/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/230105.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, January 5, 2023, Vol. 25, No. 5

                            Headlines

450 NORTH: Seeks Jan. 17 Extension to File Class Cert Response
ACCENTURE PLC: Sued Over Hotel Data Breach
ACCEPTANCE NOW: Files Bid to Seal Documents in McBurnie Class Suit
ACCURA HEALTH: Class Cert. Hearing Set for Jan. 17
ANCESTRY.COM: Parties Stipulate to Extend Class Cert. Deadlines

ANDREW SCHROEDER: Discovery Plan, Sched Order Entered in Penichter
APPLE INC: Dismissal With Prejudice of Barnett BIPA Suit Affirmed
ARK RESTAURANTS: Settles Labor Suit in New York Court
AUDIBLE INC: Seeks More Time to File Bid to Seal
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE: Dismissal of Family Tacos Class Suit Upheld

BRITAX CHILD: Coleman, et al Seek., to Certify Class & Subclasses
CGS STORES: Seeks Jan. 11 Extension to File Cert Response
CONCENTRIX CORPORATION: Scheduling Order Entered in Helwig Suit
CONSOLIDATED EDISON: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Moses Class Suit
CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Interim Co-Lead Counsel Named in Guy Suit

DAKTRONICS INC: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due Feb. 20
DECORATIVE PANELS: Bid to Dismiss Burcar Suit Terminated as Moot
EASTERN WISCONSIN: $525K Class Settlement in Kapp Suit Has Final OK
FAMILY FIRST: Class Certification Deadline Extended to May 16
FARMERS CASUALTY: Bid to Stay Creasman Class Suit Granted in Part

FCA US: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Myslivecek Class Suit
GLOBAL BROKERAGE: Court Grants Bid to Stay Securities Class Suit
GOFUND ADVANCE: Haymount, et al., Lose Class Certification Bid
HARBOR FREIGHT: Comes Bid to File Docs Under Seal OK'd
HARRY WINSTON: Second Bid for Approval of PAGA Settlement OK'd

HCA-IT&S: Seeks More Time to Respond for Class Certification Bid
HEINEKEN USA: Faces Class Action Over Mislabeled Flavored Beer
INSIDER INC: Parties Must File Revised CMP by Jan. 5
KIROMIC BIOPHARMA: Faces Karp Shareholder Suit Over Stock Offering
KIROMIC BIOPHARMA: Faces Podmore Shareholder Suit Over Stock Offer

LOS ANGELES, CA: Sustention of Demurrer in Kaminsky Suit Affirmed
META PLATFORMS: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Brickman TCPA Suit
META PLATFORMS: Settles Cambridge Analytica Lawsuit for $725-Mil.
MITEK SYSTEMS: Refusal to Send Johnson to Arbitration Affirmed
NEPTUNE WELLNESS: Settlement of Shareholder Suit for Court Nod

NEW BALANCE: Loses Bid to Toss & Strike Cristostomo's Class Claims
NSH PORT: Shadwick Files Bid for Conditional Certification
OLO INC: Scott+Scott Named Lead Counsel in Pompano Class Suit
OREGON: Magistrate Judge Endorses Denial of Zambrano Class Cert Bid
PILLPACK LLC: W.D. Washington Certifies Class in Williams Suit

STREAMLABS LLC: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Amended Leventhal Suit
SWEET EARTH: Bid to Continue Class Cert Deadlines Nixed
TEN BRIDGES: Court OK's Proposed Case Schedule in Taie Class Suit
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY: 6th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Ceres Class Suit
TURQUOISE HILL: Pentwater Remains Lead Plaintiff in Securities Suit

VIESTE SPE: Plaintiffs Seek More Time to File Class Cert Reply
VIRGIN AMERICA: Plaintiffs' Bid to Amend Judgment Granted in Part
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: 9th Cir. Amends Oct. 18, 2020 Memo in Riley Suit
WAREHOUSE DEMO: Cal. App. Flips Summary Judgment in Espinoza Suit
WESTFIELD INSURANCE: Sixth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Equity Suit

WESTFIELD INSURANCE: Sixth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of MIKMAR Suit
ZURICH AMERICAN: Sixth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Brunswick Suit
ZWANGER & PESIRI: Sali FDCPA Class Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice

                            *********

450 NORTH: Seeks Jan. 17 Extension to File Class Cert Response
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as OCTAVIO COLLADO For
himself and all others similarly situated v. 450 NORTH RIVER DRIVE,
LLC, d/b/a KIKI ON THE RIVER, RJ RIVER, LLC, and ROMAN JONES, Case
No. 1:22-CV-23074 (S.D. Fla.), the Defendants ask the Court to
enter an order granting their unopposed motion for extension of
time to respond to the motion for conditional certification of a
Collective Action extending the time in which the Defendants have
to respond to the Motion to January 17, 2023, while also granting
any such other further relief the Court deems just and appropriate
under the circumstances.

On December 7, 2022, the Plaintiff filed his amended complaint
asserting claims for the recovery of tips/overtips and minimum wage
violations. The amended complaint included three discrete causes of
action asserting claims pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act,
Florida Minimum Wage Act, and Florida common law.

On December 19, 2022, the Plaintiff filed his motion for
conditional certification of a Collective Action, which requests
the court conditionally certify Count I, titled Violation(s) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, as a collective action, and appoint him
as the representative.

The Defendants' response to the Motion is currently due on or
before January 3, 2022. The Defendants are in the process of
preparing their response to the Motion, and undersigned counsel has
been working diligently to complete the response.

A copy of the Defendants' motion dated Dec. 28, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Wx2yXk at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Reynaldo Velazquez, Esq.
          Roman Sarangoulis, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
          One Biscayne Tower, Suite 3500
          Two South Biscayne Boulevard
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 577-7600
          E-mail: rey.velazquez@jacksonlewis.com
                  roman.sarangoulis@jacksonlewis.com

ACCENTURE PLC: Sued Over Hotel Data Breach
-------------------------------------------
Accenture PLC disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report for the quarterly
period ended November 30, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on December 16, 2022, that on July 24, 2019,
Accenture was named in a putative class action lawsuit filed by
consumers of Marriott International, Inc. Marriott in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland.

The complaint alleges negligence by the company and seeks monetary
damages, costs and attorneys' fees, and other related relief,
relating to a data security incident involving unauthorized access
to the reservations database of Starwood Worldwide Resorts, Inc.
("Starwood"), which was acquired by Marriott on September 23, 2016.


On October 27, 2020, the court issued an order largely denying
Accenture's motion to dismiss the claims against the company. On
May 3, 2022, the court issued an order granting in part the
plaintiffs' motion for class certification, which the company is
appealing.

Accenture is a professional services company based in Ireland.


ACCEPTANCE NOW: Files Bid to Seal Documents in McBurnie Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as McBurnie et al v.
Acceptance Now, LLC, Case No. 3:21-cv-01429-JD (N.D. Cal.), the
Defendant files an administrative motion to seal documents
submitted in connection with its Opposition to Plaintiffs' motion
for class certification.

RAC has identified the information that is sealable with
particularity in the Declaration of Jim Villalon.

Pursuant to Civil L.R. 79-5(d), the Proposed Sealed Materials are
identified as follows:

   1. The unredacted version of Exhibit J to Declaration of
      Matthew G. Ball in Support of RAC's Opposition to
      Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

   2. The unredacted version of Exhibit K to Declaration of
      Matthew G. Ball in Support of RAC's Opposition to
      Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Dec. 28, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Q7abl1 at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          James T. Hannink, Esq.
          Zach P. Dostart, Esq.
          Catherine S. Klobucar, Esq.
          Lisa A. Dozier, Esq.
          DOSTART HANNINK LLP
          4225 Executive Square, Suite 600
          La Jolla, CA 92037-1484
          E-mail: jhannink@sdlaw.com
                  zdostart@sdlaw.com
                  cklobucar@sdlaw.com

                  ldozier@sdlaw.com

               - and -

          Michael Rubin, Esq.
          Connie K. Chan, Esq.
          ALTSHULER BERZON LLP
          177 Post Street, Suite 300
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          E-mail: mrubin@altber.com
                  cchan@altber.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Matthew Ball, Esq.
          K&L GATES LLP
          Caitlin Blanche, Esq.
          Amy Wong, Esq.
          Ashley Song, Esq.
          4 Embarcadero Center, Suite 1200
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 882 8200
          Facsimile: (415) 882 8220
          E-mail: caitlin.blanche@klgates.com
                  amy.wong@klgates.com
                  ashley.song@klgates.com
                  matthew.ball@klgates.com

ACCURA HEALTH: Class Cert. Hearing Set for Jan. 17
--------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Gaul v. Accura Health
Ventures, LLC et al., Case No. 4:22-cv-00154 (S.D. Iowa), the Hon.
Judge Stephen H. Locher entered an order setting hearing motion for
summary judgment and motion to certify class pursuant to Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) for Jan. 17, 2023.

The suit alleges violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Dec. 29,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at at no extra charge.[CC]

ANCESTRY.COM: Parties Stipulate to Extend Class Cert. Deadlines
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANTHONY SESSA and MARK
SESSA, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
v. ANCESTRY.COM OPERATIONS INC., a Virginia Corporation;
ANCESTRY.COM INC., a Delaware Corporation; and ANCESTRY.COM LLC, a
Delaware Limited Liability Company, Case No. 2:20-cv-02292-GMN-BNW
(D. Nev.), the Parties ask the Court extending the class
certification deadlines as follows.:

           Event              Current          Proposed
                              Deadline         Deadline

   Last Day to Oppose      Jan. 17, 2023      Feb. 2, 2023
   Motion to Certify
   Class:

   Last Day to File        Feb. 14, 2023      March 2, 2023
   Reply Supporting
   Motion to Certify
   Class:

Ancestry.com provides online family genealogy information and
resources. The Company allows website users to upload family
history information to create genealogy networks.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Dec. 28, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Gnh3aO at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Miles N. Clark, Esq.
          Nevada Bar No. 13848
          Law Offices of Miles N. Clark, LLC
          5510 So. Fort Apache Rd, Suite 30
          Las Vegas, NV 89148
          Telephone: (702) 856-7430
          Facsimile: (702) 447-8048

               - and -

          Michael F. Ram, Esq.
          Marie N. Appel (Pro Hac Vice)
          MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX
          LITIGATION GROUP
          711 Van Ness Avenue, Suite 500 San
          Francisco, CA 94102
          Telephone: (415) 358-6913
          Facsimile: (415) 358-6293
          E-mail: MRam@forthepeople.com
                  MAppel@forthepeople.com

               - and -

          Benjamin R. Osborn, Esq.
          102 Bergen Street Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (347) 645-0464
          E-mail: Ben@benosbornlaw.com

The Counsel for ANCESTRY.COM OPERATIONS INC., ANCESTRY.COM INC.,
and ANCESTRY.COM LLC, are:

          H. Stan Johnson, Esq.
          COHEN-JOHNSON, LLC
          375 E. Warm Springs Road, Suite 104
          Las Vegas, NE 89119
          Telephone: (702) 823-2500
          Facsimile: (702) 823-3400
          E-mail: sjohnson@cohenjohnson.com

               - and -

          Shon Morgan, Esq.
          John W. Baumann, Esq.
          QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
          SULLIVAN, LLP
          865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 443-3000
          Facsimile: (213) 443-3100
          E-mail: shonmorgan@quinnemanuel.com
                  jackbaumann@quinnemanuel.com

               - and -

          Cristina Henriquez, Esq.
          555 Twin Dolphin Drive, 5th Floor
          Redwood Shores, CA 94065
          Telephone: (650) 801-5000
          Facsimile: (650) 801-5000
          E-mail: cristinahenriquez@quinnemanuel.com

ANDREW SCHROEDER: Discovery Plan, Sched Order Entered in Penichter
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Thomas Penichter v. Andrew
Schroeder, et al., Case No. 1:22-cv-03504-LDH-PK (E.D.N.Y.), the
Hon. Judge Peggy Kuo entered a discovery plan/scheduling order as
follows:

   -- Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures exchanged:      Jan. 19, 2023

   -- Identification of John Doe/Jane Doe       Jan. 19, 2023
      defendants:

   -- Plaintiff to make settlement demand:      Feb.  2, 2023

   -- Defendant to make settlement offer:       Feb. 16, 2023

   -- Initial documents requests and            Feb. 16, 2023
      interrogatories:

   -- All fact discovery to be completed        July 28, 2023
      (including disclosure of medical
      records):

   -- Joint status report certifying close      Aug. 11, 2023
      of fact discovery and indicating
      whether expert discovery is needed:

   -- Joint status report certifying close      Aug. 11, 2023
      of ALL DISCOVERY and indicating
      whether dispositive motion is
      anticipated:

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 28, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Q13HUO at no extra charge.[CC]

APPLE INC: Dismissal With Prejudice of Barnett BIPA Suit Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID BARNETT, ETHEL BURR, and MICHAEL HENDERSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants v. APPLE INC., Defendant-Appellee, Case No.
1-22-0187 (Ill. App.), the Appellate Court of Illinois for the
First District, Sixth Division, affirms the trial court's dismissal
of the Plaintiffs' putative class action suit with prejudice.

The complaint alleges that the Court has personal jurisdiction over
Apple because the biometrics that give rise to the lawsuit were
captured from Barnett while he was residing and physically present
in Cook County. There is no such similar allegation made with
respect to Burr and Henderson. However, all three Plaintiffs are,
and have been at all relevant times, residents and citizens of
Illinois.

Apple is a California corporation with its principal place of
business in California. It manufactures iPhones, iPads, and
MacBooks with "Touch ID" and "Face ID" features, and it sells or
distributes these products throughout Illinois.

The Plaintiffs filed their complaint on June 25, 2021, and served
Apple on July 12, 2021. The two-count complaint alleges that Apple
violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act (Act) (740 ILCS 14/1
et seq. (West 2020)) by offering users of its phones and computers
the option of utilizing face and fingerprint recognition features
(1) without first instituting a written policy regarding the
retention and destruction of the users' biometric information and
(2) without first obtaining the users' written consent. The
Plaintiffs claim that, under the Act, Apple was in "possession" of,
and had "collected" and "captured," the users' biometric
information where Apple designed and owns the software that
plaintiffs opted to use and where Apple has the ability to, and
does, remotely update the software.

In relief, the Plaintiffs seek class certification, attorney fees
and costs, and "statutory damages of $5,000 for each and every
intentional and/or reckless violation of the Act pursuant to 740
ILCS 14/20(2), or alternatively statutory damages of $1,000 for
each and every violation pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20-1 if the Court
finds that the Defendant's violations were negligent.

The trial court dismissed their complaint with prejudice, pursuant
to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615
(West 2020)), for failure to state a cause of action. The Jan. 4,
2022 order stated that Apple's motion to dismiss was granted with
prejudice and that the order was final and appealable. On Feb. 2,
2022, the Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal, and this
appeal followed.

The Plaintiffs allege violations of both section 15(a) and section
15(b) of the Act. They argue that Apple captures and collects their
biometric information, while Apple argues that it does not. They
allege that section 20 applies because they were "aggrieved by a
violation" of the Act, while Apple argues that there is no
violation. The Plaintiffs also argue that Apple collects and
captures their biometric information, where they utilized Apple
software to collect and capture their fingerprints or facial
images.

The Appellate Court cannot find, based on the facts alleged by the
Plaintiffs, and assuming those facts to be true, that Apple
possessed, captured, or collected their biometric information. On
this appeal, the Plaintiffs do not dispute that the user's
biometric information is stored on the user's own device; that
Apple does not collect or store this information on a separate
server or device; that these features are completely optional; that
the user is the sole entity deciding whether or not to use these
features; that, to enable the features, the user employs his or her
own device to capture and collect his or her own biometric
information on that device; that, to utilize these features, the
user must undertake a number of steps, which are all documented in
photos in the Plaintiffs' complaint; and that the user has the
power to delete this biometric information from the device, at any
time, without negatively impacting the device.

Based on these facts, the Appellate Court affirms the thoughtful
memorandum order of dismissal by the trial court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 23, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2233e5ma from Leagle.com.

William H. Beaumont, of Beaumont Costales LLC, of Chicago, and
Philip L. Fraietta -- pfraietta@bursor.com -- of Bursor & Fisher,
P.A., of New York, New York, for the Appellants.

Raj N. Shah -- Raj N. Shah  -- Eric M. Roberts --
eric.roberts@dlapiper.com -- and Yan Grinblat --
yan.grinblat@dlapiper.com -- of DLA Piper LLP (US), and Joshua G.
Vincent -- jvincent@hinshawlaw.com -- and Kimberly A. Jansen --
kjansen@hinshawlaw.com -- of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, both of
Chicago, and Isabelle Ord -- isabelle.ord@dlapiper.com -- (pro hac
vice), of DLA Piper LLP (US), of San Francisco, California, for the
Appellee.


ARK RESTAURANTS: Settles Labor Suit in New York Court
-----------------------------------------------------
Ark Restaurants Corp. disclosed in its Form 10-K Report for the
fiscal year ended October 1, 2022, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on December 16, 2022, that on May 1, 2018, two
former tipped service workers, individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated personnel, filed a putative class action
lawsuit against the company and certain subsidiaries as well as
certain officers of the company. The suit has now been settled.

Plaintiffs alleged, on behalf of themselves and the putative class,
that the Defendants violated certain of the New York State Labor
Laws and related regulations. The complaint sought unspecified
monetary damages, together with interest, liquidated damages, and
attorney fees.

In December 2020, the parties reached a settlement agreement
resolving all issues alleged in the complaint, which received final
approval by the New York State Supreme Court in October 2022, for
approximately the amount which was previously accrued. Under the
terms of the court-approved settlement agreement, settlement
proceeds will be distributed to the Plaintiffs in the first quarter
of the fiscal year 2023

Ark Restaurants Corp. is a New York corporation that operates
restaurants and bars, fast food concepts, and catering operations
through its subsidiaries.


AUDIBLE INC: Seeks More Time to File Bid to Seal
------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Golden Unicorn
Enterprises, Inc. et al. v. Audible, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-07059-JMF (S.D.N.Y.), the Defendant asks the Court to enter
an order granting Audible until Friday, January 6, 2023 to file its
letter‐motion to seal.

At that point, Plaintiffs will file any redacted exhibits as
publicly viewable documents.

Audible writes to request a one‐week extension on its
letter‐motion to file certain materials from Plaintiffs’ class
certification motion under seal. The Court previously adopted a
procedure under which Audible would have until December 30, rather
than December 27, to file a letter‐motion, and at which point
Plaintiffs would file any redacted versions as publicly viewable
documents. Audible conferred with Plaintiffs' counsel, and
Plaintiffs do not oppose this further extension.

Audible is an American online audiobook and podcast service that
allows users to purchase and stream audiobooks and other forms of
spoken word content.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Dec. 28, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3WPm6WR at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Brian D. Buckley, Esq.
          FENWICK & WEST LLP
          1191 Second Avenue
          10th Floor
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 389 4510


AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE: Dismissal of Family Tacos Class Suit Upheld
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FAMILY TACOS, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant v. AUTO-OWNERS
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 21-3224 (6th Cir.),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirms the
district court's order granting Auto-Owners' motion to dismiss.

Family Tacos operates two restaurants in northeast Ohio. Like many
restaurant owners, it lost substantial business due to the COVID-19
pandemic and the ensuing government orders that restricted
in-person dining. Family Tacos sought to recover this lost income
under a commercial insurance policy that it purchased from
Auto-Owners. The policy obligates Auto-Owners to pay for some
amounts of lost income when this economic loss grows out of a
"direct physical loss of or damage to" Family Tacos' property.

Family Tacos sought a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to
coverage and alleged that Auto-Owners' denial of coverage would
breach both the policy and the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Family Tacos also sought to certify a class action made up
of several classes of businesses. Auto-Owners removed the case to
federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and the Class
Action Fairness Act.

Auto-Owners then moved to dismiss Family Tacos' complaint for
failure to state a claim. The district court granted Auto-Owners'
motion to dismiss because neither the pandemic nor the government
shutdown caused a "direct physical loss of or damage to" Family
Tacos' restaurants. In the meantime, another district court asked
the Ohio Supreme Court to consider a similar insurance-policy
question -- Neuro-Commc'n Servs., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., ___
N.E.3d ___, 2022 WL 17573883, at *3 (Ohio Dec. 12, 2022).

Family Tacos appealed.

The Sixth Circuit reviews the district court's dismissal of Family
Tacos' complaint de novo. It states that the appeal boils down to
whether the spread of COVID-19 or the ensuing government shutdown
orders could qualify as a "direct physical loss of or damage to"
Family Tacos' restaurants (or nearby properties). Auto-Owners says
that this text is unambiguous and requires a tangible harm to
property. Family Tacos responds that "direct physical loss" is
ambiguous and could be read to cover limits on the use of
property.

The Ohio Supreme Court decided to consider a similar question in
Neuro-Communication. In that case, the relevant insured business
provided "hearing and balance services to its patients." The Ohio
government's shutdown orders forced it to close its operations for
about six weeks, and it sought reimbursement for lost income under
a similar insurance policy issued by Cincinnati Insurance Company.
The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the business' argument that the
phrase "physical loss" could include a loss of use of its property
to serve customers. It reasoned that a "physical loss" requires
"loss or damage to Covered Property that is physical in nature" and
thus does not cover simply "a loss of the ability to use Covered
Property for business purposes."

The Sixth Circuit opines that the instant case raises the same
question as Neuro-Communication, so it must reach the same answer.
In cases governed by Ohio contract law, the Sixth Circuit must
follow the controlling decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court. And it
sees no basis to distinguish the contract in this case from the one
in Neuro-Communication.

The Sixth Circuit is bound by Neuro-Communication's interpretation.
Under its analysis, Family Tacos has not adequately alleged the
required "direct physical loss of or damage to" its property or to
nearby properties simply from its loss of use. Therefore, it need
not consider any other interpretive question, such as whether the
virus exclusion would otherwise have barred Family Tacos' claim.
Accordingly, it affirms.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/yrea64h4 from Leagle.com.


BRITAX CHILD: Coleman, et al Seek., to Certify Class & Subclasses
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TIFFANY COLEMAN, KELI
SWANN, and HEATHER BROOKE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, v. BRITAX CHILD SAFETY, INC., Case No.
0:21-cv-00721-SAL (D.S.C.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter
an order, pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, certifying the following Classes and
Subclasses:

  -- Nationwide Class

     "All persons within the United States who purchased a
     Britax Booster Seat between 2008 and present;"

  -- North Carolina Subclass

     "All persons in the state of North Carolina who purchased a
     Britax Booster Seat between 2008 and present;"

  -- Indiana Subclass

     "All persons in the state of Indiana who purchased a Britax
     Booster Seat between 2008 and present;" and

     Florida Subclass

     "All persons in the state of Florida who purchased a Britax
     Booster Seat between 2008 and present."

The Plaintiffs also move the Court, pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4), for
certification of particular issues on behalf of the Nationwide
Class and state subclasses.

Lastly, the Plaintiffs request this Court appoint undersigned
counsel as class counsel pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1)(B) and Rule
23(g). The Plaintiffs bring a claim for violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The following claims are brought on
behalf of the Nationwide Class and, alternatively, the respective
individual state subclasses: (1) fraudulent misrepresentation; (2)
fraudulent concealment; (3) unjust enrichment; and (4) negligent
misrepresentation.

Additionally, the Plaintiff Keli Swan brings claims for violation
of the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
N.C. Gen. Stat. sections 75-1.1, et seq. and for breach of implied
warranty of merchantability, N.C. Gen. Stat. section 25-2-314 on
behalf of the North Carolina Subclass.

The Plaintiff Tiffany Coleman brings claims for violation of the
Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, Ind. Code section 24-5-0.5-1,
et seq. and for breach of implied warranty of merchantability, Ind.
Code section 26-1-2-314 on behalf of the Indiana Subclass.

The Plaintiff Heather Brooke brings claims for violation of the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat.
section 501.291, et seq. and for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability, Fla. Stat. section  672.314, et seq.

Britax offers car seats, strollers and travel systems.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated Dec. 29, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3WF2eWA at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Harper T. Segui, Esq.
          Martha A. Geer, Esq.
          Jonathan B. Cohen, Esq.
          MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON
          PHILLIPS GROSSMAN, PLLC
          900 W. Morgan Street
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Telephone: (919) 600-5000
          Facsimile: (919) 600-5035
          E-mail: hsegui@milberg.com
                  mgeer@milberg.com
                  jcohen@milberg.com

CGS STORES: Seeks Jan. 11 Extension to File Cert Response
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BEVERLY WILLIS,
Individually, and on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated as a class, v. CGS STORES, LLC, Case No.
1:22-cv-01166-JDB-jay (W.D. Tenn,), the Defendant asks the Court to
enter an order for a two-week extension, through and including
January 11, 2023, of its deadline to respond to Plaintiff Beverly
Willis's Motion for Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Conditional
Certification.

On August 4, 2022, the Plaintiff filed a Collective Action
Complaint asserting claims for alleged violations of the FLSA.

On November 17, 2022, the Court entered a Joint Scheduling Order,
which provided for the completion of discovery addressing issues
related to the propriety of certification of the collective action
and established January 13, 2023, as the deadline for Plaintiff to
file a motion for conditional certification.

Counsel for the Parties have conferred regarding Plaintiff’s
Motion and anticipate entering an agreed order reflecting their
stipulation to the conditional certification of, and issuance of
notice to, a collective inclusive of certain current and former
employees of the Defendant.

However, the parties are in need of additional time to finalize
their agreement related to conditional certification, particularly
as it relates to form of the notice to be issued to members of the
collective and other details.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Dec. 28, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3WSB12j at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Robert E. Turner, IV, Esq.
          Robert E. Morelli, III, Esq.
          JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER, HOLT,
          OWEN & BRYANT
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754-8001
          Facsimile: (901) 754-8524
          E-mail: gjackson@jsyc.com
                  rbryant@jsyc.com
                  rturner@jsyc.com
                  rmorelli@jsyc.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Matthew G. Gallagher, Esq.
          Kaitlyn A. Hansen, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          3725 Champion Hills Drive, Suite 3000
          Memphis, TN 38125
          Telephone: (901) 795-6695
          Facsimile: (901) 881-4333
          E-mail: mgallagher@littler.com
          khansen@littler.com

CONCENTRIX CORPORATION: Scheduling Order Entered in Helwig Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DAVID HELWIG, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, v. CONCENTRIX
CORPORATION, Case No. 1:20-cv-00920-DAR (N.D. Ohio), the Hon David
A. Ruiz entered a joint proposed scheduling order as follows:

  -- Discovery cutoff related to        February 14, 2023
     class certification:

  -- Plaintiff's Motion for Class       March 14, 2023
     Certification:

  -- Defendant's Opposition to          April 13, 2023
     Class Certification:

  -- Plaintiff's Reply in Support       April 27, 2023
     of Class Certification:

  -- Phase II Case Management
     Schedule:

     a. Non-Expert Phase II Discovery Cut-Off: If a class is
        certified, 120 days from the Court’s order on class
        certification. If a class is not certified, 60 days from
        the Court’s order on class certification.

     b. Plaintiff’s Expert Report (if any): 30 days after Phase
        II Discovery Cut-Off.

     c. Defendant's Expert Report (if any): 60 days after Phase
        II Discovery Cut-Off.

     d. Expert Discovery Cut-Off: 90 days after Phase II
        Discovery Cut-Off.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Dec. 28, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3PZamPe at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew A. Dooley, Esq.
          Stephen M. Bosak, Jr., Esq.
          DOOLEY GEMBALA McLAUGHLIN PECORA
          5455 Detroit Road
          Sheffield Village, OH 44054
          Telephone: (440) 930-4001
          Facsimile: (440) 934-7208
          E-mail: mdooley@dooleygembala.com
                  sbosak@dooleygembala.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Jeffrey N. Lindemann, Esq.
          Brice C. Smallwood, Esq.
          FROST BROWN TODD LLC
          One Columbus -- Suite 2300
          10 West Broad Street
          Columbus, OH 43215-3484
          Telephone: (614) 464-1211
          Facsimile: (614) 464-1737
          E-mail: jlindemann@fbtlaw.com
                  bsmallwood@fbtlaw.com

CONSOLIDATED EDISON: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Moses Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RAVEN MOSES, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs v. CONSOLIDATED EDISON
COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC., ET AL., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-1200
(ALC) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr., of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York enters an Amended
Opinion and Order granting Defendant ConEd's motion to dismiss.

The Plaintiffs, a group of workers employed as flagmen or flaggers,
brought the putative class action against a group of Defendants,
including Consolidated Edison of New York ("ConEd"). The Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant Griffin Industries and Griffin Services
(together, "Griffin") failed to pay their wages at the prevailing
rates. They bring suit against ConEd under a joint-employer theory.
Magistrate Judge Ona Wang previously granted the Plaintiffs' motion
to conditionally certify an FLSA collective.

Defendant ConEd moves to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, several of the opt-in FLSA
plaintiffs. It argues that the FLSA claims of several opt-in
plaintiffs should be dismissed because their claims are
time-barred. The Plaintiff appears to argue that dismissal of these
plaintiffs would be premature because their class certification
motion has not yet been decided. One does not preclude the other.

Judge Carter opines that the FLSA imposes a two-year statute of
limitations period for actions brought under that statute unless
the defendants' violation was willful. That period may be extended
to three years for willful violations. Using the three-year statute
of limitations as the outward date, Magistrate Judge Wang surmised
that FLSA claims for the Plaintiffs who worked for ConEd before
July 20, 2017 were time barred.

Judge Carter sees no reason to contradict Judge Wang. Given this,
the FLSA claims for the Plaintiffs who either (i) ceased working
for Griffin before July 20, 2017 or (ii) although still employed by
Griffin, did not work on a ConEd project after July 20, 2017 are
dismissed as time barred. To be clear, Judge Carter dismisses the
claims of those people who did not perform flagging work through
Griffin for ConEd on or after July 20, 2017.

For these reasons, Judge Carter grants the Defendant's motion to
dismiss. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate
ECF No. 603. This amended order is issued pursuant to Rule 60(a)
and supersedes the prior order at ECF 650.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2022 Amended Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/mu8ww98b from
Leagle.com.


CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Interim Co-Lead Counsel Named in Guy Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEO GUY, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING, INC.,
Defendant, Lead Case No. C22-1558 MJP (W.D. Wash.), Judge Marsha J.
Pechman of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, grants the Plaintiffs' Motion to Appoint
Interim Co-Lead Counsel.

Judge Pechman explains that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(g)(3) permits the appointment of interim lead counsel to act on
behalf of putative class members before determining whether to
certify the action as a class action. In deciding which counsel to
appoint, the Court examines counsel's: (1) work in identifying or
investigating potential claims; (2) experience in handling class
action and complex litigation and the types of claims asserted in
the action; (3) knowledge of the applicable law; and (4) available
resources.

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to appoint as interim co-lead counsel:
(1) Gary E. Mason of Mason LLP; (2) Jean S. Martin of Morgan &
Morgan Complex Litigation Group; and (3) Gary M. Klinger of Milberg
Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC.

Judge Pechman has reviewed the resumes and supporting information
provided by these attorneys and finds that their skill shown to
date, and knowledge and experience in the kind of case before the
Court is sufficient to satisfy Rule 23(g). She also finds that the
resources their firms possess is adequate.

At the hearing, Judge Pechman shared her reservations about
appointing counsel from three different law firms as co-lead
interim counsel. But she is satisfied that the three lawyers who
seek appointment will work together efficiently to serve the
interests of the proposed class. And the Court has imposed a
requirement that the three co-lead counsel select just one to
coordinate all appearances before the Court -- the "whip." Judge
Pechman has further required that the interim co-lead counsel
select one local attorney to serve as local liaison counsel. The
Plaintiffs must meet and confer to discuss these selections and
notify the Court of the co-lead whip and the local liaison
counsel.

On this basis, Judge Pechman grants the Motion and appoints as the
interim co-lead counsel: (1) Gary E. Mason of Mason LLP; (2) Jean
S. Martin of Morgan & Morgan Complex Litigation Group; and (3) Gary
M. Klinger of Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC.

The Clerk is ordered to provide copies of the Order to all
counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4x6sp47n from Leagle.com.


DAKTRONICS INC: Bids for Lead Plaintiff Appointment Due Feb. 20
---------------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Johnson Fistel, LLP announces that a
class action lawsuit has commenced on behalf of investors
Daktronics, Inc. ("Daktronics" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: DAKT).
The class action is on behalf of shareholders who purchased
Daktronics securities between March 10, 2022 and December 6, 2022,
inclusive (the "Class Period") Investors are hereby notified that
they have until February 20, 2023, to move the Court to serve as
lead plaintiff in this action.

What actions may I take at this time? If you suffered a loss and
are interested in learning more about being a lead plaintiff,
please contact Jim Baker (jimb@johnsonfistel.com) by email or phone
at 619-814-4471. If emailing, please include a phone number.

To join this action, you can click or copy and paste the link below
into a browser:

https://www.cognitoforms.com/JohnsonFistel/DaktronicsInc

There is no cost or obligation to you.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that the Company was experiencing challenges that
increased costs, including supply chain disruptions, that impacted
Daktronics' ability to fund inventory levels and operations; (2)
that, as a result, it was probable that some portion of the
Company's deferred tax assets would not be realized; (3) that as a
result, Daktronics was reasonably likely to record a material
valuation allowance to its deferred tax assets; (4) that there were
material weaknesses in the Company's internal controls over
financial reporting related to income taxes; (5) that the foregoing
presented liquidity concerns and there was substantial doubt as to
the Company's ability to continue as a going concern; (6) as a
result, Defendants' statements about its business, operations, and
prospects were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a
reasonable basis at all relevant times.

A lead plaintiff will act on behalf of all other class members in
directing the Daktronics class-action lawsuit. The lead plaintiff
can select a law firm of its choice to litigate the class-action
lawsuit. An investor's ability to share any potential future
recovery of the Daktronics class action lawsuit is not dependent
upon serving as lead plaintiff.

For more information regarding the lead plaintiff process please
refer to https://www.johnsonfistel.com/lead-plaintiff-deadlines.

                        About Johnson Fistel

Johnson Fistel, LLP is a nationally recognized shareholder rights
law firm with offices in California, New York and Georgia. The firm
represents individual and institutional investors in shareholder
derivative and securities class action lawsuits. Johnson Fistel
seeks to recover losses incurred due to violations of federal
securities laws. For more information about the firm and its
attorneys, please visit http://www.johnsonfistel.com.Attorney
advertising. Past results do not guarantee future outcomes.[GN]

DECORATIVE PANELS: Bid to Dismiss Burcar Suit Terminated as Moot
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MATT BURCAR AND JOHN BUREK, Plaintiffs v. DECORATIVE
PANELS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant, Case No. 22-cv-12054 (E.D.
Mich.), Judge Matthew F. Leitman of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, terminates the
Defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice as moot.

On Aug. 31, 2022, Plaintiffs Burcar and Burek filed the putative
class action against Defendant Decorative Panels International,
Inc. ("DPI"). The Plaintiffs allege, among other things, that DPI
has released, and on frequent separate, distinct, and additional
occasions continues to release, noxious odors onto Plaintiffs'
property, which has caused property damage by private nuisance and
negligence. DPI thereafter filed a motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' claims.

On Nov. 22, 2022, without expressing any view on the merits of the
motion to dismiss, the Court entered an order granting the
Plaintiffs leave to file a First Amended Complaint in order to
remedy the alleged deficiencies in their claims identified by DPI
in its motion to dismiss. The Court informed the parties that if
the Plaintiffs provided notice that they intended to file a First
Amended Complaint, the Court would terminate DPI's motion to
dismiss without prejudice.

On Dec. 9, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed a notice with the Court in
which they indicated that they will be filing a First Amended
Complaint. Accordingly, because the Plaintiffs will be filing a
First Amended Complaint, Judge Leitman terminates DPI's motion to
dismiss without prejudice as moot. DPI may re-file a motion to
dismiss directed at the First Amended Complaint if it believes that
such a motion is appropriate after reviewing that pleading.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/42bm7bzu from Leagle.com.


EASTERN WISCONSIN: $525K Class Settlement in Kapp Suit Has Final OK
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, AARON KAPP, individually and as the representative of
a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. EASTERN
WISCONSIN WATER CONDITIONING CO. and UNCO DATA SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 20-CV-286 (E.D. Wis.), Magistrate Judge
William E. Duffin of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin grants the parties' request for final
approval of the class action settlement.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Judge Duffin finally approves the
settlement of the action, as embodied in the terms of the
Settlement Agreement, as a fair, reasonable, and adequate
settlement of the case in the best interests of the Settlement
Class considering the factual, legal, practical and procedural
considerations raised.

On Aug. 23, 2022, the Court preliminarily approved the Settlement
Agreement and certified for settlement purposes the Settlement
Class defined as follows: "All persons in the United States with a
cellular phone or residential landline who received a prerecorded
telephone call or voice message from the defendants: (1) between
Dec. 14, 2014 and Jan. 1, 2019; (2) related to maintenance or
service on a Culligan(R) water system and (3) without prior express
written consent."

Judge Duffin confirms the preliminary appointment of Aaron Kapp as
the Class Representative and the Plaintiff's attorneys (Phillip A.
Bock and David M. Oppenheim of Bock Law Firm LLC dba Bock Hatch &
Oppenheim LLC) as the Class Counsel.

The following persons validly requested exclusion from the
Settlement Class and the settlement and are excluded: Matt/Linda
Cichowski, Haeng Park, John Rosenbaum, Lois Anderson, Dennis
Jacobson, and Lynn Williams.

The Defendants have agreed to make available a settlement fund of
$525,000 (the "Settlement Fund") to pay the approved claims, the
class action settlement administration costs, the Class Counsel's
attorney fees, costs, and expenses, and a service award to the
Plaintiff as determined and awarded by the Court.

As agreed in and subject to the Settlement Agreement, each person
who submits a timely and valid claim will be paid their pro rata
share of the Settlement Fund less the approved attorney fees,
expenses, cost of administration, and incentive award. The
Settlement Administrator will cause those payments to be made after
receiving the Settlement Fund from the Defendants. Checks issued to
the claimants will be void 181 days after issuance and any amount
from voided checks will be paid as cy pres in equal shares to the
following organizations: Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee and Legal
Action of Wisconsin.

Judge Duffin approves the Class Counsel's request for attorney fees
of $175,000 and out-of-pocket expenses in the amount of $6,242.12.
The Defendants will pay these amounts from the Settlement Fund.

He approves a $15,000 service award to the named Plaintiff, Kapp,
for serving as the Class Representative. The Defendants will pay
this amount from the Settlement Fund.

Judge Duffin expressly adopts and incorporates all the terms of the
Settlement Agreement. The Parties to the Settlement Agreement will
carry out their respective obligations under that Agreement.

The action is dismissed with prejudice and without taxable costs to
any Party.

Claims or causes of action of any kind by any Settlement Class
member or anyone claiming by or through him, her or it brought in
the Court or any other forum (other than those by persons who have
opted out of the action) are barred pursuant to the Releases set
forth in the Settlement Agreement. All persons and entities are
enjoined from asserting any claims that are being settled or
released therein, either directly or indirectly, against the
Defendants, in the Court or any other court or forum.

The Court retains jurisdiction over the action, the Plaintiff and
the Settlement Class, and the Defendants, to determine all matters
relating in any way to this Final Judgment and Order, the
Preliminary Approval Order, or the Settlement Agreement, including
but not limited to, their administration, implementation,
interpretation or enforcement. It further retains jurisdiction to
enforce this Order.

Judge Duffin finds that there is no just reason to delay the
enforcement of the Final Approval Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2022 Final Approval Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/5n7xzdfj from Leagle.com.


FAMILY FIRST: Class Certification Deadline Extended to May 16
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Suescum v. Family First
Life, LLC, Case No. 6:21-cv-01769 (M.D. Fla.), the Hon. Judge Embry
J. Kidd  entered an order on motion for miscellaneous relief:

-- The class certification deadline         May 16, 2023
    is extended to:

-- The Plaintiffs' expert disclosure        June 17, 2023
    deadline is extended to:

-- The Defendant's expert disclosure        July 15, 2023
    deadline is extended to:

-- No other deadlines are modified by the Order.

The nature of suit states restrictions of use of telephone
equipment.

Family First is an insurance broker founded by Shawn Meaike and
headquartered in Uncasville, Connecticut.[CC]

FARMERS CASUALTY: Bid to Stay Creasman Class Suit Granted in Part
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Charles Creasman, Plaintiff v. Farmers Casualty
Insurance Company, Defendant, Case No. CV-22-01820-PHX-DJH (D.
Ariz.), Judge Diane J. Humetewa of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona grants in part the Defendant's Expedited Motion
to Stay Proceedings.

The case concerns the Plaintiff's class action efforts to enforce
the Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage policies issued to
him by the Defendant. After removing the action to federal court,
the Defendant filed an Expedited Motion to Stay Proceedings pending
a decision from the Arizona Supreme Court on two certified
questions that are related to the Plaintiff's breach of insurance
contract and bad faith claims under A.R.S. Section 20-259.01 --
Franklin v. CSAA General Insurance Company, No. 2:22-cv-00540-JJT
(D. Ariz. Nov. 2, 2022).

On Dec. 21, 2022, the Court found good cause to vacate and postpone
the Scheduling Conference in this matter until the Court could rule
on the merits of the Motion, which is fully briefed.

Judge Humetewa explains that the power to stay proceedings is
incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the cases on its docket with economy of time and
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. She says courts
must weigh the following "competing interests" to determine whether
to issue a Landis stay: "[1] the possible damage which may result
from the granting of a stay, [2] the hardship or inequity which a
party may suffer in being required to go forward, and [3] the
orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or
complicating of issues, proof, and question of law which could be
expected to result from a stay," citing Lockyer v. Mirant Corp.,
398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).

Judge Humetewa holds that these three competing interests set forth
in Lockyer weigh in favor of staying the present proceedings.
First, the Plaintiff's argument that a stay would cause irreparable
harm to the Defendant's insureds is moot. Second, absent a stay,
the parties would largely proceed to needlessly devote resources to
litigating issues that will be directly impacted by the Arizona
Supreme Court's response to the certified questions. Finally, a
stay would promote the orderly course of justice. Thus, it is in
the interest of judicial economy to wait until the Arizona Supreme
Court clarifies this area of the law as it would avoid the use of
resources on discovery and potentially fruitless motions.

Franklin constitutes a "lead" case for numerous cases in the
District of Arizona raising similar issues under A.R.S. Section
20-259.01. As noted in the parties' Joint Case Management Report,
many of these cases have been stayed pending the resolution of the
certification request in Franklin. Thus, Judge Humetewa stay
proceedings in the present matter because it relates to the
certified questions and resolution of these questions could
similarly narrow the issues raised in the Plaintiff's First Amended
Class Action Complaint.

However, because she agrees with the Plaintiff that resolution of
the Defendant's pending Motion to Dismiss does not turn on the
Arizona Supreme Court's resolution of the stacking issue under
A.R.S. Section 20-259.01, she will rule on the Motion in due
course.

Accordingly, Judge Humetewa grants in part the Defendant's
Expedited Motion to Stay Proceedings. She stays the matter as it
relates to the Arizona Supreme Court's ultimate disposition on the
district court's request to accept and decide the certified
questions proposed in Franklin. The Court will rule on the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, however, in due course.

The parties must file a joint notice of decision within five days
of the Arizona Supreme Court's decision.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 23, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4n5n5ywn from Leagle.com.


FCA US: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Myslivecek Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Dean Myslivecek, Paul Caputo, Christopher Chow,
Michael Busovicki, and Kevin Schaffner, Plaintiffs v. FCA US LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 21-10346 (E.D. Mich.), Judge Judith E. Levy of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
Southern Division, grants in part the Defendant's motion to
dismiss.

The Plaintiffs bring this proposed nationwide class action lawsuit
against the Defendant. FCA manufactures and distributes Jeep
branded vehicles. The Plaintiffs assert claims related to the
presence of a clutch defect in their vehicles, as well as the
adequacy of the recall that the Defendant provided.

The Plaintiffs bring the class action on behalf of themselves and
others who purchased or leased a "Class Vehicle," defined in the
amended complaint as manual-transmission "2018-2021 Jeep Wranglers
(2 door)," "2018-2021 Jeep Wranglers Unlimited (4 door)," and
"2020-2021 Jeep Gladiators." The amended complaint states that each
of these vehicles is equipped with same 3.6L V6 engine that
produces an advertised 285 horsepower and 260 lb-ft of torque.

The Plaintiffs allege that the vehicles have a "clutch defect" that
causes the friction plate to slip on the flywheel, creating high
temperatures and dangerous conditions, including fires. They also
allege that one of the Defendant's recalls addressing the clutch
defect -- a software update that prevents the clutch from failing
-- is inadequate because it "effectively neuters" the class
vehicles by depriving the Class Members of the benefit of their
bargains -- a class Vehicle equipped with a 6-speed manual
transmission and a 3.6L V6 engine that produces 285 horsepower and
260 lb-ft of torque.

The Plaintiffs' amended complaint contains the following 10
counts:

      Count 1: Breach of express warranty - All individual
plaintiffs and the putative national class

      Count 2: Breach of implied warranty - All individual
plaintiffs and the putative national class

      Count 3: Unjust enrichment - All individual plaintiffs and
the putative national class

      Count 4: Deceptive Acts and under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law Section
349 - Myslivecek, Schaffner, and the Practices putative New York
subclass

      Count 5: False Advertising under the N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law
Section 350 - Myslivecek, Schaffner, and the putative New York
subclass

      Count 6: Violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies
Act, Cal. Civ. Code Section 1750 - Chow and the putative California
subclass

      Count 7: Violation of the California Unfair Competition Law,
Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200 - Chow and the putative California
subclass

      Count 8: Breach of implied warranty under the Song-Beverly
Act, Cal. Civ. Code Section 1790 - Chow and the putative California
subclass

      Count 9: Violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act -
Caputo and the putative New Jersey subclass

      Count 10: Violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act,
Mich. Comp. Laws Section 445.903 - Busovicki and the putative
Michigan subclass

Before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs'
amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a
plausible claim for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). In support of its motion, it provides a declaration by
Dave Valley, which states that the recalls were provided free of
charge and explains how the recalls fix the clutch defect.

On May 3, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On June
3, 2021, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint. The Plaintiffs filed a response to the motion to
dismiss, and the Defendant filed a reply brief. On Nov. 18, 2021,
the Court held a hearing by video conference and heard oral
argument.

Because standing is a threshold requirement for federal
jurisdiction, and because the Court is required to dismiss moot
claims, Judge Levy focuses her analysis on the Defendant's Rule
12(b)(1) arguments.

She finds that in its motion, the Defendant makes a factual attack
on subject matter jurisdiction by providing evidence that its
recall adequately fixes the clutch defect. She concludes that
Busovicki lacks standing to bring his claims and grants the
Defendant's motion to dismiss, without prejudice, as to Busovicki.

Judge Levy also considers the Defendant's factual attack on subject
matter jurisdiction and finds that there is insufficient evidence
to support that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims
brought by Myslivecek, Chow, Schaffner, and Caputo. These
Plaintiffs are granted an opportunity to present evidence
demonstrating that they have standing and that their claims are not
mooted by the recall. Failure to do so will result in dismissal.

In view of the foregoing, Judge Levy grants in part the Defendant's
motion to dismiss. She grants the Defendant's motion without
prejudice as to Busovicki for lack of standing. Accordingly, Count
10 is dismissed, as well as Counts 1 to 3 with respect to
Busovicki. Remaining in the case are Counts 4 to 9, as well as
Counts 1 to 3 with respect to Myslivecek, Chow, Schaffner, and
Caputo.

Judge Levy gives Myslivecek, Chow, Schaffner, and Caputo until Feb.
6, 2023, to provide the Court with evidence to demonstrate that the
Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The Defendant
will have until March 6, 2023 to respond to the evidence that the
remaining Plaintiffs present. The Court will address class
certification at a later stage.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 23, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/38u9e4pa from Leagle.com.


GLOBAL BROKERAGE: Court Grants Bid to Stay Securities Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Ronnie Abrams of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York enters an order staying the case, In re Global
Brokerage, Inc. f/k/a FXCM Inc. Master File Securities Litigation
This Document Relates To: All Actions, Case No.
1:17-cv-00916-RA-BCM (S.D.N.Y.).

The matter comes before the Court on the Parties' joint letter
motion, filed Dec. 23, 2022. Upon consideration of the Parties'
motion, and good cause appearing, therefore, Judge Abrams grants
the Parties' motion.

Judge Abrams stays the action to allow the Parties to document the
settlement and all upcoming deadlines and proceedings, including
trial, pretrial deadlines, and vacates all deadlines and
requirements set forth in the Court's Order dated Nov. 29, 2022.

The Parties will execute a stipulation of settlement and the
Plaintiffs will file a motion for preliminary approval of the
settlement within 30 days of the entry of the instant Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 23, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2p8rzr59 from Leagle.com.


GOFUND ADVANCE: Haymount, et al., Lose Class Certification Bid
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as HAYMOUNT URGENT CARE PC et
al., v. GOFUND ADVANCE, LLC, et al., Case No. 1:22-cv-01245-JSR
(S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Jed S. Rakoff entered an order denying
the motion of the Plaintiffs Robert A. Clinton Jr., and Haymount
Urgent Care PC for class certification.

An opinion explaining the Court's reasoning will issue no later
than Jan. 17, 2023.

Pursuant to the parties' case management plan:

  -- Any motions for summary judgment shall      Feb. 13, 2023
     be due 45 days from the entry of the
     order:

  -- Opposing papers will be due:                Feb. 27, 2023

  -- Reply papers will be due:                   March 6, 2023

  -- A final pre-trial conference                March 15, 2023
     and argument on summary
     judgment motions will
     held on:

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 29, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3G7XIZU at no extra charge.[CC]



HARBOR FREIGHT: Comes Bid to File Docs Under Seal OK'd
------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Clarence Carter, Mel
Comes, Duane Thomas, and Markeith Mitchell, on behalf of themselves
Comes, et al v. Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc., Case No.
CV-20-5451-DMG-Kkx (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Dolly M. Gee entered
an order granting application to file under seal.

  -- An unredacted version of Plaintiffs' Memorandum in
     Support of the Motion for Class Certification.

  -- An exhibit to that motion consisting of inspection
     reports created by Harbor Freight employees at the
     facilities that manufactured the subject jackstands.

  -- An unredacted version of an exhibit consisting of Harbor
     Freight's responses to class discovery.

Each of these items were designated confidential by the Defendant
pursuant to the protective order entered in this action on July 29,
2022. Good cause being shown for allowing these documents to be
filed under seal. Pursuant to Local Rule 79-5.2.2(c), the
Plaintiffs shall e-file the unredacted documents consistent with
this Order within three days of this Order.

The Plaintiffs Markeith Mitchell and Mel Comes have filed with the
Court an Application to File Documents Under Seal, complete with
the requisite declaration under Local Rule 79-5.

Harbor Freight is a privately held tool and equipment retailer,
headquartered in Calabasas, California, United States.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 28, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3G3sQcH at no extra charge.[CC]

HARRY WINSTON: Second Bid for Approval of PAGA Settlement OK'd
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SAMER SROUR AYOUB, v.
HARRY WINSTON, INC., Case No. 4:21-cv-01599-JST (N.D. Cal.), the
Hon. Judge Jon S. Tigar entered an order granting second motion for
approval of PAGA settlement.

  -- The PAGA settlement is approved and Ayoub's request for
     attorney's fees and costs is granted in part and denied in
     part.

  -- Ayoub's individual claims and PAGA claims are dismissed
     with prejudice.

  -- The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. The
     Court will retain jurisdiction over this matter for the
     purposes of effectuating and enforcing the terms of the
     individual settlement agreement and the PAGA settlement
     agreement.

Ayoub worked as a security guard at the store of Defendant Harry
Winston, Inc., from March 15, 2019, to September 28, 2020.
Following the end of his employment, Ayoub filed a complaint
against Harry Winston, asserting individual claims for wage and
hour violations and derivative claims under PAGA on behalf of
himself and other non-exempt security officers in California
employed by Harry Winston beginning December 18, 2019.

On September 3, 2021, the parties attended a half-day mediation at
which Ayoub agreed to resolve his individual claims for $76,500, ,
and to settle the PAGA claims for $23,500 (the "PAGA Settlement
Fund 1"), Ayoub filed an unopposed motion for approval of the PAGA
settlement and requested that the Court dismiss his individual
claims with prejudice.

The proposed PAGA settlement deducts the following amounts from the
$23,5000 PAGA Settlement Fund:

   1. Ayoub's attorney's fees in the amount of $7,833.33;

   2. Ayoub's litigation costs in the amount of $3,134.64, and

   3. third-party administration costs in the amount of $975.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 29, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3WEdJxI at no extra charge.[CC]


HCA-IT&S: Seeks More Time to Respond for Class Certification Bid
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CAROLYN MARTIN and TROY
GOINGS, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, v.
HCA-IT&S FIELD OPERATIONS, INC., Case No. 1:22-cv-23323-PCH (S.D.
Fla.), the Defendant submits an unopposed motion for extension of
time to respond to the Plaintiffs' motion to conditionally certify
collective action and facilitate notice to putative class members.

On December 21, 2022, the Plaintiffs Carolyn Martin and Troy Goings
and Opt-In Plaintiff Gregory Fulton filed their Motion to
Conditionally Certify Collective Action and Facilitate Notice to
Putative Class Members. The Defendant's Response is presently due
on or before January 4, 2023.

However, the Defendant requires additional time to properly prepare
and submit its Response due to the holidays and multiple scheduling
conflicts. Accordingly, Defendant requests a 21-day extension to
January 25, 2023 to submit its Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion.

A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Dec. 28, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3GoNK7C at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gina Marie Cadogan, Esq.
          CADOGAN LAW
          300 s. Pine Island Road, Suite 107
          Plantation, FL 33324
          E-mail: gina@cadoganlaw.com
                  kathy@cadoganlaw.com
                  tyler@cadoganlaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Luis A. Santos, Esq.
          Shannon L. Kelly, Esq.
          Mark Fereg, Esq.
          FORD HARRISON LLP
          401 E. Jackson Street, Suite 2500
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 261-7800
          Facsimile: (813) 261-7899
          E-mail: lsantos@fordharrison.com
                  skelly@fordharrison.com
                  mfereg@fordharrison.com

HEINEKEN USA: Faces Class Action Over Mislabeled Flavored Beer
--------------------------------------------------------------
Heather Isringhausen Gvillo at madisonrecord.com reports that New
York attorney Spencer Sheehan filed a class action lawsuit against
Heineken USA Incorporated, alleging its Dos Equis "Ranch Water" is
just flavored beer rather than the traditional tequila and lime.

The proposed class action was filed on behalf of plaintiff Caleb
Pautz in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.

According to the complaint, Heineken manufactures "Ranch Water"
under the Dos Equis brand, which it describes as "hard seltzer" and
"classic lime."

"Ranch water likely originated in the 1960s in the blazing sun on
West Texas ranches where cowboys worked long days," Sheehan wrote.
"They would often begin the day with a thermos full of tequila and
ice, and after lunch they would add lime, a staple of their Tex-Mex
cuisine."

The suit states that carbonated water was added at some point to
"improve refreshment."

Sheehan wrote that ranch water gained popularity due to its
consistency and simplicity. He added that consumers who purchase
Dos Equis ranch water expect the product to contain ingredients
associated with the classic drink.

"First, 'hard seltzer' beneath 'ranch water' contributes to the
expectation the product will contain tequila because 'hard' in the
context of alcohol refers to distilled spirits or 'hard liquor,'"
the suit states.

However, Sheehan wrote that Heineken's ranch water does not contain
tequila.

"The representations are misleading because though the product
contains carbonated water, it does not contain tequila or lime,
shown through their absence from the ingredient list on the side of
the box and cans," he wrote.

The ingredient list includes carbonated water, alcohol (from
sugar), natural flavors, citric acid, and sodium citrate. The suit
states that the drink contains alcohol from a fermented sugar base
instead of tequila from agave. Additionally, the drink contains
natural flavors and citric acid instead of lime.

"Natural flavors refers to a synthesized blend of substances
prepared in a laboratory which may contain not more than a de
minimis or negligible amount of lime," Sheehan wrote.

"That the label states' classic lime' makes it more likely
purchasers will expect real lime, because 'classic' is understood
as original or unmodified, like an actual lime," he added.

Sheehan alleges the ranch water is actually flavored beer.

"The representations are misleading because 'hard seltzer' does not
indicate the class of malt beverages the product fires in,
preventing consumers from knowing the type of alcoholic drink they
are buying," Sheehan wrote.

Sheehan alleges consumers paid more for the product than it was
worth. They also chose the Dos Equis product over others due to the
alleged misrepresentations.

"Plaintiff is unable to rely on the labeling and representations
not only of this product, but other brands of ranch water, because
he is unsure whether those representations are truthful," Sheehan
wrote.

The class action alleges violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Practices Act and of the State Consumer
Fraud Acts. The suit also alleges the defendant engaged in
negligent misrepresentation, fraud, unjust enrichment and breach of
express warranty, implied warranty of merchantability and the
Magnuson Moss Warranty Act.

Sheehan seeks injunctive relief directing the defendant to correct
the challenged practices, monetary damages, interest, court costs
and attorneys fees.[GN]

INSIDER INC: Parties Must File Revised CMP by Jan. 5
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Johnson v. Insider Inc.,
Case No. 1:22-cv-06529-AT (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Analisa Torres
entered an order that by January 5, 2023, the parties shall file a
revised case management plan.

The Court has reviewed the parties proposed case management plan.
The parties request 270 days for fact discovery, without providing
an exceptional circumstance which makes more than 120 days of fact
discovery necessary. Further, the parties request that expert
discovery close 90 days after the close of fact discovery without
providing an exceptional circumstance which makes more than 45
additional days necessary.

The parties also propose a schedule for Plaintiffs' anticipated
class certification motion, but the parties must file pre-motion
letters in accordance with the Court's Individual Rules in Civil
Cases.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 29, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3WDdyCK at no extra charge.[CC]

KIROMIC BIOPHARMA: Faces Karp Shareholder Suit Over Stock Offering
------------------------------------------------------------------
Brera Holdings PLC disclosed in its Form F-1 Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 16, 2022, that on
August 5, 2022, the plaintiff, Ronald Karp commenced a putative
class action against Kiromic Biopharma, Inc. and its current or
former officers and directors, among other defendants, in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Kiromic's chief executive officer, Pietro Bersani was named as
director nominee of Brera.

The allegations in the complaint, which the plaintiff filed on the
same day, center on alleged violations of federal securities laws
in relation to Kiromic's public stock offering that opened on or
about June 29, 2021, and closed on or about July 2, 2021.

The complaint alleges that the June 2021 offering documents
contained untrue or material misleading misrepresentations or
omissions due to the failure of those documents to disclose that
the FDA had placed a clinical hold on Kiromic's two Investigational
New Drug (IND) applications. Pietro Bersani, who has been nominated
to serve as a member of the board of directors, is individually
named as a defendant in the complaint due to his position as a
member of Kiromic's board of directors and chairman of the audit
committee during the time relevant to the allegations in the
complaint.

Mr. Bersani is also currently Kiromic's chief executive officer.
The complaint prays for certification of the case as a class action
and judgment in favor of the named plaintiff and members of the
putative plaintiff class for an award against the defendants,
jointly and severally, for recission (as appropriate) of amounts
paid for shares purchased in June 2021 Offering or all damages
sustained in an amount to be proven at trial, including interest,
and attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses, among other relief.

On October 27, 2022, the court consolidated the action with the
Podmore action discussed below, appointed Ronald H. Karp, Ari Karp,
and Ethan Karp as Lead Plaintiff, and ordered the filing of a
consolidated amended class action complaint within 60 days. As of
December 14, 2022, this case was pending.

Brera Holdings PLC is an Irish holding company focused on expanding
the social impact of football.


KIROMIC BIOPHARMA: Faces Podmore Shareholder Suit Over Stock Offer
------------------------------------------------------------------
Brera Holdings PLC disclosed in its Form F-1 Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 16, 2022, that on
October 3, 2022, the plaintiff, Joseph Podmore, commenced a
putative class action against Kiromic Biopharma, Inc. (Kiromic) and
its current or former officers and directors, among other
defendants, in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. Kiromic's chief executive officer, Pietro
Bersani was named as director nominee of Brera.

The allegations in the complaint, which the plaintiff filed on the
same day, center on alleged violations of federal securities laws
in relation to Kiromic's public stock offering that opened on or
about June 29, 2021, and closed on or about July 2, 2021.

The complaint alleges that the June 2021 Offering documents
contained untrue or material misleading misrepresentations or
omissions due to the failure of those documents to disclose that
the FDA had placed a clinical hold on Kiromic's two Investigational
New Drug (IND) applications. Pietro Bersani, who has been nominated
to serve as a member of the Brera board of directors, is
individually named as a defendant in the complaint due to his
position as a member of Kiromic's board of directors and chairman
of the audit committee during the time relevant to the allegations
in the complaint.

Mr. Bersani is also currently Kiromic's chief executive officer.
The complaint prays for certification of the case as a class action
and judgment in favor of the named plaintiff and members of the
putative plaintiff class for an award against the defendants,
jointly and severally, for recission (as appropriate) of amounts
paid for shares purchased in the June 2021 Offering or all damages
sustained in an amount to be proven at trial, including interest,
and attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses, among other relief.

On October 27, 2022, the court consolidated the action with the
Karp action discussed above, appointed Ronald H. Karp, Ari Karp,
and Ethan Karp as Lead Plaintiff, and ordered the filing of a
consolidated amended class action complaint within 60 days. As of
December 14, 2022, this case was pending.

Brera Holdings PLC is an Irish holding company focused on expanding
the social impact of football.


LOS ANGELES, CA: Sustention of Demurrer in Kaminsky Suit Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ESTHER KAMINSKY, Plaintiff and Appellant v. CITY OF
LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent, Case No. B310170 (Cal.
App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the Second District,
Division Five, affirms the trial court's judgment sustaining the
City's demurrer to the operative complaint in its entirety without
leave to amend.

California's basic speed law provides that no person will drive a
vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or
prudent and in no event at a speed which endangers the safety of
persons or property. The Vehicle Code prohibits peace officers or
other persons from using a speed trap in arresting any person for
any alleged violation of this code and from using a speed trap in
securing evidence as to the speed of any vehicle for the purpose of
an arrest or prosecution under this code. It also specifies certain
consequences when speed traps are used.

Plaintiffs and Appellants Esther Kaminsky, James Cameron, Mark
Shamoun, and Joseph McLaughlin were each cited for driving over a
posted speed limit in the City. All four Plaintiffs were informed
by the respective police officers who arrested them that their
speed had been detected by use of a laser device, and the citations
they received similarly indicated a laser device was used in
determining their speed. They were released from custody only by
signing an agreement to appear in court.

McLaughlin chose not to contest his citation and paid $436 in fines
and fee assessments in June 2018, as well as a fee to attend
traffic school. His conviction on the citation charge was entered
in October 2018. Shamoun, Cameron, and Kaminsky each retained
counsel to represent them. Their citations were ultimately
dismissed at trial because no valid traffic survey was in place at
the time of the citation.

The Plaintiffs filed a putative class action complaint alleging
nine causes of action against the City of Los Angeles and the City
of Los Angeles' Department of Transportation in July 2019.
Generally speaking, the complaint alleged that in or around 2008,
the City began allowing its engineering and traffic surveys
(traffic surveys) to expire on hundreds of miles of City streets
and began conducting inadequate traffic surveys that did not meet
the requirements of the Vehicle Code. As alleged, the City did not
disclose that it was not complying with legislative prohibitions
against speed traps to the public, instead concealing that fact
while continuing to arrest motorists and issue them speeding
citations at speed trap locations based on the use of radar or
laser devices. The complaint also alleged the City Council for the
City began making efforts to update speed limits in 2018.

After an initial demurrer, the Plaintiffs filed a first amended
class action complaint (the operative complaint) in May 2020. The
operative complaint asserts nine causes of action, including:
violation of mandatory duties under Government Code section 815.6;
negligence; a claim under Section 1983 for arrest and citation
without probable cause; a claim under Section 1983 for violation of
the due process right to disclosure of exculpatory material; a
claim under Section 1983 for violation of the due process right to
not be criminally charged or prosecuted based on falsified
evidence; violation of Article 1, sections 7 and 13 of the
California Constitution; and violation of the Bane Act (Civil Code
section 52.1).

Broadly speaking, these various causes of action can be grouped to
allege two theories of liability. First, the Plaintiffs contend the
City, or its employees, breached duties in relation to their
arrests and citations in speed traps. Second, they contend various
of their constitutional rights had been violated by the use of the
speed traps and by the course of events in plaintiffs' respective
prosecutions. Among the exhibits to the operative complaint were
excerpts from LADOT's 2008 and 2014 databases identifying City
streets with associated traffic surveys and their expiration
dates.

In terms of remedies sought, the operative complaint seeks
compensatory, consequential, actual, and treble damages;
restitution and disgorgement; preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief; and attorney fees and costs of suit.

The City demurred to the operative complaint, arguing it failed to
state facts sufficient to state a cause of action. It sought
judicial notice of the traffic surveys for the locations at which
the Plaintiffs had been cited and the notice of ruling for the
trial court's decision on the original demurrer.

The Plaintiffs opposed the City's demurrer. Their opposition
included a single sentence requesting leave to amend if any cause
of action was deemed insufficient. They also sought judicial notice
of a portion of the California Manual on Uniform Traffic Control
Devices, a minute order in another case involving Kaminsky, and a
judgment entered in a case involving someone who was not a named
plaintiff.

The trial court sustained the City's objection to the Plaintiffs'
request for judicial notice of the unrelated judgment and otherwise
granted the parties' requests for judicial notice. It then
sustained the demurrer in its entirety without leave to amend. The
trial court denied leave to amend, stating it allowed the
Plaintiffs leave to amend after the original demurrer and the First
Amended Complaint still did not state viable causes of action.

The Court of Appeals opines that the trial court's ruling is
correct. The Legislature has prohibited the use of speed traps, but
the statutory language indicates it has not imposed mandatory
duties on municipalities like the City to ensure compliance with
that prohibition (as opposed to the aforementioned remedy of
suppression for anyone cited as part of a speed trap). Speed trap
citations also do not constitute constitutional violations, at
least on the facts alleged in the operative complaint: Police
officers who stop motorists driving over the posted speed limit
have probable cause to stop them; disclosure of traffic surveys in
traffic court rather than prior to trial does not constitute a due
process violation; and plaintiffs have not alleged any evidence was
actually fabricated in support of their falsification of evidence
claim. Finally, the City employees mentioned in the operative
complaint are immune from liability for their asserted negligence
under the alleged circumstances described in the complaint.

In their opening brief, the Plaintiffs make several conclusory
representations, mostly in footnotes, that they could amend their
complaint to allege new causes. However, the Court of Appeals
opines that their piecemeal assertions that they could, if
necessary, amend to allege new claims and their specific argument
as to a single element of one new cause of action does not
demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion in denying leave
to amend.

For these reasons, the judgment is affirmed. The Defendants will
recover their costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 23, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/bdfvka9z from Leagle.com.

Schonbrun Seplow Harris Hoffman & Zeldes, Paul Hoffman --
hoffpaul@aol.com -- and John C. Washington --
jwashington@sshhzlaw.com; Donald G. Norris, a Law Corporation and
Donald G. Norris; Law Offices of Sherman M. Ellison and Sherman M.
Ellison; Waymaker, Donald R. Pepperman --
dpepperman@waymakerlaw.com -- and Sam Meehan --
smeehan@waymakerlaw.com -- for the Plaintiff and Appellant.

Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Scott Marcus, Chief Assistant City
Attorney, Blithe S. Bock, Managing Assistant City Attorney, and
Sara Ugaz, Deputy City Attorney, for the Defendant and Respondent.


META PLATFORMS: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Brickman TCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, COLIN R. BRICKMAN, individually and on behalf of a
class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff-Appellant v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor-Appellee, META PLATFORMS,
INC., Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 21-16785 (9th Cir.), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirms the district court's
dismissal with prejudice of Brickman's class-action claim under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The case arises from the district court's dismissal with prejudice
of Brickman's class-action claim under the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. Section 227, against Meta,
formerly known as Facebook, Inc. Enacted in 1991, the TCPA
generally bans calls made to a telephone if the call is generated
by an "automatic telephone dialing system" (commonly referred to as
an "autodialer"). The TCPA defines an autodialer as a piece of
equipment with the capacity "to store or produce telephone numbers
to be called, using a random or sequential number generator" (an
RSNG), and "to dial such numbers."

Brickman argues that Meta violated the TCPA by sending unsolicited
"Birthday Announcement" text messages to consumers' cell phones. He
alleges that these Birthday Announcements were sent by Meta through
an autodialer that used an RSNG to store and dial the telephone
numbers of the consumers being texted. He does not argue that the
RSNG actually generated the consumers' phone numbers (consumers
provided them directly to Facebook), but that the RSNG was used to
determine the order in which the phone numbers were stored and
dialed, an activity that he argues implicates the TCPA. Meta
disagrees with Brickman's interpretation of the autodialer
provision, arguing that a TCPA-defined RSNG must actually generate
the phone numbers in the first instance.

The question on appeal is whether a TCPA-defined autodialer must
use an RSNG to generate the telephone numbers that are dialed.
During the Ninth Circuit's consideration of this matter, another of
its panel answered this exact question in Borden v. eFinancial,
LLC, 53 F.4th 1230 (9th Cir. 2022), holding that "an autodialer
must generate and dial random or sequential telephone numbers under
the TCPA's plain text." Borden resolves the sole issue in the
instant case. The Ninth Circuit therefore holds that Meta did not
violate the TCPA because it did not use a TCPA-defined autodialer
that randomly or sequentially generated the telephone numbers in
question.

Brickman argues to the contrary, contending that Borden does not
control the outcome because Borden addressed the 'production' prong
of Section 227(a)(1)(A), not the 'storage' prong at issue here."
But Borden did not in fact limit its holding to the production
prong. The court instead interpreted the definition of an
autodialer in its entirety, finding that the text and context of
the TCPA make clear that the number in 'number generator' means a
telephone number. This is true regardless of whether the numbers
are stored or produced -- either way, an autodialer must randomly
or sequentially generate telephone numbers, not just any number.
Borden therefore clearly controls the case.

For what it is worth, the majority of the present panel agrees with
the analysis in Borden. But they recognize that whether they agree
or not is inconsequential because the Court of Appeals cannot
disregard an earlier published decision of this circuit that is
directly on point. The Ninth Circuit, therefore, affirms the
judgment of the district court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2wnruaj3 from Leagle.com.

Patrick J. Perotti -- pperotti@dworkenlaw.com -- (argued) and Frank
A. Bartela -- fbartela@dworkenlaw.com -- Dworken & Bernstein Co.
LPA, Painesville, Ohio; Andrea R. Gold -- agold@tzlegal.com -- and
Hassan A. Zavareei -- hzavareei@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei
LLP, Washington, D.C.; Sabita J. Soneji -- ssoneji@tzlegal.com --
Tycko and Zavareei LLP, Oakland, California, for the
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Lindsey Powell, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C., Intervenor-Appellee.

Samir Deger-Sen -- samir.deger-sen@lw.com -- (argued) and Peter
Trombly, Latham & Watkins LLP, New York, New York; Andrew B.
Clubok, Susan E. Engel, and Gregory B. in den Berkern, Latham &
Watkins LLP, Washington, D.C.; Elizabeth L. Deeley and Melanie M.
Blunschi, Latham & Watkins LLP, San Francisco, California, for the
Defendant-Appellee.

Andrew J. Pincus -- apincus@mayerbrown.com -- Archis A. Parasharami
-- aparasharami@mayerbrown.com -- and Daniel E. Jones --
djones@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, D.C.; Tara S.
Morrissey, Jonathan D. Urick, and Janet Galeria, United States
Chamber Litigation Center, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae The
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America.

Michele A. Shuster, Mac Murray & Shuster LLP, New Albany, Ohio, for
Amicus Curiae Professional Association for Customer Engagement.


META PLATFORMS: Settles Cambridge Analytica Lawsuit for $725-Mil.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Steve Dent at engadget.com reports that fallout from Facebook's
Cambridge Analytica privacy scandal continues over four years after
it was first exposed. Parent company Meta has agreed to pay $725
million to settle a long-running class-action lawsuit accusing
Facebook of allowing Cambridge Analytica and other third parties to
access users' private information, Reuters reports.

The settlement resolves user claims that Facebook violated federal
and state laws by allowing the company's preferred vendors and
partners to harvest their personal data without consent. It's
reportedly the largest ever in a US data privacy class action and
the most Meta has ever paid to resolve a class-action lawsuit.

"This historic settlement will provide meaningful relief to the
class in this complex and novel privacy case," the lead lawyers for
the plaintiffs said in a statement.

Meta admitted no wrongdoing as part of the settlement, which is
still subject to approval by a federal judge. "Over the last three
years we revamped our approach to privacy and implemented a
comprehensive privacy program," Meta said in a statement, adding
that the settlement "was in the best interest of our community and
shareholders."

Cambridge Analytica, now defunct, worked for Ted Cruz and Donald
Trump's 2016 presidential campaigns. It accessed the personal data
of up to 87 million people by an app (thisisyourdigitallife) and
used the information gathered to target individuals with personally
tailored messages. The scandal was exposed by The New York Times
and The Guardian in 2018, thanks in large part to whistleblower
Christopher Wylie.

In 2019, Facebook agreed to pay a $5 billion fine following a
Federal Trade Commission investigation and $100 million to settle
US Securities and Exchange Commission claims. It also paid
£500,000 (about $644,000) in fines to the UK, a pittance compared
to what it would have paid had the GDPR been in place when the
scandal occurred.

Facebook hasn't put Cambridge Analytica behind it yet, either. The
company is still fighting a lawsuit by the Washington DC attorney
general, as well as a number of state attorneys general. [GN]

MITEK SYSTEMS: Refusal to Send Johnson to Arbitration Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSHUA JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellee v. MITEK SYSTEMS,
INC., Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 22-1830 (7th Cir.), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirms the district
court's denial of Mitek's move to send the case to arbitration.

HyreCar is an intermediary between people who own vehicles and
other people who would like to drive for services such as Uber and
GrubHub. Before leasing a car, HyreCar tries to ensure that the
potential driver is who he says he is and has the license and
driving record he claims to have. As part of this check, it sends
an applicant's information, including a photograph, to Mitek
Systems, which provides identity-verification services.

Johnson, one of HyreCar's drivers, contends in this putative class
action that Mitek has used that information without the consent
required by Section 15 of the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act, 740
ILCS 14/15. Mitek removed the suit to federal court under the Class
Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1453, and asked the district
court to send it to arbitration. After the court declined, Mitek
took an immediate appeal on the authority of 9 U.S.C. Section
16(a)(1).

Johnson's contract with HyreCar includes the Arbitration Agreement.
Johnson thus agreed to arbitrate with a long list of entities, but
the district court concluded that suppliers such as Mitek are not
on the list. Mitek contends that it is -- that it is a "beneficiary
of services or goods provided under the Agreement."

The Seventh Circuit does see how. It says the "services or goods
provided under the Agreement" are vehicles, plus some ancillary aid
that HyreCar furnishes to drivers. Mitek does not receive "services
or goods under the Agreement" between Johnson and HyreCar. Nor can
Mitek be classified as a "user" of HyreCar's services or goods.
Mitek insists that it must be a "beneficiary" because HyreCar pays
for its work. But the contract deals with "services or goods" that
HyreCar provides to its customers, not money paid to suppliers.

According to Mitek, a court must bend over backward to deem it a
"beneficiary", because "the Federal Arbitration Act requires that
arbitration agreements be generously construed and that all doubts
be resolved in favor of arbitration." That is not, however, what
the statute says, the Seventh Circuit points out. The Act requires
arbitration agreements to be treated just like other contracts.

Mitek's invocation of equitable estoppel is ridiculous, the Seventh
Circuit describes. It says Johnson has not done anything that would
estop himself from litigating this suit. The fact that he may have
consented to the collection or use of biometric data (a question on
the merits, which we do not address) is unrelated to the identity
of the forum that will resolve the parties' disputes.

Finally, the Seventh Circuit observes that Johnson has not alleged
a concrete harm and, on this claim at least, seeks only statutory
damages. The district court should not attempt to adjudicate
Johnson's claim under Section 15(c) but must remand it to state
court after resolving all claims within the court's adjudicatory
competence.

The decision refusing to refer the suit to arbitration is affirmed,
and the case is remanded for a decision whether the suit may
proceed as a class action followed by a disposition on the merits
(except for the claim under Section 15(c)).

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2umrub4a from Leagle.com.


NEPTUNE WELLNESS: Settlement of Shareholder Suit for Court Nod
--------------------------------------------------------------
Neptune Wellness Solutions Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q Report
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2022, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 16, 2022, that on
March 16, 2021, a purported shareholder class action was filed in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York against the company and certain of its current and former
officers alleging violations of Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, with respect to the company's
acquisition of SugarLeaf Labs, Inc.

On October 21, 2022, the company announced that it had agreed to
settle and resolve the purported shareholder class action for a
gross payment to the class of between $4 and $4.25 million, with
the exact amount being within the company's control and dependent
on the type of consideration used.  The settlement is subject to
court approval and certification by the court of the class.

Neptune Wellness Solutions Inc. is a modern consumer packaged goods
company based in Canada.


NEW BALANCE: Loses Bid to Toss & Strike Cristostomo's Class Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MATTHEW CRISTOSTOMO, ANTHONY BOLLINI, SPENCER
VERRILLA, DERRICK EVANS, CLIFTON BRADLEY, and ROBERT KAMINSKY,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. NEW BALANCE ATHLETICS, INC., Defendant, Civil Action
No. 1:21-cv-12095-AK (D. Mass.), Judge Angel Kelley of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts denies New
Balance's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint and to strike
certain class allegations.

New Balance sells a line of shoes that prominently feature claims
that the shoes are "Made in the USA" despite the fact that the
shoes' foreign composition mean they do not meet the "all or
virtually all" standard used by the Federal Trade Commission to
merit such a label.

The Plaintiffs bring forth this action against New Balance. The
Plaintiffs purchased shoes from a premium New Balance "Made in the
USA" collection. New Balance admits the shoes in this collection
are made of up to 30% foreign content but claims they adequately
disclose this detail to consumers. They dispute this
characterization.

The Plaintiffs allege that no reasonable person would expect the
language that appears on the side of the shoebox, the rear of the
hangtag, and on the website to contradict the unqualified
representation that the shoes were "Made in the USA." They further
allege that a reasonable consumer would not expect a shoe labeled
"Made in USA" to have significant parts made outside of the Unites
States.

The Plaintiffs bring 14 claims against New Balance for the
allegedly deceptive marketing of their "Made in USA" shoes. The
first claim is for deceptive advertising in violation of Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 93A (Count I). The second and third claim are for breach
of express warranty (Count II) and violation of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act ("MMWA") (Count III).

The Plaintiffs also bring one claim for unjust enrichment (Count
IV) and one claim for fraud (Count V). The remaining claims are
brought under various consumer protection state statutes in
California (Counts VI-VIII), Michigan (Count IX), Pennsylvania
(Count X), New Jersey (Count XI), Florida (Count XII), and New York
(Counts XIII-XIV), which prohibit false/misleading advertising.

New Balance has filed a motion to dismiss all claims and to strike
the Plaintiffs class allegations, which the Plaintiffs have
opposed.

First, the Plaintiffs claim that New Balance's deceptive marketing
of its shoes violates several consumer protection statutes that
prohibit deceptive advertising and unfair business practices. New
Balance argues that alongside any "Made in USA" statement, it
includes an express qualification that any consumer would see at
the point of purchase, that these qualifications are unambiguous,
and that its marketing complies with the relief agreed to in the
Dashnaw settlement.

Judge Kelley finds that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently plead that
New Balance sold shoes in its "made" series without adequately
disclosing the foreign content of its shoes. First, they plausibly
allege that the disclaimer is too inconspicuous for the
qualification to be brought to the consumers attention. Second,
even if a consumer notices a disclaimer about the shoes having a
"domestic value of 70% or greater," the Plaintiffs have plausibly
alleged that this phrase contains a level of inherent ambiguity as
it has no relevant legal definition.

Second, New Balance does not argue that the Dashnaw settlement
precludes the Plaintiffs' claims, but rather that New Balance's
compliance with Dashnaw makes their claims implausible. The
Plaintiffs meanwhile argue that since a footnote in Dashnaw
indicated that the settlement stopped short of enforcing Cal. Bus.
and Prof. Code Section 17533.7, that even compliance with Dashnaw
was not sufficient to bring New Balance into compliance with the
law.

In Dashnaw v. New Balance Athletics, Inc., 2019 WL 3413444 (S.D.
Cal. 2019), the Southern District of California approved a
settlement based on a similar challenge brought against New
Balance's "Made in USA" claims. The advertising challenged in
Dashnaw featured more unqualified "Made in USA" statements in
stores and on the Defendant's website than plaintiffs here plead.
As part of the settlement, New Balance agreed that it would less
prominently advertise "Made in USA" claims regarding its shoes with
less than 95% domestic content and that such claims instead be
accompanied with the disclosure that the "Made in USA" collection
"contains a domestic value of 70% or greater."

The injunctive relief further specified that the phrase "Made in
the USA" would be removed from the front of the hangtags on the
shoes, the hangtag would include the sentence, "New Balance 'made'
is a premium collection that contains domestic value of 70% or
greater", the phrase "Made in the USA" would be removed from the
top of shoe boxes, any representations on the side of shoe boxes
would include the 70% domestic value disclaimer, and any claims on
New Balance's website would include the same qualification. Dashnaw
does not have preclusive effect on the Plaintiffs here who are
consumers either outside of California or who purchased the shoes
in California after the class period in Dashnaw.

Judge Kelly holds that the Plaintiffs have plausibly plead that the
marketing of New Balance's "made" shoe line does not fully comply
with the Dashnaw settlement. Given the presence of unqualified
claims and the potential deficiency of New Balance's qualifiers,
she also finds that the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that New
Balance may employ deceptive marketing even when in compliance with
the Dashnaw settlement. Dashnaw does not preclude the claims
brought here, and while it is an instructive prior adjudication,
its conclusions are not binding on this Court.

Third, the Plaintiffs assert that New Balance's representation that
its shoes were "Made in the USA" constitutes fraud. New Balance
asserts that the Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims fail because they
have not alleged that their qualified representations are false or
that they cannot plausibly allege intent, especially given its
compliance with the Dashnaw settlement.

Judge Kelley finds that that, even under the heightened 9(b)
standard, the Plaintiffs have plead sufficient facts to make their
claims plausible. She also finds that the Plaintiffs have plausibly
alleged New Balance's representations are false because of both the
presence of unqualified "Made in the USA" claims and because of the
alleged insufficiency of the associated qualifications.
Furthermore, New Balance's settlement in Dashnaw is not sufficient
to disregard the Plaintiff's allegation of intent given that they
have plausibly plead that New Balance is not in compliance with the
Dashnaw injunction.

Hence, the motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's consumer protection
claims, fraud-based claims, and any associated claims subject to
Rule 9(b) (Count I, V-XIV) is therefore denied.

Fourth, the Plaintiffs bring two warranty-based claims: a breach of
express warranty (Count II) and a violation of the MMWA (Count
III). They base these claims on the fact that New Balance issued
representations and written warranties that the shoes were "Made in
the USA," that this formed part of the basis of the bargain between
New Balance and the Plaintiffs, and that because the shoes do not
meet that description as it is defined by the FTC, New Balance
breached these warranties. The Defendant argues in part that
plaintiffs' warranty claims fail because of their attendant
disclaimers.

Judge Kelley concurs with the majority of district courts that have
addressed this issue. Because the Plaintiffs' amended complaint
pleads facts sufficient to establish both that their claim meets
the amount in controversy and diversity requirements of 28 U.S.C.
1332(d)(2) and, as discussed, establishes a plausible claim for
breach of express warranty under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106 Section
2-313(1), she finds that they have stated a claim for a violation
of the MMWA. As such, the Defendant's motion to dismiss as to the
Plaintiffs' warranty claims is denied.

Finally, the Plaintiffs have introduced two claims, breach of
express warranty under the MMWA and a violation of Mass. Gen. Laws
Ch. 93A, as the basis for their nationwide class allegations. Since
they have adequately plead their claim under Mass. Gen. Laws Ch.
93A and the MMWA, the striking of a nationwide class would be
premature at this stage. The motion to dismiss as the nationwide
class allegations at this stage is also denied.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Kelley denies New Balance's motion
to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 23, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p9y25zs from Leagle.com.


NSH PORT: Shadwick Files Bid for Conditional Certification
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CHIQUITA SHADWICK,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v. NSH
PORT WASHINGTON, LLC, Case No. 2:22-cv-1120 (E.D. Wisc.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. conditionally certifying the collective proposed by the
      Plaintiff:

      "All Hourly Employees who earned a bonus in connection
      with work performed in at least one week in which they
      worked over40 hours since September 26, 2019;"

   2. approving the use of U.S. Mail and email to distribute the
      Plaintiff's proposed notice and consent to join;

   3. granting approval to the form and content of Exhibits 1–4
      for use in providing notice to the potential collective
      members via the methods described in this Motion;

   4. directing the Defendant to produce the names and last
      known mailing addresses and email addresses of each
      potential opt-in Plaintiff in an electronically importable
      and malleable electronic format, such as Excel, within
      seven days after this Court's Order is entered;

   5. allowing for an opt-in period of 90 days, to begin seven
      days after the day that Defendant produces the names and
      contact information for the putative collective
      members, in which putative collective members may submit
      their Consents to Join this lawsuit as opt-in plaintiffs;

   6. granting the Plaintiff leave to send a follow-up reminder
      via email or U.S. Mail, beginning 30 days after the opt-in
      period begins, to potential plaintiffs who have not
      responded to the Notice; and

   7. awarding costs and a reasonable attorney's fee and grant
      all other relief to which Plaintiff may be entitled,
      whether specifically prayed for or not.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Dec. 28,
2022 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3jCqUAm
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Kirkpatrick Plaza
          10800 Financial Centre Pkwy, Suite 510
          Little Rock, Arkansas 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


OLO INC: Scott+Scott Named Lead Counsel in Pompano Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, POMPANO BEACH POLICE AND FIREFIGHTERS' RETIREMENT
SYSTEM, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff v. OLO INC., NOAH GLASS, and PETER J.
BENEVIDES, Defendants, Case No. 22-cv-8228 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge
Jed S. Rakoff of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York appoints Steamship Trade Association-International
Longshoreman's Association ("STA-ILA") as the Lead Plaintiff and
Scott+Scott as the Lead Counsel.

The lawsuit is a putative class action filed by the Plaintiff
against Defendants Olo, a provider of software to restaurants, and
two of Olo's officers, Noah Glass and Peter J. Benevides, on behalf
of similarly situated investors in Olo. The Complaint alleges that
the Defendants made false and/or misleading statements of material
fact relating to Olo's partnership with Subway restaurants.

Three investors in Olo initially moved to be appointed as lead
plaintiff pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 78u-4(a)(1). Subsequently,
two movants voluntarily withdrew from consideration, leaving only
one movant, STA-ILA remaining.

On Dec. 16, 2022, Judge Rakoff held an evidentiary hearing in
which, inter alia, it posed questions to Richard P. Krueger III, a
representative of STA-ILA who is to supervise this case on behalf
of STA-ILA. At that hearing, he stated that he appointed STA-ILA as
the Lead Plaintiff and that he approved of STA-ILA's choice of lead
counsel, Scott+Scott, as well. Judge Rakoff  also promised a
memorandum setting forth the reasons for those rulings.

In his Memorandum, Judge Rakoff holds that because STA-ILA has made
a prima facie showing of satisfying the requirements of Rule 23,
and because, as the sole movant, it has the largest financial
interest at stake, it is entitled to the presumption of greatest
adequacy. This presumption has not been rebutted. Thus, Judge
Rakoff appoints STA-ILA as the Lead Plaintiff.

STA-ILA's choice of counsel, Scott+Scott, has represented investors
in several prior cases and has recovered hundreds of millions of
dollars for them. Further, Judge Rakoff has examined Scott+Scott's
retainer agreement with STA-ILA, and while that agreement is not
binding on the Court, it reinforces his confidence in Scott+Scott's
professionalism. Thus, Judge Rakoff approves STA-ILA's choice of
counsel.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Rakoff appoints STA-ILA as the
Lead Plaintiff and Scott+Scott as the Lead Counsel. The Clerk is
respectfully requested to close numbers 9, 12, and 14 on the docket
of the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2022 Memorandum Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ydt7mksz from Leagle.com.


OREGON: Magistrate Judge Endorses Denial of Zambrano Class Cert Bid
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Zambrano v. Oregon
Department of Corrections et al., Case No. 2:22-cv-00443-SB (D.
Or.), the Hon. Magistrate Judge Stacie F. Beckerman recommends that
the district judge deny Zambrano's motion for preliminary
injunction, and deny Zambrano's motion for class certification and
appointment of class counsel.

The Court will refer its Findings and Recommendation to a district
judge. Objections, if any, are due within 14 days. If no objections
are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement
on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due within 14
days. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier,
the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.

The Plaintiff Zambrano, a self-represented litigant in the custody
of the Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC) at Eastern Oregon
Correctional Institution (EOCI), filed this civil rights action
against ODOC, Oregon Corrections Enterprises (OCE), and eighteen
ODOC and OCE officials.

Zambrano asserts several claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983,
alleging violations under the Oregon and United States
Constitutions, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, the "Federal Environment Pesticides Act," the
Federal Hazardous Substances Act, the Performance Rating Act of
1950, the False Claims Act, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, and
related state law.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 29, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3jxRB9q at no extra charge.[CC]


PILLPACK LLC: W.D. Washington Certifies Class in Williams Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, AARON WILLIAMS, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PILLPACK LLC, Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-05282-DGE (W.D. Wash.), Judge David G. Estudillo of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, Tacoma,
grants in part the Plaintiff's renewed motion for class
certification.

The Court previously granted the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification on February 12, 2021. It certified the following
class:

     All persons or entities within the United States, whose
telephone number was obtained by Prospects DM from Yodel
Technologies, LLC or Fluent, Inc., and who between March 13, 2018,
and June 16, 2019, received a non-emergency telephone call
promoting goods or services on behalf of PillPack, LLC, as part of
the PillPack Performance Media campaign: a) to a cellular telephone
number through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system or
an artificial or prerecorded voice; or b) to a cellular or
residential telephone number that had been registered on the
national Do Not Call Registry for at least 31 days and who received
more than one call as part of the PillPack Performance Media
campaign within any twelve-month period.

     Transfers Sub-Class: All Class members who were transferred at
least once to a PillPack call center on the Dialed Number
Identification Service at: 866-298-0058.

In certifying this class, the Court and the Parties presumed that
Prospects DM obtained Williams's phone number from Yodel
Technologies, LLC or Fluent, Inc. Further discovery later
undermined this assumption, and as such Williams moved to modify
the class certification because he no longer was a member of the
putative certified class.

The Court rejected this motion and granted PillPack's motion to
decertify the class because it fails to meet the requirements under
Rule 23. In decertifying the class, the Court noted Williams may be
able to define a much narrower class.

On April 22, 2022, Williams filed a renewed motion for class
certification. PillPack filed its motion in opposition to renewed
class certification on May 20, 2022. Williams filed his reply on
July 3, 2022.

The Plaintiff moves to certify the following class:

      All persons or entities within the United States who between
March 13, 2018 and June 16, 2019, received a non-emergency
telephone call promoting goods and services on behalf of PillPack,
LLC as part of the PillPack Performance Media campaign:

          i. to a cellular telephone number through the use of an
artificial or prerecorded voice; and

          ii. Performance Media or its agents live transferred the
call to a PillPack call center on the DNIS 866-298-0058; and

          iii. Performance Media or its agents did not obtain the
cellular telephone number through Rewardzoneusa.com,
Nationalconsumercenter.com, or Surveyvoices.com between June 19,
2017 and May 3, 2019 before the date(s) of the call(s); and

          iv. Performance Media or its agents did not obtain the
cellular telephone number through the website Financedoneright.com
before the date(s) of the call.

Judge Estudillo states that to certify a class, the Court must
determine that class meets the four requirements of Rule 23(a): (1)
numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of
representation as well as the requirements for one of the types of
classes enumerated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b).

The Plaintiff asserts his proposed class meets the requirements of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), which requires the Court
to find that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The burden is
on the Plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
the requirements for class certification are met.

At the outset, Judge Estudillo rejects PillPack's argument that the
law of the case doctrine precludes the Court from determining that
a class may be certified based on common questions of consent or
vicarious liability. Given the broad discretion granted to the
Court to certify or decertify a class based on new evidence
obtained during the course of litigation, he finds the Court is not
bound by the law of the case doctrine to apply the Court's prior
determinations as to class certification. Additionally, as the
Plaintiffs point out, there is new, intervening authority the Court
did not previously consider when decertifying the prior proposed
class.

Next, Judge Estudillo finds that the requirements for class
certification are met. He says (i) the proposed class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (ii)
Williams has presented sufficient evidence to establish there are
questions of law or fact common to the class members' that can be
determined in one stroke; (iii) Williams' claims and defenses are
typical of the proposed class and that he and the class counsel are
adequate class representatives; and (iv) a class action is superior
to alternative methods of adjudicating the dispute.

Accordingly, and having considered the Plaintiff's motion, the
briefing of the parties, and the remainder of the record, Judge
Estudillo grants the Plaintiff's motion in part.

Pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1)(C), he certifies the following class:

     All persons or entities within the United States who between
March 13, 2018, and June 16, 2019, received a non-emergency
telephone call promoting goods and services on behalf of PillPack,
LLC as part of the PillPack Performance Media campaign:

          i. to a cellular telephone number through the use of an
artificial or prerecorded voice; and

          ii. Performance Media or its agents live transferred the
call to a PillPack call center on the DNIS 866-298-0058; and

          iii. Performance Media or its agents did not obtain the
cellular telephone number through Rewardzoneusa.com,
Nationalconsumercenter.com, finddreamjobs.com,
instantplaysweepstakes.com, startacareertoday.com,
samplesandsavings.com, sweepstakesaday.com, Surveyvoices.com, or
Financedoneright.com between June 19, 2017, and May 3, 2019, before
the date(s) of the call(s).

Williams is appointed as the Class Representative, and Terrell
Marshall Law Group PLLC, Smith & Dietrich Law Offices PLLC, and
Paronich Law PC are appointed as the Class Counsel pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g).

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 23, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/bdzms4hf from Leagle.com.


STREAMLABS LLC: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Amended Leventhal Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ZARA LEVENTHAL, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. STREAMLABS LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 22-cv-01330-LB (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
San Francisco Division, denies Streamlabs' motion to dismiss the
amended complaint.

The Plaintiff, on behalf of a nationwide class, contends that
Streamlabs deceives consumers into signing up for a subscription
product that carries an automatic monthly fee of $5.99.

Streamlabs has software that allows content creators to (1) stream
their videos on platforms (such as YouTube) and (2) collect
donations from viewers through third-party payment processors (such
as PayPal). The subscription product is Streamlabs Pro, which
allows donors to add GIFs or other effects (such as hearts, stars,
or confetti) to the messages that accompany the viewers'
donations.

The Plaintiff added a GIF to a donation and contends that
Streamlabs' subsequent disclosure to her -- that adding a GIF or
effect required joining Streamlabs Pro for $5.99 per month -- was
deceptive because it suggested that it was a one-time fee and did
not disclose that the $5.99 monthly fee would renew automatically,
in violation of California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and
Unfair Competition Law (UCL).

She claims that the process violates the UCL: it is fraudulent (and
thus is unfair competition) because Streamlabs concealed the fact
that the subscription would renew automatically and impose
recurring charges until cancelled, thus deceiving thousands of
consumers. It is unlawful because it is fraud, in violation of Cal.
Civil Code Sections 1572, 1709, and 1710, and deceptive
advertising, in violation of California's False Advertising Law
(FAL), Cal. Bus & Prof. Code Section 17500.

The class is "all persons in the United States who were enrolled in
the Streamlabs Pro automatic renewal subscription after adding a
GIF or effect to their donation, and were then billed $5.99 per
month for the subscription."

Streamlabs moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), generally on the ground that the
plaintiff did not plausibly allege claims. The Plaintiff alleges
facts that violate two requirements of California's Automatic
Renewal Law (ARL): conspicuous disclosure of subscription terms and
a consumer's affirmative consent to automatic renewal. She parrots
the ARL's language but does not cite it, possibly because the ARL
protects only California consumers and she resides in New York.

Streamlabs contends that the Plaintiff thus cannot rely on the ARL,
the CLRA's reasonable-consumer test otherwise does not require the
ARL's conspicuous disclosure and consumer consent, and,
alternatively, she must provide a more definite statement that
cites the ARL explicitly so that Streamlabs can assert its ARL
defenses. It also contends that the Plaintiff did not plead fraud
with the particularity required by Rule 9(b), unfair conduct in
violation of the UCL, or an entitlement to equitable relief under
the UCL.

Judge Beeler held a hearing on Dec. 22, 2022. She denies the motion
because the Plaintiff alleged facts that, if true, plausibly plead
Streamlabs' misrepresentations and deceptive advertising.

First, Judge Beeler holds that the complaint's fact allegations
(about Streamlabs' misrepresentations and false advertising that
also violate the ARL) do not defeat the claim. While the Plaintiff
as a New York resident cannot predicate a UCL claim on a violation
of the ARL, she can support her claims with fact allegations about
Streamlabs' failure to fairly apprise consumers of the terms they
were accepting.

Given that the Plaintiff does not rely on the ARL as a predicate
statute, Judge Beeler also denies Streamlabs' motion for a more
definite statement that cites the ARL by section. The rule is aimed
at unintelligibility rather than lack of detail and is only
appropriate when the defendants cannot understand the substance of
the claim asserted. The Rule 12(e) standard is not met here: the
Plaintiff's fact allegations are not unintelligible and are
sufficiently specific for Streamlabs to prepare a response.

Regarding whether the Plaintiff pleaded fraud with particularity
under Rule 9(b), Judge Beeler holds the Plaintiff did. The
Plaintiff plausibly pleads the fraud-based claims specifically,
allowing Streamlabs to answer the complaint. This conclusion
includes the Plaintiff's specifically pleading facts that, if true,
show a material misrepresentation, her reliance on that
misrepresentation, and her resulting damages in the form of the
monthly fees incurred until PayPal notified her of the recurring
fee.

The unlawful and fraud UCL claims survive, Judge Beeler finds. The
last issue is whether the Plaintiff plausibly pleaded unfair
conduct and her entitlement to equitable relief under the UCL in
the form of restitution. She did. The amended complaint satisfies
the balancing test. It alleges consumer confusion sufficiently and
that the deception about the subscription outweighs its benefits,
given that consumers "don't believe they are enrolled in and,
therefore, don't use" the subscription. Judge Beeler thus does not
dismiss the UCL claim for equitable relief in the form of
restitution.

In sum, Judge Beeler concludes that the Plaintiff's fact
allegations, if true, plausibly plead that Streamlabs deceived
consumers with its disclosures about the $5.99 fee. The complaint's
reliance on ARL requirements does not bar the claims. Therefore,
she denies the motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Her Order
resolves ECF No. 32.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 23, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yn8hkyxa from Leagle.com.


SWEET EARTH: Bid to Continue Class Cert Deadlines Nixed
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as GABRIELA SOTO HURTADO, v.
SWEET EARTH, INC., Case No. 5:21-cv-04894-BLF (N.D. Cal.), the Hon.
Judge Beth Labson Freeman entered an order denying stipulated
request to continue motion for class certification deadlines.

  -- The parties' stipulated request to continue the last day
     for Plaintiff to file a motion for class certification from
     June 3, 2023 to December 13, 2023 is denied.

  -- Due to the Court's impacted calendar, a motion filed in
     December 2023 would result in a hearing date in April 2024.

  -- If class certification were granted, there would not be
     time for notice and opt-outs before the June 3, 2024 18
     trial.

  -- Also, the requested schedule modification would require
     simultaneous briefing on class certification and any motion
     for summary judgment.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 29, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3CfnaLD at no extra charge.[CC]


TEN BRIDGES: Court OK's Proposed Case Schedule in Taie Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MARY TAIE, et al., v. TEN
BRIDGES LLC, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-00526-JCC (W.D. Wash.), the
Hon. Judge John C. Coughenour entered an order grating parties'
joint notice and proposed case schedule as follows:

                  Event                       Deadline

-- Discovery Cutoff:                       March 3, 2023

-- Motion for Class Certification:         March 9, 2023

-- Motions for Summary Judgment:           March 9, 2023

-- 39.1 Mediation:                         September 15, 2023

-- Motions in Limine:                      October 13, 2023

-- Proposed Pretrial Order:                October 13, 2023

-- Verdict Forms and Jury                  October 16, 2023
    Instructions:

-- Trial Briefs:                           October 19, 2023

-- Trial Date:                             October 23, 2023

The Court previously stayed this case pending the Ninth Circuit's
issuance of a mandate in Ten Bridges LLC v. Midas Mulligan LLC,
2022 WL 17039001 (9th Cir. 2022). The Ninth Circuit issued its
mandate on December 12, 2022. Accordingly, the stay is lifted.

Ten Bridges is a full-service web development and hosting company.

TRAVELERS INDEMNITY: 6th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Ceres Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CERES ENTERPRISES, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant v. THE
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF AMERICA, originally named as
Travelers Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 21-3232
(6th Cir.), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirms the
district court's order granting Travelers' motion to dismiss.

Ceres operates seven hotels across the Midwest. Like many
hospitality businesses, Ceres lost substantial income due to the
COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing government orders that restricted
non-essential business activities. It sought to recover this lost
income under a commercial insurance policy that it bought from the
Travelers Indemnity Company of America. The policy obligates
Travelers to pay for some amounts of lost income when this economic
loss grows out of a "direct physical loss of or damage to" Ceres's
property.

Travelers then moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim. The district court granted Travelers' motion to dismiss
because neither the pandemic nor the government shutdown caused a
"direct physical loss of or damage to" Ceres's hotels. In the
meantime, another district court asked the Ohio Supreme Court to
consider a similar insurance-policy question. See Neuro-Commc'n
Servs., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., ___ N.E.3d ___, 2022 WL
17573883, at *3 (Ohio Dec. 12, 2022).

Ceres appealed.

The Sixth Circuit reviews the district court's dismissal of Ceres'
complaint de novo. It states that the appeal turns on whether the
spread of COVID-19 or the ensuing government shutdown orders could
qualify as a "direct physical loss of or damage to" Ceres' hotels
(or nearby properties). Travelers says that this text is
unambiguous and requires a tangible harm to property. Ceres
responds that "direct physical loss" is ambiguous and could be read
to cover restrictions on the use of property.

The Ohio Supreme Court decided to consider a similar question in
Neuro-Communication. In that case, the relevant insured business
provided hearing and balance services to its patients. The Ohio
government's shutdown orders forced it to close its operations for
about six weeks, and it sought reimbursement for lost income under
a similar insurance policy issued by Cincinnati Insurance Company.
Id. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the business's argument that
the phrase "physical loss" could include a loss of use of its
property to serve customers. It reasoned that a "physical loss"
requires "loss or damage to Covered Property that is physical in
nature" and thus does not cover simply "a loss of the ability to
use Covered Property for business purposes.

The Sixth Circuit opines that the instant case raises the same
question as Neuro-Communication, so it must reach the same answer.
In cases governed by Ohio contract law, the Sixth Circuit must
follow the controlling decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court. And it
sees no basis to distinguish the contract in this case from the one
in Neuro-Communication.

The Sixth Circuit is bound by Neuro-Communication's interpretation.
Under that analysis, Ceres has not adequately alleged the required
"direct physical loss of or damage to" its property or to nearby
properties simply from its loss of use. Therefore, the Sixth
Circuit need not consider any other interpretive question, such as
whether the virus exclusion would otherwise have barred Ceres'
claim. Accordingly, it affirms.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/3uypncf5 from Leagle.com.


TURQUOISE HILL: Pentwater Remains Lead Plaintiff in Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE TURQUOISE HILL RESOURCES LTD. SECURITIES
LITIGATION, Case No. 20-cv-08585 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Lewis J.
Liman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York denies without prejudice to renewal:

   a. The Pentwater Funds' motion for leave to add John J. Murphy
      as an additional lead plaintiff and

   b. Chang Pin Lin's motion requesting that he replaces
      Pentwater as the Lead Plaintiff.

The case was initiated through a class complaint which was accepted
for filing on Oct. 15, 2022. That complaint asserted various causes
of action against Turquoise Hill, Ulf Quellmann, Brendan Lane, and
Luke Colton (collectively, "the Turquoise Defendants") as well as
Rio Tinto plc, Rio Tinto Limited, Rio Tinto International,
Jean-Sebastien Jacques, and Arnaud Soirat (collectively, the "Rio
Defendants"). Namely, the complaint asserted that the Turquoise
Defendants and the Rio Defendants made a number of
misrepresentations or omissions in connection with the development
of the Oyu Tolgoi copper mine in Southern Mongolia in violation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder. The allegations were made on behalf of a class of
persons who had acquired the securities of Turquoise Hill from July
17, 2018 to and including July 31, 2019.

On Nov. 6, 2020, this Court ordered, pursuant to the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), 15 U.S.C. Section
78u-4(a)(3)(A), that members of the purported class had until Dec.
14, 2020 to move to serve as lead plaintiff in the case. Seven
parties filed timely motions seeking to be appointed lead
plaintiff.

On Jan. 15, 2021, the Court appointed Pentwater as the Lead
Plaintiff and appointed their counsel, Bernstein, Litowitz Berger &
Grossman LLP, as the Class Counsel. As a condition of the
appointment of Pentwater and in the exercise of its responsibility
to supervise the litigation to protect the interests of absent
class members, the Court will impose an affirmative obligation on
Pentwater to report that litigation to the Court within five days
of filing that litigation with an explanation as to why they
believe it does not create a conflict of interest with the
interests of the class or their position as lead plaintiff for the
class.

Subsequent to the Court's order appointing Pentwater as the Lead
Plaintiff, the Turquoise Defendants moved for a protective order
directing Pentwater, until the conclusion of the litigation, from
ceasing all communications with Turquoise Hill concerning Oyu
Tolgoi and prohibiting it from posing questions on Turquoise Hill's
earnings calls and during other presentations to investors or
analysts." The Court denied the request, concluding that the
communications did not threaten the proper functioning of the class
action or violate the rules of professional conduct.

On March 17, 2021, Pentwater filed an amended complaint. On Sept.
16, 2021, it filed a second amended class complaint. On Oct. 19,
2021, the Turquoise Defendants and the Rio Defendants each
separately moved to dismiss the second amended class complaint. On
Sept. 2, 2021, the Court granted the Turquoise Defendants' motion
to dismiss in full and granted in part and denied in part the Rio
Defendants' motion to dismiss.

On Sept. 20, 2022, Pentwater filed a motion for an order (i)
permitting it to challenge the plan of arrangement between
Turquoise Hill and Rio Tinto in a Canadian court, while continuing
to serve as lead plaintiff and a proposed class representative in
this action; and (ii) granting leave for Murphy to be added as an
additional lead plaintiff and proposed class representative.

In that motion, Pentwater noted that on Sept. 5, 2022, Turquoise
Hill and Rio Tinto had agreed to a deal in which Rio Tinto would
acquire the entire minority interest in Turquoise Hill, subject to
approval by a Canadian court, via a plan of arrangement. Pentwater
also noted that, in January 2022, Rio Tinto forced Turquoise Hill
to forgive $2.4 billion of indebtedness owed to Turquoise Hill by
the Mongolian Government in an attempt to compensate the government
for Rio Tinto's misconduct. It asserted that such actions favored
the interests of Rio Tinto, as majority shareholder of Turquoise
Hill, over the interests of the minority shareholders, including
Pentwater. Pentwater therefore implied that it planned to pursue
oppression claims as well as to challenge the Plan of Arrangement.

Lin, a putative class member who had previously moved to be lead
plaintiff, filed a memorandum of law in opposition to Pentwater's
motion, and filed his own motion to be appointed to serve as lead
plaintiff in place of Pentwater. The Court held a hearing on the
two motions on Oct. 26, 2022.

Following that hearing, the Court received a number of letters on
the status of Rio Tinto's plans to acquire the remaining shares in
Turquoise Hill, as well as the nature of any oppression claims
Pentwater may pursue. On Dec. 12, 2022, Pentwater wrote to the
Court concerning the proposed acquisition by Rio Tinto of all
shares of Turquoise Hill not already owned by Rio Tinto. It wrote
that the acquisition was approved by a vote of Turquoise Hill's
minority shareholders on Dec. 9, 2022.

Pentwater then stated that if approved, under the arrangement, all
minority shareholders can pursue oppression claims against
Turquoise Hill, Rio Tinto or their respective affiliates where such
claims are served on or provided to Turquoise Hill and Rio Tinto no
later than seven days following the date the arrangement becomes
effective. Further, minority shareholders who have validly
dissented to the arrangement can pursue those dissent rights as
provided under Section 193 of the Yukon Business Corporations Act
and the terms of the arrangement. Pentwater intends to pursue its
dissent rights and a shareholder oppression claim in Canada.

An initial pretrial conference has yet to be held in this case and
discovery has not commenced.

Judge Liman first examines the request to disqualify Pentwater as
the Lead Plaintiff and to appoint Lin. Pentwater requests that it
be allowed to continue as the Lead Plaintiff despite its decision
to pursue the oppression and dissenters' rights suits in Canada. In
opposition, Lin argues that he should replace Pentwater as lead
plaintiff as Pentwater can no longer adequately protect the
interests of the class.

Judge Liman denies the request to replace Pentwater as the Lead
Plaintiff as premature. He agrees with Rio Tinto that the request
to replace Pentwater as the Lead Plaintiff is premature at this
stage. While Pentwater's decision to pursue oppression and
dissenter's rights claims in Canada raises the potential for an
incurable conflict of interest, that conflict of interest is still
largely speculative at this stage. He is also not convinced with
Lin's argument that Pentwater's Canadian lawsuits could jeopardize
the rights and recovery of the class requires Pentwater to be
replaced as the Lead Plaintiff at this early stage of the
litigation.

Turning to the request to add Murphy as an additional Lead
Plaintiff, Judge Liman denies the request to add Murphy as an
additional lead plaintiff without prejudice to Pentwater renewing
this request at a later stage in the litigation including at class
certification. As noted, it is not clear at this juncture that
Pentwater is incapable of adequately protecting the interests of
the class and, if it is incapable, on what basis and whether this
can be cured merely through the addition of another lead plaintiff.
It also is not clear that if another lead plaintiff should be
appointed, Murphy should be that lead plaintiff. The Court will be
in a better position to assess all of these questions and their
implications at class certification after class discovery has been
conducted and during which the Court is tasked with conducting a
more "searching inquiry" of named plaintiffs' compliance with Rule
23.

Another reason to wait for class certification is that, in the
event that Pentwater is found not adequate under Rule 23, the most
appropriate procedure would be to allow other putative class
members, including Lin, to move for appointment as lead plaintiff
upon Pentwater's withdrawal.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Liman denies Pentwater's motion
for leave to add Murphy as an additional lead plaintiff and Lin's
motion requesting that he replace Pentwater as lead plaintiff
without prejudice to renewal. The Clerk of Court is respectfully
directed to close Dkt. Nos. 155, 163.

An initial conference in the matter is scheduled for Jan. 23, 2023,
at 10:00 a.m. The hearing will be held in-person in Courtroom 15C
at the 500 Pearl Street Courthouse. A proposed case management plan
is due to the Court one week prior to the initial conference.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 23, 2022 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/48886t9j from Leagle.com.


VIESTE SPE: Plaintiffs Seek More Time to File Class Cert Reply
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Crossfirst Bank, a Kansas
banking corporation, et al., v. Vieste SPE, LLC, an Arizona limited
liability company, et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-01637-DLR (D. Ariz.),
the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order extending the
deadline for filing a Reply in Support of Class Certification, to
January 17, 2023.

On July 15, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed their motion for class
certification. On August 2, 2022, the Defendants Herbert J. Sims &
Co. and Timothy "Xan" Smith filed an opposition to Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification.

On August 9, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed the first Unopposed Motion
to Extend Time to File Reply. On November 23, 2022, the Defendants
Lawson Financial Corporation, Robert Lawson, and Pamela Lawson;
Defendants Vieste SPE LLC, Vieste Energy LLC, Vieste LLC, Mark
Branaman, Michael Comparato, Don Currise, and Joseph Cook;
Defendants Herbert J. Sims & Co. and Timothy "Xan" Smith; and
Defendant Joshua Rogers filed four separate oppositions to
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

On December 2, 2022, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' second
Unopposed Motion to Extend Time to File Reply to December 30, 2022.
With undersigned counsel's apologies, due primarily to the travel
disruptions during and continuing after the recent winter storm,
(our attorneys experiencing multiple cancelled and rescheduled
flights at multiple times during the period), undersigned counsel
is unable to complete the Reply by December 30, 2022.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion dated Dec. 29, 2022 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3GtP8Ga at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jeffrey Goulder, Esq.
          Timothy Lauxman, Esq.
          STINSON LLP
          1850 North Central Avenue, Suite 2100
          Phoenix, AZ 85004-4584
          Telephone: (602) 279-1600
          Facsimile: (602) 240-6925
          E-mail: jeffrey.goulder@stinson.com

                - and -

          Clinton A. Krislov, Esq.
          KRISLOV & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
          20 North Wacker Drive
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 606-0500
          Facsimile: (312) 739-1098
          E-mail: clint@krislovlaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Todd Feltus, Esq.
          Sarah M. Humble, Esq.
          KERCSMAR FELTUS & COLLINS PLLC
          7150 East Camelback Road, Suite 285
          Scottsdale, AZ 85251
          E-mail: tfeltus@kfcfirm.com
                  smh@kfcfirm.com

                - and -

          Scot L. Claus, Esq.
          Vail C. Cloar, Esq.
          Holly M. Zoe, Esq.
          DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC
          1850 North Central Avenue, Suite 1400
          Phoenix, AZ 85004
          E-mail: sclaus@dickinsonwright.com
                  vcloar@dickinsonwright.com
                  hzoe@dickinsonwright.com

                - and -

          Jeffrey C. Matura, Esq.
          BARRETT & MATURA, P.C.
          8925 East Pima Center Parkway, Suite 100
          Scottsdale, AZ 85258
          E-mail: jmatura@barrettmatura.com

                - and -

          Hutson Smelley, Esq.
          Thomas F.A. Hetherington, Esq.
          MCDOWELL HETHERINGTON LLP
          1001 Fannin, Suite 2700
          Houston, TX 77002
          E-mail: hutson.smelley@mhllp.com
          tom.hetherington@mhllp.com

                - and -

          Jon D. Weiss, Esq.
          Nicholas S. Bauman, Esq.
          LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE LLP
          201 East Washington Street, Suite 1200
          Phoenix, AZ 85504-2595
          E-mail: jweiss@lrrc.com
                  nbauman@lrrc.com

                - and -

          John T. Lynch, Jr., Esq.
          E-mail: John_Lynch_Jr@me.com

                - and -

          Nancy A. Temple, Esq.
          KATTEN & TEMPLE LLP
          209 South LaSalle Street, Suite 950
          Chicago, IL 60604
          E-mail: ntemple@kattentemple.com

VIRGIN AMERICA: Plaintiffs' Bid to Amend Judgment Granted in Part
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JULIA BERNSTEIN, et al.,
v. VIRGIN AMERICA, INC., et al., Case No. 4:15-cv-02277-JST (N.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Jon S. Tigar entered an order granting in
part and denying it in part the Plaintiffs' motion to amend
judgment.

  --  The Court found the reduction appropriate on the ground
      that $33.3 million in PAGA penalties would be confiscatory
      relative to $45 million in damages, but the Court lessened
      the weight of that consideration "given that Virgin has
      not presented any evidence that the full penalty would be
      excessive in relation to its ability to pay."

  --  The Court rejects Virgin's proposed 75% reduction for two
      reasons.

      First, the cases on which Virgin relies in support of a
      75% reduction remain, as the Court previously concluded,
      "wholly inapposite."

      Second, the Court disagrees with Virgin's argument that
      legal developments subsequent to the Court's grant of
      summary judgment "prove that there was greater uncertainty
      regarding the Defendants' liability than this Court
      previously recognized."

The Plaintiffs are flight attendants who worked for Defendant
Virgin America, Inc., and Defendant Alaska Airlines, Inc., in
California. The Plaintiffs alleged that Virgin failed to pay its
flight attendants minimum wage, overtime, and for all hours
worked.

On November 7, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification as to the following class and subclasses:

  -- Class

     "All individuals who have worked as California-based flight
     attendants of Virgin America, Inc. at any time during the
     period from March 18, 2011 (four years from the filing of
     the original Complaint) through the date established by the
     Court for notice of certification of the Class (the "Class
     Period")."

  -- California Resident Subclass

     "All individuals who have worked as California-based flight
     attendants of Virgin America, Inc. while residing in
     California at any time during the Class Period."

  -- Waiting Time Penalties Subclass

     "All individuals who have worked as California-based flight
     attendants of Virgin America, Inc. and have separated from
     their employment at any time since March 18, 2012."

     The Court later decertified the class only "with respect to
     any claims based on the completion of incident reports."
     The Defendant subsequently moved for summary judgment.

Virgin America was a low-cost U.S. airline that operated from 2007
until 2018, when it was acquired by Alaska Airlines.

A copy of the Court's order dated Dec. 29, 2022 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Ig8gZn at no extra charge.[CC]

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: 9th Cir. Amends Oct. 18, 2020 Memo in Riley Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, TIMOTHY G. RILEY, Plaintiff-Appellant v. VOLKSWAGEN
GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., DBA Volkswagen of America, Inc., a New
Jersey corporation; VOLKSWAGEN AG, Defendants-Appellees. LUKE G.
SANWICK; KATHRYN SANWICK, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP
OF AMERICA, INC., DBA Volkswagen of America, Inc., a New Jersey
corporation; VOLKSWAGEN AG, Defendants-Appellees. RICHARD V. ORTIZ;
VIRGINIA TORRES ORTIZ, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF
AMERICA, INC., DBA Volkswagen of America, Inc., a New Jersey
corporation; VOLKSWAGEN AG, Defendants-Appellees. JULIA ROBERTSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., DBA
Volkswagen of America, Inc., a New Jersey corporation; VOLKSWAGEN
AG, Defendants-Appellees. BYRON CLENDENEN, Plaintiff-Appellant v.
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., DBA Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
a New Jersey corporation; VOLKSWAGEN AG, Defendants-Appellees.
SCOTT SALZER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA,
INC., DBA Volkswagen of America, Inc., a New Jersey corporation;
VOLKSWAGEN AG, Defendants-Appellees. KENNETH J. COON; MARIA E.
COON, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC.,
DBA Volkswagen of America, Inc., a New Jersey corporation;
VOLKSWAGEN AG, Defendants-Appellees, Case Nos. 20-15882, 20-15884,
20-15885, 20-15886, 20-15887, 20-15889, 20-15890 (9th Cir.), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enters an order
amending the memorandum disposition filed on Oct. 18, 2022.

The memorandum disposition affirmed in part and reversed in part
the district court's order granting summary judgment dismissing the
Appellants' Song-Beverly Act claims, Cal. Civ. Code Section 1790 et
seq., because the cars were merchantable and did not qualify for
relief under the statute. The district court remanded the case.

The Court of Appeals orders that said memorandum disposition is
amended by:

    1. On page 4, footnote 1, changing "filed concurrently with
this memorandum disposition" to "filed concurrently with the
original memorandum disposition."

    2. On page 4, replacing "Song-Beverly Claims Act" with
"Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act."

    3. On page 5, replacing "As applied to automobiles, the implied
warranty of merchantability is breached by "a defect that is so
basic it renders the vehicle unfit for its ordinary purpose of
providing transportation." Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Super. Ct., 37
Cal.App.4th 1291, 1296 (Ct. App. 1995). " with "Under the Act,
"'[i]mplied warranty of merchantability' . . . means that the
consumer goods meet each of the following: (1) Pass without
objection in the trade under the contract description. (2) Are fit
for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. (3) Are
adequately contained, packaged, and labeled. (4) Conform to the
promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label."
Cal. Civ. Code Section 1791.1(a). "[T]he plain language of section
1791.1 provides that goods which fail to meet any of the four
conditions listed therein are in breach of the implied warranty"
under the Act. DeNike v. Mathew Enter., Inc., 76 Cal. App. 5th 371,
384 (2022), review denied (June 15, 2022). The first two conditions
"overlap to some degree" and "fitness for the ordinary purpose" "is
shown if the product is in safe condition and substantially free of
defects. Thus, a new car need not be perfect in every detail;
rather, its implied merchantability requires only that a vehicle be
reasonably suited for ordinary use." Brand v. Hyundai Motor Am.,
226 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1546 (2014), as modified on denial of reh'g
(July 16, 2014) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."

    4. On page 5, after "summary judgment" inserting "as to the
first two conditions."

    5. On page 5, after "transportation." in a new paragraph
inserting "As to the third and fourth labeling conditions of the
Song-Beverly Act, the district court misstated the law in rejecting
those claims on the basis that "mislabeling alone cannot render a
product unmerchantable." The statute is clear: a consumer good must
meet "each" of the conditions or else it breaches the implied
warranty of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Act. Section
1791.1(a); see DeNike, 76 Cal. App. 5th at 384. Appellants argue
that Volkswagen mislabeled the vehicles with stickers on the engine
saying that the vehicles complied with EPA and California Air
Resources Board standards and by marketing the vehicles as "green."
See Section 1791.1(a)(4).

        Information on "[a]n owner's manual or a ''specs' sticker
may be relevant to express warranty claims, but neither has
anything to do with 'promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label,' . . . for purposes of establishing a breach of
implied warranty," especially when the consumer never sees the text
of the manual or sticker. Simgel Co. v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am.,
LLC, 55 Cal. App. 5th 305, 320 (2020) (citation omitted). Likewise
here, marketing promises and an emissions compliance sticker under
the hood of the car are not labels under the implied warranty
provision of the Song-Beverly Act, especially since the Appellants
never saw the compliance stickers. See id. Thus, the cars do not
qualify for relief under the Song-Beverly Act. We affirm the
district court's dismissal of this claim.".

    6. On page 6, footnote 2, changing "we need not and will not
address" to "we need not and do not address."

    7. On page 6, after the sentence "We conclude that Volkswagen's
correction offer was not "appropriate" because it barred the
Appellants' ability to bring their other claims arising outside of
the CLRA." adding the sentence "We reverse the district court's
dismissal of the CLRA claim and remand because Volkswagen did not
offer an appropriate correction."

    8. On page 9, changing "AFFIRMED" to "AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED."

With these amendments, the panel unanimously voted to deny the
petition for panel rehearing. No future petitions for rehearing or
rehearing en banc will be entertained.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2022 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yeyuvft9 from Leagle.com.


WAREHOUSE DEMO: Cal. App. Flips Summary Judgment in Espinoza Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GEORGINA ESPINOZA, Plaintiff and Appellant v.
WAREHOUSE DEMO SERVICES, INC., Defendant and Respondent, Case No.
A165820 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the
First District, Division Five, reverses the trial court's order
granting the Respondent's motion for summary judgment.

The appeal presents the question of whether an employee working at
a fixed site not owned or leased by the employer is subject to the
outside salesperson exemption where the employer controls the
employee's hours and working conditions. Plaintiff and Appellant
Espinoza appeals a judgment in favor of Defendant and Respondent
Warehouse following the trial court's order granting its motion for
summary judgment.

The subject dispute involved a class action suit in which various
Labor Code violations were alleged against the Respondent as the
employer. The trial court granted the Respondent's motion and found
that the outside salesperson exemption applied because the
Appellant did not work at a site owned or controlled by the
Respondent and therefore worked away from its place of business.
The trial court did not reach respondent's arguments in support of
summary adjudication.

The Respondent is the exclusive or in-house product demonstration
company for Costco Wholesale. It employs demonstrators (sometimes
referred to as sales advisors) to perform demonstrations of various
products inside Costco warehouses. These demonstrators are
classified as part-time, nonexempt, hourly employees eligible for
overtime pay according to state and federal law. Demonstrators are
generally assigned to a single Costco and do not travel from
warehouse to warehouse. Respondent collects floor space rent from
the vendors it demonstrates products for and remits these payments
to Costco on a monthly basis.

The Appellant was employed by respondent as a demonstrator from
2011 to approximately 2016. She worked at three Costco locations in
the South Bay during her employment with the Respondent. She worked
four days a week and her regular shift lasted for six hours. Upon
arriving at Costco, the Appellant went to the Respondent's office
in the back of the store, clocked in, reviewed her assignment to
see what she would be selling or promoting that day, got her
supplies and equipment, set up her cart and took it out to the
floor near the product, and started demonstrating and promoting the
product.

The Respondent's policy was that demonstrators could not leave
their demonstration areas unattended at any time during their
six-hour shifts. Because of this, the Appellant could only leave
her demonstration area to take a break when an assigned "breaker"
(another demonstrator) came to relieve her. At the end of her
shift, she had 15 minutes to take her cart back to the office, wash
her dishes, and put her supplies away. She then waited for her turn
to clock out on the tablet device. The Appellant had to input her
lunch break time when she clocked out.

The Appellant filed a class action complaint against the Respondent
that alleged various Labor Code violations, including failure to
pay wages and/or overtime (Lab. Code, Sections 510, 1194, 1199),
failure to provide meal breaks (Sections 226.7, 512), and failure
to provide rest breaks (Section 226.7). The Respondent filed a
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Appellant
lacked standing to bring the subject claims because she fell under
the outside salesperson exemption (Section 1171).

The Appellant's opposition argued that the Respondent did not meet
its burden of showing that she qualified as an "outside
salesperson," contending that although the Respondent did not lease
any space at Costco, it exerted extensive control and supervision
over its office and demonstration areas within Costco such that she
did not work "outside" of the Respondent's place of business for
purposes of the outside salesperson exemption. She argued that the
Respondent failed to compensate her for the time she spent
complying with respondent's security screening policy that was
implemented by Costco and that this time constituted "hours worked"
under California law.

Following oral argument, the trial court granted the Respondent's
motion for summary judgment and did not reach the arguments made in
support of summary adjudication. In holding that the outside
salesperson exemption applied, its order extensively discussed
Moore v. International Cosmetics and Perfumes, Inc. (C.D. Cal.
2016) 2016 WL 3556610 (Moore), an unpublished federal district
court case cited by respondent in its moving papers. The trial
court concluded that appellant did not work at respondent's place
of business because respondent did not maintain, own, or control
any space within Costco.

The court further concluded that appellant was engaged in sales
activity because demonstrating products, like the court held in
Moore, constitutes sales. And while the exact time appellant spent
on non-sales tasks was not calculated, it held that it was
"implausible that set up and end-of-shift clean up would take
anywhere close to half of the Appellant's six-hour shift."

Judgment was entered in favor of the Respondent and the Appellant
now appeals.

The Court of Appeals holds that the pertinent inquiry as to whether
an employee works away from the employer's place of business is not
whether the employer owns or controls the work site, but the extent
to which the employer maintains control or supervision over the
employee's hours and working conditions. It finds that the
Respondent assigned the Appellant to work not only at a fixed site,
but within a small, designated area within this site during each
shift. The Appellant was required to clock in and out at every
shift, was responsible for maintaining her designated area, and
could not leave this designated area during her shift unless
another employee came to relieve her for a break. The outside
salesperson exemption was created because it has historically been
difficult for an employer to control or monitor outside
salespersons who control their own hours and schedule. The purpose
of the exemption would not be served here where the Appellant's
hours and schedule were carefully monitored and controlled by
respondent. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reverses.

As it holds that the Appellant did not work away from the
Respondent's place of business for purposes of the outside
salesperson exemption, the Court of Appeals need not reach the
issue of whether the Appellant was engaged in "selling" under the
exemption.

The Court of Appeals reverses the order granting summary judgment
in favor of the Respondent. It remands the matter to the trial
court to address the issues raised in the Respondent's motion for
summary adjudication. The Appellant is entitled to her costs on
appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 23, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/4ycsp36y from Leagle.com.

Kingsley & Kingsley; Ariel J. Stiller-Shulman, Jessica L. Adlouni,
and Eric Bryce Kingsley, for the Plaintiff and Appellant.

Littler Mendelson; Yesenia Garcia Perez -- ygarciaperez@littler.com
-- Gregory G. Iskander -- giskander@littler.com -- and Natalie
Marie Kuzma -- njansen@littler.com -- for the Defendant and
Respondent.


WESTFIELD INSURANCE: Sixth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Equity Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EQUITY PLANNING CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant v.
WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 21-3229
(6th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirms
the district court's order granting Westfield's motion to dismiss.

Equity leases commercial property to tenants in Ohio and other
states. Like many businesses, these tenants lost substantial income
due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing government orders that
temporarily banned non-essential business activities. They were
thus unable to pay rent to Equity. Equity sought to recover its own
lost income under a commercial insurance policy that it had
purchased from Westfield Insurance Company. The policy obligates
Westfield to pay for some amounts of lost income when this economic
loss grows out of a "direct physical loss of or damage to" Equity's
property.

Westfield then moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim. The district court granted Westfield's motion to dismiss
because neither the pandemic nor the government shutdown caused a
"direct physical loss of or damage to" Equity's leased properties.
In the meantime, another district court asked the Ohio Supreme
Court to consider a similar insurance-policy question --
Neuro-Commc'n Servs., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., __ N.E.3d __,
2022 WL 17573883, at *3 (Ohio Dec. 12, 2022).

Equity appealed.

The Sixth Circuit reviews the district court's dismissal of its
complaint de novo. It states that the appeal turns on whether the
spread of COVID-19 or the ensuing government shutdown orders could
qualify as a "direct physical loss of or damage to" Equity's
properties (or nearby properties). Westfield says that this text is
unambiguous and requires a tangible harm to property. Equity
responds that "direct physical loss" is ambiguous and could be read
to cover limits on the use of property.

The Ohio Supreme Court decided to consider a similar question in
Neuro-Communication. In that case, the relevant insured business
provided hearing and balance services to its patients. The Ohio
government's shutdown orders forced it to close its operations for
about six weeks, and it sought reimbursement for lost income under
a similar insurance policy issued by Cincinnati Insurance Co. The
Ohio Supreme Court rejected the business' argument that the phrase
"physical loss" could include a loss of use of its property to
serve customers. It reasoned that a "physical loss" requires "loss
or damage to Covered Property that is physical in nature" and thus
does not cover simply "a loss of the ability to use Covered
Property for business purposes."

The Sixth Circuit opines that the instant case raises the same
question as Neuro-Communication, so it must reach the same answer.
In cases governed by Ohio contract law, the Sixth Circuit must
follow the controlling decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court. And it
sees no basis to distinguish the contract in the case from the one
in Neuro-Communication.

The Sixth Circuit is bound by Neuro-Communication's interpretation.
Under that analysis, Equity has not adequately alleged the required
"direct physical loss of or damage to" its property or to nearby
properties simply from its loss of use. The Sixth Circuit need not
consider any other interpretive question, such as whether the virus
exclusion would otherwise have barred Equity's claim. Accordingly,
it affirms.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/22xwdmyz from Leagle.com.


WESTFIELD INSURANCE: Sixth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of MIKMAR Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MIKMAR, INC.; MICHAELS, INC., dba LaMalfa Centre and
Vine Beverage and Caterers, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. WESTFIELD
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 21-3230 (6th Cir.),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirms the
district court's order granting Westfield's motion to dismiss.

MIKMAR and LaMalfa together own and operate a hotel and adjoining
banquet facility. Like many hospitality businesses, MIKMAR and
LaMalfa lost substantial income due to the COVID-19 pandemic and
the ensuing government orders generally requiring residents to stay
at home. They sought to recover this lost income under commercial
insurance policies that they had purchased from Westfield. The
policies obligate Westfield to pay for some amounts of lost income
when this economic loss grows out of a "direct physical loss of or
damage to" the companies' properties.

Westfield then moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim. The district court granted Westfield's motion to dismiss
because neither the pandemic nor the government shutdown caused a
"direct physical loss of or damage to" the hotel or banquet
facility. In the meantime, another district court asked the Ohio
Supreme Court to consider a similar insurance-policy question --
Neuro-Commc'n Servs., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., __ N.E.3d __,
2022 WL 17573883, at *3 (Ohio Dec. 12, 2022).

MIKMAR and LaMalfa appealed.

The Sixth Circuit reviews the district court's dismissal of their
complaint de novo. It states that the appeal turns on whether the
spread of COVID-19 or the ensuing government shutdown orders could
qualify as a "direct physical loss of or damage to" MIKMAR's or
LaMalfa's properties (or nearby properties). Westfield says that
this text is unambiguous and requires a tangible harm to property.
MIKMAR and LaMalfa respond that "direct physical loss" is ambiguous
and could be read to cover restrictions on the use of property.

The Ohio Supreme Court decided to consider a similar question in
Neuro-Communication. In that case, the relevant insured business
provided "hearing and balance services to its patients." The Ohio
government's shutdown orders forced it to close its operations for
about six weeks, and it sought reimbursement for lost income under
a similar insurance policy issued by Cincinnati Insurance Company.
The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the business's argument that the
phrase "physical loss" could include a loss of use of its property
to serve customers. It reasoned that a "physical loss" requires
"loss or damage to Covered Property that is physical in nature" and
thus does not cover simply "a loss of the ability to use Covered
Property for business purposes."

The Sixth Circuit concludes that it is bound by
Neuro-Communication's interpretation. Under its analysis, MIKMAR
and LaMalfa have not shown the required "direct physical loss of or
damage to" their properties or to nearby properties. Therefore, it
need not consider any other interpretive question, such as whether
the virus exclusion would otherwise have barred MIKMAR's and
LaMalfa's claims. Accordingly, it affirms.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/3tzxfx73 from Leagle.com.


ZURICH AMERICAN: Sixth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Brunswick Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRUNSWICK PANINI'S, LLC; KENT ENTERTAINMENT GROUP,
LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 21-3222 (6th Cir.), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirms the district court's order
granting Zurich's motion to dismiss.

Brunswick and Kent operate restaurants in northeast Ohio. Like many
restaurant owners, they lost substantial business due to the
COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing government orders that restricted
in-person dining. Brunswick and Kent sought to recover this lost
income under a commercial insurance policy that they purchased from
Zurich. The policy obligates Zurich to pay for some amounts of lost
income when this economic loss grows out of a "direct physical loss
of or damage to" the companies' property.

Before Zurich could resolve this request, they sued it in state
court. Brunswick and Kent sought a declaratory judgment that they
were entitled to coverage and alleged that Zurich's denial of
coverage would breach both the policy and the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. The companies also sought to certify a
class action made up of several classes of businesses. Zurich
removed the case to federal court on the basis of the Class Action
Fairness Act.

Zurich then moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim.

The district court granted Zurich's motion to dismiss because
neither the pandemic nor the government shutdown caused a "direct
physical loss of or damage to" Brunswick's or Kent's restaurants.
In the meantime, another district court asked the Ohio Supreme
Court to consider a similar insurance-policy question --
Neuro-Commc'n Servs., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., ___ N.E.3d ___,
2022 WL 17573883, at *3 (Ohio Dec. 12, 2022).

The companies appealed.

The Sixth Circuit reviews the district court's dismissal of the
Companies' complaint de novo. It states that the appeal turns on
whether the spread of COVID-19 or the ensuing government shutdown
orders could qualify as a "direct physical loss of or damage to"
Brunswick's or Kent's restaurants (or nearby properties). Zurich
says that this text is unambiguous and requires a tangible harm to
property. Brunswick and Kent respond that the key phrase ("direct
physical loss of or damage to") is ambiguous and could be read to
cover limits on the use of property.

The Ohio Supreme Court decided to consider a similar question in
Neuro-Communication. In that case, the relevant insured business
provided "hearing and balance services to its patients." The Ohio
government's shutdown orders forced it to close its operations for
about six weeks, and it sought reimbursement for lost income under
a similar insurance policy issued by Cincinnati Insurance Co. The
Ohio Supreme Court rejected the business' argument that the phrase
"physical loss" could include a loss of use of its property to
serve customers. It reasoned that a "physical loss" requires "loss
or damage to Covered Property that is physical in nature" and thus
does not cover simply "a loss of the ability to use Covered
Property for business purposes."

The Sixth Circuit opines that the instant case raises the same
question as Neuro-Communication, so it must reach the same answer.
In cases governed by Ohio contract law, the Sixth Circuit must
follow the controlling decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court. And it
sees no basis to distinguish the contract in this case from the one
in Neuro-Communication.

The Sixth Circuit is bound by Neuro-Communication's interpretation.
Under its analysis, Brunswick and Kent have not adequately alleged
the required "direct physical loss of or damage to" their
restaurants or to nearby properties simply from their loss of use.
Therefore, it need not consider any other interpretive question,
such as whether the microorganism exclusion would otherwise have
barred Brunswick's and Kent's claim. Accordingly, it affirms.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2022 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2xhw8yk7 from Leagle.com.


ZWANGER & PESIRI: Sali FDCPA Class Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Frederic Block of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York dismisses the case, NILGUN SALI, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
ZWANGER & PESIRI RADIOLOGY GROUP, LLP, VANVORST LAW FIRM, PLLC, and
JOHN DOES 1-50, Defendants, Case No. 19-CV-275-FB-CLP (E.D.N.Y.),
without prejudice.

In 2021, the Supreme Court held in TransUnion, LLC v. Ramirez, 141
S.Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021) that plaintiffs with claims for statutory
damages under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") lacked
constitutional standing unless they have suffered concrete harm
having a "close relationship to harm traditionally recognized as
providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts."

The parties have submitted letter briefs addressing the effect of
Ramirez on the Plaintiff's standing to assert claims for statutory
damages under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").
Judge Block treats the parties' letters as a fully briefed motion
to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

In December of 2018, Sali received a letter from the VanVorst Law
Firm. The letter stated that VanVorst was "acting in its capacity
as a debt collector" on behalf of its client, Zwanger, and that,
according to Zwanger's records, Sali had a balance due of $129.13.

Sali brought a putative class action against VanVorst and Zwanger
under the FDCPA. She alleges that VanVorst only operates under the
exclusive control of ZWANGER, and therefore, that the letter
violated -- among other provisions of the FDCPA -- the act's
explicit ban on any communication from a debt collector containing
"the false representation or implication that any individual is an
attorney or that the communication is from an attorney." She seeks
statutory damages, attorney fees, costs, and all other relief,
equitable or legal in nature, as deemed appropriate by this Court
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated.

On Nov. 20, 2020, the Court held that the complaint plausibly
alleged that VanVorst was under Zwanger's exclusive control and,
accordingly, denied both the Defendants' motions to dismiss for
failure for state a claim; the issue of standing was not raised or
addressed. On March 18, 2022, it denied Sali's motion for class
certification without prejudice to renewal upon resolution of the
Defendants' anticipated motions for summary judgment. Those motions
have not yet been submitted because the standing issue was raised
during discovery.

Judge Block explains that the "irreducible constitutional minimum"
of standing consists of three elements, citing Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The plaintiff must have (1)
suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision. The present case is at
the pleading stage, so the Plaintiff must clearly allege facts
demonstrating each element.

Judge Block easily concludes that the statutory damages recoverable
for a violation of the ban do not, without more, have a "close
historical or common-law analogue" to a constitutionally sufficient
concrete harm. The most obvious candidate is a claim for negligent
or intentional misrepresentation, but both require actual damages
flowing from "some form of reliance." The complaint contains no
allegations as to how Sali relied on the letter, or how such
reliance caused her concrete pecuniary or other harm. A future
violation of the same statutory provision will result in precisely
the same harm and, for the reasons stated, that harm is not
sufficient to confer standing.

Finally, Sali argues that any dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
must be without prejudice. The Second Circuit has squarely held
that where a complaint is dismissed for lack of Article III
standing, the dismissal must be without prejudice, and the Court
must follow that mandate.

For these reasons, Judge Block grants the motion to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Since such a dismissal does
not constitute an adjudication of the merits of Sali's claim under
the FDCPA, the case is dismissed without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 21, 2022 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4skb8zy7 from Leagle.com.

FRANCIS R. GREENE, Greene Consumer Law, Highland Park, Illinois,
ABRAHAM KLEINMAN, Kleinman LLC, Uniondale, New York, for the
Plaintiff.

PATRICK McCORMICK -- pmccormick@cmmllp.com -- Campolo, Middleton
&McCormick, LLP, Ronkonkoma, New York, for Zwanger & Pesiri
Radiology Group, LLP.

MARK K. ANESH -- Mark.Anesh@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois
Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, New York, New York, for VanVorst Law Firm,
PLLC.



                            *********

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