/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/240919.mbx C L A S S A C T I O N R E P O R T E R Thursday, September 19, 2024, Vol. 26, No. 189 Headlines 3M COMPANY: Barajas Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Chemicals & Foams 3M COMPANY: May Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams 3M COMPANY: Suitt Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams 3M COMPANY: Tyree Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams 701 PROSPECT: Hernandez Seeks to Recover Unpaid Minimum Wages, OT ACADIA HEALTHCARE: Rosen Law Investigates Securities Claims AFFINITY CARDIOVASCULAR: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Suit Says ARC ONE PROTECTIVE: Pasteur's Conditional Class Cert. Bid Denied ATHLETIC MEDIA: Discloses Customers' Info to Meta, Coppedge Says ATLASSIAN CORP: Wins Dismissal of Firefighters Pension Fund Suit BEVERLY'S HOME: Castillo Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages Under FLSA BISSELL HOME: Court Dismisses Franzini Suit Without Prejudice CALIFORNIA: Dispositive Motions in Hoch Suit Due by September 27 CARTER'S INC: Faces Namvary Class Suit Over False Price Discounts CELINE INC: Akeju Alleges Unpaid Wages, Unfair Biometric Collection COINBASE GLOBAL: Rosen Law Investigates Securities Claims COINMARKETCAP OPCO: Ninth Circuit Narrows Claims in Cox Lawsuit CRYSTAL CLINIC: Court OKs Plaintiff's Bid to Remand Class Action DIFF LLC: Violates FTSA's Caller ID Rules, Lewis Class Suit Alleges EI DU PONT: Court Denies Motions in Limine in Hall Injury Suit EI DU PONT: S.D. Ohio Denies Motions in Limine in Lynn Injury Suit ENROLL CONFIDENTLY: Fails to Safeguard Personal Info, Bailey Says EXXON MOBIL: Loses Bid for Judgment on Yoshikawa Suit Pleadings FENIX INTERNATIONAL: Faces Another Suit Over Systemic Deception FISHER-PRICE INC: Deadline for Claims Filing Set April 29, 2025 FOSTER POULTRY: Court Grants Summary Judgment for Beazley Insurance GITLAB INC: Investors Sue Over False and Misleading Statements HIGHGATE HOTELS: Website Inaccessible to Blind, Andrews Alleges HOAG MEMORIAL: Two Class Actions Remanded to State Court INT'L LONGSHOREMEN'S: S.D. Georgia Dismisses Dodd Class Suit INTUIT INC: Court Narrows Claims in Rodriguez ERISA Lawsuit JUAN MANUEL MERCHAN: Asanov Sues Over Organized Criminal Group LENNAR CORP: Faces Abboud TCPA Suit Over Unwanted Messages MARICOPA COUNTY, AZ: Curley Suit Dismissed With Leave to Amend MEDICAL PROPERTIES: Court Appoints John Cuomo as Lead Plaintiff MULTIPLAN INC: Alter Management Suit Transferred to N.D. Illinois NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION: Epps Suit Removed to C.D. California NEW YORK CITY: Meadows' Bid to Intervene in Gould Suit Denied OFFICE DEPOT: Wins Bid to Dismiss Benge Class Action Lawsuit PANERA LLC: Fails to Pay Training Specialists' OT, Cissokho Says PRIME HYDRATION: Wins Dismissal of Kennedy, et al. Lawsuit PRO CUSTOM: Court Narrows Claims in Culbertson Lawsuit ROB JEFFREYS: Court Dismisses Burns' Civil Rights Action RUSHMORE SERVICE: District Court Orders in George Suit Vacated STANLEY & BLACK: Filing for Class Cert Bid Due July 15, 2025 STATE OF GEORGIA: 11th Cir. Narrows Claims in Skilled-Nursing Suit STATE OF NEW JERSEY: Wins Bid to Strike Amended Salvato Class Suit STATE STREET: Class Settlement Obtains Final Court Approval STG LOGISTICS: Conrado Class Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages Under FLSA SUMMIT HEALTH: Discloses Customers' Info to Meta, Andretta Says TACTILE SYSTEMS: Class Settlement in Weaver Suit Wins Final Nod TARO PHARMACEUTICAL: Mitchell Balks at Merger Deal With Sun Pharma TEKSYSTEMS INC: Seeks to Adjourn Briefing Schedules TELECHECK SERVICES: Loses Bid to Dismiss Morris Amended Complaint TETRA TECH: Further Amended Class Settlement, Class Notice Okayed THOMAS CUISINE: Forsythe Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. TIDELANDS HEALTH: Loses Bid to Compel Arbitration in Marshall Suit TRANSNATIONAL STAFFING: Syncreon's Bid for Subpoena Compliance OK'd TRC STAFFING: Burke Seeks to Stay Requirement to File Class Cert. TWITTER INC: Zeman Bid for Conditional Status Partly OK'd UNCHARTED LABS: Judge Divulges Prior Representation of Warner Bros. UNION PACIFIC: Must Face Zaragoza's Discrimination Claims UNITED AIRLINES: Court Grants Motion to Dismiss Zajac Lawsuit UNITED STATES: E.D. Arkansas Dismisses Sanders v. USPS and DeJoy VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Court Narrows Claims in Kimball Suit VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA: Thompson Suit Settlement Has Final Approval WELLS FARGO: Amended Sched Order Entered in McNamara Class Suit WELLS FARGO: McNamara Suit Seeks to Certify Class WELLS FARGO: Parties Must Work Out Class Discovery, Court Says WESTERN REFINING: Class Cert Bid Filing Continued to Feb. 10, 2025 WILKES-BARRE, PA: Arias Sues Over "Physical Fitness" Requirements [*] Shine Lawyers Probes Potential Heartburn Drugs Class Action ********* 3M COMPANY: Barajas Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Chemicals & Foams ----------------------------------------------------------------- Alberto Barajas, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD. CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.); Case No. 2:24-cv-04877-RMG (D.S.C., Sept. 6, 2024), is brought for damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams ("AFFF") and firefighter turnout gear ("TOG") containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is not limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in response to Class B fires. The Defendants collectively designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF or TOG with knowledge that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFAS, which would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with PFAS. Further, defendants designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF or TOG which contained PFAS for use in firefighting. PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body while presenting significant health risks to humans. The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products. Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop the serious medical conditions and complications alleged herein. Through this action, Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products at various locations during the course of Plaintiff's training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further seeks injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the same, says the complaint. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian firefighter and was diagnosed with Testicular Cancer as a result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products. The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers, distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals used in AFFF production.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Frederick T. Kuykendall, III, Esq. THE KUYKENDALL GROUP, LLC 23710 US Hwy A-1 Fairhope, AL 36532 Phone: (205) 252-6127 Facsimile: (205) 449-1132 Email: ftk@thekuykendallgroup.com 3M COMPANY: May Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams -------------------------------------------------------------- Robert Kelly May, on behalf of himself v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota) Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; ALLSTAR FIRE EQUIPMENT; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BASF CORPORATION; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER FIRE & SECURITY CORPORATION; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DAIKIN AMERICA INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; FIRE-DEX, LLC; FIRE SERVICE PLUS INC.; GLOBE MANUFACTURING COMPANY LLC; HONEYWELL SAFETY PRODUCTS USA, INC.; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE P.L.C.; LION GROUP, INC.; MALLORY SAFETY AND SUPPLY LLC; MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES CO., INC.; MUNICIPAL EMERGENCY SERVICES, INC.; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; PBI PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS, INC.; PERIMETER SOLUTIONS LP.; SOUTHERN MILLS, INC.; STEDFAST USA, INC.; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix Inc.); W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES INC.; Case No. 2:24-cv-04874-RMG (D.S.C., Sept. 6, 2024), is brought for damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams ("AFFF") containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is not limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in response to Class B fires. TOG is personal protective equipment designed for heat and moisture resistance in order to protect firefighters in hazardous situations. Most turnout gear is made up of a thermal liner, moisture barrier, and an outer layer. The inner layers contain PFAS, and the outer layer is often treated with additional PFAS. The Defendants collectively designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF and or TOG with knowledge that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFAS, which would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with PFAS. Further, defendants designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF or TOG which contained PFAS for use in firefighting. PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to it where it remains and persists over extended periods of time. Due to their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remains in the human body while contemporaneously presenting significant health risks to humans. The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF or TOG products were used by Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous properties of the Defendants' AFFF or TOG products and relied on the Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products. Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of PFAS from Defendant's AFFF or TOG products caused Plaintiff to develop the serious medical conditions and complications alleged herein. Through this action, Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF or TOG products at several Fire Departments and or Military bases during Plaintiff's training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further seeks injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the same, says the complaint. The Plaintiff regularly exposed to AFFF and/or TOG during his firefighting career and was diagnosed with Kidney Cancer as a direct result of exposure to Defendants' products. The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers, distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals used in AFFF production.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: J. Edward Bell, III, Esq. Randolph L. Lee, Esq. Gabrielle Anna Sulpizio, Esq. BELL LEGAL GROUP, LLC 219 Ridge Street Georgetown, SC 25442 Phone: 843-546-2408 Facsimile: 843-546-9604 Email: jeb@belllegalgroup.com rlee@belllegalgroup.com gsulpizio@belllegalgroup.com 3M COMPANY: Suitt Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams ---------------------------------------------------------------- Cary Joe Suitt, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BASF CORPORATION BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CB GARMENT, INC.; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DAIKIN AMERICA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; FIRE SERVICE PLUS, INC.; FIRE-DEX, LLC; GLOBE MANUFACTURING COMPANY LLC; HONEYWELL SAFETY PRODUCT USA, INC.; INNOTEX CORP.; JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC.; KIDDE PLC INC.; L.N. CURTIS & SONS; LION GROUP, INC.; MILLIKEN & COMPANY; MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES CO., LLC; MUNICIPAL EMERGENCY SERVICES, INC.; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; PBI PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS, INC.; PERIMETER SOLUTIONS, LP; RICOCHET MANUFACTURING CO., INC; SAFETY COMPONENTS FABRIC TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; SOUTHERN MILLS, INC.; STEDFAST USA, INC.; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.); VERIDIAN LIMITED; W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES, INC.; and WITMER PUBLIC SAFETY GROUP, Case No. 2:24-cv-04887-RMG (D.S.C., Sept. 6, 2024), is brought for damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams ("AFFF") containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is not limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in response to Class B fires. The Defendants collectively designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with PFAS. Further, the Defendants designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF which contained PFAS for use in firefighting. PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body while presenting significant health risks to humans. The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products. Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop the serious medical conditions and complications alleged herein. Through this action, Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a direct result of Decedent's exposure to Defendants' AFFF products at various locations during the course of Decedent's training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further seeks injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the same, says the complaint. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to, AFFF in training and to extinguish fires during his military career and was diagnosed with Liver Cancer as a result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products. The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers, distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals used in AFFF production.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Gregory A. Cade, Esq. Gary A. Anderson, Esq. Kevin B. McKie, Esq. ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C. 2160 Highland Avenue South Birmingham, AL 35205 Phone: 205-328-9200 Facsimile: 205-328-9456 3M COMPANY: Tyree Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Film-Forming Foams ---------------------------------------------------------------- John Tyree, and other similarly situated v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD. CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.); Case No. 2:24-cv-04846-RMG (D.S.C., Sept. 5, 2024), is brought for damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams ("AFFF") and firefighter turnout gear ("TOG") containing the toxic chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is not limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related chemicals including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in response to Class B fires. The Defendants collectively designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF or TOG with knowledge that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFAS, which would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with PFAS. Further, defendants designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF or TOG which contained PFAS for use in firefighting. PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain in the human body while presenting significant health risks to humans. The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products. Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop the serious medical conditions and complications alleged herein. Through this action, Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF products at various locations during the course of Plaintiff's training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further seeks injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the same, says the complaint. The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to AFFF in training and during Plaintiff's working career in the military and/or as a civilian firefighter and was diagnosed with Thyroid Disease as a result of exposure to the Defendants' AFFF products. The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers, distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors and sellers of PFAS containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing chemicals used in AFFF production.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Frederick T. Kuykendall, III, Esq. THE KUYKENDALL GROUP, LLC 23710 US Hwy A-1 Fairhope, AL 36532 Phone: (205) 252-6127 Facsimile: (205) 449-1132 Email: ftk@thekuykendallgroup.com 701 PROSPECT: Hernandez Seeks to Recover Unpaid Minimum Wages, OT ----------------------------------------------------------------- NORMA HERNANDEZ v. 701 PROSPECT INC. (DBA K & B DEPT. STORE) and KHALID KHAN, individually, Case No. 1:24-cv-06317 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 9, 2024) is a class action lawsuit filed by the Plaintiff on behalf of herself and other similarly situated employees of the Defendants pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law. The complaint seeks to recover unpaid minimum and overtime wage compensation for the Plaintiff, a former employee of Defendant 701 Prospect Inc. The Plaintiff was hired directly by the Defendant Khalid Khan, who not only set her work schedule but also consistently gave her daily orders and instructions regarding her duties. The Defendant Khalid Khan also exercised disciplinary authority over the Plaintiff, including, but not limited to, issuing warnings, reprimands, and implementing other disciplinary measures as she deemed necessary. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants knowingly and intentionally failed to pay the required wages. The Plaintiff was employed primarily as a cashier, in addition to organizing products, unloading trucks with merchandise, and assisting with the cleaning of the store, under the direct supervision and control of Defendant Khalid Khan. The Defendants were required, under relevant New York State law, to pay and compensate the Plaintiff at a minimum rate of $15.00 per hour; however, the Plaintiff was only compensated at a rate of $11, $12, $13 and $14 per hour for 40 hours workweek.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Lina Stillman, Esq. STILLMAN LEGAL, P.C. www.StillmanLegalPC.com 42 Broadway, 12t Floor New York, NY 10004 Telephone: (212) 203-2417 ACADIA HEALTHCARE: Rosen Law Investigates Securities Claims ----------------------------------------------------------- Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces an investigation of potential securities claims on behalf of shareholders of Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc. (NASDAQ: ACHC) resulting from allegations that Acadia Healthcare may have issued materially misleading business information to the investing public. So What: If you purchased Acadia Healthcare securities you may be entitled to compensation without payment of any out of pocket fees or costs through a contingency fee arrangement. The Rosen Law Firm is preparing a class action seeking recovery of investor losses. What to do next: To join the prospective class action, go to https://rosenlegal.com/submit-form/?case_id=28482 or call Phillip Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email case@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action. What is this about: On Sunday, September 1, 2024, The New York Times published an article entitled “How a Leading Chain of Psychiatric Hospitals Traps Patients.” This article stated that “Acadia Healthcare is one of America's largest chains of psychiatric hospitals. Since the pandemic exacerbated a national mental health crisis, the company's revenue has soared. [. . .] But a New York Times investigation found that some of that success was built on a disturbing practice: Acadia has lured patients into its facilities and held them against their will, even when detaining them was not medically necessary. In at least 12 of the 19 states where Acadia operates psychiatric hospitals, dozens of patients, employees and police officers have alerted the authorities that the company was detaining people in ways that violated the law, according to records reviewed by The Times. In some cases, judges have intervenes to force Acadia to release patients.” On this news, the price of Acadia Healthcare stock fell by 4.5% on September 3, 2024. Why Rosen Law: We encourage investors to select qualified counsel with a track record of success in leadership roles. Often, firms issuing notices do not have comparable experience, resources, or any meaningful peer recognition. Many of these firms do not actually litigate securities class actions. Be wise in selecting counsel. The Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe, concentrating its practice in securities class actions and shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm has achieved the largest ever securities class action settlement against a Chinese Company. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1 by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the top 4 each year since 2013 and has recovered hundreds of millions of dollars for investors. In 2019 alone the firm secured over $438 million for investors. In 2020, founding partner Laurence Rosen was named by law360 as a Titan of Plaintiffs' Bar. Many of the firm's attorneys have been recognized by Lawdragon and Super Lawyers. Attorney Advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Contact Information: Laurence Rosen, Esq. Phillip Kim, Esq. The Rosen Law Firm, P.A. 275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor New York, NY 10016 Tel: (212) 686-1060 Toll Free: (866) 767-3653 Fax: (212) 202-3827 case@rosenlegal.com www.rosenlegal.com [GN] AFFINITY CARDIOVASCULAR: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Suit Says ----------------------------------------------------------------- JOHNNA BATTLES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. AFFINITY CARDIOVASCULAR SPECIALISTS, LLC, d/b/a ALABAMA CARDIOLOGY GROUP, Case No. 3:24-cv-01074 (M.D. Tenn., Sept. 6, 2024) sues the Defendant for its failure to properly secure and safeguard the protected health information and other personally identifiable information of its patients and employees. The suit says that unauthorized parties gained access to the Defendant's network on June 6, 2024, and maintained access to the network until detected on July 2, 2024. The compromised information includes name, address, email, phone number, date of birth, social security number, health insurance information, medical information (dates of service, diagnoses, medications, imaging, lab results, etc.), driver's license numbers, credit/debit card information, and bank account numbers. As a result of the Data Breach, the Plaintiff suffered injuries including: invasion of privacy; theft of PHI/PII; lost or diminished value of PII; lost time and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; loss of benefit of the bargain; an increase in spam calls, texts, and/or emails; and the continued and increased risk their PII will be further misused, the suit asserts. The Plaintiff brings this class action lawsuit individually, and on behalf of all those similarly situated, to address the Defendant's inadequate data protection practices and for failing to provide timely and adequate notice of the Data Breach. Affinity Cardiovascular is a medical establishment that diagnoses and provides treatment advice for various health conditions.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Roy T. Willey, Esq. Paul J. Doolittle, Esq.* POULIN | WILLEY | ANASTOPOULO 32 Ann Street Charleston, SC 29403 Telephone: (803) 222-2222 Facsimile: (843) 494-5536 E-mail: paul.doolittle@poulinwilley.com roy@poulinwilley.com cmad@poulinwilley.com ARC ONE PROTECTIVE: Pasteur's Conditional Class Cert. Bid Denied ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the lawsuit captioned RAYNARD PASTEUR, Plaintiff v. ARC ONE PROTECTIVE SERVICES LLC, Defendant, Case No. 6:23-cv-01479-CEM-DCI (M.D. Fla.), Judge Carlos E. Mendoza of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division, denies without prejudice the Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification. The matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Default Judgment and the Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification of This Case as a Class Action. The United States Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the Motions be denied without prejudice and the Plaintiff be given an opportunity to amend his Complaint. After review in accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and noting that no objections were timely filed, Judge Mendoza accepts the Magistrate Judge's recommended disposition. Accordingly, the Court rules as follows. The Report and Recommendation is adopted and made a part of this Order. The Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Default Judgment is denied without prejudice. The Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification of This Case as a Class Action is denied without prejudice. The Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint in accordance with the parameters set forth in the Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will result in the dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute without further notice. A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 22, 2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2yfu5jdf from PacerMonitor.com. ATHLETIC MEDIA: Discloses Customers' Info to Meta, Coppedge Says ---------------------------------------------------------------- DAVIN COPPEDGE, MAX THERIAULT, and ESTEBAN CUESTA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. THE ATHLETIC MEDIA COMPANY and THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY, Case No. 1:24-cv-12312 (D. Mass., Sept. 9, 2024) alleges that Athletic discloses subscribers' video viewing history in connection with Plaintiffs' personally identifiable information to Third Parties in violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988. Accordingly, the Defendants provided the Third Parties with information sufficient to identify the specific individuals who watched videos on The Athletic's platform. For example, The Athletic discloses subscribers' video viewing history, email addresses, first and last names, and unique Customer ID numbers to Meta. Third parties like Meta, Google, X, and TikTok maintain individual profiles and data about their users. With this existing user data, the Third Parties were able to match the information transmitted by The Athletic and the NYT to a specific individual using the disclosed PII, says the suit. The Athletic is a sports news and media video streaming platform owned and operated by the NYT that provides exclusive video content to millions of paid subscribers. The Athletic's subscribers gain access to exclusive sports news and media content, including coverage of over 10 different professional sports and fantasy sports. Subscribers may access The Athletic's streaming platform through a website or mobile application. This platform incorporates several third-party application programing interfaces ("APIs"). APIs allow web and app developers, like The Athletic, to integrate pre-built functionality into their software products free of charge. Among other things, these APIs allow The Athletic and the NYT to collect and analyze customer data concerning their subscribers to facilitate marketing and engagement efforts. The Defendants incorporated third party APIs into their website. These APIs were developed by third parties such as, Meta, Google, X, and TikTok (the "Third Parties"). Notably, third party APIs are not completely free -- there is a cost. When web and app developers incorporate third party APIs into their platforms, the customer information developers seek to analyze is automatically disclosed to the third party, the suit further alleges. The Athletic and the NYT incorporated third party APIs into their streaming platform. As a result, Third Parties Meta, Google, X, and TikTok received subscriber information that Defendants intended to analyze: video viewing history in connection with personally identifiable information, like names, email addresses, and Customer IDs.BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Guillaume Buell, Esq. Michael P. Canty, Esq. Carol C. Villegas, Esq. Danielle Izzo, Esq. Gloria J. Medina, Esq. LABATON KELLER SUCHAROW LLP 140 Broadway New York, NY 10005 Telephone: (212) 907-0700 Facsimile: (212) 818-0477 E-Mail: gbuell@labaton.com mcanty@labaton.com cvillegas@labaton.com dizzo@labaton.com gmedina@labaton.com - and - Yitzchak Kopel, Esq. Max S. Roberts, Esq. BURSOR & FISHER, P.A. Victoria X. Zhou 1330 Avenue of the Americas, Floor 32 New York, NY 10019 Telephone: (646) 837-7150 Facsimile: (212) 989-9163 E-Mail: ykopel@bursor.com mroberts@bursor.com vzhou@bursor.com ATLASSIAN CORP: Wins Dismissal of Firefighters Pension Fund Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as CITY OF HOLLYWOOD FIREFIGHTERS PENSION FUND, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ATLASSIAN CORPORATION, et al. Defendants, Case No. 3:23-cv-00519-WHO (N.D. Calif.), Judge William H. Orrick of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted the motion filed by the defendants to dismiss the plaintiffs' second amended complaint. Lead plaintiffs City of Hollywood Firefighters Pension Fund and Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement Systems filed this securities lawsuit against defendants Atlassian Corporation, Atlassian Corporation PLC, Atlassian's co-founder and co-CEO Michael Cannon-Brookes, Atlassian's other co-founder and co-CEO Scott Farquhar, Atlassian's current President and former Chief Operating Officer Anu Bharadwaj, and Atlassian's former Chief Revenue Officer Cameron Deatsch. In a nutshell, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants made various false and misleading statements to the market, reproduced below, that said Atlassian was not feeling the impact of the macroeconomic pressure and constraints that other software companies faced throughout 2022. When the defendants "revealed" the truth to the market in November 2022, announcing that "cloud growth came in at just 49%" and that the company missed its earnings guidance for the first time, the stock price fell, and the plaintiffs lost a collective $7 billion. Their new allegations, added to the SAC after dismissal of the First Amended Complaint, focus on the experience of Confidential Witness 3, who asserts that he was the Head of Product Strategy & Business Operations, Work Management from June 2022 through June 2023. He alleges that when he joined in June 2022, "things" were already "slowing down" at Atlassian, "it was clear growth rates were not what they were," and Atlassian "was not growing at 50% year-over-year growth." He also asserts that he was told of a hiring freeze in July 2022, and that "paid seat expansion numbers had slowed down" in July or August. He says he reported metrics to "division heads" and "everyone" was aware of the metrics, and that he directly or indirectly presented "these metrics" to Bharadwaj. And, he says that "Project Big Fish" was started in July or August to "understand some of the ‘big things'" and "find[] ways to increase Atlassian's user expansion." Bharadwaj was part of Project Big Fish, though CW3 did not join until September. The SAC brings two causes of action: first under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, and second under 20(a) of the Act. Judge Orrick says, "My Prior Order explained that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that there was a slowdown to Paid User Expansion in mid-August 2022 based on the defendants' statements to that effect in their November shareholder update. But of the nine statements alleged to be misleading, I determined that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged only that Bharadwaj misleadingly omitted information about the slowdown during a conference in September 2022; the remaining statements were not plausibly pleaded as false or misleading. But the plaintiffs failed to plead the requisite scienter for Bharadwaj's statement, so the complaint was dismissed." He concludes, "The plaintiffs' complaint is again insufficient. They rely almost entirely on CW3's allegations to remedy the issues from the FAC, but his assertions do not show that any of the other statements were false or misleading because they are too vague and nonspecific to show that the Paid User Expansion slowdown happened before mid-August 2022. And, his assertions do not show that Bharadwaj had the requisite scienter in making her misleading omissions because CW3 failed to establish his reliability or personal knowledge for the allegations he makes." A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated August 13, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=vmS8fc BEVERLY'S HOME: Castillo Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages Under FLSA -------------------------------------------------------------- DANIA PEREZ CASTILLO, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. BEVERLY'S HOME HEALTH CARE, INC., BEVERLY NICHOLS, and RICARDO FRANCOIS, Case No. 1:24-cv-06294 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 9, 2024) seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and the recovery of unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, statutory damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and attorneys' fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New York Labor Law, and the NYLL's Wage Theft Prevention Act. According to the complaint, the Plaintiff regularly worked fifty-four hours per workweek throughout her employment with Defendants as a home health attendant. The Defendants unlawfully paid her on a straight-time basis, meaning the same regular hourly wage rate for all hours worked, thereby denying Perez the overtime premiums due for hours worked over 40 per workweek, says the Plaintiff. The Defendants further failed to: (1) timely pay Perez's wages on a weekly basis and not later than seven days after the end of the week in which the wages were earned; (2) provide Perez with a compliant wage notice at the time of her hiring; and (3) provide Perez with compliant wage statements with each payment of wages. The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a home health attendant from approximately March 16, 2022, until Feb. 6, 2023. Beverly's Home owns, operates, and does business as Beverly's Home Health Care with an office and principal place of business located at 125-10 Queens Blvd., Ste. 5, Kew Gardens, New York.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Louis Pechman, Esq. Galen C. Baynes, Esq. 488 Madison Avenue, 17th Floor New York, NY 10022 Telephone: (212) 583-9500 E-mail: pechman@pechmanlaw.com baynes@pechmanlaw.com BISSELL HOME: Court Dismisses Franzini Suit Without Prejudice ------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Joan M. Azrack of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York adopted Magistrate Judge Lee G. Dunst's conclusion that the case captioned as COREY FRANZINI, on behalf of Plaintiff and a class, Plaintiff, -against- BISSELL HOME CARE, INC., Defendant, Case No. 23-CV-02985 (JMA) (LGD) (E.D.N.Y.), must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice and without leave to amend. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to close this case. Presently before the Court is the motion by Defendant to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, and Magistrate Judge Dunst's July 10, 2024, Report and Recommendation that the Court grant dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint asserting on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated individuals that Defendant violated (1) the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2302(c), and the implementing regulation of that provision, 16 C.F.R. Sec. 700.10, by conditioning the Device warranty on using Bissell cleaning fluids, and (2) violated New York General Business Law ("GBL") Sec. 349 by falsely stating in the user guide that non-Bissell cleaning fluids would damage the Device. Without specifying how jurisdiction applies to its particular claims, the Amended Complaint contends that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332(d), and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367. Defendant moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim; Plaintiff opposed the motion. After the Court referred the motion to Judge Dunst for a report and recommendation, Judge Dunst directed the parties to file supplemental letter briefs regarding "whether [CAFA] provides an alternative basis for federal jurisdiction over [MMWA] claims, or whether the MMWA's more stringent federal jurisdictional requirements must always be met." Judge Dunst then issued the R&R, which determined that "the Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's MMWA claims" and "Plaintiff does not have standing" to maintain the NYGBL claim. Plaintiff timely objected to the R&R. Defendant neither objected to the R&R nor responded to Plaintiff's objection. The R&R held that the Amended Complaint's allegations that Plaintiff overpaid when he purchased Bissell fluid are insufficient to support the requisite injury in fact for standing to maintain the GBL claim. Plaintiff asserts that the R&R applied the incorrect standard for this stage of the case by requiring Plaintiff to demonstrate" rather than plead facts to confer standing. This argument has no merit, according to the Court. Plaintiff contends that he satisfied the rule that "general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice" to demonstrate injury in fact. Relatedly, Plaintiff insists that this case is like the case that the Second Circuit addressed in John v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 858 F.3d 732, 736 (2d Cir. 2017). The Court disagrees. The Court points out the John plaintiff established standing to maintain his GBL claims by alleging both that he regularly purchased certain of the defendant's products, and that the defendant "mislabeled and overpriced" those products -- as described in an investigation report referenced in and attached to the complaint. The Amended Complaint neither quantifies the supposed price difference between Bissell and non-Bissell fluids nor references or attaches (like the John complaint) supporting evidence; the price difference allegations are conclusory, the Court finds. The R&R declined to adopt Plaintiff's argument that the Court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the MMWA claim after exercising CAFA jurisdiction over the GBL claim. The R&R reasoned that Plaintiff's lack of standing to maintain the GBL claim precluded the supplemental jurisdiction Plaintiff sought. Plaintiff contends this analysis was erroneous because he has standing to maintain the GBL claim. But the Court reaches the contrary conclusion. Accordingly, Plaintiff's argument for maintaining the MMWA claim through supplemental jurisdiction fails. The R&R determined, after a thorough analysis of the relevant statutes and the "sharp disagreement" among the courts that similarly confronted the issue, that CAFA does not provide a workaround to MMWA's explicit jurisdictional requirements in 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2310(d) for asserting MMWA claims in federal court. Plaintiff objects to that conclusion by reasserting the arguments he already advanced. The Court finds no clear error in the R&R's reasoning and conclusion. Moreover, out of an abundance of caution, the Court conducted a de novo review of the full record and applicable law. After doing so, the Court agrees with Judge Dunst that, for the reasons set forth in the R&R, CAFA does not provide jurisdiction for MMWA claims in federal court. The R&R concluded that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff argues the R&R erred by recommending that his claims be dismissed with prejudice. But the R&R is more accurately read to recommend dismissal without prejudice and without leave to amend in federal court. Indeed, the R&R twice states that Plaintiff may bring his claims in state court. The Court therefore construes the R&R as recommending that Plaintiff's claims be dismissed without prejudice and without leave to amend. A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order dated August 12, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=Rcd60p CALIFORNIA: Dispositive Motions in Hoch Suit Due by September 27 ---------------------------------------------------------------- Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California grants the Defendants' request to continue the dispositive motion deadline to Sept. 27, 2024, in the lawsuit entitled CORY HOCH, Plaintiff v. STEPHANIE CLENDENIN, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:23-cv-00796-KES-SKO (E.D. Cal.). The Plaintiff is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. This action proceeds against Defendants Clendenin and Brandon Price for violations of the Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Clendenin is the director of the California Department of State Hospitals. On Feb. 6, 2024, the Court issued its Discovery and Scheduling Order. The deadline for the filing of dispositive motions was set for Sept. 6, 2024. On Aug. 21, 2024, the Defendants filed an Ex Parte Application to Modify Dispositive Motion Cutoff in Discovery and Scheduling Order. The Defendants seek an additional 21 days within which to file a motion for summary judgment. The ex parte application is supported by the Declaration of Brenda A. Ray. Defense counsel states that in the next two weeks she has another motion for summary judgment due in an action pending in this Court, a response to a demurrer in a putative class action matter pending in Sacramento County Superior Court, an evidentiary hearing in a separate matter before the Sacramento state court, and an evidentiary hearing in another matter pending in Amador County Superior Court. The Defendants' counsel states she has spent considerable time researching and investigating the claims, preparing responsive pleadings and dispositive motions, and preparing witness testimony and argument in the stated matters. The Defendants request the Court to continue the dispositive motion deadline to Sept. 27, 2024. Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendants' ex parte application to modify the dispositive motion deadline. The deadline for the filing of any dispositive motion is extended from Sept. 6, 2024, to Sept. 27, 2024. A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 22, 2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/54wuz8nb from PacerMonitor.com. CARTER'S INC: Faces Namvary Class Suit Over False Price Discounts ----------------------------------------------------------------- SHAHEEN NAMVARY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. CARTER'S, INC., and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Case caption, Case No. 1:24-cv-06787 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 6, 2024) contends that the Defendant has continually advertised false price discounts for merchandise sold throughout its stores and on its website, carters.com. Through its false and misleading marketing, advertising, and pricing scheme, the Defendant violated, and continues to violate, New York and federal law, the suit says. Specifically, the Defendant violates and continues to violate: New York Consumer Protection from Deceptive Acts and Practices Act, New York False Advertising Act, as well as the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Plaintiff has therefore suffered economic injury as a direct result of the Defendant's unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent false reference pricing scheme, the suit asserts. The Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated consumers who have purchased one or more of the Defendant's items advertised at a purported discount from a fictitious higher reference price from a Carter's store and/or its website. Further, the Plaintiff seeks damages, restitution, and declaratory and injunctive relief from the Defendant arising from its false discounting scheme on its infant and children's apparel and other items sold in its brick and mortar stores and e-commerce website. The Plaintiff has purchased many items from the Defendant's stores in the past, including on April 16, 2023, when he shopped for clothing at the Carter's Manhattan-Harlem store located at 214 West 125th Street, Manhattan, NY 10027. Carters is the "largest branded marketer of young children’s apparel in North America."[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Gary F. Lynch, Esq. Todd D. Carpenter, Esq. Scott G. Braden, Esq. James B. Drimmer, Esq. Matthew J. Zevin, Esq. LYNCH CARPENTER LLP 1133 Penn Ave., 5th Floor Pittsburgh, PA 15222 Telephone: (412) 322.9243 E-mail: gary@lcllp.com todd@lcllp.com scott@lcllp.com jim@lcllp.com mattz@lcllp.com CELINE INC: Akeju Alleges Unpaid Wages, Unfair Biometric Collection ------------------------------------------------------------------- ADERINSOLA AKEJU, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. CELINE INC., a corporation, Case No. 1:24-cv-08202 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 9, 2024) arises from Celine's willful violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, and the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act. In order to sell its products, Celine employed hourly non-exempt employees, with job titles including, but not limited to, Client Advisors and Senior Client Advisors. These employees were responsible for communicating with clients, studying new looks, preparing for product launches, making sales to clients, and providing any desired products or information to clients. Celine employed the Plaintiff as an hourly employee within the last three years. Due to the nature of its operations, Celine required Plaintiff and similarly situated employees to wear company-issued uniforms to be kept in lockers on-site, says the suit. Plaintiff Akeju is an Illinois resident and worked for Celine as a non-exempt hourly Client Advisor at Celine's Neiman Marcus location in Chicago, Illinois from July 2022 through March 2024. The Plaintiff regularly worked 40 or more hours per week and was paid an hourly wage, most recently at the rate of $22.00. Celine manufactures and markets apparels and leather products. The Company offers handbags, shoes, leather accessories, jewelries, and sunglasses.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Jesse L. Young, Esq. Kevin J. Stoops, Esq. SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C. One Towne Square, 17th Floor Southfield, MI 48076 Telephone: (248) 355-0300 E-mail: jyoung@sommerspc.com kstoops@sommerspc.com - and - Jonathan Melmed, Esq. Meghan Higday, Esq. MELMED LAW GROUP, P.C. 1801 Century Park E., Suite 850 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 824-3828 E-mail: mh@melmedlaw.com jm@melmedlaw.com COINBASE GLOBAL: Rosen Law Investigates Securities Claims --------------------------------------------------------- Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, continues to investigate potential securities claims on behalf of shareholders of Coinbase Global, Inc. (NASDAQ: COIN) resulting from allegations that Coinbase may have issued materially misleading business information to the investing public. So what: If you purchased Coinbase securities you may be entitled to compensation without payment of any out of pocket fees or costs through a contingency fee arrangement. The Rosen Law Firm is preparing a class action seeking recovery of investor losses. What to do next: To join the prospective class action, go to https://rosenlegal.com/submit-form/?case_id=28116 or call Phillip Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email case@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action. What is this about: On July 25, 2024, the Financial Conduct Authority ("FCA"), a U.K. financial regulator, announced that it had fined CB Payments Limited ("CBPL"), which is affiliated with Coinbase, for "repeatedly breaching a requirement that prevented the firm from offering services to high-risk customers." The FCA noted that "[t]he breaches were the result of CBPL's lack of due skill, care and diligence in the design, testing, implementation and monitoring of the controls put in place" to prevent such violations. On the same day, Reuters released an article entitled "Coinbase UK unit fined for breaching financial crime requirements." This article stated that "[a] Coinbase business in Britain has been fined for breaching a regulatory agreement to improve its [defenses] against financial crime, in the first sanction of its kind in the UK cryptoassets sector." On this news, Coinbase's stock price fell 5.5% on July 25, 2024. Attorney Advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Contact Information: Laurence Rosen, Esq. Phillip Kim, Esq. The Rosen Law Firm, P.A. 275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor New York, NY 10016 Tel: (212) 686-1060 Toll Free: (866) 767-3653 Fax: (212) 202-3827 case@rosenlegal.com www.rosenlegal.com [GN] COINMARKETCAP OPCO: Ninth Circuit Narrows Claims in Cox Lawsuit --------------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as RYAN COX, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COINMARKETCAP OPCO, LLC; BINANCE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LTD., DBA Binance, DBA Binance.com; BAM TRADING SERVICES, INC., DBA Binance.US; CHANGPENG ZHAO; CATHERINE COLEY; YI HE; TED LIN, Defendants-Appellees, No. 23-15363 (9th Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the United States District Court for the District of Arizona's dismissal, for lack of personal jurisdiction, of Ryan Cox's action under the Commodity Exchange Act, alleging that defendants unlawfully manipulated the price of a cryptocurrency called "HEX." The Ninth Circuit considers whether the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. Sec. 25(c), authorizes nationwide service of process without regard to whether the venue provision in the same subsection of the Act is met. Its answer, contrary to the district court's conclusion, is yes. Cox, an Arizona resident, filed a putative class action complaint on behalf of himself and those similarly situated in the district court, alleging violations of the Commodity Exchange Act and the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act. CoinMarketCap, Binance.US, Binance Capital, and the individual defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Cox contends in this action that the defendants violated the Act by unlawfully manipulating the price of a cryptocurrency called "HEX." He alleges that the defendants participated in artificially suppressing the price of HEX by inaccurately lowering its ranking among cryptocurrencies on a website called CoinMarketCap.com. Although the Act authorizes nationwide service of process, the district court concluded that its venue provision must be satisfied before the nationwide service provision applies. As a result, the district court reasoned, Cox first had to show that the defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, Arizona. The defendants were two domestic companies headquartered in states other than Arizona, a foreign company, and three individual officers of the foreign company. The district court concluded that each defendant lacked sufficient contacts with Arizona and dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Guided by case law interpreting similar provisions in other statutes and settled principles of statutory construction, the Ninth Circuit held that the Commodity Exchange Act authorizes nationwide service of process independent of its venue requirement. Thus, to establish personal jurisdiction in Arizona under the Act, Cox did not have to show first that the venue requirement was satisfied. It concluded that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the U.S. defendants under the Act because they had sufficient contacts with the United States to satisfy due process. It also concluded that the complaint alleged colorable price manipulation claims against the U.S. defendants. The Ninth Circuit therefore reversed the district court's dismissal of the claims under the Act against those defendants and remanded for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Cox's claims under the Act as to the foreign corporate and individual defendants but vacated the dismissal against them "with prejudice" and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint against the foreign defendants without prejudice. It concluded that the foreign defendants lacked sufficient contacts with the United States for purposes of personal jurisdiction. A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated August 12, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=dW5qNG CRYSTAL CLINIC: Court OKs Plaintiff's Bid to Remand Class Action ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as JANE DOE, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CRYSTAL CLINIC ORTHOPAEDIC CENTER, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 5:24-cv-907 (N.D. Ohio), Judge Charles E. Fleming of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted Plaintiff's motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The action is remanded to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. On April 26, 2024, Plaintiff Jane Doe filed an amended class action complaint in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas against Defendant Crystal Clinic Orthopaedic Center, LLC, a "physician-owned" medical group headquartered in Akron, Ohio who provides orthopedic care and treatment to patients. The complaint alleges that Defendant violated federal and state laws by disclosing "Protected Health Information" and "Personally Identifying Information" to third parties without authorization and consent. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant facilitated the disclosure of this protected information to third parties by embedding "Meta Pixel" and other tracking technology into its website; this allegedly tracked information about its website user's device and transmitted private health information to third parties for marketing purposes. The proposed class was: "All Ohio citizens whose Private Information was disclosed by Defendant to third parties through the Meta Pixel and related technology without authorization." Plaintiff asserted seven state law claims: (i) breach of confidence, unauthorized disclosure of nonpublic medical information (Count One); (ii) negligence (Count Two); (iii) negligence per se (Count Three); (iv) invasion of privacy-intrusion upon seclusion (Count Four); (v) breach of implied contract (Count Five); (vi) unjust enrichment (Count Six); and (vii) interception and disclosure of electronic communications, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Sec. 2933.52 (Count Seven). On May 22, 2024, Defendant removed the case to the Northern District of Ohio pursuant to the Federal Officer Removal Statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1442(a)(1). Defendant asserted that removal was proper under Sec. 1442, even though it is a private actor, because: (i) it qualifies as a person acting under the authority of a federal officer; (ii) Plaintiff's claims relate to actions taken under color of federal office; and (iii) Defendant will raise a colorable federal defense. On June 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. She argues that removal was improper under Sec. 1442(a)(1), and the Court lacks jurisdiction, because Defendant was not "acting under" or taking actions pursuant to federal authority. Plaintiff also argues that the removal lacked an objectively reasonable basis and moves for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1447(c). The Court points out the parties do not dispute that Defendant is not a federal officer. In cases where the defendants are not federal officers, the removing defendants must satisfy three requirements in order to invoke the federal-officer removal statute: (1) the defendants must establish that they acted under a federal officer, (2) those actions must have been performed under color of federal office, and (3) the defendants must raise a colorable federal defense. Defendant's argument that removal was proper under Sec. 1442 is based on its assertion that it was "acting under" a federal officer through its participation in the federal government's "Meaningful Use Program." The Court finds that removal was improper under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1442(a)(1) because Defendant's participation in the Program does not constitute "acting under" a federal officer. Defendant maintains that it was "acting under" the authority of a federal officer because, as a participant in the Program, it helped assist the federal government's goal in creating a nationwide system of electronic access to healthcare patients and was under a degree of control by the federal government who laid out a framework and guidelines for Program participants to follow. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. Judge Fleming says, "Defendant has demonstrated that it is a voluntary participant in a federal program where participants are monitored by the federal government and receive monetary incentives for complying with federal regulations. But this does not establish that Defendant was 'acting under' a federal officer, even when applying Sec. 1442's liberal standard. There is no contract between Defendant and the federal government and a healthcare provider's participation in the Program involves no delegation of federal authority." Having concluded that Defendant improperly removed this action under Sec. 1442(a)(1), the Court must address Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1447(c). The Court finds that Defendant's basis and argument for removal was objectively reasonable and fairly supported. With no binding precedent and some authority supporting removal, Defendant's notice of removal did not lack an "objectively reasonable basis" and was "fairly supportable." Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees under Sec. 1447(c) is denied. A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated August 12, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=tb1GYv DIFF LLC: Violates FTSA's Caller ID Rules, Lewis Class Suit Alleges ------------------------------------------------------------------- ADAM LEWIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. DIFF, LLC, Case No. CACE-24-012813 (Fla. Cir., Sept. 6, 2024) alleges that the Defendant violated the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act's Caller ID Rules by transmitting a phone number that was not capable of receiving phone calls when it made Telephonic Sales Calls by text message. The Defendant transmitted 55721 to Plaintiff' s Cell Phone's caller identification service when it made the Diff Text Message Sales Calls. The Plaintiff called 55721 and the call could not be completed, the suit says. The Plaintiff seeks liquidated damages for each violation, and injunctive relief to ensure the Defendant complies with the Caller ID Rules when it makes Diff Text Message Sales Calls. The Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the FTSA's Caller ID Rules, and is a member of and seeks to represent a class of persons defined as: "All persons and entities that reside in Florida whose caller identification service was transmitted a telephone number that was not capable of receiving telephone calls when Diff Text Message Sales Calls were made to them since July 1,2021." Mr. Adam Lewis is the regular user of a cellular telephone number that receives the Defendant's telephonic sales calls, and he resides in Florida. DIFF is a designer sunglasses, blue light glasses, and prescription eyeglasses.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Joshua A. Glickman, Esq. Shawn A. Heller, Esq. SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW COLLECTIVE, PL 974 Howard Ave. Dunedin, FL 34698 Telephone: (202) 709-5744 Facsimile: (866) 893-0416 E-mail: josh@sjlawcollective.com shawn@sjlawcollective.com EI DU PONT: Court Denies Motions in Limine in Hall Injury Suit -------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, issued an Omnibus Motions in Limine Order in the lawsuit styled Joseph and Donna Hall v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Case No. Case No. 2:23-cv-00869-EAS-EPD (S.D. Ohio). IN RE: E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY C-8 PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION, Case No. 2:13-md-2433 (S.D. Ohio). The matter is before the Court on multiple motions in limine filed by the Plaintiffs in preparation for the consolidated trial in Joseph and Donna Hall v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Case No. Case No. 2:23-cv-00869-EAS-EPD (S.D. Ohio), and Ian and Heather Lynn v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Case No. 1:22-cv-00751-EAS-EPD (S.D. Ohio). In Motion in Limine No. 8, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude DuPont from introducing any evidence, testimony, or argument of counsel relating to any payments or funding commitments made by DuPont under the Leach Class Action Settlement Agreement or the C8 Personal Injury Litigation Settlement Agreement (reached on Feb. 13, 2017), including during any punitive damages phase. The Plaintiffs filed Motion in Limine Nos. 8, 9, 16, and 18 in both Hall and Lynn. For ease of reading, the Court cites only to the Hall papers in this Motions in Limine Order unless otherwise noted. The Plaintiffs explain that they and DuPont are parties to the Leach Class Action Settlement Agreement ("Leach Settlement Agreement"), and DuPont agreed to make certain cash payments under the Agreement. The Plaintiffs argue that such payments, as well as the C8 Personal Injury Litigation Settlement Agreement payments, are not relevant to the current cases under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 because, among other reasons, the payments did not represent compensation paid to the Halls or Lynns for Mr. Hall's and Mr. Lynn's testicular cancer. Even if the Court were to determine evidence of payments was relevant, the Plaintiffs urge the Court to nevertheless exclude it because such evidence will do nothing more than prejudice them, confuse the jury, waste time, and result in undue delay. Partly, DuPont responds that it does not intend to introduce evidence of the C-8 Personal Injury Litigation Payments and believes that such should be shielded from the jury, as this Court has previously recognized. To the extent that the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 8 asks the Court to preclude DuPont from introducing payments related to the C8 Personal Injury Litigation Settlement Agreement, Judge Sargus holds that portion of the Motion is denied as moot. But seemingly reading the Plaintiffs' Motion more broadly as urging the Court to exclude "Leach Settlement information" and "evidence associated with the Leach Agreement," DuPont opposes it in part. DuPont argues such evidence is highly relevant to whether DuPont consciously disregarded a great probability of substantial harm and whether DuPont intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the Plaintiffs. DuPont contends evidence related to the Leach Settlement Agreement came in during the Vigneron and Abbott/Swartz trials in phase I. Evidence related to the Leach Settlement Agreement must come in so that the jury receives a complete picture, DuPont urges. Judge Sargus notes that the parties point to no fact-specific reasons or changes in the law that suggest the Court should deviate from its previous rulings. Thus, the Court rules in accordance with its previous rulings in this MDL on these issues. As in the Vigneron and Abbott/Swartz trials, if the parties need to revisit the issue during trial, they may do so at sidebar. In Motion in Limine No. 9, the Plaintiffs request that the Court prevent DuPont from introducing evidence on speculative alternative cause for the Plaintiffs' testicular cancers. The Plaintiffs rely on Rules 401 and 403 to argue such evidence is irrelevant and would serve no purpose other than to mislead and confuse the jury. They explain that the parties' experts, Dr. Kamal S. Pohar and Dr. Craig Nichols, agree that there are few established risk factors for testicular cancer, but that DuPont has sought to insert evidence of other speculative causes of cancer other than C8, such as asbestos, chemical or other work exposures, and smoking. As for DuPont's arguments that evidence about Mr. Hall's smoking is relevant to his damages, the Court will not exclude such evidence on the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 9 because the Plaintiffs argue for exclusion on different grounds in this Motion. DuPont states that it does not intend to affirmatively introduce evidence of either Mr. Hall's or Mr. Lynn's workplace exposures. The Court rules that Motion in Limine No. 9 is denied as moot in its entirety. In their 16th Motion in Limine, the Plaintiffs move the Court for an order precluding DuPont from introducing evidence relating to any payments or funding commitments made by DuPont under any settlement or court order unrelated to the facts or circumstances of this MDL litigation, the Leach Settlement Agreement, or the C8 Personal Injury Litigation Settlement Agreement, including during the punitive damages phase. The Plaintiffs reference examples of large monetary settlements DuPont paid including: a June 2023 settlement to resolve public water system claims as part of the aqueous film-forming foam multi-district litigation; a November 2023 settlement agreement with the state of Ohio to resolve certain natural resource damage claims; and a March 2024 settlement with the city of Rome, Georgia to resolve claims brought by residents of water districts in the area. The Plaintiffs argue such payments are unrelated to the cases at bar and no portion of them have been paid to them for their specific injuries. DuPont agrees, stating it has no intention of affirmatively introducing any such evidence. Thus, the Court rules that the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 16 is denied as moot. In Motion in Limine No. 18, the parties argue about some of the same issue that they argue about in Motion in Limine No. 9. The Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude DuPont from introducing evidence relating to cancerphobia from cigarette smoking or other non-probable link conditions. The Plaintiffs again cite Rules 401 and 403, urging that evidence about cancerphobia from cigarette smoking is not relevant to any facts at issue and admission of such would do nothing other than mislead and confuse the jury. Judge Sargus finds the Plaintiffs have not met the high standard of showing such evidence is clearly inadmissible. As a result, Motion in Limine No. 18 is denied. Accordingly, the Court rules on Plaintiffs' Motions in Limine as follows: -- Motion in Limine No. 8 is denied in part as moot and otherwise ruled on in accordance with this Court's previous rulings in this MDL on similar issues. (Hall, Case No. 2:23-cv- 69, ECF No. 78; Lynn, Case No. 1:22-cv-751, ECF No. 81.); -- Motion in Limine No. 9 is denied as moot. (Hall, Case No. 2:23-cv-869, ECF No. 79; Lynn, Case No. 1:22-cv-751, ECF No. 82.); -- Motion in Limine No. 16 is denied as moot. (Hall, Case No. 2:23-cv-869, ECF No. 86; Lynn, Case No. 1:22-cv-751, ECF No. 89.); and -- Motion in Limine No. 18 is denied. (Hall, Case No. 2:23-cv-869, ECF No. 88; Lynn, Case No. 1:22-cv-751, ECF No. 91.). The Clerk is directed to file this Motions in Limine Order on the Hall docket, Case No. 2:23-cv-869, and the Lynn docket, Case No. 1:22-cv-751, but not the main MDL 2433 docket. A full-text copy of the Court's Motions in Limine Order dated Aug. 22, 2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4ek7dyad from PacerMonitor.com. EI DU PONT: S.D. Ohio Denies Motions in Limine in Lynn Injury Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------ Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, issued an Omnibus Motions in Limine Order in the lawsuit titled Ian and Heather Lynn v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Case No. 1:22-cv-00751-EAS-EPD (S.D. Ohio). IN RE: E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY C-8 PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION, Case No. 2:13-md-2433 (S.D. Ohio). The matter is before the Court on multiple motions in limine filed by the Plaintiffs in preparation for the consolidated trial in Joseph and Donna Hall v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Case No. Case No. 2:23-cv-00869-EAS-EPD (S.D. Ohio), and Ian and Heather Lynn v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Case No. 1:22-cv-00751-EAS-EPD (S.D. Ohio). In Motion in Limine No. 8, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude DuPont from introducing any evidence, testimony, or argument of counsel relating to any payments or funding commitments made by DuPont under the Leach Class Action Settlement Agreement or the C8 Personal Injury Litigation Settlement Agreement (reached on Feb. 13, 2017), including during any punitive damages phase. The Plaintiffs filed Motion in Limine Nos. 8, 9, 16, and 18 in both Hall and Lynn. For ease of reading, the Court cites only to the Hall papers in this Motions in Limine Order unless otherwise noted. The Plaintiffs explain that they and DuPont are parties to the Leach Class Action Settlement Agreement ("Leach Settlement Agreement"), and DuPont agreed to make certain cash payments under the Agreement. The Plaintiffs argue that such payments, as well as the C8 Personal Injury Litigation Settlement Agreement payments, are not relevant to the current cases under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 because, among other reasons, the payments did not represent compensation paid to the Halls or Lynns for Mr. Hall's and Mr. Lynn's testicular cancer. Even if the Court were to determine evidence of payments was relevant, the Plaintiffs urge the Court to nevertheless exclude it because such evidence will do nothing more than prejudice them, confuse the jury, waste time, and result in undue delay. Partly, DuPont responds that it does not intend to introduce evidence of the C-8 Personal Injury Litigation Payments and believes that such should be shielded from the jury, as this Court has previously recognized. To the extent that the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 8 asks the Court to preclude DuPont from introducing payments related to the C8 Personal Injury Litigation Settlement Agreement, Judge Sargus holds that portion of the Motion is denied as moot. But seemingly reading the Plaintiffs' Motion more broadly as urging the Court to exclude "Leach Settlement information" and "evidence associated with the Leach Agreement," DuPont opposes it in part. DuPont argues such evidence is highly relevant to whether DuPont consciously disregarded a great probability of substantial harm and whether DuPont intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the Plaintiffs. DuPont contends evidence related to the Leach Settlement Agreement came in during the Vigneron and Abbott/Swartz trials in phase I. Evidence related to the Leach Settlement Agreement must come in so that the jury receives a complete picture, DuPont urges. Judge Sargus notes that the parties point to no fact-specific reasons or changes in the law that suggest the Court should deviate from its previous rulings. Thus, the Court rules in accordance with its previous rulings in this MDL on these issues. As in the Vigneron and Abbott/Swartz trials, if the parties need to revisit the issue during trial, they may do so at sidebar. In Motion in Limine No. 9, the Plaintiffs request that the Court prevent DuPont from introducing evidence on speculative alternative cause for the Plaintiffs' testicular cancers. The Plaintiffs rely on Rules 401 and 403 to argue such evidence is irrelevant and would serve no purpose other than to mislead and confuse the jury. They explain that the parties' experts, Dr. Kamal S. Pohar and Dr. Craig Nichols, agree that there are few established risk factors for testicular cancer, but that DuPont has sought to insert evidence of other speculative causes of cancer other than C8, such as asbestos, chemical or other work exposures, and smoking. As for DuPont's arguments that evidence about Mr. Hall's smoking is relevant to his damages, the Court will not exclude such evidence on the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 9 because the Plaintiffs argue for exclusion on different grounds in this Motion. DuPont states that it does not intend to affirmatively introduce evidence of either Mr. Hall's or Mr. Lynn's workplace exposures. The Court rules that Motion in Limine No. 9 is denied as moot in its entirety. In their 16th Motion in Limine, the Plaintiffs move the Court for an order precluding DuPont from introducing evidence relating to any payments or funding commitments made by DuPont under any settlement or court order unrelated to the facts or circumstances of this MDL litigation, the Leach Settlement Agreement, or the C8 Personal Injury Litigation Settlement Agreement, including during the punitive damages phase. The Plaintiffs reference examples of large monetary settlements DuPont paid including: a June 2023 settlement to resolve public water system claims as part of the aqueous film-forming foam multi-district litigation; a November 2023 settlement agreement with the state of Ohio to resolve certain natural resource damage claims; and a March 2024 settlement with the city of Rome, Georgia to resolve claims brought by residents of water districts in the area. The Plaintiffs argue such payments are unrelated to the cases at bar and no portion of them have been paid to them for their specific injuries. DuPont agrees, stating it has no intention of affirmatively introducing any such evidence. Thus, the Court rules that the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 16 is denied as moot. In Motion in Limine No. 18, the parties argue about some of the same issue that they argue about in Motion in Limine No. 9. The Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude DuPont from introducing evidence relating to cancerphobia from cigarette smoking or other non-probable link conditions. The Plaintiffs again cite Rules 401 and 403, urging that evidence about cancerphobia from cigarette smoking is not relevant to any facts at issue and admission of such would do nothing other than mislead and confuse the jury. Judge Sargus finds the Plaintiffs have not met the high standard of showing such evidence is clearly inadmissible. As a result, Motion in Limine No. 18 is denied. Accordingly, the Court rules on Plaintiffs' Motions in Limine as follows: -- Motion in Limine No. 8 is denied in part as moot and otherwise ruled on in accordance with this Court's previous rulings in this MDL on similar issues. (Hall, Case No. 2:23-cv- 69, ECF No. 78; Lynn, Case No. 1:22-cv-751, ECF No. 81.); -- Motion in Limine No. 9 is denied as moot. (Hall, Case No. 2:23-cv-869, ECF No. 79; Lynn, Case No. 1:22-cv-751, ECF No. 82.); -- Motion in Limine No. 16 is denied as moot. (Hall, Case No. 2:23-cv-869, ECF No. 86; Lynn, Case No. 1:22-cv-751, ECF No. 89.); and -- Motion in Limine No. 18 is denied. (Hall, Case No. 2:23-cv-869, ECF No. 88; Lynn, Case No. 1:22-cv-751, ECF No. 91.). The Clerk is directed to file this Motions in Limine Order on the Hall docket, Case No. 2:23-cv-869, and the Lynn docket, Case No. 1:22-cv-751, but not the main MDL 2433 docket. A full-text copy of the Court's Motions in Limine Order dated Aug. 22, 2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/yf7jasyd from PacerMonitor.com. ENROLL CONFIDENTLY: Fails to Safeguard Personal Info, Bailey Says ----------------------------------------------------------------- Janelle Bailey, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Enroll Confidently Inc., Case No. 2:24-cv-02350-ROS (D. Ariz., Sept. 6, 2024) sues the Defendant for its failure to properly secure and safeguard the personally identifiable information that it collected and maintained as part of its regular business practices, including Plaintiff's and Class Members' names and Social Security numbers. On Aug. 16, 2024, the Defendant began sending the Plaintiff and other victims of the Data Breach a Notice of Data Event letter, informing that an unauthorized actor gained access to the Defendant's network on Feb. 13, 2024. Omitted from the Notice Letter were the identity of the cybercriminals who perpetrated this Data Breach, the details of the root cause of the Data Breach, the vulnerabilities exploited, and the remedial measures undertaken to ensure such a breach does not occur again, the suit says. The Plaintiff and Class Members have allegedly suffered injury as a result of Defendant's conduct. These injuries include: invasion of privacy; theft of their PII; lost or diminished value of PII; lost time and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; loss of benefit of the bargain; lost opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; and actual misuse of the compromised data consisting of an increase in spam calls, texts, and/or emails. The Plaintiff seeks to remedy these harms and prevent any future data compromise on behalf of herself and all similarly situated persons whose personal data was compromised and stolen as a result of the Data Breach and who remain at risk due to the Defendant's inadequate data security practices. The Plaintiff and Class Members are current and former employees of the Defendant's clients. Enroll Confidently is a company that provides employee-benefit management services to its clients. [BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Cristina Perez Hesano, Esq. PEREZ LAW GROUP, PLLC 7508 North 59th Avenue Glendale, AZ 85301 Telephone: (602) 730-100 Facsimile: (602) 612-6266 E-mail: cperez@perezlawgroup.com - and - Gary M. Klinger, Esq. MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN PLLC 227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 2100 Chicago, IL 60606 Telephone: (866) 252-0878 E-mail: gklinger@milberg.com EXXON MOBIL: Loses Bid for Judgment on Yoshikawa Suit Pleadings --------------------------------------------------------------- Chief Judge David C. Godbey of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied Exxon Mobil Corporation and Melissa Bond's motion for judgment on the pleadings in the case captioned as MENDI YOSHIKAWA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. EXXON MOBIL CORP., et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 3:21-CV-0194-N (N.D. Tex.). This is a federal securities putative class action on behalf of all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired ExxonMobil common stock between March 7, 2018 and January 15, 2021. Plaintiffs allege that ExxonMobil portrayed its oil and gas assets in the Permian Basin as more valuable than they were, and when ExxonMobil finally disclosed that its production goals could not be realized, the value XOM shares declined. Plaintiffs initially sued ExxonMobil and several of its personnel under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act and the related Rule 10b-5(b). Plaintiffs allege both affirmative misrepresentations of ExxonMobil's drilling potential in the Permian Basin and omissions of material information about the project's obstacles. The Court initially dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for failure to plead adequately that any Defendant acted with the requisite state of mind but granted leave to amend. Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint, omitting several of the original defendants but maintaining the Section 10(b) misrepresentation and omission claims against ExxonMobil and its officers Woods and Mallon, as well as the Section 20(a) control person claim against Woods. In the SAC, Plaintiffs additionally asserted a scheme liability claim against Melissa Bond, the former Senior Manager of Delaware Basin Development, alongside Mallon and ExxonMobil, and named Mallon as a control person. The SAC alleged that Bond and Mallon conspired to manipulate the valuation of ExxonMobil's Permian assets, of which Woods either would or should have learned from a meeting with Bond. Specifically, the SAC alleged Bond manipulated learning curve assumptions included in ExxonMobil's 2019 development plan, which increased proved reserves by increasing the number of wells Exxon expected to drill. In ruling on the motion to dismiss the SAC, the Court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and the claims against Mallon under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) with prejudice. The scheme liability claims under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) against Bond and ExxonMobil remain. At that stage, the Court determined that Plaintiffs adequately pled facts that created a strong "inference that Bond was at least severely reckless regarding the possibility that falsification of the 2019 Development Plan would mislead investors." Likewise, because Defendants did not assert any deficiency in Plaintiffs' pleading regarding scheme liability against ExxonMobil based on Bond, the Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) claim against ExxonMobil survived the Rule 12(b)(6) challenge. Finally, Plaintiffs' Section 20(a) claims survived the motion to dismiss because Defendants' sole argument for dismissing the control person liability claims was that Plaintiffs did not adequately plead a primary violation -- but as of the Order on the second motion to dismiss, primary liability claims survived. Now, Defendants move again to dismiss Plaintiffs' remaining claims, seeking a judgment on the pleadings. In this case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs adequately alleged facts that Bond's deceptive acts were communicated to the public. ExxonMobil maintains that Bond's alleged scheme consisted of entirely internal company conduct. Despite Defendants' insistence that Bond's allegedly fabricated development plant was not incorporated into any public filing, any factual disputes regarding the calculation of reserves cannot be resolved at the pleading stage, and Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts that allow the court to infer that Bond's deceptive acts were communicated to the public through the development plan's incorporation into the public reports. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs could not have relied on Bond's allegedly deceptive conduct in their purchase or sale of a security; therefore, Plaintiffs' scheme liability claim against Bond fails as a matter of law. Plaintiffs pled that they are entitled to a presumption of reliance pursuant to the fraud-on-the-market doctrine as outlined in Basic Inc. v. Levinson and are also entitled to a presumption of reliance under Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). At the pleading stage, Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to establish a presumption of reliance under both theories, the Court concludes. As in Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss, Defendants' sole argument against controlling person liability in this case is that Plaintiffs have not adequately pled a primary violation. The Court once again rejects this argument. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 20(a) claims. A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated August 12, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=LbEHfn FENIX INTERNATIONAL: Faces Another Suit Over Systemic Deception --------------------------------------------------------------- JD Davis and RFT Writers report that five anonymous plaintiffs alleged in a class action lawsuit against OnlyFans' parent company that the adults-only platform subjects its users to what they're referring to as "systemic deception." The complaint includes allegations that paying users are unwittingly interacting with paid chatters who impersonate creators. The plaintiffs claim that this is a violation of privacy. This isn't the first rodeo for the adults-only platform. OnlyFans has faced class action suits before, and prevailed in court after five (theoretically different) anonymous plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in California. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California ruled it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The plaintiffs had argued that OnlyFans was subject to personal jurisdiction in California due to conducting business there when California residents enrolled in recurring subscriptions. The charges brought forth included: -- Violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) -- Violations of the Federal Video Privacy Protection Act -- Violations of the California Invasion of Privacy Act -- Violations of California's false advertising laws -- Violations of California's unfair competition laws -- Breach of contract -- Fraud The question at the heart of the controversy is that of authenticity: Who are you really talking to when you choose to slide into an OF model's DMs? To understand the controversy, one must first understand how OnlyFans works. Individual creators, commonly known as "models," run their businesses through an OnlyFans account. That account primarily generates revenue through subscriptions, where followers pay a recurring fee to access exclusive content from that creator. Content creators can also choose to offer additional paid content. Think photos, videos, or personalized interactions that come at a premium. OnlyFans takes a percentage of these earnings, leaving the rest for the creators to enjoy as money earned. While the platform gained popularity for its adult content, it needs to be noted that creators span a wide range of industries. Fitness, cooking, and art are all genres that have a strong presence on OnlyFans. The controversy surrounding OnlyFans usually stems from debates surrounding adult content. That said, multiple things can be true: Normal adults who are not professional porn stars can create a platform on OnlyFans, make content, and talk to fans via the OF messaging system. Adult film stars can also leverage personal brands on OnlyFans. Keeping up with messages from followers while attending to all other areas of running an OnlyFans business becomes difficult to do at scale. OnlyFans creators are running a business with multiple products and service offerings. The "girlfriend experience" is a paid service. It's not reasonable to expect someone you're purchasing services from to actually be your partner. But a certain subset of lonely guys subscribe to OnlyFans and conflate this with buying a girlfriend. The rise of AI chatbots has made it deceptively easy to fall in love with a robot and confuse this for genuine connection. People get addicted to contacting a pretend partner who has no needs, remembers everything about them, never suggests you go to therapy, and always responds right away with an answer that is tailored to whatever needs the human initiating the chatting might have. OnlyFans terms of service don't specifically allow the use of chat services, but their terms do caution against using "OnlyFans to engage in misleading or deceptive conduct, or conduct that is likely to mislead or deceive any other User." It is generally understood that the actors in adult films are putting on a performance. As with any performance, the audience is encouraged to suspend disbelief. In other words: everyone sets aside their critical thinking skills and knowledge of how the real world operates while they're enjoying a performance, because reality would wreck the story. Intellectually, you might be aware that there are dozens of people on a film set even though there are only two actors on screen. But when you're watching a movie (pornographic or otherwise), you're not thinking about the director of photography or the costume designer. You're focused on the actors giving a performance. The difference is that on OnlyFans, you can interact with the leading lady when she's not in the middle of a scene. And so does everyone else who pays for that privilege. When your favorite local coffee shop gains popularity, and needs help keeping up with demand, the business owner hires additional baristas to help make lattes. Businesses that grow need support staff to continue to meet the needs of consumers - especially when those consumers demand 24/7 attention. It only makes sense that a model who amasses thousands of subscribers would need some customer support staff to help her care for every thirsty user. That's what OnlyFans chatters are. Support staff. So what options does this leave OnlyFans consumers who want to guarantee that their favorite model is indeed the one speaking to them? The only way to be sure the original creator is the one behind the screen is to order a custom video. The end of the story is this: OnlyFans content creators are business owners protecting their bottom line. You might be interesting, but talking about your cat isn't going to be fascinating enough to get them to give you their focused attention for free. If you want that attention, and it's important to you that a bot isn't on the other side of the chatbox, understand that you're asking a business owner to provide a service. No business is in it for free. With sending private photos to beautiful strangers on the internet, as with all things: Caveat emptor, some restrictions may apply. [GN] FISHER-PRICE INC: Deadline for Claims Filing Set April 29, 2025 --------------------------------------------------------------- The following statement is being issued by Kroll Settlement Administration LLC regarding the Fisher Price Rock 'n Play Sleeper Settlement. WHAT IS THIS LAWSUIT ABOUT? A proposed Settlement has been preliminary approved by the Court in a class action lawsuit against Fisher-Price, Inc. and Mattel, Inc. ("Defendants") concerning the Fisher-Price Rock 'n Play Sleeper ("RNPS"), an inclined infant sleeper, which was recalled by Fisher-Price and the Consumer Product Safety Commission in April 2019 due to reports of infant deaths. The lawsuit is called In Re: Fisher-Price Rock 'N Play Sleeper Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 2903, United States District Court for the Western District of New York, and claims that the RNPS is an unsafe sleeping environment for infants. If you currently own an RNPS, DO NOT use your product under any circumstances. Instead, please disable your product as shown on the video at www.FisherPriceRockNPlaySettlement.com and follow the instructions to file a Claim Form to receive a cash payment under the Settlement. WHO IS INCLUDED? You are included in the settlement as a Settlement Class Member if you live in United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, or any United States territories and/or possession and (a) you purchased or acquired (including by gift) a RNPS for or on behalf of themselves or to be given as a gift, or (b) you currently have a RNPS in your possession. All models of the RNPS are covered by this Settlement -- a full list is available on the website. WHAT DOES THE SETTLEMENT PROVIDE? The Settlement provides $19,000,000.00 to pay approved claims. You can receive cash payments as follows: (1) If you received a voucher or toy for returning a RNPS according to the Recall, you can get $10. (2) If you currently own a RNPS, or you previously purchased a new RNPS, you can get up to the purchase price depending on if you still have the RNPS, the price you paid, if you have proof-of-purchase, and the date product was purchased/manufactured. WHAT ARE YOUR RIGHTS? File a Claim: You must file a claim to get any money from the Settlement. The deadline to file a claim is April 29, 2025. You may file your Claim Form online or download a claim form at FisherPriceRockNPlaySettlement.com. Do Nothing: If you do nothing, you will not receive money, but will be legally bound by decisions of the Court and give up any right to sue for the claims resolved by this settlement. Object: You can tell the court what you don't like about the Settlement but remain a Settlement Class Member entitled money. The deadline to object is December 30, 2024. Exclude Yourself ("Opt-out"): If you exclude yourself, you will not receive money, but you keep the right to sue for the claims resolved by this settlement. The deadline to exclude yourself is December 30, 2024. For details on how to file a claim, object, or exclude yourself ("opt-out"), visit FisherPriceRockNPlaySettlement.com or call (833) 522-3524. WHEN IS THE FAIRNESS HEARING? The Court will hold a hearing on January 28, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. ET at United States District Court Western District of New York, 2 Niagara Square, Buffalo, New York 14202-3498 to hear any objections, determine if the Settlement is fair, and to consider attorney's fees of 28% of the settlement fund, expenses of up $825,000, and class representative awards of $3,500. The motion for attorneys' fees and expenses, and class representative service awards will be posted to the settlement website after it is filed. Class Members may attend the Hearing, at their own expense, but they aren't required to. This is only a summary. If you have questions or want more information about this lawsuit, the Settlement, and your rights under the Settlement, visit FisherPriceRockNPlaySettlement.com, call (833) 522-3524, or write to: Fisher Price Rock N' Play Settlement, c/o Kroll Settlement Administration LLC, P.O. Box 5324, New York, NY 10150-5324. [GN] FOSTER POULTRY: Court Grants Summary Judgment for Beazley Insurance ------------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Lee H. Rosenthal of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California grants the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in the lawsuit captioned BEAZLEY INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff v. FOSTER POULTRY FARMS, and FOSTER FARMS LLC, Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-01806-LHR-SKO (E.D. Cal.). The matter is a dispute about whether Beazley Insurance Company, Inc., is obligated to pay defense costs arising from class action litigation alleging that Foster Poultry Farms and Foster Farms LLC (together, "Foster Farms") and other major chicken producers illegally fixed the price of broiler chickens. Broiler chickens are chickens raised for meat consumption to be slaughtered before the age of 13 weeks, and which may be sold in a variety of forms, including fresh or frozen, raw or cooked, or whole or in parts. Beazley argues that it has no obligation to pay Foster Farms' defense costs under an excess liability insurance policy (the "Excess Policy") it issued to Foster Farms because: (1) the Excess Policy excludes coverage for antitrust claims; and, alternatively, (2) the limits of the primary policy issued by a third-party insurer have not been exhausted. Based on the pleadings, the motions, the briefs, the arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that Beazley has no obligation to pay Foster Farms' defense costs because the antitrust exclusion applies to all claims in the underlying litigation and, alternatively, the primary insurance policy has not been exhausted. Hence, summary judgment is granted in favor of Beazley. In 2016, several actions were filed against Foster Farms and other major chicken producers in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The actions were consolidated into In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 16-cv-08637 ("In re Broiler Chicken"). The plaintiffs comprise four distinct groups: (1) a class of direct purchasers of broiler chickens; (2) a class of indirect purchasers who sold broiler chickens; (3) a class of individuals who purchased broiler chickens; and (4) over eight dozen direct-action plaintiffs who filed their own complaints. Beazley sued Foster Farms in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California in December 2021. Beazley seeks a declaratory judgment that it owes no duty to pay Foster Farms' defense costs under the Excess Policy because (1) the antitrust exclusion applies to In re Broiler Chicken, and, even if the antitrust exclusion does not apply, (2) coverage has not been triggered because the limits of the Followed Policy have not been exhausted. Foster Farms asserts counterclaims for (1) a mirror-image declaratory judgment, (2) breach of the Excess Policy, and (3) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In March 2023, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The parties filed responses and replies. Beazley also filed objections to Foster Farms' summary judgment evidence and a request for judicial notice. In April 2024, the case was assigned to this Court, which is temporarily performing judicial duties in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California to ease the backlog in that overburdened district. In July 2024, the Court heard argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment. Based on the record, the briefing, oral argument, and the applicable law, summary judgment is granted for Beazley and denied for Foster Farms. The Court denies Beazley's evidentiary objections and request for judicial notice as moot because the summary judgment ruling does not depend on the challenged evidence or the mathematical calculations that are the subject of the request for judicial notice. Beazley argues, among other things, that it owes Foster Farms no duty to pay defense costs because In re Broiler Chicken falls within the antitrust exclusion for any actual or alleged violation of any law, whether statutory, regulatory or common law, respecting any of the following activities: antitrust, business competition, unfair trade practices or tortious interference in another's business or contractual relationships. Foster Farms contends, among other things, that the antitrust exclusion does not bar coverage because many of the cases consolidated in In re Broiler Chicken assert causes of action for unjust enrichment and violations of state consumer protection laws, and include allegations of fraud and false advertising. Judge Rosenthal finds that Foster Farms' arguments are unpersuasive. As an initial matter, whether the antitrust exclusion applies to all the In re Broiler Chicken claims is a pure question of law. Whether In re Broiler Chicken is a "mixed" action subject to the duty to advance defense fees, or instead falls entirely outside the antitrust exclusion, turns on the language of the exclusion itself. Accordingly, Beazley's arguments based on a "potential" for coverage are unavailing, Judge Rosenthal points out. Further, Judge Rosenthal opines, the unjust enrichment claims asserted by the indirect purchaser plaintiffs are derivative of, and entirely dependent upon, the antitrust claims and underlying price-fixing allegations. For these reasons, the Court holds that the antitrust exclusion applies to all claims in In re Broiler Chicken, and that Beazley has no duty to pay Foster Farms' defense costs. In 2016, Foster Farms purchased a liability insurance policy (the "Followed Policy") from National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA ("AIG"). Even if the antitrust exclusion does not apply to all the claims in In re Broiler Chicken, Beazley would still owe no duty to advance Foster Farms' defense costs because the primary layer of insurance provided by AIG has not been exhausted, Judge Rosenthal explains. The Followed Policy--which is the primary layer of insurance provided by AIG--has a $10M limit of liability. Coverage under the Excess Policy is not triggered unless and until the limits of the Followed Policy have been exhausted through payments by, or on behalf of, or in place of the insurers of the Underlying Insurance [AIG] of amounts covered under the Underlying Insurance. Put simply, Judge Rosenthal says, Beazley is obligated to pay only if more than $10M of covered defense costs have been paid under the Followed Policy. Foster Farms' payments in excess of the $5.65M paid by AIG did not exhaust the limits of the Followed Policy and did not trigger Beazley's obligations as an excess carrier. Accordingly, the Court grants Beazley's motion for summary judgment. Foster Farms' motion for summary judgment is denied. Beazley must submit a proposed final judgment by Sept. 20, 2024. A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Opinion dated Aug. 22, 2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4fbdjcy4 from PacerMonitor.com. GITLAB INC: Investors Sue Over False and Misleading Statements -------------------------------------------------------------- Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized stockholder rights law firm, announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed against GitLab Inc. ("GitLab" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: GTLB) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf of all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired GitLab securities between June 6, 2023 and March 4, 2024, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"). Investors have until November 4, 2024 to apply to the Court to be appointed as lead plaintiff in the lawsuit. According to the complaint, defendants provided overwhelmingly positive statements to investors while, at the same time, disseminating materially false and misleading statements and/or concealing material adverse facts concerning GitLab's ability to develop AI features that would generate code more efficiently and increase market demand for its DevSecOps platform. On March 4, 2024, GitLab issued a press release reporting a strong Q1 in 2024, followed by an announcement lowering full-year guidance for 2025. In pertinent part, defendants announced that the company needed time to build its pipeline and close deals on new products. In addition, provided first quarter 2025 and full year 2025 guidance with growth rates hovering between 30 and 31% and 27%, respectively. Furthermore, GitLab anticipated a Q1 2025 non-GAAP operating loss of $12-$13 million and an operating non-GAAP revenue of $5-$10 million for the full year of 2025. Investors and analysts reacted immediately to GitLab's revelation. The price of GitLab's common stock declined dramatically. From a closing market price of $74.47 per share on March 4, 2024, GitLab's stock price fell to $58.84 per share on March 5, 2024, a decline of about 21% in the span of just a single day. If you purchased or otherwise acquired GitLab shares and suffered a loss, are a long-term stockholder, have information, would like to learn more about these claims, or have any questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with respect to these matters, please contact Brandon Walker or Marion Passmore by email at investigations@bespc.com, telephone at (212) 355-4648, or by filling out this contact form. There is no cost or obligation to you. About Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.: Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a nationally recognized law firm with offices in New York, California, and South Carolina. The firm represents individual and institutional investors in commercial, securities, derivative, and other complex litigation in state and federal courts across the country. For more information about the firm, please visit www.bespc.com. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes. Contact Information: Brandon Walker, Esq. Marion Passmore, Esq. Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. (212) 355-4648 investigations@bespc.com www.bespc.com [GN] HIGHGATE HOTELS: Website Inaccessible to Blind, Andrews Alleges --------------------------------------------------------------- VICTOR ANDREWS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Highgate Hotels, L.P., Case No. 1:24-cv-05726 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 19, 2024) sues the Defendant for their failure to design, construct, maintain, and operate their website, Westhousehotelnewyork.com, to be fully accessible to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired persons, under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Plaintiff browsed and intended to make an online reservation on Westhousehotelnewyork.com. Despite his efforts, however, the Plaintiff was denied an online experience like that of a sighted individual due to the Website's lack of a variety of features and accommodations. Unless Defendant remedies the numerous access barriers on its website, the Plaintiff and Class members will continue to be unable to independently navigate, browse, use, and complete the reservation on Westhousehotelnewyork.com. Because Defendant's website, Westhousehotelnewyork.com, is not equally accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers, it violates the ADA. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in Highgate Hotels' policies, practices, and procedures to that Defendant’s website will become and remain accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in Grupo Gitano's policies, practices, and procedures so that the Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers. This complaint also seeks compensatory damages to compensate Class members for having been subjected to unlawful discrimination.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Asher Cohen, Esq. ASHER COHEN PLLC 2377 56th Dr, Brooklyn, NY 11234 Telephone: (718) 914-9694 E-mail: acohen@ashercohenlaw.com HOAG MEMORIAL: Two Class Actions Remanded to State Court -------------------------------------------------------- Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1447(d), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the orders issued by the United States District Court for the Central District of California remanding two putative class action complaints against Hoag Memorial Hospital Presbyterian—one brought by plaintiff-appellee Jane Doe, and another brought by plaintiff-appellee Kelly Davis—to California state court. Plaintiffs brought claims under only California law in California state court on behalf of all California residents who accessed Hoag's website. They challenged Hoag's use of the Meta Pixel tool on its website—a piece of code offered by Meta (formerly Facebook) to assist in advertising and driving traffic to websites. Hoag removed both cases to federal court, alleging that removal was proper under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1442(a)(1). Both plaintiffs moved to remand their respective cases to state court, and the district court granted both motions. Hoag timely filed its notice of appeal from both remand orders, and this court consolidated the appeals. According to the Ninth Circuit, Hoag fails to establish that it was "acting under" a federal officer when it used the Meta Pixel tool in developing and maintaining its website, as would be required for removal under Sec. 1442(a)(1). Hoag argues that it was acting under a federal officer because it developed and maintained its website pursuant to the Department of Health and Human Services' "Meaningful Use Program." The Appellate Court holds that Hoag did not "act under" a federal officer when it developed and maintained its website, as required for removal under Sec. 1442(a)(1). A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum dated August 12, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=IHGzWX INT'L LONGSHOREMEN'S: S.D. Georgia Dismisses Dodd Class Suit ------------------------------------------------------------ Chief Judge R. Stan Baker of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Savannah Division, grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss the lawsuit titled LAUREN DODD, RICHARD SMITH, and AMANDA HAMMOND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION LOCAL 1475 CLERKS AND CHECKERS UNION, INC., Defendant, Case No. 4:23-cv-00327-RSB-CLR (S.D. Ga.). The Plaintiffs brought this putative class action against Defendant International Longshoreman's Association Local 1475 Clerks and Checkers Union, Inc.'s ("Local 1475") and International Longshoremen's Association ("ILA") alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation to union members. Defendant ILA was dismissed from this action on March 21, 2024. Local 1475 is a local labor organization that, along with ILA, serves as the bargaining representative for clerks and checkers in the Port of Savannah ("Port"). The Plaintiffs are bargaining unit members of Local 1475. ILA and Local 1475 are parties to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with the Georgia Stevedore Association ("GSA"), which governs the rates of pay, rules, and working conditions for clerks and checkers at the Port. Local 1475 operates a hiring hall where it assigns work to clerks and checkers in accordance with the order set forth in the CBA, referred to as the Savannah Clerks and Checkers Seniority Plan ("Seniority Plan"). Under the Seniority Plan, clerks and checkers are grouped together in divisions known as "Classes." Each Class consists of clerks and checkers, who achieved at least 700 hours of work in a specific "contract year," and who maintained 700 hours of work in each contract year thereafter. Under the Seniority Plan, contract years begin on October 1, and end on September 30, and are designated by the calendar years they straddle (e.g., 2023–24). The requirement to work at least 700 hours to establish seniority is in the ILA Constitution, which states that "[e]very local union shall have a seniority system requiring a minimum of 700 work hours or credited hours to establish a year of service" and that "[s]uch seniority system based on years of service shall be used to determine priority of employment for hiring purposes." The Classes created under the Seniority Plan form a seniority-based system for assigning work to clerks and checkers. Under the Seniority Plan, Local 1475 and ILA offer available work to all members of a Class before offering work to the next Class. During contract year 2020–21, there was an unusual expansion of work at the Port, creating a temporary demand for additional clerks and checkers. ILA, Local 1475, and GSA responded to the increased demand by creating an "Emergency List" of new clerks and checkers. Local 1475 placed approximately 200 individuals on the Emergency List. However, before announcing the creation of the Emergency List to members of the bargaining unit, Local 1475 recruited its leaders' family and friends to become clerks and checkers under the Emergency List. In the Complaint, the Plaintiffs identify 22 individuals, who were either related to or close family friends of Local 1475 leaders, who were added to the Emergency List. At a Local 1475 meeting in February 2021, members asked Local 1475 leaders about the Emergency List. In response, Local 1475 made the Emergency List available to members, but only if they signed up in person at a location within the Port during a single four-hour period occurring two days after the membership meeting. Only those persons with valid Port credentials could access the location where the Emergency List signup occurred. ILA and Local 1475 required clerks and checkers on the Emergency List to execute a waiver of seniority rights as a condition of employment. Consequently, Emergency List members, who worked as clerks and checkers in the 2020–21 contract year had no seniority preference over the members, who first worked as clerks and checkers during the 2021–22 contract year. On Oct. 11, 2021, ILA, Local 1475, and GSA executed a Memorandum of Understanding ("2021 MOU"). Under the 2021 MOU, Class "HH" consisted of individuals, who worked at least 700 combined hours in the 2021–22 contract year. Until June 19, 2023, Class HH consisted only of clerks and checkers, who first worked in the 2021–22 contract year and clerks and checkers, who first worked under the Emergency List. Beginning in February 2023, the amount of available clerk and checker work at the Port declined. In the Spring of 2023, at the urging of ILA and Local 1475, GSA entered into a Memorandum of Understanding ("2023 MOU") that subdivided Class HH into two Subclasses designated as HH-1 and HH-2. Local 1475 created these subdivisions because of a case filed against the union. The 2023 MOU defined Subclass HH-1 as: All individuals who worked at least 700 hours through the Local 1475 hiring system during both the 2020–21 and 2021–22 Contract Years, and all individuals who were on an [E]mergency [L]ist during the 2020–21 Contract Year and worked at least 700 hours through the Local 1475 hiring system during the 2021–22 Contract Year. Class HH-2 was defined as "[a]ll other individuals who worked at least 700 hours through the Local 1475 hiring system during the 2021–22 Contract Year." The 2023 MOU further provided, "For purposes of hiring preference within in the HH classification, all members of the Sub-classification HH-1 will be referred work they are qualified to perform before any jobs are offered to members of Sub-classification HH-2." Local 1475 did not disclose to members that the Emergency List, and consequently part of the HH-1 Subclass, was populated with Local 1475 leaders' family and friends. On May 11, 2023, Local 1475 members voted to ratify the 2023 MOU in a single day ratification vote. On June 19, 2023, ILA and Local 1475 carried out the division of Class HH into Subclasses HH-1 and HH-2. Because of the Class division, the amount of work available to members of Subclass HH-1 increased substantially, and the amount of work available to members of Subclass HH-2 declined substantially. Plaintiff Amanda Hammond filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") on May 17, 2023. The Charge alleged that Local 1475 "violated [29 U.S.C. Section 158](b)(1)(A) and (2) by operating the hiring hall in manner that [was] arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, by splitting the HH seniority group into two sub-groups." The NLRB dismissed the charge, finding the division was not so far outside the wide range of reasonableness afforded to labor organizations when administering their duties as to be deemed arbitrary or irrational. The NLRB dismissal also stated that insofar the challenge was based on the previous creation of the Emergency List, that act occurred more than six months before the Charge was filed and could not be considered. The Plaintiffs sued Local 1475 and IRL ILA in this Court on Nov. 9, 2023. In the Complaint, the Plaintiffs bring one claim under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 158(b)(1)(A) and (2). Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that Local 1475 violated the duty of fair representation by dividing Class HH into subclasses and by not disclosing Local 1475 leaders' personal ties to individuals on the Emergency List before the ratification vote. On Dec. 29, 2023, the Plaintiff Hammond filed an appeal of the NLRB decision to the NLRB's Office of General Counsel. The appeal was denied on Jan. 23, 2024, based on the determination that previous litigation and facts presented belied the notion that the composition of the Emergency List--that being "friends and family of local union leadership"--was concealed from members, who voted to approve the HH subgroups addressed in the 2023 MOU. Local 1475 filed the at-issue Motion to Dismiss on Jan. 29, 2024, arguing that the Court should dismiss this action because (1) it is barred by the six-month statute of limitations, and (2) it is inadequately pled--the Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts showing Local 1475 acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith. Local 1475 also requests that the Court take judicial notice of Hammond's previously-filed grievance and the NLRB's disposition of that Charge. The Plaintiffs filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss, but did not respond to Local 1475's Request for Judicial Notice. Local 1475 filed a Reply. Specifically, Local 1475 asks the Court to take judicial notice of (1) the NLRB Charge filed against Local 1475 by Plaintiff Hammond on May 17, 2023; (2) the NLRB's letter, dated Dec. 18, 2023, dismissing Hammond's claim; (3) the NLRB's letter, dated Dec. 29, 2023, acknowledging receipt of Hammond's appeal; and (4) the NLRB Office of General Counsel's letter, dated Jan. 23, 2024, denying Hammond's appeal. Local 1475 also asks that the Court take judicial notice of the contents of the Seniority Plan, the 2021 MOU, and the 2023 MOU. As Local 1475 highlights in its Reply, Judge Baker notes that the Plaintiffs failed to object to the Judicial Notice Request. Given that Local 1475 has provided a sound legal basis for its proposed judicially noticed facts, and because the Plaintiffs have failed to show how these facts could be reasonably disputed, the Court grants Local 1475's Request. Accordingly, the Court will consider the NLRB charge and its disposition for the purposes of Local 1475's Motion to Dismiss. The Court likewise takes judicial notice of the contents of the Seniority Plan, the 2021 MOU, and the 2023 MOU that are referenced in the Complaint and which Local 1475 attached to its Request. Local 1475 first moves to dismiss the Complaint on statute of limitation grounds, arguing that the duty of fair representation claim is based on conduct that occurred outside the statutory period. The Court disagrees. Judge Baker opines that the Plaintiffs' claim is based on Local 1475's division of the HH Class and its failure to disclose, before the ratification vote, that the proposed HH-1 Subclass consisted of leaders' friends and family. While the Emergency List may be relevant for showing who those individuals are and how they came to comprise the HH-1 Subclass, the action challenged in this lawsuit is the (existing and ongoing) division of the HH Class, not the original creation of the Emergency list. Accordingly, because the Plaintiffs' claims are based on actions that fall within the statutory period, Judge Baker holds that Local 1475's Motion is not due to be granted on statute of limitations grounds. Taken together with the judicially noticed facts, Judge Baker finds the allegations in the Complaint provide a reasonable factfinder with no basis, beyond mere speculation, to find that the class split was arbitrary, discriminatory, or made in bad faith. While the Plaintiffs may feel wronged because some of Local 1475's leadership's friends and family may have ultimately received seniority status, there are insufficient facts to support an inference that the seniority rights were improperly bestowed. There is, therefore, no basis for finding that the class division breached the duty of fair representation. Absent any allegation that Local 1475 was obligated to disclose this information or that it intentionally concealed it before ratification, Judge Baker says the Plaintiffs have, at best, alleged a negligent failure to disclose, which cannot by itself carry their claim. Moreover, even if the Court were to find this information material to the vote and that Local 1475 intentionally concealed it, Judge Baker points out the Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts showing that this would have affected the outcome of the ratification vote. Indeed, the Plaintiffs have not alleged that they were unaware of the Emergency List's membership let alone that disclosure would have impacted the vote of a membership majority. Any claim that such disclosure would have changed the outcome of the ratification vote is wholly speculative. Accordingly, Judge Baker holds the Plaintiffs' assertions that Local 1475 failed to disclose its relationships to individuals on the Emergency List before the ratification vote splitting the HH Class is not enough to support a fair representation claim. The Plaintiffs' claims are, therefore, due to be dismissed. The Court concludes that the Complaint does nothing to thwart the judicially noticed fact that Local 1475 split the HH Class in response to charges raised by union membership. The division was based on objective criteria, and the Plaintiff fails to allege any facts, beyond mere speculation, that indicates Local 1475 was otherwise motivated by discrimination or improper motives. While the Plaintiffs may be unhappy that those who were on the Emergency List were afforded higher seniority status than the Plaintiffs' own, the Complaint has failed to show why such division, or the alleged failure to disclose the names of the Emergency List members, was legally improper. Accordingly, absent any allegations on which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Local 1475's actions were arbitrary, discriminatory, or made in bad faith, the Plaintiffs' duty of fair representation claim cannot proceed. Based on this, the Court grants Local 1475's Request for Judicial Notice, and grants Local 1475's Motion to Dismiss. The Court, thereby, dismisses the Plaintiffs' action against Defendant International Longshoreman's Association Local 1475 Clerks and Checkers Union, Inc., and directs the Clerk of Court to close this case. A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 22, 2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2hxawjbk from PacerMonitor.com. INTUIT INC: Court Narrows Claims in Rodriguez ERISA Lawsuit ----------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as DEBORAH RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. INTUIT INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. Case No. 23-cv-05053-PCP, Judge P. Casey Pitts of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss the case. On October 2, 2023, Deborah Rodriguez commenced this putative class action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act against both her former employer, Intuit, and the Employee Benefits Administrative Committee of the Intuit Inc. 401(k) Plan. She alleges that Intuit used forfeited nonvested accounts to reduce its own matching contributions to its employee pension benefits plan in contravention of the terms of the plan and in violation of its fiduciary obligations under federal law. Defendant Intuit is a financial software corporation employing over 17,000 individuals. Intuit is incorporated under the laws of Delaware with its headquarters located in Mountain View, California. Intuit sponsors and administers "The Intuit Plan" (hereinafter "Plan"), "a defined contribution, individual account, employee pension benefit plan under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1002(2)(A) and Sec. 1002(34) subject to the provisions of ERISA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1003(a)." The Committee is an entity "created by Intuit to assist in the management of the Plan [that] was delegated with authority to, among other things, direct the trustee with respect to the crediting and distribution of the Plan assets." The complaint asserts six total causes of action. The following five causes of action are bought against all defendants: (1) Breach of Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104(a)(1)(A)); (2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty of Prudence, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1104(a)(1)(B); (3) Breach of ERISA's Anti-Inurement Provision, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1103(c)(1); (4) Prohibited Transactions in violation of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1106(a)(1); and (5) Prohibited Transactions in violation of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1106(b)(1). The Complaint asserts a sixth cause of action against Intuit only for failure to monitor fiduciaries. On December 18, 2023, the defendants moved to dismiss Ms. Rodriguez's claims under Rule 12(b)(6), contending that the complaint fails to state any valid causes of action. The defendants seek to dismiss Counts I and II for three reasons. First, they argue that Ms. Rodriguez fails to allege that Intuit functioned as a fiduciary, arguing instead that it functioned as a settlor. Second, they argue that offsetting employer contributions is not a fiduciary breach. Third, they argue that Ms. Rodriguez fails to plead damages. Fiduciaries under the ERISA statute must act "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries" and "for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan." The complaint plausibly alleges that Intuit acted in contravention of ERISA's mandate to provide benefits solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries when it chose to use forfeitures to reduce its own contributions during the class period. The defendants contend that Intuit did not breach its duty of loyalty because their conduct expressly complied with the terms of the Plan Document, which were not unlawful. According to the Court, even if Intuit had complied with the terms of the Plan Document, that alone would not excuse Intuit from fulfilling its fiduciary duties under ERISA. The allegations in the complaint plausibly suggest that Intuit breached its duty of loyalty by making decisions that were not in the best interest of Plan participants, the Court finds. Section 1104(a)(1)(B) imposes a fiduciary duty of prudence. The complaint alleges that the defendants breached the duty of prudence by "declining to use the forfeited funds in the plan to eliminate the administrative expenses charged to participant accounts and instead using such Plan assets to reduce the Company's own contributions to the Plan." The Court says Ms. Rodriguez has plausibly alleged not only that Intuit did not in fact comply with the terms of the Plan Document but also that a prudent employer in this particular context would have at minimum engaged in a "reasoned and impartial decision-making process" considering "all relevant factors" before determining how to use the forfeited funds in the best interest of the participants and beneficiaries. According to Ms. Rodriguez, Intuit failed to do so. At this stage, Ms. Rodriguez has stated a plausible claim for breach of the duty of prudence, the Court finds. Section 1132(a)(2) permits "a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary" to bring a civil action for appropriate relief under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1109(a). Ms. Rodriguez has pleaded sufficient facts to support her claim that the Plan as a whole was damaged, the Court states. Ms. Rodriguez alleges that by applying forfeitures to reduce Intuit's contributions in violation of its fiduciary duties, Intuit "caused the Plan to receive fewer contributions that would otherwise have increased Plan assets," thereby "reduc[ing] the funds available to participants for distribution and/or investing." The defendants' argument that these allegations are merely speculative is without merit, the Court holds. Ms. Rodriguez has plausibly stated a claim for breach of ERISA's anti-inurement provision. The crux of Ms. Rodriguez's allegations is that Intuit received a benefit amounting to "millions of dollars in contribution expenses" by "electing to use the plan assets as a substitute for the Company's own future contributions to the plan." That savings, Ms. Rodriguez asserts, is equivalent to "debt forgiveness" and is thus a "direct and greater-than-incidental benefit" to Intuit. Intuit argues that "it is illogical characterize the forfeitures as being ‘substituted' for Intuit's contributions, when . . . Intuit only ever committed to making contributions in an amount already offset by forfeitures." At the 12(b)(6) stage, Ms. Rodriguez has plausibly stated a claim for unlawful employer inurement, the Court notes. Ms. Rodriguez alleges that Intuit, as the employer of Plan participants, is a "party in interest," and that it engaged in prohibited transactions by "electing to use forfeited funds in the Plan as a substitute for future employer contributions to the Plan," causing "a direct or indirect exchange of existing Plan assets for future employer contributions and/or use of Plan assets by or for the benefit of a party in interest." The defendants move to dismiss both of Ms. Rodriguez's prohibited transaction claims for three reasons. First, they argue that the plaintiff fails to identify an actionable fiduciary act because Intuit never acted in a capacity other than that of a settlor. For the reasons addressed above, that argument lacks merit because Ms. Rodriguez as plausibly pleaded that Intuit acted as fiduciary and not a settlor with respect to the challenged conduct. The defendants next argue that Ms. Rodriguez fails to identify a "transaction at issue" that violates 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1106(a)(1) or 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1106(b)(1). They contend that "Intuit's decision about how much to contribute to the Plan does not constitute a 'transaction.'" Finally, the defendants invoke their arguments against Ms. Rodriguez's anti-inurement claim to argue that Ms. Rodriguez fails to plausibly allege any self-dealing in this case. Ms. Rodriguez has plausibly pleaded that Intuit's reallocation of forfeitures created a benefit to it to the detriment of the Plan by reducing the funds available to participants and for investment, the Court finds. Those facts are sufficient to support a plausible inference that Intuit engaged in self-dealing in light of the plaintiffs' plausible interpretation of the Plan as prohibiting such conduct, the Court states. Accordingly, Ms. Rodriguez has plausibly stated a claim for prohibited transactions under both 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1106(a)(1) and 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1106(b)(1), the Court concludes. Judge Pitts holds, "The defendants' motion to dismiss is granted with respect to Count VI and all claims against The Committee. The defendants' motion with respect to all remaining claims is denied." A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated August 12, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=N60ykV JUAN MANUEL MERCHAN: Asanov Sues Over Organized Criminal Group -------------------------------------------------------------- Dr. Alexander N. Asanov, individually, on behalf of himself, and on behalf of The People of the USA- hundreds of millions of similarly situated victims v. Juan Manuel Merchan, and Joe Doe - unidentified yet Defendants colluded into organized anti-American criminal group, Case No. 5:24-cv-00514-FL (E.D.N.C., Sept. 6, 2024) is civil action seeking to safeguard all Americans, regardless of their political preferences, race, or religion. The Plaintiffs seek court orders so that Ms. Kamala Harris, Mr. Donald Trump, Mr. Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and other candidates can equally participate in the 2024 presidential campaign, free from crimes limiting their capability of campaigning. The criminal interference with Trump's campaign, committed by the organized criminal group of the Defendants, has injured class of Plaintiffs, damaged US national CBRNE security and imposed the imminent risks of death and injuries onto hundreds of millions of Americans, the lawsuit says. The Plaintiffs seek the attention of jurists of integrity, who uphold the rule of law. The Plaintiffs petition for an order, which will deter the Defendants from Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and other felony crimes. The Defendant was born in Colombia. He immigrated to New York City when a boy. His father was a military officer in Colombia.[BN] The Plaintiff appears pro se.[BN] LENNAR CORP: Faces Abboud TCPA Suit Over Unwanted Messages ---------------------------------------------------------- Monica Abboud, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v. Lennar Corporation, Case No. 1:24-cv-23452-KMW (S.D. Fla., Sept. 6, 2024) contends that the Defendant allegedly sent unsolicited text messages to Plaintiff and the putative class on their respective residential phones which are registered on the National Do-Not Call Registry, all in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The Defendant allegedly violated 47 U.S.C. Sections 227 et seq. and 47 C.F.R. section 64.1200(a)(2) by bombarding consumers' mobile phones with non-emergency advertising and marketing text messages without prior express written consent. The Plaintiff was assigned, and was the owner of, a cellular telephone number of ending in 3670 ("Cell Phone"). The Plaintiff uses the Cell Phone primarily for residential purposes including calling and texting friends and family. The Plaintiff's Cell Phone was registered on the National Do Not Call Registry since Feb. 27, 2020. On April 13, 2024, at approximately 11:32 am (central time), the Defendant sent a text message to Plaintiff advertising homes for sale, from the number 844-414-5445. Then again, on April 17, 2024, at approximately 11:36 am (central time), sent another text message to Plaintiff advertising homes for sale, from the same number, 844-414-5445, the suit says. The Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring the Defendant to cease all unsolicited text messages to numbers on the DNC, as well as an award of statutory damages and treble damages (for knowing and/or willful violations) for the Plaintiff and members of the Class per violation, together with court costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees. Lennar Corporation is in the home construction industry.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mohammad Kazerouni, Esq. Ryan L. McBride, Esq. KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC 245 Fischer Ave., Suite D1 Costa Mesa, CA 92626 Telephone: (800) 400-6808 Facsimile: (800) 520-5523 E-mail: mike@kazlg.com ryan@kazlg.com MARICOPA COUNTY, AZ: Curley Suit Dismissed With Leave to Amend -------------------------------------------------------------- In the lawsuit titled Cheryl Marie Curley, Plaintiff v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Office Jails, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:24-cv-02036-JAT--ASB (D. Ariz.), Senior Judge James A. Teilborg of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona dismisses the Plaintiff's complaint with leave to amend. Self-represented Plaintiff Cheryl Marie Curley, who is confined in a Maricopa County Jail, filed a civil rights Complaint and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. The Plaintiff contends she is "part of the class action lawsuit case with." She does not indicate which class action she believes she is a part of. She refers elsewhere in the Complaint to a lawsuit filed by Tanya Delgadillo Nareau, Nareau v. Tempe Police Station, CV-24-01363-PHX-DGC (CDB), but that lawsuit is not a class action, Judge Teilborg notes. The Plaintiff alleges the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to "medical and inhumane housing" and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). However, Judge Teilborg opines, "medical and inhumane housing" is not a jurisdictional basis, and the Plaintiff is only suing state actors. The Court will construe the Plaintiff's claims as having been asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The Court grants the Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Judge Teilborg says the Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350. The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $8.20. The remainder of the fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month's income credited to the Plaintiff's trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10. The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. The Court will dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint because it fails to state a claim, with leave to amend because it may possibly be amended to state a claim. In her one-count Complaint, the Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendants Maricopa County Sheriff's Office Jails, the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, and Correctional Health. She contends she is being subjected to inhumane housing in unsanitary conditions that are full of black mold and bad for health. She asserts unspecified prior litigation held that the black mold infestation at the Estrella Jail is hazardous to health and is an active live parasite and fungi. The Plaintiff claims her "health has been decreased," she has become "sick more," and her immune system is "dimin[i]shed." Judge Teilborg opines that the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office is not a proper defendant because it is a "nonjural entity." In Arizona, the responsibility of operating jails and caring for prisoners is placed by law upon the sheriff. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Defendant Maricopa County Sheriff's Office. Section 1983 imposes liability on any "person" who violates an individual's federal rights while acting under color of state law. Congress intended municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to whom Section 1983 applies. Judge Teilborg opines that jails are buildings or collections of buildings, not people or legally created entities capable of being sued. Thus, the Court will dismiss Defendant Maricopa County Sheriff's Office Jails. Defendant Correctional Health is an administrative subdivision of Maricopa County. Judge Teilborg points out that it is not a municipal corporation, local governing body, or private corporation, and, therefore, it is not a "person" amenable to suit under Section 1983. Thus, the Court will dismiss Defendant Correctional Health. Moreover, even if the Plaintiff had sued Maricopa County, Judge Teilborg finds her allegations do not support a claim. A municipality may not be sued solely because an injury was inflicted by its employees or agents. Judge Teilborg points out that the Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support that Maricopa County maintained a specific policy or custom that resulted in a violation of her federal constitutional rights and has failed to explain how her injuries were caused by any municipal policy or custom. For these reasons, the Court will dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Within 30 days, the Plaintiff may submit a first amended complaint to cure the deficiencies outlined here. The Clerk of Court will mail the Plaintiff a court-approved form to use for filing a first amended complaint. If the Plaintiff fails to use the court-approved form, the Court may strike the amended complaint and dismiss this action without further notice to her. Judge Teilborg directs the Plaintiff to, among other things, clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the "First Amended Complaint," and that the Plaintiff must write short, plain statements telling the Court: (1) the constitutional right she believes was violated; (2) the name of the Defendant, who violated the right; (3) exactly what that Defendant did or failed to do; (4) how the action or inaction of that the Defendant is connected to the violation of her constitutional right; and (5) what specific injury she suffered because of that Defendant's conduct. To the extent the Plaintiff is seeking the appointment of counsel in her Request for Relief, the Court will deny her request. There is no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in a civil case. In proceedings in forma pauperis, the court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford one. Appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(1) is required only when "exceptional circumstances" are present. Judge Teilborg says it does not appear at this time that exceptional circumstances are present that would require the appointment of counsel in this case. The Plaintiff is in no different position than many self-represented prisoner litigants. If Plaintiff is released while this case remains pending, and the filing fee has not been paid in full, Judge Teilborg rules that the Plaintiff must, within 30 days of her release, either (1) notify the Court that she intends to pay the unpaid balance of her filing fee within 120 days of her release or (2) file a non-prisoner application to proceed in forma pauperis. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this action. Accordingly, the Court rules as follows: (1) Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is granted; (2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency, the Plaintiff must pay the $350 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $8.20; (3) The Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Plaintiff has 30 days from the date this Order is filed to file a first amended complaint in compliance with this Order; (4) If the Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days, the Clerk of Court must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with prejudice that states that the dismissal may count as a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g) and deny any pending unrelated motions as moot; and (5) The Clerk of Court must mail the Plaintiff a court- approved form for filing a civil rights complaint by a prisoner. A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 22, 2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/ymv7d4rv from PacerMonitor.com. MEDICAL PROPERTIES: Court Appoints John Cuomo as Lead Plaintiff --------------------------------------------------------------- The Honorable Vernon S. Broderick of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York appointed John Cuomo as lead plaintiff in the case captioned as CHRISTOPHER ARMSTRONG, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. MEDICAL PROPERTIES TRUST, INC., EDWARD K. ALDAG, JR., R. STEVEN HAMNER, and J. KEVIN HANNA, Defendants, Case No. 1:23-cv-08597-VSB (S.D.N.Y.). Cuomo satisfies the requirements for appointment as Lead Plaintiff pursuant to Section 21D(a)(3)(B)(iii) of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Lead Plaintiff, pursuant to Section 21D(a)(3)(B)(v) of the PSLRA, has selected and retained Pomerantz LLP as Lead Counsel for the Class in the Action. Lead Counsel shall have the following responsibilities and duties, to be carried out either personally or through counsel whom Lead Counsel shall designate: (a) to coordinate the briefing and argument of motions; (b) to coordinate the conduct of discovery proceedings; (c) to coordinate the examination of witnesses in depositions; (d) to coordinate the selection of counsel to act as a spokesperson at pretrial conferences; (e) to call meetings of the plaintiffs' counsel as they deem necessary and appropriate from time to time; (f) to coordinate all settlement negotiations with counsel for defendants; (g) to coordinate and direct the pretrial discovery proceedings and the preparation for trial and the trial of this matter and to delegate work responsibilities to selected counsel as may be required; (h) to assign discrete tasks to additional counsel (e.g., Wohl & Fruchter LLP),as needed, working under Lead Counsel's direction and supervision; and (i) to supervise any other matters concerning the prosecution, resolution, or settlement of the Action. A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated August 13, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=EJQsEc MULTIPLAN INC: Alter Management Suit Transferred to N.D. Illinois ----------------------------------------------------------------- The case styled as Alter Management LLC d.b.a Alter Behavioral Health, Awakening Behavioral Health d.b.a. Renaissance Ranch Treatment Centers, Guardian Health Care Services, Inc. d.b.a. D'Amore Healthcare and PCI Westlake Centers, on behalf of itself and others similarly situated v. MultiPlan, Inc., Aetna, Inc., The Cigna Group, UnitedHealth Group Incorporated and Elevance Health, Inc., Case No. 1:24-cv-04656 was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on Sept. 6, 2024. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:24-cv-08007 to the proceeding. The nature of suit is stated as Anti-Trust. MultiPlan, Inc. -- https://www.multiplan.us/ -- provides healthcare cost management solutions. The Company specializes in providing claim cost management solutions for controlling the financial risks associated with medical bills.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Matthew M Lavin, Esq. ARNALL GOLDEN GREGORY LLP 2100 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Ste. 350s Washington, DC 20037 Phone: (202) 677-4030 Email: matt.lavin@agg.com - and - Hunter Jay Shkolnik, Esq. NAPOLI SHKOLNIK 1302 Avenida Ponce de Leon Santurce, PR 00907 Phone: (787) 493-5088 Fax: (646) 843-7619 Email: Hunter@nsprlaw.com NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION: Epps Suit Removed to C.D. California ----------------------------------------------------------- The case styled as Larell Epps, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated v. NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION CENTERS, LLC; and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, Case No. CIVSB2423276 was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Bernardino, to the United States District Court for the Central District of California on Sept. 6, 2024, and assigned Case No. 5:24-cv-01915. The Complaint asserts the following five causes of action: Failure to Authorize or Permit Meal Periods; Failure to Authorize or Permit Rest Periods; Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Wage Statements; Failure to Timely Pay All Earned Wages and Final Paychecks Due at Time of Separation of Employment; and Unfair Business Practices.[BN] The Defendants are represented by: Allison S. Wallin, Esq. LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. 2049 Century Park East, 5th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067.3107 Phone: 310.553.0308 Fax: 800.715.1330 Email: awallin@littler.com - and - Alvin Arceo, Esq. Valentina Wilson, Esq. LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. 101 Second Street, Suite 1000 San Francisco, CA 94105 Phone: 415.433.1940 Fax: 415.399.8490 Email: aarceo@littler.com vwilson@littler.com NEW YORK CITY: Meadows' Bid to Intervene in Gould Suit Denied ------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Rachel Kovner of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York denies non-party Carolette Meadows' motion to intervene as a plaintiff or for joinder in the lawsuit captioned EBONY GOULD, CURTAYSIA TAYLOR, SHAVONA WARMINGTON, SHALONDA CURTIS-HACKETT, CHRISTOPHER HACKETT, MARIANNA AZAR, MATHEW ENG, JANE DOE 1, AND JANE DOE 2, individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant, Case No. 1:24-cv-01263-RPK-JRC (E.D.N.Y.). The Plaintiffs in this putative class action bring claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the City of New York, alleging that the New York City Administration for Children Services violated their Fourth Amendment rights by conducting unreasonable searches of their homes and failing to adequately train and supervise caseworkers. The New York City Administration for Children Services ("ACS") is responsible for investigating and prosecuting allegations of child neglect and abuse in New York City. When ACS receives reports of alleged child maltreatment, ACS caseworkers must investigate the home environment within 24 to 48 hours. ACS can perform home searches by obtaining a court order, acting on exigent circumstances requiring immediate action, or obtaining voluntary consent from parents. The Plaintiffs are parents, who filed this putative class action in February 2024 on behalf of themselves and similarly situated parents or legal guardians subjected to ACS's home searches. They allege that ACS caseworkers violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment by performing warrantless and non-exigent home searches. They also claim that ACS failed to adequately train and supervise their caseworkers on their constitutional right to decline unreasonable searches. The Plaintiffs allege ACS repeatedly used coercive tactics to search their homes, such as threatening to take their children away; threatening to call the police if they refuse searches; stating searches were "required" and they could not deny entry to caseworkers; abusing and misrepresenting ACS's authority; failing to inform them of their rights to refuse searches; and making public scenes to gain entry. The Plaintiffs allege these tactics made parents feel like they had no choice but to allow caseworkers to enter and search their homes. Once inside the Plaintiffs' homes, ACS caseworkers allegedly subjected them to "invasive investigations" by searching all rooms and possessions and strip-searching their children. After ACS concluded these home searches, the Plaintiffs' children were never removed, no court case was ever filed against them, and the investigations were ultimately unfounded. The Plaintiffs seek equitable and injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and attorney's fees. Non-party Carolette Meadows moves, pro se, to intervene in this action as a plaintiff pursuant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. In the alternative, Meadows seeks to "join" the claims in this action with those asserted in a different action Meadows brought in the Western District of New York. In the Western District action, Meadows asserts claims against the Erie County Department of Social Services ("ECDSS"), the New York State Office of Child and Family Services, a state family court judge, and various local government officials and other individuals (Meadows v. Erie Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 23-CV-920 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2023). Meadows alleges that ECDSS engaged in malicious prosecution and violated her due process rights based in part on the removal of her daughter in Erie County, New York. Specifically, Meadows alleges that following several physical altercations between Meadows and her daughter, ECDSS improperly seized her daughter without a court order, and Meadows was charged with child abuse and found guilty of neglect. She alleges that on other occasions, ECDSS harassed, annoyed, alarmed, and maliciously prosecuted her. Ms. Meadows claims that throughout these encounters and others, government officials did deny her fair and equal access to the courts, did conduct themselves in a continuing pattern of retaliation and discrimination based on her race and free speech rights, did perform deliberate acts to deny her life/liberty pursuit of happiness, did deny her due process under laws, and did maliciously prosecute her. She also refers in passing to the Fourth Amendment, though she does not describe the basis for any Fourth Amendment claim. The Plaintiffs and the Defendant both oppose Meadows's motion to intervene or for joinder. The Court denies Meadows's motion to intervene or for joinder. Judge Kovner opines that Meadows fails to satisfy the requirements for both intervention as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b). Judge Kovner adds, among other things, that Meadows has not established that the disposition of this action would impair her ability to protect her asserted interest in curtailing NYS child protective services agencies' abuse and overreach of power. In the alternative, Meadows moves for joinder. However, Judge Kovner opines, Meadows does not meet the requirements for required joinder of an absent party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 or permissive joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20. Meadows is not a necessary party, as neither of the conditions that would require joinder under Rule 19 are present. Hence, Meadows's motion to intervene or for joinder is denied. A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order dated Aug. 22, 2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/kh7kjr2j from PacerMonitor.com. OFFICE DEPOT: Wins Bid to Dismiss Benge Class Action Lawsuit ------------------------------------------------------------ In the class action lawsuit captioned as CHRISTOPHER BENGE, individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. OFFICE DEPOT, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; OFFICE DEPOT, INC., a Delaware corporation; THE ODP CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:24-cv-00749-DJC-DB (E.D. Calif.), the Honorable Daniel J. Calabretta of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted defendants' motion to dismiss the case. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend one more time. Plaintiff Christopher Benge brings his Class Action Complaint against Defendants Office Depot, LLC, Office Depot, Inc., and The ODP Corporation, along with 100 Doe Defendants, alleging that Defendants violated various California Labor Code provisions and California's Unfair Competition Law as a result. Defendants again seek dismissal, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Plaintiff is a California resident who worked for Defendants. Plaintiff was an hourly-paid, non-exempt Sales Advisor. Defendants are retailers who are in the business of operating and providing products and services through their retail stores and online platforms to sell office related supplies and services. Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendants violated California's Labor Code and some Wage Orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission by: (1) failing to pay overtime; (2) failing to provide meal breaks; (3) failing to provide rest breaks; (4) failing to pay the minimum wage; (5) failing to pay all unpaid wages upon discharge; and (6) failing to provide accurate wage statements. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated California's UCL because of the predicate Labor Code violations. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's first four causes of action are deficient in light of Landers v. Quality Commc'ns, Inc., 771 F.3d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), as amended (Jan. 26, 2015). The Court agrees. As for the first and fourth causes of action, which bring a claim for unpaid overtime and unpaid minimum wages, respectively, Plaintiff argues that he states a Labor Code violation, noting that the Second Amended Complaint "alleges an example of a pay period where Plaintiff was not compensated overtime wages for all hours worked." The fourth cause of action does not include a similar allegation. The Court grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the first and fourth causes of action. Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff's first and fourth causes of action. Similarly, Plaintiff argues that the second and third causes of action, which bring meal and rest break claims, respectively, state Labor Code violations because Plaintiff alleges that there were daily violations and provides representative allegations for two weeks. However, as before, Plaintiff fails to "allege facts specifically identifying an instance where they were deprived of a meal or rest break." For the second cause of action's meal break claim, Plaintiff vaguely alleges that "meal periods were either missed, shortened, taken late, and/or were interrupted." Similarly, for the third cause of action, Plaintiff only alleges that, for one week, he "worked more than six hours and did not receive two full uninterrupted paid, off-duty rest periods." The Court grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the second and third causes of action. The Court dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff's second and third causes of action. Plaintiff's only argument for the fifth cause of action was that "Plaintiff's SAC adequately alleges that Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the other class members for all hours worked at the applicable minimum, base, or overtime rate and for all meal and rest periods owed." However, the fifth cause of action for violations of California Labor Code sections 201, 202, and 203 depend on Plaintiff's allegation that he "was not paid at the time of separation all wages earned and unpaid throughout his employment, including but not limited to, minimum wages and overtime wages for time worked off-the-clock and meal and rest period premium payments for short, late, interrupted, and/or missed meal and rest periods." Because the Court concluded that Plaintiff failed to allege a plausible Labor Code violation, the fifth cause of action fails too. Similarly, Plaintiff's sixth cause of action depends on the wage statements being inaccurate because Defendants "provided wage statements that did not reflect the time worked off-the-clock or all meal and rest period premiums earned." The Court grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the fifth and sixth causes of action. Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice the fifth and sixth causes of action. But the Court concluded that Plaintiff did not allege a Labor Code violation, so Plaintiff cannot allege an inaccurate wage statement claim. Plaintiff's seventh cause of action under the UCL "is predicated on Defendants' violations of multiple state laws, including Labor Code sections 203, 226, and 1174[.]" Because the Court concluded that Plaintiff did not plausibly allege a predicate violation, the UCL claim necessarily fails. Defendants also requested dismissal without leave to amend with respect to certain theories Plaintiff brings under the UCL. The Court agrees because "[p]revailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution." As a result, the section 203 claim must be dismissed without leave to amend under the UCL because it "would not ‘restore the status quo by returning to the plaintiff funds in which he or she has an ownership interest." A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated August 12, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=7zb3yh PANERA LLC: Fails to Pay Training Specialists' OT, Cissokho Says ---------------------------------------------------------------- OUSSEYNOU CISSOKHO, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v. PANERA, LLC, Case No. 1:24-cv-02559 (D.D.C., Sept. 6, 2024) seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, interest, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as a result of Defendant's willful violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The complaint says that despite Defendant's knowledge that Bakery Training Specialists (BTS) regularly work in excess of 40 hours, the Defendant did not pay BTS their wages for working overtime. Additionally, the Plaintiff brings this action for himself and all other similarly situated BTS to recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, interest, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as a result of Defendant's willful violations of the D.C. Minimum Wage Act Revision Act of 1992 and the D.C. Wage Payment and Wage Collection Act. Further, the Plaintiff brings this action for himself and all other similarly situated BTS to recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, interest, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as a result of Defendant's willful violations of the Virginia Wage Payment Act and the Virginia Overtime Wage Act. Plaintiff Cissokho was employed by the Defendant as a baker from 2014 through 2018, and as a BTS from 2018 through April 2024. Panera provides food and beverage services to customers in areas including District of Columbia, Maryland, Missouri, California, and Virginia.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Edmund C. Celiesius, Esq. BROWN, LLC 111 Town Square Place, Suite 400 Jersey City, NJ 07310 Telephone: (877) 561-0000 Facsimile: (855) 582-5297 E-mail: ed.celiesius@jtblawgroup.com PRIME HYDRATION: Wins Dismissal of Kennedy, et al. Lawsuit ---------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as TURKOISE KENNEDY et al., PLAINTIFFS v. PRIME HYDRATION, LLC et al., DEFENDANTS, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-CV-00476-GNS (W.D. Ky.), Chief Judge Greg N. Stivers of the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case. The amended complaint is dismissed without prejudice. In 2023, Defendants Logan Paul, and Olajide Olayinka Williams Olatunji ("KSI"), two popular YouTubers, launched Prime Energy, which is a zero-sugar, flavored electrolyte energy drink that contains 200 milligrams of caffeine per can. Prime Energy's launch came one year after Paul and KSI released Prime Hydration, a non-caffeinated sports drink with a similar color scheme and flavor selection. Plaintiffs Turkoise Kennedy and Jamal Harper allege that Paul and KSI use their social media presence and Prime Energy's flavors, colors, alleged health benefits, and similarity to Prime Hydration to market the drink to children, who cannot consume that much caffeine without serious health risks or complications. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves, their minor sons, and all those similarly situated, sued Paul; KSI; and Defendants Prime Hydration, LLC, and Congo Brands, LLC, asserting various consumer protection and tort claims under California and Kentucky law. Prime Hydration, LLC and Congo Brands, LLC moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint, but the Court denied the motion as moot after granting Plaintiffs' motion to amend. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint asserts a similar collection of California and Kentucky consumer protection and tort claims. Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction based upon the Class Action Fairness Act. In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert the following: violations of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Count I), the California False Advertising Law (Count II), the California Unfair Competition Law (Count III), and the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act (Count IV), along with claims for negligent misrepresentation (Count V), fraudulent misrepresentation (Count VI), unjust enrichment (Count VII), and public nuisance (Count VIII). Defendants seek dismissal of each count. Defendants argue that Counts I-VII of the Amended Complaint should be dismissed because they are subject to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard and Plaintiffs failed to meet it. Plaintiffs do not dispute that Counts I-VII sound in fraud. Indeed, each of the counts concern Plaintiffs' allegations that Defendants, Paul, and KSI made false and misleading statements to portray Prime Energy as healthy and suitable for children while misrepresenting or omitting facts about the drink's content and risks. Based on these allegations, Counts I-VII are subject to Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard, the Court states. Plaintiffs have failed to meet Rule 9(b)'s pleading standard to state their fraud claims with particularity, the Court finds. At minimum, Plaintiffs have failed to explain each defendant's involvement in the alleged scheme, the Court notes. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to the fraud claims. Plaintiffs also assert a public nuisance claim under Kentucky law. Plaintiffs allege that the social media and marketing campaigns promoting Prime Energy constitute a public nuisance because Prime Energy's high caffeine content threatens the public health. Defendants move to dismiss the claim on the basis that public nuisance does not apply to the sale of lawful products. The Court points out Plaintiffs rely on cases interpreting California's broad public nuisance law to allow claims based on the harm from products, but Plaintiffs do not explain how California's conception of a public nuisance compares to Kentucky's. The Court says indeed, Plaintiffs do not cite any Kentucky cases to support their position, and a review of the caselaw has not revealed a single Kentucky appellate court decision recognizing the application of public nuisance in this context. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' public nuisance claim is dismissed. A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated August 13, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=uRN5Qz PRO CUSTOM: Court Narrows Claims in Culbertson Lawsuit ------------------------------------------------------ In the class action lawsuit captioned as DARREK CULBERTSON, TRACY JAMES, and STEPHEN WILFORD, Plaintiffs, v. PRO CUSTOM SOLAR LLC, Defendant, Case No: 8:22-cv-2252-CEH-UAM (M.D. Fla.), Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted-in-part and denied-in-part the motion filed by the defendant to dismiss or strike Counts II and IV of plaintiffs' second amended complaint. Count II of plaintiffs' second amended complaint is dismissed. The Court granted plaintiffs leave to file a third amended complaint. In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs Darrek Culbertson, Tracy James, and Stephen Wilford bring this putative class action, on behalf of themselves and others, against Defendant Pro Custom Solar, LLC d/b/a Momentum Solar for alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 227, et seq., and Florida's statutory counterpart, Fla. Stat. Sec. 501.059. Defendant Pro Custom Solar is a solar energy company that promotes its services through unsolicited marketing. Plaintiffs seek injunctive, legal, and equitable relief to stop Defendant's statutory violations, which have resulted in an invasion of privacy, harassment, aggravation, and disruption of daily life of the Plaintiffs and the putative class. Defendants failed to have procedures in place to avoid the statutory violations. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant's statutory violations were knowing, willful, and intentional. In their five-count class action Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs sue Pro Custom Solar for TCPA violations under Sec. 227(b) (Counts I and II); and Sec. 227(c) (Counts III and IV); and violations of Sec. 501.059, Fla. Stat. (Count V). Pro Custom Solar moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or to strike under Rule 12(f) Counts II and IV of the Second Amended Complaint as duplicative because the causes of action are the same as asserted in Counts I and III, with the only difference being Counts II and IV allege knowing and willful conduct and a request for treble damages. Plaintiffs oppose the motion requesting the Court deny it for failure to raise the argument in its earlier motion to dismiss. Alternatively, if the Court is inclined to dismiss or strike those counts, Plaintiffs request leave to amend to clarify that they are seeking treble damages in Counts I and III. Review of the Second Amended Complaint reveals that Count II does not allege an independent cause of action. According to the Court, because the possibility of treble damages does not create an independent cause of action under the plain language of Sec. 227, Count II is due to be dismissed. Plaintiffs may amend their Complaint to clarify within each Count for which treble damages are sought, but the request for treble damages may not be pleaded as a stand-alone cause of action, the Court states. The Court will not dismiss Count IV for failing to be an independent cause of action, as it did with Count II. However, Count IV also seeks treble damages for knowing and willful violations. Although the Court is not dismissing Count IV, any request for treble damages is more appropriately included in the preceding claim seeking statutory damages. A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated August 13, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=QJEGim ROB JEFFREYS: Court Dismisses Burns' Civil Rights Action -------------------------------------------------------- Judge Staci M. Yandle of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois dismissed the case captioned as SHAUNE BURNS, #N51789, Plaintiff, vs. ROB JEFFREYS, LISA MADIGAN, JOHN BALDWIN, and ROBIN RIGGS, Defendants, Case No. 23-cv-1797-SMY (S.D. Ill.), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915A for failure to state a constitutional claim upon which relief may be granted. The dismissal of this case is with prejudice and without leave to further amend. Plaintiff Shaune Burns filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 while he was an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections at Shawnee Correctional Center. He was released on parole/Mandatory Supervised Release on January 26, 2024. Plaintiff's original Complaint was dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915A. He sought damages for what he alleges was excessive incarceration before an earlier MSR release on June 29, 2021. The Court allowed Plaintiff to submit an amended complaint to re-plead his claim that the June 29, 2021 MSR release was unconstitutionally delayed, against any individuals he believes improperly denied or delayed approval of his host site. The First Amended Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915A, which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the First Amended Complaint. He was sentenced to six years on or about February 4, 2018. At the time he was sentenced, he had served over seven years in Cook County Jail fighting his case, which amounted to more than 100% of the six-year sentence. However, he was not released on MSR because he must register as a sex offender and did not have an approved home site. He served approximately 2,215 days before he was released. The laws or rules governing home site requirements at the time were very burdensome and violated his due process rights. The Defendants, former IDOC Directors Jeffreys and Baldwin, former Attorney General Madigan, and Riggs (prisoner re-entry group worker) applied and enforced the host site policies that prevented Plaintiff from being timely released on MSR. After Plaintiff's June 29, 2021 MSR release, the policies changed because of a court case. Plaintiff was released again on MSR in January 2024 because the government found him an approved home site. As relief, Plaintiff requests $2.50 for each day that he was made to serve beyond his sentence. Based on the First Amended Complaint, the Court designates the following claim in this pro se action: Count 1: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against all Defendants for prolonging/delaying the location and/or approval of a host site for Plaintiff's MSR release until June 29, 2021, causing Plaintiff to remain incarcerated beyond the date he was eligible for MSR. In the original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the delay in finding him an approved host site violated the provisions of Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731, 755-56 (N.D. Ill. 2019). During his earlier period of incarceration, prior to June 29, 2021, Plaintiff was a member of the class of plaintiffs in Murphy, defined as "all individuals sentenced to serve 'three-years-to-life' on MSR currently detained in the IDOC who have been approved for release on MSR by the PRB [Prisoner Review Board] but have been denied release from IDOC custody because of their inability to obtain an approved host site." The Court concluded that Plaintiff did not state a viable constitutional claim based on the Murphy decision; Plaintiff obtained the same relief as did the other Murphy class members, through revision of the IDOC's policies and practices governing the approval of home site requirements for indigent sex offenders. The Court points out the First Amended Complaint does not raise or rely on Murphy as grounds for relief. Instead, Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants responsible for extending his incarceration because they oversaw and applied the former policies that prolonged his incarceration, the Court states. These were the same policies that gave rise to the Murphy class action, the Court notes. Plaintiff was instructed that in order to state a constitutional claim, he must plead facts showing that prison official(s) violated the Constitution in their handling of his application for a suitable host site placement prior to his June 29, 2021 release on MSR. As with the original Complaint, the First Amended Complaint fails to identify any individual(s) at Plaintiff's former prison(s) who were responsible for approving or denying his host site placement, or who mishandled the matter of his placement, the Court finds. To hold a defendant liable for a civil rights violation, a plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating that the individual was personally involved in the alleged improper conduct. According to the Court, even if the defendants herein oversaw the operation/implementation of the IDOC's former policies on host site placement for sex offenders, such supervisory authority is not enough to support Plaintiff's claims against them. Plaintiff does not allege that Baldwin, Jeffreys, Madigan, or Riggs5 had any personal involvement in his efforts to identify, locate, or seek approval of a host site prior to his release. As such, the First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Baldwin, Jeffreys, Madigan, or Riggs, the Court concludes. Additionally, Plaintiff cannot obtain damages for the period he alleges he was improperly held in prison before his June 29, 2021 MSR release, the Court adds. This case is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915A for failure to state a constitutional claim upon which relief may be granted. Because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed this case, the Court counts the dismissal of this action as one of Plaintiff's three "strikes" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(g). The claim for damages in Count 1 is dismissed without prejudice. A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order dated August 12, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=h0DjJk RUSHMORE SERVICE: District Court Orders in George Suit Vacated -------------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as ALISON GEORGE, Appellant v. RUSHMORE SERVICE CENTER, LLC; MILES K. BEACOM; DALE DOBBERPUHL; THOMAS D. SANFORD; JOHN DOES 1 to 10 (3rd Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit will vacate the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey's orders and remand with instructions to dismiss George's case for lack of standing. For almost six years now, George has been seeking to represent a class and obtain damages from Rushmore, based on a letter naming the collection arm of her credit card company, rather than the credit card company itself, as the "current/original creditor." As alleged in the operative complaint, that phrasing violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by failing to identify "the creditor to whom the debt [was] owed" and providing "false, deceptive, or misleading" information. 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1692e, 1692g(a)(2). And as alleged by way of injury, these violations would have left "the least sophisticated consumer" confused about "to whom the alleged debt [was] owed and if it [was] legitimate." After the District Court granted Rushmore's motion to stay proceedings and compel individual arbitration, George lost before the arbitrator, who ruled in Rushmore's favor, and before the District Judge, who declined to vacate the arbitration award. On appeal, George challenges the merits of those rulings. The Third Circuit says, "As it turns out, however, the main question on appeal is not related to the merits. Instead, it is whether these many years of litigation have been much ado about nothing. For while George's suit was proceeding, we issued two opinions -- Kelly v. RealPage Inc., 47 F.4th 202 (3d Cir. 2022), and Huber v. Simon's Agency, Inc., 84 F.4th 132 (3d Cir. 2023)2 -- calling into question whether confusion alone is sufficient to allege a concrete injury in this context. Because we conclude that George lacked standing from the very outset, we must vacate the District Court's orders and remand with instructions to dismiss George's case. But as it may be that the arbitration award 'can be enforced in a jurisdictionally correct proceeding,' Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 868 (3d Cir. 1996), we will decline to vacate the award itself at this juncture." A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated August 13, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=oMICyx STANLEY & BLACK: Filing for Class Cert Bid Due July 15, 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------ In the class action lawsuit captioned as Kistler, et al., v. Stanley Black & Decker Inc., et al, Case No. 3:22-cv-00966 (D. Conn., Filed July 29, 2022), the Hon. Judge Stefan R. Underhill entered a scheduling order as follows: -- Discovery due by: Oct. 17, 2025 -- Dispositive Motions due by: Jan. 9, 2026 -- Plaintiffs' Motion for Class July 15, 2025 Certification due by: -- Defendant's Opposition to Class Aug. 18, 2025 The suit alleges violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Stanley & Black, formerly known as The Stanley Works, is an American manufacturer of industrial tools and household hardware, and a provider of security products.[CC] STATE OF GEORGIA: 11th Cir. Narrows Claims in Skilled-Nursing Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------ The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings the summary judgment granted by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in favor of the patients in the case M.H., a minor child, by and through his mother and legal guardian, THELMA LYNAH, C.C., a minor child, by and through her mother and legal guardian, Christine Claxton, H.K., a minor child, by and through her mother and legal guardian, RUTH KITT, E.C., a minor child, by and through her mother and legal guardian, Ketie Calixte, Plaintiffs-Appellees, S.R. et al., Plaintiffs, versus COMMISSIONER OF THE GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH, Defendant-Appellant, No. 22-12071 (11th Cir.). The Commissioner argues that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment for the patients on their challenge to the practice of reducing a patient's skilled-nursing hours after the patient's caregiver learns to perform skilled tasks and permanently enjoined that practice. He argues that the Department may account for a patient's stability or a caregiver's training when it assesses what number of skilled-nursing hours is medically necessary for a patient. The patients respond that the Department cannot substitute the skilled-nursing services to which they are entitled under the Act with care that they receive from their caregivers at home. The Eleventh Circuit agrees with the Commissioner. According to the Eleventh Circuit, "The patients argue that the Department's policy unlawfully denies them the private nursing services to which they are entitled under the Act and substitutes those services with skilled tasks performed by their caregivers. But the question is whether the patients reasonably require those services to correct or ameliorate their conditions. If the skills of a patient's caregiver can improve a patient's condition, it is reasonable to refuse to approve additional hours of skilled-nursing services even though those services would also improve the patient's condition. Because the Department's practice is reasonable, the district court erred by granting summary judgment for the patients and by enjoining that practice. We vacate the permanent injunctions against reducing skilled-nursing hours after the patients' caregivers learn skilled tasks." This interlocutory appeal requires the Eleventh Circuit to decide whether the provision of skilled nursing for severely disabled children by the Georgia Department of Community Health complies with the Medicaid Act. When the Department reviews the request of a disabled child's treating physician for skilled nursing, a contractor records the patient's conditions on a scoresheet to arrive at a presumptive range of skilled-nursing hours that the patient should receive each week. The Department periodically reduces those hours as the patient's caregiver learns to perform skilled tasks. This class action challenges those practices. The district court granted summary judgment for the patients and entered several permanent injunctions against the Commissioner of the Department. But the Eleventh Circuit concluded that both the contractor's use of the scoresheet and the practice of reducing the hours of skilled nursing as a patient's caregiver learns to perform skilled tasks comply with the Medicaid Act. The Eleventh Circuit holds, "We reverse the summary judgments in favor of the patients, vacate the permanent injunctions against the Commissioner, and remand for further proceedings." A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated August 12, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=6nlLuH STATE OF NEW JERSEY: Wins Bid to Strike Amended Salvato Class Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------ Judge Zahid N. Quraishi of the United States District Court for District of New Jersey grants the motion filed by Steven Harris in his official capacity of Administrator of the State of New Jersey to strike Lisa Salvato's second amended class action complaint. The Court will strike Count I of the SAC and dismiss Count II of the SAC, without leave to amend. As early as December 2001, Plaintiff owned shares of Boston Life Sciences, Inc. stock. In June 2007, BLSI changed its name to Alseres Pharmaceuticals, Inc., entitling stockholders to receive ALSE stock upon tender of their BLSI stock certificates. Plaintiff did not tender her BLSI stock certificate, resulting in escheat of her stock to the New Jersey Unclaimed Property Administration in 2010 pursuant to the New Jersey Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act. The UPA subsequently sold Plaintiff's unclaimed ALSE stock for a total of $2.40, which it held for Plaintiffs benefit. Plaintiff submitted a claim inquiry form to the UPA about her stocks in August 2015.In response, the UPA erroneously informed her that it did not have any of her property in its possession. However, the UPA later acknowledged that it had indeed received and sold Plaintiff's stock, and opened a new claim on Plaintiff's behalf. To this day, Plaintiff has not followed through with the UPA's claim process or provided the UPA with her current address. Instead, Plaintiff filed this class action lawsuit against the Defendant in June 2021, alleging violations of her constitutional rights under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In addressing various motions, the Court has thrice concluded that Plaintiff's Takings Clause claim is not ripe for adjudication because it lacks finality. Most recently, the Court granted summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiffs Due Process claim and dismissed Plaintiff's Takings Clause claim for lack of ripeness, but without prejudice so as to give Plaintiff an opportunity to plead facts that would cure the ripeness issue. Currently before the Court is a Motion to Strike the SAC, which Defendant filed on February 23, 2024. The Court construes the portion of the Motion that seeks relief as to the SAC's Fifth Amendment Takings Claim as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), and will analyze the Motion accordingly.' The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 based on the claims alleged in the SAC. As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff inappropriately re-asserts her Due Process claim in the SAC. This is improper because a final Judgment on the merits was already reached with respect to that claim insofar as the Court previously granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant for Count I of the First Amended Complaint. The Court will therefore strike Count I of the SAC. Plaintiff's remaining allegations in the SAC, which purportedly support her Takings Clause claim (Count II), must also be dismissed because the Court finds that the SAC does not adequately plead a ripe Takings Clause claim. There is no legal requirement that a plaintiff alleging a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause violation must exhaust the defendant's administrative claim process. In its Prior Opinion, the Court found that Plaintiff's Takings Clause claim was unripe because, based on the facts as pled in the FAC, there had been no final determination by the UPA with respect to Plaintiff's property claim. The Court warned that this same ripeness deficiency was identified in earlier Court opinions, but generously gave Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to add facts which would show that she indeed finished pursuing her claim with the UPA in order to satisfy the finality requirement. However, rather than introduce any new facts to cure Plaintiff's ripeness issue, the SAC perpetuates it. At this point in time, there are still no allegations in the SAC which point to finality of Plaintiff's property claim with the UPA. The Court rejects Plaintiffs argument that her claim is now ripe simply because she filed an initial claim with the UPA nine years ago. Although Plaintiff did file a claim with the UPA when she first learned that her stock had escheated, and the UPA initially provided an erroneous response that it did not hold any of her property, Plaintiff has failed to pursue the new claim that the UPA opened for her since correcting its error (or to follow up on her old claim, for that matter). In fact, the UPA to this day holds $2.40 for Plaintiff's benefit, which Plaintiff does not claim to have pursued. Finality is therefore lacking, and Plaintiff's new allegations in the SAC are wholly insufficient to show otherwise.' Moreover, the Court finds that any further amendment to Plaintiff's Takings Clause claim, as it has faced the same ripeness issue four times now but has not rectified it, would be futile. The Court must therefore dismiss Count II of the SAC without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but without leave to amend. A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated August 12, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=2BKn2B STATE STREET: Class Settlement Obtains Final Court Approval ----------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as ELIZABETH GOMES, EVA M. CONNORS, JENNIFER BOWEN, KATISHA SHOULDERS, KENNETH N. MARENGA, PAMELA PRISCO CARPENTER, STEVEN PETERS, ZHANNA KARP, Individually, and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. STATE STREET CORPORATION, STATE STREET BANK & TRUST COMPANY, NORTH AMERICA REGIONAL BENEFITS COMMITTEE OF STATE STREET CORPORATION, INVESTMENT COMMITTEE OF STATE STREET CORPORATION, and JANE and JOHN DOES 1-20, Defendants, Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-10863-MLW (D. Mass.), the Honorable Mark Wolf of the United States District Court for the District Court of Massachusetts granted plaintiff's motion for final approval of class action settlement. The following Settlement Class is certified under Rule 23(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for purposes of the Settlement only: All Participants and beneficiaries in the State Street Salary Savings Program from May 25, 2015 through the date of the Preliminary Approval Order (as defined in the Class Action Settlement Agreement). The Court finds that this Settlement Class meets all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(1). Pursuant to Rule 23(e)(2), the Court approves and confirms the Settlement and its terms as being fair, reasonable, and adequate to the Plan and the Settlement Class members. The Court finds that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate based on the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and determinations of mixed fact/law questions: A. The Settlement resulted from arm's-length negotiations by experienced and competent counsel overseen by a neutral mediator; B. The Settlement was negotiated only after Class Counsel had received pertinent information and documents from Defendants; C. The Settling Parties were well positioned to evaluate the value of the Class Action; D. If the Settlement had not been achieved, both Plaintiffs and Defendants faced the expense, risk, and uncertainty of extended litigation; E. The Settlement Amount ($4,300,000.00) is fair, reasonable, and adequate. The Settlement Amount is within the range of reasonable settlements that would have been appropriate in this case, based on the nature of the claims, the potential recovery, the risks of litigation and settlements that have been approved in other similar cases; F. The Named Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have concluded that the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate; G. Settlement Class members had the opportunity to be heard on all issues regarding the Settlement and release of claims by submitting objections to the Settlement Agreement to the Court; H. There were no objections to the Settlement. I. The Settlement was reviewed by an independent fiduciary who has approved the Settlement on behalf of the Plan. The Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement is granted. The Settlement of the Class Action is approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate to the Plan and the Settlement Class. The Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses, Administrative Settlement Expenses, and Case Contribution Awards is granted in part. As stated at the August 8, 2024 hearing, the court awards: $903,000 in attorneys' fees, which represents 21% of the Qualified Settlement Fund, to Class Counsel; $100,000 in expenses; and $2,500 contribution awards to each of the Named Plaintiffs. The $100,000 expense award shall first be used to pay the Settlement Administration and Independent Fiduciary expenses in full. Class Counsel may retain the remaining balance of the expense award as reimbursement for litigation costs and expenses incurred while prosecuting this action. . A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated August 12, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=sEvaaM STG LOGISTICS: Conrado Class Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages Under FLSA ------------------------------------------------------------------ Gilberto J. Conrado, and other similarly situated individuals v. STG Logistics, Inc., Case No. 1:24-cv-23460 (S.D. Fla., Sept. 6, 2024) seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) on behalf of the Plaintiff and all other current and former employees similarly situated to Plaintiff and who worked more than 40 hours during one or more weeks on or after August 2021, without being adequately compensated. During his employment, the Plaintiff worked seven days per week on a regular schedule. He worked for a total of 68.5 hours weekly. The Plaintiff did not take bonafide lunchtime hours. However, he was not paid for overtime hours. In addition, the Plaintiff did not perform any work related to the management of the warehouse, and his primary duties did not require independent judgment or discretion concerning matters of significance for the department. Consequently, the Plaintiff did not meet the requirements for any overtime payment exemption, and he was entitled to be paid for every overtime hour worked, the suit says. The Plaintiff also seeks to recover liquidated damages, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees under the provisions of the FLSA. Mr. Conrado was employed as a full-time employee from June 13, 2020, to March 31, 2023. STG Logistics is an international logistics company.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Zandro E. Palma, Esq. ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A. 9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500 Miami, FL 33156 Telephone: (305) 446-1500 Facsimile: (305) 446-1502 E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com SUMMIT HEALTH: Discloses Customers' Info to Meta, Andretta Says --------------------------------------------------------------- VICTORIA ANDRETTA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. SUMMIT HEALTH MANAGEMENT, LLC D/B/A CITYMD, Case No. 2:24-cv-09039 (D.N.J., Sept. 9, 2024) is a class action lawsuit to address CityMD's illegal and widespread practice of disclosing its patients' confidential personally identifiable information and protected health information to unauthorized third parties, including Meta Platforms and Google LLC. The Defendant's illegal privacy violations occurred and continue to occur because of the tracking technologies that it installed on its Website including, but not limited to, the Meta Pixel, Google Analytics, Google Tag Manager, Google DoubleClick, Bing (Microsoft) tracking code, BlueCava, LinkedIn cookies and related tools (Tracking Technologies). The Tracking Technologies that Defendant installed and configured allowed unauthorized third parties to intercept the contents of patient communications, view patients' Private Information, mine that information for purposes unrelated to the provision of healthcare and further monetize it to deliver targeted advertisements to specific individuals, the lawsuit says. The Defendant is a healthcare entity and thus its disclosure of health and medical communications is tightly regulated. The Defendant operates over 175 urgent care locations across New York and New Jersey. The Defendant also owns and controls citymd.com and its webpages, which Defendant encourages its patients to use to (i) book medical appointments, (ii) locate urgent care facilities, (iii) pay bills, (iv) check insurance coverage, (v) research treatment options and (vi) research specific medical conditions.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Stefanie Colella-Walsh, Esq. STARK & STARK, P.C. 100 American Metro Blvd Hamilton, NJ 08619 Telephone: (609) 895-7362 Facsimile: (609) 896-0629 E-mail: scolellawalsh@stark-stark.com - and - David S. Almeida, Esq. Matthew J. Langley, Esq. ALMEIDA LAW GROUP LLC 849 W. Webster Avenue Chicago, IL 60614 Telephone: (312) 576-3024 E-mail: david@almeidalawgroup.com matt@almeidalawgroup.com TACTILE SYSTEMS: Class Settlement in Weaver Suit Wins Final Nod ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as Jack Weaver, v. Brent Moen, William Burke, Peter Soderberg, Raymond O. Huggenberger, Richard Nigon, Kevin H. Roche, Lynn Blake, Gerald R. Mattys, Robert Folkes, Bryan F. Rishe, and Tactile Systems Technology, Inc., Case No. 1:22-cv-01063-GBW (D. Del.), the Hon. Judge Gregory Williams entered an order that: -- The Court grants approval of the Settlement. -- The agreed-to Fee and Expenses Amount is approved. -- The Service Awards in the amount of $5000 each are approved. Tactile is a medical technology company focused on developing medical devices for the treatment of vascular disease. A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 4, 2024, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=jGkiYH at no extra charge.[CC] TARO PHARMACEUTICAL: Mitchell Balks at Merger Deal With Sun Pharma ------------------------------------------------------------------ NEAL A. MITCHELL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. TARO PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES LTD., DILIP SHANGHVI, ABHAY GANDHI, UDAY BALDOTA, LINDA BENSHOSHAN, JAMES KEDROWSKI, ODED SARIG, ROBERT STEIN, SUDHIR VALIA and SUN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES LTD., Case No. 7:24-cv-06818 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 9, 2024) is a class action lawsuit in connection with the acquisition of Taro by Sun Pharma. On January 17, 2024, the Board caused the Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with the Sun Pharma, pursuant to which, Taro shareholders received $43.00 in cash for each ordinary share they owned. On, April 15, 2024, the Board authorized the filing of a materially incomplete and misleading definitive proxy statement (the "Proxy") with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and setting a vote on May 22, 2024. On June 24, 2024, Sun Pharma announced the closing of the Transaction. While Defendants touted the fairness of the Merger Consideration to the Company's stockholders in the Proxy, they failed to disclose material information that is necessary for stockholders to properly assess the fairness of the Transaction, thereby rendering certain statements in the Proxy incomplete and misleading. Specifically, the Proxy contains materially incomplete and misleading information concerning BofA Securities, Inc.'s methodology and key assumptions in describing the valuation analyses that BofA Securities performed. The Plaintiff asserts claims against the Defendants for violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The Plaintiff seeks recover damages resulting from the Defendants' violations of the Exchange Act. The Plaintiff was, and had been at all relevant times, the owner of Taro common stock. Taro is an Israeli company with its principal U.S. executive offices located at 3 Skyline Drive, Hawthorne, NY 10532. Taro is a pharmaceutical company. The Individual Defendants are directors of the company. Sun Pharma is the largest pharmaceutical company in India and is a leading generic company in the U.S. Sun Pharma is the majority owner of Taro. Sun Pharma and its affiliates controlled 85.7% of Taro's total voting power.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mitchell Breit, Esq. Arthur Stock, Esq. MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS GROSSMAN PLLC 405 East 50th Street New York, 10022 Telephone: (212) 946-9306 E-mail: mbreit@milberg.com astock@milberg.com - and - Guri Ademi, Esq. ADEMI LLP 3620 East Layton Avenue Cudahy, WI 53110 Telephone: (414) 482-8000 E-mail: gademi@ademilaw.com jfruchter@ademilaw.com TEKSYSTEMS INC: Seeks to Adjourn Briefing Schedules --------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as MICHAEL THOMAS, MARIA CONYERSJORDAN, AUSTIN SHERMAN, LYNDA ALEXANDRA MAHER, AVA DORE, RACHEL RICHENBERG, and EMILY BURKE, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, v. TEKSYSTEMS, INC., Case No. 2:21-cv-00460-WSS (W.D. Pa.), the Defendant asks the Court to enter an order: -- adjourning the briefing schedules pertaining to Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Collective Action Certification and Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification until the Court issues its Order on TEK's currently pending Motion for Approval of Notice to Interviewees; and -- permitting TEK 21 days from the date of its Order on TEK's Motion for Approval to file its oppositions to Plaintiffs' Motions for Collective and Class Certification. In order to formulate its oppositions, TEK needs to know whether the Court will approve the proposed notice to interviewees, so TEK can proceed with the interviews or proceed with crafting its oppositions without conducting the interviews. TEK requests that its oppositions to Plaintiffs' Motions for Collective and Class Certification be due 21 days after the Court's Order on the Motion for Approval, in order to permit TEK sufficient time to finalize and execute on its strategy in light of this Court's Order. The Defendant's counsel has conferred with counsel for Plaintiffs, and the Plaintiffs' counsel does not consent to the relief requested in this Motion. On Aug. 19, 2024, TEK filed its Motion for Approval. On Aug. 26, 2024, the Plaintiffs filed their Opposition to TEK's Motion for Approval of Notice of Interviewees. On Aug. 29, 2024, the Plaintiffs filed their Motions for Collective and Class Certification. TEK provides information technology services. A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Sept. 5, 2024, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=wryfM0 at no extra charge.[CC] The Defendant is represented by: Andrew Scroggins, Esq. Noah A. Finkel, Esq. Brian P. Long, Esq. James Nasiri, Esq. Jacob Oslick, Esq. SEYFARTH SHAW LLP 233 South Wacker Drive, Suite 8000 Chicago, IL 60606-6448 Telephone: (312) 460-5000 Facsimile: (312) 460-7000 E-mail: ascroggins@seyfarth.com nfinkel@seyfarth.com bplong@seyfarth.com jnasiri@seyfarth.com joslick@seyfarth.com TELECHECK SERVICES: Loses Bid to Dismiss Morris Amended Complaint ----------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Susan P. Watters of the United States District Court for the District of Montana adopted the recommendation of Magistrate Judge Timothy Cavan that it deny TeleCheck Services, LLC and TeleCheck Services, Inc.'s motion to dismiss the amended complaint filed by Brandy Morris. Before the Court is Judge Cavan's Findings and Recommendations, filed May 17, 2024. Judge Cavan recommends that the Court deny TeleCheck's Motion to Dismiss on the grounds the motion relitigates issues the Court addressed in its order on Defendant Walmart, Inc.'s earlier Motion to Dismiss, which is prohibited by the law of the case doctrine. TeleCheck timely filed an objection disagreeing with Judge Cavan's application of the law of the case doctrine. TeleCheck lodges three other objections, two of which pertain to the additional legal arguments in TeleCheck's motion and one of which pertains to Judge Cavan's characterization of TeleCheck's alleged conduct, as outlined in Plaintiff Brandy Morris's Amended Complaint. Morris timely filed a response rebutting each of TeleCheck's arguments. TeleCheck filed a reply. The Court will not consider the reply, as the Local Rules prohibit a party from filing a reply to Findings and Recommendations. TeleCheck objects to only one of Judge Cavan's factual findings -- his description of the conduct Morris's lawsuit targets. Since resolving that objection requires a full understanding of the facts and no other factual findings are objected to, the Court will provide Judge Cavan's recitation of the facts here, then resolve TeleCheck's objection. Morris brings this action challenging Defendants' practices of (1) charging multiple returned check fees for the same check and (2) reprocessing checks and returned check fees as separate items. Morris alleges these practices breach the check policy that is posted at checkout aisles in Walmart's Montana stores. Morris alleges TeleCheck is liable on grounds that it serves as Walmart's check processing partner and processes returned check fees on Walmart's behalf. Morris initially brought this case as a class action solely against Walmart and asserted claims for breach of contract (Count I), breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count II), and unjust enrichment (Count III). The Court considered a motion to dismiss filed by Walmart and determined that Morris's claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing were plausible. Specifically, the Court found that both Morris and Walmart set forth plausible, opposing interpretations of the Check Policy and that resolving the potential ambiguity was not appropriate on a motion to dismiss. The Court, therefore, denied Walmart's motion to dismiss Count I and Count II to the extent it was based on a contract theory. The Court granted Walmart's motion as Count II to the extent it was based on a tort theory, as well as Count III. Thereafter, Morris filed the Amended Complaint adding TeleCheck. Other than adding TeleCheck and omitting the dismissed claims, the Amended Complaint is substantially identical to the original Complaint subject to Walmart's motion to dismiss. In the Amended Complaint, Morris reasserts the claims for breach of contract (Count I) and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count II). TeleCheck now moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint, arguing Morris did not plausibly allege a claim for breach of contract or breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. TeleCheck makes three arguments: First, the Check Policy is a disclosure, not a contract. Second, even if the Check Policy is a contract, the Check Policy must be read in tandem with the National Automated Clearing House Association Rules, which govern electronic funds transfers made via the Automated Clearing House Network. According to TeleCheck, the NACHA Rules unambiguously allow the five attempted withdrawals from Morris's account, and so Morris's breach of contract claim fails. And third, Morris's injuries were caused by her bank, not by TeleCheck, since she seeks to recover the NSF Fees charged by her bank. With respect to the facts as outlined by Judge Cavan, TeleCheck objects to Judge Cavan's finding that Morris seeks to challenge "‘Defendants' practices of charging multiple returned check fees for the same check.'" TeleCheck contends that Morris actually challenges "Defendants' attempt to debit the same Return Fee from Morris's account, not multiple fees." As an initial matter, TeleCheck's objection is proper, and the Court reviews the issue de novo. The Court rejects Judge Cavan's Findings and Recommendations on the law of the case doctrine and adopts his findings on the consideration of extrinsic evidence. The Court overrules TeleCheck's other objections and adopts Judge Cavan's recommendation that the Court deny TeleCheck's Motion to Dismiss. A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated August 13, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=80ZJSk TETRA TECH: Further Amended Class Settlement, Class Notice Okayed ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case captioned as LAGARION BROWN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TETRA TECH, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:20-cv-01133-DJC-DMC (E.D. Calif.), the Honorable Daniel J. Calabretta of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California approved plaintiffs' further amended class settlement and further amended class notice. On February 6, 2024, Plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval of their amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 class, Fair Labor Standards Act collective, and Private Attorneys General Act settlement. Plaintiffs sought: (1) conditional certification of the settlement class and FLSA collective; (2) preliminary approval of the amended settlement; (3) approval of the amended class and collective notice; (4) appointment of Plaintiffs as class representatives; (5) appointment of Plaintiffs' counsel as class counsel; (6) appointment of Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions as the settlement administrator; and (7) a hearing date for final approval of the settlement. The Court granted the Motion in part and denied it in part. Specifically, the Court granted conditional certification of the settlement class and FLSA collective; appointed Plaintiffs Lagarion Brown, Roy Jackson, Yaphett Saunders, Isaac Saunders, Hakeem Allambie, and Nichlon Garrett as the class representatives; appointed Plaintiffs' counsel Mallison & Martinez as class counsel; and appointed Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions as the settlement administrator. However, the Court denied preliminary approval of the amended settlement and notice without prejudice in order for the Parties to remedy issues related to the treatment of Plaintiffs' PAGA claims. The Court also required the Parties to more clearly specify the required contents of any dispute concerning the number of workweeks used to calculate class members' estimated settlement shares in the amended notice. Plaintiffs were granted forty-five days to submit a further amended settlement and notice, which they have now done. The Court has reviewed the further amended settlement and further amended notice, and find they adequately address the Court's concerns. Concerning the Further Amended Class Settlement, the Court previously found that preliminary approval of the settlement was appropriate with respect to Plaintiffs' Rule 23 class and FLSA collective claims. However, the Court noted concerns regarding Plaintiffs' PAGA claims. Although the Court found that the PAGA settlement amount was fair and reasonable, the settlement did not properly inform PAGA class members that they would be bound by settlement of the PAGA claims and would receive a share of the PAGA settlement regardless of whether they opted out of the settlement or not. The Parties have now revised their settlement to accurately explain that all PAGA class members will receive their pro rata portion of the PAGA payment, regardless of whether they opt out of the settlement, and will release their PAGA claims. Accordingly, the Court will approve the Further Amended Class Settlement. The hearing for final settlement approval is set for February 20, 2025, at 1:30 p.m. before the undersigned in Courtroom 10, with the motion for final approval of class action settlement to be filed at least 35 days in advance of the final settlement approval hearing, in accordance with Local Rule 230(b). The Court also previously found that the Rule 23 class and FLSA collective notice were largely adequate, but required clarifications regarding Plaintiffs' PAGA claims and the procedure to dispute class members' settlement share calculations. The Further Amended Class Notice has been revised to explain that any members of the PAGA class will be bound by the Further Amended Class Settlement's release of their PAGA claims and will receive payment for those claims. In addition, the Further Amended Class Notice now informs class members of the full scope of information they must submit in order to dispute the workweeks used to calculate their anticipated settlement share. Accordingly, the Court will approve the Further Amended Class Notice. A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated August 12, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=6wceQz THOMAS CUISINE: Forsythe Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct. ------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against Thomas Cuisine Management, LLC. The case is styled as Thmas Forsythe, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public v. Thomas Cuisine Management. LLC. an Idaho Limited Liability Company, Case No. STK-CV-UOE-2024-0011122 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Joaquin Cty., Sept. 5, 2024). The case type is stated as "Unlimited Civil Other Employment." Thomas Cuisine -- https://thomascuisine.com/ -- is the leading foodservice provider in Real food and provide healthcare food service, senior living food service, corporate dining, and more.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Roman Otkupman, Esq. OTKUPMAN LAW FIRM, ALC 28632 Roadside Dr, Ste 203 Agoura Hills, CA 91301-6015 Phone: (818) 293-5623 Fax: (888) 850-1310 Email: roman@OLFLA.com TIDELANDS HEALTH: Loses Bid to Compel Arbitration in Marshall Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case captioned as LORETTA SABRINA MARSHALL, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. GEORGETOWN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, d/b/a Tidelands Health, Defendant - Appellant, No. 22-2010 (4th Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment issued by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissing the Tidelands' motion to compel arbitration. This appeal arises from a putative class action against Tidelands, a South Carolina healthcare provider. The action challenges Tidelands' policy of requiring new hires to pass a physical agility test, alleging principally that this policy discriminates against persons with disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, or the ADA, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12112, and has a disparate impact on people with disabilities and women in violation of the ADA and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2.1 Loretta Marshall applied for a nursing job with Tidelands Health, using Tidelands' online application process. After Marshall failed a mandatory physical agility test, she was denied employment. Marshall then sued Tidelands in federal court, alleging that its use of the physical agility test constitutes prohibited discrimination. Marshall filed her putative class action lawsuit in federal district court in 2021. Tidelands promptly moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, giving rise to the appeal. Tidelands argued that the online application materials submitted by Marshall included an arbitration agreement covering the parties' dispute. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Tidelands had not shown the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. The parties agree that when Marshall entered the Tidelands' online portal in 2020 as a returning user, the "Agreement to Arbitrate" she signed in 2016 became available to her -- not on the screen initially visible, but at the bottom of the document, to which she could have scrolled. According to Tidelands, that was enough to put Marshall on notice that it was offering her an arbitration agreement in 2020. Like the district court, the Ninth Circuit disagrees. The Ninth Circuit says, "Tidelands did not adhere to the same standards in 2020, and we must agree with the district court that no arbitration agreement was formed when Marshall submitted her 2020 application. The judgment of the district court is affirmed." A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated August 13, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=mEAYMl TRANSNATIONAL STAFFING: Syncreon's Bid for Subpoena Compliance OK'd ------------------------------------------------------------------- Magistrate Judge Kimberly G. Altman of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, grants syncreon Technology (USA), LLC's motion to compel compliance with third-party subpoena in the lawsuit styled IN RE: MOTION TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH SUBPOENA, Case No. 2:24-mc-50922-DPH-KGA (E.D. Mich.). The matter is an action to enforce compliance with a subpoena. The moving party, syncreon Technology (USA), LLC (syncreon), seeks entry of an order compelling the production of information in a subpoena directed to the responding party, Transnational Staffing (Transnational), in connection with an action pending in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, as well as attorney fees and costs. Transnational filed a response, stating in part that it does not object to the subpoena but requests that it be compensated for the time needed to gather the information sought. syncreon filed a reply, contending that Transnational is not entitled to compensation for gathering the information and again requesting attorney fees and costs related to enforcing the subpoena. The matter has been referred to Judge Altman. On Aug. 22, 2024, the parties appeared for a hearing via Zoom. For the reasons stated at the hearing, syncreon's motion will be granted. Judge Altman holds that Transnational must comply with the subpoena no later than close of business on Aug. 23, 2024. syncreon's request for attorney fees will be denied. However, if Transnational fails to comply with this Order, syncreon may file a petition seeking attorney fees and costs. As noted, this motion is made in connection with a class action wage and hour lawsuit brought by Named Plaintiff Ricardo Ayala against syncreon, which is currently pending in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Case No. 2:23-cv-04561 (the "Ayala Lawsuit"). The Parties have reached a settlement in the Ayala Lawsuit and, on June 21, 2024, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania entered an Order preliminarily approving the settlement. Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement and the Court's Order, syncreon is required to provide contact information for all workers, who worked more than forty (40) hours for at least one workweek at one of three syncreon Pennsylvania facilities during the relevant dates. This information is to be provided to the settlement administrator so the settlement administrator may timely issue Notice Forms to the class members and settlement checks to any class member, who does not exclude themself from the settlement. Many of the class members, who worked at the syncreon sites were temporary workers employed by staffing agencies like Transnational. syncreon is not in possession of any contact information for those workers. Under the Court's June 21, 2024 Order, syncreon has requested information from several staffing agencies that it worked with, including Transnational. After some discussion, Transnational agreed to produce the requested contact information for the twelve (12) individuals, who were employed by Transnational but requested that it be compensated for gathering the information. syncreon says that it has contacted eleven (11) other staffing agencies with similar requests, and those agencies provided the requested information without requiring a subpoena or imposing costs on syncreon. Transnational then stated that they would provide the requested contact information in response to a subpoena. Accordingly, syncreon prepared a subpoena directed to Transnational's registered agent for service, which is Transnational's counsel. The subpoena was properly served at counsel's law office on July 1, 2024, with a requested response date of July 5, 2024. On July 1, 2024, counsel for Transnational objected to the subpoena, arguing that syncreon did not allow sufficient time for Transnational to respond, due in part to the Independence Day holiday, and again requesting that syncreon pay Transnational's costs associated with responding. On Aug. 1, 2024, syncreon filed the instant motion seeking to compel compliance with the subpoena. Judge Altman opines that Transnational has not provided a valid reason for failing to comply with the subpoena, nor has it provided any authority for the Court to require syncreon to pay Transnational the costs associated with complying. Accordingly, as stated during the hearing, syncreon's motion to compel compliance with the subpoena issued to Transnational is granted, and Transnational must comply with the subpoena. Judge Altman denies syncreon's request for attorney fees and costs. However, if Transnational fails to comply with this Order, syncreon may file a petition seeking attorney fees and costs. A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 22, 2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2s3t9a5v from PacerMonitor.com. TRC STAFFING: Burke Seeks to Stay Requirement to File Class Cert. ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as Burke v. TRC Staffing Services, Inc. (TRC STAFFING SERVICES, INC. DATA BREACH LITIGATION), Case No. 1:24-cv-02398-VMC (N.D. Ga.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order suspending or staying the requirement for her to file a motion for class certification. The Plaintiff submits a proposed order for the Court's consideration. For the Plaintiff to properly advance a motion for class certification and comply with the legal requirements of Rule 23 and relevant case law, Plaintiff needs additional time to propound, receive, and review discovery responses and documents from the Defendants, conduct depositions, and prepare motions and memoranda, including expert reports. The Plaintiffs' counsel has met and discussed these issues and, at the appropriate time after consolidation, intend to propose a Case Management Report, which will include a revised proposed schedule for class certification briefing. The Defendant does not oppose this request. This request to suspend or toll the deadline is made in good faith, and not for the purposes of undue delay or obfuscation. No prior extensions of time have been sought or obtained for this deadline. The Plaintiff filed her Class Action Complaint on June 6, 2024. On July 29, 2024, this Court granted the parties' Motion to Consolidate this action and ten related actions. It is unclear whether the Order suspended the deadlines in the underlying actions, including for the filing of class certification, so Plaintiff Davis files this motion out of an abundance of caution. TRC Staffing provides workforce management. A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Sept. 4, 2024, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=mD3d0f at no extra charge.[CC] The Plaintiff is represented by: Kyle G.A. Wallace, Esq. SHIVER HAMILTON CAMPBELL, LLC 3490 Piedmont Road, Suite 640 Atlanta, GA 30305 Telephone: (404) 593-0020 - and - Jason Rathod, Esq. MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD, LLP 412 H Street NE, Washington, DC 20002 Telephone: (202) 470-3520 E-mail: jrathod@classlawdc.com The Defendant is represented by: Marcol Harvey, Esq. GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP 55 Ivan Allen Jr. Blvd., Nw Suite 750 Atlanta, GA 30308 Telephone: (404) 869-9054 E-mail: Mharvey@grsm.com TWITTER INC: Zeman Bid for Conditional Status Partly OK'd --------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOHN ZEMAN, v. TWITTER, INC., et al., Case No. 3:23-cv-01786-SI (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Susan Illston entered an order granting in part the Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification of a collective action: "All Twitter employees across the United States age 50 or older who were involuntarily terminated as a result of the Nov. 4, 2022 layoffs that occurred after Elon Musk acquired the company." The parties are directed to meet and confer and submit a revised notice to the court within 21 days along with the protective order referenced in (2) of Section IV. The Plaintiff's counsel is directed to concurrently submit draft text for the text message and reminder notices. After the Court approves the finalized notice, the 90-day notice period will run from the time the notice is sent. The Plaintiff alleges that this "mass layoff affected well more than half of Twitter's workforce" and "most laid off employees were notified on Nov. 4, 2022, although some were laid off earlier and many were laid off after that date." The Plaintiff alleges that "decisions regarding which employees would be laid off during the initial layoffs were made under extremely hurried circumstances, with little if any regard given to employees’ job performance, qualifications, experience, and abilities." The Plaintiff is a former employee of Twitter. Twitter provides online social networking and microblogging service. A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 3, 2024, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=sWw5fA at no extra charge.[CC] UNCHARTED LABS: Judge Divulges Prior Representation of Warner Bros. ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the lawsuit entitled UMG RECORDINGS, INC., CAPITOL RECORDS, LLC, SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, ARISTA MUSIC, ARISTA RECORDS LLC, ATLANTIC RECORDING CORPORATION, RHINO ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY, WARNER MUSIC INC., WARNER MUSIC INTERNATIONAL SERVICES LIMITED, WARNER RECORDS INC., WARNER RECORDS LLC, and WARNER RECORDS/SIRE VENTURES LLC, Plaintiffs v. UNCHARTED LABS, INC., d/b/a Udio.com, and JOHN DOES 1—10, Defendants, Case No. 1:24-cv-04777-AKH (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an order regarding his prior representation of Warner Bros. Judge Hellerstein says: "I write to advise the parties that between 1993 and 1998, as a partner of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, I represented Warner Bros. Inc. and affiliated companies in defense of a class action against the record companies for alleged unpaid royalties. The case is Moore v. AFTRA, 93 Civ. 2358, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia." "Within the first five years of becoming a district court judge, I recused myself from cases involving Warner Bros. However, there is no reason at this time why I should recuse myself. I am not biased, nor would there be an appearance of bias. I have had no contact with the company since becoming a judge." "If any counsel wishes to lodge an objection, they should do so by addressing the Clerk of Court by August 28, 2024." A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 22, 2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/28n7mhuh from PacerMonitor.com. UNION PACIFIC: Must Face Zaragoza's Discrimination Claims --------------------------------------------------------- The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas' summary judgment dismissing the disability discrimination claims of Robert Anthony Zaragoza against Union Pacific Railroad Company. The case is remanded for further proceedings. Zaragoza worked as a brakeman and train conductor for Union Pacific from November 2006 to April 2016. Zaragoza's employment was terminated in July 2015 after he tested positive for cocaine; he was reinstated in September 2015. Throughout Zaragoza's tenure, including after his reinstatement, Union Pacific administered a fitness-for-duty program to comply with various internal and federal safety regulations. Union Pacific's Medical Rules establish the fitness-for-duty program, which applies to all employees and post-offer applicants. That program includes tests designed to assess employees' color vision acuity. One such test, the Ishihara test, requires subjects to identify numbers and figures made up of multi-colored dots across fourteen plates. Zaragoza passed an Ishihara test when he began his employment in 2006, though he failed them in 2010, 2013, and 2016. When Zaragoza failed those Ishihara tests, he was given additional field tests to assess his color vision. In 2010 and 2013, Union Pacific's alternate field test required the subject to identify ten wayside signal configurations in a preset order. Zaragoza passed the field test in those years, and he was allowed to continue working as a conductor. However, in 2014, Union Pacific amended its fitness-for-duty program. Some of the changes included suspension from duty without pay, further testing requirements, and, in some cases, termination from the company if an employee disclosed or Union Pacific discovered certain medical or physical conditions. When Zaragoza failed the Ishihara test on April 8, 2016, he was removed from service. After he also failed the light cannon test on April 19, 2016, he was denied recertification as a train conductor on May 3, 2016. Over the next few months, Zaragoza contested Union Pacific's determination that he had a color vision deficiency. Zaragoza submitted various reports from doctors attesting to his adequate color vision, though he wore special contact lenses to pass at least one of his doctor's tests. There is a question whether Zaragoza wore similar corrective lenses for the Union Pacific tests that he passed in 2006, 2010, and 2013. Regardless, Zaragoza was never reinstated as a conductor. American Pipe tolling equitably freezes the statute of limitations for all putative or certified class members during the pendency of a class action. American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). Zaragoza contends American Pipe salvages his otherwise untimely discrimination claims against Union Pacific Railroad Company. Zaragoza asserts that his claims were tolled from 2016 to 2020 because he was a putative and certified class member in a separate class action against Union Pacific during that period. The district court rejected Zaragoza's argument and dismissed his claims at summary judgment, as untimely. However, because the operative complaint and certification order in the class action both contained class definitions that included Zaragoza, his claims were tolled, and the district court erred by concluding otherwise. The Fifth Circuit reverses the district court's dismissal of Zaragoza's disability discrimination claims and remands for further proceedings. According to The Ninth Circuit, "Zaragoza was included in the Harris class, as pled in February 2016 and as initially certified in February 2019. Therefore, his disability discrimination claims were tolled from the time they accrued until he asserted them, as an individual claimant, with the EEOC in March 2020. The district court's summary judgment dismissing Zaragoza's claims as untimely was therefore in error. We decline to consider the parties' remaining summary judgment arguments in the first instance." A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated August 12, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=IRvrlR UNITED AIRLINES: Court Grants Motion to Dismiss Zajac Lawsuit ------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Paula Xinis of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted United Airlines, Inc.'s motion to dismiss the class action lawsuit filed by Alexander Zajac pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On November 19, 2023, Zajac filed this lawsuit against United, alleging that the airline's misrepresentations regarding its Eco-Skies Program and the use of sustainable aviation fuel violates the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law Sec. 13-101, et seq. (Count I) and constitutes common law fraud (Count II). United moved to dismiss both claims as preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 41713. Zajac, in response, withdrew the fraud claim. As to the MCPA claim, Zajac contends that because the nature of United's deception focuses on its supposed commitments to "going green," the MCPA action is not preempted. United principally argues that because the MCPA claim alleges deception in United's pricing and services, the Deregulation Act expressly preempts the claim. United argues that the MCPA claim concentrates on how United's false "going green" advertising induced Zajac and others to fly with United at premium prices. Thus, says United, the claim sufficiently relates to "services" such that it is preempted. Zajac, for his part, unpersuasively attempts to recast the MCPA claim as concerning solely United's false commitments to "going green" and using energy sources that are not fossil fuels. Reading the Complaint most favorably to Zajac and the putative class, United's alleged misrepresentations were aimed at inducing consumers to fly United at higher ticket prices. From this, the Court easily concludes that the MCPA claim relates to United's provision of transportation services and is therefore preempted by the Deregulation Act. The claim must be dismissed. The Court will also dismiss this claim with prejudice. A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated August 13, 2024, is available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=lvQmdY UNITED STATES: E.D. Arkansas Dismisses Sanders v. USPS and DeJoy ---------------------------------------------------------------- Judge James M. Moody, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Central Division, grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss the lawsuit titled LETICIA SANDERS, et al., PLAINTIFFS v. LOUIS DEJOY, Postmaster General and UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DEFENDANTS, Case No. 4:24-cv-00327-JM (E.D. Ark.). On April 12, 2024, Plaintiff Leticia Sanders sought permission to proceed in forma pauperis and filed a pro se petition for class-action on behalf of herself and Dejasiuna Hill, Jashawn Sanders, Rikeya Holmes, Monique Murphy, and Miesha Dennis alleging workplace discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000, et seq. Before the Court could screen the Complaint as required under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e), Sanders paid the filing fee and summonses were issued and returned to her for service. The Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Sanders has responded. Foremost, Judge Moody opines that Sanders is not an attorney and cannot represent the interests of other pro se parties. As a result, all of Sander's allegations raised on behalf of her co-plaintiffs are dismissed as a matter of law. In any event, had the filing fee not been paid, Judge Moody points out this case would not have survived screening for the same reasons now asserted by the Defendants. Sanders has failed to state a claim of discrimination on which relief can be granted. She broadly contends that she was subjected to disparate treatment, toxic work environment, harassment, retaliation, and unlawfully terminated but fails to offer a single factual explanation to support the allegations, Judge Moody opines. Even liberally reading Sander's papers, the Court and the Defendants, are left with to guess as to the substance of any of the allegations, Judge Moody says. Sanders has provided absolutely no information as to who harassed her, when it occurred, who within management she told, how she was treated disparately from others, what protected activity she exercised for which she was retaliated against, or even if what discrete class of individuals she contends she is a part of that is protected under Title VII. Judge Moody points out that Sanders claims are completely conclusory. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to dismiss. This case is dismissed with prejudice. A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 22, 2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/2kpxyr2w from PacerMonitor.com. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Court Narrows Claims in Kimball Suit ------------------------------------------------------ In the class action lawsuit captioned as JULIE KIMBALL, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., et al., Case No. 2:22-cv-04163-JKS-MAH (D.N.J.), the Hon. Judge Jamel Semper entered an order granting in part and denying in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that the replacement or repair of her turbocharger was futile such that the futility exception applies here. Furthermore, the Plaintiff argues that the warranty was unconscionable. Nevertheless, for the same reasons stated in this Court's prior opinions, she still fails to plausibly plead procedural and substantive unconscionability. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's express warranty claim (Count V) is again dismissed without prejudice. The Plaintiff fails to specifically plead with sufficient detail the nature of this alleged affirmative misrepresentation or why this statement should be attributed to Defendant. Accordingly, the Plaintiff fails to plead any fraud-based claims based on affirmative misrepresentations. The Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition. The Court reviewed the Second Amended Complaint and the parties' submissions and decided the motion without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. This putative class action lawsuit arises from an alleged engine defect present in certain Audi and Volkswagen (VW) vehicles. Volkswagen Group is the North American operational headquarters, and subsidiary of the Volkswagen Group of automobile companies of Germany. A copy of the Court's opinion dated Sept. 3, 2024, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=Z8DLJO at no extra charge.[CC] VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA: Thompson Suit Settlement Has Final Approval ------------------------------------------------------------------ Chief Judge Pamela Pepper of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin grants the parties' joint motion for settlement approval in the lawsuit entitled ANIA THOMPSON, Plaintiff v. VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA OF MINNESOTA, Defendant, Case No. 2:23-cv-00075-PP (E.D. Wis.). The Plaintiff filed a collective and class action on behalf of herself and similarly situated current and former hourly-paid, non-exempt employees of Defendant Volunteers of America of Minnesota. The complaint also named as a defendant "Dungarvin, Inc." But on July 27, 2023, the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss Dungarvin from the lawsuit, and the Clerk terminated Dungarvin on that same day. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant failed to include non-discretionary compensation, such as monetary bonuses, incentives, awards and/or other rewards and payments, in all current and former hourly-paid, non-exempt employees' regular rates of pay for overtime calculation purposes. In May 2024--approximately 15 months after the case was filed--the Court preliminarily approved the parties' settlement and certified two classes: a collective class under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and a Rule 23 class under Wisconsin's Wage Payment and Collection Laws (WWPCL). The parties since have filed a joint motion for settlement approval, and the Plaintiff has filed a motion for approval of the service award, and a motion for attorneys' fees and costs. Judge Pepper notes that the Court may approve a settlement only after a hearing and on a finding that the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate. The Court held that hearing on Aug. 21, 2024. The Court previously appointed Ania Thompson as representative of the collective and Rule 23 classes. The Court certified the following FLSA collective class: All thirty-eight (38) current and former hourly-paid, non-exempt employees who worked for the Defendant between Jan. 20, 2020, and Jan. 20, 2023, as reflected in Exhibit A to the parties' Settlement Agreement and Release, and have timely returned Consent Forms in this action. The Court certified the following Rule 23 class: All thirty-eight (38) current and former hourly-paid, non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant between Jan. 20, 2020, and Jan. 20, 2023, as reflected in Exhibit A to the parties' Settlement Agreement and Release, and who do not timely exclude themselves from this action. The Court appointed Thompson to serve as the representative for the certified collective class and, as it stated at the August 21 hearing, it is not aware of any conflicting interests between Thompson and the other class members. Class counsel--David Potteiger and Scott Luzi of the law firm of Walcheske & Luzi--have adequately represented the class during the litigation. Judge Pepper holds that the Court is satisfied that the class is adequately represented and that the parties negotiated at arm's length and in good faith, balancing the strength of the Plaintiff's case on the merits against the amount offered in settlement. The agreement provides for a gross settlement of $35,000, which includes: (1) $9,250 for alleged unpaid overtime of the class members; (2) $2,500 as a service payment to the representative Plaintiff; and (3) $23,250 in attorneys' fees and costs to class counsel. The aggregate amount available to members of the FLSA collective class will be $4,625 and the aggregate amount to members of the Rule 23 class will also be $4,625. Accordingly, the Court grants the joint motion for approval of settlement. The Court approves the settlement as fair, reasonable and adequate under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court approves the settlement payments to the settlement class. The Defendant's counsel will provide class counsel with the settlement checks for the settlement class within thirty days of this order. Upon receiving the settlement check, class counsel must mail the settlement checks to the settlement class via U.S. Mail within ten days. The settlement class members each have 120 days to cash their individual checks. If the checks are not cashed in that time, the amounts revert to the Defendant. Any settlement class member who cashes their settlement check is bound by the settlement. The Court grants the Plaintiff's unopposed motion for approval of service award. The Court approves the requested payment in the amount of $2,500 to the representative Plaintiff. The Court grants the class counsel's motion for approval of attorneys' fees and costs. The Court approves the requested attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $23,250. The Court orders that this case is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk will enter judgment, accordingly. A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Aug. 22, 2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/arkycxj9 from PacerMonitor.com. WELLS FARGO: Amended Sched Order Entered in McNamara Class Suit --------------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as THOMAS W. MCNAMARA, as the Court-Appointed Receiver for Triangle Media Corporation, Apex Capital Group, LLC; and their successors, assigns, affiliates, and subsidiaries, v. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, a corporation, WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., a national banking association, Case No. 3:21-cv-01245-TWR-DDL (S.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge David D. Leshner entered an order amending the current scheduling order as follows: Event Current New Deadline Deadline Mandatory Settlement Conference Aug. 30, 2024 Oct. 21, 2024 Deadline to Exchange MSC Briefs and Email MSC Briefs to Chambers Mandatory Settlement Conference Sept. 9, 2024 Oct. 30, 2024 (In-Person) Deadline to File Motion for Sept. 5, 2024 NO CHANGE Class Certification Deadline to File Opposition to Sept. 26, 2024 NO CHANGE Class Certification Motion Deadline to File Reply to Oct. 10, 2024 NO CHANGE Class Certification Motion Hearing on Pretrial Motions and Oct. 24, 2024 Oct. 29, 2024 Class Certification Motion Final Pretrial Conference Dec. 12, 2024 Apr. 3, 2025 Wells Fargo is an American multinational financial services company. A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 5, 2024, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=BnSsg8 at no extra charge.[CC] WELLS FARGO: McNamara Suit Seeks to Certify Class ------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as THOMAS W. MCNAMARA, as the Court-Appointed Receiver for Triangle Media Corporation, Apex Capital Group, LLC; and their successors, assigns, affiliates, and subsidiaries, v. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, a corporation, WELLS FARGO BANKS, N.A., a national banking association, Case No. 3:21-cv-01245-TWR-DDL (S.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff, on Oct. 29, 2024, in the courtroom of the Honorable Todd W. Robinson, will move pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for an order: 1. Certifying the following Class pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3): "All persons who were enrolled in recurring billing by any of the Apex Enterprise Companies or Triangle Enterprise Companies, or who were enrolled in recurring billing by any of the Tarr Enterprise Companies for any Tarr Enterprise Products." 2. Appointing McCraner Plaintiffs John McCraner, Sharon Stiansen, Janet Pollard, John Tuffield, Michael Darlington, and Susan Landreau as Class Representatives; 3. Appointing Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP as Class Counsel pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g); and 4. Granting such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. Wells Fargo is an American multinational financial services company. A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Sept. 5, 2024, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=S4a5jB at no extra charge.[CC] The Plaintiff is represented by: Garth Spencer, Esq. Jonathan M. Rotter, Esq. Greg B. Linkh, Esq. Garth Spencer, Esq. Melissa Wright, Esq. GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 201-9150 E-mail: info@glancylaw.com WELLS FARGO: Parties Must Work Out Class Discovery, Court Says -------------------------------------------------------------- In the class action lawsuit captioned as BERNARD J. PATTERSON et al., individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, v. WELLS FARGO & CO., et al., Case No. 3:23-cv-03858-TLT (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Laurel Beeler entered an order directing the parties to work out a plan about how they will approach class discovery. If the trial court does not postpone the due date for the class-certification motion on or before September 19, then class discovery must proceed on that date. This putative class action involves a scheme where fraudsters use fake and real personal identification information (PII) to open unauthorized bank accounts and then transferred funds through those accounts. The plaintiffs sued Wells Fargo entities and Early Warning Services, claiming that they assisted that fraud. They claim violations of (1) the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) (claim one against Wells Fargo by the plaintiffs, the class, and the FCRA subclass), (2) the FCRA (claims two and three against Early Warning by the plaintiffs, the class, and the FCRA subclass), and (3) the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA) (claim four against Wells Fargo and Early Warning by Linda Jordan and the CCRAA subclass). The motion for class-certification is due October 7, 2024 In sum, on this record, what seems to make the most sense is to postpone the filing of the class-certification motion (and any relevant discovery) until after the trial court decides the pending dispositive motions. It might be most efficient to vacate the due date for the class certification motion now and revisit the case schedule, either at the September 19 case management conference or at the October 29 hearing on the motion to dismiss. The latter might be most efficient. A final point is that Wells Fargo said at the discovery hearing that this is a problem of the plaintiffs’ making: the defendants tried to get the plaintiffs to confer on a new schedule in July, and they would not. But forcing the plaintiffs to file a class-certification motion with no discovery does not seem like a very good idea. And having class discovery now on a case that was mostly dismissed the last time doesn't make much sense either. For now, the court does not lift the stay pending the case-management conference on September 19, 2024 Wells Fargo is an American multinational financial services company with a significant global presence. A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 3, 2024, is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=cQrjZ0 at no extra charge.[CC] WESTERN REFINING: Class Cert Bid Filing Continued to Feb. 10, 2025 ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the class action lawsuit captioned as Steve Barden v. Western Refining Retail, LLC, et al., Case No. 5:23-cv-01360 (C.D. Cal., Filed July 12, 2023), the Hon. Judge Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpo entered an order granting ex parte application to continue deadline to file motion for class certification from Oct. 11, 2024, to Feb. 10, 2025. The nature of suit alleges violation of the Labor Litigation. Western Refining engages in the business of refining and marketing crude oil and refined products.[CC] WILKES-BARRE, PA: Arias Sues Over "Physical Fitness" Requirements ----------------------------------------------------------------- GENESIS ARIAS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. CITY OF WILKES-BARRE and CITY OF WILKES-BARRE POLICE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Case No. 3:24-cv-01517-JFS (M.D. Pa., Sept. 6, 2024) alleges that the Defendants have adopted and implemented purported "physical fitness" requirements that discriminate against the Plaintiff and other women seeking employment as police officers with the Wilkes-Barre Police Department. Allegedly, the Defendants require police officer job applicants to successfully complete all of the following tests: (i) a vertical jump of 15.5 inches within 3 attempts; (ii) 30 sit-ups; (iii) a 300-meter run in 66 seconds; (iv) 25 push-ups; and (v) a 1.5-mile run in 15 minutes and 54 seconds. The vertical jump test is administered first. Thus, applicants who fail the vertical jump are immediately eliminated from consideration and prohibited from performing sit-ups, the 300-meter run, the push-ups, and the 1.5-mile run, the suit says. The Defendants' vertical jump requirement (and, possibly, some of the other physical fitness requirements) serves no legitimate governmental or business purpose, bears no meaningful relationship to the day-to-day work of City police officers, and is not predictive of one's ability to competently serve as a police officer, the Plaintiff contends. By requiring all police officer job applicants to satisfy the vertical jump requirement (and, possibly, some of the other physical fitness requirements), Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and other female job applicants in violation of Title VII, the Plaintiff adds. The Plaintiff seeks all available relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. sections 2000e, et seq., the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 P.S. sections 951, et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as actionable through 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Wilkes-Barre is a city in and the county seat of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, United States.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Peter Winebrake, Esq. Deirdre Aaron, Esq. Michelle Tolodziecki, Esq. WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC 715 Twining Road, Suite 211 Dresher, PA 19025 Telephone: (215) 884-2491 E-mail: pwinebrake@winebrakelaw.com daaron@winebrakelaw.com mtolodziecki@winebrakelaw.com [*] Shine Lawyers Probes Potential Heartburn Drugs Class Action --------------------------------------------------------------- Emily McPherson of 9News reports that when Donna Johnstone began suffering from reflux more than 20 years ago, her doctor gave her a prescription for a medication he assured her would sort it out. And, to her amazement it did, Johnstone said. The mother, from the NSW Central Coast, began taking Somac, a type of proton pump inhibitor (PPI) which works by decreasing the amount of acid in the stomach. "It helped the reflux, it was beautiful," she said. "I had no symptoms or anything, it was fantastic for that." Johnstone kept taking the medication for the next two decades, until she began having serious health problems with her kidneys around 2018. "I ended up with lots and lots of kidney stones," she said. "Then, my doctor was doing some routine blood tests, and one of them showed my kidney function had dropped to 19 percent." Johnstone said she was stunned to hear her kidney function was so low, as she had no symptoms. "I had no side effects at all, nothing," she said. "If I hadn't had those routine blood tests done, I would have ended up on dialysis, because when your kidney function drops to 15 percent they put you on dialysis." When she saw a specialist, the doctor advised Johnstone that the loss of her kidney function was due to the heartburn medication. "He said that this was due to the Somac. And he said, 'No more Somac'," she said. Proton pump inhibitors like Somac have been widely prescribed since the early nineties because of their effectiveness for treating heartburn and reflux. But there is now a concern proton pump inhibitors could increase the risk of debilitating kidney issues and gastric cancers. Pharmaceutical giant AstraZeneca settled a US lawsuit late last year, paying $630 million to almost 19,000 patients who claimed two proton pump inhibitors -- Nexium and Prilosec (marketed as Losec in Australia) -- caused their chronic kidney disease. Shine Lawyers is now investigating proton pump inhibitors still available here in Australia, including Nexium, Losec, Somac, Pariet and Zoton for a potential class action lawsuit against the manufacturers. Craig Allsopp, Joint Head of Class Actions at Shine Lawyers, said PPI drugs were incredibly popular. "In the past four years alone, there are likely to have been more than five million Australians who have filled a prescription for a PPI drug," he said. "In 2021, over 23 million individual prescriptions were filled, and this number is increasing year on year." Shine Lawyers will be examining the latest research into the heartburn and reflux medications, with the help of US class action specialist legal firm Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, Allsopp said. "Research across the globe has revealed that users of PPIs are at an increased risk of developing stomach cancers and kidney injuries," "This is concerning given research also shows that PPIs are some of the most-prescribed medicines on the market and that consumers typically take PPIs for longer periods and at higher doses than recommended," he said. Johnstone, who is now living with chronic kidney disease, said she was eager to take part in a class action investigationif it went ahead. While her kidney function has improved over time thanks to medication, it was still only sitting at around 60 percent, she said. "I'll have chronic kidney disease for the rest of my life and there is nothing I can do," she said. "I have a 10 year old special needs child. I live with this daily, knowing that I might die well before my time because of the kidney disease that I now have through no fault of my own. "I could leave my son and it's the most horrible feeling in the world." Johnstone said she was given no warning from the doctor who prescribed her medication that it could have any adverse effects. "He said it was the best treatment and would solve the problem. And it did. But there was no mention of what side effects could come from that," she said. A spokesperson for Takeda Pharmaceuticals, the manufacturers of Somac, said the company chose not to comment on potential or ongoing litigation. [GN] ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2024. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are $25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000. *** End of Transmission ***