/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/220606.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, June 6, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 106

                            Headlines

22ND CENTURY: Second Cir. Affirms in Part Dismissal of Noto Suit
ABBOTT LABORATORIES: Clean Label Suit Moved to D.C. Superior Court
ABITINO'S PIZZA: Bid for Settlement Approval in Choror Suit Denied
ACE INSULATION: Bigby Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
ACUTUS MEDICAL: Faces Class Action in California Court

AETNA LIFE: Court Grants Bid to Certify Class in Wolff ERISA Suit
ALL HOURS: June 14 Extension to File Class Cert. Response Sought
ARC ONE: Raposo Seeks Conditional Cert of Collective Action
ATHIRA PHARMA: Faces Jawandha Shareholder Suit in Washington Court
ATHIRA PHARMA: Faces Slyne Shareholder Suit in Washington Court

ATHIRA PHARMA: Faces Wang Shareholder Suit in Washington Court
ATRIA MANAGEMENT: Khoshchin Wage-and-Hour Suit Goes to E.D. Cal.
BECKMAN COULTER: Figueroa Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
BEDFORD CHEESE: Tucker Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BERKELEY LIGHTS: Court Names Hagens Berman Lead Counsel in Ng Suit

BLINK HOLDINGS: Fails to Timely Pay Wages, Gregory Suit Claims
BOOT BARN HOLDINGS: Faces Labor Suit in California Court
BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Stephens Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Turner Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Wallace Suit

BP VENTURE MANAGEMENT: Noel Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
BRIGHT HEALTH GROUP: Faces Marquez Securities Suit in NY Court
CALIFORNIA CEMETERY: Harp Suit Remanded to Kern County Super. Court
CALIFORNIA: Bid for Discovery in Peyton v. HDSP Partially Granted
CITADEL SALISBURY: Bid to Dismiss Hooker Class Suit Granted in Part

CO-DIAGNOSTICS: Faces Stockholder Suits Over Faulty Press Releases
CODE ENFORCEMENT: Underpays Security Guards, Niekerk Suit Claims
CONSUMER ADJUSTMENT: Brittingham Seeks Class Certification
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY: Bid to Dismiss Cheslow Suit Granted in Part
CORMEDIX INC: Plaintiff in Securities Suit Balks at Bid to Dismiss

DEVA CONCEPTS: Denial of Bid for Exclusion in Settlement Appealed
DJO GLOBAL INC: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DRINKS INSIDERS: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
EARLY WARNING: Arant Consumer Fraud Suit Removed to D. Arizona
EASTWOOD CONSTRUCTION: Russo Class Suit Removed to D.S.C.

ENCORE CAPITAL: Williams Appeals Summary Judgment in FDCPA Suit
ENDA ATHLETIC: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
EPIC LANDSCAPE: Faces Gomez Wage-and-Hour Class Suit in D. Kansas
ERIE INSURANCE: Summary Judgment Order in Rubinstein Suit Affirmed
ETELEQUOTE INSURANCE: Clough Sues Over Unsolicited Telephone Calls

EVERSOURCE ENERGY: Court Certifies Class in Garthwait ERISA Suit
FIRSTSUN CAPITAL: Faces Besser Overdraft Suit in CO Court
FIRSTSUN CAPITAL: McCollam Overdraft Suit Dismissed
FLEET NEW YORK: Court Vacates Entries of Default in Li Class Suit
FORSTER & GARBUS: Parties Must File Class Cert Bid by June 24

FRIENDLY HOME CARE: Konstantynovska Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.
GAS GATHERING: Lyman Suit Transferred From Minnesota to W.D. Texas
GEICO CASUALTY: Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Grossman Suit
GLOBAL TRADE: Li Files FLSA Suit in D. Oregon
GOOGLE LLC: Extension of Time for Class Cert. Deadlines OK'd

GREAT LAKES: Court Amends Class Certification Orders in Dawson Suit
HCF MANAGEMENT: Pike Sues Over Failure to Pay Proper Overtime
HUDSONVILLE CREAMERY: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
HYUNDAI CAPITAL: Scherer Sues Over Improper Business Schemes
IANTHUS CAPITAL: Faces Cedeno Securities Suit

IANTHUS CAPITAL: Faces Hi-Med Securities Suit in NY Court
IANTHUS CAPITAL: Faces Kwong Securities Suit in Toronto
ILLUMINATE EDUCATION: Chung Files Suit in E.D. New York
INTERACTIVE BROKERS: Batchelar Files Bid for Class Certification
J&M DELI: Fails to Pay Minimum & OT Wages, Morales Suit Claims

J. QUEEN NEW YORK: Miller Files ADA Suit in W.D. New York
JACK ROGERS: Miller Files ADA Suit in W.D. New York
JANTZEN APPAREL: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
JUUL LABS: Causes Youth E-Cigarette Crisis, Wyoming County Claims
JUUL LABS: E-Cigarette Ads Target Youth, Northeast School Claims

JUUL LABS: Promotes E-Cigarette Use to Youth, Western School Says
KELLOGG SALES: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Harris Class Complaint
KEYPOINT GOVERNMENT: Appeals Reconsideration Bid Denial in Brayman
KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Castay Sues Over Defective CPAP Devices
KRAFT HEINZ: Tarantino Suit Moved From E.D.N.Y. to N.D. Ill.

KSF ACQUISITION: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
LABORATORY CORP: Court Certifies Classes in Davis ADA Suit
LOCUST MEDICAL: Seeks Denial of Jackson Class Cert Bid
MCCLATCHY CO: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Kelly TCPA Suit Denied
MCLEOD HEALTHCARE: Hourly Employee Class Certified in Wilkes Suit

MDL 2724: IRPs' Claims v. Distributors in Antitrust Suit Dismissed
MDL 2887: Eichhorn-Burkhard Complaint Dismissed From Dog Food Suit
MDL 2936: Court Amends Sched Order in Products Liability Suit
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY: Final Judgment & Order Entered in Shields
MID-HUDSON VALLEY: Edwards Files Suit in N.D. New York

MY FAVORITE DELI: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Romero Suit Alleges
MYRON CORP: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
NASHVILLE, TN: Harris Ordered to File Amended Complaint v. DCSO
NASSAU CANDY: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
NEABAR INC: Misclassifies Dancers, McCoy Suit Claims

NEW GENERATION: Rodriguez Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Wages
NEW JERSEY: Bid for Prelim. Injunction in Carmona v. NJDEP Denied
NEW JERSEY: Bid to Certify Class in Pasquerello v. EMCFW Denied
NISSAN NORTH AMERICA: Martinez Sues Over Failure to Disclose Defect
NOBLE ENERGY: Boulter Appeals Breach of Contract Suit Dismissal

NOCO COMPANY: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
NORTH AMERICAN: Court Denies Bennett's Bid for Class Certification
OHIO: Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment Entered in Cowell Suit
OSCAR HEALTH: Improperly Reimbursed Physicians, ECURE Suit Claims
PACIFIC GRAIN: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Salcedo Suit Alleges

PATREON INC: Discloses Consumers' Personal Info, Stark Suit Says
PAYSIGN INC: Faces Chase Shareholder Suit in Nevada Court
PAYSIGN INC: Faces Shi Shareholder Suit in Nevada Court
PERPAY INC: Newell TCPA Class Suit Removed to S.D. Florida
PRO THERAPY SUPPLIES: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

PROCTOR & GAMBLE: Court Denies Bid to Transfer Gamboa Suit Venue
PROSPER MARKETPLACE: Faces Suit Over Violations of MD Loan Laws
QUALCOMM INC: Shah, et al., Seek to Certify Class of Investors
RAY KLEIN: Class Settlement in Russell Suit Wins Prelim. Approval
RETROPOLIS LLC: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

REX SIGNATURE: Taylor Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
RIDGWAY LLC: Fails to Provide Overtime Pay, Ruid Suit Alleges
RITEWAY MARINE: Tucker Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
RIVERLANDS HOME: Cambre Bill of Rights Suit Removed to E.D. La.
ROSEVIEW NURSING: Johnson Bill of Rights Suit Goes to W.D. La.

SAFI-G INC: Ponce et al. Sue Over Failure to Pay Wages & OT
SCHROTH SAFETY: Faces Moore Suit Over Interference and Retaliation
SDH PIZZA: Mayo-Keller Sues Over Unpaid Delivery Drivers' Wages
SELECT EMPLOYMENT: Class & Nine Subclasses Certfied in Romero
SERVICE KING: Hassanpoor Sues Over Body Technicians' Unpaid Wages

SHATTUCK LABS: Faces Two Shareholder Suits in NY Court
SILVERBACK THERAPEUTICS: Faces Dresner Securities Suit in WA Court
SOUTH CAROLINA: Wins Summary Judgment v. Huger Class
SPARC GROUP: Faces Gregory Suit Over Failure to Timely Pay Wages
SST CONSTRUCTION: Garcia Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.

ST. JOSEPH: Cole Bill of Rights Suit Removed to E.D. Louisiana
ST. LOUIS, MO: District Court Certifies Classes in Cody v. MSI
STYM LLC: Chalas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
SUFFOLK MARINE CENTER: Tucker Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY: Faces Breach of Contract Suit in VA

TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Court Dismisses Osorio FDCPA Complaint
TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Osorio Appeals FDCPA Suit Dismissal
TRINET HR: Huang Files Bid for Class Certification
UNITED STAFFING: Class of Filipino Nurses Certified in Magtoles
US BANK: Melnick's Bid to Certify Class Denied as Premature

VENUS CONCEPT:  Settlement in Wong Securities Suit Wins Final Nod
VENUS CONCEPT: Court Approves Li Securities Suit Settlement
VENUS CONCEPT: Settlement in Guerrini Securities Suit Wins Final OK
VENUS CONCEPT: Settlement in Yzeiraj Suit Gets Final Approval
VVF INTERVEST: Extension to File Conditional Cert Reply Sought

WAKEFIELD & ASSOCIATES: Getchel Has Until June 8 to File Response
WALMART INC: Lebby's Time to File Class Cert Extended to Sept. 16
WEWORK INC: Faces Carter Suit Over Breach of Fiduciary Duties
WEWORK INC: Won Shareholder Suit in California Court Ongoing
WISCONSIN: Court Dismisses Carr, Fessahaye and Moon From Lewis Suit

WYZE LABS: Quevedo Suit Alleges Unsolicited Telemarketing Calls
ZYMERGEN INC: Faces Shankar Securities Suit in CA Court

                            *********

22ND CENTURY: Second Cir. Affirms in Part Dismissal of Noto Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Joseph Noto, Garden State Tire Corp., Stephens
Johnson, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. 22nd Century Group, Inc., Henry
Sicignano, III, John T. Brodfuehrer, Defendants-Appellees, Case No.
21-0347-cv (2d Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirms in part and vacates in part the judgment of the
Western District of New York dismissing the Plaintiffs' complaint
against the Defendants.

I. Background

Plaintiffs Joseph Noto, Stephens Johnson, and Garden State Tire
Corp. appeal from a judgment of the Western District of New York
(Sinatra, J.) dismissing their complaint against 22nd Century Group
and its former CEO and CFO, Henry Sicignano, III and John T.
Brodfuehrer.

The corporate Defendant, 22nd Century, is a publicly traded company
that strives to genetically engineer tobacco and cannabis plants to
regulate their nicotine levels or cannabinoids. From 2015 to 2019,
Sicignano was the Company's CEO, and from 2013 to 2019, Brodfuehrer
was the Company's CFO. Shortly after Sicignano became CEO, he
engaged the consulting firm IRTH Communications to handle 22nd
Century's investor relations.

The Plaintiffs, investors in 22nd Century Group, allege on behalf
of an investor class that (1) the Defendants engaged in an illegal
stock promotion scheme in which they paid authors to write
promotional articles about the company while concealing the fact
that they paid the authors for the articles; and (2) the Defendants
failed to disclose an investigation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") into the company's financial control weaknesses.
After public articles revealed the promotion scheme and SEC
investigation, the company's stock price fell, and the Plaintiffs
allege they were harmed.

In November 2019, after the case was transferred to the Western
District of New York, the Plaintiffs filed the amended class action
complaint at issue in this appeal. The class consisted of any
person or entity that acquired 22nd Century securities between Feb.
18, 2016, and July 31, 2019.

On May 1, 2020, the Defendants moved to dismiss the amended
complaint for failure to state a claim. The Plaintiffs asked the
district court for an opportunity to further amend the complaint
should the Court grant any part of the Defendants' motion. On Jan.
14, 2021, the district court dismissed the entirety of the amended
complaint with prejudice or failing to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, and denied the Plaintiffs' request for
leave to amend as futile.

On appeal, the Plaintiffs argue that (1) they adequately alleged
material misrepresentations and manipulative acts sufficient to
sustain claims under subsections (a), (b), and (c) of SEC Rule
10b-5; (2) their claim under Section 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act was premised on a valid predicate violation of Section
10(b); and (3) the district court erred in dismissing the complaint
with prejudice.

II. Discussion

A. Rule 10b-5(b) Claims

The complaint alleges that the Defendants violated Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5(b). The Plaintiffs claim that
the Defendants unlawfully published promotional articles and
concealed an SEC investigation, all in an effort to artificially
inflate the Company's stock price. The Plaintiffs contend that when
these infractions were brought to light, the stock price fell.

1. Stock Promotion Scheme

The complaint alleges that the Defendants omitted the material fact
that they were paying authors to promote the Company's stock. The
district court found that the Defendants had no duty to disclose
that fact and therefore made no material omission. On appeal, the
Plaintiffs first argue that the Defendants had a duty to disclose
that the Company and IRTH paid the authors of the promotional
articles because the Defendants provided content for, edited,
reviewed, and/or approved those articles.

The Second Circuit opines that under Section 17(b) of the
Securities Act of 1933, an issuer who merely pays an author to
write positive articles on a stock does not, without more, violate
the Act. The articles themselves did little more than republish
publicly-available content. Moreover, there is no allegation that
the press releases, the content of which was captured in the
articles themselves, were false or misleading. Because the
complaint does not adequately allege that defendants had a duty to
disclose that they paid for the articles' publication, the
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim that the existence of the stock
promotion scheme constituted a materially misleading omission.

2. SEC Investigation

The complaint next alleges that the Defendants violated Rule
10b-5(b) by failing to disclose the SEC investigation into the
Company's accounting controls. The district court found that the
Defendants had no duty to disclose the investigation. The
Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants had such a duty because, by
not mentioning the investigation, their disclosures of the
accounting deficiencies were misleading.

The Second Circuit agrees with the Plaintiffs. It opines that the
Company had a duty to disclose the SEC investigation into the
weaknesses throughout the class period. Because the Defendants
specifically noted the deficiencies and that they were working on
the problem, and then stated that they had solved the issue, "the
failure to disclose the investigation would cause a reasonable
investor to make an overly optimistic assessment of the risk.

Finally, the Defendants' false public denial of any knowledge of
the SEC investigation amounts to an admission of the materiality of
its nondisclosure. Otherwise, the Company would not have tried to
hide it. Moreover, these denials were affirmatively misleading in
their own right. Thus, the Second Circuit easily finds that the
complaint adequately alleged that the Defendants violated Rule
10b-5(b) both by first omitting mention of the SEC.

B. Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) Claims

The complaint next alleges that the Defendants violated Rule 10b-5,
specifically subsections (a) and (c), by illegally manipulating the
market through the stock promotion scheme. The district court found
that the complaint did not adequately allege a manipulative act or
market activity sufficient to state a claim under those rules.

The Second Circuit agrees. It opines that the complaint fails to
support a claim that the Defendants manipulated the market. It does
not allege that the market was manipulated by either the
information in the articles, the payments to the writers, or the
non-disclosure of the payments. There is no allegation that the
articles themselves, which consisted of analysis and information
derived from public filings, press releases, and statements by
management, manipulated the market. Relatedly, there is no claim
that defendants paying the articles' authors somehow manipulated
the market or was intentionally designed to do so. Thus, the
Plaintiffs fail to plead that the Defendants engaged in any
manipulative act sufficient to sustain a market manipulation claim
based on the undisclosed payments.

C. Section 20(a) Claim

The complaint also alleges that Sicignano and Brodfuehrer are
liable under the control person provision of Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act. To state a claim under Section 20(a), a plaintiff
must demonstrate, inter alia, a primary violation by the controlled
person.

The district court held that, because the Plaintiffs failed to
plead a primary violation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the
dependent Section 20(a) claims must necessarily fail. Because it
remands the Section 10(b) material misrepresentation claim based on
the non-disclosure of the SEC investigation, the Second Circuit
also vacates the Section 20(a) claim dismissal solely as it
pertains to that particular non-disclosure.

D. Leave to Amend

At the conclusion of their opposition to the motion to dismiss, the
Plaintiffs requested an opportunity to amend their complaint should
any part of defendants' motion be granted. The district court
denied the request. While it remands on the dismissal of the SEC
investigation non-disclosure aspect of the Plaintiffs' Rule
10b-5(b) claim, the Second Circuit agrees that the Plaintiffs
should not be permitted to amend their complaint to reallege any
violations stemming from the non-disclosure of the article
promotion scheme.  The district court thus properly denied the
Plaintiffs' request to replead their allegations stemming from the
stock promotion scheme.

III. Conclusion

Judge John M. Walker, Jr., writing for the Second Circuit, agrees
that the allegation that the Defendants failed to disclose the SEC
investigation states a material misrepresentation and could also
support Section 20(a) liability. He finds no merit in the remaining
challenges. Accordingly, Judge Walker affirms in part, vacates in
part, and remands for further proceedings consistent with the
Second Circuit's Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 24, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/3p6p998h from Leagle.com.

JEREMY A. LIEBERMAN -- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, in
New York City, for the Plaintiffs-Appellants.

JOHN A. TUCKER -- jtucker@foley.com -- (Jonathan H. Friedman --
jfriedman@foley.com -- on the brief), Foley & Lardner LLP,
Jacksonville, FL, New York, NY; Charles C. Ritter, Jr. --
critter@dhpglaw.com -- on the brief, Duke, Holzman, Photiadis &
Gresens LLP, Buffalo, NY, for the Defendants-Appellees.


ABBOTT LABORATORIES: Clean Label Suit Moved to D.C. Superior Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Beryl A. Howell of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia remands the case, CLEAN LABEL PROJECT FOUNDATION,
Plaintiff v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, INC., Defendant, Civil Action No.
21-cv-3247 (BAH) (D.D.C.), to the D.C. Superior Court.

I. Introduction

The case about product labeling is itself difficult to label. It is
not exactly a case about product safety, but about whether an
allegedly unsafe component of a product renders misleading
advertising materials suggesting that the product is beneficial. It
is not exactly a case about federal law, but it looks to federal
agency guidance as to what a product can or cannot safely contain.
It is not exactly a class action, but is brought by a
representative named plaintiff organization on behalf of a large
number of non-participating members of the general public. It is
not exactly a case seeking money damages, but the Plaintiff's
pleadings, as framed, could require the expenditure of substantial
funds to effectuate the relief sought.

Pending before the Court is the Plaintiff's motion to remand the
case to D.C. Superior Court following its removal by the
Defendant.

II. Background

Plaintiff Clean Label Project Foundation describes itself as a
"non-profit public interest organization whose mission is to
educate the public and enable consumers to make informed shopping
choices." In service of that mission, the Plaintiff "uses
state-of-the-art laboratory testing to identify the best and worst
labeled products," publicly publishes its findings, and in so doing
hopes to "reduce contamination across all consumer products."

Contaminants of interest to the Plaintiff include lead, a "known
neurotoxin," and cadmium, a "known neurotoxin and osteotoxin." The
Plaintiff cites statements by an assortment of government and
private organizations in support of a general scientific consensus
that "there is no safe level of lead for children," and alleges
various facts pertaining to the myriad adverse physiological
effects of lead. It similarly alleges facts related to the adverse
effects of cadmium, but without citing any statements by U.S.
government agencies.

One item in the Defendant's expansive product portfolio is Similac
Alimentum Infant Formula for Food Allergies and Colic. Alimentum is
part of the Defendant's broader Similac line of infant formula
products marketed as having benefits pertaining to "brain
development," "bone development," and "immune support." The
Defendant also markets Similac products with such slogans as "We
promise to give your baby the best" and "Nearly a century of
keeping promises."

To evaluate Alimentum, the Plaintiff purchased an amount of the
product for analysis by a third-party laboratory. According to the
Plaintiff, that analysis showed that the purchased Alimentum sample
"contains dangerous levels of" lead and cadmium, which it asserts
shows that these contaminants "are present in Alimentum, or at a
minimum, that the Defendant makes no efforts to confirm that they
are absent." According to the Plaintiff, this type of contamination
is incompatible with the Defendant's descriptions of Alimentum as
promoting "brain development," "bone development," and "immune
support."

Based on these findings, on Oct. 1, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a
complaint in D.C. Superior Court alleging, in a single count, that
the Defendant violated the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act
("CPPA"), D.C. Code Section 28-3901 et seq. The Complaint is styled
as a "representative action claim on behalf of the Plaintiff and
the general public of the District of Columbia," pursuant to D.C.
Code Section 28-3905(k)(1-2). The Plaintiff alleges that because
Alimentum contains detectable amounts of lead and cadmium, the
Defendant's marketing statements mislead or fail to inform
consumers with respect to "material facts about" Alimentum.
Additionally, it alleges a further CPPA violation because Alimentum
is "adulterated," as defined by D.C. Code Section 48-103, due to
the presence of the harmful metals lead and cadmium. On Dec. 10,
2021, the Defendant timely filed a Notice of Removal to the Court.

The Plaintiff timely filed the instant Motion to Remand to D.C.
Superior Court on Jan. 10, 2022. During briefing on the motion to
remand, on Jan. 31, 2022, the Defendant filed the also-pending
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The motion to dismiss was
accompanied by a Request for Judicial Notice, concerning 22
exhibits from various public sources. Before filing its opposition
to the motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff filed, on Feb. 21, 2022, a
Motion to Strike Defendant's Requests for Judicial Notice, seeking
to strike a declaration filed with the motion to dismiss, the
request for judicial notice, the 22 sundry exhibits thereto, and
"all arguments relying on those documents." Briefing on the trio of
interlocking motions was completed on March 14, 2022.

On May 11, 2022, review by the Court identified a possible lack of
diversity of citizenship between the parties on account of both
named parties appearing to be incorporated in Delaware, and
directed the parties to file a supplemental report clarifying the
citizenship of the parties. The parties responded in a joint
statement on May 13, 2022. All pending motions are now ripe for
disposition.

III. Discussion

The Defendant asserts three independent bases for removal: (1) the
Complaint "raises substantial questions of federal law" both by
relying on "federal regulatory bodies" for the assertion that there
is "no known safe level" of lead and cadmium, and because federal
law governs the contents and labeling of infant formula; (2)
diversity jurisdiction lies under the Class Action Fairness Act
("CAFA"); and (3) even if CAFA is inapplicable and only a single
plaintiff is named, the parties are completely diverse and the
$75,000 amount in controversy threshold is met by considering the
expected total cost of injunctive relief.

Judge Howell examines each proposed basis in turn, and finds that
each fails. First, she finds that the Defendant fails to identify a
question of federal law on which the Plaintiff's CPPA claim turns,
let alone any that is "necessary" to its resolution. To be sure,
federal agency statements about no safe level of lead existing have
considerable persuasive value as scientific authority when
assessing the factual question whether Alimentum is "unsafe," but
the agencies' scientific advice is no different in kind as a legal
matter from similar statements by other domestic and international
organizations, around which the Plaintiff also bases its claims.
Accordingly, the Defendant cannot justify removal by claiming that
the action "arises under" federal law.

Second, Judge Howell holds that the parties have cited to no
binding authority from either the D.C. Circuit or D.C. Court of
Appeals directly addressing whether a CPPA representative action
seeking only injunctive relief and brought in a "private attorney
general" posture is to be deemed a "class action" within the scope
of Rule 23 and/or CAFA. Her analysis confirmed by persuasive
authority, leads to the conclusions that Rule 23's requirements
need not apply to such actions, CAFA does not provide a basis for
federal jurisdiction over such actions, and the case is not
converted into a federal class action simply by seeking injunctive
relief for consumers. Accordingly, the case is not a "class action"
for CAFA purposes.

Finally, diversity jurisdiction is not established. The Complaint
is most reasonably read as intending to sue the Delaware entity
"Abbott Laboratories Inc." To the extent any ambiguity persists,
"any ambiguities concerning the propriety of removal" militate "in
favor of remand." Further, even if the Defendant had a colorable
argument the Complaint should be construed differently, the
Defendant has utterly failed -- even with the opportunity provided
for supplemental briefing on the topic -- to meet the burden it
bears as the removing party to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the parties are diverse.

IV. Conclusion

Judge Howell concludes that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the matter on any of the grounds the Defendant
proposes -- federal question, CAFA, or ordinary diversity
jurisdiction -- and therefore the case must be remanded to Superior
Court. As a result, she need not -- and cannot -- weigh in on the
merits of the case so her analysis must stop here.

For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is
granted. Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the
Request for Judicial Notice contained therein, and the Plaintiff's
Motion to Strike are all denied as moot.

An Order consistent with the Memorandum Opinion will be entered
contemporaneously.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3n8tt2ad from Leagle.com.


ABITINO'S PIZZA: Bid for Settlement Approval in Choror Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PEDRO GIDDEL CHAVALOC CHOROR and RENATO LOPEZ SAYAMAN,
Plaintiffs v. ABITINO'S PIZZA 49TH STREET CORP., d/b/a, ABITINO'S
PIZZERIA, ABITINO'S PIZZA & RESTAURANT, INC. NO. II d/b/a ABITINO'S
PIZZERIA, and MARIO ABITINO, SALVADOR ABITINO, DOMINIQUE ABITINO,
and MARIO ABITINO, as individuals, Defendants, Case No. 19 Civ.
9297 (AT) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Analisa Torres of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York denies the parties'
motion for settlement approval without prejudice to renewal.

I. Background

Plaintiffs Pedro Giddel Chavaloc Choror and Renato Lopez Sayaman
bring the action against Defendants Abitino's Pizza 49th Street
Corp., Abitino's Pizza & Restaurant, Inc. No. II, Mario Abitino,
Salvador Abitino, Dominique Abitino, and Mario Abitino, raising
claims for, inter alia, unpaid minimum wage and overtime wages
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (the "FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Section
201 et seq., and parallel claims, as well as wage notice and wage
statement violations under the New York Labor Law (the "NYLL")
Section 190 et seq. Having reached a settlement, the parties seek
the Court's approval of their proposed agreement.

II. Analysis

The Settlement provides the Plaintiffs with a recovery of $20,000,
inclusive of attorneys' fees and costs. To ascertain the
Plaintiffs' best-case scenario for recovery, the Plaintiff's
counsel reviewed the Defendants' time and pay records for both the
Plaintiffs, and documents from a prior class-action settlement
against the Defendants for similar violations. On this basis, the
Plaintiffs believe their maximum possible recovery is $70,000,
including $25,000 for unpaid wages, as well as liquidated damages
and statutory penalties.

The parties note that continuing formal discovery -- including
numerous depositions -- would have created significant burdens and
expenses for both parties. And, trial would have imposed
significant costs and burdens on both parties, including requiring
the Plaintiffs to miss work and incur expenses related to
translation, in addition to other trial costs. The Plaintiffs also
recognized that, although they challenged the accuracy of the
Defendants' payroll records, had such records been accepted by a
fact-finder, they would receive a substantially lower recovery than
what they would obtain through a settlement.

Moreover, the settlement was reached after a year of extensive
settlement talks, as well as a Court-annexed mediation, with both
sides represented by experienced counsel. Finally, the parties
state that there is no possibility of fraud or collusion. Judge
Torres concludes, therefore, that the Settlement satisfies each of
the Wolinsky factors.

However, the Settlement contains a liability release clause only as
to the Defendants, which Judge Torres finds improper in three
aspects. First, the clause binds the Plaintiffs, as well as their
"heirs, executors, administrators successors and assigns." Second,
the Settlement releases from liability numerous entities beyond the
Defendants alone. And, the Plaintiffs are afforded no releases from
liability whatsoever. Therefore, Judge Torres cannot conclude that
the Settlement's release clause is "fair and reasonable" under
Cheeks, and will not approve the Settlement.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the parties' motion for settlement
approval is denied without prejudice to refiling a revised
settlement agreement that narrows the release provision (1) so as
not to confer an unearned benefit on entities and individuals
beyond the parties herein; and (2) limits release only as to claims
arising out of the same facts that gave rise to the claims advanced
in the action. The parties will file a revised settlement agreement
by June 7, 2022.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 24, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/38cak4b3 from Leagle.com.


ACE INSULATION: Bigby Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ace Insulation Inc.,
et al. The case is styled as Justin Bigby, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Ace Insulation Inc., Does 1-50, Case
No. 34-2022-00320638-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty.,
May 26, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited."

Ace Insulation Inc. -- https://aceinsulation.biz/ -- specializes in
commercial and home insulation in Petaluma, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Darren M Cohen, Esq.
          KINGSLEY & KINGSLEY APC
          16133 Ventura Blvd., Ste. 1200
          Encino, CA 91436-2416
          Phone: 818-990-8300
          Fax: 818-990-2903
          Email: dcohenlaw@sbcglobal.net


ACUTUS MEDICAL: Faces Class Action in California Court
------------------------------------------------------
Acutus Medical, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that as of March 31, 2022,
the company and certain of its current officers have been named as
defendants in Case Number 22CV206 filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California.

Acutus Medical, Inc. is an arrhythmia management company focused on
improving the way cardiac arrhythmias are diagnosed and treated
based in California.


AETNA LIFE: Court Grants Bid to Certify Class in Wolff ERISA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOANNE WOLFF, individually and on behalf of a Class of
Similarly Situated Individuals, Plaintiff v. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 4:19-CV-01596 (M.D. Pa.), Judge
Matthew W. Brann of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania grants Wolff's motion for class certification.

I. Background

In 2020, Wolff, on behalf of herself on all similarly situated
individuals, filed a second amended complaint against Aetna raising
claims for: a violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion,
money had and received, intentional misrepresentation, negligent
misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, theft by deception, attempted
theft, a violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law, and a violation of the Pennsylvania Fair
Credit Extension Uniformity Act.

Ms. Wolff avers that she was previously insured for long-term
disability benefits under the terms of a group plan issued by Aetna
through Bank of America Corp. -- Wolff's employer. In September
2015, Wolff was temporarily disabled as a result of a motor vehicle
accident that caused Wolff injuries. Wolff submitted a claim to
Aetna under the Plan and received long-term disability benefits
exceeding $50,000.

Ms. Wolff separately filed a civil action against the other party
involved in the accident. Wolff and the Defendant eventually
settled the matter, with Wolff receiving monetary compensation from
the defendant in that matter. Aetna and another entity with which
it worked, the Rawlings Co., sought reimbursement of the benefits
that Aetna had paid to Wolff under the terms of the Plan, despite
the Plan allegedly not permitting such reimbursement. After
negotiations between Wolff and Rawlings, Wolff agreed to reimburse
Aetna and Rawlings $30,000.

Despite agreeing to pay that sum to Aetna, Wolff asserts that the
Plan did not permit Aetna to pursue reimbursement for her personal
injury recovery. As relevant in the case, Wolff alleges that the
Plan permitted Aetna to obtain reimbursement only for "Other Income
Benefits," and personal injury recoveries are not included in the
Plan's definition of "Other Income Benefits."

Ms. Wolff has now filed a motion to certify a class pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. She contends that certification
is appropriate because Aetna engaged in a common course of conduct
by seeking reimbursement from individuals who had plans similar to
Wolff's -- in that said plans did not permit reimbursement for
personal injury recoveries -- but Aetna nevertheless pursued
reimbursement from those individuals. She further asserts that the
remainder of the requirements for class certification are met and,
therefore, the class should be certified.

Aetna responds that the conditions for class certification have not
been met. First, it argues that different Aetna plans contain
varying language, meaning the Court would need to conduct an
individualized assessment of each plan. Second, Aetna asserts that
there are insufficient class members to warrant certification.
Third, Aetna claims that certain defenses are applicable only to
certain individuals, and misrepresentation claims require
individual analyses as to each individual, rendering class
certification inappropriate. Finally, it contends that joinder of
the parties is practical, and trial of a class action would be
unmanageable.

Ms. Wolff has filed a reply brief, and the motion is now ripe for
disposition.

II. Discussion

A. Rule 23(a) Requirements

First, Wolff must establish the four requirements of Rule 23(a):
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation. "The requirements of Rule 23(a) are meant to assure
both that class action treatment is necessary and efficient and
that it is fair to the absentees under the particular
circumstances."

Judge Brann concludes that Wolff has satisfied these requirements.
He opines that (i) at this stage, there is sufficient evidence that
the proposed class satisfies the numerosity requirement of Rule 23;
(ii) bcause Wolff "shares at least one question of fact or law with
the grievances of the prospective class, commonality is met; (iii)
the interests and incentives of Wolff would appear to be aligned
with the potential class members; (iv) Wolff's interests adequately
align with those of the potential class; and (v) Wolff's attorney
is capable of adequately representing the class.


B. Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements

Having concluded that the requirements of Rule 23(a) have been met,
Judge Brann must assess whether Wolff has satisfied the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Under Rule 23(b)(3), class
certification is appropriate if "the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy."

As to the first requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), Judge Brann finds
that Wolff has established predominance, as a single issue is "more
prevalent or important than the non-common, aggregation-defeating,
individual issues. As to superiority, he concludes that Wolff has
also established that class certification is superior to other
available methods to adjudicate the issue.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Brann concludes that certification
of the proposed class is appropriate. Consequently, Wolff's motion
for class certification will be granted.

An appropriate Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mtas8n7a from Leagle.com.


ALL HOURS: June 14 Extension to File Class Cert. Response Sought
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JILL ADLER, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. ALL HOURS
PLUMBING DRAIN CLEANING 24-7-365 LLC, Case No. 2:21-cv-00141-DBP
(D. Utah), the Parties stipulated that All Hours may have a two
week extension, up to and including June 14, 2022, to file its
response to plaintiff's motion to certify a class.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated May 24, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3x4ZYMK at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J. Morrison, Esq.
          MORRISON LAW OFFICE
          www.morrisonlegal.blogspot.com
          231 Old Bernal Ave Ste 2A
          Pleasanton, CA 94566-7010
          Telephone: (925) 399-1856
          Facsimile: (925) 860-2743
          E-mail: matthewmorrisonlegal@gmail.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Robert H. Scott, Esq.
          AKERMAN LLP
          170 South Main Street, Suite 725
          Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1648
          Telephone: (801) 907-6900
          Facsimile: (801) 355-0294
          E-mail: robert.scott@akerman.com

ARC ONE: Raposo Seeks Conditional Cert of Collective Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as FELIX A. RAPOSO v. ARC ONE
PROTECTIVE SERVICES LLC, CHANCE F. RAMOS, AND AUSTIN WALLACE, Case
No. 1:22-cv-21194-MGC (S.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
enter an order:

   A. granting conditional certification of a Collective Action
      under section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act for
      the proposed Putative Class defined as follows:

      "All persons who are currently, or who were, working for
      ARC One Protective Services LLC, Chance Ramos, and Austin
      Wallace from April 19, 2019, to the present as security
      officers or other similarly titled positions, either
      directly by or through any of their subsidiaries or
      affiliated companies."

   B. appointing him as the representative of the Putative Class
      with authority to appear at any mediation/settlement
      conference and to bind the Putative Class.

   C. requiring that within 10 days, the Defendants to format
      and produce a in hard copy and electronically an Excel
      spreadsheet a complete list of each person in alphabetical
      order by last name -- including his/her last known home
      address, cellular telephone number, and email address in a
      separate field -- who worked as a security officer or
      other similarly titled position for Defendants at any time
      between April 18, 2019 and the present to facilitate the
      preparation and sending of notice;

   D. permitting his counsel to send a Court-Approved Notice by
      email and by U.S. Mail to all members of the Putative
      Class about their rights to opt into this collective
      action by filing a Consent to Join Lawsuit and to
      call/text each to ensure that they received the Notice
      forms;

   E. permitting his counsel to send a Court-Approved Reminder
      Notice by email and by U.S. Mail to all Putative Class
      members and to call/text each to ensure that they received
      the Reminder Notice; and

   F. requiring the Defendants to post notice in their break
      room for the entire notice period and to provide a copy of
      the Court-Approved Notice to all Putative Class members in
      the next paycheck / pay stub provided to Defendants’
      current employees.

The Plaintiff brought this collective action for himself and other
similarly situated current and former security officer employees of
Defendants, ARC One Protective Services, LLC, Chance F. Ramos, and
Austin Wallace, for failing to properly pay overtime wages for all
hours worked after 40 a week pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b)
of Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated May 24,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3NKTc5C
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian H. Pollock, Esq.
          FAIRLAW FIRM
          135 San Lorenzo Avenue, Suite 770
          Coral Gables, FL 33146
          Telephone: (305) 230-4884
          E-mail: brian@fairlawattorney.com

ATHIRA PHARMA: Faces Jawandha Shareholder Suit in Washington Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
Athira Pharma, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that the company was named
as a defendant in a class action lawsuit alleging the company's IPO
registration statement was materially false and misleading.

On June 25, 2021, plaintiff Harshdeep Jawandha filed a putative
securities class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington against the Company, Dr. Kawas, the
Company's Chief Financial Officer, certain members of the Company's
board of directors at the time of the Company's IPO, as well as the
IPO underwriters, captioned "Jawandha v. Athira Pharma, Inc., et
al." No. 2:21-cv-00862.

The Jawandha complaint asserts violations of Sections 11 and 15 of
the Securities Act of 1933, alleging that the Company's IPO
registration statement was materially false and misleading because
it omitted to state that certain of Dr. Kawas's published doctoral
research papers at WSU contained allegedly improperly altered
images, that the research was allegedly foundational to the
Company's efforts to develop treatments for Alzheimer's disease,
and that the defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading. The
plaintiff seeks unspecified compensatory damages, and reasonable
costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees.

Athira Pharma, Inc. is a late clinical-stage biopharmaceutical
company based in Washington.


ATHIRA PHARMA: Faces Slyne Shareholder Suit in Washington Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
Athira Pharma, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that the company was named
as a defendant in a class action lawsuit alleging that purported
issues with a doctoral research at WSU should have been disclosed
in the company's IPO registration statement.

Also on June 25, 2021, plaintiffs Timothy Slyne and Tai Slyne filed
a putative securities class action lawsuit in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington against the Company,
Dr. Kawas, the company's Chief Financial Officer, and the same
members of the company's board of directors and underwriters as in
the Jawandha complaint, captioned "Slyne v. Athira Pharma, Inc. et
al.,"  No. 2:21-cv-00864.

The Slyne complaint asserts violations of Sections 11 and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933, alleging that purported issues with Dr.
Kawas's doctoral research at WSU should have been disclosed in the
company's IPO registration statement. The Slyne plaintiffs seek
unspecified compensatory damages, reasonable costs and expenses,
including attorneys' fees, and injunctive and other equitable
relief.

Athira Pharma, Inc. is a late clinical-stage biopharmaceutical
company based in Washington.


ATHIRA PHARMA: Faces Wang Shareholder Suit in Washington Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
Athira Pharma, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that the company was named
defendant in a class action lawsuit alleging they made materially
false and misleading statements and omitted material adverse facts
regarding the company's business.

In June 25, 2021, plaintiffs Fan Wang and Hang Gao filed a putative
securities class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington against the Company and the
company's former Chief Executive Officer Dr. Leen Kawas, captioned
"Wang v. Athira Pharma, Inc., et al.," No. 2:21-cv-00861.

Plaintiffs Wang and Gao assert claims under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5,
alleging that the defendants made materially false and misleading
statements and omitted material adverse facts regarding the
company's business. Specifically, the Wang plaintiffs allege that
the company failed to disclose to investors that certain research
conducted by Dr. Kawas was allegedly tainted by scientific
misconduct during her doctoral work at WSU, including the
manipulation of data, and that as a result, the defendants'
positive statements about the company's business, operations, and
prospects were materially misleading. The Wang plaintiffs seek
unspecified compensatory and punitive damages, and reasonable costs
and expenses, including attorneys' fees.  

Athira Pharma, Inc. is a late clinical-stage biopharmaceutical
company based in Washington.


ATRIA MANAGEMENT: Khoshchin Wage-and-Hour Suit Goes to E.D. Cal.
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled MARYAM KHOSHCHIN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. ATRIA MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC and DOES
1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 34-2022-00318414, was removed
from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of
Sacramento, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California on May 27, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of California assigned
Case No. 2:22-cv-00916-TLN-KJN to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged failure to pay
appropriate wages in violation of the California Labor Code and the
California's Business and Professions Code.

Atria Management Company, LLC is an operator of assisted senior
living communities, headquartered in Louisville, Kentucky. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Richard B. Lapp, Esq.
         Christopher A. Crosman, Esq.
         SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
         2029 Century Park East, Suite 33500
         Los Angeles, CA 90067-3021
         Telephone: (310) 277-7200
         Facsimile: (310) 201-5219
         E-mail: rlapp@seyfarth.com
                 ccrosman@seyfarth.com

                 - and –

         Phillip J. Ebsworth, Esq.
         SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
         400 Capitol Mall, Suite 2350
         Sacramento, CA 95814-4428
         Telephone: (916) 448-0159
         Facsimile: (916) 558-4839
         E-mail: pebsworth@seyfarth.com

BECKMAN COULTER: Figueroa Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Beckman Coulter,
Inc., et al. The case is styled as Ermelinda Figueroa, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Beckman Coulter, Inc.,
Does 1-50, Case No. 34-2022-00320014-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Sacramento Cty., May 16, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited."

Beckman Coulter Inc. -- http://www.beckmancoulter.com/-- is a
Danaher Corporation company that develops, manufactures and markets
products that simplify, automate and innovate complex biomedical
testing.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory Mauro, Esq.
          THE MAURO LAW FIRM APLC
          790 E Colorado Blvd., Fl. 9
          Pasadena, CA 91101-2193
          Phone: 626-698-0048
          Fax: 626-698-0049
          Email: greg@maurolawfirm.net


BEDFORD CHEESE: Tucker Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bedford Cheese Shop
Inc. The case is styled as Henry Tucker, on behalf of himself and
all other persons similarly situated v. Bedford Cheese Shop Inc.,
Case No. 1:22-cv-04338 (S.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Bedford Cheese Shop -- https://bedfordcheeseshop.com/ -- is an
old-fashioned cheese shop dedicated to providing the finest quality
cheeses from around the world.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly G. Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM, PC
          155 East 55th St., Ste. 6a
          New York, NY 10022
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: brad@markslawpc.com


BERKELEY LIGHTS: Court Names Hagens Berman Lead Counsel in Ng Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VICTOR J. NG, Plaintiff v. BERKELEY LIGHTS, INC., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-09497-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California appoints Michael Damelio as the
Lead Plaintiff and Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP as the Lead
Counsel for the putative class.

I. Background

On Feb. 7, 2022, the Court received six competing motions for
appointment as Lead Plaintiff in the putative securities class
action. Only two contenders' motions remain pending: (1) tthe
Berkeley Lights Investor Group ("BLI Investors"), represented by
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. and Bernstein Liebhard LLP; and (2) Mr.
Damelio, represented by Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP. The Court
finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument
and the matter is deemed submitted.

II. Discussion

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") "instructs
district courts to select as lead plaintiff the one 'most capable
of adequately representing the interests of class members.'" "The
'most capable' plaintiff -- and hence the lead plaintiff -- is the
one who has the greatest financial stake in the outcome of the
case, so long as he meets the requirements of Rule 23." The Ninth
Circuit interprets the PSLRA as establishing "a simple three-step
process for identifying the lead plaintiff pursuant to these
criteria."

A. Notice Requirement

Step One consists of meeting the PSLRA's notice requirement. In the
case, the notice was published in Business Wire on the same day
that the complaint was filed. This complied with the PSLRA's 20-day
filing deadline, and Business Wire is a "widely circulated
[inter]national business-oriented news reporting service," as
required. The notice specifically announced the filing of the
action against Berkeley Lights, Inc.; described the asserted claims
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; described the class as
encompassing "purchasers of Berkeley Lights, Inc. (NASDAQ: BLI)
common stock between July 17, 2020 and Sept. 14, 2021, inclusive";
and notified the putative class members that any motion to be
appointed lead plaintiff must be filed no later than Feb. 7, 2022.
Accordingly, Step One's requirements are met.

B. Largest Financial Stake in the Litigation

Step Two consists of identifying the presumptive lead plaintiff.
Mr. Damelio argues that he has the highest total losses:
$124,348.14. In their opposition brief, BLI Investors respond that
Mr. Damelio overstates his losses because he includes $31,236.85
from a joint account, and he has not established that he has
standing or consent to pursue claims for this account. Without the
losses from the joint account, BLI Investors assert that Mr.
Damelio's financial interest drops to $93,111 -- below that of the
BLI Investors. In reply, however, Mr. Damelio clarified that he
shares the joint account with his wife. He therefore argues that he
has a direct ownership interest in all losses flowing from the
joint account.

Judge Gilliam finds that the BLI Investors appear to acknowledge
the sufficiency of Mr. Damelio's declaration because they do not
repeat this argument in their sur-reply brief. He finds that Mr.
Damelio has the largest financial stake, and is therefore the
presumptive lead plaintiff.

C. Typicality and Adequacy

A presumptive lead plaintiff also has the burden of setting forth a
prima facie case that he can satisfy the class representative
requirements of Rule 23(a), typicality and adequacy. Mr. Damelio
argues that he meets the adequacy and typicality requirements
because like the rest of the proposed class, he purchased shares in
BLI during the class period and suffered damages as a result of
Defendants' false or misleading statements or omissions. There is
no indication of any conflict between Mr. Damelio and other class
members. The BLI Investors nevertheless raise several arguments
that Mr. Damelio cannot satisfy the adequacy requirement of Rule
23.

Judge Gilliam finds that (i) Mr. Damelio has provided sufficient
background information addressing concern as to his adequacy as
lead plaintiff; (ii) there does not appear to be a question that
Mr. Damelio himself purchased Berkeley Lights common stock, and he
confirmed in reply that he understands the scope of the putative
class as currently drafted; and (iii) Mr. Damelio has provided a
reasonable explanation for the phrasing of his prior certification,
and has remedied any outstanding question about whether he has
reviewed the complaint himself. Notwithstanding any technical
errors, Mr. Damelio has met his burden of establishing that he
satisfies the class representative requirements of typicality and
adequacy at this stage.

D. Appointment of Lead Counsel

Mr. Damelio has moved for approval of his selection of Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP as lead counsel.

Judge Gilliam defers to Mr. Damelio's choice of lead counsel
because his choice is not "so irrational, or so tainted by
self-dealing or conflict of interest, as to cast genuine and
serious doubt on his willingness or ability to perform the
functions of lead plaintiff." Hagens Berman has extensive
experience as counsel in securities class actions. Judge Gilliam,
thus, approves Mr. Damelio's selection of counsel.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Gilliam grants Mr. Damelio's motion. All pending
unwithdrawn motions are denied. Mr. Damelio is appointed as the
Lead Plaintiff for the putative class, and Hagens Berman is
approved as the Lead Counsel for the putative class.

Judge Gilliam further sets a telephonic initial case management
conference on June 14, 2022, at 2:00 p.m. All counsel will use the
following dial-in information to access the call: Dial-In:
888-808-6929; Passcode: 6064255

For call clarity, parties will not use speaker phone or earpieces
for these calls, and where at all possible, parties will use
landlines. Judge Gilliam directs the parties to meet and confer and
submit a joint case management statement by June 7, 2022.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/bdh3dtf5 from Leagle.com.


BLINK HOLDINGS: Fails to Timely Pay Wages, Gregory Suit Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
RHYS GREGORY, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BLINK HOLDINGS, INC., d/b/a BLINK FITNESS,
Defendant, Case No. 1:22-cv-03139 (E.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022) brings
this class action complaint against the Defendant to recover
damages for delinquent wage payments made to its workers pursuant
to New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant from approximately
March 2020 until June 2020 as a non-exempt, hourly-paid maintenance
worker at the Defendant's fitness center, where he would typically
perform physical tasks for more than of 25% of his workday.

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant failed to pay him timely
wages. Throughout his employment with the Defendant, he was
compensated by the Defendant every other week or on a bi-weekly
basis, added the Plaintiff.

Blink Holdings, Inc. d/b/a Blink Fitness operates a fitness
facility. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brett R. Cohen, Esq.
          Jeffrey K. Brown, Esq.
          Michael A. Tompkins, Esq.
          LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
          One Old Country Road, Suite 347
          Carle Place, New York 11514
          Tel: (516) 873-9550

BOOT BARN HOLDINGS: Faces Labor Suit in California Court
--------------------------------------------------------
Boot Barn Holdings, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended March 26, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that in February 27, 2020,
one employee, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated
employees, filed a class action lawsuit against the company, which
includes claims for penalties under California's Private Attorney
General Act, in the Sacramento County Superior Court, Case No.
34-2019-00272000-CU-OE-GDS, alleging violations of California's
wage and hour, overtime, meal periods and rest breaks, and an
alleged violation of the suitable seating requirement as per
California Labor Law among other things. The complaint seeks an
unspecified amount of damages and penalties.

Boot Barn Holdings, Inc. lifestyle retail chain based in
California.


BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Stephens Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RANDI STEPHENS v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC., ET
AL., SECTION: "J"(1), Civil Action No. 17-4294 (E.D. La.), Judge
Carl J. Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana grants in part the Motion for Summary Judgment for
Lack of Specific Causation Evidence filed by Defendants, BP
Exploration & Production Inc. and BP America Production Company, BP
p.l.c., collectively referred to as BP.

I. Background

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve "claims
for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to oil
and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response (e.g.,
dispersant)." See In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in
Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613, at
*10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021). During the course of the MDL
proceedings, this Court approved the Deepwater Horizon Medical
Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement. Id. at *2. The B3
plaintiffs either opted out of the class action settlement
agreement or were excluded from its class definition. Id. at *10
n.3. In any event, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal cause
of the claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other
chemicals used during the response."

The Plaintiff was employed in the DWH oil spill response as a
shoreline cleanup worker on the beaches of Fort Morgan, Alabama and
Gulf Shores, Alabama for about four months. She allegedly performed
beach cleanup work, picking up oil and tar balls. This work,
Plaintiff alleges, exposed her to crude oil and chemical
dispersants which caused Plaintiff to develop nasal congestion,
nasal discharge, sinusitis, sore throat, upper respiratory
infection, nausea, abdominal cramps and pain, eye burning,
irritation, shortness of breath, cough, wheezing, headaches,
dizziness, depression, mood disorder, anxiety, and insomnia.
Plaintiff filed the instant action, and, subsequently, BP filed
this motion for summary judgment.

II. Discussion

BP argues that because the Plaintiff has not submitted any expert
proof on the required element of specific causation, her claims
must be dismissed. The expert report from Dr. Cook is non-specific,
and hence, does not address the nature of the Plaintiff's work on
the spill response or the nature, duration, or type of exposure
that he allegedly had to any particular toxin.

In reply, the Plaintiff does not contest that Dr. Cook's report
fails to address specific causation. Instead, he contends that the
general causation expert report in conjunction with specific
evidence of his exposure is sufficient to permit the jury to
conclude that exposure to the toxicants in the oil and dispersants
more likely than not caused the Plaintiff's alleged medical
conditions.

Specifically, the Plaintiff asserts, "when the medical conditions
are either 'within the common knowledge of the jury' or
'contemporaneous and transient' general causation expert testimony
along with specific evidence of exposure is all that is required."
Thus, the question before the Court is whether, in the context of
this particular case, specific causation requires an expert report
and testimony.

Judge Barbier holds that when the relationship between the chemical
"and the complained-of injuries is 'within the layperson's common
knowledge,' the general causation evidence is sufficient to meet
the plaintiff's burden of proof with regard to summary judgment."
Louisiana state courts have found that common issues such as
"dehydration, overheating, exhaustion, mental anguish, fear,
stress, anxiety, and depression" are within common knowledge.
Generally, "medical expert testimony is not required to establish
causation for temporary pain and suffering" because the nature of
these injuries fall within the layperson's common knowledge.

BP argues that the Plaintiff's reliance on Louisiana law's more
relaxed rule of evidence is not proper, in a case controlled by
maritime law. In Gowdy v. Marine Spill Response Corp., 925 F.3d
200, 206 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379
F.3d 32, 46 (2d Cir. 2004) (Sotomayor, J.)), the Fifth Circuit
found that "expert testimony is not required in cases where the
nature of the injury can be understood by lay factfinders based on
ordinary knowledge and experience.

In Gowdy, the court was faced with a question similar to the one
before the Court: "When is expert medical testimony needed to
survive summary judgment in a Jones Act negligence case?" The
plaintiff alleged that, while he was employed as a seaman, he
"injured his left foot when he stepped off the last rung of a
ladder that was dangerously raised four feet off the floor." In
finding that the plaintiff did not require expert testimony
regarding his injury, the court reasoned that "the danger
implicated by stepping down from a four-foot-tall ladder rung falls
within ordinary understanding." Accordingly, the so called "relaxed
rule" of evidence may apply to maritime cases when the nature of
the alleged injury is within the common knowledge of lay persons.

Next, Judge Barbier turns to an analysis of what injuries are, in
fact, within the common knowledge of lay people. The Plaintiff
alleges that the oil and dispersant caused her to develop nasal
congestion, nasal discharge, sinusitis, sore throat, upper
respiratory infection, nausea, abdominal cramps and pain, eye
burning, irritation, shortness of breath, cough, wheezing,
headaches, dizziness, depression, mood disorder, anxiety, and
insomnia.

Judge Barbier holds that without an expert opinion on specific
causation, the Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of proof on her
claims of sinusitis, upper respiratory infection, abdominal cramps
and pain, mood disorder, and insomnia. These are neither medical
conditions within the common knowledge of a lay person nor
conditions classified as "transient" or "temporary."

The remaining medical conditions are nasal congestion, nasal
discharge, sore throat, nausea, eye burning, irritation, shortness
of breath, cough, wheezing, headaches, dizziness, depression, and
anxiety. The Court finds that these types of transient or temporary
medical conditions are likely within the common knowledge of lay
people, much like the irritant symptoms in Guidry v. Dow Chemical
Co., No. 19-12233, 2021 WL 4460505, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 29,
2021), and the dehydration, overheating, exhaustion, mental
anguish, fear, stress, anxiety, and depression that Louisiana
courts have found within the common knowledge of lay people.
Therefore, the Plaintiff does not require an expert on specific
causation for these particular medical conditions.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, BP's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part.
The Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice except for the
claims for nasal congestion, nasal discharge, sore throat, nausea,
eye burning, irritation, shortness of breath, cough, wheezing,
headaches, dizziness, depression, and anxiety.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 24, 2022 Order & Reasons is
available at https://tinyurl.com/48k6wu6p from Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Turner Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL DARNELL TURNER v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION
INC., ET AL., SECTION: "J"(2), Civil Action No. 17-4210 (E.D. La.),
Judge Carl J. Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants in part the Motion for Summary
Judgment for Lack of Specific Causation Evidence filed by
Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc. and BP America
Production Company, BP p.l.c., collectively referred to as BP.

I. Background

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve "claims
for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to oil
and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response (e.g.,
dispersant)" -- In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in
Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613, at
*10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021).

During the course of the MDL proceedings, the Court approved the
Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs either opted out of the class action
settlement agreement or were excluded from its class definition. In
any event, "B3 plaintiffs must prove that the legal cause of the
claimed injury or illness is exposure to oil or other chemicals
used during the response."

The Plaintiff was employed in the DWH oil spill response as a
shoreline cleanup worker on the beaches of Gulf Shores, Alabama;
Theodore Alabama; and Dauphin Island, Alabama for approximately a
year. He allegedly performed beach cleanup work, picking up oil and
tar balls, as well as some decontamination work. This work, the
Plaintiff alleges, exposed him to crude oil and chemical
dispersants which caused him to develop hypertension, acute renal
insufficiency, chronic kidney disease stage III, hematuria,
nephrotic range proteinuria, chest pain, frontoparietal
cerebrovascular accident, stroke, headaches, blindness, obstructive
sleep apnea, shortness of breath, wheezing, depression, abdominal
pain, diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, dizziness, decreased sense of
smell, facial pain or sinus pain, nasal congestion/discharge,
throat irritation, skin blistering, boils, skin dryness/flaking,
inflammation, redness or swelling, itching, peeling, and scaling.

The Plaintiff filed the instant action, and, subsequently, BP filed
the motion for summary judgment.

II. Discussion

BP argues that because the Plaintiff has not submitted any expert
proof on the required element of specific causation, his claims
must be dismissed. The expert report from Dr. Cook is non-specific,
and hence, does not address the nature of the Plaintiff's work on
the spill response or the nature, duration, or type of exposure
that he allegedly had to any particular toxin.

In reply, the Plaintiff does not contest that Dr. Cook's report
fails to address specific causation. Instead, he contends that the
general causation expert report in conjunction with specific
evidence of his exposure is sufficient to permit the jury to
conclude that exposure to the toxicants in the oil and dispersants
more likely than not caused his alleged medical conditions.

Specifically, the Plaintiff asserts, "when the medical conditions
are either 'within the common knowledge of the jury' or
'contemporaneous and transient' general causation expert testimony
along with specific evidence of exposure is all that is required."
Thus, the question before the Court is whether, in the context of
this particular case, specific causation requires an expert report
and testimony.

Judge Barbier holds that when the relationship between the chemical
"and the complained-of injuries is 'within the layperson's common
knowledge,' the general causation evidence is sufficient to meet
the plaintiff's burden of proof with regard to summary judgment."
Louisiana state courts have found that common issues such as
"dehydration, overheating, exhaustion, mental anguish, fear,
stress, anxiety, and depression" are within common knowledge.
Generally, "medical expert testimony is not required to establish
causation for temporary pain and suffering" because the nature of
these injuries fall within the layperson's common knowledge."

BP argues that the Plaintiff's reliance on Louisiana law's more
relaxed rule of evidence is not proper, in a case controlled by
maritime law. In Gowdy v. Marine Spill Response Corp., 925 F.3d
200, 206 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379
F.3d 32, 46 (2d Cir. 2004) (Sotomayor, J.)), the Fifth Circuit
found that "expert testimony is not required in cases where the
nature of the injury can be understood by lay factfinders based on
ordinary knowledge and experience. In Gowdy, the court was faced
with a question similar to the one before the Court: "when is
expert medical testimony needed to survive summary judgment in a
Jones Act negligence case?" The plaintiff alleged that, while he
was employed as a seaman, he "injured his left foot when he stepped
off the last rung of a ladder that was dangerously raised four feet
off the floor." In finding that the plaintiff did not require
expert testimony regarding his injury, the court reasoned that "the
danger implicated by stepping down from a four-foot-tall ladder
rung falls within ordinary understanding." Accordingly, the so
called "relaxed rule" of evidence may apply to maritime cases when
the nature of the alleged injury is within the common knowledge of
lay persons.

Next, Judge Barbier turns to an analysis of what injuries are, in
fact, within the common knowledge of lay people. The  Plaintiff
alleges that the oil and dispersant caused him to develop
hypertension, acute renal insufficiency, chronic kidney disease
stage III, hematuria, nephrotic range proteinuria, chest pain,
frontoparietal cerebrovascular accident, stroke, headaches,
blindness, obstructive sleep apnea, shortness of breath, wheezing,
depression, abdominal pain, diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, dizziness,
decreased sense of smell, facial pain or sinus pain, nasal
congestion/discharge, throat irritation, skin blistering, boils,
skin dryness/flaking, inflammation, redness or swelling, itching,
peeling, and scaling.

Judge Barbier holds that without an expert opinion on specific
causation, the Plaintiff cannot meet his burden of proof on his
claims of hypertension, acute renal insufficiency, chronic kidney
disease stage III, hematuria, nephrotic range proteinuria, chest
pain, frontoparietal cerebrovascular accident, stroke, blindness,
obstructive sleep apnea, abdominal pain, decreased sense of smell,
and facial pain or sinus pain. These are neither medical conditions
within the common knowledge of a lay person nor conditions
classified as "transient" or "temporary."

The remaining medical conditions are headaches, shortness of
breath, wheezing, depression, skin blistering, boils, skin
dryness/flaking, inflammation, redness or swelling, itching,
peeling, and scaling, diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, dizziness, nasal
congestion/discharge, and throat irritation. Judge Barbier finds
that these types of transient or temporary medical conditions are
likely within the common knowledge of lay people, much like the
irritant symptoms in Guidry and the dehydration, overheating,
exhaustion, mental anguish, fear, stress, anxiety, and depression
that Louisiana courts have found within the common knowledge of lay
people. Therefore, the Plaintiff does not require an expert on
specific causation for these particular medical conditions.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, BP's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part.
The Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice except for the
claims for headaches, shortness of breath, wheezing, depression,
skin blistering, boils, skin dryness/flaking, inflammation, redness
or swelling, itching, peeling, and scaling, diarrhea, nausea,
vomiting, dizziness, nasal congestion/discharge, and throat
irritation.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 24, 2022 Order & Reasons is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3se97bv7 from Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Wallace Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PATTI WALLACE, on behalf of decedent, GUY WALLACE v.
BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC., ET AL., SECTION: "J"(2), Civil
Action No. 13-1039 (E.D. La.), Judge Carl J. Barbier of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana grants in part
the Motion for Summary Judgment for Lack of Specific Causation
Evidence filed by Defendants BP Exploration & Production Inc. and
BP America Production Company, BP p.l.c., collectively referred to
as BP.

I. Background

The instant action is a "B3" case arising out of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. B3 cases involve "claims
for personal injury and wrongful death due to exposure to oil
and/or other chemicals used during the oil spill response (e.g.,
dispersant)," -- In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in
Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613, at
*10 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021). During the course of the MDL
proceedings, the Court approved the Deepwater Horizon Medical
Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement. The B3 plaintiffs
either opted out of the class action settlement agreement or were
excluded from its class definition. In any event, the B3 plaintiffs
must prove that the legal cause of the claimed injury or illness is
exposure to oil or other chemicals used during the response.

The Plaintiff was employed in the DWH oil spill response as a
shoreline cleanup worker on the beaches of Florida from about June
2010 to August 2010. He allegedly performed beach cleanup work,
picking up oil and tar balls. This work, the Plaintiff alleges,
exposed him to crude oil and chemical dispersants which caused him
to develop urinary tract infections, kidney infections, respiratory
infections, sinus infections, vision problems, bowel problems,
stomach problems, oil burn on his right hand, skin rashes, body
sores, and bladder cancer.

The Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking a bench trial with
respect to his claims of negligence under general maritime law.
Subsequently, BP filed the motion for summary judgment.

II. Discussion

BP argues that because the Plaintiff has not submitted any expert
proof on the required element of specific causation, her claims
must be dismissed. The expert report from Dr. Cook is non-specific,
and hence, does not address the nature of the Plaintiff's work on
the spill response or the nature, duration, or type of exposure
that Plaintiff allegedly had to any particular toxin.

In reply, the Plaintiff does not contest that Dr. Cook's report
fails to address specific causation. Instead, he contends that the
general causation expert report in conjunction with specific
evidence of his exposure is sufficient to permit the jury to
conclude that exposure to the toxicants in the oil and dispersants
more likely than not caused his alleged medical conditions.

Specifically, the Plaintiff asserts, "when the medical conditions
are either 'within the common knowledge of the jury' or
'contemporaneous and transient' general causation expert testimony
along with specific evidence of exposure is all that is required."
Thus, the question before the Court is whether, in the context of
this particular case, specific causation requires an expert report
and testimony.

Judge Barbier holds that when the relationship between the chemical
"and the complained-of injuries is 'within the layperson's common
knowledge,' the general causation evidence is sufficient to meet
the plaintiff's burden of proof with regard to summary judgment,"
citing Guidry v. Dow Chemical Co., No. 19-12233, 2021 WL 4460505,
at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 2021). Louisiana state courts have found
that common issues such as "dehydration, overheating, exhaustion,
mental anguish, fear, stress, anxiety, and depression" are within
common knowledge. Generally, "medical expert testimony is not
required to establish causation for temporary pain and suffering"
because the nature of these injuries fall within the layperson's
common knowledge.

BP argues that the Plaintiff's reliance on Louisiana law's more
relaxed rule of evidence is not proper, in a case controlled by
maritime law. In Gowdy v. Marine Spill Response Corp., 925 F.3d
200, 206 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379
F.3d 32, 46 (2d Cir. 2004) (Sotomayor, J.)), the Fifth Circuit
found that "expert testimony is not required in cases where the
nature of the injury can be understood by lay factfinders based on
ordinary knowledge and experience.

In Gowdy, the court was faced with a question similar to the one
before the Court: "When is expert medical testimony needed to
survive summary judgment in a Jones Act negligence case?" The
plaintiff alleged that, while he was employed as a seaman, he
"injured his left foot when he stepped off the last rung of a
ladder that was dangerously raised four feet off the floor." In
finding that the plaintiff did not require expert testimony
regarding his injury, the court reasoned that "the danger
implicated by stepping down from a four-foot-tall ladder rung falls
within ordinary understanding." Accordingly, the so called "relaxed
rule" of evidence may apply to maritime cases when the nature of
the alleged injury is within the common knowledge of lay persons.

Next, Judge Barbier turns to an analysis of what injuries are, in
fact, within the common knowledge of lay people. The Plaintiff
alleges that the oil and dispersant caused him to develop urinary
tract infections, kidney infections, respiratory infections, sinus
infections, vision problems, bowel problems, stomach problems, oil
burn on his right hand, skin rashes, body sores, and bladder
cancer. (Rec. Doc. 38-1, at 2). Plaintiff contends that his medical
conditions are comparable to those in Guidry.

Judge Barbier holds that without an expert opinion on specific
causation, the Plaintiff cannot meet his burden of proof on his
claims of urinary tract infections, kidney infections, respiratory
infections, sinus infections, vision problems, bowel problems,
stomach problems, and bladder cancer. These are neither medical
conditions within the common knowledge of a lay person nor
conditions classified as "transient" or "temporary."

The remaining medical conditions are the oil burn on his right
hand, skin rashes, and body sores. Judge Barbier finds that these
types of transient or temporary medical conditions are likely
within the common knowledge of lay people, much like the irritant
symptoms in Guidry and the dehydration, overheating, exhaustion,
mental anguish, fear, stress, anxiety, and depression that
Louisiana courts have found within the common knowledge of lay
people. Therefore, the Plaintiff does not require an expert on
specific causation for these particular medical conditions.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, BP's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part.
The Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice except for the
claims for oil burn on his right hand, skin rashes, and body
sores.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 24, 2022 Order & Reasons is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3nwyyxuf from Leagle.com.


BP VENTURE MANAGEMENT: Noel Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against BP Venture Management
Inc., et al. The case is styled as Kaitlyn Noel, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. BP Venture Management Inc., Does
1–10, Case No. 34-2022-00320637-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Sacramento Cty., May 26, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Other employment – Civil Unlimited."

BP Venture Management Inc. is categorized under Business
Consultants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kane Moon, Esq.
          MOON & YANG, APC
          1055 W 7th St., Ste. 1880
          Los Angeles, CA 90017-2529
          Phone: 213-232-3128
          Fax: 213-232-3125
          Email: kane.moon@moonyanglaw.com


BRIGHT HEALTH GROUP: Faces Marquez Securities Suit in NY Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
Bright Health Group, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that in January 6, 2022, a
putative securities class action lawsuit was filed against the
company and certain of its officers and directors in the Eastern
District of New York. The case is captioned "Marquez v. Bright
Health Group, Inc. et al.," 1:22-cv-00101 (E.D.N.Y.)

The lawsuit alleges, among other things, that the company made
materially false and misleading statements regarding its business,
operations, and compliance policies, which in turn adversely
affected our stock price.

Bright Health Group, Inc. healthcare company based in Minnesota.


CALIFORNIA CEMETERY: Harp Suit Remanded to Kern County Super. Court
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SCOTT HARP, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. CALIFORNIA CEMETERY AND FUNERAL
SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware Corporation and Does 1 to 100 inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-01118-JLT-BAK (E.D. Cal.), Judge
Jennifer L. Thurston of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California grants Harp's motion to remand the case to
the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of
Kern.

I. Introduction

Mr. Harp, acting on his own behalf and on the behalf of similarly
situated employees, initiated suit in state court for violations of
the California Labor Code and California Business and Professions
Code by his former employer, California Cemetery and Funeral
Services, LLC ("CCFS"). CCFS removed the case to federal court,
asserting diversity jurisdiction. Harp moved to remand the case to
state court because it contends CCFS has not satisfied the amount
in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction.

II. Background

Mr. Harp filed his complaint in the Superior Court of California in
Kern County, alleging CCFS violated sections of the California
Labor Code Sections 226, 2699, 2751 and California Business and
Professions Code Section 17200 for failure to provide accurate wage
statements and written contracts to employees. He brought these
claims on behalf of himself, all similarly situated employees, and
as a representative for the California Labor and Workforce
Development Agency under the Private Attorneys General Act
("PAGA"), Cal. Lab. Code Section 2699. On July 23, 2021, CCFS filed
a notice of removal.

On Aug. 23, 2021, Harp filed a motion to remand the case, arguing
CCFS failed to adequately establish the amount in controversy for
diversity jurisdiction. He also seeks an award of attorneys' fees
associated with its motion, arguing CCFS lacked an objective basis
for removal.

In the notice of removal, CCFS alleged federal subject matter
jurisdiction existed under two avenues of diversity jurisdiction:
28 U.S.C. Section 1332 for Harp's individual claims and the Class
Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") for all employees' claims. In
opposition to the motion to remand, however, CCFS did not provide
any factual or legal basis for jurisdiction under CAFA and only
maintains diversity jurisdiction exists under Section 1332. CCFS
estimates the amount in controversy to be $76,200, attributing
$70,000 to attorneys' fees. Because CCFS no longer asserts subject
matter jurisdiction under CAFA, the only issue before the Court is
whether Harp's individual claims for relief satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements under Section 1332.

III. Discussion

Mr. Harp does not dispute the parties are completely diverse but
asserts that the amount in controversy is not satisfied. CCFS
maintains the case exceeds the amount in controversy threshold
because the civil penalties and damages flowing from the alleged
Labor Code, Business and Professions Code, and PAGA claims amount
to $6,200 and attorneys' fees total $70,000. Harp does not contest
the $6,200 amount but argues CCFS' calculation of attorneys' fees
improperly aggregates all fees to a single plaintiff. Therefore,
the parties' dispute turns on whether CCFS may attribute all
attorneys' fees to a single plaintiff in a PAGA action.

A. Calculating Attorneys' Fees for the Amount in Controversy under
PAGA

CCFS has not provided a pro rata share of attorneys' fees
associated with Harp's individual claims. Instead, it argues that
two recent decisions from the California Court of Appeals permit
CCFS to aggregate attorneys' fees to meet the amount in
controversy: Robinson v. S. Ctys. Oil Co., 53 Cal. App. 5th 476
(2020), and Starks v. Vortex Industries, Inc., 268 Cal.Rptr.3d 274
(Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (ordered unpublished). According to CCFS,
Robinson and Starks stand for the proposition that "when multiple
employees incur legal fees, if they do so in separate suits, only
one of them can recover their fees under Section 3699(g)(1) because
only one of them could ever successfully bring a PAGA claim." Under
this reasoning, CCFS concludes that prorating attorneys' fees
"would result in an absurdity" because Harp is the only named
plaintiff and therefore, no other aggrieved employees could recover
attorney fees under PAGA. CCFS contends: "That cannot be the law."

Judge Thurston holds that neither Robinson nor Starks address
aggregation of attorneys' fees for the purpose of determining the
amount in controversy for federal jurisdiction. Furthermore, the
reasoning of Robinson and Starks does not undermine the Ninth
Circuit's precedent prohibiting the aggregation of fees under PAGA
actions. The opinions in Robinson and Stark rest on the nature of
PAGA actions as representative actions on behalf of the state
interest. District courts have also rejected similar challenges to
the Ninth Circuit precedent prohibiting aggregation under PAGA.

Because CCFS provides no alternative basis to calculate attorneys'
fees apart from aggregation, and because it concedes Harp's
individual claims only amount to $6,200, CCFS has not met its
burden to establish the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
Thus, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and remands the
case to state court.

B. Harp's Motion for Attorneys' Fees

Mr. Harp requests the Court awards attorneys' fees associated with
his motion to remand. An order remanding the case may require
payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney
fees, incurred as a result of removal. Absent unusual
circumstances, courts may award attorneys' fees under Section
1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively
reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an
objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied. The
defendant lacks an objectively reasonable basis for removal when
the law compelling remand is well established.

Mr. Harp requested a total fee award of $9,035. Harp's attorney,
Gregg Lander, submitted a declaration to support the request and
explained his billable rate is $695 per hour. He declared he spent
nine hours researching and drafting the initial motion and
anticipated four hours for drafting the reply and attending the
hearing.

However, the Court did not hold a hearing to resolve this motion.
Because Harp did not delineate how much time he spent on the reply
brief, Judge Thurston does not find sufficient support to award
fees associated with the reply. She, in her discretion, finds the
billable rate of $695 and nine hours spent drafting the motion
reasonable and grants an award of $6,255 in attorneys' fees.

IV. Conclusion & Order

For the reasons she set forth, Judge Thurston grants Harp's motion
to remand and grants Harp's request for attorneys' fees associated
with this motion in the amount of $6,255. The action is remanded to
the Superior Court of California in Kern County. The Clerk of Court
is directed to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 24, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3crhxu26 from Leagle.com.


CALIFORNIA: Bid for Discovery in Peyton v. HDSP Partially Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEE EDWARD PEYTON, Plaintiff v. BRIAN KIBLER, et al.,
Defendants (Case No. 2:21-cv-0719 JAM KJN P) (E.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Kendall A. Newman of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California partially grants the Plaintiff's
motion to compel discovery, and grants modification of the
scheduling order.

I. Plaintiff's Allegations

The Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se, in an action
brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The case proceeds on the
Plaintiff's complaint against Defendants Kibler, Pickett, Peery,
and Pannu for their alleged failure to protect the Plaintiff in
violation of the Eighth Amendment by causing plaintiff to be
exposed to COVID-19 "during his entire confinement" at High Desert
State Prison ("HDSP").

The Plaintiff alleges that despite his verbal complaints to
correctional officers and other prison staff, as well as multiple
grievances and letters alerting the Defendants to such health and
safety violations, numerous correctional officers and porters at
HDSP continued to serve breakfast and dinner meals without wearing
masks over their mouths and noses. Indeed, the Plaintiff sets forth
specific instances from Oct. 17, 2020, through April 18, 2021,2 in
which he alleges he was served meals by officers and porters who
were not properly wearing masks. The Plaintiff contracted COVID-19
twice, and was fearful he would contract it again.

In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Kibler, Pickett
and Peery had actual knowledge of the alleged hazardous conditions
yet tolerated a deliberately indifferent policy and custom of
exposure and spreading of COVID-19, and refused to take reasonable
measures to prevent Defendant Pannu and other officers and porters
from handling and serving meals without properly wearing face masks
covering their mouths and nostrils.

The Plaintiff seeks money damages and injunctive relief, including
an order enjoining the Defendants from continuing their policy and
custom of serving meals without face masks covering the servers'
mouths and noses.

II. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel

The Plaintiff seeks to compel production of documents and answers
to interrogatories.

A. Scope of Discovery

Judge Newman is not persuaded by the Defendants' argument that the
Plaintiff's claims end on the day he contracted COVID-19. It is
public knowledge that it is possible to be reinfected with
COVID-19. Thus, the Plaintiff's discovery requests are not as
narrow as the Defendants contend, and their objections on such
bases are overruled.

B. Unclean Hands

The Plaintiff objects that the Defendants violated his rights when
they used his medical records to oppose his motion for preliminary
injunction and case-related sanctions to discuss his infection with
COVID-19. However, the Plaintiff's objection is overruled because
his complaint alleged he had been infected with COVID-19 on two
occasions, thus putting his infection at issue in the public
record. Moreover, the Defendants were entitled to rebut plaintiff's
claim that he had been infected twice, when at his deposition he
confirmed he was infected only once at HDSP.

C. Request for Production of Documents

The Plaintiff seeks to compel further responses to Request for
Production, Set One, Requests Nos. 3 to 14:

     a. RPD No. 3: All surveillance video that evidence, mention,
or refer to, or footage depicting the interior of Facility B,
building 4, during periods of time when morning and evening meals
are serving during the period of October 2020 through May 30, 2021,
including but not limited to HDSP records, reports, statements and
other investigative materials, and documents relating to prisoner
grievances and including responses to such grievances prepared by
HDSP staff in connection with the surveillance video footage during
the period between October 2020 and May 30, 2021.

     b. RPD No. 4: All documents that evidence, mention, or refer
to AVSS evidence requests or otherwise requests to review audio
and/or video recordings in connection with HDSP appeal log numbers
50547, 55703, 65272, 77010, 82385, 94408, 100835, 103062, and
108658, including but not limited to records, reports, statements
and other investigative materials and documents relating to
subsequent inmate and staff discipline, if any, relative to these
appeal log numbers.

     c. RPD No. 8: All documents that evidence, mention, or refer
to, including but not limited to, any request or directive to place
a litigation hold or to preserve AVSS footage in connection with
HDSP 602-appeal log numbers 50547, 55703, 65272, 77010, 82385,
94408, 100835, 103062, and 108658, including but not limited to any
emails, records, reports, statements and other investigative
materials and documents relating to the personnel who reviewed
these appeals at HDSP.

     d. RPD No. 5: All documents that evidence, mention, or refer
to, bed moves facilitated on Facility B, building 4, during period
between Nov. 11, 2020 and Nov. 15, 2020 at HDSP.

     e. RPD No. 6: All documents that evidence, mention, or refer
to, the housing roster for Facility B, building 4, during the
period between Nov. 1, 2020 and Nov. 30, 2020 at HDSP.

     f. RPD No. 7: All documents that evidence, mention, or refer
to, including but not limited to inmate time-keeping logs relative
to porters assigned on second and third watch on Facility B,
building 4, during the period between October 2020 and May 30,
2021, at HDSP.

     g. RPD No. 9: All documents that evidence, mention, or refer
to, Covid-19 infections to both staff and inmates on Facility B
during the month of November 2020, including but not limited to
medical records, reports, evaluations, statements and other
materials and documents relating to the massive Covid-19 outbreak
on Facility B in November 2020 at HDSP.

     h. RPD No. 10: All documents that evidence, mention, or refer
to, non-compliance with masking protocols and social distancing
requirements during the period between October 2020 and May 30,
2021 on Facility B, including but not limited to records, reports,
statements and other investigative materials and documents relating
to the non-compliance tracking log maintained by HDSP Employee
Relations Officer and subsequent inmate and staff discipline, if
any.

     i. RPD No. 11: All documents that evidence, mention, or refer
to, inmate deaths as a result of Covid-19 at HDSP.

     j. RPD No. 12: All documents written or created since October
2020, that contain, mention, construe, or refer to, any inspection,
inquiry or complaint about safety conditions or the risk of
Covid-19 infection at HDSP, including but not limited to, whether
formal or informal, official or unofficial, including inmate, staff
and civilian grievances, complaints and appeals, including
responses to such documents prepared by HDSP staff or its agents,
including inmate lawsuits against HDSP relative to Covid-19.

     k. RPD No. 13: All other documents, items of evidence, or
sworn or unsworn statements or affidavits that relate to the
allegations made in Plaintiff's complaint, including but not
limited to, records, reports, statements and other investigative
materials and documents relating to Plaintiff's Nov. 20, 2020 and
Jan. 17, 2021 letters to Defendant Kibler, including any responses
to such documents prepared by Kibler and/or inmate and staff
discipline, if any.

     m. RPD No. 14: All documents that contain, mention, construe,
or refer to any insurance agreement or arrangement to which an
insurance company or other person or entity will guaranty, act as a
surety for, or otherwise bear any responsibility for litigating
this action, including, but not limited to paying the Defendants'
attorney's fees, costs, or out-of-pocket expenses, or paying for
any monetary or injunctive relief ordered as part of a court or
consent judgment.

Judge Newman holds that (i) the Plaintiff's request for inmate
grievances in RPD No. 3 is unclear, so his motion to compel
discovery of inmate grievances from October 2020 to May 30, 2021;
(ii) the Defendants' responses to RPD Nos. 4 and 8 are insufficient
as to appeals log nos. 94408 and 55703, so they will supplement
their responses to set forth what efforts they took to locate the
responsive documents; (iii) RPD No. 5 is not relevant to the
Plaintiff's claim, so no further production is required; (iv) the
housing roster information (RPD No. 6) is necessary for the
Plaintiff to identify witnesses and must be disclosed to him; and
(v) the Defendants will produce to the Plaintiff the logs bearing
the inmate porters' names for the second and third watch for the
time frame Oct. 17, 2020, through May 27, 2021 (RPD No. 7).

Judge Newman also holds that (i) the Defendants' objection that RPD
No. 9 is overbroad is sustained; (ii) the Defendants will produce,
for in camera review, copies of the biweekly reports (RPD No. 10)
provided to the Plaintiffs' class counsel and the federal receiver
in Plata for HDSP for the time frame Oct. 17, 2020, to May 27,
2021; (iii) he does not find such inmate deaths (RPD No. 11)
relevant to the Plaintiff's claims asserted; and (iv) the
Plaintiff's Request No. 12 is overbroad, both as to time because it
is not limited in time, and as to subject matter because the
request is not narrowly tailored to the issues of the case.

Judge Newman further finds that (i) the Defendants are directed to
produce for in camera review those unredacted "reports concerning
non-compliance observed on the Audio/Video Surveillance System,
reports from supervisors and managers, and correspondence," solely
for Building 4, Facility B, HDSP, for the time frame Oct. 17, 2020
to Nov. 20, 2020 (RPD No. 14), and solely as to those reports or
complaints that face masks were not being properly worn during meal
service; and (ii) he denies the Plaintiff's motion to compel
further response to RPD No. 14 because he cannot compel the
Defendant to produce documents that cannot be located after a
reasonable inquiry and diligent search.

D. Interrogatories

Defendant Pickett's Response to Interrogatory Nos. 6 & 9:

      a. No. 6: Describe what you did, if anything, to ensure staff
and inmates followed face covering and physical distancing
requirements in effect during the time period between March 2020
and May 30, 2021, during your employment as acting Warden and Chief
Deputy Warden at HDSP.

      b. No. 9: Describe any actions you took in response to the
allegations of staff and inmate noncompliance with face covering
and physical distancing requirements at HDSP made by Plaintiff
relating to events during the time period between October 2020 and
May 30, 2021, at HDSP.

Judge Newman opines that the Defendants' objection that the
interrogatories are overbroad as to time and not relevant are
overruled. However, she says, the Defendants' objections that the
interrogatory is compound and overbroad in scope because they were
not limited to Facility B where the Plaintiff was housed, are
sustained. Moreover, although the Plaintiff contends Pickett did
not respond as to actions Pickett personally took, Defendant
Pickett, Chief Deputy Warden, holds a supervisory position, and set
forth efforts he took as a supervisor to ensure compliance with
COVID-19 protocols. If Defendant Pickett has an additional response
applicable to the time frame Nov. 11, 2020, to May 27, 2021, solely
during meal service in building 4, Facility B at HDSP, Defendant
Pickett will supplement his responses to interrogatories Nos. 6 &
9.

Defendant Kibler's Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 6 & 7:

     a. No. 6: Describe what you did, if anything, to ensure that
HDSP staff followed the face covering and physical distancing
requirement policies in effect during the time period between
October 2020 and May 30, 2021, during your employment as acting
Warden at HDSP.

     b. No. 7: Describe what you did, if anything, to ensure that
HDSP inmates followed the face covering and physical distancing
requirement policies in effect during the time period between
October 2020 and May 30, 2021, during your employment as acting
Warden at HDSP.

Judge Newman opines that the Defendants' objection that the
interrogatories are overbroad as to time and not relevant are
overruled. She says, the Defendants' objections that the
interrogatory is compound and overbroad in scope because they were
not limited to Facility B where plaintiff was housed, are
sustained. Moreover, although the Plaintiff contends Kibler did not
respond as to actions Kibler personally took, Defendant Kibler,
Warden of HDSP, holds a supervisory position, and set forth efforts
he took as a supervisor to ensure compliance with COVID-19
protocols. If Defendant Kibler has an additional response
applicable to the time frame Nov. 11, 2020, to May 27, 2021, solely
related to face mask wearing during meal service in building 4,
Facility B at HDSP, Defendant Kibler will supplement his responses
to interrogatories Nos. 6 & 9.

Defendant Pannu's Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6 & 7:

     a. No. 5: Please describe in as much detail as possible the
complete circumstances surrounding you and porters under your
supervision being captured on HDSP surveillance footage depicting
the interior of Facility B, building 4, during morning and dinner
meals, serving meals without wearing masks covering your mouths
and/or noses during the time between February 2021 and May 30,
2021.

     b. No. 6: What did you do, if anything, after learning that
you and porters were captured on HDSP surveillance footage on
Facility B building 4, serving breakfast and dinner meals without
wearing a mask covering your mouths and noses during the period of
time between February 2021 and May 30, 2021.

     c. No. 7: What did you do, if anything, to ensure fellow staff
and inmates followed face covering and physical distancing
requirements in effect during the period of time between February
2021 and May 30, 2021, during your employment as a correctional
officer of HDSP.

Judge Newman holds that the Defendants' objection that No. 7 is not
relevant is overruled. Defendant Pannu will respond to
interrogatory No. 7 as to his employment in building 4 at HDSP from
Feb. 2021 to May 27, 2021.

Defendant Peery's Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 4, 5 & 9:

     a. No. 4: Please describe in as much detail as possible, if
you, as the personnel who reviewed CDCR 602 appeal/grievance HDSP
log numbers 77010, 82385, 94408, 100835, 103062 and 108658, at the
time acknowledged that the grievances placed you on notice that the
events were captured by video surveillance, and that the policy in
place in 2020-2021 required the video to be preserved for a longer
period since staff misconduct was alleged.

     b. No. 5: Describe what you did, if anything, after learning
that staff and porters were captured on HDSP surveillance footage
depicting the interior of Facility B, building 4, during morning
and dinner meals, serving meals without wearing masks covering
their mouth and nose during the time period between October 2020
and May 30, 2021.

     c. No. 9: Describe what you did, if anything, to ensure staff
and inmates followed face covering and physical distancing
requirements in effect during the time period between March 2020
and May 30, 2021, during your employment as acting Chief Deputy
Warden and Associate Warden of HDSP.

Judge Newman opines that the Defendants' objection that the
interrogatories are overbroad as to time are overruled. No further
response to Interrogatory No. 4 is required. As to interrogatory
No. 5, despite the objections, Defendant Peery provided a response
as to what actions were taken. However, if defendant Peery has an
additional response applicable to the time frame Jan. 7, 2021, to
May 27, 2021, solely related to face mask wearing during meal
service in building 4, Facility B at HDSP, Defendant Peery will
supplement his responses to interrogatory Nos. 5 and 9.

III. Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions

The Plaintiff maintains that the Court should view the Defendants'
responses as a failure to answer, and impose sanctions on the
Defendants, including issuing a finding that the Plaintiff has made
a prima facie showing as to paragraphs 11-39 of the complaint, and
order a judgment awarding monetary sanctions for the Defendants'
alleged abuse of the discovery process.

Judge Newman does not find that the Defendants failed to respond to
discovery requests in a meaningful manner. While the Court
overruled the Defendants' objection that the Plaintiff's claims
ended on Nov. 20, 2020, the date the Plaintiff was infected with
COVID-19, Judge Newman does not find the Defendants' position was
unreasonable or taken in bad faith. And, despite lodging
objections, the Defendants provided responsive documents and
responses to interrogatories, with the exception of Defendant
Pannu.

With respect to reasonable expenses, the Court may apportion
expenses if a motion is granted in part and denied in part. To the
extent Plaintiff also seeks attorney fees, he may not seek
attorney's fees or reimbursement for fees based on his estimate of
the time he invested in preparing his motion to compel.

IV. Motion to Strike

The Plaintiff filed a document entitled "Commercial Notice
Appointment of Fiduciary Debtor." He claims to have unilaterally
appointed defense counsel as a fiduciary under Internal Revenue
Code sections 6036 and 6903. The Defendants move to strike the
notice as immaterial and impertinent to the Plaintiff's Eighth
Amendment allegations pled herein, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f),
and argue that the notice may result in prejudice to the
Defendants.

The Plaintiff's "Commercial Notice" is disregarded. Judge Newman
orders that the Plaintiff will refrain from filing any further
documents related to the Uniform Commercial Code in the action.
Failure to comply with this order may result in the imposition of
sanctions, including a recommendation that the action be dismissed
based on a failure to comply with court orders.

V. Motion to Modify Scheduling Order

The Plaintiff moves to extend the discovery deadline, and now moves
to modify the scheduling order. The Defendants object that
discovery should not be reopened in toto because such extension is
not required for the purpose of corresponding with putative inmate
witnesses, and because the Plaintiff has already served multiple
sets of discovery and was not diligent about serving other sets
prior to the Court's deadline.

In light of the finding that the Plaintiff's claims did not expire
when he was first diagnosed with COVID-19, and because the
Defendants are being required to provide additional discovery,
Judge Newman finds good cause to modify the discovery deadline to
provide for responses as ordered herein, and for the Court to
conduct its in camera review. She agrees that it is not appropriate
to fully reopen discovery. Rather, the Plaintiff is granted a
period of time to review the Defendants' additional responses and
seek further court intervention if such responses are not
satisfactory.

In light of this Order, it appears that the Defendants' motion for
summary was prematurely filed and should be vacated without
prejudice. The Defendants should refrain from refiling such motion
until the discovery disagreements are resolved.

VI. Disposition

Accordingly, Judge Newman partially grants the Plaintiff's motion
to compel.

Thirty days from the date of the Order, the Defendants shall:

     (a) electronically submit the surveillance video from Feb. 10,
2021, through May 30, 2021, during meal service in building 4 at
HDSP, sought in RPD No. 3, for in camera review to
kjnorders@caed.uscourts.gov.

     (b) produce for in camera review any staff complaint filed
against Defendant Pannu claiming Pannu was not properly wearing his
face mask while Pannu was serving meals in Building 4 at HDSP, from
Oct. 17, 2020, through May 27, 2021 (RPD Nos. 3, 10); if no such
staff complaint was filed, the Defendants will so state.

     (c) supplement their responses to RPD Nos. 4 & 8 to set forth
what efforts were taken to locate the responsive documents as to
appeals log nos. 94408 and 55703. If the "California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation Form 602 Audio Video Surveillance
System" referred to in appeal log no. 55703 cannot be located, the
Defendants will so state.

     (d) produce to the Plaintiff the redacted housing rosters for
Facility B, building 4, at HDSP for Nov. 1, 2020, and Nov. 30, 2020
(RPD No. 6).

     (e) produce, for in camera review, copies of the biweekly
reports provided to the Plaintiffs' class counsel and the federal
receiver in Plata for HDSP for the time frame Oct. 17, 2020, to May
27, 2021 (RPD No. 10).

     (f) produce for in camera review those unredacted "reports
concerning non-compliance observed on the Audio/Video Surveillance
System, reports from supervisors and managers, and correspondence,"
reviewed by defendant Kibler, solely for Building 4, Facility B,
HDSP, for the time frame Oct. 17, 2020, to Jan. 21, 2021, and
solely as to those reports or complaints that face masks were not
being properly worn during meal service. (RPD No. 13.) For the
documents produced to the Plaintiff, the Defendants will serve the
Plaintiff with supplemental responses and file certifications with
the Court as ordered. For the documents submitted for in camera
review, the Defendants will submit the documents to
kjnorders@caed.uscourts.gov.

     (g) Defendant Pannu will respond to interrogatory No. 7 as to
his employment in building 4 at HDSP from February 2021 to May 27,
2021.

     (h) In light of the Court overruling the Defendants' narrow
view of the scope of discovery, if additional responses applicable
to the time frame Nov. 11, 2020, to May 27, 2021, solely as to meal
service in building 4, Facility B at HDSP, are appropriate, the
Defendants will supplement their responses to interrogatories as
identified.

In all other respects, Judge Newman denies (i) the Plaintiff's
motion to compel, (ii) the Plaintiff's motion for sanctions and
declines to award expenses; and (iii) the Defendants' motion to
strike.

The Clerk of the Court will mark the Plaintiff's "Commercial
Notice" as disregarded.

Judge Newman (i) partially grants the Plaintiff's motion to extend
discovery and (ii) grants the Plaintiff's motion to modify the
scheduling order.

Discovery is extended to Aug. 1, 2022, for the sole purpose of
resolving the discovery requests at issue the dispositive motions
deadline is extended to Oct. 1, 2022; in all other respects the
terms of the Oct. 21, 2021 discovery and scheduling order remain
the same.

The Defendants' motion for summary judgment is vacated. The parties
will refrain from renewing or filing motions for summary judgment
until after all discovery disputes have been resolved.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y2t649yk from Leagle.com.


CITADEL SALISBURY: Bid to Dismiss Hooker Class Suit Granted in Part
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SONYA HOOKER, SYBIL RUMMAGE, DONNA DEAL, KENNETH
MICHAEL DEAL, and BETTY DEAL, individually and on behalf of a class
of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. THE CITADEL SALISBURY
LLC, SALISBURY TWO NC PROPCO LLC, ACCORDIUS HEALTH LLC, THE
PORTOPICCOLO GROUP, LLC, SIMCHA HYMAN, and NAFTALI ZANZIPER,
Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-00384 (M.D.N.C.), Judge Thomas D.
Schroeder of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in
part and denying in part:

     1. the Plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint; and

     2. the Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint.

I. Introduction

The class action lawsuit seeks economic and emotional distress
damages arising out of alleged nursing home understaffing prior to
and through the COVID-19 pandemic. The Plaintiffs are residents of
The Citadel Salisbury nursing home: Sybil Rummage, along with her
sponsor, Sonya Hooker; and Betty Deal, along with her sponsors
Donna Deal and Kenneth Michael Deal. Defendants The Citadel
Salisbury, LLC; Salisbury Two NC Propco, LLC; Accordius Health,
LLC; The Portopiccolo Group, LLC; Simcha Hyman; and Naftali
Zanziper, move to dismiss, or alternatively, to stay the action,
and to strike portions of the complaint. The Plaintiffs have
responded, opposing the motions, and the Defendants have filed
replies.

Fifteen days after the Defendants filed their reply brief in
support of their motion to dismiss, the Plaintiffs moved to amend
the complaint to, among other things, add multiple parties and
claims, withdraw one claim, and augment certain allegations. The
Plaintiffs have responded, opposing the motion, and the Defendants
have replied.

II. Background

Resident Plaintiffs Sybil Rummage and Betty Deal are residents of a
nursing home facility located at 710 Julian Road. When each
Plaintiff entered the facility prior to 2020, it was known as
"Salisbury Center" and was owned and operated by Genesis
Healthcare. When they arrived at Salisbury Center, the Resident
Plaintiffs executed admission agreements outlining the care and
basic services they should expect to receive. Sponsor Plaintiffs
Sonya Hooker, Donna Deal, and Kenneth Michael Deal are family
members who sponsor and assist the Resident Plaintiffs.

On Feb. 1, 2020, Salisbury Center was sold, and operational control
was transferred to The Citadel. The services and care at Salisbury
Center had deteriorated as Genesis fought financial trouble, and
conditions grew worse once The Citadel took over. Residents
experienced various problems from alleged chronic understaffing as
part of the Defendants' business model, such as failures to provide
necessary medication and care to the residents and to adequately
communicate with sponsors. The Plaintiffs suffered general
emotional distress because of these failures. According to the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"), during the time
of The Citadel's ownership, the quality rating of the facility
declined from one to zero out of five stars. The Citadel was
eventually "subject to more frequent inspections, escalating
penalties, and potential termination from Medicare and Medicaid" as
part of the state's "Special Focus Facility" program for nursing
home facilities with a "history of serious quality issues."

The Citadel is a limited liability company organized under North
Carolina law and holds a license with the State of North Carolina,
Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Health
Services Regulation, to operate as a for-profit combination skilled
nursing facility and adult care home.  Defendant Salisbury Two NC
Propco, LLC is a limited liability company organized under North
Carolina law and owns the property where the facility is operated.
Defendant Accordius is a limited liability company organized under
the laws of the State of New York and provides "management"
services to The Citadel. Portopiccolo is a limited liability
company organized under New Jersey law and provides "back office
services" to The Citadel. The sole members and owners of all
limited liability companies involved are Simcha Hyman and Naftali
Zanziper.

Beginning when The Citadel assumed operations, the Plaintiffs
allege, The Citadel was purposefully and consistently staffed
inadequately such that it was unable to provide the services
required for the safety and well-being of its residents. The
Plaintiffs' original complaint brings four claims for relief: (1)
breach of contract, (2) violation of the North Carolina Unfair
Trade Practices Act ("UDTPA"), N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 71-1.1., (3)
breach of fiduciary duty, and (4) negligent infliction of emotional
distress ("NIED").

The proposed amended complaint seeks to withdraw the breach of
fiduciary duty claim, add a negligence claim, and add several
parties and other Defendant-related facilities. The Plaintiffs seek
damages reflecting payments they made and disgorgement of Medicare
or Medicaid payments made on their behalf "reflecting the
reasonable value of the staffing hours they were entitled to have
receive and did not receive."

The Plaintiffs allege class action treatment, citing "hundreds" of
plaintiffs and 15 common questions that include the following: the
use of "uniform policies and systems" of management; allegedly
deceptive advertising and statements; "whether the law requires the
facility to maintain staffing at a reasonable across-the-board
level" which is alleged to be 4.1 hours per resident day of "total
nurse staffing" and 0.75 hours per resident day of "Registered
Nurse staffing"; and damages.

The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, or in the
alternative to stay, and to strike certain allegations of the
complaint. The Plaintiffs responded with oppositions and filed a
motion to file an amended complaint that purports to shore up
deficiencies of the original complaint and to expand the action.
The Defendants oppose any further amendment.

All motions are fully briefed and ready for consideration.

III. Analysis

A. Motion to Amend and Motion to Dismiss

The Plaintiffs' motion to amend, filed on the heels of the briefing
of the Defendants' motion to dismiss, seeks to amend the complaint
to (1) add Ms. Kilgo and her sponsor and adult daughter, Ms. Lee,
as Plaintiffs; (2) join Myers Park and Myers Park Propco, LLC, as
Defendants; (3) "provide greater factual and legal support" that
all the Defendants "should be held jointly and severally liable due
to their direct involvement on the facts"; (4) expand the proposed
class to all 37 facilities owned and operated by Hyman and
Zanziper; (5) add claims for negligence and equitable relief; and
(6) withdraw their fiduciary duty claim.

The Plaintiffs argue the motion to amend should be granted because
it "is made in good faith, will assist in ensuring litigation of
the material issues, and is neither frivolous nor will cause any
material prejudice." The Defendants argue the motion should be
denied because it is futile, in bad faith, and unduly prejudicial.

1. Immunity Defense

The Defendants first argue that the complaint should be dismissed,
and any amendment disallowed, on the ground that the claims for
understaffing are barred by the North Carolina Emergency or
Disaster Treatment Protection Act ("EDTPA"). They also argue that
the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by Session Law 2020-89, entitled
"An Act to Provide Limited Immunity from Liability for Claims Based
on Transmission of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19).

Taking the allegations as true, as the Court must at this
preliminary stage, a motion to dismiss on this basis must be
denied, Judge Schroeder holds. Among other things, he finds that
because the Plaintiffs allege harms resulting from understaffing
that occurred before the onset of the COVID-19 emergency
declaration, the Defendants' statutory immunity arguments based on
the EDTPA are premature at this stage.

2. Breach of Contract

The Plaintiffs' first cause of action in the complaint, repeated in
substantively the same form in the proposed amended complaint, is
for breach of contract between the Resident Plaintiffs and The
Citadel. The Resident Plaintiffs allege they had either an express
or, in the alternative, an implied-in-fact contract with The
Citadel. The Plaintiffs further contend this contract was breached
when The Citadel experienced chronic understaffing resulting in
harm to the residents.

Judge Schroeder holds that the facts, reasonably construed in the
light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, state a plausible claim for
breach of contract. He opines that the Plaintiffs allege a valid
express contract, and they plausibly allege that The Citadel
contractually committed itself to maintaining adequate staffing
levels for the proper care of their residents within the structure
of North Carolina regulations. Furthermore, the Resident
Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim does not rest solely on an
alleged failure to comply with North Carolina regulations.

3. North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice Act

The Plaintiffs' second cause of action in both the complaint and
proposed amended complaint alleges that the "Defendants engaged in
one or more unfair or deceptive acts or practices, or unfair
methods of competition, or in affecting commerce" in violation of
the UDTPA. The Defendants make multiple arguments to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' UDTPA claim. Most notably, they argue that a mere
breach of contract is insufficient to state a claim under the
UDTPA.

As the Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege a UDTPA claim,
the motion to dismiss claim two of the complaint against all the
Defendants will be granted, and because the Plaintiffs' proposed
amended complaint offers no substantively different allegations,
the motion to amend as to this claim is denied as futile.

4. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The Plaintiffs' fourth claim of the original complaint, which is
the third claim of the proposed amended complaint, alleges that The
Citadel is liable for NIED under North Carolina law.

Judge Schroeder opines that the Plaintiffs do not allege any
specific facts to render the requisite severe emotional distress
plausible. Temporary anxiety or distress, or more long-lasting
anger and frustration, is not sufficient to establish severe
emotional distress, and the Plaintiffs have alleged no further
facts showing any "severe and disabling" mental or emotional
condition. Accordingly, Judge Schroeder dismisses all claims of
NIED against The Citadel. And because the Plaintiffs' proposed
amended complaint offers no substantively different allegations,
the motion to amend as to this claim is denied as futile.

5. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The Plaintiffs' third cause of action of the original complaint
alleges that Defendants breached a fiduciary duty to the Sponsor
Plaintiffs. But as the Plaintiffs have withdrawn this claim in
their proposed amended complaint, the motion to amend is granted
and the motion to dismiss the Sponsor Plaintiffs' breach of
fiduciary duty claim is denied as moot.

6. Joinder

The Plaintiffs move to amend their complaint to join (1) Ms. Kilgo,
a resident of another Citadel-related facility, Myers Park, and her
sponsor and adult daughter, Ms. Lee, as Plaintiffs under Rule 20;
and (2) Myers Park and another limited liability company, Myers
Park Propco, LLC, as Defendants under Rule 20. The Defendants argue
that the Plaintiffs' attempted joinder is improper because Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 20 "does not authorize a plaintiff to join
defendants in a single lawsuit when the plaintiff's claims against
the defendants are unrelated." The Plaintiffs' response is largely
that the other nursing home is part of "the same enterprise" with
the "same defective staffing practices."

Judge Schroeder denies the Plaintiffs' motion to amend the claims
to add Ms. Kilgo and Ms. Lee as Plaintiffs, and Myers Park and
Myers Park Propco, LLC as Defendants, pursuant to Rule 20. He
opines that while there is an allegation of chronic understaffing
by design, the understaffing, if demonstrated, would only be
evidence to support a claim that any particular Plaintiff failed to
receive the services contracted for. Thus, any particular
Plaintiff's claim does not arise out of the alleged fact of a plan
to understaff; rather, it would arise, if at all, based on the
actual staffing each resident received. Moreover, allowing the
Plaintiffs' claims would balloon the lawsuit to include some 37
facilities managed or operated by the various Defendants, and
including hundreds, if not more, individual residents, rendering
the litigation unmanageable.

7. Joint and Several Liability

The Plaintiffs' claims are brought against The Citadel, with whom
the Resident Plaintiffs contracted, and rely on the
"instrumentality rule" to allege claims of civil conspiracy and
concert of action to pierce the corporate veil and reach the
remaining Defendants. The Plaintiffs argue that their amended
complaint "provides greater factual and legal support" that all
Defendants "should be held jointly and severally liable due to
their direct involvement on the facts."

First, Judge Schroeder denies the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
liability claim against Defendants Salisbury Two NC Propco, LLC;
Accordius; Portopiccolo; Simcha Hyman; and Naftali Zanziper without
prejudice; and grants the Plaintiffs' motion to amend those same
liability claims against those Defendants (Count IV of proposed
amended complaint)), but only insofar as necessary to allow the
parties to work off of a single (amended) complaint. Final
resolution of the claim will be held in abeyance pending the
resolution of a decision on class certification.

Second, as the Plaintiffs' complaint fails to plausibly allege a
civil conspiracy, the amended complaint's civil conspiracy claims
are futile as to Defendants Salisbury Two NC Propco, LLC;
Accordius; Portopiccolo; Simcha Hyman; and Naftali Zanziper. Thus,
the Plaintiffs' claims for civil conspiracy in the complaint are
dismissed, and the motion to add those claims in the proposed
amended complaint is denied as futile.

8. New Claims

The Plaintiffs move to amend their complaint to add claims for
negligence and equitable relief. They also move to amend to
withdraw their claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The Defendants
argue that the Plaintiffs' new claims are futile because the
"Plaintiffs have failed to offer the requisite certification and
supporting expert affidavits as required by North Carolina Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(j)" for medical malpractice claims. The
Plaintiffs argue that these are not claims of medical negligence;
"rather, this case is about corporate failure to budget for
required staffing."

First, Judge Schroeder opines that he need not resolve whether the
Plaintiffs' negligence claim is best characterized as a medical
malpractice claim or one for negligent conduct in understaffing
because the claim is futile regardless. Second, he denies as futile
the Plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint to assert a request
for declaratory relief.

9. Prejudice

The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs' amended complaint
should be denied as unduly prejudicial as it was made "after the
motion to dismiss was filed," the Plaintiffs were already aware of
their "new" facts prior to filing their initial complaint, and
"expanding the class allegations to another facility and then to
all North Carolina facilities is being done for no other reason
than to prejudicially drive up Defendants' cost of litigation." The
Plaintiffs do not respond to this argument.

Judge Schroeder opines that the timing and changes in the
Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint appear to be, at least in
part, an attempt to circumvent the Defendants' pending motion to
dismiss and has complicated the court's resolution of the pending
motions. However, as the Court is nevertheless entertaining the
Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Defendants are not unduly
prejudiced either by a delay or through the "time and expense of
fully briefing a motion to dismiss." Additionally, the Court has
denied expansion of the litigation to include joinder of Ms. Kilgo
and Ms. Lee as Plaintiffs, and Myers Park and Myers Park Propco,
LLC as Defendants, under Rule 20. On the whole, therefore,
consideration of the Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint
does not unduly prejudice Defendants.

B. Motion to Strike

The Defendants move to strike various allegations in the
Plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(f). Specifically, they move to strike the following: (1)
"inflammatory terms" such as "cut-rate medical supplies," "reckless
cost-cutting measures," and "upstart nursing home chain"; (2)
allegations against a non-party, Genesis; (3) allegations
"concerning standard of care violations"; and (4) "allegations
pertain[ing] to marketing materials." In response, the Plaintiffs
argue that "there is nothing inflammatory, scandalous or otherwise
strike-able about the allegations in the Complaint. The Defendants
did not file a reply.

Judge Schroeder opines that the dispute over many of the
allegations deemed offensive has been resolved by the Court's grant
of the Defendants' motion to dismiss. Even if many of the alleged
"inflammatory terms" and facts surrounding Genesis were removed,
dismissal of the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim would not be
warranted. Additionally, the Court has already determined that the
allegations in the purported "standard of care violations" may
demonstrate breach of contract. See supra. Finally, the
"allegations pertaining to marketing materials" are only relevant
to the Plaintiffs' UDTPA claim, which the court is dismissing.
Accordingly, the motion to strike is denied as moot.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons he stated, Judge Schroeder grants in part and
denies in part the Plaintiffs' motion to amend. He (i) grants the
motion as to the Resident Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim
(Count I) of the proposed amended complaint; (ii) denies the motion
as futile as to joinder to add Ms. Kilgo and Ms. Lee as Plaintiffs,
and Myers Park and Myers Park Propco, LLC as Defendants; (iii)
denies as futile as to Counts II (Unfair and Deceptive Trade
Practices), III (Negligent Infliction of Severe Emotional
Distress), V (Negligence), VI (Equitable Relief), and IV (as to
civil conspiracy), against all Defendants, as alleged in the
proposed amended complaint; (iv) grants the motion as to
allegations of liability against all the Defendants under the
instrumentality rule (Count IV) except that as to this count the
Plaintiffs will be permitted only to file the amended complaint
(deleting reference to civil conspiracy) and discovery on any claim
seeking to pierce the corporate structure of any Defendant as well
as the Court's final determination on whether Count IV can proceed
will be stayed pending resolution of the determination of class
certification.

Judge Schroeder grants in part and denies in part the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the complaint as follows: The motion is granted
as to Count II (Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices) and Count IV
(Negligent Infliction of Severe Emotional Distress) of the
complaint, which claims are dismissed against all the Defendants;
the motion is denies as to the Resident Plaintiffs' breach of
contract claim (Count I); and denied as moot as to the Sponsor
Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim (Count III), which thr
Plaintiffs have withdrawn, and denied as to the allegations of
liability under the instrumentality rule (Count V), which the
Plaintiffs have amended and the court has allowed subject to the
limitations noted.

The motion to stay is withdrawn and denied as moot.

The motion to strike is denied as moot.

The prior stay of consideration of the Plaintiffs' class
certification is lifted and the Plaintiffs will have 30 days within
which to file their updated briefing in support of their motion to
certify the class. The Defendants' response briefs and the
Plaintiffs' reply briefs will be filed as provided in the court's
Local Rules.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2custddk from
Leagle.com.


CO-DIAGNOSTICS: Faces Stockholder Suits Over Faulty Press Releases
------------------------------------------------------------------
Co-Diagnostics, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that the company is
currently a defendant in five different securities class action
complaints that were filed by certain stockholders of the company
claiming that the company promulgated false and misleading press
releases to increase the price of our stock to improperly benefit
the officers and directors of the Company.

The plaintiffs demand compensatory damages sustained as a result of
the company's alleged wrongdoing in an amount to be proven at
trial.

Co-Diagnostics, Inc., a Utah corporation, develops, manufactures
and sells reagents used for diagnostic tests.


CODE ENFORCEMENT: Underpays Security Guards, Niekerk Suit Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case, IAN VAN NIEKERK, and all others similarly situated under
29 U.S.C. Section 216(b), Plaintiff v. CODE ENFORCEMENT SECURITY,
INC., DENIS VARGAS, individually, HOMETEAM SECURITY, INC., and
ALBERT VARGAS, individually, Defendants, Case No.
1:22-cv-21653-XXXX (S.D. Fla., May 27, 2022) arises from the
Defendants' alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendants as a non-exempt
security guard beginning in August 2021 until his separation on
November 30, 2021.

The Plaintiff brings this complaint as a collective action
asserting claims that the Defendant did not properly pay his and
similarly situated security guards overtime compensation at the
legally mandated overtime rate despite routinely working more than
40 hours per week throughout his employment with the Defendants.

The Plaintiff seeks actual damages for the unpaid overtime wages
for himself and other similarly situated security guards, as well
as liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and litigation costs, all
recoverable interest, and other relief as the Court deems just and
proper.

Code Enforcement Security Inc. and HomeTeam Security, Inc. are
for-profit corporation operating out of Miami-Dade County, Florida.
Both Defendants offers security services. Denis Vargas is the owner
and operator of CES, while Albert Vargas is the owner of HomeTeam
Security, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J. Freddy Perera, Esq.
          Brody M. Shulman, Esq.
          Alexander T. Harne, Esq.
          PERERA ALEMAN, P.A.
          12555 Orange Drive, Second Floor
          Davie, FL 33330
          Tel: (786) 485-5232

CONSUMER ADJUSTMENT: Brittingham Seeks Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DANNY N. BRITTINGHAM v.
CONSUMER ADJUSTMENT COMPANY, INC., Case No. (), the Plaintiff asks
the Court to enter an order certifying a class of:

   "All persons who were (1) residents of the United States; (2)
   whose credit information was communicated to Experian,
   Equifax, TransUnion, or other consumer reporting agencies, by
   CACi using the name Midwest Recovery Systems, between
   September 1, 2019, and September 30, 2020."

Excluded from this Class are all persons who have already settled
or otherwise compromised their claims against Defendant. Also
excluded from the Class is the Defendant, and any entity in which
the Defendant has a controlling interest, the Defendant’s agents,
and employees, any Judge to whom this action is assigned and any
member of such Judge's staff and immediate family, and all people
who submit timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion from
the Class.

The Plaintiff's claims are in every respect typical and
representative of the class that he seeks to represent. Class
certification under these circumstances is both appropriate and
required. This action should be certified as a class action because
it meets all the requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are met, the Plaintiff says.

This case is brought under Federal Consumer Protection Statutes.
The Plaintiff seeks certification of a class under Rules
23(a)1)-(4), and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
He asserts claims against the defendant under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA).

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated May 23,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3m21j1P
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Earl P. Underwood, Jr.
          ATTORNEY AT LAW
          21 South Section Street
          Fairhope, AL 36532
          Telephone: (251) 990-5558
          Facsimile: (251) 990-0626
          E-mail: epunderwood@alalaw.com

               - and -

          Steven P. Gregory, Esq.
          GREGORY LAW FIRM, PC
          505 20th Street North, Suite 1215
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 208-0312
          E-mail: steve@gregorylawfirm.us

The Defendant is represented by:

          Matthew J. Bell, Esq.
          MALONE FROST MARTIN
          1200 S. Big Bend Bvld.
          St. Louis, MO 63117
          Telephone: (314) 669-5490
          Facsimile: (888) 632-6937

               - and -

          L. Jackson Young, Jr.
          MOORE YOUNG FOSTER & HAZELTON, LLP
          1122 Edenton Street
          Birmingham, AL 35242
          Telephone: (205) 879-8722
          Facsimile: (205) 879-8831
          E-mail: jyoung@my-defense.com

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY: Bid to Dismiss Cheslow Suit Granted in Part
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LINDA CHESLOW, Plaintiff v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, Defendants, Case No. 21 C 4010 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Virginia
M. Kendall of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, grants in part and denies in part the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Cheslow brought claims against Defendant Continental
alleging breach of contract and fraud claims. Cheslow purchased
long-term care insurance from Continental through her employer's
group policy. Continental raised nationwide premiums at different
rates and times based on varying state regulatory regimes. Cheslow
argues the raising of premiums at different rates violated the
terms of the contract and amounted to fraud due to Continental's
statement that a change in premiums would only occur if "premiums
for all other Insureds in the same premium class" rose and that
premiums could not be changed due to "age or health."

II. Background

Ms. Cheslow, a citizen and resident of the State of California,
purchased a certificate for long-term care insurance provided by
Continental through her employer, Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc.'s long-term
care group policy, effective June 1, 2008. Long-term care insurance
policies provide for the costs of assistance required due to
disability or old age. Unique from long-term disability insurance,
which provides income protection in the event an individual becomes
disabled, long-term care insurance provides for a range of services
individuals may require if they are unable to care for themselves.
Individuals may purchase long-term care at a younger age to "secure
a more favorable premium than they could otherwise obtain over the
coming years."

Continental issued long-term care insurance policies across the
nation, including a group long-term care policy number 0010177TQ
offered to Hoffman-LaRoche, Cheslow's employer, with an effective
date of Nov. 2, 2002. The Policy Cheslow enrolled in provided her
with a daily nursing home benefit of $250, a daily Alternate Care
Facility benefit of $250, and a daily Community Based Care benefit
of $150.

The Policy certificate does not include any additional definition
of "premium class." The rate schedules for the Policy included
rates ranging based on only age and benefit level. The master
policy includes tables of monthly and biweekly premium rates
nationwide, without indicating differences based on state of
residency. In contrast to the Policy Cheslow obtained, Continental
also offered individual long-term care insurance coverage policies,
one of which stated expressly, "We may change the premium rates.
Any change will apply to all policies in the same class as Yours in
the state where the policy was issued."

At the outset, Cheslow's Policy certificate included a monthly
premium of $206.71 or an annual premium of $2,478.12. On Sept. 13,
2016, Continental issued a letter to Cheslow indicating her premium
would increase by 95.5% in two phases. The first phase would be a
70% increase on Nov. 1, 2016, followed by a 15% increase on Nov. 1,
2017. After the first phase of a 70% increase, Cheslow was informed
her new monthly premium payment would be an additional $72.71 each
month at $279.42.

In response to the premium increase, Cheslow could react in one of
three ways, according to the letter. First, she could continue her
coverage by paying the new premium of $279.42 each month. Second,
she could reduce her level of coverage to "minimize the effect" of
the increase. Or third, she could execute a non-forfeiture benefit
and discontinue premium payments, accepting "a drastically reduced
maximum benefit under the certificate." Cheslow was unable to pay
the increased monthly premium and chose to take the second option,
reducing her benefit in order to reduce her premium.

The letter Continental sent in September 2016 also informed Cheslow
that the premium rate increase would not be effective for everyone:
"Continental must comply with the laws and regulations of the
states in which certificates were issued, which vary by state. It
is likely that the size and timing of the rate increases may vary
by state." The rates did in fact vary by states. For example, in
Washington D.C., Continental sought a 10% increase to take effect
Sept. 1, 2016, for insured individuals in Cheslow's premium class.

Ms. Cheslow is seeking to raise claims as a class action
representing "all individuals who purchased or are insured under a
Continental Casualty Company group policy for long-term care
coverage delivered in New Jersey, whose group policy either states
or was marketed using material that states that premiums will not
increase unless they also increase for all other insureds or all
other insureds in a premium class, age, category, or other
specified category."

The Plaintiff raises five claims for relief. The first count is
breach of contract due to Continental's increasing premiums in a
manner that was not uniform for all other insured individuals in
the same premium class by raising premiums under the Policy at
different rates and different times in different states. The second
cause is breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing on the same basis. Third, Cheslow brings a cause of action
for violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:
8-1 et seq. ("NJCFA"), "through its unfair and deceptive practices
in marketing and selling long-term care policies, including
concealing its intent to raise premiums on a state-by-state basis
at the time the coverage was sold." The fourth cause of action is
fraudulent concealment based on Continental's "failure to disclose
its intention to seek premium increases that varied in timing and
amount from state to state." Finally, Cheslow raises a cause of
action for declaratory and injunctive relief.

III. Discussion

A. Count I: Breach of Contract Claim

Continental allegedly breached the language of the contract in both
the group policy and membership certificate providing that premium
changes would be "based on his or her premium class, but only if we
change the premiums for all other Insureds in the same premium
class" by raising premiums at different rates and different times
varying by states.

Continental argues Cheslow is incapable of proving breach of an
actual promise. According to Continental, insured individuals are
presumed to know state regulatory requirements prohibit imposition
of a "nationwide" rate increase, and such requirements are
incorporated into the policy. Cheslow argues state regulatory
regimes are irrelevant to "Continental's promises of a groupwide
premium class based on age" since "no statute or regulation
mandated any premium increase, let alone increases that vary from
one state to the next."

Judge Kendall opines that while she may consider extrinsic evidence
to resolve a facial ambiguity, the reference by Continental to
state regulations as a basis to dissuade the Court of dual
reasonable interpretations is unpersuasive at this point. The term
"premium class" is not defined; it is ambiguous and subject to
multiple reasonable interpretations, including the interpretation
put forth by the Plaintiff. She denies the Defendant's motion as to
Count I along the same reasoning.

B. Count II: Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing

Like the bases for the breach of contract claim, the Plaintiff
alleges Continental breached the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing by failing "to exercise its discretion over rate
increases reasonably, in a manner consistent with Cheslow's
justified expectations."

Judge Kendall finds that Cheslow reiterates the same set of facts
for her claim of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing as she alleges for the breach of contract claim. She holds
that Cheslow's surviving count for breach of contract sufficiently
encapsulates her claims based on Continental breaching explicit
terms in the agreement, and therefore, Count II is duplicative of
Count I and dismissed as such.

C. Count III: Violation of the NJCFA

Ms. Cheslow argues Continental violated the NJCFA by affirmatively
misrepresenting to insured individuals that the premium being
charged "was a nationwide premium that could be raised only based
on the age group of the insured" when in fact premiums were charged
at different rates by state. Continental argues application of the
Second Restatement requires the Court apply consumer fraud laws of
the state with the most significant relationship to a plaintiff's
claims.Therefore, it claims California fraud laws should apply
since Cheslow is a California resident who purchased coverage in
California from Continental, an Illinois-based insurer.

Judge Kendall agrees with Continental that the nexus to New
Jersey's consumer fraud protections is too attenuated to Cheslow's
relationship with Continental and therefore dismisses the third
count. She holds that the district court in New Jersey held
"applying New Jersey law to out-of-state claims 'would frustrate
the policies of each claimant's state,' even if 'New Jersey has an
interest in deterring misconduct by corporations headquartered
within its borders,'" citing Gelis v. Bayerische Motoren Werke
Aktiengesellschaft, 2018 WL 6804506, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2018)
(quoting Maniscalco v. Borhter Intern. (USA) Corp., 709 F.3d 202,
208 (3rd Cir. 2013)). In Gelis, the allegation was based on actions
and misrepresentations by a Defendant with headquarters in New
Jersey. In the present case, Cheslow's allegations are based on the
group Policy being issued to her employer, based in New Jersey.

D. Count IV: Fraudulent Concealment

Like the other claims brought in the action, the claim for
fraudulent concealment is based on Continental's group policy
"suggesting that the premiums are based on age alone." As further
basis, Cheslow argues the letter Continental sent to insured
individuals describing that increase to premiums would vary by
state evinces Continental could have been forthright about the
variance during the initial application process. Continental argues
Cheslow failed to specifically allege the "who, what, when, where,
and how" of the alleged fraud in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P.
9(b).

Judge Kendall opines that Cheslow has put forward a plausible
allegation that Continental's assurances about raising premiums by
"premium class" without noting the increases would range based on
state of residency could be considered a half-truth, and therefore
give rise to a duty to disclose. It is also possible and
sufficiently plead that Defendant may have intentionally withheld
the material fact of raising premiums based on state of residency.
Similar to the first count, two other courts in this district have
come to similar results.

Judge Kendall denies the Defendant's motion as to Count IV along
the same reasoning. Cheslow's complaint satisfies the pleading
process stage and survives the motion to dismiss on this count.

E. Count V: Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

Finally, Continental moves to dismiss the fifth count on the basis
that the Plaintiff has not alleged that it violated any legal
rights, or that such a purported violation created a risk of
irreparable harm. As Judge Kendall has upheld two of the four other
counts as viable claims, she denies the Defendant's motion to
dismiss Count V.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons she set forth, Judge Kendall grants in part and
denies in part the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. The Plaintiff's
claim in Count II for breach of implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is dismissed as redundant. The Plaintiff's claim in
Count III for violation of the NJCFA is also dismissed. The
Plaintiff's claims in Counts I, IV, and V remain.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 24, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc3kfxk4 from
Leagle.com.


CORMEDIX INC: Plaintiff in Securities Suit Balks at Bid to Dismiss
------------------------------------------------------------------
CorMedix Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on May 12, 2022, that the lead plaintiff of the
consolidated class action lawsuit filed an opposition to the
company's motions to dismiss.

On October 13, 2021, the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey consolidated into "In re CorMedix Inc.
Securities Litigation," Case No. 2:21-cv014020-JXN-CLW, two
putative class action lawsuits filed on or about July 22, 2021 and
September 13, 2021, respectively, and appointed lead counsel and
lead plaintiff, a purported stockholder of the company. The lead
plaintiff filed a consolidated amended class action complaint on
December 14, 2021, alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Exchange Act, along with Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,
and Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933. The complaint
names as defendants the company, Khoso Baluch, Matthew David,
Phoebe Mounts, John L. Armstrong, Robert Cook, Janet Dillione, Alan
W. Dunton, Myron Kaplan, Steven Lefkowitz, Paulo F. Costa, and Greg
Duncan, as well as two underwriters of the Company's secondary
stock offering, B. Riley Securities, Inc. and Needham & Company,
LLC.

The purported bases for these claims are alleged misstatements and
omissions in connection with the NDA submitted to the FDA for
DefenCath, and the subsequent notification by the FDA that the NDA
could not be approved in its present form. The lead plaintiff
purports to assert the Exchange Act claims on behalf of persons
that purchased or otherwise acquired shares of the company's
securities between October 16, 2019, and September 6, 2021, and
purports to assert the Securities Act claims on behalf of persons
that purchased shares of the company's securities pursuant or
traceable to a secondary offering of stock that commenced on
November 27, 2020. The company filed a motion to dismiss the
current complaint in full, with prejudice, on February 21, 2022.

The company and the other defendants refiled their motions to
dismiss on March 28, 2022, the lead plaintiff filed an opposition
to the Defendants' motions to dismiss on April 27, 2022.

CorMedix Inc. is a biopharmaceutical company focused on developing
and commercializing therapeutic products for the prevention and
treatment of infectious and inflammatory diseases based in New
Jersey.


DEVA CONCEPTS: Denial of Bid for Exclusion in Settlement Appealed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Movant Katherine Robaina filed an appeal from a court ruling
denying her motion for leave to be excluded from a  settlement in
the consolidated class action complaint entitled IN RE: DEVA
CONCEPTS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, Case No. 1:20-cv-01234-GHW,
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (New York City).

The complaint is a civil class action brought by the Plaintiffs on
behalf of consumers who purchased the Defendant's "DevaCurl No-Poo
Original" non-lathering conditioning cleanser, DevaCurl One
Condition Original hair-conditioner, DevaCurl Light Defining Gel,
DevaCurl Low-Poo Original cleanser, DevaCurl Low-Poo Delight
cleanser, DevaCurl No-Poo Decadence cleanser, DevaCurl One
Condition Delight hair-conditioner, DevaCurl One Condition
Decadence hair-conditioner, Melt into Moisture Mask, Styling Cream,
DevaCurl Leave-In Decadence conditioner, Super Stretch Coconut Curl
Elongator, Wavemaker, and DevaCurl Ultra Defining Gel which are
used for personal cosmetic purposes.

In 2002, the Defendant created and developed the formula for the
DevaCurl No-Poo Original, which is marketed as containing no
sulfate, and is also marketed as an "innovative new haircare
category" and a "game-changing alternative to traditional
shampoo."

However, despite the "DevaCurl phenomenon" that has caused many
curly haired consumers across the United States to purchase and use
the Products, use of the Products cause scalp irritation, excessive
shedding, hair loss, thinning, breakage, and/or balding during
normal use by consumers, says the suit.

On January 3, 2022, Judge Gregory H. Woods granted final approval
of a class settlement in the case. The Settlement involves
allegations in Plaintiffs' Consolidated Class Action Complaint that
Defendant designed, formulated, manufactured, distributed and sold
haircare products that are falsely and misleadingly labeled and
sold as well as caused adverse reactions resulting in personal
injures to Plaintiffs and the Class. The Settlement does not
constitute an admission of liability by DevaCurl, and the Court
expressly does not make any finding of liability or wrongdoing by
DevaCurl.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on February 21, 2022,
Judge Gregory H. Woods of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York ordered the counsel for both Lead Plaintiffs
and the Defendant to respond to Katherine Robaina's Feb. 3, 2022
motion for leave to be excluded from the class action settlement no
later than Feb. 25, 2022.

On April 25, 2022, Judge Woods entered a Memorandum Opinion and
Order denying Ms. Robaina's motion for leave to be excluded from
the settlement.

Ms. Robaina is now seeking a review of this order.

The appellate case is captioned as IN RE: DEVA CONCEPTS PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION, Case No. 22-1142, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, filed on May 25, 2022.[BN]

Movant-Appellant Katherine Robaina is represented by:

          Amy Davis, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF AMY E. DAVIS LLC
          1021 North Bishop Avenue
          Dallas, TX 75208
          Telephone: (214) 838-3501

Defendant-Appellee Deva Concepts, LLC, DBA DevaCurl, is represented
by:

          John Luger McManus, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, P.A.
          401 East Las Olas Boulevard
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 768-8291
          E-mail: mcmanusj@gtlaw.com

DJO GLOBAL INC: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against DJO Global, Inc. The
case is styled as Vanessa Jimenez, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. DJO Global, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-04369 (S.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

DJO -- https://www.djoglobal.com/ -- is an American medical device
company headquartered in Lewisville, Texas, that produces a variety
of orthopedic products for rehabilitation, pain management, and
physical therapy.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


DRINKS INSIDERS: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Drinks Insiders, LLC.
The case is styled as Jose Mejia, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Drinks Insiders, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-04367 (S.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

DRINKS -- https://www.drinks.com/ -- operates the leading consumer
marketplace for high quality and affordable premium wine available
for delivery around the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


EARLY WARNING: Arant Consumer Fraud Suit Removed to D. Arizona
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled ROBERT ARANT, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. EARLY WARNING SERVICES, LLC d/b/a ZELLE, Case
No. CV2022-005057, was removed from the Superior Court of the State
of Arizona for the County of Maricopa to the U.S. District Court
for the District of Arizona on May 27, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the District of Arizona assigned Case No.
2:22-cv-00920-MTL to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the
Arizona Consumer Fraud Act and the Washington Consumer Protection
Act by making misrepresentations about the safety of its Zelle
mobile banking service.

Early Warning Services, LLC, doing business as Zelle, is a private
financial services company, with its principal place of business in
Scottsdale, Arizona. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Meridyth M. Andresen, Esq.
         Jacob A. Maskovich, Esq.
         BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER LLP
         Two North Central Avenue, Suite 2100
         Phoenix, AZ 85004-4406
         Telephone: (602) 364-7000
         Facsimile: (602) 364-7070
         E-mail: jamaskovich@bclplaw.com
                 mmandresen@bclplaw.com

EASTWOOD CONSTRUCTION: Russo Class Suit Removed to D.S.C.
---------------------------------------------------------
The case styled MARY RUSSO, KAREN HALVERSON, SANCHELLE JOHNSON, AND
JULIANN CALLERY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, JESSICA ANCRUM, SHERRYL ANDERSON, BRIANNA BENDIK, JUSTIN
BENDIK, RANDY BROWN, JUAN DOZIER, DARRYL FELKEL, MEGAN FELKEL,
NICOLE FLOYD, CANDID FORTNER, PETER FORTNER, KYLE GREGO, ASHLEY
HALLOCK, CHRISTIAN HALLOCK, SAMUEL HALVERSON, KATHLEEN HARVEY,
ARTHUR HUNTER, JANICA HUNTER, JOHN JEFFERSON, SHEILA JEFFERSON,
AHMAD LEWIS, PATICIA LEWIS, LUCINDA LIFERIDGE, PHILLIP LIFERIDGE,
JEREMY MCNEER, TIMOTHY O'BRIEN, WENDI O'BRIEN, JASON POGAR, LINDSEY
POGAR, TRISTAN PROCTOR, MARVIN RAVENEL, DIANE SASS, JEREMY SHELTRA,
MATTHEW SHREVE, DOLORES SMILEY, MAE TAYLOR, NEVERROL THOMPSON, JOHN
TURNER, MARIA TURNER, LYNN WASHINGTON, and JANELLE WRIGHT v.
EASTWOOD CONSTRUCTION PARTNERS, LLC F/K/A EASTWOOD CONSTRUCTION,
LLC F/K/A EASTWOOD HOMES, INC.; EASTWOOD HOMES, INC.; EXTERIOR
CONTRACT SERVICES, LLC; SOUTHCOAST EXTERIORS, INC.; ALPHA OMEGA
CONSTRUCTION GROUP, INC., CIRO LOPEZ, JUAN GARZA RAMOS, JOHN DOE
SUBCONTRACTORS 1-25, and AIR VENT, INC., Case No. 2020-CP-10-03786,
was removed from the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, County
of Charleston, to the U.S. District Court for the District of South
Carolina on May 27, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the District of South Carolina assigned Case
No. 2:22-cv-01686-DCN to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged negligence, breach of
implied warranties, and violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act
by manufacturing and selling defective roof ridge vent that caused
damages to residential homes.

Eastwood Construction Partners, LLC, formerly known as Eastwood
Construction, LLC, formerly known as Eastwood Homes, Inc., is a
construction company in North Carolina.

Eastwood Homes, Inc. is a home construction company based in North
Carolina.

Exterior Contract Services, LLC is an exterior contract services
company based in South Carolina.

Southcoast Exteriors, Inc. is a roofing contractor in South
Carolina.

Alpha Omega Construction Group, Inc. is a residential and
commercial general contracting company, headquartered in North
Carolina. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         E. Raymond Moore, III, Esq.
         Cordes B. Kennedy, Esq.
         MURPHY & GRANTLAND, P.A.
         P.O. Box 6648
         Columbia, SC 29260
         Telephone: (803) 782-4100
         E-mail: ermoore@murphygrantland.com
                 ckennedy@murphygrantland.com

ENCORE CAPITAL: Williams Appeals Summary Judgment in FDCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Lloyd Williams filed an appeal from a summary judgment
ruling entered in his lawsuit entitled LLOYD WILLIAMS, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ENCORE
CAPITAL GROUP, INC., et al., Defendants, Civil No.
2:19-cv-05252-JMG, in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff obtained a credit card
from Comenity Capital Bank. This credit card charged an interest
rate that would ordinarily be considered usurious and unlawful in
Pennsylvania, which is where the Plaintiff resides. But Comenity is
a state-chartered, federally insured bank within the purview of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act and could, therefore, charge the
Plaintiff interest exceeding the limits imposed by  Pennsylvania
law. Comenity issued a credit card to the Plaintiff, and this
credit card charged between 24.99% and 25.99% annual interest. Over
time, the Plaintiff fell behind on his credit card payments.
Comenity closed the Plaintiff's account, charged it off, and sold
the account to the Defendants.

After acquiring the Plaintiff's account, the Defendants made
various efforts to collect on the Plaintiff's debt. Unlike
Comenity, the Defendants are not state-chartered, federally insured
banks.

In response to Defendants' efforts to collect on his debt, the
Plaintiff filed the lawsuit in federal court claiming that the
Defendants lack authority to collect a portion of his debt and that
the Defendants' efforts to collect that portion violate
Pennsylvania and federal law. The Plaintiff brought this lawsuit as
a putative class action on behalf of himself and other Pennsylvania
residents from whom the Defendants have attempted to collect debt.

After holding a conference with counsel, the Court instructed the
parties to complete discovery related to class certification and
the merits of the Plaintiff's individual claims. The parties have
completed that discovery. The Plaintiff moved for class
certification and partial summary judgment, and the Defendants
moved for total summary judgment.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on May 23, 2022, Judge
John M. Gallagher of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania granted the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment. Because the Court found the Defendants' motion
dispositive of all the Plaintiff's claims, the Court said it will
not proceed to address the Plaintiff's motions for partial summary
judgment or class certification.

The appellate case is captioned as Lloyd Williams v. Encore Capital
Group Inc, et al., Case No. 22-2000, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, filed on May 25, 2022.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant LLOYD WILLIAMS, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Danielle Bruno McDermott, Esq.
          SCHNADER HARRISON SEGAL & LEWIS
          120 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2700
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 577-5200

               - and -

          Layla A. Issa, Esq.
          Ira N. Richards, Esq.
          SCHNADER HARRISON SEGAL & LEWIS
          1600 Market Street, Suite 3600
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 751-2498

Defendants-Appellees ENCORE CAPITAL GROUP INC., MIDLAND CREDIT
MANAGEMENT INC., and MIDLAND FUNDING LLC are represented by:

          Lauren M. Burnette, Esq.
          MESSER STRICKLER BURNETTE
          12276 San Jose Boulevard, Suite 718
          Jacksonville, FL 32223
          Telephone: (904) 527-1172
          E-mail: lburnette@messerstrickler.com

               - and -

          Katherine M. Olson, Esq.
          MESSER STRICKLER
          225 West Washington Street, Suite 575
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 334-3469

ENDA ATHLETIC: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Enda Athletic, Inc.
The case is styled as Vanessa Jimenez, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Enda Athletic, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-04368 (S.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Enda -- https://www.endasportswear.com/ -- is an African running
shoe brand that inspires by the world's greatest runners in
Kenya.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


EPIC LANDSCAPE: Faces Gomez Wage-and-Hour Class Suit in D. Kansas
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE GONZALEZ GOMEZ, ADRIAN MARGARITO LOPEZ-ARENAS, ALEJANDRO
NAVAEZ-USCANGA, ALFONSO FAVELA-HERRERA, ALFREDO ALFONSO
SANCHEZ-VALDEZ, ANTONIO LOPEZ-HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO MARTINEZ-MARTINEZ,
CLAUDIO REY SALAS-LOPEZ, DAVID PALMA-MARTINEZ, FIDEL
MEDRANO-RENTERIA, GERARDO JOEL QUINONES-VARGAS, J. ASCENCION
ADAME-GUERRERO, JAVIER DIODONEY-CARABALLO, JESUS SALVADOR
HERNANDEZ-DEVORA, JOEL QUINONES-MEDINA, JORGE PALMA-MARTINEZ, JOSE
LUIS MARTINEZ-MEDRANO, JUAN CARLOS GALAVIZ-GARCIA, JUAN JOSE
GALINDO-GARCIA II, JUAN JOSE MARTINEZ-MEDRANO, LEONEL
QUINONES-VARGAS, LUIS ARRIETA-BRAVO, MARCO ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ,
MIGUEL ANGEL ROCHA-GUTIERREZ, NOE BAZALDUA-SANCHEZ, RAMON ENRIQUE
AVILA-VILLA, RICARDO ANTONIO RIQUELME-HERNANDEZ, SERGIO
LOZANO-CORONADO, TOMAS FAVELA-RODRIGUEZ, VICTOR JOSE ANGEL
CHAIREZ-CENISEROS, AARON JACOB WILLIS, ABRAHAM DE JESUS BARRERA,
ADAMS DEIVI ORTIZ-GARCIA, ALEXIS SANTIAGO-LOPEZ, ANAIS ESPERANZA
GARCIA-MORALES, ANDRES EDUVIGE LIRIANO-DEVORA, ANGEL BAEZ, ANGEL F.
HERNANDEZ-NIEVES, ANGEL L. TORRES-COTTO, ANGEL LUIS ORTIZ-PEREZ,
ANTONIO ("TONY") SANTANA-ARCE, APOLINAR TRINIDAD-DELOSSANTOS,
ARNALDO JARED PENA-DELGADO, ATCEN JOEL CORSINO, AUSTIN TYLER BLACK,
CARLOS MARTINEZ-REYES, CARLOS ALFREDO REYES-VILLEGAS, CARLOS DANIEL
SANCHEZ-ALVAREZ, CARLOS M. SUSTAITA, JR., CESAR AUGUSTO
ROMEU-FLORES, CHARLES NELSON, CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL JONES,
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL SMITH, CIPRIANO ISLAS, CLAUDIA BEATRIZ PERAZA,
DAN ELVIS RAMIREZ-MARRERO, DAVID RODRIGUEZ BRACERO, DEVON J.
WHITMORE, EDWIN OMAR VARGAS RESTO, EDWIN EDUARDO CARDENAS-PERALES,
EDY SIKLER, ELLIS D. COX, ERICK ZAYAS-MORALES, ETHAN M. JOHNSON,
FABIAN DELGADO-GONZALEZ, FABIAN QUEZADA-AVILA, FERNANDO
FLORES-CARDENAS, FRANCISCO JAVIER HERNANDEZ, FREDERICK
TYRONE-WHITBY, GREGORIO HERNANDEZ, HERMINIO SEGARRA, IRVING JOEL
COLLAZO-MERCADO, IVAN CORTES-DOMINGUEZ, JAM CARLOS
SANTIAGO-MALDONADO, JEFFREY CHARLES SCHELBAR, JELFRY ALEJANDRO
BARIAS, JESSE MICHAEL CARPENTER, JOHNNY CRUZ-LUNA, JONATHAN
RIOS-ARGUETA, JONATHANRIVERA-BONILLA, JORGE LUIS AYALA-SANTANA,
JOSE A. PINEDA MEJIA, JOSE AGUSTIN PEREZ-ARROYO, JOSE ALBERTO
GONZALEZ-GOMEZ, JOSE ANTONIO VARGAS-GUZMAN, JOSE E. MARTINEZ ROQUE,
JOSE JUAN ARCHILLA, JOSHUA ISAAC ORTIZ-LUNA, JOSUE IRIZARRY-PEREZ,
JUAN CARLOS RODRIGUEZ, JULIO JOSUE VERGARA-MARTINEZ, JUNIOR JOSE
GRIMONT-YANEZ, JUSTO A. VILLARREAL, KELVIN SOTO-SOTO, KELVIN DAVID
RESTO-MONTANEZ, KEVIN REY-ANCHONDO, KEVIN ANTONIO GUEVARA-CORDERO,
LIZZETH JACQUELINE BLANCO, LORENZO MELGAREJO-GAMEZ, LUIS
TROCHE-PINTO, LUIS ALBERTO ORELLANO-RODRIGUEZ, LUIS DANIEL
DELGADO-RIVERA, LUIS ENRIQUE RODRIGUEZ, LUIS O. VERGARA-MARTINEZ,
MANUEL MALDONADO-RODRIGUEZ, MARCELINO ESTRADA, MARLIS C.
MORALES-MOLINA, MARTIN FRANCISCO VARELA II, MATTHEW ANDREW BLACK,
MERWEEN R. MARRERO-RODRIGUEZ, MICHAEL SANCHEZ-MOLINA, MITSON TOM,
NICOLAS QUEZADA-AVILA, OCTAVIO RODRIGUEZ, RAYMUNDO SILVA-QUINONEZ,
REICHY ERAM, REUEL TIRADO-ORTIZ, ROGELIO MORALES-ROBLES, RUBEN
GAMINO CRUZ, SALVADOR JOSEPH VILLARREAL, SAMUEL ANTONIO
MOLINA-LOPEZ, SERGIO ROMAN RODRIGUEZ, SONIA LOPEZ-LUIS, STEPHANE
BLAKE HARMON, STEVEN J. HOLDEN, THOMAS EDWARD PONDS, TYRONE ALVIN
SCOTT EL, ZACHARY PAULEY, MICHAEL ARCHILLA, ANDRES
SANTANDER-ESPINOZA, MARCOS XAVIER PAGAN-SANTIAGO, GUILLERMO A.
SUAREZ, JUAN JOSE PALMA-MARTINEZ, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. EPIC LANDSCAPE
PRODUCTIONS, L.C., Defendant, Case No. 2:22-cv-02198 (D. Kan., May
30, 2022) is a class action against the Defendant for unpaid
minimum wages and overtime wages in violation of Fair Labor
Standards Act, breach of contract, third party beneficiary, and
quantum meruit/unjust enrichment.

The Plaintiffs are current and former hourly-paid employees of the
Defendant in Kansas.

Epic Landscape Productions, L.C. is a landscaping company
headquartered in Olathe, Kansas. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:
         
         Michael Hodgson, Esq.
         THE HODGSON LAW FIRM, L.L.C.
         6 NW Main St.
         Lee's Summit, MO 64063
         Telephone: (913) 890-3529
         E-mail: mike@thehodgsonlawfirm.com

                 - and –

         Timothy R. West, Esq.
         BERTRAM & GRAF, L.L.C.
         2345 Grand Boulevard, Suite 1925
         Kansas City, MO 64108
         Telephone: (816) 523-2205
         Facsimile: (816) 523-8258
         E-mail: tim@bertramgraf.com

ERIE INSURANCE: Summary Judgment Order in Rubinstein Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDREW RUBINSTEIN AND JESSICA RUBINSTEIN, HIS WIFE,
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED
Appellants v. ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Case No. 1353 WDA 2021 ( Pa.
Super.), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirms the order of
the Indiana County Court of Common Pleas granting Erie's motion for
summary judgment.

Appellants Andrew Rubinstein and Jessica Rubinstein, his wife,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, appeal
from the Nov. 8, 2021, order of the Indiana County Court of Common
Pleas, which granted Erie's motion for summary judgment in the
class action lawsuit concerning an automobile insurance policy.

In early April 2018, the Appellants applied for and were issued an
automobile insurance policy by Erie. They obtained the Policy
through one of Erie's local agents, Thomas M. Frick Insurance
Agency, LLC, (Agent), with an initial term from April 9, 2018
through April 9, 2019. The Agent is not a party to the instant
action.

The Appellants' teenage son obtained his driver's license on April
24, 2018, and they maintain that they notified Agent of the same so
that he could be added to the Policy. On July 16, 2018, the
Appellants informed Erie that Andrew Rubinstein had been in an
accident, and shortly thereafter, on July 19, 2018, Jessica
Rubinstein contacted Erie, seeking to change their automobile
coverage from limited tort to full tort.

Approximately 13 months later, on May 17, 2019, the Appellants
became aware that their son had not been added to the Policy and
contacted Erie regarding this issue. They then received a letter
from Erie with enclosed Amended Declarations for their Policy.
Effective as of April 24, 2018, the Appellants' son was added to
the Policy, resulting in a retroactive premium increase of $1,517.
The Amended Declarations also included the full tort coverage for
the Appellants' son, effective as of July 19, 2018, resulting in a
retroactive premium charge of $482.

In May 2019, the Appellants instituted the lawsuit by filing a
class action complaint, and subsequently filed a second amended
complaint in August 2019, raising four counts: (1) violation of the
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
(UTPCPL); (2) breach of contract; (3) declaratory and injunctive
relief pursuant to Pennsylvania's Declaratory Judgment Act; and (4)
unjust enrichment.

In June 2021, Erie filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging
among other things: (1) the Policy "expressly states that the
Policy premium may be increased effective the date that a material
change in the Policy occurs, such as the addition of a licensed
driver to the insureds' household;" (2) the clear and unambiguous
Policy terms require the Policy premium to change effective as of
the date the changed occurred;" (3) the Appellants "failed to
establish that Erie had engaged in any unfair or deceptive trade
practices." The Appellants filed a brief in opposition to Erie's
motion for summary judgment.

On Aug. 17, 2021, the court held argument on the matter. At that
time, the Appellants conceded that summary judgment was proper as
to UTPCPL and unjust enrichment counts. On Nov. 8, 2021, the court
granted Erie's motion for summary judgment on the remaining counts.
The Appellants filed this timely appeal.

The Appellants raise the following issues for the Superior Court's
review:

      A. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or
committed an error of law when granting Erie's motion for summary
judgment based on the conclusion that the Policy language is not
ambiguous?

      B. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or
committed an error of law when granting Erie's motion for summary
judgment based on the conclusion that a company-wide practice of
backdating policy changes and charging insureds retroactively
increased premiums when no related claims were made is consistent
with the intent and purpose of the MVFRL?

      C. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or
committed an error of law when granting Erie's motion for summary
judgment based on assumptions and speculation rather than on facts
of record?

      D. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or
committed an error of law when granting Erie's motion for summary
judgment based on the conclusion that the form Policy language
permits Erie to backdate changes to an insured's Policy and charge
a retroactively increased premium when no related claims were made,
to a date within any prior policy period -- back to the inception
of the Policy?

The Superior Court concludes that although the Appellants requested
that their son be added to the Policy shortly after he turned 16
years old, he was not officially added until approximately 13
months later. Erie charged the Appellants for premiums related to
that period. Central to the Appellants' dispute is their allegation
that Erie acted improperly by retroactively charging increased
premiums and backdating changes to the Policy where no claims were
paid during the backdated period.

Relatedly, they contend the trial court erred and abused its
discretion by: (1) not determining there were ambiguities in the
Policy language and that Erie may only charge increased premiums
from the date a change was made; (2) applying a public policy
analysis to their interpretation of the Policy; (3) basing its
decision on assumptions and speculation; and (4) concluding that
the Policy language permits Erie to backdate changes and charge a
retroactively increased premium to the date within any prior policy
period, including the inception of the Policy. Upon review, the
Superior Court affirms and enters judgment.

In sum, the Superior Court holds that contrary to the Appellants'
arguments, there were no ambiguities in the Policy language at
issue and therefore, it concludes the trial court did not err or
abuse its discretion in granting Erie's motion for summary
judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Decision is available
at https://tinyurl.com/bdf94ukp from Leagle.com.


ETELEQUOTE INSURANCE: Clough Sues Over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
------------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT CLOUGH, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. ETELEQUOTE INSURANCE, INC., Defendant, Case No.
8:22-cv-01214 (M.D. Fla., May 26, 2022) is a class action complaint
brought against the Defendant for its alleged violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff brings this action to enforce the consumer-privacy
provisions of the TCPA alleging that the Defendant mad
telemarketing calls to numbers on the National Do Not Call
Registry, including him. The Plaintiff claims that he received
multiple telemarketing calls from the Defendant on at least
February 23, 24, 25, 2022. Accordingly, his telephone number
603-421-XXXX has been on the National Do Not Call Registry since
May 2019. The Defendant's calls are allegedly related to
solicitations and offers for Medicare and insurance service. The
Plaintiff also asserts that he did not provided the Defendant with
his prior express written consent to receive such telemarketing
calls.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and all other similarly
situated individuals have been harmed by the unlawful conduct of
the Defendant because their privacy has been violated and they were
subjected to annoying and harassing calls that constitute a
nuisance.

Thus, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated
individuals, the Plaintiff seeks an order enjoining the Defendant
and/or its affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities
acting on the Defendant's behalf from making telemarketing calls to
numbers on the Do Not Call Registry, as well as an award of damages
and other relief as the Court deems necessary, just, and proper.

Etelequote Insurance, Inc. offers Medicare and insurance services.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
          Rachel E. Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          237 S. Dixie Hwy, 4th Floor
          Coral Gables, FL 33133
          Tel: (305) 469-5881
          E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com
                  rachel@kaufmanpa.com

EVERSOURCE ENERGY: Court Certifies Class in Garthwait ERISA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KIMBERLY GARTHWAIT, ET AL., Plaintiffs v. EVERSOURCE
ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL., Defendants, Civil Case No.
3:20-CV-00902(JCH) (D. Conn.), Judge Janet C. Hall of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Connecticut granted in part and
denied in part the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

I. Background

The Plaintiffs, who have participated in the Eversource 401(k)
Plan, bring the putative class action against Eversource and other
Defendants under section 1132(a)(2) of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), section 1001 of title 29, et
seq., of the U.S. Code. Four named Plaintiffs seek to represent the
putative class: Kimberly Garthwait, Cumal T. Gray, Kristine T.
Torrance, and Michael J. Hushion, former Eversource employees and
former Plan participants. They bring their claims against the
following Defendants: Eversource; Eversource's Board of Directors;
the Eversource Plan Administration Committee; the Eversource
Investment Management Committee; and Christine M. Carmody, Robert
J. DeAngelo, Richard J. Morrison, and Michael P. Synan, Gregory B.
Butler, Christine M. Carmody, James J. Judge, Philip J. Lembo,
Thomas J. May, David R. McHale, and John M. Moriera, who were
members of the Board, the Administrative Committee, or the
Investment Oversight Committee.

The four named Plaintiffs are former Eversource employees who were
previously enrolled in the Plan, a defined contribution 401(k)
retirement plan with over 11,000 Participants. In their Amended
Complaint, the Plaintiffs bring claims for breach of fiduciary
duty, failure to monitor, and knowing breach of trust, seeking
declaratory, injunctive, equitable, legal, or remedial relief
pursuant to section 502 of ERISA.

In support of their claims, the Plaintiffs allege, first, that the
Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the Plan by charging
excessive recordkeeping and administrative fees. Second, they claim
that the Defendants breached their duties by investing in and
retaining a suite of actively managed target date funds known as
the Fidelity Freedom Funds rather than their less risky, less
expensive, passively managed counterparts, the Freedom Index
Funds,. Third, they allege the Defendants invested in and retained
imprudent investment options.

In total, the Plaintiffs challenge 14 of the Plan's 19 investment
offerings. Between the four named Plaintiffs, each has invested
through the Plan in at least one of the challenged funds or suites
of funds. Garthwait invested in the Fidelity Freedom 2030 Fund, one
of the Freedom Funds. Gray invested in the Fidelity Freedom 2040
Fund through December 2015, when he transferred the balance into
the Fidelity Freedom 2050 Fund. Torrance invested in the Fidelity
Freedom 2030 Fund. Finally, Hushion invested in the Fidelity
Freedom 2030 Fund, the Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund Emerging
Markets Portfolio, the Frank Russell Small Cap Fund, the Morgan
Stanley Institutional Fund Small Co. Growth Portfolio, the Lord
Abbett Developing Growth Fund, the Fidelity Growth Co. Fund, the
Fidelity Low-Priced Stock Fund, and the Fidelity International
Discovery Fund.

The Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint on June 30, 2020,
followed by their First Amended Complaint on Sept. 22, 2020.
Subsequently, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the First
Amended Complaint, which the Court granted in part. In its Ruling,
the Court dismissed without prejudice the Plaintiffs' claims
related to the selection, retention, and mismanagement of specific
funds as well as the excessive fees or expense ratios generated by
particular investment options and share classes. It denied the
Motion to Dismiss with respect to the Plaintiffs' claims that the
Defendants charged excessive recordkeeping fees, because such fees
affect every participant in the Plan no matter which investments
she holds.

Following the Court's Ruling and grant of leave to amend, on Oct.
18, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint
detailing their investments. In response, on March 15, 2022, the
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment that is pending.

Now before the Court is the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification, in which they propose the following class: All
participants and beneficiaries in the Plan at any time on or after
June 30, 2014 to the present (the Class Period or Relevant Time
Period), including any beneficiary of a deceased person who was a
participant in the Plan at any time during the Class Period.

The Plaintiffs seek an order certifying their proposed class under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), naming Garthwait, Gray,
Torrance, and Hushion as the class representatives, and designating
Miller Shah, LLP and Capozzi Adler, PC as the class counsel.

Judge Hall now considers the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify the
Class under Federal Rule of Procedure 23.

II. Discussion

A. Standing

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs, as former participants in
the Plan, lack Article III standing to seek prospective relief.
They also contend that the Plaintiffs lack standing to represent a
class challenging funds in which they have not personally
invested.

Judge Hall finds that the Plaintiffs do have standing to seek to
recover the Plan's losses, although they lack standing to pursue "a
permanent injunction against the Defendants prohibiting the
practices described in the Second Amended Complaint and
affirmatively requiring them to act in the best interests of the
Plan and its participants."

Judge Hall also finds that the Plaintiffs have standing to bring
all of their claims on behalf of the absent class members, with the
exception of any claims for prospective injunctive relief. Because
the named Plaintiffs lack standing to seek prospective injunctive
relief, the class fails insofar as it seeks prospective relief.

B. Rule 23

The Plaintiffs must also satisfy the requirements for class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). These
prerequisites are referred to as "numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation. In addition to
satisfying the four prerequisites, a class action must qualify
under at least one of the types of class actions listed in Rule
23(b). As the Second Circuit has explained, class certification
furthers the purpose of ERISA section 502(a)(2), acting as a
procedural safeguard to ensure that recovery "inures to the benefit
of the Plan as a whole."

Judge Hall holds that the Plaintiffs meet the criteria to certify
their putative class as to their claims excepting those for
prospective injunctive relief. She finds that (i) the proposed
class satisfies the numerosity requirement because the proposed
class has more than 11,000 members; (ii) whether the defendants
failed to negotiate for appropriate recordkeeping fees for the
Plan, as the Plaintiffs allege, is a common question with a common
answer as to all Plan participants, even those who invested in the
five funds whose performance is not at issue; (iii) the typicality
requirement has been met as to Plan participants who invested in
the challenged funds or suites of funds; (iv) the named Plaintiffs,
including Gray, are adequate representatives of the class insofar
as they seek retrospective relief; and (v) Miller Shah and Capozzi
Adler are "qualified, experienced and able to conduct the
litigation, and appoints Miller Shah and Capozzi Adler the class
counsel.

Judge Hall also holds that the Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants owed and breached a fiduciary duty by mismanaging the
Plan, affecting more than 11,000 putative class members. Thus,
certification under 23(b)(1)(A) is warranted. And because the
Plaintiffs' allegations are brought with respect to breaches of
fiduciary duties to the Plan as a whole, the Defendants' duties
rise and fall with all plaintiffs." Thus, the class is properly
certified under 23(b)(1)(A) or, alternatively, 23(b)(1)(B).

C. Modifications to the Class Definition

Judge Hall rules that the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their
claims for prospective injunctive relief. Therefore, she exercises
her discretion under Rule 23(c)(4) to limit the claims at issue to
those for retrospective relief. However, she grants the Plaintiffs
leave to move to amend to add as a named plaintiff a member of the
proposed class with standing to bring claims for prospective relief
-- i.e., a current Plan participant.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Hall granted in part the Motion
for Class Certification as to a class of participants and
beneficiaries in the Plan at any time on or after June 30, 2014, to
the present, including any beneficiary of a deceased person who was
a participant in the Plan at any time during the Class Period. The
class is certified only as to the Plaintiffs' claims for
retrospective relief.

Insofar as the Plaintiffs seek to certify a class pursuing
prospective injunctive relief, their Motion is denied in part for a
lack of standing, unless within 30 days a member of the proposed
class with standing to bring such claims moves for and is granted
leave to intervene.

Further, the Court may well create subclasses should conflicts
among the interests of class member arise over the course of the
litigation. Judge Hall enters this Ruling with the understanding
that certification may be revisited at the remedial stage if such
concerns become apparent.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Ruling is available at
https://tinyurl.com/rdnr3zbe from Leagle.com.


FIRSTSUN CAPITAL: Faces Besser Overdraft Suit in CO Court
---------------------------------------------------------
Firstsun Capital Bancorp disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that it is facing a
putative class action amended complaint against the company in the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado.

On September 13, 2021, Samantha Besser filed an amended complaint
alleging that the company improperly charged multiple insufficient
funds or overdraft fees when a merchant resubmits a rejected
payment request.

The complaint asserts claims for breach of contract, which
incorporates the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Plaintiff seeks to represent a proposed class of all the company's
checking account customers who were charged multiple insufficient
funds or overdraft fees on resubmitted payment requests.

Plaintiff seeks unspecified restitution, actual and statutory
damages, costs, attorneys' fees, pre-judgment interest, and other
relief as the Court deems proper for herself and the purported
class.

In September 27, 2021, the company filed a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint. The motion to dismiss has been fully pleaded,
and is before the Court for decision.

FirstSun Capital Bancorp, headquartered in Denver, Colorado, is the
financial holding company for Sunflower Bank, National Association,
which operates as Sunflower Bank, First National 1870 and Guardian
Mortgage.


FIRSTSUN CAPITAL: McCollam Overdraft Suit Dismissed
---------------------------------------------------
Firstsun Capital Bancorp disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that its motion to dismiss
a putative class action amended complaint was granted on April 15,
2022.

On September 10, 2021, Karen McCollam filed said complaint alleging
that the bank improperly charged overdraft fees where a transaction
was initially authorized on sufficient funds but later settled
negative due to intervening transactions.

The complaint asserted a claim for breach of contract, which
incorporated the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and a
claim for violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act.
Plaintiff sought to represent a proposed class of all the company's
checking account customers who were allegedly charged overdraft
fees on transactions that did not overdraw their checking account.

Plaintiff sought unspecified restitution, actual and statutory
damages, costs, attorneys' fees, pre-judgment interest, and other
relief as the Court deemed proper for herself and the putative
class. On September 24, 2021, the company filed a motion to dismiss
the amended complaint. The motion to dismiss was granted on April
15, 2022.

FirstSun Capital Bancorp, headquartered in Denver, Colorado, is the
financial holding company for Sunflower Bank, National Association,
which operates as Sunflower Bank, First National 1870 and Guardian
Mortgage.


FLEET NEW YORK: Court Vacates Entries of Default in Li Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHANRU LI, Plaintiff v. FLEET NEW YORK METROPOLITAN
REGIONAL CENTER LLC, LAGUARDIA PERFORMANCE CENTER, LLC, EEGH II,
L.P., AND RICHARD XIA, Defendants, Case No. 21-CV-5185 (PKC) (RER)
(E.D.N.Y.), Magistrate Judge Ramon E. Reyes, Jr., of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York grants the
Defendants' motion to set aside the Clerk's entries of default
against all the Defendants in the consolidated action.

I. Background

Plaintiff Li commenced the action on Sept. 17, 2021, on behalf of
himself and similarly situated international investors against EEGH
II, L.P. (the "Partnership,"), its General Partner, Fleet New York
Metro Regional Center LLC (the "General Partner" or "New York
Metro"), an affiliated real estate developer, LaGuardia Performance
Center, LLC (the "Developer"), and their mutual President, Richard
Xia ("Xia") (collectively, the "Li Defendants"), alleging common
law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting breach
of fiduciary duty.

Four days after Li's complaint was filed, Ji Su Ai, Ruohong Li, and
Yi Ding (collectively, "the Ai Plaintiffs" and together with Li,
the "Plaintiffs") filed a separate class action complaint
containing substantially similar factual allegations and asserting
the same causes of action against Xia, New York Metro, and two
substitute Defendants: A different EB-5 investment vehicle, EEGH,
L.P. (together with EEGH II, L.P., the "Partnerships"), whose
General Partner is also New York Metro; and a different developer,
Eastern Emerald Group LLC (together with LaGuardia Performance
Center, LLC, the "Developers") (collectively, with the Li
Defendants, the "Defendants" or the "Fleet Group"), which is also
affiliated with and controlled by Xia, all of which allegedly
solicited funding from foreign investors to develop the same luxury
hotel complex in Corona, Queens -- Ai v. Federal New York
Metropolitan Regional Center LLC, et al., 21-CV-5250 (PKC) (RER)
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2021)).

After the Defendants failed to appear, answer, or otherwise timely
respond to the Plaintiffs' complaints in both actions, the
Plaintiffs requested, and the Clerk of the Court entered,
certificates of default against all the Defendants. On Dec. 8,
2021, the Honorable Pamela K. Chen consolidated the Li and Ai
actions pursuant to Rule 42(a).

Before the Court is the Defendants' motion to set aside the Clerk's
entries of default against all the Defendants in the consolidated
action pursuant to Rule 55(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which Judge Chen referred to Judge Reyes on Dec. 13,
2021. The Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

II. Discussion

Because Rule 55(c) does not define the term 'good cause,' the
Second Circuit has established three criteria that must be assessed
in order to decide whether to relieve a party from default or from
a default judgment," citing Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.33d
90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993) (alterations omitted). These criteria,
commonly referred to as the Enron factors, "are: '(1) the
willfulness of default, (2) the existence of any meritorious
defenses, and (3) prejudice to the non-defaulting party.'"

I. Willfulness

The Defendants argue primarily that this is not a case of bad faith
or egregious and unexplained conduct; rather, they did not respond
to the complaints because they were not properly served. In August
2021, Xia moved from the home where the Plaintiffs attempted to
effect personal service the following month, and where the
Plaintiffs purportedly served him via "nail-and-mail" in October
2021. The Partnerships, General Partner, and Developers similarly
moved offices in August 2021, but had not yet updated their
addresses at the time of service such that they were not notified
of service by the Secretary of State. Accordingly, the Defendants
deny having received proper service of the complaints, and argue
that their defaults were not willful.

In response, the Plaintiffs argue that contemporaneous messages
sent by Xia prove that he had actual notice of the actions after
service was completed, such that the defaults were deliberate and
likely intentional. According to WeChat messages exchanged between
Xia and investors on October 15 and Oct. 18, 2021 -- days after
service was completed via nail-and-mail -- Xia discussed the filing
of a class action with investors, discussed class action issues
with attorneys, and shared pictures of the summonses issued against
him in both actions, both of which describe the time to respond and
the consequences for failure to do so, i.e., the entry of default.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs argue that Xia was personally aware of
the actions, and that by extension the entities he dominates and
controls were on notice that responses were required.

The Defendants respond that Xia's knowledge of the existence of
lawsuits as demonstrated by the WeChat messages is insufficient to
demonstrate that he was served or that he knew he was served, and
that it is service of process, rather than actual notice of a
lawsuit, that triggers a Defendants' duty to respond. They further
argue that after learning of the purported service and certificates
of default, the Defendants moved quickly to vacate the defaults
soon after they were entered.

Judge Reyes holds that this is a "close call." However, taking into
account the Defendants' explanations, the short period of time
between the entry of default and the Defendants' action in the
case, and the lenient standard of Rule 55(c) which requires that
the Court resolves all doubts regarding willfulness in their favor,
Judge Reyes finds that the Defendants did not deliberately default.
Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of vacating the entries of
default.

B. Meritorious Defenses

The Defendants raise several legal defenses to the action
sufficient to clear this low bar. For example, with respect to
subject matter jurisdiction, Defendants contend that the complete
diversity required by 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a) is impossible
where, as in the present case, a limited partner brings suit
against a partnership, and that jurisdiction under the Class Action
Fairness Act ("CAFA") is inappropriate where, despite meeting
minimal diversity requirements, only four plaintiffs purport to
represent a class of 270 investors, at least eighty-three of those
investors oppose the litigation, and the Plaintiffs have not
established that they have conducted sufficient inquiry to
determine whether others are on board.

However, as the Plaintiffs note, even accounting for the 83
identified "opt out" investors, the number of remaining limited
partners and the value of their aggregated claims exceed the
relevant CAFA requirements, i.e., more than 100 class members and
an amount in controversy of more than $5 million. Nevertheless,
"when the complaint fails to allege a specific damages amount, and
facts relating to the jurisdictional amount are challenged," the
party asserting the Court's jurisdiction "must establish the
requisite amount in controversy 'with competent proof and justify
its allegations by a preponderance of evidence.'"

Though the Plaintiffs have alleged the number of investors
participating in each offering and the corresponding amounts
raised, Judge Reyes finds that they have not alleged any specific
amount in damages and have not put forward specific proof to
support jurisdiction at this early stage. Accordingly, the
Defendants have identified issues regarding the Court's
jurisdiction, such that further briefing and consideration is
warranted, and such that they have raised a meritorious legal
defense. Similarly, with respect to the statute of limitations,
Judge Reyes finds that the parties have each raised valid points on
the issue that merit further briefing and consideration on the
merits. She need not consider the parties' numerous additional
arguments regarding potential meritorious defenses to other
specific claims.

C. Prejudice to Plaintiffs

The Defendants argue that the short delay between the entries of
default and the motion to vacate those entries of default makes
prejudice unlikely, and that the Court's entry of a TRO freezing
Defendants' assets in connection with the SEC action also renders
unlikely any greater opportunity for fraud and collusion or any
depletion of funds that would otherwise be available to the
Plaintiffs in the event of an adverse judgment. Thne Plaintiffs
respond that the TRO's temporary nature may allow the Defendant's
to further misappropriate funds in the future if the freeze is
lifted, and that any further delay in resolving the case therefore
risks the possibility that funds won't be recoverable in the event
of an adverse judgment.

Judge Reyes holds that the improper communications are not
sufficient to constitute prejudice to withstand the Circuit's
preference for resolving disputes on the merits. Since (1) the
Defendants quickly responded upon learning of the entry of default,
(2) discovery has not yet begun, and the Plaintiffs have pointed to
no discovery issues that will result from Defendants' delayed
response, (3) since court imposed guardrails, including the TRO in
the SEC action and the Court's strong warning to the Defendants not
to communicate with putative class members are sufficient to
prevent fraud and collusion, and (4) since the Circuit favors
resolving disputes on the merits, Judge Reyes finds that the third
factor does not weigh strongly in favor of denying the Defendants'
request to set aside the Clerk's entries of default.

III. Conclusion

Given the totality of the circumstances and the lenient "good
cause" standard imposed by Rule 55(c), Judge Reyes finds that, on
balance, the Enron factors weigh in favor of vacating the
Defendants' defaults. Accordingly, for the reasons he set forth,
Judge Reyes grants the Defendants' motion to vacate the entries of
default.

The Clerk of the Court is accordingly directed to vacate the
defaults entered against all the Defendants on Nov. 30, 2021. The
Defendants are directed to file and serve answers to the complaints
within 20 days of receipt of the Memorandum and Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3xnh4vnt from Leagle.com.


FORSTER & GARBUS: Parties Must File Class Cert Bid by June 24
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as FRANCOIS v. FORSTER &
GARBUS, LLP, et al., Case No. 3:21-cv-20664 (D.N.J.), the Hon.
Magistrate Judge Rukhsanah L. Singh entered an order that the
Parties are to file a joint motion for class certification and
preliminary approval of class action settlement no later than June
24, 2022.

The telephone conference set for July 18, 2022 is canceled, says
Judge Singh.

The suit alleges violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.

Forster & Garbus is a New York debt collection law firm.[CC]


FRIENDLY HOME CARE: Konstantynovska Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Friendly Home Care,
Inc. The case is styled as Lyudmyla Konstantynovska, and
individually and on behalf of other persons similarly situated v.
Friendly Home Care, Inc., Case No. 523015/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Kings Cty., May 26, 2022).

The case type is stated as "E-Filed Other."

Friendly Home Care, Inc. -- https://www.friendlyhomecareny.com/ --
is a home health care service in New York City that provide a
multitude of services that include obtaining home care service and
more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          VIRGINA & AMBINDER
          Phone: (212) 943-9080

The Defendant is represented by:

          TRIVELLA & FORTE, LLP.
          1311 Mamaroneck Ave., Ste 170
          White Plains, NY 10605
          Phone: (914) 949-9075

               - and -

          DANIELS PORCO AND LUSARDI LLP
          Phone: (845) 206-4049


GAS GATHERING: Lyman Suit Transferred From Minnesota to W.D. Texas
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, William Lyman, Plaintiff v. Gas Gathering Specialists,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-2386 (KMM/ECW) (D. Minn.), Judge
Katherine Menendez of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Minnesota granted the Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a).

When deciding a motion to transfer venue, courts typically consider
"(1) the convenience of the parties, (2) the convenience of the
witnesses, and (3) the interests of justice." To determine the
interests of justice, courts generally consider: (1) judicial
economy, (2) the plaintiff's choice of forum, (3) the comparative
costs to the parties of litigating in each forum, (4) each party's
ability to enforce a judgment, (5) obstacles to a fair trial, (6)
conflict of law issues, and (7) the advantages of having a local
court determine questions of local law.

The burden is on the party seeking transfer to show that these
factors weigh in their favor. In the present case, Judge Menendez
found that the relevant factors, save for one, weigh heavily in
favor of transfer to the Western District of Texas, Midland/Odessa
Division. Specifically, Judge Menendez found that the only
connection the case has to the District of Minnesota is the fact
that Mr. Lyman worked there for two of the 36 months at issue. Mr.
Lyman does not reside in Minnesota, nor do any of the witnesses or
any of the evidence. Indeed, the substantial majority of witnesses
and evidence are in Texas.

With respect to the interests of justice, Judge Menendez found that
allowing the case to proceed in this district would create a
substantial risk of contradictory judgments with a very similar
action currently pending in the Western District of Texas, as the
two cases involve substantially the same class members, the
Defendants, and issues of fact and law. For the same reasons, as
well as the fact that the Defendant's offices and both parties'
counsel are located in Texas, Judge Menendez found that it would be
wasteful of judicial and party resources to permit the case to
continue in this district. Accordingly, she concluded that all of
the relevant factors, save for the Plaintiff's choice of forum,
strongly favor transfer.

Judge Menendez explained that, for several reasons, the Plaintiff's
choice to sue in Minnesota deserves little to no weight in the
case. While "there is ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of
the Plaintiff's choice of forum," that presumption is not
unwavering. First, it is "much less reasonable" to assume that a
plaintiff chose a district in which he does not live for
convenience purposes. Mr. Lyman lives in Iowa -- not Minnesota. The
Plaintiff's choice is also afforded less deference where "the
transaction or underlying facts did not occur in the chosen forum,"
or "where a case is brought as a nationwide class action." Finally,
choice of forum is afforded no weight where the decision was "based
on impermissible forum shopping."

For these reasons, Judge Menendez held that if Mr. Lyman's choice
of forum were due any deference in the case, it is certainly not
enough to counter the overwhelming weight of the other factors in
favor of transfer. Accordingly, she granted Gas Gathering's Motion
to Transfer Venue. She transferred the venue to the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Texas, Midland/Odessa Division.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 24, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/mrxbrmjn from Leagle.com.


GEICO CASUALTY: Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Grossman Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TODD GROSSMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, MUJO PEREZIC, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. GEICO
CASUALTY COMPANY, GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY, GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 21-2789 (2d Cir.), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment entered on Sept. 13, 2021, dismissing the
Plaintiffs' complaint and later denying their motion for
reconsideration.

I. Background

Plaintiffs-Appellants Todd Grossman and Mujo Perezic bring the
putative class action against Defendants-Appellants GEICO Casualty
Company, GEICO Indemnity Co., and GEICO Insurance Co. (together,
"GEICO"), seeking to represent a class of New York residents who
had or purchased automobile, motorcycle, or RV insurance policies
from GEICO during the period between March 1, 2020, and the date on
which they filed their complaint. The Plaintiffs allege that
COVID-19-related stay-at-home orders first implemented in March
2020 caused a dramatic reduction in driving and, in turn,
driving-related accidents, resulting in windfall profits for
automobile insurance companies, including GEICO.

In April 2020, GEICO instituted a "Giveback Program" that provided
a 15% premium reduction on new or renewed policies. The Plaintiffs
contend that this credit was inadequate, that GEICO's advertising
about the Giveback Program was misleading, and that GEICO charged
unconscionably excessive premiums and unjustly retained windfall
profits during the pandemic. They assert claims for breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and
violations of New York General Business Law ("GBL") Sections 349
and 350.

The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs' complaint for failure
to state a claim and later denied their motion for reconsideration.
The Plaintiffs now appeal from the judgment of dismissal.

In July 2021, acting pursuant to the district court's local and
individual rules, GEICO filed a letter in which it briefly stated
its arguments for why the complaint did not state a plausible claim
and requested a pre-motion conference to discuss its planned motion
to dismiss. The district court "construed" the letter as a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and
then granted the "motion."

II. Discussion

On such review, the Second Circuit concludes that the Plaintiffs'
complaint fails to state a claim as a matter of law for at least
two independent reasons. First, the Plaintiffs' claims are
precluded by the filed rate doctrine, which "bars suits against
regulated utilities grounded on the allegation that the rates
charged by the utility are unreasonable." Second, even if the
Plaintiffs' claims were not barred by the filed rate doctrine, they
were properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for the independent
reason that each cause of action fails to state a plausible claim.

Finally, the Plaintiffs submit that the district court erred by
converting GEICO's pre-motion letter into a motion to dismiss and
then granting the motion without full briefing or argument. They
raise a valid concern with the district court's action in
dismissing their complaint without the opportunity for full
briefing and in possible violation of the applicable local rules
and the district court's stated individual practice. Nonetheless,
the Second Circuit concludes that, in the case, any error in the
district court's dismissal order is harmless in light of the
substantial deficiencies in the complaint.

III. Conclusion

The Second Circuit has considered all of the Plaintiffs' remaining
arguments and finds in them no basis for reversal. For the reasons
it set forth, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Summary Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p9cj92r from Leagle.com.

ROY T. WILLEY, IV (Eric M. Poulin -- eric@akimlawfirm.com -- Blake
G. Abbott -- blake@akimlawfirm.com -- on the brief), Anastopoulo
Law Firm, Charleston, SC; Edward Toptani, Toptani Law PLLC, in New
York City, for the Appellants.

DAMON VOCKE -- DNVocke@duanemorris.com -- (David T. McTaggart --
dtmctaggart@duanemorris.com -- on the brief), Duane Morris, LLP, in
New York City, for the Appellees.


GLOBAL TRADE: Li Files FLSA Suit in D. Oregon
---------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Global Trade
Enterprises, Inc., et al. The case is styled as Hongjiang Li,
Shouwen Fu, Chen Li, Jiyou Cao, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated v. Global Trade Enterprises, Inc. doing
business as: Duck House Chinese Restaurant, Haidong Liu also known
as: John Liu, Sam Doe, David Doe, Sammy Woo, Case No.
3:22-cv-00720-SB (D. Or., May 16, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Global Trade Enterprises, Inc. doing business as Duck House Chinese
Restaurant -- https://www.duckhousepdx.com/ -- serves authentic
Szechuan Chinese Food, located in downtown Portland, Oregon.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Aurelia J. Erickson, Esq.
          Kelsey M. Peddie, Esq.
          CHENOWETH LAW GROUP
          510 SW Fifth Ave., 4th Floor
          Portland, OR 97204
          Phone: (503) 221-7958
          Email: aerickson@chenowethlaw.com
                 kpeddie@chenowethlaw.com


GOOGLE LLC: Extension of Time for Class Cert. Deadlines OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANIBAL RODRIGUEZ, et al.
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
GOOGLE LLC, Case No. 3:20-cv-04688-RS (N.D. Cal.), the Judge
Richard Seeborg entered an order extending discovery, class
certification briefing schedule, and hearing date as follows:

  -- Close of Fact Discovery:           September 26, 2022

  -- Initial Expert Witness             October 13, 2022
     Disclosures:

  -- Rebuttal Expert Witness            January 20, 2023
     Disclosures:

  -- Close of Expert Discovery:         February 16, 2023

  -- Motion for Class Certification:    February 23, 2023

  -- Opposition to Motion for           March 30, 2023
     Class Certification:

  -- Reply In Support of Class          April 27, 2023
     Certification:

Google is an American multinational technology company that focuses
on artificial intelligence, search engine, online advertising,
cloud computing, computer software, quantum computing, e-commerce,
and consumer electronics.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 20, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3z9uoAa at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Mark C. Mao, Esq.
           BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
           44 Montgomery Street, 41st Floor
           San Francisco, CA 94104
           Telephone: (415) 293 6858
           Facsimile: (415) 999 9695
           E-mail: mmao@bsfllp.com


                - and -

           Beko Reblitz-Richardson, Esq.
           44 Montgomery Street, 41 st Floor
           San Francisco, CA 94104
           Telephone: (415) 293 6858
           Facsimile: (415) 999 9695
           E-mail: brichardson@bsfllp.com

                - and -

           William Christopher Carmody, Esq.
           Shawn J. Rabin, Esq.
           SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
           1301 Avenue of the Americas, 32nd Floor
           New York, NY 10019
           Telephone: (212) 336-8330
           E-mail: bcarmody@susmangodfrey.com
                   srabin@susmangodfrey.com

                - and -

           John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
           Ryan J. McGee, Esq.
           MORGAN & MORGAN
           201 N. Franklin Street, 7th Floor
           Tampa, FL 33602
           Telephone: (813) 223-5505
           E-mail: jyanchunis@forthepeople.com
                    rmcgee@forthepeople.com

The Defendant is represented by:

           Benedict Y. Hur, Esq.
           Simona Agnolucci, Esq.
           Eduardo E. Santacana, Esq.
           Lori C. Arakaki, Esq.
           Argemira Florez, Esq.
           WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP
           One Front Street, 34th Floor
           San Francisco, CA 94111
           Telephone: (415) 858-7400
           Facsimile: (415) 858-7599
           E-mail: bhur@willkie.com
                   sagnolucci@willkie.com
                   esantacana@willkie.com
                   larakaki@willkie.com
                   aflorez@willkie.com

GREAT LAKES: Court Amends Class Certification Orders in Dawson Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MEREDITH D. DAWSON, Plaintiff v. GREAT LAKES
EDUCATIONAL LOAN SERVICES, INC. and GREAT LAKES HIGHER EDUCATION
CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-475-jdp (W.D. Wis.), Judge
James D. Peterson of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin amends the orders certifying the class to
exclude from the class all borrowers, who overpaid their student
loans by less than five dollars.

Plaintiff Dawson represents a class of student loan borrowers who
contend that Defendants Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc.
and Great Lakes Higher Education Corp. (collectively "Great Lakes")
negligently inflated their account balances by improperly
capitalizing their interest. The Court granted to summary judgment
to Great Lakes on most claims because Great Lakes submitted
unrefuted evidence that the class's account balances had been
corrected to remove the effects of the improperly capitalized
interest. But it denied summary judgment on the claims of class
members who had already paid off their loans and had overpaid by an
amount of less than five dollars.

Great Lakes argued that the class members with overpayments of less
than five dollars weren't entitled to a refund because the policy
of the Department of Education was not to provide refunds in that
situation unless the borrower requests it. The Court rejected Great
Lakes' argument for two reasons. First, the lawsuit represents a
request by the entire class to receive a full refund, so Great
Lakes should have acted as if the class members had requested a
refund, regardless of how small the refund was. Second, Great Lakes
didn't explain why department policy should determine damages in a
federal lawsuit. So the Court denied Great Lakes' summary judgment
motion on these claims.

But that decision raised the question of how the case should
proceed. The Court couldn't grant summary judgment to Dawson, both
because Dawson hadn't proven negligence and because there was no
evidence about how much money was at issue and which class members
had made overpayments of less than five dollars. But holding a
trial on what was likely a relatively small amount of money seemed
like an imprudent use of judicial resources. So the Court directed
the parties to weigh in on how they wished to resolve the remaining
disputes.

Great Lakes responds with one observation and two suggestions. Its
observation is related to the maxim "de minimis non curat lex,"
which courts translate to mean that "the law does not concern
itself with trifles." Under that maxim, a court may "withhold a
remedy" when "the harm is small but measuring it for purposes of
calculating a remedy would be difficult, time-consuming, and
uncertain, hence not worthwhile given that smallness," citing
Mitchell v. JCG Indus., Inc., 745 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2014).

Great Lakes contends that the circumstances of the case support the
application of that maxim. It submits the declaration of its
director of servicing operations, Jamie Brown, who says that 1,626
class members (out of approximately 137,000) overpaid their
accounts by less than five dollars, with a mean amount of $1.65,
and a total amount of $2,689.53.Brown also says that Great Lakes
hasn't received updated contact information from those class
members since they paid off their loans, which was several years
ago.

Under these circumstances, Great Lakes contends that it isn't
"economically rational" to provide the class members with refunds.
And because Great Lakes doesn't have updated contact information
for the class members, many checks would likely be returned as
undeliverable. The process would be more complicated for class
members whose accounts were transferred to a different servicer
because Great Lakes would have to request account records from
those other servicers. Great Lakes estimates that it would take
"several hundred hours" of employee time to complete the necessary
tasks.

In light of these administrative difficulties, Great Lakes proposes
two solutions. The first is to allow Great Lakes to donate the
approximately $2,700 to an appropriate charity, which is what often
occurs in class action settlements to distribute small or unclaimed
amounts. The second is to exclude from the class those who overpaid
less than five dollars and then enter judgment. Great Lakes points
out that Dawson, who is the only named plaintiff, isn't one of the
class members who overpaid their loans by less than five dollars,
so Great Lakes contends that she is not an adequate representative
of those class members.

In her response, Dawson doesn't dispute Great Lakes' estimates of
the number of class members affected, the total amount owed to
those class members, or the logistical difficulties Great Lakes
identifies for providing refunds to those class members. She also
doesn't challenge Great Lakes contention that Dawson isn't an
adequate representative for the remaining class members with live
claims. And she doesn't ask the court to hold a trial to determine
the class's entitlement to less than $3,000. Rather, her only
response is that she wishes to preserve for appeal any arguments
she has asserted previously, without identifying anything
specific.

Under these circumstances, Judge Peterson concludes that the
appropriate resolution is to exclude from the class those borrowers
who overpaid their accounts by less than five dollars. As Great
Lakes points out, donations to charity, or cy pres awards, are used
to resolve undistributed amounts for settlement funds. They aren't
a substitute for damages, so the court isn't persuaded that a cy
pres award is appropriate here.

It also isn't clear whether the de minmis doctrine applies. But
even if the de minmis doctrine doesn't apply, Great Lakes is
correct that Dawson isn't an adequate class representative under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 for borrowers with small
overpayments because there is no dispute that she isn't one of
those borrowers. A named plaintiff may not serve as a class
representative when she "has suffered a different kind of injury
from other members of the class." When a class representative is
inadequate, it can be appropriate under some circumstances to allow
class counsel to identify a substitute. But the class counsel has
neither identified an appropriate substitute nor sought permission
to look for one. So Judge Peterson has no choice but to exclude
from the class the borrowers with overpayments of less than five
dollars. Taking this path preserves those class members' right to
request a refund if they wish.

Once the borrowers with small overpayments are excluded, there are
no remaining disputes to be resolved. Judge Peterson court grants
summary judgment to Great Lakes on the claims of all other class
members. So she directs the clerk of court to enter judgment in
Great Lakes' favor and close the case.

The orders certifying the class are amended to exclude from the
class all borrowers who overpaid their student loans by less than
five dollars. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in
favor of the Defendants on the remaining claims and close the
case.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 24, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/5dep79tm from Leagle.com.


HCF MANAGEMENT: Pike Sues Over Failure to Pay Proper Overtime
-------------------------------------------------------------
DEBORAH PIKE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HCF MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:22-cv-00165-SPB (W.D. Penn., May 27, 2022) brings this complaint
as a class and collective action against the Defendant to recover
damages as a result of its alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act, and the
Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law.

The Plaintiff, who has worked for the Defendant as a non-exempt,
hourly-paid and salaried workers, claims that the Defendant has
failed to keep accurate track records of the Plaintiff's and other
similarly situated employees' hours worked consequently after its
timekeeping system was affected and compromised by the Kronos
ransomware attack by hackers. As a result, the Defendant failed to
properly compensate its employees. Instead of paying them for the
hours they actually worked, the Defendant reduced their pay without
documentation. Thus, despite working more than 40 hours per week,
the Defendant also failed to properly pay their lawfully earned
overtime at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rate
of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek, the
Plaintiff asserts.

HCF Management, Inc. is an Ohio-based health care services entity
with operations across western Pennsylvania and Ohio. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Troy M. Frederick, Esq.
          Beth A. Frederick, Esq.
          FREDERICK LAW GROUP, PLLC
          836 Philadelphia Street
          Indiana, PA 15701
          Tel: (724) 471-2056
          Fax: (724) 801-8358
          E-mail: TMF@FrederickLG.com
                  BAF@FrederickLG.com

HUDSONVILLE CREAMERY: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hudsonville Creamery
and Ice Cream Company, LLC. The case is styled as Vanessa Jimenez,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Hudsonville Creamery and Ice Cream Company, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-04372 (S.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Hudsonville Creamery & Ice Cream Company --
https://www.hudsonvilleicecream.com/ -- operates as an ice cream
manufacturing firm.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


HYUNDAI CAPITAL: Scherer Sues Over Improper Business Schemes
------------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM R. SCHERER III, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HYUNDAI CAPITAL AMERICA, INC.
d/b/a KIA FINANCE AMERICA; and HYUNDAI MOTOR FINANCE, Defendant,
Case No. 0:22-cv-61014-WPD (S.D., Fla., May 27, 2022) is an action
challenging the Defendant's alleged wrongful business practices of
increasing the predetermined vehicle lease buyout cost and instead
requiring payment of excessive fees to lessees who have sought to
exercise their purchase option at the end of the lease term.

According to the complaint, at the end of a consumer motor vehicle
lease, a lessee has the option to purchase the vehicle. When that
option to purchase is exercised, the lessor may only charge the
amounts expressly disclosed in the lease. Despite this, the
Defendant failed to honor the lease terms and violated applicable
law by requiring a lessee to pay additional undisclosed fees and
amounts when the lease buy-out option was exercised, says the
suit.

HYUNDAI CAPITAL AMERICA, INC. provides commercial finance services.
The Company offers vehicle financing and leasing services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Cristina M. Pierson, Esq.
          Matthew DellaBetta, Esq.
          KELLEY UUSTAL, PLC
          500 North Federal Highway, Suite 200
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 522-6601
          Facsimile: (954) 522-6608
          Email: cmp@kulaw.com
                 mdb@kulaw.com

IANTHUS CAPITAL: Faces Cedeno Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------
Ianthus Capital Holdings, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report
for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that on May 5,
2020, Peter Cedeno, a shareholder of the company, filed a putative
class action lawsuit with the court against the company and is
seeking damages for an unspecified amount against the company, its
former Chief Executive Officer, its current Chief Financial Officer
and others for alleged false and misleading statements regarding
certain proceeds from the issuance of long-term debt, that were
held in escrow to make interest payments in the event of default on
such long-term debt.

Ianthus Capital Holdings, Inc. is an owner and operator of licensed
cannabis cultivation, processing and dispensary facilities, and a
developer, producer and distributor of innovative branded cannabis
and CBD products in New York, United States.


IANTHUS CAPITAL: Faces Hi-Med Securities Suit in NY Court
---------------------------------------------------------
Ianthus Capital Holdings, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report
for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that it is
facing a securities suit filed by Hi-Med LLC, an equity holder and
one of the Lenders holding an unsecured debenture of the company.

On April 19, 2020, Hi-Med LLC filed a complaint with the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York against
the company and certain of the company's current and former
directors and officers and other defendants.

Hi-Med is seeking damages of an unspecified amount and the full
principal amount of the unsecured debenture against the company,
for among other things, alleged breaches of provisions of the
Unsecured Debentures and the related Debenture Purchase Agreement
as well as alleged violations of Federal securities laws, including
Sections 10(b), 10b-5 and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and common law
fraud relating to alleged false and misleading statements regarding
certain proceeds from the issuance of long-term debt that were held
in escrow to make interest payments in the event of a default
thereof.

On July 9, 2020, the court issued an order consolidating the class
action matter with the shareholder class action referenced below.
On July 23, 2020, Hi-Med and the defendants filed a stipulation and
proposed scheduling and coordination order to coordinate the
pleadings for the consolidated actions. On September 4, 2020,
Hi-Med filed an amended complaint.

On October 14, 2020, the court issued a stipulation and scheduling
and coordination order, which required that the defendants answer,
move, or otherwise respond to the Hi-Med amended complaint no later
than November 20, 2020. On November 20, 2020, the company and
certain of its current officers and directors filed a motion to
dismiss the Hi-Med amended complaint.

On January 8, 2021, Hi-Med filed an opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss. The company and certain of its current officers and
directors' reply were filed on February 22, 2021. In a memorandum
of opinion dated August 30, 2021, the SDNY granted the company's
and certain of its officers and directors' motion to dismiss the
Hi-Med amended complaint. The court indicated that Hi-Med may move
for leave to file a proposed second amended complaint by September
30, 2021. On September 30, 2021, Hi-Med filed a motion for leave to
amend the Hi-Med amended complaint.

On October 28, 2021, the parties filed a Stipulation and Proposed
Scheduling Order Regarding Hi-Med's motion for leave to file a
second amended complaint. In November 3, 2021, the court so-ordered
the stipulation and Hi-Med's second amended complaint was deemed
filed as of this date. On December 20, 2021, the company and its
current named officers and directors filed a motion to dismiss
Hi-Med's second amended complaint. Hi-Med's opposition to the
company's and its current named officers and directors' motion to
dismiss was filed on February 3, 2022.

The company and its current named officers and directors' reply to
Hi-Med's opposition was filed on March 21, 2022. The Motion to
Dismiss Hi-Med's second amended complaint remains pending before
the court. On June 29, 2020, Hi-Med filed a claim in the court,
which mirrors the Hi-Med complaint.

Ianthus Capital Holdings, Inc. is an owner and operator of licensed
cannabis cultivation, processing and dispensary facilities, and a
developer, producer and distributor of innovative branded cannabis
and CBD products in New York, United States.


IANTHUS CAPITAL: Faces Kwong Securities Suit in Toronto
-------------------------------------------------------
Ianthus Capital Holdings, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report
for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that a class
action lawsuit was filed against the company alleging statutory and
common law misrepresentation.

In July 23, 2020, Blue Sky Realty Corporation filed a putative
class action against the company, its former Chief Executive
Officer and its Chief Financial Officer in Toronto. In September
27, 2021, the court granted leave for the plaintiff to amend its
claim. In the Amended Claim, the plaintiff seeks to certify the
proposed class action on behalf of two classes. Plaintiff alleges
statutory and common law misrepresentation and seeks an unspecified
amount of damages together with interest and costs. The plaintiff
also alleges common law oppression for releasing certain statements
allegedly containing misrepresentations inducing Class B members to
hold the company's securities beyond April 5, 2020. No
certification motion has been scheduled. The amended claim also
changed the named plaintiff from Blue Sky Realty Corporation to
Timothy Kwong. The hearing date for the motion for leave to proceed
with a secondary market claim under the Securities Act (Ontario)
has been vacated.

Ianthus Capital Holdings, Inc. is an owner and operator of licensed
cannabis cultivation, processing and dispensary facilities, and a
developer, producer and distributor of innovative branded cannabis
and CBD products in New York, United States.


ILLUMINATE EDUCATION: Chung Files Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Illuminate Education,
Inc. The case is styled as Sarah Chung, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Illuminate Education, Inc.,
Case No. 1:22-cv-03110 (E.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated Fraud or Truth-In-Lending.

Illuminate -- http://www.illuminateed.com/-- provides a
streamlined solution that helps educators to accurately assess
learning, identify needs, align whole child supports, and drive
school improvement in order to equitably accelerate growth for
every learner.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer I. Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 Cuttermill Road Ste 412
          Great Neck, NY 11021
          Phone: (516) 268-7080
          Fax: (516) 234-7800
          Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com


INTERACTIVE BROKERS: Batchelar Files Bid for Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ROBERT SCOTT BATCHELAR, v.
INTERACTIVE BROKERS, LLC, INTERACTIVE BROKERS GROUP, INC., and
THOMAS A. FRANK, Case No. 3:15-cv-01836-AWT (D. Conn.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order, pursuant to Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

   1. certifying a class or alternative classes;

   2. appointing him as class representative; and

   3. appointing his counsel as class counsel.

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify a damages class and
injunctive relief class defined as All United States residents who
at any time from Dec. 18, 2013 to date of trial had margin accounts
with IB, which accounts had trades executed by the Auto-Liquidation
Software.

Interactive Brokers is an American multinational brokerage firm. It
operates the largest electronic trading platform in the U.S. by
number of daily average revenue trades.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated May 24,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/38YFtcS
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gary N. Reger, Esq.
          ORGAIN, BELL AND TUCKER, LLP
          207 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 301
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 861-0441
          E-mail: gnr@obt.com

               - and -

          L. DeWayne Layfield, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF L. DEWAYNE LAYFIELD, PLLC
          P.O. Box 3829
          Beaumont, TX 77704
          Telephone: (409) 832-1891
          E-mail: dewayne@layfieldlaw.com

               - and -

          William M. Bloss, Esq.
          Christopher M. Mattei, Esq.
          KOSKOFF, KOSKOFF & BIEDER, P.C.
          350 FAIRFIELD AVENUE
          BRIDGEPORT, CT 06604
          Telephone: (203)336-4421
          Facsimile: (203)368-3244
          E-mail: bbloss@koskoff.com
                  cmattei@koskoff.com

J&M DELI: Fails to Pay Minimum & OT Wages, Morales Suit Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
MARCOS MORALES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. J&M DELI CORP. and NEW 45 FARM INC. d/b/a 45
DELI, JIN HWAN OH and KIM IN YONG, as individuals, Defendants, Case
No. 1:22-cv-04394 (S.D.N.Y., May 27, 2022) is a collective action
complaint brought against the Defendants for their alleged
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor
Law.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants from in or around
January 2018 until in or around January 2020 as a deli worker and
food preparer while performing related miscellaneous duties for the
Defendants.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was required by the
Defendants to regularly work 54 hours or more hours each week
throughout the entirety of his employment with the Defendants.
However, the Defendants paid him a flat weekly rate of
approximately $570.00 per week for all hours he has worked. The
Defendants allegedly failed to pay him overtime compensation at the
rate of one and one-half times his regular rate of pay for all
hours he worked in excess of 40 per workweek. In addition, the
Defendants failed to pay him the legally prescribed minimum wage
for all his hours worked from January 2019 until in or around
January 2020. Moreover, the Defendants willfully failed to post
notices of the minimum wage and overtime requirements in a
conspicuous place at the location of their employment, willfully
failed to keep payroll records, and willfully failed to provide the
Plaintiff with a written notice of his regular rate of pay as well
as with any wage statements upon each payment of his wages, says
the suit.

On behalf of himself and all other similarly situated employees,
the Plaintiff seeks all unpaid minimum wages and overtime wages, as
well as liquidated damages, pre- and post-judgment interest,
litigation costs with reasonable attorneys', and other relief as
the Court deems necessary and proper.

J&M Deli Corp. & New 45 Farm, Inc. operate a retail food store
under the name 45 Deli. Jin Hwan Oh and Kim In Yong are co-owners
of the Corporate Defendants. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Tel: (718) 263-9591

J. QUEEN NEW YORK: Miller Files ADA Suit in W.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against J. Queen New York
Inc. The case is styled as Kimberly Miller, on behalf of herself
and all other persons similarly situated v. J. Queen New York Inc.,
Case No. 1:22-cv-00401 (W.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

J. Queen New York -- https://jqueen-ny.com/ -- offers timeless
bedding, elegantly styled. Upgrade your home with luxurious
comforter sets, quilts, window treatments, and home decor.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: jeffrey@gottlieb.legal


JACK ROGERS: Miller Files ADA Suit in W.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jack Rogers, LLC. The
case is styled as Kimberly Miller, on behalf of herself and all
other persons similarly situated v. Jack Rogers, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-00402 (W.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Jack Rogers -- https://www.jackrogersusa.com/ -- is a retail
women's footwear company that offers sandals, flats, sneakers,
boots, and booties, as well as men’s and kids’ shoes, and
accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: jeffrey@gottlieb.legal


JANTZEN APPAREL: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jantzen Apparel, LLC.
The case is styled as Vanessa Jimenez, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Jantzen Apparel, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-04378 (S.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Jantzen -- https://jantzen.com/ -- is a brand of swimwear that was
established in 1916 and first appeared in the city of Portland,
Oregon.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


JUUL LABS: Causes Youth E-Cigarette Crisis, Wyoming County Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
WYOMING COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, WYOMING COUNTY, STATE OF WEST
VIRGINIA, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC. F/K/A PAX LABS, INC.; JAMES MONSEES;
ADAM BOWEN; NICHOLAS PRITZKER; HOYOUNG HUH; RIAZ VALANI; ALTRIA
GROUP, INC.; ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC; ALTRIA GROUP DISTRIBUTION
COMPANY; and PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., Defendants, Case No.
3:22-cv-03127 (N.D. Cal., May 27, 2022) is a class action against
the Defendants for negligence, gross negligence, and violations of
the West Virginia Public Nuisance Law and the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

Wyoming County Board of Education (WCBOE) is a school district with
its administrative offices located at 155 Park Street, Pineville,
West Virginia.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Andy D. Birchfield, Jr., Esq.
         Joseph G. VanZandt, Esq.
         Davis S. Vaughn, Esq.
         BEASLEY ALLEN CROW METHVIN PORTIS & MILES, LLC
         234 Commerce Street
         Montgomery, AL 36103
         Telephone: (334) 269-2343
         E-mail: Andy.Birchfield@BeasleyAllen.com
                 Joseph.VanZandt@BeasleyAllen.com
                 Davis.Vaughn@BeasleyAllen.com

                 - and –

         Charles R. "Rusty" Webb, Esq.
         THE WEBB LAW CENTRE, PLLC
         716 Lee St. E.
         Charleston, WV 25301
         Telephone: (304) 344-9322
         E-mail: Rusty@RustyWebb.com

JUUL LABS: E-Cigarette Ads Target Youth, Northeast School Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
NORTHEAST SCHOOL CORPORATION, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC. F/K/A PAX LABS,
INC.; JAMES MONSEES; ADAM BOWEN; NICHOLAS PRITZKER; HOYOUNG HUH;
RIAZ VALANI; ALTRIA GROUP, INC.; ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC; ALTRIA
GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY; and PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-03112 (N.D. Cal., May 27, 2022) is a
class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross
negligence, and violations of the Indiana Public Nuisance Law and
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

Northeast School Corporation is a public school district with its
offices located in Shelburn, Indiana.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Thomas P. Cartmell, Esq.
         Jonathan P. Kieffer, Esq.
         Tyler W. Hudson, Esq.
         WAGSTAFF & CARTMELL LLP
         4740 Grand Ave., Ste. 300
         Kansas City, MO 64112
         Telephone: (816) 701-1100
         Facsimile: (816) 531-2372
         E-mail: tcartmell@wcllp.com
                 jpkieffer@wcllp.com
                 thudson@wcllp.com

                 - and –

         Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
         Brad Honnold, Esq.
         GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
         9500 Nall Ave., Ste. 400
         Overland Park, KS 66207
         Telephone: (913) 451-3433
         E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com
                 bhonnold@gohonlaw.com

                 - and –

         Andy D. Birchfield, Jr., Esq.
         Joseph G. VanZandt, Esq.
         BEASLEY ALLEN CROW METHVIN PORTIS & MILES, LLC
         234 Commerce Street
         Montgomery, AL 36103
         Telephone: (334) 269-2343
         E-mail: Andy.Birchfield@BeasleyAllen.com
                 Joseph.VanZandt@BeasleyAllen.com

                 - and –

         Rahul Ravipudi, Esq.
         PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP
         11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700
         Los Angeles, CA 90025
         Telephone: (310) 477-1700
         Facsimile: (310) 477-1699
         E-mail: ravipudi@psblaw.com

                 - and –

         John P. Fiske, Esq.
         BARON & BUDD, P.C.
         11440 West Bernardo Court Suite 265
         San Diego, CA 92127
         Telephone: (858) 251-7424
         Facsimile: (214) 520-1181
         E-mail: jfiske@baronbudd.com

                 - and –

         Khaldoun Baghdadi, Esq.
         WALKUP MELODIA KELLY & SCHOENBERGER, P.C.
         650 California Street, 26th Floor
         San Francisco, CA 94108
         Telephone: (415) 617-1269
         E-mail: kbaghdadi@walkuplawoffice.com

JUUL LABS: Promotes E-Cigarette Use to Youth, Western School Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
WESTERN SCHOOL CORPORATION, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC. F/K/A PAX LABS,
INC.; JAMES MONSEES; ADAM BOWEN; NICHOLAS PRITZKER; HOYOUNG HUH;
RIAZ VALANI; ALTRIA GROUP, INC.; ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC; ALTRIA
GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY; and PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-03114 (N.D. Cal., May 27, 2022) is a
class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross
negligence, and violations of the Indiana Public Nuisance Law and
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

Western School Corporation is a public school district with its
offices located in Russiaville, Indiana.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Thomas P. Cartmell, Esq.
         Jonathan P. Kieffer, Esq.
         Tyler W. Hudson, Esq.
         WAGSTAFF & CARTMELL LLP
         4740 Grand Ave., Ste. 300
         Kansas City, MO 64112
         Telephone: (816) 701-1100
         Facsimile: (816) 531-2372
         E-mail: tcartmell@wcllp.com
                 jpkieffer@wcllp.com
                 thudson@wcllp.com

                 - and –

         Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
         Brad Honnold, Esq.
         GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
         9500 Nall Ave., Ste. 400
         Overland Park, KS 66207
         Telephone: (913) 451-3433
         E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com
                 bhonnold@gohonlaw.com

                 - and –

         Andy D. Birchfield, Jr., Esq.
         Joseph G. VanZandt, Esq.
         BEASLEY ALLEN CROW METHVIN PORTIS & MILES, LLC
         234 Commerce Street
         Montgomery, AL 36103
         Telephone: (334) 269-2343
         E-mail: Andy.Birchfield@BeasleyAllen.com
                 Joseph.VanZandt@BeasleyAllen.com

                 - and –

         Rahul Ravipudi, Esq.
         PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP
         11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700
         Los Angeles, CA 90025
         Telephone: (310) 477-1700
         Facsimile: (310) 477-1699
         E-mail: ravipudi@psblaw.com

                 - and –

         John P. Fiske, Esq.
         BARON & BUDD, P.C.
         11440 West Bernardo Court Suite 265
         San Diego, CA 92127
         Telephone: (858) 251-7424
         Facsimile: (214) 520-1181
         E-mail: jfiske@baronbudd.com

                 - and –

         Khaldoun Baghdadi, Esq.
         WALKUP MELODIA KELLY & SCHOENBERGER, P.C.
         650 California Street, 26th Floor
         San Francisco, CA 94108
         Telephone: (415) 617-1269
         E-mail: kbaghdadi@walkuplawoffice.com

KELLOGG SALES: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Harris Class Complaint
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANITA HARRIS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. KELLOGG SALES COMPANY, Defendant,
Case No. 21-CV-01040-SPM (S.D. Ill.), Judge Stephen P. McGlynn of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois
grants Kellogg's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Harris filed a proposed class action Complaint alleging
that the labeling for Kellogg's Strawberry Pop-Tarts is misleading
because the filling contains other fruits. Pending before the Court
is Defendant Kellogg's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and
memorandum in support. Harris filed a response to the Motion and
Kellogg's replied.

II. Background

Kellogg manufactures, labels, markets, and sells toaster pastries
labeled as "Frosted Strawberry" under the Pop Tarts brand. Harris
purchased the pastries "on one or more occasions at stores
including Walmart" in Cahokia, Illinois in 2020 and 2021.

Kellogg only promotes the strawberry content of the pastries in its
labeling on the front of the box. The pastries' description as
"Frosted Strawberry - Toaster Pastries," is false, misleading, and
deceptive because they contain a relatively significant amount of
non-strawberry fruit ingredients, specifically pears and apples. To
trick the consumer into thinking that there was a higher
concentration of strawberries in the filling, the filling contained
red synthetic food coloring. The pastries were sold at a higher
compared price than they "would otherwise be sold for, absent the
misleading representations and omissions." Harris would not have
purchased the pastries or paid as much if she had known about the
lack of strawberry content and, as a result, she suffered damages.

Ms. Harris claimed that Kellogg's engaged in deceptive business
practices in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act ("ICFA"); breach of warranty; negligent
misrepresentation; fraud; and unjust enrichment.

III. Analysis

Judge McGlynn finds that the case is substantially similar to a
case the Court previously dismissed, Floyd v. Pepperidge Farm,
Inc., 2022 WL 203071 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2022). In that case, the
plaintiff claimed that the packaging for Pepperidge Farm's "Golden
Butter" crackers was misleading because "even though the crackers
contain butter," they also contained a "non-de minimis amount of
butter substitutes -- vegetable oils." The plaintiff claimed that
"she wanted to consume a cracker which contained more butter than
it did and did not contain butter substitutes where butter could be
used." Injecting some common sense into the matter, the Court
dismissed the plaintiff's ICFA claims, reasoning that there were no
"untruths on the packaging" or deception because the crackers were
golden-colored and contained butter.

In the case, like in Floyd, even viewing all of the allegations in
the amended complaint in a light most favorable to Harris, the
Kellogg's Strawberry Pop-Tarts label is, on its face, not
deceptive, nor does it lead to consumer confusion more generally,
Judge McGlynn holds. The front of the pastries' packaging did not
make a claim regarding the amount of strawberry contained in the
pastries' filling and Harris conceded that the filling does contain
some strawberries. "What matters most is how real consumers
understand and react to the advertising."

Where plaintiffs base deceptive advertising claims on unreasonable
or fanciful interpretations of labels or other advertising,
dismissal on the pleadings may well be justified. Harris'
interpretation of the pastries' label is unreasonable and not
grounded in the reality of how the public understands and reacts to
product advertising. Accordingly, relief is foreclosed and Harris'
claim under ICFA is dismissed with prejudice.

Ms. Harris' remaining claims rely on the same theory of deception
and would impose the same labeling requirement. Therefore, all of
her remaining claims are also dismissed with prejudice.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons he set, Judge McGlynn grants Defendant Kellogg's
Motion to Dismiss. Harris' Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 24, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/p6f68kp8 from Leagle.com.


KEYPOINT GOVERNMENT: Appeals Reconsideration Bid Denial in Brayman
------------------------------------------------------------------
Keypoint Government Solutions, Inc. filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit entitled RACHEL BRAYMAN, individually
and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, v.
KEYPOINT GOVERNMENT SOLUTIONS, INC., a Delaware corporation, Case
No. 1:18-cv-00550-WJM-NRN, in the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado-Denver.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiff brings the
action against KeyPoint for alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") and violations of California law. The
Plaintiff's FLSA and California law claims concern KeyPoint's
alleged failure to properly compensate a certain class of employees
known as "Investigators" for overtime hours worked, as well as
other employment and wage violations.

KeyPoint moved to compel arbitration of California state law claims
and strike related Rule 23 class action allegations.

On Feb. 4, 2021, KeyPoint's request that the Court compel the
California Plaintiffs to arbitrate their state law claims, strike
Plaintiffs' Rule 23 Class allegations as to the arbitration
agreement signatories, and stay the remaining proceedings pending
arbitration was denied.

On March 31, 2022, the Court granted in part KeyPoint's Motion to
Clarify the Court's Order Denying its Motion to Compel Arbitration
to the extent it seeks clarification of the Court's February 4,
2021 Order, and denied it in all other respects. KeyPoint's Amended
Motion for Decertification was also denied. Meanwhile, the
Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Final Certification of the FLSA
Collective was granted, and the Court certified a FLSA Collective
Action class. The Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Rule 23 Class
Certification was also granted. Plaintiffs Dana McCarthy and
Adriana Ponce were approved as Rule 23 class representatives. The
Court also appointed Nichols Kaster, PLLP as class counsel.

On April 14, 2022, KeyPoint filed a motion for reconsideration,
asking the Court to reconsider its March 31, 2022 Order on Pending
Motions related to: (1) its denial of KeyPoint's Amended Motion for
Decertification; and (2) its grant of Plaintiffs' Amended Motion
for Final FLSA Certification. However, Judge William J. Martinez
denied KeyPoint's request that same day.

The Defendant is now appealing Judge Martinez's denial of his
motion for reconsideration.

The appellate case is captioned as Brayman, et al. v. Keypoint
Government Solutions, Case No. 22-1168, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, filed on May 26, 2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Docketing statement, transcript order form and notice of
appearance are due on June 9, 2022 for Keypoint Government
Solutions, Inc.; and

   -- Notice of appearance is due on June 9, 2022 for Rachel
Brayman, Dana McCarthy and Adriana Ponce.[BN]

Defendant-Appellant KEYPOINT GOVERNMENT SOLUTIONS, INC., a Delaware
corporation, is represented by:

          Thomas W. Carroll, Esq.
          Jennifer Harpole, Esq.
          Margaret Parnell Hogan, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON
          1900 Sixteenth Street, Suite 800
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 629-6200
          E-mail: mphogan@littler.com

               - and -

          Jacqueline Elise Kalk, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON
          80 South Eighth Street
          IDS Center, Suite 1300
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 630-1000
          E-mail: jkalk@littler.com

               - and -

          Brandon Mita, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON
          1150 17th Street, NW, Suite 900
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 842-3400

Plaintiffs-Appellees RACHEL BRAYMAN, individually and on behalf of
all other similarly situated individuals; ADRIANA PONCE,
individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated
individuals; and DANA MCCARTHY, individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated individuals, are represented by:

          Caroline Elizabeth Bressman, Esq.
          Rachhana T. Srey, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER
          4700 IDS Center
          80 South 8th Street, Suite 4700
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 256-3200
          E-mail: srey@nka.com

               - and -

          Benjamin L. Davis, III, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF PETER T. NICHOLL
          36 South Charles Street, Suite 1700
          Baltimore, MD 21201
          Telephone: (410) 244-7005
          E-mail: bdavis@nicholllaw.com

KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Castay Sues Over Defective CPAP Devices
------------------------------------------------------------
JAMES J. CASTAY, JR., HUSBAND OF/AND MARYBETH CASTAY, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V.; PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA LLC; PHILIPS
HOLDING USA, INC.; and PHILIPS RS NORTH AMERICA LLC, Defendants,
Case No. 2:22-cv-01542-JCZ-MBN (E.D. La., May 27, 2022) is a class
action against the Defendants for products liability, manufacturing
defect, and negligent design.

According to the complaint, the Defendants manufactured and sold
Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (CPAP) and BiLevel Positive
Airway Pressure (BiLevel PAP) devices for sleep and home
respiratory care, which contain polyester-based polyurethane sound
abatement foam (PE-PUR Foam). The Defendants recalled CPAP and
BiLevel PAP devices containing PE-PUR Foam because they determined
that (a) the PE-PUR Foam was at risk for degradation into particles
that may enter the devices' pathway and be ingested or inhaled by
users, and (b) the PE-PUR Foam may off-gas certain chemicals during
operation health risks associated to the devices. As a result of
the health risks associated with the use of these devices, Mr.
Castay has suffered personal injuries including a brain abscess,
the necessity for a frontal craniotomy, among others, says the
suit.

Koninklijke Philips N.V. is a health technology company with its
principal executive offices at Philips Center, Amstelplein 2, 1096
BC Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Philips North America LLC is a health technology company with its
principal place of business located at 222 Jacobs Street, Floor 3,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Philips Holding USA Inc. is a holding company with its principal
place of business located at 222 Jacobs Street, Floor 3, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.

Philips RS North America LLC is a company that manufactures and
markets medical devices with its principal place of business
located at 6501 Living Place, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         John R. Walker, Esq.
         Thomas H. Huval, Esq.
         JONES FUSSELL, LLP
         P.O. Box 1810
         Covington, LA 70434
         Telephone: (985) 246-7808
         Facsimile: (985) 892-4925
         E-mail: johnwalker@jonesfussell.com
                 thuval@jonesfussell.com

KRAFT HEINZ: Tarantino Suit Moved From E.D.N.Y. to N.D. Ill.
------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled KELLY TARANTINO, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. THE KRAFT HEINZ COMPANY A/K/A KRAFT
HEINZ FOODS COMPANY, Case No. 2:21-cv-04013, was transferred from
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on May
27, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of Illinois assigned
Case No. 1:22-cv-02807 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the New
York General Business Law Section 349 and the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, breach of express warranty, fraudulent concealment,
and unjust enrichment by engaging in deceptive and misleading
business practices with respect to the marketing and sales of its
Kraft Mac & Cheese products in New York.

The Kraft Heinz Company, also known as Kraft Heinz Foods Company,
is an American multinational food company, headquartered in
Chicago, Illinois. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Jason P. Sultzer, Esq.
         Joseph Lipari, Esq.
         Daniel Markowitz, Esq.
         THE SULTZER LAW GROUP P.C.
         270 Madison Avenue, Suite 1800
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: (845) 483-7100
         Facsimile: (888) 749-7747
         E-mail: sultzerj@thesultzerlawgroup.com
                 liparij@thesultzerlawgroup.com
                 markowitzd@thesultzerlawgroup.com

                  - and –

         David C. Magagna Jr., Esq.
         Charles E. Schaffer, Esq.
         LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN
         510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
         Philadelphia, PA 19106
         Telephone: (215) 592-1500
         E-mail: dmagagna@lfsblaw.com
                 cschaffer@lfsblaw.com

KSF ACQUISITION: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against KSF Acquisition
Corporation. The case is styled as Vanessa Jimenez, individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. KSF Acquisition
Corporation, Case No. 1:22-cv-04371 (S.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

KSF Acquisition Corporation doing business as SlimFast --
http://www.slimfast.com/-- is an American company headquartered in
Palm Beach Gardens, Florida that markets an eponymous brand of
shakes, bars, snacks, packaged meals, and other dietary supplement
foods sold in the U.S. Canada, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland,
Latin America, and the U.K.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


LABORATORY CORP: Court Certifies Classes in Davis ADA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LUKE DAVIS, JULIAN VARGAS,
et al., v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS, Case No.
2:20-cv-00893-FMO-KS (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Fernando M. Olguin
entered an order:

   1. certifying the following classes:

      -- Nationwide Injunctive Class

         "All legally blind individuals in the United States who
         visited a LabCorp patient service center in the United
         States during the applicable limitations period and
         were denied full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
         services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
         accommodations due to LabCorp's failure to make its e-
         check-in kiosks accessible to legally blind
         individuals;" and

      -- California Class

         "All legally blind individuals in California who
         visited a LabCorp patient service center in California
         during the applicable limitations period and were
         denied full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
         facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations
         due to LabCorp's failure to make its e-check-in kiosks
         accessible to legally blind individuals;"

   2. appointing Luke Davis and Julian Vargas as the
      representatives of the Nationwide Class and Vargas as the
      representative of the California Class; and

   3. appointing the law firms of Nye, Stirling, Hale & Miller,
      LLP and Handley, 4 Farah & Anderson, PLLC as class
      counsel.

The Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of: (1) the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA); (2) California's Unruh Civil Rights
Act; and (3) California's Disabled Persons Act (CDPA). The Unruh
Act and CDPA claims are brought by Vargas on behalf of himself and
a putative California class, while the remaining federal claims are
brought by plaintiffs on behalf of the Nationwide Injunctive
Class.

The Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, statutory
damages, and attorney's fees. The Plaintiffs do "not seek class
recovery for actual damages, personal injuries or emotional
distress that may have been caused by defendant's conduct."

The Plaintiffs allege that LabCorp discriminates against them and
other visually impaired individuals, "by refusing and failing to
provide auxiliary aids and services to Plaintiffs, and by requiring
[them] to rely upon other means of communication that are
inadequate to provide equal opportunity to participate in and
benefit from Defendant's health care services free from
discrimination."

A copy of the Court's order dated May 23, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3PMutzE at no extra charge.[CC]

LOCUST MEDICAL: Seeks Denial of Jackson Class Cert Bid
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as GERARD JACKSON,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
LOCUST MEDICAL, LLC, Case No. 4:22-cv-00424-MWB (M.D. Pa.), the
Defendant asks the Court to enter an order denying class
certification of the Plaintiff's Complaint.

As set forth in the contemporaneously filed brief, Jackson has
failed to qualify the matter for class certification. Locust
Medical, LLC respectfully requests that this Court enter the
proposed Order denying class certification of Plaintiff Gerard
Jackson's complaint.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated May 23, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Ncje1N at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Faith M. Lucchesi, Esq.
          DE BOEF LUCCHESI, PC
          1402 S. Atherton Street
          State College, PA 16801
          Telephone: (814) 231-4050
          E-mail: Faith@DLASC.com


MCCLATCHY CO: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Kelly TCPA Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Robert Kelly, Eryn Learned, and Kerry Wano, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. The
McClatchy Company, LLC, a Delaware Corporation, Defendants, Case
No. 2:21-cv-01960-KJM-JDP (E.D. Cal.), Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
denies the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration of the
Plaintiffs' claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

I. Background

Plaintiffs Robert Kelly, Eryn Learned and Kerry Wano bring the
proposed class action under the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. Section 227.
Defendant McClatchy is a publishing company, which operates 29
local newspapers in 14 states. Each Plaintiff and potential class
member purchased a subscription to a McClatchy publication. Every
individual who subscribes to a McClatchy newspaper must agree to be
bound by the company's Terms of Service.

The "Terms of Service are identical for each newspaper, except for
the information specific to the newspaper." Each agreement's
provisions allow a subscriber to "terminate these Terms of Service
or the subscriber's account by: (a) discontinuing use and (b)
destroying and removing all copies of Content in the subscriber's
possession and control. The Terms of Service also include a
"Dispute Resolution and Arbitration" provision, which provides that
the subscriber and McClatchy "agree that any Subject Legal Claim
that either [party] may have must be resolved through binding
individual arbitration before the American Arbitration Association
using its Consumer Arbitration Rules." The agreement makes two
exceptions for individual actions in small claims court and
enforcement of patents, trademarks, copyrights or trade secrets.

The Terms of Service incorporate a Privacy Policy by reference,
which acknowledges that McClatchy collects phone numbers and other
contact information when a person registers for a McClatchy
service. In the section discussing what McClatchy does with the
information it collects, the Privacy Policy notes "first and
foremost, McClatchy uses the subscriber's information to help
subscribers use and navigate McClatchy Services."

Nowhere does the Privacy Policy or Terms of Service document
mention the Defendant's right to use information it gathered while
an individual was subscribed to later solicit renewal of a
subscription after the Terms of Service have ceased to apply by
virtue of a customer's cancellation of a subscription. The Privacy
Policy also provides that individuals "can ask the Defendant to
unsubscribe from our mail or telephone solicitations."

The Plaintiffs eventually canceled their respective subscriptions,
and then began receiving unwanted calls from McClatchy soliciting a
renewal. They each told the Defendant to stop calling, but the
calls continued. They then filed the case in the Western District
of Washington, bringing two claims against McClatchy for two
violations of the TCPA: Making telemarketing calls to individuals
listed on the National Do Not Call Registry without written consent
and continuing calls despite receiving "do not call" requests. The
Washington district court transferred the case to this district.

As noted, the Defendant moves to compel arbitration. The Plaintiffs
oppose. The Defendant replied. The Court submitted the matter
without oral argument.

II. Analysis

The parties do not dispute that they entered into an arbitration
agreement. The Plaintiffs contend, however, that the arbitration
agreement terminated with the cancellation of their subscriptions.
They also argue their claims fall outside the scope of the
arbitration clause, and that they did not agree an arbitrator would
resolve their current disputes.

Judge Mueller concludes that the arbitration agreement does not
cover the dispute at issue. She holds that the Defendant did not
continually call the Plaintiffs to enforce a provision of the
agreement the Plaintiffs failed to meet prior to termination. The
parties' dispute did not concern a right that "survived expiration
of the remainder of the agreement," as the Plaintiffs' "TCPA claims
were entirely unrelated to the parties' prior relationship."
Similarly, the Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy in the case
provide that the Plaintiffs agreed to give the Defendant their
contact information, but there is no language supporting the
Defendant's right to continue contact indefinitely after
termination, including with repeated "do not call" requests.

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, Judge Mueller denies the motion to compel
arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4adrs295 from Leagle.com.


MCLEOD HEALTHCARE: Hourly Employee Class Certified in Wilkes Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Maya Wilkes, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, v. McLeod Healthcare
Network, LLC, Case No. 4:22-cv-00061-JD (D.S.C.), the Hon. Judge
Joseph Dawson III entered an order that the Plaintiff's FLSA
claims, a collective action of the following individuals is
conditionally certified for the sole purpose of sending notice and
consent and in accord with the schedule and method of distribution
outlined in the Joint Motion:

   "All hourly employees who worked for McLeod Regional Medical
   Center of the Pee Dee, Inc., McLeod Loris Seacoast Hospital,
   McLeod Health Clarendon, McLeod Health Cheraw, McLeod Medical
   Center–Dillon, McLeod Occupational Health, LLC, and McLeod
   Physician Associates II in a patient-facing position at any
   time within three years prior to May 23, 2022, and who were
   subject to the automatic meal break pay deduction."

This conditional certification of the FLSA claims pursuant to 29
U.S.C. section 216(b) does not preclude and is without prejudice to
Defendant's right to later contend that no claims in this action
are suitable for collective or class adjudication and/or to seek
decertification of the collective action.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 23, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3lZCIuL at no extra charge.[CC]

MDL 2724: IRPs' Claims v. Distributors in Antitrust Suit Dismissed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS PRICING ANTITRUST
LITIGATION. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: Reliable Pharmacy v. Actavis
Holdco U.S., Inc., Case Nos. MDL 2724, 16-MD-2724 (E.D. Pa.), Judge
Cynthia M. Rufe of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania grants the Distributor Defendants' motion to
dismiss the claims brought against them by the Indirect Reseller
Plaintiffs.

I. Introduction

The case is part of a large and complex multidistrict litigation
("MDL") concerning allegations that manufacturers engaged in an
antitrust conspiracy by allocating the market for and fixing the
prices of numerous generic pharmaceutical products. Within the MDL
are individual cases and proposed class actions brought by
different groups of plaintiffs, such as entities that purchased
pharmaceuticals directly from the manufacturers (including drug
purchasing cooperatives and retail pharmacy operators), third-party
payors (including employee welfare benefits funds, labor unions,
private individuals, and private insurers) that indirectly
purchased the drugs or provided reimbursements, and states and
other jurisdictions asserting claims on their own behalf or on
behalf of their citizens.

The Plaintiffs here, independent pharmacies and a hospital that did
not purchase directly from the manufacturers (the "Indirect
Reseller Plaintiffs" or "IRPs"), have filed a proposed class-action
Amended Complaint alleging an overarching conspiracy by both the
manufacturers of generic pharmaceuticals and by the distributors of
the products. The Distributor Defendants have moved to dismiss the
claims brought against them.

II. Background

The IRPs allege that the Distributer Defendants actively
participated in a "fair share" conspiracy among generic drug
manufacturers to allocate market share to ensure generic
pharmaceuticals could be sold for supracompetitive prices, in
violation of the Sherman Act and the antitrust statutes of every
state and territory. Distributor Defendants, which represent "over
81% of the total purchasing volume of generic drugs in the United
States," allegedly "understood, agreed with, and did their part to
achieve the common goals of the fair share conspiracy: to prevent
price erosion by 'stabilizing' and 'settling' the market, and to
encourage coordinated price increases."

Additionally, the IRPs allege that the Distributor Defendants went
beyond merely discussing their own purchases with the
manufacturers, an otherwise standard business practice, and instead
"arranged anticompetitive communications that affected the market
as a whole."

The IRPs bring five counts against the Distributor Defendants: (1)
"Violation of Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act—Injunctive
Relief;" (2) "Violation of Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman
Act—Damages;" (3) "Violation of State Antitrust Statutes;" (4)
"Violation of State Consumer Protection Statutes;" and (5) "Unjust
Enrichment."

III. Discussion

A. Failure to State a Sherman Act Claim

The IRPs allege that the Distributor Defendants engaged in a
"contract, combination, or conspiracy," which "is a per se
violation of the federal antitrust laws." To state a claim for a
Sherman Act conspiracy, a plaintiff must plead "enough factual
matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made."

Judge Rufe dismisses the IRPs' Section 1 claims against the
Distributor Defendants. She finds that (i) a desire for profit does
not itself constitute a conspiratorial motive; (ii) the IRPs have
not alleged facts that would give rise to the inference that
Distributor Defendants acted contrary to their own interests, nor
do the allegations suggest a traditional conspiracy; (iii) even if
IRPs had sufficiently alleged a conspiracy between the Distributor
Defendants and the Manufacturer Defendants, the alleged conspiracy
would not constitute a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act; (iv) there are no similar allegations supporting concerted
action among the Distributor Defendants; and (v) the IRPs have not
plead sufficient factual detail to show that the conduct alleged
plausibly suggests an illegal conspiracy subject to per se
condemnation under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

B. Antitrust Standing for Damages Claim

Even if the Distributor Defendants could be held liable under the
Sherman Act for the conduct alleged, the IRPs nevertheless would be
ineligible to recover damages from them because they are indirect
purchasers of the pharmaceuticals at issue, Judge Rufe opines. To
the extent that any of the IRPs could invoke the limited
co-conspirator exception, they have not alleged "complete,
voluntary and substantially equal participation in an illegal
practice" by the Distributor Defendants. The communication of
market share and pricing information alleged is not substantially
equal to the allegations that the Manufacturer Defendants allocated
the markets through a "fair share" scheme. Therefore, the IRPs are
still barred from recovering damages from the Distributer
Defendants under Illinois Brick.

C. State Law Claims

The Distributor Defendants also move to dismiss IRPs' state
antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment claims
against them, arguing that they are all derivative of the IRPs'
federal claims. The IRPs argue that the "Court has already upheld
IRPs' state law claims in earlier complaints, and the claims in
this Complaint were drafted in accordance with those earlier
decisions."

However, in the earlier decisions, the federal antitrust claims
moved forward, and state law claims generally are derivative of the
federal antitrust claims. The IRPs have not alleged that their
claims under state law are subject to a qualitatively different
standard than their Sherman Act claims. Nor have the IRPs otherwise
explained why their claims that the Distributor Defendants violated
25 state antitrust statutes, 16 state consumer protection statutes,
and the unjust enrichment laws of every state and territory aside
from Ohio and Indiana should proceed in the absence of an
overarching federal claim against the Distributor Defendants.

D. Leave to Amend

The Distributor Defendants seek dismissal of the IRPs' claims with
prejudice "because granting leave to file a fourth version of IRPs'
Complaint would be inequitable and futile," given that the IRPs
have twice amended their complaint on this docket and have
"countless iterations of their complaint in other dockets." The
Distributor Defendants further assert that "amendment would be
futile because IRPs simply cannot plead around Illinois Brick."
Lastly, they argue that given the IRPs' access to voluminous
amounts of discovery, they would have been able to properly plead a
Sherman Act violation by now if they could.

The IRPs respond that they continue to receive additional evidence
of the Distributor Defendants' conduct in furtherance of the
overarching conspiracy, and thus the Court should grant them leave
to amend.

Judge Rufe finds that the IRPs have already amended their
complaint, meaning they may further amend it "only with the
opposing party's written consent or the court's leave."
Nevertheless, she grants leave for the IRPs to file a further
amended complaint, provided that they are able to do so in
conformity with her Memorandum Opinion.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons she set forth, Judge Rufe grants the Distributor
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss without prejudice, and the IRPS are
given leave to amend their complaint. An appropriate order
follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ytp4s2rn from Leagle.com.


MDL 2887: Eichhorn-Burkhard Complaint Dismissed From Dog Food Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: HILL'S PET NUTRITION, INC., DOG FOOD PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION, MDL No. 2887. This Document Relates to Diana
Anja Eichhorn-Burkhard v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc. and
Colgate-Palmolive Company, D. Kan. Case No. 19-cv-2672-JAR-TJJ,
Case No. 19-md-2887-JAR-TJJ (D. Kan.), Judge Julie A. Robinson of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas grants the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Eichhorn-Burkhard Complaint.

I. Introduction

In January 2019, Defendant Hill's announced a voluntary recall of
canned dog food products that contained elevated levels of vitamin
D. In the wake of the recall, putative class-action lawsuits were
filed across the country alleging harm from the purchase and use of
Hill's dog food products. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation transferred and assigned these actions to the Court for
coordinated and consolidated pretrial proceedings.

Plaintiff Diana Anja Eichhorn-Burkhard -- a resident of Germany who
bought recalled Hill's pet food and fed it to her dog -- brings the
tag-along action against Hill's and Colgate-Palmolive Co., its
corporate parent, on her own behalf and as a class action on behalf
of other European purchasers of recalled Hill's pet food products.
The Plaintiff's Complaint raises a single claim for breach of
warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections
2301-2312.

Now before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
Eichhorn-Burkhard Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The
motion is fully briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule.

II. Background

The Defendants manufacture pet food products, including dog food.
Hill's is headquartered in Topeka, Kansas, and manufactures its
products in the United States. Colgate, a Delaware corporation that
maintains its principle executive office in New York, is the parent
company of Hill's. Colgate exercises control over Hill's and
derives profits from the sales of its pet food products. Defendants
sell Hill's pet food products in 86 countries, including Germany
and other European Union member states.

In marketing and advertising materials, the Defendants represent
that Hill's pet food products meet "the special nutritional needs
of puppies and adult dogs," protect "vital kidney and heart
function," "suppor your dog's natural ability to build lean muscle
daily," and "improve & lengthen quality of life." They also state
that they "only accept ingredients from suppliers whose facilities
meet stringent quality standards," and "each ingredient is examined
to ensure its safety."

Despite these representations, Hill's recalled some of its canned
dog food products in January 2019 because they contained elevated
levels of vitamin D. Hill's updated the list of recalled products
in February 2019 and again in March 2019. The Plaintiff, a citizen
and resident of Dusseldorf, Germany, had purchased recalled Hill's
dog food from her veterinarian and fed it to her dog. She claims
the dog food contained toxic levels of vitamin D and caused her dog
to become seriously ill.

The Plaintiff styles her lawsuit as a class action. She purports to
bring the suit individually and on behalf of "all persons residing
in European Union member states who purchased Recalled Products and
suffered damages as a result" (the "European Union Class"). She
also proposes a subclass composed of "all persons residing in
Germany who purchased Recalled Products and suffered damages as a
result" (the "German Sub-Class"). The Complaint asserts a single
claim for breach of warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
The Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

III. Discussion

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA") protects consumers damaged
by a warrantor's failure to comply with the terms of a warranty.
The Defendants argue that the Court must dismiss the Plaintiff's
MMWA claim -- the only claim she asserts against them -- because
the MMWA does not apply extraterritorially, and the Complaint does
not allege a proper domestic application of the statute. They also
argue that Plaintiff's MMWA claim fails for four additional,
independent reasons: (1) the Plaintiff must, but fails to, allege
an underlying state-law warranty claim; (2) the Plaintiff does not
meet the MMWA's jurisdictional requirement of naming 100
plaintiffs; (3) the Plaintiff must, but did not, seek a refund or
give Defendants a reasonable opportunity to cure the alleged defect
before bringing suit; and (4) the Complaint cites statements that
did not create written warranties within the meaning of the MMWA.

Because it is dispositive, Judge Robinson reaches only the first
argument for dismissal -- that the Plaintiff's MMWA claim is
impermissibly extraterritorial. To this argument, the Plaintiff
responds that the MMWA applies extraterritorially when, as in the
case, the consumer products at issue were exported from the United
States and sold abroad. Neither the Supreme Court nor any federal
court of appeals has yet addressed the extraterritorial reach of
the MMWA. The Court must therefore interpret the MMWA to determine
whether it applies extraterritorially.

As step one, Judge Robinson interprets the MMWA in light of the
presumption against extraterritoriality: "Absent clearly expressed
congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be
construed to have only domestic application." The Supreme Court
"has established a two-step framework for deciding questions of
extraterritoriality." "The first step asks `whether the presumption
against extraterritoriality has been rebutted.'" If the statute
does not apply extraterritorially, "the second step of the
framework asks 'whether the case involves a domestic application of
the statute.'"

Judge RObinson finds that there is no "clear" and "affirmative"
indication in the MWWA that it applies extraterritorially, and so
she concludes that it does not. She cannot interpret the MMWA's
generic definition of "commerce" as an affirmative indication that
the statute applies extraterritorially. And no other provision of
the MMWA contains a clear and affirmative expression of
extraterritorial application.

What's more, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), the agency
charged with implementing the MMWA, has similarly interpreted the
MMWA not to reach exported consumer products sold abroad. Although
the FTC promulgated its interpretations of the MMWA using
notice-and-comment procedures, its interpretations are
self-avowedly "advisory in nature"; they are "not substantive
rules" and lack "the force or effect of statutory provisions."

At step two, Judge Robinson holds that because the Plaintiff's MMWA
claim is impermissibly extraterritorial, she grants the Defendants'
motion to dismiss. She finds that the Plaintiff urges the Court to
deny the Defendants' motion to dismiss because, she contends, the
MMWA applies extraterritorially. But for the reasons explained, the
Court has concluded that it does not.

IV. Order

In light of the foregoing, Judge Robinson grants Defendants Hill's
and Colgate's Motion to Dismiss the Eichhorn-Burkhard Complaint.
The case is dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 24, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p86zc42 from Leagle.com.


MDL 2936: Court Amends Sched Order in Products Liability Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit RE: SMITTY'S/CAM2 303 TRACTOR HYDRAULIC
FLUID MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION, Case No. (), the Hon. Judge Stephen R. Bough entered an
amended scheduling order as follows:

  1. Class Certification Expert Deadlines

     The Plaintiffs shall designate expert witnesses relating to
     class certification issues on or before July 29, 2022.

     At the time of disclosure, the Plaintiffs shall provide
     deposition dates within 21 days of the disclosure for the
     taking of those depositions.

     The Defendants shall designate expert witnesses relating to
     class certification issues on or before September 27, 2022.

     At the time of disclosure, Defendants shall provide
     deposition dates within 21 days of the disclosure for the
     taking of those depositions. Each party shall ensure
     compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) at the time of
     the party's expert witness designations.

  2. Class Certification Briefing; Hearing Date

     The Plaintiffs' motion for class certification shall be
     filed on or before October 28, 2022.

     The Defendants' opposition brief shall be filed on or
     before December 5, 2022.

     The Plaintiffs' reply shall be filed on or before December
     19, 2022.

     A class certification hearing will be held on January 5,
     2023, at 9:00am.


A copy of the Court's order dated May 23, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3x35aC2 at no extra charge.[CC]

METROPOLITAN PROPERTY: Final Judgment & Order Entered in Shields
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Glen H. Davidson of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Mississippi, Aberdeen Division, enters Final Judgment
and Order in the case, TASHAL SHIELDS and LLOYD HACHAT individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and
METROPOLITAN GROUP PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00222-GHD-RP (N.D. Miss.).

The Plaintiffs filed the operative complaint, Second Amended Class
Action Complaint, alleging that the Defendants violated applicable
law and breached its contracts by improperly deducting Nonmaterial
Depreciation from actual cash value payments when adjusting
Structural Loss Claims under Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Ohio,
and Tennessee homeowners insurance policies. The Defendants have
denied, and still deny, any liability, wrongdoing, and damages with
respect to the matters alleged in the Second Amended Complaint.

Representative Plaintiffs Shields and Hachat, individually and on
behalf of the Settlement Class, and the Defendants agreed to settle
the Action pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth in the
March 10, 2022 Amended Class Action Stipulation of Settlement
Agreement.

On March 15, 2022, the Court granted preliminary approval of the
proposed class action settlement set forth in the Agreement and
provisionally certified the Settlement Class for settlement
purposes only. On March 15, 2022, the Court, entered the Amended
Preliminary Approval Order, preliminarily approving the Agreement,
preliminarily certifying the Settlement Class for settlement
purposes only, and scheduling a hearing for May 25, 2022 at 10:00
a.m. to consider final approval of the Proposed Settlement and
other actions described in the Preliminary Approval Order.

On March 15, 2022, the Court, entered the Amended Preliminary
Approval Order, preliminarily approving the Agreement,
preliminarily certifying the Settlement Class for settlement
purposes only, and scheduling a hearing for May 25, 2022 at 10:00
a.m. to consider final approval of the Proposed Settlement and
other actions described in the Preliminary Approval Order

As part of its Amended Preliminary Approval Order, the Court
certified for settlement purposes a class ("Settlement Class")
defined as: All Class Members within the Illinois Settlement Class,
Kentucky Settlement Class, Mississippi Settlement Class, Ohio
Settlement Class or Tennessee Settlement Class (except for those
explicitly excluded), which are defined as follows:

      a. Illinois Settlement Class means all policyholders, (except
for those explicitly excluded), under any property insurance policy
issued by Metropolitan, who made: (i) a Structural Loss claim for
property located in the State of Illinois between June 12, 2019 and
Nov. 16, 2020; and (ii) that resulted in an ACV Payment from which
Nonmaterial Depreciation was withheld, or that would have resulted
in an ACV Payment, but for the withholding of Nonmaterial
Depreciation causing the loss to drop below the applicable
deductible.

      b. Kentucky Settlement Class means all policyholders, (except
for those explicitly excluded), under any property insurance policy
issued by Metropolitan, who made: (i) a Structural Loss claim for
property located in the State of Kentucky between April 1, 2019 and
Nov. 16, 2020; and (ii) that resulted in an ACV Payment from which
Nonmaterial Depreciation was withheld, or that would have resulted
in an ACV Payment, but for the withholding of Nonmaterial
Depreciation causing the loss to drop below the applicable
deductible.

      c. Mississippi Settlement Class means all policyholders,
(except for those explicitly excluded), under any property
insurance policy issued by Metropolitan, who made: (i) a Structural
Loss claim for property located in the State of Mississippi between
Dec. 17, 2016 and Nov. 16, 2020; and (ii).that resulted in an ACV
Payment from which Nonmaterial Depreciation was withheld, or that
would have resulted in an ACV Payment, but for the withholding of
Nonmaterial Depreciation causing the loss to drop below the
applicable deductible.

      d. Ohio Settlement Class means all policyholders, (except for
those explicitly excluded), under property insurance policy issued
by Metropolitan, who made: (i) a Structural Loss claim for property
located in the State of Ohio between Feb. 13, 2019 and Nov. 16,
2020; and (ii) that resulted in an ACV Payment from which
Nonmaterial Depreciation was withheld, or that would have resulted
in an ACV Payment, but for the withholding of Nonmaterial
Depreciation causing the loss to drop below the applicable
deductible.

      e. Tennessee Settlement Class means all policyholders,
(except for those explicitly excluded), under any homeowners
residential property insurance policy issued by Metropolitan, who
made: (i) a Structural Loss claim for property located in the State
of Tennessee between Dec. 17, 2018 and Nov. 16, 2020; and (ii) that
resulted in an ACV Payment from which Nonmaterial Depreciation was
withheld, or that would have resulted in an ACV Payment, but for
the withholding of Nonmaterial Depreciation causing the loss to
drop below the applicable deductible.

The Settlement Class does not include: (i) policyholders whose
claims arose under policy forms, endorsements, or riders expressly
permitting the Nonmaterial Depreciation within the text of the
policy form, endorsement or rider, i.e., by express use of the
words depreciation and labor; (ii) policyholders who received one
or more ACV Payments for a claim that exhausted the applicable
limits of insurance; (iii) policyholders whose claims were denied
or abandoned without an ACV Payment for any reason other than that
the ACV payment was not made solely because the withholding of
Nonmaterial Depreciation caused the loss to drop below the
applicable deductible; (iv) Metropolitan and its officers and
directors; (v) members of the judiciary and their staff to whom
this Action is assigned and their immediate families; and (vi)
Class Counsel and their immediate families.

On May 18, 2022, the Plaintiffs applied to the Court for final
approval of the terms of the Proposed Settlement and for the entry
of this Final Judgment Order.

On May 25, 2022, the Court held the duly noticed final approval
hearing. Before the Court is the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for
Final Approval of Class Settlement and Motion for Service Awards to
Class Representatives and Awards of Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and
Litigation Expenses pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(e)(2).

Judge Davidson, having read and considered the Agreement and the
Memoranda, having received evidence in advance of and at the
hearing, and having heard argument by counsel, concludes that the
Settlement Class meets all the requirements of Rule 23, the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution, and all other
applicable rules and law, granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Final
Approval and finally approved all provisions and terms of the
Agreement in all respects. The Parties to the Agreement are
directed to consummate the Agreement in accordance with its terms,
as may be modified by subsequent orders of the Court.

Timely requests for exclusion were submitted by six potential
members of the Settlement Class and those potential Class Members
are excluded from the Settlement Class and are free to pursue their
claims against the Defendant or the Defendants as they deem
appropriate. All other potential members of the Settlement Class
are adjudged to be members of the Settlement Class and are bound by
the Final Judgment Order and by the Agreement, including the
releases provided for in the Agreement and this Final Judgment
Order.

The Final Judgment Order will be immediately entered as to all
claims in the Action between the Representative Plaintiffs and
Class Members and Metropolitan, and Final Judgment is entered
approving and adopting all terms and conditions of the Settlement
and the Agreement, fully and finally terminating all claims of the
Representative Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class in the Action
against Metropolitan, on the merits, with prejudice, and without
leave to amend. Judge Davidson expressly determines that there is
no just reason for delay in entering the Final Judgment Order.

Pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (g), Plaintiffs Shields and Plaintiffs
Hachat are appointed as the Representative Plaintiffs for the
Settlement Class, and the following counsel are appointed as the
counsel for the Settlement Class: Erik D. Peterson James Brandon
McWherter ERIK PETERSON LAW OFFICES, PSC MCWHERTER SCOTT BOBBITT
PLC 249 E. Main St. 341 Cool Springs Blvd., Suite 230 Suite 150
Franklin, TN 37067 Lexington, KY 40507 Telephone: 615-354-1144
Telephone: 800-614-1957 Facsimile: 731-664-1540 erik@eplo.law
brandon@msb.law Thomas Joseph Snodgrass LARSON KING LLP 30 East 7th
Street, Suite 2800 St Paul, MN 55101 Telephone: 651-312-6500
Facsimile: 651-312-6618 jsnodgrass@larsonking.com

The Class Counsel's motion concerning attorneys' fees, litigation
costs, and a service award is granted. Pursuant to Rule 23(h),
Judge Davidson awarded the Class Counsel the total sum of
$1,895,876 in attorneys' fees and costs. In addition, he awarded
each of the two Representative Plaintiffs a service award of
$7,500. Metropolitan will not be responsible for and will not be
liable with respect to the allocation among the Class Counsel or
any other person who may assert a claim thereto, of attorneys' fees
and expenses awarded by the Court.

Claim Settlement Payments to the Class Members who timely file a
completed Claim Form will be made in the amounts, within the time
period, and in the manner described in the Agreement.

Judge Davidson appointed Robert Gibbs and/or Anne Veazey as the
Neutral Evaluator(s) to carry out the duties and responsibilities
set forth in the Agreement. The Plaintiffs, the Class Counsel,
Metropolitan, and the Defendants' Counsel will not be liable for
any act or omission of the Neutral Evaluator(s).

Without further order of the Court, the Parties may agree to
reasonably necessary extensions of time to implement any of the
provisions of the Agreement.

The Action is dismissed in its entirety on the merits, with
prejudice, without leave to amend, and without fees or costs to any
party, except as otherwise provided herein, and the case is
closed.

Without in any way affecting the finality of the Final Judgment
Order, the Court will retain continuing jurisdiction over the
Action for purposes of: (a) Enforcing the Agreement and the
Proposed Settlement; (b) Hearing and determining any application by
any party to the Agreement for a settlement bar order; and (c) Any
other matters related or ancillary to any of the foregoing.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Final Judgment & Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/2s42c4eh from Leagle.com.


MID-HUDSON VALLEY: Edwards Files Suit in N.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mid-Hudson Valley
Federal Credit Union. The case is styled as Reginald Edwards, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Mid-Hudson
Valley Federal Credit Union, Case No. 1:22-cv-00562-TJM-CFH
(N.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated Banks and Banking for Breach of
Contract - Insurance.

Mid-Hudson Valley Federal Credit Union -- https://www.mhvfcu.com/
-- provides financial services to Ulster, Dutchess, Orange,
Westchester, Rockland, Putnam and Sullivan counties.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey D. Kaliel, Esq.
          KALIEL GOLD PLLC
          1100 15th Street NW-4th Floor
          Washington, DC 20005
          Phone: (202) 615-3948
          Email: jkaliel@kalielpllc.com

               - and -

          Sophia Goren Gold, Esq.
          KALIEL GOLD PLLC
          950 Gilman Street-Suite 200
          Berkeley, CA 94710
          Phone: (202) 350-4783
          Email: sgold@kalielgold.com


MY FAVORITE DELI: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Romero Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
MARTIN ROMERO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MY FAVORITE DELI, INC. (d/b/a MY FAVORITE
DELI); HASSAN M. SALEM; and KHALED A. SALEH, Defendants, Case No.
1:22-cv-03159 (E.D.N.Y., May 27, 2022) seeks to recover from the
Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest,
liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Plaintiff Romero was employed by the Defendant as food preparer and
sandwich maker.

MY FAVORITE DELI, INC. (d/b/a MY FAVORITE DELI) owns and operates a
deli and sandwich shop, located at Brooklyn, NY. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Catalina Sojo, Esq.
          CSM LEGAL, P.C
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620

MYRON CORP: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Myron Corp. The case
is styled as Vanessa Jimenez, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Myron Corp., Case No. 1:22-cv-04374
(S.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Myron -- https://www.myron.com/ -- provides promotional products to
businesses of all sizes.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


NASHVILLE, TN: Harris Ordered to File Amended Complaint v. DCSO
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VAUGHN HARRIS, et al., Plaintiffs v. CITY OF
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-00221
(M.D. Tenn.), Judge Aleta A. Trauger of the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division, grants
Plaintiff Harris permission to proceed in forma pauperis and orders
him to file an amended complaint.

I. The Pleadings

On March 31, 2022, a complaint under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 was
filed by Vaughn Harris, Lacory Lytle, and Bobby Mosley, three
pretrial detainees in the custody of the Davidson County Sheriff's
Office (DCSO) in Nashville, Tennessee. Proceeding pro se, these
inmates sue the City of Nashville, Davidson County Sheriff Daron
Hall, Correct Care Solutions (CCS), Dr. Krystal Lewis, Dr. Arfica,
and Jenny Jaynes for violations of their First, Fourth, Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, in addition to their
rights under Tenn. Code Ann. Section 29-20-201(b)(2). They also
name as defendants (in both their official and individual
capacities) an additional 54 employees of DCSO and CCS.

However, aside from generally requesting relief for all deserving
inmates in DCSO custody, the Complaint requests specific relief
for, and is almost exclusively focused on, harms suffered by
Plaintiff Harris. Those harms include alleged dental injuries,
injuries to his ribs and back, and mental injuries related to
"P.T.S.D. and Bipolar disorder." Harris is the only plaintiff who
submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) with
the Complaint.

On April 18, 2022, Harris filed a motion to amend the Complaint and
a proposed amended complaint that lists himself as the first
plaintiff, and "all pretrial prisoners injured by Nashville, TN
Government" as the second plaintiff. The proposed amended complaint
utilizes a running list of names from the original Complaint (and
earlier filings) to name additional defendants, and it purports to
institute a class action challenging (1) the alleged deliberate
delay in providing urgently needed dental care; (2) the poisonous
nature of the drink mix, syrup, and food served to inmates; and (3)
the denial of adequate library time to access legal materials or
other materials to "educate inmates' minds."

Two copies of the final page of the proposed amended complaint are
provided. The first, signed by Harris and Lytle, requests that
Harris be awarded injunctive and monetary relief while the other
members of the proposed class have their medical needs and law
needs met. The second, signed only by Harris and obviously
repurposed from a 2019 lawsuit, seeks monetary relief for Harris
and monetary and other relief for all deserving DCSO inmates from
October 28, 2014 "into the future."

Judge Trauger holds that although "a party may amend its pleading
once as a matter of course" within 21 days of service, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(a)(1)(A), such amendment may not be accomplished by one pro
se plaintiff on behalf of any other. Pro se prisoners may not
represent other prisoners, whether they be individual
co-plaintiffs, or members of a purported class of plaintiffs. In
addition to being unsigned, the motion to amend incorporates a
proposed amended complaint that seeks class relief and concludes
with one pro se prisoner signing for another.

Accordingly, the motion to amend is denied. Likewise, the related
motions "for certification of the class of plaintiffs" and to
recognize the amended, class complaint and appoint class counsel
are also denied. Finally, Plaintiff Harris' motions to order the
Defendants to provide the injunctive relief sought in the Complaint
and proposed amendment are denied as premature.

II. The Plaintiffs & the Filing Fee

Next, the number of Plaintiffs and the matter of the filing fee
must be resolved. Harris has filed two IFP applications. His first
IFP application is clearly an old application that he modified for
use in the current lawsuit. It is written in both ink and pencil,
bears three different dates spanning more than two years, and was
notarized in January 2020. Because it does not reliably reflect his
current financial condition, Judge Trauger denies Harris' first IFP
application.

Plaintiff Harris' second IFP application, however, includes a DCSO
official's March 2022 certification that Harris had a zero-dollar
trust account balance. This certification is consistent with a
transaction history (from January 2021 to January 2022) attached to
Harris' first application and demonstrates that he lacks sufficient
financial resources to pay the full filing fee in advance. Judge
Trauger therefore grants Harris permission to proceed IFP.

Plaintiff Lacory Lytle also appears to have filed an IFP
application, though only the affidavit of poverty is valid; the
attached trust account certification is for the account belonging
to Harris. Without corroboration of Lytle's account balance and
6-month account history, as required by 28 U.S.C. Section
1915(a)(2), his IFP application is deficient and therefore denied.

Plaintiff Bobby Mosley has not filed an IFP application or made any
filing fee payment in support of the Complaint, though he has
attempted to file a separate pleading under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) alleging defects in the prosecution of his
pending criminal charges. Judge Trauger notes that Plaintiff Mosley
is subject to the "three-strikes" rule, which prohibits the filing
of any new civil lawsuit in federal court without prepayment of the
full $402 filing fee unless he is under imminent danger of serious
physical injury. His joinder as a co-plaintiff in the case is
therefore improper.

In view of these deficiencies and, in any event, because the
Complaint does not appear to contain allegations personal to Lytle
or Mosley but focuses almost exclusively on Harris, Judge Trauger
in her discretion declines to allow the case to proceed as a
multi-plaintiff case.

Accordingly, Lytle and Mosley are dismissed as plaintiffs to the
action, without prejudice to their ability to file separate cases
related to the conditions alleged in the Complaint. The Clerk is
directed to return Mosley's pleading to him.

As the sole remaining plaintiff to whom pauper status has been
granted, Harris is responsible for paying a $350 filing fee
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1915(b) and 1914(a), which the Court
assesses. The warden of the facility in which the Plaintiff is
currently housed, as custodian of his trust account, is directed to
submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, the greater
of: (a) 20% of the average monthly deposits to the Plaintiff's
credit at the jail; or (b) 20% of the average monthly balance to
the Plaintiff's credit for the six-month period immediately
preceding the filing of the complaint. Thereafter, the custodian
will submit 20% of the Plaintiff's preceding monthly income (or
income credited to the Plaintiff for the preceding month), but only
when the balance in his account exceeds $10. Payments will continue
until the $350 filing fee has been paid in full to the Clerk of
Court.

The Clerk of Court must send a copy of the Order to the warden of
the facility where the Plaintiff is currently housed to ensure
compliance with that portion of 28 U.S.C. Section 1915 pertaining
to the payment of the filing fee. If the Plaintiff is transferred
from his present place of confinement, the custodian must ensure
that a copy of the Order follows the Plaintiff to his new place of
confinement, for continued compliance with the Order. All payments
made pursuant to the Order must be submitted to the Clerk of Court
for the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee,
719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.

III. Instructions to Plaintiff Harris

In view of the deficiencies in his filings to date, discussed,
Plaintiff Harris must file a proper amended complaint if he is to
proceed with the lawsuit.

The amended complaint must not include photocopies of pages from
previous filings or any class allegations/claims, and must not
assert unrelated claims against unrelated parties. Under Rules 18
and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Harris
can assert any claims he has against a single defendant, or he can
assert all the claims he has against multiple defendants that arise
from the same incident or series of related incidents. If Plaintiff
Harris wishes to pursue other claims or defendants outside that
limited scope of his amended complaint, he is free to do so by
filing separate lawsuits.

The Clerk of Court is directed to provide Plaintiff Harris with a
blank Section 1983 complaint form for his use in drafting his
amended complaint. The amended complaint must be typed or neatly
written (in ink, if possible) and must include the matter number
for the case, 3:22-cv-00221. The amended complaint must be received
in the Court within 30 days of the entry of the Order. Plaintiff
Harris is cautioned that, should he fail to comply with the Order
(or seek an extension of time within which to do so) within the
time specified, or should he fail to keep the court apprised of his
current address, the action may be dismissed for want of
prosecution and failure to comply with a court order.

IV. Conclusion

In sum, Judge Trauger grants Plaintiff Harris permission to proceed
IFP and orders him to use the form provided by the Clerk of Court
to file an amended complaint that complies with the Order within 30
days. All other pending motions and applications are denied.
Plaintiffs Lytle and Mosley are dismissed from the action, and the
Clerk will return Mosley's recent filing to him.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 24, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mtx6rcac from Leagle.com.


NASSAU CANDY: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nassau Candy
Distributors, Inc. The case is styled as Vanessa Jimenez,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Nassau Candy Distributors, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-04373 (S.D.N.Y.,
May 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Nassau Candy -- https://www.nassaucandy.com/ -- is a leading candy
manufacturer and food distributor, specializing in handmade
confections and gourmet food, selling wholesale B2B.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


NEABAR INC: Misclassifies Dancers, McCoy Suit Claims
----------------------------------------------------
MAIYA MCCOY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. NEABAR, INC., d/b/a GATSBY'S PUB, KEVIN
NEADING, BARRY BARBERA, and BARRY BARBERA, JR., Defendants, Case
No. 5:22-cv-00884 (N.D. Ohio, May 26, 2022) brings this complaint
as a collective action alleging the Defendant of violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendants as a dancer from about
April 2021 to about May 2022.

The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants misclassified her and
other similarly situated dancers as independent contractors.
Throughout their employment with the Defendants, the Defendants
never paid them any wages whatsoever. On multiple occasions, they
also worked more than 40 hours in a workweek. But the Defendants
never paid them overtime compensation at the rate of one and
one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in
excess of 40 per workweek, the Plaintiff says.

On behalf of herself and all other similarly situated dancers, the
Plaintiff seeks for their unpaid minimum and overtime wages,
liquidated damages, post-judgment interest, attorney's fees and
costs, and all other relief to which they are entitled.

NEABAR, INC., d/b/a GATSBY'S PUB, is an adult entertainment club in
Ohio. The Individual Defendants are co-owners of the Corporate
Defendant. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stephen I. Voudris, Esq.
          Christopher M. Sams, Esq.
          VOUDRIS LAW LLC
          8401 Chagrin Road, Suite 8
          Chagrin Falls, OH 44023
          Tel: (440) 543-0670
          Fax: (440) 543-0721
          E-mail: svoudris@voudrislaw.com
                  csams@voudrislaw.com

NEW GENERATION: Rodriguez Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
PABLO RAMON RODRIGUEZ, on behalf of himself and all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NEW GENERATION HARDWARE STORE
CORP. d/b/a NEW GENERATION HARDWARE STORE, and KEVIN REYES,
Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-04422 (S.D.N.Y., May 28, 2022) brings
this collective action complaint alleging the Defendants of willful
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor
Law.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a store clerk from
2013 until approximately July 2021.

The Plaintiff claims that although he worked more than 40 hours per
week throughout his employment with the Defendants, the Defendants
denied him of overtime compensation at the legally mandated rate of
one and one-half times his regular rate of pay for all hours worked
in excess of 40 per workweek.

The Plaintiff also asserts these claims:

     -- The Defendants failed to pay him spread of hours pay even
though his daily shifts exceeded ten hours in length from start to
finish;

     -- The Defendants failed to provide him with properly
compliant paystubs; and

     -- The Defendants failed to provide him with a wage
acknowledgement notice upon his hiring or at any time thereafter.

The Plaintiff seeks all unpaid compensation, liquidated damages,
statutory damages, back pay, punitive damages, pre- and
post-judgment interest, litigation costs and expenses together with
reasonable attorneys' and expert fees, and other relief as the
Court deems just and proper.

New Generation Hardware Store Corp. d/b/a New Generation Hardware
Store sells hardware products. Kevin Reyes is the owner of the
Corporate Defendant. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Samuel, Esq.
          THE SAMUEL LAW FIRM
          1441 Broadway – Suite 6085
          New York, NY 10018
          Tel: (212) 563-9884

NEW JERSEY: Bid for Prelim. Injunction in Carmona v. NJDEP Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JENNICA CARMONA, et al., Plaintiffs v. NEW JERSEY
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No.
21-18746 (D.N.J.), Judge John Michael Vazquez of the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey denies the Plaintiffs' motion
for a preliminary injunction.

I. Introduction

Through the case, parents of special needs children in New Jersey
seek to ensure that their children continue to receive in-person
educational services during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The
Plaintiffs, parents of fifteen special needs children, initiated
the putative class action by filing a Complaint against the New
Jersey Department of Education ("NJDEP") and multiple public-school
districts throughout New Jersey (the "School District Defendants"),
and a motion for a preliminary injunction.

In his Opinion, Judge Vazquez addresses the motion for a
preliminary injunction. Some of the School District Defendants
filed letters opposing the Plaintiffs' motion that incorporated
arguments from their pending motions to dismiss. The NJDEP filed a
brief in opposition, to which the Plaintiffs replied. Judge Vazquez
reviewed all submissions made in support and in opposition to the
motion and considered the motion without oral argument pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b).

II. Background

The Plaintiffs brought suit individually and on-behalf of fifteen
school-aged children in New Jersey. The children are pupils in
different school districts throughout the state. All have special
needs and, all but one, B.A., had an Individualized Education Plan
("IEP") for the 2019-2020 and/or the 2020-2021 school years. An IEP
is the "primary mechanism" to ensure that every disabled child
receives a free appropriate public education ("FAPE"), as required
by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). An IEP
is a written document that sets forth the special education and
related services that must be provided to the child, to enable a
FAPE. Through their IEPs, all the named children in this matter,
except B.A., received some type of specialized support or
modifications at school during the 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 school
years.

On March 16, 2020, Governor Phil Murphy signed an Executive Order
that indefinitely closed all public and private preschools, as well
as elementary and secondary schools in New Jersey because of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Due to the Executive Order, every school in the
state that had not already stopped in-person instruction, including
some of the School District Defendants in the matter, ceased
in-person learning and began providing students with virtual
instruction. The Plaintiffs received virtual instruction and
services for the remainder of the 2019-2020 school year. Virtual
instruction continued until various points in the 2020-2021 school
year, when the School District Defendants began providing hybrid
learning or in-person instruction. The Plaintiffs allege that the
unilateral change from in-person to virtual instruction and
services altered their IEPs so that they did not receive a FAPE
through virtual instruction.

The Plaintiffs filed their Complaint and the instant motion on Oct.
18, 2021, asserting claims under the IDEA, Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section
1983, the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"). On Oct. 19, 2021, the Court entered a
text order explaining that after the Plaintiffs informed the Court
that Defendants had been served, the Court would set a briefing
schedule on the Plaintiffs' motion. On Dec. 10, 2021, the
Plaintiffs informed the Court that they served all the Defendants
except two. The Court scheduled a telephone conference with the
parties on Dec. 13, 2021. After the conference, the parties agreed
to a briefing schedule for the preliminary injunction motion and
three pending motions to dismiss filed by some Defendants.

On Jan. 3, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction after numerous school
districts throughout the state announced that they would switch
from in-person to remote instruction for two or more weeks after
winter break.The Court held a telephone conference with the parties
on Jan. 4, 2022, and the following day, the Plaintiffs filed a
letter clarifying which schools switched to remote instruction or
closed. The Court held another telephone conference with the
parties on Jan. 11, 2022, to address the Plaintiffs' request for
temporary restraints, and denied the motion. In addition, various
Defendants filed five more motions to dismiss the Complaint, and
four Defendants filed a motion for sanctions.

Although there are multiple motions pending in the matter, Judge
Vazquez focuses his analysis on the Plaintiffs' initial motion for
a preliminary injunction.

III. Analysis

The Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief through their civil RICO and
IDEA claims. Among other things, they seek an injunction declaring
that their (and other class members') "status quo pendency
placement is in-person instruction and services"; stating that the
Defendants violated the IDEA when they provided them with remote
instruction and services; and appointing a special monitor to
oversee and implement evaluations to determine class members'
regression from remote learning and to implement new IEPs. The
Defendants maintain that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a
preliminary injunction because, among other things, they fail to
establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits for
their RICO and IDEA claims.

With respect to the RICO claim, the Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants are involved in a scheme to deprive them of IDEA Part B
funds. The NJDOE asserts that there is no private right of action
for equitable relief under RICO.

Judge Vazquez opines that the Plaintiffs fail to establish that
they can pursue their RICO claim for the relief sought. The
Plaintiffs provide no explanation as to why the Court should follow
the Second Circuit instead of the weight of authority in this
district. The Plaintiffs' motion, therefore, is denied as to their
RICO claim because they do not demonstrate a reasonable probability
of success on the merits.

Turning to their IDEA claim, the Plaintiffs seek an automatic
injunction under the stay put provision of IDEA. They maintain that
when the Defendants moved to virtual education in March 2020, it
amounted to a unilateral change in educational placement that
implicated the stay put provision. The Defendants disagree.

Judge Vazquez holds that the Plaintiffs fail to establish that
their educational placements changed when the School District
Defendants moved from in-person to virtual instruction for all
students. The stay put provision, therefore, does not apply to any
the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a class-wide
injunction under the IDEA.

IV. Conclusion

Therefore, for the reasons he set forth and for good cause shown,
Judge Vazquez denies the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 24, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2jynz7hu from Leagle.com.


NEW JERSEY: Bid to Certify Class in Pasquerello v. EMCFW Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JENNIFER PASQUERELLO & MICHELLE ANGELINA, Plaintiffs
v. PHIL MURPHY, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 21-18806 (ZNQ)
(DEA) (D.N.J.), Judge Zahid N. Quraishi of the U.S. District Court
for the District New Jersey issues an Opinion:

   (1) denying the Plaintiffs' motion to remand;

   (2) denying the Plaintiffs' motion for joinder of claims,
       class certification and appointment of counsel;

   (3) denying the Plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary
       injunction;

   (4) denying Defendant Demitrius Minor's motion to dismiss as
       moot; and

   (5) granting in part and denying in part Defendants Marcus O.
       Hicks, Al Kandell, Victoria Kuhn, Patricia McGill, and
       Phil Murphy's (the "State Defendants") motion to dismiss.

I. Background

Plaintiffs Jennifer Pasquerello and Michelle Angelina, inmates
confined at Edna Mahan Correctional Facility for Women ("EMCFW"),
are proceeding pro se with a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. Section 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000cc to 2000cc-5, and
state law.

The case arises from the New Jersey Department of Corrections'
("NJDOC") adoption of an internal management procedure titled
"Transgender, Intersex and Non-Binary Inmates" (the "Policy") in
2019. Pursuant to the Policy, the NJDOC houses certain transgender
inmates who identify as women but who have not undergone
gender-confirmation surgery (the "Pre-operative Transgender
Inmates") at EMCFW. The Plaintiffs allege that the State Defendants
designed and implemented the Policy.

The Plaintiffs are two female inmates currently incarcerated at
EMCFW. According to them, the Policy and the arrival of
Pre-operative Transgender Inmates at EMCFW have caused numerous
issues within the facility. For instance, the Plaintiffs allege
that the Pre-operative Transgender Inmates committed acts of
violence, harassment, and threats upon other inmates. They contend
that they suffered emotional anguish, headaches, hypertension, and
insomnia as a result.

The Plaintiffs further allege that the presence of the
Pre-operative Transgender Inmates infringes on their exercise of
religion and privacy. Finally, they complain that "female inmates"
at EMCFW receive unequal treatment compared to the Pre-operative
Transgender Inmates.

The Plaintiffs initiated the action on June 25, 2021, in the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division - Hunterdon County. They
then filed the Amended Complaint on Aug. 5, 2021. The Amended
Complaint raises nine claims alleging that the Policy and the
presence of the Pre-operative Transgender Inmates violate their
Eighth Amendment rights to physical safety; their Fourteenth
Amendment rights to bodily privacy, equal protection, and
substantive due process; their right to be free from religious
discrimination under RLUIPA; and their rights under state law.

On Oct. 15, 2021, the State Defendants filed a notice of removal
with the Court. In response, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to
remand the matter back to state court on Nov. 15, 2021.

On Dec. 6, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for joinder of
claims, class certification, and appointment of counsel. The same
day, the Plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction.

On Dec. 13, 2021, Defendant Minor filed a motion to dismiss. The
State Defendants also moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on
Dec. 17, 2021.

The State Defendants also filed oppositions to the Plaintiffs'
motions on Dec. 20, 2021. On Jan. 10 and 13, 2022, the Plaintiffs
filed oppositions to the Defendants' motions to dismiss. The State
Defendants replied to the Plaintiffs' opposition to the motion to
dismiss on Jan. 20, 2022. Finally, on April 29, 2022, while the
Plaintiffs' first motion for a preliminary injunction remained
pending, the Plaintiffs filed a second motion for a preliminary
injunction, which the State Defendants opposed on May 23.
Accordingly, the matter is ripe for determination.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Remand

Judge Quraishi first addresses the Plaintiffs' motion to remand the
action to state court. The Plaintiffs' sole argument in support of
their motion is that the Defendants failed to file a timely notice
of removal. The Plaintiffs complain that they did not learn of the
notice of removal until they called the Civil Division Manager
Office on Oct. 24, 2021.

The State Defendants sent written notice to the Plaintiffs via the
United States Postal Service on Oct. 19, 2021. Although it is
unclear when or even if the Plaintiffs received that notice, Judge
Quraishi finds that it is sufficient to satisfy Section 1446(d)
because the State Defendants made a good faith attempt at notice
and the Plaintiffs were not prejudiced as the Civil Division
Manager Office notified the Plaintiffs of the removal on Oct. 24,
2021. Accordingly, he denies the Plaintiffs' motion to remand.

B. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Judge Quraishi next considers the Plaintiffs' motion to appoint
counsel to represent them. The Plaintiffs' only argument in support
is that the Court must assign counsel pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(g)(1). That Rule provides that "a court that
certifies a class must appoint class counsel."

The Court, however, has not certified a class, and Judge Quraishi
finds that the matter does not warrant class certification. Thus,
Rule 23(g)(1) is not applicable. Moreover, although the Court has
broad discretion to appoint counsel under 28 U.S.C. Section
1915(e)(1), Judge Quraishi declines to exercise that discretion.
The Plaintiffs' federal claims lack arguable merit, and Judge
Quraishi declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
Plaintiffs' state law claims, Accordingly, he denies the
Plaintiffs' motion to appoint counsel.

C. Motion for Class Certification

The Plaintiffs also move the Court for class certification. They
propose that the class consist of "all the female inmates at
EMCFW."

Judge Quraishi opines that the Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that
they would fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class,
"It is well settled that pro se inmates are not permitted to
represent a class of litigants." Moreover, the Plaintiffs fail to
demonstrate that their claims would be typical of the claims of the
class. For example, while the Plaintiffs do not challenge the
housing of post-operative transgender inmates at EMCFW, they fail
to demonstrate that other inmates' claims would be so limited.
Accordingly, Judge Quraishi denies the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.

D. State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Judge Quraishi now turns to the State Defendants' motion to
dismiss. The State Defendants argue that dismissal is appropriate
because they are entitled to qualified immunity and because the
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against them.

1. Qualified Immunity

Judge Quraishi's own review of the caselaw reveals no factually
similar precedent or a consensus of persuasive authority that would
have put reasonable policymakers on notice that their conduct is
constitutionally prohibited. Moreover, the facts that the
Plaintiffs allege do not make out a violation of a federal
statutory or constitutional right. The State Defendants are
therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the Plaintiffs' federal
claims for damages, and Judge Quraishi dismisses the Plaintiffs'
federal claims with prejudice to the extent they seek such relief.

2. Failure to State a Claim

The State Defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity does not
end the inquiry, however, because the Plaintiffs also seek
declaratory and injunctive relief. Therefore, Judge Quraishi
analyzes the State Defendants' argument that the Plaintiffs fail to
state a claim against them. He finds that the Amended Complaint is
completely devoid of any allegations that the State Defendants
personally participated in violating Plaintiffs' rights or directed
others to violate them. The Amended Complaint is also devoid of
allegations that the State Defendants had knowledge of and
acquiesced to their subordinates' violations of the Plaintiffs'
rights.

Thus, the Plaintiffs' fail to demonstrate that the State Defendants
were personally involved in violating theu federal rights.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs fail to state a federal claim against
the State Defendants, and Judge Quraishi dismisses those claims
without prejudice.

3. State Law Claims

The Plaintiffs also allege various state law claims against the
State Defendants. However, as the Court dismisses all claims for
which it has original jurisdiction, Judge Quraishi declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' state law
claims. He dismisses all of the Plaintiffs' claims for which it has
original jurisdiction for failure to state a claim. Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1367(c)(3), Judge Quraishi declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' state law claims and
remands those claims to state court. Accordingly, he denies the
Defendants' remaining arguments seeking dismissal of the
Plaintiffs' state law claims as moot.

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, Judge Quraishi: (1) denies the Plaintiffs'
motions; (2) grants in part the State Defendants' motion to dismiss
as to the Plaintiffs' federal claims; (3) sua sponte dismisses the
Plaintiffs' federal claims against Defendants Minor and Martinez;
(4) declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
Plaintiffs' state law claims; and (5) denies the remainder of the
State Defendants' motion to dismiss and Defendant Minor's motion to
dismiss as moot. An appropriate order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/3zz48fb7 from Leagle.com.


NISSAN NORTH AMERICA: Martinez Sues Over Failure to Disclose Defect
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Minerva Martinez, Sandra Scott, Carl Graham, Anne Parys, David
Ortiz, Sean Chambers and Tiffany James, individually, and on behalf
of a class of similarly situated individuals v. NISSAN NORTH
AMERICA INC., a Delaware corporation, Case No. 3:22-cv-00354 (M.D.
Tenn., May 16, 2022), is brought concerning a failure to disclose
material facts and a safety concern to consumers as a result of the
Defendant who manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold the
Class Vehicles without disclosing that the Class Vehicle's Xtronic
Continuously Variable Transmission ("CVT") is defective.

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the CVT contains design and/or
manufacturing defects. The CVT is defective as detailed herein
(collectively, the "CVT Defect" or "Defect"). Discovery will show
the Class Vehicles are designed and/or manufactured with an
inadequate cooling system. The CVT fluid temperature in Class
Vehicles is controlled by a small cooler, rather than a radiator.
This cooler is too small and/or manufactured so poorly that it
fails to properly regulate the temperature in the fluid which
lubricates all the components of the CVT, including the belts,
pulleys, and valves. This design and/or manufacturing defect makes
the transmission unreasonably sensitive to heat. The CVT in every
Class Vehicle is thus prone to overheating, which activates a fluid
temperature protection mode and reduces transmission performance,
among other symptoms. As a result, drivers experience conditions
ranging from shuddering, jerking, failure to accelerate, all the
way to catastrophic transmission failure.

The CVT Defect causes sudden, unexpected shaking and violent
jerking (commonly referred to as "juddering" or "shuddering") when
drivers attempt to accelerate their vehicles; it causes the vehicle
to lag or delay when the driver tries to accelerate, causing an
unsafe and unpredictable acceleration; it exhibits a hard
deceleration or "clunk" when drivers either slow down or accelerate
at low speeds; it causes complete transmission failure in the
middle of roadways; and it suffers catastrophic failure,
necessitating replacement. The CVT Defect is inherent in each Class
Vehicle and was present at the time of sale.

The Plaintiffs allege, that since 2013, if not earlier, Nissan has
been aware that the CVT installed in the Class Vehicles would
require frequent replacement, including replacements just outside
of warranty, that the replacement transmissions installed would be
equally defective as the originals, and that the CVT would cause
the symptoms of the CVT Defect (juddering, lag when attempting to
accelerate, hard deceleration, complete failure and other
symptoms), and that the Class Vehicles' CVT would require frequent
repair, yet Nissan continued to install the defective CVT.
Moreover, Nissan not only refused to disclose the problem to owners
and lessees, but it also actively concealed, and continues to
conceal, its knowledge concerning the CVT Defect.

As a result of Nissan's failure to disclose material facts
regarding the CVT Defect to its customers, the Class has incurred
significant and unexpected repair costs. Nissan's omission of the
CVT's marked tendency to fail -- whether within warranty or just
outside of warranty -- at the time of purchase is material because
no reasonable purchaser or lessee expects to spend thousands of
dollars to repair or replace an essential vehicle component (such
as a transmission, which must be replaced and cannot be repaired)
in the early years of owning their vehicles. Nissan's failure to
disclose the alleged defect has caused Plaintiffs and putative
Class members to lose use of the Class Vehicles and/or incur costly
repairs that have conferred an unjust substantial benefit upon
Nissan. Had Nissan disclosed the CVT Defect to Plaintiffs and Class
members, they would not have purchased the Class Vehicles, would
have paid less for them, and/or would have required Nissan to
replace or pay for the replacement of the defective CVT with a
non-defective version before their warranty periods expired, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiffs purchased or leased any model year 2017-2018 Nissan
Altima equipped with a Continuously Variable Transmission, and/or
model year 2018-2019 Nissan Sentra, Versa, and Versa Note equipped
with a Continuously Variable Transmission (Altima Class Vehicles
and Sentra Class Vehicles, together, "Class Vehicles" or
"Vehicles").

Nissan North America, Inc. designs and manufactures motor vehicles,
parts, and other products for sale throughout the United States,
and the world.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gregory F. Coleman, Esq
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN PLLC
          800 South Gay Street Suite 1100
          Knoxville, TN 37929
          Email: gcoleman@milberg.com

               - and -

          Tarek Zohdy, Esq
          Cody R. Padgett, Esq
          Laura E. Goolsby, Esq
          CAPSTONE LAW APC
          1875 Century Park East, Suite 1000
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: (310) 556-4811
          Facsimile: (310) 943-0396
          Email: Tarek.Zohdy@capstonelawyers.com
                 Cody.Padgett@capstonelawyers.com
                 Laura.Goolsby@capstonelawyers.com

               - and -

          Norberto J. Cisneros, Esq.
          Barbara McDonald, Esq
          MADDOX & CISNEROS, LLP
          3230 S. Buffalo Drive, Suite 108
          Las Vegas, NV 89117
          Phone: (702) 366-1900
          Facsimile: (702) 366-1999

               - and -

          Melissa S. Weiner, Esq
          PEARSON, SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP
          800 LaSalle Avenue, Suite 2150
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Phone: (612) 389-0600
          Facsimile: (612) 389-0610
          Email: mweiner@pswlaw.com

               - and -

          James C. Shah, Esq
          Natalie Finkelman Bennett, Esq
          MILLER SHAH LLP
          1845 Walnut Street, Suite 806
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Phone: (866) 540-5505
          Facsimile: (866) 300-7367
          Email: jcshah@millershah.com
                 nfinkelman@millershah.com

               - and -

          Lawrence Deutsch, Esq
          Russell D. Paul, Esq
          Amey J. Park, Esq
          Abigail J. Gertner, Esq
          BERGER MONTAGUE PC
          1818 Market Street, Suite 3600
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Phone: (215) 875-3000
          Fax: (215) 875-4604
          Email: ldeutsch@bm.net
                 rpaul@bm.net
                 apark@bm.net
                 agertner@bm.net


NOBLE ENERGY: Boulter Appeals Breach of Contract Suit Dismissal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Mike Boulter, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit entitled MIKE BOULTER, BOULTER, LLC,
RALPH NIX PRODUCE, INC., and BARCLAY FARMS, LLC, on behalf of
themselves and classes of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs v.
NOBLE ENERGY, INC., and KERR-McGEE OIL & GAS ONSHORE, LP,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 21-cv-03500-RM-SKC, in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado-Denver.

The case arises from the Defendants' practice of underpaying
royalties owed to the Plaintiffs for over six years. The Defendants
are allegedly deducting transportation charges and other costs in
their calculation and payment of royalties to the Plaintiffs on oil
sales, which are not permitted under the Noble Class oil royalty
provision and the Kerr-McGee Subclass I oil royalty provision. As a
result of the Defendants' breach of their contractual obligations,
the Plaintiffs and Class members have sustained substantial
damages, the suit says.

On May 17, 2021, Plaintiffs refiled their Class Action Complaint
against Noble and Kerr-McGee in the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado which contained allegations
substantially identical to the claims alleged in the class action
complaint in D. Colo. Case No. 1:21-cv-01346-RM-KLM. On June 30,
2021, both Defendants, Noble and Kerr-McGee filed separate motions
to dismiss the May 17, 2021 complaint citing lack of the Court's
subject matter jurisdiction.

On April 27, 2022, Judge Raymond P. Moore entered an order granting
Defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed the case without
prejudice.

The Plaintiffs now seek a review of Judge Moore's order.

The appellate case is captioned as Boulter, et al. v. Noble Energy
Inc., et al., Case No. 22-1170, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, filed on May 26, 2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Docketing statement, transcript order form, and notice of
appearance are due on June 9, 2022 for Barclay Farms, LLC, Mike
Boulter, Boulter, LLC and Ralph Nix Produce, Inc.; and

   -- Notice of appearance is due on June 9, 2022 for Oil & Gas
Onshore, LP, and Noble Energy Inc.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants MIKE BOULTER, BOULTER, LLC, RALPH NIX
PRODUCE, INC., and BARCLAY FARMS, LLC, on behalf of themselves and
classes of similarly situated persons, are represented by:

          George Barton, Esq.
          Stacy Ann Burrows, Esq.
          BARTON AND BURROWS
          5201 Johnson Drive, Suite 110
          Mission, KS 66205
          Telephone: (913) 563-6250
          E-mail: george@bartonburrows.com
                  stacy@bartonburrows.com

Defendants-Appellees NOBLE ENERGY INC. and KERR-MCGEE OIL & GAS
ONSHORE, LP are represented by:

          Kyle M. Holter, Esq.
          Shannon Wells Stevenson, Esq.
          DAVIS GRAHAM & STUBBS
          1550 Seventeenth Street, Suite 500
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 892-7533

               - and -

          Spencer Allen, Esq.
          Carlos Romo, Esq.
          Ezekiel J. Williams, Esq.
          WILLIAMS WEESE PEPPLE & FERGUSON
          1801 California Street, Suite 3400
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 861-2828

               - and -

          Anthony N. Kaim, Esq.
          Shannon Nicole Smith, Esq.
          GIBBS & BRUNS
          1100 Louisiana, Suite 5300
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 650-8805

NOCO COMPANY: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Noco Company. The
case is styled as Vanessa Jimenez, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. The Noco Company, Case No.
1:22-cv-04377 (S.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

The NOCO Company -- http://no.co/-- is an American, privately
held, multinational corporation that designs, manufactures, and
markets consumer electronics, automotive chemicals, plastics, and
various electrical components.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


NORTH AMERICAN: Court Denies Bennett's Bid for Class Certification
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JUNE BENNETT, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, and GERALD McGHEE, Plaintiffs v. NORTH AMERICAN
BANCARD, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-00586-AJB-KSC (S.D. Cal.),
Judge Anthony J. Battaglia of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California denies Bennett's motion for class
certification.

I. Background

The action arises out of an alleged "bait and switch" scheme by the
Defendant. The theory of Bennett's case is that the Defendant
promised its customers a specific pay-as-you-go service but failed
to deliver by eventually assessing fees.

The Defendant offers mobile payment solutions that provide
nationwide customers, including individuals, small business owners,
and merchants, "convenient, low cost point of sale credit card
payment processing services, including credit card readers that can
be connected to mobile devices." Between 2011 and May 2018, the
Defendant offered one "pay-as-you-go" program under two brand
names: "PayAnywhere" and "PhoneSwipe" (collectively, the
"Services"). These two brands were ultimately combined under the
"PayAnywhere" name in May 2018. Both Services were originally sold
as a purely no out-of-pocket or pay-as-you-go offering. To obtain
the credit card processing services, merchants were required to
apply on either payanywhere.com or phoneswipe.com. This application
required prospective merchants, such as Bennett, to agree to either
PhoneSwipe or PayAnywhere's Terms and Conditions of Merchant
Service Agreement ("the MSA").

In May 2011, Bennett signed up for the PhoneSwipe service and a
credit card reader for a small business she and her husband owned
and operated called "Santa Rocks." Before applying for the Service,
Bennett understood there would be no recurring or setup charges,
and that she would only be charged a fee for each transaction
processed using the Service.

Toward the end of 2015, the Defendant decided to add a new monthly
non-use or "Inactivity Fee" to PayAnywhere and PhoneSwipe. It was
and still is a monthly $3.99 fee automatically debited from the
bank accounts of "inactive" merchants, i.e., those who had not
processed a transaction in twelve months. Prior to rolling out the
new Inactivity Fee, Defendant notified existing customers by email
about the new fee. The email blast also provided a "live" link the
merchants could click if they chose to cancel the service. The
Defendant continued to provide "inactive" merchants with such
monthly email notices through January 2018. It also provided
information about the Inactivity Fee on its websites.

Around February 2017, the Defendant began charging Bennett monthly
Inactivity Fees, which she did not notice until mid-2018. Upon
noticing the charges, Bennett called the Defendant and cancelled
her account. The Defendant refunded the last Inactivity Fee it
deducted but has refused to refund any others.

Plaintiff Gerald McGhee instituted the lawsuit on March 24, 2017,
by filing the class action complaint. McGhee thereafter filed a
motion to certify the class in October 2020, which the Court denied
without prejudice. On Oct. 1, 2021, McGhee filed the First Amended
Complaint ("FAC"), which added Bennett as a named plaintiff.

The Plaintiffs argue Defendant falsely promised its hundreds of
thousands of PayAnywhere and PhoneSwipe customers a no
out-of-pocket cost, "pay-as-you-go" service plan. the Plaintiffs
assert claims for (1) fraudulent concealment; (2) intentional
misrepresentation; (3) restitution/unjust enrichment; (4)
violations of California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); (5)
violations of California's False Advertising Law ("FAL"); and (6)
conversion.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Bennett's motion for class
certification. On April 14, 2022, the Court heard oral arguments
and took the matter under submission.

II. Discussion

A plaintiff seeking to represent a class must satisfy the threshold
requirements of Rule 23(a) as well as the requirements for
certification under one of the subsections of Rule 23(b). Rule
23(a) provides a case is appropriate for certification as a class
action if: "(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class."

A plaintiff must also establish that one of the subsections of Rule
23(b) is met. In the instant matter, Bennett seeks to certify a
class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). Under Rule 23(b)(3), Bennett must
demonstrate that (1) the questions common to the class predominate
over any questions that affect only individual members; and (2) a
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3). These requirements are commonly known as predominance and
superiority.

Bennett seeks to certify the following classes:

     a. All persons in California who became NAB's pay-as-you-go
merchants prior to Sept. 1, 2017, and who were debited at least one
$3.99 inactivity fee prior to Sept. 1, 2017; and

     b. All persons in California who became NAB's pay-as-you-go
merchants prior to Sept. 1, 2017, who were debited at least one
$3.99 inactivity fee after Sept. 1, 2017, and did not agree to a
contract authorizing debit of the $3.99 inactivity fee.

A. Rule 23(a) Requirements

The Defendant first contends Bennett cannot satisfy her burdens
under Rule 23(a) because she has not satisfied the typicality
requirement. It further asserts Bennett and her counsel are
inadequate to represent the class.

Judge Battaglia ultimately finds Bennett has met all of the
requirements of Rule 23(a). He finds that (i) the proposed class is
ascertainable because the proposed class is identifiable based on
objective criteria; (ii) Bennett points out "over 500,000
individuals successfully applied for a its pay-as-you-go credit
card processing services; (iii) Bennett identifies questions common
to the proposed class; (iv) Bennett's claims are typical of those
of the putative class; (v) Bennett has demonstrated she is an
adequate class representative; and (vi) the case has no bearing on
the matter at hand and finds the counsel adequate to serve as the
class counsel.

B. Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements

In addition to meeting the conditions imposed by Rule 23(a), the
party seeking class certification must also show that the action is
appropriate under Rule 23(b)(1), (2) or (3)." Certification under
Rule 23(b)(3) -- the subsection under which Bennett seeks
certification -- is appropriate only where the plaintiff
establishes that (1) issues common to the class predominate over
issues affecting individual class members; and (2) the class action
device is superior to other methods available for adjudicating the
dispute.

Judge Battaglia holds that (i) common questions of fact and law do
not predominate as to the standing claim; (ii) predominance is not
met for Bennett's UCL claim predicated on the "fraud" prong; (iii)
Bennett has not shown she has met the predominance requirement for
her UCL claim under the "unfairness" prong; (iv) Bennett has not
shown a viability of her unjust enrichment claim; (v) Bennett has
not established the predominance requirement of her conversion
claim; and (vi) no management difficulties that would preclude the
action from being maintained as a class action. On balance, Judge
Battaglia finds a class action would be the superior method of
adjudication. The alternative to class action would likely result
in an abandonment of claims by most class members since the amount
of individual recovery is so small.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth, Judge Battaglia denies Bennett's motion
for class certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ycxb73mm from Leagle.com.


OHIO: Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment Entered in Cowell Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STATE OF OHIO, Appellee v. JOSHUA R. COWELL,
Appellant, C.A. No. 30052 (Ohio App.), the Court of Appeals of
Ohio, Ninth District, Summit County, affirms the judgment of the
Summit County Court of Common Pleas denying Mr. Cowell's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.

I. Relevant Background Information

In 2011, Mr. Cowell pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated
burglary, in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1)/(A)(2), a felony of
the first degree; one count of felonious assault, in violation of
R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)/(A)(2), a felony of the second degree; one count
of rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a felony of the first
degree; and one count of kidnapping, in violation of R.C.
2905.01(A)(2)/(A)(3), a felony of the first degree. As part of the
plea agreement, the State dismissed two counts of kidnapping, two
sexually violent predator specifications and one sexual motivation
specification. Mr. Cowell was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment
and did not appeal his conviction.

Mr. Cowell subsequently filed two motions to vacate his sentence,
which were both denied by the trial court. Mr. Cowell also filed a
mandamus action which this Court dismissed. Mr. Cowell then filed a
motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial, which the trial
court denied. On April 14, 2021, Mr. Cowell filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1, which is the
subject of this appeal.

In his motion, Mr. Cowell argued his guilty plea, entered on April
26, 2011, was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
because, at the time of the plea, he was unaware of the "side
effects of Abilify," which he allegedly took from Sept. 12, 2010,
to Oct. 31, 2010. Specifically, due to taking Abilify, Mr. Cowell
alleged suffering from blackouts, sleepwalking, memory loss, and
compulsive and/or impulsive behavior. Mr. Cowell contended he
learned about these side effects after the manufacturer of Abilify,
in 2016, added a warning regarding the same. Additionally, Mr.
Cowell asserted he is a plaintiff in a federal class-action lawsuit
filed against the manufacturer of Abilify, which is currently in
the discovery phase.

As a result of the Abilify class-action, Mr. Cowell retained Frank
A. Fetterolf, M.D., as an expert witness. Dr. Fetterolf's report,
which was attached as an exhibit to Mr. Cowell's motion, concluded
Abilify caused Mr. Cowell to act compulsively. Mr. Cowell argued
evidence of Abilify's side effects would constitute a defense of
involuntary intoxication or insanity because he lacked the
requisite mens rea to commit these crimes, his actions were not
voluntary, and he was suffering from a severe mental defect.
Further, Mr. Cowell argued, had he known this information in 2011,
he would not have entered a plea of guilty.

The State, in opposing Mr. Cowell's motion, argued: (1) undue
delay; (2) Ohio does not recognize a diminished capacity defense;
(3) Ohio no longer permits a voluntary intoxication defense; and
(4) Mr. Cowell would bear the burden of proving the affirmative
defense of involuntary intoxication. The trial court denied Mr.
Cowell's motion.

Mr. Cowell now appeals, raising five assignments of error for the
Court of Appeals' review. Because its analysis of Mr. Cowell's
assignments of error is identical, the Court of Appeals consolidate
them to better facilitate its discussion.

II. Discussion

Mr. Cowell now appeals, raising the following five assignments of
error for the Court of Appeals' review:

     a. Assignment of Error I: The court erred by failing to
recognize Mr. Cowell could not have possibly known the concealed
side effects of abilify at the time of the crime.

     b. Assignment of Error II: The court erred by not applying
R.C. 2901.21(a) properly in the case.

     c. Assignment of Error III: The court erred by not applying
R.C. 2901.22(b) properly in the case.

     d. Assignment of Error IV: Mr. Cowell is not responsible for
his criminal conduct as a result of mental disease or defect and
did not have the capacity to know the wrongfulness of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

     e. Assignment of Error V: Mr. Cowell's plea of guilty was not
made knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily due to him being
unaware of the cause of his criminal conduct and acts.

Upon review, the Court of Appeals cannot conclude the trial court
abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Cowell's post-sentence
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In September 2010, Mr. Cowell
was taking prescription medication including Prozac, Adderall,
Abilify, and Klonopin, and using cocaine. Mr. Cowell reported being
"out of control" a few weeks prior to committing these crimes.
Additionally, he knew, at the time he pleaded guilty to the crimes
of aggravated burglary, felonious assault, rape, and kidnapping
that he was "blacking out" and experiencing memory issues.
Importantly, prior to entering a guilty plea in this matter, Mr.
Cowell was twice evaluated for both competency and sanity, and was
found to be competent to stand trial and sane at the time he
committed these offenses.

Because Mr. Cowell was previously determined to be sane at the time
of the offense, Mr. Cowell cannot now offer expert psychiatric
testimony to prove he lacked the requisite mens rea to commit these
crimes or that Abilify caused him to involuntarily kidnap, assault,
and rape the victims. Further, Mr. Cowell did not provide a
credible explanation to the trial court regarding his five-year
delay in filing the motion to withdraw his guilty plea in 2021,
when warnings regarding the side effects of Abilify became
available in 2016.

Thus, because Mr. Cowell did not meet his burden of proof regarding
the existence of manifest injustice in the plea proceedings, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Cowell's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, Mr. Cowell's five
assignments of error are overruled.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals overrules Mr.
Cowell's five assignments of error. The judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. The Court of Appeals
orders a special mandate issue out of the Court, directing the
Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry
this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal
entry will constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing thereof, this document will constitute
the journal entry of judgment, and it will be file stamped by the
Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review
will begin to run. The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed
to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to
make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R.
30. Costs taxed to the Appellant.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Decision is available
at https://tinyurl.com/yx67h25d from Leagle.com.

Joshua R. Cowell, pro se, Appellant.

Sherri Bevan Walsh, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jacquenette S.
Corgan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the Appellee.


OSCAR HEALTH: Improperly Reimbursed Physicians, ECURE Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ECURE CA LLC, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. OSCAR HEALTH PLAN OF CALIFORNIA and DOES 1
through 20, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 22SMCV00780 (Cal.
Super., Los Angeles Cty., May 27, 2022) is a class action against
the Defendants for quantum meruit and breach of implied contract.

According to the complaint, the Defendants allegedly failed and
refused to make payments due and owing physicians for medical and
surgical care, treatment, and procedures provided to a number of
patients. Rather than simply pay physicians the lesser of their
billed charges or usual, customary, and reasonable rates, the
Defendants instead routinely and deliberately reimbursed
physicians' claims at below usual, customary, and reasonable
levels, forcing physicians to exhaust time and energy first
identifying and then appealing the improperly reimbursed claims,
says the suit.

ECURE CA LLC is a healthcare services provider based in
California.

Oscar Health Plan of California is a health insurance company based
in California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Alan Nesbit, Esq.
         NESBIT LAW GROUP US LLP
         8383 Wilshire Boulevard, Ste. 800
         Beverly Hills, CA 90211
         Telephone: (323) 456-8605
         Facsimile: (323) 456-8601
         E-mail: anesbit@nesbitlawgroup.com

PACIFIC GRAIN: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Salcedo Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
SANDRA L. SALCEDO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PACIFIC GRAIN & FOODS, LLC; and
DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-at-00386 (E.D.
Cal., May 27, 2022) is an action against the Defendants for failure
to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize and permit
meal and rest periods, and provide accurate wage statements.

Plaintiff Salcedo was employed by the Defendants as staff.

PACIFIC GRAIN & FOODS, LLC supplies food products. The Company
provides beans, dried fruits, grains, nuts, and spices, as well as
offers packaging, blending, milling, and roasting services. Pacific
Grain & Foods serves food industries and public worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Craig J. Ackermann, Esq.
          ACKERMANN & TILAJEF, P.C.
          1180 South Beverly Drive, Suite 610
          Los Angeles, CA 90035
          Telephone: (310) 277-0614
          Facsimile: (310) 277-0635
          Email: cja@ackermanntilajef.com

PATREON INC: Discloses Consumers' Personal Info, Stark Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
BRAYDEN STARK; JUDD OOSTYEN; KEVIN BLACK; and MARYANN OWENS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. PATREON, INC., Defendant, Case No. 3:22-cv-03131
(N.D. Cal., May 27, 2022) Video Privacy Protection Act ("VPPA" or
"the Act") and state law by disclosing its digital subscribers'
identities and video-viewing preferences to Facebook without proper
consent.

According to the complaint, The VPPA prohibits "video tape service
providers," such as Patreon, from knowingly disclosing consumers'
personally identifiable information ("PII"), including "information
which identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific
video materials or services from a video tape provider," without
the person having expressly given consent in a standalone consent
form.

Patreon discloses the user's FID and viewing content to Facebook
together in a single transmission. Because the user's FID uniquely
identifies an individual's Facebook account, Facebook—or any
other person—can use the FID to quickly and easily locate,
access, and view the user's corresponding Facebook profile. In
simplest terms, the Pixel allows Facebook to know what video
content one of its users viewed on Patreon's website, says the
suit.

At no point are Patreon users informed about Patreon's
dissemination of their viewing content to a third party. Nor do
Patreon users consent to such sharing, through a standalone consent
form or otherwise. As a result, Patreon violates the VPPA by
disclosing this information to Facebook, the suit added.

PATREON INC. develops application software. The Company supports
artists and content creators by letting fans fund each piece of
created content. Patreon operates in Palo Alto, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Simon S. Grille, Esq.
          Adam E. Polk, Esq.
          Kimberly Macey, Esq.
          GIRARD SHARP LLP
          601 California Street, Suite 1400
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 981-4800
          Email: apolk@girardsharp.com
                 sgrille@girardsharp.com
                 kmacey@girardsharp.com

PAYSIGN INC: Faces Chase Shareholder Suit in Nevada Court
---------------------------------------------------------
Paysign, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on May 12, 2022, that the company has been named as a
defendant in the case captioned "Lorna Chase v. Paysign, Inc. et.
al.," (March 25, 2020, D. Nev.)

Sais complaint generally alleges that the company violated Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act by making materially false or misleading
statements, or failing to disclose material facts, regarding the
company's internal control over financial reporting and its
financial statements. The complaint seek class action
certification, compensatory damages, and attorney's fees and
costs.

In December 2, 2020, the court consolidated said case to "In re
Paysign, Inc. Securities Litigation." In January 12, 2021,
plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint in the consolidated action.
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on March
15, 2021, which Plaintiffs opposed via an opposition brief filed on
April 29, 2021, to which defendants replied on June 1, 2021.

Paysign Inc. is a provider of prepaid card products and processing
services for corporate, consumer and government applications based
in Nevada.


PAYSIGN INC: Faces Shi Shareholder Suit in Nevada Court
-------------------------------------------------------
Paysign, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on May 12, 2022, that the company has been named as a
defendant in case captioned "Yilan Shi v. Paysign, Inc. et. al.,"
(March 19, 2020, D. Nev.). It is a putative class action filed on
behalf of a class of persons who acquired the Company's common
stock from March 19, 2019 through March 31, 2020.

Sais complaints generally alleges that the company violated Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act by making materially false or misleading
statements, or failing to disclose material facts, regarding the
company's internal control over financial reporting and its
financial statements. The complaint seek class action
certification, compensatory damages, and attorney's fees and
costs.

In December 2, 2020, the court consolidated said case to "In re
Paysign, Inc. Securities Litigation." In January 12, 2021,
plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint in the consolidated action.
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on March
15, 2021, which Plaintiffs opposed via an opposition brief filed on
April 29, 2021, to which defendants replied on June 1, 2021.

Paysign Inc. is a provider of prepaid card products and processing
services for corporate, consumer and government applications based
in Nevada.


PERPAY INC: Newell TCPA Class Suit Removed to S.D. Florida
----------------------------------------------------------
The case styled BRADLEY NEWELL, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. PERPAY, INC., was removed from the
Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm
Beach County, Florida, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida on May 27, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Southern District of Florida assigned
Case No. 9:22-cv-80792 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act and the Florida Telephone
Solicitation Act.

Perpay, Inc. is a company that operates an all-in-one shopping app,
headquartered in Pennsylvania. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Daniel O. Mena, Esq.
         Martha R. Mora, Esq.
         2525 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
         Penthouse 12th Floor
         Coral Gables, FL 33134
         Telephone: (305) 779-3560
         Facsimile: (305) 779-3561
         E-mail: dmena@avilalaw.com
                 mmora@avilalaw.com

                    - and –

         Meredith C. Slawe, Esq.
         Michael W. McTigue, Jr., Esq.
         SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
         One Manhattan West
         New York, NY 10001-8602
         Telephone: (212) 735-3000
         Facsimile: (212) 735-2000
         E-mail: meredith.slawe@skadden.com
                 michael.mctigue@skadden.com


                    - and –

         Mayra Aguilera, Esq.
         SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
         300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 3400
         Los Angeles, CA 90071
         Telephone: (213) 687-5000
         Facsimile: (213) 687-5600
         E-mail: mayra.aguilera@skadden.com

PRO THERAPY SUPPLIES: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pro Therapy Supplies,
LLC. The case is styled as Vanessa Jimenez, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Pro Therapy Supplies,
LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-04375 (S.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Pro Therapy Supplies -- https://www.protherapysupplies.com/ -- core
mission is to become the internet leader in medical, therapy and
fitness supplies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


PROCTOR & GAMBLE: Court Denies Bid to Transfer Gamboa Suit Venue
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAN GAMBOA, individually and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. THE PROCTOR & GAMBLE
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 21 C 6515 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Joan H.
Lefkow of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, denies P&G's motion to transfer venue.

I. Introduction

Gamboa filed the action individually and on behalf of similarly
situated individuals in Illinois state court, alleging that the P&G
violated the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat.
14/1, et seq. (typically referred to as BIPA), by collecting,
storing, using, and disseminating biometric data with their Oral B
smartphone application. P&G removed the action to federal court
under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d). P&G
now seeks to transfer venue to the Southern District of Ohio
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a).

II. Background

In June 2021, Gamboa, a resident of Illinois, purchased an Oral B
iO Series 7G toothbrush. Gamboa also downloaded the Oral B
smartphone application, which connects with the user's toothbrush
via Bluetooth and tracks the user's brushing habits to provide
feedback on how well he is brushing. The Oral B iO Series 7G
toothbrush and corresponding app are products of P&G.

The user sees a disclosure that Oral B collects "usage data"
followed by three bullet points with clickable boxes providing
additional information about the app. The first and most relevant
point states "REQUIRED FOR REGISTRATION. Terms. You are at least
18, have read P&G Privacy Policy and agree to the Oral-B Mobile app
Terms of service." The user can then click on the hyperlinked Terms
of service to read the agreement. The agreement states that it
"contains very important information about your rights and
obligations, as well as limitations and exclusions that may apply
to you if you register, participate in and/or use the Oral-B mobile
application."

Later on, the agreement provides that any disputes related to the
agreement "shall be resolved exclusively in the state or federal
courts located in Hamilton County, Ohio." The user does not have to
actually click the link or scroll through the agreement to register
an account in the app; he need only click the box affirming that he
has read it, then click the "ALLOW" button at the bottom of the
screen.

Yet a user does not need to register an account to use the app.
Underneath the "ALLOW" button is a "MAYBE LATER" button. If the
user clicks "MAYBE LATER," he can continue using the app without
registering an account or clicking the box affirming that he agrees
to the Terms. Although P&G provided an affidavit describing the
registration process, Gamboa never alleged nor did either party
present evidence that he registered such an account.

Mr. Gamboa alleges that, as part of the app's
toothbrushing-tracking technology, P&G captures, collects, stores,
uses, and disseminates facial geometry and biometric data in
violation of BIPA. P&G now seeks to enforce the forum selection
clause in the Terms against Gamboa and transfer venue to the
Southern District of Ohio.

III. Analysis

A. Enforceability of Forum Selection Clause

P&G argues that Gamboa is bound by the app's Terms of service
agreement and its forum selection clause designating the
appropriate venue in Hamilton County, Ohio. Gamboa argues that he
never assented to the Terms and therefore is not bound by the forum
selection clause.

Judge Lefkow opines that no evidence shows that Gamboa ever visited
the Oral B website, and he cannot be found to have constructive
knowledge of the Terms from a website he may never have visited.
Moreover, the app allows the user to bypass registering an account
and still use the app by clicking "MAYBE LATER." Thus, while the
app puts a reasonable user on notice that there are Terms
associated with registering an account and he should investigate
them by clicking the hyperlink, the app's disclosure page gives no
notice that the terms are equally applicable to mere use of the
app.

Additionally, there is no evidence that the Terms are presented to
the user after he leaves the disclosure page, nor is there evidence
of a "clear prompt" directing a user to visit the "Legal" section
of the app to read the Terms there. Therefore, P&G has not shown
that Gamboa had constructive knowledge of the Terms, and he is not
bound by the forum selection clause.

B. Transfer Factors Analysis

Although the forum selection clause does not apply, the parties
also present arguments on the appropriateness of transfer under the
traditional factors analyzed on a Section 1404(a) motion. "To
support a motion to transfer venue, the moving party must show that
(1) venue is proper in this district; (2) venue is proper in the
transferee district; (3) the transferee district is more convenient
for both the parties and witnesses; and (4) transfer would serve
the interest of justice," citing Imperial Crane Servs., Inc. v.
Cloverdale Equip. Co., No. 13 C 4750, 2013 WL 5904527, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 4, 2013) (internal citation omitted).

Judge Lefkow finds that the factors weigh in favor of Gamboa. As to
the first and second factors, venue is proper in either district.
For the third factor, in assessing the convenience for the parties
and witnesses, it weighs in favor of Gamboa because the convenience
factor favors keeping the case in Illinois. Finally, the interests
of justice also favor Gamboa. Gamboa is an Illinois citizen, whose
claims are based on an Illinois statute, and the controversy arose
in Illinois, meaning that Illinois is a desirable forum with an
interest in adjudicating this dispute. Therefore, P&G's motion to
transfer is denied.

IV. Conclusion

P&G's motion to transfer venue is denied with leave to refile in
the event that evidence obtained in discovery shows that Gamboa is
subject to the forum selection clause. P&G has until 6/8/2022 to
file a response to Gamboa's motion to remand, if any. Gamboa has
until 6/15/2022 to file a reply.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 24, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8udyje from Leagle.com.


PROSPER MARKETPLACE: Faces Suit Over Violations of MD Loan Laws
---------------------------------------------------------------
Prosper Marketplace, Inc. (PMI) disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report
for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that a class
action was filed against the company asserting claims for violation
of certain Maryland state laws.

In March 2021, PMI was named in a purported class action lawsuit
brought by two individual plaintiffs in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, Maryland, filed on February 3, 2021.

The complaint asserts, on behalf of the plaintiffs and the class
members, claims for violation of certain Maryland state laws and
seeks damages. The plaintiffs also seek a declaration of
requirement for Maryland licensure and that PMI did not have the
right to collect money from the plaintiffs and the class members on
the loan accounts.

The litigation was accompanied by a related petition to stay
arbitration and demand declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County, Maryland (the Jones Petition). In April 8,
2021, it was removed to the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland.

Prosper Marketplace, Inc. is a limited liability company based in
California.


QUALCOMM INC: Shah, et al., Seek to Certify Class of Investors
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Shah v. Qualcomm
Incorporated, et al. (RE QUALCOMM INCORPORATED SECURITIES
LITIGATION), Case No. 3:17-cv-00121-JO-MSB (S.D. Cal.), the
Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order:

   1. Certifying a class of investors defined as:

      "All persons or entities who purchased or otherwise
      acquired the common stock of Qualcomm between February 1,
      2012 and January 20, 2017, inclusive, and who were damaged
      thereby;"

      Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, the officers
      and directors of Qualcomm at all relevant times, members
      of their immediate families and their legal
      representatives, heirs, agents, affiliates, successors or
      assigns, Defendants' liability insurance carriers, and any
      affiliates or subsidiaries thereof, and any entity in
      which Defendants or their immediate families have or had a
      controlling interest;

   2. Appointing Lead Plaintiffs as Class Representatives; and

   3. Approving Lead Plaintiffs' selection of Bernstein Litowitz
      Berger & Grossmann LLP and Motley Rice LLC as Class
      Counsel.

Qualcomm is an American multinational corporation headquartered in
San Diego, California, and incorporated in Delaware. It creates
semiconductors, software, and services related to wireless
technology. It owns patents critical to the 5G, 4G, CDMA2000,
TD-SCDMA and WCDMA mobile communications standards.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated May 23, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3M668Sg at no extra
charge.[CC]

Counsel for Lead Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel for the Class, are:

          Jonathan D. Uslaner, Esq.
          Richard D. Gluck, Esq.
          BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER
          & GROSSMANN LLP
          2121 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 2575
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 819-3470
          E-mail: jonathanu@blbglaw.com
                  rich.gluck@blbglaw.com

               - and -

          Gregg S. Levin, Esq.
          MOTLEY RICE LLC
          28 Bridgeside Blvd.
          Mount Pleasant, SC 29464
          Telephone: (843) 216-9000
          E-mail: glevin@motleyrice.com

RAY KLEIN: Class Settlement in Russell Suit Wins Prelim. Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NICHOLAS RUSSELL and MICHAEL McKIBBEN, Plaintiffs v.
RAY KLEIN, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00001-MC (D. Or.),
Judge Michael McShane of the U.S. District Court for the District
Oregon grants the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Settlement and Certification.

I. Introduction

The Plaintiffs bring the class action lawsuit individually and on
behalf of others who were similarly injured by the Defendant's
alleged violations of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act ("FDCPA"), Oregon's Unlawful Trade Practices Act ("UTPA"), and
Oregon's Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act ("UDCPA"). After
reaching a settlement, the Plaintiffs move for preliminary
certification of the class and approval of the settlement agreement
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

II. Background

Plaintiffs Nicholas Russell and Michael McKibben are two Oregon
debtors. Defendant Ray Klein is a debt collection agency. To
collect revenue for outstanding debts, the Defendant issued
garnishments to debtors' employers and banks through its in-house
attorneys. The Oregon Legislature allows collectors to charge fees
that compensate for the expense of hiring attorneys who issue such
garnishments.

Since 2018, the Defendant has maintained a practice of charging a
$45 garnishment "issuance fee" on all consumer debts. The
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant's $45 fee is an abuse of the
cost recovery statute because using in-house attorneys relieves the
Defendant from ever incurring such an expense. Although the
Defendant denies any wrongdoing, the Plaintiffs contend that the
fees were unlawfully collected in violation of the FDCPA, UTPA, and
UDCPA.

The Plaintiffs filed the action in 2019 and amended their complaint
four times, while the Defendant has moved to dismiss certain
claims. The parties underwent rounds of mediation with Judges Jean
Mauer and Michael Hogan, the latest of which successfully produced
a settlement agreement.

The Plaintiffs now seek preliminary approval of the agreement, as
well as preliminary certification of the class for settlement
purposes only. The proposed class is a group of Oregonians
similarly injured by the $45 issuance fees imposed by Defendant
from 2018-2019. The proposed agreement provides for the Defendant's
release from liability and any claims of class members who do not
opt-out. In turn, the Defendant must pay $2 million into a
qualified settlement fund to be dispersed over stipulated
expenses.

III. Discussion

The Plaintiffs seek preliminary approval of the settlement
agreement, as well as preliminary certification of the following
class: (a) All individual consumers with Oregon addresses, (b)
whose wages or accounts or property was garnished by Ray Klein, (c)
between Jan. 1, 2018 through and including Sept. 30, 2019, (d) with
respect to a debt incurred primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes, (e) from whom Ray Klein collected a purported
garnishment issuance fee.

Judge McShane opines that the proposed class meets the requirements
of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3). Accordingly, he grants preliminary
certification of the proposed class for settlement purposes only.

Having properly certified the class, Judge McShane's analysis turns
to preliminary settlement approval. To guide the inquiry into
whether a settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate," Congress
codified four considerations: (A) The class representatives and
class counsel have adequately represented the class; (B) the
proposal was negotiated at arm's length; (C) the relief provided
for the class is adequate, taking into account: (i) the costs,
risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of any
proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the
method of processing class-member claims; (iii) the terms of any
proposed award of attorney's fees, including timing of payment; and
(iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3);
and (D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to
each other.

Assessing each in turn, Judge McShane opines that the factors weigh
in favor of preliminarily approving the settlement agreement.
Because the agreement appears fair, reasonable, and adequate, he
grants preliminary approval of the proposed settlement agreement.

The Plaintiffs offer the Court two forms of notice and a
comprehensive plan to notify class members. The short form notice
contains each requirement enumerated above in clear, plain
language. The Administrator will mail the short form notice via
U.S.P.S. to the last known addresses of class members, which has
already been ascertained through a review of the Defendant's
records. If needed, the Administrator will update addresses based
on information received from class members. The parties have
negotiated a long form notice as well, intended to populate a
website accessible to all class members and containing extensive
information and documents regarding the settlement. Judge McShane
approves of the timeline and delegation of tasks regarding the
notices as set forth in the settlement agreement.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Settlement and Certification is granted.

Judge McShane certifies the proposed class for settlement purposes
only as defined in the settlement agreement and in accordance with
his Opinion and Order. He grants preliminary approval of the
proposed settlement agreement subject to a forthcoming final
approval hearing pursuant to Rule 23(e).

Under Rule 23(a), Judge McShane appoints (i) Plaintiffs Nicholas
Russell and Michael McKibben as the representatives for the class;
(ii) Michael Fuller, Kelly D. Jones, and Matthew Sutton as the
class counsel; and (iii) Settlement Services, Inc. as the
Settlement Administrator.

Judge McShane approves the form and content of the notices in
substantially the same form as attached to the settlement agreement
and the instant motion.

Dates of performance are as follows:

      a. The Administrator will establish the website for long form
notice and send short form notice in the mail by June 23, 2022.

      b. The Class counsel will file its fee and expense
application by June 23, 2022.

      c. The Class members who desire to be excluded will request
exclusion through the Administrator by Aug. 22, 2022.

      d. Any objections to the settlement agreement or the
counsel's fees will be filed or mailed to the Court by Aug. 22,
2022.

      e. Responses to any and all objections will be filed or
mailed by Sept. 12, 2022.

      f. The counsel will file any documents in support of the
final approval hearing, including a motion seeking entry of a final
approval order by Sept. 12, 2022.

      g. The final approval hearing will be held at 9:00 a.m. on
Sept. 21, 2022 in Courtroom 2 at the Wayne L. Morse United States
Courthouse, 405 E Eighth Avenue, Eugene, Oregon, 97401 before the
Hon. Michael J. McShane, United States District Judge for the
District of Oregon.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 24, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8d2rmd from Leagle.com.


RETROPOLIS LLC: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Retropolis, LLC. The
case is styled as Vanessa Jimenez, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Retropolis, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-04376 (S.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Retropolis, LLC doing business as Shout! Factory --
https://www.shoutfactory.com/ -- is an American home video and
music company founded in 2002 as Retropolis Entertainment.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


REX SIGNATURE: Taylor Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rex Signature
Services, LLC, et al. The case is styled as Farrah Taylor, and on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. Rex
Signature Services, LLC, Does 1-50, Case No.
34-2022-00320032-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty., May
16, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment – Civil Unlimited"

Rex Signature Services is a shared service company and is part of
the Accounting, Tax Preparation, Bookkeeping, and Payroll Services
Industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christina Marie Lucio, Esq.
          FARNAES & LUCIO, APC
          2235 Encinitas Blvd., Ste. 210
          Encinitas, CA 92024-4357
          Phone: 760-942-9433
          Fax: 760-452-4421
          Email: clucio@farnaeslaw.com


RIDGWAY LLC: Fails to Provide Overtime Pay, Ruid Suit Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------
MARK RUID, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. RIDGWAY LLC; and ROBERT KIECKHEFER,
Defendants, Case No. 22-cv-634 (E.D. Wi., May 27, 2022) is an
action against the Defendants' failure to pay the Plaintiff and the
class overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours
per week.

Plaintiff Ruid was employed by the Defendant as superintendent.

RIDGWAY LLC was founded in 2005. The Company's line of business
includes installing building equipment. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
          James A. Walcheske, Esq.
          David M. Potteiger, Esq.
          WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
          235 N. Executive Drive, Suite 240
          Brookfield, WI 53005
          Telephone: (262) 780-1953
          Facsimile: (262) 565-6469
          Email: jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com
                  sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com
                  dpotteiger@walcheskeluzi.com

RITEWAY MARINE: Tucker Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Riteway Marine
Solutions, Inc. The case is styled as Henry Tucker, on behalf of
himself and all other persons similarly situated v. Riteway Marine
Solutions, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-04337 (S.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Riteway Marine -- http://www.ritewaymarinesolutions.net/-- is a
state of the art full-service marina located in Babylon Cove on the
Great South Bay of Long Island.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly G. Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM, PC
          155 East 55th St., Ste. 6a
          New York, NY 10022
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: brad@markslawpc.com


RIVERLANDS HOME: Cambre Bill of Rights Suit Removed to E.D. La.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled DREMA CAMBRE, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. RIVERLANDS HOME GROUP, L.L.C. D/B/A
CHATEAU ST. JAMES REHAB AND RETIREMENT AND PRIORITY MANAGEMENT
GROUP, L.L.C., Case No. 40840-D, was removed from the 23rd Judicial
District Court for the Parish of St. James, State of Louisiana, to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on
May 27, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana assigned
Case No. 2:22-cv-01517-LMA-DPC to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the
Louisiana Residents' Bill of Rights and Louisiana Admin Code.

Riverlands Home Group, LLC, doing business as Chateau St. James
Rehab and Retirement, is a provider of skilled nursing facility
based in Louisiana.

Priority Management Group, LLC is an operator of skilled nursing
facilities in Louisiana. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Jimmy R. Faircloth, Jr., Esq.
         Mary Katherine Price, Esq.
         Richard F. Norem, III, Esq.
         FAIRCLOTH MELTON SOBEL & BASH, LLC
         105 Yorktown Drive
         Alexandria, LA 71303
         Telephone: (318) 619-7755
         Facsimile: (318) 619-7744
         E-mail: jfaircloth@fairclothlaw.com
                 kprice@fairclothlaw.com
                 enorem@fairclothlaw.com

ROSEVIEW NURSING: Johnson Bill of Rights Suit Goes to W.D. La.
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled DIANE JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. ROSEVIEW NURSING & REHABILITATION
CENTER, LLC and CENTRAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, Case No.
636,719-B, was removed from the 1st Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana, to the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Louisiana on May 27, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Western District of Louisiana assigned
Case No. 5:22-cv-01423 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the
Louisiana Residents' Bill of Rights and Louisiana Admin Code.

Roseview Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC is an operator of a
nursing home and rehabilitation center in Shreveport, Louisiana.

Central Management Company, LLC is an operator of a nursing
facility in Louisiana. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Jimmy R. Faircloth, Jr., Esq.
         Mary Katherine Price, Esq.
         Richard F. Norem, III, Esq.
         FAIRCLOTH MELTON SOBEL & BASH, LLC
         105 Yorktown Drive
         Alexandria, LA 71303
         Telephone: (318) 619-7755
         Facsimile: (318) 619-7744
         E-mail: jfaircloth@fairclothlaw.com
                 kprice@fairclothlaw.com
                 enorem@fairclothlaw.com

SAFI-G INC: Ponce et al. Sue Over Failure to Pay Wages & OT
-----------------------------------------------------------
The case, MARIA PAZ PONCE and WILSON LOZANO REY, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SAFI-G,
INC. d/b/a CAFFE BUON GUSTO and NASSER CHORCHIAN, as an individual,
Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-04341 (S.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022) arises
from the Defendants' alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiffs have worked for the Defendants. Plaintiff Ponce was
employed from in or around March 2018 until in or around February
2020 and from in or around August 2020 until in or around March
2021 as a waitress, counterperson and cleaner while performing
miscellaneous duties for the Defendants. Plaintiff Rey was employed
from in or around September 1, 2019 until in or around September
30, 2019 as a dishwasher and cleaner while performing related
miscellaneous duties for the Defendants.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs regularly worked more
than 40 hours per week. However, the Defendants did not pay them
overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their
regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per
workweek. Plaintiff Ponce also claims that the failed to pay her
the legally prescribed minimum wage for all her hours worked
throughout her employment with the Defendants, says the suit.

Moreover, the Defendants willfully failed to post notices of the
minimum wage and overtime wage requirements in a conspicuous place
at the location of their employment, willfully failed to keep
payroll records, and willfully failed to provide the Plaintiff and
other similarly situated employees with a written notice and with
any wage statements upon each payment of their wages, the suit
alleges.

Safi-G, Inc. operates a restaurant owned by Nasser Chorchian. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Tel: (718) 263-9591

SCHROTH SAFETY: Faces Moore Suit Over Interference and Retaliation
------------------------------------------------------------------
ANGELICA MOORE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SCHROTH SAFETY PRODUCTS LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 0:22-cv-61020 (S.D. Fla., May 27, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendant for interference and retaliation under the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as an operator from
approximately January 14, 2001 until her wrongful termination on or
about March 7, 2022.

Schroth Safety Products LLC is a manufacturer of occupant
protection and restraint systems, headquartered in Broward County,
Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Tanesha W. Blye, Esq.
         R. Martin Saenz, Esq.
         SAENZ & ANDERSON, PLLC
         20900 NE 30th Avenue, Ste. 800
         Aventura, FL 33180
         Telephone: (305) 503-5131
         Facsimile: (888) 270-5549
         E-mail: tblye@saenzanderson.com
                 msaenz@saenzanderson.com

SDH PIZZA: Mayo-Keller Sues Over Unpaid Delivery Drivers' Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
DEVONE MAYO-KELLER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SDH PIZZA, INC., and STEVEN
DOUGLAS HALL, Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-00675-MHH (N.D. Ala.,
May 26, 2022) is a collective action complaint brought against the
Defendants for their alleged willful violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendants as an hourly-paid
delivery driver from approximately January 2020 until October
2020.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and other similarly
situated delivery drivers performed dual jobs by delivering food to
the Defendant's customers and receive tips, and working inside the
store completing non-tipped duties. While inside the store
performing non-tipped, they were paid a rate at or close to minimum
wage per hours. On the other hand, while outside of the restaurant
making deliveries, the Defendants paid them less than minimum wage
per hour for all hours worked. The Defendants allegedly did not
adequately reimburse them for their automobile expenses and other
expenses incurred while delivering pizza for the Defendants'
customers, thereby depriving them of minimum wages in accordance
with the FLSA, says the suit.

Moreover, the Plaintiff and other similarly situated delivery
drivers occasionally worked hours over 40 in a week, but they were
not given a sufficient overtime premium at the rate of one and
one-half times their regular rates of pay due to the unreimbursed
mileage expenses, the suit added.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime
premiums, as well as liquidated damages, attorney's fees and
litigation costs, pre-judgement interest, and other relief as the
Court may deem just and proper.

SHD Pizza, Inc. owns and operates Domino's Pizza franchises in
Alabama. Steven Douglas Hall is a principal, director, officer
and/or owner of SDH Pizza. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Courtney Lowery, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Kirkpatrick Plaza
          10800 Financial Centre Pkwy, Suite 510
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Tel: (501) 221-0088
          Fax: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: courtney@sanfordlawfirm.com

SELECT EMPLOYMENT: Class & Nine Subclasses Certfied in Romero
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Elsie Romero et al v.
Select Employment Services, Inc. et al., Case No.
2:19-cv-06369-TJH-AGR (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Terry J. Hatter,
Jr.entered an order that the renewed motion for class certification
is granted as follows:

  -- The Class shall be defined as follows:

     "All persons employed by Defendant California
     Rehabilitation Institute, L.L.C. as non-exempt employees at
     any time between May 31, 2016, and May 23, 2022."

  -- Nine subclasses, defined as follows:

     Subclass 1: All persons employed by California
     Rehabilitation Institute, L.L.C. as non-exempt employees
     between May 31, 2016, and May 23, 2022, who were required
     to carry a communication device and be available during
     their meal breaks.

     Subclass 2: All persons employed by California
     Rehabilitation Institute, L.L.C. as non-exempt employees
     between May 31, 2016, and May 23, 2022, who were required
     to carry a communication device and be available during
     their rest breaks.

     Subclass 3: All persons employed by California
     Rehabilitation Institute, L.L.C. as non-exempt employees
     between May 31, 2016, and May 23, 2022, who (i) worked a
     shift of 3.5 hours or more and received no rest breaks;
     (ii) worked a shift of more than six hours and received
     fewer than two rest breaks; or (iii) worked a shift more
     than 8 10 hours and received fewer than three paid rest
     breaks.

     Subclass 4: All persons employed by California
     Rehabilitation Institute, L.L.C. as non-exempt employees
     between May 31, 2016, and May 23, 2022, who worked a shift
     over 12 hours for which California Rehabilitation
     Institute, L.L.C.'s time records do not show a second 30-
     minute meal period.

     Subclass 5:

     "All persons employed by California Rehabilitation
     Institute, L.L.C. as non-exempt employees between
     May 31, 2016, and May 23, 2022, who received at least one
     meal or rest break premium.

     Subclass 6:

     "All persons employed by California Rehabilitation
     Institute, L.L.C. as non-exempt employees between May 31,
     2016, and May 23, 2022, who worked an overnight shift
     followed by a shift that began the same calendar day and
     were not paid overtime for all time worked in excess of
     eight hours in a 24-hour period, or, if they worked an
     alternative workweek schedule, in excess of 12 hours in a
     24-hour period.

     Subclass 7:

     "All persons employed by California Rehabilitation
     Institute, L.L.C. as non-exempt employees between May 31,
     2016, and May 23, 2022, who used their personal cell phones
     for work purposes and were not compensated for that
     expense."

     Subclass 8: All persons employed by California
     Rehabilitation Institute, L.L.C. as non-exempt employees
     between May 31, 2016, and May 23, 2022, who dry cleaned
     or separately laundered their uniforms and were not
     compensated for those expenses.

     Subclass 9: All persons employed by California
     Rehabilitation Institute, L.L.C. as non-exempt employees
     between May 31, 2016, and May 23, 2022, who received a
     wage statement from California Rehabilitation Institute,
     L.L.C.

  -- Plaintiff Elsie Romero is, appointed as class
     representative for Subclasses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and
  -- Plaintiff Ricardo Ibarra is appointed as class
     representative for Subclasses 1, 2, 3, and 9.

  -- Plaintiff Lauren Lindsay is appointed as class
     representative for Subclasses 1, 2, 3, 7, and 9.

  -- Matthew J. Matern and Launa Adolph are appointed as class
     counsel.

Select Employment Services is a locally-owned staffing company with
experience serving the Laredo and surrounding markets.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 23, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3PU0bef at no extra charge.[CC]

SERVICE KING: Hassanpoor Sues Over Body Technicians' Unpaid Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MOHAMMAD HASSANPOOR, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SERVICE KING PAINT & BODY, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 2:22-at-00539 (E.D. Cal., May 27, 2022) is a
class action against the Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act including failure to pay overtime wages, failure to
pay minimum wages, and retaliation.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendant as a body technician at
various places of business in Sacramento, Yolo, and Placer Counties
in California.

Service King Paint & Body, LLC is a national automotive collision
repair company, headquartered in Richardson, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Clayeo C. Arnold, Esq.
         Joshua H. Watson, Esq.
         CLAYEO C. ARNOLD
         A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION
         865 Howe Avenue
         Sacramento, CA 95825
         Telephone: (916) 777-7777
         Facsimile: (916) 924-1829
         E-mail: jwatson@justice4you.com

SHATTUCK LABS: Faces Two Shareholder Suits in NY Court
------------------------------------------------------
Shattuck Labs, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that class action lawsuits
were filed against the company alleging that they made or are
responsible for false or misleading statements.

In January 31, 2022 and February 11, 2022, putative class action
lawsuits were filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York against the company and certain of its
officers and directors. In each complaint, the plaintiff cites the
volatility in its common stock and alleges that the defendants made
or are responsible for false or misleading statements regarding its
collaboration agreement with Takeda. The plaintiffs in both
lawsuits seek a ruling that the case may proceed as a class action,
and seek unspecified damages and attorneys' fees, expert fees and
costs.

Shattuck Labs, Inc.  innovative clinical-stage biotechnology
company based in Texas.


SILVERBACK THERAPEUTICS: Faces Dresner Securities Suit in WA Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
Silverback Therapeutics, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that a class
action was filed against the company alleging violations of the
Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On November 5, 2021, a securities class action complaint was filed
against the company and certain of the company's officers and
directors in the U.S. District for the Western District of
Washington, captioned "Dresner v. Silverback Therapeutics, Inc., et
al.," Case No. 2:21-cv-01499.

The court has appointed lead plaintiff and lead plaintiff's
counsel, and plaintiff's counsel then filed the amended complaint
on April 11, 2022. The amended complaint alleges that between
December 3, 2020 and March 31, 2022, the Company and certain of the
company's officers and directors violated Sections 11 and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended; and Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, by making
allegedly false and misleading statements in various SEC filings
and press releases regarding the clinical and commercial prospects
of the company's product candidate, "SBT6050," which is now
discontinued.  

The complaint seeks unspecified damages and interest, as well as
attorneys' fees and other costs.

Silverback Therapeutics, Inc. is a biopharmaceutical company based
in Washington.


SOUTH CAROLINA: Wins Summary Judgment v. Huger Class
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as VONEA HUGER and ROSHANDA
GERALD, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
v. South Carolina Department of Corrections et al., Case No.
3:20-cv-02871-MGL (D.S.C.), the Hon. Judge Mary Geiger Lewis
entered an order granting the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment.

The claims against John Does 1–10 is dismissed with prejudice,
Judge Lewis says.

The Plaintiffs bring this action against the Defendants alleging
that SCDC and Individual Defendants violated Plaintiffs' Fourth
Amendment rights during a strip search at Kirkland Correctional
Institution (KCI).

The Plaintiffs brought this Section 1983 action seeking monetary
and injunctive relief. Although they pled this case as a class
action, Plaintiffs never moved for class certification. After
discovery, the Defendants brought the instant motion for summary
judgment. The Plaintiffs filed their response in opposition to the
motion, and then Defendants filed their reply in support.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 23, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3a7tOZj at no extra charge.[CC]



SPARC GROUP: Faces Gregory Suit Over Failure to Timely Pay Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
RHYS GREGORY, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SPARC GROUP LLC (f/k/a AERO OPCO LLC) d/b/a
AEROPOSTALE, Defendant, Case No. 1:22-cv-03144 (E.D.N.Y., May 27,
2022) is a class action complaint brought against the Defendant for
its alleged delinquent wage payments made to its workers in
violation of New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a non-exempt,
hourly-paid manual laborer from approximately August 2019 until
March 2020.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant failed to timely pay his
and other similarly situated worker's wages. Throughout their
employment with the Defendant, the Defendant compensated them every
other week or on a bi-weekly basis instead of a weekly basis, says
the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff seeks for himself and all other similarly situated
manual laborers the damages resulted from the Defendant's failure
to timely pay wages, plus liquidated damages, interest, attorneys'
fees and costs, and other relief as the Court may deem
appropriate.

Sparc Group LLC is a fashion industry leader that designs, sources,
manufacturers, distributes and markets women's, men's and kids
apparel, and accessories in key markets worldwide for iconic
brands. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brett R. Cohen, Esq.
          Jeffrey K. Brown, Esq.
          Michael A. Tompkins, Esq.
          LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
          One Old Country Road, Suite 347
          Carle Place, NY 11514
          Tel: (516) 873-9550

SST CONSTRUCTION: Garcia Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against SST Construction LLC,
et al. The case is styled as Ronnie Garcia, on behalf of themselves
and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals v. SST
Construction LLC, Does 1-10, Case No. 34-2022-00320638-CU-OE-GDS
(Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty., May 26, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited."

SST Construction -- http://sstconstructionllc.com/-- specializes
in home remodeling and upgrades, complete renovation/restoration
and will soon be expanding to include new home building.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alex P. Katofsky, Esq.
          GAINES & GAINES, APLC
          4550 E Thousand Oaks Blvd., Ste. 100
          Westlake Village, CA 91362-3824
          Phone: 818-703-8985
          Fax: 818-703-8984
          Email: alex@gaineslawfirm.com


ST. JOSEPH: Cole Bill of Rights Suit Removed to E.D. Louisiana
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled ANSANTA COLE, as representative of OSBORNE PICOU,
JR., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
ST. JOSEPH OF HARAHAN, LLC, HIGHPOINT HEALTHCARE, LLC, and
PLANTATION MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, Case No. 827-574-I, was removed
from the 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson,
State of Louisiana, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana on May 27, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana assigned
Case No. 2:22-cv-01540-SSV-DMD to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the
Louisiana Residents' Bill of Rights and Louisiana Admin Code.

St. Joseph of Harahan, LLC is an operator of a rehabilitation and
long-term care facility located in Harahan, Louisiana.

Highpoint Healthcare, LLC is a healthcare services provider in
Louisiana.

Plantation Management Company, LLC is a health care company in
Louisiana. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:                                 
                                    
         
         Jimmy R. Faircloth, Jr., Esq.
         Mary Katherine Price, Esq.
         Richard F. Norem, III, Esq.
         FAIRCLOTH MELTON SOBEL & BASH, LLC
         105 Yorktown Drive
         Alexandria, LA 71303
         Telephone: (318) 619-7755
         Facsimile: (318) 619-7744
         E-mail: jfaircloth@fairclothlaw.com
                 kprice@fairclothlaw.com
                 enorem@fairclothlaw.com

ST. LOUIS, MO: District Court Certifies Classes in Cody v. MSI
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES CODY, et al., Plaintiffs v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS,
Defendant, Case No. 4:17-CV-2707 AGF (E.D. Mo.), Judge Audrey G.
Fleissig of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division, grants the Plaintiffs' Motion Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C) Proposing Narrower Class Definitions
and Renewing Motion for Class Certification.

I. Background

The current named Plaintiffs, James Cody, Jasmine Borden, Michael
Mosley, Diedre Wortham, Callion Barnes, and Eddie Williams, were
detained in MSI at various points from January to October of 2017.
They claim that they endured inhumane conditions, in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, while detained either
pretrial or post-conviction in MSI.

The Plaintiffs initially sought class certification of the
following classes of pretrial and post-conviction detainees:

     a. Pretrial Class: All persons who are or were pretrial
detainees in MSI, and who were or will be released from MSI on or
after Nov. 13, 2012.

     b. Pretrial Heat Subclass: All persons who are members of the
Pretrial Class who were assigned to a dorm, pod, or other area at
MSI in which the internal temperature equaled or exceeded 88
degrees Fahrenheit.

     c. Post-Conviction Class: All persons who are or were
post-conviction detainees in MSI, and who were or will be released
from MSI on or after Nov. 13, 2012.

     d. Post-Conviction Heat Subclass: All persons who are members
of the Post-Conviction Class who were assigned to a dorm, pod, or
other area at MSI in which the internal temperature equaled or
exceeded 88 degrees Fahrenheit.

In its Memorandum and Order denying class certification, the Court
found that the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the requirements of
Rules 23(a) and (b). Specifically, the Court found that the
Plaintiffs' proposed decade-long, open-ended class periods, which
ran from 2012 to some indefinite future point when detainees "will
be released from MSI," were unascertainable and failed to satisfy
Rule 23(a)'s commonality and Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance factors.
The Court noted that it was undisputed that the City implemented
substantial changes to MSI over the proposed class period,
including installing air conditioning units in July of 2017 and
drastically decreasing MSI's population by the summer of 2021.

Further, the Plaintiffs' brief in support of their original motion
for class certification proposed to combine class members'
complaints of poor facility conditions, including pest
infestations, plumbing problems, and mold, with their complaints of
excessive force. The Court rejected this proposal in light of the
differing legal standards between conditions-of-confinement and
excessive force claims, and the fact that none of the named
Plaintiffs was actually subjected to any use of force.

The Court noted that "a more focused claim, covering a more
discrete time period, on behalf of a more uniform class, may well
be appropriate for class certification. But the Plaintiffs had not
proposed such a class or offered the Court any guidance to create
one."

The Plaintiffs now attempt to do just that. In their Renewed
Motion, the Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3) of
the following modified classes of pretrial and post-conviction
detainees:

     a. Narrowed Pretrial Conditions Class: All persons who were
pretrial detainees in MSI between Nov. 13, 2012 and July 1, 2018.

     b. Narrowed Pretrial Heat Subclass: All pretrial detainees who
were detained in dormitories in MSI between Nov. 13, 2012 and July
24, 2017 on days where the ambient air temperature in St. Louis,
Missouri equaled or exceeded 88 degrees Fahrenheit.

     c. Narrowed Post-Conviction Conditions Class: All persons who
were post-conviction detainees in MSI between Nov. 13, 2012 and
July 1, 2018.

     d. Narrowed Post-Conviction Heat Subclass: All post-trial
detainees who were detained in dormitories in MSI between Nov. 13,
2012 and July 24, 2017 on days where the ambient air temperature in
St. Louis, Missouri equaled or exceeded 88 degrees Fahrenheit.

The Plaintiffs assert that these proposed narrowed class
definitions address the deficiencies previously identified by the
Court in the following ways:

     a. The proposed conditions classes provide a definitive end
date and narrow the timeframe of the class period;

     b. The proposed conditions classes eliminate the use of force
claim, thereby proposing a class solely related to the conditions
of the jail;

     c. The proposed heat subclasses provide a definitive end-date
and narrow the timeframe of the class period to the period in which
air conditioning was not in the cell;

     d. The proposed heat subclasses eliminate detainees held in
pods, so that only class members who were held in the MSI
dormitories are class members; and

     e. The proposed heat subclasses now use the objective criteria
of external temperature at or above 88 degrees in order to generate
the classes incarcerated in unconstitutionally hot conditions.

The City opposes the Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion. The City argues
that the Plaintiffs should not be permitted to renew their motion
for class certification at this late stage and that, in any event,
the purportedly narrowed classes still fail to satisfy Rule 23.

II. Discussion

As noted in its prior Memorandum and Order, certification of a
class is proper only if, after "rigorous analysis," the Court is
satisfied that the Rule 23 requirements are met. Rule 23(a) allows
individuals to sue on behalf of a class if: (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable (numerosity);
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class
(commonality); (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class
(typicality); and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy).

Rule 23(b)(3) requires that "the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members" (predominance), and that a class action "is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy" (superiority).

A. Narrowed Conditions Classes

The Plaintiffs argue that the Narrowed Pretrial Conditions Class
and Narrowed Post-Conviction Conditions Class (the "Narrowed
Conditions Classes") can be ascertained through objective criteria,
including review of the City's own records. They further limit the
Narrowed Conditions Classes to the time period of Nov. 13, 2012 to
July 1, 2018. According to the Plaintiffs, this period captures the
time period before the City began implementing changes to MSI's
physical facility. They note that the bulk of their
conditions-related evidence comes from their proposed narrowed time
period.

The City argues that the Narrowed Conditions Classes fail to
satisfy Rule 23's requirements because each class member was
subject to a different set of conditions for different periods of
time. The City also argues that the narrowed class definitions fail
to distinguish between inmates housed in MSI's dormitories and
those housed in what the parties describe as MSI's "PODS"; the City
asserts (without citing evidence) that the PODS were constructed in
the 1990s, after the dormitories were constructed, and therefore
had more updated equipment and systems. Finally, the City argues
that the named Plaintiffs were only incarcerated in 2017, and they
therefore cannot demonstrate that their experiences were similar to
or typical of those incarcerated in the years before or after. The
Court will address these arguments as they relate to Rule 23's
factors.

Judge Fleissig holds that the Narrowed Conditions Classes satisfy
the requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b)(3). She thus certifies the
Narrowed Pretrial Conditions Class under Rule 23(b)(3), and
appoints Jasmine Borden, Michael Mosley, Diedre Wortham, Eddie
Williams, and Callion Barnes as the Class Representatives. She also
certifies the Narrowed Post-Convictions Conditions Class under Rule
23(b)(3), and appoints James Cody and Callion Barnes as the Class
Representatives.

B. Narrowed Heat Subclasses

The Plaintiffs contend that the Narrowed Pretrial Heat Subclass and
Narrowed Post-Conviction Heat Subclass ("Narrowed Heat Subclasses")
can be ascertained through objective criteria, including the City's
records and national weather data. They limit the classes to
detainees housed in MSI's dormitories because they concede that the
PODS were equipped with some form of air conditioning (though
Plaintiffs do not concede that the air conditioning was adequate).
They also limit the Narrowed Heat Classes to the time period of
Nov. 12, 2012 through July 24, 2017, the date that they allege
temporary air conditioning was installed in MSI's dormitories.
Based on national weather data, Plaintiffs argue that, during this
limited class period, there were at least 310 days in which the
external air temperatures reached above 88 degrees Fahrenheit.

The City contends that differences in the named Plaintiffs'
testimony demonstrate that the Plaintiffs cannot establish
commonality or predominance. Further, the City asserts that the
proposed 88-degree temperature threshold is arbitrary and
inconsistent with federal law. Finally, the City argues that it
cannot be easily ascertained from the City's records whether a
detainee was housed in the dormitories as opposed to PODS.

Judge Fleissig holds that the Narrowed Heat Subclasses satisfy the
requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b)(3). She thus certifies the
Narrowed Pretrial Heat Subclass under Rule 23(b)(3), and appoints
Michael Mosley and Eddie Williams as the Class Representatives. She
also certifies the Narrowed Post-Convictions Heat Subclass under
Rule 23(b)(3), and appoint James Cody and Callion Barnes as the
Class Representatives.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Fleissig grants the Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion.

Named Plaintiffs Jasmine Borden, Michael Mosley, Diedre Wortham,
Eddie Williams, and Callion Barnes are appointed as the Class
Representatives to represent the Narrowed Pretrial Conditions
Class, defined as follows: All persons who were pretrial detainees
in MSI between Nov. 13, 2012 and July 1, 2018.

Named Plaintiffs Michael Mosley and Eddie Williams are appointed as
the Class Representatives to represent the Narrowed Pretrial Heat
Subclass, defined as follows: All pretrial detainees who were
detained in dormitories in MSI between Nov. 13, 2012 and July 24,
2017 on days where the ambient air temperature in St. Louis,
Missouri equaled or exceeded 88 degrees Fahrenheit.

Named Plaintiffs James Cody and Callion Barnes are appointed as the
Class Representatives to represent the Narrowed Post-Conviction
Conditions Class and Narrowed Post-Conviction Heat Subclass,
defined as follows:

      a. Narrowed Post-Conviction Conditions Class: All persons who
were post-conviction detainees in MSI between Nov. 13, 2012, and
July 1, 2018.

      b. Narrowed Post-Conviction Heat Subclass: All post-trial
detainees who were detained in dormitories in MSI between Nov. 13,
2012, and July 24, 2017, on days where the ambient air temperature
in St. Louis, Missouri equaled or exceeded 88 degrees Fahrenheit.

Nathaniel Carroll, Matthew Dollan, Brandon Jackson, Blake Strode,
Maureen Hanlon, Jacki Langum, and John Waldron of ArchCity
Defenders, Inc., 440 N. 4th Street, Suite 390, St. Louis, Missouri
63102; and Robert J. Alesi, Gail Rodgers, Dennis Kiker, Saher
Valiani, and Matthew Riley of DLA Piper, 1251 Avenue of the
Americas New York, NY 10020, are appointed as the Class Counsel.

The parties will promptly meet and confer and will file, within 14
days of the date of the Memorandum and Order, a joint proposed
schedule for the remainder of the litigation, including prompt
proposed deadlines for the re-referral of the action to mediation,
the filing of dispositive and/or other anticipated pretrial
motions, and trial, as well as the estimated length of trial.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3wrewjzk from Leagle.com.


STYM LLC: Chalas Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Stym, LLC. The case
is styled as Ana Chalas, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Stym, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-04366 (S.D.N.Y.,
May 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Stym Bedtime Diffuser -- https://bedtimediffuser.com/ -- is a
personal aromatherapy device.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


SUFFOLK MARINE CENTER: Tucker Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Suffolk Marine
Center, Inc. The case is styled as Henry Tucker, on behalf of
himself and all other persons similarly situated v. Suffolk Marine
Center, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-04336 (S.D.N.Y., May 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Suffolk Marine Center -- https://www.suffolkmarine.com/ -- is
located in the heart of Babylon Village, and is a New York's
authorized dealer for Regulator and Sea Hunt Boats.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly G. Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM, PC
          155 East 55th St., Ste. 6a
          New York, NY 10022
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: brad@markslawpc.com


TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY: Faces Breach of Contract Suit in VA
---------------------------------------------------------------
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report
for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that on June 9,
2020, a proposed class action lawsuit was filed against TVA and one
of its LPCs, Bristol Virginia Utilities Authority (BVUA), in
federal court in Abingdon, Virginia, by a LPC customer, asserting
claims for breach of contract and violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act.

The lawsuit alleges that the customers of TVA's LPCs are
third-party beneficiaries under TVA's wholesale power contracts
with its LPCs and that TVA's rate changes dating back to 2010
violate Section 11 of the TVA Act. Section 11 of the TVA Act
establishes the broad policy that TVA power projects shall be
considered primarily for the benefit of the people of the Tennessee
Valley and that service to industry is a secondary purpose to be
used principally to secure a sufficiently high load factor and
revenue returns to permit domestic and rural use at the lowest
possible rates.

The remedies requested include an injunction prohibiting TVA rate
changes that violate Section 11, monetary damages, and repayment of
rates charged in violation of Section 11. TVA and BVUA filed
motions to dismiss the case on November 9, 2020, and filed
supplemental motions to dismiss on December 21, 2020, in response
to an amended complaint filed by the plaintiff. Oral argument on
the motions was held on February 18, 2021, and on March 19, 2021,
the court granted TVA's and BVUA's motions to dismiss.

The plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Fourth Circuit) on April
15, 2021. The parties filed their briefs with the Fourth Circuit,
and oral argument was held on January 27, 2022.

Tennessee Valley Authority is a corporate agency and
instrumentality of the United States based in Tennessee.


TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Court Dismisses Osorio FDCPA Complaint
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARTHA OSORIO, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC. and JOHN
DOES 1-25, Defendants, Civ. No. 2:21-cv-19812 (WJM) (D.N.J.), Judge
William J. Martini of the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey grants TSI's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim.

I. Introduction

In the putative class action, Plaintiff Osorio claims that a
collection letter sent by Defendant Transworld Systems, Inc.
("TSI"), a debt collector, violates the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. Sect 1692 et seq. More
specifically, Osorio alleges that the letter fails to clearly
identify the current creditor to whom the alleged debt is owed,
such that the least sophisticated debtor would be confused or
deceived. The matter is now before the Court on TSI's motion to
dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

II. Background

Ms. Osorio incurred a financial obligation to Garden State
Healthcare Associates and the debt was placed with TSI for
collections. Attempting to collect on the debt, TSI sent Osorio a
collection letter dated Sept. 17, 2021, a copy of which is attached
to the Complaint as Exhibit A.

The body of the Letter begins with the message: "Your account has
been placed with us for collections." The Letter then restates the
balance due and the TSI account number from above and provides
information about Osorio's debt collection rights and how to
dispute the debt. The Letter also states: "If you request of this
office in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice, this
office will provide you with the name and address of the original
creditor, if different from the current creditor."

Despite the Letter expressly identifying Garden State as the
creditor, Osorio alleges that the Letter fails to clearly identify
whether Garden State is the original creditor or the current
creditor, which Osorio claims is a violation of Section
1692g(a)(2). She alleges that this deficiency causes confusion as
to who placed the debt with TSI and to whom the debt is actually
owed, making the Letter false, deceptive, or misleading, in
violation of Section 1692e(10).

TSI, in seeking dismissal of the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6),
argues that the Letter adequately identifies the name of the
creditor to whom the debt is owed as required by the FDCPA and,
read in its entirety and with care, is not confusing or misleading
to the least sophisticated debtor.

III. Discussion

The FDCPA protects against abusive debt collection practices "by
imposing affirmative requirements on debt collectors and
prohibiting a range of debt-collection practices." The Court
determines whether a communication from a debt collector violates
the FDCPA by analyzing the debt collector's statements from the
perspective of the "least sophisticated debtor" in order to protect
"all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd," while
simultaneously "preserving a quotient of reasonableness and
presuming a basic level of understanding and willingness to read
with care."

First, Judge Martini opines that Osorio has not stated a claim that
TSI's Letter violates Section 1692g(a). Contrary to her assertion
that the Letter violates the statute because it does not identify
whether Garden State is the original creditor or the current
creditor, "the FDCPA 'does not require that the creditor to whom
the debt is owed be labeled current creditor.'" Nor does the FDCPA
require the debt collector to state in the written notice how it
received the account that it is attempting to collect. Instead, the
statute simply requires the debt collector to identify the name of
the creditor to whom the debt is owed. TSI did so here by
conspicuously and unambiguously identifying Garden State as the
creditor.

Second, because Osorio cannot prevail on her claim under Section
1692g(a), she likewise cannot proceed under Section 1692e(10).
Osorio concedes that her Section 1692e(10) claim that the Letter
used false representation or deceptive means in its collection
efforts is premised on the same creditor language underlying her
Section 1692g(a) claim. "When language is upheld pursuant to
Section 1692g, that analysis is usually dispositive for Section
1692e." Because the Letter clearly identifies the name of the
creditor to whom the debt is owed as required by Section 1692g(a)
and is not misleading to the least sophisticated debtor, Osorio has
not stated a claim under Section 1692e(10).

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Martini concludes that Osorio's
allegations do not state a claim for relief under the FDCPA. TSI's
motion to dismiss is granted, and the Complaint is dismissed.

An appropriate Order will follow.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/3pvrbdbk from Leagle.com.


TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Osorio Appeals FDCPA Suit Dismissal
-------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Martha Osorio is taking an appeal from a court ruling
dismissing her lawsuit entitled MARTHA OSORIO, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. TRANSWORLD
SYSTEMS, INC. and JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
2-21-cv-19812, in the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey.

In this putative class action filed on November 6, 2021, Plaintiff
Martha Osorio claims that a collection letter sent by Defendant
Transworld Systems, a debt collector, violates the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1692 et seq. More
specifically, Osorio alleges that the letter fails to clearly
identify the current creditor to whom the alleged debt is owed,
such that the least sophisticated debtor would be confused or
deceived.

On February 28, 2022, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, which the Court granted on May 25, 2022,
through an order entered by Judge William J. Martini.

The appellate case is captioned as Martha Osorio v. Transworld
Systems Inc., Case No. 22-2013, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, filed on May 27, 2022.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant MARTHA OSORIO, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Joseph K. Jones, Esq.
          Benjamin J. Wolf, Esq.
          JONES WOLF & KAPASI
          375 Passaic Avenue, Suite 100
          Fairfield, NJ 07004
          Telephone: (973) 227-5900
          E-mail: jkj@legaljones.com
                  bwolf@legaljones.com

Defendant-Appellee TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS INC. is represented by:

          Aaron R. Easley, Esq.
          SESSIONS ISRAEL & SHARTLE
          3 Cross Creek Drive
          Flemington, NJ 08822
          Telephone: (908) 237-1660
          E-mail: aeasley@sessions-law.biz

TRINET HR: Huang Files Bid for Class Certification
--------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SHIQIONG HUANG, CHRIS R.
STOKOWSKI, EVERETT UHL, MARK J. HEARON and MARY T. PATTERSON,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
TRINET HR III, INC., TRINET HR IV, INC., THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
TRINET HR III, INC., THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF TRINET HR IV, INC.,
THE INVESTMENT COMMITTEE OF TRINET GROUP, INC., and JOHN DOES 1-30,
Case No. 8:20-cv-02293-VMC-TGW (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiffs ask the
Court to enter an order certifying the following class pursuant to
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) and (b)(1):

   "All persons, except Defendants and their immediate family
   members, who were participants in or beneficiaries of the
   Plans, at any time between September 29, 2014 through the
   date of judgment."

Additionally, the Plaintiffs ask that the appoint them as
representatives for the certified Class, and appoint their counsel,
Capozzi Adler, P.C., as Class Counsel.

TriNet provides businesses with HR solutions including payroll,
benefits, risk management and compliance.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated May 23, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3z7zhtF at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph M. Sternberg, Esq.
          CAPOZZI ADLER, P.C.
          Telephone: (407) 495-1893
          Facsimile: (407) 362-6325
          722 W. Smith Street
          Orlando, FL 32804
          E-mail: joseph@landersandsternberg.com

               - and -

          Mark K. Gyandoh, Esq.
          Gabrielle P. Kelerchian, Esq.
          Donald R. Reavey, Esq.
          312 Old Lancaster Road
          Merion Station, PA 19066
          Telephone: (610) 890-0200
          Facsimile: (717) 233-4103
          E-mail: markg@capozziadler.com
                  gabriellek@capozziadler.com
                  donr@capozziadler.com

UNITED STAFFING: Class of Filipino Nurses Certified in Magtoles
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARY GRACE MAGTOLES, AIRA C. TAN, ANA MYRENE ESPINOSA,
and ANA MERVINE ESPINOSA, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. UNITED STAFFING REGISTRY, INC.
d/b/a UNITED HOME CARE and BENJAMIN H. SANTOS, Defendants, Case No.
21-CV-1850 (KAM) (PK) (E.D.N.Y.), Judge Kiyo A. Matsumoto of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York grants the
Nurse Plaintiffs' motion for class certification pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

I. Background

Nurse Plaintiffs Mary Grace Magtoles, Aira Tan, and Ana Myrene
Espinosa are Filipino nurses, who worked for Defendant United
Staffing Registry, Inc., a healthcare staffing agency owned by
Defendant Benjamin H. Santos. The Nurse Plaintiffs assert claims
for violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act ("TVPA"),
18 U.S.C. Section 1589, et seq., declaratory judgment, and breach
of contract under New York Law.

Defendant United Staffing, Inc., is a staffing agency that recruits
nurses and other professionals to provide healthcare services for
its clients in the New York City area. Most of the nurses that
United Staffing recruits from abroad are citizens of the Republic
of the Philippines.

Before beginning work in the United States, United Staffing
required its foreign recruits to sign a standard, three-year
employment contract with the company. Four provisions of the Nurse
Plaintiffs' contracts are relevant to the instant motion. First,
United Staffing's standard contract required nurses to work a
minimum number of hours during the three-year period. Second,
United Staffing's standard contract included a non-compete clause
of striking breadth. Third, United Staffing agreed to pay "a salary
or wage that complies with the laws, rules, regulations, and
prevailing wages" applicable to the nurse's work location. Fourth,
United Staffing's standard contract included a section entitled
"Termination of Permanent Resident Card/Deportation."

Beginning around the end of 2019, United Staffing substantially
changed its standard employment contract for registered nurses.
Among other things, its new contracts included a forum selection
clause providing that all disputes -- other than a request for a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction -- will be
resolved in an arbitration before the American Arbitration
Association. United Staffing's new contracts also included a class
action waiver provision. In their reply brief, the Nurse Plaintiffs
represent that they do not seek to include in the certified class
any nurses who signed a contract with United Staffing that
contained a class action waiver and arbitration clause.

The Nurse Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Ana Mervine Espinosa commenced
the action on April 6, 2021. On Dec. 30, 2021, the Court issued a
memorandum and order granting in part and denying in large part the
Defendants' motion to dismiss. Based on the liquidated damages
provision, non-compete clause, and immigration notification
provision in United Staffing's standard contract, it concluded that
the Nurse Plaintiffs stated plausible claims for violations of the
TVPA, breach of contract, and a declaratory judgment. Although the
Court concluded that Ms. Espinosa could not assert claims under
Section 1589 of the TVPA, it found that Ms. Espinosa stated
plausible claims for trafficking, conspiracy, and attempt under the
TVPA, as well as for fraud and unjust enrichment under New York
law.

On Feb. 8, 2022, Magistrate Judge Kuo issued an order certifying
the close of all discovery. On May 26, 2022, the Court will hold a
pre-motion conference regarding the Plaintiffs' intended motion for
summary judgment. In the meantime, the Nurse Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification is fully briefed and ripe for decision.

II. Discussion

The Nurse Plaintiffs move to certify a class of all Filipino nurses
who worked under United Staffing's standard employment contract at
any time since April 5, 2011, i.e., a contract containing a
liquidated damages provision, non-compete clause, immigration
notification provision, and prevailing wage requirement.

To certify a class action, the Nurse Plaintiffs must show that: (1)
"the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable" (numerosity); (2) "there are questions of law or
fact common to the class" (commonality); (3) "the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class" (typicality); and (4) "the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class" (adequacy).

Judge Matsumoto finds that (i) the Defendants have not rebutted the
presumption of numerosity, and the modest financial resources of
the class members, along with their foreign citizenship, green card
status, and potential language barriers, militate against separate
lawsuits and instead weigh in favor of a finding of numerosity;
(ii) the Nurse Plaintiffs' TVPA claims rest on a common contention:
that the liquidated damages provision, non-compete clause, and
immigration notification provision in United Staffing's standard
contract collectively threaten serious harm and otherwise violate
the TVPA; (iii) nurses' differing immigration statuses do not
render the Nurse Plaintiffs' claims atypical; (iv) the Nurse
Plaintiffs "meet the 'modest' requirement of being 'aware of the
basic facts underlying the lawsuit,'" and that they are "unlikely
'to abdicate their obligations to fellow class members'"; and (v)
the minor variations in the minimum number of hours do not
materially affect the TVPA claims or the claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief.

To certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), the Court must find that
"the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy."

Judge Matsumoto holds that both criteria are satisfied in the case.
She finds that (i) common questions predominate with respect to all
of the Nurse Plaintiffs' claims; and (ii) a class action is
"particularly desirable in the case, where it is likely the only
device by which many of the proposed class members" -- who may have
"limited resources" and lack "familiarity with the legal system" --
could obtain relief.

In the alternative, Judge Matsumoto concludes that certification of
the Nurse Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief
is appropriate pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2). She holds that even if
certification were not appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3), she finds
that certification of the claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2) for all class members who
worked for United Staffing in the past six years.

Based on the terms of United Staffing's standard contract, the
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief "apply generally to
the class," Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), and would result in classwide
relief if the Nurse Plaintiffs ultimately prevail. And, given the
six-year statute of limitations applicable to breach of contract
actions in New York, however, see C.P.L.R. Section 213(2), any
nurse who worked for United Staffing in the past six years pursuant
to its standard contract containing the provisions challenged here
would benefit from classwide relief.

The Nurse Plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. John J.P. Hawley, Esq. and Mr.
Leandro B. Lachica, Esq., also move to be appointed as co-lead
class counsel. Judge Matsumoto finds that the Nurse Plaintiffs'
counsel are exceedingly qualified applicants to represent the class
under Rule 23.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Nurse Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification is granted. Judge Matsumoto certifies a class of all
Filipino nurses who were employed by the Defendants at any time
since April 5, 2011 pursuant to an employment contract containing a
liquidated damages provision, non-compete clause, immigration
notification provision, and a prevailing wage requirement. The
Nurse Plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. John J.P. Hawley, Esq. and Mr.
Leandro B. Lachica, Esq., are appointed as the co-lead class
counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g).

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5k692ndw from Leagle.com.


US BANK: Melnick's Bid to Certify Class Denied as Premature
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as HUNTER ADAM MELNICK, v. US
BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Case No. 1:21-cv-03112-CMA-KLM (D.
Colo.), the Hon. Judge Kristen L. Mix entered an order:

   1. denying without prejudice Plaintiff's motion to amend;

   2. granting the U.S. Bank's motion to stay, where all
      proceedings and discovery in this case are stayed pending
      resolution of the Motion to Dismiss;

   3. denying without prejudice the Plaintiff's First, Second,
      and Third Motions for Subpoena in light of the stay of
      discovery;

   4. denying as premature the Plaintiff's motion to certify
      class; and

   5. granting the Plaintiff's motion for status.

US Bank NA operates as a bank.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 24, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3x6gEDw at no extra charge.[CC]


VENUS CONCEPT:  Settlement in Wong Securities Suit Wins Final Nod
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Venus Concept Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that a class action
complaint settlement in the Federal Actions was granted final
approval.

A putative shareholder class action complaint filed against its
affiliate Restoration Robotics, Inc., certain of its former
officers and directors, certain of its venture capital investors
and the underwriters of the initial public offering (IPO) captioned
"Wong v. Restoration Robotics, Inc., et al.," Case No. 18CIV02609,
and "Li v. Restoration Robotics, Inc., et al.," No. 19CIV08173 was
filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of
San Mateo, and assert claims under Sections 11, 12(a)(2) and 15 of
the Securities Act.

The complaint alleged that the Restoration Robotics' Registration
Statement filed with the SEC on September 1, 2017 and the
Prospectus filed with the SEC on October 13, 2017 in connection
with Restoration Robotics' IPO were inaccurate and misleading,
contained untrue statements of material facts, omitted to state
other facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading
and omitted to state material facts required to be stated therein.
The complaint sought unspecified monetary damages, other equitable
relief and attorneys' fees and costs. A settlement in the Federal
Actions was granted final approval in the District Court on
September 9, 2021.

Venus Concept Inc. global medical technology company based in
Ontario.


VENUS CONCEPT: Court Approves Li Securities Suit Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------
Venus Concept Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that a class action
complaint settlement in the Federal Actions was granted final
approval.

A putative shareholder class action complaint filed against its
affiliate Restoration Robotics, Inc., certain of its former
officers and directors, certain of its venture capital investors
and the underwriters of the initial public offering (IPO) captioned
"Li v. Restoration Robotics, Inc., et al.," Case No. 19CIV08173,
was filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County
of San Mateo, and assert claims under Sections 11, 12(a)(2) and 15
of the Securities Act.

The complaint alleges, among other things, that the Restoration
Robotics' Registration Statement filed with the SEC on September 1,
2017 and the Prospectus filed with the SEC on October 13, 2017 in
connection with Restoration Robotics' IPO were inaccurate and
misleading, contained untrue statements of material facts, omitted
to state other facts necessary to make the statements made not
misleading and omitted to state material facts required to be
stated therein. The complaints sought unspecified monetary damages,
other equitable relief and attorneys' fees and costs. A settlement
in the Federal Actions was granted final approval in the District
Court on September 9, 2021.

Venus Concept Inc. global medical technology company based in
Ontario.


VENUS CONCEPT: Settlement in Guerrini Securities Suit Wins Final OK
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Venus Concept Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that a class action
complaint settlement in the Federal Actions was granted final
approval.

A putative shareholder class action complaint filed against its
affiliate Restoration Robotics, Inc., certain of its former
officers and directors, certain of its venture capital investors
and the underwriters of the initial public offering (IPO) captioned
"Guerrini v. Restoration Robotics, Inc., et al.," Case No.
5:18-cv-03712-EJD, in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California and assert claims under Sections 11
and 15 of the Securities Act.

The complaint alleges, among other things, that the Restoration
Robotics' Registration Statement filed with the SEC on September 1,
2017 and the Prospectus filed with the SEC on October 13, 2017 in
connection with Restoration Robotics' IPO were inaccurate and
misleading, contained untrue statements of material facts, omitted
to state other facts necessary to make the statements made not
misleading and omitted to state material facts required to be
stated therein. The complaint sought unspecified monetary damages,
other equitable relief and attorneys' fees and costs. A settlement
in the Federal Actions was granted final approval in the District
Court on September 9, 2021.

Venus Concept Inc. global medical technology company based in
Ontario.


VENUS CONCEPT: Settlement in Yzeiraj Suit Gets Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
Venus Concept Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 12, 2022, that a class action
complaint settlement in the Federal Actions was granted final
approval.

A putative shareholder class action complaint filed against its
affiliate Restoration Robotics, Inc., certain of its former
officers and directors, certain of its venture capital investors
and the underwriters of the initial public offering (IPO) captioned
"Yzeiraj v. Restoration Robotics, Inc., et al.," No.
5:18-cv-03883-BLF in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California and assert claims under Sections 11
and 15 of the 1933 Act.

The complaint alleges, among other things, that the Restoration
Robotics' Registration Statement filed with the SEC on September 1,
2017 and the Prospectus filed with the SEC on October 13, 2017 in
connection with Restoration Robotics' IPO were inaccurate and
misleading, contained untrue statements of material facts, omitted
to state other facts necessary to make the statements made not
misleading and omitted to state material facts required to be
stated therein. The complaint sought unspecified monetary damages,
other equitable relief and attorneys' fees and costs. A settlement
in the Federal Actions was granted final approval in the District
Court on September 9, 2021.

Venus Concept Inc. global medical technology company based in
Ontario.


VVF INTERVEST: Extension to File Conditional Cert Reply Sought
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MARLON ROBERTSON,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
VVF INTERVEST, LLC, VVF KANSAS, LLC, & VVF KANSAS SERVICES, LLC,
Case No. 2:21-cv-02507-EFM-KGG (D. Kan.), the Parties seek to
extend the deadline for the Plaintiff to Reply to Defendants
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) Conditional Certification, to July 8, 2022.

On March 10, 2022, the Plaintiff filed Motion for FLSA Conditional
Certification Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b).

On April 14, 2022, the Defendants filed their Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for FLSA Conditional Certification
Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b) (Doc. 20).

On May 4, 2022, the Court granted the Parties' Joint Motion for
Extension of Time to File Reply and extended the time of Plaintiff
to file his Reply to May 24, 2022.

On May 16, 2022, Magistrate Judge Gale granted the Parties Joint
Motion for Extension of Report Deadline and reset the Scheduling
Conference from May 24, 2022 to June 21, 2022 to allow the Parties
additional time to reach a Stipulation.

Founded in 2007, VVF is a contract manufacturer of bar soap and
antiperspirant.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated May 23, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3N5uoFn at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew E. Osman, Esq.
          David S. Kim, Esq.
          OSMAN & SMAY LLC
          7111 W. 151 st St., #316
          Overland Park, KS 66223
          Telephone: (913) 667-9243
          Facsimile: (866) 470-9243
          E-mail: mosman@workerwagerights.com
                  dkim@workerwagerights.com

               - and -

          Patricia A. Konopka, Esq.
          Emily N. K. Monroe, Esq.
          STINSON LLP
          1201 Walnut Street, Suite 2900
          Kansas City, MO 64106-2150
          Telephone: (816) 842-8600
          Facsimile: (816) 691-3495
          E-mail: pat.konopka@stinson.com
                  emily.monroe@stinson.com

WAKEFIELD & ASSOCIATES: Getchel Has Until June 8 to File Response
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Getchel v. Wakefield and
Associates, Inc., Case No. 2:21-cv-02436 (W.D. Tenn.), the Hon.
Judge Mark S. Norris entered an order granting the plaintiff's
first motion for an extension of time to file a response to
defendant's motion to stay class certification.

The Plaintiff shall have up to and including June 8, 2022 to file
her response, says Judge  Norris.

The suit alleges violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.

Wakefield is a debt collection agency.[CC]

WALMART INC: Lebby's Time to File Class Cert Extended to Sept. 16
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DANIEL LEBBY, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated, v. WALMART INC., Case No.
3:21-cv-01365-RDM (M.D. Pa.), the Hon. Judge Robert D. Mariani
entered an order that the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for
extension of the class certification motion deadline.

The Plaintiffs' time to move for class certification is extended to
September 16, 2022.

Walmart is an American multinational retail corporation that
operates a chain of hypermarkets, discount department stores, and
grocery stores from the United States, headquartered in
Bentonville, Arkansas.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 23, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3N2OFeS at no extra charge.[CC]

WEWORK INC: Faces Carter Suit Over Breach of Fiduciary Duties
-------------------------------------------------------------
Wework Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on May 12, 2022, that its former CEO, Adam Neumann is
facing a shareholder class action captioned "Carter v. Neumann, et
al." in the Superior Court for the State of California, County of
San Francisco, Case No. CGC-19-580474, filed January 10, 2020.

Said complaint alleges, among other things, that defendants
breached fiduciary duties and/or aided and abetted breaches of
fiduciary duties in connection with certain transactions. The
complaints seek injunctive relief and damages. In both actions, the
company filed motions to compel arbitration and stay the actions,
or to enforce the company's Delaware forum selection bylaw and
dismiss or stay the actions.

In August 31, 2020, the trial court granted the motions to compel
arbitration and the motion to enforce the forum selection bylaw. In
October 30, 2020, the plaintiff filed petitions for writs of
mandate seeking to overturn the court's orders compelling
arbitration. In December 3, 2020, the California Court of Appeal
denied those petitions. Also on October 30, 2020, the second
plaintiff in Carter case appealed the trial court's decision
enforcing the forum selection bylaw.

In November 16, 2021, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the
trial court's decision enforcing the forum selection bylaw. In
December 23, 2021, the second Carter plaintiff filed a petition to
review the Court of Appeal's decision in the California Supreme
Court. In March 9, 2022, the California Supreme Court denied this
petition. The company is currently litigating the Carter claims in
private arbitration.

WeWork is a workspace provider based in New York.


WEWORK INC: Won Shareholder Suit in California Court Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------------
Wework Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on May 12, 2022, that its former CEO, Adam Neumann is
facing a shareholder class action captioned "Won v. Neumann, et
al." (Superior Court for the State of California, County of San
Francisco, No. CGC-19-581021, filed November 25, 2019).

Said complaint alleges, among other things, that defendants
breached fiduciary duties and/or aided and abetted breaches of
fiduciary duties in connection with certain transactions. The
complaints seek injunctive relief and damages. In both actions, the
company filed motions to compel arbitration and stay the actions,
or to enforce the company's Delaware forum selection bylaw and
dismiss or stay the actions.

In August 31, 2020, the trial court granted the motions to compel
arbitration and the motion to enforce the forum selection bylaw. In
October 30, 2020, Won filed petitions for writs of mandate seeking
to overturn the court's orders compelling arbitration. In December
3, 2020, the California Court of Appeal denied those petitions. In
November 16, 2021, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the
trial court's decision enforcing the forum selection bylaw.

The company is litigating Won's claims in private arbitrations.

WeWork is a workspace provider based in New York.


WISCONSIN: Court Dismisses Carr, Fessahaye and Moon From Lewis Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES ARNOLD LEWIS, Plaintiff v. NURSE YORK, RANDALL
HEPP, JOE FALKE, KEVIN CARR, MAKDA FESSAHAYE, NURSE DOE, DOE,
Health Services Manager, and MOON, Complaint Examiner ICE,
Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-232-pp (E.D. Wis.), Judge Pamela Pepper
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
grants the Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed without
prepaying the filing fee and dismisses Defendants Carr, Fessahaye
and Moon.

I. Background

Mr. Lewis, who is confined at the Kettle Moraine Correctional
Institution and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42
U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that the Defendants violated his
constitutional rights.

II. Discussion

A. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to the case because
the Plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. The
PLRA allows the court to let an incarcerated plaintiff proceed with
his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. When funds
exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. He
then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through
deductions from his prisoner account.

On March 8, 2021, the Court ordered the Plaintiff to pay an initial
partial filing fee of $25.52. The Court received that fee on March
26, 2021. Judge Pepper grants the Plaintiff's motion for leave to
proceed without prepaying the filing fee and requires him to pay
the remainder of the fee over time in the manner explained in her
Order.

B. Screening the Complaint

During the events described in the complaint, the Plaintiff was
confined at the Waupun Correctional Institution; he says that he
was placed in temporary lock up status in the segregation building
on Sept. 22, 2020. He alleges that on Oct. 13, 2020, he received a
memo from Defendant Warden Hepp regarding identified positive cases
of COVID-19 among the population. The next day, Waupun staff
allegedly moved the Plaintiff from TLU to a general population cell
in the Northwest cell hall. The Plaintiff alleges that six days
later, or on Oct. 20, 2020, he and his new cellmate were tested for
COVID-19.

The Plaintiff alleges that Hepp, Falke, defendant Kevin Carr, the
Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, and Defendant
Makda Fessahaye, the Administrator of Wisconsin Division of Adult
Institutions, knew of a prior COVID-19 outbreak at Waupun in May
2020, yet they failed to plan and prepare for the possibility of
another outbreak. He claims that because the institution had been
on lock-down the week before he was moved into general population
from TLU, there was a possibility that his new cellmate could have
been positive for COVID-19 before the Plaintiff was moved into the
cell, because 397 incarcerated persons and 32 staff had tested
positive. He asserts that Hepp, Falke, Carr and Fessahaye knew
about the importance of isolating inmates who had tested positive
from those who had tested negative, yet they failed to keep those
inmates separated or to come up with and implement an adequate plan
that would keep those who had tested positive from those who had
not.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Moon, the institution
complaint examiner, recommended dismissal of his offender complaint
alleging that he had been housed with an inmate who tested positive
for COVID-19. He says that if Moon had contacted the CDC, DHS or
the Plaintiff's primary care provider, she would have known that
his placement in a cell with a COVID-19 positive individual placed
the Plaintiff at serious risk for infection. He says that the
recommendation to dismiss his offender complaint caused him to
spend an extra day in a cell with COVID-19 inmate.

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants showed deliberate
indifference when they left him housed with his cellmate for
several days after the cellmate's test results came back positive
for COVID-19, even after the Plaintiff informed them that he had a
compromised immune system. He also claims that the defendants
showed deliberate indifference when the Plaintiff was moved from
TLU to the general population without first testing inmates for
COVID-19, when they knew there was an outbreak in the general
population. Finally, the Plaintiff claims that the defendants
showed deliberate indifference to other inmates who tested negative
but were forced to be housed with COVID-19 positive inmates and
asserts that his complaint should be accepted as a class action
suit.

For relief, the Plaintiff seeks monetary damages as well as a
permanent injunction preventing Waupun from housing inmates who
test positive for COVID-19 with those who have tested negative
and/or whose results are pending.

Judge Pepper finds that the Plaintiff may proceed on an Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Nurse
York, Randall Hepp, Joe Falke, Nurse Doe and Doe HSM/HSU Manager,
based on allegations that the Plaintiff has a compromised immune
system and the Defendants failed to move him from his cell after
his cellmate tested positive for COVID-19. After the named
Defendants file a responsive pleading to the complaint, the
Plaintiff may use discovery to identify the Doe defendants.

III. Conclusion

Judge Pepper grants the Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed
without prepaying the filing fee. She dismisses Defendants Carr,
Fessahaye and Moon.

Under an informal service agreement between the Wisconsin
Department of Justice and the Court, the Court will electronically
transmit a copy of the complaint and the Order to the Wisconsin
Department of Justice for service on defendants York, Hepp and
Falke. Under the informal service agreement, Judge Pepper orders
those Defendants to file a responsive pleading to the complaint
within 60 days.

Judge Pepper orders that the agency that has custody of the
Plaintiff must collect from his institution trust account the
$46.23 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments
from the Plaintiff's prison trust account in an amount equal to 20%
of the preceding month's income credited to his trust account and
forwarding payments to the clerk of court each time the amount in
the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section
1915(b)(2). The agency must clearly identify the payments by the
case name and number. If the Plaintiff transfers to another county,
state or federal institution, the transferring institution must
forward a copy of the Order, along with the Plaintiff's remaining
balance, to the receiving institution.

The Court will send a copy of the Order to Warden at Kettle Moraine
Correctional Institution.

Judge Pepper orders that the parties may not begin discovery until
after the Court enters a scheduling order setting deadlines for
completing discovery and filing dispositive motions.

Judge Pepper orders those Plaintiffs who are in custody at Prisoner
E-Filing Program institutions to submit all correspondence and case
filings to institution staff, who will scan and e-mail documents to
the Court. The Plaintiffs who are in custody at all other prison
facilities must submit the original document for each filing to the
court to the following address: Office of the Clerk United States
District Court Eastern District of Wisconsin 362 United States
Courthouse 517 E. Wisconsin Avenue Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

Judge Pepper advises the Plaintiff that if he fails to file
documents or take other required actions by the deadlines the Court
sets, it may dismiss the case based on his failure to diligently
pursue it. The parties must notify the Clerk of Court of any change
of address. Judge Pepper advises the Plaintiff that it is his
responsibility to promptly notify the Court if he is released from
custody or transferred to a different institution. The Plaintiff's
failure to keep the Court advised of his address may result in the
Court dismissing the case without further notice.

The Court will include a guide prepared by court staff to address
common questions that arise in cases filed by prisoners. Entitled
"Answers to Prisoner Litigants' Common Questions," this guide
contains information that the Plaintiff may find useful in
prosecuting his case.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 24, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yc8m7pjj from Leagle.com.


WYZE LABS: Quevedo Suit Alleges Unsolicited Telemarketing Calls
---------------------------------------------------------------
EDUARDO QUEVEDO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. WYZE LABS, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:22-cv-21658 (S.D. Fla., May 30, 2022) is a class action against
the Defendant of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and the
Florida Telephone Solicitation Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has sent telephonic calls
to the Plaintiff and similarly situated consumers in an attempt to
promote its goods and services without obtaining their prior
express written consent. As a result of the Defendant's misconduct,
the Plaintiff and Class members suffered harm, including violations
of their statutory rights, statutory damages, annoyance, nuisance,
and invasion of their privacy, says the suit.

Wyze Labs, Inc. is a company that specializes in smart home
products and wireless cameras based in Seattle, Washington. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
         HIRALDO P.A.
         401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
         Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
         Telephone: (954) 400-4713
         E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

                 - and –

         Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
         THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
         110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
         Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301

ZYMERGEN INC: Faces Shankar Securities Suit in CA Court
--------------------------------------------------------
Zymergen Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2022, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on May 12, 2022, that the company was named as a
defendant in a class action lawsuit alleging violations of the
Securities Act of 1933.

In August 4, 2021, a putative securities class action was filed on
behalf of purchasers of the Company's common stock pursuant to or
traceable to the registration statement for its IPO. The action is
pending in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, and is captioned "Shankar v. Zymergen Inc.
et al.," Case No. 3:21-cv-06028-JCS.

The action alleges violations of Sections 11 and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, in connection with the
Company's IPO, names the Company, certain of its current and former
officers and directors, its IPO underwriters, and certain
stockholders as defendants and seeks damages in an unspecified
amount, attorneys' fees, and other remedies.

Zymergen Inc. designs, develops and commercializes microbes,
molecules, and materials for diverse end markets based in
California.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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