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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, April 4, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 61

                            Headlines

ADAM GONZALES: Lowery Files Bid for Rule 23 Class Certification
AGA SERVICE: Extension of Time to File Class Cert Bid Sought
AGRI STATS: On Point/Henterly Subpoenas in Antitrust Suit Quashed
ALABAMA: Dist. Court Denies James' Class Action Request v. Raybon
ALEXANDRIA, LA: Clark Partly Granted Leave to File Amended Suit

ALLSUP EMPLOYMENT: Barnes Files Bid for Class Certification
ANTHEM COMPANIES: Seeks More Time to File Class Cert Response
ARAMARK UNIFORM: Seeks Summary Judgment in Thermal Products Suit
ART+1 INC: Approval of Settlement Deal in Sanchez Sought
ATRIA SENIOR: Bid to Compel Stickles to Submit Trial Plan Nixed

AURORA, CO: Seeks Extension to Respond to Class Cert. Bid
BETTER MORTGAGE: Seeks Permission to File Certain Documents
BLUE DIAMOND: Brand Not Made in Smokehouse, Clark Suit Alleges
BNY MELLON: Joint Stipulation on Class Status Hearing Filed
BOB DEAN: Anderson Filing of Class Status Bid Extended to May 15

BOSTON FISH: Harleysville Files Declaratory Judgment Action
BOUCHERIE LLC: Settlement Deal in Gabilly Suit Wins Final Nod
BRIGHAM YOUNG: Evans Seeks to Stay Class Suit Pending Appeal
BROADWIND ENERGY: June 14 Proof of Claim Submission Deadline Set
CARLOS DEL TORO: Springs, et al. Win Class Certification Bid

CENTURY 21: District of Nevada Dismisses Rahimian TCPA Class Suit
CHELMSFORD GROUP: Smith Files Bid for Class Certification
CITRIX SYSTEMS: Cirillo Appeals Judgment in FLSA Suit to 4th Cir.
CITY NATIONAL BANK: Carter Seeks to Certify Three Classes
CLEAN ADVANTAGE: Bruno Seeks Unpaid Wages for Janitors Under FLSA

CLUB 360: Bazarganfard Must File Class Cert Bid by May 24
COVERALL NORTH: Court Lifts Stay of Reeves' Claims in Billie Suit
DEERE & CO: Monopolizes Repair Service Market, Lloyd Family Says
DELTA AIR: Seeks Leave to File Class Cert Documents Under Seal
DYNCORP INT'L: Del Fierro Seeks to Vacate Class Cert. Deadlines

EDGEWELL PERSONAL: Schloegel Class Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
FIELDWORKS LLC: Bid to Modify Class Cert. Order Tossed
FLEETECH INC: Jenkins Sues Over Delivery Drivers' Unpaid Wages
FOREST RIVER: Gross Class Certification Bid Junked as Moot
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: Washington Files Bid for Conditional Status

GATEHOUSE MEDIA: Loses Bid to Junk Ewalt Suit Class Certification
GENERAL MILLS: Faces McDermott Suit Over Mislabeled Fruit Snacks
GERVASI VINEYARD: Pays Servers at Minimum Wage Rate, Dewitt Alleges
HAWAII MEDICAL: Partly Wins Summary Judgment Bid vs Park et al.
HEALTHCARE SERVICE: Fails to Pay OT Wages Under FLSA, Kuzma Says

HOME DEPOT: Extension of Time to File Class Status Bid Sought
HOST INT'L: Frankenstein 401(k) Plan Suit Seeks to Certify Class
HYUNDAI MOTOR: Scheduling Order Entered in Friche Class Suit
I360 LLC: Tag Suit Remanded to San Diego County Superior Court
INNOCOLL HOLDINGS: $2.75MM Class Settlement to be Heard on July 6

INTEGRITY SERVICES: Fails to Pay Overtime Premiums, Kelley Alleges
JBS USA: Campos Seeks Overtime Pay for Maintenance Techs Under FLSA
JOHN HIESTER: Loses Bid to Bifurcate/Stay Discovery in Beard Suit
JOHN HIESTER: Must Supplement Discovery Responses in Bear Suit
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Faces Securities Suit Over Baby Powder

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Plaintiffs Seek Initial Approval of Settlement
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Remicade Anti-trust Suit Ongoing in PA
KALLBERG INDUSTRIES: Ojeda Seeks to Certify Relief Worker Class
KG FIBER: Fails to Pay Proper Overtime Wages, Lloyd Suit Alleges
KIMPTON HOTEL: Class Certification Hearing in Thomas Suit Vacated

LIN ROGERS: Scheduling Order Entered in Heatley Class Suit
LOUISIANA: Appeals Court Flips Denial of Crooks' Writ of Mandamus
MERRILL LYNCH: Valelly Suit Seeks to Certify Classes
MLD MORTGAGE: Dyes Allowed to File Class Cert Bid Under Seal
NABORS COMPLETION: $316K Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Gutierrez Suit

NATIONAL UNION: Lower Court's Judgment in First Solar Suit Affirmed
NEW JERSEY: District Court Narrows Claims in S.S. v. NJDOE
NONNI'S FOODS: Court Narrows Claims in Bardsley's Amended Complaint
OCEAN STATE JOB: Hanyzkiewicz Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
ORGAIN LLC: Patenaude Suit Dismissed for Failure to State a Claim

OVENLY LLC: Dawkins Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
PARTNERS HEALTHCARE: Belknap Appeals ERISA Suit Dismissal
PHARMAVITE LLC: Harmon Files Suit in N.D. Illinois
PHH MORTGAGE: Class Status Bid Filing Due April 28
PHH MORTGAGE: Reda Suit Removed to D. Massachusetts

PHILADELPHIA PARKING: Ferebee Suit Removed to E.D. Pennsylvania
PJ OPS IDAHO: Edwards' Bid to Produce Wylie & Allen Emails Approved
PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK: Talarico Appeals Summary Judgment
POWERPC MALL: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
PRESBYTERIAN HEALTH: $35.5K in Attys.' Fees Awarded in Pruess Suit

PROFECTUS BEAUTY: Guerrero Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
PROGRESSIVE ADVANCED: Bartee Files Suit in E.D. Missouri
PROGRESSIVE UNIVERSAL: Faces Kroeger Suit Over Total Loss Claims
PROHEALTH PHARMACY: Fischler Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
PUBLIC CONSULTING: Faces Kinney WARN Act Suit Over Mass Layoff

RA MEDICAL: $10MM Class Settlement to Be Heard on June 13
RTIC OUTDOORS: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
SEEDS OF HOPE: Johnson Sues Over Failure to Pay Proper Wages
SIMPLYWORKOUT: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ST. LOUIS COUNTY JAIL: Burke Files Suit in E.D. Missouri

STARBUCKS CORP: Arbitration Bid in Anderson Suit Denied in Part
STOP & SHOP: Bid to Dismiss Warren's Amended Suit Partly Granted
STRATEGIC MATERIALS: Morales FCRA Suit Removed to C.D. California
TAX RISE: Faces McClinton TCPA Suit Over Unsolicited Phone Calls
TEXAS: Clyce Appeals Case Dismissal to 5th Cir.

TIA LUPITA: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
TOPS MARKETS: Hanyzkiewicz Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
TRANSCONTINENTAL REALTY: Texas Court Dismisses Amended Berger Suit
TRENDSPIDER LLC: Gomez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
TRUSTCO BANK: Bid to Dismiss Lamoureux Class Suit Granted in Part

TRUSTCO BANK: Court Narrows Claims in Livingston's Class Complaint
TURKEY HILL DAIRY: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
TUTUDUMONDE INC: Joyner Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
UNITED STATES: Gomez Files Suit in W.D. Washington
UNITED STATES: Ravi Appeals Class Suit Dismissal

UPTOWN HEALTHCARE: Extension to File Class Status Bid Sought
USA: Federal Claims Court Dismisses Ravi Class Complaint v. ICE
VAIL CORP: Joint Status Report on Roberds Settlement Due May 27
VESTED BUSINESS: Gomez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY: Court Dismisses Amended Raimo Class Suit

WEBTOOLS LLC: Gomez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
WELLS FARGO: Order Granting Withdrawal of Gerges' Counsel Vacated
YAYYO INC: $1.7MM Class Settlement to Be Heard on June 6
YORK COUNTY, PA: Schwenk, Druck Seek to Certify Class Action

                            *********

ADAM GONZALES: Lowery Files Bid for Rule 23 Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LOGAN LOWERY, v. ADAM R.
GONZALES, et al., Case No.  2:22-cv-00016-Z-BR (N.D. Tex.), the
Plaintiff files a motion requesting class certification order under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(c)(1)(A).

The Plaintiff's suit was filed under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Texas Religious
Freedom and Restor­ation Act (TRFRA), addressing his right to
freely exercise his religious beliefs under "Christian Identity"
within the Church of Jesus Christ Christian. The decisions and
rulings of this Court will directly effect any incarserated inmate
who wishes to exercise their religious beliefs under this class or
religious belief.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 11,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3JUn5yT
at no extra charge.

The Plaintiff appears pro se.[CC]

AGA SERVICE: Extension of Time to File Class Cert Bid Sought
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ADAM ELGINDY and JULIANNE
CHUANROONG, on behalf of themselves, the general public, and those
similarly situated, v. AGA SERVICE COMPANY (d/b/a ALLIANZ GLOBAL
ASSISTANCE), JEFFERSON INSURANCE COMPANY, and BCS INSURANCE
COMPANY, Case No. 4:20-cv-06304-JST (N.D. Cal.), the Parties
stipulate to an adjournment of the next case management conference
and an extension of the schedule for Plaintiffs' class
certification motion:

                Event          Current Date    Proposed Date

  Further case management     March 30, 2022    May 11, 2022
  statement due:

  Further CMC:                April 1, 2022     May 13, 2022

  Class certification         May 6, 2022       Aug. 5, 2022
  motion due:

  Class certification         July 15, 2022     Oct. 14, 2022
  opposition due:

  Class certification         Sept. 9, 2022     Dec. 9, 2022
  reply due:

A copy of the Court's order dated March 14, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3qPJqWS at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth A. Safier, Esq.
          Stephen M. Raab, Esq.
          GUTRIDE SAFIER LLP
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          305 Broadway, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (415) 336-6545
          Facsimile: (415) 449-6469
          E-mail: stephen@gutridesafier.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Gayle I. Jenkins, Esq.
          Elizabeth J. Ireland, Esq.
          Janelle A. Li-A-Ping, Esq.
          WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
          333 S. Grand Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-1543
          Telephone: (213) 615-1700
          Facsimile: (213) 615-1750
          E-mail: gjenkins@winston.com
                  eireland@winston.com
                  jliaping@winston.com

AGRI STATS: On Point/Henterly Subpoenas in Antitrust Suit Quashed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE TURKEY ANTITRUST LITIGATION. JOHN GROSS AND
COMPANY, INC., et al., Plaintiffs v. AGRI STATS, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 19 C 8318 (N.D. Ill.), Magistrate Judge
Gabriela A. Fuentes of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted the Movants' two
motions to quash the On Point/Henterly subpoenas and denied the
Defendants' cross-motion to compel compliance with those
subpoenas.

I. Introduction

Before the Court are two motions to quash third-party subpoenas for
investigative materials generated at the direction of the
Plaintiffs' counsel, and a cross-motion by the Defendants to compel
compliance with those subpoenas. These three motions are now
docketed before the Court.

Together, the motions raise the question of whether the
work-product doctrine, or other limits on civil discovery, applies
to protect investigative work that one of the Plaintiffs' counsel,
the Hagens Berman firm, conducted through the third-party retained
investigators shortly before the filing of the action and
apparently before a named plaintiff engaged Hagens Berman to file
the lawsuit.

Resolving the motions requires the Court to look at the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as a whole, Rule 26(b)(3) governing
work-product protection in particular, the origin and evolution of
work-product protection in the federal courts, and the nature of
the materials sought by the subpoenas. To understand better the
information the Movants are seeking to protect as attorney work
product, the Court obtained from the Movants a sample of the
materials responsive to the subpoenas for in camera review.

II. Background

The consolidated action is a civil antitrust lawsuit by two sets of
Plaintiffs seeking to represent classes of purchasers of turkeys
and turkey products in the United States. Plaintiffs John Gross and
Co., Inc. and Maplevale Farms, Inc. alleged in the Second Amended
Complaint that they purchased turkey directly from one or more of
the multiple defendant turkey producers (or "integrators," as they
are called).

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of Direct Purchaser
Plaintiffs ("DPPs") who allege that the turkey integrator
defendants, who are breeders, processors, and sellers of turkeys
and turkey products, artificially inflated turkey prices through
anti-competitive exchanges of information in reports created by
another Defendant, Agri Stats. The turkey integrator Defendants are
Butterball LLC, Cargill Meat Solutions Corp. and Cargill, Inc.
("Cargill"), Cooper Farms, Inc., Farbest Foods, Inc., Foster Farms,
LLC, Foster Poultry Farms, Hormel Foods Corp., House of Raeford
Farms, Inc., Perdue Farms, Inc., Perdue Foods LLC, The Hillshire
Brands Company, Tyson Foods, Inc., Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., Tyson
Prepared Foods, Inc., Jennie-O Turkey Store, Inc., Prestage Farms,
Inc., Prestage Foods, Inc., Prestage Farms of South Carolina, LLC.

Plaintiff Sandee's Bakery is one of nine entities (the Indirect
Purchaser Plaintiffs, or "IPPs") alleging that their antitrust
injuries stemmed from their indirect purchases of turkey or turkey
products from the same turkey integrator Defendants, whom the IPPs
have named along with Agri Stats as having artificially inflated
turkey product pricing through the same alleged information
exchanges.

The motions to quash the On Point and Henterly subpoenas, and the
Defendants' cross-motion to compel compliance with them, arise from
the DPP action brought by the Plaintiffs including John Gross,
insofar as the Defendants are seeking production of investigative
files created after Hagens Berman retained On Point (which engaged
Henterly) in November 2019, shortly before the filing of the DPP
action in which John Gross was one of the initial class
representatives. The Defendants assert that if the On
Point/Henterly investigation occurred before John Gross formally
became a client of Hagens Berman, no work-product protection exists
under Rule 26(b)(3) for the related investigative documents,
because in the words of Defendants, Hagens Berman was then
"clientless," the materials concern a mere "pre-client"
investigation, and the context in which On Point and Henterly did
the investigative work was simply Hagens Berman's "business
development" activity.

The Defendants maintain that under these circumstances, the
investigative materials could not have been prepared "by or for" a
"party" or its representative, as the Defendants maintain is
required to trigger work-product protection under Rule 26(b)(3),
which they read as requiring that the "party" for whom the
materials are being prepared must be a party to the litigation. If
there was no attorney-client relationship between Hagens Berman and
any of the named Plaintiffs at the time of the On Point/Henterly
investigative work, Defendants assert, the work cannot have been
performed by or for a party to the litigation and thus falls
outside a literal reading of Rule 26(b)(3)'s protections for work
product.

That is, the Defendants are arguing that the Court should read Rule
26(b)(3) literally to determine that the work-product doctrine does
not shield the On Point/Henterly investigative materials from
discovery and are implying, at least, that Rule 26(b)(3) is the
discovery rules' sole source of protection against the Defendants'
requested investigative discovery.

The Movants counter that calling the On Point/Henterly materials
the mere product of Hagens Berman's "business development activity"
is a reductionist canard, that the subpoenas on On Point and
Henterly are attempts "to undermine the adversarial system by
intruding into the protected sphere of opposing counsel's work,"
and that in any event, Hagens Berman caused the On Point/Henterly
investigative file to be created "for" the eventual Plaintiffs.

By virtue of the consolidation of the multiple DPP and IPP matters,
the Court considers all the Defendants in all of the consolidated
matters to have joined in the opposition to the motions to quash
and in the maintenance of the cross-motion to compel.

III. Analysis

The Defendants rely heavily on a decision from the judicial
district, Castro v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., No. 13 C 2086, 2013 WL
1707094 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2013), in which the plain relevancy of
pre-filing interviews conducted by a law firm was whether the firm
conspired with the defendant's competitor to cook up an antitrust
case against the defendant, in which case the law firm
investigator's interviews of the competitor's personnel might well
be highly relevant.

The On Point and Henterly subpoenas seek the same information:

      1. All retention agreements, contracts, or agreements between
You and Counsel of Record concerning turkey, including documents
sufficient to show the date of retention.

      2. All documents relating to turkey.

      3. All documents relating to the person who apparently is
CW1.

      4. All documents relating to the person who apparently is
CW2.

      5. All documents relating to the individual referred to as
Confidential Witness 3 or CW 3 in the Complaints in the Action.

      6. Documents sufficient to show the identity of all current
or former employees of the Defendants you communicated with
concerning turkey, and the dates of communication.

      7. All documents relating to Butterball, LLC, Cooper Farms,
Inc., or Farbest Foods, Inc., concerning turkey.

      8. All documents relating to Cargill, Inc., Cargill Meat
Solutions Corporation, Foster Farms, LLC, Foster Poultry Farms, The
Hillshire Brands Company, Hormel Foods Corporation, Hormel Foods,
LLC, House of Raeford Farms, Inc., Perdue Foods, LLC, Tyson Foods,
Inc., Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., and Tyson Prepared Foods, Inc.
concerning turkey.

      9. All communications with the Plaintiffs' Counsel of Record
relating to turkey.

      10. All notes, memoranda, records, files, transcripts, audio
recordings relating to, or reflecting, any discussion about turkey
between you and one or more of the following: (i) Counsel of
Record; (ii) Scott Singleton; (iii) Steve Hammon; (iv) the
individual referred to as Confidential Witness 3 or CW 3 in the
Complaints in the Action; (v) any current or former employee of any
Defendant; and (vi) the Plaintiffs' Counsel of Record.

The three motions now pending before the Court call upon it to
consider whether the work-product doctrine, as originally developed
in the common law in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947),
can extend to investigative materials that class counsel prepared
with class litigation in mind, although on behalf of named
Plaintiffs who may not have formally retained class counsel until
the investigation was under way, substantially completed, or even
completed. If the Defendants are correct that formal retention by
an actual client is the trigger for work-product protection, even
in class litigation such as this, then at least Rule 26(b)(3) would
not shield the On Point/Henterly materials from civil discovery in
the case -- although other rules might -- and the Movants' theory
remains that the On Point/Henterly materials were prepared "for"
the Plaintiffs even if they had not yet signed up as Hagens Berman
clients. In deciding the pending motions, the magistrate judge
operates within the broad discretion afforded him to manage
discovery in civil matters.

A. The On Point/Henterly Materials Are Relevant to the Claims and
Defenses in the Action, But Not in a Way That Diminishes Movants'
Claims of Work-Product Protection.

Judge Fuentes, after reviewing the On Point/Henterly materials in
camera, reaches a very different factual conclusion, namely, that
obtaining them would result in Defendants and their counsel
"piggy-backing" off the interview work that the Plaintiffs'
counsel, through On Point and Henterly, performed to interview and
learn facts from certain former employees of various Defendants.
She finds, as a result of her in camera review, that the On
Point/Henterly materials do not have a legal significance
independent of defense counsel knowing what questions the
Plaintiffs' counsel wanted asked of former employees, and what
answers those employees gave.

Consequently, the On Point/Henterly materials are like any
investigative material that defense counsel would surely love to
obtain and review, to obtain a window into how the Plaintiffs'
counsel put together the case, to know the facts the Plaintiffs
were looking for, and to know the information that the Plaintiffs'
counsel thought was and was not valuable. The type of information
that the Defendants could gain, if the On Point and Henterly
subpoenas were enforced, would give defense counsel a direct,
behind-the-scenes view of the Plaintiffs' counsel's mental
impressions formed in anticipation not just of any litigation, but
of litigation against the Defendants in the action.

Judge Fuentes must consider whether, if the factual guts of the On
Point/Henterly materials sound in attorney work product, the
attorney work-product doctrine itself actually shields them from
discovery, particularly after the 1970 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure produced the current iteration of Rule
26(b)(3). Hagens Berman and Lockridge Grindal, as the attorneys
seeking to protect the mental impressions of themselves and their
agent investigators, may assert the work-product doctrine to block
Defendants' attempt to subpoena On Point and Henterly for
work-product materials.

B. Rule 26(b)(3) Should Be Interpreted and Applied With the
Realities of Litigation and the Doctrine As Set Forth in Hickman v.
Taylor in Mind.

Despite the outcome in Castro, and despite the authority behind the
position that Rule 26(b)(3) shields only material prepared by or
for "a party to the litigation," Judge Fuentes believes enough is
left of Hickman to protect against one party discovering opposing
counsel's mental impressions formed in anticipation of the very
litigation in which the discovery is sought.

Judge Fuentes finds that tackling the challenge of complexity in
the case teaches that if work-product protection does not apply to
the On Point/Henterly investigation materials, the ability of
putative class counsel in complex class actions to investigate,
build and file class cases would be seriously hampered, for all of
the reasons the Supreme Court mentioned as concerns in its 1947
opinion in Hickman. The class counsel would be unable to retain
investigators without risking disclosure of the investigation
materials.

Investigative materials could not contain frank assessments of the
fact finding. The counsel's ability to meet its Rule 11 obligations
would suffer. Disincentivizing even rudimentary Rule 11 pre-filing
investigations might leave the class claims and the class counsel
even more vulnerable to Rule 11 motions asserting that the
pre-filing investigation was too thin. The costs and risks of
bringing class actions would increase substantially. The persons
who would pay the greatest price would likely be individual class
members whose claims are of such small value that they are not
incentivized to bring individual actions, as well as the greater
society, which would be less able to avail itself of Rule 23 to
ensure that redress exists for greater wrongs that inflict just a
little bit of damages on a large number of individuals. These
outcomes are in the heartland of precisely what Hickman warned
against.

A result faithful to Hickman requires the Movants' work-product
claim to be upheld under any common-sense application of Rule
26(b)(3) in the appropriate circumstances presented in the case.

C. Rule 26(b)(3)'s Plain Language Ultimately Supports Granting the
Motions To Quash Without Having To Extend the Rule Beyond Its
Terms.

Even if a literal reading of Rule 26(b)(3) bars work-product
protection of investigative materials created before formal client
retention, Judge Fuentes opines that the work-product doctrine
shields the On Point/Henterly materials from discovery in the case
because the plain language of Rule 26(b)(3) offers sufficient
protection in any event, under the circumstances. The plain
language of Rule 26(b)(3) contains one important qualifier
("ordinarily"), and another important word ("for"), and the Court
must apply both faithfully.

First, the plain language of Rule 26(b)(3) accommodates Hagens
Berman's invocation of the work-product doctrine to bar discovery
of the On Point/Henterly materials under these extraordinary
circumstances. Second, even if Rule 26(b)(3) strictly applies to
limit work-product assertions to materials prepared "by or for" a
party to the litigation, and even if the Rule's use of the word
"ordinarily" does not anticipate flexibility as the Court believes
it does, On Point and Henterly still prepared their investigative
materials "for" John Gross and Olean, and the On Point/Henterly
subpoenas must be quashed.

D. Rules 26(c), 45(d) and 26(b)(1) Also Support Granting the
Motions to Quash Under the Circumstances Presented in This Case.

Two of the Defendants' leading authorities for limiting
work-product protection to materials prepared in anticipation of
litigation "by or for" parties to the litigation are the Ninth
Circuit and Wright & Miller, both of which have said, in effect,
that "by or for a party" means that party must already be in the
litigation. But both of those authorities recognized that 26(b)(3)
is not the only tool under the Rules to protect a party from
discovery that it can persuade a court is oppressive. Rules 26(c),
45(d) and 26(b)(1) also are available and independently support
quashing the On Point/Henterly subpoenas.

First, Judge Fuentes finds that the oppression and undue burden
caused by the On Point/Henterly subpoenas, in the form of hindering
the ability of Hagens Berman to prepare its case and gather facts
without intrusion and interference by the Defendants seeking to pry
into opposing counsel's mental impressions formed in preparation
for litigation, constitute good cause for a protective order under
Rule 26(c) and an alternative ground for quashing the subpoenas.

Second, she finds that the On Point/Henterly subpoenas' would-be
raid on the files of opposing counsel, in a manner that would
compel disclosure of attorney mental impressions formed in
preparation for litigation against the very parties seeking to raid
the files, presents an appropriate circumstance for issuance of a
protective order under Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iii) and (iv). Rule 45(d)
thus offers another alternative basis for granting the motions to
quash.

Finally, Judge Fuentes sees the On Point/Henterly subpoenas' burden
on the work-product protection articulated in Hickman, and on the
ability of the Defendants' opposing counsel to form mental
impressions and gather facts in anticipation of the same litigation
in which the subpoenas are issued, as a burden great enough to make
the discovery disproportional under Rule 26(b)(1), which thus
offers a third alternative basis for granting the motions to
quash.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Fuentes granted the Movants' two
motions to quash the On Point/Henterly subpoenas and denied the
Defendants' cross-motion to compel compliance with those
subpoenas.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8yut5n from
Leagle.com.


ALABAMA: Dist. Court Denies James' Class Action Request v. Raybon
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOE NATHAN JAMES, JR., Z-160, Plaintiff v. TERRY
RAYBON, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 21-437-CG-MU (S.D.
Ala.), Judge Callie V.S. Granade of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama, Southern Division, denied the
Plaintiff's class action request and Motion to Amend Complaint.

After due and proper consideration of all portions of the file
deemed relevant to the issue raised, and there having been no
objections filed, the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate
Judge made under 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B) is adopted as the
opinion of the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/y2yh9r4x from Leagle.com.


ALEXANDRIA, LA: Clark Partly Granted Leave to File Amended Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge David C. Joseph of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana, Alexandria Division, entered a judgment in
the case, DARRELL EUGENE CLARK, Plaintiff v. CITY OF ALEXANDRIA, ET
AL., Defendants, Civil Docket No. 1:20-CV-01581 (W.D. La.),
granting in part and denying in part the Plaintiff's Motion for
Leave to File First Amended Complaint and Join Additional Parties.

For the reasons contained in the Report and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge previously filed, noting the absence of objections
thereto, and concurring with the Magistrate Judge's findings under
the applicable law, Judge Joseph entered the following Judgment.

Judge Joseph granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff Clark's
Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint and Join
Additional Parties as follows:

      (1) Clark's Motion to Amend Complaint to add a class action
is denied.

      (2) Clark's Motion to Amend Complaint to add Plaintiffs is:

           (i) granted in part as to Reginald David Cooper, Cedric
Linbert Green, Glenn Hall, Markiz Marta Hood, Tyrika Trenea Love,
and Alton James Horn; and

           (ii) denied in part as to Len Hall, Juan Carlos Cruz,
Vincent Parker, Martin Medgar Williams, Marcus Kirk, Richard George
Franklin, Jr., Kaster Darrell Jones, Deric Dionelle Reed, Kerry
Keith Simmons, Mechelle Williams, and Remona Williams Casey.

Judge Joseph granted (i) Clark's Motion to Amend Complaint to add
Patrick Ramon Vandyke and Christopher Louis Cooper as Defendants
and (ii) Clark's Motion to Amend Complaint to add Plaintiffs
Clark's, Cooper's, and Green's claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1513 and La. R.S. 23:967.

As to the specific claims raised by the Plaintiffs:

      (1) For Clark, Reginald David Cooper and Cedric Linbert
Green, Clark's Motion to Amend Complaint is granted as to all
claims;

      (2) For Glenn Hall, Clark's Motion to Amend Complaint is
granted on the Section 1983, LEDL, and LCHRA claims, and denied on
the Title VII claims;

      (3) For Markiz Marta Hood, Clark's Motion to Amend Complaint
is granted on the Section 1983, LEDL, and LHCRA claims, and denied
on the Title VII claims;

      (4) For Tyrika Trenea Love, Clark's Motion to Amend Complaint
is granted on the Section 1983, LEDL, and LHCRA claim, and denied
on the Title VII claims; and
   
      (5) For Alton James Horn, Clark's Motion to Amend Complaint
is granted on the Section 1983, LEDL, and LCHRA claims, and denied
on the Title VII claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Judgment is
available at https://tinyurl.com/58y9fnzz from Leagle.com.


ALLSUP EMPLOYMENT: Barnes Files Bid for Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANNETTE BARNES,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
ALLSUP EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-21121-BB (S.D.
Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order certifying
the following proposed Class and Subclass:

  -- CLASS

     "All persons who AES called from December 2020 to July 2021
     using the OCX Platform and for which AES's call records
     reflect a disposition of "MESSAGE_PLAYED" and
     "ANSWERING_MACHINE;" and

  -- SUBCLASS

     "All persons whose cellular telephones AES called from
     December 2020 to July 2021 using the OCX Platform and for
     which AES's call records reflect a disposition of
     "MESSAGE_PLAYED" and "ANSWERING_MACHINE".

In this case, the Plaintiff's claims against AES for violation of
the TCPA raise multiple common legal and factual issues capable of
generating common answers, including: (1) whether calls using
prerecorded messages were made by AES to Plaintiff and the Class
members' telephones; (2) whether AES had the consent it needed to
place the calls; (3) whether AES obtaining the telephone numbers
from SSA resulted in Defendant securing any type of consent; (4)
whether the prerecorded messages "included or introduced an
advertisement or constituted telemarketing, 47 C.F.R. §
64.1200(a)(2); and (5) whether the Defendant is entitled to any
qualified immunity.

Allsup is a Social Security Administration-authorized Employment
Network.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 14,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3830Usb
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ignacio J. Hiraldo, Esq.
          IJH LAW
          1200 Brickell Ave Suite 1950
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (786) 496-4469
          E-mail: ijhiraldo@ijhlaw.com

               - and -

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400-4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

ANTHEM COMPANIES: Seeks More Time to File Class Cert Response
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DEON BAKER, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. THE ANTHEM
COMPANIES, INC., Case No. 1:21-cv-04866-WMR (N.D. Ga.), the
Defendant asks the Court to enter an order extending the time,
through and including April 7, 2022, to respond to Plaintiff's
Motion for Conditional Certification.

On November 11, 2021, Plaintiff filed his Complaint. The Defendant
agreed to waive service of summons in this action, and subsequently
filed its Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint on February 14, 2022.

On February 22, 2022, the Defendant filed a motion to stay further
proceedings pending resolution of proceedings before the Supreme
Court of the United States in Laura Canaday v. The Anthem
Companies, Inc., Case No. 1:19-cv-1084 (W.D. Tenn.).

On March 8, 2022, the Plaintiff filed her motion for conditional
certification and her response to Defendant's motion to stay.

The current deadline for Defendant to respond to Plaintiff's motion
for conditional certification is March 22, 2022.

The Defendant needs additional time to investigate and respond to
Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification. Defendant thus
requests an additional sixteen days from the current deadline to
file a response to Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional
Certification, up to and including April 7,
2022.

This request for an extension of time has been made in good faith
and will not prejudice the orderly administration of this matter.
No party will be prejudiced by this extension.

Anthem is a provider of health insurance in the United States.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated March 14, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3831031 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Lennon B. Haas, Esq.
          Brett C. Bartlett, Esq.
          Kevin M. Young, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
          1075 Peachtree St. NE, Suite 2500
          Atlanta, GA 30309-3958
          Telephone: (404) 885-1500
          Facsimile: (404) 892-7056
          E-mail: bbartlett@seyfarth.com
                  kyoung@seyfarth.com
                  lhaas@seyfarth.com

ARAMARK UNIFORM: Seeks Summary Judgment in Thermal Products Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit re: Behr Dayton Thermal Products, LLC
Litigation, Case No. 3:08-cv-00326-WHR (S.D. Ohio), the Defendant
Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel asks the Court to enter an order
granting their motion for partial summary judgment.

   (1) entering judgment for Aramark on the issue "whether
       Aramark's contamination, and inaction, caused class
       members to incur the potential for vapor intrusion";

   (2) entering judgment declaring the answer "no" to the issue
       "whether Aramark engaged in abnormally dangerous
       activities for which [it is] strictly liable";

   (3) entering judgment for Aramark on the issue "whether or
       not it was foreseeable to Aramark that [its] improper
       handling and disposal of TCE and/or PCE could cause the
       Aramark Plume and subsequent injuries"; and

   (4) if the Court precludes Mr. Hagemann from testifying at
       trial, entering judgment for Aramark declaring the answer
       "no" to the issue "whether the Defendants negligently
       failed to investigate and remediate the contamination at
       and flowing from their respective Facilities."

A copy of the Court's order dated March 11, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3tN2BT6 at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John M. Alten, Esq.
          Michael D. Lichtenstein, Esq.
          Joseph A. Fischetti, Esq.
          Mark Heinzelmann, Esq.
          LOWENSTEIN SANDLER LLP
          One Lowenstein Drive
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Telephone: (973) 597-2408
          E-mail: mlichtenstein@lowenstein.com
                  jfischetti@lowenstein.com
                  mheinzelmann@lowenstein.com

               - and -

          John M. Alten, Esq.
          ULMER & BERNE LLP
          1660 W. 2nd St., Suite 1100
          Cleveland, OH 44133
          Telephone: (216) 583-7354
          E-mail: jalten@ulmer.com

ART+1 INC: Approval of Settlement Deal in Sanchez Sought
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SALVADOR SANCHEZ, CELSO
TORRES, IDELFONSO GIL RODRIGUEZ, WANDY RAMIREZ, DAVID TORRES
and JHON VINAS on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, v. ART+1, Inc. and ARTAN MAKSUTI, Individually, Case No.
1:20-cv-05623-SN (S.D.N.Y.), the Plaintiffs with the consent of the
Defendants, file a consent motion to approve settlement agreement,
cerify settlement class, authorize notice to class, and schedule
fairness hearing.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated March 11, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Lt7gjf at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jacob Aronauer, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JACOB ARONAUER
          225 Broadway, 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 323-6980


ATRIA SENIOR: Bid to Compel Stickles to Submit Trial Plan Nixed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as GEORGE STICKLES and
MICHELE RHODES, v. ATRIA SENIOR LIVING, INC. and ATRIA MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, LLC, Case No. 3:20-cv-09220-WHA (N.D. Cal.), the Court
entered an order denying Defendants' bid to compel plaintiffs to
submit a trial plan.

The Plaintiffs George Stickles and Michele Rhodes each worked as a
"Community Sales Director" for defendants, Atria Senior Living,
Inc. and Atria Management Company, LLC. The Plaintiffs allege
defendants misclassified them and other CSDs as exempt employees.

A prior order certified the following class: CSDs who did not sign
arbitration agreements and whom defendants classified as exempt
outside 27 from the date plaintiff George Stickles began his
employment with defendants (April 9, 2018) through September 29,
2019. Certification applied solely to this issue: whether
defendants properly classified CSDs as exempt outside salespersons.
Certification of the underlying wage-and-hour claims was held in
abeyance.

Atria Senior is one of the largest senior living providers in North
America. It currently operates more than 430 senior living
communities in 45 states and seven Canadian provinces.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 10, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3LiWCv9 at no extra charge.[CC]

AURORA, CO: Seeks Extension to Respond to Class Cert. Bid
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LINDSAY MINTER, et al., v.
CITY OF AURORA, COLORADO, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-02172-RMR-NYW
(D. Colo.), the Defendants ask the Court to enter an order granting
an additional 21 days to respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for class
Certification.

Following multiple lengthy extensions of the class certification
deadline, the Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class Certification
on February 28, 2022.

The Defendants' deadline to respond is currently set for March 21,
2022. Given the complexity of the relevant arguments, the number of
involved parties, and ongoing discussions over the potential for a
consolidated response, Defendants will need additional time to
respond.

Specifically, the Defendants are continuing to confer among
themselves regarding the feasibility of a joint response, or
perhaps two responses which will be divided among the Defendant
groups. Defendants will need more time to further discuss and
resolve this issue.

A copy of the Defendants' motion dated March 14, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3DpGyFa at no extra
charge.[CC]

Counsel for City of Aurora Defendants, are:

          Eric M. Ziporin, Esq.
          SGR, LLC
          3900 E. Mexico Avenue, Suite 700
          Denver, CO 80210
          Telephone: (303) 320-0509
          E-mail: eziporin@sgrllc.com
                  jeddy@sgrllc.com

Counsel for the Jefferson County Defendants, are:

          Rebecca Klymkowsky, Esq.
          JEFFERSON COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
          ASSISTANT COUNTY ATTORNEY
          100 Jefferson County Parkway, No. 5500
          Golden, CO 80419
          Telephone: (303) 271-8900
          E-mail: rklymkow@co.jefferson.co.us
                  ebutler@co.jefferson.co.us

Counsel for Jeanette Rodriguez are:

          Peter H. Doherty, Esq.
          LASATER & MARTIN, P.C.
          8822 S. Ridgeline Blvd., Ste. 405
          Highlands Ranch, CO 80129
          Telephone: (303) 730-3900
          E-mail: peter@lasaterandmartin.com

Counsel for the Aurora Officer Defendants, are:

          Heidi J. Hugdahl, Esq.
          BRUNO, COLIN & LOWE, P.C.
          1900 Broadway, Suite 3100
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 831-1099
          E-mail: hhugdahl@brunolawyers.com
                  mlowe@brunolawyers.com
                  dgoodard@brunolywers.com
                  hkuhlman@brunolawyers.com

Counsel for the Arapahoe County Defendants, are:

          Writer Mott, Esq.
          ARAPAHOE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
          5334 S. Prince Street
          Littleton, CO 80120-1136
          Telephone: (303) 795-4609
          E-mail: WMott@arapahoegov.com
                  RTaylor@arapahoegov.com

BETTER MORTGAGE: Seeks Permission to File Certain Documents
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LORENZO DOMINGUEZ,
individually, on behalf of others similarly situated, and on behalf
of the general public, v. BETTER MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Case No.
8:20-cv-01784-JLS-KES (C.D. Cal.), the Defendant applies for an
order permitting it to file the following documents:

   1. Certification Under Fair Labor Standards Act;

   2. Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion to Deny Conditional
      Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion to Deny Class
      Certification Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23;
      and

   3. Declaration of Susannah K. Howard in Support of Motion to
      Deny Class Certification and Reply in Support of Motion
      Deny Conditional Certification.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated March 14, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3730sJV at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Adam J. Karr, Esq.
          Susannah K. Howard, Esq.
          Racquel B. Martin, Esq.
          Paul A. Holton, Esq.
          O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
          400 South Hope Street, 18th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-2899
          Telephone: (213) 430-6000
          Facsimile: (213) 430-6407
          E-mail: akarr@omm.com
                  showard@omm.com
                  rmartin@omm.com
                  pholton@omm.com


BLUE DIAMOND: Brand Not Made in Smokehouse, Clark Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
Margo Clark, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Blue Diamond Growers, Case No. 1:22-cv-01591 (N.D.
Ill., March 25, 2022) alleges that the Blue Diamond brand is not
made in a smokehouse, which misleads consumers, contrary to the
front label.

The relevant front label representations include "Blue Diamond
Almonds," "Smokehouse (TM), "2g Net Carbs," "Smart Eating!," and
"Irresistible Snacking," in packaging of red and orange, evocative
of the colors of fire and a picture of the almonds.

Smoking is a method to prepare and preserve food by cooking it over
a fire containing various kinds of wood chips, exposing it to
smoke. The drying action of the smoke and the different phenol
compounds help to preserve protein-rich foods such as meat, cheese,
almonds, and fish. The origins of smoking date to prehistory, as
nomadic peoples experimented with fire and primitive cheese
products. The earliest record of smoked cheese comes from ancient
Rome, when an owner of a cheese shop was forced to share space in
the macellum with a baker. The wood provides unique and powerful
flavors, based on the type of wood used. For example, wood chips
from deciduous hardwood trees of the genus Carya, hickory, provide
hearty and sweet flavors to nuts and meat ("hickory").

Beyond misleading consumers to expect almonds prepared in a
smokehouse, the labeling does not comply with federal and identical
state regulations. The Product makes "direct or indirect
representations" about its primary or "characterizing" flavor of
smoke, through the word, "Smokehouse," a noun, and the red and
orange coloring, evocative of fire, the lawsuit says.

According to the well-respected regulatory attorney Bob Holmes,
these rules are "premised on the simple notion that consumers value
'the real thing’ versus a close substitute and should be able to
rely on the label to readily distinguish between the two. This
consumer protection objective is relevant to taste claims conveyed
in advertising as well."

Blue Diamond Growers manufactures, labels, markets, and sells
almonds represented as made in a smokehouse under the Blue Diamond
brand.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 Cuttermill Rd Ste 412
          Great Neck NY 11021
          Telephone: (516) 268-7080
          E-mail: spencer@spencersheehan.com

BNY MELLON: Joint Stipulation on Class Status Hearing Filed
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOHN BERNARD, WILLIAM
BERNARD, and PAMELA MARTIN, v. BNY MELLON, N.A., Case No.
2:18-cv-00783-RJC-CRE (W.D. Pa.), the parties propose the following
joint stipulation:

   1. The Court's Prehearing Order requires the parties to file
      a joint exhibit list and joint designations of deposition
      excerpts and discovery responses on or before March 11,
      2022.

   2. The parties have agreed to submit in their joint filings
      only those exhibits that each side may offer and those
      designations that each side may read or play at the
      hearing (reserving the right to introduce additional
      evidence for purposes of (impeachment).

   3. The parties have agreed that all other evidence filed by
      either party in support of or opposition to Plaintiffs'
      Motion for Class Certification may be considered by the
      Court as though it was introduced at the hearing, subject
      to any order of the Court concerning that evidence, and
      reserving each party's right to object to or challenge the
      use of that evidence in post-hearing briefing, and each
      party's right to object to or challenge the admissibility
      of that evidence at trial.

   4. The parties agree that they may refer to such evidence in
      their respective proposed findings of fact following the
      evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, a party's failure to
      include a previously-filed exhibit or discovery excerpt in
      the parties' joint filings should not be construed as a
      failure to offer said evidence for the Court's
      consideration.

   5. The parties have reached this agreement so that they may
      focus the hearing on the evidence each side believes to be
      most important to its position.

On February 7, 2022, this Court issued a Prehearing Order setting
an evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification to commence on March 16, 2022.

BNY Mellon provides banking services. The Company offers
institutional asset management, mutual funds, private wealth
management, asset servicing, human resources, investor solutions,
and treasury services. BNY Mellon serves clients worldwide.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated March 11, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/36vcQTq at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David J. Grais, Esq.
          Kathryn C. Ellsworth, Esq.
          Vickie Reznik, Esq.
          Maria Heifetz, Esq.
          GRAIS & ELLSWORTH LLP
          950 Third Avenue, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 755-0100

               - and -

          Michael A. Comber, Esq.
          REISINGER COMBER & MILLER, LLC
          300 Koppers Building
          436 Seventh Avenue
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 894-1380

The Defendant is represented by:

          K. Issac deVyver, Esq.
          Nellie E. Hestin, Esq.
          Alexander M. Madrid, Esq.
          MCGUIREWOODS LLP
          260 Forbes, Suite 1800
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 667-6000
          Facsimile: (412) 667-6050
          E-mail: kdevyver@mcguirewoods.com
                  nhestin@mcguirewoods.com
                  amadrid@mcguirewoods.com

BOB DEAN: Anderson Filing of Class Status Bid Extended to May 15
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Nancy Anderson et al., v.
Bob Dean, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-01891-LMA-JVM (E.D. La.), the
Hon. Judge Lance M. Africk entered an order granting the joint
motion to extend the deadline for plaintiffs to move for class
certification.

The Plaintiffs shall move for class certification no later than May
15, 2022, the Court says.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 11, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3NwtpPe at no extra charge.[CC]



BOSTON FISH: Harleysville Files Declaratory Judgment Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
HARLEYSVILLE INSURANCE COMPANY, an Ohio corporation; and
HARLEYSVILLE WORCESTER INSURANCE COMPANY, an Ohio corporation v.
BOSTON FISH MARKET, INC., an Illinois corporation; and CHRISTINE
SLOWINSKI, Case No. 1:22-cv-01583 (N.D. Ill., March 25, 2022) is a
declaratory judgment action to obtain a declaration of the rights
and obligations under commercial liability insurance policies that
were issued by Plaintiffs to Boston Fish Market, Inc.

The Plaintiffs seek a declaration from this Court that they owe no
obligation under the respective policies to defend and/or to
indemnify Boston Fish for the allegations directed against it in
the First Amended Class Action Complaint filed in the Chancery
Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, under case
no. 2021 CH 003963, titled, Christine Slowinski, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Boston Fish Market,
Inc. and Caputo's New Farm Produce, Inc. d/b/a Angelo Caputo's
Fresh Markets. (the "Underlying Suit").

Harleysville is an insurance company. Boston Fish is the named
insured under the subject insurance policies issued by the
Plaintiffs and at issue in this coverage action.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kurt Zitzer, Esq.
          Matthew R. Bloom, Esq.
          MEAGHER & GEER, P.L.L.P.
          216 N. Jefferson Street, Suite 100
          Chicago, IL 60661
          Telephone: (312) 463-1045
          E-mail: kzitzer@meagher.com
                  mbloom@meagher.com

BOUCHERIE LLC: Settlement Deal in Gabilly Suit Wins Final Nod
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JULIEN GABILLY and MARIUS
ZEMACHE, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
v. BOUCHERIE LLC, BM-CHERIE PAS LLC, and EMIL STEFKOV,  Case No.
1:19-cv-07240-AT (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Analisa Torres entered
an order granting in part and denying in part final approval of the
class action settlement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

   1. granting final approval of the Settlement Agreement;

   2. granting Class Certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)
      (3) for settlement purposes only;

   3. approving the attorneys' fees in the amount of $19,500 and
      costs in the amount of $249 for Klein Law Group's;

   4. approving the service awards for named plaintiffs; and

   5. dismissing the entire lawsuit with prejudice and without
      costs to any party. All Class Members are barred and
      permanently enjoined from participating in any other
      individual or class lawsuit against the releasees
      concerning the released claims.

Boucherie designs and produces a range of machinery for brush
manufacturers worldwide.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 10, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/36QQYRU at no extra charge.[CC]




BRIGHAM YOUNG: Evans Seeks to Stay Class Suit Pending Appeal
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ROSCOE EVANS, an
individual on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
v. BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a Utah corporation, Case No.
1:20-cv-00100-TS-CMR (D. Utah), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
enter an order staying the action until a final decision is entered
by the Tenth Circuit concerning the Plaintiff's request for appeal
and appeal if granted.

Within 14 days after entry of a final decision by the Tenth
Circuit, the parties say that they shall meet and confer and
provide the Court a status update on the case. Should they wont
file a request to appeal with the Tenth Circuit within the time
specified by Rule 23(f), they will meet and confer and provide the
Court a status update on the case within 14 days after the deadline
for the Plaintiff to file a request for appeal, the Parties say.

Brigham Young University is a private research university in Provo,
Utah, United States. It was founded in 1875 by religious leader
Brigham Young, and it is sponsored by The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated March 14, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3LpwLlm at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael J. Watton, Esq.
          WATTON LAW GROUP
          311 South State Street, Suite 280
          Salt Lake City, UT 84111
          Telephone (801) 363-0130
          E-mail: mwatton@wattongroup.com

               - and -

          Michael A. Tompkins, Esq.*
          Brett R. Cohen, Esq.*
          LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
          One Old Country Road, Suite 347
          Carle Place, NY 11514
          Tel. (516) 873-9550
          E-mail: mtompkins@leedsbrownlaw.com
                  bcohen@leedsbrownlaw.com

               - and -

          Jason P. Sultzer, Esq.
          THE SULTZER LAW GROUP, P.C.
          85 Civic Center Plaza, Suite 104
          Poughkeepsie, New York 12601
          Telephone: (845) 483-7100
          E-mail: sultzerj@thesultzerlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Edward C. Ciolko, Esq.
          LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP
          1133 Penn Avenue, Floor 5
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (267) 609-1990
          E-mail: eciolko@lcllp.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Samuel C. Straight, Esq.
          RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
          36 South State Street, Suite 1400
          P.O. Box 45385
          Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
          Telephone: (801) 532-1500
          E-mail: sstraight@rqn.com

BROADWIND ENERGY: June 14 Proof of Claim Submission Deadline Set
----------------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Plaintiff,

v.

BROADWIND ENERGY, INC.,
J. CAMERON DRECOLL; and
STEPHANIE K. KUSHNER,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-01142
Hon. Charles R. Norgle, Sr.

If you purchased or acquired Broadwind Energy ("Broadwind") common
stock, traded on the NASDAQ under the trading symbol BWEN (the
"Security") during the period March 16, 2009 through March 11,
2010, inclusive (the "Recovery Period"), you may be eligible to
recover from the Broadwind Fair Fund. You must submit a completed
Proof of Claim Form with the necessary documentation so that it is
postmarked or, if not sent by U.S. Mail, received by JUNE 14, 2022
(the "Claims Bar Date") to be eligible to recover from the Fair
Fund.

PLEASE READ THE PLAN NOTICE CAREFULLY AND IN ITS ENTIRETY. IF YOU
TIMELY SUBMIT A CLAIM FORM AND YOU SATISFY THE ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
UNDER THE DISTRIBUTION PLAN APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION, YOU MAY BE
ELIGIBLE FOR A DISTRIBUTION PAYMENT FROM THE BROADWIND FAIR FUND.
THE PLAN NOTICE CONTAINS IMPORTANT INFORMATION REGARDING THE
BROADWIND FAIR FUND, THE PLAN, AND ELIGIBILITY UNDER THE PLAN.

Background

On February 5, 2015, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(the "SEC" or "Commission") filed a Complaint against Broadwind
Energy, Inc. ("Broadwind"), J. Cameron Drecoll ("Drecoll"), and
Stephanie K. Kushner ("Kushner") (collectively, the "Defendants")
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois (the "Court"). The SEC alleged accounting and disclosure
securities law violations arising from Broadwind's failure to
record and disclose a $58 million impairment charge for intangible
assets prior to a public offering in January 2010.

On February 11, 2015, the Court entered final judgments against all
of the Defendants, ordering them, in the aggregate, to pay
disgorgement of $495,000.00 plus prejudgment interest of $71,467.00
and civil penalties of $1,125,000.00, for a total of $1,691,467.00.
The Defendants have paid the full amounts ordered by the Court,
which is deposited in an interest-bearing account at the U.S.
Treasury's Bureau of Fiscal Service ("BFS"). Each of the final
judgments provides that the SEC may propose a plan to distribute
the collected funds subject to the Court's approval that the plan
may provide for a distribution pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions
of Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX"), and
that the Court shall retain jurisdiction over the administration of
any distribution of the Fund.

On February 20, 2020, the Court established a Fair Fund, pursuant
to Section 308(a) of SOX consisting of the $1,691,467.00 paid by
the Defendants, along with any accrued interest and earnings
thereon (the "Fair Fund"), and appointed Miller Kaplan Arase LLP as
tax administrator ("Tax Administrator") to fulfill the tax
obligations of the Fair Fund ("MKA Appointment Order").

On February 20, 2020, the Court also appointed Analytics Consulting
LLC as the distribution agent ("Analytics" or "Distribution Agent")
for the Fair Fund to assist in overseeing the administration and
the distribution of the Fair Fund in coordination with SEC staff,
pursuant to the terms of a distribution plan to be approved by this
Court. On January 6, 2022, the Court approved the Plan.

Who is Potentially Eligible for Compensation?

If you purchased Broadwind common stock during the period March 16,
2009 through March 11, 2010, inclusive; are not an Excluded Party
as defined in the Plan; and suffered a loss according to the Plan;
you may be eligible for a Distribution Payment from the Broadwind
Fair Fund. Distribution Payments will be subject to a $10.00
Minimum Distribution Amount.

Excluded Parties are defined as: a) any director or officer, past
or present, of Broadwind or any of their past or present advisers,
agents, affiliate ( or any of the nominees, assigns, creditors,
heirs, distributees, spouses, parents, children, or controlled
entities of the foregoing) who served in such capacity during the
Relevant Period; b) the Defendants in the captioned action (or any
of the Defendant's advisers, agents, affiliates, nominees,
assignees, creditors, heirs, distributees, spouses, parents,
children, or controlled entities); c) any employee or former
employee of the Defendant or any of its affiliates who has been
terminated for cause or has otherwise resigned, in connection with
the conduct described in the Order; d) the Distribution Agent, its
employees, and those persons assisting the Distribution Agent in
its role as Distribution Agent; e) any Person who assigned their
right to obtain a recovery in the Commission's action against
Defendants; provided, however, that this provision shall not be
construed to exclude those Persons who obtained such a right by
gift, inheritance, devise or operation of law; and f) any Person
who, as of the Claims Bar Date, has been the subject of criminal
charges related to the violations alleged in the Commission's
complaint in this action or any related Commission action ( or any
of his or her affiliates, assignees, creditors, heirs,
distributees, spouses, parents, children, or controlled entities)
unless and until such defendant is found not guilty in all such
criminal actions prior to the Claims Bar Date, and proof of the
finding(s) is included in such defendant's timely filed Claim
Form;

How to Make a Claim

You must complete and sign the Claim Form and submit it to
Distribution Agent so that it is postmarked or, if not sent by U.S.
Mail, received no later than JUNE 14, 2022

The Claim Form can be downloaded at www.SECvBroadwindFairFund.com.
If you have any questions or would like the Court-appointed
Distribution Agent to send you a Claim Form, call 1-855-907-3474 or
email Info@SECvBroadwindFairFund.com.

You can file a Claim Form by mailing the completed form to:

         Broadwind Fair Fund
         c/o Analytics Consulting LLC
         Distribution Agent
         P.O. Box 2007
         Chanhassen, MN 55317-2007

If you do not complete and timely submit a Claim Form, you will not
be considered for eligibility to receive a Distribution Payment
under the Plan.

Obtaining a Plan of Distribution and Additional Information

You can get a copy of the Plan and additional information
concerning the Broadwind Fair Fund at
www.SECvBroadwindFairFund.com. You can also obtain a copy of the
Plan by emailing the Distribution Agent at info@
SECvBroadwindFairFund.com, calling the Distribution Agent at
1-855-907-3474, or writing to Broadwind Fair Fund, c/o Analytics
Consulting LLC, Distribution Agent, P.O. Box 2007, Chanhassen, MN
55317-2007.


CARLOS DEL TORO: Springs, et al. Win Class Certification Bid
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KENNETH SPRINGS, et al.,
v. CARLOS DEL TORO, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-03244-RDM (D.D.C.),
the Hon. Judge Randolph D. Moss entered an order:

   1. granting the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification
      and for appointment of class counsel, where class shall
      include the following individuals:

      "veterans of the United States Navy or Marine Corps who
      were separated by the Department of the Navy between
      November 10, 2014 and June 27, 2019 after being found
      unfit for continued military service by the Department
      of the Navy's Physical Evaluation Board; and (2) who
      were found by the Physical Evaluation Board to have at
      least one Category II condition;"

   2. appointing Dechert LLP and NVSLP as class counsel; and

   3. directing the parties to file on or before April 15,
      2022,a joint status report proposing a schedule for
      further proceedings and indicating the parties' positions
      with respect to whether the Court should "direct
      appropriate notice to the class," Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)
      (A).

This case concerns the disability ratings assigned to former
members of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps who suffered from medical
conditions that rendered them unfit for continued military
service.

These ratings impact, among other things, service members'
eligibility for benefits following their separation from the
military.

The Plaintiffs, two former members of the U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps, allege that they were “assigned a combined disability
rating for these [medical] conditions that was lower than the
combined disability rating required by the relevant statutes and
regulations."

The Plaintiffs have moved to certify a class of similarly situated
individuals. In response, the Defendants, the Secretary of the Navy
and the United States, acknowledge that this suit may proceed as a
class action but propose alterations to the class definition, to
which Plaintiffs have agreed in their reply.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 11, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3iHvTfF at no extra charge.[CC]

CENTURY 21: District of Nevada Dismisses Rahimian TCPA Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHAHROOZ RAHIMIAN, Plaintiff v. RACHEL ADRIANO AND
JUAN MARTINEZ, INC. doing business as CENTURY 21 AMERICANA,
Defendants, Case No. 2:20-cv-02189-GMN-VCF (D. Nev.), Judge Gloria
M. Navarro of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada
granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

I. Background

The case arises out of the Defendants' alleged violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. Section 227 ("TCPA").
The Plaintiff brings the class action lawsuit against real estate
agent Ms. Adriano, who allegedly placed multiple unsolicited phone
calls to the Plaintiff, along with her broker, Defendant Century
21

Defendant Adriano is a regular attendee at Century 21 events and
trainings. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Century 21 provided
direct support, training and guidance to Adriano. Specifically,
Defendant Century 21 trained Adriano on cold calling by providing
training courses, scripts, and coaching, which allegedly led her to
placing unsolicited calls to the Plaintiff.

On April 1, 2019, at 7:39 p.m., the Plaintiff received an
unsolicited call to his landline from Ms. Adriano, who left a
pre-recorded message on Plaintiff's voicemail. A few minutes later,
the Plaintiff received another call from Ms. Adriano. This time, he
picked up the phone call and told Ms. Adriano that he was not
interested in her services. The Plaintiff again asked Ms. Adriano
to stop calling. Despite his efforts, the Plaintiff alleges he
received a third call from Ms. Adriano on April 23, 2019, at 11:09
a.m. He asked to speak to a manager to stop the calls, but Ms.
Adriano allegedly ended the call. The same scenario occurred again
on May 17, 2019.

On Dec. 1, 2020, the Plaintiff filed the instant class action
against the Defendants on behalf of three classes: (1) the
Prerecorded No Consent Class; (2) the Do Not Call Registry Class;
and (3) Internal Do Not Call Class. He makes the following
allegations: (1) violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
on behalf of Plaintiff and the Prerecorded No Consent Class; (2)
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act on behalf of the
Do Not Call Registry Class; and (3) violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act on behalf of the Do Not Call Class.

On Feb. 16, 2021, the Plaintiff amended the Complaint to add
Defendant Century 21. The Defendants then filed the instant Motion
to Dismiss.

II. Discussion

The Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiff's first cause of
action and third cause of action against Defendant Adriano and all
claims against Defendant Century 21. The TCPA prohibits any call
using automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or
prerecorded voice to a telephone without prior express consent by
the person being called, unless the call is for emergency
purposes.

The purpose and history of the TCPA indicate that Congress was
trying to prohibit the use of ATDSs to communicate with others by
telephone in a manner that would be an invasion of privacy." There
are three elements for a TCPA violation: "(1) the defendant called
a cellular telephone number; (2) using an automatic telephone
dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice; (3) without
the recipient's prior express consent."

Judge Navarro begins her analysis by discussing the Plaintiff's
first claim.

A. Claim 1: Prerecorded No Consent

First, the Defendants assert that the Plaintiff fails to plead
sufficient facts to demonstrate that one of the calls he received
was prerecorded, in violation of the TCPA. The parties each cite to
relevant authority in support of their respective positions.

Judge Navarro notes, however, that caselaw on prerecorded calls
under the TCPA is sparse in the District of Nevada. "Nevada courts
often look to California law where, as in the case, Nevada law is
silent." In California, most courts have required specific facts --
more than mere conclusory allegations -- in pleading a TCPA claim.

The Plaintiff, in the present case, simply alleges that "Century 21
transmitted unwanted solicitation telephone calls to him and other
members of the Prerecorded No Consent Class using a prerecorded
voice message." Without further specifics, Judge Navarro says the
Plaintiff's allegation is conclusory. The Plaintiff does not allege
"any circumstances that could support an inference that the calls
were placed with an artificial or prerecorded voice." She
accordingly dismisses the Plaintiff's first claim.

B. Claim 3: Internal Do Not Call Registry

The Defendants further contend that the Plaintiff fails to
plausibly allege that Defendants lack an internal Do Not Call
("DNC") policy. 47 C.F.R. Section 64.1200(c), the implementing
regulation of the TCPA, prohibits solicitation to "a residential
telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number
on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to
receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal
government."

Judge Navarro finds that the Plaintiff did not request a copy of
the Do Not Call Registry from Defendants. His allegations that he
requested Defendant Adriano to stop calling him and yet she
persisted, do not plausibly allege an internal do not call list
violation. The Plaintiff does not allege further facts to
reasonably infer that the Defendants maintained a DNC policy and
further, that Defendant Adriano called him in violation of such
policy. Accordingly, Judge Navarro dismisses the Plaintiff's third
claim.

C. Vicarious Liability

Even if the Plaintiff properly pled that the alleged calls were
prerecorded or contradicted the Defendants' DNC policy, the
Defendants alternatively argue that the Plaintiff fails to state a
direct claim against Defendant Century 21 either through direct
liability or vicarious liability. They specifically argue, as to
vicarious liability, that the Plaintiff does not plausibly allege
any theory of agency: actual authority, apparent authority, and
ratification. In response, the Plaintiff solely disputes the
Defendants' vicarious liability argument.

Because the Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant Century 21 is
not directly liable for Adriano's claims, Judge Nvarro accordingly
limits her analysis below to whether Century 21 is vicariously
liable for Ms. Adriano's actions. She finds that the Plaintiff
fails to plead a plausible claim of actual authority and apparent
authority as to Defendant Century 21, and the Plaintiff fails to
allege sufficient facts to establish ratification. Accordingly,
Judge Navarro dismisses all claims as to Defendant Century 21.

D. Leave to Amend

Judge Navarro finds that the Plaintiff may be able to plead
additional facts to cure the deficiencies as to his First Claim and
Third Claim as to Defendant Adriano and all claims against
Defendant Century 21. Accordingly, she will grant the Plaintiff
leave to file an amended complaint.

III. Conclusion

Judge Navarro granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. If the
Plaintiff elect to amend his claims that are dismissed without
prejudice, the Plaintiff will have 21 days from the date of the
Order to do so.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2p894mhu from Leagle.com.


CHELMSFORD GROUP: Smith Files Bid for Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SMITH, et al., v.
CHELMSFORD GROUP, LLC, et al., Case No. 1:21-cv-10654-DJC (D.
Mass.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order certifying
his Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act claim for class treatment
pursuant to Rule 23(a), Rule 23(b)(2), Rule 23(b)(3) and Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 93A, section 9(2).

Accordingly, Mr. Smith respectfully requests that the Court grant
the instant motion and order the following relief:

   (1) certify -- pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) --
       a hybrid Class of all current or former residents or
       tenants who have resided in or have otherwise been
       obligated to pay rent to Chelmsford Commons at any time
       since January 1, 2021 ("Class"), appoint Mr. Smith as the
       representative of the Class and designate the undersigned
       as counsel for the Class;

   (2) alternatively, certify -- pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
       93A, section 9(2) -- a Class of all current or former
       residents or tenants who have resided in or have
       otherwise been obligated to pay rent to Chelmsford
       Commons at any time since January 1, 2021, appoint Mr.
       Smith as the representative of the Class and designate
       the undersigned as counsel for the Class;

   (3) order Defendants to produce to Mr. Smith a proposed list
       of Class members within 30 days of the date of its Order;

   (4) order the parties to confer upon and file a joint
       proposal, or motion practice as needed, concerning the
       following items within 60 days of the date of its Order:
       (a) a final Class list; (b) a proposed notice plan; and
       (c) a proposed procedure for handling Class-member
       exclusion requests; and

   (5) make any further orders as the Court deems necessary and
       proper.

Newbury is a national operator of manufactured housing communities,
that is, communities where the resident-tenants typically own their
manufactured homes but rent from Newbury the land on which their
homes sit, land that is often called a home site.

Newbury operates one such community located in Chelmsford,
Massachusetts -- called Chelmsford Commons -- where Mr. Smith
resides and which is owned by the Defendant Chelmsford Group, LLC.
Purchasing a manufactured home is less expensive than purchasing a
traditional single-family home because a manufactured home is
produced on an assembly-line in a factory, rather than built
on-site by skilled laborers, and because the price of a
manufactured home does not include the value of the land on which
it sits.

Accordingly, communities like Chelmsford Commons are attractive to
lower-income homebuyers like Mr. Smith because, among other
reasons, they offer affordable single-family homeownership
opportunities which are otherwise unavailable in traditional
single-family-home neighborhoods.

Since 1973, the Massachusetts Manufactured Housing Act has
acknowledged the value of manufactured home communities as
affordable housing by restricting the manner in which community
owners may increase home-site rent.

Although the Act does not limit the amount of home-site rent a
community owner may charge, it does require that community owners
charge the same home-site rent to all similarly situated
resident-tenants, such that all rent-payers who lease similar home
sites and receive similar services from the community owner must
pay the same rent. This requirement, which is found in Section
32L(2) of the Act, accomplishes the dual goals of ensuring that the
costs of operating each community are born equally by all
resident-tenants and preventing the typical inflationary
price-discrimination that occurs in tight rental-housing markets
when landlords charge new entrants premium rents while maintaining
lower rents for existing tenants.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 11,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uBlJmd
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian J. O'Donnell, Esq.
          Ethan R. Horowitz, Esq.
          NORTHEAST JUSTICE CENTER
          50 Island Street, Suite 203B
          Lawrence MA 01840
          Telephone: (978) 888-0634
          E-mail: bodonnell@njc-ma.org
                  ehorowitz@njc-ma.org


CITRIX SYSTEMS: Cirillo Appeals Judgment in FLSA Suit to 4th Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Danielle Cirillo filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit entitled DANIELLE CIRILLO, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, v. CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC.,
Case No. 5:21-cv-00088-BO, in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina at Raleigh.

This lawsuit seeks to recover unpaid straight-time compensation,
unpaid overtime premiums for all overtime work required, suffered,
or permitted by Defendants, reimbursement of unlawful deductions,
liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and costs, prejudgment interest
and other damages permitted by the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
North Carolina Wage and Hour Act.

The lawsuit was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina to the Eastern District of North
Carolina on February 23, 2021.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiff
asked the Court to enter an order:

   1. granting conditional certification of this action and for
      court-authorized notice pursuant to section 216(b) of the
      Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA);

   2. approving the proposed FLSA notice of this action and the
      consent form;

   3. directing a production of names, last known mailing
      addresses, last-known cell phone numbers, email addresses,
      work locations, and dates of employment of all putative
      plaintiffs within 15 days of the Order; and

   4. giving Plaintiff the ability to distribute the Notice and
      Opt-in  Form via first class mail, email, and text message
as
      well as via radio and/or social media postings to:

      "all putative plaintiffs of the conditionally certified
      collective, with a reminder mailing to be sent 45-days after
      the initial mailing to all non-responding putative
      plaintiffs."

On March 21, 2022, District Judge Terrence W. Boyle entered an
order granting Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and
granted Plaintiff's motion to certify class.

The Plaintiff now files this notice of interlocutory appeal to
review the said order.

The appellate case is captioned as Danielle Cirillo v. Citrix
Systems, Case No. 22-1310, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, filed on March 23, 2022.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant DANIELLE CIRILLO, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Gilda Adriana Hernandez, Esq.
          Charlotte Smith, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF GILDA A. HERNANDEZ, PLLC
          1020 Southhill Drive
          Cary, NC 27513
          Telephone: (919) 741-8693
          E-mail: ghernandez@gildahernandezlaw.com
                  ghernandez@gildahernandezlaw.com  

Defendant-Appellee CITRIX SYSTEMS is represented by:

          Noah A. Finkel, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW, LLP
          233 South Wacker Drive
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 460-5913

               - and -

          Louisa Johnson, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW, LLP
          1075 Peachtree Street, NE
          Atlanta, GA 30309-3962
          Telephone: (404) 888-1023
          E-mail: lojohnson@seyfarth.com

               - and -

          Frederick Thomas Smith, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW, LLP
          121 West Trade Street
          Charlotte, NC 28202
          Telephone: (404) 888-1021
          E-mail: fsmith@seyfarth.com

CITY NATIONAL BANK: Carter Seeks to Certify Three Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LISA CARTER, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. THE CITY
NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF LAWTON, OKLAHOMA, and DOES 1
through 5, Case No. 5:21-cv-00029-PRW (W.D. Okla.), the Plaintiff
asks the Court to enter an order certifying the following Classes:

   -- The Repeat Fee Class

      "All customers of Defendant who have or have had accounts
      with the Defendant who incurred more than one NSF fee or
      an NSF fee followed by an overdraft fee for the same item
      during the period beginning January 14, 2016 and ending on
      the date the Class is certified;"

   -- The Regulation E Fee Class

      "All customers of Defendant who have or have had accounts
      with the Defendant who were assessed an overdraft fee on a
      one-time debit card or ATM transaction(s) during the
      period beginning January 14, 2020 and ending on the date
      the Class is certified;" and

   -- The Regulation E Injunctive Class

      "All customers of Defendant who have accounts with the
      Defendant and who are enrolled in its Regulation E
      overdraft program for one-time debit card and ATM
      transactions during the period beginning January 14, 2020
      and ending on the date the Class is certified.

      Excluded from the Classes are: (1) any entity in which the
      Defendant has a controlling interest; (2) officers or
      directors of Defendant; (3) this Court and any of its
      employees assigned to work on the case; and (4) all
      employees of the law firms representing Plaintiff and the
      Class members.

City National offers a wide variety of premier financial services
including personal banking, credit cards, business banking, and
retirement planning.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 14,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3DsX87m
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          David C. Wright, Esq.
          Emily J. Kirk, Esq.
          McCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO, LLP
          3281 E. Guasti Road, Suite 100
          Ontario, CA 91761
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557 1275
          E-mail: rdm@mccunewright.com
                  dcw@mccunewright.com
                  ejk@mccunewright.com

               - and -

          Barrett T. Bowers, Esq.
          barrett@bowerslawok.com
          THE BOWERS LAW FIRM
          P.O. Box 891628
          Oklahoma City, OK 73189
          Telephone: (405) 727-7188

CLEAN ADVANTAGE: Bruno Seeks Unpaid Wages for Janitors Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DIGNA VASQUEZ BRUNO, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, v. CLEAN ADVANTAGE CORPORATION, Case No.
1:22-cv-00816 (D.D.C., March 25, 2022) seeks unpaid wages,
liquidated damages, reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and all
related penalties and damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
the D.C. Wage Payment and Wage Collection Act, and the D.C. Minimum
Wage Act Revision Act.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendant as a janitor from August 16,
2018, until February 9, 2022. Throughout her employment, she was
assigned to work at the Van Ness North Cooperative high-rise
apartment building located at 3001 Veazey Terrace NW, Washington,
DC.

The Plaintiff and the putative class and collective members
frequently worked more than 40 hours per week. The Defendant
allegedly did not pay them at the rate of one and one-half times
their regular hourly rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in
a given workweek, the lawsuit says.

The Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The proposed Rule 23 Class is
defined as:

   "All current and former janitorial workers, employed by Clean
   Advantage Corporation in the District of Columbia, who were not
   paid overtime for all hours worked over 40 in workweeks
   compensable on or after March 25, 2019 (the "Rule 23 Class")."

Clean Advantage is a janitorial company that delivers cleaning and
disinfection services for commercial and residential sectors.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mariusz Kurzyna, Esq.
          ZIPIN, AMSTER & GREENBERG, LLC
          8757 Georgia Ave., Suite 400
          Silver Spring, MD 20910
          Telephone: (301) 587-9373
          Facsimile: (240) 839-9142
          E-mail: mkurzyna@zagfirm.com


CLUB 360: Bazarganfard Must File Class Cert Bid by May 24
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as EDWIN BAZARGANFARD and
BARAK GOLAN, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, v. CLUB 360 LLC; ABC FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC; JEHANGIR
MEHER; and DOES 1-10, Case No. 2:21-cv-02272-CBM-PLA (C.D. Cal.),
the Hon. Judge Consuelo B. Marshall entered an order:

   1. The Hearing on Plaintiffs' motion for class certification
      is continued to June 28, 2022 at 10:00 a.m.;

   2. The Plaintiffs shall file their Motion for Class
      Certification by May 24, 2022;

   3. The Defendants shall file their Opposition by June 14,
      2022; and

   4. The Plaintiffs' shall file their Reply in Support by June
      21, 2022.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 10, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3NpPgrC at no extra charge.[CC]

COVERALL NORTH: Court Lifts Stay of Reeves' Claims in Billie Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARIBE BILLIE, ET AL., Plaintiffs v. COVERALL NORTH
AMERICA, Defendants, Civil Case No. 3:19-CV-00092 (JCH) (D. Conn.),
Judge Janet C. Hall of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut granted in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Lift the
Stay.

The Court lifted the stay as to Plaintiff Reeves' claims against
Coverall.

I. Introduction

Plaintiffs Caribe Billie and Quincy Reeves bring the action against
the Defendant, commercial cleaning services provider Coverall,
alleging that Coverall misclassified them as independent
contractors and withheld portions of their wages under section
31-71e of the Connecticut General Statutes. By a Ruling dated March
12, 2020, the Court stayed the Plaintiffs' action and compelled
arbitration. Now before the Court is the Plaintiffs' Motion to Lift
the Stay.

II. Background

The Plaintiffs, janitorial workers who entered into "franchise
agreements" with Coverall, filed the case as a putative class
action in January 2019. In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs
contended that Coverall wrongfully classified them as independent
contractors rather than employees and denied them wages owed under
Connecticut law.

Coverall moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims or to compel
arbitration on the basis of arbitration agreements in the
Plaintiffs' Franchise Agreements and subsequent releases and
amendments. In opposition, the Plaintiffs objected on a number of
grounds, including the enforceability of cost-splitting provisions
in the Agreements. The provisions, which the Plaintiffs argued were
unconscionable, required that the Plaintiffs pay all arbitration
filing fees while the parties split the remaining costs. At oral
argument, the counsel for Coverall represented that his client
would not seek to enforce some of the cost splitting measures,
including an attorneys' fee provisions in Reeves' Agreement.

In March 2020, the Court granted Coverall's Motion to Compel
Arbitration. In its Ruling, the Court held that the Plaintiffs
"failed to meet their burden of establishing substantive
unconscionability as to the cost-sharing provision."

After the Court's Ruling, Billie and Reeves, as well as a third
individual, Veronica Flores, separately filed claims against
Coverall before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA").

Plaintiff Billie's Arbitrator found that the cost-splitting
provision in his Agreement was unenforceable, ordering Coverall to
pay the costs of arbitration. Billie's arbitration is ongoing, but
any decision issued in his arbitration will have no preclusive
effect on those of Reeves or Flores.

Ms. Flores, who is not a named plaintiff in the case, was ordered
to make a $2,500 deposit before the Arbitrator would consider the
enforceability of the cost-splitting provision in her Agreement.
Because Flores was unable to pay the required deposit, the
Arbitrator informed her that he would close her case within 30 days
of Jan. 21, 2021. Her arbitration has since been closed.

The Commercial Rules continued to govern Reeves' arbitration,
requiring him to pay one-half of the Arbitrator's fees. In
connection with the present Motion to Lift the Stay, Reeves has
submitted a new Affidavit to this court detailing household
finances for himself, his wife, and his two children. Reeves
reports earning around $1,700 to 1,800 per month from Coverall,
although many of his accounts were suspended due to the COVID-19
pandemic. Reeves reports a net worth of approximately $8,963,
aggregating his individual bank account, his shared bank account,
and his stocks, subtracting his debt, and excluding his wife's bank
account or retirement savings. His family's monthly expenses appear
to roughly match Reeves' monthly income.

III. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction Over Flores' Claims

As a threshold matter, Judge Hall finds that the Court lacks
jurisdiction over claims asserted by or on behalf of Flores,
because she is not a party to the action. Further, while the matter
was pled as a potential class action, the Court has not certified a
class, because it terminated the PPlaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification as moot in light of its Ruling compelling
arbitration. Thus, Flores has no standing as a class member, and
Reeves lacks standing to assert claims on her behalf.

While she recognizes the "chicken and egg" problem that emerges for
the Plaintiffs -- whereby they cannot move to add Ms. Flores as a
party with the stay in place, but cannot use Ms. Flores' experience
to advocate for lifting the stay unless she is a party -- Judge
Hall cannot adjudicate the rights of a person not a party to the
action.

B. Reeves' Motion to Lift the Stay

Mr. Reeves' arguments in support of lifting the stay fall into two
broad categories. First, he asks the Court to, in effect,
reconsider whether the cost-splitting provision in his Agreement
with Coverall is unconscionable and unenforceable. Second, he
contends that Section 3 of the FAA no longer requires the court to
stay this action because (a) the arbitration has been "had" because
Reeves was genuinely unable to pay the high fees, and (b) Coverall
has waived its right to arbitrate.

Coverall objects, arguing first that the Court has already decided
that the terms of Reeves' arbitration agreement delegate questions
of arbitrability to the arbitrator and that the delegation clause
in Reeves' arbitration agreement is not unconscionable. In response
to Reeves' second assertion, that the Court should not maintain the
stay under Section 3, Coverall argues that (a) Reeves has failed to
make good-faith attempts to arbitrate or provide evidence of his
inability to pay; and (b) Coverall has not prevented Reeves from
arbitrating.

First, Judge Hall holds that the Arbitrator's decision that the fee
sharing arrangement is not unconscionable bars the Court from
reaching an alternative conclusion. To do so would be to overstep
the deference that courts grant to arbitral decisions. Thus, the
Court cannot reconsider the issue of unconscionability, which was
submitted to and determined by the Arbitrator.

Second, Judge Hall finds that (i) because the Arbitration between
Reeves and Coverall commenced and concluded in accordance with the
terms of their Agreement, which incorporated the Commercial Rules
of the AAA, the Arbitration "has been had in accordance with the
terms of the agreement" as required by Section 3 of the FAA;(ii)
because Reeves genuinely could not afford the arbitrator's fees,
but made diligent efforts to arbitrate in good faith before the
arbitration terminated, the arbitration "has been had in accordance
with the agreement" under Section 3 of the FAA; (iii) because
Coverall refused the opportunity to advance Reeves' fees to ensure
that arbitration would continue, Coverall acted inconsistently with
its right to arbitrate, let alone its representation to the Court;
(iv) there is no basis for a stay of Reeves' claims remaining under
Section 3 of the FAA.

Finally, Judge Hall holds that Coverall has failed to identify any
section of the FAA that would compel dismissal of Reeves' claims on
the basis of his inability to pay. She will not dismiss Reeves.
And, given that no justification for a stay of Reeves' claims
remains, and the dispute is before the Court after arbitration "has
been had," Judge Hall will lift the stay as to Reeves' claims and
administratively reopen the case.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Hall granted in part the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Lift the Stay. She lifted the stay as to
Plaintiff Reeves' claims against Coverall. Plaintiff Billie's
claims will remain stayed pending the outcome of his arbitration
before the AAA. The parties are ordered to confer and propose a
Rule 26(f) Scheduling Order within 21 days of the Ruling.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Ruling is available
at https://tinyurl.com/4xzsfshj from Leagle.com.


DEERE & CO: Monopolizes Repair Service Market, Lloyd Family Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
LLOYD FAMILY FARMS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. DEERE & CO. (d/b/a JOHN DEERE),
Defendant, Case No. 3:22-cv-50090 (N.D. Ill., March 24, 2022)
arises from the Defendant's alleged monopolization of the repair
service market for John Deere brand agricultural equipment with
onboard central computers known as engine control units, in
violation of the Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant unlawfully stifles
competition by blocking farmers and independent repair shops from
repairing Deere Tractors, and reducing consumer choice in what
would otherwise be a robust and competitive repair aftermarket,
thereby artificially increasing Deere Repair Services prices to
supra-competitive levels. As a result of Deere's unlawful
withholding of the necessary software to perform repairs from
farmers and independent repair shops, Plaintiff and the Class paid
artificially inflated prices for Deere Repair Services during the
Class Period. Prices in the Repair Services Market exceeded the
amount they would have paid if the prices had been determined by a
competitive market. The Plaintiff and Class members were,
therefore, injured by Defendant's conduct, says the suit.

The Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, treble and
exemplary damages, costs, and attorneys' fees. As for equitable
relief, Plaintiff seeks an order requiring Deere to make the
necessary software available, at reasonable cost, to individuals
and independent repair shops.

Plaintiff Lloyd Family Farms is a corporation located in Virginia.
Plaintiff Lloyd Family Farms owns John Deere Tractors and John
Deere Combines with engine control units.

Deere & Co. is an American manufacturer of farm machinery and
industrial equipment.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert M. Foote, Esq.
          FOOTE, MIELKE, CHAVEZ & O'NEIL, LLC
          10 W. State Street, Suite 200
          Geneva, IL 60134
          Telephone: (630) 232-7450
          Facsimile: (630) 232-7452
          E-mail: rmf@fmcolaw.com

               - and -

          Robin F. Zwerling, Esq.
          Susan Salvetti, Esq.
          Justin M. Tarshis, Esq.
          ZWERLING, SCHACHTER & ZWERLING, LLP
          41 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10010
          Telephone: (212) 223-3900
          Facsimile: (212) 371-5969
          E-mail: rzwerling@zsz.com
                  ssalvetti@zsz.com
                  jtarshis@zsz.com

DELTA AIR: Seeks Leave to File Class Cert Documents Under Seal
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as FRANKIE LOMAS, ROXANDA
YANCOR, JOSE ALVARADO, and MARIA ALVARADO, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v. DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,
a Delaware Corporation, Case No. 2:20-cv-00786-JAK-SK (C.D. Cal.),
the Plaintiffs submit application to file under seal the following
documents:

  -- Declaration of Nathan Cobb I. Cobb in Support of Class
     Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification;

  -- Declaration of Frankie Lomas in Support Of Class
     Plaintiffs' Motion For Class Certification;

  -- Declaration of Roxanda Yancor in Support Of Class
     Plaintiffs' Motion For Class Certification;

  -- Declaration of Jose Alvarado in Support Of Class
     Plaintiffs' Motion For Class Certification; and

  -- Declaracion de Maria Alvarado en Favor de La Peticion por
     Una Certificacion de Clase Para Una Accion Colectiva, and
     relative translation.

Delta is one of the major airlines of the United States and a
legacy carrier.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated March 14, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3JXp19J at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Filippo Marchino, Esq.
          Carlos X. Colorado, Esq.
          Thomas E. Gray, Esq. (SBN 299898)
          THE X-LAW GROUP, P.C.
          625 Fair Oaks Ave, Suite 390
          5 South Pasadena, CA 91030
          Telephone: (213) 599-3380
          Facsimile: (213) 599-3370
          E-mail: FM@XLAWX.com
                  CC@XLAWX.com
                  TG@XLAWX.com

DYNCORP INT'L: Del Fierro Seeks to Vacate Class Cert. Deadlines
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RAMON DEL FIERRO,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL LLC, a Limited Liability Company; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Case No. 2:19-cv-07091-DDP-JC (C.D. Cal.),
the Plaintiff applies ex parte to vacate the deadlines set forth in
the Court's Order Approving Joint Stipulation to Continue Pretrial
and Trial Dates, which are as follows:

             Event                          Current Date

  All Discovery Cut-Off (including          May 17, 2022
  hearing of discovery motions):

  Expert Disclosure (Initial):              March 21, 2022

  Expert Disclosure (Rebuttal):             April 18, 2022

  Last Day to File Motions:                 March 14, 2022

  Final Pre-Trial Conference:               July 11, 2022

  Jury Trial (3-10 days):                   Aug. 2, 2022

DynCorp was an American private military contractor. Started as an
aviation company, the company also provided flight operations
support, training and mentoring.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated March 14, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3tT7UjP at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Larry W. Lee, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
          E-mail: lwlee@diversitylaw.com

               - and -

          Edward W. Choi, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF CHOI & ASSOCIATES
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 381-1515
          Facsimile: (213) 465-4885
          E-mail: edward.choi@choiandassociates.com

               - and -

          Dennis S. Hyun, Esq.
          HYUN LEGAL, APC
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
          E-mail: dhyun@hyunlegal.com

             - and -

          William L. Marder, Esq.
          POLARIS LAW GROUP LLP
          501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
          Hollister, CA 95023
          Telephone: (831) 531-4214
          Facsimile: (831) 634-0333
          E-mail: bill@polarislawgroup.com

EDGEWELL PERSONAL: Schloegel Class Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Greg Kays of the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Missouri, Western Division, dismissed the case, SHANNON
SCHLOEGEL, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. EDGEWELL PERSONAL CARE COMPANY and EDGEWELL PERSONAL
CARE BRANDS, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 4:21-cv-00631-DGK (W.D.
Mo.), without prejudice.

I. Background

Plaintiff Schloegel brings the putative class action against
Defendants Edgewell Personal Care Co. and Edgewell Personal Care
Brands, LLC (collectively "Edgewell"). Edgewell manufactures,
distributes, markets, and sells "Banana Boat" sunscreen products.

In June 2021, the Plaintiff purchased a Banana Boat sunscreen
product at a store in Kansas City, Missouri. She alleges that some
samples of Banana Boat sunscreen products -- including samples of
the product she purchased -- have been found to be adulterated with
benzene, a known human carcinogen. She alleges that Edgewell failed
to disclose via labeling or advertising that Banana Boat sunscreen
products may contain benzene. However, the Plaintiff does not
allege that the specific product she purchased was adulterated with
benzene.

The first count of the Plaintiff's two-count complaint alleges
Edgewell violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act
("MMPA"), Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 407.020, because Edgewell sold
Banana Boat sunscreen products without listing benzene as an
ingredient on the product label. The second count alleges that
Edgewell was unjustly enriched because it falsely represented that
Banana Boat sunscreen products did not contain benzene, and that
the Plaintiff and the putative class members conferred a benefit on
Edgewell by purchasing the products.

On her MMPA claim, the Plaintiff seeks damages "measured by the
purchase price of the sunscreen." On her unjust enrichment claim,
she likewise seeks restitution equivalent to the purchase price of
the sunscreen. The Plaintiff also seeks an injunction preventing
Edgewell from further advertising or sale of Banana Boat sunscreen
products unless Edgewell includes a warning label indicating that
the product may contain benzene.

Edgewell moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), arguing
that the Plaintiff has not established standing and that the Court
therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction. It also moved to
dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the
Plaintiff's claims are preempted by multiple provisions in the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. Ch. 9, and that the
Plaintiff has failed to state an MMPA claim or an unjust enrichment
claim.

II Discussion

The Plaintiff has standing only if she establishes 1) an
"injury-in-fact," 2) "a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of," and 3) that the Court is likely able to
redress her injury. The Plaintiff must establish each element of
standing to "the manner and degree of evidence required" at each
successive stage of the litigation. General factual allegations of
the elements of standing therefore suffice to establish standing at
the pleading stage, as the Court "presumes that general allegations
embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the
claim."

The Plaintiff argues -- consistent with her complaint -- that her
injury occurred when she purchased the Banana Boat sunscreen
product, as she would have paid significantly less or not have made
the purchase at all had she known of the risk of exposure to
benzene.

Judge Kays finds her correct that "alleged economic harm -- even if
only a few pennies each -- is a concrete, non-speculative injury."
Where the Plaintiff's argument fails, however, is that she must not
only show a concrete injury, but also a particularized one. That is
to say the Plaintiff must allege that she was actually injured. The
Plaintiff has failed to allege that she actually purchased Banana
Boat Sunscreen products which were adulterated with benzene, and
thus has failed to allege that she did not receive exactly what
Edgewell promised: An unadulterated sunscreen product.

The Plaintiff also argues it was impossible for a reasonable
consumer to detect whether the purportedly kosher meat was
non-kosher, whereas benzene is detectable and in fact has been
detected in Banana Boat sunscreen products. Finally, she argues
that Wallace "did not involve adulteration of a product with a
cancer-causing agent."

Judge Kays holds that neither distinction is relevant. The
Plaintiff has not alleged a particularized injury.

III. Conclusion

Because Judge Kays concludes that the Plaintiff does not have
standing and it therefore lacks jurisdiction to decide the matter,
he does not address the Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) arguments. He
dismissed the case without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ycy5btsj from Leagle.com.


FIELDWORKS LLC: Bid to Modify Class Cert. Order Tossed
------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MICHAEL MATHEWS, v.
FIELDWORKS, LLC, Case No. 5:20-06057-CV-RK (W.D. MO.), the Hon.
Judge Roseann A. Ketchmark entered an order denying the Defendant's
motion for reconsideration and modification of the Court's prior
order granting Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

The Court said, "Because all members of the proposed Adverse Action
class (including both applicant groups) were affected by the
Defendant's undisputed policy, which did not allow for a meaningful
"on hold" period for applicants to allow them a right to dispute
the contents of their reports after being notified Defendant
intended to take adverse action against them, Defendant's arguments
fail. Accordingly, the Defendant's motion for reconsideration and
modification is denied."

In this case, the Plaintiff was an applicant for employment with
Defendant employer. the Plaintiff alleges Defendant failed to give
Plaintiff and those similarly situated to him a copy of their
consumer report before it took adverse action against them based on
those consumer reports in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act ("FCRA").

Specifically, the Plaintiff claims Defendant used a Consumer
Report, as defined by the FCRA, to take adverse employment action
against Plaintiff and other members of the putative adverse action
class.

The Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated the FCRA by failing to
provide Plaintiff and other adverse action class members with (1) a
copy of the Consumer Report that was used to take adverse
employment action against them prior to the adverse action and (2)
a reasonable time to review, dispute, contest, address, and/or
otherwise challenge any information or inaccuracies within the
Consumer Reports prior to the adverse action.

In its Order of October 5, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff's
request to certify the following class:
   
   "All employees or prospective employees of Defendant that
   suffered an adverse employment action on or after February
   21, 2018, that was based, in whole or in part, on information
   contained in a Consumer Report, and who were not provided a
   copy of the Consumer Report by the Defendant in advance of
   the adverse action."

The Defendant first argues the Court erred in failing to clarify
whether it was distinguishing between two applicant groups: (1) a
group of approximately 500 applicants who were told they would not
be hired before receiving a copy of their consumer report and (2)
another group of approximately 2,100 applicants, some of whom were
told they would not be hired after receiving a copy of their report
and some before. The Defendant next argues the court erred in
granting class certification to include the group of 2,100 due to
the individualized inquiry it contends would be required as to the
sequencing of receipt of notification of not being hired and
receipt of a copy of their consumer report.

The Defendant asserts its policy was adequate under the FCRA as to
any applicant who received their report any time before being
rejected, thus requiring an individualized inquiry as to the
sequence of events. In support of its position that its policy was
adequate under the FCRA as to the applicants who may have received
their report some period of time before being rejected, Defendant
cites Johnson v. ADP Screening & Selection Services, Inc., for the
statement, "even if [the employer] made an automated internal
decision, it is not an adverse action for purposes of the FCRA."

The Plaintiff asserts in response that the testimony of Defendant's
owner and corporate representative reflects that it was Defendant's
policy during the relevant time for a central staff administrative
team member to change an applicant's status in the database to "not
approved" before providing the applicant with a copy of their
consumer report if the member found a reason for rejection from
information contained in the applicant's consumer report. (Doc.
75.) The Plaintiff concludes this policy affected every member of
the proposed Adverse Action class (both applicant groups) and
violated the FCRA.

Fieldworks offers field planning, data management and reporting,
training programs, and online campaigning services.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 11, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3JQSemK at no extra charge.[CC]


FLEETECH INC: Jenkins Sues Over Delivery Drivers' Unpaid Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOSHUA JENKINS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FLEETECH, INC., Defendant, Case No.
4:22-cv-00274-LPR (E.D. Ark., March 24, 2022) is brought under the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act for
declaratory judgment, monetary damages, liquidated damages,
prejudgment interest, and costs, including reasonable attorneys'
fees, as a result of Defendant's failure to pay Plaintiff and other
hourly-paid employees lawful overtime compensation for hours worked
in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a delivery driver during
part of the three years prior to the filing of this lawsuit.

Fleetech, Inc. operates in Arkansas, Illinois, Missouri,
Mississippi, and various other states as an operation centered on
interstate transport and delivery of goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chris Burks, Esq.
          WHLAW | WE HELP
          1 Riverfront Pl. - Suite 745
          North Little Rock, AR 72114
          Telephone: (501) 891-6000  
          E-mail: chris@wh.la

FOREST RIVER: Gross Class Certification Bid Junked as Moot
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ALLEN GROSS, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, v. FOREST RIVER
MANUFACTURING LLC, Case No. 3:21-cv-00616-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind.), the
Hon. Judge Damon R. Leichty entered an orde denying as moot
Plaintiff's motion to certify class defined as:

   "All current and former employees for Forest River who were
   paid based on rounded time punches (rather than actual punch
   to punch) and who worked 40 or more hours in at least one
   workweek from the period of August 19, 2018, to the present."

The nature of suit states Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant maintained an illegal rounding
policy.

Forest River is an American manufacturer of recreational vehicles,
cargo trailers, utility trailers, and pontoon boats.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 11, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Hans A. Nilges, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          7266 Portage St., N.W., Suite D
          Massillon, OH 44646
          Telephone: (330) 470-4428
          Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
          E-mail: hans@ohlaborlaw.com

               - and -

          Robi Baishnab, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          1360 E. 9th St., Suite 808
          Cleveland, OH 44114
          Telephone: (216) 230-2955
          Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
          E-mail: rbaishnab@ohlaborlaw.com

               - and -

          Robert P. Kondras, Jr., Esq.
          HASSLER KONDRAS MILLER LLP
          100 Cherry Street
          Terre Haute, IN 47807
          Telephone: (812) 232-9691
          Facsimile: (812) 234-2881
          E-mail: kondras@hkmlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1550 Old Henderson Rd., Suite No. 126e
          Columbus, OH 43220
          Telephone: (614) 949-1181
          Facsimile: (614) 386-9964
          E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: Washington Files Bid for Conditional Status
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Malaika Washington
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
Freedom of Expression, LLC d/b/a Bones Cabaret, Wisnowski Inc.
d/b/a Skin Cabaret, and Todd Borowsky, Individually, Case No.
2:21-cv-01318-MTL (D.Ariz.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter
an order conditionally certifying a class defined as:

   "All current and former exotic dancers who worked for the
    Defendants at any time starting three years before this
    lawsuit was filed up to the present."

The Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others
similarly situated filed an original complaint on July 29, 2021
seeking to recover unpaid wages owed to them under the Fair Labor 8
Standards Act ("FLSA").

The Defendants allegedly permitted the Plaintiff to work as an
exotic dancer at its club but refused to compensate her at the
applicable minimum wage. The Defendants' conduct violates the FLSA,
the Plaintiffs contend.

The Defendants operate adult entertainment clubs in Scottsdale,
Arizona currently under the operating name of "Bones Cabaret" and
Skin Cabaret.

The Plaintiff is a former exotic dancer at Bones and Skin. The
following facts apply equally to all dancers who worked, or
currently work, at Bones and Skin. The Plaintiff's and Class
Members' primary job duties were to dance in designated areas and
perform dances for Defendants' customers. 2 Defendants did not
compensate the dancers who worked at Bones and Skin.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 14,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/36A5CgZ
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David W. Hodges, Esq.
          Jerry W. Mason, Esq.
          HODGES & FOTY, LLP
          4409 Montrose, Blvd., Suite 200
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 523-0001
          Facsimile: (713) 523-1116
          E-mail: dhodges@hftrialfirm.com
                  jmason@hftrialfirm.com

GATEHOUSE MEDIA: Loses Bid to Junk Ewalt Suit Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOHN EWALT, v. GATEHOUSE
MEDIA OHIO, Case No. 2:19-cv-04262-ALM-KAJ (S.D. Ohio), the Hon.
Judge Algenon L. Marbley. entered an order denying without
prejudice Defendant's motion to deny class Certification.

In the Court's Order of January 6. 2022, it stayed briefing on
Defendant's Motion to Deny Class Certification pending resolution
of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint.
The Magistrate Judge granted leave to amend on March 8, 2022. Given
this ruling, the Defendant's motion to deny class certification no
longer relates to the class allegations in the operative
complaint.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 9, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3JV5KGh at no extra charge.[CC]



GENERAL MILLS: Faces McDermott Suit Over Mislabeled Fruit Snacks
----------------------------------------------------------------
Melanie McDermott, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. General Mills Sales, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:22-cv-01555 (N.D. Ill., March 24, 2022)
arises from the Defendant's alleged false, deceptive, and
misleading representations of its fruit snacks filled with thick,
fruit flavored liquids under the Gushers brand in violation of the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and
the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant's relevant
representations of the product include "Fruit Gushers," "Fruit
Flavored Snacks," "Strawberry Splash-Flavored With Other Natural
Flavors," "Tropical Flavors-Flavored With Other Natural Flavors,"
"No Artificial Flavors," "Gelatin Free," and various fruit-colored
liquids and images of the individual pieces. These representations
about the product's fruit flavors cause consumers, including
Plaintiff, to expect only natural fruit flavors. However, the
representations are false, deceptive, and misleading, because the
product contains artificial flavoring ingredients, says the suit.

General Mills Sales, Inc. is a Minneapolis, Minnesota-based company
which markets and sells food products. The Company offers cereals,
yogurt, refrigerated dough, and baking products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 Cuttermill Rd. Ste 412
          Great Neck NY 11021
          Telephone: (516) 268-7080
          E-mail: spencer@spencersheehan.com  

GERVASI VINEYARD: Pays Servers at Minimum Wage Rate, Dewitt Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------------
KRISTEN DEWITT, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. GERVASI VINEYARD & ITALIAN BISTRO, LLC and GERVASI
1700, LLC., Case No. 5:22-cv-00476-BYP (N.D. Ohio, March 25, 2022)
is a collective action arising as a result of the Defendants'
practices and policies of not paying its tipped, non-exempt
employees, including Plaintiff and other similarly situated
employees, the applicable minimum wage for all of the hours worked
in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio Minimum
Fair Wage Standards Act.

The Defendants allegedly pay its tipped employees, including
servers and bartenders, below the minimum wage rate by taking
advantage of the tip-credit provisions of the FLSA and, in Ohio,
the OMFWSA. Under the tip-credit provisions, an employer of tipped
employees may, under certain circumstances, pay those employees
less than the minimum wage rate by taking a "tip credit" against
the employer's minimum wage obligations from the tips received from
customers.

As a result of these violations, Defendants have lost the ability
to use the tip credit and therefore must compensate Plaintiff and
all similarly situated workers at the full minimum wage rate,
unencumbered by the tip credit, and for all hours worked. In other
words, Defendants must account for the difference between the wages
paid to Plaintiff and all similarly situated workers and the
minimum wage rate, says the suit.

The Defendants operate several dining establishments on the same
property in Canton, Ohio, including the Italian Bistro and the
Crush House, among others.

The Defendant employs servers, bartenders, and even coordinators to
provide services to customers.

From April 2015 through July 2021, the Plaintiff was employed by
Defendant as a server and event coordinator, for which she was paid
a "tip credit wage" for both positions.

As a result of Defendant's alleged practice in giving a portion of
the tips to non-tipped employees, Plaintiff and other similarly
situated servers, bartenders, and event coordinators have been paid
a tipped wage that is lower than the full minimum wage for the
hours they worked. Moreover, the Defendant required Plaintiff and
other servers, bartenders, and event coordinators to perform the
following non-exhaustive list of non-tip generating duties each
workweek that were not performed contemporaneously with serving
customers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert B. Kapitan, Esq.
          Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq.
          Lori M. Griffin, Esq.
          THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
          The Heritage Building, Suite 250
          34555 Chagrin Boulevard
          Moreland Hills, OH 44022
          Telephone: (216) 696-5000
          Facsimile: (216) 696-7005
          E-mail: robert@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  lori@lazzarolawfirm.com

HAWAII MEDICAL: Partly Wins Summary Judgment Bid vs Park et al.
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as PARK, SOOK JA; PARK, SOON
Y.; PARK, GRACE; and KIM, JAE SOOK, v. HAWAII MEDICAL SERVICE
ASSOCIATION, Case No. 1:21-cv-00039-JMS-WRP (D. Haw.), the Hon.
Judge J. Michael Seabright entered an order:

   1. granting the defendant's motion to strike; and

   2. granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion
      for summary judgment.

This case concerns the State of Hawaii's Medicaid program.
"Medicaid is a joint state-federal funding program for medical
assistance in which the Federal Government approves a state plan
for the funding of medical services for the needy and then
subsidizes a significant portion of the financial obligations the
State has agreed to assume."

Hawaii's Department of Human Services ("DHS") oversees the state's
Medicaid plan, i.e., the "Plan for Medicaid, QUEST Integration" or
simply the "PLAN." DHS implements the PLAN by contracting with
managed care organizations in order to provide medical services to
PLAN enrollees. HMSA is a managed care organization. The Plaintiffs
are PLAN enrollees and are beneficiaries to DHS's contracts with
HMSA.

The Plaintiffs were born in Korea, immigrated to the United States,
and have limited English proficiency.

HMSA is contractually obligated to cover "medically necessary"
services for enrollees. That contractual obligation incorporates
requirements from various regulations and statutes, including
Hawaii Revised Statutes, which requires managed care organizations
to cover health services recommended by an enrollee's treating
physician and determined by the managed care organization's
director or physician designee to be "medically necessary," as
defined in HRS section 432E-1.4(b).

A copy of the Court's order dated March 9, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3DbLsWj at no extra charge.[CC]


HEALTHCARE SERVICE: Fails to Pay OT Wages Under FLSA, Kuzma Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
JESSE KUZMA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
v. HEALTHCARE SERVICE CORPORATION, Case No. 1:22-cv-00217-SCY-JFR
(D.N.M., March 25, 2022) arises from Defendant's violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to pay overtime wages to the
Plaintiff and Collective Action Members when they worked over 40
hours in individual workweeks.

Plaintiff Jesse Kuzma files this Original Amended Class and
Collective Action Complaint against the Defendant Health Care
Service Corporation.

The Defendant's operations are defined by three insurance market
segments: Group, Government and Retail. Defendant's Government
Market segment is comprised of providing managed care services
pursuant to the insurance plans for each state. The Defendant is in
business to offer its Blue Cross and Blue Shield branded Medicaid
managed care products directly or through wholly owned subsidiaries
to Medicaid Programs developed by states.

The Defendant currently participates in Medicaid Programs in
Illinois, New Mexico and Texas. The Defendant has increased its
participation in Medicaid Programs by winning contracts in several
states to provide managed care services to newly enrolled members
under the Medicaid Expansion of the Affordable Care Act.

HCSC Insurance is a directly controlled subsidiary of BCBS and does
not have any employees. From February 2013 to the present, the
Defendant has participated in New Mexico's Medicaid Program by
causing its MCO Subsidiary enter into Medicaid Managed Care Service
Agreements with New Mexico's Human Services Department to provide
care coordination and other managed care services to New Mexico
Medicaid Enrollees.

HSD has entered into nearly identical agreements with other Managed
Care Organizations since 2013 including (1) contracts with three
other managed care organizations covering the Centennial Care 1.0
Program from January 2013 to December 2017; and contracts with two
other managed care organizations covering Centennial Care 2.0
Program from January 2018 to the present.

These contracts -- the latest of which spans 448 pages including a
nearly 50-page section dedicated to care coordination 10 —detail
both Defendant's obligations and those of its employees who perform
job duties under the MCO Contract, says the suit.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jack Siegel, Esq.
          SIEGEL LAW GROUP PLLC
          5706 E. Mockingbird Lane | Suite 115
          Dallas, TX 75206
          Telephone: (214) 790-4454
          E-mail: Jack@siegellawgroup.biz

               - and -

          Travis M. Hedgpeth, Esq.
          THE HEDGPETH LAW FIRM, PC
          3050 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 510
          Houston, TX 77056
          Telephone: (281) 572-0727
          E-mail: travis@hedgpethlaw.com

HOME DEPOT: Extension of Time to File Class Status Bid Sought
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the four class action lawsuits filed against Home Depot U.S.A.,
Inc. et al., the Plaintiffs Donnie Sanchez Barragan, Araceli
Barragan, Jeremy Burcham, Lisa 2 Davey, Janelly Sandoval, and
Virgie Flores, and Defendant Home Depot, ask the Court to enter an
order extending the filing deadline for the class certification
motions by four months:

   The deadline for filing class certification motions related
   to the third cause of action in Barragan and on all putative
   class claims asserted in the Davey, Sandoval, and Flores
   actions shall be continued to July 21, 2022.

On November 3, 2021, the Court granted Home Depot's motion to
consolidate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).

On December 3, 2021, the Court set the deadline for class
certification motions limited to the third cause of action in the
Barragan matter (i.e. for meal, rest, and reporting time pay) and
in the Davey, Sandoval, and Flores actions to March 21, 2022.

On January 18, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff Burcham's motion
for class certification on the second cause of action for unpaid
overtime.

On January 25, 2022, counsel for each of the related cases
participated in a conference call to discuss settlement and agreed
to mediate the consolidated claims and to this end, agreed to stay
all proceedings in all of the cases, including as to any further
formal discovery and class certification.

The four lawsuits are captioned as:

   "DONNIE SANCHEZ BARRAGAN, ARACELI BARRAGAN, and JEREMEY
   BURCHAM, individually and on behalf of others similarly
   situated, v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., a Delaware Corporation,
   Case No. 19-cv-01766-AJB-AGS (S.D. Cal.);"


   LISA DAVEY, individually and on behalf of all others
   similarly situated, v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., a Delaware
   Corporation, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 20-
   cv-02541-AJB-AGS (S.D. Cal.);"

   "JANELLY SANDOVAL, individually and on behalf of all others
   similarly situated, v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., a Delaware
   corporation and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 21-cv-
   00461-AJB-AGS (S.D. Cal.);" and

   "VIRGIE FLORES, as individuals and on behalf of others
   similarly situated, v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., a Delaware
   limited liability company, and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Case No.
   21-cv-00462-AJB-AGS (S.D. Cal.)."

Home Depot is ahome improvement retailer in the United States,
supplying tools, construction products, appliances, and services.
The company is headquartered in incorporated Cobb County, Georgia,
with an Atlanta mailing address.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated March 14, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/370jot4 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Craig M. Nicholas, Esq.
          Shaun Markley, Esq.
          NICHOLAS & TOMASEVIC, LLP
          225 Broadway, 19 th Floor
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 325-0492
          Facsimile: (619) 325-0496
          E-mail: cnicholas@nicholaslaw.org
                  atomasevic@nicholaslaw.org
                  smarkley@nicholaslaw.org

               - and -

          Noam Glick, Esq.
          GLICK LAW GROUP, P.C.
          225 Broadway, Suite 2100
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 382-3400
          Facsimile: (619) 615-2193
          E-mail: noam@glicklawgroup.com

               - and -

          James R. Hawkins, Esq.
          Gregory Mauro, Esq.
          Michael Calvo, Esq.
          JAMES HAWKINS APLC
          9880 Research Drive, Suite 800
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 387-7200
          Facsimile: (949) 387-6676
          E-mail: James@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                  Greg@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                  Michael@jameshawkinsaplc.com

               - and -

          Armond M. Jackson, Esq.
          JACKSON LAW, APC
          2 Venture Plaza, Suite 240
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 281-6857
          Facsimile: (949) 777-6218
          E-mail: ajackson@jlaw-pc.com

               - and -

          Larry W. Lee, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP
          515 South Figueroa Street, Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
          E-mail: lwlee@diversitylaw.com

               - and -

          William L. Marder, Esq.
          POLARIS LAW GROUP LLP
          501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
          Hollister, CA 95023
          Telephone: (831) 531-4214
          Facsimile: (831) 634-0333
          E-mail: bill@polarislawgroup.com

               - and -

          Dennis S Hyun, Esq.
          HYUN LEGAL APC
          515 South Figueroa Street, Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
          E-mail: dhyun@hyunlegal.com

The Defendant Home Depot is represented by:

          Donna M. Mezias, Esq.
          Dorothy Kaslow, Esq.
          AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP
          580 California Street, Suite 1500
          San Francisco, CA 94101-1036
          Telephone: (415) 765-9500
          Facsimile: (415) 765-9501
          E-mail: dmezias@akingump.com

               - and -

          Barbara J. Miller, Esq.
          John D. Hayashi, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          600 Anton Boulevard, Suite 1800
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626-7653
          Telephone: (714) 830-0600
          Facsimile: (714) 830-0700
          E-mail: barbara.miller@morganlewis.com
                  john.hayashi@morganlewis.com

HOST INT'L: Frankenstein 401(k) Plan Suit Seeks to Certify Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DAN FRANKENSTEIN,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and
on behalf of the HMSHOST 401(k) RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN AND TRUST,
v. HOST INTERNATIONAL, INC.; HMSHOST 401(k) RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN
AND TRUST RETIREMENT COMMITTEE; COLEMAN LAUTERBACH; and DOES NO.
1-10, Whose Names Are Currently Unknown, Case No. 8:20-cv-01100-PJM
(D. Md.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying the following class:

      "All current and former participants of the HMSHOST 401(k)
      Retirement Savings Plan and Trust who received reported
      tips as compensation and had a deferral election in place
      at the time they received the reported tips within six
      years of the date this action was filed;"

      Excluded from the Class is the Judge to whom this case is
      assigned and any other judicial officer having
      responsibility for this case, and Defendants;

   2. appointing him as class representative; and

   3. appointing his counsel as Class Counsel.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 11,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3tN1ymd
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kolin C. Tang, Esq.
          MILLER SHAH LLP
          19712 MacArthur Boulevard, Suite 222
          Irvine, CA 92660
          Telephone: (866) 540-5505
          E-mail: kctang@millershah.com

               - and -

          Timothy F. Maloney, Esq.
          Alyse L. Prawde, Esq.
          JOSEPH GREENWALD & LAAKE, PA
          6404 Ivy Lane, Suite 400
          Greenbelt, Maryland 20770-1417
          Telephone: (240) 553-1206
          Facsimile: (240) 553-1737
          E-mail: tmaloney@jgllaw.com
                  aprawde@jgllaw.com

               - and -

          Ronald S. Kravitz, Esq.
          MILLER SHAH LLP
          3 Embarcadero Center, Suite 1650
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (866) 540-5505
          Facsimile: (866) 300-7367
          E-mail: rskravitz@millershah.com

HYUNDAI MOTOR: Scheduling Order Entered in Friche Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SEBASTIEN FRICHE, v.
HYUNDAI MOTOR CO., et al., Case No. 8:21-cv-01324-CJC-ADS (C.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Cormac J. Carney entered a scheduling order
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) as follows:

   1. All discovery, including discovery motions, shall be
      completed by 22 October 26, 2023. Discovery motions must
      be filed and heard prior to this date.

   2. The parties shall have until December 18, 2023 to file and
      have heard all other motions, including motions to join or
      amend the pleadings.

   3. A pretrial conference will be held on Monday, February 26,
      2024 at 03:00 PM. Full compliance with Local Rule 16 is
      required.

   4. The case is set for a jury trial, Tuesday, March 5, 2024
      at 08:30 AM.

   5. The parties are referred to ADR Procedure No. 3 -- Private
      Mediation.  The parties shall have until November 9, 2023
      to conduct settlement proceedings. The parties shall file
      with the Court a Joint Status Report no later than five
      days after the ADR proceeding is completed advising the
      Court of their settlement efforts and status.

   6. The Plaintiff shall have until May 29, 2023 to file and
      have heard any class certification motion.

Hyundai Motor is a South Korean multinational automotive
manufacturer headquartered in Seoul, South Korea.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 10, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3JGiUXk at no extra charge.[CC]

I360 LLC: Tag Suit Remanded to San Diego County Superior Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JENNIFER TAG, Plaintiff v. i360, LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 21cv1184-L-MDD (S.D. Cal.), Judge M. James
Lorenz of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California granted the Plaintiff's motion to remand the putative
class action alleging unlawful sale of confidential California
voter registration records.

I. Background

Then Plaintiff alleges Defendants i360 and GC Strategies, LLC
wrongfully purchased, sold and/or distributed confidential voter
registration information. The Complaint alleges four causes of
action: (1) negligence, (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3)
invasion of privacy in violation of California Constitution Art. 1,
Section 1; and (4) violation of the Unfair Competition Law, Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200, et seq.

The Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of Californians registered
to vote whose information was allegedly distributed and sold
without prior approval from the California Secretary of State or
California election officials, and a subclass of Californians with
confidential voter status under California Elections Code Section
2166.

The Plaintiff has previously filed a nearly identical complaint in
the District, case no. 21cv975-L-MDD. Because the complaint did not
allege sufficient facts to establish federal subject matter
jurisdiction, it was dismissed with leave to amend. Two days later,
the Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, dismissing the
case without prejudice.

A day later, on May 27, 2021, the Plaintiff commenced the instant
action in state court. The Defendants removed the action to the
Court claiming federal subject matter jurisdiction under the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d).
The Plaintiff moves to remand based on CAFA's local controversy
exception, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(4)(A).

II. Discussion

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Through CAFA, Congress broadened federal diversity jurisdiction
over class actions by, among other things, replacing the typical
requirement of complete diversity with one of only minimal
diversity and allowing aggregation of class members' claims to
satisfy a minimum amount in controversy of $5 million.

Judge Lorenz holds that these requirements are met in the case. The
Plaintiff alleges she was a California citizen at the relevant
time. The Defendants claim she currently has an address in
Tennessee and argue she is a citizen of Tennessee. They assert that
i360 is a Kansas citizen. Whether the Plaintiff is a citizen of
California or Tennessee, the minimal diversity requirement is met.

Judge Lorenz also holds that the minimum amount in controversy
under CAFA is $5 million. The Plaintiff seeks actual, nominal,
statutory, and punitive damages on behalf of the putative class.
She estimates the putative class to comprise of more than 20
million California voters. It is undisputed that this action meets
the $5 million minimum amount in controversy. Based on the
foregoing, Judge Lorenz holds that the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to CAFA.

B. Local Controversy Exception

Congress "provided exceptions allowing certain class actions that
would otherwise satisfy CAFA's jurisdictional requirements to be
remanded to state court. Among these is the exception commonly
referred to as the local controversy exception." This is a "narrow
exception" and the plaintiff "bears the burden of showing its
application." "However, if the exception applies, the district
court must remand the case to state court.

1. Judicial Estoppel and Other Class Actions in Prior Three Years

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's initial action, filed
originally in the Court and voluntarily dismissed, requires denial
of remand. They contend that the statement in her prior complaint
that, "none of the exceptions to CAFA apply to the action"
judicially estops her from removal based on a CAFA exception, and
that it also precludes her from showing that no other class action
asserting the same or similar claims has been filed in the three
years prior to the instant action.

Judge Lorenz rejects the Defendant's argument. He holds that the
Plaintiff's prior dismissed action does not preclude a finding
under the local controversy exception that no other class action
asserting the same or similar claims had been filed in the
preceding three years.

2. In-State Injury and Citizenship of Class Members

The Defendants do not dispute that the principal alleged injuries
were incurred in California, as required by 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III). They dispute, however, that the Plaintiff
has met her burden to show that greater than two-thirds of the
putative class members are California citizens as required by
subsection (i)(I).

The Plaintiff defines the class as "All individuals whose
California voter registration information was distributed and sold
by GCS or i360 to other persons and/or entities without the prior
express approval from the California Secretary of State or
California elections officials on or after May 1, 2018 and until
notice is disseminated to the Class."

Judge Lorenz holds that California registered voters are by
definition limited to the citizens of California, as is the class
definition in the Complaint. And, the Defendants offer no evidence
to counter the Plaintiff's evidence or rebut the continuing
domicile presumption. Accordingly, Plaintiff has met her burden.

3. In-State Defendant

The Defendants argue that GCS conduct cannot form a significant
basis for the claims. They contend the Plaintiff cannot state a
claim against GCS because it obtained permission from the Secretary
of State to distribute voter data to i360.

Aside from the fact that the Defendants "inappropriately blur the
distinction between a jurisdictional inquiry and a merits
determination under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),"
Judge Lorenz holds that the argument ignores the allegations that
GCS knowingly enabled and conspired with i360. Along the same
lines, the Defendants also argue that the Plaintiff merely
"conflates" her claim against i360 with GCS, maintaining that only
i360 distributed voter information to third parties. This argument
misses the Plaintiff's independent theory of liability against GCS,
i.e., GCS's knowing agreement to enable and enabling of i360's
alleged misconduct. Defendants' arguments are unavailing.

GCS is only one of two Defendants in the case. All four causes of
action are asserted equally against both of them. Taking the
allegations in the complaint at face value, as the Court must,
Judge Lorenz holds that the allegations that GCS knowingly enabled
and conspired with i360 in its unlawful use of California voter
registration data raise an important ground for the Plaintiffs'
claims. The complaint raises a significant colorable claim against
GCS.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Lorenz concludes that the
Plaintiff met her burden to show that the local controversy
exception applies in the case. Her motion is granted. The action is
remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California for the
County of San Diego.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2fz7atcv from Leagle.com.


INNOCOLL HOLDINGS: $2.75MM Class Settlement to be Heard on July 6
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A. on March 28 disclosed that the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has
approved the following announcement of a proposed securities class
action settlement that would benefit purchasers of Innocoll
publicly traded securities:

SUMMARY NOTICE OF PENDENCY AND PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF CLASS ACTION
AND FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

TO: ALL PERSONS OR ENTITIES WHO PURCHASED OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED
PUBLICLY TRADED INNOCOLL SECURITIES BETWEEN JULY 25, 2014, AND
DECEMBER 29, 2016, BOTH DATES INCLUSIVE ("SETTLEMENT CLASS
PERIOD")

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to an Order of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, that a
hearing will be held on July 6, 2022, at 2:00 p.m. before the
Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter, United States District Judge of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 601 Market Street, Courtroom
10-B, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 for the purpose of
determining: (1) whether the proposed Settlement of the claims in
the above-captioned Action for consideration including the sum of
$2,755,000 should be approved by the Court as fair, reasonable, and
adequate; (2) whether the proposed plan to distribute the
Settlement proceeds is fair, reasonable, and adequate; (3) whether
the application of Lead Counsel for attorneys' fees of up to
one-third of the Settlement Amount ($918,333.33) plus a
proportionate share of interest accrued on the Settlement Amount,
Lead Counsel's reimbursement of litigation expenses incurred of not
more than $325,000, and Award to Plaintiffs of not more than
$10,000 each, or $20,000 in total, should be approved; and (4)
whether the Action should be dismissed with prejudice as set forth
in the Stipulation of Settlement, dated November 24, 2021 (the
"Stipulation"). The Court reserves the right to hold the Settlement
Hearing telephonically or by other virtual means.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Innocoll securities between
July 25, 2014, and December 29, 2016, both dates inclusive
("Settlement Class Period"), your rights may be affected by this
Settlement, including the release and extinguishment of claims you
may possess relating to your ownership interest in Innocoll
securities. You can download copies of the Notice and submit your
Proof of Claim and Release Form online at www.strategicclaims.net.
You may also obtain copies of the detailed Notice of Proposed
Settlement of Class Action, Motion for Attorneys' Fees and
Expenses, and Settlement Fairness Hearing ("Notice") and the Proof
of Claim and Release Form by writing to or calling the Claims
Administrator: Innocoll Holdings Public Limited Company Securities
Litigation, c/o Strategic Claims Services, 600 N. Jackson St., Ste.
205, P.O. Box 230, Media, PA 19063; (Tel) (866) 274-4004; (Fax)
(610) 565-7985; info@strategicclaims.net. If you are a member of
the Settlement Class, to share in the distribution of the Net
Settlement Fund, you must submit a Proof of Claim and Release Form
electronically no later than 11:59 PM on June 6, 2022 to the Claims
Administrator, establishing that you are entitled to recovery. You
may also mail a Proof of Claim and Release Form such that it is
postmarked no later than June 6, 2022. Unless you submit a written
exclusion request, you will be bound by any judgment rendered in
the Action, whether or not you make a claim.

If you are a Settlement Class Member and desire to be excluded from
the Settlement Class, you must submit to the Claims Administrator a
request for exclusion so that it is received no later than June 15,
2022, in the manner and form explained in the detailed Notice. All
members of the Settlement Class who have not requested exclusion
from the Settlement Class will be bound by any judgment entered in
the Action pursuant to the Stipulation.

Any objection by a Settlement Class Member to the Settlement, Plan
of Allocation, Lead Counsel's requests for an award to Lead Counsel
of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of expenses and Award to
Plaintiffs must be in the manner and form explained in the detailed
Notice and received no later than June 22, 2022, by each of the
following:

For more information about the Settlement, you may visit
https://www.strategicclaims.net. If you have any questions, you may
write the Claims Administrator or Lead Counsel at their respective
addresses listed above.

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT OR THE CLERK'S OFFICE REGARDING
THIS NOTICE.

Dated: March 10, 2022

BY ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA


INTEGRITY SERVICES: Fails to Pay Overtime Premiums, Kelley Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Kelley, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Integrity Services, LLC, Case No. 5:22-cv-00291 (W.D.
Tex., March 25, 2022) seeks damages for Integrity’s failure to
pay the Plaintiff time and one-half the regular rate of pay for all
hours worked over 40 during each seven day workweek while working
for Defendant on an hourly rate basis under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Portal-to-Portal Act.

The Plaintiff files this lawsuit individually and as an FLSA
collective action on behalf of all similarly situated current and
former employees of Defendant while paid on an hourly rate basis
who, like the Plaintiff, were not paid time and one-half their
respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked over 40 in
each seven day workweek in the time period of three years preceding
the date this lawsuit was filed and forward.

The Plaintiff was a non-exempt, hourly-paid conductor driller
employee of Defendant during the three years prior to the filing of
this lawsuit. The Defendant did not pay Plaintiff the correct rate
of time and one-half his regular rate of pay per hour for all hours
worked over forty hours in a workweek at (i.e., Defendant failed to
pay Plaintiff "overtime premium pay"), says the suit.

The Plaintiff began working for Defendant on May 1, 2021. The
Plaintiff is a former employee and stopped working for Defendant on
or September 1, 2021.

The Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a conductor driller in
connection with its oil and/or natural gas production operations.
His primary job duties involved drilling, setting conductor holes,
and conducting day to day operations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ricardo J. Prieto, Esq.
          Melinda Arbuckle, Esq.
          Shellist Lazarz Slobin LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1515
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 621-2277
          Facsimile: (713) 621-0993
          E-mail: rprieto@eeoc.net
                  marbuckle@eeoc.net

JBS USA: Campos Seeks Overtime Pay for Maintenance Techs Under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE CAMPOS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. JBS USA FOOD COMPANY HOLDINGS, Case No. 1:22-cv-00744
(D. Colo., March 25, 2022) alleges that the Defendant failed to pay
Plaintiff wages at a rate not less than one and one-half times his
regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in
any workweek and failed to include all remunerations in the
calculation of its overtime rate under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Plaintiff lives in Moore County, Texas. He was employed by
Defendant from May 2019 to May 2020 as an hourly paid maintenance
technician.

The Defendant is in the business of processing, preparing,
packaging, and delivering fresh beef, pork, poultry, and other
prepared foods products for sale to retailers, food service
distributors, and restaurants throughout the United States and in
various other countries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ricardo J. Prieto, Esq.
          Melinda Arbuckle, Esq.
          SHELLIST | LAZARZ | SLOBIN LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1515
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 621-2277
          Facsimile: (713) 621-0993
          E-mail: rprieto@eeoc.net
                  marbuckle@eeoc.net

JOHN HIESTER: Loses Bid to Bifurcate/Stay Discovery in Beard Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TRACIE BEARD, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JOHN HIESTER CHEVROLET, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 5:21-CV-173-D (E.D.N.C.), Magistrate Judge
Kimberly A. Swank of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, Western Division, dismisses without
prejudice the Defendant's motion to bifurcate or, alternatively, to
stay discovery.

The lawsuit is a putative class action asserting violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. Section 227 ("TCPA").

Presently before the court is the Defendant's motion to bifurcate
or, alternatively, to stay discovery, which the Plaintiff opposes.
The Defendant argues "there are multiple flaws in the Plaintiff's
individual claim, requiring dismissal of her lawsuit." It
represents "a dispositive motion is forthcoming," with an
anticipated filing within 30 days. The Defendant contends that
class discovery should not be allowed to proceed as the anticipated
motion has the potential to terminate all claims, including the
class claim asserted against Defendant.

Over six months have passed since the Defendant filed its motion to
bifurcate or stay discovery, and no motion seeking dismissal of
Plaintiff's claim has been filed. Accordingly, Judge Swank finds no
basis for, and therefore dismisses without prejudice the
Defendant's motion to bifurcate or, alternatively, to stay
discovery.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2hkxc7jk from Leagle.com.


JOHN HIESTER: Must Supplement Discovery Responses in Bear Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TRACIE BEARD, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JOHN HIESTER CHEVROLET, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 5:21-CV-173-D (E.D.N.C.), Magistrate Judge
Kimberly A. Swank of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, Western Division, granted the
Plaintiff's motion to compel the Defendant to respond to discovery
sought in the Plaintiff's First Request for Production of Documents
and First Set of Interrogatories.

I. Background

The lawsuit is a putative class action asserting violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. Section 227 ("TCPA").
The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant has violated the TCPA by
"using prerecorded messages to market its goods and services to
individuals' cellular phone numbers without express written
consent."

The Plaintiff seeks to certify the following class: All persons in
the United States who, within four years prior to the filing of
this action, (1) were sent a prerecorded message by or on behalf of
Defendant, (2) regarding Defendant's goods, products, or services,
and (3) for which Defendant failed to secure the called party's
express written consent and/or after the called party requested to
not receive future prerecorded messages from Defendant."

The Defendant denies the material allegations in the Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiff filed the instant motion seeking to compel responses
to certain interrogatories and document production requests
("RFPs") served on the Defendant. The Defendant opposes the
Plaintiff's motion, specifically objecting to class discovery. It
argues the undisputed facts reveal that the Plaintiff's claim is
without merit and the Plaintiff therefore cannot serve as a class
representative, thereby defeating any putative class claim.

II. Discussion

The Plaintiff seeks to compel discovery of the following:

     a. documents concerning the Defendant's relationship with
third-party vendors involved in making the alleged calls (RFP 2
(written agreements), RFP 3 (written communications), RFP 4
(receipts and invoices);

     b. call logs and other information concerning the individuals
to whom prerecorded messages were sent by the Defendant or its
vendor (RFPs 8, 9, 10; Interrog. 3);

     c. documents (or exemplars thereof) to support the Defendant's
claim that putative class members consented to the calls (RFPs
15-17);

     d. documents identifying revenue generated from the calls at
issue (for the purpose of determining whether the Defendant is
vicariously liable based upon ratification of its vendors' actions)
(RFP 22); and

     e. the names of employees involved in creating the prerecorded
messages (Interrog. 6).

Judge Swank finds that this information is relevant to the
Plaintiff's claim and class certification issues. She says, the
Defendant has not met its burden to demonstrate that the discovery
sought is not proportional to the case or should otherwise not be
allowed. Accordingly, she will order the Defendant to supplement
its discovery responses.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Swank granted the Plaintiff's
Motion to Compel Discovery. The Defendant had until March 31, 2022,
to supplement its discovery responses.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/28uffx4w from Leagle.com.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Faces Securities Suit Over Baby Powder
---------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson disclosed in its Form 10K Report for the fiscal
year ended January 2, 2022, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on February 17, 2022, that it facing a February 2018
securities class action lawsuit filed against it and certain named
officers in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey, alleging that Johnson & Johnson violated the federal
securities laws by failing to disclose alleged asbestos
contamination in body powders containing talc, primarily JOHNSON'S
Baby Powder, and that purchasers of Johnson & Johnson's shares
suffered losses as a result. Plaintiff is seeking damages.

In April 2019, the Company moved to dismiss the complaint and
briefing on the motion was complete as of August 2019. In December
2019, the Court denied, in part, the motion to dismiss. In March
2020, the Company answered the complaint. In April 2021, briefing
on Plaintiffs' motion for class certification was completed.

In July 2021, the Company filed a notice of supplemental authority
in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for class certification, and
Plaintiff filed a response. In December 2021, the Company filed a
motion to supplement the class certification record, and in January
2022, Plaintiff responded. Discovery is ongoing.

Johnson & Johnson is into research and development, manufacture and
sale of products in the healthcare field based in New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Plaintiffs Seek Initial Approval of Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson disclosed in its Form 10K Report for the fiscal
year ended January 2, 2022, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on February 17, 2022, that a preliminary approval of a
class settlement was filed by the plaintiffs in December 2021.

Beginning in May 2021, multiple putative class actions were filed
in state and federal courts (California, Florida, New York, and New
Jersey) against various Johnson & Johnson entities alleging
violations of state consumer fraud statutes based on nondisclosure
of alleged benzene contamination of certain Neutrogena and Aveeno
sunscreen products and the affirmative promotion of those products
as "safe"; and, in at least one case, alleging a strict liability
manufacturing defect and failure to warn claims, asserting that the
named plaintiffs suffered unspecified injuries as a result of
alleged exposure to benzene.

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has consolidated all
pending actions, except one product liability case and one case
pending in New Jersey state court, in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, Fort Lauderdale
Division. In October 2021, the Company reached an agreement in
principle for the settlement of a nationwide class, encompassing
the claims of the consolidated actions, subject to approval by the
Florida federal Court.

In December 2021, plaintiffs in the consolidated actions filed a
motion for preliminary approval of a nationwide class settlement.

Johnson & Johnson is into research and development, manufacture and
sale of products in the healthcare field based in New Jersey.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Remicade Anti-trust Suit Ongoing in PA
---------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson disclosed in its Form 10K Report for the fiscal
year ended January 2, 2022, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on February 17, 2022, that the beginning September 2017,
multiple purported class actions were filed on behalf of indirect
purchasers of Remicade against Johnson & Johnson and Janssen
Biotech, Inc. (collectively, Janssen) alleging that Janssen has
violated federal antitrust laws through its contracting strategies
for REMICADE. The cases were consolidated for pre-trial purposes as
"In re REMICADE Antitrust Litigation" in United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The consolidated
complaint seeks damages and injunctive relief. Discovery is
ongoing.

Johnson & Johnson is into research and development, manufacture and
sale of products in the healthcare field based in New Jersey.


KALLBERG INDUSTRIES: Ojeda Seeks to Certify Relief Worker Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as IVAN OJEDA, individually
and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated, v. KALLBERG
INDUSTRIES, LLC, Case No. 0:21-cv-61071-RKA (S.D. Fla,), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. Certifying a Class defined as:

      "All relief workers who were: (1) paid a day rate by
      Kallberg and/or its subcontractors (2) in Puerto Rico (3)
      on Louis Berger hurricane relief projects (4) in the
      period October 1, 2017 to November 2018;

   2. Appointing Plaintiff as class representative;

   3. Appointing counsel for the Plaintiff, Richard M. Schreiber
      of Josephson Dunlap, LLP and C. Ryan Morgan of Morgan &
      Morgan, P.A., as Class Counsel.

   4. Approving the form and method of Notice to be provided to
      the Class, and finding the Notice to be fair, reasonable,
      and adequate and consistent with due process; and

   5. Any other relief that is just and proper.

The Plaintiff filed this case against Louis Berger, Kennett
Consulting, and Kallberg Industries on December 14, 2018.

On March 19, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint
adding Jose Rodriguez-Ortiz as a plaintiff and Bluesource, ACP, HP
Services, Sun Coast, LMD, and DK&J as defendants. Only Louis Berger
answered. The other responding defendants moved to dismiss under
various parts of Rule 12.

The Court granted jurisdictional discovery and stayed merits-based
discovery. Jurisdictional discovery closed on February 29, 2020.

The Plaintiffs moved to amend and add a named plaintiff for each
defendant. The Court granted leave to amend, and the Second Amended
Complaint was filed on June 11, 2020. Kallberg moved to dismiss the
lawsuit on the grounds the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over
it. In response, the Court severed Plaintiffs' claims again
Kallberg and transferred those claims to this Court.

The Plaintiff brings this lawsuit on behalf of relief workers who
were paid a day-rate by Louis Berger and its subcontractors in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the laws of
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

In September 2017, Hurricanes Irma and Maria devasted Puerto Rico
and the US Virgin Islands. In response, FEMA and governmental
departments (such as the Department of the Army) implemented
programs to provide aid and repairs to Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands. Louis Berger was awarded multiple contracts for power
generation and repair. It deployed "more than 300 staff and
independent contractors on the ground in support of [FEMA and other
agencies] missions to bring much needed manpower, equipment and
supplies" to residents of Puerto Rico.

Kallberg is in the industrial buildings and warehouses business.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 11,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3LlWACF
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C. Ryan Morgan, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          20 N. Orange Ave., 15 th Floor
          Orlando, FL 32802-4979
          Telephone: (407) 420-1414
          Facsimile: (407) 245-3401
          E-mail: RMorgan@forthepeople.com

               - and -

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Richard M. Schreiber, Esq.
          Josephson Dunlap, LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 352-1100
          Facsimile: (713) 352-3300
          E-mail: adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  rschreiber@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH, PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

KG FIBER: Fails to Pay Proper Overtime Wages, Lloyd Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
ANDREW LLOYD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. KG FIBER OPTICS LLC; BRANDON KENNEDY; AND
MICHAEL GRAY, Defendants, Case No. 4:22-cv-00272-BSM (E.D. Ark.,
March 24, 2022) is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act for declaratory judgment, monetary
damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, and costs,
including reasonable attorneys' fees, as a result of Defendants'
failure to pay Plaintiff and other piece rate paid employees lawful
overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per
week.

Mr. Lloyd was employed by the Defendants to install and service
telecommunications equipment in the Little Rock, Arkansas area.

KG Fiber Optics LLC is a telecommunications and consulting company
that installs and services cable, Internet, and home entertainment
systems.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chris Burks, Esq.
          WHLAW | WE HELP
          1 Riverfront Pl. - Suite 745
          North Little Rock, AR 72114
          Telephone: (501) 891-6000  
          E-mail: chris@wh.la

KIMPTON HOTEL: Class Certification Hearing in Thomas Suit Vacated
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JAKE THOMAS, et al., v.
KIMPTON HOTEL & RESTAURANTGROUP, LLC, Case No. 3:19-cv-01860-MMC
(N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Maxine M. Chesney entered an order
vacating hearing on plaintiffs' motion for class certification and
defendant's motion to exclude, and continuing case management
conference:

Before the Court are two motions: (1) plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification, filed September 21, 2021, and (2) defendant's Motion
to Exclude the Opinions of Plaintiffs' Damages Expert, filed
November 22, 2021.

Having read and considered the papers filed in support of and in
opposition to the motions, the Court deems the matters appropriate
for determination on the parties' respective written submissions,
and hereby vacates the hearing scheduled for March 11, 2022.

The case management conference is continued from March 18, 2022, to
May 27, 2022, at 10:30 a.m. A joint case management statement shall
be filed no later than May 20, 22 2022, the Court says.

The Kimpton Hotel & Restaurant Group, LLC is a San Francisco,
California, based hotel and restaurant brand owned by IHG Hotels &
Resorts since 2015. Founded in 1981 by Bill Kimpton and led by
Chief Executive Officer Mike DeFrino, the group was the largest
chain of boutique hotels in the United States in 2011.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 9, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3JAry9M at no extra charge.[CC]

LIN ROGERS: Scheduling Order Entered in Heatley Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Jason Heatley v. Lin
Rogers Electrical Contractors, Inc. et al., Case No.
8:22-cv-00042-CJC-KES (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Cormac J. Carney
entered a scheduling order as follows:

   1. All discovery, including discovery motions, shall be
      completed by October 12, 2023. Discovery motions must be
      filed and heard prior to this date.

   2. The parties shall have until December 11, 2023 to file and
      have heard all other motions, including motions to join or
      amend the pleadings.

   3. A pretrial conference will be held on Monday, February 12,
      2024 at 03:00 PM. Full compliance with Local Rule 16 is
      required.

   4. The case is set for a jury trial, Tuesday, February 20,
      2024 at 08:30 AM.

   5. The parties are referred to ADR Procedure No. 3 -- Private
      Mediation. The parties shall have until October 26, 2023
      to conduct settlement proceedings. The parties shall file
      with the Court a Joint Status Report no later than 5 days
      after the ADR proceeding is completed advising the Court
      of their settlement efforts and status.

   6. The Plaintiff shall have until May 15, 2023 to file and
      have heard any class certification motion.

Lin Rogers provides electrical, lighting, and technology
contracting services.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 10, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3JMWAv8 at no extra charge.[CC]



LOUISIANA: Appeals Court Flips Denial of Crooks' Writ of Mandamus
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEVE CROOKS, ET AL. v. STATE OF LOUISIANA THROUGH THE
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Case No. 21-633 (La. App.), the
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit, affirms in part and
reverses in part the trial court's order denying the landowners'
writ and request for sanctions.

I. Background

It is a case where Plaintiff landowners brought a class action
against the State of Louisiana, Department of Natural Resources,
seeking declaration that they owned riparian property, injunctive
relief, and damages for increased flooding across the property. A
key determination in this case is whether the body of water is
defined as a river or lake. The trial court entered judgment that
the body of water is properly classified as a river, declared
landowners to be the legal owners of the area at issue, and awarded
damages and attorney fees to landowners. After exhausting the
appeals process, this judgment is final.

Thereafter, the State has failed to pay damages or attorney's fees
as ordered by the resulting judgment. The landowners filed for a
writ of mandamus to compel payment of the judgment and attorney's
fees. Further, the landowners sought sanctions against the State
for deliberate refusal to comply with the terms of the final
judgment.

The trial court denied the landowners' writ and request for
sanctions. The landowners appeal and request attorney's fees for
the work performed at the trial level regarding the writ and
attorney's fees for work done on appeal.

II. Discussion

The Plaintiffs appeal assigning four errors: The trial court erred
as a matter of law when it refused to issue a writ of mandamus to
compel the State to comply with the final judgment; the trial court
erred as a matter of law when it refused to impose sanctions for
the State's deliberate failure to obey the final judgment; the
trial court erred as a matter of law when it refused to apply res
judicata to bar any change in the terms of the final judgment; and
in addition to issuing a writ of mandamus, the trial court should
have awarded the Plaintiff class its attorney's fee.

A. Jurisdiction

Prior to addressing any assignments of error, the Court of Appeals
must first address the argument made by the State that it does not
have jurisdiction over the case. The State argues that the June 17,
2021 judgment was not designated as final and the motion filed by
Plaintiffs was interlocutory in nature. According to the State, the
Court of Appeals has the power to either convert the Plaintiffs'
appeal to a writ or to dismiss the appeal as improper.

The Court of Appeals disagrees. At issue is a denied writ of
mandamus. Thus, the State's argument regarding jurisdiction is
without merit. The State also failed to plead the dilatory
exception. Thus, any objection by the State for unauthorized use of
summary proceeding in Plaintiffs seeking a writ of mandamus has
been waived.

B. Assignment of Error No. 1

The Plaintiffs' first assignment of error is the trial court erred
in refusing to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the State to
comply with the final judgment in the case.

The Court of Appeals finds merit to this assigned error. It holds
that the Plaintiffs are required to show that ordinary means are
not available to enforce the judgment. Clearly, the Plaintiffs
cannot enforce the judgment by ordinary means. The State's property
cannot be seized and sold to satisfy the judgment. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals grants the Plaintiffs' writ of mandamus.

C. Assignment of Error No. 2

The Plaintiffs' second assignment of error is the trial court erred
in refusing to impose sanctions for the State's deliberate failure
to obey the final judgment in the case.

The Court of Appeals finds no merit to this assignment of error. It
holds that the trial court refused to impose sanctions against the
State based on its erroneous finding that the State could not
comply with the underlying judgment without first getting approval
from our legislature. As such, the trial court found no basis for
imposing sanctions against the State.

While there is vast discretion afforded a trial court in such
matters, none is given when the underlying judgment is reversed as
the Court of Appeals did in assignment of error number one and that
judgment is the basis for the trial court's denial of requested
sanctions for contempt of court. However, given that the State had
a rational argument for its failure to pay the Plaintiffs, its
stated excuse for its failure to comply with the final judgment,
the Court of Appeals finds that the State does have a justifiable
excuse for its actions. Therefore, it finds no error in the trial
court's ruling denying sanctions for contempt of court on this
matter.

D. Assignment of Error No. 3

Third, the Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in failing
to apply res judicata to bar any change in the terms of the final
judgment in the case. The Court of Appeals' finding in Assignment
of Error Number One that grants the Plaintiffs' writ of mandamus
compelling the State to comply with the final judgment in the case
renders any alleged changes in the terms of the final judgment
moot.

E. Assignment of Error No. 4

Finally, the Plaintiffs allege the trial court erred in failing to
award their attorney's fees for work performed in obtaining a writ
of mandamus and for work done on appeal.

The Court of Appeals finds merit to this assignment of error. It
has has already found merit in the Plaintiffs' claim that they are
entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling the State to comply with
the final judgment reached in the case. Per that final judgment,
the Plaintiffs' were awarded attorney's fees. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals renders the Plaintiff a writ of mandamus to compel
the State to pay their attorney's fees.

Given the time and labor performed by the Plaintiffs and the
complexity of the matter in seeking a writ of mandamus, the Court
of Appeals awards the Plaintiffs $20,000 in attorney's fees for
work done at the trial level. Further, the Plaintiffs request
attorney's fees for work done on appeal. The Court of Appeals
grants this request. Courts have consistently held that protection
of a judgment on an appellate level that includes an award of
attorney's fees is a basis to, once again, award attorney's fees
for work done to protect that judgment. Given this line of
reasoning, the Court of Appeals awards the Plaintiffs' $10,000 for
work done on appeal.

III. Conclusion

The Plaintiffs in the matter raise four assignments of error. The
Court of Appeals finds merit in the first and fourth assignments.
As such, it reverses the trial court's denial of the Plaintiffs'
writ of mandamus. Further, it awards the Plaintiffs $20,000 for
work done at the trial level and $10,000 for work done on the
appellate level. The Court of Appeals assesses all costs of the
appeal to the State in the amount of $3,323.25.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2p9cmave from Leagle.com.

Scott Johnson, Louisiana Division of Administration, 1200 North
Third Street, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802, (225) 326-6085,
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: State of Louisiana Through the
Department of Natural Resources.

Richard Traina -- rtraina@steeglaw.com -- Steeg Law Firm, 201 St.
Charles Avenue, Suite 3201, in New Orleans, Louisiana 70170, (504)
582-1199, COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: State of Louisiana
Through the Department of Natural Resources.

Machelle R.L. Hall, Ryan M. Seidemann, Ph.D., Morgan D. Rogers,
Ryan S. Montegut, Louisiana Department of Justice, P.O. Box 94005,
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9005, (225) 326-6000, COUNSEL FOR
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, State of Louisiana Through the Department
of Natural Resources.

William H. Caldwell, Ferdinand P. Leonards, Dale R. Baringer,
Baringer Law Firm, 201 St. Charles Street, in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana 70802, (225) 383-9953, COUNSEL FOR THE
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Foster Investment Corporation.

Jimmy R. Faircloth, Jr., Mary Katherine Price, Faircloth Melton,
LLC, 105 Yorktown Drive, in Alexandria, Louisiana 71303, (318)
619-7755, COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Justiss Oil Company,
Inc.

Kevin E. Huddell -- khuddell@jonesswanson.com -- Emma Daschbach,
Gladstone Jones , Bernard Boudreaux, Jr., John Arnold, Lindsay
Reeves, Christopher Swanson, 601 Poydras Street, Suite 2655, in New
Orleans, Louisiana 70130, (504) 523-2500, COUNSEL FOR THE
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Catahoula Lake Investments LLC, et al.

Robert Baldwin -- rbaldwin@hpblaw.com -- G. Adam Cossey, Hudson,
Potts & Bernstein, Post Office Drawer 3008, in Monroe, Louisiana
71210-3008, (318) 388-4400, COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Era Lee Crooks, Steve Crooks.

James J. Davidson, III -- ctalamo@davidsonmeaux.wpengine.com --
Christopher J. Piasecki, Davidson, Meaux, Sonnier, McElliott,
Fontenot, Gideon & Edwards, P.O. Box 2908, in Lafayette, Louisiana
70502-2908, (337) 237-1660, COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
Era Lee Crooks, Steve Crooks.

J. Michael Veron, Turner D. Brumby, Veron, Bice, Palermo & Wilson,
LLC, P. O. Box 2125, in Lake Charles, Louisiana 70602-2125, (337)
310-1600, COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS: Era Lee Crooks,
Steve Crooks.

Charles S. Weems III -- cweems@goldweems.com -- Gold, Weems,
Bruser, Sues & Rundell, P. O. Box 6118, Alexandria, LA 71307-6118,
(318) 445-6471, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS: Era Lee Crooks,
Steve Crooks.

V. Russell Purvis -- vrpurvis@bellsouth.net -- Smith, Taliaferro &
Purvis, P.O. Box 298, in Jonesville, Louisiana 71343, (318)
339-8526, COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS: Era Lee Crooks,
Steve Crooks.

James L. Carroll -- jcarroll@mixoncarroll.com -- Attorney at Law,
107 Riser Street, in Columbia, Louisiana 71418, (318) 649-9284,
COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS: Era Lee Crooks, Steve
Crooks.


MERRILL LYNCH: Valelly Suit Seeks to Certify Classes
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SARAH VALELLY,
Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated,
v. MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH INCORPORATED, Case No.
1:19-cv-07998-VEC (S.D.N.Y.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter
an order

   1. certifying this action as a class action pursuant to Fed.
      R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and/or 23(b)(3), on behalf of
      the following Classes:

      -- A "Reasonable Rate Class" of all persons who had one or
         more Merrill Edge retirement accounts with cash
         balances that were swept pursuant to the Retirement
         Account Sweep Program ("RASP") at any time during the
         period December 15, 2016 through March 15, 2020;"

      -- A "Statement-Link Class" of all persons who had one or
         more Merrill Edge retirement accounts with cash
         balances that were swept pursuant to the Retirement
         Account Sweep Program ("RASP") at any time from July
         13, 2014 through the present, who had multiple linked
         accounts on the Merrill Edge website but whose accounts
         were not "statement linked;" and

      -- A "MCPL Subclass" of all Statement-Link Class members
         who entered into the governing retirement agreement at
         any time from July 13, 2016 through the present in
         Massachusetts or who resided in Massachusetts at any
         time from July 13, 2016 through the present when they
         were eligible for, but did not receive the benefits of,
         statement-linking;"

   2. appointing Plaintiff as Class Representative; and

   3. appointing Wolf Popper LLP as Class Counsel thereto
      pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g).

Merrill is an American investment management and wealth management
division of Bank of America. Along with BofA Securities, the
investment banking arm, both firms engage in prime brokerage and
broker-dealer activities.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 11,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3wMZpsI
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert C. Finkel, Esq.
          Adam J. Blander, Esq.
          Philip M. Black, Esq.
          Antoinette Adesanya, Esq.
          WOLF POPPER LLP
          845 Third Ave.
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 759-4600
          E-mail: rfinkel@wolfpopper.com

MLD MORTGAGE: Dyes Allowed to File Class Cert Bid Under Seal
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ROGER AND LINDA DYE, et
al., v. MLD MORTGAGE, INC., dba THE MONEY STORE, Case No.
1:19-cv-03304-ELH (D. Md.), the Hon. Judge Ellen L. Hollander
entered an order granting the plaintiffs' unopposed motion for
leave to file the motion for class certification under seal.

MLD Mortgage provides financing services.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 10, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uARlbJ at no extra charge.[CC]

NABORS COMPLETION: $316K Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Gutierrez Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID GUTIERREZ, Petitioner v. NABORS COMPLETION &
PRODUCTION SERVICES CO., a Delaware corporation, now known as C&J
Well Services, Inc., Respondent, Case No. 2:21-cv-08435 DDP (JPRx)
(C.D. Cal.), Judge Dean D. Pregerson of the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California entered a judgment on
Gutierrez's Petition to Confirm Final Arbitration Award, For
Further Attorneys' Fees and Costs, and to Enter Judgment Against
Nabors.

On April 2, 2015, two former employees of Respondent Nabors,
Brandyn Ridgeway, and Tim Smith, filed a putative class action
alleging, among other things, claims under Labor Code Section
1194(a) and 1771 for failure to pay the minimum prevailing wage and
overtime, under Labor Code Section 226(e) for failure to provide
accurate itemized wage statements under Labor Code Section 226(a),
and for related interest and penalties, as well as attorneys' fees
and costs, (CACD Case No. 2:15-cv-03436-DDP-VBKx; "Ridgeway class
action").

On June 29, 2015 NABORS brought a motion to compel arbitration of
Ridgeway and Smith's individual claims pursuant to 9 U.SC. Section
2, the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") and a written arbitration
agreement that included a class action waiver.

On Oct. 13, 2015, the Court denied Nabors' motion to compel
arbitration, finding the arbitration agreement unenforceable.
Nabors timely appealed the denial of its motion to compel
arbitration.

On Feb. 13, 2018 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal issued a
Memorandum which reversed the Court's order denying the motion and
remanded with instructions

On March 30, 2018, Petitioner David Gutierrez, a putative class
member in the Ridgeway class action, commenced an individual
arbitration at JAMS. Gutierrez's individual claims were adjudicated
by JAMS Arbitrator Hon. Franz E. Miller (Ret.) resulting in a Final
Arbitration Award issued Oct. 18, 2021, in favor of Gutierrez.

On Oct. 25, 2021, Gutierrez filed the instant Petition to Confirm
Final Arbitration Award, For Further Attorneys' Fees and Costs, and
to Enter Judgment Against Nabors; Nabors appeared, filed an answer
and filed a crossclaim to vacate the Final Award;

On March 7, 2022 the Court granted Gutierrez motion and confirmed
the JAMS Interim Arbitration Award, issued on June 10, 2021, and
Final Award, issued on Oct. 18, 2021, in Gutierrez's Arbitration
JAMS Case No. 1220058932 and denied Nabors' request to vacate the
award.

Therefore, Judge Pregerson ordered that Petitioner Gutierrez will
recover against Respondent Nabors in the following amounts:

      a. Wages in the amount of $148,245.75;

      b. Statutory interest in the amount of $106,303 and
continuing from June 10, 2021 in the amount of $40.62 per day from
June 11, 2021;

      c. Attorneys' fees in the amount of $315,516 in attorneys'
fees and costs in the amount of $11,516 as awarded by the
Arbitrator; and,

      d. Additional post-arbitration attorneys' fees in the amount
of $8,250 and $400 in costs awarded by the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Judgment is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4f4wpkt3 from Leagle.com.


NATIONAL UNION: Lower Court's Judgment in First Solar Suit Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FIRST SOLAR, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant v. NATIONAL
UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA, and XL SPECIALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 217, 2021 (Del.),
Judge Collins J. Seitz, Jr., of the Supreme Court of Delaware
affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court that the follow-on
action was "fundamentally identical" to the first-filed action and
therefore excluded from coverage under the later-issued policies.

I. Introduction

In this appeal, the Supreme Court reviews whether a securities
class action and a later follow-on action were related actions,
such that the follow-on action was excluded from insurance coverage
under later-issued policies. The Superior Court found that the
follow-on action was "fundamentally identical" to the first-filed
action and therefore excluded from coverage under the later-issued
policies.

II. Background

According to the allegations of the complaint, First Solar, Inc.
manufactures solar panels and sells photovoltaic ("PV") power
plants. It competes in the renewable energy space and has installed
PV facilities throughout the world. In March 2012, First Solar
stockholders filed a class action lawsuit against the company
alleging that it violated federal securities laws by making false
or misleading public disclosures. The parties refer to the original
suit as the Smilovits Action.

The Smilovits plaintiffs alleged that from April 30, 2008, to Feb.
28, 2012, First Solar: (1) misrepresented that it had a winning
formula for reducing manufacturing costs so rapidly and
dramatically as to make solar power competitive with fossil fuels;
(2) perpetuated its fraudulent self-portrayal by concealing and
misrepresenting the nature and extent of major manufacturing and
design defects in its solar modules; (3) misrepresented its
financials; (4) artificially inflated its stock prices; (5) allowed
individuals to engage in insider trading; (6) manipulated the
cost-per-watt metrics; and (7) understated its expenses in
violation of General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).

National Union provided insurance coverage for the Smilovits Action
under a 2011-12 $10 million "claims made" directors and officers
insurance policy.

On June 23, 2015, while the Smilovits Action was pending, First
Solar stockholders who opted out of the Smilovits Action filed what
has been referred to as the Maverick Action. The Maverick Action
alleged violations of the same federal securities laws as the
Smilovits Action, as well as violations of Arizona statutes and
claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.

As summarized by the Superior Court, the plaintiffs in the Maverick
Action alleged that from May 2011 to December 2011, First Solar:
(1) misrepresented how close it was to achieving grid parity--the
point at which solar electricity became cost competitive with
conventional methods of producing electricity without government
subsidies; (2) concealed defects in First Solar's panels and
manufacturing process; (3) concealed problems with First Solar's
modules that resulting [sic] in increased costs; (4) manipulated
the cost-per-watt metrics; (5) misrepresented the value of a
pipeline project; (6) falsely represented that it was on track to
meet its financial targets; (7) refused to adjust its targets in
light of an influx of panels globally; (8) issued false financials
that violated GAAP; and (9) artificially inflated its stock price.

When the plaintiffs filed the Maverick Action in 2015, First Solar
had a $10 million "claims made" policy with National Union for
2014-15 (the "Primary Policy") and a $10 million layer of excess
coverage with XL Specialty Insurance Company ("XL Specialty" and
the "XL Specialty Policy"). The 2014-15 Primary Policy excluded
coverage for "Related Claims." Applied in the instant case, the
Related Claim Exclusion bars coverage under the 2014-15 policies if
the Maverick Action is a Related Claim to the Smilovits Action.

At first, First Solar obtained defense coverage for the Maverick
Action under its 2011-12 policies. In 2015, First Solar exhausted
all coverage under the 2011-12 National Union policy. Chubb, an
excess insurer next in line after the 2011-12 National Union
policy, accepted coverage of the Maverick Action because "the new
Maverick litigation is based on the same facts and circumstances of
the previously noticed Smilovits class action complaint," and as
such, "Chubb treats this matter as a related claim."

Chubb provided coverage for the Maverick Action as the litigation
progressed. In the Smilovits Action, First Solar filed a "Motion to
Transfer Related Case" to litigate both Actions before the same
judge. It argued that "the substantial overlap in legal and factual
issues and the substantial overlap in parties weigh in favor of
transferring the Maverick Action to the Court." The court granted
the motion.

After years of litigation and after incurring over $80 million in
defense costs, First Solar settled the Smilovits Action on Jan. 5,
2020 for $350 million. All primary and excess insurers under the
2011-12 policies paid their policy limits. Having settled the
Smilovits Action and exhausted all coverage under the 2011-12
policies, First Solar began to arbitrate a settlement of the
Maverick Action. It sought coverage under the 2014-15 Primary
Policy and the XL Specialty Policy (the "Policies") for the
Maverick Action. First Solar eventually settled the Maverick Action
for $19 million without a coverage commitment from National Union
or XL Specialty (collectively, the "Insurers"). After the Insurers
denied coverage under the Policies, First Solar filed suit in the
Superior Court for breach of contract and declaratory relief that
the Insurers were obligated to provide coverage under the
Policies.

The Superior Court litigation focused on the relatedness of the
Smilovits and Maverick Actions and whether the Maverick Action fell
within the Primary Policy exclusion for Related Claims. Relying on
Pfizer Inc. v. Arch Insurance Co., the Superior Court held that a
complaint is "related to" or "arises out of" a previous complaint
if the claims are "fundamentally identical." Among other aspects,
the lawsuits stemmed from the same original suit, were against
"identical defendants," overlapped in time, contained allegations
of the same securities law violations, and relied on the same
specific disclosures. Also, the court found that the underlying
wrongful conduct was the same. While there were some differences,
including the theory of damages claimed by the Maverick plaintiffs,
the court held that the differences did not outweigh the
similarities. It concluded that the Maverick Action was
fundamentally identical to the Smilovits Action and was excluded as
a Related Claim under the Policies.

III. Discussion

On appeal, First Solar argues that the Superior Court ruled
incorrectly that the Smilovits Action and the Maverick Action were
fundamentally identical. It claims that the Maverick Action focused
on grid parity and the company's "Systems Business," as shown by
the Action's damage claims and reliance on First Solar's "objective
to achieve grid parity with respect to utility-scale solar power
plant facilities in the future." By contrast, the Smilovits Action
focused on "misrepresentations regarding the historical cost of
individual solar modules," a temporally and categorically distinct
part of the company's business. First Solar contends that the
Actions merely share "thematic similarities," not "fundamental
identity." Finally, it argues that, even if the claims overlap,
parts of the Maverick Action seek to recover for separate Wrongful
Acts (specific statements and misrepresentations) that are not
excluded by the Primary Policy.

The Insurers counter that the Maverick Action meets the
"fundamentally identical" standard because it is directed to the
same Wrongful Act and fraudulent scheme as the Smilovits Action.
They argue further that the fundamentally identical standard has
been taken out of context and misapplied by the Superior Court.
According to the Insurers, the meaning of "related to" should come
from the language of the insurance policy. The Insurers also
contend that any non-overlapping claims would only be distinct,
non-excluded causes of action if the underlying wrongful conduct
was different, whereas here the complaints are directed to the same
fraudulent scheme.26 And finally, National Union argues that even
if the Maverick Action is not barred by relation back, the Specific
Matter Exclusion in the Primary Policy independently precludes
coverage.

In response to the Insurers' argument directed to the
"fundamentally identical" relatedness standard, First Solar
contends that stare decisis and policy considerations should
control but does not dispute that Delaware decisions have
substituted a "fundamentally identical" standard for the language
of the insurance policies. Instead, it argues that the plain
language of the Primary Policy's relatedness standard would render
coverage illusory.

On appeal, the Supreme Court reviews "the Superior Court's grant of
a motion to dismiss" de novo. It also reviews the Superior Court's
interpretation of an insurance policy de novo.

A.

As an initial matter, the Supreme Court agrees with the Insurers
that the Superior Court's use of the "fundamentally identical"
standard to assess the relatedness of the Smilovits and Maverick
Actions disregards the plain language of the insurance policy. The
error can be traced to a misunderstanding of a Superior Court
decision that addressed the meaning of "arising out of" or "related
to" for coverage of "related" complaints and claims.

But as a recent Superior Court decision observed about the error,
"neither the Delaware Supreme Court nor any other jurisdiction has
adopted 'fundamental identity' as the standard governing all
relatedness inquiries, regardless of the contractual language at
issue." With all insurance policies, the scope of an insurance
policy's coverage is prescribed by the language of the policy. And
absent "ambiguity, Delaware courts interpret contract terms
according to their plain, ordinary meaning." Whether a claim
relates back to an earlier claim is decided by the language of the
policy, not a generic "fundamentally identical" standard.

B.

Among other things, First Solar argues that the Smilovits Action
focused on cost-per-watt representations while the Maverick Action
focused on grid parity, which was understood to be a future
objective. It also draws a distinction between the "Components
Business" alleged in the Smilovits Action (individual PV cells or
solar modules) and the "Systems Business" alleged in the Maverick
Action (the PV facilities built by First Solar). These
distinctions, according to First Solar, show that the Smilovits
Action centered on "historical performance" representations while
the Maverick Action dealt with predictions of grid parity, or
"forward-looking statements."

These differences are not, however, meaningful to the relatedness
inquiry. While there might be minor differences -- like the
disparity between a certain cost-per-watt level and grid parity --
the Supreme Court holds that the Actions focus on First Solar's
misrepresentations about the cost of solar power. Both Actions
allege violations of the same federal securities laws from this
wrongful conduct. In both cases, the plaintiffs allege that First
Solar made material misrepresentations regarding its solar power
capabilities as part of a fraudulent scheme to increase stock
prices.

Finally, if there is any remaining doubt about relatedness under
the Primary Policy language, the Supreme Court can rely on what
First Solar said about the two Actions when insurance coverage was
not at issue. First Solar agreed in another matter that the Actions
were nearly identical. In addition to seeking and receiving
coverage for the Maverick Action as an action related to the
Smilovits Action under its 2011-2012 policies, First Solar filed a
"Motion to Transfer Related Case" to litigate the two Actions
before the same judge. It argued that "the substantial overlap in
legal and factual issues and the substantial overlap in parties
weigh in favor of transferring the Maverick Action to the Court."
In its filings, First Solar claimed that the Maverick Action made
"nearly identical allegations" to other actions "asserting that
First Solar's stock price decline was somehow caused by a
fraudulent scheme to conceal the existence and costs of various
manufacturing deviations."

C.

First Solar also claims that even if the Actions are Related
Claims, the Actions have "distinct wrongful acts" such that
non-excluded separate claims exist. It asks the Supreme Court to
look at the individual misrepresentations--for instance, the
specific statements made in conference calls and SEC filings--as
separate Wrongful Acts under the Primary Policy. It contends that
all "non-overlapping alleged misrepresentations and corrective
disclosures are independent claims" that do not relate back and
must be covered under the Primary Policy.

But as the Superior Court ruled, the Wrongful Act is the fraudulent
scheme to inflate the price of First Solar's stock by making
misrepresentations about its solar power cost and efficiency. The
Smilovits Action and the Maverick Action include different
misrepresentations and evidence to support their claims -- not
different Wrongful Acts. It is analogous to United Westlabs, where
the Superior Court held that United Westlabs had "engaged in a
continuous series of related acts, constituting a single wrongful
act as defined by the" policy at issue, even though the complaints
spanned different time periods and included different allegations.

D.

Finally, First Solar claims in a footnote that the Superior Court
incorrectly applied the Relation Back Provision of the Primary
Policy instead of the Specific Matter Exclusion.

The Supreme Court holds that this argument was not sufficiently
briefed and is waived. But even so, the Primary Policy's Relation
Back Provision applies when two claims are related. Under the
Policy, "any Related Claim that is subsequently made against an
Insured will be deemed to have been first made at the time that
such previously reported Claim was first made." Claims first made
before the inception date of the Primary Policy "are not covered
under this policy." The Superior Court correctly applied the
Primary Policy language, because if the Maverick Action relates
back to the Smilovits Action, it is deemed "first made" at the time
of the Smilovits Action and thus "not covered under this policy."

Using the Primary Policy's Related Claim definition, the Maverick
Action raised claims "alleging, arising out of, based upon or
attributable to any facts or Wrongful Acts that are the same as or
related to those" raised in the Smilovits Action. Thus, the
Maverick Action Claim is deemed first made at the time of the
Smilovits Action and is excluded from coverage under the Related
Claim Exclusion of the Policies.

IV. Disposition

The Supreme Court concludes that even though the Superior Court
applied an incorrect standard to assess the relatedness of the two
actions, nonetheless because under either the erroneous
"fundamentally identical" standard or the correct relatedness
standard defined by the policies, the later-issued insurance
policies did not cover the follow-on action, the judgment of the
Superior Court is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2p94dt9h from Leagle.com.

Jennifer C. Wasson, Esquire, Carla M. Jones, Esquire, POTTER
ANDERSON & CORROON LLP, in Wilmington, Delaware, Adam S. Ziffer --
and Meredith Elkins -- Esquire (argued), and Meredith Elkins --
melkins@cohenziffer.com -- COHEN ZIFFER FRENCHMAN & MCKENNA LLP, in
New York City, Attorneys for Appellant First Solar, Inc.

Kurt M. Heyman, Esquire (argued) -- kheyman@hegh.law -- Aaron M.
Nelson, Esquire -- anelson@hegh.law -- HEYMAN ENERIO GATTUSO &
HIRZEL LLP, in Wilmington, Delaware, Scott B. Schreiber, Esquire ,
Arthur Luk, Esquire, Omomah Abebe, Esquire, and Kolya D. Glick,
Esquire , ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, in Washington, D.C.,
Attorneys for Appellee National Union Fire Insurance Company of
Pittsburgh, PA.

John C. Phillips, Jr., Esquire -- jcp@pmhdelaw.com -- David A.
Bilson, Esquire -- dab@pmhdelaw.com -- PHILLIPS MCLAUGHLIN & HALL,
P.A., in Wilmington, Delaware, Charles C. Lemley, Esquire (argued),
Kim Melvin, Esquire, and Anna Schaffner, Esquire, WILEY REIN LLP,
in Washington, D.C., Attorneys for Appellee XL Specialty Insurance
Company.


NEW JERSEY: District Court Narrows Claims in S.S. v. NJDOE
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, S.S. AND M.S., individually and on behalf of H.S., and
H.S., Plaintiffs v. HILLSBOROUGH TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION and
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendants, Case No.
1:20-cv-13077-NLH-MJS (D.N.J.), Judge Noel L. Hillman of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey granted in part and
denied in part New Jersey Department of Education's motion to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint.

I. Background

H.S. is a disabled child born in 2001 who was receiving special
education services from the Hillsborough Township Public Schools
District ("HTPSD"). The complaint alleges that H.S. has been
diagnosed with autism, Attention Deficit Disorder ("ADD");
Generalized Anxiety Disorder; Major Depressive Disorder and Social
Anxiety Disorder. The Plaintiffs claim that HTPSD knew about H.S.'s
autism diagnosis at all relevant times and knew about H.S.'s ADD
and anxiety since at least December 2011. Despite HTPSD's knowledge
of the diagnoses, Plaintiffs contend that H.S. did not receive the
proper education placement, in part because HTPSD failed to conduct
learning assessments when it was obligated to do so. Among other
failures, the Plaintiffs contend that HTPSD was obligated to
conduct learning assessments of H.S. in 2014 and that they never
conducted such an assessment. Because of this, H.S. was not placed
in an appropriate educational program.

The Plaintiffs further allege that H.S. was subjected to severe
bullying by teachers at Hillsborough High School, particularly the
Director of Bands. The complaint details verbal abuse by the
Director and emulation of that abuse by H.S.'s classmates.
Ultimately, because of this bullying and the fact that HTPSD failed
to provide H.S. with an appropriate educational program, the
Plaintiffs decided to withdraw H.S. from Hillsborough High School
and enroll him at Fusion Academy. Before doing so, in August 2017,
the Plaintiffs filed two "ten-day notices" with HTPSD to give HTPSD
an opportunity to try to remedy the issue. HTPSD never proposed a
remedy during those ten-day periods and H.S. started schooling at
Fusion Academy in October 2017.

The complaint states that the Plaintiffs ultimately filed a due
process petition with the New Jersey Department of Education's (the
"NJDOE") to resolve their grievances. The NJDOE eventually
transferred the matter to the New Jersey Office of Administrative
Law (the "OAL") for a hearing. According to the complaint, the
Administrative Law Judge (the "ALJ") who handled the hearing took
over a year to issue an opinion and when she finally did, it was so
rife with factual errors and failures to address the facts that it
shows a complete breakdown of the hearing process which the NJDOE
was responsible for maintaining. Specifically, the Plaintiffs
allege that the ALJ completely ignored the testimony of certain
witnesses at the hearing, improperly shifted the burden of proof
and persuasion onto Plaintiffs, and ignored the fact that the
Plaintiffs gave notice of their concerns regarding H.S.'s
educational placement prior to enrolling him at Fusion Academy.

The Plaintiffs originally filed the matter on Sept. 23, 2020,
naming the Hillsborough Township Board of Education as the sole
defendant. On Feb. 10, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint, naming the NJDOE as a defendant. The amended complaint
contains five counts against the NJDOE.

Count VI alleges that the State Defendants violated the Plaintiffs'
right to an impartial due process hearing under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act 20 U.S.C. Section 1400, et seq.
(the "IDEA") and corresponding New Jersey law, N.J.A.C. 6A:14-1, et
seq. Count VII alleges that the State Defendants violated the
Plaintiffs' right to a timely final decision by the ALJ under the
IDEA and attendant New Jersey law. Count VIII alleges violation of
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Section
794, et seq. Count IX alleges violation of Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. Section 12101 et
seq. (the "ADA"). Finally Count X alleges a violation of the New
Jersey State Constitution via the New Jersey Civil Rights Act,
N.J.S.A. 10:6-2 (the "NJCRA").

The NJDOE moves to dismiss the counts against it under Rule
12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6).

II. Analysis

A. Counts VI and VII: Violation of the IDEA and New Jersey Law

The NJDOE moves to dismiss Counts VI and VII on the grounds that
the Plaintiff has not plausibly pled that they did not receive an
impartial due process hearing and that the NJDOE violated the 45
Day Rule. The NJDOE argues that the Plaintiffs have not plausibly
pled that they did not receive an impartial due process hearing
because the NJDOE does have a dispute resolution system in place
pursuant to the IDEA. They further argue that the statutory
framework and its attendant regulations, specifically citing to 20
U.S.C. Section 1415(f)(3) 34 C.F.R. Section 300.511, and N.J.A.C.
Section 6A:14-2.7(k), requires that due process hearings be
conducted by an impartial hearing officer and that the NJDOE may
not review those decision.

With respect to Count VII, the NJDOE argues that a violation of the
45 Day Rule is a procedural violation, not a substantive violation
under the IDEA, and therefore, the Plaintiffs have not pleaded a
denial of FAPE. They also argue that Count VII is precluded by the
entire controversy doctrine.

With respect to whether the Plaintiffs have plausibly pled enough
facts to suggest that they did not receive an impartial due process
hearing and the 45 Day Rule was violated such that there was a
substantive violation of the IDEA, Judge Hillman holds that those
claims have been adequately pled. First, the Plaintiffs are correct
that the IDEA is organized such that the ALJs who conduct the due
process hearings may not be employees of the NJDOE. Further, the
tone of Section 1415 makes clear that it is the State Educational
Agency, in the case, the NJDOE, that is responsible for the
"procedures" underlying dispute resolution. The NJDOE may not
outsource its statutory obligations under federal law. Judge
Hillman is satisfied that the Plaintiffs have pleaded Count VI
sufficiently such that he will deny the NJDOE's motion to dismiss
on this count.

Judge Hillman will also deny the NJDOE's motion to dismiss Count
VII alleging a violation of the 45 Day Rule. The Plaintiffs have
plausibly stated a claim that the NJDOE violated the 45 Day Rule.
The complaint specifically states that the NJDOE "has failed, and
continues to fail to ensure, the timely resolution of special
education disputes, as required by federal and state law." It then
goes on to state that 505 days went by between the filing of the
due process petition and the final resolution of Plaintiffs'
claims. Further, Judge Hillman sees good prudential reason to allow
Count VII to proceed. At this time, he holds that it is not
appropriate to construe the entire controversy doctrine so as to
require dismissal of Count VII at this early stage of the
litigation.

B. Counts VIII and IX: Violation of the ADA and Section 504

The NJDOE also moves to dismiss Count VIII, violation of Section
504, and Count IX, violation of the ADA. They argue that dismissal
of Counts XIII and IX is appropriate because the claims require a
showing "that the disabled person was denied access to a service,
program, or activity of the state on the basis of their
disability." The Plaintiffs counter that their complaint alleges
that the NJDOE's dereliction of their duties to provide proper
special education dispute resolution procedures was so egregious
that they "constructively closed the courtroom doors to the
Plaintiffs."

Judge Hillman reads the allegations in the complaint as a whole and
the allegations read in that light tell a story of due process
procedures so deficient that the Plaintiffs were not able to place
their child in the right educational setting, a benefit that
non-disabled children were readily receiving. Thus, he declines the
NJDOE's invitation to dismiss Counts VIII and IX.

C. Count X: Violation of the NJCRA

Judge Hillman will dismiss Count X, the claim for violation of the
NJCRA. The NJDOE argues that it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity for that claim and the Plaintiffs do not contest that
point. Judge Hillman will not allow the Plaintiffs an opportunity
to amend Count X, because such amendment would be futile. He holds
that amendment would be futile because Count X seeks damages
directly against the NJDOE and such a damages claim is barred by
the Eleventh Amendment. Courts have made clear that the Eleventh
Amendment does not allow damages claims under the NJCRA to proceed
against the state. And courts in this district have made clear that
the NJDOE is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes.

Given that the Plaintiffs do not contest dismissal of Count X, and
because Eleventh Amendment immunity bars their damages claim under
Count X against the NJDOE, Judge Hillman will dismiss that count
without leave to amend.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons he expressed in his Opinion, Judge Hillman granted
in part and denied in part NJDOE's motion to dismiss. An
appropriate Order will be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/yeytyr5y from Leagle.com.

ROBERT CRAIG THURSTON, THURSTON LAW OFFICES LLC, in CHERRY HILL,
NEW JERSEY, DONALD A. SOUTAR -- dsoutar@johnruelaw.com -- COYLE LAW
GROUP, LLP, in MORRISTOWN, NEW JERSEY, KRISTA LYNN HALEY --
info@johnruelaw.com -- JOHN RUE & ASSOCIATES, in SPARTA, NEW
JERSEY, JOHN DOUGLAS RUE, JOHN RUE & ASSOCIATES, in LAKE HOPATCONG,
NEW JERSEY, LISA MARIE QUARTAROLO, JOHN RUE & ASSOCIATES, LLC, in
LAKE HOPATCONG, NEW JERSEY, Counsel for the Plaintiffs.

JACLYN MICHELLE FREY, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, in TRENTON, NEW JERSEY, Counsel for NJDOE.

VITTORIO S. LAPIRA, FOGARTY & HARA, ESQS., in FAIR LAWN, NEW
JERSEY, Counsel for Hillsborough Township Board of Education.


NONNI'S FOODS: Court Narrows Claims in Bardsley's Amended Complaint
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LISA BARDSLEY, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NONNI'S FOODS LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 20 Civ. 2979 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Nelson S.
Roman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's motion to
dismiss.

I. Introduction

The putative class action alleges that the Defendant misrepresented
to consumers the extent to which its "Limone Biscotti" from its
Nonni's brand ("the Product") is flavored only or predominantly
from lemons. Plaintiff Bardsley, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, brings the action against the Defendant
asserting claims for violations of New York's General Business Law
Sections 349 and 350, negligent misrepresentation, breach of
express warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability,
violation of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, fraud, and unjust
enrichment.

Presently pending before the Court is the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6).

II. Background

The Defendant manufactures, distributes, markets, labels, and sells
singular long, crisp, twice-baked Italian cookies (biscotti)
purporting to be flavored mainly or exclusively by lemon. The
Plaintiff alleges the Product's label is misleading because the
Product is neither exclusively nor predominantly flavored from
lemons. Specifically, she claims that the Product's ingredients
list includes a "natural flavor," which means that the lemon flavor
is not derived exclusively from lemons. She alleges that this
ingredient contains a de minimis amount of lemon oil and that the
lemon taste it provides is mainly from lemon oil extenders and
enhancers from non-lemon sources. The Plaintiff claims that under
federal regulations, Defendant's Product is misleading because it
fails to disclose that the source of the lemon taste is not only
from lemons but from non-lemon sources.

The Plaintiff also alleges that laboratory testing of the Product
reveals that "though it contains citral, the main flavor compound
in lemons, through the isomers neral and geranial, it lacks other
compounds essential to a lemons taste." Hence, she claims that "the
Product's flavoring lacks the complexity and taste expected by
consumers because the added lemon oil extenders ('Other Natural
Flavor') mainly provide citrus notes, instead of the balanced
flavor of lemons."

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant's omission and failure to
disclose these facts is deceptive and misleading to consumers who
want a lemon-flavored product that contains flavoring mainly from
lemons and that tastes like lemon. She avers that Defendant knows
the consumers "are willing to pay higher prices for the real thing
because flavor from a characterizing ingredient involves minimal
and less processing -- it is more natural." As such, she claims
that the Defendant's branding and packaging of the Product is
designed to, and does, deceive, mislead, and defraud plaintiffs and
consumers. She also claims that Defendant sold more of the Product
and at higher prices than it would have in the absence of this
misconduct, resulting in additional profits at the expense of
consumers.

The Plaintiff alleges that she purchased the Product on at least
one occasion, including in October 2019 at the Hannaford
Supermarket in New Windsor, New York 12553. She claims to be among
a class of consumers who bought the Product for its intended use,
and that she relied upon the front label's representations to
expect a lemon taste that would come exclusively and/or
predominantly from real lemons and not from artificial lemon
flavorings. She further claims that she would not have paid as much
for the Product absent the Defendant's false and misleading
statements and omissions.

On April 13, 2020, the Plaintiff filed the original operative class
action complaint. On Oct. 2, 2021, the Defendant filed a letter
seeking leave to file a motion to dismiss, which also stated the
grounds on which Defendant would move for dismissal. Four days
later, the Plaintiff requested an extension of time to file an
amended complaint that would address the deficiencies set forth in
Defendant's letter and obliviate the need for a motion to dismiss,
which the Court subsequently granted.

On Dec. 1, 2020, the Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint on
behalf of all purchasers of the Product who reside in New York,
asserting claims for (1) violation of New York General Business Law
Sections 349 and 350; (2) breach of express warranty; (3) breach of
implied warranty of merchantability; (4) violation of the Magnuson
Moss Warranty Act; (5) negligent misrepresentation; (6) fraud; and
(7) unjust enrichment. As relief, the Plaintiff seeks both monetary
damages and injunctive relief that would require Defendant to
correct the Product's allegedly misleading label.

On Dec. 23, 2021, the Defendant again sought leave to file a motion
to dismiss, which the Court subsequently granted and issued a
briefing schedule. On March 23, 2021, the parties filed their
respective briefing on the instant motion: The Defendant its notice
of motion memorandum in support, reply; and the Plaintiff her
response in opposition.

III. Discussion

The Plaintiff asserts claims against the Defendant for (1)
violations of New York General Business Law ("GBL") Sections 349
and 350, (2) negligent misrepresentation, (3) breach of express
warranty, (4) breach of implied warranty of merchantability, (5)
violation of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), (6) fraud,
and (7) unjust enrichment. It seeks to dismiss all claims based on
several grounds, including: (1) lack of subject matter
jurisdiction; (2) failure to plausible allege consumer deception;
and (3) federal preemption.

Accordingly, Judge Roman must first address the Defendant's
challenge to subject matter jurisdiction and will only analyze the
Defendant's remaining arguments if the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over the case.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

In the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff claims that the Court has
subject matter jurisdiction over his state law claims based on the
Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2).
CAFA amended the federal diversity jurisdiction statute to confer
federal jurisdiction over class actions where: (1) the proposed
class contains at least 100 members (the 'numerosity' requirement);
(2) minimal diversity exists between the parties, (i.e., where `any
member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different
from any defendant'); and (3) the aggregate amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million." The Plaintiff also asserts a federal law claim
under the MMWA. Because Plaintiff actually raises both individual
and class action claims, the Court must consider whether
jurisdiction is proper under both sets of claims.

Judge Roman finds that there is no reasonable probability that the
Plaintiff can satisfy the jurisdictional amount of $75,000 for any
of her individual claims. Moreover, nor can the Plaintiff satisfy
the jurisdictional amount of $50,000 for her federal MMWA claim.
Therefore, Judge Roman concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to
plead any facts or legal theory that would reasonably lead to a
finding of $75,000 (for her state law claims) or $50,000 (for her
federal MMWA claim) in damages, such that the Court can exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over her individual claims.
Accordingly, he dismisses the Plaintiff's individual claims for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Next, he finds that the Defendant fails to overcome the presumption
that the Plaintiff has made a good faith representation of the
actual amount in controversy in showing "the legal impossibility of
recovery must be so certain as virtually to negate the Plaintiff's
good faith in asserting the claim." Accordingly, Judge Roman now
addresses the merits of the Defendant's motion under Rule
12(b)(6).

B. New York General Business Law Sections 349 and 350

The Defendant next argues that, even if the Court has subject
matter jurisdiction over the case, the Plaintiff nonetheless still
fails to assert a plausible claim under GBL Sections 349 and 350 by
alleging that the Product's packaging is misleading because she
merely asserts conclusory allegations.

But after due consideration, Judge Roman concludes that the
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that a reasonable consumer could
find the Product's packaging misleading. He opines that (i) the
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the Product's packaging is
misleading for purposes of her claims under GBL Sectiosn 349 and
350; (ii) the Plaintiff's consumer protection claims are not
preempted by the FDCA because her claims do not affirmatively seek
to impose additional or different requirements other than those the
statute already imposes; and (iii) the Defendant fails to carry its
burden in asserting an affirmative defense under the safe harbor
provisions because it does not point to any facts appearing on the
face of the Amended Complaint that support its affirmative defense:
That the Product's packaging complied with the federal requirements
under the FDCA and its implementing regulations.

C. Negligent Misrepresentation

To state a claim for negligent misrepresentation under New York
law, the plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant had a duty,
as a result of a special relationship, to give correct information;
(2) the defendant made a false representation that he or she should
have known was incorrect; (3) the information supplied in the
representation was known by the defendant to be desired by the
plaintiff for a serious purpose; (4) the plaintiff intended to rely
and act upon it; and (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on it to
his or her detriment.

After due consideration, Judge Roman concludes that the Plaintiff's
negligent misrepresentation fails because she has failed to allege
the existence of a special relationship giving rise to a duty to
speak on the part of the Defendant. The relationship between the
Defendant, as the manufacturer and seller, and the Plaintiff as the
buyer, does not rise to the level of the kind of special
relationship -- approaching that of privity -- that would impose a
duty to speak on the Defendant. The Amended Complaint's allegations
only describe a relationship between the Plaintiff and the
Defendant which is that of an ordinary buyer and seller -- which
does not give rise to the kind of special relationship necessary to
maintain a claim for negligent misrepresentation.

Because the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant
was not so close as to approach that of privity, the Plaintiff has
not adequately pleaded that Defendant had a duty to provide
information to the Plaintiff. Accordingly, Judge Roman dismisses
the Plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim.

D. Breach of Express Warranty

To state a claim for an express breach of warranty under New York
law, plaintiffs must plead "(1) the existence of a material
statement amounting to a warranty, (2) the buyer's reliance on this
warranty as a basis for the contract with the immediate seller, (3)
breach of the warranty, and (4) injury to the buyer caused by the
breach." However, in order to assert a breach of express warranty
claim under New York law, a buyer must provide the seller with
timely notice of the alleged breach of warranty.

Judge Roman concludes that the Plaintiff's express warranty claim
fails for lack of timely notice. The Plaintiff alleges only that
"she provided or will provide notice to defendant, its agents,
representatives, retailers and their employees." That allegation is
insufficient to show that the buyer provided timely notice of the
alleged breach -- the statement is wholly equivocal." It does not
allege that notice has been provided, only that Plaintiff "provided
or will provide" notice. "If the Plaintiff had provided notice, she
could have written that, rather than pleading, in essence, both
that she did provide notice, and that she did not do so but will do
so in the future. The Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded that she
in fact provided notice."

Accordingly, Judge Roman dismisses the Plaintiff's claim for breach
of express warranty.

E. Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability

On the same basis on which the Court dismissed the Plaintiff's
claim for breach of express warranty, Judge Roman similarly
dismisses her claim for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability. The U.C.C.'s notice requirement for express
warranty claims also applies to claims for breach of implied
warranty.

F. Magnuson Moss Warranty Act

The Plaintiff also brings a claim under the MMWA, 15 U.S.C.
Sections 2301, et seq. To state a claim under MMWA, plaintiffs must
adequately plead a cause of action for breach of written or implied
warranty under state law. Hence, as her state law claims for
express and implied warranty fail, the Plaintiff's MMWA claim
similarly fails for the same reasons.

G. Fraud

To state a claim of fraud under New York law, the Plaintiff must
allege (1) a material misrepresentation or omission of fact, (2)
made with knowledge of its falsity, (3) with an intent to defraud,
and (4) reasonable reliance on the part of the plaintiff, (5) that
causes damage to the plaintiff.

Judge Roman concludes that the Plaintiff's fraud claim fails
because she has failed to plead fraudulent intent. He finds that
the Plaintiff's only allegation about the Defendant's intent is
that the "Defendant's fraudulent intent is evinced by its failure
to accurately identify the Product on the front label and
ingredient list, when it knew its statements were neither true nor
accurate and misled consumers." That allegation on its own is
insufficient because "the simple knowledge that a statement is
false is not sufficient to establish fraudulent intent, nor is a
defendants' 'generalized motive to satisfy consumers' desires or
increase sales and profits.'"

Moreover, while the existence of accurate information regarding the
product's ingredients on the package does not stymie a deceptive
labeling claim as a matter of law, it is certainly a substantial
barrier to a plaintiff seeking to plead a claim of fraud."

Accordingly, Judge Roman dismisses the Plaintiff's claim for
fraud.

H. Unjust Enrichment

Under New York law, an unjust enrichment claim requires "(1) that
the defendant benefitted; (2) at the plaintiff's expense; and (3)
that equity and good conscience require restitution." However,
"unjust enrichment is not a catchall cause of action to be used
when others fail."

Judge Roman concludes that the Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim
is duplicative of her other claims. He opines that the unjust
enrichment claim is a mere repackaging of her other claims based on
the alleged misrepresentations on the Product's packaging. It
"relies on the same factual allegations and the same theory of
liability" as the Plaintiff's other theories of recovery.
Accordingly, Judge Roman dismisses the Plaintiff's unjust
enrichment claim as duplicative.

I. Injunctive Relief

Finally, the Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief for the Defendant
"to remove, correct and/or refrain from the challenged practices
and representations, and restitution and disgorgement for members
of the class pursuant to the applicable laws."

But after considering the issue sua sponte, Judge Roman concludes
that the Plaintiff does not have Article III standing to pursue
injunctive relief because she is aware of the allegedly deceptive
packaging, and therefore cannot demonstrate that she will be harmed
in a similar way in the future. Accordingly, he denies the
Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief.

J. Leave to Amend

The Plaintiff has already amended once, after having the benefit of
a pre-motion letter from Defendant stating the grounds on which it
would move to dismiss. Further, while she requested leave to file a
Second Amended Complaint within the last sentence of her response
in opposition, she has not otherwise suggested that she is in
possession of facts that would cure the deficiencies that
Defendants highlighted in the instant motion and that the Court
highlighted in the Opinion. Accordingly, with respect to all those
claims that the Court has dismissed from the Amended Complaint,
Judge Roman will dismiss them with prejudice.

IV. Disposition

Judge Roman granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
motion to dismiss. He granted the motion with respect to the
Plaintiff's (1) individual claims not asserted under the Class
Action Fairness Act; (2) claim for negligent misrepresentation; (3)
claim for breach of express warranty; (4) claim for breach of
implied warranty of merchantability; (5) claim under the Magnuson
Moss Warranty Act; (6) claim for fraud; (7) claim for unjust
enrichment; and (8) request for injunctive relief. He dismissed all
these claims with prejudice. Judge Roman denied the motion with
respect to the Plaintiff's consumer protection claims under GBL
Sections 349 and 350.

Judge Roman further directed the Defendant to file an answer to the
Amended Complaint with respect to the Plaintiff's claims under GBL
Sections 349 and 350 by April 18, 2022. He moreover directed the
parties to confer and jointly complete and file a Case Management
Plan and Scheduling Order by March 31, 2022. After review and
approval of the Scheduling Order, the Court will issue an Order of
Reference to Magistrate Judge Judith C. McCarthy for general
pretrial purposes. The parties will contact Judge McCarthy within
seven business days of the date of the Order of Reference to
schedule a conference.

The Clerk of Court is finally directed to terminate the motion at
ECF No. 23.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p9hxrst from Leagle.com.


OCEAN STATE JOB: Hanyzkiewicz Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ocean State Job Lot,
Inc. The case is styled as Marta Hanyzkiewicz, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated v. Ocean State Job Lot, Inc.,
Case No. 1:22-cv-01666 (E.D.N.Y., March 25, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Ocean State Job Lot -- https://www.oceanstatejoblot.com/ -- is an
northeastern American chain of discount closeout retailers founded
in Rhode Island in 1977.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


ORGAIN LLC: Patenaude Suit Dismissed for Failure to State a Claim
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DOUGLAS PATENAUDE, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. ORGAIN, LLC, Defendant,
Civil Action No. 21-40018-TSH (D. Mass.), Judge Timothy S. Hillman
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.

I. Background

Plaintiff Patenaude brings the putative class action against the
Defendant alleging that the labeling on the Defendant's vanilla
flavored milk is deceptive and misleading. The Plaintiff asserts
claims against the Defendant for unfair or deceptive acts pursuant
to Mass. Gen. L. c. 93A, Section 2, Section 9; untrue and
misleading advertising pursuant to Mass. Gen. L. c. 266, Section
91, and for unjust enrichment.

The Defendant "labels, markets, and sells a food product, known as
a 'Vanilla' almond milk, under the brand name of 'Orgain.'" in an
"Unsweetened Vanilla" flavor. The front label of the Product
prominently displays the word "vanilla" without additional language
modifiers.

In his Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff claims he purchased
the Product on several occasions at a Target store in Framingham,
Massachusetts. He alleges the label's reference to the Product's
flavor -- Unsweetened Vanilla -- misled him and other consumers to
the conclusion that the Product contains vanilla, not as an
exclusive ingredient, but as one of its characterizing ingredients,
contributing to the Product's Characterizing Flavor.

The Plaintiff alleges that "some oil, protein, essence, or other
extraction of the vanilla plant's bean pod may have been used to
create the Product's Natural Flavors." but claims that the Product
does not contain vanilla. He asserts that he would not have
purchased the product at full retail price if it were not for the
deceptive practices by the Defendant which led him to believe the
product contained vanilla. He does not allege any testing or other
factual basis for what natural flavors the Product contains or
whether those natural flavors include vanilla extract.

On May 7, 2021, the Plaintiff made a formal demand pursuant to the
Consumer Protection Act, Mass. Gen. L. c. 93A, Section 9,
requesting the Defendant to cease its alleged deceptive practice
and agree to renumerate the Plaintiff and the class he represents.
The Defendant did not respond within the statutorily prescribed 30
days, but on June 9, 2021, it responded claiming that they strictly
comply with all food labeling regulations and that the Plaintiff
had no claim. The Plaintiff alleges unfair or deceptive acts
pursuant to Mass. Gen. L. c. 93A, Section 2 and 940 Code of
Massachusetts Regulations Sections 3.02, 3.05(1), 3.05(2), 3.16(2),
3.16(3) and 3.16(4), alleges untrue and misleading advertising
pursuant to Mass. Gen. L. c. 266, Section 91, and alleges recovery
upon a theory of unjust enrichment.

The Defendant moves to dismiss all claims in the Second Amended
Complaint arguing that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in
all counts pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

II. Discussion

A. Mass. Gen. L. c. 93A, Section 2, Section 9 and c. 266, Section
91

The Plaintiff's first claim is based on alleged violations of
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Mass.
Gen. L. c. 93A, Section 2 and Section 9. The Defendant disputes
both that a reasonable consumer would be misled by the labeling of
its Product and that the deception was material.

Judge Hillman holds -- as many district courts across the country
have -- that the word "vanilla" without any qualifying terms does
not lead a reasonable consumer to believe that the vanilla flavor
came exclusively or predominantly from vanilla beans. The Product
label does not make any reference to vanilla extract, vanilla beans
or "real" vanilla at all, much less to how much of the natural
flavor is supplied by vanilla extract versus any other flavor
source. The label also does not bear any image of a vanilla plant,
vanilla flower or vanilla beans. Courts have repeatedly granted
motions to dismiss identical or nearly identical cases alleging a
product label's reference to "vanilla" was misleading.

In addition to the deficiency of the claim that the product
labeling is misleading, the claim of deception is premised on the
allegation that the Product does not contain vanilla and that claim
itself is without merit. Judge Hillman need not presume as true a
complaint's "naked assertion devoid of further factual
enhancement." Without an allegation of product testing or a claim
that his palate could discern the ingredients that make up the
vanilla flavor, the claim that the product does not contain vanilla
is "naked assertion." A claim that a product is misleading because
it does not contain vanilla, must plausibly state that it does not
contain vanilla, and without such a plausible claim the Plaintiff's
allegation of deception must fail.

The Plaintiff's complaint also fails to state a Chapter 93A claim
because the allegations do not plausibly establish that the Product
misleads consumers in a material way. Judge Hillman finds that a
reasonable consumer would understand that 'vanilla' on a product's
front label is merely a flavor designation, not an ingredient
claim, and therefore would not be materially mislead by such a
distinction on the front label.

Finally, the Plaintiff fails to allege facts that show reasonable
consumers would be materially mislead when a product's label uses
the word "vanilla" and its natural flavor comes in part, but not
exclusively, from the vanilla bean as opposed to other natural
vanilla sources. The product's label does not make a representation
as to the proportion or source of the vanilla flavor and the
Plaintiff fails to explain why reasonable consumers would be misled
using natural flavoring in a product, which does taste like
vanilla.

Therefore, the Plaintiff's Chapter 93A claim fails without a
plausible allegation of a deceptive act or practice that materially
mislead consumers.

B. Mass. Gen. L. c. 266, Section 91

Next, the Plaintiff asserts that the "Defendant's labeling,
advertising, promotion, and marketing of its Products are untrue,
deceptive, and misleading, in violation of Mass. Gen. L. c. 266,
Section 91." To state a claim under Mass. Gen. L. c. 266, Section
91, a Plaintiff must plausibly allege that an advertisement was
misleading or deceptive.

Judge Hillman holds that the Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege
the label of Product is deceptive or misleads consumers and does
not allege the label is untrue. As such, the Plaintiff's c. 266
claim fails for the same reasons his Chapter 93A claim fails.

C. Unjust Enrichment

The Plaintiff's third and final claim is that "as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's misconduct as set forth, the
Defendant has been unjustly enriched."

Judge Hillman finds that the fact that the Plaintiff failed to
plead the elements necessary for another contractual or statutory
claim does not allow him to assert a claim on a theory of unjust
enrichment. In addition, the Plaintiff's contention that it is
permissible to plead both an unjust enrichment claim and an
alternative cause of action at the pleading stage is correct, but
fails to address the fact that the availability of a Chapter 93A
claim bars any unjust enrichment claim. The Plaintiff has failed to
allege that any gains to the Defendant would be unjust because he
has not plausibly alleged that a reasonable consumer would be
misled or deceived by the Product's label.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Hillman granted the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Memorandum of
Decision & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/mu442t3u from
Leagle.com.


OVENLY LLC: Dawkins Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ovenly, LLC. The case
is styled as Elbert Dawkins, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Ovenly, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-01675
(E.D.N.Y., March 25, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Ovenly -- https://oven.ly/ -- is an award-winning bakery based in
New York City specializing in that magic intersection between
savory & sweet.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


PARTNERS HEALTHCARE: Belknap Appeals ERISA Suit Dismissal
---------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff SCOTT BELKNAP filed an appeal from a court ruling entered
in the lawsuit styled SCOTT BELKNAP, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PARTNERS HEALTHCARE
SYSTEM, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11437-FDS, in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.

The lawsuit alleges violation of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974.

According to the complaint, the Defendant uses the 1951 Group
Annuity Mortality Table projected to the 1960 Mortality Table, set
back two years for participants, and set back three years for
beneficiaries (the "Adjusted 1951 GAM") and a 7.5% interest rate to
determine the present value of the Non Single Life Annuities under
the Brigham Plan and for benefits earned prior to 2017 and for all
balances for grandfathered participants under the Defendants'
Plan.

The Adjusted 1951 GAM is based on mortality rates from more than 60
years ago. Even with the modest projections and setbacks, using the
Adjusted 1951 GAM depresses the present value of Non Single Life
Annuities Annuities, resulting in monthly payments that are
materially lower than they would be if the Defendant used
reasonable, current actuarial assumptions -- like the ones it uses
in its audited financial statements to calculate the benefits it
expects to pay retirees.

The complaint relates that the Plaintiff worked for Massachusetts
General Hospital for more than 37 years. By using outdated
mortality assumptions, the Defendant reduced the present value of
the Plaintiff's benefits by $10,099.77. This improper reduction
causes the Plaintiff and other participants and beneficiaries of
the Plans to receive less than they should every month and will
continue to affect them throughout their retirements.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Mar. 18, 2022, Judge F.
Dennis Saylor, IV, of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts:

    (i) denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of
        standing; and

   (ii) granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to
        state a claim, as converted to a motion for summary
        judgment.

The Plaintiff seeks a review of Judge Saylor's order.

The appellate case is captioned as SCOTT BELKNAP, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v.
PARTNERS HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Case No.
22-1188, in the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, filed on March 23, 2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that appearance
form, transcript report/order form, and docketing statement are due
on April 6, 2022.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant SCOTT BELKNAP, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Douglas P. Needham, Esq.
          Robert A. Izard, Esq.
          IZARD, KINDALL & RAABE LLP
          29 South Main Street, Suite 305
          West Hartford, CT 06107
          Telephone: (860) 493-6292
          Facsimile: (860) 493-6290
          E-mail: dneedham@ikrlaw.com
                  rizard@ikrlaw.com

               - and -

          Gregory Y. Porter, Esq.
          Mark G. Boyko, Esq.
          BAILEY & GLASSER LLP
          1054 31st Street, NW, Suite 230  
          Washington, DC 20007
          Telephone: (202) 463-2101
          Facsimile: (202) 463-2103
          E-mail: gporter@baileyglasser.com
                  mboyko@baileyglasser.com

PHARMAVITE LLC: Harmon Files Suit in N.D. Illinois
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pharmavite LLC. The
case is styled as Laura Harmon, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Pharmavite LLC, Case No. 3:22-cv-50091
(N.D. Ill., March 26, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

Pharmavite -- https://www.pharmavite.com/ -- is an American dietary
supplements company that was founded in 1971 by California
pharmacist, Barry Pressman, and that was acquired by Otsuka
Pharmaceutical in 1989.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 Cuttermill Road, Ste. 409
          Great Neck, NY 11021
          Phone: (516) 260-7080
          Fax: (516) 234-7800
          Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com


PHH MORTGAGE: Class Status Bid Filing Due April 28
--------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as WILLIAM SALTER, et al., v.
PHH MORTGAGE CORP., Case No. 0:21-cv-62318-CMA (S.D. Fla.), the
Hon. Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga entered an order granting in part
the Plaintiffs' motion for continuance of class certification
deadline as follows:

  -- Deadline for completing class         April 18, 2022
     certification discovery:

  -- The Plaintiffs deadline to file       April 28, 2022
     motion for class certification:

  -- Parties exchange expert witness       June 29, 2022.
     summaries or reports:

  -- Parties exchange rebuttal             July 13, 2022
     expert witness summaries or
     reports:

  -- All discovery, including expert       July 27, 2022
     discovery, is completed:

  -- Parties must have completed           August 3, 2022
     mediation and filed a mediation
     report:

  -- All pre-trial motions and Daubert     August 11, 2022
     motions (which include motions to
     strike experts) are filed.

PHH Mortgage provides mortgage financing solutions.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 9, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Nnw7Xq at no extra charge.[CC]

PHH MORTGAGE: Reda Suit Removed to D. Massachusetts
---------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Samir Reda, on behalf of himself and all others
so similarly situated v. PHH Mortgage Corporation formerly known
as: OCWEN Loan Servicing, LLC; Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
as trustee for the pooling and servicing agreement dated November
1, 2006 securitized asset backed receivables LLC trust 2006-FR4,
mortgage pass-through CER; Case No. 2282cv0092, was removed from
the Norfolk Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts on March 24, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:22-cv-10444-FDS to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Real Property: Foreclosure.

PHH Mortgage -- https://www.phhmortgage.com/ -- a wholly owned
subsidiary of Ocwen Financial Corporation, is one of the largest
subservicers of residential mortgages in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd S. Dion, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF TODD S. DION
          15 Cottage Avenue, Suite 202
          Quincy, MA 02169
          Phone: (401) 965-4131
          Fax: (401) 535-1231
          Email: toddsdion@msn.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Kevin W. Manganaro, Esq.
          Maura K. McKelvey, Esq.
          HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP
          53 State Street, 27th Floor
          Boston, MA 02109
          Phone: (516) 241-5521
          Email: kmanganaro@hinshawlaw.com
                 mmckelvey@hinshawlaw.com


PHILADELPHIA PARKING: Ferebee Suit Removed to E.D. Pennsylvania
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Dolly E. Ferebee, for herself and others
similarly situated v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, Nycole
Macklin, Scott A. Petri, II, Dennis G. Weldon, Jr., Michael Giunta,
City of Philadelphia, John Doe, No. 1, John Doe, No. 2, Case No.
220201184, was removed from the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania on March 25, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-01155 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Civil Rights for the Civil
Rights Act.

The Philadelphia Parking Authority -- https://philapark.org/ -- is
an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that manages many
parking operations for Philadelphia.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appears pro se.

The Defendants are represented by:

          Patrick J. Doran, Esq.
          ARCHER & GREINER PC
          Three Logan Square
          1717 Arch Street, Suite 3500
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Phone: (215) 963-3300
          Fax: (215) 963-9999
          Email: pdoran@archerlaw.com


PJ OPS IDAHO: Edwards' Bid to Produce Wylie & Allen Emails Approved
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CORY EDWARDS, et al., On behalf of themselves and
those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. PJ OPS IDAHO, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-00283-DCN (D. Idaho), Judge David C.
Nye of the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho grants the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Email Mailboxes of
Individual Defendant Tom Wylie and Forthcoming Individual Defendant
Doug Allen and Search Terms.

I. Background

Plaintiffs Cory Edwards, James Hollingsworth, Matthew Garber, Seth
Thomas Sweeney, John Carrigan, and Jeffrey Smith (the "Drivers"),
at one point or another, worked as pizza-delivery drivers for
various Papa John's franchise locations in Idaho, Kentucky,
Colorado, Louisiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Tennessee, Virginia, North
Dakota, and New York. In their class action suit, the Drivers
allege that Defendants have repeatedly violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") and relevant state wage laws by improperly
applying a tip credit to delivery driver wages and by failing to
adequately reimburse delivery drivers for their delivery expenses.
As a result, the Drivers claim Papa Johns failed to pay all
delivery drivers the legally mandated minimum wage for all hours
worked.

While there are many corporate defendants in the instant case, the
two individual defendants are of particular mention. Tom Wylie is
the sole manager of all the Papa Johns entities in the case. To
avoid delving too deeply into the organization of each LLC, for the
purposes of the instant motion, it is sufficient to summarize that
Wylie also has an ownership interest in some or all of the Papa
Johns entities and takes an active role in the operations of each
business. Douglas "Dougie" Allen is, or was, the operating partner
over all the Papa Johns entities in the case, with the exception of
PJ Colorado Springs. Allen also has an ownership interest in PJ
Holdings KY, which in turn has an ownership interest in all the
other Papa Johns entities at issue here.

The instant motion involves a discovery dispute between the
parties. Discovery in the case is focused on determining how the
Defendants reimbursed the delivery drivers and which individual(s)
qualify as an "employer" of the delivery drivers. The Drivers'
Motion to Compel seeks the production of (1) the individual email
mailboxes of Wylie and Allen, and (2) the application of the
following search terms: "(Doug or Dougie) and delivery)"; "mile*"2;
"mile* and delivery"; "reimburs*"; "termin*"; "Wylie and deliver";
and "Wylie and driver" to 12 custodians of certain records. The
parties have met and conferred on several occasions and engaged
with the Court in informal discovery dispute negotiations to no
avail. The matter is now formally before the Court.

II. Discussion

A. Production of the Individual Email Mailboxes of Wylie and Allen

The Drivers have requested that the entire email mailboxes of Wylie
and Allen be produced in discovery.

Because of the nature of the claims brought by Drivers, Judge Nye
grants this request. He holds that given the criticality of
determining who is an employer, there is no question that the
emails are relevant evidence that can be used to determine whether
Wylie and Allen are employers in the case. And while large, the
request is proportional to the needs of the case. Although the
Defendants are correct that the broad nature of the term "employer"
does not excuse the specificity requirements of Rule 34, it does
inform how narrow a request for production can be. The Defendants
will be able to redact privileged information following typical
discovery procedures.

As such, the request for the entire email mailboxes of Wylie and
Allen, in this situation, with the record that is before the Court,
is as reasonably proportional and particular as it can be. It is
not a "fishing expedition," especially given the fact that Wylie
and Allen own shares of the PJ entities and were involved in some
managerial decisions. Given the criticality of determining who the
"employer" is, and the lack of viable alternatives presented to the
Court, it is appropriate to compel production of Allen and Wylie's
entire email mailboxes.

B. Production of Specific Search Terms

Drivers have also requested emails with certain key words that
correspond to a number of topics in the case. The Drivers'
requested search terms return the following results: "(Doug or
Dougie) and delivery" (appears in 7,556 documents); "mile*" (34,661
documents); "mile* and deliver" (832 documents); "reimburs*" (4,256
documents); "Wylie and deliver" (2,142 documents); "Wylie and
driver" (6,982 documents); and "termin*" (8,769 documents).

As before, the Defendants do not dispute the relevance of the
Plaintiff's proposed terms but again argue that the search is
disproportionate and will be an undue burden. They propose using
the following revised terms that would limit the document
population: "deliver w/20 (drive* or car* or order* or reimburse*)"
(2,619 documents); "mile* w/20 delivery" (2,595 documents); "mile*
w/20 reimburse*" (765 documents); "terminat* w/20 driver*" (209
documents); "deliver w/20 (drive* or car* or order* or reimburse*)"
(2,619 documents); and "wylie w/50 driver" (498 documents).

Judge Nye finds that the search terms proposed by Drivers all
center around the main question of the instant case -- were the
Papa Johns drivers properly paid? Because these search terms will
locate information that is important to the theory of the case, the
search terms are relevant.

The search terms are also proportional to the case. Although the
term "terminat*" does have a higher possibility than the other
proposed search terms of garnering documents unrelated to the case,
all seven search terms are reasonably focused on finding only
relevant documents. As the search terms are appropriately narrowed,
the amount of documents that will be examined here is proportionate
to the large and complex nature of the case.

The Defendants claim that the Drivers' search terms will be unduly
burdensome, pointing to the high cost of producing such
information. However, Judge Nye finds that the Defendants' cost
estimates lacks credibility. They originally claimed that reviewing
Drivers' search terms would cost somewhere between $41,000 to
$63,000. Now, however, the Defendants claim that such a review
would cost between $72,000 to $118,000.

Judge Nye holds that even allowing for inflation, rising attorney
fees, and errors in the original estimate given to the Plaintiffs,
the near-doubling in cost makes little sense, and undercuts the
Defendants' claims that the search is unduly burdensome. Thus, it
seems likely that the Defendants' actual cost of following such
review will not resemble their gloomy prediction of review costs.
The Defendants' proposed search terms, on the other hand, unduly
narrow the scope of discovery and may lead to relevant emails
remaining undiscovered. Their proposed search terms also do not
include Allen within the search, which is especially troubling
considering that Allen participated in setting the driver
reimbursement rates.

As such, Judge Nye grants the Drivers' requests that the
Defendant's produce documents corresponding to the seven search
terms.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons he stated, Judge Nye grants the Plaintiff's Motion
to Compel as outlined. The parties will meet and confer to set
appropriate deadlines for production.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Memorandum Decision
& Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/5beratza from
Leagle.com.


PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK: Talarico Appeals Summary Judgment
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Charlene Talarico filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit entitled CHARLENE TALARICO v. THE PORT
AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, Case No. 1:18-cv-00909-JPO,
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
(New York City).

Talarico has filed the putative class action against her employer,
the Port Authority, alleging that the Port Authority has engaged in
a practice of filming its employees' private medical examinations
without their knowledge or consent. Talarico claims that the
alleged practice violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the U.S. Constitution, as well as the analogous guarantees of the
New York State Constitution, and she seeks individual and
class-wide relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and New York
law.

Talarico numbers among the Port Authority's roughly 8,000
employees. On Aug. 4, 2016, after receiving a hand injury in an
altercation with a coworker, Talarico visited one of the Medical
Services Offices that the Port Authority provides for the exclusive
use of its workers. There, she received an examination from a Port
Authority physician in a private examination room.

Following this incident, Talarico initiated legal proceedings in a
New Jersey municipal court against the coworker who had injured
her. During the course of discovery, the Port Authority allowed
Talarico to view several video recordings, one of which showed
Talarico's Aug. 4, 2016 medical examination in its entirety.
Talarico had not previously been aware of the recording, and she
had never consented to having her examination recorded.

On Feb. 1, 2018, Talarico initiated the instant lawsuit against the
Port Authority on behalf of herself and a proposed class of all
other employees who had been and would be subjected to "covert
video surveillance" during a medical examination at any of the Port
Authority's Medical Services Offices. Her four-count complaint
claims that the Port Authority's alleged practice of covertly
filming its employees' medical examinations without their consent
violates the guarantees against unreasonable searches enshrined in
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Count One) and
Article I, Section 12, of the New York State Constitution (Count
Three), and that the practice also violates the privacy guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Count Two)
and Article I, Section 6, of the New York State Constitution (Count
Four).

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on March 8, 2022, the Hon.
Judge J. Paul Oetken entered an order granting the Port Authority's
motion for summary judgment.

The Court said, "Talarico concedes that this case does not involve
the explicit enactment of a policy or any widespread and pervasive
custom of recording medical examinations in OMS. Besides in the
room where Talarico had her examination, which doubled as a nurse
supervisor's office, there is no evidence of cameras in any other
room of OMS. Talarico also does not offer a single other instance
of the Port Authority recording a medical examination. There is,
admittedly, evidence suggesting that other medical examinations had
taken place in the room where the doctor examined Talarico's hand,
creating the potential for the security camera to record these past
examinations. This potential would hinge both on these other
examinations happening within the view of the camera, which did not
record the entire room, and the curtain within the room not being
fully drawn so that the view of the camera was unobstructed. But
the potential for an invasion of privacy, on its own, is not a
constitutional violation. Because Talarico has not established any
policy or custom connected to her alleged constitutional violation,
the Port Authority is not liable under Monell as a matter of law.
Its motion for summary judgment therefore must be granted."

Ms. Talarico now seeks a review of the order entered by Judge
Oetken.

The appellate case is captioned as Talarico v. The Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey, Case No. 22-593, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, filed on March 22,
2022.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Charlene Talarico, individually and on behalf
of a class of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Richard Soto, Esq.
          HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP
          200 Park Avenue
          New York, NY 10166
          Telephone: (212) 309-1000

Defendant-Appellee The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is
represented by:

          David Kromm, Esq.
          THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY
          4 World Trade Center
          150 Greenwich Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 435-3483
          E-mail: dkromm@panynj.gov

POWERPC MALL: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against PowerPC Mall LLC. The
case is styled as Jose Mejia, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. PowerPC Mall LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-02475 (S.D.N.Y., March 27, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

PowerPC Mall -- https://powerpcmall.com/ -- is an online computer
store founded to provide quality computers to customers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


PRESBYTERIAN HEALTH: $35.5K in Attys.' Fees Awarded in Pruess Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge John F. Robbenhaar of the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Mexico awarded $35,531.33 in attorney's fees in
the case, DANIA PRUESS, MARY BATEMAN, LINDA VARGAS MARTINEZ, AND
DAVID GALLEGOS on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. PRESBYTERIAN HEALTH PLAN, INC., and FLUENT
HEALTH LLC, Defendants, Case No. CIV 19-629 DHU/JFR (D.N.M.).

I. Introduction

The matter comes before the Court regarding its recent decision
granting the Plaintiff's motion to compel and order for costs. The
Plaintiffs have submitted their petition for fees and the matter is
fully briefed.

II. Background

In its recent decision, the Court found that the Defendants'
withholding of discoverable material, which prompted the Plaintiffs
to file their motion to compel, was sufficiently culpable to
warrant the awarding of costs to the Plaintiffs. In their petition
for fees, the Plaintiffs explain that they served written discovery
on the Defendants in April 2021, which was answered by the
Defendants in early July. The Court issued its order on Jan. 12,
2022, granting in part the Plaintiffs' motion to compel and
authorized the imposition of fees against the Defendants.

The Plaintiffs attach to their petition the billing records of
three attorneys, which records demonstrate that they have expended
"more than 169 hours attempting to resolve the discovery disputes
with the Defendants and briefing the motion to compel." They seek
hourly rates of $450/hr for Ms. Arendt and of $600/hr for Mr.
Hedgpeth and cite to other cases where courts have found their
rates reasonable. They attach Declarations of attorneys Arendt,
Hedgpeth and Seigel, along with detailed timekeeping records of
work expended on the matter.

The Defendants object to the Plaintiffs' petition, claiming that
the fees requested are unreasonable, excessive and duplicative
since the Plaintiffs simply prepared a 12-page motion and a 12-page
reply. They object to the Plaintiffs' attorneys' duplicative
billing, i.e. billing separately for the same task, as well as to
non-specific "block billing" which fails to specify whether work
being done related to the motion to compel or to general discovery.
The Defendants object to fees associated with "time spent
performing work that would have been required whether or not the
motion to compel was filed, such as time spent reviewing
supplemental disclosures and document productions." They object to
fees incurred in the meet and confer process, as the "vast majority
of the discovery issues on which the parties met and conferred were
resolved and were not included in the motion to compel."

The Defendants further state that the hourly rates requested are
not reasonable in this jurisdiction, and point to other cases from
the District of New Mexico where hourly rates far less than those
requested by the Plaintiffs' attorneys were approved. They claim
that the subject of the litigation is not so unusual that only
out-of-state counsel would be qualified. The Defendants state that
reduced fees are appropriate because their objections were
substantially justified, some of their objections were sustained,
and the scope of the relief granted was narrower than originally
sought. The Defendants request that the Court awards "no more than
$5,000 for preparing their motion to compel."

By way of their reply, the Plaintiffs submit that the Defendants'
response is a veiled attempt to seek reconsideration, and therefore
is beyond the scope of the briefing and should be disregarded. They
state that a document-intensive, hybrid class-collective action
case requires far more collaboration among attorneys than most
cases, that the counsel's rates are reasonable, and that the level
of specialization and expertise required is such that local counsel
doesn't meet that requirement. The Plaintiffs claim few other
attorneys in the country possess their level of expertise and
experience in hybrid class-collective wage and hour cases.

III. Analysis

The Defendants' raises three primary objections: (1) the Plaintiffs
seek fees for work that was unreasonable, excessive and/or
duplicative; (2) the Plaintiffs' hourly rates are not reasonable in
this jurisdiction; and (3) the Defendants' objections and the
non-disclosure of certain documents were substantially justified,
some of the Defendants' objections were sustained, and the scope of
the relief that was granted was narrower than what was initially
sought.

A. Whether the Work Performed and Billed by Plaintiffs' Counsel was
Excessive, Duplicative or Unreasonable

The Plaintiffs have limited their fee request to time spent by
attorneys Arendt and Hedgpeth, specifically related to the written
discovery request that ultimately resulted in their motion to
compel. These two attorneys request fees for 97.5 hours even though
their total hours expended on this issue amount to 134 hours.
Additionally, the Plaintiffs specifically omit from their fee
request the time spent by other attorneys and staff who worked on
this issue, which time amounts to roughly 25 hours.

Judge Robbenhaar has carefully reviewed the declarations of the
counsel, as well as their attached billing records, for
reasonableness, excessiveness, and/or duplication. He deducts 20
hours from the Plaintiffs' attorneys' fee request (15 hours for
"meet and confer," and 5 hours for lack of specificity). He finds
that the attorneys should be compensated for 77.5 hours.

B. Whether the Hourly Rates Billed by Plaintiffs' Counsel are
Excessive


Considering the attorneys' expertise in wage-hour complex, class
action matters, the complex nature of this case, and the fact that
attorney fees are generally lower in New Mexico than in surrounding
areas, Judge Robbenhaar will exercise his discretion and awards the
Plaintiffs' attorneys a blended rate of $425/hr for the work
performed on their motion to compel.

C. Whether Reduced Fees are Appropriate Given that Defendants'
Objections and The Non-Disclosure of Certain Documents were
Substantially Justified, Some of Defendants' Objections were
Sustained, and the Scope of the Relief that was Granted was
Narrower than What was Initially Sought.

Judge Robbenhaar is not persuaded that the Defendants' failure to
provide the discovery at issue was reasonable or substantially
justified. He finds that the Defendants complain that the
production was burdensome, which the Court accepts as true. But the
Defendants do not adequately explain their earlier unwillingness or
inability to produce the discovery in the first place. The Court
will not reduce the Plaintiffs' fee request based on the
Defendants' claimed justification for their original
non-compliance, or the fact that the Court slightly narrowed the
Plaintiffs' discovery requests in two of seven issues.

IV. Conclusion

Judge Robbenhaar finds that the counsel for the Plaintiffs have
appropriately billed 77.5 hours, and should be compensated at a
blended rate of $425/hr. This results in fees of $32,937.50,
together with gross receipts tax (7.875%) of $2,593.83, for a total
award of $35,531.33. Judge Robbenhaar sees this award as reasonable
and fails to note any legitimate reason to depart from this amount.
The Defendants will tender this sum to the Plaintiffs within 45
days of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/3tcrmypx from
Leagle.com.


PROFECTUS BEAUTY: Guerrero Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Profectus Beauty,
LLC. The case is styled as Edelmira Guerrero, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Profectus Beauty, LLC,
Case No. 1:22-cv-02468 (S.D.N.Y., March 27, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Profectus Beauty is AUA Private Equity's first investment platform
in the personal care and beauty sector.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 11201
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


PROGRESSIVE ADVANCED: Bartee Files Suit in E.D. Missouri
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Progressive Advanced
Insurance Company. The case is styled as Lillian Bartee,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Progressive Advanced Insurance Company, Case No. 4:22-cv-00342
(E.D. Mo., March 24, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Insurance for Insurance Contract.

Progressive Advanced Insurance Company --
http://www.progressive.com/-- operates as an insurance firm. The
Company underwrites motor vehicle insurance policie.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, PA
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Phone: (305) 479-2299
          Fax: (786) 623-0915
          Email: ashamis@sflinjuryattorneys.com



PROGRESSIVE UNIVERSAL: Faces Kroeger Suit Over Total Loss Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
AMY KROEGER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. PROGRESSIVE UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY, an Ohio
corporation, Case No. 4:22-cv-00104 (D. Iowa, March 25, 2022) is a
class action on behalf of Plaintiff and all other similarly
situated claimants in Iowa who received a payment for the loss of a
totaled vehicle from Defendant, where Defendant used valuation
reports prepared by Mitchell International to determine the actual
cash value of the loss vehicles.

According to the complaint, by using these valuation reports, the
Defendant systemically thumbs the scale when calculating the actual
cash value ("ACV") of claimants' loss vehicles by applying
so-called "Projected Sold Adjustments" that are: (a) deceptive and
unexplained; (b) contrary to appraisal standards and methodologies;
(c) not based in fact, as they are contrary to the used car
industry's market pricing and inventory management practices; (d)
not applied by the major competitor of Defendant's vendor Mitchell;
and (e) on information and belief, not applied by Defendant and
Mitchell to insureds in other states like California.

In the event of a "total loss" to an insured vehicle -- i.e., where
repair of the vehicle is impossible or uneconomical – the
Defendant's uniform insurance policies with Plaintiff and all
putative Class members promises to pay for the loss, limited to the
actual cash value ("ACV") of the vehicle. When valuing total loss
claims for vehicles, it is improper for an automobile insurance
company, such as Progressive, to undervalue and underpay the claims
by manipulating the data used to determine the actual cash value of
the vehicles.

Specifically, under their insurance policy terms and applicable
Iowa law, Defendant has a duty to pay, and represent that they will
pay, the actual cash value of a loss vehicle when adjusting total
loss claims. Notwithstanding these obligations and representations,
Defendant fails to fulfill this obligation by using a valuation
process that employs improper and unreasonable adjustments to
reduce the value of comparable vehicles specified in the valuation
reports, which in turn reduces the valuation of the total loss
vehicles and the claim payment to the insured/claimant, says the
suit.

Specifically, Defendant, through Mitchell, systemically applies a
so-called "Projected Sold Adjustment" that results in a significant
downward adjustment to the base values of the comparable vehicles
used to calculate the actual cash value of Plaintiff's and Class
members' total loss vehicles.

An integral part of Defendant's fraudulent scheme is a provision of
the Policy which requires the parties to submit to an appraisal of
the loss if there is a disagreement over the loss. The appraisal
provision requires the insured and the insurer to each hire, at
their own expense, an appraiser, and to bear equally the expenses
of an umpire selected by the two appraisers, as well as any other
expenses of the appraisal, the suit added.

To be clear, this case does not present a dispute about
loss—which both Parties agree exceeds ACV, such that the vehicle
is a total loss—or even ACV, which Defendant never determines.
Rather, this case challenges Defendant's systematic and fraudulent
scheme to mis-value insureds' vehicles that are declared a total
loss in a manner which does not comport with representations made
by Defendant or obligations undertaken by Defendant in its
Policies, in order to illegally increase its own profits. This is
an issue that cannot be resolved through an appraisal process.

Moreover, the Policy is an unconscionable contract that was
unilaterally drafted by the Defendant with full knowledge of the
unfair scheme it intended to employ to artificially reduce the
value of its insured's vehicles, and neither Plaintiff nor the
members of the Class had any roll in drafting its terms.

Through the Defendant's alleged deceptive, fraudulent, and unfair
scheme, Defendant breached its contracts and the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing and was unjustly enriched.

By this action, the Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the
Class, seek damages and injunctive and declaratory relief.

Plaintiff Amy Kroeger was contracted with Progressive for
automobile insurance. On or about August 3, 2018, Plaintiff was in
a car wreck and Defendant deemed her vehicle to be a total loss.

The Defendant Progressive Universal Insurance Company is an Ohio
company with its principal place of business in Ohio. Defendant
provides insurance coverage throughout the United States for
first-party property damage under collision and/or comprehensive
coverage.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          Christopher Gold, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.
          20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (786) 289-9471
          Facsimile: (786) 623-0915
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com
                  chris@edelsberglaw.com

               - and -

          Edmund Normand, Esq.
          NORMAND PLLC
          3165 McCrory Pl Ste 175
          Orlando, FL 32803
          Telephone: (407) 603-6031
          Facsimile: (888) 974-2175
          E-mail: ed@ednormand.com

               - and -

          J. Barton Goplerud, Esq.
          Brian O. Marty, Esq.
          SHINDLER ANDERSON GOPLERUD &
          WEESE PC
          5015 Grand Ridge Drive, Suite 100
          West Des Moines, IO 50265-5749
          Telephone: (515) 223-4567
          Facsimile: (515) 223-8887
          E-mail: goplerud@sagwlaw.com
                  marty@sagwlaw.com

PROHEALTH PHARMACY: Fischler Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Prohealth Pharmacy,
Inc. The case is styled as Brian Fischler, individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated v. Prohealth
Pharmacy, Inc. doing business as: Prohealth Pharmacy, Case No.
1:22-cv-02392 (S.D.N.Y., March 24, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Prohealth Pharmacy -- https://prohealthny.com/ -- is a CLIA
certified pharmacy in NYC offering On-site COVID testing,
prescriptions, vitamins.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
          LIPSKY LOWE LLP
          420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1830
          New York, NY 10170
          Phone: (212) 764-7171
          Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


PUBLIC CONSULTING: Faces Kinney WARN Act Suit Over Mass Layoff
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH KINNEY on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. PUBLIC CONSULTING GROUP, INC., and STAFFING SOLUTIONS
ORGANIZATION, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-02458 (S.D.N.Y., March 25,
2022) is a class action on behalf of the Plaintiff and other
similarly situated former employees who worked for the Defendants
and who were terminated without cause, as part of, or as the
foreseeable result of, a mass layoff or plant closing ordered by
the Defendants beginning on February 25, 2022, and within 90 days
of that date and who were not provided 60 days advance written
notice of their terminations by Defendants, as required by the
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act and 90 days
advance written notice of their terminations by Defendants, as
required by the New York Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act.

The Defendants allegedly terminated hundreds of its employees
beginning on or about February 25, 2022, and within 90 days of that
date. Until he was terminated from his employment on or about
February 25, 2022, the Plaintiff was employed by Defendants in
their Virtual Call Center as a contact tracer/case investigator in
the NY Contact Tracing Initiative.

The Defendants' involvement with the NY Contact Tracing Initiative
included recruiting, interviewing, hiring, training, and managing
contact tracers and case investigators, their managers, and other
staff, and administering all human resources management functions
for this workforce. The Defendants were responsible for managing
the day-to-day operations and work performed by this workforce.

The Defendants regularly issued directives to Plaintiff and the
contact tracer/case investigators regarding what they should and
should not say in their calls, provided scripts, established
protocols, procedures, and workflows for the Virtual Call Center
teams, and kept track of their work hours, compliance with
policies, and performance.

The Plaintiff and the similarly situated Virtual Call Center
employees worked outside of any of the Defendants' regular
employment sites, and they reported to, and they received
assignments or were managed from, Defendants' Headquarters
Facility.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jack A. Raisner, Esq.
          Rene S. Roupinian, Esq.
          RAISNER ROUPINIAN LLP
          270 Madison Avenue, Suite 1801
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 221-1747
          Facsimile: (212) 221-1747
          E-mail: rsr@raisnerroupinian.com
                  jar@raisnerroupinian.com


RA MEDICAL: $10MM Class Settlement to Be Heard on June 13
---------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERVIN DERR, and PETER SHOEMAKER,
Individually and on

Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

          Plaintiffs,

    v.

RA MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC., DEAN IRWIN, ANDREW JACKSON,
MELISSA BURSTEIN, MARTIN BURSTEIN, RICHARD HEYMANN, MAURICE
BUCHBINDER,
MARTIN COLOMBATTO, RICHARD MEJIA, JR., MARK E. SAAD, and WILLIAM
ENQUIST, JR.,

          Defendants.

Case No. 3:19-cv-01079
Honorable Larry Alan Burns

SUMMARY NOTICE OF (I) PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION, CERTIFICATION OF
SETTLEMENT CLASS, AND PROPOSED SETTLEMENT; (II) SETTLEMENT FAIRNESS
HEARING; AND (III) MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND
REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES

TO: All persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired
the common stock of Ra Medical Systems, Inc. ("Ra Medical"): (a)
pursuant and/or traceable to Ra Medical's Initial Public Offering;
and/or (b) between September 27, 2018 and November 27, 2019,
inclusive (the "Settlement Class"):

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY, YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PENDING IN THIS COURT.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California, that the above-captioned
litigation (the "Action") has been certified as a class action on
behalf of the Settlement Class, except for certain persons and
entities who are excluded from the Settlement Class by definition
as set forth in the full printed Notice of (I) Pendency of Class
Action and Proposed Settlement; (II) Settlement Fairness Hearing;
and (III) Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement
of Litigation Expenses (the "Notice").

YOU ARE ALSO NOTIFIED that Lead Plaintiffs in the Action have
reached a proposed settlement of the Action for $10,000,000 in cash
(the "Settlement"), that, if approved, will resolve all claims in
the Action.

A hearing will be held on June 13, 2022 at 11:30 a.m., before the
Honorable Larry Alan Burns at the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California, United States Courthouse,
Courtroom 14A, 333 West Broadway, San Diego, CA 92101, to determine
(i) whether the proposed Settlement should be approved as fair,
reasonable, and adequate; (ii) whether the Action should be
dismissed with prejudice against Defendants, and the Releases
specified and described in the Stipulation and Agreement of
Settlement dated November 12, 2021 (and in the Notice) should be
granted; (iii) whether the proposed Plan of Allocation should be
approved as fair and reasonable; and (iv) whether Lead Counsel's
application for an award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of
expenses should be approved.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, your rights will be
affected by the pending Action and the Settlement, and you may be
entitled to share in the Settlement Fund.  If you have not yet
received the Notice and Claim Form, you may obtain copies of these
documents by contacting the Claims Administrator at Ra Medical
Systems, Inc. Securities Litigation, c/o Epiq, P.O. Box 5189,
Portland, OR 97208-5189, 1-855-675-3149.  Copies of the Notice and
Claim Form can also be downloaded from the website maintained by
the Claims Administrator, www.RaMedicalSecuritiesLitigation.com.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, in order to be
eligible to receive a payment under the proposed Settlement, you
must submit a Claim Form online or postmarked no later than
July 9, 2022.  If you are a Settlement Class Member and do not
submit a proper Claim Form, you will not be eligible to share in
the distribution of the net proceeds of the Settlement, but you
will nevertheless be bound by any judgments or orders entered by
the Court in the Action.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class and wish to exclude
yourself from the Settlement Class, you must submit a request for
exclusion such that it is received no later than May 23, 2022, in
accordance with the instructions set forth in the Notice.  If you
properly exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you will not
be bound by any judgments or orders entered by the Court in the
Action and you will not be eligible to share in the proceeds of the
Settlement.

Any objections to the proposed Settlement, the proposed Plan of
Allocation, or Lead Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of expenses, must be filed with the Court and
delivered to Lead Counsel and Defendants' Counsel such that they
are received no later than May 23, 2022, in accordance with the
instructions set forth in the Notice.

Please do not contact the Court, the Clerk's office, Ra Medical, or
its counsel regarding this notice.  All questions about this
notice, the proposed Settlement, or your eligibility to participate
in the Settlement should be directed to Lead Counsel or the Claims
Administrator.

Requests for the Notice and Claim Form should be made to:

         Ra Medical Systems, Inc. Securities Litigation   
         c/o Epiq
         P.O. Box 5189
         Portland, OR 97208-5189
         855-675-3149
         www.RaMedicalSecuritiesLitigation.com

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice and Claim Form,
should be made to Lead Counsel:

         GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
         Casey E. Sadler, Esq.
         1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
         Los Angeles, CA 90067
         (888) 773-9224
         settlements@glancylaw.com

By Order of the Court


RTIC OUTDOORS: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against RTIC Outdoors, LLC.
The case is styled as Jose Mejia, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. RTIC Outdoors, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-02521 (S.D.N.Y., March 28, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

RTIC Outdoors -- https://rticoutdoors.com/ -- offers premium
Coolers and Insulated Drinkware at a fraction of the price of the
competition.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


SEEDS OF HOPE: Johnson Sues Over Failure to Pay Proper Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
TIMOTHY JOHNSON, MARTESHIA PITTMAN, and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. SEEDS OF HOPE STAFFING AGENCY, LLC and JULIE HAWKINS,
Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-00204 (M.D. Tenn., March 24, 2022) is
brought against the Defendants for Defendants' failure to pay
Plaintiffs' minimum wages and overtime wages in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The Plaintiffs further assert
claims for unjust enrichment/quantum meruit/breach of contract in
violation of Tennessee common law.

Plaintiffs Johnson and Pittman conducted work for the Defendants in
several states by telephone and computer from September 2021, until
January 9, 2022 and from September 1, 2021 until November 8, 2021,
respectively.

Seeds of Hope is a staffing agency based in Tennessee.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kerry E. Knox, Esq.
          117 South Academy Street
          Murfreesboro, TN 37130
          Telephone: (615) 896-1000
          E-mail: kek@castelliknox.com

               - and -

          Stephen W. Grace, Esq.
          1019 16th Avenue, South
          Nashville, TN 37212
          Telephone: (615) 255-5225
          E-mail: sgrace@sgracelaw.com

SIMPLYWORKOUT: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Simplyworkout. The
case is styled as Cristian Sanchez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Simplyworkout, Case No. 1:22-cv-02422
(S.D.N.Y., March 24, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Simplyworkout -- https://www.simplyworkout.com/ -- is an E-commerce
company, that Offering a full range of high end fitness apparel &
accessories for the active woman on the go.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


ST. LOUIS COUNTY JAIL: Burke Files Suit in E.D. Missouri
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against St. Louis County
Jail, et al. The case is styled as Calvin Burke, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. St. Louis County Jail,
Sam Page, Scott Anders, Sgt. Thompson, Major Kramer, Major
McKnight, Medical Director Allen, Unknown Food Supervisor, Unknown
Nurses, Case No. 4:22-cv-00351-DDN (E.D. Mo., March 24, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Prisoner Civil Rights.

Louis County Jail --
https://stlouiscountymo.gov/st-louis-county-departments/justice-services/
-- provide secure custody and supervision to incarcerated
individuals through direct supervision.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


STARBUCKS CORP: Arbitration Bid in Anderson Suit Denied in Part
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELIZABETH ANDERSON, et al. individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. STARBUCKS
CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-01178-JD (N.D. Cal.), Judge
James Donato of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California denied Starbucks' motion to compel arbitration as to
named Plaintiffs Elizabeth Anderson, Jeffrey Bellows, James
Hancock, and Erick Lorack.

Two years after the Plaintiffs filed the California wage and hour
class action in the Alameda County Superior Court in 2019,
Defendant Starbucks seeks to compel arbitration of the non-PAGA
(California Labor Code Private Attorney General's Act of 2004,
Sections 2699 et eq.) claims of 10 named Plaintiffs: Anderson,
Bellows, Hancock, Lorack, Amanda Brekke, Casey McKay, Jordone
Shane-Sanchez, Sherri Bradley, Kevin Steinbeck, and Omar Garland.
Starbucks does not seek arbitration for the remaining 11 named
Plaintiffs.

For reasons that are not clear to the Court, Plaintiffs Brekke,
McKay, Shane-Sanchez, Bradley, Steinbeck, and Garland do not oppose
Starbucks' request. Those individuals have in effect voluntarily
elected to arbitrate all of their non-PAGA claims, and they will
not serve as named Plaintiffs for the putative class. Arbitration
is denied for the Plaintiffs who have opposed it, namely Anderson,
Bellows, Hancock, and Lorack.

The reason for the denial is straightforward, Judge Donato hold.
Starbucks is a day late and dollar short in asking for arbitration
after actively litigating the case for two years in state and
federal court. Starbucks did not make a serious effort to seek
arbitration until it filed the present motion to compel
approximately 26 months after plaintiffs first sued in the Alameda
Superior Court. The Plaintiffs' main argument in opposition is that
Starbucks has waived arbitration.

Overall, Judge Donato finds that the record amply demonstrates that
Starbucks acted for two years in a manner inconsistent with
arbitration, and has waived any right to demand it now. Although
Starbucks' arbitration agreement has language indicating delegation
of some arbitrability disputes to the arbitrator, it did not
expressly delegate the question of waiver, and Judge Donato will
decide the issue based on federal law. Neither party argues for a
different outcome, or says that the delegation clause includes
"clear and unmistakable language" sending waiver to an arbitrator.

Starbucks does not suggest that it was unaware of its own
arbitration agreements with the named Plaintiffs, which pre-dated
the filing of the original complaint in state court. Consequently,
the elements in issue are whether Starbucks acted inconsistently
with its right to arbitration, and whether that conduct prejudiced
the Plaintiffs.

By these measures, Judge Donato holds that Starbucks manifestly
waived any right to compel arbitration. It waited for almost two
years before moving to compel, despite knowing of the arbitration
clauses in its own contracts with certain of the named Plaintiffs.
Starbucks never said why this untoward delay should be excused, and
the record gives no indication that a good reason exists for
overlooking it. It may be, as Starbucks suggests, that it sprinkled
a few references to arbitration in some docket filings, but such
placeholder "statements by a party that it has a right to
arbitration in pleadings or motions is not enough to defeat a claim
of waiver."

Starbucks also does not square its active and vigorous litigation
of the case in state and federal court with a preservation of a
right to arbitration. As detailed, at every turn, Starbucks engaged
in substantive discovery, case management, and motion practice.
This is not at all situation in which a defendant did the bare
minimum in court while pressing a prompt demand for arbitration. To
the contrary, Starbucks litigated the case for two years as if
arbitration were not an option. These circumstances are a far cry
from the ones in the cases Starbucks cites for denial of waiver.

The question of prejudice to the Plaintiffs is also readily decided
against Starbucks. A finding of prejudice is by no means
"automatic" from delay and inconsistent conduct.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Donato concludes that Starbucks
has waived the right to seek arbitration of the claims by named
Plaintiffs Anderson, Bellows, Hancock, and Lorack.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/372d26rt from Leagle.com.


STOP & SHOP: Bid to Dismiss Warren's Amended Suit Partly Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KARI WARREN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. THE STOP & SHOP SUPERMARKET, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 20 Civ. 8718 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Nelson S.
Roman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.

I. Introduction

The putative class action alleges that the Defendant misrepresented
to consumers the extent to which its "Graham Crackers - Honey" from
its Stop & Shop brand is made mainly from whole grains, as well as
sweetened and flavored only or predominantly from honey. Plaintiff
Warren, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
brings the action against the Defendant asserting claims for
violations of New York's General Business Law Sections 349 and 350,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of express warranty, breach of
implied warranty of merchantability, violation of the Magnuson Moss
Warranty Act, fraud, and unjust enrichment.

II. Background

The Defendant manufactures, distributes, markets, labels, and sells
crackers purporting to be sweetened primarily with honey and made
mainly from whole grains. The Plaintiff alleges the Product's label
is misleading because: First, the Product is sweetened primarily
with sugar and contains a miniscule amount of honey; second, it is
neither exclusively nor predominantly flavored from honey; and
third, it is predominantly made with enriched flour and not graham
flour. She further claims that under federal regulations, the
Product's packaging is misleading because it fails to disclose that
the Product contains artificial flavoring that simulates the taste
of honey, as well as the percentage of honey content in the
Product.

In sum, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendant's branding and
packaging of the Product is designed to, and does, deceive,
mislead, and defraud consumers. She also claims that the Defendant
sold more of the Product and at higher prices than it would have in
the absence of this misconduct, resulting in additional profits at
the expense of consumers. Particularly, the Plaintiff claims that
as a result of the false and misleading representations, the
Defendant sold the Product at a premium price, approximately no
less than $3.29 per box of 14.4 oz, excluding tax, compared to
other similar products represented in a non-misleading way, and
higher than it would be sold absent the misleading representations
and omissions.

The Plaintiff finally alleges that she purchased the Product
numerous times during 2018, 2019, and 2020, at the Defendant's
locations, including 180 N. Main St, New City, NY 10956 and 32 S.
Middletown Rd, Nanuet, NY 10954. She claims to be among a class of
consumers who were deceived by and relied upon the Product's
deceptive labeling, and bought the Product at or exceeding the
price of $3.29 expecting it would have a non-de minimis amount of
whole grain and honey. She further claims that she would not have
paid as much for the Product absent the Defendant's false and
misleading statements and omissions.

On Oct. 19, 2020, the Plaintiff filed the original operative class
action complaint. On March 12, 2021, the Defendant filed a letter
seeking leave to file a motion to dismiss, which also stated the
grounds on which Defendant would move for dismissal. Five days
later, the Plaintiff requested an extension of time to file an
amended complaint that would address the deficiencies set forth in
the Defendant's letter and obliviate the need for a motion to
dismiss, which the Court subsequently granted. The Court also
granted Defendant leave to file an answer within 30 days of the
Plaintiff filing her amended complaint or to serve a motion to
dismiss.

On April 18, 2021, the Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint on
behalf of all purchasers of the Product who reside in New York,
asserting claims for (1) violation of New York General Business Law
Sections 349 and 350; (2) breach of express warranty; (3) breach of
implied warranty of merchantability; (4) violation of the Magnuson
Moss Warranty Act; (5) negligent misrepresentation; (6) fraud; and
(7) unjust enrichment. As relief, the Plaintiff seeks both monetary
damages and injunctive relief that would require the Defendant to
correct the Product's allegedly misleading label.

On July 6, 2021, the parties filed their respective briefing on the
instant motion: The Defendant its notice of motion, memorandum in
support with an accompanying declaration with exhibits; and the
Plaintiff her response in opposition.

III. Discussion

The Plaintiff asserts claims against the Defendant for (1)
violations of New York General Business Law ("GBL") Sections 349
and 350, (2) negligent misrepresentation, (3) breach of express
warranty, (4) breach of implied warranty of merchantability, (5)
violation of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), (6) fraud,
and (7) unjust enrichment. The Defendant seeks to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) all claims based on two
grounds, including: (1) failure to state a claim; and (2) federal
preemption.

A. New York General Business Law Sections 349 and 350

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff fails to assert a plausible
claim under GBL Section 349 and 350 by alleging that the Product's
packaging is misleading because reasonable consumers would
understand that "graham crackers" refers to the type of food the
Product contains, not that it is predominantly made from whole
grain flour. It also argues that a reasonable consumer would
understand that "honey" merely refers to its flavor, and not an
ingredient or its predominant sweetener.

After due consideration, Judge Roman agrees with the Defendant with
respect to the Plaintiff's allegations on the Product's "honey"
label, but he disagrees with respect to her allegations on the
Product's "graham crackers" label.

1. A reasonable consumer would not find the "honey" label
misleading

In the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that the Product's
"honey" label is misleading because it suggests honey is the
Product's predominant "sweetener" and that its honey flavor derives
mostly or exclusively from honey. But after due consideration,
Judge Roman concludes that the Product's "honey" label would not
lead a reasonable consumer to understand either that honey is the
Product's predominant "sweetener" or that its honey flavor derives
mostly or exclusively from honey. Indeed, the Product's label does
not use language such as "made with pure honey," "sweetened with
pure honey," "no added sugars," or anything similar. Hence, in
assessing the Product's packaging as a whole, Judge Roman concludes
that a reasonable consumer "would have recognized that the graham
crackers might be sweetened with some honey, but also with other
sweeteners.

2. But Plaintiff has adequately pleaded that a reasonable consumer
may find the word "graham" in the label misleading

The Plaintiff alleges that reasonable consumers understand the term
"graham" in "graham crackers" to refer to "whole grain flour."
Consequently, she alleges that the Product's packaging is
misleading because while it includes the term "graham," the
Product's ingredient list reveals that the Product comprises more
of enriched flour than it does of whole grain flour.

However, in evaluating the Plaintiff's allegations involving the
phrase "Graham Crackers," Judge Roman cannot conclude that the
Plaintiff has failed to plead that a reasonable consumer is likely
to be misled by the use of the word "graham" on the Product's
label. He cannot conclude that the Plaintiff has failed to plead
that a reasonable consumer is likely to be misled by the use of
'graham' on the packaging for this product as it is not implausible
that consumers would understand the words on the box to say what
they mean." In sum, at this point, Judge Roman cannot conclude as a
matter of law that no reasonable consumer would be misled by the
Defendant's use of the word "graham" in the Product's packaging.

3. The Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff's surviving consumer
protection claims are preempted under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act

But the Defendant contends that even if the Plaintiff plausibly
alleges consumer protection claims under GBL Sections 349 and 350,
her claims are still preempted by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
("FDCA") as amended by the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
("NLEA"). Specifically, it reasons that because the Product's label
complies with federal law and regulations, the Plaintiff's claims
appear to impose additional or different food labeling requirements
that are inconsistent with those imposed by the FDCA.

Judge Roman holds that while it may be possible in some cases to
ascertain how a term is commonly used on a motion to dismiss, the
Defendant's argument invites the Court to define a 'graham cracker'
in terms of its shape and taste on the basis of what would
essentially be speculation." This the Court cannot do. Accordingly,
at this point, Judge Roman cannot conclude that the Defendant's
consumer protection claims involving the "Graham Crackers" label
are preempted by federal law.

B. Negligent Misrepresentation

To state a claim for negligent misrepresentation under New York
law, the plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant had a duty,
as a result of a special relationship, to give correct information;
(2) the defendant made a false representation that he or she should
have known was incorrect; (3) the information supplied in the
representation was known by the defendant to be desired by the
plaintiff for a serious purpose; (4) the plaintiff intended to rely
and act upon it; and (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on it to
his or her detriment.

After due consideration, Judge Roman concludes that the Plaintiff's
negligent misrepresentation fails because she has failed to allege
the existence of a special relationship giving rise to a duty to
speak on the part of the Defendant. The Amended Complaint's
allegations only describe a relationship between the Plaintiff and
the Defendant which is that of an ordinary buyer and seller --
which does not give rise to the kind of special relationship
necessary to maintain a claim for negligent misrepresentation.
Because the relationship between them was not so close as to
approach that of privity, the Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded
that the Defendant had a duty to provide information to the
Plaintiff. Accordingly, Judge Roman dismisses the Plaintiff's
negligent misrepresentation claim.

C. Breach of Express Warranty

To state a claim for an express breach of warranty under New York
law, plaintiffs must plead "(1) the existence of a material
statement amounting to a warranty, (2) the buyer's reliance on this
warranty as a basis for the contract with the immediate seller, (3)
breach of the warranty, and (4) injury to the buyer caused by the
breach."

Judge Roman concludes that the Plaintiff's express warranty claim
fails for lack of timely notice. The Plaintiff alleges only that
"she provided or will provide notice to the Defendant, its agents,
representatives, retailers and their employees." That allegation is
insufficient to show that the buyer provided timely notice of the
alleged breach—the statement is wholly equivocal. It does not
allege that notice has been provided, only that the Plaintiff
"provided or will provide" notice. If the Plaintiff had provided
notice, she could have written that, rather than pleading, in
essence, both that she did provide notice, and that she did not do
so but will do so in the future. Hence, the Plaintiff has not
adequately pleaded that she in fact provided notice. Accordingly,
Judge Roman dismisses the Plaintiff's claim for breach of express
warranty.

D. Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability

On the same basis on which the Court dismissed the Plaintiff's
claim for breach of express warranty, Judge Roman similarly
dismisses her claim for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability. The U.C.C.'s notice requirement for express
warranty claims also applies to claims for breach of implied
warranty.

E. Magnuson Moss Warranty Act

The Plaintiff also brings a claim under the MMWA, 15 U.S.C.
Sections 2301, et seq. To state a claim under MMWA, plaintiffs must
adequately plead a cause of action for breach of written or implied
warranty under state law." Hence, as her state law claims for
express and implied warranty fail, the Plaintiff's MMWA claim
similarly fails for the same reasons.

F. Fraud

To state a claim of fraud under New York law, a plaintiff must
allege (1) a material misrepresentation or omission of fact, (2)
made with knowledge of its falsity, (3) with an intent to defraud,
and (4) reasonable reliance on the part of the plaintiff, (5) that
causes damage to the plaintiff.

In the case, Judge Roman concludes that the Plaintiff's fraud claim
fails because she has failed to plead fraudulent intent. He finds
that the Plaintiff's only allegation about the Defendant's intent
is that the "Defendant's fraudulent intent is evinced by its
failure to accurately identify the Product on the front label and
representing the less predominant ingredients as most predominant."
That allegation on its own is insufficient because "the simple
knowledge that a statement is false is not sufficient to establish
fraudulent intent, nor is a defendant's 'generalized motive to
satisfy consumers' desires or increase sales and profits.'"
Moreover, while the existence of accurate information regarding the
product's ingredients on the package does not stymie a deceptive
labeling claim as a matter of law, it is certainly a substantial
barrier to a plaintiff seeking to plead a claim of fraud."
Accordingly, Judge Roman dismisses the Plaintiff's claim for
fraud.

G. Unjust Enrichment

Under New York law, an unjust enrichment claim requires "(1) that
the defendant benefitted; (2) at the plaintiff's expense; and (3)
that equity and good conscience require restitution." However,
"unjust enrichment is not a catchall cause of action to be used
when others fail."

Judge Roman concludes that the Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim
is duplicative of her other claims. The unjust enrichment claim is
a mere repackaging of her other claims based on the alleged
misrepresentations on the Product's packaging. It "relies on the
same factual allegations and the same theory of liability" as the
Plaintiff's other theories of recovery. Accordingly, Judge Roman
dismisses the Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim as duplicative.

H. Injunctive Relief

Finally, the Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief for Defendant "to
remove, correct and/or refrain from the challenged practices and
representations, and restitution and disgorgement for members of
the class pursuant to the applicable laws." But after due
consideration, Judge Roman agrees with the Defendant that the
Plaintiff does not have Article III standing to pursue injunctive
relief because she is aware of the allegedly deceptive packaging,
and therefore cannot demonstrate that she will be harmed in a
similar way in the future. Accordingly, he denies the Plaintiff's
request for injunctive relief.

I. Leave to Amend

The Plaintiff has already amended once, after having the benefit of
a pre-motion letter from the Defendant stating the grounds on which
it would move to dismiss. Further, while the Plaintiff requested
leave to file a Second Amended Complaint within the last sentence
of her response in opposition, she has not otherwise suggested that
she is in possession of facts that would cure the deficiencies that
the Defendants highlighted in the instant motion and that Judge
Roman highlighted in his Opinion. Accordingly, with respect to all
those claims that the Court has dismissed from the Amended
Complaint, Judge Roman will dismiss them with prejudice.

IV. Conclusion

Judge Roman granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
motion to dismiss. He granted the motion with respect to the
Plaintiff's (1) consumer protection claims under GBL Section 349
and 350 involving the use of the word "honey"; (2) claim for
negligent misrepresentation; (3) claim for breach of express
warranty; (4) claim for breach of implied warranty of
merchantability; (5) claim under the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act;
(6) claim for fraud; (7) claim for unjust enrichment; and (8)
request for injunctive relief. He dismissed all these claims with
prejudice.

Judge Roman the motion with respect to the Plaintiff's consumer
protection claims under GBL Section 349 and 350 involving the use
of the word "graham."

Judge Roman further directed the Defendant to file an answer to the
Amended Complaint with respect to the Plaintiff's claims under GBL
Sections 349 and 350 involving the use of the word "graham" by
April 18, 2022. He moreover directed the parties to confer and
jointly complete and file a Case Management Plan and Scheduling
Order (blank form attached hereto) by March 31, 2022. After review
and approval of the Scheduling Order, the Court will issue an Order
of Reference to Magistrate Judge Paul E. Davison for general
pretrial purposes. The parties will contact Judge Davison within
seven business days of the date of the Order of Reference to
schedule a conference.

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion at ECF No.
18.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3c5ev3zm from Leagle.com.


STRATEGIC MATERIALS: Morales FCRA Suit Removed to C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Willgim Morales, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Strategic Materials, Inc., a Delaware
corporation; Does 1 through 50, inclusive; Case No. 22STCV04745,
was removed from the Los Angeles Superior Court, to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California on March 15,
2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-01723-AB-SK to
the proceeding.

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.

Strategic Materials, Inc. (SMI) -- https://www.smi.com/ -- is North
America's largest and most comprehensive glass recycler, with over
50 locations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jose Maria D. Patino, Jr., Esq.
          Chaim Shaun Setareh, Esq.
          Maxim Gorbunov, Esq.
          SETAREH LAW GROUP
          9665 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 430
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Phone: (310) 888-7771
          Fax: (323) 888-0109
          Email: jose@setarehlaw.com
                 shaun@setarehlaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          David A Yudelson, Esq.
          Natalie Torbati, Esq.
          CONSTANGY BROOKS SMITH AND PROPHETE LLP
          2029 Century Park East Suite 1100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: (310) 909-7775
          Fax: (424) 465-6630
          Email: dyudelson@constangy.com
                 ntorbati@constangy.com

               - and -

          Jasmine Lynn Anderson
          CONSTANGY BROOKS SMITH AND PROPHETE LLP
          601 Montgomery Street Suite 350
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Phone: (415) 918-3000
          Fax: (415) 918-3034
          Email: janderson@constangy.com


TAX RISE: Faces McClinton TCPA Suit Over Unsolicited Phone Calls
----------------------------------------------------------------
TRAVIS MCCLINTON individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. TAX RISE, INC., Case No. 5:22-cv-00298 (W.D. Tex.,
March 25, 2022) contends that the Defendant promotes and markets
its merchandise, in part, by placing unsolicited phone calls to
wireless phone users, in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

The Defendant allegedly uses prerecorded messages to solicit to
consumers' cellular phone numbers without first obtaining the
required express written consent to market its services. Through
this action, the Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt
Defendant's unlwawful conduct, which has resulted in the invasion
of privacy, harassment, aggravation, and disruption of the daily
life of thousands of individuals. The Plaintiff also seeks
statutory damages on behalf of Plaintiff and members of the Class,
and any other available legal or equitable remedies.

Specifically, the Defendant initiated and directed, or caused to be
initiated and directed, the transmission of unsolicited
advertisement or telemarketing text messages to Plaintiff's
cellular telephone number to sell goods, services or products in
Texas. The 6572 Number has an area code that specifically coincides
with locations in western Texas State, and Plaintiff received such
messages on the 6572 Number while residing in and physically
present in Texas, added the suit.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Manuel Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com
          Telephone: (954) 00-4713

TEXAS: Clyce Appeals Case Dismissal to 5th Cir.
-----------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Chance Marcus Clyce filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit entitled Chance Clyce, et al. v. Nadine
Butler, et al., Case No. 3:15-CV-793, in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas.

In 2009, the parents of Chance Clyce filed a lawsuit against
multiple Defendants affiliated with the Hunt County Juvenile
Detention Center for neglecting to provide medical care to their
son while in the Detention Center's custody. The district court
dismissed claims against two defendants without prejudice for
improper service and granted summary judgment in favor of the
remaining defendants.

In 2014, Chance and his parents filed a second lawsuit against
multiple Defendants affiliated with the same Detention Center and
the Texas Juvenile Justice Department. The district court dismissed
the claims for being untimely under the relevant statute of
limitations. In 2018, the district court dismissed the case again,
this time on res judicata grounds.

On January 28, 2022, the Court released Findings, Conclusions, and
Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, stating that
the Court should grant Defendants' pending motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity defense, insofar as it should
dismiss the claims against Defendant Frederick Farley with
prejudice under Rule 25(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
grant Defendants Kenneth Wright's and Shanigia Williams's requests
for summary judgment on qualified immunity, dismissing the claims
against them with prejudice; and enter final judgment accordingly.

On March 3, 2022, the Court entered an Order accepting such
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States
Magistrate Judge; and a Judgment granting Defendants' Kenneth
Wright's and Shanigia Williams's requests for summary judgment on
qualified immunity and dismissing the claims against them with
prejudice.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of this ruling.

The appellate case is captioned as Clyce v. Butler, Case No.
22-10294, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, filed on March 24, 2022.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Chance Marcus Clyce, and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, appears pro se.

Defendants-Appellees Frederick Farley, Investigator and Supervisor
for Hunt County Juvenile Detention Center, individually and in his
official capacity; Kenneth Wright, individually and in his official
capacity; and Shanigia Williams, individually and in her official
capacity, are represented by:

          Jason Eric Magee, Esq.
          ALLISON, BASS & MAGEE, L.L.P.
          402 W. 12th Street
          AO Watson House
          Austin, TX 78701-0000
          Telephone: (512) 482-0701
          E-mail: e.magee@allison-bass.com

TIA LUPITA: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Tia Lupita Hot Sauce
LLC. The case is styled as Jose Mejia, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Tia Lupita Hot Sauce LLC, Case
No. 1:22-cv-02474 (S.D.N.Y., March 27, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Tia Lupita -- https://tialupitafoods.com/ -- is a small batch hot
sauce, handcrafted with produce sourced from local growers using
Tia's generations-old family recipe.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


TOPS MARKETS: Hanyzkiewicz Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Tops Markets, LLC.
The case is styled as Marta Hanyzkiewicz, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated v. Tops Markets, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-01662 (E.D.N.Y., March 25, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Tops Friendly Markets -- https://www.topsmarkets.com/ -- is an
American supermarket chain based in Amherst, New York, with stores
in New York, Vermont, northern Pennsylvania, and formerly Ohio and
Massachusetts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          One University Plaza, Ste. 620
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


TRANSCONTINENTAL REALTY: Texas Court Dismisses Amended Berger Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PAUL BERGER, directly and derivatively on behalf of
INCOME OPPORTUNITY REALTY INVESTORS, INC., Plaintiff v.
TRANSCONTINENTAL REALTY INVESTORS, INC., et al., Defendants, Civil
No. 3:19-CV-00286-E (N.D. Tex.), Judge Ada Brown of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division,
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint.

I. Background

Plaintiff Berger brings the lawsuit directly and derivatively on
behalf of nominal Defendant Income Opportunity Realty Investors,
Inc. (IOR). The Plaintiff is an IOR stockholder. As alleged in his
"Shareholder's Verified First Amended Derivative and Class Action
Complaint," Defendant Transcontinental Realty Investors (TCI) owns
81.25% of IOR's shares and 269,311 of IOR shares are held by
companies related to TCI, such that IOR is 87.58% owned by
"controlling affiliates." The remainder of IOR shares are owned by
public investors. TCI is controlled by Defendant American Realty
Investors (ARL). Individual defendants Daniel J. Moos, Gene S.
Bertcher, Louis J. Coma, Ted R. Munselle, Henry A. Butler, Robert
A. Jakuszewski, and Raymond D. Roberts Sr. are or were officers and
directors of IOR at the relevant time. The majority of IOR officers
and directors are also officers and directors of TCI and ARL.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gene Phillips, a Texas real
estate investor, secretly controlled IOR, TCI, and ARL through
Defendant Pillar Income Asset Management, Inc. The complaint
further alleges Phillips secretly controlled Pillar and that Pillar
was set up to unlawfully funnel money to other companies Phillips
controlled.

The Plaintiff alleges IOR falsely represented itself as a company
involved in real estate investment and land development. SEC
filings informed investors that an independent advisor, Pillar, was
"locating, evaluating, and recommending real estate and real
estate-related investment opportunities" for IOR. Pillar was paid
significant fees for these "alleged services." Plaintiff alleges
that IOR and its shareholders are victims in an illegal scheme
under which related corporations and individuals funnel funds from
IOR up a "daisy chain" and steal the funds for other participants,
namely, TCI, ARL, and Phillips and his brother. IOR has had its
assets removed, never to be returned, under the guise of
"purportedly legitimate corporate transactions." Defendants have
left IOR "unable to engage in any sort of new business or pay
dividends." As of Dec. 31, 2020, IOR reported $12,000 in cash on
its balance sheet, which the Plaintiff claims was the result of
having a minimum of $90 million "upstreamed" to TCI. Further, 86.7%
of all IOR assets have allegedly been converted for the use of TCI.
The Plaintiff alleges 99.99% of IOR's assets are passively
"invested" in securities of affiliates.

The Plaintiff brings the lawsuit derivatively for the benefit and
protection of IOR. He alleges that a demand on the Board of
Directors to bring the action would have been futile for a number
of reasons, including that the majority of IOR Board members are
active wrongdoers who simultaneously serve as directors of TCI and
ARL against whom IOR is seeking redress and have concealed and
misrepresented who really controls IOR. In the alternative to his
derivative claims, the Plaintiff brings a class action on behalf of
himself and all other similarly situated public IOR stockholders.

The Plaintiff's original complaint alleged 18 counts. In ruling on
previous motions to dismiss, the Court concluded that several
counts failed to state a claim. It allowed the Plaintiff the
opportunity to replead these claims. The Plaintiff chose not to,
but has filed an amended complaint that asserts four new derivative
claims against Defendant Pillar. These new claims are the subject
of Pillar's Motion to Dismiss.

Before the Court are two motions that involve the Plaintiffs claims
against one of the Defendants in the case, Pillar: (1) the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, and (2) the
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Pillar as to
Count Seven of the First Amended Complaint.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(e)(6)

Pillar moves to dismiss Counts Five through Eight of the amended
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In April
of 2011, IOR and Pillar entered into a Cash Management Agreement
("CMA") and an Advisory Agreement. Under the CMA, Pillar is
responsible for investment of "any excess funds in any such
account(s), which investments will bear interest at Wall Street
Journal Prime Rate plus 1% per annum." Such excess funds may be
invested by Pillar in such manner as it deems appropriate.

The Plaintiff alleges that since 2011, IOR funds, which have not
been designated by the Board as "excess funds," have been invested
almost exclusively with TCI. He alleges Pillar has used the CMA to
transform IOR into an investment company. IOR's most recent annual
report states, "Our primary business is currently investing in
mortgage receivables."

The Plaintiff's Counts Five and Six involve the Investment Company
Act of 1940 ("ICA"), 15 U.S.C. Section 80a et seq. In Count Five,
the Plaintiff asserts a claim against Pillar for violations of the
ICA. Plaintiff alleges 99.9% of IOR funds are held in passive
investments, rendering it an unregistered investment company under
the ICA. Count Seven is another claim for breach of the CMA. The
CMA permits investment of only "excess funds." The Plaintiff
alleges none of the funds Pillar invested in TCI have been
designated as excess funds. Count Eight is for breach of a bond
provision in the Advisory Agreement.

As an initial matter, Pillar argues that the new claims should be
dismissed because the Plaintiff has failed to allege with
particularity facts sufficient to show that a demand on IOR's Board
would be futile. It is generally held that shareholders may sue
derivatively, without first demanding that the directors enforce
the corporate cause, when the circumstances would render such
demand a futile gesture. Judge Brown concludes the Plaintiff has
plausibly alleged that, as to the new claims, demand would have
been futile as the directors are interested in the challenged
transactions because they were also on the TCI Board.

Pillar makes several other arguments regarding dismissal of Counts
Five and Six, which involve the ICA. The ICA establishes a
comprehensive regulatory scheme to regulate investment companies
that provide mutual fund services. Pillar contends the Plaintiff's
claims involving ICA violations should be dismissed for the
following reasons: (1) there is no private right of action under
Section 47(b) of the ICA; (2) the Plaintiff does not adequately
allege that IOR is an investment company; (3) the Plaintiff does
not allege a violation of the ICA; (4) the Plaintiff does not
allege that Pillar caused IOR to violate the ICA; and (5) the
Plaintiff does not allege damages to IOR.

The Plaintiff alleges Pillar turned IOR into an unregistered
investment company and thus has caused IOR to violate the ICA in
two ways. First, he contends IOR was prohibited from engaging in
any business in interstate commerce as an unregistered investment
company, citing Section 80a-7(a)(4). He also contends IOR engaged
in related-party transactions with TCI without prior SEC consent,
in violation of Section 80a-17. The Plaintiff contends that because
of these violations, it has the right to rescind the CMA under
Section 47(b).

Judge Brown concludes the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for
violation of the ICA or breach of contract based on ICA violations.
A plaintiff asserting a claim under the ICA may seek relief under
Section 47(b) only after a violation of some other section of the
Act has been established. The Plaintiff alleges violations of two
sections of the ICA.

Second, the Plaintiff alleges violations of Section 80a-17 in
connection with his allegations that an unregistered company is
prohibited from doing business with related parties (such as TCI)
without SEC permission. The language in Section 80a-17 refers to
"registered companies," not unregistered companies. As such, the
Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged the violation of this
particular provision of the ICA. Because the Plaintiff has not
plausibly alleged a violation of that provision of the ICA, he has
not shown he is entitled to relief under Section 47(b). Judge Brown
concludes the Plaintiffs Count Five and Six fail to state a claim.

Judge Brown turns to the Plaintiffs Count Seven in which he alleges
Pillar violated the CMA's requirement that it invest only IOR's
excess funds. Under the CMA, Pillar is responsible for investment
of "any excess funds" in IOR's accounts. The Plaintiff alleges none
of the funds invested by Pillar in TCI have ever been designated
excess funds and that therefore Pillar breached the CMA by
investing IOR's funds with TCI.

Finally, Pillar asserts that Count Eight, involving a fidelity
bond, should be dismissed. The Advisory Agreement provides that the
Advisor (Pillar) "shall maintain a fidelity bond with a responsible
surety company in such amount as may be required by the Directors
from time to time, covering all directors, officers, employees, and
any agents of the Advisor handing funds of the Company." The
Plaintiff alleges Pillar breached the agreement by failing to
obtain a fidelity bond to protect the IOR funds in its custody or
control. Alternatively, he asserts a claim against the TCI/IOR
Directors, Munselle, Butler, Jakuszewski, and Roberts, for breach
of fiduciary duty based on their failure to direct Pillar to obtain
a fidelity bond.

Pillar argues it cannot be held liable for failing to perform an
obligation that was never triggered under the Advisory Agreement.
Jduge Brown agrees. She finds that the relevant language of the
agreement does not require a fidelity bond under all circumstances.
Under the plain language of the agreement, a bond is only required
"as may be required by the Directors from time to time." Plaintiff
has not alleged that the Directors required a bond and Pillar
failed to maintain one. The Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
for breach of the bond provision in the Advisory Agreement. He has
also failed to state its alternative claim that the Directors
breached their fiduciary duty by failing to direct Pillar to obtain
a fidelity bond. Hence, the Plaintiff has failed to plead a
plausible claim for breach of fiduciary duty in Count Eight.

Because the Plaintiff failed to meet the pleading requirements for
his new claims, they are dismissed. Courts, however, generally
allow a plaintiff one opportunity to amend a deficient pleading
before dismissing with prejudice. Therefore, the Plaintiff is
granted leave to file, within 21 days from the date of this Order,
an amended complaint if he can, in good faith, replead facts to
support the claims asserted in Counts Five through Eight.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment on Count Seven

The Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on Count Seven.
Because she has determined that the Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim for breach of contract in Count Seven, Judge Brown finds that
the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on that Count is moot.

III. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, Judge Brown granted the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint. The Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Against Pillar as to Count Seven of the
First Amended Complaint is therefore moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/4j5d6wbj from
Leagle.com.


TRENDSPIDER LLC: Gomez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Trendspider LLC. The
case is styled as Samuel Gomez, and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated v. Trendspider LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-02509
(S.D.N.Y., March 28, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

TrendSpider -- https://trendspider.com/ -- is a new, innovative
trading platform designed to level the playing field for retail
traders.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly G. Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM, PC
          155 East 55th St., Ste. 6a
          New York, NY 10022
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: brad@markslawpc.com


TRUSTCO BANK: Bid to Dismiss Lamoureux Class Suit Granted in Part
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT N. LAMOUREUX, et al., individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. TRUSTCO BANK, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 1:21-CV-0336 (GTS/CFH) (N.D.N.Y.), Judge
Glenn T. Suddaby of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of New York granted in part and denied in part the Bank's
motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a
claim.

I. Background

In his putative class action filed on March 24, 2021, the Plaintiff
alleges that the Bank violated the contractual agreements governing
his accounts, as well as statutory law, when engaging in the
following four practices: (1) failing to comply with Regulation E's
Opt-In Rule by not fulfilling certain Regulation E prerequisites in
its Overdraft Protection contract document; (2) assessing overdraft
fees ("OD fees") on "Authorized Positive, Purportedly Settle
Negative Transactions" ("APPSN Transactions"); (3) assessing
multiple $36 insufficient fund fees ("NSF fees") on electronic
transactions or checks when they are reprocessed after being
returned for insufficient funds; and (4) in late August 2020 to
September 2020, mishandling the operation of the Bank's software
system meant to be utilized by its bank customers for electronic
transactions, which caused customers to incur multiple NSF fees
and/or OD fees.

Based on these factual allegations, the Plaintiff asserts the
following six claims: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) unjust
enrichment/restitution; (4) money had and received; (5) violation
of the Electronic Fund Transfers Act ("EFTA") (Regulation E); and
(6) violation of New York General Business Law ("GBL") Section
349.

Currently before the Court, is the Bank's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

II. Analysis

A. Whether the Court May Dismiss Plaintiff's Claim for Breach of
Contract

After carefully considering the matter, Judge Suddaby answers the
question in the negative to the extent the claim is based on the
Plaintiff's allegations regarding OD fees on APPSN transactions and
the assessment of multiple NSF fees on the same re-presented
payment, but in the affirmative to the extent the claim is based on
the Plaintiff's allegations regarding the improper software upgrade
in August 2020 to September 2020.

n his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the Bank breached the relevant
account documents when engaging in the following three practices:
(1) assessing OD fees on APPSN transactions; (2) assessing multiple
NSF fees on the same electronic transactions or checks when
reprocessed again after initially being returned for insufficient
funds; and (3) mishandling a software upgrade to mobile banking in
August 2020 to September 2020, which caused consumers to incur
multiple NSF fees and/or OD fees.

1. Overdraft Fees on APPSN Transactions

With respect to the Plaintiff's allegations regarding OD fees on
APPSN transactions, the Bank argues that the Plaintiff failed to
sufficiently allege a breach of contract for two reasons: (1) the
Plaintiff's checking account statements and overdraft fee notices
show that the OD fees the Plaintiff cites in his Complaint were not
the result of a one-time debit card transaction or APPSN
transaction; and (2) the Bank's account documents unambiguously
show that Trustco will assess OD fees based on whether sufficient
funds exist in the account when a transaction is settled or
posted.

Judge Suddaby cannot discern, from the account statements and
overdraft fee notices alone, the verity of the Bank's contention
that the OD fees are not the result of one-time debit card or APPSN
transactions. He declines to engage in this fact-intensive inquiry,
especially when the inquiry is based solely on the Bank's counsel's
representations, in deciding a motion to dismiss. He also finds
that the language in the relevant account documents is ambiguous,
because both parties' interpretations of the disputed language is
reasonable. Based on the provision as a whole, it is reasonable for
the Plaintiff to assume that, if the debit hold is placed on funds
at the time of authorization and settled within three days (i.e.,
when the funds have not yet been re-released into the account),
there is no need for an OD fee.

Because he may not grant a motion to dismiss on a
breach-of-contract claim when the contract is not "clear and
unambiguous," Judge Suddaby will not dismiss the Plaintiff's
breach-of-contract claim related to the OD fees on APPSN
transactions.

2. Multiple NSF Fees on Same Re-Presented Payment

The Bank also seeks dismissal of the Plaintiff's breach-of-contract
claim regarding the assessment of multiple NSF fees on re-presented
payments for two reasons: (1) his Complaint does not allege that
the Bank charged him NSF fees on any re-presented payment; and (2)
the relevant account documents unambiguously allow the Bank to
charge multiple NSF fees on the same re-presented payment, meaning
the Plaintiff's allegations cannot constitute a breach of
contract.

First, Judge Suddaby holds that no party contests that the
Plaintiff has Article III standing to assert the breach-of-contract
claim against the Bank for the OD fees on APPSN transactions.
Additionally, the Plaintiff alleges misconduct -- charging OD fees
on APPSN transactions and charging multiple NSF fees on
re-presented payments -- against the same defendant, based on the
same contract applying to all of the Bank's customers and
allegations that the Bank's account documents misrepresent when
(and under what circumstances) it charges certain fees to its
customers. Although he makes no determination regarding whether the
Plaintiff is an adequate class representative on the NSF fee issue,
Judge Suddaby will not dismiss the Plaintiff's breach-of-contract
claim related to NSF fees on this ground at this time.

Second, because the parties' competing interpretations of the
account documents are reasonable, the Plaintiff's
breach-of-contract claim regarding the Bank charging multiple NSF
fees on the same item is sufficient to withstand the Bank's motion
to dismiss.

Third, after reviewing the Plaintiff's Complaint, Judge Suddaby is
uncertain whether the Plaintiff alleges that a mobile banking
software upgrade the Bank performed in August 2020 and September
2020 also violated the account documents governing his claims.
Merely attaching a contract to the complaint does not allege a
breach of its terms—the complaint must identify the contractual
obligation that was breached and allege how."

Nowhere in his Complaint does the Plaintiff reference which account
document or, specifically, which portion of these documents the
Bank allegedly breached in performing the mobile banking system
upgrade. Based on this failure, Judge Suddaby dismisses the
Plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim to the extent he relies on his
allegations regarding the mobile banking software upgrade in August
2020 and September 2020.

B. Whether the Court Should Dismiss Plaintiff's Claim for Breach of
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

After carefully considering the matter, Judge Suddaby answers the
question in the affirmative for the reasons stated in the Bank's
memoranda of law.

The Bank argues that the Court should dismiss the Plaintiff's claim
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
because it is redundant of his breach-of-contract claims (i.e., the
Plaintiff does not allege any other facts that are independent of
or separate from the breach-of-contract claim). The Plaintiff does
not dispute that his Complaint does not contain factual allegations
independent of or separate from those supporting his
breach-of-contract claim, but argues that under New York law, a
defendant who has "complied with the literal terms of the parties'
contract" may nevertheless be liable for breaching its implicit
duties if it so acts "in a way that undermines the purpose of the
contract."

Judge Suddaby holds that the allegations are the exact same as
those used to support the Plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim.
Although the Plaintiff may plead alternative and inconsistent
causes of action, he has not done so here; "instead, he has pled a
duplicative cause of action." Judge Suddaby, therefore, dismisses
the Plaintiff's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.

C. Whether the Court Should Dismiss Plaintiff's Claim for Unjust
Enrichment/Restitution

After carefully considering the matter, Judge Suddaby answers the
question in the affirmative for the reasons stated in the Bank's
memoranda of law.

Similar to its arguments regarding the Plaintiff's claim for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Bank
argues that the Plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment/restitution
must be dismissed for two reasons: (1) the claim duplicates his
breach-of-contract claim; and (2) a claim for unjust
enrichment/restitution can only remain if there is a dispute as to
whether there was a valid and enforceable contract between the
parties, which no party disputes in the case. The Plaintiff
responds that, at this stage of the lawsuit, and pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(d), he may plead alternative and inconsistent legal
theories, such as breach of contract and unjust
enrichment/restitution.

Judge Suddaby agrees with the Bank that the Plaintiff's Complaint
does not contain factual allegations to support his claim for
unjust enrichment/restitution. Because the Plaintiff does not
allege that the relevant account documents are invalid or
unenforceable, Judge Suddaby dismisses his claim for unjust
enrichment/restitution.

D. Whether the Court Should Dismiss Plaintiff's Claim for Money Had
and Received

After carefully considering the matter, Judge Suddaby answers the
question in the affirmative for the reasons stated in the Bank's
memoranda of law. Accordingly, based on his ruling on the
Plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment and restitution, Judge
Suddaby dismisses the Plaintiff's claim for money had and
received.

E. Whether the Court Should Dismiss Plaintiff's Claim for Violation
of the Electronic Funds Transfers Act (Regulation E)

After carefully considering the matter, Judge Suddaby answers the
question in the affirmative for the reasons stated in the Bank's
memoranda of law.

The Bank argues that the Court should dismiss the Plaintiff's
Regulation E claim because he does not allege in his Complaint that
he ever opted into a Regulation E "Opt-In" Contract. Additionally,
it argues that the Plaintiff's Regulation E claim is time barred,
because the EFTA has a one-year statute of limitations for
Regulation E claims, which accrues upon the date of the first
allegedly improper transaction. The Plaintiff's opposition motion
contains only a footnote related to the Bank's arguments, which
states that "the Bank's attack on the Regulation E claim should be
denied for the identical reason as the APPSN claim attack, as
Regulation E transactions are only those involving a debit card or
ATM withdrawal and pertain to the same language."

After reviewing the Plaintiff's Complaint, Judge Suddaby does not
see any allegations by the Plaintiff that he entered into a
Regulation E Opt-In Contract. Without similar allegations
indicating the Plaintiff entered into a Regulation E Opt-In
contract, the Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a Regulation E
claim.

F. Whether the Court Should Dismiss Plaintiff's Claim for Violation
of New York GBL Section 349

After carefully considering the matter, Judge Suddaby answers the
question in the negative for the reasons stated in the Plaintiff's
memorandum of law.

The Bank argues that the Plaintiff fails to state a claim for
violation of New York GBL Section 349 for two reasons: (1) the
Plaintiff does not allege an act or practice that was misleading in
a material respect separate and apart from allegations that the
Bank breached the contractual agreements; and (2) the Plaintiff
does not allege that he saw, read, or relied upon
misrepresentations made by the Bank because he does not allege to
have read any of the relevant account documents and did not include
factual allegations regarding what the Plaintiff relied upon in
forming that misrepresentation. The Plaintiff disputes the first
assertion, arguing that he "adequately alleged more than just
contract interpretation alone," and that "similar allegations have
long been upheld in analogous cases where contract language is
misleading."

Based on the allegations and a review of the case law regarding
this issue, Judge Suddaby is persuaded that the Plaintiff's GBL
Section 349 claim survives dismissal at this stage. Although the
Bank's cited cases dismissed the Plaintiff's GBL Section 349 claim
because either the Plaintiff did not "allege an act or practice
that was misleading in a material respect separate and apart from
the complaint's allegations regarding the breach of contract," or
because "the alleged damages for both the breach of contract claim
and Section 349 claim" were the same, the Second Circuit in Nick's
Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. permitted
co-existence of a breach-of-contract claim and a GBL Section 349
claim. Accordingly, he denies ESL's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's GBL claim at this time. He therefore declines to
dismiss the Plaintiff's GBL Section 349 clam on this ground at this
time.

Further, Judge Suddaby will not dismiss the Plaintiff's GBL Section
349 claim based on the Bank's second argument. "Contrary to the
Bank's assertion, the Plaintiff need not allege that he ever read
the Account Agreements to satisfy causation. Under New York law,
the Court of Appeals has been clear that a plaintiff need not show
that s/he relied on the misrepresentations in order to have a claim
under GBL Section 349.'" Accordingly, the Plaintiff's GBL Section
349 claim will not be dismissed.

G. Whether the Court Should Grant Plaintiff's Request for Leave to
Amend His Complaint

After carefully considering the matter, Judge Suddaby answers this
question in the negative.

In his response to the Bank's motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff
included a sentence requesting leave to amend, should the Court
grant any portion of the Bank's motion to dismiss.

As the Court explained in Sobon v. Horizon Eng'g Assocs., LLP, this
request to amend (from a counseled Plaintiff) is procedurally
defective. Further, it holds that, except with regard to the
Plaintiff's claim for breach of contract related to the mobile
banking software upgrade in August 2020 and September 2020 and the
claim for violation of the EFTA (Regulation E), leave to amend is
unwarranted. An opportunity to amend is not required where the
defects in the Plaintiff's claims are substantive rather than
merely formal, such that any amendment would be futile.

III. Decision

n this Decision and Order, Judge Suddaby dismisses the following
five claims: (1) the claim for breach of contract related to the
mobile banking software upgrade in August 2020 and September 2020;
(2) the claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing; (3) the claim for unjust enrichment/restitution; (4)
the claim for money had and received; and (5) the claim for
violation of the EFTA (Regulation E). The defects in the
Plaintiff's claims with respect to breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment/restitution, and
money had and received are all substantive, as the Court described
in previous portions of the Decision and Order. Accordingly,
amendment is not required, and the claims will be dismissed with
prejudice.

Judge Suddaby notes, however, that the Plaintiff may be able to
provide enough additional factual allegations to state the
remaining dismissed claims (i.e., the breach-of-contract claim
related to the mobile banking software upgrade and the Regulation E
claim), because he has not previously amended his Complaint and the
defects could be "merely formal," rather than substantive. As a
result, those claims are dismissed without prejudice.

IV. Order

Accordingly, Judge Suddaby denied the Bank's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) with
respect to the following claims: (a) the claim for breach of
contract based on the allegations regarding OD fees on APPSN
transactions; (b) the claim for breach of contract based on the
allegations regarding NSF fees on re-presented payments; (c) the
claim for violation of GBL Section.

Judge Suddaby granted the Bank's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) with respect to the
following claims, which are dismissed with prejudice: (a) the claim
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing;
(b) the claim for unjust enrichment/restitution;(c) the claim for
money had and received.

Judge Suddaby granted the Bank's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) with respect to the
breach-of-contract claim based on the allegations regarding the
mobile banking software upgrade and the claim for violation of the
Electronic Funds Transfer Act (Regulation E), which are dismissed
without prejudice to refiling upon a successful motion to amend
within 30 days of the filing of the Decision and Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3e8hcttn from Leagle.com.

CHERUNDOLO LAW FIRM, PLLC J. PATRICK LANNON, ESQ. --
plannon@cherundololawfirm.com -- JOHN C. CHERUNDOLO, ESQ. --
jcherundolo@cherundololawfirm.com -- Counsel for the Plaintiff, in
Syracuse, New York.

KALIEL GOLD, PLLC JEFFREY D. KALIEL, ESQ. -- jeff@kicklawfirm.com
-- SOPHIA GOREN GOLD, ESQ., Co-Counsel for the Plaintiff, in
Washington, D.C.

WILENTZ GOLDMAN & SPITZER PA KEVIN P. RODDY, ESQ. --
kroddy@wilentz.com -- Co-Counsel for the Plaintiff, in  Woodbridge,
New Jersey.

THE KICK LAW FIRM JEFFREY BILS, ESQ., TARAS KICK, ESQ. --
taras@kicklawfirm.com -- Co-Counsel for the Plaintiff, in Los
Angeles, California.

BAILEY, JOHNSON & PECK, P.C. CRYSTAL R. PECK, ESQ., JOHN W. BAILEY,
ESQ., RYAN P. BAILEY, ESQ., Counsel for Defendant Trustco Bank, in
Albany, New York.


TRUSTCO BANK: Court Narrows Claims in Livingston's Class Complaint
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEBORAH J. LIVINGSTON, et al., individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. TRUSTCO BANK, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 1:20-CV-1030 (GTS/CFH) (N.D.N.Y.), Judge
Glenn T. Suddaby of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of New York granted in part and denied in part the Bank's
motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint for failure to
state a claim.

I. Background

In their Amended Complaint filed on April 26, 2021, the Plaintiffs
allege that the Bank violated the contractual agreements governing
their accounts, as well as statutory law, when engaging in the
following four practices: (1) failing to comply with Regulation E's
Opt-In Rule by not fulfilling certain Regulation E prerequisites in
its Overdraft Protection contract document; (2) assessing overdraft
fees ("OD fees") on "Authorized Positive, Purportedly Settle
Negative Transactions" ("APPSN Transactions"); (3) assessing
multiple $36 insufficient fund fees ("NSF fees") on electronic
transactions or checks when they are reprocessed after being
returned for insufficient funds; and (4) in late August 2020 to
September 2020, mishandling the operation of the Bank's software
system meant to be utilized by its customers for electronic
transactions, which caused them to incur multiple NSF fees and/or
OD fees.

Based on these factual allegations, the Plaintiffs assert the
following six claims: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) unjust
enrichment/restitution; (4) money had and received; (5) violation
of the Electronic Fund Transfers Act ("EFTA") (Regulation E); and
(6) violation of New York General Business Law ("GBL") Section
349.

Currently before the Court, in the putative class action against
the Bank and Does 1 through 100, is the Bank's motion to dismiss
the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

II. Analysis

Generally, in support of its motion to dismiss, the Bank sets forth
five arguments. First, the Bank argues that the Amended Complaint
does not sufficiently state a claim for breach of contract. Second,
it argues that the Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, because they
do not allege facts independent of or separate from the
breach-of-contract claim.

Third, it argues that the Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for
unjust enrichment, restitution, and money had and received, because
these claims are merely duplicative of their breach-of-contract
claim. Fourth, the Bank argues that the Plaintiffs fail to state a
claim for violation of the EFTA (Regulation E), because they never
allege that they opted into a Regulation E Opt-In contract. Fifth,
it argues that the Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for violation
of New York GBL Section 349, because the only connection to New
York State is the Bank's headquarters there, which is insufficient
to confer standing under New York GBL Section 349.

Generally, in opposition to the Bank's motion to dismiss, the
Plaintiffs set forth 11 arguments. First, they argue that the
Schedule of Service Charges (or "Fee Schedule"), which the Account
Disclosure Notice identifies as the document listing all fees, bars
multiple NSF fees on the same re-presented item. Second, they argue
that the Fee Schedule's use of the same language for an OD Fee and
an NSF fee further supports the Plaintiffs' interpretation of the
contractual agreement as providing that the Bank may charge only
one NSF fee per "item," no matter how many times the item is
processed. Third, they argue that more than 40 courts across the
country have rejected the Bank's position on the NSF fees. Fourth,
the Plaintiffs argue that other courts have already rejected the
Bank's arguments regarding the relevant contractual language.
Fifth, they argue that the Bank's motion in relation to OD fees on
APPSN transactions is the Bank's attempt to file either a motion
for summary judgment or a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion

Sixth, the Plaintiffs argue that the overdraft promises in the
account documents support their allegations regarding OD fees
assessed on APPSN transactions. Seventh, they argue that their
claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
not precluded. Eighth, they argue that the Bank's contentions
regarding the August 2020 to September 2020 mobile banking software
upgrade are based entirely on disputed material facts not
appropriately before the Court on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
motion. Ninth, the Plaintiffs argue that they sufficiently pled a
violation of the common-law counts, because Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)
permits them to plead alternative and even inconsistent legal
theories, such as breach of contract and unjust enrichment, even if
they can only recover under one of these theories.

Tenth, the Plaintiffs argue that the Bank neglected to inform the
Court of contrary authority regarding its arguments against their
New York GBL Section 349 claim and that the contrary authority
states that the Second Circuit "leaves open the possibility of
'out-of-state plaintiffs' claims of deceptive acts' where they lead
'to transactions within that state,' depending upon the location of
the transaction, and in particular the strength of New York's
connection to the allegedly deceptive transaction." Eleventh, the
Plaintiffs request leave to amend their Amended Complaint if the
Court determines it should grant the Bank's motion.

Generally, in reply to the Plaintiffs' opposition, the Bank sets
forth seven arguments. First, the Bank argues that the Court may
review and rely upon the following documents when deciding its
motion to dismiss: The Plaintiffs' account statements and notices
of insufficient funds; the Account Disclosure Notice; the Overdraft
Fee Disclosure and Schedule of Service Charges; the Online Banking
Disclosure; the Mobile Banking Disclaimer; the Notice of Online
Banking and Mobile App Upgrade; and the Nacha Rules. Second, it
argues that the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is speculative and
meant to evade the Court's gatekeeping function so that they may
embark on a broad fishing expedition to support a class action.

Third, the Bank argues that the Plaintiffs' interpretation of the
Fee Schedule only permitting one fee on the same insufficient funds
item is illogical when read in conjunction with the entire
agreement. Fourth, it argues that the Plaintiffs' lawsuit is devoid
of facts and asks the Court to reject this "assembly line style of
litigation. Fifth, it argues that the Court may treat this motion
as one for summary judgment, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) and 56.

Sixth, the Bank argues that the Court should dismiss the
Plaintiffs' claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing because their factual allegations do not plausibly
suggest that the Bank complied with the literal terms of the
contract but acted in a way to undermine the purpose of the
contract. Seventh, it argues that the Plaintiffs' New York GBL
Section 349 claim must fail, because their Amended Complaint does
not allege that they actually read the account documents, nor does
it allege that they relied on certain representations in those
documents.

A. Whether the Court May Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claim for Breach of
Contract

After carefully considering the matter, Judge Suddaby answers the
question in the negative to the extent the claim is based on the
Plaintiffs' allegations regarding OD fees on APPSN transactions and
the assessment of multiple NSF fees on the same re-presented
payment, but in the affirmative to the extent the claim is based on
the Plaintiffs' allegations regarding the improper software upgrade
in August 2020 to September 2020.

He holds that because he may not grant a motion to dismiss on a
breach-of-contract claim when the contract is not "clear and
unambiguous," Judge Suddaby will not dismiss the Plaintiffs'
breach-of-contract claim related to the OD fees on APPSN
transactions. Because the parties' competing interpretations of the
account documents are reasonable, the Plaintiffs'
breach-of-contract claim regarding the Bank charging multiple NSF
fees on the same item is sufficient to withstand the Bank's motion
to dismiss.

Finally, Judge Suddaby finds that nowhere in the Amended Complaint
do the Plaintiffs reference which account document or,
specifically, which portion of these documents the Bank allegedly
breached in performing the mobile banking system upgrade. Based on
this failure, he dismisses the Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim
to the extent they rely on their allegations regarding the mobile
banking software upgrade in August 2020 to September 2020.

B. Whether the Court Should Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claim for Breach of
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

After carefully considering the matter, Judge Suddaby answers the
question in the affirmative for the reasons stated in the Bank's
memoranda of law. He holds that the allegations are the exact same
as those used to support the Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim.
Although the Plaintiffs may plead alternative and inconsistent
causes of action, they have not done so; "instead, they have pled a
duplicative cause of action." Therefore, the Plaintiffs' claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing will
be dismissed.

C. Whether the Court Should Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claim for Unjust
Enrichment/Restitution

After carefully considering the matter, Judge Suddaby answers the
question in the affirmative for the reasons stated in the Bank's
memoranda of law. He finds that the factual allegations of the case
do not plausibly suggest that the parties dispute the validity or
enforceability of the account documents. Because the Plaintiffs do
not allege that the relevant account documents are invalid or
unenforceable, the Plaintiffs' claim for unjust
enrichment/restitution will be dismissed.

D. Whether the Court Should Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claim for Money Had
and Received

After carefully considering the matter, Judge Suddaby answers the
question in the affirmative for the reasons stated in the Bank's
memoranda of law. Under New York law, claims for unjust enrichment
and money had and received are identical. Accordingly, based on his
ruling on the Plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment/restitution,
Judge Suddaby dismisses the Plaintiffs' claim for money had and
received.

E. Whether the Court Should Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claim for Violation
of the Electronic Fund Transfers Act (Regulation E)

After carefully considering the matter, Judge Suddaby answers the
question in the affirmative for the reasons stated in the Bank's
memoranda of law. After reviewing the Amended Complaint, he does
not see any allegations by the Plaintiffs that they entered into a
Regulation E Opt-In Contract. Without similar allegations
indicating the Plaintiffs entered into a Regulation E Opt-In
contract, their Amended Complaint fails to state a Regulation E
claim and is dismissed.

F. Whether the Court Should Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claim for Violation
of New York GBL Section 349

After carefully considering the matter, Judge Suddaby answers the
question in the affirmative for the reasons stated in the Bank's
memoranda of law. He finds that the Plaintiffs have not alleged
facts plausibly suggesting that the alleged deceptive transactions
occurred in New York. Ultimately, without allegations in the
Amended Complaint indicating "the strength of New York's connection
to the allegedly deceptive transaction," Judge Suddaby finds that
the Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a GBL Section 349
claim and the claim is therefore dismissed.

G. Whether the Court Should Grant Plaintiffs' Request for Leave to
Amend Their Amended Complaint

After carefully considering the matter, Judge Suddaby answers this
question in the negative. As the Court explained in Sobon v.
Horizon Eng'g Assocs., LLP, this request to amend (from a counseled
Plaintiff) is procedurally defective. Further, Judge Suddaby holds
that, with the exception of the Plaintiffs' claim for breach of
contract related to the mobile banking software upgrade in August
2020 and September 2020 and the GBL Section 349 claim, leave to
amend is unwarranted.

III. Decision

In his Decision and Order, Judge Suddaby dismisses the following
six claims: (1) the claim for breach of contract based on the
alleged software upgrade in August 2020 to September 2020; (2) the
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; (3) the claim for unjust enrichment/restitution; (4) the
claim for money had and received; (5) the claim for violation of
the EFTA (Regulation E); and (6) the claim for violation of New
York GBL Section 349. The defects in the Plaintiffs' claims with
respect to breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, unjust enrichment/restitution, and money had and received
are all substantive, as the Court described in previous portions of
the Decision and Order. Accordingly, amendment is not required, and
the claims will be dismissed with prejudice.

With respect to the Plaintiffs' Regulation E claim, Judge Suddaby
finds any further amendment is unwarranted, because the Plaintiffs
previously had the opportunity to cure the deficiencies underlying
this claim. The Plaintiffs, who are represented by the counsel,
already amended their Complaint once, but failed to include in
either the Complaint or Amended Complaint that they entered into
the Opt-In contract that forms the basis of their Regulation E
claim. Judge Suddaby accordingly will dismiss this claim with
prejudice.

Judge Suddaby finds, however, that the Plaintiffs may be able to
provide additional factual allegations regarding their standing to
bring a New York GBL Section 349 claim and the contract
provision(s) allegedly breached during the mobile banking software
upgrade in August 2020 and September 2020. Judge Suddaby notes
that, like the Plaintiffs' Regulation E claim, they had the
opportunity to amend and include the requisite factual allegations
for their breach-of-contract claim based on the mobile banking
software upgrade.

Nonetheless, he believes the defects in the Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint with respect to this claim, as well as the GBL Section
349 claim, may be formal, rather than substantive. Additionally, he
believes that additional factual allegations could show that the
transactions at issue in the lawsuit have a sufficient nexus to the
State of New York, making amendment of the GBL Section 349 claim
not futile. As a result, these claims are dismissed without
prejudice.

IV. Order

Accordingly, Judge Suddaby denied the Bank's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) with
respect to the Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim(s) based on the
allegations regarding OD fees on APPSN transactions and multiple
NSF fees on the same item.

He granted the Bank's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) with respect to the following
claims, which are dismissed with prejudice: (a) the claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (b)
the claim for unjust enrichment/restitution; (c) the claim for
money had and received; and (d) the claim for violation of the
Electronic Funds Transfer Act (Regulation E).

Judge Suddaby granted the Bank's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) with respect to the
breach-of-contract claim based on the allegations regarding the
improper software upgrade in August 2020 to September 2020 and the
New York General Business Law Section 349 claim, which is dismissed
without prejudice to refiling upon a successful motion to amend
within 30 days of the filing of the Decision and Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yckp59up from Leagle.com.

CHERUNDOLO LAW FIRM, PLLC J. PATRICK LANNON, ESQ. --
plannon@cherundololawfirm.com -- JOHN C. CHERUNDOLO, ESQ. --
jcherundolo@cherundololawfirm.com -- Counsel for the Plaintiff, in
Syracuse, New York.

KALIEL GOLD, PLLC JEFFREY D. KALIEL, ESQ. -- jeff@kicklawfirm.com
-- SOPHIA GOREN GOLD, ESQ., Co-Counsel for the Plaintiff, in
Washington, D.C.

WILENTZ GOLDMAN & SPITZER PA KEVIN P. RODDY, ESQ. --
kroddy@wilentz.com -- Co-Counsel for the Plaintiff, in Woodbridge,
New Jersey.

THE KICK LAW FIRM JEFFREY BILS, ESQ., TARAS KICK, ESQ. --
taras@kicklawfirm.com -- Co-Counsel for the Plaintiff, in Los
Angeles, California.

BAILEY, JOHNSON & PECK, P.C. CRYSTAL R. PECK, ESQ., JOHN W. BAILEY,
ESQ., RYAN P. BAILEY, ESQ., Counsel for Defendant Trustco Bank, in
Albany, New York.


TURKEY HILL DAIRY: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Turkey Hill Dairy.
The case is styled as Cristian Sanchez, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Turkey Hill Dairy, Case No.
1:22-cv-02420 (S.D.N.Y., March 24, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Turkey Hill Dairy -- https://www.turkeyhill.com/ -- or simply known
as Turkey Hill, is an American brand of iced tea, ice cream and
other beverages and frozen desserts distributed throughout the
United States and internationally.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


TUTUDUMONDE INC: Joyner Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Tutudumonde, Inc. The
case is styled as Sharon Joyner, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Tutudumonde, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-02423 (S.D.N.Y., March 24, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Tutu du Monde -- https://tutudumonde.com/ -- is a truely unique
girls' fashion brand, renowned for its exquisitely handcrafted
dresses and accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


UNITED STATES: Gomez Files Suit in W.D. Washington
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services, et al. The case is styled as
Miriam Velasco De Gomez, Elena Gonzalez Tavira, Carlos Gonzalez
Martinez, Aleciana Costa Soares, Manuel Alvarez Garcia, on behalf
of themselves as individuals and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Ur
Jaddou, United States Department of Homeland Security, Alejandro
Mayorkas, Case No. 2:22-cv-00368 (W.D. Wash., March 25, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Statutes: Administrative
Procedures Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services -- https://www.uscis.gov/
-- is an agency of the United States Department of Homeland
Security that administers the country's naturalization and
immigration system.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Aaron Korthuis, Esq.
          Leila Kang, Esq.
          Margot Adams, Esq.
          Matt Adams, Esq.
          NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT (SEA)
          615 2nd Ave., Ste. 400
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Phone: (206) 957-8611
          Email: aaron@nwirp.org
                 leila@nwirp.org
                 margot@nwirp.org
                 matt@nwirp.org


UNITED STATES: Ravi Appeals Class Suit Dismissal
------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs TEJA RAVI filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in
the lawsuit entitled Teja Ravi, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The United States of
America, Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-01237-NBF, in the United
States Court of Federal Claims.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and class members applied
and enrolled at the University of Farmington with the understanding
that it was an accredited university offering legitimate degrees in
such programs as a Masters in Information Technology and a Masters
in Computer Science. Farmington required that Plaintiff and class
members pay tuition upon acceptance. All class members were
informed that there would be regular classes each month, and all
class members enrolled in the online program as most of the
students lived outside of the state of Michigan and/or were unable
to attend on campus courses due to their employment. But none of
the students received services in exchange for their tuition.

In January 2019, the Defendant revealed that the University was a
sham and reneged on their guarantees that Plaintiff and Class
members had properly adhered to immigration regulations and were
therefore lawfully residing and working in the United States. The
Defendant instead revoked Plaintiff and Class members' visa status,
accusing the enrollees of visa fraud, even though Plaintiff and
Class members were unwitting victims of Defendant's scheme, and had
reasonably believed in Defendant's actions and assurances, that the
University was a legitimate and authorized school.

Allegedly, the University turned out to be fraudulent and deprived
class members of millions of dollars, without providing the
services that it offered and promised. Plaintiff, therefore,
brought this action on behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated persons who enrolled at the University of Farmington
asserting Breach of Contract and Breach of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing. The Plaintiff seeks damages and
equitable relief on behalf of the Class, which relief includes, but
is not limited to, the following: refunding Plaintiff and class
members full amount paid to the University of Farmington; costs and
expenses, including attorneys' fees and expert fees; and any
additional relief that the Court determines to be necessary to
provide complete relief to Plaintiff and the class.

On January 8, 2021, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rules 12 (b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

On March 16, 2022, Senior Judge Nancy B. Firestone entered an
Opinion and Order, granting Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction; dismissing as moot government's
alternative motion for summary judgment; denying Plaintiff's
requests for discovery; and denying Plaintiff's motion to amend the
complaint.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of this order.

The appellate case is captioned as Ravi v. U.S., Case No. 22-1559,
in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, filed on
March 22, 2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Entry of Appearance is due on April 5, 2022;

   -- Certificate of Interest is due on April 5, 2022;

   -- Docketing Statement is due on April 21, 2022; and

   -- Appellant/Petitioner's brief is due on May 23, 2022.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant TEJA RAVI, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Amy Norris, Esq.
          616 E Street NW Suite 1156
          Washington, DC 20004
          Telephone: (202) 830-1225

Defendant-Appellee UNITED STATES is represented by:

          Meen Geu Oh, Esq.
          U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          Department of Justice
          PO Box 480
          Ben Franklin Station
          Washington, DC 20044

UPTOWN HEALTHCARE: Extension to File Class Status Bid Sought
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as NANCY ANDERSON; JOY
MANGUNO; JAYME SONGY, AS CURATOR FOR MALVINA SONGY; AND JANICE
VERDIN, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF CATHERINE ROUSSELL, INDIVIDUALLY AND
ON BEHALF OF OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, v. BOB DEAN, JR.; UPTOWN
HEALTHCARE CENTER, L.L.C.; PARK PLACE HEALTHCARE, LLC; RACELAND
MANOR NURSING HOME, INC.; MAISON DE'VILLE NURSING HOME, INC.; RIVER
PALMS NURSING & REHAB, LLC; MAISON DE'VILLE NURSING HOME OF HARVEY,
L.L.C.; ST. ELIZABETH'S CARING, L.L.C.; and BOB DEAN ENTERPRISES,
INC., Case No. 2:21-cv-01891-LMA-JVM (E.D. La.), the Parties ask
the Court to enter an order extending the time to move for class
certification.

The parties propose an extension of 60 days or at such time as
directed by a case management or scheduling order.

Uptown Healthcare is a skilled nursing center located near the
heart of the Uptown District of Capitol Hill in Denver, Colorado.

A copy of the Parties motion dated March 10, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uA6AS2 at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Donald C. Massey, Esq.
          Jonathan P. Lemann, Esq.
          Couhig Partners, LLC
          3250 Energy Center
          1100 Poydras Street
          New Orleans, LA 70163
          Telephone: (504) 588-1288
          E-mail: dmassey@couhigpartners.com

               - and -

          Suzette Peychaud Bagneris, Esq.
          BAGNERIS FIRM, LLC
          2714 Canal Street, Suite 403
          New Orleans, LA 70119
          Telephone: 504-810-3995
          E-mail: sbagneris@bagnerislawfirm.com

               - and -

          Ravi K. Sangisetty, Esq.
          SANGISETTY LAW FIRM
          3914 Canal Street
          New Orleans, LA 70119
          Telephone: 504-662-1016
          E-mail: rks@sangisettylaw.com

               - and -

          Gary Joseph Gambel, Esq.
          MURPHY, ROGERS, SLOSS, GAMBEL & TOMPKINS
          701 Poydras St., Suite 400
          New Orleans, LA 70139
          Telephone: 504-523-0400
          E-mail: ggambel@mrsnola.com

               - and -

          Roderick Alvendia, Esq.
          ALVENDIA, KELLY, & DEMAREST, LLC
          909 Poydras St., Suite 1625
          New Orleans, LA 70112
          Telephone: 504-200-0000
          E-mail: rico@akdlalaw.com

               - and -

          Roderick Alvendia, Esq.
          Brian P. Marcelle, Esq.
          HUBER, THOMAS AND MARCELLE, LLP
          1100 Poydras Street, Suite 2200
          New Orleans, LA 70163
          Telephone: 504-274-2500
          E-mail: brian@huberthomaslaw.com


               - and -

          Eric A. Wright, Esq.
          Wright & Gray, Esq.
          201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 3206
          New Orleans, LA 70170
          Telephone: (504) 500-0000
          E-mail: scott@wrightgray.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Philip Watson, Esq.
          DUPLASS ZWAIN BOURGEOIS
          PFISTER WEINSTOCK & BOGART
          Three Lakeway Center, Suite 2900
          3838 N. Causeway Boulevard
          Metairie, LA 70002
          Telephone: (504) 832-3700
          E-mail: PWATSON@DUPLASS.COM

               - and -

          H. Minor Pipes, III, Esq.
          PIPES MILES BECKMAN, LLC
          1100 Poydras St., Ste. 1800
          New Orleans, LA 70163
          Telephone: (504) 322-7070
          E-mail: MPIPES@PIPESMILES.COM

USA: Federal Claims Court Dismisses Ravi Class Complaint v. ICE
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TEJA RAVI, Plaintiff v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant,
Case No. 20-1237C (Fed. Cl.), Judge Nancy B. Firestone of the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims granted the government's motion to dismiss
the Plaintiff's amended complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.

I. Introduction

Between 2018 and 2019, Plaintiff Ravi, a citizen of India, enrolled
at and made tuition payments to the University of Farmington. At
the time of his enrollment, Mr. Ravi did not know that the
University of Farmington was a fictitious school staffed and
operated by agents from United States Immigration and Customs and
Enforcement (ICE) as part of an undercover law enforcement
operation whose purpose was to expose student visa fraud. In 2019,
after ICE ceased operating Farmington and began pursuing
enforcement actions, Mr. Ravi left the United States and returned
to India. In the action, Mr. Ravi seeks the return of his tuition
payments, alleging that the government breached a contract with him
when it did not provide him legitimate educational services.

II. Background

On Sept. 21, 2020, Mr. Ravi filed his initial complaint in the
Court individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
Farmington students. According to Mr. Ravi, he understood the
University to be a legitimate educational institution and, by
paying tuition, he entered into a contractual relationship with the
government for educational services. Because the government never
provided those services, Mr. Ravi brings claims for breach of
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Among other things, he seeks that the action be certified
as a class action, "compensatory, statutory and/or punitive
damages" for breach of contract, "fraud, negligent
misrepresentation and false promises," and "equitable monetary
relief, including restitution and disgorgement."

On Jan. 8, 2021, the government filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the
United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC), arguing that Mr. Ravi
failed to sufficiently allege two elements required to establish a
valid contract with the government: That the government intended to
enter into an educational services contract with Mr. Ravi and that
the HSI agents running Farmington had actual authority to bind the
government in a contract for educational services. The government
also argues that Mr. Ravi's claims should be dismissed under the
sovereign capacity doctrine, which bars contract claims that arise
out of the government's sovereign actions.

After the government filed its motion to dismiss, on Jan. 28, 2021,
Mr. Ravi filed an amended complaint under RCFC 15(a)(1)(B). The
amended complaint reiterates the allegations of the original
complaint and adds allegations that the HSI personnel behind the
University "had actual authority to bind the government in
contract." The amended complaint also alleges that the government
"ratified" the contracts for educational services with Farmington
students when it "accepted the benefit of the contracts by keeping
all tuition money paid by the Plaintiff and the class members under
the contracts."

After the government filed its reply brief in support of its motion
to dismiss, the Court held a status conference and ordered Mr. Ravi
to file a supplemental brief regarding whether Mr. Ravi, as a
citizen of India, had standing to sue under the Reciprocity Act, 28
U.S.C. Section 2502. The Reciprocity Act grants the Plaintiffs who
are citizens of a foreign government the right to sue the United
States in its courts only if a reciprocal right is afforded to an
American citizen in the Plaintiff's country. n his supplemental
briefing, Mr. Ravi argues, and the government agrees, that the
Reciprocity Act does not bar Mr. Ravi's claims.

The Court also ordered the government to file a supplemental brief
in support of its motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a
motion for summary judgment. It directed the government to address
in its supplemental briefing a variety of topics, including "the
statutory basis for the University of Farmington undercover
operation and whether that operation was certified under the
relevant statutes," whether the alleged educational services
contract with Mr. Ravi was illegal and unenforceable, and whether
the HSI agents operating the University of Farmington had the
authority to bind the United States to an educational services
contract with Mr. Ravi.

In its supplemental briefing, the government argues that Mr. Ravi's
amended complaint should be dismissed or summary judgment should be
granted in the government's favor for three reasons: (1) the
sovereign capacity doctrine bars Mr. Ravi's claims because those
claims arise out of a certified undercover law enforcement action;
(2) Mr. Ravi cannot plead or prove a mutuality of intent to
contract or that HSI agents had the necessary authority to bind the
United States to a contract for educational services; and (3) Mr.
Ravi knew his conduct was illegal, and, therefore the doctrine of
in pari delicto bars him from obtaining assistance from the Court
to recover his tuition money. The government attached to its
supplemental brief evidence in support of these arguments,
including affidavits from ICE personnel and the required
certification documents for the Farmington undercover operation.

Supplemental briefing on the government's motion to dismiss, or, in
the alternative, for summary judgment was completed on Oct. 8,
2021. Oral argument was held on Jan. 13, 2022, and the government's
motion is now pending.

Two other matters are also before the Court. First, Mr. Ravi makes
a request in his supplemental briefing for further discovery, which
the government opposes. Second, one day before oral argument, Mr.
Ravi moved to amend his complaint to add another named Plaintiff.
Pursuant to the court's Jan. 12, 2022 order, the government at oral
argument opposed the motion to amend.

III. Discussion

Although the parties agree on this point, Judge Firestone first
addresses whether the Reciprocity Act bars Mr. Ravi's claims. She
then turns to the government's motion to dismiss, or, in the
alternative, motion for summary judgment. Finally, she addresses
Mr. Ravi's request for additional discovery and Mr. Ravi's motion
to amend his complaint to add another named Plaintiff.

A. A. The Reciprocity Act Does Not Bar Mr. Ravi's Contract Claims

Because Mr. Ravi is a citizen of India, he must meet the
requirements of the Reciprocity Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 2502, in
order to pursue his claims before the Court. Under the Reciprocity
Act, "citizens or subjects of any foreign government which accords
to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute claims
against their government in its courts may sue the United States in
the United States Court of Federal Claims if the subject matter of
the suit is otherwise within such court's jurisdiction." The Act
"burdens alien plaintiffs who invoke the process of the Court of
Federal Claims with showing that their home courts treat natives
and American citizens equally when they adjudicate claims brought
against their home countries."

Judge Firestone agrees with Mr. Ravi and the government that Mr.
Ravi has satisfied the requirements of the Reciprocity Act. Mr.
Ravi provides an affidavit from an experienced Indian attorney who
is an Assistant Professor at a leading law school in India
explaining that "an American citizen has a right to sue the Indian
government in its courts under the existing constitutional as well
as statutory scheme in India." In support, Mr. Ravi's supplemental
brief and attached affidavit cite the Indian Constitution, Indian
Civil Procedure Code Sections 9, 79, and 83, and case law. Taken
together, these sources of law demonstrate that the Act does not
bar Mr. Ravi's claims.

Therefore, when read together, the Indian Constitution and Code of
Civil Procedure Sections 9, 79, and 83, and the affidavit submitted
by Mr. Ravi, demonstrate that American citizens "enjoy an equal
standing" with Indian citizens in actions against the Indian
government. Judge Firestone thus concludes that the Reciprocity Act
does not bar Mr. Ravi's contract claims in the Court.

B. The Sovereign Capacity Doctrine Bars Mr. Ravi's Contract Claims

While the government has moved to dismiss Mr. Ravi's contract
claims, or for summary judgment, on three grounds, Judge
Firestone's opinion focuses only on the government's argument based
on the sovereign capacity doctrine that Mr. Ravi's claims should be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under RCFC
12(b)(1). Under the sovereign capacity doctrine, Judge Firestone
must dismiss Mr. Ravi's contract claims. The central question in
the case is whether the government was acting in its sovereign or
proprietary capacity when it entered into the alleged contract with
Mr. Ravi for educational services.

She opines that the purported educational services contract on
which Mr. Ravi bases his contract claims arises out of a government
law enforcement operation, a sovereign action. Under the sovereign
capacity doctrine, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Ravi's
contract claims, which must be dismissed under RCFC 12(b)(1). Judge
Firestone does not address the government's other grounds for
dismissal or summary judgment, and the government's alternative
motion for summary judgment is dismissed as moot.

C. Mr. Ravi's Request for Additional Discovery is Denied as Futile

Although he has not made a formal motion, Mr. Ravi throughout his
supplemental response brief requests that the Court orders
additional discovery before ruling on the government's alternative
motion for summary judgment so that Mr. Ravi may explore certain
material facts that he argues are disputed. The government opposes
Mr. Ravi's request because additional discovery would be futile.

RCFC 56(d) permits the Court to order additional discovery during
summary judgment proceedings when essential facts are not available
to the non-movant. While motions under RCFC 56(d) are to be
"liberally granted," the Court may deny a motion for discovery
under RCFC 56(d) if the requested discovery would be futile. This
is true even in cases like this one where a formal discovery period
has not yet occurred.

Judge Firestone agrees with the government. She opines that Mr.
Ravi fails to satisfy the requirements of RCFC 56(d). To begin, Mr.
Ravi has not complied with the Rule's procedural requirements. He
has not provided an affidavit in support of the requests. In
addition, Mr. Ravi's requests for discovery would be futile in
light of the Court's holding that the sovereign capacity doctrine
presents a jurisdictional bar to Mr. Ravi's contract claims.

As discussed, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the University
of Farmington was a government-created educational institution
established as part of a lawful, certified undercover operation to
identify and prosecute student visa violators and recruiters
engaging in a "pay to stay" visa fraud scheme. Based these
undisputed facts, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Ravi's
contract claims under the sovereign capacity doctrine. Judge
Firestone therefore denies Mr. Ravi's discovery requests as
futile.

D. Mr. Ravi's Motion to Amend His Complaint is Denied as Futile

Finally, Mr. Ravi has filed a motion to amend his complaint in
order to add an additional lead plaintiff, Swetha Batchu. Mr. Ravi
asserts that "Ms. Bachu is one of the many who never received
educational services after she accepted an offer to pay tuition
money in exchange for an accredited educational program." Mr. Ravi
argues that allowing him to add an additional lead plaintiff, years
into the case "would serve justice and promote judicial
efficiency."

The government opposes this motion. First, the government argues
that "the sovereign capacity bar" is decisive, "and if the case is
resolved" on that ground, "adding a party is futile." Second, the
government contends that "there is unfair prejudice and undue
delay" in Mr. Ravi's request. Finally, the government asserts that
the motion to amend "seems to be an attempt to prolong" proceedings
at a time when the court "is clearly ready to make a decision,"
which is improper. Mr. Ravi did not file a reply.

Judge Firestone agrees with the government and will deny Mr. Ravi's
motion to amend as futile. Mr. Ravi seeks to amend his complaint to
add an additional plaintiff who will assert contract claims for
educational services with the government based on the government's
law enforcement activities during Operation Paper Chase. However,
Judge Firestone has held that the Court lacks jurisdiction over
such claims under the sovereign capacity doctrine. Because the
Court would lack jurisdiction over any such claims regardless of
the named plaintiff, Mr. Ravi's proposed amendment would be futile,
and his motion to amend his complaint is therefore denied.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons she discussed, Judge Firestone granted the
government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under RCFC 12(b)(1). She denied as moot the
government's alternative motion for summary judgment. Judge
Firestone denied Mr. Ravi's requests for further discovery and
motion to amend the complaint.

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/bdef8amt from Leagle.com.

Amy E. Norris -- amy@norrislawgroup.org -- in Washington, DC, for
the Plaintiff.

Meen Geu Oh, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC, with whom were Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Martin F. Hockey, Jr., Acting Director, and Eric
P. Bruskin, Assistant Director, for the Defendant.


VAIL CORP: Joint Status Report on Roberds Settlement Due May 27
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PAUL GREG ROBERDS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. THE VAIL CORPORATION, WHICH
WILL DO BUSINESS IN CALIFORNIA AS VAIL RESORTS MANAGEMENT COMPANY,
a Colorado Corporation; HEAVENLY VALLEY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a
Nevada Limited Partnership; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 2:21-cv-02251-WBS-DB (E.D. Cal.), Judge John A. Mendez of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
issued an order:

   a. directing the Parties to file a Joint Status Report
      addressing the status of the settlement approval process,
      and any additional information that the Court requires, no
      later than May 27, 2022; and
  
   b. setting the Status Conference Re Class Action Settlement
      for July 12, 2022, at 1:30 p.m.

Pursuant to the Court's Jan. 19, 2022 Order, the Parties submit the
joint status report regarding the status of the case and settlement
approval process in the Action and four other related cases: Gibson
v. The Vail Corporation, Case No. 2:21-cv-01260-WBS-DB (E.D. Cal.)
("Gibson"); Hamilton v. Heavenly Valley, Limited Partnership,
2:21-cv-01608-WBS-DB (E.D. Cal.) ("Hamilton I"); Hamilton v.
Heavenly Valley, Limited Partnership, SC20210148 (El Dorado County
Superior Court) ("Hamilton II"); and Heggen v. Heavenly Valley,
Limited Partnership, Case No. 2:21-cv-00107-WBS-DB (E.D. Cal.)
("Heggen").

On Dec. 28, 2021, the Parties executed a formal, long-form
Settlement Agreement that fully and finally resolves all claims
raised in this Action, pending court approval, as well as all
claims pled in related cases Gibson, Hamilton I, Hamilton II, and
Heggen (the "Settlement"). The plaintiffs in a fifth related case,
Quint v. Vail Resorts Inc., Case No. 1:20-cv-03569-DDD-GPG (D.
Colo.), are not parties to the Settlement Agreement.

On Jan. 4, 2022, Plaintiff Hamilton filed a Motion for Preliminary
Approval of the Settlement before the El Dorado Superior Court in
the Hamilton II proceeding. On Feb. 1, 2022, the Court entered an
Order granting the Motion for Preliminary Approval, provisionally
certifying the settlement class, and ordering that notice be
disseminated to all settlement class members.

On March 8, 2022, the Court issued an order to extend time to issue
notice of class settlement, continue the final approval hearing
date, and grant leave to file a brief in excess of page limits. The
Court's Order set a deadline of March 22, 2022, to mail the
required notice to Settlement Class Members. At the time, the
Counsel expected that notice will go out by March 22, 2022. The
response deadline will expire 45 days after mailing.

The Hamilton II court has set a hearing date for the Plaintiff's
Motion for Final Approval of the Settlement of June 17, 2022, at
1:30 p.m. In light of the pending June hearing, the Parties
respectfully request that the Court continues the May 17, 2022,
status conference to July 1, 2022, or a date otherwise convenient
for the Court that is after the June 17, 2022 Final Approval
hearing date.

Having reviewed the foregoing stipulation, Judge Mendez ordered the
Parties will file a Joint Status Report addressing the status of
the settlement approval process, and any additional information
that the Court requires, no later than May 27, 2022. He set the
Status Conference Re Class Action Settlement for July 12, 2022, at
1:30 p.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ayea6jhn from Leagle.com.

JAMES HAWKINS APLC, James R. Hawkins, Esq. --
james@jameshawkinsaplc.com -- Gregory Mauro, Esq. --
GREG@MAUROLAWFIRM.NET -- Michael Calvo, Esq. --
michael@jameshawkinsaplc.com -- Jeanne Sarmiento, Esq. --
jsarmiento@mcgeelerer.com -- in Irvine, California, Attorneys for
the Plaintiff, PAUL GREG ROBERDS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated.

EVAN R. MOSES -- evan.moses@ogletree.com -- MELIS ATALAY --
melis.atalay@ogletree.com -- OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK &
STEWART, P.C., in Los Angeles, California, Attorneys for Defendants
HEAVENLY VALLEY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP and THE VAIL CORPORATION.


VESTED BUSINESS: Gomez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Vested Business
Brokers LTD. The case is styled as Samuel Gomez, and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated v. Vested Business Brokers
LTD., Case No. 1:22-cv-02510 (S.D.N.Y., March 28, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Vested Business Brokers -- https://www.vestedbb.com/ -- facilitates
the purchase and sale of businesses in all industry sectors
throughout the New York tri-state area by providing an extensive
network of buyers and sellers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly G. Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM, PC
          155 East 55th St., Ste. 6a
          New York, NY 10022
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: brad@markslawpc.com



WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY: Court Dismisses Amended Raimo Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALEXANDER RAIMO, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN
ST. LOUIS, Defendant, Case No. 4:20-cv-00634-SEP (E.D. Mo.), Judge
Sarah E. Pitlyk of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri, Eastern Division, granted the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint.

I. Background

Plaintiff Alexander Raimo is an undergraduate student at Defendant
Washington University in St. Louis. In response to the spread of
COVID-19, on March 11, 2020, the University temporarily canceled
in-person classes and transitioned to remote learning. While
expected to be only temporary at first, the University announced on
March 31, 2020, that the remainder of the semester would be
conducted online.  Students were instructed to complete their
coursework at their permanent residences and were required to leave
the University's residence halls and apartments. The University
noted that it was "working hard to finalize and process refunds
related to residential life housing, dining, parking, and a partial
refund of the student health fee."

Mr. Raimo was registered for classes for the Spring 2020 semester.
His Spring 2020 semester expenses consisted of (1) $27,125 for
tuition; (2) $6,474 for housing; (3) a maximum of $3,319.50 for a
meal plan; (4) $250 for a student health and wellness fee; and (5)
$271 for an undergraduate activities fee. The University agreed to
prorate housing, student parking fees, and a portion of the student
health and wellness fee. The University also issued refunds on a
student-by-student basis for meal plan balances and lost wages for
students in work study programs.

The Complaint, thus, focuses on tuition for full-time students,
which the University classifies as any student who takes between 12
and 18 credit hours. Because the University charged a flat tuition
rate for all full-time students, the dollar-to-credit ratio varied
between $1,506 and $2,260 per credit, depending on how many hours
the student was enrolled in. Raimo claims that, either way, the
amount was "significantly higher" than the cost of the University's
online-only programs. He argues that his tuition paid for the
benefits, services, opportunities, and facilities that come along
with "on-campus courses." When the University was forced to close
its facilities due to the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, it did
not refund any tuition, explaining that students would still be
able to complete coursework and receive full credit toward their
degree programs.

Mr. Raimo brings the action seeking monetary relief under the Class
Action Fairness Act on behalf of himself and a purported class of
Washington University students. Raimo claims that moving classes
online deprived him and the purported class of "in-person learning
from their peers and school faculty, access to the facilities,
materials, and opportunities only offered on the University's
physical campus, including laboratory and research experience, use
of campus facilities, such as the gym and libraries, and use of
on-campus services and events such as sporting events, end-of-year
programs, lectures, and various student services.

The Amended Complaint brings four counts: Count I - Breach of
Contract, Count II - Breach of Implied Contract, Count III - Unjust
Enrichment, and Count IV - Conversion.

II. Discussion

The University argues that all of Raimo's claims are barred by
Missouri's educational malpractice doctrine. It also argues that
each count is independently deficient for failure to state a
claim.

A. Educational Malpractice Doctrine

In states that recognize the educational malpractice doctrine,
courts have generally cited four public policy grounds for doing
so: (1) the lack of a satisfactory standard of care by which to
evaluate an educator; (2) the inherent uncertainties about
causation and the nature of damages in light of such intervening
factors as a student's attitude, motivation, temperament, past
experience, and home environment; (3) the potential for a flood of
litigation against schools; and (4) the possibility that such
claims will embroil the courts into overseeing the day-to-day
operations of schools.

Because none of Raimo's claims involves a standard of care, Judge
Pitlyk holds the first policy rationale for the educational
malpractice doctrine is not implicated. The other three certainly
are. Nevertheless, other courts faced with the same question in
similar cases have largely concluded that the educational
malpractice doctrine does not bar these claims.

Despite the majority of courts having held that similar claims were
not barred by the educational malpractice doctrine, the University
urges the Court to hold that all of Raimo's claims are barred by
Missouri's educational malpractice doctrine. It argues that the
Complaint boils down to one main claim: the purported difference in
some undefined value between instruction provided in person and
instruction provided online." This, the University contends, would
require the Court to "determine whether and how the quality of
education the University provided fell short of what Plaintiff
alleges it was obligated to provide, and then to assign a financial
value to the difference."

Mr. Raimo counters that he "is not asking the Court to evaluate the
quality of education at the University, but assess whether the
promised in-person classes were provided at all." He further argues
that the nature and causation of damages in the case are
straightforward and "objectively quantifiable based on the
University's own tuition differential for in-person and online
education.

Judge Pitlyk holds that Raimo cannot claim that he received no
instruction or credits toward a degree at all. In fact, he received
online instruction, which is manifestly not the same as no
instruction at all. Although Raimo attempts to avoid acknowledging
that his claim rests entirely on an allegation that the education
he received was of diminished value relative to that he allegedly
contracted for, that conclusion is unavoidable. His claims cannot
succeed and thus merit dismissal.

Judge Pitlyk respectfully disagrees that the damages calculation
necessitated by Raimo's claim is not essential to his Complaint.
That Raimo allegedly received something that was worth less than
what he contracted for is the gravamen of his Complaint. One of the
bases for adopting the educational malpractice doctrine in Missouri
was "the inherent uncertainties about causation and the nature of
damages." For Raimo to ultimately prove damages, the Court would be
required to compare different methods of instruction, inquire into
the nuances of educational processes, and analyze the quality of
education he received -- precisely the kinds of analysis Missouri's
educational malpractice doctrine forecloses. Therefore, Judge
Pitlyk finds that the Amended Complaint is barred by that
doctrine.

Judge Pitlyk's conclusion finds support even from courts that have
held otherwise. Raimo has not made such a showing. Contrary to his
assertion, he has not successfully alleged that the courses
provided by Washington University and those offered by University
College are comparable. Moreover, the Court is not alone in holding
that a COVID-19 tuition reimbursement claim is foreclosed by the
educational malpractice doctrine.

Resolving his claims would require the Court to make judgments
about the quality and value of the education that the University
provided during the Spring 2020 semester, a task foreclosed by
Missouri law. Thus, Raimo's claims are barred by Missouri's
educational malpractice doctrine and must be dismissed on that
basis. Given the lack of unanimity among district courts on that
issue, however, Judge Pitlyk will also address the University's
other arguments for dismissal of each claim.

B. Counts I & II: Breach of Contract

1. Breach of Contract

To plead a claim for breach of contract under Missouri law, a
plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to establish: "(1) the
existence and terms of a contract; (2) that the plaintiff performed
or tendered performance pursuant to the contract; (3) breach of the
contract by the defendant; and (4) damages suffered by the
plaintiff."

The University argues that Raimo's claim likewise fails to allege a
specific, discrete promise for in-person instruction. Raimo
counters that he contracted with the University specifically for
"in-person" classes. In support, he points to an array of
promotional language taken from the University's website; the
course catalog, which showed that classes were assigned building
numbers; and the University's usual and customary practice of
providing on-campus instruction. Raimo claims that the "combination
of the express terms of the course catalog, the Defendant's
publications and the Defendant's usual and customary practice
constituted an offer for in-person classes." The University replies
that Raimo cannot "piece together some unspoken, unwritten promise
to provide in-person learning" as a basis for an express contract;
rather, he must identify "objective or quantifiable promises."

Judge Pitlyk finds that (i) none of the allegations amounts to a
specific, discrete promise for in-person instruction; (ii) the
University's course catalog reflected its intent to hold the listed
courses in certain buildings and rooms, and did not create a
binding obligation to do so; and (iii) because Raimo has not
otherwise sufficiently alleged a specific promise establishing that
a mutual agreement to provide in-person instruction existed, he
cannot use the concept of custom and usage to create a contract
where there otherwise is none. Because Raimo fails to establish the
existence of a specific, discrete promise to provide in-person
instruction, his Count I fails to state a claim for breach of
contract under Missouri law.

2. Breach of Implied Contract

Added to the Amended Complaint as an alternative to Count I, Count
II alleges that Raimo entered into an implied contract by
"accepting Defendant's offer to register for on-campus classes and
use Defendant's facilities." In support, Raimo pleads the same
facts as in his breach of contract claim. Specifically, he alleges
that the University's "course catalog, brochures, advertisements,
and other promotional materials," as well as the University's
"usual and customary practice of providing on-campus courses," gave
rise to a reasonable expectation that he and the class members were
mutually agreeing to on-campus instruction.

Judge Pitlyk finds that while other jurisdictions have found a
contractual relationship exists between a student and a university,
there is no "case law in Missouri that expressly finds the
existence of a contractual relationship between a student and a
university." Raimo does not cite, and the Court has not found, any
Missouri case "that has held that an implied contract for
educational services arises between a student and a University."
Therefore, Raimo's Count II fails to state a claim for breach of
implied contract under Missouri law.

C. Count III: Unjust Enrichment

To state a claim for unjust enrichment under Missouri law, a
plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to establish that (1) they
conferred a benefit on the defendant, (2) the defendant appreciated
the benefit, and (3) the defendant accepted and retained the
benefit under inequitable or unjust circumstances.

Count III alleges that Raimo and the class members "directly
conferred non-gratuitous benefits upon the Defendant" in the form
of tuition so that they "could avail themselves of in-person
educational opportunities and utilize campus facilities," and that
the Defendant "knowingly, inequitably, and unjustly chose to retain
and profit from" those benefits. Raimo also alleges that, by
keeping what students have paid for "in-person instruction that is
no longer available to them, access to buildings they can no longer
enter, technology, programs and services that it is no longer
providing, and activities that are no longer available," the
University is "profiting from COVID-19 while further burdening
students and their families," and the "result is an enormous
windfall" to the University.

At the motion to dismiss stage, such allegations are sufficient to
assert a claim that the University "accepted and retained the
benefit under inequitable or unjust circumstances," Judge Pitlyk
holds.

D. Count IV: Conversion

"Conversion is the unauthorized assumption of the right of
ownership over personal property of another to the exclusion of the
owner's right." To plead a claim for conversion, a plaintiff must
allege that the: "(1) plaintiff was the owner of the property or
entitled to its possession; (2) defendant took possession of the
property with the intent to exercise some control over it; and (3)
defendant thereby deprived the plaintiff of the right to
possession."

Judge Pityk holds that the alleged matriculation documents, which
Raimo neither provides nor describes in his Complaint, are not the
type of document with which intangible rights may be merged for
purposes of a conversion claim. Raimo has not established that the
matriculation documents were transferable or transferred to him.
Raimo does not allege, nor could he, that he was entitled to sell
his purported right to an in-person education at the University.
The University's strict admission requirements are but one barrier
to such an argument. If a university education were transferable,
thousands of bright students would make money by selling their
rights to attend prestigious institutions to students who were
unable to satisfy admission requirements.

Because Count IV identifies no transferable document incorporating
Raimo's alleged intangible right, it fails to state a claim for
conversion and must be dismissed.

III. Conclusion

Raimo's claims are all barred by Missouri's educational malpractice
doctrine. Counts I, II, and IV (breach of contract, breach of
implied contract, and conversion) also fail to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.

Accordingly, Judge Pitlyk granted the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss. She dismissed the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint with
prejudice.

A separate Order of Dismissal will accompany the Memorandum and
Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Memorandum & Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/4bckmuvt from Leagle.com.


WEBTOOLS LLC: Gomez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Webtools, LLC. The
case is styled as Samuel Gomez, and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated v. Webtools, LLC d/b/a Earningswhispers.com,
Case No. 1:22-cv-02511 (S.D.N.Y., March 28, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Webtools, LLC doing business as EarningsWhispers --
https://www.earningswhispers.com/ -- is a provider of real,
professional whisper numbers for professional traders.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly G. Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM, PC
          155 East 55th St., Ste. 6a
          New York, NY 10022
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: brad@markslawpc.com


WELLS FARGO: Order Granting Withdrawal of Gerges' Counsel Vacated
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, YOHANNA GERGES, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. WELLS FARGO BANK N.A.,
Defendant, Civ. No. 1:21-cv-00810 MIS/GJF (D.N.M.), Judge Margaret
Strickland of the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Mexico vacates the Magistrate Judge's Order Granting Motion to
Withdraw.

The matter comes before the Court upon review of the Magistrate
Judge's Order Granting Motion to Withdraw. On March 14, 2022, the
Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion to withdraw from their
representation. On March 15, 2022, noting that the motion was
unopposed, the Magistrate Judge granted the counsel's motion.

Judge Strickland explains that an attorney may withdraw from
representation only upon a showing of good cause. The Plaintiff's
counsel have not established, by way of their motion or any other
filing, that good cause exists for withdrawal. The Court is
particularly concerned about the ethical implications of the
counsel's withdrawal because, in the case, it appears that the
Plaintiff cannot proceed without representation. The withdrawal of
the Plaintiff's counsel is therefore more than usually injurious to
the Plaintiff's interests.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Strickland exercises her
discretion to reconsider and revise the Court's prior interlocutory
Order. She vacates the Order Granting Motion to Withdraw. She
denies the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Withdrawal of Attorney.
Any further concerns on behalf of the Plaintiff's counsel will be
taken up at the status conference.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 16, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/nhc2carm from Leagle.com.


YAYYO INC: $1.7MM Class Settlement to Be Heard on June 6
--------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re YAYYO, INC. Securities Litigation

Case No.: 2:20-cv-08235-SVW-AFM

CLASS ACTION

SUMMARY NOTICE

IF YOU PURCHASED OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED YAYYO, INC. ("YAYYO") COMMON
STOCK PURSUANT OR TRACEABLE TO THE REGISTRATION STATEMENT AND
RELATED PROSPECTUSES ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH YAYYO'S NOVEMBER 13,
2019 INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING and/or purchased or otherwise acquired
YayYo stock during the period from
November 13, 2019 through and including April 28, 2020 (the
"Classes"), YOU MAY BE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE A PAYMENT FROM PROPOSED
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS.1

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY.  YOUR RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED BY
PROPOSED SETTLEMENTS OF CLASS ACTION LITIGATION PENDING IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
AND IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS
ANGELES.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Order of the United States District Court
for the Central District of California, that this Court has
preliminarily approved proposed Settlements of the above-captioned
class action litigation (the "Litigation").  The proposed
Settlements resolve all claims in the Litigation for $1,700,000.00
composed of two settlements.

All capitalized terms used in this Notice that are not otherwise
defined herein shall have the meanings provided in the Stipulation
of Settlement with Aegis Capital Corp. dated August 27, 2021, and
the Stipulation of Settlement with the YayYo Defendants and
WestPark, dated November 18, 2021 (the "Settlements"). Both of
these are available on the website at
www.yayyosecuritieslitigation.com.

A Settlement Hearing will be held on June 6, 2022, at 1:30 p.m.,
before the Honorable Stephen V. Wilson, at the United States
District Court, Central District of California, Western Division,
First Street Courthouse, 350 West 1st Street, Courtroom 10A, 10th
Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90012, for the purpose of determining
whether: (1) the proposed Settlements should be approved by the
Court as fair, reasonable, and adequate; (2) the proposed Plan of
Allocation for distribution of the Settlements proceeds is fair,
reasonable, and adequate and should therefore be approved; (3) the
application by Lead Counsel for payment of Plaintiff's Counsel's
attorneys' fees and litigation expenses from the Settlement Fund,
including interest earned thereon, and for payment of an award to
each of the named Plaintiffs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(4) in
connection with their representation of the Class, should be
approved; and (4) the Court should enter the Final Judgment.

IF YOU ARE A MEMBER OF THE CLASSES DESCRIBED ABOVE, YOUR RIGHTS
WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE SETTLEMENTS OF THE LITIGATION, AND YOU MAY
BE ENTITLED TO SHARE IN THE SETTLEMENT FUND. If you have not
received a detailed Notice of Pendency and Proposed Settlements of
Class Action (the "Notice") and a copy of the Proof of Claim and
Release, you may obtain a copy of these documents by contacting the
Claims Administrator: YayYo Securities Settlement, c/o A.B. Data,
Ltd., P.O. Box 173083, Milwaukee, WI 53217, 877-331-1068. You may
also obtain copies of the Stipulations of Settlement, Notice and
Proof of Claim and Release at www.yayyosecuritieslitigation.com.

If you are a Class Member, in order to be eligible to share in the
distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, you must submit a Proof of
Claim and Release by mail postmarked no later than May 13, 2022, or
submit it online by that date, establishing that you are entitled
to a recovery. If you do not submit a valid Proof of Claim and
Release, you will not share in the distribution of the Net
Settlement Fund, but you will otherwise be bound by the
Settlements, including any judgment entered by the Court in this
Litigation relating thereto and the releases provided for therein.
Similarly, if you do not exclude yourself from the Classes and
Settlements, you will be bound by the Settlements, including any
judgment entered by the Court in this Litigation relating thereto
and the releases provided for therein, whether or not you submit a
Proof of Claim and Release.

To exclude yourself from any of the Classes and/or either or both
of the Settlements, you must submit a written request for exclusion
postmarked no later than May 13, 2022, in accordance with the
instructions set forth in the Notice. If you request exclusion, you
will not recover money pursuant to the Settlements. Any objection
to either or both of the proposed Settlements, the Plan of
Allocation, or the fee and expense application must be filed with
the Court and delivered to Lead Counsel and each Defendant's
counsel such that they are received by no later than May 13, 2022,
in accordance with the instructions set forth in the Notice.

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT, THE CLERK'S OFFICE, OR DEFENSE
COUNSEL REGARDING THIS NOTICE. If you have any questions about the
Settlements, or your eligibility to participate in the Settlements,
you may contact Lead Counsel at the address and phone number listed
above.

DATED: January 13, 2022

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA


YORK COUNTY, PA: Schwenk, Druck Seek to Certify Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CHRISTOPHER LEE SCHWENK
and KEITH DRUCK, Individually, and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, v. JOSEPH GARCIA, CORRECTIONS SPECIAL
APPLICATION UNIT, LLC, YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA d/b/a YORK COUNTY
PRISON, JULIE WHEELER, DOUG HOKE, RON SMITH, ADAM OGLE, CLAIR DOLL,
and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, CORRECTION OFFICERS, Case No.
1:21-cv-02079-JPW (M.D. Pa.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter
an order:

   1. determining that this action may be maintained as a class
      action on behalf of the following class:

      "all persons who at the time since November 2020 have
      been, who are currently, or who will be incarcerated in
      York County Prison and addressing the following issues:

      whether the excessive/malicious force used by by
      defendants on the Plaintiffs and class members violated
      their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
      the United States Constitution and state law;"

   2. confirming that they may serve as the representative
      plaintiffs and be may be represented by Alan Denenberg,
      Esquire, of Denenberg and Abramson, P.C., who will serve
      as class counsel, and by the Chavez-Freed Law Office; and

   3. authorizing that notice of the maintenance of this class
      action be given to the members of the class pursuant to
      Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(A).

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated March 11,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3DkkADy
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Leticia C. Chavez-Freed, Esq.
          Alexandria J. Lappas, Esq.
          THE CHAVEZ-FREED LAW OFFICE
          2600 North Third Street | Second Floor
          Harrisburg, PA 17110
          Telephone: (717) 893-5698
          E-mail: leticia@chavez-freedlaw.com
                  alexandria@chavez-freedlaw.com

               - and -

          Alan Denenberg, Esq.
          ABRAMSON & DENENBERG, P.C.
          1315 Walnut Street | Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19107
          Telephone: (215) 398-7066
          E-mail: adenenberg@adlawfirm.com


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2022. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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