/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/220906.mbx C L A S S A C T I O N R E P O R T E R Tuesday, September 6, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 172 Headlines 3M COMPANY: Exposed Firefighters to PFAS, Spencer Suit Claims 3M COMPANY: Kimble Suit Alleges Complications From AFFF Products 3M COMPANY: Maloun Sues Over Side Effects of Using AFFF Products 3M COMPANY: Mattera Sues Over Injury Sustained From AFFF Products 3M COMPANY: Peeples Suit Alleges PFAS Exposure From AFFF Products 3M COMPANY: York Suit Claims Toxic Exposure From AFFF Products A. DUDA & SONS: Massengill Files Suit in M.D. Florida ABBOTT LABORATORIES: Portnoy Law Discloses Securities Class Suit AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Chaudhry MMWA Suit Goes to W.D. Pennsylvania AMF BOWLING: Web Site Not Accessible to Blind, Dicks Suit Says ARAPAHOE COUNTY DHS: Jurinsky Suit Removed to D. Colorado ARC AUTOMOTIVE: Long Files Suit in N.D. Alabama ARIJIT SENGUPTA: Cal. App. Flips Order Sustaining Demurrer in Xian ARTELEXIA INC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ASSESSOR OF FLORAL PARK: Ficarotto Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct. ASSET RECOVERY: Ragsdale Files FDCPA Suit in D. Utah AZURE POWER: Portnoy Law Discloses Securities Class Action Suit BECKETT SPRINGS: Yisrael Files Suit Over Unpaid Minimum Wages BED BATH & BEYOND: Faces Si Suit Over Alleged Drop in Share Price BELLE & BLUSH: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York BEST BUY CO: Karim Suit Removed to N.D. California BLOOMBERG LP: Faces Unpaid OT Suit Despite Prior Class Settlement BLUESCOPE BUILDINGS: Verdugo Labor Suit Goes to E.D. California BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Davis Class Suit BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Court Refuses to Dismiss Gujral Class Suit BOEING CO: Bid to Dismiss Aircraft Securities Suit Granted in Part BP EXPLORATION: Court Excludes Cook Testimony From Moore B3 Suit BUFFALO WILD WINGS: Pittman Suit Removed to D. Maryland CALIFORNIA: Dismissal of Claims in Martinez v. Newsom Partly Upheld CANADA: Hackers Stole CERB Benefits, Alleges Class Action Lawsuit CARECORE HEALTH: Gudger Sues Over Failure to Properly Pay OT Wages CARGILL MEAT: Villa PMWA Suit Removed to E.D. Pennsylvania CATALINA STRUCTURED: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Anderson TCPA Suit CENTRAL BUCKS: Cartee-Haring's Bid for Final Certification Granted CHIEF FIRE: Atty. Resila Withdraws as Class Counsel in Brown Suit CHRISTMAS TREE HILL: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York COMMUNITY HEALTH: White Sues to Recover Compensation and Benefits CONDOR LLC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York CONSTELATION CLEARSIGHT: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Haldeman Says CREDIT CONSULTING: Summary Judgment Order in Scott Suit Reversed DANIA ENTERTAINMENT: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Moore Claims DEL MONTE FOODS: Stewart Sues Over Failure to Pay Wages Owed DEVA CONCEPTS: Liability Suit Counsel to Answer Settlement Concerns DEVON ENERGY: Underpays Oilfield Workers, Stoddart Suit Claims DINGDONG LTD: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due Oct. 24 EHEALTHINSURANCE SERVICES: Salaiz Sues Over Unwanted Robocalls ELEMENTS PRODUCTION: Raus to Amend Complaint to Invoke Jurisdiction ENERGY TRANSFER: Allegheny County ERS Wins Bid to Certify Class EQUIFAX INC: Thompson Files FCRA Suit in N.D. Georgia EXPLORE SCIENTIFIC: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York EXPRESS SERVICES: Storm Suit Removed to C.D. California FIRST AMERICAN: Cal. App. Flips Dismissal of Sjobring & Kaufman FIVE ELEMENTS INC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York FLOSPORTS INC: Young Sues Over Illegal Automatic Renewal Scheme G & A OUTSOURCING: Petrol Logic Files Suit in D. Colorado G.A.S. GLOBAL: Faces Herring Suit Over Unpaid Overtime Wages GAME GOBLINS: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York GEORGIA: 11th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Crisp's Civil Complaint GONSALVES & SANTUCCI: Rodriguez Suit Remanded to Superior Court GOOGLE LLC: $118M Settlement Proposed in Work Discrimination Suit GOOGLE LLC: Faces Biometric Privacy Class Suit Over Face Blur Tool H&R FOODS INC: Serna Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. HARDER MECHANICAL: $1.5MM Settlement in Ellis Suit Wins Prelim. Nod HEART OF IOWA MARKET: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York HOMEAGLOW INC: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Costley Suit Alleges INDIANAPOLIS NEUROSURGICAL: Gill Files Suit in S.D. Indiana INSPIRED DESIGN: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York IRBSEARCH LLC: Parker FCRA Suit Removed to M.D. Florida IT GUYZ SOLUTIONS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Marshall Alleges JK MOSS ENTERPRISES: Jones Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York KAISER FOUNDATION: Getubig Labor Suit Goes to N.D. California KARAN REALTY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Perez Suit Alleges KROGER CO: Coffee Creamer Does Not Contain Real Cream, Suit Says LATCH INC: Federman & Sherwood Discloses Securities Class Action MAINLINE PRIVATE: Misclassifies Security Guards, Dennis Claims MAKING IT BIG: Maddy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York MAMAN GROUP: Underpays Restaurant Employees, Torres Suit Alleges MDL 2913: Causes Youth E-Cigarette Crisis, Mammoth-San Suit Says MDL 2913: Entices Youth to Use E-Cigarette, Fast Forward Alleges MDL 2913: Faces Bridge Creek Suit Over Deceptive E-Cigarette Ads MDL 2913: Faces Okarche Public Suit Over Youth E-Cigarette Crisis MILWAUKEE, WI: Class Settlement in Kraai Suit Wins Prelim. Approval MIRAMED REVENUE: Mitchell Sues Over Illegal Biometric Collection MISSOURI: Court Denies Pate's Bid to Intervene in Parton v. White MJC ACQUISITION: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York MONA LISA PIZZERIA: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Gomez Claims MULTICARE HEALTH: Wash. App. Affirms Summary Judgment in M.N. Suit MYLAN N.V.: Partially Compelled to Reply to KPH's FRPs of Documents NES GLOBAL: Fails to Pay Overtime Pay, Amin Suit Alleges NEW JERSEY: Amended Carmona Suit v. NJDOE Dismissed W/o Prejudice NEWVIEW OKLAHOMA: Steward Labor Suit Removed to E.D. California NIO INC: Portnoy Law Discloses Securities Class Action Lawsuit NOVANT HEALTH: Allen Files Suit in M.D. North Carolina OTGS LLC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York PECONIC LANDING: Santa Cruz Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages PELOTON INTERACTIVE: Suit Over Sales Tax Claims Sent to Arbitration PLEXUS CORP: Court Dismisses Amended O'Driscoll Suit With Prejudice POLLACK & ROSEN: Benjamin Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Florida PRACTICEMAX INC: Knox Files Suit in D. Arizona PREMIER HR: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Estrada Suit Alleges PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Oyenuga Says PREVEA CLINIC: Court Narrows Claims in Nohara's 2nd Amended Suit PROGRESSIVE ADVANCED: Court Certifies Class in Buffington Suit QUICKZIP SHEET: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York RAY MOLES: Sept. 27 Scheduling Conference in Colores Suit Vacated REALPAGE INC: Denial of Subclass Certification in Kelly Vacated RENOWN HEALTH: Court Narrows Claims in Nevett's 2nd Amended Suit RINGS END: Hwang Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York RON'S TOWING: Garrett Sues Over Unpaid Tow Truck Operators' OT RUSH CAR: Viera Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Drivers and Car Cleaners SCRIPPS HEALTH: Must File Response in Franklin Suit by Sept. 9 SERVICELINK NLS: Rinsch Wage-and-Hour Suit Removed to C.D. Cal. TARGET CORP: Conditional Certification in Babbitt Suit Affirmed TCA LOGISTICS: Faces Zambrano Wage-and-Hour Suit in E.D.N.Y. TELADOC HEALTH: Labaton Named Lead Counsel in Securities Suit TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL: Blue Cross Sues Over Copaxone Drug Monopoly TEXAS: Attorney General Sued Over Strict Anti Abortion Laws THEDACARE INC: Court Narrows Claims in Glick ERISA Class Suit TRINITY PACKAGING: Prelim. Approval of Robertson Class Deal Denied TUSIMPLE HOLDINGS: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due Nov. 1 UNCOMMON GROUNDS: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Amended Aguilar Suit VICTORIA: Police Uses Capsicum Spray Against Protesters, Suit Says WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: Court Certifies Class in Nelson FLSA Suit WEDRIVEU INC: Chatman Wage-and-Hour Suit Goes to N.D. California WINCO HOLDINGS: Court Dismisses Putman Suit With Leave to Amend WINCO HOLDINGS: Court Narrows Claims in Castanon's 2nd Amended Suit WINCO HOLDINGS: E.D. California Dismisses Phoung's 1st Amended Suit ZIGNEGO CO: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Cardenas Suit Alleges [*] Kyle Roche to Withdraw as Counsel in Crypto Class Action Suits ********* 3M COMPANY: Exposed Firefighters to PFAS, Spencer Suit Claims ------------------------------------------------------------- CARL SPENCER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); ACG CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-02820-RMG (D.S.C., August 23, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, battery, inadequate warning, design defect, strict liability, fraudulent concealment, breach of express and implied warranties, and wantonness. The case arises from severe personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff as a result of his exposure to the Defendants' aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) products containing synthetic, toxic per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances collectively known as PFAS. The Defendants failed to use reasonable and appropriate care in the design, manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling, marketing, and distribution of their PFAS-containing AFFF products and also failed to warn public entities and civilian firefighters, including the Plaintiff, who they knew would foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF products that use of and/or exposure to the products would pose a danger to human health. Due to inadequate warning, the Plaintiff was exposed to toxic chemicals and was diagnosed with prostate cancer, the suit alleges. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul. Minnesota. ACG Chemicals Americas Inc. is a manufacturer of chemical products based in Exton, Pennsylvania. Amerex Corporation is a manufacturer of firefighting products based in Trussville, Alabama. Archroma U.S. Inc. is a global specialty chemicals company headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. Arkema, Inc. is a diversified chemicals manufacturer in North America, based in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. Buckeye Fire Equipment Co. is a manufacturer of line of handheld and wheeled fire extinguishers, suppressing foam concentrates & hardware, and kitchen suppression systems, with principal place of business located at 110 Kings Road, Mountain, North Carolina. Carrier Global Corporation is a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning company based in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida. Chemdesign Products, Inc. is a chemical toll manufacturing company based in Marinette, Wisconsin. Chemguard, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire suppression and specialty chemicals, including AFFF, with principal place of business located at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin. Chemicals, Inc. is a chemical manufacturing company based in Baytown, Texas. Chemours Company FC, LLC is a manufacturer of titanium technologies, fluoroproducts and chemical solutions based in Wilmington, Delaware. Chubb Fire, Ltd is a provider of security and fire protection systems based in United Kingdom. Clariant Corp. is a specialty chemical company based in Charlotte, North Carolina. Corteva, Inc. is an American agricultural chemical and seed company based in Wilmington, Delaware. Deepwater Chemicals, Inc. is a producer of organic and inorganic iodine derivatives based in Woodward, Oklahoma. Du Pont De Nemours Inc., f/k/a DowDuPont Inc., is a chemical company based in Wilmington, Delaware. Dynax Corporation is a company that specializes in the production of fluorochemicals based in Pound Ridge, New York. E.I Dupont De Nemours & Co. is a provider of agriculture and specialty products with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire protection systems based in Ashland, Massachusetts. Kidde PLC is a manufacturer of fire safety products based in Mebane, North Carolina. Nation Ford Chemical Company is a manufacturer of specialty organic chemicals based in Fort Mill, South Carolina. National Foam, Inc. is a manufacturer of foam concentrate, foam proportioning systems, fixed and portable foam firefighting equipment, with principal place of business located at 350 East Union Street, West Chester, Pennsylvania. The Chemours Company is a manufacturer of agricultural chemicals with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Tyco Fire Products L.P., successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, is a manufacturer of water-based fire suppression system components and ancillary building construction products, including Ansul brand of AFFF, headquartered at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin. United Technologies Corporation was an American multinational conglomerate headquartered in Farmington, Connecticut. It merged with the Raytheon Company in April 2020 to form Raytheon Technologies. UTC Fire & Security Americas Corporation, Inc., f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc., is a manufacturer of security and fire control systems based in Bradenton, Florida. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq. Steven D. Gacovino, Esq. GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 270 West Main Street Sayville, NY 11782 Telephone: (631) 600-0000 Facsimile: (631) 543-5450 - and – Gregory A. Cade, Esq. Gary A. Anderson, Esq. Kevin B. McKie, Esq. ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C. 2160 Highland Avenue South Birmingham, AL 35205 Telephone: (205) 328-9200 Facsimile: (205) 328-9456 3M COMPANY: Kimble Suit Alleges Complications From AFFF Products ---------------------------------------------------------------- WILLIAM KIMBLE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); ACG CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-02827-RMG (D.S.C., August 23, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, battery, inadequate warning, design defect, strict liability, fraudulent concealment, breach of express and implied warranties, and wantonness. The case arises from severe personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff as a result of his exposure to the Defendants' aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) products containing synthetic, toxic per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances collectively known as PFAS. The Defendants failed to use reasonable and appropriate care in the design, manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling, marketing, and distribution of their PFAS-containing AFFF products and also failed to warn public entities and civilian firefighters, including the Plaintiff, who they knew would foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF products that use of and/or exposure to the products would pose a danger to human health. Due to inadequate warning, the Plaintiff was exposed to toxic chemicals and was diagnosed with testicular cancer, the suit alleges. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul. Minnesota. ACG Chemicals Americas Inc. is a manufacturer of chemical products based in Exton, Pennsylvania. Amerex Corporation is a manufacturer of firefighting products based in Trussville, Alabama. Archroma U.S. Inc. is a global specialty chemicals company headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. Arkema, Inc. is a diversified chemicals manufacturer in North America, based in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. Buckeye Fire Equipment Co. is a manufacturer of line of handheld and wheeled fire extinguishers, suppressing foam concentrates & hardware, and kitchen suppression systems, with principal place of business located at 110 Kings Road, Mountain, North Carolina. Carrier Global Corporation is a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning company based in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida. Chemdesign Products, Inc. is a chemical toll manufacturing company based in Marinette, Wisconsin. Chemguard, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire suppression and specialty chemicals, including AFFF, with principal place of business located at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin. Chemicals, Inc. is a chemical manufacturing company based in Baytown, Texas. Chemours Company FC, LLC is a manufacturer of titanium technologies, fluoroproducts and chemical solutions based in Wilmington, Delaware. Chubb Fire, Ltd is a provider of security and fire protection systems based in United Kingdom. Clariant Corp. is a specialty chemical company based in Charlotte, North Carolina. Corteva, Inc. is an American agricultural chemical and seed company based in Wilmington, Delaware. Deepwater Chemicals, Inc. is a producer of organic and inorganic iodine derivatives based in Woodward, Oklahoma. Du Pont De Nemours Inc., f/k/a DowDuPont Inc., is a chemical company based in Wilmington, Delaware. Dynax Corporation is a company that specializes in the production of fluorochemicals based in Pound Ridge, New York. E.I Dupont De Nemours & Co. is a provider of agriculture and specialty products with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire protection systems based in Ashland, Massachusetts. Kidde PLC is a manufacturer of fire safety products based in Mebane, North Carolina. Nation Ford Chemical Company is a manufacturer of specialty organic chemicals based in Fort Mill, South Carolina. National Foam, Inc. is a manufacturer of foam concentrate, foam proportioning systems, fixed and portable foam firefighting equipment, with principal place of business located at 350 East Union Street, West Chester, Pennsylvania. The Chemours Company is a manufacturer of agricultural chemicals with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Tyco Fire Products L.P., successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, is a manufacturer of water-based fire suppression system components and ancillary building construction products, including Ansul brand of AFFF, headquartered at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin. United Technologies Corporation was an American multinational conglomerate headquartered in Farmington, Connecticut. It merged with the Raytheon Company in April 2020 to form Raytheon Technologies. UTC Fire & Security Americas Corporation, Inc., f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc., is a manufacturer of security and fire control systems based in Bradenton, Florida. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq. Steven D. Gacovino, Esq. GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 270 West Main Street Sayville, NY 11782 Telephone: (631) 600-0000 Facsimile: (631) 543-5450 - and – Gregory A. Cade, Esq. Gary A. Anderson, Esq. Kevin B. McKie, Esq. ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C. 2160 Highland Avenue South Birmingham, AL 35205 Telephone: (205) 328-9200 Facsimile: (205) 328-9456 3M COMPANY: Maloun Sues Over Side Effects of Using AFFF Products ---------------------------------------------------------------- ROBERT MALOUN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); ACG CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-02826-RMG (D.S.C., August 23, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, battery, inadequate warning, design defect, strict liability, fraudulent concealment, breach of express and implied warranties, and wantonness. The case arises from severe personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff as a result of his exposure to the Defendants' aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) products containing synthetic, toxic per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances collectively known as PFAS. The Defendants failed to use reasonable and appropriate care in the design, manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling, marketing, and distribution of their PFAS-containing AFFF products and also failed to warn public entities and civilian firefighters, including the Plaintiff, who they knew would foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF products that use of and/or exposure to the products would pose a danger to human health. Due to inadequate warning, the Plaintiff was exposed to toxic chemicals and was diagnosed with prostate cancer, the suit alleges. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul. Minnesota. ACG Chemicals Americas Inc. is a manufacturer of chemical products based in Exton, Pennsylvania. Amerex Corporation is a manufacturer of firefighting products based in Trussville, Alabama. Archroma U.S. Inc. is a global specialty chemicals company headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. Arkema, Inc. is a diversified chemicals manufacturer in North America, based in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. Buckeye Fire Equipment Co. is a manufacturer of line of handheld and wheeled fire extinguishers, suppressing foam concentrates & hardware, and kitchen suppression systems, with principal place of business located at 110 Kings Road, Mountain, North Carolina. Carrier Global Corporation is a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning company based in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida. Chemdesign Products, Inc. is a chemical toll manufacturing company based in Marinette, Wisconsin. Chemguard, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire suppression and specialty chemicals, including AFFF, with principal place of business located at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin. Chemicals, Inc. is a chemical manufacturing company based in Baytown, Texas. Chemours Company FC, LLC is a manufacturer of titanium technologies, fluoroproducts and chemical solutions based in Wilmington, Delaware. Chubb Fire, Ltd is a provider of security and fire protection systems based in United Kingdom. Clariant Corp. is a specialty chemical company based in Charlotte, North Carolina. Corteva, Inc. is an American agricultural chemical and seed company based in Wilmington, Delaware. Deepwater Chemicals, Inc. is a producer of organic and inorganic iodine derivatives based in Woodward, Oklahoma. Du Pont De Nemours Inc., f/k/a DowDuPont Inc., is a chemical company based in Wilmington, Delaware. Dynax Corporation is a company that specializes in the production of fluorochemicals based in Pound Ridge, New York. E.I Dupont De Nemours & Co. is a provider of agriculture and specialty products with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire protection systems based in Ashland, Massachusetts. Kidde PLC is a manufacturer of fire safety products based in Mebane, North Carolina. Nation Ford Chemical Company is a manufacturer of specialty organic chemicals based in Fort Mill, South Carolina. National Foam, Inc. is a manufacturer of foam concentrate, foam proportioning systems, fixed and portable foam firefighting equipment, with principal place of business located at 350 East Union Street, West Chester, Pennsylvania. The Chemours Company is a manufacturer of agricultural chemicals with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Tyco Fire Products L.P., successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, is a manufacturer of water-based fire suppression system components and ancillary building construction products, including Ansul brand of AFFF, headquartered at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin. United Technologies Corporation was an American multinational conglomerate headquartered in Farmington, Connecticut. It merged with the Raytheon Company in April 2020 to form Raytheon Technologies. UTC Fire & Security Americas Corporation, Inc., f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc., is a manufacturer of security and fire control systems based in Bradenton, Florida. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq. Steven D. Gacovino, Esq. GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 270 West Main Street Sayville, NY 11782 Telephone: (631) 600-0000 Facsimile: (631) 543-5450 - and – Gregory A. Cade, Esq. Gary A. Anderson, Esq. Kevin B. McKie, Esq. ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C. 2160 Highland Avenue South Birmingham, AL 35205 Telephone: (205) 328-9200 Facsimile: (205) 328-9456 3M COMPANY: Mattera Sues Over Injury Sustained From AFFF Products ----------------------------------------------------------------- DANIEL MATTERA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); ACG CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-02830-RMG (D.S.C., August 23, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, battery, inadequate warning, design defect, strict liability, fraudulent concealment, breach of express and implied warranties, and wantonness. The case arises from severe personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff as a result of his exposure to the Defendants' aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) products containing synthetic, toxic per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances collectively known as PFAS. The Defendants failed to use reasonable and appropriate care in the design, manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling, marketing, and distribution of their PFAS-containing AFFF products and also failed to warn public entities and civilian firefighters, including the Plaintiff, who they knew would foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF products that use of and/or exposure to the products would pose a danger to human health. Due to inadequate warning, the Plaintiff was exposed to toxic chemicals and was diagnosed with prostate cancer, says the suit. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul. Minnesota. ACG Chemicals Americas Inc. is a manufacturer of chemical products based in Exton, Pennsylvania. Amerex Corporation is a manufacturer of firefighting products based in Trussville, Alabama. Archroma U.S. Inc. is a global specialty chemicals company headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. Arkema, Inc. is a diversified chemicals manufacturer in North America, based in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. Buckeye Fire Equipment Co. is a manufacturer of line of handheld and wheeled fire extinguishers, suppressing foam concentrates & hardware, and kitchen suppression systems, with principal place of business located at 110 Kings Road, Mountain, North Carolina. Carrier Global Corporation is a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning company based in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida. Chemdesign Products, Inc. is a chemical toll manufacturing company based in Marinette, Wisconsin. Chemguard, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire suppression and specialty chemicals, including AFFF, with principal place of business located at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin. Chemicals, Inc. is a chemical manufacturing company based in Baytown, Texas. Chemours Company FC, LLC is a manufacturer of titanium technologies, fluoroproducts and chemical solutions based in Wilmington, Delaware. Chubb Fire, Ltd is a provider of security and fire protection systems based in United Kingdom. Clariant Corp. is a specialty chemical company based in Charlotte, North Carolina. Corteva, Inc. is an American agricultural chemical and seed company based in Wilmington, Delaware. Deepwater Chemicals, Inc. is a producer of organic and inorganic iodine derivatives based in Woodward, Oklahoma. Du Pont De Nemours Inc., f/k/a DowDuPont Inc., is a chemical company based in Wilmington, Delaware. Dynax Corporation is a company that specializes in the production of fluorochemicals based in Pound Ridge, New York. E.I Dupont De Nemours & Co. is a provider of agriculture and specialty products with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire protection systems based in Ashland, Massachusetts. Kidde PLC is a manufacturer of fire safety products based in Mebane, North Carolina. Nation Ford Chemical Company is a manufacturer of specialty organic chemicals based in Fort Mill, South Carolina. National Foam, Inc. is a manufacturer of foam concentrate, foam proportioning systems, fixed and portable foam firefighting equipment, with principal place of business located at 350 East Union Street, West Chester, Pennsylvania. The Chemours Company is a manufacturer of agricultural chemicals with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Tyco Fire Products L.P., successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, is a manufacturer of water-based fire suppression system components and ancillary building construction products, including Ansul brand of AFFF, headquartered at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin. United Technologies Corporation was an American multinational conglomerate headquartered in Farmington, Connecticut. It merged with the Raytheon Company in April 2020 to form Raytheon Technologies. UTC Fire & Security Americas Corporation, Inc., f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc., is a manufacturer of security and fire control systems based in Bradenton, Florida. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq. Steven D. Gacovino, Esq. GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 270 West Main Street Sayville, NY 11782 Telephone: (631) 600-0000 Facsimile: (631) 543-5450 - and – Gregory A. Cade, Esq. Gary A. Anderson, Esq. Kevin B. McKie, Esq. ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C. 2160 Highland Avenue South Birmingham, AL 35205 Telephone: (205) 328-9200 Facsimile: (205) 328-9456 3M COMPANY: Peeples Suit Alleges PFAS Exposure From AFFF Products ----------------------------------------------------------------- JOHN PEEPLES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); ACG CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-02817-RMG (D.S.C., August 23, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, battery, inadequate warning, design defect, strict liability, fraudulent concealment, breach of express and implied warranties, and wantonness. The case arises from severe personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff as a result of his exposure to the Defendants' aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) products containing synthetic, toxic per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances collectively known as PFAS. The Defendants failed to use reasonable and appropriate care in the design, manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling, marketing, and distribution of their PFAS-containing AFFF products and also failed to warn public entities and civilian firefighters, including the Plaintiff, who they knew would foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF products that use of and/or exposure to the products would pose a danger to human health. Due to inadequate warning, the Plaintiff was exposed to toxic chemicals and was diagnosed with prostate cancer, says the suit. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul. Minnesota. ACG Chemicals Americas Inc. is a manufacturer of chemical products based in Exton, Pennsylvania. Amerex Corporation is a manufacturer of firefighting products based in Trussville, Alabama. Archroma U.S. Inc. is a global specialty chemicals company headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. Arkema, Inc. is a diversified chemicals manufacturer in North America, based in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. Buckeye Fire Equipment Co. is a manufacturer of line of handheld and wheeled fire extinguishers, suppressing foam concentrates & hardware, and kitchen suppression systems, with principal place of business located at 110 Kings Road, Mountain, North Carolina. Carrier Global Corporation is a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning company based in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida. Chemdesign Products, Inc. is a chemical toll manufacturing company based in Marinette, Wisconsin. Chemguard, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire suppression and specialty chemicals, including AFFF, with principal place of business located at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin. Chemicals, Inc. is a chemical manufacturing company based in Baytown, Texas. Chemours Company FC, LLC is a manufacturer of titanium technologies, fluoroproducts and chemical solutions based in Wilmington, Delaware. Chubb Fire, Ltd is a provider of security and fire protection systems based in United Kingdom. Clariant Corp. is a specialty chemical company based in Charlotte, North Carolina. Corteva, Inc. is an American agricultural chemical and seed company based in Wilmington, Delaware. Deepwater Chemicals, Inc. is a producer of organic and inorganic iodine derivatives based in Woodward, Oklahoma. Du Pont De Nemours Inc., f/k/a DowDuPont Inc., is a chemical company based in Wilmington, Delaware. Dynax Corporation is a company that specializes in the production of fluorochemicals based in Pound Ridge, New York. E.I Dupont De Nemours & Co. is a provider of agriculture and specialty products with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire protection systems based in Ashland, Massachusetts. Kidde PLC is a manufacturer of fire safety products based in Mebane, North Carolina. Nation Ford Chemical Company is a manufacturer of specialty organic chemicals based in Fort Mill, South Carolina. National Foam, Inc. is a manufacturer of foam concentrate, foam proportioning systems, fixed and portable foam firefighting equipment, with principal place of business located at 350 East Union Street, West Chester, Pennsylvania. The Chemours Company is a manufacturer of agricultural chemicals with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Tyco Fire Products L.P., successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, is a manufacturer of water-based fire suppression system components and ancillary building construction products, including Ansul brand of AFFF, headquartered at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin. United Technologies Corporation was an American multinational conglomerate headquartered in Farmington, Connecticut. It merged with the Raytheon Company in April 2020 to form Raytheon Technologies. UTC Fire & Security Americas Corporation, Inc., f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc., is a manufacturer of security and fire control systems based in Bradenton, Florida. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq. Steven D. Gacovino, Esq. GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 270 West Main Street Sayville, NY 11782 Telephone: (631) 600-0000 Facsimile: (631) 543-5450 - and – Gregory A. Cade, Esq. Gary A. Anderson, Esq. Kevin B. McKie, Esq. ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C. 2160 Highland Avenue South Birmingham, AL 35205 Telephone: (205) 328-9200 Facsimile: (205) 328-9456 3M COMPANY: York Suit Claims Toxic Exposure From AFFF Products -------------------------------------------------------------- ROBERT YORK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); ACG CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-02828-RMG (D.S.C., August 23, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, battery, inadequate warning, design defect, strict liability, fraudulent concealment, breach of express and implied warranties, and wantonness. The case arises from severe personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff as a result of his exposure to the Defendants' aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) products containing synthetic, toxic per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances collectively known as PFAS. The Defendants failed to use reasonable and appropriate care in the design, manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling, marketing, and distribution of their PFAS-containing AFFF products and also failed to warn public entities and civilian firefighters, including the Plaintiff, who they knew would foreseeably come into contact with their AFFF products that use of and/or exposure to the products would pose a danger to human health. Due to inadequate warning, the Plaintiff was exposed to toxic chemicals and was diagnosed with kidney cancer, the suit alleges. 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer, developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment, including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul. Minnesota. ACG Chemicals Americas Inc. is a manufacturer of chemical products based in Exton, Pennsylvania. Amerex Corporation is a manufacturer of firefighting products based in Trussville, Alabama. Archroma U.S. Inc. is a global specialty chemicals company headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. Arkema, Inc. is a diversified chemicals manufacturer in North America, based in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. Buckeye Fire Equipment Co. is a manufacturer of line of handheld and wheeled fire extinguishers, suppressing foam concentrates & hardware, and kitchen suppression systems, with principal place of business located at 110 Kings Road, Mountain, North Carolina. Carrier Global Corporation is a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning company based in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida. Chemdesign Products, Inc. is a chemical toll manufacturing company based in Marinette, Wisconsin. Chemguard, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire suppression and specialty chemicals, including AFFF, with principal place of business located at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin. Chemicals, Inc. is a chemical manufacturing company based in Baytown, Texas. Chemours Company FC, LLC is a manufacturer of titanium technologies, fluoroproducts and chemical solutions based in Wilmington, Delaware. Chubb Fire, Ltd is a provider of security and fire protection systems based in United Kingdom. Clariant Corp. is a specialty chemical company based in Charlotte, North Carolina. Corteva, Inc. is an American agricultural chemical and seed company based in Wilmington, Delaware. Deepwater Chemicals, Inc. is a producer of organic and inorganic iodine derivatives based in Woodward, Oklahoma. Du Pont De Nemours Inc., f/k/a DowDuPont Inc., is a chemical company based in Wilmington, Delaware. Dynax Corporation is a company that specializes in the production of fluorochemicals based in Pound Ridge, New York. E.I Dupont De Nemours & Co. is a provider of agriculture and specialty products with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. is a manufacturer of fire protection systems based in Ashland, Massachusetts. Kidde PLC is a manufacturer of fire safety products based in Mebane, North Carolina. Nation Ford Chemical Company is a manufacturer of specialty organic chemicals based in Fort Mill, South Carolina. National Foam, Inc. is a manufacturer of foam concentrate, foam proportioning systems, fixed and portable foam firefighting equipment, with principal place of business located at 350 East Union Street, West Chester, Pennsylvania. The Chemours Company is a manufacturer of agricultural chemicals with principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Tyco Fire Products L.P., successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company, is a manufacturer of water-based fire suppression system components and ancillary building construction products, including Ansul brand of AFFF, headquartered at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin. United Technologies Corporation was an American multinational conglomerate headquartered in Farmington, Connecticut. It merged with the Raytheon Company in April 2020 to form Raytheon Technologies. UTC Fire & Security Americas Corporation, Inc., f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc., is a manufacturer of security and fire control systems based in Bradenton, Florida. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq. Steven D. Gacovino, Esq. GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 270 West Main Street Sayville, NY 11782 Telephone: (631) 600-0000 Facsimile: (631) 543-5450 - and – Gregory A. Cade, Esq. Gary A. Anderson, Esq. Kevin B. McKie, Esq. ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C. 2160 Highland Avenue South Birmingham, AL 35205 Telephone: (205) 328-9200 Facsimile: (205) 328-9456 A. DUDA & SONS: Massengill Files Suit in M.D. Florida ----------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed A. Duda & Sons Inc. The case is styled as James Massengill, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. A. Duda & Sons Inc., Case No. 6:22-cv-01549 (M.D. Fla., Aug. 29, 2022). The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract for Federal Trade Commission Act. A. Duda & Sons, Inc. -- https://www.duda.com/ -- is a diversified land company that specializes in agricultural and real estate operations.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Andrew John Shamis, Esq. SHAMIS & GENTILE, PA 14 NE 1st Ave Ste 705 Miami, FL 33132 Phone: (305) 479-2299 Fax: (786) 623-0915 Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com ABBOTT LABORATORIES: Portnoy Law Discloses Securities Class Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- The Portnoy Law Firm advises Abbott Laboratories ("Abbott" or the "Company") (NYSE: ABT) investors that a class action has been filed on behalf of investors. Abbott investors that lost money on their investment are encouraged to contact Lesley Portnoy, Esq. Investors are encouraged to contact attorney Lesley F. Portnoy, by phone 844-767-8529 or email: lesley@portnoylaw.com, to discuss their legal rights, or click here to join the case via www.portnoylaw.com. The Portnoy Law Firm can provide a complimentary case evaluation and discuss investors’ options for pursuing claims to recover their losses. Abbott is a medical device and health care company that provides a broad line of products, including various forms of infant formula sold under the brand names Similac, Alimentum, and EleCare. By early 2022, Abbott was responsible for producing 40 percent of the United States' infant formula. Of that amount, nearly half was produced in the Company's manufacturing facility in Sturgis, Michigan ("Sturgis"), meaning that Abbott's Sturgis facility fed roughly one in six formula-fed babies in the United States. The complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, Defendants made numerous materially false and misleading statements and omissions concerning what the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") called "egregiously unsanitary" conditions at the Company's Sturgis facility. Specifically, Defendants repeatedly touted to investors the safety and salability of Abbott's infant formula brands and their contribution to the Company's sales and revenue growth. In truth, Abbott's Sturgis facility was in flagrant violation of multiple federal and state health and safety regulations. Those violations, which Defendants willfully or recklessly concealed from investors, put Abbott’s infant formula business in dire jeopardy and left the Company exposed to a risk of severe regulatory action, including the recall of its products and closure of the Sturgis facility. By no later than February 2021 and continuing throughout the Class Period, Abbott and Defendants received direct warnings, communications, FDA inspection reports, and consumer complaints identifying in detail the safety and regulatory violations that were rampant at the Sturgis facility. As a result of Defendants’ misrepresentations and omissions, Abbott common stock traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period. The truth began to emerge on February 17, 2022, when the FDA publicly announced that it was investigating four consumer complaints of infant illness related to powdered infant formula produced by Abbott in Sturgis. The FDA stated that it had initiated an onsite inspection at the facility, and to date had found several positive contamination results from environmental samples for a bacteria, Cronobacter sakazakii ("Cronobacter"), linked to infant illnesses and death. The FDA also revealed that its review of Abbott’s internal records indicated "environmental contamination with Cronobacter and the firm’s destruction of product due to the presence of Cronobacter." As a result of these disclosures, the price of Abbott stock declined $3.79 per share, or 3.14%. In the following days, Abbott was forced to close the Sturgis plant due to the severe safety problems, shuttering one of the major sources of infant formula for the entire United States, as well as certain Canadian and foreign markets. Approximately one month later, on March 22, 2022, the FDA released reports from its three inspections of the Sturgis facility conducted from 2019 through 2022. Those reports indicated that (a) Abbott failed to establish process controls "designed to ensure that infant formula does not become adulterated due to the presence of microorganisms in the formula or in the processing environment" and (b) Abbott failed to "ensure that all surfaces that contacted infant formula were maintained to protect infant formula from being contaminated by any source." On the news of these damaging inspection reports, the price of Abbott stock declined $4.97 per share, or 4%. As the FDA investigation continued, a redacted copy of a whistleblower complaint sent to the FDA in October 2021 was made public on April 22, 2022. Among other things, the whistleblower complaint revealed that the issues disclosed in February and March 2022 were actually known to Abbott’s management far earlier. Upon release of the whistleblower complaint, the price of Abbott stock declined $4.51 per share, or 3.8%. Then, on June 8, 2022, investors learned that, contrary to the Company’s repeated denials, Abbott was aware of the whistleblower’s formal allegations in early 2021, when it was reported that the FDA whistleblower had filed a complaint in February 2021 with the U.S. Labor Department’s Occupational Safety & Health Administration ("OSHA"), and that OSHA delivered that complaint to Abbott and the FDA during the same month. In response, the price of Abbott stock declined $4.17 per share, or 3.5%. Please visit our website to review more information and submit your transaction information. The Portnoy Law Firm represents investors in pursuing claims against caused by corporate wrongdoing. The Firm’s founding partner has recovered over $5.5 billion for aggrieved investors. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes. [GN] AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Chaudhry MMWA Suit Goes to W.D. Pennsylvania ----------------------------------------------------------------- The case styled AMBER CHAUDHRY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC, Case No. GD-22-009302, was removed from the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on August 24, 2022. The Clerk of Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-01221-WSH to the proceeding. The case arises from the Defendant's alleged failure to provide consumers with access to written warranties in violation of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act. Amazon.com Services LLC is electronic commerce company based in Seattle, Washington. [BN] The Defendant is represented by: Michael S. Nelson, Esq. Laura K. Veith, Esq. K&L Gates LLP 210 Sixth Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15222 Telephone: (412) 355-6500 Facsimile: (412) 355-6501 E-mail: michael.nelson@klgates.com laura.veith@klgates.com - and – Kathryn E. Cahoy, Esq. COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 3000 El Camino Real, 10th Floor 5 Palo Alto Square Palo Alto, CA 94306 Telephone: (650) 632-4700 Facsimile: (650) 632-4800 E-mail: kcahoy@cov.com AMF BOWLING: Web Site Not Accessible to Blind, Dicks Suit Says -------------------------------------------------------------- VICTORIA DICKS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. AMF BOWLING WORLDWIDE, INC. d/b/a Bowlero Corp., Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-07154 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 22, 2022) alleges violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendant's Web site, https://www.bowlmor.com, is not fully or equally accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers, including the Plaintiff, in violation of the ADA. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in the Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that the Defendant's Web site will become and remain accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers. AMF BOWLING WORLDWIDE INC. owns and operates bowling centers. The Company offers competitive and casual bowling, birthday party space, club, league, gift cards, and rewards. AMF Bowling Worldwide serves customers worldwide. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mars Khaimov, Esq. MARS KHAIMOV LAW, PLLC 108-26 64th avenue, Second Floor Forest Hills, NY 11375 Telephone: (929) 324-0717 Facsimile: (929) 333-7774 Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com ARAPAHOE COUNTY DHS: Jurinsky Suit Removed to D. Colorado --------------------------------------------------------- The case styled as Danielle Jurinsky, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Arapahoe County Department of Human Services Division of Child & Adult Protection Services; Robin Niceta, in her official capacity as an employee of Arapahoe County Department of Human Services; Michelle Dossey, in her official capacity as Division Manager of the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services, Division of Child & Adult Protection Services; Arapahoe County Board of County Commissioners; Case No. 2022CV31612 was removed from the Arapahoe County District Court, to the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado on Aug. 26, 2022. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:22-cv-02201-PAB-MEH to the proceeding. The nature of suit is stated as Other Civil Rights. The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services -- https://www.arapahoegov.com/388/Human-Services -- provides financial assistance and protective services to children, families and elderly and disabled adults in the community.[BN] The Defendants are represented by: Rebecca McClain Taylor, Esq. Writer Mott, Esq. ARAPAHOE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE-LITTLETON 5334 South Prince Street Littleton, CO 80120-1136 Phone: (303) 795-4639 Email: rtaylor@arapahoegov.com wmott@arapahoegov.com ARC AUTOMOTIVE: Long Files Suit in N.D. Alabama ----------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against ARC Automotive, Inc., et al. The case is styled as Preshawn Long, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. ARC Automotive, Inc., FCA US, LLC, Case No. 2:22-cv-01098-NAD (N.D. Ala., Aug. 29, 2022). The nature of suit is stated as Motor Vehicle Prod. Liability. ARC Automotive, Inc. -- http://www.arcautomotive.com/-- is a global manufacturer that produces a full complement of inflators for automotive airbag applications.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Jeanie Snipes Sleadd, Esq. Taylor C. Bartlett, Esq. W. Lewis Garrison, Jr., Esq. HENINGER GARRISON DAVIS 2224 1st Avenue North Birmingham, AL 35203 Phone: (205) 326-3336 Fax: (205) 380-8084 Email: jsleadd@hgdlawfirm.com taylor@hgdlawfirm.com wlgarrison@hgdlawfirm.com - and - Kevin R Dean, Esq. Lance V Oliver, Esq. MOTLEY RICE LLC 28 Bridgeside Blvd. Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464 Phone: (843) 216-9152 Fax: (843) 216-9450 Email: kdean@motleyrice.com loliver@motleyrice.com ARIJIT SENGUPTA: Cal. App. Flips Order Sustaining Demurrer in Xian ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case, BENNY XIAN, Plaintiff and Appellant v. ARIJIT SENGUPTA, Defendant and Respondent, Case No. A162175 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the First District, Division One, reverses the trial court's order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. Mr. Xian was a cofounder and an early investor of BeyondCore, Inc. After his employment was terminated, he recovered investments he had made in the company as cash payments with 5% interest rather than obtaining shares of BeyondCore stock under convertible promissory notes and a warrant. Several years later, BeyondCore was purchased by Salesforce, Inc. The Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against Arijit Sengupta, the founder of BeyondCore, and other defendants, alleging various causes of action related to the Salesforce acquisition, including a fraud claim alleging that Sengupta misrepresented and concealed material facts about the early capitalization of the company. He alleges that had he known those facts, he would have accepted shares in BeyondCore rather than a cash payout, and would have realized more than $7 million in profits after the Salesforce acquisition. Mr. Xian filed a class action complaint on Oct. 8, 2019, followed by a first amended complaint. After the trial court sustained demurrers to the first amended complaint with leave to amend, Xian filed the SAC. In his SAC, Xian included allegations specifically addressing his discovery of fraud after the Salesforce acquisition. Sengupta demurred to the SAC, arguing among other things, that Xian's fraud claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 338. The trial court sustained the demurrer, finding that most of Xian's claims were barred by the settlement agreement he entered with BeyondCore in September 2010 and the statute of limitations. However, it allowed Xian leave to amend his causes of action for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty to address "alleged fraudulent omissions that occurred after Sept. 3, 2010 regarding the sale of the note and the warrant, and only as alleged in Paragraphs 218, 219, and 220 of the Second Amended Complaint." The trial court specifically directed him to "plead with specificity delayed discovery and justifiable reliance" as to those two causes of action. Mr. Xian filed a third amended complaint (TAC), alleging only two causes of action for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. With respect to delayed discovery of his claims, the TAC alleged that "in early September 2016," Xian received e-mails from several friends regarding the Salesforce acquisition of BeyondCore. He searched and found online a press release about the prospective transaction. On Sept. 8, 2016, Xian "contacted and engaged an attorney (not current counsel) to aid him in evaluating his situation vis a vis BeyondCore and Salesforce. The attorney advised Xian to compile relevant documents he had from his BeyondCore tenure and to send them to him for review." Mr. Xian alleged he and his wife moved from Silicon Valley to Pasadena in September 2016, and he was not able to access his BeyondCore documentation for several weeks, but that "after getting moved into his Pasadena residence," he started compiling BeyondCore documents he had stored and forwarded them to his attorney "in November and December 2016." Xian's attorney spent "two months on-and-off" assisting Xian with potential claims, buthe alleged that the "documents compiled by him from his own sources were insufficient to uncover anything about BeyondCore's financial situation" after he left BeyondCore in 2010 and he "was not yet aware of the substantial investments made in BeyondCore from September 2010 onward." Xian "was also unable to determine financial details about BeyondCore other than what was disclosed in publicly filed documents concerning the Salesforce Acquisition." Mr. Xian alleged he was advised by new counsel in November 2017 to obtain Delaware corporate filings for BeyondCore, which led to a discovery that Sengupta had improperly issued himself shares of BeyondCore." Throughout 2018 and through August 2019, Xian sought additional documents on BeyondCore." Xian alleged that "while researching online during at dealroom.co circa Aug. 26, 2019, he discovered a listing in a schedule referring to a Series A investment of $9 million in February 2014 from Menlo Ventures, venture capital firm." Mr. Xian further alleged that in July 2019, he "met with a prior investor" in BeyondCore. Xian had "attempted to meet with the investor a year earlier, but was unsuccessful because the investor was reluctant to discuss BeyondCore or provide any disclosure about it until their own dealings were concluded with BeyondCore." The investor provided Xian with BeyondCore's "capitalization table listing all investments made in BeyondCore through December 2012." Xian attached the capitalization table to the TAC, and alleged "this was the first time he was able to discover the existence and extent of investments" made in BeyondCore after he left. Finally, Xian alleged he "was unable to discover the occurrence and nature of the causes of action alleged herein until the period of November 2017-August 2019 due to the non-public nature of the 2012 Cap Table and the Menlo Ventures Series A investment. The statute of limitations period for the fraud-based causes of action alleged herein did not start until his discoveries in July-August 2019 that tipped him off to the fraudulent concealment and misrepresentations" by Sengupta and BeyondCore. Sengupta demurred to the TAC. He argued that Xian had failed to allege delayed discovery of his fraud claim because the allegations of the TAC did not show reasonable diligence. In particular, he focused on the fact that the TAC omitted allegations contained in the verified SAC regarding "anomalies in the press release" that Xian had noticed when reading in September 2016 about the Salesforce acquisition of BeyondCore. Because "Xian was on inquiry notice as of September 2016" and "had publicly available documents accessible to him the entire time," Sengupta argued he failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence and his claims should be dismissed. Xian opposed the demurrer, arguing he had adequately alleged delayed discovery and the fact that he had publicly available documents was irrelevant because the basis of the fraud cause of action was discovered only once he received the nonpublic capitalization table in July 2019. Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. It concluded Xian had "not sufficiently pled delayed discovery to postpone accrual of the fraud and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action to 2019 when he obtained a copy of the BeyondCore 2012 Year-End Capitalization Table." It concluded Xian had not sufficiently pled delayed discovery because his allegations in the TAC "contradicted" his allegations in the SAC, and he had not sufficiently pled around the prior allegations. In sum, the trial court ruled that the three-year statute of limitations barred Xian's fraud claim, because the allegations of his third amended complaint contradicted earlier allegations in his pleadings and Xian failed to sufficiently plead delayed discovery to postpone accrual of his claim to 2019. Concluding Xian had failed to allege delayed discovery and consequently that his claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations, the trial court sustained the demurer without leave to amend. The appeal followed. Xian contends the trial court erred in determining his fraud claim is barred by the three-year statute of limitations under section 338, subdivision (d). Sengupta disagrees, and asserts Xian's cause of action accrued at the latest in September 2016, when Xian learned of the Salesforce acquisition and hired a lawyer to explore his claims vis-à-vis BeyondCore and Sengupta. The Court of Appeals opines that whether the allegations are true or whether a reasonable investigation would have earlier revealed a factual basis for his fraud claim are questions, it cannot determine at the pleading stage. Nor do the allegations of the TAC "contradict" the allegations of the SAC so as to bar Xian's claim. Also, Sengupta's attack on Xian's delayed discovery allegations do not persuade the Court of Appeals that they are insufficient as a matter of law. In the demurrer to the TAC, Sengupta raised several additional arguments regarding Xian's inability to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, none of which the trial court addressed, and none of which Sengupta reasserts on appeal. Sengupta argued in the trial court that he owed no duty to disclose the allegedly concealed financial information to Xian because he owed him no fiduciary duty. But a duty of disclosure can arise in transactional relationships even where there is no fiduciary or confidential relationship between the parties. Sengupta also asserted in his demurrer that Xian had not adequately pled concealment because the e-mail sent by Xian's lawyer asking for an update on "'fundraising efforts, etc.'" was a clearly a request regarding current efforts to raise future funds as opposed to past fundraising results, and Sengupta's response fully answered the questions that were asked. But the Court of Appeals does not think the meaning of the question is so clear. Nor can it say Sengupta's response forecloses a cause of action for fraudulent concealment. Simply put, this argument raises questions of fact not amenable to resolution on demurrer. Finally, Sengupta argued that the TAC did not adequately allege justifiable reliance because (1) Sengupta and Xian were in an adversarial position in 2012, when the alleged concealment took place; (2) Xian could not have relied on Sengupta's statements because he asked for his investment back in cash soon after receiving Sengupta's e-mail; and (3) Xian's counsel wrote in an e-mail rejecting the conversion option that Xian had "'other projects that he is much closer to and he'd like to allocate those funds to those projects.'" While all of these arguments suggest inferences that can be drawn from the allegations of the complaint, and while further discovery may reveal additional support for them, the Court of Appeals cannot determine as a matter of law that Xian's reliance was unreasonable at this stage of the litigation. In sum, the Court of Appeals concludes Xian has adequately pled delayed discovery so as to survive demurrer. Because it cannot determine as a matter of law that Xian's claim is barred by the statute of limitations, and none of Sengupta's other arguments raised in the trial court defeat Xian's fraud cause of action, the demurrer should have been overruled. For these reasons, the judgment is reversed and the action is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals' opinion. Xian is to recover costs on appeal. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/mtefu7jd from Leagle.com. ARTELEXIA INC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York --------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Artelexia, Inc. The case is styled as Jasmine Toro, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. Artelexia, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-07359 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Artelexia -- https://artelexia.com/ -- is a vibrant retail shop and event space specializing in THE BEST Mexican gifts, art, home decor, and gourmet foods.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mars Khaimov, Esq. 10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor Forest Hills, NY 11375 Phone: (917) 915-7415 Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com ASSESSOR OF FLORAL PARK: Ficarotto Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct. -------------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Assessor of the Village of Floral Park, et al. The case is styled as Carmela Ficarotto, all other similarly situated Petitioners on the annexed SCHEDULE A, Petitioners v. The Assessor of the Village of Floral Park, The Board of Assessment Review of the Village of Floral Park, Respondents, Case No. 611393/2022 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty., Aug. 26, 2022). The case type is stated as "SP-CPLR Article 78 (Body or Officer)." Floral Park -- https://fpvillage.org/ -- is an incorporated village in Nassau County, New York, United States, on Long Island.[BN] The Petitioner is represented by: MAIDENBAUM & STERNBERG, LLP 132 Spruce St Cedarhurst, NY 11516-1915 ASSET RECOVERY: Ragsdale Files FDCPA Suit in D. Utah ---------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Asset Recovery Solutions. The case is styled as Angela Ragsdale, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Asset Recovery Solutions, Case No. 2:22-cv-00547-DBP (D. Utah, Aug. 29, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Asset Recovery Solutions, LLC -- https://assetrecoverysolutions.com/ -- is one of the leading companies in the US for the effective recovery of assets along with contingency servicing.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Brett D. Cragun, Esq. CRAGUN & CRAGUN PO Box 160234 Clearfield, UT 84016 Phone: (801) 450-3267 Email: brett@brettcragun.com AZURE POWER: Portnoy Law Discloses Securities Class Action Suit --------------------------------------------------------------- The Portnoy Law Firm advises Azure Power Global Limited ("Azure" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: AZRE) investors that a class action has been filed on behalf of investors. Azure investors that lost money on their investment are encouraged to contact Lesley Portnoy, Esq. Investors are encouraged to contact attorney Lesley F. Portnoy, by phone 844-767-8529 or email: lesley@portnoylaw.com, to discuss their legal rights, or click here to join the case via www.portnoylaw.com. The Portnoy Law Firm can provide a complimentary case evaluation and discuss investors' options for pursuing claims to recover their losses. On August 29, 2022, Azure announced the resignation of its Chief Executive Officer, less than two months after his appointment. The Company also disclosed that it had "received a whistleblower complaint in May 2022 alleging potential procedural irregularities and misconduct by certain employees at a plant belonging to one of its subsidiaries." During the Company's review of these allegations, Azure "discovered deviations from safety and quality norms" and "also identified evidence of manipulation of project data and information by certain employees." On this news, the price of Azure shares declined by $4.61 per share, or approximately 44.07%, from $10.46 per share to close at $5.85 on August 29, 2022. The lawsuit alleges that, throughout the Class Period, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) there were procedural irregularities, including deviations from safety and quality standards, at one of Azure's plants; (2) certain project data was manipulated; (3) as a result of the foregoing, the Company's internal controls and procedures were not effective; (4) Azure had received a credible whistleblower report alleging such misconduct; and (5) as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis. Please visit our website to review more information and submit your transaction information. The Portnoy Law Firm represents investors in pursuing claims against caused by corporate wrongdoing. The Firm's founding partner has recovered over $5.5 billion for aggrieved investors. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes. [GN] BECKETT SPRINGS: Yisrael Files Suit Over Unpaid Minimum Wages ------------------------------------------------------------- TSIPPORAH YISRAEL, Plaintiff v. BECKETT SPRINGS, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:22-cv-00491-SJD (S.D. Ohio, August 22, 2022) brings this complaint as a collective action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated to recover unpaid minimum wages against the Defendant as a result of its unlawful pay policies and practices that violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio Rev. Code Section 4111.01. The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a licensed therapist from October 28, 2021 to July 22, 2022. Accordingly, the Plaintiff was compensated at a salary of $58,000 per year or approximately $1,208.33 per week. According to the complaint, the parties specifically agreed that the Plaintiff would receive a "Sign On Bonus." However, the Defendant has employed a policy of deducting a prorated balance of a signing bonus against the last paycheck of employment. As a result of the deductions, the Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees' minimum wage were reduced below the statutory minimum wage. In addition, the Defendant has failed to issue and/or remit a final paycheck to the Plaintiff, claiming that it was being withheld in its entirety to satisfy some of the amount it claims it is owed on her sign-on bonus, says the suit. Beckett Springs, LLC provides compassionate, trusted programs for those facing mental health & addiction challenges. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Matthew S. Okiishi, Esq. FINNEY LAW FIRM, LLC 4270 Ivy Pointe Blvd., Suite 225 Cincinnati, OH 45245 Tel: (513) 943-6659 Fax: (513) 943-6669 E-mail: matt@finneylawfirm.com BED BATH & BEYOND: Faces Si Suit Over Alleged Drop in Share Price ----------------------------------------------------------------- PENGCHENG SI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BED BATH & BEYOND; JP MORGAN SECURITIES LLC; RC VENTURES LLC; RYAN COHEN; ARNAL GUSTAVO, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-02541 (D.C., Aug. 23, 2022) is a federal securities class action brought on behalf of a class other that the Defendants who purchased or otherwise acquired BBBY common stock from March 25, 2022 to August 18, 2022, inclusive, (the "Class Period"), seeking to recover compensable damages caused by Defendants' violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that as a result of materially false statements regarding the financial condition and holding situation of BBBY during the Class Period, the stock price of BBBY was artificially inflated. The Defendants, knowing that the information they disclosed was false, took advantage of the inflated stock price and used fraudulent and misleading SEC filings to sell all their BBBY shares and options at artificially inflated prices to unsuspecting and innocent public investors and then retained control of the profits. Despite knowing or having information which would cause one to know that Cohen and Gustavo was engaged in illegal insider trading and fraudulent SEC reporting, JPM actively aided and abetted Cohen and Gutavo's activities by enabling Cohen to use JPM's accounts to effectuate such transactions and otherwise launder the proceeds of their criminal conduct, says the suit. On August 18, 2022, the Defendants Cohen and Gustavo, respectively, filed Form 4 with the SEC reporting that they had sold all their BBBY shares on August 16, 2022. In reaction to this news, BBBY Stock dives to $16.16, or over 45%, on unusually heavy trading volume. BBBY's stock price continued to decline over the next two trading days, falling an additional 16.23%, to close at $9.24 per share on August 22, 2022, and falling another 4.98% to close at $8.78 on August 23, 2022, dropping over 70% from August 17's highest price of $30 per share in five trading days after Defendants dumped their shares. The Defendants' wrongful conduct, as alleged herein, directly and proximately caused the economic loss suffered by Plaintiff and his family and other Class members, alleges the suit. BED BATH & BEYOND INC. operates a nationwide chain of retail stores. The Company, through its retail stores, sells a wide assortment of merchandise principally including domestic merchandise and home furnishings, as well as food, giftware, health and beauty care items, and infant and toddler merchandise. [BN] The Plaintiff, of Falls Church, Virginia, appears pro se. BELLE & BLUSH: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Belle & Blush, LLC. The case is styled as Christopher Loadholt, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Belle & Blush, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-07371 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Belle & Blush -- https://www.belleandblush.com/ -- is a girl's candy land full of makeup, skincare, gifts, stationery, and jewelry with makeup artists and estheticians on staff.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Yitzchak Zelman, Esq. MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC 701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300 Asbury Park, NJ 07712 Phone: (845) 367-7146 Fax: (732) 298-6256 Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com BEST BUY CO: Karim Suit Removed to N.D. California -------------------------------------------------- The case styled as Alee Karim, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Best Buy Co., Inc., Case No. 22-CV-014203 was removed from the Alameda County Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on Aug. 26, 2022. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:22-cv-04909-KAW to the proceeding. The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud. Best Buy Co. Inc. -- https://www.bestbuy.com/ -- is an American multinational consumer electronics retailer headquartered in Richfield, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff appears pro se. The Defendants are represented by: Christine Marie Reilly, Esq. MANATT PHELPS & PHILLIPS LLP 2049 Century Park East, Suite 1700 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Phone: (310) 312-4237 Fax: (310) 312-4224 Email: creilly@manatt.com BLOOMBERG LP: Faces Unpaid OT Suit Despite Prior Class Settlement ----------------------------------------------------------------- Jessy Edwards at topclassactions.com reports that a former human resources employee at Bloomberg is suing the company, saying she and others were often required to work unpaid overtime, despite Bloomberg settling a similar lawsuit on its pay practices several years ago. Plaintiff Heidi Diaz filed the class action complaint against Bloomberg LP Aug. 25 in a New York federal court, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law. According to Diaz, she and other employees were often required to work through meal breaks, as well as before and after scheduled shifts. They were not paid overtime for the additional work, she said, in violation of the law. The alleged violations happened several years after Bloomberg agreed to pay $3 million to a group of New York call center workers who claimed that the company pressured them to work through their meal breaks and past the end of their shifts but did not pay them overtime. That lawsuit came after Bloomberh settled a similar lawsuit for $54.5 million in 2018. In that case, the lawsuit was filed by three Bloomberg analytic employees in April 2014 who alleged they and other employees were wrongfully misclassified as exempt from overtime pay. Diaz alleges Bloomberg continued its illegal wage practices despite both settlements. After settlement, workers continued to work overtime unpaid, lawsuit alleges Diaz says she was paid as a salaried worker with a set schedule, but was asked regularly to work overtime for which she was not compensated. She was only paid for her scheduled shifts, she said. She alleges that in one pay period she worked up to one hour after her scheduled shift at least four different times, and worked through her one-hour uncompensated meal break six times. She says that amounted to her working about five to seven hours of overtime unpaid. Diaz alleges that Bloomberg knows exactly how many hours she and other workers do because they are required to swipe their security badges to enter and exit the building. She adds that her manager saw she was working overtime. The company's "illegal and improper wage practices. . . have deprived employees of millions of dollars in wages and overtime compensation," Diaz alleges. Diaz is looking to represent all current and former salaried and hourly employees Bloomberg employed from Feb. 4, 2020 who say they were not paid or properly compensated for overtime. She's seeking certification of the class action, damages, unpaid wages, fees, costs and a jury trial. What do you think about the Bloomberg wage theft class action claims? Let us know your thoughts in the comments! Diaz is represented by Lee S. Shalov, Brett R. Gallaway and Jason S. Giaimo of McLaughlin & Stern LLP. The Bloomberg class action lawsuit is Diaz v. Bloomberg LP, Case No. 1:22-cv-07251, in the U.S District Court for the Southern District of New York.[GN] BLUESCOPE BUILDINGS: Verdugo Labor Suit Goes to E.D. California --------------------------------------------------------------- The case styled NATHAN VERDUGO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. BLUESCOPE BUILDINGS NORTH AMERICA, INC.; BLUESCOPE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; BLUESCOPE STEEL AMERICAS LLC; BLUESCOPE STEEL NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION; ASC PROFILES LLC; STEELSCAPE LLC; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Case No. VCU292562, was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Tulare, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California on August 23, 2022. The Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of California assigned Case No. 1:22-at-00644 to the proceeding. The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the California Labor Code and the California's Business and Professions Code including unpaid overtime, unpaid minimum wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and permit rest periods, non-compliant wage statements and failure to maintain payroll records, wages not timely paid upon termination, failure to timely pay wages during employment, unreimbursed business expenses, and unlawful and unfair business practices. BlueScope Buildings North America, Inc. is a manufacturer of engineered building solutions, headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri. BlueScope Construction, Inc. is a construction engineering company, headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri. BlueScope Steel Americas LLC is a construction engineering company, doing business in California. BlueScope Steel North America Corporation. is a construction engineering company, headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri. ASC Profiles LLC is a manufacturer of building products in California. Steelscape LLC is a supplier of metallic-coated and pre-painted steel, headquartered in Kalama, Washington. [BN] The Defendants are represented by: Todd L. Nunn, Esq. K&L GATES LLP 4 Embarcadero Center, Suite 1200 San Francisco, CA 94111-5994 Telephone: (415) 882-8200 Facsimile: (415) 882-8220 E-mail: todd.nunn@klgates.com - and – Ashley Song, Esq. K&L GATES LLP 1 Park Plaza Twelfth Floor Irvine, California 92614 Telephone: (949) 253-0900 Facsimile: (949) 253-0902 E-mail: Ashley.Song@klgates.com BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Davis Class Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case, ROBERT DAVIS and DR. BRUCE BARTON, on behalf of themselves and the Putative Class, Plaintiffs v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC and BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, Defendant, Civil Action No. 19-cv-19650 (D.N.J.), Judge Claire C. Cecchi of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey denies BMW's motion to dismiss Barton's first amended putative class-action complaint. The Plaintiffs bring the instant putative class action on behalf of purchasers of certain BMW or Mini Cooper vehicles that purportedly are susceptible to catching fire as a result of an allegedly defective electric auxiliary coolant pump. The Fire Defect allegedly causes "engine control unit-driven electric auxiliary water pumps" to overheat in high-temperature environments, which purportedly increases the likelihood of engine fires. The Plaintiffs claim that these fires occur without warning and result in extreme safety risk to the Class Vehicles, their owners, and any surrounding property. They assert that the Defendant knew or should have known about the Fire Defect prior to selling the Class Vehicles, and moreover, that it concealed this risk to the Plaintiffs and failed take appropriate remedial action while they owned and operated the Class Vehicles. Instead, the Plaintiffs aver that the Defendant sold and serviced the Class Vehicles without warning to them despite its "exclusive knowledge" that the vehicles contained the Fire Defect. The Plaintiffs argue that had they known about the Fire Defect, they would not have purchased or leased the Class Vehicles (or would have paid substantially less for them due to the increased fire risk). Accordingly, the action arises out of the Defendant's allegedly defective design, manufacture, and warranting of the Class Vehicles, as well as their allegedly misleading promotion of the Class Vehicles' purported safety and dependability. Mr. Barton, a Kentucky resident, allegedly purchased his certified pre-owned 2012 Class Vehicle on Aug. 19, 2017, relying on the Defendant's marketing materials touting its high quality and outstanding safety record. He claims that the Defendant did not disclose to Barton that his vehicle contained the Fire Defect prior to purchase. In June 2018, Barton purportedly first learned via notice that his vehicle was subject to recall for a defective electric auxiliary coolant pump. He alleges to have contacted his BMW dealer to schedule the mandated repair but asserts that BMW was not able to apply the remedy in either June or August 2018. In the meantime, he alleges that the Defendant recommended to park the Class Vehicles outdoors until the recall remedy had been performed. On Jan. 10, 2019, Barton's vehicle allegedly suffered a catastrophic engine fire while parked in his driveway. His insurer purportedly declared the vehicle a total loss and determined upon inspection that the damage was allegedly caused by the Fire Defect. Davis, a Georgia resident, purchased his Class Vehicle on Aug. 24, 2015, purportedly relying on the Defendant's advertising of its reliability, high quality, and outstanding safety record. On Jan. 9, 2017, when the vehicle had 92,000 miles, Davis claims to have experienced a loss of power in the vehicle while driving to work. A few hours later, Davis discovered a small fire in the engine compartment of the vehicle. Davis' insurance company and the Defendant allegedly conducted a joint examination of the vehicle and concluded that an unspecified failure in the electric water pump caused the fire. Davis allegedly continued driving the vehicle and never received a recall notice for his purportedly defective coolant pump. The Plaintiffs aver that the Defendant had knowledge of the Fire Defect as early as 2009 yet failed to remedy the defective equipment, necessitating several rounds of recalls for an allegedly similar issue. Moreover, they claim that the recalls did not sufficiently benefit class members because the parts required to remedy the Fire Defect were unavailable at the time of recall, and vehicle owners, including Barton, suffered catastrophic vehicle fires in the interim. The Plaintiffs initiated the action on Oct. 31, 2019 and filed their FAC on Nov. 18, 2019. The FAC primarily asserts that the Defendant breached warranties, defrauded consumers by failing to disclose the Fire Defect, and misleading the Plaintiffs as to the safety of their Class Vehicles. The FAC alleges: violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. Section 56:8-2, et seq. ("NJCFA") (Counts 1 and 2); breaches of express warranty (Counts 3, 7); breaches of implied warranty (Counts 4, 8, 11); breach of written warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 2301 ("MMWA") (Count 5); violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, KRS Section 367.110 ("KCPA") (Count 6); violation of the Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practice Act, Ga. Code Section 10-1-370 et seq. ("GUDTPA") (Count 10); violation of the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, Ga. Code. Section 10-1-390 et seq. ("GFBPA") (Count 12); and unjust enrichment (Count 9). On Jan. 10, 2020, the Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's putative class-action first amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Plaintiffs filed an opposition on Feb. 10, 2020, to which the Defendant replied on Feb. 24, 2020. The Defendants first move to dismiss on grounds that the Court should defer to the primary jurisdiction of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), a government agency with federal authority to investigate and remediate motor-vehicle safety defects. Judge Cecchi finds that the NHTSA does not maintain primary jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' instant pleading. Given the seemingly ongoing status of the NHTSA's recall process, the NHTSA does not have a mechanism by which the Plaintiff could be awarded damages. Accordingly, Judge Cecchi declines to invoke the primary jurisdiction doctrine and will not refer the matter to the NHTSA. The Defendant asserts that the Court should dismiss Davis' claims in light of its purported recall of his Class Vehicle, which it argues provides full relief and renders the claims prudentially moot. Davis asserts various legal claims for damages beyond the injunctive relief provided by a recall. He alleges sufficient facts to support his claims for diminution in value and reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses including smoke damage in his garage. Accordingly, Davis' claims are not prudentially moot. Judge Cecchi need not decide whether New Jersey consumer fraud law applies to the Plaintiffs or a proposed nationwide class at the motion to dismiss stage. While New Jersey's choice of law principles apply since federal courts with diversity jurisdiction must apply the choice of law principles of the forum state, Judge Cecchi need not address the choice of law arguments at this juncture. She requires a more developed factual record to make a choice of law conclusion, and thus declines to determine whether the Plaintiffs or a nationwide class can pursue claims under the NJCFA. Similarly, the Defendant's motion to strike class certification is premature, Judge Cecchi opines. Courts throughout the Third Circuit have routinely declined to hear premature arguments regarding class certification in similar circumstances. Accordingly, because the issue of whether the Plaintiffs can satisfy the class certification requirements is a fact-intensive question, Judge Cecchi declines to strike the Plaintiffs' allegations at this stage. The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' breach of express warranty claims must fail because the warranties at issue do not extend to the type of design defect alleged in their FAC. In opposition, the Plaintiffs contend that they have sufficiently alleged potential manufacturing defects covered by the applicable warranties. Construing these claims in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, Judge Cecchi will not dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims for breach of express warranty for failure to plead a valid manufacturing defect. The Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that the Defendant knew about the Fire Defect as early as 2009 and misleadingly concealed the defect from the Plaintiffs. Further, they have sufficiently alleged "a gross disparity in bargaining power" and "no meaningful choice" in the warranty negotiation. Accordingly, Judge Cecchi will not dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims for breach of express warranty. The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant breached its implied warranties by concealing knowledge of the Fire Defect and continuing to sell and service the Class Vehicles to consumers in an allegedly unmerchantable condition. Judge Cecchi finds that according to the pleading, the Fire Defect allegedly caused the Class Vehicles to suddenly stop running or catch fire without warning, resulting in an extreme safety risk. Thus, the Plaintiffs' allegations effectively give rise to a plausible inference that the Fire Defect poses a safety risk sufficient to violate an implied warranty. Moreover, whether the Fire Defect "posed enough of a safety risk to actually hamper the Class Vehicles' ability to provide safe, reliable transportation is ultimately a question of fact to be resolved at summary judgment or by a jury." Accordingly, Judge Cecchi denies the Defendant's motion to dismiss the breach of implied warranty claims. The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendant breached express warranties in violation of the MMWA, 15 U.S.C. Section 2301 et seq. The MMWA creates a federal cause of action for state law express and implied warranty claims. The Plaintiffs base their MMWA claims on the underlying state law claims for breach of express warranty. As she has determined the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs' express warranty claims at the pleading stage, Judge Cecchi holds that the dismissal of this MMWA claim is not warranted. The Defendant argues Barton's KCPA claim is time-barred under the KCPA's two-year statute of limitations period, which it asserts began running when Plaintiff allegedly purchased the vehicle on Aug. 19, 2017. In opposition, the Plaintiffs contend that the statute of limitations did not accrue until June 2018 when the Defendant allegedly made false promises about the recall notice and availability of requisite repairs. Judge Cecchi holds that whether Barton's cause of action accrued when he purchased his vehicle in 2017 or when he was denied his repairs in 2018 is an issue of fact inappropriate for disposition on a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, construing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, she will not dismiss Barton's complaint as time-barred. The Defendant moves to dismiss Davis' GUDTPA claim on grounds that the Plaintiffs are limited to injunctive relief under the GUDTPA, and Davis is barred from that injunctive relief for failure to allege a "future" harm as required by statute. Judge Cecchi, however, agrees with the Plaintiffs in finding that the FAC plausibly alleges that the Defendant's refusal to acknowledge or remedy the Fire Defect in Davis' vehicle may represent a deceptive trade practice under the GUDTPA. Because Davis purports to have suffered from the Defendant's deceptive trade practices, his allegations support a future harm and a viable basis for injunctive relief. The Defendant asserts that Davis' GFBPA claim must be dismissed because the GFBPA expressly precludes class-action claims and, alternatively, because Davis does not adequately plead reliance. Judge Cecchi denies the Defendant's motion to dismiss Davis' GFBPA claim. First, federal courts have permitted class actions to proceed under the GFBPA when they are pursued under Rule 23, as is the situation. Next, she concludes that Davis adequately pleads reliance under the GFBPA. Lastly, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims should be dismissed for lack of privity under New Jersey law, and for inability to plead unjust enrichment when a valid contract exists under Georgia and Kentucky laws. Its arguments are without merit, Judge Cecchi finds. Courts in this District have held that a manufacturer that advertises its products directly to consumers, as alleged, may be liable for unjust enrichment even if the consumer purchases the product from an intermediate retailer. Furthermore, courts in Georgia and Kentucky have recognized that at the motion to dismiss stage, unjust enrichment may be pleaded in the alternative, as it is here, even where an allegedly valid contract exists. The Plaintiffs sufficiently allege in the alternative that the Defendant benefited financially from its alleged breach of warranty, misrepresentations, and fraud. Thus, the Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded an unjust enrichment claim. For the reasons she set forth, Judge Cecchi denies the Defendant's motion to dismiss. An appropriate Order accompanies the Opinion. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yd2tt2j7 from Leagle.com. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Court Refuses to Dismiss Gujral Class Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, RANBIR GUJRAL and DANIELLE EMERSON, on behalf of themselves and the Putative Class, Plaintiffs v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC and BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, Defendant, Civil Action No. 19-cv-20581 (D.N.J.), Judge Claire C. Cecchi of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey denies BMW's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' putative class-action complaint. The Plaintiffs bring the instant putative class action on behalf of purchasers of certain BMW vehicles that purportedly are susceptible to catching fire as a result of an allegedly defective battery cable. They claim that these fires occur without warning and result in extreme safety risk to the Class Vehicles, their owners, and any surrounding property. The Plaintiffs assert that Defendants knew or should have known about the Fire Defect prior to selling the Class Vehicles, and moreover, that the Defendants concealed this risk to the Plaintiffs and failed take appropriate remedial action while they owned and operated the Class Vehicles. Instead, the Plaintiffs aver that BMW sold and serviced the Class Vehicles without warning to Plaintiffs despite Defendant's "exclusive knowledge" that the vehicles contained the Fire Defect. The Plaintiffs argue that had they known about the Fire Defect, they would not have purchased or leased the Class Vehicles (or would have paid substantially less for them due to the increased fire risk). Accordingly, this action arises out of the Defendant's allegedly defective design, manufacture, and warranting of the Class Vehicles, as well as their allegedly misleading promotion of the Class Vehicles' purported safety and dependability. Plaintiff Gujral, a Connecticut resident, purchased his Class Vehicle in September or October of 2013, purportedly relying on Defendant's promotion of the vehicle's high quality and outstanding safety record. The Defendant allegedly did not disclose the Fire Defect to Gujral prior to his purchase, nor did Gujral receive a recall notice for his purportedly defective battery cable. On April 12, 2017, one week after his warranty expired, Gujral's Class Vehicle allegedly suffered a catastrophic fire. Plaintiff Emerson, a North Carolina resident, allegedly purchased her certified pre-owned Class Vehicle in February 2015, relying on Defendant's advertisements regarding the safety, reliability, and high performance of its cars. Five months later, Emerson's vehicle allegedly experienced a catastrophic fire as a result of a "thermal event." Emerson claims that she never received a recall notice for her vehicle, although she learned after the incident that other BMW models had been recalled for battery cable defects resulting in unexpected fires. The Plaintiffs aver that the Defendant had knowledge of the Fire Defect as early as 2006, yet repeatedly declined to include the Class Vehicles in any of its prior recalls despite purportedly near-identical defects. The Plaintiffs initiated the action on Nov. 21, 2019, primarily asserting that Defendant breached warranties, defrauded consumers by failing to disclose the Fire Defect, and misleading the Plaintiffs as to the safety of their Class Vehicles. The Complaint alleges: violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. Section 56:8-2, et seq. ("NJCFA") (Counts 1 and 2); breaches of express warranty (Counts 3, 7); breaches of implied warranty (Counts 4, 8, 9); breach of written warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 2301 ("MMWA") (Count 5); violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 42-110b(a) ("CUTPA") (Count 6); violation of the North Carolina Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 75-1.1, et seq. ("NCUDTPA") (Count 10); and unjust enrichment (Count 11). On Jan. 24, 2020, the Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's putative class-action complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Plaintiffs filed an opposition on Feb. 10, 2020, to which the Defendant replied on March 13, 2020. The Defendants first move to dismiss on grounds that the Court should defer to the primary jurisdiction of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), a government agency with federal authority to investigate and remediate motor-vehicle safety defects. Judge Cecchi opines that given the seemingly ongoing status of the NHTSA's recall process, the NHTSA does not have a mechanism by which the Plaintiff could be awarded damages. Accordingly, she declines to invoke the primary jurisdiction doctrine and will not refer this matter to the NHTSA. Judge Cecchi need not decide whether New Jersey consumer fraud law applies to the Plaintiffs or a proposed nationwide class at the motion to dismiss stage. While New Jersey's choice of law principles apply since federal courts with diversity jurisdiction must apply the choice of law principles of the forum state, she need not address the choice of law arguments at this juncture. Applying the factors necessary to determine choice of la is a very fact-intensive inquiry. She requires a more developed factual record to make a choice of law conclusion, and thus declines to determine whether the Plaintiffs or a nationwide class can pursue claims under the NJCFA. Similarly, the Defendant's motion to strike class certification is premature, Judge Cecchi finds. Courts throughout the Third Circuit have routinely declined to hear premature arguments regarding class certification in similar circumstances. Accordingly, because the issue of whether the Plaintiffs can satisfy the class certification requirements is a fact-intensive question, she declines to strike the Plaintiffs' allegations. The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' breach of express warranty claims must fail because the warranties at issue cover only manufacturing defects and do not extend to the type of design defect alleged in their Complaint. In opposition, the Plaintiffs contend that they have sufficiently alleged potential manufacturing defects covered by the applicable warranties. At present, construing the claims in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, Judge Cecchi refuses to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims for breach of express warranty for failure to plead a valid manufacturing defect. The Plaintiffs have also adequately pleaded that the Defendant knew about the Fire Defect as early as 2006 and misleadingly concealed the defect from them. Accordingly, Judge Cecchi does not dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims for breach of express warranty. The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant breached its implied warranty by concealing knowledge of the Fire Defect and continuing to sell and service the Class Vehicles to consumers in an allegedly unmerchantable condition. Both Gujral and Emerson specifically assert that their Class Vehicles unexpectedly suffered a "catastrophic fire." Judge Cecchi holds that the Plaintiffs' allegations effectively give rise to a plausible inference that the Fire Defect poses a safety risk sufficient to violate an implied warranty. Moreover, whether the Fire Defect "posed enough of a safety risk to actually hamper the Class Vehicles' ability to provide safe, reliable transportation is ultimately a question of fact to be resolved at summary judgment or by a jury." Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss the breach of implied warranty claims is denied. The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendant breached express warranties in violation of the MMWA, 15 U.S.C. Section 2301 et seq. The MMWA creates a federal cause of action for state law express and implied warranty claims. Here, Plaintiffs base their MMWA claims on the underlying state law claims for breach of express warranty. As she has determined the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs' express warranty claims at the pleading stage, Judge Cecchi opines that dismissal of this MMWA claim is not warranted. The Defendant argues Gujral's CUTPA claim is time-barred under the CUTPA's three-year statute of limitations period, which it asserts began running when the vehicle was sold in 2013. The Plaintiffs, however, allege that Connecticut courts recognize the continuing violation doctrine, which functions to toll the CUTPA's three-year statute of limitations in situations in which a plaintiff alleges a "continuing course" of deceptive conduct by the Defendant. Because the Plaintiffs' Complaint sufficiently alleges that the statute of limitations may be tolled under the continuing violation doctrine, Judge Cecchi concludes that it is premature to decide whether the CUTPA claim is time-barred on this motion to dismiss. The Defendant argues Emerson's claim is time-barred under the NCUDTPA's four-year statute of limitations, which it asserts began to accrue when Emerson purchased her vehicle in February 2015. Judge Cecchi agrees with the Plaintiffs, however, in holding that it is premature to dismiss Emerson's claim because the Complaint sufficiently alleges that the limitations period may be tolled. Construing the factual allegations supporting tolling in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, she will not dismiss Emerson's complaint as time-barred. Lastly, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims should be dismissed for lack of privity under New Jersey law, and for inability to plead unjust enrichment when a valid contract exists under Connecticut and North Carolina laws. Its arguments are without merit, Judge Cecchi opines. Courts in this District have held that a manufacturer that advertises its products directly to consumers, as alleged, may be liable for unjust enrichment even if the consumer purchases the product from an intermediate retailer. Furthermore, Courts in Connecticut and North Carolina have recognized that at the motion to dismiss stage, unjust enrichment may be pleaded in the alternative, as it is in the present case, even where a valid contract exists. The Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that the Defendant benefited financially from its alleged breach of warranty, misrepresentations, and fraud. Thus, they have adequately pleaded an unjust enrichment claim. For the reasons she set forth, Judge Cecchi denies the Defendant's motion to dismiss. An appropriate Order accompanies her Opinion. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/2kbnkty9 from Leagle.com. BOEING CO: Bid to Dismiss Aircraft Securities Suit Granted in Part ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case, IN RE THE BOEING COMPANY AIRCRAFT SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No. 19-cv-02394 (N.D. Ill.), Judge John J. Tharp, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, grants in part and denies in part the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi (MPERS), as lead plaintiff, brings securities fraud claims on behalf of a putative class of shareholders against Boeing, its former CEO Dennis Muilenburg, and its former CFO Gregory Smith. The Plaintiffs contend that Boeing made misleading statements as it responded to the October 2018 and March 2019 crashes of two 737 MAX airplanes designed and manufactured by Boeing. Boeing launched the 737 MAX program in August 2011 in response to competition from Airbus's A320neo. The threat from Airbus prompted Boeing to scuttle plans to develop an entirely new airplane, deciding instead to improve upon its existing 737 model by adding new engines that would vastly improve fuel efficiency. To approve the airplane for commercial use, Boeing's safety regulator, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), would have to make two distinct determinations, each of which is made by a separate group within the FAA. One group (otherwise unidentified in the complaint) determines whether airplanes meet federal airworthiness standards; another, known as the Aircraft Evaluation Group (FAA AEG) determines the minimum level of pilot training required. The FAA AEG compares the new version of an aircraft with the old and evaluates the differences between the two. Then the office mandates the level of "differences training" required for pilots to operate the new version of the plane. The FAA AEG can assign one of five different levels of training, ranging from Level A, the least intensive, to Level E, the most intensive. The FAA AEG publishes its recommendation for the appropriate training level in the Flight Standardization Board Report (FSB report). Among Boeing's goals in designing the 737 MAX was ensuring that it received a Level B, computer-training-only, designation in that report. But Boeing's plan for a seamless transition to the 737 MAX with minimal pilot training encountered turbulence early in the airplane's development. In 2012, it tests showed that the new fuel-efficient engines, which were much larger than the engines used on the older 737 models, created additional lift and a tendency for the airplane to pitch up abnormally in flight. Rather than redesign the entire airplane to address this problem, Boeing decided to make changes to the aircraft's automated flight control systems by adding a new software component, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). MCAS was designed to automatically swivel the horizontal stabilizer on the aircraft's tail if the plane's nose pitched too far upward, leveling the plane and preventing a potential stall. MCAS was activated by a signal from an angle-of-attack (AoA) sensor. There were two such sensors on the MAX, but MCAS drew data from only one of them, creating a situation in which a single malfunctioning sensor could erroneously trigger MCAS into trying to pitch the nose of the aircraft down when no correction was actually needed. By creating this "single point of failure," the complaint alleges, Boeing violated fundamental engineering standards and its own safety design criteria. In 2014, Boeing Chief Test Pilot Ray Craig and engineer Curtis Ewbank recognized the risk that a faulty angle-of attack sensor could cause MCAS to activate when its operation was neither necessary nor desirable. Senior Boeing executives, including then-737 MAX program director Michael Teal, rejected a proposed remedial measure because it might increase the pilot training requirements for the MAX. Furthermore, the complaint alleges, Boeing played fast and loose with a Hazard Analysis of MCAS that was required for certification of the new design, downplaying the risk posed by MCAS by making "unwarranted assumptions" that pilots would be able to recognize and respond to an MCAS failure within a matter of seconds. Boeing Chief Technical Pilot Mark Forkner led a team of Technical Pilots responsible for interfacing with FAA AEG. A series of 2016 messages between Forkner and a technical pilot on his team, Patrick Gustavsson, as well as other internal messages, show Boeing employees grappling with the implications of MCAS and its effect on FAA AEG's assessment of the additional training required to safely fly the MAX. FAA AEG issued a provisional Level B differences-training determination for the 737 MAX on Aug. 16, 2016. Boeing later changed MCAS' parameters so that it could activate between Mach 0.2 and Mach 0.8, encompassing "nearly the entire speed range for the 737 MAX." Instead of updating FAA AEG regarding these changes, however, Forkner concealed MCAS's expanded activation parameters and its aberrant behavior in the flight simulator. He succeeded, in his words, by "jedi-mind tricking regulators" that simulator training was not necessary. MCAS was not mentioned in the FSB report; this omission ensured that it was not mentioned in the flight manual, and pilots were unaware of its existence. As a result, the training materials provided to pilots were "materially false, inaccurate, and incomplete." Because of this deception, the Plaintiffs allege, Boeing secured its desired Level B training designation for the 737 MAX, which meant that pilots would not require expensive simulator training. On Oct. 29, 2018, Lion Air flight JT 610 crashed shortly after takeoff from Jakarta, killing all 189 people aboard. Boeing quickly convened a group of experts who concluded that "MCAS activation could have been a scenario" that led to the crash. As data from various sources revealed, a single faulty angle of attack sensor on the Lion Air airplane fed erroneous data to MCAS, causing the software to activate over 20 times and pitch the plane downward as the pilots struggled to maintain control. Boeing quickly met with the FAA to explain the details of MCAS. The Plaintiffs allege that, among other problems, the Lion Air pilots were deprived of critical information because their 737 MAX did not have a working AOA Disagree Alert. Had they been installed on every MAX, the AoA Disagree Alerts might have warned pilots about a malfunctioning AoA sensor before takeoff, allowing for crews to address the problem before flight. On Nov. 6, 2018, Boeing issued a bulletin to pilots informing them of a problem with the MAX's "pitch trim system" in which erroneous data from an AoA sensor could cause repeated "nose down stabilizer trim movement." The bulletin directed pilots to an "existing procedure" for responding to an errant flight control system. The Plaintiffs allege that because of the differences between MCAS and older pitch-trim systems, this procedure could not reliably counter an MCAS malfunction. In an Emergency Airworthiness Directive issued the following day, the FAA warned that this problem presented an "unsafe condition" that was "likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design." It further directed pilots to use the Runaway Stabilizer Non-Normal Checklist, consistent with Boeing's bulletin issued the day before, in the event of a MCAS malfunction. Boeing began working on a software fix for the 737 MAX and, in the months before the second MAX crash, continually struck a confident tone in press releases, interviews, and other public communications as to the aircraft's fundamental safety and its "superior value proposition" to customers and investors. Sometime in February 2019, Muilenburg learned about the text messages and emails written by Forkner and other employees between 2016 and 2017 regarding the expanded operation of the MCAS system and efforts to "jedi-mind trick" regulators. On March 10, 2019, another 737 MAX, operated by Ethiopian Airlines, crashed soon after takeoff from Addis Ababa, killing everyone on board. By March 13, the FAA and other regulators around the globe had grounded the airplane. In the weeks following the Ethiopian Airlines disaster, the Defendants continued to affirm their confidence in the aircraft's fundamental safety and in the integrity of the FAA approval process and represented that Boeing could quickly overcome the grounding order and return the MAX to operation. At the Paris Airshow in June 2019, Boeing CEO Muilenburg met with then-Acting FAA Director Daniel Elwell, who told Muilenburg to "slow down" his talk of a quick return to service for the MAX so that the FAA could have "space to exercise scrutiny." He continued to represent to investors that he anticipated the MAX would soon be recertified and back in flight. In October 2019, the Forkner messages were released to the public. The messages angered the FAA, which only then learned that Boeing had actively worked to remove mention of MCAS from the flight manual. The FAA Administrator also publicly expressed his frustration that the messages had been concealed from the FAA until their public release. In response to Muilenburg's further predictions of a speedy recertification, FAA Administrator Dickson held a private meeting with Muilenburg on Dec. 12, 2019, rebuking him for pressuring the agency to move more quickly. The same day, Dickson sent a note to Congress asserting that "some of Boeing's statements have been designed to force the FAA into taking quicker action." On December 16, Boeing announced a production halt for the 737 MAX. Boeing's Board fired Muilenburg as CEO on Dec. 22, 2019, and appointed defendant Gregory Smith as interim CEO. David Calhoun became Boeing's CEO in January 2020. Richard Seeks filed the action on April 19, 2019. A related action, Bush v. Boeing, 19-cv-03548, was consolidated with this one on June 21, 2019. Five plaintiffs' groups vied for appointment as lead plaintiff, and on Nov. 15, 2019, the Court appointed the Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi (MPERS) as lead plaintiff. On Feb. 14, 2020, MPERS filed its consolidated class action complaint. The Defendants then moved to dismiss that complaint. The Plaintiffs claim that 49 statements made by the Defendants during the putative class period were fraudulent; the Defendants maintain that the Plaintiffs have failed to allege with requisite particularity that any of those statements are false or misleading, or that they were made with scienter. In Judge Tharp's view, the Plaintiffs have alleged two events that can support a strong inference of scienter as to certain false statements by Muilenburg (and therefore to Boeing): Muilenburg's receipt of the Forkner messages in February 2019, and his conversations with various leaders of the FAA in the latter half of 2019. By contrast, they have not adequately pleaded that any of the allegedly false or misleading statements made before these events were made with an intent to deceive. As for Smith, there are no particularized allegations regarding any deceptive intent on his part, so he is dismissed from the suit. While it may be plausible to infer that a CEO would keep the CFO apprised of important developments in a brewing crisis, the PSLRA does not permit scienter to be imputed among individual defendants. Judge Tharp first addresses the Defendants' statements from the early part of the class period, from November and December 2018. Some of these statements were inaccurate, but they all nevertheless fall short of stating a claim for securities fraud because the plaintiffs did not adequately allege they were made with scienter. Second, he considers statements made from January to February 2019 regarding Boeing's financial and operational performance. These statements are either not false (insofar as they merely report the company's performance) or they are predictions that fall within the PSLRA safe harbor for forward-looking statements. Next, Judge Tharp addresses Boeing's assurances to the public in the wake of the Ethiopian Airlines crash and the grounding order that soon followed. Given Muilenburg's knowledge of the Forkner messages and their content, he says, several of these statements have been adequately pled as securities fraud claims. Finally, he weighs the allegations that Boeing misled investors regarding the 737 MAX's return to service and finds most of those statements actionable. In broad terms, Judge Tharp finds that the Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Defendants intended to deceive investors with their statements responding to the October 2018 Lion Air crash. Those claims are therefore dismissed without prejudice. Nor have the Plaintiffs advanced any plausible allegations that Smith knowingly or recklessly misled investors; he is accordingly dismissed from the suit (also without prejudice). The Plaintiffs have, however, plausibly alleged that Muilenburg (and therefore Boeing) made several materially misleading statements following the Ethiopian Airlines crash in March 2019. Specifically, their claims that Muilenburg misrepresented and omitted material information regarding Boeing's interactions with the FAA adequately state claims for securities fraud. For these reasons, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. The Plaintiffs may elect to proceed on their 10(b)(5) claims against Boeing and Muilenburg as to statements 22, 23, 24, 28, 34, 39, 42, 44, 46, 47, 48. Alternatively, they are granted leave to file an amended complaint by Oct. 10, 2022. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Memorandum Opinion & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc99rct3 from Leagle.com. BP EXPLORATION: Court Excludes Cook Testimony From Moore B3 Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, APRIL MOORE v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL., Civil Action No. 17-4456 (E.D. La.), Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana grants the motion to exclude the testimony of the Plaintiff's general causation expert, Dr. Jerald Cook, and motions for summary judgment filed by BP Exploration & Production, Inc., BP America Production Co., and BP p.l.c. The case arises from the Plaintiff's alleged exposure to toxic chemicals following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. She alleges that she performed cleanup work after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill beginning in May of 2010. She asserts that, as part of this work, she was exposed to crude oil or dispersants. She also represents that this exposure has resulted in the following conditions: headache, nausea, abdominal cramps, vomiting, diarrhea, loss of appetite, mild inflammatory changes of the paranasal sinuses, cough, dizziness, memory loss, fatigue, itching, and rashes. The Plaintiff's case was originally part of the multidistrict litigation ("MDL") pending before Judge Carl J. Barbier. Her case was severed from the MDL as one of the "B3" cases for plaintiffs who either opted out of, or were excluded from, the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement. Moore is a plaintiff who opted out of the settlement. After her case was severed, it was reallocated to the Court. She asserts claims for general maritime negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence against the Defendants as a result of the oil spill and its cleanup. To demonstrate that exposure to crude oil, weathered oil, and dispersants can cause the symptoms the Plaintiff allegedly experiences, she offers the testimony of Dr. Jerald Cook, an occupational and environmental physician. Dr. Cook is her sole expert offering an opinion on general causation. In his June 21, 2022 report, Dr. Cook utilizes a "general causation approach to determine if some of the frequently reported health complaints are indeed from the result of exposures sustained in performing oil spill cleanup work." He concludes that "general causation analysis indicates" that the following conditions, among others, "can occur in individuals exposed to crude oil, including weathered crude oil": rhinosinusitis, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, bronchitis, asthma, dermatitis, conjunctivitis, and dry eye disease. The BP parties contend that Dr. Cook's expert report should be excluded on the grounds that that it is unreliable and unhelpful. The Defendants also move for summary judgment, asserting that if Dr. Cook's general causation opinion is excluded, the Plaintiff is unable to carry her burden on causation. The Plaintiff opposes both motions. At issue here is whether the Plaintiff has produced admissible general causation evidence. Judge Vance finds that Dr. Cook's opinion is unhelpful because of his inability to link any specific chemical that Moore was allegedly exposed to, at the level at which she was exposed, to the conditions that she allegedly experiences. Specifically, hi conclusion that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the respiratory, ocular, and dermal conditions he analyzed and "exposure to crude oil, including weathered crude oil," is unhelpful without identifying the specific chemicals and exposure levels capable of causing specific conditions alleged by the Plaintiff. In sum, Judge Vance holds that the Plaintiff, as the party offering the testimony of Dr. Cook, has failed to meet her burden of establishing the reliability and relevance of Dr. Cook's report. Given that Dr. Cook's report is unreliable and fails to provide the "minimal facts necessary" to establish general causation in the case, she grants the Defendants' motion to exclude Dr. Cook's testimony. Because she excludes Dr. Cook's opinion on general causation, and the Plaintiff has produced no other admissible general causation evidence, Judge Vance need not reach the question of specific causation. Given that the Plaintiff cannot prove a necessary element of her claims against the Defendants, her claims must be dismissed. Accordingly, Judge Vance grants the Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismisses the Plaintiff's claims with prejudice. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order & Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/2ju7jt9k from Leagle.com. BUFFALO WILD WINGS: Pittman Suit Removed to D. Maryland ------------------------------------------------------- The case styled as Divane Pittman, on her own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Buffalo Wild Wings International, Inc.. Inspire Brands, Inc., Case No. 22STCV24110 was removed from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland on Aug. 26, 2022. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:22-cv-02173-SAG to the proceeding. The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud. Buffalo Wild Wings -- https://www.buffalowildwings.com/ -- is an American casual dining restaurant and sports bar franchise.[BN] The Plaintiff appears pro se. The Defendant is represented by: Ellen Elizabeth Dew, Esq. DLA PIPER LLP (US) 6225 Smith Ave. Baltimore, MD 21209 Phone: (410) 580-4127 Fax: (410) 580-3127 Email: ellen.dew@dlapiper.com CALIFORNIA: Dismissal of Claims in Martinez v. Newsom Partly Upheld ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, Danielle Howard Martinez; D. P., a minor, by his Guardian ad Litem Erica Wedlow; K. P., a minor, by his Guardian ad Litem Brittany Williams; T. W., a minor by his Guardian ad Litem Dahl Johnson; P. C., a minor by her Guardian ad Litem Raven Campbell; LASHONDA HUBBARD; AMBER WOOD, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. GAVIN NEWSOM, Governor, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 20-56404 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirms in part and vacates in part the order of the district court dismissing the Plaintiffs' claims against all the Defendants for failure to exhaust, denying the Plaintiffs leave to amend, and dismissing the case. A group of students and parents allege that every school district in California failed to adequately accommodate special needs students after California public schools transitioned to remote instruction in March 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Plaintiffs are four students enrolled in the Etiwanda and Chaffey Joint Union High School Districts as well as their parents. They allege that when California public schools transitioned to remote instruction in March 2020, every school district in the state failed to determine "what changes needed to be made to special needs students' individualized education programs ('IEP') to account for the differences in distance learning compared to in-person instruction." They allege that their IEPs were not updated to account for remote instruction, they were not offered sufficient accommodations after the transition, and they were denied a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) during the time they were receiving remote instruction. The Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit on behalf of "all special needs students and their parents in California." They sued hundreds of defendants, including, but not limited to: (1) the California Department of Education (CDE); (2) California Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Thurmond; (3) every school district in the state of California; and (4) the California School for the Deaf, the California School for the Blind, and the Diagnostic Centers of California (the State Special Schools). Their claims against the school districts are straightforward: they allege that the districts failed to adequately accommodate special needs students after the transition to remote instruction, thereby denying them—and every other special needs student in the state -- a FAPE. Their claims against the CDE and Superintendent Thurmond are more complicated. During the transition to remote instruction, the CDE issued guidance that encouraged the school districts to "work with each family to determine what a FAPE looks like during COVID-19," "ensure children with disabilities are included in all offerings of school education models by using the IEP process," and "use the annual IEP to plan for a traditional school year and while not required, it is suggested LEAs include distance learning plans or addendums to address distance learning needs during immediate or future school site closures." The Plaintiffs allege that because this guidance "encouraged, but did not require, the state's school districts" to take these measures, the CDE and Superintendent Thurmond either dissuaded or prohibited school districts from updating special needs students' IEPs and from offering adequate accommodations. At oral argument, they characterized this guidance as "a policy of inaction" and "a blanket decision not to act." The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. Section 1400 et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment, and seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they request (1) a declaration that Defendants violated the IDEA, (2) an injunction requiring them "to immediately reassess special needs students assigned to engage in distance learning" or return them to in-person instruction, and (3) an injunction ordering them to provide special needs students with various educational services "until such time as appropriate accommodations are made or they are returned to in-person instruction." They also request "compensatory education" from the school districts to make up "for special needs students' loss of a basic minimum education." After some Defendants moved to dismiss, the district court dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims against all the Defendants for failure to exhaust, denied the Plaintiffs leave to amend, and dismissed the case. The Plaintiffs timely appealed. The Ninth Circuit reviews de novo whether the IDEA requires exhaustion in these circumstances. To address the Appellants' claims, the Ninth Circuit examines whether the Plaintiffs were required to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to IDEA before filing their lawsuit. It holds that exhaustion was required. Initially, the Ninth Circuit opines that the Plaintiffs do not allege that the districts in which they are not enrolled or the State Special Schools, which they do not attend, have injured them personally. Therefore, they lack standing to sue those defendants in federal court. Their claims against the State Special Schools and the school districts in which they are not enrolled do not fall within the juridical link doctrine, and the Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims against these Defendants in federal court even if the juridical link doctrine were to exempt them from ordinary principles of Article III standing. The Ninth Circuit now addresses whether any of the Plaintiffs' claims are moot. The Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit in August 2020, when most California public schools were holding classes remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Since then, the California public schools have returned to in-person instruction. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit next addresses how the return to in-person instruction affects the Plaintiffs' claims. The Ninth Circuit agrees that the Plaintiffs' request for compensatory education means that some of their claims are not moot. If they were to prevail on the claims for which they requested compensatory education, the district court could award this relief despite the return to in-person instruction. But the Plaintiffs requested compensatory education only from the school districts. They did not request compensatory education from the CDE and Superintendent Thurmond. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit next considers whether the Plaintiffs' claims against the CDE and Superintendent Thurmond are moot. The Ninth Circuit holds that the Plaintiffs' claims against the CDE and Superintendent Thurmond are moot, as are the Plaintiffs' claims against the other defendants seeking injunctions requiring a return to in-person instruction or reassessment and services until students return to in-person instruction. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' claims against the school districts in which they are enrolled seeking compensatory education, a declaratory judgment, and attorneys' fees and costs survive. The Ninth Circuit now turns to the Plaintiffs' only remaining claims: Those against the Etiwanda and Chaffey Joint Union High School Districts. The Plaintiffs admit in their complaint that they did not exhaust this administrative process before filing the lawsuit. They argue that they were not required to do so because their claims fall within an exception to the exhaustion requirement. We have held that IDEA plaintiffs are not required to exhaust administrative remedies in three circumstances: (1) when they seek systemic or structural relief, (2) when "it is improbable that adequate relief can be obtained by pursuing administrative remedies (e.g., the hearing officer lacks the authority to grant the relief sought)," and (3) when exhaustion would be futile. They argue that all three exceptions apply. The Ninth Circuit opines that that to conclude that to fall within the systemic exception, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, identify an "agency decision, regulation, or other binding policy" that caused his or her injury. Because the Plaintiffs do not satisfy this requirement, their claims do not fall within the systemic exception. Their attempts to reframe this claim as a policy or practice of not complying with the IDEA does not allow them to evade the exhaustion requirement. Next, because the Plaintiffs seek relief for the denial of a FAPE, they are required to exhaust administrative remedies, even though some of their claims are based on the Fourteenth Amendment. The mere fact the complaint is structured as a class action seeking injunctive relief, without more, does not excuse exhaustion. The Plaintiffs' fears about 800,000 students overwhelming the administrative process are unfounded because unnamed class members need not exhaust. As to the Plaintiffs' argument that they are not required to exhaust because one of the named plaintiffs is entitled to services from the Etiwanda School District pursuant to a settlement agreement, and the plaintiffs seeking to enforce IDEA settlement agreements are not required to exhaust because these claims are simply breach of contract claims, the Ninth Circuit opines that it need not address this issue because the Plaintiffs did not include a claim for a breach of this settlement agreement in their complaint. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs did not assert a claim based on an alleged breach of a settlement agreement, and the Ninth Circuit declines to issue an advisory opinion regarding whether such a claim must be exhausted. The Ninth Circuit concludes that the district court lacked jurisdiction to resolve the Plaintiffs' claims against the school districts in which they are not enrolled and the State Special Schools, which they do not attend. It therefore vacates the district court's judgment dismissing those claims on the merits and remand with instructions to dismiss them for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Further, in light of the California public schools' return to in-person instruction, the Plaintiffs' claims against the CDE and Superintendent Thurmond are moot. The Ninth Circuit therefore vacates the district court's judgment and remands with instructions to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims against those defendants. Finally, it affirms the district court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims against the Etiwanda and Chaffey Joint Union High School Districts for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The other Defendants-Appellees are STATE OF CALIFORNIA; CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH; CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; SANDRA SHEWRY, State Public Health Officer and Department of Public Health Director; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; TONY THURMOND, State Superintendent of Public Education; CALIFORNIA SCHOOL THE DEAF, Fremont and Riverside; CALIFORNIA SCHOOL FOR THE BLIND DIAGNOSTIC CENTER, Northern California, Central California Southern California; FREMONT UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; OAKLAND UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; MT. DIABLO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; SAN RAMON VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; WEST CONTRA COSTA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; CUPERTINO UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT; HAYWARD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; JUAN UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; SBE LATITUDE 37.8 HIGH SCHOOL; LONG BEACH UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; SOUTH PASADENA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; CAPISTRANO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; SANTA ANA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; RIVERSIDE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; CHAFFEY JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT; MILPITAS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; GARDEN GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; IRVINE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; CORONA-NORCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; MORENO VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; ETIWANDA ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT; SAN BERNARDINO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; SAN JOSE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; and SBC-HIGH TECH HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/2v9fed9m from Leagle.com. Maxwell V. Pritt -- mpritt@bsfllp.com -- (argued) and Erica Nyborg-Burch -- enyborg-burch@bsfllp.com -- (argued), Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, San Francisco, California; Diana Renteria , Law Offices of Sheila C. Bayne, Newport Beach, California, for the Plaintiffs-Appellants. Len Garfinkel (argued), Deputy General Counsel; Amy Bisson Holloway, General Counsel; California Department of Education, Sacramento, California; for Defendants-Appellees California Department of Education, Tony Thurmond, California School for the Deaf, and California School for the Blind Diagnostic Center. S. Daniel Harbottle (argued), Sydney J. Blaauw, and Tracy Petznick Johnson, Harbottle Law Group, Irvine, California, for Defendants-Appellees Corona-Norco Unified School District, Garden Grove Unified School District, Irvine Unified School District, and Moreno Valley Unified School District. Marlon C. Wadlington -- mwadlington@aalrr.com -- (argued), Scott D. Danforth -- sdanforth@aalrr.com -- and Kristin M. Meyers -- kmyers@aalrr.com -- Atkinson Andelson Loya Ruud & Roma, Cerritos, California, for Defendants-Appellees Chaffey Joint Union High School District, Capistrano Unified School District, Long Beach Unified School District, Riverside Unified School District, Santa Ana Unified School District, South Pasadena Unified School District, and Milpitas Unified School District. Kirin K. Gill, Deputy Attorney General, Rob Bonta, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Sacramento, California; for Defendants-Appellees Gavin Newsom, State of California, California State Board of Education, California Department of Public Health, California Health and Human Services, and Sandra Shewry. Seth Gordon -- sgordon@leonealberts.com -- and Louis Leone -- lleone@leonealberts.com -- Leone Alberts & Duus APC, Concord, California, for Defendants-Appellants Fremont Unified School District, Oakland Unified School District, Mt. Diablo Unified School District, San Ramon Valley Unified School District, West Contra Costa Unified School District, and Cupertino Union School District. Lynn A. Garcia and Domenic D. Spinelli, Spinelli Donald & Nott, Sacramento, California, for Defendants-Appellees Hayward Unified School District and San Juan Unified School District. Katherine C. Den Bleyker -- iconKatherine.DenBleyker@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Los Angeles, California, for SBE Latitude 37.8 High School. Edward Kang and Thomas Madruga -- tmadruga@omlolaw.com -- Olivarez Madruga Law Organization LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Defendants-Appellees Etiwanda Elementary School District and San Bernardino City Unified School District. Mark Saul Posard -- mposard@grsm.com -- Gordon Rees LLP, San Francisco, California, for Defendant-Appellee San Francisco Unified School District. Sue Ann Evans -- sevans@DWKesq.com -- Managing Senior Counsel, Dannis Woliver Kelley, Long Beach, California, for Defendants-Appellees Los Angeles Unified School District and San Jose Unified School District Kevin S. Wattles -- kwattles@slfesq.com -- Soltman Levitt Flaherty & Wattles LLP, Thousand Oaks, California, for Defendant-Appellee SBC — High Tech High School District. CANADA: Hackers Stole CERB Benefits, Alleges Class Action Lawsuit ----------------------------------------------------------------- Stefan Labbe at delta-optimist.com reports that a class action against the Canadian government for alleged negligence in the hacking of thousands of Canadians' financial information will proceed after a federal court certified the lawsuit. Todd Sweet, a retired police officer living in Creston, B.C., took the Government of Canada to court as a representative plaintiff in the class action after hackers are said to have changed the direct deposit information of at least 12,700 Canadians. The suit claims hackers redirected pandemic relief payments to third-party bank accounts. Sweet alleges that in the summer of 2020, he logged on to his Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) online account to discover an unauthorized individual had applied for the Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) -- the federal government's flagship pandemic financial assistance program to help out of work Canadians through the COVID-19 pandemic. The class action states Sweet is one of likely thousands of Canadians who were vulnerable to hackers from June to August 2020. The failure, alleges the judge-certified court filing, stems from a Government of Canada Branded Credential Service Key, or GCKey. Built by 2Keys Corporation, the GCKey controls access to 100 enabled services across 30 government departments, including Parks Canada, the RCMP, and Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. The CRA -- which is named in the case with Employment and Social Development Canada -- does not use GCKey and relies on another two-step authentication process. But by using the My Service Canada Accounts as a back door to a user's online CRA account, hackers could avoid answering security questions in what's known as a "credential stuffing attack," alleges the class action. Justice Richard F. Southcott, who certified the class action lawsuit, noted in his ruling that such tactics often make use of stolen credentials sold on the Dark Web and are carried out by bot systems automatically filling in log-in details on multiple accounts at once. Once a hacker was inside the CRA account, the plaintiffs say they were able to steal a person's identity and apply for CERB benefits. Southcott said the CRA became aware of several such attacks in the summer of 2020 after it was tipped off by law enforcement that noticed the Dark Web sales. By Aug. 5, 2020, 2Keys told the government it had determined several login anomalies were a large-scale attack on the GCKey service. The tax agency fixed the security flaw around Aug. 10, 2020, but not before at least 48,110 My Accounts were accessed by a "threat actor." Of those, the hackers changed the taxpayers' direct deposit banking details and applied for CERB benefits. The hackers are alleged to have gained access to "Social Insurance Numbers, direct deposit banking information, tax information, dates of birth, records of employment, information regarding employment insurance, and other benefits information," states the lawsuit. On the way to having the class action lawsuit certified, Murphy Battista LLP suffered its own data breach, potentially comprising their clients' information a second time. Sixteen months later, Vancouver attorney Rice Harbut Elliott LLP took on the case, and the class action was eventually certified in a Vancouver federal court. In court documents, Sweet claims he and other members of the class action have: had money withdrawn from their bank accounts; had loans applied for in their names; faced credit card fraud; had their credit reputation damaged; not been able to access benefits they were entitled to; faced out-of-pocket expenses; and suffered mental distress as they communicated with credit and federal agencies to address the data breaches. In certifying the class action, Justice Southcott assessed the admissibility of a body of evidence, including expert reports and several news stories about taxpayers dealing with CERB fraud. The class action claims the federal government of systematic negligence and breach of confidence, among other failings. It states that the online application for pandemic relief programs -- while "an admiral goal," according to Sweet -- was "implemented hastily and recklessly without taking necessary precautions" and that the government "ought to have known that its databases and online systems were vulnerable to unauthorized breaches." Having certified the class action, the defendants' next step is to sign up more of the thousands of potential members to the suit. Southcott ruled that anyone with a Canadian government Online Account who had their financial information disclosed to a third party between March 1 and Dec. 1, 2020, may join the suit. The justice excluded all the people who contacted the original law firm from joining in the upcoming litigation. [GN] CARECORE HEALTH: Gudger Sues Over Failure to Properly Pay OT Wages ------------------------------------------------------------------ TRE'ANYA GUDGER, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CARECORE HEALTH LLC, Defendant, Case No. 3:22-cv-00239-MJN-CHG (S.D. Ohio, August 22, 2022) brings this collective and class action complaint against the Defendant for its alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio Prompt Act. The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendant as an hourly-paid and non-exempt employee in the medical records department from approximately February 2022 to August 2022. The Plaintiff claims that she and other similarly situated employees were schedule by the Defendant to work more than 40 hours in one or more workweek. However, the Defendant did not fully and properly pay for all their overtime wages because the Defendant required a 30-minute meal break deduction to their compensable hours worked even though they were not able to take a full and uninterrupted 30-minute meal break. As a result, the Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were denied by the Defendant of their lawfully earned overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek, says the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages against the Defendant, for herself and all other similarly situated employees, including liquidated damages, costs, disbursements, reasonable allowances for fees of counsel and experts as well as reimbursement of expenses, and any other relief as the Court deems just and proper. CareCore Health LLC provides individualized care plans and long-term care communities, operating 8 life plan communities throughout the State of Ohio. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq. Adam C. Gedling, Esq. Kelsie N. Hendren, Esq. COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC 1550 Old Henderson Rd., Suite 126 Columbus, OH 43220 Tel: (614) 949-1181 Fax: (614) 386-9964 E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com agedling@mcoffmanlegal.com khendren@mcoffmanlegal.com CARGILL MEAT: Villa PMWA Suit Removed to E.D. Pennsylvania ---------------------------------------------------------- The case styled JENNIFER VILLA and SUSAN DAVIDSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS CORPORATION, Case No. 21101004, was removed from the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on August 23, 2022. The Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania assigned Case No. 3:22-cv-01321-RDM to the proceeding. The case arises from the Defendant's alleged failure to pay production workers for the COVID-19 screening time and walking/waiting time in violation of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act. Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation is a processor and distributor of fresh beef, pork, turkey, and cooked and marinated meats, with its principal place of business in Kansas. [BN] The Defendant is represented by: Elizabeth A. Malloy, Esq. Jason A. Cabrera, Esq. COZEN O'CONNOR 1650 Market Street, Suite 2800 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Telephone: (215) 665-4792 E-mail: emalloy@cozen.com jcabrera@cozen.com - and – Jeremy J. Glenn, Esq. COZEN O'CONNOR 123 North Wacker Drive, Suite 1800 Chicago, IL 60606 Telephone: (312) 474-7981 E-mail: jglenn@cozen.com CATALINA STRUCTURED: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Anderson TCPA Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, BEVERLY ANDERSON, Plaintiff v. CATALINA STRUCTURED FUNDING, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-197 (W.D. Mich.), Judge Jane M. Beckering of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Southern Division, denies the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Ms. Anderson filed a putative class action complaint against Defendant Catalina, alleging that it violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. Section 227. The Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was referred to the Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R), recommending that the Court denies the motion. The matter is presently before the Court on the Defendant's objections to the R&R. The Plaintiff filed a response to the objections. Having considered the parties' submissions, Judge Beckering concludes that oral argument is unnecessary to resolve the issues presented. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1) and FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3), she has performed de novo consideration of those portions of the R&R to which objections have been made. She denies the objections and issues her Opinion and Order. At issue is whether the Defendant's calls to the Plaintiff were a telephone solicitation within the meaning of the TCPA. More specifically, the question is whether the Defendant called the Plaintiff to encourage her to "purchase, rent, or invest in Catalina's property, goods or services." After thoroughly setting forth the factual background, legal context and existing case law, the Magistrate Judge determined that "where the Plaintiff has expressed no interest in selling, and the Defendant is in the business of offering liquidity to structured settlement holders, the Defendant may be offering to make a purchase, but it is also marketing a service;" therefore, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the Plaintiff stated a plausible claim under the TCPA. According to the Defendant, the Magistrate Judge made two errors in her analysis. First, it argues that the Magistrate Judge erroneously distinguishes between business calls that are, and calls that are not, prompted by the recipient's indication of interest to sell. According to the Defendant, the Magistrate Judge "arbitrarily" created a "bright-line rule that a call is a telephone solicitation unless the called party first expresses interest in selling her property." Judge Beckering opines that the Defendant's argument lacks merit. She says, the Magistrate Judge did not create a bright-line rule but described decisions holding that calls made in response to advertisements were not solicitations. The Magistrate Judge properly analyzed whether Plaintiff stated a claim for relief under the TCPA that is plausible on its face. While the Defendant disagrees with the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, its first objection fails to demonstrate any factual or legal error by the Magistrate Judge. Second, the Defendant argues that the Magistrate Judge erroneously concluded that "the question of whether the payee pays the fees for services separately from an itemized list or as part of a reduced lump sum payment is irrelevant to the question of whether the payee pays fees as part of the transaction." According to it, the "tasks" it performs instead "simply amount to Catalina's cost of doing business if Catalina wants to complete its purchase of the structured settlement." Again, the Defendant's objection fails to demonstrate any error by the Magistrate Judge but merely a disagreement with her recommendation, Judge Beckering finds. The Magistrate Judge acknowledged both interpretations of the transaction and properly concluded that the transaction, as viewed from Plaintiff's perspective, states a plausible claim under the TCPA. Accordingly, Judge Beckering adopts the Magistrate Judge's R&R as the Opinion of the Court. To the extent the Defendant requests that the Court also identifies which discovery will assist the Court, the Defendant's request is misplaced. Discovery will be addressed at a scheduling conference. Therefore, Judge Beckering denies the Objections, and approves and adopts the R&R as the Opinion of the Court. She denies the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for the reasons stated in the R&R. The Defendant will, within 14 days of the date of entry of the Opinion and Order, file its answer to the Plaintiff's First Amended Class Action Complaint. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Opinion & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/z3nx95t8 from Leagle.com. CENTRAL BUCKS: Cartee-Haring's Bid for Final Certification Granted ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the cases, REBECCA CARTEE-HARING v. CENTRAL BUCKS SCHOOL DISTRICT. DAWN MARINELLO, individually and on behalf of similarly situated female employees v. CENTRAL BUCKS SCHOOL DISTRICT, Civil Action Nos. 20-1995, 21-2587 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Michael M. Baylson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania: (i) grants Marinello's Motion for Final Certification of her Equal Pay Act claim to proceed as a collective action; and (ii) denies as moot Marinello's Motion, in the alternative, for conditional certification of the same claim. Ms. Marinello, in her individual capacity and on behalf of similarly situated female teachers, seeks final certification of her Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 206(d)(1), claim against the District, so she may proceed with the claim as a collective action. Because Marinello's Equal Pay Act ("EPA") claim has yet to be conditionally certified, she alternatively seeks conditional certification. Since 2000, the District has used Salary Schedules to calculate the salaries of its full-time faculty members for each school year. Fulltime teachers were to be paid the salary in the box located where the "step" placement and "educational level" obtained intersect. Since August 2016, the District has employed Marinello as a full-time English teacher. Before Marinello accepted the District's offer of employment, the District informed her that the Salary Schedules, and only the factors contained therein, dictated the annual salaries of fulltime teachers employed by the District. Prior to her employment with the District, Marinello had earned a bachelor's degree, a master's degree, and maintained Instructional I and Instructional II teaching certifications both issued by Pennsylvania. At the time she began working for the District, she had 14 years of prior teaching experience in Pennsylvania public schools. Therefore, Marinello's "step" placement should have been Step 15, as she was to begin her fifteenth year of teaching when the 2016-2017 school year began. Placement on the Salary Schedule at Step 15 with an educational level of a master's degree would have yielded a $98,379 annual salary. However, Marinello alleges the District placed her at Step 1; at Step 1 with a master's degree Marinello was paid an annual salary of $51,157. Several witnesses, including Amy Wittman and Rebecca Cartee-Haring, testified live at an evidentiary hearing held on June 28, 2022 regarding the Motion. The Plaintiff defines its putative collective class as "All women teachers employed by the District from 2000 through the present who have been subject to compensation under the District's applicable Salary Schedules who were treated less favorably than male teachers employed by the District from 2000 through the present with respect to compensation under the applicable Salary Schedules. The Plaintiff argues final certification of this collective is proper because the two-step analysis courts traditionally apply to collective certification is not actually required, and she argues she established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a putative class of similarly situated female teachers were also subjected to the District's practice of underpaying female educators by assigning them inaccurate placements on the District's Salary Schedules. The District counters the Plaintiff's putative class cannot be certified, conditionally or with finality, because: (i) the putative class of opt-in plaintiffs are subject to different statutes of limitations dependent upon their respective dates of employment with the District; (ii) some putative class members had no prior working experience, so their placement at Step 1 was accurate; (iii) the putative opt-in plaintiffs are not similarly situated because they teach different subjects and at different grade levels; (iv) since 2000, the District has utilized different procedures directing its Salary Schedule placements, so the putative opt-in plaintiffs cannot be said to have been subjected to a "common" District policy or practice; and (v) the Plaintiff's putative class of opt-in plaintiffs is nothing more than a fail-safe class. As to final certification, Judge Baylson held an evidentiary hearing on June 28, 2022 to ascertain the similarities between the Plaintiff's proposed plaintiffs. Eight female educators testified at the hearing to the following: each witness was a female; each witness was a teacher employed by the District for some period of time between 2000 and the present; each witness earned either greater educational credentials than what her placement on the District's Salary Schedules reflected or possessed more years of prior teaching experience in Pennsylvania public school districts than her placement reflected; and each witness's inaccurate placement on the Salary Schedule(s) resulted in her receiving an annual salary lower than the annual salary her credentials actually entitled her to. The testimony given at the evidentiary record made clear that the Plaintiff established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that several women were similarly situated to the Plaintiff in that they were also female educators, employed by the District, who were subjected to the same District Salary Schedules, and who all received inaccurate placements on their respective school year's Salary Schedule which resulted in their underpayment. When compared to the twenty-six male educators who were also inaccurately placed on the Salary Schedules, but whose placements yielded overpayment not underpayment, Judge Baylson finds the Plaintiff sufficiently established her burden such that final certification of their putative class is proper. The Plaintiff seeks final certification of a collective class of female teachers employed by the District at any time between 2000 through the present. The Defendant argues this proposed collective cannot be certified because the potential claims of most teachers employed by the District during that 22 time span will be barred, in whole or in part, by the EPA's two-year statute of limitations. The Plaintiff argues the applicable statute of limitations did not begin to run as of the date the teachers were paid unequally, rather it began to run once Marinello and the putative class discovered they were being compensated unequally in 2020. She relies on doctrines of "the discovery rule" and equitable tolling but the Defendant argues both are inapplicable. Judge Baylson holds that the Plaintiff set forth evidence of the District's unequal payment to female teachers beginning in 2000 and continuing through the present. She also established the female teachers did not know they were being compensated less than their male counterparts before 202019, and on several occasions the District misstated how it utilized its Salary Schedules to calculate the female teachers' annual salaries. This pattern constitutes a continuing violation, so "the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the last occurrence of discrimination, rather than the first." Because the Plaintiff established members of the collective continue to be compensated unequally currently, the statute of limitations applicable to the collective will begin to run on the date of the last unequal payment made to a female District teacher. For the reasons she set forth, Judge Baylson grants the Plaintiff's Motion for Final Certification of her Equal Pay Act claim to proceed as a collective action. He denies as moot her Motion, in the alternative, for conditional certification of the same claim. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/3kekt5n3 from Leagle.com. CHIEF FIRE: Atty. Resila Withdraws as Class Counsel in Brown Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, RORY BROWN, ROSHANE POWELL, ROMARIO POWELL, ANDREW MORGAN, MICKEL KELLY, REYNARD MORRIS, GAREY MILLS, GARRICK ROBINSON, MARIO TEAPE, and CRAIG LYNCH, on behalf of themselves, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly-situated, Plaintiffs v. CHIEF FIRE PREVENTION & MECHANICAL CORP., and FRANK MITAROTONDA, individually, Defendants, Case No. 22 CV 3359 (VB) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an order relating to the Plaintiffs' counsel's motion to withdraw as counsel of record. On Aug. 22, 2022, the Plaintiffs' counsel, James A. Resila, Esq., of the law firm Schwab & Gasparani, PLLC, moved to withdraw as counsel of record. According to Mr. Resila, the reason for his requested withdrawal is a failure of his clients to communicate with him and to provide him discovery materials. He attaches an affirmation of service stating that the motion to withdraw was served on the Plaintiffs individually via U.S. Mail on Aug. 22, 2022. Accordingly, by no later than Sept. 13, 2022, the Plaintiffs will advise the Court by letter whether they consent to the withdrawal. In the event they do not consent, the Plaintiffs will also explain in their letter the basis for their unwillingness to consent. Mr. Resila will serve a copy of the Order on the Plaintiffs and file proof of service of same on the ECF docket. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/mpumcu67 from Leagle.com. CHRISTMAS TREE HILL: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Christmas Tree Hill, Inc. The case is styled as Christopher Loadholt, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Christmas Tree Hill, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-07300 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 26, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Christmas Tree Hill -- https://www.christmastreehill.com/ -- offers thousands of unique gifts, brands, fashions, home decor, seasonal decor, collectibles, functional gifts, and more.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Yitzchak Zelman, Esq. MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC 701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300 Asbury Park, NJ 07712 Phone: (845) 367-7146 Fax: (732) 298-6256 Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com COMMUNITY HEALTH: White Sues to Recover Compensation and Benefits ----------------------------------------------------------------- Callie White, on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., VENICE HMA, LLC, d/b/a SHOREPOINT HEALTH VENICE, Case No. 8:22-cv-01989-CEH-AEP (M.D. Fla., Aug. 29, 2022), is brought against the Defendants for violations of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, seeking to recover damages in the amount of 60 days' compensation and benefits for each of them by reason of the Defendants' violation of their rights under the WARN Act. The Defendants violated the WARN Act by terminating the Plaintiffs and the putative class members without providing sufficient advance written notice as required by the WARN Act. In this case, WARN Act liability is imputed to both Defendants via a "single employer" test/theory. The Defendants failed to provide Named Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members with the 60 days advance written notice that is required by the WARN Act, says the complaint. The Plaintiff was an employee of the Defendants and was terminated from her employment. CHS is (or recently was) "the largest provider of general hospital healthcare services in the United States in terms of number of acute care facilities."[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Brandon J. Hill, Esq. Luis A. Cabassa, Esq. Amanda E. Heystek, Esq. WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A. 1110 North Florida Avenue, Suite 300 Tampa, FL 33602 Main No: 813-224-0431 Direct No: 813-379-2565 Facsimile: 813-229-8712 Email: bhill@wfclaw.com lcabassa@wfclaw.com aheystek@wfclaw.com gnichols@wfclaw.com CONDOR LLC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against Condor, LLC. The case is styled as Jasmine Toro, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. Condor, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-07362 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Condor, LLC -- https://www.llccondor.com/home -- is a building construction Company.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mars Khaimov, Esq. 10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor Forest Hills, NY 11375 Phone: (917) 915-7415 Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com CONSTELATION CLEARSIGHT: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Haldeman Says ----------------------------------------------------------------- DAKOTA HALDEMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated Plaintiff v. CONSTELATION CLEARSIGHT, LLC f/k/a EXELON CLEARSIGHT, LLC; EXELON BUSINESS SERVICES COMPANY, LLC; and EXELON CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-03367-TJS (E.D. Pa., Aug. 23, 2022) seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Plaintiff Haldeman was employed by the Defendants as drone pilot and pole inspector. CONSTELATION CLEARSIGHT, LLC f/k/a EXELON CLEARSIGHT, LLC provides inspections using drones, robots and AI. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Peter C. Wood, Jr., Esq. Matthew Mobilio, Esq. MOBILIO WOOD 900 Rutter Ave., Box 24 Forty Fort, PA 18704 Telephone: (570) 234-0442 Facsimile: (570) 266-5402 Email: peter@mobiliowood.com matt@mobiliowood.com - and - Alex Pisarevsky, Esq. Erika R. Piccirillo, Esq. COHN LIFLAND PEARLMAN HERRMANN & KNOPF LLP Park 80 West-Plaza One 250 Pehle Avenue, Suite 401 Saddle Brook, NJ 07663 Telephone: (201) 845-9600 Facsimile: (201) 845-9423 Email: ap@njlawfirm.com ep@njlawfirm.com CREDIT CONSULTING: Summary Judgment Order in Scott Suit Reversed ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, CLIFTON JAMES SCOTT, Cross-complainant and Appellant v. CREDIT CONSULTING SERVICES, INC., Cross-defendant and Respondent, Case No. H049063 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the Sixth District reverses the trial court's order granting summary judgment in CCS' favor. After filing a debt collection lawsuit against Scott, Credit Consulting Services (CCS) stapled a typewritten note to the court-provided summons and, through a process server, served Scott with the note, summons, and complaint. Nothing in the assembled documents disclosed that CCS, not the court, had affixed the note to the summons. Scott alleged that CCS violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) (15 U.S.C. Section 1692e(9), (11))1 and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Civil Code Sections 1788.16-1788.17) by sending a written communication that gave a false impression as to its source, authorization, or approval, because CCS failed to disclose that the note was a communication from a debt collector and not the court. In February 2016, Scott received medical treatment from Hazel Hawkins Memorial Hospital. As a result, he incurred unpaid medical debts. Hazel Hawkins referred those debts to CCS for collection. CCS sent Scott eight letters between July 27, 2016 and Sept. 11, 2018. By 2017 at the latest, Scott was aware Hazel Hawkins had assigned the debt to a debt collector and had received at least one collections letter. Scott did not pay the debt. On Oct. 30, 2018, CCS initiated the present action by filing a collection complaint against Scott seeking recovery of the debt. The court issued a summons the same day. CCS stapled "a small yellow note to the summons at a 90-degree angle." The attachment read: "If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact: Credit Consulting Services, Inc., 201 John Street, Suite E, Salinas, CA 93901, 831-424-0606; outside 831 area code 1-800-679-6888." CCS then had the assembled attachment, summons, and complaint served on Scott by substituted service. Mr. Scott retained counsel and answered CCS' complaint. He also filed a cross-complaint against CCS alleging two class action causes of action, one pursuant to the FDCPA and one pursuant to the Rosenthal Act. In support of each cause of action, he alleged that it was unlawful for CCS to send the attachment with the summons and the complaint because the attachment appeared to be a message from the court and did not contain language disclosing that it was sent by a debt collector. On Jan. 9, 2020, the court certified a class defined to include: "All persons with addresses in California to whom CCS sent, or caused to be sent, a collection notice stapled to a Summons in the form of Exhibit '1' to Scott's cross-complaint in an attempt to collect a defaulted consumer debt, during the period Oct. 30, 2017, through Nov. 14, 2019." With the basic facts undisputed, the parties filed competing summary judgment motions. The trial court determined that the attachment, though a communication covered by the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act, was lawful. Accordingly, it entered judgment in CCS' favor on Scott's cross-complaint and denied Scott's cross-request for summary judgment. Scott thereafter appealed. Mr. Scott's two causes of action, one for violation of the FDCPA and one for violation of the Rosenthal Act, are predicated on the same overlapping theories of liability: (1) the attachment appeared to be authorized, issued, or approved by the court in violation of section 1692e(9) and Civil Code sections 1788.16 and 1788.17; and (2) the attachment did not have a proper disclosure in violation of section 1692e(11) and Civil Code section 1788.17. We review de novo the trial court's determination that CCS was entitled to judgment on Scott's cross-complaint, and that Scott was not, as a matter of law. Under the well-settled standard for reviewing the admissible evidence before the trial court, the Court of Appeals liberally construes the evidence in favor of the opposing party and resolves all doubts in favor of that party. CCS concedes that: CCS is a "debt collector" as defined in both statutes; Scott is a "consumer" as defined in the FDCPA; and the money Scott owed to Hazel Hawkins constituted a "debt" and "consumer debt," as defined in the FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act,5 respectively. The parties dispute: (1) whether the attachment is (a) a communication (b) in connection with the collection of any debt; and (2) whether the attachment constitutes a substantive violation of the relevant statutes. CCS disputes that the attachment was a "communication" and that it was "in connection with the collection of any debt." Underlying its arguments is the premise that the Court of Appeals must examine the yellow attachment in isolation, divorced from the summons and complaint to which CCS literally attached it. It reject this premise and concludes that CCS sent the attachment in connection with debt collection. The Court of Appeals holds that the attachment is a "communication" as defined in section 1692a(2). The attachment, by its own reference to the "matter" defined in the accompanying documents, by its provision of contact information, and by its invitation to contact CCS with "any questions" about the lawsuit, refers to the extant debt and solicits further contact regarding a debt. The Court of Appeals further holds that CCS sent the attachment to Scott in connection with the collection of a debt. The obvious function of the attachment was to prompt Scott to contact CCS, his litigation adversary, about the debt prompting the lawsuit. The Court of Appeals fails to conceive of any subject other than debt collection CCS might think the communication was in connection with. The message in the attachment refers to the existence of a debt, conveys information regarding the debt, and serves the purpose of debt collection by enticing the recipient to contact the debt collector. Mr. Scott argues that, to the least sophisticated consumer, the attachment would appear to have come from the court because it was both stapled to the official summons and lacked the mandatory disclosure language. CCS concedes the omission of the mandatory disclosure language in the attachment but asserts that disclosure is not required for an "innocuous note" and that even the least sophisticated consumer would understand that the attachment came from CCS, a debt collector. The Court of Appeals concludes on this record that the omission of the mandatory disclosures in this attachment to an official court summons violated both section 1692e(11) and 1692e(9). It agrees with CCS that an "innocuous note" may be included with a summons and complaint. But, like the judge who denied CCS' special motion to strike based, in part, on Scott's likelihood of success on the merits, it does not agree that the attachment is innocuous. The problem is that the attachment is provided in a context that is likely to mislead the least reasonable consumer as to the identity -- and authority -- of the entity sending the communication. Of course, CCS could have placed the matter beyond doubt by disclosing that it added the attachment on the face of the document, but it failed to do so. As to materiality, the Court of Appeals concludes that the false official imprimatur, in the eyes of the least sophisticated consumer, is capable of influencing them. CCS' cases do not involve similar facts. Intentional or not, the function of the attachment is to encourage the consumer to direct questions to CCS rather than to file an answer in an adversarial proceeding. Accordingly, Scott's "subjective reaction is neither here nor there." For these reasons, the Court of Appeals concludes that the court's entry of summary judgment in CCS' favor was error. Through his cross-motion for summary judgment, Scott sought, among other things, judgment in his, and the certified class', favor on both causes of action in his cross-complaint; individual awards of statutory damages under the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act; and a service award. CCS raised both procedural and substantive arguments in opposition. Having granted CCS's motion, the trial court "necessarily" denied Scott's motion. Scott now asks the Court of Appeals to direct the trial court to enter judgment in his favor. It declines to do so. The Court of Appeals agrees that the trial court's denial of Scott's motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication of issues is within the scope of his appeal. And the issues presented by Scott's cross-motion substantially overlap with the issues presented by CCS' motion. They are not, however, coterminous. Resolution of Scott's cross-motion would turn on adjudication of substantive issues not yet addressed by the trial court. In these circumstances, the Court of Appeals deems it prudent to direct the trial court to vacate its order denying Scott's motion for summary judgment and to remand for further proceedings consistent with its determination, as a matter of law on the facts presented by CCS' summary judgment motion, that CCS's attachment to the summons, served with CCS' complaint, constitutes a "false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt" within the meaning of FDCPA section 1692e, and that the misleading character of the representation or means is material under Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc. (9th Cir. 2010) 592 F.3d 1027, 1030, Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC (9th Cir. 2007) 499 F.3d 926, 934, and Hahn v. Triumph Partnerships LLC (7th Cir. 2009) 557 F.3d 755, 758. For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reverses the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of CCS and remands for further proceedings on Scott's cross-complaint, with directions to vacate the order granting CCS' motion for summary judgment and denying Scott's motion for summary judgment. Scott will recover his costs on appeal. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/9efep232 from Leagle.com. DANIA ENTERTAINMENT: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Moore Claims ------------------------------------------------------------- KOWLESSAR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. DANIA ENTERTAINMENTY CENTER LLC, Defendants, Case No. CACE-22-012428 (Fla. Cir., Broward Cty., Aug. 22, 2022) seeks to stop the Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls. DANIA ENTERTAINMENT CENTER LLC operates as a holding company. The Company holds or owns securities of companies other than banks. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Andrew Shamis, Esq. Garett O. Berg, Esq. SHAMIS & GENTILE P.A. 14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705 Miami, FL 33132 Telephone: (305) 479-2299 Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com gberg@ shamisgentile.com -and- Scott Edelsberg, Esq. Christopher Gold, Esq. EDELSBERG LAW, P.A. 20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417 Aventura, FL 33180 Telephone: (786) 289-9471 Facsimile: (305) 975-3320 Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com chris@edelsberglaw.com DEL MONTE FOODS: Stewart Sues Over Failure to Pay Wages Owed ------------------------------------------------------------ Derek Stewart, an individual, Javonte Williams, an individual, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. DEL MONTE FOODS, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Case No. 3:22-cv-04919 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 29, 2022), is brought arising from the Defendants' violations of the California Labor Code, the Fair Labor Standards Act, including for failure to provide meal and rest periods, reimburse business expenses, pay all wages owed, provide accurate wage statements, and other violations of the California Labor Code. The Defendant failed to timely pay minimum, regular and overtime wages to its California non-exempt employees in violation of California Labor Code; failed to provide timely and uninterrupted meal and rest periods to its California non-exempt employees in violation of California Labor Code, and the applicable Industrial Wage Order; failed to pay its employees one hour of pay at the regular rate of compensation for each instance that Defendant failed to provide statutorily mandated rest periods and timely off-duty meal periods; failed to furnish timely and accurate wage statements, including by failing to distinguish between meal and rest break premiums on its wage statements; failed to pay all wages due upon termination; failed to reimburse its California non-exempt employees for necessary business expenses incurred, such as boots and safety equipment, among other expenses, in violation of California Labor Code; and, is in violation of California's Unfair Competition Law and the Private Attorney General Act of 2004, says the complaint. The Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant. The Defendant manufactures and distributes packaged food products. The Company provides canned fruits and vegetables, as well as a wide range of snacks.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: David R. Markham, Esq. Maggie Realin, Esq. Lisa Brevard, Esq. THE MARKHAM LAW FIRM 888 Prospect Street, Ste. 200 La Jolla, CA 92037 Phone: (619) 399-3995 Fax: (619) 615-2067 Email: dmarkham@markham-law.com mrealin@markham-law.com lbrevard@markham-law.com - and - Walter Haines, Esq. UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP 5500 Bolsa Avenue, Suite 203 Huntington Beach, CA 92649 Phone: 888.474.7242 Fax: 562.256.1006 Email: whaines@uelglaw.com DEVA CONCEPTS: Liability Suit Counsel to Answer Settlement Concerns ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, IN RE: DEVA CONCEPTS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, Master file 1:20-cv-01234-GHW (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Gregory H. Woods of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York directs the class counsel to file a response regarding the concerns articulated in Exhibit 1 attached to the Order. On Aug. 23, 2022, the Court received electronic correspondence from one of the class members involved in the Deva Concepts Products Liability Litigation Class Action settlement. According to the correspondence received by the Court, this class member, among others, has not received an update regarding the settlement and scheduling of payments despite numerous attempts to contact the class counsel and the Settlement Administrator. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/3xnpe3e9 from Leagle.com. DEVON ENERGY: Underpays Oilfield Workers, Stoddart Suit Claims -------------------------------------------------------------- BEAU STODDART, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. DEVON ENERGY PRODUCTION COMPANY, L.P., Defendant, Case No. 5:22-cv-00725-SLP (W.D. Okla., August 22, 2022) is a collective action complaint brought against the Defendant to recover unpaid overtime wages and other damages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendant as a Completions Inspector from May 2014 until July 2020. The Plaintiff claims that throughout his employment with the Defendant, he and other similarly situated oilfield workers were paid a flat sum for each day worked regardless of the number of hours worked that workweek. Despite working more than 40 hours per week, the Defendant did not pay them overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek, says the Plaintiff. On behalf of himself and all other similarly situated oilfield workers, the Plaintiff seeks judgment for unpaid overtime and an equal amount of liquidated damages, reasonable attorney's fees and litigation costs, pre- and post-judgment interest, and other relief as may be necessary and appropriate. Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. is an independent oil and natural gas exploration and production company. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Michael A. Josephson, Esq. Andrew Dunlap, Esq. Taylor S. Montgomery, Esq. JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LLP 11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050 Houston, TX 77046 Tel: (713) 352-1100 Fax: (713) 352-3300 E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com adunlap@mybackwages.com tmontgomery@mybackwages.com - and – Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq. BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC 11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025 Houston, TX 77046 Tel: (713) 877-8788 Fax: (713) 877-8065 E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com DINGDONG LTD: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due Oct. 24 ------------------------------------------------------------- The securities litigation law firm of Kuznicki Law PLLC issues this alert to shareholders of Dingdong (Cayman) Limited (NYSE: DDL), if they purchased or acquired the Company's American Depository Shares ("ADS") pursuant and/or traceable to the Company’s June 2021 initial public offering (the "IPO"). Shareholders have until October 24, 2022 to file lead plaintiff applications in the securities class action lawsuit. Shareholders are encouraged to contact us at https://kclasslaw.com/cases/securities/nyse-ddl/, by calling toll-free at 1-833-835-1495 or by email (dk@kclasslaw.com). Kuznicki Law PLLC is committed to ensuring that companies adhere to responsible business practices and engage in good corporate citizenship. The firm seeks recovery on behalf of investors who incurred losses when false and/or misleading statements or the omission of material information by a Company lead to artificial inflation of the Company's stock. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes. [GN] EHEALTHINSURANCE SERVICES: Salaiz Sues Over Unwanted Robocalls -------------------------------------------------------------- ERIK SALAIZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. EHEALTHINSURANCE SERVICES, INC. and JOHN DOE, an unknown business entity, Defendants, Case No. 5:22-cv-04835-NC (N.D. Cal., August 23, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and Unlawful Prong of California Unfair Competition Law. According to the complaint, the Defendants placed telephone calls to the Plaintiff's and Class members' cellular and/or residential telephones without prior express written consent. The calls were made for the express purpose of soliciting customers for E-Health's Medicare insurance. As a result of the Defendants' unlawful conduct, the Plaintiff and the Class have suffered damages, including invasion of their personal privacy, says the suit. eHealthInsurance Services, Inc. is a company that sells Medicare insurance services, headquartered in California. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mark L. Javitch, Esq. JAVITCH LAW OFFICE 3 East 3rd Ave., Ste. 200 San Mateo, CA 94401 Telephone: (650) 781-8000 Facsimile: (650) 648-0705 E-mail: mark@javitchlawoffice.com ELEMENTS PRODUCTION: Raus to Amend Complaint to Invoke Jurisdiction ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, DAVID RAUS, et al., Plaintiffs v. ELEMENTS PRODUCTION, LCC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 21cv10431 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Denise Cote of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York orders the Plaintiffs to amend their complaint no later than Sept. 9, 2022, if they wish to invoke the Court's diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2). The complaint invokes the Court's diversity jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2) is available in a class action in which "any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant." Judge Cote holds that the complaint does not adequate allege the citizenships of the Defendants. Accordingly, if the Plaintiffs wish to invoke the Court's diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2), they will amend their complaint no later than Sept. 9, 2022 to include allegations sufficient to satisfy Section 1332(d)'s requirements, so long as they can do so in good faith and consistent with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. No other amendments to the complaint will be included with the amendments made pursuant to the Order. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2nhuacea from Leagle.com. ENERGY TRANSFER: Allegheny County ERS Wins Bid to Certify Class --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, ALLEGHENY COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, et al., v. ENERGY TRANSFER LP, et al., Civil Action No. 20-200 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Gerald Austin McHugh of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania grants the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Plaintiffs retirement systems and pension plans brought the action for themselves and on behalf of a class of shareholders in Energy Transfer LP against Energy Transfer, its subsidiary, and certain executives. The Plaintiffs' allegations center around a series of allegedly false or misleading statements and omissions made in reference to the Defendants' construction of three natural gas pipelines related to the Mariner East system across Pennsylvania: the ME2, the ME2x, and the Revolution Pipeline. These statements related to the anticipated timeline of the pipeline's construction; pipeline capacity; the safety of the pipeline and its compliance with various government orders related to safety; the Defendants' adherence to a code of ethics; and the Defendants' general compliance with the law. After the Defendants moved to dismiss, Judge McHugh issued a memorandum and order that reviewed in detail the various misrepresentations and omissions alleged by the Plaintiffs in order to determine whether they were actionable. He dismissed statements from 22 paragraphs of the Complaint for various reasons, finding that the remaining statements were actionable. In denying the motion to dismiss, he rejected the Defendants' arguments that the corrective disclosures regarding the project timeline, the pipeline capacity, and government investigations were legally insufficient to establish loss causation for the misrepresentations alleged. Having survived a motion to dismiss, the Plaintiffs now seek class certification of their claims against the Defendants for publicly making statements that omitted material information and made material misrepresentations in violation of the Exchange Act. The parties have submitted extensive briefing on the motion, and a hearing was held where both parties vigorously advocated their positions before the Court. For a class to be certified, the plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a), along with the requirements for a particular type of class set forth in Rule 23(b). Rule 23(a) requires that (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable (numerosity); (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class (commonality); (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class (typicality); and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy). The Plaintiff seeks certification under subsection (b)(3), which further requires that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members (predominance), and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy (superiority). Class certification requires that the Court make factual determinations and resolve factual disputes. It is proper only if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23 are met." The core dispute in the motion is over the predominance element of Rule 23(b)(3) in the context of securities litigation. The Plaintiffs have established that they are entitled to a presumption of reliance under Basic v. Levinson such that presumptive class members can be presumed to have relied on material public misrepresentations made by Defendants by means of a market-efficient share price of the security. After this presumption is established, the burden shifts to the Defendants to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the alleged misrepresentations did not in fact have an impact on the price of the security. The Defendants attempt to argue controlling legal principles in a way that would narrow the scope of relevant evidence and thereby erode the presumption established by Basic, but their arguments are unconvincing. In sum, Judge McHugh concludes that the Plaintiffs have proven that class certification is appropriate. They have established all the Rule 23(a) elements, as well as the necessary elements of Rule 23(b)(3). Following consideration of all the relevant evidence -- quantitative and qualitative alike -- he finds holds that the Defendants fail to meet their burden to rebut the presumption of market impact, with the result that the Plaintiffs can show predominance. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is granted. An appropriate order follows. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8mb2xx from Leagle.com. EQUIFAX INC: Thompson Files FCRA Suit in N.D. Georgia ----------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Equifax, Inc. The case is styled as John Thompson, Megan Govea Thompson, individually and on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Equifax, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-03469-LMM-CCB (N.D. Ga., Aug. 26, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Equifax Inc. -- http://www.equifax.com/-- is an American multinational consumer credit reporting agency headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Alison D Hawthorne, Esq. Paul W. Evans, Esq. Rachel Boyd Minder, Esq. W. Daniel Miles, III, Esq. BEASLEY ALLEN CROW METHVIN PORTIS & MILES-AL PO Box 4160 Montgomery, AL 36104-36013 Phone: (334) 269-2343 Fax: (334) 954-7555 Email: alison.hawthorne@beasleyallen.com paul.evans@beasleyallen.com rachel.minder@beasleyallen.com Dee.Miles@BeasleyAllen.com - and - Brian E. Johnson, Esq. Victoria S. Nugent, Esq. COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC-DC 1100 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20005-3964 Phone: (417) 343-5956 Fax: (202) 408-4699 Email: bejohnson@cohenmilstein.com - and - H. Clay Barnett, III, Esq. BEASLEY ALLEN Suite 400 Atlanta, GA 30339 Phone: (334) 269-2343 Fax: (334) 954-7555 Email: clay.barnett@beasleyallen.com EXPLORE SCIENTIFIC: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against Explore Scientific, LLC. The case is styled as Christopher Loadholt, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Explore Scientific, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-07370 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Explore Scientific -- https://explorescientificusa.com/ -- is a company founded by former Meade Instruments Vice President of Brand Community Scott W. Roberts in 2008.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Yitzchak Zelman, Esq. MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC 701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300 Asbury Park, NJ 07712 Phone: (845) 367-7146 Fax: (732) 298-6256 Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com EXPRESS SERVICES: Storm Suit Removed to C.D. California ------------------------------------------------------- The case styled as Eve Storm, individually and on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. Express Services, Inc., OReilly Auto Enterprises, LLC, Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. CVRI2202748 was removed from the Riverside County Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on Aug. 26, 2022. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:22-cv-01510 to the proceeding. The nature of suit is stated as Other Labor. Express Services, Inc. -- https://www.expresspros.com/ -- provides human resource services. The Company offers candidate recruitment process, workforce management, turnover calculator, and professional staffing services.[BN] The Plaintiff appears pro se. The Defendants are represented by: Derek W. Paradis, Esq. HIGGS FLETCHER AND MACK LLP 401 West A Street Suite 2600 San Diego, CA 92101-7913 Phone: (619) 236-1551 Fax: (619) 696-1410 Email: paradisd@higgslaw.com FIRST AMERICAN: Cal. App. Flips Dismissal of Sjobring & Kaufman --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, JEFFREY ALBERT SJOBRING, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants v. FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants and Respondents, Case No. B293732 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the Second District, Division Three, reverses the trial court's order granting the Defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing both the Sjobring and the Kaufman lawsuits. The Insurance Code requires title insurers and title companies to file a schedule of their rates with the Insurance Commissioner before charging those rates to the public. The Insurance Code also prohibits title insurers and title companies from charging rates for policies and services except in accordance with their filed rates. These consolidated appeals concern two class action lawsuits brought against Defendants and Respondents First American Title Insurance Co. and First American Title Co. One lawsuit was filed by Plaintiff and Appellant Sjobring. The other lawsuit was filed by Plaintiff and Appellant Kaufman. Both Plaintiffs obtained policies from defendants to insure the title on a recently purchased home: an owner's policy to cover their own interest in the title, and a loan policy to cover the mortgage-lender's interest. Because title insurance policies like these insure the same property, they are usually less expensive when purchased together. How much less expensive depends on the range of defects they insure against -- that is, whether the policies are classified as "standard coverage" or "extended coverage." The Plaintiffs allege they were overcharged for their title insurance policies. Specifically, Sjobring asserts that the Defendants' filed rate for an extended coverage loan policy when sold together with an extended coverage owner's policy was $125, not the $563 that he was charged. Alternatively, he asserts that even if his policy is considered a standard coverage policy, he should have been charged defendants' filed rate of $290. For her part, Kaufman alleges that under the Defendants' filed rates, there was no charge for a loan policy that was sold concurrently with a standard coverage owner's policy. Thus, Kaufman should have only paid $125, not the $710 that she was charged. Mr. Sjobring filed his operative fourth amended class action complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. BC329482 on Nov. 15, 2010. The court certified two classes for the fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and unfair competition claims. As to class one, the court certified the following class: "All persons who paid all or part of the premium in a transaction occurring from Jan. 1, 2003 through Oct. 8, 2006, in which the premium paid was more than $125 for any First American concurrent loan policy issued with an Eagle Owner's Policy issued without regional exceptions insuring property in California, where the aggregate liability of the loan policies issued did not exceed the aggregate liability of the owner's policy." It found a common question existed as to "whether the Eagle Owner's Policy is an extended or standard coverage policy." As to class two, the court certified the following class: "All persons who paid all or part of the premium in a transaction occurring from Jan. 1, 2003 through Oct. 8, 2007, in which the premium paid was more than 20 percent of 'Base Rate A' for a First American first concurrent loan policy insuring property in California, where the aggregate liability under the loan policies did not exceed the liability under the owner's policy, excepting those persons who are members of any class that may be certified in Kaufman Class Two may only seek to claim that the rate applied to the lender's policy, as issued, was improper and should have been charged at the lower C-5 rate." Ms. Kaufman filed her operative second amended class action complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. BC382826 on Nov. 15, 2010. In September 2017, a class was certified for the causes of action for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of the Unfair Competition Law as to: "All persons who paid for a first Eagle loan title policy in a residential real estate sales transaction in California that was issued concurrently with an owner's policy during the period Oct. 2, 2006 to Oct. 2, 2007, where the aggregate liability of the loan policies did not exceed the liability of the owner's policy." The Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings in both cases. The trial court granted the Defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed both lawsuits. It concluded that plaintiffs' allegations amounted to an improper challenge to the "use" of a rate and implicates "ratemaking." Accordingly, defendants were shielded from liability under section 12414.26, which bars suits under noninsurance laws for any "act done, action taken, or agreement made pursuant to the authority conferred" by the rate-filing statutes. On appeal, the Plaintiffs contend that immunity under section 12414.26 is limited to conduct authorized by articles 5.5 and 5.7 of the Insurance Code. Those articles do not authorize title insurers to charge more than their filed rates. To the contrary, such conduct is expressly prohibited by section 12414.27. Whether the Defendants charged more than the filed rates depends, in turn, on whether the Plaintiffs' policies provided standard or extended coverage and courts routinely interpret insurance policies. Because those classifications are not clear from the face of the pleadings and judicially noticed documents, it is a question of fact that cannot be resolved by motions for judgment on the pleadings. The Plaintiffs also contend that administrative proceedings before the Insurance Commissioner are not a consumer's exclusive remedy for the charging of an unauthorized rate. The Defendants contend they are immune from suit under section 12414.26 because the lawsuits challenge acts done pursuant to authority conferred by article 5.5 -- namely, rate setting and the classification of title insurance policies. And Villanueva doesn't assist the Plaintiffs because that case dealt with a title insurer that charged rates without filing them with the Insurance Commissioner. They also argue that article 6.7's administrative process is the sole remedy for claims that fall within section 12414.26's immunity provision. The Court of Appeals finds that the Plaintiffs contend their claims are not barred by section 12414.26 because the lawsuits do not challenge the Defendants' ratemaking. Nor do they challenge the amount of any filed rate or coverage classification. Instead, the issue is whether the Defendants unlawfully collected more than the filed rates. Accordingly, whether the Plaintiffs' policies are standard or extended coverage policies is not a question about rate setting. It is a question about the nature of the policies, which in turn determines what the Plaintiffs should have been charged. This is a question of fact. And because the answer to that question is not clear from the face of the pleadings and judicially noticed documents, it cannot be resolved in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. In a recent opinion, the California Supreme Court held that "the statutory immunity for acts done pursuant to the authority conferred' (Section 12414.26) by the rate-filing statutes does not shield title insurers from suit for charging unauthorized rates, and the Insurance Commissioner does not have exclusive jurisdiction over such claims," citing Villanueva v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 104, 110-111. In conformity with Villanueva, the Court of Appeals concludes that the Plaintiffs do not challenge the Defendants' filed rates or coverage classifications and, therefore, section 12414.26 does not shield them from suit for charging unauthorized rates for further proceedings. For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reverses the judgments and remands the matter for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in its Opinion. Sjobring and Kaufman will recover their costs on appeal. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/5f266ahr from Leagle.com. The Bernheim Law Firm, Steven J. Bernheim -- B@thebernheimlawfirm.com -- Nazo S. Semerjian -- N.Semerdjian@TheBernheimLawFirm.com; Shernoff Bidart Echeverria, Michael J. Bidart, Steven M. Schuetze; Friedman Rubin, Richard H. Friedman; The Kick Law Firm and Taras Kick for the Plaintiffs and Appellants. Dentons US, Ronald D. Kent -- ronald.kent@dentons.com -- Joel D. Siegel -- joel.siegel@dentons.com -- Susan M. Walker, Paul M. Kakuske -- paul.kakuske@dentons.com -- for the Defendants and Respondents. FIVE ELEMENTS INC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed Five Elements Inc. The case is styled as Andrew Toro, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Five Elements Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-07351 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Five Elements -- http://www.5elementshr.com/-- is an online skill assessment platform that offers HR solutions to hire, train, and measure talent.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mars Khaimov, Esq. 10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor Forest Hills, NY 11375 Phone: (917) 915-7415 Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com FLOSPORTS INC: Young Sues Over Illegal Automatic Renewal Scheme --------------------------------------------------------------- Lucas Young, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated v. FLOSPORTS, INC., Case No. 3:22-cv-04920-TSH (N.D. Cal., Aug. 29, 2022), is brought against Defendant for engaging in an illegal "automatic renewal" scheme with respect to its subscription sports broadcasting and streaming services across its network sites (the "FS Subscriptions,") through its website, https://www.flosports.tv/ (the "FloSports Website"). The Plaintiff's allegations, when customers sign up for an FS Subscription in order to gain access to a live stream through the FloSports Website, the Defendant enrolls customers in a program that automatically renews customers' FS Subscription on a yearly basis and results in yearly charges to customer's credit card, debit card, or third-party payment account (collectively, "Payment Method"). In doing so, the Defendant fails to provide the requisite disclosures and authorizations required to be made to and obtained from California consumers under California's Automatic Renewal Law ("ARL"). Specifically, the Defendant systematically violates the ARL by: failing to present the automatic renewal offer terms in a clear and conspicuous manner and in visual proximity to the request for consent to the offer before the subscription or purchasing agreement is fulfilled; charging consumers' Payment Method without first obtaining their affirmative consent to the agreement containing the automatic renewal offer terms; and failing to provide an acknowledgment that includes the automatic renewal offer terms, cancellation policy, and information regarding how to cancel in a manner that is capable of being retained by the consumer. As a result, the access to the sports broadcasting, or streaming services granted to Plaintiff and the Class under the automatic renewal of continuous service agreements are deemed to be "unconditional gifts" under the ARL, says the complaint. The Plaintiff purchased a yearly FS Subscription ("FloGrappling") from the Defendant's Website while in California. The Defendant is a Texas-based subscription sports broadcaster and streaming service that, among other activities, streams live sporting events to audiences around the world.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: L. Timothy Fisher, Esq. BURSOR & FISHER, P.A. 1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 Phone: (925) 300-4455 Facsimile: (925) 407-2700 Email: ltfisher@bursor.com - and - Joseph I. Marchese, Esq. Alec M. Leslie, Esq. BURSOR & FISHER, P.A. New York, NY 10019 Phone: (646) 837-7150 Facsimile: (212) 989-9163 Email: jmarchese@bursor.com aleslie@bursor.com - and - Adrian Gucovschi, Esq. GUCOVSCHI ROZENSHTEYN, PLLC. 630 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 New York, NY 10111 Phone: (212) 884-4230 Facsimile: (212) 884-4230 Email: adrian@gr-firm.com G & A OUTSOURCING: Petrol Logic Files Suit in D. Colorado --------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against G&A Outsourcing LLC. The case is styled as Petrol Logic LLC, Ruby Canyon Dental Group PC, DC Dental PLLC doing business as: Fruita Family Dental, Crested Oak Dentistry PLLC, individually on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. G&A Outsourcing LLC doing business as: G&A Partners, Case No. 1:22-cv-02219-PAB (D. Colo., Aug. 29, 2022). The nature of suit is stated Other Contract for Breach of Contract. G&A Outsourcing, Inc. -- https://www.gnapartners.com/ -- provides human resources outsourcing and administrative services.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Patrick H Peluso, Esq. WOODROW & PELUSO, LLC 3900 East Mexico Avenue, Suite 300 Denver, CO 80210 Phone: (720) 213-0676 Fax: (303) 927-0898 Email: ppeluso@woodrowpeluso.com G.A.S. GLOBAL: Faces Herring Suit Over Unpaid Overtime Wages ------------------------------------------------------------ STUART HERRING, individually and for others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. G.A.S. GLOBAL SERVICES, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 4:22-cv-02841 (S.D. Tex., August 22, 2022) alleges the Defendant of violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Plaintiff, who is a Mechanical Commissioning Supervisor, asserts that he regularly worked 60 or more hours per week. However, rather receiving an overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times his regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek, the Defendant paid him straight time rate, says the Plaintiff. According to the complaint, there are numerous employees, who were also paid straight time for overtime while working for the Defendant. Thus, the Plaintiff brings this complaint as a collective action against the Defendant to recover all unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and costs, pre- and post-judgment interest, and all other relief to which he and other similarly situated employees may show themselves to be justly entitled. G.A.S. Global Services, LLC provides the energy industry with staffing solutions. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Michael A. Josephson, Esq. Andrew Dunlap, Esq. Richard M. Schreiber, Esq. JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LLP 11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050 Houston, TX 77046 Tel: (713) 352-1100 Fax: (713) 352-3300 E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com adunlap@mybackwages.com rschreiber@mybackwages.com - and – Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq. BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC 11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025 Houston, TX 77046 Tel: (713) 877-8788 Fax: (713) 877-8065 E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com GAME GOBLINS: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against Game Goblins, LLC. The case is styled as Christopher Loadholt, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Game Goblins, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-07367 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Game Goblins -- https://gamegoblins.com/ -- is Central Arkansas's premier retailer of Magic the Gathering, Pokémon, Warhammer 40K, Dungeons & Dragons, board games, card games, RPGs, dice, miniatures & hobby accessories.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Yitzchak Zelman, Esq. MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC 701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300 Asbury Park, NJ 07712 Phone: (845) 367-7146 Fax: (732) 298-6256 Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com GEORGIA: 11th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Crisp's Civil Complaint --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, SERGEANT NATHAN D. CRISP, Plaintiff-Appellant v. THE STATE OF GEORGIA, GWINNETT COUNTY, MS. TOOLE, Gwinnett County Assistant District Attorney, TUWANDA RUSH WILLIAMS, Gwinnett County Law Office, WARREN DAVIS, Gwinnett County Superior Court Judge, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 21-14190 (11th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirms the district court's dismissal of Crisp's complaint. Mr. Crisp, proceeding pro se, appeals following the dismissal of his civil complaint, which brought claims arising out of his arrest for impersonating a public officer or employee in violation of Ga. Code Ann. Section 16-10-23. On appeal, Crisp challenges: (1) the district court's dismissal of his action against Gwinnett County and the State of Georgia on sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds; and (2) the district court's dismissal of his action as to four remaining defendants for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, in part, based on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In 2017, Crisp was arrested by Gwinnett County, Georgia police officers for impersonating a public officer or employee and charged with violating Ga. Code Ann. Section 16-10-23. In 2018, a Gwinnett County grand jury indicted him for the same. The charges were brought by Daniel J. Porter, the former Gwinnett County District Attorney, and Assistant District Attorney Ramona Toole prosecuted the case. Crisp's case was assigned to Gwinnett County Superior Court Judge Warren Davis. While his criminal case was pending, Crisp sued Porter, Gwinnett County, and the officers who arrested him in federal court. The civil lawsuit, which alleged several constitutional violations, was assigned to United States District Court Judge Eleanor Ross, who stayed the civil case pending the outcome of Crisp's state court criminal case under the Younger abstention doctrine. Mr. Crisp later sought mandamus relief from the Supreme Court of Georgia, invoking the original jurisdiction of that Court. Assistant Attorney General Brittanie Browning from the Georgia Attorney General's Office represented Judge Davis before the Georgia Supreme Court. In this capacity, Browning wrote the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia and notified the Court of this representation and argued that the petition should be dismissed. The Georgia Supreme Court agreed and dismissed Crisp's petition for mandamus relief shortly thereafter. Mr. Crisp eventually entered into a negotiated guilty plea to the felony charge of impersonating an officer. Judge Laura Tate, who was sitting by designation for Judge Davis on the state trial court, sentenced Crisp under Georgia's First Offender Statute to three years of probation. After pleading guilty, Crisp brought the present pro se "Class Action" complaint in federal court, against 13 defendants: the State of Georgia; Gwinnett County; Judge Davis; Gwinnett County Assistant District Attorney Toole; Georgia Assistant Attorney General Browning; Porter, the former Gwinnett County District Attorney; Judge Ross; Tuwanda Rush Williams and David D. Pritchett of the Gwinnett County Law Office; Gwinnett County Magistrate Judge Kenneth A. Parker; Clerk of Gwinnett County Superior Court Richard Alexander; Judge Tate; and a Gwinnett County Magistrate Judge Keith Miles. The district court dismissed all of Crisp's claims. Relevant now, the district court dismissed his claims against the State of Georgia and Gwinnett County on the basis of sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity. As for four other defendants --Georgia Assistant Attorney General Browning, former Gwinnett County District Attorney Porter, Officer Williams and Judge Davis -- the district court dismissed his claims for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, in part, because Heck v. Humphrey and various immunities barred his action. The timely appeal follows. First, the Eleventh Circuit holds that the district court did not err in dismissing Crisp's claims against the State of Georgia and Gwinnett County on the basis of sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity. Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits by private individuals against a state in federal court unless the state has consented to be sued, has waived its immunity, or Congress has abrogated the state's immunity. The State of Georgia is afforded sovereign immunity from suit, which "can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the extent of such waiver." This sovereign immunity also applies to Georgia's counties. Nor did the district court err in dismissing Crisp's remaining claims against Defendants Browning, Williams, Davis or Porter for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A judge enjoys immunity for judicial acts even if she made a mistake, acted maliciously, or exceeded her authority. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for damages for activities that are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Government officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability for civil damages in Section 1983 actions "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." To the extent that any claims survive these immunities, the state-law claims against these Defendants were also barred by official immunity because Crisp did not plausibly allege that any of them acted with malice or an intent to injure him. Finally, the district court correctly concluded that any remaining federal claims were barred by qualified immunity. Crisp's complaint describes a relatively straightforward criminal prosecution, which, even if done with malice, does not violate clearly established law. Crisp does not, and could not, show that "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that this conduct was unlawful in this situation." Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit concludes that the district court properly dismissed Crisp's complaint in its entirety, and it affirms. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/muchbvxz from Leagle.com. GONSALVES & SANTUCCI: Rodriguez Suit Remanded to Superior Court --------------------------------------------------------------- Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, remands the case, ELMER N. RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff v. GONSALVES & SANTUCCI, INC., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-07874-LB (N.D. Cal.), to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Contra Costa. In this putative class action, the Plaintiff -- a construction worker -- sued his former employer in state court, claiming that employees routinely were not compensated for tasks that they had to complete before clocking in at the beginning of the day and after clocking out at the end of the day. This meant that the Plaintiffs were not paid the minimum wage, did not receive accurate wage statements, and were not paid all wages due on termination. In the initial complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that class members worked overtime hours because the Defendant made them work off the clock "by, among other things, failing to accurately track and/or pay for all minutes actually worked; engaging, suffering, or permitting employees to work off the clock, including, without limitation, by requiring employees: to make phone calls or drive off the clock; detrimental rounding of employee time entries, and editing and/or manipulation of time entries to show less minutes than actually worked." They also claimed an inability to take their meal and rest breaks. As a result, the Defendant did not pay employees the full wages due them on termination (including overtime and minimum wages and vacation pay), and their wage statements were inaccurate. The employer did not reimburse costs that employees incurred in (1) buying mandatory work uniforms, safety equipment, and tools, (2) laundering mandatory uniforms, and (3) using personal cell phones for work. The Defendant also had a policy of not paying employees with compensation at their final rate of pay for unused vested vacation pay. The complaint had the following claims: (1) failure to pay overtime pay (claim one); (2) failure to pay minimum wages (claim two); (3) failure to provide meal and rest breaks (claims three and four); (4) failure to pay all wages on termination (claim five); (5) failure to provide accurate wage statements (claim six); (6) failure to reimburse employees for necessary expenditures in violation of Cal. Labor Code Section 2802 (claim seven); (7) failure to pay vested vacation pay in violation of Cal. Labor Code Section 227.3 (claim eight); and (8) a violation of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Labor Code Section 17200, predicated on the underlying Labor Code violations (claim nine). The complaint did not mention the CBA or whether the Plaintiff invoked the dispute-resolution process. In the amended complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant caused class members to work off the clock by "failing to accurately track and/or pay for all minutes actually worked; engaging, suffering, or permitting the class members to work off the clock, including, without limitation, by requiring them: to come early to work and leave late from work without being able to clock in for all that time, to complete pre-shift tasks before clocking in and post-shift tasks after clocking out, to don and doff unforms and safety equipment off the clock, and/or go through temperature checks off the clock; detrimental rounding of time entries; and editing and/or manipulation of time entries to show less hours than actually worked." This resulted in "occasional pay periods where employees were not paid for all time worked." As a result, the Defendant did not pay class members the full wages due them on termination, and their wage statements were inaccurate. The FAC had the following claims: (1) failure to pay minimum wages in violation of Cal. Labor Code Section 1197; (2) failure to provide accurate wage statements in violation of Cal. Labor Code Section 226(a); (3) failure to pay all wages on termination in violation of Cal. Labor Code Section 201-02; and (4) unfair competition in violation of the UCL. The complaint again did not mention the CBA or whether the Plaintiff invoked the dispute-resolution process. The SAC adds new allegations to support the position that the claims arise under state law and do not depend on the CBA. It reiterates that the Plaintiff's minimum-wage claims "depend entirely on whether the time at issue constitutes compensable hours worked under the applicable state law," "do not arise in any manner from any CBA-based obligations," and "are based on a failure to compensate at all for certain hours worked by the Plaintiff and Class Members." The SAC defines the off-the-clock work exactly as the FAC defined it. The SAC has the following claims: (1) failure to pay minimum wages in violation of Cal. Labor Code Section 1197 and applicable Wage Orders; (2) failure to provide accurate wage statements in violation of Cal. Labor Code Section 226(a); (3) failure to pay all wages due on termination in violation of Cal. Labor Code Sections 201-02; and (4) unfair competition in violation of the UCL. The Plaintiff worked for the Defendant on construction projects from February 2020 to December 2020 and was a member of a CBA governing ironworkers' employment. The 2017 CBA covered July 1, 2017, to June 30, 2020, and the 2020 CBA covered July 1, 2020, to Dec. 31, 2024. The Defendant removed the case to federal court, asserting federal-question jurisdiction on the ground that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) preempts the claims. The Court previously dismissed two earlier complaints on the ground that the claims were preempted because they either (1) involved rights conferred directly by the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) or (2) substantially depended on the analysis and interpretation of the CBA. The Plaintiffs then filed the SAC, and the Defendant moved to dismiss it, again based on LMRA preemption. It moved to dismiss the SAC under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that (1) the claims are preempted by the LMRA, and (2) the Plaintiff was required to submit to the CBA's grievance procedures. First, Judge Beeler holds that there is no need to apply the CBA to resolve the claims because the Court can look only to state law. The minimum-wage claim thus is not preempted. To the extent that the defendant argued at the hearing that the CBA governs the entire employment relationship, including what work is compensable, that argument does not change the result. State law also governs what work is compensable, and that analysis does not depend on interpretation of the CBA. And, although a CBA can provide for different pay arrangements, id. (citing Cal. Labor Code Sections 201-04), the final-wages claim is predicated on a failure to pay minimum wages. Also, and as the Plaintiff contends, unlike the overtime and break claims, resolution of final-wages claims predicated on a failure to pay minimum wages does not depend on an analysis of the CBA. Next, the Defendant also contends that the Plaintiff did not exhaust the CBA's grievance procedures. The Plaintiff counters that the claims do not rely on the CBA and thus he does not need to raise the claims under the CBA's grievance procedures. Looking at the CBA's grievance procedures, and considering the briefing on the issue, nothing suggests a waiver of the employees' rights to a judicial forum as a prerequisite to seeking judicial relief. The waiver provisions in the CBA apply only to disputes arising out of the "meaning and enforcement" of the CBA. There is no waiver precluding the claims. Finally, because the LMRA does not preempt the remaining claims in the slimmed-down complaint, there is no subject-matter jurisdiction. Judge Beeler concludes that because the application of California law for the remaining claims does not depend on an analysis or interpretation of the CBA, the LMRA does not preempt the claims. She remands the case to the Contra Costa County Superior Court. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2rnu3xt4 from Leagle.com. GOOGLE LLC: $118M Settlement Proposed in Work Discrimination Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- topclassactions.com reports that Google agreed to pay $118 million to resolve claims it engaged in discrimination against female employees by paying them less than their male counterparts. The settlement benefits several California classes: The Equal Pay Act Class includes women who were hired into covered positions by Google in California between Sept. 14, 2013, and July 25, 2022 The FEHA Class includes women who were hired into covered positions by Google in California between Sept. 14, 2013, and Aug. 28, 2017, excluding college hires The PAGA Class includes women who were hired into covered positions by Google in California between June 14, 2021, and July 25, 2022. Google is a massive tech company responsible for the Google search engine and other ventures, such as YouTube. Employees at the company receive benefits such as insurance, wellness programs, retirement savings, time off and more. However, according to class action lawsuit allegations, Google may have discriminated against its female workers by paying them less than their male counterparts. Women hired by the company in California say they were paid less than the men they worked with despite having "comparable experience and education." There was allegedly no basis for this pay difference except gender. In addition, Google allegedly denied women the same opportunities for corporate advancement by giving them less-important projects to work on. "Google has known or should have known of this pay disparity between its female employees in Covered Positions and male employees performing substantially equal or substantially similar work, yet Google has taken no action to equalize its male and female employees' pay for substantially equal or substantially similar work," the Google discrimination class action lawsuit contends. Plaintiffs in the Google class action lawsuit claim these actions violated the California Equal Pay Act, Unfair and Unlawful Business Practices Act and Fair Employment and Housing Act. The class action also includes claims under California's Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). Google hasn't admitted any wrongdoing but agreed to resolve the class action lawsuit with a $118 million settlement. The company also agreed to settle individual plaintiff claims with a $200,000 settlement. Of the settlement, $1 million will be used to pay penalties to the California Labor Workforce Development Agency under PAGA. After these and other deductions, around $86 million is projected to be leftover to fund settlement payments. Payments to each class member will vary depending on their hire date, wages, time worked, class member status and other factors. Minimum payments of $250 will be allocated to class members hired after Jan. 1, 2022. For class members hired on or before Dec. 31, 2021, minimum payments are $500 for those who worked more than six months and $250 for those who worked less than six months. Additional compensation will vary. The deadline for exclusion and objection is Oct. 11, 2022. The final approval hearing for the Google pay discrimination settlement is scheduled for Oct. 24, 2022. No claim form is required to benefit from the settlement. Class Members who do not exclude themselves will automatically receive a settlement payment in the mail. Who's Eligible The settlement benefits several California classes: The Equal Pay Act Class includes women who were hired into covered positions by Google in California between Sept. 14, 2013, and July 25, 2022 The FEHA Class includes women who were hired into covered positions by Google in California between Sept. 14, 2013, and Aug. 28, 2017, excluding college hires The PAGA Class includes women who were hired into covered positions by Google in California between June 14, 2021, and July 25, 2022. Potential Award Varies Proof of Purchase No proof of purchase applicable Exclusion and Objection Deadline 10/11/2022 Case Name Ellis V. Google, LLC, Case No. CGC-17-561299, the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Francisco Final Hearing 10/24/2022 Settlement Website GoogleCAPaySettlement.com Claims Administrator Google CA Pay Settlement c/o JND Legal Administration PO BOX 91343 Seattle, WA 98111 Info@GoogleCAPaySettlement.com 888-681-2480 Class Counsel Kelly Dermody Anne Shaver LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN LLP James Finberg Eve Cervantez ALTSHULER BERZON LLP Defense Counsel PAUL HASTINGS LLP[GN] GOOGLE LLC: Faces Biometric Privacy Class Suit Over Face Blur Tool ------------------------------------------------------------------ lawstreetmedia.com reports that a YouTuber sued YouTube and parent company Google (together, YouTube), alleging that it surreptitiously collects, uses, and stores millions of Illinois residents' faces through use of its "Face Blur" tool. According to the complaint, 2012-launched Face Blur allows video uploaders to select faces in a video and blur them, making those faces unrecognizable to viewers. The filing claims that "[u]nbeknownst to the average consumer, Defendants' "Face Blur" tool relies on state-of-the-art facial recognition technology to scan videos, locate human faces, and create and store scans of face geometry." The complaint, using screenshots of the YouTube website, explains that YouTube permanently stores scans of facial geometry or biometric information so that YouTube users do not need to re-use the tool. In addition, the lawsuit points to YouTube's Thumbnail Generator, which creates thumbnail photographs of various points within a particular video to create a preview, mostly to generate views and in turn, revenue for YouTube. The plaintiffs claim it is evidence that YouTube has “a software program that has been trained to detect faces. . . [and] it is likely that the software is continually being optimized by gathering more facial geometry data from YouTube videos.” Consequently, the suit asserts that the Face Blur tool violates their privacy rights because YouTube fails to disclose its collection and storage of biometric information, and even if it did, "it would still be a legally insufficient disclosure to the individual whose image was captured and stored within the video." The suit states two claims for relief under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) and seeks statutory damages on behalf of the Illinois resident class. The plaintiff and putative class are represented by Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman PLLC and Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP. [GN] H&R FOODS INC: Serna Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. -------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against H&R Foods Inc., et al. The case is styled as Rachel Monique Serna, all others similarly situated, and the general public v. H&R Foods Inc., Hardeep Singh, Does 1-50Case No. 34-2022-00325937-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty., Aug. 29, 2022). The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited." H&R Foods -- https://www.handrfoods.com/ -- has consistently provided high quality Beef, Pork and Poultry. Family owned, H&R foods services nearly 200 independent food companies.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: David G. Spivak, Esq. THE SPIVAK LAW FIRM 16530 Ventura Blvd, Ste. 203 Encino, CA 91436-4535 Phone: 818-582-3086 Fax: 818-582-2561 Email: david@spivaklaw.com - and - Walter L Haines, Esq. UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP 5500 Bolsa Ave., Ste. 203 Huntington Beach, CA 92649-1102 Phone: 562-256-1047 Fax: 562-256-1006 Email: whaines@uelglaw.com HARDER MECHANICAL: $1.5MM Settlement in Ellis Suit Wins Prelim. Nod ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, GARY ELLIS, et al., Plaintiffs v. HARDER MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-00844-JSW (N.D. Cal.), Judge Jeffrey S. White of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California grants the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. The Plaintiffs bring the class action on behalf of current and former hourly-paid California employees of the Defendant. The first amended complaint alleges class claims based on allegations that the Defendant's wage policies and practices violated California Labor Code sections 201-203 and 1194. At mediation, the parties reached an agreement to resolve the action, and now the Plaintiffs seek preliminary approval of a proposed class action settlement. The Settlement Agreement defines "Class Members" as "all current and former hourly employees who worked for Defendant in California during the Class Period." The Class Period is May 1, 2016 through June 2, 2022. "Settlement Class Members" ("SCMs") are defined as "all Class Members who do not submit a valid Request for Exclusion." There are an estimated 2,200 Class Members. The Maximum Settlement Amount ("MSA") is $1.5 million plus the Defendant's share of payroll taxes. After subtracting fees and costs, the Net Settlement Amount is estimated to be $1,079,000. SCMs will receive individual settlement payments in an amount to be calculated by dividing the number of Qualified Shifts for each individual SCM by the total number of Qualified Shifts for all SCMs. The payment ratio for each SCM will then be multiplied by the Net Settlement Amount to calculate the SCM's share of the Net Settlement Amount. No gross individual settlement payment will be less than $25, and each SCM is expected to receive an average individual payment of $490.45. The Defendant has no reversionary interest in the MSA. Unclaimed funds will be sent to the State Controller's Office, Unclaimed Property Division. The proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement explains the terms of the Settlement, describes how Class Members can opt out or object, and gives the deadlines to do so. It will be individualized to provide each Class Member's number of Qualified Shifts and calculation of their estimated Individual Settlement Payment. It informs Class Members that they have 45 calendar days from the date the Notices are mailed to request exclusion from or object to the Settlement. The Notice explains the process to dispute the number of Qualified Shifts stated on their individualized Notice. Judge White concludes that preliminary certification of the class for settlement purposes is proper. Based on the record, he finds that the Settlement appears to the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations. He further finds that that proposed settlement falls within the range of possible final approval, has no obvious deficiencies, and does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of the class. Lastly, he finds the proposed manner of class notice satisfies the requirements of due process, and complies with applicable law, including Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. For the foregoing reasons, Judge White grants the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval. The action is provisionally certified as a class action, for settlement purposes only, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The settlement Class is defined as follows: "All current and former hourly employees who worked for Defendant in California during the Class Period." The Class Period is defined as May 1, 2016 through June 2, 2022, inclusive. Judge White preliminarily approves the proposed settlement as set forth in the Settlement Agreement as within the range of possible final approval. He preliminarily appoints (i) Keller Grover LLP and the Law Offices of Scot D. Bernstein, A Professional Corporation, as the Class Counsel; (ii) Jeff Shipe as the Class Representative for the settlement Class; and (iiii) Phoenix Settlement Administrators to serve as the Settlement Administrator and directs them to carry out all duties and responsibilities of the Settlement Administrator specified in the Settlement Agreement. No later than 28 calendar days after the Order is entered by the Court, and only after the Defendant receives sufficient and reasonable assurance that the Settlement Administrator will maintain the confidentiality of the Class Data, the Defendant will provide the Settlement Administrator with the Class Data. The Class Data will be formatted as a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and will include all of the following information: (i) each Class Member's full name; (ii) each Class Member's last-known address; (iii) each Class Member's Social Security and Employee ID numbers; and (iv) the number of shifts worked by each Class Member during the Class Period. The Settlement Administrator will be obligated to keep the Class Data confidential and will take reasonable and necessary precautions to maintain the confidentiality of the data. It will not distribute or use the Class Data or any information contained therein for any purpose other than to administer this settlement. Within 14 calendar days after receiving the Class Data, the Settlement Administrator will send Class Members, by first-class mail to their last known addresses, the Court-approved Notice. It will perform address updates and verifications as necessary prior to the first mailing. If any Notice is returned as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator will perform skip-traces on returned mail and will re-mail the Notices to updated addresses (if any) as soon as possible upon return of the undeliverable Notices. Class Members who wish to receive a settlement payment are not required to submit a claim form. Any Class Member who seeks exclusion from the Class must send a signed, written request to be excluded from the settlement via mail to the address specified in the Notice that must be postmarked no later than 45 calendar days after the date the Notice is first mailed by the Settlement Administrator. Any Class Member who seeks to object to the settlement must send a written statement of objection to the address specified in the Notice which must be postmarked no later than the Response Deadline. The Plaintiff will file the motion for final approval and motion applying for awards of attorneys' fees and costs, the Class Representative Incentive Awards and settlement administration costs no later than 35 days prior to the Response Deadline. The Final Approval Hearing will be held on Jan. 6, 2023, at 9:00 a.m., at 1301 Clay Street, Courtroom 5, 2nd Floor, in Oakland, California 94612. Pending the final determination of whether the settlement should be approved, all proceedings in the action, except as necessary to implement the settlement or comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement or the Order, are stayed. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/5ayd3hzr from Leagle.com. HEART OF IOWA MARKET: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ---------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Heart of Iowa Market Place, LLC. The case is styled as Jasmine Toro, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. Heart of Iowa Market Place, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-07364 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Heart of Iowa Market Place -- https://heartofiowamarketplace.com/ -- specialize in locally crafted and Iowa themed foods and gifts.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mars Khaimov, Esq. 10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor Forest Hills, NY 11375 Phone: (917) 915-7415 Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com HOMEAGLOW INC: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Costley Suit Alleges -------------------------------------------------------------- KIMBERLY COSTLEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HOMEAGLOW INC., Defendant, Case No. 22STCV27159 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., Aug. 22, 2022) seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Plaintiff Costley was employed by the Defendant as housekeeper. HOMEAGLOW INC. offers residential cleaning services. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Jean-Claude Lapuyade, Esq. Eduardo Garcia, Esq. Sydney Castillo Johnson, Esq. JCS LAW FIRM, APC 5440 Morehouse Drive, Suite 3600 San Diego, CA 92121 Telephone: (619) 599-8292 Facsimile: (619) 5998291 Email: jlapuyade@jcl-lawfirm.com egarcia@jcl-lawfirm.com scastillo@jcl-lawfirm.com INDIANAPOLIS NEUROSURGICAL: Gill Files Suit in S.D. Indiana ----------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Indianapolis Neurosurgical Group, P.C. The case is styled as Dylan Gill, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Indianapolis Neurosurgical Group, P.C. d/b/a Goodman Campbell Brain and Spine, Case No. 1:22-cv-01704-TWP-DLP (S.D. Ind., Aug. 26, 2022). The nature of suit is stated Other P.I. for Tort/Non-Motor Vehicle. Indianapolis Neurosurgical Group, P.C. doing business as Goodman Campbell Brain and Spine -- https://www.goodmancampbell.com/ -- is one of North America's largest and most progressive neurosurgical practices.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Cody Alexander Bolce, Esq. 555 12th Street, Suit # 1725 Ste Suit # 1725 Oakland, CA 94607 Phone: (510) 891-9800 Fax: (510) 891-7030 Email: cab@colevannote.com INSPIRED DESIGN: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York --------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Inspired Design, LLC. The case is styled as Christopher Loadholt, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Inspired Design, LLC d/b/a The Polish Pottery Outlet, Case No. 1:22-cv-07302 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 26, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Inspired Design, LLC doing business as The Polish Pottery Outlet -- https://polishpotteryoutlet.com/ -- is a strip-center showroom featuring a variety of signature & traditional patterns of Polish pottery.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Yitzchak Zelman, Esq. MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC 701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300 Asbury Park, NJ 07712 Phone: (845) 367-7146 Fax: (732) 298-6256 Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com IRBSEARCH LLC: Parker FCRA Suit Removed to M.D. Florida ------------------------------------------------------- The case styled as Tabitha Parker, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. IRBSearch, LLC, Case No. 22-CA-004980 was removed from the Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, to the U.S. District Court for Middle District of Florida on Aug. 29, 2022. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 8:22-cv-01988 to the proceeding. The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. IRBsearch -- https://www.irbsearch.com/ -- allows investigative professionals to search billions of records including: criminal records, bankruptcies, property, businesses, reverse phone lookup, employment, and many more.[BN] The Plaintiff appears pro se. The Defendants are represented by: Kathryn Lopez, Esq. COLE, SCOTT & KISSANE 4301 W. Boy Scout Blvd., Suite 400 Tampa, FL 33607 Phone: (813) 509-2621 Email: kathryn.lopez@csklegal.com IT GUYZ SOLUTIONS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Marshall Alleges -------------------------------------------------------------- EDDIE MARSHALL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. IT GUYZ SOLUTIONS, LLC; EDGEWATER INVESTMENTS, LLC; JOSEPH CHRISTOPHER RILEY; and KEITH OLINGER, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-00493-MWM (S.D. Ohio., Aug. 23, 2022) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid regular hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal and rest periods. Plaintiff Marshall was employed by the Defendants as technician. IT GUYZ SOLUTIONS, LLC is a computer service provider. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Matthew S. Okiishi, Esq. Stephen E. Imm, Esq. FINNEY LAW FIRM, LLC 4270 Ivy Pointe Blvd., Suite 225 Cincinnati, OH 45245 Telephone: (513) 943-6659 Facsimile: (513) 943-6669 Email: stephen@finneylawfirm.com matt@finneylawfirm.com JK MOSS ENTERPRISES: Jones Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ---------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against JK Moss Enterprises, LLC. The case is styled as Damon Jones, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. JK Moss Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-07356 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. JK Moss Enterprises, LLC doing business as Pickle Barrel Trading Post -- https://picklebarreltradingpost.com/ -- is a native american goods store in Globe, Arizona.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mars Khaimov, Esq. 10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor Forest Hills, NY 11375 Phone: (917) 915-7415 Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com KAISER FOUNDATION: Getubig Labor Suit Goes to N.D. California ------------------------------------------------------------- The case styled FAYE GETUBIG, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC. and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Case No. 22CV015742, was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on August 23, 2022. The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of California assigned Case No. 3:22-cv-04834-SK to the proceeding. The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violation of the California's Unfair Competition Law due to its failure to comply with federal law concerning COVID-19 testing requirements. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. is a non-profit health care organization, headquartered in California. [BN] The Defendant is represented by: John T. Brooks, Esq. Samuel Duimovich, Esq. SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP 501 W. Broadway, 19th Floor San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 338-6500 Facsimile: (213) 620-1398 E-mail: jbrooks@sheppardmullin.com sduimovich@sheppardmullin.com KARAN REALTY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Perez Suit Alleges ----------------------------------------------------------- NELSON PEREZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly-situated, Plaintiff v. KARAN REALTY ASSOCIATES, LLC; and WALTER BLACK, Defendants, Case No. 51637FBD-FAD7-4D76-9B22-704612 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 23, 2022) is an action against the Defendant for failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation, provide meals and rest periods, and provide accurate wage statements. Plaintiff Perez was employed by the Defendants as janitor. KARAN REALTY ASSOCIATES, LLC owns, operates, manages, and controls a multi-unit residential building located at Richmond Hill, New York. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Nolan K. Klein, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF NOLAN KLEIN 5550 Glades Road, Suite 500 Boca Raton, FL 33431 Telephone: (954) 745-0588 Email: klein@nklegal.com amy@nklegal.com melanie@nklegal.com KROGER CO: Coffee Creamer Does Not Contain Real Cream, Suit Says ---------------------------------------------------------------- Andy Nghiem at madisonrecord.com reports that an Illinois woman filed a class action lawsuit against Kroger, claiming the company's "coffee creamer" products don't contain any actual cream. Plaintiff Stacy Sumner filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois against The Kroger Co. citing violations of the state's Consumer Fraud Acts. The suit was filed through Spencer Sheehan of Sheehan & Associates PC in Great Neck, N.Y. The lawsuit alleges Kroger sells various products misleadingly labeled as "coffee creamer," which allegedly contain no actual dairy ingredients. She claims Kroger goes even further and puts the words "Ultra Pasteurized" on the label, which could lead consumers to expect that the products contain dairy ingredients. The plaintiff states that the list of ingredients on these products shows that they contain no actual dairy products and less than 1 percent of the milk derivative sodium caseinate. She adds that nowhere on the product is it labeled "non-dairy." Sumner claims she bought the product, believing it to contain actual dairy products. She claims she paid a higher price than she would have for similar products that are correctly labeled as "non-dairy coffee whiteners." According to the lawsuit, Kroger deceptively and fraudulently misrepresented the products in violation of the state's Consumer Fraud Acts. Sumner is demanding a jury trial to seek damages for herself and everyone in her class action lawsuit plus court costs, plus attorney fees and any other relief the court deems proper. She is also seeking injunctive action to order Kroger to cease from further misrepresentation of its products. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois case number 3:22-CV-01950 [GN] LATCH INC: Federman & Sherwood Discloses Securities Class Action ---------------------------------------------------------------- Federman & Sherwood discloses that on August 31, 2022, a class action lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Latch, Inc. f/k/a TS Innovation Acquisitions Corp. (NASDAQ: LTCH). The complaint alleges violations of federal securities laws, Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, including allegations of issuing a series of material or false misrepresentations to the market which had the effect of artificially inflating the market price during the Class Period, which is May 13, 2021 through August 25, 2022. To learn how to participate in this action, please visit: https://www.federmanlaw.com/blog/federman-sherwood-announces-filing-of-securities-class-action-lawsuit-against-latch-inc The lawsuit seeks to recover damages on behalf of all Latch, Inc. shareholders who purchased common stock during the Class Period. You may move the Court no later than October 31, 2022, to serve as a lead plaintiff on behalf of the Class. If you wish to join this action or obtain further information, please contact: Lacrista A. Bagley at lab@federmanlaw.com or visit the firm's website at www.federmanlaw.com. [GN] MAINLINE PRIVATE: Misclassifies Security Guards, Dennis Claims -------------------------------------------------------------- MICHAEL DENNIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MAINLINE PRIVATE SECURITY, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:22-cv-03339 (E.D. Penn., August 22, 2022) is a collective and class action complaint brought against the Defendant for its alleged failure to pay overtime compensation in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act. The Plaintiff began his employment with the Defendant in October 2018 as a Security Guard until his most recent assignment ended on or May 8, 2022. According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and other similarly situated security guards were misclassified by the Defendant as independent contractors. Despite regularly working more than 40 hours per week, the Defendant paid them only straight-time compensation without overtime pay. The Defendant allegedly failed to pay them overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek, says the suit. As a result of the Defendant's alleged unlawful practice, the Plaintiff and other similarly situated Security Guards have suffered damages. Thus, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated Security Guards, the Plaintiff seeks unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and all costs, pre- and post-judgment interest, and other relief as the Court may deem proper. Mainline Private Security, LLC provides security services. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Michael Murphy, Esq. Michael Groh, Esq. MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC Eight Penn Center, Suite 2000 1628 John F. Kennedy Blvd. Philadelphia, PA 19103 Tel: (267) 273-1054 Fax: (215) 525-0210 E-mail: murphy@phillyemploymentlawyer.com mgroh@phillyemploymentlawyer.com MAKING IT BIG: Maddy Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ---------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Making It Big, Inc. The case is styled as Veronica Maddy, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. Making It Big, Inc. d/b/a On The Plus Side, Case No. 1:22-cv-07369 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Making It Big, Inc. doing business as On The Plus Side -- https://www.ontheplusside.com/ -- designs and sells plus size clothing for women worldwide.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mars Khaimov, Esq. 10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor Forest Hills, NY 11375 Phone: (917) 915-7415 Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com MAMAN GROUP: Underpays Restaurant Employees, Torres Suit Alleges ---------------------------------------------------------------- ALEJANDRO TORRES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MAMAN GROUP NEW YORK CORP., MAMAN TRIBECA, LLC, and "JOHN DOES I-V", Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-05029 (E.D.N.Y., August 24, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law including failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide wage notices, failure to provide accurate wage statements, and failure to pay spread-of-hours pay. The Plaintiff was employed as a general manager and waiter at the Defendants' cafe known as Maman, located at 211 West Broadway, New York, New York from on or around March 2022 through and including July 2022. Maman Group New York Corp. is a restaurant owner and operator, with its principal place of business at 211 West Broadway, New York, New York. Maman Tribeca, LLC is a restaurant owner and operator, with its principal place of business at 211 West Broadway, New York, New York. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Joshua Levin-Epstein, Esq. Jason Mizrahi, Esq. LEVIN-EPSTEIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4700 New York, NY 10165 Telephone: (212) 792-0046 E-mail: Joshua@levinepstein.com MDL 2913: Causes Youth E-Cigarette Crisis, Mammoth-San Suit Says ---------------------------------------------------------------- MAMMOTH-SAN MANUEL UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., ALTRIA GROUP, INC., PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES, LLC, ALTRIA GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, JAMES MONSEES, ADAM BOWEN, NICHOLAS PRITZKER, HOYOUNG HUH, and RIAZ VALANI, Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-04821 (N.D. Cal., August 23, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross negligence, and violations of Public Nuisance Law and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and public health crisis, says the suit. Mammoth-San Manuel Unified School District case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2913, IN RE: JUUL LABS, INC. MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge William H. Orrick. Mammoth-San Manuel Unified School District is a unified school district with its offices located at 711 McNab Parkway in San Manuel, Arizona. JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: James Frantz, Esq. William B. Shinoff, Esq. FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC 402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 233-5945 Facsimile: (619) 525-7672 E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com MDL 2913: Entices Youth to Use E-Cigarette, Fast Forward Alleges ---------------------------------------------------------------- FAST FORWARD CHARTER HIGH SCHOOL, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., ALTRIA GROUP, INC., PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES, LLC, ALTRIA GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, JAMES MONSEES, ADAM BOWEN, NICHOLAS PRITZKER, HOYOUNG HUH, and RIAZ VALANI, Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-04820 (N.D. Cal., August 23, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross negligence, and violations of Public Nuisance Law and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and public health crisis, says the suit. Fast Forward Charter High School case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2913, IN RE: JUUL LABS, INC. MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge William H. Orrick. Fast Forward Charter High School is a charter high school with its offices located at 875 W. 1400 N. in Logan, Utah. JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: James Frantz, Esq. William B. Shinoff, Esq. FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC 402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 233-5945 Facsimile: (619) 525-7672 E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com MDL 2913: Faces Bridge Creek Suit Over Deceptive E-Cigarette Ads ---------------------------------------------------------------- BRIDGE CREEK PUBLIC SCHOOLS, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., ALTRIA GROUP, INC., PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES, LLC, ALTRIA GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, JAMES MONSEES, ADAM BOWEN, NICHOLAS PRITZKER, HOYOUNG HUH, and RIAZ VALANI, Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-04819 (N.D. Cal., August 23, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross negligence, and violations of Public Nuisance Law and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and public health crisis. Bridge Creek Public Schools case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2913, IN RE: JUUL LABS, INC. MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge William H. Orrick. Bridge Creek Public Schools is a unified school district with its offices located at 2209 East Spooner Road in Blanchard, Oklahoma. JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: James Frantz, Esq. William B. Shinoff, Esq. FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC 402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 233-5945 Facsimile: (619) 525-7672 E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com MDL 2913: Faces Okarche Public Suit Over Youth E-Cigarette Crisis ----------------------------------------------------------------- OKARCHE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL LABS, INC., ALTRIA GROUP, INC., PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES, LLC, ALTRIA GROUP DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, JAMES MONSEES, ADAM BOWEN, NICHOLAS PRITZKER, HOYOUNG HUH, and RIAZ VALANI, Defendants, Case No. 3:22-cv-04818 (N.D. Cal., August 23, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for negligence, gross negligence, and violations of Public Nuisance Law and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. According to the complaint, the Defendants used three tactics to maintain market dominance in the cigarette industry: (1) product design to maximize addiction, (2) mass deception, and (3) targeting of youth. Defendants JUUL Labs and Adam Bowen designed an e-cigarette device allegedly intended to create and sustain addiction, but without the stigma associated with cigarettes and promoted them to vulnerable young population. JUUL Labs and other Defendants developed and implemented a marketing scheme to mislead users into believing that JUUL products contained less nicotine than they actually do and were healthy and safe. The Defendants enticed newcomers to nicotine with kid-friendly flavors without ensuring the flavoring additives were safe for inhalation. The Defendants targeted the youth market by placing vaporized campaigns on youth-oriented websites and media and using influencers and affiliates to amplify their message to a teenage audience. The Defendants have successfully caused more young people to start using e-cigarettes, creating a youth e-cigarette epidemic and public health crisis, says the suit. Okarche Public Schools case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2913, IN RE: JUUL LABS, INC. MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge William H. Orrick. Okarche Public Schools is a unified school district with its offices located at 632 West Oklahoma Ave in Okarche, Oklahoma. JUUL Labs, Inc., formerly known as Pax Labs, Inc., is an American electronic cigarette company, with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. Altria Group, Inc. is a producer of tobacco products, with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. Philip Morris USA, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Altria Group, Inc., with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. Altria Client Services LLC is a tobacco company, with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. Altria Group Distribution Company is a tobacco company, with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: James Frantz, Esq. William B. Shinoff, Esq. FRANTZ LAW GROUP, APLC 402 W. Broadway, Ste. 860 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 233-5945 Facsimile: (619) 525-7672 E-mail: jpf@frantzlawgroup.com wshinoff@frantzlawgroup.com MILWAUKEE, WI: Class Settlement in Kraai Suit Wins Prelim. Approval ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, KARL H. KRAAI, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CITY OF MILWAUKEE, Defendant, Case No. 20-CV-909 (E.D. Wis.), Magistrate Judge William E. Duffin of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin grants the parties' Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, Certification of a Rule 23 Class, and Certification of a Collective Action. Preliminary approval of the parties' Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims is granted as the Court finds that the settlement terms negotiated by the Parties and described in the Settlement Agreement are a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute between the Defendant and all affected employees and other persons who performed production work for it during the relevant timeframes at the relevant facilities. The Plaintiff's Rule 23 class is certified for settlement purposes pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The class is defined as follows: "All persons who are or have been employed by the City of Milwaukee as non-FLSA-exempt employees of the Milwaukee Fire Department engaged in fire protection activities, within two (2) years prior to May 8, 2020, and who allege they have not been fully compensated for all hours worked in excess of two hundred four (204) hours per twenty-seven (27) day work period based upon an undercalculation of the regular rate." Karl Kraai will serve as the representative and the law firm of MacGillis Wiemer, LLC is appointed as the class counsel for the certified Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 class. Judge Duffin certifies the case as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) with respect to the following collective: "All persons who are or have been employed by the City of Milwaukee as non-FLSA-exempt employees of the Milwaukee Fire Department engaged in fire protection activities, within three (3) years prior to May 8, 2020, and who allege they have not been fully compensated for all hours worked in excess of two hundred four (204) hours per twenty-seven (27) day work period based upon an undercalculation of the regular rate." Judge Duffin approves the Notice of Class Action and Collective Action Settlement and Consent and Claim Form. Such notice will be mailed within 10 days of the date of the Order. Each potential Class Member who wishes to be excluded from the Settlement Class must opt-out per the instructions set forth in the Notice, and any such responses must be received within 60 days of the mailing of the Notice. Any Class Member who has not properly and timely requested exclusion from the Settlement Class will be bound in the event the Court issues a final order approving the Settlement Agreement. The Court will conduct a Fairness Hearing on Dec. 20, 2022, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 242, United States Courthouse, 517 E. Wisconsin Avenue, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The Class Counsel will file a Petition for Approval of Attorneys' Fees and Costs at least 21) days prior to the Fairness Hearing, which will not exceed $400,000. Any supplemental brief in support of final approval of the Settlement Agreement or in response to any objections to the application for attorneys' fees is to be filed at least seven days before the Fairness Hearing. The Court will determine at the Fairness Hearing in what amount attorneys' fees and reimbursement of costs and expenses should be awarded to the Class Counsel. Any Class Member who wishes to object in any way to the proposed Settlement Agreement must file and serve such written objections per the instructions set forth in the Notice no later than 60 days after the mailing of the Notice, together with copies of all papers in support of his or her position. The Court will not consider objections of any Class Member who has not properly served copies of his or her objections on a timely basis. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p4sxtuj from Leagle.com. MIRAMED REVENUE: Mitchell Sues Over Illegal Biometric Collection ---------------------------------------------------------------- CALISHA MITCHELL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MIRAMED REVENUE GROUP, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2022LA000760 (Cir., DuPage Cty., Il., Aug. 23, 2022) alleges violation of the Biometric Information Privacy Act. The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendant has not properly informed employees in writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is being captured, obtained, collected or stored; informed employees in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, stored, and used; obtained employees' proper written consent to the capture, collection, obtainment or storage of their biometric identifier and biometric information derived from it; or obtained employees' executed written release as a condition of employment in violation of BIPA. MIRAMED REVENUE GROUP, LLC was founded in 2008. The company's line of business includes home health care services. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Brandon M. Wise, Esq. Paul A. Lesko, Esq. Adam Florek, Esq. PEIFFER WOLF CARR KANE CONWAY & WISE, LLP 818 Lafayette Ave., Floor 218 St. Louis, MO 63104 Telephone: (314) 833-4825 Email: bwise@peifferwolf.com plesko@peifferwolf.com aflorek@peifferwolf.com MISSOURI: Court Denies Pate's Bid to Intervene in Parton v. White ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, MICHAEL PARTON, et al., Plaintiffs v. CARL WHITE, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:81-cv-19-DDN (E.D. Mo.), Magistrate Judge David D. Noce of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Northern Division, issued an order: a. denying Movant Jermaine Cortez Pate's motions to intervene; to reopen and enforce the consent decree entered on Dec. 8, 1983; for injunctive relief; and for the appointment of counsel; and b. denying as moot the Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The case was originally filed on May 11, 1981, by three inmates at what was then called the Missouri Training Center for Men, now named the Moberly Correctional Center. The Plaintiffs alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement, largely related to overcrowding. The action was then conditionally maintained as a class action, and an amended complaint was filed on April 15, 1983. On Dec, 8, 1983, the parties entered into a consent decree, which was approved by the Court on Dec. 30, 1983. Though the case was administratively closed with the approval of the consent decree, the Court actively monitored the conditions at the prison through January 1998, occasionally sustaining the Defendants' motions for modification of the decree while requiring them to file periodic compliance reports. Prior to the motions presently before the Court, the case had been inactive since May 2001. On Feb. 18, 2022, the Movant filed a motion to intervene and to enforce the consent decree, stating that the original plaintiffs are "no longer available." He alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement, including food service violations; an unsafe work environment; inadequate health care; and inadequate living conditions. From March 15 to May 20, 2022, he filed additional motions to reopen the consent decree proceedings; to enforce the consent decree and for sanctions for breach of the decree; for an injunction to prevent his transfer to another institution; for modification of the consent decree and injunctive relief; and to appoint counsel. The Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on June 3, 2022. The Movant has also filed in the Court a separate complaint regarding the same issues, which the Court construed as an attempt to litigate the consent decree in the case -- Pate v. White, No. 2:22-CV-006 RLW, 2022 WL 2802308 at *3 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2022). The Court dismissed that action without prejudice. Judge Noce first considers the Plaintiff's motions to intervene and reopen the consent decree. In their motion to dismiss, the Defendants argue that the Movant, as a non-party, lacks standing to enforce the consent decree. They also argue that the Plaintiff's motion for an injunction preventing his transfer should be denied, as it fails under the Dataphase factors. As to standing, Judge Noce concludes that the Movant does not have standing to intervene and reopen the consent decree. Because his complaint in Pate v. White, No. 2:22-CV-006 RLW, was dismissed without prejudice, he may file a separate action to challenge allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the Moberly Correctional Center. The Movant seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent his transfer to another prison, contending that the Defendants plan to transfer him in retaliation for his efforts to reopen the consent decree. He additionally seeks injunctive relief for the remediation of allegedly inadequate living conditions. In Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981), in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the Court must consider four factors: "(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; (3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest." Judge Noce finds that none of the four factors is determinative, and each must be examined "in the context of the relative injuries to the parties and the public." However, "the absence of a likelihood of success on the merits strongly suggests that preliminary injunctive relief should be denied." A request for injunctive relief in the prison context must be viewed with caution because "judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration." In his "verified petition for preliminary and permanent injunction," the Movant states that he recently received a conduct violation report due to an unauthorized relationship with staff. He alleges that the "conduct violation is due to him reopening the consent decree" and that the Defendants intend to use the conduct violation report to transfer him to another facility as pretext for retaliation. Judge Noce construes the request for injunctive relief as a claim of retaliatory transfer. Though an inmate may be transferred from one prison to another for a constitutionally permissible reason or no reason at all, prison officials may not punish an inmate because he exercises his constitutional right of access to the courts. The Movant's request for injunctive relief provides few details beyond his conclusory assertions. He does not state when the transfer will occur, nor does he provide information about the conduct violation report. It is also unclear from the motion whether his conduct violation was a product of the present litigation or whether the violation report was prepared as retaliation. The Movant has failed to carry his substantial burden to prove that the motivating factor for his possible transfer is retaliation. He is therefore unlikely to succeed on the merits of a retaliatory transfer claim. Transfer in retaliation for challenging the conditions of his confinement would constitute irreparable harm to movant, as his transfer to another facility would render his claims moot. However, the remaining factors, the balance of harms and the public interest, weigh in favor of the Defendants. The Movant is unlikely to succeed on the merits, so there is no public interest in enjoining his transfer. Moreover, injunctive relief would harm defendants, as it would interfere with the complex task of prison administration. The Movant seeks an injunction requiring defendants to remediate "inadequate living conditions," including asbestos, poor air and water quality, food handling violations, vermin, lead-based paint hazards, and structural damage. Judge Noce construes the Movant's allegations as challenges to his conditions of confinement under the Eighth Amendment. He says, all of the Dataphase factors weigh in favor of denying the motion for injunctive relief. The Movant does not have standing to litigate the consent decree, so he cannot succeed on the merits in the action. Additionally, the Court is without sufficient information to determine whether the conditions alleged by movant constitute irreparable harm to him. While it is in the public interest to protect his constitutional rights, he cannot succeed on the merits, so there is no public interest in granting injunctive relief. Finally, injunctive relief would harm defendants in that it would interfere with prison administration. Because the Movant has failed to carry his burden, Judge Noce denies his motions for injunctive relief without prejudice to their refiling in a separate action. For the reasons he set forth, Judge Noce denies with prejudice the motions of Pate to intervene and to reopen the proceedings. He denies without prejudice Pate's motions for injunctive relief. He denies as moot Pate's motions to enforce the consent decree, to modify the consent decree, and for appointment of counsel. Judge Noce denies as moot the Defendants' motion to dismiss. An appropriate Judgment Order is issued therewith. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Memorandum & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/7habrc9r from Leagle.com. MJC ACQUISITION: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ----------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against MJC Acquisition, LLC. The case is styled as Andrew Toro, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. MJC Acquisition, LLC d/b/a Matilda Jane Clothing, Case No. 1:22-cv-07354 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. MJC Acquisition LLC doing business as Matilda Jane Clothing -- https://www.matildajaneclothing.com/ -- provides online clothing distribution services. The Company offers dresses, tops, bottoms, skirts, and other accessories.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mars Khaimov, Esq. 10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor Forest Hills, NY 11375 Phone: (917) 915-7415 Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com MONA LISA PIZZERIA: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Gomez Claims ------------------------------------------------------------- The case, JUAN CARLOS GOMEZ, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MONA LISA PIZZERIA, INC., a New Jersey corporation, and CHRISTOPHER COCCHI, an individual, Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-05146 (D.N.J., August 22, 2022) arises from the Defendants' alleged willful and intentional violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, and the New Jersey Wage Payment Law. The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants from approximately March 2020 through November 2020 as a general assistant, whose job included cleaning, washing dishes, preparing ingredients, and any other task or job that he was assigned at any given time. Throughout his employment with the Defendants, the Plaintiff was paid at the rate of $12.00 per hour for each hour worked and in cash, but with no pay stubs provided. The Plaintiff was never any raises during the term of his employment. Despite working more than 40 hours per week, the Defendants failed to pay him any overtime premium at the rate of one and one-half times his regular rates of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek, says the Plaintiff. As a result of the Defendants' alleged unlawful practice, the Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were harmed and damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. Thus, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated employees, the Plaintiff brings this complaint as a collective action seeking to recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, post-judgment interest, litigation costs together with reasonable attorneys' fees, and other relief as the Court deems necessary and proper. Mona Lisa Pizzeria, Inc. operates a restaurant. Christopher Cocchi is the owner of the Corporate Defendant. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Erik M. Bashian, Esq. BASHIAN & PAPANTONIOU, P.C. 500 Old Country Road, Suite 302 Garden City, NY 11530 Tel: (516) 279-1554 Fax: (516) 213-0339 E-mail: eb@bashpaplaw.com - and – Nolan Klein, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF NOLAN KLEIN, P.A. 5550 Glades Road, Suite 500 Boca Raton, FL 33431 Tel: (954) 745-0588 E-mail: klein@nklegal.com amy@nklegal.com melanie@nklegal.com MULTICARE HEALTH: Wash. App. Affirms Summary Judgment in M.N. Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case, M.N. and G.T., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellants, A.B. and W.N., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs Below v. MULTICARE HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., a Washington corporation, Respondents, Case No. 55288-4-II (Wash. App.), the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two, affirms the superior court's order granting summary judgment for MultiCare and dismissing the General Treatment Class' negligence claims. In 2018, an investigation was conducted relating to two patients who were diagnosed with Hepatitis C infections despite having no risk factors for the infection. The investigation revealed that a nurse, Cora Weberg, was diverting drugs from the emergency department for her own use. Weberg's drug diversion caused the Hepatitis C infections. MultiCare identified a total of 2,985 patients who were treated with certain drugs in the emergency department while Weberg was working. Weberg treated 208 of the identified patients. The remaining 2,554 patients had no record of being treated by Weberg. MultiCare notified 2,762 patients who were treated in the emergency department while Weberg was working that they may be at risk of infection and instructed the patients to get tested for Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C, and the Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus (HIV). The notification letter stated that an employee "may have exposed at least two patients to Hepatitis C." It offered free testing and any related follow-up for Hepatitis and HIV for all patients who were treated with injections in the emergency department while Weberg was working. After receiving MultiCare's notification letter, patients "who were subject to both actual and potential Hepatitis C exposure" filed a class action lawsuit against MultiCare, alleging a violation of chapter 7.70 RCW and corporate negligence. The complaint alleged that MultiCare negligently hired, trained, and supervised Weberg; failed to investigate Weberg and the misuse of drugs; and failed to implement or follow policies and procedures regarding proper medication management. The complaint asserted that, as a result of MultiCare's negligence, the class members incurred the need for necessary medical care, treatment, and services received as of the filing of this action and with reasonable probability to be required in the future; have incurred inconvenience and loss of time associated with such medical care, treatment, and services; suffered serious emotional distress, including but not limited to living with the knowledge that they could have or potentially will contract a bloodborne pathogen disease, such as Hepatitis C. The superior court granted class certification and certified two classes. The "'Weberg Treatment Class'" included the patients who received treatment from Weberg. The "'General Treatment Class" included the patients who were in the emergency department and received MultiCare's notification letter but did not receive any treatment from Weberg. M.N. and G.T. were appointed class representatives for the General Treatment Class. The court created two classes to eliminate "any concern that patients not directly treated by Nurse Weberg may not be entitled to relief under the same cause of action" as those patients directly treated by Weberg. MultiCare moved for summary judgment for all claims asserted by the General Treatment Class. It argued that that the injuries alleged by the General Treatment Class were not proximately caused by the alleged negligent acts because the class members suffered no actual exposure. In opposing summary judgment, the General Treatment Class argued that it was owed a duty under chapter 7.70 RCW and corporate negligence. Further, the General Treatment Class argued that they were not required to show actual exposure to Hepatitis C in order to establish its claims. The superior court granted MultiCare's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the claims alleged by the General Treatment Class against MultiCare. M.N. and G.T. moved for reconsideration of the superior court's order granting summary judgment to MultiCare, which the superior court denied. M.N. and G.T. appeal. M.N. and G.T. argue that MultiCare's negligence was the proximate cause of the General Treatment Class's injuries. MultiCare argues that the General Treatment Class has failed to establish legal causation and, therefore, failed to establish proximate cause. The Court of Appeals finds that there appears to be no bright-line rule regarding the requirement of actual exposure to establish proximate cause. Rather, proximate cause for claims based on damages resulting from the risk of contracting an infectious disease, which is the basis of the General Treatment Class' claims, appears to be resolved based on a determination of legal causation -- where to draw a line regarding liability based on policy considerations. M.N. and G.T. also argue that the General Treatment Class has established legal causation because, as a matter of policy, MultiCare should be held accountable for its actions. Specifically, they assert that "forcing the innocent members of the General Treatment Class to bear the burden for the emotional distress, inconvenience, and physical harm from invasive testing caused by MultiCare's negligence would run afoul of the basic and guiding principle of the law of torts: To afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as a result of the tortious conduct of another." MultiCare asserts that M.N. and G.T. have failed to establish legal causation because any damages from Weberg's conduct are too attenuated and policy considerations do not support extending liability for the direct consequences of the notification letter to the General Treatment Class. In weighing the policy considerations, the Court of Appeals is persuaded that the policy of encouraging medical institutions to be open, transparent, and overinclusive outweighs the General Treatment Class' fear of contracting a communicable disease caused by MultiCare's notification letter. Accordingly, it holds that the General Treatment Class has failed to establish legal causation. Because the General Treatment Class has failed to establish proximate cause as a matter of law, the superior court properly granted summary judgment and dismissed their claims. The Court of Appeals affirms the superior court's order granting summary judgment. A majority of the panel having determined that the Opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, the Court of Appeals so ordered. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/489umd4p from Leagle.com. Cari Campen Laufenberg -- claufenberg@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback L.L.P., 1201 3rd Ave Ste 3200, Seattle, WA, 98101-3052, Jeff Nicholas Comstock, Attorney at Law, 8018 Linden Ave N, Seattle, WA, 98103-4340, Counsel for the Appellant(s). Joseph Vickers Gardner, Attorney at Law, 701 5th Ave Ste 4750, Seattle, WA, 98104-7089, Michele Christine Forrar Atkins -- michele@favros.com -- Fain Anderson Et Al, 701 5th Ave Ste 4750, Seattle, WA, 98104-7089, Todd Wesley Reichert -- todd@favros.com -- Fain Anderson, Et Al, 701 5th Ave Ste 4750, Seattle, WA, 98104-7089, Amanda Kathleen Thorsvig -- amanda@favros.com -- Fain Anderson, Et Al, 1301 A St Ste 900, Tacoma, WA, 98402-4299, Counsel for the Respondent(s). MYLAN N.V.: Partially Compelled to Reply to KPH's FRPs of Documents ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, KPH HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., a/k/a KINNEY DRUGS INC., FWK HOLDINGS LLC, and CESAR CASTILLO, LLC, individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. MYLAN, N.V., MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC., MYLAN SPECIALTY L.P., PFIZER, INC., KING PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., and MERIDIAN MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 2:20-cv-02065-DDC-TJJ (D. Kan.), Magistrate Judge Teresa J. James of the U.S. District Court for the District Kansas grants in part and denies in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' First Requests for Production of Documents. On Nov. 25, 2021, following Mylan's production to the Plaintiffs of the documents the Defendants had produced in the MDL, the Plaintiffs served their First Set of Document Requests to Mylan. In conjunction with these requests, they have identified four new custodians and 18 new search strings, and have asked Mylan to produce documents created after 2016, which was the cutoff for Mylan's document production in the MDL. Mylan has declined these requests. In addition to seeking an order compelling Mylan to comply with their discovery requests, the Plaintiffs challenge certain entries on Mylan's MDL privilege log. The Plaintiffs recount the parties' efforts to resolve their differences through numerous meetings and exchanges of letters over several weeks. Mylan's response also refers to the parties' communications. Ultimately, the Plaintiffs were not satisfied with Mylan's responses and this motion followed. The Plaintiffs contend that Mylan has agreed to search for and produce only a narrow subset of the 12 categories of documents Plaintiffs have requested. Mylan objected to any further production on grounds of duplicity, burdensomeness, and proportionality. After conferring, the Plaintiffs requested Mylan add four new records custodians and apply search terms to capture and produce documents created after Aug. 23, 2016. Mylan rejected the request on the basis that requiring searches of these individuals' files would not yield unique results and would be burdensome and disproportional to the needs of the case. The Plaintiffs also asked Mylan to apply certain MDL search terms and 18 new search strings to existing and newly collected documents that they contend are relevant to the claims or issues in the case. Mylan rejected the proposal, asserting the Plaintiffs had not tied those search terms to the pending discovery requests. It also declined to agree to produce documents created after 2016, asserting it has produced relevant responsive documents and the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a justifiable basis for the request. The Plaintiffs deny Mylan has provided information regarding the size, scope, or actual burden associated with complying with Plaintiffs' requests. The Plaintiffs also challenge certain entries on Mylan's privilege log which it first produced in the MDL and has provided to them. They contend Mylan has not met its burden to show that communications between Mylan and Pfizer before July 2013 satisfy the "common interest doctrine" as it relates to the Teva patent and other patent litigations. Mylan disagrees, asserting it and Pfizer have substantially identical legal interests in protecting the validity and enforceability of the EpiPen patents. In addition, the Plaintiffs allege Mylan's privilege log makes an insufficient showing that certain communications were made for the purpose of seeking or giving legal advice. Mylan disagrees. There is no dispute that Mylan has produced to the Plaintiffs its entire MDL production. But that production, while unquestionably extensive, was never intended to supplant original discovery. Accordingly, after the Plaintiffs reviewed the MDL production, they served a first set of requests for production of documents on Mylan. The following areas of dispute remain following the parties' efforts to narrow and resolve their differences. First, as to whether the Defendants must produce documents through the present, Judge James holds that seeking documents to the present does not make these requests overly broad, nor are they disproportionate to the needs of the case. She grants the Plaintiffs' motion insofar as it seeks an order requiring Mylan to search for and produce relevant and responsive documents through the present, except for those categories they have noted. Next, as to whether Mylan's ESI search will include new custodians and search terms. The Plaintiffs have asked Mylan to expand its ESI search by adding four custodians and applying search terms not used in the MDL production. Judge James finds that (i) the Plaintiffs logically assert that just because some communications involving Ms. Brooks appear in custodial files of other Mylan witnesses does not mean she has no relevant communications; (ii) Joseph Carrado, the former Vice President, Clinical and Regulatory Affairs and voting member of the Joint Commercial Committee designed to streamline distribution of EpiPen products, should also be added as a custodian; (iii) Ron Graybill, former Vice President of Managed Markets and member of Mylan's EpiPen pricing committee, is a proper custodian; and (iv) Satish Medakkar, former Vice President, Head of Global Commercial Analytics & Insight, is also a proper custodian. She further finds that (i) she overrules Mylan's objection that the search terms are overbroad or duplicative of prior MDL requests and productions; (ii) she denies the motion on the basis that four of the proposed search strings are not tethered to the Plaintiffs' RFPs; and (iii) she overrules Mylan's claim of undue burden. Lastly, as to whether Mylan has waived privilege over certain documents, the Plaintiffs raise two challenges to Mylan's privilege log. The first is whether Mylan waived privilege by sharing attorney-client communications with Pfizer, and the second is whether Mylan adequately supported its asserted privilege in certain entries. Judge James finds Mylan must produce the Mylan-Pfizer communications and documents dated or exchanged before July 1, 2013, and previously withheld on grounds of attorney-client privilege and the common interest doctrine. And as Mylan points out, the privilege log was the end product of painstaking document reviews and negotiations among the MDL parties with much court supervision. Without further discussion, Judge James denies the Plaintiffs' motion with respect to its claim that Mylan has waived privilege objections for the 1,493 documents at issue. Based on the parties' efforts, Judge James finds they have complied with the requirements of D. Kan. R. 37.2. She grants in part and denies in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' First Requests for Production of Document. Specifically, the motion is (1) granted insofar as it seeks an order requiring Mylan to search for and produce relevant and responsive documents through the present, except for those categories the Plaintiffs have noted; (2) granted insofar as it seeks an order requiring Mylan is to collect documents from Joseph Carrado, Satish Medakkar, Kim Brooks, and Ron Graybill; (3) granted insofar as it seeks an order requiring Mylan to apply the search strings proposed by the Plaintiffs; (4) granted insofar as it seeks an order requiring Mylan to produce documents shared between Pfizer and Mylan that were created before July 2013 and appear on its privilege log; and (5) denied insofar as it seeks an order requiring Mylan to produce the 1,493 documents on its privilege log described by the Plaintiffs. Mylan will produce responsive documents within 30 days of the date of the Order. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Memorandum & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/4664nvbz from Leagle.com. NES GLOBAL: Fails to Pay Overtime Pay, Amin Suit Alleges -------------------------------------------------------- SACHIN AMIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NES GLOBAL, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 4:22-cv-02845 (S.D. Tex., Aug. 22, 2022) is an action brought under the California Labor Code and the California's Unfair Competition Law against the Defendant for its failure to pay the Plaintiff and the class overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. Plaintiff Amin was employed by the Defendant as instrument designer. NES GLOBAL TALENT FINANCE US LLC provides professional services. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Michael A. Josephson, Esq. Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq. Carl A. Fitz, Esq. JOSEPHSON DUNLAP, LLP 11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050 Houston, TX 77046 Telephone: (713) 352-1100 Facsimile: (713) 352-3300 Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com adunlap@mybackwages.com cfitz@mybackwages.com - and - Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq. BRUCKNER BURCH, PLLC 11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025 Houston, TX 77046 Telephone: (713) 877-8788 Facsimile: (713) 877-8065 Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com NEW JERSEY: Amended Carmona Suit v. NJDOE Dismissed W/o Prejudice ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, JENNICA CARMONA, et al., Plaintiffs v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 21-18746 (D.N.J.), Judge John Michael Vazquez of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey grants the Defendants' motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint and denies their motion for sanctions. The Plaintiffs, parents of 15 special needs children, initiated the putative class action against the New Jersey Department of Education ("NJDOE"), multiple public-school districts throughout New Jersey, and the New Jersey Commissioner of Education as well as the Superintendents of the school districts. The Plaintiffs assert claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), Section 1983, the New Jersey Administrative Code ("NJAC"), the New Jersey Special Education Statute ("NJSA"), the New Jersey Civil Rights Act ("NJCRA"), the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD," and together with the NJAC, NJSA, and NJCRA, the "New Jersey Statutes"), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). The Plaintiffs brought suit individually and on-behalf of 15 school-aged children, who are students in different school districts throughout New Jersey. All have special needs and, all but one, B.A., had an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") for the 2019-20 and/or the 2020-21 school years. An IEP is the "primary mechanism" to ensure that every disabled child receives a free appropriate public education ("FAPE"), as required by the IDEA. An IEP is a written document that sets forth the special education and related services that must be provided to the child, to enable a FAPE. Through their IEPs, all the named children in this matter, except B.A., received some type of specialized support or modifications at school during the 2019-20 and 2020-21 school years. On March 16, 2020, in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, all public and private preschools, elementary schools, and secondary schools in New Jersey were ordered to close indefinitely. As a result, all New Jersey schools that had not already done so, including some of the School District Defendants, ceased in-person learning and began virtual instruction. The Plaintiffs received virtual instruction and services for the remainder of the 2019-20 school year. Virtual instruction continued until various points in the 2020-21 school year, when the School District Defendants began providing hybrid learning or in-person instruction. On Oct. 18, 2021, the Plaintiffs commenced the present action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. On Feb. 5, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed the AC, which contains nine counts. Count One alleges violations of the IDEA; Count Two violations of the Rehabilitation Act; and Count Three violations of the ADA. Counts Four and Five assert Section 1983 claims for deprivation of the Plaintiffs' equal protection and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Count Six alleges violations of the NJAC and NJSA; Count Seven violations of the NJCRA; and Count Eight violations of the NJLAD. Finally, Count Nine alleges RICO violations against the individual Defendants. The Court previously denied the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the Plaintiffs failed to establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits on their RICO claims and that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to an automatic injunction under the stay put provision of the IDEA. Presently before the Court are the Defendants' motions to dismiss the AC. Additionally, the Court addresses the motion for sanctions filed by four Defendants. It reviewed all the submissions in support and in opposition and considered the motions without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). First, the Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' claims relating to the denial of FAPEs because the Plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies under the IDEA. The Plaintiffs admit that they have not exhausted their administrative remedies. However, they argue that they need not exhaust their administrative remedies because they were not given full notice of their procedural rights under the IDEA. Judge Vazquez opines that it is clear that the claims stated in Counts Two through Eight of the AC seek relief also available under the IDEA. The claims all arise out of the cessation of in-person instruction and services in March 2020, which allegedly resulted in Plaintiffs suffering discrimination and deprivation of their equal protection rights, substantive due process rights, and procedural safeguards. Because these factual allegations are intertwined with the Plaintiffs' complaints about the schools' failure to accommodate their educational needs and because such allegations could not be brought by a nonstudent or outside the school setting," these claims seek relief available under the IDEA and are thus subject to exhaustion. As the Plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies or shown that any exception to the exhaustion requirement applies, their claims are not properly before the Court. Therefore, Counts One through Eight are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Next, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants violated RICO by way of their involvement in a scheme to deprive them of IDEA Part B funds by making false representations to the USDOE about their compliance with the IDEA during the COVID-19 pandemic. Judge Vazquez opines that the Plaintiffs' reliance on Second Circuit decisions for the proposition that RICO does provide a private right of action for injunctive relief is insufficient to overcome the weight of authority in this district. Even assuming arguendo that RICO provides a private right of action for equitable relief, the Plaintiffs' RICO claims fail for numerous additional reasons, including that they lack standing to sue under the RICO statute and they lack standing to bring their RICO claims because they allege injuries derivative of harm suffered by a more immediate victim of the RICO activity. The Plaintiffs also fail to plausibly plead the existence of an enterprise. The AC does not contain any allegations supporting an inference that the members of each enterprise shared a common purpose. In short, the Plaintiffs have not adequately plead the existence of an enterprise, but rather, "at best, the conclusory naming of a string of entities coupled with legal conclusions." The Plaintiffs further fail to plausibly allege predicate acts of racketeering activity. Not only do they lack standing to bring their RICO claims, but they additionally fail to plausibly allege the required elements of a RICO violation. Accordingly, Count Nine is dismissed. Defendants Audubon, Lower Cape May, Dr. Andrew P. Davis, and Joseph Castellucci move for sanctions. But Judge Vazquez declines to impose sanctions. However, he cautions the Plaintiffs to ensure that any future claims have both factual and legal support (or present a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or establishing new law). Shouldthe Plaintiffs fail to heed the Court's warning, and should the Court be presented with a motion for sanctions in the face of similar circumstances in the future, it will impose sanctions if appropriate and require the Plaintiffs to pay opposing counsels' fees and costs. For the reasons he set forth, Judge Vazquez grants the Defendants' motions to dismiss and denies the motion for sanctions. The dismissal is without prejudice and the Plaintiff will have 30 days to file an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies noted. If she does not file an amended complaint within that time, the matter will be closed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An appropriate Order accompanies the Opinion. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycxpyz5t from Leagle.com. NEWVIEW OKLAHOMA: Steward Labor Suit Removed to E.D. California --------------------------------------------------------------- The case styled SHENELL STEWARD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. NEWVIEW OKLAHOMA, INC. and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. FCS058441, was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Solano, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California on August 24, 2022. The Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of California assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-01498-JDP to the proceeding. The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the California Labor Code and the California's Business and Professions Code including failure to pay overtime wages, failure to pay meal period premium, failure to pay rest period premium, failure to pay minimum wages, failure to timely pay final wages, failure to timely pay wages owed during employment, failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements, failure to reimburse necessary expenses, failure to pay sick pay at regular rate, and unfair business practices. NewView Oklahoma, Inc. is a not-for-profit organization, with its principal place of business in Oklahoma. [BN] The Defendant is represented by: Michael E. Wilbur, Esq. Africa E. Davidson, Esq. APEX EMPLOYMENT LAW, LLP 505 14th Street, Suite 900 Oakland, CA 94612 Telephone: (510) 588-1310 E-mail: mwilbur@apexemploymentlaw.com NIO INC: Portnoy Law Discloses Securities Class Action Lawsuit -------------------------------------------------------------- The Portnoy Law Firm advises NIO, Inc. ("NIO") (NYSE: NIO) investors that a class action has been filed on behalf of investors. NIO investors that lost money on their investment are encouraged to contact Lesley Portnoy, Esq. Investors are encouraged to contact attorney Lesley F. Portnoy, by phone 844-767-8529 or email: lesley@portnoylaw.com, to discuss their legal rights, or click here to join the case via www.portnoylaw.com. The Portnoy Law Firm can provide a complimentary case evaluation and discuss investors' options for pursuing claims to recover their losses. The securities class action alleges that electric car manufacturer, NIO, misrepresented and failed to disclose that it improperly overstated its net income by selling batteries for its vehicles to an unconsolidated related party. NIO, an electric car manufacturer, gave customers the option to lease batteries for their vehicles from a third party through a subscription program. On June 28, 2022, Grizzly Research LLC ("Grizzly Research") published a report claiming that NIO inflated its net income by approximately 95% by selling batteries to an unconsolidated related party and recognizing revenues immediately, rather than over the lifetime of the subscription. On this news, the price of NIO ADSs fell $0.59, or 2.57%, from a closing price of $22.95 per ADS on June 27, 2022, to close at $22.36 per ADS on June 29, 2022, on elevated trading volume. On July 11, 2022, NIO announced that it had appointed a special committee of independent directors to oversee an investigation into the allegations in the Grizzly Research report. On this news, the price of NIO ADSs fell $2.03, or 8.98%, from a closing price of $22.60 per ADS on July 10, 2022, to close at $20.57 per ADS on July 11, 2022, on elevated trading volume. Please visit our website to review more information and submit your transaction information. The Portnoy Law Firm represents investors in pursuing claims against caused by corporate wrongdoing. The Firm's founding partner has recovered over $5.5 billion for aggrieved investors. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.[GN] NOVANT HEALTH: Allen Files Suit in M.D. North Carolina ------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against Novant Health, Inc. The case is styled as Keith Van Allen, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Novant Health, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-00709 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 26, 2022). The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I. Novant Health -- https://www.novanthealth.org/ -- is a leading healthcare provider with 15 hospitals & more than 350 physician practices offering advanced medical treatment in North Carolina.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Scott C Harris, Esq. MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC 900 W. Morgan Street Raleigh, NC 27603 Phone: (919) 600-5000 Fax: (919) 600-5035 Email: sharris@milberg.com OTGS LLC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York ---------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against OTGS, LLC. The case is styled as Jasmine Toro, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. OTGS, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-07366 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. OTG Management, LLC owns and operates restaurants in airports. The Company offers food and beverages, designs airport terminals, and provides information services.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mars Khaimov, Esq. 10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor Forest Hills, NY 11375 Phone: (917) 915-7415 Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com PECONIC LANDING: Santa Cruz Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages --------------------------------------------------------------- MIA SANTA CRUZ, Plaintiff v. PECONIC LANDING AT SOUTHHOLD, INC., DIANE RADIGAN, and PATRICIA LUTZKY, Defendants, Case No. 0:22-cv-04940 (E.D.N.Y., August 22, 2022) brings this complaint as a collective action on behalf of herself and other similarly situated against the Defendants for their alleged willful and intentional violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New York Labor Law, and the New York Theft Prevention Act. The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a communication specialist from before August of 2016 to approximately May 5, 2022. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to properly and timely pay her wages at the statutory minimum wage for all hours worked. Despite consistently working more than 40 hours per week, the Defendants paid her a fixed salary on a bi-weekly basis by check or direct deposit. The Defendants allegedly denied her of her lawfully earned overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times her regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek, says the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff also asserts these claims: -- The Defendants failed to monitor her work hours regularly and accurately, thereby failing to maintain accurate and sufficient time records; -- The Defendants failed to provide her with lawful wage notices upon hiring; and -- The Defendants failed to provide her with wage statement with each wage payment. The Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages, overtime wages, and spread-of-hours pay, as well as statutory damages, liquidated damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and other relief as the Court deems just and proper. Peconic Landing at Southhold, Inc. is a 144-acre campus which houses more than approximately 400 members in a retirement community. Diane Radigan has been Member Services Director at Peconic Landing since approximately 2014. Patricia Lutzky is a member of the management team. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Clifford Tucker, Esq. SACCO & FILLAS LLP 3119 Newtown Ave., 7th Floor Astoria, NY 11104 Tel: (718) 269-2243 E-mail: CTucker@SaccoFillas.com PELOTON INTERACTIVE: Suit Over Sales Tax Claims Sent to Arbitration ------------------------------------------------------------------- Anna Bradley-Smith and Jessy Edwards at topclassactions.com report that Peloton breached contract and consumer protection laws by charging members in New York, Massachusetts, and Virginia unlawful sales tax on their subscriptions, a new class action lawsuit alleges. The class action lawsuit was filed in New York on August 12 by lead Plaintiffs Brannon Skillern and Ryan Corken. They claim the company charged Peloton members sales tax on their memberships despite the tax-exempt status of the digital goods they were purchasing -- a violation of state law. The company's practice is willfully and knowingly unlawful, deceptive, and fraudulent, the Peloton members allege. Claims of unlawful sales tax charges add to the legal woes that have besieged the company, including class action lawsuits alleging the defective Tread+ put kids and pets at risk, as well as complaints about defective pedals and shrinking class lists. Peloton members complain of 'unlawful' sales tax According to the class action lawsuit, Skillern and Corken purchased Peloton Bikes and subscribed to Peloton's All-Access Membership subscription for $39 per month in 2019. Peloton went on to charge the members both a more than 6 percent "sales tax" on their subscriptions every month through December 2020 even though no such tax was actually owed under state law, resulting in substantial overcharges in violation of Peloton's Membership Terms and state law, the claim states. With a $39 per month All-Access Membership subscription, users can access Peloton's full catalogue of classes along with real-time performance metric tracking when used with the company's bike or treadmill. Subscription to Peloton's All Access Membership is required with the purchase of the Peloton Bike and Peloton Tread. By purchasing or using a Peloton Membership, subscribers agree to Peloton's Membership Terms, where they "agree to pay the monthly fee specified" at purchase "plus any applicable taxes and other charges," the class action lawsuit states. Peloton members also provide a payment method that is saved and charged on a recurring, monthly basis at the beginning of the monthly membership cycle, which is also authorized "to pay any amounts described [in the Membership Terms] without requiring a signed receipt." Peloton used that payment method to charge consumers sales tax on its digital goods, such as Peloton Memberships, which are not taxable under the laws of several US states including in Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia, collecting millions of dollars in overcharges, the class action lawsuit explains. "Furthermore, Peloton willfully and knowingly overcharged its subscribers a false and unlawful sales tax on their Peloton Memberships. When customers complained or inquired about the impermissible tax charge, Peloton assured them that its business practices comply with state and local tax requirements," the class action lawsuit reads. "Worse, Peloton admittedly has not remitted the unlawfully collected 'sales tax' to state authorities, recouping these overcharges in an effort to maximize profits at their subscribers' expense and under the guise of a state-imposed tax." Although Peloton has changed its taxation practices, it has not reimbursed members who were overcharged, the class action lawsuit states. Skillern and Corken are suing the company on behalf of anyone living in Massachusetts, New York, or Virginia who paid tax on a Peloton Membership through December 31, 2020. They are suing for breach of contract and violation of state consumer protection and business laws. They seek certification of the Class, damages, interest, legal fees and costs, and a jury trial. [GN] PLEXUS CORP: Court Dismisses Amended O'Driscoll Suit With Prejudice ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, STEPHANIE O'DRISCOLL, individually and as representative of a class of participants and beneficiaries on behalf of the Plexus Corp. 401(k) Retirement Plan, Plaintiff v. PLEXUS CORP., et al., Defendants, Case No. 20-C-1065 (E.D. Wis.), Judge William C. Griesbach of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's amended complaint. Ms. O'Driscoll, a participant in the Plexus Corp. 401(k) Retirement Plan (the Plan), brings the case as a proposed class action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(2), against Defendants Plexus, its Board of Directors, and John Does 1-30. In approximately November 2019, the Plaintiff commenced employment with Plexus as a paralegal. Her employment with Plexus ended approximately eight months later on July 2, 2020. Plexus is the plan sponsor and plan administrator of the Plexus Corp. 401(k) and Retirement Plan. It acted through its officers, including the Board Defendants, and their members to perform plan-related fiduciary functions in the course and scope of their business. The Plan is a "defined contribution" pension plan under 29 U.S.C. Section 1102(2)(A). A defined contribution plan allows employees to make pre-tax elective deferrals through payroll deductions to an individual account under a plan. The Plan has about $419 million in assets and 4,487 participants. The Plaintiff alleges that, at all relevant times, the Plan's fees were excessive when compared with other comparable 401(k) Plans offered by other sponsors that had similar numbers of plan participants, and similar amounts of money under management. She alleges that the excessive fees led to lower net returns than returns participants in comparable 401(k) Plans enjoyed. The Plaintiff claims that, during the putative Class Period, which is defined as July 15, 2014, through the date of judgment, Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed to the Plan, to her, and to other plan participants by (1) failing to objectively and adequately review the Plan's investment portfolio with due care to ensure that each investment option was prudent, in terms of cost; (2) maintaining certain funds in the Plan despite the availability of identical or similar investment options with lower costs and/or better performance histories; and (3) failing to monitor the recordkeeping and administration fees paid by the Plan to ensure that they were reasonable and, as a result, authorizing the Plan to pay objectively unreasonable and excessive recordkeeping and administration fees, relative to the recordkeeping and administration services received. The Defendants' recordkeepers during the Class Period were Mass Mutual Retirement Services from 2014 through 2018 and T. Rowe Price RPS Inc. from 2018 to 2020. Mass Mutual and T. Rowe Price are "well-known providers" of recordkeeping and administration services. The Plaintiff alleges that (i) the Defendants failed to regularly monitor the Plan's recordkeeping and administration fees paid to covered service providers, including Mass Mutual and T. Rowe Price; (ii) the Defendants failed to regularly solicit quotes and/or competitive bids from covered service providers, including Mass Mutual and T. Rowe Price, to avoid paying unreasonable fees for recordkeeping and administration services and failed to ensure that the Plan paid no more than a competitive reasonable fee for recordkeeping and administration services.; and (iii) from the years 2014 through 2018, the Plan had, on average, 4,244 participants and paid an average effective annual recordkeeping and administration fee of at least approximately $453,478, which equates to an average of at least approximately $107 per participant. In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that (i) during the Class Period, the Defendants did not use share classes that provided the greatest benefit to plan participants and in some cases even switched from one share class to a different share class that charged a higher "net investment expense to retirement plans"; (ii) the investment options selected by the plan fiduciaries were 438% more expensive than prudent alternative and less expensive options covering the same asset category; and (iii) during the Class Period, she had no knowledge of the Defendants' process for selecting and regularly monitoring investments to ensure that the investments remained prudent selections, the recordkeeping and administration fee structure, or the revenue sharing rates associated with the investments selected by the Defendants. The Plaintiff also claims that (i) both the expense ratios and the "net investment expense to retirement plans" of the Plan's investment options between the years 2014 and 2020 were more expensive by significant multiples of comparable passively managed and actively managed alternative funds in the same investment style; (ii) the Defendants failed to properly disclose fees charged to participants in the Plan in their quarterly statements and participant fee disclosure documents. She asserts that, as a result, the plan participants were prevented from making informed decisions with regard to the management of their individual accounts. The Plaintiff asserts four claims for relief: breaches of duties of loyalty and prudence regarding recordkeeping and administration fees (Count I); breaches of duties of loyalty and prudence regarding investment management fees (Count II); failure to adequately monitor other fiduciaries regarding recordkeeping and administration fees (Count III); and failure to adequately monitor other fiduciaries regarding investment management fees (Count IV). The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's amended complaint on Oct. 30, 2020. On Sept. 30, 2021, the Court stayed and administratively closed the case pending the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hughes v. Northwestern University, No. 19-1401. The Supreme Court issued a decision in Hughes on Jan. 24, 2022. 142 S.Ct. 737 (2022). That same day, the Court lifted the stay and invited the parties to submit simultaneous supplemental briefing in light of the Supreme Court's decision. The parties submitted supplemental briefs on Feb. 7, 2022. First, Judge Griesbach finds that the Plaintiff has neither shown that she suffered a loss nor alleged that the investment option was otherwise unreasonable. Because the complaint contains no allegations that she was harmed by the Defendants' investment decisions and the Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she was injured, she lacks standing to pursue her share class claim. Next, the Plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief, that the Defendants failed to disclose revenue sharing information to plan participants. She asserts that, as a result, plan participants were prevented from making informed decisions with regard to the management of their individual accounts. But the Seventh Circuit has recognized that fiduciaries are not required to disclose "information about the revenue-sharing arrangement," citing Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Cir. 2009). In short, Judge Griesbach holds that the Defendants are not required to disclose fees charged or credited to the Plan investments with the level of detail sought by the Plaintiff. Lastly, the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants breached ERISA's duty of loyalty, which requires fiduciaries to act solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries. Her breach of the duty of loyalty claim is based on the same allegations as the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Judge Griesbach holds that she must do more than recast allegations of purported breaches of fiduciary duty as disloyal acts. The Amended Complaint does not contain any allegations beyond those pertaining to an alleged breach of fiduciary duty; therefore, the Plaintiff's breach of the duty of loyalty claims must be dismissed. The Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants breached their duty to monitor. Her breach of the duty to monitor claim is derivative of the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Because the Plaintiff has failed to state a breach of fiduciary duty claim, she has also failed to state a breach of the duty to monitor claim. For these reasons, Judge Griesbach grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss. The amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and is dismissed for that reason pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court may dismiss a case with prejudice when there is no doubt that there exists no set of facts from which a plaintiff can prove she is entitled to relief. The Plaintiff has already amended her complaint once and has not requested leave to do so again in the face of the motion to dismiss. Therefore, Judge Griesbach dismisses the case with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Decision & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/msu46yz7 from Leagle.com. POLLACK & ROSEN: Benjamin Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Florida ---------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pollack & Rosen, P.A., et al. The case is styled as Gerard Benjamin, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Pollack & Rosen, P.A., Credit Corp Solutions, Inc., Case No. 3:22-cv-00936 (M.D. Fla., Aug. 29, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Pollack & Rosen, P.A. -- https://www.pollackrosen.com/ -- is one of Florida's largest collections firms providing comprehensive collection services nationwide.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Justin Zeig, Esq. ZEIG LAW FIRM, LLC 3475 Sheridan Street, Suite 310 Hollywood, FL 33021 Phone: (754) 217-3084 Fax: (754) 217-3084 Email: justin@zeiglawfirm.com PRACTICEMAX INC: Knox Files Suit in D. Arizona ---------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against PracticeMax Incorporated. The case is styled as Justin Knox, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. PracticeMax Incorporated, Case No. 2:22-cv-01455-SPL (D. Ariz., Aug. 29, 2022). The nature of suit is stated as Other Personal Property for Breach of Contract. PracticeMax -- https://practicemax.com/ -- has over 31 years of experience providing business management and information technology solutions to a diverse mix of health care providers.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Cristina Perez Hesano, Esq. PEREZ LAW GROUP PLLC 7508 N 59th Ave. Glendale, AZ 85301 Phone: (623) 826-5593 Email: cperez@perezlawgroup.com - and - William B. Federman, Esq. FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD 10205 N Pennsylvania Ave. Oklahoma City, OK 73120 Phone: (405) 235-1560 Email: wbf@federmanlaw.com PREMIER HR: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Estrada Suit Alleges ----------------------------------------------------------- NORMA ESTRADA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PREMIER HR; and ANTHONY RECINOS, Defendants, Case No. 22STCV27168 (Cal. Sup., Los Angeles Cty., Aug. 22, 2022) is an action against the Defendant for failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation, provide meals and rest periods, and provide accurate wage statements. Plaintiff Estrada was employed by the Defendants as staff. PREMIER HR we specialize in HR and recruiting services. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Zorik Mooradian, Esq. Andrina G. Hanson, Esq. Nanor C. Kamberian, Esq. MOORADIAN LAW, APC 24007 Ventura Blvd., Suite 210 Calabasas, CA 91302 Telephone: (818) 487-1988 Facsimile: (888) 783-1030 Email: zorik@mooradianlaw.com andrina@mooradianlaw.com nanor@mooradianlaw.com PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Oyenuga Says -------------------------------------------------------------- OLUDARE OYENUGA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICES LLC; and ISMAIL QADAR, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-04972 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 23, 2022) is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation, provide meals and rest periods, and provide accurate wage statements. Plaintiff Oyenuga was employed by the Defendants as security personnel. PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY & TRAINING SERVICES, LLC was founded in 2011. The company's line of business includes providing various commercial services. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Joshua Levin-Epstein, Esq. Jason Mizrahi, Esq. LEVIN-EPSTEIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4700 New York, NY 10165 Telephone: (212) 792-0046 Email: Joshua@levinepstein.com PREVEA CLINIC: Court Narrows Claims in Nohara's 2nd Amended Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, ALISON J. NOHARA and PATTI J. SZYDEL, Plaintiffs v. PREVEA CLINIC INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 20-C-1079 (E.D. Wis.), Judge William C. Griesbach of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin grants in part and denies in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. The Plaintiffs, participants in the Prevea Clinic, Inc., 401(k) and Retirement Plan, bring the case as a proposed class action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(2), against Defendants Prevea and its Board of Directors. They allege that, at all relevant times, the Plan's fees were excessive when compared with other comparable 401(k) plans offered by other sponsors that had similar numbers of plan participants and similar amounts of money under management. The Plaintiffs claim that, during the putative Class Period, which is defined as July 20, 2014, through the date of judgment, the Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed to the Plan, to them, and to other plan participants by (1) failing to objectively and adequately review the Plan's investment portfolio with due care to ensure that each investment option was prudent, in terms of cost; (2) maintaining certain funds in the Plan despite the availability of identical or similar investment options with lower costs and/or better performance histories; and (3) failing to monitor the recordkeeping and administration fees paid by the Plan to ensure that they were reasonable and, as a result, authorizing the Plan to pay objectively unreasonable and excessive recordkeeping and administration fees relative to the recordkeeping and administration services received. The Defendants' recordkeeper during the Class Period was Transamerica Retirement Solutions, LLC, a "wellknown provider" of recordkeeping and administration services. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants failed to regularly monitor the Plan's recordkeeping and administration fees paid to covered service providers, including Transamerica, failed to regularly solicit quotes and/or competitive bids from covered service providers in order to avoid paying unreasonable fees for the recordkeeping and administration services, and failed to ensure that the Plan paid no more than a competitive reasonable fee for recordkeeping and administration services. They assert that, from the years 2014 through 2018, the Plan had, on average, 1,945 participants and paid an average effective annual recordkeeping and administration fee of at least approximately $318,411, which equates to an average of at least approximately $164 per participant. They claim that, for the same time period, the annual recordkeeping and administration fees paid by other plans of similar sizes with similar amounts of money under management ranged from $41 to $73. Based on this information, they assert that a prudent plan fiduciary for the Plan would have on average an effective annual recordkeeping and administration fee of around $53 per participant. They allege that, because the Defendants did not act in the best interests of the Plan, the Plan cost its participants a total minimum amount of approximately $1,076,525 in unreasonable and excessive recordkeeping and administration fees. In addition, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants did not engage in an objectively reasonable process when selecting funds for the Plan. They claim that the Defendants chose an investment option that effectively charges a fee that is almost 11% higher than an alternative investment option that provides the identical services of the same portfolio manager. They allege that, had the Defendants acted in the best interests of the Plan's participants, the Defendants would have selected funds with lower "net investment expense to retirement plans" than those funds actually selected by Defendants. The Plaintiffs claim that, during the Class Period, they had no knowledge of the Defendants' process for selecting and regularly monitoring investments to ensure that the investments remained prudent selections, the recordkeeping and administration fee structure, or the revenue sharing rates associated with the investments selected by the Defendants. They allege that, had the Defendants chosen other investment options, the Plan's participants would have received virtually identical portfolio management services at a lower cost. The Plaintiffs claim that both the expense ratios and the "net investment expense to retirement plans" of the Plan's investment options between the years 2014 to 2020 were more expensive by significant multiples of comparable passively managed and actively managed alternative funds in the same investment style. They assert that, because Defendants failed to act in the best interests of the Plan's participants by engaging in an objectively reasonable investigation process when selecting its investments, Defendants caused objectively unreasonable and unnecessary losses to them and the Plan's participants in the amount of approximately $3,041,829 through 2018. The Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants failed to fully disclose fees charged to the Plan investments in the participants' quarterly statements and participant fee disclosure documents. They allege that the Defendants failed to disclose to plan participants the revenue sharing rates of each investment option the Defendants made available to plan participants which represent a refund and had the effect of lowering the effective annual expense ratios of the investment funds for which a plan service credit applies. They assert that, as a result, plan participants were unable to determine the actual net investment expense paid by retirement plan participants for each of their investment options. The Plaintiffs assert four claims for relief: Breaches of duties of loyalty and prudence regarding recordkeeping and administration fees (Count I); breaches of duty of loyalty and prudence regarding investment management fees (Count II); failure to adequately monitor other fiduciaries regarding recordkeeping and administration fees (Count III); and failure to adequately monitor other fiduciaries regarding investment management fees (Count IV). The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on Nov. 20, 2020, and Plaintiff Nohara filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint on March 10, 2021. On Sept. 30, 2021, the Court stayed and administratively closed the case pending the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hughes v. Northwestern University, No. 19-1401. The Supreme Court issued a decision in Hughes on January 24, 2022. 142 S.Ct. 737 (2022). That same day, the Court lifted the stay and invited the parties to submit simultaneous supplemental briefing in light of the Supreme Court's decision. The parties submitted supplemental briefs on Feb. 7, 2022. On May 12, 2022, the Court granted the motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint on June 16, 2022. Initially, the Plaintiffs allege the Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by causing the Plan to pay excessive recordkeeping costs, failing to retain the least costly share class of each fund, retaining high-cost funds, and failing to disclose revenue-sharing information to participants. Judge Griesbach holds that (i) the second amended complaint plausibly alleges that the Defendants' failure to solicit bids and negotiate for reasonable fees was imprudent; (ii) the Plaintiffs have stated a claim that Defendants breached their fiduciary duty by retaining high-cost actively managed investments; (iii) it is plausible to infer from the Plaintiffs' allegations that the Defendants breached the duty of prudence by failing to retain low-cost share classes of four mutual funds for the Plan; and (iv) the Defendants are not required to disclose fees charged or credited to the Plan investments with the level of detail sought by Plaintiffs. The second amended complaint asserts claims of breach of the duty of loyalty. In response to the Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Plaintiffs stated that they are no longer pursuing their duty of loyalty claims in Counts I and II. Therefore, the Plaintiffs' breach of the duty of loyalty claims are dismissed. The Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants breached their duty to monitor. Their breach of the duty to monitor claim is derivative of the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Because the Plaintiffs have stated claims for breach of fiduciary duty with respect to the recordkeeping fees and investment management fees, Judge Griesbach finds that they have also stated a claim that the Defendants breached their duty to monitor. The Defendants assert that the Board of Director defendants and individual director defendants (denominated as John Does 1-10) should be dismissed. The Plaintiffs agree that the individual director defendants should be dismissed from the case. As to the Board of Director Defendants, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that the Board had fiduciary responsibility for the misconduct alleged. The second amended complaint alleges, however, that "Prevea Clinic acted through its officers, including the Board Defendants, and their members, to perform Plan-related fiduciary functions in the course and scope of their business." Accepting the Plaintiffs' allegation as true, as the Court is required to do at this stage, Judge Griesbach holds that the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the Prevea Clinic Board of Directors are fiduciaries. For these reasons, Judge Griesbach grants in part and denies in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss. He grants the motion with respect to the Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim regarding the Defendants' failure to properly disclose revenue sharing information to participants and breach of the duty of loyalty claims, and those claims are dismissed. The individual director defendants are dismissed as defendants. Judge Griesbach denies the motion all other respects. The Clerk is directed to set the matter on the Court's calendar for a Rule 16 telephonic scheduling conference. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Decision & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yt4hnsrx from Leagle.com. PROGRESSIVE ADVANCED: Court Certifies Class in Buffington Suit -------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, STEVEN BUFFINGTON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PROGRESSIVE ADVANCED INSURANCE CO., Defendant, Case No. 20-CV-07408 (PMH) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Philip M. Halpern of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York grants the Plaintiff's motion for class certification. Mr. Buffington, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, brings the action against Progressive for allegedly underpaying the "actual cash value" ("ACV") of total-loss vehicles to policyholders by omitting sales tax from the calculation thereof. He initially brought three claims for relief: (i) breach of contract; (ii) violation of New York General Business Law ("NYGBL") Section 349; and (iii) unjust enrichment. He Plaintiff thereafter voluntarily withdrew his unjust enrichment claim with prejudice. The Plaintiff was a named insured under an automobile policy issued for comprehensive and collision coverage issued by the Defendant. He insured a vehicle he leased, a 2016 Toyota Sienna minivan under the Policy. The Policy provided for a "limit of liability," by which the Defendant was obligated to pay "the lowest of the ACV of the stolen or damaged property at the time of the loss reduced by the applicable deductible or the amount necessary to replace the stolen or damaged property reduced by the applicable deductible" in the event of a total loss. The Plaintiff was involved in a total loss accident with the Insured Vehicle on March 1, 2019 and thereafter filed a claim with the Defendant. The Defendant, in turn, elected to pay out the ACV of his vehicle: $17,816.60. The Plaintiff alleges that this amount did not include sales tax as "mandated by New York laws." He alleges that he "still owed money under his lease" after the Defendant paid out $17,816.60 to his leasing company (i.e., Toyota) in an amount that "would have been satisfied or diminished had it included the sales tax in the ACV payment." He also alleges that he "replaced his total loss vehicle and incurred sales tax in doing so." The Policy contains the same limitation of liability for lessees (like the Plaintiff) as it does for vehicle owners. The Defendant, however, "has made the business decision to pay sales tax for owned vehicles" because of Reg. 64. "For leased vehicles, however, the Defendant generally does not include sales tax" based on an understanding that Reg. 64 does not apply. The Proposed Class contains all lessees and owners who "were not paid full sales tax for their total-loss claim." The Plaintiff moved, on Sept. 2, 2021, to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). The "Proposed Class" is defined as: All persons: (a) who insured a vehicle for physical damage coverage under a New York automobile insurance policy issued by Progressive Advanced Insurance Company, (b) who made a claim under the policy for physical damage to the vehicle, (c) whose claim was adjusted as a total loss between September 10, 2014, and the date of certification of the Class, and (d) who were not paid the applicable New York sales tax owed for their total-loss claim. The Plaintiff also seeks appointment as class representative and appointment of his attorneys as class counsel. The Defendant opposed the Plaintiff's motion on Oct. 11, 2021, and the motion was fully submitted upon the filing of the Plaintiff's reply papers on Nov. 10, 2021. Judge Halpern explains that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) instructs that class certification is appropriate where the putative class: (1) is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. There is also an implied requirement of ascertainability in this Circuit -- i.e., that there be an identifiable class. Once the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met, the plaintiff must then show by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed class is "maintainable" by meeting at least one of the requirements set forth in Rule 23(b). Certification in the case is sought under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that "the Court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." Judge Halpern opines that the Plaintiff has carried his burden with respect to all four requirements of Rule 23(a) and the implied requirement of ascertainability. He finds that (i) the Plaintiff avers that the class size exceeds 4,000 members and the Defendant does not dispute this assertion or that the numerosity element has been met; (ii) whether the Defendant underpaid or failed to pay sales tax to a given insured, the question remains the same for class members -- did the Defendant pay what it owed under its form policy and did it represent the same to consumers?; (iii) the Plaintiff has sufficiently shown that his claims arise from the same course of conduct as putative class members' claims do -- the Defendant's breach of a form contract; (iv) the Plaintiff does not have any conflicts with the putative class and has sufficiently demonstrated his commitment to the case to-date; (v) the Plaintiff's counsel is sufficiently experienced, and adequate to serve as the class counsel; and (vi) the Plaintiff has met his modest burden on ascertainability. As to the requirements of Rule 23(b), Judge Halpern finds that because the Plaintiff has identified a common measure for calculating damages -- multiplication of the sales tax rate by the vehicle's ACV -- the need for individualized calculations "alone cannot preclude certification under Rule 23(b)(3). He also finds that the Plaintiff has shown that "the case will be far more manageable than many class actions that are regularly certified because the class is ascertainable from the defendant's own records." He agrees that manageability considerations here weigh in favor of certification, especially given the size of the Proposed Class. Hence, the Plaintiff has met his burden under Rule 23(b)(3). For the foregoing reasons, Judge Halpern grants the Plaintiff's motion for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). He certifies a class comprised of all persons: (a) who insured a vehicle for physical damage coverage under a New York automobile insurance policy issued by Progressive Advanced Insurance Company, (b) who made a claim under the policy for physical damage to the vehicle, (c) whose claim was adjusted as a total loss between Sept. 10, 2014 and the date of this Order, and (d) who were not paid the applicable New York sales tax owed for their total-loss claim. Judge Halpern grants the Plaintiff's unopposed application to appoint Plaintiff Steven Buffington as the class representative and, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1), appoints Edward A. Normand and Amy L. Judkins of Normand PLLC, Joseph N. Kravec of Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC, and Antonio Vozzolo of Vozzolo, LLC as the class counsel. The parties will meet and confer to consider a proposed joint notice plan; and will notify the Court jointly within 14 days of the date of the Memorandum Opinion and Order of the results of their discussion, including a proposed joint notice plan. If for any reason the parties cannot agree, each will file, within 14 days of the date of the Memorandum Opinion and Order, their proposed notice plan in one joint letter of no more than five double-spaced pages. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion sequence pending at Doc. 59. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Memorandum Opinion & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/bdcttpuz from Leagle.com. QUICKZIP SHEET: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York -------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against The QuickZip Sheet Company, Inc. The case is styled as Christopher Loadholt, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. The QuickZip Sheet Company, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-07310 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 26, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. QuickZip -- https://quickzip.com/ -- make smarter, faster easier bedding.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Yitzchak Zelman, Esq. MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC 701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300 Asbury Park, NJ 07712 Phone: (845) 367-7146 Fax: (732) 298-6256 Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com RAY MOLES: Sept. 27 Scheduling Conference in Colores Suit Vacated ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, FILEMON COLORES, as an individual and on behalf all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. RAY MOLES FARMS, INC., a California Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-00101-JLT-BAM (E.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, Fresno Division, vacates the Scheduling Conference currently set for Sept. 27, 2022. Mr. Colores filed his First Suit in Tulare County Superior Court, which was Removed by Ray Moles on Jan. 25, 2021. The First Suit constituted an FRCP 23 Class Action Complaint alleging 7 causes of action for claimed payroll violations of various wage and hour provisions of the California Labor Code. It seeks an FRCP 23 Class Action consisting of all of the current and former non-exempt employees of Defendant Ray Moles Farms, Inc. who worked in California at least one shift during the four years immediately preceding the filing of the lawsuit through the present. On Jan, 26, 2021, Ray Moles filed an Answer to Colores' FRCP 23 Class Action Complaint. That Answer at the Second Affirmative Defense asserted that the entire suit was subject to exclusive and binding Arbitration due to the Arbitration Agreement which Plaintiff Colores had signed on Dec. 5, 2016. On May 19, 2021, Ray Moles filed a Motion to Dismiss the FRCP 23 Class Action First Suit. That is still pending for decision. On Feb. 12, 2021, Colores filed against Ray Moles a Second. It was a single action which sought duplicate and redundant ("stacked") civil penalties under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 ("PAGA") for the very same alleged wage and hour labor code violations that were set forth in the First Suit. On May 14, 2021, Ray Moles filed a Cross-Complaint against Colores alleging that PAGA is unconstitutional. On the same day, Ray Moles filed an FRCP 5.1 Notice of Constitutional Challenge of State Statute upon the Attorney General of California giving him notice of his right to intervene into the unconstitutional Cross-Complaint lawsuit for up to 60 days from receipt of the 5.1 Notice. The Attorney General waived by not intervening. On May 19, 2021, a Minute Order was issued from District Court Judge Dale A. Drozd to the Clerk of the Court ordering the Clerk of the Court to likewise serve a Notice upon the office of the Attorney General of the State of California, likewise giving him an opportunity for 60 days to intervene into the lawsuit. The Attorney General waived by not intervening. On April 22, 2021, the Plaintiff and the Defendant filed a stipulation to consolidate the First and Second Suit for all purposes, including trial. Then an Order the next day was issued by Judge Drozd consolidating the cases. Therein Judge Drozd stated that the First Suit was the Lead Case and that all future filings were to be made under that Case Number, and that the Second Case No. of 1:21-cv-00467-NONE-SAB was to be closed by the Clerk of the Court. On May 19, 2021, Ray Moles filed a Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated First Suit and Second Suit with a hearing date of June 22, 2021, which is now under submission for decision. A very similar Motion to Dismiss was filed by the Defendant's law firm in the Bakersfield branch of this Eastern District Federal Court at Mayen v. Cal Central Harvesting, Case No. 1:21-cv-00145AWI-JLT. Said Motion to Dismiss was granted in large part by Judge Anthony W. Ishii on Oct. 25, 2021. On May 26, 2021, the parties filed a Stipulation to Continue the Mandatory Scheduling Conference due to their agreement to go to an early Mediation on Nov. 2, 2021 before retired Presiding Tulare County Judge Howard Broadman. On May 26, 2021, U.S. Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe filed an Order accepting the Stipulation. That Order also rescheduled the Status Conference to Nov. 30, 2021 so as to give the parties an opportunity to mediate on Nov. 2, 2021 with Mediator Retired Judge Howard Broadman. Further the Magistrate's Order granted the Plaintiff Colores a continuance to file his response to the Unconstitutionality Cross-Complaint until Dec. 17, 2021. Likewise, Magistrate McAuliffe granted Colores a continuance to file an Opposition to Ray Moles' pending Motion to Dismiss the First and Second Suits until Dec. 17, 2021. On May 14, 2021, Ray Moles filed an Answer to the Consolidated Complaints. At its Second (2nd) Affirmative Defense, its Answer asserted that the entire two lawsuits should be compelled to exclusive and binding Arbitration due to Arbitration Agreement that Colores had signed on Dec. 5, 2016. It also asserted in the 33rd Affirmative Defense that the PAGA action was unconstitutional, and/or was prohibited from "stacking" or seeking "redundant" penalties for alleged labor code violations when those labor code sections otherwise specifically already provide for penalties. On Oct. 6, 2021, Ray Moles filed a Verified Motion/Petition to Compel Individual Arbitration and to dismiss and/or stay both Complaints' litigation. Its Petition is under submission awaiting a decision. Recently, on June 15, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Viking River Cruises v. Moriana, 596 U.S. ___ (2022), No. 20-1573, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state law, so that Moriana was compelled to individual arbitration, and the putative class (group) was dismissed by the Viking U.S. Supreme Court. The Defendant further notes that, even before Viking River, namely on Dec. 30, 2019, a very similar Petition to Compel Arbitration was granted by Judge Dale A. Drozd in the case of Mayreli Martinez v. Vision Precision Holdings, LLC, Case No, 1:19-cv-01002-DAD-JLT; therein Judge Drozd dismissed the lawsuit and ordered arbitration. The language of Judge Drozd's Order is quoted at page 5 within Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Verified Petition to Compel Arbitration. In a very similar case involving another client of this law firm (Defendant Bee Sweet Citrus, Inc., which is similarly defending a class action suit by a purported class of agricultural workers) Magistrate Judge Helena M. Barch-Kutcha on Sept. 13, 2021 issued a Minute Order in that Case No. of 1:21-cv-00382-NONE-HBK. There, Magistrate Barch-Kutcha in essence issued an Order upon our Ex Parte Application to Vacate the MSC granting our Application due to the pending Motion to Dismiss and the pending Motion to Consolidate in that case. Also, in a very similar case, on Nov. 3, 2020, Magistrate Judge Erica P. Grosjean sua sponte issued an Order vacating a MSC also involving defendant Bee Sweet in a putative class of farm workers case. It was vacated by Magistrate Grosjean due to a pending Motion to Dismiss so that if necessary the MSC would be set after those rulings. Further, in another similar class action which the law firm is defending for Sun Valley Packing L.P. against another putative class of farm workers, Magistrate Erica P. Grosjean on Aug. 27, 2021 vacated the MSC due to pending Motions to Dismiss, Motion to Consolidate, and a Petition to Compel Arbitration. That Order said if necessary, after the ruling on those motions, then Magistrate Grosjean will reschedule the MSC. In this Consolidated case, on 11/23/2021, Magistrate McAuliffe, citing the pending Ray Moles' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's consolidated suits, and citing its pending Motion to Compel Arbitration, moved the Nov. 29, 2021 Status Conference to April 19, 2022. Then again, citing those same still pending Defendant Motions to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration and citing the Attorney General's Motion to Intervene and also citing the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss that Cross-Complaint, she moved that status conference again to Sept. 27, 2022. All these motions are still pending for decision. Ray Moles again requests that Magistrate McAuliffe vacates the MSC until after those motions are ruled upon. Therefore, Ray Moles requests that the Court issues an Order vacating the Scheduling Conference currently set for Nov. 30, 2021 until after there are rulings on the pending Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated First and Second Suit, and on the pending Verified Petition to Compel Arbitration of both the Consolidated First and Second Suit (due to the Arbitration Agreement signed by Colores on Dec. 5, 2016), and on the pending Motion to Intervene and on the pending Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss. After those four pending rulings, then if necessary, the MSC would be re-set by the Magistrate. Judge McAuliffe vacates the Scheduling Conference currently set for Sept. 27, 2022, to be reset, if needed, following resolution of said four motions. Ray Moles will notify the Court within 10 days following resolution of these motions and indicate whether a Scheduling Conference should be set. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/56pptab5 from Leagle.com. Thomas E. Campagne -- tcampagne@campagnelaw.com -- Campagne & Campagne A Professional Corporation Airport Office Center, in Fresno, California, Attorneys for Defendant Ray Moles Farms, Inc. REALPAGE INC: Denial of Subclass Certification in Kelly Vacated --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, KEVIN JOSEPH KELLY; KARRIEM BEY, On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellants v. REALPAGE INC., d/b/a ONSITE; RP ON SITE, LLC, Case No. 21-1672 (3d Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacates the District Court's order denying class certification of the Direct Requests subclass. RealPage is a CRA that specializes in providing property managers with consumer reports, which it terms "Rental Reports," to help them evaluate their prospective tenants. To generate Rental Reports for those clients over the Class Period, RealPage collected public-record information, including criminal records and eviction filings, from third-party vendors like LexisNexis and HygenicsData, stored that information in its own databases, and compiled it to respond to client requests. A client procuring a Rental Report could also instruct RealPage to make a courtesy copy of that report available to the prospective tenant, who would then be notified of the option to download the Rental Report from RealPage's website. Consistent with its obligations under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. Section 1681 et seq., RealPage also disclosed information in response to consumers' direct requests for their files. Regardless of whether a consumer downloaded her courtesy copy of a Rental Report requested by a property manager or initiated her own independent request for her information on file, RealPage provided the consumer with the exact same report, the Rental Report -- which did not disclose the third-party-vendor "sources of the information." In late 2018, Appellants Kelly and Bey found themselves in just the sort of frustrating predicament the FCRA was designed to avoid. The Appellants are two prospective tenants whose Rental Reports contained inaccuracies and who therefore sought information from RealPage to try to correct those errors. After Kelly and Bey submitted lease applications for apartments at different properties, the respective property managers requested Appellants' consumer reports from RealPage. In response, RealPage generated and sent their clients Appellants' Rental Reports, each of which contained inaccurate public record information. Kelly's report mistakenly included two DUI convictions and a record of an outdated vehicle inspection tag, the latter of which the report described as a misdemeanor conviction rather than a non-criminal summary offense. Bey's report incorrectly stated that a civil action for possession was filed against him and included an erroneous eviction filing. Not surprisingly, the property managers turned down both the Appellants based on inaccurate consumer reports generated by RealPage, although in Kelly's case, the manager eventually relented. RealPage would not correct the reports unless the Appellants obtained proof of the error from its sources; and the identity of RealPage's sources was not included in the disclosures to Appellants, despite their requests for their files. So the Appellants availed themselves of the remedy Congress provided and sued RealPage, claiming it had violated its obligation under the FCRA to disclose on request "all information in the consumer's file at the time of the request" and "the sources of that information." They sought damages and attorneys' fees not only for themselves but also on behalf of a purported class and subclass. Kelly and Bey moved to certify the following class and subclass: a. An All Requests class, including individuals who had a Rental Report sent or caused to be sent to them by RealPage, Inc. through its On-Site operation which did not include the name of the private vendor source(s) from which public record information in the file was obtained within the Class Period; and, b. a Direct Requests subclass consisting of individuals in the All Requests class who received a Rental Report following a documented direct request by the consumer to RealPage or On-Site. These class definitions reflect the three different methods by which putative class members could have received their Rental Reports during the Class Period, i.e., as a courtesy copy of the property manager's report; through a consumer's direct request using the request form RealPage provided on its website; or through a direct request by correspondence or documented call. Approximately 2.2 million consumers, comprising the All Requests class, received copies of their Rental Reports through one or more of these methods during the Class Period. The Direct Requests subclass includes only a subset of these consumers: the 16,659 consumers who obtained their Rental Reports using the website form, plus those who submitted requests via documented calls, letters, or emails. The class action did not get far. The District Court denied the Appellants' motion for class certification on the grounds that they failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance and superiority requirements and that their proposed class and subclass were not, in any event, ascertainable. The Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing in relevant part that the District Court erred in its ascertainability determination because the "presence or absence of public records is objectively determinable from the face of the reports." They also pointed to evidence in the existing record that RealPage retained copies of the Rental Reports in a "searchable electronic format," and submitted additional testimony from RealPage -- obtained after the class certification briefing -- that the data is "stored in a database that can be queried to retrieve these reports." The Court denied the motion, rejecting what it described as a "bald assertion as to how the Appellants] would conduct the computer-aided administrative task" of identifying the proposed class members and declining to consider their explanation on the ground that it had only been raised in a footnote, which it declined to consider pursuant to its individual rules. The Appellants also sought leave to redefine the subclass and to file a renewed motion for class certification to address the District Court's ascertainability and predominance concerns in light of the Court's novel interpretation of Section 1681g(a). Construing that request as a motion to amend the scheduling order, the District Court denied it for lack of diligence, concluding that Appellants "had or could have obtained all of the information on which they base their reconsideration motion before the Court ruled on class certification." The Appellants then filed a petition for interlocutory review under Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the Third Circuit granted. RealPage argues that the Appellants lack a sufficiently concrete injury to satisfy the Supreme Court's standing requirements, while they challenge the District Court's grounds for denying class certification. The Third Circuit first addresses whether the Appellants established standing before discussing the District Court's rulings on predominance and ascertainability. As to standing, the Third Circuit opines that the Appellants have standing because they have made the requisite showing of (1) the omission of information to which they claim entitlement, (2) "adverse effects" that flow from the omission, and (3) the requisite nexus to the "concrete interest" Congress intended to protect. So it upholds the District Court's determination that the Appellants have standing. Though it agrees with the District Court's standing analysis, the Third Circuit disagrees, at least in part, with its bases for denying class certification, predominance, and ascertainability. As to predominance, it finds that the text, context, and structure of the FCRA provide that the District Court was right to distinguish between consumers who made direct requests under Section 1681g and consumers who received courtesy copies of the property managers' Rental Reports (presumably under Section 1681e(c)). Only the former were entitled to the disclosure of all the information in the consumers' files and the "sources" of that information. The All Requests class, however, consists of both types of consumers, so the District Court correctly concluded that the "essential element" of who made the request, could not be established "with common, as opposed to individualized, evidence," and that certification of the All Requests class should therefore be denied. It further finds that when read as a whole, the statute is unambiguous in providing that any generalized "request" by a consumer for the CRA's information about her triggers the CRA's disclose obligation under Section 1681g(a). Indeed, despite the legal arguments it now raises to the contrary, RealPage itself has conformed its conduct to that understanding of the statute. Throughout the Class Period, whether a consumer directly requested her Rental Report or her "file," RealPage disclosed to her the exact same document. Nor did RealPage provide for alternative disclosures for the 16,659 consumers who made direct requests on its website; they were instructed only that a request via the website would yield a "report and any of the disclosures required by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act." Because the District Court erroneously concluded that individualized proof would be needed to distinguish requests for "reports" from those for "files," it found predominance lacking on that basis. And as that decision rested on "an errant conclusion of law," the Third Circuit will vacate and remand for the District Court to consider whether Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance and superiority requirements are satisfied with respect to the subclass. Lastly, the Third Circuit opines that it not allow the Defendants to defeat ascertainability with a strategic decision to house records across multiple sources or databases. To the extent RealPage's objection is to the number of records that must be individually reviewed, that is essentially an objection to the size of the class. To hold otherwise would be to categorically preclude class actions where defendants purportedly harmed too many people, which would "seriously undermine the purpose" of a class action to "vindicate meritorious individual claims in an efficient manner." So long as the review is for information apparent on the face of the document, the number of files does not preclude ascertainability. In sum, the District Court misapprehended the case law and therefore erred in denying certification of the Direct Requests subclass on the basis of ascertainability, as well as predominance. For the foregoing reasons, because the District Court based its predominance analysis on a misinterpretation of Section 1681g(a) and erred in applying its ascertainability precedent, the Third Circuit vacates the District Court's order denying class certification of the Direct Requests subclass and remands for the Court's reconsideration in light of its Opinion. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yckjk4t2 from Leagle.com. Lauren K.W. Brennan -- lbrennan@consumerlawfirm.com -- James A. Francis -- jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com -- John Soumilas -- jsoumilas@consumerlawfirm.com -- [ARGUED], Francis Mailman Soumilas, 1600 Market Street, Suite 2510, Philadelphia, PA 19103, Counsel for the Appellants. Ronald I. Raether, Jr. -- ron.raether@troutman.com -- Troutman Pepper, 5 Park Plaza, Suite 1400, Irvine, CA 92614. Misha Tseytlin -- miiha.tseytlin@troutman.com -- [ARGUED], Troutman Pepper, 227 West Monroe Street, Suite 3900, Chicago, IL 60606, Counsel for the Appellees. Mark W. Mosier -- mmosier@cov.com -- Covington & Burling, 850 10th Street, N.W., One City Center, Washington, DC 20001, Counsel for Amici Curiae Consumer Data, Industry Association and Professional Background Screening Association. Nicole A. Saharsky -- nsaharsky@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown , 1999 K Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20006, Counsel for Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America. RENOWN HEALTH: Court Narrows Claims in Nevett's 2nd Amended Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, EMILY NEVETT and BONNIE NOBLE, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs v. RENOWN HEALTH, et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:21-cv-00319-RCJ-CSD (D. Nev.), Judge Robert C. Jones of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada grants in part and denies in part Renown's motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs Nevett and Noble allege, in their Second Amended Complaint, that their former employer, Renown, failed to properly pay them overtime wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C Section 207, and state law, Nev. Rev. Stat. Section 608.018. They also allege Renown failed to pay them for all time worked as required by Nev. Rev. Stat. Section 608.016 and failed to pay them all wages due and owing when they stopped working for Renown as required by Nev. Rev. Stat. Section 608.020. Plaintiff Nevett worked as a registered nurse for Renown from July 2018 to October 2019. Plaintiff Noble worked for Renown as a certified nursing assistant and as a unit clerk from 2015 to about August 2020. Renown used a time-keeping system known as "KRONOS" by which employees would clock in at the beginning of their shift and clock out at the end their shift. Employees would not clock out for meal breaks (and thus would not clock in at the end of a meal break). Rather, in computing the hours worked by an employee for each shift, Renown would deduct 30 minutes for the meal break. Renown did not verify whether an employee had taken a meal break. During meal breaks, the Plaintiffs were required to carry a Renown-owned telephone or radio, to respond to any calls, and were not permitted to leave Renown's premises. As part of their duties, the Plaintiffs documented patient care notes and records in Renown's electronic medical records system, known as "EPIC." The EPIC system would record the specific time that the Plaintiffs entered data into the system. The Plaintiffs allege that this time stamp in EPIC would, if compared to the KRONOS time records, show that they entered data into the EPIC system during meal breaks and when they were not clocked into the KRONOS system, i.e., when they were off-the-clock. Nevett alleges she worked in EPIC while not clocked into KRONOS on July 25, 2018. Noble alleges she worked in EPIC while not clocked into KRONOS "when she was the only unit clerk the first few weeks of 2018." Ms. Nevett had a regular schedule of three 12.5-hour shifts each week. For each shift, Renown compensated Nevett for 12 hours of work after deducting 30 minutes for the meal break. In addition to her regular shifts, she was also required to work a 12-hour on-call shift once each month. She alleges she worked approximately 10 on-call shifts during her employment. Nevett further alleges 0 working more than 40 hours in thirteen specific workweeks, which she identifies in paragraph 13 of the Second Amended Complaint. Ms. Noble initially had a regular schedule of three 12.5-hour shifts each week. Beginning sometime in 2019, Noble had a regular schedule of five 8.5-hour shifts each week. As with Nevett, for each shift Renown compensated Noble for 12 hours of work (for the 12.5-hour shifts) and 8 hours of work (for the 8-hour shifts) after deducting 30 minutes for the meal break. Noble does not allege any specific workweek in which she worked more than 40 hours. Plaintiffs Noble and Nevett each allege they "regularly and routinely worked through" their meal breaks "in order to complete work tasks including charting in the EPIC system, caring for patients, and/or taking calls on the Renown provided telephone/radio specific to patients under their care." Nevett alleges specifically recalling working during her meal break on Sept. 6, 2018, Feb. 4, 2019, June 24, 2019, and Aug. 16, 2019. Noble alleges specifically recalling working during her meal break on May 19, 2019. Both allege that they were not compensated for working through their respective meal breaks on the identified dates. Ms. Nevett further alleges that she received a non-discretionary bonus of $1,514.74 that was based upon her employee earnings during the preceding year. She alleges this bonus payment was not included in calculating her regular rate of pay for overtime payment calculations. Ms. Nevett further alleges that her regular rate of pay for a regular shift was $30.62 per hour. She alleges her regular base pay for her on-call shift was $45.93 per hour. She alleges that, for the weeks she worked an on-call shift, she was actually paid a total of $1,653.48 (representing 36 hours at $30.62 and 12 hours at $45.93). She thus alleges that her regular rate of pay for weeks that she worked an on-call shift was $34.45 ($1,653.48 divided by 48 hours) and the overtime rate during such weeks was $51.68. Accordingly, she calculates that she should have been paid $1,791.44 (40 hours at $34.45 plus 8 hours at $51.68); that is, she alleges she was underpaid by $137.96 in weeks that she worked an on-call shift in addition to her 3 regular shifts. Ms. Noble alleges that, when she ceased working for Renown, she was being paid approximately $16.40 per hour. Ms. Nevett initiated the matter in state court in April 2020, as a class action suit against Renown, alleging 3 state law claims for failure to pay overtime, failure to compensate for all hours worked, and failure to pay wages due and owing. In June 2021, Renown moved for partial summary judgment. In response, Nevett moved to amend her complaint. Before Nevett was granted leave to amend, Renown removed the matter to the Court. Nevett moved to remand the litigation back to state court. The parties then stipulated that Nevett could file her proposed First Amended Complaint, and Nevett withdrew her motion to remand. The First Amended Complaint both added Noble as a plaintiff and added the FLSA claim as a collective action. Renown moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. The Plaintiffs opposed the motion. The Court granted the motion in part, denied it in part, and granted the Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies of their dismissed claims. The Plaintiffs filed the instant Second Amended Complaint. Renown now moves to dismiss the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action. The Plaintiffs oppose the motion. As to the First Cause of Action, FLSA claim for overtime hours worked in a given week, Judge Jones accepts as true the Plaintiffs' allegations that they were required to remain on premises during meal breaks. The remain-on-premises requirement does not, of itself, cause a meal break to not be bona fide. Rather, Section 785.19(b) expressly recognizes that a remain-on-premises requirement can be consistent with bona fide meal breaks. The Plaintiffs' additional allegations that they were also required to carry a Renown-owned telephone or radio and to respond to any calls does not raise a plausible inference that, during their meal breaks, the Plaintiffs were performing activities predominately for the benefit of Renown. Judge Jones finds that the Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to raise a plausible inference that, because they were on-call, none of their meal breaks were bona fide. While they have sufficiently alleged that they remained on-call during their meal breaks, they have not alleged facts showing that this on-call status, of itself, precluded them for adequately and comfortably taking their meal break under the required circumstances. As such, the Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to raise a plausible inference that their on-call status caused their meal breaks to be compensable time. The Plaintiffs' allegations that a comparison of the EPIC and KRONOS time stamps will show that they entered data during meal breaks are likewise insufficient to raise a plausible inference that they were never given a bona fide meal break. Further, their allegation that a comparison of the EPIC and KRONOS time stamps will show they performed data entry during meal breaks does not meet their burden of showing that they worked during a given meal break or the amount of hours worked. Accordingly, Judge Jones rejects the Plaintiffs' apparent argument that they have sufficiently alleged that every meal break was not bona fide. Judge Jones next addresses the dates on which the Plaintiffs allege they specifically recall working through their meal break. He finds that neither Plaintiff has alleged facts permitting an inference that they worked more than 40 hours during the workweek in which they worked through the meal break. For similar reasons, neither Nevett nor Noble has alleged facts suggesting that they worked more than 40 hours during any week in which they specifically identified working in EPIC while not on the clock. And, neither of them has alleged facts suggesting that they worked more than 40 hours in the workweeks for which they specifically identified that they worked in EPIC while not clocked in. Finally, Judge Jones again finds that Noble has not alleged sufficient facts to raise a plausible inference that, after she began working five 8.5 hour shifts with meal breaks per workweek, she worked in excess of 40 hours for any given week for which she was not paid appropriate overtime wages under the FLSA. Her conclusory and general allegations that she "routinely worked extra shifts and extra hours" for which she was not compensated does not meet her pleading burden. Accordingly, Judge Jones dismisses Nevett's FLSA claim to the extent she seeks damages for working off-the-clock while entering data into the EPIC system and working through a meal break. He dismisses Noble's FLSA claim in its entirety. As to the First Cause of Action, improperly calculated overtime pay, Judge Jones again declines to dismiss Nevett's FLSA overtime claim to the extent it rests upon her allegation that Renown improperly calculated her overtime compensation that it paid to her. In moving to dismiss, Renown has not offered any argument that Nevett's allegations regarding her regular rate of pay are insufficient to raise a plausible inference that she was not properly compensated for her overtime hours in the approximately 10 weeks she had an on-call shift. Accordingly, Judge Jones permits Nevett's FLSA claim to go forward solely as to her theory that her regular rate of pay was incorrectly calculated during the approximately 10 weeks in which she had an on-call shift in addition to her three regular shifts and the additional weeks she has specifically identified as having worked overtime. Judge Jones denies Renown's motion as to Second Cause of Action, state claim for failure to pay wages for all hours worked, as to both Defendants. In contrast to their FLSA claim, the Plaintiffs are not required to allege facts raising an inference that the specific days in which they worked off-the-clock or during meal breaks resulted in working more than 40 hours in a week. Their identification of the specific dates of these events is sufficient to provide Renown with notice. Further, they have alleged that that they performed compensable work for which they did not receive any compensation. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have stated a colorable claim in their Second Cause of Action for failure to pay wages for all hours worked. In the Third Cause of Action, Noble seeks damages pursuant to NRS 608.018 for not receiving overtime wages in (a) workweeks in which she worked more worked more than 40 hours, and (b) days on which she worked more than 8 hours. Renown argues this claim must be dismissed for the same reasons as Noble's FLSA claim. Judge Jones agrees that, with respect to Noble's claim for overtime wages for working more than 40 hours in a workweek, this claim fails for the same reasons as Noble's FSLA claim fails. She has not alleged facts raising a plausible inference that, for a given week, she worked in excess of 40 hours for which she did not receive overtime compensation. However, the reasoning underlying the Court's dismissal of Noble's FLSA claims does not apply to her claim for overtime wages for days in which she worked more than 8 hours. Noble has sufficiently alleged that she worked more than 8 hours on that day but did not receive overtime compensation for that work. Accordingly, Judge Jones denies Renown's motion on Noble's theory that she was not paid overtime wages on days that she worked more than 8 hours. In light of the foregoing, Judge Jones grants in part and denies in part Rowan's Partial Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint. He (i) denies the Motion as to Nevett's claim, in her First Cause of Action, that she was not fully compensated for overtime work because her regular rate of pay was incorrectly calculated; (ii) denies as to the Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action; (iii) denies as to Noble's claim, in her Third Cause of Action, that she was not fully compensated for overtime work performed in excess of 8 hours in a workday; and (iv) grants without prejudice as to all remaining claims. The Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend their Second Amended Complaint to correct the deficiencies of the dismissed claims. Any such amended complaint must be filed not later than 30 days from the date the Order is entered. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yacd8fx8 from Leagle.com. RINGS END: Hwang Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York ------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rebecca Rings End, Incorporated. The case is styled as Jenny Hwang, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. Rings End, Incorporated, Case No. 1:22-cv-05132 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 29, 2022). The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Ring's End -- https://www.ringsend.com/ -- is a building supply and home improvement company with design & decor services serving CT and southern NY since 1902.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mars Khaimov, Esq. 10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor Forest Hills, NY 11375 Phone: (917) 915-7415 Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com RON'S TOWING: Garrett Sues Over Unpaid Tow Truck Operators' OT -------------------------------------------------------------- The case, PAUL GARRETT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. RON'S TOWING, INC., Defendant, Case No. 3:22-cv-01853-E (N.D. Tex., August 22, 2022) is brought by the Plaintiff as a collective action alleging the Defendant of willful violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant on and off as a tow truck operator from approximately October 2009 until June 2022. The Plaintiff claims that he and other tow truck operators regularly worked more than 40 hours per week. The Defendant paid them a set percentage for each tow. Specifically, the Plaintiff was paid 28% of the amount of the cost to the customer for each tow. However, some of their hours worked went unrecorded and uncompensated because the Defendant required them to record their shifts as lasting exactly eight hours, even though they were regularly required to work longer than 8 hours. As a result, they were deprived by the Defendant of sufficient overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek, says the Plaintiff The Plaintiff seeks for damages, for himself and for all other similarly situated Tow Truck Operators, for all unpaid wages against the Defendant, as well as liquidated damages in an amount equal to all unpaid overtime compensation, prejudgment interest, reasonable attorney's fees and all cost, and other relief as the Court may deem just and proper. Ron's Towing, Inc. provides light-duty and heavy-duty towing services. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Colby Qualls, Esq. Josh Sanford, Esq. SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC Kirkpatrick Plaza 10800 Financial Centre Pkwy, Suite 510 Little Rock, AR 72211 Tel: (501) 221-0088 Fax: (888) 787-2040 E-mail: colby@sanfordlawfirm.com josh@sanfordlawfirm.com RUSH CAR: Viera Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Drivers and Car Cleaners ------------------------------------------------------------------- JOSE MAGDALENO VIERA and EDIN EUCEDA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. RUSH CAR WASH LLC and LAWRENCE RUSH, Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-05007 (E.D.N.Y., August 24, 2022) is a class action against the Defendants for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law including failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide wage notices, and failure to provide accurate wage statements. Plaintiffs Viera and Euceda were employed by the Defendants as drivers and car cleaners from July 2013 until December 2020 and from July 2015 until July 2021, respectively. Rush Car Wash LLC is a provider of car cleaning services, with a principal executive office located at 1199 Newbridge Rd., North Bellmore, New York. [BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Roman Avshalumov, Esq. HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601 Kew Gardens, NY 11415 Telephone: (718) 263-9591 Facsimile: (718) 263-9598 SCRIPPS HEALTH: Must File Response in Franklin Suit by Sept. 9 -------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, MICHELLE FRANKLIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SCRIPPS HEALTH, et al., Defendants, Case No. 22-cv-367-MMA (MDD) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Michael M. Anello of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California issues an interim order on the Defendant's motion to stay. Judge Anello directs the Defendant to file a response by Sept. 9, 2022, indicating whether it agrees that a Landis stay is appropriate. On March 21, 2022, Plaintiffs Michelle Franklin and Irene Gamboa initiated the putative class action against Scripps Health ("Defendant") and DOES 1 through 10. The Defendant now moves the Court to stay the case pending resolution of parallel state court actions pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine, citing Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). The Plaintiffs have filed a statement of non-opposition. They specifically request that a stay be "without prejudice to seeking to lift the stay at a later time as warranted by the facts and law in the case and related matters." Having reviewed the Defendant's motion, Judge Anello has reservations that the state court actions would completely resolve the issues in the case. While he appreciates the significant overlap in the issues and claims, he nonetheless has substantial doubt that following resolution of the state court actions there would be "nothing further to do." For example, should the state court actions settle out of court, and the Plaintiffs opt-out of those classes, the matter will need to be litigated in full. Therefore, it appears that a discretionary stay may be more appropriate, citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). Accordingly, Judge Anello directs the Defendant to file a response by Sept. 9, 2022, indicating whether it agrees that a Landis stay is appropriate. Alternatively, it must provide supplemental briefing on the Court's concern noted. The Plaintiffs may then file a further response or statement of position no later than Sept. 16, 2022. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Interim Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/mu55mzyf from Leagle.com. SERVICELINK NLS: Rinsch Wage-and-Hour Suit Removed to C.D. Cal. --------------------------------------------------------------- The case styled DANIEL RINSCH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. SERVICELINK NLS, LLC, SERVICELINK HOLDINGS, LLC, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 22STCV18156, was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles, to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on August 23, 2022. The Clerk of Court for the Central District of California assigned Case No. 2:22-cv-05989 to the proceeding. The case arises from the Defendants' alleged violations of the California Labor Code and the California's Business and Professions Code including failure to provide meal periods, failure to provide rest periods, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay all wages due to discharged and quitting employees, failure to reimburse business expenses, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and unlawful business practices. ServiceLink NLS, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ServiceLink Holdings, LLC, with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. ServiceLink Holdings, LLC is a real estate company and wholly-owned subsidiary of ServiceLink Holdings, Inc., with its principal place of business in Florida. [BN] The Defendants are represented by: Ryan H. Crosner, Esq. OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. 400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Telephone: (213) 239-9800 Facsimile: (213) 239-9012 E-mail: ryan.crosner@ogletree.com - and – Madeleine K. Lee, Esq. OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. Park Tower, Fifteenth Floor 695 Town Center Drive Costa Mesa, CA 92626 Telephone: (714) 800-7900 Facsimile: (714) 754-1298 E-mail: madeleine.lee@ogletree.com TARGET CORP: Conditional Certification in Babbitt Suit Affirmed --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, Tammy Babbitt and William Carter, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs v. Target Corporation, Defendant, Civil No. 20-490 (DWF/ECW) (D. Minn.), Judge Donovan W. Frank of the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota affirms the Magistrate Judge's order dated April 5, 2022, granting the Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification. Plaintiffs Babbitt and Carter brought the action against Target on behalf of themselves and similarly situated current and former Target Executive Team Leaders ("ETLs") to recover overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). The Plaintiffs allege that Target has misclassified ETLs in violation of the FLSA. The FLSA authorizes similarly situated employees to bring collective actions against their employer for unpaid overtime pay. To become party to an FLSA collective action, an employee must opt-in, meaning that each prospective member of the collective must give "consent in writing" to the Court. Id. Courts can facilitate the opt-in process by conditionally certifying a class and authorizing court-supervised notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs moved to conditionally certify the collective of ETLs who worked for Target on or after July 20, 2018, and the Magistrate Judge granted the Plaintiffs' motion. Target objects to the conditional certification, arguing that the Magistrate Judge (1) applied the wrong standard; (2) failed to consider Target's evidence; and (3) erroneously concluded that the Plaintiffs provided a colorable basis that the putative class members are victims of a single decision, policy, or plan. In Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 74 (2013), the Supreme Court has emphasized the distinction between class actions and collective actions. "Rule 23 actions are fundamentally different" from collective actions under the FLSA. Unlike a Rule 23 class action, conditional certification "does not produce a class with an independent legal status or join additional parties to the action." Rather, "the sole consequence of conditional certification is the sending of court-approved written notice to employees, who in turn become parties to a collective action only by filing written consent with the court." "Whatever significance 'conditional certification' may have in Section 216(b) proceedings, it is not tantamount to class certification under Rule 23." Given the nature of collective actions under the FLSA, Judge Frank agrees with the Plaintiffs that a motion for conditional certification of a collective action is separate from a motion "to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action." Significantly, however, hi decision is the same even under a de novo review. Judge Frank finds that the Order notes that Target's written policies and training materials indicate that ETLs are required to spend more than 50% of their time on leadership activities. Even so, their job descriptions include hourly tasks. ETLs are required to "jump in and assist with hourly tasks on occasion" and then "jump out at the right time to ensure they are spending the clear majority of their time on leadership." As the Order indicates, Target did not submit any evidence that provided how ETLs were to determine when the "jump out" of hourly tasks. Moreover, depositions and declarations of ETLs support the Plaintiffs' assertion that they are required to "jump in" more often because Target does not sufficiently staff its stores. The Order acknowledges the fact that the Plaintiffs have only provided testimony from less than 1% of the collective, but the testimony comes from "ETLs working at stores across the country." While Target claims that its practices are decentralized, Judge Frank opines that the Plaintiffs have put forth enough evidence to show that their experience is not unique to one store or region. Rather, ETLs in several states report spending a majority of their time on hourly tasks. This evidence "cannot be merely explained by a rogue manager or region." He agrees that "there is evidence of a pattern or practice by Target of using ETLs to shore up their hourly workers across the country." At this stage in the certification process, the Plaintiffs have met their burden. Judge Frank concludes that the "sole consequence of conditional certification is the sending of court-approved written notice to employees." At this stage, the Plaintiffs need only establish a colorable basis for their claim that the putative class members were victims of a single decision, policy, or plan. The standard is intentionally lenient. The Plaintiffs have provided enough evidence to warrant notice to the collective. For that reason, Magistrate Judge Wright's order is affirmed and the Defendant's objection is overruled. The parties are directed to contact the Magistrate Judge to establish a new timeline to meet and confer regarding notice. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Memorandum Opinion & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/3vc7fkr3 from Leagle.com. TCA LOGISTICS: Faces Zambrano Wage-and-Hour Suit in E.D.N.Y. ------------------------------------------------------------ JORGE ZAMBRANO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TCA LOGISTICS CORP., Defendant, Case No. 2:22-cv-05026-KAM-ST (E.D.N.Y., August 24, 2022) is a class action against the Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law including failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide wage notices, failure to provide accurate wage statements, and failure to pay spread-of-hours pay. The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a delivery worker in New York from early March 2015 until March 22, 2022. TCA Logistics Corp. is a shipping and delivery services company, with its principal place of business located at 102 Lauman Lane, Hicksville, New York. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Jon L. Norinsberg, Esq. Michael R. Minkoff, Esq. JOSEPH & NORINSBERG, LLC 110 East 59th Street, Suite 3200 New York, NY 10022 Telephone: (212) 227-5700 Facsimile: (212) 656-1889 E-mail: jon@norinsberglaw.com michael@employeejustice.com TELADOC HEALTH: Labaton Named Lead Counsel in Securities Suit ------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, IN RE TELADOC HEALTH, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No. 22cv4687 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Denise Cote of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York appoints Leadersel Innotech ESG as the Lead Plaintiff and Labaton Sucharow LLP as the Lead Counsel. On Aug. 5, 2022, five applicants submitted a motion to be appointed as the lead plaintiff in the securities class action. Since then, each applicant except Leadersel Innotech ESG has withdrawn their motion. Accordingly, Leadersel Innotech ESG is appointed the Lead Plaintiff and Labaton Sucharow LLP will serve as the Lead Counsel. Every pleading filed in the action, and in any separate action subsequently included therein, will bear the following caption: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK IN RE TELADOC HEALTH, INC. 22cv4687 (DLC) SECURITIES LITIGATION When a class action that relates to the same subject matter as the action is filed in or transferred to the Court and assigned to Judge Cote, it will be consolidated with the action (provided that any case transferred to the Court solely for pretrial proceedings will be consolidated only to that extent absent further order of this Court), and the Clerk of Court shall: file a copy of this Order in the separate file for such action.; mail a copy of the Order of assignment of counsel for the Plaintiffs and the counsel for each defendant in the consolidated actions; make an appropriate entry in the Docket; mail to the attorneys for the Plaintiff(s) in the newly filed or transferred case a copy of the Order; and upon the first appearance of any new Defendant(s), mail to the attorneys for such Defendant(s) in such newly filed or transferred case a copy of the Order. The Clerk will maintain a separate file for each of the consolidated actions and filings will be made therein in accordance with the regular procedures of the Clerk of the Court except as modified by the Order. The Court requests the assistance of counsel in calling to the attention of the Clerk the filing or transfer of any case which might properly be consolidated with the Action. The Order will apply to each class action assigned Judge Cote alleging claims similar to those set forth in the action against Acorda and others. t will apply to each such case which is subsequently filed in or transferred to the Court, and which is assigned to Judge Cote unless a party objecting to the consolidation of that case or to any other provision of the Order serves an application for relief from the Order or from any of its provisions within 10 days after the date on which the Clerk mails a copy of the Order to counsel for that party. The provisions of the Order will apply to such action pending the Court's ruling on the application. Unless a plaintiff in a subsequently filed or transferred case is permitted by the Court to use a separate complaint, the Defendants will not be required to answer, plead or otherwise move with respect to that complaint in any such case. If a plaintiff in any such case is permitted to use a separate complaint, each defendant will have 30 days from the date the Court grants such permission within which to answer, plead or otherwise move with respect to any such complaint. The Lead Plaintiff will file an amended complaint for the action and any actions subsequently consolidated with it by Sept. 30, 2022. The Defendants will file an answer to the amended complaint or a motion to dismiss the amended complaint by Oct. 21, 2022. Pending filing and service of the amended complaint, the Defendants will have no obligation to move, answer, or otherwise respond to any complaints in any actions subsequently consolidated with the action. If a motion to dismiss the amended complaint is filed, the Lead Plaintiff may further amend its complaint by Nov. 11, 2022. It is unlikely that the Lead Plaintiff will have a further opportunity to amend. If the Lead Plaintiff elects not to further amend the complaint, it will file its opposition to the motion to dismiss by Nov. 11, 2022. The Defendants will file their reply to the opposition to the motion to dismiss by Nov. 25, 2022. They will supply the Court with two courtesy copies of the motion papers at the time the reply is served. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Class Management Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/49sebneb from Leagle.com. TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL: Blue Cross Sues Over Copaxone Drug Monopoly ---------------------------------------------------------------- BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF VERMONT; and THE VERMONT HEALTH PLAN, Plaintiffs v. TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, LTD., TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC., TEVA SALES AND MARKETING, INC., and TEVA NEUROSCIENCE, INC., Defendants, Case No. 5:22-cv-00159-gwc (D. Vt., Aug. 22, 2022) alleges violation of the Sherman Act. The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that Teva manipulated the purchasing decisions of health plan members by circumventing the cost-sharing obligations that health plans used to help make members sensitive to price. Most health plans require members to pay co-insurance or copayments, which represent a portion of the purchase price of prescription drugs and other medical care. These payments are designed to make members at least partially internalize the cost of prescriptions so they will prefer more affordable treatment options and not cause plan payors to incur excessive costs. Given these cost-sharing arrangements, Teva knew plan members would prefer more affordable generic versions of glatiramer acetate, says the Plaintiff. Rather than making the price of Copaxone more affordable, Teva provided health plan members with coupons" that relieved them of some or all of their cost-sharing obligations if they purchased Copaxone. This meant that for health plan members. Copaxone would be less expensive than generics. Unfortunately, for health plan payors, the entities that pay the bulk of the cost for all prescriptions, Copaxone remained excessively priced. In this way, Teva avoided price competition by insulating decision-makers from the true cost of Copaxone. Teva thus induced health plan payors to continue paying for Copaxone instead of lower-cost generics, alleges the suit. TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES LIMITED operates as a pharmaceutical company. The Company develops, manufactures, and markets generic and branded human pharmaceuticals, as well as active pharmaceutical ingredients. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries serves customers worldwide. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Bridget C. Asay, Esq. Michael N. Donofrio 15 East State Street Suite 2 Montpelier, VT 05602 Telephone: (802) 858-4285 Facsimile: (802) 858-4465 Email: basay@stris.com mdonofrio@stris.com - and - Elizabeth Rogers Brannen, Esq. 777 South Figueroa Street, Suite 3850 Los Angeles, CA 90017 Telephone: (213) 995-6800 Email: ebrannen@stris.com - and - Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Esq. Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Esq. Matthew M. Gerend, Esq. Felicia J. Craick, Esq. Natida Sribhibbhadh, Esq. KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P. 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200 Seattle, WA 98101 Telephone: (206) 623-1900 Facsimile: (206) 623-3384 Email: Isarko@kellerrohrback.com gcappio@kellerohrback.com mgerend@kellerohrback.com feraick@kellerohrback.com sread@kellerohrback.com - and - Alison E. Chase, Esq. KELLER ROHRBACK, L.L.P. 801 Garden Street, Suite 301 Santa Barbara, CA 93101 Telephone: (805) 456-1496 Email: achase@kellerrohrback.com TEXAS: Attorney General Sued Over Strict Anti Abortion Laws ----------------------------------------------------------- FUND TEXAS CHOICE; THE NORTH TEXAS EQUAL ACCESS FUND; THE LILITH FUND FOR REPRODUCTIVE EQUITY; FRONTERA FUND; THE AFIYA CENTER; WEST FUND; JANE'S DUE PROCESS; CLINIC ACCESS SUPPORT NETWORK; and DR. GHAZALEH MOAYEDI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. KEN PAXTON, in his Official Capacity of Attorney General; SUSAN R. DESKI, in her Official Capacity of County Attorney of Burleson County, Texas, and on behalf of a class of all Texas County Attorneys similarly situated; JULIE RENKEN, in her Official Capacity of District Attorney for Washington County, Texas; WILEY B. "SONNY" MCAFEE, in his Official Capacity of District Attorney for Blanco, Burnet, Llano, and San Saba Counties, Texas; JOSE GARZA in his Official Capacity of District Attorney for Travis County, Texas; and FRED H. WEBER, in his Official Capacity of District Attorney for Caldwell County, and on behalf of a class of all Texas District Attorneys similarly situated, Defendants, Case No. 1:22-cv-00859 (W.D. Tex., Aug. 23, 2022) seeks to challenge any criminal prosecution of the Plaintiffs under Texas anti-abortion statutes for lawful exercise of their constitutional rights. According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the Defendants from applying Texas's anti-abortion laws to the Plaintiffs for the legal exercise of their rights. The Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment declaring unconstitutional, null and void the retroactive application of the Pre-Roe Statutes and to enjoin the Defendants from applying them against the Plaintiffs, their staff, volunteers, and donors for conduct that preceded the Dobbs decision. TEXAS is a state in the South Central region of the United States. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Jennifer R. Ecklund, Esq. Elizabeth G. Myers, Esq. Allyn Jaqua Lowell, Esq. John Atkins, Esq. Elizabeth Rocha, Esq. Alexandra Wilson Albright, Esq. THOMPSON COBURN LLP 2100 Ross Avenue, Suite 3200 Dallas, TX 75201 Telephone: (972) 629-7100 Facsimile: (972) 629-7171 Email: jecklund@thompsoncoburn.com emyers@thompsoncoburn.com alowell@thompsoncoburn.com jatkins@thompsoncoburn.com erocha@thompsoncoburn.com aalbright@adjtlaw.com -and- Marcy Hogan Greer, Esq. 515 Congress Ave., Suite 2350 Austin, TX 78701-3562 Telephone: (512) 482-9300 Facsimile: (512) 482-9303 Email: mgreer@adjtlaw.com -and- Kevin Dubose, Esq. 1844 Harvard Street Houston, TX 77008 Telephone: (713) 523-2358 Facsimile: (713) 522-4553 Email: kdubose@adjtlaw.com -and- Kirsten M. Castaneda, Esq. 8144 Walnut Hill Lane, Suite 1000 Dallas, TX 75231-4388 Telephone: (214) 369-2358 Facsimile: (214) 369-2359 Email: kcastaneda@adjtlaw.com THEDACARE INC: Court Narrows Claims in Glick ERISA Class Suit ------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, JOSEPH B. GLICK, individually and as a representative of a class of participants and beneficiaries of the ThedaCare Retirement and 403(b) Savings Plan, Plaintiff v. THEDACARE INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 20-C-1236 (E.D. Wis.), Judge William C. Griesbach of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin grants in part and denies in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss. Mr. Glick, a participant in the ThedaCare, Inc. Retirement and 403(b) Savings Plan (the Plan), brings the case as a proposed class action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(2), against Defendants ThedaCare and its Board of Directors. On Sept. 4, 2018, the Plaintiff was hired as a surgical technician by ThedaCare. ThedaCare terminated Plaintiff's employment on July 27, 2020. ThedaCare is both the plan sponsor and plan administrator of the ThedaCare Retirement and 403(b) Savings Plan. The Plan is a "defined contribution" pension plan under 29 U.S.C. Section 1102(2)(A) and 1002(34), meaning that ThedaCare's contribution to the payment of plan costs is guaranteed but the pension benefits are not. The Plan has approximately $612 million in assets and over 7,900 participants. The Plaintiff claims that, at all relevant times, the Plan's fees were excessive when compared with other comparable 401(k) and 403(b) plans offered by other sponsors that had similar numbers of plan participants and similar amounts of money under management. He also alleges that the excessive fees led to lower net returns than those that participants in comparable 401(k) and 403(b) plans enjoyed. The Plaintiff asserts that during the putative Class Period, which is defined as Aug. 12, 2014, through the date of judgment, the Defendants, as fiduciaries of the Plan, breached the duties owed to the Plan, to him, and to all other plan participants by (1) failing to objectively and adequately review the Plan's investment portfolio with due care to ensure that each investment option was prudent, in terms of cost; (2) maintaining certain funds in the Plan despite the availability of identical or similar investment options with lower costs and/or better performance histories; (3) failing to monitor the recordkeeping and administration fees paid by the Plan to ensure that they were reasonable and, as a result, authorizing the Plan to pay objectively unreasonable and excessive recordkeeping and administration fees, relative to the recordkeeping and administration services received; and (4) failing to adequately disclose fees associated with the Plan to plan participants. The Defendants' recordkeeper during the Class Period was Transamerica Retirement Solutions, which the Plaintiff alleges is "well known as a high cost recordkeeper and administrator and tends to have platforms that encourage higher fee funds." The Plaintiff asserts six claims for relief: breaches of duties of loyalty and prudence regarding recordkeeping and administration fees (Count I); breaches of duties of loyalty and prudence regarding managed account service fees (Count II); breaches of duties of loyalty and prudence regarding investment management fees (Count III); failure to adequately monitor other fiduciaries regarding recordkeeping and administration fees (Count IV); failure to adequately monitor other fiduciaries regarding managed account services fees (Count V); and failure to adequately monitor other fiduciaries regarding investment management fees (Count VI). The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's amended complaint on Dec. 4, 2020. On Sept. 30, 2021, the Court stayed and administratively closed the case pending the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hughes v. Northwestern University, No. 19-1401. The Supreme Court issued a decision in Hughes on Jan. 24, 2022. 142 S.Ct. 737 (2022). That same day, the Court lifted the stay and invited the parties to submit simultaneous supplemental briefing in light of the Supreme Court's decision. The parties submitted supplemental briefs on Feb. 7, 2022. First, the Defendants assert that the Plaintiff lacks Article III standing because he does not allege that he invested in any of the allegedly imprudent investment options or paid any of the fees about which he complains. Judge Griesbach holds that the Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of Article III standing by alleging that he suffered objectively unreasonable and unnecessary monetary losses through injuries to the Plan's assets unrelated to specific funds. The Plaintiff has a "concrete stake" in the lawsuit because if Plaintiff wins his suit, he alleges that his account balance will be greater based on the excessive fees and expenses returned to his individual account by the Defendants. Because the Plaintiff has alleged his own injury in fact, he has standing to assert claims on behalf of other affected plan participants. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has standing to assert all of the claims brought in the action. Next, the Plaintiff alleges the Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by causing the Plan to pay excessive recordkeeping costs, failing to retain the least costly share class of each fund, retaining high-cost funds, failing to disclose revenue-sharing information to participants, and failing to follow a prudent process in providing managed account services. Judge Griesbach holds that (i) the amended complaint plausibly alleges that the Defendants' failure to solicit bids and negotiate for reasonable fees was imprudent; (ii) the Plaintiff has stated a claim that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duty by retaining high-cost actively managed investments and offering the Prudential GIC without undertaking an appropriate process; (iii) it is plausible to infer from the Plaintiff's allegations that the Defendants breached the duty of prudence by failing to retain low-cost share classes of nine mutual funds for the Plan; (iv) although the Defendants dispute whether the alternative services are appropriate comparisons, at this stage, the Plaintiff has asserted allegations from which it can be inferred that the Defendants followed an imprudent process in selecting Transamerica to provide managed account services; and (v) the Defendants are not required to disclose fees charged or credited to the Plan investments with the level of detail sought by the Plaintiff. As to their remaining claims, the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants breached ERISA's duty of loyalty, which requires fiduciaries to act solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries. Their breach of the duty of loyalty claim is based on the same allegations as the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Judge Griesback holds that they must do more than recast allegations of purported breaches of fiduciary duty as disloyal acts. The Amended Complaint does not contain any allegations beyond those pertaining to an alleged breach of fiduciary duty; therefore, the Plaintiff's breach of the duty of loyalty claims must be dismissed. The Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants breached their duty to monitor. Judge Griesbach finds that their breach of the duty to monitor claim is derivative of the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Because the Plaintiff has stated claims for breach of fiduciary duty with respect to the recordkeeping fees paid, managed account services fees, and investment management fees, he has also stated a claim that the Defendants breached their duty to monitor. For these reasons, Judge Griesbach grants in part and denies in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss. The motion is granted with respect to the Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim regarding the Defendants' failure to properly disclose revenue sharing information to participants and breach of the duty of loyalty claims, and those claims are dismissed. The motion is denied in all other respects. The Clerk is directed to set the matter on the Court's calendar for a Rule 16 telephonic scheduling conference. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Decision & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/3vk3durm from Leagle.com. TRINITY PACKAGING: Prelim. Approval of Robertson Class Deal Denied ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case, CLAUDE ROBERTSON and JOHN SZALASNY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. TRINITY PACKAGING CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-CV-659(JLS)(JJM)(W.D.N.Y.), Judge John L. Sinatra, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for Western District of New York denies the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and for Certification of Class for Settlement Purpose. On May 21, 2019, Robertson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, filed a Collective Action Complaint against his former employer, Trinity, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) alleging that it willfully violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 201 et seq. After the Defendant answered the Complaint, District Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo, to whom the case was previously assigned, referred the case to Magistrate Judge Jerimiah J. McCarthy for all proceedings under 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). On Dec. 27, 2019, Robertson and Szalasny, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, filed an Amended Collective and Class Action Complaint alleging that the Defendant willfully violated the FLSA, New York Labor Law, Sections 650 et seq. and 190 et seq., and 12 NYCRR Section 142-1.1 et seq. (collectively, the "NYLL"). On May 12, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed an "Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and for Certification of Class for Settlement Purposes," which attached a "Joint Stipulation of Settlement and Release" proposing to settle all NYLL class claims as well as all FLSA collective claims. On June 21, 2022, Judge McCarthy issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion be denied. Neither party objected to the Report and Recommendation and the time to do so has expired. A district court may accept, reject, or modify the findings or recommendations of a magistrate judge. It must conduct a de novo review of those portions of a magistrate judge's recommendation to which a party objects. But neither 28 U.S.C. Section 636 nor Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 requires a district court to review the recommendation of a magistrate judge to which no objections are raised. Though not required to do so, Judge Sinatra nevertheless reviewed Judge McCarthy's Report and Recommendation. Based on that review, and absent any objections, he accepts the Recommendation. For the reasons he stated, he denies the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion. The case is referred back to Judge McCarthy for further proceedings consistent with the referral order of July 31, 2019. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Decision & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/buccjd2v from Leagle.com. TUSIMPLE HOLDINGS: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due Nov. 1 ----------------------------------------------------------------- Shareholder rights law firm Johnson Fistel, LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has commenced on behalf of investors of TuSimple Holdings, Inc. ("TuSimple" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: TSP). The class action is on behalf of shareholders who purchased or otherwise, acquired TuSimple stock between April 15, 2021 and August 1, 2022, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"). Investors are hereby notified that they have until November 1, 2022 to move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff in this action. What actions may I take at this time? If you suffered a loss and are interested in learning more about being a lead plaintiff, please contact Jim Baker (jimb@johnsonfistel.com) by email or phone at 619-814-4471. If emailing, please include a phone number. To join this action, you can click or copy and paste the link below in a browser: https://www.johnsonfistel.com/investigations/tusimple-holdings-inc There is no cost or obligation to you. According to the complaint, on August 1, 2022, the Wall Street Journal published an article entitled "Self-Driving Truck Accident Draws Attention to Safety at TuSimple," which brought to light a number of previously undisclosed concerns that undermined Defendants' representations and omissions concerning the safety of the Company's autonomous driving technology. The article referenced an April 6, 2022 accident involving a truck fitted with TuSimple's technology, and reported that, among other things, "[t]he accident. . . underscores concerns that the autonomous-trucking company is risking safety on public roads in a rush to deliver driverless trucks to market, according to independent analysts and more than a dozen of the company's former employees." A lead plaintiff will act on behalf of all other class members in directing the TuSimple class-action lawsuit. The lead plaintiff can select a law firm of its choice to litigate the class-action lawsuit. An investor's ability to share any potential future recovery of the TuSimple class action lawsuit is not dependent upon serving as lead plaintiff. For more information regarding the lead plaintiff process please refer to https://www.johnsonfistel.com/lead-plaintiff-deadlines. About Johnson Fistel Johnson Fistel, LLP is a nationally recognized shareholder rights law firm with offices in California, New York and Georgia. The firm represents individual and institutional investors in shareholder derivative and securities class action lawsuits. Johnson Fistel seeks to recover losses incurred due to violations of federal securities laws. For more information about the firm and its attorneys, please visit http://www.johnsonfistel.com.Attorney advertising. Past results do not guarantee future outcomes. [GN] UNCOMMON GROUNDS: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Amended Aguilar Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case, BRIGIDO GALVEZ AGUILAR, Plaintiff v. UNCOMMON GROUNDS ENTERPRISES, INC., DISHES GROUP MANAGEMENT CORP., CITY MINT, INC., MINI MINT, INC., MINT NO. 5. INC., MOSHE MALLUL, MARGARITA TALISMAN, Defendant, Index No. 150552/2022 (N.Y. Sup.), Mary V. Rosado of the Supreme Court, New York County, grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. The Plaintiff filed a Complaint on behalf of himself and a purported Class on Jan. 18, 2022. In the Complaint, he alleged that the Defendants collectively own and operate five restaurants as one integrated enterprise under the name "Dishes." He further alleged that he worked for Dishes from December 2014 to March 2020. The Plaintiff alleged on behalf of himself and the class that the Defendants engaged in improper time shaving, improper tip credit practices, improper meal credit practices, and a variety of other violations of New York Labor Law ("NYLL"). He describes the proposed class as delivery persons, servers, runners, bussers, cashiers, porters, cooks, line-cooks, food preparers, and dishwashers employed by Dishes. He also proposed a subclass of tipped employees comprised of waiters, servers, runners, delivery persons, and busboys ("Tipped Subclass"). The Defendants did not file an Answer. Rather, they filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. They moved to dismiss on numerous grounds. First, they argued that the Plaintiff does not have standing to represent the class since he never alleges to have been a server, runner, busser, cashier, porter, cook, line-cook, food preparer, or dishwasher, but only a delivery person. They also claim that because the Plaintiff does not cite to any specific section of NYLL that provides a basis for relief, the Complaint must be dismissed. They further assert that Plaintiff cannot bring a class action for record keeping violations or statutory penalties pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") Section 901(b). The Defendants argue dismissal is also appropriate because the Plaintiff's "off the clock allegations" are too individualized to warrant class treatment. They also produced affidavits from current employees and the Plaintiff's manager that contradict their affidavit. In response to the Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint contained the same allegations as the original Complaint. The only difference between the Complaint and the Amended Complaint was that rather than alleging Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to liquidated damages and statutory penalties, in the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff sought to recover liquidated damages and statutory penalties solely for himself. One week after filing his Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff moved for class certification. The Defendant and the Plaintiff agreed to moot the Defendant's first motion to dismiss in lieu of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. The Defendants did not file an Answer to the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Instead, they moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, arguing that the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to CPLR Sections 3211(a)(2) and (7) for essentially the same reasons as their original motion to dismiss. They also argued that because the Plaintiff has not individually waived his own statutory penalty claims, he cannot pursue class relief. The Plaintiff opposed arguing that he has met the liberal pleading standard of the CPLR, that the Defendants' affidavits are self-serving, and that failure to specify under which provision of the NYLL he seeks relief is not fatal to his Complaint. Judge Rosado finds that the Defendants have conclusively shown that the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint seeking class relief is barred as a matter of law. In his Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff has not waived his right to an award of statutory penalties. Not only does he fail to notice Defendants what section of the NYLL he is seeking relief under, but the Plaintiff has not pled that the statutory penalties he seeks for himself are specifically authorized to be recovered in a class action. Therefore, as the Amended Complaint is currently pled, the Plaintiff cannot seek class relief while also seeking statutory penalties for himself, especially when he does not state under which provisions of the NYLL he seeks relief. However, a plaintiff can avoid application of CPLR Section 901(b) by waiving her right to penalties. Thus, the Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. The Plaintiff is granted leave to correct the deficiencies in his Amended Complaint. The Plaintiff's motion for class certification is rendered moot as the Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. Moreover, a motion to certify a class action is premature if it is made before a Defendant's time to serve an answer has expired. The Plaintiff may renew its motion for class certification if it files a second Amended Complaint. Accordingly, Judge Rosado grants the motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint as the Plaintiff's claim for statutory penalties bars the class action complaint. She grants the Plaintiff leave to replead within 21 days of the date of service of her Decision and Order with notice of entry. The Defendant will serve and file a responsive pleading within 35 days of the date of service of the Decision and Order with notice of entry. Judge Rosado renders moot the motion for class certification because the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed. This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Decision + Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/27wx9juw from Leagle.com. VICTORIA: Police Uses Capsicum Spray Against Protesters, Suit Says ------------------------------------------------------------------ abc.net.au reports that a class action has been launched against the Victorian government over the use by police of capsicum spray against anti-mining protesters in Melbourne three years ago. The legal action relates to demonstrations outside the International Mining and Resources Conference at the Melbourne Exhibition Centre in October 2019. Police arrested numerous people over several days of protests, and used capsicum spray to break up climate activists who'd gathered outside the venue. The class action claims the use of capsicum spray was unlawful and excessive, and that protesters were not causing an immediate threat to police officers or the public. The writ was lodged by Inner Melbourne Community Legal on behalf of lead plaintiff Jordan Brown, who was sprayed by police during the protest. "I've been documenting protests for two decades, and see that police continue to systematically suppress basic civil and political rights throughout Australia in increasing measure," Mr Brown said. "This class action provides a pathway towards some meaningful change in Victoria." The Special Counsel leading the case, Olivia McMillan said police used excessive force when they sprayed the group of between 50 and 100 protesters. "Mr Brown suffered redness and dry eyes for a couple of days, quite severe pain and continues to have apprehension when interacting with police," she said. "There's ample footage of protesters being indiscriminately sprayed. Given the important role, trust and position the police play, it's important they be held to account." Victoria Police said it could not comment on court action. At the time of the protest, then-Police Minister Lisa Neville said she was "100 per cent comfortable" with police action. "They are allowing people to peacefully protest, which we are not seeing . . . and allowing people to go about their day-to-day business without being affected," she told ABC Radio Melbourne. "Surrounding conference attendees is just inappropriate behaviour. "I commend them [police]. Without police being there, those protesters would be surrounding and making it physically dangerous for those people attempting to attend a legal conference in Victoria." [GN] WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: Court Certifies Class in Nelson FLSA Suit -------------------------------------------------------------- Magistrate Judge Carla Baldwin of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada conditionally certify the case, CHRISTOPHER NELSON, Plaintiff v. WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 3:21-CV-00066-MMD-CLB (D. Nev.), as a collective action for notice purposes. Mr. Nelson and all current Opt-In Plaintiffs -- all non-exempt hourly paid warehouse workers -- sue Wal-Mart under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 201, et seq., for its alleged failure to pay employees for pre-shift activities and labor, and bring related claims under Nevada law. Pending before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion for circulation of notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b). Defendant Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. ("Walmart") opposed the motion, and the Plaintiffs replied. For the reasons discussed, the Court will grant the motion, in part, and conditionally certify this case as a collective action for notice purposes because the Plaintiffs have persuaded the Court they are sufficiently similarly situated under the FLSA. Mr. Nelson is a non-exempt hourly employee of Defendant's Grocery Distribution Center ("GDC") warehouse in Sparks, Nevada. The warehouse is divided into a "Dry" Section and "Cold" Section. Nelson was a former processor in the Cold Section, where all of the Defendant's frozen and refrigerated items are distributed, and currently works as a processor in the Dry Section. He works four shifts per week, for ten paid hours per shift. Mr. Nelson alleges the Defendant requires all Dry Section employees to be prepared at the start of their shift time but does not permit them to clock in until immediately before their shift. In preparation for their shift, employees must check out and bring back a mobile scanner and printer from Defendant's system control window, which takes approximately 15 minutes. Nelson maintains that the scanner and printer are "integral and indispensable" to his job since Dry Section workers need the equipment to label and take inventory of Defendant's products. He alleges that he and other similarly situated workers are not compensated for this pre-shift activity, which amounts to around one hour per workweek or $33.53 of overtime pay for him. Mr. Nelson alleges the Defendant similarly requires all Cold Section workers to be prepared at the start of their shift but does not permit them to clock in until immediately before their shift. In preparation for their shift, the Defendant requires Cold Section employees to put on personal protective equipment ("PPE") for safety reasons due to the cold working environment. According to Nelson, the PPE includes RefrigiWear insulated bibs, a RefrigiWear thermal jacket, a thermal hooded sweatshirt, a stocking hat, and wool socks. He alleges that the PPE is "integral and indispensable" to the job of a Cold Section worker since they "cannot perform their job safely and/or effectively without donning" the apparel. He estimates that the process of donning the PPE takes 15 minutes per shift and employees are not compensated for this pre-shift activity, which amounts to around one hour per workweek or $33.90 of overtime pay for him. Mr. Nelson subsequently filed the collective and class action, asserting the following claims in the FAC: (1) failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"); (2) failure to pay minimum wages in violation of the Nevada Constitution; (3) failure to pay wages for all hours worked in violation of Nevada Revised Statute ("NRS") Section 608.140 and Section 608.016; (4) failure to pay overtime wages in violation of NRS Section 608.140 and Section 608.018; and (5) failure to timely pay all wages due and owing upon termination pursuant to NRS Section 608.140 and Sections 608.020-608.050. The District Court granted, in part, a motion to dismiss the FAC, wherein it dismissed, without prejudice the claim for failure to timely pay all wages due and owing upon termination pursuant to NRS Section 608.140 and Sections 608.020-608.050 based on a lack of standing. In the instant motion, Nelson seeks conditional certification of his case as a collective action under the FLSA. The question before the Court is whether the Plaintiffs are similarly situated such that notices will be sent out to other potential plaintiffs, who could then opt-in to Plaintiffs' proposed collective action. The Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that the Plaintiffs have not shown they are similarly situated such that notices should be sent out. They argue in the alternative, that if the Court chooses to preliminarily certify the collective action, the Notice should be revised and only sent to those impacted GDC associates in Nevada and South Carolina. In reply, the Plaintiffs agree to limit the notice at this time to only those similarly situated individuals who were employed by Defendant at its McCarran (Nevada) and Pageland (South Carolina) facilities. With this concession in mind, Judge Baldwin finds the Plaintiffs employed at the Nevada and South Carolina facilities are similarly situated because they have made the "requisite showing that they and the proposed collective action members were allegedly 'victims of a common policy or plan,' thereby warranting conditional certification." She says, the Plaintiffs' operative pleading and the limited evidence they have presented to the Court sufficiently show that they were victims of the Defendants' common policy -- that they were suffered and/or permitted to work without compensation prior to the start of their shift. She thus finds they have satisfied the plausibility requirement for conditional collective action certification. As discussed, the Plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing that such factual and legal similarities exist to satisfy the "lenient standard that requires a modest showing" at this stage of the litigation. Judge Baldwin therefore conditionally certifies the case as a collective action -- limited to GDC workers in the Nevada and South Carolina locations. Accordingly, she orders the parties to work collaboratively to reconcile and resolve all notice disputes -- consistent with the limitation of workers to the Nevada and South Carolina locations -- and come up with a revised notice together. Judge Baldwin notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several cases not discussed. She has reviewed these arguments and cases and determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the motion before the Court. For these reasons, she grants the Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification in part, as specified. She conditionally certifies a collective action consisting of GDC workers at the McCarran, Nevada and Pageland, South Carolina locations. The parties must work together to resolve all collective action notice issues, and if they are unable to reach an agreement, they must present their notice disputes in a motion that complies with the Local Rules. They will have 60 days to submit a revised notice to the Court for approval. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/4hmv4hnf from Leagle.com. WEDRIVEU INC: Chatman Wage-and-Hour Suit Goes to N.D. California ---------------------------------------------------------------- The case styled PRECIOUS CHATMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. WEDRIVEU, INC. and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 22-CIV-02197, was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Mateo, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on August 24, 2022. The Clerk of Court for the Northern District of California assigned Case No. 3:22-cv-04849 to the proceeding. The case arises from the Defendant's alleged violations of the California Labor Code and the California's Business and Professions Code. WeDriveU, Inc. is an operator of shuttle transportation solutions in California. [BN] The Defendant is represented by: Christopher A. Braham, Esq. MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP 2049 Century Park East, Suite 3200 Los Angeles, CA 90067-3206 Telephone: (310) 277-4110 Facsimile: (310) 277-4730 E-mail: cbraham@mwe.com WINCO HOLDINGS: Court Dismisses Putman Suit With Leave to Amend --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, GENEVA PUTMAN, on behalf of herself and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. WINCO HOLDINGS, INC., an Idaho corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-01760-MCE-JDP (E.D. Cal.), Judge Morrison C. England, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California denies the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend. Through the action, Putman seeks relief from WinCo for wage and hour violations of the California Labor Code and California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200 et seq. Presently before the Court are the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint or, in the Alternative, to Strike or, in the Alternative, to Stay Proceedings, and the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. Judge England has addressed materially identical motions in the related cases Castanon v. WinCo Holdings, Inc., Case No. 2:20-cv-01656-MCE-JDP, and Phoung v. Winco Holdings, Inc., Case No. 2:21-cv-02033-MCE-JDP. He adopts his remand analysis from Phoung here, and denies the Plaintiff's instant Motion for the same reasons set forth therein. Based on the evidence presented by the Defendant in thw case, there is simply no doubt that the diversity and amount in controversy requirements under the Class Action Fairness Act have been met. In addition, for the same reasons stated in his evaluation of previous motions to dismiss filed in those cases, Judge England finds that the Plaintiff's instant Complaint is wholly conclusory and fails to state any claim here as well. The Plaintiff concedes that her pleading as constituted is likely insufficient to meet federal standards. She thus foregoes making any arguments in opposition to dismissal and seeks leave to amend, which Judge England agrees should be permitted. Given the foregoing disposition, Judge England declines to strike class allegations or stay the case. In sum, for the reasons he stated, Judge England denies the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend. He denies as moot the Defendant's alternative requests to strike the class allegations or stay proceedings. Not later than 20 days following the date the Order is electronically filed, the Plaintiff may, but is not required to, file an amended complaint. If no amended pleading is timely filed, the action will be deemed dismissed with prejudice upon no further notice to the parties. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 24, 2022 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/3mxsyf8u from Leagle.com. WINCO HOLDINGS: Court Narrows Claims in Castanon's 2nd Amended Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, ESMERALDA CASTANON and JOHN DURON, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. WINCO HOLDINGS, INC., an Idaho Corporation, doing business as WINCO FOODS; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:20-cv-01656-MCE-JDP (E.D. Cal.), Judge Morrison C. England, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California grants in part and denies in part Winco's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. Through the present class action proceeding, Castanon challenges various wage and hour practices utilized by her employer, Defendant Winco, both on her own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated. According to her, Winco has failed 1) to pay its employees all wages owed, including overtime; 2) to provide legally compliant meal and rest periods; and 3) to pay all wages due upon separation. She further alleges that wage statements provided by Winco have been legally non-compliant. Winco operates at multiple locations in California as a retailer providing supermarket products to consumers. The Plaintiff was employed as a non-exempt customer service employee between 2001 and 2019 (her title was Loss Prevention Agent) at Winco's location in Chico, California. The Plaintiff alleges that she, as well as all other non-exempt Winco employees working in California, were required to check in and out of their shifts by using an electronic time clock that rounded total time worked each day to the nearest 15-minute inverval. While minutes were rounded to the closest 15-minute period (with an employee working seven minutes rounded down but eight or more minutes rounded up), according to the SAC, Winco's time clock also calculated seconds and always rounded down to the nearest minute. The Plaintiff alleges that by always rounding total seconds down to the previous minute in this matter, Winco's rounding policy systematically undercompensates its employees and is not neutral on its face. Moreover, citing her own personal experience, she alleges that 43% of her shifts over 8 hours fell between 8:01 and 8:07, hours as opposed to only 5% falling between 8:08 and 8:14, making it far more likely that her time was rounded down rather than up. She further alleges that some 80% of her total shifts worked from May of 2019 to July of 2019 were rounded down. As an alternative to the Plaintiff's claim that because the rounding practices employed by Winco were not neutral, she and other class members were deprived of the total wages they were owed, she further points to bonuses that were not included in her regular rate of pay for purposes of calculating overtime. The Plaintiff goes on to claim that she and others were also not provided lawful meal and rest breaks and were not compensated for breaks that were missed. According to her, she and others were impeded and/or discouraged from taking breaks when a manager was either unavailable or could not be readily located. In addition to alleging that Winco failed to pay wages owed and further failed to provide mandated meal and rest breaks, the Plaintiff also alleges a failure on Winco's part to provide accurate, lawful itemized wage statements to both herself and other class members because the correct rates of pay were not properly itemized. Finally, when Winco terminated her employment on July 15, 2019, rather than paying her immediately for all wages due and unpaid as of that time, the Plaintiff claims that she was underpaid due to all the factors discussed, including improper rounding, and unpaid meal and rest period premiums occasioned by Winco's failure to provide legally compliant breaks. Winco previously moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint on grounds that because the allegations contained therein were generic and lacked specificity, they failed to state any legally cognizable claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). That Motion, which also moved to strike, in accordance with Rule 12(f), the FAC's class action allegations as formulaic and conclusory, was granted in part and denied in part on Sept. 30, 2021. Because the Plaintiff was accorded leave to amend, a Second Amended Complaint was filed on Oct. 20, 2021. Now before the Court is an additional Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively to Strike, on the same grounds. First, Judge England concludes that, given the new averments contained in the SAC, the First Cause of Action, for failing to pay proper wages, survives Winco's pleading challenge for failure to state a claim. In now moving to dismiss the Plaintiff's subsequently filed SAC, Winco argues that she has still not pled a cause of action. Judge England disagrees saying unlike its predecessor, the SAC plausibly alleges how the rounding practices employed by Winco, in always rounding seconds down to the previous minute as set forth, impermissibly favors Winco when rounding to the nearest 15-minute interval in certain circumstances. In addition to augmenting her factual allegations concerning the potential bias of Winco's rounding policies, the Plaintiff has also added new allegations pertaining to Winco's payment of "gift card" bonuses that, because they apply to all employees working during the bonus period who are still employed at the time a bonus is distributed, are non-discretionary in nature and consequently should have been included in their regular rate of pay but were not. Next, as to Second and Third Causes of Action for meal and rest period violations, Judge England concludes that the Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to state a viable cause of action. While the California Supreme Court, in Augustus v. ABM Security Services, Inc., 2 Cal. 5th 257 (2016), noted that particularly with a short break period "one would expect that employees will ordinarily have to remain on site or nearby," the Plaintiffs allege written personnel policies that prohibit an employee from even leaving the inside of a store without management approval. On its face, such a policy would prohibit even a short walk outside or a smoke break. With respect to the Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action, which seeks waiting time penalties based on Winco's alleged failure to timely pay wages owed upon separation, purports to be based upon the requirements of California Labor Code Section 201 and 202, Judge England concludes that although he believes the allegations suffice for purposes of alleging a claim premised on Section 201, they do not state a claim for a Section 202 violation, and the Plaintiff cannot be a class representative for an injury she did not experience and has no standing to assert. Consequently, Winco's Motion is granted to the extent the Fourth Cause of Action asserts a claim premised on Section 202 but is otherwise denied. In the Fifth Cause of Action of her FAC, the Plaintiff alleged that Winco failed to comply with the items required to be included in her wage statement under California law, including time records, meal periods, split shift intervals, and total daily hours worked. She failed to identify, however, even a single deficient wage statement. Although he rejected those allegations given their lack of any factual specificity, Judge England finds that in the SAC Plaintiff has alleged at least one wage statement with overtime adjustment codes that failed to itemize the total hours and rates of pay, making it impossible for her to determine how the adjustments were calculated. Moreover, to the extent that her Fifth Cause of Action is derivative of the unpaid wages/overtime and non-compliant meal and rest period claims already discussed, which the Court deemed sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, the Fifth Cause of Action is adequately pled on that ground as well. The Plaintiff's Unfair Business Practices claim under California Business and Professions Code Section 17200, et seq., as set forth in the Sixth Cause of Action, is explicitly predicated upon the validity of her other state law claims. As a derivative claim, it rises and falls on the viability of those claims which the Court has already rejected. Because the Plaintiff has now identified viable claims that can serve as the factual predicate for her unfair business practices cause of action, Judge England holds that her Section 17200 claim also passes pleadings muster. Finally, in addition to moving to dismiss the Plaintiff's substantive claims as discussed above, Winco reiterates its previous request, as already rejected in its challenge to the FAC, to strike her class allegations as impermissibly "formulaic and conclusory" because they state only that the requirements for class certification have been satisfied, with no real factual basis for such an assertion. While conceding that courts generally refrain from ruling on the issue of class certification at the pleadings stage, Winco nonetheless claims that she has not pled enough facts to show any entitlement to relief on a class-wide basis. As the Court already remarked in previously rejecting Winco's earlier challenge to the Plaintiff's class allegations, the weight of authority holds that class action allegations should not be tested at the pleadings stage, and instead should be addressed only after one party has filed a motion for class certification, unless it is clear from the complaint that no class claims can be maintained. Because the Plaintiff has identified allegations that may potentially apply on a class-wide basis, Judge England cannot say at the onset that class action treatment is unwarranted. Moreover, while Winco cites several unpublished decisions that have dismissed class action allegations at the pleadings stage, such action is still rare in advance of a class certification motion. For all the foregoing reasons, Judge England denies the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, except with respect to the Fourth Cause of Action, which is granted to the extent said cause of action asserts a claim under California Labor Code Section 202. The Plaintiff may, but is not required to, file an amended pleading properly asserting a Section 202 claim not later than 20 days after the date this Memorandum and Order is electronically filed. If no amended complaint is timely filed, the claims dismissed by virtue of the Memorandum and Order will be deemed dismissed with prejudice upon no further notice to the parties. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Memorandum & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/zzk9xpwc from Leagle.com. WINCO HOLDINGS: E.D. California Dismisses Phoung's 1st Amended Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, SOMRET PHOUNG, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. WINCO HOLDINGS, INC., an Idaho corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:21-cv-2033-MCE-JDP (E.D. Cal.), Judge Morrison C. England, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California: (i) grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint or, and denies as moot its Motion in the Alternative, to Strike or, in the Alternative, to Stay Proceedings; and (ii) denies the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. Through the action, Phoung seeks relief from Winco for wage and hour violations of the California Labor Code and California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 17200, et seq. The Defendant, who operates grocery stores, employed the Plaintiff as an hourly, non-exempt employee until Feb. 26, 2021. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant frequently enforces multiple practices and/or policies that violate state law which are intended to increase their own profits to the detriment of its employees. Regarding rest breaks, the Plaintiff and the class members allegedly, from time to time, worked in excess of four hours, or a major fraction thereof, during workdays without being provided at least a 10-minute rest period in which they were relieved of all duties. Similarly, she alleges that the Defendant periodically failed to permit her and the class members to take timely, off-duty meal breaks of not less than 30 minutes for each five consecutive hours of work. The Defendant also allegedly on occasion failed to provide them with suitable seating during their employment. The FAC further alleges that the Defendant frequently failed to timely pay all wages owed upon termination and failed to furnish accurate wage statements to the Plaintiff and the class members. Finally, the Plaintiff contends that he and the class members were paid sick leave wages at their base hourly rates of pay, which is less than required under the California Labor Code. Given the foregoing, the Defendant allegedly also engaged in unfair competition. On Sept. 24, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. The Complaint alleges the following causes of action: (1) failure to pay earned wages, including overtime; (2) failure to properly calculate and pay sick leave wages; (3) failure to provide rest breaks; (4) failure to provide timely, uninterrupted meal breaks; (5) failure to provide suitable seating; (6) failure to reimburse for required business expenses; (7) failure to timely pay all wages owed upon termination; (8) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements and maintain accurate records; and (9) unfair business practices. The Plaintiff filed the FAC in the state court action on Nov. 2, 2021. The following day, on Nov. 3, 2021, the Defendant removed the case to the Court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2) ("CAFA"). The Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the original Complaint on Nov. 10, 2021. However, the Plaintiff refiled the FAC in the Court on Nov. 23, 2021, and in response, the Defendant withdrew its motion to dismiss. Shortly thereafter, on Dec. 7, 2021, the Defendant filed the present Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's FAC and the Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand. In its Notice of Removal, the Defendant, in part, contends that the total aggregate potential liability based on the Plaintiff's claims regarding meal breaks and rest periods alone exceeds the statutory amount. In support, it provides two declarations from its Senior Programmer and Analyst, Mr. Rudel. Based on the Defendant's electronic payroll system and electronic databases regarding its employees, and through the use of various search and filter functions, Mr. Rudel asserts that "the approximate number of hourly, non-exempt employees in California employed from Aug. 9, 2017, to Aug. 9, 2021 is 16,688," and that "the approximate number of work weeks for that period is approximately 1,253,884." He also states that "the approximate average hourly rate of pay of hourly, non-exempt employees in California employed for this time period is approximately $15.61 per hour." The Defendant contends that there is at least $12,538,840 in controversy for missed meal breaks and $12,538,840 for rest periods, both of which are "based on a conservative estimate that each putative class member failed to receive compliant rest or meal periods only once each workweek and was paid a meal or rest period premium of $10 per hour for each purported violation." Each number was reached by multiplying the number of workweeks (1,253,884) by $10 (reduced hourly rate from $15.61) by 1 (missed meal or rest period per workweek), which amounts to a 20% violation rate. Based on the allegations in the FAC and Mr. Rudel's declarations, and absent evidence to the contrary from the Plaintiff, Judge England finds that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied based on the rest period and meal break claims alone. Accordingly, he denies the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. The Defendant seeks dismissal of the Plaintiff's First Cause of Action on grounds that it fails to meet the minimum pleading requirements for wage and hour claims. The FAC, in relevant part, alleges that the "Plaintiff and the putative class are employees of Defendants working in their grocery stores," and that the Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant until Feb. 26, 2021. However, Judge England finds that the Plaintiff does not provide any allegations "relating to his employment with the Defendant, such as when his employment began, his work location, or even his job title, let alone any facts regarding his own experiences as a nonexempt employee or the circumstances that led to him allegedly experiencing any Labor Code violation." Furthermore, there are no allegations as to the length of his average workweek, his average rate of pay, how often he worked overtime, the number of hours involved, or the amount of overtime wages he believes is owed. Because the minimum pleading requirements are not met, the Plaintiff's First Cause of Action is dismissed with leave to amend. The Second Cause of Action asserts a violation of California Labor Code Section 246, specifically that the Defendant failed to properly pay sick leave wages. However, courts have routinely found that Section 246 does not create a private right of action. Because the Plaintiff does not challenge the legal sufficiency of this claim and amendment would nonetheless be futile, Judge England dismisses the Second Cause of Action without leave to amend. In the Third and Fourth Causes of Action, the Plaintiff alleges that he and the class members "missed breaks due to the press of work," and that "when breaks were provided, they were cut short because they were required to wear protective gear, which they had to take off and put on during their breaks, cutting into the time they were allowed to take rest." Similarly, he alleges that they "were often too busy and understaffed to take time away from their duties for breaks," and when he "was able to take a meal period, he was frequently interrupted as he had to remain available to assist managers and customers." Lastly, he claims that he "never received second meal breaks during shifts of 10 hours or longer." Like the First Cause of Action, these conclusory allegations are devoid of supporting factual allegations, Judge England holds. When faced with similar assertions that the plaintiff, due to a "heavy work load," was not provided meal and rest periods "within the legally required time" and was not permitted to leave her work area without permission, the court in Ovieda v. Sodexo Operations, LLC, No. CV 12-1750-GHK (SSx), 2012 WL 1627237, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012), described the allegations as "bare-bones" and "devoid of sufficient factual enhancement to allow a reasonable inference" of liability. To pass pleading muster, the Ovieda court reasoned that the complaint should have included details concerning the plaintiff's shift schedules, job duties, what specific policies and practices were used to manage her, and whether such policies were company-wide or unique to the plaintiff's job site. The FAC here contains no such details, and therefore, the Plaintiff's Third and Fourth Causes of Action are dismissed with leave to amend. Under the Fifth Cause of Action, the Plaintiff alleges that Defendant "failed to provide them with suitable seating during their employment as required by section 14 of the applicable Wage Order." However, there are no allegations in the FAC as to the Plaintiff's job position or that the Defendant "had a company-wide policy of not providing seats to Plaintiff or other employees when the nature of their work reasonably permits the use of a seat." Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action is dismissed with leave to amend. Under the Sixth Cause of Action, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant "required them to purchase and use their own personal carving knives for work related duties and they were required to take the knives home to sharpen them and bring them back for use at work but failed to reimburse Plaintiff and employees for this use." There are no allegations, however, as to "how or when the Defendant failed to reimburse the Plaintiff, or any other potential class members, for business expenses," or the "specific nature of the business expenses at issue." As such, the Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action is dismissed with leave to amend. The Plaintiff's Seventh Cause of Action purports to be based upon the requirements of California Labor Code Sections 201 and 202, which provide that wages must be paid within a certain time following an employee's separation from service. The FAC contains absolutely no facts as to how the Plaintiff separated from his employment, indicating only that his last day at work was Feb. 26, 2021. Consequently, Judge England cannot determine on what basis the Plaintiff seeks to hold the Defendant liable, let alone ascertain what final wages may have been owed and not paid. To the extent the Plaintiff argues this cause of action is derivative of his previous claims, Judge England has already determined those claims to be insufficiently pleaded. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Seventh Cause of Action is dismissed with leave to amend. In the Eighth Cause of Action, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant "knowingly and intentionally failed to furnish them with accurate itemized statements from time to time for each pay period that they worked, and frequently failed to maintain accurate payroll records of the Class Members." Such inaccuracies were allegedly caused by the "Defendants' unlawful timekeeping practices that resulted in underreporting hours worked and overtime hours worked." The Plaintiff, however, fails to identify a single deficient wage statement. Again, to the extent the Plaintiff argues that that this cause of action is derivative of his previous claims, those claims are insufficiently pleaded. As such, the Eighth Cause of Action is dismissed with leave to amend. The Plaintiff's Unfair Business Practices claim under California Business and Professions Code Sections 17200 et seq., as set forth in the Ninth Cause of Action, is explicitly predicated on the viability of the Plaintiff's other state law claims. As a derivative claim, it rises and falls on the viability of those claims which the Court has already rejected. Judge England therefore dismisses the Ninth Cause of Action with leave to amend. In addition to seeking dismissal of the Plaintiff's substantive claims as discussed, the Defendant also moves to strike the class allegations as insufficient. While conceding that courts generally refrain from ruling on the issue of class certification at the pleading stage, it still claims that the Plaintiff has not pleaded enough facts to show any entitlement to relief on a class-wide basis. Given the fact that the Court dismissed all of the Plaintiff's causes of action for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Defendant's additional Motion to Strike the class allegations is moot since the claims for which class action treatment was sought are not viable at this time. In sum, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's FAC is granted, and as a result, its Motion to Strike and alternative Motion to Stay Proceedings are denied as moot. For the foregoing reasons, Judge England grants the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. He dismisses the Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action without leave to amend. All remaining causes of action are dismissed with leave to amend. The Plaintiff may, but is not required to, file an amended complaint not later than 20 days after the date the Memorandum and Order is electronically filed. Failure to timely do so will result in the action being dismissed, in its entirety, without further notice to the parties. A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 23, 2022 Memorandum & Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/3vjmcc8k from Leagle.com. ZIGNEGO CO: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Cardenas Suit Alleges ------------------------------------------------------------ MARISOL CARDENAS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ZIGNEGO, CO., INC., Defendant, Case No. 22-cv-961 (E.D. Wis., Aug. 22, 2022) seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Plaintiff Cardenas was employed by the Defendant as dump truck driver. Zignego Company, Incorporated was founded in 1980. The Company's line of business includes highway and street construction. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Yingtao Ho, Esq. THE PREVIANT LAW FIRM S.C. 310 W. Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 100 MW Milwaukee, WI 53203 Telephone: (414) 271-4500 Facsimile: (414) 271-6308 [*] Kyle Roche to Withdraw as Counsel in Crypto Class Action Suits ------------------------------------------------------------------ cointelegraph.com reports that in the wake of allegations made by CryptoLeaks, high-profile crypto lawyer Kyle Roche has filed to withdraw as counsel on several crypto class-action lawsuits. According to a series of court records released on Aug. 31, Roche is understood to be "no longer involved" in Roche Freedman's class action practice. The law firm has also filed to withdraw Roche as counsel in class action lawsuits involving Tron and Global Trading. In a motion to withdraw as attorney in the Tether and Bitfinex Crypto asset litigation case, cryptocurrency law firm Roche Freedman said, "Roche would withdraw as one of the attorneys for the Proposed Class," and "Mr. Roche is no longer involved in RF's class action practice." The motions do not mean the lawsuits will be dropped altogether, as they could still proceed without Roche. Roche's withdrawal from the lawsuit comes amid the ongoing fallout from a recent CryptoLeaks expose, which features videos of Roche allegedly revealing a relationship with Ava Labs, and a "secret pact" to "harm" competitors through the United States legal system. On Aug. 30, Roche released a statement denying the allegations, claiming they are an attempt by a disgruntled defendant from a previous case. Ava Labs CEO Emin Gün Sirer followed suit, denying the alleged arrangement with Roche, calling it "conspiracy theory nonsense." CryptoLeaks, an anonymous website that claims to launch investigations based on information from whistleblowers and expose attacks and scams in the crypto world, has not backed away from its claims. Related: Ripple CEO comments on CryptoLeaks, denies funding law firm to target others Roche's withdrawal from the case soon after the leak has seen speculation as to the cause, but there has yet to be any confirmation from Roche Freedman about the reason for his withdrawal and whether they will proceed with the lawsuits.[GN] ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2022. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. 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