/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/221005.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, October 5, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 193

                            Headlines

3M COMPANY: Baynard Sues Over Exposure to Highly Toxic Chemicals
3M COMPANY: Fodora Sues Over Exposure to Highly Toxic Chemicals
3M COMPANY: Matherne Sues Over Exposure to Highly Toxic Chemicals
3M COMPANY: Newkirk Sues Over Exposure to Highly Toxic Chemicals
3M COMPANY: Pahkanen Sues Over Exposure to Highly Toxic Chemicals

ACCENTCARE: Gulamova Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Wages
AKIMA SUPPORT: Class Settlement in Avery Suit Wins Final Approval
ALASKA GLACIAL MUD: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ALLIED INSURANCE: Bid for Summary Judgment in Stone Suit Granted
ALLIED PILOTS: 9th Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in American Suit

AMERICAN EAGLE OUTFITTERS: Licea Sues Over Unlawful Wiretapping
AMERICAN PARA PROFESSIONAL: Jimenez Files TCPA Suit in N.D. Ill.
ARC AUTOMOTIVE: Lovett Sues Over Defective Airbag Inflators
ASTRUP DRUG INC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
AZEERA INC: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

BELCAN CORPORATION: Nezzer Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
BEN-AMUN CO: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BMW MANUFACTURING: Clark Files Suit in D. South Carolina
BOYD GAMING: $1.2MM Class Settlement in James Suit Wins Approval
BROWN UNIVERSITY: Senior Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

BURLAP AND BARREL: Slade Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CALIFORNIA: Smith v. Watanabe & DMHC Dismissed With Leave to Amend
CAPRICIO'S PIZZA: Pineda Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
CCG VENTURES: Williams Files Suit in E.D. Michigan
CHARLET BROTHERS: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

CHW GROUP INC: Katz Suit Removed to W.D. Arkansas
COLORADO BABY INC: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CONSERVICE LLC: Ray Suit Removed to S.D. California
CPC LOGISTICS: Barajas Suit Remanded to Alameda Superior Court
CREW OUTFITTERS: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

CRICKET MEDIA: Wissmueller Files Suit in E.D. Michigan
DEMISCH DANANT: Young Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DIAMONDBACK ENERGY: Trahan Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
DINOSAUR DESIGNS: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
DRAMA BOOK SHOP: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

EASTMAN KODAK: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Securities Class Suit
FIRST ON FIRST DELI: Brown Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
GAP INC: Missouri Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Hennessey Class Suit
GMRG ACQ1: Can Compel Arbitration in Palomo Suit Over Unpaid Wages
GROCERY DELIVERY: Morris Sues Over Unsolicited Telephonic Calls

HOMELAND SECURITY: Kang Suit Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL: Reid Sues Over Unlawful Vaccine Mandate
ILLINOIS FARMERS: Cross Bids for Judgment in Taqueria Suit Denied
JOSE M. PLEHN-DUJOWICH: Hu Suit Transferred to C.D. California
KAYDEN INDUSTRIES: Simons Sues to Recover Overtime Compensation

L.J. ALTFEST & CO: Jackson Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
LANDSCAPING BY FREDIS: Pavon Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
LEND SMART: S.D. Florida Grants Bid to Dismiss Frater FTSA Suit
LHOIST NORTH: Court Enters Final Judgment in Fuapau Class Suit
LIFE CARE: Atkinson Suit Remanded to King County Superior Court

MAD SCIENTIST NUTS: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MDL 2311: $231K in Attys.' Fees Given in Auto Parts Antitrust Suit
NAVICO INC: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
NISSAN OF NORTH AMERICA: Simpson Files Suit in M.D. Tennessee
OMAHASTEAKS.COM INC: Hwang Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York

OSCAR HEALTH: Levi & Glancy Named Co-Lead Counsel in Carpenter Suit
PARLER INC: Migliano Files TCPA Suit in S.D. Florida
POSTERITATI VINTAGE: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
POWER HOME SOLAR: Fuchs Sues Over Failure to Provide Advance Notice
PROGRESSIVE DIRECT: Court Narrows Claims in Williams Class Suit

PURPLE AND GOLD SPORTS: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Perlin Suit Removed to S.D. Florida
RECKITT BENCKISER: Vaglica Files Suit in E.D. New York
RECOUP FITNESS: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
RING LLC: White Sues Over Misleading Promotion of Security Products

SEARS HOLDINGS: Court Affirms Denial of Greene's Relief From Stay
SIMPLY MEDICAL: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
STATE FARM: Court Grants Bid to Certify Class in Millwood Suit
SW GROUP LLC: Cruz Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
TARGET CORP: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Bayne Class Suit

TESLA INC: Mallow Sues Over Deceptive and Misleading Representation
TOWER RESEARCH: Bid for Class Certification in Choi Suit Denied
TURKO TEXTILE: Tucker Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL: Tooker Sues Over Failure to Safeguard PII
UMAR SERVICES: Court Conditionally Certifies Class in Staley Suit

UNIVERSITY MEDICAL: Whittum Suit Stayed Over Citizenship Discovery
VERITAS PROPERTY: Paulino Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Rates
VOLTAGE SUPPLY: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
VSL PHARMACEUTICALS: Decision on Subpoena in Starr Suit Sustained
WESTERN RANGE: Castillo's Bid for Partial Summary Judgment Granted

YOPTI LLC: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ZOLA INC: Hwang Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York

                            *********

3M COMPANY: Baynard Sues Over Exposure to Highly Toxic Chemicals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Selina Baynard, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY fka
MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING CO.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT CO.;
CHEMGUARD, INC.; CORTEVA, INC.; DUPONT DE NEMOURS, INC.; DYNAX
CORPORATION; E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & CO.; KIDDE-FENWALL, INC.;
KIDDE FIRE FIGHTING, INC.; KIDDE PLC, INC.; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.;
THE CHEMOURS CO.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS,
LP; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICA'S, INC; and DOES 1 to 100,
INCLUSIVE; Case No. 2:22-cv-03095-RMG (D.S.C., Sept. 9, 2022), is
brought involving highly toxic chemicals which have earned the
designation "the forever chemicals" because they do not breakdown
and their insidious nature allows them to travel through soil and
into groundwater while maintaining their deadly nature for
decades.

This action deals with Aqueous Film Forming Foams ("AFFF") that
were designed, manufactured and sold as firefighting compounds.
AFFF compounding includes Perfluoro octane Sulfonate (commonly
known as "PFOS"), PerfluorooctanoicAcid (commonly known as "PFOA"),
and/or other Per-and Polyfluoroalkyl substances (together, with
PFOS and PFOA, commonly known as "PFAS") which are manmade
organofluorine compounds (in this case commonly referred to as
fluorinated surfactants/fluorocarbon surfactants). The compounds
are designed to lower the surface tension of water so as to create
a firefighting foam to quell/smother (cutting off oxygen), for
example, jet fuel fires.

AFFF is created by mixing fluorine-free hydrocarbon foaming
substances (chemical agents designed for a particular purpose) with
fluorinated surfactants and mixing that with water which creates an
aqueous film, i.e.: Aqueous Film Forming Foams ("AFFF"). The
manufacturing processes involved in this action are asserted to
have used fluorocarbon surfactants which are believed to include
PFOS and PFOA (and/or other per fluorinated compounds known as
"PFC" are also believed to be in the mix. PFC's are posited to
break down in PFOS and PFOA).

The Plaintiff was a dependent of Willie Charles Smith a member of
the USMC who was subsequently assigned to MCAS El Toro, CA
(1995-1997). At all times relevant, the Plaintiff lived on Base at
MCAS El Toro using and drinking the water. On information and
belief, MCAS El Toro has a PFAS environmental contamination level
of 3,826ppt (EPA max of 70ppt | California. Response max 10-40ppt).
In 2020, Baynard was diagnosed with kidney cancer and commenced
on-going medical treatment inclusive of surgical intervention via a
right partial nephrectomy. As known by Defendants, kidney cancer is
a disease linked to PFAS contamination. Baynard did not discover
that PFAS was a cause of the harm until early Fall 2020, when she
saw internet information, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was a dependent of Willie Charles Smith, a member of
the U.S. Marine Corps, who during his service was stationed at,
inter alia, MCAS El Toro, a military installation identified as
being contaminated through use of the toxic chemicals which are the
subject of this action.

The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS
containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals
used in AFFF production.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy C. Shafer, Esq.
          VETERAN LEGAL GROUP
          700 12th Street N.W., Suite 700
          Washington, D.C. 20005
          Phone: (888) 215-7834
          Email: jshafer@bannerlegal.com

               - and -

          S. James Boumil, Esq.
          BOUMIL LAW OFFICES
          120 Fairmount Street
          Lowell, MA, 01852
          Phone: (978) 458-0507
          Email: sjboumil@boumil-law.com

               - and -

          Konstantine Kyros, Esq.
          KYROS LAW
          17 Miles Rd.
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Phone: (800) 934-2921
          Email: kon@kyroslaw.com


3M COMPANY: Fodora Sues Over Exposure to Highly Toxic Chemicals
---------------------------------------------------------------
Alexis Fodora, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY fka
MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING CO.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT CO.;
CHEMGUARD, INC.; CORTEVA, INC.; DUPONT DE NEMOURS, INC.; DYNAX
CORPORATION; E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & CO.; KIDDE-FENWALL, INC.;
KIDDE FIRE FIGHTING, INC.; KIDDE PLC, INC.; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.;
THE CHEMOURS CO.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS,
LP; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICA'S, INC; and DOES 1 to 100,
INCLUSIVE; Case No. 2:22-cv-03108-RMG (D.S.C., Sept. 9, 2022), is
brought involving highly toxic chemicals which have earned the
designation "the forever chemicals" because they do not breakdown
and their insidious nature allows them to travel through soil and
into groundwater while maintaining their deadly nature for
decades.

This action deals with Aqueous Film Forming Foams ("AFFF") that
were designed, manufactured and sold as firefighting compounds.
AFFF compounding includes Perfluoro octane Sulfonate (commonly
known as "PFOS"), PerfluorooctanoicAcid (commonly known as "PFOA"),
and/or other Per-and Polyfluoroalkyl substances (together, with
PFOS and PFOA, commonly known as "PFAS") which are manmade
organofluorine compounds (in this case commonly referred to as
fluorinated surfactants/fluorocarbon surfactants). The compounds
are designed to lower the surface tension of water so as to create
a firefighting foam to quell/smother (cutting off oxygen), for
example, jet fuel fires.

AFFF is created by mixing fluorine-free hydrocarbon foaming
substances (chemical agents designed for a particular purpose) with
fluorinated surfactants and mixing that with water which creates an
aqueous film, i.e.: Aqueous Film Forming Foams ("AFFF"). The
manufacturing processes involved in this action are asserted to
have used fluorocarbon surfactants which are believed to include
PFOS and PFOA (and/or other per fluorinated compounds known as
"PFC" are also believed to be in the mix. PFC's are posited to
break down in PFOS and PFOA).

The Plaintiff's father joined the US Army and was subsequently
assigned to Fort Drum, NY (1991-1996). At all times relevant,
Plaintiff lived on Base at Fort Drum using and drinking the water.
On information and belief, Fort Drum has a PFAS environmental
contamination level of 130 (EPA max of 70ppt). In 1993, Fodora was
diagnosed with kidney cancer and commenced on-going medical
treatment inclusive of surgical intervention via nephrectomy. As
known by Defendants, kidney cancer is a disease linked to PFAS
contamination. Fodora did not discover that PFAS was a cause of her
harm until early Fall 2020, when she saw internet information, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiff was a dependent of a U.S. Army member, John Fodora,
who during her father's service was stationed at, inter alia, Fort
Drum, a military installation identified as being contaminated
through use of the toxic chemicals which are the subject of this
action.

The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS
containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals
used in AFFF production.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy C. Shafer, Esq.
          VETERAN LEGAL GROUP
          700 12th Street N.W., Suite 700
          Washington, D.C. 20005
          Phone: (888) 215-7834
          Email: jshafer@bannerlegal.com

               - and -

          S. James Boumil, Esq.
          BOUMIL LAW OFFICES
          120 Fairmount Street
          Lowell, MA, 01852
          Phone: (978) 458-0507
          Email: sjboumil@boumil-law.com

               - and -

          Konstantine Kyros, Esq.
          KYROS LAW
          17 Miles Rd.
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Phone: (800) 934-2921
          Email: kon@kyroslaw.com


3M COMPANY: Matherne Sues Over Exposure to Highly Toxic Chemicals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Curtis Matherne, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY fka
MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING CO.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT CO.;
CHEMGUARD, INC.; CORTEVA, INC.; DUPONT DE NEMOURS, INC.; DYNAX
CORPORATION; E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & CO.; KIDDE-FENWALL, INC.;
KIDDE FIRE FIGHTING, INC.; KIDDE PLC, INC.; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.;
THE CHEMOURS CO.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS,
LP; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICA'S, INC; and DOES 1 to 100,
INCLUSIVE; Case No. 2:22-cv-03091-RMG (D.S.C., Sept. 9, 2022), is
brought involving highly toxic chemicals which have earned the
designation "the forever chemicals" because they do not breakdown
and their insidious nature allows them to travel through soil and
into groundwater while maintaining their deadly nature for
decades.

This action deals with Aqueous Film Forming Foams ("AFFF") that
were designed, manufactured and sold as firefighting compounds.
AFFF compounding includes Perfluoro octane Sulfonate (commonly
known as "PFOS"), PerfluorooctanoicAcid (commonly known as "PFOA"),
and/or other Per-and Polyfluoroalkyl substances (together, with
PFOS and PFOA, commonly known as "PFAS") which are manmade
organofluorine compounds (in this case commonly referred to as
fluorinated surfactants/fluorocarbon surfactants). The compounds
are designed to lower the surface tension of water so as to create
a firefighting foam to quell/smother (cutting off oxygen), for
example, jet fuel fires.

AFFF is created by mixing fluorine-free hydrocarbon foaming
substances (chemical agents designed for a particular purpose) with
fluorinated surfactants and mixing that with water which creates an
aqueous film, i.e.: Aqueous Film Forming Foams ("AFFF"). The
manufacturing processes involved in this action are asserted to
have used fluorocarbon surfactants which are believed to include
PFOS and PFOA (and/or other per fluorinated compounds known as
"PFC" are also believed to be in the mix. PFC's are posited to
break down in PFOS and PFOA).

The Plaintiff joined the US Army and was subsequently assigned to
JBMDL, NJ (1987). At all times relevant, the Plaintiff lived/worked
on Base at JBMDL using and drinking the water. On information and
belief, JBMDL has a PFAS environmental contamination level of
264,000 (EPA max of 70ppt). In 1991, MATHERNE was diagnosed with
ulcerative colitis and commenced on-going medical treatment. As
known by Defendants, ulcerative colitis is a disease linked to PFAS
contamination. MATHERNE did not discover that PFAS was a cause of
the harm until early Fall 2020, when he saw internet information,
says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was a member of the U.S. Army, who during his service
was stationed at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst ("JBMDL"), a
military installation identified as being contaminated through use
of the toxic chemicals which are the subject of this action.

The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS
containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals
used in AFFF production.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy C. Shafer, Esq.
          VETERAN LEGAL GROUP
          700 12th Street N.W., Suite 700
          Washington, D.C. 20005
          Phone: (888) 215-7834
          Email: jshafer@bannerlegal.com

               - and -

          S. James Boumil, Esq.
          BOUMIL LAW OFFICES
          120 Fairmount Street
          Lowell, MA, 01852
          Phone: (978) 458-0507
          Email: sjboumil@boumil-law.com

               - and -

          Konstantine Kyros, Esq.
          KYROS LAW
          17 Miles Rd.
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Phone: (800) 934-2921
          Email: kon@kyroslaw.com


3M COMPANY: Newkirk Sues Over Exposure to Highly Toxic Chemicals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Kevin Newkirk, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY fka
MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING CO.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT CO.;
CHEMGUARD, INC.; CORTEVA, INC.; DUPONT DE NEMOURS, INC.; DYNAX
CORPORATION; E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & CO.; KIDDE-FENWALL, INC.;
KIDDE FIRE FIGHTING, INC.; KIDDE PLC, INC.; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.;
THE CHEMOURS CO.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS,
LP; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICA'S, INC; and DOES 1 to 100,
INCLUSIVE; Case No. 2:22-cv-03103-RMG (D.S.C., Sept. 9, 2022), is
brought involving highly toxic chemicals which have earned the
designation "the forever chemicals" because they do not breakdown
and their insidious nature allows them to travel through soil and
into groundwater while maintaining their deadly nature for
decades.

This action deals with Aqueous Film Forming Foams ("AFFF") that
were designed, manufactured and sold as firefighting compounds.
AFFF compounding includes Perfluoro octane Sulfonate (commonly
known as "PFOS"), PerfluorooctanoicAcid (commonly known as "PFOA"),
and/or other Per-and Polyfluoroalkyl substances (together, with
PFOS and PFOA, commonly known as "PFAS") which are manmade
organofluorine compounds (in this case commonly referred to as
fluorinated surfactants/fluorocarbon surfactants). The compounds
are designed to lower the surface tension of water so as to create
a firefighting foam to quell/smother (cutting off oxygen), for
example, jet fuel fires.

AFFF is created by mixing fluorine-free hydrocarbon foaming
substances (chemical agents designed for a particular purpose) with
fluorinated surfactants and mixing that with water which creates an
aqueous film, i.e.: Aqueous Film Forming Foams ("AFFF"). The
manufacturing processes involved in this action are asserted to
have used fluorocarbon surfactants which are believed to include
PFOS and PFOA (and/or other per fluorinated compounds known as
"PFC" are also believed to be in the mix. PFC's are posited to
break down in PFOS and PFOA).

The Plaintiff joined the US Army and was subsequently assigned to
Fort Ord, CA (1982-1984). At all times relevant, the Plaintiff
lived/worked on Base at Fort Ord using and drinking the water. On
information and belief, Fort Ord has a PFAS environmental
contamination level of 334 ppt (EPA max of 70ppt | California.
Response max 10-40ppt). In 2003, Newkirk was diagnosed with
ulcerative colitis and commenced on-going medical treatment. As
known by Defendants, ulcerative colitis is a disease linked to PFAS
contamination. See, for example, C8 Science Panel Report. Newkirk
did not discover that PFAS was a cause of the harm until early Fall
2020, when he saw internet information, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was a member of the U.S. Army, who during his service
was stationed at Fort Ord, a military installation identified as
being contaminated through use of the toxic chemicals which are the
subject of this action.

The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS
containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals
used in AFFF production.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy C. Shafer, Esq.
          VETERAN LEGAL GROUP
          700 12th Street N.W., Suite 700
          Washington, D.C. 20005
          Phone: (888) 215-7834
          Email: jshafer@bannerlegal.com

               - and -

          S. James Boumil, Esq.
          BOUMIL LAW OFFICES
          120 Fairmount Street
          Lowell, MA, 01852
          Phone: (978) 458-0507
          Email: sjboumil@boumil-law.com

               - and -

          Konstantine Kyros, Esq.
          KYROS LAW
          17 Miles Rd.
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Phone: (800) 934-2921
          Email: kon@kyroslaw.com


3M COMPANY: Pahkanen Sues Over Exposure to Highly Toxic Chemicals
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Patricia Pahkanen (Watson), on behalf of William Watson [dec], and
other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY fka MINNESOTA MINING &
MANUFACTURING CO.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT CO.; CHEMGUARD, INC.;
CORTEVA, INC.; DUPONT DE NEMOURS, INC.; DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I.
DUPONT DE NEMOURS & CO.; KIDDE-FENWALL, INC.; KIDDE FIRE FIGHTING,
INC.; KIDDE PLC, INC.; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS CO.; THE
CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS, LP; UTC FIRE &
SECURITY AMERICA'S, INC; and DOES 1 to 100, INCLUSIVE; Case No.
2:22-cv-03092-RMG (D.S.C., Sept. 9, 2022), is brought involving
highly toxic chemicals which have earned the designation "the
forever chemicals" because they do not breakdown and their
insidious nature allows them to travel through soil and into
groundwater while maintaining their deadly nature for decades.

This action deals with Aqueous Film Forming Foams ("AFFF") that
were designed, manufactured and sold as firefighting compounds.
AFFF compounding includes Perfluoro octane Sulfonate (commonly
known as "PFOS"), PerfluorooctanoicAcid (commonly known as "PFOA"),
and/or other Per-and Polyfluoroalkyl substances (together, with
PFOS and PFOA, commonly known as "PFAS") which are manmade
organofluorine compounds (in this case commonly referred to as
fluorinated surfactants/fluorocarbon surfactants). The compounds
are designed to lower the surface tension of water so as to create
a firefighting foam to quell/smother (cutting off oxygen), for
example, jet fuel fires.

AFFF is created by mixing fluorine-free hydrocarbon foaming
substances (chemical agents designed for a particular purpose) with
fluorinated surfactants and mixing that with water which creates an
aqueous film, i.e.: Aqueous Film Forming Foams ("AFFF"). The
manufacturing processes involved in this action are asserted to
have used fluorocarbon surfactants which are believed to include
PFOS and PFOA (and/or other per fluorinated compounds known as
"PFC" are also believed to be in the mix. PFC's are posited to
break down in PFOS and PFOA).

The Plaintiff is the widow of William Watson, who joined the USMC
and was subsequently assigned to Camp Lejeune, NC (1975-1977). At
all times relevant, Watson lived/worked on Base at Camp Lejeune
using and drinking the water. On information and belief, Camp
Lejeune has a PFAS environmental contamination level of 179,348 ppt
(EPA max of 70ppt). In 2004, Watson was diagnosed with thyroid
disease and commenced on-going medical treatment inclusive of
surgical intervention via a thyroidectomy; passing in 2017. As
known by Defendants, thyroid disease is a disease linked to PFAS
contamination. Pahkanen did not discover that PFAS was the cause of
Watson's harm until early Fall 2020, when she saw internet
information, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is the widow of William Watson, a member of the U.S.
Marine Corps, who during her spouse's service was stationed at Camp
Lejeune, a military installation identified as being contaminated
through use of the toxic chemicals which are the subject of this
action.

The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS
containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals
used in AFFF production.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy C. Shafer, Esq.
          VETERAN LEGAL GROUP
          700 12th Street N.W., Suite 700
          Washington, D.C. 20005
          Phone: (888) 215-7834
          Email: jshafer@bannerlegal.com

               - and -

          S. James Boumil, Esq.
          BOUMIL LAW OFFICES
          120 Fairmount Street
          Lowell, MA, 01852
          Phone: (978) 458-0507
          Email: sjboumil@boumil-law.com

               - and -

          Konstantine Kyros, Esq.
          KYROS LAW
          17 Miles Rd.
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Phone: (800) 934-2921
          Email: kon@kyroslaw.com


ACCENTCARE: Gulamova Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
Saiera Gulamova, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated v. ACCENTCARE OF NEW YORK, INC. d/b/a/
ACCENTCARE, and STEPHAN RODGERS, Case No. 1:22-cv-05782-KAM-VMS
(E.D.N.Y., Sept. 28, 2022), is brought against the Defendants to
seek redress for systematic underpayment of spread of hours and
overtime wages, failure in provide wage notices and failure in
keeping accurate employment records in violation of the fair Labor
Standards Act, the New York Labor Law, New York Human Rights Law,
New York Executive Law, New York City Administrative Code, and
other applicable regulations.

The Defendants, by failing to maintain and preserve proper records
required by law, failing to pay the plaintiffs correct overtime
wages at one and one-half times the basic minimum hourly rate for
all hours worked in excess of 40 per work week, failing to pay
"spread of hours" premium required by law, failing to provide
quality employment opportunity without discrimination, violated the
FLSA, NYLL, NYCHRL, NYCAC, NYCCR and other applicable regulations,
says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was as an employee of the Defendants.

The Defendants provide personal care and assistance to disabled and
elderly clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sang J. Sim, Esq.
          SIM & DEPAOLA, LLP
          4240 Bell Blvd., Suite 405
          Flushing, NY 11361
          Phone: (718) 281-0400


AKIMA SUPPORT: Class Settlement in Avery Suit Wins Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEVIER AVERY, Plaintiff v. AKIMA SUPPORT OPERATIONS,
LLC, an Alaska Limited Liability Company, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00924-DAD-AC (E.D. Cal.), Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California grants
Avery's unopposed motions for final approval of a class action
settlement and for an award of attorneys' fees, costs, and an
incentive award for the Plaintiff.

Following the grant of preliminary approval in this action, on
April 26, 2022, the Plaintiff filed the pending unopposed motion
for attorneys' fees, costs, and an incentive award for the
Plaintiff, and on Aug. 12, 2022, he filed the pending unopposed
motion for final approval of the parties' class action settlement.
On Aug. 25, 2022, the case was reassigned from Chief Judge Kimberly
J. Mueller to Judge Drozd. As of the date of the hearing on Sept.
20, 2022, no objections to the settlement had been received nor
filed with the Court, and one class member has opted out of the
settlement.

As summarized by the Court in its order tentatively granting
preliminary approval of the parties' settlement, the settlement
agreement provides for a settlement payment made by defendant in
the amount of $74,500.  Assuming the parties' proposed allocations
are awarded in full, approximately $27,167 (the "net settlement
amount") will be available for distribution to participating class
members.

The Court conducted an examination of the class action factors in
the orders granting preliminary approval of the settlement and
found certification to be warranted. Because no additional
substantive issues concerning the certification have been raised,
Judge Drozd does not repeat prior analysis and finds that final
class action certification case is appropriate.

The following class of an estimated 572 individuals is therefore
certified for settlement purposes: "All hourly, non-exempt
employees of Defendant Akima Support Operations, LLC who performed
work for Defendant at the Tracy Defense Distribution Depot located
in Tracy, California any time between April 3, 2015 and March 1,
2020." In addition, Avery is appointed as the class representative
and attorneys David Spivak of the Spivak Law Firm and Walter Haines
of United Employees Law Group are appointed as the class counsel.

The parties have agreed to retain Simpluris, Inc.to handle the
notice and claims administration process and request that Simpluris
be appointed to serve as the settlement administrator.

The estimated cost of administering the settlement is $4,000, and
the parties have specified that administrative expenses will not
exceed $7,500. The cost of administering the settlement will be
deducted from the gross settlement fund. The class counsel assert
that before agreeing to use Simpluris as Settlement Administrator,
the parties also reviewed bids from Class Action Claims
Administration, Inc., CPT Group, Inc., ILYM Group, Inc., which
submitted bids of $4,750, $9,000, and $4,911.80, respectively.   
Upon reviewing the bids from these third-party administrators,
Judge Drozd finds the administrative costs allocated under the
proposed settlement are fair and reasonable. Accordingly, Simpluris
is appointed as the settlement administrator.

On Sept. 20, 2022, the Court held a final fairness hearing, at
which the class counsel and the defense counsel appeared by video.
Judge Drozd now must determine whether the settlement is fair,
adequate, and reasonable. After considering all of the relevant
factors, he finds on balance that the settlement is. Accordingly,
he grants the Plaintiff's motion for final approval of the parties'
class action settlement.

The parties' settlement provides that class counsel will seek an
award of one-third of the gross settlement fund, equivalent to
$24,833. Judge Drozd concludes that the lodestar cross-check
supports the requested award of $24,833 in attorneys' fees.
Therefore, he approves an award of $24,833 in attorneys' fees.

Additionally, the class counsel seeks to recover the costs and
expenses advanced while prosecuting this litigation. The class
counsel request reimbursement in the amount of $3,983.01. Judge
Drozd has reviewed the lass counsel's declarations and finds all
the charges incurred to be reasonable. Accordingly, he approves the
reimbursement of costs and expenses in the amount requested.

Avery seeks an incentive award of $5,000 for his service in the
action. Because the incentive award requested is for a
"presumptively reasonable" amount, and in light of the Plaintiff's
supporting declaration detailing his assistance with the case,
Judge Drozd finds that the requested incentive payment of $5,000 to
Avery is fair and reasonable and does not destroy the adequacy of
class representation in the case. Accordingly, he awards the
incentive payment as requested.

Finally, as noted, Judge Drozd has approved the appointment of
Simpluris as the settlement administrator in the action. According
to the declaration of Christina Fowler, Case Manager for Simpluris,
the total cost for administration of the settlement, including fees
incurred and future costs for completion, is $4,000. Judge Drozd
finds these administration costs reasonable and directs payment in
the requested amount.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Drozd grants the Plaintiff's
motion for final approval of the class action settlement and the
his motion for an award of attorneys' fees and costs, incentive
award, and settlement administrator costs. He awards the following
sums:

      a. The class counsel will receive $24,833 in attorneys' fees
and $3,983.01 in expenses;

      b. Avery will receive $5,000 as an incentive payment;

      c. Simpluris will receive $4,000 in settlement administration
costs; and

      d. The parties will direct payment of 75% of the settlement
allocated to the PAGA payment, or $3,750, to the LWDA as required
by California law, and the remainder of the PAGA payment, $1,250,
will be included in the net settlement fund.

The parties are directed to effectuate all terms of the settlement
agreement and any deadlines or procedures for distribution set
forth therein.

The action is dismissed with prejudice in accordance with the terms
of the parties' amended settlement agreement, with the Court
specifically retaining jurisdiction over the action for the purpose
of enforcing the parties' settlement agreement.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 23, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2p8zfc3c from Leagle.com.


ALASKA GLACIAL MUD: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Alaska Glacial Mud
Co., LLC. The case is styled as Joyce Carrico, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated v. Alaska Glacial Mud Co., LLC,
Case No. 1:22-cv-08185 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 24, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Alaska Glacial -- https://alaskaglacial.com/ -- offers skin care
which combines premium functional ingredients with wild Alaskan
botanicals + glacial minerals to help skin achieve and sustain a
healthy glow.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Solomon Nematzadeh, Esq.
          NEMATZADEH PLLC
          101 Avenue of the Americas, Ste. 9th Floor
          New York, NY 10013
          Phone: (646) 417-8424
          Email: jsn@nematlawyers.com


ALLIED INSURANCE: Bid for Summary Judgment in Stone Suit Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Stone & Kelso LLC, Plaintiff v. Allied Insurance
Company of America, Defendant, Case No. CV-20-00160-TUC-JCH (D.
Ariz.), Judge John C. Hinderaker of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona enters an order:

   a. granting Allied's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion 1");

   b. denying Stone's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
      ("Motion 2");

   c. denying Stone's Motion for Leave to Amend ("Motion 3"); and

   d. denying Allied's request for attorney's fees.

Stone alleges that Allied (1) breached its fire-insurance contract
by denying its claim and (2) through Allied's investigation of the
claim committed tortious bad faith claims handling.

Stone is jointly owned by Amy Burns and Daniel Eftimoff. In 2012,
it purchased a commercial property located at 2619 North Stone
Avenue, in Tucson, Arizona 85705. In August 2012, Burns emailed an
agent seeking insurance on the Property. The agent sent a
questionnaire to Burns that included a question asking if there was
a centrally monitored fire alarm on the Property. Burns lived
remotely, so she forwarded the email to Eftimoff to confirm some of
the questions, including about the monitored fire alarm system.
Eftimoff believed that a monitored fire alarm system existed based
on what the previous owner's son-in-law told him. He also alleges
"personally observing" a fire alarm system on the Property in 2012
but did not see whether the system was connected to a central fire
alarm station. In any event, Stone's insurance application stated
that the Property had a monitored fire alarm system.

Allied's Policy contained a "Protective Safeguard Endorsement
["PSE"] Advisory Notice" at the beginning of the policy, which
stated at the top that "This Notice does not form part of the
contract. No coverage is provided by this Notice." The notice
explained that the "policy is written with a PSE" that "provides
explicit instructions to preserve coverage." Specifically, the PSE
must be "in place, operational, and maintained in good working
order at the building shown on the endorsement. Failure to comply
with any of these conditions may result in loss of insurance
coverage. PB0430 is a form titled "Protective Safeguards" appearing
after the coverage section in a section titled "Forms and
Endorsements." By renewing the Policy, Stone continued to represent
its compliance with the PSE.

On Jan. 22, 2018, Stone leased the Property to Chuck Blain and Zach
Blain, dba Glow Zone Mini Golf, LLC. The lease did not include any
language pertaining to installing or maintaining a monitored fire
alarm system. Eftimoff testified that when Tenants were remodeling
the Property, Eftimoff saw a panel and cameras. But he also
testified that Stone never tested to determine if it was a
monitored fire alarm system, or follow up with Tenants to verify
there was a monitored fire alarm system. And Stone never paid for
any bill for central monitoring of a fire alarm service.

At some point, relations between Tenants and Stone soured. The
Tenants changed the Property's locks and denied Stone access to
conduct inspections. In October 2018, the Tenants obtained a
preliminary injunction prohibiting Stone from accessing the
Property. In September 2019, Stone filed a lawsuit to evict them
from the Property.

On Nov. 12, 2019, either just after or as the Tenants moved out, a
fire broke out at the Property. Stone timely submitted a claim to
Allied regarding the loss. On Nov. 15, 2019, Allied hired Joe
Sesniak, a fire origin-and-cause expert, to investigate the fire's
circumstances. On Nov. 19, 2019, Sesniak reported that there was no
fire alarm, no wires in the telephone room alarm box, no fire
detectors at the Property, and no alarm pull.

On Nov. 21, 2019, Allied's adjuster James Boles inspected the
Property with property manager Phillip Fileccia. Boles did not see
any evidence of a fire alarm, and Fileccia stated that he was not
aware of any specific fire alarm on the property. Allied then hired
David Komm of Auspurger Komm Engineering, Inc., to inspect the
Property for the existence of a monitored fire alarm system.

In a Jan. 8, 2020 report, Komm stated that he saw no smoke alarms,
carbon monoxide alarms, wireless sensors, fire horn, klaxon, or
anything interior or exterior indicating a fire alarm system. He
did note that there was a control unit at the Property "suitable"
for fire controls, but "all leads were disconnected or simply cut."
Komm concluded with "a reasonable degree of engineering certainty"
there was no fire alarm system in place at the Property. Eftimoff
also visited the Property after the fire and reported that the
panel he had seen previously was ripped out and missing, along with
the cameras and wiring

On Feb. 18, 2020, Allied denied Stone's insurance claim for damages
sustained by the fire based on the Policy language stating that
coverage would not exist if the insured failed to maintain a
monitored fire alarm system at the Property.

On March 27, 2020, Stone filed its Complaint against Allied in the
Pima County Superior Court. In it, Stone alleges breach of
insurance contract (Count #1); breach of implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing, and tortious bad faith claims handling (Count
#2). On April 14, 2020, Allied filed its Notice of Removal. On Feb.
4, 2022, Allied filed Motion 1, and on March 15, 2022, Stone filed
Motion 2 and Motion 3.

First, Allied seeks summary judgment on Stone's breach of contract
claim by arguing Stone did not have a monitored fire alarm system
as the Policy requires. It points to its investigations finding no
evidence of a monitored fire alarm and to the numerous warnings in
the PSE alerting insureds to the risk of loss of coverage absent a
monitored fire alarm system.

Judge Hinderaker finds that Allied has met its initial
responsibility on this basis, and the burden shifts to Stone to
produce evidence that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in
Stone's favor. Even viewing Stone's evidence in the most favorable
light, it does not create a genuine issue of material fact for a
jury whether a monitored fire alarm system existed at the Property.
At oral argument, Stone conceded this point.  Thus, the material
facts are not in dispute and the breach of contract claim turns on
a legal issue: is Allied's PSE requiring a monitored fire alarm
enforceable (or not) under Arizona law?

Stone argues that Allied's PSE violates Arizona law by conflicting
with the Arizona Standard Fire Policy. Its argument raises an issue
of first impression for Arizona. Stone urges the Court to adopt a
bright-line rule used in Jin Zun Zou v. American Modern Home Ins.
Co., 86 F.Supp.3d 1050 (D. Minn. 2015).

There, a basement-bedroom fire caused extensive smoke damage to the
rest of insured Jin Zun Zou's home. The insurer American Modern
denied Jin Zun Zou's claim because the policy included a PSE
requiring policy holders to maintain operational smoke detectors.
In fact, Jin Zun Zou did maintain smoke detectors that worked as
designed to alert the occupants to the fire, but American Modern
still denied the claim because it found additional non-functional
smoke detectors in a closet. The district court ruled for Jin Zun
Zou, noting the absurdity of denying a claim where functioning
smoke detectors were present because additional non-functioning
smoke detectors were stored in the house. As a secondary reason for
ruling for Jin Zun Zou, the court found that American Modern's PSE
was also unenforceable because the Minnesota standard fire policy
permitted some exclusions (for sprinklers) but not others (such as
for smoke detectors).

Stone seizes on this portion of the Minnesota decision, urging the
Court similarly to adopt a bright-line rule and reject any
provisions not found in the 165 lines of the New York standard
policy that might be used to deny coverage.

Judge Hinderaker holds that Stone is effectively relying on the
negative-implication canon of interpretation. First, Stone's
argument fails to construe the text as a whole. The text at issue
is not merely the isolated language of the Arizona statute, or even
just the language of the 1943 edition of the New York standard
policy. Second, Stone's argument does not adequately consider the
standard policy as a whole, which contemplates "added provisions
not inconsistent" with the rest of the policy. Again, New York case
law is particularly persuasive.

Judge Hinderaker also disagrees with Stone's assertion that the
Court's decision is contrary to public policy. Stone correctly
notes that New York's standard fire policy was adopted in Arizona
and elsewhere primarily to protect insureds from unexpected
limitations. But the sensible concern that consumers might be
tricked into purchasing inadequate coverage is not at play here,
where the terms of Allied's PSE condition are written in plain
language and posted conspicuously at the beginning and throughout
the policy. Stone was not tricked or misled. Stone's remaining
arguments fail because they are premised on the existence of a
monitored fire alarm system that did not exist.

Turning to Motion 1's bad faith claim, Judge Hideraker finds that
Allied's investigation created a reasonable basis for denying
Stone's claim. Allied's investigation into Arizona law would not
have revealed any binding authority holding PSE's invalid, and
several persuasive New York cases holding PSEs valid under the New
York standard policy. Moreover, Allied's investigation as a whole
was adequate and provided a reasonable basis for denying Stone's
claim. There is therefore no genuine dispute between Allied and
Stone whether Allied's denial of Stone's claim was in bad faith,
and Allied is entitled to summary judgment on the bad faith claim.

Allied also is entitled to summary judgment on punitive damages.
Stone argues that ite is due punitive damages because Allied
"consciously disregarded" the "Standard Fire Policy Issue." Judge
Hinderaker grants summary judgment for Allied on Stone's bad faith
claim, and so also grants summary judgment for Allied on Stone's
punitive damages claim. He separately notes that Stone has
presented no evidence suggesting that Allied acted with an evil
mind in denying Stone's claim. Rather, Allied conducted a prompt
and reasonable investigation into the fire, discovered that Stone
lacked a monitored fire alarm system as required by Stone's policy,
and, consistent with the policy's plain language, fairly denied the
claim on that basis.

Judge Hinderaker denies Allied's request for attorneys' fees.
Allied seeks attorneys' fees under A.R.S. Section 12-341.01 as the
prevailing party in an action arising out of contract. It argues it
is entitled to attorneys' fees because Stone's claims "lack any
merit," and had Stone's "Counsel been more objective, the
litigation could have been avoided."

The core issue -- the validity of Allied's PSE under Arizona law --
is a novel one. There is no controlling case law on point. Both
sides made cogent, credible arguments supported by persuasive case
law. Stone has not stated whether awarding fees would cause it
extreme hardship, but Judge Hinderaker recognizes that Stone has
now been denied insurance coverage for a loss caused by fire, which
results in an unexpected financial blow. He therefore exercises
discretion not to award Allied attorneys' fees.

Finally, in Motion 3, Stone seeks leave to file a Second Amended
Complaint, adding class action claims against Allied on the theory
that Allied's PSE is invalid under Arizona law. Because he grants
Allied's Motion 1, Judge Hinderaker says Stone's Motion 3 is now
moot. He therefore denies Stone's Motion 3 as moot.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Hinderaker grants Allied's Motion;
denies Allied's request for award of attorneys' fees; and denies
Motions 2 and 3. The Clerk of Court must enter judgment
accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/6a7w2tp2 from Leagle.com.


ALLIED PILOTS: 9th Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in American Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, AMERICAN AIRLINES FLOW-THRU PILOTS COALITION, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated; GREGORY
RICHARD CORDES, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION;
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 21-16131
(9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirms
the district court's order granting the Union's motion for summary
judgment.

The Plaintiffs, the American Airlines Flow-Thru Pilots Coalition
and individual pilots (together, "Flow-Through Pilots"), brought
the class action suit against the Allied Pilots Association
("ALPA"), a union representing American Airlines pilots. The
Flow-Through Pilots allege that ALPA breached its duty of fair
representation by discriminating against them in negotiating for
seniority credits with their employer, American Airlines.

The district court granted the Union's motion for summary judgment.
The Ninth Circuit reviews de novo. At issue is what standard of
causation union members must satisfy to recover damages for the
assumed breach of duty. Based on longstanding precedent, the Ninth
Circuit holds that union members must show that union
discrimination was the but-for cause of their alleged injury.
Otherwise, they fail to make a claim for damages for any breach of
the duty of fair representation.

The Ninth Circuit finds that under the causation-in-fact standard
applied in labor cases, the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment for ALPA. The Flow-Through Pilots, newly minted
American Airlines pilots who previously worked for regional
airlines, alleged that the union breached its duty of fair
representation because it did not ask American to provide them with
"length of service" credits. They alleged that ALPA failed to do so
because of the union's discriminatory animus toward regional
airline pilots. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Flow-Through Pilots, no reasonable jury could conclude that the
union's actions caused the Flow-Through Pilots to be denied the
"length of service" credits.

The Flow-Through Pilots also offer no evidence that American would
have granted them the credits had ALPA asked. They assert that
American had ample resources to grant the service credits. But it
is axiomatic of collective bargaining that employers do not give
away benefits simply because doing so would not ruin their balance
sheets. As the district court concluded, just because it was
"possible" for American to provide the credits does not create a
triable issue that the airline would have granted the benefit.

On this record, there is no evidence that American would have
agreed to the seniority credits. Consequently, the Flow-Through
Pilots cannot show that ALPA's assumed breach of the duty of fair
representation caused them any injury.

The Ninth Circuit concludes that under causation doctrine
applicable in fair representation cases, for union members to
recover for their union's breach of the duty of fair
representation, they must show that the union's discriminatory
action was the but-for cause of their alleged injuries. The
Plaintiffs presented no evidence that that even if ALPA had not
breached its duty as alleged, American would have agreed to the
seniority credits. Thus, under the record presented, no reasonable
jury could conclude that ALPA's alleged discrimination was the
but-for cause of the Flow-Through Pilots' injury -- on this record,
at least, it would have happened no matter what. And, thus, the
Flow-Through Pilots can't establish a triable question of fact for
trial as to the cause of their injury.

Because no reasonable jury could conclude on this record that the
Flow-Through Pilots would have received the "length of service"
credits had ALPA sought them, the Ninth Circuit affirms.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mr2mk6je from Leagle.com.


AMERICAN EAGLE OUTFITTERS: Licea Sues Over Unlawful Wiretapping
---------------------------------------------------------------
Miguel Licea, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. AMERICAN EAGLE OUTFITTERS INC., a Delaware corporation;
and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, Case No. 5:22-cv-01702-CAS-JPR
(C.D. Cal., Sept. 28, 2022), is brought against the Defendant who
secretly wiretaps the private conversations of everyone who
communicates through the chat feature at www.ae.com; and allows at
least one third party to eavesdrop on such communications in real
time, in part to harvest data for financial gain. The Defendant
does not obtain visitors' consent to either the wiretapping or the
eavesdropping. As a result, the Defendant has violated the the
California Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA") in numerous ways.

The California Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA") prohibits both
wiretapping and eavesdropping of electronic communications without
the consent of all parties to the communication. Compliance with
CIPA is easy, and the vast majority of website operators comply by
conspicuously warning visitors if their conversations are being
recorded or if third parties are eavesdropping on them. The
Defendant's actions are not incidental to the act of facilitating
e-commerce, nor are they undertaken in the ordinary course of
business.

To the contrary, Defendant's actions are contrary to industry norms
and the legitimate expectations of consumers. To enable the
wiretapping, Defendant has covertly embedded code into its chat
feature that automatically records and creates transcripts of all
such private conversations. To enable the eavesdropping, Defendant
allows at least one third party – Moxie – to secretly intercept
in real time, eavesdrop upon, and retain transcripts of Defendant's
chat communications with unsuspecting website visitors. Though the
Defendant neither informs visitors of this conduct nor obtains
their consent to these intrusions, Defendant has boasted of its
tactics to industry insiders.

The Defendant did not inform Class Members that Defendant was
secretly recording their communications or allowing, aiding, and
abetting a third party to eavesdrop on them. The Defendant did not
obtain Class Members' express or implied consent to wiretap or
allow third parties to eavesdrop on visitor conversations, nor did
Class Members know at the time of the conversations that Defendant
was secretly wiretapping them and allowing third parties to
eavesdrop on them, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a citizen of California residing within the
Central District of California.

The Defendant is a Delaware corporation that owns, operates, and/or
controls www.ae.com.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott J. Ferrell, Esq.
          PACIFIC TRIAL ATTORNEYS
          A Professional Corporation
          4100 Newport Place Drive, Ste. 800
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Phone: (949) 706-6464
          Fax: (949) 706-6469
          Email: sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys.com


AMERICAN PARA PROFESSIONAL: Jimenez Files TCPA Suit in N.D. Ill.
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against American Para
Professional Systems, Inc. The case is styled as Luis Jimenez,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
American Para Professional Systems, Inc. doing business as: APPS
Para Medical Services, Case No. 1:22-cv-05244 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 27,
2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.

American Para Professional Systems, Inc. --
https://appslive.com/index.aspx -- is the largest paramedical
service provider in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Marwan R. Daher, Esq.
          Omar Tayseer Sulaiman, Esq.
          Mohammed Omar Badwan, Esq.
          SULAIMAN LAW GROUP, LTD.
          2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200
          Lombard, IL 60148
          Phone: (331) 307-7646
          Fax: (630) 575-8188
          Email: mdaher@sulaimanlaw.com
                 osulaiman@sulaimanlaw.com
                 mbadwan@sulaimanlaw.com


ARC AUTOMOTIVE: Lovett Sues Over Defective Airbag Inflators
-----------------------------------------------------------
Elisabeth Lovett and Timothy Miller, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated v. ARC AUTOMOTIVE, INC., GENERAL
MOTORS, LLC, KIA CORPORATION, KIA AMERICA, INC., Case No.
3:22-cv-00725 (M.D. Tenn., Sept. 16, 2022), is brought concerning
defective inflators manufactured by Defendant ARC Automotive, Inc.
and its related entities, and installed in vehicles manufactured
and distributed by General Motors LLC, Kia Corporation, Kia
America, Inc., and their related entities (collectively the
"Vehicle Manufacturer Defendants").

Airbags are a critical component in the safety features of
virtually every motor vehicle sold in the United States and
throughout the world. Airbag modules containing ARC Automotive Inc.
hybrid inflators are installed in at least 30 million vehicles in
the United States and every day millions of people utilize these
vehicles, by necessity, to carry out their daily lives. Since at
least July of 2015, Defendants have been aware of an issue
concerning hybrid inflators manufactured by ARC Automotive Inc. due
to an ongoing National Highway Traffic Safety Association ("NHTSA")
investigation into reports of ruptured inflators that had dispersed
shrapnel, injuring or even killing vehicle occupants.

The inflators in the Class Vehicles suffer from a design defect
that makes them prone to catastrophic and dangerous failure, as
follows: the design of the inflators fails to account for the
excess, asymmetrical weld flash which is a byproduct of the
friction welding process that is required to manufacture these
inflators according to ARC's design. During manufacture of these
inflators, the friction welding process creates excess,
asymmetrical weld flash at the interface between the inner diameter
of the support tube and the upper pressure vessel. During
deployment of the inflator during an accident, a portion of this
excess, asymmetrical weld flash can become dislodged. If the
dislodged weld flash is not large enough to block the gas exit
orifice, this weld flash will exit the inflator through the gas
exit orifice. If the dislodged weld flash is sufficiently large, it
will lodge in the gas exit orifice, resulting in an increase of
pressure in the inflator housing, and causing a rupture ("Inflator
Defect" or "Defect").

As a result of a defective design and defective manufacturing
process resulting in a common, uniform defect—the presence of
excess friction weld flash inside the inflators—instead of
protecting vehicle occupants from bodily injury during accidents,
airbags with the Inflator Defect (sometimes referred to herein as
the "Defective Airbags" or "Defective Airbag Modules") too often
violently explode and rupture, expelling metal debris and shrapnel
at vehicle occupants. As a result of the Defendants' misconduct,
Plaintiffs and members of the proposed Classes were harmed and
suffered actual damages. The Defective Airbags significantly
diminish the value of the cars in which they are installed.

The Plaintiffs and the Classes did not receive the benefit of their
bargain; rather, they purchased and leased vehicles that are of a
lesser standard, grade, and quality than represented, and they did
not receive vehicles that met ordinary and reasonable consumer
expectations regarding safe and reliable operation. Purchasers or
lessees of the Class Vehicles paid more, either through a higher
purchase price or higher lease payments, than they would have had
the defects been disclosed, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased or leased Class Vehicles manufactured,
distributed, or sold by the Vehicle Manufacturer Defendants that
contain airbags containing defective inflators manufactured by
Defendant ARC.

ARC Automotive Inc. is a leading manufacturer of airbag inflators,
a critical safety device in all modern motor vehicles.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kenneth S. Byrd, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          222 2nd Ave S #1640
          Nashville, TN 37201
          Phone: 615.313.9000
          Email: kbyrd@lchb.com

               - and -

          David S. Stellings, Esq.
          Katherine I. McBride, Esq.
          Gabriel A. Panek, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10013
          Phone: 212.355.9500
          Email: dstellings@lchb.com
                 kmcbride@lchb.com
                 gpanek@lchb.com

ASTRUP DRUG INC: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Astrup Drug, Inc. The
case is styled as Luis Toro, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Astrup Drug, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-08272
(S.D.N.Y., Sept. 28, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Astrup Companies -- https://astrupcompanies.com/ -- is dedicated to
helping independents thrive as pharmacy owners face ever-evolving
patient care and business challenges.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


AZEERA INC: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Azeera, Inc. The case
is styled as Victoria Dicks, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. Azeera, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-08174
(S.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

AZEERA -- https://www.azeera.com/ -- offers the chance to design a
unique gemstone ring with conflict-free gemstones and American
workmanship.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


BELCAN CORPORATION: Nezzer Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Brian Nezzer, individually and for others similarly situated v.
BELCAN CORPORATION LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-00549-MWM (W.D. Pa., Sept.
25, 2022), is brought to recover unpaid overtime wages and other
damages from the Defendant under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act.

The Plaintiff regularly worked for the Defendant in excess of 40
hours each week. But the Defendant did not pay them overtime of at
least one and one-half their regular rates for all hours worked in
excess of 40 hours per workweek. Instead of paying overtime as
required by the FLSA, the Defendant improperly classified the
Plaintiff as salaried employees exempt from the overtime
requirements of the FLSA. the Defendant's decision not to pay
overtime compensation to the Plaintiff was neither reasonable nor
in good faith. Rather, the Defendant knowingly and deliberately
failed to compensate the Plaintiff overtime of at least one and
one-half their regular rates for all hours worked in excess of 40
hours per workweek, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a recruiter from
December 2005 to April 2020.

Belcan Corporation LLC (BCL) is a global provider of engineering
services across a variety of different industries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Alyssa White, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Phone: 713-352-1100
          Facsimile: 713-352-3300
          Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                 adunlap@mybackwages.com
                 awhite@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025
          Houston, TX 77046
          Phone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com

               - and -

          Joshua P. Geist, Esq.
          William F. Goodrich, Esq.
          GOODRICH & GEIST PC
          3634 California Ave.
          Pittsburgh, PA 15212
          Phone: 412-766-1455
          Facsimile: 412-766-0300
          Email: josh@goodrichandgeist.com
                 bill@goodrichandgeist.com


BEN-AMUN CO: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ben-Amun Co. Inc. The
case is styled as Victoria Dicks, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Ben-Amun Co. Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-08150 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Ben-Amun -- https://www.ben-amun.com/ -- designs and creates
jewelry in the Garment District of New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


BMW MANUFACTURING: Clark Files Suit in D. South Carolina
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against BMW Manufacturing
Co., LLC, et al. The case is styled as Ryan Charles Clark,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. BMW
Manufacturing Co., LLC, BMW of North America, LLC, ARC Automotive,
Inc., Case No. 2:22-cv-03244-BHH (D.S.C., Sept. 23, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Motor Vehicle Product Liability.

BMW Manufacturing Co., LLC -- https://www.bmwusfactory.com/ --
manufactures automobiles. The Company produces sport activity
vehicles for the automotive markets worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John David O'Neill, Esq.
          Kevin R Dean, Esq.
          William Christopher Swett, Esq.
          MOTLEY RICE LLC
          28 Bridgeside Blvd.
          Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464
          Phone: (843) 216-9152
          Fax: (843) 216-9450
          Email: jdoneill@motleyrice.com
                 kdean@motleyrice.com
                 cswett@motleyrice.com


BOYD GAMING: $1.2MM Class Settlement in James Suit Wins Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROGER JAMES, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BOYD GAMING CORPORATION and KANSAS
STAR CASINO, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 19-2260-DDC-ADM (D. Kan.),
Judge Daniel D. Crabtree of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Kansas grants the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for
Approval of FLSA Collective Action Settlement.

In May 2019, James, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, filed the lawsuit against the Defendants. He
alleges that the Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, 29 U.S.C. Sections 201-219 ("FLSA") by: (a) paying tipped
employees below minimum wage without complying with the FLSA's tip
credit notice provisions; and (b) maintaining a mandatory tip pool
that fails to comply with the FLSA's rules for these arrangements.

The Plaintiff worked for Boyd as a table games dealer at the Kansas
Star Casino near Wichita, Kansas. As a table games dealer, the
Pplaintiff earned sub-minimum wage plus tips. He filed the lawsuit
individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated hourly,
non-exempt employees who worked at 13 casinos operated by the
Defendants. He asserts two kinds of FLSA violations.

Count I alleges that the Defendants violated the FLSA by paying the
Plaintiff and others similarly situated below the federal minimum
wage rate without complying with the "tip credit" notice provision
governing employers who pay less than the federal minimum wage.
Count II alleges the Defendants violated the FLSA by implementing
and maintaining an invalid tip pool which, in turn, failed to pay
the Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees all the tips
they were entitled to receive.

On March 2, 2021, the Court entered a 56-page Memorandum and Order.
Among other rulings, the Order granted the Plaintiff's request for
conditional collective action certification of two collectives
under the FLSA.

First, the Court conditionally certified the Tip Credit Notice
Collective under Section 216(b) of the FLSA, defined as: "All
persons employed at a relevant Boyd Gaming casino during the
relevant time period and paid a base hourly wage of less than the
applicable federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour."

Second, the Court conditionally certified the Tip Pool Collective
under Section 216(b) of the FLSA, defined as: "All persons employed
as a table games dealer and included within a tip pooling
arrangement at a relevant Boyd Gaming casino during the relevant
time period."

After more than three years of litigation (which has included a
contested conditional certification motion, the Court's conditional
certification of two FLSA collective actions, and the parties'
distribution of notice to those collective action members), the
parties successfully mediated the case to resolution. They report
that they have reached a collective action settlement to resolve
all FLSA claims at issue. On April 21, 2022, Analytics Consulting
LLC sent notice of the proposed FLSA settlement to 828 collective
members.

And now, the Plaintiff has filed an unopposed motion asking the
court to approve that FLSA collective action settlement. More
specifically, the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion For Approval of FLSA
Collective Action Settlement asks the Court to: (1) grant final
collective certification; (2) approve the $1.2 million settlement
fund to pay the claims of collective members; (3) appoint Analytics
Consulting LLC as settlement administrator and approve paying its
fees from the settlement fund as reasonable; (4) approve as
reasonable the $5,000 service award to plaintiff Roger James,
payable from the settlement fund; (5) approve as reasonable the
separately negotiated award of $1.1 million in attorneys' fees to
the Plaintiff's counsel; and (6) approve as reasonable the
Plaintiff's counsel's $85,000 in advanced litigation expenses,
payable from the settlement fund.

Judge Crabtree finds that the proposed settlement is fair and
equitable under the Rule 23(e) factors, as well as other
considerations "in light of the history and policy of the FLSA."
Thus, he finds that the parties' settlement is a fair and equitable
settlement under the FLSA.

Judge Crabtree also finds that the attorneys' fees requested are
fair and reasonable. He, thus, grants the Plaintiff's request and
approves the $1.1 million requested attorneys' fees award.

For the reasons explained, the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion For
Approval of FLSA Collective Action Settlement is granted.

Specifically, Judge Crabtree grants final collective certification;
approves the $1.2 million settlement fund to pay the claims of
collective members; appoints Analytics Consulting LLC as the
settlement administrator and approves paying its fees from the
settlement fund as reasonable; approves as reasonable the $5,000
service award to James, payable from the settlement fund; approves
as reasonable the separately negotiated award of $1.1 million
attorneys' fees to the Plaintiff's counsel; and approves as
reasonable the Plaintiff's counsel's $85,000 in advanced litigation
expenses that will be paid from the settlement fund.

The Clerk is directed to enter the parties' proposed Final Order
and Judgment Granting Approval of FLSA Collective Action Settlement
and Dismissing Collective Members and Defendants with Prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Memorandum & Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/3mupcrvn from Leagle.com.


BROWN UNIVERSITY: Senior Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Brown University. The
case is styled as Milagros Senior, on behalf of herself and all
other persons similarly situated v. Brown University, Case No.
1:22-cv-08177 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Brown University -- https://www.brown.edu/ -- is a private Ivy
League research university in Providence, Rhode Island.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: nyjg@aol.com
                 michael@gottlieb.legal


BURLAP AND BARREL: Slade Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Burlap and Barrel,
Inc. The case is styled as Linda Slade, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons v. Burlap
and Barrel, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-08231 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 27,
2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Burlap & Barrel -- https://www.burlapandbarrel.com/ -- is a spice
importer specializing in fine, single-origin products that will
take you through the major demands of everyday cooking..[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
          Scarsdale, NY 10583
          Phone: (917) 373-9128
          Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


CALIFORNIA: Smith v. Watanabe & DMHC Dismissed With Leave to Amend
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GRACE SMITH, et al., Plaintiffs v. MARY WATANABE, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-07872-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California grants the Motion to Dismiss filed
by Defendants Department of Managed Health Care and Mary Watanabe.

The Plaintiffs are two disabled individuals and a foundation that
supports Independent Living Centers and programs for persons with
disabilities in California. They filed the putative class action
lawsuit on Oct. 7, 2021, alleging that Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan, Inc. and the Department of Managed Health Care ("DMHC") and
its director, Watanabe, unlawfully exclude or limit coverage for
wheelchairs.

In 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act" ("ACA") with the aim of "increasing the number of
Americans covered by health insurance and decreasing the cost of
health care." The ACA requires most Americans to maintain "minimum
essential" coverage, which they can do through a variety of health
insurance plans provided by their employer, the government, or
private carriers. It mandates that all individual and small group
plans cover 10 broad categories of essential health benefits
("EHBs"), including "rehabilitative and habilitative services and
devices."

The ACA, however, does not compel plans to cover everything that
might fall under the broad rubric of rehabilitative or habilitative
services or devices. Instead, it directs the Secretary of Health
and Human Services ("HHS") to define, subject to certain
constraints, the specific "items and services" that must be covered
within the enumerated categories of EHBs. The only Congressional
limitation on the Secretary's power in that regard is that the
scope of coverage for EHBs must be "equal to the scope of benefits
provided under a typical employer plan."

The HHS Secretary, in turn, adopted the "benchmark" approach to
specify what must be covered within each EHB category. Under the
benchmark approach, each state is required to select one typical
benefit health plan that health plans throughout the state may use
as a model. A plan providing EHBs must offer benefits that are
"substantially equal" to the "benchmark" plan set by the state.

In 2012, the California Legislature selected the Kaiser Small Group
HMO 30 plan as the state's "Benchmark Plan." The 2014 version of
Kaiser's Small Group HMO 30 plan is presently California's
Benchmark Plan. In its list of covered "durable medical equipment"
("DME"), the Benchmark Plan does not include wheelchairs.

The Plaintiffs allege that "DMHC is responsible for implementing
and enforcing the EHB-Benchmark standards in all individual and
small group managed health care plans, and ensuring that such plans
are otherwise in compliance with federal and state law." They sue
Director Watanabe "only in her official capacity" based on her
enforcement of the EHB-benchmark standards. They aver that "the
exclusion of wheelchairs from the California EHB-benchmark plan
discriminates against people with disabilities" under Section
1557.

On Feb. 4, 2022, the Defendants filed three motions. DMHC and
Director Watanabe (together, the "State Defendants") moved to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint on the grounds that the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the Plaintiffs lack standing,
their claims are time-barred, and they  failed to plead claims upon
which relief may be granted. Kaiser separately filed motions to
compel arbitration and stay proceedings and to dismiss.

First, Judge Gilliam holds that DMHC did not waive its sovereign
immunity by virtue of receiving federal financial assistance. He
finds that (i) the Plaintiffs concede that the State Defendants are
not currently directly receiving federal funds; (ii) the Plaintiffs
fail to establish that the database constituted "real property" or
"personal property" so as to trigger any arguable ongoing waiver of
sovereign immunity that could extend beyond the period during which
the Defendants were receiving federal funds; and (iii) the
Plaintiffs make only conclusory allegations "naming Director
Watanabe under Ex parte Young" for "continuing to implement the
discriminatory policy," so dismissal of Watanabe is warranted on
this ground.

The Plaintiffs argue that injunctive or declaratory relief may be
available under Greater L.A. Council on Deafness v. Zolin, 812 F.2d
1103, 1107-1112 (9th Cir. 1987). In Zolin, the Ninth Circuit
remanded to the district court, but only for consideration of
whether declaratory relief was available against defendants who
were not protected by any form of immunity. The Zolin court
clarified that injunctive relief is not available against an entity
that is not presently receiving federal financial assistance.

In the case, suit against DMHC is barred by the Eleventh Amendment,
and the Plaintiffs fail to advance sufficient allegations to
sustain a claim against Director Watanabe. So Judge Gilliam's
finding that the Plaintiffs fail to establish subject matter
jurisdiction in the face of the Defendants' invocation of sovereign
immunity also bars the Plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief.

For these reasons, Judge Gilliam grants the State Defendants'
motion to dismiss with leave for the Plaintiffs to amend the
Complaint. Any amended complaint must be filed within 28 days from
the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/tepvv4ez from Leagle.com.


CAPRICIO'S PIZZA: Pineda Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Eduin Pineda, and all other persons similarly situated v.
CAPRICIOIS d/b/a CAPRICIO'S PIZZA and GIUSEPPE SATIRO, Case No.
5:22-cv-03831 (E.D. Pa., Sept. 27, 2022), is brought against the
Defendants to recover unpaid and overtime wages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and
Collection Law.

The Plaintiff worked from Sunday to Thursday from 10 am to 9pm
without a break. The Plaintiff worked Friday through Saturday from
10am to 10pm without a break. On Wednesday, the Plaintiff would
perform prep work in the mornings and help the restaurant before
closing for a total of five hours. On occasion, depending on how
busy the restaurant was, Plaintiff would work an extra hourly early
or an extra hour later. From January 2022 through March 2022,
Plaintiff was $300 a week. In March 2022, Plaintiff was paid $550
per week. From May 2022 through August 2022, Plaintiff was paid
$700 per week. The Plaintiff's salary was not inclusive of
overtime. Rather, the Plaintiff was only paid for the first 40
hours that he worked each week. The Defendants willfully failed to
pay the Plaintiff the appropriate overtime premiums for all hours
worked in excess of 40 hours per work week, as required by the
FLSA, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a dishwasher, would
clean the pizzeria, cook, perform prep work, do inventory and also
worked a waiter from January 15, 2022 through on August 7, 2022.

Capricio's is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the restaurant
industry with a business located in Smoketown, Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jacob Aronauer, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JACOB ARONAUER
          225 Broadway, 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 323-6980
          Email: jaronauer@aronauerlaw.com


CCG VENTURES: Williams Files Suit in E.D. Michigan
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CCG Ventures, Inc.
The case is styled as Carolyn Williams, Lisa Porter, Vermell
Sangster, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. CCG Ventures, Inc. d/b/a CBS, Case No.
2:22-cv-12282-TGB-APP (E.D. Mich., Sept. 27, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I.

CCG Ventures, Inc. doing business as CBS -- http://www.cbs.com/--
is an American commercial broadcast television and radio
network.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gregory A. Mitchell, Esq.
          Sharon S. Almonrode, Esq.
          E. Powell Miller, Esq.
          THE MILLER LAW FIRM PC
          950 W University Dr., Ste. 300
          Rochester, MI 48307
          Phone: (248) 841-2200
          Email: gam@millerlawpc.com
                 ssa@millerlawpc.com
                 epm@millerlawpc.com


CHARLET BROTHERS: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Charlet Brothers,
LLC. The case is styled as Victoria Dicks, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated v. Charlet Brothers, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-08157 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Charlet Brothers LLC -- https://www.charletbros.com/ -- is a
southern home building company that specialize in French-inspired
design and the utilization of reclaimed materials and architectural
salvage.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


CHW GROUP INC: Katz Suit Removed to W.D. Arkansas
-------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Sam Katz, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. CHW Group, Inc. doing business as: Choice
Home Warranty, Case No. 04CV-22-01766 was removed from the Benton
County Circuit Court, to the U.S. District Court for Western
District of Arkansas on Sept. 27, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:22-cv-05198-PKH to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

Choice Home Warranty (CHW) -- https://www.choicehomewarranty.com/
-- provides comprehensive coverage at an affordable price to
customers and saves homeowners money on expensive repairs and
replacement costs for home systems and appliances.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Corey D. McGaha, Esq.
          COREY D. MCGAHA PLLC
          5507 Ranch Drive, Suite 104-D
          Little Rock, AR 72223
          Phone: (501) 205-4027
          Fax: (501) 367-8208
          Email: cmcgaha@mcgahalaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Emily Aura Neal, Esq.
          5100 West JB Hunt Dr., Ste. 840
          Rogers, AR 72758
          Phone: (479) 553-7678
          Email: emily@eldridgebrooks.com

COLORADO BABY INC: Loadholt Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Colorado Baby, Inc.
The case is styled as Christopher Loadholt, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Colorado Baby, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-08241 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 27, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Colorado Baby, Inc. -- https://www.coloradobabyonline.com/ -- offer
classes locally and virtually from cloth diapering to labor skills,
breastfeeding and pelvic floor health.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


CONSERVICE LLC: Ray Suit Removed to S.D. California
---------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Michael Ray, Britni Georgianna, Roes 1 through
100, inclusive, on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Conservice, LLC, Does 1 through 10,000 inclusive, Case No.
37-02022-00034034-CU-BT-CTL was removed from the Superior Court,
San Diego County, CA, to the U.S. District Court for Southern
District of California on Sept. 23, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:22-cv-01442-BEN-AHG to
the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

Conservice -- https://www.conservice.com/ -- is the nation's
largest, most trusted utility management & billing services
company.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jeffrey L. Hogue, Esq.
          Jimmie Davis Parker, Esq.
          Tyler Jay Belong, Esq.
          HOGUE & BELONG, APC
          170 Laurel Street
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone: (619) 238-4720
          Fax: (619) 238-5260
          Email: jhogue@hoguebelonglaw.com
                 JDParker@gmail.com
                 tbelong@hoguebelonglaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Craig J Mariam, Esq.
          Scott McCaskill, Esq.
          GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI LLP
          633 West 5th Street, 52nd Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Phone: (213) 576-5000
          Fax: (877) 306-0043
          Email: cmariam@gordonrees.com
                 smccaskill@grsm.com


CPC LOGISTICS: Barajas Suit Remanded to Alameda Superior Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, OSCAR BARAJAS, Plaintiff v. CPC LOGISTICS SOLUTIONS,
LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 22-cv-03911-WHO (N.D. Cal.),
Judge William H. Orrick of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California remands the lawsuit to the Superior Court of
the State of California for the County of Alameda.

In this class action, Barajas alleges that CPC Logistics Solutions
LLC, CPC Logistics, Inc., and Newco Distributors, Inc. ("CPC")
violated California law by failing to provide compliant meal and
rest breaks, overtime pay, wage statements, and timely final wages,
as well as failed to reimburse business expenses.

At issue now is his motion to remand: He asserts that the
Defendants have failed to allege that there is in excess of $5
million in controversy, which would allow this case to be in
federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").
CPC has the burden to establish the amount-in-controversy. It used
a 100% violation rate for the derivative wage statement and penalty
claims in order to meet that burden even though the parties agreed
to use a 20% violation rate for the missed meal and rest breaks.

The wage and hour class action as removed from Alameda County
Superior Court to the Court on July 1, 2022. In support of the
Notice of Removal, and in support of the Opposition to the Motion
to Remand, the Defendants rely on the declarations of Bill Steimel
and Leslie Gomez. The Plaintiff has moved to remand because the
Defendants have failed to reasonably support their assertion that
the amount in controversy meets or exceeds the $5 million CAFA
floor.

The Plaintiff first challenges CPC's use of $27.72 as the average
hourly base rate for putative class members in order to support its
estimate of the amount in controversy. He proposes, instead, an
average wage rate based on his own average; $22.75. In opposition,
CPC agrees to use $22.75 as the average base rate to calculate the
amount in controversy.

Whether the Defendants' estimate of the amount in controversy
exceeds CAFA's $5 million floor turns on whether they have proposed
reasonable rates of violation for the claims asserted. The only
matters in dispute are the Defendants' use of the 100% violation
rate for the wage statement and waiting time penalty calculations.

Judge Orrick holds that the Defendants do not provide evidence --
other than considering the hours Barajas worked, identifying the
outer-limits of the potential class sizes for employed and
terminated employees, and noting that class members averaged just
under 40 hours of work each week -- to support their use of 100%
violation rates for these two calculations. The Plaintiffs do not
contest the Defendants' evidence regarding his work schedules, the
number of putative class members for the claims, or the average
hours worked. But that evidence is not tied to and cannot support
the Defendants' use of a 100% violation rate for the waiting time
and wage statement claims.

The Defendants rest their use of the 100% violation rates solely on
the "broad allegations" in the Plaintiff's complaint, referring to
their "policies and practices" of violating the wage and hour laws
asserted. The allegations alone are not so broad to imply that each
putative class member suffered a wage statement violation for every
pay period or that the maximum waiting time penalties could be
awarded as the Defendants have assumed.

Alone, broad allegations in a complaint do not typically justify a
100% violation rate for either the waiting time penalty or wage
statement violations. Also, with specific respect to waiting time
penalties, the fact that the Plaintiff's complaint seeks "up to"
the full 30-day maximum period does not by itself justify a 100%
violation rate.

Both sides use a 20% violation rate for the missed meal and rest
breaks. Using a 100% violation rate for the derivative wage
statement and waiting time penalty claims is unsupported by the
allegations made, the types of claims at issue, and the evidentiary
submissions by the Defendants.

Judge Orrick grants the motion to remand.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 23, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/yy7k6tme from Leagle.com.


CREW OUTFITTERS: Toro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Crew Outfitters, Inc.
The case is styled as Luis Toro, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Crew Outfitters, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-08244 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 27, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Crew Outfitters -- https://crewoutfitters.com/ -- is dedicated to
serving the airline industry with exemplary customer service.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


CRICKET MEDIA: Wissmueller Files Suit in E.D. Michigan
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cricket Media, Inc.
The case is styled as Tamara Wissmueller, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Cricket Media, Inc.,
Case No. 2:22-cv-12284-GCS-CI (E.D. Mich., Sept. 27, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I.

Cricket Media -- https://cricketmedia.com/ -- is a global education
company known for creating high-quality print and multi-media
products for children, families, eMentors, teachers, and partners
that improve learning opportunities for everyone.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          E. Powell Miller, Esq.
          THE MILLER LAW FIRM PC
          950 W University Dr., Ste. 300
          Rochester, MI 48307
          Phone: (248) 841-2200
          Email: epm@millerlawpc.com


DEMISCH DANANT: Young Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Demisch Danant, LLC.
The case is styled as Lawrence Young, on behalf of himself and all
other persons similarly situated v. Demisch Danant, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-08148 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Demisch Danant -- https://www.demischdanant.com/ -- was founded by
Suzanne Demisch and Stephane Danant as a twentieth-century French
design gallery with a post-war focus.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly G. Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM, PC
          155 East 55th St., Ste. 6a
          New York, NY 10022
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: brad@markslawpc.com



DIAMONDBACK ENERGY: Trahan Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Bryan Trahan, individually and for others similarly situated v.
DIAMONDBACK ENERGY, INC., Case No. 7:22-cv-00207 (W.D. Tex., Sept.
23, 2022), is brought to recover unpaid overtime wages and other
damages from the Defendant under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff regularly worked more than 40 hours a week. But they
never received overtime for the hours they worked in excess of 40
hours in a single workweek. Instead of receiving overtime as
required by the FLSA, the Defendant classified the Plaintiff as an
independent contractor. The Plaintiff was paid a flat amount for
each day worked for the Defendant without overtime compensation.
Neither the Plaintiff, nor any other similarly situated workers who
worked for the Defendant and received a day-rate, received a
guaranteed salary, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendant as a Drilling Consultant
from November 2017 until May 2020.

Diamondback is one of the largest independent oil and gas companies
in the Permian Basin.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Lindsay R. Itkin, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Phone: 713-352-1100
          Facsimile: 713-352-3300
          Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                 adunlap@mybackwages.com
                 litkin@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025
          Houston, TX 77046
          Phone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com


DINOSAUR DESIGNS: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dinosaur Designs
(U.S.A.) Pty Ltd. The case is styled as Valerie Dicks, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. Dinosaur Designs
(U.S.A.) Pty Ltd., Case No. 1:22-cv-08144 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 23,
2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Dinosaur Designs -- https://www.dinosaurdesigns.com/ -- are
renowned for their unique hand crafted resin Jewelry & homeware
designs.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


DRAMA BOOK SHOP: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Drama Book Shop, Inc.
The case is styled as Valerie Dicks, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Drama Book Shop, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-08173 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Drama Book Shop, Inc. -- https://www.dramabookshop.com/ -- is a
bookshop with theater & film titles that include plays & scripts,
plus in-store scene readings.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


EASTMAN KODAK: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Securities Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY SECURITIES LITIGATION,
Case No. 6:21-CV-6418 EAW (W.D.N.Y.), Judge Elizabeth A. Wolford of
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York grants
the joint motion filed by the Defendants seeking dismissal of the
consolidated class action complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.

The Plaintiffs commenced the putative federal securities class
action against Kodak, an internationally recognized company known
primarily for its photography and film manufacturing business, on
behalf of certain purchasers of Kodak securities. Following
bankruptcy proceedings in 2012, Kodak began expanding its business
by focusing on commercial products and digital printing.

In the spring of 2020, during the emergence of the COVID-19
pandemic, the United States government began exploring the
possibility of obtaining assistance from domestic companies
qualified to provide products and services to help fight COVID-19.
Specifically, on May 14, 2020, then-President Donald Trump issued
an executive order which permitted the DFC to issue loans to
domestic companies capable of providing strategic resources
responsive to the COVID-19 outbreak.

In response to the White House announcement, Kodak dedicated
resources to explore its ability to produce chemical ingredients
used in the manufacture of drugs designed to combat COVID-19,
including hydroxychloroquine. The prospect of a lucrative
government loan caused Kodak's stock price to rise from the $2
range, where it sat in the spring of 2020. Kodak designated the new
project with the code name "Project Tiger" to maintain its
confidentiality.

In the consolidated class action complaint, Lead Plaintiffs Les
Investissements Kiz Inc. and UAT Trading Service, Inc. allege
violations of federal securities laws by Kodak, Kodak's Executive
Chairman and CEO James V. Continenza, CFO David Bullwinkle, General
Counsel Roger W. Byrd, director Philippe D. Katz, director Richard
"Todd" Bradley, director Jason New, director Jeffrey Engelberg,
director William G. Parrett, and director.

The action arises out of the events surrounding a Letter of
Interest ("LOI") entered into between Kodak and the United States
International Development Finance Corp. ("DFC") in July of 2020,
discussing a contemplated loan of $765 million from DFC to Kodak to
support the conversion of Kodak's manufacturing facilities to
produce pharmaceutical products. It consists of two matters
transferred to this District and consolidated for all purposes into
a single action denominated "In re Eastman Kodak Company Securities
Litigation."

On June 23, 2020, Continenza purchased 46,737 shares of Kodak stock
at an average price of $2.22 a share and Katz purchased 5,000
shares at the same average price. During DFC's visit at Kodak
headquarters, Kodak learned that DFC would enter into an LOI with
Kodak regarding the potential loan and that the LOI would be
announced in a press release on July 28, 2020. On July 27, 2020,
Kodak leaked information to the press concerning the July 28th
announcement.

The day before the LOI was scheduled to be announced, Continenza
and Byrd convened a meeting of Kodak's Board of Directors and its
Compensation, Nominating and Governance Committee ("CNG Committee")
to notify them of the LOI prior to the DFC announcement and to seek
approval for granting "spring-loaded" stock options to certain
members of Kodak's senior management, including Continenza,
Bullwinkle, and Byrd. The options granted these Defendants the
right to purchase Kodak shares at a pre-arranged strike price that
would be worth millions if the stock price surged.

Following the leak, the price of Kodak's shares increased and
closed at $2.62 a share, but opened the following morning at $9.63
a share, representing a nearly 370% overnight increase. At
approximately 9:00 a.m. on July 28, 2020, just before the market
opened, the DFC issued a statement confirming the contemplated deal
for the $765 million loan to Kodak. The following day, Continenza
appeared on several interviews with financial news media. On July
29, 2020, Kodak's shares rose to an intra-day high of $60 per share
and closed at $33.20 per share, or more than 318% higher than the
closing price the previous day.

Also on July 29, 2020, the Defendants disclosed in Form 4 SEC
filings that Continenza, Bullwinkle, and other executives had been
granted options on July 27th. After the market closed that day, the
Wall Street Journal published an article entitled, "Tweets and
Articles Sent Kodak Shares Surging Before Official Announcement."
On July 30, 2020, Kodak's shares fell by $3.37 a share to close at
$29.83 per share. In a communication between Kodak and DFC on July
30, 2020, that discussed questions from the media about the loan, a
Kodak spokesperson responded that the loan was not guaranteed and
no deal had been finalized. Kodak shares declined an additional
$7.98 per share to close at $21.85 per share.

Over the next several days, additional news sources reported on the
options. Kodak's shares continued to fall and closed at $14.91 per
share on Aug. 3, 2020. On Aug. 5, 2020, the Wall Street Journal
published an article that indicated that several congressional
committees were seeking records from Kodak and the DFC. On Aug. 7,
2020, Kodak announced that it would conduct an "internal review" of
the facts surrounding the disclosure of the loan and the granting
of the options. It appointed a special committee of independent
directors, including New and Parrett, to oversee the review, which
was conducted by its outside counsel.

On Aug. 11, 2020, the Wall Street Journal published an article that
indicated that an SEC filing from the previous week documented that
Karfunkel had made a gift of three million shares to a congregation
in Brooklyn, New York. Kodak's share price closed that day at
$10.01, down 6.7% from the previous day. After the market closed
that day, Kodak held a conference call during which Continenza
referred to the loan as a "potential loan" and indicated support
for the DFC decision to await clarification before moving forward.
Kodak's May 17, 2021 filing with the SEC indicates that the LOI has
never been formally terminated, but given the time elapsed, Kodak
is operating on the basis that the loan will not proceed.

The consolidated class action complaint alleges three causes of
action: First, against Kodak and Continenza for violation of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act") and Rule 10b-5(b) promulgated thereunder; second, against all
Defendants for violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) promulgated thereunder; and third, against
the individual Defendants for violation of Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act. The consolidated class action complaint alleges a
class period of July 27, 2020, through Aug. 11, 2020, and the
claims are asserted on behalf of all persons or entities that
purchased or sold publicly traded securities of Kodak during that
period.

The case, Tang v. Eastman Kodak Co., Civil Action No. 6:21-cv-6418,
was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
on Aug. 13, 2020. On Aug. 26, 2020, McAdams v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
Civil Action No. 6:21-cv-6449, was filed in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York. Both matters were
transferred to this District on May 28, 2021, and June 15, 2021,
respectively. By Stipulation and Order entered June 22, 2021, the
matters were consolidated for all purposes into one action and
McAdams was administratively terminated.

On Dec. 14, 2021, the Defendants filed the instant joint motion to
dismiss the consolidated class action complaint for failure to
state a claim. A joint memorandum of law was filed on behalf of all
Defendants and separate supplemental memoranda on behalf of certain
outside directors were also filed. On Feb. 28, 2022, the Plaintiffs
filed their opposition, and on April 6, 2022, the Defendants filed
their replies. The Court heard oral argument on Aug. 3, 2022, and
reserved decision.

The Plaintiffs' first claim is asserted against Kodak and
Continenza pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5(b). The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have failed to
adequately allege that they made misstatements or omissions of
material fact in connection with the DFC loan.

Judge Wolford agrees. She says, in contrast to a statement of
existing fact, an expression of an opinion, expectation, or
intention may not be actionable under Rule 10b-5 unless certain
conditions are met. Similarly, mere statements of puffery are not
actionable. Separately, the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") a safe harbor for forward-looking statements.
Applying these legal principles, she agrees with the Defendants
that none of the specific statements allegedly made by Kodak and
Continenza are actionable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b).

Further, Judge Wolford agrees with the Defendants that the
Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege in the first instance
that the granting of the stock options constituted misconduct.
Their allegations that the grant of the stock options was wrongful
and a scheme to unjustly enrich the Defendants fail to satisfy the
applicable pleading standards. The Plaintiffs have arguably alleged
facts supporting the conclusion that the granting of the stock
options reflected poor business judgment that ultimately cost Kodak
a significant opportunity. However, the securities laws were not
designed to provide an umbrella cause of action for the review of
management practices, nor is 'fraud by hindsight' a viable basis
upon which to challenge management practices that ultimately result
in losses.

The question before the Court is whether the Plaintiffs have
alleged, with the requisite factual support, that the grant of the
stock options was wrongful such that DFC's discovery thereof would
have been expected by the Defendants to completely scuttle the loan
negotiations. They have not, nor have they otherwise viably alleged
any misstatements or omissions of material fact by the Defendants.
Count I of the consolidated class action complaint accordingly must
be dismissed.

Judge Wolford turns next to the Plaintiffs' claim under Rule
10b-5(a) and (c), which provide for a "scheme liability" or "market
manipulation" claim. The

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' consolidated class action
complaint does nothing more than rehash the same alleged
misrepresentations and omissions as in their Rule 10b-5(b) claim
and does not allege how or why the purported scheme was deceptive
or manipulative. Judge Wolford agrees. The Plaintiffs have not
"articulated with precision the contours of an alleged scheme to
defraud investors, or which specific acts were conducted in
furtherance of it." They alleged that the granting of stock options
to Continenza, Byrd, and Bullwinkle was inherently a deceptive or
manipulative act.

In other words, whether denoted as "scheme liability" claim or a
"market manipulation" claim, Count II can survive only if a
deceptive or manipulative act -- independent from the alleged
misstatements or omissions-- occurred. The Plaintiffs have not
alleged that this is the case, and so Count II must be dismissed.

In addition to the reasons discussed, the Defendants also argue
that Claims I and II fail because the Plaintiffs have failed to
plead a strong inference of scienter or loss causation. Because she
has already determined for the reasons previously discussed that
Claims I and II are subject to dismissal, Judge Wolford need not
and does not reach these arguments.

In Count III, the Plaintiffs allege that the individual Defendants
should be liable as control persons under Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act. Because she finds that the Plaintiffs have not
adequately pled primary violations in Count I and Count II, Judge
Wolford holds that Claim III is subject to dismissal as a secondary
violation. Accordingly, she grants the Defendants' motion as to
this claim.

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is
granted in its entirety. The Clerk of Court is directed to close
the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5cn92vjc from Leagle.com.


FIRST ON FIRST DELI: Brown Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against First On First Deli
Inc., et al. The case is styled as Altaune Brown, and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated v. First On First Deli Inc.,
401 East 91st Street Corp., Case No. 1:22-cv-08145-ER (S.D.N.Y.,
Sept. 23, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

First On First Deli Inc. is a deli and grocery located in New York
City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly G. Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM, PC
          155 East 55th St., Ste. 6a
          New York, NY 10022
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: brad@markslawpc.com


GAP INC: Missouri Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Hennessey Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JILL HENNESSEY, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. THE GAP, INC. and OLD NAVY,
LLC, Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-01867-SEP (E.D. Mo.), Judge Sarah
E. Pitlyk of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division, grants the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.

The lawsuit is a putative class action brought under the laws of
the State of Missouri pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005. Hennessey alleges that the Defendants The Gap and Old Navy
violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA) by making
false and misleading price comparisons in connection with the
advertisement and sale of their merchandise. She alleges that she
purchased numerous products at advertised discount prices at "one
or more Gap and Old Navy retail stores" in Missouri, and seeks to
represent herself and a putative class of similarly situated
Missouri purchasers who, within five years prior to the date of
filing, purchased products from the Defendants at prices that
purported to be discounts of 20% or more.

As many stores do, the Defendants sell products at "regular" prices
and at discounted "sale" prices. According to the Plaintiff, the
sale prices that the Defendants advertised for many of their
products were deceptive, because they did not sell a substantial
quantity of those products at the regular price for a substantial
period of time prior to selling them at the sale price. She further
alleges that, "through their use of fictitious and unsubstantiated
former price comparisons, the Defendants intentionally and/or
negligently misrepresented and/or failed to disclose material
information concerning the actual value or worth of the products
they sold to Plaintiff and the Class."

The Plaintiff claims that by advertising the sale prices in
comparison with the illusory former prices, the Defendants
"represented that consumers can buy product on 'sale' and at a
substantial discount from their advertised former price," and
"intended to induce Plaintiff and members of the Class to purchase
products in quantities and/or at prices at which they would not
otherwise have agreed." She also alleges that, in addition to their
comparative pricing scheme, the Defendants offer "a constant array
of promotions, such as store-wide sales, coupons, and other
discounts, such that the average actual selling price (and
therefore the market value) of each item is often less than the
advertised 'sale' price." She claims that as a result of the
Defendants' misleading advertising practices, she and the putative
class members did not receive the benefit of the bargain that the
Defendants promised them, because the products they purchased from
Defendants did not have the higher value that Defendants allegedly
represented they had.

The Amended Complaint details three specific transactions and
includes at least 21 items that the Plaintiff purchased during the
putative class period, such as: a blouse with a regular price of
$15.29 and a sale price of $9.17; a tank-top with a regular price
of $4.99 and a sale price of $2.49; and a crew-neck T-shirt with a
regular price of $14.99 and a sale price of $7.49. The Plaintiff
alleges that she "is now informed and believes that all of the
alleged former prices were false and misleading because they did
not represent actual, bona fide prices" as required by Missouri
law. She also alleges that she "is further informed and believes
that the prevailing retail price and, therefore, the actual fair
market value of each item at the time of her purchase was
materially lower than the advertised former prices and may have
even been less than the discounted prices that she paid."

Based on the foregoing allegations, the Amended Complaint brings
two counts: Count I - unlawful practices in violation of the MMPA;
and Count II: unjust enrichment.

In their Motion to Dismiss, the Defendants argue that The Gap
should be dismissed as a party because the Plaintiff fails to
allege a specific transaction with The Gap; Count I should be
dismissed because the Plaintiff fails to allege an ascertainable
loss under the benefit-of-the-bargain rule; and Count II should be
dismissed because the Plaintiff received what she intended to
purchase. Because she finds that Counts I and II should be
dismissed, Judge Pitlyk does not consider the Defendants' argument
regarding the individual dismissal of The Gap.

The Plaintiff claims that she was injured by the Defendants'
comparative pricing scheme, which she alleges was deceptive and
unlawful under the MMPA. The Defendants argue that even if their
pricing scheme violated the MMPA (Count I), it did not cause
Plaintiff to suffer any ascertainable loss.

Judge Pitlyk agrees with the Defendants. Because the allegations in
the Amended Complaint fail to establish that the actual market
values of the products that the Plaintiff received were lower than
represented values of those products, the Plaintiff fails to allege
an ascertainable loss and consequently fails to state an MMPA claim
upon which relief may be granted. Judge Pitlyk thus "joins a
growing number of courts, in finding that complaints based solely
on a Plaintiff's disappointment over not receiving an advertised
discount at the time of purchase has not suffered an ascertainable
loss."

The Amended Complaint alleges that "it would be against equity and
good conscience to permit the Defendants to retain the ill-gotten
benefits that they received from the Plaintiff and the Class in
light of the fact that the products that they purchased from the
Defendants did not have the higher value or worth that the
Defendants represented they had through their false former price
comparisons.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's claim for unjust
enrichment (Count II) should be dismissed because 'there can be no
unjust enrichment if the parties receive what they intended to
obtain." According to Defendants, they were not unjustly enriched
because the Plaintiff "voluntarily entered into transactions with
the Defendants and received the goods bargained for at their
advertised current prices."

The Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim rests on the same
foundation as her MMPA claim. The premise of both is that she
suffered a loss, and Defendants were correspondingly unjustly
enriched, when she did not receive products that were "worth the
higher amounts represented by Defendants' baseless reference
prices." Thus, in defense of her unjust enrichment claim, she once
again argues that her allegation that the value of the Defendants'
products was less than their advertised reference prices must be
taken as true, and that it demonstrates that she suffered a loss.

The Plaintiff is once again mistaken, Judge Pitlyk finds, and for
two reasons. First, the Court does not have to accept as true
allegations that are conclusory, or unsupported by any
particularized facts. Second, even if it were properly pled, the
fact that the value of a purchased product was less than a former
price would not support an unjust enrichment claim, because a
former price is irrelevant to whether a seller was unjustly
enriched by the price someone paid today. Nothing in the Complaint
supports a finding that it would be inequitable for the Defendants
to retain the money the Plaintiff paid for the products she
purchased. Thus, the Plaintiff fails to state an unjust enrichment
claim upon which relief may be granted.

Accordingly, for these reasons, Judge Pitlyk grants the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss, and dismisses the Amended Complaint. A separate
order of dismissal accompanies the Memorandum and Order. The Joint
Memorandum Requesting Discovery Conference is denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 23, 2022 Memorandum & Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/57afkfvp from Leagle.com.


GMRG ACQ1: Can Compel Arbitration in Palomo Suit Over Unpaid Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TIFFANY PALOMO, on behalf of herself and those
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GMRG ACQ1, LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-02181-HLT-KGG (D. Kan.), Judge Holly
L. Teeter of the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas
compels arbitration and stays the case pending completion.

Ms. Palomo brings the putative collective action against her
employer GMRG and its officers and subsidiaries. GMRG operates
Pizza Hut stores in Kansas, Nebraska, and other states. The
Plaintiff claims that the Defendants violate the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") and Nebraska state law by failing to pay
minimum wages to their pizza delivery drivers. The Defendants move
to compel arbitration and dismiss the case.

The Plaintiff delivers pizza for the Defendants. She electronically
reviewed and signed a two-page arbitration agreement when GMRG
hired her in 2020. The agreement governs any claims against GMRG
relating to her employment, including wages, compensation, and
expense reimbursement. She waived the right to bring a collective
or class action against GMRG and agreed to arbitrate disputes only
in her individual capacity.

The Plaintiff does not deny entering the agreement. Instead, she
claims the agreement is unenforceable and unconscionable. She bases
her enforceability argument on the theory that a party cannot be
compelled to submit FLSA claims to arbitration. And she argues the
agreement is unconscionable both procedurally and substantively
because of the unequal bargaining power between employer and
employee.

Judge Teeter finds that the terms of the agreement cover claims
concerning the very matters raised in the Plaintiff's complaint:
wages, expense reimbursement, and compensation. By entering the
agreement, she agreed to arbitrate "any claims" between the
parties. She also agreed to bring those claims as an individual in
arbitration and not as a collective or class action. All these
terms relate directly to her complaint, and her claims fall within
the scope of the agreement to arbitrate.

The Plaintiff attempts to avoid arbitration by arguing that the
agreement is unenforceable or unconscionable.

Judge Teeter disagrees. He holds that (i) the Plaintiff has not
shown a statutory conflict that would prohibit arbitration in FLSA
cases; (ii) her argument conflates a private settlement of claims
and a bargained-for arbitration process; and (iii) the Plaintiff
has not met her burden to show that the FLSA conflicts with the FAA
and thus renders her arbitration agreement unenforceable. He
further finds that the terms of the agreement are equally balanced;
the obligations and benefits are the same for both parties. And
GMRG agrees to pay the arbitrator's fees and any filing fee more
than a court filing fee. The Plaintiff has not shown the terms are
grossly unfair.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Teeter concludes that the parties
entered into a valid and enforceable contract to arbitrate. The
contract is not unconscionable. The Plaintiff waived the right to
bring a collective action, and the caselaw governing court approval
of collective action settlements does not nullify that waiver.

Judge Teeter compels arbitration of all claims in the case. He also
exercises discretion and stays the case rather than dismissing it
because a stay is the preferred method of managing a case that is
in arbitration. And he denies the Plaintiff's motion to send notice
to similarly-situated employees as moot because the case will be in
individual arbitration.

Hence, the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration is granted. The
action is stayed. The parties will jointly file a status report six
months from today or, alternatively, when the arbitration is
resolved, whichever is earlier. The Plaintiff's motion to send
notice to similarly-situated employees is denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 23, 2022 Memorandum & Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/fyx79c6k from Leagle.com.


GROCERY DELIVERY: Morris Sues Over Unsolicited Telephonic Calls
---------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Morris, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. GROCERY DELIVERY E-SERVICES USA, INC., D/B/A
HELLOFRESH, Case No. 1:22-cv-08138 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 2022), is
brought for legal and equitable remedies resulting from the illegal
actions of the Defendant in sending automated telephonic sales
calls, in the form of text messages, to his cellular telephone and
the cellular telephones of numerous other individuals across
Florida, in clear violation of the Florida Telephone Solicitation
Act.

Accordingly, the text messages that the Defendant made or knowingly
allowed another person to make on its behalf to Plaintiff's Number
constituted "telephonic sales calls" within the meaning of the
FTSA. The Plaintiff has never provided his prior "prior express
written consent" to Defendant or any other party acting on the
Defendant's behalf to authorize the subject telephonic sales calls
by means of an "automated system for the selection or dialing of
telephone numbers" within the meaning of the FTSA, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff is a resident and citizen of Ocala, Florida and has
received one text message from the Defendant.

Grocery Delivery E-Services USA, Inc., d/b/a HelloFresh is a
consumer meal kit company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Arun G. Ravindran, Esq.
          Frank Hedin, Esq.
          HEDIN HALL LLP
          1395 Brickell Ave., Suite 1140
          Miami, FL 33131
          Phone: +1 (305) 357-2107
          Fax: +1 (305) 200-8801
          Email: fhedin@hedinhall.com
                 aravindran@hedinhall.com


HOMELAND SECURITY: Kang Suit Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Richard J. Leon of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia dismisses the case, ZHERONG KANG, et al., Plaintiffs v.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al., Defendants, Civil Case No.
21-2944 (RJL) (D.D.C.), for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

On behalf of a purported class, 95 individuals ("Plaintiffs")
alleging processing delays in their applications for employment
authorization documents ("EADs") filed the suit for declaratory and
injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5
U.S.C. Section 701 et seq., against the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS"), its Secretary, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services ("USCIS"), and its Director. Since the Plaintiffs filed
their Complaint and prior to the Court's consideration of their
motion for class certification, the Defendants have adjudicated the
employment application of each named Plaintiff.

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. Section
1101 et seq., and its accompanying regulations, certain aliens
admitted to the United States may be eligible for employment
authorization. Although some aliens are authorized to be employed
incident to their status, individuals in a variety of classes
specified under 8 C.F.R. Section 274a.12(c) must apply for work
authorization by filing an application with USCIS. Among those who
must apply for work authorization are "aliens who has filed an
application for adjustment of status to lawful permanent
resident."

Although DHS previously directed USCIS to adjudicate employment
authorization applications within 90 days of filing, DHS eliminated
that regulatory requirement in 2016. If USCIS approves an
application, the EAD is "valid for a specific period." Previously,
"the validity period of an expiring EAD and the attendant
employment authorization was automatically extended for an
additional period not to exceed 180 days from the date of
expiration if a request for renewal" is timely filed. However, in
May 2022, DHS increased the extension period to a maximum of up to
540 days from the expiration of the EAD. See Temporary Increase of
the Automatic Extension Period of Employment Authorization and
Documentation for Certain Renewal Applicants, 87 Fed. Reg. 26614
(May 4, 2022).

The Plaintiffs are 95 individuals who each fall into the class of
nonimmigrants who must apply for employment authorization because
they "have filed an application for adjustment of status to lawful
permanent resident." They filed their applications between June
2020 (apart from one filed in July 2019) and October 2021. The
Plaintiffs allege that their applications have been "unreasonably
delayed for over six months, and some for over one year." As of
Feb. 16, 2022, the Defendants have adjudicated all named
Plaintiffs' applications.

In November 2021, the named Plaintiffs filed the suit for
declaratory and injunctive relief "on behalf of themselves" and a
purported class of "similarly situated persons affected by the
Defendants' actions with respect to EAD adjudications since the
abandonment of the 90-day processing deadline, including the
inexcusable and unreasonable delays in processing of applications."
Their proposed class identifies both individuals submitting an
initial application for an employment authorization document and
individuals requesting an extension for employment authorization.

The lawsuit alleges the Defendants (1) "arbitrarily, capriciously,
and irrationally departed from their commitment to 90-day
processing times for" employment authorization applications; (2)
failed to adjudicate plaintiffs' applications within a reasonable
time and thus unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed agency
action; and (3) "arbitrarily, capriciously, and unlawfully
implemented the adjudicatory process for EAD applications."

The Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), or,
alternatively, to transfer venue under Rule 12(b)(3). After the
parties completed briefing on the Defendants' motion to dismiss,
the Defendants filed a motion to stay briefing on class
certification under Rule 23(c)(1) pending the Court's resolution of
their motion to dismiss, which the Plaintiffs opposed. Moreover,
the Plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification.

Judge Leon stayed briefing on class certification pending
resolution of the motion to dismiss. Since the filing of the
Amended Complaint, the Defendants have notified the Court that that
they have adjudicated the employment application of each named
Plaintiff. Because this development followed the parties'
motion-to-dismiss briefing, Judge Leon ordered supplemental
briefing from the parties on whether the action is moot and, if so,
whether any exception to mootness applies. The parties submitted
their supplemental briefing on June 28, 2022.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' claims should be
dismissed because they are moot and no exception to mootness
applies. Because USCIS has adjudicated the Plaintiffs'
applications, the dispute seeking to compel USCIS to adjudicate
them is now moot.

Although the Plaintiffs previously indicated that they "agreed that
those with EAD applications that have now been adjudicated can be
dismissed," and that they "intended to file a notice of voluntary
dismissal for selected Plaintiffs," no such notice has been filed
as to any of the named Plaintiffs. Instead, the Plaintiffs disagree
that the claims are moot, arguing that their "claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief remain live despite the
intervening agency action." And, they continue, several exceptions
to mootness apply.

Unfortunately for the Plaintiffs, Judge Leon agrees with the
Defendants that the claims are moot and must be dismissed. He
opines that the Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a
forward-looking challenge because they cannot demonstrate an
imminent injury.

All the named Plaintiffs have received a decision on their
application, and their employment authorizations are subject to
automatic renewal should the authorizations expire before any
renewal applications are processed. And, because they only require
employment authorization while their underlying
adjustment-of-status applications are pending, most Plaintiffs are
unlikely to have to file for a renewal -- or, if they do, to be
left without authorization given the auto-extension period. Whether
the Plaintiffs will be subject to the policy again is thus
speculative; that the Plaintiffs "might be" subject to the
challenged policy in the future is insufficient to establish
standing. Their claims are moot.

In response, the Plaintiffs invoke several exceptions to mootness.
Unfortunately for them, none of the exceptions applies. First, the
Plaintiffs are unlikely to have to file for renewal of employment
authorization and, if they do, the particular harm suffered is
unlikely to recur given the highly fact-specific context in which
they experienced delay previously -- a context affected by the
COVID-19 pandemic and a hiring freeze.

Second, the Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show
that the inherently transitory exception applies. To start, their
claim of unreasonable delay is fundamentally at odds with the
application of the exception: On the one hand, they claim that
defendants are acting too slowly; on the other, they argue that
their claims do not last long enough. Moreover, the present
context—agency adjudication of applications for employment
authorization -- is distinguishable from the criminal and
immigration detention contexts in which the exception was created.
The Plaintiffs cite to no case -- nor has the Court found a cas --
in which the Circuit Court applied the exception to the immigration
application context.

Third, the Plaintiffs claim that the timing of the adjudication of
their applications "is highly suggestive of the agency's pick-off
motive." Other than this bare allegation that defendants picked-off
the named Plaintiffs, Judge Leon opines that the Plaintiffs have
offered no evidence or support for their position. And, as they
explained previously, "at the time of suit, they will, presumably,
be close to the front of the line for the adjudication of their"
applications for employment authorization. Hence, the Plaintiffs
have failed to show that the exception applies.

Last, because the Defendants have adjudicated each named
Plaintiff's application for employment, the Plaintiffs are no
longer affected by the Defendants' conduct of which they complain.
And there is no indication that the Defendants will rescind their
determinations on any of the Plaintiffs' adjudicated applications.
More generally, the voluntary cessation exception does not neatly
apply: The Plaintiffs do not claim that the Defendants have changed
their policies or otherwise ceased engaging in the allegedly
illegal conduct; rather, the Defendants simply adjudicated the
applications in the course of their processes. So, the Plaintiffs'
claims are therefore moot.

For all the foregoing reasons, Judge Leon grants the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss and dismisses the case for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. He denies as moot the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify
Class. An order consistent with this decision accompanies the
Memorandum Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 23, 2022 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yywhe9fk from Leagle.com.


HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL: Reid Sues Over Unlawful Vaccine Mandate
----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Reid, Keith Chee, Willard Thomas, Michael Todd Debona, Brock
Knowlton, Percy Sledge, Joseph Akers, Andrew Loudenbeck, Brook
Booth, Steve Booth, Jesse Martinez, Camron Brown, Mark Meintel,
Andrew Kezele, Celeste Evans, Scott Godley, Ronald Pixler, Dale
Richardson, Sierra Sanchez, Marcel Tira, Talon Wilder, David
Villines, Malachi Sanders, Gabe Maldonado, Richard Tuttle, Charlie
Childress, James Moes, Mikel Roden, Todd Sorensen, Mark Mannino,
Brian Kelly, James Long, Brian Andrew Mason, Michael Pentrack,
Elvira Kolundzic, Keri Mason, Jonathan Little, Juan Carlos
Fernandez, Ronald Geracci, Sierra Shepherd, Karina Burchard, David
Saunders, Tracy Haines, Sebastian Netotea, Brandon Grant, Katie
Meyer, Dwayne Mcduffee, Tim Schow, Katherine Craven, Seth Hartman,
Jane Doe, Kristin Ashford, Cody Reed, Stephanie Cumpton,
individually for themselves and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., Case No. 8:22-cv-02210
(M.D. Fla., Sept. 23, 2022), is brought seeking to recover all
available compensatory and punitive damages relating to Honeywell's
Mandate and related adverse employment actions including, but not
limited to, poor performance reviews, further harassment, placing
Plaintiffs under a microscope, placing Plaintiffs on unpaid
administrative leave, constructively discharging them, and outright
terminating them on the basis of their sincerely held religious
beliefs warranting their non-vaccinated status, their perceived
disability status, and their informed non-consent for the COVID-19
vaccine while under emergency use authorization.

The Plaintiffs are all subject to Defendant's COVID-19 vaccine
mandate. The Plaintiffs herein allege that Honeywell's COVID-19
vaccine mandate is unlawful because it mandates the injection of
the mRNA COVID-19 vaccine without actual accommodation of
Plaintiffs' religious beliefs or disability status, as a condition
of Plaintiffs' employment at Honeywell (hereinafter the "Mandate").
The United States Supreme Court has long held that the right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment is a fundamental human right.

Honeywell mandated a company-wide COVID-19 vaccine injection in May
of 2021, while only superficially granting exemptions for sincerely
held religious beliefs. The Defendant's exemptions were not
exemptions at all, and instead were a means to appear in compliance
with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act while simultaneously
singling out those employees in order to publicly shame them in
front of their peers due to their sincerely held religious beliefs
and in order to segregate them based upon their perceived
disability status in violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

For instance, Defendant required its exempted employees to display
their vaccination status by way of color-coded identification
badges, utilize separate common areas for bathrooms and lunch
breaks, and adhere to weekly testing with unpaid leave as
punishment for failing to do so--even for those employees that
worked remotely from their own residence. The Defendant's actions
towards Plaintiffs were not intended for safety measures but were,
instead, designed to harass and punish the Plaintiffs because they
requested exemptions, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs comprise a group of current and former employees of
Defendant.

HONEYWELL, INTERNATIONAL, INC. is a North Carolina corporation with
its principal place of business in Charlotte, North Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Luis A. Cabassa, Esq.
          Brandon J. Hill, Esq.
          Amanda E. Heystek, Esq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A.
          1110 North Florida Avenue, Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Phone: 813-224-0431
          Facsimile: 813-229-8712
          Email: lcabassa@wfclaw.com
                 bhill@wfclaw.com
                 aheystek@wfclaw.com
                 gnichols@wfclaw.com

               - and -

          Kathryn C. Hopkinson, Esq.
          CURRAN ANTONELLI, LLP
          400 North Tampa St, 15th Floor
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Phone: (617) 207-8670
          Fax:(617) 850-9001
          Email: khopkinson@curranantonelli.com
          Secondary: slevy@curranantonelli.com
                     ethompson@curranantonelli.com
                     filings@curranantonelli.com

ILLINOIS FARMERS: Cross Bids for Judgment in Taqueria Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TAQUERIA EL PRIMO LLC, VICTOR MANUEL DELGADO JIMENEZ,
MITCHELLE CHAVEZ SOLIS, BENJAMIN TARNOWSKI, EL CHINELO PRODUCE,
INC., and VIRGINIA SANCHEZ-GOMEZ, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. ILLINOIS FARMERS INSURANCE
COMPANY, FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, FARMERS GROUP, INC., TRUCK
INSURANCE EXCHANGE, FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and
MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants, Case No. 19-3071
(JRT/BRT) (D. Minn.), Judge John R. Tunheim of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota denies Cross Summary Judgment
Motions and Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony without prejudice
as premature.

The Defendants sold automobile insurance in Minnesota. The
Plaintiffs brought the class action alleging that the Defendants
entered into agreements with health care providers wherein the
providers agreed to not bill Defendants for care provided to their
insureds, without notifying the insureds. This allegedly limited
the ability of the insureds to seek care from the provider of their
choosing. On behalf of a class of insureds, the Plaintiffs allege
that this is illegal under Minnesota law and seek monetary damages
and injunctive relief.

To summarize, the Defendants sold members of the class automobile
insurance governed by Minnesota's No-Fault Insurance Act while also
agreeing to billing limitations that prevented certain health care
providers from billing them for care provided to those insured by
Defendants. Defendants did not disclose these limitations. The
Plaintiffs allege that this violates the insurance policy language
and Minnesota's No-Fault Insurance Act.

The Plaintiffs then moved to certify two classes: (1) a Damages
Class seeking monetary relief and (2) an Injunctive Class seeking
to enjoin Defendants from enforcing these agreements. The
Defendants opposed class certification including moving to exclude
testimony from two experts offered by the Plaintiffs.

On Dec. 28, 2021, the Court granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' class certification motion and certified an Injunctive
Class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and a Damages
Class under Rule 23(b)(3) on some of the claims the Plaintiffs
brought. It also denied the Defendants' motions to exclude using
the "focused Daubert" analysis appropriate at the class
certification stage and thus offered no view on whether the
testimony would be admissible at another stage such as summary
judgment.

On Jan. 11, 2022, the Defendants sought permission from the Eighth
Circuit to appeal the Court's grant of class certification pursuant
to Rule 23(f). In February 2022, while this request was pending,
the parties filed cross Motions for Summary Judgment and Motions to
Exclude the testimony of various expert testimony in support of the
summary judgment motions (collectively, the "Motions").

On April 14, 2022, the Eighth Circuit denied the Defendants'
request for permission to appeal the class certification order. On
May 12, 2022, the Plaintiffs moved for approval of their class
notice forms and plan. The Defendants oppose the Plaintiffs'
proposed notice forms and request the Court adopts forms they claim
would correct deficiencies in the Plaintiffs' proposal. As a
result, the Plaintiffs have not begun their class notice plan.

Before resolving the parties' Motions, Judge Tunheim must determine
whether it is appropriate to consider them before the class is
notified. In sum, he finds that if he grants summary judgment in
favor of either the Defendants or the Plaintiffs that judgment
likely would not bind the class and would nullify the Court's prior
class certification order.

In the case, Judge Tunheim finds little benefit to resolving the
Motions before notice. The parties and the Court have already spent
the time and money on class certification. Resolving these Motions
before the class is notified would waste that effort and save only
the cost of notice. Moreover, he points out that irrespective of
the outcome of the summary judgment motions -- but especially if
the Court were to grant summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs
-- other class members may file new cases or even a new class
action and restart this case from square one if the class is
destroyed. This would be grossly inefficient for the parties and
the Court and waste more than two years of work when there is a
simple solution: Wait for the end of the notice period.

In some cases, it is appropriate to resolve some motions but not
others before class certification. Although the Defendants can
waive the benefits of binding the class and notice to the
Injunctive Class as a Rule 23(b)(2) class is not mandatory, Judge
Tunheim not resolve any of the Summary Judgment Motions. There is
such significant overlap between the Motions and between the
Damages Class' claims and Injunctive Class' claims that it would be
inefficient to resolve them piecemeal and it is possible piecemeal
resolution would imply the resolution of an unresolved Motion.
Judge Tunheim will also not resolve the Motions to Exclude. Because
of the centrality of the experts' testimony to the Summary Judgment
Motions, it will be more efficient for the Court to consider the
Motions to Exclude alongside the Summary Judgment Motions and
resolution of the Motions to Exclude may directly affect the
resolution of the Summary Judgment Motions.

Judge Tunheim concludes that the class has not yet been notified of
the class action. Because the class has not been notified,
resolving these motions could result in a significant waste of
resources and could create due process issues. Therefore, he will
exercise discretion to manage the cases on its docket and deny the
Summary Judgment Motions and Motions to Exclude without prejudice
as premature, and the parties may refile their Motions after the
class has been notified.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Tunheim (i) denies the Defendants'
Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony without prejudice as premature;
(ii) denies the Plaintiffs' Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony
without prejudice as premature; (iii) denies the Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment without prejudice as premature; and (iv)
denies the Plaintiffs' Partial Motion for Summary Judgment on
behalf of the Damages Class and Motion for Summary Judgment on
behalf of the Injunctive Class without prejudice as premature.

The Parties may refile their motions within 30 days after the time
period for a putative class member to opt out of the class action
has expired.

On December 28, 2021, the Court granted in part and denied in part
Plaintiffs' class certification motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 23, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/mry86v46 from
Leagle.com.

Anne T. Regan -- aregan@hjlawfirm.com -- and Nathan D. Prosser --
nprosser@hjlawfirm.com -- HELLMUTH & JOHNSON PLLC, 8050 West
Seventy-Eighth Street, Edina, MN 55439; David W. Asp --
DWASP@LOCKLAW.COM -- Derek C. Waller -- DCWALLER@LOCKLAW.COM --
Jennifer Jacobs -- JLMJACOBS@LOCKLAW.COM -- Kristen G. Marttila --
KGMARTTILA@LOCKLAW.COM -- and Stephen Matthew Owen --
SMOWEN@LOCKLAW.COM -- LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN PLLP, 100 Washington
Avenue South, Suite 2200, Minneapolis, MN 55401; Paul J. Phelps ,
SAWICKI & PHELPS, 5758 Blackshire Path, Inver Grove Heights, MN
55076, for the Plaintiffs.

Emily C. Atmore -- emily.atmore@stoel.com -- John Thomas Katuska --
john.katuska@stoel.com -- Marc A. Al -- marc.al@stoel.com -- and
Margaret E. Dalton, STOEL RIVES LLP, 33 South Sixth Street, Suite
4200, Minneapolis, MN 55402; Timothy W. Snider --
timothy.snider@stoel.com -- STOEL RIVES LLP, 760 Southwest Ninth
Avenue, Suite 3000, Portland, OR 97205, for the Defendants.


JOSE M. PLEHN-DUJOWICH: Hu Suit Transferred to C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Qiuzi Hu, Edwin Ramirez, Ivan Ronceria, Wenzhi
Fei, individuals, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated v. Jose M. Plehn-Dujowich also known as: Jose M. Plehn, an
individual; Bizqualify LLC, a California limited liability company;
Powerlytics, Inc., a Delaware Corporation; Case No.
3:18-cv-01791-AGT was transferred from the U.S. District Court for
Northern District of California, to the U.S. District Court for
Central District of California on Sept. 23, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 8:22-cv-01751-PSG-KES to
the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Statutory Actions.

BizQualify provides verifiable business information and financial
metrics .[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael Ryan Fleming, Esq.
          Harmeet Dhillon, Esq.
          Krista L. Baughman, Esq.
          DHILLON LAW GROUP Inc.
          177 Post Street Suite 700
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Phone: (415) 433-1700
          Fax: (415) 520-6593
          Email: mfleming@dhillonlaw.com
                 harmeet@dhillonlaw.com
                 kbaughman@dhillonlaw.com

               - and -

          Loren Kieve, Esq.
          KIEVE LAW OFFICES
          2655 Steiner Street
          San Francisco, CA 94115
          Phone: (415) 364-0060
          Fax: (435) 304-0060
          Email: lk@kievelaw.com


KAYDEN INDUSTRIES: Simons Sues to Recover Overtime Compensation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Simons, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. KAYDEN INDUSTRIES (USA), INC., Case No.
4:22-cv-00039-DC-DF (W.D. Tex., Sept. 23, 2022), is brought seeking
to recover overtime compensation for the Plaintiff and similarly
situated solids control workers ("SCW") under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act.

the Plaintiff typically work "hitches" of 25 days in the field. The
Plaintiff generally work daily shifts of at least fifteen hours,
often in harsh outdoor working conditions. the Defendant originally
paid the Plaintiff by the hour plus pay labeled as per diem pay
that was part of their customary wages. Despite treating the
Plaintiff as a non-exempt employee, the Defendant failed to
properly pay overtime compensation at 1.5 times their regular rate
of pay for all hours worked.

In addition to failing to pay overtime pay, the Defendant also paid
the Plaintiff less than the number of hours they worked by shaving
time off their timesheets and/or requiring them to work "off the
clock." On March 23, 2020, the Defendant notified the Plaintiff
that they were no longer allowed to record time worked over 12.5
hours per day, and that all overtime was required to be approved by
the Defendant's President, Brent Morrice. In 2021, the Defendant
began paying the Plaintiff a salary without overtime pay, even
though the Plaintiff continued working many hours well over forty
per workweek. As a result, the Defendant significantly underpaid
the Plaintiff for overtime hours worked, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as an SCW from 2015
through April 2022.

Kayden Industries (USA), Inc. is an international solids control
company servicing the oil and gas industry in the United States
with offices in Texas, Wyoming, and Ohio.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          David I. Moulton, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025
          Houston, TX 77046
          Phone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com
                 dmoulton@brucknerburch.com

               - and -

          Joseph A. Fitapelli, Esq.
          Dana M. Cimera, Esq.
          FITAPELLI & SCHAFFER, LLP
          28 Liberty Street, 30th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Phone: (212) 300-0375
          Email: Jfitapelli@fslawfirm.com
                 Dcimera@fslawfirm.com

L.J. ALTFEST & CO: Jackson Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against L.J. Altfest & Co.,
Inc. case is styled as Sylinia Jackson, on behalf of herself and
all other persons similarly situated v. L.J. Altfest & Co., Inc.,
Case No. 1:22-cv-08130 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

L.J. Altfest & Co., Inc., doing business as Altfest Personal Wealth
Management -- https://www.altfest.com/ -- operates as a wealth
management company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dana Lauren Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (917) 796-7437
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: danalgottlieb@aol.com


LANDSCAPING BY FREDIS: Pavon Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moises Pavon, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. LANDSCAPING BY FREDIS, INC., and FREDIS REYES, Case No.
2:22-cv-05694-NM-ST (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 2022), is brought for
damages and equitable relief based upon the Defendants' flagrant
and willful violations of the Plaintiff's rights guaranteed to them
by: the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Acts and
the New York Labor Law; the NYLL's minimum wage provisions; the
NYLL's requirement that employers provide on each payday proper
wage statements to their employees containing specific categories
of accurate information; the requirement that employers pay spread
of hours premiums under the NYCCRR and any other claim(s) that can
be inferred.

The Defendants required the Plaintiff to work, and the Plaintiff
did work, more than forty hours per week. However, the Defendants
failed to pay the Plaintiff at the statutory minimum wage or pay
them at the overtime rate of pay of one and one-half times their
regular rate of pay for each hour that the Plaintiff worked per
week in excess of forty, as the FLSA and the NYLL require.
Furthermore, the Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff for their
spread of hours in violation of the NYLL. Lastly, the Defendants
failed to furnish the Plaintiff with accurate and/or any wage
statements on each payday as the NYLL requires, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as a general laborer.

The Defendants is a landscaping company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Amit Kumar, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM CAFARO
          108 West 39th Street, Suite 602
          New York, NY 10018
          Phone: (212) 583-7400
          Email: AKumar@CafaroEsq.com


LEND SMART: S.D. Florida Grants Bid to Dismiss Frater FTSA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Stacey Frater, Plaintiff v. Lend Smart Mortgage, LLC,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 22-22168-Civ-Scola (S.D. Fla.), Judge
Robert N. Scola, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint.

Ms. Frater brings a putative class-action claim for violation of
the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act ("FTSA"), Florida Statutes
Section 501.059, against Lend Smart. She claims that Lend Smart, a
"mortgage company and retail lender," sent multiple text messages
to her cellular phone and the phones of other putative class
members without her, or their, express permission.

The Plaintiff provides examples of two such text messages, dating
from April 15 and May 26, 2022, and alleges that the Defendant has
been "bombarding" her phone with similar text messages over the
past year. These texts, she asserts, have caused her and the
putative class members the following harms: "violations of their
statutory rights" and "statutory damages, inconvenience, invasion
of privacy, aggravation, annoyance, and wasted time."

Lend Smart now moves to dismiss the complaint for a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),
arguing that the Plaintiff and the putative class lack standing,
and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the
complaint contains pleading deficiencies, brings claims that are
preempted by federal law, and raises multiple constitutional
issues.

Judge Scola explains that because the question of Article III
standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it must be
addressed as a threshold matter prior to the merits of any
underlying claims. The "irreducible constitutional minimum" of
standing under Article III consists of three elements: (1) the
plaintiff must have suffered an actual or imminent injury, or a
concrete "invasion of a legally protected interest"; (2) that
injury must have been caused by the defendant's complained-of
actions; and (3) the plaintiff's injury or threat of injury must
likely be redressable by a favorable court decision.

Consistent with clear and binding Eleventh Circuit precedent, Judge
Scola finds that the Plaintiff has failed to allege a sufficient
concrete injury-in-fact to demonstrate that she -- or the members
of the putative class -- have standing to bring a claim under FTSA,
citing Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1172 (11th Cir. 2019);
Drazen v. Pinto, 41 F.4th 1354, 1360-62 (11th Cir. 2022); see also
Grigorian v. FCA US LLC, 838 F. App'x 390, 394 (11th Cir. 2020).
The Plaintiff raises several arguments in support of a finding that
standing exists.

The Plaintiff argues that the standing analysis should be different
under FTSA than under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA," the federal analog to FTSA that the Eleventh Circuit
addressed in Salcedo) because FTSA specifically identifies text
messages where the TCPA does not. But, the Eleventh Circuit clearly
stated in Salcedo that the plaintiff's complaint "facially appeared
to state a cause of action under the TCPA" because the Federal
Communications Commission had interpreted the TCPA to cover
unauthorized text messages under the agency's rule-making
authority. In other words, Salcedo's allegations of the receipt of
an unauthorized text message were satisfactory to plead an actual,
facial violation of the TCPA. To prove Article III standing,
however, a plaintiff must demonstrate more than a simple statutory
violation -- a plaintiff must still demonstrate an injury-in-fact,
and "an injury-in-fact must be concrete." Therefore, the
Plaintiff's allegations do not suffice to clear the bar for
standing simply because they state a facial violation of FTSA.

Next, the Plaintiff asserts that Salcedo and its progeny were
overruled by implication by the United States Supreme Court in
Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid. (Resp. at 4 (citing 141 S.Ct. 1163
(2021)).) In Duguid, the Supreme Court addressed whether a social
network's login notification system met the TCPA's definition of an
automatic telephone dialer system, based on that plaintiff's
alleged receipt of unauthorized text messages from Facebook's login
verification system. The Plaintiff argues that, because the Supreme
Court necessarily must consider issues of standing before it hears
any case, and the Supreme Court did not find a lack of standing in
Duguid, then the receipt of unauthorized text messages must
necessarily suffice to confer standing under the TCPA (and FTSA).

Judge Scola is not persuaded. He finds that nothing in Duguid
retreats from the standing analysis the Supreme Court developed in
Lujan and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins -- indeed, Duguid does not address
the issue of standing at all. This is sufficient reason to reject
the Plaintiff's argument on its own. Regardless, this argument is
also foreclosed by Eleventh Circuit case law. In Drazen -- which
was decided in 2022, after Duguid -- the Eleventh Circuit cited
affirmatively to Salcedo and relied upon Salcedo's holding. Salcedo
remains controlling law in this Circuit, and the Court must apply
it in the present case. Thus, Judge Scola considers whether the
Plaintiff's allegations suffice to state a concrete injury-in-fact
under FTSA, applying the analysis used by the Eleventh Circuit in
Salcedo.

The Plaintiff identifies two unauthorized text messages that she
received, alleges that she was "bombarded" with many similar
messages over the course of a year, and states that those messages
caused her and the putative class members "harm, including
statutory damages, inconvenience, invasion of privacy, aggravation,
annoyance, and wasted time." The complaint does not further
elaborate how the text messages caused those harms to the Plaintiff
or what specific injuries the Plaintiff suffered as a result.

As in Salcedo, which remains applicable in the present case, Judge
Scola says those allegations are insufficient to state a concrete
injury-in-fact that will support Article III standing. Further, the
alleged harms that the Plaintiff claims to have suffered from
receipt of the text messages are remarkably similar to harms that
this court has found to be insufficient to support standing in
light of Eleventh Circuit precedent. Finally, the fact that the
Plaintiff cannot identify a single specific harm she allegedly
suffered, beyond offering a conclusory recitation of harms like
"annoyance," "aggravation," and "wasted time," means that she has
still failed to clear the qualitative floor for a concrete injury
and, therefore, she (and the putative class) lacks standing to
bring a claim under FTSA. Thus, the Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear her claim, as pleaded, and must dismiss her
complaint.

For these reasons, Judge Scola grants Lend Smart's motion to
dismiss. The case is dismissed without prejudice, and with leave to
file a new civil action. The Clerk is directed to close the case.
Any pending motions are denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ej7cwesr from Leagle.com.


LHOIST NORTH: Court Enters Final Judgment in Fuapau Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SIONE FUAPAU, et al., Plaintiffs v. LHOIST NORTH
AMERICA OF ARIZONA, INC., Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-04404-VKD (N.D.
Cal.), Magistrate Judge Virginia K. Demarchi of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division,
enters Final Judgment, pursuant to the Court's Sept. 23, 2022 order
granting the Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of the class
action settlement and attorneys' fees and costs.

The Court enters Final Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 58 as follows: The Judgment is entered in accordance
with, and incorporates by reference the findings of, the Court's
orders and the Parties' class action settlement agreement (Joint
Stipulation of Class and Representative Action Settlement).

All class members are bound by it and are barred from pursuing, or
seeking to reopen, any of the released claims, as defined in the
settlement agreement.

Without affecting the finality of the Judgment, the Court will
retain exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the action and
the parties, including all class members, for purposes of enforcing
the terms of the Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 23, 2022 Judgment is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3zsd2dz5 from Leagle.com.


LIFE CARE: Atkinson Suit Remanded to King County Superior Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LAMONT ATKINSON, Plaintiff v. LIFE CARE CENTERS OF
AMERICA, INC., Defendant, Case No. C22-00190 RSM (W.D. Wash.),
Judge Ricardo S. Martinez of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Seattle, grants the Plaintiff's
Motion for Remand and remands the action to King County Superior
Court.

On Jan. 12, 2022, Mr. Atkinson filed a class action complaint in
King County Superior Court against Life Care. Life Care operates
skilled nursing, Alzheimer's, and rehabilitation care facilities in
Washington. Mr. Atkinson was formerly an hourly employee at Life
Care. He alleges that Life Care's facilities have seen significant
COVID-19 cases beginning in 2020, when its Kirkland facility
suffered the first major COVID-19 outbreak in the United States.

In response, Life Care purportedly instituted COVID-19 mitigation
measures in its Washington facilities. Mr. Atkinson alleges that as
a Life Care employee he had to undergo these measures without pay.
He alleges that Life Care requires its employees to undergo
screening for COVID-19 symptoms prior to each shift without pay. He
further alleges that Life Care requires its employees to submit to
weekly COVID-19 testing, but only pays employees for this time if
it occurs during the employee's regularly scheduled shift. As a
former hourly employee who was allegedly subjected to these
practices, Mr. Atkinson brought the putative class action to
recover lost wages for himself and his former coworkers. He seeks
compensatory damages, double damages, as well as an injunction,
attorneys' fees, costs, expenses and interest as allowed by law.

On Feb. 17, 2022, Life Care filed a Notice of Removal on the basis
of diversity jurisdiction. It alleges that it and Mr. Atkinson are
citizens of different states, and that the amount in controversy
between them exceeds $75,000. Life Care admits that the actual
damages at issue between it and Mr. Atkinson are between $111.36 to
$633.82. However, it alleges that the cost of an injunction and the
potential attorney fees in the case satisfy the amount in
controversy requirement. Mr. Atkinson filed the instant Motion to
Remand on March 17, 2020.

Life Care sought removal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332. Removal
jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a) only where "the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000." A
putative class action cannot be removed under Section 1332(a)
unless "at least one named plaintiff satisfies the amount in
controversy requirement."

The parties dispute whether Mr. Atkinson's request for injunctive
relief can be included in the amount in controversy and the value
of Mr. Atkinson's claim for attorneys' fees. Life Care admits that
the actual damages at issue between it and Mr. Atkinson are between
$111.36 to $633.82. However, it estimates that the total attorney
fees in the case could range from $174,616 to $1,346,400 and that
the cost of complying with an injunction "could range from
$4,054.34 to $22,766.69 per week." In other words, the cost of the
injunction or claim for attorneys' fees alone could satisfy the
amount in controversy requirement.

Judge Martinez finds that Mr. Atkinson's requested injunction
cannot be included in computing the amount in controversy. He will
not determine whether or not Life Care correctly computed the cost
of such an injunction. Life Care also has provided evidence that
its fees overall may cross the $75,000 threshold but makes no
attempt to explain how at least $75,000 can be attributed to Mr.
Atkinson after a pro rata division of fees across the class.
Without more information, the evidentiary record demonstrates that
a maximum value of $895.80 in attorneys' fees is included in the
amount of controversy -- this does not establish that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.

Having reviewed the relevant pleadings, the declarations and
exhibits attached thereto, and the remainder of the record, Judge
Martinez agrees with Mr. Atkinson. Hence, he grants Mr. Atkinson's
Motion to Remand and remands the case to the Superior Court of
Washington State in and for the County of King.

The matter is now closed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 23, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/486acd7k from Leagle.com.


MAD SCIENTIST NUTS: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mad Scientist Nuts,
Inc. The case is styled as Joyce Carrico, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated v. Mad Scientist Nuts, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-08186 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 24, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Mad Scientist Nuts -- https://madscientistnuts.com/ -- produces
gluten free nuts containing no artificial colors, artificial
flavors, GMO's, preservatives, trans fats or MSG.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Solomon Nematzadeh, Esq.
          NEMATZADEH PLLC
          101 Avenue of the Americas, Ste. 9th Floor
          New York, NY 10013
          Phone: (646) 417-8424
          Email: jsn@nematlawyers.com


MDL 2311: $231K in Attys.' Fees Given in Auto Parts Antitrust Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE AUTOMOTIVE PARTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION, IN RE:
SPARK PLUGS, THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: DIRECT PURCHASER ACTIONS,
Master File No. 12-md-02311, No. 2:15-cv-03001-SFC-RSW.,
2:15-cv-11774-SFC-RSW (E.D. Mich.), Judge Sean F. Cox of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern
Division, grants the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs' Motion for an
Award of Attorneys' Fees, Litigation Costs and Expenses, and a
Service Award to the Class Representatives.

The Court engages in a two-part analysis when assessing the
reasonableness of a petition seeking an award of attorneys' fees.
It first determines the method of calculating the attorneys' fees:
it applies either the percentage of the fund approach or the
lodestar method. It has the discretion to select the appropriate
method for calculating attorneys' fees "in light of the unique
characteristics of class actions in general, and of the unique
circumstances of the actual cases before them." In common fund
cases, the award of attorneys' fees need only "be reasonable under
the circumstances." The Court has also analyzed and weighed the six
factors described in Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 508 F.2d
1188 (6th Cir. 1974).

Judge Cox will award fees to the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs'
counsel using the percentage-of-the fund approach. This method of
awarding attorneys' fees is preferred in this district because it
eliminates disputes about the reasonableness of rates and hours,
conserves judicial resources, and aligns the interests of class
counsel and the class members.

Judge Cox grants the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs' request for
reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses in the amount of
$19,376.06. The counsel for the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs request
a fee award of 33% of the settlement funds. The 33% fee requested
is within the range of fee awards made by courts in this Circuit.

The Court has considered the six Ramey factors in weighing a fee
award to counsel for the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs: (1) the value
of the benefits rendered to the class; (2) society's stake in
rewarding attorneys who produce such benefits in order to maintain
an incentive to others; (3) whether the services were undertaken on
a contingent fee basis; (4) the value of the services on an hourly
basis -- the lodestar cross-check; (5) the complexity of the
litigation; and (6) the professional skill and standing of counsel
on both sides.

Judge Cox finds that (1) the settlement amounts constitute a
"common fund"; (2) the results achieved provide a clear benefit to
the Settlement Classes: An immediate and certain payment of
$700,000 plus accrued interest, less attorneys' fees, litigation
costs and expenses, service awards to the class representatives,
and notice and claims administration costs; (3) the Direct
Purchaser Plaintiffs' Counsel are operating on a contingency basis
and bore a significant risk of non-payment in pursuing these
claims; (4) the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs' Counsel performed
their tasks diligently, efficiently, and reasonably, and that their
billing rates and lodestar are appropriate; (5) the legal and
factual issues are complicated and highly uncertain in outcome; and
(6) the Interim Lead and Liaison Counsel are qualified to litigate
class action antitrust claims, and they have performed their duties
skillfully.

After considering the appropriate factors, Judge Cox finds that
attorneys' fees of 33% are reasonable and awards a fee of $231,000,
which is 33% of the $700,000 in settlement funds. He finds that
each class representative is deserving of a service award for the
time and effort it expended and the burden and inconvenience it
incurred in furtherance of the case, and awards each direct
purchaser plaintiff class representative Hopkins Auto Supply, Inc.
d/b/a Thrifty Auto Supply, Dyke, Inc., Irving Levine Automotive
Distributors, Inc., and KMB/CT, Inc. d/b/a KMB Warehouse
Distributors Inc. a service award of $7,500. The Interim Lead
Counsel are authorized to allocate among the Direct Purchaser
Plaintiffs' Counsel the attorneys' fees and reimbursed litigation
costs and expenses in accordance with each firm's contribution to
the prosecution of the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 23, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2puj46cm from Leagle.com.


NAVICO INC: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Navico, Inc. The case
is styled as Joyce Carrico, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. Navico, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-08187
(S.D.N.Y., Sept. 24, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Navico -- https://www.navico.com/ -- is comprised of the world's
leading brands in the marine, RV, and specialty vehicles
industries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Solomon Nematzadeh, Esq.
          NEMATZADEH PLLC
          101 Avenue of the Americas, Ste. 9th Floor
          New York, NY 10013
          Phone: (646) 417-8424
          Email: jsn@nematlawyers.com


NISSAN OF NORTH AMERICA: Simpson Files Suit in M.D. Tennessee
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nissan of North
America, Inc., et al. The case is styled as Ariel Simpson,
Dominique Brogden, Tara Martins, Gregory Swann, Danielle Romanoff,
Perry Royster, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Nissan of North America, Inc., Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.,
Case No. 3:22-cv-00747 (M.D. Tenn., Sept. 23, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Motor Vehicle Prod. Liability for
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

Nissan North America Inc. -- https://www.nissanusa.com/ -- operates
in the automotive industry.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Anthony A. Orlandi, Esq.
          Benjamin A. Gastel, Esq.
          James Gerard Stranch, IV, Esq.
          BRANSTETTER, STRANCH & JENNINGS, PLLC
          223 Rosa L. Parks Avenue, Suite 200
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Phone: (615) 254-8801
          Fax: (615) 255-5419
          Email: aorlandi@bsjfirm.com
                 beng@bsjfirm.com
                 gerards@bsjfirm.com

               - and -

          Benjamin Donahue, Esq.
          Mark Greenstone, Esq.
          GREENSTONE LAW APC
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: (310) 201-9156
          Fax: (310) 201-9160
          Email: bdonahue@greenstonelaw.com
                 mgreenstone@greenstonelaw.com


OMAHASTEAKS.COM INC: Hwang Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against OmahaSteaks.com, Inc.
The case is styled as Jenny Hwang, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. OmahaSteaks.com, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-05721 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

OmahaSteaks.com, Inc. -- https://www.omahasteaks.com/ -- is an
online shop for perfectly aged steaks, trimmed by master butchers,
and backed with a 100% money-back guarantee.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          14749 71st Ave.
          Flushing, NY 11367
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com

OSCAR HEALTH: Levi & Glancy Named Co-Lead Counsel in Carpenter Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LORIN CARPENTER, Individually and on 9/27/2022 Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. OSCAR HEALTH, INC.
et al., Defendants, Case No. 22-CV-03885 (ALC) (VF) (S.D.N.Y.),
Magistrate Judge Valerie Figueredo of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York appoints Vicki Riley-Fischer and
Robert Scott Heon as Co-Lead Plaintiff and their respective
attorneys, Levi & Korsinsky LLP and Glancy, Prongay & Murray LLP,
are approved as Co-Lead Counsel.

Carpenter commenced the action, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, against Oscar and various other Defendants
alleging violations of Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. Sections 77k and 77o, as amended by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. Section 78u-4
et seq.

Oscar is a health-insurance company that claims to be the first
such company "built around a full stack technology platform," which
will allow it "to continue to innovate like a technology company
and not a traditional insurer." The Plaintiff commenced the
class-action suit on May 12, 2022, on behalf of investors who
purchased or acquired Class A common stock of Oscar pursuant to the
registration statement and prospectus issued in connection with the
company's initial public offering ("IPO") in March 2021.

The Plaintiff claims that the registration statement was materially
false and misleading and omitted to state, among other things, that
Oscar was experiencing growing COVID-19 testing and treatment
costs, and that Oscar was on track to be negatively impacted by
significant "Special Enrollment Period" membership growth.
Following certain disclosures by the company between August 2021
and November 2021, Oscar's share price declined to $12.47 on Nov.
11, 2021 -- a more than 85% decline from the $39 per share price at
the time of its IPO.

The complaint asserts two causes of action. The first cause of
action alleges a violation of Section 11 of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. Section 77k, against all Defendants, for misrepresentations
and omissions made in the company's registration statement. And the
second cause of action alleges a violation of Section 15 of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 77o, against only the Individual
Defendants.

Now before the Court is the unopposed motion for the appointment of
Heon and Fischer as co-lead plaintiff and for appointment of their
respective attorneys as co-lead counsel. Initially, four movants
sought appointment as lead plaintiff. Two of the four movants have
since filed notices of non-opposition to the competing motions. The
two remaining individual movants -- Vicki Riley-Fischer and Robert
Scott Heon -- subsequently filed a Proposed Order, stipulating to
their appointment as co-lead plaintiff and appointment of their
respective counsel as co-lead counsel. No member of the purported
plaintiff class opposes the appointment of Fischer and Heon as
co-lead plaintiff.

Even when a motion to appoint lead plaintiff is unopposed, the
Court must still consider the factors under the PSLRA to ensure
that the movant is the most adequate plaintiff." A Magistrate Judge
may issue an order appointing lead plaintiff and approving lead
counsel under Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") establishes
the procedure for the appointment of a lead plaintiff in class
actions brought pursuant to the Securities Act. As an initial
matter, the plaintiff who files the first action must publish
notice to the class within 20 days of filing the action, informing
class members of (1) the pendency of the action; (2) the claims
asserted therein; (3) the purported class period; and (4) the right
to move the court to be appointed as lead plaintiff within sixty
days of the publication of the notice.

Within 60 days after publication of the notice, any member or group
of members of the proposed class may apply to the court to be
appointed as lead plaintiff, whether or not they have previously
filed a complaint in the action. Heon and Fischer's sworn
declaration adequately demonstrates that they are both
sophisticated investors who will work together cohesively to
effectively pursue the claims on behalf of the class.

Within 90 days after publication of notice, the PSLRA provides that
the Court will consider any motion made by a purported class member
and will appoint as lead plaintiff the "member or members of the
purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most
capable of adequately representing the interest of class members."
Pursuant to the PSLRA, the court "adopts a presumption that the
most adequate plaintiff in any private action is the person or
group of persons that": (1) "has either filed the complaint or made
a motion in response to a notice"; (2) "in the determination of the
court, has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by
the class"; and (3) "otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."

The Court's identification of the presumptively most adequate lead
plaintiff may be rebutted if class members offer evidence that the
presumptive lead plaintiff: (1) "will not fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class"; or (2) "is subject to unique
defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of adequately
representing the class."

Based on the May 12th publication date, Judge Figueredo finds that
the 60-day period in which members of the proposed class could move
to serve as lead plaintiff of said class expired on July 11, 2022.
Both Heon and Fischer filed their respective motions to be
appointed as lead plaintiff on July 11, 2022. As such, both Heon
and Fischer have timely moved for status as lead plaintiff.

Mr. Heon represents that he acquired 6,410 shares during the class
period for approximately $249,990. As of May 12, 2022, the shares
were valued at approximately $36,665.20. Heon thus estimates that
he suffered an approximate loss of $213,324.80. Fischer represents
that she acquired 16,133 shares during the class period for
approximately $510,359.68. Fischer sold the shares on Dec. 28,
2021, for $131,492.37, suffering a loss of approximately
$378,867.31. Combined, Judge Figueredo finds that Heon and Fischer
suffered financial losses of $592,192.11. She says no other
Plaintiff has come forward suggesting that she has a greater
financial interest in the litigation.

The final requirement for selecting a lead plaintiff requires that
the lead plaintiff must also "otherwise satisfy the requirements of
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Rule 23(a)
permits a party to sue on behalf of a class subject to meeting four
requirements: "(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." At this stage, "the
moving plaintiff must only make a preliminary showing that the
adequacy and typicality requirements have been met."

Judge Figueredo finds that Heon and Fischer have made preliminary
showings as to both requirements. First, Heon and Fischer, like all
members of the class, allege that Defendants made material
misstatements and omissions concerning Oscar's business,
operations, and financial results, in connection with the company's
initial public offering. Their claims thus appear typical of the
purported class as a whole. Second, their chosen law firms, Levi &
Korsinsky, LLP, and Glancy, Prongay & Murray LLP, have extensive
experience in complex securities class-action suits, including
serving as lead counsel in securities class actions in this
District.

Third, although Heon and Fischer had no prior relationship before
this ligation, they have submitted a declaration describing their
decision to participate in the case and representing that they are
able to work cohesively to ensure that the class achieves the
largest possible recovery. Given the lack of opposition to Heon and
Fischer's motion, the Court is presented with no basis to doubt
their representation that they can effectively work together to
vigorously pursue the claims on behalf of the proposed class

For the reasons Judge Figueredo sets forth, she grants the motions
at ECF Nos. 17 and 25. Heon and Fischer are appointed as co-lead
plaintiff and their choice of counsel is appointed as co-lead
counsel. The motions at ECF Nos. 14 and 21 are denied. The Clerk of
Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motions at ECF Nos.
14, 17, 21, and 25.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/3zpa4229 from Leagle.com.


PARLER INC: Migliano Files TCPA Suit in S.D. Florida
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Parler, Inc. The case
is styled as Catherine Migliano, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Parler, Inc., Case No.
0:22-cv-61805-RKA (S.D. Fla., Sept. 23, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.

Parler -- https://parler.com/ -- is a viewpoint-neutral social
media platform where people can listen, speak freely, and express
themselves openly.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Manuel Santiago Hiraldo
          HIRALDO PA
          401 E Las Olas Blvd., Ste. 1400
          Ft Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Phone: (954) 400-4713
          Email: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

               - and -

          Rachel Nicole Edelsberg, Esq.
          DAPEER LAW, P.A.
          300 South Biscayne Blvd., #2704
          Miami, FL 33131
          Phone: (305) 610-5223
          Email: rachel@dapeer.com


POSTERITATI VINTAGE: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Posteritati Vintage
Movie Posters, LLC. The case is styled as Valerie Dicks, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated v. Posteritati Vintage
Movie Posters, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-08147 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 23,
2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Posteritati Vintage Movie Posters -- https://posteritati.com/ --
offers the most authoritative collection of original movie posters
from classic Hollywood to contemporary art-house.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


POWER HOME SOLAR: Fuchs Sues Over Failure to Provide Advance Notice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Cameron Fuchs and Sabrina Bibicoff, on behalf of themselves and a
class of those others similarly situated v. POWER HOME SOLAR LLC
D/B/A PINK ENERGY and RENEWABLE CLEAN ENERGIES, LLC, Case No.
8:22-cv-02209 (M.D. Fla., Sept. 23, 2022), is brought pursuant to
the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988
("WARN Act") as a result of the Defendants' failure to provide
Plaintiffs at least 60 days' advance notice of their terminations,
as required by the WARN Act.

The Plaintiffs were terminated as part of plant shutdowns or mass
layoffs as defined by the WARN Act, for which they were entitled to
receive 60 days' advance written notice under the WARN Act. On
September 21, 2022, the Plaintiffs, who worked for the Defendants,
received an email from the Defendants informing them that their
employment with the Defendants terminated on September 21, 2022.
Despite the requirements of the WARN Act, the Defendants did not
provide at least 60 calendar days prior to the closing or mass
layoff the required notice to the state dislocated worker units and
to the chief elected officials of the unit of local government in
which the affected facilities were located. Prior to their
terminations, neither the Plaintiffs nor the other similarly
situated former employees nor their representatives received
written notice that complied with the requirements of the WARN Act,
says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants until termination
without cause on September 21, 2022.

Power Home Solar LLC is a Foreign Limited Liability Corporation
registered to do business within Florida and North Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Ryan D. Barack, B.C.S. (L&E)
          Michelle Erin Nadeau, B.C.S. (L&E)
          KWALL BARACK NADEAU PLLC
          304 S. Belcher Road, Suite C
          Clearwater, FL 33765
          Phone: (727) 441-4947
          Fax: (727) 447-3158
          Email: rbarack@employeerights.com
                 mnadeau@employeerights.com
          Secondary: jackie@employeerights.com


PROGRESSIVE DIRECT: Court Narrows Claims in Williams Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JASMYN WILLIAMS v. PROGRESSIVE DIRECT INSURANCE
COMPANY, Civil Action No. 22-510-mak (D. Del.), Judge Mark A.
Kearney of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware
grants in part and denies in part the Defendant's motion to
dismiss.

Ms. Williams challenges her car insurer Progressive's method of
calculating her car's value after an accident resulting in it
failing to pay her approximately $20. She alleges its application
of an arbitrary projected sold adjustment calculated by a third
party caused this loss and violates Delaware's Consumer Fraud Act.
She alleges Progressive's same adjustment also breaches her
insurance contract and a covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
She lastly asks the Court declares Progressive's valuation
methodology breaches her insurance contract. Progressive moved to
dismiss.

Ms. Williams purchased an auto insurance policy with a $2,000
deductible from Progressive at an unpleaded time. She somehow
damaged her car in an Oct. 30, 2020 accident leading her to submit
a property claim under the Policy. Progressive declared her car a
total loss. It then offered her the actual cash value of her car
calculated by third-party Mitchell International, Inc.

Mitchell calculates the amount owed to Progressive's insureds by
comparing cars most closely resembling the totaled car and making
certain adjustments to the comparable cars including a "projected
sold adjustment." It identified three cars comparable to Ms.
Williams' car and then applied a projected sold adjustment
deduction to the three comparison cars in the amount of -$516;
-$459, and -$489, all approximately 10.3% of their listed sale
price.

Progressive calculated the base value (which includes the projected
sold adjustment) of Ms. Williams' car at $2,521.42. It then
deducted $1,054.46 representing the condition of her car (which she
does not contest) and credited her $65 for after-market parts. This
math exercise resulted in a market value for her car of $1,531.96.
Because she had a deductible of $2,000, the settlement value for
her claim is zero. She alleges the base value is approximately $488
too low (because of the improperly applied projected sold
adjustment) and if $488 is added back to the market value, less her
deductible, Progressive owes her approximately $20.

Progressive and Ms. Williams agreed Progressive covers "sudden,
direct and accidental loss to a covered auto resulting from
collision." The Policy limits Progressive's "liability for loss to
a covered auto to the lowest of:" a. "the actual cash value of the
damaged property at the time of the loss reduced by the applicable
deductible;" b. the amount to replace the damaged property; c. the
amount to repair the damaged property; or d. the "Stated Amount" on
the Policy's declarations page.

The issue in the case is how Progressive determines the "actual
cash value" of Ms. Williams' car deemed a total loss by
Progressive. In defining Progressive's limits of liability, the
Policy provides its method to determine "actual cash value": "The
actual cash value is determined by the market value, age, and
condition of the vehicle at the time the loss occurs."

Ms. Williams challenges Progressive's application of projected sold
adjustment to the calculation of comparable cars forming the "base
vehicle value." She alleges the application of the projected sold
adjustment lowered the "base value" of her car used to determine
its actual market value (base value - loss vehicle adjustments =
market value). She alleges there are more than 100 putative class
members in Delaware damaged by the application of the projected
sold adjustment to their total loss car claims and estimates
damages exceed $5 million. She claims a violation of Delaware's
Consumer Fraud Act, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and seeks declaratory judgment.

Progressive moves to dismiss Ms. Williams' claims arguing:

      A. she fails to state a claim under Delaware's Consumer Fraud
Act because (a) there are no allegations of conduct falling within
the scope of the Act, and (b) even if she could properly invoke the
Act, she fails to plead knowing and intentional conduct to support
a fraud claim with sufficient particularity under Rule 9(b) and her
reliance on Delaware's Insurance Commissioner's Bulletin defining
fair market value is not applicable because it pertains to the
Commissioner's interpretation of Delaware's Unfair Trade Practices
Act (and not the Consumer Fraud Act) which has no private right of
action;

      B. she fails to state a claim for breach of contract because
she does not plead -- and cannot plead -- any provision of the
Policy obligating Progressive to pay the actual cash value of the
total loss car;

      C. the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
claim is duplicative of the breach of contract claim and does not
apply to conduct covered by an express contract; and,

      D. the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her claim
for declaratory relief because she seeks relief based on past harm
and does not have standing and, even if she did have standing, her
declaratory judgment claim is duplicative of her breach of contract
claim.

Ms. Williams responds she sufficiently pleads her claims under the
Rule 12(b)(6) standard and Progressive is "cooking the books" by
"asserting something to its insureds" that is false and it knows is
false. She concedes if Progressive calculated the market value by
taking the average price of comparable cars adjusted for
differences between the comparable cars and the insured car in
mileage, condition, and equipment, she would have no claim because
these are proper factors to consider under the Policy and Delaware
law. But Progressive goes farther and applies a knowingly false
projected sold adjustment reducing the actual cash market value of
the total loss car. Ms. Williams alleges this conduct constitutes
fraud under Delaware's Consumer Fraud Act.

Progressive moves to dismiss the Consumer Fraud Act claim based on
two arguments. First, Ms. Williams does not plead conduct falling
within the scope of the Act, specifically, there are no allegations
of a misrepresentation or omission "in connection with the sale,
lease, receipt, or advertisement" of the Policy. And, second, even
if Ms. Williams could properly invoke the Act, her fraud theories
are not actionable and not pleaded with particularity as required
by Rule 9(b).

Judge Kearny dismisses Ms. Williams' Consumer Fraud Act claim
finding there are no allegations within the language of the Act.
She finds that Ms. Williams does not allege a misrepresentation or
omission made by Progressive in the sale of the Policy to her
regarding the projected sold adjustment. She did not do so after
two attempts at pleading. She instead concedes that there is no
precedent on whether the allegations state a viable claim for
violation of the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act, and is willing to
concede that question is subject to reasonable debate. And in oral
argument, Ms. Williams conceded the dismissal of her Consumer Fraud
Act claim is a "close call."

Ms. Williams has now twice offered no allegations regarding how
Progressive at the time of the sale of the Policy failed to
disclose or omitted the application of the projected sold
adjustment to determining the actual cash value of a total loss
car. She instead alleges in conclusory fashion without supporting
facts: Progressive knowingly and intentionally misrepresented or
failed to disclose application of the projected sold adjustment to
comparable cars as material to the purchase decisions of her and
the class; she purchased Progressive's policy in reliance on its
misrepresentations, omissions, concealments, and/or failure to
disclose the application of the projected sold adjustment; and, but
for Progressive's deception, she would not have purchased the
Policy. Ms. Williams fails to allege facts Progressive's conduct
occurred as part of the sale, lease, or advertisement of the
insurance policy.

Progressive next moves to dismiss the breach of contract claim. Ms.
Williams alleges she did not receive the benefit of her bargain
with Progressive in the amount of the difference between what she
believes to be the correct actual cash value and Progressive's
improper calculation of market value, a difference of approximately
$488.

Judge Kearny is not persuaded to dismiss the breach of contract at
this preliminary stage subject to discovery. Ms. Williams need only
allege a contract, breach of an obligation imposed by the contract,
and damages. Paragraph 46 of her amended Complaint, as she
repeatedly cited during oral argument, alleges the breach of the
obligation and damage. The courts in Smith v. S. Farm Bureau Cas.
Ins. Co., 18 F.4 th 976 (8th Cir. 2021) and Brown v. Progressive
Mountain Ins. Co., No. 21-175 (N.D.Ga. Aug. 15, 2022) recognize
allegations the application of the projected sold adjustment to
reduce the value of comparable cars, which in turn reduces the base
value used to calculate the market value of the total loss car
plausibly states a claim for breach of contract.

Judge Kearny denies Progressive's motion to dismiss the breach of
contract claim.

Progressive moves to dismiss Ms. Williams' claim for the breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the claim
cannot be based on an express contract. To state a claim for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under
Delaware law, a plaintiff must allege: "(1) a specific implied
contractual obligation; (2) a breach of that obligation; and (3)
resulting damage."

Progressive argues the Court must dismiss the claim because it is
duplicative of the breach of contract claim. It also argues it
should reject Ms. Williams' attempt to imply terms into the Policy,
specifically an allegation Progressive failed to conduct an
investigation, study, or research into the projected sold
adjustment as alleged in paragraph 87.b. of the amended Complaint.
Ms. Williams responds the duty of good faith and fair dealing is
implied in every contract and requires Progressive to exercise its
discretionary right in a reasonable manner.

Judge Kearny finds that Ms. Williams sufficiently pleads an
alternative theory for her claim of contract damages. He allows Ms.
Williams' covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim to go
forward.

Ms. Williams seeks a declaration "in paying total-loss claims by
first-party insureds, it is a breach of Progressive's insurance
contract, as well as a violation of law, for it to base the
valuation and payment of claims on values of comparable cars that
have been reduced by projected sold adjustments that are (a)
arbitrary and capricious, (b) contrary to industry practices and
consumer experiences (and therefore not reflective of the vehicle's
fair market value), and/or (c) not reasonably specific or
appropriate as to dollar amount."

Progressive moves to dismiss Ms. Williams's claim for declaratory
relief for two reasons: (1) Ms. Williams lacks standing; and (2)
even if she has standing, she fails to state a claim because the
declaratory relief she seeks is duplicative of the breach of
contract claim.

Judge Kearny finds that the amended Complaint does not allege
prospective declaratory relief. Progressive already adjusted Ms.
Williams's claim; she does not agree with the way Progressive
adjusted the claim. She seeks "backward-looking" relief, not
"forward-looking" relief from a "future injury." Ms. Williams lacks
standing to seek declaratory relief. She challenges Progressive's
past conduct; the application of the projected sold adjustment to
the determination of the actual cash value. Hence, Ms. Williams'
claim for declaratory relief is duplicative of her contract claims
as it relates to her adjusted claim and request for relief from
conduct long over. Judge Kearny dismisses the declaratory judgment
request.

For these reasons, Judge Kearny concludes that the counsel provided
helpful briefing and oral argument. He understands how the
calculation may breach a contract term depending on whether he
finds Progressive did not consider the market value of Ms.
Williams' car by improperly applying the projected sold adjustment.
But there is no allegation of concealment or omission in connection
with a sale of the insurance contract to Ms. Williams necessary for
the consumer fraud claim.

Accordingly, Judge Kearny grants Progressive's motion in part to
dismiss Ms. Williams' claim under Delaware's Consumer Fraud Act and
her claim for declaratory relief. He denies its motion on the
alternative contract claims and allows the breach of contract and
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to proceed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3378xdf5 from Leagle.com.


PURPLE AND GOLD SPORTS: Dicks Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Purple and Gold
Sports Shop, LLC. The case is styled as Victoria Dicks, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated v. Purple and Gold
Sports Shop, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-08159 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 23,
2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Purple and Gold Sports Shop -- https://purpleandgoldsports.com/ --
is a sporting goods store in Inniswold, Louisiana.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Perlin Suit Removed to S.D. Florida
------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Julia Perlin, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., CCS Global
Holdings, Inc., Case No. CACE-22-011811 was removed from the 17th
Judicial Circuit Court, in and for Broward Co., to the U.S.
District Court for Southern District of Florida on Sept. 23, 2022.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 0:22-cv-61803-RS to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

Quest Diagnostics -- https://www.questdiagnostics.com/ -- is an
American clinical laboratory.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Evan Maxwell Rosen, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF EVAN M. ROSEN, P.A.
          2719 Hollywood Boulevard, Ste B-224
          Hollywood, FL 33020
          Phone: (754) 400-5150
          Fax: (754) 400-5260
          Email: erosen@evanmrosen.com

               - and -

          Jack Dennis Card, Jr., Esq.
          CONSUMER LAW ORGANIZATION, P.A.
          721 US Highway 1, Suite 201
          North Palm Beach, FL 33408
          Phone: (561) 822-3446
          Fax: (305) 574-0132
          Email: Dcard@Consumerlaworg.com

               - and -

          Jordan Alexander Shaw, Esq.
          Kimberly A. Slaven-Hauth, Esq.
          ZEBERSKY PAYNE
          110 SE 6th St, suite 2150
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Phone: (954) 361-3633
          Fax: (954) 989-7781
          Email: jshaw@zpllp.com
                 kslaven@zpllp.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Ian M. Ross, Esq.
          SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
          801 Brickell Avenue, Suite 800
          Miami, FL 33131
          Phone: (305) 391-5218
          Email: iross@sidley.com

               - and -

          Chantel Christine Wonder, Esq.
          GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI - TAMPA
          601 S Harbour Island Blvd., Suite 109
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Phone: (813) 523-4945
          Email: cwonder@grsm.com


RECKITT BENCKISER: Vaglica Files Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Reckitt Benckiser
LLC. The case is styled as Nicholas Vaglica, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC,
Case No. 2:22-cv-05730 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 25, 2022).

The nature of suit is stated as Fraud or Truth-In-Lending.

Reckitt Benckiser, LLC -- https://www.reckitt.com/ -- manufactures
cleaning products. The Company produces cleaners, disinfectants,
and deodorizers for household use.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer I. Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 Cuttermill Road, Ste. 409
          Great Neck, NY 11021
          Phone: (516) 260-7080
          Fax: (516) 234-7800
          Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com


RECOUP FITNESS: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Recoup Fitness, Inc.
The case is styled as Joyce Carrico, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Recoup Fitness, Inc., Case No.
1:22-cv-08188 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 24, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Recoup -- https://recoupfitness.com/ -- creates innovative hot and
cold therapy products trusted and tested by professional athletes
in all 5 major leagues.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Solomon Nematzadeh, Esq.
          NEMATZADEH PLLC
          101 Avenue of the Americas, Ste. 9th Floor
          New York, NY 10013
          Phone: (646) 417-8424
          Email: jsn@nematlawyers.com

RING LLC: White Sues Over Misleading Promotion of Security Products
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Alison White, an individual, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. RING LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability
Company; THE HOME DEPOT, INC. dba HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., a
Delaware Corporation; AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC dba AMAZON.COM, INC.,
a Delaware Corporation; DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No.
2:22-cv-06909 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 23, 2022), is brought against
Defendants for unlawful, unfair, and deceptive business practices
in violation of California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act;
California's False Advertising Law; California's Unfair Competition
Law; Negligent Misrepresentation; Intentional Misrepresentation;
and Breach of Express Warranty in response to the Defendants' false
and misleading promotion of its security products known as the
Jobsite Security 5-Piece Starter Kit and Ring Protect Pro
subscription.

The Defendants' packaging, website, advertisements, and marketing
materials associated with Defendant Ring's Jobsite Security 5-Piece
Starter Kit represents to consumers that Jobsite Security Kit, when
used in conjunction with a Wi-Fi internet connection and a Pro
Subscription with enrollment in "24/7 professional monitoring,"
Defendant Ring will automatically "handle it" and "call the
authorities and resolve it for you," when in fact, the Jobsite
Security Kit and Pro Subscription are not capable of this
advertised functionality. Users must call authorities themselves or
instruct Defendant Ring to do so when the users are prompted.
Defendants effectively sold purchasers a "911 speed dial" button
purchasers can press when purchasers see that their motion sensors
have been triggered.

The Defendants Ring and Amazon manufacture, distribute, market, and
sell the Jobsite Security 5-Piece Starter Kit ("Jobsite Security
Kit") to be used in conjunction with Defendant Ring's Ring Protect
Pro subscription ("Pro Subscription"). Defendant Ring advertises
the Jobsite Security Kit on its website as "a flexible security
system for contractors that adds wifi to your site. Easily move the
devices around. Take the system to different sites. And protect
your valuable tools and materials from anywhere, anytime.

The Defendant Ring advertises and misrepresents on its website that
its Pro Subscription provides functionality that it knows it does
not actually provide. Defendants are intentionally misrepresenting
that the Jobsite Security Kit, when used with the Pro Subscription,
will "call authorities" for users who have a triggering security
event, when it knows that its Jobsite Security Kit does not
actually contain any pieces that trigger police response.
Defendants' advertising and marketing campaign is false, deceptive,
and misleading because the Pro Subscription when used in
conjunction with the Jobsite Security Kit does not actually
automatically call authorities when the alarm is set and then the
Motion Sensor is triggered and all other conditions precedent are
satisfied.

When deciding to purchase the Jobsite Security Kit and Pro
Subscription, the Plaintiff relied on Defendants' misrepresentation
that their Jobsite Security Kit when used with the Pro Subscription
would automatically contact authorities. Plaintiff and Class
Members would not have purchased the Jobsite Security Kit and Pro
Subscription absent Defendants' misrepresentation regarding the
capability and functionality of the Jobsite Security Kit and Pro
Subscription. This conduct caused the Plaintiff damages and
requires restitution and injunctive relief to remedy and prevent
further harm, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased and used the Defendants' Jobsite Security
Kit and Pro Subscription in Los Angeles County, California.

Ring is a home security and smart home company that designed and
manufactured the Jobsite Security Kit and designed and provides the
Pro Subscription.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Carney R. Shegerian, Esq.
          Anthony Nguyen, Esq.
          Cheryl A. Kenner, Esq.
          SHEGERIAN & ASSOCIATES, INC.
          11520 San Vicente Boulevard
          Los Angeles, CA 90049
          Phone: (310) 860-0770
          Facsimile: (310) 860-0771
          Email: CShegerian@Shegerianlaw.com
                 ANguyen@Shegerianlaw.com
                 CKenner@Shegerianlaw.com


SEARS HOLDINGS: Court Affirms Denial of Greene's Relief From Stay
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: SEARS HOLDINGS CORPORATION, et al., Debtors.
NINA GREENE and GERALD GREENE, Appellants v. TRANSFORM HOLDCO, LLC,
TRANSFORM SR PROTECTION, LLC, and TRANSFORM SR LLC, Appellees, Case
No. 21 Civ. 5437 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Nelson S. Roman of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York affirms
in its entirety the May 27, 2021 order of the Bankruptcy Court.

The Order denied the Appellants' Motion for Relief from the
Automatic Stay Under 11 U.S.C. Section 362(d).

The appeal arises from the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case of Debtors
Sears Holdings Corporation and its affiliates in the Southern
District of New York, Case No. 18-23538 (RDD). Appellants Nina and
Gerald Greene are the class representatives of two certified
classes in a 2015 class action against Debtors in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (the "Class
Action."). The Class Action has been stayed since the commencement
of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case.

During the course of the bankruptcy case, the Bankruptcy Court
oversaw the extensive negotiations between the Debtors and
Appellees Transform Holdco, LLC, Transform SR Protection, LLC, and
Transform SR, LLC, regarding the Debtors' sale of substantially all
of their assets to Appellees. In February 2019, the Debtors and the
Appellees closed this sale transaction after the Bankruptcy Court
approved the Asset Purchase Agreement ("APA") between them.

In December 2019, the Appellants moved for relief from the
automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. Section 362(d) to continue
prosecuting the Class Action, but with the Appellees substituted as
the Defendants. They argued that the APA provides for Appellees'
assumption of certain liabilities from the Debtors, including the
claims asserted against them in the Class Action. On May 27, 2021,
the Bankruptcy Court denied Appellants' motion. The Appellants
appealed on June 9, 2021.

On March 25, 2015, the Appellants commenced a class action against
Debtors in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. In the Class Action, they allege that Debtors sold Master
Protection Agreements ("MPAs") to repair or replace covered home
appliances that they had no intention of performing, for which they
assert claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and
violations of the consumer protection laws of Illinois and
Pennsylvania. Following motion practice and the completion of
discovery, the court in the Class Action certified two classes
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, naming the Appellants as
class representatives for both.

On Oct. 15, 2018, the Debtors filed voluntary petitions for relief
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. As a result, the
Appellants' Class Action was automatically stayed under 11 U.S.C.
Section 362(a). The Appellants, on behalf of the two certified
classes and their own, filed Proofs of Claim against Debtors in
April 2019.

Upon commencing the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, the Debtors began
to solicit bids to sell some or all of their assets under 11 U.S.C.
Section 363. After intensive negotiations and a competitive
auction, the Debtors selected the Appellees' bid for $5.2 billion
to acquire substantially all of the Debtors' assets. The Debtors
and the Appellee's reflected the terms of the winning bid in the
APA, which they executed on Jan. 17, 2019. Following a contested
hearing that spanned several days, on Feb. 8, 2019, the Bankruptcy
Court approved the APA and the sale transaction. The sale closed on
Feb. 11, 2019.

On Dec. 13, 2019, the Appellants moved before the Bankruptcy Court
for an order granting relief from the automatic stay under 11
U.S.C. Section 362(d) to continue prosecuting their Class Action,
but with Appellees substituted as defendants. By their motion, the
Appellants argued that after the execution of the APA, the
Appellees were now the real parties in interest in the Class Action
because, under Section 2.3(e) of the APA, the Appellees agreed to
assume the currently pending asserted claims against the Debtors as
liabilities.

Following the parties' motion briefing, on May 14, 2021, the
Bankruptcy Court held an evidentiary hearing in which it later
issued a bench ruling denying on the Appellants' motion. On May 27,
2021, it issued an order denying the Appellants' motion and
precluding them from joining the Appellees as defendants in the
Class Action or pursuing any of the Class Action claims against the
Appellees. On June 9, 2021, the Appellants commenced the instant
appeal.

By their brief, the Appellants present only one issue on appeal:
Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in interpreting the APA to
preclude them from joining Appellees as defendants in the Class
Action or pursuing any of the Class Action claims against them. The
They argue that while it correctly concluded that the APA was
unambiguous, the Bankruptcy Court erroneously interpreted Section
2.3(e) of the APA to preclude joining the Appellees as defendants
in the Class Action or pursuing any of the Class Action claims
against them.

Judge Roman agrees with the Bankruptcy Court and the parties that
the language in the APA is unambiguous. Accordingly, he gives
effect to the plain-meaning of the contract's terms and
provisions," with "'priority to the parties' intentions as
reflected in the four corners of the agreement,' construing the
agreement as a whole and giving effect to all its provisions." On
that basis, after construing the APA as a whole and giving effect
to all its provisions, he agrees with the Bankruptcy Court that the
APA's plain and ordinary meaning precludes joining the Appellees as
defendants in the Class Action or pursuing any of the Class Action
claims against them.

This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the
Appellants' reading of the APA completely goes against Delaware
rules of contract construction not only because it considers
Section 2.3(e) in isolation, but also because it renders Section
2.4(c) "mere surplusage." Simply put, if the Appellants' reading of
Section 2.3(e) were correct, then the language in Section 2.4(c)
would be nothing more than redundant language that is inconsistent
with the rest of the APA -- a result that seems highly improbable
especially because that the Debtors and the Appellees extensively
negotiated the terms of the APA under the supervision of the
Bankruptcy Court.

Accordingly, Judge Roman concludes that the Bankruptcy Court did
not err in interpreting the APA to preclude the Appellants from
joining the Appellees as defendants in the Class Action or pursuing
any of the Class Action claims against them. Hence, the decision of
the Bankruptcy Court is affirmed. The Clerk of the Court is kindly
directed to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mr26na9k from Leagle.com.


SIMPLY MEDICAL: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Simply Medical, LLC.
The case is styled as Joyce Carrico, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Simply Medical, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-08190 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 24, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Simply Medical -- https://www.simplymedical.com/ -- offers home
healthcare medical supplies, medical equipment and caregiver
essential products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Solomon Nematzadeh, Esq.
          NEMATZADEH PLLC
          101 Avenue of the Americas, Ste. 9th Floor
          New York, NY 10013
          Phone: (646) 417-8424
          Email: jsn@nematlawyers.com


STATE FARM: Court Grants Bid to Certify Class in Millwood Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Gettys Bryant Millwood, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. State Farm Life Insurance
Company, Defendant, C/A No. 7:19-cv-01445-DCC (D.S.C.), Judge
Donald C. Coggins, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the District
of South Carolina, Spartanburg Division, grants the Plaintiff's
Motion for Class Certification.

In 1988, the Plaintiff purchased policy form 86040, a flexible
premium adjustable whole life insurance policy, from State Farm.
The Policy was a universal life insurance policy, a type of
"permanent" life insurance that, unlike standard term insurance, is
designed to provide lifetime death benefit protection. The
Plaintiff paid premiums that were deposited into an investment
feature or savings component, called the "Cash Value," which
accumulated interest over time. Each month, State Farm was
permitted to make a deduction from the Policy that included "(1)
the cost of insurance, (2) the monthly charges for any riders, and
(3) the monthly expense charge." The Policy remained in force so
long as there was sufficient money in the Cash Value to cover these
monthly deductions.

The cost of insurance ("COI") charge was calculated using a monthly
cost of insurance rate. The Policy provides that COI rates "for
each policy year are based on the Insured's age on the policy
anniversary, sex, and applicable rate class," and "can be adjusted
for projected changes in mortality." These factors are commonly
used to determine mortality expectations for an insured or group of
insureds. However, the Plaintiff contends that State Farm did not
base its COI rates solely on the "projected changes in mortality"
but instead used other, unauthorized factors, unrelated to
mortality expectations, in determining the Policy's COI rates, and
that State Farm thereby deducted COI charges from Cash Values in
amounts exceeding those authorized by the Policy.
The Plaintiff alleges claims for breach of contract, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, and
for a declaratory judgment. The class the Plaintiff seeks to
certify consists of "all persons who own or owned a universal life
insurance policy issued by State Farm Life Insurance Company on
Form-86040 in the State of South Carolina at any time between Jan.
1, 1993, and Dec. 31, 2020, inclusive."

The matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification. State Farm filed a Response in Opposition, and the
Plaintiff filed a Reply.

In order for a class to be certified, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a) requires a district court to make the following
determinations: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.

In addition to satisfying the requirements outlined in Rule 23(a),
"the class action must fall within one of the three categories
enumerated in Rule 23(b)." The categories are as follows: "(1)
individual actions would risk inconsistent adjudications with
respect to individual class members or adjudications dispositive of
the interests of non-parties; (2) class-wide injunctive ot
declaratory relief is sought and appropriate; or (3) questions of
fact or law common to the class predominate over any questions
affecting individual members." In addition, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has "repeatedly recognized that Rule
23 contains an implicit threshold requirement that the members of a
proposed class be 'readily identifiable.'

Judge Coggins opines that (i) the proposed class members are
sufficiently numerous; (ii) the Plaintiff has made a sufficient
showing that State Farm's conduct in basing COI rates on
unauthorized factors was consistent as to each member of the class;
(iii) common evidence and answers will dictate the result in the
case, and State Farm's concerns do not negate predominance or
provide a basis for denying the Plaintiff's request for class
certification; (iv) the Plaintiff has satisfied the typicality
requirement because his claims arise from the same course of
conduct that gives rise to the claims of the other class members
and are based on the same legal theories; and (v) the Plaintiff's
interests are substantively identical to those of the other class
members and his class counsel will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.

Judge Coggins further opines that the Plaintiff has satisfied the
superiority requirement. There is no evidence before the Court that
there is any other case pending against State Farm regarding policy
form 86040 on behalf of South Carolina policyholders and concerning
the claims at issue. Because the Plaintiff and the class members
are policyholders in the State of South Carolina, it is reasonable
for the litigation of these claims to be concentrated in this
forum. Moreover, the case involves interpretation of a form
contract, the interpretation of which will apply to all class
members, making class action an efficient form of adjudication.
Therefore, Judge Coggins finds that the superiority requirement has
been met. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion for Certification is
granted pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).

As discussed previously, Judge Coggins finds that the terms of the
Policy are the same for each prospective class member.
Consequently, the interpretation will result in one declaratory
judgment applicable to all class members. Because the Plaintiff
does not seek to certify any claim for monetary relief under Rule
23(b)(2), the prohibition against class certification under Rule
23(b)(2) for damages claims is inapplicable. Accordingly, the
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is
granted only as to his declaratory judgment claim.

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Coggins grants the Plaintiff's
Motion for Class Certification.

Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), he certifies a class of plaintiffs
consisting of "all persons who own or owned a universal life
insurance policy issued by State Farm Life Insurance Company on
Form-86040 in the State of South Carolina at any time between Jan.
1, 1993, and Dec. 31, 2020, inclusive," for each of the Plaintiff's
claims, except that Excluded Persons are excluded from the class.
He certifies the same class of plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2)
for the Plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim only.

Based on a review of the Plaintiff's counsel's qualifications and
experience provided in the record, Judge Coggins has considered the
work the Plaintiff's counsel has done in identifying and
investigating potential claims in the action; the counsel's
experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and
the types of claims asserted in this action; the counsel's
knowledge of the applicable law; and the resources that counsel
will commit to representing the class. As discussed, he finds that
the Plaintiff's counsel will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. Accordingly, Judge Coggins appoints the
Plaintiff as the Class Representative and his counsel as the Class
Counsel, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g).

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 23, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5n8tmff8 from Leagle.com.


SW GROUP LLC: Cruz Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against SW Group, LLC. The
case is styled as Miriam Cruz, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. SW Group, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-05717-LDH-RER
(E.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

SW Group LLC operates a chain of department stores. The Company
offers casual and dress wear, shoes, home furnishings, housewares,
linens, and home decor products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          14749 71st Ave.
          Flushing, NY 11367
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com


TARGET CORP: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Bayne Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MIEKE BAYNE and ALYSSA HART, individually on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. TARGET
CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-05938 (MKV) (S.D.N.Y.),
Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York grants in part and denies in part Target's
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.

Plaintiffs Bayne and Hart brought the putative class action against
Target, asserting six causes of action sounding in fraud, breach of
warranty, and unjust enrichment. Specifically, they allege that
Target manufactured, marketed and sold hundreds of thousands of
defective phone chargers, which would malfunction after only a week
of normal use.

Target is a retail store franchise that owns and operates nearly
two thousand general merchandise stores nationwide. Among the
various items sold by Target is a charger for iPhones and iPads
called the Heyday Charging Cable. The Heyday Charger comes in
various lengths, but all versions of the product are otherwise
identical. The packaging for this product describes features
typical of phone chargers, while emphasizing its "high charging
speed." The product sells for approximately $10, and Target, as the
product's exclusive retailer, has sold hundreds of thousands of
units.

The problem, the Plaintiffs allege, is that "the Product is of
extremely poor quality and uses inferior manufacturing materials,
which causes the Product to break and cease working as a phone
charger shortly after purchase." These latent manufacturing defects
manifested in various ways, "such as the plug breaking or the cable
overheating." This resulted in eight consumer complaints regarding
the product being filed with the Consumer Product Safety Commission
("CPSC"), and in one model of the product being recalled in January
2019. But the defects were never cured.

The problems with the product soon resulted in a barrage of
negative reviews on Target's website. In fact, the reviews for one
model of the Heyday Charger had an average review of 2.2 stars,
based on 323 reviews, and 78% of reviewers reported that they would
not recommend the product to others.

Bayne and Hart were among the frustrated customers. Bayne bought a
Heyday Charger from a New York Target store in December 2020. The
product began to malfunction a week after it was purchased,
becoming so hot to the touch that Bayne could not safely charge her
phone or any other device. Hart bought two Heyday Chargers from a
New York Target store in June 2021. However, the charger broke at
the tip only a week after it was purchased, making it impossible to
charge her phone or any other device. They both bought the Heyday
Chargers after reviewing the packaging and concluding that the
product would adequately serve the purpose of an ordinary phone
charger. Had the product's defects been disclosed, Bayne and Hart
would never have bought the product, or would have done so only for
a substantially reduced price.

The Plaintiffs initiated the action by filing a putative class
action complaint on July 9, 2021. They brought causes of action for
(i) breach of implied warranty; (ii) violation of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 2301, et seq.; (iii) violation of
New York General Business Law Section 349; (iv) violation of New
York General Business Law Section 350; (v) fraud; and (vi) unjust
enrichment.

The Plaintiffs sought to represent "all persons in the United
States who purchased" the Heyday Chargers and also sought to
represent a subclass of all Class members who purchased Heyday
Chargers in the State of New York.

Target brought a timely motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure
to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. This motion to dismiss asserted, among other
things, that "the breach of implied warranty claim fails because
the Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they provided any notice
of any alleged defect of any product they purchased." On Aug. 31,
2021, they sent Target a "Demand Letter," which outlined their
claims.

On Sept. 21, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, which
alleged the same six causes of action as in the original Complaint,
and sought to represent the same classes. Target filed a motion to
dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). That
motion was accompanied by a memorandum of law, and a Declaration of
David J. Carrier. The Plaintiffs opposed that motion, and Target
replied.

Judge Vyskocil finds that the Plaintiffs have adequately alleged
facts which, if proved, would support a claim based on breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability. She concludes that the
Plaintiffs' claim does not fail merely for lack of pre-suit notice.
It will be for the finder of fact to determine whether the
Plaintiffs filed their complaints, and hence gave notice,
sufficiently timely.

Turning to the merits, Target contends that even if the Plaintiffs
properly provided notice, their claim must be dismissed because
they failed to demonstrate that Target knew that the product
suffered from any defects. But knowledge of a defect is not an
element of a breach of implied warranty claim. The only two cases
that Target cites to the contrary concern the defense available to
retailers who could not discover through ordinary inspection the
alleged defect in a sealed product. These cases are Porrazzo v.
Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, 822 F.Supp.2d 406, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("For
claims for breach of warranty and negligence, a retailer cannot be
held liable for injuries sustained from the contents of a sealed
product even though a test might have disclosed a potential danger
because there is no obligation upon it to make such a test."); and
O'Neill v. Standard Homeopathic Co., 346 F.Supp.3d 511, 531-32
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (same).

This standard is unique and has not, so far as Judge Vyskocil can
tell, been expanded to cover breach of warranty claims for any
other category of products. She will not convert the exception into
the rule, especially not in a case where the retailer also is
alleged to have manufactured the defective product. She thus
rejects Target's argument that the breach of warranty claim must be
dismissed for lack of knowledge, which is the only basis on which
Target challenges the merits of the claim.

Target argues that the Plaintiffs claim under the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act ("MMWA") must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs argue that their MMWA claim still
survives because the Court has federal subject matter jurisdiction
over their claims pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act
("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d).

Judge Vyskocil disagrees. As the majority of other courts to have
addressed this issue have persuasively reasoned, the Plaintiffs'
position "is flatly contradicted by the plain text of the MMWA,"
which "provides that no claim will be cognizable in a suit brought
under paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection -- i.e., a suit brought
under the MMWA in federal district court -- unless the MMWA's
independent jurisdictional requirements are met." Hence, the
Plaintiffs MMWA claim must therefore be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.

The Plaintiffs claim that Target's misleading conduct took place by
omission, i.e., that Target misled investors by failing to disclose
the latent defects in the product. The main thrust of their
argument is that Target knew that the product was defective because
of the negative reviews on their website and the reports filed with
the CPSC.

Critically, however, the Plaintiffs never alleged that this
information was not readily available to them, Judge Vyskocil
points out. This is unsurprising, given that both sources are
available to the public. And while consumers cannot be expected to
peruse the CPSC reports before making any small purchase, a quick
trip to Target's website hardly seems unusual or overly burdensome.
Had the Plaintiffs done so, they would have seen the negative
reviews, and could have made a more informed purchasing decision.
Judge Vyskocil thus dismisses this claim for failure to plausibly
plead deception through omission.

With respect to their claim of fraudulent omission under New York
law, the Plaintiffs do not allege that Target owed them a fiduciary
duty. And, Judge Vyskocil opines that the Plaintiffs have failed to
adequately allege that Target possessed information that was not
readily available to them. As a result, this claim must be
dismissed.

Finally, the Plaintiffs have offered no explanation of how its
unjust enrichment claim differs from its other causes of action,
which seek the same relief for the same conduct. As such, the
motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim is
granted.

Finally, Target claims that there is no class action standing
because neither plaintiff has asserted a valid claim against
Target. Judge Vyskocil holds that the Plaintiffs have plausibly
stated a valid breach of warranty claim against Target. As a
result, they have standing to pursue their breach of warranty claim
on behalf of the putative Class.

As she set forth, Judge Vyskocil grants in part and denies in part
Target's Motion to Dismiss. Specifically, Target's motion is
granted in all respects except as it relates to the Plaintiffs'
breach of implied warranty claim.

Having dismissed the MMWA claim, which was the sole basis on which
the Plaintiffs invoked federal jurisdiction, Judge Vyskocil directs
the parties to submit simultaneous letter briefs within 14 days of
her Order, addressing whether the Court retains jurisdiction over
the matter under CAFA and/or whether it should exercise
supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1367.

The Clerk of Court respectfully is requested to close the Motion at
ECF No. 27.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 23, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3zdy8jbe from Leagle.com.


TESLA INC: Mallow Sues Over Deceptive and Misleading Representation
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Mallow, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. TESLA, INC. dba TESLA MOTORS, INC.; TESLA
LEASE TRUST; and TESLA FINANCE LLC, Case No. 3:22-cv-05443 (N.D.
Cal., Sept. 23, 2022), on behalf of himself and other consumers who
purchased or leased a new Tesla vehicle and paid more for Tesla's
ADAS technology in reliance on partial, deceptive and misleading
representations and/or omissions by Tesla.

Tesla advertises its vehicles as "engineered to be the safest in
the world." In particular, Tesla touts its "Autopilot technology,"
claiming that its cars' "active safety features can help reduce the
severity or prevent accidents from happening altogether." In
reality, many of the statements and claims made by Tesla about its
advanced driver assistance systems ("ADAS") technology, which is
marketed under various names, including "Autopilot," "Enhanced
Autopilot," and "Full Self-Driving Capability" ("FSD"), are
deceptive and misleading. Tesla's untrue and misleading claims
about its vehicles equipped with ADAS features are the subject of a
complaint filed by the State of California Department of Motor
Vehicles.

The Complaint in that case alleges: "Tesla advertised ADAS features
in written marketing materials primarily on Tesla's internet
website using the product labels and descriptions: 'Autopilot';
'Full Self-Driving Capability'; The phrase: 'The system is designed
to be able to conduct short and long-distance trips with no action
required by the person in the driver's seat.'; The claims: 'From
Home – All you will need to do is get in and tell your car where
to go. If you don't say anything, your car will look at your
calendar and take you there as the assumed destination. Your Tesla
will figure out the optimal route, navigating urban streets,
complex intersections and freeways. To your Destination – When
you arrive at your destination, simply step out at the entrance and
your car will enter park seek mode, automatically search for a spot
and park itself. A tap on your phone summons it back to you.'

Instead of simply identifying product or brand names, these
'Autopilot' and 'Full Self-Driving Capability' labels and
descriptions represent that vehicles equipped with the ADAS
features will operate as an autonomous vehicle, but vehicles
equipped with those ADAS features could not at the time of those
advertisements, and cannot now, operate as autonomous vehicles.
Yet, in an effort to increase revenue, sales, and investment, Tesla
continuously deceived and mislead consumers regarding the abilities
of its ADAS technology, knowing that autonomous and semi-autonomous
driving technology is highly coveted by consumers. Tesla continued
to make untrue statements in 2016 on its official blog that "All
Tesla Cars Being Produced Now Have Full Self-Driving Hardware." The
blog post included the misleading October 2016 video of a Tesla car
purportedly driving itself without incident, and suggested that
Tesla was on the cusp of bringing to market cars that would be
fully "self-driving" and have "full autonomy." When Tesla and Musk
made these statements, they knew there was no reasonable chance of
Tesla being able to meet those promises.

Tesla continued to deceive and mislead consumers about its "Full
Self-Driving Capability" technology throughout 2017-2019. Tesla's
website included statements representing that Tesla owners with the
FSD version of its ADAS technology would receive cars capable of
"full self-driving in almost all circumstances," ...that could
"conduct short and long distance trips with no action required by
the person in the driver's seat" and with a "probability of safety
at least twice as good as the average human driver."

Tesla's ADAS technology is not what Tesla has represented it to be.
Rather than being as advertised, the "Full Self-Driving Capability"
the Plaintiff and fellow consumers paid for is instead used to
generate data for Tesla's software programming. Buyers were guinea
pigs, used to test Tesla's technology at the expense of injury and
sometimes death. Had the Plaintiff and other Class members known
that Tesla's ADAS technology would not result in a fully
self-driving car, they would not have paid more for the technology.
As a result of their reliance on partial representations and/or
omissions by Tesla, the Plaintiff and the other Class members have
suffered a loss of money and/or loss in value of their vehicles,
says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased a new 2020 Model 3 Tesla Performance
Edition and paid an additional $7,000.00 for the "Full Self-Driving
Capability" option on November 4, 2019.

Tesla, Inc. designs, develops, manufactures, tests, markets,
distributes, sells, and leases electric vehicles under the brand
name "Tesla."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David S. Casey, Esq.
          Gayle M. Blatt, Esq.
          Jeremy Robinson, Esq.
          P. Camille Guerra, Esq.
          Michael J. Morphew, Esq.
          CASEY GERRY SCHENK FRANCAVILLA BLATT & PENFIELD, LLP
          110 Laurel Street
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone: (619) 238-1811
          Email: dcasey@cglaw.com
                 gmb@cglaw.com
                 jrobinson@cglaw.com
                 camille@cglaw.com
                 mmorphew@cglaw.com


TOWER RESEARCH: Bid for Class Certification in Choi Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MYUN-UK CHOI, JIN-HO JUNG, SUNG-HUN JUNG, SUNG-HEE
LEE, and KYUNG-SUB LEE, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs v. TOWER RESEARCH CAPITAL LLC and
MARK GORTON, Defendants, Case No. 14-CV-9912 (KMW) (S.D.N.Y.),
Judge Kimba M. Wood of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York enters an Opinion and Order:

   a. denying the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification;

   b. denying the Plaintiffs' motions to appoint class
      representatives and class counsel;

   c. denying as moot the parties' joint request for oral
      argument; and

   d. granting provisionally the Defendants' motions to seal
      portions of the Plaintiffs' memorandum and exhibits in
      support of the motion for class certification, of the
      Defendants' memorandum and exhibits in opposition to the
      motion, and of the Plaintiffs' reply memorandum and exhibit
      in further support of the motion.

The Plaintiffs sue on behalf of themselves and a putative class of
investors who bought or sold futures contracts based on the Korean
KOSPI 200 stock index during overnight trading in 2012. The class
they seek to represent consists of investors who traded with
Defendant Tower Research Capital LLC during periods in which Tower
allegedly manipulated the overnight market for KOSPI 200 futures.

The KOSPI 200 is an index of two hundred stocks that trade on the
Korea Exchange (the "KRX"), which is the only securities exchange
in South Korea. It is comparable to the S&P 500 or Dow Jones
Industrial Average, indices of the stocks of large companies listed
on U.S. exchanges.

The KRX created a derivative product, KOSPI 200 futures contracts,
to allow investors to speculate about the future value of the KOSPI
200 index. From 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. Seoul time, trading of KOSPI
200 futures occurs on CME Globex, an electronic platform located in
Aurora, Illinois (the "KOSPI 200 Night Market"). The platform
matches orders to buy (or sell) KOSPI 200 futures with
corresponding orders by counterparties who wish to sell (or buy)
futures. Settlement of those trades occurs on the KRX the next
day.

Tower is a high-frequency trading firm that was founded in 1998 by
Mark Gorton. High-frequency trading firms use computer algorithms
to place orders and execute trades at extremely fast speeds,
measurable in milliseconds, making small amounts of money on each
of a very large number of trades. They employ numerous trading
strategies. One prominent strategy is "market making."

Tower was highly active on the KOSPI 200 Night Market in 2012. The
Plaintiffs' expert calculated that Tower was on either the buy side
or the sell side of the trade (or both) for more than 50% of the
contracts traded in the KOSPI 200 Night Market. As described in the
parties' expert reports, Tower used two broad trading strategies.
The Plaintiffs' expert, Haim Bodek, portrays Tower's two strategies
as working in concert. He labels the first strategy the "Supporting
Strategy." Bodek calls the second strategy the "Aggressive
Strategy." The Defendants' expert, Professor Hendrik Bessembinder,
portrays Tower's trading strategies as legitimate, profitable, and
beneficial to the rest of the market. Neither party's expert could
identify another single entity that has participated in such a high
proportion of trading in a market.

The Court entered summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs'
Commodity Exchange Act claims. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs moved
forward with their only remaining claim, a state law claim of
unjust enrichment. On Sept. 16, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed their
motion to certify an unjust enrichment class. The Defendants oppose
the motion. The parties submitted multiple expert reports in
support of or in opposition to class certification.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class consisting of investors
who traded with Tower during periods in which it allegedly
manipulated the overnight market for KOSPI 200 futures. They also
move to appoint Myun-Uk Choi, Jin-Ho Jung, Sung-Hun Jung, and
Sung-Hee Lee as the class representatives and to appoint Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC as the class counsel.

The Defendants raise a host of arguments against the putative
class' eligibility for class treatment. Judge Wood need address
only the requirement that the Plaintiffs demonstrate that common
questions predominate over individual ones.

The parties dispute whether it is necessary for the Court to
conduct a choice-of-law analysis for this motion. As with the rest
of Rule 23(b)(3), the Plaintiffs bear the burden to show that there
are not variations in applicable law that cause individualized
issues to predominate over common issues.

Judge Wood finds that the Plaintiffs provide no authority to
support the notion that a party's invocation of the law of one
state during a prior stage of litigation precludes that party from
raising choice-of-law arguments at the class-certification stage.
There are also notable differences between the unjust enrichment
laws of various states, not to mention South Korea and other
countries in which Plaintiffs might reside. The Court cannot
conclude that the Plaintiffs have shown that an actual conflict
does not exist. The Plaintiffs have failed "to demonstrate that any
variations in relevant state laws do not predominate over the
similarities.

For these reasons, Judge Wood concludes that the Plaintiffs fall
short of demonstrating that common issues predominate in the
determinations of liability and of damages, even if one accepts
their position that New York law governs. She thus assumes without
deciding that New York law applies.

To determine whether a party seeking class certification has
satisfied the predominance requirement, a court "must assess (1)
the 'lements of the claims and defenses to be litigated'; and (2)
'whether generalized evidence could be offered to prove those
elements on a class-wide basis or whether individualized proof will
be needed to establish each class member's entitlement to relief.'"
Under New York law, the elements of unjust enrichment are: "(1)
that the defendant benefitted; (2) at the plaintiff's expense; and
(3) that equity and good conscience require restitution.

With respect to each of these three elements, Judge Wood opines
that the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they could
prove the element on a classwide basis using generalized evidence.
Individual issues thus predominate over common issues when
determining each plaintiff's entitlement to relief. This is fatal
to the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

Judge Wood finds that without a valid method of establishing
artificial prices, the Plaintiff's expert resorts to arbitrary
assumptions, such as assuming that the "true" price for the trade
is the price that prevails five-to-ten minutes after the trade.
Similarly, Bodek's use of misleading labels such as "Artificial
Price Detector" implies that Bodek's model does what it cannot:
detect artificial prices. The Plaintiffs have not shown that they
can use generalized proof "to identify and measure the artificial
prices created by Tower's algorithm."

For these same reasons, the Plaintiffs cannot identify with common
evidence a "true price" at which a given trade should have occurred
rather than the actual execution price. Individualized issues would
predominate in the Plaintiffs' attempts to demonstrate that trades
benefitted the Defendants "at the plaintiff's expense."

The final element of unjust enrichment poses the most intractably
individualized issues. The inquiry is whether "equity and good
conscience require restitution." Judge Wood finds that Plaintiffs
cannot establish that equity counsels in favor of restitution
without demonstrating that a given putative class member was lured
by Tower into placing its non-marketable order. There is no sense
in which an injustice was done as between Tower and this type of
non-lured trader; neither equity nor good conscience requires
restitution in such a circumstance. Yet, the Plaintiffs have done
nothing to show that they can prove luring without the use of
individualized evidence.

In other words, the Plaintiffs have the burden "to establish by a
preponderance that common questions would predominate over
individual ones." They have fallen far short of carrying this
burden. Their motion for class certification must therefore be
denied.

The Plaintiffs' predominance problems are not limited to liability.
Judge Wood says the disparities between the Plaintiffs' theory of
liability and their expert's damages model further militate against
certification of the proposed class. None of the flaws in Bodek's
damages model can be remedied with a simple, mechanical tweak to
his methodology. These issues present deep, conceptual problems,
akin to the challenge in Comcast of disentangling damages caused by
each of four different theories of antitrust liability.
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs provide scant reason to believe that
they could revise Bodek's damages model in a way that overcomes
these conceptual problems. Judge Wood finds that the inadequacies
of the Plaintiffs' damages model provide further cause to deny the
motion for class certification.

Judge Wood concludes that the Plaintiffs fail to do so twice over.
First, given their current theory of liability, they cannot
establish that a class member is entitled to relief unless they can
show that Tower traded with that class member at an artificial
price and that the class member was enticed into placing an order
that he would not have made but for Tower's Supporting Strategy.
The Plaintiffs have not shown that they could accomplish either
task using generalized proof. Second, the damages methodology
proposed by their expert is inconsistent with their theory of
liability in several fundamental respects. The methodology
therefore fails to satisfy the standard announced in Comcast Corp.
v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013), and cannot be relied upon to
show that damages can be determined using a classwide methodology.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Wood (i) denies the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification and (ii) denies as moot their
motions to appoint class representatives and class counsel, and the
parties' joint request for oral argument.

The Court grants the Defendants' motions to seal provisionally,
except with respect to the passages that are quoted in the Opinion.
The unredacted versions of these submissions will remain sealed for
no more than 10 weeks -- through Dec. 6, 2022 -- absent further
order of the Court. By Oct. 25, 2022, the Defendants will file an
unredacted copy of the documents to which they seek to make
redactions, red-lining each excerpt they contend should be sealed.
Immediately after each excerpt, the Defendants will include an
annotation stating the reason or reasons that excerpt should be
sealed.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the
pending motions at ECF Nos. 258, 264, 267, and 277.

By Oct. 25, 2022, the parties must jointly submit a letter
proposing the next steps in this litigation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 27, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/bdzj9m6k from Leagle.com.


TURKO TEXTILE: Tucker Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Turko Textile LLC.
The case is styled as Henry Tucker, on behalf of himself and all
other persons similarly situated v. Turko Textile LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-08146 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Turko Textile doing business as Enchante Home --
https://www.enchantehome.com/ -- set the unique Turkish towels
around the world.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly G. Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM, PC
          155 East 55th St., Ste. 6a
          New York, NY 10022
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: brad@markslawpc.com


U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL: Tooker Sues Over Failure to Safeguard PII
---------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Tooker, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL, INC., Case No. 2:22-cv-01631-SMB
(D. Ariz., Sept. 23, 2022), is brought against Defendant for its
failure to properly secure and safeguard personally identifiable
information ("PII") for past and current customers of Defendant,
including, but not limited to their: names, dates of birth, and
driver's license numbers or state identification numbers.

Prior to April 5, 2022, the Defendant obtained the PII of the
Plaintiff and Class Members, including the PII of the Plaintiff,
who was a customer of the Defendant, and stored that PII,
unencrypted, in an Internet-accessible database on the Defendant's
network. On August 1, 2022, the Defendant learned of a data
security incident on its network (the "Data Breach"). The Defendant
determined that, during the Data Breach, an unknown actor
compromised two unique passwords for accessing the Defendant's
copies of contracts with Defendant's past customers, which includes
the Plaintiff and Class Members. On September 9, 2022, the
Defendant notified the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") of the Data Breach. On September 9, 2022, the
Defendant began notifying Class Members of the Data Breach,
including the Plaintiff.

By obtaining, collecting, using, and deriving a benefit from the
PII of the Plaintiff and Class Members, the Defendant assumed legal
and equitable duties to those individuals to protect and safeguard
their information against unauthorized access and intrusion.
Moreover, the Defendant admits that the unencrypted PII accessed by
an unauthorized actor included name, date of birth, and driver's
license number or state identification number. The PII was
compromised due to the Defendant's negligent and/or careless acts
and omissions and the failure to protect the PII of the Plaintiff
and Class Members. In addition to the Defendant's failure to
prevent the Data Breach, Defendant waited almost months after the
Data Breach allegedly ended to report it to the SEC and affected
individuals. The Defendant has also purposefully maintained secret
the specific vulnerabilities and root causes of the breach and has
not informed the Plaintiff and Class Members of that information.

As a result of this delayed response, the Plaintiff and Class
Members had no idea their PII had been compromised, and that they
were, and continue to be, at significant risk of identity theft and
various other forms of personal, social, and financial harm,
including the sharing and detrimental use of their sensitive
information. The risk will remain for their respective lifetimes.
The Defendant disregarded the rights of the Plaintiff and Class
Members by intentionally, willfully, recklessly, or negligently
failing to take and implement adequate and reasonable measures to
ensure that the PII of the Plaintiff and Class Members was
safeguarded, failing to take available steps to prevent an
unauthorized disclosure of data, and failing to follow applicable,
required and appropriate protocols, policies and procedures
regarding the encryption of data, even for internal use, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff is a customer of the Defendant who provided and
entrusted the Defendant with sensitive and confidential
information.

The Defendant "U-Haul is an American moving truck, trailer, and
self storage rental company, based in Phoenix, Arizona, that has
been in operation since 1945."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          M. Anderson Berry, Esq.
          Gregory Haroutunian, Esq.
          CLAYEO C. ARNOLD, A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORP.
          865 Howe Avenue
          Sacramento, CA 95825
          Phone: (916) 239-4778
          Facsimile: (916) 924-1829
          Email: aberry@justice4you.com;
                 gharoutunian@justice4you.com


UMAR SERVICES: Court Conditionally Certifies Class in Staley Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Angela Staley, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. UMAR Services, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:21CV42 (M.D.N.C.), Judge Loretta C. Biggs of
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina
grants in part and denies in part the Plaintiff's Motion for
Conditional Certification and Facilitation Notice.

UMAR is "a nonprofit organization that provides housing services to
adults with intellectual or developmental disabilities." It
operates twenty-one group homes in North Carolina. To operate these
homes, the Defendant has a group of employees designated as "Direct
Support Professional-Live In" ("DSP-LI") employees.

DSP-LIs "provide the Defendant's clients with direct support for
their daily needs, including medication administration and personal
care assistance." They "work a seven-day schedule that begins on
Wednesday of each week," on a seven-days-on/seven-days-off cadence.
During their seven days working, the Defendant requires the
DSP-LIs to sleep at the group homes. DSP-LIs must clock out for
this sleep time. However, if a resident requires assistance during
the night, DSP-LIs must respond and are permitted to clock back in
while they are responding.

Ms. Staley was employed by the Defendant as a DSP-LI from March
2020 to October 2021. She initiated the action against the
Defendant "on behalf of herself and others similarly situated
DSP-LIs as an opt-in collective action pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b)." She alleges that
the Defendant willfully violated the FLSA by not paying DSP-LIs
both regular and overtime pay in that it treated sleep time hours
as non-compensable time.

At this stage in the proceedings, the parties have completed Phase
I discovery related to class certification issues. During this
period, 10 other DSP-LIs have consented to join the lawsuit as
party plaintiffs. Relying on declarations from these additional
DSP-LIs, the Plaintiff has moved for conditional class
certification. She seeks conditional certification of a proposed
class of similarly situated former employees of UMAR, and
authorization to send opt-in notices and consent forms of her
design to such employees.

Judge Biggs explains that the FLSA permits an employee to bring an
action for unpaid minimum or overtime wages on "behalf of himself
and other employees similarly situated." There are two requirements
for the certification of an FLSA collective action." First, there
must be "similarly situated" members of a proposed class. Second,
the class members must opt in.

The Plaintiff's present motion for conditional certification
pertains only to the first step of the foregoing process. Her basic
contention is that the Defendant violated the FLSA by requiring the
Plaintiff and other DSP-LIs to be on call at the Defendant's group
homes at night while clocked out, which had the result of depriving
them of overtime wages. Thus, at this stage of the proceedings, the
Plaintiff must make a "relatively modest" showing that the
Defendant had a common policy of treating this time as
non-compensable, and must propose a class of prospective plaintiffs
who were subject to this policy and share "at least a manageably
similar factual setting."

With respect to defining a class of plaintiffs, the Plaintiff has
proposed the following: "All individuals who currently work, or
have worked, for Defendant as a Direct Support Professional-Live In
(DSP-LI) at the Arey, Bowden, Clingman, Weaver, and Westridge group
homes, at any time within the preceding 3-years from the date of
filing the complaint."

Judge Biggs finds that the Defendant has not presented any argument
or evidence that it did not have a policy of requiring DSP-LIs to
clock out but remain at its group homes overnight and on call
without compensation for those hours. Nor has the Defendant
challenged whether it used a seven-day work week for most of its
DSP-LIs with the standard clock-in times, clock-out times, and
overnight periods reflected in the charts in the declarations. It
has also not addressed whether the Plaintiff's proposed definition
of the class is appropriate for the case.

Returning to the Plaintiff's evidence, Judge Biggs finds that the
DSP-LI declarations satisfy the Plaintiff's relatively modest
burden for conditional certification. Specifically, these
declarations support that the Defendant did have the allegedly
unlawful policy regarding sleep time for DSP-LIs at its group
homes. Furthermore, because the declarations indicate that the
sleep hours policy affected all DSP-LIs, she also finds that the
Plaintiff's articulation of the proposed class appropriately
describes the potential plaintiffs. The Plaintiff's articulation
also focuses the class to a manageably similar factual setting by
specifying a single specific role at a handful of specific group
homes. Judge Biggs, therefore, finds that the Plaintiff has carried
her burden for conditional certification of her FLSA collective
action.

Judge Biggs next turns to the Defendant's arguments. The Defendant
makes two arguments why the Court should not conditionally certify
this proposed class. First, it argues that the Plaintiff's own
conditions of employment were unique, and that she is therefore too
dissimilar to other DSP-LIs to bring a collective action on their
behalf. Second, it argues the case cannot proceed as a
representative action because considerations of manageability,
fairness, and judicial economy weigh against it.

The Defendant's arguments are not persuasive. First, regardless of
whether the Plaintiff worked somewhat fewer hours than her
colleagues, she is similarly situated to the proposed class in that
she was not compensated for nighttime hours when she was required
to clock out but remain at Defendant's group home -- and this is
the critical similarity that is common to the members of the
proposed class. Second, the mere presence of a claim that is not
part of the FLSA collective action is not an impediment to
conditional certification. Third, the Court does not make
credibility determinations when resolving a motion to conditionally
certify an FLSA class. Finally, the Plaintiff did carry her burden,
and because the Court found that the Plaintiff carried her burden
pursuant to a widely accepted test created to help courts
effectively manage conditional certification, it follows that
conditional certification here is manageable, fair, and efficient.

Judge Biggs now turns to the matter of notifying potential
plaintiffs of this conditionally certified class action. The
Plaintiff has asked that that the Court: (1) appoint the
Plaintiff's Counsel as Class Counsel; (2) order Defendant to
produce contact information for all potential opt-in plaintiffs to
the Plaintiff's Counsel within seven days; (3) authorize sending a
notice to the potential opt-in plaintiffs at the Plaintiff's
expense; (4) approve proposed notice and consent forms of the
Plaintiff's design; (5) order the notices be posted at Defendant's
group homes; and (6) provide a 60-day opt-in period after the date
the notice forms are mailed. The Defendant has asked that, should
the Court conditionally certify the Plaintiff's class, it "orders
that the parties confer in an attempt to agree upon the content and
form of notice as well as an appropriate manner of distribution."

At this juncture, Judge Biggs declines to approve the Plaintiff's
notice or notification plan. At this time, she will not approve the
Plaintiff's proposed notice form or opt-in form, nor will she
approve the Plaintiff's proposed methods of distribution or opt-in
deadline. Instead, she will order that the parties confer and
attempt to resolve their differences amicably. Judge Biggs will
grant the Plaintiff's unopposed requests that the Plaintiff's
Counsel be appointed the Class Counsel, and that the Defendant
produce contact information for potential plaintiffs.

Although the Plaintiff has requested telephone numbers for
potential plaintiffs, the order will not require the Defendant to
produce such telephone numbers because telephone numbers implicate
privacy concerns and Plaintiff has not made a "special need"
showing. Within 30 days of the Order, the parties will file a Joint
Status Report regarding their efforts to agree on a notification
plan, including their joint or individual proposals for such
matters.

For the reasons she stated, Judge Biggs grants in part and denies
in part the Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification and
Facilitation Notice.

The Plaintiff's claim under the FLSA is conditionally certified as
a collective action under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).

The conditionally certified FLSA class is identified as "all
individuals who currently work, or have worked, for Defendant as a
Direct Support Professional-Live In ("DSP-LI") at the Arey, Bowden,
Clingman, Weaver, and Westridge group homes, at any time within the
preceding 3-years from the date of filing the complaint."

Judge Biggs appoints the Plaintiff's present counsel as the Class
Counsel.

Within seven days of the Order, the Defendant will produce to the
Plaintiff's counsel a computer-readable data file containing the
names, addresses, e-mail addresses, and dates of employment for all
individuals who currently work, or have worked, for the Defendant
as a Direct Support Professional-Live In ("DSP-LI") at the Arey,
Bowden, Clingman, Weaver, and Westridge group homes, at any time
within the preceding 3-years from the date of filing the
complaint.

Judge Biggs denies without prejudice the Plaintiff's request for
court approval of its proposed notice form, consent form, proposal
for distribution, and proposal for an opt-in period.

The parties will confer regarding an appropriate notice form,
consent form, manner of distribution, and opt-in deadline.

Within 30 days of the Order, the parties will file a Joint Status
Report regarding their efforts to agree on each item identified in
Paragraph 6 of the Order and will include in their joint report
their joint or individual proposals for each of these items.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 23, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p93j238 from
Leagle.com.


UNIVERSITY MEDICAL: Whittum Suit Stayed Over Citizenship Discovery
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEISA WHITTUM, et al., Plaintiffs v. UNIVERSITY
MEDICAL CENTER OF SOUTHERN NEVADA, Defendant, Case No.
2:21-cv-01777-MMD-EJY (D. Nev.), Judge Miranda M. Du of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nevada enters an order:

   a. granting in part and denying in part without prejudice the
      Plaintiffs' motion to remand under the local controversy
      exception of the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), or
      alternatively, to stay the case pending class citizenship
      discovery; and

   b. denying without prejudice UMC's motion to dismiss the first
      amended complaint ("FAC").

Plaintiffs Leisa Whittum and Nichole Kilburn sued UMC for injuries
stemming from a data breach of UMC's systems in June 2021. UMC is a
local Las Vegas hospital and affiliate of the University of Nevada
School of Medicine that provides medical services to the
community.

On June 14, 2021, a third party breached UMC's systems. The
Plaintiffs are residents of Nevada and victims of the data breach.
They received a letter from UMC on Aug. 2, 2021, which revealed
that their "personally identifiable information" including "certain
protected health information," "demographic information (name,
address, date of birth, Social Security Number), clinical
information (history, diagnosis, test results), or financial
information (insurance number)" may have been compromised during
the breach. The Plaintiffs allege that UMC failed to promptly and
adequately notify them of the breach, and safeguard their personal
information.

The Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, brought the class action against UMC in the Eighth
Judicial District of Clark County, Nevada. They assert the
following state-law claims against UMC: (1) negligence, (2) breach
of implied contract, (3) negligent misrepresentation, and (4)
violation of NRS Section 41.600. UMC removed the case under CAFA.
The Motion to Remand followed shortly thereafter.

Judge Du first addresses UMC's argument that the Court has
independent federal question jurisdiction. She finds there is no
federal question jurisdiction because the Plaintiffs' state-law
claims do not implicate significant federal issues and are not
completely preempted by federal law. UMC fails to demonstrate that
the Plaintiffs' state-law claims implicate significant federal
questions under Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g &
Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005). Thus, the case does not belong to
the "special and small category" of cases where federal "arising
under" jurisdiction exists. She declines to exercise federal
"arising under" jurisdiction based on complete preemption.

Judge Du then addresses the Plaintiffs' request for remand under
the CAFA local controversy exception, or alternatively, for limited
jurisdictional discovery. The parties' dispute primarily focuses on
whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated that more than two-thirds of
class members are Nevada citizens under the CAFA local controversy
exception.

Judge Du will grant the Plaintiffs' request for discovery because
they have limited access to class citizenship information and
because more data is necessary for the Court to resolve the remand
issue. She finds that the Plaintiffs have made reasonable efforts
to investigate class citizenship using publicly available
information. However, their efforts were constrained by the limited
public record and lack of access to the addresses of breach
victims, which are currently in UMC's possession and which UMC has
refused to provide.

Judge Du also finds that it is reasonable to infer that many of the
victims' addresses are relatively current and pertinent to the
determination of domicile. Finally, the data breach in this case
involves a local Las Vegas hospital that services the Las Vegas
community. If jurisdictional discovery reveals that Nevada
residents were disproportionately impacted by the breach, state
courts have a stronger interest in adjudicating this uniquely local
matter.

Judge Du therefore grants class citizenship discovery because
pertinent facts bearing on jurisdiction are disputed, and
additional citizenship data is necessary to determine whether the
CAFA local controversy exception applies.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Du notes that the parties made
several arguments and cited to several cases not discussed. She has
reviewed these arguments and cases and determines that they do not
warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the issues
before the Court.

Judge Du, therefore, grants the Plaintiffs' request for limited
jurisdictional discovery, as to class citizenship. She denies
without prejudice, their motion to remand, with leave to file a
renewed motion at the conclusion of jurisdictional discovery.

Judge Du also denies UMC's motion to dismiss the FAC without
prejudice, with leave to file a renewed motion at the conclusion of
jurisdictional discovery.

Judge Du stays all deadlines in the case for 60 days pending the
conclusion of jurisdictional discovery. Any renewed motions must be
filed within 30 days of the conclusion of jurisdictional
discovery.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 23, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/4d9kaj47 from Leagle.com.


VERITAS PROPERTY: Paulino Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Rates
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Louis Paulino, individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. VERITAS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT L.L.C., 6535 BROADWAY
OWNERS CORP., and JAMES MAISTRE, Case No. 1:22-cv-08167 (S.D.N.Y.,
Sept. 23, 2022), is brought seeking damages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New York Labor Law against the Defendants for
willfully failing to pay the Plaintiff wages at the applicable
overtime rates and for failing to proffer wage statements.

The Plaintiff's official schedule Monday through Friday was from
8:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. However, Defendants directed Plaintiff to
be on call for 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The Plaintiff
generally started work between 5:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. The
Plaintiff also often worked until 6:00 p.m. or 7:00 p.m. depending
on the amount of work he had to do. On days when Plaintiff cleaned
the building's basement, he would work as late as 11:00 p.m. The
Plaintiff also regularly worked 4 or 5 hours on Saturday and
periodically on Sunday.

At the end of Plaintiff's employment, Defendants paid him $600 per
week. The Defendants paid Plaintiff extra for two hours of work on
Saturday at his regular rate of pay. The Plaintiff asked Defendant
Maistre to be paid for his extra hours other than his 2 hours for
Saturday, but Defendants refused to do so. At no time during his
employment did Defendants proffer a wage notice to Plaintiff in
compliance with the NYLL. Moreover, at no time during his
employment did the Defendants proffer wage statements to Plaintiff
that complied with the NYLL. The Defendants also required the
Plaintiff to pay them $100 monthly for parking in violation of
NYLL, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff began working in 2010 as a building superintendent
for the building located in Bronx, New York.

Veritas is a domestic business corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the State of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Taubenfeld, Esq.
          FISHER TAUBENFELD LLP
          225 Broadway, Suite 1700
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 571-0700
          Facsimile: (212) 233-3801


VOLTAGE SUPPLY: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Voltage Supply, LLC.
The case is styled as Joyce Carrico, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Voltage Supply, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-08189 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 24, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Voltage Supply -- https://www.voltagerestaurantsupply.com/ --
provide coffee shop owners, baristas, and specialty coffee
professionals the best commercial coffee equipment, espresso
machines, and service available.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Solomon Nematzadeh, Esq.
          NEMATZADEH PLLC
          101 Avenue of the Americas, Ste. 9th Floor
          New York, NY 10013
          Phone: (646) 417-8424
          Email: jsn@nematlawyers.com


VSL PHARMACEUTICALS: Decision on Subpoena in Starr Suit Sustained
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID STARR, et al., Plaintiffs v. VSL
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., et al., Defendants, Civil Action No.
19-02173-LKG (D. Md.), Judge Lydia Kay Griggsby of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland sustains Magistrate
Judge Simms' June 6, 2022-decision granting non-party Claudio De
Simone's motion to modify a subpoena served by VSL on Danisco USA,
Inc.

Defendants VSL, Leadiant Biociences, Inc., and Alfasigma USA, Inc.,
have filed objections to Magistrate Judge Simms' June 6, 2022
Decision. Specifically, they request that the Court denies the
motion to modify, or, in the alternative, re-submits the matter to
Magistrate Judge Simms for reconsideration.

The discovery dispute involves a request by a non-party, Claudio De
Simone, to modify a subpoena issued by VSL seeking certain
documents from Danisco -- another non-party to this action. The
case is a putative class action in which the Plaintiffs allege that
the Defendants engaged in a scheme to deceive consumers by, among
other things, misrepresenting the chemical formulation of a
probiotic product known as VSL#3 through "false and misleading
advertising and marketing," in violation of, among other things,
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").
Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants engaged in
a "false advertising campaign," in which the Defendants continued
to communicate to consumers from 2016 onward that the VSL#3 product
was the same product that had been sold and marketed to consumers
prior to 2016, despite VSL#3's change in formulation.

Relevant to this dispute, the Defendants have asserted numerous
affirmative defenses in this action, including: good faith;
contributory negligence; assumption of the risk; waiver; estoppel;
failure to state a claim; failure to satisfy the particularity
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); lack of standing; failure to
establish privity of contract; laches; and failure to establish
that defendants made material misrepresentations and/or omissions
with regard to VSL#3.

The parties have been engaged in discovery since March 24, 2021. On
Nov. 30, 2021, VSL served the VSL Subpoena on Danisco. The VSL
Subpoena seeks the various documents and information that are
relevant to this discovery dispute, including but not limited to
the following: All documents produced by Danisco in the De Simone
Litigation; all documents reflecting any change in the bacteria
used in the manufacture of VSL#3; all documents reflecting any
change in the bacteria used in the manufacture of Visbiome; all
documents reflecting any change in the cryoprotectants used in
VSL#3 from July 1, 2000 through the final date of its production by
Danisco; and all documents reflecting any change in the excipients
used in the manufacture of VSL#3 from July 1, 2000 through the
final date of its production by Danisco.

The Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Simms for all
discovery and related scheduling matters on Jan. 26, 2022.

On Jan. 31, 2022, Claudio De Simone filed a motion to modify the
VSL Subpoena, upon the ground that Requests #1-16 and #19 of the
VSL Subpoena improperly seek his confidential trade secret
information related to the chemical formulation of VSL#3. The
Defendants countered that modification of the VSL Subpoena is
improper, because: (1) they have a substantial need for the
documents sought in the Challenged Requests; (2) the Challenged
Requests do not implicate protected trade secret information; (3) a
protective order adequately safeguards Claudio De Simone's trade
secret concerns; and (4) Claudio De Simone improperly raises
collateral estoppel as a ground for modification of the VSL
Subpoena.

On June 3, 2022, Magistrate Judge Simms issued an oral ruling: (1)
granting Claudio De Simone's motion to modify the VSL Subpoena; (2)
striking the Challenged Requests; and (3) directing defendants and
Danisco to meet and confer regarding Request #19 of the VSL
Subpoena. On June 6, 2022, Magistrate Judge Simms issued a written
Order consistent with her oral ruling (the "June 6, 2022,
Decision").

Magistrate Judge Simms made several findings in her decision that
are pertinent to the pending objections. First, Magistrate Judge
Simms found that the Plaintiffs' claims concern whether the VSL#3
formulation that they purchased during the period 2016 to the
present has the same chemical makeup as a version of VSL#3 that was
sold and marketed by the Defendants prior to 2016. Second,
Magistrate Judge Simms found that the second amended complaint does
not contain any allegations that "differences between value or
safety or efficacy mattered necessarily to consumers."

In addition, Magistrate Judge Simms observed that the Defendants
had not informed the Court about which of their affirmative
defenses in this action were relevant to the Challenged Requests.
And so, based upon these findings, Magistrate Judge Simms concluded
that the Challenged Requests were not relevant to the claims and
affirmative defenses.

Lastly, Magistrate Judge Simms found that the information sought in
the Challenged Requests related to VSL#3's chemical formula is not
known to the general public, and that this information is also
subject to a protective order in another case. Given this,
Magistrate Judge Simms held that the Challenged Requests improperly
seek Claudio De Simone's confidential trade secret information.

On June 21, 2022, the Defendants filed six objections to the June
6, 2022, Decision. In their objections, they argue that the June 6,
2022, Decision constitutes clear error and is contrary to law,
because the Challenged Requests seek information relevant to the
claims and affirmative defenses.

The Defendants request that the Court sets aside the June 6, 2022,
Decision and either denies Claudio De Simone's motion to modify the
VSL Subpoena, or re-submits this discovery dispute to Magistrate
Judge Simms for reconsideration.

The Defendants argue that Magistrate Judge Simms' June 6, 2022,
Decision is clearly erroneous and contrary to law, upon the grounds
that the Challenged Requests are relevant to the claims and
affirmative defenses, because: (1) the second amended complaint
contains claims related to the comparative value, safety, and
efficacy of the probiotic products at issue in this case; (2)
changes in the contents and manufacturing process of VSL#3 prior to
2016 bear on the Plaintiff's allegations regarding the products'
comparative value; (3) the Magistrate Judge's suggestion that they
should rely on clinical studies to obtain the information that they
seek from Danisco improperly constrains their litigation strategy
and ability to defend against the Plaintiffs' claims; and (4) the
Magistrate Judge's decision improperly foreclosed their ability to
gather evidence to defend against the Plaintiffs' claims.

The Defendants also argue that the Challenged Requests do not
implicate protected trade secret information, because: (1) no prior
ruling has found that the information at issue contains enforceable
trade secrets and (2) Claudio De Simone has not shown that
information sought in the Challenged Requests contains enforceable
trade secrets.

Claudio De Simone counters that the Court should sustain the June
6, 2022, Decision, because Magistrate Judge Simms correctly held
that the claims and affirmative defenses are not relevant to the
Challenged Requests, and that the Challenged Requests seek
confidential, proprietary, and/or trade secret information.

Judge Griggsby opines that the Defendants have not shown that the
June 6, 2022, Decision is either clearly erroneous, an abuse of
discretion, or contrary to law. As an initial matter, a careful
reading of the second amended complaint, and the answers thereto,
make clear that the Challenged Requests do not seek information or
documents that are relevant to the claims and affirmative defenses.
Given this, Magistrate Judge Simms appropriately concluded that the
Challenged Requests are not relevant to the affirmative defenses.

Because Magistrate Judge Simms' conclusion that the Challenged
Requests seek information that is not relevant to the claims and
affirmative defenses is not clearly erroneous, an abuse of
discretion, or contrary to law, Judge Griggsby sustains the June 6,
2022, Decision.

Lastly, because she concludes that Magistrate Judge Simms properly
held that the Challenged Requests are not relevant to the claims or
affirmative defenses, Judge Griggsby does not reach the issue of
whether the Challenged Requests impermissibly seek confidential
trade secret information.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 23, 2022 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/whcpe46n from
Leagle.com.


WESTERN RANGE: Castillo's Bid for Partial Summary Judgment Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ABEL CANTARO CASTILLO, Plaintiff v. WESTERN RANGE
ASSOCIATION, Defendant, Case No. 3:16-cv-00237-RCJ-CLB (D. Nev.),
Judge Robert C. Jones of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Nevada issued an order:

   a. granting the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
      Judgment;

   b. deferring ruling on the Defendant's Motion for Summary
      Judgment; and

   c. denying the Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class.

Mr. Castillo raises five causes of action against the Defendant:
(1) failure to pay minimum wages in violation of the Nevada
Constitution, (2) breach of contract or quasi contract, (3)
promissory estoppel, (4) unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, and
(5) failure to pay separated employees' wages when due. The
Plaintiff was a nonimmigrant agricultural worker, who worked as a
sheepherder. The basis of his causes of action is his contentions
that the Defendant was his joint employer and did not pay him the
minimum hourly wage required by Nevada law. He seeks to bring these
claims on behalf of himself as well as those similarly situated
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

The Plaintiff, a citizen of Peru, worked as an H-2A sheepherder
from "around October 2007" to June 8, 2014. The H-2A temporary
agricultural worker program permits individuals to work in the
United States on temporary nonimmigrant agricultural worker visas.
Department of Labor ("DOL") regulations set minimum wages and
working conditions for H-2A workers. Agricultural employers seeking
the admission of H-2A workers must first file a temporary labor
certification application with the DOL. This application must
include a job offer, commonly referred to as a "clearance order" or
"job order," that complies with applicable federal regulations.
These regulations establish the minimum benefits, wages, and
working conditions that the employer must offer to the employee in
order to avoid adversely affecting similarly-situated United States
workers.

The Defendant is a membership association that recruits and employs
foreign shepherds to work at individual member ranches. It runs
recruitment operations in Mexico, Chile, and Peru. These
recruitment operations are run by "coordinators" -- independent
contractors who are paid and instructed in their duties by the
Defendant. Coordinators' recruiting duties include interviewing
potential herders and checking their references. Subsequently, they
guide potential herders through the visa process, helping them to
obtain passports, comply with H-2A paperwork requirements, prepare
for their visa interviews, obtain the required medical examination
paperwork, and arrange herders' travel.

Through these recruitment operations, the Defendant helped to
secure employment for the Plaintiff with El Tejon Sheep Co. as a
sheepherder with an H-2A visa. During this work, the Plaintiff
split his time between California and Nevada under a document that
both the Defendant and the Plaintiff signed titled, "Pre-Employment
Notice of Rights and Obligations." The Defendant drafted this
document for the Plaintiff to set out the terms of employment.

For example, the document established the base wage of $750, who
would supply the tools for employment, when the Plaintiff would
receive pay, who would transport him, and who would provide
housing. This document also puts him on notice that sheepherders
were on call for 24 hours a day, seven days a week to ensure that
the sheep received proper attention. The Plaintiff claims to have
worked under this agreement from about October to mid-April
(approximately seven months out of the year) in California, and
from mid-April to September or early October (approximately five
months of the year) in Nevada.

During this time, the Plaintiff worked as a sheepherder for El
Tejon and allegedly tended to the sheep for 24 hours a day.
However, the Defendant only compensated the Plaintiff for a
fraction of those hours allegedly worked and allegedly paid himf
the wrong wage. Under the H-2A program, an employer must pay the
larger wage of either the state's minimum wage or the adverse
effect wage rate ("AEWR") established under the program. The
Defendant paid the Plaintiff the California AEWR rather than the
Nevada minimum wage.

The Plaintiff brought an action in the Court to recover the wages
for 24 hours of everyday that he worked as a sheepherder because
Defendant is allegedly a joint employer with El Tejon under the
H-2A agreements. He brought the action on behalf of himself, and
those similarly situated to certify the action as a class action.
He brought it against the Defendant, associations like the
Defendant, and ranches that employed him. The Court dismissed the
ranches and other associations from the action and only Defendant
remains.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant failed to pay minimum
wages in violation of the Nevada Constitution. He argues that he is
entitled to 24 hours worth of pay for everyday he worked as a
sheepherder because he needed to tend to the sheep for 24 hours a
day to keep the sheep safe. The 24 hours that the Plaintiff spent
on the range included time eating, resting, sleeping, and other
time for his personal benefit. Even though he spent time during the
24 hours for his personal benefit, he was required to look after
the sheep because they were constantly at risk of being harmed.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff maintains that he is entitled to the
Nevada minimum wage for all 24 hours of everyday that he worked for
El Tejon as a sheepherder.

The Defendant argues that it is not a joint employer under the H-2A
program, and even if it was, the Plaintiff received the proper
amount of compensation because he is not entitled to compensation
for hours spent outside of tending to the sheep. It states that it
is not a proper party for the action because it is not a joint
employer under the H-2A program. Withstanding this argument, the
Defendant argues that it paid the Plaintiff the proper wage under
the H-2A program and that the wage it paid is higher than the
Nevada minimum wage, so it did not underpay him. It argues further
that, even if it paid the wrong wage, the Plaintiff is not entitled
to compensation for the hours that he spent for his personal
benefit.

Currently before the Court are three motions ripe for
consideration: (1) the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, (2) the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and (3)
the Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class.

In his Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff moves for summary
judgment on the issue of the Defendant's status as a joint employer
under the H-2A program. He argues every reasonable juror would find
that the Defendant was a joint employer from the evidence he
presents.

Judge Jones agrees. It is quite clear from the Plaintiff's motion
and prior case law that there is no genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the Defendant is a joint employer. Therefore, he
grants the Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.

In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant argues it is
entitled to summary judgment on all the claims against it because
the Plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to
conclude that he worked more hours for which it compensated him.
The Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to 24 hours of pay for
every day that he was a sheepherder because he was always working
to some degree.

Judge Jones holds that he cannot rule on the Defendant's motion for
summary judgment because there is a question as to whether, under
Nevada law, the Plaintiff can receive compensation for time spent
sleeping and for personal benefit. If Nevada law does not
compensate him for all the hours that he spent on the range as a
sheepherder and, instead, only compensates him for time spent
tending to the sheep, then the Defendant's motion for summary
judgment is proper. However, the Defendant's motion is improper if
Nevada law does compensate the Plaintiff for all the hours he spent
on the range as a sheepherder because he may have been underpaid
for his work.

Accordingly, Judge Jones certifies the following question of law to
the Nevada Supreme Court: Under the Constitution of the State of
Nevada and Chapter 608 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, does Nevada
law require Defendant Western Range Association to pay Plaintiff
Abel Cantaro Castillo 24 hours of wages for every day worked
because Plaintiff Castillo was not allowed to leave and was always
performing some job duties even though some of the time he spent on
the range was for his personal benefit? He defers on the
Defendant's summary judgment motion and stays all further
proceedings until the Nevada Supreme Court answers the certified
question.

The Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of sheepherders that
allegedly did not receive compensation for all the hours that they
worked. Certifying the class and allowing the Plaintiff to proceed
with a class action "is an exception to the usual rule that
litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named
parties only." The Plaintiff must meet the factors under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a): "(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law and fact
common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." Essentially, he
must show numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate
representation.

Judge Jones that class certification fails because the prospective
the class members' claims do not share commonality or typicality.
As to commonality, he finds that some prospective class members
allegedly got sleep, some could not sleep, some barely worked, and
some needed to always work. The stark contrast in experiences makes
it difficult for each prospective class member to allege that they
were adversely affected by the same sheep herding conditions, which
caused them to work more hours than they were paid.

Moreover, the named representative's claim differs from the
prospective class members in that he claims that he should receive
compensation for 24 hours of every day that he served as a
sheepherder. The prospective class members claim that they faced
different hardships which caused them to work only a few hours a
day. The "named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are not so
interrelated" that the claims share commonality. Accordingly,
commonality does not exist between the prospective class members.

With respect to typicality, Judge Jones finds that the difference
in experience highlighted previously makes it difficult for the
prospective class members to claim that each claim arose from the
same set of events. As mentioned, some prospective class members
worked many hours, and some worked very few hours. Just based on
these factual circumstances alone, the prospective class members'
claims are not typical.

Having considered the motions, Judge Jones grants the Plaintiff's
partial motion for summary judgment because the Defendant is
clearly a joint employer for H-2A purposes. Further, he does not
rule on the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Rather, he
believes that he cannot rule on the motion because an ambiguity
exists in Nevada law. For that reason, he certifies a question to
the Nevada Supreme Court. Finally, Judge Jones denies the
Plaintiff's motion to certify a class.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 23, 2022 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/4p4f2d7k from Leagle.com.


YOPTI LLC: Carrico Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Yopti, LLC. The case
is styled as Joyce Carrico, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. Yopti, LLC, Case No. 1:22-cv-08191-RA
(S.D.N.Y., Sept. 24, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Yopti LLC is a Consumer Services, Information Technology, and
Software company located in Bellevue, Washington.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Solomon Nematzadeh, Esq.
          NEMATZADEH PLLC
          101 Avenue of the Americas, Ste. 9th Floor
          New York, NY 10013
          Phone: (646) 417-8424
          Email: jsn@nematlawyers.com


ZOLA INC: Hwang Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Zola, Inc. The case
is styled as Jenny Hwang, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. Zola, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-05723 (E.D.N.Y.,
Sept. 23, 2022).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Zola -- https://www.zola.com/ -- is an online wedding registry,
wedding planner, and retailer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          14749 71st Ave.
          Flushing, NY 11367
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: mars@khaimovlaw.com



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2022. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***