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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, September 13, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 177

                            Headlines

ALLSTATE CORP: Agrees to Settle Class Action Suit Over Sales Taxes
APPLE INC: Distribution in $14.8MM iCloud Deal to Begin Soon
ATBCOIN LLC: Must Oppose Balestra Class Cert Bid by Sept 16
AVAMERE HOLDINGS: Faces Class Action Over Alleged Data Breach
B&G FOODS: Court Junks Silva Bid for Class Certification

BAYER HEALTHCARE: Agrees to Resolve Coppertone Claims for $2.3MM
BEIERSDORF INC: $2.3M Deal in Benzene Suit Gets Prelim. Approval
BETTER MORTGAGE: Files 9th Cir. Appeal in Dominguez Suit
BIG PICTURE: Seeks Extension of Class Certification Deadlines
BROWN UNIVERSITY: $1.5M Deal in Refund Suit Gets Prelim. Approval

CENTER FOR AUTISM: Wins Bid to Compel Arbitration in Norde Suit
CLOVER HEALTH: Initial Case Management Order Modified in Bond
COLORADO: Court Dismisses Anthony Class Action
COMMONWEALTH BANK: May Face Class Suit Over Drop in Share Price
DR. SQUATCH: Faces Class Suit Over Misleading Men's Natural Shampoo

ELON MUSK: Faces Suit Over Alleged $258-B Dogecoin Pyramid Scheme
EQUIFAX LLC: 11th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Amended Rajapakse Suit
FAITH TECHNOLOGIES: Court Narrows Claims in Laabs ERISA Suit
FIVE STAR: Plaintiff Litigates for Years to Win $500 in TCPA Suit
FORD MOTOR: March Hearing on Class Status in "Death Wobble" Case

FRESH HARVEST: Sarmiento's Bid for Protective Order Partly Granted
FUNPLUS INTERNATIONAL: Sued Over False In-Game Microtransactions
GEORGIA: Additional Plaintiffs in Richardson v. Wilcher Dismissed
GREENBRIER INTERNATIONAL: Sued Over Lidocaine Patches' False Ads
HALSTED FINANCIAL: Remand of Bailey Suit to State Court Recommended

HONOLULU, HI: Class Suit Tolling Applied to Mass Torts, Ruling Says
KANE COUNTY, IL: Appeals Court Affirms Dismissal of Tejada Suit
KIA AMERICA: Le Beau Sues Over Defective, Unsafe Vehicles
KIA CORP: Chicago Class Action Alleges Ease of Theft
LABORATORY CORP: McDonald Sues for Breach of Fiduciary Duties

LABRADA NUTRITION: Settles Class Suit Over Weight-Loss Supplements
MANNA PRO PRODUCTS: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Perry Class Suit
MAXIMUS INC: Seeks Stay of Proceedings in Thomas Suit
MCKESSON CORP: Covington & Burling Attorneys Discuss Court Ruling
MDL 2566: PWC, PNC, IPS and Others Dismissed From Securities Suit

MDLIVE INC: Fails to Protect Patients' Privacy, Class Suit Claims
MEDTRONIC PLC: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due November 7
NATIONAL FOOTBALL: Antitrust Suit May Become Class Action Case
NELNET SERVICING: Faces Class Action Over Alleged Data Breach
NELNET SERVICING: Markovits Stock Investigates Data Breach Claims

NEW JERSEY: Bid to Substitute Class Rep in Ortiz v. Callahan OK'd
NEWFOUNDLAND & LABRADOR: Ex-Inmate Excluded From Confinement Suit
NOW OPTICS LLC: Dopp Wins Bid to Remand Suit to Superior Court
OLE MEXICAN: Hardy Appeals False Ad Suit Dismissal to 2nd Cir.
ON THE RUN: Settles Wage Class Action Lawsuit for $6 Million

PITTSBURGH, PA: Summary Judgment Bid Must be Filed by Jan. 17, 2023
PORTLAND, OR: People With Disabilities Sue Over Blocked Sidewalks
PRIMOHOAGIES FRANCHISING: Settles Class Action Over Cyberattack
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Faces Class Action Lawsuit Over Data Breach
SEMA4 HOLDINGS: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due Nov. 17

SFC GLOBAL: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Zuchowski Consumer Suit
SKYWEST INC: Court Dismisses Hirst Suit Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
SNAP INC: Nov. 5 BIPA Settlement Claims Filing Deadline Set
SPIRIT AIRLINES: Proposed Class Suit Alleges Denied FMLA Benefits
STATE FARM: Files 4th Cir. Appeal in Elegant Massage Suit

STITCH FIX: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due October 25
STOCKX LLC: Settlement in Canadian Data Breach Suit Wins Final OK
TOTAL STAFFING: Agrees to Settle Wage-and-Hour Suit for $250,000
TRITERRAS INC: $9-Mil. Deal in Securities Class Suit Wins Final OK
TUSIMPLE HOLDINGS: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due Oct. 31

UNITED SERVICES: Settles Class Action Over Auto Insurance Claims
UNITED STATES: Class Action Against Trump-Era Medicaid Rule Amended
UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE: Seeks to File Response Under Seal in Russo
VIRGIN ISLANDS: 3rd Cir. Nixes Denial of Duncan's Class Cert. Bid
WAUPACA ELEVATOR: Court Refuses to Stay Proceedings in Tis Suit

WHOLE FOODS: Faces Class Action Over "No Antibiotics Ever" Slogan
ZINUS INC: Class Action Alleges Injury From "Green Tea Mattress"

                            *********

ALLSTATE CORP: Agrees to Settle Class Action Suit Over Sales Taxes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dave LaChance at repairerdrivennews.com reports that Allstate has
agreed to make payments to thousands of its insureds in
Pennsylvania to settle a class action lawsuit alleging that the
carrier violated state law by failing to include full sales tax in
settling total loss claims on leased vehicles over the past 10
years.

The class includes anyone who submitted a damage claim for a leased
vehicle between January 1, 2012, through April 29, 2022 and was not
paid full sales tax when Allstate adjusted their claim as a total
loss, according to the settlement agreement filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Under the terms of the proposed settlement filed Sept. 1, Allstate
agrees to pay class members the difference between whatever sales
tax they were reimbursed for, and what the total reimbursement
should have been. The state's sales tax is 6%, with some counties
adding an additional 1% or 2%.

The complaint was filed Jan. 18, 2019 by Michael Erby, a
Pennsylvanian whose 2014 Honda Accord sedan was struck on Aug. 25,
2016 by a Cadillac Escalade driven by a third party, who was
insured by Allstate.

Erby said that Allstate deemed the vehicle a total loss, and
offered Erby $19,104.50. That sum included the CCC ONE Market
Valuation of $18,144.50, a DMV fee of $60, and a negotiated
adjustment of $900. Not included, he said, was the Pennsylvania
sales tax.

"Since Plaintiff's vehicle was totaled, Plaintiff accepted
Defendant's offer of $19,104.50, rather than suffering a total loss
of his vehicle without payment," the complaint states, even though
"Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, an insurer or a carrier must
reimburse the applicable sales tax to a party when reimbursing that
individual or entity for the total loss of his vehicle."

The complaint cites Pa. Code Sec 62.3(e)(4), which states,
"Applicable sales tax on the replacement cost of a motor vehicle
shall be included as part of the replacement value."

"When settling a total loss claim, an insurance carrier is required
to reimbursed (sic) for the sales tax on the replacement vehicle,"
the complaint states. "Failure to do so is a per se violation of
Pennsylvania law and/or the insurer's contractual obligations."

In seeking class certification for the suit, the complaint said the
plaintiff believes the class "consists of thousands of insureds
statewide," although "The exact number of class members is unknown
as such information is in exclusive control of Defendant."

The complaint accused Allstate of breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices Act
and Consumer Protection Law, and breach of the Motor Vehicle
Physical Damage Appraiser Act.

In the agreement, all parties stipulate that Allstate denies
"wrongdoing of any kind," and has agreed to the settlement to
"avoid further burden, expense and risk of protracted litigation."
[GN]

APPLE INC: Distribution in $14.8MM iCloud Deal to Begin Soon
------------------------------------------------------------
Dan Avery, writing for CNET.com, reports all eyes [were] on Apple
[last week] as the trillion-dollar company [was] set to unveil the
iPhone 14, a new Apple Watch series, and more. But if you're
eligible to be part of a $14.8 million settlement, there's one more
reason to keep tabs on the iPhone maker. If you paid for an Apple
iCloud Plus subscription in 2015 or 2016, you might be one of the
people receiving payments, which are expected to arrive soon.

The class action lawsuit claims the company stored iCloud
subscribers' data on third-party servers without telling them.
Apple iCloud's basic edition comes with 5GB of storage, but
additional space requires a paid iCloud Plus subscription. In 2019,
plaintiffs in Williams v. Apple alleged Apple used outside servers
to store data but made no mention of that fact in its marketing
materials or terms and conditions. (The current iCloud customer
agreement does refer to third-party servers.)

Apple did not respond to a request for comment.

Plaintiffs in Williams v. Apple allege the company distributed data
among third-party cloud services like Amazon Web Services, Google,
and Microsoft's Azure platform -- a violation of Apple's own iCloud
contract.  In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege Apple "lacked
the necessary infrastructure" to run iCloud and misrepresented the
nature of its service, "merely reselling cloud storage space on
cloud facilities of other entities."

Customers wouldn't have paid for a subscription if they knew Apple
wasn't providing storage directly, they claim, or they would have
expected to pay a lot less. The alleged misrepresentation allowed
Apple "to charge a premium for its iCloud service because
subscribers placed a value on having the 'Apple' brand as the
storage service provider," according to the suit.

Apple's agreement to the settlement was not an admission of
wrongdoing, the company said in filings.

The settlement includes US residents who paid for an iCloud Plus
subscription any time between Sept. 16, 2015, and Jan. 31, 2016,
and had a US mailing address associated with their account.
According to Apple, nearly 16.9 million people qualify as eligible
class members.  During the settlement administration process, 20
people requested exclusion from the suit, although Apple accounts
could only be verified for seven of them.

The deadline has passed to submit a claim if you didn't receive a
notification but believe you are eligible. However, most
subscribers didn't have to file a claim to benefit from the
settlement. As long as the email you used to sign up for iCloud
Plus storage is still active, you should have received a
notification that you are an eligible recipient, or "class member."


The gross amount approved in August for the iCloud settlement is
$14,800,000.23. However, how much will reach class members will be
determined after attorneys' fees and administrative costs are
deducted.

The settlement agreement sets a cap of $2.4 million to cover "all
costs and expenses related to the settlement administration
functions to be performed by the Settlement Administrator." Lawyers
for the plaintiffs requested $4.93 million, or one-third of the
settlement, in attorneys' fees, but the court awarded them $3.7
million, or 25% of the settlement amount.

The exact amount of individual payments depends on how much storage
you paid for, how long you had your subscription and the total
number of people participating in the claim.  Don't expect to
retire on the payout, though: Between 2015 and 2016, a monthly
iCloud subscription ranged from 50GB of storage for 99 cents to
200GB for $2.99 to 1TB for $9.99.

If you still have a monthly iCloud Plus subscription, your payment
will appear as a credit on your Apple account.  If you no longer
have a monthly iCloud subscription you will receive a physical
check in the mail or an electronic transfer directly into your bank
account.

According to the terms of the settlement, payments should be
distributed to eligible users within 90 days of the final approval
on Aug. 4, 2022.  There may be appeals or objections, however.
Payments will be distributed "as soon as possible," according to
the settlement.[GN]


ATBCOIN LLC: Must Oppose Balestra Class Cert Bid by Sept 16
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Raymond Balestra,
indivodually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
ATBCOIN LLC et al., Edward Ng, and Herbert W. Hoover, Case No.
1:17-cv-10001-DLC (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Denise Cote entered an
order:

  -- The Defendants shall file any      September 16, 2022
     opposition to the motion for
     class certification by:

  -- The lead plaintiff's reply,        September 16, 2022
     if any, shall be filed by:

  -- Counsel must file a notice         September 16, 2022
     of appearance on behalf of
     ATBCoin by:

  -- The lead plaintiff must move       September 16, 2022
     for an entry of a default
     against ATBCoin by:

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 25, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3BbAfpn at no extra charge.[CC]



AVAMERE HOLDINGS: Faces Class Action Over Alleged Data Breach
-------------------------------------------------------------
John Hall, writing for McKnights, reports that attorneys
representing a potentially large group of residents and employees
of nursing home behemoth Avamere Holdings announced they have filed
a class action suit accusing the long-term care provider of failing
to protect its residents and staff from a massive cyberattack.

The operator faces the class-action lawsuit over a data breach
believed to have affected more than 380,000 people across the
company's 96 healthcare sites. Plaintiffs' attorneys also
questioned why the company initially reported a smaller number of
potential victims (200,000).

The Wilsonville, OR-based company operates skilled nursing
facilities and senior living communities throughout the West. The
breach reportedly affected facilities located in Oregon,
Washington, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada and Utah.

A company representative said they were simply being careful when
they notified potentially affected individuals.

"Out of an abundance of caution, Avamere Health Services recently
notified certain individuals whose information was included in a
security incident involving unauthorized access to a third-party
hosted network utilized by Avamere," Kevin Hill, general counsel
for Avamere, told McKnight's Long-Term Care News. "Although we
cannot comment on any pending litigation, we remain committed to
protecting the privacy and security of personal information."

Portland lawyer Nick Kahl filed the lawsuit on Aug. 24 on behalf of
a former Avamere employee. The suit faults "Avamere's failure to
protect its computer systems from unauthorized access by
cybercriminals" despite numerous industry warnings and earlier
breaches.

The lawsuit also alleges Avamere waited more than two months to
notify people of the breach, which included theft of names, birth
dates, addresses, Social Security numbers, lab results and
information about medical conditions and medication, according to
the company.

An unauthorized individual gained access to an Avamere
third-party-hosted network between Jan. 19 and March 17, 2022,
according to the HIPAA Journal, a privacy publication. The breach
was eventually discovered by Avamere on May 18; victims were
notified on July 13.

Kahl's lawsuit claims victims' personal information "is likely for
sale to criminals on the dark web, meaning that unauthorized
parties accessed and viewed their unencrypted, unredacted
information, including names, addresses, email addresses, dates of
birth, Social Security numbers, bank account information, private
health information, and more."

He added those victims suffered "losses in the form of loss of the
value of their private and confidential information, loss of the
benefit of their contractual bargain, out-of-pocket expenses and
the value of their time reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate
the effects of the attack."

"Out of an abundance of caution, Avamere Health Services recently
notified certain individuals whose information was included in a
security incident involving unauthorized access to a third-party
hosted network utilized by Avamere," Kevin Hill, general counsel
for Avamere, told McKnight's Long-Term Care News. "Although we
cannot comment on any pending litigation, we remain committed to
protecting the privacy and security of personal information."

Avamere had previously claimed that it took steps to improve its
data protection following the breach. It also encouraged people to
call a hotline for more information and offered complimentary
credit monitoring services as well as best practices to protect
their information.

Another cyberattack

Around the same time as legal proceedings were beginning in the
Avamere case, the Department of Health and Human Services warned of
another potentially massive cyberattack threatening healthcare
providers.

Dubbed "Karakurt" by the agency's Cybersecurity Coordination
Center, the ransomware group has attacked at least four
unidentified provider organizations in the last three months. Those
observed attacks included an assisted living community, a dental
firm, a provider and a hospital.

The Karakurt actors typically claim to steal data and threaten to
auction it off on the dark web or release it to the public unless
their demands are met. Ransoms range from $25,000 to $13 million in
Bitcoin with deadlines often set to expire within just one week.
[GN]

B&G FOODS: Court Junks Silva Bid for Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SABRINA SILVA, et al., v.
B&G FOODS, INC., et al., Case No. 4:20-cv-00137-JST (N.D. Cal.),
the Hon. Judge Jon S. Tigar entered an order denying the
plaintiffs' motion for class certification of:

   "All citizens of California, Connecticut, the District of
   Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan,
   Missouri, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington, who
   purchased, between Jan. 1, 2010 and Dec. 31, 2016, for
   household or personal use, Ortega taco shell products
   containing partially hydrogenated oil in packaging bearing
   the labeling claim '0g Trans Fat!'."

The Court said, "the Plaintiffs have not met their burden of
showing that they satisfy Rule 23(b)(3) by a preponderance of the
evidence. Accordingly, their motion for class certification is
denied. The parties shall appear for a case management conference
on November 1, 2022, at 2:00 p.m., to discuss a case schedule for
resolving Plaintiffs' individual claims. A joint case management
statement is due by October 25, 2022."

The Plaintiffs bring this putative class action against Defendants
B&G Foods, Inc. and B&G Foods North America, Inc. asserting claims
under California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and Unfair
Competition Law (UCL). They allege that B&G's Ortega taco shells
contained partially hydrogenated oil, and that the packaging was
misleading because it advertised "0g Trans Fat! Per serving” on
the front. The Plaintiffs seek only damages, and not injunctive
relief, because B&G removed both trans fat and the challenged label
from Ortega taco shells in 2015.

B&G Foods is an American branded foods holding company based in
Parsippany, New Jersey.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 26, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3CU2Kco at no extra charge.[CC]

BAYER HEALTHCARE: Agrees to Resolve Coppertone Claims for $2.3MM
----------------------------------------------------------------
Top Class Actions.com reports that Bayer HealthCare and Beiersdorf
agreed to pay $2.3 million to resolve claims that Coppertone
sunscreen contains benzene -- a human carcinogen. Proof of purchase
is not required for participation in the settlement.

The settlement benefits consumers who purchased certain Coppertone
spray sunscreen products before August 2, 2022. Products covered by
the settlement are:

- Pure & Simple SPF 50
- Pure & Simple Kids SPF 50
- Pure & Simple Baby SPF 50
- Sport Mineral SPF 50
- Sport SPF 50
- Sport SPF 30
- Sport SPF 15
- Complete SPF 50
- Complete SPF 30
- Glow Shimmer SPF 50
- Glow Shimmer SPF 30
- Kids SPF 50

Coppertone is a sunscreen brand that offers various sunscreen
products for sports, everyday use, tanning, and kids. Coppertone
sunscreen was originally sold by Bayer HealthCare but was later
acquired by Beiersdorf.

In September 2021, Beiersdorf announced it was recalling 12 lots of
its Coppertone spray sunscreen due to concerns the products
contained benzene. Benzene is a human carcinogen linked to
leukemia, blood cancer of the bone marrow, and other blood
disorders.

Consumers quickly took legal action against both Beiersdorf and
Bayer HealthCare, arguing the companies harmed customers by selling
Coppertone sunscreen products that were contaminated with benzene.
Plaintiffs in the case say they wouldn’t have purchased the
products if they were sufficiently warned about the risk of benzene
contamination.

"Defendants have improperly, deceptively, and misleadingly labeled
and marketed its products to reasonable consumers [. . .] by
labeling, touting, and marketing its products as being healthy,
safe, pure, and simple while knowing (but omitting and not
disclosing to consumers on its packaging) that the products contain
benzene (or at the very least that they are at the risk of
containing benzene)," the Coppertone sunscreen class action lawsuit
contends.

Bayer and Beiersdorf haven't admitted any wrongdoing but agreed to
resolve these allegations with a $2.3 million class action
settlement.

Under the terms of the Coppertone sunscreen benzene contamination
settlement, class members can receive a cash payment based on the
number of products they purchased, the retail cost of these
products, and any proof of purchase provided.

With proof of purchase, class members can receive a full refund for
the covered products they purchased. Without proof of purchase,
class members can collect the average retail price for up to six
covered products per household.

Class members may have their payments reduced if they participated
in the defendants' voluntary recall program that offered full
refunds for all purchased products with proof of purchase or up to
five covered products without proof of purchase.

In addition to funding settlement payments, the defendants will
require benzene testing for Coppertone sunscreen products for at
least 18 months. If these tests reveal the presence of benzene, the
defendants will address this issue.

The deadline for exclusion and objection is Nov. 7, 2022.

The final approval hearing for the settlement is scheduled for Jan.
5, 2023.

In order to receive benefits from the Coppertone sunscreen benzene
settlement, class members must submit a valid claim form by Nov. 7,
2022.

The case is captioned, Bangoura v. Beiersdorf, Inc. and Bayer
Healthcare, LLC., Case No. 1:22-cv-00291-BMC, the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York

Additional information is available on the Settlement Website:

           https://www.2022coppertonesettlement.com/

The Claims Administrator:

         Sunscreen Settlement Claim Administrator
         1650 Arch Street, Suite 2210
         Philadelphia, PA 19103
         Info@2022coppertonesettlement.com
         Tel: 833-903-3800

Class Counsel:

         Jason Sultzer, Esq.
         THE SULTZER LAW GROUP PC

         Charles E Schaffer, Esq.
         LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN

Defense Counsel:

         Robert Scarborough, Esq.
         SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP [GN]


BEIERSDORF INC: $2.3M Deal in Benzene Suit Gets Prelim. Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
aboutlawsuits.com reports that the manufacturers of Coppertone
sunscreen products have reached an agreement to pay $2.3 million
into a settlement fund for individuals exposed to benzene from
aersol spray products, which can cause cancer and blood disorders.

The Coppertone Sunscreen settlement agreement will resolve a class
action lawsuit which alleges Beiersdorf, Inc. and Bayer Healthcare,
LLC failed to properly test their products for benzene, which was
detected in twelve different lines of sunscreen sprays advertised
for adults and children.

The litigation emerged after the FDA announced a Coppertone
sunscreen recall in September 2021, when unsafe levels of benzene
were found, which could cause serious long-term health risks.

Benzene is an industrial chemical that has long been linked to
fatal forms of leukemia and other cancers. The FDA considers it a
solvent which should not be used in drug products, if avoidable.
However, if benzene is not avoidable, it should be restricted to 2
parts per million (ppm), FDA regulations state.

Coppertone Sunscreen Lawsuit Over Benzene Risks
The Coppertone lawsuit which led to this settlement was originally
brought by Almany Ismael Bangoura in the U.S. District Court
Eastern District of New York on January 18, raising allegations
that Beiersdorf, Inc. and Bayer Healthcare, LLC made false and
misleading marketing claims that the products were safe for human
use to persuade customers into purchasing their sunscreen
products.

As a result of the benzene contamination and false and misleading
advertising, plaintiff's claimed that the products they purchased
had no value, and they would not have purchased the products if
they were sufficiently warned of the benzene exposure. The lawsuit
further states the manufacturer failed to properly screen its final
products for harmful toxins and contaminants.

The companies have agreed to settle the class action lawsuit for a
maximum amount of $2.3 million. According to the terms of the
agreement, any person who purchased one of the following Coppertone
spray sunscreen products before August 2, 2022 may be entitled to
benefits from the settlement agreement;

Pure & Simple SPF 50
Pure & Simple Kids SPF 50
Pure & Simple Baby SPF 50
Sport Mineral SPF 50
Sport SPF 50
Sport SPF 30
Sport SPF 15
Complete SPF 50
Complete SPF 30
Glow Shimmer SPF 50
Glow Shimmer SPF 30
Kids SPF 50

While the terms of the agreement have been tentatively accepted by
the court, a Final Approval Hearing is scheduled to be held on
January 5, 2023. Claimants will have until November 7, 2022 to
submit a valid claim to receive settlement benefits.

Other Sunscreen Lawsuit Settlements
Multiple class action and individual sunscreen lawsuits have been
filed by consumers across the nation over the past few years, after
the the on-line pharmacy Valisure issued a warning in May 2021,
indicating that internal testing confirmed benzene was in 78
sunscreen and after-sun care products from their inventory. More
than a quarter of the sunscreen benzene levels exceeded 2 ppm; the
level at which the FDA considers the chemical to pose a safety
concern.

Johnson & Johnson has faced a number of a number of sunscreen
cancer lawsuits brought on behalf of consumers who developed
various forms of blood cancers following regular use of recalled
Neutrogena or Aveeno products, including Acute Myeloid Leukema
(AML), Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia (CML), Acute Lymphocytic
Leukemia (ALL), Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia (CLL), Hairy Cell
Leukemia (HCL), Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma, Multiple Myeloma,
Myelodysplastic Syndrome (MDL), Myelofibrosis and Myeloid
Metaplasia, Aplastic Anemia and Thrombocytopenic Purpura.

In a court order issued in March, U.S. District Judge Raag Singhal
granted preliminary approval of a Neutrogena and Aveeno sunscreen
class action settlement, which provided full cash refunds for those
with recalled aerosol spray products. It would also provide up to
$1.75 million in vouchers for consumers who bought non-aerosol
Neutrogena and Aveeno products which were not recalled.[GN]

BETTER MORTGAGE: Files 9th Cir. Appeal in Dominguez Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
BETTER MORTGAGE CORPORATION is taking an appeal from a court order
granting in part and denying in part a motion to invalidate
uncounseled releases and waiver agreement obtained ex parte and for
corrective notice and requiring the parties to provide an updated
proposed curative notice in the lawsuit styled Lorenzo Dominguez,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Better Mortgage Corporation, Defendant, Case No.
8:20-cv-01784-JLS-KES, in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California.

The Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, brought this class action suit against the Defendant for
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, California Labor Code,
and California's Business and Professions Code including failure to
pay overtime compensation, failure to provide itemized wage
statements, failure to provide and/or authorize meal and rest
periods, failure to pay earned wages upon discharge, and unfair
business practices.

On October 1, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a motion for relief from
uncounseled releases and waiver agreements obtained ex parte.
District Judge Josephine L. Staton granted in part and denied in
part the motion on May 17 2022. In her order, the parties were
ordered to meet and confer to decide on appropriate language for
the curative notice, which the parties must submit to the Court for
approval within 14 days of the date of the court's order. The
Defendant was further ordered to communicate with putative class
members regarding the subject matter of the litigation only in
writing and with Court approval.

On May 31, 2022, the Plaintiff filed the parties' joint notice of
disputes regarding court-approved curative notice.

On July 21, 2022, the Court ordered the parties to provide an
updated proposed curative notice within 14 days of the orders
issuance. The court held that to the extent there are disputes
regarding any language, the parties shall include in the same
proposed curative notice, their versions of proposed language for a
particular section. Upon the parties filing, the Court will take
the matter under submission and make its ruling on the final
language for the curative notice. The Court further advised the
parties that if any party proposes a notice that clearly conflict
with the multiple orders the Court has now issued, the Court may
award attorneys' fees to the other side.

The appellate case is captioned as Lorenzo Dominguez v. Better
Mortgage Corporation, Case No. 22-55731, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on August 3, 2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Better Mortgage Corporation Mediation Questionnaire
was due on August 10, 2022;

   -- Transcript is due on September 30, 2022;

   -- Appellant Better Mortgage Corporation opening brief is due on
November 9, 2022;

   -- Appellee Lorenzo Dominguez answering brief is due on December
9, 2022.

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief. [BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee LORENZO DOMINGUEZ, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

            Daniel S. Brome, Esq.
            Matthew C. Helland, Esq.
            NICHOLS KASTER, LLP
            235 Montgomery Street, Suite 810
            San Francisco, CA 94104
            Telephone: (415) 277-7235

                   - and –

            Matt Pearson, Esq.
            Aidan Chowning Poppler, Esq.
            Todd A. Seaver, Esq.
            BERMAN TABACCO
            425 California Street, Suite 2300
            San Francisco, CA 94104
            Telephone: (415) 433-3200

Defendant-Appellant BETTER MORTGAGE CORPORATION is represented by:

            Paul A. Holton, Esq.
            O'MELVENY & MYERS, LLP
            610 Newport Center Drive
            Newport Beach, CA 92660
            Telephone: (949) 823-6900

                   - and –

            Susannah Howard, Esq.
            O'MELVENY & MYERS, LLP
            Two Embarcadero Center, 28th Floor
            San Francisco, CA 94111
            Telephone: (415) 984-8700

                   - and -

            Adam Joseph Karr, Esq.
            O'MELVENY & MYERS, LLP
            610 Newport Center Drive
            Newport Beach, CA 92660
            Telephone: (949) 760-9600

                   - and -

            Racquel B. Martin, Esq.
            O'MELVENY & MYERS, LLP
            Two Embarcadero Center, 28th Floor
            San Francisco, CA 94111
            Telephone: (415) 984-8714

BIG PICTURE: Seeks Extension of Class Certification Deadlines
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RICHARD LEE SMITH, JR.,
individually and on behalf of persons similarly situated, v. MATT
MARTORELLO, et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-01651-AR (D. Or.), the
Defendant asks the Court to enter an order extending the class
certification deadlines as follows:

   -- Defendants' opposition to plaintiff's motion for class
      certification is due by September 9, 2022; and

   -- plaintiff’s reply in support of his motion for class
      certification is due by October 11, 2022.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Aug. 23, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Rhap8S at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Kristin M. Asai, Esq.
          HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP
          Kristin.Asai@hklaw.com
          601 SW 2nd Ave., Ste. 1800
          Portland, OR 97204
          Telephone: (503) 243-2300
          Facsimile: (503) 241-8014

               - and -

          Bernard R. Given, Esq.
          William N. Grosswendt, Esq.
          LOEB & LOEB LLP
          10100 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 2200
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 282-2000
          Facsimile: (310) 282-2200
          E-mail: bgiven@loeb.com
                  wgrosswendt@loeb.com


BROWN UNIVERSITY: $1.5M Deal in Refund Suit Gets Prelim. Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Caleb Lazar at browndailyherald.com reports that a federal judge
granted preliminary approval of a $1.5 million settlement in a
class action lawsuit, which three students brought against the
University seeking tuition and fee refunds for the Spring 2020
semester when the University sent students home and switched to
remote learning at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The plaintiffs argued that moving to online classes and sending
students home constituted a breach of contract, unjust enrichment
and conversion - deprival of personal property from an owner
without consent - which entitled students to a refund, The Herald
previously reported.

The three plaintiffs in the class action suit will each receive no
more than $2,000 in compensation, and up to 30% of the settlement
fund will go to attorney fees, to be determined at the Jan. 10
hearing, according to court documents. The rest of the compensation
will be divided among the nearly 10,000 students who were enrolled
at Brown during the spring 2020 semester.

A final approval hearing is scheduled to be held Jan. 10, 2023,
according to court documents.

A student first filed the lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Rhode Island in April 2020, The Herald previously
reported. Though the University committed to refunding 50 percent
of students' room and board fees for the semester, the University
chose not to refund tuition because classes continued remotely.

In September 2020, the University filed a motion to dismiss the
lawsuit, The Herald previously reported. A U.S. District Court in
Rhode Island judge ruled in favor of it in March 2021. In April
2022, students appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit before reaching a settlement agreement with
the University, according to court documents.

Though the University agreed to the settlement, Brown denies any
wrongdoing.

"The discovery process and court decisions showed there was no
evidence that Brown had violated students' rights," University
Spokesperson Brian Clark wrote in an email to The Herald. "Despite
the circumstances brought on by the pandemic, the University
continued to provide students with a world-class education, and
students continued to learn remotely as they earned academic credit
toward completion of their degrees. Brown appropriately refunded
unused room, board and recreation fees, and continued to provide
health care and campus activities services funded by other student
fees."

"While Brown remains fully confident in its Spring 2020 decisions
on tuition and fees, and all court rulings in the case have decided
in the University's favor, the settlement offers a more productive
resolution than a protracted litigation process that would require
financial and time investments better reserved for supporting
student success on campus," Clark added.

Nationally, college students have filed over 300 class action
lawsuits accusing their institutions of breaching contract or
unjustly enriching themselves through the transition to online
classes and reduced programming at the start of the pandemic.

While judges have largely dismissed such cases, some Universities
have reached settlements with students. Last November, Columbia
agreed to a $12.5 million settlement in a similar case, and the
University of Tampa agreed to a $3.4 million settlement this May.
[GN]

CENTER FOR AUTISM: Wins Bid to Compel Arbitration in Norde Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California grants the Defendant's motion to
compel arbitration and dismiss the case titled CADE NORDE,
Plaintiff v. CENTER FOR AUTISM AND RELATED DISORDERS, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 22-cv-00639-DMR (N.D. Cal.).

Ms. Norde filed the putative class action against her former
employer Center for Autism and Related Disorders, LLC ("CARD")
alleging violations of her privacy rights after CARD suffered a
data breach.

CARD is a California corporation that provides healthcare, remote
clinical services, training programs, and specialized outpatient
services at 221 locations in 24 states. Norde was a former CARD
employee from June 2018 to June 2019. In October 2020, it announced
that it was the victim of a cyberattack in which "highly sensitive"
personal health information, personally identifiable information,
and financial information was accessed. This information included
clinical and treatment information, contact information, dates of
birth, and insurance details. CARD had collected this information
from putative class members, including Norde, "in connection with
their employment or receiving healthcare services."

Ms. Norde claims that her highly sensitive information was exposed
in the data breach because CARD stored or shared this information.
She claims further that CARD failed to comply with its statutory
obligations under the laws such as the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") and the California Confidentiality
of Medical Information Act ("CMIA"), industry standards, and its
own assurances and representations that it would keep this
information confidential.

The Plaintiff seeks to certify a nationwide class of individuals
whose information was also exposed during the breach, including a
subclass of California residents. She alleges claims for CMIA
violations, negligence, invasion of privacy, breach of confidence,
implied contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, California's Unfair Competition Law, and unjust
enrichment.

When Norde was hired, the parties signed an arbitration agreement.
It is CARD's standard practice for all employees to sign an
arbitration agreement during their onboarding process. Norde's
signed agreement formed part of her personnel file.

The agreement expressly says at the top of the page "ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT."

The Agreement provides that if any disagreement comes up between
the Company and Norde, then the parties will present the
disagreement for binding determination before a retired judge
selected from JAMS, Inc. or any similar organization that both of
the parties agree to. The parties also expressly waived their right
to pursue their claims as a class action.

CARD now moves to compel arbitration of Norde's claims in
accordance with the Agreement. Norde filed an opposition, to which
CARD replied.

CARD moves to compel arbitration of Norde's claims because the
Agreement applies to violations of federal and state laws, and tort
and negligence claims that arise out of her "employment
relationship" and a "confidentiality agreement." Norde does not
dispute the existence of the Agreement nor that she signed it.
Rather, she contests the scope and enforceability of the Agreement.
Specifically, she argues that her claims do not arise out of her
employment relationship because they deal with a data breach that
occurred after she was no longer employed, and the language of the
Agreement states that it only applies to employment-related
matters. She also argues that the Agreement is procedurally and
substantively unconscionable and, thus, unenforceable.

The Agreement requires arbitration of all disputes enumerated in
Section 2, which encompasses for all claims, including the issue of
whether or not a dispute is arbitrable.

Neither party disputes the existence of this delegation clause, and
Norde does not challenge the enforceability of the clause
specifically. Instead, Norde challenges the enforceability of the
Agreement as a whole. However, the Agreement's delegation clause
means that her issues relating to the scope and enforceability,
including unconscionability, of the Agreement must be addressed by
the arbitrator, not this Court, Judge Ryu holds.

CARD also moves to dismiss the action or in the alternative, to
stay the action in its entirety pending the completion of
arbitration proceedings.

The Court finds it appropriate to stay this action pending the
outcome of the parties' arbitration proceedings. For case
management reasons, it will accomplish this by administratively
closing the case. To reopen the case, the parties are directed to
file a joint status report within two weeks of the completion of
any arbitration.

For these reasons, the Court grants CARD's motion to compel
arbitration and stays this action in its entirety pending the final
resolution of the arbitration. The clerk will administratively
close the case. The parties may reopen the case by filing a joint
status report within two weeks of the completion of any
arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 22, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/275yehzn from Leagle.com.


CLOVER HEALTH: Initial Case Management Order Modified in Bond
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TIMOTHY BOND, Lead
Plaintiff, and JEAN-NICOLAS TREMBLAY, Named Plaintiff, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v. CLOVER HEALTH
INVESTMENTS, CORP. f/k/a SOCIAL CAPITAL HEDOSOPHIA HOLDINGS CORP.
III, VIVEK GARIPALLI, ANDREW TOY, JOE WAGNER, and CHAMATH
PALIHAPITIYA, Case No. 3:21-cv-00096 (M.D. Tenn.), the Hon. Judge
Aleta A. Trauger entered an order modifying the initial case
management order and subsequent order as follows:

   -- the Defendants' deadline to file their opposition to class
      certification from September 9, 2022, to September 30,
      2022; and

   -- the Plaintiffs' deadline to file a reply in further
      support of their motion for class certification from
      October 10, 2022, to October 31, 2022.

Clover Health is a healthcare technology company.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 25, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3RvN4QA at no extra charge.[CC]

COLORADO: Court Dismisses Anthony Class Action
-----------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DION ANTHONY v. COLORADO
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; COLORADO STATE PENITENTIARY; and RAENNE
WILL, Case No. 1:20-cv-01484-DDD-SKC (D. Colo.), the Hon. Judge
Daniel D. Domenico entered an order:

   1. accepting and adopting Judge Crews' Report and
      Recommendation;

   2. granting the Defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissing
      the case; and

   3. denying as moot the Plaintiff’s Motion to Sanction
      Defendants, the Plaintiff’s Class Certification Motion,
      the Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to
      Plaintiff's Motion to Sanction Defendants and Class
      Certification Motion, and Plaintiff's Demand for Partial
      Summary Judgment.

The Plaintiff brings this suit alleging that the Colorado
Department of Corrections and the Colorado State Penitentiary
violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution by interfering with his legal mail and failing to
provide him with prompt notification regarding a prison
disciplinary matter, a pending out-of-state indictment, and a
pending Colorado indictment.

Mr. Anthony also alleges that Reanne Will, a prison official,
violated his due process rights when she denied his request for
evidence at a disciplinary hearing. He also challenges the
constitutionality of Colorado Revised Statute section
16-18.5-106(2) as unconstitutionally vague.

The Colorado Department of Corrections is the principal department
of the Colorado state government that operates the state prisons.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 26, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Qh27N7 at no extra charge.[CC]

COMMONWEALTH BANK: May Face Class Suit Over Drop in Share Price
---------------------------------------------------------------
triplem.com.au reports that the Commonwealth Bank could be facing a
massive class action by thousands of its shareholders.

Maurice Blackburn Lawyers is pursuing the action on behalf of CBA
investors after a fall in the share price following money
laundering and terrorism-funding allegations.

They say the bank's 800,000 shareholders suffered a significant
drop on the back of AUSTRAC starting legal proceedings against the
CBA.

"Our investigations and analysis show that this drop was in the top
one per cent of price movements that CBA experienced in the past
five years, making it apparent that the news was of material
significance to shareholders," lawyer Andrew Watson said.

CBA had admitted its board was aware of the breaches in the second
half of 2015 but the bank said nothing to the stock exchange until
August 4 this year, he said.

The class action is only open to shareholders who bought CBA shares
between August 17, 2015, and August 3 this year, and who still held
some stock on the afternoon of August 3. [GN]

DR. SQUATCH: Faces Class Suit Over Misleading Men's Natural Shampoo
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Corrado Rizzi at classaction.org reports that a proposed class
action contends that Dr. Squatch men's "natural" shampoo is
misleadingly advertised since it contains a number of synthetic
ingredients.

According to the 14-page case, a peek at the shampoo's ingredients
list reveals that the product contains, among other non-natural
substances, decyl glucoside, which is made via chemical
condensation, and glycerin, a factory-produced texturizer. The
supposedly natural Dr. Squatch shampoo also contains
coco-glucoside; "fragrance," the many compounds of which are
derived synthetically; citric acid; and xanthan gum, among a host
of other substances, the suit says.

The filing argues that reasonable consumers understand the term
"natural," as it pertains to product labeling, to mean that the
ingredients are derived from a natural source, have not undergone a
chemical change, or have not undergone a chemical change "created
by a naturally occurring biological process." Guidance from
regulatory agencies has defined "synthetic" to mean a substance
that is "formulated or manufactured by a chemical process or by a
process that chemically changes a substance extracted from
naturally occurring plants, animals, or mineral sources," the case
adds.

Consumers, the filing stresses, lack the meaningful ability to test
for themselves or independently ascertain whether a product is
truly natural, especially at the point of sale, and buyers cannot
know the true nature of a product's ingredients merely by reading
the label, the lawsuit contends.

"That is why, even though the ingredients listed above are
identified on the back of the Product's packaging in the listed
ingredients, the reasonable consumer would not understand-nor are
they expected to understand-that these ingredients are synthetic,"
the suit reads.

The complaint also alleges that the front-label statement "Oat
Protein, Jojoba Oil, Honey" is misleading given the ingredients are
present in the shampoo in amounts less than buyers expect.

The case claims that defendant Dr. Squatch, LLC has sold more of
the shampoo - and at higher prices - than it would have "in the
absence of this misconduct."

The lawsuit looks to cover consumers in Illinois, North Dakota,
Texas, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, Nebraska, South Carolina, Kansas and
Wyoming who bought Dr. Squatch men's "natural" shampoo within the
applicable statute of limitations period. [GN]

ELON MUSK: Faces Suit Over Alleged $258-B Dogecoin Pyramid Scheme
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sissi Cao at observer.com reports that the $258 billion class
action lawsuit accusing Elon Musk of running a pyramid scheme to
inflate the price of dogecoin, a meme-based cryptocurrency, has
added seven new investor plaintiffs and six new defendants,
including The Boring Company, a tunneling startup owned by Musk,
according to an amended complaint filed on Sept. 6 in a New York
federal court.

Keith Johnson, a dogecoin investor, sued Musk in June, accusing him
of intentionally driving up dogecoin's price by more than 36,000
percent between 2019 and 2021 and then letting it crash, causing
huge losses for retail investors while profiting tens of billions
of dollars himself.

Keith Johnson, a dogecoin investor, sued Musk in June, accusing him
of intentionally driving up dogecoin's price by more than 36,000
percent between 2019 and 2021 and then letting it crash, causing
huge losses for retail investors while profiting tens of billions
of dollars himself.

"Defendants were aware since 2019 that dogecoin had no value yet
promoted dogecoin to profit from its trading," the complaint said.
"Musk used his pedestal as World's Richest man to operate and
manipulate the Dogecoin Pyramid Scheme for profit, exposure and
amusement."

Two of Musk's companies, Tesla and SpaceX, were also named as
defendants in the original complaint. The amended suit added The
Boring Company as a defendant.

Johnson is seeking a total of $258 billion in damages, representing
three times the drop in dogecoin's market value between May 2021
and the time the suit was filed.

Musk has not directly addressed the suit but after it was filed in
June tweeted "I will keep supporting Dogecoin." [GN]

EQUIFAX LLC: 11th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Amended Rajapakse Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled SAMANTHA DELANE RAJAPAKSE,
Plaintiff-Appellant v. EQUIFAX, LLC, Defendant, EQUIFAX
INFORMATION, LLC, Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 21-12569 (11th
Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirms the district court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's amended
complaint.

Plaintiff Samantha Rajapakse appeals the dismissal of her amended
complaint as frivolous. In the district court, she asserted claims
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Rajapakse alleged that she was
a class member in the Equifax data breach litigation and that
Equifax hadn't complied with its obligations as part of the
settlement agreement by not taking extra measures to investigate
and to remove inaccurate information on her credit reports.

Specifically, Rajapakse alleged that Equifax maintained two credit
accounts in her name: one in her married name and one in her maiden
name. According to her, it failed to timely remove one of the
accounts and it failed to investigate disputes she had with two
creditors.

After Rajapakse moved for in forma pauperis status, the district
court screened the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. section
1915(e)(2)(B) and dismissed it as frivolous. The amended complaint
was frivolous, the district court explained, because, to the extent
that the Plaintiff was claiming damages as a result of the 2017
Equifax data breach, she was a member of the consumer class and
those claims have been settled. As to any other allegations, the
district court concluded, they were "outlandish and
incomprehensible."

On appeal, Rajapakse argues that: the district court abused its
discretion because it dismissed the amended complaint after she
questioned the court's "behavior"; she was entitled to relief as a
matter of law because Equifax "provided no defense"; the district
court violated her due process rights as a pro se litigant; and the
district court violated her "rights as a consumer" under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act.

But the Court of Appeals finds no error.

First, the district court dismissed the amended complaint because
Rajapakse's claims had already been settled as part of the Equifax
class action--not because she questioned the court's behavior.
Second, under section 1915(e)(2)(B), the district court may
"dismiss the case at any time"--even before the Defendant answers
the amended complaint--if the "action" "is frivolous," or "fails to
state a claim," as the district court found here.

Third, dismissing the amended complaint under the section
1915(e)(2)(B) screening procedures did not violate Rajapakse's due
process rights. And fourth, the district court didn't violate
Rajapakse's rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act because she
failed to state a claim for relief under the Act.

Thus, the Court of Appeals affirms the district court's dismissal
of the amended complaint.

Affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Aug. 22, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p83wzph from Leagle.com.


FAITH TECHNOLOGIES: Court Narrows Claims in Laabs ERISA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge William C. Griesbach of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin grants in part and denies in part the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the lawsuit captioned GENNA B. LAABS,
individually and as a representative of a class of participants and
beneficiaries of the Faith Technologies Inc. 401(k) Retirement
Plan, Plaintiff v. FAITH TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., Defendants,
Case No. 20-C-1534 (E.D. Wis.).

Laabs, a participant in the Faith Technologies, Inc. 401(k)
Retirement Plan, brings the case as a proposed class action under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(2), against Defendants Faith Technologies,
Inc., the Board of Directors of Faith Technologies, Inc., and John
Does 1 through 30.

On Dec. 1, 2020, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's complaint. On Sept. 16, 2021, the Court referred the
case to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Dries to address any motions.
Magistrate Judge Dries issued a Report and Recommendation to
partially grant the motion to dismiss on Sept. 30, 2021. The
parties filed timely objections to the Report and Recommendation.

On Dec. 8, 2021, the Court stayed and administratively closed the
case pending the Supreme Court's decision in Hughes v. Northwestern
University, No. 19-1401. The Supreme Court issued a decision in
Hughes on Jan. 24, 2022 (142 S.Ct. 737 (2022)). That same day, the
Court lifted the stay and invited the parties to submit
simultaneous supplemental briefing in light of the Supreme Court's
decision. The parties submitted supplemental briefs on Feb. 7,
2022.

The Plaintiff asserted five claims for relief in her complaint:
breaches of duties of loyalty and prudence regarding recordkeeping
and administration fees (Count I); breaches of duty of loyalty and
prudence regarding investment management fees (Count II); failure
to adequately monitor other fiduciaries regarding recordkeeping and
administration fees (Count III); failure to adequately monitor
other fiduciaries regarding investment management fees (Count IV);
and engaging in prohibited party-in-interest transactions (Count
V).

In the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommended
that the Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted with respect to
Counts II and IV because those claims are precluded by Divane v.
Northwestern University, 953 F.3d 980, 991 (7th Cir. 2020), and
Count V because the Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the claim.
The Magistrate Judge recommended that the motion be denied with
respect to Claims I and III because the Plaintiff stated valid
claims for breach of fiduciary duties (but not for breach of the
duty of loyalty) based on the Defendants' alleged failure to shop
for or negotiate recordkeeping fees.

The Plaintiff filed objections to the Report and Recommendation
dealing with her allegations of the Defendants' breach of the duty
of prudence and to monitor regarding the high-cost funds and stable
value investments, disclosure of revenue-sharing arrangement, and
investment services. The Defendants filed objections to the Report
and Recommendation dealing with the Plaintiff's allegations of
their breach of the duty of prudence and to monitor regarding the
recordkeeping fees, as well as the Plaintiff's standing as to
investments she never selected or fees she did not pay.

As an initial matter, no party filed an objection to the portion of
the Report and Recommendation dealing with the dismissal of the
Plaintiff's breach of the duty of loyalty and prohibited
party-in-interest transaction claims. Upon clear-error review, the
Court adopts the Report and Recommendation as to these claims.

Having reviewed de novo the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's
well-reasoned recommendation on the issues of standing, breach of
the duty of prudence and to monitor based on the Defendants'
alleged failure to shop for or negotiate recordkeeping fees, and
breach of the duty of prudence based on the Defendants' alleged
failure to disclose the revenue-sharing arrangement.

However, the Court rejects the Magistrate Judge's recommendation on
the issues of breach of the duty of prudence and to monitor based
on the Defendants' alleged offering of higher-cost actively managed
investments and Prudential GIC, and failure to follow a prudent
process in selecting Prudential's GoalMaker Asset Allocation
Service.

In the Supreme Court's most recent decision discussing the
fiduciary's duty of prudence, the Court reversed key Seventh
Circuit rulings on which the Magistrate Judge had relied (Hughes v.
Northwestern Univ., 142 S.Ct. 737 (2022)). There, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants violated their duty of prudence by
offering needlessly expensive investment options and failing to
solicit quotes or competitive bids for recordkeeping services. The
Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim
because the plan offered a mix of low-cost index funds, including
the types of funds the plaintiffs wanted. Because the plaintiffs'
preferred type of investments were available, the court reasoned,
the plaintiffs could not complain about the flaws in the other
options. The Seventh Circuit also found that the amount of
recordkeeping fees paid were within the participants' control,
since "'plan participants had options to keep the expense ratios
(and, therefore, recordkeeping expenses) low,'" quoting Divane v.
Northwestern Univ., 953 F.3d 980, 991 (7th Cir. 2020).

While the Magistrate Judge properly considered the motion under the
law as it existed at the time, the analysis can no longer stand in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Hughes, Judge Griesbach
holds. Accordingly, the Court declines to adopt the Magistrate
Judge's discussion of those issues.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached their fiduciary duty
by retaining high-cost actively managed investments. She also
asserts that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duty by
offering the Prudential GIC, a stable value investment, because it
had excessive spread fees and lacked diversification. She contends
that the Defendants should have selected the less expensive
"Benchmark GIC." The Defendants rely on Divane for the proposition
that a plaintiff cannot establish imprudence when the plan offers a
"wide range of investment options and fees." While they concede
that the Supreme Court's decision in Hughes renders this argument
moot, they argue that the Plaintiff's claims remain implausible.

The Plaintiff does not generally oppose actively managed funds.
Instead, she maintains that, although actively managed funds can be
part of the mix of investments of a plan if a prudent process has
been followed in selecting them, the Defendants breached their
fiduciary duty by failing to make a specific and informed finding
regarding the cost of the investment options in the Plan. She
alleges that the fees charged were up to 520% more expensive than
the fees for comparable institutional mutual funds that were used
by other similar plans.

Although the Plaintiff has provided comparative tables to suggest
that the Defendants engaged in an imprudent process when selecting
those investments, she is not suggesting that the difference in the
cost alone creates a cause of action. The difference in cost,
however, does raise an inference that the Defendants engaged in an
imprudent process when selecting those investments by failing to
consider materially similar and less expensive alternatives.
Therefore, Judge Griesbach finds, the Plaintiff has stated a claim
that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duty by retaining
high-cost actively managed investments and offering the Prudential
GIC without undertaking an appropriate process.

The Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants failed to follow a
prudent process in selecting Prudential's GoalMaker Asset
Allocation Service. She asserts that the Prudential GoalMaker asset
allocation service funneled employees' retirement savings into
imprudent funds that paid excessive fees to Prudential and mostly
excluded low-cost index funds that did not pay fees to Prudential.
She alleges that participants in the GoalMaker service had their
assets directed toward funds with excessive fees. She claims that
approximately $25 million of the Plan's assets were invested in the
Prudential Guaranteed Income Fund, which charged highly inflated
fees compared not only to competitors but to the fees Prudential
charged its other clients.

The Defendants argue that the Plan's offering of GoalMaker as an
optional service cannot plausibly show imprudence because GoalMaker
is one investment option that participants can choose based on
their personal preferences. They also assert that the Plaintiff's
alternative funds are not appropriate comparisons. But these
factual questions are inappropriate at the pleading stage. The
Plaintiff has asserted allegations from which it can be inferred
that the Defendants followed an imprudent process in selecting
Prudential's GoalMaker Asset Allocation Service.

Finally, the Plaintiff's breach of the duty to monitor claim is
derivative of the breach of fiduciary claim, Judge Griesbach notes.
Because she has stated claims for breach of fiduciary duty with
respect to high-cost funds and stable value assets, as well as
investment services, she has also stated a claim that the
Defendants breached their duty to monitor in these respects.

For these reasons, the Court orders that the Report and
Recommendation is adopted-in-part and the Defendants' motion to
dismiss is granted-in-part and denied-in-part. The motion is
granted with respect to the Plaintiff's breaches of duty of loyalty
claims, breach of the duty of prudence claim based on the
Defendant's alleged failure to disclose the revenue-sharing
arrangement, and prohibited party-in-interest transaction claim,
and those claims are dismissed.

What remains are the Plaintiff's claims for breach of the duty of
prudence and to monitor based on the Defendants' alleged failure to
shop for or negotiate recordkeeping fees, failure to follow a
prudent process in selecting Prudential's GoalMaker Asset
Allocation Service, and offering of higher-cost actively managed
investments and Prudential GIC.

The Clerk is directed to set the matter on the Court's calendar for
a Rule 16 telephonic scheduling conference.

A full-text copy of the Court's Decision and Order dated Aug. 22,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydnj3r2e from
Leagle.com.


FIVE STAR: Plaintiff Litigates for Years to Win $500 in TCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Generally speaking failing to respond to a TCPA class action
complaint is about the worst idea imaginable. But for a couple of
alleged fax miscreants in Colorado, the strategy turned out pretty
good.

Five Star Advertising, LLC and some guy named Johnny Lee, allegedly
blasted a bunch of folks with faxes back in 2019. One company was
outraged enough about the faxes to sue in a TCOA class action.

The defendants never showed up, which lead to the court certifying
the case for purposes of injunctive relief. But since the Plaintiff
never obtained the class data-the defendants never showed up
remember?-the case could not be certified for damages purposes.

Following the certification ruling the plaintiff moved for a
default judgment and an injunction. The court granted the
motion-awarding Plaintiff $500.00 for the one fax it received. And
although it awarded an injunction banning defendants from sending
similar faxes in the future it denied plaintiff's request for
attorneys fees-the TCPA does not allow for an award of such fees.

In the end, therefore, defendants' decision to simply not show up
in court resulted in a judgment of a mere $500.00.

I'm not recommending this strategy. The Court could have done 1,000
different things here, and this outcome was probably the least
likely. Failing to show up in court generally leads to BAD things
happening.

Still, this is an interesting little tale.

Case is Stone v. Five Star Advertising, 2022 WL 4094067 (D. Colo.
Sept. 7, 2022). [GN]

FORD MOTOR: March Hearing on Class Status in "Death Wobble" Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
Channel 9's Jason Stoogenke provided a major update in a legal
battle that could impact drivers everywhere involving an issue
Stoogenke has been investigating since 2019.

Customers call it the Ford "death wobble." Despite the name, it's
not clear if anyone has been killed because of it, but the problem
is serious enough to where plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in late 2020.
More than a year and half later, they're almost to the point where
they'll ask the judge to make it a class action.

In a major development, the judge has now set a date for that
request: March 10, 2023. It may sound a long way off, but if the
judge says yes, it could open the case to drivers everywhere,
including drivers in the Carolinas, such as David Jenkins.

"It bounces so much. It's just unbelievable," Jenkins told
Stoogenke. "The reason I came to you is really . . . it's serious .
. . I think it's really bad."

Jenkins owns a 2016 Ford F-250 and he told Stoogenke he felt the
so-called "death wobble" multiple times.

Ford offered a fix in 2020, but the offer ended the same year and
only applied to certain models. The model Jenkins owns was not
covered. Ford has not issued a recall, which is why many car owners
are relying on the lawsuit becoming a class action suit so they can
be included in it.

In its court filings, Ford denies many of the allegations. It
admits issuing technical service bulletins related to steering
wheel shaking but denies these are "associated with the death
wobble."

In the past, the automaker told Stoogenke it doesn't typically
comment on pending litigation but advised customers to contact Ford
or their dealership if they have a concern. Stoogenke asked the
company if it had anything new to add for this report, but Ford did
not respond in time.

Stoogenke suggests "that if you have this issue, take your truck to
the dealer if for no other reason than to document the problem. If
you spend any money because of the problem, save your receipts in
case there is a recall or legal settlement, and you can get
reimbursed later." [GN]


FRESH HARVEST: Sarmiento's Bid for Protective Order Partly Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Jose Division, grants in part
and denies in part the Plaintiffs' motion for protective order in
the lawsuit styled RIGOBERTO SARMIENTO, et al., Plaintiffs v. FRESH
HARVEST, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-07974-BLF (N.D.
Cal.).

Plaintiffs Rigoberto Sarmiento and Gustavo Luevano-Vaca moved for
protective order to limit Defendants Fresh Harvest, Inc. and SMD
Logistics, Inc.'s (collectively, "Fresh Harvest") communications
with the Plaintiffs and putative class members in this pre-class
certification wage and labor class action. The Plaintiffs' motion
is based on evidence of Fresh Harvest's prior communications with
putative class members and the Plaintiffs, including an incident on
June 13, 2022, when Fresh Harvest allegedly sent a leader of a
Mexican vigilante group to Plaintiff Luevano-Vaca's residence in
Mexico.

The lawsuit is a California wage and hour case brought on behalf of
foreign national agricultural workers, who work seasonally in the
United States pursuant to H-2A visas ("H-2A workers") and domestic
agricultural workers, who are allegedly in "corresponding
employment" with the H-2A workers ("domestic workers") under the
H-2A regulations. The case was originally brought by a single
Plaintiff--Mr. Sarmiento--who is a domestic worker. Mr.
Luevano-Vaca--an H-2A worker--joined the case as a Plaintiff on
June 11, 2021. Before Mr. Luevano-Vaca joined the case, he signed a
release of claims against his prior employer Fresh Harvest. In its
answer to the First Amended Complaint, Fresh Harvest counterclaimed
for breach of contract based on Mr. Luevano-Vaca's suit against
Fresh Harvest in breach of the release he had previously signed
while a putative class member.

The Plaintiffs moved to dismiss Fresh Harvest's counterclaim,
arguing that the release Mr. Luevano-Vaca signed was void under
H-2A regulation 29 C.F.R. Section 501.5, which prohibits waiver of
an H-2A worker's rights outside of certain situations, including in
agreements in settlement of private litigation.

On Dec. 1, 2021, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion, finding
that since Mr. Luevano-Vaca was only a putative class member at the
time he signed the release of claims against Fresh Harvest, the
agreement was not "in settlement of private litigation" and was
void as a matter of public policy under 29 C.F.R. Section 501.5 as
a waiver of Mr. Luevano-Vaca's rights under the H-2A regulations.

In this present motion, the Plaintiffs submit evidence that on June
13, 2022, Mr. Luevano-Vaca was visited at his residence in the
state of Baja California, Mexico, by a leader of a Mexican
vigilante group, who had flown from Mexico City to offer him $8,000
to settle his claims against Fresh Harvest. The Plaintiffs submit
evidence that the vigilante group leader put Mr. Luevano-Vaca in
touch with a lawyer, who spoke further with Mr. Luevano-Vaca about
settling his claims. They argue that the June 13, 2022 incident is
in line with Fresh Harvest's prior conduct, which has included
contacting putative class members to sign releases--in violation of
the Court's Dec. 1, 2021 order--that include provisions preventing
the putative class members from serving as witnesses in the present
case.

In response, Fresh Harvest submits evidence that the person, who
visited Mr. Luevano-Vaca's residence was a legal assistant--not a
vigilante group leader--and he was sent by a Mexican attorney named
Eduardo Baltazar to discuss a potential truck driving job for
Harvest Tek de Mexico--an affiliate of Fresh Harvest. As to the
releases Fresh Harvest has collected from putative class members,
Fresh Harvest argues that the only releases the Plaintiffs can
point to were collected before the Court issued its Dec. 1, 2021
order finding that such releases are void as a matter of public
policy.

Based on the evidence of Fresh Harvest's contact with the
Plaintiffs and putative class members, the Plaintiffs seek a
protective order (1) prohibiting Fresh Harvest and its agents from
communicating with the Plaintiffs other than through counsel of
record; (2) prohibiting Fresh Harvest and its agents from
communicating with putative class members about waivers or releases
of claims; and (3) prohibiting Fresh Harvest and its agents from
communicating with putative class members about this litigation.
Fresh Harvest opposes, arguing that any such protective order is
unnecessary based on the evidence.

               Communications With the Plaintiffs

The Plaintiffs argue that the Court should prohibit communications
between Fresh Harvest and the Plaintiffs, because such
communications violate California Rule of Professional
Responsibility 4.2, which limits ex parte communications with
represented parties. They further argue that such a prohibition is
particularly necessary given Fresh Harvest's use of coercive
conduct, including sending a vigilante leader to Mr. Luevano-Vaca's
house. Additionally, the Plaintiffs argue that regardless of the
identity of the agent sent to Mr. Luevano-Vaca's house, a
protective order prohibiting ex parte communications is necessary,
since the evidence shows that the agent visited his
home--unannounced, uninvited, and to the dismay of Mr. Luevano-Vaca
and his wife--to discuss the present lawsuit and a monetary
settlement.

In response, Fresh Harvest argues that the Plaintiffs' account of
the events of June 13, 2022 is false, because the evidence
indicates that Mr. Luevano-Vaca was not visited by a vigilante
leader. Further, it argues that Mr. Baltazar did not violate any
ethical rules because the evidence indicates that he contacted Mr.
Luevano-Vaca merely to offer him a job with Harvest Tek--which had
nothing to do with the case and is, therefore, outside the scope of
the representation relevant under California Rule of Professional
Responsibility 4.2.

The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs. It declines to determine
whether the Harvest Tek "agent" was a vigilante leader, but
regardless of the identity of the agent sent to Mr. Luevano-Vaca's
house, the undisputed evidence indicates that an agent of a lawyer
for a Fresh Harvest affiliate showed up at Mr. Luevano-Vaca's house
uninvited and without advance notice.

Further, Judge Freeman says Fresh Harvest's innocent explanation
for the incident defies belief: it is implausible that Harvest Tek
would have had a lawyer send an agent on a 3.5-hour flight to offer
Mr. Luevano-Vaca a truck driver job, and the evidence suggests that
Mr. Baltazar and Mr. Luevano-Vaca discussed the present lawsuit.

The Court finds that such ex parte communication between Fresh
Harvest (and affiliates) and the Plaintiffs is improper, so a
protective order prohibiting such communication is appropriate.

Accordingly, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' motion as to the
relief sought regarding communications between Fresh Harvest and
the Plaintiffs. Any future communication with the named Plaintiffs
will be through counsel.

           Communications With Putative Class Members

The Plaintiffs further argue that the Court should limit
communications between Fresh Harvest and putative class members
regarding this litigation and settlement of their claims, because
such communications violate the Court's Dec. 1, 2021 order finding
Mr. Luevano-Vaca's release of claims against Fresh Harvest void
under 29 C.F.R. Section 501.5.

Further, the Plaintiffs argue that courts have "roundly condemned"
solicitation of putative class members to prevent them from
participating in litigation. The Plaintiffs argue that Fresh
Harvest's conduct is particularly egregious given that the releases
they have signed with putative class members have precluded the
putative class members from assisting any other person in any
action at law regarding claims arising out of their employment.

The Plaintiffs additionally argue that even if they cannot point to
releases that Fresh Harvest has solicited putative class members to
sign since the Court's Dec. 1, 2021 order, Fresh Harvest also
declines to swear that they have not sought such releases since
that order was issued.

At the Aug. 11, 2022 hearing, the Plaintiffs clarified that any
order should apply to both H-2A worker and domestic worker putative
class members. They argued that domestic worker putative class
members are in "corresponding employment" with H-2A workers under
the H-2A regulations and, therefore, any release of domestic worker
claims is governed by 29 C.F.R. Section 501.5 just like any release
of H-2A worker claims.

In response, Fresh Harvest argues that any order precluding it from
obtaining putative class member declarations would hamstring its
efforts to oppose class certification. Further, Fresh Harvest
argues that the Plaintiffs exaggerate the impact of the Court's
holding in its Dec. 1, 2021 order, since that only pertained to the
facts regarding Mr. Luevano-Vaca's release of claims. Additionally,
at the Aug. 11, 2022 hearing, Fresh Harvest argued that any
protective order should apply only to H-2A workers, since the
Court's Dec. 1, 2021 order was premised on the H-2A regulations.

The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs in part. Based on the Court's
Dec. 1, 2021 order, Fresh Harvest and its agents have no reason to
communicate with H-2A worker putative class members about releases
or waivers of claims against Fresh Harvest. The Court's Dec. 1,
2021 order held that any such release is void under applicable H-2A
regulations as a matter of public policy. Accordingly, it has no
trouble finding that such a restriction on Fresh Harvest's
communications with putative class members is justified.

The Plaintiffs also seek a protective order prohibiting Fresh
Harvest and its agents from communicating with putative class
members about the subject matter of this litigation or the claims
asserted therein.

The Court finds that such a limitation on communications between
Fresh Harvest and H-2A worker putative class members is--in
part--justified in the interest of protecting putative class
members from undue solicitation. Fresh Harvest argues that such a
limitation on communications with putative class members would
hamper its efforts to oppose class certification. But a protective
order can be tailored to address Fresh Harvest's concerns, Judge
Freeman states.

Accordingly, any limitation on Fresh Harvest's communications with
H-2A putative class members does not limit Fresh Harvest's ability
to communicate with H-2A putative class members to obtain
affidavits or other evidence in connection with class
certification. Further, any limitation on Fresh Harvest's
communications with H-2A putative class members is with respect to
the case only--Fresh Harvest can continue to communicate with
putative class members about current or future employment matters,
for instance, Judge Freeman explains.

The Court disagrees with the Plaintiffs as to domestic worker
putative class members. The Court's Dec. 1, 2021 order only
pertained to releases of rights by H-2A workers. The Court has not
ruled whether releases of rights by domestic workers in
"corresponding employment" with H-2A workers are void under 29
C.F.R. Section 501.5--or, for that matter, whether domestic worker
putative class members are in "corresponding employment" with H-2A
workers under the H-2A regulations.

Accordingly, any protective order prohibiting Fresh Harvest's
communications with domestic worker putative class members would be
overbroad at this stage, Judge Freeman opines.

Based on this reasoning, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' motion to
the extent it seeks to prohibit communications between Fresh
Harvest and H-2A worker putative class members regarding any
settlement of their claims in this case. However, the Court denies
the Plaintiffs' motion to the extent it seeks to prohibit Fresh
Harvest from communicating with H-2A worker putative class members
to obtain affidavits or other evidence regarding class
certification. Further, the Court denies the Plaintiffs' motion to
the extent it seeks to prohibit communications between Fresh
Harvest and domestic worker putative class members.

For these reasons, Judge Freeman rules that:

   1. The Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order prohibiting
      ex parte communications between Fresh Harvest (and its
      agents, including affiliates) and the Plaintiffs is
      granted;

   2. The Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order prohibiting
      communications between Fresh Harvest (and its agents,
      including affiliates) and H-2A worker putative class
      members regarding settlement of putative class members'
      claims in this case is granted, provided that any such
      protective order allows Fresh Harvest to communicate with
      H-2A worker putative class members to obtain affidavits or
      other evidence in connection with class certification, or
      to discuss current or future employment matters;

   3. The Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order prohibiting
      communications between Fresh Harvest and domestic worker
      putative class members is denied without prejudice to
      moving for such a protective order at some later date
      following a relevant Court ruling as to the validity of
      releases of domestic worker putative class members' claims;
      and

   4. The Court directed the parties at the Aug. 11, 2022 hearing
      to meet and confer regarding the contents of a protective
      order consistent with the Court's comments during the
      hearing and file a proposed order with the Court on or
      before Aug. 18, 2022, unless the parties stipulate to a
      continuance of that deadline. The Court awaits the parties'
      proposed order. The only objections to any proposed order
      that the Court will entertain will be as to whether the
      proposed order is consistent with this Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 22, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5d5h7zzd from Leagle.com.


FUNPLUS INTERNATIONAL: Sued Over False In-Game Microtransactions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Corrado Rizzi at classaction.org reports that a proposed class
action alleges the companies behind the microtransaction-laden
State of Survival (SOS) mobile game have misled players by
advertising false former prices for purportedly limited-time sales
of in-game items.

The 33-page lawsuit against FunPlus International AG and KingsGroup
Holdings says the "original prices" presented for certain items in
the zombie-themed, post-apocalyptic survival game are wholly
"fabricated" and meant to induce players into quickly taking
advantage of what they believe to be massive discounts.

"These advertisements have run for years," the complaint out of
California says. "But at no point, let alone within three months of
the advertised discounts, have these in-game items ever actually
been offered at a non-discounted price-i.e., without their 'limited
time' discounts."

The filing contends that the defendants' microtransaction-focused
business model, rooted in creating a false sense of urgency,
scarcity of items and purported value for its offerings, fosters
"dangerous consumer behaviors" at the expense of players. Further,
the case notes that since the game pits players against each other,
players feel "significant pressure" to take advantage of what
they're told are limited-time offerings.

According to the suit, purchases within the free-to-download State
of Survival, reportedly one of the highest-grossing mobile strategy
games across Apple and Android devices, range from $0.99 to $99.99
each. Since its inception in 2019, State of Survival has grossed
over a billion dollars in revenue, primarily through in-game
microtransactions whereby players can acquire hero "badges,"
speed-ups and other valuables, the lawsuit says.

Per the complaint, FunPlus uses strikethrough pricing and
percentages to "trick" players into believing they're benefiting
from limited-time promotions that would substantially increase the
value of their in-game purchases. Essentially, players have bought
packs on "sale" for prices that were the same as those they would
usually pay, the filing summarizes.

Importantly, microtransactions are necessary to gameplay in that
they help players further their progress and maintain
competitiveness with others, the suit shares.  

"In other words, a player who spends money in the game will be more
powerful in relation to players who choose not to spend money in
the game. The game leverages this by bombarding players with
advertisements and invitations to buy additional packs and
resources whenever they reach a point in the game where their
progress has stalled. In other words, the game's model is designed
to create a sense of urgency around the purchase of in-game
resources, and SOS further capitalizes on this sense of urgency by
suggesting that purchases are limited-time offerings made available
at a substantial discount."
The purpose of the game, the case explains, is to advance the
strength of a player's "settlement" by upgrading buildings,
locating and upgrading heroes, and training large numbers of
troops. State of Survival exists amid a genre of mobile games the
lawsuit characterizes as "pay to win" given that increasingly
expensive items essential to gameplay must be bought with
real-world money.

"If a player does not make any purchases in the game, it would
require close to 16 months of playing two hours each day, 365 days
a year, to gather the necessary resources to upgrade their
Headquarters to level 30. And this is considered to be the first
priority upgrade for players; in other words, a player who manages
to upgrade their Headquarters to level 30 has only just begun."

According to the case, the total cost for items needed to advance
to this point-roughly $1,400-is never made clear to a player
because the defendants are aware that players would not be willing
to pay the outsized amount up front. To combat this, the defendants
have leveraged an incremental upgrade system to spread gameplay
costs over "29 separate upgrades, all while keeping consumers in
the dark," the filing says.

"In other words, at no point are players told it will cost them
$1,400 to upgrade their Headquarters to level 30," the suit states.
"Instead, they are bombarded with an endless series of
advertisements urgently offering limited-time sales, each providing
the opportunity to purchase just the incremental resources needed
at the time to reach the next level of the upgrade."

The lawsuit looks to cover all persons who, within the applicable
statute of limitations period, bought falsely priced strikethrough
packs, percentage-off packs or limited-time-availability packs in
State of Survival, or any packs for which they were double charged.
[GN]

GEORGIA: Additional Plaintiffs in Richardson v. Wilcher Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled RODRICK L. RICHARDSON, Plaintiff v. SHERIFF
JOHN T. WILCHER, et al., Defendants, Case No. 4:22-cv-181 (S.D.
Ga.), Judge R. Stan Baker of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia, Savannah Division, adopts the
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, and dismisses the
additional plaintiffs.

Before the Court is the Magistrate Judge's Aug. 1, 2022, Report and
Recommendation recommending that the individuals identified as
additional plaintiffs by pro se Plaintiff Rodrick L. Richardson be
dismissed. Richardson objects, confirming his intent that this case
be brought on behalf of a class of plaintiffs, and "noting that one
person, or a small group of people, can sue on behalf of all other
people who happen to be in the same situation(s)." He proceeds to
argue that the proposed class meets the requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Notably, none of the other purported
Plaintiffs have filed an objection to the Magistrate Judge's
recommendation that they be dismissed.

The Report and Recommendation explained that the law in the
Eleventh Circuit expressly prohibits prisoners seeking to proceed
in forma pauperis from joining together as plaintiffs in a single
lawsuit. Additionally, the Plaintiff cannot initiate or maintain a
class action as a pro se litigant.

As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, "It is plain error to permit
an imprisoned litigant who is unassisted by counsel to represent
his fellow inmates in a class action," Judge Baker notes, citing
Wallace v. Smith, 145 F. App'x. 300, 302 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) and
citing Massimo v. Henderson, 468 F.2d 1209, 1210 (5th Cir. 1972).

Therefore, after careful de novo review, the Court overrules
Richardson's objection and adopts the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation as its opinion. All Plaintiffs, other than Rodrick
L. Richardson, are dismissed. The Clerk of Court is directed to
update the docket accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 22, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ykb3hymh from Leagle.com.


GREENBRIER INTERNATIONAL: Sued Over Lidocaine Patches' False Ads
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lidocaine class action overview:

Who: Greenbrier International, Inc. has been hit with a class
action lawsuit due to its Assured lidocaine patches.
Why: The plaintiff alleges the lidocaine patches are falsely
marketed.
Where: The lidocaine class action was filed in an Illinois federal
court.
Assured lidocaine patches promise pain relief for up to eight hours
but fall off within minutes, a new class action lawsuit alleges.

Plaintiff Shannon Hunt filed the class action lawsuit against
Greenbrier International, Inc., Sept. 3 in an Illinois federal
court, alleging violations of state and federal consumer laws.

According to the lawsuit, Greenbrier International, Inc. makes and
sells "Maximum Strength" adhesive patches promising to deliver 4%
lidocaine for eight hours under the Assured brand.

The label promises "Temporary Relief" and "Numbing relief" for
eight hours, shown by text that instructs to "Apply For 8 Hours."

However, the product fails to deliver lidocaine in the way that it
promises, the lidocaine class action alleges.

Lidocaine class action alleges patch cannot stick for eight hours
While the marketing on the product says to remove the product after
eight hours, it cannot actually adhere to the skin for eight hours,
the lawsuit states.

"The message that the wearer can 'Apply [the Product] For 8 Hours'
of 'Temporary Relief' is misleading because it regularly peels off
skin within three to four hours, and sometimes in minutes, after
being applied," the lidocaine class action states.

The product also does not deliver the "maximum strength" of
lidocaine because it cannot adhere for very long, the plaintiff
alleges.

Hunt looks to represent an Illinois class of consumers who bought
the product, plus a consumer fraud multistate class from Virginia,
Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Alaska, Kentucky, West Virginia, Kansas,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Georgia, Iowa, Mississippi, Arkansas, South
Carolina and Utah.

She sued under Illinois consumer laws and for breach of warranty,
negligent misrepresentation, fraud and unjust enrichment and seeks
certification of the class action lawsuit, damages, fees, costs and
a jury trial.

The lidocaine class action comes after multiple other producers of
lidocaine patches were hit with claims that they are stronger and
more long-lasting than they actually are, a new class action
lawsuit alleges.

Target, Walmart, Walgreens, Dollar General, CVS and Kroger are all
facing similar claims about their lidocaine patches. Click the
retailer names for more details.

Have you bought lidocaine patches that fall off before eight hours?
Let us know your experience in the comments!

The plaintiff is represented by Spencer Sheehan of Sheehan &
Associates, P.C.

The Greenbrier lidocaine class action lawsuit is Shannon Hunt v.
Greenbrier International, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-04742, in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois Eastern
Division. [GN]

HALSTED FINANCIAL: Remand of Bailey Suit to State Court Recommended
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled GLORIA BAILEY, on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HALSTED FINANCIAL SERVICES,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:21CV686 (M.D.N.C.), Magistrate Judge Joe
L. Webster of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina issued a Memorandum Opinion and Recommendation
recommending that:

   (1) the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration as to the
       Plaintiff, and to dismiss class action complaint, be
       denied without prejudice as moot for lack of subject
       matter jurisdiction; and

   (2) the Plaintiff's motion to remand this action to state
       court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1447 be granted and
       this action be remanded to the General Court of Justice,
       Superior Court Division, in Forsyth County, North
       Carolina.

The Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
commenced the action against Halsted in the General Court of
Justice, Superior Court Division, in Forsyth County, North Carolina
on July 7, 2021. On Sept. 3, 2021, Halsted filed a notice of
removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1441, et seq. Halsted
thereafter filed an answer to the Complaint. The Plaintiff then
filed an Amended Complaint, and Halsted filed an answer to the
Amended Complaint.

After allowing limited discovery solely on the issue of
arbitrability (Text Order dated 11/12/2021), Halsted filed the
pending motion to compel arbitration of the individual claims
asserted by the Plaintiff and to dismiss all further proceedings
with prejudice. The Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to
Halsted's motion and Halsted filed a reply. Shortly thereafter, the
Plaintiff filed the motion to remand. Halsted did not file a
response to the Plaintiff's motion.

The Plaintiff brings the putative class action seeking to recover
damages against Halsted for violations of the North Carolina Debt
Collection Act, the North Carolina Collection Agency Act, the North
Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the federal
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). The putative class
consists of consumers in North Carolina whose debt information
Halsted sent to a third-party without prior consent of those
consumers. Specifically, as to the Plaintiff, it is alleged that
she owes a debt, which was in default and subsequently transferred
to Halsted, a debt collector.

In an effort to collect on the debt, Halsted used a third-party
vendor to prepare and mail written correspondence to the Plaintiff
regarding the debt. To accomplish such, the Plaintiff alleges that
the Defendant conveyed information regarding the debt to the
third-party vendor, and the vendor then populated some or all this
information into a prewritten template, and printed, and mailed the
letter to the Plaintiff at Halsted's direction. Shedid not consent
to Halsted sharing her debt information with anyone, including the
third-party vendor.

The Plaintiff seeks an order remanding this action to State court.
She argues that remand is proper "for a failure to allege concrete
harm required by Spokeo, Inn v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016),
as revised (May 24, 2016) and TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S.Ct.
2190, 2205, 210 L. Ed. 2d 568 (2021)." She also relies on three
recent decisions from this Court "remanding similar actions back to
State court, for a failure to identify concrete harm resulting from
the defendant's alleged federal statutory violations" (citing Brown
v. Alltran Fin., LP, No. 1:21-CV-595, 2022 WL 377001, at *1
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 8, 2022) (unpublished)). Halsted did not file a
response to Plaintiff's motion.

The Plaintiff argues that substantial questions arise as to this
Court's federal question jurisdiction in this matter, particularly
in the light of the ruling in Brown. The Court in Brown explained
the standing requirement--with emphasis on establishing "concrete
harm"--and the Supreme Court's recent ruling in TransUnion.

Similar to Brown, the original Complaint here is nearly silent on
the type of harm the Plaintiff alleges to have suffered from
Halsted's nonconsensual sharing of her debt information to the
third-party vendor, Judge Webster notes.

The Plaintiff alleges that Halsted disclosed information to a third
party without prior consent and did so with reckless disregard for
the harm to the Plaintiff and the Classes that could result from
Defendant's unauthorized disclosure of private and sensitive
information. According to her, such disclosure "is both unfair and
unconscionable." But even if that were true, Halsted's failure to
consider future harms caused by its disclosure of information to
the third-party vendor is not a concrete harm, as it is too
speculative, Judge Webster opines.

The Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not cure the noted
deficiencies, Judge Webster says. Beyond the same relevant
underlying factual allegations, the Amended Complaint alleges that
Halsted's harm stems from its "unauthorized disclosure of private
and sensitive financial information to the third party in the form
of consumer informational injury." However, as in Brown, there is
no further explanation of "consumer informational injury."

Ultimately, Judge Webster finds, and Halsted has not contested,
that there are no "specific allegations of injury in fact from the
alleged disclosure at issue, and, as such, the Court does not have
subject matter jurisdiction and remand is appropriate."

For the reasons stated, Judge Webster recommends that the
Plaintiff's motion to remand be granted, and this action be
remanded to the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division,
in Forsyth County, North Carolina for further proceedings.

Judge Webster also recommends that Halsted's motion to compel
arbitration of the individual claims asserted by the Plaintiff and
to dismiss all further proceedings with prejudice be denied without
prejudice as moot for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and
Recommendation dated Aug. 22, 2022, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2fhcvdfc from Leagle.com.


HONOLULU, HI: Class Suit Tolling Applied to Mass Torts, Ruling Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
John O'Brien at Legal Newsline reports that property owners in
Hawaii will get to sue Honolulu over a 2018 flood they say could
have been prevented.

The Hawaii Supreme Court made that ruling on Sept. 2 when it
settled a question of whether those plaintiffs had missed their
window of time in which to file suit. A class action that lingered
for three years before the plaintiff settled only his own claims
froze the statute of limitations, the court ruled.

The lawsuit said Honolulu failed to inspect and maintain part of
its storm and drainage system.

"The complaint alleged that approximately 410 homes were damaged by
the flood and indicated that the State had confirmed damage to over
280 homes," the ruling says. "Collectively, this information
notified the city of 'the number and generic identities of the
potential plaintiffs who may participate in judgment.'"

The ruling settled a question of whether class action tolling can
be applied to mass torts. Hakim Ouansafi was the plaintiff in the
original class action, but the trial court denied his motion for
class certification after he settled his own - and not the
prospective class' - claims.

Individuals brought 12 separate actions after Ouansafi settled,
seven of which were assigned to Judge Dean Ochiai. Honolulu filed
motions to dismiss in those seven, arguing the suits were barred
because they did not come within two years.

Plaintiffs countered the statute of limitations was suspended
between October 2018 and June 2021, when the class action was
pending, even though class certification was ultimately denied.

"(W)e hold that the availability of class action tolling turns not
on whether or not the class action is a 'mass tort,' but rather on
whether it provided the defendant notice of the subject matter and
potential size of the litigation at issue," the ruling says.

And the original class action complaint provided that notice, it
adds. [GN]

KANE COUNTY, IL: Appeals Court Affirms Dismissal of Tejada Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled RAUL TEJADA, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, and ALEJANDRO VALENCIA, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants v.
THERESA E. BARREIRO, as successor to Thomas M. Hartwell, as Circuit
Court Clerk, Kane County, Illinois; MICHAEL J. KILBOURNE, as
successor to David J. Rickert, as Treasurer of Kane County,
Illinois; and KANE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, a body politic,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 2-21-0696 (Ill. App.), the Appellate
Court of Illinois for the Second District affirms the circuit
court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice.

Justice Mary S. Schostok delivered the judgment of the Court.

Tejada and Valencia filed complaints against the Kane County
Circuit Court Clerk, the Kane County Treasurer, and Kane County
seeking damages for the Clerk's improper assessment of certain
fees. The circuit court of Kane County dismissed the Plaintiffs'
complaint with prejudice.

In 2014, the circuit court entered an order of default and a
judgment of foreclosure against Tejada in Everbank v. Raul Tejada,
et al., No. 13-CH-2185 (Cir. Ct. Kane County). Tejada subsequently
filed a motion to vacate the default judgment of foreclosure. The
Clerk charged him a $75 fee.

In 2017, the circuit court dismissed Valencia's action in No.
16-L-360 (Cir. Ct. Kane County) for want of prosecution.
Thereafter, Valencia filed a motion to vacate that dismissal. The
Clerk charged him a $50 fee to have the case reinstated, which his
attorney paid.

A section of the Clerks of Courts Act, applicable to Kane County
when the Plaintiffs filed their motions to vacate, authorizes the
circuit clerk to charge between a minimum of $50 and a maximum of
$90 when a party files a petition to vacate or modify any final
judgment or order of court in most civil cases. The key word there
is final--that is, that the fee applies only to final judgments.
Neither the judgment of foreclosure entered in Tejada's case nor
the dismissal for want of prosecution entered in Valencia's case
were final orders. Accordingly, the Kane County Circuit Clerk was
not statutorily authorized to charge either Tejada or Valencia a
fee to reinstate their cases.

On April 5, 2017, Tejada filed a class action complaint. On July
25, 2017, Valencia filed a class action complaint. Both complaints
alleged that the Clerk had improperly charged and collected fees
for filing petitions to reconsider, vacate, or modify interlocutory
orders. Each of the complaints alleged a violation of the Act,
alleged unjust enrichment, and sought a declaratory judgment and an
injunction. The Plaintiffs sought damages, including pre- and
post-judgment interest, costs and attorney fees. Tejada's and
Valencia's actions were ultimately consolidated.

At the time Tejada and Valencia filed their complaints, many other
courts were considering the same issue of whether county circuit
clerks had been improperly charging fees for parties to vacate or
modify non-final orders. As a result, the trial court stayed the
proceedings on two different occasions as it waited for guidance
from the Illinois appellate courts.

On March 7, 2018, the Illinois Appellate Court, First District,
issued the first decision that the circuit court had stayed the
proceedings for, Midwest Medical Records Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 2018
IL App (1st) 163230. In that case, the court held that the fees at
issue were not authorized by statute and that litigants could seek
equitable relief of a declaratory judgment and the return of their
fees in the form of restitution. It additionally held that the
plaintiffs could not seek damages that included costs and attorney
fees because the Act did not afford the plaintiff a private cause
of action to seek redress because the plaintiff already had an
adequate remedy to recover.

After the Midwest decision, the trial court lifted the stay and
granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss those parts of the
Plaintiffs' complaint that alleged a private cause of action under
the Act. The trial court denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss
the Plaintiff's claims for unjust enrichment.

On May 20, 2021, the trial court stayed the proceedings pending the
supreme court's decision in Walker v. Chasteen but allowed the
plaintiff to file an amended complaint and an amended motion to
certify a class. On June 17, 2021, the supreme court held in Walker
that the voluntary payment doctrine does not bar an action for the
return of circuit court filing fees.

On June 23, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed amended complaints. The
Plaintiffs continued to seek damages. On July 22, 2021, the
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' amended
complaints pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

On Oct. 4, 2021, the trial court dismissed the Plaintiffs'
complaints with prejudice. Relying on Midwest, it found that the
Plaintiffs could not pursue an action for damages; rather, they
could only seek restitution. It rejected the Plaintiffs' argument
that their unjust enrichment claims essentially sought
restitution.

Relying on Board of Managers of Hidden Lake Townhome Owners Ass'n
v. Green Trails Improvement Ass'n, 404 Ill.App.3d 184, 193 (2010),
the trial court found that unjust enrichment was based on an
implied contract between the parties. Because the Act governed the
relationship between the parties, it found there was nothing
implied between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. As such, the
trial court found that the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim
failed. As it found that the Plaintiffs had failed to allege a
valid cause of action, it dismissed their complaints with
prejudice.

The Plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion to reconsider. On Oct. 28,
2021, following a hearing, the trial court denied their motion.
Following the trial court's ruling, the Plaintiffs filed a timely
notice of appeal.

On appeal, they argue that (1) the trial court erred in dismissing
their complaint because their existing pleadings properly sought
restitution; (2) even if their complaint insufficiently sought
restitution, they should be allowed to amend their complaint
because they can state a cause of action for restitution; and (3)
this Court should hold that an implied cause of action exists for
violation of the Act.

Judge Schostok states that the trial court's decision to grant a
section 2-615 motion to dismiss is subject to de novo review,
citing Luise, Inc. v. Village of Skokie, 335 Ill.App.3d 672, 685
(2002). The question is "whether the allegations in the complaint,
when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are
sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be
granted."

Judge Schostok holds that the Court will affirm the dismissal based
only on the pleadings where the Court finds "no set of facts can be
proven which would entitle the plaintiff to the relief sought."

As the trial court correctly stated, Illinois courts have
considered what is the proper way for a litigant to recover fees
that were improperly assessed under the Act, Judge Schostok notes.
Based on Midwest, a litigant may seek restitution for the return of
wrongly assessed fees by the county circuit court clerk; he may not
seek damages.

The Plaintiffs here did not specifically request restitution.
Rather, they asserted a claim for unjust enrichment, which they
point out includes as a remedy restitution.

Judge Schostok finds the doctrine of unjust enrichment does not
apply to the facts of this case. Here, there was not an implied
contract between the parties. Rather, the parties' relationship was
governed by the Act. As the doctrine of unjust enrichment is
inapplicable to the case at bar, Judge Schostok holds that the
Plaintiffs' attempt to use that doctrine as a basis to claim
restitution fails.

The Court also rejects the Plaintiffs' argument that because they
indicated in the paragraphs setting forth the proposed class that
they wanted "the return of unlawful fees collected" and that the
"Defendant should be required to refund the fees to Plaintiff and
the members of the Class," they argued sufficiently they were
seeking restitution.

In making this argument, the Plaintiffs point to Midwest, where the
reviewing court held that the plaintiff's request for a return of
fees collected pursuant to section 27.2a(g) of the Act should be
construed as one for restitution. In making that determination, the
Midwest court noted that the trial court had ruled prior to Gassman
v. Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, 2017 IL App (1st)
151738 being decided. As such, the Midwest court explained that the
plaintiff's claim should be "construed as one for restitution, and
not attempting to impose tort liability or damages on the Clerk."

Here, unlike in Midwest, Judge Schostok finds there was ample
authority available for the Plaintiffs as to how to properly seek a
return of fees improperly collected under section 27.2a(g) of the
Act. Based on that authority, there was no basis for the trial
court (or the Court) to construe the Plaintiffs' prayer for relief
requesting damages against the Clerk as really a request for
restitution.

Accordingly, Judge Schostok holds that the trial court correctly
determined that the Plaintiffs' complaints failed to state a valid
cause of action.

The Plaintiffs insist that if they can state a cause of action by
amending their complaints, the trial court should not dismiss their
complaints with prejudice. When considering whether the trial court
erred in not allowing a party to amend its complaint, the Court's
review is guided by two principles: (1) if a plaintiff can state a
cause of action by amending his complaint, his complaint should not
be dismissed with prejudice; and (2) the trial court has discretion
whether to allow a party to amend its complaint.

The Plaintiffs focus only on the first principle and infer that the
trial court is mandated to allow a party to file an amended
complaint if he can state a viable cause of action. However, the
second principle clearly refutes that inference, Judge Schostok
points out.

Here, the Plaintiffs filed their initial complaints in 2017. The
trial court then stayed the proceedings to allow the reviewing
courts to provide guidance on the proper interpretation of the Act.
After the Appellate Court issued its decision in Midwest, the trial
court gave the Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaint.
In 2021, four years after the Plaintiffs had filed their initial
complaint and after several appellate decisions had been issued
providing further guidance on how to properly plead an action under
the Act, the trial court dismissed the Plaintiffs' complaint with
prejudice.

Based on that span of time and because the Plaintiffs had been
given the opportunity to conform their pleadings to existing law,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the
Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice, Judge Schostok opines.

The Plaintiffs' final contention is that, even if the Court
determines that they did not properly seek restitution, the Court
should reverse anyway because the Clerk's violation of the Act
provides them with a private cause of action that allows them to
seek damages. The Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Midwest court
rejected this argument, but they ask the Court to depart from that
authority. The Court declines to do so.

Relying on Marshall v. County of Cook, 2016 IL App (1st) 142864,
the Midwest court then determined that fees imposed by section
27.2a(g) are intended to compensate for the financial costs of
operating the Clerk's office in handling litigants' pleadings and
motions. Judge Schostok points out that it is not meant to benefit
litigants, such as the Plaintiffs. As the Marshall court
specifically held, the Act is intended to "benefit counties that
want to reduce court security costs or establish and maintain
document storage or automated recordkeeping systems" and a private
right of action is inconsistent with the purpose of the Act and is
not necessary to provide an adequate remedy. Accordingly, the
Midwest court held that the plaintiffs' only remedy was through
restitution and not through a private cause of action.

The Plaintiffs insist that Midwest court erred in relying on
Marshall as that case is distinguishable. The plaintiff raised a
similar argument in Midwest which the court rejected.

The Court believes that the Midwest court properly relied on
Marshall in determining that the purpose of the Act is to
facilitate the running of the Clerk's office in terms of document
maintenance and security and is not meant to protect litigants from
being charged too much. As such, the Court believes the analysis in
Midwest is sound and that it was correctly decided.

For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County
is affirmed.

Affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 22, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2pkbr3bw from Leagle.com.


KIA AMERICA: Le Beau Sues Over Defective, Unsafe Vehicles
---------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL LE BEAU, PHILLIS LE BEAU, and DAVID GRIESEMER, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. KIA
AMERICA, INC., Defendant, Case No. 8:22-cv-01545 (C.D. Cal., Aug.
18, 2022) seeks remedies for the Defendant's breaches of implied
warranties, fraud, unjust enrichment, violations of state consumer
protection laws, and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to
prevent Kia's continued misconduct.

The Plaintiffs bring this action individually, and on behalf of a
nationwide class and classes for the states of Louisiana and South
Carolina for the benefit and protection of purchasers and lessees
of Kia's model year 2016 and 2017 Optima and 2017 Sportage
vehicles. The Plaintiffs allege that the class vehicles are
defective and unsafe; the vehicles are equipped with a dangerous
and defective power window system that results in power window
regulator failure that causes the vehicles' automatic windows to
malfunction, function intermittently, or become non-operational.
This poses a significant safety hazard to drivers and occupants of
class vehicles, says the suit.

In manufacturing, marketing, and selling and/or leasing these
unsafe Vehicles, Kia has engaged in unfair, deceptive, and
misleading consumer practices, and has breached warranties with the
vehicles' purchasers and lessees, including Plaintiffs. As a result
of the defect, Plaintiffs and class members are unable to utilize
their vehicles in a safe manner, and have incurred damages, the
suit alleges.

Kia America, Inc. operates as an automobile dealer.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert Ahdoot, Esq.
          Tina Wolfson, Esq.
          Theodore Maya, Esq.
          AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
          2600 W. Olive Avenue, Suite 500
          Burbank, CA 91505
          Telephone: (310) 474-9111
          Facsimile: (310) 474-858
          E-mail: rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com
                  twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com
                  tmaya@ahdootwolfson.com

               - and -

          Riley W. Prince, Esq.
          BARNOW AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          205 W. Randolph Street, Suite 1630
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 621-2000
          E-mail: rprince@barnowlaw.com

KIA CORP: Chicago Class Action Alleges Ease of Theft
----------------------------------------------------
KIA CORP: Chicago Class Action Alleges Ease of Theft

"They are too easy to steal."  That's the claim behind the new
class action lawsuit in Illinois against Kia and Hyundai, according
to Dana Kozlov, reporting for CBSnews.com.  CBS 2 has been
investigating the alarming jump in thefts of those cars, leaving
many drivers feeling helpless, but Kozlov, CBS' Political
Investigator, has learned, now there's something you can do about
it.   

It was a proud moment for Yvette Davis when, after years of
struggling financially, she was finally able to buy this 2011
Hyundai Sonata and call it her own.  "That was something I
purchased all by myself," Davis said. That pride was crushed August
28 when Davis came outside to find her car gone, stolen from in
front of her home.

"When I got to the curb, that's when I saw the glass," Davis said.


Davis filed a police report and then started digging. She found a
slew of class action lawsuits have been filed across the country
against Hyundai and Kia, alleging a failure to install something
called an immobilizer is the reason the cars are particularly easy
to steal.  Then CBS 2 found one had just been filed in Illinois
too, in federal court, in Chicago.

"It affects millions of people, potentially."

Ken McClain is the lead attorney on the Illinois lawsuit and a
dozen others, all alleging Hyundai and Kia did not install the
immobilizers in order to keep the price down on the cars.  "Kia and
Hyundai have known for a long time that their failure to install an
immobilizer put their cars at a disadvantage," McClain said.

Davis said it's inexcusable. So, she said, is stealing. "Stop
taking people's stuff! Stop taking it," Davis said.

But Davis is one of the lucky ones. In the last 24 hours, she got a
letter stating her Sonata was in a city impound lot, it was
damaged, but drivable. But with only liability insurance, she
doesn't have any money to fix it. CBS 2 put her in touch with
lawyers handling the class action lawsuit.

McClain said people who've had their Kias or Hyundais stolen are
part of the lawsuits. "We will have several categories of people
with damages, including those that have had their cars stolen, and
we will be seeking to have them compensated," McClain said.

While McClain is the lead attorney on 13 lawsuits against Kia and
Hyundai, there are at least three others. CBS 2 reached out to both
Hyundai and Kia, asking for an interview or a response. Both said
they do not comment on pending litigation.


LABORATORY CORP: McDonald Sues for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
-------------------------------------------------------------
DAMIAN MCDONALD, on behalf of the Laboratory Corporation of America
Holdings Employees' Retirement Plan, himself, and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA
HOLDINGS, Defendant, Case No. 1:22-cv-680 (M.D.N.C., Aug. 18, 2022)
is a class action against the Defendant for breaching its fiduciary
duties in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant caused the Laboratory
Corporation of America Holdings Employees' Retirement Plan to pay
unreasonable and excessive fees for recordkeeping and other
administrative services, instead of leveraging the Plan's
tremendous bargaining power to benefit participants and
beneficiaries. For example, the Defendant did not adhere to
fiduciary best practices to control Plan fees and expenses. To the
extent that Defendant made any prudent attempt to control the
Plan's expenses and to ensure the expenses were not excessive,
Defendant employed flawed and ineffective processes, which failed
to ensure that: (a) the fees and expenses charged to Plan
participants were reasonable, and (b) that the compensation
third-party service providers received from the plan for services
provided were reasonable, says the suit.

The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant's mismanagement of the
Plan constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence in
violation of the law. The Defendant's actions (and omissions) were
contrary to actions of a reasonable fiduciary and cost the Plan and
its participants, including Plaintiff, millions of dollars, the
suit alleges.

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings is an American S&P 500
company headquartered in Burlington, North Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J. Matthew Norris, Esq.
          NORRIS LAW FIRM, PLLC
          1776 Heritage Center Drive, Suite 204
          Wake Forest, NC 27687
          Telephone: (919) 981-4475
          Facsimile: (919) 926-1676
          E-mail: matt@lemonlawnc.com

               - and -

          Brandon J. Hill, Esq.
          Luis A. Cabassa, Esq.
          Amanda E. Heystek, Esq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A.
          1110 North Florida Ave., Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 224-0431
          Facsimile: (813) 229-8712
          E-mail: bhill@wfclaw.com
                  lcabassa@wfclaw.com
                  aheystek@wfclaw.com

               - and -

          Michael C. McKay, Esq.
          MCKAY LAW, LLC
          5635 N. Scottsdale Road, Suite 170
          Scottsdale, AZ 85250
          Telephone: (480) 681-7000
          E-mail: mckay@mckay.law

LABRADA NUTRITION: Settles Class Suit Over Weight-Loss Supplements
------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael J. Zbiegien Jr., Esq., of Taft Stettinius & Hollister, in
an article for Mondaq, reports that there is a public perception
that class actions result in multimillion-dollar liability for the
defendants. The recent settlement of Woodard v. Labrada, a case in
which TV's Dr. Mehmet Oz was originally named as a defendant, shows
that is not always the case. The suit alleged misrepresentations
regarding certain weight-loss supplements manufactured by Labrada
Bodybuilding Nutrition, Inc., which the plaintiffs claimed Dr. Oz
received compensation to promote on his TV show. After six years of
litigation, Labrada -- the only remaining defendant (the plaintiffs
dismissed the allegations against Dr. Oz and other media
defendants) -- agreed to a settlement that requires the payment of
just $625,000.

In 2018, the judge denied a motion for preliminary approval of a
$5.25 million settlement. The claims against Dr. Oz and other media
defendants were subsequently dismissed with prejudice in 2020. And
in 2021, the court certified two classes of people in California
who purchased Labrada Green Coffee Bean Extract Product and Labrada
Garcinia Cambogia Product.

The judge has granted preliminary approval of the $625,000
settlement. In addition to the monetary payment, the current
proposed settlement also requires Labrada to cease selling the
Labrada Green Coffee Bean Extract Product and Labrada Garcinia
Cambogia Product. Unlike the rejected 2018 settlement, the current
settlement is limited to California residents.

The preliminary approval order notes that the plaintiff
"acknowledges the hurdles she would need to overcome to succeed on
the merits of her case," such as "determining whether the products
at issue were actually ineffective." Those hurdles can help justify
a lower monetary component to a class-action settlement and explain
why not every class action should result in a million-dollar
payment. [GN]

MANNA PRO PRODUCTS: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Perry Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Audrey G. Fleissig of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Eastern Division, grants the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the lawsuit entitled TONI PERRY, Plaintiff v.
MANNA PRO PRODUCTS, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 4:22-cv-00127-AGF
(E.D. Mo.).

The Plaintiff, a New York resident, filed the putative class action
seeking damages and injunctive relief on behalf of persons, who
purchased various versions of the Defendant's Nutri-Vet Hip & Joint
supplements for dogs. The Plaintiff alleges that the supplements
contain false or misleading labels and asserts claims alleging
deceptive practices in violation of New York Gen. Bus. Law Section
349 (Count I), false advertising in violation of New York Gen. Bus.
Law Section 350 (Count II), breach of express warranty (Count III),
fraud (Count IV), breach of warranty under the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act (Count V), and unjust enrichment (Count VI). She seeks
damages and injunctive relief.

The matter is now before the Court on the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and, as to the
request for injunctive relief and as to product versions not
actually purchased by the Plaintiff, for lack of standing.

The Defendant markets and sells the following joint health
supplements for dogs: Nutri-Vet Hip & Joint Chewables For Dogs,
Regular Strength; Nutri-Vet Hip & Joint Chewables For Dogs, Extra
Strength; Nutri-Vet Hip & Joint Chewables For Dogs, Advanced
Strength; Nutri-Vet Hip & Joint Soft Chews For Dogs, Regular
Strength; Nutri-Vet Hip & Joint Soft Chews For Dogs, Extra
Strength; Nutri-Vet Hip & Joint Biscuits For Dogs; Nutri-Vet Joint
health DS Plus MSM Chewables For Dogs, Maximum Strength; Nutri-Vet
Joint Health Plus Perna Mussel Chewables For Dogs, Standard
Strength Plus; Nutri-Vet Advanced Cetyl-M Joint Action Formula For
Dogs.

The Supplements contain the following language on their labels:
"Helps supports joint health, flexibility and cartilage in dogs of
all ages, including older, previous injured working dogs." Further,
the Defendant states on its website that the Supplements "contain
ingredients like glucosamine, a key building block for making
cartilage"; that glucosamine helps maintain healthy canine joint
function and connective tissue; and that the Supplements also
contain chondroitin sulfate, which protects existing cartilage and
slows breakdown.

The Plaintiff alleges that these representations are false. In
support of such allegation, she cites the following peer-reviewed
clinical studies comparing the efficacy of a supplement containing
glucosamine and chondroitin against a placebo: (1) Moreau, M., et
al., Clinical Evaluation Of A Nutraceutical, Carprofen And
Meloxicam For The Treatment Of Dogs With Osteoarthritis, Vet.
Record No. 152 at 323-29 (2003); and (2) Scott, et al., Efficacy Of
An Oral Nutraceutical For The Treatment Of Canine Arthritis: A
Double-Blind Randomized, Placebo-Controlled Prospective Clinical
Trial, Vet. Comp. Ortho. Traumatol., 30 at 318-23 (2017).

The Plaintiff also cites Plumb's Veterinary Handbook, which noted
that glucosamine/chondroitin supplements are well tolerated, but
efficacy is uncertain; and a journal publication from 2010 that
stated that "the benefits of using a combination of glucosamine
hydrochloride and chondroitin sulfate nutraceuticals to improve
symptoms associated with canine and feline joint disease has yet to
be determined."

The Defendant has attached to its motion to dismiss copies of the
Moreau and Scott Studies, the Plumb Veterinary Handbook, and the
journal article cited by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff does not
dispute that the Court may consider the publications cited in the
complaint on this motion to dismiss. Nor does the Plaintiff dispute
that the exhibits attached to the Defendant's briefs are authentic
and accurate copies of those publications.

The Plaintiff purchased Nutri-Vet Hip & Joint Chewables For Dogs,
Advanced Strength, numerous times over the years for her arthritic
dog. Most recently, she purchased a 150-count bottle of Nutri-Vet
Hip & Joint Chewables For Dogs, Advanced Strength in or about April
2021 from Chewy.com for $35.99. Prior to her purchases, the
Plaintiff carefully read the bottle's labeling, including the
representations that it was a "Hip & Joint" product for dogs, and
that the product would help support joint health, flexibility and
cartilage in dogs of all ages, including older, previous injured
working dogs. The Plaintiff gave her dog these Supplements as
directed but alleges that they did not have any impact on the dog's
"joint pain or osteoarthritis."

The Defendant argues that each of the Plaintiff's claims fails
because she has not plausibly alleged that the Defendant made any
false or misleading representations. Specifically, the Defendant
highlights the "disconnect" between the publications offered to
demonstrate falsity, which address the efficacy of glucosamine and
chondroitin in treating osteoarthritis or joint disease, and the
actual content of the Defendant's representations, which state only
that the Supplements promote or maintain joint health. Further, the
Defendant contends that the Plaintiff has failed to plausibly
allege an injury because her statement that the Supplements had no
impact on her dog's joint pain or osteoarthritis is conclusory.

Next, the Defendant argues that each of the Plaintiff's claims
fails for separate reasons, including that she fails to satisfy
Rule 9(b)'s particularity standard or to plead scienter with
respect to fraud claims; she fails to plausibly allege timely
notice with respect to the warranty claims; and her unjust
enrichment claims is duplicative of her other claims. Finally, the
Defendant argues that the Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue
injunctive relief because she has not pled a threat of ongoing or
future harm, and that she likewise lacks standing to assert claims
involving products that she did not purchase.

In response, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendant's focus on
osteoarthritis studies as compared to general joint health is a
"distinction without a difference" because it is well known that
joint health (or lack thereof) is a symptom of osteoarthritis.
Further, she cites cases in which federal courts allowed
similarly-pled claims relating to joint-health supplements to go
forward, including Lytle v. Nutramax Lab'ys, Inc., 2019 WL 8060070,
at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2019), in which the plaintiff relied on
the same Moreau and Scott Studies to establish falsity.

The Plaintiff further argues that she has adequately pled injury in
the form of her purchase price because she would not have purchased
the Supplements had she known that the representations were false.
Next, she maintains that she has pled fraud with particularity,
that the sufficiency and timeliness of any required notice is a
question for the jury, and that her unjust enrichment claim is
properly pled in the alternative. Finally, the Plaintiff contends
that Defendant's arguments related to standing are not true
challenges to standing but instead premature challenges to the
class definition.

According to Judge Fleissig, in this case, by contrast, complete
copies of the Moreau and Scott Studies, as well as the other
publications cited by the Plaintiff, are properly before the Court.
The Court has reviewed the publications and determined that they
are focused on the effectiveness of glucosamine or chondroitin in
the treatment of osteoarthritis, joint disease, and joint
pain--topics which are not mentioned the Defendant's product labels
or website.

The Defendant's alleged representations did not relate to mobility,
joint pain, or particular activity levels, Judge Fleissig notes.
Rather, the representations more broadly claimed that the
Supplements help support joint health, flexibility, and cartilage
and maintain healthy canine joint function and connective tissue.
And nothing in the conclusions of the publications cited by the
Plaintiff can be plausibly said to directly address or contradict
such representations.

In short, Judge Fleissig points out that it is the Plaintiff's
burden to plausibly plead falsity or deception. Her only attempt to
do so here is to cite to the noted publications and to state that
the Supplements had no impact on her dog's osteoarthritis or joint
pain. But the alleged representations on which the Plaintiff relied
do not claim otherwise, Judge Fleissig finds.

The Plaintiff has, thus, failed to plausibly allege a false or
misleading representation, and the Court will dismiss each of her
claims without reaching the Defendant's alternative arguments.

Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order dated Aug. 22,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/396ujn8n from
Leagle.com.


MAXIMUS INC: Seeks Stay of Proceedings in Thomas Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as Sharey Thomas, et al., v. Maximus, Inc.,
Case No. 3:21-cv-00498, Maximus, Inc. filed on August 22, 2022, a
petition asking the United States Supreme Court to enter an order
staying the district court's conditional-certification order
pending the disposition of its petition for a writ of certiorari.

The Plaintiffs, on behalf of current and former Maximus employees,
brought this class action suit against the Defendant for alleged
failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

As reported by the Class Action Reporter on May 25, 2022, Judge
David J. Novak of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs'
Opposed Motion for Conditional Certification and Notice to Putative
Class Members.

Maximus sought a stay from the United States Court of Appeals of
the Fourth Circuit and from the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia but both courts refused to stay
the proceedings. To facilitate meaningful review of the standard
applicable to certification motions under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA), Maximus requests that the Supreme Court enter an order
staying the district court's order conditionally certifying
Plaintiffs' putative collective action and authorizing Plaintiffs'
counsel to send notice of the action to supposedly similarly
situated employees pending the disposition of Maximus' petition for
a writ of certiorari.[BN]

Defendant-Applicant MAXIMUS INC. is represented by:

            Paul DeCamp, Esq.
            EPSTEIN, BECKER & GREEN, P.C.
            1227 25th Street, N.W., Suite 700
            Washington, DC 20037
            Telephone: (202) 861-1819
            E-mail: PDeCamp@ebglaw.com

                   - and -

            Francesco A. DeLuca, Esq.
            EPSTEIN, BECKER & GREEN, P.C.
            125 High Street, Suite 2114
            Boston, MA 02110
            Telephone: (617) 603-1100
            E-mail: FDeLuca@ebglaw.com

                   - and -

            Adriana S. Kosovych, Esq.
            EPSTEIN, BECKER & GREEN, P.C.
            875 Third Avenue
            New York, NY 10022
            Telephone: (212) 351-4500
            E-mail: AKosovych@ebglaw.com

MCKESSON CORP: Covington & Burling Attorneys Discuss Court Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Laura Flahive Wu, Esq., Megan L. Rodgers, Esq. and Nicole Antoine,
Esq., of Covington & Burling LLP, in an article for Bloomberg Law,
report that in courts across the US, parties are disputing whether
the public nuisance doctrine should apply to the manufacture and
sale of lawful products.

In one such case, a federal judge in West Virginia awarded a
decisive victory in July to three large opioid distributors --
McKesson Corp., Cardinal Health Inc., and AmerisourceBergen Corp.
Judge David Faber said that to "apply the law of public nuisance to
the sale, marketing, and distribution of products would invite
litigation against any product with a known risk of harm."

The decision is also notable because it rejects a broad-ranging
"abatement" remedy for public nuisance that seeks relief -- in the
form of medical treatment and other services -- for the harms
allegedly caused by a product.

The court here determined that the plaintiffs were "not seeking to
'abate' (enjoin or stop) the nuisance" but instead were seeking
"remuneration for the costs of treating" downstream harms allegedly
caused by the product.

The court said this was not a proper abatement remedy for a public
nuisance.

Courts in other states, including California and Oklahoma, have
agreed with that result that plaintiffs in public nuisance claims
involving lawful products cannot use "abatement" to collect
damages.

Public Nuisance and Lawful Products
This has important implications for the application of public
nuisance law to the manufacture and sale of lawful products. Even
assuming public nuisance law can be applied to lawful products, the
West Virginia decision establishes that a plaintiff cannot seek to
recover for the claimed downstream harms caused by that product in
the guise of seeking "abatement" of the nuisance.

The plaintiffs in West Virginia case disclaimed all damages that
might accompany traditional tort claims. Instead, they sought more
than $2.5 billion in forward-looking "abatement" funds, primarily
to fund programs and services for downstream harms like treatment
of opioid addiction and abuse. They did not seek any relief aimed
at altering the distributor defendants' conduct generally or in the
plaintiff jurisdictions.

Abatement Remedy and Damages
Faber explained that the difference between equitable abatement
relief and damages is that abatement is usually limited to an
injunction, which is designed to eliminate allegedly tortious
conduct or remove contaminants from the environment. Damages, on
the other hand, are directed to compensating a plaintiff for the
costs of "eliminating the nuisance effects."

The proposed remedy did not seek to "abate" the alleged nuisance
but was instead aimed at treating the "downstream harms" of opioid
abuse. Those costs have no "direct relation" to any of the alleged
misconduct, and thus are "not properly understood as in the nature
of abatement."

Faber was not the first judge in opioid litigation to reach this
conclusion.

Other Courts Reach Same Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in 2021 held in a case against
Johnson & Johnson that the plaintiffs were not seeking proper
abatement relief. The court said the abatement relief does not stop
the act constituting the nuisance and was instead an award to fund
future programs.

A court in the state of Washington expressed similar skepticism in
an opioid public nuisance trial brought by the state against
McKesson Corp. During the course of the trial, the court remarked
that the remedy the state sought, which included funds to treat
medical harms, was the classic definition of damages.

The court emphasized that the state had not identified a single
public nuisance case where a court had ordered an abatement remedy
that included future medical treatment.

Although the question of the limits of abatement as a remedy has
been most squarely presented in opioid cases thus far, decisions in
similar cases mirror these principles.

In a case against ConAgra Grocery Products Co., the plaintiffs
brought a public nuisance involving lead paint. The court said the
proposed abatement remedy was not to "recompense anyone for accrued
harm but solely to pay for the prospective removal of the hazards"
--i.e., removal of the lead paint from homes, not for harms caused
by exposure to the lead paint.

These interpretations of the abatement remedy may have the effect
of curtailing plaintiffs' reliance on public nuisance claims with
respect to the manufacture and sale of lawful products.

In cases across the country, opioid plaintiffs have narrowed their
kitchen-sink complaints to focus on public nuisance claims,
appearing to concede that individual damages would be difficult or
impossible to prove.

But "abatement damages" are not an end-run around that problem.
Public nuisance claims involving a lawful product cannot properly
seek wide-ranging "abatement" relief that is in effect a form of
past and future damages.

This article does not necessarily reflect the opinion of The Bureau
of National Affairs, Inc., the publisher of Bloomberg Law and
Bloomberg Tax, or its owners.

Author Information
Laura Flahive Wu is a partner at the Washington, D.C., office of
Covington & Burling LLP and a member of the firm's commercial
litigation and mass torts groups.

Megan L. Rodgers is a partner at the Palo Alto, Calif., office of
Covington and Burling LLP and a member of the firm's mass torts and
class action groups.

Nicole Antoine is an associate in the Washington, D.C., office of
Covington & Burling LLP and a member of the firm's mass torts and
appellate and Supreme Court practice groups.

Disclaimer: McKesson is a Covington client that the firm
represented in matters discussed in this article. [GN]

MDL 2566: PWC, PNC, IPS and Others Dismissed From Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: TELEXFREE SECURITIES LITIGATION, Civil Action
No. 4:14-md-02566-TSH (D. Mass.), Judge Timothy S. Hillman of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued an
Order and Memorandum:

   a. granting the motions to dismiss the Fifth Consolidated
      Amended Complaint (the "5CAC") filed by The Sheffield
      Group, Inc., PNC Bank, N.A., International Payout Systems,
      Inc., Garvey Schubert Barer, P.C., and
      PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP;

   b. granting in part and denying in part the motion to dismiss
      filed by The Estate of Jeffrey A. Babener; and

   c. denying the motions to dismiss filed by Mauricio Cardenas,
      Bank of America, N.A., Dustin Sparman and Vantage Payments,
      LLC, TD Bank, N.A., Wells Fargo Advisors LLC and Wells
      Fargo Bank N.A., and ProPay, Inc.

TelexFree was a billion-dollar pyramid scheme that operated from
2012 to mid-April 2014. Holding itself out as a multilevel
marketing company, it generated revenue by selling packages of
Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP") calling plans to "promoters."
It charged promoters $50 for membership, and then $289 for the
right to sell 10 VoIP plans per month for a year, or $1,375 for the
right to sell 50 VoIP plans per month for a year. In theory,
promoters could make money by selling VoIP plans to consumers. The
plans, however, were "impossible to sell." No matter, TelexFree
guaranteed promoters a return on investment, touting, at least
until March 9, 2014, that promoters could make money "without
selling anything."

If a promoter posted TelexFree advertisements on the Internet each
day, TelexFree would "buy back" from the promoter any unsold plans
for more than three times the amount the promoter paid for them. It
paid promoters in "credits." Once a promoter's credits reached a
certain balance, the promoter could withdraw the credits as cash.
Plaintiffs Anthony Cellucci and Rita Dos Santos tendered funds for
TelexFree memberships and their promised pre-March 9, 2014
returns.

In January 2013, Brazilian regulators announced that they were
investigating TelexFree in Brazil, stating that they were concerned
that TelexFree violated Brazilian laws against Ponzi schemes. In
June 2013, a Brazilian court issued an injunction prohibiting
TelexFree from recruiting new promoters in Brazil, effectively
closing the scheme's operations there. Although TelexFree was also
under investigation here, TelexFree executives assured promoters in
the United States, like the Plaintiffs, that they had nothing to
worry about.

On March 9, 2014, TelexFree announced that promoters would have to
sell VoIP plans to make money. The scheme's daily revenues
plummeted, and promoters began to demand cash withdrawals of their
credits. IPromoters made over $150 million worth of requests in the
weeks following the announcement. On April 14, 2014, the scheme
unraveled and TelexFree filed for bankruptcy. The plaintiffs
"suffered great financial losses."

The next day, law enforcement intercepted a TelexFree executive
leaving the scheme's Marlborough, Massachusetts headquarters with a
bag containing $38 million in cashier's checks. The following
month, two of the scheme's founders, James Merrill and Carlos
Wanzeler, were charged federally with several counts of wire fraud
and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Merrill pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to six years in prison. Wanzeler fled to Brazil. Years
later, law enforcement intercepted an individual traveling from
Brazil to the United States to retrieve cash Wanzeler had left
behind. Law enforcement followed the individual to an apartment in
which they found $20 million hidden in a mattress box spring.

Shortly after the scheme unraveled, the Plaintiffs filed civil
actions in federal district courts across the United States seeking
to recover losses against dozens of defendants, ranging from the
operators of the scheme to their advisors, payments processors, and
banks. In October 2014, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation joined the actions into a multidistrict litigation and
ordered transfer of all actions to the District of Massachusetts
for coordinated pretrial proceedings.

In March 2015, the Plaintiffs filed their first consolidated
complaint, later amending it once as of right. Many of the
Defendants moved to dismiss. After a lengthy stay in favor of
criminal proceedings, the Court addressed the motions to dismiss in
a series of orders in January and February 2019. Thereafter, the
Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint, in part to revive claims
against several of the dismissed defendants. In December 2021, the
Court granted in part the Plaintiffs' motion to amend, paving the
way to the current operative complaint: the 5CAC. Now, over a dozen
defendants move to dismiss the claims against them in the 5CAC.
Judge Hillman's omnibus order addresses each motion in turn.

First, the Plaintiffs seek to hold Wells Fargo Bank N.A., Wells
Fargo Advisors, LLC, and Mauricio Cardenas liable for tortious
aiding and abetting. The underlying tort at issue is common law
fraud.

Read as a whole, Judge Hillman finds that the 5CAC adequately
pleads an underlying fraud. The promised returns to which the
Plaintiffs' allegations refer are sufficiently clear: a $1,040
return for a $50 membership and a $289 package, and a $5,020 return
for a $50 membership and a $1,375 package. The timing and
perpetrator of those alleged false promises, moreover, are likewise
sufficiently clear: TelexFree (the organization and its operators)
guaranteed returns until March 9, 2014, when it adjusted its
compensation model to require promoters to sell VoIP plans. Given
the expanse and complexity of the scheme, the fraudulent nature of
which is otherwise undisputed, the 5CAC adequately pleads an
underlying fraud. Accordingly, the Wells Fargo Defendants' motions
to dismiss are denied.

Second, the Plaintiffs seek to hold Bank of America liable for
tortious aiding and abetting. Bank of America contends that the
5CAC fails to state a claim because it does not sufficiently plead
(1) an injury, (2) actual knowledge, (3) substantial assistance,
and (4) shared intent.

Accepting the factual allegations in the 5CAC as true, Judge
Hillman finds that the Plaintiffs' financial losses plausibly were
a direct and reasonably foreseeable result of Bank of America's
facilitation of the $30 million transfer. It is at least plausible
that the $30 million transfer enabled TelexFree insiders to abscond
with investor funds, such as funds invested by the Plaintiffs, as
the scheme unraveled. To the extent shared intent is a required
element of tortious aiding and abetting under Massachusetts law,
the allegations supporting an inference that Bank of America
furthered the TelexFree scheme despite knowledge of its fraudulent
nature also support an inference that Bank of America acted with
the requisite shared intent. The 5CAC states a plausible claim for
tortious aiding and abetting against Bank of America. Accordingly,
Bank of America's motion to dismiss is denied.

Third, the Plaintiffs seek to hold PNC liable for tortious aiding
and abetting. PNC argues that the 5CAC fails to state a claim
because, inter alia, it does not sufficiently allege actual
knowledge.

Judge Hillman holds that the 5CAC does not permit a strong
inference that PNC had actual knowledge of the underlying fraud.
The allegations concern only red flags. In contrast to other bank
defendants, such as Bank of America, there are no allegations
relating to how PNC processed or responded to the red flags. The
allegations against PNC suggest at most that PNC should have known
that TelexFree was a fraud, not that PNC knew that TelexFree was a
fraud. Therefore, PNC's motion to dismiss is granted.

Fourth, the Plaintiffs seek to hold TD Bank liable for tortious
aiding and abetting. TD Bank contends that the 5CAC fails to state
a claim because it does not sufficiently allege (1) an injury
caused by an underlying fraud, (2) actual knowledge, (3)
substantial assistance, and (4) shared intent.

Judge Hillman finds that the 5CAC plausibly states a tortious
aiding and abetting claim against TD Bank. He says (i) the 5CAC's
allegations of red flags -- suspicious transactions and
high-profile websites declaring TelexFree a fraud -- are
insufficient on their own to establish actual knowledge; (ii) the
5CAC suggests that these services allowed TelexFree insiders to
abscond with funds and extend the duration of the fraud and these
allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to establish
substantial assistance; and (iii) the alleged facts that support an
inference that TD Bank knew of the underlying fraud yet continued
to assist the underlying fraud by helping TelexFree conceal and
abscond with funds also support an inference that TD Bank shared
TelexFree's intent to defraud. Accordingly, TD Bank's motion to
dismiss is denied.

Fifth, the Plaintiffs seek to hold Vantage and its managing
partner, Dustin Sparman, liable for tortious aiding and abetting.
They also seek to hold Sparman liable for civil conspiracy. Vantage
and Sparman argue that, as to tortious aiding and abetting, the
5CAC does not sufficiently allege actual knowledge and substantial
assistance, and as to civil conspiracy, a tortious act taken in
furtherance of the conspiracy.

Judge Hillman holds that (i) the 5CAC plausibly alleges that
Vantage and Sparman are liable for tortious aiding and abetting;
and (ii) because the 5CAC states a claim against Sparman for
tortious aiding and abetting, it also states a claim against
Sparman for "substantial assistance" conspiracy. Accordingly, the
motion to dismiss filed by Vantage and Sparman is denied.

Sixth, the Plaintiffs seek to hold International Payout Systems
("IPS") liable for tortious aiding and abetting and civil
conspiracy. The 5CAC also includes a claim for unjust enrichment
against IPS. IPS argues only that the unjust enrichment claim
should be dismissed. The Plaintiffs, in their motion to amend,
represented that they intended to reassert their unjust enrichment
claim only to preserve their appellate rights. They reiterate this
intention in response to IPS's motions to dismiss. To be clear, the
unjust enrichment claim against IPS remains dismissed. To the
extent IPS' motion seeks to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim,
therefore, it is granted.

Seventh, the Plaintiffs seek to hold ProPay liable for tortious
aiding and abetting. ProPay provided payment processing services to
TelexFree from October 2012 to at least January 2014, processing at
least $110 million in payments for TelexFree during that time.
Meanwhile, ProPay was aware of TelexFree's business model and legal
issues in Brazil. It argues that the 5CAC fails to demonstrate the
Plaintiffs' Article III standing.

Judge Hillman finds that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently
established at the pleading stage that their losses are "fairly
traceable" to ProPay. Their allegations are sufficient to establish
Article III standing. Accordingly, ProPay's motion is denied.

Eighth, the Plaintiffs seek to hold Sheffield liable for tortious
aiding and abetting and civil conspiracy. Sheffield moves to
dismiss the 5CAC for lack of personal jurisdiction, as well as for
failure to state a claim.

Judge Hillman finds that Sheffield is subject to personal
jurisdiction under the Massachusetts long-arm statute and the
exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable under the circumstances.
Accordingly, Sheffield's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction is denied.

The Plaintiffs also argue that Sheffield substantially assisted
TelexFree by (1) recruiting Internet marketing experts to work on
behalf of the scheme, (2) facilitating the provision of staffing
and IT services to the scheme, and (3) helping develop a new
compensation model intended for use as a legal defense. None of
these actions, at least insofar as they are alleged in the 5CAC,
substantially assisted the underlying fraud.

As alleged in the 5CAC, Judge Hillman holds that Sheffield's
actions, individually and taken together, do not plausibly
constitute substantial assistance. Accordingly, Sheffield's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim is granted.

Ninth, the Plaintiffs seek to hold Garvey Schubert and four of its
former partners, Robert Weaver, Samuel Kauffman, Gary Tober, and
Sara Sandford (collectively, the "Garvey Schubert Defendants")
liable for tortious aiding and abetting and civil conspiracy. The
Garvey Schubert Defendants argue, inter alia, that the Court lacks
personal jurisdiction.

The Garvey Schubert Defendants argue that the 5CAC should be
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Judge Hillman finds
that Kauffman, Tober, and Sandford are not subject to personal
jurisdiction in Massachusetts for their alleged representation of
TelexFree. Weaver also is not subject to personal jurisdiction in
Massachusetts for his alleged representation of TelexFree. Finally,
the Plaintiffs' explanation that they do not have every detail
concerning Garvey Schubert's activities directed at Massachusetts
does not, without more, warrant jurisdictional discovery.
Accordingly, the Garvey Schubert Defendants' motion to dismiss is
granted.

Tenth, the Plaintiffs seek to hold the Estate of Jeffery A. Babener
liable for violations of M. G. L. c. 93, Sections 12 and 69,
violations of M. G. L. c. 93A, Sections 2 and 11, civil conspiracy,
negligent misrepresentation, violations of M. G. L. c. 410(b),
fraud, and tortious aiding and abetting. The Estate argues that the
5CAC should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction and for
failure to state a claim.

Judge Hillman holds that (i) Massachusetts has the most significant
relationship to the Plaintiffs' claims so Massachusetts law
applies; (ii) the Plaintiffs have not identified any untrue
statement of material fact, or omission of material fact, Babener
made in connection with the sale of a security, so the 5CAC fails
to state a claim under M. G. L. c. 110, Section 410(b); (iii) the
sole allegation on fraud claims is conclusory and lacks the
specificity required by Rule 9(b) so the 5CAC fails to state a
claim for fraud and negligent misrepresentation against the Estate;
(iv) the 5CAC plausibly alleges that Babener had actual knowledge
of and substantially assisted the TelexFree fraud; (v) the 5CAC
states a claim for tortious aiding and abetting and civil
conspiracy against the Estate.

Accordingly, the Estate's motion is granted in part and denied in
part. The motion is denied as the Plaintiffs' tortious aiding and
abetting and civil conspiracy claims. The motion is granted as to
the Plaintiffs' remaining claims.

Eleventh, the Plaintiffs seek to hold PricewaterhouseCoopers
("PwC") liable for tortious aiding and abetting. PwC argues that
the Plaintiffs lack Article III standing, and that the 5CAC fails
to state a claim by not adequately alleging, inter alia,
substantial assistance.

Judge Hillman finds that (i) the Plaintiffs' allegations are
sufficient at the pleading stage to establish Article III standing;
and (ii) while the 5CAC alleges that PwC advised TelexFree on
moving money overseas, international expansion, corporate
restructuring, and taxation, the 5CAC does not allege how this
advice contributed to the underlying fraud. The 5CAC does not
plausibly allege that PwC substantially assisted the underlying
fraud; accordingly, the 5CAC fails to state a claim against PwC for
tortious aiding and abetting. Thus, PwC's motion to dismiss is
granted.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Hillman grants the motions to dismiss
filed by Sheffield, PNC, IPS, Schubert, and PWC are granted. He
grants in part and denies in part motion filed by the Estate of
Jeffrey A. Babener. He denies the motions filed by Cardenas, Bank
of America, Sparman and Vantage, Wells Fargo Defendants, and
ProPay.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 31, 2022 Order & Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4j389cxs from Leagle.com.


MDLIVE INC: Fails to Protect Patients' Privacy, Class Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Evan Sweeney at fiercehealthcare.com reports that Telehealth
provider MDLive is facing allegations that the company failed to
maintain patient privacy by sharing screenshots of confidential
medical information with a third party.

The class action lawsuit, filed earlier by MDLive app user Joan
Richards, alleges the telehealth provider took continuous
screenshots during the first 15 minutes of use as patients were
prompted to enter personal medical information regarding allergies,
procedures and behavioral health history. The company took an
average of 60 screenshots during that time frame, according to the
complaint.

Unbeknownst to the patients, MDLive transmitted those screenshots
to a third-party tech company called TestFairy, based in Israel,
contracted to identify potential bugs and track user experience.
The suit alleges that the screenshots are also accessible to MDLive
employees through an unrestricted database.

"MDLive does not disclose to patients that it captures screenshots
of medical information or that it transmits screenshots to
TestFairy," the complaint states. "Nor does MDLive provide any
justification for the wholesale disclosure of patients' medical
information to TestFairy (likely because screenshots of patients
entering medical information offers little to no value in ensuring
proper app functionality or bug testing)."

MDLive did not respond to a request for comment.

According to the company's website, the MDLive has "the nation's
largest telehealth network." For a flat fee of $49, patients can
access telehealth physicians on-demand who treat minor health
conditions like allergies, cough, flu and respiratory problems and
send e-prescriptions to local pharmacies. The company expanded its
behavioral health unit last year to treat depression, addiction and
panic disorders.

A study published last year found the quality of urgent care varies
widely among telehealth providers. Experts have cautioned that
patient data privacy concerns could bubble to the service as
telehealth gains traction.

Update:

Following the publication of this story, an MDLive spokesperson
sent FierceHealthcare the following statement:

"Protecting patient privacy and confidentiality is a top priority
for MDLIVE. We have confirmed that patient information is safe and
we have located no evidence of any breach of HIPAA. Our services,
policies and procedures are designed to keep personally
identifiable information secure and meet the strictest legal and
regulatory standards. The claims of this lawsuit are entirely
without merit, and we will immediately seek its dismissal."[GN]

MEDTRONIC PLC: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due November 7
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Class: Shareholder rights law firm Robbins LLP reminds
investors that a shareholder filed a class action on behalf of all
persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Medtronic
PLC (NYSE:MDT) common stock between June 8, 2019 and May 25, 2022,
for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Medtronic is
a medical device company. Among its products is the MiniMed insulin
pump system for the treatment of diabetes, including the MiniMed
780G model. Medtronic is currently seeking regulatory approval for
the MiniMed 780G.

What is this Case About: Medtronic PLC (MDT) Had Inadequate Quality
Control Systems, Which Delayed the Approval of its MiniMed 780G
Device and Caused Shareholders Financial Harm.

According to the complaint, during the class period, defendants
repeatedly assured investors that the MiniMed 780G model was "on
track" for approval by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (the
"FDA") and would provide the Company with the edge it needed to
close a growing gap with its competitors in the diabetes market.

On December 15, 2021, Medtronic revealed it had received a warning
letter from the FDA regarding its Northridge, California facility.
The Warning Letter followed an FDA inspection relating to the
Company's MiniMed 600 series recall, and focused on "the inadequacy
of specific medical device quality system requirements . . . in the
areas of risk assessment, corrective and preventive action,
complaint handling, device recalls, and reporting of adverse
events." As a result of the warning Letter, Medtronic lowered its
guidance for its Diabetes Group. On this news, the price of
Medtronic common stock declined $6.75 per share, or approximately
6%, to close at $104.94 per share on December 15, 2021.

On May 26, 2022, Medtronic reported its financial results for the
fourth quarter and full year of fiscal year 2022, and provided
guidance for fiscal year 2023. Notably, defendants disclosed that
as a result of the Company's need to improve its quality control
system and its expectation that the MiniMed 780G model-which
Defendants had repeatedly identified as crucial to future
growth-would not be approved in 2023, the Company expected revenues
from its Diabetes Group to decline between 6% and 7% in fiscal year
2023. On this news, the price of Medtronic common stock fell $6.10
per share, or nearly 6%, from a close of $105.54 per share on May
25, 2022, to close at $99.44 per share on May 26, 2022.

Next Steps: If you acquired shares of Medtronic PLC between June 8,
2019 and May 25, 2022, you have until November 7, 2022, to ask the
court to appoint you lead plaintiff for the class. A lead plaintiff
is a representative party acting on behalf of other class members
in directing the litigation. You do not have to participate in the
case to be eligible for a recovery.

All representation is on a contingency fee basis. Shareholders pay
no fees or expenses.

Contact us to learn more:

Aaron Dumas
(800) 350-6003
adumas@robbinsllp.com
Shareholder Information Form

About Robbins LLP: A recognized leader in shareholder rights
litigation, the attorneys and staff of Robbins LLP have been
dedicated to helping shareholders recover losses, improve corporate
governance structures, and hold company executives accountable for
their wrongdoing since 2002. To be notified if a class action
against Medtronic PLC settles or to receive free alerts when
corporate executives engage in wrongdoing, sign up for Stock Watch
today.

Attorney Advertising. Past results do not guarantee a similar
outcome. [GN]

NATIONAL FOOTBALL: Antitrust Suit May Become Class Action Case
--------------------------------------------------------------
Michael McCann and Daniel Libit, writing for Sportico, report that
a once-dismissed antitrust lawsuit brought in 2015 by a collection
of NFL Sunday Ticket subscribers against the NFL and DirecTV -- the
subscribers claim they were effectively ripped off -- could soon
become a class action case.

On Aug. 19, attorneys for the plaintiffs petitioned the presiding
judge, Philip Gutierrez of Los Angeles' federal district court, to
certify two classes. One would include residential subscribers to
DirecTV who bought the Sunday Ticket after June 17, 2011; the other
would cover commercial subscribers during the same period.

This is significant because the larger the class, the more
threatening the case. Potential damages climb as the number of
class members increase. Also, damages can be trebled under
antitrust law, which further highlights the potentially threatening
nature of the case.

The federal rules of civil procedure make class certification a
multifaceted process: Judge Gutierrez will only certify the
proposed classes if he finds, among other factors, there are
questions of law or fact common to the classes and the accompanying
claims are representative. A hearing on class certification is
scheduled for Dec. 16.

Though the case has been in litigation since the mid-2010s, it
could remain on the docket well into the 2020s, barring a
settlement. A jury trial is currently scheduled for Feb. 22, 2024,
but any verdict would be subject to appeal.

The most serious part of the plaintiffs' argument is that the NFL's
Sunday Ticket package, offered by DirecTV, violates antitrust law
by preventing individual NFL teams from competing with one another
in the sale of broadcasting rights to markets where out-of-town
fans reside. If a fan wants to watch a team that is not in the
market where they reside, they must buy Sunday Ticket, which
bundles games into one package but at a hefty price–$293.94 per
season. Meanwhile, local fans can normally watch games on free TV
channels.

In a more competitive market, the Sunday Ticket plaintiffs insist,
NFL teams would bid to have broadcasts outside of their primary
markets. The Dallas Cowboys, for example, might have large enough
fan bases in Houston, New Orleans or New York to profitably
distribute Cowboys telecasts there.

The Texans, Saints, Giants and Jets might not welcome the viewing
competition, but local consumers would arguably be better off since
they would have more games to watch without having to spend a huge
amount of money to buy Sunday Ticket. More NFL game broadcasts
would also create new opportunities for companies to advertise
their goods and services during game broadcasts.

But NFL teams contractually agree to not poach other teams' home
territories, which under NFL bylaws refer to "the city in which [a
team] is located and for which it holds a franchise and plays its
home games and includes the surrounding territory to the extent of
75 miles in every direction from the exterior corporate limits of
such city."

The bylaws make concessions for certain teams, such as stipulating
that the Green Bay Packers' home territory includes all of
Milwaukee County. But one stipulation is clear: "No television
station," the bylaws note, "may carry or broadcast the game if its
signal is visible in the home territory of the home club in the
city where the game is being played."

After a nearly three-decade broadcast partnership, the NFL's Sunday
Ticket deal with DirecTV will conclude at the end of this upcoming
season. Amazon announced a multiyear deal with DirecTV to show
Thursday Night Football games in over 300,000 bars, restaurants and
other non-residential locations. That arrangement, however, remains
outside the scope of the current litigation.

In 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a
trial court dismissal of the case, which seeks both monetary
damages and an injunction that would compel team competition in the
sale of broadcasting rights. Judge Sandra Segal Ikuta drew from
another sports broadcasting case, NCAA v. Board of Regents, to
identify the problematic features of the Sunday Ticket.

In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court held the NCAA had violated
antitrust law by capping the number of broadcasts each college
football team could distribute. Those caps interfered with
individual schools' autonomy to negotiate broadcasting deals that
would expand viewing options for fans. Analogously, Judge Ikuta
explained, the NFL blocking teams from selling their telecast
rights independently interferes with individual teams' autonomy and
denies fans more viewing options.

The NFL and DirecTV have insisted their arrangements withstand
antitrust scrutiny. As the league tells it, fans haven't been
denied opportunities to watch games. Instead, they argue just the
opposite -- NFL broadcasting deals supply ways for fans to watch
any game no matter the time and no matter the location in the U.S.

To that point, if NFL teams were denied the chance to pool their
broadcasts, some NFL teams might not offer games out of town, or if
they do, not in as many out-of-town markets as are currently served
by Sunday Ticket. Alternatively, fans might have to pay more to
watch those out-of-town games. The larger point is the marketplace
is not necessarily better for consumers if the NFL and DirecTV
lose.

After a relative lull in activity, a recent flurry of court filings
-- many of which remain sealed under a protective order
-- have accompanied both the class certification petition and the
declarations of the plaintiffs' experts in the case.

One of the unredacted declarations filed in August was a market
research report from Sarah Butler, managing director of the San
Francisco-based NERA Economic Consulting, who conducted a study of
975 consumers who watch NFL games.

According to Butler's focus group, which included both Sunday
Ticket subscribers and non-subscribers, there was a strong consumer
preference for having access to individual NFL games, instead of
having to pay for a package that includes many games they aren't
interested in.

"These data also demonstrate," Butler wrote, "that consumers who
are not current DirecTV subscribers would generally be unwilling to
switch to DirecTV [in order] to access their preferred NFL
content."

Earlier this summer, the plaintiffs' attorneys—led by the Los
Angeles office of the law firm, Susman Godfrey—conducted
depositions with several of the NFL's most powerful figures,
including New England Patriots owner Robert Kraft, the longtime
chair of the league's media committee, and commissioner Roger
Goodell.

In Goodell's deposition, which took place on June 16 in New York,
the commissioner was asked by opposing counsel about his
educational and professional background.

"You never studied law," queried the attorney, according to a
heavily redacted copy of the transcript.

"Nope," Goodell said, "and proud of it." [GN]

NELNET SERVICING: Faces Class Action Over Alleged Data Breach
-------------------------------------------------------------
lawstreetmedia.com reports that a putative class action commenced
against Nebraska-based student loan servicer Nelnet Servicing, LLC
over an apparent data breach. The complaint was filed by named
plaintiffs who were among the 2.5 million account holders whose
personal data were allegedly affected by the Nelnet incident.

The complaint alleges that although Nelnet discovered unauthorized
access to user accounts on July 21, then closed that access on July
22, the company did not notify the Department of Education until
August 17, and Nelnet did not begin notifying impacted customers
until August 26. Plaintiffs assert that the unauthorized access
resulted from negligence, and the delay in notifying affected
customers was unreasonable.

Plaintiffs assert that of Nelnet's 17.4 million accounts, the
incident involved personally identifiable information (PII) of
about 2.5 million account holders. Beyond subclasses for various
individual states, Plaintiffs define the nationwide putative class
as including "All persons in the United States whose personal
information was compromised in the Data Breach made public by
Nelnet in August 2022."

The particular PII allegedly included putative class members'
names, addresses, email addresses, phone numbers, and Social
Security numbers. The complaint argues that the release of that
information resulted from Nelnet's (1) failure to secure the data,
(2) failure to comply with industry standards, (3) unlawful
disclosure, and (4) failure to provide adequate notice of the
incident.

The complaint includes a lengthy discussion of FTC guidance on
businesses' data-security practice, as well as outlining an
apparent timeline of the alleged breach, its remediation, and
resultant notification.

Plaintiffs' legal claims fall under theories of negligence, breach
of implied contract, unjust enrichment, breach of confidence,
invasion of privacy, violations of various state
consumer-protection and data-protection statutes, and injunctive
relief.

As relief, plaintiffs seek injunctive relief regarding Nelnet's
security measures, its notification policies, and credit monitoring
for putative class members. It also seeks a declaratory judgment
that Nelnet owes a legal duty to secure its customers' PII and to
establish adequate security measures.

Plaintiffs are represented by Goosmann Law Firm, Silver Golub &
Teitell, and Lowey Dannenberg. [GN]

NELNET SERVICING: Markovits Stock Investigates Data Breach Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Markovits, Stock & DeMarco, a law firm experienced in data breach
cases, is investigating claims on behalf of victims of a data
breach involving data exposed by Nelnet Servicing, LLC, including a
name, address, email address, phone number, and Social Security
number[1] Nelnet Servicing, LLC is located in Lincoln, Nebraska. If
you received a notice of data breach from Nelnet Servicing, LLC,
please contact us as soon as possible so we may discuss your legal
rights with you.

WHAT HAPPENED?

According to the notification letter Nelnet Servicing, LLC sent to
the Maine Attorney General, Nelnet Servicing, LLC notified
Edfinancial and OSLA "that it had discovered a vulnerability it
believed led to" the data breach.[ Nelnet Servicing, LLC's
investigation into the data breach discovered that "certain student
loan account registration information was accessible by an unknown
party beginning in June 2022 and ending on July 22, 2022."[3]

WHAT INFORMATION WAS EXPOSED IN THE DATA BREACH?

Nelnet Servicing, LLC stated that the following private information
was subject to unauthorized access during the data breach,

Name,
Address,
Email address,
Phone number, and,
Social Security number.

HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE IMPACTED BY NELET SERVIVING'S DATA BREACH?

Approximately 2,501,324 people were impacted by Nelnet Servicing,
LLC's data breach.

WHAT SHOULD I DO IF I RECEIVED NOTIFICATION OF THE NELNET SERVICING
DATA BREACH?

If you would like to have a free, confidential consultation with an
attorney to learn more about your rights and potential legal
remedies in response to the Nelnet Servicing, LLC Data Breach,
please contact Markovits, Stock & DeMarco attorneys Jon Deters or
Terry Coates at (513) 651-3700, email us at msd@msdlegal.com. [GN]

NEW JERSEY: Bid to Substitute Class Rep in Ortiz v. Callahan OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Rukhsanah L. Singh of the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey grants the Plaintiff's motion to
substitute class representative and amend the complaint in the
lawsuit titled ASHLEY ORTIZ, on behalf of herself and all other
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PATRICK J. CALLAHAN, in his
capacity as Superintendent of New Jersey State Police, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 21-11146 (MAS) (RLS) (D.N.J.).

The matter comes before the Court upon the Motion of Ortiz to
Substitute the Class Representative and Amend the Complaint
pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendants Patrick J. Callahan, in his capacity as Superintendent
of New Jersey State Police, Gurbir S. Grewal, in his capacity as
Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, and Veronica Allende,
in her official capacity as Director of the Office of the Attorney
General Department of Law and Public Safety Division of Criminal
Justice, (collectively, the "State Defendants") oppose the Motion,
to which the Plaintiff has replied.

Marc Dennis, individually and in his capacity as Coordinator in the
New Jersey State Police Alcohol Drug Testing Unit, is also a named
Defendant. A clerk's entry of default as to Marc Dennis was entered
on July 15, 2021.

The action arises out of the Plaintiff's May 12, 2021 complaint on
behalf of a putative class, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act based on the
Defendants' use of and reliance on evidence relating to the
Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C instruments used by the State of New Jersey
to determine blood alcohol concentration ("BAC") of individuals
suspected of driving while intoxicated ("DWI").

On Oct. 15, 2021, the State Defendants moved to dismiss the
Plaintiff's Complaint based on standing, mootness, and immunity
grounds. Pursuant to a May 31, 2022 Text Order, the Court
administratively terminated the Motion to Dismiss without prejudice
pending resolution of the instant Motion.

On June 24, 2022, the Plaintiff filed the Motion sub judice.
Through the Motion, she seeks to substitute Thomas Fehr as the
Class representative and supplement the class action complaint. She
seeks to substitute as Defendants Matthew J. Platkin for Gurbir S.
Grewal and Lyndsay Routolo for Veronica Allende. Her proposed
Amended Class Action Complaint also seeks to add substantive
allegations to claims already asserted.

On July 25, 2022, the State Defendants filed their opposition to
the Motion, contending that the Court no longer maintained
jurisdiction over the matter when the Plaintiff "chose to end her
involvement in this lawsuit" before class certification and that
any amendment would be futile. On Aug. 17, 2022, the Plaintiff
filed her reply on the Motion.

The Plaintiff seeks leave to amend her complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a)(2).

The State Defendants oppose the Plaintiff's Motion on the basis
that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff
Ortiz's withdrawal of her individual claims render the action as
moot. The State Defendants also oppose the Motion on the basis that
the proposed substitution and amendments would be futile. The State
Defendants do not appear to challenge the proposed amendments on
the basis of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motives, or undue
prejudice.

Turning first to the jurisdictional issue, the Court finds that it
maintains subject matter jurisdiction to decide the instant Motion.
Judge Singh notes that Article III standing requires a live
"justiciable" controversy throughout the life of a lawsuit, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 160 (2016); Lusardi v.
Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 974 (3d Cir. 1992).

The Class Counsel represents that it learned that Ortiz had been
compensated by state actors for her conviction underlying her
individual claim, but that the Class Counsel had not been involved
in and was not aware of the terms of any such resolution.

Based on the facts presented, the Court finds that the exception
under Richardson v. Bledsoe, 829 F.3d 273, 279, 283, 286 (3d Cir.
2016) to the mootness doctrine applies because it appears that
Ortiz's individual claim for compensation may have been mooted by
the actions of state actors. Moreover, even if her individual
claims were not subject to the exception, the case is
distinguishable from Lusardi, upon which the State Defendants
rely.

In Lusardi, the class representatives sought to pursue a motion for
class certification after they entered into a settlement agreement
to broadly release the defendants from all claims in that lawsuit.
Ortiz is not attempting to continue the lawsuit as the class
representative, but rather seeks to withdraw and permit another
individual, Fehr, to pursue the claims as class representative. As
to the potential new class representative, Fehr, the State
Defendants contend that his individual claims would be futile under
a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.

Turning then to the State Defendants' contentions regarding
futility, the Court exercises its discretion and declines to
consider the State Defendants' futility arguments in connection
with its review of the Motion.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion is granted. The State
Defendants, however, may raise futility arguments by way of a
motion to dismiss after the filing of the amended class action
complaint, Judge Singh says.

Having considered the submissions of the parties, and for the
reasons set forth, Judge Singh ordered that the Plaintiff's Motion
to Substitute the Class Representative and Amend the Complaint is
granted. The Plaintiff will file the Amended Class Action Complaint
within seven (7) days of the entry of this Order.

The Defendants will file a response to the Amended Class Action
Complaint within fourteen (14) days of the filing of the Amended
Class Action Complaint.

The Clerk of the Court will terminate the motions at Docket Entry
Numbered 43.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated
Aug. 22, 2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/bdz7rfwm from
Leagle.com.


NEWFOUNDLAND & LABRADOR: Ex-Inmate Excluded From Confinement Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ariana Kelland, writing for CBC News, reports that Al Hickey is far
from the prison walls of Her Majesty's Penitentiary, but he still
distinctly remembers the time he spent in solitary confinement in
the basement of the St. John's correctional facility more than two
decades ago.

"They put me in the hole for two and a half weeks with another guy
and didn't let us out once -- not once -- in two and a half weeks,"
Hickey said in a recent interview.

Hickey, 43, describes staying in a small cell equipped with a
concrete slab, a thin mattress and toilet, without access to a
shower for the entirety of his time there.

He doesn't remember how he landed there, but said the
double-bunking wasn't done out of necessity.

"There's no room to walk, there's no room to move. And there was
lots of cells open. They didn't need to double bunk us in there,
but [the guards] would do it to cause fights so they could
entertain themselves."

Hickey couldn't recall the exact year he spent in the provincial
men's jail but court records show a period of incarceration in
1998, when he was 19.

Class-action cutoff
A class-action lawsuit brought forward by former inmates that
targets the provincial government over the use of solitary
confinement from the 1990s to present day was certified in October
2021.

But when Hickey called to join the lawsuit, after seeing a CBC
story in July, he was told he had missed the cutoff.

In Newfoundland and Labrador, legislation dictates that a
non-resident has to "opt in" to a class action within a timeline
set out by the Supreme Court where the action is certified.

In this case, there was a 90-day time limit for people outside the
province to indicate they want to join.

Jasminka Kalajdzic, an associate professor at the University of
Windsor's Faculty of Law, said most all provinces in Canada use the
opt-out process.

That means a person who qualifies for a certain class-action
lawsuit is automatically included, even if they don't know it
exists.

Newfoundland and Labrador and New Brunswick, Kalajdzic said, do
things differently.

Suing alone 'isn't for everybody'
There are benefits and drawbacks to both, she said.

"If it's an opt-out system, because they didn't remove themselves,
now they're stuck. They have no choice. They can't control their
own litigation [or] start their own lawsuit," she said.

"If you're automatically in but you don't know about the case, it
means that you may have lost all rights to compensation because the
deadlines passed to to make a claim, and you also lost your rights
to litigate."

However, in Hickey's case, he is excluded, and the only option
would be to launch his own lawsuit -- which has its own
challenges.

"Suing individually isn't for everybody. It takes a lot of
wherewithal, patience," Kalajdzic said.

"Sometimes the publicity is something that people shy away from."

Ideally, she said all provinces would have an opt-out system, but
would require a more concerted effort to alert the public about the
litigation.

Trevor Farrow, a professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, said it
would be beneficial for the legislation to change in Newfoundland
and Labrador, to become uniform with the rest of Canada.

"It's a good thing because even though we still operate
provincially, there's a lot of stuff that happens across provincial
borders," Farrow said.

"And so the more things are unified, the simpler and more efficient
they can be and the more predictable."

Both Farrow and Kalajdzic say creating a system that's clear of
confusion is key in helping people understand class-action lawsuits
and their rights.

A spokesperson from the Newfoundland and Labrador Department of
Justice and Public Safety said no amendments to the Class Actions
Act are being considered at this time.

Speaking while on a boat off the coast of British Columbia, Hickey
said he's glad the issue of solitary confinement is getting
attention.

"If you want to throw somebody in a prison and treat them like
garbage and basically turn it into a Fight Club with shanks and all
kinds of horrific violence, well, be prepared to have that person
living next door to you," he said.

In retrospect, Hickey believes that time in solitary confinement --
albeit short -- helped changed the trajectory of his life.

Throughout adulthood, Hickey has been drawn to isolation, working
on trap lines in northern Alberta and gold prospecting in the
Yukon.

"Now I live on a boat out on the islands and I usually just do my
best to stay away from people. And I'm starting to realize now that
that's a problem," Hickey said.

"I found beauty in my solitude. Don't get me wrong, I know how
beautiful nature is, but I've missed out on the beauty of
humanity." [GN]

NOW OPTICS LLC: Dopp Wins Bid to Remand Suit to Superior Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned ALLISON DOPP, an individual, Plaintiff v.
NOW OPTICS, LLC, a Florida limited liability company; VISION
PRECISION HOLDINGS, LLC, a Florida limited liability company;
ALEXANDER SANCHEZ, an individual; AMY KOGER, an individual; and
DOES 1 through 50, Defendants, Case No. 22-CV-964-CAB-RBB (S.D.
Cal.), Judge Carthy Ann Bencivengo of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of California grants the Plaintiff's motion
to remand to state court.

On Jan. 19, 2022, the Plaintiff, a California resident, filed a
complaint in the Superior Court of the State of California for the
County of San Diego against Defendants Now Optics, LLC and Vision
Precision Holdings, LLC, both Florida limited liability companies
(the "Company Defendants"). The suit was removed to federal court,
and the Plaintiff dismissed it without prejudice shortly thereafter
on Feb. 28, 2022.

On June 10, 2022, the Plaintiff filed an individual and class
action complaint in San Diego Superior Court against the Company
Defendants and two additional Defendants, Alexander Sanchez and Amy
Koger. Sanchez and Koger are also California residents. On June 22,
2022, the Plaintiff amended her state court complaint by filing the
operative First Amended Individual and Class Action Complaint
("FAC"), alleging largely the same facts as her prior complaint and
adding no additional defendants. On Aug. 26, 2021, the Defendants
removed the action to federal court, asserting that this Court has
original jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1332.

The Plaintiff's FAC asserts 13 claims for alleged violations of the
California Labor Code, gender discrimination, sexual harassment,
failure to prevent harassment and/or discrimination, retaliation,
and wrongful constructive termination in violation of public
policy, among others. Of the 13 claims, six are alleged against
Sanchez and five are alleged against Koger, but all 13 are alleged
against the Company Defendants. The Defendants argue that although
Sanchez and Koger are California residents and would defeat
complete diversity, they were fraudulently joined as sham
defendants in the Plaintiff's most recent lawsuit in a deliberate
attempt to deprive the Defendants of their right to a federal
forum.

The Plaintiff's sixth through ninth, eleventh and twelfth claims
are brought against Sanchez and the Company Defendants. These
claims allege: (6) gender discrimination under Cal. Gov't Code
Section 12940(a); (7) sexual harassment under Cal. Gov't Code
Section 12940(j); (8) failure to prevent harassment and/or
discrimination under Cal. Gov't Code Section 12940(k); (9)
retaliation under Cal. Gov't Code Section 12940(h); (11)
retaliation under Cal. Lab. Code Section 1102.5; and (12) wrongful
constructive termination in violation of public policy under Cal.
Gov't Code Section 12940, et seq.

The crux of these claims is that Sanchez, while acting as the
Plaintiff's direct supervisor at the Company Defendants' La Mesa
store from March to July 2021, allegedly harassed the Plaintiff
daily by making vulgar and sexually charged comments to her
regarding other customers and employees. The Plaintiff alleges that
because of Sanchez's daily harassment, she was no longer able to
tolerate the abusive and harassing environment created by her
supervisor and was forced to resign. Further, the Plaintiff alleges
that Sanchez "wrongfully refused" to promote her to a Sales Manager
position to punish her for opposing his sexual comments and because
of her gender.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has demonstrated at least a
"possibility" of stating a cause of action from the listed claims
against Sanchez. The Plaintiff makes specific factual allegations
detailing Sanchez's daily harassing comments, states that these
comments were directed to her based on her gender, alleges that she
was "punished" for opposing these comments by not being promoted,
and asserts that because of Sanchez's severe and pervasive
harassment, she was eventually forced to resign.

Accepting these allegations as true, as the Court must at the
pleading stage, Judge Bencivengo finds that the Plaintiff has
alleged sufficient facts from which a state court could possibly
find that Sanchez harassed her in violation of California
Government Code section 12940(j).

Moreover, the Defendants have not proven by clear and convincing
evidence that Sanchez was fraudulently joined, Judge Bencivengo
notes. The Defendants have not pointed to anything indicating that
the allegations in the present lawsuit were fraudulently made to
defeat diversity jurisdiction. Since the Plaintiff's first state
court complaint filed on Jan. 19, 2022, her factual allegations
regarding Sanchez's conduct have remained largely the same. The
Plaintiff was, therefore, free to bring another case--even a very
similar one--naming additional defendants, Judge Bencivengo holds.

Although the Defendants contend that Sanchez cannot be personally
liable for five of the Plaintiff's six claims against him, the
Plaintiff can at least state a harassment claim against Sanchez
individually. The Defendants then argue that the Plaintiff's
allegations do not constitute "actionable harassment" because
Sanchez's comments were made about others and not the Plaintiff.

Judge Bencivengo opines that there is no requirement under
California law that the harassing comments be made about the
Plaintiff rather than directed to her, and the Defendants do not
cite a single case to support their theory. Accordingly, the
Plaintiff can possibly state at least one claim against Sanchez
individually, which is sufficient to find that joinder of Sanchez
was proper and warrant remand.

The Plaintiff's first through fourth and thirteenth claims are
brought against Koger and the Company Defendants. These claims
allege: (1) failure to pay meal period premiums under Cal. Lab.
Code Sections 226.7 and 512; (2) wage and hour violations under
Cal. Lab. Code Sections 201, 202, 203, 204, and 510, et seq.; (3)
failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements under Cal.
Lab. Code Section 226, et seq.; (4) unfair and unlawful business
practices under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200, et seq.; and
(13) rest period violations under Cal. Lab. Code Section 226.7. The
crux of these claims is that Koger, as the Company Defendants'
District Manager and managing agent, allegedly maintained unlawful
policies of underpaying the Plaintiff and purported class members
for overtime, double-time, meal and rest period premiums, and sick
time pay.

The Plaintiff's five claims against Koger are premised on alleged
wage and hour violations under the California Labor Code.

Based on the Plaintiff's allegations regarding Koger's role and
level of knowledge and control as a District Manager, the Court
cannot find that there is no possibility that a state court would
find that the complaint states a cause of action against Koger for
Labor Code violations.

The Plaintiff alleges that Koger had intimate knowledge of and
control over the wage and hour practices of the stores, and she was
responsible for interviewing new employees, hiring/firing,
overseeing operations, budget and staffing, and monitoring wages,
commissions and budget performance of the Company Defendants' eight
San Diego stores. The Plaintiff also alleges that Koger had
responsibility for setting District goals regarding budgeting and
staffing, and that she had control over operations, payroll
policies and practices, and wage payment policies.

These allegations could possibly establish that Koger exercises
substantial discretionary authority over corporate policy decisions
and had some oversight of the company's operations, Judge
Bencivengo notes. Accordingly, the Plaintiff can possibly state a
claim against Koger individually, which is sufficient to find that
joinder of Koger was proper and warrant remand.

For the reasons stated, the Court finds that the Defendants have
not met their "heavy burden" to show that a state court could not
possibly find that the FAC states a cause of action against Sanchez
and/or Koger. Consequently, the Court finds Sanchez and Koger's
joinder proper, which destroys complete diversity for purposes of
subject matter jurisdiction. The Court must, therefore, remand the
case to state court.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that removal of this
matter was improper and grants the Plaintiff's motion to remand.
The Court remands this action back to state court for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.

Because the Defendants removed this matter and opposed remand with
no reasonable basis--let alone clear and convincing evidence--for
asserting fraudulent joinder, the Court finds that the Plaintiff is
entitled to attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. Section
1447(c).

Accordingly, the Court grants the Plaintiff's request for
reasonable attorney's fees and awards Plaintiff $9,750.

The Clerk of the Court will close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 22, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p8c26r3 from Leagle.com.


OLE MEXICAN: Hardy Appeals False Ad Suit Dismissal to 2nd Cir.
--------------------------------------------------------------
RYAN HARDY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, is taking an appeal from a court ruling dismissing his
lawsuit entitled Ryan Hardy, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Ole Mexican Foods, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-01261, in the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of New York.

The Plaintiff brought this suit against the Defendant for false,
deceptive, and misleading advertising, labeling, and marketing of
tortillas under the brand La Banderita in violation of Sections 349
and 350 of New York General Business Law.

On February 3, 2022, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's complaint, which Judge John L. Sinatra, Jr. granted on
July 21, 2022. The Court ruled that the Plaintiff fails to state a
claim under GBL Sections 349 and 350. The Court concluded that a
reasonable consumer, acting reasonably under the circumstances,
would not be misled as to where the tortillas were manufactured.

The appellate case is captioned as Hardy v. Ole Mexican Foods,
Inc., Case No. 22-1805, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, filed on August 17, 2022. [BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant RYAN HARDY, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

            Innessa Melamed Huot, Esq.
            Nina M. Varindani, Esq.
            FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
            685 3rd Avenue
            New York, NY 10017
            Telephone: (212) 983-9330

                   - and -

            Timothy J. Peter, Esq.
            FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
            1617 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
            Philadelphia, PA 19103
            Telephone: (215) 277-5770

Defendant-Appellee OLE MEXICAN FOODS, INC., is represented by:

            Barry M. Benjamin, Esq.
            KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP
            The Grace Building
            1114 Avenue of the Americas
            New York, NY 10036
            Telephone: (212) 775-8700

ON THE RUN: Settles Wage Class Action Lawsuit for $6 Million
------------------------------------------------------------
ABC News reports that South Australia's largest private employer
and convenience store chain, OTR has agreed to pay almost $6
million to settle long-running wage underpayment claims.

Federal court documents reveal OTR agreed to pay $5.8 million
dollars to settle a class action involving accusations it underpaid
staff across South Australia between 2014 and 2020.

The class action was launched on behalf of 1,050 workers in May
2020.

Law firm Adero Law estimated that 8,000 current or former employees
were eligible to join the class action when it was first brought to
court.

It also claimed Shahin Enterprises could be liable to pay back
between $50 million and $70 million in unpaid wages and
entitlements.

The company was accused of failing to pay overtime, underpaying
staff and misusing its traineeship program as a method to reduce
workers' pay.

OTR denies the allegations.

The proposed settlement would come with no admission of liability
or wrongdoing on the part of the convenience store chain.

If approved by the court, the lump-sum payment will be divided
between employees who have already registered to be part of the
proceedings.

The Federal Court will decide in December whether to approve the
settlement. [GN]

PITTSBURGH, PA: Summary Judgment Bid Must be Filed by Jan. 17, 2023
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as NICOLE RULLI, et al, v.
CITY OF PITTSBURGH, et al, Case No. 2:20-cv-00965-CB-LPL (W.D.
Pa.), the Hon. Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan entered an order on class
certification deadline:

   1. Motions for summary judgment,        January 17, 2023
      if any, shall be filed by:

   2. Responses to motions for summary     February 17, 2023
      judgment shall be filed by:

   3. Replies in support of motions        March 3, 2023
      for summary judgment shall be
      filed by:

Pittsburgh is a city in western Pennsylvania at the junction of 3
rivers.

A copy of the Court's order dated Aug. 23, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3wPQN3o at no extra charge.[CC]

PORTLAND, OR: People With Disabilities Sue Over Blocked Sidewalks
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Claire Rush at apnews.com reports that people with disabilities in
Portland, Oregon, have sued the city, saying they can't navigate
its sidewalks because of sprawling homeless encampments.

The federal class action lawsuit says the city has violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act by allowing homeless people's tents
to block city sidewalks, making it difficult for people using
wheelchairs, walkers or canes to use them.

"The entire class of persons with disabilities are regularly
deprived of the benefits of services of the city of Portland," said
John DiLorenzo, lead counsel for the plaintiffs.

The suit was filed in U.S. District Court in Portland.

The plaintiffs include nine people with disabilities and a
caretaker. Among the plaintiffs is Keith Martin, a 71-year-old
Portland resident who has used a wheelchair since having a stroke
three years ago.

"I couldn't get to my breakfast in the morning because there was a
tent covering the whole sidewalk," Martin said. "I was forced onto
the street and narrowly missed a streetcar that came around the
corner."

Oregon's homelessness crisis has been fueled by a housing shortage,
the coronavirus pandemic and high drug addiction rates. Federal
data from the latest National Survey on Drug Use and Health found
that 9% of teens and adults in Oregon had illicit drug use
disorders in 2020. That year, the state also ranked last in access
to drug addiction treatment, according to the survey.

The class action suit seeks to require the city to clear all
sidewalks of tent encampments and debris, and to "construct,
purchase, or otherwise provide for emergency shelters in which to
house the unsheltered persons" who may be affected.

Such measures would make sidewalks accessible for people with
disabilities in a safe manner while providing a safe place for
unhoused people, DiLorenzo said.

Portland Mayor Ted Wheeler's office said the mayor is meeting with
the city attorney before providing comment.

About 13% of Portlanders live with a disability, according to the
lawsuit, including 6% with mobility impairments and 2.4% with
visual impairments.

Plaintiff Steve Jackson, 47, is legally blind and uses a cane to
walk. He said tents prevent him from navigating the sidewalk and
accessing bus stops.

"Often there's tents blocking the entire sidewalk, where I don't
see them because they weren't there the day before, and I hit the
tent and then people are mad at me and think I'm attacking them,"
Jackson said during a news conference.

There were about 3,000 unsheltered people living in Multnomah
County, home to Portland, during the most recent point-in-time
count in January 2022, county figures show.

The Portland City Council declared a state of emergency on
homelessness in 2015 and has extended it five times since then. The
measure, now set to expire in 2025, reduces the bureaucratic
hurdles surrounding the creation of homeless shelters.

Despite the city's years-long emergency measure, the estimated
number of people experiencing homelessness spiked 25% in the
Portland area between 2020 and 2022, according to point-in-time
counts reported to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development.

This year alone, Wheeler has issued four emergency declarations to
address homelessness issues. Most recently in August, he expanded a
previous declaration that prohibits camping along high-speed
corridors such as highways to include key walking routes to K-12
schools.

The state has wrestled with a debate over the best way to reduce
homelessness. Some business groups have called for more encampment
sweeps and stricter enforcement of anti-camping ordinances, while
others want more investment in social services and affordable
housing.

Oregon lawmakers earlier this year approved a budget that includes
$400 million to address homelessness and housing.[GN]

PRIMOHOAGIES FRANCHISING: Settles Class Action Over Cyberattack
---------------------------------------------------------------
MyChesCo reports that a settlement has reportedly been reached with
PrimoHoagies Franchising, Inc. d/b/a PrimoHoagies in a class action
lawsuit stemming from an external criminal cyberattack that
targeted PrimoHoagies' online payment platform between July 15,
2019, and February 18, 2020. PrimoHoagies made the cyberattack
public on April 17, 2020. The pending class action was filed in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey and is
captioned Hozza v. PrimoHoagies Franchising, Inc. d/b/a
PrimoHoagies, Case No. 1:20-cv-04966 (D.N.J.).

PrimoHoagies denies any wrongdoing and that it violated any law.
PrimoHoagies further maintains that it has good and meritorious
defenses to Plaintiff's claims and would prevail if the case were
to proceed. Nevertheless, to avoid further expense, inconvenience,
and distraction of burdensome and protracted litigation, the
parties have agreed to settle the claims in the lawsuit.

Under the terms of the agreement, subject to certain exceptions,
the proposed settlement class purportedly consists of all persons
in the United States whose payment card information was used to
make an online order with PrimoHoagies during the data breach that
PrimoHoagies made public on April 17, 2020. Each proposed class
member may be entitled to receive credit monitoring services for
one year; and/or reimbursement for certain unreimbursed
out-of-pocket costs and expenses and/or for lost time and effort,
subject to limitations and documentation requirements.

The District Court has appointed Christian Levis, Anthony M.
Christina and Amanda G. Fiorilla of Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., 44
South Broadway, Suite 1100, White Plains, NY 10601, as class
counsel to represent the settlement class.

The court will reportedly conduct a Final Approval Hearing on March
22, 2023, to determine whether to grant final approval of the
settlement.

More information about the lawsuit and settlement can be found at
www.hoagiesettlement.com. [GN]

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Faces Class Action Lawsuit Over Data Breach
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sumit Adhikari at androidheadlines.com reports that Samsung has
been hit with a class action lawsuit over the recent data breach.
The lawsuit alleges the company of failing to notify affected
consumers about the breach on time. Plaintiff Shelby Harmer and
other affected customers filed the class action at the US District
Court for Nevada on September 6, Bloomberg reports.

The data breach in question took place in late July when an
unauthorized third party got access to Samsung's US-based systems.
The attacker stole personally identifiable information about some
Samsung customers. The new report states that more than 3,000
customers were affected. Information accessed included the full
name, contact, demographic information, date of birth, and product
registration information, though it may vary for each customer.
Samsung confirmed that Social Security numbers and payment details
such as credit and debit card numbers weren't accessed.

The company came to know about this data breach on August 4th while
conducting an internal investigation. However, it didn't notify the
affected customers or publicly disclose the breach until September
2. And this is what the class action lawsuit is targeting. The
complaint alleges that Samsung failed to follow its own policies as
well as the industry security standards to protect the private
information of its customers. Moreover, the company took almost a
month to notify the affected customers about it.

Samsung faces lawsuit for delayed disclosure of the data breach
In its public notice regarding the data breach, Samsung said it has
communicated directly with affected customers, at least those it
could identify. The company is in the process of identifying more
customers whose personal information may have been compromised in
the breach. It will accordingly notify them of the same. In the
meantime, Samsung encourages people to remain cautious of any
unsolicited communications asking for their personal information.
The company also wants you to avoid clicking on links or
downloading attachments from suspicious emails.

Samsung says it has taken action to secure the affected systems.
Along with the internal security team, the company also engaged a
"leading outside cybersecurity firm" to strengthen its security
measures. It also coordinated the matter with law enforcement. But
the Korean firm may still end up in a courtroom over this data
breach because it took longer than it should have to notify
customers about it. Time will tell what comes out of this class
action lawsuit. We will keep you posted as and when we have more
information. [GN]

SEMA4 HOLDINGS: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due Nov. 17
---------------------------------------------------------------
RM LAW, P.C. announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
on behalf of all persons or entities that purchased Sema4 Holdings
Corp. ("Sema4" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: SMFR) securities during
the period from March 14, 2022 through August 15, 2022 inclusive
(the "Class Period").

Sema4 shareholders may, no later than November 7, 2022, move the
Court for appointment as a lead plaintiff of the Class. If you
purchased shares of Sema4 and would like to learn more about these
claims or if you wish to discuss these matters and have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights, contact
Richard A. Maniskas, Esquire toll-free at (844) 291-9299 or to sign
up online, click here.

According to the complaint, on August 15, 2022, the Company
announced changes to its research and development leadership team,
including that Eric Schadt was stepping down from his roles as
President and Chief R&D Officer. The Company also disclosed that it
was eliminating approximately 13% of its workforce as part of a
series of restructuring and corporate realignments. During the
related conference call, Sema4 revealed that it had "reversed $30.1
million of revenue this quarter related to prior periods," in
connection with negotiations with "one of [Sema4's] larger
commercial payors regarding the potential recoupment of payments
for Sema4 carrier screening services rendered from 2018 to early
2022." On this news, Sema4's stock fell $0.80, or 33.3%, to close
at $1.60 per share on August 16, 2022.

If you are a member of the class, you may, no later than November
7, 2022, request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff of
the class. A lead plaintiff is a representative party that acts on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. In order
to be appointed lead plaintiff, the Court must determine that the
class member's claim is typical of the claims of other class
members, and that the class member will adequately represent the
class. Under certain circumstances, one or more class members may
together serve as "lead plaintiff." Your ability to share in any
recovery is not, however, affected by the decision whether or not
to serve as a lead plaintiff. You may retain RM LAW, P.C. or other
counsel of your choice, to serve as your counsel in this action.

For more information regarding this, please contact RM LAW, P.C.
(Richard A. Maniskas, Esquire) toll-free at (844) 291-9299 or by
email at rm@maniskas.com or click here. For more information about
class action cases in general or to learn more about RM LAW, P.C.
please visit our website by clicking here.

RM LAW, P.C. is a national shareholder litigation firm. RM LAW,
P.C. is devoted to protecting the interests of individual and
institutional investors in shareholder actions in state and federal
courts nationwide. [GN]

SFC GLOBAL: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Zuchowski Consumer Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York grants the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint in the lawsuit entitled KAREN
ZUCHOWSKI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SFC GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 20-CV-10171 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Karen Zuchowski brings the consumer class action against
SFC. SFC is a Minnesota corporation that manufactures "Red Baron"
brand pizzas, including the Brick Oven Cheese Trio Pizza, Classic
Crust Four Cheese Pizza, and Thin & Crispy Five Cheese Pizza. These
three pizzas have labels that represent that the pizzas contain
"PRESERVATIVE FREE CRUST" and "NO ARTIFICIAL FLAVORS."

The Complaint defines "chemical preservative" as any chemical that
when added to food tends to prevent or retard deterioration, but
does not include common salt, sugars, vinegars, or spices. The
Complaint defines "artificial flavor" as "any substance, the
function of which is to impart flavor, which is not derived from a
spice, fruit or fruit juice, vegetable or vegetable juice, edible
yeast, herb, bark, bud, root, leaf or similar plant material."

The Plaintiff is a resident of New York and a consumer of the Red
Baron pizzas. She alleges that she relied on the Defendant's
"PRESERVATIVE FREE CRUST" and "NO ARTIFICIAL FLAVORS" labeling when
purchasing the pizzas on several occasions, most recently in
September 2020 in the Bronx, New York.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant misrepresented its
products because the pizzas actually contain preservatives and
artificial flavoring as they contain modified food starch,
hydrolyzed soy, corn protein, sodium stearoyl lactylate, enzymes,
and mono- and diglycerides, all of which are chemical food
additives. She alleges that she would have bought pizzas less
expensive than the Defendant's products if she had known that its
pizzas did not actually contain preservative free crust and no
artificial flavors.

The Plaintiff initiated the action on Dec. 3, 2020, bringing her
claims individually and on behalf of those similarly situated from
the following classes of consumers, who purchased the relevant
products in the relevant time period: a national class, a consumer
fraud multi-state class, and a New York sub-class. She alleges the
following claims against the Defendant: violation of state consumer
fraud acts, violation of Sections 349 and 350 of the New York
General Business Law ("GBL"), common law fraud, breach of express
warranties, breach of implied warranties, and unjust enrichment.

The Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 12(b)(1), and 12(b)(2). It
argues that (1) the Plaintiff failed to state a claim for her New
York Business Law Sections 349 & 350 claim, breach of express
warranty claim, and common law fraud claim; (2) she failed to
provide the Defendant with timely notice of the common law fraud
claim; (3) her unjust enrichment claim is duplicative; (4) the
Court does not have personal jurisdiction over the non-resident
multistate class members and SFC; (5) and the Plaintiff lacks
standing to pursue injunctive and declarative relief.

The Plaintiff has withdrawn her implied warranty claim.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses the implied warranty claim.

The Plaintiff brings suit under Sections 349 and 350 of the New
York General Business Law. GBL Section 349 prohibits deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or
in the furnishing of any service and GBL Section 350 prohibits
false advertising in the conduct of any business, trade or
commerce.

She alleges that modified food starch and hydrolyzed soy and corn
protein, "which are commercially manufactured and highly processed,
and which contain monosodium glutamate (or "MSG") as a byproduct of
the protein processing," are artificial flavors. According to her,
the ingredients are artificial because they undergo a chemical
process that changes their original form and are altered to become
synthetic substances. Therefore, according to her, the
representation that the pizzas contain "NO ARTIFICIAL FLAVORS" is
misleading to consumers.

As the Defendant argues, the Complaint incorporates the definition
of "artificial flavor" established by the United States Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA"): "Any substance, the function of which
is to impart flavor, which is not derived from a spice, fruit or
fruit juice, vegetable or vegetable juice, edible yeast, herb,
bark, bud, root, leaf or similar plant materia." The same
regulation provides that synthetic flavors are artificial flavors
except where these synthetic flavors are derived from natural
sources. Thus, as the allegedly artificial flavors are not alleged
to be derived from artificial sources, and are in fact derived from
natural sources--soybeans, corn, and other plants--the Plaintiff's
claim cannot stand.

The Court agrees with the Defendant. The Complaint has not
sufficiently alleged that the pizzas contain non-artificial
flavors. As the Court has previously held, absent any factually
substantiated allegations that the flavors in the Defendants'
product are not derived from natural sources, the Court finds that
the Plaintiffs have failed to allege the presence of artificial
flavors, and their claim that the ingredient list makes a
materially misleading omission, thus, fails.

Further, Judge Carter finds the Complaint does not support its
allegation that consumers expect a "No Artificial Flavors"
representation to mean that the product includes no
chemically-altered flavors even if those flavors are derived from
natural sources. The Complaint merely offers the generalization
that consumers are particularly vulnerable to these kinds of false
and deceptive labeling and marketing practices.

Such unsubstantiated allegations do not pass muster, Judge Carter
holds, citing Santiful v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., No.
20-CV-2933, 2022 WL 268955, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2022).

The Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant deceptively
misrepresents that the pizzas do not contain preservatives. She
again adopts the FDA definition when defining preservative. She
claims that the pizzas use sodium stearoyl lactylate, enzymes, and
mono- and diglycerides, which she classifies as preservatives.
Specifically, the Complaint alleges that these ingredients function
as "as an anti-staling agent in breads to preserve the softness of
the crust during the product's shelf life," and "as an anti-staling
agent in baked goods."

However, the Plaintiff does not explain how these ingredients
operate as preservatives in the Defendant's product, frozen pizzas,
as opposed to breads and baked goods, Judge Carter says. Thus, the
Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged the presence of
preservatives in the pizzas and her claim that the "PRESERVATIVE
FREE CRUST" labeling is a deceptive practice fails.

The Court finds as a matter of law that the Plaintiff has failed to
adequately plead a materially misleading representation under GBL
Section 349 and 350. Because she has not pleaded an underlying
materially misleading representation, the other claims in this
case, which are pleaded on the basis that the label would likely
deceive or mislead, are dismissed.

Hence, the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint is granted.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this motion, ECF No.
28, and close this case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion & Order dated Aug. 22,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4waubxrm from
Leagle.com.


SKYWEST INC: Court Dismisses Hirst Suit Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, ANDREA HIRST, et al., Plaintiffs v. SKYWEST, INC., et
al., Defendants. CHERYL TAPP, et al., Plaintiffs v. SKYWEST, INC.,
et al., Defendants, Case Nos. 15 C 02036, 15 C 11117 (N.D. Ill.),
Judge John J. Tharp, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a
Memorandum Opinion & Order:

   a. granting SkyWest's motion to dismiss in Hirst case;

   b. denying the Plaintiffs' motion to amend and terminating the
      case; and

   c. granting in part and denying in part SkyWest's motion to
      dismiss in Tapp case.

The Plaintiffs in these two lawsuits filed their initial complaints
in 2015. In both cases, the Plaintiffs challenge SkyWest's
"block-time" compensation structure for flight attendants. They
contend that its compensation scheme denied them minimum and
overtime wages.

Andrea Hirst, Molly Stover, and Emily Stroble Sze, the Plaintiffs
in Hirst, all worked as flight attendants out of O'Hare
International Airport and were Illinois-based. The Plaintiffs in
Tapp worked for SkyWest in Arizona, Washington, and California:
Tapp was based in San Francisco, California at the San Francisco
International Airport ("SFO") and Los Angeles, California at Los
Angeles International Airport ("LAX"); Renee Sitavich was based at
O'Hare and SFO; Sarah Hudson was based at Fresno Yosemite
International Airport in California; Brandon Colson was based at
Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport in Arizona; and Brüno
Lozano was based in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, O'Hare, LAX, and SFO and
Seattle, Washington at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport
("SEA").

Initially, both complaints challenged SkyWest's block-time
compensation structure under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")
and applicable states' laws. SkyWest pays its flight attendants
based on the block time they worked -- the time spent on the
airplane with the cabin door closed -- rather than for the total
hours worked. In Hirst, the Court initially dismissed the FLSA
claims without prejudice and the claims under the Illinois Minimum
Wage Law ("IMWL") with prejudice. It granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for reconsideration in part, converting the dismissal of the IMWL
claims to a dismissal without prejudice. The Court granted leave to
amend in both cases, SkyWest moved to dismiss the new complaints,
and dismissed all of the claims in both lawsuits.

The Plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims but
reinstated their state law claims. The parties filed petitions for
writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, and
this Court stayed the proceedings until the Supreme Court denied
the petitions, which it did on June 24, 2019. The Court then
directed the parties to complete supplemental briefing on the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the state law claims. The parties
re-briefed the motion to dismiss those claims; the Plaintiffs also
filed motions to amend both complaints. The Court considers the
Plaintiffs' motions to amend in conjunction with SkyWest's motions
to dismiss.

As to the Hirst Plaintiffs' Illinois claims, they allege that
SkyWest failed to pay them the state's minimum wage and failed to
pay them overtime according to Illinois law. SkyWest contends that
the Plaintiffs fell far short of plausibly alleging either claim.

Judge Tharp agrees. He opines that the Plaintiffs fail to cite a
week in which SkyWest paid a single plaintiff less than the minimum
wage in Illinois. They fail to plausibly allege that SkyWest paid
them less than the minimum wage in Illinois in violation of the
IMWL. They also fail to allege any specific workweek in their
proposed amended complaint, and the amendment is therefore futile
as to this claim. Hence, the plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege
any facts to state a claim for relief under Illinois law.

As to the Tapp Plaintiffs' Arizona claims, Judge Tharp opines that
Colson fails to state overtime and minimum wage claims under
Arizona law. The Plaintiffs cannot allege that SkyWest owed Mr.
Colson overtime wages under FLSA because FLSA exempts airlines from
paying overtime wages. Even if he could allege SkyWest failed to
pay him overtime, his claim is barred by the statute of
limitations. Thus, Mr. Colson has not stated a claim that SkyWest
failed to pay him the minimum wage in Arizona.

None of the Plaintiffs' proposed amendments address either problem.
Of course, the Plaintiffs' proposed amendments can do nothing about
the statute of limitations bar. The Plaintiffs do not provide any
proposed amendments that allege that SkyWest paid Mr. Colson less
than Arizona's minimum wage in any particular workweek. As a
result, Mr. Colson fails to plausibly allege that he was paid less
than the state minimum wage in violation of Arizona law. The motion
to dismiss, therefore, must be granted as to the Arizona claims.

As to the Tapp Plaintiffs' Washington claims, SkyWest argues that
Mr. Lozano cannot rely on the Washington Minimum Wage Act because
the complaint alleges that Mr. Lozano is a Michigan resident. Judge
Tharp holds that the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Mr.
Lozano was a Washington-based employee protected by the Washington
Minimum Wage Act.

SkyWest also contends that Mr. Lozano's overtime claim fails
because he did not allege any week when he worked over 40 hours in
Washington. But, Judge Tharp holds that for his overtime claim to
survive this motion to dismiss, Mr. Lozano needs to allege that he
worked in excess of 40 hours in a given week as a Washington-based
employee, and he did so.

Finally, SkyWest argues that Mr. Lozano's claims fail because the
"Plaintiffs do not plead that Lozano in particular worked in excess
of 40 hours while based at SeaTac SEA where such hours were not the
result of a shift trade." Judge Tharp holds that the Washington
Minimum Wage Act exempts overtime hours that were voluntarily
worked as a part of a shift trading practice. Demanding that the
Plaintiffs anticipate this affirmative defense with specific facts
asks too much at the motion to dismiss stage. Further, SkyWest
recognizes that the Plaintiffs acknowledge the exception and allege
that they were denied overtime wages for hours over 40 hours per
week "except where the excess hours were worked voluntarily after a
shift trade." Although that allegation seems general, it is a
factual allegation regarding when SkyWest failed to pay overtime.
At the motion to dismiss stage the Court must accept that fact as
true, and the Plaintiffs' allegations suffice. In short, SkyWest's
motion is denied as to Mr. Lozano.

With respect to the Tapp Plaintiffs' California claims, they assert
three claims: (1) that SkyWest underpaid them based on California's
minimum wage law and local ordinances, (2) that SkyWest failed to
pay overtime as required by California law, and (3) that SkyWest
failed to provide them with itemized wage statements as required by
state law. In support of these claims, they also assert that they
are entitled to waiting time penalties as a result of unpaid
minimum wages and overtime and that SkyWest's alleged failure to
comply with California labor law violates the California Unfair
Competition Law ("UCL").

As to state law, Judge Tharp opines that (i) all of the
California-based plaintiffs have alleged that they worked some
below-minimum-wage hours, with some uncompensated hours in
California; (ii) given that the Court found that SkyWest's
challenges to the minimum wage law theory fail -- i.e., that the
wage and overtime claims of the California Plaintiffs survive under
at least one legal theory -- Rule 12(b)(6) provides no basis to
eliminate other theories that may not warrant relief on the claims;
and (iii) the Plaintiffs are not required to anticipate affirmative
defenses and it would be improper to resolve the affirmative
defense at this stage. Judge Tharp, therefore, declines to dismiss
the Plaintiffs' claim on the basis of SkyWest's affirmative defense
of good faith.

As to local law, although the Plaintiffs did fail to address
arguments about their local law theories in their supplemental
response to SkyWest's motion, dismissal of those theories is not
authorized by Rule 12(b)(6), Judge Tharp finds. He says the
California Plaintiffs' claim that SkyWest underpaid them; the
Plaintiffs assert both state and local legal theories to support
that claim. As long as the facts alleged plausibly entitle the
Plaintiffs to relief under one of the theories asserted, the Court
cannot dismiss alternative legal theories at the motion to dismiss
stage. Thus, SkyWest's motion to dismiss in Tapp to the extent that
it seeks dismissal of legal theories under local law is denied.

Finally, the Plaintiffs in both cases seek to add new class
allegations that they who worked periodically in California -- but
were based elsewhere -- were underpaid based on California's
minimum wage provision. SkyWest contends that these amendments
would be both prejudicial and futile. Judge Tharp agrees. Under
these circumstances, he declines to apply California's minimum wage
provision to non-residents who only work in California for brief
and episodic periods.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Tharp grants SkyWest's motion to
dismiss in Hirst, grants in part and denies in part the Plaintiffs'
motion to amend, and terminates the case. He also grants in part
and denies in part SkyWest's motion to dismiss in Tapp. He
dismisses the Plaintiffs' Arizona claims, but their Washington and
California claims survive the motion to dismiss. Judge Tharp denies
the Plaintiffs' motion to amend.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 31, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y4d5zzv6 from
Leagle.com.


SNAP INC: Nov. 5 BIPA Settlement Claims Filing Deadline Set
-----------------------------------------------------------
Polarbear reports that earlier this year, two Illinois residents
alleged in a lawsuit that Snapchat was violating a state privacy
law by scanning and storing faceprints. On May 11, attorney James
C. Vlahakis, of the Sulaiman Law Group, of suburban Lombard, filed
suit in Chicago federal court against Snap Inc. The class-action
lawsuit was filed on behalf of named plaintiffs Maribel Ocampo and
Adrian Coss.

The 33-page complaint alleged that Lenses feature by Snapchat
violates the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act.

Snapchat has agreed to pay $35 million to Illinois residents who
used the app's "lenses" or "filters" features between Nov. 17,
2015, and today. Illinois residents wishing to receive part of the
settlement must submit a claim by Nov. 5. Claims can be filed at
snapillinoisbipasettlement.com.

Snap spokesperson Pete Boogaard, said:

While we are confident that Lenses do not violate BIPA, out of an
abundance of caution and as a testament to our commitment to user
privacy, earlier this year we rolled out an in-app consent notice
for Snapchatters in Illinois.

Recently, about 1.42 million Illinois Facebook users received
settlement checks of up to $400 for collecting and storing
"biometric data" without consent. Google has also agreed to pay
$100 million to end the claims against them, related to face scans
in the Google Photos app. [GN]

SPIRIT AIRLINES: Proposed Class Suit Alleges Denied FMLA Benefits
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Corrado Rizzi at classaction.org reports that a former Spirit
Airlines flight attendant alleges in a proposed class action that
the carrier has enforced family and medical leave policies that are
"facially inconsistent" with the federal Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA).

Under the FMLA, certain employees are entitled to take unpaid,
job-protected leave for specified family and medical reasons, the
17-page lawsuit explains. Flight attendants in particular must hit
a certain "hours of service" requirement in order to be entitled to
FMLA leave, per the case.

Specifically, a flight attendant will meet the law's
hours-of-service requirement if, during the previous 12 months,
they have worked or been paid for not less than 60 percent of their
applicable monthly guarantee, or worked or been paid for not less
than 504 hours, the lawsuit relays. Moreover, the law requires that
FLMA leave eligibility must be calculated using an employee's "duty
hours," i.e., all hours worked within the past 12 months, including
time spent performing a variety of support tasks that begin before
a plane takes off and end after it lands, the case says.

The complaint alleges Spirit has wrongfully required flight
attendants to maintain 520 credit hours within the previous 12
months in order to be eligible for FMLA leave, higher than the 504
hours required by the law. Further, the "credit hours" Spirit uses
to calculate a flight attendant's FMLA service requirement include
only "block-to-block time"-that is, the period of time beginning
when an aircraft first moves for a flight and ending when the
aircraft is next secured with blocks at a ramp or unloading point,
the lawsuit states.

Because Spirit's FMLA hours requirement is based on block-to-block
time rather than duty hours, the airline fails to account for the
time flight attendants work pre- and post-flight, a minimum of 80
to 90 minutes per flight, the suit says.

"As a result, this policy effectively interferes with, restrains,
or denies the exercise of or the attempt to exercise the FMLA
benefits by Plaintiff and the Class," the filing alleges.

The suit also alleges Spirit has wrongfully provided eligible
flight attendants with up to 12 workweeks of paid FMLA leave in a
12-month period, even though the law stipulates that they're
entitled to up to 72 days of FMLA leave during any 12-month period.
Similarly, although Spirit allows eligible flight attendants to
take up to 26 workweeks of FMLA leave in a 12-month period to care
for a covered service member with a serious injury, the FMLA allows
for 156 days for the care of a covered service member during a
12-month period, the suit says.

Finally, the lawsuit claims that although Spirit requires flight
attendants to report FMLA leave no later than three business days
after their leave starts, the FMLA allows workers to report leave
within three days "or as soon as practicable."

The case looks to cover all current and former flight attendants
who were employed by Spirit and based in the United States at any
time within the last three years and until the final date of
judgment in the lawsuit. [GN]

STATE FARM: Files 4th Cir. Appeal in Elegant Massage Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, et al., appeals
from a court ruling entered in the lawsuit entitled ELEGANT
MASSAGE, LLC d/b/a LIGHT STREAM SPA, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY and STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY, Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-265, in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia at
Norfolk.

As previously reported, the Plaintiff purchased an insurance policy
from State Farm. The Policy issued to Plaintiff is an "all risk"
commercial property insurance policy, which covers loss or damage
to the covered premises resulting from all risks other than those
expressly excluded. The Policy was effective from July 22, 2019
until July 22, 2020 and Plaintiff paid an annual premium of
$475.00. The Policy includes coverage for "Loss of Income and Extra
Expense," the standard form for which is identified as CMP-4705.1.
Under the provision, the Policy provides for the loss of business
income sustained as a result of the suspension of business
operations which includes action of a civil authority that
prohibits access to the Plaintiffs business property.

On May 27, 2020, the Plaintiff filed the instant suit. On July 21,
2020, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. In its Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff stated that Elegant Massage has owned and
operated Light Stream Spa since 2016, which provides therapeutic
massages in Virginia Beach, Virginia.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Hon. Judge Raymond
Jackson entered an order on February 11, 2022, which, among other
things, granted the Plaintiff's Motion for class certification of a
class comprised of:

      "All persons or entities in the Commonwealth of Virginia
      wit a Businessowners insurance policy issued by State Farm
      on Form CMP-4100, including a Loss of Income and Extra
      Expense endorsement on Form CMP 4705.1 or CMP 4705.2, in
      effect at any time betyween March 23, 2020 and June 30,
      2020 (the Closure Period), that were subject to partial or
      full business suspension under the Orders and submitted
      claims for business income losses and/or extra expenses
      incurred during the Closure Period that were denied by the
      Defendants."

On Feb. 23, 2022, the Defendants sought a review of this ruling in
the appellate case styled State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company v. Elegant Massage, LLC, Case No. 22-119, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

This appeal has been transferred from miscellaneous docket 22-119
and is now captioned Elegant Massage, LLC v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, New Case No. 22-1853, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, filed on Aug. 15,
2022.[BN]

Defendants-Appellants STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY and STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY are represented
by:

          Theodore Ira Brenner, Esq.
          FREEBORN & PETERS, LLP
          901 East Byrd Street
          Richmond, VA 23219
          Telephone: (804) 644-1300
          E-mail: tbrenner@freeborn.com

               - and -

          Douglas Webber Dunham, Esq.
          DECHERT, LLP
          3 Battery Park
          1095 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10036-6797
          Telephone: (212) 698-3500

               - and -

          Christina Guerola Sarchio, Esq.
          DECHERT LLP
          1900 K Street NW
          Washington, DC 20006-1110
          Telephone: (202) 261-3465

Plaintiff-Appellee ELEGANT MASSAGE, LLC, d/b/a Light Stream Spa, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, is represented
by:

          Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.
          Melissa L. Troutner, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087-0000
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706

STITCH FIX: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due October 25
--------------------------------------------------------------
ClaimsFiler, a FREE shareholder information service, reminds
investors that they have until October 25, 2022 to file lead
plaintiff applications in a securities class action lawsuit against
Stitch Fix, Inc. (NasdaqGS: SFIX), if they purchased the Company's
shares between December 8, 2020, and March 8, 2022, inclusive (the
"Class Period"). This action is pending in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California.

Get Help
Stitch Fix investors should visit us at
https://claimsfiler.com/cases/nasdaq-sfix-1/ or call toll-free
(844) 367-9658. Lawyers at Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC are available to
discuss your legal options.

                      About the Lawsuit

Stitch Fix and certain of its executives are charged with failing
to disclose material information during the Class Period, violating
federal securities laws.

On December 7, 2021, the Company disclosed the occurrence of "short
term cannibalization" from new customers who chose to use its new
direct-buy Freestyle option rather than the traditional Fix option,
as well as a loss for its first quarter of 2021 and a cut to its
full-year revenue projections. On this news, shares of Stitch Fix
declined by $5.97 per share, or 24%, from $24.97 per share to
$19.00 per share.

Then, on March 8, 2022, the Company disclosed a weak outlook for
the third quarter of 2022 and a cut to its revenue guidance for the
full year, as well as "friction" that had occurred due to customers
visiting stitchfix.com, the primary landing page for customers
interested in the Fix, being redirected to the Freestyle experience
first. On this news, shares of Stitch Fix declined by $0.67 per
share, or 6%, from $11.01 per share to $10.34 per share.

The case is Retail Wholesale Department Store Union Local 338
Retirement Fund v. Stitch Fix, Inc., No. 22-cv-4893.

                     About ClaimsFiler

ClaimsFiler has a single mission: to serve as the information
source to help retail investors recover their share of billions of
dollars from securities class action settlements. At
ClaimsFiler.com, investors can: (1) register for free to gain
access to information and settlement websites for various
securities class action cases so they can timely submit their own
claims; (2) upload their portfolio transactional data to be
notified about relevant securities cases in which they may have a
financial interest; and (3) submit inquiries to the Kahn Swick &
Foti, LLC law firm for free case evaluations. [GN]

STOCKX LLC: Settlement in Canadian Data Breach Suit Wins Final OK
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Detailed information and updates are available on the Settlement
Website at the following address: www.stockxsettlement.ca.  

Proceedings

A Canada-wide Settlement has been reached in a class action
relating to the StockX Data Breach that occurred on May 14, 2019,
when an unknown third-party was able to gain unauthorized access to
certain customer data from StockX's cloud environment.

On May 2, 2022, the Superior Court of Quebec authorized the Class
Action for settlement purposes only.

On July 11, 2022, the Settlement Agreement was approved by Court.

AM I A SETTLEMENT CLASS MEMBER?
You may be a Settlement Class Member if you live in Canada and
registered for a StockX user account on the StockX website or
mobile application prior to May 14, 2019.

WHAT DOES THIS SETTLEMENT PROVIDE?
Pursuant to the Settlement, an 18-month subscription with
TransUnion for credit monitoring services will be made available
for activation by Settlement Class Members, free of charge.

In addition, substantiated and documented monetary claims totaling
up to an aggregate Settlement Cap of $130,000 CAD for all approved
claims may be reimbursed to Settlement Class Members who provide
evidence of out of pocket losses, costs and/or unreimbursed
expenses which were caused by the Data Breach and/or incurred as a
result of the Data Breach or the receipt of the StockX Notices
(which were sent on August 3 and 8, 2019), as accepted by the
Claims Administrator (at its discretion) pursuant to the
Distribution Protocol attached to the Settlement Agreement.

StockX will also pay Class Counsel Fees, administration costs and
expenses, as well as all notice costs above and beyond of the said
Settlement Cap payable to Settlement Class Members.

HOW DO I SUBMIT A CLAIM?
To submit a claim, you must, no later than December 7, 2022:

Complete a Claim Form online at www.stockxsettlement.ca; or  
Obtain a Claim Form in paper format from the website or the Claims
Administrator, complete it and send it by email or by mail to the
Claims Administrator.
HOW CAN I GET MORE INFORMATION?
The Settlement Agreement and further detailed information,
including relevant judgments, are on the Settlement Website at
www.stockxsettlement.ca.

WHO IS THE CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR?
MNP Ltd c/o Rick Anderson
1500, 640 - 5th Avenue SW
Calgary, AB, T2P 3G4
stockxsettlement@mnp.ca
1-877-410-9008

WHO REPRESENTS THE SETTLEMENT CLASS MEMBERS?

LEX GROUP INC.
c/o Mtre David Assor
www.lexgroup.ca

Please note that in case of any discrepancy between the terms of
this Notice and the Settlement Agreement, the terms of the
Settlement Agreement shall prevail. Any term not defined in this
Settlement Approval Notice shall have the meaning ascribed in the
Settlement Agreement.

The publication of this Notice has been ordered by the Superior
Court of Quebec.[GN]

TOTAL STAFFING: Agrees to Settle Wage-and-Hour Suit for $250,000
-----------------------------------------------------------------
topclassactions.com reports that Total Staffing Solutions will pay
$250,000 to resolve claims it violated Illinois wage-and-hour laws
by failing to pay earned vacation pay.

The settlement benefits current and former employees of Total
Staffing Solutions in Illinois who worked between 200 and 1,800
hours of compensated work during any calendar year between Jan. 1
and Dec. 31, 2017, and who did not receive a pro rata share of
Total Staffing Solutions vacation pay plan for this period.

Total Staffing Solutions is a staffing company that offers
temporary, temp-to-hire and direct-hire placements for its clients.
The company also provides employment-related services such as
background checks, drug screening and safety orientations.

According to a class action lawsuit against the company, Total
Staffing Solutions violates the Illinois Wage Payment and
Collection Act (IWPCA) by failing to pay its employees all the
vacation pay they earned while working. Under the company's former
policy, employees were allegedly entitled to a pro rata share of
Total Staffing Solutions' vacation pay plan. The company has since
stopped using this vacation policy.

Total Staffing Solutions hasn't admitted any wrongdoing but agreed
to resolve these allegations with a $250,000 class action
settlement.

Under the terms of the settlement, class members can receive a cash
payment based on the number of hours they worked during the class
period.

Each hour worked will result in an estimated payment of $0.04,
though hourly payments could be as high as $0.19. For example, if
an employee worked 1,500 hours during the class period, their
payment would be around $60 based on $0.04 hourly payments, or $285
based on $0.19 hourly payments.

Payments from the settlement will be considered statutory damages
for tax purposes and will result in a 1099 tax form. Class members
may wish to consult with a tax professional about these payments.

The deadline for exclusion and objection is Oct. 31, 2022.

The final approval hearing for the Total Staffing Solutions
settlement is scheduled for Dec. 14, 2022.

In order to receive settlement benefits, class members must submit
a valid claim form by Oct. 31, 2022.

Who's Eligible
The settlement benefits current and former employees of Total
Staffing Solutions in Illinois who worked between 200 and 1,800
hours of compensated work during any calendar year between Jan. 1
and Dec. 31, 2017, and who did not receive a pro rata share of
Total Staffing Solutions vacation pay plan for this period.

Potential Award
Varies

Proof of Purchase
No proof of purchase applicable

Claim Form
CLICK HERE TO FILE A CLAIM »
NOTE: If you do not qualify for this settlement do NOT file a
claim.

Remember: you are submitting your claim under penalty of perjury.
You are also harming other eligible Class Members by submitting a
fraudulent claim. If you're unsure if you qualify, please read the
FAQ section of the Settlement Administrator's website to ensure you
meet all standards (Top Class Actions is not a Settlement
Administrator). If you don't qualify for this settlement, check out
our database of other open class action settlements you may be
eligible for.

Claim Form Deadline
10/31/2022

Case Name
Maldonado, et al. v. Total Staffing Solutions, Inc., Case No. 2017
CH 01786, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois County
Department, Chancery Division

Final Hearing
12/14/2022

Settlement Website
Total-Settlement.com

Claims Administrator
Maldonado v Total Staffing Solutions, Inc.
c/o Atticus Administration
PO Box 64053
St. Paul, MN 55164
TotalSettlement@atticusadmin.com
888-220-6629

Class Counsel
Christopher J Williams
WORKERS LAW OFFICE PC

Defense Counsel
Danielle Gould
Christopher E Kentra
BURKE WARREN MACKAY & SERRITELLA PC[GN]

TRITERRAS INC: $9-Mil. Deal in Securities Class Suit Wins Final OK
------------------------------------------------------------------
Triterras Inc., a leading fintech company focused on trade and
trade finance, reported that on September 8, 2022 the Company
received final court approval to settle the securities class action
lawsuit under the caption Erlandson v. Triterras, Inc., et al.
(Civil Action No. 7:20-cv-10795-CS (S.D.N.Y.)). The settlement
resolves all claims asserted against the Company and the other
named defendants without any admission of liability or wrongdoing
by the Company or any other defendant. Pursuant to the settlement,
the Company made a $9 million payment, of which $4.25 million is
expected to be covered by insurance payments.

                     About Triterras

Triterras is a global fintech company co-headquartered in Singapore
and Dubai and leading innovator of inclusive finance solutions for
the world's micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). The
company launched and operates Kratos(TM) - one of the world's
largest digital financing platforms - to directly connect MSMEs
with lenders online and source capital across commodity trading,
supply chain, logistics, and ecommerce finance. [GN]

TUSIMPLE HOLDINGS: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due Oct. 31
------------------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") reminds investors of the
upcoming October 31, 2022 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion
in the class action filed on behalf of TuSimple Holdings Inc.
("TuSimple" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: TSP) investors who: (a)
purchased common stock pursuant and/or traceable to the
Registration Statement and Prospectus (collectively, the
"Registration Statement") issued in connection with the Company's
April 15, 2021 initial public offering ("IPO") and/or (b) purchased
securities between April 15, 2021 and August 1, 2022, inclusive
(the "Class Period").

If you suffered a loss on your TuSimple investments or would like
to inquire about potentially pursuing claims to recover your loss
under the federal securities laws, you can submit your contact
information at www.glancylaw.com/cases/tusimple-holdings-inc/. You
can also contact Charles H. Linehan, of GPM at 310-201-9150,
Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, or via email at
shareholders@glancylaw.com to learn more about your rights.

On April 15, 2021, TuSimple conducted its IPO, selling 33.8 million
class A common shares at $40.00 per share.

On August 1, 2022, The Wall Street Journal published an article
bringing to light a number of previously undisclosed concerns
regarding the Company's autonomously driven trucks, alleging, among
other things, that an accident involving a truck fitted with
TuSimple's autonomous driving technology "underscores concerns that
the autonomous-trucking company is risking safety on public roads
in a rush to deliver driverless trucks to market, according to
independent analysts and more than a dozen of the company's former
employees."

On this news, TuSimple's stock fell $0.97, or 9.7%, to close at
$8.99 per share on August 1, 2022, thereby injuring investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to investors
that: (1) TuSimple's commitment to safety was significantly
overstated and Defendants concealed fundamental problems with the
Company's technology; (2) TuSimple was rushing the testing of its
autonomous driving technology in order to deliver driverless trucks
to the market ahead of its more safety-conscious competitors; (3)
there was a corporate culture within TuSimple that suppressed or
ignored safety concerns in favor of unrealistically ambitious
testing and delivery schedules; (4) the aforementioned conduct made
accidents involving the Company's autonomous driving technology
more likely; (5) the aforementioned conduct invited enhanced
regulatory scrutiny and investigatory action toward the Company;
and (6) as a result, Defendants' positive statements about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired TuSimple securities during
the Class Period, you may move the Court no later than October 31,
2022 to request appointment as lead plaintiff in this putative
class action lawsuit. To be a member of the class action you need
not take any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your
choice or take no action and remain an absent member of the class
action. If you wish to learn more about this class action, or if
you have any questions concerning this announcement or your rights
or interests with respect to the pending class action lawsuit,
please contact Charles Linehan, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park
East, Suite 2100, Los Angeles, California 90067 at 310-201-9150,
Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com,
or visit our website at www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email
please include your mailing address, telephone number and number of
shares purchased.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules. [GN]

UNITED SERVICES: Settles Class Action Over Auto Insurance Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
Insurance Journal reports that another national insurance company
has agreed to settle a class-action lawsuit alleging it underpaid
hundreds of auto insurance claims.

A federal court in Mississippi in August signed off on a
confidential settlement in a suit brought by Mississippi drivers
against San Antonio-based United Services Automobile Association
(USAA). The terms of the settlement were not disclosed. The
agreement came just days after U.S. District Judge Sharion Aycock
refused to dismiss the suit.

It's unlikely that each class member will receive more than a few
hundred dollars in the settlement. The plaintiffs have said that
USAA failed to pay actual cash value for vehicles totaled in
accidents, as required by comprehensive and collision policies. But
in most claims, the payments may have left out only license and
registration fees, taxes and dealer fees, the amended complaint
reads.

"Taken together, the average vehicle incurs approximately $571.00
in license fees," the complaint noted.

The suit said that the Mississippi Department of Insurance in 2007
put out a bulletin notifying insurers that in total losses,
carriers must include license fees, taxes, and title fees in their
payouts to insureds.

USAA, which insures members of the military, their families and
veterans, argued in court briefs last year that the plaintiffs had
misinterpreted the policy language and had misconstrued "a
limitation of liability as a promise to pay."

"Nowhere in the policy does USAA promise to pay taxes and dealer
fees in the event of a total loss," a USAA brief said. "Nor was
USAA contractually obligated to pay 'ACV.' Plaintiff confuses his
policy's insuring agreement -- which defines USAA's obligation to
pay for loss -- with the policy's limit of liability -- which is
the limit, or most, that USAA will pay for a given loss."

The suit is one of several class actions or regulatory actions
around the country alleging insurers have underpaid property claims
by one method or another.

GEICO in May was hit with a similar class-action suit in Georgia,
accusing it of underestimating taxes in total vehicle losses,
according to news reports.

The state insurance commissioner last spring had raised the same
issue and directed auto insurers to stop under-calculating tax
amounts for totaled vehicles. Some carriers were paying the actual
value of the vehicle but basing the sales tax, also owed to the
insurer, on a lower value, calculated from a combination of retail
and wholesale prices.

State Farm Insurance in July settled an Alabama lawsuit that
charged it had depreciated the cost of labor on home repairs, which
is not allowed by Alabama law. The depreciation in many cases
brought the payout below the policies' deductible amount, leaving
insureds with no recovery, the suit alleged.

In March, policyholders in Illinois filed a class-action lawsuit
against State Farm Automobile Insurance, charging that the insurer
applied a "typical negotiation adjustment" to improperly reduce the
value of a car deemed a total loss.

Some of the suits are still in litigation, but others have not been
successful. USAA's court filing in the Mississippi suit notes that
in two cases brought by the same plaintiffs' attorneys, a federal
appeals court ruled in favor of the insurer. The U.S. 7th Circuit
Court of Appeals in Illinois in 2021 upheld the dismissal of claims
over missing sales tax because the plaintiff had mistaken a
liability ceiling for a floor, USAA said.

USAA officials could not be reached for comment on the Mississippi
class action. Three of attorneys in the case are based in Florida.
[GN]

UNITED STATES: Class Action Against Trump-Era Medicaid Rule Amended
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Christine Stuart, writing for CTNews Junkie, reports that
low-income disabled and older adults in Connecticut, Delaware, and
Nebraska filed an amended complaint on Aug. 26 that seeks
nationwide class-action status to protect against a Trump
administration rule regarding Medicaid.

The rule requires states to trim their Medicaid rolls as a
condition of receiving additional funds to combat the COVID-19
pandemic. Attorney's for the plaintiffs say it's a clear violation
of Congress' mandate to ensure continued access to Medicaid-funded
health care throughout the ongoing public health emergency.

One new plaintiff, a 65-year-old Nebraska woman, lost access to
full Medicaid services in the midst of cancer treatment because she
turned 65. She was notified in December of 2021 she was losing
access to Medicaid even though the state had recently notified her
in June of that year that she remained eligible.

Since her full Medicaid services have been terminated, she cannot
afford required Medicare co-insurance payments for her doctor
visits or to pay for dental care (not covered at all by Medicare)
out-of-pocket, and she has forgone treatment for some conditions
and is concerned about accruing even more medical debt for others.

Another new plaintiff, a 73-year-old woman in Delaware, lives
entirely on her small Social Security benefits. She has multiple
long-term serious health issues including rheumatoid arthritis
(RA), COPD, high blood pressure, and an artery occlusion. In March
of this year, she was notified by the state that she would no
longer qualify for this program because the Social Security Cost of
Living Adjustment put her $1 over the limit. It is now difficult to
afford the regular infusions to treat her RA that her doctor
recommends, which are $478 per treatment. A scan this past spring
showed possible cancer in her lungs, and her pulmonologist
recommends further screening, but she cannot afford this.

The original lawsuit was filed in U.S. District Court in
Connecticut by three Connecticut plaintiffs in early August citing
the impact of the rule on at least 6,600 plaintiffs in the state
who lost access to Medicaid benefits as a result of the rule. Two
of the three plaintiffs received a temporary reprieve when the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services temporarily restored
benefits pending a court hearing which is scheduled for Sept. 27.

The proposed nationwide class consists of all individuals who were
enrolled in Medicaid in any state or the District of Columbia on
March 18, 2020 or later and had their Medicaid eligibility
terminated or reduced to a lower level of benefits on or after
November 6, 2020, or will have their Medicaid eligibility
terminated or reduced to a lower level of benefits prior to a
redetermination conducted after the end of the Public Health
Emergency, for a reason other than moving out of the state or the
District (including through death) or voluntarily disenrolling from
benefits.

The plaintiffs are represented by Disability Rights Connecticut,
Justice in Aging, The National Health Law Program (NHeLP) and the
law firm Stinson LLP. [GN]

UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE: Seeks to File Response Under Seal in Russo
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as HANNAH RUSSO, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. UNIVERSITY OF
DELAWARE, Case No. 20-cv-1693-SB (D. Del.), the Defendant moves for
leave to file their Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification, together with the Declaration of James D. Taylor,
Jr. and its accompanying exhibits, under seal.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Aug. 26, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Rjx3gV at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James D. Taylor, Jr., Esq.
          Marisa R. De Feo, Esq.
          Juliana G. Clifton, Esq.
          SAUL EWING ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP
          1201 N. Market Street, Suite 2300
          Wilmington, DE 19801
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VIRGIN ISLANDS: 3rd Cir. Nixes Denial of Duncan's Class Cert. Bid
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In the case, JENNIFER DUNCAN, Appellant v. GOVERNOR OF THE VIRGIN
ISLANDS; KIRK CALLWOOD, SR., Department of Finance; DIRECTOR VIRGIN
ISLANDS BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE; GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN
ISLANDS, Case No. 21-3024 (3d Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit vacates the order denying Duncan's motion for
class certification and remands for further consideration.

Ms. Duncan brought a putative class-action lawsuit against the
Government of the Virgin Islands and certain of its high-ranking
officials (collectively, the "Territory"), seeking to end what
Duncan describes as the Territory's practice of delaying income tax
refund checks for most taxpayers but expediting refunds for certain
favored taxpayers and government employees.

Ms. Duncan makes no secret of what inspired her lawsuit. It was a
similar class action against the Government of Guam. In Paeste v.
Government of Guam, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary
judgment to Guam taxpayers in their class-action lawsuit against
the territorial government. Struggling with budget deficits, Guam
had excessively withheld income taxes to support government
spending, rather than refunding the excess taxes. Some taxpayers
got their refunds, however, through an "expedited refund" process
that devolved into arbitrariness and favoritism. The Ninth Circuit
held that the challenged process violated the Organic Act of Guam
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As
Duncan emphasizes, the district court in Paeste certified a class
of taxpayers who were entitled to, but did not receive, timely tax
refunds.

Having been inspired by the Paeste litigation, Duncan brought her
action seeking to cause systemic change" in the Virgin Islands
income tax collection practices, those taxes being the Territory's
largest source of revenue. In her original class-action complaint,
filed in August 2018, Duncan alleged that the Territory owed
taxpayers at least $97,849,992.74 in refunds for the years 2007
through 2017. She also alleged that, for the years 2011 through
2017, the Territory failed to comply with the requirement in title
33, section 1102(b) of the Virgin Islands Code, that the Territory
set aside ten percent of collected income taxes for the purpose of
paying refunds. As a consequence, she said, the Territory left
underfunded by more than $150 million the required reserve for
meeting those obligations.

Shortly after filing her original complaint, Duncan moved for class
certification. The District Court ordered class discovery, during
which Duncan deposed Marcella Somersall, a recently retired
employee of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue who was
"familiar with the process of expedited refunds." Somersall
explained that the Bureau makes expedited refunds available on an
ad hoc basis to taxpayers experiencing a hardship, such as a
medical emergency or home displacement, if they write a letter
requesting an expedited refund. The director of the Bureau reviews
each request and decides whether to approve or reject it. That
decision is not subject to further review.

According to Somersall, the existence of the expedited refund
process has not been made public, and at least some procedures for
approving and denying requests are not written down. She also
testified that refunds were expedited automatically, without a
request, for all Bureau employees and for the employees at the
Department of Finance who processed refund checks, as a "test to
make sure that the files that went to Finance were correct."

Armed with Somersall's deposition testimony, Duncan filed the
now-operative First Amended Class Action Complaint (the "Amended
Complaint"). In general, that pleading alleges that the Territory
failed to timely pay income tax refunds to nearly all taxpayers,
while secretly allowing expedited refunds for certain taxpayers,
including all Bureau employees and some Department of Finance
employees.

The Amended Complaint sets forth five causes of action:

     1. A refund action, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C.) Section
7422 and title 33, section 1692 of the Virgin Islands Code;

     2. A petition for a writ of mandamus ordering the commissioner
of the Department of Finance and the director of the Bureau to set
aside ten percent of income taxes for refunds, as required by title
33, section 1102(b) of the Virgin Islands Code;

     3. A request for declaratory and injunctive relief based on
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment by delaying refunds to
taxpayers generally while creating a separate class of taxpayers
given expedited refunds;

     4. A request for declaratory and injunctive relief based on
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment by automatically expediting
refunds for all Bureau employees and some Department of Finance
employees; and

     5. A request for declaratory and injunctive relief based on
violations of the Virgin Islands' equivalent of the Administrative
Procedure Act, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 3, Sections 911 et seq., by
creating an expedited refund process outside of the prescribed
rulemaking process.

The Amended Complaint also spells out the following proposed class:
All persons and entities who: (a) have filed a timely claim for
refund of an overpayment of the Virgin Islands Territorial Income
Tax for any tax year from at least 2003 to the present, (b) have
not been given by the USVI or the Bureau, via certified or
registered mail, a timely notice of disallowance of such claims,
and (c) have not been paid such refunds by the USVI.

Following the close of class discovery, the District Court denied
Duncan's motion to certify the proposed class. In its analysis of
the prerequisites for class certification set out in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(a), it concluded that Duncan had met the
first two: numerosity, because the proposed class consists of
24,364 individuals and 49 corporations; and commonality, because
the question of whether the Territory has been delinquent in paying
income tax refunds is common to the class.

The Court held, however, that Duncan failed to meet the typicality
prerequisite under Rule 23(a)(3) because she had received a refund
check. Even though Duncan disagreed with the refund amount and did
not cash the check, her dispute with the Territory had become one
about calculation, not about nonpayment, the Court said, and so her
claim was different from those of the rest of the class. The Court
also decided, in the context of its typicality analysis, that
Duncan lacked Article III standing to pursue her claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief. It determined that she could not
rely on the Virgin Islands' taxpayer-suit statute, V.I. Code Ann.
tit. 5, Section 80, to establish standing, because standing in
federal court is determined by federal law.

Ms. Duncan likewise failed to convince the District Court that she
was an adequate representative under Rule 23(a)(4). The Court cited
three reasons for that conclusion. First, it said that, although
Duncan declared her "interests to be perfectly aligned with those
of the absent class members," that assertion was unsupported by any
evidence. Second, it noted that Duncan focused on the adequacy of
her lawyers to represent the class, which is a separate issue
governed by Rule 23(g), and she did not address the concern with
her own adequacy to represent the class. Third, in keeping with its
analysis of the typicality prerequisite, the Court said that
Duncan's receipt of a refund check presented "significant
questions" as to whether her interests were aligned with those of
the class.

Because the Court concluded that Duncan failed to meet all four
prerequisites under Rule 23(a), it declined to reach the issue of
what type of class to certify under Rule 23(b). Duncan then
petitioned us pursuant to Rule 23(f) for leave to appeal the
District Court's denial of class certification. The Third Circuit
granted the petition.

On appeal, Duncan argues that the District Court abused its
discretion in denying her motion for class certification.

The Third Circuit notes that the interlocutory appeal of the
District Court's denial of class certification hinges largely on
the legal effect of a single fact: Duncan's receipt of a refund
check from the Territory during the pendency of her lawsuit. The
District Court held that the refund check, while not in the amount
Duncan says she is owed, called into question Duncan's standing to
press certain claims and made all of her claims atypical of the
claims of the putative class. It also held that Duncan failed to
meet her burden of proving that she was an adequate representative
of the class.

The Third Circuit opines that although the District Court's
handling of the class-certification dispute was thoughtful, it
disagrees with the District Court's conclusion that the
mid-litigation refund check deprived Duncan of standing and
rendered all of her claims atypical. And, in evaluating whether
Duncan was an adequate representative, the District Court applied a
legal standard inconsistent with their precedent.

A district court need not accept as true, for example, a putative
class representative's bare allegation that there is an "alignment
of interests and incentives between the representative plaintiffs
and the rest of the class," or, as in the present case, Duncan's
argument that "there are no intra-class conflicts." But a court
ought to examine the documents bearing directly on how the class is
drawn, what the complaint asserts to be the operative facts, and
what relief is sought (in addition to any other information or
evidence bearing on whether there is a conflict of interest), and
then make an independent finding on whether the interests of that
class, more likely than not, are aligned with the putative class
representative.

The Third Circuit, therefore, vacates the order denying Duncan's
motion for class certification and remands for the District Court
to reconsider whether Duncan has established that she is an
adequate representative of the proposed class.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 31, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2m9y2nnx from Leagle.com.

Joseph A. DiRuzzo, III -- jd@diruzzolaw.com -- [ARGUED] Alexander
Golubitsky, Daniel M. Lader, DiRuzzo & Company, 401 East Las Olas
Blvd., Suite 1400, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301, Counsel for
the Appellant.

Kenneth Case, Aquannette Chinnery-Montell, Ian S.A. Clement
[ARGUED], Ariel M. Smith-Francois, Office of Attorney General of
Virgin Islands, Department of Justice, 34-38 Kronprindsens Gade,
GERS Complex, 2nd Floor, in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands 00802,
Counsel for the Appellees.


WAUPACA ELEVATOR: Court Refuses to Stay Proceedings in Tis Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Terrence W. Boyle of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, Southern Division, denies the
Defendant's motion to stay proceedings in the lawsuit entitled
WILLIAM and ELIZABETH TIS, et al., Plaintiffs v. WAUPACA ELEVATOR
COMPANY, INC., Defendant, Case No. 7:21-CV-200-BO (E.D.N.C.).

The Plaintiffs initiated the putative class action by filing a
complaint on Nov. 19, 2021. They allege claims arising from of the
free fall and crash of home elevators, which were manufactured and
produced by the Defendant; specifically claims for negligent
misrepresentation, fraud by omission, and unfair and deceptive
trade practices. The Plaintiffs seek both declaratory and
injunctive relief, as well as damages. Prior to filing an answer or
otherwise responding to the complaint, the Defendant filed the
instant motion seeking a stay of all proceedings in this case.

On Dec. 28, 2021, the Defendant entered into receivership
proceedings in the Circuit Court of Outagamie County, Wisconsin, In
re Waupaca Elevator Company, Inc., No. 21 CV 000994 (Wis. Dec. 28,
2021). The receivership was approved by the Outagamie County court
following the Defendant's voluntary entry into receivership for the
benefit of the debtor's creditors as provided in Chapter 128 of the
Wisconsin Statutes. The Outagamie County court's order provides
that all creditors and claimants of the Defendant are immediately
enjoined and restrained from prosecuting any action or proceedings
against the Defendant, and from continuing to prosecute any action
or proceeding currently pending against the Defendant.

Although a receivership under Wisconsin state law is not binding on
the Court, the Defendant asks the Court to stay this action for the
duration of the Wisconsin receivership proceeding. The Plaintiffs
oppose a stay.

A district court has inherent authority to manage its docket, which
includes the authority to stay litigation. As the Defendant
recognizes, the Wisconsin state receivership order is not binding
on this Court. The Defendant argues, however, that the Chapter 128
proceedings are sufficiently similar to federal bankruptcy
proceedings such that a stay of this action is appropriate for the
same reasons that a mandatory stay in bankruptcy is imposed
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 362. It further cites the Full Faith
and Credit Act as grounds for a stay.

The Defendant also argues that Burford abstention is appropriate.
Federal courts typically have an unflagging duty to exercise their
jurisdiction to decide cases which are properly before them.

Abstention is not necessary, however, where has been no assertion
that the claims in the federal case are intertwined or entangled
with the issues in the receivership proceeding, Judge Boyle
opines.

As discussed, the Wisconsin court's order imposing a stay is not
binding on this Court. The Court has also declined to stay a
related proceeding, Brackin v. Waupaca Elevator Company, Inc., No.
7:21-CV-94-BO (E.D.N.C. May 24, 2022). Although the named
Plaintiffs to this action have appeared as interested parties in
the Wisconsin receivership proceeding, this remains an appropriate
forum for these Plaintiffs to prosecute their claims, Judge Boyle
points out.

The case was filed prior to the Wisconsin receivership proceeding,
which was entered into voluntarily by the Defendant, Judge Boyle
notes. This distinguishes this case from the Fourth Circuit's
holding in Penn-Pacific. Additionally, the Defendant has not
demonstrated that the Plaintiff's claims brought herein are
intertwined with the issues in the receivership.

Judge Boyle holds that Burford abstention is not required every
time there is a "complex state administrative process" or even
where there is a potential for conflict with state regulatory law
or policy. Finally, the Court has not been presented any state
court judgment which would implicate the Full Faith and Credit
Act.

In sum, the Court has considered the arguments of the parties and,
in its discretion, declines to stay this matter pending the
Wisconsin state receivership proceedings.

For these reasons, the Defendant's motion to stay is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 22, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5fursrfd from Leagle.com.


WHOLE FOODS: Faces Class Action Over "No Antibiotics Ever" Slogan
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Dan Flynn, writing for Food Safety News, reports that Austin-based
Whole Foods Market Inc. likely hasn't been served with the notice
it is being sued; it will likely choose its words carefully when it
does respond.

That's because the complaint against Whole Foods is mostly about
words.

"This consumer fraud action concerns Whole Foods' material
misrepresentations and omissions about the use of antibiotics in
the beef it sells," according to the plaintiffs' filing. "Whole
Foods markets its beef with the slogan, 'No Antibiotics, Ever' and
reinforces this promotional message that its beef is
antibiotic-free with other similar representations at retail
stores, online marketing, and product packaging."

A Portland, OR-based organization campaigning against "factory
farms" is a plaintiff in the lawsuit against Whole Foods. "Farm
Forward" claims that "independent testing." has turned up
antibiotic and other pharmaceutical "residue," making false the
Whole Foods claims that it sells only antibiotic-free beef.

According to the complaint, the "No Antibiotics, Ever" sloganeering
allows Whole Foods to charge premium prices for its beef, ripping
off consumers.

"Consumers overpaid for and were economically harmed as a result of
Whole Foods' misleading promotion of its Beef Products," it says.
"Whole Foods charges -- and consumers pay -- a substantial price
premium for beef products based on the claim that the cattle that
become these Products were not given any antibiotics.

"For instance, Whole Foods charges $31.99 per pound for beef
tenderloin steak filet mignon. A traditional retailer charges only
$24.99 per pound for the same cut of beef. Thus, Whole Foods marks
up the price of this Beef Product by 28 percent in connection with
its antibiotic-free representations.

"Consumer Plaintiffs would not have purchased beef products, or
would not have paid the prices they did, had they had known the
truth that cattle used in the products were raised with
antibiotics."

Individual plaintiffs are Sara Safari, Peymon Khaghani, and Jason
Rose, Whole Foods customers from Orange County, CA. The complaint
seeks certification as a Class Action filing and requests a jury
trial.

While primarily out for economic compensation, the complaint does
raise an important food safety issue.

"Administering routine or subtherapeutic antibiotics to farmed
animals creates serious health risks," the complaint says. "It
contributes to the development of antibiotic-resistant bacteria in
the animals -- bacteria that consumers of the meat eventually
ingest. Once in the human system, these bacteria can cause
infections that cannot be treated with existing antibiotics because
the bacteria are antibiotic-resistant."

The civil action is filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California. It was assigned to the Court's
Southern Division.

Plaintiffs want an injunction requiring Whole Foods to correct and
clarify its "past and ongoing misrepresentations and omissions" and
to remove the misrepresentations or, in the alternative, to ensure
that Whole Foods' beef products conform with how it markets them.

The complaint says Whole Foods has used the "No Antibiotics, Ever"
slogan since 2002. Numerous other allegations and several causes of
action claims are made in the complaint. Whole Foods gets 21 days
after it is served to file its initial response. [GN]

ZINUS INC: Class Action Alleges Injury From "Green Tea Mattress"
----------------------------------------------------------------
Britney Nguyen and Hannah Towey, writing for Business Insider,
report that a woman in Sacramento, California is leading a proposed
class-action lawsuit against Zinus Inc., the maker of the popular
"Green Tea Mattress" that she alleges caused her family of five
serious health issues and resulted in $20,000 in damages.

The proposed class-action suit represents 2,000 individuals from
across the US who say they were harmed by the Zinus mattress. It is
awaiting class certification approval and is one of several suits
being brought against the company.

Vanessa Gutierrez alleged the fiberglass fibers in her Zinus
mattress escaped and caused medical issues "so severe" she had to
"take her infant daughter to multiple medical appointments to
obtain treatment," a July filing says.

She told the Los Angeles Times that she noticed her five-month-old
had "sores and rashes," while her nine-year-old "experienced asthma
flare-ups," according to a feature published by the outlet.

The lawsuit also alleges the glass fibers contaminated the family's
two-bedroom apartment, forcing them to temporarily relocate and
discard clothing, bedding, and furniture worth thousands of
dollars.

According to the Washington State Department of Health, "direct
contact with fiberglass or breathing airborne dust containing
fiberglass may irritate the skin, eyes, nose, and throat," and
continuous exposure can aggravate existing asthma or
bronchitis-like conditions.

The "bed-in-a-box" mattress cited in the suit is currently listed
as the #1 bestseller in Amazon's mattress category, with an average
review of four-and-a-half stars.

Many budget mattresses contain fiberglass, a mix of plastic and
glass, as a fire retardant because it's a cheaper way to ensure the
bed meets federal flammability tests required by the US Consumer
Product Safety Commission. Previously, most mattresses used benzene
and antimony as fire retardants, two chemicals that are now deemed
unsafe for consumer products.

In a statement shared with Insider, a Zinus spokesperson said the
chemical-free fire safety material used to make its mattresses
fire-resistant is standard and the CPSC doesn't consider it
hazardous. The company also said that its mattress labels tell
consumers the mattress's contents, and says not to open or remove
the mattress's cover, which acts as a protective barrier.

"Zinus mattresses currently being sold include locked zippers
without pull tabs and an additional sewn-in label that warns
against removing the outer cover," the Zinus spokesperson said.
"For all these reasons, we look forward to defending the
composition and construction of our products in court, should that
be necessary, and are confident we will prevail."

In an email to Insider, the US Consumer Product Safety Commission
said mattresses that have a layer of fiberglass "have a protective
outer cover which acts as a barrier to separate the fiberglass
layer from consumers and to maintain the effectiveness of its
fire-resistant properties."

The commission said if the mattress cover is left intact, "exposure
to fiberglass particles is expected to be minimal."

Gutierrez said she never removed the mattress cover, per the July
filing.

Zinus did not immediately respond to Insider's request for comment.
[GN]


                            *********

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