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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, February 28, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 36

                            Headlines

101-11 86 AVE: Class in Villalta Labor Suit Conditionally Certified
9199-4467 QUEBEC INC: Fogle Files Suit in M.D. Florida
ABBOTT LAB: Suarez Sues Over Alleged Infant Formula Contamination
ACE AMERICAN: Court Sets Class Cert Briefing Schedule in MSP Suit
ACUTUS MEDICAL: Robbins Geller Files Securities Class Action

AIR-CITY INC: Faces Hermosillo Suit Over Unpaid Wages for Workers
AIRBNB INC: March 28 Settlement Claims Filing Deadline Set
ALABAMA PLUMBING: Court Refuses to Dismiss McAnally FLSA Suit
ALLEGIANCE RETAIL: Hanyzkiewicz Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
ALLIED INTERSTATE: E.D. New York Dismisses Rottenberg FDCPA Suit

AMERICAN FEDERATION: N.D. New York Stays Carlisle Securities Suit
AMERICAN GOLD & DIAMONDS: Miller Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
AMERICAN TANK: Full Time Employees Get Conditional Class Status
AMWASTE LLC: Richards Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages Under FLSA
ANGEL QUIROS: Bid to Certify Class Tossed in Gawlik Complaint

ANIIE INC: Court Tosses Class Suit Over Mislabeled Fruit Snacks
APPLE INC: Coring Antitrust Suit Moved From S.D. Fla. to N.D. Cal.
APPLE INC: Judge Issues Mixed Ruling on iPhone Data Drain Suit
ARANCINI BROS: Quintanilla Suit Seeks Proper Wage for Janitors
ASCOT DIAMONDS: Miller Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

ASTRA SPACE: Gainey McKenna Reminds of April 11 Deadline
ASURION LLC: Iskhakova Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
AVNET INC: Time Extension to Respond to Conditional Cert. Bid Filed
AXA EQUITABLE: Connecticut Court Flips Judgment in O'Donnell Suit
BANK OF AMERICA: Fails to Refund Late Fees, Simmons Class Suit Says

BANTER BY: Alfaro Wage-and-Hour Suit Removed to C.D. California
BEAUFORT COUNTY SCHOOL: Patel Suit Removed to D. South Carolina
BLUE CROSS: Appeals Court Affirms Denial of Bid to Toss Kirby Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Gibson-Hensley's Claims Dismissed With Prejudice
BRAVO ARKOMA: McKnight Realty Seeks to Certify Settlement Class

BUON CAFE: Mendez Seeks to Recover Unpaid OT for Restaurant Staff
BURLINGTON STORES: Fox Rothschild Attorney Discusses FLSA Suit
BUTCH'S RAT: Settlement in Key Suit Partly Granted Final Approval
CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: Ondey Sues Over Therapists' Unpaid Wages
CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses Stowers Suit Without Leave to Amend

CARPENTER & HAZLEWOOD: Wolf Seeks Entry of Jan. 18 Judgment
CHALLENGE MFG: Misclassifies Quality Engineers, Pratt Suit Alleges
CHAMPION PETFOODS: Tenth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Renfro Suit
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE: Class Cert. Hearing Reset to March 14
COLONIAL LIFE: Castro Labor Code Suit Goes to C.D. California

COMPUTER HAUS: Bid for Equitable Tolling in Jahagirdar Suit Granted
CONAGRA FOODS: Negrete Suit Counsel Awarded $5.97MM in Fees & Costs
CONAIR CORP: Gonsalves Class Cert Hearing Continued to March 28
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Kevin Kihnke Bid to Dismiss Corker Suit Nixed
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Settlement in Corker Suit Gets Initial Nod

CVI SGP: District of Utah Narrows Claims in Cotte FDCPA Class Suit
DEJA VU PIZZA: Conditional Cert. of Delivery Driver Class Sought
DETROIT, MI: Bray's Bid for Judgment on Pleadings Granted
DING DYNASTY: Galvez. Files FLSA Suit in S.D. New York
E.T. BROWNE DRUG: Watson Sues Over False Representations

E25BIO INC: Covid Tests Falsely Labeled, URENA Class Suit Alleges
ELECTROLUX HOME: Amended Scheduling Order Entered in Reichardt
EML PAYMENTS: Sets Aside $10.5-Mil. for Class Action Legal Costs
EML PAYMENTS: To Vigorously Defend Class Action Over Disclosures
EMPIRE SCAFFOLDING: Richards Seeks Conditional Status of Collective

ENSITE USA: Can Compel Arbitration in Johnson FLSA-NYLL Class Suit
ESTEE LAUDER: Law, et al. Seek to Certify Plan Participant Class
FACEBOOK: Initial Approval of Class Settlement Deal Sought
FAIRFIELD HEALTHCARE: Aboah to File Second Amended Complaint
FAMULARIS 002: Craven Sues Over Unpaid Minimum Wages

FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE: Court Certifies Class in Shields Suit
FIFTH AVENUE: Vivanco Seeks Correct Overtime Pay Rates Under FLSA
FIRST NATIONAL: 9th Circuit Affirms Denial of Class Certification
FIRST NATIONAL: Denial of Bid to Certify Class in Lara Suit Upheld
FIRSTBANK: Face Class Action Suit Over Alleged Overdraft Fees

FORTE DATA: Foote Files TCPA Suit in N.D. Georgia
GEICO ADVANTAGE: Court Denies Amended Bid to Dismiss Thaxton Suit
GENERAL MOTORS: May Face Class Action Over Faulty Vehicles
GENWORTH LIFE: Hearing in Brighton Suit Rescheduled to March 24
GEORGIA: Court Sets Submission Deadline in King Class Action

GIORGIO ARMANI: Collects Data Without Proper Consent, Suit Claims
GOLDMAN SACHS: Judge Certifies 401(k) Lawsuit as Class Action
GOOGLE LLC: Vance Suit Stayed Pending Resolution of IBM Action
HAGYARD DAVIDSON: Dismissal of Swearingen's Original Suit Affirmed
HARTFORD HEALTHCARE: Connecticut Residents File Monopoly Suit

HUMANA MEDICAL: Tauber Sues Over Pre-Recorded Telemarketing Calls
HYP3R INC: Must Face Instagram Privacy Class Action
INMEDIATA HEALTH: Agrees to Settle Breach Class Action for $1.125-M
J.B. HUNT: Wins Final Approval of Class Settlement in Wilson Suit
JODY ENTERPRISES: Violates FLSA, NYLL, Morga Class Suit Alleges

JOHNS HOPKINS: Among Defendants in Financial Aid Class Action
JUMIO CORPORATION: Dudley Suit Removed to N.D. Illinois
JUUL LABS: Berkeley Sues Over Deceptive E-Cigarette Youth Ads
JUUL LABS: Colton-Pierrepont Sues Over Youth's E-Cigarette Crisis
JUUL LABS: E-Cigarette Ads Target Youth, Kane County Suit Says

JUUL LABS: La Canada Sues Over E-Cigarette Campaign to Youth
JUUL LABS: LaFargeVille Sues Over Youth's E-Cigarette Addiction
JUUL LABS: Markets E-Cigarette to Youth, Coldwater Community Claims
KBK NO. 11: B.C. Supreme Ct. Certifies Suit Over Defective Windows
KIND LLC: N.D. California Grants Bid to Dismiss Chong Class Suit

KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Class Suit Over Recalled CPAP Devices Pending
KROGER COMPANY: Judge Gives Tentative OK to Labor Class Action
KSE SPORTSMAN: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Pratt Class Suit
L.A.R.E PARTNERS: Court Certifies Two Classes in Umbrino Labor Suit
LAKE VENTURES: Faces Ramsey BIPA Class Suit Over Vocollect System

LIBERTY MUTUAL: Averts Class Action Over Totaled Cars
MAHWAH TOWNSHIP, NJ: Harris Sues Over Contaminated Drinking Water
MANHATTAN BEER: Cap 111 Files Suit in S.D. New York
MATTEL INC: May 2 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
MCDONALD'S USA: Settles Biometric Data Privacy Suit Up to $50MM

MCMENAMINS INC: Faces Data Breach Class Action in Washington
MDL 2968: Oglevee Appeals Dismissal Order and Final Judgment
MDL 3010: Court Orders Google to Produce Docs in Advertising Suit
MERAKEY USA: $117.5K Class Settlement in Kyem Suit Wins Approval
MERRILL LYNCH: Scheduling Order Entered in Iowa Public Complaint

META PLATFORMS: Settles Data Privacy Class Action for $90 Million
MORLEY CO: Fails to Secure PII/PHI Info, Ratcliff Data Breach Suit
NETWORK 1: Second Circuit Affirms Orders & Judgment in Malik Suit
NISSAN NORTH: Loses Bid for Partial Review of Order in Norman Suit
ORANGE COUNTY, CA: Judgment Entered in Toll Roads Suit v. OCTA

PABST BREWING: Loses Bid to Strike Peacock Nationwide Class Claims
PAYCOR INC: Stang Wins Bid for Court-Authorized Collective Notice
PNC BANK: Arbitration Order in Lyons Class Suit Affirmed in Part
QUINCY BOOTH: Banks, et al., Seek to Certify Settlement Class
RA MEDICAL: Class Settlement in Derr Suit Wins Preliminary Approval

REATA PHARMA: Faces Pham Securities Suit Over Stock Price Drop
REMINGTON ARMS: Sandy Hook Victims' Families Settle Class Action
RENEWABLE ENERGY: Rosa Appeals Securities Suit Dismissal
RIO TINTO PLC: S.D. New York Dismisses Colbert Securities Suit
RIVER STREET: Faces Rodriguez Suit Over Unwanted Phone Calls

SAFEWAY INC: Consumers Get Class Action Settlement Checks
SAN MATEO COUNTY, CA: Court Tosses Chapman Suit With Leave to Amend
SCHWABE NORTH: Prenatal Vitamins Mismarketed, Schmucker Suit Says
SCIENTIFIC GAMES: Rider to Protective Order in Reed Suit Approved
SCRIPPS HEALTH: Rubenstein Appeals Dismissal of Data Breach Suit

SKYWEST AIRLINES: Wright Seeks Wages & OT for Flight Attendants
SOCIETY INSURANCE: Faces Solly Ringo Suit Over Property Insurance
STAR BRANDS: Seeks Dismissal of Mislabeling Class Action Suit
STARTEK USA: Violates FLSA & State Labor Laws, Harris Suit Alleges
STATE FARM: E.D. Virginia Certifies Class in Elegant Massage Suit

SUNPOWER CORP: Settles Defective Solar Panels Class Suit for $4.7-M
SUTTER HEALTH: 3-Mil. Plaintiffs Seek $1.2-Bil. in Antitrust Suit
SUTTER HEALTH: Faces Antitrust Class Action in California
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION: Final Approval of Saucillo Settlement Vacated
SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Securities Suit

TALIS BIOMEDICAL: Faces Mitcham Securities Over Stock Price Drop
TELOS CORP: Klein Law Firm Reminds of April 8 Deadline
TEN BRIDGES: Taie Granted Leave to File Amended Class Complaint
TJX COMPANIES: Web Site Not Accessible to Blind, Hanyzkiewicz Says
TRUE SELECT: Class in Larson FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified

UNITED SERVICES: Trial Court Allows Vehicle Class Action to Proceed
UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAVEN: Wnorowski Seeks to Certify Two Classes
UPS STORE: Appeals Remand Ruling in Tripicchio Case
VERO BEACH, FL: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Taig v. Police Dep't
VITAMIN SHOPPE: $650K in Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Walters Suit

VITAMIN SHOPPE: Settlement in Walters Suit Wins Final Approval
WASHINGTON, DC: DOC Agrees to Implement Covid-19 Measures
WASHINGTON: District Court Allows Hegge's Claims to Proceed
WEST VIRGINIA: Bid for Prelim. Injunction in Lambert v. Ames Denied
WESTCOURT PLACE: Tenants' Class Action Over 2019 Fire Can Proceed

WESTJET AIRLINES: McMillan Discusses Ruling in Baggage Fee Suit
[*] Aus. Litigation Funding, Class Action Policies Discussed
[*] U.S. Class Action Settlements Reached Record High
[*] U.S. Congress Passes Law to Void Sexual Harassment Arbitration

                            *********

101-11 86 AVE: Class in Villalta Labor Suit Conditionally Certified
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSE ARNLADO SOLIS VILLALTA, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. 101-11 86
AVE. CORP, d/b/a JC & SONS HOME IMPROVEMENT CORP., JUAN ARCE, as an
individual, and JC & SONS HOME IMPROVEMENT CORP, Defendants, Case
No. 20-CV-0249 (RRM) (TAM) (E.D.N.Y.), Magistrate Judge Taryn A.
Merkl of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York granted the Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification
as a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

I. Background

On Jan. 14, 2020, Plaintiff Jose Arnlado Solis Villalta, also known
as Jose Villalta, initiated the action individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated against Defendants 101-11 86 Ave.
Corp., foing business as JC & Sons Home Improvement Corp., Juan
Arce, as an individual, and JC & Sons Home Improvement Corp. The
Plaintiff seeks damages for unpaid wages pursuant to the FLSA, and
the New York Labor Law, Art. 6 Section 190 et seq. and Art. 19
Section 650 et seq. ("NYLL").

As noted, Plaintiff Villalta initiated the collective action on
Jan. 14, 2020. He filed an amended complaint on July 16, 2021,
which is the operative complaint in the action.

According to the amended complaint, JC & Sons is a Kew
Gardens-based corporation, owned and operated by Defendant Juan
Arce, that employs "between 20 and 30 employees within the past
three years subjected to similar payment structures." The Plaintiff
alleges that from October 2011 until in or around October 2019, he
worked for the Defendants performing his primary duties "as a
roofing and siding concrete laborer, while performing other
miscellaneous duties." He claims that he was paid "approximately
$150 per day from in or around January 2014 until in or around
December 2014, approximately $160 per day from in or around January
2015 until in or around December 2015," approximately $170 per day
from in or around January 2016 until in or around December 2017,
and approximately $180 per day from in or around January 2018 until
in or around December 2019."

The Plaintiff also alleges that he "worked approximately 72 hours
or more per week during his employment by the Defendants from in or
around January 2014 until in or around October 2019." Additionally,
he claims that the "Defendants did not pay him time and a half for
hours worked over 40, a blatant violation of the overtime
provisions contained in the FLSA and NYLL." The Plaintiff also
alleges that the Defendants failed to post notices of minimum wage
and overtime wage requirements and failed to keep payroll records.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges, inter alia,
that the Defendants willfully violated the overtime requirements of
the FLSA and NYLL, as well as the wage and notice and spread of
hours requirements under the NYLL.

On July 29, 2021, the Plaintiff moved for an order conditionally
certifying this case as a collective action under the FLSA pursuant
to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b), on behalf of all similarly situated,
non-exempt employees of the Defendants employed as roofing, siding,
or concrete laborers (or other similarly titled professionals)
within the last three years. Opt-in Plaintiff Selvin Garrido Lobo
consented to join as a Plaintiff on July 29, 2021.

On Oct. 12, 2021, the parties filed a joint status letter proposing
a briefing schedule for the present motion, which the Court adopted
on Oct. 13, 2021. The motion was fully briefed as of Dec. 6, 2021.

II. Analysis

A. Conditional Certification

The Plaintiffs now move for an order conditionally certifying the
case as a collective action on behalf of all similarly situated,
non-exempt employees of Defendants who worked as roofing, siding,
or concrete laborers (or other similarly titled professionals)
within the last three years, and for authorization to distribute
notice of the action to potential opt-in plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs contend that "all of these employees are similarly
situated because they were subject to the same payroll practices
prohibited under the FLSA and New York Labor Law." The Defendants
oppose the Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification and
raise several objections to the proposed notice form submitted by
the Plaintiffs.

Judge Merkl finds that the Plaintiffs have made a "modest factual
showing" that Plaintiff Villalta and the other roofing, siding, and
concrete laborers were similarly situated in terms of the
Defendants' alleged FLSA overtime violations. Accordingly,
conditional certification is warranted, subject to the time frame
and other limitations she outlines.

Having reviewed the amended complaint, the record, and the
Plaintiffs' motion, which includes the described affidavits, Judge
Merkl finds that the Plaintiffs have made a "modest factual
showing" sufficient to grant conditional certification of a
collective as to Plaintiffs Jose Villalta, Selvin Garrido, and the
Defendants' employees who worked as roofing, siding, and concrete
laborers (and other similarly titled professionals) within the last
three years.

First, she finds that the Plaintiffs have attested to facts
sufficient at this stage to show that they were subject to an
unlawful overtime policy in violation of the FLSA. Second, she
finds that the Plaintiffs have made the requisite "modest factual
showing" necessary to be afforded the opportunity to send a notice
to other roofing, siding, and concrete laborers employed by
Defendants so that they may choose to opt into the lawsuit.

Regarding the notice of pendency, Judge Merkl adopts the
Plaintiffs' proposed notice, in part, pursuant to the modifications
she sets forth. First, she says, the section entitled "I. PURPOSE
OF THIS NOTICE" should be edited to add Plaintiff Villalta's name
following mention of the "named Plaintiff." Second, the notice need
not include any comment regarding whether 101-11 86 Avenue Corp.
"employed any employees or had anything to do with JC * SONS HOME
IMPROVEMENT CORP." Third, the language similar to the following
conveys the information in a more neutral way: "No determination
has been made that you are owed any amount of money, and the Court
is not endorsing the merits of this lawsuit or advising you to
participate in this lawsuit. You are under no obligation to respond
to this notice." Fourth, for clarity, the "TO:" paragraph should
make plain that the notice is directed to roofing, siding, or
concrete laborers (or other similarly titled professionals).
Finally, the proposed notice be modified to include a section
titled: "Will I need to be actively involved in this action?"

As to the Notice Period, Judge Merkl concludes that "the remedial
purposes of the FLSA are best served by applying the three-year
statute of limitations from the date of the filing of the Complaint
in the action." Accordingly, she directs that notice be provided to
potential opt-in plaintiffs employed by the Defendants in the three
years prior to Jan. 14, 2020, the date the Complaint was filed in
the case. The parties are therefore directed to edit the "TO:"
section on the first page of the notice to reflect that the notice
is being provided to potential opt-in plaintiffs employed by the
Defendants as roofing, siding, or concrete laborers (or other
similarly titled professionals) in the three years preceding Jan.
14, 2020.

With respect to the opt-in period in the case, the proposed notice
will be modified to provide for 60 days during which potential
plaintiffs may opt in.

As to equitable tolling, courts in this circuit have permitted
equitable tolling while a plaintiff's motion for conditional
certification is pending before the court through the expiration of
the opt-in period. In the case, given the length of time that has
passed since the instant motion was filed and the relative
diligence of the Plaintiffs' counsel in pursuing conditional
certification, the limitations period will be tolled from July 29,
2021, the date the Plaintiffs filed their conditional certification
motion, until 60 days from the Court's final approval of the
revised notice.

Judge Merkl also authorizes the Plaintiffs to circulate the notice
in English and Spanish. She further directs the Plaintiffs to
provide the Defendants with a copy of the Spanish translation of
the revised notice pursuant to the timeline outlined.

The Defendants ask the Court to direct the Plaintiffs to include
the defense counsel's contact information on the proposed notice
and also argue that "disclosure of the Plaintiffs' counsel's fees
should be clear that the fees and expenses of the Plaintiffs'
counsel will be deducted from the gross settlement/judgment amount,
if any, and reduce the amount available to members of the
collective action." Additionally, they contend that information
regarding the Plaintiffs' counsel's fees "should be prominently
disclosed on the first page of the proposed notice."

Judge Merkl finds that including the defense counsel's information
on the notice is appropriate "so as to give putative collective
members full counsel information." She also finds that the
Plaintiffs' current draft language concerning the fee arrangement
to be sufficiently clear for the present purposes. She does not
find that the details regarding the Plaintiffs' counsel's fees must
be disclosed on the first page of the proposed notice.

However, Judge Merkl does find that the section entitled "VIII.
YOUR LEGAL REPRESENTATION IF YOU JOIN" and the "Consent to Sue"
form need to be edited to more clearly indicate that opt-in
plaintiffs can hire their own lawyer and that they do not have to
be represented by Plaintiffs' counsel to join the collective. In
the revised notice, the potential opt-in plaintiffs must be advised
of their right to hire their own counsel at the beginning of the
section titled "VIII. YOUR LEGAL REPRESENTATION IF YOU JOIN."

Judge Merkl grants the Plaintiffs' requested methods of
distributing the notice. First, dissemination of the notice by mail
is appropriate. Second, posting the notice at Defendants' physical
business location is a generally acceptable form of distributing
information related to such notices, and is therefore approved.

In sum, Judge Merkl approves the contents of the proposed notice,
save for the issues described. Once the Plaintiffs have edited the
notice of pendency and consent to sue forms to reflect the
requirements, the Plaintiffs will serve a draft (in both English
and Spanish) on the Defendants by March 1, 2022, and by March 15,
2022, the Defendants will serve any objections or give their
consent. By March 29, 2022, the parties will file a joint motion
for Court approval, which must include the final version of the
notice form. Upon the Court's approval of the final version, the
Plaintiffs will distribute the notice within two weeks. Finally,
all opt-in consent forms must be filed with the Clerk of the Court
within 60 days from the date the Court approves the final notice
form.

Finally, the Plaintiffs ask that the Court order the Defendants to
"provide the Plaintiffs' counsel in electronically readable format,
the names, addresses, e-mail addresses, employee number or unique
identifier, telephone numbers, last four digits of the social
security numbers, job titles and dates of employment of all
potential class members." "In general, it is appropriate for courts
in collective actions to order the discovery of names, addresses,
telephone numbers, email addresses, and dates of employment of
potential collective members." The Defendants are ordered to
produce the names, addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses,
job titles, and dates of employment of potential collective members
within 14 days of entry of this Memorandum and Order.

C. Remaining Discovery Schedule

On Jan. 3, 2022, the parties filed a joint motion requesting an
extension of time for the parties to complete all discovery. They
requested that the completion of all discovery be extended to 60
days following the Court's determination of the Plaintiffs' motion
for conditional certification. The Court denied the parties'
discovery motion without prejudice, and extended discovery until
March 5, 2022. It noted that "the parties are granted leave to
request additional time should that be necessary following the
determination of Plaintiff's Motion for Collective Certification."
Judge Merkl directed the parties to file a joint status report by
March 5, 2022, informing the Court as to the status of discovery.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons she set forth, Judge Merkl granted the Plaintiffs'
motion for conditional certification as a collective action under
the FLSA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b), subject to the
limitations discussed in her Memorandum and Order.

Judge Merkl further ordered that:

      (1) the Plaintiffs will serve a draft notice of pendency and
consent to sue form (in both English and Spanish) on the Defendants
by March 1, 2022, and by March 15, 2022, the Defendants will serve
any objections or give their consent. By March 29, 2022, the
parties will file a joint motion for Court approval, which must
include the final version of the notice of pendency and consent to
sue form;

      (2) within 14 days of the Order, by March 1, 2022, the
Defendants are to produce to the Plaintiffs in electronically
readable format, the names, addresses, e-mail addresses, telephone
numbers, job titles, and dates of employment of roofing, siding,
and concrete laborers (and other similarly titled professionals)
whom the Defendants employed at any time in the three years prior
to Jan. 14, 2020;

      (3) within 30 days of final approval by the Court, the
Plaintiffs or their designated representative will cause a copy of
the notice form to be disseminated to the putative collective by
first class mail and email and to be posted at 84-72 130th Street,
Kew Gardens, New York, 11415;

      (4) the statute of limitations period for opt-in plaintiffs
will be tolled from July 29, 2021, the date the Plaintiffs filed
the conditional certification motion, until the close of the opt-in
period, i.e., 60 days from the Court's final approval of the
revised notice; and

      (5) the parties are directed to file a joint status report by
March 5, 2022, informing the Court as to the status of discovery
and whether the parties require an extension of the discovery
deadline.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 15, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8enf4t from Leagle.com.


9199-4467 QUEBEC INC: Fogle Files Suit in M.D. Florida
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against 9199-4467 Quebec,
Inc. The case is styled as Courtney Fogle, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated v. 9199-4467 Quebec, Inc. doing
business as: Earth Rated, Case No. 6:22-cv-00283-CEM-EJK (M.D.
Fla., Feb. 8, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud for Deceptive Trade
Practices.

9199-4467 Quebec, Inc. doing business as Earth Rated --
https://earthrated.com/ -- is a Canadian company that creates
products designed to make cleaning up after pets as simple as
possible.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel Patrick Faherty, Esq.
          TELFER FAHERTY & ANDERSON PLLC
          815 S Washington Ave Ste 201
          Titusville, FL 32780-8400
          Phone: (321) 269-6833
          Fax: (321) 383-9970
          Email: cguntner@ctrfa.com

               - and --

          William Charles Wright, Esq.
          THE WRIGHT LAW OFFICE, P.A.
          515 N. Flagler Drive Suite P-300
          West Palm Beach, FL 33401
          Phone: (561) 514-0904
          Email: willwright@wrightlawoffice.com


ABBOTT LAB: Suarez Sues Over Alleged Infant Formula Contamination
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LUIS ALFREDO SUAREZ, individually and as legal guardian of A.S., a
minor child, and LUIS ALFREDO SUAREZ on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES INC., Case No.
1:22-cv-20506-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Feb. 18, 2022) is class action
complaint regarding the February 17, 2022, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration announcement that it was investigating consumer
complaints of Cronobacter and Salmonella infections related to
ingestion of Similac, Alimentum and EleCare.

Abbott manufactures, labels, markets, and sells infant formula
under the Similac, Alimentum, and Elecare brands.

Specifically, the FDA announced it was: "investigating consumer
complaints of Cronobacter sakazakii and Salmonella Newport
infections. All of the cases are reported to have consumed powdered
infant formula produced from Abbott Nutrition's Sturgis, Michigan
facility. As a result of the ongoing investigation, along with the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and state and local
partners, the FDA is alerting consumers to avoid purchasing or
using certain powdered infant formula products produced at this
facility.

The FDA news release further advised consumers should "not use
Similac, Alimentum, or EleCare powdered infant formulas if:

-- the first two digits of the code are 22 through 37; and

-- the code on the container contains K8, SH or Z2; and

-- the expiration date is 4-1-2022 (APR 2022) or later.

The FDA news release also advised it was "investigating complaints
of four infant illnesses from three states. All four cases related
to these complaints were hospitalized and Cronobacter may have
contributed to a death in one case. The FDA has initiated an onsite
inspection at the facility. Findings to date include several
positive Cronobacter sakazakii results from environmental samples
taken by the FDA and adverse inspectional observations by the FDA
investigators.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Rafael De La Grana, Esq.
          Ryan A. Jurney, Esq.
          JURNEY & DE LA GRANA, P.A.,
          782 NW 42 nd Avenue, Suite 428
          Miami, FL 33126
          Telephone: (305) 859-3030
          Facsimile: (305) 859-3031
          E-mail: rdelagrana@jdlawmiami.com
                  info@jdlawmiami.com
                  rjurney@jdlawmiami.com
                  info@jdlawmiami.com

ACE AMERICAN: Court Sets Class Cert Briefing Schedule in MSP Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS,
SERIES LLC, v. ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No.
1:17-cv-23749-PAS (S.D. Fla.), the Hon. Judge Patricia A. Seitz
entered an order granting joint motion to set class certification
briefing and expert disclosure schedule.

The class certification proceedings in this action shall be
governed by the following schedule:

-- The Plaintiff shall file its class     February 25, 2022
    certification motion and include
    the reports of any class
    certification experts with the
    motion:

-- As stated in the Joint Motion, the     March 7, 2022
    parties agree to set mutually
    agreeable dates for the depositions
    of Plaintiff's class certification
    experts to occur by:

-- The Defendant shall file its           March 28, 2022
    opposition to the class
    certification motion and include
    the reports of any class
    certification experts with
    the opposition:

-- As stated in the Joint Motion,        April 18, 2022:
    the parties agree to set mutually
    agreeable dates for the depositions
    of the Defendant's class
    certification experts:

MSP Recovery is a Medicaid and Medicare Secondary Payer Act
Recovery Specialist.

ACE American operates as an insurance company.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 15, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3LXOl0M at no extra charge.[CC]

ACUTUS MEDICAL: Robbins Geller Files Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP on Feb. 16 disclosed that it has
filed a class action lawsuit seeking to represent purchasers of
Acutus Medical, Inc. (NASDAQ: AFIB) common stock between May 13,
2021 and November 11, 2021, inclusive (the "Class Period") and
charging Acutus Medical and certain of its top executives with
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Acutus
Medical class action lawsuit was commenced on February 15, 2022 in
the Southern District of California and is captioned Brown v.
Acutus Medical, Inc., No. 22-cv-00206.

The plaintiff is represented by Robbins Geller, which has extensive
experience in prosecuting investor class actions including actions
involving financial fraud. You can view a copy of the complaint by
clicking here.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff of the Acutus Medical class
action lawsuit, please provide your information by clicking here.
You can also contact attorney J.C. Sanchez of Robbins Geller by
calling 800/449-4900 or via e-mail at jsanchez@rgrdlaw.com. Lead
plaintiff motions for the Acutus Medical class action lawsuit must
be filed with the court no later than April 18, 2022.

CASE ALLEGATIONS: Acutus Medical is an arrhythmia management
company focused on improving the diagnosis and treatment of cardiac
arrhythmias. Acutus Medical's primary product is its AcQMap imaging
and mapping system, which consists of a console, workstation,
proprietary software algorithms, and a single-use catheter that
contains ultrasound transducers and electrodes which collect the
data required to create a comprehensive map of a patient's cardiac
anatomy and electrical propagation pathways and patterns. To gain a
market foothold, Acutus Medical initially lent its first-generation
AcQMap console and workstation to users free of charge to
facilitate the sale of its disposable products. In late 2019,
Acutus Medical began to install its second generation AcQMap
console and workstation products with potential purchasers under
evaluation arrangements.

The Acutus Medical class action lawsuit alleges that, throughout
the Class Period, Acutus Medical made false and misleading
statements and failed to disclose that: (i) a material percentage
of the AcQMap systems under evaluation had been randomly installed
at sites with little, if any, consideration given to whether the
healthcare providers at the selected locations were likely to
adopt, or desire, Acutus Medical's products; (ii) a material
percentage of the AcQMap systems under evaluation had been
installed in locations where Acutus Medical did not possess the
infrastructure necessary to appropriately educate, train, and
support medical service providers on the system's operations; (iii)
as a result, Acutus Medical was in the process of designing a
strategic plan to terminate and relocate approximately 20% of
then-existing AcQMap systems evaluation arrangements; (iv) Acutus
Medical's management discussion and analysis was materially false
and misleading and failed to disclose that the termination and
relocation of approximately 20% of existing AcQMap systems
evaluation arrangements was reasonably likely to have a material
adverse effect on Acutus Medical's 2021 financial results; and (v)
Acutus Medical's risk factor discussions were materially false and
misleading and made reference to potential risks without disclosing
that such risks were then-existing or adequately describing the
specific nature of the risks then facing Acutus Medical.

On November 11, 2021, Acutus Medical announced that it had slashed
its 2021 revenue guidance due, in part, to a strategic decision by
Acutus Medical during the third quarter of 2021 to relocate
approximately 20% of AcQMap systems installations under
then-existing evaluation arrangements to address meaningfully
lower-than-expected product adoption. Further, contrary to Acutus
Medical's representations during the Class Period, Acutus Medical
revealed that Acutus Medical needed to relocate AcQMap systems that
had been placed in improper locations, thereby negatively impacting
customer uptake. On this news, the price of Acutus Medical common
stock plummeted more than 45% in a single day, damaging investors.

THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROCESS: The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 permits any investor who purchased Acutus
Medical common stock during the Class Period to seek appointment as
lead plaintiff in the Acutus Medical class action lawsuit. A lead
plaintiff is generally the movant with the greatest financial
interest in the relief sought by the putative class who is also
typical and adequate of the putative class. A lead plaintiff acts
on behalf of all other class members in directing the class action
lawsuit. The lead plaintiff can select a law firm of its choice to
litigate the class action lawsuit. An investor's ability to share
in any potential future recovery of the class action lawsuit is not
dependent upon serving as lead plaintiff.

ABOUT ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP: With 200 lawyers in 9
offices nationwide, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP is the largest
U.S. law firm representing investors in securities class actions.
Robbins Geller attorneys have obtained many of the largest
shareholder recoveries in history, including the largest securities
class action recovery ever – $7.2 billion – in In re Enron
Corp. Sec. Litig. The 2020 ISS Securities Class Action Services Top
50 Report ranked Robbins Geller first for recovering $1.6 billion
for investors that year, more than double the amount recovered by
any other securities plaintiffs' firm. Please visit
http://www.rgrdlaw.comfor more information.

Attorney advertising.

Past results do not guarantee future outcomes.

Services may be performed by attorneys in any of our offices.

Contacts:

Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP
655 W. Broadway, San Diego, CA 92101
J.C. Sanchez, 800-449-4900
jsanchez@rgrdlaw.com [GN]

AIR-CITY INC: Faces Hermosillo Suit Over Unpaid Wages for Workers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
HECTOR HERMOSILLO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. AIR-CITY, INC.; AMERICAN FREIGHT INT'L LAX
CORP.; LANGFAN RUAN; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 22STCV06252 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., February 18,
2022) is a class action against the Defendants for violations of
the California Labor Code including failure to pay minimum wages,
failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide uninterrupted
meal periods and rest breaks, failure to furnish itemized wage
statements, failure to pay all wages due upon separation, failure
to reimburse business expenses, failure to provide accurate wage
notice, failure to provide the required sick leave.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as a non-exempt employee
from February 2020 until February 2021.

Air-City, Inc. is a freight forwarding company based in New York.

American Freight Int'l Lax Corp. is a transportation services
provider based in California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Jasmin K. Gill, Esq.
         J. GILL LAW GROUP, P.C.
         515 South Flower Street, Suite 1800
         Los Angeles, CA 90071
         Telephone: (310) 728-2137
         Facsimile: (310) 728-2137
         E-mail: jasmin@jkgilllaw.com

AIRBNB INC: March 28 Settlement Claims Filing Deadline Set
----------------------------------------------------------
Clarrie Feinstein, writing for Toronto Star, reports that some 1.5
million Canadians are eligible to receive up to $45 in credit
following a $6-million settlement in a class-action lawsuit filed
over Airbnb's service fees.

Users of the travel booking site are eligible to receive the credit
if they booked accommodations on the platform for the first time
between Oct. 31, 2015, and June 25, 2019. The travel cannot have
been business related.

To be eligible, you must also have been located in Canada during
the time of booking and must have an active Airbnb account that has
not been suspended or removed on the company's platform at the time
the credit is issued. Quebec residents are excluded (there is a
separate settlement for the province).

The credit is one-time-use only and non-refundable, and cannot be
combined with any other offer, discount or coupon. The credit can
be used to book an accommodation offered by a third-party host on
Airbnb in any location worldwide.

Anyone eligible for the credit will be contacted by Deloitte LLP to
submit a claim, with many customers having already received an
email. Receiving the email "does not mean that you are part of the
settlement or eligible to submit a claim for a redeemable credit,"
Deloitte said in its email to customers.

Claims must be submitted by March 28, 2022, via the Deloitte online
claims portal, and will be issued by May 27, 2022, and be valid for
use on the site for 24 months.

The credit could be lower than $45 depending on the number of
claims approved, the notice of settlement said.

The class-action was spearheaded by Vancouver resident Arthur Lin,
who alleged the company had hidden service fees that were only
charged upon payment.

Court documents show Lin alleged the company was "double
ticketing," which falls under misleading advertising, according to
the Government of Canada. This means that a seller puts two or more
prices on a product or service, and the consumer is charged the
higher price, the government website says.

Following an appeal by Airbnb, an agreement was reached in federal
court on Nov. 19, 2021, allowing the company to avoid admitting
liability, trial, and additional costs and expenses related to the
legal proceedings, the settlement says.

After the lawsuit was filed, the company changed how it displays
pricing on the platform.

"In Canada, we now display an all-inclusive price to guests at
every step of the search and booking process," said Matt McNama,
spokesperson for Airbnb.

"We continue to test different ways to display pricing in order to
make it even easier and faster to book."

Clarification -- Feb. 16, 2022: Travel booking site Airbnb changed
how it displays pricing on the platform after a class-action
lawsuit was filed over Airbnb's service fees. A previous version of
this article said the change was made after the settlement was
reached. [GN]

ALABAMA PLUMBING: Court Refuses to Dismiss McAnally FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama,
Southern Division, denies the Defendants' motion to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the lawsuit titled PAUL
McANALLY, et al., Plaintiffs v. ALABAMA PLUMBING CONTRACTOR LLC, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 2:19-CV-2033-RDP (N.D. Ala.).

I. Background

The case was set for trial beginning on Feb. 7, 2022. The deadline
for dispositive motions was March 12, 2021. Fourteen days before
trial, the Defendants filed the current motion entitled "Motion to
Dismiss Action for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction." As the
Defendants' arguments are predicated on the presentation of this
case, going all the way back to the filing of the original
complaint, the Court details the procedural posture of the action.

On Dec. 16, 2019, Plaintiffs McAnally, Clark, and Blaine Simmons
filed this action "individually and on behalf of similarly situated
employees." The complaint contained only one count for violations
of the Fair Labor Standards Act. In their answer, the Defendants
raised statute of limitations as an affirmative defense and a
general defense that each Plaintiff has failed to meet conditions
precedent to being a plaintiff in this civil action.

On Feb. 6, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed their first attempt to
certify the FLSA claim as a collective action. The Court denied the
motion without prejudice explaining that the Plaintiffs had not
provided any affidavit evidence (or any other evidence for that
matter) to support the motion. The Court advised the Plaintiffs
that they could re-file their motion to certify a collective action
at a later date; however, before doing so they were to consider
applicable law and the Court's guidance.

On Feb. 12, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the
complaint seeking to add a claim for retaliation. The next day, the
Court granted the motion and ordered the Plaintiffs to file an
amended complaint by Feb. 20, 2020. However, the Plaintiffs failed
to file a first amended complaint. The Plaintiffs' next motion was
their second attempt to certify a collective action under the FLSA.
The Court administratively terminated the second action and noted
that the Plaintiffs could re-file the motion if mediation was
unsuccessful.

Following the May 20, 2020 scheduling conference, the Court ordered
the Plaintiffs to submit an amended complaint that complies with
federal pleading standards. The Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended
Complaint on May 26, 2020. The Second Amended Complaint named
McAnally, Clark, and Blaine Simmons "individually and on behalf of
similarly situated employees." The Second Amended Complaint
contained two counts: (1) the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims and (2)
McAnally's retaliation claim. Again, in their answer, the
Defendants included the statute-of-limitations defense and the
general defense that the Plaintiffs failed to meet conditions
precedent.

The motion practice continued on June 23, 2020: The Plaintiffs
filed a second motion to amend the complaint and a third motion to
certify an FLSA collective action. The Court granted the motion to
amend the complaint, but it administratively terminated the motion
to certify an FLSA collective action because the parties had not
participated in mediation (the same rationale for administratively
terminating the second motion to certify an FLSA collective
action).

The Third Amended Complaint added Plaintiffs Kirby and Hoffman
"individually and on behalf of similarly situated employees" as
named parties, as well as a breach of contract claim. The
Defendants responded by filing a partial motion to dismiss and
answer. After a telephonic conference, the Court denied the partial
motion to dismiss and ordered the Defendants to file an amended
answer. In the Amended Answer, the Defendants continued to assert
the affirmative defense of statutes of limitations, as well as
their conditions precedent defense.

On Aug. 14, 2020, for the fourth time, the Plaintiffs filed a
motion to amend the complaint and subsequently corrected that
motion. The Court granted the fourth motion to amend the complaint,
stayed the action until the conclusion of mediation, and ordered
counsel (because of acrimony that existed between them) to engage
in a socially-distanced lunch. The Fourth Amended Complaint added
Allen Simmons as a plaintiff "individually and on behalf of
similarly situated employees." Despite the stay of the action, the
Plaintiffs filed still another motion to amend the complaint (to
name Dallas Gray as an additional plaintiff); the Court denied the
motion without prejudice in light of the stay.

On Nov. 9, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed a third motion to certify an
FLSA collective Action, which the Plaintiffs subsequently amended
on Dec. 14, 2020. The Court denied the motion because the
Plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden to show a reasonable
basis that other employees were interested in participating in this
litigation (other than Dallas Gray). The Court granted leave for
the Plaintiffs to name Dallas Gray as an additional plaintiff,
though no pleading was filed on his behalf.

On Aug. 24, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed their final motion
attempting to name still an additional plaintiff. The Court denied
the motion explaining that the deadline for the Plaintiffs to join
additional parties was July 30, 2020; discovery had concluded; the
parties had participated in a pretrial conference; the pretrial
order had been entered; and the Defendants would be unduly
prejudiced by the belated joinder of an additional plaintiff.

The Defendants present two arguments in their motion. First, the
Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims should be
dismissed for lack of standing by invoking the case-or-controversy
requirement in Article III Section 2 of the Constitution. While a
standing defense is considered a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, a statute-of-limitation argument is
more aptly characterized as an affirmative defense or a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, District Judge R. David Proctor opines, citing Stalley ex
rel. U.S. v. Orlando Regional Healthcare System, Inc., 524 F.3d
1229, 1234-35 (11th Cir. 2008).

After careful review, the Court concludes that both arguments miss
the mark.

Second, the Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims
should be dismissed based upon the applicable statute of
limitations. To determine the statute of limitations in an FLSA
action, the Defendants compare sections 255(a) and 256.

II. Standard of Review

The Court notes that the mechanism by which the Defendants attempt
to dismiss the action is unclear. First, while the Defendants ask
the Court to dismiss the case as a whole, they ignore Plaintiff
Hoffman's breach of contract claim. Second, and more importantly,
the Defendants entitle their filing "Motion to Dismiss Action for
Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction," but the entirety of their
first argument section appears to be premised on what they say is
the FLSA's interplay between filing a written consent and the
applicable statute of limitations in a collective action, which is
clearly not a basis to dismiss an action for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.

In addition, their statute-of-limitations contentions are wholly
unmoored to any suggestion or argument as to what standard of
review applies here, Judge Proctor points out.

III. Analysis

According to the Pretrial Order, the Plaintiffs in this action are
Paul McAnally, Christopher Todd Clark, Jr., Blaine Simmons, Jason
Kirby, Donnie Hoffman, and Daniel Simmons. Each Plaintiff asserts a
claim for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act; Hoffman
asserts an additional claim for breach of contract; and McAnally
asserts an additional claim for retaliatory constructive discharge
under the FLSA. For the reasons stated here, the Court concludes
that the Plaintiffs have met all the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements for this action to proceed to trial.

First (and putting aside the lack of timeliness of the Defendants'
motion), and as the Court made clear in its April 29, 2021
Memorandum Opinion, this case is not an FLSA collective action.
Rather, each named Plaintiff has brought an individual FLSA claim
against the Defendants. If the Defendants are questioning the
propriety of six Plaintiffs asserting individual claims within the
same complaint, they need not look further than Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 20(a)(1).

Judge Proctor holds that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction
to hear the individual FLSA claims and McAnally's FLSA retaliation
claim under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 (federal question jurisdiction).
And, the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Hoffman's
breach of contract claims under 28 U.S.C. 1367 (supplemental
jurisdiction).

Second, even if the case were a collective action (and, to be
clear, it is not), the Fair Labor Standards Act provides that no
employee will be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he
gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such
consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought. The
Defendants argue that the named Plaintiffs are subject to the
consent-form requirement and rely on the Seventh Circuit's opinion
in Harkins v. Riverboat Services, Inc., 385 F.3d 1099 (7th Cir.
2004), to support their contention.

However, Judge Proctor opines, the Eleventh Circuit interprets this
provision as applying only to opt-in plaintiffs, citing Mickles on
behalf of herself v. Country Club Inc., 887 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th
Cir. 2018).

The Defendants contend Mickles supports their argument. It does
not, Judge Proctor holds. In fact, when the Seventh Circuit last
discussed its rule that a named plaintiff must file a consent form
separate from the complaint to be entitled to proceed as a party in
a collective action, that court (1) noted a circuit split exists on
the issue and (2) further acknowledged that the Eleventh Circuit is
on the other side of the split (i.e., that our circuit in Mickles
did not require the named plaintiff to file a separate written
consent).

The Court states that it need not remind the Defendants that when
there is in fact a circuit split on an issue, the Court is bound by
controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent.

The action was commenced on Dec. 16, 2019. The Defendants have not
stated a date on which they believe the statute of limitations ran,
and the Plaintiffs were not required to file a written consent
(apart from the complaint or the amended complaints) in order to
maintain their individual claims under the FLSA. The Court
concludes that the Defendants' motion is without merit.

IV. Conclusion

Both the Defendants' arguments are premised on their assertion that
the case is an FLSA collective action. But, that assertion misses
the mark. Therefore, both the Defendants' statute-of-limitation
argument and standing argument are without merit. The Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss is due to be denied.

A separate order in accordance with this memorandum opinion will be
entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated Feb. 7,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/yjkekxhp from
Leagle.com.


ALLEGIANCE RETAIL: Hanyzkiewicz Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Allegiance Retail
Services, LLC. The case is styled as Marta Hanyzkiewicz, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated v. Allegiance Retail
Services, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-00909 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 18, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Allegiance Retail Services, LLC --
https://www.allegianceretailservices.com/ -- is a retailer owned
co-op that is headquartered in Iselin, New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


ALLIED INTERSTATE: E.D. New York Dismisses Rottenberg FDCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
dismissed without prejudice the Plaintiffs' complaint in the
lawsuit titled ESTHER ROTTENBERG, et al., Plaintiffs v. ALLIED
INTERSTATE, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 20-CV-708 (WFK) (RLM)
(E.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiffs Esther Rottenberg, Doris Encarnado, and Sandy Macius
commenced this class action alleging Defendant Allied Interstate,
LLC violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.
Section 1692, et seq. ("FDCPA") because the debt letters sent by
the Defendant purportedly (1) caused confusion as to the addresses
to which written disputes of the debt should be sent; (2) failed to
identify the amount of debt due; and (3) buried statutorily
required language. The Plaintiffs claimed they were thus injured
because they were "confused" or "uncertain" as to their rights and
may, for instance, fail to dispute the validity of their debt.

On Jan. 12, 2022, the Plaintiffs notified the Court that they no
longer have Article III standing to pursue their claims following
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's recent
decision in Maddox v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., 2021 U.S. App.
LEXIS 34056 (2d Cir. Nov. 17, 2021).

In Maddox, the plaintiffs alleged damages for a bank's violation of
a state mortgage-satisfaction recording statute. The Second Circuit
held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate Article III standing
because they had failed to allege, beyond the violation of the
state statute itself, that the plaintiffs suffered actual concrete
harm. In so holding, the Second Circuit explained that a violation
of a statute by itself is insufficient to confer standing;
plaintiffs must instead show they suffered a concrete injury
"traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in
American courts," such as "physical and monetary harms" in addition
to certain "intangible harms" such as "reputational harm."

In applying Maddox, the Court agrees with the Plaintiffs that the
Court no longer has jurisdiction over their case. Here, as in
Maddox, the Plaintiffs have failed to allege any particularized or
concrete injury resulting from the Defendant's violation of the
FDCPA. Although the Plaintiffs allege they were "confused" or
"uncertain" as to their rights regarding their debt under the
FDCPA, mere confusion in and of itself does not rise to the level
of injury for purposes of Article III standing. Nor have the
Plaintiffs asserted a sufficient likelihood of future harm to
establish such injury.

Because the Plaintiffs have not assert an injury in fact sufficient
to pass the muster of Article III standing, the Court dismisses
this case sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Conclusion

The Plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed without prejudice for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court is directed to
enter judgment and close this case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Decision & Order dated Feb. 7,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2ywyfvwf from
Leagle.com.


AMERICAN FEDERATION: N.D. New York Stays Carlisle Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT CARLISLE, individually and as a representative
of a class of similarly situated persons, on behalf of the NEW YORK
STATE TEAMSTERS CONFERENCE PENSION AND RETIREMENT FUND, Plaintiff
v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF THE NEW YORK
STATE TEAMSTERS CONFERENCE PENSION AND RETIREMENT FUND; JOHN
BULGARO; BRIAN K. HAMMOND; PAUL A. MARKWITZ; GEORGE F. HARRIGAN;
MARK D. MAY; MICHAEL S. SCALZO, SR.; ROBERT SCHAEFFER; MARK
GLADFELTER; SAMUEL D. PILGER; DANIEL W. SCHMIDT; TOM J. VENTURA;
MEKETA INVESTMENT GROUP, INC.; and HORIZON ACTUARIAL SERVICES, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 8:21-cv-00455 (BKS/DJS) (N.D.N.Y.), Judge
Brenda K. Sannes of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of New York granted the Fund Defendants' motion to stay
proceedings.

The lawsuit is stayed pending the determination of the Fund
Defendants' application for Special Financial Assistance with the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. ("PBGC") pursuant to the American
Rescue Plan Act of 2021 ("ARPA"), H.R. 1319, 117th Cong. Section
4262 (2021).

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Carlisle, brings the proposed class action individually
and as a representative of a class of similarly situated persons,
on behalf of the New York State Teamsters Conference Pension and
Retirement Fund, under the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 1001 et seq., alleging
breach of fiduciary duty in violation of ERISA Sections
404(a)(1)(A)-(D), 29 U.S.C. Section 1104(a)(1)(A)-(D) and ERISA
Sections 405(a)(1) and (2), 29 U.S.C. Section 1105(a)(1) and (2).

The Plaintiff names as Defendants the Board of Trustees of the New
York State Teamsters Conference Pension and Retirement Fund (the
"Fund"), four current Union Trustees, four current Employer
Trustees, and three former Trustees (collectively the "Fund
Defendants"). He also names as Defendants Mekata, which provided
investment consulting services and investment management services
to the Fund Defendants, and Horizon, which provided actuarial
services to the Fund Defendants.

II. Background

The Plaintiff, a participant in the Fund, a defined-benefit plan,
alleges that beginning in 2014 and continuing to the present, the
Defendants breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA by
"imprudently deploying and maintaining the Fund assets in an
extraordinarily high risk, high cost asset allocation to chase a
grossly excessive and unreasonable 8.5% 'actuarial return target,'
as the Plan remained in dangerous and worsening financial
condition." The Plaintiff alleges that Horizon, as the Fund's
actuary, "recklessly increased the actuarial return assumption from
8% to 8.5% knowing the Fund would chase this unrealistic return
assumption with extraordinary allocation of Fund assets to the
riskiest asset classes."

The Plaintiff alleges that Mekata used its position as the Fund's
"nondiscretionary investment consultant to recommend itself for the
position of the Fund's paid discretionary investment manager" and
advised the Fund's Trustees (in its role as nondiscretionary
investment consultant) that "the only way to achieve the 'actuarial
return target' was with significantly overweighted allocations of
Fund assets to the highest risk asset classes" -- namely, Emerging
Markets Equities ("EME") and Private Equity ("PE"). The Plaintiff
alleges that this dual role was a conflict of interest and caused
the fees the Fund paid to Mekata to "soar from $250,000 to $1.4
million annually."

From 2010 to 2017, the Fund's "funded percentage steadily declined
until the Department of Treasury approved extraordinary benefit
cuts pursuant to the Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014
("MPRA")." In January 2016, the Fund's actuary certified the Fund
as being in "Critical in Declining" status under the MPRA, meaning
it was projected to become insolvent and unable to pay benefits --
in the case, by 2026. "The MPRA permits a plan in 'critical and
declining status to seek authorization from the Department of
Treasury to reduce earned benefits to combat projected
insolvency."

Beginning in August 2016, the Fund filed a series of applications
under the MPRA for reduction of pension benefits. In September
2017, the Department of Treasury approved the benefit reductions.
In October 2017, the Fund implemented the reductions: A 19%
reduction for active participants and a 29% reduction for retired
participants.

The Plaintiff alleges that during the class period, 2014 and
continuing to present, the Fund Defendants, Mekata, and Horizon
continued "to chase a grossly excessive and unreasonable 8.5%
'actuarial return target," as the Fund's "financial condition
worsened." Specifically, during the class period, the risky EME and
PE investments constituted "more than 50% of the Fund's assets."
According to the Plaintiff, the Fund "lost approximately $31
million in value on the EME assets" during the class period.

The Plaintiff alleges that "the Trustees' and their advisors'
'significantly overweight' allocation of Plan assets to high risk
illiquid alternatives investments has exposed the Fund to further
risk of losses in the ongoing pandemic and accompanying financial
crisis." As an active participant, the Plaintiff's "vested monthly
pension benefit payments were cut and have continued to be cut by
19% each month since 2017." The Plaintiff seeks, inter alia,
declaratory relief, restoration of Fund losses resulting from
breach of fiduciary duty, and other equitable and monetary relief.

III. Analysis

The Fund Defendants seek an order staying the action pending a
determination by the PBGC on its pending application for special
financial assistance to restore the reduced benefits, both
retroactively and prospectively, to Fund participants, including
the Plaintiff. On Jan. 28, 2022, the Fund's Board of Trustees
submitted an application, on behalf of the Fund, for special
financial assistance with the PBGC under the ARPA.

The ARPA amends ERISA to add ERISA Section 4262, 29 U.S.C. Section
1432, which directs the PBGC to "provide special financial
assistance to an eligible multiemployer plan," with no repayment
obligation. The Fund represents that as a plan that has
"implemented benefit reductions pursuant to" MPRA, prior to March
11, 2021, it is eligible for special financial assistance. The Fund
further represents that if its application is approved, the Fund
will be required to restore benefits previously reduced under the
MPRA, 26 U.S.C. Sections 431-32, 26 U.S.C. Sections 1084-85, both
retroactively and prospectively, and that it will be prohibited
from applying for further benefit reductions. According to the
applicable regulations, the PBGC has up to 120 days to make a
determination on an application.

Courts in the Second Circuit consider five factors when determining
whether to grant a stay: (1) [T]he private interests of the
plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with the civil litigation as
balanced against the prejudice to the plaintiffs if delayed; (2)
the private interests of and burden on the defendants; (3) the
interests of the courts; (4) the interests of persons not parties
to the civil litigation; and (5) the public interest.

Judge Sannes finds that the balance of the relevant factors weighs
in favor of staying all proceedings pending a determination on the
Fund Defendants' application for special financial assistance. The
Plaintiff undoubtedly has a strong interest in proceeding
expeditiously with the present litigation. The Plaintiff correctly
notes that "it remains uncertain and speculative whether" the
Fund's application will be approved and in what amount."

But even if Judge Sannes denies the stay, she says it appears that
the Fund's application will nevertheless proceed to a
determination. Moreover, the resolution of the Fund's application
may provide information helpful in resolving the existing standing
issue, and may aid the Court addressing the Plaintiff's arguments
concerning, among other things, interest and investment returns.
Thus, as the Plaintiff's arguments do not suggest that a short
delay in the case while the Fund's application is under
consideration would be prejudicial, Judge Sannes concludes that the
first factor weighs in favor of a stay.

The remaining factors also weigh in favor of a stay. The private
interests of all the Defendants will be served by staying the
litigation to "confirm that benefits have been restored in full and
that the harm pled in the Plaintiff's complaint has been properly
remediated before any significant determinations or undertakings
are made in this case." In addition, to the extent that the
restoration of the Plaintiff's benefits necessitates dismissal for
lack of standing, a brief stay while the application is pending,
would enable the Defendants "to avoid the significant burdens
imposed by continued proceedings and the potential opening of
discovery in the matter," which is a proposed class action.

While the parties have not specifically addressed the interests of
third parties, the interest of the Court and the public would be
served by a stay; it would "promote the public and judicial
'interest in the efficient conduct of litigation, and the
conservation of judicial resources, Judge Sannes determines.
Moreover, any stay would be limited in duration, reducing any
prejudice to the Plaintiff and any other parties. She has
considered all of the Plaintiff's remaining arguments and finds
they do not warrant a different result. Accordingly, the Fund
Defendants' motion to stay the action is granted.

For all these reasons, and because consideration of all the
Defendants' motions simultaneously not only conserves judicial
resources but ensures a consistent outcome, Judge Sannes declined
Horizon's request, that the Court resolves its motion to dismiss
prior to the issuance of a stay.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, Judge Sannes granted the Fund Defendants' motion
to stay the action.

The Clerk is respectfully directed to stay the action for 120 days
or 14 days after the Fund has received a determination from the
PBGC, whichever is sooner.

The parties file a joint status report within 90 days of the
Memorandum-Decision and Order, or within seven days of any
determination by PBGC, whichever is sooner.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 11, 2022 Memorandum-Decision &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc4pnykj from
Leagle.com.

Steven A. Schwartz -- SteveSchwartz@chimicles.com -- Chimicles
Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, in Haverford, Pennsylvania.

Robert J. Kriner, Jr. -- RobertKriner@chimicles.com -- Emily L.
Skaug, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, in
Wilmington, Delaware.

Leslie A. Blau, Blau & Malmfeldt, in Chicago, Illinois, for the
Plaintiff.

Brian T. Ortelere -- brian.ortelere@morganlewis.com -- Sara E.
DeStefano, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, in New York City.

Bernard T. King -- btking@bklawyers.com -- Brian J. LaClair,
Blitman & King LLP, in Syracuse, New York, for the Defendants: The
Board of Trustees of the American Federation of the New York State
Teamsters Conference Pension and Retirement Fund; John Bulgaro;
Brian K. Hammond; Paul A. Markwitz; George F. Harrigan; Mark D.
May; Michael S. Scalzo, Sr.; Robert Schaeffer; Mark Gladfelter;
Samuel D. Pilger; Daniel W. Schmidt; and Tom J. Ventura:

Diana K. Lloyd -- dlloyd@choate.com -- Samuel N. Rudman, Preston F.
Bruno, Choate, Hall & Stewart, in Boston, Massachusetts.

Eric G. Serron -- eserron@steptoe.com -- Steptoe & Johnson LLP, in
Washington, D.C., for Defendant Meketa Investment Group, Inc.:

Edward J. Meehan -- emeehan@groom.com -- Stephen M. Saxon Samuel I.
Levin, Kalena R. Kettering, Groom Law Group, Chartered in
Washington, D.C., for Defendant Horizon Actuarial Services, LLC:


AMERICAN GOLD & DIAMONDS: Miller Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against American Gold &
Diamonds, Inc. The case is styled as Kimberly Miller, on behalf of
herself and all other persons similarly situated v. American Gold &
Diamonds, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-01414 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 18, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

American Gold & Diamonds is a jeweler in New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18th Street, Suite Phr
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


AMERICAN TANK: Full Time Employees Get Conditional Class Status
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOSEPH BERNIER, et al. for
themselves and all others similarly situated, v. AMERICAN TANK &
FABRICATING COMPANY, Case No. 1:21-cv-01302-JRA (N.D. Ohio), the
Hon. Judge John R. Adams entered an order approving the parties'
stipulation to conditional class certification and notice to the
class:

   "All current and former hourly, full time employees of the
   Defendant who, during the three year period prior to the date
   the Court conditionally certifies an Fair Labor Standards
   Act (FLSA) collective class, clocked in and out for their
   shift."

The Plaintiffs filed this action on July 6, 2021, alleging that
their employer, the Defendant American Tank & Fabricating Company,
failed to pay Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals for all
wages earned, including overtime compensation at the rate of one
and one-half times their regular rates for the hours worked in
excess of 40 hours in a workweek.

AT&F is a manufacturer of steel products, services and metalworking
technologies.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 15, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3IijF8b at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Greg R. Mansell, Esq.
          Rhiannon M. Herbert, Esq.
          MANSELL LAW, LLC
          1457 S. High St.
          Columbus, OH 43207
          Telephone: (614) 796-4325
          Facsimile: (614) 547-3614
          E-mail: Greg@MansellLawLLC.com
                  Rhiannon@MansellLawLLC.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Stephen S. Zashin, Esq.
          Michele L. Jakubs, Esq.
          ZASHIN & RICH CO., L.P.A.
          950 Main Avenue, 4th Floor
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: (216) 696-4441
          Facsimile: (216) 696-1618
          E-mail: ssz@zrlaw.com
                  mlj@zrlaw.com

AMWASTE LLC: Richards Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages Under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
AUSTIN RICHARDS, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. AMWASTE, LLC, Case No. 2:22-cv-00221-SGC (N.D. Ala.,
Feb. 18, 2022) seeks to recover compensation, overtime wages,
liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the
provisions of Sections 206, 207 and 216(b) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.

The Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are those similarly
situated persons who worked for AmWaste, anywhere in the United
States, at any time during the relevant statutes of limitations
through the final disposition of this matter, and have not been
paid for all hours worked nor the proper amount of overtime in
violation of federal law.

The Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members routinely worked (and
continue to work) in excess of 40 hours per week. During the
relevant time period, AmWaste has knowingly and deliberately failed
to compensate the Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for all
hours worked in excess of 40 each week on a routine and regular
basis, the lawsuit says.

AmWaste is a full-service solid waste company providing waste
collection, recycling, and disposal services to a commercial,
industrial, and residential customers across the states of Alabama
and Louisiana.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David A. Hughes, Esq.
          HARDIN & HUGHES, LLP
          2121 14th Street
          Tuscaloosa, AL 35401
          Telephone: (205) 523-0463
          Facsimile: (205) 344-6188
          E-mail: dhughes@hardinhughes.com

               - and -

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Austin Anderson, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER , PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  austin@a2xlaw.com

ANGEL QUIROS: Bid to Certify Class Tossed in Gawlik Complaint
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Jan M. Gawlik v.
Angel Quiros, et al., Case No. 3:21-cv-01549 (D. Conn.), the Hon.
Judge Sarah A.L. Merriam entered an order denying motion to certify
class.

The Court said, "The Plaintiff seeks to certify a class action in
this matter. His motion is insufficient in various ways, but most
importantly, a self-represented party cannot bring a class action
lawsuit, because a layperson cannot represent other parties before
the Court. "Although plaintiffs have a right to proceed pro se in
civil actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1654, a pro se
plaintiff may not seek to represent the interests of
third-parties."

The nature of suit states Prisoner Petitions -- Habeas Corpus --
Prison Condition.[CC]

ANIIE INC: Court Tosses Class Suit Over Mislabeled Fruit Snacks
---------------------------------------------------------------
Keller and Heckman LLP, in an article for The National Law Review,
disclosed that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York has dismissed with prejudice a class-action lawsuit that
alleged that Annie Inc's Bunny Fruit Snacks - Tropical Treat (the
"Fruit Snacks") mislead consumers with non-functional slack fill.

By way of background, pursuant to Section 403(d) of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (codified at 21 U.S.C. Section 343), a food may be
deemed misbranded if its container is "so made, formed, or filled
to be misleading." A container is "considered to be filled as to be
misleading" if it "does not allow the consumer to fully view its
contents" and "it contains nonfunctional slack-fill." (See 21
C.F.R. Sec. 100.100). "Slack-fill" is defined as the "difference
between the actual capacity of a container and the volume of
product contained therein" and is prohibited by FDA as
"nonfunctional slack-fill" unless it is present for any of the
reasons listed in Section 100.100 (e.g., it protects the package or
is required by the packaging machine).

The box in which the fruit snacks were packaged allegedly contained
60% non-functional empty space (slack fill). However, the front of
the box also included a disclosure which provided the number of
fruit packages in the box, the weight of each package, and the net
weight of the box. The accuracy of these disclosures was not
challenged.

Notably, the Court did not reach the issue of whether the
slack-fill was non-functional. Instead, the Court held that as a
matter of law a reasonable consumer could not be misled by the
alleged non-functional slack fill because the contents of the
package were clearly disclosed. Accordingly, it dismissed the
deceptive practices claims. [GN]

APPLE INC: Coring Antitrust Suit Moved From S.D. Fla. to N.D. Cal.
------------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled THE CORING COMPANY, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. APPLE INC. and MR. TIM COOK, Case
No. 9:21-cv-82235, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Florida to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California on February 18, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of California assigned
Case No. 3:22-cv-01044-JCS to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged denial of essential
facility, patent infringement, and violations of Sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act, the Florida Antitrust Act, and the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act by monopolizing the market
for iOS app distribution or smartphone app distribution.

The Coring Company is a technology company based in Norway.

Apple, Inc. is a technology company, headquartered in Cupertino,
California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Keith Mathews, Esq.
         AWP LEGAL
         1000 Elm Street, Suite 800
         Manchester, NH 03102
         Telephone: (603) 622-8100
         E-mail: keith@aaone.law

APPLE INC: Judge Issues Mixed Ruling on iPhone Data Drain Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Christina Tabacco, writing for Law Street, reports that on Feb. 14,
Judge Edward J. Davila issued a mixed ruling on Apple Inc.'s motion
to dismiss a case arguing that the iPhone possesses software that
permits the device to "secretly consume cellular data" for the
company's benefit.

The opinion explained that the plaintiff purchased an iPhone from a
Verizon retailer in 2018, and in 2019, updated his iPhone with the
iOS version 13 software. Apple reportedly promised that the update
would improve iPhone functionality and make it faster.

The plaintiff claimed that contrary to that assertion, the update
actually activated the phone's data stealing capabilities.
Specifically, it caused iPhones to "send significant amounts of
data to Apple, routed Apple's data transfers exclusively over
cellular networks, and exempted Apple's data transfers from normal
settings favoring Wi-Fi connections." The complaint said that Apple
concealed this by falsely suggesting that users caused data
consumption by uninstalling applications.

As previously reported, the plaintiff, a Washington resident, sued
in October 2020 on behalf of himself and a putative class who pay
for monthly data plans with certain caps. He alleged claims under
the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), the California Unfair
Competition Law (UCL), the California Computer Data Access and
Fraud Act (CDAFA), and trespass to chattels.

In the opinion, Judge Davila overrode Apple's challenge to the
plaintiff's injunctive relief and restitution claims. Specifically,
the defendant argued that the consumer failed to allege that he
lacked an adequate remedy at law. The court reasoned that legal
remedies alone are inadequate because in theory, Apple "could again
reintroduce software that ‘triggered' the embedded ability to
misappropriate user data for Defendant's benefit," necessitating an
injunction.

As to restitution, the court found that legal damages alone would
not cover the full value of the harm alleged. In particular, the
court said that though damages may address situations in which a
plaintiff exceeds his data plan and must pay an overage, they do
not address the harm experienced by individuals who did not exceed
their data plan, but whose data was consumed by Apple.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's injunctive relief claim under
the CLRA because the plaintiff never stopped using his iPhone and
has continued to update it with new versions of iOS. "[T]he past
harm must somehow impact the plaintiff's future use of the
product," the court explained in denying leave to amend that claim.
In addition, the court sided with Apple as to the plaintiff's
fraud-based claims after finding that he failed to plead reliance.

Finally, the court permitted the consumer's trespass to chattels
claim to proceed. Judge Davila determined that Apple's interference
with the plaintiff's iPhone was significant enough to be
actionable. "For example, Defendant's conduct caused Plaintiff and
the putative class members to incur cellular data charges, suffer
from reduced iPhone data speeds, and lose cellular data that they
purchased," the opinion said.

The plaintiff has until March 10 to amend his complaint. He is
represented by Gibbs Law Group and Tousley Brain Stephens PLLC and
Apple by Morrison & Foerster LLP. [GN]

ARANCINI BROS: Quintanilla Suit Seeks Proper Wage for Janitors
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE QUINTANILLA, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. ARANCINI BROS. LLC, DAVE CAMPANIELLO, and
GIULIA DELLA GATTA A/K/A "JULIE" A/K/A "JULIA", Case No.
1:22-cv-01410 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 18, 2022) seeks equitable and legal
relief for the Defendants' violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as a janitor at the
restaurant from 2013 until March 2020. As a janitor, the
Plaintiff's primary job duties included, cleaning the machines that
were used to prepare food, washing pots and pans used to prepare
food, loading food and other materials into vans that were used to
deliver food for large scale jobs, cleaning the kitchen, and
performing any other cleaning and maintenance tasks as needed.

Throughout his employment with the Defendants, the Plaintiff
regularly worked six days per week, as follows: Mondays through
Thursdays and Saturdays from approximately 10:00 a.m. until 8:00
p.m.; and Fridays from approximately 10:00 a.m. until approximately
10:00 p.m. or 11:00 p.m., with a daily 30 minute meal break, for an
average of approximately 59.5 hours per week.

Throughout his employment, the Defendants compensated Plaintiff
with a fixed salary of $500.00 per week, regardless of the number
of hours worked per week, the Plaintiff contends.

Arancini owns a brick and mortar restaurant located at 88 Essex
Street, New York, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eliseo Cabrera, Esq.
          KATZ MELINGER PLLC
          370 Lexington Ave, Suite 1512
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 460-0047
          Facsimile: (212) 428-6811
          E-mail: edcabrera@katzmelinger.com

ASCOT DIAMONDS: Miller Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ascot Diamonds, Inc.
The case is styled as Kimberly Miller, on behalf of herself and all
other persons similarly situated v. Ascot Diamonds, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-01415 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 18, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Ascot Diamonds -- https://www.ascotdiamonds.com/ -- is an upscale
jeweler specializing in diamond pieces, such as engagement rings,
earrings & bracelets.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18th Street, Suite Phr
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


ASTRA SPACE: Gainey McKenna Reminds of April 11 Deadline
--------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston announces that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Astra Space, Inc. (f/k/a Holicity, Inc.) ("Astra
Space" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: ASTR) in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of
investors who purchased Astra Space's common stock between February
2, 2021 and December 29, 2021, both dates inclusive (the "Class
Period").

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose: (1) the Company cannot launch
"anywhere"; (2) the Company significantly overstated its
addressable market; (3) the Company overstated the effectiveness of
its designs and reliability; (4) the Company significantly
overstated its plans for diversification and its broadband
constellation plan; and (5) as a result, Defendants' public
statements were materially false and/or misleading at all relevant
times. When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims
that investors suffered damages.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares of Astra Space
should contact the Firm prior to the April 11, 2022 lead plaintiff
motion deadline. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting
on behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If
you wish to discuss your rights or interests regarding this class
action, please contact Thomas J. McKenna, Esq. or Gregory M.
Egleston, Esq. of Gainey McKenna & Egleston at (212) 983-1300, or
via e-mail at tjmckenna@gme-law.com or gegleston@gme-law.com.

Please visit our website at http://www.gme-law.comfor more
information about the firm.[GN]

ASURION LLC: Iskhakova Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Asurion, LLC. The
case is styled as Marina Iskhakova, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Asurion, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-00928
(E.D.N.Y., Feb. 20, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Asurion -- https://www.asurion.com/ -- is a privately held company
based in Nashville, Tennessee, that provides insurance for
smartphones, tablets, consumer electronics, appliances, satellite
receivers and jewelry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


AVNET INC: Time Extension to Respond to Conditional Cert. Bid Filed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Angela Determan Heikkia
and Natalie Lopez, Each Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, v. Avnet, Inc., Case No. 2:21-cv-01531-DJH (D.
Ariz.), the Parties asks the Court to enter an order extending the
time for the Defendant to respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Conditional Certification, for Approval and Distribution of Notice
and for Disclosure of Contact Information

The Defendant's response is currently due February 22, 2022.
Pursuant to this Joint Motion, the Parties respectfully request
that Defendant's time to respond to the Motion be extended to March
18, 2022.

Avnet, Inc. is a distributor of electronic components headquartered
in Phoenix, Arizona.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Feb. 15, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3IeFHsD at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Benjamin A. Nucci, Esq.
          Curtney Lowery, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Kirkpatrick Plaza
          10800 Financial Centre Pkwy, Suite 510
          Little Rock, AR 72211

The Defendant is represented by:

          John F. Lomax, Esq.
          Benjamin A. Nucci, Esq.
          SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.
          One Arizona Center
          400 E. Van Buren, Suite 1900
          Phoenix, AZ 85004-2202
          Telephone: (602) 382-6000
          Facsimile: (602) 382-6070
          E-Mail: jlomax@swlaw.com
                  bnucci@swlaw.com

AXA EQUITABLE: Connecticut Court Flips Judgment in O'Donnell Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RICHARD T. O'DONNELL v. AXA EQUITABLE LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, AC 44215 (Conn. App.), the Appellate Court of
Connecticut:

    (i) reversed the trial court's judgment granting AXA's motion
        for entry of judgment on the Plaintiff's stricken
        complaint; and

   (ii) remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with
        its Opinion.

I. Background

In the putative class action, Plaintiff O'Donnell, appeals from the
judgment of the trial court rendered after it granted the motion
filed by the Defendant AXA for entry of judgment on the Plaintiff's
stricken complaint. On appeal, the Plaintiff claims that the court
improperly concluded that his amended complaint (1) was not
"materially different" from his original complaint and (2) failed
to adequately allege that the defendant's actions caused him
damages.

The Plaintiff is a resident of the state of Connecticut. The
Defendant is a company organized under New York law with its
principal place of business also in New York. It is authorized to
do and does business in Connecticut. The Defendant offers a broad
portfolio of life insurance products and a variety of annuity
products, including fixed deferred annuities, payout annuities, and
variable annuities. A variable annuity, the product at issue in the
present action, is a contract between the purchaser, also known as
the "annuitant," and the insurance company. Pursuant to the
contract, the insurance company agrees to make periodic payments to
the annuitant, beginning either immediately or at some future date.
The Defendant's annuity policies permitted the policyholders to
allocate their premiums toward various investment options, each
with different risk-reward characteristics.

In November, 2008, the Plaintiff purchased a variable annuity
policy from the defendant. The policy that the Plaintiff and the
other putative class members purchased permitted them to acquire,
for an additional premium, a guarantee that certain benefits would
increase by a minimum percentage each year. The policy also
included a reset provision, which provided that the value of
guaranteed benefits could only increase and never decrease. The
guarantee, in combination with the reset provision, effectively
immunized the benefits of the policy from the risks of stock market
volatility.

The policy also provided that the Defendant (1) would comply with
all applicable laws, (2) had established and would maintain the
accounts under New York law, (3) would not change the investment
strategy for the variable annuity policy unless approved by the
Superintendent of Insurance of New York State (superintendent) or
deemed approved in accordance with such law or regulation, and (4)
would not make a material change to the policy without prior
approval of the superintendent. Although the policy did grant the
defendant some discretion over investment options, it did not
permit the defendant to make material changes to the investment
strategy without complying with applicable New York law.

In 2011, after the Plaintiff had already purchased his annuity
policy from the Defendant, the Defendant changed the investment
strategy associated with the Plaintiff's and other putative class
members' policies. The Defendant implemented the new investment
policy, referred to as the "AXA Tactical Manager Strategy" (ATM
Strategy), without seeking approval from the New York State
Department of Financial Services (NYDFS), as required by the terms
of the contract and New York law. The ATM Strategy was a material
change to the investment policy pursuant to New York Insurance Law
Section 4240(e), which required the Defendant to seek approval of
the change from the NYDFS prior to its implementation.

The Plaintiff also alleged the breach caused the Plaintiff and the
other policyholders damages. To implement the ATM Strategy, the
Defendant sold all or substantially all of the Plaintiff's and the
other policyholders' investment positions without their permission.
This left their accounts with no equity exposure. After the market
recovered, the Defendant bought these positions back at much higher
prices, immediately resulting in substantial losses passed on to
the Plaintiff and the other policyholders.

In other words, alleged the Plaintiff, the ATM Strategy reduced the
Defendant's risks and costs by using derivatives to hedge its own
equity exposure to market volatility at the expense of the variable
annuity customers who purchased their policies, in part, for the
opportunity to benefit from market volatility. The ATM Strategy
altered the very nature of the product held by policyholders. It
materially changed the variable annuity products and reduced the
value of the annuity accounts. The reduction of the value of the
accounts also diminished the periodic reset amounts built into the
policies. In the case of the Plaintiff, the Defendant's breach cost
him approximately $90,000, or almost 20% of his original
investment. The members of the putative class lost in excess of
$100 to $200 million dollars during the relevant period.

Soon after the Defendant's implementation of the ATM Strategy, the
NYDFS commenced an investigation of the Defendant concerning the
implementation of the ATM Strategy. The focus of the investigation
was whether the Defendant had properly informed the NYDFS of the
implementation of the ATM Strategy. After the conclusion of the
investigation, the NYDFS found that the Defendant had failed to
seek the requisite approval for the material changes to the
investment strategy under the ATM Strategy.

As a result, the Defendant entered into a consent order with the
NYDFS on March 14, 2014. According to the consent order, "had the
NYDFS been aware of the extent of the changes, it may have required
that the existing policyholders affirmatively opt in to the ATM
Strategy." The consent order required the Defendant to (1) pay $20
million to the NYDFS, (2) seek all necessary approvals in
connection with the ATM Strategy in the future, and (3) issue
written reports to the NYDFS concerning changes to certain accounts
on a quarterly basis for a period of five years from the date of
the consent order.

The Plaintiff commenced the putative class action against the
Defendant on Aug. 21, 2015. In his complaint, the Plaintiff
asserted a single claim for breach of contract against the
Defendant. On Dec. 27, 2018, the Defendant filed both a motion to
strike the sole count of the Plaintiff's complaint and a motion to
dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint to the extent that it purported
to assert claims on behalf of members of a putative class who are
not Connecticut residents. The court heard oral argument on the two
motions on May 6, 2019.

The court granted the Defendant's motion to strike, concluding that
"the causation of damages the Plaintiff has alleged for his breach
of contract claim are speculative, and that, as a result, his
complaint fails to plead facts that sufficiently allege the
causation element of his breach of contract claim." The Plaintiff
then filed an amended complaint pursuant to Practice Book Section
10-44. The Defendant filed a motion for entry of judgment, or
alternatively, to strike the sole count of the amended complaint.
After hearing oral argument on the Defendant's motion, the court
granted the Defendant's motion for entry of judgment and rendered
judgment in favor of the Defendant. The appeal followed.

II. Analysis

A.

The Plaintiff first claims that the trial court improperly
concluded that his amended complaint was not "materially different"
from his original complaint and, therefore, that he had failed to
file a new pleading within the meaning of Practice Book Section
10-44. Specifically, the Plaintiff claims that the court erred by
applying the wrong legal standard in its review of the amended
complaint, causing it to conclude that the amended complaint was
not "materially different" from the original complaint. The
Plaintiff claims that the changes in the amended complaint are
material because they reflect his good faith effort to cure the
causation defect identified by the court in striking the original
complaint.

The Appellate Court agrees. It opines that the Plaintiff's amended
complaint does more than merely reiterate the facts alleged in the
original complaint. There are significant factual additions
describing how the Defendant's actions caused the Plaintiff damages
apart from whatever action the NYDFS may or may not have taken, and
these allegations attempt to address the legal insufficiency
identified by the trial court.

Specifically, the Appellate Court finds that the amended complaint
includes new facts describing the Defendant's ATM Strategy, how it
was implemented, and how it allegedly caused the Plaintiff damages
in specified amounts. The amended complaint contains factual
additions that allege that, pursuant to the ATM Strategy, the
Defendant "sold the equivalent of all of the equity securities in
the Plaintiff's investment account" by selling certain futures
contracts that "left the Plaintiff's account with no equity
exposure."

According to the amended complaint, the Defendant then repurchased
those futures contracts "at a higher price, immediately resulting
in substantial losses passed onto the Plaintiff and other similarly
situated policyholders." The amended complaint then alleges that,
"in summary, the Defendant used the ATM Strategy to hedge its
equity exposure and pass on the losses to its clients.

The Appellate Court concludes that, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, the new allegations set forth in the
Plaintiff's amended complaint "constitute a good faith effort";
plead causation and, accordingly, the amended complaint is
materially different from the original complaint.

B.

Because it concludes that the amended complaint is materially
different from the original complaint and, therefore, the waiver
rule does not apply, the Appellate Court addresses the Plaintiff's
challenge to the merits of the court's ruling striking the amended
complaint. The Plaintiff claims that the court improperly
determined that the amended complaint failed to sufficiently plead
causation. Specifically, the Plaintiff claims that the court erred
by (1) applying the wrong legal standard in concluding that the
plaintiff's amended complaint failed to adequately plead causation
and (2) relying upon findings of fact at the pleading stage.

The Appellate Court again agrees. It concludes that the Plaintiff
has alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action for breach
of contract. The Plaintiff has included in his amended complaint,
among other things, facts describing how the Defendant's breach has
allegedly caused him damages.

Specifically, the Appellate Court finds that the Plaintiff has
alleged that his contract required the defendant to (1) comply with
all applicable laws, (2) establish and maintain the Plaintiff's
annuity account pursuant to New York law, and (3) seek approval
from the NYDFS prior to making a material change or a change to the
investment strategy.

The amended complaint alleges that the Defendant did not seek
approval from the NYDFS prior to implementing the ATM Strategy, as
required by the contract, resulting in a breach. The Plaintiff
alleges that, as a result of the breach, the ATM Strategy
automatically went into effect. Under the newly implemented ATM
Strategy, the plaintiff alleges, the Defendant sold the equivalent
of all of the equity securities in the Plaintiff's account, leaving
his account with no equity exposure. Then, according to the
Plaintiff, the Defendant repurchased the securities at a higher
price, immediately resulting in the losses to him and the putative
class.

"Construing the complaint in the manner most favorable to
sustaining its legal sufficiency," the Appellate Court concludes
that these facts allege all of the requisite elements of a cause of
action for breach of contract. Whether the Plaintiff can prove
causation properly should be left to the finder of fact.

III. Disposition

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with the Opinion. In the Opinion, the other
judges concurred.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 15, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/fyp298r7 from Leagle.com.

David A. Slossberg -- dslossberg@hssklaw.com -- with whom were Sara
A. Sharp, and, on the brief, Daniella Quitt -- dquitt@hfesq.com --
pro hac vice, for the Appellant (Plaintiff).

Jay B. Kasner -- jkasner@skadden.com -- pro hac vice, with whom
were Kurt Wm. Hemr -- kurt.hemr@skadden.com -- pro hac vice, John
W. Cerreta and Thomas D. Goldberg, for the Appellee (Defendant).


BANK OF AMERICA: Fails to Refund Late Fees, Simmons Class Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
LAVERNE SIMMONS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. (BANA), Case No. 2:22-cv-01126
(C.D. Cal., Feb. 18, 2022) challenges (1) BANA's systematic
violation of its covenant of good faith and fair dealing, flowing
from BANA's failure to consider requests for refunds of late fees,
despite reserving the discretion to charge or not charge these fees
and despite promising customers that it would exercise its
discretion in their favor during the deadly COVID-19 pandemic; (2)
BANA's unjust enrichment through its knowing retention of the
benefit of late fees, despite its promise to refund those fees to
consumers; and (3) BANA's violation of California's unfair trade
practices laws by misrepresenting that it would refund late fees
levied during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Ms. Simmons contend that is a breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing for BANA to (1) provide itself discretion as to
whether to charge or waive late fees; (2) promise customers that it
would waive such fees; (3) refuse to take into consideration the 18
circumstances of a global pandemic and worst economy since the
Great Depression, the money that was provided to it by the federal
government, and the harm these fees would impose on vulnerable
customers when determining not to exercise discretion in customers'
favor; and (4) either fail to exercise discretion at all by failing
to setup a system for considering the financial hardship of
customers who request a waiver of those fees or consistently
exercise its discretion in its own. These actions deny BANA's most
vulnerable customers the full benefit of the contract that BANA
itself wrote.

It is likewise a violation of the California Unfair Competition
Law, the California Business and Professions Code section 17200, et
seq., to deceive customers by promising to refund late fees, and
then systematically refuse to do so, the Plaintiff adds.

These alleged false promises are misrepresentations that are likely
to mislead the public as to whether late fees will be refunded
during the COVID-19 pandemic. Ms. Simmons relied on and suffered
financial harm from these promises because she would have taken
action to avoid these punitive fees had she known that BANA was
going to refuse to refund these fees, during this time of
extraordinary financial hardship.

BANA also unjustly enriched itself at the expense of its customers
by retaining the benefit of late fees, despite its promise to
refund those fees to struggling customers.

Ms. Simmons and other Class members have been injured by BANA's
improper practices. On behalf of herself and the Class, Ms. Simmons
seeks damages, restitution, and injunctive relief for BANA's
violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and for
the violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, and
disgorgement of the wrongful and inequitable proceeds received by
BANA due to its unjust practices.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Hassan A. Zavareei, Esq.
          Andrea R. Gold, Esq.
          Lauren Kuhlik, Esq.
          Glenn E. Chappell, Esq.
          Annick M. Persinger, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          1828 L Street NW Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 973-0900
          E-mail: hzavareei@tzlegal.com
                  agold@tzlegal.com
                  lkuhlik@tzlegal.com
                  gchappell@tzlegal.com
                  apersinger@tzlegal.com

BANTER BY: Alfaro Wage-and-Hour Suit Removed to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled SILVIA ALFARO, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. BANTER BY PIERCING PAGODA, PIERCING
PAGODA, ZALE DELAWARE, INC., AMANDA HORN, and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, Case No. 30-2021-01237686-CU-OE-CXC, was removed from
the Superior Court for the State of California for the County of
Orange to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California on February 18, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Central District of California assigned
Case No. 8:22-cv-00266 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the
California Labor Code including failure to pay lawful wages
including overtime, failure to provide meal periods and permit rest
breaks, failure to reimburse business expenses, failure to timely
pay wages during employment, and failure to timely pay wages due at
termination.

Banter By Piercing Pagoda is a jewelry retailer doing business in
California.

Piercing Pagoda is a jewelry retailer doing business in
California.

Zale Delaware, Inc. is a jewelry retailer doing business in
California. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Thomas N. McCormick, Esq.
         Emily A. Papania, Esq.
         VORYS SATER SEYMOUR AND PEASE LLP
         4675 MacArthur Court, Suite 700
         Newport Beach, CA 92660
         Telephone: (949) 526-7900
         Facsimile: (949) 526-7901
         E-mail: tnmccormick@vorys.com
                 eapapania@vorys.com

BEAUFORT COUNTY SCHOOL: Patel Suit Removed to D. South Carolina
---------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Patel, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Beaufort County School District, Case No.
2021-CP-07-02232 was removed from the South Carolina Court of
Common Pleas, Beaufort County, to the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina on Feb. 8, 2022, and assigned
Case No. 9:22-cv-00384-DCN.

The Complaint alleges an unlawful taking and a violation of Due
Process rights under the United States Constitution and the South
Carolina Constitution, as well as violations of the South Carolina
state law.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          David T. Duff, Esq.
          David N. Lyon, Esq.
          DUFF | FREEMAN | LYON, LLC
          P.O. Box 1486
          Columbia, SC 29202
          Phone: (803) 790-0603
          Facsimile: (803) 790-0605
          Email: dduff@dfl-lawfirm.com
                 dlyon@dfl-lawfirm.com



BLUE CROSS: Appeals Court Affirms Denial of Bid to Toss Kirby Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD HEALTHCARE PLAN OF
GEORGIA, INC., et al. v. KIRBY, et al., Case No. A21A1387 (Ga.
App.), the Court of Appeals of Georgia, Third Division, affirms the
state court's order denying BCBS's motion to dismiss.

Blue Cross Blue Shield Healthcare Plan of Georgia, Inc., ("BCBS")
appeals from an order of the Cobb County Superior Court denying its
motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs Frances Kirby, Audrey Logan, Dioli Azofeifa, John David
Marks, Wanda Silva, Tonya Beach, and David Frohman filed a
class-action complaint against BCBS alleging that it made certain
misrepresentations as part of a marketing scheme. According to the
complaint, BCBS offered its Pathway HMO plans during the Affordable
Care Act ("ACA") Open Enrollment ("OE") period for the 2019
calendar year. The Plaintiffs alleged that during the 2019 OE
period they enrolled with BCBS because Wellstar Health System,
Inc., Emory Healthcare, Piedmont Healthcare, and other healthcare
providers were inaccurately represented as being in-network for the
Pathway plans.

After the Plaintiffs selected a Pathway plan, the ACA OE period
ended, and the Plaintiffs paid premiums to BCBS, the Plaintiffs
discovered that providers, including Wellstar, Emory Healthcare,
Piedmont Healthcare, and specialists, were not in-network for their
selected plans. The complaint also claimed that each Plaintiff
entered into an Individual Member Contract with BCBS, which stated,
in part, "You do not need a Referral to see a Specialty Care
Physician."

However, according to the Plaintiffs, BCBS subsequently sent
letters dated Feb. 21, 2019, indicating that the Plaintiffs' plans
actually did require a referral to see a specialist. Additionally,
the Complaint alleged that BCBS sent insurance cards to "some or
all" of the Plaintiffs with their primary care physicians listed
even though they were not included in the network for their plans.

The Plaintiffs filed a class-action complaint on April 12, 2019,
alleging several causes of action, but primarily asserting that
BCBS had engaged in a health insurance marketing scheme during the
ACA 2019 OE period by misrepresenting the size of BCBS's physician
and hospital networks, and thereby inducing Plaintiffs to select
plans that they otherwise would not have chosen. The Plaintiffs
also asserted that BCBS further breached the Plaintiffs' member
contracts when BCBS stated that they had to obtain a referral to
see a specialist when their member contracts stated that no such
referral was needed.

BCBS filed an answer and a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
complaint, which the trial court denied. The Appellate Court
granted BCBS's application for interlocutory appeal.

BCBS's Claims of Error

BCBS argues that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' claims under the filed-rate doctrine. Specifically,
BCBS asserts that awarding the damages that they seek would require
the trial court to judicially determine the reasonableness of the
rate filed with the Georgia Commissioner of Insurance, which is
prohibited under the filed-rate doctrine.

Judge Clyde L. Reese, III, writing for the Panel, notes that
Georgia courts have seldom addressed the filed-rate doctrine, and
none have applied it to a situation involving rates filed with the
Commissioner, specifically medical insurance policies. However, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has
provided some guidance, stating that the filed-rate doctrine
forbids a regulated entity from charging rates for its services
other than those properly filed with the appropriate regulatory
authority.

The Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges, inter alia, that BCBS
intentionally disseminated misinformation regarding their network,
and violated the Plaintiffs' contracts by requiring them to obtain
a referral before seeing a specialist. The Plaintiffs do not,
however, directly state they are challenging BCBS's premiums.
Therefore, the filed-rate doctrine does not bar the Plaintiffs'
claims as a direct challenge to the rates approved by the
Commissioner, Judge Reese holds.

The Panel next examines whether the Plaintiffs' Complaint contained
a facially-neutral challenge that would indirectly require the
trial court's award of damages to change the rate approved by the
Commissioner. Although the filed-rate doctrine bars causes of
action that would, effectively, change the rate paid by the
customer-plaintiff to one below the filed rate paid by other
customers or would, in effect, result in a judicial determination
of the reasonableness of that rate, the Plaintiffs' Complaint does
not contain such a challenge, Judge Reese finds.

The Plaintiffs asserted that BCBS disseminated uniform deceptive
marketing materials to its independent agents that falsely
represented that WellStar, Emory, Piedmont and other health care
providers were going to be in-network health care providers in its
Pathway health insurance plans. The Plaintiffs also claimed that
BCBS listed WellStar, Emory and other primary care physicians on
some or all of the Plaintiffs' health insurance cards. Moreover,
the Plaintiffs also assert that in violation of its Member
Contract, BCBS sent letters to the Plaintiffs and Class Members
that stated members would need to obtain a referral to see a
specialist without obtaining the Plaintiffs' or Class Members'
approval and without being signed by BCBS's President.

The Plaintiffs' Complaint neither directly alleges that BCBS's
rates were too high, nor requires the trial court to recalculate
the rate in order to award the damages sought.

Unlike Patel v. Specialized Loan Servicing, 904 F.3d 1314,
1321(III)(A) (11th Cir. 2018), where the plaintiffs repeatedly
stated that they were challenging the defendant's premiums, here
the Plaintiffs' allegations did not involve the actual rates
charged by BCBS, Judge Reese notes. Rather, the Plaintiffs claimed
that BCBS's actions induced them into selecting a plan that they
would not have chosen had they known the actual status of their
providers in relation to BCBS's network, and that BCBS improperly
imposed an additional requirement on them by requiring a referral.

Thus, Judge Reese holds, the Plaintiffs' claims were not barred by
the filed-rate doctrine.

BCBS also asserts that the trial court erred in denying its motion
for dismissal because the filed-rate doctrine applies to insurance
rates. However, in light of the ruling above, the Panel need not
reach this argument.

Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Brown, J., concur.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Feb. 7, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yckm92f6 from Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Gibson-Hensley's Claims Dismissed With Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Terry F. Moorer of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama, Southern Division, dismissed with prejudice
the case, PAMELA GIBSON-HENSLEY, Plaintiff v. BP EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION INC., et al., Defendants. PAMELA GIBSON-HENSLEY,
Plaintiff, v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC., et al., Defendants,
Civil Action Nos. 1:19-cv-382-TFM-MU-C, 1:21-cv-117-TFM-MU-C (S.D.
Ala.).

Pending before the Court is the parties' Rule 41(a) Stipulation of
Dismissal With Prejudice, filed Feb. 10, 2022. Judge Moorer
explains that the Rules of Civil Procedure permit a plaintiff to
voluntarily dismiss the action without an order of the court "by
filing a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves
either an answer or a motion for summary judgment" or "a
stipulation signed by all parties who have appeared." He finds that
the joint stipulation is signed by both sides and the Plaintiff
reserves her remaining rights that she may have under the Deepwater
Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement.

Consequently, by operation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 41, the action has
been dismissed in accordance with the joint notice. Therefore, the
claims in the case are dismissed with prejudice with each party to
bear their own attorneys' fees and costs.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 11, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/mry2fzb8 from Leagle.com.


BRAVO ARKOMA: McKnight Realty Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned McKnight Realty Company, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, v. Bravo
Arkoma, LLC, Case No. 6:20-cv-00428-KEW (E.D. Okla.), the Plaintiff
asks the Court to enter an order preliminarily approving the class
settlement after having reached the agreement with Defendant and
recovery for the Class:

   1. certifying the Settlement Class for Settlement purposes;

   2. preliminarily approve the Settlement;

   3. appointing Plaintiff as Class Representative for the
      Settlement Class;

   4. appointing Reagan E. Bradford and Ryan K. Wilson
      of Bradford & Wilson PLLC as Class Counsel for the
      Settlement Class;

   5. approving the form and manner of the proposed Notice;

   6. appointing a Settlement Administrator;

   7. appointing an Escrow Agent; and

   8. setting a hearing date for final approval of the
      Settlement and application for an award of Plaintiff's
      Attorneys' Fees, Litigation Expenses and Administration,
      Notice, and Distribution The Costs, and a Case
      Contribution Award to Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff has obtained an outstanding recovery for the
Settlement Class. Specifically, the Plaintiff has reached a
settlement with Defendant worth $2.6 million in cash value for
Plaintiff's class claims for statutory interest owed for late
payments of oil-and-gas proceeds under Oklahoma law.

The Plaintiff initiated this action on November 23, 2020, alleging
that Defendant violated Oklahoma's Production Revenue Standards
Act, by failing to pay statutory interest owed on the payment of
oil-and-gas proceeds made outside of the timelines set out in the
PRSA. The Defendant answered on December 15, 2020.

The parties conferred and submitted a joint status report to the
Court on February 8, 2021. The parties further jointly moved for a
proposed protective order, and the Court entered the protective
order on February 19, 2021.

Also on February 19, the Court held a scheduling and status
conference. During that conference, the Court ordered that, if
Defendant desired to move for dismissal based on lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, then Defendant should do so by March
5, 2021.

The Court further ordered that, if Defendant chose not to move for
dismissal on those grounds, the parties were to submit a joint
brief within twenty-one days. The Defendant chose not to move for
dismissal, and thus the parties conferred and submitted a joint
brief concerning subject-matter jurisdiction on March 12, 2021.

Bravo is an exploration and production company.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Feb. 15,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/34XH5Sb
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Reagan E. Bradford, Esq.
          Ryan K. Wilson, Esq.
          BRADFORD & WILSONPLLC
          431 W. Main Street, Suite D
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102
          Telephone: (405) 698-2770
          E-mail: reagan@bradwil.com
                  ryan@bradwil.com

BUON CAFE: Mendez Seeks to Recover Unpaid OT for Restaurant Staff
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SANTIAGO MENDEZ v. BUON GELATO AND EURO BAR OF NY CORP d/b/a BUON
CAFE & TRATTORIA and FELLIPO GALLINA, individually, Case No.
1:22-cv-00922 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 18, 2022) is brought on behalf of the
Plaintiff and all others similarly situated seeking to remedy
violations of the wage-and-hour provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

The complaint is a civil action brought by the Plaintiff and his
similarly situated co-workers (cooks, deliverymen, bussers, and
food runners) to recover unpaid overtime compensation and other
wages. The Plaintiff worked at the restaurant owned, controlled,
and operated by Defendant Fellipo Gallina.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jacob Aronauer, Esq.
          225 Broadway, 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 323-6980
          E-mail: jaronauer@aronauerlaw.com

BURLINGTON STORES: Fox Rothschild Attorney Discusses FLSA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Tabakman, Esq., of Fox Rothschild LLP, in an article for
JDSupra, reports that How many Assistant Manager overtime cases can
there be? There seems to be another one every five minutes. The
latest iteration of this phenomenon is a FLSA class action against
Burlington Coat Factory. The claim is (again) that the Assistant
Managers were misclassified in order to avoid paying them overtime.
The case is entitled Payton-Fernandez v. Burlington Stores Inc. et
al. and was filed in federal court in the District of New Jersey.

The Complaint asserts that the "defendants' unlawful conduct, as
described above, was willful or in reckless disregard of the
applicable wage and hour laws pursuant to defendants' centralized,
companywide policy, pattern and practice of attempting to minimize
labor costs by violating the FLSA." The named plaintiff claims she
worked 50-55 hours per week, never received overtime, but spent the
bulk of her time stocking shelves, making sales at the cash
register, performing janitorial duties and folding/hanging clothes.
She claims none of the Assistant Managers could hire or fire or
perform any other managerial duties.

This is not Burlington's first time at the rodeo. The named
plaintiff contends that her allegations find ample support in the
evidence developed in the 2011 and 2014 class actions that sought
overtime on the same basis, for classes of Assistant Managers.
Those cases settled for approximately $20 million in 2020, the
plaintiff asserts this shows that the Company was fully cognizant
that these employees were non-exempt, but still classified them as
exempt.

The Plaintiffs clearly want to rely upon the earlier cases. The
Complaint asserts that the "defendants' collective decision to
continue to deny [assistant store managers] overtime, after eight
years of litigation and a multi-million dollar settlement of
identical issues in two prior cases … can only be characterized
as an intentional and willful violation." She wants the class to
include all Assistant Managers who worked in excess of forty (40)
hours in any week in the last three years. She opines there are
hundreds if potential opt-ins to the class.

The Takeaway

I sometimes think the easiest and best thing to do is pay all of
these titled employees on an hourly basis, pay them overtime or
ensure that they do not work more than the magical forty hours in
most weeks. Then, all of this unpleasantness could be avoided. Or
the employer must enhance the job duties of these employees to show
they are actually discharging true management duties, even though
they may be stocking shelves.

Then this scenario would be just a memory . . . [GN]

BUTCH'S RAT: Settlement in Key Suit Partly Granted Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM KEY, Plaintiff v. BUTCH'S RAT HOLE & ANCHOR
SERVICE, INC., Defendant, Case No. CIV 17-1171 RB/KRS (D.N.M.),
Judge Robert C. Brack of the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Mexico granted in part the Joint Motion for Final Approval
of Class and Collective Action Settlement, filed on Jan. 13, 2022.

I. Introduction

The matter is before the Court on the Joint Motion for Final
Approval of Class and Collective Action Settlement. The Court held
a final fairness hearing on Jan. 20, 2022. The primary issues
before the Court are: (1) whether the proposed settlement is fair
and reasonable; (2) whether the incentive award of $7,500 to the
named Plaintiff is fair, reasonable, and adequate; and (3) whether
the requested attorney fee award of 40% of the Settlement Amount,
in addition to litigation expenses and taxable costs up to $15,000,
is reasonable.

II. Background

The Defendant is a Texas oilfield service company that provides
services to oil and gas industry customers. It employed Key (the
named Plaintiff) from November 2014 through August 2016. Key filed
a class action complaint alleging that Defendant failed to pay
certain "non-exempt workers" overtime hours in violation of the New
Mexico Minimum Wage Act (NMMWA), N.M. Stat. Ann. Section
50-4-22(D). Key sought damages on behalf of himself and on behalf
of the putative class. The Defendant contends that it properly paid
all the class members on a "piece rate" basis, which exempted them
from the NMMWA.

The case is related to litigation that was filed and concluded in
Texas, Gutierrez v. Butch's Rat Hole & Anchor Service, Inc., No.
7:2016-cv-00314 (W.D. Tex.). Gutierrez involved a claim for unpaid
overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
Section 201-19, and the parties settled the case in 2017. The
Gutierrez settlement specifically excluded the claim for unpaid
overtime wages under the NMMWA.

Key filed the Complaint in November 2017. The parties engaged in
discovery beginning in March 2018, and the Defendant filed a motion
for partial summary judgment in September 2018. The Court denied
the Defendant's motion. It granted a joint motion to stay
proceedings on Sept. 25, 2018, and the parties began to work toward
a settlement. "During the course of the settlement discussions, the
Parties exchanged additional information on an informal basis,
including a damage model which was based on the information
provided in this case and in the Gutierrez litigation."

On Aug. 27, 2019, the parties engaged in mediation with Jack
Wisdom, a mediator with considerable experience in wage and hour
cases. "At the end of the mediation, Wisdom issued a mediator's
proposal and gave the Parties time to consider the proposal." "On
Oct. 29, 2019, the Parties informed the Court that they had reached
an agreement and would begin preparing the settlement documents."
The Court set a Feb. 14, 2020 deadline for the parties to file the
necessary documents.

Plaintiff Key filed an Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class and Collective Action Settlement on March 5, 2020. The Court
granted the motion and set a final approval hearing for Nov. 16,
2020. The parties requested several extensions due to delays in
finalizing and processing the settlement. Eventually, the claims
administrator mailed the court-approved notice to the 160 putative
class members. No objections were received.

III. Discussion

A. The Court will approve the parties' settlement agreement.

First, Judge Brack is satisfied that the settlement agreement is
the product of fair and honest negotiations. The parties "have
vigorously advocated their respective positions throughout the
pendency of the case," including thorough briefing on a contested
issue regarding whether the class members were exempt from the
NMMWA in a summary judgment motion. The parties worked toward
settlement for months, with the counsel "discussing a framework for
settlement" based on the Gutierrez case even before they met with
the mediator. The Counsel gathered and reviewed detailed payroll
records to create a damage model to use at mediation. The parties
started "far apart" but came to an agreement with the help of an
experienced mediator at a full-day mediation. These facts show that
the settlement process was open, fair, and honest. Because the
settlement resulted from arm's length negotiations between
experienced the counsel after significant discovery had occurred,
Judge Brack may presume the settlement to be fair, adequate, and
reasonable.

1. Serious questions of law and fact exist.

Although Judge Brack need not evaluate the merits of the parties'
dispute to approve the settlement agreement, he says, it is clear
that "serious questions of law and fact  exist such that they could
significantly impact the case if it were litigated." He finds that
serious factual and legal questions remained that could have
serious implications for either side had the matter gone to trial.
This factor weighs in favor of settlement.

2. The value of immediate recovery outweighs the possibility of
future relief.

The matter has been pending for over four years. The parties would
incur both significant risks and costs to go to trial. By contrast,
the proposed settlement agreement provides the class with
substantial, guaranteed relief. An evaluation of the benefits of
the settlement also must be tempered by the recognition that any
compromise involves concessions on the part of the parties. The
parties recognize that pursuing the case to trial might result in
an all-or-nothing proposition for the Plaintiffs. The Settlement
Fund provides for recovery of an appropriately discounted recovery
even after the payment of attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
administration costs, and service payments." Thus, this factor
weighs in favor of the settlement.

3. Counsel for the parties believe the settlement is fair and
reasonable.

Judge Brack opines that the counsels' judgment as to the fairness
of the agreement is entitled to considerable weight. He believes
the settlement agreement is fair and reasonable. The Defendant's
attorney agreed at the hearing that there are issues on which the
parties disagree, both parties compromised in coming to a
settlement, and Defendant is satisfied with the agreement. Because
the attorneys in the action, all of whom are experienced and
competent attorneys, support the settlement agreement, this factor
favors approval.

In sum, Judge Brack finds that the settlement agreement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate.

B. The Court will approve the requested incentive award for the
named plaintiff.

The Plaintiff's counsel moves the Court to approve an incentive
award to Key, the named Plaintiff, in the amount of $7,500.

Judge Brack holds that incentive awards are typical in class action
cases. The parties agree that the requested incentive award is
reasonable and in line with similar awards approved in other cases.
The Notice of Class Action Settlement mailed to the class members
included information about the proposed incentive award. Judge
Brack agrees that the incentive award is reasonable and will
approve it.

C. The Court will approve attorneys' fees in the amount of 33.3% of
the settlement fund.

The Plaintiff's counsel requests an attorney fee award of 40% of
the common fund. In a certified class action, the court may award
reasonable attorneys' fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized
by law or by the parties' agreement."

Judge Brack agrees that the class counsel was competent and
obtained a substantial award for the class. However, the matter was
not so overly complicated or risky as to merit a 40% attorney fee.
Judge Brack is in favor of approving an award that is less than the
40% requested. Hence, he will approve an attorney fee award of
33.3% of the common fund. He will further approve litigation
expenses and taxable costs of up to $15,000 to be approved by the
claims administrator.

IV. Conclusion

Having reviewed the parties' submissions and heard the arguments of
counsel, Judge Brack finds that the proposed settlement and the
incentive award are fair, reasonable, and adequate, and that an
attorney fee award of 33.3%, together with litigation expenses and
taxable costs up to $15,000 is reasonable.

Judge Brack granted in part the Joint Motion for Final Approval of
Class and Collective Action Settlement: He finds that the
Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate; he approves
an incentive award to Key, the named Plaintiff, in the amount of
$7,500; he approves attorneys' fees in the amount of 33.3% of the
settlement fund together with litigation expenses and taxable costs
of up to $15,000 to be approved by the claims administrator.

The Interim Order will become final 30 days after entry, subject to
any objections from the class members and the submission of a final
declaration from the claims administrator. If any issue or
objection is raised within 30 days, the settlement will remain in
interim approval status until the matters are addressed.

After the Order is final, the matter is dismissed with prejudice.
The Court will, however, retain jurisdiction to address any issues
that may arise in implementing the Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 15, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Interim Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8m66p3 from
Leagle.com.


CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: Ondey Sues Over Therapists' Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
MICHELE ONDEY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT, INC. formerly known as ELDORADO
RESORTS INC.; CIRCUS AND EL DORADO JOINT VENTURE, LLC d/b/a SILVER
LEGACY RESORT CASINO; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No.
3:22-cv-00096-RCJ-CLB (D. Nev. Feb. 18, 2022) is a collective and
class action complaint alleging violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and  Nevada Revised Statutes for:

   1) Unlawful Tip Pooling in Violation of FLSA, 29 U.S.C. section
      203(m)(2)(B);

   2) Failure to Pay Overtime at the Correct Legal Rate in
      Violation of 29 U.S.C. section 207, et al.;

   3) Failure to Pay Overtime at the Correct Legal Rate in
      Violation of NRS 608.018 and NRS 608.140;

   4) Failure to Pay PTO Wages in Violation of NRS 608.0197 and
NRS
      608.140;

   5) Failure to Pay Daily Overtime in Violation of NRS 608.018
and
      NRS 608.140; and

   6) Failure to Pay Continuation Wages in Violation of NRS
      608.020-.050 and NRS 608.140.

Plaintiff Ondey has been employed by Defendants as a non-exempt
Massage Therapist at the Silver Legacy property from on or about
July 2019 to the present date.

The Defendants allegedly paid Plaintiff on an hourly basis at the
lower-tier Nevada minimum wage rate plus commissions, where the
Plaintiff would receive a 20% commission for the total cost of the
service that she provided.

The Plaintiff also received 80% of an optional and discretionary
service charge as tip income. The remaining 20% of the optional
service charge was distributed to other co-workers and supervisory
personnel.

The Plaintiff regularly worked in excess of eight (8) hours in a
workday. From September 24, 2020, to October 10, 2020, she worked
approximately five, ten hour shifts. From approximately October 10,
2020, through January 29, 2022, she only worked 10 hour shifts on
Saturdays, and, during that time period, she estimates that she
worked approximately 65, ten hour shifts. Despite earning the
lower-tier minimum wage amount and having worked over eight hours
in a workday, Defendants never compensated Plaintiff daily overtime
when she worked over eight hours in a workday, added the suit.

The Defendant Circus and El Dorado Joint Venture, LLC owns and
operates the Silver Legacy Resort Casino, located in Reno,
Nevada.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark R. Thierman, Esq.
          Joshua D. Buck, Esq.
          Leah L. Jones, Esq.
          Joshua R. Hendrickson, Esq.
          THIERMAN BUCK LLP
          7287 Lakeside Drive
          Reno, NE 89511
          Telephone: (775) 284-1500
          Facsimile: (775) 703-5027
          E-mail: mark@thiermanbuck.com
          josh@thiermanbuck.com
          leah@thiermanbuck.com
          joshh@thiermanbuck.com

CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses Stowers Suit Without Leave to Amend
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled ALTON D. STOWERS, Plaintiff v. THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL SYSTEM, Defendant, Case No. EDCV 21-2003-ODW
(PVC) (C.D. Cal.), the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California issued an order summarily dismissing the action
without leave to amend.

Plaintiff Alton D. Stowers, a California state pretrial detainee,
constructively filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42
U.S.C. Section 1983 on Nov. 22, 2021. The Plaintiff did not pay the
full filing fee or submit a request to proceed in forma pauperis
with the Complaint, and despite being notified of the omission by
the Court Clerk, to date has not remedied the error.

In these circumstances, the Court would typically order the
Plaintiff to pay the filing fee or file an IFP application within
30 days, barring which the action would be summarily dismissed.
However, because the Complaint is utterly frivolous and the
Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any circumstances, even
if the Plaintiff did move to proceed IFP, the application would be
denied.

As such, it is futile to delay the dismissal of this action any
longer, District Judge Otis D. Wright, II, opines. Accordingly, for
the reasons stated, this action is immediately dismissed without
leave to amend.

Allegations of the Complaint

In his three-page Complaint, the Plaintiff brings a facial
challenge to the constitutionality of California's Three Strikes
Law in a putative class action against the "State of California
Judicial System." He summarily contends, without further factual
context or legal support, that "[n]o judge or court should be able
to tell an individual how many times they can break a given law. As
there are already in place low, middle and high terms on
sentencing, each crime should have its own term not being
'enhanced' or '3 Strike enhanced.'" As such, the Plaintiff
maintains that California's Three Strikes Law should be declared
unconstitutional "retroactively" because it violates civil rights
and unidentified civil liberties guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.

The Plaintiff requests that the Courts of California be required to
"remove 3 strikes retroactively," including in his own case. The
Plaintiff further seeks a monetary award of $100,000 in
compensatory damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

The Plaintiff's Claims Are Frivolous and Amendment Would Be Futile

Judge Wright finds that the Complaint suffers from many incurable
defects that warrant immediate dismissal of this action. The
Plaintiff's sole constitutional claim is a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of California's Three Strikes Law.

Even if the Plaintiff had attempted to identify the specific "civil
and constitutional" rights that California's Three Strikes Law
purportedly violates and explained how it violates them, which he
did not, his blanket challenge, which seeks to invalidate
California's Three Strikes Law in all circumstances, necessarily
fails because the United States Supreme Court has expressly upheld
the constitutionality of California's Three Strikes Law, Judge
Wright holds, citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24-28
(2003).

Judge Wright also finds that the Complaint fails in other regards,
as well. In both the caption and the first sentence of the
Complaint, the Plaintiff styles his challenge to California's Three
Strikes Law as a "class action lawsuit." However, because the
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he can bring suit only to redress
harms that he personally suffered, Judge Wright notes.

Furthermore, the sole named Defendant -- the State of California
Judicial System -- is immune from lawsuit under the Eleventh
Amendment to the extent that the Plaintiff seeks monetary damages
or retrospective declaratory relief, Judge Wright states.

Because the Plaintiff has neither paid the full filing fee nor
filed an application to proceed IFP, this case cannot go forward,
Judge Wright holds. However, even if the Plaintiff filed an
adequately-supported IFP application, it would be denied as
frivolous because his cursory challenge to the constitutionality of
California's Three Strikes Law has already been adjudicated by the
United States Supreme Court.

Accordingly, the action is immediately dismissed without leave to
amend.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 7, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p9938v6 from Leagle.com.


CARPENTER & HAZLEWOOD: Wolf Seeks Entry of Jan. 18 Judgment
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Janis Wolf, individually
and on behalf of those similarly situated, v. Carpenter, Hazlewood,
Delgado & Bolen, LLP, Case No. 2:20-cv-00957-DLR (D. Ariz.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order that judgment be entered
as set forth in the Court's decision and Order dated January 18,
2022.

The Order granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, denied
Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment and Class Certification,
and directed the clerk to enter judgment accordingly. To date,
judgment has not been entered.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that judgment be
entered promptly so that Plaintiff can proceed with her appeal.

Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen is a full service law firm.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Feb. 15,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3t24Ct9
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan A. Dessaules, Esq.
          Ashley C. Hill, Esq.
          Thomas E. Raccuia, Esq.
          Jesse Vassallo Lopez, Esq.
          DESSAULES th LAW GROUP
          5343 North 16 Street, Suite 200
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (602) 274-5400
          Facsimile: (602) 274-5401
          E-mail: jdessaules@dessauleslaw.com
                  ahill@dessauleslaw.com
                  traccuia@dessauleslaw.com
                  jvassallo@dessauleslaw.com

CHALLENGE MFG: Misclassifies Quality Engineers, Pratt Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN PRATT, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated individuals v. CHALLENGE MFG. COMPANY, Case No.
2:22-cv-10362-SFC-KGA (E.D. Mich., Feb. 18, 2022) is a civil class
action for money damages, liquidated damages, costs, attorneys'
fees and other relief against Defendant Challenge MFG. Company.

The Plaintiffs' claims arise out of the Defendant's
misclassification of its Quality Engineers as employees that are
exempt from overtime compensation in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. Additionally, Plaintiff John Pratt asserts a claim
of age discrimination in violation of the Michigan Elliott-Larsen
Civil Rights Act , M.C.L. 37.2101, et seq., individually and on his
own behalf.

Mr. Pratt brings this action on his own behalf and on behalf of all
other Quality Engineers of Defendant, present and former, who were
and/or are affected by the actions, pay schemes, policies, and
procedures of Defendant. In addition, the Plaintiff brings this
action in his individual capacity, separate and apart from the
collective action claims set forth herein.

The Defendant is a for-profit company in the automotive
manufacturing industry with facilities in Michigan, Alabama,
Kentucky, Missouri and Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Noah S. Hurwitz, Esq.
          Grant M. Vlahopoulos, Esq.
          HURWITZ LAW PLLC
          617 Detroit St. Ste. 125
          Ann Arbor, MI 48104
          Telephone: (844) 487-9489
          E-mail: Noah@hurwitzlaw.com
                  Grant@hurwitzlaw.com


CHAMPION PETFOODS: Tenth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Renfro Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CAMMEO RENFRO; BARB McGRAW; DESIREE DEMPSTER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants v. CHAMPION PETFOODS USA, INC; CHAMPION
PETFOODS LP, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 20-1274 (10th Cir.),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
district court's grant of Champion's motion to dismiss.

I. Introduction

A group of pet owners brought a class action against Champion,
alleging representations on Champion's packaging on its Acana and
Orijen brands of dog food were false and misleading. Champion's dog
food packaging contains a number of claims about the product,
advertising the food as "Biologically Appropriate," "Trusted
Everywhere," using "Fresh and Regional Ingredients," and containing
"Ingredients We Love From People We Trust." The district court
dismissed the claims as either unactionable puffery or overly
subjective and therefore not materially misleading to a reasonable
consumer.

II. Background

Champion is a pet food producer located in Auburn, Kentucky, where
it manufactures pet food that is distributed throughout the United
States. It launched a food brand called Acana in the 1990s, and in
2006 another called Orijen. Champion's Orijen brand was aimed at
offering a premium product to consumers that would mirror foods
dogs might encounter in the wild. Champion marketed Orijen as
"Biologically Appropriate" dog food that contained the "richness,
freshness, and variety" of meats dogs were "evolved to eat."
Champion later employed the same nutritional philosophy with its
Acana brand as well.

The food packaging reflected this branding. For example, on Orijen
bags, the packaging explained that "Biologically Appropriate" meant
that the food would "nourish as nature intended." The Orijen
packaging also advertised it was "Trusted Everywhere" and contained
"Fresh Regional Ingredients" "Grown Close to Home" that were
"ethically raised by people we know and trust." On the packaging of
certain dog food formulas, Champion made more specific claims. For
example, on the packaging of the Orijen Six Fish formula, Champion
listed the approximate amount of each fish included by weight.

Unrelated to its packaging advertising, Champion was notified in
2018 by the Food and Drug Administration that some of the beef
tallow (beef fat) it used in certain pet food formulas had been
contaminated with pentobarbital, a controlled substance. But none
of the dog foods purchased by the Plaintiffs contained ingredients
tainted with pentobarbital.

The Plaintiffs filed the class action in the District of Colorado.
In the complaint, they allege seven claims based on Champion's
package labeling and sale of contaminated product, including: (1)
violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, (2) breach of
express warranty, (3) breach of implied warranty, (4) fraudulent
misrepresentation, (5) fraudulent concealment, (6) unjust
enrichment, and (7) negligence.

The district court dismissed the case based on the Plaintiffs'
failure to allege any materially false or misleading
representations or omissions of material fact. The district court
acknowledged that whether a statement is false or misleading is
typically a question for the jury, but when statements are "so
general or devoid of specific factual content," they are incapable
of empirical verification and cannot, "as a matter of law, give
rise to liability."

First, the district court dismissed "Trusted Everywhere" and
"Ingredients We Love from People We Trust" as "non-actionable
puffery" because no rational consumer would rely on these two
phrases as material statements of fact. Next, the court found that
the Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring any claims under
"Biologically Appropriate" because they did not allege the dog food
they purchased from Champion contained any pentobarbital
contamination. Because the Plaintiffs had purchased all the dog
food before Champion received shipments of allegedly contaminated
ingredients, they suffered no harm arising from Champion's
packaging. Third, the claims based on the statement about "Fresh
Regional Ingredients" were dismissed as subjective claims that were
not empirically verifiable. Finally, the district court dismissed
the Plaintiffs' claims that Champion omitted material facts,
finding that the packaging was not misleading.

III. Analysis

The Tenth Circuit first describes the legal framework under
Colorado law for deciding whether an advertising statement
constitutes an actionable misrepresentation under the Colorado
Consumer Protection Act. Next, it reviews the legal framework for
claims of omission. Then, it analyzes whether each of the four
statements was actionable for false or misleading
misrepresentations and whether the Plaintiffs had standing to bring
their claims under "Biologically Appropriate." Finally, it address
the Plaintiffs' omission-based claims.

A. Legal Framework

In a case based on federal diversity jurisdiction, the law of the
forum state governs. The tenth Circuit thus defers to the judgments
of the Colorado Supreme Court and relies on decisions of the
state's intermediate appellate court for persuasive logic.

1. Affirmative Misrepresentations

The Colorado Consumer Protection Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. Sections
6-1-101, et seq., "was enacted to provide prompt, economical, and
readily available remedies against consumer fraud." For a plaintiff
to recover on a claim under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act,
the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive trade practice;
(2) the challenged practice occurred in the course of the
defendant's business; (3) the deceptive trade practice
significantly impacted the public as actual or potential consumers
of the defendant's goods; (4) the plaintiff suffered injury in fact
to a legally protected interest; and (5) the deceptive trade
practice caused actual damages or losses to the plaintiff.   
Section 6-1-105 of the CCPA provides a non-exhaustive list of
deceptive trade practices that are actionable. Among the deceptive
trade practices alleged by the Plaintiffs are that Champion:
"knowingly or recklessly made a false representation as to the
characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, alterations, or
quantities of goods or food"; "represented that goods or food are
of a particular standard, quality, or grade when Champion knew or
should have known that they are of another"; "advertised goods with
intent not to sell them as advertised"; and "failed to disclose
material information concerning goods, services, or property which
information was known at the time of an advertisement or sale if
such failure to disclose such information was intended to induce
the consumer to enter into a transaction."

Under Colorado law, misrepresentation is defined as a "false or
misleading statement that induces the recipient to act or refrain
from acting." But misrepresentation is only actionable when "it is
made 'either with knowledge of its untruth, or recklessly and
willfully made without regard to its consequences, and with an
intent to mislead and deceive the plaintiff.'" "Thus, a party may
establish a deceptive trade practice by proof that a defendant
knowingly made a misrepresentation that induces a party's action or
inaction." And in addition, the alleged "representation of a fact
must be material." But "mere statements of opinion such as puffing
or praise of goods by seller is no warranty."

2. Omission-Based Claims

In addition to affirmative misrepresentations, Colorado law makes
actionable certain omissions of fact. In determining whether there
is a duty to disclose, Colorado courts have looked to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 551 for guidance. Section 551
of the Restatement and the Colorado cases interpreting it
demonstrate that in the absence of a special relationship or custom
requiring disclosure, a party is not required to disclose material
facts unless he has done something to create a false impression.

B. Application

Applying Colorado law, the Tenth Circuit concludes none of the
phrases supports claims for deceptive advertising. First, it finds
that the Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege the claims are
falsifiable. Champion did not claim its dog food was trusted by
100% of its customers. Nor did Champion claim that everyone loves
all the ingredients it uses. Instead, Champion merely made vague
and unproveable claims. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit concludes
these claims are protected puffery.

Second, the Tenth Circuit says the district court correctly
concluded that claims that ingredients are "fresh" and "regional"
are not subject to measurement. No reasonable consumer would find
Champion's packaging misleading merely because the ingredients
contained some percentage of non-fresh or non-regional ingredients
when, as in the present case, the packaging disclosed that very
fact.

Third, the Tenth Circuit finds that the Plaintiffs do not allege
that the ingredients did not approximate what a dog may find in a
natural environment or that the dog food caused any actual harm to
their pets. Their complaint thus fails to allege Champion's
"Biologically Appropriate" advertising claim was false or
misleading.

In sum, the Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged a false
advertising claim based on Champion's Acana and Orijen packaging.

C. Omission

The Plaintiffs press two omission claims on appeal: one based on
the CCPA and the other on fraudulent concealment. The Tenth Circuit
finds that the Plaintiffs fail on their CCPA omission claim through
forfeiture by failure to argue the claim at the district court. A.
Although the Plaintiffs made the claim in their complaint, they
failed to press the argument in their brief opposing the motion to
dismiss. On the fraudulent concealment claim, the Tenth Circuit
holds that puffery is not transformed into an actionable claim
because the Plaintiffs object to some of the ingredients in the dog
food. Nor do they allege any plausible baseline to compare
Champion's ingredients against some ideal. Consequently, the Tenth
Circuit concludes the district court properly dismissed the
omission-based claims.

IV. Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit agrees with the district court that the
Plaintiffs' claims fail to allege materially false or misleading
statements on Champion's packaging because the phrases fail to
deceive or mislead reasonable consumers on any material fact.
Therefore, it affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
Plaintiffs' complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 15, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yakjuwy9 from Leagle.com.

Kenneth Wexler -- kaw@wexlerwallace.com -- (Robert K. Shelquist --
rkshelquist@locklaw.com -- and Rebecca A. Peterson, Lockridge
Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P., in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Daniel E.
Gustafson -- dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com -- and Raina C. Borrelli
-- rborrelli@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Gluek PLLC,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, Kevin A. Seely -- kseely@robbinsllp.com --
and Steven M. McKany, Robbins LLP, in San Diego, California, Joseph
DePalma -- dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com -- and Susana Cruz Hodge,
Lite Depalma Greenberg, LLC, Newark, New Jersey, and Charles LaDuca
and Katherine Van Dyck, Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP, Washington,
D.C., with him on the briefs), Wexler Wallace LLP, in Chicago,
Illinois, for the Appellants.

Dominic Draye -- drayed@gtlaw.com -- (David A. Coulson --
coulsond@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig LLP, Miami, Florida, and
John K. Crisham -- crishamj@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig LLP,
Denver, Colorado, with him on the brief), Greenberg Traurig LLP, in
Washington, D.C., for the Appellees.


COLGATE-PALMOLIVE: Class Cert. Hearing Reset to March 14
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SHARON WILLIS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO., Case No. 2:19-cv-08542-JGB-RAO (C.D. Cal.),
the Hon. Judge Jesus G. Bernal entered an order rescheduling
hearing on plaintiff's motion for class certification and
defendant's motions to exclude plaintiff's expert witnesses and
evidence, from February 28, 2022 to March 14, 2022.

Colgate-Palmolive Company is an American multinational consumer
products company headquartered on Park Avenue in Midtown Manhattan,
New York City. It specializes in the production, distribution and
provision of household, health care, personal care and veterinary
products.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 15, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3sfusuz at no extra charge.[CC]

COLONIAL LIFE: Castro Labor Code Suit Goes to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled RENE CASTRO, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. COLONIAL LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE
CO., and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive, Case No. 21LBCV00618, was removed
from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los
Angeles, to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California on February 18, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Central District of California assigned
Case No. 2:22-cv-01135 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the
California Labor Code's Private Attorney General Act including
failure to pay wages, failure to reimburse necessary business
expenses, failure to provide proper written commission agreements,
failure to pay overtime, failure to provide meal and rest periods,
failure to maintain adequate records, failure to provide accurate
itemized wage statements, and failure to timely pay all wages due
upon termination.

Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co. is an insurance company,
with its principal place of business located in Columbia, South
Carolina. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Robert D. Vogel, Esq.
         Danielle C. Cepeda, Esq.
         JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
         725 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2500
         Los Angeles, CA 90017-5408
         Telephone: (213) 689-0404
         Facsimile: (213) 689-0430
         E-mail: robert.vogel@jacksonlewis.com
                 danielle.cepeda@jacksonlewis.com

COMPUTER HAUS: Bid for Equitable Tolling in Jahagirdar Suit Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHAILESH JAHAGIRDAR, et al., Plaintiffs v. THE
COMPUTER HAUS NC, INC., d/b/a CITYMAC, et al., Defendants, Case No.
1:20-cv-33-MOC-WCM (W.D.N.C.), Judge Max O. Cogburn, Jr., of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,
Asheville Division, granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Equitable
Tolling of the Statute of Limitations.

I. Background

The case is a class action concerning wage and hour claims raised
by employees of CityMac alleging violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and related state laws. The Plaintiffs assert
numerous violations, including failure to pay overtime and earned
commissions, off-the-clock work, pay deductions for meal breaks not
actually taken, and failure to timely pay final paychecks. The
Defendants broadly deny the Plaintiffs' allegations.

Plaintiff Jahagirdar began the action by filing a Complaint on Feb.
5, 2020, seeking unpaid wages and statutory penalties under the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 201 et seq.
The Defendants broadly denied Mr. Jahagirdar's allegations, with
the exception of a small amount of unpaid wages for 5.5 hours of
work, in their Answer filed on March 6, 2020.

Plaintiff Jahagirdar later filed an amended complaint to initiate a
putative class action, alleging FLSA violations on behalf of
himself and other similarly situated employees across five states,
and moved to conditionally certify and collective action, both
filed on March 14, 2020. The Plaintiffs moved to amend the
Complaint on Aug. 5, 2020. The Court granted leave to amend the
Complaint on Dec. 14, 2020.

The Plaintiffs now move to equitably toll the statute of
limitations back to the date they filed their Motion to Amend
Complaint on Aug. 5, 2020 for their claims arising in South
Carolina, Colorado, Washington, and Oregon.  For their North
Carolina claims, the Plaintiffs seek to toll the statute of
limitations back to the date of filing their amended complaint:
March 14, 2020.

On Nov. 5, 2021, the Court certified the Plaintiff's class and
appointed the class counsel. In so ruling, it expressly withheld
judgment on the question of whether the statutes of limitations in
this case should be equitably tolled so the parties could fully
brief this issue. The parties have done so and the matter is now
ripe for disposition.

II. Discussion

In the case, Judge Cogburn finds that the Plaintiffs diligently
pursued their rights. The Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint
in February 2020 and reasonably promptly filed an amended complaint
in May 2020. The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs do share in
responsibility for the delay because they voluntarily withdrew
their complaint. However, as discussed at oral argument, this
withdrawal was with the Court's permission for the purpose of
adding alter ego Defendants and did not amount to delay by the
Plaintiffs.

Judge Cogburn also finds that the Plaintiffs were prevented from
timely moving to amend their complaint by two distinct
"extraordinary circumstances" that were both beyond their control.
First, the COVID-19 pandemic amounted to an "extraordinary
circumstance." Second, and more importantly, the Court delayed in
granting permission for the Plaintiffs to amend their complaint and
will not penalize the Plaintiffs for its own delay as doing so
would be unconscionable and grossly unjust. Hence, the Plaintiffs
have shown that they diligently pursued their rights but were
prevented from timely obtaining leave to amend their complaint by
extraordinary circumstances beyond their control.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs are disingenuously blaming
their delays on the Court.

Judge Cogburn disagrees with this interpretation of the Plaintiffs'
argument. In his view, the Plaintiffs are simply arguing that the
delay in granting leave to amend the Complaint was caused, in part,
by the Court and they should not be prejudiced accordingly. This
appears to be correct. The Plaintiffs are not accusing the Court of
wrongdoing. The Court was busy, as the Defendants note, with
numerous discovery disputes in the case as well as the many other
matters before the Court, many of which were complicated by
COVID-19. But this does not mean that the Court's delay did not
prejudice the Plaintiffs' interests, nor does it mean that the
Plaintiffs are not entitled to a reasonable equitable remedy to
cure the prejudice.

Judge Cogburn agrees with the Plaintiffs that equitable tolling is
particularly appropriate in cases involving FLSA and state wage and
hour laws due to their remedial nature. The Plaintiffs cite
numerous cases establishing this principle. Judge Cogburn finds
that the remedial nature of FLSA and the state wage and hour laws
weighs in favor of construing these statutes more liberally and, in
the case, in favor of granting the Plaintiffs' motion for equitable
tolling.

Turning to the balance of the equities, Judge Cogburn finds that
the Plaintiffs will be significantly prejudiced and the Defendants
will not be prejudiced by equitable tolling. The Defendants had
ample and adequate notice of Mr. Jahagirdar's lawsuit and of his
desire to certify a class action, and do not appear to argue that
they would be prejudiced by equitable tolling. The Plaintiffs argue
that equitable tolling may only involve the inclusion of eight
additional Plaintiffs but "for those eight Plaintiffs, tolling is
significant and will determine if they are permitted to assert
their legal claims."

The Defendants also raise for a second time their argument that the
classes are not large enough to fulfill Rule 23's "numerosity"
requirement and proceed as a class action, which they previously
developed in opposing Plaintiffs' motion to certify. Judge Cogburn
again rejects this argument for the reasons stated in the Court's
order certifying the Plaintiffs' class action.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have failed to carry their
burden under the relevant state laws. In reply, the Plaintiffs cite
the American Pipe doctrine (Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414
U.S. 538, 551-52 (1974)) that "filing a complaint alone tolls the
statutes of limitations of the state law claims of putative Rule 23
class members" and argue that it is applicable in the instant
case.

Judge Cogburn agrees with the Plaintiffs. American Pipe appears to
control the outcome of the case. As the Supreme Court observed in
American Pipe, the commencement of the action satisfied the purpose
of the limitation provision as to all those who might subsequently
participate in the suit as well as for the named plaintiffs. The
case appears to fall squarely within the Supreme Court's reasoning
in American Pipe.

Moreover, the rationale of American Pipe applies with even more
force in cases where the Court is granting equitable tolling in
part to cure prejudice caused by its own delay. It would hardly be
fair to bar class members from proceeding on state law claims
merely because the class proceeded in federal court and the Court
delayed in granting leave to amend. Finally, the Defendants have
not shown that state law bars equitable tolling in this case and
Plaintiffs have provided ample authority suggesting that it does
not. Therefore, Judge Cogburn finds that the statute of limitations
in the case should be equitably tolled.

III. Order

In light of the foregoing, Judge Cogburn granted the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Equitable Tolling of the Statutes of Limitations.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 15, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/5htawbuj from Leagle.com.


CONAGRA FOODS: Negrete Suit Counsel Awarded $5.97MM in Fees & Costs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
awarded $5,400,000 in attorney's fees, and $571,244 in costs to the
class counsel in the lawsuit entitled MOISES NEGRETE, et al.,
Plaintiffs v. CONAGRA FOODS, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. CV
16-0631 FMO (AJWx) (C.D. Cal.).

Pursuant to the Court's Order Re: Final Approval of Class Action
Settlement ("Order"), filed contemporaneously with the filing of
this Judgment, it is adjudged that Plaintiffs Verduzco and Villar
will each be paid a service payment of $5,000, and Plaintiffs
Negrete, Anderson, Avila, Maldonado, Villela, Perez, Njoroge,
Patriz, Ibarra, Cruse, and Soto will each be paid a service payment
of $10,000 in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement
and the Order.

Class counsel will be paid $5.4 million in attorney's fees, and
$571,244 in costs in accordance with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement and the Order.

The Claims Administrator, Simpluris, will be paid for its fees and
expenses in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
The LWDA will be paid $270,000 pursuant to the Settlement
Agreement.

All class members, who did not validly and timely request exclusion
from the settlement, have released their claims, as set forth in
the Settlement Agreement, against any of the released parties.

Except as to any class members, who have validly and timely
requested exclusion, this action is dismissed with prejudice, with
all parties to bear their own fees and costs except as set forth
and in the prior orders of the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Judgment dated Feb. 7, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3hfvemzs from Leagle.com.


CONAIR CORP: Gonsalves Class Cert Hearing Continued to March 28
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MICHELLE GONSALVES, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, v. CONAIR
CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Case No. 8:21-cv-00138-JVS-ADS
(C.D. Cal.), the Court entered an order granting Conair's ex parte
notice and application for an order to continue the hearing and
enlarging the time to file brief in opposition to plaintiff's
motion for class certification and to continue hearing on
plaintiff's motion as follows:

  -- The hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification
     shall be continued to March 28, 2022;

  -- Conair's brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
     Class Certification shall be due February 28, 2022; and

  -- Plaintiffs' reply shall be due March 14, 2022.

Conair is an American company based in Stamford, Connecticut which
sells small appliances, personal care products, and health and
beauty products for both professionals and consumers.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 14, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3vaVvZQ at no extra charge.[CC]

COSTCO WHOLESALE: Kevin Kihnke Bid to Dismiss Corker Suit Nixed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BRUCE CORKER, et al., on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, v. COSTCO
WHOLESALE CORPORATION, et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-00290-RSL (W.D.
Wash.), the Hon. Judge Robert S. Lasnik entered an order denying
Kevin Kihnke's motion to dismiss.

The named Defendants grow Kona coffee in the Kona District of the
Big Island of Hawaii and the suit alleges that various
distributors, wholesalers, and retailers of coffee products sell
ordinary commodity coffee labeled as "Kona" coffee, to the
detriment of those who grow actual Kona coffee. Among these
defendants is Kevin Kihnke, the president and sole owner of L&K
Coffee Co. (which is also named as a defendant in the present
action).

On November 18, 2020, plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to
add Kihnke as a defendant after reviewing L&K's Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition testimony, which led plaintiffs to believe "Kihnke was
personally liable for L&K's Lanham Act violations because he
'authorized and directed' them."

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 14, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/33NigI0 at no extra charge.[CC]


The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Daniel E. Seltz, Esq.
          Jason L. Lichtman, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10013
          Telephone: (212) 355-9500
          E-mail: dseltz@lchb.com

               - and -

          Nathan T. Paine, Esq.
          Daniel T. Hagen, Esq.
          Joshua M. Howard, Esq.
          KARR TUTTLE CAMPBELL
          701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3300
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 223.1313
          E-mail: npaine@karrtuttle.com


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Settlement in Corker Suit Gets Initial Nod
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BRUCE CORKER, et al., on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, v. COSTCO
WHOLESALE CORPORATION, et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-00290-RSL (W.D.
Wash.), the Hon. Judge Robert S. Lasnik entered an order granting
motion for preliminary approval of class settlements and directing
issuance of notice.

  -- The Court finds that the proposed Settlement Class,composed
     of all persons and entities who farmed Kona coffee in the
     Kona District and then sold their coffee from February 27,
     2015 to the present, likely meets the requirements for
     class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)
     (3).

  -- The Court appoints Nathan Paine, of Karr Tuttle Campbell,
     and Jason Lichtman, Daniel Seltz, and Andrew Kaufman, of
     Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP as Settlement 26
     Counsel upon consideration of the factors set forth in Fed.
     Riv. Civ. P. 23(g).

  -- The Court appoints JND Legal Administration as Settlement
     Administrator.

Costco is an American multinational corporation which operates a
chain of membership-only big-box retail stores.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 14, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3vaWI3d at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Daniel E. Seltz, Esq.
          Jason L. Lichtman, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10013
          Telephone: (212) 355-9500
          E-mail: dseltz@lchb.com

               - and -

          Nathan T. Paine, Esq.
          Daniel T. Hagen, Esq.
          Joshua M. Howard, Esq.
          KARR TUTTLE CAMPBELL
          701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3300
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 223.1313
          E-mail: npaine@karrtuttle.com

CVI SGP: District of Utah Narrows Claims in Cotte FDCPA Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, AUGOSTO COTTE and MERCEDES HIDALGO, on behalf of
themselves and a class of similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs v. CVI SGP ACQUISITION TRUST, CVI SGP-CO ACQUISITION
TRUST, and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants, Case No.
2:21-cv-00299-JNP-DAO (D. Utah), Judge Jill N. Parrish of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Utah granted in part and denied
in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds of res
judicata, or in the alternative, failure to state a claim.

I. Background

The case arises from an attempt by Defendants CVI SGP Acquisition
Trust and CVI SGP-CO Acquisition Trust to collect debts from
Plaintiffs Cotte and Hidalgo. Plaintiffs Cotte and Hidalgo are Utah
residents and individual debtors. The Defendants are debt
collection agencies organized as Delaware Statutory Trusts. Cotte
and Hidalgo each incurred debt from Sterling Jewelers. The
Defendants purchased the Plaintiffs' debt from Sterling Jewelers.

On May 15, 2020, CVI SGP-CO filed a consumer debt collection action
against Cotte in Utah state court and obtained a default judgment
of $1,951.86 about a month later. Similarly, on Aug. 10, 2020, CVI
SGP filed a consumer debt collection action against Hidalgo in Utah
state court. CVI SGP obtained a default judgment of $2,543.68 about
a month later. CVI SGP subsequently pursued and obtained a writ of
continuing garnishment as to Hidalgo. During the time period in
which Defendants pursued collection of the Plaintiffs' debt, they
were not registered with the state of Utah to collect debts as
required by the Utah Collection Agency Act (the "UCAA").

On April 10, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Utah state
court, (1) asserting a violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (the "FDCPA"); (2) asserting a violation of the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act (the "UCSPA"); and (3) requesting
assorted declaratory and injunctive relief, including a declaration
that Defendants were acting unlawfully as an unlicensed collection
agency, and an injunction against Defendants attempting to collect
improperly entered judgments. CVI removed the case to federal court
on May 10, 2021.

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res
judicata, or in the alternative, failure to state a claim.

II. Analysis

A. Res Judicata

The Defendants first argue that the twin doctrines encompassed by
res judicata -- issue preclusion and claim preclusion -- bar the
Plaintiffs' claims. Specifically, they contend that the earlier
collection action in Utah state court acts as a bar to the
Plaintiffs' claims.

Judge Parrish holds that the Defendants, as the party asserting
preclusion, have the burden of proving that the Plaintiffs' claims
are, indeed, barred by preclusion. She notes that the Defendants
have failed to carry that burden for both issue and claim
preclusion.

First, Judge Parrish finds that the Defendants have failed to carry
their burden of establishing that the issue decided in the prior
adjudication is identical to the one presented in the instant
action. Second, the issue of the legality of the Defendants'
actions was not fully and fairly litigated in the prior action.
There is no indication on the record that the issue of whether the
Defendants' acts violated the FDCPA or UCSPA was ever raised by
either party or even considered by the Utah court. Third, because
the Defendants have failed to establish that the issue in the
underlying state case is identical to the issue to be precluded
from litigation, and because the Defendants have failed to
establish that the question of the legality of their debt
collection practices was fully and fairly litigated in the prior
action, the Defendants may not avail themselves of issue preclusion
in the present action.

Fourth, Judge Parrish finds that even if the Plaintiffs prevail on
their FDCPA and UCSPA claims, CVI could still be entitled to a
valid debt purchased from Sterling Jewelers -- CVI would simply
need to collect that debt via lawful means. However, to the extent
that the Plaintiffs request declaratory or injunctive relief that
represents a collateral attack on the state court judgment, claim
preclusion bars such claims. Finally, the Plaintiffs' requests to
render the state court judgment unenforceable exceed the scope of
the FDCPA.

In sum, Judge Parrish dismisses the Plaintiffs' claims to the
extent they seek declaratory or injunctive relief that would, in
essence, relitigate the claim already decided by the state court
judgment. However, to the extent the Plaintiffs seek statutory or
actual damages, res judicata does not bar their FDCPA and UCSPA
claims.

B. Failure to State a Claim

Upon finding that issue preclusion and claim preclusion do not bar
the Plaintiffs' lawsuit, Judge Parrish continues to the Defendants'
substantive objections to the Plaintiffs' causes of action. The
Defendants argue that their alleged failure to register as a
collection agency as required by Utah law does not give rise to a
violation of the FDCPA or the UCSPA. Specifically, they contend
that the Plaintiffs improperly attempt to predicate their claims
for violations of the FDCPA and the UCSPA on violation of the
UCAA.

First, Judge Parrish finds that the Plaintiffs have adequately
pleaded that CVI violated the FDCPA. She says, suing to collect
while unregistered with the relevant Utah authority allegedly
constitutes an action that cannot legally be taken in Utah.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs can use a violation of the UCAA to
establish an element required under the FDCPA.

Second, because the Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege
that the Defendants knowingly or intentionally engaged in deceptive
acts, or engaged in unconscionable conduct, Judge Parrish dismissed
the Plaintiffs' cause of action under the UCSPA. She finds that the
Plaintiffs misapprehend Rule 9(b)'s reduced requirement for
pleading a defendant's state of mind.

Even viewing the facts in the light most reasonable to the
Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs provide no factual basis for their
conclusory allegation that the Defendants acted knowingly or
intentionally in misrepresenting their licensing status. Because
"legal conclusion must be supported by factual allegations," the
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim that Defendants knowingly or
intentionally engaged in deceptive acts under the UCSPA. The
Plaintiffs also include no allegations in the amended complaint
that specifically relate to unconscionability. Accordingly, they
have failed to state a claim that Defendants acted unconscionably
under the UCSPA.

C. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

The Plaintiffs' amended complaint requests wide-ranging declaratory
and injunctive relief predicated on their substantive claims under
the FDCPA and UCSPA. Per Judge Parrish's analysis, the Plaintiffs'
only remaining statutory claim falls under the FDCPA. But the FDCPA
does not provide for equitable relief. Because she dismisses the
UCSPA claims, Judge Parrish holds that the Plaintiffs can no longer
predicate their injunctive and declaratory relief claims on their
UCSPA substantive claim -- which would provide for injunctive
relief. Accordingly, she dismisses the Plaintiff's third claim for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.

D. Leave to Amend

During oral argument, the counsel for the Plaintiffs orally moved
for leave to amend in the event that the Court granted the motion
to dismiss. Amendments that are not permitted as a matter of course
under Rule 15(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require
written consent from the opposing party or leave of the court. The
court should freely give leave when justice so requires." "Refusing
leave to amend is generally only justified upon a showing of undue
delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith or dilatory
motive, failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, or futility of amendment."

In the case, the Plaintiffs suggest that they can assert new
allegations that would demonstrate that the Defendants acted
knowingly or intentionally in misrepresenting their licensing
status to the Plaintiffs. Therefore, Judge Parrish the Plaintiffs
21 days from the date of her Order to amend their complaint, if
they can, to allege facts showing why the Defendants' actions
constitute deceptive or unconscionable acts under the UCSPA.

III. Conclusion

Judge Parrish granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
motion to dismiss. She dismissed the Plaintiffs' second cause of
action under the UCSPA and the Plaintiff's third cause of action
for declaratory and injunctive relief. She denied the Defendants'
motion to dismiss as to the Plaintiffs' first cause of action under
the FDCPA. She granted the Plaintiffs 21 days from the date of her
Order to amend their complaint to state a claim for relief under
the UCSPA.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 15, 2022 Memorandum Decision &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8m8fbe from
Leagle.com.


DEJA VU PIZZA: Conditional Cert. of Delivery Driver Class Sought
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Ashleigh Hoffman, On
behalf of herself and those similarly situated, v. Deja Vu Pizza,
LLC, et al., Case No. 1:22-cv-00006 (D.N.D.), the Plaintiff asks
the Court to enter an order conditionally certifying the case as an
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action and authorizing
her to send notice of the pendency of this action to her similarly
situated co-workers.

Specifically, Plaintiff seeks conditional certification of the
following employees:

   "All current and former delivery drivers employed at the
   Defendants’ Papa John’s stores between the date three years

   prior to filing of the original complaint and the date of the
   Court’s Order approving notice."

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Feb. 16,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3JJzo0y
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew R. Biller, Esq.
          Andrew P. Kimble, Esq.
          Emily A. Hubbard, Esq.
          BILLER & KIMBLE, LLC
          8044 Montgomery Road, Suite 515
          Cincinnati, OH 45236
          Telephone: (513) 202-0710
          Facsimile: (614) 340-4620
          E-mail: abiller@billerkimble.com
                  akimble@billerkimble.com
                  ehubbard@billerkimble.com

               - and -

          Leo F.J. Wilking, Esq.
          Wilking Law Firm, PLLC
          PO Box 3085
          Fargo, ND 58108-3085
          Telephone: (701) 356-6823
          Facsimile: (701) 478-7621

DETROIT, MI: Bray's Bid for Judgment on Pleadings Granted
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Justin Reid v. City of
Detroit, et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-13681-SFC-APP (E.D. Mich.), the
Hon. Judge Sean F. Cox entered an order granting Defendant Matthew
Bray's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

This Court now reaches the same result in this case. An excessive
force claim was not included in the Davis class-action complaint
and the motion for class certification in Davis did not seek to
certify any excessive-force claims. Thus, Reid does not benefit
from American Pipe tolling and his excessive-force claim against
Defendant Bray is barred by the applicable three-
year statute of limitations.

This case is one of several individual actions that were filed
after another judge in this district declined to certify a putative
class action that asserted section 1983 claims against the City of
Detroit, and several of its police officers.

Detroit is the largest city in the midwestern state of Michigan.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 15, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/34XHGDp at no extra charge.[CC]

DING DYNASTY: Galvez. Files FLSA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ding Dynasty LLC, et
al. The case is styled as Jesus Pastrana Galvez, on behalf of other
similarly situated employees v. Ding Dynasty LLC doing business as:
The Handpulled Noodle, Andrew Ding, Case No. 1:22-cv-01421
(S.D.N.Y., Feb. 21, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act for Denial of Overtime Compensation.

Ding Dynasty LLC doing business as The Handpulled Noodle --
https://thehandpullednoodle.com/ -- offers the best hand pulled
noodles and dumplings in New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter Hans Cooper, Esq.
          CILENTI & COOPER, PLLC
          200 Park Avenue
          17th Floor
          New York, NY 10166
          Phone: (212) 209-3933
          Fax: (212) 209-7102
          Email: pcooper@jcpclaw.com



E.T. BROWNE DRUG: Watson Sues Over False Representations
--------------------------------------------------------
Lynn Watson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. E.T. BROWNE DRUG CO., INC., Case No. 2022LA000151 (Ill.
18th Judicial Ct., DuPage Cty., Feb. 9, 2022), is brought on behalf
of purchasers of Palmer's Massage Lotion for Stretch Marks, Massage
Cream for Stretch Marks, and Tummy Butter for Stretch Marks which
is deceptively and falsely represented by the Defendant.

The Defendant represents that each of the Products is "for stretch
marks," and the use of the Products "helps reduce the appearance of
stretch marks." Unfortunately for consumers, the Products are a
sham. Scientific evidence shows the Products do not prevent or
reduce the appearance of stretch marks. The Products are
ineffective for their stated purpose. The Defendant has sold
millions of units of the Products by promising consumers an
effective solution for reducing and preventing stretch marks. Each
of the Products use the same labeling and active ingredients, and
are advertised for the same exact purposes. The identical claims
made on the packaging of the Products are false and misleading for
the same exact reason: this formula is ineffective for the stated
purpose of preventing and reducing the appearance of stretch
marks.

The Plaintiff asserts claims on behalf of herself and similarly
situated purchasers of the Products for violations of the consumer
protection laws of Illinois, breach of express warranty, and fraud.
The Plaintiff and Class Members purchased the Products designed,
marketed manufactured, distributed, and sold by Defendant as "for
stretch marks." Further, Plaintiff and Class Members relied to
their detriment on Defendant's representation that the Products
"help reduce the appearance of stretch marks." Plaintiff and Class
Members would not have paid to purchase the Products--or would not
have paid as much as they did to purchase them--had they known that
they did not in fact "help reduce the appearance of stretch marks."
Plaintiff and Class Members thus suffered monetary damages as a
result of Defendant's deceptive and false representations, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased the Tummy Butter for Stretch Marks in early
2021.

The Defendant distributes Palmer's-brand products throughout the
United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J. Dominick Larry, Esq.
          NICK LARRY LAW LLC
          8 S. Michigan Ave, Suite 2600
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Phone: (773) 694-4669
          Fax: (773) 694-4691
          Email: nick@nicklarry.law

               - and -

          Yitzchak Kopel, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Phone: (646) 837-7150
          Fax: (212) 989-9163
          Email: ykopel@bursor.com


E25BIO INC: Covid Tests Falsely Labeled, URENA Class Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
PEDRO URENA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
v. E25BIO INC., Case No. 1:22-cv-01379 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 18, 2022) is
a class action lawsuit regarding the Defendant's manufacturing,
distribution, and sale of E25Bio COVID-19 Direct Antigen Rapid
Tests, also known as E25Bio SARS-CoV-2 Antigen Test Kits (the
"Covid Tests") that are highly inaccurate and falsely labeled as
claiming to be authorized by the Food & Drug Administration.

As the COVID-19 pandemic enters its third year, consumers have
sought a convenient and easy way to test for COVID-19 rather than
having to schedule an appointment at a clinic. This demand has only
increased in the wake of the Omicron variant of the virus, which
has infected a record number of Americans.

To fulfill this need, a number of companies have developed at-home
rapid COVID-19 tests. These at-home rapid tests are supposed to
provide a consumer with quick and accurate results from the
convenience of the consumer's home, rather than waiting several
days for a test result from a clinic.

The Defendant claims to provide such a service. A Cambridge,
Massachusetts-based start-up that develops diagnostic tests for
infectious diseases like dengue and Zika, Defendant raised $2
million from investors to specifically develop and manufacture the
Covid Tests.

On each package of the Covid Tests, Defendant allegedly represents
that the Covid Tests are "rapid tests for the detection of
Coronavirus CoV Spike and nucleoprotein antigen," and that the
tests are issued pursuant to an "Emergency Use Authorization (EUA)
USA FDA."

On its website, the Defendant promises consumers that its "novel
technology has better accuracy than 'gold standard' PCR without the
need for equipment and at a fraction of the cost and time." "PCR"
refers to polymerase chain reaction test, which is generally
considered the most accurate test for COVID-19. 5 By contrast, most
rapid tests, including Defendant's, are "antigen tests." The
Defendant thus represents on its website that its Covid Tests are
more accurate than PCR tests, which are considered the most
accurate test of all, added the suit.

Unfortunately for consumers, these alleged representations are
false. On February 4, 2022, the FDA warned consumers "not to use
the E25Bio COVID-19 Direct Antigen Rapid Test" due to the risk of
false results "because E25Bio has not provided the FDA with
adequate data demonstrating that the test's performance is
accurate." The FDA also instructed physicians to retest patients
who were previously tested with the Covid Tests due to the risk of
inaccurate results, the lawsuit says.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua D. Arisohn, Esq.
          Max S. Roberts, Esq.
          Matthew A. Girardi, Esq.
          Julian C. Diamond, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-Mail: jarisohn@bursor.com
                  mroberts@bursor.com
                  mgirardi@bursor.com
                  jdiamond@bursor.com

ELECTROLUX HOME: Amended Scheduling Order Entered in Reichardt
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOHN REICHARDT, et al., v.
ELECTROLUX HOME PRODUCTS INC, Case No. 17-cv-0219-bhl (E.D. Wisc.),
the Hon. Judge Brett H. Ludwig entered an amended scheduling order
as follows:

  -- Discovery

     1. No further amendments to the pleadings shall be
        permitted without Court approval. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15
        will apply to any proposed amendment.

     2. All fact discovery must be           July 29, 2022
        completed no later than:

     3. In accordance with Fed. R.           July 8, 2022
        Civ. P. 26, both parties'
        primary expert witness
        disclosures are due
        on or before:

     4. Rebuttal expert witness              August 12, 2022
        disclosures are due on or
        before:

     5. All expert discovery must            September 9, 2022
        be completed no later than:

  -- Class Action and Daubert Motions

     6. Motions for class                    September 30, 2022
        certification under
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 23
        must be filed no later
        than:

     7. The Defendant's opposition           November 4, 2022
        to class certification must
        be filed no later than:

     8. The Plaintiffs' reply in             November 18, 2022
        support of class certification
        must be filed no later than:

     9. Motions challenging expert           December 16, 2022
        testimony under Daubert must
        be filed no later than:

    10. Response briefs on any Daubert       January 6, 2022
        issues must be filed by:

    11. Daubert reply briefs must be         January 20, 2022
        filed by:

  -- Summary Judgment Motions

    12. Motions for summary judgment         April 14, 2023
        must comply with Fed. R.
        Civ. P. 56 and Civil L. R. 7
        and shall be served and filed
        on or before:

  -- Final Pretrial Conference and Trial

    13. The Court will set dates for a final pretrial conference
        and trial after resolution of any class certification,
        Daubert, and summary judgment motions.

  -- Additional Procedures

    14. All requests of the Court must be made by formal motion
        in accordance with Civil L.R. 7 and the Federal Rules of
        Civil Procedure.

Electrolux manufactures and distributes electrical appliances.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 15, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/33JTGaO at no extra charge.[CC]

EML PAYMENTS: Sets Aside $10.5-Mil. for Class Action Legal Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Ogg, writing for Business news Australia, reports that an
otherwise positive half-year result for Brisbane-based gift and
reloadable card company EML Payments (ASX: EML) has been
overshadowed by a $10.5 million provision for legal costs in
relation to a class action brought by Shine Justice (ASX: SHJ),
which CEO Tom Cregan described in a conference call on Feb. 16 as
"baseless and opportunistic".

Cregan said the provision was excluded from underlying EBITDA, a
figure that was down 4 per cent at $26.9 million in the December
half while group revenue rose 20 per cent year-on-year to $114.4
million.

Shine's legal action concerns EML's disclosure obligations
surrounding regulatory compliance issues with the Central Bank of
Ireland (CBI) -- a matter connected to the fintech's Irish
subsidiary that covers a significant chunk of the group's European
operations.

When the EML revealed the CBI's investigation into its anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorism compliance in May last year it
lost more than $800 million in a single day, and shares have been
volatile ever since as updates continue.

The CEO was upbeat in the conference call however, noting gross
debit volumes (GDV) were up 209 per cent to $31.6 billion, in part
due to the acquisition of Sentenial, whose eponymous UK subsidiary
and French subsidiary Nuapay are not related to the business under
scrutiny from Irish regulators.

Cregan said the 4 per cent decline in earnings was a reasonable
result considering an increase in overheads of approximately $6
million in Europe, particularly for risk and compliance, but also
the impact of Omicron on European shopping malls in December.

"We are implementing our remediation plan with the Central Bank of
Ireland, which obviously requires significant resources and
management focus," he said.

"So to grow 20 per cent in the midst of a regulatory investigation
talks to the revenue diversity of the business and our ability to
generate revenue growth from existing customers.

"In the second half of the year we expect to see a recovery in in
revenue growth -- growth rates and gross margin -- as we sign and
launch new programs in Europe."

The executive emphasised that EML's ability to launch programs in
Europe in December, and submit new contracts for approval, came
about in part because of the company's commitment to its
remediation plan with the Irish regulator.

"So the priority for us was not about expense management in the
half, but making the investments needed -- hiring senior executives
to the team, and employing independent directors for the PCSIL
(Irish company) board," he said.

He added the board also believed that without the impact of
Omicron, the company would have recorded an additional $100 million
in GDV.

"Of course, it is difficult to be prescriptive about that, because
proving causality solely on Omicron is hard to do, but that's our
view - certainly looking at lower foot traffic and restrictions in
the UK and Germany as two key markets.

"Despite our regulatory challenges in in Europe, I think our sales
team have done a great job in continuing to build out the pipeline.
Having looked at this recently, our win rate on the prepaid
business is holding at 40 per cent."

With regards to the Shine case, he said the group would be asking
the Supreme Court of Victoria to deposit the amount with the court
"so that they can cover our costs when we win".

"In general terms, we consider this to be both baseless and
opportunistic, and it's in the commercial interest of Shine to drag
this out and maximise their fees," he said.

"We've taken this provision and investors should expect this to
play out over the next three years."

At the time of writing, EML shares were down 8.61 per cent at $2.76
each. [GN]

EML PAYMENTS: To Vigorously Defend Class Action Over Disclosures
----------------------------------------------------------------
James Eyers, writing for Australian Financial Review, reports that
international payment conglomerate EML says it will vigorously
defend a class action lawsuit relating to disclosures about its
regulatory troubles in Ireland, as a provision for legal costs
sliced earnings and sent the volatile stock down sharply again.

EML recognised a $10.5 million provision for legal fees for the
group legal action and also reported overheads were up 24 per cent
to $48.5 million, its largest increase over a half year. The spike
was largely down to remediation projects responding to concerns
raised by the Central Bank of Ireland about EML's corporate
governance in Europe.

Investors were unimpressed. The volatile stock was down 9.3 per
cent after an hour of trading on Feb. 16 before recovering to be
down 3.3 per cent at $2.92 just before the market closed. Royal
Bank of Canada's sales desk said the market was responding to the
revenue miss and the "class action overhang".

CEO Tom Cregan assured the market he would fight the class action.
He described allegations made by Shine Lawyers that EML had not met
continuous disclosure obligations as it informed the market about
the Irish action as "baseless and opportunistic".

Removing legal costs, EML said underlying earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortisation of $26.9 million were down 4
per cent on the previous first half because of the record
overheads, while revenue was up 20 per cent to $114.4 million as
sales opportunities opened up again as shopping malls reopened in
Europe and the US after omicron restrictions.

EML provides digital payments services, including gift cards, which
were hurt by social distancing in Canada, Germany and Britain. It
also has customers in the gambling industry and provides salary
packaging and various "reloadable cards".

On the class action, Mr Cregan said it was in the commercial
interest of ASX-listed Shine Lawyers to "drag this out to maximise
fees", and he expected the law firm to attempt to use the media to
publicise the case.

But he assured investors that EML had engaged quality class action
defence lawyers to "vigorously defend the proceedings" and they
will ask the court to make Shine pay $10.5 million into the court
so EML can "recover it when we win".

Unable to sign new customers
The investigation by the Central Bank of Ireland, which regards
e-money providers such as EML as "inherently high risk", affected
results in broader ways.

The CBI is limiting EML's growth in Europe (EML has not disclosed
the limits), which will stay in place until December. It was unable
to sign new customers during the first half, hitting establishment
fee revenue, and the CBI will approve new customers, which is
normal process.

EML, a Brisbane-based company that operates in 32 countries, said
costs in Europe were up $6 million as it put on more people,
controls and technology. CBI insisted it appoint more independent
directors, develop external oversight mechanisms and appoint new
senior management, including a new head of compliance and general
counsel, which need to be approved by CBI.

The Ireland remediation program will be complete at the end of
June. Mr Cregan said all the remediation work meant EML would
become an "ultimately stronger business with more resources to
support future growth objectives in Europe".

It is pushing into new services after its acquisition of Sentenial,
to enter open banking in Europe, including account-to-account
payments. In the US, it has created a white-label payments service
creating a digital alternative to paper cheques, which still
represent about 23 per cent of all payments by value made in the
US. In the medium term, it sees opportunity in "earned wage access"
products.

Similar to major banks, EML saw margins hit by lower interest
revenue given historic low central bank rates but said the Bank of
England cash rate rises in December 2021 and February 2022 would
lift group earnings in the second half by $2.5 million.

EML reaffirmed underlying guidance for fiscal year 2021-22 revenue
of between $230 million and $250 million, up 18 per cent to 29 per
cent on 2020-21. But overheads would be up between 34 per cent and
46 per cent and underlying net profit in the range of $27 million
to $34 million.

EML was a victim of a decision to shift its non-UK business out of
Britain after Brexit.

EML shares rose sharply in November when it said its regulatory
problems were abating but have remained choppy. The stock reacted
violently to the emergence of regulatory risk, falling 15 per cent
in a single day in early October when the Central Bank of Ireland
flagged additional concerns about its anti-money laundering
programs which, when first revealed in May, saw the EML share price
almost halve in a single trading session.

The Central Bank of Ireland has not identified any actual instances
of financial crime, or AML or counter-terrorism financing events,
running through EML systems. [GN]

EMPIRE SCAFFOLDING: Richards Seeks Conditional Status of Collective
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as WAYNE RICHARDS, on behalf
of himself, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly-situated, v. EMPIRE SCAFFOLDING SYSTEMS, INC., and DEMARI
INSTALLATIONS CORP., and ANTONIOS MAMOUNAS, individually, Case No.
1:21-cv-06638-VEC (S.D.N.Y.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter
an order:

   (1) Conditionally certifying this case as a Fair Labor
       Standards Act ("FLSA") collective action consisting of
       current and former non-managerial employees of
       Defendants, who during the applicable FLSA limitations
       period, performed any work for Defendants as non-
       managerial laborers, mechanics, and/or in another similar
       position and who consent to file a claim to recover
       damages for unpaid overtime compensation and liquidated
       damages that are legally due to them ("potential
       collective action members");

   (2) Requiring Defendants, within fourteen days of the Court's
       Order, to produce a computer-readable data file
       containing the names, last known mailing addresses, all
       last known home and mobile telephone numbers, all known
       email addresses, dates of employment, and primary
       languages spoken of all potential collective action
       members who worked for Defendants at any point from
       August 5, 2018, to the present;

   (3) Permitting Plaintiff to disseminate to the potential
       collective action members the Notice of Lawsuit
       ("Notice") and Consent to Join Form, in English, Spanish,
       and in any other identified primary language via regular
       mail, text message, and e-mail, and permitting a sixty-
       day opt-in period;

   (4) Permitting Plaintiff to disseminate the proposed Reminder
       Notice to the potential collective action members, in
       English, Spanish, and in any other identified primary
       language via regular mail, text message, and e-mail,
       thirty days after sending the initial Notice; and

   (5) Granting any other further relief that the Court deems
       just and proper.

Empire Scaffolding is located at 3870 Review Ave, Long Island City,
New York. The Company specializes in manufacturing and industrial
supplies.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Feb. 14,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3t3vSHF
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Caitlin Duffy, Esq.
          Alexander T. Coleman, Esq.
          Michael J. Borrelli, Esq.
          BORRELLI & ASSOCIATES, P.L.L.C.
          Attorneys for Plaintiffs
          910 Franklin Avenue, Suite 200
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 248–5550
          Facsimile: (516) 248–6027

ENSITE USA: Can Compel Arbitration in Johnson FLSA-NYLL Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RICHARD JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ENSITE USA, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 21-CV-04437 (PMH) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Philip M.
Halpern of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration.

I. Background

Plaintiff Johnson commenced the action against Ensite USA on May
17, 2021, and filed an Amended Complaint on May 26, 2021. The
Plaintiff asserts one claim for relief under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") and four claims for relief under the New
York Labor Law ("NYLL").

The Plaintiff entered into two agreements with Defendant, both
entitled: "Arbitration Agreement and Class/Collective Action
Waiver." He entered into the first agreement on July 12, 2019, and
the second agreement on June 10, 2020.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a Welding Inspector
from January 2017 through December 2019. Between March 2018 and
June or July 2018, the Plaintiff performed work for the Defendant
in Yorktown, New York. According to him, the Defendant paid him a
set daily rate, regardless of the number of hours he worked in a
week. He maintains that he often worked 30 minutes to an hour (or
more) beyond his scheduled shift, was not always permitted to
record this additional time, and was not paid overtime for hours
worked beyond forty in a workweek. In addition, the Plaintiff
insists that the Defendant failed to provide him with proper wage
statements and notices, and to make timely payment of wages.

Prior to the commencement of the lawsuit, an individual named
Leslie Doyle brought a substantially similar action against the
Defendant in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas on Aug. 24, 2018. The Doyle Lawsuit alleged collective action
claims seeking certification of a nationwide class of the
Defendant's inspectors under the FLSA, as well as claims under the
Kentucky Wage and Hour Laws and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Act.

Doyle, like the Plaintiff, alleged that the Defendant paid its
inspectors a set daily rate, regardless of how many hours they
worked. The parties in the Doyle Lawsuit stipulated to conditional
certification, which the Court so-ordered on July 8, 2019. On Aug.
15, 2019, the Plaintiff filed his consent to opt into the Doyle
Lawsuit. The parties in the Doyle Lawsuit engaged in discovery and
participated in two unsuccessful mediations.

On March 26, 2021, following the completion of discovery, the
Defendant filed a motion to decertify the collective action in the
Doyle Lawsuit, which was granted on May 19, 2021. On April 23,
2021, the Defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment,
which was granted on Aug. 23, 2021. Also on April 23, 2021, Doyle
filed a motion for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23. On Sept. 13, 2021, all of Doyle's claims were
dismissed and the Doyle Lawsuit was terminated.

Prior to that dismissal, however, on May 17, 2021, the Plaintiff
withdrew his consent in the Doyle Lawsuit. That same day, the
Plaintiff commenced his action.

Before the Court is the Defendant's motion to compel the Plaintiff
to arbitrate his claims under two written arbitration agreements,
or in the alternative, to dismiss or transfer the case. The
Defendant moved on July 26, 2021, the Plaintiff opposed on Aug. 27,
2021, and the motion was fully briefed with the Defendant's
submission of a reply memorandum of law in further support of its
motion on Sept. 13, 2021.

II. Analysis

The Plaintiff does not dispute that his claims fall within the
Agreements' scope -- nor could he, as the Agreements clearly evince
a mutual intent to arbitrate "Covered Claims," and the Plaintiff's
FLSA and NYLL claims plainly qualify as such. Rather, the Plaintiff
insists that the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration should be
denied for two reasons. First, the Plaintiff argues that the
Defendant waived its ability to invoke its right to arbitration by
litigating the Doyle Lawsuit. Second, the Plaintiff argues that the
Agreements amount to "improper and misleading communications," and
are therefore unenforceable. Judge Halpern finds both arguments
unavailing.

A. Waiver

Judge Halpern opines that the Agreements that are at issue did not
exist when the Doyle Lawsuit was commenced. The Plaintiff also
withdrew his opt in consent in the Doyle Lawsuit on May 17, 2021,
and commenced the action on the same date. Given those facts, the
Plaintiff should not be heard to complain about waiver by the
Defendant by participating in the Doyle Lawsuit and/or
participating in the Doyle Lawsuit while the Plaintiff here was an
opt in plaintiff there. The Plaintiff has created this new and
arbitrable action by his own hand.

First, Judge Halpern finds that the Defendant did not waive its
right to compel arbitration because of the lapse of time since the
commencement of the action. He says, Aug. 15, 2019 cannot be the
correct date from which to measure. For one, one of the agreements
did not come into existence until roughly nine months later. As to
the agreement that was signed approximately 28 days earlier, its
terms expressly prevented Defendant from compelling arbitration of
Plaintiff's claims in the Doyle Lawsuit. As such, the Doyle Lawsuit
was not subject to the terms of an arbitration agreement. However,
once the Plaintiff filed the action on May 17, 2021, the issue of
arbitrability, under both Agreements, arose ab initio. Therefore,
May 17, 2021 is a more appropriate starting point for a waiver
analysis. Because the Defendant filed its motion to compel
arbitration on July 26, 2021 -- only 70 days later -- Judge Halpern
finds the amount of time elapsed to be insubstantial.

Second, the amount of litigation occurring since the commencement
of the action does not operate as a waiver. Judge Halpern holds
that the Defendant's participation in the Doyle Lawsuit is
irrelevant to the analysis of this factor. What really matters is
the amount of litigation that has occurred since the filing of the
lawsuit. The Defendant's motion to compel arbitration was preceded
by very little activity. Indeed, it has not filed an answer, nor
have the parties engaged in discovery or briefed the merits of the
Plaintiff's claims. Therefore, Judge Halpern finds that this factor
weighs against waiver.

Third, Judge Halpern holds that the Plaintiff cannot now claim
prejudice resulting from that decision, and in any event, has not
shown prejudice sufficient to excuse himself from arbitration. The
Plaintiff measures prejudice from the wrong starting point. The
Defendant was unable to compel the Plaintiff to arbitrate his
claims in the Doyle Lawsuit, and therefore, the clock should not
start ticking until the filing of this action on May 17, 2021, at
the earliest.

That being said, Judge Halpern is only concerned with the "time and
effort" the Plaintiff has spent litigating the action. That
expenditure is quite minimal. While the Plaintiff states that he
has spent some "time and effort on filing the instant action," the
fact remains that the parties have neither engaged in discovery nor
briefed any substantive motions until this one. Moreover, the
Plaintiff himself chose to withdraw his consent from the Doyle
Lawsuit and commence the action.

B. Unenforceability

Finally, the Plaintiff argues that the Agreements are unenforceable
because they were "improper and misleading communications." The
Plaintiff insists that the timing of the Defendant's actions was
"highly suspect," and suggests that the Defendant provided him with
the Agreements to surreptitiously prevent him from opting into
pending litigation.

The Plaintiff's argument, however, cannot withstand the Agreements'
plain language, which expressly did "not prohibit or otherwise
affect his right to participate in a lawsuit or any other action
concerning Covered Claims pending when the Agreements were
executed," Judge Halpern opines. Accordingly, he says, the
Plaintiff's attempt to characterize the Agreements as "improper and
misleading communications" fails.

III. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, Judge Halpern granted the Defendant's
motion to compel arbitration. The action is stayed pending
arbitration.

The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to: (i) terminate
the motion sequence pending at Doc. 10; and (ii) administratively
close the case, without prejudice to either party moving by letter
motion to reopen the case within 30 days of the conclusion of the
arbitration proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 15, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/4aycrjax from
Leagle.com.


ESTEE LAUDER: Law, et al. Seek to Certify Plan Participant Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs Kar Yee S. Law, Emanuele Caroleo, Palmer McGuinness,
and Kathy L. Gandy in the two class action lawsuits against Estee
Lauder, Inc., et al., ask the Court, pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(1), to enter an order:

   1. certifying the following class:

      "All persons, except Defendants and their immediate family
      members, who were participants in or beneficiaries of the
      Plan, at any time between June 22, 2014 through the date
      of judgment (the "Class Period");"

   2. appointing them as representatives of the certified Class;
      and

   3. appointing Capozzi Adler, P.C. and Edelson Lechtzin LLP,
      as Lead Class Counsel and Class Counsel Executive
      Committee Member, respectively for the certified Class.

The two class action lawsuits are captioned as:

   "KAR YEE S. LAW, et al., v. ESTEE LAUDER, INC., et al., Case
   No. 20-cv-4770-JMF (S.D.N.Y.);" and

   "KATHY L. GANDY, et al., v. ESTEE LAUDER, INC., et al., Case
   No. 20-cv-5779-JMF (S.D.N.Y.)."

Estee Lauder is an American multinational manufacturer and marketer
of skincare, makeup, fragrance and hair care products, based in
Midtown Manhattan, New York City. The company owns a diverse
portfolio of brands, distributed internationally through both
digital commerce and retail channels.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Feb. 15,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3hb8imJ
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Mark K. Gyandoh, Esq.
          Gabrielle Kelerchian, Esq.
          CAPOZZI ADLER, P.C.
          312 Old Lancaster Road
          Merion Station, PA 19066
          Telephone: (610) 890-0200
          Facsimile: (717) 233-4103
          E-mail: markg@capozziadler.com

               - and -

          Donald R. Reavey, Esq.
          2933 North Front Street
          Harrisburg, PA 17110
          Telephone: (717) 233-4101
          Facsimile: (717) 233-4103
          E-mail: donr@capozziadler.com

               - and -

          Mark H. Edelson, Esq.
          EDELSON LECHTZIN LLP
          3 Terry Drive, Suite 205
          Newtown, PA 18940
          Telephone: (215) 867-2399
          Facsimile: (267) 685-0676
          E-mail: medelson@edelson-law.com


FACEBOOK: Initial Approval of Class Settlement Deal Sought
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as In Re FACEBOOK INTERNET
TRACKING LITIGATION, Case No. 5:12-md-02314-EJD (N.D. Cal), the
Lead Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order pursuant to Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

   1. preliminarily approving the proposed Settlement and
      Settlement Agreement;

   2. certifying a class for settlement purposes;

   3. approving the form and manner of notice to the Settlement
      Class;

   4. approving the selection of the Settlement Administrator;
      and

   5. scheduling a final fairness hearing before the court.

      -- The proposed Settlement provides two forms of relief
         for the proposed Settlement Class: injunctive relief
         and monetary relief.

         For the injunctive relief, Defendant Meta Platforms,
         Inc., formerly Facebook, Inc. has agreed to sequester
         and delete all data that Plaintiffs alleged was
         wrongfully collected during the Settlement Class
         Period.

         For the monetary relief, the proposed Settlement also
         establishes a fully non-reversionary Settlement Fund of
         $90 million. The Settlement, if approved, will also
         resolve a parallel class action in California State
         Court.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Feb. 14, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3h646Vt at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Lead Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Straite, Esq.
          Amy E. Keller, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC GRYGIEL LAW LLC
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 2400
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (646) 933-1000
          E-mail: dstraite@dicellolevitt.com
                  akeller@dicellolevitt.com

               - and -

          Stephen G. Grygiel, Esq.
          GRYGIEL LAW LLC
          301 Warren Avenue, Suite 405
          Baltimore, MD 21230
          Telephone: (407) 505-9463
          E-mail: sgrygiel@silvermanthompson.com

               - and -

          Jay Barnes, Esq.
          SIMMONS HANLY CONROY LLC
          112 Madison Avenue, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 784-6400
          Facsimile: (212) 213-5949

FAIRFIELD HEALTHCARE: Aboah to File Second Amended Complaint
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as GWENDOLINE ABOAH and TANIA
STEWART, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. FAIRFIELD HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. d/b/a BRIGHTSTAR
CARE OF FAIRFIELD & SOUTHBURY and PETER R. MOORE, Case No.
3:20-cv-00763-SVN (D. Conn.), the Court entered an order granting
plaintiffs' motion for leave to file second amended complaint

The Court finds that under Rule 15(a)(2), justice requires
affording Plaintiffs leave to file their Second Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiffs Gwendoline Aboah and Tania Stewart, who were
employed as live-in home health aides by Defendant Fairfield,
brought this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs allege, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, that Defendants failed to accurately record
hours worked by their employees and failed to properly compensate
the employees for overtime.

Fairfield Healthcare is a hospital and health care company.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 14, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3hpJcAR at no extra charge.[CC]


FAMULARIS 002: Craven Sues Over Unpaid Minimum Wages
----------------------------------------------------
Donald Nicholas Craven, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. FAMULARIS 002, LLC, Case No.
2:22-cv-00385-DCN (D.S.C., Feb. 8, 2022), is brought against the
Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the
South Carolina Payment of Wages Act for unpaid minimum wages and
unreimbursed business expenses.

The Plaintiff and the other Delivery Drivers at the Defendant's
restaurants work "dual jobs." Specifically, they deliver food to
the Defendant's customers and receive tips, and they also work
inside the store completing nontipped duties. The Defendant paid
Plaintiff and other Delivery Drivers a rate at or close to minimum
wage per hour for work performed while in the store. The Defendant
paid Plaintiff and other Delivery Drivers less than minimum wage
per hour for all hours worked outside of the restaurant making
deliveries. In other words, the Defendant takes advantage of the
"tip credit" provision of the FLSA while Plaintiff and other
Delivery Drivers are out making deliveries.

The Defendant requires Delivery Drivers to incur and/or pay
job-related expenses, including but not limited to automobile costs
and depreciation, gasoline expenses, automobile maintenance and
parts, insurance, financing, cell phone costs, and other equipment
necessary for delivery drivers to complete their job duties. The
Defendant does not track Plaintiff's or other Delivery Drivers'
actual expenses nor does the Defendant keep records of all of those
expenses. The Defendant does not reimburse Plaintiff and other
Delivery Drivers for their actual expenses. The Defendant does not
reimburse Plaintiff and other Delivery Drivers at the IRS standard
business mileage rate. The Defendant knew or should have known that
it was not paying the Plaintiff and other Delivery Drivers
sufficient minimum wages. The Defendant has willfully failed to pay
minimum wage to the Plaintiff and similarly situated Delivery
Drivers, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as an hourly-paid
Delivery Driver from October of 2020 until January of 2021.

The Defendant owns and operates multiple Famularis franchises in
South Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jacob J. Modla, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JASON E. TAYLOR, P.C.
          115 Elk Avenue
          Rock Hill, SC 29730
          Phone: (803) 328-0898
          Email: jmodla@jasonetaylor.com

               - and -

          Sean Short, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Kirkpatrick Plaza
          10800 Financial Centre Pkwy, Suite 510
          Little Rock, AK 72211
          Phone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          Email: sean@sanfordlawfirm.com
                 josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE: Court Certifies Class in Shields Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, THOMAS A. SHIELDS, et al., Plaintiffs v. FEDERATION
INTERNATIONALE DE NATATION, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-07393-JSC
(N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California issued an
order:

   a. granting in part and denying in part the Plaintiffs' motion
      for class certification;

   b. granting the Plaintiffs' motion to appoint class counsel;

   c. granting in part and denying in part the parties'
      administrative motions to file under seal; and

   b. denying the Federation Internationale de Natation
      ("FINA")'s motion to file supplemental materials.

I. Background

The Plaintiffs are professional swimmers who bring federal
antitrust claims and a state law tort claim against FINA, related
to FINA's control over international swimming competitions. Thomas
A. Shields and Michael C. Andrew, are both residents of California,
and Katinka Hosszu is a resident of Hungary.

FINA is a Swiss organization recognized by the International
Olympic Committee ("IOC") as the governing body for Olympic
swimming, diving, high diving, water polo, artistic swimming,
masters and open-water swimming. It is one of "dozens" of
sport-specific international federations recognized by the IOC and
charged with "administering their respective sports and
establishing and organizing the types and rules of competitions
held at the Olympic Games." Thus, FINA sets the "qualifying
criteria" for swimmers to participate in the Olympics and "will
recognize only those qualifying times that are met at FINA-approved
qualifying events."

Although not a party to the ase, the International Swimming League,
Ltd. ("ISL") is involved in the facts giving rise to the
Plaintiffs' claims, and brings its own claims against FINA in a
related case.

The gravamen of the Plaintiffs' complaint is that FINA uses its
control over Olympic aquatic sports to determine the terms of
compensation and competition for international swimming events
outside of the Olympic games and FINA's own competitions. In doing
so, FINA engages in anticompetitive conduct "to maintain its grip
on both its monopoly power in the market for top-tier international
swimming competitions and its monopsony power in the market for the
supply of top-tier swimmers." They further allege that FINA used
those rules to threaten member federations and swimmers from
competing in ISL events.

The Plaintiffs allege that FINA controls the sellers' market for
the promotion and organization of top-tier international swimming
competitions as well as the buyers' market for the services of
top-tier swimmers. They allege that FINA's anticompetitive conduct
reduced the number of events ISL was able to put on in 2018 and the
years that followed, injuring the swimmers who planned to compete
in those events.

The Plaintiffs bring claims for: (1) violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1; (2) violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 2; and (3) a state law claim for
"tortious interference with prospective economic relations." They
seek "both injunctive relief against FINA's enforcement of its
anti-competitive 'unauthorised relations' rules and damages to
compensate them for the real financial harm FINA's efforts
caused."

In the operative First Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs sought to
represent the following proposed class: "All natural persons who
are eligible to compete in swimming world championship and Olympic
Game competitions.

The Plaintiffs now move to certify a narrower class under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and (b)(3): "All swimmers who
signed contracts to participate in ISL from Jan. 1, 2018 through
the date of trial."

The Plaintiffs further propose the following Rule 23(b)(3)
subclasses:

     a. 2018 Damages Subclass: All swimmers who signed contracts to
participate in ISL's December 2018 event set to take place in
Turin, Italy.

     b. 2019 Damages Subclass: All swimmers who signed contracts to
participate in ISL's 2019 season.

     c. 2022 Damages Subclass: All swimmers who sign contracts to
participate in ISL's 2022 season, and any seasons thereafter
through the date of trial.

II. Discussion

1. Motion for Class Certification

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs the maintenance of class
actions in federal court. A trial court has broad discretion in
making the decision to grant or deny a motion for class
certification. The Plaintiffs must satisfy the threshold
requirements of Rule 23(a) as well as the requirements under one of
the subsections of Rule 23(b).

Under Rule 23(a), a case is appropriate for certification if: (1)
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.

Beyond the threshold requirements of Rule 23(a), the Plaintiffs
contend that the putative class satisfies Rule 23(b)(2) with
respect to injunctive relief and Rule 23(b)(3) with respect to
damages. "Before certifying a class, the trial court must conduct a
rigorous analysis to determine whether the party seeking
certification has met the prerequisites of Rule 23."

A. Rule 23(a)

Judge Corley finds that (i) because it is impracticable to join
more than 200 class members, numerosity is satisfied; (ii) common
questions of law and fact satisfy the "limited burden" of
commonality; and (iii) the Plaintiffs' claims are typical because
the proposed class shares the same or similar injury from the same
course of conduct: Allegedly anticompetitive practices by FINA that
deprived the class of opportunities to earn prize money and
appearance fees.

As to the adequacy requirement, Judge Corley analyzes it with
respect to the damages class, followed by the injunctive relief
class.

First, she holds that the Plaintiffs' bid to certify a damages
class raises a number of adequacy concerns. Most importantly, there
is no apparent way to determine individual damages (and causation)
without putting the class members fundamentally at odds with one
another, a conflict that "goes to the heart of the litigation."
Furthermore, Mr. Grigorishin's funding of the Plaintiffs case
creates a risk that the Plaintiffs will not adequately monitor
class counsel on behalf of the absent class members. That risk does
not help to mitigate Plaintiffs Andrew and Hosszu's financial stake
in ISL. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have not met their burden to
establish that they, and the class counsel, can adequately
represent the proposed Rule 23(b)(3) damages class.

As to the injunctive relief class, however, Judge Corley holds that
the Plaintiffs have met their burden on adequacy. She says, the
Plaintiffs have no conflicts with the proposed injunctive relief
class. Winston counsel (Winston & Strawn LLP) is experienced in
sports-related antitrust class actions and competent to vigorously
prosecute the case. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have met their
burden to establish that they and their counsel can adequately
represent the proposed Rule 23(b)(2) class.

B. Rule 23(b)(3)

Although she concludes that the Plaintiffs have not met the
threshold requirements of Rule 23(a) with respect to the damages
class, Judge Corley proceeds to the Rule 23(b)(3) analysis to
create a thorough record. Certification under Rule 23(b)(3)
requires the Court to find "that the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.

Judge Corley holds that all of the Plaintiffs' claims present
common questions of law and fact, but it is a close question
whether they predominate. Regardless, she says, the Plaintiffs have
not met their burden to demonstrate that the class action device is
superior. The lack of superiority is an additional reason the
proposed damages class under Rule 23(b)(3) is not appropriate for
certification.

C. Rule 23(b)(2)

With respect to their proposed injunctive relief class, the
Plaintiffs meet the threshold requirements under Rule 23(a). They
must also establish that "the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so
that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole." The requirements of
Rule 23(b)(2) "are unquestionably satisfied when members of a
putative class seek uniform injunctive or declaratory relief from
policies or practices that are generally applicable to the class as
a whole." "That inquiry does not require an examination of the
viability or bases of the class members' claims for relief, does
not require that the issues common to the class satisfy a Rule
23(b)(3)-like predominance test, and does not require a finding
that all members of the class have suffered identical injuries."

So it is in the present case. The Plaintiffs seek uniform
injunctive relief from anticompetitive conduct by FINA, including
an injunction preventing FINA from sanctioning swimmers or member
federations for participating in non-FINA competitions. The
Plaintiffs have established that "a single injunction or
declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the
class." The individualized questions relevant to the Rule 23(b)(3)
analysis present no problem under Rule 23(b)(2). And to the extent
the Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief may be moot, as FINA
argues, that is a common and predominant question of law.
Accordingly, an injunctive relief class is certifiable under Rule
23(b)(2).

2. Administrative Issues

A. Motion to File Supplemental Materials

After FINA had filed its opposition to class certification but
before the Plaintiffs filed their reply, FINA sought leave to file
supplemental materials in opposition. FINA presents new factual
issues that "would have featured in FINA's opposition had they been
available at the time of filing," including issues relating to
ISL's 2021 season and swimming events at the 2021 Olympic Games.
Supplemental materials may be helpful where new facts are produced
in discovery, e.g., Shenzhenshi Haitiecheng Sci. & Tech. Co., Ltd.
v. Rearden LLC, No. 15-cv-00797-JST, 2019 WL 1560449, at *1-2 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 10, 2019), but less so where the facts come from ongoing
events in the real world—just two and a half months after FINA
filed its opposition.

Judge Corley is not persuaded that the proposed supplemental
materials will help resolve the issues presented at this stage.
Accordingly, she denied FINA's motion.

B. Administrative Motions to File Under Seal

Judge Corley granted in part and denied in part the parties'
administrative motions to file under seal, (Dkt. Nos. 193, 219,
246, 261, 262, 272, 275, 276), as she described in her Order,
including that (i) Document Disposition Reason Dkt. No. 193-79 -
Not sealable; (ii) Confidentiality designation was withdrawn (Dkt.
Nos. 193-78, 193-80, 193-87) - Sealable; and (iii) Contains
information about contract negotiations, projected revenues, and
business plans (Dkt. Nos. 193-75, 193-76, 193-77) - Not sealable.

Portions of motion papers that quote or reference the material
determined sealable above are also sealable. This includes without
limitation portions of the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification, FINA's opposition and expert reports, the
Plaintiffs' reply, FINA's sur-reply, and the Plaintiffs' reply in
support of their motion to strike.

With respect to the material determined not sealable, unless the
designating party files a renewed motion to seal within five days
of the date of the Order, the Court will unlock the prior docket
entries so that the material previously filed under seal is
available on the public docket.

A party may file a notice on the docket if the disposition above
omits any document for which an administrative motion to seal was
filed.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons she explained, Judge Corley granted the Plaintiffs'
motion to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2) but denied the motion
to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3). Winston & Strawn LLP are
appointed as the class counsel to represent the Rule 23(b)(2)
injunctive relief class.

Judge Corley denied FINA's motion to file supplemental materials
and granted in part and denied in part the parties' administrative
motions to file under seal.

Judge Corley will hold a further Case Management Conference in the
case and the related case on March 3, 2022 at 1:30 p.m. by Zoom
videoconference. An updated joint case management conference
statement, including a proposed schedule through trial, is due Feb.
24, 2022. Judge Corley will refer to the arguments regarding the
Plaintiffs' merit expert reports so the parties need not repeat
them in the case management conference statement.

The Order disposes of Docket Nos. 191, 193, 219, 231, 246, 261,
262, 272, 275, 276, 284.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 11, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/m3x8tf36 from Leagle.com.


FIFTH AVENUE: Vivanco Seeks Correct Overtime Pay Rates Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH VIVANCO, individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated, v. FIFTH AVENUE APPLIANCE SERVICE, INC. and CHRISTINA
MUCCI, Case No. 7:22-cv-01376 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 18, 2022) is a
putative collective action arising under the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 and the New York Labor Law against the Defendants for
willfully failing to pay Plaintiff Vivanco and a collective of
similarly situated persons' wages at the applicable overtime
rates.

On these claims, Plaintiff, individually, and on behalf of the
putative class and collective seeks actual and statutory damages,
interest, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees. The Plaintiff
seeks back pay, front pay, emotional distress damages, punitive
damages, interest, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees under the
applicable civil rights laws.

Between August 2020 and February 15, 2021, Mr. Joseph Vivanco
worked as a repairman for Defendants in New York. Typically,
Plaintiff Vivanco would work six days per week from 8:00 AM to 8:00
PM but was only paid a flat rate of $250 per day by the
Defendants.

Fifth Avenue offers appliance repairs and installation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Taubenfeld, Esq.
          FISHER TAUBENFELD LLP
          233 Broadway, Suite 2340
          New York, New York 10279
          Telephone: (212) 571-0700
          Facsimile: (212) 233-3801

FIRST NATIONAL: 9th Circuit Affirms Denial of Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Wystan Ackerman, Esq., of Robinson+Cole, in an article for JDSupra,
reports that numerous class action suits have been filed against
auto insurers regarding the valuation of vehicles that are total
losses. These cases typically allege that insurers are undervaluing
vehicles in some common way or in violation of a state regulation.
The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the denial of class
certification in a published decision that I expect will be helpful
to insurers defending these cases and others involving different
lines of insurance but similar issues.

In Lara v. First National Insurance Company of America, No.
21-35126, -- F.4th --, 2022 WL 414691 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 2022), the
plaintiffs sued Liberty Mutual companies and CCC Intelligent
Solutions, a vendor that assists insurers in valuing vehicles,
alleging breach of contract as to Liberty Mutual and an unfair
trade practices claim against all defendants. The insurance policy
required payment of the "actual cash value" of the vehicle, which
was defined by a Washington regulation as "fair market value." CCC
researches the prices at which used vehicles sell at car dealers,
and then makes adjustment based on the pre-loss condition of the
insured vehicle and the difference between prices paid for vehicles
purchased from private parties rather than dealerships. The
insurance adjuster then in some cases adjusts the value shown on
the CCC report. Plaintiffs claimed that the "condition adjustments"
on the CCC reports violated a Washington regulation. The case
survived a motion to dismiss, but the district court denied class
certification under Rule 23(b)(3), based on lack of predominance of
common issues and because a class action would not be a superior
method of resolving the dispute.

In affirming, the Ninth Circuit concluded that whether the
condition adjustment violated the regulation was a common question,
but liability and injury would require individualized adjudication
of each claim. The court explained that "[b]ecause Liberty owed
each putative class member the actual cash value of his or her car,
if a putative class member was given that amount or more, then he
or she cannot win on the merits," and determining that "would
involve looking into the actual pre-accident value of the car and
then comparing that with what each person was offered." In other
words, there would have to be a minitrial on the value of each
vehicle.

As plaintiffs often do in these cases, the plaintiffs here argued
that the value of the vehicles involved "damages issues," and some
courts have said that if the only individualized issues involve
damages, that should not defeat class certification. But, as the
Ninth Circuit explained here, "if there's no injury, then the
breach of contract and unfair trade practices claims must fail,"
and "[t]hat's not a damages issue; that's a merits issue." In other
words, if the ultimate amount paid was sufficient, it doesn't
matter how you get there. As the court put it, "the district court
was correct to apply ‘the old basketball phrase, ‘no harm, no
foul.'" The court also agreed with the district court that the
superiority requirement was not satisfied because individual trials
would be preferable given the nature of the issues to be decided.

Insurers will want to cite this opinion in cases involving other
lines of insurance as well, such as property. Property insurance
class actions often involve disputes over actual cash value or
replacement cost value, and the same principle should apply.
Disputes over whether a few hundred dollars more were owed for
damage from a hail storm, for example, are individualized. As in
this case, those disputes may be best resolved by the appraisal
process provided for in these policies, or in small claims court,
and often fail to satisfy the requirements for a class action. [GN]

FIRST NATIONAL: Denial of Bid to Certify Class in Lara Suit Upheld
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEEANA LARA, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated; CAMERON LUNDQUIST, Plaintiffs-Appellants v.
FIRST NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, a New Hampshire
Corporation; LM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY; CCC INTELLIGENT
SOLUTIONS INC., Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 21-35126 (9th Cir.),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's order denying the Plaintiffs' motion to certify
class.

Background

In the auto insurance suit, the district court declined to certify
a proposed damages class because it held both that individual
questions predominated over common questions and that
individualized trials were superior to a class action.

The case is about how auto insurance companies value totaled
vehicles. Plaintiffs Leeana Lara and Cameron Lundquist sued both
Liberty Mutual, an auto insurer, and CCC Intelligent Solutions, a
company that Liberty works with to help it develop its valuations.
The Plaintiffs allege that Liberty breached its contracts with its
insureds and that both companies violated Washington's unfair trade
practices law and committed civil conspiracy. Their claims and the
appeal depend on the details of Liberty's valuation process.

A car is "totaled" when it makes more sense to salvage the car than
to fix it. When that happens, the insurance company has to figure
out how much the car was worth before the accident, so it knows how
much to pay the insured. In Washington, the insurer only has to pay
the "actual cash value" of the car -- the "fair market value."
Paying the actual cash value requires the insurer to figure out how
much the car would have been sold for before the accident. Looking
at the car after the accident doesn't always indicate its worth
before, so Liberty values the totaled car with a multi-step process
involving a separate company (CCC, the other Defendant).

Lara and Lundquist's vehicles were totaled, and Liberty valued them
in part with the disputed downward condition adjustment. Lara and
Lundquist then sued Liberty and CCC, arguing that they didn't
follow Washington state insurance regulations. More specifically,
the regulations require the insurers to itemize the deductions or
additions that they make, and that these adjustments be
appropriate. Because these regulations are enforced by the
Washington insurance commissioner, and do not create a private
cause of action, the Plaintiffs couldn't sue Liberty and CCC
directly for violating them, so instead, they sued Liberty for
breach of contract and both companies for unfair trade practices,
and civil conspiracy.

Liberty moved to dismiss the case, but the district court declined,
holding that the relevant regulation did apply to the adjustments
and that Plaintiffs had plausibly alleged their claims. The
Plaintiffs then asked the district court to certify a class of all
people whose valuations included the disputed adjustment.

To certify any class requires numerosity, commonality, typicality,
and adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). And to certify a damages
class, like this one, plaintiffs must also show that common
questions predominate over individual ones and that a class action
is the superior method of resolving the dispute.

The district court declined to certify the class, agreeing with the
Plaintiffs that the named plaintiffs were typical but agreeing with
the Defendants that there was no predominance or superiority. A
motions panel of the Court granted permission to appeal.

Discussion

A.

The Ninth Circuit finds that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the predominance and superiority
requirements were not satisfied. First, it finds that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that common questions
do not predominate. Second, the Plaintiffs respond that the
individualized issues of harm are "damages issues" that can be
tried separately. But that's not right either: If there's no
injury, then the breach of contract and unfair trade practices
claims must fail. That's not a damages issue; that's a merits
issue.

Third, the Plaintiffs say that even if proof of individual injuries
is required, the amount of the deduction would still be "relevant
evidence" in that inquiry. That's true, but it's also beside the
point, the Ninth Circuit holds. It saysa, some relevant evidence
could be in common, but much of it wouldn't be, and that's why the
district court didn't abuse its discretion in finding that
individual questions predominate.

Fourth, the Plaintiffs point to Achziger v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins.
Co., 772 F. App'x 416 (9th Cir. 2019), to argue that we reversed a
district court for not finding predominance in similar
circumstances. But on top of being unpublished, Achziger does not
apply because it did not involve any sort of individualized
determinations. While the condition adjustment here is applied
across the board, other compensating adjustments and the ultimate
valuation are made individually. And it's those other things that
would require more individualized inquiries in the present case.

The Plaintiffs finally resort to calling the Defendants'
adjustments "illegal." But that's an argument for the Washington
insurance commissioner, the official who could prosecute this kind
of alleged violation. Lara brought this argument to the
commissioner, and that office has chosen not to pursue the case.
Because the regulations do not provide a private cause of action,
the Plaintiffs instead sued Liberty and CCC for breach of contract
and unfair trade practices. Those causes of action require proof of
an injury, and so the district court was correct to apply "the old
basketball phrase, 'no harm, no foul.'" If there was no injury,
then there was no breach of contract or unfair trade practice. And
because figuring out whether each plaintiff was injured would be an
individualized process, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that individual questions predominated.

B.

Next, the Ninth Circuit holds that the district court's finding of
no superiority was not an abuse of discretion for the same reason.
A class action would involve adjudicating issues specific to each
class member's claim, and that would be unmanageable. Individual
trials would be a better way to adjudicate those issues. The
district court's finding of no superiority was thus not an abuse of
discretion.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Ninth Circuit concldues that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
individual questions predominate over common ones, or that
individual trials would be superior to a class action. It need not
reach the Defendants' remaining arguments. The district court's
order is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 11, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/569rsvss from Leagle.com.

John M. DeStefano -- johnd@hbsslaw.com -- (argued) and Robert B.
Carey, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Phoenix, Arizona; Steve
Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, in Seattle, Washington,
for the Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. -- tboutrous@gibsondunn.com -- (argued),
Bradley J. Hamburger, Daniel R. Adler, and Matt Aidan Getz, Gibson
Dunn & Crutcher LLP, in Los Angeles, California; James A. Morsch
and Casey T. Grabenstein, Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP, in
Chicago, Illinois, for Defendants-Appellees First National
Insurance Company of America, and LM General Insurance Company.

Gregory G. Garre -- gregory.garre@lw.com -- (argued), Marguerite M.
Sullivan, Jason R. Burt, and Cherish A. Drain, Latham & Watkins
LLP, Washington, D.C.; Samir Deger-Sen, Latham & Watkins LLP, New
York, New York; for Defendant-Appellee CCC Intelligent Solutions
Inc.

Daniel L. Syhre -- dsyhre@bpmlaw.com -- Betts Patterson & Mines
P.S., in Seattle, Washington, for Amici Curiae American Property
Casualty Insurance Association, and National Association of Mutual
Insurance Companies.


FIRSTBANK: Face Class Action Suit Over Alleged Overdraft Fees
-------------------------------------------------------------
Nashville-based FirstBank has been accused in a new class action
lawsuit of "deceptive, unfair, and unconscionable" practices
related to its overdraft fees.

Daniel Marvin accuses the bank of assessing retail customers
multiple $35 fees on a single charge. The potential class,
according to the filing, could include "many thousands" of
FirstBank customers in Tennessee.

The lawsuit argues that the charging of multiple fees on a single
insufficient-funds payment runs counter both to the bank's
agreements with customers and past guidance from the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp.

Marvin is represented by local attorney Gerard Stranch IV and
lawyers from Indiana and Arkansas. Stranch did not respond to a
request for comment. The suit was filed in Davidson County Chancery
Court earlier this week.

A FirstBank spokesperson declined to comment, citing a company
policy regarding pending litigation.

The bank has more than 80 retail locations in Tennessee, Kentucky,
Alabama and Georgia, with more than $11 billion in assets. The bank
will be the anchor tenant for the under-construction ONE22ONE
building at 1221 Broadway.

Parent company FB Financial's stock was trading at $44.63 per share
Friday afternoon, up slightly from the mark of the start of the
year.[GN]

FORTE DATA: Foote Files TCPA Suit in N.D. Georgia
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Forte Data Systems,
Inc. The case is styled as Hilton Foote, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated v. Forte Data Systems, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-00712-MHC (N.D. Ga., Feb. 18, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

Forte Data Systems -- https://www.fortedata.com/ -- provides
valuable technology solutions to the automotive extended service
contract industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
          PARONICH LAW, P.C.
          350 Lincoln St., Suite 2400
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Phone: (615) 485-0018
          Email: anthony@paronichlaw.com

               - and -

          Steven Howard Koval, Esq.
          THE KOVAL FIRM, LLC
          Building 15, Suite 120
          3575 Piedmont Rd.
          Atlanta, GA 30305
          Phone: (404) 513-6651
          Fax: (404) 549-4654
          Email: shkoval@aol.com


GEICO ADVANTAGE: Court Denies Amended Bid to Dismiss Thaxton Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL THAXTON, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. GEICO ADVANTAGE INSURANCE
COMPANY, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, GEICO GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY, GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY,
GEICO COUNTY MUTUAL, and GEICO SECURE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00306-KWR-KK (D.N.M.), Judge Kea W.
Riggs of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico
denied the Defendants' Amended Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Complaint.

I. Introduction

The putative class action arises out of a dispute over
"underinsured motorist coverage." In New Mexico, underinsured
motorist coverage generally consists of the difference between an
insured's uninsured motorist coverage limit and a tortfeasor's
liability coverage.

Pursuant to this statutory offset under NMSA Section 66-5-301,
underinsured motorist coverage at minimum limits generally does not
exist. If a tortfeasor's liability limit is $25,000 and an
insured's uninsured motorist coverage limit is $25,000, the insured
will rarely if ever access the underinsured motorist coverage
portion of his or her motorist insurance.

Nevertheless, some insurers sold this coverage to insureds. The
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants sold him underinsured
motorist coverage but did not disclose that it had little value.

The case is now before the Court following the New Mexico Supreme
Court's answer to a certified question in Crutcher, which asked
whether (1) underinsured motorist coverage the minimum limits was
illusory, and if so, (2) whether insurers could charge a premium
for that illusory coverage, citing Crutcher v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 2022-NMSC-001, paragraph 1, 501 P.3d 433, 434.

Crutcher held that underinsured motorist coverage at minimum
limits, as in the instant case, is illusory in the sense that it
misleads insureds into believing they are purchasing coverage when
they really are not. However, Crutcher noted that this coverage was
statutorily authorized, and therefore the Court would not prohibit
insurers from collecting premiums for minimum underinsured motorist
coverage if they issued a disclosure or "exclusion."

The Defendants move to dismiss all claims in the case in light of
Crutcher. They argue that the Plaintiff lacks standing because he
did not suffer an injury-in-fact, and alternatively, his claims
fall under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Defendants primarily base
their motion on the belief that Crutcher applies prospectively as
to the misrepresentation claims and grants the Defendants immunity
from misrepresentation claims which accrued prior to the Crutcher
opinion.

II. Background

On Aug. 16, 2017, the Plaintiff was injured in an automobile
collision with another driver. The tortfeasor carried minimum
limits of liability coverage, that is, $25,000 per person and
$50,000 per occurrence. The Plaintiff received the full extent of
liability coverage carried by the tortfeasor, but that coverage was
insufficient to fully compensate him for his damages. Therefore,
the Plaintiff alleges that the tortfeasor was an underinsured
motorist at the time of the collision.

At the time of the collision, the Plaintiff was insured by the
Defendants. He had purchased uninsured and underinsured motorist
coverage in the amount of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per
occurrence. He alleges he paid a premium for that coverage. The
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to inform him that a
purchase of 25/50 UIM coverage, when triggered by a crash with a
tortfeasor who has 25/50 bodily injury liability limits, would
result in payment of a premium for which no payment of benefits
would occur. He also alleges that the Defendants failed to inform
him that New Mexico's offset law drastically diminishes payment of
benefits arising from a covered occurrence under his policy.
Finally, they allegedly misrepresented to the Plaintiff that he
would benefit form 25/50 UIM coverage when it knew or should nave
know, pursuant to New Mexico law, that coverage was meaningless.

When the Plaintiff requested that Defendants provide him with the
UIM benefits for which he paid a premium, the Defendants denied his
claim.

The Plaintiff subsequently filed the putative class action,
asserting the following claims: Count I: Negligence; Count II:
Violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (N.M.S.A.1978, Section
57-12-2) (UPA); Count III: Violations of the Unfair Insurance
Practices Act (N.M.S.A.1978, Sections 59A-16-1 et seq.) (UIPA);
Count IV: Breach of Contract and claim for Motorist Coverage Count
V: Breach of Contract and Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;
Count VI: Injunctive Relief; Count VII: Declaratory Judgment; and
Count VIII: Punitive Damages.

The putative class consisting of the following: "All persons (and
their heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns)
who, in the prior six years from the date of filing of this
complaint, were a policyholder and/or insured, of a Motor Vehicle
Policy issued by Defendants where that policy did not and does not
provide underinsured coverage paid for by the policyholder, and
sold and solicited by Defendants, due to the application of an
offset as set forth in NMSA 66-5-301, otherwise known as the New
Mexico offset law or being a difference state."

In Crutcher, District Judge Judith C. Herrera certified the
following questions to the New Mexico Supreme Court: Under N.M.
Stat. Ann. Section 66-5-301, is underinsured motorist coverage on a
policy that offers only minimum UM/UIM limits of $25,000 per
person/$50,000 per accident illusory for an insured who sustains
more than $25,000 in damages caused by a minimally insured
tortfeasor because of the offset recognized in Schmick v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and, if so, may insurers
charge a premium for that non-accessible underinsured motorist
coverage?

The matter was stayed pending the New Mexico Supreme Court's
answer. As explained below, the New Mexico Supreme Court answered
this question and the Defendants moved to dismiss the claims in the
case.

III. Discussion

A. Crutcher v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. does not mandate dismissal of
the claims in the case.

The Defendants seek dismissal of all claims in the case in light of
the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Crutcher. They appear to
believe that Crutcher applies prospectively and grants them
immunity from pre-Crutcher misrepresentation claims as to minimum
limit underinsured motorist coverage.

Judge Riggs disagrees and concludes that Crutcher does not mandate
dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims. As this is the primary ground
on which the Defendants seek to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, she declines to dismiss any of the Plaintiff's claims under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Judge Riggs finds that the New Mexico Supreme Court did not
expressly state that Crutcher applies prospectively as to
misrepresentation claims. Moreover, the presumption of
retroactivity has not been overcome as to misrepresentation claims.
In other words, Crutcher does not provide Defendants with immunity
for misrepresentation claims which arose pre-Crutcher. Finally, the
statutory offset clearly does not provide immunity from claims that
Defendants misrepresented the nature or value of underinsured
motorist coverage.

B. Court declines to dismiss case for lack of standing.

The Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the claims in
the case because the Plaintiff lacks standing. They primarily argue
that the Plaintiff did not suffer an injury-in-fact, because
Crutcher's holding that underinsured motorist coverage at minimum
limits is misleading to insureds only applies prospectively.

Judge Riggs disagrees and declines to dismiss the case. She opines
that Crutcher does not grant insurers immunity from
misrepresentation claims as to minimum limit underinsured motorist
coverage. Moreover, even without Crutcher's holding that
underinsured motorist coverage at minimum limits is illusory, cases
before Crutcher applied established law to conclude that plaintiffs
had stated plausible claims that such coverage was illusory, i.e.,
misleading to insureds. Finally, the putative class may have
suffered a concrete injury because they allege that they paid for
coverage which they would never receive. This states a plausible
allegation that the Plaintiff and the putative class suffered a
concrete injury in fact. At this procedural stage, the Court takes
these allegations as true and Judge Riggs declines to dismiss for
lack of standing.

IV. Conclusion

Judge Riggs concludes that Crutcher does not bar the
misrepresentation claims in the case which accrued prior to the
issuance of the Crutcher opinion. The Plaintiff states plausible
claims upon which relief can be granted and Judge Riggs declines to
dismiss any claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Hence, she
denied the Defendants' Amended Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 11, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/mt2e6t2x from
Leagle.com.


GENERAL MOTORS: May Face Class Action Over Faulty Vehicles
----------------------------------------------------------
Jason Stoogenke, writing for wsoctv.com, reports that a lawsuit
over what's become known as the "Chevy Shake" is one step closer to
becoming a class-action suit.

General Motors has not issued a recall for the so-called "Chevy
Shake," where the vehicle may vibrate due to a faulty part. Many
drivers are relying on the Won v. General Motors lawsuit, hoping it
becomes a class-action suit and covers anyone who owns the
following vehicles if the plaintiffs win or settle:

2015-2019 Chevrolet Silverado
2017-2019 Chevrolet Colorado
2015-2019 Chevrolet Corvette
2016-2019 Chevrolet Camaro
2015-2019 Cadillac Escalade and Escalade ESV
2016-2019 Cadillac ATS, ATS-V, CTS, CT6 and CTS-V
2015-2019 GMC Sierra, Yukon, Yukon XL and Yukon Denali XL
2017-2019 GMC Canyon

Recently, lawyers for the plaintiffs filed a motion officially
asking the judge to make it a class-action lawsuit. They believe
the judge could rule on whether to make it a class-action suit as
early as this month.

Representatives with GM told Action 9′s Jason Stoogenke it does
not usually comment at this stage of a case.

Stoogenke, who first reported on the vibration issues more than two
years ago, was one of the first in the country to report on it.
Since then, more consumers have complained to him about this issue
than any other, except for problems related to the pandemic such as
stimulus checks and unemployment. Nearly 300 drivers in 30 states
and Canada have contacted Action 9.

Keith Tolbert from Clover, South Carolina, owns his own roadside
assistance business. He told Stoogenke his Chevy Silverado is his
office.

"I need something that drives normal, to run my business," Tolbert
said, but he says his truck doesn't drive normally.

"(When it shakes, it feels like) all the tires are going to fall
off of it," he told Stoogenke. "I just want a comfortable work
truck that don't do that."

Tolbert would like GM to find a fix for his truck or replace it.
[GN]

GENWORTH LIFE: Hearing in Brighton Suit Rescheduled to March 24
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Brighton Trustees, LLC, et
al v. Genworth Life and Annuity Insurance Company, Case No.
3:20-cv-00240-DJN (E.D. Va.), the Hon. Judge David J. Novak entered
an order that the hearing on Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification is rescheduled to March 24, 2022, at 10:00 a.m.

The Court said, "The parties shall use the additional time and
previously scheduled hearing date to engage in meaningful
settlement discussions. The Court expects both sides to engage
fully in settlement discussions in a good faith effort to resolve
this case. Let the Clerk file a copy of this Order electronically
and notify all counsel of record."

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 14, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3LQvpRJ at no extra charge.[CC]


GEORGIA: Court Sets Submission Deadline in King Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as King, et al., v. State of
Georgia, et al., Case No. 1:21-cv-03082 (N.D. Ga.), the Hon. Judge
J.P. Boulee entered an order setting submission deadline.

  -- In the event mediation fails,            March 22, 2022
     the Defendants shall file its
     responses to the Motion for
     Preliminary Injunction and
     Motion to Certify Class and
     its replies to their Motion
     to Dismiss and Motion to Stay
     no later than:

  -- The Plaintiffs' reply to their           March 29, 2022
     motions shall be filed no
     later than:

  -- The preliminary injunction               April 12, 2022
     hearing will be scheduled for:

The suit alleges violation of the Civil Rights Act.

Georgia is a southeastern U.S. state whose terrain spans coastal
beaches, farmland and mountains.[CC]

GIORGIO ARMANI: Collects Data Without Proper Consent, Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Giorgio Armani Corporation unlawfully collects the biometric data
of consumers using its website's virtual "Try-it-On" feature, a new
class action lawsuit alleges.

Plaintiff Tricia Lipscomb claims consumers who use the feature to
virtually try on cosmetics are not informed by Giorgio Armani that
the company is collecting their biometric data. She says Giorgio
Armani encourages consumers to virtually try on products by either
uploading a photo of their face or turning on their camera to get a
live shot.

In addition to the Try-it-On feature on its website, Giorgio Armani
also allows customers in its retail locations to digitally try on
cosmetics by using a webcam in its stores, according to the class
action lawsuit.

Lipscomb claims Giorgio Armani's Try-it-On software is able to
digitally apply cosmetics to a consumer's face by using facial
detection technology.

"Defendant's Try-it-On feature and technology uses an algorithm
that scans the face in each photo and video to detect facial
features or landmarks and calculates a unique digital map of the
face (i.e., a face template) based on geometric attributes such as
the distance between various facial features," the lawsuit states.

In doing so, Lipscomb claims Giorgio Armani violates the Illinois
Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) by collecting biometric
data without acquiring the necessary consent.

Lipscomb argues that, in accordance with BIPA regulations, Giorgio
Armani would need to inform consumers that it was collecting their
biometric information and how it was going to be retained.

"Defendant is depriving consumers of any meaningful opportunity to
make an informed decision about the collection and use of their own
biometrics in direct violation of BIPA," the class action lawsuit
states.

Lipscomb wants to represent an Illinois class of consumers who have
used Giorgio Armani's virtual Try-it-On feature since Feb. 9, 2017.


Lipscomb is demanding a jury trial and requesting injunctive relief
along with statutory damages for herself and all class members.

Last year, Amazon was accused of unlawfully collecting and storing
the biometric data of consumers who virtually tried on products
using its virtual Try-On feature.

Have you virtually tried on Giorgio Armani cosmetic products? Let
us know in the comments!

The plaintiffs are represented by Brendan Donelon and Daniel W.
Craig of Donelon, P.C. and Thomas M. Ryan of the Law Office of
Thomas M. Ryan, P.C.

The Giorgio Armani Virtual Try-It-On Class Action Lawsuit is
Lipscomb v. Giorgio Armani Corporation, Case No. 1:22-cv-01039, in
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois. [GN]

GOLDMAN SACHS: Judge Certifies 401(k) Lawsuit as Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jacklyn Wille, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that a lawsuit
accusing Goldman Sachs Group Inc. of filling its employees' $7.5
billion 401(k) plan with expensive, affiliated mutual funds will
move forward as a certified class action, according to a Manhattan
federal court order filed under seal.

Judge Edgardo Ramos granted the plan participants' motion for class
certification, subject to certain conditions not yet made public,
in a sealed order docketed on Feb. 14. Ramos instructed the parties
to submit proposed redactions before the order is made publicly
available in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York.

The motion for class certification was filed in April 2021. [GN]

GOOGLE LLC: Vance Suit Stayed Pending Resolution of IBM Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as STEVEN VANCE, et al., v.
GOOGLE LLC, Case No. 5:20-cv-04696-BLF (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge
Beth Labson Freeman entered an order extending the stay until
August 15, 2022, or sooner should the IBM Action be resolved before
that date.

The parties shall submit a joint status report to the Court within
14 days of the resolution of the IBM Action or on August 15, 2022.

Accordingly, the Court finds that a further six-month stay is
appropriate to allow the IBM Action parties to complete discovery
and provide them a meaningful amount of time to resolve some of the
issues that overlap with this case.

This is an action brought against Google for violation of the
Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act ("BIPA") and unjust
enrichment for its alleged use of IBM's Diversity in Faces dataset,
which allegedly contained the Plaintiffs' Flickr photographs.

On February 12, 2021, the Court stayed this action pending the
resolution of Vance v. International Business Machines, Corporation
("IBM Action") before the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, an earlier-filed action in which Plaintiffs
brought BIPA and unjust enrichment claims against IBM for the
alleged creation and dissemination of the Diversity in Faces
dataset.

Google LLC is an American multinational technology company that
specializes in Internet-related services and products, which
include a search engine, online advertising technologies, cloud
computing, software, and hardware.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 14, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ItbSVv at no extra charge.[CC]

HAGYARD DAVIDSON: Dismissal of Swearingen's Original Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TOM SWEARINGEN, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellant v. HAGYARD DAVIDSON McGEE ASSOCIATES,
PLLC; JOHN DOES 1-100; DEAN DORTON ALLEN FORD, PLLC; DR. DWAYNE
RODGERSON; DR. MICHAEL SPIRITO; DR. MICHAEL T. HORE; AND DR. ROBERT
J. HUNT, Appellees, Case No. 2020-CA-0456-MR (Ky. App.), the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed the judgment of the Fayette Circuit
Court, which dismissed Swearingen's original class action complaint
and denied Swearingen's contemporaneous motion to file an amended
class action complaint.

Mr. Swearingen individually, and on behalf of a putative class of
similarly situated parties, appeals from the Fayette Circuit
Court's grant of summary judgment to Hagyard Davidson McGee
Associates, PLLC, Dr. Michael T. Hore, Dr. Dwayne Rodgerson, Dr.
Michael Spirito, Dr. Robert J. Hunt, and Dean Dorton Allen Ford,
PLLC (collectively appellees), which dismissed Swearingen's
original class action complaint, and the trial court's denial of
Swearingen's contemporaneous motion to file an amended class action
complaint. Having determined that the trial court's judgment was
not an abuse of discretion and is not otherwise erroneous, we
affirm.

In February 2019, Swearingen filed a class action complaint against
the appellees and John Does asserting claims of: (1) fraudulent
inducement and/or fraudulent misrepresentation; (2) breach of
express warranty; (3) civil conspiracy; (4) aiding and abetting a
civil conspiracy; (5) aiding and abetting fraud; (6) negligence;
and (7) negligence per se. As will prove to be relevant later, the
complaint was not verified by Swearingen.

In the complaint, Swearingen listed 24 horses that he had purchased
at the Keeneland sales between 2007 and 2016. The focus of the
complaint was on allegations that the Appellees had for years
altered the dates of procedure shown on digital radiographs taken
of horses in order to make it appear that x-rays had been performed
within the three weeks prior to the horse's eventual sale at
Keeneland. Those x-rays which contained false dates were placed in
the "repository" at Keeneland where they could be viewed by
potential buyers in advance of sale.

Mr. Swearingen alleges that the misdated x-rays caused buyers to
purchase horses they would not have otherwise, and that if they had
known of this practice they "would not have participated in the
Keeneland sale in the first place and never would have bought the
aforementioned horses." He explicitly alleged that he "would review
or have his agents review the radiographs of such horse" prior to
making a purchase at Keeneland and "did in fact review the x-rays
in the Repository."

The complaint specifically defined the class of similarly situated
individuals as those "who purchased one or more horses at Keeneland
who reviewed digital x-rays in the Repository prior to bidding and
who, if it had been disclosed in advance would not have purchased
such horses at the sale."

Two alleged characteristics of Swearingen's ostensible class would
ultimately determine the fate of this litigation. First, that the
plaintiffs or their agents reviewed digital x-rays in Keeneland's
repository. Second, that they would not have purchased their horses
had they known of improprieties in radiograph dating.

Mr. Swearingen's deposition was conducted on Feb. 11, 2020. His
testimony was inconsistent with both the specific allegations in
his class action complaint and his prior written discovery
responses. Specifically, Swearingen admitted under oath that he
never used the repository and never relied on any information in
the repository. He also admitted to purchasing a horse at Keeneland
in 2019, despite already knowing at that time that radiograph dates
could be back-dated.

Based upon Swearingen's deposition testimony, the Appellees moved
for summary judgment on all counts asserting that Swearingen's
deposition showed him to have no compensable damages and that the
factual allegations contained in his complaint were in fact false.
The Appellant's counsel responded by offering an affidavit from
Swearingen, dated Feb. 20, 2020, attempting to explain, and change,
his testimony. The counsel also filed a motion for leave to file a
first amended complaint which changed both the underlying factual
basis of their claims and their damage model.

On March 24, 2020, the trial court issued its order denying
Swearingen's motion to file an amended complaint as untimely and
dismissing Swearingen's individual and class action claims with
prejudice.

On appeal, Swearingen argues that the trial court erred by: (1)
denying his motion to file an amended complaint; and (2) dismissing
the class action on the basis that Swearingen was not an
appropriate class representative. The second assignment of error
includes the assertions that the trial court erred by: (a) not
permitting class certification discovery prior to dismissing the
class action; (b) not permitting the modification of the class
definition; (c) not permitting the identification of an alternative
class representative; and (d) not recognizing that the original and
amended complaints stated prima facie causes of action pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 23. A third assertion of
error made by Swearingen was that the dismissal of a separate
breach of warranty claim against Dean Dorton Allen Ford, PLLC and
Hagyard was not addressed by the trial court and should not
otherwise have been dismissed.

There is no argument made by Swearingen that the dismissal of his
original complaint was improper given his deposition testimony. In
fact, the propriety of that action is conceded. The original
complaint was dismissed based upon testimony by the sole plaintiff
and putative class representative whose testimony made it quite
clear that he had sustained no injury attributable to any actions
of the appellees.

Based upon the facts presented in this matter, the Court of Appeals
does not agree that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the filing of the amended complaint and furthermore do not
believe that the interests of justice would have been served had it
allowed the amended complaint to be filed. The question presented
for the Court of Appeals' decision is not only whether the
Appellant's new and belated contentions could subject the Appellees
to liability. The decisive issue to be determined is whether the
trial judge acted properly in refusing the Appellant leave to
inject a new theory of liability into the case under the
circumstances presented. Swearingen in effect abandoned his initial
claims and attempted to inject a completely new claim of
liability.

In view of the time that had passed and the fact that he only
attempted to change his previously false allegations after his
deposition was completed (which served to alter basic factual and
legal issues in the case), the Court of Appeals may conclude that
the trial court acted well within its discretion when it denied
leave to file the amended pleadings.

Mr. Swearingen's second assignment of error is that the trial court
erred in dismissing the class action on the basis that Swearingen
was not an appropriate class representative. Within his second
assignment of error Swearingen alleges the trial court erred by not
permitting class certification discovery prior to dismissing the
class action.

In this argument, the Court of Appeals opines that Swearingen fails
to address the fact that the trial court's litigation plan was not
only sound but agreed to by his counsel at the Jan. 2, 2020 status
conference. While Swearingen complains that he was unable to
conduct formal discovery of the potential class members, he always
had access to Keeneland's online "Sales Summaries" database. Under
these circumstances there could be no means to prosecute any claim,
much less certify a class. The Court of Appeals cannot find any
fault with the trial court's analysis and it can therefore not say
that it abused its discretion.

Mr. Swearingen's third assignment of error fails for much the same
reason. All allegations of compensable injury found in his
complaint were disproven by his own testimony. That necessary
element is missing from all his causes of action.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit
Court, which dismissed Swearingen's original class action complaint
and denied Swearingen's contemporaneous motion to file an amended
class action complaint, is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 11, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/mubekn5e from Leagle.com.

Mason L. Miller -- Mmiller@merlegal.com -- William C. Rambicure --
wrambicure@merlegal.com -- in Lexington, Kentucky, Briefs for the
Appellant.

Mason L. Miller, in Lexington, Kentucky, Oral Argument for the
Appellant.

Sheryl G. Snyder, Nolan M. Jackson -- njackson@fbtlaw.com -- Keith
Moorman -- kmoorman@fbtlaw.co -- in Lexington, Kentucky, Brief for
Appellee Hagyard Davidson McGee Associates, PLLC.

W. Craig Robertson, III -- wrobertson@wyattfirm.com -- Courtney R.
Samford, Thomas E. Travis, in Lexington, Kentucky, Brief for
Appellee Dean Dorton Allen Ford, PLLC.

Michael P. Casey, Sarah E. Boggs, in Lexington, Kentucky, Brief for
Appellees Dr. Michael T. Hore, Dr. Dwayne Rodgerson, and Dr.
Michael Spirito.

Thomas W. Miller -- twm@kentuckylaw.com -- Elizabeth C. Woodford,
in Lexington, Kentucky, Brief for Appellee Dr. Robert J. Hunt.

Michael P. Casey, Courtney R. Samford -- csamford@wyattfirm.com --
in Lexington, Kentucky, Oral argument for the Appellees.


HARTFORD HEALTHCARE: Connecticut Residents File Monopoly Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Katy Golvala, writing for the ct mirror, reports that a group of
Connecticut residents filed a proposed class-action lawsuit against
Hartford HealthCare on Feb. 14, alleging the network uses its
market dominance to charge higher prices to the state's
commercially insured residents.

The 60-page complaint filed in Hartford Superior Court claims HHC
used anticompetitive practices to create a monopoly on inpatient
hospital services and leveraged its market power to charge insurers
higher rates for those services and others, the costs of which were
passed onto the state's employers and consumers.

"As one of Connecticut's major hospital networks, the result of
HHC's anticompetitive conduct has been a dramatic increase in
prices on acute care and in the cost of commercial health insurance
for commercially insured individuals and their employers," the
lawsuit alleges.

In an emailed statement, a representative from Hartford HealthCare
said the complaint was "without merit," and added that the network
plans defend itself against the allegations in court.

The plaintiffs are being represented by New York City-based law
firm Perry Guha and Fairmark Partners. E. Danya Perry, founding
partner of Perry Guha stated, "Connecticut has one of the highest
rates of health care spending in the country and patients are being
saddled with rising insurance premiums for needed medical care."

The complaint comes just a month after another lawsuit was filed
against Hartford HealthCare by rival hospital system Saint Francis
Hospital and Medical Center, alleging similar anticompetitive
tactics. Lawyers for Saint Francis said HHC is attempting to create
a monopoly by acquiring physician practices and demanding they
refer patients exclusively to HHC facilities.

Karen Staib and Patrick Fahey, lawyers with Hartford-based Shipman
& Goodwin, who are representing HHC in that litigation, didn't
immediately respond to emails on Feb. 15.

In Connecticut, both the attorney general and the Office of Health
Strategy are paying close attention to the issue of hospital
consolidation and the impact it can have on the cost of care. A
spokesperson for the office of the Attorney General William Tong
stated in an email on Feb. 15 that they are "concerned about the
allegations and reviewing the matter." The state's Office of Health
Strategy declined to comment.

The six plaintiffs are seeking class action status in the lawsuit,
defining the group as anyone who was enrolled in a commercial
health plan in the relevant market, who paid insurance premiums or
co-pays for services at HHC facilities. A judge must determine
whether to grant class status to the case.

Alleged harm
The allegations the plaintiffs outlined in their complaint on Feb.
15 include several instances where HHC charged more than its
competitors for similar services.

In Hartford, HHC's prices for procedures requiring an overnight
hospital stay are higher than all other hospitals in the city,
according to the lawsuit. The average price for a hospital stay at
Hartford Hospital is about $4,000 more than at Saint Francis, and
the price for the least serious type of emergency room visit is 50%
higher, the six plaintiffs alleged in the lawsuit.

In New Britain, HHC's Hospital of Central Connecticut charges
"prices that are about 70% higher for inpatient procedures relative
to its closest competitor, John Dempsey Hospital, which is less
than six miles away."

In three of the markets in which it operates, Hartford HealthCare
has a monopoly, according to the lawsuit. These include Windham,
Norwich and Torrington, where HHC accounts for around 80% of all
in-patient admissions.

HHC has been able to charge these higher prices by using that
leverage to engage in anticompetitive practices when negotiating
with insurance agencies, including "all-or-nothing contracts,"
"anti-steering and anti-tiering" and gag clauses.

According to a September 2021 presentation to the state
legislature's Insurance and Real Estate Committee, "all or nothing
contracts" require insurers to include all of a network's
facilities in its coverage plan, regardless of how expensive they
are.

"Anti-steering and anti-tiering" clauses require insurers to "place
all hospitals in a health system in the most favorable tier with
the lowest cost-sharing tier," which discourages patients from
finding providers that might be lower-cost and higher-quality.

Gag clauses, according to the complaint, prevent health plans from
"revealing the terms of HHC's payer/provider agreements," thus
decreasing price transparency for patients.

"In the context of a hospital system with both significant market
power in cities like Hartford and Bridgeport and monopoly market
power in three other markets [Willimantic, Torrington, and
Norwich], these contract provisions have an especially harmful
impact on price and quality," the lawsuit states.

The CT market follows a pattern
The use of contract clauses to discourage competition and drive up
prices have come under scrutiny over the last several years.

In 2016, the Department of Justice and the North Carolina Attorney
General went after the state's largest health system for its use of
"anti-steering and anti-tiering" clauses. The case settled two
years later, and the system was prevented from using the clauses in
future contracts.

In 2018, the state of California, under then-Attorney General
Xavier Becerra, filed a lawsuit against the largest hospital system
in Northern California for its use of anticompetitive practices to
drive higher prices, including "all or nothing" contracts. The case
settled a year later, with the hospital system agreeing to pay $575
million and adopt several reforms to its practices.

Becerra now serves as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services under President Joe Biden, and some have
speculated that he'll use the office to zero in on anticompetitive
practices at hospitals. [GN]

HUMANA MEDICAL: Tauber Sues Over Pre-Recorded Telemarketing Calls
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Steven M. Tauber, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. HUMANA MEDICAL PLAN INC., a Florida
corporation, Case No. 0:22-cv-60295-RKA (S.D. Fla., Feb. 8, 2022),
is brought to stop the Defendant from violating the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act by making pre-recorded and other
telemarketing calls to consumers without their consent, including
pre-recorded telemarketing calls to consumers who expressly
requested for the calls to stop.

The Defendant uses telemarketing and cold calling to solicit their
products and services to consumers across the country. The
Defendant places such telemarketing calls without implementing
internal procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request
not to be called by the entity and/or by implementing procedures
that do not meet the minimum requirements to allow the Defendant to
initiate telemarketing calls, as in the Plaintiff's case, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff is a resident of Boynton Beach, Florida.

Humana provides healthcare products and services to consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stefan Coleman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF STEFAN COLEMAN, P.A.
          201 S. Biscayne Blvd, 28th Floor
          Miami, FL 33131
          Phone: (877) 333-9427
          Email: law@stefancoleman.com

               - and -

          Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          400 NW 26th Street
          Miami, FL 33127
          Phone: (305) 469-5881
          Email: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com



HYP3R INC: Must Face Instagram Privacy Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
Joan M. Young, Esq., and Mala Milanese, Esq., of McMillan,
disclosed that the B.C. Supreme Court recently certified a class
action proceeding against Hyp3R Inc. ("Hyp3R"),[1] a U.S.-based
marketing firm that collected Canadian Instagram users' personal
information in breach of the platform's policies. The Court also
ordered Hyp3R to pay more than $24 million in damages.

Background

Instagram permits users to share posts, including texts, photos,
and videos, with other members and the public. It makes available
tools that allow third parties to interact with Instagram, but
requires third parties to adhere to certain policies, including the
prohibition of "scraping" or improper collection and retention of
users' personal information.

In April of 2018, Instagram made changes such that it would not be
possible to access or collect all public posts from specific
locations or collect and retain users' Instagram stories through
those tools. After these changes were made, the defendant Hyp3R
carried out "scraping" of personal information from users' profiles
on Instagram up until about August 2019, at which time Instagram
announced that Hyp3R's actions were in violation of its policies
and that it was removing the company from its platform.

The plaintiff sought to hold Hyp3R accountable for this conduct to
Instagram users in Canada (other than Quebec). It was alleged that
Hyp3R's actions constituted a breach of the privacy statutes of
four provinces as well as the tort of intrusion upon seclusion (in
the remaining provinces and territories).

The Decision

The Court noted that the plaintiff had served Hyp3R with the notice
of civil claim, but that Hyp3R had failed to respond, resulting in
the plaintiff obtaining a default judgment for damages to be
assessed. After reviewing applicable case law, the Court concluded
that it was appropriate to proceed with certification and
determination of the issues notwithstanding the defendant's
default. The Court went on the address the following matters:

Certification

The plaintiff argued that all of the certification requirements for
a class action were met. The Court accepted this argument for the
reasons set out below.

i. The pleadings disclosed a cause of action

Statutory torts for breach of privacy are set out in provisions of
the privacy statutes in B.C.,[2] Saskatchewan,[3] Manitoba,[4] and
Newfoundland and Labrador.[5] The privacy statutes of these
provinces contain a significant amount of parallel language.

In each of these provinces, it is a tort to violate a person's
privacy wilfully and without claim of right; "proof of damages" is
not a required element of the tort.[6] Privacy may be violated by
eavesdropping or surveillance.[7]

It is also a tort to use, without authorization, the name or
likeness of a person for purposes of advertising or promoting the
sale of, or any other trading in, any property or services.[8]

The plaintiff claimed that Hyp3R breached both of these torts in
B.C., Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Newfoundland and Labrador when it
collected personal information without consent from the plaintiff
and class members in each of these provinces and sold that
information to third parties.

The remaining common law jurisdictions in Canada (i.e., Ontario,
Alberta, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Yukon,
the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut) do not have statutes
comparable to the privacy statutes described above. However, the
common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion is available in these
jurisdictions. The plaintiff alleged that, through its unauthorized
collection, retention, and use of class members' personal
information, Hyp3R committed the tort of instruction upon seclusion
against class members in these jurisdictions.

The Court found that the plaintiff had pleaded claims that
demonstrated causes of action on behalf of class members both in
the four provinces with privacy statutes and in the remaining
common law jurisdictions.

ii. There was an identifiable class of two or more persons

The plaintiff sought an order defining the class as all persons in
Canada (excluding Quebec) who were Instagram users with profile
settings set to public at any time between April 4, 2018 and the
date of certification of the action at issue. The Court concluded
that the class as so defined had objective criteria and appeared to
be clear.

iii. The claims of the class members raised common issues

The Court found that the common issues as proposed met the
requirements for certification.

iv. A class proceeding was the preferable procedure for the fair
and efficient resolution of the common issues

The plaintiff argued that Hyp3R's misconduct was uniform against
people using its services, and that aggregating claims against
Hyp3R under the Class Proceedings Act[9] was beneficial to class
members and to the Court. The Court agreed with these submissions
and concluded that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure
for resolution of the common issues.

v. There was an appropriate representative plaintiff

The plaintiff, Catherine Severs, was a class member, and an
Instagram user with her privacy settings set to public at the
relevant times. The Court was satisfied that Ms. Severs was an
appropriate representative of the class and met the requirements
for certification.

Judgment on the Common Issues and Assessment of Damages

As these were default proceedings, the plaintiff was entitled to
proceed on the basis that the allegations set out in the notice of
civil claim were true. Based on the deemed admission of the
allegations of fact in the notice of civil claim, along with
affidavit evidence filed by the plaintiff, the Court was satisfied
that there had been a violation by Hyp3R of the privacy of class
members in each of the four provinces with privacy statutes,
through the intentional and unauthorized collection of information
(which the Court characterized as surveillance) and use of names
and photographs of class members for commercial purposes. With
respect to the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, the Court
similarly concluded based on the evidence and the deemed admissions
that the conduct of Hyp3R was intentional, that it involved the
invasion of class members' privacy without lawful justification,
that a reasonable person would regard that invasion as highly
offensive, and that a reasonable person would be caused distress,
humiliation or anguish.

The Court determined that each class member should be entitled to
$10 in damages. The award applies only to Instagram users who had
their accounts on a public rather than a private setting at the
relevant times, which includes more than 2.4 million users.

Takeaways

The decision in Severs v Hyp3R appears at odds with the more recent
decision of the court in the Chow v. Facebook, Inc[10] class
proceedings. The B.C. Supreme Court in this case has clearly stated
that the intentional and unauthorized collection and commercial use
of personal data from public social media profiles constitutes a
breach of the Privacy Act (in British Columbia, Saskatchewan,
Manitoba, and Newfoundland and Labrador) as well as the tort of
intrusion upon seclusion (in the remaining Canadian common law
jurisdictions). In contrast, the court's decision in the recent
Facebook case suggested that these kinds of claims were too
individualized and not suitable for class proceedings.

Ultimately, the result in this case is probably more a function of
the claim not being defended on its merits and the result of the
default judgment, more than anything. Going forward it will prove
interesting to see whether this case or the Facebook decision is
the leading law in BC on these types of claims.

References
References
1 Severs v Hyp3R Inc, 2021 BCSC 2261 [Severs v Hyp3R].
2 Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 [Privacy Act (BC)].
3 Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24 [Privacy Act (SK)].
4 Privacy Act, CCSM, c P125 [Privacy Act (MB)].
5 Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22 [Privacy Act (NL)].
6 See Privacy Act (BC) at s 1; Privacy Act (SK) at s 2; Privacy Act
(MB) at s 2; and Privacy Act (NL) at s 3(1).
7 See Privacy Act (BC) at s 1(4); Privacy Act (SK) at s 3(a);
Privacy Act (MB) at s 3(a); and Privacy Act (NL) at s 4(a).
8 See Privacy Act (BC) at s 3(2); Privacy Act (SK) at s 3(c);
Privacy Act (MB) at s 3(c); and Privacy Act (NL) at s 4(c).
9 Class Proceedings Act, RSBC 1996, c 50 [Class Proceedings Act].
10 2022 BCSC 137. [GN]

INMEDIATA HEALTH: Agrees to Settle Breach Class Action for $1.125-M
-------------------------------------------------------------------
hipaajournal.com Inmediata, a provider of clearinghouse services
and business process software, has agreed to settle a class action
lawsuit filed by victims of its 2019 security breach that exposed
the protected health information of more than 1.56 million
individuals.

In January 2019, Inmediata discovered a misconfiguration on its
website resulted in internal web pages containing electronic
protected health information (ePHI) being accessible over the
Internet. The web pages were indexed by the search engines and
could be found in the search engine listings. The exposed
information was mostly limited to names, addresses, dates of birth,
gender, and medical claim information. A small percentage of
individuals also had their Social Security numbers exposed. When
sending notification letters to affected individuals, errors were
made by its mailing vendor that resulted in letters being sent to
incorrect individuals. Some individuals reported receiving multiple
notification letters, with some containing the names of other
patients. The notification letters were sent in April 2019, three
months after the data breach was discovered. Inmediata's
investigation found no evidence to suggest any information on the
web pages had been viewed or copied by unauthorized individuals,
but it was not possible to rule out unauthorized ePHI access.

In April 2019, a class action lawsuit - Jessie Seranno et al. v.
Inmediata Corp. and Inmediata Health Group Corp - was filed on
behalf of victims of the breach that alleged Inmediata had failed
to implement appropriate information security measures to keep
individuals' protected health information private and confidential,
and also unnecessarily delayed issuing breach notification
letters.

Inmediata has not admitted any wrongdoing and does not accept any
liability for the data breach but has decided to settle the case to
avoid further legal costs and the uncertainty of a jury trial.
Under the terms of the settlement, Inmediata will set up a $1.125
million fund to cover claims from the plaintiffs and class
members.

All class members will be entitled to submit claims of up to $2,500
as reimbursement for documented out-of-pocket expenses incurred in
relation to the data breach, including the costs incurred from
credit monitoring services, fees, and any fraudulent charges on
their accounts, as well as up to three hours of time at a rate of
$15 per hour. A further $50 or more can be claimed by all breach
victims who were living in California at the time of the breach, as
required by the California Confidentiality of Medical Information
Act (CMIA). The amount available to cover CMIA claims will be
determined by the number of individuals who submit a claim. All
class members will also be entitled to a complimentary membership
to Kroll's Web Watcher credit and identity theft monitoring
service.

The plaintiffs and class members have until March 21, 2022, to
submit their claims, exclude themselves, or object to the
settlement. The final approval hearing is scheduled for April 21,
2022. [GN]

J.B. HUNT: Wins Final Approval of Class Settlement in Wilson Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned KAREEM WILSON, on behalf of himself, and
all others similarly situated, and as an "aggrieved employee" on
behalf of other "aggrieved employees" under the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004, Plaintiff v. J.B. HUNT LOGISTICS,
INC., an Arkansas corporation; J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC., a
business entity of unknown form; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-3487-SVW-AFMx (C.D. Cal.), the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California, Western
Division, grants final approval of the Settlement Agreement as set
forth in the Parties' Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement.

District Judge Stephen V. Wilson notes that the Court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this litigation and over
all Parties to this litigation, including the Plaintiff and Class
Members.

On July 27, 2020, the Plaintiff submitted a copy of the Settlement
Agreement with the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency
(LWDA). On May 13, 2021, at the Defendants' request, the Settlement
Agreement administrator ILYM Group, issued the notices required by
the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") to the Attorney Generals and
Labor Commissioners for each required state.

Pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order, the appointed
Settlement Agreement Administrator, ILYM Group, mailed a Notice of
Class Action Settlement Agreement ("Class Notice") and a Notice of
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ("PAGA") Settlement Agreement
to all known Class Members and PAGA Releasees by First Class U.S.
Mail. The Court finds and determines that the Notice of Class
Action Settlement Agreement provided in the Action was the best
notice practicable, which satisfied the requirements of law and due
process.

In response to the Notice of Class Action Settlement Agreement, no
Class Members objected to the Settlement Agreement.

The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement offers significant
monetary recovery to all Class Members and finds that such recovery
is fair, adequate, and reasonable when balanced against further
litigation related to liability and damages issues. The Court
further finds that the Settlement has been reached as the result of
intensive, serious, and non-collusive, arms-length negotiations.

Thus, the Court approves the Settlement set forth in the Settlement
Agreement and finds that the Settlement is, in all respects, fair,
adequate, and reasonable and directs the Parties to effectuate the
Settlement Agreement according to its terms.

The Court orders the Settlement Administrator to distribute the
Individual Settlement Payments to Class Members in accordance with
the provisions of the Settlement Agreement.

For purposes of the Order and for the Settlement Agreement only,
the Court certifies the Class, as defined in the Settlement
Agreement. For purposes of this Order and this Settlement only, the
Court confirms the appointment of Named Plaintiff Kareem Wilson as
the class representative for the Class. Further, the Court approves
a Class Representative General Release Payment to the Plaintiff in
the amount of 1,000.

For purposes of the Order and the Settlement only, the Court
confirms the appointment of David Spivak of The Spivak Law Firm and
Walter Haines of the United Employees Law Group, as the Class
Counsel. Further, the Court finally approves the requested Attorney
Fee Award, as fair and reasonable, not to exceed $25,000. As well,
the Court finally approves the Costs Award of $10,974.95 as fair
and reasonable.

For purposes of the Order and the Settlement Agreement only, the
Court finally approves Settlement Administration Costs of $5,767.07
as fair and reasonable.

By operation of the entry of the Final Approval Order and Final
Judgment, every Class Member will have conclusively released the
Released Claims against the Released Parties, including for any
injunctive or declaratory relief.

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff agrees to provide a
Complete and General Release and a 1542 Waiver to the Released
Parties, as defined and set forth fully in the Settlement
Agreement.

After Settlement administration has been completed in accordance
with the Settlement Agreement, and in no event later than 180 days
after the Effective Date, the Plaintiff will file a report with
this Court certifying compliance with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.

If the Settlement does not become final and effective in accordance
with the terms of the Settlement Agreement, resulting in the return
and/or retention of the Settlement funds to the Defendants
consistent with the terms of the Settlement Agreement, then the
Order and all orders entered in connection herewith, including any
order certifying the Class, appointing a class representative or
Class Counsel, will be rendered null and void and will be vacated.

Final Judgment is entered based on the parties' class action
Settlement Agreement. Without affecting the finality of this Final
Approval Order and Final Judgment in any way, the Court retains
continuing jurisdiction over the interpretation, implementation and
enforcement of the Settlement Agreement and all orders and
judgments entered in connection therewith.

A full-text copy of the Court's Final Approval Order and Final
Judgment dated Feb. 7, 2022, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yksunx4n from Leagle.com.


JODY ENTERPRISES: Violates FLSA, NYLL, Morga Class Suit Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
JONATHAN MORGA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. JODY ENTERPRISES, INC., GIUSTINO GALLONE, and ABEL
NOLASCO, Case No. 2:22-cv-00912 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 18, 2022) is a
class action complaint seeking equitable and legal relief for the
Defendants' violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and
the New York Labor Law.

The Defendants employed the Plaintiff as a garbage collector from
January 2010 until March 2, 2021. As a garbage collector, the
Plaintiff's job duties included, inter alia, collecting garbage and
placing it in the truck, doing heavy lifting, and cleaning areas as
needed.

Throughout the Plaintiff's employment with the Defendants, the
Plaintiff regularly worked five days per week, as follows: Mondays,
Tuesdays, and Thursdays from approximately 4:30 a.m. until
approximately 3:30 p.m.; and Wednesdays and Fridays from
approximately 4:30 a.m. until approximately 1:00 p.m., for a total
of approximately 50 hours worked per week.

Throughout his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff was not
afforded meal or rest breaks during his shifts, the suit says.

JEI is a waste management company operating in New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eliseo Cabrera, Esq.
          KATZ MELINGER PLLC
          370 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1512
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 460-0047
          E-mail: edcabrera@katzmelinger.com

JOHNS HOPKINS: Among Defendants in Financial Aid Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Gilbert Litigators & Counselors, P.C. on Feb. 16 disclosed that the
students and families who recently filed the antitrust class action
lawsuit against 16 of the country's most elite, private
universities -- for price fixing and reducing financial aid to
needy students for almost 20 years -- have expanded their
allegations in an amended complaint.

The amended complaint first adds Johns Hopkins University as a
defendant. In 2021, Johns Hopkins joined the 568 Presidents Group,
also known as the "568 Cartel." The amended complaint alleges that,
in joining the Cartel, Johns Hopkins adopted the use of a
"Consensus Methodology" (CM) for determining financial aid, which
is a central component of the alleged scheme that has artificially
reduced the amounts of financial aid the universities awarded to
their students. The students and families allege that the
conspiracy among the 17 defendants effectively raised the net price
of attendance, harming in the aggregate more than 200,000 students
from working and middle-class families.

The amended complaint further alleges that all of the defendant
universities using the CM -- now including Johns Hopkins -- failed
to follow a need-blind admissions policy and therefore did not meet
the terms of a narrow statutory antitrust exemption under Section
568 of the Higher Education Act. That exemption allows only those
universities using "need-blind" admissions policies, as defined by
the law, for all their students "to use common principles of
analysis for determining the need of such students for financial
aid." The amended complaint thus alleges that because all 17
defendants systematically favored wealthy applicants in making
admissions decisions, they were not entitled to the antitrust
exemption for their conduct.

The amended complaint also presents data showing the enormous
growth in the endowments of each of the 17 defendants since the 568
exemption was adopted in 1994, and how such growth has far outpaced
the growth in the annual operating expenses for the defendants for
which such data is available. These facts, the amended complaint
contends, illustrate that the defendants easily had, and continue
to have, the financial means to provide more generous financial aid
awards to their students—in particular, for low- and
middle-income families struggling to afford the cost of a
university education and to achieve success for their children—if
the defendants were not colluding.

Named Defendants
The Defendants are Brown University, California Institute of
Technology, University of Chicago, Columbia University, Cornell
University, Dartmouth College, Duke University, Emory University,
Georgetown University, Johns Hopkins University, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Northwestern University, Notre Dame,
University of Pennsylvania, Rice University, Vanderbilt University,
and Yale University.

The law firms representing the plaintiffs are Roche Freedman,
Gilbert Litigators & Counselors, Berger Montague and FeganScott.
For a copy of the amended complaint and more information on the
litigation, go to 568Cartel.com.

Contact: media@568Cartel.com [GN]

JUMIO CORPORATION: Dudley Suit Removed to N.D. Illinois
-------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Cora Dudley, Jeanne Matthews, individually
and on behalf of other persons similarly situated v. Jumio
Corporation, Case No. 2022 CH 00408 was removed from the Circuit
Court of Cook County, to the U.S. District Court for Northern
District of Illinois on Feb. 18, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:22-cv-00890 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I. for Personal Injury.

Jumio -- https://www.jumio.com/ -- is an online mobile payments and
identity verification company that provides card and ID scanning
and validation products for mobile and web transactions, which they
sell as "Netverify Trusted Identity as a Service."[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear pro se.

The Defendant is represented by:

          Susan Donnelly Fahringer, Esq.
          PERKINS COIE LLP
          1201 Third Ave., Suite 4900
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Phone: (206) 359-8000
          Email: SFahringer@perkinscoie.com


JUUL LABS: Berkeley Sues Over Deceptive E-Cigarette Youth Ads
-------------------------------------------------------------
BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC. F/K/A PAX
LABS, INC.; JAMES MONSEES; ADAM BOWEN; NICHOLAS PRITZKER; HOYOUNG
HUH; RIAZ VALANI; ALTRIA GROUP, INC.; ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC;
ALTRIA GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY; and PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-01031 (N.D. Cal., February 18, 2022)
is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross
negligence, and violations of Public Nuisance Law and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

Berkeley Unified School District is a unified school district with
its offices located at 2020 Bonar Street in Berkeley, California.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         James Frantz, Esq.
         William B. Shinoff, Esq.
         FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
         402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 233-5945
         Facsimile: (619) 525-7672
         E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com

JUUL LABS: Colton-Pierrepont Sues Over Youth's E-Cigarette Crisis
-----------------------------------------------------------------
COLTON-PIERREPONT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, on behalf of itself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC. F/K/A
PAX LABS, INC.; JAMES MONSEES; ADAM BOWEN; NICHOLAS PRITZKER;
HOYOUNG HUH; RIAZ VALANI; ALTRIA GROUP, INC.; ALTRIA CLIENT
SERVICES LLC; ALTRIA GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY; and PHILIP MORRIS
USA, INC., Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-01006 (N.D. Cal., February
18, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for negligence,
gross negligence, and violations of Public Nuisance Law and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

Colton-Pierrepont Central School District is a unified school
district with its offices located at 4921 NY-56 in Colton, New
York.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         James Frantz, Esq.
         William B. Shinoff, Esq.
         FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
         402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 233-5945
         Facsimile: (619) 525-7672
         E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com

JUUL LABS: E-Cigarette Ads Target Youth, Kane County Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
KANE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC. F/K/A PAX LABS,
INC.; JAMES MONSEES; ADAM BOWEN; NICHOLAS PRITZKER; HOYOUNG HUH;
RIAZ VALANI; ALTRIA GROUP, INC.; ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC; ALTRIA
GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY; and PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-01026 (N.D. Cal., February 18, 2022)
is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross
negligence, and violations of Public Nuisance Law and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, the suit says.

Kane County School District is a unified school district with its
offices located at 746 South 175 East in Kanab, Utah.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         James Frantz, Esq.
         William B. Shinoff, Esq.
         FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
         402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 233-5945
         Facsimile: (619) 525-7672
         E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com

JUUL LABS: La Canada Sues Over E-Cigarette Campaign to Youth
------------------------------------------------------------
LA CANADA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC. F/K/A PAX
LABS, INC.; JAMES MONSEES; ADAM BOWEN; NICHOLAS PRITZKER; HOYOUNG
HUH; RIAZ VALANI; ALTRIA GROUP, INC.; ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC;
ALTRIA GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY; and PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-01038 (N.D. Cal., February 18, 2022)
is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross
negligence, and violations of Public Nuisance Law and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

La Canada Unified School District is a unified school district with
its offices located at 4490 Cornishon Avenue in La Canada
Flintridge, California.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         James Frantz, Esq.
         William B. Shinoff, Esq.
         FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
         402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 233-5945
         Facsimile: (619) 525-7672
         E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com

JUUL LABS: LaFargeVille Sues Over Youth's E-Cigarette Addiction
---------------------------------------------------------------
LAFARGEVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC. F/K/A PAX
LABS, INC.; JAMES MONSEES; ADAM BOWEN; NICHOLAS PRITZKER; HOYOUNG
HUH; RIAZ VALANI; ALTRIA GROUP, INC.; ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC;
ALTRIA GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY; and PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-01008 (N.D. Cal., February 18, 2022)
is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross
negligence, and violations of Public Nuisance Law and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

LaFargeville Central School District is a unified school district
with its offices located at 20414 Sunrise Avenue in LaFargeville,
New York.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         James Frantz, Esq.
         William B. Shinoff, Esq.
         FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
         402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 233-5945
         Facsimile: (619) 525-7672
         E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com

JUUL LABS: Markets E-Cigarette to Youth, Coldwater Community Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------------
COLDWATER COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC. F/K/A PAX LABS,
INC.; JAMES MONSEES; ADAM BOWEN; NICHOLAS PRITZKER; HOYOUNG HUH;
RIAZ VALANI; ALTRIA GROUP, INC.; ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC; ALTRIA
GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY; and PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-00998 (N.D. Cal., February 18, 2022)
is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross
negligence, and violations of Public Nuisance Law and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, the suit contends.

Coldwater Community Schools is a unified school district with its
offices located at 401 Sauk River Drive in Coldwater, Michigan.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         James Frantz, Esq.
         William B. Shinoff, Esq.
         FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
         402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 233-5945
         Facsimile: (619) 525-7672
         E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com

KBK NO. 11: B.C. Supreme Ct. Certifies Suit Over Defective Windows
------------------------------------------------------------------
Joanne Lee-Young, writing for Vancouver Sun, reports that a B.C.
Supreme Court case alleging that defective glass windows have been
fogging, leaking and spontaneously breaking at the Shangri-La
residential condo tower in downtown Vancouver has been certified as
a class-action suit.

The move allows all owners of condo units in the high-end
Shangri-La live/work building, where there are two strata -- one
for units on floors 16 to 43 and for those on floors from 44 to 62
-- to take part in the claim.

The B.C. Supreme Court ruling giving a green light to the class
action proceedings was issued in early February by Justice Paul
Walker.

The lead plaintiff, who owns and lives in a unit on one of the
highest floors, first filed a notice of civil claim back in
December 2015.

In September, 2021, the plaintiff sought to amend the claim by
expanding the class definition and adding new claims of negligence
and a number of new parties, but the court found some of these to
be "an abuse of process," according to a note on the defendants'
lawyers' website.

The class action certification now comes after leaked strata
minutes in recent years had been describing the possibility of the
building's windows cracking as a "real and unacceptable risk."

The court's ruling in February gave more details that illustrate
the challenging number of stages, components and parties involved
when it comes to potentially assigning fault.

It described the building's curtain-wall system as "consisting of
prefabricated panels constructed as distinct four-sided insulated
glass units (IGUs) which are said to be integral to the proper
functioning of the building and separate the exterior and interior
environments. IGUs include inner and outer glass (called lites)
separated by a metal spacer bar."

"The outer and inner lites have different structural attributes.
The outer lite is heat-strengthened glass while the inner lite is
tempered glass. The inner lite is twice as stiff as the outer lite
and unlike the outer lite it is supposed to break into small pieces
when shattered. Both glass lites are sealed to the spacer using two
types of sealant which are meant to provide an air- and
vapour-tight cavity between the glass panes. A chemical known as a
"dessicant," designed to absorb moisture in the air between the two
lites, is contained inside of the spacer bar."

The defendants named by the suit are the legal owner of the land,
KBK No. 11 Ventures Ltd., the developer, 1100 Georgia Partnership
and its partners, which includes companies related to local groups
such as the Peterson Group and Westbank Corp.

"It will be interesting how they identify the reason for the …
failures," said Tony Gioventu, executive director for the
Condominium Home Owners Association. "It could be a number of
reasons, and it's not even just thinking beyond the developers and
builders to the suppliers, but how the glass and materials were
stored and transferred to the construction site."

The building, which is Vancouver's tallest tower and known for its
floor-to-ceiling ocean and mountain views, was completed in 2009
and is contains some of the city's most expensive condos.

An initial set of minutes for a special general meeting for the
lower floors strata in September 2020 noted that, over the years,
shattered inner panes meant some windows had already been removed
and replaced on nine floors.

The minutes alleged up to 70 per cent of the windows were failing
"prematurely by decades and reaching just a fraction of their
expected lifespan of 40 years."

A few months later, these strata minutes for the units in the lower
part of the building on floors 16 to 43 were amended with a more
muted version, leaving out the above details and an initial
estimate that it could cost $65 million to reconstruct the curtain
wall and replace the window units in increments.

Each strata also has two other legal actions underway, one to
recover costs under warranty from insurers and the other against
developers, builders and contractors.

These four other cases will be heard by the court at the same time,
starting in September in a trial that is expected to take 130 days,
according to the recent B.C. Supreme Court ruling about the
class-action certification.

The strata allege "that the systematic dangerous defects pose a
substantial risk of physical danger, including to the health and
safety of any person in the vicinity of the building."

The plaintiff, named in previous filings as Amos Michelson, a
resident who owns and lives in a penthouse unit, "advances the same
allegations in this proceeding concerning systemic defects,"
according to the ruling. [GN]

KIND LLC: N.D. California Grants Bid to Dismiss Chong Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LISA CHONG, et al., Plaintiffs, v. KIND LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-04528-RS (N.D. Cal.), Judge Richard
Seeborg of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California granted KIND's motion to dismiss without leave to
amend.

I. Introduction

In the putative class action, named Plaintiffs Lisa Chong and Zach
Schwartz challenge the statements Defendant KIND makes on the
packaging of various "breakfast and snack products" sold under the
KIND brand name regarding the protein content of those products.
KIND moves to dismiss, arguing the Plaintiffs' claims, which all
sound in state law, are preempted by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA).

The Plaintiffs' counsel previously filed a nearly identical action
against a maker of pancake and waffle mixes, citing Minor v. Baker
Mills, Inc., No. 20-cv-02901 RS. A motion to dismiss in Minor,
brought largely on the same grounds advanced in the instant case,
was denied. It has now become apparent, however, that Minor was
incorrectly decided. Because the Plaintiffs are attempting to use
state law to impose labeling requirements that go beyond what the
FDA regulations require, their claims are preempted and the motion
to dismiss must be granted.

II. Background

KIND manufactures, distributes, markets, and sells nut bars,
granola, and other snack products. One of the ways KIND markets
many of its products is by touting the grams of protein per serving
on the front of its packages. Plaintiffs insist KIND's products do
not contain or provide the amount of protein claimed on the front
because KIND uses "low quality, incomplete protein sources that are
of little use to the human body." Plaintiffs contend that KIND's
labels are therefore misleading and the products misbranded under
state and federal law. In addition to the claim that the amount of
protein is overstated on the front of packaging, plaintiffs allege
that KIND has failed to include a "% Daily Value" figure in the
Nutrition Facts panels for some of its products.

Plaintiffs correctly note that this case is "nearly identical" to
Minor. The original complaint in Minor focused on a theory that the
grams of protein in the products had been overstated because
defendant calculated the number using the "nitrogen method," rather
than an "amino acid method." Although that complaint survived a
motion to dismiss, the plaintiff subsequently amended to present a
refined theory that the product labeling was misleading not only
because of how the grams of protein were calculated, but also
because the numbers were not adjusted for "digestibility," given
the particular source of the protein. The complaint in this action
similarly stresses the latter point.

The Plaintiffs argue that the present motion to dismiss on
preemption grounds should be denied just like the motions in Minor.
KIND, however, urges "a fresh look at the governing FDA
regulations."

III. Discussion

A. Statements on the front of packaging

There is no dispute that if KIND's labeling practices are
consistent with the requirements set out in FDA regulations, state
law claims challenging those practices are preempted. There is also
no dispute that KIND is expressly permitted by FDA regulations to
state the amount of protein in grams in the Nutrition Facts panels
of its products (1) using the "nitrogen method," and (2) without
adjusting the number to reflect digestibility. The question is
whether KIND may use those same numbers when stating the grams of
protein elsewhere on product packaging. Minor held the defendants
cannot.

Judge Seeborg holds that the Minor will not be followed to save the
Plaintiffs' complaint. As set out in the recent decision of
Nacarino v. Kashi Company, No. 3:21-cv-07036-VC (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9,
2022), a correct reading of the regulations establishes that
producers may state grams of protein even outside the Nutrition
Facts panel calculated by the nitrogen method, and without
adjustment for digestibility. The motion to dismiss the claims
based on front-of-packaging statements must be granted. As in
Nacarino, because the defect in the case lies in the legal theory,
not the factual allegations, the dismissal will be without leave to
amend.

B. Failure to provide "% Daily Value"

In Minor, the defendants did not argue preemption with respect to
the claims for failure to include a "% Daily Value," and instead
moved to dismiss them by arguing plaintiff could not show he had
relied on the omission. In the present case, KIND argues the claims
are subject to implied preemption under Buckman v. Plaintiffs'
Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001). The Plaintiffs insist Buckman
does not apply because their claims "parallel the FDA
regulations."

JUdge Seeborg finds that the Plaintiffs here are not pursuing
pre-existing, traditional, state tort law claims, rather they rely
on California's Sherman Law, which post-dates and is entirely
dependent upon the FDCA, in that it expressly adopts the FDCA and
regulations as state law. It provides that "all food labeling
regulations and any amendments to those regulations adopted
pursuant to the federal act, in effect on Jan. 1, 1993, or adopted
on or after that date will be the food labeling regulations of this
state." As such, the Plaintiffs' claims based on the omission of
the % DV in some of KIND's product labels are preempted. Those
claims must also be dismissed. Because the defect again is one of
theory, not factual sufficiency, no leave to amend will be
granted.

IV. Conclusion

Judge Seeborg granted the motion to dismiss without leave to amend.
A separate judgment will be issued.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 15, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yc7h89cw from Leagle.com.


KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Class Suit Over Recalled CPAP Devices Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------
Legal Examiner reports that on June 14, 2021, Philips Respironics
announced a recall of its "continuous positive airway pressure"
(CPAP), "bilevel positive airway pressure" (BiPAP), and
ventilators. These machines help patients with obstructive sleep
apnea breathe during times of sleep by keeping air passageways or
lungs open. Philips used polyester-based polyurethane foam in these
machines to abate the vibration and noise.

Heat, humidity, ultraviolet rays, and ozone cleaners contribute to
the degrading of the foam. The process releases toxic and
potentially cancer-causing gasses and small particles. The U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) designated the recall as a
"Class I," recognizing the potential of serious health hazards that
these devices pose.

Philips manufactured the recalled CPAP devices between 2009 and
April 26, 2021. If you used one of these machines, you might have
claims based on products liability and violations of consumer
protection laws. Various plaintiffs have filed cumulatively well
over 100 lawsuits, including class actions. Below, we explain class
actions, multidistrict litigation, and how you can join these
proceedings if you have used a defective Philips device.

How Does a Class Action Typically Start?
Class actions arise when a single wrongful act or a set of them
causes harm or violates the legal rights of numerous people and
parties. A plaintiff or small group of plaintiffs will start an
individual lawsuit and request class certification. To obtain the
designation for the case, the lead plaintiff or plaintiffs must
demonstrate to a court that the victims are so numerous as to
prevent their joinder in a regular lawsuit, that common legal and
factual issues apply to the claims and that the lead plaintiffs can
adequately represent the interests of those in the class.

Why Are There Class Actions?
By one report, the Philips CPAP, BiPAP, and ventilators in service
number between three and four million around the globe. Roughly 1.5
to 2 million have been used in the United States. This proves not
surprising given that nearly 22 million people in the United States
have sleep apnea.

With these numbers come the prospects that several thousands of
people may have claims due to defects with the machines. Class
actions promote judicial economy by bringing potentially hundreds
or thousands of claims into a single forum.

A class action removes the financial burdens that otherwise would
prevent a claimant from pursuing claims. Often, wrongful conduct
(especially in consumer affairs) does not cause significant
monetary damages to an individual claimant. The Philips machines
typically run between $300 and $800, depending on the model and
features.

The attorney fees and other expenses of litigation may far outweigh
the benefits an individual plaintiff would receive from the
lawsuit. Class actions allow many similarly-situated claimants to
share the costs such that pursuing the defendant proves worthwhile.
Otherwise, companies such as Philips Respironics could escape
accountability for defective products or unfair consumer
practices.

What Steps Must You Take to Join a Class Action?
Upon certification, the court or the lead litigants will notify
potential class members of the existence of the class action. In
the Philips CPAP actions, the class likely will include those who
purchased or used one of the CPAP, BiPAP, or ventilators that
Philips has recalled. In particular, if you registered the product
with Philips, the lead plaintiffs, Philips' lawyers, or the court
may already have your information. Advertisements for legal
services invite those with the recalled devices to submit their
information.

Typically, you need not act upon getting the notice unless you wish
to "opt-out" of the class action. Should you not "opt-out," you
will become a part of the class action. Membership in the class
means you will have the lead plaintiffs' attorneys participating in
pretrial hearings, pretrial discovery, and negotiations. Often, the
representative plaintiffs and defendants will fashion a settlement
of the class action. By staying in the class action, you become
bound by the settlement terms or judgment of the court.

What Relief Can You Get in a Philips CPAP Class Action?
Class actions arise when multitudes of people seek essentially the
same or similar relief, such as refunds, replacements, or standard
compensation for harms. Plaintiffs in the Philips CPAP class
actions generally want to be refunded for the defective machines or
the costs of acquiring replacement ones. In these cases, the users
may not have suffered the ill effects of exposure to the toxins
from the polyester-based polyurethane foam.

What If a Philips CPAP Machine Causes You Serious Injuries or
Illnesses?
Inhaling or ingesting the degraded foam could result in nausea,
vomiting, breathing difficulties, irritation, kidney or lung
failure, and cancer. These personal injuries call for relief beyond
a refund for or replacement of a defective device. Depending on the
extent of the illness, you may have claims for:

-- Expenses for hospital stays, doctor's visits, therapies,
prescriptions, and other medical services
-- Lost wages due to time away from work
-- Lost earning capacity should the toxin exposure render you
disabled
-- Pain and suffering, including anxiety, depression, and physical
discomfort
-- Loss of the affection and companionship of your spouse

With the emphasis on standard forms of relief for claimants, a
traditional class action may not adequately compensate you for
personal injuries from using a defective Philips device. In
particular, cancer caused by the foam's toxins results in expensive
chemotherapy, surgery, and long-term treatments. In 2018, health
care related to cancer carried a price tag of $183 billion in the
United States. Projections place that figure at almost $246 billion
by 2030. Chemotherapy alone has a cost per patient of $10,000 up to
$200,000 for those without health insurance coverage. The level of
sickness and, thus, damages from exposure varies between those with
product liability or other claims against Philips.

What Is Happening in the Multidistrict Litigation?
Should you sue for personal injuries in federal court from using a
Philips device, your claim will likely find itself in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. In
October 2021, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation transferred the class actions and personal injury claims
arising out of Philips CPAP, BiPAP, and ventilator devices to this
federal district.

Multidistrict litigation has become an oft-used method of handling
mass tort and other cases where hundreds or perhaps thousands of
claimants allege a common set of wrongful acts. The transfer of
federal cases to multidistrict litigation does not on its own
create a class action. Instead, the transfer to a single district
places multiple class actions or individual suits under the
supervision of a single federal judge. The court schedules the
conduct and completion of pretrial actions, such as the production
of documents, depositions of fact and expert witnesses, answering
of written questions posed by the parties, and motions to dismiss
or grant judgment without a trial. In the discovery stage of these
proceedings, courts direct personal injury claimants to produce
medical records and a list of treating physicians to substantiate
the claims.

The Philips CPAP multidistrict litigation includes a set of "lead"
attorneys for the plaintiffs. Those in these leadership roles
likely will work with defense lawyers on discovery requests and
responses, scheduling of deadlines and hearings, other pretrial
matters, and settlement negotiations. In other multidistrict
litigation cases, defendants have agreed with the lead attorneys
for plaintiffs for a global settlement. Plaintiffs then receive
settlements or awards out of the fund.

With the Philips action in its early phase, it may prove sometime
before lawyers can gauge the possible or likely compensation for
Philips CPAP victims. [GN]

KROGER COMPANY: Judge Gives Tentative OK to Labor Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Karlik at coloradopolitics.com reports that a federal judge
has given preliminary approval to a class-action lawsuit against
The Kroger Company seeking to allow salaried supervisors at King
Soopers, a brand of Kroger, to recover overtime compensation they
are allegedly owed.

U.S. District Court Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer certified, as a
class of plaintiffs, all current and former supervisors of King
Soopers in Colorado since Feb. 22, 2018 who were classified as
overtime-exempt. Brimmer ordered Kroger to provide the names and
contact information of all workers in that category.

"Employees deserve to be compensated for the work they do," said
Andrew Swan of Leventhal Lewis Kuhn Taylor Swan PC, one of the
attorneys involved with the litigation. "Like millions of other
employees across the country, many of these King Soopers
supervisors were misclassified as exempt from federal and state
overtime laws. That allowed King Soopers to underpay these
employees even as they worked long hours, risking their safety to
make sure Coloradans had groceries in their homes during the
pandemic."

Tammy Kibler of Fountain, who was a supervisor at multiple King
Soopers locations in Douglas County, filed a lawsuit against Kroger
in February 2021, alleging that Kroger improperly classified some
of its supervisory workers as exempt under the Fair Labor Standards
Act. Exempt workers are not required to receive overtime pay after
40 hours.

Under the "executive" exemption, the U.S. Department of Labor notes
that being salaried does not, by itself, make a supervisor exempt
from overtime provisions. To qualify, the employee must have
management as their primary duty, regularly direct the work of
others, and have some authority over hiring and firing.

"Kroger's Supervisors did not have the authority to hire or fire
employees, nor did we have authority to exercise discretion or
independent judgment as to matters of significance. We likewise
were not involved in Kroger's management," Kibler declared in court
filings. "In reality, and despite our titles, Supervisors'
essential job duties mirror those of the associates with whom we
worked."

Kibler added that she "routinely" worked in excess of 50 hours per
week.

Kroger strenuously objected to certifying Kibler's lawsuit as a
class action, arguing she had not established that her experience
was similar to other supervisors or that their pay structures were
the same as hers.

"To say that Plaintiff has not met her burden of proving that
collective treatment is appropriate here is nothing short of an
epic understatement," the company's lawyers wrote.

Brimmer agreed last month to narrow the class of plaintiffs from
all Kroger supervisors to just those in Colorado working for King
Soopers and who were classified as exempt from overtime. Interested
plaintiffs will be allowed to opt in to the litigation, with Kibler
representing the class. Brimmer explained that he was employing a
"lenient" standard at this stage in deciding to advance the class
action litigation.

Kroger is also facing litigation specifically involving assistant
store managers, who made similar allegations that Kroger improperly
exempted them from overtime pay even though they performed many of
the same duties as hourly workers — moving freight, stocking
shelves and working as cashiers.

Last January, U.S. District Court Judge Raymond P. Moore granted
preliminary class certification in one such case involving King
Soopers. He subsequently agreed to transfer the litigation to the
Southern District of Ohio, where Kroger's headquarters are located
and where four similar lawsuits were pending. A jury trial is set
for those cases in April 2023.

In January, following a strike at dozens of King Soopers locations
in Colorado, union members ratified a new contract with the grocery
chain that included raises and new worker protections. Kroger is
the second-largest grocery vendor by revenue, after Walmart, and
had a profit of $2.6 billion in 2020, according to The Cincinnati
Enquirer.

Swan said the company has not expressed an interest in settling
Kibler's case out of court. Kroger did not immediately respond to a
request for comment on Brimmer's order.

Kibler's lawsuit is seeking payment of overtime owed, a declaration
that Kroger's practices violate the Fair Labor Standards Act and an
injunction requiring Kroger to cease its allegedly erroneous
classification of supervisors.

The case is Kibler v. The Kroger Company et al. [GN]

KSE SPORTSMAN: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Pratt Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RICHARD PRATT and LARRY JONES, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. KSE
SPORTSMAN MEDIA, INC., d/b/a OUTDOOR SPORTSMAN GROUP, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-11404 (E.D. Mich.), Judge Thomas L.
Ludington of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Northern Division, granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint.

I. Background

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged disclosure of the
Plaintiffs' "Private Reading Information" to several data miners
that "disclosed their information to aggressive advertisers,
political organizations, and non-profit companies," leading to "a
barrage of unwanted junk mail."

The Defendant is a Colorado corporation with its headquarters and
principal place of business in New York, New York. Doing business
as Outdoor Sportsman Group, Inc., the Defendant publishes several
subscription magazines, including Guns & Ammo, RifleShooter, and
Handguns. Plaintiffs Pratt and Jones, paying subscribers of Guns &
Ammo, RifleShooter, and Handguns, filed a class-action complaint
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated.

On June 15, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that
the Defendant violated the Preservation of Personal Privacy Act
(PPPA), Mich. Comp. Laws Section 445.1711 et seq. Specifically,
they contend that the Defendant "rents, exchanges, or otherwise
discloses its customers' private information," including "full
names, titles of publications subscribed to, and home addresses
(collectively 'Private Reading Information'), as well as age,
gender, income, marital status, occupation, and hunting license
status" to data miners "without the written consent of its
customers."

Because the Defendant does not sell exclusive rights to the
information, the Plaintiffs explain, the Defendant "is able to
disclose the information time and time again to countless third
parties." They warn that this practice is extraordinarily
dangerous, as the buyers could filter the information to uncover
"particularly vulnerable members of society," for example, "women
over the age of 40, possess a hunting license, and make over
$80,000 per year." The Plaintiffs conclude that the Defendant's
"rental, exchange, and/or disclosure of its customers' Private
Reading Information" violates the PPPA, because it "does not obtain
its customers' written consent."

On Nov. 24, 2011, the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss,
advancing two arguments. First, it contends that Michigan's
three-year statute of limitations, which applies to "death of a
person or for injury to a person or property," bars the Plaintiffs'
PPPA claims. According to the Plaintiffs, who filed the Complaint
on June 15, 2021, their PPPA claims accrued between June 15, 2015,
and July 30, 2016. Second, the Defendant claims that if Michigan's
six-year statute of limitations applies instead of the three-year
statute of limitations, then the Plaintiffs lack an injury in fact
sufficient to establish Article III standing.

II. Discussion

A.

The Defendant contends that the three-year statute of limitations
from Michigan Compiled Laws Section 600.5805(2) governs the
Plaintiff's Complaint, because it governs "all actions for injury
to a person, including invasion of privacy claims." It elaborates
that Michigan Compiled Laws Section 600.5813, the statute of
limitations "on which Plaintiffs apparently rely," "only applies if
neither MCL Section 600.5805 nor MCL Section 600.5807 applies."

The Plaintiffs respond that the Defendant's argument that Section
600.5805(2) applies "fails as a matter of law because a claim for
violation of a statute that does not itself provide a limitation
period -- such as the PPPA -- is governed by the six-year
limitation period set forth in M.C.L. Section 600.5813." They
elaborate that the Sixth Circuit explicitly held that Section
600.5813 applies to statutory causes of action that contain no
statute of limitations. They conclude that their "claims are
timely, and the Motion to Dismiss should be denied."

Judge Ludington explains that the Michigan legislature enacted the
PPPA shortly after Congress enacted the federal Video Privacy
Protection Act (VPPA), 18 U.S.C. Section 2710. Originally passed
"as a criminal statute without any private right of action," the
Michigan legislature amended the PPPA "in 1989 to add a civil cause
of action." Like the VPPA, the PPPA aims to "'preserve personal
privacy with respect to the purchase, rental, or borrowing' of
written materials, sound recordings, and video recordings."

Effective July 31, 2016, the Michigan legislature amended the PPPA
to remove its $5,000 statutory-damages provision, requiring
plaintiffs to prove "actual damages" to recover.  After the
Michigan legislature amended the PPPA, a few federal courts
released opinions that assumed the three-year statute of
limitations from Section 600.5805(2) applied to the PPPA. But those
opinions assumed that the three-year statute of limitations applied
because the parties in those cases did not contest the issue.

Judge Ludington stresses that when Michigan precedent does not
expressly address which statute of limitations applies to a
statutory cause of action, as in the present case, Michigan courts
look to "Federal court authority." The Sixth Circuit carefully
analyzed Michigan precedent to hold that a six-year statute of
limitations applies to statutory causes of action, like the PPPA,
citing Palmer Park Square, LLC v. Scottsdale Ins., 878 F.3d 530,
540 (6th Cir. 2017). That published Sixth Circuit precedent
controls the Court.

For these reasons, Judge Ludington opines that Michigan Compiled
Laws Section 600.5813 applies to the PPPA. Therefore, the
Plaintiffs may bring a claim under the PPPA until six years from
"the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done
regardless of the time when the damage results."

B.

Next, Judge Ludington must determine whether Section 600.5813 bars
the Plaintiffs' PPPA claim. A PPPA claim accrues "at the time
Defendant committed its alleged [PPPA] violations."

The Plaintiffs timely filed most of their PPPA claims under
Michigan Compiled Laws Section 600.5813. The Complaint alleges that
the PPPA violations are based on the Defendant's nonconsensual
disclosures of the Plaintiffs' Private Reading Information between
June 15, 2015, and July 30, 2016. According to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 6(a), Plaintiffs had until June 14, 2021, to file
any PPPA claims accruing on June 15, 2015. But the Plaintiffs filed
the Complaint on June 15, 2021.

Judge Ludington opines that the six-year statute of limitations
bars the Plaintiffs' PPPA claims that accrued on or before June 15,
2015. But the Plaintiffs also pled PPPA harms accruing from June
16, 2015, to July 30, 2016. Accordingly, any PPPA claims that
accrued on or after June 16, 2015, were timely filed on June 15,
2021. Consequently, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be
granted in part regarding claims accruing on or before June 15,
2015, and it will be denied in part in all other regards.

C.

The Defendant contends that the Plaintiffs lack standing under
Article III of the United States Constitution. It essentially
contends that if Section 600.5805(2), which covers "injury to a
person or property," does not apply to the Plaintiffs' claim, then
the Plaintiffs lack an injury in fact necessary to establish
Article III standing. Indeed, in its own words, the Defendant
argues that if Section 600.5813's six-year statute of limitations
for "all other personal actions" applies to the PPPA, then claims
brought under the PPPA have no constitutional standing in federal
courts. To that end, it heavily relies on TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 141 S.Ct. 2190 (2021).

As a threshold matter, Judge Ludington holds that Section 600.5813
has no effect on Article III standing or jurisdiction. It is well
settled that "statutes of limitations and other filing deadlines
'ordinarily are not jurisdictional.'" For a statute of limitations
to be jurisdictional, the legislature must have "clearly stated" it
is jurisdictional. Nothing in the "text, context, and relevant
historical treatment" of Section 600.5813 indicates that it imposes
a jurisdictional limit. For these reasons, contrary to the
Defendant's assertion, a statutory cause of action does not lack
Article III standing simply because Michigan Compiled Laws Section
600.5813 applies to it.

Moreover, Judge Ludington says it is well established that a
properly alleged PPPA claim confers Article III standing. The Sixth
Circuit held that PPPA claims grant Article III standing in
Coulter-Owens v. Time Inc., 695 F. App'x 117, 121 (6th Cir. 2017).
To that end, the Coulter-Owens panel reasoned that a violation of
the PPPA necessarily arises from the nonconsensual dissemination of
information that reflects a plaintiff's personal reading choices,
which acutely invades a statutorily protected right to privacy in
such matters and, thus, inflicts harm in a concrete and
particularized way -- albeit intangibly. Inexplicably, the
Defendant does not address Coulter-Owens or any of the numerous
other federal decisions. For these reasons, contrary to the
Defendant's assertion, even if Section 600.5813 applies to the
PPPA, claims brought under the PPPA have Article III standing.

The Defendant's reliance on TransUnion is also misplaced. In
TransUnion, the Supreme Court considered whether two groups of
class members bringing claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
suffered a concrete injury in fact under Article III. Likewise, the
Plaintiffs allege that their "Private Reading Information" was
disclosed to third parties without their consent. In this way,
TransUnion reinforces that the Plaintiffs' PPPA claims have Article
III standing.

In sum, as the Sixth Circuit in Coulter-Owen so aptly put it, "the
violation at issue is not a bare procedural violation; it is a
violation of the PPPA's most basic substantive protection, the
privacy in one's reading material." The facts do not compel a
departure from that wisdom. For these reasons, the Plaintiffs' PPPA
claim confers Article III standing. Consequently, the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss will be denied regarding the Plaintiffs' Article
III standing and regarding all claims accruing on or after June 16,
2015, and the Defendant's Motion will be granted regarding all
claims accruing on June 15, 2015.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Ludington granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. He denied the Defendant's Motion
regarding the Plaintiffs' Article III standing and all claims
accruing on or after June 16, 2015. He granted the Defendant's
Motion regarding all claims accruing on June 15, 2015, which are
time-barred.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 15, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5y8x6p5u from Leagle.com.


L.A.R.E PARTNERS: Court Certifies Two Classes in Umbrino Labor Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VICKI UMBRINO, et al., Plaintiffs v. L.A.R.E PARTNERS
NETWORK, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 6:19-cv-06559 EAW
(W.D.N.Y.), Judge Elizabeth A. Wolford of the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of New York issued a Decision and Order:

   (1) granting in part and denying in part the Named Plaintiffs'
       motion to certify the matter as a class action pursuant to
       Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

   (2) denying the Defendants' cross-motion to decertify the FLSA
       collective action; and

   (3) granting in part and denying in part the Named Plaintiffs'
       motion for partial summary judgment.

I. Introduction

Named Plaintiffs Vicki Umbrino and Richard Zoller commenced the
putative class and collective action on July 26, 2019, asserting
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29
U.S.C. Sections 201 et seq. (the "FLSA") and the New York Labor Law
(the "NYLL") by Defendants L.A.R.E. Partners Network, Inc.; doing
business, formerly known as List Assist Real Estate, Inc.; Real
Agent Pro, LLC, formerly known as L.A.R.E. Marketing, LLC; L.A.R.E.
Properties, LLC; List-Assist of Rochester, LLC; and Isaiah Colton.
Upon stipulation of the parties, the Court conditionally certified
the matter as a collective action under the FLSA on Feb. 28, 2020.

II. Background

At the outset, the Court acknowledges that the parties dispute
whether Named Plaintiffs are former employees of all the Defendants
or solely of Real Agent Pro, with the Named Plaintiffs taking the
former position and Defendants taking the latter. It is undisputed
that Real Agent Pro operates in the real estate industry and
provides services to real estate agents, whom it matches with
individuals looking to sell their homes. Real Agent Pro's goal was
to be "a Zillow for sellers" and to generate leads for real estate
agents.

The Named Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants do not sell any
services directly to homeowners and that "homeowners who want to
sell their homes are the product to be delivered to the Defendants'
real estate agent-clients." The Defendants dispute this
characterization, again asserting that it was only Real Agent Pro
that contracted with the real estate agents and further that in
2017 and 2018 Real Agent Pro sold homeowners a "Mega Agent Pro
subscription for access to education services."

The Named Plaintiffs were employed as "inside sales employees" by
at least Real Agent Pro. They claim that they regularly worked more
than 40 hours in a workweek without being paid overtime
compensation. They further claim that they were not provided with
wage notices as required by NYLL Section 195, which is part of New
York's Wage Theft Prevention Act ("WTPA").

The parties disagree regarding the extent of Colton's role with the
business entity defendants. They agree that Colton helped start the
businesses and has served as Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of the
business entity defendants. It is further undisputed that Colton
"provided strategic oversight to the various defendants" and, as to
Real Agent Pro, "directly supervised the managers, including
operations, controller and vice president of sales." The parties
also do not dispute that Colton "served as a sales director as the
company started, and then on an as-needed basis," and that "early
on" he "directly supervised inside sales employees, and after the
company grew, he supervised the managers responsible for
supervising the inside sales employees."

However, the Defendants dispute the Named Plaintiffs' contention
that Colton was involved in the hiring process for inside sales
employees, maintaining that while he "occasionally referred an
individual for hire, Real Agent Pro did not necessarily hire them."
The Named Plaintiffs claim that Colton "helped train inside sales
employees, evaluated their performance and was involved with
disciplining employees." The Defendants dispute this claim,
maintaining that Colton "rarely conducted formal training of inside
sales employees" and "did not have direct involvement in
performance evaluations or discipline of inside sales employees."

The parties also disagree regarding Colton's role in setting
policies and determining employee pay. The Defendants state that
Colton "did not create, draft, or revise Real Agent Pro's
employment policies, including the Employee Handbook" and that he
does not even "recall ever reviewing them before their
implementation."

The Defendants further dispute the following claims by the Named
Plaintiffs: (1) Colton made the decision to revoke an employee's
stock award; (2) Colton directed the human resources manager "to
actively engage in employee recognition, and he made decisions on
what benefits to provide to employees"; (3) Colton decided when the
office would be closed for holidays; (4) Colton decided not to pay
inside sales employees overtime; and (5) Colton maintained and
reviewed personnel files.

The Named Plaintiffs commenced the instant action on July 26, 2019.
The Defendants failed to timely file an answer.

On Oct. 16, 2019, the Named Plaintiffs filed a motion for
conditional certification of the matter as a collective action
under the FLSA. They requested Clerk's entries of default on Dec.
17, 2019, and the same were entered by the Clerk of Court's office
on Dec. 18, 2019.

On Feb. 24, 2020, the parties entered a stipulation whereby they
agreed, among other things, that: (1) the Clerk's entries of
default as to each of the Defendants would be vacated; and (2) the
Defendants would not oppose the Named Plaintiffs' motion for
conditional certification. The Court so-ordered the parties'
stipulation on Feb. 28, 2020.

The Defendants filed an answer to the complaint on March 24, 2020.
Their answer did not assert as an affirmative defense the "retail
or service" exemption to the FLSA's and NYLL's overtime
requirements.

The Named Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for class
certification on July 6, 2021. The Defendants filed their opposing
papers and cross-motion to decertify the collective action on July
28, 2021. The Named Plaintiffs filed their reply brief in further
support of their motion for class certification and their
opposition to the Defendants' decertification cross-motion on Aug.
20, 2021. The Defendants filed their reply brief in further support
of their decertification cross-motion on Sept. 3, 2021.

The Named Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for partial summary
judgment on Sept. 15, 2021.

On Oct. 25, 2021, the Named Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.
The Defendants' answer to the amended complaint was filed on Nov.
16, 2021, and does include as an affirmative defense the retail or
service exemption.

The Defendants filed their opposition to the Named Plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment on Nov. 19, 2021. The Named
Plaintiffs filed their reply brief in further support of their
motion for partial summary judgment on Dec. 17, 2021.

III. Discussion

A. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

The Defendants' opposition to the Named Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification and cross-motion for decertification of the
FLSA collective action rests, in part, on  the Defendants'
contention that the potential applicability of the retail or
service exemption precludes a finding of commonality. However, in
their motion for partial summary judgment, the Named Plaintiffs ask
the Court to find, among other things, that the retail or service
exemption is inapplicable as a matter of law. Because resolution of
that matter bears on her analysis of the certification and
decertification issues, Judge Wolford considers the Defendants'
motion for partial summary judgment first.

The Named Plaintiffs seek partial summary judgment on two distinct
points. First, they ask the Court to find as a matter of law that
the Defendants cannot prove the applicability of the retail or
service exemption. Second, they ask the Court to find as a matter
of law that Colton was an "employer" under both the FLSA and the
NYLL.

Judge Wolford holds that the record before the Court is devoid of
evidence to establish that (1) the real estate industry in which
Real Agent Pro operates has a retail concept or (2) Real Agent
Pro's services are viewed as retail within that industry. Real
Agent Pro thus cannot establish the necessary elements of the
retail or service exemption. The Named Plaintiffs are entitled to
summary judgment on this issue on this basis, and Judge Wolford
need not and does not consider the other arguments made by the
parties respecting the viability of Real Agent Pro's invocation of
the retail or service exemption.

Regarding Colton being an "employer" under both the FLSA and the
NYLL, Judge Wolford finds that the record before the Court simply
does not establish the same degree of control by Colton over Real
Agent Pro. In particular, she has no information about the
membership or functioning of the "executive team" referenced in the
papers. Further, while Colton concedes that he directly supervised
inside sales employees for some period of time, she has no
information about whether this time period overlapped with the
Named Plaintiffs' employment. The undisputed facts of record are
not sufficient, at this point in time, to allow the Court to find
as a matter of law that Colton was Named Plaintiffs' employer for
purposes of the FLSA and the NYLL. Judge Wolford accordingly denies
this aspect of the Named Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
judgment.

B. Motion for Class Certification

Having resolved the Named Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
judgment, Judge Wolford turns next to their motion for class
certification. She explains that in determining whether class
certification is appropriate, a district court must first ascertain
whether the claims meet the preconditions of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure] 23(a).

Specifically, the Court must conclude that the proposed class meets
the following requirements: (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.

If all these requirements are met, the Court may grant class
certification where one of the scenarios set forth under Rule
23(b)(1)-(3) is satisfied. The party seeking class certification
bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that each of Rule 23's requirements has been met.

In the case, the Plaintiffs seek certification of their proposed
classes under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(3). Rule 23(b)(1)(A) "covers
cases in which separate actions by or against individual class
members would risk establishing 'incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class.' Rule 23(b)(3) provides that a
class may be certified if the Rule 23(a) criteria are satisfied and
if "the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods."

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify the following two classes:

     (a) Inside Sales Class: "All persons who performed insides
sales work for defendants, including those who held job titles such
as Business Development Specialist, Business Development
Coordinator, Client Fulfillment Specialist, Client Fulfillment
Coordinator, and Insides Sales Associate, at any time from July 26,
2013 through the entry of final judgment."

     (b) Wage Theft Prevention Act Class: "All persons who worked
for defendants who at any time from July 26, 2013 through the entry
of final judgment in the matter, did not receive the annual written
notice, when required, or notice upon hire as required under the
Wage Theft Prevention Act."

The Defendants oppose class certification on several grounds.
First, they argue that the proposed Wage Theft Prevention Act Class
(the "WTPA Class") is an impermissible fail-safe class. Second,
they argue that the WTPA Class cannot be certified as proposed
because "the WTPA does not provide a private right of action for an
employer's failure to provide required annual wage notices to its
employees." Third, they argue that their assertion of the retail or
service exemption precludes a finding of commonality. Finally, the
Defendants argue that the Named Plaintiffs lack standing to
represent the proposed classes.

Initially, Judge Wolford holds that the Defendants' alleged failure
to comply with the NYLL during the course of the Named Plaintiffs'
employment plainly implicates the same set of concerns as the
Defendants' alleged failure to comply with the NYLL in precisely
the same manner during the unnamed class members' employment.
Accordingly, she does not find a lack of standing on the part of
the Named Plaintiffs.

As to the Defendants' argument that there is not a private cause of
action under the NYLL for failure to provide annual wage notices,
Judge Wolford states there is a split of authority on this point
within district courts in this Circuit. However, she need not wade
into those waters at this time, because class certification does
not resolve the merits of any particular claim. As the Supreme
Court has explained, it is necessary at the class certification
stage "that questions common to the class predominate, not that
those questions will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the
class," citing Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds,
568 U.S. 455, 459 (2013). In the instant case, if the WTPA Class
ultimately loses on the merits of any claims related to the
provision of annual wage notices, it will do so as a class.
Accordingly, this argument by the Defendants does not provide a
basis to deny class certification.

As to the remaining Rule 23 requirements, Judge Wolford finds that
the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements
of Rule 23(a) are satisfied. As to numerosity, it is undisputed
that the proposed classes consist of at least 40 members. With
respect to commonality, the Named Plaintiffs have identified
multiple common questions of fact and law related to Defendants'
alleged employment practices. As to typicality, Umbrino has
submitted a sworn declaration indicating that inside sales
employees were subject to uniform compensation policies. Judge
Wolford further finds that the Named Plaintiffs will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the proposed classes. Finally,
she finds that the proposed classes in the case (taking into
account the Court's modification of the WTPA Class definition)
satisfy requirement of ascertainability.

Judge Wolford next considers whether the Named Plaintiffs have
demonstrated that the requirements of either Rule 23(b)(1)(A) or
Rule 23(b) are satisfied. As to Rule 23(b)(1)(A), she finds that
the Named Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the case falls
within the relatively narrow circumstances that warrant
certification of a mandatory class action under that provision.
Multiple federal courts have held that wage and hour class actions
are not suitable for certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A).
Moreover, this is a case in which the primary relief sought is
monetary damages, and accordingly certification under Rule
23(b)(1)(A) would raise significant due process concerns.

However, Judge Wolford does find that the requirements of Rule
23(b)(3) are satisfied in the case. She says it is undisputed that
inside sales employees "were paid under the same policies and in
the same manner" and "performed their job duties under the same
policies and in the same manner." Common issues of law and fact
thus predominate, because the matter of liability can be determined
on a class-wide basis with generalized proof. While there may be
individualized questions as to damages, "the fact that damages may
have to be ascertained on an individual basis is not sufficient to
defeat class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)."

As to the superiority inquiry, Judge Wolford holds it is an
appropriate forum for the claims, and the nature of the case is
such that it is infeasible for each class member to individually
expend the resources necessary to bring a lawsuit. There is no
reason to conclude that the litigation will be any less manageable
than the numerous wage and hour class actions that have previously
passed through this District.

For all these reasons, Judge Wolford certifies the following two
classes:

     (a) Inside Sales Class: "All persons who performed insides
sales work for defendants, including those who held job titles such
as Business Development Specialist, Business Development
Coordinator, Client Fulfillment Specialist, Client Fulfillment
Coordinator, and Inside Sales Associate, at any time from July 26,
2013 through the entry of final judgment in this matter."

     (b) Wage Theft Prevention Act Class: "All persons who worked
for defendants at any time from July 26, 2013, through the entry of
final judgment in this matter, and who did not receive written
notice upon hire of the information set forth in New York Labor Law
Section 195(1)(a) and its associated regulations, or who did not
receive annual written notice of the same prior to Feb. 27, 2015."

The Named Plaintiffs have submitted to the Court a proposed form
for notice to the certified classes. However, Judge Wolfson will
not approve the proposed notice as it is currently written. In
particular, she finds that the following language is inaccurate:
"The other class consists of all employees who worked for
defendants any time from July 26, 2013 to the present as a result
of defendants' failure to provide wage notices." She says, not only
does this sentence not accurately describe the WTPA Class, it makes
no sense grammatically, inasmuch as it indicates that it was
Defendants' alleged failure to provide wage notices that caused the
employees to work for Defendants. Further, the proposed notice
frequently refers to a singular "Class" notwithstanding the fact
that there are two classes in this case, which is likely to confuse
class members.

Rather than simply rewriting the proposed notice, Judge Wolford
instead finds it appropriate to direct the parties to confer and
propose a mutually acceptable form of notice. Accordingly, the
parties are directed to confer in good faith and make a joint
submission to the Court proposing a single form of notice for the
certified classes within 20 days of entry of this Decision and
Order. In the event the parties are unable to agree on a single
form of notice, they will each submit a letter of not more than
five pages setting forth any disputes and their respective
positions.

The Named Plaintiffs also ask the Court to "order the Defendants to
provide the Plaintiffs' counsel in both electronic format (in an
Excel spreadsheet) and by hard copy, a list containing the
following information for each class member in a separate field:
Name, current or last known address, phone number, job title, dates
of employment, last four digits of social security number, date of
birth and e-mail address, within 15 days of the issuance of" the
instant Decision and Order. The Defendants have not addressed this
request by the Named Plaintiffs.

Judge Wolford also finds that the Named Plaintiffs' request for
information overly broad. Accordingly, she orders that the
Defendants provide only the names, current or last known address,
phone number, dates of employment, and e-mail address as to members
of the certified classes. Because the Defendants have not objected
to the Named Plaintiffs' formatting request -- namely, that the
information be provided both in hard copy and as an Excel
spreadsheet with each item of information in a separate field -- or
to the time frame proposed by the Named Plaintiffs, those requests
are granted.

C. Defendants' Motion for Decertification of the FLSA Collective
Action

The Defendants make two arguments in support of their request for
decertification: (1) that application of the retail or service
exemption renders the Named Plaintiffs and the opt-in plaintiffs
not similarly situated; and (2) the Named Plaintiffs lack standing
with respect to any claims outside their dates of employment.

Judge Wolford holds that Umbrino and the opt-in plaintiffs are
similarly situated, because they "share one or more similar
questions of law or fact material to the disposition of their FLSA
claims." Accordingly, the Defendants' motion for decertification is
denied.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons she set forth, Judge Wolford granted in part and
denied in part the Named Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
judgment. Specifically, she granted summary judgment to the extent
that she finds that Defendant Real Agent Pro, LLC f/k/a L.A.R.E.
Marketing, LLC is not a retail or service establishment for
purposes of the retail or service exemption and denied the Named
Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment in all other
respects.

Judge Wolford granted the Named Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification to the extent that she certified the following two
classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23:

     (a) Inside Sales Class: "All persons who performed insides
sales work for defendants, including those who held job titles such
as Business Development Specialist, Business Development
Coordinator, Client Fulfillment Specialist, Client Fulfillment
Coordinator, and Inside Sales Associate, at any time from July 26,
2013, through the entry of final judgment in this matter."

     (b) Wage Theft Prevention Act Class: "All persons who worked
for defendants at any time from July 26, 2013, through the entry of
final judgment in this matter, and who did not receive written
notice upon hire of the information set forth in New York Labor Law
Section 195(1)(a) and its associated regulations, or who did not
receive annual written notice of the same prior to Feb. 27, 2015.

However, Judge Wolfordt denied the Named Plaintiffs' request for
approval of their proposed notice. Instead, the parties are
directed to confer in good faith and make a joint submission to the
Court proposing a single form of notice for the certified classes
within 20 days of entry of this Decision and Order. Within 15 days
of entry of the Decision and Order, the Defendants will provide the
Plaintiffs' counsel in both hard copy and an Excel spreadsheet, a
list containing the following information for each class member in
a separate field: name, current or last known address, phone
number, dates of employment, and e-mail address.

Judge Wolford denied the Defendants' motion for decertification of
the FLSA collective action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 15, 2022 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/bdfyb67r from Leagle.com.


LAKE VENTURES: Faces Ramsey BIPA Class Suit Over Vocollect System
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CORDELL RAMSEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. LAKE VENTURES LLC dba at FRESH THYME MARKET and
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., Case No. 2022LA000176 (Ill Cir.,
Dupage Cty., Feb. 18, 2022) is a class action complaint against
Lake Ventures for its violations of the Biometric Information
Privacy Act.

The Plaintiff worked at one of Defendant's distribution center in
Illinois. The Defendant operates its distribution centers through
the use of biometrics and, in particular, the use of voiceprints
and voice/speaker recognition technology called "Vocollect" (also
known as the "Talkman").

The Plaintiff alleges that he has continuously and repeatedly been
exposed to the risks and harmful conditions created by the
Defendant's alleged violations of BIPA, including the risk that his
voiceprint or voice template will be obtained by hackers who could
then misuse it to, among other things, steal their identity and
commit identity theft.

The Plaintiff and the Class now seek statutory damages under BIPA
as compensation for the injuries Defendant has caused as well as
injunctive or other relief.

The Vocollect system is sold and managed by Respondent in Discovery
Honeywell International, Inc. Honeywell claims its Vocollect system
(which it offers as part of its Honeywell Voice products) is used
by more than one million users on a daily basis.

Through use of Honeywell's Vocollect technology, Defendant
allegedly creates workers' voiceprints, voice patterns or
templates, which are then used to enable workers to interact with
the Defendant's warehouse technology to identify a worker.

Lake Ventures LLC owns and operates supermarkets. It is
headquartered in Downers Grove, Illinois and managed by Lake
Ventures Holding Company, LLC.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Fish, Esq.
          Mara Baltabols, Esq.
          FISH POTER BOLANOS, P.C.
          200 East Fifth Avenue, Suite 123
          Naperville, IL 60563
          E-mail: dfish@fishlawfirm.com
                  mara@fishlawfirm.com

LIBERTY MUTUAL: Averts Class Action Over Totaled Cars
-----------------------------------------------------
Jessy Edwards, writing for Top Class Actions, reports that Liberty
Mutual and CCC Intelligent Solutions have dodged a class action
lawsuit over condition adjustments for totaled cars thanks to a
decision in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals that could affect
other similar cases brought by car insurance customers.

In a decision made Feb. 11 in the 9th Circuit, the court said
owners of totaled vehicles can't bring a class action against
Liberty Mutual or its valuation contractor for using a "condition
adjustment" to reduce the amount it offers to pay on a claim,
Reuters reports.

As a class action the case would be "unmanageable" because each
individual plaintiff would have to show they received less than
their vehicle was worth, the court said.

The decision could impact at least three other similar cases
against insurers that are currently underway in the same district.

CCC's lawyers said the decision was "particularly impactful in
light of numerous putative class actions – all involving similar
claims against CCC and its insurer customers – that are still
pending."

The 9th Circuit put three other actions against CCC, Allstate,
Geico and USAA on hold last summer, waiting to make a decision in
the Liberty Mutual case.

Liberty Mutual Shouldn't Be Able to Reduce Payouts on Total Cars
With Unitemized Condition Adjustments, Plaintiffs Said
In the decision, the 9th Circuit said the lower court's denial of
class action status to the lawsuit for breach of contract and
unfair trade practices was correct as it was hard to prove harm.

"If there was no injury, then there was no breach of contract or
unfair trade practice," and "figuring out whether each plaintiff
was injured would be an individualized process," Circuit Judge Ryan
Nelson wrote for the 9th Circuit.

The plaintiffs had argued that Liberty Mutual shouldn't be able to
reduce their payouts on totaled cars with unitemized condition
adjustments and that those adjustments violated Washington state
insurance regulations.

"But that's an argument for the Washington insurance commissioner,"
the court wrote.

In 2020, Liberty Mutual was hit with a class action lawsuit in Ohio
by a woman who claimed that the insurance company failed to pay the
sales tax, title transfer fees and registration fees she was
entitled when her car was a total loss, as per her policy.

The plaintiff is represented by Steve Berman, Robert Carey and John
DeStefano III of Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro.

The Liberty Mutual Adjustments Class Action Lawsuit is Lara et al.
v. First National Insurance Co et al., 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, No. 21-35126. [GN]

MAHWAH TOWNSHIP, NJ: Harris Sues Over Contaminated Drinking Water
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Shenell Harris, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. MAHWAH TOWNSHIP, Case No. BER-L-000754-22 (N.J. Super.
Ct., Bergen Cty., Feb. 8, 2022), is brought seeking indemnification
and reimbursement under equitable and common law principles for
herself and a class of other similarly situated recipients of
Defendant's Notice, for the expenses she incurred as a consequence
of following the directive in Defendant's Notice to seek medical
advice about her drinking water and to replace the contaminated tap
water with bottled water.

This action arises solely from a uniformly-worded form notice which
Defendant sent to the class on January 13, 2022 which is entitled:
"Important Information About Your Drinking Water" and sub-titled
"The Mahwah Water Department Has Levels of Perfluorooctanesulfonic
Acid (PFOS) Above A Drinking Water Standard." Defendant's Notice to
the class went on to admit that the water distributed by Defendant
to class members had violated a New Jersey standard relating to the
allowable amount of a chemical human carcinogen called
Perfluorooctanesulfonic Acid ("PFOS") in drinking water.
Defendant's Notice to the class further admitted that this
violation stemmed from what the Notice described as "Well #19,"
stating "samples collected from 1/1/2021 to 12/31/21 at Well #19
showed that our well exceeds the PFOS MCL." Defendant's Notice went
on to explain the consequences and risks involved in exposure to
PFOS in drinking water as levels higher than the allowable
standard. Despite this, Defendant's Notice stated that a filtration
plant designed to filter out PFOS from Well #19 would not be
completed until "sometime near August of 2023."

The Defendant's Notice also specifically directed that the
recipient's tap water should not be used to prepare infant formula
or other beverages for infants and that bottled water should be
used for such purposes. Defendant's Notice also advised other class
members to consider using bottled water in place of tap water. The
Notice stated specifically that these directives were based on what
the Notice itself described as violations of standards by
Defendant.

Upon receiving Defendant's form Notice, Plaintiff, who suffers from
specific health concerns and a compromised immune system, did
exactly what the Notice urged her to do. She followed Defendant's
written directives to consult with her doctor about the conditions
described in the Notice, thereby incurring unreimbursed costs in
the form of doctor co-pays. In addition, Plaintiff followed the
recommendation in the Notice to begin buying bottled water for
drinking and cooking, buying bottled water. The costs for the
doctor's consultation incurred by Plaintiff and the cost of bottled
water incurred by Plaintiff were fully foreseeable to Defendant at
the time Defendant placed the directive in its Notice. In issuing
these directives in the Notice, Defendant was not simply acting out
of altruism, but rather Defendant sought to benefit itself through
the Notice by trying to eliminate or minimize Defendant's potential
liability for the violation of drinking water standards described
in the Notice, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is an individual and citizen of New Jersey who
resides in Mahwah Township, Bergen County, New Jersey, who is a
domestic water customer of Defendant.

Mahwah Township is a municipality in Bergen County which was formed
under New Jersey law and which owns and operates the water system
in Mahwah Township under the name "Mahwah Water Department."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Galpern, Esq.
          JAVERBAUM, WURGAFT, HICKS, KAHN, WIKSTROM & SININS, P.C.
          1000 Haddonfield-Berlin Rd., Ste. 203
          Voorhees, NJ 08043
          Phone: (856) 596-4100

               - and -

          Stephen P. DeNittis, Esq.
          Joseph A. Osefchen, Esq.
          Shane T. Prince, Esq.
          DeNITTIS OSEFCHEN PRINCE, P.C.
          525 Route 73 North, Suite 410
          Marlton, NJ 08053
          Phone: (856) 797-9951


MANHATTAN BEER: Cap 111 Files Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Manhattan Beer
Distributors, LLC, et al. The case is styled as Cap 111 Enterprises
LLC, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated v.
Manhattan Beer Distributors, LLC, Simon Bergson, Case No.
7:22-cv-01408 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 18, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

Manhattan Beer Distributors -- http://www.manhattanbeer.com/-- is
a full-service beer distributor that provides services to customers
through retail and hospitality industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Steven Lance Wittels, Esq.
          WITTELS MCINTURFF PALIKOVIC
          18 Half Mile Road
          Armonk, NY 10504
          Phone: (914) 319-9945
          Email: slw@wittelslaw.com


MATTEL INC: May 2 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
-------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION

In re Mattel, Inc. Securities Litigation

Case No. 2:19-CV-10860-MCS (PLAx)

SUMMARY NOTICE OF (I) PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION
AND PROPOSED SETTLEMENT; (II) SETTLEMENT HEARING;
AND (III) MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES

This notice is for all persons and entities who purchased or
otherwise acquired the common stock of Mattel, Inc. ("Mattel")
during the period from August 2, 2017 to August 8, 2019, inclusive
(the "Class Period"), and were damaged thereby (the "Class").
Certain persons and entities are excluded from the Class by
definition, as set forth in the full printed Notice of (I) Pendency
of Class Action and Proposed Settlement; (II) Settlement Hearing;
and (III) Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Expenses (the
"Notice").

YOUR RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED BY A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PENDING IN
THIS COURT.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District Court
for the Central District of California (the "Court"), that the
above-captioned litigation (the "Action") is pending in the Court.

YOU ARE ALSO NOTIFIED that Lead Plaintiffs DeKalb County Employees
Retirement System and New Orleans Employees' Retirement System have
reached a proposed settlement of the Action for $98,000,000.00 in
cash (the "Settlement") on behalf of the Class, that, if approved,
will resolve all claims in the Action.

A hearing will be held on May 2, 2022 at 9:00 a.m., before the
Honorable Mark C. Scarsi, at the United States District Court for
the Central District of California, in Courtroom 7C of the First
Street Courthouse, 350 W. First Street, Los Angeles, California
90012, for the following purposes: (a) to determine whether the
proposed Settlement on the terms and conditions provided for in the
Stipulation is fair, reasonable, and adequate to the Class, and
should be finally approved by the Court; (b) to determine whether a
Judgment substantially in the form attached as Exhibit B to the
Stipulation should be entered dismissing the Action with prejudice
against Defendants;

(c) to determine whether the proposed Plan of Allocation for the
proceeds of the Settlement is fair and reasonable and should be
approved; (d) to determine whether the motion by Lead Counsel for
attorneys' fees and litigation expenses should be approved; and (e)
to consider any other matters that may properly be brought before
the Court in connection with the Settlement.

If you are a member of the Class, your rights will be affected by
the pending Action and the Settlement, and you may be entitled to
share in the Settlement Fund. If you have not yet received the
Notice and Claim Form, you may obtain copies of these documents by
contacting the Claims Administrator at Mattel Securities
Litigation, c/o JND Legal Administration, P.O. Box 91434, Seattle,
WA 98111, 1-877-379-5987. Copies of the Notice and Claim Form can
also be downloaded from the website maintained by the Claims
Administrator, www.MattelSecuritiesLitigation.com

If you are a member of the Class, in order to be eligible to
receive a payment under the proposed Settlement, you must submit a
Claim Form postmarked (if mailed), or online, no later than June 8,
2022, in accordance with the instructions set forth in the Claim
Form. If you are a Class Member and do not submit a proper Claim
Form, you will not be eligible to share in the distribution of the
net proceeds of the Settlement but you will nevertheless be bound
by any releases, judgments, or orders entered by the Court in
connection with the Settlement.

If you are a member of the Class and wish to exclude yourself from
the Class, you must submit a request for exclusion such that it is
received no later than April 11, 2022, in accordance with the
instructions set forth in the Notice. If you properly exclude
yourself from the Class, you will not be bound by any judgments or
orders entered by the Court in the Action and you will not be
eligible to share in the proceeds of the Settlement.

Any objections to the proposed Settlement, the proposed Plan of
Allocation, or Lead Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of litigation expenses, must be filed with the Court
and delivered to Lead Counsel and Defendants' counsel such that
they are received no later than April 11, 2022, in accordance with
the instructions set forth in the Notice.

Please do not contact the Court, the Clerk's office, Mattel, the
other Defendants, or their counsel regarding this notice. All
questions about this notice, the proposed Settlement, or your
eligibility to participate in the Settlement should be directed to
Lead Counsel or the Claims Administrator. Visit
www.MattelSecuritiesLitigation.com or call toll-free at
1-877-379-5987.

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice and Claim Form,
should be made to

Lead Counsel:

BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
John Rizio-Hamilton, Esq.
1251 Avenue of the Americas, 44th Floor
New York, NY 10020
1-800-380-8496
settlements@blbglaw.com

Requests for the Notice and Claim Form should be made to:

Mattel Securities Litigation  
c/o JND Legal Administration
P.O. Box 91434
Seattle, WA 98111
1-877-379-5987
www.MattelSecuritiesLitigation.com

By Order of the Court [GN]

MCDONALD'S USA: Settles Biometric Data Privacy Suit Up to $50MM
---------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Burt, writing for BiometricUpdate.com, reports that
McDonald's and franchisees will pay out up to $50 million to settle
its biometric data privacy lawsuit involving employees of Illinois
locations, Top Class Actions writes.

The settlement applies to employees of McDonald's and McDonald's
franchises in the state, and was given preliminary approval in
late-2021, according to the report. In addition to McDonald's Corp
and franchisees, McDonald's USA and McDonald's Restaurants of
Illinois are plaintiffs in the case.

The suit alleges violations of Illinois' Biometric Information
Privacy Act (BIPA) requirements to collect biometrics only with
written, informed consent, though the defendants to not admit any
wrongdoing under the terms of the settlement.

The settlement starts at $40 million, with two further reserves of
$5 million each released if a certain percentage of the class
submits claims. Employees from before December 31, 2018 can receive
up to $375, and those whose employment began after that date can
receive $190, though actual amounts will depend on the number of
claimants.

The deadline to file a claim, opt out or object is February 9.
2022.

A similar BIPA suit involving employee biometrics was settled for
$10 million by Walmart a year ago. [GN]

MCMENAMINS INC: Faces Data Breach Class Action in Washington
------------------------------------------------------------
Sander Gusinow, writing for Oregon Business, reports that the
Oregon-based hotel and brewpub chain McMenamins is facing a class
action lawsuit over a 2021 data breach that may have compromised
the personal information of more than 20,000 current and former
employees. Separately, a personal injury law firm says it's
investigating the breach's impact on customers.

The lawsuit was filed Jan. 28 in federal court in the U.S. District
of Washington. Former McMenamins employee Andrew Leonard is named
as the primary plaintiff, filing on behalf of individuals who
worked for McMenamin's between Jan. 1, 1998 and Dec. 12, 2021,
according to a copy of the complaint at classaction.org, a legal
news website that reported on the case that day.

In December McMenamins announced it had become the victim of a
ransomware attack, which exposed current and former employees'
personal information, including names, home addresses, phone and
Social Security numbers, health information, email addresses and
bank account information included on direct deposit forms.

According to the legal complaint, Leonard worked for the
hospitality chain between 2015 and 2019. The lawsuit seeks to
represent anyone whose private information was stored in
McMenamins' compromised computer systems.

The suit alleges that McMenamins waited an unacceptable amount of
time before contacting employees whose data were compromised -- and
says Leonard was not notified of the breach until January of this
year.

After the breach, McMenamins offered 12 months of Experian
IdentityWorks credit for employees whose information was exposed.
The lawsuit claims this was insufficient restitution for the
damages and says McMenamins failed to take adequate security
measures to protect employees' financial data.

The suit includes a list of "basic, practical email security
measures that every business, not only those who handle sensitive
financial information, should be doing," including using and
maintaining preventive software programs, including IT staff in
security conversations and hardening the IT infrastracture.
"McMenamins should be doing even more. But by adequately taking
these common-sense solutions, McMenamins could have prevented this
Data Breach from occurring."

The suit says victims are entitled to compensatory damages but does
not name a dollar amount.

McMenamins declined to comment for this story.

The complaint lists two law firms as counsel for the plaintiffs:
Seattle-based Breskin Johnson & Townsend and Migliaccio & Rathod,
based in Washington, D.C. OBM was not able to reach either firm. A
press release issued by the latter in December and updated includes
a questionnaire for employees who may have been affected by the
breach.

Also in January, Console & Associates, a New Jersey-based personal
injury firm, announced that it is investigating a potential class
action lawsuit to determine the breach's impact on consumers.

"It's easy to place all the blame for a data breach on the person
who hacks into an organization's system; however, this ignores the
legal and moral obligation that these companies owe to customers.
When someone gives a company their business, they trust that the
information in the organization's possession will remain private --
and out of the hands of criminals. While protecting consumer data
requires a business to undergo some effort and expense, in our
current environment of widespread hacking, this is a cost of doing
business that all organizations must take seriously," said attorney
Richard Console in the firm's press release. [GN]

MDL 2968: Oglevee Appeals Dismissal Order and Final Judgment
------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Rebecca Oglevee, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the multi-district litigation captioned In Re:
Generali COVID-19 Travel Insurance Litigation, Case No. 20-md-2968,
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
(New York City).

The Plaintiffs brought this putative class action against the
defendants, Generali US Branch and Customized Services
Administrators, Inc. alleging breach of insurance contracts and
related non-contract claims. The Plaintiffs alleged that they
incurred losses because they planned and paid for travel that was
canceled because of restrictions that were occasioned by COVID-19.
They claim that their losses were covered by trip insurance
contracts issued by Generali because their losses were "Covered
Events." The Plaintiffs point to two alleged Covered Events: (1) a
"Quarantine" provision of the relevant policy, or (2) the provision
for "unavailable accommodations due to . . . natural disaster."

The Defendants contend that the trip cancelations were not
occasioned by those Covered Events and that, in any event, the
government regulations that brought about the Plaintiffs' losses
fell within an explicit Exclusion in the Policies for any loss
under the Policy "caused by, or resulting from ". . . travel
restrictions imposed for a certain area by governmental
authority."

On April 26, 2021, Generali moved to dismiss the action as to
Plaintiffs Clonts, Garner, Johner, Sharma, Oglevee, Morris, and
Shrader.

Judge John G. Koeltl entered an order on December 21, 2021 and
final judgment on February 9, 2022, granting the Defendants' motion
to dismiss the consolidated class action complaint as to Plaintiffs
Clonts, Garner, Johner, Sharma, Morris, and Shrader. The order
further states that the motion to dismiss was denied as moot as to
Plaintiff Oglevee with respect to the claims to be arbitrated while
the motion to dismiss was granted with respect to her claims not
subject to arbitration.

The Plaintiffs are challenging the Court's decision in their
appellate case captioned In Re: Generali COVID-19 Travel Insurance
Litigation, Case No. 22-336, filed in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit on February 18, 2022.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Rebecca Oglevee, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated; Kristen Johner, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated; Renee Clonts, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Melissa Garner,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated;
Amitabh Sharma, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated; Gary Schrader, on behalf of himself and all other
similarly situtated; and Howard Morris, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          David E. Kovel, Esq.
          KIRBY MCINERNEY LLP
          250 Park Avenue
          New York, NY 10177
          Telephone: (212) 371-6600

Defendants-Appellees Assicurazioni Generali Group, S.p.A.; Generali
U.S. Branch; Generali Global Assistance, Inc.; and Customized
Services Administrators, Inc., AKA Generali Global Assistance and
Insurance Services, are represented by:

          Archis Ashok Parasharami, Esq.
          MAYER BROWN LLP
          1999 K Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 263-3328

MDL 3010: Court Orders Google to Produce Docs in Advertising Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
orders Google LLC to produce certain documents in the multidistrict
litigation styled IN RE GOOGLE ADVERTISING ANTITRUST LITIGATION,
MDL No. 21-md-3010 (PKC) (S.D.N.Y.).

At the Sept. 24, 2021 conference, the Court stayed all discovery in
the action, except it required the production to all other
Plaintiffs the documents that Google LLC had produced to the state
of Texas and to plaintiffs in an action in the Northern District of
California. In doing so, the Court relied upon Google's
representations about its prior productions.

District Judge P. Kevin Castel notes that it is too late in the
game for Google to revisit the discovery ruling.

Judge Castel states that the Court's directive was reasonably
plain: Google was required to produce to all plaintiffs in the MDL
the documents Google had produced to the state of Texas and to
certain other plaintiffs, numbering approximately 2 million, within
30 days of entry of a protective order. Because the document
production was a mirror copy of prior productions that already
existed in an electronic format, it could be accomplished without
significant difficulty or expense.

As noted in the Court's exchange with Google's counsel, there is a
separate Department of Justice ("DOJ") investigation. The Court had
no reason to know the direction that investigation may take.
Accordingly, at the September 24 conference it did not order Google
to also produce the documents that were sought by the DOJ; the
production to the Plaintiffs was limited to the documents that had
been produced to the state of Texas, which were also said to be the
documents it had produced to plaintiffs in the Northern District of
California.

By mid-October, Google first attempted to constrain its production
by claiming a belief that the Court had authorized it to redact
from its production any document that also had been requested by
the DOJ (Letter of Oct. 13, 2021). By that logic, if the DOJ asked
for all documents produced to the state of Texas or to private
Northern District of California plaintiffs, then Google would not
be required to produce anything. This prompted the Court to enter
an Order on Nov. 5, 2021, as follows: "While neither side has
sought specific relief, it is appropriate for the Court to restate
its direction at the Sept. 24, 2021 conference regarding document
production. Google shall produce to all plaintiffs in the MDL the
documents previously produced to any of the state plaintiffs in
their digital advertising investigations, whether voluntarily,
pursuant to CIDs or otherwise. At the risk of redundancy, Google
may not withhold from the foregoing those documents that have also
been produced to the DOJ."

The Court has now learned that Google is seizing on the language of
the November 5 Order arguing that it modified the Sept. 24, 2021
direction because it referred to the state plaintiffs in their
digital advertising investigations. Google interprets this to mean
that the Court has granted it permission to pour through the
documents produced to the state of Texas and remove any that in
Google's view do not specifically relate to digital advertising.

Having considered the arguments of the parties, the Court orders
that within 30 days of this Order, Google will produce to all
Plaintiffs in the MDL (1) all documents without limitation produced
by Google or any corporate affiliate to the state of Texas from
Jan. 1, 2018, through Sept. 24, 2021, whether pursuant to a CID,
voluntarily or otherwise; and (2) to the extent not subsumed by
(1), all documents without limitation produced by Google or any
corporate affiliate prior to Sept. 24, 2021, to any Plaintiff in
the MDL, including in any action commenced in the Northern District
of California.

The production will be protected by the existing protective order.
Google is advised that failure to fully comply will result in
sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., which may
include the striking of its answer and entry of judgment against
it.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 7, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mr24rejr from Leagle.com.


MERAKEY USA: $117.5K Class Settlement in Kyem Suit Wins Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRANCIS KYEM, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MERAKEY USA, et al., Defendants,
Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-05577-KSM (E.D. Pa.), Judge Karen Spencer
Marston of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted the Plaintiffs':

    (i) Unopposed Motion for an Order Approving the Settlement
        Agreement and Granting a Service Award; and

    (i) Unopposed Motion for an Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees
        and Reimbursement of Expenses.

I. Background

Plaintiff Kyem is employed as a Behavioral Specialist Consultant
with Defendant Merakey Children's Services (a subsidiary of
Defendant Merakey USA). The Plaintiff alleges that he was an hourly
employee and the Defendants failed to appropriately compensate him
for all the hours that he worked; specifically, he alleges that
time spent on certain "non-billable" work went uncompensated. He
brings the lawsuit, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, alleging that the Defendants' policy or practice of not
paying employees for non-billable work violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") and Pennsylvania wage and hour laws.

Since 2012, the Plaintiff has worked for Defendants as a Behavioral
Specialist Consultant ("BSC") and, more recently, as a Licensed
Behavioral Specialist Consultant ("LBSC").

The Plaintiff filed the action on Nov. 26, 2019, alleging that the
Defendants had violated his and others' rights under the FLSA and
state wage and hour laws by refusing to compensate them for
overtime when the combination of their billable and non-billable
work exceeded 40 hours a week. He moved to conditionally certify
the collective on June 9, 2020, and the parties engaged in limited
discovery related to certification. On April 30, 2021, the Court
conditionally certified the collective with respect to all BSCs and
LBSCs employed by the Defendants.

On May 5, 2021, the Court approved the proposed Collective Action
Notice, and the Plaintiffs' counsel mailed the Notice to the 19
individuals Defendants identified as being qualified for the
collective. In addition to the Plaintiff, three other employees
timely opted in to the action: Jacqueline Johnson, Cherrie Sage,
and Sharon Palmer.

At the close of the opt-in period, the parties began engaging in
"extensive, arms-length negotiations." Subject to the Court's
approval, the Defendants have agreed to pay $117,500 to settle the
Plaintiffs' claims.

The funds will be allocated as follows: $72,628.37 to the
Plaintiffs (Kyem - $14,106.10, Johnson - $9,087.82, Palmer -
$48,876.63, and Sage - $557.82); $41,871.63 to the Plaintiffs'
counsel in attorneys' fees and costs; and $3,000 to Mr. Kyem as an
award for his service as class representative.

Under the Proposed Settlement, each of the Plaintiffs would receive
approximately 84% of the total maximum recovery they could possibly
receive if they were successful at litigation

The Court preliminarily certified this matter as a collective
action on April 30, 2021. Presently before the Court are the
Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for an Order Approving the Settlement
Agreement and Granting a Service Award and Unopposed Motion for an
Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses.

II. Analysis

A. The Settlement

Judge Marston considers whether the Proposed Settlement satisfies
each of the three requirements for approval: a Bona fide factual
and legal disputes between the parties exist, the Proposed
Settlement is fair and reasonable, and the Proposed Settlement
furthers the purposes of the FLSA.

Judge Marston finds that (i) the Proposed Settlement resolves bona
fide disputes between the parties; (ii) the Proposed Settlement is
fair and reasonable; (iii) the Settlement Agreement does not
contain a confidentiality clause; (iv) the release is appropriately
and narrowly tailored; and (v) the Proposed Settlement, like all of
the filings in the matter, is publicly available on the Court's
docket. Because the Proposed Settlement satisfies all three
requirements, it will be approved.

B. Service Award

Judge Marston will also approve the $3000 service award, finding
that the proposed service award is reasonable. Mr. Kyem has been
"actively involved in this litigation since before it was
commenced." Significantly, Mr. Kyem is still employed by the
Defendants, so he faced substantial personal and professional risk
in prosecuting the lawsuit. Finally, the proposed service award is
relatively small. The $3000 payment represents roughly 2.5% of the
total recovery in the matter. Courts have regularly approved
similar service awards in FLSA cases. For these reasons, Judge
Marston approves the proposed payment of $3,000 to award Mr. Kyem
for his service as the named plaintiff.

C. Attorneys' Fees & Costs

The Plaintiffs' counsel seeks $41,125, or 35% of the settlement
amount, in attorneys' fees and $746.63 in costs.

Judge Marston finds that all seven Gunter factors weigh in favor of
awarding the requested fees. First, the Plaintiffs' counsel's
efforts allowed the Plaintiffs to recover over $70,000. Second,
none of the Plaintiffs objected to the Proposed Settlement. Third,
the Plaintiffs' counsel are skilled and litigated this matter
efficiently and effectively. Fourth, the Plaintiffs' counsel have
litigated the case for over two years. Fifth, the Plaintiffs'
counsel accepted this case on a wholly contingent basis, so the
risk of non-payment has been high throughout the litigation. Sixth,
the Plaintiffs' counsel dedicated a significant amount of time to
litigating the matter. Finally, the 35% award is similar to what
the sister courts have awarded in like cases.

Judge Marston also finds that the Plaintiffs' request for $746.63
in costs expended by the counsel is reasonable.

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, Judge Marston granted the Plaintiffs' Unopposed
Motions. An appropriate Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 11, 2022 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mwa8rmc6 from Leagle.com.


MERRILL LYNCH: Scheduling Order Entered in Iowa Public Complaint
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as IOWA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'
RETIREMENT SYSTEM, et al., v. MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH
INC., et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-06221-KPF-SLC (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon.
Judge Sarah L. Cave entered a scheduling order:

The Court intends to hold Oral Argument regarding the Motion for
Class on a date to be determined. A Telephone Conference is
scheduled for March 4, 2022 at 10:00 am on the Court's conference
line to discuss logistical planning for Oral Argument, including
the format of the proceeding and any technological needs of the
parties.

The Iowa Public Employees' Retirement System operates as a pension
funds.

Merrill is an American investment management and wealth management
division of Bank of America.

A copy of the Court's order dated Feb. 14, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3vaxFgM at no extra charge.[CC]

META PLATFORMS: Settles Data Privacy Class Action for $90 Million
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Meta (NASDAQ: FB), the parent company of Facebook, has agreed to
pay $90 million to settle high-profile, long-running data privacy
litigation over its use of tracking "cookies" in 2010 and 2011 to
track subscribers' internet use even after they had logged off the
Facebook platform. The settlement, submitted for approval late on
Feb. 14 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, will rank as one of the ten-largest data privacy
settlements in U.S. history, in a case that had already established
important precedent for future data privacy litigation. As part of
the settlement, Facebook also agreed to sequester and delete all
the data at issue, which is believed to be unprecedented in a data
privacy class action. The agreement is subject to Court review and
approval.

Filed in 2012, the case focuses on Facebook's use of proprietary
plug-ins to track users' internet browsing on third-party sites.
Facebook obtained consent to track subscribers while logged in but
promised to stop the tracking once the subscriber logged out. The
class action alleged that Facebook continued to track users'
browsing activity even after they had logged off the social media
platform.

Even before the Feb. 15 settlement, the case had already created
significant law favoring consumers in future data privacy actions.
In a 2020 opinion in this litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that the unlawful copying and monetization
of personal data creates "economic harm," even if the value of the
data in plaintiffs' hands does not diminish as a result. The
finding of economic harm is vital to plaintiffs seeking monetary
damages. Lower federal courts had been split on the critical issue,
with some requiring a showing that the value of the data in
question diminished. The Ninth Circuit also ruled that Facebook was
not a party to the communication that it allegedly intercepted for
purposes of the Wiretap Act, meaning that its data collection
required actual user consent. Facebook appealed the rulings to the
U.S. Supreme Court, which, last year, declined to review the case,
allowing the Ninth Circuit's decision to stand.

"We are grateful to the Ninth Circuit for its watershed ruling, and
to Facebook for negotiating this resolution in good faith. This
settlement not only repairs harm done to Facebook users but sets a
precedent for the future disposition of such matters," said David
Straite, co-lead counsel for the plaintiffs and a New York-based
partner at DiCello Levitt Gutzler. "I've been involved in more than
a few data privacy matters in which the defendant would only
consider monetary relief or window-dressing injunctive relief. We
applaud Facebook's willingness to also delete the user data that we
alleged was improperly collected."

The Feb. 15 settlement sets a new bar for data privacy lawsuits.
Plaintiffs believe the $90 million settlement fund, no part of
which will revert to Facebook, represents at least 100% of any
unjust profits earned on the data at issue. The injunctive relief,
meanwhile, requires Facebook to sequester and eventually delete all
data that the plaintiffs alleged was wrongfully collected during
the class period. The agreement to delete data is the "gold
standard" for non-monetary relief in data privacy class actions of
this kind.

This marks DiCello Levitt's second top-ten settlement among all
data privacy and data breach class actions. In 2019, partner Amy
Keller served as plaintiffs' co-lead counsel in the Equifax data
breach litigation, helping secure a $505.5 million common fund
settlement, with an additional $1 billion in injunctive relief,
which remains the largest data breach settlement in U.S. history.

In the Facebook case, Straite and DiCello Levitt were joined by
co-lead counsel Stephen G. Grygiel of Grygiel Law LLC and Jason
"Jay" Barnes of Simmons Hanly Conroy LLP.

"It's been an honor co-leading this action with David and his
colleagues at DiCello Levitt on a case of such monumental
importance to U.S. consumers," Grygiel said. "It's truly a wake-up
call for internet and advertising companies who collect user data
and use advanced browser tracking."

A copy of the settlement agreement is available upon request, and
Straite is available for media interviews. The case is In re:
Facebook Internet Tracking Litigation, case number
5:12-MD-2314-EJD, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division.

About DiCello Levitt Gutzler

At DiCello Levitt Gutzler, we're dedicated to achieving justice for
our clients through class action, business-to-business, public
client, whistleblower, personal injury, and mass tort litigation.
Our lawyers are highly respected for their ability to litigate and
win cases – whether by trial, settlement, or otherwise—for
people who have suffered harm, global corporations that have
sustained significant economic losses, and public clients seeking
to protect their citizens' rights and interests. Every day, we put
our reputations—and our capital—on the line for our clients.

For more, visit our website: https://dicellolevitt.com/

Contacts
Jason Milch
312.379.9406
jmilch@baretzbrunelle.com

Luke Allingham
312.286.1317
lallingham@baretzbrunelle.com [GN]

MORLEY CO: Fails to Secure PII/PHI Info, Ratcliff Data Breach Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
KENNETH RATCLIFF, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. MORLEY COMPANIES, INC., Case No.
1:22-cv-10360-TLL-PTM (E.D. Mich., Feb. 18, 2022) is a class action
against Morley for its failure to secure and safeguard the
Plaintiff's and approximately 521,046 other individuals' ("Class
members") private, confidential, and sensitive medical and
personally identifying information ("PII/PHI"), including: names,
addresses, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, client
identification numbers, medical diagnostic and treatment
information, and health insurance information.

The Defendant is a company that provides various business services,
such as customer service, meeting planning, and exhibit and display
design.

On August 1, 2021, unauthorized individuals gained access to
Morley's networks and accessed and copied the PII/PHI of Plaintiff
and Class members (the "Data Breach").

Morley owed a duty to Plaintiff and Class members to implement and
maintain reasonable and adequate security measures to secure,
protect, and safeguard their PII/PHI against unauthorized access
and disclosure. Morley breached that duty by, among other things,
failing to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures
and practices to protect its employees', former employees', and
clients' PII/PHI from unauthorized access and disclosure, the suit
says.

As a result of Morley's inadequate security measures and breach of
its duties and obligations, the Data Breach occurred, and
Plaintiff's and Class members' PII/PHI was accessed and disclosed,
added the suit.

This action seeks to remedy these failings and their consequences.
Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all other
individuals whose PII/PHI was exposed as a result of the Data
Breach.

The Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all other Class members,
asserts claims for negligence, negligence per se, breach of implied
contract, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Michigan Consumer
Protection Act, and seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief,
monetary damages, statutory damages, punitive damages, equitable
relief, and all other relief authorized by law.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nicholas A. Coulson, Esq.
          Lance Spitzig, Esq
          LIDDLE SHEETS COULSON P.C.
          975 E. Jefferson Avenue
          Detroit, MI 48207
          Telephone: (313) 392-0015
          Facsimile: (313) 392-0025
          E-mail: ncoulson@lsccounsel.com
                  lspitzig@lsccounsel.com

               - and -

          Ben Barnow, Esq.
          Anthony L. Parkhill, Esq.
          Riley W. Prince, Esq.
          BARNOW AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          205 West Randolph Street, Ste. 1630
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 621-2000
          Facsimile: (312) 641-5504
          E-mail: b.barnow@barnowlaw.com
                  aparkhill@barnowlaw.com
                  rprince@barnowlaw.com

               - and -

          Andrew W. Ferich, Esq.
          Tina Wolfson, Esq.
          Robert Ahdoot, Esq.
          AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
          201 King of Prussia Road, Suite 650
          Radnor, PA 19087
          Telephone: (310) 474-9111
          Facsimile: (310) 474-8585
          E-mail: aferich@ahdootwolfson.com
                  twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com
                  rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com

NETWORK 1: Second Circuit Affirms Orders & Judgment in Malik Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MOHAMMAD A. MALIK, Plaintiff-Appellant, KARTHIK REDDY,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, LOONG
CHEE MIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, ROBERT E. MILLER, CHEN WEI, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. NETWORK 1 FINANCIAL
SECURITIES, INC., Defendant-Appellee, LONGFIN CORP., VIVEK KUMAR
RATAKONDA, ANDY ALTAHAWI, SURESH TAMMINEEDI, DORABABU PENUMARTHI,
VENKAT S. MEENAVALLI, Defendants, Case No. 20-2948-cv (2d Cir.),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
following orders and judgment of the district court:

   (1) the district court's June 21, 2019 scheduling order
       permitting the Plaintiffs to amend their complaint for a
       second time, but only in a limited manner; and

   (2) the district court's Nov. 15, 2019 opinion and order
       denying the motion for relief from its July 29, 2019 order
       dismissing Network 1 from the action with prejudice.

Mr. Malik, the Lead Plaintiff in the action, appeals from the
orders and judgment of the district court related to claims brought
against Network 1 as part of a federal securities class action,
filed on April 3, 2018, against Network 1, Longfin, Altahawi, and
other Longfin executives and insiders.

As relevant to the appeal, the lawsuit alleges that Network 1
participated in a scheme to deceive the public by facilitating the
unlawful issuance of unregistered Longfin securities, thereby
causing the public to purchase unregistered Longfin securities at
inflated prices, in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b), and Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, 17
C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5.1.

More specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that Network 1, as the
lead underwriter for Longfin's Regulation A+ ("Reg A+") offering,
was aware of, or recklessly disregarded, the fact that a
significant number of Longfin shares had not been validly issued
pursuant to a Reg A+ exemption from securities registration
requirements, because they had been transferred to Longfin insiders
for no consideration on Dec. 6, 2017.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs claim the shares should not have been
publicly traded. The Plaintiffs assert that it was through this
fraudulent conduct in connection with the Reg A+ offering that
Longfin was able to reach the 1 million-share minimum for listing
on the NASDAQ market.

On appeal, the Plaintiffs challenge the following: (1) the district
court's June 21, 2019 scheduling order permitting the Plaintiffs to
amend their complaint for a second time, but only in a limited
manner; and (2) the district court's Nov. 15, 2019 opinion and
order denying the motion for relief from its July 29, 2019 order
dismissing Network 1 from the action with prejudice.

Specifically, the Plaintiffs contend that the district court, in
its June 21, 2019 order, improperly denied the Plaintiffs' request
for comprehensive leave to amend and then compounded that error by
denying their subsequent motion for relief, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2), in which they sought to file a
Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") based on purportedly new evidence.
In denying the Rule 60(b)(2) motion, the district court concluded,
inter alia, that the purported new evidence contained in the TAC
would not alter its previous conclusion that the allegations
regarding Network 1's scienter were insufficiently pled.

As a threshold matter, the parties dispute whether the Plaintiffs
properly requested leave to amend the pleadings in broad terms,
such that they can challenge the limitations placed on such
amendments by the district court in its June 21, 2019 order. The
parties similarly dispute whether the additional allegations that
the Plaintiffs later sought to include in the TAC as part of their
Rule 60(b)(2) motion were "newly discovered evidence" or whether
such evidence was, in whole or in part, already available to the
Plaintiffs before the deadline for amending the pleadings.

However, the Second Circuit need not address these issues because
it concludes that, even if all of the additional allegations
contained in the proposed TAC are considered, the district court
correctly concluded that the proposed TAC fails to adequately
allege scienter as to Network 1 and, thus, any proposed amendment
would be futile.

Moreover, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a securities fraud
claim must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.
In the Circuit, the scienter requirement is met where the complaint
alleges facts showing either (1) "motive and opportunity to commit
the fraud" or (2) "strong circumstantial evidence of conscious
misbehavior or recklessness. A complaint will survive a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim "if a reasonable person would
deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as
any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged."

The Second Circuit holds that the Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently
plead a motive by Network 1 to commit fraud that would create a
strong inference of scienter. Because they failed to plead
particularized facts demonstrating motive and opportunity to commit
fraud, they must plead particularized allegations showing conscious
misbehavior or recklessness to survive a motion to dismiss.
However, the Plaintiffs' allegations sound, at most, in negligence
and thus are insufficient to support an inference of recklessness
that satisfies the scienter requirement. Similarly, although the
TAC alleges that "the records for Longfin's escrow accounts and
bank account show that none of the December 6 Shareholders paid for
the shares," it is not entirely clear that these are the same
records that Longfin provided to Network 1 after Network 1
requested such documentation regarding the receipt of funds.

In sum, the Second Circuit concludes that the TAC does not
adequately allege scienter, and therefore does not cure the
deficiencies in the Second Amended Complaint that led to the
dismissal of Network 1 from the action. Accordingly, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the claims with
prejudice, or in denying the Plaintiffs' subsequent motion for
reconsideration to file the TAC, because any such amendment was
futile.

The Second Circuit has considered the Plaintiffs' remaining
arguments and find in them no basis for reversal. Accordingly, it
affirmed the orders and judgment of the district court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 15, 2022 Summary Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/puvyb7ur from Leagle.com.

DONALD J. ENRIGHT, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, in Washington, D.C., for
the Plaintiff-Appellant.

JEFFREY IMERI -- jjimeri@mdwcg.com -- (Richard C. Imbrogno,
Marshall Dennehey Warner, on the brief), Coleman & Goggin, P.C., in
New York City, for the Defendant-Appellee.


NISSAN NORTH: Loses Bid for Partial Review of Order in Norman Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, CHEYNNE NORMAN, et al., individually and on behalf of
a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs v. NISSAN
NORTH AMERICA, Defendant. PATRICIA WECKWERTH, et al., individually
and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, Defendant. CHRISTOPHER GANN, et
al., individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiffs v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, Defendant, Case
Nos. 3:18-cv-00534, 3:18-cv-00588, 3:18-cv-00966 (M.D. Tenn.),
Judge Eli J. Richardson of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee, Nashville Division, denied the Defendant's
motion for partial reconsideration of Jan. 24, 2022 Order.

I. Background

The case involves claims brought by a nationwide class of owners
and lessees of Nissan vehicles equipped with a Continuously
Variable Transmission ("CVT"), which the class alleges is
defective. On March 10, 2020, the Court entered, in each of the
three actions, a Final Approval Order and Judgment, whereby the
Court approved a class settlement and dismissed with prejudice
claims brought by the putative class.

Following final approval, AUL, a third-party company that sells
vehicle-service contracts for which customers pay AUL a fee in
order for AUL to cover certain repair costs customers may incur
after expiration of their manufacturer's warranty, sued Nissan
North America, Inc. ("NNA") in California state court, bringing
claims regarding the same CVT defect -- A.U.L. Corp. v. Nissan
North America, Inc., Case No. 20CV000362 (the "California Suit").
NNA thereafter filed the referenced Motion to Enforce Judgment in
the Court pursuant to the directive of the judge presiding over the
California Suit (Judge Victoria Wood), through which NNA asked the
Court to determine "whether the California Suit is barred in whole
or part by the Settlement Agreement, the Court approved.

The Court denied NNA's Motion to Enforce Judgment, finding that
"because AUL is not a successor or assign of any Class Members in
the action, and because AUL lacks privity to any Class Members, no
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act gives the Court authority
pursuant to the All Writs' Act to enjoin the California Suit. AUL
has the right to bring its claims in the California Suit regardless
of this settled federal class action, and this Court cannot and
should not interfere with AUL's right to do so."

In the present Motion, the Defendant asks the Court to reconsider
three of the Court's rulings specifically related to AUL's
subrogation claim, namely its rulings that "(1) the Anti-Injunction
Act ('AIA') applies to the Motions to Enforce; (2) in pursuing its
subrogation claim, AUL is not a 'successor' to the Class Members'
claims; and (3) the AIA prevents the Court from interfering with
AUL's litigation of the subrogation claim in the Napa County
suit."

II. Discussion

The Defendant asserts that the first, fifth, and sixth grounds
"collectively capture the grounds for the Motion," i.e., that there
was a "clear error of law," that the Court "clearly overlooked
material facts that were presented by the movant in its prior
motion that would result in a different disposition," and that the
Court "clearly overlooked controlling law that was presented by the
movant in its prior motion and that would result in a different
disposition."

1. Clear error of law

The Motion does not assert or establish any error that is "clear."
Instead, the Defendant argues that the Court should have come out
differently on an issue that was already briefed by the parties:
Whether the final approval order in the matter precludes the
California Suit due to the Court's retained jurisdiction to enforce
the federal Class Settlement. It contends that the parties did not
already have the opportunity to argue whether Anti-Injunction Act
applies or, if it does, whether an exception to the Act also
applies. The Defendant now argues that the Anti-Injunction Act is
not implicated at all by the Motion to Enforce Judgment because
there is no "conflict" between competing courts and that therefore
it was not required to establish one of the three enumerated
exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act.

Judge Richardson opines that the fact that the Defendant failed to
argue the applicable law in connection with its Motion to Enforce
Judgment is no reason for the Court now to reconsider its prior
ruling. Even if the applicable test for whether the California Suit
impedes the Court's jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement
Agreement was tied to the existence of a "conflict," he finds that
there is an actual conflict in the case (and that it is the
Defendant who insisted there was such a conflict in the first
place).

Judge Richardson is not convinced by the Defendant's claimed
ignorance that the Anti-Injunction Act applies in the case (and
that the Defendant had no way of knowing that in its prior Motion
to Enforce Judgment, it should have squarely addressed the
exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act and convinced the Court that
at least one exception applied). The fact that the Defendant failed
to identify the Anti-Injunction Act as a crucial potential obstacle
to the granting of its Motion to Enforce Judgment does not warrant
reconsideration of the Court's ruling and an opportunity for the
Defendant to now elaborate on its prior arguments.

The Defendant also argues that the Court improperly took an
"all-or-nothing" approach to the Motion to Enforce Judgment,
whereby the Court denied the Motion to Enforce Judgment in its
entirety because at least some of AUL's claims were non-derivative
in nature. Judge Richardson holds that although he does not doubt
that he could choose to apply (or not apply) the Anti-Injunction
Act on a claim-specific basis, the Defendant has not shown that the
Court was required to apply (or, to put it more aptly, not apply)
it on a claim-specific basis--especially where, as in the case, the
Court was not even asked to do so. Thus, the Defendant has failed
to show that the Court's "all-or-nothing" resolution of the
Defendant's Motion to Enforce Judgment did not constitute a clear
error of law.

In sum, the Defendant has failed to demonstrate a clear error of
law. Thus, Judge Richardson finds that the Motion cannot be granted
on this particular ground.

2. Overlooked material facts

A motion to reconsider may be granted where the movant shows that
"the court clearly overlooked controlling law that was presented by
the movant in its prior motion and that would result in a different
disposition." The Defendant contends that the Motion should be
granted on this ground. However, it does not identify any material
facts overlooked by the Court. Indeed, as far as the Court can see,
the Defendant does not even make any real attempt to do so. Judge
Richardson thus finds that this is not a cognizable ground for
granting the Motion.

3. Overlooked controlling law

In the Motion and supporting memorandum, Defendant goes on at some
length to present an argument that the Court got it wrong the first
time around. As indicated above, Defendant is entitled to its
opinion on that and to present it to the Court of Appeals as
purported grounds for reversal. But that does not mean that
Defendant has identified (or even tried to identify) any particular
controlling law that the Court "clearly" overlooked. It is one
thing to say that all things considered (and considering various
cases that are not even binding on this Court), the Court should
have come out the other way; it is quite another to say that it is
"clear" that the Court "overlooked" law that is "controlling"
(surely meaning precedential and at least close to being squarely
applicable). At best, Defendant has established the former
(although the Court does not believe that it has). But Defendant
simply has not established the latter, or even made any real
attempt specifically to explain how it has established the latter.
The Court must therefore conclude that this is not a cognizable
ground for granting the Motion.

III. Conclusion

Because the Defendant has not shown any proper grounds for granting
its Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Richardson reaffirmed the
Court's prior decision on the Motion to Enforce Judgment. He
declined to entertain the Defendant's request merely to re-argue a
motion (including by addressing for the first time a matter, the
Anti-Injunction Act, that the Defendant previously should have
addressed) that the Court has already considered and addressed in
some detail in rendering its prior decision. Accordingly, Judge
Richardson denied the Defendants' Motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 15, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/3td43dvj from
Leagle.com.


ORANGE COUNTY, CA: Judgment Entered in Toll Roads Suit v. OCTA
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Otis D. Wright of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California entered a Class Action Judgment in the case,
In re TOLL ROADS LITIGATION PENNY DAVIDI BORSUK, et al., Plaintiffs
v. FOOTHILL/EASTERN TRANSPORTATION CORRIDOR AGENCY, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 8:16-cv-00262-ODW (ADSx) (C.D. Cal.).

On April 12, 2021, Plaintiff Dan Golka, on behalf of himself and
the proposed Settlement Class, and Defendants Orange County
Transportation Authority, Darrell Johnson and Lori Donchak
(collectively "OCTA"), and Defendant Cofiroute USA, LLC, entered
into a Settlement Agreement and Release.

On May 17, 2021, the Court granted preliminary approval of the
Agreement and ordered that notice be sent to the Settlement Class.

Concurrently with entry of the Class Action Judgment, the Court
granted final approval of the Settlement. Now pursuant to the
Court's Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement,
and the Plaintiff, the Final Settlement Class Members and the
Defendants having so agreed as provided in the Agreement, Judge
Wright issued Judgment in favor of the Defendants and against the
Final Settlement Class Members.

On Count V of the Plaintiff's Corrected First Amended Consolidated
Class Action Complaint, as the Court determined in its Order
Regarding Defendants' Motion to Decide Key Legal Questions, Judge
Wright finds and declares that:

           a. It is not a violation of California Streets &
Highways Code section 31490 for OCTA or its processing agency,
including Cofiroute, to send a license plate number of a vehicle
which incurred a toll violation and the violation date directly or
indirectly through a vendor to a department of motor vehicles to
get the registered owner's name and address so the agency can send
a notice of toll evasion violation to the registered owner or to
send a license plate number directly or indirectly to a department
of motor vehicles for a second or subsequent violation to get the
registered owner's name and address so the agency can send a notice
of toll evasion violation to the registered owner;

            b. It is not a violation of Section 31490 for OCTA or
its processing agency, including Cofiroute, to send to the
California Department of Motor Vehicles the information it requires
to prevent the registration of a vehicle that incurred a toll
violation from being renewed until outstanding tolls and penalties
are paid as authorized by California Vehicle Code sections 40267(a)
and 4770(a);

            c. It is not a violation of Section 31490 for OCTA or
its processing agency, including Cofiroute, to send to the
California Franchis Tax Board ("FTB") the information the FTB
requires to intercept a toll violator's tax refund or lottery
winnings and use them to pay outstanding tolls and penalties as
authorized by California Government Code sections 12419.10 and
12419.12;

            d. It is not a violation of Section 31490 for OCTA or
its processing agency, including Cofiroute, to send to a vendor the
name and address of the registered owner of a vehicle which
incurred or other person responsible for a toll violation to obtain
an updated address to send a notice directly related to a toll
evasion violation;

            e. It is not a violation of Section 31490 for OCTA or
its processing agency, including Cofiroute, to send to a car rental
company the information required to be included in a notice of toll
evasion violation when a vehicle owned by that car rental company
incurs a toll violation; and

            f. It is not a violation of Section 31490 for OCTA or
its processing agency, including Cofiroute, to send another
transportation agency the license plate number, transponder Hex ID
number, unique account identifying number, date and time of
transaction, and toll plaza and/or lane of the other transportation
agency's accountholder's use of its toll road or toll lane for
purposes of interoperability as authorized by California Streets
and Highways Code section 27565(a)(2) and required by the
California Toll Operators Committee interoperability
specifications.

On Counts III and IV of the Complaint, as the Court determined in
its Orders Regarding Defendants' Motions For Partial Summary
Judgment, Judge Wright finds and declares that the Defendant OCTA's
toll violation enforcement procedures.

All other counts or claims alleged in the Complaint are dismissed
with prejudice and, except as otherwise provided in the Agreement
or ordered by the Court, each party will bear his, her or its own
costs and attorney's fees.

The Plaintiff and the Final Settlement Class Members are
permanently enjoined from bringing, joining, or continuing to
prosecute any Released Claims against any of the Defendants or the
Released Parties.

Judge Wright further ordered, adjudged, and decreed against the
Plaintiff and all the Settlement Class Members, regardless of
whether they opted out or excluded themselves from the Final
Settlement Class, that providing Settlement Class Member
Information to the Class Administrator pursuant to the Agreement,
the Preliminary Approval Order, Court ordered Class Notice, or the
Final Approval Order does not violate Section 31490 or any other
federal, state or local constitution, statute, rule, regulation or
policy purporting to limit the disclosure of the personally
identifiable information that is reasonably necessary to provide
notice to the Settlement Class Members and to otherwise implement
the Settlement.

The Plaintiff and the Settlement Class Members are permanently
enjoined from filing or pursuing any claim or litigation against
Defendants OCTA, Cofiroute, Foothill/Eastern Transportation
Corridor Agency and San Joaquin Hills Transportation Corridor
Agency, 3M Company, BRiC-TPS, LLC, and any other person or entity
who provided or provides information to the Class Administrator
pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order or Final Approval Order,
and any of their respective officers, agents, employees and
attorneys, asserting that compliance with the obligations imposed
by the Agreement, the Preliminary Approval Order, Court ordered
Class Notice, or Final Approval Order violates Section 31490 or any
federal, state or local constitution, statute, rule, regulation or
policy purporting to limit the disclosure of the personally
identifiable information that is reasonably necessary to provide
notice to the Settlement Class and to otherwise implement the
Settlement.

Defendant OCTA will, for a period of 10 years, maintain its maximum
toll violation penalty at no more that $100 per violation. Judge
Wright finds and declares that a maximum penalty of $100 per
violation is not facially a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution or Article I, Section 17 of the California
Constitution.

Unless there is a change in current law governing the personally
identifiable information of a toll violator that a transportation
agency may provide to a third-party debt collection agency, the
only personally identifiable information of a toll violator
Defendant OCTA, and its processing agency, including Defendant
Cofiroute while acting in its capacity as processing agency for
OCTA, will provide a third-party debt collection agency is the
information contained in the relevant toll violation notice, any
updated contact, address and/or email information, and a unique
violation number and toll violator identification number. Defendant
OCTA and its processing agency will have no obligation under this
Judgment to search for or obtain updated contact information for a
toll violator before providing information to a third-party debt
collection agency.

Judge Wright finds and declares that it is not a violation of
Section 31490 or the United States Constitution, California
Constitution or any federal or California statutory provision for
OCTA or its processing agency, including Cofiroute, to provide a
third-party debt collection agency with the information contained
in the relevant toll violation notice, any updated contact, address
and/or email information, and a unique violation number and toll
violator identification number.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 11, 2022 Judgment is available
at https://tinyurl.com/msrs6hx3 from Leagle.com.


PABST BREWING: Loses Bid to Strike Peacock Nationwide Class Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRENDAN PEACOCK, Plaintiff v. PABST BREWING COMPANY,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-00568-TLN-CKD (E.D. Cal.), Judge
Troy L. Nunley of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of California issued an order:

   (1) granting in part and denying in part the Plaintiff's
       Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses; and

   (2) denying the Defendant's Motion to Strike Nationwide Class
       Allegations.

I. Background

The case arises out of a dispute over the Defendant's marketing of
its "Olympia" brand beer. The Plaintiff alleges the Defendant
deceives consumers by marketing Olympia Beer in a way that "falsely
suggests to consumers that the water in the beer is from the
Olympia area of Washington State."

The Plaintiff filed a putative class action on March 15, 2018,
claiming he was injured when induced by the Defendant's misleading
marketing to pay a "premium" price for the beer in violation of
California Business and Professions Code Section 17200. He filed
the operative Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") on Sept. 19, 2019.
The Defendant answered on Oct. 21, 2020.

The Plaintiff filed his instant motion pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(f) on Nov. 12, 2020. On Jan. 29, 2021, the
Defendant filed its instant motion pursuant to Rules 12(f),
23(c)(1)(A), and 23(d)(1)(D). Also pending before the Court is a
Motion for Class Certification.

II. Analysis

A. Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses

As a preliminary matter, the Defendant seeks to voluntarily strike
six of the affirmative defenses and its prayer for attorneys' fees
challenged by the instant motion. Therefore, Judge Nunley grants
the Plaintiff's motion as to affirmative defenses one, six, eight,
twenty-two, twenty-five, and thirty-five with leave to amend.

The Plaintiff requests the Court strikes nine additional
affirmative defenses because they are either inappropriate or the
Defendant failed to plead sufficient facts to support them. In
opposition, the Defendant argues its Answer survives the lenient
"fair notice standard" and the Plaintiff fails to identify how the
presence of any of the affirmative defenses prejudice him.

i. Affirmative Defenses Four, Twelve, and Fifteen

The Plaintiff argues the Court should strike Defendant's statute of
limitations, waiver, and latches affirmative defenses for
insufficient factual support.

Judge Nunley finds that all three are well-established defenses
whose application is typically self-explanatory. Indeed, all three
are listed in Rule 8(c) as examples of affirmative defenses. The
Plaintiff pleads only a single claim for relief, so the applicable
statute of limitations is obvious without the Defendant having to
specifically plead it. Further, as the Defendant notes in its
opposition to the instant motion, the Plaintiff's SAC only vaguely
describes the period on which his action is premised.

To the extent the Plaintiff seeks to recover for injuries "since
2003" or otherwise outside the limitations period, he is on notice
Defendant intends to bar recovery with these defenses. Finally, the
Plaintiff fails to demonstrate the Defendant will be unable to
prove any of the three defenses as a matter of law. Therefore,
Judge Nunley denied the Plaintiff's motion as to affirmative
defenses four, twelve, and fifteen.

ii. Affirmative Defenses Thirty, Thirty-One, and Thirty-Four

The Plaintiff argues the Court should strike the Defendant's class-
and injunction-related defenses as inappropriate. The Defendant
argues striking the defenses would serve no purpose other than
formalism and the Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how their
inclusion is prejudicial.

Judge Nunley finds that all three purported defenses are merely
ways of stating the Plaintiff is unable to prove the merits of its
claim. Although motions to strike affirmative defenses are
sometimes not granted absent prejudice to the plaintiff, the
Defendant has not shown, and the text of Rule 12(f) does not
suggest, prejudice is required. Accordingly, Judge Nunley grants
the Plaintiff's motion as to affirmative defenses thirty,
thirty-one, and thirty-four with leave to amend.

iii. Affirmative Defenses Two and Three

The Plaintiff argues the Court should strike the Defendant's
standing affirmative defenses for insufficient factual support and
because the Court settled the issue of standing for injunctive
relief in its Oct. 1, 2020 Order. The Defendant argues its
standings defenses were adequately pleaded because they provide the
Plaintiff fair notice of the defenses being asserted.
Although the Court previously held the Plaintiff adequately alleged
a threat of future harm sufficient to confer standing to pursue
injunctive relief, the Defendant may again challenge the
Plaintiff's standing at summary judgment or trial where the
Plaintiff will be unable to sustain his action on mere allegations,
Judge Nunley holds. Therefore, he denies the Plaintiff's motion as
to affirmative defenses two and three.

iv. Affirmative Defense Eighteen

Lastly, the Plaintiff argues the Court should strike Defendant's
third party conduct affirmative defense for insufficient factual
support. The Defendant argues it is not required to plead
additional facts to support this defense and may rely on the
discovery process to flesh out its defense. To support its
assertion that the Defendant's pleading is inadequate, the
Plaintiff solely cites to the portion of a Northern District of
Illinois opinion striking an affirmative defense alleging failure
to join an indispensable party. He has further failed to rebut any
of the Defendant's arguments in its opposition.

Judge Nunley finds that the discretion of whether to grant a motion
to strike is soundly with the Court. The Plaintiff has failed to
provide any persuasive authority or argument for why this request
should be granted. Accordingly, the Plaintiff fails to carry his
burden and Judge Nunley denies his motion as to affirmative defense
eighteen.

B. Motion to Strike Nationwide Class Allegations

In its motion, the Defendant argues the Court should strike the
nationwide class allegations from the Plaintiff's SAC because they
are barred by the choice of law analysis articulated in Mazza v.
Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012). In
opposition, the Plaintiff argues the Defendant's motion is: (1)
untimely; (2) unauthorized by the Court's scheduling order; and (3)
fails to carry its heavy burden to demonstrate why a nationwide
class is inappropriate. The Defendant replies by asserting the
Court has the authority to strike the requested portions of the
Plaintiff's SAC before the class certification stage and Plaintiff
wholly fails to respond to Defendant's analysis under Mazza.

Because the Defendant has not shown the Plaintiff can achieve class
certification as either a Rule 12(b)(1) or (2) class, Judge Nunley
does not reach the Plaintiff's procedural arguments. He holds that
he sees no point in striking a fraction of a sentence on which the
Plaintiff does not rely, permitting further amendments to the
pleadings, inviting additional Rule 12 motions, and further
delaying this action. Therefore, without any explanation as to why
the Court should apply Mazza outside of the Rule 23(b)(3)
preponderance analysis in which it was decided, the Defendant fails
to carry its heavy burden on a motion to strike.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Nunley granted in part and denied
in part the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses, and
denied the Defendant's Motion to Strike Nationwide Class
Allegations. The Defendant will file an amended answer within 21
days of the electronic filing date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 11, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4cjc8u4u from Leagle.com.


PAYCOR INC: Stang Wins Bid for Court-Authorized Collective Notice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael R. Barrett of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, grants the Plaintiff's
Motion for Court-Authorized Collective Notice in the lawsuit styled
Adam Quincy Stang, Plaintiff v. Paycor, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:20-cv-00882 (S.D. Ohio).

The Plaintiff brings the lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly
situated exempt-classified Client Sales Executives, and other
similar sales representative roles, at the Defendant's office or
other fixed location. He worked in the Defendant's Cincinnati, Ohio
office as a Client Sales Executive from May 23, 2016, to Nov. 12,
2018.

The Defendant is a software company that is headquartered in
Cincinnati, Ohio, with other offices nationwide, and sells various
human resources products to companies nationwide.

The Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendant failed to pay the
Plaintiff, and others in the same role or similar sales
representative roles, overtime in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") and Ohio's wage laws. The Amended Complaint
alleges that the Defendant has a policy of misclassifying Client
Sales Executives, and other similar sales representative roles, as
exempt from the FSLA's and Ohio's overtime provisions such that the
Plaintiff, and others in the same role or similar sales
representative roles, repeatedly worked more than 40 hours per
workweek without receiving overtime compensation.

The Plaintiff currently asks the Court to conditionally certify the
following FLSA collective:

     Plaintiff and all similarly situated persons who work or
     have worked for Paycor as exempt-classified Client Sales
     Executive, Senior Client Sales Executive, and Newtown Client
     Sales Executive [(now called Sales Executive, Client)] who
     worked primarily at Paycor's offices or another fixed
     location from November 3, 2017 to the present and who elect
     to opt in to this action.

The Plaintiff also requests that the Court permit Notice of the
action to be sent to members of the proposed FLSA collective
informing them of their right to opt-in to this case. The Defendant
responds that the Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that
a collective action should be conditionally certified. In the
alternative, and if the Court conditionally certifies the
Plaintiff's proposed FLSA collective, the Defendant argues that the
proposed Notice sought is flawed.

Conditional Certification

The FLSA requires a covered employer to pay overtime wages to an
employee who works more than 40 hours per week unless the employee
falls into the category of exempted employees.

In support of conditional certification, the Plaintiff submits,
inter alia, his declaration and a copy of one of the Defendant's
manuals he acquired in 2018 ("Manual"). The Plaintiff states that
while employed by the Defendant he worked as a Client Sales
Executive. He explains that, as a Client Sales Executive, he
primarily performed sales-related work, including researching
potential sales leads, cold calling sales prospects, emailing sales
prospects, booking qualified meetings with sales prospects, and
tracking his sales progress. He states that he performed almost all
of his sales work by phone, email, and videoconference from
Defendant's Cincinnati office or from home. He explains that the
Defendant used SalesForce, a customer relationship management
platform, to manage and track his and other sales representatives'
sales work, and sales representatives could see each other's sales
numbers in SalesForce.

The Plaintiff states that the Defendant required him and other
sales representatives to meet certain sales metrics on a weekly and
monthly basis. He states that the Defendant maintained standardized
training materials for its sales representatives. He explains that,
as a Client Sales Executive, the Defendant paid him a base salary;
he was eligible to earn commissions; the Defendant did not direct
him to record his hours in a timekeeping system and he did not do
so; he regularly worked more than 40 hours each week; it was
difficult to meet the Defendant's job requirements without working
substantially more than 40 hours per week; and he did not receive
overtime compensation for the hours that he worked over 40 hours in
a workweek.

The Plaintiff names four other Client Sales Executives, who he
states also performed the same job duties in the Cincinnati office,
regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, received a base
salary with a commission eligibility option, and did not receive
overtime compensation. He explains that he knows this information
about the four named Client Sales Executives by observing them in
the office, speaking with them individually, hearing about their
sales progress during monthly sales meetings, and looking at their
performance metrics on SalesForce.

In response, the Defendant submitted the declaration of Ellie
Elder, who serves as its "Director, HR Business Partner." Ms. Elder
explains that she reads the Plaintiff's proposed FLSA collective,
found in the Motion for Court-Authorized Collective Notice, to
include 15 different job categories of the Defendant's sales
representatives. She clarifies that, of these 15 different job
categories, only the Defendant's sales representative positions of
Client Sales Executive, Senior Client Sales Executive, and Newtown
Client Sales Executive are exempt positions.

In Reply, and in light of Ms. Elder's clarification, the Plaintiff
amended his proposed FLSA collective to include only those
employees, who worked for the Defendant as Client Sales Executives,
Senior Client Sales Executives, and Newtown Client Sales
Executives.

The Manual states that the Client Sales Executive roles and Newtown
Client Sales Executive role are generally housed at the Defendant's
Cincinnati headquarters and make the majority of their sales calls
virtually from their office.

Based on the information provided to the Court, thus far, Judge
Barrett holds that the Plaintiff has made a modest factual showing
to support conditionally certifying the following FLSA
collective--the Plaintiff and all similarly situated persons who
work or have worked for Paycor as an exempt-classified Client Sales
Executive, Senior Client Sales Executive, and Newtown Client Sales
Executive (now called Sales Executive, Client) who worked primarily
at Paycor's offices or another fixed location from Nov. 3, 2017, to
the present and who elect to opt in to this action--and to support
sending Notice to those employees, who work or worked for the
Defendant in those three roles.

Notice

The Plaintiff seeks permission to send the proposed Notice by mail,
email, text message, and a reminder. The Defendant responds that
any Notice should be distributed once and by regular mail only.
Trial courts have discretion to facilitate notice to potential
plaintiffs in FLSA collective actions.

The Plaintiff requests a 90-day opt-in period. The Defendant
counters that a 60- or 75-day opt-in period is reasonable. Judge
Barrett finds that a 75-day opt-in period is adequate in this
matter.

The Plaintiff requests that the Court order the Defendant to
produce a computer-readable list that contains the names, last
known mailing address, last known telephone numbers, last known
personal and work email addresses, work locations and dates of
employment, and the last four digits of Social Security numbers of
the members of the conditionally certified FLSA collective.

The Defendant responds that the Court should not order it to
provide the last known telephone numbers, last known personal and
work email addresses, and the last four digits of Social Security
numbers of the members of the conditionally certified FLSA
collective.

Judge Barrett holds that the Defendant is required to produce a
computer-readable list that includes the names, last known mailing
address, last known personal and work email addresses, and work
locations and dates of employment for the members of the
conditionally certified FLSA collective, but not those members'
last known telephone numbers or the last four digits of Social
Security numbers.

The Plaintiff also requests that the Court authorize the creation
of a standalone website through which opt-in plaintiffs can
electronically submit claim forms. The Defendant opposes this
request to the extent that the Plaintiff would create and maintain
the proposed website and asserts that the website should provide no
characterization of this case.

In his Reply, the Plaintiff agrees that a neutral claims
administrator should create and maintain the proposed website, but
argues that the content of the website should be the language in
the Notice that the Court ultimately approves.

The Court will grant the Plaintiff's request that potential opt-in
plaintiffs be permitted to submit consent to join forms via a
website. A neutral claims administrator must create and maintain
that website and the content of the website shall be the language
in the Notice that the Court approves.

The Defendant appears to object to the Plaintiff's inclusion of the
following language in the proposed Notice: "the notice period
re-starts if the notice is returned undeliverable and a new address
is located" and "[i]f you believe that you have been penalized,
discriminated against, or disciplined in any way as a result of you
receiving this notification, considering whether to join this
lawsuit, or actually joining this lawsuit, please contact
Plaintiff's lawyers listed below."

Unlike its other objections to the proposed Notice, for its
comments and objection to the inclusion of these two sentences, the
Defendant directs the Court to an attached redline version of the
proposed Notice and its comments and objection therein. Despite the
Defendant's statement otherwise, in the future, it would be easier
to present its comments and objection in the text of its responsive
memorandum instead of directing the Court to different document and
then to comments and an objection therein, Judge Barrett notes.

Regardless, the Court agrees with the Plaintiff regarding the
inclusion of those two sentences, and those sentences should remain
in the Notice except that the second sentence should read: "[i]f
you believe that you have been penalized, discriminated against, or
disciplined in any way as a result of you receiving this
notification, considering whether to join this lawsuit, or actually
joining this lawsuit, please contact Plaintiff's lawyers listed
below or another attorney of your choice."

Finally, the Defendant does not object to the Plaintiff's proposed
Consent to Join Form and the Court approves the Consent to Join
Form as proposed.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is ordered that:

   1. The Defendant's Motion to file its Sur-Reply is granted,
      and the Court will consider the Defendant's proposed
      Sur-Reply as docketed;

   2. The Plaintiff's Motion for Court-Authorized Collective
      Notice is granted, as described;

   3. The Defendant will provide a computer-readable list of the
      information described above of all putative collective
      members to the Plaintiff's counsel within fourteen (14)
      days of entry of this Order; and

   4. The Plaintiff will file a copy of the Court-Authorized
      Collective Notice, that is consistent with the Court's
      findings here, within fourteen (14) days of entry of this
      Order, for purposes of the record.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion & Order dated Feb. 7, 2022,
is available at https://tinyurl.com/bdhzarzt from Leagle.com.


PNC BANK: Arbitration Order in Lyons Class Suit Affirmed in Part
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, WILLIAM T. LYONS, Individually and on Behalf of
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellee v. PNC BANK, National
Association, Defendant-Appellant, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU, Amicus Curiae. WILLIAM T. LYONS, Individually and on Behalf
of Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PNC BANK,
National Association, Defendant-Appellee, CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION BUREAU, Amicus Curiae, Case Nos. 21-1058, 21-1289 (4th
Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in
part and reversed in part the district court's order granting in
part and denying in part PNC's motion to compel arbitration.

I. Introduction

William Lyons, Jr. filed suit against PNC, alleging violations of
the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") related to PNC's set-off of funds
from two of Mr. Lyons's deposit accounts to pay the outstanding
balance on a Home Equity Line of Credit ("HELOC"). PNC moved to
compel arbitration of the dispute based on an arbitration provision
in the parties' agreement applicable to the two deposit accounts,
and the district court granted the motion as to one account and
denied the motion as to the other account.

II. Background

Mr. Lyons opened a HELOC with National City Bank on Feb. 4, 2005.
J.A. 32-33. To do so, he signed an Equity Reserve Agreement that
did not contain an arbitration provision. Five years later, on May
3, 2010, Mr. Lyons opened three deposit accounts at PNC. One of
those deposit accounts was an account ending 2553 ("2010 Account").
In opening the 2010 Account, Mr. Lyons signed a document that
stated he was "bound by the terms and conditions of PNC Bank's
Account Agreement for Checking Accounts and Saving Accounts." The
2010 Account Agreement included a provision authorizing PNC to set
off funds from the account to pay "any loans, overdrafts,
obligations or other indebtedness now or hereafter owing to us by
you." It also included a clause allowing PNC to amend the Account
Agreement and explaining the procedures it must follow to do so.

In 2013, PNC added an arbitration clause to the Account Agreement.
The amended version of the Account Agreement stated that it took
effect on Feb. 1, 2013, but customers were given 45 days to opt out
of the arbitration provision. PNC kept track of the opt-out
deadline for each customer, and its records show that Mr. Lyons had
until June 11, 2013, to opt out of the arbitration provision.

Mr. Lyons opened another deposit account with PNC Bank on June 6,
2014 and again agreed to be "bound by the terms and conditions" of
the 2014 version of the Account Agreement, which included the same
arbitration clause as in the 2013 version. Mr. Lyons was again
provided an opportunity to opt out of the arbitration provision and
did not.

Mr. Lyons's HELOC ended on Feb. 4, 2015, as expected, but he did
not finish paying off the credit until June 17, 2020. On Sept. 26,
2019, PNC applied a set-off of $1,396.97 from Mr. Lyons's 2010
Account to pay the overdue HELOC payment. On Feb. 26, 2020, PNC
applied another set-off of $1,589 from the 2014 Account, which was
also used to make a payment on the HELOC.

Mr. Lyons filed suit against PNC in Circuit Court in June 2020
raising claims under TILA. PNC removed the suit to federal court
and filed a motion to compel arbitration. In its filings, PNC
discussed only the most recent, Aug. 11, 2019, version of the
Account Agreement.

On Nov. 15, 2020, after the matter was fully briefed, the district
court requested supplemental briefing on two questions: "(1)
whether the Arbitration Clause existing in the 2019 version of the
Account Agreement also existed in the Account Agreement at the time
Mr. Lyons opened the accounts in 2010 and 2016; and (2) if not,
whether Mr. Lyons can be considered bound to an Arbitration Clause
added to the Account Agreement after the accounts were opened."
Both parties submitted supplemental memoranda simultaneously on
Dec. 1, 2020. PNC's supplemental memorandum described for the first
time the various versions of the Account Agreement.

On Jan. 6, 2021, the district court issued a memorandum opinion
granting in part and denying in part PNC's motion to compel
arbitration. The court found that amendments made by the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to TILA barred
arbitration of Mr. Lyons's claims related to the 2014 Account
because it was opened after the effective date of the provisions
but that those restrictions did not apply retroactively to bar
arbitration of his claims related to the 2010 account.

The court explained that the 2010 Account was updated to include an
arbitration provision with an effective date of Feb. 1, 2013 --
several months before June 1, 2013, the effective date of the
relevant provisions of Dodd-Frank. It then found that the relevant
Dodd-Frank provisions did not apply retroactively to the 2010
Account because there was no language in the statute evidencing an
intent for the provisions to overcome the presumption against
retroactivity.

PNC filed an appeal on Jan. 12, 2021, and Mr. Lyons filed a
cross-appeal on Jan. 25, 2021. It appeals the district court's
partial denial of its motion to compel arbitration, and Mr. Lyons
cross-appeals the district court's partial grant of the motion to
compel arbitration.

III. Discussion

A.

First, the Fourth Circuit must consider whether the district court
erred in interpreting the Dodd-Frank Act to make the arbitration
provision in Mr. Lyons's Account Agreement inapplicable to his
set-off claims. The district court provided two independent
statutory bases for finding that the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits
arbitration of the claims raised by Mr. Lyons in the case: Section
1639c(e)(1) and Section 1639c(e)(3).

Since it agrees that Section 1639c(e)(3) bars arbitration of Mr.
Lyons's claims, the Fourth Circuit need not determine whether
Section 1639c(e)(1) also applies and prohibits arbitration of his
claims.

The plain language of Section 1639c(e)(3) is clear and unambiguous:
A consumer cannot be prevented from bringing a TILA action in
federal district court by a provision in an agreement "related to"
a residential mortgage loan -- like a HELOC. By all accounts, Mr.
Lyons's Account Agreement stands in relation to, pertains to,
refers to, and has bearing on or concerns his HELOC. PNC relied on
a set-off provision included in the deposit Account Agreement as a
mechanism for repayment of the amount outstanding on his HELOC
loan. Thus, by PNC's own design, the Account Agreement and the
HELOC loan are connected.

PNC insists, however, that Section 1639c(e)(3) cannot prohibit
arbitration of Mr. Lyons's claims because the provision was not
intended to restrict agreements to arbitrate. Rather, argues PNC,
the provision limits a consumer from agreeing to waive certain
claims but does not control the proper judicial forum for
resolution of such claims.

In contrast to the provisions at issue in the cases cited by PNC,
which authorize a cause of action, the Fourthn Circuit opines that
Section 1639c(e)(3) expressly prohibits a covered agreement from
barring a consumer "from bringing an action in an appropriate
district court of the United States, or any other court of
competent jurisdiction." There is a substantive difference between
finding that arbitration is an appropriate alternative mechanism to
enforce a statutorily created right to sue and overriding an
express congressional command proscribing waiver of a specific
judicial forum.

Further, PNC's position is difficult to reconcile with the
structure of Dodd-Frank. While the text of Section 1639c(e)(3) does
not include the term "arbitration," the provision is found in a
short section of the Act entitled "Arbitration." This regulation
would be unwarranted unless Section 1639c(e)(3) prohibits
pre-dispute agreements to resolve claims in a non-judicial forum.

Given the unambiguous language of Section 1639c(e)(3), the Fourth
Circuit holds that it is implausible that Congress did not intend
the provision to prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
Since, Mr. Lyons' Account Agreement clearly "relates to" his HELOC
agreement, it finds that, properly interpreted, Section 1639c(e)(3)
bars arbitration of Mr. Lyons' set-off claims.

B.

Having determined that Section 1639c(e)(3) precludes arbitration of
Mr. Lyons' set-off claims, the Fourth Circuit must next determine
whether the district court nevertheless erred by finding that the
provision applied to bar arbitration of Mr. Lyons' claims related
to the 2014 Account -- even though the parties had a long-standing,
and pre-existing depository relationship prior to the effective
date of the relevant Dodd-Frank provisions.

On appeal, PNC contends that the district court erred in denying
its motion to compel arbitration of claims related to the 2014
Account because the court should have found that those claims are
arbitrable pursuant to the arbitration clause found in the 2013
Account Agreement. Specifically, it argues that when Mr. Lyons
opened the 2014 Account, he was not entering a new contractual
relationship with PNC but merely continuing an existing
relationship with the bank and, therefore, that the later Account
is properly covered by the arbitration provision in the earlier
Account Agreement.

But, the fourth Circuit finds, a review of the record makes clear
that the arbitration provision applicable to the 2010 Account via
the 2013 Account Agreement was not entered into by Mr. Lyons until
June 11, 2013 -- 10 days after the effective date of Section
1639c(e)(3). Thus, the arbitration clause is precluded by Section
1639c(e)(3) from applying to Mr. Lyons' claims related to either
the 2010 Account or the 2014 Account. Although the stated effective
date of the 2013 Account Agreement was Feb. 1, 2013, customers were
given 45 days to opt out of the Arbitration Clause. PNC's own
records show that Mr. Lyons had until June 11, 2013, to opt out of
the arbitration provision. Thus, the arbitration agreement between
Mr. Lyons and PNC was not formed until June 11, 2013 -- after the
effective date of Section 1639c(e)(3).

Since the 2013 arbitration agreement between Mr. Lyons and PNC was
not formed until after the effective date of Section 1639c(e)(3),
the provision applies prospectively to both the 2010 Account and
the 2014 Account.

PNC argues, however, that the Fourth Circuit lacks jurisdiction to
review the district court's order compelling arbitration of the
2010 Account Agreement.

The Fourth Circuit opines that the district court's partial grant
of PNC's order to compel arbitration of the 2010 Account is
"inextricably intertwined" with the district court's partial denial
of the order to compel arbitration of the 2014 Account because our
consideration of the latter order necessarily resolves the former.
As it discussed, PNC contends on appeal that the district court
erred in finding that Section 1639c(e)(3) precluded arbitration of
Mr. Lyons' claims related to the 2014 Account because it should
have found that the arbitration provision in the 2013 Account
Agreement applied to the 2014 Account.

The Fourth Circuit finds, however, that PNC cannot rely on the
arbitration clause in the 2013 Account Agreement to require
arbitration of claims related to the 2014 Account because Mr. Lyons
did not accept the terms of the arbitration clause until June 11,
2013 -- after the effective date of Section 1639c(e)(3), which
prohibits the arbitration of such claims. The same issue underlies
and necessarily resolves the arbitrability of Mr. Lyons' claims
related to the 2010 Account. Since the arbitration clause in the
2013 Account Agreement was not agreed to until June 11, 2013, it
also cannot prevent Section 1639c(e)(3) from precluding arbitration
of Mr. Lyons's claims related to the 2010 Account.

IV. Conclusion

Because it finds that Section 1639c(e)(3) of the Dodd-Frank Act
precludes pre-dispute agreements requiring the arbitration of
claims related to residential mortgage loans and that the
arbitration agreement relevant to the appeal was not formed until
after the effective date of Section 1639c(e)(3), the Fourth Circuit
finds that PNC may not compel arbitration of Mr. Lyons' claims as
to both the 2010 Account and the 2014 Account. Therefore, it
affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's order
granting in part and denying in part PNC's motion to compel
arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 15, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2p8axkx5 from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Daniel J. Tobin -- tobindj@ballardspahr.com -- BALLARD
SPAHR LLP, in Washington, D.C., for the Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Ellen Louise Noble, PUBLIC JUSTICE, in Washington, D.C., for the
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Kevin E. Friedl, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, in
Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae.

ON BRIEF: Matthew D. Lamb -- lambm@ballardspahr.com -- BALLARD
SPAHR LLP, in Washington, D.C., for the Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Scott C. Borison -- usdc@legglaw.com -- BORISON FIRM LLC, San
Mateo, California; Phillip R. Robinson --
phillip@marylandconsumer.com -- CONSUMER LAW CENTER LLC, Silver
Spring, Maryland; Karla Gilbride, PUBLIC JUSTICE, in Washington,
D.C., for the Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Stephen Van Meter, Acting General Counsel, John R. Coleman, Deputy
General Counsel, Steven Y. Bressler, Assistant General Counsel,
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, in Washington, D.C., for
Amicus Curiae.


QUINCY BOOTH: Banks, et al., Seek to Certify Settlement Class
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned EDWARD BANKS, et al., v.
QUINCY BOOTH, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-00849-CKK (D.D.C.), the
Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying a settlement class as to all claims in this
      action, defined as follows:

      "All persons who were confined in the DOC Central
      Detention Facility (CDF) or Correctional Treatment
      Facility (CTF) for any amount of time from March 30, 2020,
      to the Expiration Date of the Settlement Agreement;"

   2. certifying Edward Banks, Keon Jackson, Eric Smith, and
      D'Angelo Phillips as class representatives; and

   3. appointing Zoe Friedland, Jonathan Anderson, Jenna Cobb,
      and Hanna Perry from the Public Defender Service for the
      District of Columbia; Scott Michelman, Arthur Spitzer, and
      Michael Perloff from the American Civil Liberties Union
      Foundation of the District of Columbia; and Jacob
      Kreilkamp, Rachel Miller-Ziegler, and Brendan Gants from
      Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP as class counsel.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Feb. 14,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/35mBPr3
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Zoe Friedland, Esq.
          Jonathan W. Anderson, Esq.
          Jenna Cobb, Esq.
          Hanna Perry, Esq.
          PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE
          FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
                    633 Indiana Avenue N.W.
          Washington, D.C. 20004
          Telephone: (202) 824-2524
          Facsimile: (202) 824-2525

               - and -

          Scott Michelman, Esq.
          Arthur B. Spitzer, Esq.
          Michael Perloff, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION
          OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
          915 15th Street NW, Second Floor
          Washington, D.C. 20005
          Telephone: (202) 457-0800
          E-mail: smichelman@acludc.org

               - and -

          Jacob S. Kreilkamp, Esq.
          MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
          350 South Grand Avenue, 50th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-3426
          Telephone: (213) 683-9260
          Facsimile: (213) 593-2960
          E-mail: jacob.kreilkamp@mto.com

               - and -

          Rachel G. Miller-Ziegler, Esq.
          Brendan B. Gants, Esq.
          MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
          601 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Suite 500E
          Washington DC, 20014
          Telephone: (202) 220-1100
          E-mail: rachel.miller-ziegler@mto.com

RA MEDICAL: Class Settlement in Derr Suit Wins Preliminary Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ERVIN DERR, and PETER SHOEMAKER, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs v. RA MEDICAL
SYSTEMS, INC., DEAN IRWIN, ANDREW JACKSON, MELISSA BURSTEIN, MARTIN
BURSTEIN, RICHARD HEYMANN, MAURICE BUCHBINDER, MARTIN COLOMBATTO,
RICHARD MEJIA, JR., MARK E. SAAD, and WILLIAM ENQUIST, JR.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-01079 (S.D. Cal.), Judge Larry Alan
Burns of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Amended Order:

   a. granting the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
      Action Settlement;

   b. denying the Motion to Dismiss without prejudice; and

   c. denying the Motion for Consideration of Documents without
      prejudice.

Lead Plaintiffs Ervin Derr and Peter Shoemaker brought the action
against Defendant Ra Medical, and Individual Defendants Andrew
Jackson, Richard Heymann, Maurice Buchbinder, Martin Colombatto,
Mark Saad, William Enquist, Jr., Dean Irwin, Melissa Burstein, and
Martin Burstein, on behalf of a putative class of investors in Ra
Medical.

The parties have reached a mutually satisfactory Stipulation and
Agreement of Settlement, and the Lead Plaintiffs now apply for an
order preliminarily approving the settlement effected by that
Stipulation and permitting their counsel to send notice to members
of the putative class.

The Court may preliminarily approve the settlement and direct the
parties to send notice to the class only if the parties show that
the Court "will likely be able to: (i) approve the proposal under
Rule 23(e)(2); and (ii) certify the class for purposes of judgment
on the proposal." Based on (a) the Lead Plaintiffs' motion for
preliminary approval of the Settlement, and the papers filed and
arguments made in connection with that motion, and (b) the
Stipulation and its attached exhibits, Judge Burns granted the
motion for preliminary approval. He set the hearing on final
approval of the settlement for June 13, 2022 at 11:30 a.m.

Pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Judge Burns finds that he will likely be able to certify
the proposed Settlement Class solely for purposes of effectuating
the proposed Settlement. That Settlement Class would consist of all
persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Ra
Medical common stock: (a) pursuant and/or traceable to Ra Medical's
IPO; and/or (b) between Sept. 27, 2018 and Nov. 27, 2019,
inclusive.

Judge Burns also will likely be able to approve the Settlement, as
embodied in the Stipulation, as being fair, reasonable, and
adequate to the Settlement Class, subject to further consideration
at the Settlement Hearing to be conducted. On that basis, he
preliminarily approved the Settlement.

He will hold the Settlement Hearing on June 13, 2022 at 11:30 a.m.
in Courtroom 14A of the United States Courthouse, 333 West
Broadway, San Diego, CA 9210.

The Lead Counsel is authorized to retain Epiq Class Action & Claims
Solutions, Inc. to supervise and administer the notice procedure in
connection with the proposed Settlement as well as the processing
of Claims.

Notice of the Settlement and the Settlement Hearing will be given
by the Lead Counsel as follows:

     a) within five business days of the date of entry of this
Order, Ra Medical will provide or cause to be provided to the
Claims Administrator in electronic format (at no cost to the
Settlement Fund, the Lead Counsel, or the Claims Administrator) its
lists (consisting of names and addresses) of shareholders of record
of Ra Medical common stock during the Settlement Class Period;

     (b) not later than 20 business days after the date of entry of
the Order, the Claims Administrator will cause a copy of the Notice
and the Claim Form, to be mailed by first-class mail to potential
Settlement Class Members at the addresses set forth in the records
provided by Ra Medical or in the records which Ra Medical caused to
be provided, or who otherwise may be identified through further
reasonable effort;

     (c) contemporaneously with the mailing of the Notice Packet,
the Claims Administrator will cause copies of the Notice and the
Claim Form to be posted on a website to be developed for the
Settlement, from which copies of the Notice and Claim Form can be
downloaded;

     (d) not later than 10 business days after the Notice Date, the
Claims Administrator will cause the Summary Notice, to be published
once in Investor's Business Daily and to be transmitted once over
the PR Newswire; and

     (e) not later than seven calendar days prior to the Settlement
Hearing, the Lead Counsel will serve on the Defendants' Counsel and
file with the Court proof, by affidavit or declaration, of such
mailing and publication.

Judge Burns approved, as to form and content, the Notice, the Claim
Form, and the Summary Notice. Brokers and other nominees who
purchased or otherwise acquired Ra Medical Stock during the
Settlement Class Period for the benefit of another person or entity
will (a) within seven calendar days of receipt of the Notice,
request from the Claims Administrator sufficient copies of the
Notice Packet to forward to all such beneficial owners and within
seven calendar days of receipt of those Notice Packets forward them
to all such beneficial owners; or (b) within seven calendar days of
receipt of the Notice, send a list of the names and addresses of
all such beneficial owners to the Claims Administrator in which
event the Claims Administrator will promptly mail the Notice Packet
to such beneficial owners.

Upon full compliance with these directions, such nominees may seek
reimbursement of their reasonable expenses actually incurred, up to
a maximum of $0.50 per Notice Packet mailed; $0.05 per Notice
Packet transmitted by email; or $0.10 per name, mailing address,
and email address (to the extent available) provided to the Claims
Administrator, by providing the Claims Administrator with proper
documentation supporting the expenses for which reimbursement is
sought. Such properly documented expenses incurred by nominees in
compliance with the terms of the Order will be paid from the
Settlement Fund, with any disputes as to the reasonableness or
documentation of expenses incurred subject to review by the Court.

Unless the Court orders otherwise, all Claim Forms must be
postmarked no later than 120 calendar days after the Notice Date.
Any member of the Settlement Class who wishes to exclude himself,
herself or itself from the Settlement Class must request exclusion
no later than 21 calendar days prior to the Settlement Hearing.

Until otherwise ordered by the Court, Judge Burns stays all
proceedings in the Action other than proceedings necessary to carry
out or enforce the terms and conditions of the Stipulation. Pending
final determination of whether the Settlement should be approved,
he barred and enjoined the Lead Plaintiffs, and all other members
of the Settlement Class, from commencing or prosecuting any and all
of the Released Plaintiffs' Claims against each and all of the
Defendants' Releasees.

All reasonable costs incurred in identifying Settlement Class
Members and notifying them of the Settlement as well as in
administering the Settlement will be paid as set forth in the
Stipulation without further order of the Court.

The contents of the Settlement Fund held by The Huntington National
Bank (which the Court approves as the Escrow Agent), will be deemed
and considered to be in custodia legis of the Court, and will
remain subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, until such time as
they will be distributed pursuant to the Stipulation and/or further
order(s) of the Court.

The Lead Counsel is authorized and directed to prepare any tax
returns and any other tax reporting form for or in respect to the
Settlement Fund, to pay from the Settlement Fund any Taxes owed
with respect to the Settlement Fund, and to otherwise perform all
obligations with respect to Taxes and any reporting or filings in
respect thereof without further order of the Court in a manner
consistent with the provisions of the Stipulation.

If the Settlement is terminated as provided in the Stipulation, the
Settlement is not approved, or the Effective Date of the Settlement
otherwise fails to occur, the Order will be vacated, rendered null
and void and be of no further force and effect, except as otherwise
provided by the Stipulation, and the Order will be without
prejudice to the rights of the Lead Plaintiffs, the other
Settlement Class Members and the Defendants, and the Parties will
revert to their respective positions in the Action as of Oct. 1,
2021, as provided in the Stipulation.

The Lead Counsel will file and serve the opening papers in support
of the proposed Settlement, the Plan of Allocation, and the Lead
Counsel's motion for an award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement
of Litigation Expenses no later than 42 calendar days prior to the
Settlement Hearing; and reply papers, if any, will be filed and
served no later than seven calendar days prior to the Settlement
Hearing.

The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint, and their Motion for Consideration of Documents
Incorporated by Reference and Judicially Noticeable, are denied
without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 11, 2022 Amended Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4w6spzkr from Leagle.com.


REATA PHARMA: Faces Pham Securities Suit Over Stock Price Drop
--------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTINA PHAM, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. REATA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., J. WARREN HUFF, and
MANMEET S. SONI, Case No. 2:22-cv-00903 (D.N.J., Feb. 18, 2022) is
a class action on behalf of persons or entities who purchased or
otherwise acquired publicly traded Reata securities between
November 9, 2020 and December 8, 2021, inclusive seeking to recover
compensable damages caused by the Defendants' violations of the
federal securities laws under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On December 6, 2021, the FDA released briefing documents in advance
of an Advisory Committee meeting for the Company's NDA for
bardoxolone, stating that the agency had repeatedly questioned the
validity of Reata's study design because bardoxolone's
pharmacodynamic effect on kidney function would make the results
difficult to assess the effectiveness of the drug. Specifically,
the briefing document noted that, "in September 2018, FDA
encouraged [Reata] to request an end-of-phase 2 meeting to discuss
the development program and ensure alignment,” but Reata
declined.

Then, in  February 2019, the FDA "emphasized the importance of
obtaining FDA concurrence that a study intended to support a
marketing application was adequate and acceptable for this
purpose."

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $29.77, or 38%, to
close at $48.92 per share on December 6, 2021, on unusually heavy
trading volume.

Then, on December 8, 2021, the FDA's Advisory Committee unanimously
decided that bardoxolone was not effective based on the submitted
data.

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $25.31, or 46%, to
close at $29.11 per share on December 9, 2021, on unusually heavy
trading volume.

As a result of the Defendants' alleged wrongful acts and omissions,
and the precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
common shares, the Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages.

The Plaintiff purchased Reata securities during the Class Period
and was economically damaged thereby.

Reata is a clinical-stage biopharmaceutical company that focuses on
small-molecule therapeutics. One of its two lead product candidates
is bardoxolone methyl ("bardoxolone"), which is being developed for
multiple indications, including chronic kidney disease ("CKD")
caused by Alport syndrome ("AS"). Reata is incorporated under the
laws of Delaware with its principal executive offices located in
Plano, Texas. The Individual Defendants are officers of the
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Laurence Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          One Gateway Center, Suite 2600
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 313-1887
          Facsimile: (973) 833-0399
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com

REMINGTON ARMS: Sandy Hook Victims' Families Settle Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Kesslen, writing for The New York Post, reports that families
of Sandy Hook victims reached a $73 million settlement on Feb. 15
in their lawsuit against Remington Arms, manufacturer of the AR-15
semi-automatic rifle used to kill 20 kids and six staff members in
the 2012 massacre.

The nine families brought a class-action suit in 2014 against
Remington Arms, which made the weapon used in the mass shooting,
claiming the gun-maker sought to sell the military-grade weapon to
the mentally ill.

Remington had offered the families a $33 million settlement in July
2021, about $3.7 million per family, less than half of what
ultimately will be doled out.

"Today is not about honoring our son Benjamin. Today is about how
and why Ben died," said Francine Wheeler, mother to 6-year-old Ben,
who was killed in the massacre. "It is about what is right and what
is wrong. Our legal system has given us some justice today, but
David and I will never have true justice. True justice would be our
fifteen-year-old healthy and here with us."

Josh Koskoff, a lawyer for victims, said on Feb. 15 that the suit
was just as much about greed as it was guns.

The lawyer said the settlement "should serve as a wake-up call not
only to the gun industry, but also the insurance and banking
companies that prop it up."

"For the gun industry, it's time to stop recklessly marketing all
guns to all people for all uses and instead ask how marketing can
lower risk rather than court it," Koskoff said.

Remington declared bankruptcy for the second time in 2020 and has
maintained that gunman Adam Lanza was solely responsible for the
horrific tragedy. The company was apparently drowning in debt from
legal fees.

Lawyers representing the families lambasted Remington in court
filings last year for playing dirty in the drawn-out suit, saying
the company flooded them with a mass of pretrial data that
contained tens of thousands of "random" images -- including bizarre
cartoons based on the "Despicable Me" franchise.

"Having repeatedly represented to the (families) and this court
that it was devoting extensive resources to making what it
described as 'substantial' document productions … Remington has
instead made the plaintiffs wait years to receive cartoon images,
gender reveal videos, and duplicate copies of catalogues," a
complaint filed by the plaintiffs in Connecticut Superior Court
said.

"There is no possible reasonable explanation for this conduct," the
complaint said, adding that of the 46,000 pages Remington sent,
less than 15 percent pertained to the suit.

Remington also subpoenaed the report cards, attendance records, and
disciplinary records of five kids killed in the shooting, according
to September 2021 court docs.

"There is no conceivable way that these [records] will assist
Remington in its defense, and the plaintiffs do not understand why
Remington would invade the families' privacy with such a request,"
lawyers for the victims wrote in a filing. [GN]

RENEWABLE ENERGY: Rosa Appeals Securities Suit Dismissal
--------------------------------------------------------
Lead Plaintiff Steven Rosa filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled DAVID RAMSEY, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. RENEWABLE ENERGY GROUP,
INC., RANDOLPH L. HOWARD, CYNTHIA J. WARNER, CHAD STONE, and TODD
ROBINSON, Case No. 1:21-cv-01832, in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York (New York City).

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on March 25, 2021, the
lawsuit is a class action on behalf of persons and entities that
purchased or otherwise acquired Renewable Energy securities between
May 3, 2018 and February 25, 2021, inclusive (the Class Period)
pursuing claims against the Defendants under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

The biodiesel tax credit ("BTC") is a federal biodiesel mixture
excise tax credit whereby the first person to blend pure
biomass-based diesel with petroleum-based diesel fuel receives a
$1.00 per-gallon refundable tax credit. It is an incentive shared
across the advanced biofuel production and distribution chain
through routine, daily trading and negotiation. The BTC was first
implemented on January 1, 2005, but has been allowed to lapse and
then been reinstated, sometimes retrospectively. In February 2018,
the BTC was retroactively reinstated for 2017, but was not
reinstated for 2018. In December 2019, the BTC was retroactively
reinstated for 2018 and 2019 and made effective from January 2020
through December 2022.

On February 25, 2021, after the market closed, Renewable Energy
issued a press release announcing its fourth quarter and full year
2020 financial results. Therein, the Company revealed that it would
restate "$38.2 million in cumulative revenue from January 2018
through September 30, 2020" because Renewable Energy was not the
"proper claimant for certain BTC payments on biodiesel it sold
between January 1, 2017 and September 30, 2020." Renewable Energy
further stated that it had reached an agreement with the Internal
Revenue Service "on a $40.5 million assessment, excluding interest"
to correct these claims.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $8.17, or 9.5%, over
two consecutive trading sessions to close at $77.77 per share on
February 26, 2021, on unusually heavy trading volume.

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects, asserts the complaint. Specifically, Defendants
failed to disclose to investors that due to failures in the diesel
additive system, petroleum diesel was not periodically added to
certain loads by the Company and was instead added by the Company's
customers.

As a result of Defendants' alleged wrongful acts and omissions, and
the precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damage, adds the complaint.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of the Court's Opinion and Order
dated January 20, 2022, granting Defendants' August 6, 2021 motion
to dismiss.

The appellate case is captioned as IN RE RENEWABLE ENERGY GROUP
SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No. 22-335, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, filed on Feb. 18, 2022.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Steven Rosa is represented by:

          Constantine Philip Economides, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, P.A.
          777 South Flagler Drive
          West Palm Beach, FL 33401
          Telephone: (561) 650-7977
          E-mail: ceconomides@rcfllp.com  

Defendants-Appellees Renewable Energy Group, Inc., Randolph L.
Howard, Cynthia J. Warner, Chad Stone, and Todd Robinson are
represented by:

          Michael G. Bongiorno, Esq.
          WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP
          7 World Trade Center
          250 Greenwich Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 937-7220
          E-mail: michael.bongiorno@wilmerhale.com  

RIO TINTO PLC: S.D. New York Dismisses Colbert Securities Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Analisa Torres of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismisses the Plaintiff's complaint in the
lawsuit entitled ANTON COLBERT, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. RIO TINTO PLC, RIO TINTO
LIMITED, THOMAS ALBANESE, and GUY ROBERT ELLIOTT, Defendants, Case
No. 17 Civ. 8169 (AT) (DCF) (S.D.N.Y.).

On Oct. 23, 2017, the Plaintiff brought the putative class action
against Defendants Rio Tinto plc and Rio Tinto Limited Thomas
Albanese, and Guy Robert Elliott (Albanese and Elliott together,
the "Individual Defendants"), alleging violations of (1) Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Section
78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5, against all
Defendants; and (2) Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
Section 78t, against the Individual Defendants.

By order dated June 3, 2019, the Court granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. On July 29, 2019,
the Court denied the Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and for
leave to file a second amended complaint, holding that the
Plaintiff had abandoned his claim regarding the "long-term
opportunity" statement because he failed to raise it in opposition
to the Defendants' motion to dismiss.

The Plaintiff timely appealed, and on Aug. 6, 2020, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded the case to the Court to
consider whether the Plaintiff adequately pleaded his claim
regarding the "long-term opportunity" statement.

Background

Rio Tinto is an international mining group that is headquartered in
the United Kingdom. Albanese was Rio Tinto's Chief Executive
Officer from May 2007 through January 2013, and Elliott was Rio
Tinto's Chief Financial Officer from 2002 through April 2013. They
were members of Rio Tinto's "Investment Committee," which made
investment decisions for the Company.

In 2010, Rio Tinto identified a company called Riversdale Mining
Limited as a potential acquisition target. Riversdale's principal
assets were coal mining licenses for contiguously-located areas in
Mozambique. In December 2010, Rio Tinto's Investment Committee
presented a proposal to acquire Riversdale to Rio Tinto's Board of
Directors, which included the Individual Defendants. The proposal
stated that the purchase would increase Rio Tinto's production of
coal to more than 30 million tons annually after 2020, that coal
could be transported by barging or rail, and that the value of the
acquisition was $3.6 billion. Rio Tinto acquired Riversdale in
August 2011 for approximately $3.7 billion and renamed the business
"Rio Tinto Coal Mozambique" ("RTCM").

Rio Tinto soon ran into problems with the project. In late 2011 and
early 2012, RTCM created a "ground-up" valuation model that
generated valuations ranging from approximately negative $3.45
billion to approximately negative $9 billion. However, RTCM was
valued at its acquisition price--about $3.7 billion--in Rio Tinto's
2011 annual report.

On Aug. 9, 2012, Rio Tinto filed its interim financial report for
half-year 2012 (the "HY 2012 Report") as an exhibit to its Form 6-K
filed with the SEC. The HY 2012 Report valued RTCM at more than $3
billion, and did not discuss the recent significant setbacks. On
Nov. 2, 2012, Rio Tinto filed its Form 6-K for the third quarter of
2012 with the SEC, which also did not disclose any of the severe
adverse developments at RTCM.

At a November 2012 investor conference, Albanese described the
Moatize Basin as a long-term opportunity with the potential to grow
beyond 25 million tons of coal per year.

Following a Nov. 26, 2012 Audit Committee meeting, the head of Rio
Tinto's Technology & Innovation Group ("T&I") informed Albanese
that RTCM had a negative valuation. The head of T&I then bypassed
the Individual Defendants and informed the Chairman of the Board
about RTCM's negative valuation. At a Jan. 15, 2013 meeting of the
Board, RTCM's value was revised downward to $611 million.

On Feb. 15, 2013, Rio Tinto filed its Form 6-K announcing its
financial results for 2012, which included an impairment for RTCM
of $3.269 billion. The Form 6-K also reported a net loss of almost
$3 billion (the first loss in Rio Tinto's history), and the same
day, Rio Tinto announced a 15% increase in its full-year dividend.
Over the following days, the price of Rio Tinto's American
Depositary Receipts fell by $2.51, to close at $55.26 on Feb. 20,
2013. On March 15, 2013, Rio Tinto filed its Form 20-F with the
SEC, which contained its audited financial statements for 2012.
Among other things, the audited financial statements explained the
breakdown of the $3.269 billion impairment of RTCM.

On Oct. 17, 2017, the SEC filed a complaint against Rio Tinto and
the Individual Defendants. By order dated March 18, 2019, the Court
granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the SEC's complaint, and held that the SEC had stated a
claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. Section 78a, et seq., with respect to the "long-term
opportunity" statement. That action remains pending before the
Court.

Discussion

Because the Plaintiff did not allege that his reliance on the
"long-term opportunity" statement caused his injury, his Section
10(b) claim fails, Judge Torres finds. The Plaintiff alleges that
partial disclosures occurred in January, February, and March 2013,
when Rio Tinto announced that it would record a $3 billion
impairment, reported a net loss of almost that amount, and
published audited financial statements detailing the loss,
respectively, because Rio Tinto did not receive formal approval to
transport coal by barge.

However, Judge Torres explains, whether express or constructive,
these disclosures did not reveal to the market that Albanese's
prior statements were not entirely true or accurate. The
disclosures did not reveal anything about the Defendants' alleged
fraud or suggest that the impairments should have been taken
earlier.

Because the Plaintiff alleges that the news of the impairments
caused a drop in share price, not that disclosure of the alleged
fraud resulted in a drop in share price, he has not adequately
alleged a Section 10(b) claim regarding the "long-term opportunity"
statement, Judge Torres holds, citing In re Gentiva Securities
Litigation, 932 F.Supp.2d 352, 384 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Section 10(b) claim regarding the
"long-term opportunity" statement is dismissed for failure to state
a claim.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 7, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3e6asyrp from Leagle.com.


RIVER STREET: Faces Rodriguez Suit Over Unwanted Phone Calls
------------------------------------------------------------
ELIZABETH RODRIGUEZ, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. RIVER STREET AUTO SALES, LLC D/B/A RIVERSIDE
NISSAN, Case No. (Feb. 18, 2022) contends that the Defendant
promotes and markets its merchandise, in part, by sending
unsolicited telephone calls to wireless phone users, in violation
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Defendant sells new and used automobiles while owning and/or
operating nine automotive dealerships which encompass thirteen
different automotive brands.

The Defendant also uses prerecorded messages to individuals’
telephones numbers without first obtaining the required express
written consent, the lawsuit says.

Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt
Defendant's alleged illegal conduct, which has resulted in the
invasion of privacy, harassment, aggravation, and disruption of the
daily life of thousands of individuals. The Plaintiff also seeks
statutory damages on behalf of Plaintiff and members of the Class,
and any other available legal or equitable remedies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Rachel Edelsberg, Esq.
          DAPEER LAW, P.A.
          3331 Sunset Avenue
          Ocean, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (305) 610-5223
          E-mail: rachel@dapeer.com

SAFEWAY INC: Consumers Get Class Action Settlement Checks
---------------------------------------------------------
Megan Loe, writing for Verify, reports that it can be difficult to
know exactly how to protect your personal information with so many
scams out there.

That's why viewer Loretta emailed the VERIFY team to ask if a check
she received from a Safeway class action lawsuit was legitimate or
a scam to steal her banking information. Safeway is a grocery store
chain with locations throughout the United States.

THE QUESTION
Are mailed checks from a Safeway class action lawsuit settlement
real?

THE SOURCES
Safeway class action lawsuit settlement website
Rodman v. Safeway Inc.

THE ANSWER
   
This is true.
Yes, mailed checks from a Safeway class action lawsuit settlement
are real. You may have received money if you registered for
Safeway's online grocery delivery service before Nov. 15, 2011, and
made purchases between April 2010 and Dec. 21, 2014, that were
subject to an undisclosed price markup.

WHAT WE FOUND
The class action lawsuit Rodman v. Safeway Inc., filed in 2011,
claims Safeway breached the terms and conditions of its online
grocery service by charging higher prices than it charged in
stores. On Nov. 30, 2015, a court approved a $42 million judgment
in the class action lawsuit. Safeway appealed the decision, but a
court affirmed that judgment in August 2017.

Shoppers who registered for Safeway's online grocery delivery
service before Nov. 15, 2011, and made purchases between April 2010
and Dec. 21, 2014 that were subject to an undisclosed price markup
are eligible for money from the settlement, according to the class
action lawsuit's website. Any markups that Safeway applied or
continues to apply to any orders placed after Dec. 21, 2014 are not
part of the lawsuit.

The first round of checks was mailed to class members in 2018, the
settlement website says. Following a judge's order in November
2021, the remaining funds in the settlement are now being sent to
class members who cashed checks during the first round of
distribution.

The judgment administrator mailed the second round of checks in
January 2022, according to the settlement website. All funds
remaining after this distribution will be donated to Meals on
Wheels.

People who received checks have 90 days to cash them and will
receive at least three emails from the judgment administrator
reminding them to do so, the class action lawsuit website says.

Those who have moved or have a different email address since they
received their initial distribution check should provide updated
information to the judgment administrator via email or by sending a
letter, first class mail, to: Safeway Judgment Administrator, Attn:
Address Update, 1650 Arch Street, Suite 2210.

Class members should include their claim number in all
correspondence.[GN]

SAN MATEO COUNTY, CA: Court Tosses Chapman Suit With Leave to Amend
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California dismissed the case, MARCEL E.
CHAPMAN, Plaintiff v. SAN MATEO COUNTY, et al., Defendants, Case
No. 21-cv-09038-HSG (N.D. Cal.), with leave to amend.

I. Introduction

The Plaintiff, an inmate at Maguire Correctional Facility has filed
a pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. His complaint
is now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A.
The Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis
in a separate order.

II. Complaint

The complaint names as Defendants Sheriff Carlos Bolanos, assistant
sheriff John W. Munsey, undersheriff Mark C. Robbins,
administrative lieutenant John Kovach, sergeant Richardson,
correctional officer Shwiri Robinson, and the San Mateo County
Sheriff's Department. The complaint makes the following
allegations. First, the complaint alleges that, starting in March
2021, due to unidentified inmates receiving a 13 film strip of
suboxone through the mail, Defendants no longer allow inmates
housed at Maguire Correctional Facility to receive handwritten
mail, in violation of the First Amendment. Second, the complaint
alleges that Maguire Correctional Facility inmates are denied
access to the courts because they are prohibited from purchasing or
possessing ink pens, pencil eraser, single eraser, legal folders,
and legal paper bonders. Third, the complaint alleges that
Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to the serious
medical needs of Plaintiff and other inmates when they require
inmates to remove their footwear, including special footwear
authorized by medical chronos, during transport to court hearings
or when travelling through the custody hallway facility to the
medical clinic.

Judge Gilliam holds that the complaint will be dismissed with leave
to amend because the complaint violates the joinder requirements
set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Fed R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)
provides that all persons "may be joined in one action as
defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them
jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact
common to all defendants will arise in the action." The upshot of
these rules is that "multiple claims against a single party are
fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with
unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2."

The Plaintiff challenges the policy disallowing receipt of
handwritten mail, the policy disallowing purchase or personal
possession of ink pens, pencil eraser, single eraser, legal
folders, and legal paper bonders, and the policy requiring removal
of medically authorized footwear during certain transports. These
policies are distinct and do not arise out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or allegations. The claims
arise out of different questions of fact and different questions of
law (First Amendment right to mail, First Amendment right to access
the courts, Eighth Amendment prohibition on deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs).

The Plaintiff needs to choose the claims he wants to pursue in this
action that meet the joinder requirements. He should only pursue
the acts that arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences, and share a common question
of law or fact. To seek relief for claims arising out of other
incidents or raising different questions of law, Plaintiff must
bring separate actions.

To assist the Plaintiff in preparing an amended complaint, Judge
Gilliam reviews the following legal principles:

     a. First Amendment Right to Receive Mail: Prisoners enjoy a
First Amendment right to send and receive mail. A prison, however,
may adopt regulations or practices which impinge on a prisoner's
First Amendment rights as long as the regulations are "reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests."

      b. Right of Access to the Courts: Prisoners have a
constitutional right of access to the courts. To establish a claim
for any violation of the right of access to the courts, the
prisoner must prove that there was an inadequacy in the prison's
legal access program that caused him an actual injury. If the
Plaintiff pursues an access to the courts claim based on the
inability to purchase and possess ink pens, pencil eraser, single
eraser, legal folders, and legal paper bonders, the Plaintiff must
plausibly allege that the restriction caused him an actual injury
and identify what non-frivolous claim he was hindered in pursuing.

     c. Eighth Amendment Medical Needs Claim: Deliberate
indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs violates the
Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment. If pursuing an Eighth Amendment claim about the
requirement that medically authorized footwear be removed during
transport, the Plaintiff should plausibly allege how the removal
during transport resulted in a serious medical need.

     d. Equal Protection Claim: "The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State will 'deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,'
which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike." If pursuing an equal protection
claim, the Plaintiff should plausibly allege facts that are at
least susceptible of an inference of discriminatory intent.

     e. Standing: The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants are
violating the rights of all inmates housed at Maguire Correctional
Facility. Judge Gilliam holds that the Plaintiff lacks standing to
bring suit to complain about the deprivations of the constitutional
rights of others. To the extent that the Plaintiff seeks to bring a
class action, the Court cautions that, generally speaking, pro se
prisoner plaintiffs are not adequate class representatives able to
fairly represent and adequately protect the interests of the class,
and class certification may be denied on that basis.

     f. Defendants: In naming defendants, the Plaintiff must name
the individuals who directly violated his constitutional rights. If
the Plaintiff is seeking to hold the San Mateo County Sheriff's
Department liable for constitutional violations, he is alleging a
municipal liability claim against San Mateo County, and the proper
defendant for the Plaintiff's municipal liability claim would be
San Mateo County itself. To state a cognizable municipal liability
claim against San Mateo County, the Plaintiff is advised as to the
following. In order to hold the municipality liable, the policy,
practice, or custom must be the "moving force behind a violation of
constitutional rights."

     g. Potential Co-Plaintiff: The Plaintiff has alleged that
Sirvontre Ingram also seeks to proceed as a co-plaintiff in the
action. Mr. Ingram has not indicated that he wishes to join in the
action. Regardless, Judge Gilliam is not inclined to allow Mr.
Ingram to join the action as a co-plaintiff. If Mr. Ingram wishes
to pursue the claims in the action, he should file a separate
action. The Clerk is directed to send Mr. Ingram two copies of the
court's complaint form, along with a copy of the Order.

III. Supplemental Complaint

The Plaintiff has filed a supplemental complaint, an affidavit in
support of the supplemental complaint, and an additional
supplemental complaint, which Judge Gilliam construes as a request
for leave to file a supplemental complaint. He denies this request.
The Plaintiff has been granted leave to file an amended complaint.
He should include in his amended complaint all the claims he wishes
to present and all of the defendants he wishes to sue, including
the claims in his supplemental complaint. The Plaintiff may not
amend the complaint piecemeal, i.e., by filing multiple pleadings
at different times. Rather, the amended complaint should name all
the Defendants that the Plaintiff wishes to sue and list all of the
Plaintiff's legal claims in one pleading. Judge Giliam will not
piece together te Plaintiff's claims and the named defendants from
different pleadings.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Gilliam dismissed the complaint
with leave to amend. Within 28 days of the date of the Order, the
Plaintiff will file an amended complaint that addresses the
identified deficiencies. The amended complaint must include the
caption and civil case number used in the Order, Case No. C
21-09038 HSG (PR) and the words "AMENDED COMPLAINT" on the first
page.

If using the court form complaint, the Plaintiff must answer all
the questions on the form in order for the action to proceed. An
amended complaint completely replaces the previous complaints.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff must include in his amended complaint
all the claims he wishes to present and all of the defendants he
wishes to sue, and may not incorporate material from the prior
complaint by reference. Failure to file an amended complaint in
accordance with this order in the time provided will result in
dismissal of this action without further notice to the Plaintiff.

The Clerk will include two copies of the Court's complaint form
with a copy of the Order to the Plaintiff. The Clerk will also send
two copies of the Court's complaint form and a copy of this order
to Sirvontre Ingram, #1236119, 1300 Maple Street, Redwood City CA
94063.

Judge Gilliam denied as moot the Plaintiff's request to file a
supplemental complaint. The Plaintiff may raise all his claims in
his amended complaint.

The Order terminates Dkt. Nos. 5, 6, 9.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 11, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/t68wtmr3 from Leagle.com.


SCHWABE NORTH: Prenatal Vitamins Mismarketed, Schmucker Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Mariah Schmucker and Kayla McGowan, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situation v. Schwabe North America, Inc. and
Nature's Way Brands, LLC, Case No. 2:22-cv-00323-KJM-DB (E.D. Cal.,
Feb. 18, 2022) is a class action complaint against the Defendants
for their alleged negligent, reckless, and/or intentional practice
of mismarketing their Nature's Way Prenatal Vitamins sold
throughout the United States.

According to the complaint, the Defendants' mismarketing is
twofold. First, Defendants fail to disclose the presence, or risk,
of dangerous substances in the Prenatal Vitamins, including heavy
metals. Second, Defendants misrepresent the quantity of ingredients
in their Prenatal Vitamins, including the amount of Folic Acid.
Plaintiff seeks both injunctive and monetary relief on behalf of
the proposed Class (as defined herein), including requiring full
and accurate disclosure of all dangerous substances, ingredients,
and nutrients in its marketing, advertising, and labeling, and
restoring monies to the members of the proposed Class.

The significance of prenatal health is underscored by the words of
Ian Donald, the obstetrician who developed ultrasound diagnostics
in Europe during the twentieth century, when he stated: "The first
38 weeks of life spent in the allegedly protected environment of
the amniotic sac are medically more eventful and more fraught with
danger than the next 38 years in the life span of most human
individuals."

The importance of prenatal health has not gone unnoticed to
expectant mothers or women who may become pregnant. And the
prenatal vitamin market is capitalizing on the increased
awareness.

The North America Prenatal Vitamin market was valued at an
estimated 200.47 million U.S. dollars in the United States in 2020,
and the market is expected to increase by almost USD 100 million in
the next five years, reaching a market value of USD 293.6 million,
10 by 2025.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kolin C. Tang, Esq.
          MILLER SHAH LLP
          19712 MacArthur Blvd., Suite 222
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (866) 545-5505
          Facsimile: (866) 300-7367
          E-mail: kctang@millershah.com

               - and -

          Robert K. Shelquist, Esq.
          Rebecca A. Peterson, Esq.
          Megan S. Van Dyke, Esq.
          Catherine A. Peterson, Esq.
          LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN P.L.L.P.
          100 Washington Avenue South, Suite 2200
          Minneapolis, MN 55401
          Telephone: (612) 339-6900
          Facsimile: (612) 339-0981
          E-mail: rkshelquist@locklaw.com
                  rapeterson@locklaw.com
                  msvandyke@locklaw.com
                  capeterson@locklaw.com

               - and -

          Charles J. LaDuca, Esq.
          Alexandra C. Warren, Esq.
          CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
          4725 Wisconsin Avenue, NW, Suite 200
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: 202-789-3960
          Facsimile: 202-789-1813
          E-mail: charles@cuneolaw.com
                  awarren@cuneolaw.com

               - and -

          Harris L. Pogust, Esq.
          Joshua M. Neuman, Esq.
          Jordyn N. Mitzman, Esq.
          PGMBM, LLC
          161 Washington Street, Suite 250
          Conshohocken, PA 19428
          Telephone: (610) 941-4204
          Facsimile: (610) 941-4245
          E-mail: hpogust@pgmbm.com
                  jneuman@pgmbm.us
                  jmitzman@pgmbm.us

               - and -

          James C. Shah, Esq.
          MILLER SHAH LLP
          1845 Walnut St., Suite 806
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (856) 526-1100
          Facsimile: (866) 300-7367
          E-mail: jcshah@millershah.com

SCIENTIFIC GAMES: Rider to Protective Order in Reed Suit Approved
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DONNA REED, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SCIENTIFIC GAMES CORP., a Nevada
corporation, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-565-RSL (W.D. Wash.), Judge
Robert S. Lasnik of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Seattle, issued an Order on the Agreed
Rider To Protective Order Regarding The Use And Disclosure Of
Discovery Produced By Nonparty Apple Inc.

The agreement is entered into between and among Apple and named
Plaintiff Reed. The Plaintiff and Apple anticipate that Apple will
produce documents in the action that contain sensitive consumer
information. Their agreement is intended to supplement the
protective ordered entered by the Court on March 8, 2019. Pursuant
to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Lasnik
finds good cause for the Rider.

Apple Protected Material designated under the terms of the Rider
will be used by the Parties solely for the purpose of providing
notice to and verifying and paying the recovery amount owed to each
member of the Settlement Class. It will not be used directly or
indirectly for any other purpose whatsoever. No Apple Protected
Material provided by Apple to the Class Action Administrator under
the terms of the Rider may be shared with any of the Parties,
unless specifically authorized by this Rider. It is the intention
of Apple and the Parties that the Rider will protect all materials
produced by Apple in the Actions unless otherwise specified.

The protections conferred by the Rider cover not only the Apple
Protected Material governed by the Rider as addressed therein, but
also any information copied or extracted therefrom, as well as all
copies, excerpts, summaries, or compilations thereof, plus
testimony, conversations, or presentations by the Parties or their
counsel in court or in other settings that might reveal Apple
Protected Material.

Nothing in the Rider will prevent or restrict Apple's own
disclosure or use of its own Apple Protected Material for any
purpose, and nothing in the Rider will preclude Apple from showing
its Apple Protected Material to an individual who prepared the
Apple Protected Material.

Even after the termination of the case, the confidentiality
obligations imposed by the Order will remain in effect until a
Producing Party agrees otherwise in writing or a court order
otherwise directs, subject to the Final Disposition clause
therein.

It is Apple's and the Parties' intention that Apple will produce
Apple Protected Materials directly to the Class Action
Administrator, with no production to any of the Parties. For the
avoidance of doubt, no Settlement Class Member contact information
or Lifetime Spending Amounts will be provided to the Counsel for
the Plaintiff unless the Counsel for the Plaintiff have been
appointed by the Court as the Class Counsel.

The Rider is intended to provide no mechanism to the Parties
through which they can challenge the designation or protected
status of Apple Protected Materials. Absent written permission from
Apple or a court Order secured after appropriate notice to all
interested persons, the Parties may not file or disclose in the
public record any Apple Protected Material.

Not later than 90 days after closure of the Final Disposition of
the case, each Party and the Class Action Administrator will return
all Discovery Material of a Producing Party to the respective
outside counsel of the Producing Party or destroy such Material, at
the option of Apple. For purposes of the Order, "Final Disposition"
occurs after an order, mandate, or dismissal finally terminating
the captioned action with prejudice, including all appeals. All
Parties that have received any such Discovery Material, as well as
the Class Action Administrator, will certify in writing that all
such materials have been returned to counsel for Apple or
destroyed.

Pursuant to the Stipulation, Judge Lasnik so ordered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 15, 2022 Stipulation & Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yduzkhwf from Leagle.com.


SCRIPPS HEALTH: Rubenstein Appeals Dismissal of Data Breach Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Michael Rubenstein, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit entitled Michael Rubenstein, et al.
v. Scripps Health, Case No. 3:21-cv-01135-GPC-MSB, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California, San Diego.

The case involves a consolidated purported class action complaint
against Defendant Scripps regarding a ransomware attack where
cybercriminals infiltrated the Defendant's network servers and
accessed highly sensitive personal and medical information around
April 29, 2021. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant failed to
properly secure and safeguard its patient's personally identifiable
information ("PII") and personal health information ("PHI") stored
within the Defendant's information networks and have been damaged.

The six state law causes of action alleged against Scripps, on
behalf of the California subclass, are negligence, invasion of
privacy, breach of confidence and declaratory relief on behalf of
the Nationwide Class or, alternatively, on behalf of the California
Subclass, and violations of the California Customer Records Act,
Cal. Civil Code section 1798.80, and violation of California
Confidentiality of Medical Records Act, Cal. Civ. Code section 56
et seq.

On November 18, 2021, Scripps Health moved to dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") or, in
the alternative, moved to stay the action under the Colorado River
doctrine.

On January 26, 2022, the Court granted Defendant's motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The Court denied the motion to stay as
moot.

The Plaintiffs now seek a review of this order.

The appellate case is captioned as Michael Rubenstein, et al. v.
Scripps Health, Case No. 22-55186, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on Feb. 18, 2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellants James D. Garren, Richard Machado, Kate Rasmuzzen
and Michael Rubenstein Mediation Questionnaire was due on February
25, 2022;

   -- Appellants James D. Garren, Richard Machado, Kate Rasmuzzen
and Michael Rubenstein opening brief is due on April 18, 2022;

   -- Appellee Scripps Health answering brief is due on May 18,
2022; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants MICHAEL RUBENSTEIN, RICHARD MACHADO, KATE
RASMUZZEN, and JAMES D. GARREN, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Scott Edward Cole, Esq.
          COLE & VAN NOTE
          555 12th Street, Suite 1725
          Oakland, CA 94607
          Telephone: (510) 891-9800

               - and -

          William B. Federman, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 North Pennsylvania Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Telephone: (405) 235-1560
          E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee SCRIPPS HEALTH is represented by:

          Teresa Carey Chow, Esq.
          BAKER & HOSTETLER, LLP
          11601 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Los Angeles, CA 90025-0509
          Telephone: (310) 820-8800
          E-mail: tchow@bakerlaw.com

               - and -

          Casie D. Collignon, Esq.
          BAKER HOSTETLER LLP
          1801 California Street
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 861-0600
          E-mail: ccollignon@bakerlaw.com

SKYWEST AIRLINES: Wright Seeks Wages & OT for Flight Attendants
---------------------------------------------------------------
DAQUASIA WRIGHT, ERIKA THOMAS, and CHERIE POOLE, on behalf of
themselves, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly-situated v. SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC., Case No.
1:22-cv-00914 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 18, 2022) alleges Defendant’s
systemic and continuous violations of the minimum wage and overtime
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New York Labor Law,
and the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act.

The Defendant owns and operates an airline that provides
transportation services to passengers throughout the United
States.

The Plaintiffs are three of Defendant's current employees, working
for Defendant as flight attendants. Before the Plaintiffs were
permitted to perform any duties or responsibilities related to any
of Defendant’s transportation activities, as newly hired flight
attendants (Trainees) the Defendant required them to undergo a
rigorous thirty-day training program. This training program forced
Plaintiffs to work over 350 hours, while only permitting them two
days off, and while only paying them approximately 64 hours total,
the lawsuit says.

For their work, while the Defendant purported to pay them at an
hourly rate of $18.13, in reality, Defendant paid them an effective
hourly rate averaging little more than $3.00 per hour. As a result,
the Defendant allegedly failed and refused to pay Plaintiffs and
all of Defendant's Trainees minimum wages and overtime
compensation, in willful violation of the FLSA.

SkyWest Airlines is an American regional airline headquartered in
St. George, Utah, United States. SkyWest is paid to staff, operate
and maintain aircraft used on flights that are scheduled, marketed
and sold by a partner mainline airline.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jon L. Norinsberg, Esq.
          Michael R. Minkoff, Esq.
          JOSEPH & NORINSBERG, LLC
          110 East 59th Street, Suite 3200
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 227-5700
          Facsimile: (212) 656-1889

SOCIETY INSURANCE: Faces Solly Ringo Suit Over Property Insurance
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SOLLY RINGO'S LLC, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. SOCIETY INSURANCE, a Mutual Company, Case No.
3:22-cv-50054 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 18, 2022) is a class action
complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, seeking
contractual and declaratory relief claims on behalf of the
Plaintiff and a putative class of the Defendant's property
insurance policyholders who are similarly situated.

This lawsuit only concerns property coverage for buildings and
structures, and not personal contents, such as furniture and
clothes. Further, this lawsuit only concerns claims wherein Society
itself accepted coverage and then Society itself chose to calculate
actual cash value exclusively pursuant to the replacement cost less
depreciation methodology.

The property insurance forms sold by Society in Illinois,
Tennessee, and Wisconsin are materially identical as it relates to
the alleged contractual dispute.

The Defendant offers property insurance in multiple states across
the United States of America, specifically including the states of
Illinois, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J. Brandon McWherter, Esq.
          McWHERTER SCOTT BOBBITT PLC
          341 Cool Springs Blvd., Suite 230
          Franklin, TN 37067
          Telephone: (615) 354-1144
          E-mail: brandon@msb.law

               - and -

          Douglas J. Winters,Esq.
          THE WINTERS LAW GROUP, LLC
          190 Carondelet Plaza, Suite 1100
          St. Louis, MO 63105
          Telephone: (314) 499-5200
          Facsimile: (314) 499-5201
          E-mail: dwinters@winterslg.com

               - and -

          Erik D. Peterson, Esq.
          ERIK PETERSON LAW OFFICES, PSC
          150 East Short Street, Suite 150
          Lexington, KY 40507
          Telephone: (800) 614-1957
          E-mail: erik@eplo.law

               - and -

          T. Joseph Snodgrass, Esq.
          SNODGRASS LAW LLC
          100 South 5th Street, Suite 800
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 339-1421
          E-mail: jsnodgrass@snodgrass-law.com

STAR BRANDS: Seeks Dismissal of Mislabeling Class Action Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
John O'Brien, writing for Legal Newsline, report that the consumer
protection lawsuit alleging white fudge-covered Flipz are
misleading customers is ridiculous, the product's maker is arguing
in a motion to dismiss.

Star Brands filed the document Feb. 4 in New York federal court in
an effort to cut off the class action filed by food lawyer Spencer
Sheehan, whose case alleges the ingredients in the Flipz are not
consistent with real fudge.

Star Brands complains Sheehan's perspective would require it to
conform "to certain specific recipes for home-made fudge dating as
far back as the Nineteenth Century."

"There are no absolute legal or canonical definitions for the
ingredients in fudge," the motion adds. "A reasonable consumer
understands 'fudge' in this context to refer to a soft candy
coating having a certain flavor… and a specific soft, creamy
texture.

"Moreover, in the context of a packaged snack foods, reasonable
consumers -- even if there were a canonical definition of home-made
fudge -- would not expect a fudge covering to conform to such a
traditional, rustic definition."

Sheehan filed the suit June 23. It says fudge is made by mixing
sugar, butter and milk but the ingredients list on the Flipz
reveals the presence of hard vegetable fats.

With most of Sheehan's lawsuits, the key issue will be whether a
reasonable consumer would be misled. Many defendants point to the
fact that the ingredients are listed on their packaging.

"Plaintiff . . . alleges that the product is misleading because
'the fat content in the product's fudge is not balanced between
vegetable fats and dairy ingredients.' Plaintiff alleges absolutely
no basis for the requirement that there be any particular relative
proportions or 'balance' of different sources of fat in fudge,
other than insisting every 'fudge' recipe should conform to the
ratio between vegetable fats and dairy ingredients found in a
specific Nineteenth Century recipe," the motion says. [GN]

STARTEK USA: Violates FLSA & State Labor Laws, Harris Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------------
MAKAYLA HARRIS, COLLEEN LEWIN, and TIFFANY WILLIAMS individually,
and on behalf of others similarly situated v. STARTEK USA, INC., a
corporation, Case No. 1:22-cv-00437 (D. Colo., Feb. 18, 2022) is a
collective and class action arising from the Defendant's willful
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act as well as the Minimum
Wage Act of the State of Arkansas, the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage
Standards Act, and the Virginia Minimum Wage Act.

According to Defendant's website, the Defendant is in the call
center services business, offering customers of its clientele --
"some of the largest companies in the world," like AT&T and IBM --
live solutions and answers to various problems and inquiries"
across all customer contact channels."

In order to provide the aforementioned service, Defendant employs
hourly (non-exempt) customer service representatives with a number
of job titles, including, but not limited to: Customer Service
Representative and Engagement Specialist (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "CSRs"). Over 40,000 employees work for Defendant
worldwide at brick-and-mortar call centers and remotely at virtual
call centers. Within the United States, the Defendant employs CSRs,
including Plaintiffs, at call centers in Ohio, South Carolina,
Virginia, Missouri, Arkansas, Indiana, Texas, Georgia, Jamaica and
Colorado (where Defendant's headquarters are located).

Regardless of the specific job title, all CSRs are: paid on an
hourly basis; are classified as non-exempt employees; use the same
timekeeping system(s); use many (if not all) of the same computer
programs; are subject to the same relevant timekeeping and
attendance policies (including Defendant's unlawful time rounding
policy); and have the primary job duty of providing assistance to
Defendant's clients' customers.

The U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL") recognizes that call center
jobs, like those held by Defendant's CSRs, are homogenous; in July
2008, the DOL issued Fact Sheet #64 to alert call center employees
of some abuses that are prevalent in the industry.

The Plaintiffs seek a declaration that their rights, and the rights
of the putative Collective and Class were violated, an award of
unpaid wages, an award of liquidated damages, injunctive and
declaratory relief, attendant penalties, and an award of attorneys'
fees and costs to make them whole for damages they suffered, and to
ensure that they and future workers will not be subjected by
Defendant to such illegal conduct in the future.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kevin Stoops, Esq.
          Charles R. Ash, IV, Esq.
          Alana Karbal, Esq.
          SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C.
          One Towne Square, 17 th Floor
          Southfield, Mi 48076
          Telephone: 248-355-0300
          E-mail: kstoops@sommerspc.com
                  crash@sommerspc.com
                  akarbal@sommerspc.com

STATE FARM: E.D. Virginia Certifies Class in Elegant Massage Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELEGANT MASSAGE, LLC d/b/a LIGHT STREAM SPA, on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. STATE
FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY and STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-265 (E.D.
Va.), Judge Raymond A. Jackson of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division, issued a Memorandum
Opinion and Order:

   1. granting the Motion for Class Certification under
      Rule 23(b)(3), Appointment of Class Representative, and
      Appointment of Class Counsel filed by Elegant Massage;

   2. denying the Motion to Exclude the Testimony and Opinions of
      Jeffrey E. Meyers filed by State Farm Mutual Automobile
      Insurance Co. and State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.; and

   3. granting in part the Motion to Exclude Opinions and
      Testimony of Stephen D. Prowse for Class Certification,
      Summary Judgment, and Trial filed by Elegant Massage.

I. Background

On May 27, 2020, the Plaintiff filed the instant suit. On July 21,
2020, the Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. In its Amended
Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that it has owned and operated
Light Stream Spa since 2016, which provides therapeutic massages in
Virginia Beach, Virginia. In 2019, the Plaintiff purchased an
insurance policy (Policy No. 96-C6-P556-2) from State Farm.

The Policy issued to the Plaintiff is an "all risk" commercial
property insurance policy, which covers loss or damage to the
covered premises resulting from all risks other than those
expressly excluded. The Policy was effective from July 22, 2019
until July 22, 2020 and the Plaintiff paid an annual premium of
$475. The Policy includes coverage for "Loss of Income and Extra
Expense," the standard form for which is identified as CMP-4705.1.
Under the provision, the Policy provides for the loss of business
income sustained as a result of the suspension of business
operations which includes action of a civil authority that
prohibits access to the Plaintiff's business property. It also
states that it does not cover Exclusions for "Fungi, Virus or
Bacteria," "Ordinance or Law," "Acts or Decisions," or
"Consequential Loss."

On March 13, 2020, Pres. Donald J. Trump issued a National
Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease ("COVID-19)
Outbreak. On March 16, 2020, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) issued guidance recommending the implementation of
"social distancing" policies to prevent the spread of the a novel
strain of coronavirus, SARSCoV-2 ("COVID-19").

On March 20, 2020, Governor Northam and the Virginia State Health
Commissioner declared a public health emergency and restricted the
number of patrons permitted in restaurants, fitness centers, and
theaters to ten or less. On March 23, 2020, Governor Northam issued
Executive Order No. 53, which ordered the closure of "recreational
and entertainment businesses," including "spas" and "massage
parlors." On March 23, 2020, Governor Northam issued Executive
Order No. 55, which ordered all individuals in Virginia to stay
home unless they were carrying out necessary life functions.

On May 8, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order No. 61, which
amended Executive Order Nos. 53 and 55 and, beginning on May 15,
2020, eased some of the restrictions. Under Executive Order No. 61,
spas and message centers were permitted to re-open subject to
certain restrictions including limiting occupancy to 50% as well as
requiring six feet between workstations, workers and patrons to
wear face coverings, and hourly cleaning and disinfection while in
operation. However, if businesses were unable to comply with the
restrictions in Executive Order No. 61, they were ordered to remain
closed.

As a result of the policies on social distancing and restrictions
on its business, the Plaintiff voluntarily closed Light Stream Spa
on March 16, 2020. On March 23, 2020, Executive Order No. 53
mandated that the Plaintiff remain closed through May 15, 2020.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff suffered a complete loss of income after
closing on March 16, 2020 and incurred extra expenses as well.

On March 16, 2020, the Plaintiff submitted a claim for loss of
business income and extra expenses under the Policy. On March 26,
2020, the Defendants denied the Plaintiff's claim ("Denial
Letter"). The Denial Letter stated that the grounds for denial were
because the Plaintiff voluntarily closed their business on March
16, 2020, there was no civil order to close the business, there was
no known damage to the business space or property resulting from
COVID-19, and the Loss of Income Coverage excludes coverage for
loss caused by virus.

On May 27, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment (Count I) and Breach of Contract (Count II)
against the Defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3) on behalf of itself and all
members of the proposed class and sub-class. On July 21, 2020, the
Plaintiff filed the instant First Amended Class Action Complaint
against Defendants pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), and
23(b)(3) for Declaratory Judgment on behalf of itself and the
proposed Declaratory Judgment Class (Count I), Breach of Contract
on behalf of itself and the proposed Nationwide Class, or
alternatively, on behalf of the proposed Virginia Sub-Class (Count
II), and Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing on
behalf of itself and the proposed Virginia Sub-Class (Count III).

On Aug. 11, 2020, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim as to all three Counts. The Plaintiff
responded in opposition and the Defendants replied. On Dec. 9,
2020, the Court denied in part and granted in part the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.

The Plaintiff filed their first Motion for Class Certification on
May 27, 2021. On Aug. 19, 2021, the Court granted in part and
denied in part the Plaintiff's First Motion for Class
Certification. On Aug. 31, 2021, the Defendants filed a petition
for permission to appeal the Court's Certification Order to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to FRCP 23(f). On Sept. 2,
2021, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the Court's sua
sponte certification of an 'opt-in' Rule 23(b)(3) damages class. It
expressed no opinion on whether a Rule 23(b)(3) class is
appropriate in the case, but rather reversed and remanded due to
the sua sponte nature of the certification and the opt-in
provision. Accordingly, the Court granted the Plaintiff leave to
file a new request for class certification, if any. Order Grant.

On Sept. 27, 2021, the Plaintiff filed their Second Motion for
Class Certification. The Defendants filed a memorandum in
opposition and the Plaintiff replied.

On Oct. 12, 2021, the Defendants filed a Motion to Exclude the
Testimony and Opinions of Jeffrey E. Meyers. On Oct. 26, 2021, the
Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition and the Defendants
replied.

On Oct. 29, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Exclude Opinions
and Testimony of Stephen D. Prowse for Class Certification, Summary
Judgment, and Trial. Since the cross-Motions to Exclude will bear
on the Court's approach to the Second Motion for Class
Certification, Judge Jackson must decide those two Motions first.

II. Discussion

A. Expert Testimony

a. Defendants' Motion to Exclude Jeffrey E. Meyers

The Plaintiff includes and relies upon the report of proffered
expert Mr. Jeffrey E. Meyers in support of their instant Motion for
Class Certification. The Defendants move to exclude Mr. Meyers'
proffered expert opinions and testimony. The Defendants argue,
specifically, that Meyers is not qualified, his process is not
reliable, his process does not fit the Plaintiff's liability
theory, and that his opinions and reports "are nothing but handoffs
from the Plaintiff's counsel."

Among other things, Judge Jackson finds that (i) Mr. Meyers is
qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education"
to opine on class-wide damages for insurance business interruption
claims and, if so, to perform that calculation; (ii) Meyers' common
methodology has been sufficiently tested and generally accepted by
the industry such that it is reliable, and therefore admissible;
(iii) it is illogical to rely on the standard set there because
patent cases are particularly unique, and Defendants do not provide
any support to indicate that case is analogous to an insurance
breach of contract action; (iv) Meyers provides his calculations
and methods for addressing the two remaining damage elements,
Extended Loss of Income and Extra Expenses"; and (v) the Defendants
fail to cite to any authority to support their accusation that
Meyers' opinions and reports are "nothing but handoffs from the
Plaintiff's counsel."

In sum, Judge Jackson finds that Meyers is sufficiently qualified
and his process sufficiently reliable such that it is admissible.
Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion to Exclude is denied.

b. Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Stephen D. Prowse

The Defendants include and rely upon the declaration and report of
proffered expert Dr. Stephen D. Prowse in their opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification. The Plaintiff moves to
exclude Dr. Prowse's proffered expert opinions and testimony for
class certification, summary judgment, and trial. In support, it
offers multiple arguments, including that Dr. Prowse is not
qualified to serve as a damages expert here and that his opinions
are irrelevant and unreliable.

Among other things, Judge Jackson finds that (i) Dr. Prowse is not
qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, nor
education" to opine on one of the issues for which he is proffered:
Whether it is possible by generalized proof to calculate class-wide
damages for insurance business interruption claims and, if so, to
perform that calculation; (ii) Dr. Prowse's report is overall
irrelevant for purposes of analyzing the (b)(3) Class and his
report from the Court's consideration of the instant Class
Certification Motion must be excluded; and (iii) Dr. Prowse's
testimony on issues like potential reasons the Plaintiff decided to
permanently close its business, would create jury confusion because
the jury would likely conflate his testimony as an expert and fact
witness.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude the Opinions and
Testimony of Dr. Stephen D. Prowse is granted in part.
Specifically, Judge Jackson concludes that Dr. Prowse is
unqualified to opine on business interruption claims and the
calculation of loss of income and extra expense damages under the
Policy. He also concludes that Dr. Prowse's opinions and testimony
set forth in his report intrude on the purview of the Court and
trier of fact. Therefore, Dr. Prowse's opinion and testimony on the
issue for which he is unqualified and his report will be excluded.
However, because the Plaintiff moves to exclude his opinion and
testimony for summary judgment and trial, Judge Jackson limits its
exclusion ruling to this particular issue and report. He will
reserve his ruling on Dr. Prowse's opinion and testimony on other
issues and at other stages until they are properly before the
Court.

B. Class Certification

To conduct a sufficient analysis of the Plaintiff's Motion, Judge
Jackson must apply relevant facts within the Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint to Rule 23(a) and (b). He will evaluate the Plaintiff's
Motion under Rule 23. As a threshold matter, however, the
Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's Motion is waived, forfeited,
and untimely. Further, the Defendants ardently contest the
applicability of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3), arguing that common
questions do not predominate because the Plaintiff and proposed
class members are not similarly situated and cannot rely upon
common evidence.

Judge Jackson addresses the threshold matter the Defendants raise
and proceeds to analyze the Rule 23 class action requirements in
turn.

a. Waiver, Forfeiture, and Timeliness

The Defendants, as a threshold matter, argue that the Court should
summarily reject the Plaintiff's Motion as waived, forfeited, and
untimely. They claim that the Plaintiff violated Rule 23(c)(1)(A)
in filing the Instant Motion.

Judge Jackson opines that regardless of the merits of the Motion to
Bifurcate, the Plaintiff's decision to immediately file its First
Motion for Class Certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) was
consistent with its Motion to Bifurcate and, if anything, made
litigation in this action more expeditious. Indeed, if the Court
had granted the Motion to Bifurcate, thus allowing the declaratory
relief claim under (b)(2) to go forward, and the Plaintiff had not
yet filed the First Motion for Class Certification, the action
would have been further delayed.

Moreover, regardless of any "strategic decisions" involved, the
Motion to Bifurcate specifically asked the Court to bifurcate the
action into two phases: The first addressing declaratory relief on
behalf of a Rule 23(b)(2) class, and the second addressing
certification under Rule 23(b)(3). The Defendants acknowledge that
the bifurcation Motion asked the Court to allow the Plaintiff to
"defer moving for a (b)(3) class," not to intentionally relinquish,
abandon, or explicitly withdraw that motion. Accordingly, Judge
Jackson finds that the Plaintiff did not waive their right to file
the instant Motion.

b. Rule 23(a)

Judge Jackson finds that (i) the Plaintiff satisfied the Rule
23(a)(1) numerosity requirement because the joinder of all 111
proposed class members is impracticable; (ii) the Plaintiff's
claims are also typical among the class; (iii) the ultimate common
questions -- of whether the Defendants correctly interpreted their
Policy and whether Defendants concocted a scheme to uniformly deny
all claims based on that erroneous interpretation -- apply to all
proposed class members and can be resolved in a single hearing;
(iv) there is no evidence to suggest that the interests of the
named Plaintiff in any way contradict that of the purported class;
and (v) the proposed class is sufficiently defined qualitatively
and qualitatively such that it is ascertainable or "readily
identifiable."

c. Rule 23(b)(3) Certification

Under Rule 23(b)(3), common questions of law or fact "must
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members."
Further, a plaintiff must establish "that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy." These requirements are commonly
referred to as the predominance and superiority requirements of a
Rule 23(b)(3) analysis.

Judge Jackson finds that (i) although there may be individualized
issues pertaining to specific members of the proposed class, there
are common and cohesive legal questions pertaining to all members;
(ii) the questions of fact and law required to establish Count II
for the proposed class are predominate across each member of the
purported class; (iii) the questions of fact and law required to
establish Count III for the proposed class predominate across each
member of the purported class; (iv) the Plaintiff has shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that they will be able to prove
damages using common proof; and (v) common issues predominate,
class action treatment is superior to any alternative means of
adjudication.

d. Request to Defer Contact Information and Class Notice

The Defendants request the Court defers ordering the disclosure of
contact information and notice to the class members given the
privacy considerations of the putative class members. They also
request this time to have a "meaningful opportunity" for their
apparently inevitable appeal to the Fourth Circuit.

Yet, Judge Jackson opines that the Defendants cite no authority and
provide no explanation as to why this is warranted. He does not
find that either of these reasons warrant deferring the disclosure
or notice requirements under Rule 23(c)(2)(B), and that doing so
would unnecessarily delay litigation. Accordingly, the Defendants'
request is denied.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Jackson denied the Defendants'
Motion to Exclude, granted in part the Plaintiff's Motion to
Exclude, and granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification.

Judge Jackson ordered certification of the following class: "All
persons or entities in the Commonwealth of Virginia with a
Businessowners insurance policy issued by State Farm on Form
CMP-4100, including a Loss of Income and Extra Expense endorsement
on Form CMP 4705.1 or CMP 4705.2, in effect at any time between
March 23, 2020 and June 30, 2020 (the Closure Period), that were
subject to partial or full business suspension under the Orders and
submitted claims for business income losses and/or extra expenses
incurred during the Closure Period that were denied by Defendants
(the Class)."

The following issues relating to claims and/or defenses present
common class-wide questions:

     a. Whether the term accidental direct physical loss in the
Policies includes losses resulting from the Orders;

     b. Whether the Plaintiff's and the Class members' loss of
income and/or extra expenses were caused by a Covered Cause of Loss
under the Policies;

     c. Whether the Loss of Income and Extra Expense Endorsements
provide coverage for losses stemming from the Orders;

     d. Whether the Defendants breached their contracts of
insurance by erroneously interpreting the Policy provisions and
wrongfully denying claims for loss of income and/or extra expenses
under the Policies;

     e. Whether the Defendants breached their implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing to the Plaintiff and members of the
Class under the Policies by engaging in a uniform scheme to deny
all claims submitted by Class members without conducting any
investigations; and

     f. Whether the Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged by
the Defendants' conduct.

Elegant Massage is appointed as the representative of the Class,
and Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Carella, Byrne, Cecchi,
Olstein, Brody & Angello, P.C. and Glasser and Glasser, P.L.C. are
appointed as the Class Counsel.

The Defendants will provide to the Plaintiff's counsel the names,
last known addresses, home and mobile phone numbers, and email
addresses of all potential members of the certified class within 15
days of the date of the Order/

The Plaintiff's counsel will circulate notices of pendency and
consent to joinder to all potential members of the certified Class
upon the Court's approval of the form of notice.

The filing of all dispositive motions will be stayed until further
notice of the Court.

Judge Jackson directed the Clerk to provide copies of the
Memorandum Opinion and Order to the counsel of record.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 11, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p87489e from
Leagle.com.


SUNPOWER CORP: Settles Defective Solar Panels Class Suit for $4.7-M
-------------------------------------------------------------------
SunPower agreed to pay $4.75 million to resolve claims that it sold
solar panels with defective microinverters.

The settlement benefits Class Members who purchased one or more
SunPower solar modules (also called solar panels) equipped with
defective microinverters and/or own a house where these modules are
installed.

The allegedly defective microinverters were installed in SunPower
solar panels between July 2015 and December 2016 and carry serial
numbers beginning with 4140515xxxx and 4140516xxxx. These were
equipped in solar modules included in SunPower's Equinox systems
with the following model numbers:

SPR-E20-327-C-AC
SPR-E19-320-C-AC
SPR-E18-305-C-AC
SPR-X22-360-C-AC
SPR-X21-350-BLK-C-AC
SPR-X21-345-C-AC
SPR-X21-335-C-AC
SPR-X21-335-BLK-C-AC
SPR-X20-327-BLK-C-AC

SunPower is a solar power company based in Silicon Valley. The
company reportedly holds over 1,000 patents for solar innovation
and, according to the company's website, has been the No. 1 ranked
commercial solar company since 2017.

However, consumers who purchased solar panels from the company may
have unknowingly paid for defective products.

Plaintiffs in the SunPower class action lawsuit claim the company
sold solar panels with defective microinverters. The microinverters
were allegedly manufactured with a defective component from a third
party; that component causes the parts to degrade prematurely,
generate less power, and even stop working.

As a result of this defect, the plaintiffs contend consumers who
purchased SunPower solar panels faced financial damages due to
premature product failure and increased electric utility bills.
According to the SunPower class action lawsuit, the solar power
company is liable for these damages.

SunPower hasn't admitted any wrongdoing but agreed to resolve these
claims with a $4.75 million settlement.

The settlement promises cash payments to consumers who experienced
any of the following: lost or reduced power production, property
damage due to microinverter repair or replacement, and/or loss of
solar renewable energy credits or other incentives. According to
the settlement website, payments are expected to be $173.52 per
Class Member.

The SunPower class action settlement also provides non-monetary
benefits to Class Members. [GN]

SUTTER HEALTH: 3-Mil. Plaintiffs Seek $1.2-Bil. in Antitrust Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Thompson Associated Press reports that a lawsuit over high health
care bills filed on behalf of more than 3 million employers and
people seeks as much as $1.2 billion from a large Northern
California health system in an antitrust class-action trial getting
underway. Plaintiffs in the lawsuit allege in court documents that
Sutter Health abused its market power and "caused enormous adverse
economic impacts" by discouraging patients from using lower-cost
insurance and lower-cost hospitals. Sutter Health said in a
statement that it looks forward to "demonstrating that in Northern
California's highly competitive market, Sutter's integrated
healthcare network provides high-quality care that creates
efficiencies, drives down total cost of care and benefits the
diverse communities we serve." The lawsuit claims Sutter used its
market power for inpatient services in seven mostly rural Northern
California areas where it is the only or dominant hospital to bind
insurers in four other communities where it has competition. That
allowed Sutter to overcharge for its own services, the lawsuit
alleged, and caused nearly $400 million in insurance premium
overcharges to the plaintiffs between 2011-2017. Five companies
provided the health insurance: Anthem Blue Cross, Blue Shield of
California, Aetna, United Healthcare, and Health Net.

The law allows triple damages if the plaintiffs win against Sutter
Health, meaning a potential award of $1.2 billion. The named
plaintiffs are four people who paid health insurance premiums and
two companies that paid premiums for their employees since 2011,
but the class includes any individuals or companies in the same
position across much of Northern California. The plaintiffs'
attorneys estimate that includes 3 million patients and employers.
The system operates 24 hospitals with more than 12,000 doctors and
16,000 nurses. It's the second such lawsuit filed against Sutter
Health. The health system two years ago paid different plaintiffs
$575 million to settle similar claims that it used anti-competitive
practices to artificially increase patients' costs and agreed then
in a separate settlement with the state to accept a court-approved
monitor for 10 years to make sure it no longer works through
insurance companies to increase patients' costs.[GN]

SUTTER HEALTH: Faces Antitrust Class Action in California
---------------------------------------------------------
Jessy Edwards, writing for Top Class Actions, reports that a class
action trial seeking $1.2 billion in damages from a major health
system for allegedly "price-gouging" people on their medical
insurance premiums has kicked off in California.

The class action complaint claims Sutter violated antitrust and
unfair competition laws, causing certain people and employers in
parts of Northern California to overpay health insurance premiums
whether or not they used Sutter hospitals.

Plaintiffs in the trial, which kicked off Feb. 10, seek to
represent more than 3 million employers and people who were
affected by the alleged anticompetitive behavior.

According to the plaintiffs, Sutter used its market power in areas
of rural Northern California, where it is in most cases the only
hospital, to bind insurers in places where it does have
competition.

That allowed the health system to overcharge for its own services,
the lawsuit alleged, causing nearly $400 million in insurance
premium overcharges to the class between 2011-2017.

The class includes anyone living or working in certain areas of
Northern California who paid premiums for a fully insured health
insurance policy from Blue Shield, Anthem Blue Cross, Aetna, Health
Net or United Healthcare from Jan. 1, 2011, to now.

The law allows triple damages if the plaintiffs win against Sutter
Health, meaning a potential award of $1.2 billion.

Sutter Denies Wrongdoing in Antitrust Class Action
Sutter denies that it has done anything wrong or that its conduct
caused any increase in the price of premiums that individuals and
employers paid for health insurance.

The system operates 24 hospitals with more than 12,000 doctors and
16,000 nurses.

It's the second such lawsuit filed against Sutter Health. In 2021,
Sutter Health agreed to a $575 million settlement resolving claims
it violated competition law.

The United Food and Commercial Workers International Union and
Employers Benefit Trust filed a class action lawsuit in 2014,
alleging Sutter Health had "imposed price secrecy, all-or-nothing
and anti-tiering provisions" in its health plan contracts and that
the company's restrictive conduct violated both the Cartwright Act
and Unfair Competition Law.

The People of the State of California filed a second lawsuit in
March 2018, and the court consolidated the cases in May 2018.

Did you pay Sutter Health for health services or products? Let us
know what you think of the settlement in the comment section
below.

The plaintiffs are represented by David Brownstein and David
Goldstein of Farmer Brownstein Jaeger Goldstein Klein & Siegel LLP;
Matthew L. Cantor and Jean Kim of Constantine Cannon LLP; Jill M.
Manning of Pearson Simon & Warshaw LLP; and Allan Steyer of Steyer
Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez & Smith LLP.

The Sutter Health Antitrust Class Action Lawsuit is Sidibe et al.
v. Sutter Health, Case No. 3:12-cv-04854, in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California. [GN]

SWIFT TRANSPORTATION: Final Approval of Saucillo Settlement Vacated
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GILBERT SAUCILLO; JAMES R. RUDSELL, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
and JOHN BURNELL; JACK POLLOCK, Plaintiffs, v. LAWRENCE PECK,
Objector-Appellant v. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY OF ARIZONA, LLC,
an Arizona corporation, Defendant-Appellee, and SWIFT
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY INCORPORATED; DOES, Defendants. GILBERT
SAUCILLO; JAMES R. RUDSELL, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and JOHN BURNELL; JACK
POLLOCK, Plaintiffs, v. SADASHIV MARES, Objector-Appellant v. SWIFT
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY OF ARIZONA, LLC, an Arizona corporation,
Defendant-Appellee, and SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY INCORPORATED;
DOES, Defendants, Case Nos. 20-55119, 20-55159 (9th Cir.), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismisses in part, vacates,
and remands in part the district court's order giving final
approval to the settlement.

I. Introduction

Plaintiffs Gilbert Saucillo and James Rudsell are plaintiffs in
actions brought against Swift and associated entities and
individuals. In 2019, after years of litigation, the Plaintiffs and
Swift reached a settlement pertaining to the Plaintiffs' class
claims and claims brought pursuant to the California Private
Attorneys General Act (PAGA), Cal. Lab. Code Sections 2698 et seq.,
which allows private citizens to recover civil penalties on behalf
of themselves "and other current or former employees" for
violations of the California Labor Code.

Lawrence Peck and Sadashiv Mares filed objections to the settlement
agreement. Peck objected to the PAGA portion of the settlement,
while Mares argued that the monetary award for the class claims was
not fair and reasonable. The district court overruled both sets of
objections and gave final approval to the settlement.

II. Background

Swift is a trucking company that operates throughout the United
States. In September 2009, John Burnell, a former Swift driver,
informed the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency
(LWDA) of Swift's alleged violations of California labor law.
Burnell specifically claimed that Swift was violating California
Labor Code Section 2802, which requires an employer to "indemnify
his or her employee for all necessary expenditures or losses
incurred by the employee in direct consequence of his or her
duties." The next month, LWDA informed Burnell that it would not
investigate the claim. In October 2010, another former Swift
driver, Jack Pollock, sent a letter to LWDA asserting various
violations of California labor law, including Section 2802.
Pollock's letter purportedly "served as an update to Burnell's
correspondence."

In February 2010, Burnell filed a class action against Swift in
California state court alleging various wage and hour violations
pursuant to California law. In June 2010, Swift removed the case to
federal court. Burnell then amended the complaint in October 2010,
adding Pollock as a named plaintiff. The amended complaint asserted
both an independent cause of action pursuant to Section 2802 and a
PAGA cause of action. Pollock subsequently withdrew as a named
plaintiff, and Burnell then filed another amended complaint, this
time adding Saucillo as a named plaintiff. In 2016, the district
court denied a motion by Burnell and Saucillo for class
certification.

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for permission to appeal
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). Eventually, the
district court granted Swift's motion for partial judgment on the
pleadings, but te Ninth Circuit vacated that ruling after issuing
Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, 769 F.3d 637 (9th Cir. 2014).

In 2012, Rudsell, another Swift driver, sent his own letter to the
LWDA, similarly alleging that Swift had violated various California
labor laws. Rudsell did not specifically cite Section 2802, nor did
his complaint, which he attached to the letter. Rudsell next filed
an amended complaint, and Swift eventually removed Rudsell's suit
to federal court. The district court stayed Rudsell's suit while
Burnell's action was pending. Rudsell never moved for class
certification.

In May 2019, Burnell, Saucillo, and Rudsell reached a settlement
with Swift pertaining to the class claims and PAGA claims in both
their suits. The settlement provided that Swift would pay $7.25
million for the class claims, $2,416,666.66 for attorneys' fees,
and $500,000 for the PAGA claim. Pursuant to PAGA, $375,000 (75%)
would be paid to the LWDA, and $125,000 (25%) would be paid to
aggrieved employees.

Upon the instruction of the district court, the Plaintiffs filed a
new, consolidated complaint in June 2019. In the consolidated
complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that Swift violated Section 2802.
They also asserted a PAGA cause of action that "incorporated each
and every one of the allegations contained in the preceding
paragraphs of the consolidated Complaint." The parties submitted a
copy of the settlement agreement to the LWDA, in accordance with
PAGA. The LWDA did not object to the settlement.

Peck and Mares, two Swift drivers, objected to the proposed
settlement. Both Peck and Mares had filed their own suits against
Swift. Peck filed a PAGA complaint in California state court, while
Mares filed a class action. Despite these objections, the district
court granted final approval to the settlement agreement in January
2020. The district court then evaluated the agreement pursuant to
the eight-factor test in Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011,
1026 (9th Cir. 1998).

The district court rejected the objections raised by Peck and
Mares. It granted final approval to the settlement agreement for
both the class claims and the PAGA claim, though the court reduced
the attorneys' fees.

III. Discussion

Mr. Peck raises his same objection on appeal, while Mares now
argues that the district court applied an incorrect presumption
that the settlement agreement was the product of arm's-length
negotiations. Both appeals were fully briefed, oral argument was
held, and both Peck's and Mares' cases were submitted in April
2021.

Approximately one month later, the Ninth Circuit decided Magadia v.
Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., 999 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2021), which
concluded that the plaintiff -- Roderick Magadia -- lacked Article
III standing to bring a "meal-break claim" under PAGA "because he
did not suffer an injury himself."This conclusion flowed from
Magadia's core holding that plaintiffs seeking penalties under PAGA
for California labor law violations must satisfy the traditional
Article III standing requirement of an injury in fact.

After this decision was filed, the Ninth Circuit directed the
parties to file supplemental briefs addressing Magadia's impact
with respect to the Plaintiffs' standing to sue under PAGA. It has
reviewed the parties' supplemental briefs, as well as the parties'
letters directing us to additional, recent authorities.

A. Objections to the PAGA Settlement

In renewing his objection to the district court's approval of the
PAGA portion of the settlement, Peck identifies three potential
errors made by the district court: (1) Rudsell and Saucillo lack
standing to enter into the PAGA settlement because they allegedly
did not ask the LWDA to investigate a potential Section 2802
violation; (2) the PAGA release is overbroad; and (3) the $500,000
PAGA penalty is too small. Swift counters that Peck lacks standing
to object to such a settlement, and that Peck may not appeal the
settlement in any event because he is a non-party to the underlying
litigation. We agree with the latter contention, and so we must
dismiss Peck's appeal.

The Ninth Circuit opines that (i) objectors to a PAGA settlement
are not "parties" to a PAGA suit in the same sense that absent
class members are "parties" to a class action; (ii) the fact that
Peck may ultimately receive a portion of the PAGA settlement does
not make him a party to the lawsuit; (iii) the fact that Peck might
have some interest in the outcome of Saucillo's and Rudsell's PAGA
lawsuit does not make him a "party" to that suit; and (iv)
maintaining a parallel action does not change the fact that Peck is
not a party to the PAGA lawsuit brought by Saucillo and Rudsell.

The Ninth Circuit concludes that because Peck lacks the right to
appeal the PAGA settlement, it dismisses his appeal and do not
consider whether the district court erred in approving the PAGA
settlement. Two final observations are warranted. First, Peck did
not move to intervene in the cases before the Ninth Circuit.
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit does not address whether he could
have been permitted to intervene, raise objections to the PAGA
settlement, and then pursue those objections on appeal. Second, the
Ninth Circuit hasoccasionally allowed a non-party to appeal when
"exceptional circumstances" warrant a departure from this general
rule. It has allowed such an appeal only when (1) the appellant,
though not a party, participated in the district court proceedings,
and (2) the equities of the case weigh in favor of hearing the
appeal." Peck does not argue that this exception applies in the
case, and so the Ninth Circuit expresses no opinion on whether a
PAGA settlement objector could invoke it in an appropriate appeal.

B. Correct Legal Standard for the Class Action Settlement

To the district court, Mares objected to the size of settlement for
the class claims, believing that it was inadequate. Mares does not
renew his same objections on appeal. Instead, he now argues that
"the district court erroneously applied a presumption of fairness."
Mares contends that because the district court approved the
settlement before certifying a class, the court should have applied
a heightened standard of review, in line with the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Roes, 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir.
2019). Mares additionally highlights what he believes are six signs
of self-interest on the part of the Plaintiffs and Swift.

Swift first argues that the Ninth Circuit cannot reach the merits
of Mares's objection because he did not raise such an objection in
the district court. The Ninth Circuit opines that the district
court's order granting preliminary approval to the settlement
agreement noted that the negotiations were conducted at
"arms-length." However, the district court did not state in its
preliminary approval order that it was applying a presumption that
the agreement was non-collusive. The district court did use such
language in its order granting final approval. Because the district
court did not apply the presumption before its final order, Mares
had no reason to make the objection he now makes on appeal.
Therefore, Mares did not (and could not) waive his objection to the
legal standard employed by the district court in its final order.

Swift and the Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the district
court's order from the Ninth Circuit's decision in Roes in a number
of ways. First, Swift argues that Roes applies only to cases where
a party never sought class certification. According to Swift,
because Saucillo moved for certification of a litigation class,
which the district court denied, the heightened legal standard does
not apply. This argument is plainly at odds with our decision in
Roes. The Ninth Circuit opines that Saucillo's unsuccessful motion
for class certification meant there was an "absence of a certified
class" and that the district court approved the settlement "before
the class had been certified."

Next, Swift argues that the district court "held only that" the
presumption of fairness "was a factor that weighs in favor of
approval." Swift is correct that the district court noted that the
presumption was a "factor" that "weighs in favor of approval." The
district court then applied the Hanlon factors. However, the
district court in Roes did the same thing, only for the Ninth
Circuit to reverse.

Swift additionally tries to distinguish Roes by arguing that the
concerns underlying our decision are not present in the instant
case, where "the parties actively litigated for several years,
conducted comprehensive discovery, and contest certification of a
litigation class on the merits." But the procedural posture in Roes
was similar. The Ninth Circuit reversed despite the litigation
history of Roes, and it does the same in instant case. Furthermore,
its holding in Roes announced a bright-line rule: District courts
must apply a more searching legal standard "where the parties
negotiate a settlement agreement before the class has been
certified." The Ninth Circuit did not make any exceptions based on
how long the parties have been litigating prior to approval of the
settlement.

Finally, Swift and the Plaintiffs ask the Ninth Circuit to affirm
the district court's approval of the settlement despite application
of an erroneous legal standard. The Ninth Circuit holds that
failure to respond to a "purely technical" objection is not
analogous to employing an incorrect legal standard. Factfinding is
the basic responsibility of district courts, rather than appellate
courts. It offers no opinion as to whether there is merit to
Mares's allegations. On remand, the district might decide to once
again approve the settlement pursuant to the correct legal
standard, or it might not. The Ninth Circuit, however, cannot
review the settlement in the first instance under the appropriate
legal standard.

IV. Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit concludes that Peck may not appeal the PAGA
settlement because he is not a party to the underlying PAGA action,
and so it dismisses his appeal. However, it vacates the district
court's approval of the class action settlement agreement and
remands the class action for further proceedings, as it agrees with
Mares that the district court abused its discretion by applying an
incorrect legal standard when evaluating the settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 11, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/mr3d347d from Leagle.com.

Neal J. Fialkow -- nfialkow@fialkowlawgroup.com -- (argued) and
James S. Cahill -- jscahilllaw@aol.com -- Law Office of Neal J.
Fialkow Inc., in Pasadena, California, for Objector-Appellant
Lawrence Peck.

Joseph Clapp (argued) -- jc@asmlawyers.com -- Aiman-Smith & Marcy,
in Oakland, California, for Objector-Appellant Sadashiv Mares.

Deepak Gupta (argued) -- deepak@stanfordalumni.org -- and Urja
Mittal, Gupta Wessler PLLC, Washington, D.C.; James R. Hawkins and
Gregory Mauro, James Hawkins APLC, Irvine, California; Stanley D.
Saltzman, Marlin & Saltzman LLP, in Agoura Hills, California, for
the Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Paul S. Cowie (argued) -- pcowie@sheppardmullin.com -- Karin Dougan
Vogel -- kvogel@sheppardmullin.com -- and John D. Ellis --
jellis@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP,
in San Francisco, California, for the Defendant-Appellee.


SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case
No. 3:18-cv-1818 (VAB) (D. Conn.), Judge Victor A. Bolden of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut denied the
Defendants' renewed motion to dismiss as to the remaining claim.

I. Background

On April 5, 2019, Lead Plaintiffs Stichting Depositary APG
Developed Markets Equity Pool and Stichting Depositary APG Fixed
Income Credits Pool filed an Amended Complaint in this putative
class action against, inter alia, Defendants Synchrony, Margaret M.
Keane, Brian D. Doubles, and Thomas M. Quindlen.

The Lead Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint on behalf of
themselves, all similarly situated purchasers of Synchrony
Financial common stock between Oct. 21, 2016, and Nov. 1, 2018 (the
"Class Period"), and all similarly situated purchasers of Synchrony
Financial 3.95% bonds due 2027 either in or traceable to
Synchrony's Dec. 1, 2017 note offering during the Class Period,
alleging violations of Sections 10(b), 20A, and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 78j(b), 78t-1, and 78t(a); insider
trading in violation of SEC Rule 10b-5, and 17 C.F.R. Section
240.10b-5 promulgated thereunder; and violations of Sections 11 and
15 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. Sections 77k and 77o.

On March 31, 2020, the Court dismissed all claims (In re Synchrony
Fin. Sec. Litig., 450 F.Supp.3d 127, 131 (D. Conn. 2020)
("Synchrony I")). On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed in part
and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings Lead
Plaintiffs' claim under the Exchange Act for allegedly false or
misleading statements regarding "pushback" from retail partners, as
required to state a class action claim for securities fraud (In re
Synchrony Fin. Sec. Litig., 988 F.3d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 2021)
("Synchrony II")).

On May 17, 2021, the Defendants have renewed their motion to
dismiss as to this remaining claim and seek dismissal of the case.
On July 1, 2021, the Lead Plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in
opposition to the Defendants' renewed motion to dismiss. On Aug. 2,
2021, the Defendants submitted a reply.

II. Discussion

Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for "any
person, directly or indirectly" to use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors. SEC Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for "any person,
directly or indirectly ": (a) To employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.

To state a cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a
plaintiff must plead that the defendant made a false statement or
omitted a material fact, with scienter, and that plaintiff's
reliance on defendant's action caused plaintiff injury."

1. False Statement or Omitted Material Fact

In order to state a claim for securities fraud, the plaintiffs
first must specify each allegedly misleading statement or omission.
The Lead Plaintiffs allege that, in an earnings call on Jan. 19,
2018, Ms. Keane made a material misstatement regarding "pushback"
from retail partners. In their renewed motion to dismiss, the
Defendants argue that the alleged misstatement was not material,
and that no reasonable investor would have considered Ms. Keane's
statement in the January 2018 call important in making investment
decisions. They assert that the alleged misstatement was
"unscripted" and underscore that the statement "did not name any
retailer in particular."

Judge Bolden holds that reasonable minds could differ as to the
importance of the "no pushback" representation. Even if the
disclosed information about Walmart's resistance to changed
underwriting policies did not definitively indicate the termination
of the relationship with Walmart, it altered the "total mix" of
information available as to the value of the investment. The
company's disclosures and warnings, moreover, are not sufficient to
offset an inference of reasonable reliance under the circumstances.
In addition, under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, "alleged
misrepresentations in a stock offering are immaterial as a matter
of law if it cannot be said that any reasonable investor could
consider them important in light of adequate cautionary language
set out in the same offering."

Accordingly, Judge Bolden will not dismiss the Amended Complaint on
the grounds that the misstatement was immaterial.

2. Scienter

"To plead scienter so as to survive a motion to dismiss, a
plaintiff must state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind.'" Scienter "may be established by facts '(1) showing that
the defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit the fraud
or (2) constituting strong circumstantial evidence of conscious
misbehavior or recklessness.'" A complaint alleging securities
fraud under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act may establish
scienter through "strong circumstantial evidence of conscious
misbehavior or recklessness."

The Defendants argue, first, that the context in which Ms. Keane
made the alleged misstatement weighs against a finding of scienter.
They further highlight disclosures that Synchrony made about the
state of the market as evidence that the alleged misstatement
cannot plausibly be viewed as reckless or an extreme departure from
the standard of ordinary care, or otherwise reflect a conscious
intent to mislead investors. In addition, the Defendants argue that
alleged statements of former employees about the relationship
between Synchrony and Walmart in 2017 and 2018, fail to raise a
sufficiently strong inference of scienter, where the former
employees did not have close contact with Ms. Keane. Finally, they
argue that any inference of scienter that could be drawn from the
allegations in the Amended Complaint is undermined by the fact
that, as a result of the Second Circuit's decision in Synchrony II,
the Lead Plaintiffs have "only adequately alleged the falsity of a
single passing statement made by Ms. Keane during the entire Class
Period."

In the Lead Plaintiffs' view, scienter is strongly supported by the
allegations in the Amended Complaint that Synchrony and its
representatives knew the "no pushback" statement was false when
made, as noted by the Second Circuit in Synchrony II. They further
argue that scienter is alleged by the "personal involvement of the
Defendants in the negotiations with Walmart, and that the
statements of former employees regarding the company's relationship
with Walmart, provide sufficient support for a finding of scienter,
even without allegations of direct contact between those former
employees and the named defendants. Finally, the Lead Plaintiffs
argue that the allegations regarding the significance of the
partnership with Walmart to Synchrony "bolster" other allegations
regarding scienter in the Amended Complaint.

Judge Bolden agrees. He finds that there are multiple allegations
in the Amended Complaint to support that Synchrony and its
representatives, including Ms. Keane, knew or should have known
that Synchrony was mispresenting material facts with respect to
Synchrony's relationship with its partners, when Ms. Keane made the
alleged misstatement at issue. Even though disclosures about risk
may, in some circumstances, undercut an inference of a state of
mind going toward deliberate illegal behavior or conduct which is
highly unreasonable, the Defendants do not provide, nor has the
Court located, any authority to suggest that such disclaimers allow
this Court to dismiss a complaint for lack of scienter where the
Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the Defendants knew or
should have known that a statement, even if only a single
statement, was false when made.

Accordingly, Judge Bolden will not dismiss the Amended Complaint
for lack of scienter, as there are sufficient allegations to
support an inference of recklessness.

3. Loss Causation

"A private plaintiff who claims securities fraud must prove that
the defendant's fraud caused an economic loss." To adequately plead
loss causation, a plaintiff must allege "that the market reacted
negatively to a corrective disclosure regarding the falsity" of
defendants' statements. "Plaintiffs need not demonstrate on a
motion to dismiss that the corrective disclosure was the only
possible cause for decline in the stock price." But plaintiffs must
"allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable inference that
defendants' misstatements or fraudulent conduct caused an
ascertainable portion of its loss."

The Plaintiffs allege corrective disclosures on July 12, 2018; July
26 and 27, 2018; and Nov. 1, 2018. The Defendants argue that the
Lead Plaintiffs fail to establish loss causation in relation to
each of these alleged corrective disclosures. First, as to the
media reporting on July 12, 2018, the Defendants contend that the
statements at issue constituted mere "speculation." Second, as to
the alleged disclosures on July 26 and 27, 2018, the Defendants
contend that the media reporting "did not identify any new
information about pushback on tightened credit, as necessary to
constitute a corrective disclosure." Third, as to the alleged
disclosure on November 1, 2018, Defendants identify at least three
deficiencies, including: (1) that the Lead Plaintiffs do not allege
that the filing of Walmart's lawsuit revealed "any information
about pushback on tightened underwriting."

In response, the Lead Plaintiffs contend that, first, the July 12,
2018 disclosure revealed the alleged fraud where the Wall Street
Journal reported that Walmart had indeed resisted, or "pushed back"
on, the changes in Synchrony's underwriting practices, when Walmart
expressed its desire for Synchrony to approve a higher percentage
of applicants "in a meeting with Synchrony's board last year."
Second, they argue that the information disclosed by media outlets
on July 26 and 27, 2018 included relevant, new information that
caused the alleged stock price drop. Finally, as to the alleged
disclosure on Nov. 1, 2018, the Lead Plaintiffs contend that the
Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges loss causation where it
alleges that "all of the Nov. 1, 2018 stock price decline" can be
causally attributed to "the disclosure of Walmart's lawsuit."

In reply, the Defendants argue that the Lead Plaintiffs have failed
to allege facts to support an inference that an "ascertainable"
portion of the stock price decline was caused by the alleged
misstatement, in reliance on the Court's decision in In re Frontier
Communications Corp. Stockholders Litigation, No. 3:17-CV-1617
(VAB), 2020 WL 1430019 (D. Conn. Mar. 24, 2020).

Judge Bolden disagrees. He finds that of the three disclosures
alleged, only the first reveals the information allegedly concealed
by Ms. Keane's statement. On July 12, 2018, the Wall Street Journal
revealed that Walmart "wanted Synchrony to approve a higher
percentage of applicants" and had "aired those concerns in a
meeting with Synchrony's board last year," and that, in late 2017,
Walmart launched "for the 'first time,' a formal request for bids
from other credit card issuers." These specific disclosures reveal
the information that allegedly had been concealed: that Synchrony's
partners -- including, most importantly, Walmart -- had in fact
resisted or "pushed back" on Synchrony's tightened underwriting
policies, in direct contradiction to the alleged misstatement.

Accordingly, the Amended Complaint also will not be dismissed for
lack of loss causation.

4. Discovery

In recognition of the viable claim in the case being narrower than
anticipated by the Lead Plaintiffs initially -- given the present
Ruling and Order, and the Court's previous one (Synchrony I) -- the
parties are ordered to meet, confer, and submit a Rule 26(f) report
by March 11, 2022. Consistent with the Court's "inherent authority
to manage its docket with a view toward the efficient and expedient
resolution of cases," and the time already passed since the filing
of the lawsuit, Judge Bolden expects the parties, where possible,
to agree only to the discovery "relevant to any party's claim or
defense and proportional to the needs of the case," and to develop
a timeline for the case's resolution, as expeditiously as
reasonably possible.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons he explained, Judge Bolden denied the motion to
dismiss. In light of this ruling, the parties are ordered to meet,
confer, and submit a report under Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure by March 11, 2022, as further discussed by Judge
Bolden.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 11, 2022 Ruling & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yckpm9fu from Leagle.com.


TALIS BIOMEDICAL: Faces Mitcham Securities Over Stock Price Drop
----------------------------------------------------------------
KAREN MITCHAM, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. TALIS BIOMEDICAL CORPORATION, BRIAN COE, J. ROGER
MOODY, JR., FELIX BAKER, RAYMOND CHEONG, MELISSA GILLIAM, RUSTEM F.
ISMAGILOV, KIMBERLY J. POPOVITS, MATTHEW L. POSARD, and RANDAL
SCOTT, Case No. 3:22-cv-01039 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 18, 2022) is a class
action on behalf of persons and entities that purchased or
otherwise acquired Talis common stock pursuant and/or traceable to
the registration statement and prospectus issued in connection with
the Company's February 2021 initial public offering pursuing claims
against the Defendants under the Securities Act of 1933.

On February 12, 2021, the Company filed its prospectus on Form
424B4 with the Securities Exchange Commission, which forms part of
the Registration Statement. In the IPO, the Company sold 15,870,000
shares of 25 common stock at a price of $16.00 per share. The
Company received net proceeds of approximately 26 $232.6 million
from the Offering. The proceeds from the IPO were purportedly to be
used for commercial activities (including the hiring and training
of sales and marketing personnel), research and development, and
working capital and other general corporate purposes.

On March 8, 2021, Talis announced that it had withdrawn its
Emergency Use Authorization ("EUA") application for the Talis One
COVID-19 test. In a press release, the Company revealed that "[in
late February, the FDA informed the company that it cannot ensure
the comparator assay used in the primary study has sufficient
sensitivity to support Talis's EUA application." As a result, Talis
"intends to initiate its previously planned clinical validation
study in a point-of-care environment" to submit its EUA application
"early in the second quarter of 2021." This study "was designed
with a different comparator study, which Talis believes will
address the FDA's concerns."

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $1.80, or 12%, to
close at $12.85 per share on March 8, 2021.

Then, on August 10, 2021, Talis revealed that its "development
timelines have been extended by delays in the launching of
[Talis's] COVID-19 test and manufacturing scale." As a result,
Talis "expects to see its first meaningful revenue ramp in 2022."

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $0.58, or 6%, to close
at $8.39 per share on August 11, 2021, on unusually heavy trading
volume.

On August 30, 2021, after the market closed, Talis announced that
its Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"), Brian Coe ("Coe"), had
"stepped down" as President, CEO, and Director.

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $1.00, or 11%, to
close at $8.06 per share on August 31, 2021, on unusually heavy
trading volume.

On November 15, 2021, Talis announced that Brian Blaser ("Blaser")
was appointed as 26 President, CEO, and Director of Talis effective
December 1, 2021, However, a week after his appointment on December
8, 2021, Talis announced that Blaser had stepped down from his
positions.

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $0.55, or more than
11%, to close at $4.28. By the commencement of this action, Talis
stock has traded as low as $3.81 per share, a more than 76% decline
from the $16.00 per share IPO price.

The Registration Statement was allegedly false and misleading and
omitted to state material adverse. Specifically, Defendants failed
to disclose to investors that the comparator assay in the primary
study lacked sufficient sensitivity to support Talis's EUA
application for the Talis One COVID-19 test.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages.

The Plaintiff purchased or otherwise acquired Talis common stock
pursuant and/or traceable to the Registration Statement issued in
connection with the Company's IPO, and suffered damages as a result
of the alleged federal securities law violations and false and/or
misleading statements and/or material omissions.

Talis purportedly develops diagnostic tests to enable accurate,
reliable, low cost, and rapid molecular testing for infectious
diseases and other conditions at the point-of-care. The Talis One
tests are being developed for respiratory infections, infections
related to women's health, and sexually transmitted infections. The
Individual Defendants are officers and directors of the
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jennifer Pafiti, Esq.
          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          1100 Glendon Avenue, 15th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 405-7190
          E-mail: jpafiti@pomlaw.com
                  jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com

TELOS CORP: Klein Law Firm Reminds of April 8 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------
The Klein Law Firm on Feb. 15 disclosed that a class action
complaint has been filed on behalf of shareholders of Telos
Corporation (NASDAQ: TLS) alleging that the Company violated
federal securities laws.

Class Period: November 19, 2020 to November 12, 2021

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: April 8, 2022

No obligation or cost to you.

Learn more about your recoverable losses in TLS:

https://www.kleinstocklaw.com/pslra-1/telos-corporation-loss-submission-form?id=23672&from=4


Telos Corporation NEWS - TLS NEWS

CLASS ACTION CASE DETAILS: The filed complaint alleges that Telos
Corporation made materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) the Transportation Security
Administration ("TSA") and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services ("CMS") contracts, which constituted a majority of the
Company's future revenues, were not on track to commence as
represented at the end of 2021 and in 2022; (2) Defendants lacked a
reasonable basis and sufficient visibility to provide and affirm
the Company's 2021 guidance in the face of the uncertainty
surrounding the TSA and CMS contracts; (3) COVID-19- and hacking
scandal-related headwinds were throwing off the timing for
performance of the TSA and CMS contracts and their associated
revenues; (4) as a result, the guidance provided by Defendants was
not in fact "conservative"; (5) as a result of the delays, Telos
would be forced to dramatically reduce its revenue estimates; and
(6) as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' statements about
Telos' business, operations, and prospects, were materially false
and/or misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

WHAT THIS MEANS TO YOU AS A SHAREHOLDER: If you have suffered a
loss in Telos you have until April 8, 2022 to petition the court
for lead plaintiff status. Your ability to share in any recovery
doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

NO COST TO YOU: If you purchased Telos securities during the
relevant period, you may be entitled to compensation without
payment of any out-of-pocket fees.

HOW TO PROTECT YOUR FINANCIAL INTERESTS: For additional information
about the TLS lawsuit, please contact J. Klein, Esq. by telephone
at 212-616-4899 or click this link:
https://www.kleinstocklaw.com/pslra-1/telos-corporation-loss-submission-form?id=23672&from=4

ABOUT KLEIN LAW FIRM

J. Klein, Esq. represents investors and participates in securities
litigations involving financial fraud throughout the nation. The
Klein Law Firm is a boutique litigation firm with experience in a
wide range of areas including securities law, corporate finance and
commercial litigation. Since 2011, our experienced attorneys have
achieved superior results for our clients with a personalized
focus. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar
outcomes.

CONTACT:

J. Klein, Esq.
Empire State Building
350 Fifth Avenue
59th Floor
New York, NY 10118
jk@kleinstocklaw.com
Telephone: (212) 616-4899
www.kleinstocklaw.com [GN]

TEN BRIDGES: Taie Granted Leave to File Amended Class Complaint
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARY TAIE, et al., Plaintiffs v. TEN BRIDGES LLC, et
al., Defendants, Case No. C21-0526-JCC (W.D. Wash.), Judge John C.
Coughenour of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle:

    (i) granted the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an
        amended complaint; and

   (ii) dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiffs' claims against
        the Heald marital community.

I. Background

The Plaintiffs filed the putative class action against Defendants
Ten Bridges, Demean Heald (Ten Bridges' sole member), and his
marital community, asserting per se violations of Washington's
Consumer Protection Act ("CPA") and challenging the validity of an
instrument quitclaiming to Ten Bridges their rights in a foreclosed
property. They allege that Ten Bridges operates by finding surplus
foreclosure proceeds on deposit in court registries, wildly
underpaying the property owners (or their heirs) to acquire their
rights to the proceeds, and then claiming the proceeds for a
massive profit.

The Court dismissed without prejudice the Plaintiffs' claims
against Heald and his marital community. The Plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint, and Ten Bridges again moved to dismiss those
claims. Rather than respond to that motion, the Plaintiffs moved
for leave to file a second amended complaint ("SAC"). The Court
stayed the motion to dismiss pending resolution of the motion to
amend.

The proposed SAC alleges that, after a state court ruled that Ten
Bridges' chief business practice was unlawful, Heald and Ten
Bridges entered a transaction in which Heald replaced Ten Bridges'
assets with a debt owed to Heald. The proposed SAC asks the Court
to unwind the transaction under Washington's Uniform Voidable
Transfer Act, Chapter 19.40, RCW ("UVTA") and to hold Heald liable
for Ten Bridges' acts under an alter ego theory.

II. Analysis

The Defendants do not contend there was undue delay, bad faith, or
prejudice -- only that the Plaintiffs have repeatedly failed to
cure certain pleading deficiencies and that amendment is futile.

A. UVTA Claim

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' UTVA claim is futile
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)'s heightened pleading
standard for fraud actions. Judge Coughenour disagrees.

The proposed amendment cites a December 2021 state trial court
filing in which Heald states that he extended a $1.2 million line
of credit to Ten Bridges in June 2019 to fund its operations and
received a promissory note in exchange. He perfected his security
interest in the spring of 2021 via a security agreement and UCC
financing statement. Heald also loaned Ten Bridges $476,356.41 in
late June and early July 2019. Heald signed these documents both
for himself and for Ten Bridges.

The Plaintiffs' theory appears to be that, once the state court
ruled it was unlawful for Ten Bridges to buy the rights to
foreclosure proceeds the way it did, Heald realized that many of
Ten Bridges' previous deals represented potential legal claims
against it, so he reorganized Ten Bridges' capital structure to let
it operate on borrowed funds while putting his claim in front of
other potential creditors who did not yet have judgments. The
Plaintiffs identify the facts supporting these inferences: The
line-of-credit transaction happened the day after the state trial
court ruling; Heald perfected his security interest after another
adverse court ruling; Ten Bridges appears to be insolvent; and
Heald is now contending that he has priority over other potential
creditors.

For the reasons the Plaintiffs explain, this is enough to satisfy
Rule 9(b). It is unrealistic to expect them to know what they do
not, and their theory is plausible based on what they do. Thus, it
does not appear that "no set of facts can be proved under the
proposed amendment that would constitute a valid and sufficient
claim or defense," and Judge Coughenour grants leave to amend to
assert the UVTA claim.

B. Alter Ego Liability

Although the Plaintiffs' allegations supporting their alter ego
theory are somewhat formulaic, their allegations regarding the
transaction discussed indeed suggest that Heald failed to
adequately observe the corporate formalities needed to justify
treating Ten Bridges as a separate entity in the context of the
line-of-credit transaction (but not necessarily for all purposes).
As the Defendants point out, an alter ego theory is not a
standalone cause of action but rather a means of imposing liability
when the separateness of a business entity could be used as a
shield for wrongdoing.

But, Judge Coughenour holds that the Plaintiffs' allegations
support this theory with respect to the line-of-credit transaction
-- in effect, an alternative means of recovery alongside their UVTA
claim. Accordingly, leave to amend will be granted with respect to
the Plaintiffs' alter ego theory.

C. Claims Against the Heald Marital Community

The Plaintiffs are correct that their motion implicates only
whether they should be able to assert the alter ego and UVTA
claims, Judge Coughenour finds. But, he finds that there appears to
be zero difference between the Plaintiffs' first amended complaint
and the proposed SAC as to allegations about Heald's marital
community, and these allegations are just as conclusory as they
were originally. "A trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte"
under Rule 12(b)(6) "without notice where the claimant cannot
possibly win relief." The Plaintiffs' failure to address the
deficiencies in the marital community allegations over three
iterations of pleading suggest there is no basis to assign it
liability. Thus, Judge Coughenour sua sponte dismisses with
prejudice the Plaintiffs' claims against the Heald marital
community.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Coughenour granted the Plaintiffs'
motion for leave to amend.

The Plaintiffs' claims against the Heald marital community are
dismissed with prejudice. Within seven days, the Plaintiffs will
file a revised version of the proposed SAC that deletes any
reference to the Heald marital community.

Within 14 days of the Order, the Defendants will file a notice
indicating either: (a) that they are standing on their current
motion to dismiss; or (b) that they are withdrawing the motion. If
the Defendants withdraw the motion, they must indicate whether they
will refile it and, if so, propose an aggressive deadline for doing
so. The Court would plan to have any such motion briefed on an
accelerated basis so the case can proceed expeditiously.

In the meantime, briefing on that motion will remain stayed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 11, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/73x7zzy9 from Leagle.com.


TJX COMPANIES: Web Site Not Accessible to Blind, Hanyzkiewicz Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
MARTA HANYZKIEWICZ, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. THE TJX COMPANIES, INC., Case No. 1:22-cv-00926
(E.D.N.Y., Feb. 18, 2022) alleges that the Defendant failed to
design, construct, maintain, and operate its website to be fully
accessible to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other
blind or visually-impaired people.

The Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its website, and
therefore denial of its goods and services offered thereby, is a
violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

The Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read website content using her
computer. The Plaintiff uses the terms "blind" or
"visually-impaired" to refer to all people with visual impairments
who meet the legal definition of blindness in that they have a
visual acuity with correction of less than or equal to 20 x 200.
Some blind people who meet this definition have limited vision.
Others have no vision.

Based on a 2010 U.S. Census Bureau report, approximately 8.1
million people in the United States are visually impaired,
including 2.0 million who are blind, and according to the American
Foundation for the Blind's 2015 report, approximately 400,000
visually impaired persons live in the State of New York.

Because Defendant's website, www.homesense.com (the "Website"), is
not equally accessible to blind and visually impaired consumers, it
violates the ADA. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to
cause a change in Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that Defendant's website will become and remain
accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers.

The Defendant is a company that owns and operates
www.homesense.com, offering features which should allow all
consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant
ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States,
including New York State. The Defendant's Website offers products
and services for online sale and general delivery to the public.
The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse
for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about
pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous
items offered for sale.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Suite 620
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282-6500
          Facsimile: (201) 282-6501
          E-mail: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


TRUE SELECT: Class in Larson FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOYCE LARSON, individually and on behalf of all
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TRUE SELECT, LLC, d/b/a
FIRSTLIGHT HOME CARE, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No.
5:21-cv-00077 (W.D. Va.), Judge Thomas T. Cullen of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Virginia, Harrisonburg
Division, granted Larson's motion for conditional certification of
her Fair Labor Standards Act collective action with modifications.

I. Introduction

Ms. Larson noticed something odd in her two biweekly paychecks.
Even when she worked more than 40 hours a week, she didn't receive
any overtime. Larson claims that when she asked her supervisor,
Wendy Stanton, about the discrepancy, Stanton told her that the
company's policies were what they were and would not change. So
Larson complained to her coworkers. That perceived rabblerousing
apparently caught the attention of Kendra Ghanbari, the company's
owner, who invited Larson and Stanton to a meeting. There, Ghanbari
and Stanton asked Larson to stop discussing the company's overtime
policies with other workers and to start discussing any potential
legal claims with them. She declined, and clams that Ghanbari fired
her as a result.

In response, Larson filed the lawsuit. Her complaint states a
collective action suit under the federal FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section
216(b), a personal retaliation claim under the same statute, id.
Section 215(a)(3), and a Rule 23 class action suit under the
Virginia Overtime Wage Act ("VOWA"), Va. Code Ann. Section
40.1-29.2.

II. Background

Ms. Larson started working for FirstLight Home Care in March 2021.
When Larson began, she worked as an Office Assistant (for 40 hours
a week) and as a Home Care Worker (for 24 hours a week). In
September 2021, she stopped working as an Office Assistant and
began working exclusively as a Home Care Worker, until she was
fired on Nov. 1, 2021. In that role, she worked approximately 48
hours in a week on at least two occasions. FirstLight never paid
her overtime.

Ms. Larson alleges that FirstLight's decision to not pay her
overtime was a widespread practice at the company. Employees
working for FirstLight often received two biweekly paychecks, one
each from True Select LLC and GuardianLight of Northwestern
Virginia, Inc. The paycheck from True Select compensated the
employee for services provided to clients in certain "regions" and
the paycheck from GuardianLight compensated employees for services
provided to clients in other "regions." Larson admits that she does
not know how FirstLight assigns clients to particular regions but
notes that sometimes clients from the same city are assigned to
different regions.

In short, Larson's contention is that True Select and GuardianLight
are "alter egos" of each other, "one business with two names." She
alleges that both companies provide home care services and do
business as FirstLight Home Care. Many people work for both
companies, which share back-office staff (e.g., human resources).
And the two companies share office space in at least four
locations: Winchester, Fairfax, Charlottesville, and Woodbridge.

According to Larson, FirstLight used this overlapping structure to
avoid paying overtime to her and other similarly situated
employees. When FirstLight employees worked more than 40 hours
total in a week, but worked less than 40 hours for either True
Select or GuardianLight, they did not receive overtime.

In October, Larson complained to Stanton about her missing overtime
and talked to other employees about FirstLight's failure to pay
overtime. Stanton apparently told Larson that FirstLight "would not
be paying Home Care Workers overtime pay." FirstLight then cut
Larson's hours from 48 a week to 24 a week.

Later that month, Ghanbari, who owns True Select and partially owns
GuardianLight, learned that Larson had been discussing FirstLight's
overtime policy with other workers. Ghanbari "demanded" that Larson
come into the office to discuss the matter with her. That meeting
-- between Ghanbari, Stanton, and Larson -- occurred on Nov. 1,
2021.

Ghanbari told Larson that she should not be discussing overtime
policies with other employees. She also stated that Larson was
"insubordinate and incompetent at her job." Larson alleges that
this was the first time anyone at FirstLight had negatively
characterized her job performance. Finally, Ghanbari requested that
Larson discuss any pending legal action with Ghanbari and Stanton.
Larson declined, directing Ghanbari to Larson's counsel, so
Ghanbari fired Larson.

On Nov. 3, 2021, Larson filed her complaint against True Select,
GuardianLight, and Ghanbari. She alleged three causes of action:
Claims for overtime pay under the VOWA (Count I) and the FLSA
(Count II) on behalf of herself and "classes" and a claim for
retaliation under the FLSA (Count III).

Judge Cullen's memorandum opinion concerns only her FLSA claim for
unpaid overtime. Specifically, Larson asks the Court to
conditionally certify a collective of "Home Care Workers" comprised
of "Caregivers, Home Health Aides, Certified Nursing Assistants,
Care Coordinators, Companion Care Assistants and Personal Care
Assistants." She further asks the Court for a 60-day opt-in period
and for permission to send a reminder to the putative collective
after 30 days.

III. Analysis

Judge Cullen opines that Larson has met the modest standard of
identifying a putative collective of similarly situated workers
subject to the same allegedly illegal overtime policy to which
FirstLight subjected her. Accordingly, her motion for conditional
certification will be granted with modifications.

A. Larson's Presentation

Larson asks the Court to conditionally certify a collective of
"Home Care Workers": "Caregivers, Home Health Aides, Certified
Nursing Assistants, Care Coordinators, Companion Care Assistants
and Personal Care Assistants" employed by FirstLight over the last
three years. At this stage, Larson must show that there is a
putative collective of other employees who were subject to the same
illegal policy or plan to which she was subject.

Judge Cullen holds that Larson has made this showing. He finds that
the allegations corroborate Larson and Lassiter's suspicions that
FirstLight assigned clients to regions "to avoid paying overtime
compensation for Home Care Workers who work many hours in the same
workweek for clients in multiple Regions." Further, Larson's
retaliation claim against FirstLight contributes to the "modest
factual showing" required at this stage. Larson's allegation that
FirstLight fired her for complaining about its overtime policies
weighs in favor of granting conditional certification. Accordingly,
Judge Cullen exercises discretion to grant Larson's motion for
conditional certification.

B. FirstLight's Counterarguments

FirstLight offers several general arguments in rebuttal, each
attempting to distinguish Larson from her proposed collective or
the purported collective members from each other. Broadly stated,
these arguments are: Larson worked a set schedule for one client
instead of an as-needed schedule for multiple clients; Larson
provided companion care services but many of the job titles in her
purported collective provided health-based services; Home Care
Workers work out of different offices; some Home Care Workers
provide companion-based services while others provide health-based
services; and some Home Care Workers are paid hourly rates while
others are paid a flat rate.

Judge Cullen finds that (i) FirstLight has not presented the Court
with a legally relevant reason that Larson is an improper
representative of her purported collective: (ii) Larson's rejection
of FirstLight's settlement offer does not distinguish her FLSA
claim from the purported collective member's FLSA claims; (iii) the
size of this potential collective is of limited importance; (iv)
Larson's pending claim for retaliation will not predominate future
proceedings.

C. Notice Period

Having conditionally certified Larson's FLSA collective action,
Judge Cullen must also address the proper form of notice to the
collective. He will allow Larson to send reminders for three
reasons. First, although Larson initially requested a 60-day opt-in
period, she has assented to the Defendants' request for a 45-day
opt-in period. Second, courts frequently allow for reminders in
employment settings where some employees often work away from their
homes and are less likely to congregate in an office together.
Third, a reminder would help mitigate any hesitancy among eligible
Home Care Workers caused by Larson's allegedly retaliatory
termination. Finally, FirstLight's request to include its own
counsel's contact information in the notice will be rejected."

For these reasons, Judge Cullen will shorten the notice period from
60 days to 45 days and allow Larson to send reminders to potential
collective members after 30 days.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Judge Cullen granted Larson's motion to for
conditional certification of her proposed collective with
modifications. The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of the
Memorandum Opinion and the accompanying Order to all counsel of
record.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 11, 2022 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/8ekr3z49 from Leagle.com.


UNITED SERVICES: Trial Court Allows Vehicle Class Action to Proceed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Adolfo Pesquera, writing for PropertyCasualty360, reports that a
Dallas trial court's class action certification based on the
insurer's alleged taking of title without proper notice could
impact drivers involved in USAA-insured vehicle accidents. The
case, in litigation for more than a decade, required the named
plaintiff, Sunny Letot, to overcome a 2014 summary judgment in
favor of United Services Automobile Association (USAA).

The issue has to do with whether USAA improperly takes title to
vehicles it considers unrepairable, without knowledge or consent of
the owner. [GN]




UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAVEN: Wnorowski Seeks to Certify Two Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KRYSTIAN WNOROWSKI,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAVEN, Case No. 3:20-cv-01589-MPS (D. Conn.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying classes, pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(2),
      23(b)(3), and/or Rule 23(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of
      Civil Procedure, defined as:

      -- The Tuition Class

         "All persons whom paid tuition for or on behalf of
         students enrolled in classes at the University of New
         Haven for the Spring 2020 Semester and were denied live
         in-person instruction from March 9, 2020 until the end
         of the Semester;" and

      -- The Fees Class:

         "All persons whom paid fees for or on behalf of
         students enrolled at the University of New Haven who
         were charged fees for services, facilities, resources,
         events and/or activities for the Spring 2020 Semester
         that were not provided in whole or in part."

   2. appointing him as Class Representative; and

   3. appointing Anastopoulo Law Firm, LLC as Class Counsel.

The University of New Haven is a private university in West Haven,
Connecticut. Between its main campus in West Haven and its graduate
school campus in Orange, Connecticut.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Feb. 15,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3t5eHFs
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roy T. Willey, IV, Esq.
          Eric M. Poulin, Esq.
          Blake G. Abbott, Esq.
          ANASTOPOULO LAW FIRM, LLC
          32 Ann Street
          Charleston, SC 29403
          Telephone: (843) 614-8888
          Facsimile: (843) 494-5536
          E-mail: eric@akimlawfirm.com
                  roy@akimlawfirm.com
                  blake@akimlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Edward Toptani, Esq.
          TOPTANI LAW OFFICES
          375 Pearl St., Ste. 1410
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 699-8930
          Facsimile: (212) 699-8939
          E-mail: edward@toptanilaw.com

UPS STORE: Appeals Remand Ruling in Tripicchio Case
---------------------------------------------------
The UPS Store Inc, et al., filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled Vincent Tripicchio v. The UPS Store
Inc, et al., Case No. 3-21-cv-14512, in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey.

The lawsuit was removed from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Burlington County, to the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey on August 3, 2021.

The class action is brought against the Defendants for violations
of the New Jersey Revised Statute Sec. 22A:4-14 and the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy.

The Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all customers
of The UPS Store, Inc. (TUPSS) in New Jersey, alleges that the
Defendants charged notary fees above the required maximum amount of
$2.50. Representative Defendant and Franchisee Defendants employ
notaries to perform notarial acts within New Jersey. Despite the
legal cap set on notary fees, TUPSS mandates that each location in
New Jersey charge notary fees of $5 instead of $2.50 for each
notarial act performed. The Defendants' actions in charging
unlawful and excessive notary fees constitute an unfair, deceptive
and unconscionable practice within New Jersey's consumer production
laws and a violation of New Jersey statute prescribing proper
notary charges, asserts the complaint.

On August 19, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a motion for the Court to
remand the case to the New Jersey Superior Court, Burlington
County.

On January 31, 2022, Judge Freda L. Wolfson granted the Plaintiffs'
motion to remand.

The Defendants now seek a review of the Court's ruling in their
appellate case captioned Vincent Tripicchio v. The UPS Store Inc,
et al., Case No. 22-8009, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, filed on Feb. 8, 2022.[BN]

Defendants-Petitioners THE UPS STORE INC. and JB & A ENTERPRISES
INC. are represented by:

          David J. Fioccola, Esq.
          MORRISON & FOERSTER
          250 West 55th Street, Suite 900
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 468-4069
          E-mail: dfioccola@mofo.com

               - and -

          Matthew B. Johnson, Esq.
          GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI
          One Battery Park Plaza, 28th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 402-2298
          E-mail: mbjohnson@grsm.com   

               - and -

          Andrew M. Schwartz, Esq.
          GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI
          Three Logan Square
          1717 Arch Street, Suite 610
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 717-4023
          E-mail: amschwartz@grsm.com

Plaintiff-Respondent VINCENT TRIPICCHIO, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Stephen P. DeNittis, Esq.
          DENITTIS OSEFCHEN PRINCE
          525 Route 73 North
          5 Greentree Centre, Suite 410
          Marlton, NJ 08053
          Telephone: (856) 797-9951
          E-mail: sdenittis@denittislaw.com

VERO BEACH, FL: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Taig v. Police Dep't
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEITH TAIG, individually, and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. CITY OF VERO BEACH, CHIEF DAVID
CURREY in his individual capacity, CAPTAIN KEVIN MARTIN (RETIRED)
in his individual capacity, LIEUTENANT JOHN PEDERSEN in his
individual capacity, DETECTIVE PHIL HUDDY in his individual
capacity, DETECTIVE SEAN CROWLEY in his individual capacity, and
DETECTIVE MIKE GASBARRINI in his individual capacity, Defendants,
Case No. 9:21-CV-80391-RLR (S.D. Fla.), Judge Robin L. Rosenberg of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida issued
an order:

   a. granting Vero Beach's Motion to Dismiss; and

   b. denying in part and converting in part the Individual
      Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

I. Background

The lawsuit stems from the Vero Beach Police Department's ("VBPD")
investigation of East Spa massage parlor. Members of the VBPD began
to investigate East Spa in June 2018 for alleged prostitution
activity. In November 2018, Detective Sean Crowley submitted an
"Affidavit for Surreptitious Entry and Installation of Electronic
Surveillance Camera" to a Florida Circuit Court Judge. Detective
Crowley averred that, based on surveillance, undercover operations,
trash pulls, and statements by customers of East Spa, he believed
that a prostitution organization was being operated at the
premises.

The Circuit Court Judge issued an "Order for Surreptitious Entry
and Installation of Electronic Surveillance Camera" on Nov. 27,
finding probable cause to believe that prostitution was being
performed at East Spa. The Order permitted law enforcement to enter
East Spa, install video surveillance cameras in the premises, and
monitor the cameras for no longer than 30 days.

On November 28, the VBPD and the United States Department of
Homeland Security installed cameras in East Spa that did not have
audio capability or the ability to be switched on or off.

In December 2018, Detective Crowley submitted a second "Affidavit
for Surreptitious Entry and Installation of Electronic Surveillance
Camera" to a different Florida Circuit Court Judge. Detective
Crowley averred that, between November and December, he had
observed the performance of approximately 100 sex acts for money,
and he sought authorization for an additional 30 days of video
surveillance to "identify the organizational structure of the
criminal enterprise" at East Spa, investigate suspected
racketeering activity, and "identify and arrest subjects involved
in prostitution."

The second Circuit Court Judge found probable cause to believe that
prostitution was being performed at East Spa and issued an "Order
for Surreptitious Entry and Installation of Electronic Surveillance
Camera" on December 28. As with the first Order, the second Order
permitted law enforcement to enter East Spa, install video
surveillance cameras in the premises, and monitor the cameras for
no longer than 30 days, and the Order included the same
minimization language as had the first Order.

Around Jan. 11, 2019, the Office of the State Attorney instructed
the VBPD to stop recording sex acts and to shift the focus of the
investigation to human trafficking activity. Nevertheless, the
cameras continued to record for the remainder of the second 30-day
period. he installed cameras recorded 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week, for 60 days. Arrest warrants subsequently were issued for
various East Spa customers for solicitation of prostitution. In
addition, the VBPD held a press conference during which the VBPD
named customers under investigation and made their photographs
publicly available.

Numerous individuals charged with solicitation of prostitution
moved to suppress the surveillance videos. A Florida County Court
Judge granted the motion to suppress, and the Florida District
Court of Appeal affirmed. The appellate court concluded that the
November and December 2018 Circuit Court Orders "failed to contain
sufficient minimization guidelines" and that law enforcement "did
not sufficiently minimize the video recording of innocent spa goers
receiving lawful massages." Thus, it determined that it was proper
to suppress the surveillance videos under the exclusionary rule.

Mr. Taig filed the class action lawsuit in February 2021, and the
case was reassigned to the undersigned in August 2021. He filed the
operative Amended Complaint in October 2021. Discovery closed in
November 2021.

Mr. Taig maintains that he suffered an invasion of privacy, arrest,
and prosecution as a result of the video surveillance at East Spa.
He seeks to represent a class of "customers who visited East Spa
from Nov. 29, 2018 to Jan. 27, 2019, who were illegally
video-recorded without their knowledge or consent, criminally
charged, identified in the media for their wrongful charge during
the referenced time period, and publicly humiliated in the media as
being involved."

Mr. Taig raises three counts under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Count I
is against Vero Beach and the Individual Defendants for search and
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Count II is against
Vero Beach for failure to train and supervise. Count III is against
the Individual Defendants for failure to train and supervise. Vero
Beach and the Individual Defendants now move to dismiss the Amended
Complaint on various grounds.

II. Discussion

A. Vero Beach's Motion to Dismiss

Vero Beach argues that the claims against it in Counts I and II
must be dismissed because Taig lacks standing to bring the action
and because the Amended Complaint is a shotgun pleading and fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. With respect to
the claims against Vero Beach, Judge Rosenberg need address only
the argument that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim.

Vero Beach argues that Taig has not pled facts demonstrating that
it had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference
to constitutional rights, as is required to hold a municipality
liable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. As to the claim of failure to
train and supervise, Vero Beach also argues that Taig has not pled
facts demonstrating that it knew of a need to train or supervise
and made a deliberate choice not to do so.

Mr. Taig responds that he has alleged a custom or policy through a
pattern of unconstitutional conduct by law enforcement. He points
to paragraphs in the Amended Complaint concerning the video
surveillance at East Spa, such as that the cameras did not have the
ability to be switched on or off; that the cameras recorded 24
hours a day, 7 days a week, for 60 days; and that Detective Crowley
sought authorization for an additional 30 days of video
surveillance despite having observed approximately 100 sex acts.
Taig further argues that he has alleged facts showing a need for
training and supervision, again pointing to paragraphs in the
Amended Complaint concerning the video surveillance at East Spa.

Judge Rosenberg explains that a municipality may be held liable for
failure to train or supervise employees when the failure evidences
a deliberate indifference to the rights of inhabitants such that
the failure can be thought of as a policy or custom. To establish
deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that the
municipality knew of a need to train or supervise in a particular
area and made a deliberate choice to take no action. A pattern of
similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is
ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for
purposes of failure to train.

In the case, Judge Rosenberg finds that Taig points only to alleged
misconduct of VBPD members during the East Spa investigation to
justify holding Vero Beach liable under Counts I and II. He alleges
no facts showing prior misconduct, either during video surveillance
specifically or during police investigations more generally, that
could demonstrate the existence of either (1) a custom of
sanctioning constitutional violations that was so settled and
permanent as to take on the force or law, or (2) an officially
adopted or created policy sanctioning constitutional violations.
Nor does Taig cite any caselaw indicating that activities during a
single investigation could constitute such a persistent and
widespread practice as to reach the level of a custom or policy.
Taig has not pled facts demonstrating that Vero Beach had a custom
or policy that could constitute deliberate indifference to his
constitutional rights.

With respect to training and supervision, Taig has not alleged
facts showing that Vero Beach knew of a need to train or supervise
VBPD members and, with that knowledge, made a deliberate choice to
take no action. While Taig asserts that Vero Beach was deliberately
indifferent, that assertion, without factual enhancement, is
conclusory. He has not pled facts demonstrating that Vero Beach was
deliberately indifferent to a need to train or supervise its
employees.

Consequently, Judge Rosenberg holds that Taig has failed to state a
claim against Vero Beach under Counts I and II. Vero Beach's Motion
to Dismiss is therefore granted, and Counts I and II are dismissed
as to Vero Beach. The dismissal of these claims is with prejudice
for several reasons.

First, a court need not give a represented party any opportunity to
amend a deficient pleading where no amendment has been requested.
Second, the case has been pending for nearly a year. Third, Taig
amended his Complaint after being alerted to the deficiencies in
his claims against Vero Beach through a prior Motion to Dismiss,
and he did not remedy those deficiencies in the Amended Complaint.
Fourth, while lack of discovery is not a justification for failing
to state a claim, Taig filed the Amended Complaint after discovery
was substantially complete in this matter, and thus he cannot
contend that he needed discovery in order to adequately plead his
claims against Vero Beach. For all of these reasons, Counts I and
II are dismissed as to Vero Beach with prejudice.

B. The Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

The Individual Defendants argue that the claims against them in
Counts I and III must be dismissed because Taig lacks standing to
bring this action, because they are protected from liability by
qualified immunity, and because the Amended Complaint is a shotgun
pleading and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Judge Rosenberg first addresses the issue of shotgun
pleading before turning to the Individual Defendants' remaining
arguments.

First, Judge Rosenberg concludes that Counts I and III do not fail
to specify which Individual Defendants are responsible for which
acts. The Amended Complaint gives the Individual Defendants
adequate notice of the claims and allegations raised against them.
Judge Rosenberg holds that Count I does not comingle separate
causes of action. Where the Amended Complaint makes allegations
that refer to the Defendants in the plural sense, those allegations
can be read as being brought against the Individual Defendants
collectively. Therefore Judge Rosenberg will not dismiss the
Amended Complaint as a shotgun pleading.

Second, as to the remaining arguments that the Individual
Defendants raise in their Motion to Dismiss, Judge Rosenberg
converts the Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d). She does so because
Taig has attached a copious amount of evidence to the Amended
Complaint and because the Individual Defendants make arguments that
are not based solely on the allegations in the Amended Complaint.
In addition, because discovery closed in November 2021, the case
has now reached a procedural posture that enables the parties to
brief summary judgment issues in short order.

For clarity of the record, Judge Rosenberg orders that the
Individual Defendants will file a motion for summary judgment,
together with a statement of material fact and attached material,
in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local
Rules for the Southern District of Florida, and the Court's
procedures set forth. The Individual Defendants will file the
motion for summary judgment by March 14, 2022. They may raise any
issues on which they seek summary judgment and are not limited to
the remaining issues in the Motion to Dismiss. Taig may file a
response, and the Individual Defendants may file a reply, in
accordance with the applicable rules.

In the event a party fails to comply with the requirements
delineated in this section, the Court may strike the deficient
statement of material facts and require immediate compliance, grant
an opposing party relief, or enter any other sanction that the
Court deems appropriate.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Vero Beach's Motion to Dismiss is
granted. Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint are dismissed
with prejudice as against Vero Beach.

The Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied in part and
converted in part to a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Motion to
Dismiss is denied as to the Individual Defendants' challenge to the
Amended Complaint as a shotgun pleading. As to the remaining
issues, Judge Rosenberg converted the Motion to Dismiss into a
Motion for Summary Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(d). The Individual Defendants will file a motion for summary
judgment by March 14, 2022, and the parties' summary judgment
briefing will comply with the Order and all applicable rules.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 15, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2p83t9d7 from Leagle.com.


VITAMIN SHOPPE: $650K in Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Walters Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled LEE WALTERS, MD, an Oregon resident; ROBBIE
LINDORES, a California resident; and KAREN CARAVELLO, a Washington
resident, Plaintiffs v. VITAMIN SHOPPE INDUSTRIES, INC., a Delaware
corporation, Defendant, Case No. 3:14-cv-01173-JR (D. Or.),
Magistrate Judge Jolie A. Russo of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Oregon, Portland Division, grants the Plaintiffs'
application for award of attorneys' fees and expenses, and
incentive awards.

The Court awards attorneys' fees in the total amount of $650,000.
The Class Counsel are also to be reimbursed for their reasonable
expenses and non-taxable costs in the total amount of $9,012.85.

Pursuant to Rules 23(h)(3) and 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court finds that the parties, by and through their
respective counsel, separately negotiated and agreed upon a maximum
amount of attorneys' fees to be paid to the Class Counsel of
$650,000 for the legal services performed by Class Counsel in this
action. These negotiations took place after counsel had negotiated
and agreed upon the injunctive relief to be made available to the
class members under the parties' Settlement Agreement. The
negotiations were arms-length and took place in a separate
mediation session.

Once an agreement was reached on the maximum amount of attorneys'
fees to be paid to the Class Counsel, the parties negotiated and
agreed upon a dollar cap amount of $17,000 to the Class Counsel in
reimbursement for the litigation-related expenses incurred by the
Class Counsel, as well as reasonable incentive awards to the three
Class Representatives in the amount of $3,000 each to two Class
Representatives and $1,000 to one Class Representative.

Judge Russo finds that the Class Counsel's lodestar in the amount
of $737,722 is reasonable and justified based on: (a) the market
competitive hourly rates charged by Class Counsel for the work that
was performed; (b) the significant time and effort that was
expended by Class Counsel (more than 1400 hours); and (c) the
duration of the case (over seven years).

The attorneys' fees requested in the amount of $650,000 represent a
multiplier of 0.88 which is reasonable and justified based on: (a)
the difficult and novel legal challenges faced by Class Counsel in
the case; (b) the risks and financial burdens that the Class
Counsel undertook in litigating this case on a fully contingent
basis; and (c) the significant benefits that are being made
available to the class members under the settlement. When analyzed
as a percentage of the overall amount of attorneys' fees that the
Class Counsel expended in achieving the settlement, the attorneys'
fees requested represent 88% of this amount.

Therefore, when analyzed on a lodestar/multiplier basis or as a
percentage of the overall amount of attorneys' fees that the Class
Counsel actually expended, the attorneys' fees requested by the
Class Counsel in the amount of $650,000 are fair and reasonable,
Judge Russo states.

Judge Russo notes that the expenses sought by the Class Counsel in
the amount of $9,012.85 are less than the $17,000 cap amount agreed
to by Class Counsel under the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
The expenses for which the Class Counsel seek reimbursement appear
to be reasonably and necessarily incurred in connection with the
prosecution and resolution of the action.

The incentive awards requested on behalf of the Class
Representatives in the amount of $3,000 each to two Class
Representatives and $1,000 to one Class Representative are fair and
reasonable in light of the significant amount of personal time each
devoted to fulfilling his/her duties as a class representative in
this action, Judge Russo finds. The Fee, Expense and Incentive
Award Application was filed two weeks prior to the deadline for
class members to opt-out or file any objection to the Fee, Expense
and Incentive Award Application.

Order

Judge Russo ordered and adjudged that attorneys' fees in the total
amount of $650,000 are awarded to the Class Counsel for their
services in connection with the litigation and resolution of the
claims asserted in the action.

The Class Counsel is to be reimbursed for their reasonable expenses
and non-taxable costs incurred in connection with the litigation
and resolution of the claims asserted in this action in the total
amount of $9,012.85.

The Class Representatives are granted incentive awards in the
amount of $3,000 each to Lee Walters and Karen Caravello and $1,000
to Robbie Lindores.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 7, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/43r2yzmj from Leagle.com.

Rick Klingbeil -- rick@klingbeil-law.com -- RICK KLINGBEIL, PC, in
Portland, Oregon, of Attorneys for the Plaintiff.


VITAMIN SHOPPE: Settlement in Walters Suit Wins Final Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Jolie A. Russo of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Oregon, Portland Division, issued an Order and Judgment
giving final approval to the settlement agreement in the lawsuit
styled LEE WALTERS, MD, an Oregon resident; ROBBIE LINDORES, a
California resident; and KAREN CARAVELLO, a Washington resident,
Plaintiffs v. VITAMIN SHOPPE INDUSTRIES, INC., a Delaware
corporation, Defendant, Case No. 3:14-cv-01173-JR (D. Or.).

On Oct. 20, 2021, the Court granted preliminary approval to the
parties' Settlement Agreement. On Dec. 6, 2021, the Plaintiffs
filed their Motion for Final Approval of the Settlement.

The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
this action, over all claims raised therein and over all Parties
thereto, including all members of the Settlement Class. Venue is
proper in this Action.

The Settlement Classes is composed of Injunctive Relief Settlement
Subclasses, which are defined as follows:

   (a) The Oregon Subclass: All Oregon residents who, at any
       time between July 23, 2008 and the date that the Court
       entered the Order Granting Preliminary Approval, purchased
       one or more Accused Product. The Subclass representative
       is Lee Walters;

   (b) The California Subclass: All California residents who, at
       any time between July 23, 2010 and the date that the Court
       entered the Order Granting Preliminary Approval, purchased
       one or more Accused Product. The Subclass representative
       is Robbie Lindores; and

   (c) The Washington Subclass: All Washington residents who, at
       any time between December 14, 2014 and the date that the
       Court entered the Order Granting Preliminary Approval,
       purchased one or more Accused Product. The Subclass
       representative is Karen Caravello.

As ordered in the Court's Order Granting Preliminary Approval of
Class Action Settlement, in the event the Settlement Agreement is
terminated or not consummated, conditional certification of the
Settlement Class will be null and void and the Class
Representatives, the Settlement Class, and VSI will be returned to
their respective statuses as of the date immediately prior to the
execution of the Settlement Agreement.

The Court previously conditionally certified the Settlement Class
for purposes of settlement only. The Court finds on the record
before it that certification of the Settlement Class satisfies the
requirements of Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Court finds that (a) the Settlement Class
Members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical;
(b) there are questions of law and fact common to the Settlement
Class Members; (c) the named Class Representatives' claims are
typical of the claims of the respective Settlement Class Members
they seek to represent; (d) the Class Representatives and Class
Counsel are able to adequately represent the Settlement Class
Members; and (e) final injunctive relief is appropriate respecting
the Settlement Class as a whole.

Based on the fact that the Settlement Agreement provides for only
injunctive relief and requires no release of any monetary remedies
by any Settlement Class Member, and the Settlement Class is
certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) only, the Court finds that
notice to the Settlement Class is not necessary.

The Court finds that the Defendant has ensured that a notice of
proposed settlement that complies with the requirements of the
Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1715, was served upon
the appropriate State official of each State in which a member of
the Settlement Classes resides, and the appropriate Federal
official.

In determining whether to approve the Settlement Agreement, the
Court has considered the "the strength of plaintiffs' case; the
risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status throughout
the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of
discovery completed, and the stage of the proceeding; the
experience and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental
participant; and the reaction of the class members to the proposed
settlement" (Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268,
1291 (9th Cir. 1992)). After consideration of each of these factors
as applicable, the Court finds that the Settlement is fair,
reasonable and adequate and is in the best interests of the
Settlement Class.

The Court makes these findings for the reasons articulated in
Plaintiffs' briefing supporting the Motions for Preliminary
Approval and Final Approval of the Settlement and for the reasons
identified by the parties and the Court at the Final Approval
Hearing on Feb. 7, 2022.

Order

The Court finally approves the Settlement. In the event of a
conflict between the terms of the Settlement Agreement and this
Final Approval Order and Judgment, the terms of this Final Approval
Order and Judgment will take precedence.

The Releases set forth in Section 4 of the Settlement Agreement are
expressly incorporated into this Final Approval Order and Judgment.
Upon the Effective Date, the Released Parties will be released and
forever discharged by the Releasing Parties from the Released
Claims.

The Court orders the Parties and their counsel to implement and
consummate the Settlement Agreement according to its terms and
provisions, including the payment of benefits and attorneys' fees
following the procedures described in the Settlement Agreement and
described here.

The Court dismisses this lawsuit on the merits with prejudice to
all claims brought by Class Representatives and with prejudice as
to Settlement Class Members' claims for injunctive relief. The
Settlement Class Members' claims for monetary remedies are
dismissed without prejudice. All dismissed claims are dismissed
without fees or costs to any Party, and each Party is to bear their
respective attorneys' fees and costs except as provided in both (i)
the Settlement Agreement and (ii) any Attorneys' Fee Award and/or
Incentive Award ordered by this Court.

Without affecting the finality of this Final Approval Order and
Judgment, the Court will retain exclusive and continuing
jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the
Judgment and this Order, and all Parties and the members of
Settlement Classes submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court with respect to the enforcement of the Settlement Agreement.

VSI is enjoined from labeling supplements sold under the Vitamin
Shoppe private label brand in any way inconsistent with Section 2.1
of the Settlement Agreement.

Nothing in this Final Approval Order and Judgment or in the
Settlement Agreement will be construed as an admission by any
Party. The Settlement Agreement and this resulting Final Judgment
simply represent a compromise of disputed allegations.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order and Judgment dated Feb. 7,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/3pjhybuj from
Leagle.com.

Rick Klingbeil -- rick@klingbeil-law.com -- RICK KLINGBEIL, PC, in
Portland, Oregon, of Attorneys for the Plaintiff.


WASHINGTON, DC: DOC Agrees to Implement Covid-19 Measures
---------------------------------------------------------
The D.C. Department of Corrections (DOC) on Feb. 14 notified a
federal court that it had agreed to implement comprehensive
protections to reduce the spread of COVID-19 in the D.C. Jail.
These measures are part of a settlement in Banks v. Booth, a
federal class action lawsuit filed by the ACLU of the District of
Columbia, the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia,
and the law firm of Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP in March 2020 on
behalf of all residents of the D.C. Jail to compel DOC to meet its
constitutional obligations to the 1,385 people in its custody by
implementing basic sanitation standards and ensuring prompt medical
care for people in custody.

The court filing asked the court to approve a settlement in the
case, but DOC agreed to begin implementing precautions immediately
while the approval process unfolds.

The settlement follows DOC's consistent failure to control the
spread of COVID-19 in its facilities, leading to a federal court
ruling in April 2020 that DOC was "deliberately indifferent" to the
rights of the people in its jail facilities and a year-long
injunction requiring DOC to take basic precautions it had failed to
adopt on its own. The court further found in January 2021 that,
more than six months after the injunction was issued, DOC had still
not come into full compliance.

Under the terms of the settlement, an infectious disease
specialist, selected jointly by lawyers for the incarcerated class
members and DOC, will conduct up to five unannounced inspections
over six months to confirm compliance with the settlement's
operative provisions. The inspections will assess:

-- Sanitation and hygiene, including residents' access to cleaning
supplies
-- Promptness of medical care for COVID-19 related symptoms
-- Masking for staff
-- Contact tracing for jail residents and staff who test positive
for the virus
-- Social distancing
-- Reasonable access to showers and recreation, including outdoor
and outside-of-cell time
-- Ensuring that residents on medical quarantine and isolation
units are not subjected to punitive conditions that would
discourage reporting of symptoms

"It should have never come to a lawsuit to force the D.C. Jail to
protect the people in their custody. These measures will protect
incarcerated people, officers, and the whole community," said
Edward Banks, one of the plaintiffs in Banks v. Booth.

The settlement also requires regular reporting from DOC about
vaccination rates, infection rates, and written policies for
responding to the pandemic. This information will help the public
assess if DOC controls the spread of COVID-19.

"We are glad that the District has finally agreed to implement
basic COVID-19 precautions," said attorney Zoe Friedland of the
Special Litigation Division of the Public Defender Service for the
District of Columbia. "This settlement is an important step in
protecting the health and safety of the people incarcerated by the
District in the D.C. Jail."

The DC Jail failed to contain the spread of COVID-19 at the
beginning of the pandemic, when residents and staff did not have
access to prompt medical care, masks, cleaning supplies, showers,
and other necessities to sanitize and limit the spread of COVID-19.
These conditions did not improve until the court ordered
improvements. Since the start of the pandemic, more than 700 people
incarcerated at the Jail have tested positive for COVID-19.
Incarcerated people remain at least three times as likely to be
infected with COVID-19 and around three times as likely to die of
the disease than people in the free population.

While the settlement reached is a significant step forward
regarding COVID-19 precautions, advocates including the ACLU-D.C.
continue to call on the D.C. Council to enact long-term reforms,
starting with empowering an independent oversight body with
unrestricted access to the Jail to regularly report to the Council
and the public on conditions and treatment at the Jail. [GN]

WASHINGTON: District Court Allows Hegge's Claims to Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Barbara J. Rothstein of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Seattle, adopts the Report and
Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Michelle L. Peterson in
the lawsuit entitled ALVIN HEGGE, et al., Plaintiffs v. JAY INSLEE,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:20-cv-06170-BJR-MLP (W.D. Wash.).

Among other things, Judge Peterson recommends allowing Plaintiff
Hegge's claims to proceed.

I. Introduction

Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation ("R&R") of
Magistrate Judge Michelle L. Peterson. The R&R recommends that all
claims except for those of Plaintiff Alvin Hegge be dismissed for
failure to prosecute. The R&R further recommends allowing Plaintiff
Hegge's claims to proceed, provided his complaint is amended to
reflect only the claims pertinent to him.

II. BACKGROUND

The Plaintiffs are current and former prisoners at Stafford Creek
Correctional Center ("SCCC") in Aberdeen, Washington. They filed a
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983, 1985, and 1986,
alleging that the conditions of their confinement at SCCC violated
their constitutional rights. The complaint alleges the use of an
unsanitary and toxic kitchenware cleaning process, deliberate
indifference of SCCC staff to the Plaintiffs' safety during the
COVID-19 pandemic, and retaliation for their attempts to pursue
legal action.

The 18 prisoners Plaintiff Hegge seeks to represent are referred to
as the "putative plaintiffs" in the order.

The Plaintiffs sought to certify the action as a class action under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), with all litigants proceeding pro se and
Plaintiff Hegge serving as the class representative. The Defendants
in the case include Governor Jay Inslee, Attorney General Robert
Ferguson, various other state and local officials, and members of
the SCCC staff. The Plaintiffs also claim that Magistrate Judge J.
Richard Creatura and Deputy Clerk Tyler Campbell failed to prevent
the wrongs of the Defendants by returning a check for the filing
fee sent by Plaintiff Hegge.

On Feb. 22, 2021, Magistrate Judge Peterson issued an order to show
cause directing the Plaintiffs to demonstrate why all the
Plaintiffs except for Plaintiff Hegge should not be dismissed for
failure to prosecute based on their lack of individual
participation in the case. Among other things, the order instructed
the putative Plaintiffs to file a signed response indicating that
they wished to participate in this action.

When no Plaintiff other than Plaintiff Hegge responded, Magistrate
Judge Peterson issued an R&R recommending that the putative
Plaintiffs be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute.
Plaintiff Hegge filed objections to the R&R on July 7, 2021.

III. Discussion

The issue before the Court is whether the case can be maintained as
a class or joint action or if all Plaintiffs except Plaintiff Hegge
should be dismissed. Magistrate Judge Peterson's order to show
cause noted that the Plaintiffs were improperly seeking to proceed
as a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c), with
Plaintiff Hegge serving as representative.

Magistrate Judge Peterson then analyzed whether the putative
Plaintiffs could be joined under Rule 20 and found that, though
there may be common issues of fact underlying some of the claims,
the Plaintiffs' individual claims will also involve independent
factual allegations which would require separate and distinct
evidence, evaluations, and analyses. Magistrate Judge Peterson
further stated that, even if joinder were proper, all Plaintiffs
would need to read, approve, and sign each joint filing--a
requirement that presents numerous logistical problems for
prisoners and with which the Plaintiffs have not complied.

In her R&R, Magistrate Judge Peterson reiterated these deficiencies
and emphasized that none of the Plaintiffs aside from Plaintiff
Hegge had responded to the order to show cause.

As an initial matter, Judge Rothstein holds that Magistrate Judge
Peterson is correct that the Plaintiffs cannot proceed as a class
and Plaintiff Hegge cannot serve as representative or formal legal
counsel for his fellow prisoners.

Furthermore, as Magistrate Judge Peterson noted, because pro se
plaintiffs cannot represent others' legal interests, all the
Plaintiffs must sign the complaint and any joint filings. The
Plaintiffs have not done so. The response to the order to show
cause was signed only by Plaintiff Hegge and, thus, cannot serve as
a joint filing. No other Plaintiff filed a separate response,
despite Magistrate Judge Peterson's order explicitly warning them
that if they did not respond, it would represent a failure to
prosecute.

Additionally, Plaintiff Hegge asserts that the Court lacked
jurisdiction to dismiss any parties from this action because
service had not been ordered on the Defendants. Judge Rothstein
holds that this assertion is groundless. The complaint names nearly
50 Defendants, including Governor Inslee and Magistrate Judge
Creatura. The complaint fails to explain who many of the other
Defendants are, let alone describe the role they played in the
alleged constitutional violations.

Judge Rothstein explains that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1996 ("PLRA") requires the Court to screen complaints brought by
prisoners against a government entity, officer, or employee. Rule 8
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint
give a defendant sufficient notice of the claim and the grounds
upon which it rests.

Judge Rothstein finds that Plaintiff Hegge's complaint does not
meet the Rule 8 standard. Before service is ordered, Plaintiff
Hegge must either amend his complaint to include specific
allegations against each defendant or remove defendants that have
no clear connection to the conduct alleged in the complaint.

In summary, the Court adopts the R&R's recommendation that all
Plaintiffs except for Plaintiff Hegge be dismissed without
prejudice for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff Hegge's action may
proceed, but he must amend his complaint to reflect only his
individual allegations and to include specific allegations against
those defendants against whom he wants to proceed.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court adopts the R&R. All Plaintiffs except
Alvin Hegge are dismissed without prejudice. If any of these
Plaintiffs wish to pursue their claims, they may do so in separate,
individual actions. Plaintiff Hegge is ordered to amend his
complaint as described no later than 30 days from the date of this
order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 7, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8cnyyd from Leagle.com.


WEST VIRGINIA: Bid for Prelim. Injunction in Lambert v. Ames Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned JIMMEY LEE LAMBERT, Petitioner v. DONALD
AMES, Respondent, Case No. 2:21-cv-00260 (S.D.W. Va.), Judge Irene
C. Berger of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia, Charleston Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order denying without prejudice the Petitioner's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Certification of Class Action
Representative.

On April 21, 2021, the Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. Section 2241.
Currently pending in the matter are the Petitioner's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Certification of Class Action
Representative, both also filed on April 21, 2021.

By Standing Order entered on April 23, 2021, the action was
referred to the Honorable Dwane L. Tinsley, United States
Magistrate Judge, for submission to the Court of proposed findings
of fact and recommendation for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 636.

On Jan. 13, 2022, the Magistrate Judge submitted a Proposed
Findings and Recommendation wherein it is recommended that the
Petitioner's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Motion for
Certification of Class Action Representative be denied without
prejudice. Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings
and Recommendation were due by Jan. 31, 2022.

Neither party has timely filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's
Proposed Findings and Recommendation. The Court is not required to
review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the
findings or recommendation to which no objections are addressed.
Failure to file timely objections constitutes a waiver of de novo
review and the Petitioner's right to appeal the Court's Order.

Accordingly, the Court adopts and incorporates the findings and
recommendation of the Magistrate Judge as contained in the Proposed
Findings and Recommendation, and orders that the Petitioner's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Certification of
Class Action Representative be denied without prejudice.

The Court directs the Clerk to send a certified copy of this Order
to Magistrate Judge Tinsley, counsel of record, and any
unrepresented party.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated
Feb. 7, 2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4juafm3a from
Leagle.com.


WESTCOURT PLACE: Tenants' Class Action Over 2019 Fire Can Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dave Battagello, writing for Windsor Star, reports that a
class-action lawsuit seeking $35 million in damages filed on behalf
of displaced residential and commercial tenants of the downtown
Westcourt Place building has been certified to proceed in a
decision handed down on Feb. 14 in Superior Court.

"We won round one," said lawyer Harvey Strosberg whose firm is
representing the tenants. "We are soldiering on."

A fire in the downtown building located at 251 Goyeau Ave. that
started in the garage area on Nov. 12, 2019, ended up displacing
dozens of tenants in the building, plus several businesses and the
Provincial Offences Court located on the lower floors.

No one has since been allowed to occupy the building more than two
years later and Strosberg believes renovations haven't even begun
to be undertaken.

"It's been two years and three months and no renovations," he said.
"It's mind-boggling."

Now that the class-action lawsuit has been certified, the next step
is to see over this month if lawyers for the defendants — the
owners and property managers of Westcourt Place -- will appeal the
certification decision by Superior Court Justice Spencer
Nicholson.

Should that not occur, then Strosberg's next step will be "to make
a decision to move for summary judgement" based on the large amount
of evidence presented to the court already in terms of damages and
costs tenants have suffered due to being displaced from Westcourt.

There are 154 apartment units in the building and tenants from
about 120 of those units indicated they wish to be included in the
court action to date, along with 14 commercial tenants, he said.

Some of those residents have moved on and do not wish to return to
Westcourt, but about half of the tenants definitely want to return
to the building, if possible, Strosberg said.

Everyone who originally indicated they wish to participate in the
court action will automatically be included in the class-action
lawsuit now that it has been certified by the court, unless they
provide notification to his office this month that they wish to
"opt out," Strosberg said.

"The issue remains the damages and how much did each person suffer
because of being displaced from their house," he said.

Nicholson in his ruling declared: "In my view, this is a textbook
case regarding access to justice that favours a class action."

Lawyers representing Westcourt Place had argued tenants should
instead seek damages from the Landlord and Tenant Board, but
Nicholson in his ruling disagreed as he noted: "the amounts claimed
exceed the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims court, which
is determinative." [GN]

WESTJET AIRLINES: McMillan Discusses Ruling in Baggage Fee Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Joan Young, Esq., and Carina Chiu, Esq., of McMillan LLP, in an
article for Mondaq, report that Westjet's baggage fee woes are not
over. We have previously reported on a decision of the B.C. Supreme
Court to certify a class proceeding against the defendants WestJet
Airlines Ltd. and WestJet Encore Ltd. (together, "WestJet")
relating to the charging of baggage fees ("Bergen #1").1 The Court
had found common issues in the plaintiff's breach of contract and
unjust enrichment claims and granted leave to amend deficiencies in
the notice of civil claim in respect of the Competition Act
claims.

In a subsequent decision, the Court accepted the plaintiff's
amendments and certified additional common issues under section 54
of the Competition Act, which relates to the offence of
double-ticketing ("Bergen #2").2 Westjet then appealed this
decision.3

The two issues on appeal were:

Did the certification judge err in concluding that the facts as
pleaded can support a cause of action under section 54 of the
Competition Act? Alternatively, do they fail to support a cause of
action for class members commencing travel outside Canada and not
paying through WestJet's website?

Did the certification judge err in certifying the common issues
with respect to the Competition Act claims and determining that a
class proceeding was the preferable procedure for resolving those
claims?

Facts
The plaintiff alleged that WestJet's tariffs in relation to
domestic and international flights at specified periods of time
(the "Tariffs") contained conflicting provisions as to whether a
fee would be charged for a passenger's first checked bag or if the
bag would be accepted free of charge.

Section 54 of the Competition Act prohibits double ticketing. The
requisite elements are: (a) the supply of a product; (b) at a price
that exceeds the lowest of two or more prices; (c) the two prices
must be clearly expressed on the product, on something attached to
or accompanying the product, or on a point of purchase display; and
(d) the two prices must be expressed at the time the product is
supplied.

In Bergen #1, the Court found that the pleadings did not assert
that the two prices were expressed at the time the product was
supplied and were therefore deficient. In Bergen #2, the Court was
satisfied that the plaintiff's proposed amendments addressed this
deficiency and certified additional common issues in relation to
the section 54 claim.

Issue 1 - Do the facts as pleaded support a cause of action under
section 54 of the Competition Act? Alternatively, is the claim
bound to fail outside of Canada?

On appeal, WestJet argued that the plaintiff's pleadings were still
deficient and could not support a finding that the first price was
expressed at the time of supply; any finding about the manner in
which the second price was expressed; or that both prices were
expressed in a manner enumerated in section 54(1).4

A. Expression of the first price

WestJet asserted that the "availability of the Tariffs . .. and
signage referring to them" could not constitute a "clear
expression" of the first price.

The plaintiff pointed to certain allegations in its claim that
could satisfy this requirement, including that "[a]t the time of,
or immediately prior to checking for checked baggage, the Tariffs
or the prominent notices or signs referring to the Tariffs, were
displayed to the passengers . . .".

B. Manner of expression of the second price

WestJet argued that the pleadings failed to disclose how the second
price was expressed, only that it was "expressed by WestJet or its
agents at the time of or immediately prior to a payment for a first
checked bag".

At the hearing, the plaintiff clarified that the second price was
expressed in the Tariffs just prior to the charging of the baggage
fee. The plaintiff agreed to further amend its pleadings to improve
clarity if necessary.

C. Expression of prices in a manner listed in section 54(1)

WestJet argued that the plaintiff did not plead facts that could
establish clear expression of prices in any of the modes listed in
section 54. Westjet argued that section 54 should be interpreted
narrowly to exclude oral expressions.

The plaintiff stated that they were not relying on oral expressions
of price and the law was unsettled as to how the listed modes
applied in the modern sales context. Accordingly, the pleadings
could not be said to be bound to fail.

Alternative claim -- the section 54 claim is bound to fail outside
of Canada

WestJet asserted that the section 54 claim was bound to fail
outside of Canada, because the plaintiffs relied on regulatory
requirements that WestJet have Tariffs available at its business
offices and on signs indicating such. However, WestJet was not
required to have these Tariffs available for inspection outside of
Canada.

The plaintiff argued that WestJet's position incorrectly assumed
that "business office" could only apply to locations in Canada.
Further, the pleadings do not restrict how the first price is
expressed within Canada alone.

Analysis
The Court observed that WestJet based its arguments on what it
interpreted section 54 to require, rather than on established, but
limited, caselaw. The Court also considered the Federal Court
decision of Lin v Airbnb, Inc,5 in which Justice Gascon cautioned
that "novel or difficult questions of statutory interpretation"
should not be determined at the certification stage.

At the same time, the Court acknowledged the gate-keeping role of a
certification judge, and if complex questions of statutory
interpretation could be resolved such that a claim is struck, that
would save the expense of judicial resources, citing Wakelam v
Wyeth Consumer Healthcare/Wyeth Soins de Sante Inc.6

The Court ultimately concluded that where statutory interpretation
is required, "if it is arguable", the certification judge should
not engage in a merits-based analysis. However, where there is
binding precedent or the interpretive exercise is so
straightforward that it is plain and obvious that the claim would
fail, then the judge should exercise their gate-keeping role.

Issue 1 - Do the facts as pleaded support a cause of action under
section 54 of the Competition Act?

A. Expression of the first price

The Court concluded that the interpretation of the manner of
expression required by section 54 was not settled. Accordingly, it
was not plain and obvious that the reference to Tariffs or signs
referring to them could not constitute the expression that is
required by section 54.

B. Manner of expression of the second price

The Court concluded that the pleadings could be read to include an
assertion that the second price is expressed in the Tariffs, and if
necessary, the pleadings were reasonably capable of amendment to
clarify the manner in which the second price was expressed.

C. Expression of prices in a manner listed in section 54(1)

The caselaw regarding manner of expression required by section 54
was not settled. WestJet's argument relied on a specific
interpretation of this section that went to the merits of the
claim.

Alternative claim - the section 54 claim is bound to fail outside
of Canada

The pleadings were not bound to fail as they were not based on mere
assertions that WestJet is not required to post signs outside of
Canada. Rather, the pleadings actually alleged that notices or
signs were posted at every airport terminal where Westjet operates
(and not just within Canada).

Issue 2 - Does the Competition Claim produce common issues? Is a
class proceeding preferable?

WestJet argued that even if the pleadings were adequate, there were
no common issues. This was because the manner of expression of the
first price and the clarity of that expression would need to be
determined on a site-by-site basis and might change over time. As
different determinations would need to be made, a class proceeding
would not be preferable.

The plaintiff responded that notice and expression of the Tariffs
when class members paid for their baggage fee online or at a
self-serve kiosk had been pled. Although WestJet could prove that
these expressions did not occur or that they did not constitute
"clear expression" at trial, this should not bar certification.

Decision
The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed Westjet's appeal.

The Court found that the pleadings were sufficient, or could be
reasonably amended, to support a section 54 claim. It was not plain
and obvious that the claim was bound to fail.

Further, there was a real possibility that the issues in relation
to the Competition Act claim would be resolved in common for the
entire class. At the certification stage, it is unnecessary to
believe that the common issues will be answered identically for
every class member. Although some individual-issues trials may
become necessary, this does not preclude certification of issues in
common.

Although not necessary to decide the appeal, the Court commented
that a class proceeding had already been certified that had not
been appealed (in relation to breach of contract and unjust
enrichment).7 Because there would be some overlap between those
claims and the section 54 claim, one could not ignore the fact that
a class proceeding would be moving forward in any event when
assessing the judicial economy in having the section 54 claim heard
in a class proceeding.

Takeaways
This decision confirms that, at the certification stage, the court
is not to engage in a merits based analysis, particularly where
complex questions of statutory interpretation must be resolved. At
the same time, the Court recognized that in certain instances, it
would be appropriate for the certification judge to exercise its
gate-keeping role, where it is obvious that a claim will fail.

Even if it is possible that some individual-issues trials may
become necessary in the future, this does not preclude
certification if there is a real possibility that issues would be
resolved in common for the entire class once again making it
challenging for defendants to stop class actions at an early
juncture.

Footnotes

1. Bergen v WestJet Airlines Ltd, 2021 BCSC 12.

2. Bergen v WestJet Airlines Ltd, 2021 BCSC 351.

3. Trotman v WestJet Airlines Ltd, 2022 BCCA 22.

4. Section 54(1) requires expression of both prices (a) on the
product, its wrapper or container; (b) on anything attached to,
inserted in or accompanying the product, its wrapper or container
or anything on which the product is mounted for display or sale; or
(c) on an in-store or other point-of-purchase display or
advertisement.

5. 2019 FC 1563.

6. 2014 BCCA 36, leave to appeal refused.

7. Bergen #1. [GN]

[*] Aus. Litigation Funding, Class Action Policies Discussed
------------------------------------------------------------
The government's new policies on litigation funding and class
actions are causing regulatory chaos and will deprive ordinary
Australians of fair legal representation, Andrew Watson writes for
Asia & The Pacific Policy Society.

For the last 18 months, the federal government has waged a
sustained campaign against class actions and litigation funding.

Through a series of legislative interventions it has created
regulatory chaos and will restrict the ability of everyday
Australians to gain access to justice by restricting litigation
funding.

Rather than adopt the recommendations of three separate,
independent inquiries conducted by the Australian Law Reform
Commission (ALRC), Productivity Commission, and Victorian Law
Reform Commission, it has set out about enacting a series of its
own reforms which will come at the expense of ordinary
Australians.

The Corporations Amendment (Improving Outcomes for Litigation
Funding Participants) Bill 2021, currently before the Senate, seeks
to impose a series of restrictions on how litigation can be
funded.

While it promises to ensure greater returns to members of a class
action, its actual outcome will be to reduce the number of cases
which receive litigation funding. This ensures, in effect, that
some victims of egregious corporate or government misconduct will
be unable to pursue compensation.

In particular, it creates confusion regarding the availability of
common fund orders.

More on this:Freedom of expression, or protection from harm?
The Bill's apparent intent is to restrict litigation funding to
only class action members who sign a funding agreement. Previously,
a court could allow for a common fund order to be in place, where
lawyers could commence proceedings with some confidence that the
court could rule all members of a class action would be required to
contribute to its costs.

The option of a common fund order has seen litigation funding
become available for worthy cases which had previously struggled to
get funding.

Before common fund orders were an option, shareholder class actions
were the predominant focus of litigation funders. Once common fund
orders were an option, it became possible to bring cases that
carried more risk, or a lower overall financial outcome, to the
courts if their cause was important.

It meant those ripped off by financial institutions, First Nations
peoples who had had their wages stolen, Indonesian seaweed farmers
affected by an oil spill, and other small groups of worthy
claimants could take legal action.

The competition of common fund orders also drives a significant
drop in funding commissions - or the proportion of compensation
from a class action goes to the lawyers who helped secure it. In
2017-18, third-party funded rates sat routinely north of 30 per
cent, while the median rate for common fund order funded class
actions was roughly 22 per cent.

By stipulating that only members who have signed up to a funding
agreement can fund action, the Bill will restrict access to justice
by ensuring that some meritorious cases simply do not obtain
funding because their members are apt not to sign up to a funding
agreement.

Even in those cases which do obtain funding, those who do not sign
will be excluded from the action, and these are often the most
disadvantaged in the group, who are in most in need of redress.

It will also increase transaction costs, because these will be
spread across a smaller pool of claimants, and finally it will
encourage multiple proceedings over the same matter, often
involving multiple closed groups who signed onto funding agreements
with different firms, followed by larger 'mop up' cases of open
groups.

The Bill also contains a presumptive 30 per cent cap on commission
fees, which is likely to have a particularly noxious effect. Whilst
is ostensibly guarantees class members a minimum proportion of any
settlement, its practical effect will be to deter the funding of
worthy claims on financial grounds.

If the Bill passes, litigation funders will be forced to go back to
only funding very large, sure cases - for the most part shareholder
claims.

Smaller, riskier, or more difficult cases will simply not get
funding. In the end, everyday Australians who have been ripped off
or harmed by corporations or governments will be denied redress
because they won't be able to get the funding to support their
claims without a common fund order.

In those cases which do get funding, defendants will have every
incentive to needlessly run up costs in a 'war of attrition' that
will ensure cases are determined by financial resources rather than
justice and fairness.

If it is really concerned about the costs faced by members of class
actions, the government has other options. For one, it could
improve outcomes for class action participants by facilitating
competition in the provision of funding.

Instead of pursuing these reforms, it should adopt the Australian
Law Reform Commission's recommendations and legislate to confirm
the capacity of courts to make common fund orders and introduce
contingency fees.

Allowing lawyers to charge contingency fees - where legal costs are
funded through a percentage of the amount recovered by the
litigation - has also been shown to return more to the pockets of
class action members, with law firms seeking such arrangements in
the Supreme Court of Victoria for 25 per cent and below, lower than
the proposed cap in the government's Bill.

As it stands, the Bill instead proposes interfering with freedom of
contract, introducing price controls, and giving legislation power
that should be within the jurisdiction of the courts. This will
both reduce competition and restrict litigation finances, even for
worthy cases.

Ultimately, it is competition which will produce lower fees and
better outcomes for class action members, rather than this Bill,
which is ham-fisted regulation. [GN]

[*] U.S. Class Action Settlements Reached Record High
-----------------------------------------------------
Emma Ascott at topclassactions.com reports that the COVID-19
pandemic has impacted all aspects of life, including the legal
system in general and workplace class actions in particular -- in
2021, the value of class action settlements reached in the United
States hit a record high.

The general thought might have been that the ongoing pandemic would
depress the pace and size of settlements, but this ultimately
proved incorrect.

A labor law firm published a report detailing how workplace class
action lawsuit settlements reached a record $3.62 billion in 2021,
compared to $1.58 billion in 2020.

In the report's executive summary, Seyfarth chair and managing
partner Peter C. Miller noted that "the continuation of the
COVID-19 pandemic has impacted everyone and everything, including
class action litigation. The last few years have seen a
transformation in class action and collective action litigation
involving workplace issues."

The annual report, which is now in its 18th year, analyzed 1,607
class action rulings on a circuit-by-circuit and state-by-state
basis.

With the rollout of return-to-work programs and vaccine mandates in
the fourth quarter of 2021, class actions by states, employee
advocates, unions, and employer groups were filed in record
numbers.

"Given the rise of abusive labor practices, particularly within the
tech industry, these numbers are not surprising," Mark Burton, a
class actions lawyer at Audet & Partners told Top Class Actions.

Based on sheer volume and statistical numbers, workers scored the
most success in securing certification of wage and hour class and
collective actions in 2021 (compared to other areas of workplace
law).

The plaintiffs' bar converted case filings into successful
certification rulings at a rate of 81%  - the highest level ever.

Last year, workplace class action litigation was fueled by the
change from conservative to democratic policies in the White House,
expansion of workers' rights, increased regulation of businesses,
and aggressive enforcement of workplace laws, according to the
report.

Eric Kingsley, a class action lawyer at the Kingsley & Kingsley law
firm, told Top Class Actions that he believes the inflated class
action settlement numbers for 2021 are likely due to the courts
being backed up during the pandemic.

"I'm not sure that's (the report) necessarily the best capturing of
data. Maybe 2022 compared to 2019 will be a better comparison to
see where the trends really are lined," Kingsley told Top Class
Actions.

According to a 2021 survey by Carlton Fields, class action matters
have become increasingly high-risk for corporations.

"In 2020, companies reported that 34.3% of the class actions they
faced were high-risk or bet-the-company, up from only 4.5% reported
in 2011. Class action spending has increased for six consecutive
years, and companies project that spending will hit nearly $3.3
billion in 2021," according to Carlton Fields

In actuality, this projection was incorrect by an additional 320
million.

Author of the original report Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. said, "many
thought the impact of the pandemic -- with months of court closings
and transition of legal proceedings to zoom hearings -- would
depress settlement numbers and allow corporate defendants to defer
legal issues for months if not years."

This turned out not to be the case. Instead, these class action
cases were only deferred for a short while.

"From personal experience, in 2020, the courts just weren't hearing
stuff, and April, May, June - it was basically completely shut
down, so you couldn't get hearings in front of the court. There was
a period of at least a year when there was a huge bottleneck in the
court," Eric Kingsley said.

This bottleneck eventually dissipated, resulting in a whopping
$3.62 billion in class action settlements just last year. One class
action attorney believes this is a trend that will not continue
into the future, and that 2021 was an outlier year.

Douglas N. Silverstein, a class action lawyer with the Kesluk,
Silverstein, Jacob & Morrison firm, and the president of the
Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles told Top Class
Actions that the upward trend in class actions suits has been
pretty consistent until now.

"When the pandemic hit, things really slowed down and the cases
that would have otherwise resolved in 2020 did not. You basically
had increased resolutions in 2021, accounting for the increased
amount, so 2020 was still largely in line with prior years. There
does seem to be an upward trend - but the significant increase in
2021 I think is best explained by cases being pushed off due to the
pandemic," Silverstein told Top Class Actions.

Aside from pandemic-related backups, Silverstein believes employers
are also at fault for the increase in class actions.

"Employers are trying to find ways to save money, and they do that
by not complying with the law. So that's why there's been an
explosion of class action cases in a variety of areas,"
Silverstein told Top Class Actions.

Silverstein says the long-term trend is actually a decrease in
class action cases because employers are becoming better at
complying with the law because they want to avoid exposure.

"The stakes in these types of employment lawsuits can be extremely
significant, as the financial risks of such cases are enormous.
More often than not, class actions adversely affect the market
share of a corporation and impact its reputation in the
marketplace. It is a legal exposure which keeps corporate counsel
and business executives awake at night," Seyfarth chair and
managing partner Peter C. Miller said in the report's executive
summary.

The report noted that advocates for workers and labor are doubling
down on efforts to overturn the regime of workplace arbitration
agreements with class/collective action waivers established by Epic
Systems v. Lewis.

"The most significant thing that has happened in class action
litigation is the increased use of arbitration with class waivers,
meaning that employees who are subject to arbitration may only
bring the case on their own behalf and not as a class action on
behalf of other employees," Silverstein said.

Lastly, Silverstein says that one of the factors that will affect
these cases in the future is the 6-3 conservative majority of the
US Supreme Court.

"I expect there will continue to be decisions that are pro-employer
and anti-employees in the class action context, given the current
constitution of the US Supreme Court, and that will trickle down to
all levels of the federal courts and district courts," Silverstein
said.

Employers can look at this past year as a precursor to new legal
challenges and an explosion of class and collective actions in
2022, according to the report. [GN]

[*] U.S. Congress Passes Law to Void Sexual Harassment Arbitration
------------------------------------------------------------------
Carrie N. Baker, writing for Ms., reports that on Feb. 10, 2022,
Congress passed legislation to void forced arbitration agreements
and collective action waiver clauses for sexual harassment and
assault claims in any contract. The law, which is now heading to
Biden's desk for his signature, prohibits employers from requiring
employees to sign away their rights to sue for sexual harassment
and assault in the workplace. Advocates celebrated the legislation
-- a long-term priority since Alyssa Milano's #MeToo tweet went
viral in October of 2017.

"Since that start, we've seen the #MeToo movement expand, and with
it, we've seen how pervasive and insidious forced arbitration
clauses can be," said Congresswoman Cheri Bustos (D-Ill.), lead
sponsor of the legislation in the House. "Sexual harassment,
quid-pro-quo arrangements for sexual favors, abuse and even rape
within a company were all being hidden behind closed doors because
of a simple legal technicality in the employment paperwork. My bill
to void this legal language for sexual assault and harassment
claims will let survivors' voices be heard."

The #MeToo uprising revealed pervasive sexual harassment and
assault in the workplace, in housing and beyond.

"Studies estimate that almost a quarter to more than eighty percent
of women experience sexual harassment in the workplace in their
lifetimes," said Representative Carolyn Maloney (D-N.Y.). "Yet many
survivors are forced to enter into a private system of arbitration
instead of resolving their claims in a court of law. Forced
arbitration is a trap — one that many employees do not even know
they have entered until after an incident occurs."

Surprisingly, at a time when Republicans are opposing every piece
of legislation that might expand or protect women's rights, the
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment
Act of 2021 received bi-partisan support. The legislation passed
the House by a vote of 335-97 and the Senate by a voice vote.

Former Fox News host Gretchen Carlson worked to win Republican
support for the legislation. The 2019 film Bombshell portrayed
Carlson's story of sexual harassment and abuse at Fox News.

"Ending the use of forced arbitration for sexual harassment and
assault will create safer work environments and protect millions of
people," said Gretchen Carlson, co-founder of Lift Our Voices.
"Everyone deserves the right to be heard, to have choices and to be
free from mechanisms that silence their voices."

For years, employers have been able to preemptively silence workers
through forced arbitration clauses in employment contracts, which
today prevent more than 60 million workers from filing complaints
in open court. In forced arbitration, a company may limit discovery
of evidence, skew rules in their favor, block access to counsel,
and bar similar claims. Employers choose the arbitrators who decide
the cases and pay them. If they like the results, they hire them
again.

"What we know about mandatory arbitration is that it favors
employers," said civil rights attorney Debra Katz. "All the
research shows that employers get a better shake when they go to a
confidential system of mandatory arbitration where there is no
record and no public transparency."

Brian Spitz—counsel for Lora Henry, a sexual assault survivor who
testified before the House Judiciary Committee in favor of the
legislation—explained why employers like mandatory arbitration.
"Those who oppose letting women present their accounts of being
sexually harassed to a jury in open court keep chanting their
mantra that arbitration is easier, quicker, and cheaper. First off,
jumping out of a twentieth-story window is a much easier and faster
way to reach the ground, not to mention much less costly than
running an elevator, but I'd still prefer the elevator," said
Spitz. "The truth is that employers are willing to pay $100,000 or
more per case to arbitrate a case because it gives them two
significant advantages: secrecy and a significantly higher win
rate."

In addition to voiding mandatory arbitration clauses, the new law
also voids collective action waiver clauses that forfeit employees'
rights to join together in class-action lawsuits. These clauses,
which employers require employees to agree to, effectively prevent
them from proving the pervasive nature of the workplace harassment.


In a 2018 decision authored by Neil Gorsuch, the Supreme Court
upheld mandatory arbitration and collective action waiver clauses
as enforceable.

Sexual assault survivor Andowah Newton, who testified before the
House Judiciary Committee on the bill, applauded the new
legislation for "sending a powerful message that the type of sexual
harassment, assault, and retaliation which my employer has
inflicted upon me will no longer be buried and forced in secretive,
biased, and unjust proceedings that penalize and disfavor
survivors."

Forced arbitration and collective action waiver clauses appear in
the fine print of contracts not only for employment, but also for
property leases, nursing homes, insurance, ride-share apps, movers,
maintenance services and more, affecting tens of millions of
Americans each year. These clauses silence survivors and grant
impunity to perpetrators and the companies that harbor them and
cover up their abuse.

"From employment paperwork and lease agreements to the terms and
conditions for apps and services, the majority of Americans have
unknowingly signed their rights away, and don't realize it until
they're the one being silenced," said Rep. Bustos.

The legislation not only frees survivors to file a claim in court,
but also allows them to share their experiences with co-workers,
discuss their cases publicly and warn job applicants and customers
about companies that tolerate harassment and abuse of women.

"This bill will give thousands of survivors of sexual violence
their voices back," said Spottiswoode, a sexual assault survivor
who testified for the bill before the House Judiciary Committee
"They will not have to go through a secret process, designed by
their employer, and keep their experiences secret forever. This is
going to make such a real, meaningful difference in their lives."
[GN]


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