---

              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, November 11, 2022, Vol. 24, No. 220

                            Headlines

ALLSTATE LIFE: Must Reply to Holland-Hewitt's Interrogatories & RFP
AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Transfer of Montijo Suit to C.D. Cal. Endorsed
AMERICAN AIRLINES: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Scanlan Suit
ANADARKO E & P: Bid to Certify Class in Box Elder Suit Denied
ARGENT TRUST: Lysengen Partly Wins Bid to Review Class Cert. Denial

BIG DOG TACKLE: Faces Sweeney Suit Over Telephonic Sales Calls
BOEING COMPANY: Varhelyi Can't Intervene in Smartwings Suit
BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Schexnayder Suit
CARVANA LLC: Jennings Suit Stayed Pending Arbitration Appeal Ruling
CHRISTNER'S PIZZA: Younger Balks at Drivers' Unlawful Wages

DIESTEL TURKEY: Compelled to Reply to Wetzel's Discovery Requests
DUARTE NURSERY: Appeal From Denial of Class Certification Dismissed
DUARTE NURSERY: Owner's Dismissal From Mendez-Villegas Suit Upheld
EVERGLADES COLLEGE: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Leigue Class Suit
FACEBOOK INC: Court Issues Final Order and Judgment in Olin Suit

GAP INC: Hennessey Appeals Suit Dismissal to 8th Circuit
GLOBAL PRECISION: Gomez Loses Bid to Add 150 New Named Plaintiffs
HP INC: Court Denies Bid for Class Certification in Cepelak Suit
HSBC BANK: Court Issues Final Order and Judgment in Chambers Suit
I&B CAPITAL: Maryland Court Narrows Claims in Layani Investor Suit

KNAUF GIPS: Ersham & Macomber Testimonies Excluded From Karpel Suit
LAWGIX LAWYERS: Attorneys in Currier Suit Awarded $12K in Fees
MARKEN LLP: Faces Beria Suit Over Failure to Pay Timely Wages
MASSACHUSETTS: Bid for Discovery From Absent Class Members Denied
MDL 2873: AFFF Exposure Led to Death, Flavin Suit Says

MDL 2873: Fernandez Suit Alleges PFAS Exposure Caused Cancer
MDL 2873: Hepplewhite Files PI Suit Over PFAS Exposure
MDL 2873: Hollingsworth Files Suit Over PFAS Exposure
MDL 2873: Oitker Files Personal Injury Suit Over PFAS Exposure
MDL 2873: PFAS Exposure Caused Cancer, Stephan Says

MDL 2873: Steele Sues Over Illness From PFAS Exposure
MGM RESORTS: Court Narrows Claims in Smallman Data Breach Suit
MINDBODY INC: Court Issues Final Order/Judgment in Securities Suit
MONSANTO CO: Oral Argument in Seattle Suit Set for November 16
PAYCHEX NORTH: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Callahan Suit Granted

PENNSYLVANIA: Bid to Certify Class in Jennings v. Wolf Granted
PREMIER NUTRITION: Appeals Judgment Bid Denial in Montera Suit
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLC: Cal. App. Reverses $2.5-Mil. Sanction
SALLIE MAE: Bid to Stay Prelim. Injunction in Homaidan Suit Denied
SONUS NETWORKS: Court Refuses to Dismiss Miller Securities Suit

UNITED STATES: Oztimurlenk's Bid to Certify Nurses Class Denied
VISALUS INC: Refusal to Decertify Class in Wakefield Suit Affirmed
WARNER BROS: Appeals Arbitration Bid Denial in Keebaugh Suit

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3M Co. Co-Defends Numerous Product Liability Suits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Albany Int'l. Defends 3,603 Claims at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Carrier Global Has $231MM Asbestos Liabilities
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Chemours Co Has 900 Pending Suits at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Colgate-Palmolive Has 224 Cases Pending

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Columbus McKinnon Has $10.6MM Est. Liabilities
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Hartford Financial Still Defends A&E Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Honeywell Still Faces Personal Injury Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: IDEX Corp. Still Faces Exposure Lawsuits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Lincoln Electric Co-Defends 1,489 Exposure Claims

ASBESTOS UPDATE: MSA LLC Faces 4,193 Claims at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Otis Worldwide Has $45MM Estimated Liabilities
ASBESTOS UPDATE: TriMas Corp. Has 418 Pending Cases at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: U.S. Steel Defends 930 Active Cases at Sept. 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: W.W. Grainger Defends Personal Injury Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Zurn Elkay Defends 6,000 Personal Injury Suits


                            *********

ALLSTATE LIFE: Must Reply to Holland-Hewitt's Interrogatories & RFP
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SUSAN L. HOLLAND-HEWITT, Plaintiff v. ALLSTATE LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-00652-ADA-SAB (E.D.
Cal.), Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of California grants the Plaintiff's
motion to compel the Defendant to provide further responses to
Interrogatory Nos. 17, 19, 20 and 21, and to provide a supplemental
response and production related to Request for Production No. 34.

On May 8, 2020, Holland-Hewitt filed this putative class action
against Allstate. She alleges the Defendant wrongfully lapsed or
terminated life insurance policies, including hers, without first
providing all the consumer protections mandated by California
Insurance Code Sections 1113.71 and 10113.72, namely: minimum grace
periods, proper notices of lapse, and the right to designate others
to receive important duplicative notices and information regarding
the insurance policy. She alleges the termination of her policy,
and many others, was and is invalid.

The Plaintiff brings claims for Declaratory Relief, Breach of
Contract, and Unfair Competition under the California Business &
Professions Code on behalf of herself and a putative class defined
as follows: All past, present, and future owners or beneficiaries
of Defendant's life insurance policies in force on or after Jan. 1,
2013 and governed by Sections 10113.71 and/or 10113.72, where the
policies underwent or will undergo lapse, termination, and/or
reinstatement without Defendant first providing written notice of
and an actual 60-day grace period, a 30-day notice of pending lapse
and termination, and/or an annual notice of a right to designate at
least one other person to receive notice of lapse or termination of
a policy for nonpayment of premium.

On Jan. 10, 2022, the Court issued a class action scheduling order
setting deadline of Sept. 30, 2022, for pre-certification
discovery, and a deadline of Oct. 28, 2022, to file a motion for
class certification. On Aug. 1, 2022, the Plaintiff filed a motion
to compel the Defendant to provide further responses to
Interrogatory Nos. 17, 19, 20 and 21, and to provide a supplemental
response and production related to Request for Production No. 34.

The Interrogatories and RFP requested as follows:

   -- Interrogatory No. 17: Please identify, by POLICY owner name,
address, phone number, email address, POLICY type (i.e. group
versus individual), all CLASS MEMBERS, including beneficiaries for
POLICIES where the insured has died. This information should be
provided in electronic format and specifically, in .CSV, .XLS, or
other format fully accessible by Microsoft Excel.

   -- Interrogatory No. 6: State the actual or estimated number of
YOUR LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES in California at any time, not pending
lapse or termination and in force as of Jan. 1, 2013.

   -- Interrogatory No. 20: For each POLICY identified in response
to Interrogatory No. 19, identify and provide all contact
information for the named beneficiary or beneficiaries under the
POLICY, whether and when the POLICY owner previously requested
reinstatement of the POLICY, and whether and when a claim for
benefits was made and/or rejected.

   -- Request for Production No. 34: Please produce YOUR data or
ESI disclosing, for every LIFE INSURANCE POLICY issued or delivered
in California which lapsed at any time on or after Jan. 1, 2013 for
nonpayment of premium, the following categories, columns, or data
points: policy number, administrative system, policy type, product
name or code, issue date, current policy status, date of policy
lapse/TERMINATION, issue state, reinstatement date, owner contact
information (name, mailing address, phone number, email address);
beneficiary contact information (name, mailing address, phone
number, email address), policy benefit amount, and date of death of
the insured, if applicable. This data or ESI should be produced in
the form of an electronic spreadsheet or .CSV file capable of being
read, sorted, or filtered using Microsoft Excel.

On Aug. 24, 2022, the parties filed a joint statement regarding the
motion to compel. On Oct. 21, 2022, the Court granted an extension
of the deadline to file a motion for class certification until Nov.
14, 2022.

The Parties' current dispute as to further and supplemental
responses presents two principal issues. The first issue concerns
the Defendant's objection to providing contact information. The
second issue concerns its objection to providing any information
related to policies issued in or after 2013.

Judge Boone finds in favor of the Plaintiff as to the substantive
issues surrounding Issue No. 1, and overrules the Defendant's
objections to providing information pertaining to the absent class
members. He finds the Plaintiff has demonstrated relevancy for the
class discovery sought, and the caselaw supportive of granting the
Plaintiff's motion to compel. Additionally and relatedly, the
Defendant has not shown a burden of production or other Rule 26(b)
factors counsel against discovery, nor demonstrated that privacy
concerns outweigh the need for the discovery in light of the
existence of the protective order.

In addition, Judge Boone concludes the Defendant has not
demonstrated the privacy interests outweigh the need for the
discovery to convince the Court that such discovery is foreclosed,
particularly given it has not addressed the presence or impact of
the protective order at all in the parties' briefing, and it
appears the parties have not considered (at least not presented to
the Court) whether an opt-in or opt-out procedure and the potential
to alleviate any privacy concerns. Thus given the presence of the
protective order, Judge Boone does not find the privacy concerns
outweigh the discoverability of the absent member contact
information.

Judge Boone also finds in favor of the Plaintiff as to Issue No. 2,
and overrules Defendant's objections. Among other things, he finds
that the parameters of the issues developed as currently briefed
and presented to the Court, signify sufficient meet and confer for
the Court to weigh the parties' respective positions and make a
decision as to Issue No. 2, particularly given no other indication
has been presented to the Court that further meet and confer has
resolved any outstanding issue.

Finally, Judge Boone finds the opposing party's nondisclosure,
response, or objection was substantially justified; or other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Accordingly, he
declines to order the Defendant to pay attorneys' fees related to
this motion.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Boone grants the Plaintiff's motion
to compel and declines to award any attorneys' fees. The Defendant
will serve further responses to Interrogatory Nos. 17, 19, 20, and
21, and will serve a supplemental response and production to
Request for Production No. 34 within 21 days of his order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 2, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/mr2tm57f from Leagle.com.


AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Transfer of Montijo Suit to C.D. Cal. Endorsed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LUIS MONTIJO, Plaintiff v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:22-cv-00084-ADA-SAB (E.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Stanley A. Boone of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California recommends that the Court:

   (1) grants Amazon's motion to dismiss, stay, or transfer
       action pursuant to the first-to-file doctrine by
       transferring the action to the Central District of
       California; and

   (2) denies as moot Amazon's motion to alternatively stay
       pursuant the Court's inherent power; and its motion to
       alternatively dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
       Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

On Dec. 10, 2021, Montijo filed this putative class action against
Amazon in the Stanislaus County Superior Court, State of
California, Case No. CV-21-006616. On Jan. 20, 2022, it removed the
action to the present Court. On the same date, it filed a notice of
related cases. On Feb. 24, 2022, the Defendant filed an additional
notice of related case.

On Feb. 24, 2022, the Defendant filed the motion to transfer,
dismiss, or stay, that is the subject of these findings and
recommendations. It also concurrently filed a request for judicial
notice. On March 17, 2022, the Plaintiff filed an opposition to the
motion.

On Aug. 24, 2022, the action was reassigned to District Judge Ana
de Alba. On Sept. 12, 2022, Judge de Alba referred the pending
motion to transfer, dismiss, or stay, to Judge Boone for the
preparation of findings and recommendations or other appropriate
action. On Oct. 19, 2022, the Court held a hearing on the
Defendant's motion.

On Dec. 10, 2021, the Plaintiff filed the action against the
Defendant on behalf of himself and a putative class of "all
Defendants' California employees, at any time during the four years
before filing this Complaint through the date of trial."

He seeks to certify one putative "Expense Reimbursement Subclass,"
consisting of "all Class Members who incurred business-related
expenses, including but not limited to cell phone expenses."

Under the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), California Business and
Professions Code section 17200 et seq., he also seeks to certify a
"UCL Subclass" of "all Class Members who were subject to
Defendants' unlawful or unfair business acts or practices."

The Plaintiff alleges that he worked "as a Production Assistant at
the Defendants' Patterson facility for approximately five years,
ending on March 6, 2020.

The Plaintiff alleges, on behalf of himself and the classes he
seeks to represent, that the Defendant "failed to reimburse him and
other similarly-situated employees for their reasonable business
use of their cell phones, including for their use of cell phone
applications which Defendants required them to download and use,"
in violation of California Labor Code section 2802.

The Plaintiff also seeks relief under the UCL based on the
Defendant's alleged failure to reimburse these same cell phone
expenses. He seeks declaratory judgments, injunctive relief,
expense reimbursements, interest, attorneys' fees, and costs for
his claims.

The Defendant submits that the Plaintiff's claim that Amazon did
not reimburse him or other employees for expenses incurred in the
discharge of their duties is duplicative of a claim in an
earlier-filed putative class action currently pending in the
Central District of California, Porter v. Amazon.com Services LLC,
Case No. 2:20-cv-09496-JVS-SHK (C.D. Cal.). It proffers he has
refused to consent to transfer the case so that it may be litigated
before the same court presiding over the first-filed matter;
therefore the Defendant moves the Court to transfer the action, or
alternatively, stay or dismiss his claims.

First, Judge grants the Defendant's request for judicial notice for
such purposes. He takes judicial notice of the following
documents:

      1. A First Amended Complaint in Porter v. Amazon.com
Services, LLC, Case No. 2:20-cv-09496-JSV-SHK (C.D. Cal.), filed on
Nov. 30, 2020, (Ex. A, ECF No. 14 at 5-23);

      2. Los Angeles County Superior Court Class Action Complaint,
Case No. 20STCV32765, filed on Aug. 25, 2020, that Amazon removed
to the Central District of California in Porter, (Ex. B, ECF No. 14
at 24-40);

      3. Notice of Motion and Motion by Defendant Amazon.com
Services LLC to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or Stay Action
filed by Amazon in Porter on Jan. 15, 2021, (Ex. C, ECF No. 14 at
41-72);

      4. Order Granting Joint Stipulation to Stay the Porter Action
Pending Resolution of Trevino, et al. v. Golden State FC LLC, Lead
Case No. 1:18-cv-00120-DAD (BAM) (E.D. Cal.), entered on Dec. 9,
2021, (Ex. D, ECF No. 14 at 73-75);

      5. Order staying Trevino pending Olean Wholesale Grocery
Cooperative, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 5 F.4th 950 (9th Cir.
2021), entered on Aug. 27, 2021, (Ex. E, ECF No. 14 at 76-78); and

      6. San Francisco County Superior Court Class Action Complaint
Case No. CGC-21-589695, filed Feb. 8, 2021, that Amazon removed to
the Northern District of California in Scott v. Golden State FC,
LLC, Case No. 4:21-cv-02147-HSG (N.D. Cal.), filed on March 26,
2021, (Ex. F, ECF No. 14 at 79-104).

Next, Judge Boone recommends transfer to the Central District of
California as the most appropriate remedy sought through the
Defendant's motions. He finds transfer to be the most appropriate
remedy given the earlier action, Porter, filed Aug. 25, 2020,
asserts substantially similar claims against the same Amazon, by a
substantially similar putative class. He further finds transfer is
appropriate under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404 because permitting the
action to proceed in the Eastern District while substantially
similar litigation is pending in the Central District, would waste
limited judicial resources and risk inconsistent judgments
regarding the same legal and factual questions as applied to a same
group of Amazon employees. Finally, he finds the three
first-to-file rule factors weigh in favor of transferring the case:
Porter preceded this action, the parties are substantially similar,
and the issues in the cases are substantially similar.

For his explained reasons, Judge Boone recommends that:

     1. Amazon's motion to transfer, dismiss, or stay action, be
granted;

     2. The case be transferred to the Central District of
California, where an earlier-filed putative class action, Porter,
is pending against the Defendant;

     3. The Defendant's alternative motion to stay the action
pursuant to the Court's inherent powers be denied as moot; and

     4. The Defendant's alternative motion to dismiss the action
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), be
denied as moot.

Within 14 days of service of these recommendations, the Plaintiff
may file written objections to the findings and recommendations
with the Court. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to
Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." The Plaintiff is
advised that failure to file objections within the specified time
may result in the waiver of rights on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 2, 2022 Findings &
Recommendations is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc75a2m8 from
Leagle.com.


AMERICAN AIRLINES: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Scanlan Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES P. SCANLAN on his own behalf and all others
similarly situated, et al. v. AMERICAN AIRLINES GROUP, INC., et
al., Civil Action No. 18-4040 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Harvey Bartle, III
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania:

   a. denies the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to
      their breach-of-contract claim under count II of their
      second amended complaint; and

   b. grants the Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to
      the Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim.

Mr. Scanlan, an American Airlines pilot and a retired Major General
in the United States Air Force Reserve, and Carla Riner, an
American Airlines pilot and a Brigadier General in the Delaware Air
National Guard, have brought this class action against Defendants
American Airlines Group, Inc. ("AAG") and American Airlines, Inc.
("American") pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act ("USERRA"), 38 U.S.C. Sections 4301 et
seq., and for breach of contract. The Plaintiffs assert that for
the period between Jan. 1, 2013, and Oct. 31, 2021, they and the
class of American pilots they represent have not received the
compensation or benefits due to them under USERRA and under the
contract.

Plaintiffs Scanlan and Riner represent a class of individuals who
at some point during the class period simultaneously served as
pilots with American and as members of a military branch. They
advance three claims against Defendants. Under count III, they seek
a declaratory judgment that USERRA obligates American to provide
them with paid short-term military leave, which they define as
periods of 16 days or fewer. They further seek damages in an amount
equal to the difference between their salary at American and the
amount of compensation received for their military service for
periods of short-term military leave during the class period.

Count I, also a claim under USERRA, focuses on the profit-sharing
plan of AAG, American's parent company. AAG has not credited
military leave time as part of pilots' eligible earnings. The
Plaintiffs seek to compel AAG to recalculate and pay profit-sharing
awards in a manner that credits imputed income for the time they
spent serving in the military. The profit-sharing plan, it should
be noted, was established at AAG's initiative and is not the
product of any collective bargaining agreement with the pilots or
their unions.

Count II alleges a state-law breach-of-contract claim. The
Plaintiffs contend that regardless of USERRA the language of the
profit-sharing plan obligates AAG to credit periods of military
leave when calculating their annual profit-sharing awards.

The essence of the Plaintiffs' claim in Count III is that American
has violated USERRA by not compensating its pilots for the pay
differential when they take military leave despite compensating
them when they are on jury duty and bereavement leave.

Before the Court are the cross-motions of the parties for summary
judgment. The Defendants seek summary judgment as to all of the
Plaintiffs' claims while the Plaintiffs seek summary judgment only
on their breach-of-contract claim.

American moves for summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' USERRA claim
under Count III on the ground that leaves for jury duty and
bereavement are not comparable to military leave. It contends that
military leave is distinguishable from the other forms of leave in
duration, frequency, purpose, and the ability of a pilot to choose
when to take that leave.

Judge Bartle holds that there is nothing in the language or purpose
of USERRA or its interpreting regulations which forbids
consideration of frequency in determining the issue of
comparability. Furthermore, analyzing the duration of the average
military leave without considering frequency of military leave
provides a false impression in any comparison of military leave
with jury duty and bereavement leave.

He further holds that even taking the facts in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiffs, pilots often have significantly more
flexibility in scheduling military leave than they do with respect
to jury duty and bereavement leave. It cannot also be disputed that
the purposes of the three types of leave are different. Unlike
bereavement leave and jury duty, those who take military leave do
so not only out of a sense of patriotism but also for more than
minimal compensation from the Government and sometimes pensions for
their service over an extended period and often for years.

Judge Bartle also holds that as a matter of law that the undisputed
evidence demonstrates that jury duty and bereavement leave are not
comparable to military leave. Thus, American has not violated
Section 4316(b)(1) of USERRA. For pilots who took short-term
military leave, the average time away from the job on military
leave annually is over 21 days while absence on jury duty is 2.3
days and on bereavement leave is 3.1 days.

Accordingly, the motion of American for summary judgment on the
Plaintiffs' USERRA claim in Count III of their second amended
complaint is granted.

AAG has also moved for summary judgment as to count I of the
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint, which is also a claim under
Section 4316(b)(1) of USERRA but related to payments from AAG's
profit-sharing plan. It contends that it does not need to credit
short-term military leave when calculating each pilot's award under
the plan because short-term military leave is not comparable to
jury duty and bereavement leave.

Judge Bartle holds that the comparability analysis for the
Plaintiffs' claim against American for pay while on military leave
in Count III applies equally to their claim against AAG for
inclusion of imputed income while on military leave in the
calculation of profit-sharing awards. Accordingly, the motion of
AAG for summary judgment on Count I is likewise granted.

Finally, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment
as to the Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim under Count II. They
dispute whether the AAG profit-sharing plan by its terms requires
credit for military leave as compensation.

Judge Bartle holds that there is no evidence that anyone other than
the members of the AAG Compensation Committee made the
determination as to how the profit-sharing plan should be
interpreted. Wicker did not make the decision as to what
compensation meant. Wicker's position and role were far less
consequential than the position and role of the vice president in
Mauldin who had made the critical decision adverse to the plaintiff
there.

For these reasons, the motion of the Plaintiffs for summary
judgment as to their breach-of-contract claim under count II of
their second amended complaint is denied. The Defendants' motion
for summary judgment as to the Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim
is granted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 2, 2022 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yymaf7um from Leagle.com.


ANADARKO E & P: Bid to Certify Class in Box Elder Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BOX ELDER KIDS, LLC, C C OPEN A, LLC, and GUEST FAMILY
TRUST, by its Trustee CONSTANCE F. GUEST, individually and on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs
v. ANADARKO E & P ONSHORE, LLC, ANADARKO LAND CORPORATION, and
KERR-MCGEE OIL AND GAS ONSHORE, LP, Defendants, Civil Action No.
20-cv-2352-WJM-SKC (D. Colo.), Judge William J. Martinez of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado:

   a. denies the Plaintiffs' Corrected Motion for Class
      Certification; and

   b. denies as moot the parties' Joint Motion for Oral Argument
      Regarding Class Certification.

The Plaintiffs bring this breach of contract lawsuit against the
Defendants, alleging that Anadarko failed to pay them the correct
monetary amount pursuant to the terms of their surface owner
agreements ("SOAs") with Anadarko.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of surface landowners
whose land is within the defined premises of SOAs on which there
are wells that produce from beyond the SOAs' defined premises. The
area from which a well produces is known as a "spacing unit" and is
defined by state regulators when a well is approved. Well placement
and spacing units do not necessarily follow property lines, and the
spacing units for wells often contain land within multiple,
individually owned parcels. Sometimes, they even contain land
covered by multiple SOAs.

Prior to 2010, the Defendants paid 2.5% of the cash value of a
well's production to the owner of the land on which the wellhead
sat. Since 2010, they have allocated payments based on what
percentage of a well's spacing unit was within a landowner's
parcel, regardless of where the wellhead is located. This change in
methodology resulted in some SOA landowners receiving larger
payments, while others' payments were reduced.

Before the Court is the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify and the
parties' Joint Motion.

The Plaintiffs seek certification of the following class: All
owners of the surface of the land within the UP Strip (Colorado,
Wyoming, and Utah) who are receiving production payments under an
unexpired Surface Owner Agreement (the SOA) covering mineral
interests once owned by Union Pacific Railroad Company to which
Defendants Anadarko Land Corporation, Anadarko E & P Onshore, LLC,
or Kerr-McGee Oil and Gas Onshore, LP have succeeded and on which
one or more wellheads are located that produce oil and gas from the
subsurface beyond the boundaries of the Described Premises covered
by the SOA.

Judge Martinez holds that not all Rule 23(a) requirements are met.
He finds that (i) the Defendants seemingly concede numerosity is
met; (ii) there are potentially thousands of class members; (iii)
joinder of all class members would be impractical; (iv) there are
questions of law and fact common to the putative class; (v) the
Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class; and (vi) the
Plaintiffs cannot adequately represent the class, and this action
is not appropriate for classwide adjudication.

Because he finds that not all Rule 23(a) requirements are met,
Judge Martinez does not analyze the Plaintiffs' Rule 23(b)
arguments.

For these reasons, Judge Martinez denies that Plaintiffs' Corrected
Motion for Class Certification and Brief in Support; and denies as
moot the parties' Joint Motion.

The parties are directed to jointly contact the chambers of
Magistrate Judge S. Kato Crews to set a status conference, or such
other proceeding as Judge Crews deems appropriate, to determine the
next steps the Court and parties should undertake to move this
litigation forward.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 2, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/29sm6n4w from Leagle.com.


ARGENT TRUST: Lysengen Partly Wins Bid to Review Class Cert. Denial
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael M. Mihm of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of Illinois, Peoria Division, grants in part the
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Order Denying
Class Certification in the lawsuit entitled JACKIE LYSENGEN, on
behalf of the Morton Buildings, Inc. Leveraged Employee Stock
Ownership Plan, and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ARGENT TRUST COMPANY, EDWARD C. MILLER, GETZ
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ESTATE OF HENRY A. GETZ, and ESTATE OF
VIRGINIA MILLER, Defendants, Case No. 20-1177 (C.D. Ill.).

The Court had previously entered a short order denying the
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification primarily focusing on
the fact that there was a conflict within the class and that the
Plaintiff was not able to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court mistakenly
stated that the Plaintiff only certified the class under Rule
23(b)(1)(A).

Judge Mihm notes that the Plaintiff uses this misstatement as the
primary basis for her motion for reconsideration. The Court
acknowledges that the Plaintiff also moved under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).
This, however, does not change the overall analysis that there was
a class conflict and as the Defendants point out, "courts typically
collapse their analysis of the two subparagraphs of Rule 23(b)(1)
and consider them jointly."

The Court initially drafted a relatively short order denying the
Plaintiff's motion without prejudice because it intended to provide
the Plaintiff the opportunity to attempt to redefine the class or
take the other necessary steps to address the class conflict, if
possible. The Plaintiff has indicated that she does not plan to
attempt redefining the class but wishes to have the Seventh Circuit
review the Court's decision.

Accordingly, the Court uses this opportunity to vacate the prior
opinion to correct the record and now provide a more thorough
explanation for its reasons to deny the Plaintiff's motion for
class certification. To the extent the Plaintiff sought additional
clarification, her Motion for Reconsideration is granted in that
respect, and denied in all other respects.

Morton Buildings designs and builds structures for farm,
commercial, and residential use. After operating as a family
business for many years, the shareholders decided to sell the
business, opting to utilize an Employee Stock Ownership Plan
("ESOP") transaction.

Before the ESOP transaction, some employees already owned a portion
of Morton Buildings through a defined contribution plan known as
The Morton Buildings, Inc. 401(k) and ESOP ("KSOP"). The employees
owned a total of 17.4% of Morton Buildings through the KSOP.
Chartwell Financial Advisory, Inc., conducted annual KSOP
valuations prior to 2015 and Prairie Capital prepared valuations
for 2015 and 2016.

The Defendants assert that before the ESOP transaction, Chartwell
and Prairie treated certain excess cash, the billing in excess of
cost, as a liability that reduced the stock price. The Defendants
explain the excess cash was due to Morton Buildings being paid up
front to complete certain work. Before the ESOP transaction,
Chartwell and Prairie Capital each concluded that the excess cash
was a liability for the purposes of the KSOP valuation because the
KSOP only held a minority interest in the company and thus, could
not control how the excess cash was used. This valuation, however,
came into question during the negotiation of the ESOP transaction.

To facilitate the purchase of the stock that the KSOP did not own,
Morton Buildings hired Defendant Argent, a professional independent
trust company, as trustee to the KSOP and the to-be-formed ESOP to
negotiate the terms of the deal on the ESOP's behalf for the
benefit of the employee participants. Argent hired Prairie Capital
as its valuation advisor and the law firm of Morgan Lewis & Bockius
as legal counsel.

Then, as an advisor to the selling shareholders in the ESOP
transaction, Chartwell Financial concluded that the excess cash
should be treated as an asset because the ESOP was purchasing 100%
of the company's shares and gaining a controlling interest in how
the cash was used. Argent disagreed with Chartwell's analysis that
the excess cash should be treated differently depending on whether
the subject was a minority or a controlling interest. Argent
concluded that the cash should be treated as an equity enhancing
asset irrespective of whether the company's shares were valued on
minority or controlling basis.

In short, all the relevant parties agreed that the excess cash
should be treated as an asset rather than a liability for the
purpose of the ESOP transaction. However, Chartwell Financial and
Prairie Capital had previously treated the cash as a liability when
assessing the valuation for the KSOP, believing that it should
qualify as a liability when assessing the value for a minority
shareholder with no control over how the money was used. The only
question was whether the past KSOP valuations were correct.
Ultimately, it appears the relevant parties came to an
understanding that the past valuations were too low.

Prairie raised the valuation of its 2016 year-end valuation from
$58.04 a share to a range of $76.53 to $87.51 per share at the time
of the May 8, 2017 ESOP transaction. To rectify the prior
undervaluation, Morton Buildings made cash payments to employee
participants whose KSOP shares had been negatively affected by the
company's prior treatment of the excess cash. The corrective
payments were made after the ESOP transaction was completed. Argent
accounted for this liability to reduce the range of fair market
value, noting a $5 million reduction in the company's equity. The
Plaintiff benefitted from these payments because she held shares in
the KSOP during the years the pre-ESOP transaction valuations were
made. After the necessary corrections were made with the IRS and
Department of Labor, she received $4,467.22 after she left Morton
Buildings.

In addition to the cash payments to account for the prior
undervaluation of the stock, eligible KSOP members also received
price protected status for five years after the ESOP transaction.
At times, the price protected valuation was more than twice the
current value of the stock after the ESOP transaction. The
Plaintiff left the company after the ESOP transaction and did not
have price protected status, so her KSOP shares were down in value
when she left. In her deposition, the Plaintiff cited this drop in
price of her KSOP shares as her primary complaint.

The Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of participants in the
ESOP, asserting that the ESOP overpaid for the stock it purchased.
She alleges that Defendants Argent Trust Company, Edward Miller,
Getz Family Limited Partnership, the Estate of Henry A. Getz, and
the Estate of Virginia Miller caused the plan to engage in and
themselves engaged in transactions prohibited by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, and breached
their fiduciary obligations to the plan.

The proposed class is defined as:

     All participants in the Morton Buildings, Inc. Leveraged
     Employee Stock Ownership Plan (the Plan) and the
     beneficiaries of such participants as of the date of the
     May 8, 2017 ESOP Transaction or anytime thereafter.

     Excluded from the Class are the shareholders who sold the
     stock of Morton Buildings, Inc. (Morton) to the Plan on
     May 8, 2017, and their immediate families; the directors and
     officers of Morton and their immediate families; and legal
     representatives, successors, and assigns of any such
     excluded persons.

The Defendants argue that there is a conflict between KSOP class
members, who received cash payments and price protected status, and
other class members, who did not participate in the KSOP. The
Defendants state that this irreconcilable conflict renders class
certification inappropriate and the Plaintiff an inadequate class
representative.

The Plaintiff moves for class certification under Rule 23(b)(1),
and in contrast to other forms of class actions, this class is
"mandatory" with no opt-out rights. Accordingly, there are "strict"
requirements for certifying a class under Rule 23(b) requiring an
"identity of interest among all class members."

Judge Mihm finds that the Plaintiff does not meet the requirements
for class certification under Rule 23(a). The parties do not
dispute that the numerosity requirement is met. However, the Court
remains unpersuaded that the Plaintiff meets the commonality,
typicality, and adequacy requirements.

Judge Mihm finds that the Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the
class satisfies the commonality, typicality and adequacy
requirements. The Plaintiff also fails to demonstrate that the
putative class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1) because
of conflict of interest and unique defenses within the proposed
class.

The Court says it appropriately considered merits issues only to
the extent relevant to determining whether the prerequisites for
class certification are satisfied. The Court holds that the
Shareholder Defendants' claim that the Plaintiff did not move for
class certification on Count IV is without merit.

Judge Mihm opines that the Defendants' accusations regarding
spoliation do not undermine the Plaintiff's ability to represent
the class. He explains that the Plaintiff did not alter the most
important piece of evidence in this case. There is no reason to
believe that her interactions with former colleagues would have any
bearing on the allegations here. The deletion was also a largely
automatic and not intentional. Accordingly, the Court is not
persuaded that there was any spoliation or that the Plaintiff
deleting certain messages otherwise disqualifies her as a class
representative.

As explained, the Court took the opportunity to further clarify its
position and, thus, the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is
granted to the extent that the Court has clarified its position but
is denied in all other aspects. The Court further found it
appropriate to vacate its initial opinion denying class
certification and replace it with this opinion.

Judge Mihm holds that the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate class
certification is appropriate under Rule 23(a) or Rule 23(b)(1).
Thus, the Plaintiff's Motion to Certify a Class is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order and Opinion dated Oct. 20,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/mrykudcz from
Leagle.com.


BIG DOG TACKLE: Faces Sweeney Suit Over Telephonic Sales Calls
--------------------------------------------------------------
BRENDAN SWEENEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BIG DOG TACKLE, INC., Defendant, Case No.
CACE-22-015695 (Fla. Cir., 17th Judicial, Broward Cty., Oct. 21,
2022) is a class action brought against the Defendant under the
Florida Telephone Solicitation Act.

The Plaintiff alleges the engagement of the Defendant in telephonic
sales calls using text messages to promote its product and
services. She asserts that the Defendant engages in telephonic
sales calls to consumers without having secured prior express
written consent as required by the FTSA. The Defendant's telephonic
sales calls have caused her and the Class members harm, including
violations of their statutory rights, statutory damages, annoyance,
nuisance, and invasion of their privacy, says the Plaintiff.

Big Dog Tackle, Inc. is a fishing store in Pompano Beach,
Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400-4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

               - and -

          Michael Eisenband, Esq.
          EISENBAND LAW, P.A.
          515 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 120
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 533-4092
          E-mail: MEisenband@Eisenbandlaw.com

BOEING COMPANY: Varhelyi Can't Intervene in Smartwings Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,
Seattle, denies Kornel Varhelyi's Motion to Intervene in the
lawsuit styled SMARTWINGS, A.S., A CZECH REPUBLIC COMPANY,
Plaintiff v. THE BOEING COMPANY, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, Defendant,
Case No. 2:21-cv-918-RSM (W.D. Wash.).

The Court, having considered the Motion, Boeing's Opposition
thereto, and the remainder of the record, denies the Motion for the
reasons set forth in Boeing's Opposition.

It agrees that there is no basis for intervention as of right under
Rule 24, and that the introduction of a class action tort lawsuit
by pilots into this commercial suit between Boeing and one of its
airline customers is not warranted under permissive intervention.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 20, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/36h2bp3r from Leagle.com.


BP EXPLORATION: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Schexnayder Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana grants BP's motion for summary judgment in
the lawsuit styled LARRY SCHEXNAYDER, ET AL. v. BP EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION, INC., ET AL., Case No. 17-3207 (E.D. La.).

Before the Court is BP Exploration & Production, Inc., BP America
Production Co., and BP p.l.c.'s motion to exclude the testimony of
the Plaintiffs' general causation expert, Dr. Jerald Cook, and
their motion for summary judgment. The Plaintiffs oppose both
motions.

The Plaintiffs bring a survival action to challenge the decedent
Gary Schexnayder's alleged exposure to toxic chemicals following
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The
Plaintiffs allege that decedent Gary Schexnayder performed cleanup
work after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill from June until
September 2010. They assert that, as part of this work, decedent
was exposed to crude oil and chemical dispersants. They also
represent that this exposure resulted in the following conditions:
respiratory problems, headaches, nausea, blurred vision, ear
infections, fatigue, skin irritations, volatile organic compounds
in blood, and a fatal heart attack.

The Plaintiffs' case was originally part of the multidistrict
litigation ("MDL") pending before Judge Carl J. Barbier. The case
was severed from the MDL as one of the "B3" cases for plaintiffs
who either opted out of, or were excluded from, the Deepwater
Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement (In re
Oil Spill by Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex., on
Apr. 20, 2010, No. MDL 2179, 2021 WL 6053613, at *2, 12 & n.12
(E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2021)). They opted out of the settlement. After
their case was severed, it was reallocated to this Court. The
Plaintiffs assert claims for general maritime negligence,
negligence per se, and gross negligence as a result of the oil
spill and its cleanup.

To demonstrate that exposure to crude oil, weathered oil, and
dispersants can cause the symptoms the Plaintiffs allege in their
complaint, they offer the testimony of Dr. Jerald Cook, an
occupational and environmental physician. Dr. Cook is the
Plaintiffs' sole expert offering an opinion on general causation.

In his June 21, 2022 report, Dr. Cook concludes that general
causation analysis indicates that the following conditions, among
others, can occur in individuals exposed to crude oil, including
weathered crude oil: rhinosinusitis, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, bronchitis, asthma, dermatitis, conjunctivitis, and dry
eye disease.

The BP parties contend that Dr. Cook's expert report should be
excluded on the grounds that that it is unreliable and unhelpful.
They also move for summary judgment, asserting that if Dr. Cook's
general causation opinion is excluded, the Plaintiffs are unable to
carry their burden on causation.

At issue is whether the Plaintiffs have produced admissible general
causation evidence, Judge Vance notes.

Given Dr. Cook's failure to determine the relevant harmful level of
exposure to chemicals to which decedent was exposed for decedent's
specific conditions, the Court finds that he lacks sufficient facts
to provide a reliable opinion on general causation, citing McGill
v. BP Expl. & Produc., Inc., 830 F. App'x 430, 433 (5th Cir. 2020)
(per curiam).

The Court also finds that Dr. Cook's opinion is unhelpful because
of his inability to link any specific chemical that decedent was
allegedly exposed to, at the level at which he was exposed, to the
conditions that the Plaintiffs allege in the complaint.

In sum, Judge Vance opines that the Plaintiffs, as the party
offering the testimony of Dr. Cook, have failed to meet their
burden of establishing the reliability and relevance of Dr. Cook's
report. Given that Dr. Cook's report is unreliable and fails to
provide the "minimal facts necessary" to establish general
causation in this case, the Court grants the Defendants' motion to
exclude Dr. Cook's testimony.

In their opposition to the motion in limine, the Plaintiffs ask the
Court, in the alternative, to defer ruling on the Defendants'
motion in limine until their counsel has completed discovery on the
issue of BP's failure to conduct dermal monitoring and
biomonitoring.

Judge Vance holds that the additional discovery the Plaintiffs seek
would not produce information germane to the motions at issue,
because the information sought would not fill the gaps in Dr.
Cook's report. Finding out more about BP's failure to do the
monitoring the Plaintiffs describe would not provide a
dose-response relationship. Nor would it cure the lack of "fit"
between Dr. Cook's general causation report and the facts of
plaintiffs' case. Judge Vance points out that Dr. Cook failed to
identify any chemical that is capable of causing any of the
conditions that the Plaintiffs allege in their complaint, and also,
he failed to address several of the symptoms the Plaintiffs allege
in their complaint.

Further, the lack of the desired data from BP does not excuse the
flaws in Dr. Cook's report, Judge Vance holds. Hence, the request
to defer ruling on the Defendants' motion in limine is denied.

In their motion for summary judgment, the Defendants contend that
they are entitled to summary judgment because the Plaintiffs cannot
establish either general or specific causation. Here, the Court has
excluded testimony from the Plaintiffs' only expert offering an
opinion on general causation. Although the Plaintiffs have also
retained Dr. Rachel Jones as a "general exposure assessment"
expert, she does not provide a general causation opinion, nor does
she provide the information or analysis that Dr. Cook's report
lacks.

Because the Court excludes Dr. Cook's opinion on general causation,
and the Plaintiffs have produced no other admissible general
causation evidence in this case, the Court need not reach the
question of specific causation. Given that the Plaintiffs cannot
prove a necessary element of their claims against the Defendants,
their claims must be dismissed, Judge Vance holds.

For these reasons, the Court grants the BP parties' motion to
exclude the testimony of Dr. Cook. The Court also grants the BP
parties' motion for summary judgment. The Plaintiffs' claims are
dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order and Reasons dated Oct. 20,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/mw87js8m from
Leagle.com.


CARVANA LLC: Jennings Suit Stayed Pending Arbitration Appeal Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANA JENNINGS and JOSEPH A. FURLONG, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs v. CARVANA
LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. 21-5400 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Edward
G. Smith of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania grants the Defendant's motion to stay these
proceedings pending outcome of appeal to the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals from denial of motion to compel arbitration and, in the
alternative, dismiss the case for the failure to state a claim.

The Plaintiffs, who are both Pennsylvania citizens, commenced this
consumer protection action by filing a putative class action
complaint against Carvana in the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County on Nov. 5, 2021. On Dec. 9, 2021, Carvana
removed the matter to this Court under 28 U.S.C. Section 1441,
1453, invoking federal jurisdiction under the general diversity
statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a), and the Class Action Fairness
Act, 28 U.S.C. Sections 1332(d).

Prior to Carvana filing a response to the complaint, the Plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint on Jan. 13, 2022. In the amended
complaint, the Plaintiffs allege they each purchased a vehicle
online from Carvana, a national used car dealer incorporated in
Georgia. As part of the transaction, they both agreed to pay, and
did pay, inter alia, a $38 state registration fee, $16 license
plate fee, and $55 state title fee. Despite paying these fees, the
Plaintiffs claim that Carvana failed to complete the permanent
registration of their vehicles. Instead, Carvana provided them with
temporary license tags without the legal right or authorization to
do so.

Both Plaintiffs allege actual damages amounting to $93 (including
the $38 state registration fee, $16 license plate fee, and $55
state title fee)1 for licensing and registration for the vehicles
which Carvana failed to complete. They set forth claims for breach
of contract and violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. Sections 201-1-10. They seek
to represent a class of individuals defined as: All persons in the
United States east of the Mississippi River who entered into
contracts with CARVANA to purchase vehicles since Nov. 5, 2019, and
CARVANA agreed to provide car registration services with
non-temporary and permanent vehicle registrations in the state of
their residence. They also seek to represent a subclass of all
persons from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania who are members of
the Nationwide Class.

In response to the amended complaint, Carvana filed a motion to
compel arbitration and to dismiss on Jan. 28, 2022. The Plaintiffs
filed a response in opposition to the motion.

On Sept. 30, 2022, the Court entered a memorandum opinion and order
which denied Carvana's motion to compel arbitration and,
alternatively, to dismiss. It directed Carvana to file an answer to
the amended complaint by Oct. 21, 2022.

Carvana timely filed a notice of appeal from the memorandum opinion
and order on Oct. 17, 2022, to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
In conjunction with the filing of the notice of appeal, it also
filed a motion to stay these proceeding pending the outcome of its
appeal. On Oct. 20, 2022, Carvana a motion for an extension of time
to file its answer to the amended complaint.

The Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the motion stay on
Oct. 31, 2022. On the same date, they filed a motion to certify the
class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
appoint them as class representatives, and appoint class counsel.

The Plaintiffs oppose Carvana's motion by generally claiming that a
stay is not warranted insofar as (1) any appeal is either forfeited
or frivolous and (2) they will be irreparably harmed by the court
staying the case.

Judge Smith finds that Carvana's appeal is not forfeited or
frivolous and, as such, Carvana's notice of appeal automatically
divested the Court of jurisdiction to proceeding further in the
case. Accordingly, he grants Carvana's motion to stay and stays
these proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal. He also denies
the other currently pending motions without prejudice to the
parties to reassert them if the Third Circuit upholds the Court's
decision.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 2, 2022 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3x2wezjt from Leagle.com.


CHRISTNER'S PIZZA: Younger Balks at Drivers' Unlawful Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------
ANTHONY YOUNGER, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
persons, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTNER'S PIZZA, INC., a domestic
corporation and TODD WILLIAM CHRISTNER, an individual, Defendants,
Case No. 6:22-cv-01608-AA (D. Or., Oct. 21, 2022) is a collective
action brought by Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, against Defendant for violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Oregon Wage and Hour Laws

The lawsuit arises from the Defendant's common policy of not
reimbursing delivery drivers for automobile expenses related to
making deliveries for Defendant's restaurants and not providing
lawful minimum wages or overtime premiums.

The Plaintiff was employed as an hourly-paid delivery driver from
approximately September 2019 until June 2021.

Christner's Pizza, Inc. owns and operates multiple Domino's Pizza
franchises in Oregon.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ashley A. Marton, Esq.
          Rebecca Cambreleng, Esq.
          CRISPIN HANNON MARTON CAMBRELENG LLC
          1834 SW 58th Avenue, Suite 200
          Portland, OR 97221
          Telephone: (503) 293-5770
          Facsimile: (503) 293-5766
          E-mail: ashley@employmentlaw-nw.com
                  rebecca@employmentlaw-nw.com

               - and -

          Lydia H. Hamlet, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Kirkpatrick Plaza
          10800 Financial Centre Pkwy, Suite 510
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: lydia@sanfordlawfirm.com

DIESTEL TURKEY: Compelled to Reply to Wetzel's Discovery Requests
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CYNTHIA WETZEL, on behalf of herself and all other New
Mexico consumers similarly situated, Plaintiff v. DIESTEL TURKEY
RANCH, Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-1213 DHU/KRS (D.N.M.),
Magistrate Judge Kevin R. Sweazea of the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Mexico grants in part and denies in part the
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel.

The Plaintiff brings a putative class action against Diestel for
violations of the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act, New Mexico's
False Advertising Law, and common law unjust enrichment, based on
allegations that Defendant provided false and misleading statements
and advertising about its turkey products.

In her Motion to Compel, the Plaintiff contends that the
Defendant's reference to its general objections in response to
discovery requests is improper because it fails to set forth the
specific grounds on which it is objecting. She also argues that its
responses to Interrogatory Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8, and Request
for Production ("RFP") Nos. 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 19, 20, 21, and 22, are
insufficient and should be supplemented, and that it has failed to
state whether it is withholding documents pursuant to its
objections. She also argues that the Defendant must state whether
it is withholding any responsive documents and produce a privilege
log.

In response, the Defendant states that it has produced almost 9,000
pages of responsive documents, its general objections are common
practice in this district, and it is not required to provide a
document log showing documents it withheld based on its objections.
It states it produced over 300 pages of additional documents on
Aug. 19, 2022, which address the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, and
that it will continue to provide supplemental responses to the
disputed interrogatories and RFPs. The Defendant contends that it
has sufficiently responded to each disputed discovery request.

First, Judge Sweazea finds that the Defendant's responses are
proper under Rules 33 and 34, despite its use of general
objections. Instead of merely relying on boilerplate or generalized
objections, he says, it provides specific grounds for its
objections to each discovery request and puts the Plaintiff on
notice of what type of information is being withheld and why. The
Defendant's use of general objections is not itself improper
because it did not rely solely on those objections, and set forth
the specific grounds for its objections and tailored those
objections to each response.

Second, as to the Defendant's general objections to Interrogatory
Nos. 2, 3, 5, and 8, Judge Sweazea finds that the Defendant
sufficiently complied with Rule 33 by producing the reports that
reflect the information sought by the Plaintiff because the burden
would be substantially the same for either party to compile or
summarize the data from the reports. However, while it states it
has produced the Bates numbers for the Whole Foods market sales
reports and Diestel's online sales report, it also states that it
will supplement its written responses to identify responsive
documents by Bates numbers, and Plaintiff states that Defendant has
not yet done so. Therefore, the Plaintiff's motion to compel is
granted in part as to these interrogatories, and the Defendant will
provide supplemental responses containing Bates numbers for all
responsive reports and any other responsive documents.

Third, Judge Sweazea denies the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel as to
the general request for the Defendant to supplement every RFP to
clarify whether it is withholding responsive information on the
basis of its objections. He says if the Defendant withheld any
otherwise discoverable information on the basis of privilege, it
must produce a privilege log with the required information.

Fourth, since the Defendant has now explained that it has not
conducted market analyses or consumer surveys specific to its
individual DTR branded products, and produced documents related to
its brand strategy marketing and public relations, Judge Sweazea
finds that the Defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 4 is
adequate. The Defendant will produce the summary of companies it
that it agreed to produce as a supplemental response.

Fifth, Judge Sweazea grants the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel as to
Interrogatory No. 5, and the Defendant will supplement its response
to this request and disclose the number of brochures it provided
for advertising in New Mexico and where they were sent.
Interrogatory No. 5 asks for "BASIC DISSEMINATION DATA for each
unique ADVERTISEMENT for each TURKEY PRODUCT disseminated
throughout the CLASS PERIOD." He agrees with the Defendant that the
request should be limited to information that was directed to New
Mexico consumers.

Sixth, Interrogatory No. 6 asks Defendant to "IDENTIFY every store,
facility, or location within New Mexico where at least one of the
TURKEY PRODUCTS was sold during the CLASS PERIOD." Judge Sweazea
agrees that the Defendant must seek this information from its
distributors or explain why it is unable to do so. It must also
provide a supplemental interrogatory response explaining the
discrepancy between the number of stores listed on its website and
the list of stores it provided in response to the interrogatory.
So, the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel as to this interrogatory is
granted.

Seventh, Interrogatory No. 8 asks the Defendant to state the dates
each of its products became available for sale in New Mexico, and,
if applicable, the dates it stopped selling them. Judge Sweazea
denies the Motion to Compel as to this interrogatory. He says the
Defendant sufficiently responded to this interrogatory by providing
sales reports and identifying sales data from its website,
distributors, and retailers that identify the turkey products they
sold in New Mexico.

Eighth, the Plaintiff seeks the Defendant's written document
retention policies and procedures (RFP No. 1). The Plaintiff
indicates it her reply brief that the Defendant has not yet
provided this supplemental response, so the Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel as to this RFP is granted and the Defendant is ordered to
provide a supplemental response.

Ninth, the Plaintiff asked the Defendant to provide documents
sufficient to show all third parties with whom YOU contracted for
services RELATING TO the MARKETING, ADVERTISING, manufacture,
development, distribution, or sale of the TURKEY PRODUCTS (RFP No.
4). Judge Sweazea holds it does not appear that the Defendant fully
responded to the RFP because it did not include documents relating
to the manufacture, development, distribution, or sale of its
products. The Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is granted as to this
request in part, and the Defendant will provide a supplemental
response that includes any contracts for manufacture, development,
distribution, or sale of products it sold in New Mexico.

Tenth, Request for Production No. 5 seeks "exemplars of all LABELS,
ADVERTISEMENTS, packaging, package inserts, and brochures RELATING
TO the PRODUCTS during the CLASS PERIOD" while Request for
Production No. 6 seeks all "DOCUMENTS showing the periods of time
during which each PRODUCT LABEL or ADVERTISEMENT was introduced,
used or discontinued." Judge Sweazea grants in part the Motion to
Compel as to these RFPs and the Defendant will state what search or
searches it performed to obtain its responsive documents, and
provide the URLs for its current websites and YouTube videos.

Eleventh, Judge Sweazea also grants the Motion to Compel as to RFP
No. 9 and the Defendant will produce information responsive to the
RFP that relates to advertising that reached New Mexico consumers,
not just advertising that was specifically targeted at New Mexico.

Twelfth, RFP Nos. 19, 20, and 21 seek information and documents
related to the cost of goods and revenue or losses the Defendant
experienced related to its turkey products that carried the
challenged advertising. Judge Sweazea finds that the Defendant has
sufficiently explained what data it produced and that the
information it produced is adequate to respond to these RFPs. He
denies the Motion to Compel as to these requests.

Finally, in RFP No. 22, the Plaintiff seeks "All DOCUMENTS
sufficient to show during the CLASS PERIOD YOUR sales of PRODUCTS
where the end purchasers are in New Mexico; YOUR costs of
production, MARKETING, and distribution, and YOUR profit from sale
of the PRODUCTS, in such a form as may be distinguished by
point-of-sale to the consumer." Judge Sweazea grants the Motion to
Compel as to this request and orders the Defendant to supplement
its response to this RFP with those email addresses if they are
available.

The Defendant will provide the supplemental responsive information
by Nov. 16, 2022.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 2, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/pxbp4mtb from Leagle.com.


DUARTE NURSERY: Appeal From Denial of Class Certification Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled TERESA E. MENDEZ-VILLEGAS, et al., Plaintiffs
and Appellants v. DUARTE NURSERY, INC., et al., Defendants and
Respondents, Case No. F081733 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of
California for the Fifth District dismisses the Plaintiffs' appeal
from the trial court's order denying their motion for class
certification.

Plaintiffs Teresa E. Mendez-Villegas, Maria Navarro, Loyda Aguilar,
and Olimpia Cano de Peral filed their original class action
complaint alleging various Labor Code violations in 2015. They
moved for class certification in December of 2019--less than three
months before a jury trial scheduled for March 3, 2020. The
COVID-19 pandemic ultimately pushed the trial date back nine months
to December 2020. In the interim, the trial court denied class
certification in part, because the Plaintiffs' dilatory approach to
the litigation rendered it "impossible" to complete class discovery
before trial.

On appeal, the Plaintiffs ask the Court of Appeal to reverse the
trial court's order and remand with instructions that this case
proceed as a class action.

However, Judge Brad R. Hill, writing for the Panel, explains the
case does not implicate the "death knell" doctrine allowing for
immediate appellate review of an order denying certification of
class claims while leaving intact individual claims. Moreover, the
case does not present "unusual circumstances" such that the Court
of Appeal may treat the Plaintiffs' premature appeal as a petition
for extraordinary writ in the alternative.

Therefore, the Court of Appeal dismisses the Plaintiffs' appeal and
award the Defendants their costs.

                 Motion for Class Certification

On Dec. 12, 2019, the Plaintiffs moved for class certification
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and California
Rules of Court, rule 3.764. At the time of filing, trial was
scheduled for March 3, 2020.

They sought certification of a global class and five subclasses:

   * Proposed Global Class:

     All current and former non-exempt agricultural workers
     employed by DNI at any time from April 22, 2011, to the
     present;

   * Auto-Deduct Meal Period Subclass:

     All current and former non-exempt agricultural workers
     employed by DNI who worked at least one shift of 5 hours
     or greater at any time from April 22, 2011, to the present;

   * Short, Untimely, Incomplete, or Missed Meal Period Subclass:

     All current and former non-exempt agricultural workers
     employed by DNI at any time from April 22, 2011, to the
     present;

   * Unpaid Time Subclass -- Time Worked During Meal Periods:

     All current and former non-exempt agricultural workers
     employed by [DNI] who worked at least one shift of 5 hours
     or greater at any time from April 22, 2011, to the present;

   * Unpaid Time Subclass -- Pre and Post-Shift Time Worked:

     All current and former non-exempt agricultural workers
     employed by [DNI] who worked at least one shift at any time
     from April 22, 2011, to the present; and

   * Unpaid Time Subclass -- Defendants' Unlawful Time-Shaving
     Policy:

     All current and former non-exempt agricultural workers
     employed by [DNI] at any time from April 22, 2011, to the
     present.

According to the Plaintiffs, "at least 2,500" DNI employees
constituted their proposed global class and subclasses. On this
basis, they claimed their motion satisfied the "ascertainability
and numerosity" prerequisites for class certification.

On June 23, 2020, the trial court denied the Plaintiffs' motion. It
explains that the Plaintiffs were provided with timekeeping data
and contact information for potential class members in 2017; but it
was not until Dec. 12, 2019--more than 4-1/2 years later--that they
moved to certify the class.

Judge Hill notes that the Plaintiffs have offered no explanation or
excuse for why this motion was filed so late. He explains that the
delay in seeking certification has made it almost impossible for
the Defendants to complete class discovery before trial must be
held in order to comply with the five-year deadline of Code of
Civil Procedure section 583.310.

The Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on Sept. 17, 2020. On
Oct. 13, 2020, they filed their motion to stay the action pending
outcome of the appeal. The Defendants opposed the motion, in part
because the order denying class certification was not appealable
because of the pending PAGA claim. The parties litigated this issue
at the hearing to stay the proceedings. The trial court granted the
Plaintiffs' motion to stay on Oct. 29, 2020.

The Court of Appeal agrees the death knell doctrine does not permit
the Plaintiffs to appeal the trial court's order denying class
certification. The Plaintiffs have asserted a representative PAGA
claim in the FAC. The cause of action remains pending in the trial
court. Indeed, in their motion to stay proceedings, they confirmed
they brought both a class action and a "representative action"
pursuant to PAGA.

Judge Hill notes that the Court of Appeal recognizes that it may
treat an appeal from a nonappealable order as a petition for writ
of mandate under "unusual circumstances." However, there are no
unusual circumstances justifying treating this appeal as a writ,
Judge Hill opines.

While the Plaintiffs' notice of appeal requests this alternative
relief, neither their opening brief nor their reply brief discusses
treating this matter as a writ petition and the Court of Appeal
declines to exercise its discretion to do so here.

In sum, the Court of Appeal concludes the Plaintiffs do not appeal
from an appealable order because an order denying class
certification does not fall within the scope of the death knell
doctrine where, as here, a PAGA claim remains pending in the trial
court.

The Plaintiffs' appeal from the trial court's June 23, 2020 order
denying their motion for class certification is dismissed. The
Court of Appeal expresses no opinion on the merits of the
Plaintiffs' appeal. The Defendants will recover their costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Oct. 20, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/eph2jyzb from Leagle.com.

Mallison & Martinez, Stan S. Mallison -- stanm@themmlawfirm.com --
Hector R. Martinez -- hectorm@themmlawfirm.com -- Liliana Garcia
and Daniel C. Keller -- dkeller@themmlawfirm.com -- for the
Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Law Offices of Brunn & Flynn, Gerald E. Brunn --
mail@Brunn-Flynn.com -- and Mahanvir S. Sahota, for the Defendant
and Respondent.


DUARTE NURSERY: Owner's Dismissal From Mendez-Villegas Suit Upheld
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled TERESA E. MENDEZ-VILLEGAS, et al., Plaintiffs
and Appellants v. JOHN DUARTE, Defendant and Respondent, Case No.
F082174 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the
Fifth District affirms the trial court's judgment granting part
owner John Duarte's motion for summary judgment.

Former employees of Duarte Nursery, Inc. (DNI) filed this action
against DNI, John Duarte, and other individuals seeking civil
penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of
2004 (PAGA). Plaintiffs Teresa E. Mendez-Villegas, Maria Navarro,
Loyda Aguilar, and Olimpia Cano de Peral allege Duarte was
personally liable under PAGA because he was a person, who violated
or caused to be violated various provisions of the Labor Code.

DNI operates a greenhouse in Hughson and farms other properties in
Stanislaus County. Duarte serves as its CEO, and his brother, Jeff
Duarte (Jeff), serves as another executive officer. Collectively,
they perform most of the decisionmaking at DNI.

The Plaintiffs reside in Stanislaus County and were employed as
non-exempt employees by DNI until 2014.

In April 2015, the Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint
setting forth seven causes of action against DNI for violations of
the Labor Code and the unfair competition law. An eighth cause of
action asserted a PAGA claim for civil penalties against DNI and
five individuals: (1) Duarte; (2) Michael Duarte; (3) Jeff; (4)
Patricia Lopez; and (5) Engracia Lopez.

In August 2015, the Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint
(FAC). It sets forth the same causes of action and removes Michael
Duarte as a defendant.

The FAC explains that the core violations the Plaintiffs allege
against DNI include failure to pay all minimum wages owed, failure
to provide rest or meal periods (or pay the statutory additional
wages due), failure to reimburse necessary expenses incurred, and
failure to pay all wages owed upon termination or resignation.

In August 2020, Duarte, an owner, president and chief executive
officer (CEO) of DNI, moved for summary judgment, contending he
lacked sufficient personal involvement to have caused the alleged
violations. He contends that the claim against him had no merit,
and that he was not responsible for any Labor Code violations that
allegedly damaged the Plaintiffs. Duarte noted he was not the
actual employer and argued the fact that he is the president and
part owner of DNI is not enough to confer liability under PAGA.

In addition, Patricia Lopez filed a separate summary judgment
motion. Engracia Lopez also filed a separate summary judgment
motion. The Plaintiffs opposed Duarte's motion for summary
judgment.

On Oct. 27, 2020, the trial court heard argument on Duarte's
summary judgment motion. The trial court granted the motion one day
after the hearing. The trial court concluded that there was no
evidence in the record that Duarte was individually responsible for
violations of sections 558 or 1197.1. In separate orders, the trial
court denied the summary judgment motions filed by Patricia Lopez
and Engracia Lopez.

The Plaintiffs timely appealed the summary judgment in Duarte's
favor.

Judge Brad R. Hill, writing for the Panel, notes that whether
Duarte was a person acting on behalf of an employer, who violated,
or caused to be violated, California's wage and hours law for
purposes of section 558 presents the Appellate Court with a
question of statutory construction.

The Appellate Court concludes an officer of a corporate employer
does not cause a violation merely by being an officer. Instead, the
officer must have engaged in some affirmative conduct beyond his or
her status as an officer. In particular, Judge Hill explains the
officer must (1) have been personally involved in the purported
violation or (2) have had sufficient participation in managing or
overseeing the activities of those persons directly responsible for
the violation that such participation can be found to have
contributed to the violation, citing Usher v. White (2021) 64
Cal.App.5th 883, 896-897 (Usher).

Applying this statutory interpretation to the evidence about the
conduct attributable to Duarte, the Appellate Court concludes
Duarte carried his initial burden of showing he was not personally
involved in the purported violations and lacked sufficient
participation in the management or oversight of those directly
responsible for the violations to be deemed to have contributed or
caused the violations.

Judge Hill points out that the evidence relied upon by the
Plaintiffs is insufficient to establish the existence of a triable
issue of material fact.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, affirms the judgment. Duarte will
recover his costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Oct. 20, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2ehx4w35 from Leagle.com.

Mallison & Martinez, Stan S. Mallison -- stanm@themmlawfirm.com --
Hector R. Martinez -- hectorm@themmlawfirm.com -- Liliana Garcia
and Daniel C. Keller -- dkeller@themmlawfirm.com -- for the
Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Law Offices of Brunn & Flynn, Gerald E. Brunn --
mail@Brunn-Flynn.com -- and Mahanvir S. Sahota, for the Defendant
and Respondent.


EVERGLADES COLLEGE: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Leigue Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled MARIA FERNANDA SOTO LEIGUE, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. EVERGLADES
COLLEGE, INC., doing business as Keiser University, Defendant, Case
No. 22-cv-22307-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes (S.D. Fla.), Judge Beth Bloom of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida denies
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Class
Action Complaint or, in the Alternative, Strike Portions Thereof.

The Plaintiff commenced this case by filing a complaint in state
court asserting claims against Keiser for violations of the Florida
Telephone Solicitation Act ("FTSA"). Keiser removed the case from
state court to this Court on July 22, 2022. In response to Keiser's
request to dismiss the Complaint, the Plaintiff filed the First
Amended Complaint ("FAC").

In the FAC, the Plaintiff alleges that she submitted an inquiry to
Keiser through a form on its website on Jan. 2, 2020. According to
her, she did not consent to receive automated text message
solicitations on her cellular phone, but nevertheless, consistent
with Keiser's aggressive telemarketing practices, Keiser called her
eleven (11) times between Jan. 2, 2020, and Jan. 13, 2020. In
addition, Keiser sent solicitation emails to the Plaintiff multiple
times from Jan. 2, 2020, until Aug. 6, 2021, and sent text messages
to her cell phone multiple times from Feb. 11, 2020, until Sept.
23, 2021.

The FAC alleges that Keiser's messages did not include opt-out
instructions. On Sept. 23, 2021, the Plaintiff responded in an
attempt to opt out of further text messages with Keiser. Despite
the Plaintiff's attempt, she alleges that Keiser continued to send
her additional promotional text messages. She alleges that the
purpose of Keiser's telephonic sales messages was to solicit the
sale of consumer services--which she identifies as educational
services in the form of university courses.

As a result, the Plaintiff asserts three claims against the
Defendant for violations of the FTSA, seeking damages and
injunctive relief individually, and on behalf of a putative class.

In the Motion, the Defendant requests dismissal of the FAC pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the
alternative, to strike certain allegations in the FAC pursuant to
Rule 12(f).

The Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed
because college degrees and college courses are not "consumer goods
or services" as defined in the FTSA. In response, the Plaintiff
argues that educational services are consumer services, and under
the FTSA, the purpose, and not just the content, of a communication
controls.

Judge Bloom states that the Defendant's reliance on family law does
not offer support in the context of consumer protection. Similarly,
while the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") is a
consumer protection statute, it specifically applies to debt
collection, and the Plaintiff appears to conflate the issue of
whether educational services can be considered to be personal
property under the FTSA and the purpose for which the personal
property is used.

In any event, Judge Bloom finds the Defendant does not provide
persuasive authority for the proposition that the FTSA does not
apply to educational services as alleged by the Plaintiff. As such,
the Court will not read that limitation into the statute.

The authority the Defendant relies upon for the proposition that
the Florida legislature intended to treat communication related to
education differently--Florida's telemarketing laws--does not
support the conclusion the Defendant urges, Judge Bloom finds. The
Florida Telemarketing Act contains a provision that specifically
exempts soliciting for educational purposes. Had the Florida
Legislature intended to exclude communications related to
educational services or university courses from the ambit of the
FTSA, it certainly could have done so explicitly, Judge Bloom
opines.

As such, Judge Bloom finds the communications alleged by the
Plaintiff are sufficient to state a claim under the FTSA.

The Defendant argues next that even if the text messages fall
within the purview of the FTSA, they are nevertheless not
actionable because they were sent in response to the Plaintiff's
inquiry, and such communications should be exempted from the
definition of a sales call. The Defendant also contends that the
FAC itself disproves the allegation that it engaged in unsolicited
text messaging because the form the Plaintiff completed contained
clear consent language. The Court disagrees with respect to both
arguments.

The Court does not find, as the Defendant argues, that the consent
language on its website disproves the allegation that it engaged in
unsolicited text messaging.

In the alternative, the Defendant requests that the Court strike
paragraphs 12 through 22 of the FAC, and Exhibit A, as immaterial
and scandalous allegations regarding Keiser's status as a
non-profit entity.

Upon review, Judge Bloom finds the Defendant has not demonstrated
that the challenged allegations and Exhibit A have no possible
relation to the controversy and that they may cause prejudice, such
that the drastic remedy of striking is warranted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 20, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mjs7smjj from Leagle.com.


FACEBOOK INC: Court Issues Final Order and Judgment in Olin Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Chief District Judge Richard Seeborg of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, issued
a Final Order and Judgment in the lawsuit entitled LAWRENCE OLIN,
HAROLD NYANJOM, SHERON SMITH-JACKSON, JANICE VEGA-LATKER, MARC
BOEHM, and RAVEN WINHAM, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. FACEBOOK, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 3:18-cv-01881-RS (N.D. Cal.).

The Court has considered the Class Action Settlement Agreement
between the Plaintiffs and Defendant Facebook, Inc., now known as
Meta Platforms, Inc., dated May 13, 2022, the motion for an order
finally approving the Settlement Agreement, the record in this
Action, the arguments and recommendations made by counsel, and the
requirements of the law.

Judge Seeborg approves the Settlement Agreement under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

For the purposes of this Final Approval Order and Final Judgment
("Order"), the Court adopts all defined terms as set forth in the
Settlement Agreement.

The Court finds and concludes that, for the purposes of approving
this Settlement only, the proposed Rule 23(b)(2) Settlement Class
meets the requirements for certification under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court, accordingly, certifies, for settlement purposes only, a
class under Rule 23(b)(2), consisting of all persons in the United
States, who installed the Facebook Messenger and Facebook Lite apps
for Android, and granted Meta permission to access their contacts.
Excluded from the Settlement Class are (i) all Persons who are
directors, officers, and agents of Meta or its subsidiaries and
affiliated companies or are designated by Meta as employees of Meta
or its subsidiaries and affiliated companies; and (ii) the Court,
the Court's immediate family, and Court staff, as well as any
appellate court to which this matter is ever assigned, and its
immediate family and staff.

Notice of the settlement is not required because the Settlement
Agreement only releases claims for injunctive and/or declaratory
relief and does not release the monetary or damages claims of the
Class, and thus the settlement expressly preserves the individual
rights of class members to pursue monetary claims against the
Defendant. Nonetheless, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, all
documents pertaining to the Settlement, preliminary approval, and
final approval (including Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees
and incentive awards and any opposition or reply papers thereto),
were posted on Class Counsel's public website.

The Order constitutes a full, final and binding resolution between
the Class Representatives' Releasing Parties, on behalf of
themselves and the Settlement Class Members, and the Released
Parties.

The Settlement Agreement and this Order will be the exclusive
remedy for any and all Released Claims of the Settlement Class
Representatives, Settlement Class Members, and Meta.

Meta will delete all Call and Text History Data uploaded from
persons in the United States though the Facebook Messenger or
Facebook Lite apps for Android devices that Meta is not otherwise
legally obligated to preserve by jurisdictions outside of the
United States within 45 days of the effective date (which will be
seven (7) days after the final settlement approval order and final
judgment have been entered and become Final).

Any data retained because of continuing legal obligations will be
quarantined in access-controlled data warehouse tables that are
segregated from any systems used or accessed in the ordinary course
of Meta's business, and access to this data is limited to Meta's
Legal team. Any such data will be preserved and used solely in
connection with any legal obligations and not for any business use,
and Meta will delete all such data within 45 days of the expiration
of any legal obligation to preserve it.

The Court's decision regarding the payment of attorneys' fees and
expenses to Class Counsel and incentive awards to the Settlement
Class Representatives is addressed in a separate order.

By this Order, the Parties are authorized to implement the terms of
the Settlement Agreement.

The Court will retain jurisdiction over any claim relating to the
Settlement Agreement (including all claims for enforcement of the
Settlement Agreement and/or all claims arising out of a breach of
the Settlement Agreement) as well as any future claims by any
Settlement Class Member relating in any way to the Released
Claims.

By operation of this Order, this Action is dismissed with
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Final Order and Judgment dated Oct.
20, 2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2p98rj57 from
Leagle.com.


GAP INC: Hennessey Appeals Suit Dismissal to 8th Circuit
--------------------------------------------------------
JILL HENNESSEY is taking an appeal from a court order dismissing
her lawsuit entitled Jill Hennessey, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. The Gap, Inc., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-01867-SEP, in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri.

The lawsuit is a putative class action brought under the laws of
the State of Missouri pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants The Gap and Old
Navy violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA) by
making false and misleading price comparisons in connection with
the advertisement and sale of their merchandise. She alleges that
she purchased numerous products at advertised discount prices at
"one or more Gap and Old Navy retail stores" in Missouri, and seeks
to represent herself and a putative class of similarly situated
Missouri purchasers who, within five years prior to the date of
filing, purchased products from the Defendants at prices that
purported to be discounts of 20% or more.

On Nov. 12, 2020, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint which
details three specific transactions and includes at least 21 items
that the Plaintiff purchased during the putative class period. The
Plaintiff alleges that she "is now informed and believes that all
of the alleged former prices were false and misleading because they
did not represent actual, bona fide prices" as required by Missouri
law. She also alleges that she "is further informed and believes
that the prevailing retail price and, therefore, the actual fair
market value of each item at the time of her purchase was
materially lower than the advertised former prices and may have
even been less than the discounted prices that she paid."

Based on the foregoing allegations, the Amended Complaint brings
two counts: Count I for unlawful practices in violation of the
MMPA; and Count II for unjust enrichment.

On Jan. 7, 2022, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, which the Court granted through an
Order entered by Sarah E. Pitlyk on Sept. 23, 2022. The Court found
that the Plaintiff failed to state MMPA and unjust enrichment
claims.

The appellate case is captioned Jill Hennessey v. The Gap, Inc., et
al., Case No. 22-3187, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, filed on October 21, 2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appendix is due on November 30, 2022;

   -- Appellant Jill Hennessey brief is due on November 30, 2022;
and

   -- Appellee brief is due 30 days from the date the court issues
the Notice of Docket Activity filing the brief of appellant. [BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant JILL HENNESSEY, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

            Christopher O. Bauman, Esq.
            Robert David Blitz, Esq.
            BLITZ & BARDGETT
            Suite 1500
            120 S. Central
            Saint Louis, MO 63105
            Telephone: (314) 863-1500

                   - and -

            Scott A. Kitner, Esq.
            KITNER & WOODWARD
            Suite 110
            13101 Preston Road
            Dallas, TX 75240
            Telephone: (214) 443-4300

                   - and -

            Daniel B. Sivils, Esq.
            121 Summer Brook Lane
            Branson, MO 65616
            Telephone: (417) 827-7202

                   - and -

            Matthew J. Zevin, Esq.
            KITNER & WOODWARD
            P.O. Box 459
            Cardiff by the Sea, CA 92007
            Telephone: (619) 235-5306

Defendants-Appellees THE GAP, INC., et al., are represented by:

            Elizabeth Brooke Herrington, Esq.
            Zachary Ryan Lazar, Esq.
            MORGAN & LEWIS
            Suite 2800
            110 N. Wacker Drive
            Chicago, IL 60606
            Telephone: (312) 324-1445

GLOBAL PRECISION: Gomez Loses Bid to Add 150 New Named Plaintiffs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge David C. Guaderrama of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Texas, El Paso Division, denies the Plaintiffs'
motion to amend their complaint to add about 150 new named
plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled ROBERT GOMEZ, ALVARO RODRIGUEZ,
ERIC BORUNDA, and DANIEL PORRAS, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs v. GLOBAL PRECISION SYSTEMS,
LLC and ASSET PROTECTION AND SECURITY SERVICES, LP, Defendants,
Case No. EP-21-CV-00269-DCG (W.D. Tex.).

The Court denies the Plaintiffs' Motion but equitably tolls the
statute of limitations for those individuals whom the Plaintiffs
seek to add as named plaintiffs. It tolls the statute of
limitations for those people from the day the Plaintiffs filed
their Motion (May 13, 2022) to the day the Court decides whether
this case can properly proceed as a collective action.

The Plaintiffs are current or former employees of Defendants Global
Precision Systems, LLC ("GPS") and Asset Protection and Security
Services, LP ("Asset"). Both GPS and Asset are government
contractors operating at the El Paso Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE") Facility. GPS supplies detention officers for
the ICE Facility; Asset supplies detention and transportation
officers.

The Plaintiffs, who are or were detention officers, allege that GPS
and Asset required them to work "off the clock" before and after
their scheduled hours. They argue that by engaging in this practice
GPS and Asset violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") --
specifically, 29 U.S.C. Section 207 -- by failing to pay
time-and-a-half for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours during a
workweek. They bring this case as a potential collective action
under the FLSA.

Judge Guaderrama notes that the Plaintiffs don't seek to determine
which employees are similarly situated and, thus, could opt into
the collective; rather, they seek to amend their complaint to add
nearly 150 individuals as new named plaintiffs. He holds that
allowing the Plaintiffs to amend to add this many named plaintiffs
would bypass the collective action procedure.

According to the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order, separation
of the named plaintiffs and potential opt-in plaintiffs at the
outset of a potential collective action tracks the FLSA's joinder
procedures. And adding nearly 150 people as new named plaintiffs
could throw the case's status as a potential collective action into
question.

The FLSA joinder mechanism also promotes efficient litigation
management, Judge Guaderrama says. As compared to tens or hundreds
(or even thousands) of independently named plaintiffs, a small
group of named plaintiffs allows parties and courts to test the
merits of a collective action in an orderly manner.

Where the Plaintiffs bring a potential collective action, Rule
15(a)(2) and Rule 20 generally give way to the joinder mechanism
rooted in the FLSA, Judge Guaderrama holds. The Court, thus, denies
the Plaintiffs' Motion to add 149 named plaintiffs to this
potential collective action.

Although the Court denies the Plaintiffs' Motion, it recognizes
that the individuals Plaintiffs want to add as named plaintiffs
have diligently pursued their claims. Judge Guaderrama says the
potential opt-in plaintiffs have exercised due diligence in
pursuing their rights and extraordinary circumstances stand in
their way of timely filing to vindicate their rights. Moreover, in
the world of Swales v. KLLM Transp. Servs., LLC, 985 F.3d 430, 434
(5th Cir. 2021), denying the Plaintiffs leave to amend, and doing
nothing more, would result in inequity for the potential opt-in
plaintiffs because, through no fault of their own, time will pass
that puts their rights in jeopardy. Equity demands that the Court
tolls the statute of limitations for the potential opt-in
plaintiffs named in the Plaintiffs' Motion.

Hence, the Court denies the Plaintiffs' "Motion for Leave to File
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint" but equitably tolls the statute of
limitations for those persons the Plaintiffs identify in their
Motion as potential opt-in plaintiffs. Their statute of limitations
is tolled from the day the Plaintiffs filed their Motion (May 13,
2022) to the day the Court decides whether this case can properly
proceed as a collective action.

The Court further orders that the parties meet and confer to draft
an agreed upon proposed scheduling order for the first phase of
this potential collective. The parties will file a joint proposed
scheduling order by Nov. 10, 2022. The parties should make every
effort to agree on deadlines, but if disagreement persists after
good faith attempts at negotiation, the parties may note their
respective positions in the joint filing.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated
Oct. 20, 2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2rk5633p from
Leagle.com.


HP INC: Court Denies Bid for Class Certification in Cepelak Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Vince Chhabria of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California denies the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification in the lawsuit titled JOHN CEPELAK, et al.,
Plaintiffs v. HP INC., Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-02450-VC (N.D.
Cal.).

The Plaintiffs seek certification of eight classes across four
states. For each state, they first define a Rule 23(b)(3) damages
classes of all buyers of any HP printer, on the theory that all HP
printers use color ink when printing what seem to be black and
white or grayscale documents. The Plaintiffs also ask for these
classes to be certified for injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2)
and alternatively request certification of issue classes under Rule
23(c)(4), with damages to be figured out later.

Second, the Plaintiffs define injunctive relief classes of all
buyers of 28 models of HP printers that stop all printing when any
ink cartridge is empty. The Plaintiffs term the first set of
classes the "underprinting" classes and the latter set the
"print-to-stop" classes, though neither label has much connection
to the conduct they complain of.

The Plaintiffs' briefing and their expert report demonstrate that
the underprinting classes do not present such a common question,
Judge Chhabria finds. There is a dizzying array of printers,
settings, and software in play, and the behavior of any given
configuration may vary based on the document being printed.

The Plaintiffs insist that the legal and factual questions are
nonetheless common. But the classwide answers to these questions
must be, at best, it depends. While a class definition need not be
perfectly drawn, Judge Chhabria holds that the Plaintiffs cannot
simply draw an all-encompassing class and say that somewhere within
it lie meritorious claims.

Even a showing that every HP printer has some different combination
of inputs that can result in the use of color ink is not enough for
class certification, because the legal questions of materiality,
duty to disclose, reliance, and damages would likely still vary for
different subsets of the class, Judge Chhabria explains.

The same goes for the Plaintiffs' purported common factual
questions, Judge Chhabria holds. The Plaintiffs consolidate a
variety of printer behaviors under the term "underprinting," and
then pose the supposedly common questions of whether the printers
underprint, whether HP was aware of and concealed that fact, and
whether the class members suffered damages. But since
"underprinting" is an umbrella term, not a single behavior, none of
those questions are amenable to classwide resolution. Judge
Chhabria says none of the underprinting classes can be certified,
then: not the (b)(3) damages classes, not the (b)(2) injunctive
relief classes, and not the (c)(4) issue classes.

Three of the four print-to-stop classes cannot be certified because
the named plaintiffs never owned a print-to-stop printer, Judge
Chhabria finds. Since those named plaintiffs are not members of the
classes at all, they are not typical members of those classes, and
the New York, Arizona, and Arkansas print-to-stop classes cannot be
certified. The Court declines the Plaintiffs' invitation to
conditionally certify the classes and swap in appropriate
plaintiffs later.

The fourth named plaintiff, John Cepelak of California, did own a
print-to-stop printer. But he suggested in his deposition that he
liked the print-to-stop feature. He said he would not want a
printer that was low on ink to keep printing if it would result in
streaky text. He also stated that he preferred not to use the
black-ink-only mode on his printer since the output was
"wishy-washy" compared to the setting that used some color ink.

If Cepelak does not want a printer to keep printing when low on
ink, and he does not ever want to use only black ink (because
either option would be of lower quality), then he does not seem to
have suffered any injury from the print-to-stop behavior, Judge
Chhabria points out. These preferences make him an atypical class
representative for this class, and certification must be denied.

A further case management conference is scheduled for Nov. 30,
2022. In their joint case management statement, Judge Chhabria says
the parties should make sure to address two questions. First,
should the denial of class certification be with prejudice? Second,
if not, should the Plaintiffs be given leave to substitute new
named plaintiffs? At first glance, it seems unfairly prejudicial to
HP to give the Plaintiffs another crack at class certification,
given how badly they have overreached in so many regards thus far,
and how much time and expense they have already put HP through as a
result.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 20, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/29xv8pj7 from Leagle.com.


HSBC BANK: Court Issues Final Order and Judgment in Chambers Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edgardo Ramos of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York issued a Final Approval Order and Judgment in
the lawsuit styled PATRICE CHAMBERS, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HSBC BANK USA, N.A.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-10436-ER Hon (S.D.N.Y.).

Judge Ramos states that the Settlement Agreement and Release,
including its exhibits, fully executed on April 1, 2022, (the
"Agreement"), and the definitions contained therein are
incorporated by reference in this Order. The terms of this Court's
Preliminary Approval Order are also incorporated by reference in
this Order.

The Settlement Class means all persons who, between Nov. 1, 2013,
and December 31, 2020, held an HSBC consumer deposit account and
were charged and not refunded one or more Retry Overdraft Fees.

All Persons, who validly excluded themselves from the Class are not
Settlement Class Members, will not be bound by this Final Approval
Order or any release provided herein. There are no persons, who
validly excluded themselves from the Settlement Class.

There are no objections to the Settlement. The Court finds that the
Settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable, and adequate to
all concerned.

The Court finds and concludes that Class Notice was disseminated to
Class Members in accordance with the terms set forth in Sections
4(C) and 6(B) of the Agreement and this Court's Preliminary
Approval Order. It finds and concludes that the Class Notice
program fully satisfies Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the requirements of due process, and constitutes the
best notice practicable under the circumstances.

The Court finds and concludes that the notice provided by HSBC Bank
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1715 fully satisfied the requirements
of that statute.

The Court finds that the Settlement's terms constitute a fair,
reasonable, and adequate settlement as to all Settlement Class
Members in accordance with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and directs its consummation pursuant to its terms and
conditions. The Plaintiff, in her role as Class Representative, and
Class Counsel adequately represented the Settlement Class for
purposes of entering into and implementing the Agreement.

Accordingly, the Agreement is finally approved in all respects, and
the Parties are directed to perform its terms. The Parties and
Settlement Class Members, who were not excluded from the Settlement
Class are bound by the terms and conditions of the Agreement.

The Court specifically approves Class Counsel's application for
attorneys' fees of $658,333.33 (representing 1/3 of the $1,975,000
Settlement Fund). The Court also approves Class Counsel's
application for reimbursement of reasonable litigation expenses in
the amount of $56,250.82. The awards of attorneys' fees and
expenses are to be paid from the Settlement Fund pursuant to and in
the manner provided by the terms of the Agreement.

The Court finds the payment of a service award to the Class
Representative in the amount of $5,000 is fair and reasonable.
Accordingly, the Class Representative is hereby awarded $5,000,
such amount to be paid from the Settlement Fund pursuant to and in
the manner provided by the terms of the Agreement.

The Settlement Class is finally certified, solely for purposes of
effectuating the Settlement and this Order and Final Judgment.

The requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) have been satisfied for
settlement purposes, for the reasons set forth herein.

The Court dismisses this Action with prejudice, without costs to
any party, except as expressly provided for in the Agreement.

The Settlement Administrator is directed to distribute the
consideration to the Settlement Class pursuant to the terms of the
Agreement.

The Court orders that this Final Approval Order and Judgment will
constitute a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court orders that, upon the Effective
Date, the Settlement will be the exclusive remedy for any and all
Released Claims of Plaintiff and each and every Settlement Class
Member. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter this Order on
the docket forthwith.

If an appeal, writ proceeding, or other challenge is filed as to
this Final Approval Order, and if thereafter the Final Approval
Order is not ultimately upheld, all orders entered, stipulations
made and releases delivered in connection herewith, or in the
Settlement or in connection therewith, will be null and void to the
extent provided by and in accordance with the Settlement.

Without further order of the Court, the Parties may agree to
reasonably necessary extensions of time to carry out any of the
provisions of the Settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Final Approval Order and Judgment
dated Oct. 20, 2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/5xa9wtzc
from Leagle.com.


I&B CAPITAL: Maryland Court Narrows Claims in Layani Investor Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland grants in part and denies in part the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the lawsuit captioned GERARD LAYANI,
et al., the Plaintiffs v. ISAAC OUAZANA, et al., the Defendants,
Case No. SAG-20-420 (D. Md.).

Plaintiffs Gerard Layani, Britt Investment Baltimore LLC, Yehuda
Ragones, RDNA Investments LLC, Kandy, LLC, Henya Karniel, Yonason
S. Keyak, Devora A. Keyak, 4802 Frankford Ave, LLC, Yosef Keyak,
Issac Krausz, and Haim Taub are individuals and their wholly-owned
entities, who invested in various real estate properties with the
Defendants. Following the Court's ruling on Feb. 1, 2022,
dismissing certain of the Plaintiffs' state law claims, the
Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Class Action Complaint for
Damages and Injunctive Relief ("SAC"). While the factual
allegations in the SAC are identical to the previous complaint, the
Plaintiffs have amended several of their state law claims in an
effort to remedy defects that led to their prior dismissal.

Defendants Isaac and Benjamin Ouazana ("the Ouazanas"), I&B Capital
Investments LLC, WAZ-Brothers, LLC ("WAZ-B"), WAZ-Investments, LLC
("WAZ-I"), and WAZ-Management, LLC ("WAZ-M") have now filed a
motion to dismiss the SAC.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have engaged in a
wide-ranging scheme to defraud scores of investors via the sale and
management of various properties in Baltimore City, in violation of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") and
Maryland state law.

The instant motion pertains to the third iteration of the
Plaintiffs' complaint. The original complaint was dismissed in full
with leave to amend, as explained in an 82-page memorandum opinion
by United States District Judge Ellen L. Hollander issued on March
3, 2021. In relevant part, Judge Hollander concluded that the Court
lacked federal question jurisdiction. Without a viable federal
claim, she declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
Plaintiffs' state law claims.

Following that dismissal, the Plaintiffs filed a First Amended
Class Action Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief ("FAC"),
which incorporated additional allegations regarding the Defendants'
alleged pattern of fraudulent real estate activity. In a memorandum
opinion issued Feb. 1, 2022, the Court granted in part and denied
in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss the FAC. With respect to
the civil RICO claims, the Court determined that the new
allegations in the FAC successfully moved the Plaintiffs' claims
into the realm of civil RICO.

The Court also declined to dismiss the class action claims for
failure to satisfy Rule 23, finding that such a ruling would be
premature prior to discovery. But the Court dismissed of several of
the Plaintiffs' state law counts, including their claims of fraud
(Count Five), constructive fraud (Count Six), breach of contract
(Counts Seven and Eight), conversion (Count Ten), and unjust
enrichment (Count Eleven).

Notwithstanding the exhaustive factual allegations in the FAC, the
Feb. 1, 2022 opinion explained that the Plaintiffs had failed to
state with particularity which facts they intended to rely upon to
support each state law claim. The Court also dismissed the
Plaintiffs' breach of partnership claim (Count Nine) with respect
to Defendant WAZ-M, because that count failed to include any
factual allegations regarding WAZ-M's role in the relevant
partnership agreement.

In recognition of the extensive and detailed facts alleged in the
FAC, the Court granted the Plaintiffs leave to amend the FAC for
the limited purpose of particularizing the state law claims. The
Plaintiffs subsequently filed their SAC, which is the subject of
the instant motion to dismiss.

The Defendants first ask the Court to revisit its prior ruling and
conclude that the Plaintiffs have failed to plead a viable RICO
claim or a certifiable class under Rule 23. The Court considered
and rejected similar arguments by the Defendants in its previous
memorandum opinion. The Defendants, nonetheless, contend that close
scrutiny of the SAC compels further evaluation and, ultimately,
dismissal of these claims. In response, the Plaintiffs assert that
the Defendants' RICO and class action arguments are precluded by
the law-of-the-case doctrine.

Ultimately, for the reasons stated in its prior opinion, the Court
continues to conclude that (1) the Plaintiffs have pled sufficient
facts to state a claim for civil RICO, and (2) it would be
premature at this stage to consider whether the Plaintiffs can
satisfy their burden of establishing the class requirements set
forth in Rule 23. Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss the RICO
and class action claims or entertain the Defendants' related
arguments to dismiss the Plaintiffs' state law claims for lack of
supplemental jurisdiction.

The Defendants next assert that certain of the Plaintiffs' claims
are time-barred, both by RICO's four-year statute of limitations,
and the three-year limitations period for claims brought under
Maryland law. The Plaintiffs do not directly confront these
arguments, but instead continue to assert that the law-of-the-case
doctrine bars their consideration. This argument misconstrues the
law-of-the-case doctrine as explained, Judge Gallagher holds.

Because the Court dismissed various of the Plaintiffs' state law
claims for lack of particularity, it did not consider whether some
of the allegedly fraudulent acts underpinning those claims may fall
outside the limitations period. Declining to consider the
Defendants' new limitations argument now would do little to promote
judicial administration or secure the speedy and just resolution of
this case, given that the Defendants could simply reassert those
arguments at subsequent stages of the litigation, Judge Gallagher
explains. Thus, the Court will exercise its discretion to consider
the Defendants' limitations arguments.

In dismissing the original complaint in this case, Judge Hollander
ruled that the RICO claims regarding the marketing and sale of 314
N. Hilton Street and 726 N. Hilton Street to the Plaintiffs Layani
and Britt (collectively "the Layani Plaintiffs") were barred by
RICO's four-year statute of limitations. The Plaintiffs do not
challenge that ruling here. However, the SAC continues to assert
the Defendants' conduct surrounding the marketing and sale of these
two properties as grounds for relief under state law Counts V, VI,
VII, X, and XI.

Because the Defendants' conduct related to the marketing and sale
of these properties is not actionable under RICO's four-year
statute of limitations, it follows that suit must also be barred by
Maryland's stricter three-year limitations period, Judge Gallagher
states. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' state law counts are dismissed
to the extent that they relate to the marketing and sale of the
North Hilton Street properties. However, for the reasons explained
by Judge Hollander, claims relating to the Defendants' allegedly
fraudulent conduct in subsequently managing those properties, which
the Plaintiffs aver they did not discover in full until October
2018, may continue to move forward.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' claims related to other
properties are also time-barred based on the facts alleged in the
SAC. The Court finds these new arguments unavailing, with two
exceptions: the Layani Plaintiffs' purchases of 3905 W. Forest Park
Avenue and 805 N. Lakewood Avenue.

Thus, Judge Gallagher holds, the same logic applied by Judge
Hollander in dismissing the Layani Plaintiffs' claims regarding the
sale of the North Hilton Street properties compels dismissal of the
RICO and state law claims stemming from the marketing and sale of
3905 W. Forest Park Avenue and 805 N. Lakewood Avenue. As with the
North Hilton Street properties, however, the Plaintiffs' claims
which stem from the Defendants' subsequent alleged fraud in
managing those properties may move forward, Judge Gallagher says.
Likewise, the Court deems premature the remainder of the
Defendants' limitations arguments, which rely on facts or
inferences that do not appear on the face of the SAC. The
Defendants may of course re-raise their limitations defenses if
they establish a factual record during discovery to support their
assertions.

With respect to the Plaintiffs' state law claims, Judge Gallagher
dismisses some and retains some of the claims:

   1. Fraud (Count Five) and Constructive Fraud (Count Six).
      The Court says inquiry on this claim is better suited to
      later stages of the litigation once a fuller record has
      been established;

   2. Breach of Contract (Counts Seven and Eight). The Court will
      not dismiss the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims,
      except insofar as they rely on the limitations-barred
      actions relating to the sale of certain properties to the
      Layani Plaintiffs;

   3. Breach of Partnership Agreement (Count Nine). The Court
      will dismiss the Plaintiffs' claim for breach of the
      Aug. 29, 2017 agreement as it relates to WAZ-M;

   4. Conversion (Count Ten). The Court will not dismiss
      Count Ten, except as it relates to the time-barred claims;
      and

   5. Unjust Enrichment (Count Eleven). The Court will not
      dismiss this claim, which has been sufficiently
      particularized in the SAC.

For the reasons described, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
SAC will be granted in part and denied in part. The Plaintiffs'
RICO and state law claims are dismissed to the extent that they are
based on the marketing and sale to the Layani the Plaintiffs of the
following properties: 314 N. Hilton Street, 726 N. Hilton Street,
3905 W. Forest Park Avenue, and 805 N. Lakewood Avenue. In
addition, Count Nine is dismissed insofar as it purports to state a
claim against WAZ-M. The remainder of the motion to dismiss is
denied. A separate order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated Oct. 20,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/jd2pm5ab from
Leagle.com.


KNAUF GIPS: Ersham & Macomber Testimonies Excluded From Karpel Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEVIN KARPEL, Plaintiff v. KNAUF GIPS KG, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 21-24168-CIV-SCOLA/GOODMAN (S.D. Fla.),
Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, grants the
Defendants' motion to exclude or limit the testimony of two of the
Plaintiffs' experts, Howard Ersham and Shawn Macomber.

Mr. Karpel, a south Florida homeowner, along with other Plaintiffs
in the Related Cases, filed suit against Kanuf Gips KG and Knauf
New Building System (Tianjin) (collectively, "Knauf"), asserting
the following claims: negligence (Count I), negligence per se
(Count II), strict liability (Count III), breach of express and/or
implied warranty (Count IV), private nuisance (Count V), negligent
discharge of a corrosive substance (Count VI), unjust enrichment
(Count VII), and violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA") (Count VIII).

Following the District Court's Orders on Defendants' summary
judgment motion, only the following counts remain: negligence
(Count I), strict liability (Count III), breach of express and/or
implied warranty (Count IV),2 and unjust enrichment (Count VII).

On June 15, 2009, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation established MDL No. 2047 in the Eastern District of
Louisiana -- In re: Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prod. Liab.
Litig., 626 F.Supp.2d 1346 (U.S. Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 2009). The
cases centralized under section 1407 all "shared factual questions
concerning drywall manufactured in China, imported to and
distributed in the United States, and used in the construction of
houses; plaintiffs in all actions allege that the drywall emits
smelly, corrosive gases." The Related Cases concern the same type
of core factual allegations.

The Defendants are foreign manufacturers accused of constructing
defective drywalls that have been installed in homes across the
country. The Plaintiffs in the Related Cases own such homes.

The Plaintiffs listed two experts in support of their claims. The
first, Ehrsam, the President of Chinese Drywall Screening, LLC,
offers opinions concerning the corrosiveness of Knauf-Tianjin (KPT)
drywall. The second, Macomber, a defective drywall consultant and
remediator, inspected the properties for the presence of certain
types of drywall and opines on the cost of a full remediation of
the home.

The Defendants challenge the reliability and helpfulness of both
experts' opinions. They filed a Daubert motion, which seeks to
exclude or limit their testimony.

District Court Judge Robert N. Scola referred the motion to Judge
Goodman.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have made two omissions
in their recitation of the Daubert standard. They say that these
omissions concern important qualifiers to the Daubert framework.
First, they find it necessary to note that Daubert was decided in
the context of toxic tort litigation. The second omission that the
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants made is that although Daubert
also applies in bench trials, the concern that the fact-finder will
be misled there carries little weight.

Judge Goodman finds that neither of these purported omissions will
impact the analysis of the Defendants' contention that Ehrsam and
Macomber's opinions are unreliable and unhelpful.

Regarding Ehrsam, he holds that Plaintiffs have fallen well short
of their burden on the requirements other than qualifications. They
offer no explanation or law supporting their contention that
Ehrsam's opinions are relevant to the appropriate damages to award.
Ehrsam cannot attach any degree of certainty to a finding that any
uppercase KPT drywall impacted the Plaintiffs' properties. He
admits that inspection is the only way to determine whether an item
has been impacted by drywall-related corrosion. There is a
reasonable fear that a jury may be overly influenced by Ehrsam's
qualifications, which the Plaintiffs' tout proudly in their
response. For these reasons, the Defendants' request to exclude
Ehrsam's expert testimony is granted.

Judge Goodman also grants the Defendants' request to exclude
Macomber's testimony. He holds that Macomber's opinion is
irrelevant because he seeks to opine only on damages which the
Plaintiffs may not recover under the economic loss rule. The
Plaintiffs have offered no specific argument or explanation for
which parts of Macomber's opinions, if any, fall outside the
proscriptions of the economic loss rule.

Moreover, Macomber's opinions are built on an inadequate factual
foundation and there is real fear that a jury could be misled by
his unreliable testimony making his testimony unreliable. Finally,
as with yhe Defendants' other argument concerning the RS Means
method, this issue is better left for cross examination. If
Macomber were being permitted to present his opinion (which he is
not), then this issue would not serve as an independent ground to
strike his testimony.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Goodman grants the Defendants'
Daubert Motion and excludes for trial purposes both Ehrsam's and
Macomber's opinions as irrelevant and unreliable.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 2, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2hjmp4nd from Leagle.com.


LAWGIX LAWYERS: Attorneys in Currier Suit Awarded $12K in Fees
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled SANDRA CURRIER, Plaintiff v. LAWGIX LAWYERS,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-419-pp (E.D. Wis.), Chief District
Judge Pamela Pepper of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin grants the Plaintiff's request for attorneys'
fees and awards her $12,067.50.

On Aug. 12, 2022, the Court granted the Plaintiff's motion to
remand the case to state court, concluding that the Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. The Court also granted the Plaintiff's
28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c) motion for an award of costs and fees
incurred as a result of the Defendant's improper removal.

The Court gave the Plaintiff a deadline by which to file an
accounting of the costs and attorneys' fees incurred as a result of
the removal. On Aug. 26, 2022, Shpetim Ademi, managing partner of
the Plaintiff's counsel's firm, filed an affidavit in support of an
award for attorneys' fees along with a chart listing the attorneys,
who worked on the motion to remand, their respective hourly rates
and the total time each attorney worked on the motion.

The Defendant objected, requesting that the Court reject or, in its
discretion, reduce the amount of fees sought by the Plaintiff.
Ademi then filed a supplemental affidavit in support of the award
of attorneys' fees to provide additional support for the fee
request, including descriptions of tasks, amounts of time worked
and billing rates.

On Sept. 16, 2022, the Court ordered that if the Defendant wished
to do so, it must file an objection to the supplemental affidavit
no later than Sept. 23, 2022. The Defendant did not file an
objection.

The Court found in its Aug. 12, 2022 order of remand that it was
objectively unreasonable for the Defendant to remove this case to
the federal court. It concludes that the tasks depicted in the
supplemental affidavit all relate to the improper removal and
motion to remand.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 20, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ms6r7mnc from Leagle.com.


MARKEN LLP: Faces Beria Suit Over Failure to Pay Timely Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
DELMARYS BERIA, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. MARKEN LLP, Defendant, Case No.
1:22-cv-06415 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 21, 2022) is a class action brought
pursuant to New York Labor Law to recover damages for delinquent
wage payments made to workers who qualify as manual laborers and
who were employed at any time by Defendant in the state of New
York.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has compensated all its
employees on a bi-weekly (every other week) basis, regardless of
whether said employees qualified as manual laborers under the NYLL.
The Defendant allegedly failed to pay timely wages, failed to
provide compliant wage statements, and failed to provide notice
upon hiring, says the suit.

The Plaintiff has been employed by the Defendant as a warehouse
worker since approximately July 2021 at its Queens warehouse.   

Marken LLP provides logistics services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brett R. Cohen, Esq.
          Jeffrey K. Brown, Esq.
          Michael A. Tompkins, Esq.
          LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
          One Old Country Road, Suite 347
          Carle Place, NY 11514
          Telephone: (516) 873-9550

MASSACHUSETTS: Bid for Discovery From Absent Class Members Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled LEONARD BRIGGS, GEORGE SKINDER, LOUIS
MARKHAM, FRANCIS McGOWAN, ERIC ROLDAN, ROLANDO S. JIMENEZ, and
JENNIFER WARD, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 15-40162-GAO (D. Mass.), Judge George A.
O'Toole, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts denies the Massachusetts Department of Correction's
Motion to Take Discovery from Absent Class Members.

The other Defendants are CAROL A. MICI, Commissioner of the
Massachusetts Department of Correction; JENNIFER GAFFNEY, Deputy
Commissioner of Classification, Programs, and Reentry Division;
SUZANNE THIBAULT, Superintendent of MCI-Shirley; STEVEN SILVA,
Superintendent of MCI-Norfolk; LISA MITCHELL, Superintendent of the
Massachusetts Treatment Center; KYLE PELLETIER, Acting
Superintendent of MCI-Framingham; and MASSACHUSETTS PARTNERSHIP FOR
CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE, LLC.

Defendant Massachusetts Department of Correction ("DOC") seeks
leave to conduct further discovery from members of the class, who
are not named plaintiffs (the "absent class members") concerning
the Plaintiffs' remaining claim that the "DOC facilities lack
effective visual systems for notifying deaf and hard of hearing
prisoners of emergency alarms and announcements, which also places
them at risk of serious physical injury and other harms."

After the denial of the DOC's motion for summary judgment, the
parties jointly requested that the Court allow a brief period of
supplemental discovery concerning the DOC's emergency notification
systems. On Nov. 10, 2021, the Court granted the parties' request,
permitting an additional 75 days to conduct such discovery. The
DOC, thereafter, filed the present motion, seeking leave to
propound to class members, who are not named parties to the action,
some further interrogatories and a request for production of
documents.

The DOC's proposed discovery requests implicate more than 500
absent class members, including individuals, who may require an
interpreter or other auxiliary aids or services to respond to the
requests. It is evident that the issuance of the requested
interrogatories and request for production of documents on all
absent class members would be unduly burdensome for both the
individuals and for class counsel, Judge O'Toole notes.

Furthermore, the DOC has not identified any such class member whose
knowledge about classwide issues is superior to that of the named
plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Massachusetts Department of
Correction's Motion to Take Discovery from Absent Class Members is
denied.

The Plaintiff Class Member's Verified Motion for (1) Consequential
Relief, or (2) Defendant's Contempt of Settlement Agreement, by
Either Discrimination for Disability, or Retaliation for Federal
Causation is also denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 20, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc5uvann from Leagle.com.


MDL 2873: AFFF Exposure Led to Death, Flavin Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------
MARY ANN FLAVIN, as personal representative/administrator/ executor
of the Estate of DENNIS FLAVIN, deceased, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY
(f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS
AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA USS. INC.; ARKEMA,
INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION;
CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.;
CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA,
INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a
DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND
COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL
COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE
PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED
TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION,
INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No.
2:22-cv-03650-RMG (D.S.C., Oct. 21, 2022) is a class action brought
by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated individuals seeking
damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals
collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).

According to the complaint, the Defendants have failed to use
reasonable, ordinary and appropriate care in the design,
manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling,
marketing, and distribution of AFFF products containing synthetic,
toxic PFAS. The Defendants' AFFF products are dangerous to human
health because PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals and
can accumulate in the blood and body of exposed individuals. The
Defendants have also failed to warn public entities and firefighter
trainees who they knew would foreseeably come into contact with
their AFFF products. The Plaintiff used the Defendants'
PFAS-containing AFFF products in their intended manner, without
significant change in the products' condition due to inadequate
warning about the products' danger, says the suit.

Plaintiff Mary Ann Flavin is an adult resident of the State of
Arizona. She is the proposed personal
representative/administrator/executor of the Estate of Dennis
Flavin. Decedent Flavin regularly used, and was thereby directly
exposed to, AFFF in training and to extinguish fires during his
working career as a military and/or civilian firefighter. Prior to
death, Decedent was diagnosed with prostate cancer, lung cancer,
and esophageal cancer as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF
products. The Decedent's diagnosis caused and/or contributed to his
death, the suit alleges.

The Flavin case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul,
Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue
          South Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

MDL 2873: Fernandez Suit Alleges PFAS Exposure Caused Cancer
------------------------------------------------------------
STAN FERNANDEZ, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA USS. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-03657-RMG
(D.S.C., Oct. 21, 2022) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff
and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for
personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming
foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as
per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).

According to the complaint, the Defendants have failed to exercise
reasonable, ordinary and appropriate care in the design,
manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling,
marketing, and distribution of AFFF products containing synthetic,
toxic PFAS. The Defendants' AFFF products are dangerous to human
health because PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals and
can accumulate in the blood and body of exposed individuals. The
Defendants have also failed to warn public entities and firefighter
trainees who they knew would foreseeably come into contact with
their AFFF products. The Plaintiff used the Defendants'
PFAS-containing AFFF products in their intended purpose, without
significant change in the products' condition due to inadequate
warning about the products' danger. He relied on the Defendants'
instructions as to the proper handling of the products, says the
suit.

As a result of Defendants' conduct and the resulting contamination,
the Plaintiff was diagnosed with prostate cancer by exposure to
AFFF containing PFAS, the suit alleges.

The Fernandez case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul,
Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
          Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
          GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          270 West Main Street
          Sayville, NY 11782
          Telephone: (631) 600-0000
          Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

               - and -

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue
          South Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

MDL 2873: Hepplewhite Files PI Suit Over PFAS Exposure
------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT HEPPLEWHITE, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining
and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA USS. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-03655-RMG
(D.S.C., Oct. 21, 2022) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff
and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for
personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming
foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as
per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).

According to the complaint, the Defendants have failed to exercise
reasonable, ordinary and appropriate care in the design,
manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling,
marketing, and distribution of AFFF products containing synthetic,
toxic PFAS. The Defendants' AFFF products are dangerous to human
health because PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals and
can accumulate in the blood and body of exposed individuals. The
Defendants have also failed to warn public entities and firefighter
trainees who they knew would foreseeably come into contact with
their AFFF products. The Plaintiff used the Defendants'
PFAS-containing AFFF products in their intended purpose, without
significant change in the products' condition due to inadequate
warning about the products' danger. He relied on the Defendants'
instructions as to the proper handling of the products, says the
suit.

As a result of Defendants' conduct and the resulting contamination,
Mr. Hepplewhite was diagnosed with prostate cancer by exposure to
AFFF containing PFAS, the suit alleges.

The Hepplewhite case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul,
Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
          Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
          GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          270 West Main Street
          Sayville, NY 11782
          Telephone: (631) 600-0000
          Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

               - and -

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue
          South Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

MDL 2873: Hollingsworth Files Suit Over PFAS Exposure
-----------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM HOLLINGSWORTH, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota
Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.;
AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA USS. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-03660-RMG
(D.S.C., Oct. 21, 2022) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff
and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for
personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming
foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as
per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).

According to the complaint, the Defendants have failed to exercise
reasonable, ordinary and appropriate care in the design,
manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling,
marketing, and distribution of AFFF products containing synthetic,
toxic PFAS. The Defendants' AFFF products are dangerous to human
health because PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals and
can accumulate in the blood and body of exposed individuals. The
Defendants have also failed to warn public entities and firefighter
trainees who they knew would foreseeably come into contact with
their AFFF products. The Plaintiff used the Defendants'
PFAS-containing AFFF products in their intended purpose, without
significant change in the products' condition due to inadequate
warning about the products' danger. He relied on the Defendants'
instructions as to the proper handling of the products, says the
suit.

As a result of Defendants' conduct and the resulting contamination,
Mr. Hollingsworth was diagnosed with kidney cancer by exposure to
AFFF containing PFAS, the suit alleges.

The Hollingsworth case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In
Re: Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The
case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul,
Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
          Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
          GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          270 West Main Street
          Sayville, NY 11782
          Telephone: (631) 600-0000
          Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

               - and -

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue
          South Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

MDL 2873: Oitker Files Personal Injury Suit Over PFAS Exposure
--------------------------------------------------------------
BRUCE OITKER, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA USS. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-03656-RMG
(D.S.C., Oct. 21, 2022) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff
and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for
personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming
foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as
per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).

According to the complaint, the Defendants have failed to exercise
reasonable, ordinary and appropriate care in the design,
manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling,
marketing, and distribution of AFFF products containing synthetic,
toxic PFAS. The Defendants' AFFF products are dangerous to human
health because PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals and
can accumulate in the blood and body of exposed individuals. The
Defendants have also failed to warn public entities and firefighter
trainees who they knew would foreseeably come into contact with
their AFFF products. The Plaintiff used the Defendants'
PFAS-containing AFFF products in their intended purpose, without
significant change in the products' condition due to inadequate
warning about the products' danger. He relied on the Defendants'
instructions as to the proper handling of the products, says the
suit.

As a result of Defendants' conduct and the resulting contamination,
Plaintiff was diagnosed with prostate cancer by exposure to AFFF
containing PFAS, the suit alleges.

The Oitker case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul,
Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
          Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
          GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          270 West Main Street
          Sayville, NY 11782
          Telephone: (631) 600-0000
          Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

               - and -

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue
          South Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

MDL 2873: PFAS Exposure Caused Cancer, Stephan Says
---------------------------------------------------
PATRICK STEPHAN, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining
and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA USS. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-03658-RMG
(D.S.C., Oct. 21, 2022) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff
and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for
personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming
foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as
per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).

According to the complaint, the Defendants have failed to exercise
reasonable, ordinary and appropriate care in the design,
manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling,
marketing, and distribution of AFFF products containing synthetic,
toxic PFAS. The Defendants' AFFF products are dangerous to human
health because PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals and
can accumulate in the blood and body of exposed individuals. The
Defendants have also failed to warn public entities and firefighter
trainees who they knew would foreseeably come into contact with
their AFFF products. The Plaintiff used the Defendants'
PFAS-containing AFFF products in their intended purpose, without
significant change in the products' condition due to inadequate
warning about the products' danger. He relied on the Defendants'
instructions as to the proper handling of the products, says the
suit.

As a result of Defendants' conduct and the resulting contamination,
Mr. Stephan was diagnosed with prostate cancer by exposure to AFFF
containing PFAS, the suit alleges.

The Stephan case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul,
Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
          Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
          GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          270 West Main Street
          Sayville, NY 11782
          Telephone: (631) 600-0000
          Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

               - and -

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue
          South Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

MDL 2873: Steele Sues Over Illness From PFAS Exposure
-----------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL STEELE, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA USS. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE
EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS,
INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC;
CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER
CHEMICALS, INC; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.);
DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY;
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY;
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP,
as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.), Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-03659-RMG
(D.S.C., Oct. 21, 2022) is a class action brought by the Plaintiff
and those similarly situated individuals seeking damages for
personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming
foams (AFFF) containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as
per and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).

According to the complaint, the Defendants have failed to exercise
reasonable, ordinary and appropriate care in the design,
manufacture, labeling, warning, instruction, training, selling,
marketing, and distribution of AFFF products containing synthetic,
toxic PFAS. The Defendants' AFFF products are dangerous to human
health because PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals and
can accumulate in the blood and body of exposed individuals. The
Defendants have also failed to warn public entities and firefighter
trainees who they knew would foreseeably come into contact with
their AFFF products. The Plaintiff used the Defendants'
PFAS-containing AFFF products in their intended purpose, without
significant change in the products' condition due to inadequate
warning about the products' danger. He relied on the Defendants'
instructions as to the proper handling of the products, says the
suit.

As a result of Defendants' conduct and the resulting contamination,
Mr. Steele was diagnosed with leukemia by exposure to AFFF
containing PFAS, the suit alleges.

The Steele case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.

3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., is a
multinational conglomerate corporation and designer, marketer,
developer, manufacturer, distributor of firefighting equipment,
including those with AFFF. It is located at 3M Center, St. Paul,
Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Zgoda, Jr., Esq.
          Steven D. Gacovino, Esq.
          GACOVINO, LAKE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          270 West Main Street
          Sayville, NY 11782
          Telephone: (631) 600-0000
          Facsimile: (631) 543-5450

               - and -

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue
          South Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 328-9200
          Facsimile: (205) 328-9456

MGM RESORTS: Court Narrows Claims in Smallman Data Breach Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SMALLMAN, et al., Plaintiffs v. MGM Resorts
International, Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-00376-GMN-EJY (D. Nev.),
Judge Gloria M. Navarro of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Nevada grants in part and denies in part MGM's Motion to
Dismiss.

The case arises from a July 7, 2019, data breach of MGM's network
in which hackers download the personally identifiable information
("PII") of MGM guests worldwide. The Plaintiffs are a consolidated
class action of consumers whose PII was stolen in the Data Breach.

The Plaintiffs allege that the stolen PII has been posted on the
dark web for purchase on at least three separate occasions. They
posit that they now face a long-term heightened risk that their PII
will be sold or disseminated on the dark web.

MGM has not disclosed how the hackers were able to obtain consumers
PII. Despite the Data Breach occurring on July 7, 2019, it did not
notify affected consumers until nearly two months later, on Sept.
7, 2019. The Plaintiffs allege that MGM's delayed response
exacerbated their risk of harm.

The Plaintiffs contend that MGM failed to implement reasonable data
security measures to protect their PII, maintain and monitor its
server against intrusions, and retained their PII for longer than
necessary. Additionally, they allege that MGM failed to encrypt the
PII stored on its server. Furthermore, they allege that MGM failed
to adopt reasonable safety measures despite knowing that the hotel
industry is frequently targeted by cyber security attacks.

On April 4, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed the present Consolidated
Class Action Complaint asserting claims for: (1) negligence; (2)
negligent misrepresentation; (3) breach of implied contract; (4)
unjust enrichment; (5) violation of the Nevada Consumer Fraud Act,
NRS Section 41.600; (6) violation of the California Unfair
Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 17200, et seq.;
(7) violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal.
Civ. Code Sections 1750, et seq.; (8) violation of the California
Customer Records Act, Cal. Civ. Code Sections 1798.80, et seq.; (9)
violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen.
Stat. Section 42-110a, et seq.; (10) violation of the Georgia
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ga. Code. Ann. Sections 10-1-370, et
seq.; (11) violation of New York General Business Law, N.Y. Gen.
Bus. Law Section 349; (12) violation of the Ohio Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, Ohio Rev. Code Sections 4165.01, et seq.; (13)
violation of the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act, Or. Stat.
Sections 646.605, et seq.; and (14) violation of the Oregon
Consumer Information Protection Act, Or. Stat. Sections 646A.600,
et seq.

On June 1, 2021, MGM filed the present Motion to Dismiss seeking
dismissal of all of the Plaintiffs' common law and statutory
claims.

Judge Navarro finds that (i) the economic loss doctrine does not
bar the Plaintiffs' negligence claim because they allege both
economic and non-economic harms; (ii) the Plaintiffs have
sufficiently alleged that the Defendants breached the duty of care
owed to them; and (iii) the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged
benefit of the bargain damages and that purchasing prophylactic
measures was necessary to mitigate any future risk of harm.
Accordingly, Judge Navarro dismisses the Plaintiffs' negligence
claim to the extent it alleges damages based solely on lost time.
The negligence claims of those Plaintiffs who purchased identity
protection services may proceed.

Next, Judge Navarro finds that in the absence of a special
relationship, the Plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation to the
extent it is based on an omission, fails as a matter of law.
Accordingly, she dismisses their negligent misrepresentation claim
with prejudice.

In addition, Judge Navarro finds that the Plaintiffs have
adequately alleged damages as a result of MGM's breach.
Specifically, they allege that they "were required to" provide
their PII to MGM as a condition of staying at its hotels. Thus,
they provided their PII to Defendant MGM for lodging, with the
understanding that MGM, while it held the information, would take
adequate measures to protect it. Accordingly, they have adequately
pled their implied contract claims.

However, Judge Navarro is unable to conclude that the Plaintiffs'
alleged injuries cannot be remedied by money damages when that is
the precise remedy requested. The Plaintiffs have not alleged, even
in the alternative, that they do not have adequate legal remedies.
Therefore, their unjust enrichment claims are dismissed, with leave
to amend.

Because the Plaintiffs have adequately pled violations of NRS
Sections 41.600 and 598.0923(b)(1), Judge Navarro declines to
dismiss the Plaintiffs NCFA claims. She holds that the Plaintiffs
sufficiently allege that MGM's failure to disclose its data
security deficiency or vulnerability to them constitutes a
"knowing" omission.

Judge Navarro also finds that the California Plaintiffs have
sufficiently alleged a loss of money or property as a result of the
UCL violation. They have also adequately pled a duty to disclose
based upon the Defendant's exclusive knowledge of the alleged
inadequacy of its security measures. Accordingly, the California
Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled "unlawful" conduct in violation
of the UCL.

And because she has already considered the adequacy of the
California Plaintiffs' fraudulent omission UCL claim, Judge Navarro
declines to dismiss the Plaintiffs' fraudulent omission California
Consumers Legal Remedies Act claim for the same reasons. She also
declines to dismiss the California Plaintiffs' California Customer
Records Act ("CRA") claim, finding that they adequately alleged
that MGM failed to maintain reasonable cybersecurity practices as
required by the CRA.

Judge Navarro further declines to dismiss Connecticut Plaintiff
Robert Taylor's Connecticut's Unfair Trade Practices Act's claim.
She holds that he sufficiently alleged that MGM knew or should have
known about its allegedly inadequate data security practices and
the risk of a data breach. Georgia Plaintiff Michael Fossett's has
also plausibly alleged the inadequacy of remedies at law with
respect to their claims for injunctive relief as well. Accordingly,
Judge Navarro declines to dismiss his GUDTPA claim.
New York Plaintiff Kerri Shapiro has adequately pled that the
alleged deception took place in New York, that MGM misrepresented
her security and privacy measures, and that she suffered an injury
as result of this deception. Therefore, Judge Navarro declines to
dismiss her GBL claim. She also sides with the majority of courts
that have found that consumers do not have standing under the Ohio
Trade Practices Act. ("ODTPA"), as the OCSPA would be rendered
superfluous if consumers could sue under ODTPA. Accordingly, she
dismisses Julie Mutsko's ODTPA claim with prejudice. She also
dismisses John Dvorak's Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act claim
with prejudice to the extent it is based on a violation of the
Oregon's Consumer Information Act. She says the statute does not
expressly provide a private remedy for a statutory violation, and
she eclines to find one.

Finally, Judge Navarro finds that Oregon's Consumer Information Act
("OCIPA") does not provide the Oregon Plaintiff with a private
cause of action. Accordingly, she dismisses his OCIPA claim with
prejudice.

In sum, Judge Navarro holds that the Plaintiffs' negligence claim
to the extent it alleges damages based solely on lost time,
negligent misrepresentation, ODPTA, and OCIPA claims cannot be
cured by the inclusion of other facts. Accordingly, she dismisses
these claims without leave to amend. The Plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment is dismissed with leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 2, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3w77zxu7 from Leagle.com.


MINDBODY INC: Court Issues Final Order/Judgment in Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Valerie Caproni of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York issued a Final Order and Judgment in the
lawsuit captioned IN RE MINDBODY, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case
No. 1:19-cv-08331-VEC (S.D.N.Y.).

As of March 3, 2022, Walleye Trading LLC and Walleye Opportunities
Master Fund Ltd. ("Co-Lead Plaintiffs"), on behalf of themselves
and all other members of the Settlement Class, on the one hand, and
MINDBODY, Inc., Richard L. Stollmeyer, Brett White, and Eric Liaw
(collectively, "Defendants"), on the other, entered into a
Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement (the "Stipulation") in the
litigation (the "Action").

Pursuant to the Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement, Approving Form and Manner of Notice, and Setting Date
for Hearing on Final Approval of Settlement, entered June 6, 2022,
the Court scheduled a hearing for Oct. 27, 2022, at 2:30 p.m. to,
among other things: (i) determine whether the proposed Settlement
of the Action on the terms and conditions provided for in the
Stipulation is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and should be
approved by the Court; (ii) determine whether a judgment as
provided for in the Stipulation should be entered; and (iii) rule
on Lead Counsel's Fee and Expense Application.

The Court ordered that the Notice of Pendency of Class Action,
Proposed Settlement, and Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses
and a Proof of Claim and Release form be mailed 10 business days
after the date of entry of the Preliminary Approval Order to all
potential Settlement Class Members, and that the Summary Notice of
Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlement, and Motion for
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses be published in The Wall Street
Journal and transmitted over PR Newswire within fourteen (14)
calendar days of the Notice Date.

On Oct. 4, 2022, Co-Lead Plaintiffs moved for final approval of the
Settlement, as set forth in the Preliminary Approval Order. The
Settlement Hearing was duly held before the Court on Oct. 27, 2022,
at which time all interested Persons were afforded the opportunity
to be heard.

This Judgment incorporates and makes a part hereof: (i) the
Stipulation filed with the Court on March 3, 2022; and (ii) the
Notice, which was filed with the Court on Oct. 4, 2022.

The Court affirms its determinations in the Preliminary Approval
Order and finally certifies, for purposes of the Settlement only,
pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Settlement Class of: all persons and entities who or
which sold shares of the publicly traded Class A common stock of
Mindbody during the period from Nov. 6, 2018, through Feb. 15,
2019, inclusive, and were allegedly damaged thereby.

No Persons have validly sought exclusion from the Settlement
Class.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for
purposes of the Settlement only, the Court re-affirms its
determinations in the Preliminary Approval Order and finally
certifies Walleye Trading LLC and Walleye Opportunities Master Fund
Ltd. as Class Representatives for the Settlement Class; and finally
appoints the law firm of Labaton Sucharow LLP as Class Counsel for
the Settlement Class.

There have been no objections to the Settlement.

Pursuant to Rule 23(e)(2), the Court approves the Settlement.

The Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the
Federal Securities Laws (the "SAC"), filed on Aug. 18, 2021, is
dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice, and without costs to any
Party, except as otherwise provided in the Stipulation.

In the event that the Settlement does not become effective in
accordance with the terms of the Stipulation, then this Judgment
will be rendered null and void to the extent provided by and in
accordance with the Stipulation and will be vacated.

Without further order of the Court, the Parties may agree to
reasonable extensions of time to carry out any of the provisions of
the Stipulation.

The Parties are directed to consummate the Stipulation and to
perform its terms.

A full-text copy of the Court's Final Order and Judgment dated Oct.
20, 2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4xrnhdpp from
Leagle.com.


MONSANTO CO: Oral Argument in Seattle Suit Set for November 16
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned CITY OF SEATTLE, Plaintiff v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Case No. C16-107-RAJ-MLP (W.D. Wash.),
Magistrate Judge Michelle L. Peterson of the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Washington, Seattle, sets an oral
argument for Nov. 16, 2022, at 1:00 p.m., on the parties' pending
motions.

The matter comes before the Court on the Honorable Richard A.
Jones's reference of: (1) two issues raised in Defendants Monsanto
Company, Solutia Inc., and Pharmacia Corporation's Motion for
Summary Judgment; and (2) Plaintiff City of Seattle's Motion to
Strike Defendants' Amendments to Their Affirmative Defenses 10, 15,
18, 21, and 82.

Oral argument is set for Nov. 16, 2022, at 1:00 p.m., on both the
Defendants' Motion and the Plaintiff's Motion. The parties are each
authorized to submit 20-pages of supplemental briefing, by close of
business on Nov. 10, 2022, on the issues identified in Judge Jones'
reference of the Defendants' Motion, and as raised in the
Plaintiff's Motion, with specific consideration of:

   (a) the effect of the State of Washington's June 2020
       settlement agreement with Defendants in light of the
       Honorable Robert S. Lasnik's prior ruling that Plaintiff's
       public nuisance claim was brought for the benefit of the
       State--based on authority delegated from the State's
       duty to hold all navigable waters within the state in
       trust for the public- and determination that Plaintiff's
       efforts to remediate its waterways of pollution is an act
       for the public good undertaken in its sovereign capacity;

   (b) whether this Court can revisit Judge Lasnik's prior
       rulings or if this Court is bound to those determinations
       in light of law of the case doctrine and the previously
       addressed statute of limitations issue concerning
       the Plaintiff's public nuisance claim;

   (c) under Washington law, whether a municipality functions as
       an agency of the State, and whether the State's settlement
       agreement otherwise contemplated the release of claims by
       all of the State's municipalities as agencies of the
       State;

   (d) the distinction between the City of Seattle's public
       nuisance action against Defendants and the named
       class-action plaintiffs City of Tacoma and City of Spokane
       in the Defendants' pending class-action settlement
       agreement, in regard to whether the State's settlement
       agreement would otherwise release the City of Tacoma and
       City of Spokane's claims absent the pending class-action
       settlement;

   (e) the effect of the State's settlement agreement on all of
       the Washington municipalities identified as initial
       settlement class members in the Defendants' pending
       class-action settlement agreement and whether the State's
       settlement agreement would also release those
       municipalities' claims absent the pending class-action
       settlement; and

   (f) whether the acquiescence exception, and/or waiver, applies
       to the Defendants' res judicata defense given the
       Defendants' litigation of the City of Seattle and the
       State of Washington's claims in dual proceedings and
       separate forums.

Based on Judge Jones's reference of the issues contained in the
Defendants' Motion, and reference of the Plaintiff's Motion, the
Clerk is directed to re-note the parties' pending Daubert Motions
and Motions to Strike for the Court's consideration on Nov. 25,
2022.

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order to the parties
and to Judge Jones.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 20, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/a94skncc from Leagle.com.


PAYCHEX NORTH: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Callahan Suit Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Charles R. Breyer of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California grants the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration in the lawsuit titled STANLEY CALLAHAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs v. PAYCHEX NORTH AMERICA INC., Defendant, Case No.
21-cv-05670-CRB (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs Stanley Callahan and Faisal Gailani, who worked as Sales
Representatives at Defendant Paychex North America, Inc. (PNA) from
2019 to 2020, allege that PNA violated various provisions of the
California Labor Code. They claim that PNA misclassified them as
outside sales representatives, failed to issue accurate itemized
statements, failed to pay overtime, and failed to reimburse for
business expenses. The Plaintiffs bring this claim under
California's Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) on behalf of
themselves and other individuals currently and formerly employed by
PNA as Sales Representatives or in a similar capacity.

PNA moves to compel arbitration in accordance with an arbitration
agreement signed by the Plaintiffs while employed at PNA. PNA moves
to compel arbitration of the individual PAGA claims and dismiss the
representative claims. Callahan and Gailani entered into
arbitration agreements with PNA on June 3, 2020, and Dec. 19, 2019,
respectively. The arbitration agreements were contained in PNA's
HRS Sales Representative Plan Agreement and Sales Representative
Level II Incentive Plan Agreement (together, the "Incentive Plans")
that were sent to Callahan and Gailani via email.

The agreement requires the Plaintiffs to resolve "any dispute"
between them and PNA by binding arbitration, "including, but not
limited to, a dispute arising out of or relating to their
employment."

The Plaintiffs argue that they did not agree to arbitrate the
claims at issue in this action, because they allege a violation of
California Labor Code Sections 925 and 432.5 from the inclusion of
forum selection and choice of law provisions in PNA's
Confidentiality Non-Solicitation and Non-Compete Agreement (the
"CNN"). They argue that because Paragraph 12(b) of the arbitration
agreement excludes "[d]isputes related to violation of the
confidentiality, non-solicitation and non-compete provisions," that
the parties did not agree to arbitrate the Plaintiffs' claims in
this action.

This argument clearly fails, Judge Breyer holds. The Plaintiffs
bring claims that specific provisions contained in the CNN are
unlawful; they do not dispute any violation of those provisions. As
a result, those claims are not excluded and the parties agreed to
arbitrate the claims at issue here, Judge Breyer points out.

The Plaintiffs further argue that the Supreme Court's most recent
decision regarding preemption of arbitral waivers of PAGA actions,
Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 142 S.Ct. 1906 (2022),
requires the Court to find that the PAGA waiver in this agreement
is invalid. This argument also fails, Judge Breyer holds.

The Plaintiffs and PNA entered into valid, binding arbitration
agreements that require the Plaintiffs to arbitrate all individual
claims, Judge Breyer holds. The clear intent of Paragraph 12(e) is
to send the individual claims to arbitration--exactly the sort of
provision that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not permit
California to invalidate.

The Plaintiffs emphasize that Paragraph 12(e) goes on to forbid
representing the interests of others and then states that "class
action, collective action, and representative action procedures
shall not be asserted or permitted in arbitration." They,
therefore, argue that the provision constitutes the type of
"wholesale waiver of representative actions" that remains
unenforceable under California law.

But, in context, the Plaintiffs' reading of these lines is
incorrect, Judge Breyer holds. The primary intent of the provision
is in stated up front: it requires parties to "submit individual
claims to arbitration." Judge Breyer points out that the phrase
"class action, collective action, and representative action
procedures" is used to mean procedures related to "non-individual"
or class claims.

Even if this sentence can also be read as unenforceably broad, the
Court construes it to be enforceable.

Finally, the Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration agreement is
unenforceable because it is unconscionable under California law.
Because the provisions here fail to present more than a "modest"
level of procedural and substantive unconscionability, Judge Breyer
holds the arbitration agreement is enforceable.

Accordingly, Judge Breyer rules that PNA's motions to compel
individual arbitration and to dismiss the remaining non-individual
PAGA claims are granted. The Plaintiffs are ordered to submit their
respective individual PAGA claims to individual arbitrations with
the American Arbitration Association pursuant to their Dispute
Resolution Agreements.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 20, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/48jx3rrx from Leagle.com.


PENNSYLVANIA: Bid to Certify Class in Jennings v. Wolf Granted
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RUSSEL "JOEY" JENNINGS, by and through his
parents/guardians, Richard and Susan Jennings, et al., Plaintiffs
v. TOM WOLF, et al., Defendants, Civil No. 3:20-CV-148 (M.D. Pa.),
Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson of the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania:

     a. grants the Motion for Class Certification; and
     b. denies the Motions for Preliminary Injunction.

The case comes before the Court for consideration of a motion for
class certification and two motions for preliminary injunction. It
is a putative class action brought by the named Plaintiffs on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against Governor
Wolf and other Commonwealth of Pennsylvania officials and agencies.
The action was brought on behalf of the named Plaintiffs, who are
individuals with profound and severe intellectual disabilities
residing in state-run residential facilities in the Commonwealth,
by their guardians or decisionmakers. The complaint alleges that
the Defendants have violated and continue to violate the
Plaintiffs' and other putative class members' civil rights, in that
the Commonwealth is closing two of these residential facilities --
Polk Center and White Haven Center -- and transferring the
residents to other facilities in the Commonwealth without their
consent.

Following the closure announcement, several residents or their
guardians expressed a desire to remain at White Haven Center and
Polk Center, with some refusing to even begin the transition
planning process. This appeared to be, at least in part, due to the
confusion surrounding placement of individuals following the
closure; many residents and guardians were under the impression
that the residents would be forced to move into a community setting
rather than intermediate care facilities ("ICFs").

Thus, the instant lawsuit was filed on Jan. 29, 2020, by 13 named
Plaintiffs -- residents or guardians/decisionmakers of residents
who currently reside at Polk Center or White Haven Center -- as a
proposed class action on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated. The Plaintiffs brought this action against Governor Wolf;
Theresa Miller, the Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Human
Services ("DHS"); Kristin Ahrens, the Deputy Secretary of Office of
Developmental Programs ("ODP") for the DHS; Sue Rodgers, the
facility director at Polk Center; Mark Georgetti, the facility
director at White Haven Center; DHS; ODP; Polk Center; and White
Haven Center.

The complaint asserts claims under the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. Section 12132, the Rehabilitation Act
("RA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 794(a), the Medical Assistance Program
authorized by 42 U.S.C. Section 1396 et seq., and the United States
Constitution. These claims stem from the premise announced by the
United States Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring,
527 U.S. 581 (1999), in which the Court held that individuals with
intellectual disabilities have a right under the ADA to receive
services in the least restrictive setting. As to these plaintiffs
and putative class members, the complaint alleged that closing
these two ICFs and placing these individuals in community-based
settings violates the ADA because for these individuals, the least
restrictive setting is either Polk Center or White Haven Center.

Read as a whole, the principal thrust of the Plaintiffs' complaint
was their belief that the state closure plans were forcing families
to make a hard and inappropriate choice to place their loved ones,
who require a high degree of ICF care, in less secure and medically
inappropriate community or home environments. However, in passing
the Plaintiffs seemed to acknowledge in their complaint that this
transfer process entailed a broader array of choices and options
since the plaintiffs also sought the opportunity "to receive
treatment in accordance with the independent recommendations of the
multidisciplinary evaluation, either at his/her current residence,
another state operated ICF/IID facility, or non-ICF/IID certified
setting, as each Plaintiff deems appropriate." Thus, the relief
sought by them, in part, involved precisely what the Commonwealth
is currently offering to do; namely, to work with families to
either facilitate (1) a community placement; (2) a transfer to a
private ICF; or (3) a transfer to one of the remaining state
operated ICFs.

The Plaintiffs then filed a motion to certify a class. This motion
asserted that there were, at that time, 248 residents of Polk
Center and White Haven Center that were opposing the closure of the
centers and placement into a community setting. Prior to the motion
for class certification, the Defendants had filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint, and thus, the district court stayed the
motion for class certification pending resolution of the motion to
dismiss. The motion to dismiss was subsequently denied.

Following the denial of the motion to dismiss, the Plaintiffs filed
their first motion for a preliminary injunction. They requested
that the Court directs the Defendants to provide adequate staff at
Polk Center and White Haven Center; to cease pushing the closure
date of August 2022; and to stay consideration of all moves, even
of those residents who had consented, until an investigation was
undertaken to determine if such consent had been unduly coerced.

This motion was briefed extensively. Additionally, the Plaintiffs
filed a motion to expedite a ruling on the class certification
motion, which was also extensively briefed. In the interim, the
case was referred to mediation, although mediation efforts were
ultimately unsuccessful.

Before the Court ruled on the motion for a preliminary injunction,
a second motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction was filed. This second motion asserted that residents of
Polk Center and White Haven Center and their
guardians/decisionmakers had been informed that they must choose a
location to be transferred to -- Selinsgrove Center or Ebensburg
Center—and that all residents were to be moved by Nov. 30, 2022.
The motion averred that the residents did not consent to such a
transfer, as they believed these two state centers were not the
least restrictive setting and could not adequately meet their
needs.

The case was ultimately assigned to Judge Carlson on Sept. 20,
2022. Following this assignment, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to
expedite rulings on the pending motions for preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order. The hearing took place over a
period of seven days. The hearing concluded on Oct. 28, 2022.

After a thorough consideration of all of the evidence presented,
and recognizing that this situation presents a series of
intractable challenges for all, challenges thrust upon the parties
by the imperfect nature of the available alternatives, Judge
Carlson grants the motion for class certification but denies the
motions for a preliminary injunction.

The current iteration of the proposed class definition is as
follows: All current and future residents of White Haven Center and
Polk Center who are not on the Planning List and who do not want to
be placed in a community setting or in another ICF because they
believe that their current placements at Polk Center or at White
Haven Centers are the least restrictive environments that are
available that can meet all their needs.

Judge Carlson holds that the case is properly brought as a class
action. He finds that the Plaintiffs' proposed class satisfies the
requisites of Rule 23. He says (i) there is a consensus among all
parties that the number of putative class members well exceeds 40;
(ii) the size of the class is clearly ascertainable; (iii) the
Plaintiffs' counsel is highly skilled and fully informed regarding
the law; (iv) common interests of the putative class predominate
over their individualized concerns; and (v) the named Plaintiffs'
concerns regarding transfers of these residents from Polk Center
and White Haven Center are typical of the common concerns of all
class members.

Judge Carlson also finds that the harms that may flow from denying
a preliminary injunction are largely offset by the harms that would
flow from granting this unprecedented preliminary injunction. In
this setting, where the competing equities stand in equilibrium, we
are reminded that "upon an application for a preliminary injunction
to doubt is to deny." Therefore, he denies the Plaintiffs' motions
for preliminary injunction.

As he reaches these conclusions, Judge Carlson recognizes that for
all parties there is a sense of urgency to the litigation, coupled
with a need for finality. Recognizing these dual and competing
impulses, he encourages any party aggrieved by his rulings to seek
further review of these decisions. On this score at this juncture,
he believes that the denial of preliminary injunction relief can be
appealed immediately under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(a)(1).

An appropriate order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 2, 2022 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ymymmu8f from Leagle.com.


PREMIER NUTRITION: Appeals Judgment Bid Denial in Montera Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
PREMIER NUTRITION CORPORATION is taking an appeal from a court
ruling denying its Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and its
Motion for New Trial, and a ruling granting in part and denying in
part the Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees in the lawsuit
entitled Mary Beth Montera, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Premier Nutrition
Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 3:16-cv-06980-RS, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California.

The Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated New York consumers, brought this class action suit against
the Defendant for alleged violations of Sections 349 and 350 of the
New York General Business Law (GBL) in connection with its
promotion and marketing of Joint Juice, a line of joint health
dietary supplements.

On June 2, 2022 and July 12, 2022, the Defendant filed a motion for
judgment as a matter of law and motion to decertify class,
respectively.

On June 9, 2022, the Plaintiff filed a motion for entry of final
judgment.

On August 12, 2022, Judge Richard Seeborg denied the Defendant's
motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion to decertify
class, and granted the Plaintiff's motion for entry of final
judgment.

On August 26, 2022, the Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney
fees.

On September 9, 2022, the Defendant filed a Renewed Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law and a Motion for New Trial. In its
renewed motion, Premier raised several familiar arguments,
including that the Plaintiff failed to prove the elements of
injury, causation, materiality, and deceptiveness.

On October 18, 2022, the Court denied the Defendant's Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law and its Motion for New Trial and
granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff's Motion for
Attorney Fees through an Order entered by Judge Richard Seeborg.

Judge Seeborg ruled that nearly all of the Defendant's arguments
have been raised before and can be dismissed outright, including
that: (1) the Defendant was not entitled to invoke the GBL's safe
harbor provision due to its failure timely to notify the FDA as
required by the statute, and thus it was not entitled to a jury
instruction on this subject; and (2) Premier's Seventh Amendment
rights were not violated. None of these arguments individually
warrant a new trial, nor is Premier's argument, as a whole, greater
than the sum of its parts, ruled the Court.

Judge Seeborg granted the Plaintiff's motion only with respect to
the request for a service award for Ms. Montera. The motion was
denied in all other respects, without prejudice.

The appellate case is captioned Mary Beth Montera v. Premier
Nutrition Corporation., Case No. 22-16622, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on October 21, 2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Premier Nutrition Corporation Mediation
Questionnaire was due on October 28, 2022;

   -- Appellee Mary Beth Montera first cross appeal brief is due on
December 19, 2022;

   -- Appellant Premier Nutrition Corporation second brief on cross
appeal is due January 19, 2023;

   -- Appellee Mary Beth Montera third cross appeal brief is due on
February 21, 2023; and

   -- Optional cross appeal reply brief is due within 21 days of
service of third brief on cross appeal. [BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee MARY BETH MONTERA, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

            Timothy G. Blood, Esq.
            Leslie E. Hurst, Esq.
            Thomas Joseph O'Reardon, II, Esq.
            BLOOD HURST & O'REARDON LLP
            501 West Broadway
            San Diego, CA 92101
            Telephone: (619) 338-1100

                   - and -

            Todd David Carpenter, Esq.
            LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP
            1350 Columbia Street, Suite 603
            San Diego, CA 92101
            Telephone: (619) 762-1900

                   - and -

            Eugene G. Iredale, Esq.
            Grace Jun, Esq.
            IREDALE AND YOO, APC
            105 West F. Street, 4th Floor
            San Diego, CA 92101
            Telephone: (619) 233-1525

Defendant-Appellant PREMIER NUTRITION CORPORATION, FKA Joint Juice,
Inc., is represented by:

            Angel Antonio Garganta, Esq.
            VENABLE LLP
            101 California Street, Suite 3800
            San Francisco, CA 94111
            Telephone: (415) 653-3735

                   - and -

            Jessica Grant, Esq.
            MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP
            425 Market Street
            San Francisco, CA 94105
            Telephone: (415) 268-7670

                   - and -

            Amit Rana, Esq.
            VENABLE LLP
            101 California Street, Suite 3800
            San Francisco, CA 94111
            Telephone: (415) 653-3747

                   - and -

            Antonia I. Stabile, Esq.
            VENABLE LLP
            101 California Street, Suite 3800
            San Francisco, CA 94111
            Telephone: (415) 653-3734

                   - and -

            Steven Edward Swaney, Esq.
            VENABLE LLP
            101 California Street, Suite 3800
            San Francisco, CA 94111
            Telephone: (415) 653-3722

                   - and -

            Mark D. Taticchi, Esq.
            FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH, LLP
            One Logan Square, Suite 2000
            Philadelphia, PA 19103
            Telephone: (215) 988-2987

                   - and -

            Aaron Daniel Van Oort, Esq.
            FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH, LLP
            90 S. 7th Street, Suite 2200
            Minneapolis, MN 55402
            Telephone: (612) 766-8138

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLC: Cal. App. Reverses $2.5-Mil. Sanction
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and
Appellant v. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLC, Defendant and Respondent,
Case No. B310118 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California,
Second District, Division Five, reverses the trial court's
postjudgment order awarding $2.5 million in sanctions.

A defendant in a civil lawsuit filed a motion for sanctions under
Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 of the Civil
Discovery Act (Discovery Act; Section 2016.010, et seq.) nine
months after the case was dismissed with prejudice, seeking
monetary sanctions for egregious misuse of the discovery process
while the litigation was pending. The trial court awarded $2.5
million in sanctions.

In 2010, Plaintiff and Appellant City of Los Angeles entered into a
contract with Defendant and Respondent PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC
(PWC) to modernize the billing system for the Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power (LADWP). Using new billing software
introduced in 2013, the City failed to accurately bill a
significant portion of its customers. LADWP customers began filing
lawsuits against the City over billing disputes.

On March 6, 2015, the City's special counsel Paul Paradis, Gina
Tufaro, and Paul Kiesel, along with the City's attorneys Michael
Feuer, Thomas Peters, Joseph Brajevich, Richard Tom, and Eskel
Solomon, filed the instant action against several Defendants,
including PWC. The City alleged PWC fraudulently induced the City
to enter into the contract for the billing system and breached the
contract.

On April 1, 2015, Ohio attorney Jack Landskroner, on behalf of
plaintiff Antwon Jones, filed a class action lawsuit against the
City based on the billing errors (the class action). Without filing
an answer, the City entered into mediation in the class action in
June 2015. The parties to the class action entered into a
preliminary settlement agreement on Aug. 7, 2015. The trial court
judge in this case presided over both the class action and the
City's civil case.

On Dec. 21, 2015, PWC served requests for production of documents
related to remediation of the billing system and the alleged
damages. The City served responses, refusing to provide documents
for a majority of the requests. On June 8, 2016, PWC served a
second set of requests seeking documents concerning remediation, to
which the City served responses.

One of the documents listed as protected attorney work product was
described as an initial complaint for a lawsuit entitled Jones v.
PWC, dated Jan. 24, 2015, with a cover letter from attorney Eskel
Solomon in the city attorney's office to several LADWP employees
and attorneys.

On Feb. 3, 2017, PWC filed a motion to compel the documents
withheld by the City as privileged that were not authored by an
attorney, written to an attorney, and did not appear to disclose
the mental impressions of an attorney.

The court granted PWC's motion to compel in part and denied it in
part. The court ordered production of the documents withheld based
on attorney work product, because the work of programmers, computer
technicians, and other third parties involved in remediation was
predominately related to a business purpose and not privileged
under the work product doctrine. The court denied the motion to
compel as to the documents withheld on the basis of attorney-client
privilege.

In April 2017, the City produced a revised privilege log with 1,547
entries. In May 2017, PWC served a third set of requests for
production seeking all documents transmitted between LADWP and
Jones's counsel before Aug. 7, 2015. The City responded that the
only responsive document was a comprehensive settlement demand from
Jones protected by the settlement privilege or other privileges.
The City asserted that no documents were sent by LADWP to Jones's
counsel before Aug. 7, 2015.

On July 20, 2017, the class action settlement was approved and
entered as the final judgment. The class action judgment included
payment of all remediation costs, as well as a total payment of $19
million in attorney fees, including $15.2 million to the attorneys
for Jones and two other plaintiffs.

On Nov. 3, 2017, PWC filed a second motion to compel production of
documents withheld as privileged. PWC sought the Jones v. PWC draft
complaint, the settlement demand, documents concerning ordinary
business functions related to remediation, and 131 documents listed
on the original privilege log that were not produced or included on
the revised log.

On Dec. 4, 2017, the trial court heard PWC's second motion to
compel production of documents. One hundred fifty-five documents
remained in dispute. The trial court granted the motion as to the
131 documents originally logged as privileged, but subsequently
reclassified as nonresponsive after the City had lost its
objection. The remaining 24 documents were ones for which the City
changed the basis of the privilege claim. For the other 12
documents, the City changed the privilege claim from attorney work
product to attorney-client privilege, including the Jones v. PWC
draft complaint.

On Feb. 12, 2019, the City provided PWC with a copy of the caption
and signature pages of the Jones v. PWC draft complaint, which
listed Paradis, Tufaro, and Kiesel as the attorneys for Jones in
January 2015.

At a status conference on March 4, 2019, PWC argued the
significance of the draft complaint was the unethical alliance
revealed between counsel for Jones and the City prior to filing the
class action. Landskroner was introduced to Jones on March 26,
2015, six days before the complaint was filed. PWC believed the
settlement was effectively prearranged before the lawsuit was
filed.

The court asked Landskroner whether he paid a referral fee to
Paradis. Landskroner's attorney advised him to assert his privilege
against self-incrimination as to all questions about fee payments
and his disclosures to the court.

The trial court restrained the City from paying any further sums to
Paradis or Landskroner. The court set an order to show cause with
regard to appointment of a special auditor regarding all sums
previously paid to Landskroner, Paradis, or any company in which
they had an interest in connection with the class action lawsuit,
including the remediation effort.

On March 5, 2019, Landskroner appeared for his deposition and
asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in
response to substantive questions. On March 6, 2019, Paradis,
Tufaro, and Kiesel withdrew as special counsel to the City. The
City substituted in attorney Eric George and the law firm of Browne
George Ross LLP as new counsel for the City.

On March 11, 2019, the City provided the full Jones v. PWC draft
complaint to PWC.

On July 2, 2019, PWC filed a motion to compel documents and answers
to deposition questions that were withheld on the basis of
mediation privilege. On July 19, 2019, PWC filed a motion to compel
documents related to the class action settlement based on Paradis's
representation of Jones. The City objected on the ground of
attorney-client privilege and argued the crime-fraud exception did
not apply, because Paradis and Kiesel acted alone, without the
City's knowledge or approval, and the City had not been aware of
the extent of former special counsel's representation of Jones. At
a hearing on the motion to compel on Aug. 12, 2019, PWC asked the
court to apply the crime-fraud exception and mandate production of
documents, instead of the slow drip of discovery that had been
received since the City brought in new counsel.

The court found, based on the totality of the evidence, that
reasonable inferences could be drawn establishing a prima facie
case of fraud and the City's complicity. The documents at issue
were communications between the City and its attorneys, who were
involved in representing both sides in the same lawsuit with the
City's knowledge and purported direction. As a result, the City's
written communication with special counsel about Landskroner's
settlement proposal, the sham mediation, and the charade
settlement, were reasonably related to uncovering the scope of the
claimed fraud. The court found all of the communications
orchestrating the class action were directly related to the
collusive conduct and subsequent coverup.

On Sept. 26, 2019, the City filed a request for dismissal of its
case against PWC and others with prejudice. After the City notified
this appellate court that the action had been dismissed with
prejudice, the Appellate Court dismissed the City's pending
petition for writ of mandate as moot.

PWC withdrew deposition notices for eight witnesses, but intended
to proceed with the depositions of five witnesses related to PWC's
intended sanctions motion.

On June 29, 2020, PWC filed the motion for monetary sanctions
pursuant to sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 that is at issue on
appeal. The motion was based on the City's conduct that PWC argued
was a misuse of the discovery process under section 2023.010 as
follows: (1) asserting attorney-client and attorney work product
privileges in bad faith to prevent discovery of the Jones v. PWC
draft complaint and remediation documents that were not privileged.
In August 2020, the City filed an opposition to the motion for
monetary sanctions.

At the hearing on PWC's motion for sanctions on Oct. 6, 2020, PWC
argued the misuse of discovery arose from the City's effort to
resist production of the Jones v. PWC draft complaint and to
prevent discovery about the circumstances surrounding the class
action lawsuit. PWC had suspected collusion between the City and
Jones's counsel early in the litigation based on a number of
factors: (1) Landskroner's prior relationship with Paradis; (2) the
City's settlement of the class action without answering the
complaint; (3) the agreement to pay excessive attorney fees when no
discovery was conducted; and (4) the terms of the settlement, which
simply obligated the City to take actions that it had already
promised to take.

The trial court found there had been a serious abuse of discovery
by the City and its counsel. It concluded that PWC was required to
expend substantial hours because of the City's misuse of the
discovery process, which PWC stated totaled more than 9,405 hours.
The court found that the serious abuse of discovery merited
considerable sanctions. Based on the court's consideration of all
the evidence and the totality of the circumstances, the court
granted the motion for sanctions and awarded sanctions against the
City in the amount of $2.5 million. The court's order did not
allocate amounts to different categories, nor explain what the
total amount included or excluded.

On Nov. 10, 2020, the trial court entered a written order granting
PWC's motion for monetary sanctions in accord with its ruling on
Oct. 6, 2020. The City filed a timely notice of appeal from the
order awarding sanctions. The Appellate Court sent a letter
pursuant to Government Code section 68081 providing the parties
with an opportunity to present their views on whether the trial
court had authority to impose sanctions pursuant solely to section
2023.010, section 2023.030, or both.

Based on the plain language of the statutes, the Appellate Court
concludes that sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 do not independently
authorize the trial court to impose monetary sanctions for misuse
of discovery. The award of monetary sanctions in this case, which
was based solely on sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 without regard
to any other provision of the Discovery Act, constituted an abuse
of discretion because it was outside the bounds of the court's
statutory authority.

Associate Justice Carl H. Moor, writing for the Panel, recognizes
that the statutory language of section 2023.030 limiting sanctions
"to the extent authorized" by other provisions of the Discovery Act
was not addressed in the trial court, and no prior case law
squarely held that section 2023.030 requires monetary sanctions to
be authorized by another provision of the Discovery Act.

As a result, Judge Moor concludes the order must be reversed and
remanded to allow PWC an opportunity to present the issue of
sanctions to the trial court for determination under the law as
clarified. The Appellate Court's conclusion that the sanctions
order must be reversed, and any award of sanctions must be made in
conformance with the requirements of the Discovery Act, is not
intended to absolve the City of the serious and egregious nature of
the conduct at issue; the Panel takes no position as to the amount
of monetary sanctions that would be appropriate for the trial court
to assess on remand.

Under the circumstances of the present case, the Appellate Court
concludes, among other things, that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by implicitly finding PWC's motion for discovery
sanctions to be timely.

In summary, Judge Moor holds that although the trial court had
jurisdiction to entertain PWC's motion for sanctions and discretion
to find it was timely filed, the order awarding sanctions must be
reversed and remanded to allow the trial court to award PWC's
reasonable expenses incurred as a result of sanctionable conduct
under provisions of the Discovery Act other than sections 2023.010
and 2023.030.

Judge Moor holds that the postjudgment order awarding sanctions is
reversed, and the matter remanded for the trial court to enter a
new and different order on the issue of monetary sanctions based on
discovery provisions authorizing the imposition of sanctions in
this case. In the interests of justice, the parties are to bear
their own costs on appeal.

RUBIN, P. J., concur. GRIMES, J., concurring and dissenting.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Oct. 20, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3vpdsmba from Leagle.com.

Office of the City Attorney, Michael N. Feuer --
Mike.Feuer@lacity.org -- Kathleen A. Kenealy --
kathleen.kenealy@lacity.org -- Joseph A. Brajevich --
joseph.brajevich@ladwp.com -- Browne George Ross O'Brien Annaguey &
Ellis, Ellis George Cipollone O'Brien Annaguey, Eric M. George --
egeorge@egcfirm.com -- Guy C. Nicholson -- gnicholson@egcfirm.com
-- Kathryn L. McCann -- kmccann@egcfirm.com -- for the Plaintiff
and Appellant.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Casey J. McCracken --
cmccracken@gibsondunn.com -- Daniel J. Thomasch --
dthomasch@gibsondunn.com -- Lauren J. Elliot --
lelliot@gibsondunn.com -- and Joseph M. Ortega, for the Defendant
and Respondent.


SALLIE MAE: Bid to Stay Prelim. Injunction in Homaidan Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, In re: HILAL KHALIL HOMAIDAN, aka Helal K Homaidan,
Chapter 7, Debtor. In re: REEHAM YOUSSEF, aka Reeham Navarro
Youssef, aka Reeham N. Youssef, Chapter 7, Debtor. HILAL KHALIL
HOMAIDAN on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
and REEHAM YOUSSEF, Plaintiffs v. SALLIE MAE, INC., NAVIENT
SOLUTIONS, LLC, NAVIENT CREDIT FINANCE CORPORATION, Defendants,
Case Nos. 08-48275-ess, 13-46495-ess, Adv. Pro. No. 17-1085-ess
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y.), Judge Elizabeth S. Stong of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of New York denies the motion for a
stay pending appeal of the Court's preliminary injunction entered
on Oct. 17, 2022, filed by Navient Solutions, LLC and Navient
Credit Finance Corp.

On Dec. 4, 2008, Mr. Homaidan filed a petition for relief under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, Case No. 08-48275. On April 9,
2009, the Court entered an order discharging Mr. Homaidan, and his
bankruptcy case was closed. On April 14, 2017, Mr. Homaidan moved
to reopen his bankruptcy case to obtain a determination of the
dischargeability of certain of his student loans, and on May 26,
2017, the Court reopened the case.

On Oct. 29, 2013, Ms. Youssef filed a petition for relief under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. On Feb. 6, 2014, the Court
entered an order discharging Ms. Youssef, and her bankruptcy case
was closed. On Oct. 1, 2019, Ms. Youssef moved to reopen her
bankruptcy case to obtain a determination of the dischargeability
of certain of her student loans, and on Dec. 4, 2019, the Court
reopened the case.

On June 23, 2017, Mr. Homaidan commenced this adversary proceeding
as a putative class action, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, by filing a complaint against SLM Corp., Sallie
Mae, Inc., and Navient Solutions and Navient Credit (together,
"Navient"). As to himself, Mr. Homaidan seeks a determination that
certain debts that he incurred as a student are not
nondischargeable student loan debts under Bankruptcy Code Section
523(a)(8)(B), and an award of damages, including attorneys' fees
and costs, for the Defendants' willful violations of the bankruptcy
discharge order entered in his case. And as to the class, he seeks
the same the relief.

On Oct. 21, 2019, Mr. Homaidan filed an amended complaint to add
Ms. Youssef as a named plaintiff and proposed class representative.
On Dec. 18, 2019, the Court entered an Order permitting amendment
of the complaint to add Ms. Youssef as a named plaintiff and a
proposed class representative.

In their Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, seek a declaratory judgment,
injunctive relief, and damages arising from Sallie and Navient's
alleged "pattern and practice" of violating the discharge
injunction provided by Bankruptcy Code Section 542(a)(2). They
allege that the Defendants either misrepresented or failed to
disclose facts and information related to the dischargeability of
private loans, and that the Defendants did not make the same
misrepresentations "to more sophisticated parties."

The Plaintiffs request that the Court declares that their debts
were discharged upon the entry of the applicable statutory
bankruptcy discharge injunctions, because they are not student
loans excluded from discharge under Bankruptcy Code Section
523(a)(8). They seek permanent injunctive relief prohibiting the
Defendants from continuing to seek collection on their discharged
debts. They also request that since the Defendants were notified of
their discharge orders pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4004(g), and
still sought to collect on these debts, the Court should cite them
for civil contempt for their willful violations of the Discharge
Order, and order them to pay damages in an amount to be determined
at trial pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 524 and 105, and also
to pay his attorneys' fees and costs.

As stated in the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs seek to maintain
the action on behalf of themselves and as representatives of
Putative Class Members who: obtained private Tuition Answer loans
in amounts that exceeded the Cost of Attendance; were never issued
or designated to be issued 1098-E tax forms to deduct the interest
payments from their federal tax returns; have never reaffirmed any
pre-petition Tuition Answer loan; and have nonetheless been
subjected to the Defendants' attempts to induce payment on
discharged debts and have or have not repaid these loans since
bankruptcy.

Before the Court is the Motion to Stay Preliminary Injunction by
Navient. Navient seeks a stay of the Court's direction that it
ceases its collection efforts on "Tuition Answer Loans" that
"exceed the cost of attendance" as defined by Internal Revenue Code
Section 221(d), and that have an outstanding loan balance subject
to collection held by the Plaintiffs and the members of a putative
nationwide class of borrowers who received discharges in
bankruptcy.

Navient makes several arguments in support of its motion. As a
threshold matter, Navient states that the Court lacks the
jurisdiction to address violations of discharge orders entered by
other bankruptcy courts. It also argues that the Preliminary
Injunction was not warranted, as the Plaintiffs cannot establish a
likelihood of success on the merits because, among other reasons,
each member of the putative class certified on their loan documents
that their loans were within the cost of attendance at a Title IV
institution. Further, it argues that the Plaintiffs substantially
delayed in seeking a Preliminary Injunction, and therefore the
Court lacked the authority to issue the injunction. And finally,
Navient argues that the public interest weighs in favor of staying
the Preliminary Injunction, as injunctive relief may harm certain
members of the putative class and reward unscrupulous borrowers.
For these reasons, among others, it argues that the Preliminary
Injunction should be stayed until the resolution of its appeal.

Based on the entire record, and after careful and thorough
consideration of all of the arguments and authorities that have
been presented, Judge Stong concludes that the Preliminary
Injunction should not be stayed. She holds that Navient has not
made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on its request
for leave to appeal, or on the merits of its appeal. Nor has it
shown that it will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of a
stay, or that the Plaintiffs will not suffer substantial injury if
a stay of the Preliminary Injunction is issued. And finally,
Navient has not shown that the public interest weighs in favor of a
stay pending appeal.

Finally, it is worth noting that, at the time the TRO was entered,
on July 8, 2022, the Court delayed the effective date of the relief
for 60 days, until Sept. 6, 2022, in accordance with Navient's
representations that it would take sixty days to comply with a
direction to cease its collection activities on the loans that are
at issue -- private student Tuition Answer Loans that exceed the
cost of attendance and therefore are outside the scope of Section
523(a)(8)(B)'s exclusion from discharge. That is, as of the date of
this Memorandum Decision, Navient has been enjoined from collecting
on these debts for some eight weeks. And as stated in Navient's
Notice of Compliance, it has "ceased collection activities,"
including "the transmittal of monthly statements as well as any
outgoing written or oral communications requesting payment." In the
case, the record does not show, or even suggest, that the perils
and adverse consequences that Navient predicts have come to pass.

For the reasons she stated and based on the entire record, Judge
Stong denies Navient's Motion to Stay Preliminary Injunction. An
order in accordance with the Memorandum Decision will be entered
simultaneously therewith.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 2, 2022 Memorandum Decision is
available at https://tinyurl.com/msxadfd5 from Leagle.com.

George F. Carpinello, Esq. -- gcarpinello@bsfllp.com -- Adam Shaw,
Esq. -- ashaw@bsfllp.com -- Boies Schiller Flexner LLP Albany, NY,
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs.

Jason W. Burge, Esq.-- jburge@fishmanhaygood.com -- Kathryn J.
Johnson, Esq., Fishman Haygood LLP, New Orleans, LA, Attorneys for
the Plaintiffs.

Lynn E. Swanson, Esq. -- lswanson@jonesswanson.com -- Peter N.
Freiberg, Esq. -- info@jonesswanson.com -- Jones, Swanson, Huddell
& Garrison, LLC, New Orleans, LA, Attorneys for the Plaintiffs.

Thomas M. Farrell, Esq. -- tfarrell@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuire
Woods LLP, Houston, TX, Attorneys for the Defendants.

Shawn R. Fox, Esq. -- sfox@mcguirewoods.com -- Joseph A. Florczak,
Esq. -- jflorczak@mcguirewoods.com -- Dion W. Hayes, Esq. --
dhayes@mcguirewoods.com -- K. Elizabeth Sieg, Esq. --
bsieg@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, New York, NY, Attorneys
for the Defendants.


SONUS NETWORKS: Court Refuses to Dismiss Miller Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge George A. O'Toole, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts denies the Defendants' motion to dismiss
the lawsuit styled RON MILLER, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SONUS NETWORKS, INC.,
RAYMOND P. DOLAN, MARK T. GREENQUIST, and MICHAEL SWADE,
Defendants, Case No. 18-12344-GAO (D. Mass.).

The Defendants have moved under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to dismiss the amended complaint.

Lead Plaintiffs Guiseppe Veleno and Gary Williams and named
Plaintiff Ron Miller brought this suit against Sonus, and three of
its executives, on behalf of themselves and a putative class of
others, who purchased Sonus common stock between Jan. 8, 2015, and
March 24, 2015 (the "Class Period"), alleging violations of
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5. The Plaintiffs claim
that they were misled by revenue forecasts issued by the Defendants
and, in reliance on those projections, suffered harm when they
purchased the company's stock at prices artificially inflated by
the Defendants' unrealistically optimistic statements.

The Plaintiffs identify statements made by the Defendants on two
dates, Jan. 8, 2015, and Feb. 18, 2015, that the Plaintiffs allege
were both materially false and misleading by reason of the
Defendants' knowingly unrealistic optimism.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants, who were closely
involved in monitoring sales at the company, knew a significant
miss was imminent and that, consequently, the cautionary risk
disclosures made during the February call were themselves
materially misleading.

Between Feb. 18 and March 24, 2015, the Sonus sales team removed
approximately $20 million in revenue from the Q1 "committed"
pipeline. Before the market opened on March 24, 2015, the last day
of the alleged Class Period, Sonus issued a press release that
disclosed the significant Q1 2015 revenue miss, indicating that
instead of the $74 million projected, Sonus only expected revenue
between $47 and 50 million. In response, Sonus shares dropped
dramatically, from $13.16 to $8.70 per share, resulting in a loss
of over 33%.

On April 22, 2015, the Defendants held a Q1 2015 earnings
conference call, during which, the Plaintiffs allege, blame for the
shortfall was placed on "longer sales cycles" and the company's
sales team.

In August 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
issued a press release and cease and desist order ("SEC Order"),
publicizing that the company, Greenquist, and Swade had been
charged with making material misstatements on both Jan. 8, 2015,
and Feb. 18, 2015. The SEC Order and press release disclosed
information previously unavailable to the Plaintiffs. The SEC
reached a settlement with the Defendants in which the company,
Greenquist, and Swade agreed to pay $1.97 million in civil
penalties without admitting responsibility.

In 2016, a prior class action complaint against Sonus had been
brought asserting many of the same allegations as those set forth
in the present action; Sousa v. Sonus Networks, Inc., 261 F.Supp.3d
112 (D. Mass. 2017). At issue were two dates when statements were
made by the Defendants, Oct. 23, 2014, and, as alleged in this
action, Feb. 18, 2015. The Court concluded that the October
statement constituted non-actionable corporate puffery and that the
allegations pled in that case concerning the February statements
fell short of alleging a "strong inference" of scienter.

The Plaintiffs, in their amended complaint, advance many of the
same allegations as those set forth in Sousa. However, the Oct. 23,
2014 statement relied on by the Sousa plaintiffs has been replaced
by the statement made on Jan. 8, 2015. Further, the amended
complaint includes additional facts previously unknown to the
Plaintiffs that were drawn from the subsequent SEC Order.

As an initial matter, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs'
claims asserted in this action are barred by the applicable
two-year statute of limitations because they merely mirror and add
detail to the claims previously alleged in Sousa. They contend that
the essence of the Plaintiffs' allegations have been discoverable
since 2015 and, in support of this contention, claim that such
allegations were discoverable "because they were actually
discovered by the SEC." That is a non sequitur, Judge O'Toole
says.

While the underlying allegations may have been uncovered by the SEC
through its investigation, there is nothing in the record to
support the conclusion that a reasonably diligent plaintiff,
lacking the SEC's authority and tools, would have discovered the
facts later made public in the SEC Order and now asserted by the
present Plaintiffs in alleging plausible scienter, Judge O'Toole
opines.

The Defendants have not shown that the Sousa plaintiffs would or
should have discovered facts that ultimately were only disclosed in
the subsequent SEC investigation, Judge O'Toole points out. The
present Plaintiffs have alleged facts that became publicly
available precisely because of their disclosure by the SEC
investigation. The present action was filed within the limitations
period that commenced as of the date of the publication of the
SEC's findings and order. Under conventional discovery principles,
Judge O'Toole holds that the Plaintiffs' action was timely
commenced.

Judge O'Toole also finds that the facts alleged as of the January
statement are more plausibly supportive of scienter, and that the
present Plaintiffs have added factual allegations that make a
conclusion of scienter more plausible than in the prior action.

The amended complaint pleads allegations to support scienter that
were not pled in Sousa, Judge O'Toole says. The present Plaintiffs
focus on three allegations: the Defendants' refusal to take
seriously the concerns of the sales team surrounding the revenue
forecast; the insistence at the sales conference that the sales
team reclassify uncertain sales to the "committed" pipeline; and
the reduction of sales by approximately $5 million from the Q1
committed pipeline in advance of the February statements.

By alleging specific instances in the months leading up to the
February statements that indicate when the Defendants became "aware
of facts that should have made them aware of the falseness of their
optimistic statements," the present Plaintiffs make a sufficient
showing of scienter, Judge O'Toole points out.

The Plaintiffs further assert claims under Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act against the individual Defendants, Dolan, Greenquist,
and Swade, for liability as controlling persons of Sonus. Because
the Plaintiffs have pled a viable Section 10(b) claim, Judge
O'Toole holds the Section 20(a) claims may also proceed.

For these reasons, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Oct. 20,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/muttz37v from
Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: Oztimurlenk's Bid to Certify Nurses Class Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Matthew H. Solomson of the United States Court of Federal
Claims denies without prejudice the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification in the lawsuit captioned SENOL OZTIMURLENK, R.N., et
al., Plaintiffs v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant, Case No. 19-1715C
(Fed. Cl.).

The Plaintiffs, current and former nurses employed at the Northport
Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Northport, New York, have sued
to recover overtime pay allegedly owed for work performed outside
regularly scheduled tours of duty. The Plaintiffs move for class
certification pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Court of
Federal Claims ("RCFC"). The Defendant, the United States, acting
by and through the Department of Veterans Affairs (the "VA"),
opposes the motion.

On Nov. 5, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed suit in this Court to recover
overtime compensation pursuant to 38 U.S.C. Section 7453. On Feb.
19, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint. On
May 26, 2020, the government filed its answer. On Sept. 22, 2020,
with permission from the Court, the Plaintiffs filed their second
amended complaint. On Dec. 16, 2020, the government filed its
answer to the Plaintiffs' second amended complaint.

The Plaintiffs seek to litigate the case as a class action. To that
end, the parties engaged in class discovery from Aug. 21, 2020, to
March 22, 2021. On April 28, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed a motion
for class certification. The government filed its response brief,
and the Plaintiffs filed their reply brief.

The Plaintiffs' motion for class certification proposes the
following class definition:

     All persons who are past or present licensed practical
     and/or registered nurses employed by the VA, Northport
     Medical Center in Northport, New York; and who since
     November 5, 2013, worked at least 15 minutes of their unpaid
     30-minute meal period performing patient care and clinical
     duties without compensation.

On Dec. 20, 2021, the Court held oral argument on the Plaintiffs'
pending motion.

Judge Solomson notes that nurses (and other medical professionals)
employed by the VA are exempt from the overtime pay provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. Section 201, et
seq., and the Federal Employees Pay Act (FEPA), 5 U.S.C. Section
5542, et seq. Instead, VA nurses are compensated for hours worked
in excess of defined limits pursuant to overtime pay provisions of
Title 38 of the United States Code. Specifically, nurses are
entitled to "additional pay" pursuant to 38 U.S.C. Section
7453(e).

The crux of the Plaintiffs' allegations is that they were
"expected, required, and induced" to work without compensation on a
recurring and involuntary basis additional hours in excess of
fifteen minutes in a calendar day, in excess of 40 hours in an
administrative workweek, in excess of eight consecutive hours in a
workday, or in excess of their daily work requirements during their
unpaid meal period to ensure that patient care was not
compromised.

To resolve the pending class certification motion, the Court
primarily focuses on the RCFC 23 requirements of commonality,
predominance, and typicality. The Court, then, considers
superiority and numerosity, particularly with regard to how those
class certification requirements apply in the context of an opt-in
class action.

Judge Solomson holds that the Plaintiffs' motion fails to
demonstrate commonality, predominance, and typicality. He states
that the Plaintiffs' evidence does not demonstrate that even bare
inducement is resolvable on a classwide basis. Moreover, regardless
of the proper test for compensable overtime pursuant to 38 U.S.C.
Section 7453(e), the Plaintiffs have not shown that any of the
critical class certification questions the Plaintiffs have posed
are answerable on a classwide basis. Thus, class certification is
not warranted pursuant to RCFC 23.

The Court also holds that the Plaintiffs' motion also fails the
"far more demanding" predominance requirement. Given that the
nature of evidence in this case will necessarily vary across the
Plaintiffs, Judge Solomson says there are no common answers to
common questions here nor do they predominate; accordingly, the
claims are not appropriate for class certification.

Measuring damages here similarly presents an insurmountable
obstacle to class certification in this case, Judge Solomson finds.
The Court is convinced that where individualized damages questions
would overwhelm any possible common liability question, class
certification should be denied.

The Court concludes that the putative class representatives' claims
are typical of the broader putative class only in the most general
sense that they involve overtime claims based on alleged work
performed during unpaid breaks. That level of generality, however,
is not sufficient to overcome the Plaintiffs' failure to
demonstrate commonality and predominance.

The Court holds that the Plaintiffs have not met their burden to
demonstrate numerosity or superiority. The Court concludes that the
Plaintiffs have not carried their burden on numerosity or
superiority, although neither factor clearly favors the
government.

Accordingly, Judge Solomson directs the parties to meet-and-confer
and to submit a joint status report regarding how this case should
proceed. In particular, the parties must provide a comprehensive
case management plan, addressing:

   1. how the claims of the Plaintiffs, who already have joined
      this case will proceed, including whether the Court should
      utilize a bellwether-type approach;

   2. how discovery on the merits will be conducted;

   3. whether, despite having denied the Plaintiffs' motion to
      certify a class, this Court nevertheless should facilitate
      the joinder of additional plaintiffs; and

   4. a proposed schedule to resolve this case.

Should the evidence ultimately show that class resolution may be
possible for particular groups of nurses, the Plaintiffs may be
granted leave to renew their motion for class certification at a
future date.

For all of these reasons, the Plaintiffs' motion to certify a class
action is denied, without prejudice. The parties will file the
joint status report ordered herein on or before Nov. 21, 2022.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Oct. 20,
2022, is available at https://tinyurl.com/22cbxzdn from
Leagle.com.

Jacob Y. Statman -- jstatman@sniderlaw.com -- Snider & Associates,
LLC, in Baltimore, Maryland, for the Plaintiff. Of counsel was
Jason I. Weisbrot -- jason@sniderlaw.com.

Liridona Sinani -- liridona.sinani@usdoj.gov -- Commercial
Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of
Justice, in Washington, D.C., for the Defendant. With her on the
briefs were Brian M. Boynton -- brian.m.boynton@usdoj.gov -- Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Martin F. Hockey, Jr. --
martin.hockey@usdoj.gov -- Acting Director, and Elizabeth M.
Hosford -- Elizabeth.Hosford@usdoj.gov -- Assistant Director. Of
counsel were Mark Frassinelli and Barbara Burke, Office of General
Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, in
Washington, D.C.


VISALUS INC: Refusal to Decertify Class in Wakefield Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled LORI WAKEFIELD, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee v. VISALUS, INC.,
a Nevada corporation, Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 21-35201 (9th
Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:

   (a) affirms the district court's denial of ViSalus's
       post-trial motion to decertify class;

   (b) affirms the district court's denial of ViSalus's
       post-trial motion to grant judgment as a matter of law, or
       grant a new trial; and

   (c) vacates and remands the district court's denial of
       ViSalus's post-trial motion challenging the
       constitutionality of the statutory damages award to permit
       reassessment of that question guided by the applicable
       factors.

Each party will bear its own costs.

Ms. Wakefield, seeking to represent herself and a now certified
class of similarly situated individuals, initiated this action
against ViSalus under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA"), alleging that ViSalus unlawfully sent her and the other
class members automated telephone calls featuring an artificial or
prerecorded voice message without prior express consent. During the
relevant timeframe, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
rules were amended to define "prior express consent" to require,
among other things, a written disclosure explicitly stating that,
by providing a signature and phone number, the recipient consented
to receive calls featuring an artificial or prerecorded voice.

Ms. Wakefield and other class members had signed up with ViSalus to
purchase or sell purported weight-loss products. When their
interest as customers or promoters waned, ViSalus sought to get
their continued participation through targeted robocalls. Wakefield
then brought federal statutory claims in response to these calls.

Because ViSalus did not provide the required written disclosures to
the Plaintiffs before making the calls at issue, it petitioned the
FCC for a retroactive waiver of the written prior express consent
rule. It did not, however, plead prior express consent as an
affirmative defense.

After a three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict against
ViSalus, finding that it sent 1,850,440 prerecorded calls in
violation of the TCPA. Because the TCPA sets the minimum statutory
damages at $500 per call, the total damage award against ViSalus
was $925,220,000.

Nearly two months later, the FCC granted ViSalus a retroactive
waiver of the heightened written consent and disclosure
requirements. ViSalus then filed post-trial motions to decertify
the class, grant judgment as a matter of law, or grant a new trial
on the ground that the FCC's waiver necessarily meant ViSalus had
consent for the calls made. Alternatively, ViSalus filed a
post-trial motion challenging the $925,220,000 statutory damages
award as being unconstitutionally excessive. The district court
denied these motions, and ViSalus timely appealed.

ViSalus is a multi-level marketing company that sells purported
weight-loss products direct to consumers. Its success depends on
individuals signing up with ViSalus as either "customers" who only
purchase products, or "promoters" who can also earn rewards by
referring ViSalus products to new customers.

Promoters and customers become part of the ViSalus network by
completing an enrollment application. During the relevant time,
these applications asked individuals to voluntarily provide a phone
number to ViSalus. The enrollment applications varied as to what
communication options they provided applicants. ViSalus often
communicated with its customers and promoters who had provided a
phone number.  

From 2012 to 2015, ViSalus began systematically placing telephone
calls as part of what it termed a "WinBack" campaign, designed to
entice former promoters and customers to return to or reactivate
their ViSalus memberships by offering promotional pricing on
ViSalus products. These calls were initially placed by an "outreach
team." By 2015, to increase the efficiency of ViSalus's "outreach,"
the company turned to a "Progressive Outreach Manager" automated
system that allowed it to make tens of thousands of calls with the
push of a button. A large volume of the calls placed using this
system featured pre-recorded messages.

Ms. Wakefield enrolled to be a ViSalus promoter in 2012, and
voluntarily provided her phone number to ViSalus on her enrollment
application. After discontinuing her relationship with ViSalus a
few months later and receiving written confirmation of the
termination of the relationship in March of 2013, she had no
further contact with the company until April 2015, when she
received five prerecorded audio messages from ViSalus on her home
phone as part of the WinBack Campaign.

Ms. Wakefield instituted the lawsuit in October 2015, alleging that
ViSalus had violated the TCPA by sending unsolicited telemarketing
calls featuring artificial or prerecorded voices without her prior
express consent. ViSalus answered the complaint, alleging that
Wakefield could not make out a claim under the TCPA. ViSalus did
not plead that it had consent for the calls it made to the
Plaintiffs.

After a brief class discovery period, Wakefield moved to certify
her TCPA claims for class treatment. The district court thereafter
granted the motion in part, and certified a class:

     All individuals in the United States who received a
     telephone call made by or on behalf of ViSalus:
     (1) promoting ViSalus's products or services; (2) where such
     call featured an artificial or prerecorded voice; and
     (3) where neither ViSalus nor its agents had any current
     record of prior express written consent to place such call
     at the time such call was made.

ViSalus raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the Plaintiffs
can establish a concrete injury in fact under Article III; (2)
whether ViSalus's failure to assert a consent defense at trial is
excused because the FCC's retroactive waiver constituted an
intervening change in law; and (3) whether the $925,220,000
aggregate damages award violates due process because it is
unconstitutionally excessive.

ViSalus argues for the first time on appeal that Wakefield and
other members of the certified class lack Article III standing to
sue. The Court of Appeals reviews this issue de novo, citing
Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2003), and holds
that the Plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit.

ViSalus argues that the district court erred in refusing to
consider the FCC's retroactive waiver when ruling on ViSalus's
motions to decertify the class, grant judgment as a matter of law,
or grant a new trial. Because ViSalus waived a consent defense and
no intervening change in law excuses this waiver, the Court of
Appeals disagrees.

As a preliminary matter, Judge Tallman holds that the district
court properly concluded that ViSalus had waived a consent defense.
It also properly concluded that the FCC's grant of ViSalus's
petition did not excuse ViSalus's waiver of its consent defense,
Judge Tallman holds. The Court of Appeals finds that ViSalus does
not qualify for protection under the intervening change in law
exception. Even if the FCC's retroactive waiver of the 2012 Rule
did constitute a change in law, ViSalus always reasonably knew, or
should have known, that the FCC was quite likely to grant its
petition.

ViSalus last argues that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment requires a reduction of the $925,220,000 statutory
damages award. It argues that even if the TCPA's statutory penalty
of $500 per violation is constitutional, an aggregate award of
$925,220,000 in this class action case is so "severe and
oppressive" that it violates ViSalus's due process rights.

Judge Tallman notes that aggregation can, in extreme circumstances,
result in awards that may greatly outmatch any statutory
compensation and deterrence goals, resulting in awards that are
largely punitive. He concludes that the aggregated statutory
damages, even where the per-violation penalty is constitutional,
are subject to constitutional limitation in extreme situations.
Just because an aggregate award becomes predominantly punitive does
not render it constitutionally unsound.

Because the district court did not apply the Williams test or Six
Mexican Workers factors to determine the constitutionality of the
damages award in this case, the Court of Appeals remands so the
court may assess in the first instance, guided by these factors and
this opinion, whether the aggregate award of $925,220,000 in this
class action case is so severe and oppressive that it violates
ViSalus's due process rights and, if so, by how much the cumulative
award should be reduced.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Oct. 20, 2022, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/mr2j2rkf from Leagle.com.

Becky S. James -- bjames@dykema.com -- and Lisa M. Burnett --
lmburnett@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett LLP, in Los Angeles,
California; Ryan J. Vanover -- rvanover@dykema.com -- Dykema
Gossett PLLC, in Detroit, Michigan, for the Defendant-Appellant.

J. Aaron Lawson -- alawson@edelson.com -- and Rafey S. Balabanian
-- rbalabanian@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, in San Francisco,
California; Jay Edelson -- jedelson@edelson.com -- Ryan D. Andrews
-- randrews@edelson.com -- Benjamin H. Richman --
brichman@edelson.com -- and Ryan D. Andrews -- randrews@edelson.com
-- Edelson PC, in Chicago, Illinois; Greg S. Dovel --
greg@dovel.com -- Simon Franzini -- simon@dovel.com -- Dovel &
Luner, in Santa Monica, California; Scott F. Kocher, Forum Law
Group LLP, in Portland, Oregon, for the Plaintiff-Appellee.


WARNER BROS: Appeals Arbitration Bid Denial in Keebaugh Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC. is taking an appeal from a court
order denying its Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings
in the lawsuit entitled Charissa Keebaugh, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., Defendant, Case No.
2:22-cv-01272-MEMF-AGR, the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
filed this putative class action against Warner Bros. on Feb. 24,
2022. The Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC")
against Warner Bros. on May 23, 2022, alleging nine causes of
action: (1) violation of California's Unfair Competition Law; (2)
violation of California's False Advertising Law; (3) violation of
the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act; (4) fraud; (5)
negligent misrepresentation; (6) declaratory judgment; (7)
violation of New Hampshire's Regulation of Business Practices for
Consumer Protection Act; (8) violation of Washington's Consumer
Protection Act; and (9) violation of New York General Business Law
Sections 349 & 350. The Complaint identifies a Global Class of:
"all persons, within the applicable statute of limitations, who
purchased False Gold Strikethrough Packs or False Sale Packs,
and/or such subclasses as the Court may deem appropriate." The
Plaintiffs allege that Warner Bros. deceived them, and other
consumers like them, by falsely advertising discounts on in-app
purchases.

On June 13, 2022, Warner Bros. filed a Motion to Compel
Arbitration. The Court heard oral argument on the Motion on Oct. 6,
2022. During the hearing, the Court asked Warner Bros. to submit
images relating to the downloading of Game of Thrones ("GOTC") and
the Opening Screens. Following the hearing, Warner Bros. submitted
supplemental exhibits to the Court, which the Court considered in
reaching its decision.

On Oct. 13, 2022, the Court denied the Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Stay Proceedings through an Order entered by Judge
Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong. The Court ruled that Warner Bros. has
failed to meet its burden to establish that it provided reasonably
conspicuous notice of the Terms of Use ("TOU") on its Opening
Screen. Because Warner Bros. has not met the first element of
mutual assent, it has not established the existence of a valid
arbitration agreement. As such, the Court denied its motion.

The appellate case is captioned Charissa Keebaugh, et al. v. Warner
Bros. Entertainment Inc., Case No. 22-55982, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on October 21, 2022.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. Mediation
Questionnaire was due on October 28, 2022;

   -- Appellant Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. opening brief is
due on January 30, 2023;

   -- Appellees Charissa Keebaugh, Heather Mercieri, Stephanie
Neveu, Sophia Nicholson and P.W. answering brief is due on March 1,
2023; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief. [BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees CHARISSA KEEBAUGH, et al., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented by:

            Raphael Janove, Esq.
            POLLOCK COHEN, LLP
            111 Broadway, Suite 1804
            New York, NY 10006
            Telephone: (212) 337-5361

                   - and -

            Karl S. Kronenberger, Esq.
            KRONENBERGER ROSENFELD, LLP
            150 Post Street
            San Francisco, CA 94108
            Telephone: (415) 955-1155

Defendant-Appellee WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC. is represented
by:

            Christopher Chorba, Esq.
            GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP
            333 S. Grand Avenue
            Los Angeles, CA 90071
            Telephone: (213) 229-7396

                   - and -

            Patrick James Fuster, Esq.
            GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP
            333 S. Grand Avenue
            Los Angeles, CA 90071
            Telephone: (213) 229-7117

                   - and -

            Jeremy Sokol Smith, Esq.
            GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP
            333 S. Grand Avenue
            Los Angeles, CA 90071
            Telephone: (213) 229-7973

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3M Co. Co-Defends Numerous Product Liability Suits
-------------------------------------------------------------------
3M Company, as of September 30, 2022, is a named defendant, with
multiple co-defendants, in numerous lawsuits in various courts that
purport to represent approximately 4,088 individual claimants,
compared to approximately 3,876 individual claimants with actions
pending December 31, 2021, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "The vast majority of the lawsuits and claims
resolved by and currently pending against the Company allege use of
some of the Company's mask and respirator products and seek damages
from the Company and other defendants for alleged personal injury
from workplace exposures to asbestos, silica, coal mine dust or
other occupational dusts found in products manufactured by other
defendants or generally in the workplace. A minority of the
lawsuits and claims resolved by and currently pending against the
Company generally allege personal injury from occupational exposure
to asbestos from products previously manufactured by the Company,
which are often unspecified, as well as products manufactured by
other defendants, or occasionally at Company premises.

"The Company's current volume of new and pending matters is
substantially lower than it experienced at the peak of filings in
2003. The Company expects that filing of claims by unimpaired
claimants in the future will continue to be at much lower levels
than in the past. Accordingly, the number of claims alleging more
serious injuries, including mesothelioma, other malignancies, and
black lung disease, will represent a greater percentage of total
claims than in the past. Over the past twenty plus years, the
Company has prevailed in fifteen of the sixteen cases tried to a
jury (including the lawsuits in 2018 described below). In 2018, 3M
received a jury verdict in its favor in two lawsuits – one in
California state court in February and the other in Massachusetts
state court in December – both involving allegations that 3M
respirators were defective and failed to protect the plaintiffs
against asbestos fibers. In April 2018, a jury in state court in
Kentucky found 3M's 8710 respirators failed to protect two coal
miners from coal mine dust and awarded compensatory damages of
approximately $2 million and punitive damages totaling $63 million.
In August 2018, the trial court entered judgment and the Company
appealed. In 2019, the Company settled a substantial majority of
the then-pending coal mine dust lawsuits in Kentucky and West
Virginia for $340 million, including the jury verdict in April 2018
in the Kentucky case mentioned above and the appeal has been
dismissed. In October 2020, 3M defended a respirator case before a
jury in King County, Washington, involving a former shipyard worker
who alleged 3M's 8710 respirator was defective and that 3M acted
negligently in failing to protect him against asbestos fibers. The
jury delivered a complete defense verdict in favor of 3M,
concluding that the 8710 respirator was not defective in design or
warnings and any conduct by 3M was not a cause of plaintiff's
mesothelioma. The plaintiff appealed the verdict. In May 2022, the
First Division intermediate appellate court in Washington affirmed
in part and reversed in part 3M's trial victory, concluding that
the trial court misapplied Washington law in instructing the jury
about factual causation. 3M has sought review by the Washington
Supreme Court.

"The Company has demonstrated in these past trial proceedings that
its respiratory protection products are effective as claimed when
used in the intended manner and in the intended circumstances.
Consequently, the Company believes that claimants are unable to
establish that their medical conditions, even if significant, are
attributable to the Company's respiratory protection products.
Nonetheless, the Company's litigation experience indicates that
claims of persons alleging more serious injuries, including
mesothelioma, other malignancies, and black lung disease, are
costlier to resolve than the claims of unimpaired persons, and it
therefore believes the average cost of resolving pending and future
claims on a per-claim basis will continue to be higher than it
experienced in prior periods when the vast majority of claims were
asserted by medically unimpaired claimants. Since the second half
of 2020, the Company has experienced an increase in the number of
cases filed that allege injuries from exposures to coal mine dust;
that increase represents the substantial majority of the growth in
case numbers referred to above.

"As previously reported, the State of West Virginia, through its
Attorney General, filed a complaint in 2003 against the Company and
two other manufacturers of respiratory protection products in the
Circuit Court of Lincoln County, West Virginia, and amended its
complaint in 2005. The amended complaint seeks substantial, but
unspecified, compensatory damages primarily for reimbursement of
the costs allegedly incurred by the State for worker's compensation
and healthcare benefits provided to all workers with occupational
pneumoconiosis and unspecified punitive damages. In October 2019,
the court granted the State's motion to sever its unfair trade
practices claim, which seeks civil penalties of up to $5,000 per
violation under the state's Consumer Credit Protection Act relating
to statements that the State contends were misleading about 3M's
respirators. A bench trial for the unfair trade practices claims
has been set for November 2022. An expert witness retained by the
State has recently estimated that 3M sold over five million
respirators into the state during the relevant time period, and the
State alleges that each respirator sold constitutes a separate
violation under the Act. 3M disputes the expert's estimates and the
State's position regarding what constitutes a separate violation of
the Act. 3M has asserted various additional defenses, including
that the Company's marketing did not violate the Act at any time,
and that the State's claims are barred under the applicable statute
of limitations. No liability has been recorded for any portion of
this matter because the Company believes that liability is not
probable and reasonably estimable at this time. In addition, the
Company is not able to estimate a possible loss or range of loss
given the lack of any meaningful discovery responses by the State
of West Virginia as to key issues, and the assertions of claims
against two other manufacturers where a defendant's share of
liability may turn on the law of joint and several liability and by
the amount of fault, if any, a factfinder may allocate to each
defendant if the case were ultimately tried."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3TEeAw9


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Albany Int'l. Defends 3,603 Claims at Sept. 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
Albany International Corp. is s defendant of 3,603 claims as of
September 30, 2022, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Albany International Corp. is a defendant in
suits brought in various courts in the United States by plaintiffs
who allege that they have suffered personal injury as a result of
exposure to asbestos-containing paper machine clothing synthetic
dryer fabrics marketed during the period from 1967 to 1976 and used
in certain paper mills.

"We anticipate that additional claims will be filed against the
Company and related companies in the future but are unable to
predict the number and timing of such future claims. Due to the
fact that information sufficient to meaningfully estimate a range
of possible loss of a particular claim is typically not available
until late in the discovery process, we do not believe a meaningful
estimate can be made regarding the range of possible loss with
respect to pending or future claims and therefore are unable to
estimate a range of reasonably possible loss in excess of amounts
already accrued for pending or future claims.

"While we believe we have meritorious defenses to these claims, we
have settled certain claims for amounts we consider reasonable
given the facts and circumstances of each case. Our insurance
carrier has defended each case and funded settlements under a
standard reservation of rights. As of September 30, 2022, we had
resolved, by means of settlement or dismissal, 38,007 claims. The
total cost of resolving all claims was $10.5 million. Of this
amount, almost 100% was paid by our insurance carrier, who has
confirmed that we have approximately $140 million of remaining
coverage under primary and excess policies that should be available
with respect to current and future asbestos claims.

"The Company's subsidiary, Brandon Drying Fabrics, Inc.
("Brandon"), is also a separate defendant in many of the asbestos
cases in which Albany is named as a defendant, despite never having
manufactured any fabrics containing asbestos. While Brandon was
defending against 7,709 claims as of September 30, 2022, only
twelve claims have been filed against Brandon since January 1,
2012, and only $15,000 in settlement costs have been incurred since
2001. Brandon was acquired by the Company in 1999 and has its own
insurance policies covering periods prior to 1999. Since 2004,
Brandon's insurance carriers have covered 100% of indemnification
and defense costs, subject to policy limits and a standard
reservation of rights.

"In some of these asbestos cases, the Company is named both as a
direct defendant and as the "successor in interest" to Mount Vernon
Mills ("Mount Vernon"). We acquired certain assets from Mount
Vernon in 1993. Certain plaintiffs allege injury caused by
asbestos-containing products alleged to have been sold by Mount
Vernon many years prior to this acquisition. Mount Vernon is
contractually obligated to indemnify the Company against any
liability arising out of such products. We deny any liability for
products sold by Mount Vernon prior to the acquisition of the Mount
Vernon assets. Pursuant to its contractual indemnification
obligations, Mount Vernon has assumed the defense of these claims.
On this basis, we have successfully moved for dismissal in a number
of actions."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3NX5vwX

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Carrier Global Has $231MM Asbestos Liabilities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Carrier Global Corporation, as of September 30, 2022, has $231
million total asbestos liabilities, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "The amounts recorded for asbestos-related
liabilities are based on currently available information and
assumptions that the Company believes are reasonable and are made
with input from outside actuarial experts. These amounts are
undiscounted and exclude the Company's legal fees to defend the
asbestos claims, which are expensed as incurred. In addition, the
Company has recorded insurance recovery receivables for probable
asbestos-related recoveries.

"The Company has been named as a defendant in lawsuits alleging
personal injury as a result of exposure to asbestos allegedly
integrated into certain Carrier products or business premises.
While the Company has never manufactured asbestos and no longer
incorporates it into any currently-manufactured products, certain
products that the Company no longer manufactures contained
components incorporating asbestos. A substantial majority of these
asbestos-related claims have been dismissed without payment or have
been covered in full or in part by insurance or other forms of
indemnity. Additional cases were litigated and settled without any
insurance reimbursement. The amounts involved in asbestos-related
claims were not material individually or in the aggregate in any
period."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3G0O2lh



ASBESTOS UPDATE: Chemours Co Has 900 Pending Suits at Sept. 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Chemours Company, at September 30, 2022 and December 31, 2021,
had approximately 900 and 1,000 lawsuits pending against former
parent company E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (EID) alleging
personal injury from exposure to asbestos, respectively, according
to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "In the Separation, EID assigned its asbestos
docket to Chemours.  These cases are pending in state and federal
court in numerous jurisdictions in the U.S. and are individually
set for trial. A small number of cases are pending outside of the
U.S. Most of the actions were brought by contractors who worked at
sites between the 1950s and the 1990s. A small number of cases
involve similar allegations by EID employees or household members
of contractors or EID employees. Finally, certain lawsuits allege
personal injury as a result of exposure to EID products.

"At September 30, 2022 and December 31, 2021, Chemours had an
accrual of $33 related to these matters."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3ElSqdE


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Colgate-Palmolive Has 224 Cases Pending
--------------------------------------------------------
Colgate-Palmolive Company, as of September 30, 2022, has recorded
224 individual cases pending in state and federal courts throughout
the United States, as compared to 203 cases as of June 30, 2022 and
171 cases as of December 31, 2021, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

During the three months ended September 30, 2022, 33 new cases were
filed and 12 cases were resolved by voluntary dismissal or
settlement. During the nine months ended September 30, 2022, 72
cases were filed and 19 cases were resolved by voluntary dismissal
or settlement. The values of the settlements in the quarter and
year-to-date period presented were not material, either
individually or in the aggregate, to the Company's results of
operations in either such period.

The Company has been named as a defendant in civil actions alleging
that certain talcum powder products that were sold prior to 1996
were contaminated with asbestos and/or caused mesothelioma and
other cancers. Many of these actions involve a number of
co-defendants from a variety of different industries, including
suppliers of asbestos and manufacturers of products that, unlike
the Company's products, were designed to contain asbestos.

A significant portion of the Company's costs incurred in defending
and resolving these claims has been, and the Company believes that
a portion of such costs will continue to be, covered by insurance
policies issued by several primary, excess and umbrella insurance
carriers, subject to deductibles, exclusions, retentions, policy
limits and insurance carrier insolvencies.

While the Company and its legal counsel believe that these cases
are without merit and intend to challenge them vigorously, there
can be no assurances regarding the ultimate resolution of these
matters.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3UGpVMW


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Columbus McKinnon Has $10.6MM Est. Liabilities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Columbus McKinnon Corporation has reported an estimated net
asbestos-related aggregate liability including related legal costs
to range between $5,800,000 and $10,600,000, net of insurance
recoveries, using actuarial parameters of continued claims for a
period of 37 years from September 30, 2022, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

The Company states, "The Company has estimated its asbestos-related
aggregate liability that is probable and estimable, net of
insurance recoveries, in accordance with U.S. generally accepted
accounting principles approximates $7,749,000. The Company has
reflected the liability gross of insurance recoveries of $9,059,000
as a liability in the Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheet as of
September 30, 2022. The recorded liability does not consider the
impact of any potential favorable federal legislation. This
liability will fluctuate based on the uncertainty in the number of
future claims that will be filed and the cost to resolve those
claims, which may be influenced by a number of factors, including
the outcome of the ongoing broad-based settlement negotiations,
defensive strategies, and the cost to resolve claims outside the
broad-based settlement program. Of this amount, management expects
to incur asbestos liability payments of approximately $2,400,000
over the next 12 months. Because payment of the liability is likely
to extend over many years, management believes that the potential
additional costs for claims will not have a material effect on the
financial condition of the Company or its liquidity, although the
effect of any future liabilities recorded could be material to
earnings in a future period.

"Like many industrial manufacturers, the Company is involved in
asbestos-related litigation.  In continually evaluating costs
relating to its estimated asbestos-related liability, the Company
reviews, among other things, the incidence of past and recent
claims, the historical case dismissal rate, the mix of the claimed
illnesses and occupations of the plaintiffs, its recent and
historical resolution of the cases, the number of cases pending
against it, the status and results of broad-based settlement
discussions, and the number of years such activity might continue.
Based on this review, the Company has estimated its share of
liability to defend and resolve probable asbestos-related personal
injury claims. This estimate is highly uncertain due to the
limitations of the available data and the difficulty of forecasting
with any certainty the numerous variables that can affect the range
of the liability. The Company will continue to study the variables
in light of additional information in order to identify trends that
may become evident and to assess their impact on the range of
liability that is probable and estimable."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3TtQqEi


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Hartford Financial Still Defends A&E Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., continues to receive
A&E claims, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Asbestos claims relate primarily to bodily
injuries asserted by people who came in contact with asbestos or
products containing asbestos. Environmental claims relate primarily
to pollution and related clean-up costs.

"The vast majority of the Company's exposure to A&E relates to
Run-off A&E, reported within the P&C Other Operations segment. In
addition, since 1986, the Company has written asbestos and
environmental exposures under general liability policies and
pollution liability under homeowners policies, which are reported
in the Commercial Lines and Personal Lines segments.

"Prior to 1986, the Company wrote several different categories of
insurance contracts that may cover A&E claims. First, the Company
wrote primary policies providing the first layer of coverage in an
insured's liability program. Second, the Company wrote excess and
umbrella policies providing higher layers of coverage for losses
that exhaust the limits of underlying coverage. Third, the Company
acted as a reinsurer assuming a portion of those risks assumed by
other insurers writing primary, excess, umbrella and reinsurance
coverages.

"Significant uncertainty limits the ability of insurers and
reinsurers to estimate the ultimate reserves necessary for unpaid
gross losses and expenses related to environmental and asbestos
claims. The degree of variability of gross reserve estimates for
these exposures is significantly greater than for other more
traditional exposures."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3NVBQnL


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Honeywell Still Faces Personal Injury Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
Honeywell International Inc. is named in asbestos-related personal
injury claims related to North American Refractories Company
(NARCO), which was sold in 1986, and the Bendix Friction Materials
(Bendix) business, which was sold in 2014, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

The Company states, "NARCO manufactured high-grade, heat-resistant,
refractory products for various industries. Honeywell's
predecessor, Allied Corporation, owned NARCO from 1979 to 1986.
Allied Corporation sold the NARCO business in 1986 and entered into
a cross-indemnity agreement which included an obligation to
indemnify the purchaser for asbestos claims, arising primarily from
alleged occupational exposure to asbestos-containing refractory
brick and mortar for high-temperature applications. NARCO ceased
manufacturing these products in 1980 and filed for bankruptcy in
January 2002, at which point in time all then current and future
NARCO asbestos claims were stayed against both NARCO and Honeywell
pending the reorganization of NARCO. The Company established its
initial liability for NARCO asbestos claims in 2002.

"The NARCO asbestos-related liability reflects an estimate for the
resolution of Annual Contribution Claims and Pre-Established
Unliquidated Claims filed with the Trust, as well as for unasserted
Annual Contribution Claims and Pre-Established Unliquidated Claims.
The NARCO asbestos-related liability excludes the annual operating
expenses of the Trust which are expensed as they are incurred
(approximately $21 million in 2021).

"Bendix manufactured automotive brake linings that contained
chrysotile asbestos in an encapsulated form. Claimants consist
largely of individuals who allege exposure to asbestos from brakes
from either performing or being in the vicinity of individuals who
performed brake replacements.

"The Company reflects the inclusion of all years of epidemiological
disease projection through 2059 when estimating the liability for
unasserted Bendix-related asbestos claims. Such liability for
unasserted Bendix-related asbestos claims is based on historic and
anticipated claims filing experience and dismissal rates, disease
classifications, and resolution values in the tort system for the
previous five years. The Company valued Bendix asserted and
unasserted claims using average resolution values for the previous
five years. The Company updates the resolution values used to
estimate the cost of Bendix asserted and unasserted claims during
the fourth quarter each year."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3DYgRfJ


ASBESTOS UPDATE: IDEX Corp. Still Faces Exposure Lawsuits
---------------------------------------------------------
IDEX Corporation and seven of its subsidiaries are presently named
as defendants in a number of lawsuits claiming various
asbestos-related personal injuries, allegedly as a result of
exposure to products manufactured with components that contained
asbestos, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "These components were acquired from third
party suppliers and were not manufactured by the Company or any of
the defendant subsidiaries. To date, the majority of the Company's
settlements and legal costs, except for costs of coordination,
administration, insurance investigation and a portion of defense
costs, have been covered in full by insurance, subject to
applicable deductibles. However, the Company cannot predict whether
and to what extent insurance will be available to continue to cover
these settlements and legal costs, or how insurers may respond to
claims that are tendered to them. Asbestos-related claims have been
filed in jurisdictions throughout the United States and the United
Kingdom. Most of the claims resolved to date have been dismissed
without payment. The balance of the claims have been settled for
various immaterial amounts. Only one case has been tried, resulting
in a verdict for the Company's business unit. No provision has been
made in the financial statements of the Company, other than for
insurance deductibles in the ordinary course, and the Company does
not currently believe the asbestos-related claims will have a
material adverse effect on the Company's business, financial
position, results of operations or cash flows.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3fRnAjo


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Lincoln Electric Co-Defends 1,489 Exposure Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
Lincoln Electric Holdings, Inc., as of September 30, 2022, was a
co-defendant in cases alleging asbestos induced illness involving
claims by approximately 1,489 plaintiffs, which is a net decrease
of 12 claims from those previously reported, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

The Company states, "In each instance, the Company is one of a
large number of defendants. The asbestos claimants seek
compensatory and punitive damages, in most cases for unspecified
sums. Since January 1, 1995, the Company has been a co-defendant in
other similar cases that have been resolved as follows: 56,866 of
those claims were dismissed, 23 were tried to defense verdicts, 7
were tried to plaintiff verdicts (which were reversed or resolved
after appeal), 1 was resolved by agreement for an immaterial amount
and 1,012 were decided in favor of the Company following summary
judgment motions."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3NUSmEK


ASBESTOS UPDATE: MSA LLC Faces 4,193 Claims at Sept. 30
-------------------------------------------------------
MSA Safety Incorporated's subsidiary, Mine Safety Appliances
Company, LLC ("MSA LLC") was named as a defendant in 1,544
cumulative trauma lawsuits comprised of 4,193 claims at September
30, 2022, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Cumulative trauma product liability claims
involve exposures to harmful substances (e.g., silica, asbestos and
coal dust) that occurred years ago and may have developed over long
periods of time into diseases such as silicosis, asbestosis,
mesothelioma or coal worker's pneumoconiosis. A reserve has been
established with respect to estimated amounts for cumulative trauma
product liability claims currently asserted, as well as, incurred
but not reported ("IBNR") cumulative trauma product liability
claims. Because our cumulative trauma product liability risk is
subject to inherent uncertainties, and since MSA LLC is largely
self-insured, there can be no certainty that MSA LLC may not
ultimately incur losses in excess of presently recorded
liabilities. Many factors affecting cumulative trauma product
liability claims may change over time or as a result of sudden
unfavorable events within a single reporting period. Associated
losses could have a material adverse effect on our business,
operating results, financial condition and liquidity, or could
result in volatility from period to period.

"We will adjust the reserve from time to time based on developments
in MSA LLC's actual claims experience, the claims environment or
other significant changes in the factors underlying the assumptions
used in establishing the reserve. Each of these factors may
increase or decrease significantly within an individual period
depending on, among other things, the timing of claims filings,
settlements, or litigation outcomes during a particular period that
are especially favorable or unfavorable to MSA LLC. We accordingly
consider MSA LLC's claims experience over multiple periods or
whether there are changes in MSA LLC's claims experience and trends
that are likely to continue for a significant time into the future
in determining whether to make an adjustment to the reserve, rather
than evaluating such factors solely in the short term. Any future
adjustments to the reserve may be material and could materially
impact future periods in which the reserve is adjusted.

"In the normal course of business, MSA LLC makes payments to settle
these types of cumulative trauma product liability claims and for
related defense costs, and records receivables for the amounts
believed to be recoverable under insurance. MSA LLC has recorded
insurance receivables totaling $125.9 million and notes receivables
of $44.3 million at September 30, 2022. Since MSA LLC is now
largely self-insured for cumulative trauma claims, additional
amounts recorded as insurance receivables will be limited. Amounts
recorded as insurance receivables are based on the amount of future
losses presently recorded in the cumulative trauma product
liability reserve. These projected future losses are used to
calculate contingent reimbursements deemed probable of collection
under negotiated Coverage-in-Place Agreements. Reimbursements are
calculated based on modeled assumptions, including claims
composition, claims characteristics, and timing (each of which are
relevant to calculating reimbursement under the terms of
Coverage-In-Place Agreements). These factors, and the potential for
future insurer insolvencies, could affect the timing and amount of
actual receivables collected in any given period or in total."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3WNlt0F


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Otis Worldwide Has $45MM Estimated Liabilities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Otis Worldwide Corporation, as of September 30, 2022 and December
31, 2021, has approximately $22 million to $45 million estimated
range of total liabilities to resolve all pending and unasserted
potential future asbestos claims through 2059, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

The Company states, "Because no amount within the range of
estimates is more likely to occur than any other, we have recorded
the minimum amount of $22 million, which is principally recorded in
Other long-term liabilities on our Condensed Consolidated Balance
Sheets as of September 30, 2022 and December 31, 2021. Amounts are
on a pre-tax basis, not discounted, and exclude the Company's legal
fees to defend the asbestos claims (which will continue to be
expensed as they are incurred). In addition, the Company has an
insurance recovery receivable for probable asbestos-related
recoveries of approximately $5 million, which is principally
included in Other assets on our Condensed Consolidated Balance
Sheets as of September 30, 2022 and December 31, 2021.

"As previously disclosed, we have been named as defendants in
lawsuits alleging personal injury as a result of exposure to
asbestos. While we have never manufactured any asbestos-containing
component parts, and no longer incorporate asbestos in any current
products, certain of our historical products have contained
components manufactured by third parties incorporating asbestos. A
substantial majority of these asbestos-related claims have been
dismissed without payment or were covered in full or in part by
insurance or other forms of indemnity. Additional cases were
litigated and settled without any insurance reimbursement. The
amounts involved in asbestos-related claims were not material
individually or in the aggregate as of and for the periods ended
September 30, 2022 and December 31, 2021."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3DTSaAT


ASBESTOS UPDATE: TriMas Corp. Has 418 Pending Cases at Sept. 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
TriMas Corporation, as of September 30, 2022, was a party to 418
pending cases involving an aggregate of 4,774 claimants primarily
alleging personal injury from exposure to asbestos containing
materials formerly used in gaskets (both encapsulated and
otherwise) manufactured or distributed by its former Lamons
division and certain other related subsidiaries for use primarily
in the petrochemical, refining and exploration industries,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

In addition, the Company acquired various companies to distribute
its products that had distributed gaskets of other manufacturers
prior to acquisition. The Company believes that many of its pending
cases relate to locations at which none of its gaskets were
distributed or used.

The Company may be subjected to significant additional
asbestos-related claims in the future, and will aggressively defend
or reasonably resolve, as appropriate. The cost of settling cases
in which product identification can be made may increase, and the
Company may be subjected to further claims in respect of the former
activities of its acquired gasket distributors. The cost of claims
varies as claims may be initially made in some jurisdictions
without specifying the amount sought or by simply stating the
requisite or maximum permissible monetary relief, and may be
amended to alter the amount sought. The large majority of claims do
not specify the amount sought. Of the 4,774 claims pending at
September 30, 2022, 40 set forth specific amounts of damages (other
than those stating the statutory minimum or maximum). At September
30, 2022, of the 40 claims that set forth specific amounts, there
were zero claims seeking more than $5 million for punitive
damages.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3NUGZfR


ASBESTOS UPDATE: U.S. Steel Defends 930 Active Cases at Sept. 30
----------------------------------------------------------------
United States Steel Corporation, as of September 30, 2022, was a
defendant in approximately 930 active asbestos cases involving
approximately 2,520 plaintiffs, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "The vast majority of these cases involve
multiple defendants. About 1,545, or approximately 61 percent, of
these plaintiff claims are currently pending in a jurisdiction
which permits filings with massive numbers of plaintiffs. At
December 31, 2021, U. S. Steel was a defendant in approximately 915
active asbestos cases involving approximately 2,505 plaintiffs.
Based upon U. S. Steel’s experience in such cases, it believes
that the actual number of plaintiffs who ultimately assert claims
against U. S. Steel will likely be a small fraction of the total
number of plaintiffs.

"The amount U. S. Steel accrues for pending asbestos claims is not
material to U. S. Steel’s financial condition. However, U. S.
Steel is unable to estimate the ultimate outcome of
asbestos-related claims due to a number of uncertainties,
including: (1) the rates at which new claims are filed, (2) the
number of and effect of bankruptcies of other companies
traditionally defending asbestos claims, (3) uncertainties
associated with the variations in the litigation process from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, (4) uncertainties regarding the
facts, circumstances and disease process with each claim and (5)
any new legislation enacted to address asbestos-related claims.

"Further, U. S. Steel does not believe that an accrual for
unasserted claims is required. At any given reporting date, it is
probable that there are unasserted claims that will be filed
against the Company in the future. The Company engages an outside
valuation consultant to assist in assessing its ability to estimate
an accrual for unasserted claims. This assessment is based on the
Company's settlement experience, including recent claims trends.
The analysis focuses on settlements made over the last several
years as these claims are likely to best represent future claim
characteristics. After review by the valuation consultant and U. S.
Steel management, it was determined that the Company could not
estimate an accrual for unasserted claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3fP8US7


ASBESTOS UPDATE: W.W. Grainger Defends Personal Injury Litigation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
W.W. Grainger, Inc., has been named, along with numerous other
nonaffiliated companies, as defendant in litigation in various
states involving asbestos and/or silica, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

These lawsuits typically assert claims of personal injury arising
from alleged exposure to asbestos and/or silica as a consequence of
products manufactured by third parties purportedly distributed by
the Company. While several lawsuits have been dismissed in the past
based on the lack of product identification, if a specific product
distributed by the Company is identified in any pending or future
lawsuits, the Company will seek to exercise indemnification
remedies against the product manufacturer to the extent available.
In addition, the Company believes that a substantial number of
these claims are covered by insurance. The Company has entered into
agreements with its major insurance carriers relating to the scope,
coverage and the costs of defense, of lawsuits involving claims of
exposure to asbestos. The Company believes it has strong legal and
factual defenses and intends to continue defending itself
vigorously in these lawsuits.

While the Company is unable to predict the outcome of any of these
proceedings and other matters, it believes that their ultimate
resolution will not have, either individually or in the aggregate,
a material adverse effect on the Company’s consolidated financial
condition or results of operations.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3tjB36O


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Zurn Elkay Defends 6,000 Personal Injury Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Zurn Elkay Water Solutions Corporation and numerous other unrelated
companies, as of September 30, 2022, were defendants in
approximately 6,000 asbestos related lawsuits representing
approximately 7,000 claims, according to the Company's Form 10-K
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Plaintiffs' claims allege personal injuries
caused by exposure to asbestos used primarily in industrial boilers
formerly manufactured by a segment of Zurn. Zurn did not
manufacture asbestos or asbestos components. Instead, Zurn
purchased them from suppliers. These claims are being handled
pursuant to a defense strategy funded by insurers.
    
"As of September 30, 2022, the Company estimates the potential
liability for the asbestos-related claims described above, as well
as the claims expected to be filed in the next ten years, to be
approximately $66.0 million, of which Zurn expects its insurance
carriers to pay approximately $49.0 million in the next ten years
on such claims, with the balance of the estimated liability being
paid in subsequent years. The $66.0 million was developed based on
actuarial studies and represents the projected indemnity payout for
current and future claims. There are inherent uncertainties
involved in estimating the number of future asbestos claims, future
settlement costs, and the effectiveness of defense strategies and
settlement initiatives. As a result, actual liability could differ
from the estimate described herein and could be substantial. The
liability for the asbestos-related claims is recorded in reserve
for asbestos claims within the condensed consolidated balance
sheets.
    
"Management estimates that its available insurance to cover this
potential asbestos liability as of September 30, 2022 is in excess
of the ten year estimated exposure, and accordingly, believes that
all current claims are covered by insurance.
    
"As of September 30, 2022, the Company had a recorded receivable
from its insurance carriers of $66.0 million, which corresponds to
the amount of this potential asbestos liability that is covered by
available insurance and is currently determined to be probable of
recovery. However, there is no assurance the Company's current
insurance coverage will ultimately be available or that this
asbestos liability will not ultimately exceed the Company's
coverage limits. Factors that could cause a decrease in the amount
of available coverage or create gaps in coverage include: changes
in law governing the policies, potential disputes and settlements
with the carriers regarding the scope of coverage, and insolvencies
of one or more of the Company's carriers. The receivable for
probable asbestos-related recoveries is recorded in insurance for
asbestos claims within the condensed consolidated balance sheets."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3hvzuA7



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2022. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***