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              Friday, June 10, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 110

                            Headlines

A&E TELEVISION: Alabama Court Tosses Byrdsong Suit With Prejudice
AETNA INC: Pennsylvania Judge Approves ERISA Class Action Suit
AFTERMATH SERVICES: Torigian Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
ALASKA AIRLINES: Averts Pilots' Military Bias Class Action
ALLSTATE INSURANCE: Question for Appeal Certified in Revival Suit

AMAZON.COM INC: Klein Law Firm Reminds of July 5 Deadline
AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Loses Bid to Stay Briefing in Hamilton Suit
ARQIT QUANTUM: Klein Law Firm Reminds of July 5 Deadline
ASSURANCE IQ: 9th Cir. Reverses Dismissal of Amended Javier Suit
ATLANTIC SPECIALTY: Judgment on Pleadings in PF Sunset Suit Upheld

AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE: Allowed to Seal Exhibits in MSP Suit
AVANT ENTERPRISES: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
AXSOME THERAPEUTICS: Glancy Prongay Reminds of July 12 Deadline
B.O.S. COMPANY: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BANK OF AMERICA: Al-Ramahi Sues Over Fraudulent Money Transfer App

BASF CATALYSTS: Claim Distributions Report in Williams Suit OK'd
BEAM SUNTORY: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BEYOND MEAT: Roberts Balks at Products' Mislabeled Protein Content
BIO-REFERENCE LABORATORIES: Bid to Remand Lopez Wage Suit Denied
BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Ngo BELO Suit

BROWN-FORMAN CORPORATION: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL: Fraser Files Suit in E.D. Virginia
C. TECH COLLECTIONS: Kramer Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
CAREDX INC: Klein Law Firm Reminds of July 22 Deadline
CCUR HOLDINGS: Delaware Chancery Court Trims Claims in Samuels Suit

CDC RESTAURANT: Juarez Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
CDR MAGUIRE: Barker Wins Bid for Conditional FLSA Certification
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Wins Bid to Arbitrate in Johnson Suit
CHRISTIE BUSINESS: Podroykin Files Suit in C.D. Illinois
COLES COUNTY, IL: Wolfe, et al., Bid to Certify Class Nixed as Moot

COMCAST CABLE: Park Sues Over Illegal Debt Collection Practices
COVETRUS INC: Juan Monteverde Investigates Proposed TPG Merger Deal
CRAIG MCCAW: Newbold Sues Over Breaches of Fiduciary Duty
CRESCO CAPITAL: Dahir Suit Moved to Hennepin County District Court
CSX TRANSPORTATION: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Varecka Class Suit

CYPRESS PORK: Underpays Pork Production Workers, Rodas Suit Says
DESTIRA INC: Davis Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DON SEBASTIANI: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
E Z PORTABLE: Discloses Incorrect Sales Tax Rate, Naszady Claims
EAST TENNESSEE: Ziler Files Suit in E.D. Tennessee

EMF OF WINTER: Faces Lexima Suit Over Telemarketing Calls
ENSERVCO CORP: Robbins LLP Reminds of July 19 Deadline
EPIC LANDSCAPE: Faces FLSA Class Action Lawsuit in Kansas
EZ DISPOSAL & RECYCLING: Torigian Files Suit in Mass. Super. Ct.
GANNETT COMPANY: Belozerov Sues Over Data Privacy Violations

GENERAL MOTORS: Court Dismisses Elliott Suit Over Headlight Defect
GOOGLE LLC: Faces Class Suit Over Illegal Automatic Renewal Scheme
GREAT LAKES: Court Denies Dawson's Two Bids for Reconsideration
HIBBET INC: Kamel FCRA Suit Removed to C.D. California
HLA USA LLC: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

HUMBL INC: Bronstein Gewirtz Reminds of July 19 Deadline
ILLINOIS: Adamczyk's Bid to Certify Rule 23 Class Tossed
INJURED WORKERS: Faces Data Breach Class Action in Massachusetts
INVITATION HOMES: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss McCumber Suit
IONQ INC: Glancy Prongay Reminds of Lead Plaintiff Deadline

JETSON ELECTRIC: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Faces BIPA Class Action in New Jersey
KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN: Roberson Sues Over FMLA Rights Violation
KENNETT, MO: Bruce Files Suit in E.D. Missouri
KERRY INC: Must Face Class Action Over Mismanaged Retirement Funds

KIA AMERICA: Court Grants Bid to Add Class Reps in Marvin Suit
KURARAY CO: Court Dismisses Remaining Claims in Teamster Suit
LMP AUTOMOTIVE: Frank R. Cruz Law Reminds of July 26 Deadline
LMP AUTOMOTIVE: Gainey McKenna Reminds of July 26 Deadline
LMP AUTOMOTIVE: Nguyen Sues Over Share Price Drop

LMP AUTOMOTIVE: Rosen Law Firm Reminds of July 26 Deadline
MAIN STREET: DeFino Sues Over Restaurant Servers' Unpaid Wages
MCCLATCHY CO: Attorney Discusses TCPA Case Ruling in Kelly Suit
MDL 2804: Putnam Cty. Board Sues Over Children's Opioid Exposure
MIDLAND CREDIT: Foley & Lardner Discusses FDCPA Suit Court Ruling

MIKE AND ALLY: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MITSUBISHI MOTORS: Damocles Files Suit in M.D. Tennessee
MITSUBISHI MOTORS: Wade Files Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
MM 879 INC: 9th Cir. Affirms in Part Summary Judgment in Cruz Suit
MOTOCADDY INC: Davis Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

NATIONAL CREDIT: Court Certifies Class in Swanson TCPA Suit
NELNET INC: Seeks to Strike Johansson Class Action Claims
NELSON'S GREEN BRIER: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
NETFLIX INC: Grant & Eisenhofer Reminds of July 5 Deadline
NORTHWEST CONFECTIONS: Young Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.

OIL PRICE: Compelled to Comply With Subpoenas in Bogard Suit
OKTA INC: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of July 19 Deadline
OLE SMOKY DISTILLERY: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ONIN STAFFING: Class Settlement in Miles Suit Wins Prelim. Approval
OONI INC: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

OSCAR HEALTH: Gross Law Firm Reminds of July 11 Deadline
PATTERN ENERGY: Extension of Remaining Briefing Deadlines Sought
PAYPAL INC: Wins Bid to Compel Arbitration; Evans Suit Dismissed
PEGASYSTEMS INC: Gross Law Firm Reminds of July 18 Deadline
PEGASYSTEMS INC: Klein Law Firm Reminds of July 18 Deadline

PENN MUTUAL: 11th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Cochran's Class Claims
PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY: Knapp Sues Over Wage and Hour Laws Violation
PERNOD RICARD: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
PETROLEUM SERVICE: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
PNC BANK: Polonowskis Seek to Certify Class of Consumers

PRECIGEN INC: Court Tosses Abadilla Fraud Suit With Leave to Amend
PREMIERE GLOBAL: Goodnow Sues Over Alleged Violation of ERISA
PRIME ASSOCIATION: Faces Rankins Wage-and-Hour Suit in Calif.
PRO-LITE INTERNATIONAL: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
PROFESSIONAL FINANCE: Rohl FDCPA Class Suit Remanded to State Court

PROXIMO SPIRITS INC: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
PURE RADIANCE: New Jersey Court Affirms Dismissal of Hoffman Suit
REX ENTERPRISES: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
RISE SERVICES: Does not Properly Pay Coordinators, Lloyd Says
ROOSEVELT FIELD: Sapuy Seeks to Certify Narrowed Class

RUSSIA: Class Action Mulled on Behalf of Ukrainian War Victims
RVSHARE LLC: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
SMITHEY IRONWARE: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
SNOWFLAKE DESIGNS: Davis Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
SPB HOSPITALITY: Penn Suit Alleges Unpaid Wages, Illegal Tip Credit

SPERO THERAPEUTICS: Robbins LLP Reminds of July 25 Deadline
SPERO THERAPEUTICS: Wolf Haldenstein Reminds of July 25 Deadline
ST. VINCENT HEALTH: Applegate Files Discrimination Class Action
STATE FARM: McClanahan Files Bid for Class Certification
SUGARLANDS DISTILLING: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

TEETIME DELIVERY: Piech Sues Over Delivery Drivers' Unpaid Wages
TENNECO INC: Frayer Files Suit for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
TEXAS: Ward, et al., Seek to Correct Class Certification Order
THINX INC: Women's Undergarments Contain PFAS, Class Suit Says
TOWNE HEALTHCARE: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Diallo Suit Alleges

TRAEGER PELLET: Yates, Jones Allowed Leave to File Class Cert
TRANSAMERICA LIFE: Loses Bid for Summary Judgment in Hegarty Suit
TRAVELEX INSURANCE: Court Modifies Class Certification Deadlines
TREK RETAIL: Parties Seek to Continue Class Cert. Deadlines
TRUIST BANK: Supreme Court Denies Certiorari Petition

TUTTLE PUBLISHING: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
UNION PACIFIC: Fleury's Bid to Remand Suit to Circuit Court Denied
UNITED STATES: Extension of Time to File Class Cert Bid Sought
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA: Sued Over Breach of Fiduciary Duties
UNIVERSITY OF TAMPA: Settles Tuition Class Action Suit for $3.4MM

UPSTART HOLDINGS: Lieff Cabraser Reminds of July 12 Deadline
VISA INC: Settles Conspiracy Class Action for CA$188 Million
WELLS FARGO: Faces Price Wage-and-Hour Suit in N.D. California
WOLF 1834: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
WYZE LABS: Faces Class Action Over Unsolicited Text Messages

XTO ENERGY: Hearing on Bid to Certify Class Set for Sept. 28
ZAMZAM LIVE: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Cujcuy Suit Alleges
ZERO LOUNGE: De Oca Awarded $187K in Damages and $22K in Interest
ZOOM VIDEO: Faces Class Action Over Unlawful Data Sharing
[*] Class Action Lawsuit Set to Determine Climate Change Damages


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ballantyne Strong Faces Personal Injury Lawsuits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: CECO Environmental Has 240 Pending Cases
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Columbus McKinnon Has $7.8MM Liability at March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Constellation Energy Has $81MM Estimated Liability
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Enovis Reports $2.5MM Asbestos-Related Costs

ASBESTOS UPDATE: ESAB Corp. Faces Personal Injury Lawsuits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Kaanapali Land Defends Personal Injury Cases
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Metropolitan Life Receives 721 New Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: MRC Global Defends 1,140 Claims as of March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Park-Ohio Defends 99 Personal Injury Cases

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pfizer Inc. Has Numerous Pending Exposure Cases
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Resolute Forest Faces Several Exposure Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Scotts Miracle-Gro Faces Product Liability Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Univar Solutions Has 235 Cases as of March 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Williams Industrial Defends Personal injury Suit

NORDIC AVIATION: Azorra Buys 37 Aircraft as NAC Exits Chapter 11


                            *********

A&E TELEVISION: Alabama Court Tosses Byrdsong Suit With Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GABRIEL BYRDSONG, et al., Plaintiffs v. A&E TELEVISION
NETWORKS, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 4:21-cv-607-CLM (N.D.
Ala.), Judge Corey L. Maze of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama, Middle Division, grants the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint.

I. Introduction

The Plaintiffs are inmates at Etowah County Detention Center who
were depicted in the sixth season of the reality television show
"60 Days In." They have sued Defendants A&E and Broadleaf
Productions LLC. The Defendants ask the court to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.

II. Background

In June 2019, the Defendants filmed the sixth season of an
undercover reality television show called "60 Days In" in the
Etowah County Detention Center. To produce the show, they placed
undercover actors inside the jail who posed as inmates. The actors
obtained personal information from the inmates and had personal
interactions with the inmates. The Defendants included the
information and interactions in the reality television series. Only
some Plaintiffs who were depicted in the show signed release forms.
Of those who signed the release forms, the parties disagree about
whether the Defendants legally obtained the forms.

A&E aired the sixth season from January 2020 to April 2020. The
Defendants paid no inmate for appearing in the show.

III. Analysis

In the Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs present three
counts: (Count I) Defamation; (Count II) Unjust Enrichment; and
(Count III) Fraudulent Suppression. The Plaintiffs also included
sections titled "Rule 23 - Class Action Notice" and "Class
Representatives Noticed and Class Member Notice Reservation,"
asking the court to certify the action as a class action.

First, Judge Maze addresses the merits of the Plaintiffs' claims.
Then he addresses their request for the Court to certify the action
as a class action.

A. The Merits of the Claims

Though the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint still has some
deficiencies -- i.e., it contains "conclusory, vague, and
immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of
action" -- Judge Maze finds that it provides the Defendants with
"adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon
which each claim rests." So he addresses the merits of the
Plaintiffs' claims.

B. Count I: Defamation

In its previous opinion, the Court instructed the Plaintiffs to
identify the elements of the claim, then plead specific facts to
support the elements. The Plaintiffs failed to do so -- as
highlighted by the fact that they again failed to allege any
statements that the Defendants made about them. In fact, many
paragraphs within Count I are unrelated to defamation. Those that
are defamation related only contain conclusory or vague
statements.

In short, Judge Maze holds that the Plaintiffs only provided vague,
conclusory statements, not facts that would prove a defamation
claim. They did so after the court walked them through how to plead
a viable claim. So he dismisses this claim with prejudice.

C. Count II: Unjust Enrichment

In Count II, the Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants were unjustly
enriched at their expense. "To prevail on a claim of unjust
enrichment, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant knowingly
accepted and retained a benefit, (2) provided by another, (3) who
has a reasonable expectation of compensation."

Though the Plaintiffs may think they should get profits from the
show, Judge Maze finds that they do not plead any facts to show
that they had a reasonable expectation of compensation as required
to plead an unjust enrichment claim. In fact, the Plaintiffs admit
that "no profit-sharing or like proposal was made to them." Because
the Plaintiffs do not plead facts that would prove they had a
reasonable expectation of payment for appearing on the show, Judge
Maze dismisses Count II with prejudice.

D. Count III: Fraudulent Suppression

In Count III, the Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants engaged in
fraudulent suppression when they obtained releases from some
Plaintiffs by presenting the show as a documentary but withheld
that A&E was the associated broadcasting company. To state a claim
for fraudulent suppression, the Plaintiffs must plead: "(1) that
the Defendants had a duty to disclose the existing material fact;
(2) that the Defendants suppressed this material fact; (3) that the
Defendant's suppression of this fact induced the Plaintiffs to act
or to refrain from acting; and (4) that the Plaintiffs suffered
actual damage as a proximate result."

Judge Maze explains that under Alabama law, a "person who signs a
contract is on notice of the terms therein and is bound thereby
even if he or she fails to read the document." So the Plaintiffs
who signed releases were, or should have been, aware that the show
was for "entertainment purposes" and could be presented in "all
media." None of the remaining Plaintiffs pleaded that he lacked
capacity to read, comprehend, and contractually bind himself.
Because the terms of the release unambiguously state that the show
is for entertainment purposes and covers all media outlets, the
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for fraudulent suppression. Judge
Maze dismisses this claim with prejudice.

E. The Class Action Notice

As Judge Maze explained, the Plaintiffs have pleaded no viable
claims. So if the Plaintiffs meant for the section of their
complaint titled "Class Representatives Noticed and Class Member
Notice Reservation" to be construed as a motion to certify the case
as a class action, he denies this motion as moot.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons he stated, Judge Maze grants the Defendants' motion
to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. Because the
Court previously gave the Plaintiffs the chance to cure their
pleading deficiencies, he dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims with
prejudice.

The Court will enter a separate order that carries out this
ruling.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mwkjr6ba from Leagle.com.


AETNA INC: Pennsylvania Judge Approves ERISA Class Action Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jakob Emerson, writing for Becker's Payer Issues, reports that a
federal judge in Pennsylvania approved a class-action lawsuit
against Aetna on May 25 for allegedly violating the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act by forcing disability benefits
recipients to return their personal injury payments.

Aetna had argued that certain potential class members should be
excluded because their health plans were sponsored by different
companies, but the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania certified the class for 48 people because the plan
language was similar enough between them all.

The plaintiff who filed for class status had originally received
over $50,000 in long-term disability benefits from her
Aetna-sponsored group plan after she was temporarily disabled in a
car accident in 2015. The plaintiff then sued the other actor in
the accident and won a monetary settlement. In a 2019 lawsuit, the
plaintiff claims Aetna sought reimbursement for the disability
benefits, which she negotiated down to $30,000. The plaintiff sued
under the grounds that the group plan's language did not allow
Aetna to reclaim the disability payments.

The plaintiff said the class action is needed "because Aetna
engaged in a common course of conduct by seeking reimbursement from
individuals" with similar plans. [GN]

AFTERMATH SERVICES: Torigian Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Aftermath Services
LLC, et al. The case is styled as Brandon M. Torigian, on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Aftermath Services LLC, Does 1-20,
Inclusive, Case No. 34-2022-00320893-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Sacramento Cty., June 1, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited."

Aftermath Services -- http://www.aftermath.com/-- a ServiceMaster
company, performs crime scene clean up, homicide cleanup, suicide
cleanup, hoarding cleanup, unattended death cleanup, infectious
disease disinfection, and other trauma cleanup and specialty
biohazard cleaning services such as hoarding and tear gas
cleanup.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jessica L. Campbell, Esq.
          AEGIS LAW FIRM
          9811 Irvine Center Dr., Ste. 100
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Phone: 949-379-6250



ALASKA AIRLINES: Averts Pilots' Military Bias Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reports that a Washington federal court handed Alaska
Airlines an early win May 31 in a class action alleging that the
airline illegally denied accrued vacation or sick time to pilots on
military assignments, with an Evergreen State judge ruling that the
pilots didn't show the airline flouted federal law. [GN]


ALLSTATE INSURANCE: Question for Appeal Certified in Revival Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled REVIVAL CHIROPRACTIC LLC, on behalf of
Jazmine Padin, on behalf of Natalie Rivera,
Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, Case No. 21-10559 (11th
Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
certifies this question to the Supreme Court of Florida:

     When a personal injury protection insurance policy provides
     notice that it will limit payment pursuant to the statutory
     schedule of maximum charges, may an insurer pay 80% of the
     charge submitted, even when the charge submitted is less
     than 80% of the statutory schedule of maximum charges?

The putative class action appeal turns on an important question
about Florida's personal injury protection statute. Florida law
requires an automotive insurance policy to pay 80% of all
"reasonable expenses" for medical services, Fla. Stat. Section
627.736(1)(a). If the insurer provides proper notice, it may limit
payment to 80% of a schedule of maximum charges provided in the
statute. The statute also provides that, if "a provider submits a
charge for an amount less than the amount allowed under [the
schedule of charges], the insurer may pay the amount of the charge
submitted."

The dispositive question in this appeal is whether an insurer that
has given notice that it will limit payments according to the
statutory schedule of maximum charges may nonetheless pay 80% of
the charge submitted as a reasonable expense. This question
allegedly affects thousands of Florida insurance policies. Two
Florida intermediate appellate courts have answered it in the
negative, but the Supreme Court of Florida recently issued an
opinion that calls their answer into substantial doubt. The upshot
is that there are presently scores of lawsuits pending in the
Florida state courts on this question, and they have led to
different results.

Both parties in this appeal moved the Eleventh Circuit to certify
this question to the Supreme Court of Florida as the ultimate
expositor of Florida law.

Background

Allstate issued two separate auto insurance policies to Natalie
Rivera and Jazmine Padin. In those policies, it gave notice that it
would limit payments according to the statutory schedule in Section
627.736(5)(a)1.

Padin and Rivera were both involved in car accidents, and they
sought treatment from Revival. They also assigned to Revival any
rights and benefits that they had under their respective policies.

After rendering services to these insureds, Revival submitted a
charge of $100. The services corresponded to a maximum charge of
$149.92 under the statutory schedule. So 80% of the maximum charge
under the schedule was $119.94, which was higher than the submitted
charge. Because the charge of $100 was less than $119.94, the
statute expressly allowed Allstate to pay the amount billed.
Instead of paying the scheduled amount or amount billed, Allstate
chose to pay 80% of the amount billed--$80.

Revival also submitted a charge of $75 for a service corresponding
to a maximum charge of $81.70 under the schedule. Again, instead of
paying 80% of the maximum charge under the schedule ($65.36) or the
amount billed ($75), Allstate paid 80% of the amount billed ($60).

Neither Padin nor Rivera paid the remaining 20% of the charges
submitted to Allstate.

Revival filed a putative class action against Allstate in Florida
state court, seeking a judgment declaring that Allstate violated
Florida law by paying only 80% of the charges submitted where the
charges submitted were for less than the amounts allowed under
Section 627.736(5)(a)1.

Allstate removed the case to the Middle District of Florida, and
both parties moved for summary judgment. In its motion, Allstate
argued that it complied with its own policies by paying 80% of the
amounts billed, and that those policies conformed to the statute.
It asserted that it was not obligated to pay the full amount billed
under the statute.

For its part, Revival argued that Section 627.736(5)(a)1 provides a
distinct method for insurers to satisfy the 80% payment requirement
by limiting payments according to the statutory schedule. And it
argued that, because Allstate provided notice of its intent to use
that schedule, it "must adhere to that payment methodology." It
further argued that, when a provider submits a charge that is less
than the amount allowed under the schedule, an insurer using the
schedule has only two options: to pay 80% of the schedule or to pay
the total amount billed. So, Revival argued, Allstate's policies
conflicted with Florida law because they allowed it to pay only 80%
of the amount billed

The district court granted summary judgment to Revival and denied
it to Allstate. It agreed with Revival that, "when the Schedule is
elected through proper notice and a provider submits a Lesser
Charge, the PIP statute only provides the insurer with two options
for payment." That is, it "may pay 80% of the amount allowed under
the Schedule, or if it is less, the full amount of the charge
submitted."

Allstate appealed. Both parties later moved to certify the
substantive question interpreting the statute to the Supreme Court
of Florida.

Discussion

The Eleventh Circuit notes that it faces a situation where there
are no clear controlling precedents from the Supreme Court of
Florida on a dispositive issue of Florida law. Two Florida
appellate courts have held that, when an insurer gives notice that
it will reimburse according to the scheduled rates, it must either
pay 80% of the applicable fee schedule or 100% of the bill. Hands
On Chiropractic PL a/a/o Justin 1 Revival cross-appealed the denial
of its motion for class certification.

The Eleventh Circuit states that it will address that procedural
issue, if necessary, after the Supreme Court of Florida answers the
dispositive substantive question of whether Allstate's payments
were lawful (Wick v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 327 So.3d 439, 441-44
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021); Geico Indem. Co. v. Muransky
Chiropractic P.A., 323 So.3d 742, 744 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)).
That is, these courts have held that the statute creates a floor
that an insurance company cannot go below: the lower of 80% of the
schedule or 100% of the charge. But a recent decision from the
Supreme Court of Florida calls those authorities into question; it
reasons that the statute creates a ceiling, not a floor, on an
insurer's obligations.

The Eleventh Circuit begins with the Florida intermediate appellate
courts. In Geico Indemnity Co. v. Muransky Chiropractic P.A., as
here, a provider billed an insurer for an amount less than 80% of
the schedule of maximum charges, but the insurer paid only 80% of
the amount billed. The Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected the
insurer's argument that Section 627.736 mandates 20% coinsurance
for all charges billed. It instead held that, "if the billed
amounts are less than 80% of the fee schedule, the insurer may pay
the billed amounts in full or pay the 80% reimbursement rate of
maximum charges." The Eleventh Circuit notes that, in reaching this
conclusion, the court cited favorably to the district court's
decision in this case.

The Fifth District Court of Appeal held similarly in Hands on
Chiropractic PL a/a/o Justin Wick v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. Again, the
insurer in that case paid only 80% of the amount billed, even
though it had chosen to limit reimbursements according to the
scheduled rates. The court held that this payment violated the
statute. It explained that, when an insurer chooses to reimburse
according to the scheduled rates, it must either pay the amount
allowed based on the applicable fee schedule or, if the billed
amount is less than the amount allowed, it is to be paid in full.
The statute does not permit the insurer to then discount that
billed amount further.

If it was limited to these precedents from the Fourth and Fifth
District Courts of Appeal, Florida law would not be in substantial
doubt, the Eleventh Circuit points out. But the Supreme Court of
Florida recently undermined--but did not directly repudiate--their
reasoning in MRI Associates of Tampa, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 334 So.3d 577 (Fla. 2021). There, the
Supreme Court of Florida held that an insurer could simultaneously
use the "reasonable charge" method for calculating reimbursements
and also elect the "schedule of maximum charges" limitation.

As in this case, the insurance policy in MRI Associates said that
the insurer would limit payment to 80% of a reasonable charge, but
in no event would it pay more than 80% of the "schedule of maximum
charges." The Supreme Court of Florida held that the insurer's
policy conformed to Section 627.736. Put differently, the Supreme
Court of Florida explained that the schedule "establishes a ceiling
but not a floor."

As of this writing, none of Florida's intermediate appellate courts
have conclusively addressed the tension between MRI Associates and
Muransky/Wick, the Eleventh Circuit notes. The Third District Court
of Appeal has noted the possibility that MRI Associates abrogated
the Fifth District Court of Appeal's precedent. But the Fifth
District Court of Appeal has continued following its holding from
Wick without reference to MRI Associates.

For their part, state trial courts have reached different
conclusions about the issue with some following the on-point
opinions in the intermediate appellate courts and others following
the reasoning of MRI Associates, the Eleventh Circuit explains.

Conclusion

Considering this substantial uncertainty, principles of federalism
and comity counsel it not to attempt to divine the answer to this
challenging question itself, the Eleventh Circuit opines, citing In
re Cassell, 688 F.3d 1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the
Eleventh Circuit certifies the following question to the Supreme
Court of Florida:

     When a personal injury protection insurance policy provides
     notice that it will limit payment pursuant to the statutory
     schedule of maximum charges, may an insurer pay 80% of the
     charge submitted, even when the charge submitted is less
     than 80% of the statutory schedule of maximum charges?

Of course, the Eleventh Circuit points out, statement of the
question certified does not "limit the inquiry" of the Supreme
Court of Florida or restrict its consideration of the issues that
it perceives are raised by the record certified in this case. The
entire record on appeal in this case, including copies of the
parties' briefs, is transmitted along with this certification.

Question certified.

A full-text copy of the Court's Certification dated June 2, 2022,
is available at https://tinyurl.com/246evvpw from Leagle.com.


AMAZON.COM INC: Klein Law Firm Reminds of July 5 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------
The Klein Law Firm on May 31 disclosed that a class action
complaint has been filed on behalf of shareholders of Amazon.com,
Inc. (NASDAQ: AMZN) alleging that the Company violated federal
securities laws.

Class Period: February 1, 2019 to April 5, 2022
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: July 5, 2022
No obligation or cost to you.

Learn more about your recoverable losses in AMZN:
https://www.kleinstocklaw.com/pslra-1/amazon-com-inc-loss-submission-form?id=27815&from=4

Amazon.com, Inc. NEWS - AMZN NEWS

CLASS ACTION CASE DETAILS: The filed complaint alleges that
Amazon.com, Inc. made materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Amazon engaged in
anticompetitive conduct in its private-label business practices,
including giving Amazon products preference over those of its
competitors and using third-party sellers' non-public data to
compete with them; (ii) the foregoing exposed Amazon to a
heightened risk of regulatory scrutiny and/or enforcement actions;
(iii) Amazon's revenues derived from its private-label business
were in part the product of impermissible conduct and thus
unsustainable; and (iv) as a result, the defendants' public
statements throughout the class period were materially false and/or
misleading.

WHAT THIS MEANS TO YOU AS A SHAREHOLDER: If you have suffered a
loss in Amazon you have until July 5, 2022 to petition the court
for lead plaintiff status. Your ability to share in any recovery
doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

NO COST TO YOU: If you purchased Amazon securities during the
relevant period, you may be entitled to compensation without
payment of any out-of-pocket fees.

HOW TO PROTECT YOUR FINANCIAL INTERESTS: For additional information
about the AMZN lawsuit, please contact J. Klein, Esq. by telephone
at 212-616-4899 or click this link:
https://www.kleinstocklaw.com/pslra-1/amazon-com-inc-loss-submission-form?id=27815&from=4.

ABOUT KLEIN LAW FIRM
J. Klein, Esq. represents investors and participates in securities
litigations involving financial fraud throughout the nation. The
Klein Law Firm is a boutique litigation firm with experience in a
wide range of areas including securities law, corporate finance and
commercial litigation. Since 2011, our experienced attorneys have
achieved superior results for our clients with a personalized
focus. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar
outcomes.

CONTACT:
J. Klein, Esq.
Empire State Building
350 Fifth Avenue
59th Floor
New York, NY 10118
jk@kleinstocklaw.com
Telephone: (212) 616-4899
www.kleinstocklaw.com [GN]

AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Loses Bid to Stay Briefing in Hamilton Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAN HAMILTON, individually and on behalf of other
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 22-cv-00434-PAB (D. Colo.), Judge
Philip A. Brimmer of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado denies the Defendant's Motion to Stay Briefing on
Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class Action Pending Disposition of
its Motion to Dismiss and for Expedited Briefing Schedule.

On March 3, 2022, Defendant Amazon filed a motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's individual and class action complaint. On April 14, the
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Certify Class Action and a Motion for
Order Certifying a Determinative Question of Colorado Law to the
Colorado Supreme Court. It now moves to stay briefing on the
Plaintiff's class certification motion pending the resolution of
defendant's motion to dismiss. The Plaintiff opposes a stay of
briefing on his motion.

It is well established that a court has "broad discretion to stay
proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket."
However, the Tenth Circuit has cautioned that "the right to proceed
in court should not be denied except under the most extreme
circumstances," citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Chilcott
Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., 713 F.2d 1477, 1484 (10th Cir. 1983). Stays
of proceedings, discovery, or briefing are generally disfavored. A
stay may, however, be appropriate in certain circumstances.

In determining whether to grant or deny a stay, courts in the
district consider the following factors (the "String Cheese
Incident factors"): "(1) plaintiff's interests in proceeding
expeditiously with the civil action and the potential prejudice to
plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden on the defendants; (3) the
convenience to the court; (4) the interests of persons not parties
to the civil litigation; and (5) the public interest," citing
String Cheese Incident, LLC v. Stylus Shows, Inc., No.
05-cv-01934-LTB-PAC, 2006 WL 894955, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 30,
2006).

The Defendant argues briefing should be stayed because responding
to the Plaintiff's motion for class certification would cause a
substantial burden for it. Additionally, the Defendant argues the
Plaintiff is not prejudiced since the effect of his motion to
certify an issue to the Colorado Supreme Court would be to stay the
case. The Plaintiff responds that a stay of the briefing would
prejudice class members and that the case is not the type of case
that warrants a stay.

Weighing all the String Cheese factors and considering the
disfavored nature of stays, Judge Brimmer finds that a stay in the
case is not warranted. Regarding the first String Cheese Incident
factor, he says it weighs in favor of a stay of briefing given that
any prejudice to the Plaintiff is minimal and, in any event, his
own motion to certify a question to the Colorado Supreme Court
would involve a comparable delay. On the second factor, he finds
that it weighs against a stay of briefing because the Defendant
provides no reason why the briefing to the motion for class
certification is more onerous than the normal briefing on such a
motion.

On the third factor, Judge Brimmer finds that the Defendant
provides no other reason judicial economy would be served by
deciding the motion to dismiss before briefing the motion for class
certification. On the fourth factor, he finds that it weighs
against a stay of briefing. Neither party addresses the public
interest in a stay. He finds that the public interest is best
served by having both the motion to dismiss and the motion for
class certification briefed at the same time, which will be more
expeditious.

Accordingly, Judge Brimmer denies the Defendant's Motion to Stay.
The Defendant's response to the Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class
Action was due June 9, 2022.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4r3s2ny7 from Leagle.com.


ARQIT QUANTUM: Klein Law Firm Reminds of July 5 Deadline
--------------------------------------------------------
The Klein Law Firm on May 31 disclosed that a class action
complaint has been filed on behalf of shareholders of Arqit Quantum
Inc. f/k/a Centricus Acquisition Corp. (NASDAQ: ARQQ) alleging that
the Company violated federal securities laws.

This lawsuit is on behalf of: (i) all persons or entities who
purchased or otherwise acquired Arqit securities between September
7, 2021 and April 18, 2022, inclusive; and/or (ii) all holders of
Centricus securities as of the record date for the special meeting
of shareholders held on August 31, 2021 to consider approval of the
merger between Arqit and Centricus (the "Merger") and entitled to
vote on the Merger.
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: July 5, 2022
No obligation or cost to you.

Learn more about your recoverable losses in ARQQ:
https://www.kleinstocklaw.com/pslra-1/arqit-quantum-inc-f-k-a-centricus-acquisition-corp-loss-submission-form?id=27814&from=4

Arqit Quantum Inc. f/k/a Centricus Acquisition Corp. NEWS - ARQQ
NEWS

CLASS ACTION CASE DETAILS: The filed complaint alleges that Arqit
Quantum Inc. f/k/a Centricus Acquisition Corp. made materially
false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that:
(1) Arqit's proposed encryption technology would require widespread
adoption of new protocols and standards for telecommunications; (2)
British cybersecurity officials questioned the viability of Arqit's
proposed encryption technology in a meeting in 2020; (3) the
British government was not an Arqit customer but, rather, providing
grants to Arqit; (4) Arqit had little more than an early-stage
prototype of its encryption system at the time of the Merger; and
(5) as a result, Defendants' statements about its business,
operations, and prospects, were materially false and misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.

WHAT THIS MEANS TO YOU AS A SHAREHOLDER: If you have suffered a
loss in Arqit Quantum Inc. f/k/a Centricus Acquisition Corp. you
have until July 5, 2022 to petition the court for lead plaintiff
status. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require that
you serve as a lead plaintiff.

NO COST TO YOU: If you purchased Arqit Quantum Inc. f/k/a Centricus
Acquisition Corp. securities during the relevant period, you may be
entitled to compensation without payment of any out-of-pocket
fees.

HOW TO PROTECT YOUR FINANCIAL INTERESTS: For additional information
about the ARQQ lawsuit, please contact J. Klein, Esq. by telephone
at 212-616-4899 or click this link:
https://www.kleinstocklaw.com/pslra-1/arqit-quantum-inc-f-k-a-centricus-acquisition-corp-loss-submission-form?id=27814&from=4.

ABOUT KLEIN LAW FIRM
J. Klein, Esq. represents investors and participates in securities
litigations involving financial fraud throughout the nation. The
Klein Law Firm is a boutique litigation firm with experience in a
wide range of areas including securities law, corporate finance and
commercial litigation. Since 2011, our experienced attorneys have
achieved superior results for our clients with a personalized
focus. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar
outcomes.

CONTACT:
J. Klein, Esq.
Empire State Building
350 Fifth Avenue
59th Floor
New York, NY 10118
jk@kleinstocklaw.com
Telephone: (212) 616-4899
www.kleinstocklaw.com [GN]

ASSURANCE IQ: 9th Cir. Reverses Dismissal of Amended Javier Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FLORENTINO JAVIER, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v. ASSURANCE IQ,
LLC; ACTIVEPROSPECT INC., Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 21-16351
(9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reverses the district court's order granting the
Defendants-Appellees' motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.

Assurance is an insurance platform that owns and operates
Nationalfamily.com. On this website, users can request life
insurance quotes from Assurance and its insurance partners. To
operate this website, Assurance relies on a product created by
ActiveProspect called "TrustedForm." TrustedForm records user's
interactions with the website and creates a unique certificate for
each user certifying that the user agreed to be contacted.

In January 2019, Javier visited Nationalfamily.com. To request an
insurance quote, he answered a series of questions about his
demographic information and medical history. Unbeknownst to Javier,
TrustedForm captured in real time every second of his interaction
with Nationalfamily.com and created a video recording of that
interaction. After filling out the insurance quote questionnaire,
Javier viewed a screen that stated that clicking the "View My
Quote" button would constitute agreement to Assurance's Privacy
Policy. Javier clicked the "View My Quote" button.

Mr. Javier filed a class action complaint against Assurance and
ActiveProspect in the Northern District of California. He alleged
that Defendants violated Section 631(a) of the California Invasion
of Privacy Act ("CIPA"). The district court granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for failure to state
a claim without leave to amend. It held that Javier's claims were
defeated because he had retroactively consented to the conduct at
issue by agreeing to Assurance's privacy policy, and that
retroactive consent is valid under Section 631(a). The district
court did not reach any of the Defendants' other arguments.

The Ninth Circuit grants Javier's request for judicial notice. It
reviews de novo a district court's decision to grant a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Though
written in terms of wiretapping, Section 631(a) applies to Internet
communications. It makes liable anyone who "reads, or attempts to
read, or to learn the contents" of a communication "without the
consent of all parties to the communication." The district court
held that consent under Section 631(a) is valid even if it is given
after the communication has taken place.

The Ninth Circuit disagrees. It notes that when interpreting state
law, federal courts are bound by decisions of the state's highest
court. In the absence of such a decision, a federal court must
predict how the highest state court would decide the issue. The
Ninth Circuit must therefore predict whether the California Supreme
Court would interpret Section 631(a) to require prior consent.

The California Supreme Court has stated that another provision in
CIPA, Section 632, requires prior consent even though the text of
that section contains only the word "consent." It has also
emphasized that all CIPA provisions are to be interpreted in light
of the broad privacy-protecting statutory purposes of CIPA.

Based on these statements by the California Supreme Court, the
Ninth Circuit concludes that the California Supreme Court would
interpret Section 631(a) to require the prior consent of all
parties to a communication. Javier has sufficiently alleged that he
did not provide express prior consent to ActiveProspect's
wiretapping of his communications with Assurance. According to the
complaint, neither Assurance nor ActiveProspect asked for Javier's
consent prior to his filling out the insurance questionnaire
online, even though ActiveProspect was recording Javier's
information as he was providing it. Javier has therefore alleged
sufficient facts to plausibly state a claim that, under Section
631(a), his communications with Assurance were recorded by
ActiveProspect without his valid express prior consent.

The Ninth Circuit reverses the district court's dismissal of
Javier's Second Amended Complaint and remands for proceedings
accordingly. Because they were not reached by the district court,
it also does not reach the Defendants' other arguments, including
whether Javier impliedly consented to the data collection, whether
ActiveProspect is a third party under Section 631(a), and whether
the statute of limitations has run.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2z9hpsjt from Leagle.com.


ATLANTIC SPECIALTY: Judgment on Pleadings in PF Sunset Suit Upheld
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled PF SUNSET VIEW, LLC, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated d.b.a. Planet Fitness, PF
RIVERVIEW, LLC, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated d.b.a. Planet Fitness, PF SKIPPER, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated d.b.a. Planet Fitness, PF
WATER VIEW, LLC, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated d.b.a. Planet Fitness, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. ATLANTIC
SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, a New York corporation,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 21-11580 (11th Cir.), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirms the
district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings to the
Defendant-Appellee.

The appeal involves claims for property loss insurance coverage
stemming from gym closures caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The
question is whether (under Florida law) the COVID-19 related
business losses suffered by the Plaintiffs -- the owners and
operators of four Planet Fitness franchise locations in Florida --
constituted "direct physical loss of or damage to" insured property
under a commercial all-risk insurance policy issued by the
Defendant, Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company. The district court
held that it did not and granted judgment on the pleadings to the
insurance company. The franchisees appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit recently decided a case involving multiple
claims for COVID-19 losses under nearly identical insurance
contract provisions, concluding that direct physical loss or damage
to property requires a "tangible alteration of the insured
properties" (SA Palm Beach, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's
of London, 32 F.4th 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2022)). Because the
losses alleged here did not involve a tangible alteration of the
insured properties -- the franchisees' gym locations -- Atlantic
Specialty Insurance was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirms.

I. Background

The Plaintiffs are the franchisees of four Planet Fitness gym
locations in Florida. The Defendant, Atlantic Specialty Insurance
Company, issued separate -- but materially identical -- commercial
property insurance policies to the Plaintiffs (collectively, the
"Policy").

The Policy states that the insurance company "will pay for the
actual loss of Business Income you sustain due to the necessary
suspension of your 'Operations' during the 'Period of
Restoration,'" but only if the suspension is caused "by direct
physical loss of or damage to" covered property. Under the Policy,
the insurance company "will pay necessary Extra Expense you incur
during the 'Period of Restoration' and the Extended Period of
Indemnity that you would not have incurred if there had been no
direct physical loss or damage to" one of the covered properties.
Moreover, the insurance company "will pay for the actual loss of
Business Income you sustain and necessary Extra Expense caused by
action of civil authority that prohibits access to the described
premises due to direct physical loss of or damage to property,
other than at the described premises." Thus, for claims based on
business interruption, extra expense, or civil authority coverage,
the franchisees need to show "direct physical loss of or damage to
property."

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Florida state and county
officials signed orders effectively shuttering gyms for months
beginning in late March 2020. The franchisees filed claims with
Atlantic Specialty Insurance for business income losses and extra
expenses incurred because of the closure orders. The insurance
company denied their claims.

The franchisees then filed a putative class action complaint in
Florida state court alleging that the insurance company unlawfully
denied coverage because the presence of COVID-19 caused direct
physical loss of and/or damage to the covered premises by, among
other things, damaging the properties, denying access to the
properties, preventing customers from physically occupying the
properties, causing the properties to be physically uninhabitable
by customers, causing their functions to be nearly eliminated or
destroyed, and/or causing a suspension of business operations on
the premises.

The insurance company removed the case to federal district court
and moved for judgment on the pleadings. Because COVID-19 closures
did not cause a "distinct, demonstrable, physical alteration of the
property," the insurance company argued, the closures did not
result in a "direct physical loss" covered by the policy. The
franchisees responded that Florida law does not interpret "physical
loss" of property so narrowly and that the phrase includes more
than losses caused by actual harm to the structure of the covered
property. The district court agreed with the insurance company and
granted its motion for judgment on the pleadings. The franchisees
timely appealed.

II. Standard of Review

Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where there are no
material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law (Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d
1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014), quoting Cannon v. City of W. Palm
Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001)).

III. Discussion

For any of the Plaintiffs' insurance claims to be viable, they had
to stem from "direct physical loss of or damage to" covered
property. The dispositive question, therefore, is whether losses
from the suspension of business operations and increased cleaning
and sanitation costs constitute "direct physical loss of or damage
to" property under Florida law. The franchisees say that requiring
a direct, physical alteration of the property departs from the
plain meaning and context of that phrase. Their arguments are a
non-starter -- binding precedent mandates the franchisees show a
tangible alteration to the insured property and that losses
stemming from suspension of operations and extra expenses incurred
in response to COVID-19 closure orders do not count.

The Eleventh Circuit notes that its recent decision in SA Palm
Beach resolves this appeal. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit
addressed whether, under Florida law, "direct physical loss of or
damage to" property included losses stemming from the suspension of
business operations and extra costs incurred because of COVID-19.
Facing a dearth of Florida Supreme Court decisions on the meaning
of "direct physical loss of or damage to" property in the COVID-19
closure context, the Eleventh Circuit predicted the Florida Supreme
Court would adopt the majority position that "physical loss of or
damage to" requires some "tangible alteration of the insured
properties."

The Eleventh Circuit held that there is no coverage for loss of use
based on intangible and incorporeal harm to the property due to
COVID-19 and the closure orders that were issued by state and local
authorities even though the property was rendered temporarily
unsuitable for its intended use. The Eleventh Circuit also noted
that the "need to clean or disinfect" property to "get rid of
COVID-19 does not constitute direct physical loss or damage under
Florida law."

The losses alleged by the Plaintiffs here are functionally the same
as those alleged by the plaintiffs in SA Palm Beach -- losses from
the suspension of business operations under COVID-19 closure orders
and extra cleaning and sanitation costs, the Eleventh Circuit
states. But as discussed, the Eleventh Circuit previously held that
such losses are not "physical loss of or damage to" insured
property under Florida law.

The Eleventh Circuit points out that it is bound by its prior
decision. Accordingly, the insurance company properly denied the
Plaintiff's claims, and the district court did not err in holding
it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated June 2, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc3z2cn2 from Leagle.com.


AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE: Allowed to Seal Exhibits in MSP Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MSP Recovery Claims,
Series LLC v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Case No. 1:17-cv-23841
(), the Hon. Judge Patricia A. Seitz entered an order granting the
Defendants' amended motion to file under seal exhibits in support
of opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

The suit alleges violation of the Medicare Act.

Auto-Owners Insurance Group is a mutual insurance company that
provides life, home, car and business insurance. Their policies are
sold exclusively through local, independent insurance agents within
their 26 operating states.[CC]

AVANT ENTERPRISES: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Avant Enterprises,
Inc. The case is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Avant Enterprises, Inc.,
Case No. 1:22-cv-04543 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Avant Enterprises -- https://avantsports.com/ -- is the home of
brands like Aventon, 6KU & Populo.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


AXSOME THERAPEUTICS: Glancy Prongay Reminds of July 12 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") reminds investors of the
upcoming July 12, 2022 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion in
the class action filed on behalf of investors who purchased or
otherwise acquired Axsome Therapeutics, Inc. ("Axsome" or the
"Company") (NASDAQ: AXSM) securities between December 30, 2019 and
April 22, 2022, inclusive (the "Class Period").

If you suffered a loss on your Axsome investments or would like to
inquire about potentially pursuing claims to recover your loss
under the federal securities laws, you can submit your contact
information at www.glancylaw.com/cases/axsome-therapeutics-inc/.
You can also contact Charles H. Linehan, of GPM at 310-201-9150,
Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, or via email at
shareholders@glancylaw.com to learn more about your rights.

On November 5, 2020, Axsome released its third quarter 2020
results, disclosing that the Company's previous plan to submit a
New Drug Application ("NDA") for its migraine treatment AXS-07 in
the fourth quarter of 2020 had been postponed to the first quarter
of 2021 to "allow for inclusion of supplemental manufacturing
information to ensure a robust submission package."

On this news, Axsome's stock fell $5.22, or 7%, to close at $69.51
per share on November 5, 2020, thereby injuring investors.

Then, on April 25, 2022, Axsome disclosed that the Company had been
informed by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") that
chemistry, manufacturing, and control ("CMC") issues "identified
during the FDA's review of the Company's [NDA] for its AXS-07
product [. . .] are unresolved."

On this news, Axsome's stock fell $8.60, or 22%, to close at $30.50
per share on April 25, 2022, thereby injuring investors further.

Then, on May 2, 2022, Axsome announced that it received a Complete
Response Letter from the FDA, citing "the need for additional CMC
date pertaining to the drug product and manufacturing process."

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to investors
that: (1) Axsome's CMC practices were deficient with respect to
AXS-07 and its manufacturing process; (2) as a result, Axsome was
unlikely to submit the AXS-07 NDA on its initially represented
timeline; (3) the foregoing CMC issues remained unresolved at the
time that the FDA reviewed the AXS-07 NDA; (4) accordingly, the FDA
was unlikely to approve the AXS-07 NDA; (5) as a result of all the
foregoing, Axsome had overstated AXS-07's regulatory and commercial
prospects; and (6) as a result, Defendants' positive statements
about the Company's business, operations, and prospects were
materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all
relevant times.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Axsome securities during the
Class Period, you may move the Court no later than July 12, 2022 to
request appointment as lead plaintiff in this putative class action
lawsuit. To be a member of the class action you need not take any
action at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice or take
no action and remain an absent member of the class action. If you
wish to learn more about this class action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests
with respect to the pending class action lawsuit, please contact
Charles Linehan, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park East, Suite
2100, Los Angeles, California 90067 at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at
888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our
website at www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email please
include your mailing address, telephone number and number of shares
purchased.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules.

Contacts
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Los Angeles
Charles Linehan, 310-201-9150 or 888-773-9224
shareholders@glancylaw.com
www.glancylaw.com [GN]

B.O.S. COMPANY: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against B.O.S. Company, LLC.
The case is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. B.O.S. Company, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-04541 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

B.O.S. Company, LLC is located in Golden Valley, Minnesota and is
part of the Miscellaneous Nondurable Goods Merchant Wholesalers
Industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


BANK OF AMERICA: Al-Ramahi Sues Over Fraudulent Money Transfer App
------------------------------------------------------------------
MOHAMMAD AL-RAMAHI, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Defendant,
Case No. 5:22-cv-03118-NC (N.D. Cal., May 27, 2022) is a class
action brought against the Defendant for breach of contract and
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and for
violation of the California Unfair Competition Law and the Consumer
Legal Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the suit is brought on behalf of the
Plaintiff and thousands of similarly situated customers of BofA who
have signed up for a person to person money transfer service, such
as Venmo or Zelle, and who have been the victim of fraud on the
Transfer App; have incurred losses due to that fraud and have not
been reimbursed by BofA; and were entitled by federal regulations,
the marketing representations of BofA, and by the BofA's contract
promises to a full reimbursement of losses caused by fraud on the
Transfer App.

The complaint asserts that BofA prominently touts Zelle to its
accountholders as a secure, free, and convenient way to make money
transfers. However, it misrepresents and omits a key fact about the
service that is unknown to accountholders: that there is virtually
no recourse for consumers to recoup losses due to fraud. Indeed,
unlike virtually every other payment method commonly used by
American consumers -- debit cards, credit cards, and checks --
there is no protection for accountholders who are victims of fraud,
and virtually no recourse for accountholders attempting to recoup
losses due to fraud, says the suit.

The Plaintiff and the Class members have been allegedly injured by
signing up for and using the Zelle service. The Plaintiff brings
this action on behalf of himself, the putative Class, and the
general public, seeking actual damages, punitive damages,
restitution, and an injunction on behalf of the general public to
prevent BofA and Zelle from continuing to engage in its illegal
practices.

Bank of America, N.A. is a national bank with its principal place
of business located in Charlotte, North Carolina and is
incorporated in Delaware. Among other services, BofA operates
banking centers and conducts business throughout the State of
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          L. Timothy Fisher, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          1990 North California Boulevard, Suite 940
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 300-4455
          Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
          E-mail: ltfisher@bursor.com

               - and -

          Philip L. Fraietta, Esq.
          Julian C. Diamond, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Ave, Third Floor
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: pfraietta@bursor.com
                  jdiamond@bursor.com

BASF CATALYSTS: Claim Distributions Report in Williams Suit OK'd
----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Andre M. Espinosa of the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey accepts and approves the Special
Master's Claim Distributions Report and Recommendation in the
lawsuit entitled KIMBERLEE WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs v. BASF
CATALYSTS LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 11-cv-01754-BRM-AME
(D.N.J.).

The matter has come before the Special Master in the lawsuit upon
Class Counsel's motion requesting entry of a Distribution
Recommendation pursuant to Section 9.5.1 of the Plan of
Distribution on the basis that the Claims processes and notices
under the Plan have been completed.

The appointed Settlement Administrator, Verus LLC, has completed
the Plan's claim administration processes, procedures,
adjudications and notifications, and has submitted to the Special
Master schedules and statistical summaries of approved and
disapproved claims regarding each compensation Part of the Plan as
required under Section 9.4.2.1 of the Plan, along with a
Declaration of Mark Eveland, Verus' Chief Executive Officer, in
support of the Report and Recommendation attesting to: (1) the
Settlement Fund's fulfillment and completion of the Plan's claims
intake, review, adjudication, audit and notice processes and
procedures; and (2) the content and accuracy of the claims
administration statistical summaries' and schedules of allowed and
disallowed claims for each of the Plan's three compensation Parts.

The Special Master has independently reviewed the statistical
summaries and has further received Class Counsel's advice that
after their review of the statistical summaries they have no issue
concerning either their accuracy or conformity to the Plan's
requirements, Magistrate Judge Espinosa accepts, approves, and
adopts the Settlement Fund Claim summaries as the Settlement
Trustee's report on the results of the Plan's Claim
Administration.

In fulfillment of the Plan's requirement that the summaries be made
available to the public by the Settlement Trustee, a copy of the
statistical summaries has been posted on the Settlement Website and
is included as part of the Distribution Recommendation Appendix
("DRA") accompanying this Report and Recommendation.

Having also independently reviewed the schedules of allowed claim
distribution awards and of disallowed claims prepared by Verus
relating to the Plan's three compensation Parts ("Distribution
Recommendation Schedules), true and correct copies of which are
included in the accompanying DRA, and having additionally received
Class Counsel's advice that after their reviewing the Distribution
Recommendation Schedules they have no issue concerning their
accuracy or conformity to the Plan's requirements, Magistrate Judge
Espinosa has approved and adopted the Distribution Recommendation
Schedules as: (1) the formal adjudications and claim awards of all
Claims received by the Settlement Fund; and (2) as the Settlement
Trustee's and Special Master's Distribution Recommendations.

Magistrate Judge Espinosa, therefore, recommends to the District
Court that:

   1. The District Court accepts and approves the Distribution
      Recommendations in the annexed DRA as the determinations
      and adjudications of the Settlement Class Members' Claims
      to the Settlement Fund under the Plan;

   2. That the District Court authorizes the Settlement Trustee
      and Claims Adminstrator to forthwith begin making payments
      and distributions from the Settlement Fund under the Plan
      to the Settlement Class Member Claimants listed in the
      Distribution Recommendations as being awarded compensation
      under one or more of the Plan's Parts, subject to the Lien
      Clearance requirements of the Plan and Settlement
      Agreement;

   3. That the District Court authorizes the Settlement Trustee
      and Claims Administrator to forthwith pay the Class
      Representatives the Class Representative Service awards
      which the Court has previously approved and make payment of
      remaining costs and expenses of the claims administration;
      and

   4. That the District Court authorizes the Settlement Trustee
      and Claims Administrator to take any and all further steps
      necessary to effectuate the orderly distribution of the
      Settlement Fund in accordance with the Plan.

Order

The Court notes that the matter has been opened to it upon the
Claim Distributions Report and Recommendation of the Honorable
Marina Corodemus, J.S.C. (Retired), whom the Court appointed as
Special Master and Settlement Trustee in this matter. No opposition
has been filed.

The Court rules that the Claim Distributions Report and
Recommendation of the Special Master is accepted, approved and
entered as the order of the Court, with further direction to the
Settlement Trustee and Settlement Administrator to forthwith carry
out the provisions of this Order and the Plan.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated June 2, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc7bbksx from Leagle.com.


BEAM SUNTORY: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Beam Suntory Inc. The
case is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Beam Suntory Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-04521 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Beam Suntory Inc. The
case is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Beam Suntory Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-04521 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Beam Suntory, Inc. -- https://www.beamsuntory.com/en -- is an
American-founded, Japanese multinational company that produces
alcoholic beverages.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Beam Suntory, Inc. -- https://www.beamsuntory.com/en -- is an
American-founded, Japanese multinational company that produces
alcoholic beverages.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


BEYOND MEAT: Roberts Balks at Products' Mislabeled Protein Content
------------------------------------------------------------------
ANGELIQUE ROBERTS, HANNAH OFFUTT, DYLAN RUSHING, ORLANDRA
HAWTHORNE, NISHA ALBERT, ADAM SORKIN, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. BEYOND MEAT, INC.
Defendant, Case No. 1:22-cv-02861 (N.D. Ill., May 31, 2022) is a
civil class action lawsuit brought by Plaintiffs on behalf of all
consumers who purchased Defendant's Beyond Meat products for
personal or household use who were mislead into believing that they
stand to benefit from the products' stated protein content.

The complaint alleges that Beyond Meat Products' labels, and
Defendant's marketing claims, are false and misleading because
Defendant: (1) miscalculates and overstates the products' protein
content, which is measured in grams per serving determined by
nitrogen testing; (2) miscalculates and overstates the quality of
the protein found in its products, which is represented as a
percentage of daily value and calculated by the Protein
Digestibility Amino Acid Corrected Score method; and (3) misleads
consumers into believing that the products provide equivalent
nutritional benefits to that found in traditional meat-based
products.

The Plaintiffs and members of the Proposed Class were injured by
Defendants false, fraudulent, unfair, deceptive, and misleading
practices, says the suit.

Beyond Meat, Inc. is a plant-based meat substitutes company that
was founded in 2009 and launched its initial product line in
2012.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
          Russell Busch, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 2100
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (866) 252-0878
          E-mail: gklinger@milberg.com
                  rbusch@milberg.com

               - and -

          Nick Suciu, III, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          6905 Telegraph Rd., Suite 115
          Bloomfield Hills, MI 48301
          Telephone: (313) 303-3472
          Facsimile: (865) 522-0049
          E-mail: nsuciu@milberg.com

               - and -

          Daniel K. Bryson, Esq.
          J. Hunter Bryson, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN PLLC
          900 W. Morgan Street
          Raleigh, NC, 27603
          Telephone: (919) 600-5000
          Facsimile: (919) 600-5035
          E-mail: dbryson@milberg.com
                  hbryson@milberg.com

BIO-REFERENCE LABORATORIES: Bid to Remand Lopez Wage Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California denies the Plaintiff's motion to
remand the case, Denise Lopez, Plaintiff v. Bio-Reference
Laboratories, Inc., et al., Defendants, Case No.
2:21-cv-02063-KJM-DB (E.D. Cal.).

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Lopez brought the putative wage-and-hour class action
against her employers, Defendants Bio-Reference Laboratories, Inc.
and Opko Health, Inc., in Amador County Superior Court. The
Defendants timely removed to the Court, invoking the Court's
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The
Plaintiff has moved to remand, arguing the Defendants failed to
establish the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.

II. Background

The Plaintiff has worked as a phlebotomist for defendants since in
or about 2016. She sued the Defendants in 2021, alleging unfair
business practices and eight violations of the California Labor
Code: (1) failure to pay overtime wages in violation of sections
510 and 1198; (2) failure to provide meal period premiums in
violation of sections 226.7 and 512(a); (3) failure to provide rest
break premiums in violation of section 226.7; (4) failure to pay
minimum wage in violation of sections 1194, 1197, and 1197.1; (5)
failure to timely pay wages upon termination in violation of
sections 201 to 203; (6) failure to timely pay wages during
employment in violation of sections 204 and 210; (7) failure to
provide complete itemized wage statements in violation of section
226(a); and (8) failure to reimburse business expenses in violation
of sections 2800 and 2802.

The Plaintiff seeks to represent a class comprising current and
former non-exempt California employees who worked for the
Defendants within the last four years.

As noted, the Defendants timely removed to the Court, invoking the
Court's jurisdiction under CAFA. The Plaintiff moved to remand,
arguing the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the
Defendants have not shown that more than $5 million is in
controversy. The Court received full briefing and submitted the
matter without oral argument.

III. Discussion

The core dispute is whether the Defendants have sufficiently
supported the assumptions undergirding their amount-in-controversy
calculation. The Defendants calculate the amount in controversy in
three steps. First, Defendant BioReference's Senior Director of
Human Resources Operations and Payroll, Jacqueline DiBartolo,
attests to the size of the putative class and the class members'
average hourly wage, among other relevant metrics. To generate
these numbers, Ms. DiBartolo reviewed personnel files, payroll
data, and time records. Second, the Defendants look to key language
in the Plaintiff's complaint and cases analyzing analogous language
to determine an appropriate violation rate to use in estimating the
amount in controversy. Third, combining Ms. DiBartolo's data and
the Defendants' inferred violation rates, the Defendants calculate
the amount in controversy for each of the Plaintiff's claims.

The Plaintiff takes issue with the assumptions the Defendants draw
from Ms. DiBartolo's data and with the Defendants' assumed
violation rates. For several claims, the Plaintiff provides
alternative, allegedly more reasonable violation rates.

A. Meal & Rest Breaks

The Defendants calculate that the Plaintiff's claims for missed
meal and rest breaks put $3,013,253.32 in controversy. They arrive
at this figure by multiplying three numbers together: 32,767
workweeks completed by class members, 4 missed breaks per week, and
the average hourly wage of $22.99 as the penalty for each missed
break. Judge Mueller adopts this estimate.

B. Overtime & Minimum Wage

The Defendants calculate that the Plaintiff's overtime claim puts
$848,867.88 in controversy by multiplying three numbers together:
The number of workweeks completed by employees working at least 40
hours per week (24,612), one unpaid hour per week, and 150% of
class members' average hourly wage ($34.49). The Defendants value
the Plaintiff's minimum wage claim at $197,326.80 by multiplying
three numbers together: The number of workweeks completed by
employees working less than 40 hours per week (8,154), one unpaid
hour per week, and the average minimum wage during the limitations
period ($12.10); the Defendants then double the result because
double damages are available for minimum wage violations. Judge
Mueller adopts both estimates.

C. Waiting Time & Wage Statement Penalties

The Defendants generate their more conservative estimate for
waiting time penalties -- $795,637.92 -- by multiplying together
four numbers: The number of class members terminated during the
limitations period (206), 30 days of penalties for each terminated
class member, the average number of hours worked per day by these
employees (5.6), and the average hourly wage for all class members
($22.99). The total minimum amount in controversy of the claims is
$5,269,735.92.

Without needing to reach the Plaintiff's remaining claims for
attorneys' fees, unreimbursed business expenses, and failure to
timely pay wages during employment, Judge Mueller finds that the
Defendant has shown it is more likely than not that more than $5
million dollars is in controversy.

IV. Conclusion

Judge Mueller finds that the Defendants have established it is more
likely that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. She
therefore denies the Plaintiff's motion. The Order resolves ECF No.
5.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2p97bzfh from Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Ngo BELO Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PHIEU NGO v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., ET
AL., Civil Action No. 17-4464-WBV-JVM (E.D. La.), Judge Wendy B.
Vitter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana grants the Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by
Defendants BP Exploration & Production, Inc., BP America Production
Company, and BP p.l.c.

I. Background

The case arises from Phieu Ngo's alleged exposure to harmful
chemicals following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill that occurred
on April 20, 2010. On Jan. 11, 2013, U.S. District Judge Carl J.
Barbier, who presided over the multidistrict litigation arising out
of the Deepwater Horizon incident, approved the Deepwater Horizon
Medical Benefits will Action Settlement Agreement (the "MSA"). The
MSA includes a Back-End Litigation Option ("BELO") that permits
certain will members, such as clean-up workers who follow
procedures outlined in the MSA, to sue BP for Later-Manifested
Physical Conditions ("LMPC's").

After opting out of the MSA, Ngo filed an individual Complaint on
May 1, 2017, against Defendants BP, Transocean Holdings LLC,
Transocean Deepwater Inc., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling
Inc., and Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. Ngo alleges that after
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, he was injured as a result of
exposure to oil and/or dispersing chemicals and/or decontaminants
by virtue of his residential and work environment, and further
asserts that he is a commercial fisherman, shrimper, and oysterman.
Ngo also alleges "Medical monitoring, personal injury, or wrongful
death arising from alleged exposure to crude oil or dispersants,"
and that he was continuously exposed in and around his residence in
Morgan City, Louisiana "and Gulf Waters." Ngo alleges that his
symptoms include coughing, fever, chills, runny nose, weakness,
chest pain, and headaches. Ngo further alleges that he suffered
personal injury damages, including past and future medical expenses
and pain and suffering, as a result of the defendants' negligence,
strict liability, gross negligence, willful and wanton conduct, and
violations of applicable safety, construction, or operation
regulations and/or statutes.

Mr. Ngo also "adopts and incorporates by reference all matters
originally pled" in the Complaint filed in Civ. A. No. 13-4756, Yen
Do, et al. v. BP Exploration & Production Inc., et al., wherein Ngo
and several other plaintiffs alleged that they have experienced
headaches, nausea, vomiting, respiratory problems, and eye
irritation as a result of exposure to crude oil, dispersants, and
other harmful chemicals in the environment resulting from the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Ngo also alleged in the Do matter that
his exposure to the oil, dispersants, and/or other hazardous
chemicals used for or resulting from the oil spill may lead to
serious health problems, diseases, and medical conditions that may
be prevented by timely diagnosis and treatment, and that he has
developed a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious
latent disease.

The Defendants filed the instant Motion on May 2, 2022, asserting
that they are entitled to summary judgment because Ngo has not
produced an expert report or any expert testimony in support of his
health complaints and, thus, cannot prove that his alleged medical
conditions were caused by his exposure to substances related to the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. They claim that the Fifth Circuit and
at least eleven Sections of the Court have issued numerous opinions
addressing the obligation of a BELO plaintiff to prove legal
causation. According to them, this requirement derives from the
fundamental principles governing proof of causation in toxic tort
cases decided under general maritime law.

The Defendants claim that B3 plaintiffs like Ngo, who were
originally part of the multidistrict litigation stemming from the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, must satisfy the same legal cause
standard as BELO plaintiffs. They further assert that due to the
technical nature of the proof, courts have uniformly concluded that
toxic tort plaintiffs need expert testimony to meet their burden of
proving causation. They claim that courts have repeatedly granted
summary judgment dismissing claims of plaintiffs who alleged
injuries from exposure to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, but
failed to produce expert support for their claims. Defendants argue
that, for these reasons, Ngo's claims lack the expert support
required to carry his burden of proof on causation. As such, the
Defendants assert that the Court should grant their Motion and
dismiss Ngo's claims with prejudice.

Mr. Ngo did not file a response to the Motion.

II. Analysis

As the Defendants correctly point out, Judge Barbier previously
described the BELO and B3 cases in similar terms, explaining that:
BELO cases and the B3 cases are similar in several important
respects. Both allege personal injuries or wrongful death due to
exposure to oil or other chemicals used during the oil spill
response. Furthermore, both BELO plaintiffs and B3 plaintiffs must
prove that the legal cause of the claimed injury or illness is
exposure to oil or other chemicals used during the response.

In a separate matter, the Court recently explained that the Fifth
Circuit and at least nine Sections of this Court have uniformly
held that, with regard to BELO plaintiffs, "absent expert
testimony, a BELO plaintiff cannot meet his burden of proof on
causation." Judge Vitter finds that because Ngo failed to identify
a causation expert in the case by the Court's April 6, 2022
deadline and did not move for an extension of that deadline, or for
an extension of his deadline to respond to the instant Motion, he
cannot meet his burden of proof on causation. Accordingly, the
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Vitter grants BP's Motion for
Summary Judgment. She dismisses with prejudice Ngo's claims against
BP Exploration & Production, Inc., BP America Production Company,
BP p.l.c., Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling, Inc., Transocean Holdings, LLC, and Transocean
Deepwater, Inc.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Amended Order &
Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/mrktn573 from
Leagle.com.


BROWN-FORMAN CORPORATION: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Brown-Forman
Corporation. The case is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Brown-Forman
Corporation, Case No. 1:22-cv-04528-PAE-GWG (S.D.N.Y., June 1,
2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

The Brown–Forman Corporation -- https://www.brown-forman.com/ --
is an American company, one of the largest in the spirits and wine
business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com



BUREAU OF ALCOHOL: Fraser Files Suit in E.D. Virginia
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. The case is styled as John Corey
Fraser, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated as a
Class v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives;
Marvin Richardson, in his official capacity as Acting Director of
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Merrick
Garland, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United
States, Case No. 3:22-cv-00410-REP (E.D. Va., June 1, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Civil Rights.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, also
referred to as BATFE -- http://www.atf.gov/-- is a domestic law
enforcement agency within the United States Department of
Justice.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Elliott M. Harding, Esq.
          608 Elizabeth Ave
          Charlottesville, VA 22901
          Phone: (434) 962-8465
          Email: elliott@hardingcounsel.com


C. TECH COLLECTIONS: Kramer Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against C. Tech Collections,
Inc. The case is styled as Chana Kramer, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. C. Tech Collections, Inc., Case
No. 2:22-cv-03240 (E.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

C.Tech Collections, Inc. -- https://www.ctech-collects.com/ -- is a
collection agency located in Mt. Sinai, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Uri Horowitz, Esq.
          HOROWITZ LAW, PLLC
          14441 70th Road
          Flushing, NY 11367
          Phone: (718) 705-8706
          Fax: (718) 705-8705
          Email: uri@horowitzlawpllc.com


CAREDX INC: Klein Law Firm Reminds of July 22 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------
The Klein Law Firm on May 31 disclosed that a class action
complaint has been filed on behalf of shareholders of CareDx, Inc.
(NASDAQ: CDNA) alleging that the Company violated federal
securities laws.

This lawsuit is on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased
CareDx common stock between February 24, 2021, and
May 5, 2022.

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: July 22, 2022
No obligation or cost to you.

Learn more about your recoverable losses in CDNA:
https://www.kleinstocklaw.com/pslra-1/caredx-inc-loss-submission-form?id=27821&from=4

CareDx, Inc. NEWS - CDNA NEWS

CLASS ACTION CASE DETAILS: The filed complaint alleges that CareDx,
Inc. made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or
failed to disclose that: (1) defendants had engaged in a variety of
improper and illegal schemes to inflate testing services revenue
and demand, including pushing a surveillance protocol through
inaccurate marketing materials, offering extravagant inducements or
kickbacks to physicians and other providers, and improperly
bundling expensive testing services with other blood tests as part
of the Company's RemoTraC service for remote, home-based,
blood-drawing; (2) these practices, and others, subjected CareDx to
an undisclosed risk of regulatory scrutiny; (3) these practices
rendered the Company's testing services revenue reported throughout
the class period artificially inflated; and (4) as a result,
defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects were materially false and misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.

WHAT THIS MEANS TO YOU AS A SHAREHOLDER: If you have suffered a
loss in CareDx you have until July 22, 2022 to petition the court
for lead plaintiff status. Your ability to share in any recovery
doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

NO COST TO YOU: If you purchased CareDx securities during the
relevant period, you may be entitled to compensation without
payment of any out-of-pocket fees.

HOW TO PROTECT YOUR FINANCIAL INTERESTS: For additional information
about the CDNA lawsuit, please contact J. Klein, Esq. by telephone
at 212-616-4899 or click this link:
https://www.kleinstocklaw.com/pslra-1/caredx-inc-loss-submission-form?id=27821&from=4.

ABOUT KLEIN LAW FIRM
J. Klein, Esq. represents investors and participates in securities
litigations involving financial fraud throughout the nation. The
Klein Law Firm is a boutique litigation firm with experience in a
wide range of areas including securities law, corporate finance and
commercial litigation. Since 2011, our experienced attorneys have
achieved superior results for our clients with a personalized
focus. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar
outcomes.

CONTACT:
J. Klein, Esq.
Empire State Building
350 Fifth Avenue
59th Floor
New York, NY 10118
jk@kleinstocklaw.com
Telephone: (212) 616-4899
www.kleinstocklaw.com [GN]

CCUR HOLDINGS: Delaware Chancery Court Trims Claims in Samuels Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CRAIG SAMUELS, Plaintiff v. CCUR HOLDINGS, INC., DAVID
J. NICOL, ROBERT PONS, and STEVEN G. SINGER, Defendants, C.A. No.
2021-0358-PAF (Del. Ch.), the Court of Chancery of Delaware:

    (i) grants in part and denies in part the Defendants' motion
        to dismiss the complaint; and

   (ii) denies their motion to strike.

I. Background

In 2020, the board of directors of CCUR approved an amendment to
the Company's certificate of incorporation to effect a 3000-for-1
reverse stock split. The stated purpose of the Reverse Split was to
take CCUR private and avoid the expense and administrative burden
of operating as a public company. In the Reverse Split, any
stockholder owning any number of pre-split shares not evenly
divisible by 3000 would have those shares -- which would be
fractional interests after the split—cashed out at $3.06 per
pre-split share.

Shortly after approving the Reverse Split, the Company learned that
approximately $13.8 million of its funds held in escrow had been
frozen after the arrest of the escrow agent's principal. CCUR's
board of directors then wrote down the full amount of the frozen
funds as a loss, reassessed the Reverse Split, and decided to lower
the amount paid for fractional interests to $2.86 per pre-split
share. The Reverse Split became effective on April 22, 2021.

The Plaintiff held 500 shares of CCUR stock immediately prior to
the consummation of the Reverse Split, after having sold more than
65,000 shares between the announcement of the Reverse Split and its
effective date. He alleges the directors breached their fiduciary
duties in approving and effecting the Reverse Split. He also
alleges the Company violated Section 155 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law because the amount paid for his fractional
interests did not reflect fair value as the statute requires.

On April 26, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a two-count Verified Class
Action Complaint. Count I alleges that all of the Director
Defendants breached their fiduciary duties through their approval
of the Reverse Split. The Plaintiff alleges that the Reverse Split
was a product of self-dealing, resulting in an unfair price for
those stockholders who were cashed out of their fractional
interests. Count II is a claim against the Company for violating 8
Del. C. Section 155. Section 155(2) requires a Delaware corporation
to pay "fair value" to stockholders who are cashed out for their
fractional interests in a reverse stock split. The Plaintiff
alleges that the Company's payment of $2.86 for each pre-split
share not evenly divisible by 3,000 violated the statute because it
was less than fair value.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to
state a claim and lack of standing. Specifically, they argue that
the Board's approval of the Reverse Split and its terms must be
afforded deference under the business judgment rule, and the
Complaint fails to allege a non-exculpated claim of disloyalty or
bad faith. The Defendants further contend that the Plaintiff's
standalone claim under Section 155 is non-cognizable, and even if
it were recognized, the $2.86 price per pre-split share constituted
fair value for stockholders' fractional interests under the
statute.

Additionally, the Defendants challenge the Plaintiff's standing to
bring his claims altogether, or alternatively, his ability to
represent the class of stockholders he purports to represent. They
have also moved to strike certain paragraphs of the Complaint if
their motion to dismiss is not granted in its entirety.

On Feb. 15, 2022, the Court heard argument on the Defendants'
motion.

II. Analysis

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Court of
Chancery Rule 12(b)(6): (i) all well-pleaded factual allegations
are accepted as true; (ii) even vague allegations are well-pleaded
if they give the opposing party notice of the claim; (iii) the
Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party; and (iv) dismissal is inappropriate unless the
plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any reasonably
conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.

A. Standing

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's participation in the
Reverse Split bars him from challenging it under principles of
standing, relying on Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840
(Del. 1987). In Bershad, the plaintiff sued for breach of fiduciary
duty in connection with a cash-for-stock merger. At the time the
merger was proposed, the acquirer was already a majority
stockholder in the acquiree and conditioned the merger on a
majority-of-the-minority stockholder vote. While the plaintiff
initially, and unsuccessfully, voted against the merger, he
ultimately tendered all of his shares to the acquirer in exchange
for the merger consideration. The Court of Chancery granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff
subsequently appealed. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that "when an informed minority shareholder either votes in favor
of the merger, or like Bershad, accepts the benefits of the
transaction, he or she cannot thereafter attack its fairness. Since
Bershad tendered his shares and accepted the merger consideration,
he acquiesced in the transaction and cannot now attack it."

The Defendants maintain that the Plaintiff would have remained a
stockholder had he not sold enough shares to fall below the
3,000-share threshold before the Effective Date. Therefore, they
contend the Plaintiff voluntarily availed himself to the benefits
of the Reverse Split just like the plaintiff in Bershad.

The Court of Chancery opines that the Defendants' argument suffers
from a basic logical flaw. The Plaintiff was involuntarily cashed
out of his 500 shares. The Defendants also ignore that even if the
Plaintiff had done nothing, he still would have had a portion of
his pre-split shares cashed out because his holdings were not
evenly divisible by 3,000. The Plaintiff did not vote in favor of
the certificate amendment that effected the Reverse Split -- it was
effected by a written stockholder consent and the Plaintiff was not
among the consenting stockholders. The Plaintiff accordingly has
standing to bring his claims.

B. The Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim

The Plaintiff asserts that the Director Defendants breached their
fiduciary duties by approving the Reverse Split at an unfair price.
According to the Complaint, the Court should assess the fiduciary
duty claim under the stringent entire fairness standard because all
of the Director Defendants had conflicts of interest at the time
that they voted in favor of the Reverse Split.

The Defendants counter that the Reverse Split was not a conflicted
transaction, and the court should apply the deferential business
judgment rule in analyzing Plaintiff's claim. Furthermore, they
contend that an exculpatory provision in the Company's certificate
of incorporation limits the Director Defendants' liability to
conduct that rises to the level of bad faith or breaches the duty
of loyalty.

The Court of Chancery holds that the Complaint, however, does not
allege that Karen Singer is a controller of either company. Indeed,
the Complaint does not allege anything about the percentage of her
ownership of either company. There are no allegations that she has
the power to remove either Pons or Nicol from their directorships
at any company or influence their compensation. Even assuming that
the Plaintiff's theory that the Singers lobbied for the Reverse
Split while harboring a conflicted ulterior motive is viable -- it
is not—there are no well-pleaded allegations suggesting that
either Pons or Nicol lacked independence from the Singer family.

The Court of Chancery further holds that the Plaintiff makes no
attempt to rebut the business judgment rule, fully resting on his
argument that the directors lacked independence. He concedes that
if the Complaint lacks sufficient allegations to question the
independence of Nicol and Pons, Count I is subject to dismissal.
Therefore, because the Plaintiff has not alleged facts creating a
reasonable inference to question the independence of a majority of
the Board, Count I is dismissed.

C. The Alleged Violation of Section 155

In addition to his claim against the Board for breach of fiduciary
duty, the Plaintiff asserts a direct claim against the Company for
violating Section 155 of the DGCL. The Plaintiff alleges that CCUR
violated Section 155(2) because the Reverse Split's $2.86 per
pre-split share cash consideration was not fair value as required
under the statute. The Defendants argue the Plaintiff's statutory
claim fails because Section 155 does not provide for a freestanding
claim against the Company and that the payment of $2.86 per
cashed-out share constituted fair value.

The Court of Chancery holds that both of these arguments rely
heavily on two cases from the Court, one of which was also affirmed
in a written opinion by the Delaware Supreme Court. It finds that
it is reasonably conceivable that the Company's selection of a
10-day trading average of CCUR stock on the OTC was not fair value
under Section 155(2). This is not to say that at a later stage of
the case the Company will not be able to establish $2.86 per share
as the appropriate payment for cashed-out fractional interests. At
this stage, however, giving the Plaintiff the benefit of all
reasonable inferences, the Court of Chancery cannot conclude that
the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Section 155(2).

D. Motion to Strike

The Defendants have moved to strike paragraphs 2 to 5 and 10 to 13
of the Complaint. Those paragraphs refer to the allegations of the
"Cooper Companies scandal." Court of Chancery Rule 12(f) provides
that the court "may order stricken from any pleading any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." The Defendants
argue that the offending paragraphs are irrelevant to the
Plaintiff's claims and prejudicial.

The Court of Chancery holds that the Court has granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the fiduciary duty claim. As
discussed, it concluded that the Plaintiff's allegations concerning
the events of 30 years ago involving Cooper and Gary Singer did not
create a reasonable inference that a majority of the Board lacked
independence. Nevertheless, it cannot conclude that the allegations
were completely irrelevant to the Plaintiff's unsuccessful legal
theory. Nor are those allegations unduly prejudicial. The only
Defendant referenced in the offending paragraphs of the Complaint
is Steven Singer. The Court has dismissed the only claim against
him. Recognizing that motions to strike are strongly disfavored,
the Court of Chancery denies the motion.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Chancery grants the
Defendants' motion to dismiss Count I and denies the motion to
dismiss Count II.  It denies the Defendants' motion to dismiss for
lack of standing and motion to strike.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5n7mxx6z from Leagle.com.

Eric M. Andersen -- eric.m.anderson@Andersen.com -- ANDERSEN
SLEATER SIANNI LLC, in Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Plaintiff
Craig Samuels.

Catherine A. Gaul -- CGaul@ashbygeddes.com -- ASHBY & GEDDES, P.A.,
in Wilmington, Delaware; Ryan Phair -- rphair@HuntonAK.com --
Daniel Stefany -- dstefany@HuntonAK.com -- HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH
LLP, in Washington, D.C., Attorneys for Defendants CCUR Holdings,
Inc., David J. Nicol, Robert Pons, and Steven G. Singer.


CDC RESTAURANT: Juarez Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
-----------------------------------------------------
Claudia Emma Gonzalez Juarez, an individual and class
representative on behalf of herself and all other similarly
situated non-exempt former and current employees v. CDC RESTAURANT
GROUP, INC. DBA CHICK-FIL-A, a California corporation; and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive, Case No. 22STCV16759 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los
Angeles Cty., May 20, 2022), is brought to recover, among other
things, wages and penalties from unpaid wages earned and due,
including but not limited to unpaid minimum wages and unpaid wages,
unpaid and illegally calculated overtime compensation, illegal meal
and rest period policies, failure to timely pay wages, failure to
pay all wages due to discharged or quitting employees, failure to
maintain required records, failure to provide accurate itemized
wage statements, failure to indemnify employees for necessary
expenditures and/or losses incurred in discharging their duties,
and interest, attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.

The Defendants acted pursuant to their policies and practices of
not paying the Plaintiff all wages earned and due, through methods
and schemes which include, but are not limited to, failing to pay
overtime premiums; failing to provide rest and meal periods;
failing to properly maintain records; failing to provide accurate
itemized statements for each pay period; failing to properly
compensate the Plaintiff for necessary expenditures; and requiring,
permitting or suffering the Plaintiff to work off the clock, in
violation of the California Labor Code and the applicable IWC Wage
Order, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a non-exempt
employee.

CDC RESTAURANT GROUP, INC. DBA CHICK-FIL-A conducts business in the
County of Los Angeles, State of California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shoham J. Solouki, Esq.
          Grant Joseph Savoy, Esq.
          SOLOUKI | SAVOY, LLP
          316 W. 2nd Street, Suite 1200
          Los Angeles, CA 90012
          Phone: (213) 814-4940
          Facsimile: (213) 814-2550


CDR MAGUIRE: Barker Wins Bid for Conditional FLSA Certification
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, Eugene
Division, grants the Plaintiffs' motion for conditional
certification in the lawsuit captioned CODY DWAYNE BARKER; TAMMY
MONDELLO; CRAIG GEDDIS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. CDR MAGUIRE, INC.; ELITE SERVICES
OF LOUISIANA, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 6:21-cv-01720-AA (D. Or.).

The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") case comes before the Court
on Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional FLSA Certification and
Court-Authorized Notice Against Defendant CDR Maguire, Inc. The
Plaintiffs' motion indicates that Defendant CDR does not oppose
this motion. Defendant Elite Services has not yet appeared in the
case.

Background

Named Plaintiffs Cody Dwayne Barker, Tammy Mondello, and Craig
Geddis bring this action on behalf of themselves and other
similarly situated employees of Defendants CDR and Elite Services
as a collective action under the FLSA and as a Rule 23 class action
for violations of the FLSA and Oregon wage and hour laws.
Plaintiffs seek to recover unpaid overtime, as well as compensatory
and liquidated damages, attorney fees, taxable costs of court, pre-
and post-judgment interest, and penalty wages.

Between January 2021 and June 2021, CDR employed Barker and other
similarly situated individuals as Health and Safety Officers and
employed Mondello and other similarly situated individuals as
Division Supervisors/Directors in providing disaster recovery
services in several counties in Oregon following wildfires in 2020
(the "OWR Projects.") CDR also employed Arborists in the OWR
Projects, including jointly employing Plaintiff Geddis and other
similarly situated individuals with Defendant Elite Services.

The Defendants classified the Plaintiffs and other similarly
situated individuals as exempt from overtime and did not pay them
at the rate of and one-half times the regular rate for all hours
worked over 40 hours in a workweek. The OWR Projects were of
limited duration and the Plaintiffs consistently worked more than
40 hours in a seven-day workweek. The Plaintiffs and other
similarly situated "were not paid a guaranteed minimum weekly
amount regardless of the number of hours, days, or shifts worked,"
and were instead "paid a set hourly rate for the number of hours
they worked."

Plaintiff Barker worked for CDR on the OWR Projects from Jan. 20,
2021, to June 30, 2021. Geddis worked as an arborist for Elite
Services "under the control of CDR Maguire, Inc.," working on the
OWR Projects between Feb. 13, 2021, and April 9, 2021. Mondello
worked for CDR on OWR Projects between Feb. 13, 2021, and April 10,
2021. Hakeem Allambie has filed a consent to join the proposed
collective action and has submitted a declaration affirming that he
worked as a Safety Officer for CDR on the OWR Projects from Jan.
20, 2021, to June 30, 2021.

Another possible member of the proposed class and collective, Jimmy
Daniels, worked for CDR on the OWR Projects in the same period and
regularly worked more than 40 hours per work week without being
paid overtime.

Discussion

The named Plaintiffs seek to certify the following FLSA class in
this action as to CDR:

     All individuals who worked in field positions for CDR
     Maguire on the Oregon Wildfire Recovery Projects in Oregon
     since 2020 and who were classified as exempt from overtime
     but who were paid on an hours worked basis (the FLSA Class).

The proposed class includes these subclasses: d) Health and Safety
Officers employed by CRD Maguire on the OWR Projects; e) Arborists
employed by one or both Defendants on the OWR Projects; f) Division
Supervisors/Directors employed by one of both  Defendants on the
OWR Projects (collectively, the FLSA Class).

Although Elite Services was served with the FAC on April 25, 2022,
Elite Services has not appeared in this action. The Plaintiffs
request that the Court "conditionally certify the FLSA class with
the Court's Order to be effective against Defendant CDR Maguire,
Inc. at this time."

District Judge Ann Aiken notes that the FLSA requires that
non-exempt employees receive compensation at "one and one-half
times" their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of
forty hours in a workweek. The Plaintiffs allege that they are
hourly non-exempt employees of the Defendants and allege that the
Defendants violated this provision when they failed to pay overtime
rates for work done in excess of forty hours in a workweek. The
Plaintiffs allege that this failure was willful and that it applies
to the Plaintiffs and to other similarly situated employees. These
allegations are supported by the Declarations of Plaintiffs Barker,
Mondello, and Geddis, and the Exhibits submitted in support of this
motion, as well as the Declarations of putative collective members
Jimmy Daniels and Hakeem Allambie.

The Court concludes that these submissions satisfy the standard for
conditional certification and the Plaintiffs' motion will,
therefore, be granted.

The Court has reviewed the proposed Notice and Consent to Join
forms attached as exhibits to the Plaintiffs' Motion. The Court
concludes that the proposed Notice and Consent to Join forms are
clear and neutral and provide the best practicable notice to
potential members of the class.

The Plaintiffs seek to distribute the Notice and Consent to Join
forms by mail, by email, by posting in the workplace, and by
publication to a website. Considering the interstate nature of the
Defendants' work, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs' request
is reasonable and the Court will approve distribution of the Notice
and Consent to Join forms by mail, email, workplace posting, and
publication to a website.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Conditional FLSA Class Certification and Court Authorized
Notice. Consistent with the Plaintiffs' Motion, this conditional
certification is effective against Defendant CDR Maguire, Inc., but
not as to non-appearing Defendant Elite Services of Louisiana,
LLC.

The Court conditionally certifies the action as a representative
collective action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b), as to
Defendant CDR.

The Court authorizes the Plaintiffs, or a third-party class
administrator if one is engaged, to distribute by regular mail
and/or electronic mail, notice of this action to prospective
collective action members, defined as:

     All individuals who worked in field positions for CDR
     Maguire and/or Elite Services on the Oregon Wildfire
     Recovery Projects in Oregon since 2020 and who were
     classified as exempt from overtime but who were paid on an
     hours worked basis (the FLSA Class).

The proposed class includes these subclasses:

   a) Health and Safety Officer employed by CDR Maguire on the
      OWR Projects;

   b) Arborists employed by one or both Defendants on the OWR
      Projects;

   c) Division Supervisors/Directors employed by one or both
      Defendants on the OWR Projects (collectively the FLSA
      Class).

The Court authorizes the Plaintiffs to send reminders to all notice
recipients 30 days prior to expiration of the deadline for joining
this action.

The Court orders Defendant CDR to post the Court-approved Notice in
a conspicuous location in all employee break rooms at ongoing
projects in Oregon. The Notice is to remain posted for the entire
duration of the notice period.

The Court allows the Plaintiffs, or their third-party claims
administrator, to create and maintain a website for purposes of
providing information pertaining to the Notice and permitting
Notice recipients to complete and submit Consent to Join forms
online. If a website is created, the Plaintiffs will submit the
contents to Defendant CDR, and if Defendant CDR has objections that
cannot be resolved, the content will be submitted to the Court for
review and approval.

The Court conditionally appoints Plaintiffs Cody Dwayne Barker,
Tammy Mondello, and Craig Geddis as class representatives.

The Court appoints Andrew Lewinter and Alan J. Leiman as class
counsel and authorizes them to engage a third-party claims
administrator to administer the notice process.

The Court approves the proposed Notice of this action, which was
submitted as Exhibit A to the Plaintiffs' Motion, and the Consent
to Join form, attached as Exhibit B to the Plaintiffs' Motion.

The Court orders that Defendant CDR produce to the Plaintiffs'
counsel the last known names, addresses, email addresses, and
telephone numbers of all prospective collective action members as
defined; and that such information be provided in Microsoft Excel
format within ten (10) days of the date of this Order for purposes
of sending notice.

The Court orders that all prospective collective action members, as
defined, will have until ninety (90) days after the sending of
notice to submit a completed Consent to Join form to the
Plaintiffs' counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion & Order dated June 2, 2022,
is available at https://tinyurl.com/23erz2dz from Leagle.com.


CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Wins Bid to Arbitrate in Johnson Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled LORETTA JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No.
21-cv-06135-HSG (N.D. Cal.), the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California grants the motion to compel
arbitration filed by Defendants Spectrum Management Holding
Company, LLC, and Charter Communications, Inc.

Procedural Background

Plaintiff Johnson alleges that when she called Spectrum in July
2020 to sign up for its cable and internet service, her phone calls
were recorded without her consent in violation of the California
Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA"). In July 2021, Johnson brought the
putative class action lawsuit in Alameda County Superior Court
asserting a CIPA claim against Spectrum and its parent company
Charter Communications, Inc. (collectively, "Spectrum"). Two months
later, Spectrum removed the case to this Court.

The Agreement

Aside from Johnson's attempt to sign up for Spectrum's services by
phone, Johnson separately signed up for Spectrum's services through
its website. In doing so, Johnson agreed to Spectrum's Residential
General Terms and Conditions of Service (the "Agreement"). The
Agreement says it contains (1) a binding arbitration provision,
which includes a waiver of your right to bring claims as class
actions; (2) a limitation on your right to bring claims against
spectrum more than 1 year after the relevant events occurred; and
(3) the right to opt out of the foregoing provisions. In addition,
the Agreement contains an arbitration section.

Legal Standard

The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") sets forth a policy favoring
arbitration agreements and establishes that a written arbitration
agreement is "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable."

District Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., notes that when considering
a motion to compel arbitration, the Court is limited to determining
(1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, and if so, (2)
whether the arbitration agreement encompasses the dispute at issue,
citign Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir.
2008). If these conditions are satisfied, the Court must compel
arbitration.

Discussion

Spectrum seeks to compel arbitration on the ground that the
parties' Agreement delegated arbitrability issues to the
arbitrator. Spectrum also asserts that if the Court decides it must
determine the gateway issues of arbitrability, the Court should
find the parties' Agreement to be valid and enforceable, and to
cover Johnson's claims. Because Spectrum's argument regarding the
delegation of gateway issues to the arbitrator is a threshold
issue, the Court begins there.

Pointing to the Agreement's arbitration provision language stating
that "all issues are for the arbitrator to decide (including the
scope of the arbitration clause)," Spectrum argues that the parties
"clearly and unmistakably" delegated arbitrability issues to the
arbitrator.

The Court agrees. The language clearly indicates that the
arbitrability determination is committed to the arbitrator, Judge
Gilliam explains. The Agreement includes this arbitrability
language here -- and not elsewhere -- because questions of
arbitrability are to be determined by the arbitrator in
arbitration, not by a court. Accordingly, the Court concludes that
the Agreement "clearly and unmistakably" delegates the question of
arbitrability to the arbitrator.

Ms. Johnson also challenges the "clear and unmistakable" delegation
by claiming that other language in the Agreement conflicts with
this provision. Thus, Johnson contends, the Agreement limits the
arbitrator's authority to determine the arbitrability of claims to
those brought in arbitration, not those brought before a court.

However, Judge Gilliam finds, this provision does not create any
ambiguity as to that delegation. The clause does not conflict with
the Agreement's clear delegation of arbitrability to an
arbitrator.

This conclusion squares with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., which held that an express delegation
provision is not rendered ambiguous merely because a different
section of the agreement recognizes that the parties may need to
invoke the jurisdiction of a court, Judge Gilliam opines. Mohamed
dealt with two contracts containing a venue provision granting
state or federal courts in San Francisco exclusive jurisdiction
over any disputes arising out of or in connection with the
contracts.

Accordingly, the Agreement's reference to what happens "IF A CLAIM
IS BROUGHT THAT IS FOUND BY A COURT TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE SCOPE
OF THESE ARBITRATION PROVISIONS" does not undermine the express
delegation language of the Agreement, Judge Gilliam holds.

Conclusion

The Court grants Spectrum's motion to compel arbitration. The Court
denies as moot Spectrum's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.

This action is stayed pending resolution of the arbitration. The
parties will file a joint report regarding the status of the
arbitration proceeding 90 days from the date of this order, and
every 90 days thereafter until that proceeding is concluded. The
parties also are directed to jointly notify the Court within 48
hours of the conclusion of the arbitration proceeding.

The clerk is directed to administratively close the case.

This order terminates Docket Nos. 35, 36.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated June 2, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/nr9f53zh from Leagle.com.


CHRISTIE BUSINESS: Podroykin Files Suit in C.D. Illinois
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Christie Business
Holdings Company PC. The case is styled as Artur Podroykin,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Christie Business Holdings Company PC doing business as: Christie
Clinic, Case No. 2:22-cv-02117-CSB-EIL (C.D. Ill., June 1, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I. for Personal Injury.

Christie Business Holdings Company PC doing business as Christie
Clinic -- https://www.christieclinic.com/ -- is one of the largest
physician-owned, multi-specialty group medical practices in
Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          227 West Monroe Street, Suite 2100
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Phone: (847) 208-4585
          Email: gklinger@milberg.com

               - and -

          William B Federman, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 N Pennsylvania Ave
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Phone: (405) 235-1560
          Fax: (405) 239-2112
          Email: wbf@federmanlaw.com


COLES COUNTY, IL: Wolfe, et al., Bid to Certify Class Nixed as Moot
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MERVIN WOLFE, TAYLOR
SCHOENEMAN, and ANTHONY GOLDING, v. COLES COUNTY STATE'S ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE; COLES COUNTY, ILLINOIS BOARD; and ILLINOIS STATE'S
ATTORNEYS APPELLATE PROSECUTOR, Case No. 2:21-cv-02206-CSB-EIL
(C.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Colin Stirling Bruce entered an order:

   1. granting the Defendants' motions to dismiss;

   2. dismissing the Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice; and

   3. denying as moot the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class.

The Plaintiffs seek relief that would amount to federal
interference in their ongoing state court criminal proceedings.
Those proceedings plainly implicate important state interests.

Moreover, the Plaintiffs' due process claims can easily be reviewed
both by the circuit court and, if necessary, by the Illinois
Appellate Court.

Finally, Plaintiffs have failed to meet the "heavy burden required
to persuade the Court that an exception to Younger abstention
should apply." Accordingly, the court declines to exercise
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the Younger abstention
doctrine and dismisses Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice.

The Plaintiffs have brought a complaint for declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief, alleging violations of their rights to due
process in connection to their individual criminal prosecutions in
Coles County, Illinois.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 31, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3as6nKz at no extra charge.[CC]


COMCAST CABLE: Park Sues Over Illegal Debt Collection Practices
---------------------------------------------------------------
JUDY PARK, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC d/b/a XFINITY,
Defendant, Case No. 9:22-cv-80795 (S.D. Fla., May 27, 2022) is a
class action brought under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act for the benefit
of Florida consumers, including Plaintiff, whose rights have been
violated by Defendant Comcast Cable Communications.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has engaged in and
continues to engage in two separate courses of conduct that violate
the TCPA and FCCPA. First, Defendant or its agents initiated a debt
collection text messaging campaign using an "automatic telephone
dialing system" as defined by the TCPA to deliver impersonal,
prewritten debt collection text messages to Plaintiff's and Class
members' wireless telephone numbers without their prior express
consent, even after ignoring demands to stop sending such text
messages. Second, Defendant or its agents attempted to collect a
debt from a consumer that did not or never has had an account with
Defendant and alleged there is an obligation of debt when the
consumer owes the Defendant no debt, the suit says.

The Plaintiff brings this action for injunctive relief and
statutory damages resulting from Defendant's actions in violation
of the TCPA and FCCPA, and to permanently enjoin Defendant's
violations of the TCPA and the FCCPA, added the suit.

Comcast Cable Communications, LLC is an Internet, telephone and
communications provider, headquartered in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, that provides services throughout the United States
to consumers and businesses.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David P. Mitchell, Esq.
          MANEY & GORDON, P.A.
          101 East Kennedy Blvd., 17th Floor, Suite 1700
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 221-1366
          Facsimile: (813) 223-5920
          E-mail: d.mitchell@maneygordon.com

               - and -

          Christopher Hixson, Esq.
          CONSUMER LAW ATTORNEYS CORP.
          2727 Ulmerton Rd., Ste. 270
          Clearwater, FL 33762
          Telephone: (877) 241-2200
          E-mail: chixson@consumerlawattorneys.com

COVETRUS INC: Juan Monteverde Investigates Proposed TPG Merger Deal
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Juan Monteverde, founder and managing partner of the class action
firm Monteverde & Associates PC (the "M&A Class Action Firm"), a
national securities firm rated Top 50 in the 2018-2021 ISS
Securities Class Action Services Report and headquartered at the
Empire State Building in New York City, is investigating Covetrus,
Inc. (CVET), relating to its proposed acquisition by funds
affiliated with TPG Capital and Clayton, Dubilier & Rice. Under the
terms of the agreement, CVET shareholders will receive $21.00 in
cash per share they own. Click here for more information:
http://monteverdelaw.com/case/covetrus-inc.It is free and there is
no cost or obligation to you.

About Monteverde & Associates PC

Monteverde & Associates PC is a national class action securities
litigation law firm that has recovered millions of dollars and is
committed to protecting shareholders from corporate wrongdoing. We
were listed in the Top 50 in the 2018-2021 ISS Securities Class
Action Services Report. Our lawyers have significant experience
litigating Mergers & Acquisitions and Securities Class Actions. Mr.
Monteverde is recognized by Super Lawyers as a Rising Star in
Securities Litigation in 2013, 2017-2019, an award given to less
than 2.5% of attorneys in a particular field. He has also been
selected by Martindale-Hubbell as a 2017-2021 Top Rated Lawyer. Our
firm's recent successes include changing the law in a significant
victory that lowered the standard of liability under Section 14(e)
of the Exchange Act in the Ninth Circuit. Thereafter, our firm
successfully preserved this victory by obtaining dismissal of a
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted at the United States
Supreme Court. Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
Also, in 2019 we recovered or secured six cash common funds for
shareholders in mergers & acquisitions class action cases.

If you own common stock in CVET and wish to obtain additional
information and protect your investments free of charge, please
visit our website or contact Juan E. Monteverde, Esq. either via
e-mail at jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com or by telephone at (212)
971-1341.

Contact:

Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
The Empire State Building
350 Fifth Ave. Suite 4405
New York, NY 10118
United States of America
jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com
Tel: (212) 971-1341 [GN]

CRAIG MCCAW: Newbold Sues Over Breaches of Fiduciary Duty
---------------------------------------------------------
Jesse Newbold, on behalf of himself and similarly situated v. CRAIG
MCCAW, CATHLEEN A. MASSEY, WAYNE PERRY, RANDY RUSSELL, R. GERARD
SALEMME, DENNIS WEIBLING, PENDRELL CORPORATION, and X-ICITY
HOLDINGS CORPORATION f/k/a PENDRELL HOLICITY HOLDINGS CORPORATION,
Case No. 2022-0439-LWW (Del. Chancery Ct., May 25, 2022), is
brought asserting breach of fiduciary duty claims stemming from
Holicity's merger (the "de-SPAC Transaction") with Legacy Astra
Space, Inc. against: (a) Craig McCaw, Cathleen A. Massey, Wayne
Perry, R. Gerard Salemme, and Dennis Weibling, in their capacities
as members of Holicity's board of directors (the "Board"); (b)
Craig McCaw and Randy Russell, in their capacities as Holicity
officers; and (c) Pendrell Corporation, X-icity Holdings
Corporation f/k/a Pendrell Holicity Holdings Corporation (the
"Sponsor"), and Craig McCaw, in their capacities as controlling
stockholders of Holicity and to seek monetary damages and all
available equitable relief arising from Defendants' breaches of
fiduciary duty.

This case presents the latest twist on this Court's application of
"well-worn fiduciary principles" to the "novel issues presented" in
the context of a de-SPAC transaction The conflicts underlying many
SPAC transactions are by now fairly well-accepted in the
marketplace, and the frenzy of deal chasing in 2020 and into 2021
is objectively demonstrable. The real-world consequences of a SPAC
sponsor and board of directors pursuing a "shoot-the-moon" deal
even after learning that it would likely prove disastrous has not
been explored until this case.

This case involves Holicity, a SPAC created and controlled by Craig
McCaw, a tech industry visionary whom Forbes magazine dubbed the
"father of the U.S. cellular industry." McCaw populated the
Holicity Board with members of the so-called "McCaw Mafia," a group
of telecommunications industry executives who owe their
professional success to their time at McCaw Cellular
Communications, Inc., before its mid-1990s multi-billion dollar
sale to AT&T, and their subsequent ties to other McCaw-related
entities. McCaw further ensured the Board's overriding focus on his
and the Sponsor's interests by paying them exclusively with
Holicity founder shares ("Founder Shares"), which would either
convert into 20% of Holicity's Class A shares immediately before
closing a de-SPAC transaction, or would expire worthless absent
such a deal.

If McCaw, the Sponsor, and Holicity's Board and officers were
managing an operating business that had a term lasting beyond the
next several months, they could have demanded proper disclosures
and the common stockholders would reject the deal and let the
controller and other fiduciaries continue to run the existing
business. But McCaw, the Sponsor, and Holicity's Board and officers
did not have the option to go back to a status quo. No SPAC has
successfully completed a de-SPAC transaction after an initially
proposed deal was rejected by stockholders. Rather than make clear
to Holicity's Class A stockholders that the deal the Board hoped to
be approving is simply not the deal that would be presented for
vote, Defendants stayed mum, choosing to get the de-SPAC
Transaction closed, and thereafter hoping for the best.

Unfortunately for Class A common stockholders, after the de-SPAC
Transaction closed in June 2021, the news that should have been in
the deal proxy slowly became public. For example, since Astra did
not actually have the technology to build a rocket with a 500 kg
payload, it resorted to secretly licensing (in spring 2021, before
the deal proxy was filed and before the stockholder vote on the de-
SPAC Transaction) the technology for making the larger rocket
engines from a competitor, FireFly Aerospace. With deeply
conflicted fiduciaries who neither conducted adequate diligence nor
provided adequate disclosures, Class A common stockholders gave up
their valuable redemption rights and voted in favor of the deal,
buying the proverbial "pig in a poke." McCaw, the Sponsor, and
Holicity's Board and officers still made out fine, converting their
Sponsor Shares into a 20% stake in the resulting business. The day
prior to the filing of this Complaint, Class A shares closed at
just $2.65 per share, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff has consistently held, and has been the beneficial
owner of, Astra / Holicity stock.

The Defendant Craig McCaw served as Holicity's Chairman of the
Board and chief executive officer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Lebovitch, Esq.
          BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
          1251 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10020
          Phone: (212) 554-1400

               - and -

          Gregory V. Varallo, Esq.
          Daniel E. Meyer, Esq.
          BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
          500 Delaware Avenue, Suite 901
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Phone: (302) 364-3601


CRESCO CAPITAL: Dahir Suit Moved to Hennepin County District Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Eric C. Tostrud of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Minnesota remands the case, Ali Dahir, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Cresco Capital, Inc.,
and Lone Mountain Truck Leasing, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
21-cv-1700 (ECT/BRT) (D. Minn.), to the Minnesota District Court,
Fourth Judicial District, Hennepin County.

I. Background

In this putative class action brought originally in Hennepin County
District Court, Plaintiff Dahir alleges that the Defendants
violated Minnesota's Uniform Commercial Code and Consumer Fraud Act
in connection with their repossession of a commercial truck Dahir
had purchased from them.

Lone Mountain "sells trucks to truck drivers all over the country."
These sales occur "under so-called 'lease-to-own' arrangements."
"Each time a person purchases a truck from Lone Mountain through
the 'lease-toown' program, the financing is completed through
Cresco." Lone Mountain is a limited liability company that
maintains its principal place of business in Carter Lake, Iowa.
Cresco is incorporated under Minnesota law and also maintains its
principal place of business in Carter Lake, Iowa (at the same
address as Lone Mountain).

Mr. Dahir is an Ohio citizen. In 2016, Dahir purchased a truck from
Lone Mountain for a total cost of $69,300. The agreements Dahir
signed in connection with this purchase required Dahir to make a
down payment of $5,500 and "make 44 regular monthly installment
payments in the amount of $1,450." If Dahir defaulted, the
Defendants could accelerate the balance due and repossess the
truck, among other remedies.

As of June 2020, the Plaintiff paid $66,400 to the Defendants,
which included 42 of the 44 monthly payments (i.e., $60,900) and
the $5,500 down payment." In addition to his monthly payments,
Dahir paid the Defendants $590 toward $882.50 in additional fees
during this time that included a "$100 fee to change the payment
date, $275 in NSF fees, and $507.50 in late fees." Though Dahir
doesn't say so explicitly, he admits having a "valid balance owed"
for the truck that was between $3,192.50 and $3,992.50, presumably
in June 2020. Because of an "alleged default," the Defendants
repossessed the truck on June 25, 2020. The repossession occurred
in Minnesota.

The Defendants notified Dahir of their decision to terminate the
agreement in a letter dated June 25, 2020. On June 26, 2020, the
Defendants informed Dahir that: (a) he needed to pay off the truck
in full; and (b) that the alleged balance was approximately
$6,000." After Dahir requested an accounting, the Defendants
informed Dahir on June 30 that "he needed to pay $5,992.50 to
redeem" the truck and that this amount was due "in full by July 2,
2020." The Defendants "blocked" Dahir from accessing "his online
customer portal" to "verify the alleged balance owed." "On July 7,
2020, Dahir told the Defendants that he wanted to redeem the
truck." In response, the Defendants represented to Dahir that, if
he wanted the truck back, he would have to "wait for it to go to
auction" on the Defendants' online system and bid for it there.

On July 9, Dahir's counsel demanded that Defendants return the
truck to Dahir and "allow him to pay the alleged balance owed." In
response to the counsel's demand, things changed. The Defendants
represented that Dahir's outstanding balance was $3,992.50 (or
$2,000 less than what the Defendants represented to Dahir before he
retained counsel), and the "Defendants provided the requisite wire
instructions to complete the payment." Dahir purchased the truck
back from the Defendants on July 9 for $3,992.50. He paid this
amount "by wire and was charged a $30 fee." Dahir owns the truck
free of any obligations to the Defendants.

Mr. Dahir brought the lawsuit in Hennepin County District Court.
Dahir "perfected service" of his original Complaint on the
Defendants on July 15, 2021. In his original Complaint, Dahir
asserted four theories of recovery in four separate counts, all
arising under Minnesota's Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC").

In Count I, Dahir alleged that the Defendants failed to engage in
commercially reasonable dispositions of collateral, including with
respect to Dahir's truck. In Count II, Dahir alleged that the
Defendants failed to provide UCC-compliant notices of collateral
dispositions, including with respect to Dahir's truck. In Count
III, he alleged that the Defendants' lease-to-own agreements
violated the UCC by not requiring them to "pay any lessee a surplus
after disposition" and by including "an additional $2,000 fee." And
in Count IV, Dahir alleged that the Defendants violated the UCC
"because they refused to allow him and the would-be class members
to redeem their trucks at any time prior to the sale of their
trucks."

Mr. Dahir concluded each Count in his original Complaint with the
following damages allegation: The "Plaintiff and the Classes have
suffered damages in an amount to be proved at trial but reasonably
believed to be in excess of $50,000." And in his prayer for relief,
Dahir sought actual and statutory damages for himself and class
members, along with attorneys' fees and costs.

The Defendants removed the case to the Court, invoking
subject-matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act
("CAFA") and then filed a motion to dismiss the suit under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Mr. Dahir filed his Amended Complaint in compliance with Rule
15(a)(1)(B). The Amended Complaint asserts six theories of
recovery, all under Minnesota law. Counts I and II of the Amended
Complaint assert the same UCC claims asserted in Counts I and II of
the original Complaint. The Amended Complaint includes a new claim,
in Count III, alleging that the Defendants violated the UCC by
failing to provide Dahir and the putative class members with a
reasonably detailed accounting in response to their requests. Count
IV of the Amended Complaint includes the same UCC claim asserted in
Count IV of the original Complaint. In Count V, Dahir asserts a new
claim under the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act, alleging essentially
that the $2,000 fee charged by the Defendants and perhaps other
practices or charged amounts were "misrepresentations and deceptive
practices" prohibited by the Act. Finally, in Count VI, Dahir
alleges essentially that the Defendants' acceleration of the
balance of Dahir and would-be class members' loans violated the UCC
because Defendants' disposition notices were defective.

The Amended Complaint includes allegations that differ from the
original Complaint concerning the remedies Dahir seeks for himself
and the classes. With respect to Counts I, II, IV, and VI, Dahir
seeks "damages in an amount to be determined at trial." In Count
III, alleging a claim for deficient accounting, Dahir alleges that
he and the "Accounting Class are entitled to statutory damages of
$500." Finally, in Count V, alleging violations of the Minnesota
Consumer Fraud Act, Dahir seeks damages, attorneys' fees and costs,
and "any other equitable or injunctive relief the court may deem
just and proper." The Defendants responded to Dahir's Amended
Complaint with a successive Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

In the course of adjudicating the Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
questions surfaced regarding whether the case meets CAFA's $5
million amount-in-controversy jurisdictional threshold, and the
Parties were given the opportunity to file supplemental briefs
addressing this question.

II. Discussion

Judge Tostrud finds that the Defendants' Notice of Removal does not
include "a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy
exceeds the jurisdictional threshold." The Notice's allegation that
Dahir asserts a greater-than-$50,000 individual claim misconstrues
Dahir's damages allegations. Dahir's original Complaint asserts an
aggregate $50,000 damages claim per count on behalf of Dahir and
the would-be classes. Dahir's $60,000 settlement demand doesn't
plausibly support the allegation that Dahir asserts a
greater-than-$50,000 individual damages claim because the demand
lacks any explanation, and its amount could be driven by any number
of factors unconnected to the amount in controversy. If that
weren't so, it requires speculation to conclude that the demand
shows the amount in controversy generated by potential class
members' claims.

Finally, Judge Trostrud holds that the fact that the plaintiff in
Mohamed Abdirizak v. Cresco Capital, Inc. and Lone Mountain Truck
Leasing, Inc., No. 62-cv-20-3112 seeks damages greater than $50,000
doesn't plausibly show that amount in controversy here because the
two suits' factual allegations, theories of recovery, and requested
damages are materially different. The absence of allegations in the
Defendants' Notice of Removal (as supplemented by the settlement
demand and Abdirizak complaint) plausibly showing that the amount
in controversy exceeds $5 million warrants remanding the case to
Hennepin County District Court.

III. Conclusion

After reviewing those submissions and other materials, Judge
Tostrud concludes that the case must be remanded to Hennepin County
District Court because the Defendants have not met their burden to
allege facts plausibly showing that Dahir's original Complaint
gives rise to an amount in controversy above CAFA's $5 million
jurisdictional threshold.

Accordingly, based on all the files, records, and proceedings
therein, Judge Tostrud remands the case to Minnesota District
Court, Fourth Judicial District (Hennepin County) pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1447(c). He denies as moot the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2s39d7s4 from Leagle.com.

Adam R. Strauss -- ars@attorneysinmn.com -- and Benjamin William
Tarshish, Tarshish Cody, PLC, in Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Thomas
J. Lyons, Jr., Consumer Justice Center P.A., in Vadnais Heights,
Minnesota, on behalf of Plaintiff Ali Dahir.

R. Henry Pfutzenreuter -- hpfutzenreuter@larkinhoffman.com --
Larkin Hoffman Daly & Lindgren Ltd., in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on
behalf of Defendants Cresco Capital and Lone Mountain Truck
Leasing.


CSX TRANSPORTATION: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Varecka Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN VARECKA, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-00876 (W.D.N.Y.), Judge Christina Reiss
of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York
grants CSX's motion to dismiss.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Varecka brings the putative class action against
Defendant CSX, his employer, alleging CSX interfered with his
rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C.
Sections 2601-2654. Pending before the Court is CSX's Sept. 21,
2021 motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint.

The Plaintiff opposed the motion on Oct. 6, 2021, and CSX replied
on Oct. 13, 2021, at which time the court took the motion under
advisement. The issue presented is one of first impression in the
Second Circuit: Whether hours an employee would have worked but for
a wrongful termination should count towards FMLA eligibility upon
reinstatement.

The Plaintiff is represented by Jonathan E. Staehr, Esq., Jonathan
L. Stone, Esq., and Nicholas D. Thompson, Esq. CSX is represented
by Susan C. Roney, Esq., and Thomas R. Chiavetta, Esq.

II. Background

The Plaintiff is a resident of New York and has been employed for
thirteen years by CSX, which provides freight rail services in
several states, including New York. He suffers from a serious
health condition and was granted intermittent FMLA leave by CSX. In
2018, CSX accused the Plaintiff of abusing his FMLA leave by using
it to take off holidays and terminated him. The Plaintiff
challenged his termination in arbitration pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement. In 2021, in a series of decisions addressing
separate incidents of allegedly improper use of FMLA leave, the
arbitrator "found for the Plaintiff, reinstating him with
backpay."

The Plaintiff's challenge to his termination resulted in two
arbitration awards by the National Railroad Adjustment Board
("NRAB"), both issued on Jan. 14, 2021. The first decision
addressed the Plaintiff's alleged misuse of FMLA leave on or about
Christmas 2017. The NRAB ordered that "the discipline imposed must
be rescinded and the Plaintiff made whole." The NRAB's second
decision considered the Plaintiff's alleged misuse of FMLA leave
during the New Year holiday in 2018. The NRAB ordered "that the
discipline be rescinded and that the Plaintiff be made whole for
wages lost in accordance with the parties' agreement and/or past
practice."

After he was reinstated, the Plaintiff again applied for FMLA
leave. CSX rejected his request because he had not worked the
requisite number of hours in the preceding year to qualify for it.
The Plaintiff alleges that his "unlawful termination is the only
reason he had not worked enough qualifying hours during the
preceding year" and that the "FMLA prohibits employers from
benefiting from an unlawful termination when determining qualifying
hours." He further asserts that his unlawful termination and denial
of FMLA leave after reinstatement is part of CSX's pattern and
practice of using delays in the arbitration process to "deny FMLA
leave to reinstated employees because of the time they were out of
work due to their unlawful suspensions and/or terminations." In
other words, he alleges that CSX purposefully deprives reinstated
employees of the hours they need to qualify for FMLA leave.

The Plaintiff seeks to bring this action not only on his own behalf
but also on behalf of a putative class consisting of: "Individuals
employed by CSX who have been reinstated with backpay by an
arbitrator and who, at any time from three years preceding the
complaint's filing to the resolution of this action, were denied
FMLA leave solely because of their overturned suspensions and/or
terminations."

The Complaint asserts a single cause of action for interference
with rights under the FMLA. The Plaintiff alleges that class
members have a right to appeal suspensions and terminations to an
arbitrator under their unions' collective bargaining agreements
with CSX, but that the process "takes years" and CSX is "using this
delay to its advantage" in a "pattern and practice" of "interfering
with, restraining, and denying the exercise of the protected rights
of the Plaintiff and the putative class members" by denying their
requests for FMLA leave after their reinstatement.

The Plaintiff seeks compensatory, liquidated, and punitive damages;
declaratory and injunctive relief; and attorney's fees, costs, and
prejudgment interest.

III. Conclusions of Law and Analysis

A. Whether the Complaint Must Be Dismissed for Failure to State a
Claim.

CSX contends the Plaintiff fails to adequately plead that he was an
eligible employee under the FMLA and therefore his Complaint must
be dismissed. To state a claim for interference with FMLA rights,
the Plaintiff must plausibly allege: 1) that he is an eligible
employee under the FMLA; 2) that the Defendant is an employer as
defined by the FMLA; 3) that he was entitled to take leave under
the FMLA; 4) that he gave notice to the Defendant of his intention
to take leave; and 5) that he was denied benefits to which he was
entitled under the FMLA.

Judge Reiss opines that because the Plaintiff has not alleged the
elements of an equitable claim in his Complaint, CSX's motion to
dismiss must be granted. She finds that the Second Circuit has made
clear that, while federal common law equitable doctrines can
"confer eligibility upon an otherwise ineligible employee," an
employee must "establish all of the elements" of an equitable
claim.

B. Whether Plaintiff May Amend His Complaint.

The Plaintiff may only amend his complaint "with the opposing
party's written consent or the court's leave." The court must
"freely give leave when justice so requires." Id. Because "outright
dismissal for reasons not going to the merits is viewed with
disfavor in the federal courts," "permission to amend a complaint
at least once is normally given."

The Plaintiff has not requested leave to amend and Judge Reiss is
not required to grant it sua sponte. The Plaintiff therefore must
move for leave to amend in compliance with the Local Rules or file
an amended complaint with CSX's written consent within 30 days of
this Opinion and Order or the case will be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Reiss grants CSX's motion to
dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/fcub3dek from Leagle.com.


CYPRESS PORK: Underpays Pork Production Workers, Rodas Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
NELI RODAS, individually and On behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CYPRESS PORK, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
4:22-cv-00491-JM (E.D. Ark., May 27, 2022) is a class action
brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas
Minimum Wage Act for declaratory judgment, monetary damages,
liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, and costs, including
reasonable attorneys' fees, as a result of Defendant's failure to
pay Plaintiff and other flat-rate employees a lawful minimum wage
compensation as well as lawful overtime compensation for hours
worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff asserts that he was employed at Defendant Cypress
Pork, LLC's concentrated animal feeding operating as pork
production worker and was classified as flat rate employee and paid
a flat rate, regardless of the amount of hours he worked.

Cypress Pork, LLC engages in concentrated animal feeding operation
which raises pigs and hogs for pork processing.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chris Burks, Esq.
          WHLAW | WE HELP
          1 Riverfront Pl. - Suite 745
          North Little Rock, AR 72114
          Telephone: (501) 891-6000
          E-mail: chris@wh.law

DESTIRA INC: Davis Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Destira, Inc. The
case is styled as Kevin Davis, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Destira, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-04550
(S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Destira -- https://destira.com/ -- is a family- and women-owned
gymnastics apparel company designing and producing high-quality,
affordable leotards and accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


DON SEBASTIANI: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Don Sebastiani & Sons
International Wine Negociants. The case is styled as Jose Quezada,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Don
Sebastiani & Sons International Wine Negociants, Case No.
1:22-cv-04530 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Don Sebastiani & Sons International Wine Negociants --
http://donsebastianiandsons.com/-- is a purveyor of upscale,
moderately priced varietal wines sourced from some of the best
growing regions worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


E Z PORTABLE: Discloses Incorrect Sales Tax Rate, Naszady Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH NASZADY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. E Z PORTABLE BUILDINGS, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 3:22-cv-00287-BJB (W.D. Ky., May 31, 2022) alleges
monetary losses of the Plaintiff arising from the Defendant's
inaccurate disclosures of applicable sales taxes on a purchase
contract in violation of the Truth in Lending Act.

The Defendant is a supplier of goods, in this case portable
buildings, which consumers like the Plaintiff and putative Class
Members use for a variety of uses including storage.

The case seeks recourse for consumers across the U.S. who suffered
damages as a result of the Defendant's actions in disclosing an
incorrect sales tax rate on the purchase contract and then
collecting upon the incorrect sales tax rate. The case further
seeks recourse for the Plaintiff individually for breach of
contract and violations of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act
made by the Defendant as to coverage of the limited warranty which
resulted in the Plaintiff suffering continued harm by the
deprivation of use of the product.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Flick, Esq.
          Marc E. Dann, Esq.
          Daniel M. Solar, Esq.
          DANNLAW
          15000 Madison Avenue
          Lakewood, OH 44107
          Telephone: (216) 373-0539
          Facsimile: (216) 373-0536

EAST TENNESSEE: Ziler Files Suit in E.D. Tennessee
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against East Tennessee
Children's Hospital Association, Inc. The case is styled as Kara
Ziler A.L.S., A Minor, Through Her Parent and Legal Guardian, Linda
Stanton, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. East Tennessee Children's Hospital Association, Inc.,
Case No. 3:22-cv-00195-TRM-JEM (E.D. Tenn, June 1, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I. for Personal Injury.

East Tennessee Children's Hospital -- https://www.etch.com/ -- is a
private, independent, not-for-profit, 152-bed pediatric medical
center in Knoxville, Tennessee.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Leigh Anne St. Charles, Esq.
          Kevin H Sharp, Esq.
          SANFORD, HEISLER, SHARP, LLP
          611 Commerce Street, Suite 3100
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Phone: (615) 434-7006
          Email: lstcharles@sanfordheisler.com
                 ksharp@sanfordheisler.com


EMF OF WINTER: Faces Lexima Suit Over Telemarketing Calls
---------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTIAN LEXIMA, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. EMF OF WINTER PARK, LLC D/B/A J.
STERLING'S DAY SPA Defendant, Case No. CACE-22-007855 (Fla. Cir.,
17th Judicial, Broward Cty., May 27, 2022) asserts a class action
claim for monetary and treble damages pursuant to the Florida
Telephone Solicitation Act.

According to the complaint, on September 10, 2021 (at a minimum),
the Defendant began spamming Plaintiff with unsolicited texts to
Plaintiffs cellular telephone number. The purpose of the
Defendant's alleged telephonic sales call was solely to solicit the
sale of consumer goods and/or services.

The suit alleges that the Defendant's unsolicited text messages
caused Plaintiff harm, including invasion of privacy, aggravation,
and annoyance. The Defendant's call also inconvenienced Plaintiff,
caused disruptions to Plaintiff's daily life, caused Plaintiff to
waste time dealing with Defendant's unsolicited text message.
Additionally, Defendant's unsolicited messages violated Plaintiff's
substantive rights under the FTSA from being free from harassing
calls like Defendant's, says the suit.

EMF OF WINTER PARK, LLC, D/B/A J. STERLING'S DAY SPA, is a day spa
service provider based in Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy Dover, Esq.
          DEMESMIN & DOVER, PLLC
          1650 SE 17th Street, Suite 100
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316
          Telephone: (866) 954-6673
          Facsimile: (954) 916-8499  
          E-mail: Spam-Pleadings@attorneysoftheinjured.com

ENSERVCO CORP: Robbins LLP Reminds of July 19 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------
The Class: Shareholder rights law firm Robbins LLP reminds
investors that a shareholder filed a class action on behalf of all
persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Enservco
Corporation (NYSE: ENSV) securities between May 13, 2021 and April
19, 2022, for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Enservco provides well enhancement and fluid management services to
the onshore oil and natural gas industry in the U.S.

What is this Case About: Enservco Corporation (ENSV) Delays Filing
its Year End and Quarterly Reports due to Accounting Errors

According to the complaint, defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that Enservco had defective
disclosure controls and procedures and internal control over
financial reporting. As a result, there were errors in Enservco's
financial statements relating to, inter alia, its transactions with
Cross River Partners, a related party, and accounting for ERCs, a
tax credit provided for under the CARES Act. Specifically, the
Company improperly accounted for a conversion of debt to equity
with Cross River Partners and "misinterpret[ed the] eligibility for
certain employee retention tax credits under relevant provisions of
the [CARES Act]." Accordingly, the Company would need to restate
certain of its financial statements and delay the filing of its
2021 annual report with the SEC.

Ultimately, Enservco could not file its delayed 2021 annual report
with the SEC within its initially represented timeline. A series of
disclosures to the public and SEC regarding the delay negatively
impacted the Company's stock price.

Next Steps: If you acquired shares of Enservco Corporation (ENSV)
securities between May 13, 2021 and April 19, 2022, you have until
July 19, 2022, to ask the court to appoint you lead plaintiff for
the class. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. You do
not have to participate in the case to be eligible for a recovery.


All representation is on a contingency fee basis. Shareholders pay
no fees or expenses.

Contact us to learn more:

advertisement
Aaron Dumas

(800) 350-6003
adumas@robbinsllp.com

About Robbins LLP: A recognized leader in shareholder rights
litigation, the attorneys and staff of Robbins LLP have been
dedicated to helping shareholders recover losses, improve corporate
governance structures, and hold company executives accountable for
their wrongdoing since 2002.

Attorney Advertising. Past results do not guarantee a similar
outcome.

Contact:
Aaron Dumas
Robbins LLP
5040 Shoreham Place
San Diego, CA 92122
adumas@robbinsllp.com
(800) 350-6003
www.robbinsllp.com [GN]

EPIC LANDSCAPE: Faces FLSA Class Action Lawsuit in Kansas
---------------------------------------------------------
Wilson Fay, writing for Law Street, reports that on May 30, 133
former or current employees of Epic Landscape Productions, L.C.
filed a class action complaint in the District of Kansas against
Epic alleging violations of the Fair labor Standards Act (FLSA).

According to the complaint, Epic is a Kansas limited liability
corporation and landscaping company. Further, the complaint states
that Epic at some point employed each of the plaintiffs as
non-exempt hourly workers.

The plaintiffs allege that Epic had a policy and practice of
failing and refusing to properly compensate the plaintiffs and
other hourly workers for overtime hours in excess of 40 hours per
week. The complaint argues that the defendant's policy and practice
violate the FLSA because the defendant paid its non-exempt hourly
employees their standard rate for overtime hours worked instead of
the required 1.5 times their regular rate for all hours worked in
excess of 40 hours per week.

Additionally, the complaint alleges that Epic breach the plaintiffs
employment contract which stated that they would be paid the
required 1.5 times their regular rate for all overtime hours
worked.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs filed the present lawsuit on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated to recover their unpaid
wages. The plaintiffs seek to bring and maintain the complaint as
an "opt-in" collective action under the FLSA.

The complaint alleges five causes of action; violation of the FLSA,
violation of Missouri law by failing to pay earned wages and
overtime, breach of contract, third party beneficiary and quantum
meruit/unjust enrichment. The plaintiffs seek class certification,
declaratory relief, restitution, pre- and post-judgment interest,
attorney's fees and costs.

The plaintiffs are represented by Bertram & Graf, L.L.C. and The
Hodgson Law Firm, L.L.C. [GN]

EZ DISPOSAL & RECYCLING: Torigian Files Suit in Mass. Super. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against EZ Disposal &
Recycling, LLC, et al. The case is styled as Michael Johnson,
individually and on behalf of Others similarly situated v. EZ
Disposal & Recycling, LLC, Michael J. Merullo, Case No. 2277CV00504
(Mass. Super. Ct., Essex Cty., June 1, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Contract / Business Cases."

EZ Disposal Service -- https://www.ezdisposalservice.com/ -- is a
fully insured and bonded disposal service company serving Eastern
Massachusetts, Central Massachusetts and Southern New
Hampshire.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam Jeremy Shafran, Esq.
          RUDOLPH FRIEDMANN LLP
          92 State St.
          Boston, MA 02109


GANNETT COMPANY: Belozerov Sues Over Data Privacy Violations
------------------------------------------------------------
SERGE BELOZEROV, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GANNETT COMPANY, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:22-cv-10838 (D. Mass., June 1, 2022) is an action against the
Defendant's practice of knowingly disclosing to a third party, Meta
Platforms, Inc. ("Facebook"), data containing its digital
subscribers' personally-identifiable information or Facebook ID
("FID"), and the computer file containing video and its
corresponding URL viewed ("Video Media") in violation of the Video
Privacy Protection Act ("VPPA").

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendant as the
owner of national newspaper USA Today, violated the VPPA by
disclosing its digital subscribers' identities and Video Media to
Facebook without the proper consent.

The Defendant combines its digital subscribers' Personal Viewing
Information into one data point which is then sent to Facebook.
Because FIDs are unique and can be used to identify an individual's
Facebook user account, Facebook—or any other ordinary
person—can use this information to quickly and easily locate,
access, and view a particular digital subscriber's corresponding
Facebook profile. Put simply, the pixel allows Facebook to know
what Video Media one of its subscribers viewed on the USA Today
site, says the suit.

Without telling its digital subscribers, Defendant profits
handsomely from its unauthorized disclosure of its digital
subscribers' Personal Viewing Information. It does so at the
expense of its digital subscribers' privacy and their statutory
rights under the VPPA, the suit further asserts.

GANNETT CO., INC. operates as a local newspaper company. The
Company publishes news through storytelling and events that connect
readers and communities, as well as focuses on business practices
for sourcing, consumption, and waste. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan M. Jagher, Esq.
          FREED KANNER LONDON & MILLEN LLC
          923 Fayette Street
          Conshohocken, PA 19428
          Telephone: (610) 234-6487
          Facsimile: (224) 632-4521
          Email: jjagher@fklmlaw.com

               - and -

          Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS
          GROSSMAN, PLLC
          227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 2100
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (866) 252-0878
          Email: gklinger@milberg.com

               - and -

          Katrina Carroll, Esq.
          LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP
          111 W. Washington Street, Suite 1240
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 750-1265
          Email: katrina@lcllp.com

GENERAL MOTORS: Court Dismisses Elliott Suit Over Headlight Defect
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge George Caram Steeh of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Southern Division, grants the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the lawsuit titled ROBERT ELLIOTT, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GENERAL
MOTORS LLC, Defendant, Case No. 21-12561 (E.D. Mich.).

Background Facts

Plaintiff Robert Elliott is a Virginia resident. General Motors
manufactures vehicles, including those sold under the Cadillac
brand. In July 2016, Plaintiff purchased a used 2016 Cadillac SRX
with approximately 22,000 miles on the odometer, from Suttle Motors
in Newport News, Virginia. The Plaintiff began to have problems
with the vehicle's headlights in January 2021, when the headlights
began to dim. Plaintiff alleges that the problem became
progressively worse, such that he was unable to drive safely at
night.

The Plaintiff took his vehicle to Suttle Motors for repairs in June
2021. He was informed that the headlight seals had eroded and the
moisture caused damage to the reflectors inside the headlights,
which led to the dim output. Suttle Motors replaced the headlights
at a cost of $1600. However, the Plaintiff alleges that two months
later, one of the headlights began experiencing the same dimness
problem. The Plaintiff plans to return to the dealer for another
repair or replacement.

The Plaintiff contends that the headlight problem he experienced is
the result of a defect ("Headlight Defect"). In particular, he
alleges that "the seals GM uses in the Vehicles headlights'
exterior housing units wear out prematurely, thereby allowing
moisture to accumulate and condense. The moisture damages the
assemblies' internal components, and causes the headlights to
malfunction and/or fail because it corrodes the lamp assembly
components and/or because it causes electrical shorts."

Additionally, "the vents that allow air flow to maintain pressure
and prevent the lenses from cracking increase the tendency for
water to accumulate and condense in the housing units. These
defects result in damage to assembly components, such as corroding
igniters and burnt-out bulbs, resulting in the Headlight Defect."

The Plaintiff alleges that GM has been aware of the Headlight
Defect since 2010 because the same defect affected the 2010-2015
SRX models. GM has issued Technical Service Bulletins ("TSBs"),
which inform dealers about repairs, regarding headlight issues that
he claims relate to the Headlight Defect. He asserts that the fixes
set forth in the relevant TSBs are inadequate to resolve the
headlight problem, as the failed parts are replaced with "the very
same defectively designed parts and components."

GM issued a Customer Satisfaction Campaign regarding the 2010 SRX,
wherein the company offered to reimburse customers who paid to
repair their headlamps. In 2019, a class action involving the
Headlight Defect was settled on behalf of 2010-2015 SRX customers
in California and Florida. GM also sent a letter to 2011-2015 SRX
customers regarding "issues that could cause moisture to accumulate
in SRX headlamp capsules." GM offered to reimburse these customers
for headlight repairs.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Headlight Defect is the same in the
2016 SRX as in the 2011-2015 SRX models. The Plaintiff asserts that
GM has concealed its knowledge of the defect and has refused to
recall or extend warranties to repair the 2016 SRXs.

The Plaintiff seeks to represent a nationwide class of 2016
Cadillac SRX owners and lessees and/or a class of Virginia 2016 SRX
owners and lessees. The complaint alleges the following claims:
Count I, Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; Count II, fraudulent
concealment; Count III, unjust enrichment; Count IV, breach of
implied warranty of merchantability; and Count V, Virginia Consumer
Protection Act (on behalf of the Virginia subclass only). The
Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) and lacks standing to represent a class under
Rule 12(b)(1).

Law and Analysis

A. Implied Warranty of Merchantability

The Defendant makes several arguments in favor of dismissing the
Plaintiff's implied warranty claim. Because the Court finds that
this claim is barred by the statute of limitations, it need not
consider the Defendant's additional arguments.

The Plaintiff purchased his vehicle in July 2016 and filed this
action on Oct. 29, 2021, well outside of the four-year statute of
limitations. The Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations
should be tolled based upon GM's fraudulent concealment of the
defect or the discovery rule. Under Virginia law, however, a
plaintiff must allege an affirmative misrepresentation in order to
toll the statute of limitations, Judge Steeh opines, citing Evans
v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 137 F.Supp.3d 877, 882 (E.D. Va. 2015).

Because the Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to
support equitable tolling of the statute of limitations under
Virginia law, the Court will dismiss his implied warranty claim as
time barred.

B. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

The Magnuson-Most Warranty Act provides a federal cause of action
to "a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier,
warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation
under this chapter, or under a written warranty, implied warranty,
or service contract."

Because the Plaintiff does not have a valid implied warranty claim
under Virginia law, his MMWA claim must be dismissed, Judge Steeh
holds.

C. Unjust Enrichment

The Defendant seeks dismissal of the Plaintiff's unjust enrichment
claim because an express written warranty governs the subject
matter of their dispute.

Judge Steeh notes that there is no dispute that the Plaintiff's
vehicle was covered by an express written warranty. Accordingly,
the Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim is subject to dismissal.

D. Fraud-Based Claims

The Plaintiff alleges fraudulent concealment under common law and
the Virginia Consumer Protection Act.

Although this pleading standard is slightly relaxed with regard to
fraudulent omissions, a plaintiff must plead "the who, what, when,
where, and how" of the alleged omission, that is "(1) precisely
what was omitted; (2) who should have made a representation; (3)
the content of the alleged omission and the manner in which the
omission was misleading; and (4) what [the defendant] obtained as a
consequence of the alleged fraud," Judge Steeh states, citing
Republic Bank & Tr. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 683 F.3d 239, 255-56
(6th Cir. 2012), et al.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has not adequately alleged
that GM knew of the defect prior to the sale of his vehicle in
2016. The Plaintiff asserts that GM knew of the defect based upon
(1) TSBs issued beginning in 2010; (2) the Customer Service
Campaign and offer to reimburse 2011-2015 model owners for repairs;
(3) consumer complaints; (4) and information only within GM's
custody, including "pre-production design failure mode and analysis
data, production design failure mode and analysis data, pre-release
testing data [and] early consumer complaints to GM and its dealers,
testing conducted in response to those complaints, high failure
rates and replacement part sales data, and other aggregate data
from GM dealers about the problem."

The Plaintiff's allegations regarding pre- and post-sale testing
and data are conclusory and similar to allegations that the Sixth
Circuit has determined are insufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss, Judge Steeh opines. The Court rejected allegations that
pre-sale testing demonstrated an automaker's knowledge of a defect,
when the Plaintiff made no specific allegations about the results
of the tests, such as data obtained by GM or documents confirming
or suggesting whether the defect became known.

In sum, Judge Steeh points out, even accepting that GM produced
defective vehicles the Plaintiff must show that GM had sufficient
knowledge of the harmful defect to render its sales fraudulent. The
Plaintiff has failed to plausibly plead GM's knowledge here.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss his fraudulent concealment
claims, arising under common law and the Virginia Consumer
Protection Act, VCPA.

To the extent the Plaintiff alleges that GM made affirmative
misrepresentations in violation of the VCPA, his allegations are
likewise insufficient to state a claim, Judge Steeh holds.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses all of the Plaintiff's fraud-based
claims, whether premised upon common or state statutory law.

Conclusion

Because the Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim, it need not consider the Defendant's arguments that the
Plaintiff lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of a class or
that the VCPA precludes class relief.

The Defendant's motion to dismiss, therefore, is granted and the
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated June 2,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p9xdewn from
Leagle.com.


GOOGLE LLC: Faces Class Suit Over Illegal Automatic Renewal Scheme
------------------------------------------------------------------
Gabby Urenda, writing for KOIN, reports that a class-action lawsuit
was filed against YouTube and Google on behalf of two Oregon men,
claiming the defendants were engaging in an "illegal automatic
renewal scheme" with respect to their subscription plans.

The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court in Portland, seeks at
least $5 million or "punitive damages to be determined by the court
and/or jury." The plaintiffs also requested an order declaring the
defendants' conduct violated specific statutes and common laws,
along with reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses with the cost of
the suit.

According to the complaint, when consumers sign up for the
auto-renewal membership programs, YouTube and Google enroll
consumers in a program that automatically renews the subscriptions
from month-to-month or year-to-year and results in monthly or
annual chargers to the person's credit card, debit card or
third-party payment account.

In doing so, added the document, the defendants fail to provide the
requisite disclosures and authorizations required to be made to
Oregon consumers under Oregon's Automatic Renewal Law, which is in
direct violation of Oregon's Unlawful Trade Practices Act.

The lawsuit says Oregon law requires online retailers -- who offer
automatically renewing subscriptions to Oregon consumers -- must
provide the complete automatic renewal offer terms in a clear and
conspicuous manner and in visual proximity to the request for
consent prior to the purchase. [GN]

GREAT LAKES: Court Denies Dawson's Two Bids for Reconsideration
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James D. Peterson of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin denies the Plaintiff's two motions for
reconsideration in the lawsuit styled MEREDITH D. DAWSON, Plaintiff
v. GREAT LAKES EDUCATIONAL LOAN SERVICES, INC., and GREAT LAKES
HIGHER EDUCATION CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-475-jdp
(W.D. Wis.).

The case was a class action about the proper calculation of student
loan interest. The Court granted summary judgment to Defendants
Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc., and Great Lakes Higher
Education Corporation (collectively "Great Lakes") on the claims of
all class members except those who had overpaid their loans by less
than five dollars. The Defendants estimated that there are 1,626
borrowers in that category (out of approximately 137,000 class
members) and that the total amount of overpayments by those class
members is less than $3,000. In light of the small amount that
remained at stake, the Court asked the parties for input on how
they wished to bring the case to a resolution.

Among other things, Great Lakes contended that the Court should
enter judgment after excluding from the class borrowers, who
overpaid their balances by less than five dollars. Great Lakes said
that Dawson--the sole class representative--wasn't part of that
group, so she wasn't an adequate representative of them. In a
two-sentence response, Dawson said only that she wished to preserve
all of her previous arguments for appeal. She didn't contend that
she was an adequate representative of the class members with
unresolved claims, she didn't ask to name an additional class
representative for those class members, and she didn't otherwise
provide reasons for rejecting Great Lakes' argument.

The Court concluded that Dawson wasn't an adequate representative
of the class members, who had overpaid their accounts by less than
five dollars because she wasn't a member of that group. As a
result, the Court excluded those borrowers from the class and
directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment.

On the same day, before judgment was entered, Dawson filed a motion
in which she contended that the excluded class members should
receive notice and Great Lakes should be required to bear the costs
of notice. In the same motion, she asked for reconsideration of the
decision that she isn't an adequate class representative for the
borrowers, who made overpayments of less than five dollars. Two
days later, she filed a second motion for reconsideration, this
time challenging a portion of the summary judgment decision in
which the Court concluded that she had forfeited an argument.

Analysis

A. Notice to excluded class members

Neither side cites any provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 that requires notice to class members, who have been excluded.
But Rule 23(d)(1)(B) allows the Court to order notice of "any step
in the action" if doing so is necessary to "protect class members."
And the court of appeals has construed Rule 23 to include an
implicit requirement to provide notice to class members when a
class is decertified. This is because the statute of limitations is
tolled while the class action is pending, but it starts running
again when the class is decertified (Culver v. City of Milwaukee,
277 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2002)).

Judge Peterson notes that notice lets the former class members know
that they will have to file their own lawsuits if they wish to
protect their rights. The circumstances of this case are
sufficiently similar to Culver to suggest that notice to the
excluded class members is appropriate.

Great Lakes acknowledges both Rule 23(d)(1)(B) and Culver, and it
doesn't object to providing notice in this case. It suggests that
notice take the form of an email to the excluded class members,
along with an update to the class action website,
http://www.greatlakesclassaction.com.Great Lakes also says that it
doesn't object to providing the names of the 1,626 excluded class
members to the class administrator. But Great Lakes contends that
class counsel should bear the cost of sending notice because that
is the usual rule and because it is class counsel, not Great Lakes,
that owes fiduciary duties to the class.

Ms. Dawson didn't argue for a particular form of notice in her
motion, and she doesn't object in her reply brief to Great Lakes'
suggestion of electronic notice. The Court concludes that notice by
email and through the class action website is reasonable under the
circumstances of this case.

So the only issue in dispute is whether Great Lakes or class
counsel should bear the cost of notice. As Great Lakes points out,
the usual rule is that a plaintiff must bear the cost of notice to
the class, citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 178
(1974). And the Supreme Court has significantly cabined a district
court's discretion to depart from the general rule.

In Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, the Court concluded that the
district court abused its discretion by shifting the costs of
notice to the defendant, reasoning that it was the plaintiffs'
lawsuit, the defendant obtained no benefit from notice, and the
costs of notice would be no greater for the plaintiffs than they
would be for the defendant.

That reasoning applies in this case, as well, Judge Peterson holds.
The Court rejected arguments that the defendant should pay because:
(1) much of the cost of notice was the defendant's fault because it
had objected to a smaller class and less expensive method of
notice; and (2) the cost of notice was "modest" in relation to the
defendant's ability to pay. These are similar to Dawson's arguments
that Great Lakes should pay for notice because the cost of notice
would be "minor" for Great Lakes and that it is Great Lake's fault
that notice is needed because Great Lakes refused to give refunds
to the excluded class members.

Eisen and Oppenheimer both involved notice of a class certification
rather than an exclusion or a decertification. There is a plausible
argument that certification is different because in that situation
the plaintiffs are the proponent of the motion requiring notice,
Judge Peterson notes. But the court of appeals has required
plaintiffs to bear the cost of a notice of decertification, as
well, citing Culver. This makes sense because it is class counsel
and the class representative, who have a duty to excluded class
members, not the defendants, Judge Peterson explains.

Judge Peterson points out that Dawson identifies no authority for
shifting costs to Great Lakes under the circumstances. She cites
Brown v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., No. 1:12-CV-62-BLW, 2013 WL
1760267, at *5 (D. Idaho Apr. 24, 2013), which noted in passing the
Ninth Circuit's rule that courts may shift costs of notice of a
class action "after they determine that the defendant is liable on
the merits."

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit hasn't adopted that
rule, but even it had, it doesn't apply, Judge Peterson holds. He
points out that Dawson didn't prevail on any of her claims in this
case. The Court dismissed her federal claims at summary judgment
and didn't determine liability on her state-law claims, but instead
concluded that it was unnecessary to do so because the vast
majority of class members didn't have damages.

The Court will approve Dawson's request to send notice to the
excluded class members. Because Great Lakes is in the best position
to identify the relevant borrowers, the Court will direct Great
Lakes to provide Dawson with a list of the names and any available
email addresses of the excluded class members. To ensure a complete
record, Great Lakes should also file the list with the Court. But
it will be Dawson's responsibility to coordinate with the class
administrator to send an email to the excluded class members and
update the class website. It will also be Dawson's responsibility
to pay for the costs of notice, other than Great Lakes' costs of
providing the list of names and email addresses.

B. Reconsideration of other issues

Ms. Dawson seeks reconsideration of two issues: (1) the Court's
determination in the May 24, 2022 order that she isn't an adequate
representative of class members, who overpaid their accounts by
less than five dollars; and (2) the Court's determination in the
May 12, 2022 order that she forfeited her argument that Great Lakes
had not remediated any harm to the class. The Court denies both
requests.

As for her adequacy as a class representative, Dawson has forfeited
that argument, Judge Peterson holds. As already noted, Great Lakes
argued in its response to the Court's summary judgment decision
that Dawson could not serve as a representative of class members,
who overpaid their accounts by less than five dollars, because she
is not a member of that group. Dawson neither responded to that
argument nor asked the court for an opportunity to name an
additional representative. In any event, Dawson still cites no
authority for the view that a named plaintiff can be adequate
representative of a group that she is not a member of.

As for Dawson's argument that Great Lakes failed to remediate any
harm to the class, that argument was forfeited too, Judge Peterson
holds. In both her opening summary judgment brief and her
opposition to Great Lakes' summary judgment motion, Dawson argued
that the class has suffered approximately $6.6 million dollars in
damages, acknowledging that Great Lakes had corrected the bulk of
the improper interest calculations. In her reply brief, Dawson
changed course, arguing for the first time that Great Lakes had
failed to submit admissible evidence that it had corrected any of
its errors, so the class was entitled to approximately $29
million.

Ms. Dawson argues that she changed her position based on new
information that Great Lakes provided in response to her proposed
findings of fact. But the evidence cited in both Great Lakes'
response and Dawson's reply to the relevant facts was a deposition
taken in April 2019, a declaration filed in June 2020,
interrogatory responses from November 2018, and an expert report
prepared in September 2021, Judge Peterson notes. So Dawson had all
the relevant evidence long before she filed her summary judgment
brief in April 2022.

The Court isn't persuaded that Dawson received any new information
that would justify such a significant change in her position.

Order

Judge Peterson ruled that Plaintiff Meredith Dawson's motions for
reconsideration are denied. Ms. Dawson's request to send notice to
the excluded class members is granted.

The Defendants may have until June 10, 2022, to submit a list a
names and email addresses of all the excluded class members. Ms.
Dawson may have until June 17, 2022, to submit proposed language
for the email notice and the update on the class action website.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated June 2,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/22rsdxnd from
Leagle.com.


HIBBET INC: Kamel FCRA Suit Removed to C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Anthony Kamel, individually and on behalf of a
class of other similarly situated individuals v. Hibbet, Inc.,
Hibbett Retail, Inc., Case No. 30-02022-01257316-CU-NP-CXC was
removed from the Superior Court of CA for the County of Orange, to
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on
June 1, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 8:22-cv-01096-DOC-JDE to
the proceeding.

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.

Hibbett Sports, Inc. -- http://www.hibbett.com/-- is an American
publicly traded holding company for Hibbett Sporting Goods, a full
line sporting goods retailer headquartered in Birmingham,
Alabama.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John R. Habashy, Esq.
          Lexicon Law PC
          633 West Fifth Street 28th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Phone: (213) 233-5900
          Fax: (888) 373-2107
          Email: john@lexiconlaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Ophir Johna, Esq.
          Karen T Tsui, Esq.
          Misty A. Murray, Esq.
          Maynard Cooper and Gale PC
          10100 Santa Monica Boulevard Suite 550
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: (310) 595-4364
          Fax: (205) 254-1999
          Email: ojohna@maynardcooper.com
                 ktsui@maynardcooper.com
                 misty.murray@maynardcooper.com



HLA USA LLC: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against HLA USA LLC. The case
is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. HLA USA LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-04536
(S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

HLA USA LLC is located in Chaska, Minnesota and is part of the
Electronic Shopping and Mail-Order Houses Industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


HUMBL INC: Bronstein Gewirtz Reminds of July 19 Deadline
--------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC reminds investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against the following publicly-traded
companies. You can review a copy of the Complaints by visiting the
links below or you may contact Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or his Law
Clerk and Client Relations Manager, Yael Nathanson of Bronstein,
Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If you suffered a loss,
you can request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your
ability to share in any recovery doesn't require that you serve as
a lead plaintiff. A lead plaintiff acts on behalf of all other
class members in directing the litigation. The lead plaintiff can
select a law firm of its choice. An investor's ability to share in
any potential future recovery is not dependent upon serving as lead
plaintiff.

HUMBL, Inc. (OTCMKTS: HMBL)
Class Period: HUMBL common stock and/or the unregistered HUMBL
BLOCK Exchange Traded Index ("ETX") securities between November 21,
2020 and the filing of this action
Deadline: July 19, 2022
For more info: www.bgandg.com/hmbl.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business and operations. Specifically, defendants made
false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose (1)
that the HUMBL Pay App did not have even the basic functionality
that it promised investors; and (2) that several of its hyped
international business partnerships had a very low chance of
contributing material revenues to the Company's bottom line.

Pegasystems Inc. (NASDAQ: PEGA)
Class Period: May 29, 2020 - May 9, 2022
Deadline: July 18, 2022
For more info: www.bgandg.com/pega.
The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, defendants
made materially false and misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) PEGA committed corporate espionage and misuse of
trade secrets to better compete against Appian. was involved in;
(2) Defendant's product development and related success was not, in
significant part, the result of its own research and product
testing, but the result of such corporate espionage and trade
secret theft; (3) the defendants were involved in a scheme to steal
Appian trade secrets, which was not only known, but carried out
through the personal involvement of the CEO of PEGA; (4) PEGA's CEO
and other officers and employees did not comply with PEGA's written
code of conduct; (5) PEGA was "unable to make a reasonable estimate
of damages" in the Appian lawsuit; and (6) as a result of the
foregoing, Defendant's statements regarding PEGA's business,
operations, prospects, legal compliance, and potential harm risk in
Appian Litigation were materially false and/or misleading and/or
made of reasonable grounds. There was a lack.

Okta, Inc. (NASDAQ: OKTA)
Class Period: March 5, 2021 - May 22, 2022,
Deadline: July 19, 2022
For more info: www.bgandg.com/okta.
The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operations, and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) the Company had inadequate
cybersecurity controls; (ii) as a result, the Company's systems
were vulnerable to data breaches; (iii) the Company ultimately did
experience a data breach caused by a hacking group, which
potentially affected hundreds of the Company customers; (iv) the
Company initially did not disclose and subsequently downplayed the
severity of the data breach; (v) all the foregoing, once revealed,
was likely to have a material negative impact on the Company's
business, financial condition, and reputation; and (vi) as a
result, the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

Contact:
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
Peretz Bronstein or Yael Nathanson
212-697-6484 | info@bgandg.com [GN]

ILLINOIS: Adamczyk's Bid to Certify Rule 23 Class Tossed
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Adamczyk v. IDOC et al.,
Case No. 3:22-cv-00863 (S.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Staci M. Yandle
entered an order denying motion to certify class.

The Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, seeks certification of a class
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23. However, a
prisoner bringing a pro se action cannot represent a class of
plaintiffs, Judge Staci says.

The Illinois Department of Corrections is a multicultural agency
deeply committed to ensuring diversity, equity, and inclusion.

The nature of suit states Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus -
Prison Condition.[CC]

INJURED WORKERS: Faces Data Breach Class Action in Massachusetts
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jessy Edwards, writing for Top Class Actions, reports that drug
delivery service Injured Workers Pharmacy (IWP) failed to protect
the private information of its patients, leading to a data breach,
according to a class action lawsuit.

Plaintiffs Alexsis Webb and Marsclette Charley filed the class
action complaint against IWP May 23 in a Massachusetts federal
court, alleging negligence and invasion of privacy.

IWP distributes prescription medications to the homes of injured
workers.

According to the complaint, the company failed to protect the
personal information of more than 75,000 customers amid a data
breach and then didn't notify the patients until nine months
later.

The plaintiffs claim the company failed to implement data security
safeguards, train its employees for IT security or take other steps
to protect its customers' private, personally identifiable
information before it was compromised during a January 2021 data
breach.

"IWP's negligent conduct caused the data breach," the class action
lawsuit claims.

"IWP violated its obligation to implement best practices and comply
with industry standards concerning computer system security, IWP
failed to comply with security standards and allowed its patients
[personally identifiable information] to be accessed and stolen --
for nearly four months -- by failing to implement security measures
that could have prevented, mitigated or detected the data breach,"
the lawsuit states.

Patients Not Alerted to Breach Until Nine Months Later, According
to Class Action
The patients say their credit reports, financial information,
Social Security numbers and other sensitive data was exposed to
cybercriminals.

Despite this, they say, they weren't alerted of the breach until
Feb. 3, almost nine months after the company said it discovered it.


Since then, the plaintiffs say they have spent time and money
trying to protect and monitor their accounts to protect themselves
from identity theft. Webb says she believes her information has
been used by a cybercriminal.

The plaintiffs seek to represent a class of current and former IWP
customers.

They're suing for negligence, negligence per se, breach of implied
contract and fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment and invasion of
privacy, and seek certification of the class action, damages, fees,
costs and a jury trial.

The news comes after Capital One agreed to pay $190 million as part
of a settlement to resolve claims it jeopardized customer
information in a 2019 data breach.

The patients are represented by H. Luke Mitcheson of Morgan &
Morgan.

The IWP Data Breach Class Action Lawsuit is Webb et al. v. Injured
Workers Pharmacy LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-10797, in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts. [GN]

INVITATION HOMES: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss McCumber Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRANCINE McCUMBER, et al., Plaintiffs v. INVITATION
HOMES, INC., Defendant, Civil Action No. 3:21-CV-2194-B (N.D.
Tex.), Judge Jane J. Boyle of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, grants in part and
denies in part Invitation Homes' Motion to Dismiss.

I. Background

The lawsuit is a putative class action dispute about the legality
of late-fee amounts for late rent payments. The Plaintiffs consist
of former renters of Invitation Homes' properties in ten different
states who were charged late fees. Plaintiff McCumber rented a home
in Arizona, Plaintiff Erin Bird rented a home in Colorado,
Plaintiff Melissa Lynch rented homes in Florida, Plaintiff La Shay
Harvey rented a home in Georgia, Plaintiff Maryah Marciniak rented
a home in Illinois, Plaintiff Brian Majka rented a home in North
Carolina, Plaintiff Chad Whetman rented a home in Nevada, Plaintiff
Tracy White rented a home in Tennessee, Plaintiff Rachel Osborn
rented a home in Texas, and Plaintiff Teresa Kerr rented a home in
Washington. Each represents a putative subclass representing
plaintiffs in their respective states.

Invitation Homes "owns, leases, and manages more than 82,000 rental
homes across the country" with "uniform late rent penalty policies
across all their residential properties in a state." If a renter
fails to pay their rent on time or within the applicable grace
period, Invitation Homes charges a late fee and threatens eviction.
Invitation Homes "often tacks on a 'legal' fee which can be $75 or
more." The late fees can result in "pyramiding" penalties for
renters if they carry over a late fee from month to month.

The Plaintiffs contend that each of the late fees "had little to no
relation to the actual damages" sustained by Invitation Homes from
the late payment of rent. As such, according to them, these late
fees amount to an "illegal penalty" in violation of each state's
laws prohibiting "liquidated damages" unless "(a) it would be
extremely difficult or infeasible to calculate actual damages from
the late payment; and (b) they undertake a sufficient endeavor to
set a reasonable amount in light of the actual harm."

The Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on Jan. 14, 2021, in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The Maryland
District Court transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas on Sept. 9, 2021. The Plaintiffs
amended their complaint on Jan. 20, 2022; the Amended Complaint
includes claims for unjust enrichment for each of the Plaintiffs'
states, declaratory judgment claims for each of the Plaintiffs'
states except Florida and Colorado, and statutory claims for each
of the Plaintiffs' states except Colorado, Tennessee, and Nevada.

On Feb. 22, 2022, Invitation Homes moved to dismiss the amended
complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6).

The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. Judge Boyle
considers it.

II. Analysis

Judge Boyle addresses Invitation Homes' general arguments for
dismissal before addressing the arguments for dismissal of the
class allegations. She then addresses the particularized arguments
for each claim, beginning with the unjust enrichment claims and
then the separate state statutory claims.

A. Specificity of the Allegations and Standing

Judge Boyle denies Invitation Homes' motion as to the arguments
regarding specificity of the allegations and standing. She allows
the Plaintiffs to replead their allegations to include a class
period for each of the class claims. Inclusion of the class period
will naturally hinge on the statute of limitations for Plaintiffs'
claims, addressing one of Invitation Homes' arguments. As for
standing, Plaintiffs are only required to plead general allegations
of injury resulting from Invitation Homes' conduct. The Plaintiffs
have sufficiently alleged that Invitation Homes harmed each of them
by charging a late fee.

B. Dismissal of the Class

The Plaintiffs brings a class action for ten separate subclasses
for "all of Defendant's specified state tenants who were charged
penalties or fees for paying rent Defendant deemed as late or
deficient." The individual subclasses include tenants in Arizona,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Nevada, North Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and Washington.

Invitation Homes argues for dismissal of the Plaintiff classes
because the Amended Complaint "seeks to assert class claims
involving various and differing state laws," failing "the
commonality and superiority requirements of Rule 23(a) and
23(b)(3)." It further contends that the class allegations fail
"because they do not identify the relevant time period and define
the class to include those who suffered no injury."

Judge Boyle holds that Invitation Homes' first argument fails
because the Plaintiffs bring 10 subclasses and not a nationwide or
multistate class. The case cited by Invitation Homes dismissed the
national and multistate classes because of the conflict between the
various state laws. The second argument succeeds because the
classes lack any definitive class period and thus are not
ascertainable. The subclasses do not include a time period for when
the proposed classes were charged a late fee. The lack of a
temporal limitation proves fatal for the class allegations, because
the Court cannot determine the beginning or end date for each of
the proposed subclasses. Therefore, Judge Bole dismisses without
prejudice the class allegations.

C. Declaratory Judgment -- Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, North
Carolina, Nevada, Tennessee, Texas, Washington -- Counts 3, 10, 13,
16, 18, 20, 23, 26

The Plaintiffs bring eight claims under the Declaratory Judgment
Act requesting that the Court "declare that the Defendant's late
fees are illegal penalties under specified state's law that must be
voided and all fees collected returned." Because the Plaintiffs
bring the same claim for each state, the Court analyzes the claims
together. Invitation Homes argues for dismissal of all eight
declaratory judgment claims because they are redundant of the
state-law claims that seek the same relief.

Judge Boyle holds that the declaratory judgment claims duplicate
the state law claims. Therefore, she dismisses without prejudice
the declaratory judgment claims.

D. Unjust Enrichment

Invitation Homes argues that each of the unjust enrichment claims
are deficient because they fail to plead facts of "why the late
fees are unlawful." The claims also fail, according to Invitation
Homes, because the Plaintiffs cannot assert a quasi-contract claim
"when there is an express contract governing the parties'
relationship." Additionally, Invitation Homes avers that the
Plaintiffs "cannot plausibly allege that there is anything
'unjust'" about the late fees. Further, Invitation Homes contends
that the Plaintiffs' "one-size-fits-all approach" to pleading the
claims fails to allege each of the elements required in the
different jurisdictions.

The Plaintiffs respond that no "enforceable contract controls the
Plaintiffs' remedies," so their claim is allowed. Alternatively,
they claim that the contracts are void because the late-fee
provision is unenforceable for imposing an illegal penalty. They
contend that several courts have allowed unjust enrichment claims
based on a liquidated damages provision. Further, they maintain
that the "entire Complaint" sufficiently alleges each of the
elements for the individual state claims and explains how
Invitation Homes' late fees are unjust.

Judge Boyle (i) dismisses without prejudice Count 2 (Arizona); (ii)
denies Invitation Homes' motion to dismiss as to Count 4
(Colorado); (iii) denies Invitation Homes' motion to dismiss as to
Count 6 (Florida); (iv) denies Invitation Homes' motion to dismiss
as to Count 9 (Georgia) for the same reasons as the Colorado and
Florida claims; and (v) dismisses Count 12 (Illinois) with
prejudice because the Plaintiffs are unable to plead such a claim
under Illinois law without relying on the express contract between
the parties.

Judge Boyle further (i) denies Invitation Homes' motion to dismiss
as to Count 15 (North Carolina) because the Plaintiffs sufficiently
alleged the elements of this claim in their Amended Complaint; (ii)
denies Invitation Homes' motion to dismiss as to Count 17 (Nevada)
for the same reasons as the Colorado, Florida, and Georgia claims;
(iii) denies Invitation Homes' motion to dismiss as to Count 19
(Tennessee); (iv) denies Invitation Homes' motion to dismiss as to
Count 22 (Texas) because the Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that
Invitation Homes took undue advantage of them and their other Texas
claim survives; and (v) denies Invitation Homes' motion to dismiss
as to Count 25 (Washington) because the Plaintiffs sufficiently
alleged each of these elements in the Amended Complaint.

E. State Statutory Claims

Judge Boyle finds that (i) the Plaintiffs cannot state a claim
under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 47-2718(A) (Count 1) for a
residential lease and this claim is dismissed with prejudice; (ii)
nothing is inherently unfair or deceptive about requiring on-time
payment and then charging a fee for noncompliance and dismisses
without prejudice the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act Violation - Fla. Stat. Section 501.201 (Count 5) claim; (iii)
because of the conflict between the Amended Complaint and the
Plaintiffs' Response to the Motion to Dismiss, she is unsure
whether the Plaintiffs intended to plead a GFBPA claim or a Georgia
Uniform Deceptive Practices Act - Ga. Code Section  10-1-370 (Count
7) claim and dismisses this claim without prejudice; and (iv) the
allegation that the liquidated damages provision acted as a penalty
suffices to plead a claim under Ga. Code. Ann. Section 13-6-7
(Count 8) and denies Invitation Homes' motion to dismiss for this
claim.

Judge Boyle further finds that (i) the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act
- 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1 (Count 11) claim "fails to rise to the
level of unfairness necessary to support a claim under the Consumer
Fraud Act and dismisses this claim with prejudice; (ii) the
Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded their North Carolina Unfair and
Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("NCUDTPA") (Count 14) claim and
denies Invitation Homes' motion for this claim; (iii) the
Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the Rexas Deceptive Trade Practices
- Consumer Protection Act - Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Section 17.41
(Count 21) claim with enough particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b) and
denies Invitation Homes' motion for this claim; and (iv) aany
dispute about Invitation Homes' late fee falls within the ambit of
the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973 and outside of the
ambit of the Washington Consumer Protection Act - Rev. Code Wash.
Section 19.86.010 (Count 24) and dismisses this claim with
prejudice.

F. Leave to Amend

Given that this is the Court's first opportunity to assess the
sufficiency of the Plaintiffs' allegations, Judge Boyle deems it
appropriate to provide them one chance to amend their pleadings in
light of the deficiencies noted in the Order. She says, this second
amended complaint will be filed within 30 days of the date of the
Order.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, grants in part and denies in part
Invitation Homes' Motion to Dismiss. Specifically, she dismisses
without prejudice the class allegations and counts 2, 3, 5, 7, 10,
13, 16, 18, 20, 23, and 26. She dismisses with prejudice counts 1,
11, 12, and 24. Further, she denies the Motion for counts 4, 6, 8,
9, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 22, and 25.

Within 30 days of the date of the Order, the Plaintiffs may file a
second amended complaint as permitted. From the date of the
Plaintiffs' filing, Invitation Homes has 21 days to file an answer
or motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/32nwwvt5 from
Leagle.com.


IONQ INC: Glancy Prongay Reminds of Lead Plaintiff Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM"), disclosed that it has filed a
class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, captioned Leacock v. IonQ, Inc., et al., Case
No. 22-cv-1306, on behalf of persons and entities that purchased or
otherwise acquired IonQ, Inc. ("IonQ" or the "Company") (NYSE:
IONQ) securities between March 30, 2021 and May 2, 2022, inclusive
(the "Class Period"). Plaintiff pursues claims under Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act").

Investors are hereby notified that they have 60 days from this
notice to move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff in this
action.

If you suffered a loss on your IonQ investments or would like to
inquire about potentially pursuing claims to recover your loss
under the federal securities laws, you can submit your contact
information at https://www.glancylaw.com/cases/ionq-inc/. You can
also contact Charles H. Linehan, of GPM at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free
at 888-773-9224, or via email at shareholders@glancylaw.com or
visit our website at www.glancylaw.com to learn more about your
rights.

On May 3, 2022, Scorpion Capital released a research report
alleging, among other things, that IonQ is a "scam built on phony
statements about nearly all key aspects of the technology and
business." It further claimed that the Company reported
"[f]ictitious 'revenue' via sham transactions and related-party
round-tripping."

On this news, the Company's stock fell $0.71, or 9%, to close at
$7.15 per share on May 3, 2022, on unusually heavy trading volume.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that IonQ had not yet developed a 32-qubit quantum
computer; (2) that the Company's 11-qubit quantum computer suffered
from significant error rates, rendering it useless; (3) that IonQ's
quantum computer is not sufficiently reliable, so it is not
accessible despite being available through major cloud providers;
(4) that a significant portion of IonQ's revenue was derived from
improper round-tripping transactions with related parties; and (5)
that, as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements
about the Company's business, operations, and prospects were
materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all
relevant times.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired IonQ securities during the
Class Period, you may move the Court no later than 60 days from
this notice to ask the Court to appoint you as lead plaintiff. To
be a member of the Class you need not take any action at this time;
you may retain counsel of your choice or take no action and remain
an absent member of the Class. If you wish to learn more about this
action, or if you have any questions concerning this announcement
or your rights or interests with respect to these matters, please
contact Charles Linehan, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park East,
Suite 2100, Los Angeles California 90067 at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free
at 888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit
our website at www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email please
include your mailing address, telephone number and number of shares
purchased.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules.

Contacts:
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Los Angeles
Charles H. Linehan, 310-201-9150 or 888-773-9224
1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
Los Angeles, CA 90067
www.glancylaw.com
shareholders@glancylaw.com [GN]

JETSON ELECTRIC: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jetson Electric Bikes
LLC. The case is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Jetson Electric Bikes
LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-04544 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Jetson Electric -- https://ridejetson.com/ -- is a leader in
personal mobility devices including electric bikes, electric
scooters, and hoverboards.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Faces BIPA Class Action in New Jersey
--------------------------------------------------------
Jessy Edwards, writing for Top Class Actions, reports that a
consumer hit Johnson & Johnson with a class action lawsuit claiming
the company illegally collected and stored her biometric
information through its Neutrogena Skin360 skincare program.

Plaintiff Helene Melzer filed the class action complaint against
Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc. (J&J) May 26 in a New Jersey
federal court, alleging violations of the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act (BIPA).

According to the lawsuit, J&J breached BIPA through a digital skin
care program called Neutrogena Skin360 that scans consumers' faces
to recommend specific beauty products.

Neutrogena Skin360 provides a "personalized at-home skin
assessment" online and as an app for smartphones, the lawsuit says.


To use the program, J&J asks consumers to complete a 180-degree
facial scan in which the software analyzes their skin health and
creates a "Skin360 score" through which they can receive skin
routine recommendations, the class action states.

However, the biometric data is also then linked to personal
information, such as the consumer's name, birthday and email
address, as well as sleep schedules, exercise routines, stress
levels and geographic location, Melzer says.

J&J also used the data to improve the functionality of its
artificial intelligence assistant, which recommends products based
on what it learns about customers' faces, without their consent,
she says.

Johnson & Johnson Class Action Alleges Neutrogena 360 Uses Data
Without Customers' Knowledge
J&J obtains and stores biometric data without the customer's
express knowledge of the process or of how long their data will be
used, the class action lawsuit alleges.

"Defendant's violations of BIPA injured plaintiff and the class
members, who lost the power and ability to make informed choices
about defendant's collection, storage and use of their highly
sensitive biometric information," the lawsuit states.

Melzer seeks to represent a class of thousands of consumers in
Illinois whose biometric data was collected, stored or otherwise
used through Neutrogena Skin360.

She's suing under BIPA and for unjust enrichment. The lawsuit is
seeking an injunction preventing continued violations of BIPA,
damages, fees, costs and a jury trial.

Consumers have become growingly concerned with their right to data
privacy and data security when it comes to biometric data made
vulnerable by devices such as fingerprint and facial scanners.

Lawmakers introduced the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act
in 2008 as a way to combat these concerns, and it has since been at
the center of a number of class action lawsuits and settlements.

What do you think of the allegations in this case? Let us know in
the comments.

Melzer is represented by Matthew R. Mendelsohn of Mazie Slater Katz
& Freeman LLC; Grace E. Parasmo and Yitzchak H. Lieberman of
Parasmo Lieberman Law; and Allen Schwartz of the Law Office of
Allen Schwartz.

The Johnson & Johnson BIPA Class Action Lawsuit is Melzer v.
Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc., Case No. 3:22-cv-03149, in the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. [GN]

KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN: Roberson Sues Over FMLA Rights Violation
--------------------------------------------------------------
Roderick Roberson, Michael Hudson, Dylon White, Caleb Schmitt,
Justin Berberich, Chris Ulrich, and Ron Collins, individually and
on behalf of the proposed class, Plaintiffs v. The Kansas City
Southern Railway Co., Defendant, Case No. 4:22-cv-00358-RK (W.D.
Mo., May 31, 2022) alleges that the Defendant systematically
deprives its employees, including Plaintiffs, of their Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave by grossly miscalculating the amount
of FMLA leave available.

According to the complaint, KCS provides employees with as little
as 12 days of leave per year rather than giving employees 12 weeks
of FMLA leave. Based on its flawed calculations, KCS falsely
asserts that employees have exhausted their FMLA leave, then
disciplines and terminates employees who take time off to meet
their important family and medical needs -- time off that should be
protected under the FMLA, says the suit.

The Plaintiffs, current and former KCS employees who rely on the
protections of the FMLA, bring this class action to put a stop to
KCS's alleged unlawful conduct.

The Kansas City Southern Railway Co. is an American Class I
railroad. Founded in 1887, it operates in 10 midwestern and
southeastern U.S. states: Illinois, Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma,
Arkansas, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and
Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Steven L. Groves, Esq.
          GROVES POWERS LLC
          One U.S. Bank Plaza
          505 N. 7th St., Ste. 2010
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: (314) 696-2300
          E-mail: sgroves@grovespowers.com

               - and -

          Adam W. Hansen, Esq.
          Eleanor Frisch, Esq.
          APOLLO LAW LLC
          333 Washington Avenue North Suite 300
          Minneapolis, MN 55401
          Telephone: (612) 927-2969
          E-mail: adam@apollo-law.com
                  eleanor@apollo-law.com

               - and -

          Colin Reeves, Esq.
          APOLLO LAW LLC
          1000 Dean Street, Suite 101
          Brooklyn, NY 11238
          Telephone: (646) 363-6763
          E-mail: colin@apollo-law.com

               - and -

          Nicholas D. Thompson, Esq.
          CASEY JONES LAW
          3520 Cherryvale Avenue, Suite 83
          Appleton, WI 54913
          Telephone: (757) 477-0991
          E-mail: nthompson@caseyjones.law

KENNETT, MO: Bruce Files Suit in E.D. Missouri
----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Brown-Forman
Corporation. The case is styled as Jim R. Bruce, Katherine F.
Bruce, individually and on befalf of others similarly situated v.
City of Kennett, Nick Weatherwax, Roger Wheeler, Kay Collins, Kent
Freeman, Kenny Wilson, individually and in their official
capacities as members of the Kennett Missouri City Council and its
Public Safety Committee acting as Building Commissioner; Bob
Hancock, former mayor and ex-officio member of the Public Safety
Committee; Victor Mode, Individually, and as City Code Enforcement
Officer; Ross Farms Trucking, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-00072 (E.D.
Mo., June 1, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Civil Rights.

Kennett -- https://www.cityofkennettmo.com/ -- is a city in, and
the county seat of, Dunklin County, Missouri.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jim R. Bruce, II, Esq.
          P.O. Box 37
          Kennett, MO 63857
          Phone: (573) 888-9696
          Fax: (573) 888-3931
          Email: jimbrucelaw@yahoo.com


KERRY INC: Must Face Class Action Over Mismanaged Retirement Funds
------------------------------------------------------------------
Jacklyn Wille, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that Kerry Inc.
must face the bulk of a proposed class action claiming the food and
nutrition company mismanaged its employees' $444 million retirement
plan by allowing the plan to charge excessive fees for record
keeping and managed account services, a US judge ruled, denying the
company's motion to dismiss.

Kerry argued its 401(k) record keeping fees were "reasonable as a
matter of law" under the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit's 2020 decision in Divane v. Northwestern University. [GN]

KIA AMERICA: Court Grants Bid to Add Class Reps in Marvin Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEFANIE MARVIN, and KATHERINE WARGIN, on behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. KIA
AMERICA, INC., HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, and HYUNDAI AMERICA TECHNICAL
CENTER, INC., Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-1146-pp (E.D. Wis.), Judge
Pamela Pepper of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin issues an order granting:

   a. the Plaintiffs' Motion to Add Party Proposed Class
      Representatives;

   b. the Plaintiffs' Motion to Restrict Amended Complaint; and

   c. the Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Redacted
      Complaint.

I. Background

On June 23, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a putative class action in
Milwaukee County Circuit Court after Milwaukee saw a record rise in
the number of vehicles stolen in the community. According to the
complaint, Kia and Hyundai represent 66% of all auto thefts in
Milwaukee. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants knew of the
design defects that made their cars easier to steal. On Oct. 5,
2021, the Defendants filed a notice of removal from state court,
asserting that the case was removable under the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. Sections 1332(d) and 1453.

Soon thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to join additional
class representative; an amended complaint; a motion to restrict
the amended complaint; and a motion for leave to file a redacted
amended complaint. The Defendants since have filed two motions to
dismiss: One motion filed by the two car manufacturers and the
other motion filed by Hyundai America Technical Center, Inc.

II. Discussion

A. Plaintiffs' Motion to Add Party Proposed Class Representatives

On Nov. 4, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to join Chaid
Przybelski, Chad Just, Amy Flasch and Lydia Davis as additional
class representatives under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
15(a)(1)(A) and 20(a)(1). They argue that "the amendment" --
presumably an amended complaint to add these representatives -- is
proper under Rule 15 because the rule allowed them to amend once as
a matter of right 21 days after serving the original complaint and
the parties entered into a stipulated schedule extending the
deadline for the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint to Nov. 4,
2021.

The Plaintiffs assert that they satisfy the requirements for
permissive joinder because the claims arise out of the same
transactions or occurrences. They assert that all named Plaintiffs
purchased or leased the class vehicles with the alleged defects,
all are victims of Milwaukee's car theft "epidemic," and all
vehicles were stolen (or totaled) in the same way and sustained
similar damage.

In addition, the Plaintiffs also allege that they share common
questions of law or fact "including whether: (i) the Defendants
designed and manufactured the Class Vehicles with the Defect; (ii)
this Defect rendered the Class Vehicles susceptible to theft; and
(iii) there was an alternative design Defendants could have
implemented to render the Class Vehicles less susceptible to theft,
among many others."

The Defendants did not respond to the motion.

Judge Pepper finds that not only is the motion unopposed, but it
satisfies the requirements for permissive joinder under Rule 20.
The events arise out of the same occurrence -- the alleged defects
that the plaintiffs say contributed to the thefts and resulting
damage to the vehicles. They also raise common questions of fact
and law. They call into question the same alleged manufacturing and
design defects and the same alternative designs available to each
defendant. Judge Pepper will grant the unopposed motion for joinder
and allow the Plaintiff to proceed on the amended complaint (which
the Defendants already have moved to dismiss).

B. Plaintiffs' Motion to Restrict Amended Complaint and Plaintiffs'
Motion for Leave to File Redacted Complaint

On the same day that the Plaintiffs filed the amended complaint,
they filed a motion to restrict the amended complaint. They explain
that Milwaukee is experiencing an auto theft epidemic, with 8,432
auto thefts in 2021 (up from 3,100 thefts in 2020). At issue are
the vehicles manufactured by Kia and Hyundai, which the Plaintiffs
allege contain a combination of defects that make them susceptible
to theft. The Plaintiffs include in the amended complaint details
about the specific nature of the defect, how the vehicles are
stolen and the existence of alternative designs that would have
prevented the thefts. The Plaintiffs fear that making such
information public will only exacerbate the problem.

The Milwaukee County Circuit Court had sealed the original
complaint and the parties stipulated to a briefing schedule to
address any necessary redactions to the amended complaint. To
comply with the rules, the Plaintiffs consulted with the clerk's
office and filed two versions of the amended complaint but asked
that both be restricted until the parties could discuss the
proposed redactions.

On Feb. 16, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed their motion to approve the
filing of the redacted amended complaint. They explained that the
parties reached an agreement regarding the scope of the redactions
and asked the Court to approve the stipulation. The Plaintiffs
argue that there is a good cause for the redactions because "the
redacted portions of the Amended Complaint either depict in
pictures or describe in words the various steps that, when pieced
together, can be undertaken to steal certain vehicles described in
the Amended Complaint."

Judge Pepper holds that the agreement of the parties is
insufficient to warrant restricting documents from the public
because the long-standing tradition in this country is that
litigation is open to the public. To the extent possible, the
movant should file a version of the document or material that
redacts only those portions of the document that are subject to the
sealing requirement.

The Plaintiffs are asking that the amended complaint be restricted
to the parties and that they be able to file the redacted version
that they have agreed upon. Having reviewed the 168-page amended
complaint and the proposed redactions,  Judge Pepper is satisfied
that the parties have made sufficient effort to narrowly tailor the
redactions to prevent the disclosure of the design defect that
allegedly makes it easy to steal the Kia and Hyundai cars. While
some of this information could be discovered through an internet
search, not all of it appears to be publicly available or
consolidated into a single document. Judge Pepper finds that the
parties have established good cause for restricting the amended
complaint and for filing a redacted version of the same.

III. Conclusion

Judge Pepper grants the Plaintiffs' motion to join additional class
representatives. She orders the Clerk of Court to add Chaid
Przybelski, Chad Just, Amy Flasch and Lydia Davis to the docket as
plaintiffs.

Judge Pepper also grants the Plaintiffs' motion to restrict the
amended complaint. She orders that the amended complaint at Dkt.
No. 12 remain restricted to case participants and the Court.

She approves the parties' stipulation to file a redacted amended
complaint and grants the Plaintiffs' motion to file redacted
amended complaint. She orders the Plaintiffs to file the redacted
version of the amended complaint, along with the unredacted
versions of Exhibits A-S (currently filed as dkt. nos. 12-2 to
12-20).

Finally, Judge Pepper orders that the parties must appear for a
telephonic motion hearing on Sept. 6, 2022, at 3:00 p.m., to
address the Defendants' motions to dismiss. The parties are to
appear by calling the Court's conference line at 888-557-8511 and
entering access code 4893665#.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/njbermjj from Leagle.com.


KURARAY CO: Court Dismisses Remaining Claims in Teamster Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TEAMSTER MEMBERS RETIREMENT PLAN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. RANDALL S.
DEARTH, ROBERT M. FORTWANGLER, STEVAN R. SCHOTT, JAMES A. COCCAGNO,
CHAD WHALEN, J. RICH ALEXANDER, WILLIAM J. LYONS, LOUIS S. MASSIMO,
WILLIAM R. NEWLIN, JOHN J. PARO, JULIE S. ROBERTS, TIMOTHY G.
RUPERT, DONALD C. TEMPLIN, KURARAY CO., LTD., KURARAY HOLDINGS
U.S.A., INC. AND MORGAN STANLEY & CO. LLC, Defendants, C.A. No.
2020-0807-MTZ (Del. Ch.), the Court of Chancery of Delaware grants
the Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss the remaining counts
in the Complaint.

I. Background

The Verified Class Action Complaint in the action asserts putative
class action claims stemming from the March 2018 acquisition of
Calgon Carbon Corp. ("Calgon" or the "Company") by Defendants
Kuraray Co. Ltd. and Kuraray Holdings U.S.A., Inc. (collectively,
"Kuraray"). Plaintiff Teamster Members Retirement Plan was a
beneficial owner of Calgon common stock at all relevant times
before the Acquisition.

Before the Acquisition, Calgon was a publicly traded activated
carbon manufacturer. Its products had multiple applications,
including water purification, pollution abatement, and other
industrial uses. Calgon originated as the Pittsburgh Coke &
Chemical Co. in 1942. It had several ties to the Pittsburgh
community and was headquartered in the Pittsburgh suburb of Moon
Township, Pennsylvania.

Calgon was managed by a nine-member board of directors. All nine
directors are Defendants in the action: Randall S. Dearth, the
Board's chairman; J. Rich Alexander; William J. Lyons; Louis S.
Massimo; William R. Newlin; John J. Paro; Julie S. Roberts; Timothy
G. Rupert; and Donald C. Templin (together, the "Director
Defendants"). In addition to being the Board's chairman, Dearth was
also the Company's CEO. Four other officers are named as
Defendants: Robert M. Fortwangler, the Company's CFO; Stevan R.
Schott, the Company's Executive Vice President of the Advancement
Materials, Manufacturing and Equipment Division and its former CFO;
James A. Coccagno, the Company's Executive Vice President of the
Core Carbon and Services Division; and Chad Whalen, the Company's
Senior Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary (together
with Dearth, the "Officer Defendants," and with the Director
Defendants, the "Individual Defendants").

In March 2018, Kuraray, a major Japanese chemical manufacturer
acquired a Pittsburgh-based activated carbon company for $1.1
billion in a cash-out transaction. The acquisition was the
culmination of years of discussions between the target and the
buyer about various strategic transactions. The final price
represented a 62.9% premium over the target's unaffected stock
price. The target's stockholders voted overwhelmingly in favor of
the transaction.

The single-bidder process predictably attracted scrutiny. The
Plaintiff, a former target stockholder, criticizes the acquisition
and the process that led to it, and sought company documents to
investigate its theory and then to sue. The stockholder claims the
buyer's promise of continued employment incentivized the company's
fiduciaries to make a deal happen by depressing valuation
information and tainting the negotiation process.

The Complaint asserts four counts. Counts I and II assert breaches
of fiduciary duty against the Officer Defendants and the Director
Defendants, respectively. The Plaintiff contends Calgon's
management was motivated not by stockholder value, but by seeking
to keep their jobs, and constrained the sale process and depressed
calculations of the Company's value in order to draw an offer from
their preferred bidder that appeared fair and would keep them in
their roles after the Acquisition. Count III alleges Morgan Stanley
aided and abetted those breaches, and Count IV alleges Kuraray
aided and abetted those same breaches. The Plaintiff has since
voluntarily dismissed Kuraray and Morgan Stanley; Counts III and IV
have accordingly been dismissed.

The target's former directors and officers moved to dismiss the
claims against them, contending the stockholder vote approving the
transaction was fully informed and uncoerced, and therefore
"cleansed" the transaction under Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings
LLC. The stockholder counters by asserting three alleged disclosure
violations place the acquisition beyond Corwin's reach. The parties
completed briefing and the Court heard oral argument on Feb. 22,
2022.

II. Analysis

Because Calgon stockholders received cash for their shares, the
Acquisition is presumptively subject to at least enhanced scrutiny
under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. The
Individual Defendants argue that the fiduciary duty claims in
Counts I and II must be dismissed under Corwin85 because a fully
informed, uncoerced majority of Calgon shareholders voted in favor
of the Acquisition and, therefore, the business judgment rule
unrebuttably applies. Even if Corwin is inapplicable, the
Individual Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's fiduciary duty
counts fail on their merits.

Corwin gives rise to the irrebuttable presumption of the business
judgment rule when a transaction "is approved by a fully informed,
uncoerced vote of the disinterested stockholders." To obtain the
protection of Corwin's presumption, the Defendants must
"demonstrate that the cash-out Acquisition has been approved by a
fully informed, uncoerced majority of the disinterested
stockholders.

Though the Plaintiff raises several alleged disclosure
deficiencies, the Court of Chancery concludes that the stockholder
vote approving the Acquisition was fully informed. There is no
dispute that the vote was uncoerced. It is satisfied that the
Plaintiff has failed to plead that the stockholders' decision to
vote for the Acquisition was not fully informed. The Plaintiff does
not argue that decision was coerced or that a conflicted
controlling stockholder put the Acquisition beyond Corwin's reach.

Given Corwin's application in the case, "the only claim the
Plaintiff could state that would overcome application of the
business judgment rule is a claim for waste." The Plaintiff has not
attempted to plead that claim. Thus, the Individual Defendants'
Motion is granted with respect to the breach of fiduciary duty
claims in Counts I and II. The Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed
Counts III and IV.

Because the Plaintiff does not allege waste, its breach of
fiduciary duty claims against the Individual Defendants must be
dismissed.

III. Conclusion

After careful consideration, the Court of Chancery concludes that
none of these alleged disclosure issues indicate the stockholders
were not fully informed when they approved the transaction. Because
the challenged acquisition was ratified by a fully informed
majority of the target's disinterested stockholders, the
stockholder's claims against the company's fiduciaries are
dismissed. Hence, the Motion is granted.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p9xsbkw from Leagle.com.

R. Bruce McNew -- bmcnew@coochtaylor.com -- COOCH AND TAYLOR, P.A.,
in Wilmington, Delaware; Randall J. Baron -- randyb@rgrdlaw.com --
and David T. Wissbroecker, ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP, in San
Diego, California; Christopher H. Lyons, ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN &
DOWD LLP, in Nashville, Tennessee, Attorneys for Plaintiff Teamster
Members Retirement Plan.

Stephen C. Norman, Tyler J. Leavengood, and Christopher D. Renaud,
POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP, in Wilmington, Delaware; Marc J.
Sonnenfeld, Michael L. Kichline, and Matthew D. Klayman, MORGAN,
LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Robert H.
O'Leary, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, in San Francisco, California,
Attorneys for Defendants Randall S. Dearth, Robert M. Fortwangler,
Stevan R. Schott, James A. Coccagno, Chad Whalen, J. Rich
Alexander, William J. Lyons, Louis S. Massimo, William R. Newlin,
John J. Paro, Julie S. Roberts, Timothy G. Rupert, and Donald C.
Templin.


LMP AUTOMOTIVE: Frank R. Cruz Law Reminds of July 26 Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Frank R. Cruz on May 31 disclosed that a class
action lawsuit has been filed on behalf of persons and entities
that purchased or otherwise acquired LMP Automotive Holdings, Inc.
("LMP" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: LMPX) securities between June 29,
2021 and May 19, 2022, inclusive (the "Class Period"). LMP
investors have until July 26, 2022 to file a lead plaintiff
motion.

On November 16, 2021, after the market closed, when LMP filed a
notification of inability to timely file its quarterly report for
third quarter 2021, it also identified several material weaknesses
in its internal control over financial reporting, including that
"[t]he Company did not maintain a formalized set of accounting
policies" and "[t]he Company did not maintain effective controls
over the review and approval of journal entries, account
reconciliations, review of significant accounts and disclosures,
and adequate documentation of management assumptions, estimates and
judgments."

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $0.74, or 5.5%, to
close at $12.66 per share on November 17, 2021.

Then, on March 31, 2022, LMP revealed that it could not timely file
its fiscal 2021 annual report "primarily [as] a result of its
ongoing evaluation of (i) the proper identification and elimination
of intercompany transactions, (ii) estimates of chargeback reserves
for finance and insurance products and (iii) various financial
presentation matters related to the Company's business, including
as it relates to the presentation, characterization and amounts of
such items in prior fiscal quarters."

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $0.19, or 3.8%, to
close at $4.81 per share on April 1, 2022.

Then, on May 17, 2022, after the market closed, LMP disclosed that
it could not timely file its Q1 2021 quarterly report due to the
previously announced ongoing evaluation. LMP further disclosed that
due to errors in the Company's quarterly reports during fiscal year
2021, such reports "will likely need to be restated." The Company
also disclosed that these errors may impact "certain previously
disclosed material weaknesses in the registrant's controls over
financial reporting."

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $0.07 per share, or
1.5%, to close at $4.60 per share on May 18, 2022.

Then, on May 19, 2022, after the market closed, LMP revealed that
it would restate the financial statements for quarterly periods in
fiscal 2021 "primarily due to the following errors: (i) the
improper identification and elimination of intercompany
transactions, (ii) incorrect estimates of chargeback reserves for
finance and insurance products, and (iii) certain financial
statement misclassifications impacting various balance sheet and
income statement financial statement captions in the Relevant
Periods." These results caused a decrease in total revenues up to
$15 million for third quarter 2021, up to $8 million for second
quarter 2021, and up to $1 million for first quarter 2021. As a
result, the Company stated that "material weaknesses exist in the
Company's internal control over financial reporting and that the
Company's disclosure controls and procedures were not effective."

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $0.20 per share, or
4.4%, to close at $4.26 per share on May 20, 2022.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to investors
that: (1) that the Company engaged in the improper identification
and elimination of intercompany transactions; (2) that the Company
used incorrect estimates for chargeback reserves for finance and
insurance products; (3) that the Company had misclassified certain
items in its financial statements which impacted balance sheet and
income statement financial statement captions; (4) that there were
material weaknesses in LMP's internal control over financial
reporting; (5) that, as a result of the foregoing, the Company
overstated its revenue; (6) that, as a result of the foregoing, the
Company would restate certain of its previously issued financial
statements and results; and (7) that, as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.

If you purchased LMP securities during the Class Period, you may
move the Court no later than July 26, 2022 to ask the Court to
appoint you as lead plaintiff. To be a member of the Class you need
not take any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your
choice or take no action and remain an absent member of the Class.
If you purchased LMP securities, have information or would like to
learn more about these claims, or have any questions concerning
this announcement or your rights or interests with respect to these
matters, please contact Frank R. Cruz, of The Law Offices of Frank
R. Cruz, 1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1100, Los Angeles,
California 90067 at 310-914-5007, by email to
info@frankcruzlaw.com, or visit our website at
www.frankcruzlaw.com. If you inquire by email please include your
mailing address, telephone number, and number of shares purchased.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules.

Contacts
The Law Offices of Frank R. Cruz, Los Angeles
Frank R. Cruz, 310-914-5007
fcruz@frankcruzlaw.com
www.frankcruzlaw.com [GN]

LMP AUTOMOTIVE: Gainey McKenna Reminds of July 26 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston on May 31 disclosed that a class action
lawsuit has been filed against LMP Automotive Holdings, Inc. ("LMP"
or the "Company") in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida on behalf of investors who purchased
LMP stock between June 29, 2021 and May 19, 2022, inclusive (the
"Class Period").

The Complaint alleges that Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (i) that the Company engaged in the improper
identification and elimination of intercompany transactions; (ii)
that the Company used incorrect estimates for chargeback reserves
for finance and insurance products; (iii) that the Company had
misclassified certain items in its financial statements which
impacted balance sheet and income statement financial statement
captions; (iv) that there were material weaknesses in LMP's
internal control over financial reporting; (v) that, as a result of
the foregoing, the Company overstated its revenue; (vi) that, as a
result of the foregoing, the Company would restate certain of its
previously issued financial statements and results; and (vii) that,
as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about
the Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares of LMP should
contact the Firm prior to the July 26, 2022 lead plaintiff motion
deadline. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation.  If you
wish to discuss your rights or interests regarding this class
action, please contact Thomas J. McKenna, Esq. or Gregory M.
Egleston, Esq. of Gainey McKenna & Egleston at (212) 983-1300, or
via e-mail at tjmckenna@gme-law.com or gegleston@gme-law.com.

Please visit our website at http://www.gme-law.comfor more
information about the firm. [GN]

LMP AUTOMOTIVE: Nguyen Sues Over Share Price Drop
-------------------------------------------------
CHRIS NGUYEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. LMP AUTOMOTIVE HOLDINGS, INC., SAMER TAWFIK,
and ROBERT BELLAFLORES, Defendants, Case No. 0:22-cv-61019 (S.D.
Fla., May 27, 2022) is a class action on behalf of the Plaintiff
and all persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired
LMP securities between June 29, 2021 and May 19, 2022, inclusive,
pursuing claims against the Defendants under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

LMP, through its subsidiaries, offers customers the ability to buy,
sell, rent and subscribe for, and obtain financing for automobiles
online and in person. LMP buys pre-owned automobiles primarily
through auctions or directly from other automobile dealers, and new
automobiles from manufacturers and manufacturer distributors at
fleet rates.

According to the complaint, throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements, as well as
failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects. Specifically, Defendants
failed to disclose to investors: (1) that the Company engaged in
the improper identification and elimination of intercompany
transactions; (2) that the Company used incorrect estimates for
chargeback reserves for finance and insurance products; (3) that
the Company had misclassified certain items in its financial
statements which impacting balance sheet and income statement
financial statement captions; (4) that there were material
weaknesses in LMP's internal control over financial reporting; (5)
that, as a result of the foregoing, the Company overstated its
revenue; (6) that, as a result of the foregoing, the Company would
restate certain of its previously issued financial statements and
results; and (7) that, as a result of the foregoing, Defendants'
positive statements about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis, says the suit.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, the suit asserts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Leo W. Desmond, Esq.
          DESMOND LAW FIRM, P.C.
          5070 Highway A1A, Suite D
          Vero Beach, FL 32963
          Telephone: (772) 231-9600
          E-mail: lwd@desmondlawfirm.com
        
               - and -

          Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
          Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
          Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100  
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160

               - and -

          Frank R. Cruz, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF FRANK R. CRUZ
          1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 914-5007

LMP AUTOMOTIVE: Rosen Law Firm Reminds of July 26 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------
WHY: Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, on May 31
announced the filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of
purchasers of the securities of LMP Automotive Holdings, Inc.
(NASDAQ: LPMX) between June 29, 2021 and May 19, 2022, both dates
inclusive (the "Class Period"). If you wish to serve as lead
plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than July 26, 2022.

SO WHAT: If you purchased LMP securities during the Class Period
you may be entitled to compensation without payment of any out of
pocket fees or costs through a contingency fee arrangement.

WHAT TO DO NEXT: To join the LMP class action, go to
https://rosenlegal.com/submit-form/?case_id=6635 or call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action. A class
action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve as lead
plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than July 26, 2022. A
lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf of other
class members in directing the litigation.

WHY ROSEN LAW: We encourage investors to select qualified counsel
with a track record of success in leadership roles. Often, firms
issuing notices do not have comparable experience, resources or any
meaningful peer recognition. Be wise in selecting counsel. The
Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm has achieved the
largest ever securities class action settlement against a Chinese
Company. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1 by ISS Securities Class
Action Services for number of securities class action settlements
in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the top 4 each year since 2013
and has recovered hundreds of millions of dollars for investors. In
2019 alone the firm secured over $438 million for investors. In
2020, founding partner Laurence Rosen was named by law360 as a
Titan of Plaintiffs' Bar. Many of the firm's attorneys have been
recognized by Lawdragon and Super Lawyers.

DETAILS OF THE CASE: According to the lawsuit, defendants
throughout the Class Period made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) the Company engaged in the
improper identification and elimination of intercompany
transactions; (2) the Company used incorrect estimates for
chargeback reserves for finance and insurance products; (3) the
Company had misclassified certain items in its financial statements
which impacting balance sheet and income statement financial
statement captions; (4) there were material weaknesses in LMP's
internal control over financial reporting; (5) as a result of the
foregoing, the Company overstated its revenue; (6) as a result of
the foregoing, the Company would restate certain of its previously
issued financial statements and results; and (7) as a result of the
foregoing, defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

To join the LMP class action, go to
https://rosenlegal.com/submit-form/?case_id=6635 or call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

No Class Has Been Certified. Until a class is certified, you are
not represented by counsel unless you retain one. You may select
counsel of your choice. You may also remain an absent class member
and do nothing at this point. An investor's ability to share in any
potential future recovery is not dependent upon serving as lead
plaintiff.

Attorney Advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a similar
outcome.

Contacts:
Laurence Rosen, Esq.
Phillip Kim, Esq.
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Tel: (212) 686-1060
Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
Fax: (212) 202-3827
lrosen@rosenlegal.com
cases@rosenlegal.com
pkim@rosenlegal.com
www.rosenlegal.com [GN]

MAIN STREET: DeFino Sues Over Restaurant Servers' Unpaid Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
ANTHONY DeFINO, TAYLOR DOSS, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. THE MAIN STREET ASSOCIATES, INC.,
BARRY ROAD ASSOCIATES, LLC, BARRY ROAD ASSOCIATES ll, LLC, BARRY
ROAD ASSOCIATES III, LLC, 5107 MAIN, INC., 5101 MAIN, INC.,
SOUTHWEST BOULEVARD PIZZA, LLC, MIDLAND ASSOCIATES, INC. and GREGG
D. JOHNSON, Defendants, Case No. 4:22-cv-00350-HFS (W.D. Mo., May
27, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for unpaid
minimum wage and overtime compensation, for unlawful tip pool
scheme, and related penalties and damages pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act and Federal Rule Civil Procedure 23.

Plaintiff DeFino has worked as a server for Defendant's place of
business in Kansas City, Missouri from approximately August 2020 to
the present.

Plaintiff Doss has worked as a server for Defendant's place of
business in Independence, Missouri from 2013-2015 and again in
Kansas City, Missouri from approximately August 2020-August 2021.

The Defendants operate restaurants under the brand names Minsky's
Osteria Il Centro, and Eggtc.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael Hodgson, Esq.
          THE HODGSON LAW FIRM, LLC
          3609 SW Pryor Rd.
          Lee's Summit, MO 64082
          Telephone: (816) 600-0117   
          E-mail: mike@elgkc.com

MCCLATCHY CO: Attorney Discusses TCPA Case Ruling in Kelly Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Eric J. Troutman, Esq., in an article for TCPAWorld, disclosed that
it is important to keep in mind, however, that some courts will not
enforce arbitration provisions for conduct arising after a contract
terminates.

For instance, in Robert Kelly v. the McClatchy Company, No.
2:21-cv-01960-KJM-JDP, 2022 WL 1693339 (E.D. Cal. 05/26/2022) the
Court held that calls made after the plaintiffs cancelled their
newspaper subscriptions were not subject to arbitration.

In Kelly, the Plaintiffs all agreed to arbitration by subscribing
to the newspaper. But they did not receive the challenged phone
calls until after the newspaper subscription terminated.

When the Plaintiffs sued under the TCPA the Defendant moved to
compel arbitration but the Court denied the motion finding that the
arbitration provision between the parties terminated when the
subscription did. Since the calls at issue arose after the
arbitration provision was terminated there was no basis to send the
dispute to arbitration.

The Court distinguished cases in which the calls at issue arose out
of a terminated contract–i.e. where debt collection calls were
made to a number supplied in an agreement. There the calls arose
out of the contract in the sense that contractual rights were being
enforced–but that was not the case here.

Notice that the Kelly court's interpretation of arbitration rights
is different from the prevailing view on revocation of consent.
Merely stopping a newspaper subscription would not be revocation of
consent -- consent can only be revoked by a clear revocation and
not by conduct suggestive of revocation -- but cancelling the
subscription was sufficient to terminate arbitration rights.
Something to keep in mind.

Folks that engage in win-back campaigns–i.e. calls to former
customers -- should keep the Kelly case in mind. Those former
customers may still be covered by EBR rules -- and you might even
have express written consent to call them using regulated
technology -- but don't expect to be able to enforce your
arbitration provisions in the context of calls to customers that
have terminated their agreement with you.

We'll keep an eye on this. [GN]

MDL 2804: Putnam Cty. Board Sues Over Children's Opioid Exposure
----------------------------------------------------------------
Putnam County School Board, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Cephalon, Inc., Teva
Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,
Endo International Plc, Endo Health Solutions Inc., Endo
Pharmaceuticals Inc., Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
Orth-McNeilJanssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., n/k/a/ Janssen
Pharmaceutica, Inc., n/k/a Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Johnson &
Johnson, Inc, AbbVie, Inc., Allergan plc f/k/a Actavis plc, Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. n/k/a Actavis, Inc., Watson Laboratories,
Inc., Actavis LLC, Actavis Pharma, Inc. f/k/a/ Watson Pharma, Inc.,
KVK-Tech, Inc., Viatris, Inc. f/k/a Mylan N.V., Assertio Holdings,
Inc., AmerisourceBergen Corporation, Cardinal Health, Inc.,
McKesson Corporation, CVS Health Corporation, CVS Indiana L.L.C.,
CVS Rx Services, Inc., CVS TN Distribution, LLC, CVS Pharmacy,
Inc., Holiday CVS, LLC, Omnicare Distribution Center LLC, Walgreens
Boots Alliance, Inc., a/k/a Walgreen Co., Walgreen Eastern Co.,
Inc., Walmart Inc., f/k/a Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Wal-Mart Stores
East, LP, WSE Management, LLC, WSE Investment, LLC, Wal-Mart Stores
East, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 1:22-op-45025-DAP (N.D. Ohio, May
27, 2022) arises from the Defendants alleged engagement in a civil
conspiracy in their unlawful marketing, distribution, and selling
of opioids and/or efforts to boost the sale of opioids into
Plaintiff's and the Class' school district communities in violation
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have intentionally,
unlawfully, recklessly, and negligently either manufactured,
marketed, distributed, or sold prescription opioids that Defendants
knew, or reasonably should have known, would be diverted, causing
widespread distribution of prescription opioids to the employees,
parents, and students of the Plaintiff's school district and those
of the Class, resulting in children born after damaging exposure to
opioids before birth, students' damaged by living in
opioid-afflicted households, student addiction to opioids, and
employees addicted to opioids, imposing the nuisance burdening
Plaintiff and the Class and resulting in direct costs to Plaintiff
and the Class.

The Putnam County School Board case has been consolidated in MDL
No. 2804, In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation. The case
is assigned to Judge Dan Aaron Polster.

Putnam County School Board for the Putnam County School District is
a school district located in Palatka, Florida.

The Defendants are pharmaceutical companies in the U.S.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter G. Tsarnas, Esq.
          Marc P. Gertz, Esq.
          GERTZ & ROSEN, LTD
          11 South Forge Street
          Akron, OH 44304
          Telephone: (330) 376-8336
          E-mail: mpgertz@gertzrosen.com
                  ptsarnas@gertzrosen.com

               - and -

          Wayne Hogan, Esq.
          Leslie A. Goller, Esq.
          TERRELL HOGAN YEGELWEL, P.A.
          233 East Bay Street, 8th Floor
          Jacksonville, FL 32202
          Telephone: (904) 722-2228
          E-mail: hogan@terrellhogan.com
                  lgoller@terrellhogan.com

               - and -

          Cyrus Mehri, Esq.
          Joshua Karsh, Esq.
          C. Ezra Bronstein, Esq.
          Autumn Clarke, Esq.
          MEHRI & SKALET, PLLC
          2000 K Street NW, Suite 325
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 822-5100
          E-mail: cmehri@findjustice.com
                  jkarsh@findjustice.com
                  ebronstein@findjustice.com
                  aclarke@findjustice.com

               - and -

          Neil Henrichsen, Esq.
          HENRICHSEN LAW GROUP, PLLC
          655 15th Street, N.W. Suite 800
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 423-3649
          E-mail: nhenrichsen@hslawyers.com

MIDLAND CREDIT: Foley & Lardner Discusses FDCPA Suit Court Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jessica N. Walker, Esq., and Michael D. Leffel, Esq., of Foley &
Lardner LLP, disclosed that the Seventh Circuit rejected emotional
distress and other intangible injuries as a basis for Article III
standing in a class action seeking statutory damages under the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). In Pierre v. Midland Credit
Management, Inc., Nos. 19-2993 & 19-3109, 2022 WL 986441 (7th Cir.
Apr. 1, 2022), relying on the recent Supreme Court decision in
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), the Seventh
Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. It is just the latest in a growing
number of appellate court decisions addressing Article III standing
in class actions based on statutory damages claims.

Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Renetrice Pierre accumulated and defaulted on a credit
card account. Years later, in 2015, defendant Midland Credit
Management, Inc. (Midland Credit) sent Pierre a letter seeking
payment of the debt in its role as a collector for Midland Funding
— which had purchased Pierre's debt. The letter stated she was
approved for a discount program that would save her money, and
included an expiration date of 30 days. The debt was so old that
the statute of limitations had run — Midland Credit, therefore,
could ask for payment but could not sue for payment. Its letter
concluded, "The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt.
Because of the age of your debt, we will not sue you for it, we
will not report it to any credit reporting agency, and payment or
non-payment of this debt will not affect your credit score."

Pierre reacted to the letter with surprise, confusion, and concern,
yet she did not pay any of the debt or agree to pay any of the
debt. She alleged she suffered emotional distress and confusion
based on the letter and that she had to contact Midland Credit to
contest the debt collection and hire a lawyer. She sued Midland
Credit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) on
behalf of a class of Illinois residents who received similar
letters. The Northern District of Illinois certified the class and
entered summary judgment for the class, and a jury awarded more
than $350,000 in damages.

The Majority Determined Pierre Failed to Establish Article III
Standing
Addressing the concreteness requirement of Article III standing,
the Seventh Circuit noted that recent decisions had hinted "the
mere ‘risk of real harm' could concretely injure plaintiffs
seeking money damages." However, the Seventh Circuit held that
under TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), a risk of
harm can only serve as a concrete injury for forward-looking,
injunctive relief, and "[a] plaintiff seeking money damages has
standing to sue in federal court only for harms that have in fact
materialized."

Pierre's asserted harm, that the letter she received created a risk
that she might make a payment on a time-barred debt, or restart the
limitations period by either paying or promising to pay, represents
only a risk of future harm, not any actual, experienced harm such
as making a payment. The Seventh Circuit concluded that Pierre had
therefore not established standing. Consistent with prior
decisions, the Seventh Circuit also held that calling to dispute a
debt and contacting a lawyer for advice were not legally cognizable
harms, and that psychological states such as confusion and worry
caused by the letter were likewise insufficiently concrete. Based
on this analysis, the Seventh Circuit vacated the lower court's
judgment and remanded the case for dismissal for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Dissent Raised Concerns about Deference to Congress and a
Growing Circuit Split
Circuit Judge Hamilton dissented and raised concerns about "zombie
debt," such as Pierre's, and a greater circuit split on "whether
Congress has the power under the Constitution to create private
causes of action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and
other consumer protection statutes for injuries that are intangible
but quite real." The dissent asserted that Congress has authorized
private actions to seek damages for harm such as emotional
distress, stress, anxiety, confusion, and fear. In Judge Hamilton's
view, in passing the FDCPA, Congress specifically prohibited
actions likely to cause intangible and emotional harm, such as fear
and confusion, by including threats, obscene language, and false or
misleading statements.

The dissent reasoned that Pierre's claim satisfied Article III
standing under both Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340
(2016), and TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. 2190, "by offering evidence of
harms that, first, lie close to the heart of the protection
Congress reasonably tried to offer consumer debtors in the FDCPA,
and second, bear close relationships to harms long recognized under
the common law and constitutional law."

The dissent pointed to the Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits as
being less restrictive in allowing standing for intangible injuries
such as emotional or psychological harm under the FDCPA, and the
Sixth and Eighth Circuits as issuing decisions with a broader
approach toward standing for similar injuries.

Impact On Businesses Facing FDCPA Lawsuits Alleging Only Emotional
or Psychological Harm
Businesses litigating FDCPA lawsuits within the Seventh Circuit
should review this decision closely, as it may provide fruitful
grounds for dismissing cases for a lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction based on the failure to establish standing under
Article III. However, as the dissent demonstrated, other circuits
have interpreted standing more broadly and found emotional distress
to be concrete enough to establish standing. Moreover, dismissal
for lack of Article III standing may simply mean that the case
moves forward in state court. Because of the differing approaches
across the circuits and the important question raised regarding the
power of Congress to protect consumers from a multitude of harms
through legislation, we expect this to remain a contested area of
law until the Supreme Court provides further guidance. [GN]

MIKE AND ALLY: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mike and Ally, Inc.
The case is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Mike and Ally, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-04547-AT (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Mike and Ally -- https://mikeandally.com/ -- offers a stunning
range of luxury bathroom accessories sets, made by artisans at
their New York studio in varied textures and finishes.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


MITSUBISHI MOTORS: Damocles Files Suit in M.D. Tennessee
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mitsubishi Motors
North America, Inc. The case is styled as Oral Damocles, Justin
Haller, Brett Halliday, Kristen Jantz, Rocco Russo, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Mitsubishi Motors
North America, Inc., Case No. 3:22-cv-00401 (M.D. Tenm., June 1,
2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract for Breach of
Contract.

Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. --
https://www.mitsubishi-motors.com/ -- is the U.S. operation of
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, overseeing sales, manufacturing and
research and development functions. The company manufactures and
sells Mitsubishi brand cars and sport utility vehicles through a
network of approximately 350 dealers.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Susan S. Lafferty, Esq.
          LAFFERTY LAW FIRM, P.C.
          1321 Murfreesboro Pike, Suite 521
          Nashville, TN 37217
          Phone: (615) 878-1926
          Fax: (615) 472-7852
          Email: ssl@laffertylawtn.com


MITSUBISHI MOTORS: Wade Files Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mitsubishi Motors
North America, Inc. The case is styled as Courtney Wade, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated v. Mitsubishi Motors
North America, Inc., Case No. 2:22-cv-02135 (E.D. Pa., June 1,
2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. --
https://www.mitsubishi-motors.com/ -- is the U.S. operation of
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, overseeing sales, manufacturing and
research and development functions. The company manufactures and
sells Mitsubishi brand cars and sport utility vehicles through a
network of approximately 350 dealers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sergei Lemberg, Esq.
          LEMBERG LAW
          43 Danbury Road, 3rd Floor
          Wilton, CT 06897
          Phone: (203) 653-2250
          Email: slemberg@lemberglaw.com


MM 879 INC: 9th Cir. Affirms in Part Summary Judgment in Cruz Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned ANGELA CRUZ, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants
v. MM 879, INC., a corporation, Defendant, and THE SERVICEMASTER
COMPANY, LLC, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 21-15974 (9th
Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirms in part and reverses in part the district court's grant of
summary judgment.

Angela Cruz, Maria Madrigal, Lourdes Baiz, and Christie Goodman
(collectively, "Plaintiffs") appeal from the district court's
orders granting summary judgment to two sets of Defendants: (1) the
group consisting of The ServiceMaster Company, LLC; Merry Maids,
LP; and MM Maids, LLC (collectively, "Merry Maids Defendants"); and
(2) Barrett Business Services, Inc. ("BBSI").

The Plaintiffs were formerly employed as home cleaners by MM 879,
Inc. According to the Merry Maids Defendants' undisputed statement
of facts, MM 879 is an independently owned Merry Maids franchisee
based in Fresno and Lodi, California, pursuant to a written
Franchise Agreement with Merry Maids, LP. MM 879 contracted with
BBSI, "a professional employment organization," to manage its
employees' payroll, benefits, human resources, and more.

In a putative class action suit, the Plaintiffs alleged that MM
879's wage and hour practices violated California law. The
Plaintiffs also alleged that they were jointly employed by both the
Merry Maids Defendants and BBSI, as well as by MM 879. The district
court first granted summary judgment to the Merry Maids Defendants.
It denied the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of that
order.

In a subsequent order, the district court then granted summary
judgment to BBSI. The district court held that there was no triable
issue of fact as to whether either the Merry Maids Defendants or
BBSI was a joint employer of the Plaintiffs. Further, the district
court held as a matter of law that the ostensible agency theory did
not apply to California Wage Order 5-2001.

The Ninth Circuit affirms the district court's grant of summary
judgment to the Merry Maids Defendants, but it reverses the
district court's grant of summary judgment to BBSI. The Ninth
Circuit remands for further proceedings.

The Ninth Circuit finds that the Plaintiffs have not established a
genuine dispute of material fact whether the Merry Maids Defendants
qualified as an employer under any of these three prongs of
Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 278 (Cal. 2010).

According to the Ninth Circuit's Memorandum, there is no genuine
dispute about whether the Merry Maids Defendants exercised, or had
the right to exercise, control over the Plaintiffs' wages, hours,
or working conditions. That the Franchise Agreement directed MM 879
to conduct its business in accordance with written materials
provided by the Merry Maids Defendants is insufficient to create
such a dispute.

Further, MM 879's co-owner testified that he was solely responsible
for implementing MM 879's wage and hour practices, and that he was
not required to comply with the Merry Maids Defendants' suggested
procedures. Similarly, the Merry Maids Defendants did not establish
a common law employment relationship with the Plaintiffs. As
franchisors, they did not satisfy the "principal test of an
employment relationship" under the common law: whether the person
to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and
means of accomplishing the result desired.

The Ninth Circuit finds that the district court erred in concluding
as a matter of law that BBSI is not a joint employer under
Martinez. To evaluate the third Martinez test for joint
employment--whether a common law employment relationship was
established--the Ninth Circuit applies the California Supreme
Court's analysis in Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, 327 P.3d
165 (Cal. 2014). That Court wrote: Perhaps the strongest evidence
of the right to control is whether the hirer can discharge the
worker without cause, because the power of the principal to
terminate the services of the agent gives him the means of
controlling the agent's activities.

Other factors, including those recited in Futrell v. Payday
California, Inc., 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 526 (Cal. Ct. App 2010),
upon which the district court relied, are "secondary indicia," the
Ninth Circuit notes.

The Plaintiffs have presented evidence that BBSI retained the right
to terminate MM 879 employees with or without cause, even if it did
not exercise that right. For example, the Application for
Co-Employment for MM 879 employees stated: "Employment at your
Worksite Employer and Barrett Business Services, Inc. (BBSI) is
'AT-WILL.' The employment relationship may be terminated for any
reason with or without cause or notice at any time by you or either
Company."

Further, BBSI's Person Most Knowledgeable testified that BBSI
retained "the right to terminate the employment, with or without
cause, of a worker for a Merry Maids franchise in California."
Similarly, the Agreement for Employer and Staffing Services between
BBSI and MM 879 stated that BBSI will have the right to hire,
discipline, and terminate employees.

Finally, in the Employee Handbook for MM 879 employees, BBSI is
unambiguously characterized as a joint employer. Such
characterization, standing alone, is not necessarily enough to
create an employment relationship, but it is evidence of such a
relationship, the Ninth Circuit says.

Under Ayala, the district court, therefore, erred in concluding as
a matter of law that BBSI did not establish a common law employment
relationship with the Plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit reverses the
district court's grant of summary judgment to BBSI.

The Ninth Circuit declines to certify to the California Supreme
Court the question whether the ostensible agency theory applies to
the definition of employer in California Wage Order 5-2001.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum dated June 2, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/42dmk6me from Leagle.com.


MOTOCADDY INC: Davis Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Motocaddy, Inc. The
case is styled as Kevin Davis, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Motocaddy, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-04549 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Motocaddy -- https://www.motocaddy.us/ -- engages in providing a
suite of technology-led golf products, with a particular focus on
powered golf trolleys.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


NATIONAL CREDIT: Court Certifies Class in Swanson TCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROSALYNE SWANSON, Plaintiff v. NATIONAL CREDIT
SERVICES, INC., Defendant, Case No. C19-1504-RSL (W.D. Wash.),
Judge Robert S. Lasnik of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Seattle, grants the Plaintiff's Motion for
Class Certification.

I. Background

The Defendant is a Washington debt collection company. The
Department of Education ("DOE") hired the Defendant to collect its
federal student loan debts. The Defendant received borrowers' cell
phone numbers from three different sources: (1) from DOE directly;
(2) from Maximus, DOE's contractor, which maintains a Debt
Management Collection System ("DMCS") with information regarding
borrowers; and (3) from third party vendors hired by defendant to
perform skip tracing services.

On Jan. 26, 2019, DOE placed the Plaintiffs unpaid student loan
with the Defendant for collection. That same day, the Defendant
obtained the Plaintiffs number through skip tracing services
performed by one of its vendors, Interactive Data LLC, also known
as idiCORE ("IDI").

Previously, in November 2017, Maximus obtained the Plaintiffs
number in a phone conversation with the Plaintiff regarding
potential loan rehabilitation. Although the recording of that
conversation became available to the Defendant on Jan. 26, 2019,
the Defendant did not become aware of the recording or seek access
to the file until almost one year later, when the Plaintiff filed
the instant lawsuit. It also received a DMCS file from Maximus
which included the Plaintiffs number, but not until after it had
already acquired the number from IDI.

The Defendant called the Plaintiff on 23 different dates between
Jan. 31, 2019, and July 25, 2019. The Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendant called her up to seven times a day. She claims that the
Defendant uses an automatic telephone dialing system ("ATDS") and
prerecorded calls or artificial voice calls in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. Section 227,
et seq.

The Plaintiff seeks to certify and represent the following class
(the "No Consent Class"): All persons in the United States who,
from September 19, 2015 through the date notice is disseminated,
(1) Defendant caused to be called; (2) on the person's cellphone;
(3) using the same dialing equipment that was used to call
Plaintiff; (4) for the purpose of collecting a debt; and (5) had
their cellphone number obtained by NCS in the same way that NCS
obtained Plaintiff's cellphone number.

The Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, actual
damages, treble damages for willful or knowing violations,
statutory damages, and reasonable attorney's fees.

The Defendant denies using ATDS and artificial or prerecorded
calls. It argues that because it had constructive access to the
recording of the Plaintiff's 2017 phone conversation with Maximus
and received the DMCS file with her number, it had her prior
express consent to receiving calls. It also states that its policy
is to obtain express consent during its first live conversation
with borrowers. Since prior express consent is an affirmative
defense to TCPA claims, the Defendant contends the class definition
is overbroad, as it includes class members who gave their prior
express consent as well as those who did not.

The Defendant maintains that the class thus cannot be certified due
to problems with commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation. It also states that determining whether each
individual class member gave their prior express consent to Maximus
will disrupt predominance. Separately, the Defendant avers that
small claims court provides a superior forum for members of the
putative class to litigate their TCPA claims.

II. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. Section 1331. Plaintiff has stated a cause of action
arising under the TCPA, which is a federal statute.

B. Article III Standing

The Defendant argues that the putative class is overbroad because
it contains class members who gave their prior express consent to
receiving phone calls, and that those members therefore lack
requisite injury for Article III standing. Judge Lasnik holds that
the class has standing to bring the case.

C. Defining the Class

At this stage, Judge Lasnik declines to make any substantive
modifications to the class definition, other than to clarify that
putative class members whose numbers were obtained the "same way"
that the Defendant obtained the Plaintiffs' number means persons
whose numbers were acquired through IDI's services and through
Maximus' DMCS files or recorded conversations. Whether the
Defendant's right of access to Maximus's files containing borrower
information was sufficient to confer consent is an issue which is
capable of classwide resolution. If the Defendant prevails on this
defense, then nothing alters the Court's equitable power to modify
or decertify the class.

It is also inappropriate to modify the class based on the
Defendant's live call consent defense, Judge Lasnik holds. He says,
the Defendant has not offered a single case in support of its
contention that requesting consent after contacting borrowers
constitutes "prior express consent" within the meaning of the TCPA.
He will not create a subclass or refuse certification based on a
defense that is neither factually nor legally supported.

Notably, the Plaintiffs definition excludes borrowers who provided
their number directly to the original creditor, DOE, during the
original transaction resulting in the debt. No one, including the
Plaintiff, argues that borrowers who provided their number directly
to DOE did not give adequate prior express consent. The Court's
clarification should resolve at least some of defendant's concerns
regarding overbreadth.

D. Prerequisites of a Class

The party seeking certification must demonstrate that all four
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are met, as well as one of the
requirements of Rule 23(b). Rule 23(a) "requires that plaintiffs
demonstrate numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation in order to maintain a class action."

Judge Lasnik finds that (i) because the Defendant does not argue
that joinder of all putative class members is practicable,
numerosity is satisfied; (ii) the Plaintiff has identified specific
common contentions capable of classwide resolution; (iii) under the
permissive standards of Rule 23(a)(3), the Plaintiff's allegations
are sufficient to satisfy typicality; and (iv) both the Plaintiff
and the counsel are adequate class representatives.

E. Maintenance of a Class

In addition to meeting all four prerequisites of Rule 23(a), a
plaintiff must also meet one of the three requirements of 23(b). An
"adventuresome innovation" created specifically with damages class
actions in mind, Rule 23(b)(3) imposes two additional requirements
on a putative class beyond the four prerequisites of 24(a):
predominance and superiority.

Judge Lasnik finds that (i) common issues central to resolution of
the Plaintiff's claims predominate over individualized inquiries in
the case and (ii) that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.

E. Appointment of Class Counsel

The Plaintiff's counsel, Patrick Peluso and Stephen L. Woodrow of
Woodrow & Peluso, LLC, and Michael P. Matesky, II of Matesky Law
PLLC, seek appointment as class counsel. Judge Lasnik finds
significant evidence in the record of the work the counsel has done
in bringing the case, and the counsel's experience litigating TCPA
class actions and settlements is also well-documented. He therefore
finds the Plaintiff's counsel adequate and enters appointment in
the case, contingent upon the counsel's continued observation of
their respective responsibilities as the counsel pro hac vice and
the local counsel.

III. Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, Judge Lasnik grants the
Plaintiff's motion for class certification pursuant to the
modifications set forth in the Order. Patrick H. Peluso and Steven
L. Woodrow of Woodrow & Peluso, LLC, and Michael Matesky of Matesky
Law, PLLC, are appointed as the class counsel. Rosalyne Swanson is
appointed as the class representative.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/mrxmveta from Leagle.com.


NELNET INC: Seeks to Strike Johansson Class Action Claims
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANDREW JOHANSSON, JON
PEARCE, and LINDA STANLEY, on behalf of themselves and the Class
Members described herein, Plaintiffs, v. NELNET, INC., a Nebraska
Corporation, NELNET DIVERSIFIED SOLUTIONS, LLC, a Nebraska limited
liability company, and NELNET SERVICING, LLC, a Nebraska limited
liability company, Case No. 4:20-cv-03069-JMG-CRZ (D. Neb.), the
Defendants ask the Court to enter an order striking the Plaintiffs'
class action allegations and their Motion for Class Certification
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1)(D).

On May 19, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification
along with a supporting brief. In their motion for class
certification, the Plaintiffs abandon the theories of liability and
putative class definitions set forth in the Complaint, and instead
introduce a new, unpled theory of class-wide liability under a
materially different putative class definition.

The Plaintiffs are precluded from advancing the theory of liability
and putative class definition presented in their Motion for Class
Certification because (a) they were not properly included in
Plaintiffs' Complaint and (b) the Court's May 4, 2022 memorandum
and order denying the Plaintiffs leave to plead this theory and
redefine the putative class is the law of this case.

Furthermore, if Plaintiffs were permitted to pursue a new and
unpled theory of liability under a materially different putative
class definition, it would work great prejudice against Defendants.


Nelnet is a United States-based conglomerate that deals in the
administration and repayment of student loans and education
financial services.

A copy of the Defendants' motion dated June 1, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3zjewep at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Charles F. Kaplan, Esq.
          Daniel F. Kaplan, Esq.
          PERRY, GUTHERY, HAASE
          & GESSFORD, P.C., L.L.O.
          233 South 13th Street, Suite 1400
          Lincoln, NE 68508
          Telephone: (402) 476-9200
          Facsimile: (402) 476-0094
          E-mail: dkaplan@perrylawfirm.com
                  ckaplan@perrylawfirm.com

NELSON'S GREEN BRIER: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nelson's Green Brier
Distillery, LLC. The case is styled as Jose Quezada, individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Nelson's Green
Brier Distillery, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-04531 (S.D.N.Y., June 1,
2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Nelson's Green Brier Distiller -- https://greenbrierdistillery.com/
-- is a distillery that produces the celebrated small-batch Belle
Meade Bourbon and Tennessee Whiskies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


NETFLIX INC: Grant & Eisenhofer Reminds of July 5 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------
Grant & Eisenhofer P.A. filed a securities class action lawsuit on
May 27, 2022 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California. The lawsuit was filed on behalf of a proposed class
consisting of all investors who purchased Netflix, Inc. ("Netflix"
or the "Company") (NASDAQ: NFLX) common stock between January 19,
2021 and April 19, 2022, inclusive (the "Class Period"). This
action extends the Class Period to begin prior to the October 19,
2021 start date alleged in the initial class action complaint filed
against Netflix and certain of its executives for certain
misconduct (described below) on May 3, 2022, styled as Pirani v.
Netflix, Inc., et al., Case No. 4:22-cv-02672 (N.D. Cal.).

The action alleges that Netflix and certain of its officers
violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, by falsely
representing that subscriber growth headwinds were primarily caused
by the after-effect of a COVID-related boom, and concealing that
the real culprits were high market penetration and competition. The
truth about Netflix's growth was partially revealed on January 20,
2022, when the Company announced weak quarterly guidance for the
first quarter of 2022. In response, the Company's stock price fell
nearly 22% on heavy trading volume to close at $397.50 per share on
January 21, 2022. Then, on April 19, 2022, Netflix announced that
its first quarter 2022 results fell short of its previous guidance,
and revealed that high market penetration and competition were
hampering growth. On that news, the price of Netflix stock fell
another 35% on high trading volume, to close at $226.19 per share
on April 20, 2022.

If you are a member of the class described above, you may move the
Court to serve as lead plaintiff of the class , by no later than
July 5, 2022. A lead plaintiff is a representative party that acts
on behalf of other class members and directs the litigation.
Investors' ability to share in any recovery is not affected by the
decision whether or not to serve as a lead plaintiff.

The plaintiff in the action is represented by Grant & Eisenhofer
P.A., which has extensive expertise in prosecuting investor class
actions involving financial fraud. Grant & Eisenhofer represents
institutional investors and shareholders internationally in
securities class actions, corporate governance actions and
derivative actions, and has recovered more than $29 billion for its
clients over the last 25 years. For more information about Grant &
Eisenhofer visit www.gelaw.com.

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions concerning
this notice, please contact:

CONTACT:

Dan L. Berger
Grant & Eisenhofer
dberger@gelaw.com
646-722-8500 [GN]

NORTHWEST CONFECTIONS: Young Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Northwest Confections
California, LLC, et al. The case is styled as Ronald Young, and on
behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated v.
Northwest Confections California, LLC, Northwest Confections LLC,
Does 1-100, Case No. 34-2022-00320387-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Sacramento Cty., May 20, 2022).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited."

Northwest Confections California, LLC is located in Sacramento,
California and is part of the Specialty Food Stores Industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
          LAWYERS FOR JUSTICE, PC
          410 Arden Avenue, Suite 203
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Phone: 818-265-1020
          Fax: 818-265-1021


OIL PRICE: Compelled to Comply With Subpoenas in Bogard Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BOGARD CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al., Plaintiffs v. OIL
PRICE INFORMATION SERVICE, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
22-mc-80104-JSC, No. 22-mc-80107-JSC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Jacqueline
Scott Corley of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California:

    (i) grants the Parties' motions to compel Oil Price
        Information Service, LLC (OPIS) to comply with the
        subpoenas; and

   (ii) denies OPIS' counter-motions to quash.

I. Introduction

In the underlying putative antitrust class action, the Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants Vitol Inc. and SK Energy conspired to
manipulate the benchmark price published by non-party OPIS -- In
Re: California Gasoline Spot Market Antitrust Litigation, No.
20-cv-3131 JSC (N.D. Cal.). The Plaintiffs and the Defendants in
that action issued document and (in the case of the Defendants)
deposition subpoenas to OPIS. OPIS refused to comply.

Now pending before the Court are the Plaintiffs' and the
Defendants' motions to compel OPIS to comply with the subpoenas,
and OPIS' counter-motions to quash.

II. Background

OPIS resists the subpoenas on three grounds: (1) the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction of the underlying California law
antitrust action; (2) Rule 45 requires the Plaintiffs to pay market
rate for OPIS's published information; and (3) California's Shield
Law governs and bars production of OPIS' unpublished information.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

OPIS first argues that the Court does not have subject matter
jurisdiction of the underlying action because the Court dismissed
the Sherman Act claim -- the only federal claim—on standing
grounds. Subject matter jurisdiction, however, is now premised on
the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), not federal question
jurisdiction.

Next, OPIS argues that the "local controversy" exception to CAFA
jurisdiction deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction of
the entire case. JUdge Corley finds that OPIS is wrong. The Ninth
Circuit has squarely held that CAFA's "local controversy" exception
is not jurisdictional. Thus, the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction.

Finally, OPIS insists that the Court must decline to exercise its
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the "local controversy"
exception to CAFA jurisdiction and therefore dismiss the entire
case. But it fails to show that a non-party has any standing to
raise whether the Court should exercise its subject matter
jurisdiction. OPIS' emphasis on the local controversy exception's
mandatory language -- the court "shall decline to exercise
jurisdiction" if the local controversy requirements are met, 28
U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(4) -- is no more persuasive. OPIS still does
not have standing to assert -- and attempt to prove -- that the
exception applies." T case was filed in this District, and after
dismissal of the federal claim, no party to the action sought
remand. That is the end of the matter.

B. Rule 45 Subpoena

The Plaintiffs in the underlying action seek transactional data
showing gasoline purchases on the (1) spot market, (2) rack market,
and (3) retail market from Jan. 1, 2008 through Dec. 31, 2020. OPIS
is willing to produce the data provided the parties pay what OPIS
contends it would charge any customer seeking such data.

If a Rule 45 subpoena requests "commercial information," a court
may quash or modify the subpoena. In the alternative, the court may
order production of the commercial information under specified
conditions if the requesting party "(i) shows a substantial need
for the testimony or material that cannot be otherwise met without
undue hardship; and (ii) ensures that the subpoenaed person will be
reasonably compensated."

There is no dispute that the data the parties seek is commercial
information protected by Rule 45(d)(3)(B)(i). The question, then,
is whether the Court should nonetheless order it produced under
conditions and with the payment of reasonable compensation.

First, Judge Corley holds that she need not find the substantial
license fee is an undue hardship as Rule 45(d)(3)(C)(i) contains
alternatives: The court may order production under specified
conditions if the requesting party "shows a substantial need for
the testimony or material that cannot be otherwise met without a
substantial hardship." Second, she holds that the Plaintiffs will
pay OPIS the reasonable cost of compliance with their subpoena;
that is, the loss that OPIS will actually suffer. Third, she holds
that Maryland's Reporter's Shield Law applies to the privilege
question. Finally, she hold that Maryland's Reporter's Shield Law
does not bar OPIS from complying with the Gasoline Spot parties'
subpoena for unpublished information in anonymized form where
needed.

III. Conclusion

After carefully considering the parties' written submissions, and
having had the benefit of oral argument on May 11, 2022, Judge
Corley grants the motions to compel and denies the motions to
quash. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction of the underlying
action, Rule 45 does not require the Plaintiffs to pay OPIS a
substantial licensing fee for published material, and the Maryland
Shield Law governs the privilege dispute and does not bar
production of OPIS's unpublished material.

The Plaintiffs' motion to compel publicly available (for a price)
trading data is granted in part, subject to the Protective Order
governing the case. Before the Court orders OPIS to provide data as
far back as 2008, the Plaintiffs must submit a declaration from
their expert(s) explaining why they need such data for that time
period (or for whatever time period they request) on June 8, 2022.
Further, pursuant to Rule 45(d)(3)(C)(ii), the Plaintiffs must pay
OPIS for the actual costs of producing its commercial information.

The Defendants' and the Plaintiffs' motions to compel production of
unpublished communications and data is granted on the condition
that source information is redacted and thus not disclosed.

OPIS' motions are denied and the motions to file sur-replies are
granted.

The parties will meet and confer via video regarding compliance
with the Court's order. The Court will hold a further case
management conference on June 23, 2022 in the underlying action.
OPIS is required to attend the conference if there are any disputes
remaining regarding OPIS' compliance with the subpoenas and the
Order.

The Order disposes of Dkt. Nos. 1, 4, 22, 33, 41 in Case No.
22-mc-80104, and Dkt. No. 1 in Case No. 22-mc-80107.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/5czx64ks from Leagle.com.


OKTA INC: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of July 19 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP notifies investors in Okta, Inc. ("Okta" or
the "Company") OKTA of a class action securities lawsuit.

The lawsuit on behalf of Okta investors has been commenced in the
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California. Affected investors purchased or otherwise acquired
certain Okta, Inc. securities between March 5, 2021 and March 22,
2022. Follow the link below to get more information and be
contacted by a member of our team:

https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/okta-inc-loss-submission-form?prid=27930&wire=5

or contact Joseph E. Levi, Esq. either via email at
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com or by telephone at (212) 363-7500. There is
no cost or obligation to you.

Cannot view this video? Visit:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Tc5IJYdVio

Okta, Inc. NEWS - OKTA NEWS

CASE DETAILS: The filed complaint alleges that defendants made
false statements and/or concealed that: (i) Okta had inadequate
cybersecurity controls; (ii) as a result, Okta's systems were
vulnerable to data breaches; (iii) Okta ultimately did experience a
data breach caused by a hacking group, which potentially affected
hundreds of Okta customers; (iv) Okta initially did not disclose
and subsequently downplayed the severity of the data breach; (v)
all the foregoing, once revealed, was likely to have a material
negative impact on Okta's business, financial condition, and
reputation; and (vi) as a result, the Company's public statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

WHAT THIS MEANS TO SHAREHOLDERS: If you suffered a loss in Okta
during the relevant timeframe, you have until July 19, 2022 to
request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability
to share in any recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead
plaintiff.

NO COST TO YOU: If you are a class member, you may be entitled to
compensation without payment of any out-of-pocket costs or fees.
Discuss your rights with our legal team without cost or
obligation.

PROTECT YOUR FINANCIAL INTERESTS: Complete this brief submission
form
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/okta-inc-loss-submission-form?prid=27930&wire=5
or call 212-363-7500 to discuss the case.

WHY LEVI & KORSINSKY: Over the past 20 years, the team at Levi &
Korsinsky has secured hundreds of millions of dollars for aggrieved
shareholders and built a track record of winning high-stakes cases.
Our firm has extensive expertise representing investors in complex
securities litigation and a team of over 70 employees to serve our
clients. For seven years in a row, Levi & Korsinsky has ranked in
ISS Securities Class Action Services' Top 50 Report as one of the
top securities litigation firms in the United States.

CONTACT:
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
Ed Korsinsky, Esq.
55 Broadway, 10th Floor
New York, NY 10006
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
Tel: (212) 363-7500
Fax: (212) 363-7171
www.zlk.com [GN]

OLE SMOKY DISTILLERY: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ole Smoky Distillery,
LLC. The case is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Ole Smoky Distillery,
LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-04518 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Ole Smoky Tennessee Moonshine -- https://olesmoky.com/ -- is a corn
whiskey distillery in Gatlinburg, Tennessee.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


ONIN STAFFING: Class Settlement in Miles Suit Wins Prelim. Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BOBBY LEE MILES, JR., on his own behalf and all
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ONIN STAFFING, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 3:21-cv-0275 (M.D. Tenn.), Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr.,
of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee,
Nashville Division, grants the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Settlement and Notice to Settlement.

The Plaintiff seeks certification, for settlement purposes, of a
class defined as: All applicants and employees in the United States
who were subject to and harmed by an adverse employment action
(including, but not limited to, the failure to hire, wrongful
termination of employment, wrongful dismissal, or wrongful
reassignment) based in whole or in part on their background report
but to whom Defendant did not first provide notice and a copy of
their background report during the Covered Period from April 4,
2017, through March 23, 2022.

Judge Crenshaw finds and concludes that the Settlement is "fair,
reasonable, and adequate." Based upon the record, he finds the
interests of the class are served if the litigation is resolved. If
the final Class size is 450 as estimated, the gross award will be
$777.77 per person, nearly 78% of the maximum statutory damages
available, and the Settlement gross award will be $649.35 at a
minimum, nearly 65% of the maximum statutory damages available.

Judge Crenshaw also finds the Settlement, which eliminates future
costs, delays and risk, to be in the best interest of the Class.
Further, he says, any service award of $4,500 to Bobby Lee Miles is
appropriate for his service to the Class. He also finds that Marc
R. Edelman, Esq. and his firm, Morgan & Morgan P.A. will adequately
represent the Settlement Class.

Judge Crenshaw approves the Parties' proposed Notice and schedule:

     a. Mailing of Class Notice - 14 days after entry of
preliminary approval order

     b. Motion for Attorney's Fees - At least 30 days before
objection deadline

     c. Deadline to file claims - 60 days after date notice is
mailed by settlement administrator

     d. Objections to settlement and requests - 60 days after date
notice is for exclusion from settlement mailed by settlement
administrator

     e. Motion for final approval and fairness hearing - At least
14 days before final response to objections to settlement

The hearing for final approval of the settlement on Dec. 20, 2022,
at 1:00 p.m., and instructs the Parties to include this hearing
date, time and location in the Notice to be sent pursuant to the
notice plan.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yv2vacwz from Leagle.com.


OONI INC: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ooni, Inc. The case
is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Ooni, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-04535
(S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Ooni -- https://ooni.com/ -- is the world's #1 outdoor pizza oven
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


OSCAR HEALTH: Gross Law Firm Reminds of July 11 Deadline
--------------------------------------------------------
The Gross Law Firm issues the following notice to shareholders of
Oscar Health, Inc.

Shareholders who purchased shares of OSCR during the class period
listed are encouraged to contact the firm regarding possible lead
plaintiff appointment. Appointment as lead plaintiff is not
required to partake in any recovery.

CONTACT US HERE:
https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/oscar-health-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=27911&from=4

CLASS PERIOD: This lawsuit is on behalf of persons and entities
that purchased or otherwise acquired Oscar Class A common stock
pursuant and/or traceable to the registration statement and
prospectus issued in connection with the Company's March 2021
initial public offering.

ALLEGATIONS: The complaint alleges that during the class period,
Defendants issued materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Oscar was experiencing growing
COVID-19 testing and treatment costs; (2) Oscar was experiencing
growing net COVID costs; (3) Oscar would be negatively impacted by
an unfavorable prior year Risk Adjustment Data Validation result
relating to 2019 and 2020; (4) Oscar was on track to be negatively
impacted by significant SEP membership growth; and (5) as a result
of the foregoing, defendants' positive statements about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

DEADLINE: July 11, 2022 Shareholders should not delay in
registering for this class action. Register your information here:
https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/oscar-health-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=27911&from=4

NEXT STEPS FOR SHAREHOLDERS: Once you register as a shareholder who
purchased shares of OSCR during the timeframe listed above, you
will be enrolled in a portfolio monitoring software to provide you
with status updates throughout the lifecycle of the case. The
deadline to seek to be a lead plaintiff is July 11, 2022. There is
no cost or obligation to you to participate in this case.

WHY GROSS LAW FIRM? The Gross Law Firm is nationally recognized
class action law firm, and our mission is to protect the rights of
all investors who have suffered as a result of deceit, fraud, and
illegal business practices. The Gross Law Firm is committed to
ensuring that companies adhere to responsible business practices
and engage in good corporate citizenship. The firm seeks recovery
on behalf of investors who incurred losses when false and/or
misleading statements or the omission of material information by a
company lead to artificial inflation of the company's stock.
Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar
outcomes.

CONTACT:
The Gross Law Firm
15 West 38th Street, 12th floor
New York, NY, 10018
Email: dg@securitiesclasslaw.com
Phone: (646) 453-8903 [GN]

PATTERN ENERGY: Extension of Remaining Briefing Deadlines Sought
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit re Pattern Energy Group Inc. Securities
Class Action, Case No. 20-cv-275-MN-JLH (D. Del.), the Parties ask
the Court to enter an order that the remaining class certification
briefing deadlines shall be extended as follows:

   1. The Defendants' class certification      June 10, 2022
      opposition brief(s):

   2. Lead Plaintiffs' class certification     July 22, 2022
      reply brief:

Pattern Energy is an American company that develops, owns and
operates utility scale wind and solar power facilities in the
United States, Canada, and Japan.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated June 1, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3NruTKq at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Andrew J. Entwistle, Esq.
          Vincent R. Cappucci, Esq.
          Jonathan H. Beemer, Esq.
          Jessica A. Margulis, Esq.
          ENTWISTLE & CAPPUCCI LLP
          500 W. 2nd Street, Suite 1900-16
          Austin, TX 78701
          E-mail: aentwistle@entwistle-law.com
                  vcappucci@entwistle-law.com
                  jbeemer@entwistle-law.com
                  jmargulis@entwistle-law.com

               - and -

          Christopher J. Kupka, Esq.
          FIELDS KUPKA & SHUKUROV LLP
          1441 Broadway, 6th Floor - #6161
          New York, NY 10018
          E-mail: ckupka@fksfirm.com

               - and -

          Marc M. Seltzer, Esq.
          Krysta Kauble Pachman, Esq.
          SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.
          1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-6029
          E-mail: mseltzer@susmangodfrey.com
                  kpachman@susmangodfrey.com

               - and -

          Sue L. Robinson, Esq.
          Brian E. Farnan, Esq.
          Michael J. Farnan, Esq.
          FARNAN LLP
          919 North Market Street, 12th Floor
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          E-mail: srobinson@farnanlaw.com
                  bfarnan@farnanlaw.com
                  mfarnan@farnanlaw.com

PAYPAL INC: Wins Bid to Compel Arbitration; Evans Suit Dismissed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Jose Division, grants PayPal's
motion to compel arbitration and dismisses without prejudice the
lawsuit captioned LENA EVANS, et al., Plaintiffs v. PAYPAL, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 22-cv-00248-BLF (N.D. Cal.).

In this case, the Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of
individuals whose accounts with Defendant PayPal, Inc., were frozen
after PayPal alleged that the account holders had violated PayPal's
User Agreement or Acceptable Use Policies. If PayPal finds an
alleged violation of those policies, PayPal allegedly seizes all
the funds in the account as liquidated damages. The Plaintiffs
bring nine claims challenging this practice.

Now before the Court is PayPal's motion to compel arbitration
("MTC"). PayPal argues that its User Agreement contains an
arbitration agreement and class action waiver that covers all of
the claims asserted in this lawsuit. The Plaintiffs oppose the
motion to compel. The Court previously found this motion
appropriate for disposition without oral argument and vacated the
hearing.

I. Background

As alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiffs Lena Evans, Roni Shemtov,
and Shbadan Akylbekov each have accounts with Defendant PayPal,
Inc. through which they receive and send online payments. When they
signed up for their PayPal accounts, the Plaintiffs agreed to the
PayPal User Agreement ("UA"). PayPal's UA has included some form of
alternative dispute resolution provision since its inception. In a
November 2012 update to its UA, PayPal modified the dispute
resolution procedure to include an explicit agreement to arbitrate
and class action waiver. The UA specifies that continued use of
PayPal's services after the effective date of changes to the UA
constitutes agreement to the changes. Each Plaintiff continued to
use PayPal after Nov. 1, 2012.

The UA states in its initial paragraphs that it contains an
agreement to arbitrate. The UA also includes a class action waiver.
The UA also specifies certain "Restricted Activities" that users of
PayPal agree not to do, including activities that violate PayPal's
separate "Acceptable Use Policy" ("AUP"). PayPal states, and the
Plaintiffs do not dispute, that during the sign-up process, each
Plaintiff assented to the UA by (1) checking a box next to language
stating that he or she had "read and agreed to the User Agreement;"
and then (2) clicking a button stating "Agree and Create Account,"
or materially similar language.

The Plaintiffs allege that PayPal suspended their accounts for
alleged violations of the AUP. Plaintiff Lena Evans alleges that
PayPal froze her account on Nov. 22, 2020, and approximately six
months later seized $26,084 from her account. Plaintiff Roni
Shemtov alleges that PayPal froze her account in March 2017 and
seized a total of $42,737. Plaintiff Shbadan Akylbekov alleges that
several of his and his wife's PayPal accounts became "limited"
beginning in around March 2020 and that PayPal eventually seized
$172,206.43 from the accounts.

The Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit on Jan. 13, 2022. They assert
claims for conversion, civil violations of the federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), violation of the
Electronic Funds Transfer Act, breach of written contract, breach
of fiduciary duty, violation of California Business & Professions
Code Section 17200, unjust enrichment, declaratory relief, and
accounting. The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of all PayPal
users, who had funds seized from their accounts by PayPal based on
purported breaches of PayPal's Acceptable Use Policy.

The Court granted PayPal's motion to relate this case to Cheng v.
PayPal, Inc., No. 21-cv-3608 (N.D. Cal., filed May 13, 2021). On
the same day that the Plaintiffs filed this case, the Court granted
PayPal's motion to compel arbitration in Cheng. The Court found
that the arbitration provision in PayPal's User Agreement applied
to the dispute over PayPal's liquidated damages policy, and that
the arbitration provision was valid and enforceable under Delaware
law. The Court compelled arbitration and dismissed the case without
prejudice to filing a later action to confirm or vacate the
arbitration award. PayPal heavily relies on Cheng in this motion.
The Plaintiffs do not address Cheng.

II. Legal Standard

Under the Federal Arbitration Act, arbitration agreements will be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. Under
the FAA, a court must determine two issues in deciding a motion to
compel arbitration: (1) whether there is an agreement to arbitrate
between the parties; and (2) whether the agreement covers the
dispute (Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir.
2015)).

The parties dispute which state's law governs interpretation of the
UA. PayPal asserts that Delaware law governs because of the
Delaware choice of law provision in the UA. The Plaintiffs assert
that the Delaware choice of law provision is unenforceable because
Delaware has no substantive relationship to the parties or the
transactions at issue here.

The Court agrees with PayPal that the Delaware choice of law
provision is enforceable.

III. Discussion

The Court now considers the two FAA questions to determine if the
motion to compel arbitration should be granted. As it did in Cheng,
the Court finds that the Plaintiffs' claims must proceed in
arbitration rather than in this Court.
A. The Agreement to Arbitrate Covers this Dispute

The Court first finds that the answer to the second FAA
question--"whether the arbitration agreement covers the
dispute"--is yes. The arbitration agreement states that "any and
all disputes or claims that have arisen or may arise" between the
Plaintiffs and PayPal, "including without limitation federal and
state statutory claims, common law claims, and those based in
contract, tort, fraud, misrepresentation or any other legal theory,
shall be resolved exclusively through final and binding
arbitration, rather than in court." This lawsuit is a dispute that
has arisen between the Plaintiffs and PayPal, and it includes both
federal and state statutory claims and "common law claims.

B. The Agreement to Arbitrate is Valid and Enforceable

The remainder of the parties' dispute concerns whether the
arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable. The Plaintiffs make
several arguments against enforcement of the provision.

The Court analyzes these arguments in the context of
unconscionability under Delaware law. Ignoring the dated language
of the Delaware test, this formulation has been divided into
procedural unconscionability--the lack of a meaningful choice--and
substantive unconscionability--unreasonably favorable arbitration
terms to one party.

The Plaintiffs' arguments that the arbitration agreement is
unconscionable fit in both categories, but none of the arguments is
convincing, Judge Freeman finds.

i. Procedural Unconscionability

The Plaintiffs make multiple arguments that the arbitration
agreement is procedurally unconscionable.

Judge Freeman opines that the case that the Plaintiffs cite in this
context pre-dates relevant Supreme Court precedent on arbitration
agreements--most importantly, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563
U.S. 333 (2011)--and so is not persuasive authority. Judge Freeman
also holds that the location of the arbitration agreement in the UA
does not make the arbitration agreement unconscionable.

Finally, the Court finds it important to note that the Plaintiffs
could have opted out of the arbitration provision. The Court has
previously looked favorably on the opt-out opportunity offered in
PayPal's UA. The Plaintiffs do not address the consequences of the
opt-out provision.

The Plaintiffs have, thus, not shown that the arbitration agreement
is procedurally unconscionable, Judge Freeman holds.

ii. Substantive Unconscionability

The Plaintiffs make a few attempts to show that the arbitration
agreement is substantively unconscionable. First, the Plaintiffs
argue that the arbitration provision is substantively
unconscionable because PayPal is only required to pay arbitration
costs if a claimant is seeking less than $10,000, and that if the
claim is for higher than that amount, the claimant must show that
the cost of arbitration is "prohibitive" and PayPal is only
required to pay costs as determined by the arbitrator. The Court
has previously approved PayPal's cost-shifting provisions in this
arbitration agreement.

Second, the Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration provision
impermissibly prevents the use of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel by successful claimants. Judge Freeman notes that the
consequence of this provision is that every claimant must litigate
his or her claim individually and cannot rely on a prior claimant's
success. But as PayPal says, this provision borrows from state-law
estoppel rules: an "arbitration award cannot have nonmutual
collateral estoppel effect" absent the parties' agreement
otherwise. The Plaintiffs cite no case finding that this type of
provision is substantively unconscionable.

The Plaintiffs make two other arguments they claim concern
substantive unconscionability. They argue that (1) PayPal's
practice of seizing account balances as liquidated damages is
unconscionable; and (2) PayPal's entire terms of service is
illusory because of PayPal's "absolute authority" to determine
violations of its UA and AUP. But these arguments concern the
merits of this dispute, not the unconscionability of the
arbitration provision itself, Judge Freeman holds.

The Court declines to opine on PayPal's liquidated damages
practices, which are at the heart of this case.

The Plaintiffs have, thus, also failed to show substantive
unconscionability, Judge Freeman finds. Because the Plaintiffs have
not met their burden to show that the arbitration agreement is
unconscionable, the agreement to arbitrate is valid and
enforceable. Because PayPal has shown that the claims asserted in
this lawsuit are within the scope of the arbitration provision, the
Court will dismiss this action without prejudice to filing a later
action to confirm or vacate any arbitration award.

IV. Order

For these reasons, Judge Freeman ruled that PayPal's motion to
compel arbitration is granted. The case is dismissed without
prejudice to filing a later action to confirm or vacate the
arbitration award.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated June 2, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/bd7mx6rd from Leagle.com.


PEGASYSTEMS INC: Gross Law Firm Reminds of July 18 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Gross Law Firm issues the following notice to shareholders of
Pegasystems Inc.

Shareholders who purchased shares of PEGA during the class period
listed are encouraged to contact the firm regarding possible lead
plaintiff appointment. Appointment as lead plaintiff is not
required to partake in any recovery.

CONTACT US HERE:

https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/pegasystems-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=27914&from=4
CLASS PERIOD: This lawsuit is on behalf of all persons and entities
that purchased PEGA common stock between May 29, 2020 and May 9,
2022, inclusive.

ALLEGATIONS: The complaint alleges that during the class period,
Defendants issued materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) PEGA had engaged in corporate
espionage and misappropriation of trade secrets to better compete
against Appian, a principal competitor; (2) defendants' product
development and associated success was, in significant part, not
the result of its own research and product testing but rather the
result of such corporate espionage and trade secret theft; (3)
defendants had engaged in a scheme to steal Appian trade secrets,
which was not only known to, but carried out through, the personal
involvement of the Company's CEO; (4) the Company's CEO and other
officers and employees did not comply with the Company's written
Code of Conduct, including its express prohibition on "stealing"
confidential information from a competitor and "misrepresenting
your identity in hopes of obtaining confidential information"; (5)
the Company was "unable to reasonably estimate damages" in the
lawsuit filed by Appian as a result of the foregoing misconduct
(the "Appian Litigation"); and (6) as a result of the foregoing,
defendants' statements about PEGA's business, operations,
prospects, legal compliance, and potential damages exposure in the
Appian Litigation were materially false and/or misleading and/or
lacked a reasonable basis when made.

DEADLINE: July 18, 2022 Shareholders should not delay in
registering for this class action. Register your information here:
https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/pegasystems-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=27914&from=4

NEXT STEPS FOR SHAREHOLDERS: Once you register as a shareholder who
purchased shares of PEGA during the timeframe listed above, you
will be enrolled in a portfolio monitoring software to provide you
with status updates throughout the lifecycle of the case. The
deadline to seek to be a lead plaintiff is July 18, 2022. There is
no cost or obligation to you to participate in this case.

WHY GROSS LAW FIRM? The Gross Law Firm is nationally recognized
class action law firm, and our mission is to protect the rights of
all investors who have suffered as a result of deceit, fraud, and
illegal business practices. The Gross Law Firm is committed to
ensuring that companies adhere to responsible business practices
and engage in good corporate citizenship. The firm seeks recovery
on behalf of investors who incurred losses when false and/or
misleading statements or the omission of material information by a
company lead to artificial inflation of the company's stock.
Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar
outcomes.

CONTACT:
The Gross Law Firm
15 West 38th Street, 12th floor
New York, NY, 10018
Email: dg@securitiesclasslaw.com
Phone: (646) 453-8903 [GN]

PEGASYSTEMS INC: Klein Law Firm Reminds of July 18 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Klein Law Firm on May 31 disclosed that a class action
complaint has been filed on behalf of shareholders of Pegasystems
Inc. (NASDAQ: PEGA) alleging that the Company violated federal
securities laws.

This lawsuit is on behalf of all persons and entities that
purchased PEGA common stock between May 29, 2020 and May 9, 2022,
inclusive.
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: July 18, 2022
No obligation or cost to you.

Learn more about your recoverable losses in PEGA:
https://www.kleinstocklaw.com/pslra-1/pegasystems-inc-loss-submission-form?id=27819&from=4

Pegasystems Inc. NEWS - PEGA NEWS

CLASS ACTION CASE DETAILS: The filed complaint alleges that
Pegasystems Inc. made materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) PEGA had engaged in corporate
espionage and misappropriation of trade secrets to better compete
against Appian, a principal competitor; (2) defendants' product
development and associated success was, in significant part, not
the result of its own research and product testing but rather the
result of such corporate espionage and trade secret theft; (3)
defendants had engaged in a scheme to steal Appian trade secrets,
which was not only known to, but carried out through, the personal
involvement of the Company's CEO; (4) the Company's CEO and other
officers and employees did not comply with the Company's written
Code of Conduct, including its express prohibition on "stealing"
confidential information from a competitor and "misrepresenting
your identity in hopes of obtaining confidential information"; (5)
the Company was "unable to reasonably estimate damages" in the
lawsuit filed by Appian as a result of the foregoing misconduct
(the "Appian Litigation"); and (6) as a result of the foregoing,
defendants' statements about PEGA's business, operations,
prospects, legal compliance, and potential damages exposure in the
Appian Litigation were materially false and/or misleading and/or
lacked a reasonable basis when made.

WHAT THIS MEANS TO YOU AS A SHAREHOLDER: If you have suffered a
loss in PEGA you have until July 18, 2022 to petition the court for
lead plaintiff status. Your ability to share in any recovery
doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

NO COST TO YOU: If you purchased PEGA securities during the
relevant period, you may be entitled to compensation without
payment of any out-of-pocket fees.

HOW TO PROTECT YOUR FINANCIAL INTERESTS: For additional information
about the PEGA lawsuit, please contact J. Klein, Esq. by telephone
at 212-616-4899 or click this link:
https://www.kleinstocklaw.com/pslra-1/pegasystems-inc-loss-submission-form?id=27819&from=4.

ABOUT KLEIN LAW FIRM
J. Klein, Esq. represents investors and participates in securities
litigations involving financial fraud throughout the nation. The
Klein Law Firm is a boutique litigation firm with experience in a
wide range of areas including securities law, corporate finance and
commercial litigation. Since 2011, our experienced attorneys have
achieved superior results for our clients with a personalized
focus. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar
outcomes.

CONTACT:
J. Klein, Esq.
Empire State Building
350 Fifth Avenue
59th Floor
New York, NY 10118
jk@kleinstocklaw.com
Telephone: (212) 616-4899
www.kleinstocklaw.com [GN]

PENN MUTUAL: 11th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Cochran's Class Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JEFFREY A. COCHRAN, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v. THE PENN MUTUAL
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, HORNOR, TOWNSEND & KENT, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 20-13477 (11th Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirms the district court's
dismissal of Cochran's putative class action claims against the
brokerage firm Hornor, Townsend & Kent and its parent company Penn
Mutual.

I. Background

Mr. Cochran appeals the district court's dismissal of his putative
class action claims against Hornor, Townsend & Kent (HTK) and Penn
Mutual. The complaint alleges that HTK breached its fiduciary
duties under Georgia law and that Penn Mutual aided and abetted
that breach. The district court concluded that the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act barred Cochran from using a class
action to bring those state law claims. It dismissed Cochran's
class allegations under Rule 12(b)(1), accepting as true the facts
alleged in Cochran's amended complaint, which is the operative
one.

Judge Ed Carnes, writing for the Eleventh Circuit, accepts the
facts as alleged, just as the district court did.

After the company where Cochran worked was acquired and his 401(k)
plan was terminated, he transferred his 401(k) funds into a
rollover individual retirement account. He opened that account with
HTK, a brokerage firm and investment adviser that is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Penn Mutual. The account was a "tax-qualified" or
"tax deferred" one, meaning it had the tax advantage of allowing
for deferral of taxes on the earnings made by investments held in
the account. After Cochran opened the account, an HTK advisor
"urged and directed" him "to invest his retirement funds in a Penn
Mutual variable annuity." He followed that advice and did so.

A variable annuity is a "hybrid insurance and investment product."
According to the complaint, a variable annuity is not a suitable
investment choice for a tax advantaged account because it causes
the investor to pay high fees without getting an extra tax benefit.
An account that is tax deferred in two different ways is no better
than an account that is tax deferred in only one way.

Mr. Cochran's choice to invest in a variable annuity has not caused
him to lose any of his investment, but he alleges that he has not
gained as much as he might have if he had invested in something
else. According to the complaint, Cochran's initial investment in
February 2013 of $365,274.83 had grown to $498,313.63 by September
2018. Based on Cochran's estimation, if he had invested in
something different during that time period, like a lowcost S&P 500
index, he could have avoided paying HTK fees and grown his
investment to $712,435.99.

Mr. Cochran filed a putative class action lawsuit alleging that HTK
breached its fiduciary duties to him and its other Georgia clients
who invested in Penn Mutual's variable annuity. He also alleged
that Penn Mutual, HTK's parent company, aided and abetted the
breach. Those claims are based solely on Georgia state law.

The complaint alleges that "brokerage firms make more money selling
variable annuities than they make selling other products," giving
them a "true conflict of interest" that leads them to "target sales
of variable annuities to persons seeking to invest in tax-qualified
retirement funds." The complaint asserts that the asserted cause of
action derives from Georgia state law. It points specifically to
Holmes v. Grubman, 691 S.E.2d 196 (Ga. 2010), as setting out the
"applicable standard."

According to the complaint, Holmes holds that a brokerage firm owes
a duty to holders of nondiscretionary accounts, like the one
Cochran had, which are accounts that require the broker to get the
client's authorization before making any transaction. The complaint
quotes Holmes as stating that the fiduciary duty is "heightened"
when a broker is "recommending an investment which the holder has
previously rejected or as to which the broker has a conflict of
interest."

Also according to the complaint, "HTK's uniform practice of
recommending that its clients use tax-qualified funds to purchase
variable annuities constitutes just such a conflict of interest"
because it ensured that higher fees will be paid to the firm out of
the client's pocket (or account).

The complaint defines the members of the putative class as having
all four of these characteristics: (1) Georgia residents, (2) who
were HTK customers, and (3) who purchased a variable deferred
annuity issued by Penn Mutual (4) for use in a tax qualified
account.

HTK moved to dismiss Cochran's class action allegations, arguing
among other things that the use of a class action is barred by
federal law. The district court granted the motion, concluding that
federal law did bar the class action. It pointed to the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act, commonly called SLUSA, which
generally prohibits class actions based on state law claims that
allege material misrepresentations or omissions in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security.

The district court concluded that SLUSA applies because Cochran
alleges that HTK misrepresented or omitted a material fact when
selling him the variable annuity. It reached that conclusion
because "the essence of the Complaint is HTK's overall fraudulent
practice of recommending variable annuities in order to make more
money on fees and commissions." The court emphasized that the
complaint "repeatedly references HTK's advice, assistance and
recommendations," and that it alleges Cochran bought the variable
annuity "because of what HTK represented when providing its advice
and recommendations." That made the essence of the complaint "the
unlawful marketing of tax-deferred annuities, either by
misrepresenting their suitability for tax-deferred retirement
plans, or by failing to disclose their unsuitability for such
accounts." It was on that basis the court dismissed Cochran's class
action allegations.

II. Discussion

Judge Carnes reviews de novo the court's conclusion that the
SLUSA's bar applies.

The essence of Cochran's complaint is that through its investment
advice and recommendations, HTK affirmatively made false
statements, or failed to disclose material facts, about the
suitability of the variable annuity investment for the type of
account that the plaintiff had, and in that way made
misrepresentations to the Plaintiff. The complaint makes at least
11 references to recommendations, advice, or other communications.
The substance of Cochran's complaint is that variable annuities
were unsuitable investments for tax deferred accounts, but HTK
recommended that clients invest in them anyway.

Judge Carnes finds that Cochran's position is that the conflict of
interest HTK had cannot ever be consented to because no amount of
disclosure can ever cure the breach of the duty caused by the
conflict. If he's right, the duty could be breached and the claim
established without any false statement or failure to disclose a
material fact. But Cochran is not right. Georgia law does not
recognize the cause of action that his position posits. Instead,
the Georgia Supreme Court's Holmes decision rejects Cochran's
position and in doing so scuttles his attempt to slip the grip of
SLUSA.

In Holmes the court held that under Georgia law a brokerage firm
owes a fiduciary duty to the holder of a non-discretionary account.
That type of account, which is what Cochran had, allows the broker
to carry out only transactions that the client authorizes. The
Holmes court also held that the duty a broker owes to a client who
has a nondiscretionary account includes "the duty to transact
business only after receiving prior authorization from the client
and the duty not to misrepresent any fact material to the
transaction."

That a broker with a conflict of interest has a heightened duty not
to misrepresent by statement or omission any material fact
necessarily means that a conflicted broker can nonetheless advise
and recommend with full disclosure and without misrepresentation.
Which necessarily means that a conflict of interest alone is not
enough for a cause of action under Georgia law. There must be both
a conflict of interest and a material misrepresentation or
omission.

While the conflict of interest heightens the amount of disclosure
and accuracy required, and thereby lessens a plaintiff's burden,
Judge Carnes holds that it does not dispense entirely with the
element of misrepresentation or omission. Without that element,
there is no cause of action. And that is Cochran's central problem.
To be viable under Georgia law, his claims against HTK must and do
involve allegations of misrepresentation or omission, and because
they do, his class action allegations are SLUSA-barred. Persuading
us that he is not claiming that HTK made any misrepresentation or
omission would earn Cochran only the right to have his entire
complaint dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Because the complaint does allege "an untrue statement or omission
of material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a
covered security," the district court correctly dismissed the class
action allegations of it.

III. Conclusion

Judge Carnes affirms.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/mpd4xcwf from Leagle.com.


PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY: Knapp Sues Over Wage and Hour Laws Violation
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Albert Knapp and Elham Tabibian, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY, a California
Non-Profit Corporation, Case No. 22STCV16736 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los
Angeles Cty., May 20, 2022), is brought against the Defendant's
violations of California's wage and hour laws and unfair
competition laws.

The Defendant offered online courses to students, taught remotely
by Class Members. To teach these courses, Class Members incurred
business expenses in carrying out their job duties for the
Defendant, including but not limited to the cost of internet
service, cellular phone charges, software, ink toner/cartridges,
paper, and other expenses associated with working from home or
remotely ("Home Office Expenses").

In addition, during the part of the Class Period from March 2020
through to August 2021, the Defendant required and/or expected all
adjunct instructors to carry out their job duties remotely from
home. On March 11, 2020, in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the
Defendant directed all faculty to begin delivering courses
virtually from home beginning on March 16, 2020. This directive
continued through 2020 and for much of 2021 for many of the adjunct
instructors. Class Members incurred Home Office Expenses as a
result of the Defendant's directive and in carrying out their job
duties for the Defendant.

The Defendant knew that Class Members incurred Home Office
Expenses, yet, the Defendant did not maintain a policy or practice
of reimbursing Class Members for these necessarily incurred
expenses, at any point during the Class Period, in violation of
Labor Code  As a result of the above Labor Code violations, the
Defendant committed unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business
practices, in violation of the UCL, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendant as adjunct
instructors.

The Defendant is a private non-profit university, incorporated in
California and located in Malibu, California.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Julian Hammond, Esq.
          Polina Brandler, Esq.
          Ari Cherniak, Esq.
          HAMMONDLAW, P.C.
          1201 Pacific Ave Suite 600
          Tacoma WA 98402
          Phone: (310) 601-6766
          Fax (310) 295-2385
          Email: jhammond@hammondlawpc.com
                 pbrandler@hammondlawpc.com
                 acherniak@hammondlawpc.com


PERNOD RICARD: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pernod Ricard USA,
LLC. The case is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Pernod Ricard USA, LLC,
Case No. 1:22-cv-04532 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Pernod Ricard USA -- https://www.pernod-ricard-usa.com/ -- is a
global leader in wine and spirits.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


PETROLEUM SERVICE: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Petroleum Service
Company. The case is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Petroleum Service
Company, Case No. 1:22-cv-04516 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Petroleum Service Company -- https://petroleumservicecompany.com/
-- offers lubricants for industrial, manufacturing, automotive,
fleet and aviation applications.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


PNC BANK: Polonowskis Seek to Certify Class of Consumers
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JEFFREY J. POLONOWSKI and
BARBARA A. POLONOWSKI, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, v. PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a National
Banking, Case No. (), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an
order certifying a class of consumers defined as follows:

   "Every natural person with whom PNC has entered a
   reaffirmation agreement regarding a line of credit secured by
   the mortgage of such person's single-family residence, where
   the following are true: (1) the person resides within the
   United States; (2) the agreement originating the line of
   credit does not indicate a business or commercial loan or
   line of credit; (3) a discharge order was entered in favor of
   such person; (4) PNC has, for at least one billing cycle
   during the period from February 19, 2019 to present and after
   entry of such person's discharge order,
   failed to send such person a periodic statement; and (5) PNC
   assessed interest to the loan account of such person during
   at least one billing cycle for which PNC did not send a
   statement to such person during the period from February 19,
   2019 to present."

In their First Amended Class Action Complaint, the Plaintiffs
alleged a pattern of violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act
(TILA), consisting of the Defendant's unlawful failure to disclose
information to Plaintiffs and the putative class members regarding
their home equity lines of credit ("HELOCs") that TILA requires to
be disclosed each monthly billing cycle.

This case is a putative class action, based on the core theory that
the Defendants' violations of law were part of a routine and
systematic practice of failing to disclose required information to
consumers nationwide, in many instances for
years at a time, creating palpable risks that putative class
members would be subjected to excessive penalties, interest, and
collection action up to and including foreclosure.

PNC Bank offers personal banking services including checking and
savings accounts, credit cards, mortgage loans, and auto loans.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated June 1, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3miJLPd at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Theodore J. Westbrook, Esq.
          WESTBROOK LAW PLLC
          Attorney for Plaintiffs
          Centennial Plaza, Suite 205
          2851 Charlevoix Dr. SE
          Grand Rapids, MH 49546
          Telephone: (616) 288-9548
          E-mail: ted@westbrook.law

PRECIGEN INC: Court Tosses Abadilla Fraud Suit With Leave to Amend
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARTIN JOSEPH ABADILLA, ET AL., Plaintiffs v.
PRECIGEN, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-06936-BLF (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Jose Division, grants the
Defendants' motion to dismiss with leave to amend.

Before the Court is Defendants Precigen, Inc. ("Precigen"), Randal
J. Kirk, Rick L. Sterling, and Andrew Last's motion to dismiss Lead
Plaintiff Raju Shah's Second Amended Consolidated Class Complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) in this securities
fraud class action.

I. Background

Defendant Robert F. Walsh III joins in the other Defendants' motion
(collectively, including Mr. Walsh, "Precigen"; "Individual
Defendants" refers to Mr. Kirk, Mr. Sterling, Mr. Last, and Mr.
Walsh).

Precigen is a Virginia corporation with its headquarters in
Maryland. It went public in 2013 under the name Intrexon, which it
changed to Precigen on Feb. 1, 2020. Precigen is a synthetic
biology company that develops biologically based products,
including healthcare products, food, energy, chemicals, and
biosensors.

Mr. Kirk served as Precigen's Chairman of the Board and CEO
throughout the Class Period until Jan. 1, 2020, after which he
served as Precigen's Executive Chairman. Mr. Sterling served as
Precigen's CFO throughout the Class Period. Mr. Walsh served as
Precigen's Senior VP of Energy & Fine Chemical Platforms from May
2013 through November 2019 and was a self-described "Section 16
Officer." Mr. Last served as Precigen's Chief Operating Officer
("COO") from August 2016 to December 2017.

Lead Plaintiff Shah allegedly purchased Precigen common stock
during the Class Period and was damaged by the Defendants' alleged
misstatements. Each of the Individual Defendants allegedly
personally uttered or signed company disclosures containing the
alleged misstatements.

Mr. Shah's allegations pertain to Precigen's representations
regarding its methane bioconversion platform ("MBP") -- part of the
company directed by Mr. Walsh. The MBP program sought to use
certain enzymes known as methanotrophs to convert methane into
valuable commercial end-products. The methane provided to the
methanotrophs (the "feedstock") can come in two forms: (1) natural
gas and (2) pure methane. At all relevant times, the price of pure
methane was over 200 times that of natural gas. However, using
natural gas -- rather than pure methane -- as a feedstock poses
significant technical challenges.

Mr. Shah alleges that Precigen defrauded investors by publicly
touting its MBP, which sought to convert cheap natural gas into
valuable industrial products. He alleges that Precigen touted the
MBP program based on misleading results based on testing utilizing
expensive pure methane gas -- rather than natural gas.

Mr. Shah brings claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities and Exchange Act ("Exchange Act") on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons or entities who purchased or otherwise
acquired Precigen common stock between May 10, 2017 and Sept. 25,
2020.

Precigen moves to dismiss Mr. Shah's second amended complaint. Mr.
Shah opposes.

Precigen supports its claims with allegations from six confidential
witnesses (the "CWs"). The CWs served as researchers, engineers,
and scientists in Precigen's South San Francisco facility, where
the MBP program was headquartered during the Class Period. The CWs
allege that the ongoing challenges of using natural gas as a
feedstock were well-known, commonly discussed, and accessible
throughout the MBP program, such that Mr. Walsh and his top
lieutenant Bryan Yeh were aware of them. Further, they allege that
Mr. Kirk was present at or aware of the substance of town hall
meetings where difficulties with using natural gas as a feedstock
were discussed.

CW4's allegations are the most fulsome, indicating that, for
example, Walsh and Yeh were briefed on ongoing difficulties with
natural gas feedstock and the fact that public statements about the
MBP program were based on pure methane experiments. CW4 also
indicates that he recommended investing in a space for constructing
a 20,000-liter facility for the MBP program and initially got Mr.
Kirk's agreement, but the plan was vetoed by Mr. Walsh because the
MBP program had not achieved its key metrics.

II. Discussion

A. Request for Judicial Notice

Precigen requests judicial notice as to 36 exhibits. Mr. Shah does
not oppose for the limited purpose of showing what statements it
made during the Class Period. However, he argues that such exhibits
cannot be used to establish the truth of any matters asserted
therein or to present a counternarrative.

Precigen argues that Exhibits 2-4, 5-14, 18-24, 26-29, and 36 are
incorporated by reference into the Complaint. Judge Freeman agrees,
since these documents serve as the basis of Mr. Shah's claims.

Precigen further argues that the remaining exhibits -- Exhibits 1,
15-17, 25, and 30-35 -- are subject to judicial notice. Exhibit 1
is Precigen's March 1, 2017 Form 10-K and Exhibit 25 is a
transcript from Precigen's earnings call on the same day. Judge
Freeman grants Precigen's request for judicial notice as to
Exhibits 1 and 25, for the limited purpose of showing Precigen's
public statements.

Exhibits 15 to 17 are scientific articles regarding natural gas and
methanotrophs. Since she does not see how the facts contained in
these articles are not subject to reasonable dispute, Judge Freeman
denies Precigen's request for judicial notice as to these
exhibits.

Exhibits 30 to 33 are a compilation of the SEC Form 4 filings made
by Mr. Kirk, Mr. Walsh, Mr. Last, and Mr. Sterling during the Class
Period, disclosing their Precigen stock holdings. Further, Exhibits
34 and 35 are Precigen's SEC Schedule 14A filings made on May 1,
2017 and April 29, 2020. Judge Freeman grants this request limited
to the fact that the filings make certain representations and not
the underlying truth of those statements.

B. Motion to Dismiss

At the hearing on April 7, 2022 on Precigen's motion to dismiss,
the Court indicated that it would grant the motion to dismiss with
leave to amend based upon the lack of adequate factual allegations
on the key issue of scienter. Judge Freeman's Order is intended to
highlight the areas of primary concern to the Court.

1. Claim 1 - Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5

To plead a claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Plaintiff
must allege: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2)
scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or
omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5)
economic loss; and (6) loss causation." The parties' disputes hinge
on (1) falsity (i.e., whether Mr. Shah has adequately alleged a
material misrepresentation or omission); (2) scienter; and (3) loss
causation.

As to falsity, Judge Freeman finds that Mr. Shah has adequately
alleged falsity as to certain identified statements but not as to
others. Mr. Shah can amend to address the deficiencies identified
as to certain of the identified statements. Further, as the Court
discussed at the April 7, 2022 hearing, Mr. Shah should consider
submitting along with any amended pleading a chart listing all
challenged statements, the individuals alleged to have made each
statement, and the CW allegations supporting scienter as to each
statement.

As to scienter, Judge Freeman holds that none of Mr. Shah's
individual allegations are sufficient to adequately plead scienter.
Further, she finds that when considered holistically, Mr. Shah's
allegations are insufficient. Accordingly, Mr. Shah has failed to
adequately plead scienter.

As to loss causation, Judge Freeman finds that Mr. Shah has failed
to adequately plead a Section 10(b) claim against any of the
Defendants, due to insufficient falsity and scienter allegations.

2. Claim 2: Section 20(a)

Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act extends liability for Section
10(b) violations to those who are "controlling persons" of the
alleged violations. To prevail on his claim for violations of
Section 20(a), the Plaintiff must first allege a violation of
Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. As outlined, the Plaintiff has failed
to do so. Accordingly, Judge Freeman grants the motion to dismiss
the Section 20(a) claim against Defendants Kirk, Walsh, Sterling,
and Last.

Precigen also argues that Mr. Shah does not adequately allege that
Mr. Walsh -- only a Senior Vice President -- was a "control
person," since Mr. Shah does not allege that Mr. Walsh had control
over any other Individual Defendant. In response, Mr. Shah argues
that he alleges Mr. Walsh was a self-described "Section 16 Officer"
as the direct or indirect beneficial owner of more than 10% of
Precigen's equity. Further, Mr. Shah argues that Mr. Walsh was in
charge of the unit responsible for the MBP program.

Judge Freeman agrees with Precigen. Mr. Shah's generalized
allegations about Mr. Walsh's title and management of the MBP
program, and internal communications are insufficient to plead he
was a controlling person. Mr. Shah must allege specific facts
regarding Mr. Walsh's involvement in Precigen's day-to-day affairs
or in his role in the preparation and release of the allegedly
false and misleading statements to adequately plead a Section 20(a)
claim against Mr. Walsh.

C. Leave to Amend

Judge Freeman finds that leave to amend is appropriate. While the
present pleading is Mr. Shah's second amended complaint, this is
the first time the Court has reviewed the adequacy of Mr. Shah's
pleadings. Further, there is no indication that amendment would be
futile at this stage. Accordingly, the dismissal of Mr. Shah's
complaint is with leave to amend.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Freeman dismisses Mr. Shah's
Section 10(b) and 20(a) claims with leave to amend. Mr. Shah will
file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of the Order.
He will file a chart listing each false statement, the person
alleged to have made the statement, and the allegations supporting
scienter as to that statement. If Precigen chooses to move to
dismiss Mr. Shah's amended complaint, then Precigen will provide
copies of its exhibits with highlighting indicating cited
portions.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2e8rc38b from Leagle.com.


PREMIERE GLOBAL: Goodnow Sues Over Alleged Violation of ERISA
-------------------------------------------------------------
KIMBERLY GOODNOW; and AUDRA TERRAZAS, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. PREMIERE GLOBAL
SERVICES, INC.; AMERICAN TELECONFERENCING SERVICES, LTD.; AUDIO
TELCOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY II LLC; and DOE CORPS 1-10,
Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-02184-TWT (N.D. Ga., June 1, 2022)
alleges violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA)".

According to the complaint, on March or June 2021, the Defendants
provided the Plaintiffs and Putative Class with notice that their
positions would be permanently eliminated on or around March 31,
2021 or June 25, 2021 as part of a reduction in force.

As a result of the involuntary layoff, the Plaintiffs and the
Putative Class were entitled, pursuant to the Premiere U.S.
Affiliates Severance Pay Plan Amended and Restated Effective
January 1, 2018 ("Plan"), to severance equal to a full week's
salary for every year they worked ("Basic Severance Pay"), says the
suit.

Without legal justification, the Defendants notified the Plaintiffs
and the Putative Class that it would not be processing that pay
period's severance payments (Basic or Enhanced Severance Pay) and
have continued to fail to make the remaining Basic or Enhanced
Severance Pay in violation of the ERISA, the suit alleges.

PREMIERE GLOBAL SERVICES, INC. provides collaboration software. The
Company offers web casting, event streaming, project management,
cloud based virtual meeting, audio, video, and web conferencing
solutions. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy Stephens, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          191 Peachtree Street, N.E., Ste. 4200
          Atlanta, GA 30343-1007
          Telephone: (404) 965-1682
          Email: jstephens@forthepeople.com

               - and -

          Bryan Arbeit, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          8151 Peters Rd, Fl. 4
          Plantation, FL 33324
          Telephone: (954) 694-9610
          Email: barbeit@forthepeople.com

PRIME ASSOCIATION: Faces Rankins Wage-and-Hour Suit in Calif.
-------------------------------------------------------------
ELZENA RANKINS, individually and on behalf of all other Aggrieved
Employees, Plaintiff v. PRIME ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC., a
California Corporation, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 22STCV17875 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty.,
May 31, 2022) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff arising
from the Defendants' violations of the California Labor Code.

The complaint alleges that the Defendants failed to provide
employment records, pay overtime and double time, provide rest and
meal periods, pay minimum wage, keep accurate payroll records and
provide itemized wage statements, pay reporting time wages, pay
split shift wages, pay all wages earned on time, pay all wages
earned upon discharge or resignation, and reimburse necessary,
business-related expenses.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendants with the job title of
community manager on September 1, 2018 until December 13, 2021.

Prime Association Services, Inc. is a California corporation that
operates as a property management company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Haig B. Kazandjian, Esq.
          Cathy Gonzalez, Esq.
          Kevin Crough, Esq.
          HAIG B. KAZANDJIAN LAWYERS, APC
          801 North Brand Boulevard, Suite 970
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 696-2306
          Facsimile: (818) 696-2307
          E-mail: haig@hbklawyers.com
                  cathy@hbklawyers.com
                  kevin@hbklawyers.com

PRO-LITE INTERNATIONAL: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pro-Lite
International, Inc. The case is styled as Jose Quezada,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Pro-Lite International, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-04513 (S.D.N.Y.,
June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Prolite -- https://prolite.com/ -- builds surfboard bags, traction
pads, leashes and accessories designed for surf and travel.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com



PROFESSIONAL FINANCE: Rohl FDCPA Class Suit Remanded to State Court
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, REMI ROHL, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PROFESSIONAL FINANCE COMPANY,
INC., Defendants, Civil Action No. 21-17507 (MAS) (LHG) (D.N.J.),
Judge Michael A. Shipp of the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey denies as moot Defendant PFC's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff Remi Rohl's Amended Complaint and remands the matter to
state court.

I. Background

The putative class action arises out of PFC's alleged violations of
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. Sections
1692, et seq. This story begins before Jan. 1, 2020, when Rohl
incurred a $742.40 debt with Dental Care at Palladium. At some
point, Rohl defaulted on the debt and Dental Care referred it to
PFC. Thereafter, Rohl received a debt collection letter.

According to the Complaint, PFC used an unnamed third-party vendor
to send the Collection Letter. The Collection Letter included
information such as Rohl's alleged status as a debtor, the amount
of the debt, Rohl's residential address, and other personal
information. Furthermore, the Collection Letter included an
additional 25% collection fee, bringing the total debt to $928,
more than what Rohl originally owed. Additionally, the letter had
two sections entitled "Interest Rate %" and "Accrued Interest $"
that were both marked "N/A." On Jan. 6, 2021, however, Dental Care
accepted the original amount due, $742.40, as payment in full.

On Sept. 21, 2021, Rohl initiated a putative class action in the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Monmouth County. PFC removed the
Complaint to the Court on Sept. 24, 2021. The Complaint seeks a
declaratory judgment under the New Jersey Declaratory Judgment Act,
that PFC violated Rohl's rights and the FDCPA ("Count One"). The
Complaint further claims that PFC violated several provisions of
the FDCPA, including Sections 1692c(b), 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g by
improperly communicating debt information to a third party,
inaccurately adding fees to the amount due, and falsely indicating
that interest could accrue in the future ("Count Two").

On Oct. 8, 2021, PFC filed the instant Motion. Rohl opposed and PFC
replied. The United States also filed a brief in support of the
constitutionality of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA"). PFC responded to the Government's submission, to which
the Government replied.

II. Discussion

Judge Shipp has carefully considered the parties' submissions and
decides the matter without oral argument under Local Civil Rule
78.1. He finds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over the action.

To start, Judge Shipp says, Rohl's Complaint alleges that PFC
violated the FDCPA by transmitting her personal information to a
third-party vendor. Analogizing to more traditionally recognized
harms, the harm Rohl alleges most closely resembles a cause of
action for public disclosure of private facts. New Jersey courts
define that tort as the invasion of privacy "by unreasonable
publication of private facts as occurring when it is shown that the
matters revealed were actually private, that dissemination of such
facts would be offensive to a reasonable person, and that there is
no legitimate interest of the public in being apprised of the facts
publicized." Neither the Third Circuit nor New Jersey courts have
addressed whether dissemination of private information to
third-party mail vendors violates this tort. Regardless, courts
have addressed that publication is a critical element of this
traditional harm.

Plaintiff Rohl's privacy injury must therefore fail because the
Complaint does not allege publication, Judge Shipp holds. In New
Jersey, the standard for publication means information is made
public when it is "communicated to the public at large, or to so
many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially
certain to become one of public knowledge." Applying that standard
in the present case, Judge Shipp finds that Rohl's Complaint does
not allege that her private information was publicized to the
general public. At best, the Complaint alleges that a small group
of PFC employees or agents may have read the Collection Letter. But
dissemination to a small group of employees is far from
communicating to a large enough group such that Rohl's information
became public knowledge.

Turning to the Complaint's alleged injury stemming from PFC's added
fee, Judge Shipp holds that that injury is insufficient under
another doctrine of standing: Mootness. For a federal court to
reach the merits of a case, Article III of the Constitution
requires an actual "case" or "controversy" between adverse parties.
If at any time during the litigation no case or controversy exists,
the case becomes moot.

Ms. Rohl's Complaint admits that Dental Care "accepted payment of
$742.40 as payment in full." Thus, even if PFC attempted to
overcharge Rohl, any injury Rohl suffered was settled by paying off
the underlying debt. Indeed, Rohl's Complaint does not allege that
PFC ever attempted to collect this added fee post-settlement.

Regarding the Complaint's final alleged injury of
misrepresentations in the Collection Letter, Judge Shipp again
looks to TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez for guidance. As explored, the
Supreme Court held in Transunion that an injury-in-law is not an
injury-in-fact sufficient to confer Article III standing. Rohl
complains that PFC used misleading representations to collect by
sending the Collection Letter with the suggestion that the balance
could increase due to fees in violation of the FDCPA.

On Judge Shipp's review, the historical or common law analogue for
this injury is fraudulent misrepresentation. He takes the facts in
the light most favorable to Foley, but the Complaint fails to
plausibly allege that she relied on Medicredit's representation
such that her injury-in-law is transformed into an injury-in-fact.
Indeed, Rohl alleges nothing more than an "informational harm"
because PFC attempted to deceive her. To be sure, "merely receiving
a letter from a debt collector that was confusing or misleading as
to the amount owed does not demonstrate a harm closely related to
fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation where the recipient's
financial condition made the amount of money owed irrelevant."

Finally, Rohl alleges no additional harm because of PFC sending the
Collection Letter. Judge Shipp therefore finds that Rohl does not
allege an injury beyond statutory violations, which the Supreme
Court has made clear is not enough to confer standing. As such,
Rohl lacks standing to bring the action.

As Rohl does not have Article III standing to bring the case, Judge
Shipp remands the action to state court. He, therefore, remands the
action to Superior Court.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons he set forth, and for other good cause shown, Judge
Shipp denies PFC's Motion as moot and remands the matter to state
court. The Court will enter an order consistent with the Memorandum
Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mry3dyhb from Leagle.com.


PROXIMO SPIRITS INC: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Proximo Spirits, Inc.
The case is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Proximo Spirits, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-04534 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Proximo Spirits, Inc. -- https://proximospirits.com/lite/ -- is an
American spirits importer and international distributor based in
Jersey City, New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


PURE RADIANCE: New Jersey Court Affirms Dismissal of Hoffman Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HAROLD M. HOFFMAN, individually and on behalf of those
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v. PURE RADIANCE, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent, Case No. A-2765-20 (N.J. Super. App. Div.),
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirms the
order dismissing the Plaintiff's complaint.

I. Background

Plaintiff Hoffman, an attorney representing himself, filed a
proposed will action alleging that Defendant Pure Radiance had
engaged in consumer fraud by falsely marketing a hair growth
product. The Plaintiff appeals from an order granting summary
judgment to the Defendant and dismissing with prejudice his claims
under the Consumer Fraud Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to-227.

In November 2020, the Defendant had placed an advertisement in the
New York Post for Re-Nourish, a topical hair-restoration product
(the Product). It had claimed that the Product would regrow "a
thick, full head of hair, even after years of balding." It also
claimed that the Product was "the world's first and only hair loss
solution that revives dead hair follicles" and regrows hair "in
just 30 days." The advertisement had displayed a before-and-after
image of the back of a man's head. The before picture showed a
balding head and the after picture showed a full head of hair and
no bald spots.

On Nov. 20, 2020, the Plaintiff saw the Defendant's newspaper
advertisement, placed an order, and paid $108.90 to purchase the
Product. After purchasing the Product, the Plaintiff conducted
research on the Product and its efficacy and concluded that the
Defendant's claims in its advertisements were "misrepresentations
of material fact." That same day, he filed a proposed will action
alleging the Defendant violated the Act. It is undisputed that the
Plaintiff did not receive or use the Product before filing his
lawsuit against the Defendant.

In his complaint, the Plaintiff alleged the Defendant's conduct
constituted an "unconscionable commercial practice," "deception,"
"fraud," "misrepresentation," and "knowing concealment" in
violation of the Act. He did not allege violations of common-law
fraud. The Plaintiff also did not allege that the Product was
harmful or that he had used, examined, or tested the Product. On
Nov. 25, 2020, five days after placing his order and filing his
action, the Plaintiff received the Product.

In January 2021, the Defendant filed an answer to the Plaintiff's
complaint and as an affirmative defense asserted that he had
received a full refund of the purchase price and all fees he paid
to the Defendant. The Plaintiff does not dispute that he received
the refund.

In February 2021, the Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings
or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. In support of that
motion, it submitted two certifications, along with various
documents. The Defendant also submitted a statement of uncontested
material facts. The trial court adjourned Defendant's motion and
the Plaintiff filed a certification in opposition to the motion.
The Plaintiff did not support his certification with any citations
to documents or evidence.

The trial court did not hear arguments on the motion. Instead, on
March 30, 2021, the trial court issued an order and written opinion
granting the Defendant's motion and dismissing the Plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice. The court analyzed the Defendant's motion
both as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted and as a summary-judgment motion.

The court concluded that the Plaintiff (1) lacked standing to bring
a claim under the Act; (2) had not established an ascertainable
loss; (3) could not bring a claim under the prior-substantiation
theory; (4) failed to plead facts establishing any "wrongful acts"
by defendant or any ascertainable loss to plaintiff; and (5) failed
to plead specific facts establishing fraud. Moreover, the trial
court reasoned that the Plaintiff failed to file the proper
response to the Defendant's statement of material facts and did not
dispute its statement of material facts with citations to the
record. Finally, the trial court reasoned that it was appropriate
to dismiss the complaint with prejudice because any attempt to
amend the complaint would be futile.

The Plaintiff moved for reconsideration but on May 12, 2021, the
trial court denied his motion. He now appeals from the trial
court's March 30, 2021 order dismissing his complaint with
prejudice.

II. Discussion

On appeal, the Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in
summarily dismissing his complaint with prejudice. He maintains
that he properly pled all elements of claims under the Act. In that
regard, he contends that the Defendant engaged in fraud to induce
the purchase of the Product in violation of the Act, the Product's
purchase price constitutes his ascertainable loss, and he properly
showed causation between the Defendant's unlawful conduct and an
ascertainable loss from his purchase of the Product.

The Plaintiff also asserts that he has standing to bring claims
under the Act because he paid the Defendant for the Product.
Finally, he argues that he did not allege a lack-of-substantiation
claim against the Defendant and, therefore, his complaint should
not be dismissed on that ground.

Having conducted a de novo review of the record and the applicable
law, the Superior Court holds that the Plaintiff did not show that
he had suffered an ascertainable loss.

First, the Plaintiff has not explained how he would demonstrate
that the Product does not perform as advertised. Consequently, his
claim of loss is purely hypothetical. Therefore, the material facts
on the record for summary judgment did not show that the Plaintiff
suffered an ascertainable loss as required under the Act.

Second, the Plaintiff offered no evidence that he could establish
that the Product did not perform as advertised. In other words, he
simply wants to assert that the advertisement must be presumed to
be false. Proof of an ascertainable loss cannot be based on
unsupported assumptions about the Product; rather, there must be
evidence that the Product does not perform as advertised."

Third, in opposing the Defendant's summary-judgment motion, the
Plaintiff did not produce evidence that the Product failed to
perform as advertised or state that he intended to produce such
evidence during discovery. Instead, he made a few factual
assertions in his certification which did not present competent
proof demonstrating he suffered an ascertainable loss or respond to
the statement of material facts offered by the Defendant and
dispute them with citations to the record. Accordingly, dismissal
with prejudice was appropriate.

Finally, the Superior Court clarifies that it expresses no view on
whether the Defendant's claims about the Product are accurate. It
may well be that the Attorney General could bring claims under the
Act. It also could be that another private party, who could
demonstrate ascertainable loss and causation, could bring a viable
claim under the Act. The Plaintiff, however, failed to show an
ascertainable loss and failed to demonstrate that he could show an
ascertainable loss through discovery. Therefore, it was appropriate
to grant summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiff's claims under
the Act.

Accordingly, the Superior Court will affirm the order dismissing
the Plaintiff's complaint on that ground and do not reach the other
issues relied on by the trial court.

III. Conclusion

Because the Plaintiff did not show he suffered an ascertainable
loss, the Superior Court affirms the order dismissing the
Plaintiff's complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/34vwskex from Leagle.com.

Harold M. Hoffman, appellant pro se.

Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP, attorneys for the Respondent (Scott
Shaffer -- sshaffer@olshanlaw.com -- on the brief).


REX ENTERPRISES: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rex Enterprises LLC.
The case is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Rex Enterprises LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-04545 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Rex Enterprises LLC is located in Centerville, Iowa and is part of
the Sporting Goods, Hobby, and Musical Instrument Stores
Industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


RISE SERVICES: Does not Properly Pay Coordinators, Lloyd Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
Christie Lloyd, on behalf of herself and all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Rise Services Inc. dba Rise Inc., an Arizona
corporation; and Rise Services Inc., a Utah corporation,
Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-00928-JFM (D. Ariz., May 27, 2022) is
a class action brought against the Defendants pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the Arizona Wage Statute for unpaid wages
including unpaid minimum wage and overtime for all hours worked
exceeding 40 in a workweek, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees
and costs.

The Plaintiff was employed by Rise Services as a coordinator from
2009 until approximately August 15, 2020. She worked for Defendant
at its caregiving facility in the Phoenix metropolitan area.

Rise Services was founded in 1987 and provides caregiving services
for children, adults, and families throughout Arizona, as well as
other states including Utah, Oregon, Texas, and Idaho.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ty D. Frankel, Esq.
          YEN PILCH ROBAINA & KRESIN PLC
          6017 N. 15th Street
          Phoenix, AZ 85014
          Telephone: (602) 682-6450
          E-mail: TDF@yprklaw.com

               - and -

          Patricia N. Syverson, Esq.
          YEN PILCH ROBAINA & KRESIN PLC
          9655 Granite Ridge Drive, Suite 200
          San Diego, CA 92123
          Telephone: (619) 756-7748
          E-mail: PNS@yprklaw.com

ROOSEVELT FIELD: Sapuy Seeks to Certify Narrowed Class
------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RAINIER SAPUY,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
ROOSEVELT FIELD MALL DENTAL, P.C., CARE ANGEL, INC., and STOMATCARE
DSO, LLC, Case No. 2:21-cv-00322-JMA-AYS (E.D.N.Y.), the Plaintiff
asks the Court to enter an order certifying one proposed class,
which is a narrowed version of the class proposed in the First
Amended Complaint:

   "All persons within the United States: (1) to whose cellular
   telephone number, (2) Care Angel placed a call concerning
   Roosevelt Field Mall Dental using an artificial voice, (3)
   after the person responded with a "stop" request to a text
   message from Care Angel concerning Roosevelt Field Mall
   Dental, (4) between July 10, 2019 and June 29, 2021 (5) and
   who Defendants do not claim purportedly re-consented to be
   called after their stop request but before the artificial
   voice call."

According to the complaint, Roosevelt Field Mall Dental, P.C. and
StomatCare DSO, LLC hired Care Angel, Inc. to make automated,
artificial voice calls to individuals in an attempt to schedule
dental appointments with them.

Care Angel made those pre-recorded calls to individuals, like the
Plaintiff, who had previously instructed Care Angel to stop
contacting them. Why did Care Angel do it? Because it claimed that
even though call recipients had told them to stop calling,
they only did so in response to a text message and as a result they
could still be sent pre-recorded messages, and despite knowledge of
the stop requests, Stomatcare and Roosevelt Dental did not direct
Care Angel to stop make such calls to them, the lawsuit says.

Roosevelt Field Dental Pc is a medical group practice located in
Garden City, New York that specializes in Dentistry.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated June 1,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3az4eNe
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN PA
          237 South Dixie Highway, 4 th Floor
          Coral Gables, FL 33133
          Telephone: (305) 469-5881
          E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com

               - and -

          Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
          PARONICH LAW, P.C.
          350 Lincoln St., Suite 2400
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Telephone: (617) 485-0018
          E-mail: anthony@paronichlaw.com

RUSSIA: Class Action Mulled on Behalf of Ukrainian War Victims
--------------------------------------------------------------
According to The Crime Report, hundreds of Ukrainian and
international lawyers are preparing a suite of class action
lawsuits on behalf of Ukrainian war victims, reports the Guardian.
The actions will target the Russian state, but also private
contractors and business people considered complicit in Russia's
attack with the goal of seizing Russian assets in order to
compensate Ukrainians who have lost a loved one, their home,
property, or business in the invasion.

While the class action is independent of the Ukrainian government,
Ukrainian MP Serhiy Taruta has been facilitating meetings between
lawyers and investigators and Ukrainian officials to assist with
gathering evidence. Independent research collective Bellingcat and
other investigative teams are helping the collective identify the
assets of contractors and business people linked to the Russian war
effort. Notably, the case will plead that Russia's invasion
qualified, at least partially, as terrorism, a move that would make
it easier to go after defendant assets in court. [GN]



RVSHARE LLC: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against RVshare, LLC. The
case is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. RVshare, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-04542
(S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

RVshare -- https://rvshare.com/ -- is an online marketplace that
provides peer-to-peer recreational vehicle rental services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


SMITHEY IRONWARE: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Smithey Ironware
Company, LLC. The case is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Smithey Ironware
Company, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-04540 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Smithey Ironware Co. -- https://smithey.com/ -- designs and
manufactures heirloom quality cast iron and carbon steel cookware
in Charleston, South Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


SNOWFLAKE DESIGNS: Davis Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Snowflake Designs,
Inc. The case is styled as Kevin Davis, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Snowflake Designs, Inc., Case
No. 1:22-cv-04551 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Snowflake -- https://www.snowflakedesigns.com/ -- designs
manufactures gymnastics leotards and apparel that is sold all over
the world.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


SPB HOSPITALITY: Penn Suit Alleges Unpaid Wages, Illegal Tip Credit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
ALEXANDRIA PENN, on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SPB HOSPITALITY, LLC and J.
ALEXANDER'S OF TEXAS, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 4:22-cv-01755 (S.D.
Tex., May 31, 2022) implicates Defendants' alleged violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act over their tip credit and subsequent
underpayment of employees at the federally mandated minimum wage
rate and for failing to pay Plaintiff and all similarly situated
workers their earned minimum wages.

The Plaintiff worked for Defendants at the J. Alexander's in
Columbus, Ohio. She worked as a server and was paid less than the
federal minimum wage from approximately February 2019 to November
2019, asserts the complaint.

SPB Hospitality, LLC and J. Alexander's of Texas, LLC operate a
nationwide chain of restaurants under the trade name "J.
Alexander's" throughout the U.S.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Don J. Foty, Esq.
          HODGES & FOTY, LLP
          4409 Montrose Blvd, Ste. 200
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 523-0001
          Facsimile: (713) 523-1116
          E-mail: dfoty@hftrialfirm.com

               - and -

          Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq.
          Alanna Klein Fischer, Esq.
          Lori M. Griffin, Esq.
          THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
          The Heritage Building, Suite 250
          34555 Chagrin Boulevard
          Moreland Hills, OH 44022
          Telephone: (216) 696-5000
          Facsimile: (216) 696-7005
          E-mail: anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  alanna@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  lori@lazzarolawfirm.com

SPERO THERAPEUTICS: Robbins LLP Reminds of July 25 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Class: Shareholder rights law firm Robbins LLP informs
investors that a shareholder filed a class action on behalf of all
persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Spero
Therapeutics, Inc. (NASDAQ: SPRO) securities between October 28,
2021 and May 2, 2022. The complaint alleges violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Spero is clinical-stage
biopharmaceutical company that focuses on developing treatments for
multi-drug resistant (MDR) bacterial infections and rare diseases
in the United States. The Company's product candidates include
Tebipenem Pivoxil Hydrobromide (HBr), an oral carbapenem -- class
antibiotic to treat complicated urinary tract infections.

What is this Case About: Spero Therapeutics, Inc. (SPRO) Failed to
Obtain FDA Approval of One of its Lead Product Candidates

According to the complaint, during the class period, defendants
failed to disclose that the data submitted in support of the
Tebipenem HBr NDA were insufficient to obtain FDA approval and
therefore, it was unlikely that the FDA would approve the Tebipenem
HBr NDA in its current form. The failure to obtain FDA approval
necessitated a significant workforce reduction and restructuring of
Spero's operations, and as a result, the Company's public
statements were materially false and misleading.

On March 31, 2022, Spero announced the Company's fourth quarter and
full year 2021 financial results, disclosing that the FDA "has
notified Spero that, as part of its ongoing review of Spero's New
Drug Application (NDA) for tebipenem HBr, it has identified
deficiencies that preclude discussion of labeling and
post-marketing requirements/commitments at this time." On this
news, Spero's stock price fell $1.59 per share, or 18.27%, to close
at $7.11 per share on April 1, 2022.

Then on May 3, 2022, Spero issued a press release announcing "that
it will immediately defer current commercialization activities for
tebipenem HBr based on feedback from a recent Late Cycle Meeting
(LCM) with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regarding
Spero's New Drug Application (NDA) for tebipenem HBr[,]" and that,
"[a]lthough the review is still ongoing and the FDA has not yet
made any final determination regarding approvability, the
discussion suggested that the data package may be insufficient to
support approval during this review cycle." Specifically, the FDA
advised the Company, in relevant part, that the FDA's separate
analysis of the relevant study population had "reduce[d] the number
of evaluable patients in the primary analysis population compared
with those resulting from the trial's pre-specified micro-ITT
population as outlined in the statistical analysis plan" and [a]s a
result, the FDA considers that the pre-specified non-inferiority
margin of -12.5% was not met." Further, the press release advised
that, "[i]n connection with this development, Spero announced that
it is undertaking a reduction in its workforce by approximately 75%
and a restructuring of its operations to reduce operating costs and
reallocate resources." On this news, Spero's stock price fell $3.24
per share, or 63.65%, to close at $1.85 per share on May 3, 2022.

Next Steps: If you acquired shares of Spero Therapeutics, Inc.
(SPRO) securities between October 28, 2021 and May 2, 2022, you
have until July 25, 2022, to ask the court to appoint you lead
plaintiff for the class. A lead plaintiff is a representative party
acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. You do not have to participate in the case to be
eligible for a recovery.

All representation is on a contingency fee basis. Shareholders pay
no fees or expenses.

Contact us to learn more:

Aaron Dumas
(800) 350-6003
adumas@robbinsllp.com
Shareholder Information Form

About Robbins LLP: A recognized leader in shareholder rights
litigation, the attorneys and staff of Robbins LLP have been
dedicated to helping shareholders recover losses, improve corporate
governance structures, and hold company executives accountable for
their wrongdoing since 2002.
Attorney Advertising. Past results do not guarantee a similar
outcome.

Contacts
Aaron Dumas
Robbins LLP
5040 Shoreham Place
San Diego, CA 92122
adumas@robbinsllp.com
(800) 350-6003
www.robbinsllp.com [GN]

SPERO THERAPEUTICS: Wolf Haldenstein Reminds of July 25 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP on May 31 disclosed that
a federal securities class action lawsuit has been filed against
Spero Therapeutics, Inc. ("Spero" or the Company") (NASDAQ: SPRO)
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York on behalf of a class consisting of those that purchased or
otherwise acquired Spero securities between October 28, 2021 and
May 2, 2022,

All investors who purchased the shares of Spero Therapeutics, Inc.
and incurred losses are advised to contact the firm immediately at
classmember@whafh.com or (800) 575-0735 or (212) 545-4774. You may
obtain additional information concerning the action or join the
case on our website, www.whafh.com.

If you have incurred losses in Spero Therapeutics, Inc., you may,
no later than July 25, 2022, request that the Court appoint you
lead plaintiff of the proposed class. Please contact Wolf
Haldenstein to learn more about your rights as an investor in Spero
Therapeutics, Inc.

On October 28, 2021, Spero announced that it had submitted a New
Drug Application ("NDA") to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") for Tebipenem HBr for the Treatment of Complicated Urinary
Tract Infections including Pyelonephritis (the "Tebipenem HBr
NDA").

The complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operations, and prospects. Specifically,
Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that:

   -- the data submitted in support of the Tebipenem HBr NDA were
insufficient to obtain FDA approval;
   -- it was unlikely that the FDA would approve the Tebipenem HBr
NDA in its current form; and
   -- the foregoing would necessitate a significant workforce
reduction and restructuring of Spero's operations.

On March 31, 2022, Spero issued a press release announcing the
Company's fourth quarter and full year 2021 financial results. In
the press release, Spero disclosed that "[t]he U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) has notified Spero that, as part of its
ongoing review of Spero's New Drug Application (NDA) for tebipenem
HBr, it has identified deficiencies that preclude discussion of
labeling and post-marketing requirements/commitments at this time."


On this news, Spero's stock price fell $1.59 per share, or 18.27%,
to close at $7.11 per share on April 1, 2022.

Then on May 3, 2022, Spero issued a press release announcing "that
it will immediately defer current commercialization activities for
tebipenem HBr based on feedback from a recent Late Cycle Meeting
with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regarding Spero's
New Drug Application (NDA) for tebipenem HBr[,]" and that,
"[a]lthough the review is still ongoing and the FDA has not yet
made any final determination regarding approvability, the
discussion suggested that the data package may be insufficient to
support approval during this review cycle." Specifically, the FDA
advised the Company, in relevant part, that the FDA's separate
analysis of the relevant study population had "reduce[d] the number
of evaluable patients in the primary analysis population compared
with those resulting from the trial's pre-specified micro-ITT
population as outlined in the statistical analysis plan and [a]s a
result, the FDA considers that the pre-specified non-inferiority
margin of -12.5% was not met." Further, the press release advised
that, "[i]n connection with this development, Spero announced that
it is undertaking a reduction in its workforce by approximately 75%
and a restructuring of its operations to reduce operating costs and
reallocate resources."

On this news, Spero's stock price fell $3.24 per share, or 63.65%,
to close at $1.85 per share on May 3, 2022.

Wolf Haldenstein has extensive experience in the prosecution of
securities class actions and derivative litigation in state and
federal trial and appellate courts across the country. The firm has
attorneys in various practice areas; and offices in New York,
Chicago and San Diego. The reputation and expertise of this firm in
shareholder and other class litigation has been repeatedly
recognized by the courts, which have appointed it to major
positions in complex securities multi-district and consolidated
litigation.

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions regarding
your rights and interests in this case, please immediately contact
Wolf Haldenstein by telephone at (800) 575-0735 or via e-mail at
classmember@whafh.com

Contact:

Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP
Patrick Donovan, Esq.
Gregory Stone, Director of Case and Financial Analysis
Email: gstone@whafh.com, donovan@whafh.com or
classmember@whafh.com
Tel: (800) 575-0735 or (212) 545-4774

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules. [GN]

ST. VINCENT HEALTH: Applegate Files Discrimination Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
KAYLYN APPLEGATE, ROBIN BANKS, KRISTINA BARGA, CINDY BISHOP, DONNA
JO BOWLES, JOSIE BROWN, DONNA BRYANT, MOLLY BUEHLER, ROBIN BURNS,
SAMANTHA CASSIDY, ROBERT CLEMENTS, JENNIFER COLLINS, RHONDA DAVIS,
CHAD DENNEY, PATRICIA DRONE-MCCULLOUGH, ERIKA FOWLER, PATRICK
FOWLER, DR. JOSHUA FREDERICK, RICHARD FULKERSON, MARZENA GASLAWSKI,
DONNA GRANT, TRACEY HARBAUGH, BRENDA HARTMAN, KAREN HERSH, GARY
HIGGINBOTHAM, MATT HORNE, SARAH HORNER, BRANDY KEHRT, HEATHER KING,
MADISON KUHN, MICHELLE LANDIS, CECILIA LESCH, TERESA LESCH,
JENNIFER MAUPIN, JOSHUA MILLER, TIFFANY MILLER, BETHANY MONTE,
MONICA NALLEY, STEVEN OHLHEISER, SUSANA OSBORNE, CHRIS PARR, JEMAEL
PARTLOW, AMANDA PISANO, ASHLEY PLOUGHE, BARBARA PLUHAR, MONICA
POOLE, LEISA RANDALL, TERESA RIDLEN, BONNIE RIPBERGER, ROCHELLE
ROTT, ROBERT RUNGE, TINA SNEED, DANIELLA STAFFORD, LISA STULTS,
KERI STULTZ, DELLA TAYLOR, AMANDA THIERGARTNER, MILICA VRANIC, LISA
WEBB, ALAYNAH WEISEND, VICTORIA WILLOUR, JODI WOLFENBARGER, ANDREW
ZENTHOFER, AND JUSTON ZENTHOFER on behalf of Themselves and all
those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. ST. VINCENT HEALTH, INC.,
ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL & HEALTH CENTER, INC., ST. MARY'S HEALTH, INC.,
ST. MARY'S MEDICAL GROUP, LLC, ST. MARY'S WARRICK HOSPITAL, INC.,
ST. VINCENT ANDERSON REGIONAL HOSPITAL, INC., ST. VINCENT CARMEL
HOSPITAL, INC., ST. VINCENT DUNN HOSPITAL, INC., ST. VINCENT
FISHERS HOSPITAL, INC., ST. VINCENT HEART CENTER OF INDIANA, LLC,
ST. VINCENT HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE CENTER, INC., ST. VINCENT
HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE CENTER, INC. D/B/A WILLIAM K. NASSER, MD,
HEALTHCARE EDUCATION AND SIMULATION CENTER, ST. VINCENT HOSPITAL
AND HEALTH CARE CENTER, INC. D/B/A ASCENSION HEALTH ST. VINCENT
STRESS CENTER, ST. VINCENT HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE CENTER, INC.
D/B/A ASCENSION HEALTH ST. VINCENT WOMEN'S HEALTH BOUTIQUE, ST.
VINCENT MEDICAL GROUP, INC., ST. VINCENT SETON SPECIALTY HOSPITAL,
INC., ST. VINCENT WILLIAMSPORT HOSPITAL, INC., ASCENSION HEALTH,
INC., ASCENSION HEALTH-IS, INC., ASCENSION HEALTH MINISTRY SERVICE
CENTER, LLC; AND MEDXCEL FACILITIES MANAGEMENT, LLC. Defendants,
Case No. 1:22-cv-01097-TWP-MJD (S.D. Ind., May 27, 2022) is a class
action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
remedy a pattern of religious discrimination by Ascension Health,
Inc. against employees who requested religious accommodations from
Ascension Health's mandate that its employees and the employees of
Ascension Health's affiliates receive the COVID-19 vaccine.

According to the complaint, on November 12, 2021, Plaintiffs and
numerous similarly situated St. Vincent Health, Inc. employees and
other Ascension Health healthcare workers and staff were suspended
without pay in violation of Title VII merely for exercising their
Title VII right to seek religious exemptions to Ascension Health's
vaccine mandate. All employees denied religious exemptions and
suspended were told they would be terminated on January 4, 2022, if
they did not submit to vaccination before then. Ascension Health
maintained its illegal, coercive, suspension without pay program
for more than a month from November 12, 2021, through at least
December 17, 2021, during which time Plaintiffs and other St.
Vincent Health and Ascension Health healthcare workers and staff
who had sought religious exemptions were not permitted to work and
were not paid, alleges the suit.

For these Plaintiffs, their supposedly confidential religious
exemption request generated ridicule by other Ascension Health and
St. Vincent Health associates and subjected those seeking religious
exemptions to unwelcomed harassment regarding their request.
Instead of this ridicule being properly addressed, it was simply
ignored by Ascension Health. The Plaintiffs filed their charges of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and
have received Notice of Right to Sue letters from the EEOC, the
suit says.

The Defendants are providers of healthcare services in the
U.S.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          William Bock, III, Esq.
          Adam R. Doerr, Esq.
          Allyse E. Wirkkala, Esq.
          KROGER, GARDIS & REGAS, LLP
          111 Monument Circle, Suite 900
          Indianapolis, IN 46204
          Telephone: (317) 692-9000

STATE FARM: McClanahan Files Bid for Class Certification
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOHN BAKER MCCLANAHAN,
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MELISSA BUCHANAN on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, v. STATE FARM LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 1:22-cv-01031-STA-jay (W.D. Tenn.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order granting class
certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

State Farm is a life insurance provider.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated June 1,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3aJmxPJ
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David M. Wilkerson, Esq.
          THE VAN WINKLE LAW FIRM
          11 N. Market Street
          Asheville, NC 28801
          Telephone: (828) 258-2991
          Facsimile: (828) 257-2767
          E-mail: dwilkerson@vwlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Melinda R. Coolidge, Esq.
          James J. Pizzirusso, Esq.
          Nathaniel C. Giddings, Esq.
          HAUSFELD LLP
          888 16th Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 540-7200
          Facsimile: 202-540-7201
          E-mail: mcoolidge@hausfeld.com
                  jpizzirusso@hausfeld.com
                  ngiddings@hausfeld.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Kaliel, Esq.
          Sophia Goren Gold, Esq.
          KALIEL PLC
          1875 Connecticut Avenue NW, 10th Floor
          Washington, DC 20009
          Telephone: 202-350-4783
          E-mail: jkaliel@kalielpllc.com
                  sgold@kalielpllc.com

               - and -

          Larry D. Lahman, Esq.
          Roger L. Ediger, Esq.
          MITCHELL DeCLERCK
          202 West Broadway Avenue
          Enid, OK 73701
          Telephone: (580) 234-5144
          Facsimile: (580) 234-8890
          E-mail: larry.lahman@sbcglobal.net
                  rle@mdpllc.com

               - and -

          George Brandt, III, Esq.
          HENDERSON, BRANDT & VIETH, P.A.
          360 E. Henry St., Suite 101
          Spartanburg, SC 29302
          Telephone: (864) 583-5144
          Facsimile: (864) 582-2927
          E-mail: gbrandt@hbvlaw.com

SUGARLANDS DISTILLING: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sugarlands Distilling
Company, LLC. The case is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Sugarlands Distilling
Company, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-04520 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Sugarlands Distilling Company -- https://www.sugarlands.com/ -- is
a craft distillery producing award-winning moonshine, rum, cream
liqueurs, and rye whiskey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com



TEETIME DELIVERY: Piech Sues Over Delivery Drivers' Unpaid Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
WALTER PIECH, on behalf of himself, and all other plaintiffs
similarly situated, known and unknown, Plaintiff v. TEETIME
DELIVERY, INC. AND JASON TINMAN, INDIVIDUALLY, Defendants, Case No.
1:22-cv-02859 (N.D. Ill., May 31, 2022) is a class action brought
against the Defendants under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
Illinois Minimum Wage Law, and the Chicago Minimum Wage Ordinance
of the Municipal Code of Chicago for depriving Plaintiff proper
overtime rate of pay for overtime-eligible hours worked in excess
of 40 in individual work weeks as a result of Defendants' failure
to include non-discretionary, per-stop bonuses in the calculation
of the regular rate.

Mr. Piech is a former delivery driver employee of Defendants who
performed all manual labor aspects of driving and package delivery
including driving a van, loading/unloading packages, engaging with
customers at delivery locations, etc.

TeeTime Delivery, Inc. is an Illinois corporation that owns and
operates a package delivery business. TTI is a subcontractor of
FedEx.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Samuel D. Engelson, Esq.
          John William Billhorn, Esq.
          BILLHORN LAW FIRM
          53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 1137
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 853-1450

TENNECO INC: Frayer Files Suit for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
-------------------------------------------------------------
RYAN FRAYER and TANIKA PARKER, individually and on behalf of the
DRIV 401(K) RETIREMENT SA VIN GS PLAN, and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. TENNECO INC.; DRIV AUTOMOTIVE INC.; TENNECO
AUTOMOTIVE OPERA TING COMPANY INC.; THE TENNECO BENEFITS COMMITTEE;
and JOHN AND JANE DOE DEFENDANTS 1-30, Defendants, Case No.
3:22-cv-00132-DPM (D. Ark., May 27, 2022) is a class action brought
pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
against the Defendants for breaches of their fiduciary duties.

This class action concerns the DRiV 401(k) Retirement Savings Plan
and is brought by the Plaintiffs, on behalf of all persons who were
and/or are participants in and beneficiaries of the Plan at any
time during the six-year period preceding the filing of the
original complaint and up through the present.

According to the complaint, when selecting and monitoring
investment options and service providers for an ERISA-governed
plan, the plan's fiduciaries are required to act for the exclusive
benefit of the plan and its participants and beneficiaries, perform
with undivided loyalty, act prudently, defray reasonable plan
expenses, diversify investments to minimize large losses unless
clearly prudent not to do so, and discharge their duties in
accordance with the governing documents and instruments so long as
they are consistent with ERISA.

The Defendants allegedly failed to fulfill these duties. During the
Class Period, Defendants could have leveraged the Plan's assets to
qualify for lower-cost versions of the same investments, chosen
less costly and equally or better-performing investment options for
the Plan, and used the Plan's size to reduce recordkeeping fees,
says the suit.

The Plaintiffs bring this action to remedy this unlawful conduct,
prevent further mismanagement of the Plan, and obtain equitable and
other relief as provided by ERISA. The Plaintiffs bring this action
and request this relief for the benefit of the Plan and its
participants and beneficiaries, the suit added.

Tenneco Inc. is a designer, manufacturer and marketer of automotive
products for original equipment and aftermarket customers with
principal place of business in Lake Forest, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Emmett Bowers Chiles IV, Esq.
          QUATTLEBAUM, GROOMS & TULL PLLC
          111 Center Street, Suite 1900
          Little Rock, AR 72201
          Telephone: (501) 379-1734
          Facsimile: (501) 379-1701
          E-mail: cchiles@ggtlaw.com

               - and -

          Boyd A. Byers, Esq.
          Emily L. Matta, Esq.
          FOULSTON SIEFKIN LLP
          1551 N. Waterfront Pkwy, Suite 100
          Wichita, KS 67206-4466
          Telephone: (316) 291-9716
          Facsimile: (316) 771-6011
          E-mail: bbyers@foulston.com
                  ematta@foulston.com

               - and -

          Scott C. Nehrbass, Esq.
          32 Corporate Woods, Suite 600
          9225 Indian Creek Parkway
          Overland Park, KS 66210-2000
          Telephone: (913) 253-2144
          Facsimile: (913) 498-2101
          E-mail: snehrbass@foulston.com


TEXAS: Ward, et al., Seek to Correct Class Certification Order
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOSEPH WARD, by his next
friend FLOYD JENNINGS, et al., v. CECILE YOUNG, in her official
capacity as Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human
Services Commission, Case No. 1:16-cv-00917-LY (W.D. Tex.), the
Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order granting their motion
and correcting the Court's Order on Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification to conditionally appoint Mary Sapp as class
representative to represent the class of persons found incompetent
to stand trial along with Plaintiffs Joseph Ward, Marc Lawson,
Kenneth Jones, Jennifer Lampkin, and Julian Torres.

The Plaintiffs' motion for class certification filed June 17, 2019
listed the following Named Plaintiffs as members of the proposed
Class for Incompetent Detainees: Joseph Ward, Marc Lawson, Kenneth
Jones, Jennifer Lampkin, Mary Sapp, and Julian Torres.

The Plaintiffs' motion for class certification also proposed a
class for NGRI acquittees and Mary Sapp was proposed as a class
representative for this second class as well as the Class for
Incompetent Detainees.

On March 29, 2022, the Court partially granted Plaintiffs' Motion
for Class Certification, certified the Class for Incompetent
Detainees, and denied Plaintiffs' motion to certify a class of NGRI
acquittees.

In granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification with respect
tothe Incompetency Detainees, the Court specifically found with
respect to all of the Named Plaintiffs proposed as representatives
for the Incompetency Detainee class, the "Plaintiffs have
demonstrated that, in all pertinent respects, they are typical of
the proposed class" and determined that they will adequately
represent the interests of the class.

Though the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion to certify a class on
behalf of NGRI acquittees and appoint Mary Sapp one of the NGRI
acquittee class representatives, her exclusion as a class
representative for the class of incompetency detainees was a
clerical mistake or oversight and should be corrected pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a),the Plaintiffs contend.

The Texas Health and Human Services Commission is an agency within
the Texas Health and Human Services System.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated June 1, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3zjMxeQ at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Beth Mitchell, Esq.
          Peter Hofer, Esq.
          LISA SNEAD
          DISABILITY RIGHTS TEXAS
          2222 West Braker Lane
          Austin, TX 78758
          Telephone: (512) 454-4816
          Facsimile: (512) 454-3999
          E-mail: bmitchell@drtx.org
                  phofer@drtx.org
                  lsnead@drtx.org

               - and -

          Coty Meibeyer, Esq.
          DISABILITY RIGHTS TEXAS
          1500 McGowen, Suite 100
          Houston, TX 77004
          Telephone: (713) 974-7691
          Facsimile: (713) 974-7695
          E-mail: cmeibeyer@drtx.org

               - and -

          John Michael Gaddis, Esq.
          WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
          2121 N. Pearl St., Suite 900
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 453-6500
          Facsimile: (214) 453-6400
          E-mail mgaddis@winston.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Kimberly Gdula, Esq.
          William D. Wassdorf, Esq.
          Christopher D. Hilton, Esq.
          ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL
          GENERAL LITIGATION DIVISION
          P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
          Austin, TX 78711-2548

THINX INC: Women's Undergarments Contain PFAS, Class Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
Corrado Rizzi, writing for ClassAction.org, reports that a proposed
class action alleges Thinx women's underwear is falsely advertised
in that the supposedly safe, healthy and sustainable hygienic
undergarments contain polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) and silver
nanoparticles.

The 41-page complaint out of New York says that independent,
third-party testing done by the plaintiff, an Okeechobee, Florida
resident, has confirmed the existence of the harmful substances,
seemingly contradicting Thinx's "unvarying representations that the
product is nontoxic, harmless, sustainable, organic,
environmentally friendly, and otherwise safe for women and the
environment."

According to the case, Thinx has intentionally concealed the true
nature of its products, which it touts as a more sustainable
approach to feminine hygiene, while misrepresenting the results of
third-party testing, concealing the nature of its "anti-odor"
technology and telling consumers that some of its underwear is
organic. The lawsuit says the PFAS chemicals in Thinx underwear
stem from the products' "moisture-wicking" and "leak-resistant"
qualities, while the alleged silver nanoparticles stem from the
items' treatment with an antimicrobial coating.

"Thinx's misbranding is intentional, and it renders the Thinx
Underwear worthless or less valuable," the lawsuit alleges,
contending that consumers would not have bought the items, or would
have paid less for them, had they known they contained harmful
chemicals.

Which Thinx products are included in the lawsuit?
The Thinx products mentioned in the complaint include the cotton
brief, cotton bikini, cotton thong, sport, hiphugger, hi-waist,
boyshorts, French cut, cheeky and thong styles.

Thinx underwear contains "material and trace amounts" of PFAS, case
says
As the case tells it, Thinx is well aware of the demand for
reusable menstrual hygiene products and has become a leader in the
market at a time when there is growing public concern about the
chemicals in and environmental impact of typical single-use period
products. The company touts Thinx as "washable, reusable underwear"
designed to replace pads and tampons, or to be worn with pads and
menstrual cups for extra protection, the suit relays.

"Without exception, every advertisement, marketing campaign,
instructional video, and public statement produced and distributed
in relation to Thinx's products encourages customers to use the
Thinx Underwear the same way as traditional menstrual products
and/or underwear," the lawsuit stresses.

Despite the praise Thinx has drawn for its mission, independent,
third-party testing, which the suit attests is "industry standard"
for detecting and determining whether certain materials comply with
quality and safety benchmarks, has found that the company's
products contain short-chain PFAS at "material and trace amounts,"
the complaint states.

The case relays that PFAS are a category of human-made chemicals
that may be used to enhance the performance of textiles and
apparel. Per the suit, PFAS are frequently used in outdoor apparel,
for instance, to make it water repellant or stain resistant. The
carbon-fluorine bonds in PFAS are among the strongest in nature,
allowing the substances to persist in the human body and
environment over time, according to the complaint.

The lawsuit theorizes that Thinx uses PFAS to "enhance the
performance" of its underwear, including its "moisture-wicking" and
"leak-resistant" properties.

Silver nanoparticles linked to Thinx antimicrobial treatment, suit
claims
The lawsuit goes on to relay that although Thinx represents on its
website that its underwear does not contain toxic metals or
engineered nanoparticles, the products' treatment with Agion, an
antimicrobial coating, for odor protection causes silver and copper
nanoparticles to linger on the fabric. Per the case, it is the size
of the nanoparticles that poses a problem for humans.

Nanoparticles are small-scale substances which are undetectable to
the human eye. Whether they are engineered or naturally occurring,
it is a nanoparticle's size that creates a hazard since these small
particles can readily enter the human body through inhalation,
ingestion, and skin absorption."

The filing further argues that even if a nanoparticle is naturally
occurring, it is not automatically rendered safer than one that is
engineered.

"Thus, Thinx's representation that it does not include
‘engineered nanoparticles' is misleading to a reasonable
consumer," the suit charges, adding that Thinx fails to disclose on
product packaging that its underwear contains silver
nanoparticles.

Importantly, the lawsuit says silver nanoparticles pose a
particular risk to the female body, especially when present in
period products, given that they have been found to cause
"ultrastructural changes to the vaginal mucosa, urethra and rectum"
and adverse effects on vaginal bacteria.

"Thinx does not reveal to consumers that Agion is an antimicrobial,
or that it contains silver and copper nanoparticles which are known
to migrate and pose a safety hazard to the female body and the
environment," the case alleges. "Thus, Thinx's representations that
its Underwear does not contain harmful chemicals, toxic metals or
engineered nanoparticles is inaccurate and misleading."

Thinx underwear is not organic either, case claims
Lastly, the lawsuit argues that four styles of cotton Thinx
underwear are not organic as advertised because the presence of
PFAS disqualifies the items for Global Organic Textile Standards
(GOTS) certification. Per the suit, GOTS is the worldwide leading
processing standard for organic fibers and ultimately determines
when a textile may be classified as organic.

In reality, the lawsuit says, Thinx does not hold any independent
organic certifications, conform to industry standards for organic
clothing or use exclusively organic cotton.

Who's covered by the lawsuit?
The case looks to represent all individuals in the United States
who have purchased the Thinx underwear at issue during the maximum
period permitted by law.

I've bought some Thinx underwear. How do I get involved?
When a class action case like this is initially filed, there's
usually nothing you need to do to join or ensure that you're
included in the litigation. Fact is, it's only if and when a
lawsuit settles that a consumer would have to act. This might
involve submitting a claim form online or by mail.

If the suit settles and you're one of the people who are "covered,"
you would most likely receive a notice by mail and/or email. This
notice will probably contain certain important information on, for
example, how to file a claim, the rundown on your legal rights,
what proof you might need to claim your money, and more.

Most class action lawsuits take some time to work through the legal
process, usually en route to a settlement, dismissal or
arbitration. [GN]

TOWNE HEALTHCARE: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Diallo Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
DIONNE DIALLO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. TOWNE HEALTHCARE STAFFING LLC d/b/a TOWNE
NURSING STAFF, INC.; BRONX CARE; BRONX CENTER FOR REHABILITATION
AND HEALTHCARE, LLC d/b/a BRONX CENTER FOR REHABILITATION AND
NURSING, WORKMEN'S CIRCLE CENTER OF THE BRONX, INC. d/b/a WORKMEN'S
CIRCLE; MORNINGSIDE HOUSE NURSING HOME COMPANY, INC. d/b/a MORNING
SIDE NURSING & REHABILITATION; KINGSBRIDGE NURSING HOME; TRIBORO
CENTER; DEWITT REHABILITATION AND NURSING CENTER INC. d/b/a UPPER
EAST SIDE REHABILITATION AND NURSING CENTER; BETH ABRAHAM SERVICES
d/b/a BETH ABRAHAM CENTER FOR REHABILITATION AND NURSING; HOPE
CENTER OPERATIONS, LLC d/b/a HOPE CENTER; and JOHN DOE CORPORATIONS
1-10, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-04495 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022)
is an action against the Defendant for failure to pay minimum
wages, overtime compensation, and provide accurate wage
statements.

Plaintiff Diallo was employed by the Defendants as nursing
assistant.

TOWNE HEALTHCARE STAFFING LLC d/b/a TOWNE NURSING STAFF, INC. is
engaged in the business of providing employment services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Amit Kumar, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM CAFARO
          108 West 39th Street, Suite 602
          New York, NY 10018
          Telephone: (212) 583-7400
          Email: AKumar@CafaroEsq.com

TRAEGER PELLET: Yates, Jones Allowed Leave to File Class Cert
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MICHAEL YATES,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; and
NORMAN L. JONES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. TRAEGER PELLET GRILLS, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company, Case No. 2:19-cv-00723-BSJ (D. Utah), the Hon.
Judge Bruce S. Jenkins entered an order granting the Plaintiffs'
motion for leave to file overlength motion for class certification
and memorandum in support, dated May 27, 2022.

The Plaintiffs shall be granted leave to file a 54 page overlength
Motion for Class Certification and Memorandum in Support.

Traeger is a manufacturer of wood pellet grills for outdoor
cooking.

A copy of the Court's orderdated June 1, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3NlYq8j at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jared D. Scott, Esq.
          ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
          50 West Broadway; #700
          Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2035
          Telephone: (801) 534-1700
          E-mail; jscott@aklawfirm.com

               - and -

          Karl S. Kronenberger, Esq.
          Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld, Esq.
          Liana W. Chen, Esq.
          KRONENBERGER ROSENFELD, LLP
          150 Post Street, Suite 520
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 955-1155
          E-mail: karl@KRintemetLaw.com
                  jeff@KRintemetLaw.com
                  liana@KRintemetLaw.com

TRANSAMERICA LIFE: Loses Bid for Summary Judgment in Hegarty Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT HEGARTY, Plaintiff v. TRANSAMERICA LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-06006-MMC (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Maxine M. Chesney of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California denies the Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, filed Jan. 7, 2022.

Before the Court is Defendant Transamerica's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Hegarty has filed opposition, to which
the Defendant has replied. The matter came on regularly for hearing
on May 27, 2022.

Having read and considered the papers filed in support of and in
opposition to the motion, and having considered the oral arguments
made at the hearing, Judge Chesney, for the reasons set forth in
detail on the record at the hearing, finds as follows:

     1. Although the Defendant has submitted considerable evidence
to show the Plaintiff's policy is covered by the Oakes settlement,
the evidence on which the Plaintiff relies, in particular, the
numbers affixed to his policy documents that appear to be
inconsistent with those covered by the settlement agreement,
suffices to create a triable issue.

     2. Assuming, arguendo, the Plaintiff's policy is covered by
the Oakes settlement, the Defendant has submitted essentially
indisputable evidence that the claims raised in the instant action
fall within the scope of the release.

     3. The Defendant has not submitted sufficient evidence to
support a finding that the claims pleaded in the instant case and
those pleaded in the operative Oakes complaint are, as a matter of
law, based on an "identical factual predicate," and it has not
submitted any authority suggesting the Supreme Court of Texas would
not apply that doctrine.

Accordingly, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/54xdk3rd from Leagle.com.


TRAVELEX INSURANCE: Court Modifies Class Certification Deadlines
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DONNA HAAS, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, v. TRAVELEX INSURANCE
SERVICES INC., BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and
DOES 1-100, inclusive, Case No. 2:20-cv-06171-ODW-PLA (C.D. Cal.),
the Hon. Judge Otis D. Wright, II entered an order granting joint
stipulation to modify reply deadline on motion for class
certification, set briefing schedule on motion to exclude, and
clarify hearing date:

                 Event             Current           New
                                   Deadline          Deadline

-- Hearing on Class             July 11, 2022    July 25, 2022
   Certification Motion,
   Motion to File Under Seal,
   and Daubert Motion
   [64][65][74][75]:

-- Deadline to File Reply       July 4, 2022     July 15, 2022
   to Daubert Motion

-- Deadline to File             June 20, 2022    June 27, 2022
   Opposition to Daubert
   Motion:

-- Deadline to File Reply       June 20, 2022    June 27, 2022
   to Class Certification
   Motion:

-- Deadline to File             May 16, 2022     Unchanged
   Opposition to Class
   Certification
   Motion:

-- Deadline to File             April 4, 2022    Unchanged
   Class Certification
   Motion:

Travelex provides travel insurance.

A copy of the Court's order dated June 1, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3NSXJmC at no extra charge.[CC]

TREK RETAIL: Parties Seek to Continue Class Cert. Deadlines
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SCOTT GREEN, individually
and on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, v. TREK
RETAIL CORPORATION, a Wisconsin Corporation; and DOES 1-50,
inclusive, Case No. 4:21-cv-07004-HSG (N.D. Cal.), the Parties ask
the Court to continue the deadlines related to the filing,
briefing, and hearing associated with Plaintiffs' forthcoming
motion for class certification in order to allow them to attend
mediation and focus on informal resolution without incurring
potentially unnecessary additional costs associated with discovery,
experts, and class certification briefing:

   1. The Parties are scheduled to attend mediation with Judge
      Stone on October 13, 2022.

   2. In the interest of conserving judicial and party resources
      and to allow the Parties to focus their efforts on
      preparing for said mediation, the Parties agree on the
      following dates for class certification and discovery:

      a. Fact discovery cut-off for certification-related issues
         will be continued to March 31, 2023 from October 14,
         2022.

      b. Expert Disclosure cut-off for certification related
         issues will be continued to April 10, 2023 from October
         21, 2022.

      c. Last day for Rebuttal Disclosures for certification
         will be continued to April 24, 2023 from November 4,
         2022.

      d. The Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification will be
         filed by May 15, 2023 (currently set for November 14,
         2022).

      e. The Defendant's Opposition due by June 14, 2023
         (currently set for December 5, 2022).

      f. The Plaintiff's Reply due by June 28, 2023 (currently
         set for December 19, 2022).

      g. Hearing on Motion for Class Certification on or about
         July 13, 2023 (currently set for January 12, 2023 at
         2:00 p.m.) or a date and time thereafter that is
         convenient for the Court.

A copy of the Court's order dated May 31, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3atfMkL at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James R. Hawkins, Esq.
          Christina M. Lucio, Esq.
          JAMES HAWKINS APLC
          9880 Research Drive, Suite 200
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 387-7200
          Facsimile: (949) 387-6676
          E-mail: james@Jameshawkinsaplc.com
                  christina@Jameshawkinsaplc.com

The Attorneys for Defendant Trek Retail Corporation, are:

          Jennifer N. Lutz, Esq.
          Rio F. Schwarting, Esq.
          PETTIT KOHN INGRASSIA LUTZ & DOLIN PC
          11622 El Camino Real, Suite 300
          San Diego, CA 92130
          Telephone: (858) 755-8500
          Facsimile: (858) 755-8504
          E-mail: jlutz@pettitkohn.com
                  rschwarting@pettitkohn.com

TRUIST BANK: Supreme Court Denies Certiorari Petition
-----------------------------------------------------
Law360 reports that the U.S. Supreme Court on May 31 declined to
review a Sixth Circuit decision that banking industry groups say
has called into question the enforceability of millions of
arbitration provisions inserted into account agreements and other
consumer contracts. In an order list, the Supreme Court said it has
denied a certiorari petition filed by what is now Truist Bank, in a
matter concerning its attempt to invoke an arbitration provision in
a 2019 customer class action. [GN]

TUTTLE PUBLISHING: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Tuttle Publishing.
The case is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Tuttle Publishing, Case No.
1:22-cv-04548 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Tuttle Publishing -- https://www.tuttlepublishing.com/ --
originally the Charles E. Tuttle Company, is a book publishing
company that includes Tuttle, Periplus Editions, and Journey
Editions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


UNION PACIFIC: Fleury's Bid to Remand Suit to Circuit Court Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled DAVID FLEURY, individually and on behalf of
a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff v. UNION
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Defendant, Case
No. 20-cv-00390 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Jorge Alonso of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order:

   (1) denying the Plaintiff's motion to sever and remand his
       section 15(a) BIPA claim back to the Circuit Court of Cook
       County; and

   (2) granting the Plaintiff's motion to lift the stay imposed
       by the Court on June 23, 2021.

Background

Plaintiff David Fleury filed the case alleging that Union Pacific
violated various provisions of the Illinois Biometric Information
Privacy Act, 745 ILCS 14/15 ("BIPA"). Fleury filed the putative
class action against Defendant Union Pacific alleging that it
violated various provisions under BIPA. Throughout 2019, Fleury
worked as a truck driver, which required him to visit various
railyards in Illinois, including those owned by Union Pacific. To
enter its facilities, Union Pacific required Fleury and others to
provide biometric information through "identity verification
kiosks."

Mr. Fleury alleges that Union Pacific failed to provide him or
others with written disclosures describing the specific purpose and
length of time that it would collect and store their biometric
data. In addition, he alleges that Union Pacific failed to develop
retention or destruction policies governing the stored biometric
data.

The Plaintiff originally filed this case in the Circuit Court of
Cook County. On Jan. 17, 2020, Union Pacific removed the case to
the Northern District of Illinois. Fleury filed an amended
complaint on June 16, 2020, that contains one general count for
"Violations of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740
ILCS 14/1, et seq," although he specifies at various points
throughout the complaint that Union Pacific violated sections
15(a), (b), (c), and (d) of BIPA.

The Court previously entered an order staying discovery in this
case pending certain state and federal appellate BIPA cases that
would affect the scope of the case, both individually and on a
proposed class basis.

Discussion

Mr. Fleury seeks to sever and remand his section 15(a) claim back
to the Circuit Court of Cook County based on a lack of standing. He
also asks the Court to lift the stay on proceedings.

I. Motion to Remand

Mr. Fleury argues that he lacks Article III standing to pursue his
section 15(a) claim in federal court because he only alleges a
procedural violation. Section 15(a) imposes on an entity collecting
biometric information a duty to develop and publicly disclose
retention schedules and guidelines for destroying the biometric
data. This section further compels those entities to comply with
their retention and destruction policies.

Judge Alonso notes that the party invoking federal jurisdiction,
which in this case is Union Pacific as the removing party, bears
the burden of establishing Article III standing, citing Collier v.
SP Plus Corp., 889 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 2018). To establish
Article III standing, three requirements must be met: (1) the
plaintiff must have suffered a concrete and particularized
injury-in-fact; (2) there must be a causal connection between the
plaintiff's injury and the defendant's conduct; and (3) the injury
is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision (Fox v.
Dakkota Integrated Systems, LLC, 980 F.3d 1146, 1153 (7th Cir.
2020)).

Mr. Fleury challenges only the concrete and particularized injury
factor. Before discussing it, however, the Court recaps three BIPA
cases that inform the Court's analysis.

The first is Bryant v. Compass Group, USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617 (7th
Cir. 2020). In Bryant, the plaintiff's employer installed "Smart
Market" vending machines in its cafeteria. To use these machines, a
patron had to create an account using his or her fingerprint. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated, among other
provisions, section 15(a) by failing to publicly disclose its
retention and destruction schedules. The Seventh Circuit held that
an entity owes the duty to disclose under section 15(a) to the
public generally and not to specific persons whose biometric data
it collects. As a result, the court found that the plaintiff lacked
Article III standing to bring a section 15(a) claim because she
alleged only a procedural violation owed to the public and thus did
not suffer a particularized injury. Importantly, the Seventh
Circuit understood the plaintiff to assert only that the defendant
failed to make its retention and destruction policies publicly
available.

The second case is Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir.
2019). In Patel, the plaintiffs sued Facebook for BIPA violations
based on its "Tag Suggestions" feature, which uses
facial-recognition technology to detect whether an uploaded photo
depicts a user's Facebook friend. The plaintiffs alleged that
Facebook failed to obtain their consent prior to collecting their
biometric data and failed to maintain retention or destruction
guidelines, thereby violating BIPA sections 15(a) and 15(b). The
Ninth Circuit held that the users suffered a concrete and
particularized injury based on these acts.

Last is Fox v. Dakkota Integrated Systems, LLC, 980 F.3d 1146 (7th
Cir. 2020). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that her former
employer violated section 15(a) by failing to comply with its own
retention and destruction policies. The Seventh Circuit held that
the plaintiff had standing to bring her section 15(a) claim because
she alleged that the defendant violated the full panoply of duties
in section 15(a), not just the duty to publicly disclose.

Notably, Judge Alonso says, when distinguishing Fox from Bryant,
the court recognized that section 15(a) places three independent
duties upon entities collecting biometric data: a duty to develop,
duty to publicly disclose, and duty to comply with its data
retention and destruction policies. The court further explained
that "unlawful retention of biometric data inflicts a privacy
injury in the same sense as an unlawful collection does." The court
noted that Bryant carefully narrowed its holding to the duty to
publicly disclose. But the Fox court reached the duty to comply,
analogizing a violation of this duty to the privacy injury
resulting from unlawful collection under section 15(b).

In the case, Fleury argues that his section 15(a) claim should be
severed and remanded because he alleges only a procedural
violation--i.e., the duty to publicly disclose biometric data
retention and destruction policies. Union Pacific, on the other
hand, argues that Fleury alleges that it failed to develop these
policies in addition to unlawfully retaining his biometric data,
thereby, satisfying the particularized injury component.

The Court finds that the allegations in the First Amended Complaint
rise to the level of a concrete and particularized injury for
purposes of Article III standing. Unlike Bryant, Fleury alleges
that Union Pacific failed to develop any data-retention or
destruction policies whatsoever--not just that it failed to publish
them.

The Court likens this to the particularized injury the Seventh
Circuit found in Fox. To be sure, Fox addressed compliance with
data retention and destruction policies, not the mere requirement
to establish those policies. But Fox also noted that the BIPA
requirement to implement data retention and destruction protocols
protects a person's biometric privacy just as concretely as the
statute's informed-consent regime. Flipping that around, the
failure to develop retention and destruction policies once (or
before) an entity begins retaining a person's biometric data
inflicts a privacy injury in the same way that unlawful collection
does.

Consequently, once an entity collects a person's biometric data,
the duty to develop retention and destruction policies becomes one
that adheres to the person whose identifiers were collected--much
the same way the duty to comply with retention/destruction policies
does. This makes the duty to develop particularized in a way that
the duty to publicly disclose is not. The Court finds that this
approach best reflects the Seventh Circuit's holdings in Fox and
Bryant and aligns with the way other judges in this circuit view
the issue.

And in this case, Fleury alleges that Union Pacific failed to
develop retention/destruction policies while still retaining his
and others' biometric data. The Court finds these allegations
sufficient to establish Article III standing.

Mr. Fleury also argues that he does not have Article III standing
to pursue his section 15(a) claim in federal court because he
continues to access Union Pacific's railyards and, therefore, the
continued retention of his biometric data is not unlawful given
that the initial purpose for collecting his identifiers has not
been satisfied, nor has 3 years elapsed since his last interaction
with Union Pacific.

The Court does not read the statute this way. Indeed, it makes
little sense to read BIPA this way because such a reading would
contradict the proactive approach to biometric data collection and
retention that the General Assembly sought when it enacted BIPA.
Rather, the Court reads the phrase "... when the initial purpose
for collecting or obtaining such identifiers or information has
been satisfied or within 3 years of the individual's last
interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first" to
explain what the policies must describe—not to create a time
frame within which these policies must be developed.

Put differently, Judge Alonso opines, BIPA requires that the
policies describe what happens to an individual's biometric data
after the initial purpose is completed or three years after the
last interaction, but it does not say when those policies must be
created.

At minimum, the statute imposes the duty to develop these policies
as soon as the entity possesses the biometric data, Judge Alonso
holds. Based on the allegations, Union Pacific owed Fleury this
duty to develop as soon as it possessed his biometric information.
For those reasons, the Court denies the motion to remand.

II. Motion to Lift Stay

Mr. Fleury asks the Court to lift the stay arguing that it is no
longer needed. For its part, Union Pacific argues that a stay is
still appropriate for the same reasons articulated in its prior
briefing.

The Court previously stayed discovery in this case pending
appellate decisions in Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc., No.
1-28-0563 (Ill. App. Ct., 1st Dist.); Marion v. Ring Container
Technologies, LLC, No. 3-20-0184 (Ill. App. Ct., 3rd Dist.); and
Cothron v. White Castle Sys., Inc., Case No. 20-3202 (7th Cir.).

Tims and Marion, Illinois Appellate Court cases, considered whether
a one-year, two-year, or five-year statute of limitations applies
to BIPA claims. Relatedly, Cothron, a Seventh Circuit case,
addresses when a BIPA claim accrues and, more precisely, if a
private entity violates BIPA only when it first collects or
discloses an individual's biometric data without making the
required disclosures, or if a violation occurs each time the entity
collects or discloses the data.

On Sept. 17, 2021, the First District issued a decision in Tims,
holding that a five-year statute of limitations applies to section
15(a) and 15(b) claims. But the Illinois Supreme Court allowed
leave to appeal in Tims. On March 19, 2021, the Illinois Third
District Appellate Court stayed Marion pending the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision in McDonald v. Symphony Bronzeville Park LLC, No.
126511. The Illinois Supreme Court issued a decision in McDonald on
February 3, 2022. On Dec. 20, 2021, the Seventh Circuit certified
the claim accrual question in Cothron to the Illinois Supreme
Court.

Looking to the factors, the Court finds that a stay is no longer
necessary. Accordingly, the Court grants Fleury's motion to lift
the stay.

Conclusion

The motion to remand is denied. The motion to lift the stay on
proceedings is granted. Fact discovery will be completed by Sept.
30, 2022. The Court previously entered a referral to the Magistrate
Judge for discovery supervision and settlement (if requested). The
Court will continue to monitor the docket and set further hearing
dates as necessary.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated
June 2, 2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/u5p26xz2 from
Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: Extension of Time to File Class Cert Bid Sought
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LAKIA BEASLEY, RICHARD
HENDERSON, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, v. CARLOS DEL TORO, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, in his official capacity, and UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF THE NAVY, Case No. 1:22-cv-00667-CRC (D.D.C.), the Plaintiffs
ask the Court to enter an order extending the time to file their
Motion for Class Certification until 75 days after Defendants file
the administrative record in this case.

The Plaintiffs have conferred with Defendants' counsel, who consent
to the relief sought by this Motion.

The United States Navy is the maritime service branch of the United
States Armed Forces and one of the eight uniformed services of the
United States.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated May 31, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3xggY47 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew Soukup, Esq.
          Ranganath Sudarshan, Esq.
          Jeffrey Huberman, Esq.
          COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
          850 10th Street NW
          Washington, DC 20001-4956
          Telephone: (202) 662-6000
          E-mail: asoukup@cov.com
                  rsudarshan@cov.com
                  jhuberman@cov.com
                  neccles@cov.com

               - and -

          Esther Leibfarth, Esq.
          Rochelle Bobroff, Esq.
          David Sonenshine, Esq.
          Renee Burbank, Esq.
          NATIONAL VETERANS LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM
          1600 K Street, NW, Suite 500
          Washington, DC 20006-2833
          Telephone: (202) 265-8305
          E-mail: Esther@nvlsp.org
                  rochelle@nvlsp.org
                  david@nvlsp.org
                  Renee.Burbank@nvlsp.org

UNIVERSITY OF IOWA: Sued Over Breach of Fiduciary Duties
--------------------------------------------------------
D.J.; Toni Cordova; John Cortina; George Demko; Donovan Helton;
Mary Helton; Sydney Johnson; Damon Laforce; Michael Masula; James
Matthews; Thomas Olszewski; Thomas Stanziano; Jeanne Wallace
individually as surviving spouse of Joseph Wallace, deceased, and
as Personal Representative of the Estate Of Joseph Wallace; James
Wallace; and Samuel Wallace; Eddie Viers, individually as surviving
spouse of Teresa Viers, deceased, and as Personal Representative of
the Estate Of Teresa Viers; individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. UNIVERSITY OF IOWA HOSPITALS AND
CLINICS (UIHC), an Iowa Entity; ADEMOLA ABIOSE; COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
MEDICAL CENTER, a New York Entity; MARYAM BANIKAZEMI; CHILDREN'S
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, an Illinois entity; JOEL CHARROW; BAYLOR COLLEGE
OF MEDICINE, a Texas entity; CHRISTINE ENG; CINCINNATI CHILDREN'S
HOSPITAL, an Ohio entity; ROBERT HOPKIN; UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, a
Minnesota entity; MICHAEL MAUER; DUKE UNIVERSITY HEALTH CENTER, a
North Carolina entity; MANESH PATEL; UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
MEDICINE, a Washington entity; RONALD SCOTT; MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL
HOSPITAL, a Massachusetts entity; KATHERINE SIMS; UNIVERSITY OF
ALABAMA AT BIRMINGHAM MEDICINE, an Alabama entity; DAVID WARNOCK;
CEDARS SINAI MEDICAL CENTER, a California entity; WILLIAM WILCOX;
UNIVERSITY OF VERSAILLES, a French entity; AND DOMINIQUE GERMAIN,
Case No. 2:22-cv-00752-CB (W.D. Pa., May 21, 2022), is brought
against the Defendants who breached their fiduciary responsibility
by placing the needs of the generic U.S. Fabry community above the
interests and needs of individual Fabry patients; breached their
fiduciary responsibility of full disclosure by not telling anyone
that alternative treatment, Replagal, was available through the
FDA; breached their fiduciary responsibility by misleading the
Plaintiffs into believing that "something was better than nothing."
The duty was further breached by concealing (and continuing to
conceal) the data proving "low dose" Fabrazyme was medically
useless in treating the Plaintiffs and the other research subjects
in the Fabry Registry.

Fabrazyme is produced in bioreactors that are similar to
fermentation tanks. Genetically engineered Chinese hamster ovary
cells ("CHO cells") secrete the human agalsidase enzyme into the
cell growth medium where it is collected and purified into an
injectable form. Sometime before June 2009, Sanofi Genzyme
Corporation contaminated its bioreactors with Vesivirus 2117
(Allston), a genus of calicivirus. In mid-June 2009, Sanofi Genzyme
suspended production of Fabrazyme and several other enzyme
replacement drugs manufactured at its plant due to the viral
contamination in the bioreactors. In mid-November 2009, Sanofi
Genzyme shut the plant down again due to ongoing manufacturing
deficiencies. As a consequence, Sanofi Genzyme did not have enough
drug to ensure a continued supply to all of its customers both in
the United States and overseas.

In 2009, limited stocks of Fabrazyme were available for supply, all
of which were contaminated, so Sanofi Genzyme Corporation
recommended a new and untested method of treating Fabrazyme
patients with what Sanofi Genzyme called "low dose" Fabrazyme or
"dose skipping." "Low dosing" Fabrazyme consisted of Sanofi Genzyme
selling a "full dose" in the sense it was the proper mass and
number of vials per weight of the patient, but "low dose" in that
it was shipped once every 1-6 months instead of bi-weekly as
prescribed. Patients were given a choice of taking a reduced dose
(0.5-0.2mg/kg) every two weeks or taking a full dose (1mg/kg)
administered every month or longer by skipping doses. Either way,
the FDA only approved Fabrazyme to be infused intravenously at
1mg/kg every other week, administered as described on the label and
prescribed by the Plaintiffs' physicians.

The Defendants had hoped that "low dose" Fabrazyme would be
effective, but once it became apparent that U.S. Fabry patients
were being injured and dying from "low dose," they became publicly
silent on the "low dose" issue. Even worse, the Defendants began
concealing the "low dose" data they had collected from 2009-2012 in
the Fabry Registry. When reporting data from the Fabry Registry
after 2012, the Defendants have used methods of statistical
manipulation to conceal the American "low dose" data: exclusion and
averaging. All the data points are relevant and necessarily
reported in any scientifically sound longitudinal study, but when
an intervening variable changes (such as dosage), the data is
explained, not excluded. Specifically, in a standard longitudinal
study, a rise in Fabry-related deaths or adverse events between
2009 and 2012 would be noted due to receiving the "low dose"
instead of being excluded altogether.

Relying on the expert recommendations of the Defendants, the
Plaintiffs were delivered and injected with ineffective and
dangerous "low dose" Fabrazyme from 2009 to 2012. The Defendants'
ongoing concealment of the dangerous nature and the lack of
efficacy of the "low dose" resulted in the Plaintiffs' clinical
status deteriorating as the Fabry disease has increased and
accelerated due to the "low dose" Fabrazyme treatment. The
Plaintiffs' disease has increased due to his reasonable reliance on
ineffective treatment in lieu of effective treatment. Had the
Plaintiffs known that the "low dose" was ineffective and dangerous,
they would have sought an effective dose or obtained alternative
medication through the federal government's "compassionate use"
program instead of waiting for the shortage to end. The Plaintiffs'
life expectancy has been shortened due to taking "low dose"
Fabrazyme, and they are now at special risk for developing what the
Defendants describe as residual effects of "low dose" because he
reasonably relied on the Defendants' expertise for taking low dose
Fabrazyme. The Plaintiffs were also damaged by paying over $200,000
for medically worthless Fabrazyme. The "low dose" Fabrazyme was
medically worthless because it was ineffective for treating Fabry
disease and unsafe to administer at the dosage that the Defendants
recommended and knew they would be required to take, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiffs are individuals with Fabry disease.

University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, an entity Defendant, is
an Iowa corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          C. Allen Black, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF C. ALLEN BLACK
          Bldg. 1B, Ste. 200
          322 North Shore Dr.
          Pittsburgh, PA 15212
          Phone: 412.908.3268
          Email: drallenblack@gmail.com


UNIVERSITY OF TAMPA: Settles Tuition Class Action Suit for $3.4MM
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jessy Edwards, writing for Top Class Actions, reports that the
University of Tampa is the latest college to reach a class action
settlement with students who claimed they deserved refunds due to
their university studies going "remote" during the pandemic.

In documents filed May 25 in New York federal court, students and
the University of Tampa said they reached a $3.4 million settlement
to resolve claims the university broke its contractual agreement
with students who paid tuition and fees expecting an in-person
educational experience in the spring of 2020.

The students alleged the university held in-person education only
for about half of the spring semester before going remote. The
settlement would benefit students who paid for the spring 2020
semester and were still enrolled on March 1 that year.

If the settlement is approved, those students will automatically
receive several hundred dollars in cash or tuition credit unless
they exclude themselves.

The University of Tampa does not accept it broke any express or
implied contract with students, according to the class action
settlement.

University of Tampa Not Only School to Reach Tuition Settlement
In 2021, Columbia University agreed to pay $12.5 million in tuition
and fee reimbursements to students allegedly deprived of the
"unique benefits of an in-person, on-campus educational experience"
during remote learning due to the coronavirus pandemic under the
terms of a proposed class action settlement.

The students are represented by Alec Mitchell Leslie and Philip
Lawrence Fraietta of Bursor & Fisher PA.

The University of Tampa Pandemic Refund Class Action Lawsuit is
D'Amario et al. v. The University of Tampa, Case No. 7:20-cv-03744,
in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. [GN]

UPSTART HOLDINGS: Lieff Cabraser Reminds of July 12 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP on May 31
disclosed that class action litigation has been filed on behalf of
investors who purchased or otherwise acquired the securities of
Upstart Holdings, Inc. ("Upstart" or the "Company") (Nasdaq: UPST)
from March 18, 2021 through May 9, 2022, inclusive (the "Class
Period").

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Upstart securities during
the Class Period, you may move the Court for appointment as lead
plaintiff by no later than July 12, 2022. A lead plaintiff is a
representative party who acts on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation. Your share of any recovery in the actions
will not be affected by your decision of whether to seek
appointment as lead plaintiff. You may retain Lieff Cabraser, or
other attorneys, as your counsel in the action.

Upstart investors who wish to learn more about the litigation and
how to seek appointment as lead plaintiff should click here, text
or email investorinfo@lchb.com, or call Sharon M. Lee of Lieff
Cabraser at 1-800-541-7358.

Background on the Upstart Securities Class Litigation

Upstart, headquartered in San Mateo, California, is a financial
technology firm that operates a cloud-based artificial intelligence
("AI") lending platform. Upstart claims that its underwriting
process allows banking partners to originate credit with higher
approval rates, lower loss rates, and a high degree of automation.

The action alleges that defendants made material misrepresentations
and failed to disclose to investors: (1) that Upstart's AI model
was not able to adequately account for macroeconomic factors,
including rising interest rates which impact loans' market-clearing
price; (2) that the Company's conversion rate was being negatively
impacted by macroeconomic factors; and (3) that Upstart was likely
to resort to using its balance sheet to fund loans which exposed it
to increased credit risk.

On May 9, 2022, after market close, the Company announced its
financial results for the first quarter 2022 and reported that the
loans on its balance sheet had more than doubled in just one
quarter, from $252,477,000 for the period ending to December 31,
2021, to $597,981,000 for the period ended March 31, 2022. In
addition, Upstart reduced its guidance for fiscal year 2022, with
expected revenue lowered from $1.4 billion to $1.25 billion. On the
same day, during an earnings conference call with investors and
analysts, Upstart's Chief Financial Officer, defendant Sanjay
Datta, stated that the substantial increase in loans held on the
Company's balance sheet was the result of "loan default rates" from
loans from the "two or three vintages" of loans since the
expiration of government stimulus. On this news, the price of
Upstart stock fell $43.52, or 56.42%, from its closing price of
$77.13, to close at $33.61 per share on May 10, 2022, on extremely
heavy trading volume.

About Lieff Cabraser

Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, with offices in San
Francisco, New York, Nashville, and Munich, is an
internationally-recognized law firm committed to advancing the
rights of investors and promoting corporate responsibility. The
National Law Journal has recognized Lieff Cabraser as one of the
nation's top plaintiffs' law firms for fourteen years. Law360 has
selected Lieff Cabraser as one of the Top 50 law firms nationwide
for litigation, highlighting our firm's "laser focus" and noting
that our firm routinely finds itself "facing off against some of
the largest and strongest defense law firms in the world."
Benchmark Litigation has named Lieff Cabraser one of the "Top 10
Plaintiffs' Firms in America."

For more information about Lieff Cabraser and the firm's
representation of investors, please visit
https://www.lieffcabraser.com/.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules.

Contacts
Sharon M. Lee
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP
Telephone: 1-800-541-7358 [GN]

VISA INC: Settles Conspiracy Class Action for CA$188 Million
------------------------------------------------------------
Thomas MacDonald, writing for MTL Blog, reports that a group of
banks, as well as Visa and Mastercard credit card companies have
agreed to a settlement following a class-action lawsuit that
alleged they conspired, among other practices, to set high fees for
merchants who accepted credit card payments.

The law firms representing the class announced the CA$188 million
settlement on May 30. As a stipulation, the defendants, including
the aforementioned credit card companies as well as Bank of
America, Citigroup, Capital One, Desjardins, National Bank, CIBC,
Royal Bank, BMO, TD and Bank of Nova Scotia, do not admit any
wrongdoing.

Anyone who accepted a Visa or Mastercard payment between March 23,
2001, and September 2, 2021, can claim a share of the $131 million
set aside to compensate affected merchants, the lawyers said in a
statement.

For the record, the complete definition of the class, according to
the settlement website, is as follows: people who "accept or
accepted Visa credit cards and/or Mastercard credit cards as
payment for goods or services and incurred merchant discount fees,
including interchange fees, in Canada" within that more than
19-year timeframe.

Merchants with average annual revenue of less than $5 million don't
even need to submit documents to support their claims. According to
the statement, they can get $30 for each year they accepted a Visa
or Mastercard payment.

Merchants with between $5 million and $20 million in annual revenue
can get $250 for each qualifying year if they have documents to
support their claims. "Large merchants," those with more than $20
million in annual revenue, can get the same $250 per qualifying
year plus a "proportional share" of the settlement fund with
supporting documentation.

Qualifying merchants have until September 30, 2022, to submit their
claims. The claim form and complete details about the settlement
are available online. [GN]

WELLS FARGO: Faces Price Wage-and-Hour Suit in N.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
JANISHA LEE PRICE; CARMEN ZAMARIPPA; individually, and on behalf of
all employees similarly situated; Plaintiffs v. WELLS FARGO &
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. Defendants,
Case No. 3:22-cv-03128 (N.D. Cal., May 27, 2022) arises from the
Defendants' unlawful labor policies and practices that violate the
California Labor Code.

The complaint alleges that the Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs
and other similarly situated employees overtime wages, minimum wage
and regular wage; failed to provide meal and rest periods; failed
to reimburse necessary business expenses; failed to pay all wages
upon termination; and failed to provide accurate wage statements.

Plaintiffs Price and Zamarippa were employed as hourly telephone
bankers at the call center operated by Wells Fargo in San
Bernardino, California. Plaintiff Price is still currently working
with the Defendant while Plaintiff Zamarippa was employed from
September 2012 to February 2021.

Wells Fargo is an international bank that offers services related
to banking, loans and credit, insurance, investing and wealth
management.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Christina A. Humphrey, Esq.
          CHRISTINA HUMPHREY LAW, P.C.
          591 Telegraph Canyon Road, #376
          Chula Vista, CA 91910
          Telephone: (805) 618-2934
          E-mail: christina@chumphreylaw.com

               - and -

          Richard E. Quintilone, II, Esq.
          Jeffrey T. Green, Esq.
          QUINTILONE & ASSOCIATES
          22974 El Toro Road, Suite 100
          Lake Forest, CA 92630
          Telephone: (949) 458-9675
          Facsimile: (949) 458-9679
          E-mail: req@quintlaw.com
                  jtg@quintlaw.com

WOLF 1834: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wolf 1834. The case
is styled as Jose Quezada, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Wolf 1834, Case No. 1:22-cv-04546-LJL
(S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

WOLF -- https://www.wolf1834.com/ -- is the premier name in luxury
jewelry accessories, watch boxes, cases & watch winders.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


WYZE LABS: Faces Class Action Over Unsolicited Text Messages
------------------------------------------------------------
Samantha Hawkins, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that Wyze Labs
Inc. faces a proposed class action brought by an individual who
alleges that the smart home camera company sent him texts without
his consent, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
and the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act.

Eduardo Quevedo says he received unsolicited text messages
advertising Wyze Lab deals on his personal cell phone number. The
phone numbers were selected with an autodialer, and the texts
didn't provide any instructions on how to opt out of future
messages, the complaint alleges.

Quevado says the texts have caused him and the proposed class
members inconvenience, invasion of privacy.

COURT: S.D. Fla.
TRACK DOCKET: No. 1:22-cv-21658
COMPANY INFO: Wyze Labs Inc. [GN]

XTO ENERGY: Hearing on Bid to Certify Class Set for Sept. 28
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SALVATORA et al v. XTO
ENERGY INC., Case No. 2:19-cv-01097 (W.D. Pa.), the Hon. Judge
Nicholas Ranjan entered an order setting hearing on Plaintiff's
motion to certify class for Sept. 28, 2022.

To the extent the parties intend to present live testimony, counsel
shall exchange witness lists and include a proffer of each witness
by Sept. 1, 2022, and shall file the list and proffer on the docket
by that same date. To the extent the parties intend to use exhibits
not of record, the exhibits shall be identified and exchanged by
Sept. 1, 2022, and counsel shall file the exhibit list and
corresponding exhibits on the docket by that same date. The parties
need not identify those documents already of record and shall refer
to all exhibits with the electronic filing number of record at the
hearing. This case shall remain administratively closed until
September 28, 2022, Judge Ranjan says.

The nature of suit states diversity-contract dispute.

XTO Energy is an American energy company, principally operating in
North America, specializing in the drilling and production of
unconventional oil and natural gas assets, typically from shale
rock through a process known as hydraulic fracturing.[CC]



ZAMZAM LIVE: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Cujcuy Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------
ANTONY CUJCUY; and HEBERT CUJCUY, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ZAMZAM LIVE POULTRY II
CORP.; ROCKAWAY LIVE POULTRY INC.; ALMEDINA LIVE POULTRY II CORP.;
MAEEN ALTAWIL; and JAMEEL BOKER, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-03218
(E.D.N.Y., June 1, 2022), is an action against the Defendants for
failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize and
permit meal and rest periods, and provide accurate wage statements
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as store staffs.

ZAMZAM LIVE POULTRY II CORP. operate four New York City live
poultry markets that sell freshly slaughtered Halal chicken, hens,
ducks, roosters, guinea, and turkey, as well as goats, lambs and
beef. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Harrison, Esq.
          HARRISON HARRISON & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
          110 State Highway 35, Suite 10
          Red Bank, NJ 07701
          Telephone: (718) 799-9111
          Email: dharrison@nynjemploymentlaw.com

ZERO LOUNGE: De Oca Awarded $187K in Damages and $22K in Interest
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EDILANYI MABELL SURIEL MONTE DE OCA, et al.,
Plaintiffs v. AGAPITO DELA CRUZ, et al., Defendants, Case No.
20-CV-8442 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Vernon S. Broderick of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an
Opinion and Order:

   (1) awarding Suriel $187,494 in damages against the Defaulting
       Defendants, comprised on the following: (i) $58,297 in
       unpaid minimum wages; (ii) $30,450 in unpaid overtime
       wages; (iii) $88,747 in liquidated damages; and (iv)
       $10,000 in statutory damages;

   (2) awarding Suriel $22,126.63 in pre-judgment interest;

   (3) awarding Suriel post-judgment interest pursuant to
       28 U.S.C. Section 1961;

   (4) awarding Suriel attorneys' fees in the amount of $62,498
       and costs in the amount of $400;

   (5) dismissing without prejudice Suriel's claims against
       Miguel Acosta, Jr., pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
       Procedure 4(m) and 41(b); and

   (6) denying the Opt-in Plaintiffs' requests for damages,
       attorneys' fees, and costs, and dismissing the Opt-in
       Plaintiffs.

On Oct. 9, 2020, Plaintiff Suriel brought a putative class action
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 201 et seq.,
and New York Labor Law, New York Labor Law Sections 195 et seq.,
and 650 et seq., against Defendants Agapito Dela Cruz, Domingo
Espinal, Luisa Martinez, Acosta, Zero Lounge Restaurant d/b/a
O'Side Restaurant & Lounge ("Zero Lounge Restaurant") (together,
"Defendants"), and John Does 1-10 and ABC Corporations 1-5. Suriel
served Zero Lounge Restaurant, Cruz, Martinez, and Espinal
(together, the "Defaulting Defendants") with the Summons and
Complaint, but the Defaulting Defendants failed to answer or
respond, or otherwise appear in the action.

After the Defaulting Defendants likewise failed to appear at an
April 22, 2021 hearing to show cause why a default judgment should
not be entered, Judge Broderick entered a default judgment in favor
of Suriel and referred the case to Magistrate Judge Sarah L. Cave
for an inquest on damages and attorneys' fees. On July 26, 2021,
after Judge Broderick had already entered a default judgment, Renzo
A. Hernandez Martinez and Juan B. Liz Rosario both filed notices
that they consented to be plaintiffs in the action (together, the
"Opt-in Plaintiffs").

On Jan. 10, 2022, Judge Cave issued a thorough, 40-page Report and
Recommendation, recommending that:

      (1) Suriel be awarded $187,494 in damages against the
Defaulting Defendants, comprised on the following: (i) $58,297 in
unpaid minimum wages; (ii) $30,450 in unpaid overtime wages; (iii)
$88,747 in liquidated damages; and (iv) $10,000 in statutory
damages;

      (2) Suriel be awarded $22,126.63 in pre-judgment interest;

      (3) Suriel be awarded post-judgment interest pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1961;

      (4) Suriel be awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of
$62,498 and costs in the amount of $400;

      (5) Suriel's claims against Acosta be dismissed without
prejudice pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(m) and
41(b); and

      (6) The Opt-in Plaintiffs' requests for damages, attorneys'
fees, and costs be denied, and that the Opt-in Plaintiffs be
dismissed without prejudice.

Although the Report and Recommendation explicitly provided that
"the parties will have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and
holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file
written objections" and "FAILURE TO OBJECT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14)
DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE
APPELLATE REVIEW," Judge Broderick finds that neither party filed
an objection or sought additional time to file an objection. He has
reviewed Judge Cave's thorough and well-reasoned Report and
Recommendation for clear error and, after careful review, finds
none. He therefore adopts the Report and Recommendation in its
entirety.

The Clerk's Office is respectfully directed to terminate any open
motions, to enter judgment in accordance with the Order, and to
close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 31, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5dbxtta7 from Leagle.com.

William Henry Grae, Law Office of W.H. Grae, in Ridgewood, New
Jersey, Counsel for the Plaintiff.


ZOOM VIDEO: Faces Class Action Over Unlawful Data Sharing
---------------------------------------------------------
Samantha Hawkins, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that Zoom
Video Communications Inc. faces another proposed class action
claiming it shared user data with companies like Facebook and
Google, this time brought by international users who weren't
included in an April settlement with the video calling platform
over similar allegations.

S. Westron and J. Milne allege that because Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom are part of the Five Eyes Agreement
-- an intelligence agreement that allocates electronic surveillance
collection among the five states -- class members from those
countries were also affected by Zoom's alleged data sharing.

The $85 million settlement was approved in April by a federal
judge.

COURT: N.D. Cal.
TRACK DOCKET: No. 5:22-cv-03147
COMPANY INFO: Zoom Video Communications Inc. [GN]

[*] Class Action Lawsuit Set to Determine Climate Change Damages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Garbacz, writing for The Heartland Institute, reports
that in two previous articles at American Thinker, Garbacz
suggested filing a climate change class action lawsuit to determine
if the planet is in danger of total destruction from anthropogenic
climate change and to assess dollar damages if the court concludes
there is no danger. This essay examines examples of situations that
might justify a lawsuit.

Defendants would be the usual suspects in government, universities,
foundations, Green non-profits, renewable corporations and their
lobbyists, and corporations. Greens have filed such lawsuits
against governments for moving too slowly to implement the Green
Agenda and against corporations for promoting disinformation about
the Green Agenda.

Greens have been unsuccessful with these lawsuits because they
cannot prove damages. After all, a computer model from the UN IPCC
does not prove damages.

However, it is quite clear that the Green Agenda has damaged and
will damage numerous business entities and it's possible to reach a
reasonable estimate of dollar damages.

ExxonMobile, which invests in "green" energy, provides a good
example of what a suit could look like. According to ExxonMobile:

ExxonMobile is planning a hydrogen production plant and one of the
world's largest carbon capture and storage projects at its
integrated refining and petrochemical site at Baytown, Texas,
supporting efforts to reduce emissions from company operations and
local industry. . . . this project can play an important part in
achieving America's lower-emissions aspirations

Reducing up to 30% of CO2 at the plant alone would cost $1 billion
or so and that doesn't consider the company's other "green"
schemes. Pensions & Investments Research Consultants (PIRC), a
British proxy adviser, has been urging shareholders to vote against
five directors, including ExxonMobile's chairman, Darren Woods, for
wasting money through these Green investments.

Obviously, "achieving America's lower-emissions aspirations" isn't
needed if the UN IPCC model doesn't prove future damages from
higher "earth temperatures." Therefore, the investment resources
committed to this project and similar past and ongoing projects are
unnecessary expenditures and directly harm shareholders.

While the PIRC does not call for vetting the UN IPCC modeling, this
would seem to be an excellent opportunity to do so. If ousting the
CEO and the directors is not successful, shareholders could go to
court and make their case against the Green Agenda. Numerous other
corporations could face similar suits.

The Texas electric blackout kerfuffle of February 2021 is another
example of another costly, even deadly, Green agenda item:

Nobody yet knew just how widespread the blackouts would
become—that they would spread across almost the entire state,
leave an unprecedented 11 million Texans freezing in the dark for
as long as three days, and result in as many as seven hundred
deaths. But neither could the governor, legislators, and regulators
who are supposed to oversee the state's electric grid claim to be
surprised. They had been warned repeatedly, by experts and by
previous calamities—including a major blackout in 2011—that the
grid was uniquely vulnerable to cold weather.

All kinds of excuses have been made for grid failure. Still,
backing away from fossil fuel and heavily depending on wind, this
never would have happened. How much is a life worth?

The North American Electricity Council (NERC) has warned that
rolling blackouts around the country are likely this summer. The
reason is that renewables have replaced fossil generation in many
states. Renewables only work part of the time so backup power
(read: fossil fuel) is required for a reliable electric grid. Too
much fossil fuel has already been taken offline because of the
Green Agenda to save the planet. This would make for an excellent
class action lawsuit as suggested.

Foundations and universities that the left captured can be sued too
for essentially misappropriating funding to the Green Agenda cause
that is not scientifically proven. Board members could right the
ship internally but, if necessary, suits could be filed.

Renewable proponents could be challenged in public service
commission hearings around the country. Intervene and provide
testimony on the science of the UN IPCC modeling. This has never
been done, though it seems so logical to insist on verification.

President Biden admits that his administration wants to destroy
fossil fuels and replace them with renewable energy. The only
reason to do so is the unfounded claim that the world will be
destroyed otherwise. If this reason can be debunked with climate
change class action lawsuits, America and the world will greatly
benefit. It's easy to think of many other possibilities for such
lawsuits.

How do you turn the Green Agenda on its head? Say "Class action
lawsuits will save the planet."

First published at American Thinker. [GN]

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ballantyne Strong Faces Personal Injury Lawsuits
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ballantyne Strong, Inc., and certain of its subsidiaries are named
as defendants in personal injury lawsuits based on alleged exposure
to asbestos-containing materials, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "A majority of the cases involve product
liability claims based principally on allegations of past
distribution of commercial lighting products containing wiring that
may have contained asbestos. Each case names dozens of corporate
defendants in addition to the Company. In the Company's experience,
a large percentage of these types of claims have never been
substantiated and have been dismissed by the courts. The Company
has not suffered any adverse verdict in a trial court proceeding
related to asbestos claims and intends to continue to defend these
lawsuits. During 2021, the Company recorded a loss contingency
reserve of approximately $0.3 million, which represents the
Company's estimate of its potential losses related to the
resolution of open cases. When appropriate, the Company may settle
certain claims. The Company does not expect the resolution of these
cases to have a material adverse effect on the Company's
consolidated financial condition, results of operations or cash
flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3tpyNvj


ASBESTOS UPDATE: CECO Environmental Has 240 Pending Cases
---------------------------------------------------------
CECO Environmental Corp. has reported a total of 240 cases pending
against the Company as of March 31, 2022 (with Illinois, New York,
Pennsylvania and West Virginia having the largest number of cases),
as compared with 223 cases that were pending as of December 31,
2021, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "During the three-months ended March 31, 2022,
37 new cases were filed against the Company, and the Company was
dismissed from 18 cases and settled 2 cases. Most of the pending
cases have not advanced beyond the early stages of discovery,
although a number of cases are on schedules leading to or scheduled
for trial. The Company believes that its insurance coverage is
adequate for the cases currently pending against the Company and
for the foreseeable future, assuming a continuation of the current
volume, nature of cases and settlement amounts. However, the
Company has no control over the number and nature of cases that are
filed against it, nor as to the financial health of its insurers or
their position as to coverage.

Our subsidiary, Met-Pro Technologies LLC ("Met-Pro"), beginning in
2002, began to be named in asbestos-related lawsuits filed against
a large number of industrial companies including, in particular,
those in the pump and fluid handling industries. In management's
opinion, the complaints typically have been vague, general and
speculative, alleging that Met-Pro, along with the numerous other
defendants, sold unidentified asbestos-containing products and
engaged in other related actions which caused injuries (including
death) and loss to the plaintiffs. Counsel has advised that more
recent cases typically allege more serious claims of mesothelioma.
The Company's insurers have hired attorneys who, together with the
Company, are vigorously defending these cases. Many cases have been
dismissed after the plaintiff fails to produce evidence of exposure
to Met-Pro's products. In those cases, where evidence has been
produced, the Company's experience has been that the exposure
levels are low and the Company's position has been that its
products were not a cause of death, injury or loss. The Company has
been dismissed from or settled a large number of these cases.
Cumulative settlement payments from 2002 through March 31, 2022 for
cases involving asbestos-related claims were $4.9 million, of
which, together with all legal fees other than corporate counsel
expenses, $4.8 million has been paid by the Company's insurers. The
average cost per settled claim, excluding legal fees, was
approximately $40,000."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3O5CJsL


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Columbus McKinnon Has $7.8MM Liability at March 31
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Columbus McKinnon Corporation, at March 31, 2022, has recorded a
liability for asbestos-related product liability claims and related
legal costs of $7.8 million, according to the Company's Form 10-K
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Columbus McKinnon states, "Like many industrial manufacturers, the
Company is involved in asbestos-related litigation.  In continually
evaluating costs relating to its estimated asbestos-related
liability, the Company reviews, among other things, the incidence
of past and recent claims, the historical case dismissal rate, the
mix of the claimed illnesses and occupations of the plaintiffs, its
recent and historical resolution of the cases, the number of cases
pending against it, the status and results of broad-based
settlement discussions, and the number of years such activity might
continue. Based on this review, the Company has estimated its share
of liability to defend and resolve probable asbestos-related
personal injury claims. This estimate is highly uncertain due to
the limitations of the available data and the difficulty of
forecasting with any certainty the numerous variables that can
affect the range of the liability. The Company will continue to
study the variables in light of additional information in order to
identify trends that may become evident and to assess their impact
on the range of liability that is probable and estimable.

"A share of the Company's previously incurred asbestos-related
expenses and future asbestos-related expenses are covered by
pre-existing insurance policies. The Company had been engaged in a
legal action against the insurance carriers for those policies to
recover past expenses and future costs incurred. The Company came
to an agreement with the insurance carriers to settle its case
against them for recovery of a portion of past costs and future
costs for asbestos-related legal defense costs. The agreement was
finalized during the quarter ended September 30, 2020. The terms of
the settlement require the carriers to pay gross defense costs
prior to retro-premiums of 65% for future asbestos-related defense
costs subject to an annual cap of $1,650,000 for claims covered by
the settlement. The reimbursement net of retro-premiums is
approximately 47% which resulted in a $1,830,000 increase to the
Company's asbestos liability during the second quarter of fiscal
2021.

"In addition, the insurance carriers were required to reimburse the
Company for past defense costs through the date of the settlement
amounting to $3,006,000 which was paid during the second quarter of
fiscal 2021. The reimbursement for past cost was recorded net of a
contingent legal fee of $1,500,000 which was paid in the third
quarter of fiscal 2021. Further, the insurance carriers are
expected to cover 100% of indemnity costs related to all covered
cases. Estimates of the future cost sharing have been included in
the loss reserve calculation as of March 31, 2022 and 2021. The
Company has recorded a receivable for the estimated future cost
sharing in Other assets in the Balance Sheet in the amount of
$9,160,000 and $8,052,000, which offsets its asbestos reserves, at
March 31, 2022 and 2021, respectively."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3H2oRxu


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Constellation Energy Has $81MM Estimated Liability
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Constellation Energy Corporation, at March 31, 2022 and December
31, 2021, has recorded estimated liabilities of approximately $81
million in total for asbestos-related bodily injury claims,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "As of March 31, 2022, approximately $20
million of this amount related to 233 open claims presented to us,
while the remaining $61 million is for estimated future
asbestos-related bodily injury claims anticipated to arise through
2055, based on actuarial assumptions and analyses, which are
updated on an annual basis. On a quarterly basis, we monitor actual
experience against the number of forecasted claims to be received
and expected claim payments and evaluate whether adjustments to the
estimated liabilities are necessary.

"We maintain a reserve for claims associated with asbestos-related
personal injury actions at certain facilities that are currently
owned by us or were previously owned by ComEd, PECO, or BGE. The
estimated liabilities are recorded on an undiscounted basis and
exclude the estimated legal costs associated with handling these
matters, which could be material."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3tpa9uD


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Enovis Reports $2.5MM Asbestos-Related Costs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Enovis Corporation has asbestos-related costs of $2.5 million and
$0.9 million, net of taxes, during the three months ended April 1,
2022 and April 2, 2021, respectively, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

"The Company retained certain asbestos-related contingencies and
insurance coverages from divested businesses for which it did not
retain an interest in the ongoing operations subject to the
contingencies. In conjunction with the Separation, all
asbestos-related contingencies and insurance coverages from its
industrial businesses were transferred fully to ESAB Corp. The
Company has classified asbestos-related selling, general and
administrative activity in its Condensed Consolidated Statements of
Operations as part of Loss from discontinued operations, net of
taxes."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3xtrRQc



ASBESTOS UPDATE: ESAB Corp. Faces Personal Injury Lawsuits
----------------------------------------------------------
ESAB Corporation's subsidiaries are each one of many defendants in
a large number of lawsuits that claim personal injury as a result
of exposure to asbestos from products manufactured or used with
components that are alleged to have contained asbestos, according
to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Certain entities that became subsidiaries of
ESAB Corporation during the three months ended April 1, 2022 are
the legal obligor for certain asbestos obligations including
long-term asbestos insurance assets, long-term asbestos insurance
receivables, accrued asbestos liabilities, long-term asbestos
liabilities, asbestos indemnity expenses, asbestos-related defense
costs and asbestos insurance recoveries related to the asbestos
obligations from the Parent’s other legacy industrial businesses.
As a result, the Company holds certain asbestos-related
contingencies and insurance coverages.

"The subsidiaries settle asbestos claims for amounts the Company
considers reasonable given the facts and circumstances of each
claim. The annual average settlement payment per asbestos claimant
has fluctuated during the past several years. The Company expects
such fluctuations to continue in the future based upon, among other
things, the number and type of claims settled in a particular
period and the jurisdictions in which such claims arise. To date,
the majority of settled claims have been dismissed for no
payment."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3Nz2K45


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Kaanapali Land Defends Personal Injury Cases
-------------------------------------------------------------
Kaanapali Land, LLC, as successor by merger to other entities has
been named as defendant in personal injury actions allegedly based
on exposure to asbestos, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "While there are relatively few cases that name
Kaanapali Land, there were a substantial number of cases that were
pending against D/C on the U.S. mainland (primarily in California).
Cases against Kaanapali Land (hereafter, "Kaanapali Land asbestos
cases") are allegedly based on its prior business operations in
Hawaii and cases against D/C are allegedly based on sale of
asbestos-containing products by D/C's prior distribution business
operations primarily in California. Each entity defending these
cases believes that it has meritorious defenses against these
actions, but can give no assurances as to the ultimate outcome of
these cases. The defense of these cases had a material adverse
effect on the financial condition of D/C as it has been forced to
file a voluntary petition for liquidation as discussed below.
Kaanapali Land does not believe that it has liability, directly or
indirectly, for D/C's obligations in those cases. Kaanapali Land
does not presently believe that the cases in which it is named will
result in any material liability to Kaanapali Land; however, there
can be no assurance in that regard."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3QbW4dJ


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Metropolitan Life Receives 721 New Claims
----------------------------------------------------------
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, for the three months ended
March 31, 2022 and 2021, has received approximately 721 and 678 new
asbestos-related claims, respectively, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "These suits principally allege that the
plaintiff or plaintiffs suffered personal injury resulting from
exposure to asbestos and seek both actual and punitive damages.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company has never engaged in the
business of manufacturing or selling asbestos-containing products
nor has Metropolitan Life Insurance Company issued liability or
workers' compensation insurance to companies in the business of
manufacturing or selling asbestos-containing products. The lawsuits
principally have focused on allegations with respect to certain
research, publication and other activities of one or more of
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's employees during the period
from the 1920s through approximately the 1950s and allege that
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company learned or should have learned
of certain health risks posed by asbestos and, among other things,
improperly publicized or failed to disclose those health risks.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company believes that it should not
have legal liability in these cases. The outcome of most asbestos
litigation matters, however, is uncertain and can be impacted by
numerous variables, including differences in legal rulings in
various jurisdictions, the nature of the alleged injury and factors
unrelated to the ultimate legal merit of the claims asserted
against Metropolitan Life Insurance Company."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3Mr1wGx


ASBESTOS UPDATE: MRC Global Defends 1,140 Claims as of March 31
---------------------------------------------------------------
MRC Global Inc. as of March 31, 2022, was named a defendant in
approximately 575 lawsuits involving approximately 1,140 claims,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "We are one of many defendants in lawsuits that
plaintiffs have brought seeking damages for personal injuries that
exposure to asbestos allegedly caused. Plaintiffs and their family
members have brought these lawsuits against a large volume of
defendant entities as a result of the defendants' manufacture,
distribution, supply or other involvement with asbestos, asbestos
containing-products or equipment or activities that allegedly
caused plaintiffs to be exposed to asbestos. These plaintiffs
typically assert exposure to asbestos as a consequence of
third-party manufactured products that our MRC Global (US) Inc.
subsidiary purportedly distributed. No asbestos lawsuit has
resulted in a judgment against us to date, with a majority being
settled, dismissed or otherwise resolved. Applicable third-party
insurance has substantially covered these claims, and insurance
should continue to cover a substantial majority of existing and
anticipated future claims. Accordingly, we have recorded a
liability for our estimate of the most likely settlement of
asserted claims and a related receivable from insurers for our
estimated recovery, to the extent we believe that the amounts of
recovery are probable. It is not possible to predict the outcome of
these claims and proceedings. However, in our opinion, the
likelihood that the ultimate disposition of any of these claims and
legal proceedings will have a material adverse effect on our
consolidated financial statements is remote."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3xy5kSp

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Park-Ohio Defends 99 Personal Injury Cases
-----------------------------------------------------------
Park-Ohio Holdings Corp. is a co-defendant in 99 cases asserting
claims on behalf of 161 plaintiffs alleging personal injury as a
result of exposure to asbestos, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "These asbestos cases generally relate to
production and sale of asbestos-containing products and allege
various theories of liability, including negligence, gross
negligence and strict liability, and seek compensatory and, in some
cases, punitive damages.

"In every asbestos case in which we are named as a party, the
complaints are filed against multiple named defendants. In
substantially all of the asbestos cases, the plaintiffs either
claim damages in excess of a specified amount, typically a minimum
amount sufficient to establish jurisdiction of the court in which
the case was filed (jurisdictional minimums generally range from
$25,000 to $75,000), or do not specify the monetary damages sought.
To the extent that any specific amount of damages is sought, the
amount applies to claims against all named defendants.

"There are four asbestos cases, involving 20 plaintiffs, that plead
specified damages against named defendants. In each of the four
cases, the plaintiff is seeking compensatory and punitive damages
based on a variety of potentially alternative causes of action. In
two cases, the plaintiff has alleged three counts at $3.0 million
compensatory and punitive damages each; one count at $3.0 million
compensatory and $1.0 million punitive damages; one count at $1.0
million. In the third case, the plaintiff has alleged compensatory
and punitive damages, each in the amount of $20.0 million, for
three separate causes of action, and $5.0 million compensatory
damages for the fifth cause of action. In the fourth case, the
plaintiff has alleged compensatory and punitive damages, each in
the amount of $10.0 million, for ten separate causes of action.

"Historically, we have been dismissed from asbestos cases on the
basis that the plaintiff incorrectly sued one of our subsidiaries
or because the plaintiff failed to identify any asbestos-containing
product manufactured or sold by us or our subsidiaries. We intend
to vigorously defend these asbestos cases, and believe we will
continue to be successful in being dismissed from such cases.
However, it is not possible to predict the ultimate outcome of
asbestos-related lawsuits, claims and proceedings due to the
unpredictable nature of personal injury litigation. Despite this
uncertainty, and although our results of operations and cash flows
for a particular period could be adversely affected by
asbestos-related lawsuits, claims and proceedings, management
believes that the ultimate resolution of these matters will not
have a material adverse effect on our financial condition,
liquidity or results of operations. Among the factors management
considered in reaching this conclusion were: (a) our historical
success in being dismissed from these types of lawsuits on the
bases mentioned above; (b) many cases have been improperly filed
against one of our subsidiaries; (c) in many cases the plaintiffs
have been unable to establish any causal relationship to us or our
products or premises; (d) in many cases, the plaintiffs have been
unable to demonstrate that they have suffered any identifiable
injury or compensable loss at all or that any injuries that they
have incurred did in fact result from alleged exposure to asbestos;
and (e) the complaints assert claims against multiple defendants
and, in most cases, the damages alleged are not attributed to
individual defendants. Additionally, we do not believe that the
amounts claimed in any of the asbestos cases are meaningful
indicators of our potential exposure because the amounts claimed
typically bear no relation to the extent of the plaintiff's injury,
if any."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3Q8SHV3


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pfizer Inc. Has Numerous Pending Exposure Cases
----------------------------------------------------------------
Pfizer Inc., American Optical and certain of its previously owned
subsidiaries, are defendants in numerous cases pending in various
federal and state courts seeking damages for alleged personal
injury from exposure to products allegedly containing asbestos and
other allegedly hazardous materials sold by Pfizer and certain of
its previously owned subsidiaries, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Plaintiffs in these cases seek damages and
other relief on various grounds for alleged personal injury and
economic loss.

Between 1967 and 1982, Warner-Lambert owned American Optical
Corporation (American Optical), which manufactured and sold
respiratory protective devices and asbestos safety clothing. In
connection with the sale of American Optical in 1982,
Warner-Lambert agreed to indemnify the purchaser for certain
liabilities, including certain asbestos-related and other claims.
Warner-Lambert was acquired by Pfizer in 2000 and is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Pfizer. Warner-Lambert is actively engaged in the
defense of, and will continue to explore various means of
resolving, these claims.

There also are a small number of lawsuits pending in various
federal and state courts seeking damages for alleged exposure to
asbestos in facilities owned or formerly owned by Pfizer or its
subsidiaries."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3tKqkDd


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Resolute Forest Faces Several Exposure Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
Resolute Forest Products Inc. was involved in a number of
asbestos-related lawsuits filed primarily in U.S. state courts,
including certain cases involving multiple defendants, according to
the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "These lawsuits principally allege direct or
indirect personal injury or death resulting from exposure to
asbestos-containing premises. While we dispute the plaintiffs'
allegations and intend to vigorously defend these claims, the
ultimate resolution of these matters cannot be determined at this
time. These lawsuits frequently involve claims for unspecified
compensatory and punitive damages, and we are unable to reasonably
estimate a range of possible losses, which may not be covered in
whole or in part by our insurance coverage. However, unfavorable
rulings, judgments or settlement terms could materially impact our
Consolidated Financial Statements. Hearings for certain of these
matters are scheduled to occur in 2022."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3tKVXMX


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Scotts Miracle-Gro Faces Product Liability Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Scotts Miracle-Gro Company has been named as defendant in a
number of cases alleging injuries that the lawsuits claim resulted
from exposure to asbestos-containing products, apparently based on
the Company's historic use of vermiculite in certain of its
products, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "In many of these cases, the complaints are not
specific about the plaintiffs' contacts with the Company or its
products. The cases vary, but complaints in these cases generally
seek unspecified monetary damages (actual, compensatory,
consequential and punitive) from multiple defendants. The Company
believes that the claims against it are without merit and is
vigorously defending against them. No accruals have been recorded
in the Company's consolidated financial statements as the
likelihood of a loss is not probable at this time; and the Company
does not believe a reasonably possible loss would be material to,
nor the ultimate resolution of these cases will have a material
adverse effect on, the Company's financial condition, results of
operations or cash flows. There can be no assurance that future
developments related to pending claims or claims filed in the
future, whether as a result of adverse outcomes or as a result of
significant defense costs, will not have a material effect on the
Company's financial condition, results of operations or cash
flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/391pA5p


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Univar Solutions Has 235 Cases as of March 31
--------------------------------------------------------------
Univar Solutions Inc., as of March 31, 2022, has an approximately
235 asbestos-related cases for which the Company has the obligation
to defend and indemnify; however, this number tends to fluctuate up
and down over time, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Historically, the vast majority of these
asbestos cases have been dismissed without payment or with a
nominal payment. While the Company is unable to predict the outcome
of these matters, it does not believe, based upon currently
available facts, that the ultimate resolution of any of these
matters will have a material effect on its overall financial
position, results of operations, or cash flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3Q8BvPt


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Williams Industrial Defends Personal injury Suit
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The acquiror of certain assets from a former operating unit of
Williams Industrial Services Group Inc. has been named as a
defendant in an asbestos personal injury lawsuit and has submitted
a claim for indemnification and tendered defense of the matter to
the Company, according to the its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

"The Company has assumed defense of the matter subject to a
reservation of rights and objection to the claim for
indemnification. Neither the Company nor its predecessors ever
mined, manufactured, produced, or distributed asbestos fiber, the
material that allegedly caused the injury underlying this action.
The Company does not expect that this claim will have a material
adverse effect on its financial position, results of operations or
liquidity. Moreover, during 2012, the Company secured insurance
coverage that will help to reimburse the defense costs and
potential indemnity obligations of its former operating unit
relating to these claims. The Company intends to vigorously defend
all currently active actions, and it does not anticipate that this
action will have a material adverse effect on its financial
position, results of operations or liquidity. However, the outcomes
of any legal action cannot be predicted and, therefore, there can
be no assurance that this will be the case."

"A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3tkhbRA


NORDIC AVIATION: Azorra Buys 37 Aircraft as NAC Exits Chapter 11
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David Kaminski-Morrow of Flight Global reports that US lessor
Azorra has acquired a portfolio of 37 aircraft previously owned by
Nordic Aviation Capital, the leasing firm which has newly emerged
from Chapter 11 protection.

Azorra says it has picked up 29 Embraer E-Jet regional aircraft
plus ATR and De Havilland turboprops.

The aircraft are leased to 13 different airlines, and chief
executive John Evans says they are "ideally suited for today's
market dynamics."

Azorra owns and manages 60 aircraft and has commitments to purchase
another 49, among them Airbus A220s and Embraer E2-family jets.

Nordic Aviation Capital has emerged from Chapter 11 restructuring,
with a new board of directors, following confirmation of a plan of
reorganisation by a Virginia bankruptcy court in April 2022.

It says it has "eliminated" nearly $4.1 billion of debt and
"significantly" improved its liquidity, having obtained access to
around $537 million in additional capital – a mix of new equity
and revolving credit loans.

The lessor says it has achieved a "significantly deleveraged"
balance sheet and that it is "well-positioned" for the future.

New chairman Klaus Heinemann says the restructuring has been
"complex and challenging," adding: "We begin a new chapter at NAC
with a strategy focused on growth."

Nordic says it will maintain its position as one of the world's
largest lessors, with over 350 aircraft.

Law firm Norton Rose Fulbright says it worked with an ad hoc group
of secured creditors during the restructuring – among them
Deutsche Bank, Development Bank of Japan, and JP Morgan – with
claims of around $1 billion, developing new financing structures
for 118 aircraft.

                   About Nordic Aviation Capital

Nordic Aviation Capital is the largest regional aircraft lessor
serving almost 70 airlines in approximately 45 countries.  In 2021,
it had a fleet of 475 aircraft that included ATR 42, ATR 72, De
Havilland Dash 8, Mitsubishi CRJ900/1000, Airbus A220 and Embraer
E-Jet family aircraft.

On Dec. 17, 2021, Nordic Aviation Capital Pte. Ltd., NAC Aviation
17 Limited, NAC Aviation 20 Limited, and Nordic Aviation Capital
A/S each filed petitions seeking relief under Chapter 11 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. E.D. Va.).  On Dec. 19, 2021, Nordic
Aviation Capital Designated Activity Company and 112 affiliated
companies also filed petitions seeking Chapter 11 relief.  The lead
case is In re Nordic Aviation Capital Designated Activity Company
(Bankr. E.D. Va. Lead Case No. 21-33693).

Judge Kevin R. Huennekens oversees the cases.

The Debtors tapped Kirkland & Ellis and Kutak Rock, LLP as
bankruptcy counsels and the law firms of Clifford Chance, LLP,
William Fry, LLP and Gorrissen Federspiel as corporate counsels.

N.M. Rothschild & Sons Limited, Ernst & Young, LLP, and
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, serve as the Debtors' financial
advisor, restructuring advisor and tax advisor, respectively.  Epiq
Corporate Restructuring, LLC is the claims and noticing agent.

                          *     *     *

In April 2022 the Bankruptcy Court confirmed NAC's Plan of
Reorganization, which reduced the company's indebtedness by $4.1
billion and strengthened its capital position with $337 million of
new equity.  At the end of May 2022, NAC emerged from its Chapter
11 restructuring process.  NAC intends to gradually diversify its
fleet of over 350 aircraft by selling and retiring certain regional
jet and older vintage aircraft and investing in narrowbody aircraft
manufactured by Airbus SE and The Boeing Company.


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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