, she
finds the fourth factor weighs against granting a preliminary
injunction.

(5) Sixth Factor: Impropriety/Bad Faith

In the instant case, in contrast to cases in which the sixth factor
has been found to favor injunctive relief, the Plaintiffs make no
showing of intentional delay, or even that any delay is the result
of negligence on the part of USCIS. Indeed, given the reasons for
delay identified by USCIS, any delay appears to be outside of its
control. Accordingly, Judge Chesney finds the sixth factor either
weighs against granting a preliminary injunction or, alternatively,
is neutral.

In sum, on the present record, as set forth, the first, and "most
important," factor, as well as the second and fourth factors, weigh
against granting a preliminary injunction, the third and fifth
factors together weigh in favor of granting a preliminary
injunction, and the sixth factor either weighs against granting a
preliminary injunction or is neutral. Under such circumstances,
Judge Chesney finds the Plaintiffs have failed to show a clear
likelihood of success on the merits.

b. Remaining Preliminary Injunction Elements

In light of her finding, Judge Chesney does not address the
remaining elements bearing on entitlement to a preliminary
injunction.

For these reasons, Judge Chesney will deny the Plaintiffs' motion
for a preliminary injunction.

B. Class Certification

The Plaintiffs seek to certify a class under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. They rely on Rule 23(b)(2), which
requires a showing that "the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so
that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole."

In the instant case, Judge Chesney, to determine the merits of the
Plaintiffs' claims, as well as those of putative class members,
must, balances the TRAC factors. Of those factors, the third and
fifth factors, namely, harm and prejudice, are subject to
determination on an individual basis, and the first factor is, in
part, namely, the length of delay, likewise subject to
determination on such basis. Although, in cases where the other
TRAC factors all weigh in favor of the relief requested, a showing
of any amount of harm, prejudice, or delay might warrant issuance
of an injunction applicable to the entire class, such showing has
not been made. Consequently, an individual evaluation would be
necessary in order to determine if a class member is entitled to
injunctive relief.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification will be
denied.

Conclusion

For the reasons she stated, Judge Chesney denied the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Class
Certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y5v5fmux from Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: Court Denies in Part Bid to Dismiss Campo's Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Federal Claims issued an Opinion and
Order denying in part the Government's motion to dismiss claims
from the lawsuit titled ROBERT L. CAMPO, et al., Plaintiffs v. THE
UNITED STATES, Defendant, Case Nos. 20-44; 20-47; 20-55
(consolidated) (Fed. Cl.).

Judge Ryan T. Holte notes that in his 1690 Second Treatise of
Government, John Locke famously noted "the labour of his body, and
the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever
then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and
left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property." Over
300 years later, this case raises the unique legal issue of whether
Louisiana oyster growers may claim property rights in the fruits of
their labor--oysters.

The Plaintiffs, oyster farmers, allege the United States deprived
them of use, occupancy and enjoyment of their personal oyster stock
and real property (oyster beds and reefs). The Farmers allege the
Government actions resulted in a permanent taking of their property
for a public use without payment of just compensation in violation
of the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution.

The Government admits when the Plaintiffs sell oysters they are
paid for the fruits of their effort, and the Plaintiffs may assert
rights to exclude, destroy, use, possess, recover for larceny,
alienate, sue third parties for damages, and enjoy the fruits of
selling oysters. Despite acknowledging those rights, the Government
moves to dismiss the portion of the Plaintiffs' claim alleging a
taking of the oysters; the Government argues Plaintiff Farmers lack
a compensable property right in the oysters.

Background

According to the Class Action Complaint, oysters are bivalves,
which have two hard outer shells composed primarily of calcium
carbonate (CaCO3), and which encase a soft inner invertebrate body.
Oysters have been cultivated, grown, farmed, and harvested
commercially in Louisiana since the mid-1800s and, today, Louisiana
is the top harvester of oysters in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico ("Gulf")
and has led the United States in oyster landings every year since
2000. Louisiana leads the nation in oyster production largely due
to the state's successful public-private oyster cultivation
partnership developed in the late 1800s and early 1900s.

In response to the Great Mississippi flood of 1927, the United
States Army Corps of Engineers authorized the construction of the
Bonnet Carre Spillway in 1928. In 1931, the spillway was completed
as a flood control structure in the Lower Mississippi Valley.

The decision to operate or open the Bonnet Carre Spillway is the
responsibility of the Mississippi River Commission ('MRC')
president. The MRC president relies heavily on the recommendations
of the Corps' New Orleans District Engineer, who is responsible for
the actual operation of the control structure and the floodway of
the Bonnet Carre Spillway. The decision to operate the Bonnet Carre
Spillway is made when existing conditions, combined with predicted
river stages and discharges, indicate that the mainline levees in
New Orleans and other downstream communities will be subjected to
unacceptable stress from high water.

The Bonnet Carre Spillway was first opened during the flood of
1937, and 12 times thereafter through February 2019, to lower river
stages at New Orleans.

In 2019, the Corps opened the Bonnet Carre Spillway for a total of
123 days, first from 27 February until 11 April and then from 10
May until 27 July. On June 13, 2019, the Governor of Louisiana,
"John Bell Edwards, sent a letter to the United State Secretary of
Commerce" admitting "the extreme influx of freshwater from the
Bonnet Carre Spillway opening has greatly reduced salinity levels
in our coastal waters and disrupted estuarine productivity." On
July 3, 2019, the Louisiana Department of Health announced the
closing of several oyster-harvesting areas due to the low salinity
levels caused by the influx of fresh water from the Mississippi
River resulting from the opening of the Bonnet Carre Spillway.

On Jan. 14, 2020, the Plaintiffs, Robert L. Campo, Michael Campo,
Lepetich Aquaculture, L.L.C., and M.J. Lepetich Oysters, L.L.C.,
along with several consolidated Plaintiffs, filed a complaint
alleging as a direct, natural or probable consequence of the
opening of the Bonnet Carre Spillway during the year 2019, the
Plaintiffs and the putative Class members have been deprived of the
use, occupancy and enjoyment of their personal (oyster stock) and
real (oyster beds and reefs) property, resulting in a permanent
taking of their property for a public use, without payment of just
compensation.

The Court granted the parties' motion to consolidate Case Nos.
20-47 & 20-55 with this case on May 1, 2020. The Government then
moved to dismiss in part the Plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC")
arguing the Plaintiffs lack a compensable property right in the
oysters themselves. The Plaintiffs responded to the Government's
motion to dismiss by stating the Takings Clause applies to all
forms of property rights and not only ownership. On July 27, 2020,
the Government filed a reply averring none of the Plaintiffs'
arguments contradict its argument the State of Louisiana owns the
oysters, not the Plaintiffs.

On Feb. 1, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a
surreply in opposition to the Government's motion to dismiss in
part. In their surreply, the Plaintiffs present two arguments: (1)
Louisiana's statutory scheme for leasing water bottoms gives the
Plaintiffs the right to possess the oysters they grow and the
Plaintiffs own these oysters through possession; and (2) this Court
has jurisdiction over their action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1497 (2018). In response, the Government argues the Plaintiffs fail
to justify their filing of a surreply and if the Court grants the
Plaintiffs' motion, it should conclude neither argument has merit.

On July 9, 2021, the Court held oral argument on the Government's
motion to dismiss in New Orleans, Louisiana. After oral argument,
the Court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing to
address the appropriate application of Louisiana Supreme Court
decisions. On July 30, 2021, the Government filed its supplemental
brief wherein the Government argues Louisiana Supreme Court's
precedent, Avenal v. State, 886 So.2d 1085 (La. 2004), squarely
resolves the question presented in the Government's motion and is
binding authority. The Plaintiffs filed their supplemental brief
arguing Avenal v. State does not address the key issues presented
in this case and, thus, this Court is not bound by it.

Whether Plaintiffs' Claim Should be Dismissed Pursuant to 12(b)(6)
for Failure to State a Claim

The Government argues, because the Plaintiffs have no compensable
property right to the oysters themselves, any claim related to a
taking of the oysters must be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.

Judge Holte notes that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
provides "private property" may not "be taken for public use,
without just compensation," U.S. Const. amend. V. To prevail on a
takings claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a protectable property
interest, Judge Holte explains, citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986, 1000 (1984).

In 2019, the Corps opened the Bonnet Carre Spillway on Feb. 27 and
again on May 10 in anticipation of flood water conditions in New
Orleans. Part of the Plaintiffs' prayer for relief requests a
finding that their properties have been taken for a public purpose.
For purposes of this motion, the Government does not contest the
openings occurred for a public purpose, affirmatively asserting the
United States operated the Bonnet Carre Spillway in order to
minimize flood damages along the lower river reaches and the City
of New Orleans. During oral argument, the Government agreed, for
the purpose of the motion to dismiss, the opening of the Bonnet
Carre Spillway was for a public purpose. Additionally, the
Government concedes, for purposes of this motion, the United States
assumes the Plaintiffs own oyster leases on state-owned
waterbottoms.

Judge Holte finds that in certain circumstances, the Louisiana code
grants oyster lessees property rights in oysters, and persuasive
case law establishes oyster lessees can assert these rights against
"third parties," citing La. Stat. Ann. Section 56:423, Avenal, 886
So.2d 1085, et al.

The Government admits the Plaintiffs have several rights, including
rights to exclude, destroy, use, possess, sue third parties for
damages, recover under larceny, alienate, and enjoy the fruits of
selling the oysters. The Court, therefore, finds the Plaintiffs
have all three essential features of the "bundle of rights"
commonly characterized as "property" under Louisiana law.
Accordingly, a traditional property rights analysis confirms the
Plaintiffs have compensable property rights in oysters as against
third parties, such as the United States under certain
circumstances.

The Government concedes the elements of Plaintiffs' takings claims
for the purposes of this motion and instead bases its RCFC 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss solely on the argument the Plaintiffs have no
compensable property right to the oysters themselves. This is the
Government's only argument, and as the Court found, the Plaintiffs
have compensable property rights in the oysters as against third
parties, such as the United States, in certain circumstances.

Therefore, the Court must deny the Government's motion to dismiss
in part pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6).

Conclusion

The Government concedes when the Plaintiffs sell oysters they are
paid for the fruits of their effort, and the Plaintiffs demonstrate
rights to exclude, destroy, use, possess, sue third parties for
damages, recover for larceny, alienate, and enjoy the fruits of
selling oysters. Under Louisiana precedent, federal common law, and
Lockean labor theory, the Plaintiffs have shown compensable
property rights in oysters as against the United States.

For these reasons, the Court denies the Government's motion to
dismiss in part pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6). The parties will meet
and confer, and will file a joint status report detailing the next
steps in the case and further proceedings on or before Jan. 20,
2022.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Dec. 23,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycxhkmek from
Leagle.com.

Camilo K. Salas, III, Salas & Co., L.C., with whom were Michael G.
Stag , Ashley M. Liuzza, and Mathew D. Rogenes, all of Stag Liuzza,
L.L.C., in New Orleans, Louisiana, for the Plaintiffs.

William J. Shapiro -- william.shapiro@usdoj.gov -- Senior Trial
Attorney, Environment and Natural Resources Division, Department of
Justice, of Sacramento, California, for the Government.


UNITED STATES: Federation Appeals Ruling in Miller Suit to 5th Cir.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Movant Federation of Southern Cooperatives/Land Assistance Fund
filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in the lawsuit entitled
SID MILLER, et al. v. TOM VILSACK, in his official capacity as
Secretary of Agriculture, Case No. 4:21-cv-00595-O, in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth.

The lawsuit is brought on behalf of all farmers and ranchers in the
United States who are excluded from the benefits of programs for
"socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers" because of their race
or ethnicity.

Sections 1005 and 1006 of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021,
H.R. 1319, 117th Cong. (2021), provide aid to farmers and ranchers
who have been harmed by the COVID-19 pandemic -- including loan
forgiveness up to 120 percent of the value of the loan -- but only
if they qualify as a "socially disadvantaged farmer or rancher."
Numerous other federal statutes limit government aid to individuals
who qualify as a "socially disadvantaged farmer or rancher."
Federal law defines "socially disadvantaged farmer or rancher" as
"a farmer or rancher who is a member of a socially disadvantaged
group."

According to the complaint, the Department of Agriculture has
adopted a general definition of "socially disadvantaged farmer and
rancher" as follows--A socially disadvantaged group is defined as:
A farmer or rancher who is a member of one or more of the following
groups whose members have been subjected to racial or ethnic
prejudice because of their identity as members of a group without
regard to their individual qualities: African Americans, American
Indians, Alaskan Natives, Asians, Hispanics, and Pacific
Islanders.

The Plaintiff is a farmer and rancher. His ancestry is
overwhelmingly white, and primarily Scotch-Irish. As is the case
with many Americans, his ancestry is not limited to just one racial
or ethnic group. The Plaintiff also has approximately 2%
African-American ancestry. The statutes described, as currently
interpreted and enforced by the Department of Agriculture, exclude
Mr. Miller from the benefits of programs for "socially
disadvantaged farmers and ranchers" on account of his race, says
the complaint.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on October 25, 2021, the
Hon. Judge Reed O'Connor entered an order denying Movants' requests
to opt out of the certified classes or amend the class
certification order.

Movants are plaintiffs in five of the stayed lawsuits and are
members of the classes certified by this Court. They ask the Court
for permission to opt out of the certified classes so that they may
seek to lift the stays in their cases and continue to litigate
their claims. The Defendant opposes the opt-out motion on the
grounds that fairness and efficiency concerns warrant staying those
lawsuits in favor of this class action.

On October 12, 2021, the Federation of Southern Cooperatives/Land
Assistance Fund filed a motion to intervene. On December 8, 2021,
Judge Reed C. O'Connor entered an order denying the motion to
intervene as Defendants.

The Movant now seeks a review of this order.

The appellate case is captioned as Federation of Southern
Cooperatives/Land Assistance Fund v. Sid Miller, Case No. 21-11271,
in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, filed on
December 22, 2021.[BN]

Movant-Appellant Federation of Southern Cooperatives/Land
Assistance Fund is represented by:

          Chase Johnson Cooper, Esq.
          WINSTON & STRAWN, L.L.P.
          2121 N. Pearl Street
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 453-6531
          E-mail: ccooper@winston.com

Plaintiffs-Appellees Sid Miller, On behalf of himself and others
similarly situated; Greg Macha; James Meek; Lorinda O'Shaughnessy;
and Jeff Peters are represented by:

          Jonathan F. Mitchell, Esq.
          111 Congress Avenue
          Austin, TX 78701-0000
          Telephone: (512) 686-3940
          E-mail: jonathan@mitchell.law

UNIVERSAL LOGISTICS: Faine Seeks Extension of Class Cert. Filing
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DONTE FAINE, Individually
and on behalf of all others Similarly situated, v. UNIVERSAL
LOGISTICS OF VIRGINIA, LLC, d/b/a "Estes Dedicated", a Virginia
limited liability company, Case No. 1:21-cv-00524-PAB-KLM (D.
Colo.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order amending the
preliminary scheduling order, and seeks an extension within which
to file his motion for certification until March 10, 2022.

On June 17, 2021, the Court through the Hon. Magistrate Kristen
Mix, entered its Preliminary Scheduling Order. That Order set
January 10, 2022, as the date within which Plaintiff would file his
Motion for Class Certification. No trial date nor Trial Preparation
Conference date were set out in that Order.

The Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint was filed on November 22,
2021, and Defendant’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses were filed
on December 6, 2021.

Universal Logistics is a full-service provider of customized
transportation and logistics solutions.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Dec. 23, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3HwB6kB at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David H. Miller, Esq.
          Victoria E. Guzman, Esq
          THE SAWAYA LAW FIRM
          1600 Ogden St.
          Denver, CO 80218
          Telephone: (303) 839-1650 ext. 1090
          Facsimile: (303) 832-7102
          E-mail: dhmiller@sawayalaw.com
                  vguzman@sawayalaw.com

VANDA PHARMS: Teamsters Seeks Extension to Serve Class Cert Reply
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Gordon v. Vanda Pharms.
Inc., et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-01108-FB-LB (E.D.N.Y.), the
Plaintiff Plaintiff Teamsters Local Union No. 727 Pension Fund asks
the Court to enter an order granting extension of time for the
deadline to serve Plaintiff's Reply in Further Support of Lead
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.

The Plaintiff respectfully requests that the deadline for the Reply
be extended from December 29, 2021 to January 7, 2022.

The Plaintiff requires additional time to serve its Reply because
one of Plaintiff's attorneys has contracted COVID-19. This is the
first request for an extension of time and Defendants Vanda consent
to this request, the Plaintiff's counsel says.

The Plaintiff served its opening Motion for Class Certification on
October 29, 2021, and the Defendants served their Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification on December 1, 2021.
Also on December 1, 2021, Plaintiff served on Defendants its Motion
to Exclude the Report and Opinions of Defendants' rebuttal class
certification expert Rene M. Stulz.

On November 29, 2021, the Court instructed the parties to file the
fully briefed class certification motion along with the fully
briefed Daubert Motion on the same day -- January 28, 2022.

The parties intend to file both fully briefed motions by this
Court-ordered deadline. Thus, the extension of time that Plaintiff
respectfully requests in this letter does not impact any Court
filing deadlines, the counsel adds.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Dec. 22, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3sShNy6 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael G. Capeci, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1832
          New York, NY 10170
          Telephone: (212) 432-5100
          E-mail: mcapeci@rgrdlaw.com

VI-JON LLC: Moreno Appeals Dismissal of 2nd Amended Consumer Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Anthony Moreno filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit entitled ANTHONY MORENO, individually, and
on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. VI-JON, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 3:20-cv-01446-JM-BGS, in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California, San Diego.

On July 27, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a consumer class action
complaint against Defendant, seeking damages and equitable relief
for the alleged false and misleading labeling on Defendant's hand
sanitizing products. The complaint alleged violations of
California's Unfair Competition Law, the California's False
Advertising Law, the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, breach
of warranty, and quasi-contract.

On September 14, 2020, the Plaintiff filed the first amended
complaint. On March 3, 2021, the court granted Defendant's motion
to dismiss with leave to amend.

On March 24, 2021, the Plaintiff filed the second amended complaint
alleging that the front-facing, primary display panel of each
product contains the statement "kills 99.99% of germs" followed by
an asterisk. Further, it is alleged that next to the asterisk on
the back panels of the products are the statements: "Effective at
eliminating more than 99.99% of many common harmful germs and
bacteria in as little as 15 seconds" or "Effective at eliminating
99.99% of many common harmful germs and bacteria in as little as 15
seconds." The SAC alleges the representations are false and
misleading because the products "do not kill" 99.99% of germs or
disease-causing organisms. The Plaintiff contends that the
"Products are ineffective or substantially ineffective against
approximately 54 pathogens, or approximately 26%" of approximately
204 clinically relevant pathogens, listed in a compendium of
disease-causing agents provided by the Bode Science Center.

On April 7, 2021, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. The
Plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion and Defendant filed
its reply.

On December 6, 2021, Judge Jeffrey T. Miller entered an order
granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the second amended
complaint.

The Plaintiff seeks a review of this order.

The appellate case is captioned as Anthony Moreno v. Vi-Jon, LLC,
Case No. 21-56370, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, filed on December 21, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Anthony Moreno Mediation Questionnaire was due on
December 28, 2021;

   -- Appellant Anthony Moreno opening brief is due on February 22,
2022;

   -- Appellee Vi-Jon, LLC. answering brief is due on March 21,
2022; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant ANTHONY MORENO, individually, and on behalf of
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Naomi B. Spector, Esq.
          KAMBERLAW, LLP
          1501 San Elijo Hills Road, S Suite 104-212
          San Marcos, CA 92078
          Telephone: (310) 400-1053
          E-mail: nspector@kamberlaw.com

               - and -

          Scott A. Kamber, Esq.
          KAMBERLAW
          201 Milwaukee Street, Suite 200
          Denver, CO 80246
          Telephone: (646) 964-9600

Defendant-Appellee VI-JON, LLC is represented by:

          Melanie Atswei Ayerh, Esq.
          STEPTOE & JOHNSON, LLP
          633 W 5th Street, Suite 1900
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (480) 766-8827
          E-mail: mayerh@steptoe.com

               - and -

          Anthony Hopp, Esq.
          STEPTOE & JOHNSON, LLP
          227 W Monroe Street, Suite 4700
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 577-1249
          E-mail: ahopp@steptoe.com

               - and -

          Carol R. Brophy, Esq.
          STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP
          1 Market Street, Suite 1800
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 365-6724
          E-mail: cbrophy@steptoe.com

WAL-MART STORES: Henderson Appeals ADA Suit Dismissal to 4th Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Jeremiah Henderson filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled SHANE M. JENKINS, ESQ., on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART
STORES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00271-RAJ-DEM, in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
at Norfolk.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit seeks an end
to Wal Mart's discriminatory practices, make whole relief for the
class, and punitive damages.

Unlike its competitors (e.g., Amazon.com, Kroger, and Target),
Wal-Mart has implemented a single, nationwide loss prevention
policy targeting potential shoplifters, rather than known or
suspected shoplifters. This subtle policy shift has nurtured
consumer racial profiling by Wal-Mart employees who perform loss
prevention-related acts, including enforcing receipt checking
policy. As Wal-Mart reduced full-time positions and shifted to a
part-time workforce, Wal-Mart has become increasingly more reliant
on its greeters (hereinafter this term includes positions such as
customer host and any position involving receipt checking) to
perform loss prevention functions. For many Americans, encounters
with Wal-Mart greeters have become reminiscent of the Nazi Germany
Gestapo because Wal-Mart greeters have targeted minorities and
other protected classes and demanded "papers, please." The result
is harassment, detention, and interrogation. In some cases,
innocent consumers who fail to comply -- whether inadvertent or
intentional -- have been assaulted, arrested, or suffered serious
bodily harm or death. Such experiences are reported in the news and
documented across social media.

Accordingly, Shane alleges that Wal-Mart harassed, defamed,
assaulted, or falsely imprisoned Shane and other putative Class
Members who were singled out and treated less favorably on the
basis of race, national origin, or other impermissible criterion in
violation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act. Shane further
alleges that Wal-Mart's loss prevention policy, and enforcement
thereof, continue to pose an inequitable and unreasonable risk of
serious bodily harm or death to Shane and other putative Class
Members with disabilities, resulting in the denial of access or
interference with full and equal enjoyment of goods and services
offered by Wal-Mart in violation of Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, (the "ADA"), says the complaint.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of the Court's Order granting a
motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim.

The appellate case is captioned as Jeremiah Henderson v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., Case No. 21-2417, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, filed on December 22, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant JEREMIAH HENDERSON is represented by:

          Gary M. Bowman, Esq.
          GARY M. BOWMAN, ATTORNEY AT LAW
          2728 Colonial Avenue
          Roanoke, VA 24015
          Telephone: (540) 343-1173

Defendant-Appellee WAL-MART STORES, INCORPORATED is represented
by:

          Donald Cameron Beck, Jr., Esq.
          MCCANDLISH HOLTON, PC
          P. O. Box 796
          Richmond, VA 23218-0000
          Telephone: (804) 344-6322

WASHINGTON: Court Seeks Pro Bono Counsel in Penwell v. Strange
--------------------------------------------------------------
Chief United States Magistrate Judge J. Richard Creatura of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, at
Tacoma, issued an order directing pro bono coordinator to identify
pro bono counsel in the lawsuit titled TONY PENWELL, Plaintiff v.
CHERYL STRANGE, et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:21-cv-05722-RJB-JRC
(W.D. Wash.).

The District Court has referred this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 civil
rights action to Judge Creatura pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections
636(b)(1)(A) and (B), and local Magistrate Judge Rules MJR1, MJR3,
and MJR4.

Background

The Plaintiff, who proceeds in forma pauperis, brought the matter
in September 2021. He is housed at the Washington State Reformatory
("WSR"), a portion of the Monroe Correctional Complex. He alleges
that the WSR formerly comprised four living units with 158 single
occupant cells but that as part of the planned closure of the
facility, DOC has closed two WSR living units and transferred
prisoners to the remaining two units. He alleges that this has
resulted in double-celling prisoners, who were formerly in
single-occupant cells, and has essentially resulted in a 158%
capacity increase.

The Plaintiff asserts that the conditions of confinement at the WSR
violate his Eighth Amendment rights. He argues that consolidation
has impeded the ability to socially distance and that DOC's safety
measures have been inadequate. Significantly, he claims that the
Defendants have intentionally punished prisoners, who self-report
COVID-19 symptoms, in hope of keeping people from reporting being
sick and are falsifying case numbers. He also alleges that
ventilation is inadequate, that his medical conditions are
exacerbated by the living conditions, that noise is "out of
control," that there is "regular violence," and that he is forced
to share a toilet with his cellmate. The Plaintiff further claims
that his rights to equal protection and to due process were
violated by consolidation.

The Plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunctive relief. His motion focused on allegations of
overcrowding and relocation during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

Judge Creatura recommended denying the motion because the relief
sought was overbroad, because overcrowding alone does not amount to
an Eighth Amendment violation, and because the materials that the
Plaintiff provided in support of his motion did not support that
prison administrators were deliberately indifferent to conditions
caused by alleged overcrowding during COVID-19. Judge Creatura's
report and recommendation remains pending before the District Court
at this time.

Judge Creatura notes that this matter is complex enough that it is
unlikely the Plaintiff can articulate and effectively litigate his
claims pro se. Indeed, the Plaintiff seeks to bring this matter as
a class action, and he cannot bring a class action while proceeding
pro se.

Although the Court declines to further analyze the merits of the
Plaintiff's claims at this stage in the litigation, his Section
1983 arguments do raise significant constitutional issues, as
alleged in the complaint. For instance, the Plaintiff alleges that
the Defendants created an environment in which prisoners
incarcerated at WSR were effectively punished for self-reporting
COVID-19 symptoms, in order to avoid having to report the true
scale of the COVID-19 outbreak at the WSR while the DOC is closing
and consolidating that institution.

The Court recommended denying the Plaintiff's motion for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief at
least in part because he was, acting pro se, unable to substantiate
these claims with materials that could adequately support his
claims.

The appointment of counsel to represent the Plaintiff will ensure
that he, who is housed at an institution currently being closed, is
able to engage in discovery and to litigate his claims, Judge
Creatura points out.

In short, Judge Creatura holds, the interest of justice will best
be served if counsel from the Western District Pro Bono Panel is
appointed to represent the Plaintiff in this matter.

Conclusion and Directions to Clerk

The Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel is granted, contingent on
the identification of counsel willing to represent him in this
matter. The Western District of Washington's pro bono coordinator
is directed to identify counsel to represent the Plaintiff, in
accordance with the Court's General Order 16-20 ("In re: Amended
Plan for the Representation of Pro Se Litigants in Civil Rights
Actions"), section 4. Once it has been determined whether the Court
will be able to appoint an attorney to represent the Plaintiff, the
Court will issue appropriate orders.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Dec. 23, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p827cum from Leagle.com.


WELLS FARGO: Hollis Appeals Denial of Motion to Set Aside Judgment
------------------------------------------------------------------
Claimant Andrew Hollis filed an appeal from a court ruling entered
in the lawsuit titled Shahriar Jabbari, et al. v. Wells Fargo &
Company, et al., Case No. 3:15-cv-02159-VC, in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco.

The lawsuit arises from the Defendants' illegal, fraudulent, and
deceptive tactics to generate sales of their banking and financial
products by enrolling its customers in multiple banking accounts
and services.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Wells Fargo
will pay $142 million to settle class action claims that it
secretly opened credit cards and unauthorized accounts in
customers' names going back to 2002.

The bank was hit hard by the discovery that its staff opened
millions of bank accounts and credit cards for customers without
their consent in an effort to meet internal sales goals.

On October 25, 2021, Mr. Hollis filed a motion to set aside
judgment.

On November 30, 2021, Judge Vince Chhabria entered an order denying
the motion to set aside judgment.

The Claimant now seeks a review of the order.

The appellate case is captioned as Shahriar Jabbari, et al. v.
Wells Fargo & Company, et al., Case No. 21-17103, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on December
21, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Andrew Hollis opening brief is due on February 18,
2022;

   -- Appellees Kaylee Heffelfinger, Shahriar Jabbari, Wells Fargo
& Company and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. answering brief is due on
March 21, 2022; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

Claimant-Appellant ANDREW HOLLIS, of West Palm Beach, Florida,
appears pro se.

Plaintiffs-Appellees SHAHRIAR JABBARI and KAYLEE HEFFELFINGER, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Esq.
          Benjamin Gould, Esq.
          Derek W. Loeser, Esq.
          Daniel Parke Mensher, Esq.
          Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK, LLP
          1201 3rd Avenue, Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-1900
          E-mail: gcappio@kellerrohrback.com
                  dloeser@kellerrohrback.com
                  dmensher@kellerrohrback.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Greg Lewis, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK LLP
          180 Grand Avenue, Suite 1380
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 463-3900

               - and -

          Matthew J. Preusch, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK LLP
          1129 State Street, Suite 8
          Santa Barbara, CA 93101
          Telephone: (805) 456-1496
          E-mail: mpreusch@kellerrohrback.com  

Defendants-Appellees WELLS FARGO & COMPANY and WELLS FARGO BANK,
N.A. are represented by:

          Erin Joan Cox, Esq.
          MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON, LLP
          350 S Grand Avenue, 50th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 683-9575

               - and -

          David H. Fry, Esq.
          Jacob M. Rosen, Esq.  
          MUNGER TOLLES & OLSON, LLP
          560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 512-4082
          E-mail: frydh@mto.com

ZOOSK INC: Seeks to Amend Class Certification Briefing Dates
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JUAN FLORES-MENDEZ, an
individual and AMBER COLLINS, an individual, and on behalf of
classes of similarly situated individuals, v. ZOOSK, INC., a
Delaware corporation, Case No. 3:20-cv-04929-WHA (N.D. Cal.), the
Defendant asks the Court to enter an order modifying the class
certification briefing deadlines as follows:

   1. The deadline for Plaintiffs' motion for class
      certification shall remain January 24, 2022;

   2. The deadline for Defendant's opposition to Plaintiffs'
      motion for class certification, which is currently set on
      February 7, 2022, shall be extended to February 21, 2022;

   3. The deadline for Plaintiffs' reply to Defendant's
      opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for class certification,
      which is currently set on February 14, 2022, shall be
      extended to 27 February 28, 2022; and

   4. The date of the hearing on Plaintiffs' motion for class
      certification shall remain March 10, 2022.

The Defendant says that the scheduling adjustment it sought present
unopposed motion will not affect the March 10, 2022, hearing date
set for Plaintiffs' motion for class certification -- which would
still take place 45 days after Plaintiffs’ motion is filed -- or
any other currently operative dates and deadlines in this matter.

Zoosk is an online dating service available in 25 languages and in
more than 80 countries.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Dec. 22, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ELr39P at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Douglas H. Meal, Esq.
          Rebecca Harlow, Esq.
          ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE, LLP
          The Orrick Building
          405 Howard Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105-2669
          Telephone: (415) 773 5700
          Facsimile: (415) 773 5759
          E-mail: dmeal@orrick.com
                  rharlow@orrick.com

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Court Rules Global Re to Pay Litigation Costs
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Insurance Journal reports that the New York State Court of
Appeals has upended case law for reinsurers in New York, declaring
that policy limits don't extend to litigation costs for a property
and casualty insurance carrier.  In Global Reinsurance Corp. of
America vs. Century Indemnity, the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of
Appeals said that previous decisions, issued in the 1990s, have
been undermined by a recent opinion by the New York State Court of
Appeals.

Based on that, and relying on contract law, the federal court panel
found that Global must cover Century's defense expenses in
underlying asbestos claims that were filed against Caterpillar
Tractor Co.  The 2nd Circuit upheld a federal district court's
decision, denying Global's request for a declaratory judgment on
the policy caps.  The key concept, the court said, was the
concurrency of the reinsurance policies to the liability policies.

"Applying ordinary rules of contract interpretation, we agree with
the district court: The reinsurance certificates' follow-form
clauses require Global to pay its proportionate share of Century's
defense costs in excess of the certificates' liability limits," the
appeals court wrote in its Dec. 28 opinion.  "We base this
conclusion on the certificates' unambiguous language as well as the
testimony of Century's experts confirming that a strong presumption
of concurrency prevailed in the reinsurance market at the time the
certificates were issued."

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Montana S.C. Affirms $98MM NIC Judgement
---------------------------------------------------------
Mike Dennison of KHTV reports that the Montana Supreme Court has
mostly upheld an order that National Indemnity Company (NIC) pay
the state of Montana $98 million for asbestos-related injury claims
from Libby, stemming from an insurance policy the state held almost
50 years ago.

In a 6-1 ruling late last month, the court said NIC is responsible
for the claims because it failed in its "duty to defend" against
them, after the state notified the company it might be liable.

"It so happened that this significant risk ripened, many years
later, into state liability for bodily injury that undoubtedly
occurred during the policy period, on National's watch," wrote
Supreme Court Justice Jim Rice for the majority.

The years-long case involves liability for as many as 2,000 claims
filed by former employees of the now-defunct W.R. Grace vermiculite
mine near Libby and townspeople sickened with lung disease, caused
by asbestos fibers in mine tailings.  The tailings and other mine
waste also were distributed in various locations around the town,
such as local ball fields.

Hundreds of Libby-area residents have sued the state for damages,
saying it knew of hazards at the mine since the 1950s but did
nothing to warn workers or residents.  The state, in turn, sought
coverage and payment from NIC, through a liability policy the state
held from 1973-1975.


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2022. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***