/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/220705.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, July 5, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 127

                            Headlines

ALEXANDRIA PROFESSIONAL: Maddy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
AMERICAN WEST: Rubio Sues Over Imposed Hidden Fees on Food Items
APPLE INC: Court Narrows Claims in Barrett's 1st Amended Complaint
APYX MEDICAL: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of August 5 Deadline
ARCADIA EARTH: Fischler Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

AROMA360 LLC: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
AUDIOLOGY DISTRIBUTION: Fails to Pay OT & Minimum Wages, Brown Says
BAM TRADING: Lockhart Sues Over Unregistered Terra USD StableCoin
BAMIA 2 LLC: Valenzuela Labor Code Suit Goes to N.D. California
BANK OF AMERICA: Hit With Class Action Over Money Transfer Service

BELLE AND JUNE: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BENTON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT: Farella Files Suit in W.D. Arkansas
BOB'S DISCOUNT: Goof Proof Coverage "Deceptive," Wong Suit Claims
BURLINGTON NORTHERN: Judge Won't Send Class Action to Appeal
CABINETS TO GO: Maddy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

CANAL FURNITURE: Maddy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CARROWS RESTAURANTS: S.D. California Dismisses Cota ADA Suit
CENTRACARE HEALTH: Schave Sues for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Court Returns Bid to Toss in Johnson Suit
CM GROUP HOLDINGS: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

CODDLE INC: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CONOCOPHILLIPS CO: Davis Seeks Unpaid OT Wages, Damages Under FLSA
COSMOS CLINICS: Faces Class Action Suits Over Surgical Practices
DDR MEDIA LLC: Wiretapping Violates Privacy Rights, Williams Says
DEERE & CO: Monopolizes Repair Service Market, Cronquist Contends

DEL REY FARMS: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DELAWARE: District Court Dismisses All Trangenders at BWCI v. JTVCC
DENTSPLY SIRONA: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of August 1 Deadline
DENTSPLY SIRONA: Johnson Fistel Woos Investors to Submit Losses
DEUTSCHE BANK: Class Action Over Securities Fraud to Proceed

DIGITAL TURBINE: Levi & Korsinsky Notes of Pending Class Action
DRVITA INC: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DUNLOP MANUFACTURING: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
EDUCATION PRINCIPLE: Court Has No Jurisdiction Over JobsFlag LLC
ELECTROLUX AB: Faces Class Suit Over Refrigerators' Flimsy Shelves

ELECTROLUX HOME: Faces Stern Suit Over Defective Refrigerators
ELLEVET SCIENCES: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ETTIKA LLC: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
EVOLVE BRANDS: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
FARM SHOW: Faces Knoll Suit Over Private Reading Info Disclosure

FIAT CHRYSLER: Settles COBRA Class Action Settlement for $600K
FLAGSTAR BANK: Fails to Secure Consumer Info, Angus Class Suit
FOGO DE CHAO: Garcia-Alvarez's Bid for FLSA Collective Partly OK'd
FRITO-LAY INC: Fails to Pay Hours Worked During Kronos Blackout
GENERAL ELECTRIC: Kessler Topaz Announces Securities Class Action

H GREG NISSAN: Sends Unauthorized Telemarketing Calls, Walker Says
INOTIV INC: Johnson Fistel Announces Securities Class Action
JUUL LABS: Causes Youth E-Cigarette Crisis, Crown Point Suit Says
JUUL LABS: E-Cigarette Triggers Youth Health Crisis, Kern Claims
JUUL LABS: Faces Pemberton Suit Over Youth's E-Cigarette Addiction

JUUL LABS: Holland Patent Sues Over Deceptive E-Cigarette Campaign
JUUL LABS: Laurens Sues Over Youth's Nicotine Addiction in N.Y.
JUUL LABS: Norwood-Norfolk Sues Over E-Cigarette's Risks to Youth
JUUL LABS: Promotes E-Cigarette Use Among Youth, Narragansett Says
KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Rubenstein Consumer Suit Removed to S.D.N.Y.

LESLIE'S POOLMART: Pays Manual Workers Every Other Week, Green Says
M&M's WELDING: Underpays Welder and Shop Managers, Rios Suit Says
MCG HEALTH: Strecker Sues Over Failure to Protect Customers' Info
MDL 2873: Bohler Sues Over PFAS Exposure From AFFF Products
MDL 2873: Deckard Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic PFAS

MDL 2873: Douglas Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic PFAS
MDL 2873: Johnson Sues Over PFAS Exposure From AFFF Products
MDL 2873: Molina Suit Alleges PFAS Exposure From AFFF Products
MDL 2873: Nowakowski Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic PFAS
MDL 2873: Thomas Sues Over PFAS Exposure From AFFF Products

MITRE CORPORATION: Breaches Fiduciary Duties, Brown ERISA Suit Says
MONTEFIORE MEDICAL: Breaches Fiduciaries Duties, Boyette Suit Says
MORLEY COMPANIES: Ratcliff Suit Stayed Until Resolution of Thomsen
NERVEST ENERGY: $17.3MM Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Chieftain Suit
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY: Court Refuses to Certify Class in De Leon Suit

NEW YORK: Settles Class Action Suits Over Transit Accessibility
NOVA SCOTIA: Faces Class Action Over Illegal Prison Practices
QUICK LUBE: Faces Sumpter Suit Over Unpaid Wages, Retaliation
RAY JONES: Court Grants Back's Bid for Conditional Certification
REFLEKTIONS LTD: Class Settlement in Thornburg Suit Wins Approval

ROMAN FINANCIAL: Smith Sues Over Unwanted Telephone Calls
SIMON ROOFING: Faces White FLSA Suit Over Unpaid OT in S.D.N.Y.
SOCLEAN INC: Gemelli Class Suit Moved From M.D. Fla. to W.D. Pa.
SOCLEAN INC: Meles Files Suit Over Harmful CPAP Cleaning Machines
SOCLEAN INC: Vernon Sues Over Ozone Containing Sanitizing Machine

SOLO FUNDS: Faces Isom Suit Over Illegal Debt Collection Practices
STEAK 'N SHAKE: Court Dismisses Bremmer's Claims From Berry Suit
THANK YOU: Catzin Wins Bid to Enter Judgment Against Berezovsky
TOYOTA MOTOR: Denial of Linen's Bid for Leave to Amend Suit Flipped
UNILEVER PLC: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds Investors of Deadline

UNILEVER PLC: Glancy Prongay Reminds of August 15 Deadline
UNITED STATES: 3rd Cir. Reverses Denial of Bid to Dismiss Doe Suit
UNITED STATES: Court Grants Bid to Certify Class in EWTF Suit
UNITED STATES: Kandel's Bid for Attorneys' Fees & Expenses Denied
UNIVERSAL SERVICES: Tsui Files Suit for Breach of Fiduciary Duties

VATM CONCESSIONS: Unlawfully Keeps Tips, Monroe Suit Alleges
VERRICA PHARMACEUTICALS: Kirby McInerney Notes of Aug. 5 Deadline
VERTAFORE INC: Allen Appeals Data Breach Suit Dismissal to Sup. Ct.
VERTIV HOLDINGS: Bernstein & Saxena Named Riviera Suit Lead Counsel
VIZIO INC: Youngblood Sues Over Warranty Voiding Condition on TV

W.S. BADCOCK: Miernik Sues Over Unsolicited Debt Collection Calls
WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: Bid to Decertify Class in Garcia Suit Denied
WARSON GROUP: Cromitie Seeks Blind's Equal Access to Online Store
WASTE MANAGEMENT: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of August 8 Deadline
WINCO FOODS: Ninth Circuit Affirms Judgment in Johnson Class Suit

WINNEBAGO COUNTY, IL: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Mitchell Suit
XL FLEET: Faces Kay Class Suit Over 12.1% Decline of Stock Price

                            *********

ALEXANDRIA PROFESSIONAL: Maddy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Alexandria
Professional, LLC. The case is styled as Veronica Maddy, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated v. Alexandria
Professional, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-05332 (S.D.N.Y., June 24,
2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Alexandria Professional -- https://www.alexandriaprofessional.com/
-- is the leader of professional body sugaring and hair removal in
the beauty industry worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


AMERICAN WEST: Rubio Sues Over Imposed Hidden Fees on Food Items
----------------------------------------------------------------
DAWN RUBIO, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. AMERICAN WEST RESTAURANT GROUP, d/b/a PIZZA HUT AND
DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendant, Case No.
30-2022-01265528-CU-BC-CXC (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., June 20,
2022) is a class action against the Defendant for violations of the
California's Unfair Competition Law, the California's Consumer
Legal Remedies Act, and breach of contract.

According to the complaint, the Defendant is engaged in false,
deceptive, and misleading representation of its menu prices. The
Defendant failed to disclose that it added a service fee of 8.5% to
all orders in California. The late addition of this hidden fee
substantial changes the menu prices for food items. As a result,
Pizza Hut customers are not fully informed about the true costs of
its food items, alleges the suit.

American West Restaurant Group is an owner and operator of Pizza
Hut restaurants throughout California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
         EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.
         1925 Century Park East, Suite 1700
         Los Angeles, CA 90067
         Telephone: (305) 975-3320
         E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com

                 - and –

         Jeffrey D. Kaliel, Esq.
         Sophia Goren Gold, Esq.
         KALIELGOLD PLLC
         1100 15the Street NW, 4th Floor
         Washington, D.C. 20005
         Telephone: (202) 350-4783
         E-mail: jkaliel@kalielpllc.com
                 sgold@kalielgold.com

APPLE INC: Court Narrows Claims in Barrett's 1st Amended Complaint
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned CARL BARRETT, et al., Plaintiffs v. APPLE
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 5:20-cv-04812-EJD (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, issued an amended order
granting in part and denying in part the motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' first amended complaint.

Plaintiffs Carl Barrett, Michel Polston, Nancy Martin, Douglas
Watson, Eric Marinbach, Michael Rodriguez, Maria Rodriguez,
Guanting Qiu, and Andrew Hagene bring this putative class action
against Defendants Apple, Inc., Apple Value Services LLC
(collectively, "Apple"), and Does 1-100. In their First Amended
Complaint ("FAC"), the Plaintiffs assert the following claims: (1)
unfair practices in violation of the California Consumers Legal
Remedies Act ("CLRA"); (2) unfair practices in violation of the
California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); (3) unlawful practices
in violation of the CLRA; (4) unlawful practices in violation of
the UCL; (5) deceptive practices in violation of the CLRA; (6)
deceptive practices under the UCL; (7) violation of the California
False Advertising Law ("FAL"); (8) receiving, retaining,
withholding, or concealing stolen property in violation of
California Penal Code Section 496; (9) conversion; (10) aiding and
abetting intentional torts; and (11) declaratory judgment under 28
U.S.C. Section 2201.

Before the Court is Apple's motion to dismiss the FAC pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as well as Apple's motion
for a protective order to stay depositions pursuant to Rule
30(b)(6). The Court finds the matter suitable for resolution
without oral argument.

I. Background

Defendant Apple Inc. is a California corporation with its principal
place of business in Cupertino, California. Apple Value Services,
LLC, is a Virginia corporation with its principal place of business
in Cupertino. The Plaintiffs are residents of Maryland, Oregon,
California, New York, Massachusetts, and Missouri, all of whom fell
victim to scams involving the purchase of Apple's App Store &
iTunes gift cards.

The Federal Trade Commission has reported that, between 2015 and
2019, scammers stole more than $93.5 million by carrying out a
formulaic gift card scam. FTC data indicates that gift card
scammers steal more and more money with each passing year. Gift
card scammers stole approximately $24.4 million in 2019 alone, and
$29.4 million in 2020 alone. These figures may indicate only a
fraction of the theft occurring each year, as many scam victims may
not file a report. About a quarter of all reported gift card scams
involve Apple gift cards.

The Plaintiffs allege that Apple has control of its iTunes and App
Store such that it knew or should have known about specific iTunes
gift card scams as they were occurring or soon after they occurred.
The Plaintiffs allege that Apple knew or should have known: which
Apple IDs had uploaded the codes of stolen gift cards; which iTunes
Store or App Store purchases had been made with the value uploaded
from stolen gift cards; and which Apple Developer accounts were
associated with purchases made with the value uploaded from stolen
gift cards.

More generally, the Plaintiffs allege that Apple knew or should
have known how the iTunes gift card scam works, and that it is a
widespread and impactful phenomenon. They allege that Apple could
have used its knowledge and control of its online stores to suspend
Apple ID accounts and Apple Developer accounts associated with
suspicious activity, to refuse to pay Apple Developer accounts that
seemed to be involved with scams, and to refund to scam victims
Apple's 30% commission on purchases associated with scams (if not
the full 100% loss of the stolen gift card value).

The Plaintiffs point out that in 2012, Apple started producing gift
cards in $500 denominations, potentially increasing the impact of
individual scams. They allege that Apple's actions or failures to
act indicate that Apple is aiding and abetting the scams, or is
otherwise violating California fair competition statutes by
knowingly paying scammers and keeping funds received because of the
scams.

Apple gift cards are subject to Terms and Conditions. A partial
version of the Terms and Conditions appears on the back of the
packaging sleeve for iTunes gift cards. This partial version refers
users to the full Terms and Conditions on Apple's website. The
version of the Terms and Conditions at issue here state that
California law applies.

The Plaintiffs cite an April 2016 NBC News report, in which an
Apple spokesperson stated that if someone contacts Apple Support
after sending off the gift card code -- and the money has not been
drained from the card -- the scam victim can freeze the account and
have the money refunded to them. If the money is already gone,
Apple advises people to file a complaint with the FTC. The
Plaintiffs claim that this news report indicates, among other
things, that "Apple deceptively suggests to scam victims that their
money is 'gone,' even when [Apple] will retain a 30% commission,
and, in many cases, has not yet paid or will not pay the remaining
70% into the scammer's bank account."

The Plaintiffs allege that Apple has violated California unfair
competition statutes by committing affirmative misrepresentation
and/or fraud by omission via its red warning language, its "About
Gift Card Scams" webpage, its Terms and Conditions, its
communications with news media, and its communications with gift
card users, who contacted Apple after having been scammed.

The Plaintiffs bring this action individually and also on behalf of
a proposed nationwide class of persons in the United States, who
were victims of the iTunes gift card scam and who did not receive a
refund from Apple. The Plaintiff proposes one subclass that
includes scam victims, who contacted Apple following the scam.
There are nine named Plaintiffs, all of whom fell victim to a
typical version of the scam.

The Plaintiffs filed this action on July 17, 2020, asserting claims
for violations of the UCL, CLRA, FAL, as well as claims for breach
of contract, quasi-contract, and state elder abuse laws. The Court
granted Apple's motion to dismiss the original complaint with leave
to amend, except for the breach of contract claim (which the
Plaintiffs withdrew) and the quasi-contract claims. In the
operative FAC, the Plaintiffs dropped the elder abuse claims and
instead added claims for violation of California Penal Code Section
496 and conversion.

II. Legal Standard

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a
plaintiff to plead each claim with enough specificity to "give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests," Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). A complaint, which falls short of the Rule 8(a) standard,
may therefore be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.

III. Discussion

A. Request for Judicial Notice

Apple requests the Court take judicial notice of six exhibits: (1)
a set of photographs of an Apple $50 gift card; (2) an AppleCare
Support article entitled [REDACTED/]; (3) an article entitled
"About Gift Card Scams" from Apple's website; (4) an October 2018
press release from the FTC entitled "Paying Scammers with Gift
Cards," available on the FTC's website; (5) a Nov. 24, 201 press
release from the FTC entitled "FTC Has Gift Card Tips for Holiday
Buying," available on the FTC's website; and (6) a December 2019
press release from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
entitled "FDIC Consumer News: What You Should Know About Gift
Cards," available on the FDIC's website. The Court previously
granted Apple's request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 5,
and 6. The Plaintiffs oppose only the request for judicial notice
of Exhibits 1 and 2.

Exhibit 1 includes three photographs of a $50 iTunes gift card
purchased on Aug. 18, 2020. The Court previously took judicial
notice because the disclaimer language on the back of the gift card
packaging matched verbatim the language quoted in the complaint,
and the Plaintiffs did not assert that the language and formatting
of the gift card shown in Exhibit 1 was different from the gift
cards they purchased.

In the FAC, the Plaintiffs now allege that no such warning language
appeared on the cards purchased by Barrett, Marinbach, the
Rodriguezes, and Qiu. The Plaintiffs further allege that the
warning language was not added to Apple gift cards until midway
through the class period. However, the Plaintiffs do not allege
that the language did not appear on the cards purchased by Polston,
Martin, Watson, and Hagene. The Court's earlier ruling thus still
applies to those four named Plaintiffs and to putative class
members who purchased gift cards in the first half of the class
period. Accordingly, the Court grants the request for judicial
notice of Exhibit 1 as incorporated in the complaint.

Accordingly, the Court grants Apple's request for judicial notice
of Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

1. California Penal Code Section 496 (Claim 8)

The parties do not dispute that the Plaintiffs' gift card funds are
property within the meaning of section 496(a) of the California
Penal Code, nor do they dispute that the funds are stolen or
obtained in a manner constituting theft. Instead, Apple argues that
the Plaintiffs have not stated a section 496 claim for three
reasons: (1) section 496 applies only to property that has already
been stolen or obtained in a manner constituting theft, but
Plaintiffs' purchase of the gift cards was a lawful transaction;
(2) Plaintiffs have not pled Apple's actual knowledge that the
money was stolen; and (3) Apple has a refund policy despite having
no duty to offer a refund.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not pled that the property
was stolen before Apple received the funds.

Receipt of stolen property, however, is not the only way to violate
section 496(a) -- concealing or withholding stolen property is also
actionable, Judge Davila notes. Here, Martin, Marinbach, Qiu, and
Hagene contacted Apple the same day or within one week of falling
victim to the scam, but Apple refused to refund the stolen gift
card funds. The Plaintiffs have alleged that Apple retains 100% of
app purchases until approximately 45 days after the end of the
fiscal month, when Apple pays 70% of the value to the app developer
or retains the entire amount based on indicia of fraud. Either way,
Apple retains at least 30% of the value stolen from Plaintiffs.

The Court finds that Martin, Marinbach, Qiu, and Hagene have
adequately pled a claim for concealing or withholding stolen
property under section 496(a).

Apple's reliance on its refund policy is misplaced, Judge Davila
holds. Even if the refund policy existed before the Plaintiffs fell
victim to the scam, the refund policy does not in negate the
knowledge element. The refund policy, thus, does not immunize Apple
from section 496 liability, Judge Davila opines.

Accordingly, the Court finds that only Plaintiffs Martin,
Marinbach, Qiu, and Hagene have adequately pled a section 496
claim, and that it would be futile to grant leave to amend to the
remaining named Plaintiffs.

2. Conversion (Claim 9)

Apple contends that the Plaintiffs have not pled the requisite
affirmative act to deprive them of their property. Apple relies
principally on Archer v. Coinbase, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 5th 266
(2020), but that case is distinguishable, Judge Davila finds.

The Court finds that Martin, Marinbach, Qiu, and Hagene have
alleged facts from which it may be inferred that by refusing to
refund the scammed funds, Apple prevented them from taking
possession of their property and, indeed, benefitted from
perpetuation of the scam. As to the other named Plaintiffs,
however, the FAC contains no allegations that Apple was on notice
that they were victims of a scam, and thus Apple could not have had
an intent to prevent them from recovering their property and could
not have taken any affirmative act to do so.

Accordingly, the Court finds that only Plaintiffs Martin,
Marinbach, Qiu, and Hagene have stated a claim for conversion, and
that it would be futile to grant leave to amend to the remaining
named Plaintiffs.

3. Third-party liability (Claims 1-4, 10: CLRA, UCL, FAL, aiding
and abetting intentional torts)

In its prior order, the Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' CLRA, UCL,
FAL, and aiding and abetting claims that attempted to assert
liability for third-party conduct. The Court found that the
Plaintiffs had not pled facts from which it could be inferred that
Apple gave "substantial assistance or encouragement" to the
scammers, or that Apple "reached a conscious decision to
participate" in the scam.

Apple contends that the FAC does not cure the deficiencies the
Court previously identified. In response, the Plaintiffs assert,
among other things, that Apple "affirmatively assisted the
scammers" by uploading gift card codes onto Apple IDs, converting
the codes into stored value, transferred the stored value to iTunes
apps, converting the stored value into U.S. dollars, transferring
the U.S. dollars to scammers' financial accounts, and transferring
30% or more of the U.S. dollars into Apple's own bank accounts.

The Court disagrees with the Plaintiffs' assertion that they have
adequately pled "substantial assistance or encouragement" to the
scammers. As to the Plaintiffs' list of "affirmative" acts
concerning converting and transferring funds, these acts amount to
nothing more than payment processing, which is not sufficient
standing alone to plead a claim for aiding and abetting, Judge
Davila opines, citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n,
494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).

As the Court previously held, the fact that Apple benefits from the
scam is also insufficient to plead a claim for aiding and abetting,
and the Plaintiffs offer no legal support for their proposition
that the relative amount Apple stands to obtain is dispositive. The
Plaintiffs' attempt to plead around Schulz v. Neovi Data Corp., 152
Cal.App.4th 86 (2007) by marginally modifying their allegations
concerning Apple's "hope and belief" and its decision to offer gift
cards in large denominations is unpersuasive, and these modified
allegations do not alter the Court's prior analysis.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have again not
adequately pled third-party liability. Because the Plaintiffs were
not able to plead facts supporting third-party liability despite
being granted leave to amend to do so, the Court finds that further
leave to amend would be futile and dismisses the aiding and
abetting claim and the portions of the CLRA, UCL, and FAL claims
that are premised on third-party liability with prejudice.

4. Fraud (Claims 1-2, 5-7: CLRA, UCL, FAL)

The Plaintiffs allege that Apple violated the CLRA, the UCL, and
the FAL by engaging in affirmative misrepresentation and fraud by
omission, thereby, breaching a duty to disclose.

The Court previously found that Plaintiffs' four theories of
affirmative misrepresentations were flawed. In the FAC, rgw
Plaintiffs now appear to allege three theories of affirmative
misrepresentations: (1) "falsely suggesting on its website that by
the time a victim can call, the funds will have become the rightful
property of legitimate content sellers"; (2) "misrepresent[ing] its
affiliation, connection, or association with the scammers"; and (3)
informing the named Plaintiffs who spoke to Apple that "the money
was redeemed and/or spent, and that there was nothing Apple could
do."

Apple asserts that the Plaintiffs do not state a claim under any
theory. In their opposition brief, the Plaintiffs opted not to
address their claim based on affirmative misrepresentation. The
Court understands the Plaintiffs to have effectively conceded the
point, if not waived it. Nevertheless, the Court proceeds to
address the deficiencies in pleading affirmative
misrepresentation.

Judge Davila finds that the Plaintiffs adequately plead facts
suggesting that there was, in fact, something Apple could do --
based on Apple's complete control over the iTunes ecosystem, it
could have easily determined who redeemed the stolen gift card
funds, dealt with them accordingly, halted the processing of any
payments, and returned at least some of the funds to the
Plaintiffs.

However, while the Plaintiffs have pled a false statement with
knowledge of falsity and facts suggestive of intent, they do not
adequately plead reliance and resulting damage necessary to state a
claim for fraud by affirmative misrepresentation, Judge Davila
notes.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs again have failed
to state a claim for fraud based on affirmative misrepresentations.
The Court also finds that the Plaintiffs again have not stated a
claim for fraudulent omission.

Because the Court has already afforded the Plaintiffs an
opportunity to amend their fraud claims, the Court finds that
further leave to amend would be futile and dismisses the fraud
claims under the CLRA, UCL, and FAL with prejudice.

5. Unconscionability (Claims 1, 2 and 11: CLRA, UCL, declaratory
judgment)

In the FAC, the Plaintiffs allege that their claims for unfair
practices in violation of the CLRA and UCL include the use of an
unconscionable and adhesive disclaimer on the gift card packaging
and in Apple's Terms and Conditions. The Plaintiffs say that
Apple's attempt to disclaim liability discourages victims from
contacting Apple and is unlawful as to Apple's conduct in
connection with violation of California Penal Code Section 496 and
California's consumer protection statutes.

The Court dismisses with prejudice the portions of the CLRA and UCL
unfair practices claims concerning unconscionability of Apple's
disclaimer as to third-party liability. Otherwise, the Plaintiffs
have pled a claim that Apple's disclaimer of its own tortious acts
is unconscionable and an unfair practice. As a result, the
Plaintiffs have also stated a claim for declaratory judgment
seeking a declaration that Apple's attempt to disclaim liability is
unconscionable and unenforceable as to its own conduct.

6. Unlawful conduct (Claims 3 and 4: CLRA, UCL)

Claim 3 of the FAC alleges unlawful practices in violation of the
CLRA based on violation of the UCL, California Penal Code Section
496, and Apple's unconscionable disclaimer. Similarly, Claim 4 of
the FAC alleges unlawful practices in violation of the UCL based on
violation of the CLRA, section 496, and Apple's unconscionable
disclaimer.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have stated claims for unlawful
conduct under the CLRA and UCL.

C. Apple's Motion for Protective Order

While the motion to dismiss the FAC was pending, the Plaintiffs
sought to take Apple's deposition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 30(b)(6). Apple moved for a protective order barring the
Plaintiffs from seeking those depositions until and unless the
Court determines that the Plaintiffs have stated a viable claim
against Apple.

Because the Court has now ruled on the motion to dismiss and
determined that the Plaintiffs have stated viable claims against
Apple, the Court denies as moot the motion for a protective order.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the
motion to dismiss as follows:

   (1) The portions of Claims 1-7 and 10 relating to third-party
       liability are dismissed with prejudice;

   (2) The portions of Claims 1-2 and 5-7 relating to fraud by
       affirmative misrepresentation or by omission are dismissed
       with prejudice;

   (3) The portions of Claims 1, 2, and 11 relating to
       unconscionability of disclaiming third-party liability are
       dismissed with prejudice;

   (4) The Court dismisses with prejudice Claims 8 and 9 only as
       to Plaintiffs Barrett, Polston, Watson, Michael Rodriguez,
       and Maria Rodriguez; and

   (5) The Court otherwise denies the motion to dismiss as to
       Claims 8 and 9, the portions of Claims 3 and 4 concerning
       unlawful conduct, and the portions of Claims 1, 2, and 11
       relating to unconscionability of disclaiming Apple's own
       tortious or illegal conduct.

Apple's answer was due on June 24, 2022.

The Court denies as moot Apple's motion for a protective order.

The parties will submit a joint case management statement by July
18, 2022 and appear before the Court for an initial case management
conference on July 28, 2022, at 10:00 a.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's Amended Order dated June 13, 2022,
is available at https://tinyurl.com/4a92araf from Leagle.com.


APYX MEDICAL: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of August 5 Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard LLP, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, reminds investors of the deadline to file a lead plaintiff
motion in a securities class action lawsuit that has been filed on
behalf of investors who purchased or acquired the securities of
Apyx Medical Corporation between May 12, 2021 and March 11, 2022,
inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit was filed in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida and
alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Apyx claims to be an advanced energy technology company with
products in the cosmetic and surgical markets. Nearly 80% of the
Company's revenue is derived from the Advanced Energy segment,
which consists of Apyx's helium plasma technology that is marketed
and sold as Renuvion (in the cosmetic surgery market) and J-Plasma
(in the hospital surgical market).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements throughout the Class Period. Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to disclose that: (1) a
significant number of Apyx's Advanced Energy products were used for
off-label indications; (2) such off-label uses led to an increase
in the number of medical device reports filed by Apyx reporting
serious adverse events; (3) as a result, the Company was reasonably
likely to incur regulatory scrutiny; and (4) as a result of the
foregoing, the Company's financial results would be adversely
impacted.

On March 14, 2022, Apyx disclosed that the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") would be posting a Medical Device Safety
Communication ("MDSC") related to the Company's Advanced Energy
Products. The Company further disclosed that "[b]ased on our
initial interactions with the FDA, we believe the Agency's MDSC
will pertain to the use of our Advanced Energy products outside of
their FDA-cleared indication for general use in cutting,
coagulation, and ablation of soft tissue during open and
laparoscopic surgical procedures."

On this news, the Company's stock fell over 40%, to close at $5.88
per share on March 14, 2022.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than August 5, 2022. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased APYX securities, and/or would like to discuss your
legal rights and options please visit Apyx Medical Corporation
Shareholder Class Action Lawsuit or contact Peter Allocco at (212)
951-2030 or pallocco@bernlieb.com.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact:
Peter Allocco
Bernstein Liebhard LLP
https://www.bernlieb.com
(212) 951-2030
pallocco@bernlieb.com [GN]

ARCADIA EARTH: Fischler Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Arcadia Earth LLC.
The case is styled as Brian Fischler, individually and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated v. Arcadia Earth LLC, doing
business as: Arcadia Earth, Case No. 1:22-cv-05358 (S.D.N.Y., June
24, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Arcadia Earth -- https://www.arcadia-earth.com/ -- is a large scale
multi-sensorial journey through underwater worlds, fantasy lands,
and inspirational art installations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
          LIPSKY LOWE LLP
          630 Third Avenue Fifth Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Phone: (212) 392-4772
          Fax: (212) 444-1030
          Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


AROMA360 LLC: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Aroma360 LLC. The
case is styled as Vanessa Jimenez, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Aroma360 LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-05394-VEC (S.D.N.Y., June 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Aroma360 -- https://www.aroma360.com/ -- is a boutique Scent
Marketing and Branding company that specializes in providing the
highest-quality essential oil-based scenting solutions to
businesses and individuals all around the world.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


AUDIOLOGY DISTRIBUTION: Fails to Pay OT & Minimum Wages, Brown Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
IA BROWN, individually on behalf of herself, all others similarly
situated, and the general public, v. AUDIOLOGY DISTRIBUTION, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company; CRAIG CAMERON, an individual;
HEARX WEST, INC, a California corporation; STEVE MAHON, an
individual; TINO SCHWEIGHOEFER, an individual; HEARX WEST LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company; MEAL/REST BREAKS, California
professional corporation; SIVANTOS, INC., a Delaware corporation;
and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, Case No. 2:22-cv-04271 (C.D. Cal.,
June 22, 2022) alleges that Defendants failed to pay overtime and
minimum wages in violation of the California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, although the Plaintiff frequently
worked overtime, and her wage statements reflect that for such
hours she worked in excess of eight per day and/or 40 per week, she
was paid 1.5 times her standard hourly rate of pay. However, those
same wage statements also reflect that she was not paid 1.5 times
her regular rate of pay for such hours she did work in excess of
eight per day and/or 40 per week.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants within the State of
California for 17 years from December 15, 2004, to February 25,
2021.

The Corporate Defendants herein operate audiology practices both in
California and nationwide and are dispensers of hearing aids. The
Plaintiff was employed as a non-exempt, hourly paid employee by the
Business Entity the Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Paul T. Cullen, Esq.
          THE CULLEN LAW FIRM, APC
          19360 Rinaldi Street, Box 647
          Porter Ranch, CA 91326
          Telephone: (818) 360-2529
          Facsimile: (866) 794-5741
          E-mail: paul@cullenlegal.com

BAM TRADING: Lockhart Sues Over Unregistered Terra USD StableCoin
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JEFFREY LOCKHART, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BAM TRADING SERVICES INC. and
BRIAN SHRODER, Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-03461 (S.D. Cal., June
13, 2022) asserts claims against the Defendants under Sections 5
and 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 to recover damages,
consideration paid for Terra USD (UST), and trading fees, together
with interest thereon, as well as attorneys' fees and costs.

UST is an "algorithmic stablecoin" created and centrally controlled
by Terraform Labs (TFL), a crypto-asset company based in Singapore
that is run by its founder and CEO Kwon Do-hyung. The value of UST
depends on and is derivative of the value of "LUNA," another
crypto-asset developed and centrally controlled by TFL.

BAM Trading Services Inc. is a Delaware corporation headquartered
in Palo Alto, California, that operates under the trade name
Binance U.S. Mr. Lockhart purchased UST on Binance U.S. during the
Class Period.

According to the complaint, between April 13, 2022, and the
present, Binance U.S. used its website to buy from and sell Terra
USD to investors. UST was advertised and sold to investors as a
"safe" asset that could be used to earn substantial returns,
including in the form of interest. The respective prices of UST and
LUNA both depended upon, and continue to depend upon, the efforts
and success (or failure) of TFL. For example, the amount of
interest that investors earned from UST depended directly upon the
success (or failure) of TFL's efforts in maintaining the Anchor
Protocol, which was the platform created and maintained by TFL that
generated UST's interest payments, says the suit.

Despite enjoying those fantastic profits, Binance U.S. plainly
failed to comply with federal and state securities laws. Binance
U.S. allegedly failed to disclose that UST is in fact a security,
and that it is selling these securities, even though (i) there is
no registration statement in effect for them, and (ii) Binance U.S.
itself has refused to register with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission either as a securities exchange or as a
broker-dealer. Since the collapse of UST, Binance U.S. has removed
its advertisements touting UST as "safe" and "fiat-backed,"
effectively conceding that UST was none of those things, the suit
adds.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Tibor L. Nagy, Jr., Esq.
          Gregory N. Wolfe, Esq.
          William LaGrange, Esq.
          Heidi R. Schumann, Esq.
          Susan S. Hu, Esq.
          DONTZIN NAGY & FLEISSIG LLP  
          980 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10075
          E-mail: tibor@dnfllp.com
                  greg@dnfllp.com
                  wlagrange@dnfllp.com
                  hschumann@dnfllp.com
                  shu@dnfllp.com

               - and -

          Kyle Roche, Esq.
          Edward Normand, Esq.
          Joseph Delich, Esq.
          Alex Potter, Esq.
          Ivy T. Ngo, Esq.
          ROCHE FREEDMAN LLP
          99 Park Avenue, 1910
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (646) 350-0527
          E-mail: kyle@rochefreedman.com
                  tnormand@rochefreedman.com
                  jdelich@rochefreedman.com
                  apotter@rochefreedman.com
                  ingo@rochefreedman.com

BAMIA 2 LLC: Valenzuela Labor Code Suit Goes to N.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled ALEJANDRO VALENZUELA and ANGELEIGH MANJARREZ, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. BAMIA 2
LLC and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No. CGC-22-598895, was
removed from the Superior Court of the State of California for the
County of San Francisco to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California on June 22, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of California assigned
Case No. 3:22-cv-03675 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the
California Labor Code and the California's Unfair Competition Law
including unfair competition, failure to pay minimum wages, failure
to pay overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to
provide paid rest period, failure to reimburse, failure to furnish
accurate itemized wage statements, and failure to provide wages
when due.

Bamia 2 LLC is a limited liability company, with its principal
place of business located in Miami, Florida. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Mia Farber, Esq.
         Michael R. Minguet, Esq.
         Janet J. Hur, Esq.
         JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
         725 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2500
         Los Angeles, CA 90017-5408
         Telephone: (213) 689-0404
         Facsimile: (213) 689-0430
         E-mail: Mia.Farber@Jacksonlewis.com
                 Michael.Minguet@Jacksonlewis.com
                 Janet.Hur@Jacksonlewis.com

BANK OF AMERICA: Hit With Class Action Over Money Transfer Service
------------------------------------------------------------------
Erin Shaak of ClassAction.org reports that a class action claims
Bank of America has misled Zelle users by failing to disclose the
"extreme risks" that come along with using the money transfer
service.

More specifically, the 20-page case says that Bank of America has
touted Zelle as a secure, free and convenient way to transfer money
while failing to warn accountholders of the "key fact" that there
is virtually no recourse for users who fall victim to fraud.

In fact, the lawsuit states that although "virtually every other
payment method commonly used by American consumers" includes fraud
protection, Zelle does not. According to the suit, "any money
transferred for any reason via Zelle is gone forever, without
recourse, reimbursement or protection."

Per the complaint, many users who signed up and used the Zelle
service "without the benefit of accurate information" have ended up
with "massive" unreimbursed losses due to fraud.

"Such users never would have signed up for Zelle in the first place
if they had known the extreme risks of signing up for and using the
service," the lawsuit says.

As the case tells it, the nature of the Zelle money transfer
service—particularly, the immediacy with which transfers can be
performed and the fact that the funds are not recoverable—has set
the stage for a "massive fraud problem" on the network. Per the
suit, Bank of America, one of seven banks who operate the Zelle
network through a company called Early Warning Services, is well
aware that Zelle has been plagued by organized crime and fraudsters
yet has failed to warn users of these risks or protect
accountholders who fall victim to fraud.

The plaintiff, an Orange County, California college student, is one
such Zelle user who claims to have lost over $2,000 to a fraudster
through the service. Per the complaint, the plaintiff was searching
for an apartment to rent in November 2021 when she found what she
believed to be a suitable unit. The case says the plaintiff
submitted a rental application and transferred a $150 application
fee via Zelle to the purported owner of the property. After being
informed that her application had been approved, the plaintiff then
transferred via Zelle an $800 security deposit and $1,200 for the
first month's rent, the suit relays.

When the plaintiff arrived at the apartment at the time she
arranged with the purported owner, he was "nowhere to be found,"
according to the case.

"The fraudster repeatedly called Plaintiff with excuses for his
tardiness and reassured Plaintiff that he would be arriving
promptly with the keys, but he never showed," the complaint relays.
"At this point, Plaintiff determined she fell victim to fraud and
demanded her money be returned. Despite Plaintiff's demand, the
fraudster did not return the money and ceased all communications
with Plaintiff."

After the plaintiff determined that she had been a victim of fraud,
she contacted Bank of America, who initially informed her that she
would be reimbursed for the lost funds, the case says. According to
the complaint, however, the bank ultimately denied the plaintiff's
claim and refused to reimburse the woman for her loss.

The plaintiff looks to represent anyone with a Bank of America
account who signed up for the Zelle service and incurred
unreimbursed losses due to fraud. [GN]

BELLE AND JUNE: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Belle and June, Inc.
The case is styled as Vanessa Jimenez, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Belle and June, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-05396 (S.D.N.Y., June 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Belle and June -- https://www.belleandjune.com/ -- is a top online
home decor store.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


BENTON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT: Farella Files Suit in W.D. Arkansas
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Benton County
District Court, DIV.4, et al. The case is styled as Abigail
Farella, Logan W. Murphy, all other similarly situated v. Benton
County District Court, DIV.4, District Judge A.J. Anglin, Case No.
5:22-cv-05121-TLB (W.D. Ark., June 24, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Civil Rights for the Civil
Rights Act.

Benton County District Court -- https://www.co.benton.wa.us/ -- is
a court of limited jurisdiction.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Norman Douglas Norwood, Esq.
          NORWOOD & NORWOOD, P.A.
          PO Box 1960
          Rogers, AR 72757
          Phone: (479) 636-1262
          Fax: (479) 636-7595
          Email: dougnorwood@cox-internet.com


BOB'S DISCOUNT: Goof Proof Coverage "Deceptive," Wong Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KENNETH WONG, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BOB'S DISCOUNT FURNITURE, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 2:22-cv-04220 (C.D. Cal., June 20, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendant for violations of California's Unfair
Competition Law, False Advertising Law, and California's Consumer
Legal Remedies Act, bad faith insurance denial, unjust enrichment,
breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of
merchantability/fitness for a particular purpose and violation of
the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act.

The case arises from the Defendant's denial of claims under its
Goof Proof furniture protection plan. The Defendant's Goof Proof
service contract aims to protect the furniture purchased by its
customers. However, in reality, Goof Proof has a lengthy list of
coverage exclusions, including customer misuse and accidental
damage. As a result of the Defendant's false, misleading, and
deceptive misrepresentations and omissions, the Plaintiff and Class
members were deprived of the benefit of their bargain because they
paid for Goof Proof to cover accidental damage but the Defendant
relied on exclusions and undefined terms to deny coverage, the suit
alleges.

Bob's Discount Furniture, LLC is an American furniture store chain
headquartered in Manchester, Connecticut. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Craig Borison, Esq.
         BORISON LAW
         468 North Camden Drive, Ste. 200-90416
         Beverly Hills, CA 90210
         Telephone: (818) 256-5449
         E-mail: craig@borisonlaw.com

                 - and –

         Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
         SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         60 Cuttermill Rd., Ste. 412
         Great Neck, NY 11021
         Telephone: (516) 268-7080
         Facsimile: (516) 234-7800
         E-mail: spencer@spencersheehan.com

                 - and –

         Steffan T. Keeton, Esq.
         THE KEETON FIRM LLC
         100 S. Commons, Ste. 102
         Pittsburgh, PA 15212
         Telephone: (888) 412-5291
         E-mail: stkeeton@keetonfirm.com

BURLINGTON NORTHERN: Judge Won't Send Class Action to Appeal
------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Holland, writing for the Cook County Record, reports that a
federal judge denied rail giant Burlington Northern Santa Fe's
request to have an appeals panel determine whether the judge was
correct in refusing to end a truck driver's biometrics class action
stemming from railyard handprint scans.

U.S. District Judge Matthew Kennelly issued an opinion June 21. The
decision stands as the latest development in a lawsuit trucker
Richard Rogers filed in April 2019 accusing BSNF of violating the
Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act by deploying fingerprint
scanners, allegedly without first getting written consent from
those who wanted yard access to collect their personal information.
The lawsuit further accused BNSF of failing to provide written
disclosure of its plans for retaining and destroying the
fingerprint scans.

In October 2019, Kennelly denied BNSF's motion to dismiss, finding
the federal Railroad Safety Act, as well as the Interstate Commerce
Commission Termination and Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization acts, didn't pre-empt Rogers' state law claims.
Kennelly also rejected BNSF's arguments that Rogers' claims were
insufficient.

In August 2021, Kennelly granted Rogers' motion to sever and remand
part of his BIPA claim to Cook County Circuit Court. The next
month, he filed an amended complaint in federal court, narrowing it
to just one claim under BIPA. BNSF moved for summary judgment on
that remaining claim, a request Kennelly denied in March 2022.

BNSF had again argued federal railroad law regulates the same
subject matter as BIPA — secure access to railroad property —
but Kennelly said federal law doesn't necessarily preempt the
safety concerns addressed by state law, unless it "substantially
subsumes" those concerns. He further explained neither the FRSA nor
federal regulations concerning transportation or homeland security
say anything about an individual's right to privacy for their
biometric information, such as fingerprints.

After hitting that roadblock, BNSF asked Kennelly to allow the
company to appeal his denial of summary judgment. BNSF argued a
later decision in the same federal district court conflicts with
Kennelly's position on federal pre-emption and further said
Kennelly was wrong to find BNSF could be held vicariously liable
for the actions of Remprex, the company that BNSF says actually
collected the data.

The railroad cited an opinion from Northern District of Illinois
Chief Judge Rebecca Pallmeyer, issued a week after Kennelly denied
summary judgment, in which she held the Airline Deregulation Act
pre-empted BIPA claims against American Airlines.

"If a disagreement between two district judges sufficed" to
establish the difference of opinion needed to establish the
credentials for an appeal, "the floodgates would be opened to
virtually unlimited interlocutory appeals given the number of
sitting district judges," Kennelly wrote. "And this would be so
even were the argument confined to a disagreement between two
judges within a district, particularly when one considers that the
Northern District of Illinois has 21 active and 11 senior district
judges."

Kennelly said the railroad failed to show how the appeal would
quicken the litigation, while also noting it filed its request for
appeal six weeks after Kennelly's March 15 opinion, a delay he said
"adds further weight" to his conclusion that pre-emption isn't
appropriate. And although BNSF argued it could face a "crippling"
liability if it is made to pay damages for the alleged BIPA
violations, "this point was made nowhere — not even once, not
even in passing — in the two briefs BNSF filed on the motion for
summary judgment."

Suggesting Kennelly found BNSF could be vicariously liable for
Remprex employees' conduct, he wrote, is "a mischaracterization" of
his ruling because he "denied summary judgment based on conflicting
evidence regarding BNSF's direct involvement in registering
drivers."

Kennelly noted BNSF never argued BIPA doesn't permit vicarious
liability, meaning it forfeited that point, at least as a basis for
getting the interlocutory appeal approved.

BNSF is represented in the case by attorneys Elizabeth B.
Herrington and Alex D. Berger, of the firm of Morgan Lewis and
Bockius, of Chicago.

Rogers is represented by attorneys Brendan Duffner, Myles McGuire,
Evan M. Meyers and David L. Gerbie, of the firm of McGuire Law
P.C., of Chicago. [GN]

CABINETS TO GO: Maddy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cabinets To Go, LLC.
The case is styled as Veronica Maddy, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Cabinets To Go, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-05335 (S.D.N.Y., June 24, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Cabinets To Go -- https://cabinetstogo.com/ -- is an American
specialty cabinet retail store chain, offering cabinets for
kitchens, bathrooms, laundry rooms, mudrooms, and garages.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


CANAL FURNITURE: Maddy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Canal Furniture Corp.
The case is styled as Veronica Maddy, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Canal Furniture Corp., Case No.
1:22-cv-05342 (S.D.N.Y., June 24, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Canal Furniture -- https://nyfurniture.com/ -- offers a large
selection of Modern and Contemporary Furniture with many custom
options.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


CARROWS RESTAURANTS: S.D. California Dismisses Cota ADA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Todd W. Robinson of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California dismisses without prejudice the lawsuit
styled JULISSA COTA, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CARROWS RESTAURANTS, LLC, a
California corporation; CARROWS CALIFORNIA FAMILY RESTAURANTS, LLC,
a Delaware corporation; SHARI'S MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation; and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
20-CV-1428 TWR (RBB) (S.D. Cal.).

On July 24, 2020, Plaintiff Julissa Cota filed this putative class
action, alleging two causes of action for violations of (1) the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. Sections
12101, et seq.; and (2) the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code
Section 51. The Plaintiff filed proofs of service on Defendants
Carrows Restaurants, LLC; Carrows California Family Restaurants,
LLC; and Shari's Management Corporation through CSC Lawyers
Incorporating Services on Aug. 28, 2020.

On June 2, 2021, after the action was transferred to Judge
Robinson, the Plaintiff requested that the Clerk of the Court enter
default against the Defendants. The Clerk entered default on June
7, 2021. Thereafter, the Plaintiff moved for default judgment on
June 28, 2021, and filed an amended motion for default judgment on
Aug. 12, 2021.

On Jan. 24, 2022, the Court set aside the Clerk's entry of default
and denied the Plaintiff's amended motion for default judgment on
the grounds that she had failed properly to serve the Defendants,
and ordered her to show cause why this action should not be
dismissed for failure timely to effect service pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) and Civil Local Rule 4.1.

On Feb. 7, 2022, the Plaintiff filed a Response to the January 24
Order to Show Cause, as well as proofs of service on the Defendants
through their actual registered agent of record, CT Corporation, on
Feb. 7, 2022. The Plaintiff's counsel explained that there had been
a "mistake" regarding service: He had initially sent his process
server the wrong agent for service of process (CSC - Lawyers
Incorporating Service), and, upon realizing his error, sent his
process server the correct agent (CT Corporation System). Although
the process server acknowledged receipt of the corrected agent for
service of process, service was effected on the wrong agent, and
counsel "failed to realize that the process server had served the
wrong Agents for Service."

The following day, the Court, therefore, discharged the January 24
Order to Show Cause and extended nunc pro tunc the Plaintiff's
service deadline to Feb. 7, 2022 (the February 8 Order).

After the February 8 Order was docketed, however, the Defendants
filed their own Brief in Response to Order for Plaintiff to Show
Cause Why This Action Should Not Be Dismissed for Failure to Timely
Effect Service, arguing that the Plaintiff had failed to
demonstrate good cause to excuse her failure to timely effect
service on the Defendants.

On Feb. 15, 2022, the Court, therefore, vacated its February 8
Order discharging the January 24 Order to Show Cause and ordered
the Plaintiff to file a response to the Defendants' Response to the
Court's Order to Show Cause addressing the Defendants' authorities
and the three factors relevant to establishing good cause (the
"Feb. 15 Order").

The Court is now in receipt of the Plaintiff's Brief in Response to
Defendants' Response to the Court's Order to Show Cause Pursuant to
the Court's Order, filed on Feb. 28, 2022. Having carefully
reviewed the Parties' arguments and the relevant law, the Court
dismisses without prejudice this action for failure timely to
effect service.

Analysis

The Plaintiff contends that good cause exists for her failure
timely to serve the Defendants and, consequently, the Court should
grant her leave to serve the Defendants outside the 90-day service
limit. The Defendants, on the other hand, ask the Court to deny the
Plaintiff's request and dismiss this action with prejudice for
failure to prosecute. Finding the Plaintiff has failed to establish
good cause or excusable neglect for her failure timely to effect
service, the Court dismisses without prejudice this action.

I. Good Cause

As discussed above, to establish good cause, the Plaintiff must
demonstrate at a minimum excusable neglect. The Court, therefore,
examines the following factors: (1) whether the Defendants received
actual notice of this lawsuit; (2) whether the Defendants would
suffer prejudice if the Court were to extend the Plaintiff's
service deadline; and (3) whether dismissal of the complaint would
severely prejudice the Plaintiff.

Turning to the first factor in the good cause determination, the
Plaintiff concedes that the Defendants lacked actual notice of this
lawsuit until Feb. 7, 2022, 563 days after the Plaintiff initiated
this action. The Defendants' lack of actual notice weighs against a
finding of good cause.

If the Court were to grant the Plaintiff her requested extension of
time to effect service, the Defendants claim that they would
"suffer substantial prejudice" in defending against this action.
Specifically, Defendants contend that they have not preserved
evidence related to their website's compliance with the ADA because
their website "has undergone multiple iterations since the
Complaint was filed" on July 24, 2020. The Plaintiff counters that
the prejudice the Defendants claim they will suffer, is slight, if
any.

The Plaintiff argues that any purported loss of evidence will not
prejudice the Defendants because (1) the Plaintiff accessed past
iterations of the Defendants' website using the Wayback Machine and
determined that a majority of the website remains almost wholly
unchanged, and (2) the Defendants are still aware of the policies
and procedures they had in place in order to ensure that the
website was ADA compliant or not.

Judge Robinson holds that the Plaintiff's position is problematic
for several reasons. Judge Robinson finds that that Plaintiff's use
of the Wayback Machine does little to assuage the Defendants'
concerns regarding loss of evidence. The Plaintiff's proffer of the
Wayback Machine, therefore, fails to counter the potential
prejudice--specifically, the loss of evidence--the Defendants face
given the Plaintiff's lengthy delay in service.

Judge Robinson also finds that the Plaintiff misconstrues the
Defendants' claim that the website has undergone multiple
iterations due to the restaurant's "changing seasonal offerings."
Judge Robinson adds that the Plaintiff's conclusory argument that
loss of evidence does not prejudice the Defendants because they are
still aware of the policies and procedures they had in place in
order to ensure that the website was ADA compliant or not, ignores
the potential prejudice the Defendants face in the form of
unavailable witnesses, faded memory, or loss of physical evidence.
Because the Plaintiff fails to show that the Defendants will
"suffer no prejudice" from the delay in service, this factor also
weighs against a finding of good cause.

Finally, the Plaintiff contends that she will be greatly prejudiced
because the Defendants seek for her claims to be dismissed with
prejudice under Rule 41(b). Here, the Plaintiff does not argue--and
therefore fails to establish--that she would be prejudiced by
dismissal of this action without prejudice, Judge Robinson notes.
The Court, therefore, finds that the third factor weighs against a
finding of good cause.

Because the Plaintiff fails to establish that the Defendants had
actual notice of this action within the 90-day period for service,
that the Defendants would not suffer prejudice due to the
Plaintiff's lengthy service delay, and that dismissal would
severely prejudice the Plaintiff, the Court concludes that the
Plaintiff has not succeeded in showing good cause to extend her
service deadline. Nonetheless, the Court retains discretion to
extend the Plaintiff's service deadline if she can demonstrate
"excusable neglect." The Court, therefore, proceeds to the
excusable neglect inquiry.

II. Excusable Neglect

The excusable neglect determination requires an equitable analysis
that takes account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the
party's omission or negligence. The Court, therefore, considers
four factors: (1) prejudice to the opposing party; (2) length of
delay and its potential impact on proceedings; (3) reason for the
delay, including whether it was within the plaintiff's reasonable
control; and (4) whether the Plaintiff acted in good faith.

As explained in the Court's good cause analysis, the Plaintiff has
failed to rebut that her 473-day delay in service may cause the
Defendants to suffer prejudice in the form of loss of evidence. The
first factor, therefore, weighs against a finding of excusable
neglect.

Because the delay in service is significant and, given the
Defendants' evidentiary concerns, will likely have an impact on
proceedings, the second factor weighs against a finding of
excusable neglect, Judge Robinson

The Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Coelho, explains that he initially
mistakenly sent the process server the wrong agent for service of
process, and then failed to recognize that the process server had
still served the wrong agents despite acknowledging receipt of the
correct agent, which resulted in the erroneous proofs of service
being filed with this Court.

In arguing that the reason for the service delay here was
reasonable, the Plaintiff cites to Tain v. Hennessey, in which the
district court found that the plaintiff had established good cause
for her failure timely to effect service after she had attempted
service by publication for six successive weeks in a local
periodical. Here, however, Mr. Coelho did not rely on inaccurate
"representations" from his process server, Judge Robinson notes.
Rather, Mr. Coelho had the proofs of service at his disposal, which
plainly revealed that the incorrect agent had been served.

While Mr. Coelho's oversight undoubtedly affects Ms. Cota's claim,
"litigants are bound by the conduct of their attorneys, absent
egregious circumstances," which have not been established here,
Judge Robinson holds. Mr. Coelho's inadvertence and oversight,
therefore, does not favor a finding of excusable neglect.

The Defendants do not argue that the Plaintiff acted in bad faith,
and the Court finds no indication that the Plaintiff's error was
the product of "deviousness or willfulness." This factor,
therefore, weighs in favor of excusable neglect.

Although the Plaintiff acted in good faith, her counsel's
inadvertent error does not qualify as excusable neglect, Judge
Robinson holds. Because the Plaintiff's delay also exceeded the
deadline pursuant to Rule 4(m) by 473 days and the Defendants, as a
result of the delay, are prejudiced moving forward in litigation,
the Court finds no excusable neglect for the Plaintiff's failure
timely to effect service. The Court, therefore, declines to
exercise its discretion to further extend the Plaintiff's service
deadline.

III. Failure to Prosecute

Because the Court does not find good cause or excusable neglect for
the Plaintiff's failure timely to serve the Defendants, it need not
reach the failure to prosecute issue pursuant to Rule 41(b).

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, the Court dismisses without prejudice
this action for failure timely to effect service pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) and Civil Local Rule 4.1.
Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court will close the file.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated June 13, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mr358jmf from Leagle.com.


CENTRACARE HEALTH: Schave Sues for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
-----------------------------------------------------------
ANGI SCHAVE, Plaintiff v. CENTRACARE HEALTH SYSTEM, THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF CENTRACARE HEALTH SYSTEM, and JOHN DOES 1-40,
Defendants, Case No. 0:22-cv-01555 (D. Minn., June 13, 2022) is
brought by the Plaintiff, on behalf of the CentraCare Health System
403(b) Plan, the CentraCare Health System 401(k) Plan, herself, and
all others similarly situated, under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 against the Defendants for breaches of
fiduciary duty.

The Plaintiff alleges that, during the putative Class Period,
Defendants, as "fiduciaries" of the Plan, as that term is defined
under ERISA Section 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. Section 1002(21)(A),
breached the duties they owed to the Plan, to Plaintiff, and to the
other participants of the Plan by, inter alia, (1) failing to
objectively and adequately review the Plan's investment portfolio
with due care to ensure that each investment option was prudent, in
terms of cost; (2) maintaining certain funds in the Plan despite
the availability of identical or similar investment options with
lower costs and/or better performance histories; and (3) failing to
control the Plans' recordkeeping costs.

The Defendants' mismanagement of the Plans, to the detriment of
participants and beneficiaries, constitutes a breach of the
fiduciary duty of prudence, in violation of 29 U.S.C. Section 1104,
asserts the complaint. Their actions were contrary to actions of a
reasonable fiduciary and cost the Plan and its participants
millions of dollars, it adds.

Based on this conduct, Plaintiff assert claims against Defendants
for breach of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence.

Plaintiff Schave participated in the 403(b) Plan and the 401(k)
Plan, investing in the options offered by the Plans, during her
employment.

CentraCare Health is an integrated health care system in Central
Minnesota. The nonprofit includes six hospitals, seven senior care
facilities, 18 clinics, four pharmacies and numerous inpatient and
outpatient specialty care services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shawn J. Wanta, Esq.
          Scott A. Moriarity, Esq.
          Katherine E. Rollins, Esq.
          BAILLON THOME JOZWIAK & WANTA LLP
          100 South Fifth Street, Suite 1200
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 252-3570
          E-mail: sjwanta@baillonthome.com
                  samoriarity@baillonthome.com
                  kerollins@baillonthome.com

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Court Returns Bid to Toss in Johnson Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LORETTA JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiffs v. CHARTER
COMMUNICATIONS, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-06135-HSG
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California reinstates the
Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as
it relates to Charlotte Guss.

On June 2, 2022, the Court granted the Defendants' motion to compel
Plaintiff Johnson's claims to arbitration and stayed the putative
class action pending resolution of arbitration. The Court's order
also denied as moot the Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.

However, the Defendants' motion did not seek to compel arbitration
as to the other named plaintiff in the suit, Guss. Accordingly,
Judge Gilliam clarifies that the Court's June 2, 2022 Order
compelling arbitration applies only to Johnson's claims, and not
Guss'. He further lifts the stay in the case as it applies to Guss'
claims and reinstates the Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction as it relates to Guss. Judge Gilliam rescinds
the Court's order directing the Clerk to administratively close the
case.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 22, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2p9y75ta from Leagle.com.


CM GROUP HOLDINGS: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CM Group Holdings
Inc. The case is styled as Vanessa Jimenez, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. CM Group Holdings Inc.,
Case No. 1:22-cv-05391 (S.D.N.Y., June 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

CM Group Holdings -- https://cmgroup.com/ -- is a provider of
scrapbooking solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


CODDLE INC: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Coddle Inc. The case
is styled as Vanessa Jimenez, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Coddle Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-05390
(S.D.N.Y., June 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Coddle Inc. -- https://coddleme.com/ -- make hand-crafted furniture
that adapts to meet the needs of every individual: tech-enabled
convertible sofas, sleeper sofas, reclining chairs, and more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


CONOCOPHILLIPS CO: Davis Seeks Unpaid OT Wages, Damages Under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN DAVIS, individually and for others similarly situated v.
CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY, Case No. 1:22-cv-00105-DLH-CRH (D.N.D.,
June 22, 2022) seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages and other
damages from CPC under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Mr. Davis brings this lawsuit individually and on behalf of all
current and former Maintenance Consultants (Putative Class Members)
who worked for ConocoPhillips Company (CPC) and were paid a day
rate with no overtime compensation. He and the Putative Class
Members worked for CPC as Maintenance Consultants.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and the Putative Class
Members regularly worked for CPC in excess of 40 hours each week.
But CPC did not pay them overtime of at least one and one-half
their regular rates for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per
workweek. Instead of paying overtime as required by the FLSA, CPC
improperly classified Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members as
independent contractors ineligible for overtime, and paid them a
day rate with no overtime compensation. This practice violates the
overtime requirements of the FLSA, says the suit.

ConocoPhillips is an American multinational corporation engaged in
hydrocarbon exploration and production. It is based in the Energy
Corridor district of Houston, Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew Dunlap, Esq.
          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Alyssa White, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, Texas 77046
          Telephone: (713) 352-1100
          Facsimile: (713) 352-3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  awhite@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

COSMOS CLINICS: Faces Class Action Suits Over Surgical Practices
----------------------------------------------------------------
Adele Ferguson of The Sydney Morning Herald reports that
Australia's biggest cosmetic procedures operator Cosmos Clinics is
facing two separate class action investigations after dozens of
unhappy patients came forward with a range of disturbing stories
after undergoing liposuction and Brazilian Butt Lifts (BBL).

It follows a joint media investigation into the cosmetic surgery
industry by this masthead and 60 Minutes that uncovered a litany of
troubling practices including one patient, Keisha Amoah, who had a
BBL and liposuction in the Melbourne clinic in April 2021 and had
to call an ambulance hours after surgery as she was in excruciating
pain.

Keisha Amoah was drawn in by social media content, but her cosmetic
surgery reality tells a different story.

Hospital records show Amoah received multiple lacerations to her
liver and she was bleeding internally, or as Mark Ashton, Professor
of Surgery and Anatomy at the University of Melbourne said, the
doctor "lipo-sucked" her liver.

The law firms, Maddens Lawyers and Goldman & Co, opened up
registrations in the last few days. Maddens class action principal
Kathryn Emeny said the law firm had received dozens of complaints,
including post-surgical issues such as chronic pain, numbness, loss
of sensation and disfigurement.

"The treatment of patients pre, post and during surgery has also
emerged as a significant issue. Inadequate pain management during
surgery is one of the issues our investigation is focusing on," she
said.

Former patient, Taylor S, who also had a BBL and liposuction
procedure in Cosmos in Melbourne in March 2021, is one of a number
of unhappy patients who have registered with Maddens and said more
than a year after surgery she is in constant pain and unable to sit
comfortably.

Taylor S had a BBL at Cosmos in Melbourne and suffers from pain a
year on.

"This is not a way I wish to live. I thought I could trust the
medical team at Cosmos Clinic but the whole experience has been a
disaster. I'm taking a lot of painkillers and currently trialling a
chronic pain medication under my GP's supervision," she said.

Law firm Goldman & Co said it was using independent cosmetic
medical experts to investigate compensation claims for alleged
victims of malpractice and negligent outcomes against doctors and
surgeons working in Cosmos.

"Even though there are no existing adverse findings against Cosmos
or their staff, it is clear a more detailed investigation into the
history and claims of patients must be undertaken," Goldman
principal Jaswinder Sekhon said in a statement.

The law firm said issues of concern to patients included alleged
misrepresentation of outcomes, social media influencers and
grooming of potential patients, emergency hospitalisation,
infections and breach of privacy.

Separately, a class action launched against celebrity cosmetic
surgeon Daniel Lanzer and associates including Dr Ryan Wells, Dr
Daniel Aronov, Dr Daniel Darbyshire and Dr Ali Fallahi has
attracted more than 430 patient registrations.

Maddens, which is running the class action, said it had been
contacted by numerous patients of Wells after the 60 Minutes
program. "Many patients have undertaken otoplasty (ear pinning)
procedures with Dr Wells," it said. "Patients have reported very
serious issues following these surgeries including ongoing severe
pain, bleeding from the ears, chronic headaches and complications
following infections."

The class action, lodged in the Victorian Supreme Court, alleges
that Lanzer and his associates were negligent in the provision of
cosmetic procedures and failed to ensure procedures were
appropriate and undertaken with due care and skill. Lanzer and his
associates deny any wrongdoing and will defend the case.

Since 60 Minutes aired Bad Look on June 9, along with a series of
articles in this masthead, more than 100 patients have come forward
to share harrowing experiences and photos relating to procedures by
doctors at Cosmos, Lanzer clinics and Wells' clinics in
Queensland.

But it took almost a month to get to air. From the moment the
founder of Cosmos, Dr Joseph Ajaka, realised his BBL and
liposuction business was about to face the media glare part as part
of an investigation into the $1.4 billion cosmetic procedures'
industry, he used a number of levers to stop the story.

For starters, he hired celebrity lawyers who rushed to the Supreme
Court of NSW and at the same time engaged in some eyebrow raising
practices including contacting either directly or via a third
party, patients, media friends a GP and a priest.

One 60 Minutes employee, who had a past association with Ajaka, had
to be relocated to a hotel after receiving a series of calls and
messages from Ajaka and his wife. He also called the employee's GP,
who told the employee Ajaka had wanted the GP to look up the
employee's home address so he could send his wife to talk to her
about a court case and "find out what is in the 60 Minutes story…
[60 Minutes Employee] is the solution". Days later he sent the GP a
photo of the employee's building saying "is this her place?"

When the court case was won in the court of appeal and again in the
Supreme Court, the program was rushed to air that night.

In response to a request for comment, Cosmos said in a statement:
"The claims made ... are malicious lies published without giving us
notice of them so we could meaningfully respond."

It said "we have no information about the advertisements of these
lawyers soliciting clients for their intended class action
investigation. We are certainly not aware of any such multitude of
claims against us." [GN]

DDR MEDIA LLC: Wiretapping Violates Privacy Rights, Williams Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LORETTA WILLIAMS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. DDR MEDIA, LLC; and LEAD
INTELLIGENCE, d/b/a Jornaya, Defendants, Case No. 4:22-cv-03789-DMR
(N.D. Cal., June 27, 2022) seeks to obtain redress for, and to put
an end to, the Defendants' serial wiretapping of the electronic
communications of visitors to DDR Media's websites, including
snappyrent2own.com.

According to the complaint, the wiretaps are embedded in the
computer code on DDR Media's websites and are used by Defendants to
covertly observe and record visitors' keystrokes and clicks in real
time. Such actions violated the California Invasion of Privacy Act
("CIPA"), and invaded the Plaintiff's and class members' privacy
rights, says the suit.

DDR MEDIA, LLC provides website development including design,
hosting, search engine optimization, social media optimization, and
social media marketing. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Rebecca Davis, Esq.
          LOZEAU DRURY LLP
          1939 Harrison St., Suite 150
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 836-4200
          Facsimile: (510) 836-4205
          Email: rebecca@lozeaudrury.com

               -and-

          Patrick H. Peluso, Esq.
          Steven L. Woodrow, Esq.
          WOODROW & PELUSO, LLC
          3900 East Mexico Avenue, Suite 300
          Denver, CO 80210
          Telephone: (720) 213-0675
          Facsimile: (303) 927-0809
          Email: ppeluso@woodrowpeluso.com
                 swoodrow@woodrowpeluso.com

DEERE & CO: Monopolizes Repair Service Market, Cronquist Contends
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DEXTER CRONQUIST, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. DEERE & CO. (d/b/a JOHN DEERE), Case No.
3:22-cv-50223 (N.D. Ill., June 22, 2022) is case about John Deere's
monopolization of the repair service market for John Deere brand
agricultural equipment with onboard central computers known as
engine control units, or "ECUs."

According to the complaint, Deere has deliberately monopolized the
market for repair and maintenance services of its agricultural
equipment with ECUs ("Deere Repair Services") by making crucial
software and repair tools inaccessible to farmers and independent
repair shops. Deere's network of highly-consolidated independent
dealerships (the "Dealerships") is not permitted through their
agreements with Deere to provide farmers or repair shops with
access to the same software and repair tools the Dealerships have.
As a result of shutting out farmers and independent repair shops
from accessing the necessary resources for repairs, Deere and the
Dealerships have cornered the Deere Repair Services Market in the
United States for Deere-branded agricultural equipment controlled
by ECUs and have derived supracompetitive profits from the sale of
repair and maintenance services, says the suit.

This is an antitrust class action pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act brought by the Plaintiff Dexter Cronquist on its
own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons and entities
similarly situated. The Plaintiff seeks to represent those persons
and entities who purchased repair services from Defendant Deere and
Co. and Deere-affiliated independent Dealerships and technicians in
the Deere Repair Services Market for Deere agricultural equipment
from January 12, 2018 to the present.

Despite the use of, and access to, this Software being essential to
the continued functionality of its Tractors, Deere has deliberately
made this necessary Software unavailable to individual owners and
independent repair shops. Instead, Deere makes the full Software
available only to Deere Dealerships and technicians, who are not
permitted by Deere to sell it.

DEERE & CO. is an American corporation that manufactures
agricultural machinery, heavy equipment, forestry machinery, diesel
engines, drivetrains used in heavy equipment, and lawn care
equipment.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David M. Cialkowski, Esq.
          Jason P. Johnston, Esq.
          Ian F. McFarland, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN REED LLP
          1100 IDS Center, 80 S. 8th St.
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 341-0400
          E-mail: david.cialkowski@zimmreed.com
                  jason.johnston@zimmreed.com
                  ian.mcfarland@zimmreed.com

               - and -

          Robert M. Foote, Esq.
          Kathleen C. Chavez, Esq.
          FOOTE, MIELKE, CHAVEZ & O'NEIL, LLC
          10 West State St., Suite 200
          Geneva, IL 60134
          Telephone: (630) 473-9374
          E-mail: rmf@fmcolaw.com
                  kcc@fmcolaw.com

DEL REY FARMS: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Del Rey Farms, LLC.
The case is styled as Vanessa Jimenez, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Del Rey Farms, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-05389-LGS (S.D.N.Y., June 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Del Rey Farms is open 7-days a week and is committed to providing
an unparalleled Cannabis dispensary experience.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


DELAWARE: District Court Dismisses All Trangenders at BWCI v. JTVCC
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Circuit Judge Leonard P. Stark of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Delaware dismisses the lawsuit titled ALL TRANGENDERS
AT BWCI, JTVCC SCI AND GANDER HILL, et al., Plaintiffs v. JTVCC, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 20-814-LPS (D. Del.).

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Mrs. Evonca S. Aliahmed, an inmate at the Sussex
Correctional Institution in Georgetown, Delaware, filed this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. She was housed at the James T.
Vaughn Correctional Center ("JVCC") in Smyrna, Delaware, when she
commenced this action. She appears pro se and has been granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court proceeds to review
and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections
1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(a).

Recently, Aliahmed changed her name to Cea G. Mai, as noted on the
docket on April 5, 2022. The Court refers to her herein by the name
used in the operative pleadings.

II. Background

The Court docket indicates that Aliahmed is a Plaintiff. Aliahmed,
however, is not a named plaintiff. The named Plaintiffs include All
Transgenders at BWCI, JTVCC, SCI, and Gander Hill; All Intersex At
BWCI, JTVCC, SCI, and Gander Hill; and All Other Inmates at BWCI,
JTVCC, SCI, and Gander Hill (together "Plaintiffs").

The Complaint states that Aliahmed falls in the "female category"
as "all females (i.e., legally and medically recognized and not
'identified as') at any male orientated facilities of DDOC and
DDOJ." The Civil Cover Sheet states that the claims are brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for cruel and unusual conditions
of confinement violating all prison-applicable U.S. Constitutional
Amendments. The Civil Cover Sheet also states that this is a class
action, seeking $25 million in damages, and is signed by Mrs.
Aliahmed as attorney of record.

III. Legal Standards

A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the
screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B) and Section
1915A(b) if "the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief." See Ball v.
Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013), et al.

The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as
true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se
plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229
(3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007).

Because the Plaintiffs proceed pro se, Judge Stark opines that
their pleading is liberally construed and the Complaint, "however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," citing Erickson, 551 U.S. at
94.

IV. Discussion

A. Non-Attorney

The Complaint is signed by Aliahmed, who is not an attorney. Even
if Aliahmed considers herself as a named plaintiff, as a
non-attorney she may not act as an attorney for the other
Plaintiffs. Aliahmed may only represent herself in this Court,
Judge Stark holds.

B. Eleventh Amendment

Named State Defendants include James T. Vaughn Correctional Center
("JTVCC"), Baylor Women's Correctional Institution ("BWCI"), Sussex
Correctional Institution ("SCI"), Gander Hill (i.e., Howard R.
Young Correctional Institution ("HRYCI")), and the Delaware
Department of Correction and Department of Justice ("DDOC and
DDOJ").

JTVCC, BWCI, SCI, and HRYCI fall under the umbrella of the Delaware
Department of Correction. Judge Stark notes that the DDOC is a
state agency that is immune from suit. The DDOJ also has Eleventh
Amendment immunity.

The Eleventh Amendment protects states and their agencies and
departments from suit in federal court regardless of the kind of
relief sought.

Accordingly, all State Defendants will be dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and Section 1915A(b)(2) based
upon their immunity from suit, Judge Stark holds.

C. Medical Provider

The last named Defendant is Centurion. The Court takes judicial
notice that Centurion is the current contract medical health care
provider for the DDOC. The Court liberally construes the Complaint
as an attempt to raise claims against Centurion under a theory of
respondeat superior.

The Court has thoroughly reviewed the Complaint and finds in it no
mention of Centurion. A civil rights complaint must state the
conduct, time, place, and persons responsible for the alleged civil
rights violations. Additionally, when bringing a Section 1983
claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of
a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation
acted under color of state law.

Judge Stark finds that the Complaint raises no claims against
Centurion.

As to Centurion, then, the Complaint is legally frivolous.
Centurion will be dismissed as a Defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Sections 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(1).

V. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint. The Court
finds amendment would be futile. An appropriate Order will be
entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated June 13,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/25ubej58 from
Leagle.com.

Mrs. Evonca S. Aliahmed, Sussex Correctional Institution, in
Georgetown, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.


DENTSPLY SIRONA: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of August 1 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard LLP, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, reminds investors of the deadline to file a lead plaintiff
motion in a securities class action lawsuit that has been filed on
behalf of investors who purchased or acquired the common stock of
Dentsply Sirona, Inc. (NASDAQ: XRAY) between June 9, 2021 and May
9, 2022, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit was filed in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
and alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Dentsply produces a wide array of dental supplies, ranging from
anesthetics, plaque and gum disease prevention, tooth polishers,
and artificial teeth. The Company sells approximately two-thirds of
its dental consumable and technology and equipment products through
third-party distributors.

As (former) executives of Dentsply, Defendants Donald M. Casey, Jr.
("Casey") and Jorge Gomez ("Gomez") were eligible for significant
cash- and stock-based incentive compensation. Indeed, up to 89% of
their annual compensation was awarded based on the Company's
ability to meet certain milestones linked to Dentsply's financial
performance.

Given the challenges posed by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic,
Dentsply bifurcated its Annual Incentive plans for executives into
two six-month periods. The 2021 First Half Annual Incentive Plan
and the 2021 Second Half Annual Incentive Plan each provided for
potential incentive payments based on achievement of performance
criteria during the first two and the last two quarters of 2021,
respectively. The funding levels for each plan were wholly
dependent on the Company's financial performance for the applicable
half of 2021.

For the first half of the year, Dentsply met the applicable
financial performance targets, entitling top executives, including
Casey and Gomez, to the maximum compensation under the 2021 First
Half Annual Incentive Plan. However, to ensure that they received
at least some of their awards under the 2021 Second Half Annual
Incentive Plan, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants appear to have
orchestrated a scheme to inflate the Company's revenue and earnings
by manipulating the way in which Dentsply recognized revenue tied
to certain distributor rebate and incentive programs.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements throughout the Class Period. Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that Dentsply touted its "go-to-market strategy"
and "more sophisticated and strategic incentive plans" as drivers
of the Company's success. Dentsply also assured investors that it
complied with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") and
maintained adequate internal controls over financial reporting, yet
the Company announced revenues and earnings that were inflated by
the improper recognition of revenue.

On April 11, 2022, Dentsply announced that Defendant Gomez had
"resigned" as Chief Financial Officer, but assured investors that
his departure was "not the result of any dispute or disagreement
with the Company, the Company's management or the Board of
Directors of the Company on any matter relating to the Company's
operations, policies or practices."

The truth began to emerge on April 19, 2022, when Dentsply suddenly
announced that its Board of Directors had terminated Defendant
Casey, the Company's Chief Executive Officer, effective immediately
and with no succession plan in place. As a result of this
disclosure, Dentsply shares declined by $6.52 per share, or 13%,
from $48.72 per share to $42.20 per share.

Then, on May 10, 2022, Dentsply announced that, following reports
from several internal whistleblowers, the Audit and Finance
Committee of its Board of Directors (the "Audit Committee") had
commenced an investigation regarding certain financial reporting
matters. Specifically, Dentsply disclosed that the Audit Committee
was investigating "the Company's use of incentives to sell products
to distributors in the third and fourth quarters of 2021" and
"whether those incentives were appropriately accounted for" in the
Company's periodic reports with the SEC. The Company also disclosed
that the Audit Committee is investigating allegations that "certain
former and current members of senior management directed the
Company's use of these incentives and other actions to achieve
executive compensation targets in 2021." On this news, the
Company's stock declined over 7% to close at $36.38 per share on
May 10, 2022.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than August 1, 2022. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased XRAY common stock, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc.
Shareholder Class Action Lawsuit or contact Peter Allocco at (212)
951-2030 or pallocco@bernlieb.com.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact:
Peter Allocco
Bernstein Liebhard LLP
https://www.bernlieb.com
(212) 951-2030
pallocco@bernlieb.com [GN]

DENTSPLY SIRONA: Johnson Fistel Woos Investors to Submit Losses
---------------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Johnson Fistel, LLP announces that a
class action lawsuit has commenced on behalf of investors of
DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. ( XRAY). The class action is on behalf of
shareholders who purchased between June 9, 2021 and May 9, 2022,
both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"). Investors are hereby
notified that they have until August 1, 2022, to move the Court to
serve as lead plaintiff in this action.

What actions may I take at this time? If you suffered a substantial
loss, $750,000 or more, and are interested in learning more about
being a lead plaintiff, please contact Jim Baker
(jimb@johnsonfistel.com) by email or phone at 619-814-4471. If
emailing, please include a phone number.

To have your losses evaluated, you can click or copy and paste the
link below in a browser:

https://www.johnsonfistel.com/investigations/why-did-dentsply-stock-drop-recover-your-losses

There is no cost or obligation to you.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose that: (i)
they had improperly recognized revenue tied to certain dealer
incentive or rebate programs to allow management to meet certain
incentive-based compensation targets; and (ii) as a result,
Dentsply's financial statements were not prepared in accordance
with applicable rules, and the Company's internal controls over
financial reporting were deficient throughout the Class Period.

A lead plaintiff will act on behalf of all other class members in
directing the Dentsply class-action lawsuit. The lead plaintiff can
select a law firm of its choice to litigate the class-action
lawsuit. An investor's ability to share any potential future
recovery of the Dentsply class action lawsuit is not dependent upon
serving as lead plaintiff. For more information regarding the lead
plaintiff process please refer to
https://www.johnsonfistel.com/lead-plaintiff-deadlines.

Johnson Fistel, LLP is a nationally recognized shareholder rights
law firm with offices in California, New York and Georgia. The firm
represents individual and institutional investors in shareholder
derivative and securities class action lawsuits. Johnson Fistel
seeks to recover losses incurred due to violations of federal
securities laws. For more information about the firm and its
attorneys, please visit http://www.johnsonfistel.com/

Contact:
Johnson Fistel, LLP
Jim Baker, 619-814-4471
Investor Relations [GN]

DEUTSCHE BANK: Class Action Over Securities Fraud to Proceed
------------------------------------------------------------
Brian Kearney of Ballard Spahr LLP wrote on JD Supra that Judge Jed
Rakoff of the Southern District of New York recently issued an
opinion on a motion to dismiss in a putative class action
securities fraud case against Deutsche Bank ("DB") and several
current and former bank executives. The opinion, while technically
a "split decision," allows the bulk of plaintiffs' claims to
proceed to the class certification phase -- dismissing claims only
with regard to the bank's current and former CFOs.

The case against DB and its current and former CEO now proceeds to
the class certification phase - which, if the Court continues at
its current pace, may culminate sooner rather than later. Aside
from continuing to keep DB in the headlines for all the least
desirable reasons, this case may continue to serve as an ongoing
object lesson in the costs - legal, financial, reputational - of
talking the talk, but potentially failing to walk the walk, with
regards to anti-money laundering ("AML") and "Know Your Customer"
("KYC") compliance.

Background

The suit was originally filed in the District of New Jersey in July
2020, and was transferred to SDNY in March 2022, granting an April
2021 motion to transfer or dismiss. The operative Complaint
contains securities fraud claims under 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b) and
Rule 10b-5 against DB and its current and immediate former CEOs and
CFOs, covering a proposed class period of March 14, 2017 through
May 12, 2020. It also contains Section 20(a) (15 U.S.C. Section
78t) control-person claims against the individual defendant
executives.

The Complaint alleges that DB made materially misleading statements
(referred to in the Opinion and in this post as the "Challenged
Statements") in its annual reports, Form 20-F submissions, and on
its website, regarding its AML/KYC policies and procedures, and
that it responded to reporting highlighting deficiencies in those
practices with public denials which claimed DB's KYC program was in
fact a robust one.

Contrary to the Challenged Statements, the Complaint alleges, DB's
AML/KYC processes were materially ineffective - specifically,
because high-ranking U.S. and global DB executives "routinely
overruled" AML/KYC staff recommendations to avoid business
relationships with high-risk clients and "politically exposed
persons" ("PEPs"). These executive interventions allegedly took
place particularly with regard to prospective clients brought in by
DB's wealth management group, which catered to global "ultra-rich"
individuals and their controlled entities. The Complaint cites
eleven confidential witnesses within DB to support allegations of
specific instances of executive overruling of risk management staff
and opting to ignore clear red flags, including for accounts for
various Russian oligarchs and even Jeffrey Epstein (for whom it is
alleged that no KYC investigation was ever undertaken.)

The Complaint also describes the findings of various internal
audits and reports by U.S. and European regulators, all allegedly
identifying systemic AML/KYC deficiencies. The CEOs are
specifically alleged to have been aware of the audits' findings,
either directly or through reporting chains, and of the regulatory
findings, both through meetings with regulators and by virtue of
their positions.

In their motion to dismiss, defendants made two arguments: first,
that the Complaint did not identify any actionable misstatement or
omission - instead, the Challenged Statements were either a)
puffery, or b) immaterial because DB's AML/KYC shortcomings were
already known to the market, and the Complaint had not adequately
alleged falsity; second, that it did not adequately allege scienter
by any individual defendant. Defendants also pointed to two
previous SDNY cases dismissing securities fraud claims against DB
for alleged problems with internal controls, arguing that they
weighed in favor and that Plaintiffs had filed in DNJ to avoid
their precedential impact. (Judge Rakoff, however, pronounced
neither case dispositive.) The Court's analysis mapped to the
defendants' motion - first addressing whether the Challenged
Statements contained actionable misrepresentations or omissions,
and then whether scienter had been adequately alleged.
The Challenged Statements Were Material Misrepresentations or
Omissions

The Court found each of defendants' arguments with regard to
whether the Challenged Statements were material misrepresentations
to be wanting. It determined that the statements touting the bank's
AML/KYC processes were not puffery - not only were they detailed
rather than general, but they included descriptions of processes
which the Complaint alleges were either routinely ignored or did
not exist. Nor could the Challenged Statements be considered
aspirational - they purported to describe ongoing processes already
in place.

The Court found the argument against materiality similarly
unavailing. It noted that a persistent failure to apply a viable
AML/KYC regime to ultra-rich and PEP clients was material because
that demographic group was highly likely to be a source of AML/KYC
compliance issues. And the argument that DB's compliance
shortcomings had already been disclosed and "priced in" to its
value in the marketplace (referred to in the Opinion as the "truth
on the market" defense) was highlighted as generally inappropriate
as a basis for a dismissal on the pleadings, as it is an "intensely
fact-specific" defense. The Court also noted, though, that the
facts may well fail to bear that theory out, saying that DB's
"repeated insistence . . . that it had implemented specific AML &
KYC process improvements" in the Challenged Statements could not be
cancelled out by other general admissions of weaknesses and a need
for improvement.

Finally, the Court addressed whether the Complaint adequately
alleged falsity, as defendants argued that it failed to allege that
DB did not review or attempt to improve its AML/KYC processes.
Although acknowledging that this argument "is not without force,"
the Court ultimately concluded that DB's Challenged Statements
about implementation of more comprehensive KYC and "off-boarding"
higher-risk clients could be misleading if such efforts were
"systematically undermined" by executives seeking to on-board and
retain ultra-rich and PEP clients whose accounts raised clear red
flags. Even vague disclaimers that the bank had in the past and
might in the future fail to implement such policies could not, the
Court opined, cure the misinformation conveyed by descriptions of
policies and procedures that DB would routinely fail to apply to
its highest-risk clients.
Plaintiffs Adequately Alleged Scienter - But Only for the CEOs

In order to establish its allegations of scienter on the part of
the individual defendants, the Complaint relied on circumstantial
evidence - specifically, that the CEOs and CFOs were in possession
of information suggesting that the Challenged Statements were not
accurate. The Court found these allegations sufficient with regard
to the CEOs, but not the CFOs, and therefore dismissed the claims
against the two CFO defendants only.

Specifically, the Complaint identified reports of government
investigations and settlements with regulators, both of which
provided red flags; such reports and settlements, the Court noted,
are "widely recognized to be evidence of scienter." The CEOs were
alleged to have been aware of this information by virtue of both
their executive position at the apex of the DB hierarchy, and their
role as members of DB's managing board. The Court found these
allegations sufficiently plausible for the pleadings stage.

The Court also found other elements included in the Complaint
supported an inference of scienter on the part of the CEOs,
including a) the public denial of a Reuters report on a July 2018
internal audit indicating AML/KYC problems, b) allegations of
specific knowledge attributed to confidential witnesses, and c)
allegations of personal involvement by the CEOs in overruling KYC
policies in order to on-board high-risk clients.

However, the Court was unable to discern within the Complaint
specific allegations of connections between the CFO defendants and
DB's AML/KYC deficiencies. Nor could it find allegations of the
means, other than their seats on the management board, by which
those CFO defendants would have been made aware of such
deficiencies. The Court held that ascribing scienter to board seats
along was insufficient to support a claim against those
defendants.

The Court's analysis of the Section 20(a) control person claims
largely piggy-backed on its analysis of the larger Rule 10b-5
claims. A Section 20(a) claim has three prongs: it has to allege 1)
that a controlled person/entity committed the primary violation, 2)
that the defendant controlled that primary violator, and 3) that
the defendant was a culpable participant in the controlled
person/entity's fraud. In this instance, the Complaint satisfied
the first prong by stating a claim against DB (the controlled
entity). It also satisfied the second prong, as the Court noted
that there could be "no meaningful dispute" that a CEO or a CFO of
a bank is a "control person." But, for the same reasons covered in
the scienter analysis, the Court determined that there were no
allegations adequately ascribing culpability in the alleged
securities fraud to the CFO defendants - and thus, the claims
against them were likewise dismissed.

The Court's unwillingness to sustain the claims against the CFOs
may in part be, paradoxically, a side effect of the arguable
strength of plaintiffs' allegations against the CEO defendants.
Given the number of confidential witnesses who provided specificity
to the allegations against the CEOs and DB generally, the Court may
well have considered the Complaint's failure to tie the CFOs to
institutional bad behavior beyond highlighting their position on
the bank's organizational chart to be telling. [GN]

DIGITAL TURBINE: Levi & Korsinsky Notes of Pending Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP notifies investors in Digital Turbine, Inc.
of a class action securities lawsuit.

The lawsuit on behalf of Digital Turbine investors has been
commenced in the the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas. Affected investors purchased or otherwise
acquired certain Digital Turbine, Inc. securities between August 9,
2021 and May 17, 2022. Follow the link below to get more
information and be contacted by a member of the team:

https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/digital-turbine-inc-loss-submission-form?prid=29101&wire=5

or contact Joseph E. Levi, Esq. either via email at
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com or by telephone at (212) 363-7500. There is
no cost or obligation to you.

CASE DETAILS: The filed complaint alleges that defendants made
false statements and/or concealed that: (1) the Company's recent
acquisitions, AdColony and Fyber, act as agents in certain of their
respective product lines; (2) as a result, revenues for those
product lines must be reported net of license fees and revenue
share, rather than on a gross basis; (3) the Company's internal
control over financial reporting as to revenue recognition was
deficient; and (4) as a result of the foregoing, the Company's net
revenues was overstated throughout fiscal 2022; and (5) as a result
of the foregoing, defendants' positive statements about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

WHAT THIS MEANS TO SHAREHOLDERS: If you suffered a loss in Digital
Turbine during the relevant timeframe, you have until August 5,
2022 to request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your
ability to share in any recovery doesn't require that you serve as
a lead plaintiff.

NO COST TO YOU: If you are a class member, you may be entitled to
compensation without payment of any out-of-pocket costs or fees.
Discuss your rights with our legal team without cost or
obligation.

PROTECT YOUR FINANCIAL INTERESTS: Complete this brief submission
form
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/digital-turbine-inc-loss-submission-form?prid=29101&wire=5
or call 212-363-7500 to discuss the case.

WHY LEVI & KORSINSKY: Over the past 20 years, the team at Levi &
Korsinsky has secured hundreds of millions of dollars for aggrieved
shareholders and built a track record of winning high-stakes cases.
Our firm has extensive expertise representing investors in complex
securities litigation and a team of over 70 employees to serve our
clients. For seven years in a row, Levi & Korsinsky has ranked in
ISS Securities Class Action Services' Top 50 Report as one of the
top securities litigation firms in the United States.

Contact:
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
Ed Korsinsky, Esq.
55 Broadway, 10th Floor
New York, NY 10006
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
Tel: (212) 363-7500
Fax: (212) 363-7171
www.zlk.com [GN]

DRVITA INC: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against DrVita, Inc. The case
is styled as Vanessa Jimenez, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. DrVita, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-05377
(S.D.N.Y., June 25, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

DrVita -- https://natureslab.com/ -- manufactures vitamins,
supplements and herbal products with state-of-art-facility to
support continuous health and wellness.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


DUNLOP MANUFACTURING: Mejia Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dunlop Manufacturing,
Inc. The case is styled as Richard Mejia, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Dunlop Manufacturing,
Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-05349 (S.D.N.Y., June 24, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Dunlop Manufacturing, Inc. -- https://www.jimdunlop.com/ -- is a
manufacturer of musical accessories, especially effects units,
based in Benicia, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


EDUCATION PRINCIPLE: Court Has No Jurisdiction Over JobsFlag LLC
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RYAN LACON, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. EDUCATION PRINCIPLE FOUNDATION, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-03957-JDW (E.D. Pa.), Judge
Joshua D. Wolson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania issues an Order holding that the Court
does not have personal jurisdiction over JobsFlag LLC.

I. Introduction

There's a difference between something that is possible and
something that is probable. In The Pursuit Of Happyness (Columbia
Pictures 2006), "'probably' means there's a good chance something
will happen, possibly' means it might, it might not." That
distinction matters in the world of personal jurisdiction, where a
court has to decide what conduct purposefully targets a
jurisdiction. In the context of telemarketing calls, conduct that
makes a phone call into a jurisdiction possible often will not be
enough, but conduct that makes a call probable likely will.

In the case, JobsFlag sold lists of potential leads, and those
sales made it possible that someone would call the individuals on
those lists. But it did not do anything to make it probable that
any particular call would happen. So even though JobsFlag sold a
list that included Ryan Lacon's name and phone number, and Mr.
Lacon received a call, JobsFlag did not target its activity at
Pennsylvania. The Court therefore does not have personal
jurisdiction over JobsFlag.

II. Background

In the first seven months of 2020, Mr. Lacon received a number of
auto-dialed calls. At the end of July 2020, he feigned interest
during one of the calls to figure out who kept calling him. Someone
transferred Mr. Lacon to Dennis from "College Support," and Dennis
then transferred Mr. Lacon to South University, Savannah LLC's
"student support line." In making this and similar calls, Mr. Lacon
alleges that South University and entities it hired violated the
TCPA. He alleges South University worked with Double Positive
Marketing Group, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Maryland; Telesolutions d/b/a Graspy Media, a Canadian
company with its principal place of in Winnipeg, MB, Canada; Yodel
Technologies, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company with its
principal place of business in Utah; and JobsFlag, a Nevada limited
liability company with its principal place of business in Utah.

The Defendants' roles in the recruitment process are as follows:
South University partners with Double Positive Marketing Group for
"marketing services." Double Positive (on behalf of South
University) contracts with Telesolutions d/b/a Graspy Media to
"obtain leads and run telemarketing campaigns." Graspy, in turn,
subcontracts with Yodel. Yodel places calls, runs the telemarketing
campaign, and delivers "live leads" to Graspy. Both Yodel and
Graspy contract with JobsFlag to purchase "lead packets," which
contain consumer telephone numbers used to make the calls.

To call consumers, Yodel loads consumer phone numbers that it
received from JobsFlag into dialer technology. If the dialing
technology detects that a consumer answered the call, it transfers
the call to an agent, who plays a pre-recorded message. If a
consumer responds to prompts on the pre-recorded message, Yodel
transfers the call to Graspy's call center. Once transferred, an
individual at Graspy speaks to the consumer. Graspy may then
transfer the call to South University's "student support line"
where a sales agent recruits the consumer.

The Second Amended Complaint does not specify how JobsFlag creates
its lead packets. At least some leads come from its website, where
consumers can search for opportunities and provide their names,
physical addresses, email addresses, and phone numbers. But Mr.
Lacon says he never entered his information on the website, so some
of its leads may come from other sources. In its contract with
Yodel and Graspy, JobsFlag gets paid for lead packets regardless of
whether anyone contacts the leads. JobsFlag's employees are located
in Utah and Oregon. It has no employees, operations, real estate,
or assets in Pennsylvania.

Mr. Lacon filed the case on Sept. 3, 2021. On April 12, 2022, he
filed his Second Amended Class Action Complaint against South
University, Double Positive, Graspy, Yodel, and JobsFlag. On April
26, 2022, JobsFlag filed a motion to dismiss arguing, in part, that
the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over it. JobsFlag
also argued that the Court should stay the action and compel
arbitration or dismiss the claims for failure to state a claim. Mr.
Lacon opposed the Motion and argued, in part, that because JobsFlag
"compiled and sold Plaintiff's personal information to other
Defendants to make robocalls to his Pennsylvania phone number in
this judicial District," it is subject to the Court's jurisdiction.
The Motion is ripe for consideration.

II. Analysis

In determining whether it has personal jurisdiction over an
out-of-state defendant, a court must determine whether (a) the
forum state's long arm statute authorizes the exercise of personal
jurisdiction and (b) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the
Constitution. Because Pennsylvania's long-arm statute authorizes
the exercise of jurisdiction to the extent the Constitution
permits, the inquiry collapses to a Constitutional analysis.

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant requires that the
defendant have "minimum contacts" with the forum state such that
exercising jurisdiction would "not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice." Personal jurisdiction can arise
under two distinct theories: General jurisdiction and specific
jurisdiction. Mr. Lacon does not contend that the Court has general
jurisdiction over JobsFlag, Judge Wolson limits his analysis to
specific jurisdiction.

For specific jurisdiction, the Third Circuit uses a three-part test
to determine "minimum contacts": (1) a nonresident defendant must
"purposefully direct" its activities at a resident of the forum;
(2) the injury arises from, or relates to, those activities; and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise comports with fair play
and substantial justice, citing D'Jamoos ex rel. Estate of
Weinegroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 102 (3d Cir.
2009). The Parties dispute whether JobsFlag purposefully directed
its activities to Pennsylvania, so that is where Judge Wolson
focuses his analysis. The allegations in Mr. Lacon's Second Amended
Complaint do not show that JobsFlag purposefully directed its
activities to Pennsylvania.

Judge Wolson finds that JobsFlag's role in the telemarking scheme
was to compile lead packets that it sold to Graspy and Yodel.
JobsFlag had no control over what Graspy and Yodel did with those
lead packets. It knew, of course, that they might call some or all
of the individuals listed. But it was also possible that they would
mail or email, rather than call. Or they might have compared the
list to other marketing materials to winnow the universe of people
they called. JobsFlag had no control over what Graspy and Yodel did
with those contacts, and it did not monitor what they did. Nor was
its compensation tied to the calls in any way. Once it sent the
lead packets, its role ended. Because JobsFlag did not place calls
to Pennsylvania, supervise or direct the companies that made those
calls, or even monitor whether those companies made calls at all,
the cases on which Mr. Lacon relies, in which a company directed a
third party to make a call, do not apply.

Nothing about JobsFlag's role demonstrates any particular focus on
or targeting of Pennsylvania, Judge Wolson holds. It gathered
information for contacts nationally, not just from the Pennsylvania
market. Mr. Lacon argues that because the lead packets included
phone numbers with Pennsylvania area codes, JobsFlag knew that
Graspy or Yodel would make calls to Pennsylvania. But in an era of
mobile phones, area codes do not always tie geographically to the
user's location. According to Judge Wolson, those Pennsylvania area
codes could have users in New Jersey, California, or Alabama. And,
it bears repeating that JobsFlag did not know that Graspy or Yodel
would call any particular individual in the lead packets. Just as
websites that collect information nationally do not target a
particular jurisdiction where they are active, the provision of a
national list of leads does not target every jurisdiction included
in the lead packet. While JobsFlag might have made it possible that
Graspy or Yodel would call someone in Pennsylvania, it did not make
it probable or otherwise engage in conduct that targeted
Pennsylvania.

III. Conclusion

Judge Wolson concludes that JobsFlag's attenuated, indirect
contacts with Pennsylvania, taken together, do not rise to the
level of activity targeted at Pennsylvania. He, therefore, does not
have personal jurisdiction over JobsFlag. Lacking jurisdiction, he
cannot rule on JobsFlag's motion to compel arbitration or to
dismiss the Complaint. An appropriate Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 22, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/8r7p9y38 from Leagle.com.


ELECTROLUX AB: Faces Class Suit Over Refrigerators' Flimsy Shelves
------------------------------------------------------------------
Corrado Rizzi of ClassAction.org reports that a new proposed class
action alleges certain Electrolux and Frigidaire Gallery
side-by-side refrigerators are equipped with flimsy drawers and
shelves that repeatedly crack, break and fall apart.

The 40-page case out of New York argues that the defect plaguing
the shelves and drawers prevents the Electrolux and Frigidaire
refrigerators from performing their essential function of storing
food at an appropriate temperature.

Be sure to scroll down to see which Electrolux and Frigidaire model
numbers are mentioned in the lawsuit.

Per the suit, the problem is bad enough to require numerous service
calls, repairs and replacement parts, which, according to the
lawsuit, "only break again shortly thereafter." The repairs
recommended by Electrolux do nothing to address the underlying
defect, the lawsuit asserts.

Moreover, the repeated cracking and breakage of the flimsy
Electrolux and Frigidaire shelves and drawers can damage food,
causing otherwise fresh, unblemished produce to go to waste, the
complaint says.

"Because of the Defect, the Refrigerators are deficient; do not
meet advertised standards and fail of their essential purpose," the
case bluntly alleges.

According to the lawsuit, defendant Electrolux Home Products "knew,
or was reckless in not knowing" that the fridges had shelves and
drawers that would fail prematurely. The manufacturer nevertheless
concealed this information from regular consumers and "everyone in
the chain of distribution," the suit says.

Electrolux, the complaint says, has failed to remove the defective
Gallery fridges from the marketplace or take "adequate remedial
action" to address the shelving and drawer problem. As a result,
the plaintiff and other consumers have incurred expenses and
inconvenience amid attempts to fix the problem on their own.
The plaintiff's alleged experience

The plaintiff, a Seaford, New York resident, bought a new
Frigidaire Gallery side-by-side refrigerator in late November 2019
for around $1,000, the case states. Within a year of purchase, the
three shelves with drawers underneath them began to break, the suit
claims.

The plaintiff says that since he bought his fridge, all three of
the bottom shelves, made from "brittle plastic and glass," have
broken. Per the case, the shelves should be able to support the
fridge's plastic drawers but cannot.

The complaint says that although the plaintiff could have bought
replacement frames for the shelves for $60 each, it was clear that
the shelves and frames would merely break again. The man even tried
to superglue the frames, but this remedy lasted for only a few
weeks, the filing says.

"Plaintiff tried resting the drawer on top of the glass shelve
[sic] below it but that caused the frames to break more and the
glass would collapse," the lawsuit elaborates. "In exasperation,
Plaintiff has now added wood to the frames to make them functional
but the inside of the Refrigerator is quite unsightly."

The filing relays that the plaintiff and other
Electrolux/Frigidaire fridge buyers reasonably expected that their
appliances would function properly for at least 10 years and have
not received what they paid for.

Which Electrolux and Frigidaire model numbers are mentioned in the
lawsuit?

According to the complaint, Electrolux and Frigidaire Gallery
side-by-side fridges with the following model numbers are equipped
with shoddy shelving and drawers:

    DGHK2355TF;
    FGHC2355PF;
    FGHC2331PF;
    LGHK2336TF;
    LGHK2336TD;
    FGSC2335TD;
    FGSC2335TF;
    FGSS2335TF;
    GRSS2652AF;
    GRSS2352AF;
    GRSC2352AD; and
    GRSC2352AF.

Who's covered by the lawsuit?

The case looks to cover all consumers and entities in the United
States who own, or have owned, an Electrolux refrigerator with any
of the model numbers listed on this page and/or any other model of
Electrolux fridge containing a defect that causes the product's
shelves, drawers or associated parts to break prematurely and
continuously.

I own one of these Electrolux/Frigidaire fridges. What should I
do?

When a new class action case is initially filed, there's usually
nothing a consumer needs to do right away to join or make sure
they're included in the lawsuit. Really, it's only if and when a
suit settles (not a guarantee!) that a consumer might need to act,
typically by filling out and submitting a claim form online or by
mail.

If this case were to settle and you're one of the people "covered,"
you might receive a notice by mail and/or email. The notice will
most likely contain information on how, where and by when to file a
claim; your legal rights; any proof you might need to submit with
your claim; and more details for "class members."

For now, however, Electrolux and Frigidaire refrigerator owners
need only sit tight. Most proposed class action cases take some
time to work through the legal process toward a settlement,
dismissal or arbitration.

If you own one of the Electrolux or Frigidaire fridges listed on
this page, or just want to stay in the loop on class action lawsuit
and settlement news, sign up for ClassAction.org's free weekly
newsletter. [GN]

ELECTROLUX HOME: Faces Stern Suit Over Defective Refrigerators
--------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID STERN, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ELECTROLUX HOME PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 1:22-cv-03679 (E.D.N.Y., June 22, 2022) is brought by the
Plaintiff against the Defendant for actual damages, equitable
relief, including restitution, injunctive relief, and disgorgement
of profits, and all other relief and for violations of the New York
General Business Law, arising out of Electrolux's design and/or
manufacture, warranting, advertising and selling of the
refrigerator with defective parts.

According to the complaint, the Defendant's refrigerators contain a
defect that causes its drawers and shelves to repeatedly break and
fall apart within months after purchase. This defect requires
numerous service calls, repairs, and repurchasing of the defective
parts, which only break again shortly thereafter. Because of the
defect, the refrigerators are deficient, do not meet advertised
standards and fail of their essential purpose, says the suit.

As a consequence of Electrolux's false and misleading statements
and active and ongoing concealment of the defect, the Plaintiff and
the Class and Subclass purchased and currently own defective
refrigerators and have incurred damages, the suit adds.

Electrolux Home Products, Inc, is a home appliance manufacturer
with its principal place of business in Charlotte, North
Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph LoPiccolo, Esq.
          John N. Poulos, Esq.
          Anthony Almeida, Esq.
          POULOS LOPICCOLO, PC
          1305 South Roller Rd.
          Ocean, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (732) 757-0165
          E-mail: lopiccolo@pllawfirm.com
                  poulos@pllawfirm.com
                  almeida@pllawfirm.com

               - and -

          Bruce H. Nagel, Esq.
          Randee M. Matloff, Esq.
          NAGEL RICE, LLP
          103 Eisenhower Parkway
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Telephone: (973) 618-0400
          E-mail: bnagel@nagelrice.com
                  rmatloff@nagelrice.com

ELLEVET SCIENCES: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ellevet Sciences LLC.
The case is styled as Vanessa Jimenez, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Ellevet Sciences LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-05386 (S.D.N.Y., June 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

ElleVet -- https://www.ellevetsciences.com/ -- is a science-focused
CBD Company for Dogs and Cats and is the first and only company to
conduct clinical trials with proven results.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


ETTIKA LLC: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ettika, LLC. The case
is styled as Vanessa Jimenez, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Ettika, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-05381
(S.D.N.Y., June 26, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Ettika -- https://www.ettika.com/ -- is an ultimate online
destination for jewelry & accessories from trendy fashion jewelry
to everyday dainty gold pieces.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


EVOLVE BRANDS: Jimenez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Evolve Brands LLC.
The case is styled as Vanessa Jimenez, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Evolve Brands LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-05378 (S.D.N.Y., June 25, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Evolve Brands -- https://evolvesnacking.com/ -- uses dehydration
technology to create nutritionally superior and flavor-forward
snacks.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Y. Kroub, Esq.
          MIZRAHI & KROUB LLP
          200 Vesey Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10281
          Phone: (212) 595-6200
          Email: ekroub@mizrahikroub.com


FARM SHOW: Faces Knoll Suit Over Private Reading Info Disclosure
----------------------------------------------------------------
JESS KNOLL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FARM SHOW PUBLISHING, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 1:22-cv-11379-TLL-PTM (E.D. Mich., June 21, 2022) is brought
against the Defendant for violation of the Michigan's Preservation
of Personal Privacy Act by disclosing detailed information about
Plaintiff's "Farm Show" magazine subscription to data aggregators,
data appenders, data cooperatives, and list brokers, among others,
which in turn disclosed the information to aggressive advertisers,
political organizations, and non-profit companies.

According to the complaint, the Defendant violated the law by
renting, exchanging, or otherwise disclosing the Private Reading
Information of its Michigan-based subscribers during the relevant
pre-July 31, 2016 time period. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly
situated subscribers received a barrage of unwanted junk mail, says
the suit.

While FSP profits handsomely from the unauthorized rental,
exchange, and/or disclosure of its customers' Private Reading
Information and other individualized information, it does so at the
expense of its customers' statutory privacy rights (afforded by the
PPPA) because FSP does not obtain its customers' written consent
prior to disclosing their Private Reading Information, the suit
adds.

Farm Show Publishing, Inc.  is a bi-monthly magazine for farmers
and ranchers around the U.S. and Canada.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          E. Powell Miller, Esq.
          Sharon S. Almonrode, Esq.
          Dennis A. Lienhardt, Esq.
          William Kalas, Esq.
          THE MILLER LAW FIRM, P.C.
          950 W. University Drive, Suite 300
          Rochester, MI 48307
          Telephone: (248) 841-2200
          E-mail: epm@millerlawpc.com
                  ssa@millerlawpc.com
                  dal@millerlawpc.com
                  wk@millerlawpc.com

               - and -

          Joseph I. Marchese, Esq.
          Philip L. Fraietta, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: jmarchese@bursor.com
                  pfraietta@bursor.com

               - and -

          Frank S. Hedin, Esq.
          Arun G. Ravindran, Esq.
          HEDIN HALL LLP
          1395 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1140
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 357-2107
          Facsimile: (305) 200-8801
          E-mail: fhedin@hedinhall.com
                  aravindran@hedinhall.com

FIAT CHRYSLER: Settles COBRA Class Action Settlement for $600K
--------------------------------------------------------------
TopClassActions.com reports that Fiat Chrysler will pay $600,000 to
resolve claims it failed to properly notify its employees of their
rights under COBRA.

The settlement benefits participants and beneficiaries of FCA US
LLC health plans subject to Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act --
or COBRA -- who were sent a COBRA notice but did not elect COBRA
coverage.  According to the settlement agreement, there are nearly
30,000 class members included under this definition.

Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) US LLC, now known as Stellantis
after a merger with Groupe PSA, manufactures cars under several
brands including Fiat and Chrysler. Thousands of workers are
employed by the company across the country.

According to a class action lawsuit against Fiat Chrysler, the
company failed to properly notify its employees of their rights
under federal law.

Specifically, plaintiffs in the case contend FCA failed to give
proper notice of their continuation of health coverage rights under
COBRA. Although FCA did provide a COBRA notice to employees, this
notice allegedly contained inaccurate and misleading statements
that threatened criminal penalties and fines, all while failing to
properly inform employees how they could exercise their COBRA
rights.

As a result of this notice, some employees chose to not opt into
COBRA coverage. If they had been sufficiently notified of their
rights, the plaintiffs argue, these employees may have chosen to
elect COBRA coverage.

Fiat Chrysler hasn't admitted any wrongdoing but agreed to resolve
claims with a $600,000 settlement.

Under the terms of the settlement, class members can collect a cash
payment, which will vary depending on the number of participants
and the net settlement fund after deductions. For example, if each
eligible class member participates in the settlement and the court
approves deductions for attorneys' fees, litigation costs,
settlement administration costs and other expenses, each class
member would collect $10.40. Exact payment amounts may be higher or
lower than this amount depending on actual participation and
deductions.

When class members receive their settlement checks, they have 60
days to cash these funds. Uncashed funds will be used for a cy pres
payment to Legal Services of Eastern Michigan, a non-profit
organization that helps provide legal aid. No settlement funds will
revert to FCA.

The deadline for exclusion and objection is June 27, 2022.

The final approval hearing for the FCA COBRA notice settlement is
scheduled for Aug. 8, 2022.

No claim form is required to receive payments from the settlement;
checks will automatically be sent to class members through the
mail. Class members can update their address on the settlement
website to ensure that they can receive their payment.
Who's Eligible

The settlement benefits participants and beneficiaries of FCA US
LLC health plans subject to Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act —
or COBRA — who were sent a COBRA notice but did not elect COBRA
coverage. According to the settlement agreement, there are nearly
30,000 class members included under this definition.

Potential Award: Varies

Proof of Purchase: No proof of purchase applicable

Exclusion and Objection Deadline: 06/27/2022

Case Name: GABRIEL GREEN and VALERIE HALL-GREEN v. FCA US LLC, Case
No. 20-cv-13079, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Southern Division

Final Hearing: 08/08/2022

Settlement Website: GreenCobraSettlement.com

Claims Administrator:
Green v FCA US LLC
c/o Settlement Administrator
P.O. Box 23369
Jacksonville, FL 32241-3369
800-843-3719

Class Counsel:
Luis A. Cabassa Esq.
Brandon J. Hill Esq.
WENZEL FENTON CABASSA PA

Defense Counsel:
Edward J. Meehan Esq.
Mark C. Nielsen Esq.
Paul J. Rinefierd Esq.
GROOM LAW GROUP CHARTERED [GN]

FLAGSTAR BANK: Fails to Secure Consumer Info, Angus Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
PHILIP ANGUS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB, a Michigan-based federally
chartered stock savings bank, Case No. 4:22-cv-11385-SDK-KGA (E.D.
Mich., June 22, 2022) alleges that the Defendant failed to properly
secure and safeguard personally identifiable information that the
Defendant stored on its network systems, including, without
limitation, names, addresses, Social Security numbers, financial
information (e.g. account numbers, credit or debit card numbers),
and "other" types of information.

According to its website, Defendant "has assets of $31.0 billion,
is the sixth largest bank mortgage originator nationally, and the
second largest savings bank in the country." The Defendant
"operate[s] 150 branches in Michigan, Indiana, California,
Wisconsin, and Ohio and provide[s] a full complement of products
and services for consumers and businesses." Its "mortgage division
operates nationally through 103 retail locations and a wholesale
network of approximately 2,350 third-party mortgage originators."

According to the complaint, the Defendant's customers entrust
Defendant with an extensive amount of their PII. Defendant retains
this information on computer hardware -- even after the customer
relationship ends. The Defendant asserts that it understands the
importance of protecting such information.

The Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of all persons whose
personally identifiable information  was compromised as a result of
Defendant's failure to: (i) adequately protect the PII of Plaintiff
and Class Members; (ii) warn Plaintiff and Class Members of its
inadequate information security practices; (iii) allege failing to
comply with industry standards to protect information systems that
contain PII and, as a result, Defendant's systems containing
customer PII experienced unauthorized access, disclosure, and
exfiltration. Defendant's conduct amounts to negligence and
violates federal and state statutes, says the suit.

The Plaintiff seek, among other things, orders requiring the
Defendant to fully and accurately disclose the nature of the
information that has been compromised and to fully and accurately
disclose the circumstances under which that information was
compromised, to adopt reasonably sufficient security practices and
safeguards to prevent future unauthorized access, disclosure, and
exfiltration, to destroy information no longer necessary to retain
for purposes for which the information was first obtained from
Class Members.

Flagstar Bank, FSB is a Michigan-based federally chartered stock
savings bank, headquartered at 5151 Corporate Drive, Troy,
Michigan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael N. Hanna,Esq.
          John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
          Ryan D. Maxey, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          2000 Town Center, Suite 1900
          Southfield, MI 48075
          Telephone: (313) 251-1399
          E-mail: mhanna@forthepeople.com
                  jyanchunis@ForThePeople.com
                  rmaxey@ForThePeople.com

FOGO DE CHAO: Garcia-Alvarez's Bid for FLSA Collective Partly OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman
Division, granted in part the Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional
Certification of an FLSA Collective Action filed in the lawsuit
entitled CHRISTIAN GARCIA-ALVAREZ, on behalf of himself and those
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. FOGO DE CHAO CHURRASCARIA
(PITTSBURGH) LLC, a foreign limited liability company, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 4:21-CV-00124 (E.D. Tex.).

Background

The case arises from the employment relationship between Plaintiff
Christian Garcia-Alvarez and Defendants Fogo De Chao Churrascaria
(collectively "FOGO"), the owners and operators of approximately 40
"Fogo De Chao" steakhouse restaurants throughout the country. On
Sept. 8, 2020, the Plaintiff filed this action against FOGO,
asserting claims for failure to pay minimum wages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 206 and the
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act ("PMWA"), 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. Section
333.104. On June 16, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a First Amended
Complaint ("FAC"), adding allegations that FOGO violated the
Florida Constitution, Article X, Sec. 24.

The Plaintiff alleges that he worked as a churrasqueiro at several
FOGO locations from 2015 to 2020, whereby he was denied minimum
wage under the FLSA. Three additional plaintiffs ("Opt-ins") have
also joined the lawsuit, though the Plaintiff's motion for
conditional certification only contains evidence from two of them,
Jose Mendez-Ortiz ("Mendez-Ortiz") and Axel Torres-Nieves
("Torres-Nieves").

Presently, the Plaintiff requests that the Court authorize notice
to "all carvers (churrasqueiros) who worked for Defendants
nationwide and were paid pursuant to the 'tip credit' (less than
minimum wage plus tips) during the last three (3) years preceding
this lawsuit." Alternatively, if the Court finds nationwide notice
inappropriate, the Plaintiff proposes that notice be sent to
churrasqueiros, who have worked at any of the locations the
Plaintiff and the Opt-ins worked or trained. According to the
Plaintiff, these locations would include Atlanta, Georgia;
Dunwoody, Georgia; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Jacksonville, Florida;
Irvine, California; and Detroit, Michigan.

According to the Plaintiff, though each FOGO restaurant is
structured as its own entity, all of the FOGO restaurants follow
the same centralized policies. According to FOGO's policies,
Servers, Bartenders, Bussers, Customer Service Representatives
("CSRs"), and Churrasqueiros participate in the tip pool.

Further, the Plaintiff alleges that churrasqueiros have the same
job duties at each of the FOGO restaurants--butchering, skewering,
seasoning, cooking, and serving meat tableside to customers. He
alleges that churrasqueiros' job duties also include significant
pre-shift work (i.e., before customers arrive), which requires the
churrasqueiros to arrive at work one to three hours before a shift
begins to butcher meat, clean, and place charcoal. Importantly,
according to the Plaintiff, when performing this pre-shift work,
churrasqueiros clock in using the churrasqueiro job code--meaning
that when churrasqueiros perform this work they do so at the tipped
rate but without making any tips.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff alleges that FOGO employs policies that
deprive Plaintiff and the proposed collective of the minimum wage
in two ways: (1) FOGO requires the churrasqueiros to participate in
invalid tip pools that include non-tipped employees such as
Customer Service Representatives ("CSRs") and employees who do not
customarily and regularly receive tips; and (2) FOGO requires
churrasqueiros to perform non-tipped work, more than 20% rate.

On Dec. 8, 2021, the Plaintiff filed the present motion. He (i)
seeks authorization to send notice to the potential collective
action members; (ii) requests discovery of the names, addresses,
email addresses, telephone numbers, and social security numbers of
the putative class to carry out notice; and (iii) requests the
Court to authorize various details relating to the proper method
and content of the notice.

On Jan. 12, 2022, FOGO filed its response. On Jan. 26, 2022, the
Plaintiff filed his reply. To date, the parties have provided the
Court with some discovery, including depositions of the Plaintiff,
Mendez-Ortiz, Torres-Nieves, and Richard Lenderman, FOGO's
corporate representative. Along with its response, FOGO also
submitted declarations from several General Managers of FOGO's
restaurants across the country.

Analysis

The Plaintiff seeks authorization to send nationwide notice to "all
carvers (churrasqueiros) who worked for Defendants nationwide and
were paid pursuant to the 'tip credit' (less than minimum wage plus
tips) during the last three (3) years preceding this lawsuit." In
response, FOGO argues that "the definition of the putative
plaintiffs is meaningless, conflates the theories of alleged
liability, and includes those who would be, might not be, and could
not be, part of the collective action." Additionally, FOGO contends
that the Plaintiff fails to establish his substantial similarity to
those he seeks to represent.

The Plaintiff alleges FOGO enforces policies that deprive him and
the potential collective action members of the minimum wage in two
ways. First, the Plaintiff alleges that FOGO compels them to
perform non-tipped work at the tipped minimum wage rate more than
twenty percent of the time, thereby, causing him and the potential
collective action members to be paid less than the minimum wage.
Second, the Plaintiff alleges that FOGO requires him and the
potential collective action members to participate in a tip pool
that includes non-tipped employees, such as kitchen staff and
CSRs.

I. The Extent To Which The Merits of the Case Should Be Considered
at This Stage

The parties disagree on the extent to which the Court should
consider the "merits" of Plaintiff's claims when determining
whether to grant notice. The Plaintiff argues that FOGO's arguments
regarding the factual nature of his claims and the Defendant's
defenses thereto are irrelevant at this stage of the notification
process. Conversely, FOGO contends that although the Plaintiff
urges the Court to ignore threshold "merits" issues, Swales v. KLLM
Transport Services., L.L.C., 985 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2021) invites
the Court specifically to review those dispositive issues that bar
an FLSA claim.

In addition to these explicit arguments about whether the Court
should consider the "merits" of the Plaintiff's claims at this
stage, the parties' briefing also contains more subtle arguments
over the matter. The Court, thus, turns to Swales to determine how
extensively it should examine these "merits" issues at this stage.

The Court turns to the next preliminary dispute between the
parties--whether the Plaintiff must show that others are interested
in joining the lawsuit.

II. Number of Opt-In Plaintiffs Required

FOGO argues that "Swales does not extinguish the notion a plaintiff
must show that others are interested in participating in this
action." On the other hand, the Plaintiff argues he has more than
satisfied the applicable burden of persuasion that a colorable
basis exists for determining that others similarly situated to him
exist.

District Judge Amos L. Mazzant notes that though only three
Plaintiffs have opted-in at this point and the Plaintiff has
submitted evidence from only two of them, the Court finds this will
not preclude whether notice should be sent to other potential
collective action members.

Thus, the Court finds that only three individuals have opted-in is
sufficient.

With these preliminary disputes resolved, the Court now turns to
the Plaintiff's allegations that he and the potential plaintiffs
are similarly situated because FOGO requires them to perform
non-tipped work at the tipped rate more than 20% of the time.

III. Performing Non-Tipped Work at the Tipped Rate

As noted, the Plaintiff alleges that he and the potential
collective action members are similarly situated because FOGO
requires them to perform non-tipped work, more than 20 percent of
the time, prior to and during their shifts, at the tipped minimum
wage rate, thereby, depriving them of the minimum wage.

In response, FOGO alleges that the restaurants handle the
meat-related duties at the heart of the Plaintiff's claims very
differently. To support these allegations, FOGO submits
declarations from several of the restaurants' General Managers
attesting to the various pre-shift meat-handling procedures.

Applying the principles from Swales, the Court finds the Plaintiff
has failed to demonstrate that he and the potential collective
action members--whether located nationwide or only from the
restaurants he and the Opt-ins worked at--are "similarly situated"
for this claim.

Certainly, Judge Mazzant notes, there are some common aspects
between the Plaintiff and the Opt-ins' employment situations for
this claim. For example, the churrasqueiros had the same "principal
duties"--butchering, skewering, seasoning, cooking, and serving
meat tableside. However, the similarly situated analysis focuses
upon the features of which make the particular policy or practice
unlawful. And the record evidence that does exist--both the
Plaintiff's and FOGO's--shows that the churrasqueiros are not
similarly situated in that they performed extensive non-tipped work
at the tipped rate.

In sum, Judge Mazzant holds, the Plaintiff has failed to show that
the potential plaintiffs are so similarly situated that the
collective action will not devolve into a cacophony of individual
actions. For this reason, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has
not met his burden of showing that he and the potential collective
action members are similarly situated.

The Court turns to Plaintiff's next claim that churrasqueiros are
similarly situated nationwide based on FOGO's alleged invalid tip
pooling arrangement due to the inclusion of the CSRs.

IV. Invalidity of the Tip Pool Due to Inclusion of the CSRs

Next, the Plaintiff argues that he and the putative class are
"similarly situated" because they were all employed as
churrasqueiros, and they are all owed compensation as a result of
FOGO's use of an invalid tip pool. The Plaintiff explains that CSRs
have the same job duties at each FOGO restaurant--walking through
the restaurant speaking to customers and ensuring they are having a
positive experience; assisting in serving desserts and pouring
wine; taking inventory of wine and verifying dining room standards
are met; and resolving customer complaints.

Judge Mazzant notes that the parties' arguments over the
Plaintiff's tip-pooling claim mostly go toward the merits of his
claim and whether it is ultimately appropriate to include CSRs in
the tip pool. However, though Swales directs district courts to
consider the merits of an action at the outset, the purpose is to
determine whether the merits question "can be answered
collectively."

Judge Mazzant finds that the Plaintiff has sufficiently shown, on
the current record, that the Court can determine the central merits
question on a collective basis. Judge Mazzant also finds that
nationwide notice is warranted.

Because some of FOGO's employees are subject to the Arbitration
Agreement, these individuals should be excluded from receiving
notice, Judge Mazzant holds. Along the same lines, the Plaintiff is
not entitled to the contact information of the employees bound by
the Arbitration Agreement.

In sum, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has met his burden of
establishing that he and the other churrasqueiros are similarly
situated in that they are all subject to FOGO's invalid tip pooling
arrangement. However, based on the Court's ruling that the
Plaintiff and the potential collective action members are not
similarly situated in that they perform non-tipped work at the
tipped rate, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's proposed
definition of who should receive notice is too broad.

Accordingly, at this time, the Court finds that an appropriate
definition of similarly situated workers in the context of this
litigation is the following:

     All carvers (churrasqueiros) who worked for Defendant
     nationwide during the last three (3) years preceding this
     lawsuit that were paid pursuant to the 'tip credit' (less
     than minimum wage plus tips), participated in a tip pool
     contribution plan that included Customer Service
     Representatives, and claim they are owed minimum wage.

However, because the Court has revised the definition on its own,
the Court believes the parties should have an opportunity to
propose modifications they believe are appropriate. Therefore, the
Court orders the parties to meet and confer and jointly prepare a
proposed definition of the similarly situated workers in this
litigation. If there are portions of the definition on which the
parties do not agree, the parties should submit their respective
positions to the Court for resolution. The proposed collective
action definition should be filed with the Court within 10 days of
this Order.

IV. Proposed Notice to Putative Class Members

The Plaintiff has submitted a proposed notice form and consent form
for the Court's consideration to be sent to members of the
collective. He requests a 60-day opt-in period from the date
notices are initially mailed. He also requests that his counsel be
permitted to send notice to the potential class by mail and email
and that the notice be posted at each of FOGO's locations at which
the collective actions members are employed.

Additionally, the Plaintiff requests permission to send the same
notice as a reminder notice 30 days after the original mailing.
Further, to carryout notice, the Plaintiff requests the Court to
order the Defendant to provide him with of all putative class
members' names, last known addresses, phone numbers, social
security numbers, and e-mail addresses within 14 days of the
Court's Order. Finally, the Plaintiff asserts that notice should be
given within a three-year statute of limitations because he has
sufficiently alleged in its Complaint that a willful violation has
occurred.

In response, FOGO makes five objections to the Plaintiff's requests
regarding the proposed notice. Among other things, FOGO generally
argues that the Plaintiff's proposed notice is improper because the
description of the claims reflects the utter confusion present in
the lawsuit itself.

Thus, the parties dispute five matters relating to the Plaintiff's
proposed notice: (1) the notice form itself; (2) whether notice
should be posted at the FOGO restaurants; (3) whether FOGO must
disclose employees' social security numbers; (4) whether a reminder
notice should be sent; and (5) whether notice should be given for a
three-year period.

Because the Court has found that the Plaintiff failed to show that
and he and the potential collective action members are similarly
situated in their performance of pre-shift non-tipped work at the
tipped rate, the Plaintiff should amend the notice to remove any
language that mentions the performance of non-tipped work at the
tipped rate. Further, as to any other issues regarding the proposed
notice form and consent form, the Court orders the parties to meet
and confer in order to jointly prepare a proposed class notice
form. If there are portions of the notice on which the parties do
not agree, the parties should submit their respective positions to
the Court for resolution. The proposed class notice should be filed
with the Court within 10 days of the date of this Order. The 60-day
opt-in period will begin to run from the date notices are initially
mailed.

As to Plaintiff's request that the Court authorize a posting at
FOGO's restaurants, the Court finds that this is improper. Though
courts authorize posting at work sites in many instances, here, the
fact that all employees, who currently work at FOGO, are subject to
the Arbitration Agreement renders any posting at the restaurants
improper.

The Court also rejects the Plaintiff's request for the disclosure
of social security numbers. Judge Mazzant notes that the Plaintiff
has not offered any explanation as to the necessity of the social
security numbers, and the Court cannot find one. The request is,
therefore, broad and unnecessary, and FOGO will not be required at
this time to produce the information.

The Plaintiff also requests the names, the last known addresses,
phone numbers, and email addresses of the putative class members,
who worked for FOGO, which FOGO does not object to. The Court finds
that FOGO must turn over the putative class members' names, last
known mailing addresses, email addresses, and phone numbers in a
computer-readable data file to the Plaintiff to the extent the
information is in its possession within 14 days of this Court's
Order authorizing the revised proposed class definition and notice
form.

FOGO objects to the Plaintiff's request that a reminder notice be
sent, arguing that it unnecessary. However, the Court finds that
sending a reminder notice should be allowed.

Judge Mazzant notes that the Plaintiffs have the burden to
demonstrate willfulness. Prior to Swales, an allegation of
willfulness was sufficient at the notice stage to warrant notice
covering the prior three years. Post-Swales, courts have continued
to find an allegation of willfulness sufficient to warrant the
FLSA's three-year statute of limitations period.

The Court agrees. The Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged
willfulness to warrant notice covering the prior three years.

Conclusion

Judge Mazzant, therefore, ordered that the Plaintiff's Motion for
Conditional Certification of an FLSA Collective Action is granted
in part, subject to the modifications identified in the Order.

The parties will meet and confer to prepare a revised proposed
collective action definition, proposed notice form, and proposed
consent form. The proposed collective action definition, proposed
notice form, and proposed consent form should be filed within 10
days of the Order.

FOGO must provide the Plaintiff with the names of all individuals
to whom the Court has authorized the Plaintiff to provide notice
to, their last known mailing addresses, email addresses, and phone
numbers in a computer-readable data file within fourteen (14) days
of the Court's Order authorizing the revised proposed collective
action definition and notice form.

The Plaintiff is permitted to send notice by first-class mail and
email. The Plaintiff is authorized to send the same notice as a
reminder notice thirty (30) days after the original mailing.

All individuals, whose names appear on the list produced by the
Defendant's counsel, have 60 days from the date the notices are
initially mailed to file a Consent to Become Opt-In Plaintiff.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated
June 13, 2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/44mv57mf from
Leagle.com.


FRITO-LAY INC: Fails to Pay Hours Worked During Kronos Blackout
---------------------------------------------------------------
BRIAN HILL, JASON MATHIS and CRUZ VASQUEZ, Each Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. FRITO-LAY, INC., Case
No. 4:22-cv-00518 (E.D. Tex., June 22, 2022) is a collective action
brought by the Plaintiffs against Defendant for violations of the
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the overtime
provisions of the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act, and the provisions of
the Washington Minimum Wage Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant directly hired Plaintiffs
and other hourly employees to work on its behalf, paid them wages
and benefits, controlled their work schedules, duties, protocols,
applications, assignments and employment conditions, and kept at
least some records regarding their employment. The Plaintiffs kept
their time using Kronos, the timekeeping system implemented by the
Defendant.

In November of 2021, Kronos was hacked and became inoperable.
Kronos functions were restored in or around February or March of
2022. From November of 2021 until February or March of 2022, the
Plaintiffs and other hourly employees could not record their time
using Kronos. In lieu of timekeeping, during the Kronos blackout,
Defendant paid Plaintiffs and other hourly employees an average of
hours worked in previous weeks. During the Kronos blackout, the
Plaintiffs received the same amount of pay from week to week
regardless of how many hours they worked. Regardless of the exact
method of calculating payment, Defendant did not base the pay of
Plaintiffs and other hourly employees on the number of hours
actually worked in that week during the Kronos blackout. The
Plaintiffs regularly worked over forty hours in a week during the
Kronos blackout, says the suit.

The Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, monetary damages,
liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, and a reasonable
attorney's fee and costs as a result of the Defendant's failure to
pay proper compensation under the FLSA, the AMWA and the Washington
Acts.

Frito-Lay is an American subsidiary of PepsiCo that manufactures,
markets, and sells corn chips, potato chips, and other snack
foods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Kirkpatrick Plaza
          10800 Financial Centre Parkway, Suite 510
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

GENERAL ELECTRIC: Kessler Topaz Announces Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case SJUNDE AP-FONDEN and THE CLEVELAND BAKERS AND TEAMSTERS
PENSION FUND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, vs. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants (S.D.N.Y. Case No. 1:17-cv-8457-JMF), Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP announced that the the case against GE and
former GE executive Jeffrey Bornstein involving purchasers of
common stock has been certified as a class action on behalf of the
Class.

The Court has appointed Sjunde AP-Fonden and The Cleveland Bakers
and Teamsters Pension Fund as the representatives for the Class
("Class Representatives").

IF YOU ARE A MEMBER OF THE CLASS, YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
THE LAWSUIT.

You may obtain a copy of the Notice of Pendency of Class Action
("Notice") from the website for the Action,
www.GeneralElectricSecuritiesLitigation.com, or by contacting the
Administrator:

General Electric Securities Litigation
c/o JND Legal Administration
P.O. Box 91449
Seattle, WA 98111

If you are a Class member you should receive a Postcard Notice
regarding the Action by mail. If you are a Class member and you do
not receive a Postcard Notice by mail, please send your name and
address to the Administrator so that you will receive any future
notices disseminated in connection with the Action.

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice, may be made to
Court-appointed Class Counsel:

KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
Sharan Nirmul, Esq.
Richard A. Russo, Jr., Esq.
280 King of Prussia Road
Radnor, PA 19087
Telephone: (610) 667-7706
info@ktmc.com
www.ktmc.com

If you are a Class member, you have the right to decide whether to
remain a member of the Class. If you choose to remain a member of
the Class, you do not need to do anything at this time other than
retain your documentation reflecting your transactions and holdings
in GE common stock. You will automatically be included in the
Class, and you will be bound by the proceedings in the Action,
including all past, present, and future orders and judgments of the
Court, whether favorable or unfavorable. If you are a Class member
and do not wish to remain a member of the Class, you must take
steps to exclude yourself from the Class.

If you timely and validly request to be excluded from the Class,
you will not be bound by any orders or judgments in the Action, and
you will not be eligible to receive a share of any money which
might be recovered in the future for the benefit of the Class. To
exclude yourself from the Class, you must submit a written request
for exclusion postmarked no later than August 15, 2022, in
accordance with the instructions set forth in the Notice. Pursuant
to Rule 23(e)(4), the Court has discretion as to whether a second
opportunity to request exclusion from the Class will be allowed if
there is a settlement in the Action.

Further information may be obtained by contacting the Administrator
or by visiting the website
http://www.GeneralElectricSecuritiesLitigation.com/[GN]

H GREG NISSAN: Sends Unauthorized Telemarketing Calls, Walker Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
JENNIFER WALKER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. H GREG NISSAN KENDALL, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:22-cv-21891 (S.D. Fla., June 20, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendant for violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act and the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant is engaged in an unlawful
practice of sending telephonic sales calls to consumers, including
the Plaintiff, without obtaining prior express written consent. As
a result, the unauthorized calls caused the Plaintiff and Class
members harm, including violations of their statutory rights,
statutory damages, annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of their
privacy, says the suit.

H Greg Nissan Kendall, LLC is a Nissan automobile dealer in
Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Manuel Hiraldo, Esq.
         HIRALDO P.A.
         401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1400
         Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
         Telephone: (954) 400-4713
         E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

                 - and –

         Rachel N. Dapeer, Esq.
         DAPEER LAW, P.A.
         20900 NE 30th Avenue, Ste. 417
         Aventura, FL 333180
         Telephone: (305) 610-5223
         E-mail: rachel@dapeer.com

INOTIV INC: Johnson Fistel Announces Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Johnson Fistel, LLP announces that a
class action lawsuit has commenced on behalf of investors of
Inotiv, Inc. (NASDAQ: NOTV). The class action is on behalf of
shareholders who purchased Inotiv securities between September 21,
2021 and June 13, 2022, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"),
both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"). Investors are hereby
notified that they have until August 22, 2022 to move the Court to
serve as lead plaintiff in this action.

What actions may I take at this time? If you suffered a loss and
are interested in learning more about being a lead plaintiff,
please contact Jim Baker (jimb@johnsonfistel.com) by email or phone
at 619-814-4471. If emailing, please include a phone number.
To join this action, you can click or copy and paste the link below
in a browser:

https://www.johnsonfistel.com/investigations/inotiv-inc-animal-welfare-lawsuit-class-action

There is no cost or obligation to you.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose:
(1) Envigo RMS, LLC ("Envigo") and Inotiv's Cumberland, Virginia
facility (the "Cumberland Facility") engaged in widespread and
flagrant violations of the Animal Welfare Act ("AWA"); (2) Envigo
and Inotiv's Cumberland Facility continuously violated the AWA; (3)
Envigo and Inotiv did not properly remedy issues with regards to
animal welfare at the Cumberland Facility; (4) as a result, Inotiv
was likely to face increased scrutiny and governmental action; (5)
Inotiv would imminently shut down two facilities, including the
Cumberland Facility; (6) Inotiv did not engage in proper due
diligence; and (7) as a result, Defendants' statements about its
business, operations, and prospects, were materially false and
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.
When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that
investors suffered damages.

A lead plaintiff will act on behalf of all other class members in
directing the Inotiv class-action lawsuit. The lead plaintiff can
select a law firm of its choice to litigate the class-action
lawsuit. An investor's ability to share any potential future
recovery of the Inotiv class action lawsuit is not dependent upon
serving as lead plaintiff. For more information regarding the lead
plaintiff process please refer to
https://www.johnsonfistel.com/lead-plaintiff-deadlines.

Johnson Fistel, LLP is a nationally recognized shareholder rights
law firm with offices in California, New York and Georgia. The firm
represents individual and institutional investors in shareholder
derivative and securities class action lawsuits. Johnson Fistel
seeks to recover losses incurred due to violations of federal
securities laws. For more information about the firm and its
attorneys, please visit http://www.johnsonfistel.com/

Contact:
Johnson Fistel, LLP
Jim Baker, 619-814-4471
Investor Relations
jimb@johnsonfistel.com[GN]

JUUL LABS: Causes Youth E-Cigarette Crisis, Crown Point Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CROWN POINT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-03659 (N.D. Cal., June 22, 2022) is a
class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross
negligence, and violations of the Public Nuisance Law and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

The Crown Point Central School District case has been consolidated
in MDL No. 2913, IN RE: JUUL LABS, INC. MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES,
AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge William H. Orrick.

Crown Point Central School District is a unified school district
with its offices located at 2758 Main Street in Crown Point, New
York.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         James Frantz, Esq.
         William B. Shinoff, Esq.
         FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
         402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 233-5945
         Facsimile: (619) 525-7672
         E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com

JUUL LABS: E-Cigarette Triggers Youth Health Crisis, Kern Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
KERN HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., f/k/a PAX Labs,
Inc., PLOOM Inc., ALTRIA GROUP, INC., PHILLIP MORRIS USA INC.,
ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES LLC, ALTRIA GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY,
JAMES MONSEES, ADAM BOWEN, NICHOLAS PRITZKER, HOYOUNG HUH, and RIAZ
VALANI, Defendants, Case No. 22STCV20320 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles
Cty., June 22, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for
public nuisance and negligence.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

Kern High School District is a school district located in Kern
County, California.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         John P. Fiske, Esq.
         Jason Julius, Esq.
         Victoria Sherlin, Esq.
         BARON & BUDD, P.C.
         11440 West Bernardo Court Suite 265
         San Diego, CA 92127
         Telephone: (858) 251-7424
         Facsimile: (214) 520-1181
         E-mail: jfiske@baronbudd.com
                 jjulius@baronbudd.com
                 tsherlin@baronbudd.com

                 - and –

         Brian J. Panish, Esq.
         Rahul Ravipudi, Esq.
         Rachel Gezerseh, Esq.
         PANISH SHEA & BOYLE LLP
         11111 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 700
         Los Angeles, CA 90025
         Telephone: (310) 477-1700
         Facsimile: (310) 477-1699
         E-mail: panish@psblaw.com
                 ravipudi@psblaw.com
                 gezerseh@psblaw.com

                 - and –

         Khaldoun Baghdadi, Esq.
         WALKUP MELODIA KELLY & SCHOENBERGER, P.C.
         650 California Street, 26th Floor
         San Francisco, CA 94108
         Telephone: (415) 617-1269
         E-mail: kbaghdadi@walkuplawoffice.com

                 - and –

         Thomas P. Cartmell, Esq.
         WAGSTAFF & CARTMELL LLP
         4740 Grand Ave., Ste. 300
         Kansas City, MO 64112
         Telephone: (816) 701-1100
         E-mail: tcartmell@wcllp.com

                 - and –

         Andy D. Birchfield, Jr., Esq.
         Joseph G. VanZandt, Esq.
         BEASLEY ALLEN CROW METHVIN PORTIS & MILES, LLC
         234 Commerce Street
         Montgomery, AL 36103
         Telephone: (334) 269-2343
         E-mail: Andy.Birchfield@BeasleyAllen.com
                 Joseph.VanZandt@BeasleyAllen.com

                 - and –

         Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
         Brad Honnold, Esq.
         GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
         9500 Nall Ave., Ste. 400
         Overland Park, KS 66207
         Telephone: (913) 451-3433
         E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com
                 bhonnold@gohonlaw.com

JUUL LABS: Faces Pemberton Suit Over Youth's E-Cigarette Addiction
------------------------------------------------------------------
PEMBERTON TOWNSHIP SCHOOLS, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-03667 (N.D. Cal., June 22, 2022) is a
class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross
negligence, and violations of the Public Nuisance Law and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

The Pemberton Township Schools case has been consolidated in MDL
No. 2913, IN RE: JUUL LABS, INC. MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge William H. Orrick.

Pemberton Township Schools is a unified school district with its
offices located at One Egbert Street in Pemberton, New Jersey.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         James Frantz, Esq.
         William B. Shinoff, Esq.
         FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
         402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 233-5945
         Facsimile: (619) 525-7672
         E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com

JUUL LABS: Holland Patent Sues Over Deceptive E-Cigarette Campaign
------------------------------------------------------------------
HOLLAND PATENT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-03660 (N.D. Cal., June 22, 2022) is a
class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross
negligence, and violations of the Public Nuisance Law and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

The Holland Patent Central School District case has been
consolidated in MDL No. 2913, IN RE: JUUL LABS, INC. MARKETING,
SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge William H. Orrick.

Holland Patent Central School District is a unified school district
with its offices located at 9601 Main Street in Holland Patent, New
York.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         James Frantz, Esq.
         William B. Shinoff, Esq.
         FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
         402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 233-5945
         Facsimile: (619) 525-7672
         E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com

JUUL LABS: Laurens Sues Over Youth's Nicotine Addiction in N.Y.
---------------------------------------------------------------
LAURENS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-03661 (N.D. Cal., June 22, 2022) is a
class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross
negligence, and violations of the Public Nuisance Law and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

The Laurens Central School District case has been consolidated in
MDL No. 2913, IN RE: JUUL LABS, INC. MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES,
AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge William H. Orrick.

Laurens Central School District is a unified school district with
its offices located at 55 Main Street in Laurens, New York.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         James Frantz, Esq.
         William B. Shinoff, Esq.
         FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
         402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 233-5945
         Facsimile: (619) 525-7672
         E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com

JUUL LABS: Norwood-Norfolk Sues Over E-Cigarette's Risks to Youth
-----------------------------------------------------------------
NORWOOD-NORFOLK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, on behalf of itself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-03656 (N.D. Cal., June 22, 2022)
is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross
negligence, and violations of the Public Nuisance Law and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

The Norwood-Norfolk Central School District case has been
consolidated in MDL No. 2913, IN RE: JUUL LABS, INC. MARKETING,
SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge William H. Orrick.

Norwood-Norfolk Central School District is a unified school
district with its offices located at 7852 State Highway 56 in
Norwood, New York.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         James Frantz, Esq.
         William B. Shinoff, Esq.
         FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
         402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 233-5945
         Facsimile: (619) 525-7672
         E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com

JUUL LABS: Promotes E-Cigarette Use Among Youth, Narragansett Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
NARRAGANSETT SCHOOL SYSTEM, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-03664 (N.D. Cal., June 22, 2022) is a
class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross
negligence, and violations of the Public Nuisance Law and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to
maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product
design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting
of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an
e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain
addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and
promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other
Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead
users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine
than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants
enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without
ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The
Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns
on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and
affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The
Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start
using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and
public health crisis, says the suit.

The Narragansett School System case has been consolidated in MDL
No. 2913, IN RE: JUUL LABS, INC. MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge William H. Orrick.

Narragansett School System is a unified school district with its
offices located at 25 5th Ave. in Narragansett, Rhode Island.

JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American
electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California.

Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria
Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond,
Virginia.

Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal
place of business in Richmond, Virginia.

Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its
principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         James Frantz, Esq.
         William B. Shinoff, Esq.
         FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC
         402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: (619) 233-5945
         Facsimile: (619) 525-7672
         E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com
                 wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com

KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Rubenstein Consumer Suit Removed to S.D.N.Y.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled RICHARD RUBENSTEIN and ELIZABETH CALLEJA, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated v. KONINKLIJKE
PHILIPS N.V.; PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA LLC; PHILIPS RS NORTH AMERICA
LLC; PHILIPS HOLDING USA, INC.; and PHILIPS HEALTHCARE, Case No.
154758/2022, was removed from the Supreme Court of the State of New
York, County of New York, to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York on June 22, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Southern District of New York assigned
Case No. 1:22-cv-05247 to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendants' alleged strict liability,
negligent design defect, negligent failure to warn, negligent
manufacturing defect, misrepresentation, breach of express
warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and loss
of consortium by manufacturing and selling Continuous Positive
Airway Pressure and BiLevel Positive Airway Pressure devices
containing polyester-based polyurethane sound abatement foam.

Koninklijke Philips N.V. is a health technology company with its
principal executive offices at Philips Center, Amstelplein 2, 1096
BC Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Philips North America LLC is a health technology company with its
principal place of business located at 222 Jacobs Street, Floor 3,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Philips Holding USA, Inc. is a company that manufactures and
distributes medical systems and lighting appliances, headquartered
in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Philips RS North America LLC is a company that manufactures and
markets medical devices with its principal place of business
located at 6501 Living Place, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Philips Healthcare is a provider of healthcare products and
solutions, headquartered in Massachusetts. [BN]

The Defendant is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Gary Adler, Esq.
         MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
         101 Park Ave.
         New York, NY 10178-0060
         Telephone: (212) 309-6140
         Facsimile: (212) 309-6001
         E-mail: gary.adler@morganlewis.com

                 - and –

         John P. Lavelle, Jr., Esq.
         MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
         1701 Market Street
         Philadelphia, PA 19103-2921
         Telephone: (215) 963-5000
         Facsimile: (215) 963-5001
         E-mail: john.lavelle@morganlewis.com

LESLIE'S POOLMART: Pays Manual Workers Every Other Week, Green Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT GREEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. LESLIE'S POOLMART, INC., Case No. 2:22-cv-03683
(E.D.N.Y., June 22, 2022) is a class action on behalf of all of
Leslie's employees in the State of New York that engage in manual
work in the course of their employment in violation of the New York
Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has violated state law by
paying its manual workers every other week rather than on a weekly
basis. The complaint therefore demands liquidated damages,
interest, and attorneys' fees on behalf of himself and a putative
class comprised of all non-supervisor, non-managerial manual
workers employed by Defendant in New York State over the last six
years.

Leslie's, Inc., operating as Leslie's Swimming Pool Supplies, is
the largest retailer of swimming pool supplies and related
products. Leslie's sells a full range of supplies for pool
maintenance, including chemicals, cleaning devices, equipment and
parts, as well as recreational and safety products for swimming
pools.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Kopel, Esq.
          Alec M. Leslie, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: ykopel@bursor.com
                  aleslie@bursor.com

M&M's WELDING: Underpays Welder and Shop Managers, Rios Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
GERARDO ARREOLA RIOS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. M&M's WELDING AND FABRICATING, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 4:22-cv-02003 (S.D. Tex., June 20, 2022) is a
class action against the Defendant for its failure to compensate
the Plaintiff and similarly situated employees overtime pay for all
hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek in violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Mr. Rios worked for the Defendant as a welder and shop manager from
2014 until May of 2021.

M&M's Welding and Fabricating, Inc. is a mechanical contractor
based in Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Josef F. Buenker, Esq.
         THE BUENKER LAW FIRM
         P.O. Box 10099
         Houston, TX 77206
         Telephone: (713) 868-3388
         Facsimile: (713) 683-9940
         E-mail: jbuenker@buenkerlaw.com

MCG HEALTH: Strecker Sues Over Failure to Protect Customers' Info
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CYNTHIA STRECKER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MCG HEALTH, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2:22-cv-00862 (W.D. Wash., June 20, 2022) is a class action against
the Defendant for negligence and violation of the Washington
Consumer Protection.

According to the complaint, the Defendant failed to safeguard the
protected identifiable information (PII) of the Plaintiff and Class
members following a data breach on the Defendant's systems on March
25, 2022. The Defendant's acts of negligence include but not
limited to its: (1) failure to design, implement, and maintain
reasonable and adequate data security systems and safeguards,
including but not limited to a lack of encryption; (2) failure to
exercise reasonable care in the hiring, supervision, and training
of its employees and agents and vendors; (3) failure to comply with
industry-standard data security practices; and (4) failure to
comply with state and federal laws and regulations that govern data
security and practices. As a result of the Defendant's data
security failures, the Plaintiff and Class members have suffered
actual, concrete, and imminent injuries, the suit alleges.

MCG Health, LLC is a healthcare software company based in Seattle,
Washington. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Jason T. Dennett, Esq.
         Rebecca L. Solomon, Esq.
         TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
         1200 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1700
         Seattle, WA 98101-3147
         Telephone: (206) 682-5600
         Facsimile: (206) 682-2992
         E-mail: jdennett@tousley.com
                 rsolomon@tousley.com

                 - and –

         Terence R. Coates, Esq.
         MARKOVITS, STOCK & DEMARCO, LLC
         119 E. Court Street, Suite 530
         Cincinnati, OH 45202
         Telephone: (513) 651-3700
         Facsimile: (513) 665-0219
         E-mail: tcoates@msdlegal.com

                 - and –

         Joseph M. Lyon, Esq.
         THE LYON FIRM
         2754 Erie Avenue
         Cincinnati, OH 45208
         Telephone: (513) 381-2333
         Facsimile: (513) 721-1178
         E-mail: jlyon@thelyonfirm.com

MDL 2873: Bohler Sues Over PFAS Exposure From AFFF Products
-----------------------------------------------------------
TOM BOHLER, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA USS. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-01885-RMG
(D.S.C., June 14, 2022) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff
and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for
personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming
foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as
per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).

According to the complaint, the Defendants have failed to use
reasonable and appropriate care in the design, manufacture,
labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling, marketing, and
distribution of AFFF products containing synthetic, toxic PFAS. The
Defendants' AFFF products are dangerous to human health because
PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals and can accumulate
in the blood and body of exposed individuals. The Defendants have
also failed to warn public entities and firefighter trainees who
they knew would foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF
products. The Plaintiff used the Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF
products in their intended manner, without significant change in
the products' condition due to inadequate warning about the
products' danger. He relied on the Defendants' instructions as to
the proper handling of the products, added the suit.

As a result of the alleged exposure to the Defendants' AFFF
products, the Plaintiff was diagnosed with prostate cancer, says
the suit.

The Bohler case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul,
Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
          Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
          GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          270 West Main Street
          Sayville, NY 11782
          Telephone: (631) 600-0000
          Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

               - and -

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue
          South Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

MDL 2873: Deckard Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic PFAS
------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH DECKARD, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA USS. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-01900-RMG
(D.S.C., June 14, 2022) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff
and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for
personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming
foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as
per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).

According to the complaint, the Defendants have failed to use
reasonable and appropriate care in the design, manufacture,
labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling, marketing, and
distribution of AFFF products containing synthetic, toxic PFAS. The
Defendants' AFFF products are dangerous to human health because
PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals and can accumulate
in the blood and body of exposed individuals. The Defendants have
also failed to warn public entities and firefighter trainees who
they knew would foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF
products. The Plaintiff used the Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF
products in their intended manner, without significant change in
the products' condition due to inadequate warning about the
products' danger. He relied on the Defendants' instructions as to
the proper handling of the products, added the suit.

As a result of the alleged exposure to the Defendants' AFFF
products, the Plaintiff was diagnosed with tongue cancer, says the
suit.

The Deckard case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul,
Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
          Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
          GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          270 West Main Street
          Sayville, NY 11782
          Telephone: (631) 600-0000
          Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

               - and -

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue
          South Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

MDL 2873: Douglas Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic PFAS
------------------------------------------------------------
THOMAS DOUGLAS, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA USS. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-01886-RMG
(D.S.C., June 14, 2022) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff
and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for
personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming
foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as
per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).

According to the complaint, the Defendants have failed to use
reasonable and appropriate care in the design, manufacture,
labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling, marketing, and
distribution of AFFF products containing synthetic, toxic PFAS. The
Defendants' AFFF products are dangerous to human health because
PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals and can accumulate
in the blood and body of exposed individuals. The Defendants have
also failed to warn public entities and firefighter trainees who
they knew would foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF
products. The Plaintiff used the Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF
products in their intended manner, without significant change in
the products' condition due to inadequate warning about the
products' danger. He relied on the Defendants' instructions as to
the proper handling of the products, added the suit.

As a result of the alleged exposure to the Defendants' AFFF
products, the Plaintiff was diagnosed with prostate cancer, says
the suit.

The Douglas case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul,
Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
          Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
          GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          270 West Main Street
          Sayville, NY 11782
          Telephone: (631) 600-0000
          Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

               - and -

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue
          South Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

MDL 2873: Johnson Sues Over PFAS Exposure From AFFF Products
------------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM JOHNSON, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining
and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA USS. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-01888-RMG
(D.S.C., June 14, 2022) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff
and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for
personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming
foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as
per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).

According to the complaint, the Defendants have failed to use
reasonable and appropriate care in the design, manufacture,
labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling, marketing, and
distribution of AFFF products containing synthetic, toxic PFAS. The
Defendants' AFFF products are dangerous to human health because
PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals and can accumulate
in the blood and body of exposed individuals. The Defendants have
also failed to warn public entities and firefighter trainees who
they knew would foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF
products. The Plaintiff used the Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF
products in their intended manner, without significant change in
the products' condition due to inadequate warning about the
products' danger. He relied on the Defendants' instructions as to
the proper handling of the products, added the suit.

As a result of the alleged exposure to the Defendants' AFFF
products, the Plaintiff was diagnosed with prostate cancer, says
the suit.

The Johnson case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul,
Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
          Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
          GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          270 West Main Street
          Sayville, NY 11782
          Telephone: (631) 600-0000
          Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

               - and -

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue
          South Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

MDL 2873: Molina Suit Alleges PFAS Exposure From AFFF Products
--------------------------------------------------------------
EDWARD MOLINA, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA USS. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-01887-RMG
(D.S.C., June 14, 2022) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff
and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for
personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming
foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as
per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).

According to the complaint, the Defendants have failed to use
reasonable and appropriate care in the design, manufacture,
labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling, marketing, and
distribution of AFFF products containing synthetic, toxic PFAS. The
Defendants' AFFF products are dangerous to human health because
PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals and can accumulate
in the blood and body of exposed individuals. The Defendants have
also failed to warn public entities and firefighter trainees who
they knew would foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF
products. The Plaintiff used the Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF
products in their intended manner, without significant change in
the products' condition due to inadequate warning about the
products' danger. He relied on the Defendants' instructions as to
the proper handling of the products, added the suit.

As a result of the alleged exposure to the Defendants' AFFF
products, the Plaintiff was diagnosed with prostate cancer, says
the suit.

The Molina case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul,
Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
          Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
          GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          270 West Main Street
          Sayville, NY 11782
          Telephone: (631) 600-0000
          Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

               - and -

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue
          South Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

MDL 2873: Nowakowski Alleges Injury From Exposure to Toxic PFAS
---------------------------------------------------------------
DENNIS NOWAKOWSKI, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY fka MINNESOTA MINING &
MANUFACTURING CO.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT CO.; CHEMGUARD, INC.;
CORTEVA, INC.; DUPONT DE NEMOURS, INC.; DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I.
DUPONT DE NEMOURS & CO.; KIDDE-FENWALL, INC.; KIDDE FIRE FIGHTING,
INC.; KIDDE PLC, INC.; NATIONAL FOAM INC.; THE CHEMOURS CO.; THE
CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS, LP; UTC FIRE &
SECURITY AMERICA'S, INC; and DOES 1 to 100, INCLUSIVE, Defendants,
Case No. 2:22-cv-01881-RMG (D.S.C., June 14, 2022) is a class
action brought by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated
individuals seeking damages for personal injury resulting from
exposure to aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic
chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances
(PFAS).

According to the complaint, the Defendants, and each of them, were
engaged in the design, manufacture, and sale of firefighting foams
which contained chemicals known as per fluorinated compounds from
the 1960's forward. Prime markets for AFFF included airports and
fire departments, specifically including those operated by the U.S.
Navy, the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Army, and the U.S. Marine Corps,
inclusive of such installations in Arizona. The Defendants not only
concealed the true ultra-hazardous nature of the chemicals and the
severe adverse health consequences from exposure; Defendants
fraudulently maintained that there were no hazards with products,
says the suit.

The Plaintiff was a member of the U.S. Air Force, who during his
service was stationed at Davis-Monthan AFB, a military installation
identified as being contaminated through use of the toxic chemicals
which are the subject of this action. In or about 2000, Nowakowski
was diagnosed with kidney cancer and commenced on-going medical
treatment inclusive of surgical intervention via a radical
nephrectomy. As known by Defendants, kidney cancer is a disease
linked to PFAS contamination, the suit added.

The Nowakowski case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul,
Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy C. Shafer, Esq.
          VETERAN LEGAL GROUP
          700 12th Street N.W., Suite 700
          Washington, D.C. 20005
          Telephone: (888) 215-7834
          E-mail: jshafer@bannerlegal.com

               - and -

          S. James Boumil, Esq.
          BOUMIL LAW OFFICES   
          120 Fairmount Street  
          Lowell, MA, 01852
          Telephone: (978) 458-0507
          E-mail: sjboumil@boumil-law.com

               - and -

          Konstantine Kyros, Esq.
          KYROS LAW
          17 Miles Road  
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Telephone: (800) 934-2921
          E-mail: kon@kyroslaw.com

MDL 2873: Thomas Sues Over PFAS Exposure From AFFF Products
-----------------------------------------------------------
HOSEA THOMAS, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA USS. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-01889-RMG
(D.S.C., June 14, 2022) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff
and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for
personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming
foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as
per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).

According to the complaint, the Defendants have failed to use
reasonable care in the design, manufacture, labeling, warning,
instruction, training, selling, marketing, and distribution of AFFF
products containing synthetic, toxic PFAS. The Defendants' AFFF
products are dangerous to human health because PFAS are highly
toxic and carcinogenic chemicals and can accumulate in the blood
and body of exposed individuals. The Defendants have also failed to
warn public entities and firefighter trainees who they knew would
foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF products. The
Plaintiff used the Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products in
their intended manner, without significant change in the products'
condition due to inadequate warning about the products' danger. He
relied on the Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of
the products, added the suit.

As a result of the alleged exposure to the Defendants' AFFF
products, the Plaintiff was diagnosed with prostate cancer, says
the suit.

The Thomas case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul,
Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
          Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
          GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          270 West Main Street
          Sayville, NY 11782
          Telephone: (631) 600-0000
          Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

               - and -

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue
          South Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

MITRE CORPORATION: Breaches Fiduciary Duties, Brown ERISA Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
AARON L. BROWN, PETER A. YOUNG, NINA DANIEL, RUSSELL S. CRABTREE,
KIMBERLY L. NESBITT and ERIN N. WHEELER, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. THE MITRE CORPORATION, THE
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE MITRE CORPORATION, THE INVESTMENT ADVISORY
COMMITTEE OF THE MITRE CORPORATION and JOHN DOES 1-30, Case No.
1:22-cv-10976 (D. Mass., June 22, 2022) is a class action brought
by the Plaintiff pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), on behalf of the MITRE Corporation
Tax Sheltered Annuity Plan (TSA Plan) and the Qualified Retirement
Plan (QRP Plan), against the Plans' fiduciaries, which include the
MITRE Corporation and the Board of Trustees of MITRE Corporation
and its members during the Class Period and the Investment Advisory
Committee of the MITRE Corporation and its members during the Class
Period for breaches of their fiduciary duties.

To safeguard Plan participants and beneficiaries, ERISA imposes
strict fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence upon employers and
other plan fiduciaries. Fiduciaries must act "solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries," 29 U.S.C. section
1104(a)(1)(A), with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that
would be expected in managing a plan of similar scope.

According to the complaint, at all times during the Class Period,
the QRP Plan had at least $1.6 billion dollars in assets under
management. At the end of 2020 and 2019, the QRP Plan had over $2.4
billion dollars and $2.2 billion dollars, respectively, in assets
under management that were/are entrusted to the care of the Plan's
fiduciaries. The December 31, 2020 Report of Independent Auditor of
the MITRE Corporation Qualified Retirement Plan.  At all times
during the Class Period, the TSA Plan had at least $1.9 billion
dollars in assets under management. At the end of 2020 and 2019,
the TSA Plan had over $4.5 billion dollars and $4.1 billion
dollars, respectively, in assets under management that were/are
entrusted to the care of the Plan's fiduciaries. The December 31,
2020 Report of Independent Auditor of the MITRE Corporation Tax
Sheltered Annuity Plan. The Plans' assets under management
qualifies them as jumbo plans in the defined contribution plan
marketplace, and among the largest plans in the United States.  The
Plans are also large in terms of the number of its participants.
From 2016 to 2020, the QRP had between 10,798 and 12,366
participants with account balances. During the same time period,
the TSA had between 14,190 and 12,225 participants with account
balances. So combined, the Plans had between 23,164 and 26,415
participants with account balances. For comparison, according to
information derived from ERISApedia.com's database, a service that
compiles all Form 5500s filed with the Dept. of Labor ("DOL") by
retirement plans, in 2020, there were only 198 defined contribution
plans (401k, 401a, and 403b) in the country with 15,000 to 19,999
participants with account balances. For plans with 20,000 to 29,999
participants with account balances there were only 194 of such
plans, asserts the suit.

As jumbo plans, both in terms of assets and participants, the Plans
had substantial bargaining power regarding the fees and expenses
that were charged against participants' investments. The Plan's
massive size in terms of the number of participants also afforded
it the luxury to leverage its scale to obtain low recordkeeping and
administration costs.

The Plaintiffs allege that during the putative Class Period
Defendants, as "fiduciaries" of the Plans, as that term is defined
under ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. section 1002(21)(A), breached
the duties they owed to the Plans, to Plaintiffs, and to the other
participants of the Plans by, inter alia, failing to control the
Plans' administrative and recordkeeping costs ("RKA" costs).

Allegedly, the Defendants' mismanagement of the Plans, to the
detriment of participants and beneficiaries, constitutes a breach
of the fiduciary duty of prudence, in violation of 29 U.S.C.
section 1104. Their actions were contrary to actions of a
reasonable fiduciary and cost the Plans and its participants
millions of dollars. The Plaintiffs assert claims against
Defendants for breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence (Count One)
and failure to monitor fiduciaries (Count Two), says the suit.

The Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action on behalf of the
Plans because they participated in the Plans and were injured by
the Defendants' unlawful conduct. From at least 2015, preceding the
start of the Class Period, to at least 2020, there was an
unreasonably high revenue requirement to pay for RKA costs that was
tacked onto the Plans' funds in the form of an increased expense
ratio, the suit added.

MITRE is the sponsor of the Plans and a named fiduciary of both the
QRP Plan and the TSA Plan with a principal place of business being
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, Massachusetts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey Hellman, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JEFFREY HELLMAN, LLC
          195 Church Street, 10 th Floor
          New Haven, CT 06510
          Telephone: (203) 691-8762
          Facsimile: (203) 823-4401
          E-mail: jeff@jeffhellmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Donald R. Reavey, Esq.
          Mark K. Gyandoh, Esq.
          Gabrielle Kelerchian, Esq.
          CAPOZZI ADLER, P.C.
          2933 North Front Street
          Harrisburg, PA 17110
          Telephone: (717) 233-4101
          Facsimile: (717) 233-4103
          E-mail: donr@capozziadler.com
                  markg@capozziadler.com
                  gabriellek@capozziadler.com

MONTEFIORE MEDICAL: Breaches Fiduciaries Duties, Boyette Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
SHEILA A. BOYETTE and TIFFANY JIMINEZ, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. MONTEFIORE MEDICAL CENTER, THE
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MONTEFIORE MEDICAL CENTER, THE TDA PLAN
COMMITTEEE and JOHN DOES 1-30, Case No. 1:22-cv-05280 (S.D.N.Y.,
June 22, 2022) is a class action brought pursuant to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), against the TDA
Plan's fiduciaries, which include Montefiore Medical Center, the
Board of Trustees of Montefiore Medical Center and its members
during the Class Period and the TDA Plan Committee and its members
during the Class Period.

According to the complaint, as a large plan both in terms of assets
and participants, the Plan had substantial bargaining power
regarding the fees and expenses that were charged against
participants' investments. The Plan's massive size in terms of the
number of participants also afforded it the luxury to leverage its
scale to obtain low recordkeeping and administration costs.

The Plaintiffs allege that during the putative Class Period, the
Defendants, as "fiduciaries" of the Plan, as that term is defined
under ERISA section 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. section 1002(21)(A),
breached the duties they owed to the Plan, to Plaintiffs, and to
the other participants of the Plan by by failing to objectively and
adequately review the Plan's investment portfolio with due care to
ensure that each investment option was prudent, in terms of cost.

The Defendants' mismanagement of the Plan, to the detriment of
participants and beneficiaries, constitutes a breach of the
fiduciary duty of prudence, in violation of 29 U.S.C. section.
Their actions were contrary to actions of a reasonable fiduciary
and cost the Plan and its participants millions of dollars. Based
on this conduct, the Plaintiffs assert claims against Defendants
for breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence (Count One) and
failure to monitor fiduciaries (Count Two), says the suit.

Montefiore Medical Center is a premier academic medical center and
the primary teaching hospital of the Albert Einstein College of
Medicine in the Bronx, New York City. Its main campus, the Henry
and Lucy Moses Division, is located in the Norwood section of the
northern Bronx.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Donald R. Reavey, Esq.
          Mark K. Gyandoh, Esq.
          Gabrielle P. Kelerchian, Esq.
          CAPOZZI ADLER, P.C.
          2933 North Front Street
          Harrisburg, PA 17110
          E-mail: donr@capozziadler.com
          Telephone: (717) 233-4101
          Facsimile: (717) 233-4103
          E-mail: markg@capozziadler.com
                  gabriellek@capozziadler.com

MORLEY COMPANIES: Ratcliff Suit Stayed Until Resolution of Thomsen
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KENNETH RATCLIFF, Plaintiff v. MORLEY COMPANIES, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:22-cv-10360 (E.D. Mich.), Judge Tomas L.
Ludington of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Northern Division, grants the Defendant's motion to stay
the case pending the resolution of the first-filed case involving
the data breach: Thomsen v. Morley Companies, Inc., No.
1:22-cv-10271 (E.D. Mich. 2022).

I. Background

The case was initiated as a putative class action stemming from a
data breach that allegedly exposed sensitive personal information
belonging to over 500,000 people. The Defendant is a Saginaw-based
corporation that offers back-office processing and other business
services to a wide range of clients, including Fortune 500
companies. In August 2021, some unknown individuals gained
unauthorized access to Defendant's internal network, exposing the
names, addresses, Social Security numbers, and other personally
identifying information of approximately 521,046 people. The
Defendant did not disclose the breach until Feb. 2, 2022, when it
posted a notice on its website.

The Defendant's disclosure set off a wave of lawsuits -- seven
filed in the Court and one filed in the Saginaw County Circuit
Court -- all of which involved a putative class of individuals
affected by the breach (Thomsen v. Morley Cos., No. 1:22-cv-10271
(E.D. Mich. filed Feb. 10, 2022); Miller v. Morley Cos., No.
1:22-cv-10284 (E.D. Mich. filed Feb. 11, 2022); Kometh v. Morley
Cos., No. 1:22-cv-10311 (E.D. Mich. filed Feb. 15, 2022);
Teverbaugh v. Morley Cos., No. 1:22-cv-10321 (E.D. Mich. filed Feb.
15, 2022); Cable v. Morley Cos., No. 22-046585-CZ-5 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
Saginaw Cnty. filed Feb. 17, 2022); Journagin v. Morley Cos., No.
1:22-cv-10443 (E.D. Mich. filed Feb. 28, 2022); Jackson v. Morley
Cos., No. 2:22-cv-10469 (E.D. Mich. filed Mar. 3, 2022)). The
Plaintiff's case is the fifth filed action of the group.

In March 2022, the Defendant filed a motion to stay the case
pending the resolution of the first-filed action: Thomsen. It
explained that it had met and conferred with the Plaintiff's
counsel in the federal cases and that the counsel in every case
except this one agreed to dismiss their case in favor of joining
Thomsen with an amended complaint. The goal, the Defendant
explained, was to channel the various cases into one action and
thus avoid "duplicative and overlapping litigation."

The Defendant argued that a stay was appropriate in the case
because the Plaintiff and the Thomsen plaintiffs asserted
substantially identical claims, and because the Plaintiff "stood to
lose nothing" from a stay. Specifically, the Defendant noted that
the Plaintiff "was a member of the putative class in Thomsen," that
"the statute of limitations on his claims was tolled," and that he
would "reap the rewards" of any favorable outcome in Thomsen.

The Plaintiff opposed the motion. He argued that his counsel were
the most experienced data-breach attorneys and that the Defendant's
motion was little more than an attempt to "lock them out." He also
acknowledged that any resolution in Thomsen would be "potentially
dispositive" of his class claims.

One month after the Defendant's motion to stay was filed, Defendant
and the Thomsen plaintiffs attended a voluntary mediation and
reached a tentative agreement to resolve the case. The parties then
stipulated to an order setting dates for a second-amended complaint
and a motion for preliminary approval of the settlement.

After the new dates in Thomsen were entered, the Defendant filed a
supplemental motion to stay the case. It argued that, with the
prospect of settlement now looming over Thomsen, there was no need
to continue litigating this case, particularly when considering
that Plaintiff could simply opt out of the settlement and pursue
his claims individually. The Plaintiff apparently informed the
Defendant that he would "likely oppose" its supplemental motion,
but he has not filed a response brief.

Having reviewed the parties' briefing, Judge Ludington finds that a
hearing is unnecessary and proceeds to decide the Defendant's
motions on the papers.

II. Discussion

Judge Ludington explains that the power to stay proceedings is
incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the causes in its docket. Yet courts must "tread
carefully in granting a stay of proceedings, since a party has a
right to a determination of its rights and liabilities without
undue delay."  "Where the stay motion is premised on the alleged
significance of another case's imminent disposition, courts have
considered [1] the potential dispositive effect of the other case,
[2] the judicial economy achieved by awaiting adjudication of the
other case, [3] the public welfare, and [4] the relative hardships
to the parties created by withholding judgment," citing Caspar v.
Snyder, 77 F.Supp.3d 616, 644 (E.D. Mich. 2015).

Judge Ludington holds that the Defendant's motion will be granted
because each of the four Caspar factors weighs in favor of a stay.
As to the first factor, he holds that a resolution in Thomsen
would, at the very least, resolve all but one of the Plaintiff's
class claims -- claim for violation of Michigan's Consumer
Protection Act (MCPA). As to the second factor, he finds that
allowing the Plaintiff's case to proceed would likely result in
"wholly unnecessary and wholly duplicative litigation." With
respect to the third factor, Judge Ludington opines that a stay
would more likely than not promote the public welfare as a stay
would merely allow the Court and the parties to focus limited
resources on a single, streamlined case. As to the last factor, he
holds that the only hardship that the Plaintiff might suffer from a
stay is some delay in the disposition of his claims if the
settlement is rejected or he excludes himself from it. Though
noteworthy, such contingent hardship is clearly outweighed by the
hardship that the Defendant would bear in defending two
substantially identical class actions.

For these reasons, the balance of the equities weighs in favor of
staying the case pending preliminary and final approval of the
settlement in Thomsen.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Ludington grants the Defendant's Motion to Stay
and Supplemental Motion to Stay. He stays the case pending
preliminary and final approval of the settlement in Thomsen.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 22, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3ptt4vpf from Leagle.com.


NERVEST ENERGY: $17.3MM Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Chieftain Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHIEFTAIN ROYALTY COMPANY, on its behalf and as
representative of a class of similarly situated royalty owners,
Plaintiff v. ENERVEST ENERGY INSTITUTIONAL FUND XIII-A, L.P, et
al., Defendants, and CHARLES DAVID NUTLEY, et al., Objectors, Case
No. CIV-11-177-D (W.D. Okla.), Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma grants the
Class Counsel's Renewed Motion for Approval of Attorneys' Fees from
Common Fund.

The Court awarded the class counsel an attorney fee of $17,333,333
to be paid from the settlement fund in accordance with the terms of
the settlement agreement.

I. Introduction

The matter comes before the Court on the Class Counsel's Renewed
Motion for Approval of Attorneys' Fees from Common Fund. The Motion
is supported by a Memorandum of Law and a voluminous record
consisting of the following evidentiary materials: Declaration of
Bradley E. Beckworth and Robert N. Barnes on Behalf of Class
Counsel; separate declarations by each attorney on behalf of their
respective law firms, Nix, Patterson & Roach, LLP and Barnes &
Lewis, LLP; declarations of other attorneys at these law firms who
worked on the case; the declaration of appellate counsel, Daniel
Volchok of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, LLP; the attorneys'
time records; the declarations of numerous legal experts and class
members who provide opinions in support of the Motion; a
declaration of the Plaintiff's president, Robert Abernathy; and the
previously approved Settlement Agreement.

Objectors Charles David Nutley and Danny George oppose the Motion.
Their only submission is a one-page summary of an Oklahoma Bar
Association membership survey conducted in 2013. The class counsel
has replied to George's brief and Nutley's brief. Also, the parties
filed supplemental briefs regarding the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
decision in Strack v. Continental Resources, Inc., 2021 OK 21, 507
P.3d 609 (Okla. 2021). Thus, the Motion is fully briefed.

II. Background

The Plaintiff represents a certified class of oil and gas royalty
owners who settled underpayment claims in 2015 with five
Defendants, EnerVest Energy Institutional Fund XIII-A, L.P.,
EnerVest Energy Institutional Fund XIII-WIB, L.P., EnerVest Energy
Institutional Fund XIII-WIC, L.P., EnerVest Operating, LLC, and
FourPoint Energy, LLC. The Objectors appealed both the Order and
Judgment Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and the
Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees, Reimbursement of Litigation
Expenses and Case Contribution Award. The Tenth Circuit affirmed
the class action settlement but reversed the awards of attorney
fees and compensation to the class representative. As to attorney
fees, the court of appeals remanded for the Court to compute the
award under Oklahoma law and, under its view of Oklahoma law, to
use the lodestar method based on "detailed time records and
evidence as to the reasonable value for the services performed."

During the pendency of the Renewed Motion, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court decided Strack and provided controlling guidance on how to
determine class counsel's fee award under the Tenth Circuit's
mandate to apply Oklahoma law. First, the supreme court reaffirmed
an interpretation of the attorney-fee provision of Oklahoma's
class-action statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, Section 2023(G), applied
by lower courts: a percentage-of-the-fund method is authorized and
"valuable" to determine a reasonable fee in a common fund case.
Second, the supreme court directed that "courts should ensure the
reasonableness of the fee award involving a common fund by
comparing the fee based on a percentage calculation to what the
lodestar approach would produce." This comparison acts as a
cross-check on a reasonable fee award. Strack teaches that "a
court's goal in deciding attorney fee awards is to award a
reasonable fee, and a court should compare the results of both
methods to ensure it is awarding a reasonable fee in a common fund
class action."

As applied to the facts presented in Strack, the supreme court
concluded that a $19.92 million fee award computed as 40% of the
$49.8 million common fund based on a contingency fee agreement
between the class representatives and their attorneys yielded an
unreasonable amount. The court found that "an award of 40% of the
common fund was excessive when compared to (1) the average
percentage used in reported cases of 20% to 30%, and (2) the amount
owed to the class counsel for the actual time spent under the
lodestar calculation." The supreme court further found the lodestar
method used to cross-check the percentage fee was flawed because
the district court enhanced the lodestar by a multiplier of 3.17
without sufficient explanation and "based on nothing more than an
attempt to equate it to 40% of the common fund." By so doing, the
district court abused its discretion to determine a reasonable fee
in that case.

The class counsel seeks an attorney fee award of $17,333,333, which
is the same amount previously determined to be reasonable using a
percentage-based method and the federal-law factors of Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). After
applying the Johnson factors to the facts and evidence presented,
the Court found that 33 1/3 of the cash settlement amount of $52
million produced a reasonable fee for the class counsel's services.
The Court made no lodestar comparison; the class counsel did not
present evidence that permitted the use of a lodestar method.

The class counsel assert that the original fee award is justified
by a lodestar product of $8,236.561.50 enhanced by a 2.1 multiplier
that is supported by applying Oklahoma's statutory factors in
Section 2023(G)(4)(e) to the facts of the case. The Objectors
assert that the class counsel's request for the same award is
unreasonable because the hours claimed by the attorneys and their
hourly rates are excessive and because their legal work is not
properly documented.

III. Discussion

A. The Prior Percentage-Based Fee Award

The Tenth Circuit reversed the original fee award of $17,333,333
because it believed a percentage-based award was impermissible
under Oklahoma law and because the existing record was insufficient
to make a lodestar calculation. After Strack, the Court knows the
Tenth Circuit was wrong about percentage awards but correct to call
for an additional lodestar analysis. Accordingly, because the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has now approved the percentage-of-the-fund
method used in the case, the Court's prior findings regarding a
reasonable percentage-based award remain valid and are reaffirmed.

Considering the risk of recovery in the litigation, Judge Digiusti
finds that this factor weighs heavily in favor of the chosen
percentage. As explained by the class counsel, and not disputed by
Objectors, the risk in the case was multifaceted and substantial
due to the complexity of the factual and legal issues, the
difficulty of obtaining classwide relief for royalty owners
claiming under diverse leases, the unsettled nature of substantive
law on issues such as the "marketable product" rule, and the
mercurial nature of the oil and gas industry.

The Objectors urge the Court to revisit its prior decision in light
of statements in Strack regarding reasonable percentage awards.
They contend the percentage chosen by the Court is too high based
on the supreme court's observation that reported decisions reflect
an average percentage of 20-30% in common fund cases.

Judge DiGiusti is not persuaded that Strack requires a reduction of
the amount determined to be appropriate in the case based on the
particular facts and circumstances presented. As noted, the class
counsel's hard work and skilled advocacy achieved an excellent
result for the class. Further, the class counsel correctly notes
that the Court used only the $52 million cash settlement when
determining a percentage-based fee, but the award is effectively
31.5% of the total settlement value of $55 million when nearly $3
million in future benefits is considered. Judge DiGoiusti finds
this percentage is entirely reasonable under the facts of the
case.

The Court turns now to the remaining issues to be addressed under
the Tenth Circuit's mandate and the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
instruction in Strack to perform a lodestar cross-check.

B. The Lodestar Cross-Check

"The lodestar method for calculating fees is to 1) determine the
compensation based on the hours spent multiplied by an hourly rate,
and 2) enhance or decrease the fee through consideration of the
factors outlined in State ex rel. Burk v. City of Okla. City, 1979
OK 115. For class actions, thirteen factors "almost identical" to
those in Burk are provided by statute.

1. Computing the Lodestar

Upon consideration of all Objector's arguments, Judge DiGiusti
finds that the objections are unfounded and should be rejected. The
Court is intimately familiar with the case, which was pending on
its active docket for more than seven years; Objectors are relative
newcomers who appeared only after a settlement was reached. It was
through class counsel's prolonged effort, unique skill, and
substantial investment in the case that the class was able to
obtain a near-complete recovery of allegedly unpaid royalties.
Judge DiGiusti finds that the lodestar amount claimed by the class
counsel, with only a minor adjustment, is entirely justified and
reasonable. He thus finds a total lodestar sum of $8,044,667.75 for
14,235.49 hours of legal services.

2. Considering an Enhancement

To align a lodestar-based fee with the $17,333,333 percentage-based
fee would require a multiplier of 2.15. When considered solely for
the purpose of a cross-check on the reasonableness of a percentage
fee, mathematical precision is not required. However, even under an
exacting lodestar calculation, Judge DiGiust finds that a 2.15
multiplier is fully justified when the statutory factors are
applied to the facts of the case.

Taken together, Judge DiGiusti holds that the cumulative weight of
the statutory factors easily warrants a multiplier of 2.15 to the
class counsel's lodestar, and as a result, the lodestar cross-check
confirms the reasonableness of the percentage-based fee awarded to
the class counsel.

IV. Conclusion

Conclusion

For all these reasons, Judge DiGiusti finds that a reasonable
attorney-fee award to the class counsel is $17,333,333. The
original award is reinstated, to include reimbursement of expenses
of $470,605.75 that have remained unchallenged.

The Class Counsel's Renewed Motion for Approval of Attorneys' Fees
from Common Fund is granted, as set forth. The class counsel is
awarded an attorney fee of $17,333,333 to be paid from the
settlement fund in accordance with the terms of the settlement
agreement. The distribution of attorney fees among the class
counsel is a matter within their sole discretion.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 22, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/5h4n66n4 from Leagle.com.


NEW YORK UNIVERSITY: Court Refuses to Certify Class in De Leon Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NELCY MABEL GARCIA DE LEON, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NEW YORK UNIVERSITY,
Defendant, Case No. 21 Civ 05005 (CM) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Colleen
McMahon of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York denies the Plaintiff's motion to certify the proposed putative
class and to appoint her as the Lead Plaintiff and the Anastopoulo
Law Firm, LLC, as the Class Counsel.

I. Introduction

On June 7, 2021, Plaintiff De Leon, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, filed a complaint bringing the putative
class action against Defendant New York University ("NYU" or the
"University") alleging breach of its contractual obligations to
provide in-person instruction and access to campus facilities and
activities in connection with the University's decision to modify,
curtail, and cancel its activities for the spring 2020 semester in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Plaintiff brought claims for
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and for certain violations
of the New York General Business Laws ("NYGBL") seeking a pro-rata
refund of tuition and fees.

Presently before the court is the Plaintiff's motion to certify the
proposed putative class and to appoint her as the Lead Plaintiff
and the Anastopoulo Law Firm, LLC as the Class Counsel.

Specifically, the Plaintiff moves the court to certify the "Fees
Class," which she defines as all persons who paid fees for or on
behalf of students enrolled at New York University "who were
charged fees for services, facilities, resources, events and/or
activities for the spring 2020 Semester that were not provided in
whole or in part."

II. Background

The coronavirus arrived in New York City in early March 2020. In
accordance with state and local requirements imposed to "flatten
the curve" and stop the spread of the disease, universities
throughout the country moved classes online and curtailed and/or
canceled in-person activities and on-campus services. These
institutions have been met with an onslaught of lawsuits seeking
partial refunds of the tuition and fees that students pre-paid,
allegedly for in-person learning and other, non-academic services.

The Plaintiff's putative class action is one such lawsuit. It is
one of six brought against NYU in the Southern District of New
York.

Plaintiff De Leon was a full-time graduate student enrolled at NYU
for the spring 2020 semester with the University's Silver School of
Social work ("NYU Silver"), Rockland campus, before graduating in
the spring of 2020. The Plaintiff and other students based at the
Rockland campus have access to all of the services and
opportunities that the University offers, including services and
amenities offered at the New York City campus.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, NYU announced that, beginning
on March 11, 2020, all in-person classes were cancelled, and
courses would be taught remotely "across the University, including
throughout its New York City campus." On campus programs and
services were also curtailed, although the University staff found
new (virtual) ways to support its students with certain programming
and services.

The only two fees that the Plaintiff paid for the spring 2020
semester were two fees: Registration & Services Fees ("R&S Fees")
of $1,361 and the $30 Art Supply Fee for art supplies that she used
in her Creative Arts Therapy in Clinical Social Work class. It is
undisputed that NYU did not refund any of these fees. Because NYU
Silver's R&S Fees are described on its website as nonrefundable,
and because NYU continued to provide certain services associated
with those fees, the University did not refund R&S Fees.

The Plaintiff filed her Complaint on June 7, 2021. She brings the
action on behalf of herself and others similarly situated seeking
relief for harms allegedly arising from the University's decision
to suspend all in-person classes and all in-person university
sponsored events in March 2020 in response to COVID-19.

Defendant NYU moved to dismiss the Complaint in full and the Court
granted the motion in part. The claims based on the failure to
provide in-person learning were dismissed on the ground that the
Plaintiff failed to allege that NYU ever promised to provide
in-person learning in the exchange for the payment of tuition. The
NYGBL claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim. Finally,
the Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief was dismissed for
lack of standing; the Plaintiff did not and cannot allege any
continuing harm or threat of future harm because she graduated from
NYU at the end of the spring 2020 semester.

However, NYU's motion to dismiss the claims related to the payment
of fees in exchange for services and access to campus facilities
was denied.

So what remains of the Plaintiff's case is a breach of contract
claim and an unjust enrichment claim, both predicated on NYU's
failure to provide the services and access to facilities for which
the University accepted payment of various fees (the "Fees
Claims").

It is worth recounting that the Defendant also argued, in its
motion to dismiss the Complaint, that the Plaintiff lacked class
standing to assert claims related to NYU campuses that she did not
attend and programs in which she was not enrolled. While the Court
found that allegations in the Complaint were sufficient to give
rise to class standing at the pleading stage of the litigation, it
pointed out this did not mean that the Court would or could certify
the Plaintiff as the lead plaintiff representing a class of
students that includes students who were enrolled in other programs
or who attended other NYU campuses (specifically the main campus in
NYC). The Court anticipated that adequacy of representation would
be an issue when the motion to certify a class was made, because
the Plaintiff's experience as a student of the Rockland Campus
undoubtedly differed from the experience of students who attended
classes in New York City.

III. Discussion

The Plaintiff moves the Court to certify a "Fees Class," comprised
of all persons who paid fees for or on behalf of students enrolled
at New York University "who were charged fees for services,
facilities, resources, events and/or activities for the Spring 2020
Semester that were not provided in whole or in part."

Class certification is governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. To obtain class certification under Rule 23, "the
class proponent bears the burden of showing that each of the
requirements of subsection 23(a) -- numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation -- is, in fact,
satisfied.

Beyond the Rule 23(a) requirements, certification of the class must
also be deemed appropriate under one of the three Rule 23(b)
subcategories. The Plaintiff moves to certify the proposed putative
class under 23(b)(3) and 23(b)(2).

To certify a class for damages under Rule 23(b)(3), a court must
find "the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." To certify a
class for injunctive or declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2), a
court must find that "the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so
that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole."

Alternatively, the Plaintiff argues that class certification
pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4) is appropriate. Under the appropriate
circumstances, "an action may be brought or maintained as a class
action with respect to particular issues." Issue certification is
inappropriate "if, despite the presence of a common issue,
certification would not make the case more manageable." In addition
to the express requirements of Rule 23, the Second Circuit has
recognized an implied requirement that the class be
"ascertainable." Finally, if, after a "rigorous analysis" the court
finds that each of the requirements of Rule 23 are met, the court
may, in its discretion, certify the class.

A motion for class certification should not extend into a
protracted mini trial of substantial portions of the underlying
litigation, and courts must refrain from examining the underlying
merits of the case unless they are relevant to the class
certification requirements. Nonetheless, because the class
determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed
in the factual and legal issues comprising the cause of action, the
analysis may require the courts to "probe behind the pleadings" and
consider issues that "overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's
underlying claim." That is because the court is required to resolve
any factual disputes that are relevant to a finding on each Rule 23
requirement when deciding the certification motion. It is the
plaintiff who bears the burden of showing that Rule 23's
requirements are satisfied by at least a preponderance of the
evidence.

In the case, Judge McMahon holds that it is clear that the
Plaintiff is not an adequate representative of the proposed class,
and that her attorneys should not be allowed to serve as the class
counsel. First, the Plaintiff's claim for a refund thus has nothing
in common with the claim for a refund that might be asserted by a
student in the Law School, or the Stern School, or the
undergraduate school. Second, nothing in the record gives the Court
"absolute confidence" in either the Plaintiff's competence or her
loyalty to the proposed class. She is demonstrably not an adequate
class representative. Third, the counsel for the Plaintiff flouted
their discovery obligations and evidenced a clear disregard for
their responsibilities to the proposed putative class. The Proposed
class counsel is no more adequate than is the Plaintiff to
represent the proposed class. That alone dooms the motion for
certification.

Additionally, Judge McMahon finds that the Plaintiff's personal
claims are not typical of those of the proposed class members, and
individual questions with respect to each class member predominate
over any common issue that might exist (which is, in the opinion of
the Court, doubtful). The Plaintiff has not demonstrated, and
cannot demonstrate, that she suffered the same injury as every
other NYU student. She offered no evidence to support her base
assertion that any other students, let alone "all students," were
"uniformly impacted" by the shutdown and lack of fee refund that
she claims to have experienced. The putative class members in the
case have little in common except that they were enrolled in the
university in 2020 and paid some type of fee to some entity within
NYU for some purpose.

And of course, if the Plaintiff is unable to establish that she
suffered any injury at all -- a very real possibility in light of
NYU's contemporaneous evidence that contradicts her sketchy
deposition testimony about efforts to contact Student Health and
Career Counseling -- that would necessarily doom the claims of
other class members. The premise of the commonality and typicality
requirements is "where the lead plaintiff's claim fails, so too
will those of the class."

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, Judge McMahon denies the motion for class
certification and the accompanying motions for designation as the
Lead Plaintiff and the Class Counsel. Because the case cannot be
maintained as a class action -- and certainly not by the Plaintiff
-- the lone basis for federal jurisdiction disappears. For that
reason, the complaint is dismissed, albeit without prejudice. The
Plaintiff is free to bring her claim in a state court of competent
jurisdiction.

There remains in the case a motion for sanctions against the
Plaintiff's counsel -- Edward Toptani and his law firm Toptani Law
PPLC and Eric M. Poulin, Roy T. Willey, IV, Blake G. Abbott, and
Jarrett W. Withrow and their firm Anastopoulo Law Firm, LLC --
which will be fully briefed on July 1, 2022. So while the complaint
is dismissed, the Clerk of Court cannot yet close the matter. It
remains on the Court's docket for the sole purpose of deciding that
motion.

The Order constitutes the decision and order of the Court. It is a
written opinion.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the
motions at Docket Numbers 36 and 39, and to enter an order
dismissing the Complaint without prejudice for want of subject
matter jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 22, 2022 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5d3p3dub from Leagle.com.


NEW YORK: Settles Class Action Suits Over Transit Accessibility
---------------------------------------------------------------
Progressive Railroading reports that the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority announced it has settled two class-action
lawsuits brought against the New York City transit system for its
subway stations that are inaccessible to people with disabilities.

Under the terms of the agreement, MTA will add elevators or ramps
to create stair-free paths in 95% of the 346 currently inaccessible
subway and Staten Island Railway (SIR) rail stations by 2055. The
authority has committed to procuring contracts for accessibility
construction to be completed at 81 stations by 2025, another 85
stations by 2035, another 90 stations by 2045 and the remaining 90
stations by 2055. The settlement still needs court approval.

"This settlement is not just the unveiling of a game plan, but the
start of a closer collaboration between the MTA and advocates to
achieve our shared goal, to ensure that everyone has the ability to
ride mass transit without needing to plan around accessible
stations," said Quemel Arroyo, MTA's chief accessibility officer
and senior adviser.

Funds for a $5.2 billion accessibility upgrades program are
included in the 2020-24 MTA Capital Program.

MTA has 472 subway stations, plus 21 SIR stations. Only 131 subway
and SIR stations -- or 27% -- are fully accessible via elevators
and ramps. Nine stations that are only partially accessible are
also slated for upgrades. There are more than 1 million people with
disabilities living in the city.

MTA leadership has been criticized for being slow to address
accessibility concerns, reported The New York Times. Several
transit systems in the nation's largest cities are either
completely accessible or are more accessible than the MTA system,
including in San Francisco, Washington, D.C., Boston, Philadelphia
and Chicago.

Many subway lines have gaps of 10 or more stops between elevator
access. The lack of access to one of the nation's largest transit
systems has effectively blocked off some areas of the city from
being fully accessible, the Times reported.

A group of advocacy organizations, including Disabled in Action,
issued a lawsuit in 2017 claiming MTA's lack of accessibility was a
violation of the city's human rights laws. And in 2019, another
lawsuit on the federal level claimed the MTA was violating the
Americans with Disabilities Act when the agency renovated stations
without installing elevators or ramps. Later that year, MTA
officials approved the $5.2 billion capital plan to add elevators
to 70 stations by 2024.

The remaining 5% of stations that are not included in accessibility
upgrades have difficult engineering issues, making the addition of
elevators or ramps unfeasible. [GN]

NOVA SCOTIA: Faces Class Action Over Illegal Prison Practices
-------------------------------------------------------------
Shaina Luck, writing for CBC News (Canada), reports that a proposed
class-action lawsuit recently filed in Nova Scotia could see some
former inmates seeking compensation for a prison practice that's
been performed on federal prisoners for years, but which will soon
be illegal in Canada.

The practice is called "dry celling." It is a type of confinement
that critics have described as more restrictive and less regulated
than solitary confinement. Dry cells are used when guards suspect
an inmate of having swallowed contraband or hidden it in a body
cavity.

"It was humiliating. It was degrading," said Macquel Weatherbee,
one of the lead plaintiffs in the suit filed Wednesday, about her
experience.

"You don't feel like a human."

There is no running water or places with privacy in the dry cell
and the lights are always on. Inmates are watched by guards through
a window and monitored by security cameras, even while using a
toilet that doesn't flush. The expectation is that the prisoner
will expel the contraband in their waste.

Two Correctional Investigators of Canada have called for the
practice to be limited to a maximum of 72 hours.

And in a groundbreaking court case last year, former inmate Lisa
Adams and her lawyers successfully argued if the practice is used
to find contraband in a vagina, that discriminates against women
and people with vaginas as they may be detained longer.

                         Class action filed

Following the decision in the Adams case, Weatherbee and another
plaintiff from Nova Scotia came forward to co-lead a class action
for damages.

Weatherbee said that in 2017 she was an inmate at Nova Institution
for Women in Truro, N.S., when guards placed her in a dry cell on
suspicion she had pills in her vagina. She said she had hidden
cigarettes there for her own use and as a tool to negotiate with
other inmates.

"You don't know what time it is. You feel like an animal in a cage.
You don't have anything," she said.

At the end of five days, Weatherbee said she admitted to the
institution's warden that she had cigarettes. Two female guards
took her to a shower, watched her strip and instructed her to take
out the package.

"They asked me to lay on my back and spread my legs," Weatherbee
said. "I wouldn't do it. I said no."

"Even though, yes, we were in prison for crimes we committed,
humans still do not deserve to be treated like that. Prison is
supposed to be about rehabilitation, and there's no way a person
can rehabilitate from that."

Weatherbee completed her three-year sentence in 2018, which was
connected to a conviction for armed robbery, possession of a weapon
for a dangerous purpose, and disguise with intent for covering her
face.

"There was drugs involved. There was alcohol involved. I was a lot
younger," Weatherbee said in an interview in June. Since being
released from prison she has had a daughter, and she also has two
older children. She has completed a course in esthetics and started
a nail salon.

Through therapy, Weatherbee said, she's started to process these
events -- and she believes there should be alternatives to dry
celling, such as body scanners or X-rays. She says she asked for an
X-ray but was told it was too expensive.

In a decision last year, a Nova Scotia Supreme Court judge ruled
this type of dry celling is unconstitutional and discriminates on
the basis of sex, giving the federal government until May 2022 to
come up with a new law.

Justice John Keith noted that while dry cell detention is not an
"appropriate response to suspected contraband carried in a vagina,"
his decision should not be interpreted to mean that carrying
contraband is "suddenly permissible."

"Carrying contraband in a vagina represents a very serious threat
to security, health, and safety within a prison; and it remains an
offence under the CCRA [Corrections and Conditional Release Act],"
he wrote in his decision issued in November 2021.
Seeking damages

In court documents, Weatherbee and the other plaintiffs said
they're seeking damages for a breach of their charter rights as the
judge outlined in the Adams decision. The plaintiffs' statements
have not yet been tested in court.

The Correctional Service of Canada responded that it will take time
to review the claim and will respond "in due course through the
appropriate channels." It did not provide any comment on the
specific allegations Weatherbee raised.

It has not yet had time to file a statement of defence in response
to the lawsuit's allegations. The proposed class action must still
be certified by a judge in order to proceed.

Weatherbee and the other representative plaintiff Sarah Johnson are
being represented by a coalition of lawyers from the Elizabeth Fry
Society and a private law firm called Valent Legal, funded by a
private charitable foundation called Northpine.

"If you infringe on one person's charter rights, you infringe on
everybody's charter rights," said Mike Dull, one of the coalition's
lawyers. "If she's entitled to remedy, everybody similarly situated
is also entitled to remedy. So, really, this follows on the heels
of that really important precedent-setting decision."

Adams, who brought the original case that ruled dry celling
violates charter rights, said she's excited to see others challenge
the practice through the lawsuit.

"I'm glad that other women who may have had similar experiences to
me can get their voices heard and be able to make a difference in
their own life."

Dull said the team has already been in contact with "dozens" of
people who have expressed interest in the suit.
Budget to make changes

In the federal budget presented in April, the government
acknowledged that the Corrections and Conditional Release Act
(CCRA) needs to be amended to bring it "into compliance with the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms."

In the government's omnibus budget bill, which is in the final
stages of becoming law, the government said it would amend the CCRA
to prohibit federal prisons from putting inmates in dry cells if
guards suspect the inmates have contraband in the vagina.

As of April 28, Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) said in a
statement, the commissioner has directed staff that dry cells are
no longer to be used for inmates believed to be carrying contraband
anywhere other than in the digestive tract.

As well, CSC said body scan technology is permitted under the
amendments to the legislation, and it is implementing a pilot
project to use the scanners in its prisons.

The Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies has been
lobbying the government on the issue of dry cells, said Emilie
Coyle, the association's executive director.

"When we delved deeper into the proposed amendments we saw that
they were quite narrow, and so they didn't go as far as we had
hoped," she said.

Coyle has been urging the government to make a further amendment
that incorporates body scanners or X-rays and the kind of policies
used to regulate solitary confinement. She said ultimately the
association would like to see the practice of dry celling ended
altogether. [GN]

QUICK LUBE: Faces Sumpter Suit Over Unpaid Wages, Retaliation
-------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER SUMPTER, individually and on behalf of all similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff v. QUICK LUBE DEVELOPMENT 2 LLC, d.b.a.
TAKE 5 OIL CHANGE, Defendant, Case No. 1:22-cv-02515-JPB (N.D. Ga.,
June 23, 2022) is a collective action complaint against the
Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing
to pay Plaintiff and similarly situated employees proper overtime
wages and by terminating Plaintiff in retaliation for complaining
about his improper wages.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendant as a lube technician from
November 2021 until his termination on April 19, 2022.

Quick Lube Development 2 LLC operates lubricant business in
Georgia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gordon Van Remmen, Esq.
          HALL & LAMPROS, LLP
          400 Galleria Parkway, Suite 1150
          Atlanta, GA 30339
          Telephone: (404) 876-8100
          Facsimile: (404) 876-3477
          E-mail: gordon@hallandlampros.com

RAY JONES: Court Grants Back's Bid for Conditional Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SAMUEL BACK, Plaintiff v. RAY JONES TRUCKING, INC., et
al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 4:22-CV-00005-JHM (W.D. Ky.),
Judge Joseph H. McKinley of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky, Owensboro Division, issued a Memorandum
Opinion and Order:

   a. granting Back's Motion for Conditional Certification; and
   b. denying the Defendants' Motion for Expedited Discovery.

I. Background

Defendant Ray Jones employed the Plaintiff Back as a truck driver.
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's ("FMCSA") records
list Ray Jones's carrier operations as "Intrastate Only." This
classification comes from Ray Jones' own submission of Form
MCS-150.

The form defines an "Intrastate Carrier" as a company whose
business operations "never crosses state lines"; "never moves from
the United States to a foreign country" and "never passes through
another State or foreign country during transport." Conversely,
MCS-150 defines an "Interstate Carrier" as a company who
"transports property or passengers in support of interstate
commerce, i.e., the property or passengers cross State lines before
the company received them, while the company is transporting them,
or after the company has transferred the property or passengers."

Ray Jones' drivers haul coal and other materials. For compensation,
the company pays drivers a percentage of the company's earnings
from each delivery. These deliveries allegedly require drivers to
work over 40 hours some weeks. When a driver exceeds 40 hours
worked in a given week, Ray Jones pays them the normal rate for
their delivery.

Mr. Back's Complaint alleges Ray Jones improperly denied overtime
compensation to these drivers. He brings two counts: (1) a claim
under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") for nonpayment of
overtime compensation, and (2) a class action claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and Kentucky state law for nonpayment of
wages. Alongside Ray Jones, Back named Teresa Jones, Grant Jones,
and Steve Jones -- the company's directors, part-owners, and
managing agents -- as Defendants

Mr. Back now moves for conditional certification to facilitate
notice under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b). He seeks to send notice to:
All persons who were employed by Ray Jones Trucking, Inc. as a
truck driver and were not paid overtime compensation for work
performed in excess of 40 hours in one or more work weeks within
the three years preceding this notice.

In response, the Defendants filed a Motion for Expedited Discovery,
requesting a 90-day period for the parties to undergo discovery on
the "limited issue of whether the purported class members
transported goods in interstate commerce, and therefore, would have
been properly classified as exempt."

II. Discussion

A. Expedited Discovery

While two-step certification is the most common method for
notifying the collective in FLSA actions, the Defendants prefer a
single-step approach. Instead, the Defendants ask the Court for a
90-day period to conduct limited discovery on the issue of whether
the collective would be "similarly situated" to Back. They advocate
a single-step determination before the Court facilitates notice to
the collective, citing Swale v. KLLM Transport Service, LLC, 985
F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2021).

According to the Fifth Circuit, "a district court should identify,
at the outset of the case, what facts and legal considerations will
be material to determine whether a group of 'employees' is
'similarly situated.' And then it should authorize preliminary
discovery accordingly."

But, according to Judge McKinley the Court has previously rejected
Swale's method in favor of the traditional two-step approach,
finding the latter better implements Hoffman-La Roche's guidance.
Moreover, courts within the Sixth Circuit regularly implement the
two-tiered approach.

Again, the Court favors the traditional two-step certification
approach. In its recent opinion in McClurg v. Dallas Jones
Enterprises Inc., the Court considered that the employer -- not the
potential plaintiffs -- possessed the relevant government forms,
haul records, and employee timekeeping records. Furthermore, it
contrasted the "significant discovery before the conditional
certification motion" that had occurred in Swales with the fact
that a scheduling order had not yet been entered. Those factors
apply equally in the present case. Judge McKinley denies the
Defendants' Motion for Expedited Discovery.

B. Conditional Certification

Back seeks conditional certification so he may send notice to "all
persons who were employed by Ray Jones Trucking, Inc. as a truck
driver and were not paid overtime compensation for work performed
in excess of forty hours in one or more work weeks within the three
years preceding this notice." To succeed, he must prove his
"position is similar, not identical, to the positions held by the
putative class members."

The Plaintiffs are similarly situated if they "suffer from a
single, FLSA-violating policy, and when proof of that policy proves
a violation as to all the Plaintiffs," or when their claims are
"unified by common theories of the Defendants' statutory
violations." At the conditional certification stage, however, "a
court 'does not generally consider the merits of the claims,
resolve factual disputes, or evaluate credibility.'"

The primary dispute in the case is whether the FLSA's Motor
Carrier's Act ("MCA") exemption applies to Back and other Ray Jones
truck drivers. That exemption states the FLSA will not apply to
"any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation
has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service
pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of Title 49."

Judge McKinley finds Back has made a "modest factual showing" that
the other members of the potential collective are similarly
situated in that: (1) Ray Jones employed them on an "intrastate"
basis; (2) some drivers—like Back—worked in excess of forty
hours a week; (3) Ray Jones compensated them based on loads
delivered; and (4) it not pay them overtime wages.

To defeat conditional certification, the Defendants retort that any
employee "who drove intrastate but transported goods that left
[the] Commonwealth within a short period of time after delivery is
not a proper class member." Even if true, the Defendants' own
representations suggest no such employees exist; on its MCS-150,
Ray Jones did not classify itself as an "Interstate" carrier,
defined as a company that transports property that "crosses State
lines either before the company received them or after the company
has transferred them." Thus, all evidence indicates Ray Jones
operates exclusively intrastate and, therefore, would not fall
under the FLSA's MCA exception.

Lastly, the Defendants oppose conditional certification on the
grounds that Back has not identified a "numerous" class.

This argument is misplaced, Judge McKinley holds. At this stage,
the Court's only consideration is whether all potential opt-in
plaintiffs were subject to the same policy." Back successfully
alleges they were. Back's allegations indicate Ray Jones "engaged
in a single, FLSA-violating policy -- a company-wide policy of
classifying its truck drivers as exempt under the Motor Carrier's
Act despite the fact that Ray Jones strictly operates in intrastate
commerce." As such, Judge McKinley grants Back's Motion for
Conditional Certification.

C. Content of the Notice

"After determining that conditional certification is warranted, the
Court must address the substance of the notice to be sent to
similarly situated employees." The Court serves an oversight role
to ensure notice is "timely, accurate, and informative," but must
"take care to avoid even the appearance of judicial endorsement of
the merits." "The purpose of notice is simply to inform potential
class members of their rights. Once they receive that information,
it is their responsibility to act as they see fit."

Back tendered a proposed notice and consent form to the Court.
Except for case-specific details, these documents mirror the ones
the Court approved in McClurg. Since the Defendants do not object
to the forms' proposed language, Judge McKinley approves Back's
notice in full.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Judge McKinley grants Back's
Motion for Conditional Certification and denies the Defendants'
Motion for Expedited Discovery.

Judge McKinley directs the Defendants to deliver to Back by email,
within 10 days of his Order, a spreadsheet in Microsoft Excel
Format containing the following information for all potential FLSA
collective members: (a) last name, (b) first name, (c) last known
email address, and (d) last known mailing address. Within 10 days
of Back's receipt of the information from the Defendants, Back will
disseminate the approved notice and consent form documents to all
putative members of the collective via United States mail and
email.

Judge McKinley approves the use of Back's proposed notice of
collective action lawsuit and consent to become to party plaintiff.
forms. Back will insert the applicable dates, as contemplated in
the sections indicated by brackets in the approved form. He will
concurrently send a copy of the Notice to Defendants.

Within two business days of the sending of the Notice, the
Defendants will post the Notice at
conspicuous-to-truck-driver-employee locations at all facilities
operated by the Defendants, including the facility at 3296 State
Route 181 South, Greenville, KY 42345. The Defendants will keep the
Notice so posted until 60 days following the sending of the
Notice.

The email will be from Back's counsel's email address and will have
the title "Court Approved Notice in Samuel Back v. Ray Jones
Trucking, Inc., et al." The email will state the employee's name
(e.g., "Mr. Smith:"), and will then state "Attached to this email
is a Notice which has been approved by the United States District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky and which is being sent
to you as a current or former employee of Ray Jones Trucking, Inc.
Please review the attached Notice."

This language will be followed by Back's counsel's email signature
block, which will be as follows: Mark N. Foster Law Office of Mark
N. Foster, PLLC P.O. Box 869 Madisonville, KY 42431 (270) 213-1303
MFoster@MarkNFoster.com

The email will attach a PDF format copy of the Notice (the title of
the PDF document will be "Court Approved Notice") and will also
separately attach a PDF copy of the Consent Form (the title of the
PDF document will be "Consent Form").

If the United States Postal Service returns notices to Back's
counsel indicating that the United States Postal Service cannot
deliver the mailing, as addressed, and Back's counsel has not
received email communication from the employee in response to any
email sent to the employee, the following will occur:

      (a) Back's counsel will within three days inform the
Defendants by email that the mailing has been returned. The
Defendants will then review its information for the employee at
issue and the Defendants' counsel will then, within three days of
Back's email, notify Back's counsel of any other address or
addresses that the Defendants have for the person in question or
notify Back's counsel that the address previously provided is the
only address the Defendants have for the person in question. Back's
counsel shall, if the Defendants identify one or more address for
the person in question, re-send the Notice to said new address
within three days of receiving the new address from the Defendants
and will inform the Defendants' counsel by email within three days
of such re-sending that Back's counsel has done so.

      (b) If the notation from the United States Postal Service
indicates another address which may be used to send mail to the
person in question, Back will re-send the notice to said address
within three days of receiving the mailing back from the United
States Postal Service and will inform the Defendants' counsel that
by email within three days of such resending that Back's counsel
has done so.

      (c) If the Defendants state that they have no other address
for the person in question and the notification from the United
States Postal Service does not include any other address which may
be used to send mail to the person in question, Back may, within 10
days of receiving such mailing back from the United States Postal
Service, resend the mailing to such additional address as Back is
able to determine utilizing internet searching and/or person
location information services, and will inform the Defendants'
counsel by email within three days of such re-sending that Back's
counsel has done so.

      (d) In the event that the initial mailing and a subsequent
mailing are returned with respect to a particular person, Back's
counsel and the Defendants' counsel will confer in good faith to
determine whether there are other possible and reasonable methods
for Back to provide the Notice to such individuals and, if so,
utilize such methods. If the parties, after conferring, cannot
agree on whether a particular method should be used, either party
may file a motion relating to the disputed issue.

Mr. Back will file all Consent Forms received from members of the
conditionally certified collective promptly upon receipt by his
counsel, and, in any event, within five days of receipt.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 22, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/mpa4232y from
Leagle.com.


REFLEKTIONS LTD: Class Settlement in Thornburg Suit Wins Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Kiley Thornburg, et al., Plaintiffs v. Reflektions,
Ltd., Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-3905 (S.D. Ohio), Judge Michael
H. Watson of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, Eastern Division, grants the parties' joint motion for
approval of their settlement agreement.

Representative Plaintiffs Kiley Thornburg, Karcy Reymer, and
Stephanie Dura brought the action against Reflektions for various
relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the Ohio
Minimum Wage Standards Act. The Representative Plaintiffs allege
that the Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to properly pay an
overtime premium to employees who were paid on an hourly basis and
who worked more than forty total hours in any workweek. The
Defendant denies these allegations.

Before the conditional certification process started, the parties
agreed to stay the case to "explore the possibility of an early
resolution." They have settled the Plaintiffs' claims and move for
approval of their settlement agreement.

After a careful review of the proposed settlement agreement, Judge
Watson finds that the settlement agreement is a fair, reasonable,
and adequate resolution of a bona fide legal dispute between the
parties. He says, there is a bona fide dispute in the case as the
parties dispute liability and the amount thereof. There is no
indication that the settlement was reached by anything other than
arms' length negotiations between counsel. The settlement will
avoid expensive litigation for both sides, including formal
discovery, dispositive motions, trial, and possible appeals.
Although the parties did not engage in formal discovery, Judge
Watson finds that the parties reviewed compensation information,
including payroll data and schedules, to reasonably approximate the
alleged potential damages.

Although the parties dispute both the existence and amount of
unpaid overtime, the Plaintiffs' counsel declares that it is
"unlikely that any Claimant who opts-in to join the lawsuit will
receive less than 100% of the wages alleged owed to that Claimant."
The Representative Plaintiffs will each receive a service award in
addition to their individual payments: $7,500 to Kiley Thornburg,
$2,500 to Karcy Reymer, and $2,500 to Stephanie Dura. All of these
payments are reasonable.

Moreover, attorneys' fees in the amount of $75,000 represent
approximately one-third of the total settlement amount and are
reasonable. It is also reasonable for the Plaintiffs' counsel to be
compensated for their out-of-pocket costs.

Accordingly, the parties' joint motion is approved, and the
Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed with prejudice. The Court retains
jurisdiction over the action to enforce the terms of the
Settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 22, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/bdhnjkrb from Leagle.com.


ROMAN FINANCIAL: Smith Sues Over Unwanted Telephone Calls
---------------------------------------------------------
STEWART SMITH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. ROMAN FINANCIAL GROUP LLC, and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, and each of them, Case No. 2:22-cv-04285-SB-E (E.D. Pa.,
June 22, 2022) contends that the Defendant promotes and markets its
merchandise, in part, by placing unwanted phone calls to wireless
phone users, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.

According to the complaint, beginning on or about December 4, 2020,
the Plaintiff received calls from Defendant on Plaintiff's cellular
telephone number ending in -6860, in an attempt to solicit
Plaintiff to purchase Defendant's services. Specifically, the
Defendant called Plaintiff on December 4, 2020, December 10, 2020,
and four times on December 17, 2020. Additionally, during this
time, Defendants began to use Plaintiff's cellular telephone for
the purpose of sending Plaintiff a spam advertisement and/or
promotional offer, via text message, including two text messages
sent to and received by Plaintiff on or about December 17, 2020
from Defendants, says the suit.

The Plaintiff, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, brings this Complaint for damages, injunctive relief, and
any other available legal or equitable remedies, resulting from the
illegal actions of the Defendant in negligently, knowingly, and/or
willfully contacting Plaintiff on Plaintiff's cellular telephone,
thereby violating the TCPA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (323) 306-4234
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com

SIMON ROOFING: Faces White FLSA Suit Over Unpaid OT in S.D.N.Y.
---------------------------------------------------------------
DEVONTA WHITE, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SIMON ROOFING AND SHEET METAL CORP.,
Defendant, Case No. 4:22-cv-01074 (N.D. Ohio, June 20, 2022) is a
class action against the Defendant for its failure to compensate
the Plaintiff and similarly situated employees overtime pay for all
hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek in violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendant as an hourly, non-exempt
employee within the past three years.

Simon Roofing and Sheet Metal Corp. is a commercial roofing and
surfaces company, with its principal place of business located at
70 Karago Ave., Youngstown, Ohio. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
         NILGES DRAHER LLC
         7034 Braucher Street NW, Suite B
         North Canton, OH 44720
         Telephone: (330) 470-4428
         Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
         E-mail: sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com

                 - and –

         Jeffrey J. Moyle, Esq.
         NILGES DRAHER LLC
         1360 E. 9th Street, Suite 808
         Cleveland, OH 44114
         Telephone: (216) 230-2955
         Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
         E-mail: jmoyle@ohlaborlaw.com

SOCLEAN INC: Gemelli Class Suit Moved From M.D. Fla. to W.D. Pa.
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled RALPH GEMELLI, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. SOCLEAN, INC., Case No. 8:22-cv-01312,
was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida to the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania on June 22, 2022.

The Clerk of Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-00923-JFC to the proceeding.

The case arises from the Defendant's alleged breach of express
warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, fraudulent
misrepresentation, fraud by omission, negligent misrepresentation,
unjust enrichment, and violations of Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act by failing to disclose to consumers that its
continuous positive airway pressure cleaning device emits ozone.

SoClean, Inc. is a manufacturer of cleaning devices, with its
principal place of business in Peterborough, New Hampshire. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Katherine Earle Yanes, Esq.
         KYNES MARKMAN & FELMAN
         P.O. Box 3396
         Tampa, FL 33601-3396
         Telephone: (813) 229-1118
         E-mail: kyanes@kmf-law.com

                 - and –

         Ruth Anne French-Hodson, Esq.
         Sarah T. Bradshaw, Esq.
         SHARP LAW FIRM
         4820 W. 75th St.
         Prairie Village, KS 66208
         Telephone: (913) 901-0505
         E-mail: rafrenchhodson@midwest-law.com
                 sbradshaw@midwest-law.com

                 - and –

         Gary E. Mason, Esq.
         Danielle L. Perry, Esq.
         MASON LLP
         5101 Wisconsin Ave., Suite 305
         Washington, DC 20016
         Telephone: (202) 429-2290
         E-mail: gmason@masonllp.com
                 dperry@masonllp.com

SOCLEAN INC: Meles Files Suit Over Harmful CPAP Cleaning Machines
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MARK MELES, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. SOCLEAN, INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:22-cv-02354-GAM
(E.D.N.Y., June 15, 2022) is brought against the Defendant for
breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud by omission,
negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and violations of
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
arising from the Defendant's misrepresentations of its continuous
positive airway pressure (CPAP) machines.

According to the complaint, SoClean concealed and omitted material
information on the presence and risk of ozone exposure from its
devices. SoClean's marketing materials fail to disclose that its
devices emit ozone, which is a longstanding requirement of federal
law. Instead, SoClean falsely represents that its devices use
"activated oxygen" to clean CPAP machines. SoClean markets the
devices as "safe" and "healthy," which is false given that they
generate toxic ozone gas at levels that substantially exceed
federal regulations, says the suit.

These alleged misrepresentations, concealment, half-truths, and
omissions are made more egregious because the SoClean devices are
designed and marketed for use on the consumer's bedside table and
because CPAP users suffer from many symptoms that ozone exposure
exacerbates - making the falsehoods especially reprehensible and
dangerous, added the suit.

The Plaintiff purchased a SoClean 2 device to clean his Philips
CPAP machine in around 2017, considering efficiency and his safety
when making his purchasing decisions.

SoClean, Inc. manufactures cleaning devices with its principal
place of business in Peterborough, New Hampshire.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Shub, Esq.
          Kevin Laukaitis, Esq.
          SHUB LAW FIRM LLC
          134 Kings Hwy E., Fl. 2
          Haddonfield, NJ 08033
          Telephone: (856) 772-7200
          E-mail: jshub@shublawyers.com
                  klaukaitis@shublawyers.com

               - and -

          Ruth Anne French-Hodson, Esq.
          Sarah T. Bradshaw, Esq.
          SHARP LAW FIRM
          4820 W. 75th St.
          Prairie Village, KS 66208
          Telephone: (913) 901-0505
          E-mail: rafrenchhodson@midwest-law.com
                  sbradshaw@midwest-law.com

               - and -

          Gary E. Mason, Esq.
          Danielle L. Perry, Esq.
          MASON LLP
          5101 Wisconsin Ave., Suite 305
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: (202) 429-2290
          E-mail: gmason@masonllp.com
                  dperry@masonllp.com

SOCLEAN INC: Vernon Sues Over Ozone Containing Sanitizing Machine
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DALE VERNON, SR., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SOCLEAN, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:22-cv-1129 (N.D. Ohio, June 27, 2022) alleges that the Defendant
concealed and omitted material information on the presence and risk
of ozone exposure from the SoClean 2 CPAP Sanitizing Machine, the
SoClean 2 Go CPAP Sanitizing machine, and their predecessor devices
(collectively "the SoClean devices").

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that SoClean's marketing
materials fail to disclose that its devices emit ozone, which is a
longstanding requirement of federal law. Instead, SoClean falsely
represents that its devices use "activated oxygen" to clean CPAP
machines. SoClean markets the devices as "safe" and "healthy,"
which is false give that they generate toxic ozone gas at levels
that substantially exceed federal regulations. SoClean falsely
represents that its devices use "no water or chemicals" or "no
harsh chemicals" to clean CPAP machines, despite using ozone gas
– a harsh chemical that causes respiratory problems in humans,
says the suit.

SoClean represents that its devices use the same sanitizing process
found in "hospital sanitizing," however, hospitals cannot and do
not use ozone sanitizers in spaces occupied by patients. SoClean
also claims that separately sold filters convert "activated oxygen"
into "regular oxygen," which is false because SoClean's filters
have no measurable effect
on the device's ozone output. Finally, SoClean falsely claims that
its devices are "sealed" such that "activated oxygen", i.e., ozone,
does not escape the devices, the suit added.

The Plaintiff asserts that he was unaware that these products
emitted ozone, and would not have purchased the device or paid as
much for it if that information was fully disclosed.

SOCLEAN, INC. manufactures cleaning devices. The Company produces
automated continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) cleaners and
sanitizers which improves health outcomes and quality of life for
those suffering from obstructive sleep apnea and other sleeping
disorders. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey S. Goldenberg, Esq.
          GOLDENBERG SCHNEIDER, L.P.A.
          4445 Lake Forest Drive, Suite 490
          Cincinnati, OH 45242
          Tel: (513) 345-8297
          Email: jgoldenberg@gs-legal.com

               -and-

          Ruth Anne French-Hodson, Esq.
          Sarah T. Bradshaw, Esq.
          SHARP LAW FIRM
          4820 W. 75th St.
          Prairie Village, KS 66208
          Telephone: (913) 901-0505
          Email: rafrenchhodson@midwest-law.com
                 sbradshaw@midwest-law.com

               -and-

          Gary E. Mason, Esq.
          Danielle L. Perry, Esq.
          MASON LLP
          5101 Wisconsin Ave., Suite 305
          Washington, DC 20016
          Tel: (202) 429-2290
          Email: gmason@masonllp.com
                 dperry@masonllp.com

               -and-

          Ronald Verdell Johnson, IV, Esq.
          Russell L. Johnson, Esq.
          DEAKLE-JOHNSON LAW FIRM, PLLC
          P.O. Box 2072
          Hattiesburg, MS 39403
          Tel: (601) 544-0631
          Email: rljohnson@djlawms.com
                 rvjohsnon@djlawms.com

SOLO FUNDS: Faces Isom Suit Over Illegal Debt Collection Practices
------------------------------------------------------------------
RYAN ISOM, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SOLO FUNDS INC, Defendant, Case No.
CACE-22-009263 (Fla. Cir., 17th Judicial, Broward Cty., June 23,
2022) is brought against the Defendant for violations of the
Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant sent an electronic
communication to Plaintiff in connection with the collection of the
consumer debt. The communication was sent to Plaintiff between the
hours of 9:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. in the time zone of the Plaintiff.
The Defendant did not have the Plaintiff's consent to communicate
with him during those hours. Accordingly, the Defendant violated
Section 559.72(17) of the FCCPA, alleges the suit.

Solo Funds Inc. provides money lending and borrowing services. The
Company allows members to access and supply short-term funds for
immediate needs.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jennifer G. Simil, Esq.
          Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI
          110 SE 6th Street, Suite 1744
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 907-1136   
          E-mail: jen@jibraellaw.com
                  jibrael@jibraellaw.com

STEAK 'N SHAKE: Court Dismisses Bremmer's Claims From Berry Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TAMEKA BERRY and KIMBERLY WALL, individually and on
behalf of all similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs v. STEAK 'N
SHAKE INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-02932-JMS-MPB (S.D. Ind.),
Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, grants Steak
'n Shake's Partially Opposed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Kiana
Bremmer with Prejudice.

I. Introduction

On Nov. 9, 2020, Plaintiffs Berry and Wall initiated the present
action against Defendant Steak 'n Shake on behalf of themselves and
other similarly situated current and former Steak 'n Shake tipped
employees ("Servers") under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),
29 U.S.C. Section 201, et seq. On Aug. 25, 2021, Kiana Bremmer
joined the present case as an opt-in Plaintiff, but has
subsequently failed to respond to discovery.

Presently before the Court is Steak 'n Shake's Partially Opposed
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Kiana Bremmer with Prejudice, which
seeks dismissal of Ms. Bremmer with prejudice, or in the
alternative, dismissal of Ms. Bremmer without prejudice and an
order from the Court barring her from joining Brown v. Steak 'n
Shake Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-04474-SEG (N.D. Ga.) ("the Related
Case").

In support of its Motion, Steak 'n Shake has indicated that the
Plaintiffs' counsel opposes Ms. Bremmer's dismissal with prejudice
but has not objected to Ms. Bremmer's dismissal without prejudice
or to the exclusion of Ms. Bremmer from any notice authorized in
the Related Case. The Plaintiffs did not further respond to Steak
'n Shake's Motion and the time to do so has now passed.

II. Background

The Plaintiffs allege that they were employed as Servers by Steak
'n Shake, where they worked in excess of forty hours per week. They
are entitled to "at least the applicable FLSA minimum wage and
overtime rates of pay for hours worked per week within weekly pay
periods." Steak 'n Shake utilized a "tip-credit compensation
program" ("the Policy")  in which Servers were paid below the FLSA
minimum wage rate of at least $7.25 per hour ("the Minimum Wage
Rate") but the Servers' tips were credited towards the Minimum Wage
Rate. If Servers' combined tips and hourly wage did not equal the
Minimum Wage Rate, Steak 'n Shake would "supplement" the Severs'
pay to equal the Minimum Wage Rate.

However, in practice, Steak 'n Shake failed to adhere to the Policy
and failed to compensate Servers for the difference between the
Minimum Wage Rate and the Server's combined tips and wage rate.
Instead, Steak 'n Shake "merely assumed" that Servers earned enough
in tips to meet the Minimum Wage Rate or "intentionally altered"
Servers' earned tips to mispresent that Servers were earning at
least the Minimum Wage Rate. As a result of these practices, there
were "numerous shifts within weekly pay periods" where Servers
earned less than the Minimum Wage Rate without Steak 'n Shake
supplementing the difference.

Additionally, Servers would routinely spend hours of each shift
performing tasks "entirely unrelated to their tip producing duties"
("Dual Occupation Duties"), which included tasks, such as cleaning
bathrooms, making milkshakes, being a cashier, and cleaning the
restaurant. In addition to the Dual Occupation Duties, Servers also
spent more than 20% of each shift performing tasks that were
"tangentially related to their tipped occupation, but themselves
non-tip producing" ("Tangentially Related Duties"), such as
refilling salt and pepper shakers, refilling condiments, and
rolling silverware. Severs were not compensated at the Minimum Wage
Rate for their time performing Dual Occupation Duties or
Tangentially Related Duties.

Ms. Berry and Ms. Wall filed their Collective Action Complaint on
Nov. 9, 2020, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated
persons. On April 20, 2021, Ms. Berry and Ms. Wall filed a Motion
for FLSA Conditional Certification.

On July 19, 2021, the Court conditionally certified the following
class: All current and former hourly-paid tipped employees who have
been employed by and worked as Servers at Defendant's Steak 'n
Shake's restaurant in Alpharetta, Georgia at any time during the
applicable statutory limitations' period covered by this Collective
Action Complaint (i.e., two years for FLSA violations and, three
years for willful FLSA violations) up to and including the date of
final judgment in this matter, and who is the Named Plaintiff or
elect to opt-in to this action pursuant to the FLSA.

On Aug. 9, 2021, the Court authorized the Plaintiffs' counsel to
issue Notice and Consent-to-Join forms to the potential class
members.

On Aug. 25, 2021, Ms. Bremmer filed a Consent to Join the
collective action as an opt-in plaintiff. On Jan. 20, 2022, Steak
'n Shake served written discovery upon Ms. Bremmer, but she failed
to respond. Additionally, Steak 'n Shake asserts that it issued
notice to Ms. Bremmer to take her deposition, but she failed to
appear.

On March 8 and March 9, 2022, the counsel for the parties conferred
regarding Ms. Bremmer's failure to appear for her deposition and to
respond to discovery requests. The Plaintiffs' counsel did not
dispute that Ms. Bremmer failed to respond to Steak 'n Shake's
discovery requests. Their counsel indicated that they have been
unable to reach Ms. Bremmer and do not know what happened to her.

During this conversation, Steak 'n Shake asserted that it believed
that dismissal from the case with prejudice was appropriate because
"it would be improper and unfair for Ms. Bremmer to ignore her
written discovery and deposition as a party-plaintiff in the case
but then be able to join the overlapping Related Case." The
Plaintiffs' counsel indicated that they do not object to Ms.
Bremmer's dismissal without prejudice or her exclusion from any
notice authorized in the Related Case. However, the Plaintiffs'
counsel maintained that they could not agree "to dismiss Ms.
Bremmer with prejudice because they do not know what has happened
to her."

The counsel for the parties further discussed this issue via
telephone and during a status conference held before Magistrate
Judge Bookman on March 10, 2022. Contemporaneously with filing its
Motion, Steak 'n Shake asserts that it spoke with the Plaintiffs'
counsel via telephone and confirmed the parties' respective
positions.

III. Discussion

In support of its Motion, Steak 'n Shake argues that there is no
dispute between the parties that Ms. Bremmer should be dismissed
from this lawsuit and, thus, the only remaining dispute is whether
her dismissal should be with or without prejudice. Relying upon
Cottle v. Falcon Holdings Mgmt., LLC, 892 F.Supp.2d 1053, 1058
(N.D. Ind. 2012), Steak 'n Shake argues that Ms. Bremmer's
dismissal with prejudice would be consistent with precedent within
the Seventh Circuit because it has been prejudiced by Ms. Bremmer's
failure to respond to discovery. Steak 'n Shake further argues that
dismissal with prejudice is necessary to "make judicially
enforceable the understanding and agreement" that Ms. Bremmer is
excluded from the Related Case and ensure that she does not get a
"second bite at the apple."

The Plaintiffs did not directly respond to Steak 'n Shake's Motion.
However, Steak 'n Shake has attached to its Motion emails from the
Plaintiffs' counsel indicating their position as set forth.

Judge Magnus-Stinson finds in the present matter that there is no
dispute that Ms. Bremmer has failed to respond to discovery
requests and to attend her deposition. There is also no dispute
that Ms. Bremmer has failed to meaningfully advance her claim. In
fact, Ms. Bremmer's own counsel have indicated that they "do not
know what has happened to her."

Judge Magnus-Stinson finds that it would be inappropriate to allow
Ms. Bremmer to remain as a Plaintiff in the action when she has
wholly failed to respond to any of Steak 'n Shake's discovery
responses and failed to appear for her deposition. Judge
Magnus-Stinson agrees that Steak 'n Shake is prejudiced by Ms.
Bremmer's continued lack of discovery responses, "which are
necessary for Steak 'n Shake to determine if she is similarly
situated to the named FLSA plaintiffs for purposes of the
certification of the collective action." Accordingly, she finds
that dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate sanction in the
case for Ms. Bremmer's failure to provide any written discovery
responses or appear at her own deposition.

Judge Magnus-Stinson acknowledges that dismissal is "a harsh
sanction." However, courts are not obligated to tolerate
unnecessary and prolonged delay, nor is the Court "required to
employ graduated sanctions." Under these circumstances, a sanction
short of dismissal with prejudice would not alleviate the prejudice
to Steak 'n Shake or otherwise result in Ms. Bremmer's
participation in discovery because, as the record before the Court
establishes, Ms. Bremmer has become completely unresponsive to even
her own counsel. Put simply, Ms. Bremmer is not at liberty to
voluntarily opt in as a plaintiff in a federal class action and
then cut off all communication without explanation.

As discussed, an involuntarily dismissal is presumptively with
prejudice, unless the dismissal was for lack of jurisdiction,
improper venue, or failure to join a party. In light of Ms.
Bremmer's complete failure to participate in the advancement of her
claim, Judge Magnus-Stinson agrees that allowing Ms. Bremmer a
"second bite at the apple" to bring her claims against Steak 'n
Shake would be unfair. Accordingly, she declines to deviate from
the presumption, and finds that dismissal with prejudice is
appropriate in this circumstance. For the reasons stated, Judge
Magnus-Stinson concludes that dismissal with prejudice is
appropriate under Rule 37(d) and Rule 41(b).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Magnus-Stonson grants Steak 'n
Shake's Partially Opposed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Kiana Bremmer
With Prejudice. Ms. Bremmer's claims against Steak 'n Shake are
dismissed with prejudice. All other claims asserted by other
Plaintiffs will remain pending, and no partial final judgment will
enter at this time.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 22, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yrc37k8s from Leagle.com.


THANK YOU: Catzin Wins Bid to Enter Judgment Against Berezovsky
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled LUCIA LOPEZ CATZIN, ET AL., Plaintiffs v.
THANK YOU & GOOD LUCK CORP., Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-7109 (ALC)
(S.D.N.Y.), Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr., of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York grants the Plaintiffs'
motions for attorney's fees and to set aside the jury's finding and
enter judgment against Defendant Dimitri Berezovsky.

The Plaintiffs sued the Defendants -- a group of laundromats and
their owners -- asserting claims under the New York Labor Law
("NYLL") for failure to pay minimum and overtime wages, failure to
pay spread-of-hours payments, and failure to provide wage notices
and wage statements.

I. Judgment Should be Entered Against Defendant Berezovsky.

The Court held a jury trial in this case from May 13, 2019, through
May 20, 2019 to assess the liability of Defendants Dimitri
Berezovsky, Igor Birzh, Exclusive Management Solution Group, Inc.
("EMSG"), Off-Broadway Laundromat, Inc., 2167 3rd Ave Laundromat,
LLC, and 115th and Frist Ave Laundromat, LLC. At trial, the jury
found only Defendant EMSG liable. The Plaintiffs now ask the Court
to enter judgment against Defendant Berezovsky and find him liable
under the NYLL.

The Plaintiffs argue that the jury's finding of not liable is
inconsistent with the Court's prior ruling on summary judgment in
its Jan. 5, 2017 Opinion & Order. The Court agrees.

The Plaintiffs brought the issue to the Court's attention before
the Court delivered the jury instructions. The Plaintiffs argued
that by including Berezovsky on the verdict form, there is a risk
of the jury finding Defendant Berezovsky not liable while finding
EMSG liable. The Court noted that in the event of such a verdict,
the discrepancy would be dealt with at a later date. Contrary to
the Defendants' contentions that the Plaintiffs waived their
objections to the jury instructions, the Court expressly set aside
the issue to be dealt with after the verdict. The Court made clear
that including Berezovsky on the verdict form was done as a measure
to avoid any confusion that may arise in jury deliberations.

The Plaintiffs sought summary judgment on the issue of Defendant
Berezovsky's status as an employer. The Defendants failed to
address the Plaintiffs' argument. The Court found that the
Defendants had conceded this point and granted summary judgment on
this issue.

As an employer, Defendant Berezovsky is jointly and severally
liable for any recovery awarded to the Plaintiffs, Judge Carter
holds, citing Fermin v. Las Delicias Peruanas Rest., Inc., 93
F.Supp.3d 19, 37 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).

The jury's finding of not liable as to Defendant Berezovsky must be
set aside, Judge Carter rules. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion
to enter judgment as to Defendant Berezovsky is granted.

II. Damages and Prejudgment Interest

New York State law mandates that an employee be paid at a rate not
less than one-and-a-half times the regular rate for any time worked
beyond the first 40 hours per week. The NYLL also allows plaintiffs
to recover liquidated damages.

Because the New York Legislature raised the amount of liquidated
damages from 25% to one hundred present effective April 9, 2011,
the Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated damages equal to 25% of
unpaid overtime work for NYLL violations occurring between Nov. 24,
2009, and April 9, 2011, and 100% of unpaid overtime work performed
thereafter, Judge Carter holds.

Having granted summary judgment in the Plaintiffs' favor for their
wage notice and pay stub requirement claims under N.Y. Lab. Law
Sections 195(1) and 195(3), the Plaintiffs are entitled to damages
specified under Sections 195(1) and 195(3), Judge Carter holds. The
damages are computed based on the length of the employer's
violation of the NYLL.

III. Attorney's Fees and Costs

Turning to the Plaintiffs' motion for fees and costs, the
Defendants argue the Plaintiffs' requested fees should be reduced
to account for unsuccessful motions and the dismissal of several
defendants. The Plaintiffs' counsel was twice successful on their
motions for collective action. Their class action motion, though
unsuccessful, was made in good faith with a reasonable possibility
of success, Judge Carter notes.

Acknowledging the procedural history of this action, the Plaintiffs
have voluntarily reduced their requested fees by 10% and deducted
fees from hours expended on their Rule 23(f) petition. Accordingly,
the Court declines to make further reductions.

The Plaintiffs' counsel has requested an hourly rate of $450 for
two attorneys; $175 for one attorney; $120 for one law clerk; and
$100 for two paralegals.

Upon review of the Plaintiffs' counsel's submissions, the Court
makes two adjustments. First, the Plaintiffs' counsel charged their
full rate for travel time 24 occasions. Courts in this Circuit
routinely halve the hourly rate for travel time. Accordingly, the
Court will subtract half the travel time from the hours expended.

Next, the Plaintiffs' counsel requested hourly rates should be
adjusted down. Courts in this Circuit assess hourly rates based on
the requesting attorney's experience in the particular area. Here,
Mr. Taubenfeld has worked as an attorney on labor and employment
cases for ten years. For attorneys with his experience, courts in
this district routinely award between $300 and $350 per hour. Mr.
Serrins has been working as an attorney in labor and employment
disputes for over 35 years. The requested rate of $450 per hour is
reasonable for attorneys with Mr. Serrins's experience. The
requested rates of $175 for an attorney with eight years of
experience; $120 per hour for law clerks; and $100 for paralegals
are in line with other awards in this district.

The Plaintiffs cite the jury's finding that the Laundromat
Defendants were not liable as the reason for their voluntary
reduction as well as their unsuccessful class motion. The
Plaintiffs have already agreed not to seek fees related to their
appeal of the denial of class certification. As such, the Court
assesses the 10% reduction after accounting for hours expended on
the Rule 23(f) petition and the amount received from the Thank You
Good Luck Defendants. The Plaintiffs' total fees incurred, less the
time spent on their Rule 23(f) petition, totals $169,684. After
subtracting the amount received from the Thank You Good Luck
Defendants, this total becomes $155,833.73. Reducing the fee by 10%
results in $140,250.36.

Accordingly, the Court will award a total of $140,250.36 in
attorneys' fees and $4,064.86 in costs, which accounts for the
amount received from the Thank You Good Luck Defendants.

Conclusion

For reasons given, the Plaintiffs' motions for attorney's fees and
to set aside the jury's finding and enter judgment against
Defendant Berezovsky is granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed
to enter judgment for the Plaintiffs and against Defendants
Berezovsky and EMSG as follows:

    (1) To Plaintiff Lopez Catzin under the New York Labor Law
        Sections 650, et seq., and 190, et seq., in the amount of
        $233.88 for unpaid minimum wages;

    (2) To Plaintiff Lopez Catzin under the NYLL Sections 650,
        et seq., and 190, et seq., in the amount of $1,777.51 for
        unpaid overtime wages;

    (3) To Plaintiff Villano Clemente under the NYLL Sections
        650, et seq., and 190, et seq., in the amount of $450.00
        for unpaid minimum wages;

    (4) To Plaintiff Villano Clemente under the NYLL Sections
        650, et seq., and 190, et seq., in the amount of
        $2,476.94 for unpaid overtime wages;

    (5) To Plaintiff Aguilar-Cano under the NYLL Sections 650,
        et seq., and 190, et seq., in the amount of $8,112.90 for
        unpaid overtime wages;

    (6) To Plaintiff Lopez Catzin under the NYLL Sections 650,
        et seq., and 190, et seq., $1,961.38 in liquidated
        damages;

    (7) To Plaintiff Villano Clemente under the NYLL Sections
        650, et seq., and 190, et seq., $2,926.94 in liquidated
        damages;

    (8) To Plaintiff Aguilar-Cano under the NYLL Sections 650,
        et seq., and 190, et seq., $5,819.03 in liquidated
        damages;

    (9) To Plaintiff Lopez Catzin under the NYLL Section 198
        $10,000 for NYLL Section 195 damages;

   (10) To Plaintiff Villano Clemente under the NYLL Section 198
        $10,000 for NYLL Section 195 damages;

   (11) To Plaintiff Aguilar-Cano under the NYLL Section 198
        $5,000 for NYLL Section 195 damages;

   (12) To Plaintiff Lopez Catzin under the NYLL Sections 650,
        et seq., and 190, et seq., $1,302.58 in prejudgment
        interest;

   (13) To Plaintiff Villano Clemente under the NYLL Sections
        650, et seq., and 190, et seq., $1,857.68 in prejudgment
        interest;

   (14) To Plaintiff Aguilar-Cano under the NYLL Sections 650, et
        seq., and 190, et seq., $7,081.56 in prejudgment
        interest;

   (15) To Plaintiffs attorneys' fees totaling $140,250.36 under
        the NYLL Sections 663 and 198;

   (16) To Plaintiffs attorneys' costs totaling $4,064.86 under
        the NYLL Sections 663 and 198;

It is further ordered and adjudged if any amounts under the New
York Labor Law Sections 650, et seq., and 190, et seq., remain
unpaid to the Plaintiffs upon the expiration of 90 days following
issuance of judgment, or 90 days after expiration of the time to
appeal and no appeal therefrom is then pending, whichever is later,
the total amount of judgment to the Plaintiffs under Sections 650,
et seq., and 190, et seq., will automatically increase by 15%.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion & Order dated June 13,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8kb5ke from
Leagle.com.


TOYOTA MOTOR: Denial of Linen's Bid for Leave to Amend Suit Flipped
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TOYOTA MOTOR CREDIT CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Respondent
v. LaTOYA LINEN, Defendant-Appellant, 570135/22 (N.Y. App. Div.),
the Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department, issued an
order:

   a. reversing, without costs, the order of Judge Naita A. Semaj
      of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County,
      entered Oct. 5, 2021, denying Linen's motion for leave to
      amend; and

   b. striking the portion of the order denying class action
      certification.

The Defendant appeals from Judge Semaj's order which denied her
motion to amend her counterclaim and denied class action
certification.

The Appellate Division holds that the Civil Court improperly denied
the Defendant's unopposed motion for leave to amend to add a class
action counterclaim. On a motion for leave to amend a pleading, it
says that the movant need not establish the merit of the proposed
new allegations, but must "simply show that the proffered amendment
is not palpably insufficient or clearly devoid of merit." In the
case, it finds that the court prematurely reached the merits of the
proposed amendment, which was adequately pleaded and not clearly
devoid of merit.

The Appellate Division notes that the only motion before the court
was one for leave to amend. A court is generally limited to issues
or defenses that are the subject of the motion before it. In the
case, in the absence of any motion seeking class action
certification pursuant to CPLR 902, the court was without authority
to rule upon this dispositive issue. On this basis, the Appellate
Division strikes the provision in the order purporting to deny
class action certification, without prejudice to a proper
application for such relief.

All concur.

The Order constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 22, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yk4utuvk from Leagle.com.


UNILEVER PLC: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds Investors of Deadline
--------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard LLP, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, reminds investors of the deadline to file a lead plaintiff
motion in a securities class action lawsuit that has been filed on
behalf of investors who purchased or acquired the American
Depositary Receipts ("ADRs") of Unilever PLC ("Unilever" or the
"Company") (NYSE: UL) between September 2, 2020 and July 21, 2021,
inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit was filed in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York and
alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Unilever is a British multinational consumer goods company which
sells more than 400 products in over 190 countries, including Ben &
Jerry's ice cream, which they acquired in 2000. In an attempt to
preserve Ben & Jerry's longstanding "Social Mission," Unilever's
acquisition of Ben & Jerry's included allowing for an independent
board of directors, which was given primary responsibility for
preserving and enhancing the objectives of the company's Social
Mission (the "B&J Board").

More than 20 years after the acquisition, Ben & Jerry's remains a
wholly owned subsidiary of Unilever with an independent board
addressing the company's Social Mission. Since the acquisition, the
B&J Board continued its Social Mission by engaging in promotions
and advocacy across a host of issues concerning the environment,
voter turnout, fair trade, and genetically modified organisms.
Today, the B&J Board, chaired by Anuradha Mittal ("Mittal"),
consists primarily of social activists who joined long after
Unilever's acquisition.

The B&J Board passed a resolution in July 2020 to end sales of Ben
& Jerry's products in areas that the B&J Board considers to be
Palestinian territories illegally occupied by Israel. According to
Mittal, Ben & Jerry's CEO Matthew McCarthy ("McCarthy") chose not
to "operationalize" the resolution immediately, thus temporarily
thwarting the B&J Board's decision. During the morning of July 19,
2021, Unilever and its hand-picked CEO McCarthy "operationalized"
the B&J Board's resolution to boycott Israel. Ben & Jerry's
announced on its website and through its Twitter account that, upon
the expiration of the current licensing agreement by which its
products had been distributed in Israel for decades, Ben & Jerry's
would end sales of its ice cream in "Occupied Palestinian
Territory", but Ben & Jerry's would purportedly continue to sell
its products in Israel.

The decision by the B&J Board appeared to arise out of the boycott,
divestment, and sanctions ("BDS") movement. The BDS movement is a
pro-Palestinian movement promoting boycotts, divestments, and
economic sanctions against Israel. The BDS movement's objective is
to coerce Israel into making concessions to the Palestinians by
using boycotts and the like to exert economic and political
pressure. Additionally, and of particular significance here, 35
U.S. states have adopted laws, executive orders, or resolutions
aimed at discouraging boycotts, divestment, and sanctions of Israel
("Anti-BDS Legislation").

During the morning of July 22, 2021, CNBC reported that the states
of Texas and Florida were examining Ben & Jerry's actions in
connection with the states' Anti-BDS Legislation. In addition to
condemnation of Ben & Jerry's boycott by Texas Governor Greg
Abbott, CNBC reported that Texas State Comptroller Glenn Hegar, who
controls billions of dollars in assets for Texas' public pension
funds, had already told his office to take action. Similarly, the
state of Florida's CFO Jimmy Patronis ("Patronis"), who controls
Florida's public pension funds, told CNBC that his office was
already discussing the issue. In a letter reportedly sent to Ben &
Jerry's CEO, Patronis wrote: "It is my belief that Ben & Jerry's
brazen refusal to do business in Israel will result in your
placement on the Scrutinized Companies that Boycott Israel List."
The letter also stated that Florida would then "be prohibited from
investing in Ben & Jerry's or its parent company, Unilever." Being
added to the list also meant that Unilever would not be able to
enter or renew contracts with the state or any municipality in
Florida.

On this news, the price of Unilever ADRs fell $3.19 to close at
$55.52 per ADR on July 22, 2021.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than August 15, 2022. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased the ADRs of Unilever, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit Unilever PLC Shareholder
Class Action Lawsuit or contact Peter Allocco at (212) 951-2030 or
pallocco@bernlieb.com.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact:
Peter Allocco
Bernstein Liebhard LLP
https://www.bernlieb.com
(212) 951-2030
pallocco@bernlieb.com[GN]

UNILEVER PLC: Glancy Prongay Reminds of August 15 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") reminds investors of the
upcoming August 15, 2022 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion
in the class action filed on behalf of investors who purchased or
otherwise acquired Unilever PLC ("Unilever" or the "Company")
(NYSE: UL) American Depositary Receipts ("ADRs") between September
2, 2020 and July 21, 2021, inclusive (the "Class Period").

If you suffered a loss on your Unilever investments or would like
to inquire about potentially pursuing claims to recover your loss
under the federal securities laws, you can submit your contact
information at www.glancylaw.com/cases/unilever-plc/. You can also
contact Charles H. Linehan, of GPM at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at
888-773-9224, or via email at shareholders@glancylaw.com to learn
more about your rights.

On July 19, 2021, Unilever's subsidiary ice cream company, Ben &
Jerry's announced that, upon the expiration of the current
licensing agreement by which its products had been distributed in
Israel for decades, it would end sales of its ice cream in
"Occupied Palestinian Territory" but would purportedly continue to
sell its products in Israel. On this news, the Company's ADR price
fell $0.58 per ADR, or 1%.

Then, on July 22, 2021, CNBC reported that Texas and Florida were
examining Ben & Jerry's actions in connection with their
legislation against the boycott, divestment, and sanctions ("BDS")
movement, a controversial movement whose objective is to coerce
Israel into making concessions to the Palestinians. In a letter
from the state of Florida's CFO Jimmy Patronis, who controls
Florida's public pension funds, Florida would "be prohibited from
investing in Ben & Jerry's or its parent company, Unilever." That
also meant that Unilever could not enter or renew contracts with
the state or any municipality in Florida.

On this news, Unilever's ADR price fell $3.08, or 5.4%, to close at
$53.45 per ADR on July 22, 2021, thereby injuring investors
further.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that, in July 2020, Ben & Jerry's board passed a
resolution to end sales of its ice cream in "Occupied Palestinian
Territory"; (2) the risks attendant to the Ben & Jerry's board's
decision; (3) the foregoing risked adverse governmental actions for
violations of laws, executive orders, or resolutions aimed at
discouraging boycotts, divestment, and sanctions of Israel adopted
by 35 U.S. states; and (4) as a result, Defendants' positive
statements about the Company's business, operations, and prospects
were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all
relevant times.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Unilever ADRs during the
Class Period, you may move the Court no later than August 15, 2022
to request appointment as lead plaintiff in this putative class
action lawsuit. To be a member of the class action you need not
take any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice
or take no action and remain an absent member of the class action.
If you wish to learn more about this class action, or if you have
any questions concerning this announcement or your rights or
interests with respect to the pending class action lawsuit, please
contact Charles Linehan, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park East,
Suite 2100, Los Angeles, California 90067 at 310-201-9150,
Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com,
or visit our website at www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email
please include your mailing address, telephone number and number of
shares purchased.

CONTACT:
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Los Angeles
Charles Linehan, 310-201-9150 or 888-773-9224
shareholders@glancylaw.com
www.glancylaw.com
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP [GN]

UNITED STATES: 3rd Cir. Reverses Denial of Bid to Dismiss Doe Suit
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In the lawsuit captioned JOHN DOE 1; JOHN DOE 2; JOHN DOE 3; JANE
DOE 1 v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellant, Case No. 21-2140 (3d
Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reverses and remands the district court's order denying the
Appellant's motion to dismiss.

According to the Third Circuit's Opinion, judges cannot right every
wrong nor heal every wound. Even if the government hurts someone,
the victim cannot sue it for damages without the government's
consent. Sovereign immunity may seem harsh. But it ensures that the
federal government as sovereign waives immunity not through its
judges, but rather through elected officials who are empowered to
spend citizens' tax dollars. To safeguard that division of
authority, the Third Circuit does not find that Congress waived
federal sovereign immunity unless it has spoken clearly.

Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") employees say that Congress
did that, letting them sue for money they lost when the government
made late payments to their retirement accounts. Not so. Because
the statute does not clearly waive the federal government's
immunity for the employees' claims, the Third Circuit may not hear
them.

I. Background

Circuit Judge Stephanos Bibas, writing for the Panel, notes that
when Congress does not pass a budget in time, the federal
government shuts down. Smithsonian museums close, trash cans in
national parks overflow, and lots of federal workers do not get
their paychecks.

All those things happened at the end of 2018, when the longest
shutdown in history began. For more than a month, FBI employees,
like other federal workers, were not paid. Nor did they get
payments into their Thrift Savings Plan retirement accounts.

Once the government reopened, the employees had a right to back
pay. Sure enough, the FBI sent them their missed paychecks and
contributed to their Thrift accounts. But the contributions did not
make the employees whole. While the government was shut down, the
market had risen; "the most popular Thrif funds increased over
10%." If the government had made its Thrift contributions on time,
that money would have bought more shares than the late payments
did.

So the employees filed this class-action suit under the Federal
Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986 (FERSA or the Act), which
created their Thrift retirement plans. They seek compensation for
the investment gains that they would have gotten if the government
had made its contributions on time.

To understand their argument, the Panel must dive into the Act. It
requires a federal agency to contribute an amount equal to one
percent of an employee's salary to his retirement account. Plus,
the employee may choose to contribute more of his salary; if he
does, the agency must match part of that contribution.

Important here, Judge Bibas says, the Act orders agencies to make
their contributions "no later than 12 days after the end of the pay
period." But the FBI did not make those payments for nearly a
month.

Those provisions, the employees argue, give them an enforceable
right to timely Thrift contributions. Plus, they say they can
recover their losses by suing the government in federal court. In
support, they point out that the Act lets "any participant or
beneficiary" of a Thrift plan sue in federal court "to recover
benefits" (5 U.S.C. Section 8477(e)(3)(C)(i)). That provision, they
contend, waives the government's sovereign immunity for their
claims, since this is a suit to recover the benefit of timely
Thrift contributions.

The government agrees that Section 8477(e)(3)(C)(i) waives
sovereign immunity but disagrees about the scope of that waiver. It
moved to dismiss, arguing that this suit falls outside the waiver.
It frames this case as an effort to recover consequential damages
from the government's late payment, arguing that such damages are
not a "benefit" within the waiver.

The District Court agreed with the employees and refused to
dismiss. But it certified this issue for interlocutory appeal,
which the Third Circuit has jurisdiction to hear under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1292(b).

The Third Circuit reviews the District Court's reading of the
statute de novo, citing United States v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 160, 162
(3d Cir. 2020).

II. Sovereign Immunity Bars the Employees' Claims

To unlock the courthouse door and sue the federal government, a
plaintiff needs two keys, Judge Bibas explains. He must have a
cause of action so he can "invoke the power of the courts" to
remedy his injury, citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239
(1979). And Congress must have waived sovereign immunity for the
specific remedy he seeks.

Here, everyone agrees that Section 8477 both provides a cause of
action and waives immunity for suits to "recover benefits" under
the Thrift Savings Plan. The only issue is whether the employees'
suit seeks to "recover benefits."

Judge Bibas holds that it does not. The Act's text and structure
show that lost earnings on late Thrift contributions are not
benefits. And even if the waiver were ambiguous, the Third Circuit
would read it narrowly, in favor of the government.

A. The text's plain meaning supports the government

Start with the Act, Judge Bibas notes. Three provisions are on
point. The first requires the agency to make automatic Thrift
contributions within 12 days. A second provision requires the
agency to make matching contributions within 12 days. And a third
provision lets employees sue to "recover benefits."

Judge Bibas explains that the matter is a suit brought by plan
participants. And because the right to Thrift contributions falls
within "subchapter III," the employees are suing under its
provisions. Thus, the only issue is whether this is a suit to
"recover benefits." It is not, Judge Bibas points out, adding that
here benefits most naturally refers only to the agency's Thrift
contribution, not damages flowing from a late contribution.

The employees ask the Third Circuit to include the value of timely
contributions as well. But that reading does not square with the
text, Judge Bibas opines. Both Section 8432(c)(1)(A) and (c)(2)(A)
use the word "benefit" to refer to the agency's contribution, not
its timeliness.

In other words, Judge Bibas explains, the concrete benefit due is a
percentage of salary, not the returns on that money. The 12-day
timing requirement is not the object of the verb phrase. Rather, it
is a phrase or sentence that functions like an adverb, specifying
not what the agency must contribute but when.

Plus, Judge Bibas says, under Section 8477(e)(3), the "benefit"
must be the thing that the suit recovers. Put another way, the
market growth on Thrift funds would have to be a statutory
"benefit." But that would mean that if the market falls, the
employee would be entitled to a smaller late payment than if it had
been paid on time. So in a bear market, the government could save
money by delaying its contributions. That cannot be right, Judge
Bibas points out.

The 12-day limit still means something, Judge Bibas notes. It sets
an enforceable deadline for contributing. If the agency delays
beyond that, employees may sue after that to force it to
contribute.

B. The statutory scheme also favors the government

Confirming the Third Circuit's reading of the text, the Act's
meaning becomes even more apparent when viewed in the broader
statutory context, Judge Bibas states. Congress authorized a
remedial scheme to let employees recover some lost earnings on
Thrift contributions, so long as those are lost earnings resulting
from agency errors (including errors of omission). The government
shutdown stemmed not from an agency error, but from events beyond
the agencies' control. Congress chose not to authorize remedies for
Thrift lost earnings due to those events.

The Third Circuit must respect that choice.

C. The Third Circuit construes waivers of sovereign immunity
narrowly

The text, structure, and context suffice to resolve this case,
Judge Bibas opines. But if any ambiguity remained, the Panel would
resolve it for the government. To waive sovereign immunity, a
statute must say so "clearly." If there is a plausible
interpretation of the statute that would not authorize money
damages against the Government, the Panel should read the statute
in "favor of immunity." Judge Bibas holds that that clear-statement
rule guards against unintentional waivers. And it ensures that
elected officials, not judges, choose when to open the public
purse.

The employees reply that Section 8477(e)(3) does clearly waive
immunity. Any ambiguity is limited to the provisions conferring the
benefits and whether they create a right to timely contributions.
So they ask the Third Circuit to apply not the clear-statement rule
but a "demonstrably lower" standard, borrowed from the Tucker Act,
citing United States v. White Mt. Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472
(2003). Under the Tucker Act, the Third Circuit asks only whether a
statute can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for the
damage sustained.

But that Tucker Act case law does not apply here, Judge Bibas
finds. Here, the Act authorizes its own remedy by creating a cause
of action in Section 8477(e)(3); the only question is its scope.
And as the Panel has explained, the Act's text, its structure, and
the clear-statement rule all bar suits for lost earnings here,
Judge Bibas points out.

Disposition

The government's late retirement payments meant that its employees
missed out when the markets rose. But because Congress has not
waived the government's immunity from suit for these losses, the
employees may not sue to recover their lost profits. So the Third
Circuit will reverse and remand the District Court's order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated June 13, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p85auen from Leagle.com.

Bradley Hinshelwood -- bradley.a.hinshelwood@usdoj.gov -- UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, in
Washington, D.C. 20530, Counsel for the Appellant.

Jonathan D. Lindenfeld -- jonathan@feganscott.com -- FEGAN SCOTT
LLC, 140 Broadway, 46th Floor, in New York City, New York 10016,
Elizabeth A. Fegan -- beth@feganscott.com -- FEGAN SCOTT LLC, 150
S. Wacker Dr., Suite 2400, in Chicago, Illinois 60606, Counsel for
the Appellees.


UNITED STATES: Court Grants Bid to Certify Class in EWTF Suit
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In the case, ELECTRICAL WELFARE TRUST FUND, et al., Plaintiffs v.
THE UNITED STATES, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-353 (Fed. Cl.), Judge
Eleni M. Roumel of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims grants EWTF's
unopposed Motion for Class Certification, Appointment as Class
Representative, and Appointment of Class Counsel.

I. Introduction

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff Electrical Welfare Trust
Fund's (EWTF's) Motion for Class Certification, requesting the
Court certifies a class of "all self-administered, self-insured
employee health and welfare benefit plans that are or were subject
to the assessment and collection of the Transitional Reinsurance
Contribution under Section 1341 of the Affordable Care Act for
benefit year 2014." The Defendant does not oppose certifying the
class.

II. Background

The Plaintiffs in the action -- EWTF, The Operating Engineers Trust
Fund of Washington, D.C. (OETF), and The Stone & Marble Masons of
Metropolitan Washington, D.C. Health and Welfare Fund -- are
self-administered, self-insured multi-employer group health plans
seeking to recover money they allege the Defendant illegally
collected based on an unlawful interpretation of 42 U.S.C. Section
18061.

The Transitional Reinsurance Program (TRP) of the Affordable Care
Act mandated that all "health insurance issuers, and third party
administrators on behalf of group health plans, were required to
make payments to an applicable reinsurance entity for any plan year
beginning in the 3-year period beginning Jan. 1, 2014." Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations implementing the TRP
defined such "contributing entities."

Based on that definition, the Defendant required EWTF, OETF, and
Stone Masons to pay TRP contributions for benefit year 2014. It
further required OETF and Stone Masons to pay TRP contributions for
benefit years 2015 and 2016. The Plaintiffs alleged in their
initial complaint that these contributions constituted an illegal
taking violating the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause and an
illegal exaction violating the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.

The Defendant moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint for
failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of
the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC or Rules) or, in
the alternative, for summary judgment. On July 30, 2021, the Court
granted the Defendant's motion in part and denied it in part.

Specifically, the Court denied the Defendant's motion regarding
EWTF's illegal exaction claim as HHS's regulation requiring EWTF to
pay TRP contributions for benefit year 2014 was contrary to the
text of 42 U.S.C. Section 18061 and "EWTF clearly alleged that it
is a self-funded, self-administered plan that does not use a
third-party administrator." It granted the Defendant's motion
regarding OETF's and Stone Masons' illegal exaction claims as HHS
had reasonably concluded that 42 U.S.C. Section 18061 permitted HHS
to collect TRP payments from self-funded plans that used
third-party administrators. The Court denied without prejudice the
Defendant's motion with respect to each of the Plaintiff's Takings
claims. It based its denial upon uncertainty concerning "(1) the
nature of the Plaintiffs' property interest in their respective
group health care plans, and (2) the effect, if any, the TRP had on
those alleged property interests."

Subsequently, the Plaintiffs amended their complaint to address
those uncertainties. They moved on consent to file a second amended
complaint removing the word "multiemployer" from the Exaction Class
definition in the Amended Complaint.

Relevant to the present Motion, EWTF alleges inter alia that its
TRP contributions for benefit year 2014, and those made by
similarly situated, self-administered group health plans,
constituted illegal exactions. EWTF filed the present Motion
seeking to certify such a class of self-administered, self-insured
employee health and welfare benefit plans.

III. Discussion

The Court may certify a class action if: (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

To maintain a class action, the Court must also determine that "the
United States has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class," that "the questions of law or fact common
to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members," and "that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy." Put differently, a plaintiff seeking class
certification must demonstrate (i) numerosity, (ii) commonality,
(iii) typicality, (iv) adequacy, and (v) superiority.

The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing each element by a
preponderance of the evidence. Failure to establish a single
element precludes class certification.

Judge Roumel agrees that class certification is appropriate in this
instance. Plaintiff EWTF proposes certifying the following class:
All self-administered, self-insured employee health and welfare
benefit plans that are or were subject to the assessment and
collection of the Transitional Reinsurance Contribution under
Section 1341 of the Affordable Care Act for benefit year 2014 (the
Exaction Class or Class),

This class, according to Judge Roumel, satisfies the numerosity,
commonality, typicality, adequacy, and superiority requirements,
and the Defendant does not oppose the class definition. First, the
likely hundreds of fully self-administered, self-insured entities
comprising the proposed class satisfies the numerosity requirement.
Second, EWTF's proposed class satisfies those inquiries given the
proposed class' claims "are based on the same exact government
action," namely HHS requiring self-administered, self-insured
entities to pay the TRP contribution for benefit year 2014 in
contravention of the plain language of 42 U.S.C. Section 18061.

Third, EWTF's proposed class easily exceeds the threshold for
typicality because EWTF's illegal exaction theory -- that the
Government illegally exacted TRP Contribution payments from the
Plaintiff for benefit year 2014 -- is identical to the legal theory
asserted by the class. Fourth, Judge Roumel is satisfied that
proposed class counsel, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP and
McChesney & Dale, P.C., have the experience and expertise necessary
to adequately represent the class. Fifth, he is satisfied that EWTF
will adequately represent the other class members.

Finally, given the direct overlap between EWTF's claims and those
of the proposed class, "there is little benefit to having each
proposed class member retain counsel, pay filing fees, and submit
duplicative pleadings." Furthermore, judicial economy is best
served by proceeding as a class action rather than via potentially
hundreds of individual suits presenting identical questions of law
and similar questions of fact. Therefore, Judge Roumel concludes
that a class action is a superior method of adjudicating the
proposed class' claims.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, Judge Roumel grants the Plaintiff's Class
Certification Motion.

The Judge certifies the following class related to their respective
illegal exaction claims: All self-administered, self-insured
employee health and welfare benefit plans that are or were subject
to the assessment and collection of the Transitional Reinsurance
Contribution under Section 1341 of the Affordable Care Act for
benefit year 2014 (the Exaction Class or Class).

As noted, the illegal exaction class claim concerns the money HHS
collected as TRP payments for benefit year 2014 under 42 U.S.C.
Section 18061. Plaintiff EWTF will serve as the class
representative. Kessler Topaz and McChesney & Dale will serve as
the class counsel. By July 22, 2022, the parties will FILE a joint
proposed Notice and an opt-in schedule that complies with RCFC
23(c)(2)(B).

A full-text copy of the Court's June 22, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/p9myrf4b from Leagle.com.

Joseph H. Meltzer -- jmeltzer@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check, LLP, in Radnor, Pennsylvania for the Plaintiffs. With him on
the briefs are Melissa L. Troutner -- mtroutner@ktmc.com -- Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, in Radnor, Pennsylvania; and Charles
Fuller -- chuck@dalelaw.com -- McChesney & Dale, P.C., in Bowie,
Maryland.

Borislav Kushnir, United States Department of Justice, Civil
Division, in Washington, District of Columbia, for the Defendant.
With him on the briefs are Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; Patricia M. McCarthy,
Director, Commercial Litigation; Eric P. Bruskin, Assistant
Director, Commercial Litigation; Kenneth Whitley, United States
Department of Health and Human Services; and David Hoskins, United
States Department of Health and Human Services.


UNITED STATES: Kandel's Bid for Attorneys' Fees & Expenses Denied
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In the case, GERALD K. KANDEL, et al., Plaintiffs v. THE UNITED
STATES, Defendant, Case No. 06-872C (Fed. Cl.), Judge Patricia E.
Campbell-Smith of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims denies the
Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and expenses.

I. Introduction

On Dec. 15, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorneys' fees
and expenses. The Defendant filed its response on Jan. 26, 2022,
and the Plaintiffs filed their reply on Feb. 3, 2022. The motion is
now fully briefed and ripe for ruling.

II. Background

The parties settled the case in two parts, with two sub-classes.
The Court approved the first sub-class settlement on Oct. 30, 2020,
in an amount of $268,308.46. It then approved the second sub-class
settlement on June 25, 2021, in an amount of $36,900. Thus, the
Plaintiffs' claims in the case were settled for a total of
$305,208.46.

The Plaintiffs now ask the Court to direct the Defendant to pay
into the settlement fund "an additional award" to cover attorneys'
fees and expenses, and the class administrator's fees and
expenses.

The established settlement fund, in the Plaintiffs' view, should
include the following amounts:

     a. Court Approved Lump - sum payments to 1,192 class members =
$305,248.46;

     b. Attorney fees and related expenses to Class Counsel Ira M.
Lechner = $2,433,787.47;

     c. Attorney fees to Of Counsel Steven Winton = $148,883.45;
and

     d. Class Action Administration fees and costs to Epiq =
$754,511.13 for a total of $3,642,430.51.

III. Analysis

In their motion, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to award them
attorneys' fees and expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2412(b)
of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). They argue that Section
2412(b) incorporates the "common fund doctrine" as a common law
right to recovery of fees and expenses. They explain that "to
qualify for an award under the equitable common fund doctrine under
common law, plaintiffs must create or preserve a substantial common
fund for an identifiable class of beneficiaries." f such a fund is
established, "plaintiffs are then entitled to recover attorneys'
fees and out-of-pocket expenses for the benefit of the members of
the class, payable to the common fund which in turn pays fees and
reimburses expenses of plaintiffs' attorneys out of the fund
itself."

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently
addressed the manner in which the common fund doctrine applies in
Athey v. United States, No. 2020-2291, 2021 WL 4282593 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 21, 2021). As the Plaintiffs explain in their motion, the
present case is a corollary to Athey, which raised "the same
category of claims for a lump-sum back payment" on behalf of
employees of different agencies.

In the Athey decision, the Federal Circuit held as follows: "The
fundamental basis for the common fund exception is unjust
enrichment -- that a party who benefits from a plaintiff's
attorney's advocacy in recovering an award should also contribute
to that attorney's fees. Thus, we agree with the Court of Federal
Claims' determination that the common fund exception does not apply
in the manner asserted by Plaintiffs—namely to impose additional
liability on the United States as a defendant."

Despite the admitted similarities between the case and Athey, the
Plaintiff argues that the Court should not follow the Federal
Circuit's lead in applying the common fund doctrine on the basis
that the Athey decision is non-precedential and, according to the
Plaintiffs, unsound. In making this argument, the Plaintiff does
not distinguish the facts of the case from Athey, but instead
contends that the Federal Circuit erred as a matter of law.

The Court is not privy to the Federal Circuit's decision-making
process with regard to determining whether an individual opinion is
precedential or non-precedential. The Circuit's rules, however,
provide some context. The Federal Circuit believes that its
decision in Athey does not "add significantly to the body of law"
regarding application of the common fund doctrine. And while the
decision is not binding precedent, the Circuit has clearly
"indicated its view" on the relevant law therein.

Judge Campbell-Smith opines that the Federal Circuit's holding is
sufficiently clear and its reasoning sufficiently substantive to
militate in favor of the Court's deference to the same. As such,
she must deny the Plaintiffs' request that the Court directs the
Defendant to pay into the settlement fund an amount in addition to
the settlement amounts to which the parties have already agreed.
The Plaintiffs have filed a petition for a writ certiorari with the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Athey case. A direct
appeal is the most appropriate avenue for challenging the Federal
Circuit's decision.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Judge Campbell-Smith denies
the Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and expenses. On July
13, 2022, the parties are directed to file a joint status report
identifying for the Court any issues that must be resolved before
the court can enter final judgment in the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 22, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5dpfrrue from Leagle.com.

Ira M. Lechner, in Washington, D.C., for the Plaintiffs. Steven W.
Winton, of counsel.

Mikki Cottet, Senior Trial Counsel, with whom were Brian M.
Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Patricia M. McCarthy,
Director, and Reginald T. Blades, Jr., Assistant Director,
Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice, in Washington, D.C., for the Defendant.


UNIVERSAL SERVICES: Tsui Files Suit for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
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NICKOLAS TSUI and WILLIAM LUGO, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. UNIVERSAL SERVICES OF
AMERICA, LP, ALLIED UNIVERSAL TOPCO LLC, ALLIED UNIVERSAL BENEFITS
COMMITTEE, and JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-10, Defendants, Case No.
8:22-cv-01158 (C.D. Cal., June 13, 2022) is a class action brought
against the Defendants pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act, for the benefit of the Allied Universal 401(k) Plan
and its participants and beneficiaries, including Plaintiffs,
asserting claims for breaches of fiduciary duties and other
violations of ERISA from June 13, 2016 to the present and
continuing against the Plan's fiduciaries.

ERISA imposes a strict fiduciary duty of prudence upon Defendants
as Plan fiduciaries. As fiduciaries to the Plan, Defendants were
obligated to act for the exclusive benefit of Plan participants and
beneficiaries, including ensuring that fees and expenses charged to
the Plan were reasonable. The Defendants had a continuing duty to
evaluate Plan recordkeeping and administration fees (RK&A) and
expenses to ensure such charges were reasonable and appropriate.

According to the complaint, the Defendants breached their duties
owed to the Plan, Plaintiffs, and other Plan Participants by (a)
failing to monitor RK&A fees paid by the Plan to ensure that they
were reasonable and, as a result, authorizing the Plan to pay
objectively unreasonable and excessive RK&A fees, relative to RK&A
services received, and (b) failing to take standard and customary
actions to understand the market for RK&A services to monitor for
reasonableness of RK&A fees paid by the Plan in relation to RK&A
services received.

The Plaintiffs were injured by the Defendants' actions because
Defendants permitted all Plan participants to be charged excessive
RK&A fees, which reduced Plaintiffs' Plan account balances and
caused them significantly diminished investment returns, says the
suit.

Universal Services of America, LP provides security and janitorial
services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert R. Ahdoot, Esq.
          Tina Wolfson, Esq.
          Theodore Maya, Esq.
          AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
          2600 W. Olive Avenue, Suite 500
          Burbank, CA 91505
          Telephone: (310) 474-9111
          Facsimile: (310) 474-8585
          E-mail: rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com
                  twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com
                  tmaya@ahdootwolfson.com

               - and -

          Erich P. Schork, Esq.
          ROBERTS LAW FIRM
          PO Box 31909
          Chicago, IL 60631-9998
          Telephone: (510) 821-5575
          Facsimile: (510) 821-4474
          E-mail: erichschork@robertslawfirm.us

               - and -

          Michael L. Roberts, Esq.
          ROBERTS LAW FIRM
          1920 McKinney Avenue, Suite 700
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (510) 821-5575
          Facsimile: (510) 821-4474
          E-mail: mikerobert@robertslawfirm.us

VATM CONCESSIONS: Unlawfully Keeps Tips, Monroe Suit Alleges
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Everett Monroe, On Behalf of Himself and all Others Similarly
Situated v. VATM Concessions, LLC a/k/a Villa Azur, Case No.
3:22-cv-01358-S (N.D. Tex., June 22, 2022) is a civil action
brought by the Plaintiff pursuant to the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act, and the federal Portal-to-Portal Pay Act for the
Defendant's unlawful keeping of tips received/earned by Plaintiff
and the putative collective action members.

The Plaintiff and the putative collective action members were paid
on an hourly basis by the Defendant in addition to receiving tips.
On numerous occasions, at least one of Defendant's managers and/or
supervisors kept tips that rightfully belonged to Plaintiff and the
putative collective action members in violation of 29 U.S.C.
section 203(m)(2)(B), says the suit.

The Plaintiff was employed by Defendant at its restaurant located
at 2440 Victory Park Lane, Dallas, Texas 75219 relative to the
claims made the basis of this lawsuit.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Allen R. Vaught, Esq.
          VAUGHT FIRM, LLC
          1910 Pacific Ave., Suite 9150
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (972) 707-7816
          Facsimile: (972) 591-4564
          E-mail: avaught@txlaborlaw.com

VERRICA PHARMACEUTICALS: Kirby McInerney Notes of Aug. 5 Deadline
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The law firm of Kirby McInerney LLP announces that a class action
lawsuit has been filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania on behalf of those who acquired Verrica
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Verrica") (NASDAQ: VRCA) securities from
May 28, 2021 through May 24, 2022, both dates inclusive (the "Class
Period"). Investors have until August 5, 2022 to apply to the Court
to be appointed as lead plaintiff in the lawsuit.

Verrica is a dermatology therapeutics company developing medication
for skin diseases that require medical treatment. Verrica's lead
product candidate, VP-102, is a drug device combination of
Verrica's topical solution, cantharidin, administered through a
single-use precision applicator. The Company is developing VP-102
for the treatment of molluscum contagiosum.

In December 2020, Verrica submitted its New Drug Application
("NDA") to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") seeking
regulatory approval of VP-102 for the treatment of molluscum.

On September 20, 2021, after the market closed, Verrica announced
receipt of a Complete Response Letter ("CRL") due to deficiencies
at a facility of Verrica's contract manufacturer in connection with
the Company's NDA. On this news, the Company's stock price declined
by $1.00 per share, or approximately 8.31%, from $12.03 per share
to close at $11.03 per share on September 21, 2021.

In November 2021, Verrica resubmitted the NDA for VP-102, claiming
"[t]he resubmission addresses the successful resolution of
inspection deficiencies" at the manufacturing facility.

On May 24, 2022, after the market closed, Verrica announced receipt
of another Complete Response Letter regarding the VP-102 NDA citing
"deficiencies identified during a general reinspection of Sterling
Pharmaceuticals Services, LLC (Sterling), the contract
manufacturing organization (CMO) that manufactures Verrica's bulk
solution drug product." On this news, the Company's stock price
declined by $3.55 per share, or approximately 63.85%, from $5.56
per share to close at $2.01 per share on May 25, 2022.

The lawsuit alleges that, throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) there were manufacturing deficiencies at the facility
where Verrica's contract manufacturer produced bulk solution for
VP-102; (2) these deficiencies were not remediated when Verrica
resubmitted its NDA for VP-12 for molluscum; (3) the foregoing
presented significant risks to Verrica obtaining regulatory
approval of VP-102 for molluscum; and (4) as a result of the
foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Verrica securities, have
information, or would like to learn more about these claims, please
contact Thomas W. Elrod of Kirby McInerney LLP by email at
investigations@kmllp.com, or by filling out this contact form, to
discuss your rights or interests with respect to these matters
without any cost to you.

Kirby McInerney LLP is a New York-based plaintiffs' law firm
concentrating in securities, antitrust, whistleblower, and consumer
litigation. The firm's efforts on behalf of shareholders in
securities litigation have resulted in recoveries totaling billions
of dollars. Additional information about the firm can be found at
Kirby McInerney LLP's website: http://www.kmllp.com.

Contact:
Kirby McInerney LLP
Thomas W. Elrod, Esq.
212-371-6600
https://www.kmllp.com
investigations@kmllp.com[GN]

VERTAFORE INC: Allen Appeals Data Breach Suit Dismissal to Sup. Ct.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Derek Allen and other members of a putative class of Texas drivers
are asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review  a ruling entered by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the lawsuit
entitled DEREK ALLEN; LEANDRE BISHOP; and JOHN BURNS, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
VERTAFORE, INC., Defendant, Case No. 4:20-cv-04139, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

The Plaintiffs, Texas driver's license holders, brought the action
against Vertafore on Dec. 4, 2020, for a violation of the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 2721, et seq., after
Vertafore announced that unauthorized users had gained access to
personal information protected by the statute that Vertafore had
stored on unsecured external servers.

Vertafore filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the Plaintiffs lacked standing,
and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The magistrate judge held a hearing on the motion on April 27,
2021, and subsequently recommended that the district court find
that the Plaintiffs had standing but that they failed to state a
claim.

The Plaintiffs objected to the magistrate judge's Memorandum and
Recommendation and asked for an opportunity to amend their
complaint if the district judge was not inclined to deny
Vertafore's motion. On July 23, 2021, the district court adopted
the magistrate judge's Memorandum and Recommendation in its
entirety and granted Vertafore's motion to dismiss.

The Plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit. That appellate case
was captioned DEREK ALLEN; LEANDRE BISHOP; JOHN BURNS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants v. VERTAFORE, INCORPORATED,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 21-20404.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on March 28, 2022, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting
Vertafore's motion to dismiss.

"Because the Plaintiffs have not alleged a disclosure within the
meaning of the DPPA, their complaint fails to  state a plausible
claim for relief," ruled the Fifth Circuit.[BN]

VERTIV HOLDINGS: Bernstein & Saxena Named Riviera Suit Lead Counsel
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH GENERAL EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT
SYSTEM, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. VERTIV HOLDINGS CO., ROB JOHNSON, DAVID FALLON, JASON
FORCIER, GARY NIEDERPRUEM, DAVID COTE, JOSEPH VAN DOKKUM, ROGER
FRADIN, JACOB KOTZUBEI, MATTHEW LOUIE, EDWARD L. MONSER, STEVEN S.
REINEMUND, ROBIN L. WASHINGTON, J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES LLC, GOLDMAN
SACHS & CO. LLC, CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC., VPE HOLDINGS, LLC,
VERTIV JV HOLDINGS LLC, PE VERTIV HOLDINGS LLC, PLATINUM EQUITY,
LLC, PLATINUM EQUITY INVESTMENT HOLDINGS, LLC, PLATINUM EQUITY
INVESTMENT HOLDINGS MANAGER, LLC, PLATINUM EQUITY INVESTCO, L.P.,
PLATINUM EQUITY INVESTMENT HOLDINGS IC (CAYMAN), LLC, PLATINUM
INVESTCO (CAYMAN), LLC, PLATINUM EQUITY INVESTMENT HOLDINGS III,
LLC, PLATINUM EQUITY INVESTMENT HOLDINGS MANAGER III, LLC, and TOM
GORES, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-3572-GHW (S.D.N.Y.), Judge
Gregory H. Woods of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York appoints Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann
LLP and Saxena White P.A. as the Lead Counsel for the Class.

Judge Woods has considered: (1) the Motion of Louisiana Sheriffs'
Pension & Relief Fund, Orlando Police Pension Fund, City of
Plantation General Employees Retirement System, Riviera Beach
Municipal Firefighters' Pension Trust Fund, and City of Riviera
Beach General Employees' Retirement System (collectively, the
"Public Pension Funds") for appointment as Lead Plaintiff and
approval of their selection of Lead Counsel; (2) the Memorandum of
Law in support thereof; (3) the Declaration of Hannah Ross in
support thereof; and (4) all other pleadings and argument submitted
to the Court; and for good cause shown, Judge Woods grants the
Public Pension Funds' Motion.

The Public Pension Funds are appointed to serve as the Lead
Plaintiff pursuant to Section 27(a)(3)(B) of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. Section 77z-1(a)(3)(B), and Section 21D(a)(3)(B) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Section
78u-4(a)(3)(B), as amended by the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, in the ecurities class action and all related
actions consolidated.

The Public Pension Funds' selection of Lead Counsel is approved and
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP and Saxena White P.A. are
appointed as the Lead Counsel for the Class.

Pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any
actions currently pending before Judge Woods that are related to
the claims asserted in the action are consolidated for all
purposes.

The action will be captioned "In re Vertiv Holdings Co Securities
Litigation" and the file will be maintained under Master File No.
1:22-cv-3572-GHW.

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motions pending at
Dkt. Nos. 6 and 9.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 22, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y8m6mf53 from Leagle.com.


VIZIO INC: Youngblood Sues Over Warranty Voiding Condition on TV
----------------------------------------------------------------
BRIAN YOUNGBLOOD, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. VIZIO, INC., Defendant, Case No.
22STCV20900 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., June 27, 2022) alleges
violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act over warranty on
television.

According to the complaint, for years, the Defendant has produced,
marketed, and sold personal consumer goods, including the
television (the "Product") at issue in this litigation. The
Defendant  provides consumers with a one-year warranty for its
Products ("Warranty"). In so doing, the Defendant made and
continues to make multiple representations to consumers that the
Warranty is subject to carveouts expressly prohibited by federal
law, says the suit.

Specifically, the Defendant states to consumers that their Warranty
will be void if the consumers use third-party repair services to
fix their products. This type of warranty-voiding condition, where
the warranty is "tied" to exclusive repair by the manufacturer, is
expressly prohibited by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the suit
added.

VIZIO, INC. operates as a consumer electronics company. The company
offers televisions and home entertainment accessories. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gillian L. Wade, Esq.
          Sara D. Avila, Esq.
          Marc A. Castaneda, Esq.
          MILSTEIN JACKSON FAIRCHILD & WADE, LLP
          10990 Wilshire Boulevard, 8th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Tel: (310) 396-9600
          Fax: (310) 396-9635
          Email: gwade@mjfwlaw.com
                 savila@mjfwlaw.com
                 mcastaneda@mjfwlaw.com

W.S. BADCOCK: Miernik Sues Over Unsolicited Debt Collection Calls
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KRISTINA MIERNIK, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. W.S. BADCOCK CORPORATION, Defendant, Case
No. 8:22-cv-01395 (M.D. Fla., June 20, 2022) is a class action
against the Defendant for violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant is engaged in an unlawful
practice of using prerecorded messages to collect debts. The
Defendant sent prerecorded debt collection calls to consumers'
telephone numbers without obtaining prior express consent, says the
suit.

W.S. Badcock Corporation is a company that sells and finances home
furniture and electronics, with its headquarters in Mulberry,
Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Manuel Hiraldo, Esq.
         HIRALDO P.A.
         401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1400
         Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
         Telephone: (954) 400-4713
         E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

                 - and –

         Rachel N. Dapeer, Esq.
         DAPEER LAW, P.A.
         20900 NE 30th Avenue, Ste. 417
         Aventura, FL 333180
         Telephone: (305) 610-5223
         E-mail: rachel@dapeer.com

WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: Bid to Decertify Class in Garcia Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JULIO GARCIA, Plaintiff v. WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-00500-L-MDD (S.D. Cal.), Judge
M. James Lorenz of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California denies the Defendants' Motion to Decertify
Class Certification and Dismiss PAGA claims in the class action
alleging violations of the California Labor Code.

I. Background

The lawsuit is a class action alleging Defendants Wal-Mart
Associates and Wal-Mart Stores violate California Labor Code
Sections 201-203 by failing to pay its separating employees,
whether involuntarily terminated or voluntarily resigned, all final
wages within the timing requirements set forth by statute.

The Defendants, the self-proclaimed largest retailer in the world,
employ millions of workers worldwide. In California, from Feb. 1,
2015, to Nov. 23, 2018, they terminated 175, 684 workers. On the
termination or separation date, Human Resources staff initiates a
calculation request to determine the amount to be paid as final
wages to the former employee. The Defendants provide a written
check to the former employee for wages due at the point of
termination. At times, the Defendants' calculation of the
employee's final wages is not based on all wages the employee is
owed because their payroll and timekeeping systems and databases do
not reflect all earned wages due and owing to the former employee
at the time of termination. As a result, the Defendants then pay
employees additional wages, earned prior to termination, after the
former employee's termination.

The Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on Sept. 12, 2018,
seeking (1) waiting time penalties under California Labor Code
Section 203 and (2) penalties under California's Private Attorneys
General Act, Labor Code Section 2698 et seq. ("PAGA") alleging that
he was not paid all of his earned wages at the time of
termination.

On Aug. 26, 2019, the Court certified a class consisting of: All
individuals who worked for Defendants in the State of California
whose employment ended at any time from Feb. 1, 2015, through the
present, and who received a Statement of Final Pay and then
received any additional wages (regular, overtime and/or vacation)
on the Defendants' on-cycle payroll immediately subsequent to the
issuance of the Statement of Final Pay to the individual.

The Court also certified the following subclass: Any and all
individuals who worked for Defendants in the State of California
whose employment ended at any time from Feb. 1, 2015, through the
present, and who received a Statement of Final Pay and then
received any additional wages (regular, overtime and/or vacation)
more than 3 days after the issuance of the Statement of Final Pay
on Defendants' on-cycle payroll immediately subsequent to the
issuance of the Statement of Final Pay to the individual.

Named Plaintiff Garcia worked for Defendant Wal-Mart from Dec. 12,
2007, to Jan. 12, 2017, when his employment was terminated. On the
date of his termination, the Plaintiff clocked in for work at 3:12
p.m. The Plaintiff was called into the office seven minutes after
he clocked in and was told that his employment was being
terminated. The termination meeting lasted only a few minutes. The
Plaintiff testified that he walked out of the meeting without
clocking out. Garcia stated that he was at the store between 20
minutes and one hour on the day he was terminated. Another employee
clocked Garcia out at 4:12 p.m., one hour after he clocked in. The
Plaintiff did not collect his final check at the meeting, but it
was mailed to him along with a Statement of Final Pay ("SOFP").

According to Garcia, the SOFP reflected 22.59 regular hours at his
rate of $15.40 per hour. The SOFP designated four hours as
Reporting Time pay that accrued on Garcia's termination date per
company policy. He was also paid for 17.33 hours of unused personal
time, and 28.49 hours of Paid Time Off ("PTO").

Approximately two weeks later, on January 26, 2017, Plaintiff
received a payment of $12.19 along with a statement of earnings
that reflected one additional hour of regular earnings and .1 hour
of PTO when compared to his SOFP. The Plaintiff alleges that the
delayed payment of these wages violates California Labor Code
Sections 201, 203.

On Dec. 14, 2020, the Defendants' filed a motion for partial
summary adjudication, contending that the $12.19 post-termination
payment to Plaintiff Garcia did not trigger waiting time penalties
because it was not "earned", and that his PAGA claim fails because
it is derivative of the first claim. The Court denied the
Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, finding that there
was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Plaintiff
was entitled to the one hour of regular wages plus the 0.1 PTO
earned on that hour, therefore the Court was unable to determine
whether waiting time penalties under Section 203 were triggered.

The Defendants now argue that the class should be decertified
because determination of their liability would require
individualized assessments of each Plaintiff's time records and
would therefore defeat the Rule 23 commonality and predominance
requirements. They further argue that both the class claims and
PAGA claims are unmanageable because there is no way to determine
whether particular employees are entitled to waiting time penalties
without engaging in an individualized analysis of their
circumstances.

II. Discussion

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's claims for violation of
Labor Code Section 203 do not satisfy Rule 23's commonality
requirement because (1) the Plaintiff has failed to identify an
unlawful policy or practice that sanctions illegal conduct, and (2)
resolution of the claims would require an individualized
determination, indicating the claims are not amenable to common
proof or class-wide resolution. Specifically, the Defendants
contend that adjudicating the Plaintiff Garcia's "late payment"
claim would require weighing and contrasting testimony from Garcia,
his manager, coworkers, and other witnesses, and the answers to
those inquiries would apply only to Garcia's claim, and not to
other class members.

The Defendants argue that "the mere fact that an employee received
a post-termination payment does not mean the payment was late or
unlawful." These types of individual and unintentional payroll
discrepancies are not amenable to common proof in the Defendants'
view. In addition, the Defendants claim that the need for
individualized determinations of liability as to each class member
would also defeat the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).

The Plaintiff contends that any payment of earned wages after
termination date is unlawful and can be determined by reference to
the Defendants' time and payroll records, therefore resolution of
the question presented is common to all the class members. In
addition, the Plaintiff points to documentary evidence provided by
the Defendants that allegedly confirms there was a stated policy
requiring any additional hours after the employee's final payout to
be paid in the next scheduled pay period in violation of law.

A. Rule 23(a)(2) Commonality

The commonality inquiry depends on whether a claim is "of such a
nature that it is capable of classwide resolution -- which means
that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue
that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one
stroke."  "In determining that a common question of law exists, it
is insufficient to find that all putative class members have
suffered a violation of the same provision of law."

Judge Lorenz holds that the Plaintiff's claims satisfy the
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). He finds that the
evidence suggests that Wal-Mart regularly made payments to
employees after the date of termination. The Plaintiff's expert
found that 48,798 former employees were paid additional wages after
they received their final pay statement and 14,169 were paid PTO
wages after termination. Consequently, there is a common question
germane to the resolution of the claims of all the class members
regarding whether they were paid earned wages after the date of
termination.

In addition, newly produced evidence shows that the Defendants'
maintained a written policy which appears to indicate that that
under certain circumstances, terminated employees are paid after
the date of termination. Whether the Defendants had a stated policy
that resulted in late paid wages is a question whose answer could
potentially provide a classwide resolution. Lastly, while the
circumstances underlying Garcia's claims present a challenge to the
employer for purposes of compliance with section 203, the large
number of employees who were paid after termination suggest that
the practice is more than "unintentional payroll discrepancies."

B. Rule 23(b)(3) Predominance

The Defendants argue that decertification is warranted because
individualized issues swamp any common ones, noting that the Court
highlighted these issues in the order denying summary judgment.
They claim that "mini-trials" would be necessary to determine
whether waiting time penalties are owed to each class member.

In his Opposition, the Plaintiff argues that courts have repeatedly
held that wage and hour class actions can be certified based on the
employer's records where common questions predominate. He
elaborates that all that is required to adjudicate a claim under
Labor Code Section 203 is a calendar and proof that the employer
acted willfully, citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (2018).
The Plaintiff points to Walmart's PTO policy as an example of wages
earned that he, and other class members, were not paid until after
termination. In the Plaintiff's view, the facts underlying his
entitlement to the PTO wages are immaterial, and therefore not
fatal, because the common issue among the class members is whether
wages were unlawfully paid after termination.

Judge Lorenz holds that common questions predominate and the
proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant class
treatment. Well-maintained payroll records will show whether an
employee was scheduled to work, if the employee clocked in, and how
long the employee was at work. Policies will also reflect whether
an employee is entitled to wages when they clock in but do not
clock out. The only question that might require individualized
proof is whether each employee was entitled to the wages that were
paid post-termination but that is a "damages question" that does
not overcome the predominance of the common question of law.

Judge Lorenz further holds that the class claims manageable. A
class action is superior to individual actions because individual
class members may have small claims, such as Plaintiff Garcia, that
would otherwise prove difficult to pursue. Importantly,
adjudicating the claims on a class-wide basis would also promote
judicial efficiency, as it is far more efficient to litigate
violations of Labor Code Sections 201, 203 -- the basis for their
claim—on a classwide basis rather than in thousands of individual
and overlapping lawsuits. Additionally, questions of liability can
be addressed through evidence of payroll policies, as well as the
payroll databases, systems, and procedures used by the Defendants
for calculating wages owed at termination and subsequent additional
wages owed after termination to California separating employees
within the class period.

C. California Labor Code Sections 2698 et seq., the Private
Attorney General Act ("PAGA")

In claim two of the First Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff seeks
recovery of all civil penalties for the Defendants' violation of
Labor Code sections 201 and 203 as a "proxy for the State of
California and on behalf of other Aggrieved Employees" pursuant to
PAGA.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's PAGA claims are
derivative of his underlying Labor Code claims, thus adjudicating
the PAGA claims presents the same issues of individualized
determination which makes class treatment unmanageable.

Judge Lorenz holds that claims asserted pursuant to the PAGA are
not subject to the class certification requirements of Rule 23. In
addition, a federal court may strike a PAGA claim that "cannot be
rendered manageable." The Defendants' challenges to the Plaintiff's
PAGA claims fail for the same reasons as detailed.

III. Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Lorenz denies the Defendants'
motion for decertification and dismissal of the Plaintiff's PAGA
claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 22, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3u68xnam from Leagle.com.


WARSON GROUP: Cromitie Seeks Blind's Equal Access to Online Store
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SEANA CROMITIE, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. WARSON GROUP, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:22-cv-05164 (S.D.N.Y., June 20, 2022) is a class action against
the Defendant for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
and the New York City Human Rights Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has failed to design,
construct, maintain, and operate its website to be fully accessible
to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired persons. The Defendant's website,
www.reebokwork.com, contains access barriers which hinder the
Plaintiff and Class members to enjoy the benefits of its online
goods, content, and services offered to the general public through
the website. These access barriers include, but not limited to: (a)
fail to accurately describe the contents of graphical images, (b)
fail to properly label title, (c) fail to distinguish one page from
another, (d) contain multiple broken links, (e) contain headings
that do not describe the topic or purpose, and (f) the keyboard
user interfaces lack a mode of operation where the keyboard focus
indicator is visible, says the suit.

The Plaintiff and Class members seek permanent injunction to cause
a change in the Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that the Defendant's website will become and remain
accessible to blind and visually-impaired individuals.

Warson Group, Inc. is an online retail company doing business in
New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
         MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC
         701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
         Asbury Park, NJ 07712
         Telephone: (732) 695-3282
         Facsimile: (732) 298-6256
         E-mail: Yzelman@MarcusZelman.com

WASTE MANAGEMENT: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of August 8 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard LLP, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, reminds investors of the deadline to file a lead plaintiff
motion in a securities class action lawsuit that has been filed on
behalf of investors who purchased certain redeemable senior notes
(the "Notes") of Waste Management, Inc. ("WM" or the "Company")
(NYSE: WM) between February 13, 2020 and June 23, 2020, inclusive
(the "Class Period"). The Notes include the following senior
redeemable notes issued by WM in May 2019: (i) 2.95% Senior Notes
due 2024; (ii) 3.20% Senior Notes due 2026; (iii) 3.45% Senior
Notes due 2029; and (iv) 4.00% Senior Notes due 2039. The lawsuit
was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York and alleges violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

On April 14, 2019, WM entered into an agreement and plan of merger
(the "Merger") to acquire Advanced Disposal Systems, Inc. ("ADS")
for $4.9 billion, or $33.15 per share. The Merger was conditioned
upon an ADS shareholder vote and obtaining antitrust clearance from
regulators, including the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ").

On October 25, 2019, WM, ADS, and the DOJ entered into a timing
agreement that provided for a minimum 70-day settlement period
during which the parties would attempt to reach an agreement on DOJ
approval for the Merger, which included DOJ approval of the amount
of WM's asset divestures. Unbeknownst to investors, during this
process the DOJ informed WM that its agreement to divest $200
million in revenue-producing assets to address antitrust concerns
would be insufficient for regulatory approval. The DOJ concluded
that the combination of WM and ADS would, without divestures
significantly in excess of $200 million, cause harm to municipal
solid waste disposal in 24 geographic markets across 8 states, and
cause harm to small container commercial waste collection in 33
geographic markets located in 6 states.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements throughout the Class Period, including
omitting material facts relating to: (i) the DOJ's indication to WM
that it would require WM to divest significantly more than $200
million; and (ii) the impact of the DOJ's indication on the
completion of the Merger and the redemption of the Notes.

On June 24, 2020, WM disclosed that the Company and ADS had revised
the terms of the Merger and that WM needed to divest substantially
more assets than previously disclosed to receive DOJ approval for
the deal. Under the revised Merger terms, WM agreed to purchase ADS
for $4.6 billion, or $30.30 per share, thereby reducing WM's
acquisition cost by approximately $300 million to $4.6 billion. In
addition, WM and ADS had agreed to sell $835 million worth of
assets in an attempt to satisfy antitrust regulators, which assets
were responsible for generating approximately $345 million in 2019
revenue. WM also revealed that the deal was now not expected to
close until "the end of the third quarter of 2020" - six months
later than had been represented by defendants at the start of the
Class Period and, critically, after the end date which triggered
the redemption feature of the Notes.

On this news, the prices of the Notes fell significantly. For
example, the 3.45% Notes fell from 109% on June 23, 2020 to just
103% of par on June 24, 2020.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than August 8, 2022. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased the Notes, and/or would like to discuss your legal
rights and options please visit Waste Management, Inc. Class Action
Lawsuit or contact Peter Allocco at (212) 951-2030 or
pallocco@bernlieb.com.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact:
Peter Allocco
Bernstein Liebhard LLP
https://www.bernlieb.com
(212) 951-2030
pallocco@bernlieb.com[GN]

WINCO FOODS: Ninth Circuit Affirms Judgment in Johnson Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled ALFRED JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant v. WINCO FOODS, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; WINCO HOLDINGS, INC., an Idaho corporation,
Defendants-Appellees, and DOES, 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendant,
Case No. 21-55501 (9th Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirms the district court's judgment entered
in favor of WinCo.

Overview

WinCo Foods requires a drug test of successful applicants for
employment before they can begin the duties of the job. Plaintiff
Johnson represents a class of employees seeking reimbursement for
the time and travel expenses required to take the test. The
district court entered judgment in favor of WinCo on the ground
that under California law, the Plaintiffs were not yet employees
when they took the drug test. The Plaintiffs appeal contending that
they were employees. The Court of Appeals affirms.

The same issues have arisen in a number of similar cases removed
from California state courts to federal district court. The other
district courts in those cases have also ruled in favor of the
employer. See Gallegos v. Atria Mgmt. Co., No. EDCV 16-00888 JGB
(Spx), 2018 WL 7500277 (C.D. Cal. Feb 22, 2018); Brum v.
MarketSource, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-241-JAM-EFB, 2017 WL 4883376 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 27, 2017); Hakeem v. Transdev Servs., Inc., No.
19-cv-02161-VC, 2021 WL 1626486 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2021). There is
as yet, however, no authoritative California state court decision.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, affirms in a published opinion.

The Plaintiffs have two principal contentions. First they argue
that because the tests were administered under the control of the
employer, they must be regarded as employees, as California law
applies a control test to determine whether an employment
relationship exists. Second, and alternatively, they contend that
under California law the test should be regarded as a "condition
subsequent" to their hiring as employees.

Circuit Judge Mary Murphy Schroeder, writing for the Panel, holds
that neither contention can succeed. The control test relates to
control over the manner of performance of the work itself, not the
manner of establishing qualifications to do the work. There was no
condition subsequent because the Plaintiffs were not hired until
they established they were qualified.

Background of the Litigation

The facts are not complicated. WinCo Foods LLC and WinCo Holdings,
Inc. (collectively "WinCo") operate a supermarket chain with just
over 100 locations across the western United States, including
California. When WinCo hires new employees, a Hiring Manager calls
successful applicants to extend what WinCo terms a contingent offer
of employment. The offer includes the job title, the pay, and the
job location. Using the instructions in WinCo's "Verbal Contingent
Job Offer Talking Points," the Manager discusses the offer with the
applicant. Per those instructions, the Hiring Manager informs the
applicant of a mandatory drug test: "as part of your contingent job
offer with WinCo Foods, we will be conducting a pre-employment
background check and drug test on you." When an applicant consents,
WinCo instructs applicants to report to a testing location. WinCo
pays the drug testing facility's fee, but does not compensate for
the travel expenses and time required to undergo the testing.

On Aug. 23, 2017, Plaintiff Alfred Johnson, on behalf of himself
and other WinCo employees in California, filed this class action in
California state court. WinCo removed the case to federal court
under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d).
Johnson filed his first amended complaint, which forms the basis of
this appeal, claiming compensation as an employee for the time and
expenses of taking the drug test. Johnson alleges violations of the
California Labor Code relating to the payment of wages and
business-related expenses and the California Business & Professions
Code Sections 17200, et seq., proscribing unfair business
practices.

The district court granted Johnson's motion for class certification
and both sides then moved for summary judgment. The district court
held that Johnson and class members were not employees of WinCo
Foods when they underwent drug testing and the court granted
WinCo's motion for summary judgment.

I. The Control Test Does Not Apply

Mr. Johnson argues that he and his fellow class members were
employees when they took the drug tests because WinCo exerted
sufficient control over the drug testing process to render them
employees. He relies on California case law that looks to how much
control the putative employer exerts over the putative employee's
performance of the job to evaluate whether there was an employment
relationship between the two parties. The parties do not dispute
that WinCo exercises control over the mandatory drug testing by
prescribing the time and date of the tests, the facility where the
tests take place, and the scope of those tests.

The problem with Johnson's argument is that control over a drug
test as part of the job application process is not control over the
performance of the job, Judge Schroeder finds.

Judge Schroeder explains that drug testing, like an interview or
preemployment physical examination, is an activity to secure a
position, not a requirement for those already employed.

Mr. Johnson relies on a case involving staffing agencies,
Betancourt v. Advantage Human Resourcing, Inc., No.
14-cv-01788-JST, 2014 WL 4365074 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2014). Judge
Schroeder says that it does not further the Plaintiffs' position.
In Betancourt, the defendant was an agency supplying temporary
staff. The defendant hired the plaintiffs as its temporary workers
so that they could be considered for hire by the defendant's
clients. The plaintiffs were considered employees of the staffing
agency because it controlled the time, location, and manner of the
placement interviews.

Judge Schroeder opines that the key difference is that the
plaintiffs in Betancourt were doing the employment agency's work
when they went to the job interviews, whereas Johnson and fellow
class members were not doing work for WinCo when they took the drug
tests. The court in Betancourt concluded that the plaintiff class
members were required to report for job interviews as a part of
their work for the agency. The agency controlled the manner in
which the class members did their work for the agency, and that
work was applying for jobs with third parties. The employment
agency was their employer.

By contrast, Johnson and the class members were not yet doing work
for WinCo. The fact that WinCo controlled the manner in which they
took the drug test did not make them employees before they were
qualified to report for work, Judge Schroeder points out.

II. The Drug Test Is Not a Condition Subsequent to Employment

Mr. Johnson also argues that class members were employees under
what the Plaintiffs term a "contract theory." That theory looks to
whether the contract of employment is created before, or after, a
condition is satisfied. Johnson contends that the drug test is a
condition subsequent, meaning that the employment contract was
formed before the drug test, and WinCo could terminate the
employment relationship in the event of a drug test failure.

WinCo counters that the drug test is a condition precedent, meaning
that the applicant is not hired, and the employment contract is not
enforceable, until the applicant successfully passes the drug
test.

In this case, Judge Schroeder notes, there was no written contract,
but had a verbal offer of employment. WinCo went to great lengths
when the verbal offer was made to communicate that its job offer
was conditional. Class members, who accepted such offers, must have
known that they were accepting an employment offer contingent on a
successful drug test, Judge Schroeder holds. The drug test is a
condition precedent. As the district court observed, "A ruling for
Plaintiff in this case would essentially suggest to employers that
there is nothing they can do to demarcate drug testing as a
pre-employment condition rather than a condition subsequent."

Mr. Johnson relies in major part on a workers' compensation case,
Bowen v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 73 Cal.App.4th 15
(1999). At issue in Bowen was whether an injured baseball player
had been hired in California, where he accepted an offer subject to
approval by the Commissioner of Baseball, or out of state, where
the Commissioner was located and where the plaintiff worked. The
question before the California Court of Appeal was whether Bowen
could receive benefits under California workers' compensation law.

Mr. Johnson argues that this case is like Bowen and the employment
contract was made when the class members accepted a comprehensive
offer of employment over the phone. According to Johnson, the Court
of Appeals should hold that the WinCo employment contract was
subject to a condition subsequent, just as the court in Bowen held
that the Commissioner's approval was a condition subsequent.

Judge Schroeder notes that the Bowen opinion suggests that if the
court had applied California contract law, rather than workers'
compensation principles, there would not have been a contract until
all of the conditions were satisfied. This is not a workers'
compensation case and, therefore, applying the principles of
California contract law articulated in Bowen, the class members did
not become employees until they satisfied the condition of passing
the preemployment drug test.

The California law is clear, Judge Schroeder states. There is no
need to delay resolution of this case and others that may be
pending in the federal district courts by certifying any questions
to the California Supreme Court.

Conclusion

The judgment of the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, holding in relevant part that the class
members were not employees at the time of the drug test and did not
need to be compensated, is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated June 13, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/54mdcbxw from Leagle.com.

Melissa Grant -- Melissa.Grant@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Ryan H. Wu --
Ryan.Wu@CapstoneLawyers.com -- and Tyler Anderson --
Tyler.Anderson@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC, in Los
Angeles, California, for the Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kiran Aftab Seldon -- kseldon@seyfarth.com -- Kristina M. Launey --
klauney@seyfarth.com -- and Michael Kopp -- mkopp@seyfarth.com --
Seyfarth Shaw LLP, in Los Angeles, California, for the
Defendants-Appellees.


WINNEBAGO COUNTY, IL: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Mitchell Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DYLAN MITCHELL, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants v.
EUGENE G. DOHERTY, GARY CARUANA, and WINNEBAGO COUNTY,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 21-1764 (7th Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirms the district court's
order granting the Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.

I. Introduction

Winnebago County does not hold bail hearings over the weekend. As a
result, suspects may wait longer than 48 hours before a judge can
set bail. Eight detainees, who were held for up to 68 hours, sued
the County for maintaining a policy that allegedly violates the
Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the Defendants' motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

II. Background

Police arrested eight demonstrators in Rockford, Illinois, seven on
a Friday (Dylan Mitchell, Dayna Schultz, Larissa Walston, Ivan
Holland, Ross Wagner, Andrew Ehrhardt, and Jaylen Butler) and one
on a Saturday (Michael Riggs). All eight waited until Monday at
1:30 p.m. to receive a bail hearing, at which point seven were
released either on their own recognizance or on bond. The charges
against Shultz, Ehrhardt, and Butler have been dismissed, and the
court sentenced Mitchell, Riggs, and Wagner to probation or
conditional discharge. In total, the Friday detainees were held for
about 68 hours, and the Saturday detainee was held for slightly
over 48 hours.

The Plaintiffs allege the detention caused numerous injuries: Three
missed work, and Mitchell lost her job altogether; Riggs could not
seek medical attention for an open shoulder wound and bruised ribs
while in jail; Walston endured three days of solitary confinement,
was let out only once for a one-hour period, and was not allowed to
take her prescription medication; and Wagner was denied medical
attention for a concussion and a bleeding head wound.

The Plaintiffs first sued over an alleged failure to make a
probable-cause determination within 48 hours, an uncontested
violation of the Fourth Amendment. But upon learning that a judge
does make a probable-cause determination within 48 hours, albeit on
an ex parte basis, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint,
bringing claims under Section 1983 against Eugene Doherty, the
Chief Judge of the 17th Judicial Circuit Court, and Winnebago
County Sheriff Gary Caruana, in their official capacities, as well
as Winnebago County. They argued that the County violated the
Fourth Amendment by denying them a bail hearing within 48 hours
after detention even though a probable-cause determination had been
made within that period. The complaint sought injunctive and
declaratory relief against the chief judge and damages against
Sheriff Caruana as well as the County under Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

The Plaintiffs, in conjunction with filing the amended complaint,
moved for a preliminary injunction and class certification. The
Defendants moved to dismiss the counts for failure to state a
claim, and the district court granted the Defendants' motion and
denied the class-certification motion as moot. The timely appeal
followed.

III. Discussion

The Plaintiffs submit that Winnebago County violates the Fourth
Amendment by not providing a bail hearing within 48 hours after a
suspect's arrest. The Seventh Circuit reviews the dismissal of a
complaint for failure to state a claim de novo, construing all
allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs argue that Supreme Court and circuit precedent
requires a bail hearing within 48 hours after a suspect's arrest.
The Seventh Circuit disagrees. The Supreme Court has twice
addressed the procedural requirements for probable-cause
determinations but never considered the timing of bail hearings,
citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); and County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). Thus, precedent
dictates that only a probable-cause determination must be held
within 48 hours. The constitutionally required timing of a bail
hearing is an issue of first impression.

The Seventh Circuit turns now to the question of whether, under the
Fourth Amendment, a bail hearing, like a probable-cause
determination, must be held within 48 hours and, relatedly, whether
the County's practice of holding hearings up to 68 hours after a
suspect's arrest is constitutional. It begins with the County's
argument that the Fourth Amendment does not establish the
constitutional requirements for a bail hearing and, thus, it should
affirm on that basis alone. This argument implicates the more
general question of when Fourth Amendment protections cease.

Ultimately, given the far-reaching implications and the limited
briefing on the issue, the Seventh Circuit need not decide whether
the Fourth Amendment applies after a judge has made a
probable-cause determination to the timing of a bail hearing
because, assuming that it does, the Plaintiffs' claim still fails.
In assessing the constitutionally required timing of a bail hearing
under the Fourth Amendment, the Seventh Circuit considers the
traditional interpretive tools: text, history, tradition, and
guidance from caselaw.

The Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence from history or
tradition to support their argument. Of course, states can choose
to hold all bail hearings within 48 hours, which may prove easier
with technological advancements. But the Fourth Amendment does not
compel them to. Judges should proceed cautiously when asked to step
into the shoes of legislators, as the Seventh Circuit does in the
case.

IV. Conclusion

In short, the Seventh Circuit holds that the Fourth Amendment does
not require a bail hearing within 48 hours after arrest.
Furthermore, it concludes that bail hearings held within 68 hours
-- because suspects were arrested on a Friday (as the suspects held
for the longest time in the case were) -- are constitutional under
the Fourth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit leaves for another day
whether a longer detention without a bail hearing violates the
Constitution. For these reasons, it affirms the judgment of the
district court.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 22, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/372yewdv from Leagle.com.


XL FLEET: Faces Kay Class Suit Over 12.1% Decline of Stock Price
----------------------------------------------------------------
VAL KAY, derivatively on behalf of Nominal Defendant XL FLEET
CORP., Plaintiff v. DEB FRODL, ERIC TECH, KEVIN GRIFFIN, CHRIS
HAYES, JOHN LEDECKY, SARA SCLARSIC, JOHN MILLER, H.R. BRADY,
DIMITRI KAZARINOFF, THOMAS J. HYNES III, and BRIAN PIERN,
Defendants, and XL FLEET CORP., Nominal Defendant, Case No.
1:22-cv-10977 (D. Mass., June 22, 2022) is a shareholder derivative
action against the Defendants for violations of Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, breach of fiduciary
duty, waste of corporate assets, unjust enrichment, and abuse of
control.

According to the complaint, the Defendants made false and
misleading statements with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission about XL Fleet's business results and prospects in order
to trade XL Fleet stock at artificially inflated prices. The
Defendants failed to disclose that (i) XL Fleet had manipulated and
overstated its pipeline figures, (ii) XL Fleet had been
experiencing supply chain problems that impeded its ability to
timely fill existing orders, (iii) a large number of the customers
touted by XL Fleet were inactive and no longer ordering XL Fleet
products, (iv) the quality and benefits of XL Fleet's technology
were overstated and that technology did not provide the miles-per
gallon savings to customers that XL Fleet represented, and (v) as a
result of these omissions, the Defendants' rosy assessment of XL
Fleet's prospects and projections of future revenue were wildly
overstated. When the truth emerged, XL Fleet's stock closed at
$7.89 per share on April 1, 2021, 12.1 percent lower as compared to
the prior day, on exceptionally high trading volume. As a result of
the Defendants' breach of their fiduciary duties, the company has
suffered damages, not only monetarily, but also to its corporate
image and goodwill, the suit alleges.

XL Fleet Corp. is a provider of vehicle electrification solutions
for commercial and municipal fleets, with its principal executive
offices located in Boston, Massachusetts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:                                   
                                  
         
         Michael P. Utke, Esq.
         LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL P. UTKE, LLC
         P.O. Box 360
         Pepperell, MA 01463
         Telephone: (617) 314-6600
         E-mail: mutke@utkelaw.com

                 - and –

         Thomas J. McKenna, Esq.
         Gregory M. Egleston, Esq.
         GAINEY McKENNA & EGLESTON
         501 Fifth Avenue, 19th Floor
         New York, NY 10017
         Telephone: (212) 983-1300
         Facsimile: (212) 983-0383
         E-mail: tjmckenna@gme-law.com
                 gegleston@gme-law.com


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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