/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/241028.mbx
C L A S S A C T I O N R E P O R T E R
Monday, October 28, 2024, Vol. 26, No. 216
Headlines
21 MAIN NORTH: Faces Fortner Suit Over Unpaid Wages, Retaliation
3COMMAS TECHNOLOGIES: Freeman Appeals Suit Dismissal to 9th Cir.
6D GLOBAL: Puddu Allowed to Distribute of Class Settlement Funds
AGC CHEMICALS: Pickering Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Aqueous Foams
AGC CHEMICALS: Tidler Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Chemicals & Foams
AGC CHEMICALS: Wilkins Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Foams
AISIN MANUFACTURING: Steinsultz BIPA Suit Removed to S.D. Ill.
ALLEGIANCE ADMINISTRATORS: Court Certifies Class in Cohen Suit
AMARO LAW: Jones Alleges Failure to Pay Proper Overtime
APPLE INC: Must Submit Settlement Supplemental Briefing Today
AUTO WAREHOUSING: Brown Suit Removed to N.D. California
BEST BEV: Johnson Seeks Proper Wages for Workers
BIEWER LUMBER: Can't Seek Judgment on Pleadings in Evans Suit
C. OVERAA: Motion to Compel Arbitration Granted in Walton Suit
CARDINAL HEALTH: Chavez Suit Removed from Sup. Ct. to C.D. Cal.
CAROL COLE COMPANY: Chambers Files Suit in S.D. California
CHRIS REYKDAL: Plaintiffs' Bid for Settlement Approval Denied
CITY OF NEW YORK: Order to Compel Ex-Mayor's Deposition Affirmed
COBB HOSPITAL: Kulwicki Suit Asserts Gender Discrimination
DEACONESS HEALTH: Discloses Personal Info to Meta, Juenger Says
DEERE & COMPANY: Workman Sues Over Tractors' Brake System Defect
DEL MONTE: Court Modifies Case Schedule in Vlacich Class Suit
DELTONA, FL: Must File Class Cert Response by Nov. 27
DIAMOND NAIL: $34K in Attys.' Fees and Costs Awarded in Lliguicota
DREAMLAND HOLDING: Does Not Pay Proper Wages, Faris Says
EPIC AIRCRAFT: Hanney's Bid for Approval of Class Notice Granted
EQUINOX HOLDINGS: Figueredo Suit Removed from Sup. Ct. to C.D. Cal.
EVOLVE BANK: Fails to Protect Customers' Info, Nieves Says
EVOLVE BANK: Fails to Safeguard Clients' Info, St-Louis Says
EVOLVE BANK: Fails to Secure Customers' Info, Ritchey Suit Claims
FIRST FEDERAL: Parties Must Confer Class Cert Deadlines
GEICO GENERAL: Marcelletti Must File Class Cert Bid by Feb. 4
GENERAL MILLS: Haver Suit Remanded to San Diego Superior Court
GEO GROUP: Parties in Gonzalez Seek to Seal Roster of Detainees
GOAUTO INSURANCE: Williams Appeals Suit Dismissal to 5th Circuit
HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA: Santoro Suit Removed to C.D. California
INTEGRITY TREE: Beckett Seeks Unpaid OT Wages Under FLSA
JWS ACQUISITIONS: Bid for Class Cert. Modified to May 23, 2025
KIA CORP: Faces Langerhans Suit Over Defective Sliding Side Doors
KOOTENAI HEALTH: Speelman Breach Suit Removed to D. Idaho
LABORATORY CORP: Wins Bid for Arbitration; Wiggins Suit Stayed
LENOVO GROUP: Court Stays Hermanson, et al. Lawsuit
LENS.COM: Court Grants Nail Until Oct. 31 to Amend Class Complaint
LINDE GAS: Maheia Class Suit Removed From Sup. Ct. to C.D. Cal.
LITTLE CAESAR: Court Extends Case Schedule in Cuevas Class Suit
LIVE NATION ENTERTAINMENT: Brain Suit Transferred to D. Montana
LLOYD'S OF LONDON: Wins Bid for Partial Summary Judgment in Drennen
MARBA PRODUCT: Faces Fidan Wage-and-Hour Suit in D.N.J.
MDL 3113: Transfer of Two Suits to Apple Antitrust Row Denied
MDL 3113: Whiteside v. Apple Transferred to D.N.J.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OH: Court Refuses to Dismiss Summit Sun Suit
NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP: Pelosi Suit Transferred to D. Montana
NEW TSI: Faces Tordi-Devine Suit Over Unauthorized Info Access
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY: Seeks to Adjourn Class Cert Oral Argument
PARAGON 28: Artificially Inflated Stock Price, Tiedt Suit Claims
PERMIAN RESOURCES: Ford Cty. Sues Over Gasoline Price-Fixing
PROCTER & GAMBLE: Court Narrows Claims in Bounthon, et al. Suit
R1 RCM: Filing for Class Certification Bids Due May 30, 2025
ROCKFORM TOOLING: Northrup Files Suit in Ill. Cir. Ct.
RURAL MEDIA: Discloses Video Info to 3rd Party, Wissel Alleges
RYDER INTEGRATED: Bobro Suit Removed to N.D. Illinois
SAFECO INSURANCE: Must Produce Requested Data in Moshier Suit
SAN DIEGO, CA: Settlement in Bloom, et al. Suit Gets Final Court OK
SEA WORLD: Joseph Suit Removed to C.D. California
SINGULARITY FUTURE: Seeks Dismissal of Crivellaro Suit
SNAPPLE BEVERAGE: Court Refuses to Dismiss Fried Consumer Suit
STAPLES THE OFFICE: Giordani Suit Removed to C.D. California
STEELSCAPE WASHINGTON: Class Cert Bid Extended to April 8, 2025
STREAMLINE FINISHES: Ramirez Labor Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
TAFT STETTINIUS: Court Dismisses 2nd Amended Fiecke-Stifter Suit
TAKARA SAKE: Tunick Suit Seeks Class Certification
TESLA INC: Suit Filed in C.D. California
TEXONA MARKETING: Sends Unwanted Telemarketing Calls, Wilson Says
THS GROUP: Jennings' Unlawful Ads Suit Removed to D.N.J.
TICKETMASTER LLC: Howitt Suit Transferred to D. Montana
TRANSUNION RISK: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Gonzalez Says
TRAVELERS CO: Faces Chirinian Suit Over Tobacco Use Penalty
TRUGREEN LIMITED: McClain Files TCPA Suit in M.D. Florida
UNIT MANAGER EVANS: Lovett Files Suit in S.D. Ohio
UNITED PARCEL: Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand Yelp Law Case Granted
UNITED STATES: Court Denies Bridgeland's Bid to Stay Powers v. VA
UNITED STATES: Court Issues Post-Trial Opinion in Powers v. VA
UNITED STATES: Final Judgment & Injunction Issued in Powers v. VA
UNITED STATES: Injunction Issued on Brentwood Lease in Powers v. VA
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Can Compel Arbitration in Ortega, et al. Suit
URBAN NATURAL: Harrell Seeks Equal Website Access for the Blind
USAA FEDERAL SAVINGS: Solana Suit Removed to E.D. New York
UST TESTING: Villasenor Suit Removed from Sup. Ct. to N.D. Cal.
VGW HOLDINGS: Plaintiff's Motion to Remand in Kennedy Suit Nixed
WALGREENS BOOTS: Faces Bhaila Securities Suit Over SEC Disclosure
WALGREENS BOOTS: Faces Labor Union Suit Over SEC Disclosure
WEST VIRGINIA: Court Grants Steele's Bid for Return of Filing Fee
*********
21 MAIN NORTH: Faces Fortner Suit Over Unpaid Wages, Retaliation
----------------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM FORTNER, and AUTUMN MCMANUS, individually, and on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. 21 MAIN
NORTH BEACH, LLC, a South Carolina limited liability company, and
LOVIN' OVEN CATERING OF SUFFOLK, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company, Defendants, Case No. 4:24-cv-05893-JD (D.S.C., October 15,
2024) is a collective and class action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and South Carolina Payment of Wages Act brought by
the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all other bartenders
and servers who work or have worked at Defendants' dining venues
and/or facilities at North Beach Resort during the applicable
statute of limitations.
According to the complaint, the Defendants committed federal and
state wage violations because they (1) compensated Plaintiffs and
all other similarly situated employed on their property at a
reduced sub-minimum wage but failed to provide them with
statutorily required notice of their intent to rely upon a tip
credit; (2) required to surrender portions of employees' tips to
pay for cash register shortages and/or share tips with supervisors
and/or managers; (3) required employees to work more than 40 hours
without paying them the appropriate federal overtime wages for this
work; (4) required to work more than 40 hours in workweeks when
they were paid at more than one hourly rate and failed to properly
calculate overtime wages owed; and (5) terminated Plaintiff,
Fortner, in direct response to him attempting to address certain
wage compliance issues with Defendants.
As a result, the Plaintiffs and all similarly situated bartenders
and servers have been denied federal and state minimum wages and
hard-earned tips during various workweeks within the relevant time
period and are entitled to recover this compensation.
Based in North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, 21 Main North Beach,
LLC offers guests numerous on-site dining options and venue
spaces.[BN]
The Plaintiffs are represented by:
Christopher C. Mingledorff, Esq.
MINGLEDORFF & PATTERSON, LLC
245 Seven Farms Drive, Suite 310, Box 13
Charleston, SC 29492
Telephone: (843) 471-1015
E-mail: chris@mptrial.com
- and -
Jordan Richards, Esq.
Michael V. Miller, Esq.
Patrick Solberg, Esq.
USA EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS JORDAN
RICHARDS, PLLC
1800 SE 10th Ave. Suite 205
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316
Telephone: (954) 871-0050
E-mail: jordan@jordanrichardspllc.com
michael@usaemploymentlawyers.com
patrick@usaemploymentlawyers.com
3COMMAS TECHNOLOGIES: Freeman Appeals Suit Dismissal to 9th Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
CHARLES FREEMAN, et al. are taking an appeal from a court order
dismissing their lawsuit entitled Charles Freeman, et al.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. 3Commas Technologies OU, Defendant, Case No.
3:23-cv-00101-RFL, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California.
As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit is
brought against the Defendant over alleged contract violation.
On May 15, 2024, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction.
On June 11, 2024, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the
briefing schedule and for jurisdictional discovery.
On Sept. 3, 2024, Judge Rita F. Lin granted the Defendant's motion
to dismiss and denied the Plaintiffs' motion for jurisdictional
discovery.
The appellate case is captioned Freeman, et al. v. 3Commas
Technologies OU, Case No. 24-6158, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on October 9, 2024.
The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:
-- Appellant's Mediation Questionnaire was due on October 15,
2024;
-- Appellant's Appeal Opening Brief is due on November 20, 2024;
and
-- Appellee's Appeal Answering Brief is due on December 20,
2024. [BN]
6D GLOBAL: Puddu Allowed to Distribute of Class Settlement Funds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Denise L. Cote of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York grants the Plaintiffs' Motion for Distribution
of Class Action Settlement Funds in the lawsuit entitled JOSEPH
PUDDU, MARK GHITIS, VALERY BURLAK and ADAM BUTTER, Plaintiffs v. 6D
GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., NYGG (ASIA), LTD., BENJAMIN TIANBING WEI
a/k/a BENJAMIN WEY, TEJUNE KANG; MARK SZYNKOWSKI, TERRY MCEWEN and
NYG CAPITAL LLC d/b/a NEW YORK GLOBAL GROUP, Defendants, Case No.
1:15-cv-08061-DLC (S.D.N.Y.).
Having considered all materials and arguments submitted in support
of the Plaintiffs' Motion for Distribution of Class Action
Settlement Funds (the "Motion"), including the Memorandum of Law in
Support of the Motion and the Declaration of Josephine Bravata
Concerning the Results of the Claims Administration Process, the
Court grants the Motion.
Unless otherwise defined, this order incorporates by reference the
definitions in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement filed
with the Court on Feb. 3, 2023 (the "Stipulation"). All terms not
otherwise defined will have the same meaning as set forth in the
Stipulation or the Bravata Declaration.
The administrative determinations of the Claims Administrator to
accept properly-documented, valid claims, as set forth in the
Bravata Declaration and Exhibits B-1 and B-2 thereto, are approved.
The administrative determinations of the Claims Administrator to
reject inadequately-documented and ineligible claims, set forth in
Exhibits D and E of the Bravata Declaration, respectively, are
approved.
Any person submitting claims received after June 27, 2024, and any
responses to rejected or deficient claims received after Sept. 27,
2024, the last day of the claims administration process, are
finally and forever barred from asserting such claims.
The distribution plan for the Net Settlement Fund as set forth in
the Bravata Declaration and accompanying exhibits is approved. The
funds that are currently in the Net Settlement Fund (less any
necessary amounts to be withheld for payment of potential tax
liabilities and related fees and expenses) will be distributed on a
pro rata basis to the Authorized Claimants, identified in Exhibits
B-1 and B-2 to the Bravata Declaration, pursuant to the Stipulation
and the Plan of Allocation of the Net Settlement Fund.
The checks for distribution to Authorized Claimants will bear the
notation "CASH PROMPTLY, VOID AND SUBJECT TO RE-DISTRIBUTION 180
DAYS AFTER ISSUE DATE." Lead Counsel and the Claims Administrator
are authorized to locate and/or contact any Authorized Claimant who
has not cashed his, her, or its check within said time. Authorized
Claimants who fail to negotiate a distribution check within the
time allotted or consistent with the terms outlined in the Bravata
Declaration will irrevocably forfeit all recovery from the
Settlement.
If any funds remain in the Net Settlement Fund by reason of
uncashed checks or otherwise, then, after the Claims Administrator
has made reasonable and diligent efforts to have Authorized
Claimants who are entitled to participate in the distribution of
the Net Settlement Fund cash their distribution checks, any balance
remaining in the account six (6) months after the initial
distribution of such funds will be used: (i) first, to pay any
amounts mistakenly omitted from the initial distribution to
Authorized Claimants and who would receive at least a $10.00
payment; (ii) second, to pay any additional Settlement
Administration Costs incurred in administering the Settlement; and
(iii) third, to make a second distribution to Authorized Claimants
who cashed their checks from the initial distribution and who would
receive at least $10.00 from such second distribution, after
payment of the estimated costs or fees to be incurred in
administering the Net Settlement Fund and in making this second
distribution, if such second distribution is economically
feasible.
If a balance still remains in the Net Settlement Fund after these
three uses, then the balance will be donated, half of the balance
to each, to the following two 501(c)(3), non-profit charitable
organizations serving the public interest: The American Red Cross;
and the Howard University Investor Justice & Education Clinic.
The Court finds that the administration of the Settlement and
proposed distribution of the Net Settlement Fund comply with the
terms of the Stipulation and the Plan of Allocation. All persons
involved in the review, verification, calculation, tabulation, or
any other aspect of the processing of the Claims submitted herein,
or otherwise involved in the administration or taxation of the
Settlement Fund or the Net Settlement Fund, are released and
discharged from any and all claims arising out of such involvement,
and all Settlement Class Members, whether or not they are to
receive payment from the Net Settlement Fund, are barred from
making any further claim against the Net Settlement Fund or the
released persons beyond the amount allocated to them pursuant to
this Order.
The Claims Administrator is ordered to discard (a) paper or hard
copies of claims and all supporting documents no less than two
years after the second distribution, if that occurs or, if there is
no second distribution, one year after all distributions of the Net
Settlement Fund to the eligible claimants; and (b) electronic
copies of the same no less than one year after all distributions of
the Net Settlement Fund have been made to the eligible claimants.
The Court retains jurisdiction over any further application or
matter, which may arise in connection with this Action.
A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 11, 2024, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/bd5d2njw from PacerMonitor.com.
AGC CHEMICALS: Pickering Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Aqueous Foams
------------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Pickering, and other similarly situated v. AGC
CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; ALLSTAR FIRE EQUIPMENT; AMEREX
CORPORATION; ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BASF CORPORATION;
BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION;
CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.;
CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA,
INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a
DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND
COMPANY; FIRE-DEX, LLC; GLOBE MANUFACTURING COMPANY LLC; HONEYWELL
SAFETY PRODUCTS USA,INC.; KIDDE PLC; LION GROUP, INC.; MALLORY
SAFETY AND SUPPLY LLC; MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES CO., LLC; MUNICIPAL
EMERGENCY SERVICES, INC.; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL
FOAM, INC.; PBI PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS, INC.; SOUTHERN MILLS, INC.;
STEDFAST USA, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as
successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.; a, W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES INC.; and 3M COMPANY
(f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, Case No.
2:24-cv-05955-RMG (D.S.C., Oct. 18, 2024), is brought for personal
injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams
("AFFF") and firefighter turnout gear ("TOG") containing the toxic
chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances
("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is not limited to, perfluorooctanoic
acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and
related chemicals including those that degrade to PFOA and/or
PFOS.
AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and
civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires. TOG is personal protective equipment
designed for heat and moisture resistance in order to protect
firefighters in hazardous situations. Most turnout gear is made up
of a thermal liner, moisture barrier, and an outer layer. The inner
layers contain PFAS, and the outer layer is often treated with
additional PFAS.
The Defendants collectively designed, marketed, developed,
manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced
instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or otherwise released
into the stream of commerce AFFF or TOG with knowledge that it
contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFAS, which would expose
end users of the product to the risks associated with PFAS.
Further, defendants designed, marketed, developed, manufactured,
distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional
materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used
underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF or TOG which
contained PFAS for use in firefighting.
PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain
in the human body while presenting significant health risks to
humans.
The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF or TOG products were used by
the Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change
in the products' condition. Plaintiff were unaware of the dangerous
properties of the Defendants' AFFF or TOG products and relied on
the Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the
products. Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal
absorption of PFAS from Defendant's AFFF or TOG products caused
Plaintiff to develop the serious medical conditions and
complications alleged herein.
Through this action, Plaintiff seek to recover compensatory and
punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant
damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to Defendants'
AFFF or TOG products at various locations during the course of
Plaintiff's training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further
seek injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the
same, says the complaint.
The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to,
AFFF and TOG in training and to extinguish fires during his working
career as a military and/or civilian firefighter and was diagnosed
with thyroid disease and other injuries, as a result of exposure to
Defendants' AFFF or TOG products.
The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors, and sellers of
PFAS-containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing
chemicals used in AFFF production.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Eric W. Cracken, Esq.
Steven D. Davis, Esq.
TORHOERMAN LAW LLC
210 S. Main Street
Edwardsville, IL 62025
Phone: 618-656-4400
Facsimile: 618-656-4401
AGC CHEMICALS: Tidler Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Chemicals & Foams
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Tidler, and other similarly situated v. AGC CHEMICALS
AMERICAS INC.; ALLSTAR FIRE EQUIPMENT; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA
U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BASF CORPORATION; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT
COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.;
CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB
FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS,
INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX
CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; FIRE-DEX, LLC;
GLOBE MANUFACTURING COMPANY LLC; HONEYWELL SAFETY PRODUCTS
USA,INC.; KIDDE PLC; LION GROUP, INC.; MALLORY SAFETY AND SUPPLY
LLC; MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES CO., LLC; MUNICIPAL EMERGENCY SERVICES,
INC.; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; PBI
PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS, INC.; SOUTHERN MILLS, INC.; STEDFAST USA,
INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as
successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.; a, W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES INC.; and 3M COMPANY
(f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, Case No.
2:24-cv-05956-RMG (D.S.C., Oct. 18, 2024), is brought for personal
injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams
("AFFF") and firefighter turnout gear ("TOG") containing the toxic
chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances
("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is not limited to, perfluorooctanoic
acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and
related chemicals including those that degrade to PFOA and/or
PFOS.
AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and
civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires. TOG is personal protective equipment
designed for heat and moisture resistance in order to protect
firefighters in hazardous situations. Most turnout gear is made up
of a thermal liner, moisture barrier, and an outer layer. The inner
layers contain PFAS, and the outer layer is often treated with
additional PFAS.
The Defendants collectively designed, marketed, developed,
manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced
instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or otherwise released
into the stream of commerce AFFF or TOG with knowledge that it
contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFAS, which would expose
end users of the product to the risks associated with PFAS.
Further, defendants designed, marketed, developed, manufactured,
distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional
materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used
underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF or TOG which
contained PFAS for use in firefighting.
PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain
in the human body while presenting significant health risks to
humans.
The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF or TOG products were used by
the Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change
in the products' condition. Plaintiff were unaware of the dangerous
properties of the Defendants' AFFF or TOG products and relied on
the Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the
products. Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal
absorption of PFAS from Defendant's AFFF or TOG products caused
Plaintiff to develop the serious medical conditions and
complications alleged herein.
Through this action, Plaintiff seek to recover compensatory and
punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant
damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to Defendants'
AFFF or TOG products at various locations during the course of
Plaintiff's training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further
seek injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the
same, says the complaint.
The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to,
AFFF and TOG in training and to extinguish fires during his working
career as a military and/or civilian firefighter and was diagnosed
with thyroid disease and other injuries, as a result of exposure to
Defendants' AFFF or TOG products.
The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors, and sellers of
PFAS-containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing
chemicals used in AFFF production.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Eric W. Cracken, Esq.
Steven D. Davis, Esq.
TORHOERMAN LAW LLC
210 S. Main Street
Edwardsville, IL 62025
Phone: 618-656-4400
Facsimile: 618-656-4401
AGC CHEMICALS: Wilkins Sues Over Exposure to Toxic Foams
--------------------------------------------------------
Scott Wilkins, and other similarly situated v. AGC CHEMICALS
AMERICAS INC.; ALLSTAR FIRE EQUIPMENT; AMEREX CORPORATION; ARCHROMA
U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.; BASF CORPORATION; BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT
COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION; CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.;
CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.; CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB
FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA, INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS,
INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX
CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; FIRE-DEX, LLC;
GLOBE MANUFACTURING COMPANY LLC; HONEYWELL SAFETY PRODUCTS
USA,INC.; KIDDE PLC; LION GROUP, INC.; MALLORY SAFETY AND SUPPLY
LLC; MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES CO., LLC; MUNICIPAL EMERGENCY SERVICES,
INC.; NATION FORD CHEMICAL COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; PBI
PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS, INC.; SOUTHERN MILLS, INC.; STEDFAST USA,
INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS LP, as
successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC. (f/k/a
GE Interlogix, Inc.; a, W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES INC.; and 3M COMPANY
(f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, Case No.
2:24-cv-05954-RMG (D.S.C., Oct. 18, 2024), is brought for personal
injury resulting from exposure to aqueous film-forming foams
("AFFF") and firefighter turnout gear ("TOG") containing the toxic
chemicals collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances
("PFAS"). PFAS includes, but is not limited to, perfluorooctanoic
acid ("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and
related chemicals including those that degrade to PFOA and/or
PFOS.
AFFF is a specialized substance designed to extinguish
petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades by military and
civilian firefighters to extinguish fires in training and in
response to Class B fires. TOG is personal protective equipment
designed for heat and moisture resistance in order to protect
firefighters in hazardous situations. Most turnout gear is made up
of a thermal liner, moisture barrier, and an outer layer. The inner
layers contain PFAS, and the outer layer is often treated with
additional PFAS.
The Defendants collectively designed, marketed, developed,
manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced
instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or otherwise released
into the stream of commerce AFFF or TOG with knowledge that it
contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFAS, which would expose
end users of the product to the risks associated with PFAS.
Further, defendants designed, marketed, developed, manufactured,
distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional
materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used
underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF or TOG which
contained PFAS for use in firefighting.
PFAS binds to proteins in the blood of humans exposed to the
material and remains and persists over long periods of time. Due to
their unique chemical structure, PFAS accumulates in the blood and
body of exposed individuals. PFAS are highly toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals. Defendants knew, or should have known, that PFAS remain
in the human body while presenting significant health risks to
humans.
The Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF or TOG products were used by
the Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change
in the products' condition. Plaintiff were unaware of the dangerous
properties of the Defendants' AFFF or TOG products and relied on
the Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the
products. Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal
absorption of PFAS from Defendant's AFFF or TOG products caused
Plaintiff to develop the serious medical conditions and
complications alleged herein.
Through this action, Plaintiff seek to recover compensatory and
punitive damages arising out of the permanent and significant
damages sustained as a direct result of exposure to Defendants'
AFFF or TOG products at various locations during the course of
Plaintiff's training and firefighting activities. Plaintiff further
seek injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief arising from the
same, says the complaint.
The Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to,
AFFF and TOG in training and to extinguish fires during his working
career as a military and/or civilian firefighter and was diagnosed
with thyroid cancer, thyroid disease and other injuries, as a
result of exposure to Defendants' AFFF or TOG products.
The Defendants are designers, marketers, developers, manufacturers,
distributors, releasers, instructors, promotors, and sellers of
PFAS-containing AFFF products or underlying PFAS containing
chemicals used in AFFF production.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Eric W. Cracken, Esq.
Steven D. Davis, Esq.
TORHOERMAN LAW LLC
210 S. Main Street
Edwardsville, IL 62025
Phone: 618-656-4400
Facsimile: 618-656-4401
AISIN MANUFACTURING: Steinsultz BIPA Suit Removed to S.D. Ill.
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as JONATHON STEINSULTZ,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
AISIN MANUFACTURING ILLINOIS, LLC, Case No. 2024LA27 (Filed Sept.
17, 2024), was removed from the Circuit Court of Marion County,
Illinois to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois on Oct. 17, 2024.
The Southern Illinois District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:24-cv-02331 to the proceeding.
The suit alleges violation of the Illinois Biometric Information
Privacy Act ("BIPA").
Mr. Steinsultz defines the class as:
"All individuals working for Aisin Manufacturing Illinois, LLC
in the State of Illinois who had their biometric identifiers
and/or biometric information collected, captured, received,
obtained, maintained, stored or disclosed by Defendant during
the applicable statutory period."
Among the relief Steinsultz seeks are statutory damages of $5,000
per violation for each of Defendant's allegedly willful and/or
reckless violation of BIPA, and of $1,000 per violation for each of
Defendant's allegedly negligent violations of BIPA, pursuant to 740
ILCS 14/20.
Aisin manufactures automotive parts and components.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
James B. Zouras, Esq.
STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
222 W. Adams St. Suite 2020
Chicago, IL 60606
Telephone: (312) 233-1550
Facsimile: (312) 233-1560
E-mail: rstephan@stephanzouras.com
jzouras@stephanzouras.com
The Defendant is represented by:
Christopher Ward, Esq.
FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
321 North Clark Street, Suite 2800
Chicago, IL 60654-5313
Telephone: (312) 832-4500
Facsimile: (312) 832-4700
E-mail: cward@foley.com
ALLEGIANCE ADMINISTRATORS: Court Certifies Class in Cohen Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James L. Graham of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio granted plaintiff's motion for class
certification in the case captioned as Shmuel Cohen et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. Allegiance Administrators, LLC et al., Defendants,
Case No. 2:20-cv-3411 (S.D. Ohio) under Rule 23(b)(2).
The class shall be defined as follows:
Each person who entered into an Excess Wear & Tear Protection
Waiver with Defendants to provide coverage for a leased vehicle and
who (a) submitted at least one eligible claim for coverage under
the Waiver Agreement and (b) was denied coverage for a stated
reason set forth in Defendants' claims report (or other
substantively similar document) that is not a grounds for
non-coverage under the terms and conditions set forth in the Waiver
Agreement.
Plaintiffs Shmuel Cohen, Yehuda Fischer, and Eliezer Rosenberger
bring this putative class action to vindicate the contractual
rights of themselves and those similarly situated who entered into
contracts with Defendants Allegiance Administrators, LLC and
Autoguard Advantage Corporation. Defendant(s) "Extra Wear & Tear
Protection Waiver" provided reimbursement for excess wear and tear
assessments levied by the lessor of a leased vehicle when the
lessee turned it in at the end of a lease. The Waiver was meant to
insure motor vehicle leaseholders for certain damage, colloquially
called excess wear and tear, as specified in the Waiver's terms and
conditions.
Plaintiffs are lessees who purchased such contracts. Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant had a policy and practice of denying eligible
claims for reasons not justified under the terms and conditions of
the contract. Plaintiffs assert that this action qualifies for
class action certification because it involves common questions of
law and fact and because the claims of class members can be
adjudicated based on the existence of objective facts contained in
the claims records.
Defendant denies that it had a practice or policy of denying claims
based on reasons not justified in the contract and asserts that the
re-adjudication of any denied claim would require individual
consideration of subjective decisions made by claims adjusters
based on the unique facts of each case, rendering this matter
inappropriate for a class action.
The Court previously granted Allegiance Administrators' Motion for
Summary Judgment, thereby leaving Autoguard Advantage Corporation
as the sole remaining Defendant in this case. Plaintiffs move for
the Court to certify its proposed class and name them as class
representatives. The Court held an evidentiary hearing and
entertained counsel's oral arguments on the legal and factual
issues this case presents on August 9, 2024.
Plaintiffs' claims fall into two distinct categories: 1) claims
denied for the stated reason that the damage was caused by a
collision and 2) claims that were denied for the stated reason that
they were for scratches or dents in excess of certain dimensions.
Plaintiffs claim that there is no contractual basis for the
exclusion of a claim for either of those reasons. Plaintiffs have
produced clear and convincing evidence that Defendant had a custom
and practice of denying claims for both of those reasons, and it is
clear from the language of the Waiver Agreements that neither of
those grounds for denial was justified under the terms and
conditions of the Waiver Agreements.
Plaintiffs argue that the class is ascertainable by examining the
claims report of each individual class member. Furthermore,
Plaintiffs state that within the claims report, there is evidence
of Defendant's practice of denying claims for extra-contractual
reasons, specifically for "collision damage" and for scratches and
dents greater than 12 and 4 inches respectively.
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' proposed class is not
ascertainable because determination of membership requires a
subjective analysis of the stated reason for denial contained in
the claims report. Defendant's claims personnel testified that in
order to determine the reason for the denial of a claim under the
waiver, it would be necessary to review the photographs and
measurements contained in the file. Defendant further argues that
there is no objective test the Court can apply to determine class
membership and that the proposed class fails to "establish definite
boundaries of a readily identifiable class."
The Court is not persuaded by Defendant's arguments. The evidence
supports a finding that Defendant recorded the reasons for denial
of a claim in the section of its claim form entitled "Corrective
Action", as well as in other sections of the claim file. The Court
further finds that in the Corrective Action section, as well as in
other sections of Defendant's records, notations such as
"collision", "not wear and tear", "dents 4+ inches" and "scratches
12+ inches" are objective evidence of an improper denial.
Under Rule 23(a)(2), a plaintiff is required to show that "there
are questions of law or fact common to the class."
The Court finds Plaintiffs have satisfied the commonality
requirement by establishing the presence of common questions of law
and fact, in this case:
1) whether Defendant had a practice of denying eligible claims
for reasons other than those outlined in the Waiver Agreement; and
2) whether a denial for extra-contractual reasons constitutes a
breach of contract.
The next requirement, under Rule 23(a)(3), states that the claims
of the representative parties be typical of the claims of the
class.
Plaintiffs argue that the three named Plaintiffs are typical. Each
obtained Waiver Agreements submitted claims under the waiver
agreement, and all had claims denied for reasons they claimed did
not correspond to coverage exclusions in the Waiver Agreements.
Plaintiffs claim that Defendant has a practice of denying claims
for other unjustified reasons, as documented in the claims records,
such as a policy for denying claims for scratches in excess of 12
inches and dents over 4 inches in diameter.
As with the commonality requirement, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs' proposed class satisfies the typicality requirement
under Rule 23(a)(4). Each class member's claim arises out of the
same event: Defendant's practice of improperly denying claims. The
fact that the amount of damages may differ between each class
member does not disqualify this class since the claims all arise
out of Defendant's improper practice of denying claims for
extra-contractual reasons. Based on the facts presented, it is
clear that the claims of representative plaintiffs are indicative
of the rest of the proposed class. Each suffered damages based on
Defendant's practice of denying claims for
extra-contractual reasons and therefore, the proposed class
satisfies the typicality requirement under Rule 23(a)(4).
The Court next turns to the adequacy requirement under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(a)(4). "The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to
uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class
they seek to represent. A class representative must be part of the
class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as
the class members." Based on this Court's inquiry,
According to the Court, Plaintiffs satisfy the adequacy requirement
because they possess qualified counsel, and the named Class
Representatives possess the same interest and injury as the rest of
the Class. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have
satisfied all of the requirements under Rule 23(a).
In addition to the requirements under Rule 24(a), Plaintiffs must
satisfy at least one of the Rule 23(b) requirements. In the class
action presently before the Court, Plaintiffs claim that the action
satisfies the requirements under Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3).
Under Rule 23(b)(2), a Court is permitted to certify a class action
when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate
respecting the class as a whole."
Under this rule, class actions are considered "mandatory", meaning
that "potential class members do not have an automatic right to
notice or a right to opt out of the class."
The Court agrees with Plaintiff's theory that the monetary damages
in this case are incidental. As Plaintiff articulates, the monetary
damages threshold is low, as members of the proposed class are
entitled to a maximum of $1,000 for each separate occurrence,
subject to a maximum of $5,000. Additionally, calculating the
damages awarded to each class member is a simple mathematical
calculation. Even though each Plaintiff will likely be entitled to
a unique amount, the monetary damages are not dependent on each
individual member's injuries. Put differently, the damages in this
case are capable of computation by means of objective standards.
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to pursue a
class action under Rule 23(b)(2).
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed class action is entitled to
proceed under Rule 23(b)(3). Given that Plaintiffs satisfy the
requirements for a Rule 23(b)(2) class, the Court need not consider
the merits of Plaintiffs' claim for class certification under Rule
23(b)(3).
A copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated October 14, 2024, is
available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=6kZQ1r
AMARO LAW: Jones Alleges Failure to Pay Proper Overtime
-------------------------------------------------------
KRISTEN FERGUSON JONES, JENNIFER ARISPE, VANESSA GARCIA, ASHLEY
RIOS, CYNTHIA ANN MARTINEZ, KRYSTAL DELPH, MICHELLE RIOS, NATALIE
TRUJILLO, and MYRNA ESTOPIER, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. AMARO LAW FIRM Defendant, Case
No. 4:24-cv-03927 (S.D. Tex., October 15, 2024) alleges that the
Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs and others similarly situated
overtime wages when they work/worked in excess of 40 hours in a
workweek as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act.
According to the complaint, the Defendant's actions were willful
and intentional, as it was informed many times that it had not
compensated Plaintiffs and the other Class Members the proper
payment for overtime hours they worked. Rather than compensating
Plaintiff and the other Class Members, the Defendant repeatedly
lied and delayed payments in order to run out the statute of
limitations and pay as little as possible.
The Plaintiffs are all former legal assistants and paralegals
working for the Defendant.
Amaro Law Firm is a Texas law firm that specializes in personal
injury cases.[BN]
The Plaintiffs are represented by:
Gregg M. Rosenberg, Esq.
ROSENBERG & ASSOCIATES
3518 Travis Street, Suite 200
Houston, TX 77002
Telephone: (713) 960-8300
Facsimile: (713) 621-6670
E-mail: gregg@rosenberglaw.com
APPLE INC: Must Submit Settlement Supplemental Briefing Today
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California ordered the parties in the
case captioned as CHRIS SMITH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. APPLE, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-09527-HSG (N.D. Calif.), to file
supplemental briefing to address the issues in the proposed
settlement agreement.
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for preliminary
approval of class action settlement. The Court held a hearing on
the motion and took it under submission on October 3, 2024. Having
reviewed the motion and proposed settlement agreement in more
detail, the Court finds that the parties have not submitted
sufficient evidence on two points that are central to the Court's
determination of whether the parties' proposal falls within the
range of a "fundamentally fair, adequate and reasonable" settlement
such that the Court may grant preliminary approval.
First, the Court's guidelines for submitting class action
settlements for preliminary approval require such motions to state
"the class recovery under the settlement (including details about
and the value of injunctive relief), the potential class recovery
if plaintiffs had fully prevailed on each of their claims, claim by
claim, and a justification of the discount applied to the claims."
Plaintiffs' motion does meet this requirement because it does not
include an estimate of the potential class recovery at trial.
Instead, it generally asserts that trial "carried considerable risk
of a lesser recovery or none at all," without assessing how the
settlement compares to the reasonably likely result at trial. As
such, the Court has no basis for evaluating whether the settlement
incorporates a discount, and if it does, whether that discount
falls within the realm of reasonableness.
Second, the proposed settlement agreement provides that if the
number of Settlement Class members who elect to exclude themselves
from the Settlement Class exceeds the threshold agreed to by the
Parties and confidentially submitted to the Court in camera, Apple,
in its sole discretion, may elect to reject this Settlement, in
which case the entire Agreement shall be null and void. However, as
of the date of this Order, the parties have not actually submitted
the document containing this provision for the Court's review.
Without this information, the Court is not able to evaluate the
reasonableness of this term.
A copy of the Court's Order dated October 15, 2024, is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=Kw6Yh9
AUTO WAREHOUSING: Brown Suit Removed to N.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Mario B. Brown, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated v. AUTO WAREHOUSING CO.; and DOES 1 to 100,
inclusive, Case No. C24-02405 was removed from the Superior Court
of the State of California, County Contra Costa, to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California, on
Oct. 18, 2024, and assigned Case No. 3:24-cv-07300.
The Complaint contains five causes of action: failure to pay wages
for all hours worked at minimum wage; failure to authorize or
permit meal periods; failure to indemnify employees for
employment-related losses/expenditures; failure to provide complete
and accurate wage statements; and unfair business practices in
violation of Business and Professions Code.[BN]
The Defendants are represented by:
Gregory G. Iskander, Esq.
Kaa Bao Ju, Esq.
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
Treat Towers
1255 Treat Boulevard, Suite 600
Walnut Creek, CA 94597
Phone: 925.932.2468
Fax: 925.946.9809
Email: giskander@littler.com
kju@littler.com
BEST BEV: Johnson Seeks Proper Wages for Workers
------------------------------------------------
SHAKIE JOHNSON, on behalf of himself, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly-situated, Plaintiff v. BEST BEV LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 3:24-cv-01260-BKS-ML (N.D.N.Y., October 15,
2024) is a class action against the Defendant for alleged unlawful
labor practices in violation of the New York Labor Law.
According to the complaint, the Defendant has compensated Plaintiff
and all other workers whose duties required them to perform manual
labor for at least 25% of their work in New York on a bi-weekly
basis, and as such Defendant has failed to provide timely and
proper wages to Plaintiff and all other Manual Workers in New York.
The Defendants also failed to furnish accurate wage statements and
failed to furnish accurate wage notices.
Plaintiff Johnson has been employed for the Defendant as a
processing tech since January 5, 2024 until the present, at the
facility located in Waverly, New York.
Best Bev LLC is a full service beverage contract manufacturing
company that is responsible for batching and canning all beverages,
including energy drinks, ready to drinks, wines, carbonated sodas,
sparkling water, still water, juices, and functional
beverages.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Michael J. Borrelli, Esq.
BORRELLI & ASSOCIATES, P.L.L.C.
910 Franklin Avenue, Suite 205
Garden City, NY 11530
Telephone: (516) 248-5550
Facsimile: (516) 248-6027
BIEWER LUMBER: Can't Seek Judgment on Pleadings in Evans Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as JOHN EVANS and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. BIEWER LUMBER, LLC, Defendant, CAUSE NO.
3:23-CV-3094-CWR-LGI (S.D. Miss.), Judge Carlton W. Reeves of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi denied Evans' motion to extend time to seek amendment
of his pleadings and Biewer Lumber's motion seeking judgment on the
pleadings under Rule 12(c) without prejudice.
John Evans alleges that Biewer Lumber operates a
racially-discriminatory workplace in Newton County, Mississippi.
"Black workers are kept on the cleaning crew and other less
desirable jobs," "are passed over for promotional opportunities,"
and "receive less pay for equal work," he says. He filed this suit
in November 2023 seeking relief on behalf of all Black workers at
that site.
Between then and June 2024, Biewer Lumber did not file a motion
challenging the pleadings. Along the way, in May 2024, the
Magistrate Judge issued a Class Certification Scheduling Order
containing relevant discovery deadlines.
On Biewer Lumber's deadline for exchanging class
certification-related disclosures, however, it filed 13 pages of
"Objections" to the schedule, calling it a "fishing expedition." It
argued that it was faced with "a legally deficient, unartfully pled
complaint against it that does not even mention the basic
requirements of Rule 23," and said it would "likely" file a
dispositive motion.
In June 2024, Evans filed a motion to extend his time to seek
amendment of the pleadings. Biewer Lumber opposes that request.
Biewer Lumber then filed a motion seeking judgment on the pleadings
under Rule 12(c). Evans opposes that motion. Biewer Lumber's
response accuses Evans of sandbagging. "He has failed to act
diligently."
Judge Reeves says, "It was Biewer Lumber that caused the present
delay when it failed for more than five months to file a Rule 12
motion challenging the sufficiency of Evans' class allegations. It
was Biewer Lumber that failed to properly seek review of the Class
Certification Scheduling Order. Biewer Lumber's attorneys cannot
now blame the resulting delay on their opponent."
The Court concludes under Fifth Circuit precedent, Evans is
entitled to amend his complaint and allege his "best case." An
amended complaint is due in 14 days from the date of this Order.
Biewer Lumber can then answer or file a Rule 12 motion. Biewer
Lumber may also elect to seek a stay of class discovery. The Court
will then take up the pending motion(s), if any. Class discovery
shall be stayed until further notice.
A copy of the Court's Order dated October 15, 2024, is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=wZovgz
C. OVERAA: Motion to Compel Arbitration Granted in Walton Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California granted C. Overaa & Co.'s
motion to compel arbitration in the case captioned as JASON WALTON,
Plaintiff, v. C. OVERAA & CO., Defendant, Case No. 24-cv-03658-LB
(N.D. Calif.). The Court also dismissed the PAGA claim and stayed
the case.
In this putative wage-and-hours class action filed in state court
and removed to federal court, the plaintiff sued his former
employer C. Overaa & Co., asserting state-law wage-and-hours
claims, including a failure to pay minimum and overtime wages and
provide rest and meal breaks. He also asserts a derivative
unfair-competition claim and a claim under the Private Attorneys
General Act.
The parties are subject to a collective-bargaining agreement, which
requires individual arbitration of the wage-and-hours claims and
precludes PAGA claims under a carve-out in the California Labor
Code for employees in the construction industry. Overaa thus moved
to compel arbitration and for judgment on the PAGA claim The
plaintiff did not oppose the motion to arbitrate overall but
asserts that a different CBA applies that does not preclude PAGA
claims. The operative CBA requires arbitration and precludes the
PAGA claim.
Overaa removed the case to federal court based on federal-question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. The parties consented to
magistrate-judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(c)(1). The
court held a hearing on October 10, 2024.
The remaining issue is whether the plaintiff must arbitrate on an
individual rather than classwide basis. A party may not be
compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there
is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do
so.
Judge Beeler concludes that the 2022–2027 CBA is valid and
governs the plaintiff's claims. It contains a valid PAGA waiver
pursuant to Section 2699.6 of the California Labor Code, which bars
the plaintiff's PAGA claim. The 2022–2027 CBA is silent as to
class-wide arbitration, so the plaintiff must arbitrate his
wage-and-hours claims individually. The court grants Overaa's
motion to compel individual arbitration and grants the motion for
judgment on the PAGA claim.
A copy of the Court's Order dated October 14, 2024, is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=pPdfH2
CARDINAL HEALTH: Chavez Suit Removed from Sup. Ct. to C.D. Cal.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as PEDRO CHAVEZ, MATTHEW CORREA,
and ANGEL M. CISNEROS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, v. CARDINAL HEALTH 110, LLC; CARDINAL HEALTH
200, LLC; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Case No. 24STCV22512
(Filed Sept. 3,2024), was removed from the Los Angeles Superior
Court to the United States District Court for the Central District
of California on Oct. 17, 2024.
The Central California District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:24-cv-08973 to the proceeding.
The suit alleges that the Defendant failed to pay minimum wages;
failed to pay overtime wages; failed to provide meal periods,
failed to provide rest periods; failed to reimburse business
expenses; and failed to pay all wages due upon separation of
employment.
Cardinal Health distributes pharmaceutical products.[BN]
The Defendants are represented by:
Adam Y. Siegel, Esq.
Orlando Arellano, Esq.
Rebecca Kim, Esq.
JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
725 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2500
Los Angeles, CA 90017-5408
Telephone: (213) 689-0404
Facsimile: (213) 689-0430
E-mail: Adam.Siegel@jacksonlewis.com
Orlando.Arellano@jacksonlewis.com
Rebecca.Kim@jacksonlewis.com
CAROL COLE COMPANY: Chambers Files Suit in S.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Carol Cole Company,
Inc. The case is styled as Onika Chambers, individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated v. Carol Cole
Company, Inc. doing business as: Nuface, Case No.
3:24-cv-01938-DMS-MSB (S.D. Cal., Oct. 18, 2024).
The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud for Product Liability.
Carol Cole Company, Inc. doing business as NuFACE --
https://www.mynuface.com/ -- offers facial toning devices, skincare
sets, and skincare serums and gels for all types of skin.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Gregory Marc Sinderbrand, Esq.
SINDERBRAND LAW GROUP, PC
2829 Townsgate Road, Suite 100
Westlake Village, CA 91361
Phone: (818) 370-3912
Email: greg@sinderbrandlaw.com
- and -
Jenna Louise Gavenman, Esq.
Joshua Glatt, Esq.
Joshua Wilner, Esq.
Lawrence Timothy Fisher, Esq.
BURSOR & FISHER P.A.
1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
Walnut Creek, CA 94596
Phone: (925) 300-4455
Email: jgavenman@bursor.com
jglatt@bursor.com
jwilner@bursor.com
ltfisher@bursor.com
CHRIS REYKDAL: Plaintiffs' Bid for Settlement Approval Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Lauren King of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington denied without prejudice plaintiffs'
second motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement
and for certification of settlement class in the case captioned as
N.D., et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHRIS REYKDAL, et al., Defendants,
CASE NO. 2:22-cv-01621-LK (W.D. Wash.).
Defendants filed a notice stating that they do not oppose the
motion.
Plaintiffs filed this motion seeking preliminary approval of the
parties' amended class action settlement and certification of a
settlement class.
The Court finds several problems exist with Plaintiffs' proposed
notice plan for putative class members.
First, both proposed notices include an incorrect case number for
this case.
Second, Plaintiffs' motion contains two different time periods for
the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction to direct
local education agencies to provide direct notice to class members.
Third, the settlement agreement states that in addition to direct
notice to class members, OSPI "shall publish notice of this
settlement, including a link to the Court's judgment, on its
website and in its regular bulletins for a period of at least 30
days following the Court's judgment."
Finally, the amended Settlement Agreement continues to require the
Court to exercise jurisdiction over a broad swath of appeals of
"any proposal" to offer compensatory education and the failure of
LEAs to reconvene IEP teams.
A copy of the Court's Order dated October 15, 2024, is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=SWPQqT
CITY OF NEW YORK: Order to Compel Ex-Mayor's Deposition Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as McCONNELL DORCE, CECELIA JONES, and
SHERLIVIA THOMAS-MURCHINSON, individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, -against- CITY OF NEW YORK,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-02216 (JLR) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge
Jennifer L. Rochon of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York rejected the Municipal Defendants'
objections and fully adopted Magistrate Judge Cave's Order granting
Plaintiffs' request to depose former New York City Mayor Bill de
Blasio. Municipal Defendants shall make Mr. de Blasio available for
a deposition not to exceed two hours on the record.
On March 18, 2019, Plaintiffs commenced this action against, among
others, Municipal Defendants, challenging the Municipal Defendants'
operation of the Third-Party Transfer Program, through which the
City forecloses on tax-delinquent properties and transfers them to
third-party real estate developers. Most relevant in this case,
Plaintiffs allege that the Municipal Defendants discriminated
against minority homeowners and neglected to provide adequate
notice to homeowners prior to seizing their property.
On August 27, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a letter-motion seeking to
compel a four-hour deposition of Mr. de Blasio. The next day,
Magistrate Judge Cave denied as moot Plaintiffs' motion to compel
and instead construed Plaintiffs' motion as a pre-motion request
for a discovery conference pursuant to Local Rule 37.2.
The parties held a discovery conference on September 3, 2024,
during which Magistrate Judge Cave heard from Defendants and
Plaintiffs on the issue. Magistrate Judge Cave ordered that a
limited deposition of Mr. de Blasio go forward. Magistrate Judge
Cave ordered, however, that the deposition be limited to two hours
of on-the-record time.
Now before the Court are the Municipal Defendants' Rule 72
objections to Magistrate Judge Cave's September 3, 2024 Order, and
Plaintiffs' opposition thereto.
The Municipal Defendants request that the Court either:
(1) sustain their objections to Magistrate Judge Cave's Order,
vacate the Order, and deny the deposition request, or, failing
that,
(2) sustain their objections to the extent of vacating the Order
and remanding the matter for further consideration, with
opportunity provided to oppose the deposition application.
The Court rejects the Municipal Defendants' requests and orders the
Municipal Defendants to produce Mr. de Blasio for a deposition, not
to exceed two hours on the record, consistent with Magistrate Judge
Cave's September 3, 2024 Order.
Municipal Defendants argue that "Plaintiffs fall short of meeting
the demanding standard for deposing a present or former high
government official," and maintain that Magistrate Judge Cave
misapplied the controlling legal standard in concluding otherwise.
The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Cave's conclusion and finds
no basis for holding that Magistrate Judge Cave committed "clear
error" in compelling Mr. de Blasio's deposition.
Magistrate Judge Cave referenced the appropriate test for
determining whether high-ranking government officials should be
subjected to depositions. She then correctly applied that standard
to the facts and evidence herein, which demonstrate that the former
mayor has unique and non-duplicative information pertaining to the
continuation and implementation of the TPT program.
Defendants do not contest that Mr. de Blasio was the key
decision-maker behind electing to continue foreclosure actions
pursuant to the TPT program.
Magistrate Judge Cave also properly determined that the burden of
sitting for a deposition is substantially lessened in this case,
where Mr. de Blasio is no longer in office.
Defendants' cited cases do not require a contrary result.
Municipal Defendants separately argue that Magistrate Judge Cave
compelled Mr. de Blasio's deposition "without providing adequate
due process." According to Municipal Defendants, Magistrate Judge
Cave should have offered them a "full and fair opportunity to brief
the issue" instead of rendering a determination at the conclusion
of the parties' pre-motion conference. The Court finds a review of
the record demonstrates that the Municipal Defendants had a fair
opportunity to be heard.
A copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated October 15, 2024, is
available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=TP1xNz
COBB HOSPITAL: Kulwicki Suit Asserts Gender Discrimination
----------------------------------------------------------
TARA M. KULWICKI, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. COBB HOSPITAL, INC., a/k/a
WELLSTAR COBB HOSPITAL, INC., and WELLSTAR HEALTH SYSTEM, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:24-cv-04658-MLB-CCB (N.D. Ga., October 15,
2024) is brought under the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1944 arising from the Defendants' unlawful actions that were
discriminatory on the basis of Plaintiffs' sex.
According to the complaint, the Defendants' health care policy
discriminates against non-heterosexual female employees on the
basis of sex (female-sexual orientation and sex stereotyping). The
Defendants' actions engaged in sex discrimination against a class
of lesbian employees -- and other women failing to conform to
traditional stereotypes associated with female reproduction in
violation of Title VII, as amended, says the complaint.
Plaintiff Kulwicki, a lesbian, started working for Defendants as a
registered nurse and enrolled in their medical plan. On July 27,
2021, after Kulwicki sought precertification for Comprehensive
Infertility Services benefits, Defendants' health plan notified
Kulwicki that she was allegedly denied reproductive healthcare
assistance because she did not meet the criteria under the plan's
definition of infertility.
Cobb Hospital, Inc., a/k/a Wellstar Cobb Hospital, Inc., is a
medical hospital that is part of Defendant, Wellstar Health System,
Inc., with a principal place of business in Austell, Georgia.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
MaryBeth V. Gibson, Esq.
GIBSON CONSUMER LAW GROUP, LLC
4279 Roswell Road, Suite 208-108
Atlanta, GA 30342
Telephone: (678) 642-2503
E-mail: marybeth@gibsonconsumerlawgroup.com
- and -
Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
Kelly Iverson, Esq.
Jamisen Etzel, Esq.
LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP
1133 Penn Ave.
Pittsburgh, PA 15232
Telephone: (412) 322-9243
Facsimile: (412) 231-0246
E-mail: gary@lcllp.com
kelly@lcllp.com
jamisen@lcllp.com
- and -
Colleen E. Ramage, Esq.
RAMAGE LYKOS, LLC
525 William Penn Place, 28th Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15232
Telephone: (412) 325-7700
Facsimile: (412) 325-7755
E-mail: cramage@ramagelykos.law
DEACONESS HEALTH: Discloses Personal Info to Meta, Juenger Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
JOEL JUENGER, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. DEACONESS HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., DEACONESS ILLINOIS RED
BUD REGIONAL HOSPITAL, INC., and RED BUD ILLINOIS HOSPITAL COMPANY,
LLC d/b/a RED BUD REGIONAL HOSPITAL, Case No. 3:24-cv-02332 (S.D.
Ill., Oct. 17, 2024) is a class action to address Defendants'
outrageous, illegal, and widespread practice of disclosing the
confidential Personally Identifying Information and/or Protected
Health Information of the Plaintiff and the proposed Class Members
to third parties, including Meta Platforms, Inc. d/b/a Meta, and
Google, LLC and potentially others.
When Plaintiff and Class Members used RBR's Website and Online
Platforms, they thought they were communicating exclusively with
their trusted healthcare provider. Unbeknownst to them, RBR
embedded pixels from Facebook and Google, and possibly others, into
its Website and Online Platforms, surreptitiously forcing the
Plaintiff and Class Members to transmit intimate details about
their medical treatment to third parties without their consent, the
suit alleges.
The information that RBR's Meta Pixel, and possibly CAPI, sent to
Facebook included the Private Information that the Plaintiff and
the Class Members submitted to RBR's Website and Online Platforms,
including their browsing activities, including the pages they
viewed and the buttons they clicked; information concerning their
statuses as patients such as patient portal activities; information
concerning their medical concerns such as the providers they
searched for and viewed and the medical services they viewed; as
well as her identifying information, such as IP addresses and
identifying cookies. The Defendants breached their duties by
failing to exercise reasonable care in supervising their agents,
contractors, vendors, and suppliers in the handling and securing of
the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members, the suit
asserts.
As a direct, proximate, and traceable result of the Defendants'
negligence and/or negligent supervision, the Plaintiff and Class
Members have suffered or imminently will suffer injury and damages,
including monetary damages, inappropriate advertisements and use of
their Private Information for advertising purposes, and increased
risk of future harm, embarrassment, humiliation, frustration, and
emotional distress, added the suit.
Mr. Juenger is a patient of the Defendants and a victim of their
unauthorized disclosure of private information.
Deaconess is a provider of health care services.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Lynn A. Toops, Esq.
Amina A. Thomas, Esq.
COHEN & MALAD, LLP
One Indiana Square, Suite 1400
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Telephone: (317) 636-6481
E-mail: ltoops@cohenandmalad.com
athomas@cohenandmalad.com
- and -
J. Gerard Stranch, IV, Esq.
Andrew E. Mize, Esq.
Emily E. Schiller, Esq.
STRANCH, JENNINGS & GARVEY, PLLC
The Freedom Center
223 Rosa L. Parks Avenue, Suite 200
Nashville, TN 37203
Telephone: (615) 254-8801
Facsimile: (615) 255-5419
E-mail: gstranch@stranchlaw.com
amize@stranchlaw.com
eschiller@stranchlaw.com
- and -
Samuel J. Strauss, Esq.
Raina C. Borrelli, Esq.
STRAUSS & BORELLI, PLLC
One Magnificent Mile
980 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 1610
Chicago, IL 60611
Telephone: (872) 263-1100
E-mail: sam@straussborrelli.com
raina@straussborrelli.com
DEERE & COMPANY: Workman Sues Over Tractors' Brake System Defect
----------------------------------------------------------------
LEROY WORKMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DEERE & COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
6:24-cv-05950-BHH (D.S.C., October 18, 2024) is a class action
against the Defendant for breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, unjust enrichment, strict liability, and violation
of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
The case arises from the Defendant's design, production, marketing,
and distribution of John Deere Compact Utility Tractors with
defective brake systems. In more detail, the brake system defect in
the Class tractors stems from the front bell crank in the brake
linkage. This front bell crank can fail causing the tractor to lose
braking, resulting in a crash hazard. Moreover, the Defendant's
recall, which includes a free fix and repair clause in which it
will repair and replace the faulty parts, will cost the Plaintiff
and the Class hours of their time. As a result of the Defendant's
improper engineering, design, or manufacturing, the Plaintiff and
the Class suffered damages, says the suit.
Deere & Company is a tractor manufacturer based in Moline,
Illinois. [BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Paul J. Doolittle, Esq.
POULIN | WILLEY | ANASTOPOULO
32 Ann Street
Charleston, SC 29403
Telephone: (803) 222-2222
Facsimile: (843) 494-5536
Email: paul.doolittle@poulinwilley.com
cmad@poulinwilley.com
DEL MONTE: Court Modifies Case Schedule in Vlacich Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JENNIFER VLACICH, BRENDA
ROBERT, ELENA NACARINO, ANA KRISTIC, CHRISTINA VINK, LORA GRODNICK,
LISA MALARA, AND TEENA STAMBAUGH, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, v. DEL MONTE FOODS, INC., Case No.
4:22-cv-00892-JST (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Jon Tigar entered an
order modifying case schedule as follows:
Event Current Revised
Deadline Deadline
Class certification opposition and Oct. 30, 2024 Nov. 8,
2024
Defendants' class certification
expert disclosures due
Class certification expert Nov. 21, 2024 Nov. 29,
2024
discovery cut-off
Class certification reply due Dec. 5, 2024 Dec. 17,
2024
Hearing on Motion for Class Jan. 9, 2025 No Change
Certification and Appointment of
Class Representatives and Class
Counsel
On March 12, 2024, this Court entered an Order setting the schedule
for Class Certification.
On Aug. 30, 2024, the Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class
Certification.
On Sept. 11, 2024, Defendant served Notices of Deposition of
Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ Class Certification Experts, and
offered to confer with Plaintiffs regarding alternative dates if
any of the noticed dates were unavailable.
Del Monte is an American food production and distribution company
and subsidiary of NutriAsia.
A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 16, 2024, is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=qdNriW at no extra
charge.[CC]
The Plaintiffs are represented by:
Jonas Jacobson, Esq.
Simon Franzini, Esq.
Rick Lyon, Esq.
DOVEL & LUNER, LLP
201 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 600
Santa Monica, CA 90401
Telephone: (310) 656-7066
Facsimile: (310) 656-7069
E-mail: jonas@dovel.com
simon@dovel.com
rick@dovel.com
- and -
Zack Broslavsky, Esq.
BROSLAVSKY & WEINMAN, LLP
1500 Rosecrans Ave, Suite 500
Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
Telephone: (310) 575-2550
Facsimile: (310) 464-3550
E-mail: zbroslavsky@bwcounsel.com
The Defendant is represented by:
Erik K. Swanholt, Esq.
John J. Atallah, Esq.
Kelsey C. Boehm, Esq.
FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
555 South Flower Street, Suite 3300
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2418
Telephone: 213.972.4500
Facsimile: 213.486.0065
E-mail: eswanholt@foley.com
jatallah@foley.com
kboehm@foley.com
DELTONA, FL: Must File Class Cert Response by Nov. 27
-----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Anson, et al., v. City of
Deltona, Case No. 6:23-cv-00766 (M.D. Fla., Filed April 27, 2023),
the Hon. Judge Julie S. Sneed entered an order granting the
Defendant's unopposed motion for extensions of time.
-- On or before Nov. 8, 2024, the Defendant shall respond to
Plaintiffs' motion to certify class.
-- On or before Nov. 27, 2024, the Plaintiffs shall reply to
Defendant's response.
The nature of suit states real property -- Torts to Land.
Deltona is a city in Volusia County, Florida, United States. It is
located on the northern shore of Lake Monroe.[CC]
DIAMOND NAIL: $34K in Attys.' Fees and Costs Awarded in Lliguicota
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled MARIA OLGA LLIGUICOTA, Plaintiff v. DIAMOND
NAIL & SPA CT INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:21-cv-01073-VAB
(D. Conn.), Judge Victor A. Bolden of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Connecticut awards Troy Law, PLLC, a total of
$33,639 in attorneys' fees and costs.
Plaintiff Maria Olga Lliguicota, having succeeded at trial, moves
for attorney's fees and costs for her counsel, Troy Law, PLLC, in
this Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") action. The Court grants
Troy Law's Motion for attorneys' fees and costs. A total of
$33,639.93 is awarded in attorneys' fees and costs.
Troy Law represented Maria Olga Lliguicota and Shangming Lu in a
FLSA class action against Diamond Nail & Spa CT Inc., Yan Zhi Liu,
and Yue Zhu Chen.
On July 9, 2024, a satisfied settlement mooted out Shangming Lu's
claim, and his case was dismissed. Lliguicota proceeded to a jury
trial on her claims, held on July 9, 2024. The jury returned a
special verdict in favor of the Lliguicota but only against Diamond
Nail & Spa CT, Inc., as Yan Zhi Liu and Yue Zhu Chen, the other
Defendants, were not found to be liable successors in this action.
Judgment was entered in favor of Lliguicota against Diamond Nail &
Spa CT Inc.
On Aug. 15, 2024, Lliguicota moved for attorney fees and costs
requesting a total of $33,639.93 in attorney fees and costs. The
Plaintiff argues they were the prevailing party because they
received a judgment in their favor.
The Court agrees. Accordingly, as a prevailing party, the Plaintiff
is entitled to receive attorney's fees and costs.
Judge Bolden opines that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown the
appropriateness of awarding hourly rates slightly above this
District's normal range.
For these reasons, the Court grants the Plaintiff's motion. A total
of $33,639.93 is awarded in attorneys' fees and costs. The Clerk of
Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
A full-text copy of the Court's Ruling and Order dated Oct. 11,
2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4kckk42s from
PacerMonitor.com.
DREAMLAND HOLDING: Does Not Pay Proper Wages, Faris Says
--------------------------------------------------------
TERESA FARIS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DREAMLAND HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 1:24-cv-00381 (S.D. Ala., October 15, 2024) is a
collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act brought on
behalf of the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated after
Defendant denied them federal minimum wages during various
workweeks within the relevant time period.
According to the complaint, the Defendant committed federal wage
violations because it: (1) compensated restaurant servers at a
sub-minimum wage each hour/week, but failed to provide Plaintiff
and all others similarly situated with statutorily required notice
of taking a tip credit under the FLSA, and (2) required Plaintiff
and all others similarly situated to more than occasionally perform
improper types, and/or excessive amounts, of non-tipped jobs, and
non-serving duties.
The Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a non-exempt, hourly
restaurant server at the Dreamland BBQ in Mobile, Alabama beginning
in October 2023 until the end of his employment on June 19, 2024.
Dreamland Holding Company operates a restaurant chain, "Dreamland
BBQ," with 11 locations throughout Alabama and Georgia.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Erby J. Fischer, Esq.
MORGAN & MORGAN BIRMINGHAM, PLLC
216 Summit Boulevard, Ste. 300
Birmingham, AL 35243
Telephone: (659) 204-6364
Facsimile: (659) 204-6389
E-mail: efischer@forthepeople.com
- and -
Andrew R. Frisch, Esq.
MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
8151 Peters Road 4th Floor
Plantation, FL 33324
Telephone: (954) 327-5355
E-mail: afrisch@forthepeople.com
- and -
Jordan Richards, Esq.
Michael Miller, Esq.
USA EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS-JORDAN RICHARDS, PLLC
1800 SE 10th Ave. Suite 205
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316
Telephone: (954) 871-0050
E-mail: jordan@jordanrichardspllc.com
EPIC AIRCRAFT: Hanney's Bid for Approval of Class Notice Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Mustafa T. Kasubhai of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Oregon, Eugene Division, grants in part the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of Form and Manner of Class Notice
in the lawsuit captioned BRUNO HANNEY and PAUL TAYLOR, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. EPIC
AIRCRAFT, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendant,
Case No. 6:21-cv-01199-MK (D. Or.).
The Plaintiffs filed this class action against Defendant Epic
Aircraft, LLC, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and alleging that the
Defendant violated the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act
("UTPA"). The class was certified May 10, 2024.
Consistent with the requirement for class notice, the Plaintiffs
have submitted for the Court's approval short- and long-form
notices which they propose emailing (as to both forms of notice)
and mailing (as to the long-form notice) to the parties. The
Defendant raised several objections to the Plaintiffs' proposed
form and manner of class notice.
The Defendant argues that class members must be allowed to opt-out
of the class via email rather than mail if they so choose. But this
argument is unsupported by any authority--much less binding
authority--that is comparable to the circumstances of this case,
Judge Kasubhai opines. Here, where the class size is relatively
small and the amount of potential damages is large, the Court finds
that requiring a physical opt-out form with a wet ink signature is
reasonable.
However, Judge Kasubhai says, to avoid an undue burden on class
members, who choose to opt-out of the class, the Plaintiffs are
ordered to include with their long-form notice a form for such
individuals to fill out to request an opt-out. That form will be on
a separate page, and included with it will be a self-addressed
envelope.
The Defendant also argues that the Plaintiffs' class notice does
not comply with Rule 23(c)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure because the short-form notice, which will be emailed to
the parties, does not contain all the required information.
However, Judge Kasubhai notes, that information is contained in the
long-form notice which will be attached to the e-mail, as well as
mailed directly to class members. The Court finds that this is
sufficient to satisfy the class notice requirements.
The Defendant further argues that the long-form notice does not
include sufficient detail to satisfy Rule 23(c)(2)(B)(iii), which
requires inclusion of "defenses" in "clearly and concisely state in
plain, easily understood language."
After reviewing Defendant's Answer, the Court finds that the
long-form notice contains sufficient detail regarding the
Defendant's pled defenses and, therefore, complies with the rule.
Finally, the Defendant proposed several redline edits to portions
of the long-form notice. After reviewing these proposals along with
the class definitions and requirements under the rule, the Court
finds the proposed redline edits unnecessary to reasonably notice
the class as required under the rule.
In sum, after careful review of the proposed short- and long-form
notices and consideration of the parties' arguments in briefing and
during oral argument on Sept. 24, 2024, the Court finds that the
Plaintiffs' proposed form and manner of class notice is reasonable
and is the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
consistent with due process, and contains all the information
required under Rule 23(c)(2)(B).
Thus, with the exception of the language changes, which were agreed
upon by the parties, as well as the requirement that the Plaintiffs
include an opt-out form with a self-addressed envelope, Judge
Kasubhai approves the Plaintiffs' proposed form and manner of class
notice.
The Court further adopts the Plaintiffs' proposed notice plan. The
Defendant will provide a list of names, email addresses and last
known mailing addresses of class members to class counsel within 14
days of this order. Class counsel will email and mail all notices
to class members within 28 days of entry of this order. Class
counsel will file a declaration of service of class notice along
with a list of all class members, who requested to be excluded from
the classes, within 75 days of the date of the emailing/mailing of
the class notice.
The Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of Form and Manner of Class
Notice is granted in part, Judge Kasubhai holds. The Plaintiffs'
short- and long-form class notices are approved except as
modified.
A full-text copy of the Court's Amended Opinion & Order dated Oct.
11, 2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/ypkcr96k from
PacerMonitor.com.
EQUINOX HOLDINGS: Figueredo Suit Removed from Sup. Ct. to C.D. Cal.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as JUAN CAMILO FIGUEREDO, an
individual, and KAROLY MAYER, an individual on behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated, v. EQUINOX HOLDINGS, INC., a
Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No.
24STCV23259 (Filed Sept. 9, 2024), was removed from the Superior
Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles to the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
on Oct. 17, 2024.
The Central California District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:24-cv-08977 to the proceeding.
The Complaint seeks individual and class damages based on the
following alleged claims: failure to pay minimum wages, failure to
pay overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods, failure to
provide rest periods, failure to provide accurate wage statements,
failure to properly compensate employees paid by piece rate,
unlawful deduction of wages, failure to pay all wages due upon
separation, failure to pay wages timely during employment, failure
to maintain accurate payroll records, failure to reimburse business
expenses, and violation of the Unfair Competition Law.
The Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and
"all current and former Employees within the State of
California who, at any time four (4) years prior to the filing
of this lawsuit, are or were employed as Personal Trainers and
in similar and related positions" by Equinox.
The Plaintiffs additionally seek to certify the following putative
subclasses, as defined in the Complaint:
Minimum Wages Subclass:
"All Class Members who were not compensated for all hours
worked for Defendants at the applicable minimum wage."
Wages and Overtime Subclass:
"All Class Members who were not compensated for all hours
worked for Defendants at the required rates of pay, including
for all hours worked in excess of eight in a day and/or forty
in a week."
Meal Period Subclass:
"All Class Members who were subject to Defendants' policy
and/or practice of ailing to provide unpaid 30- minute
uninterrupted and duty-free meal periods or one hour of pay at
the Employee's regular rate of pay in lieu thereof."
Wage Statement Subclass:
"All Class Members who, within the applicable limitations
period, were not provided with accurate itemized wage
statements."
Equinox Holdings is an American luxury fitness company and health
club.[BN]
The Defendants are represented by:
John S. Battenfeld, Esq.
Samson C. Huang, Esq.
Eva M. Nofri, Esq.
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
300 South Grand Avenue
Twenty-Second Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90071-3132
Telephone: (213) 612-2500
Facsimile: (213) 612-2501
E-mail: john.battenfeld@morganlewis.com
samson.huang@morganlewis.com
eva.nofri@morganlewis.com
EVOLVE BANK: Fails to Protect Customers' Info, Nieves Says
----------------------------------------------------------
ENRIQUE NIEVES, on behalf of himself, and all others similarly
situated v. EVOLVE BANK & TRUST, Case No. 2:24-cv-02788-SHL-cgc
(M.D. Fla., Oct. 17, 2024) sues the Defendant for its failure to
properly secure, safeguard, and adequately destroy sensitive
Personally Identifiable Information provided by and belonging to
Plaintiff and Class Members, including names, addresses, dates of
birth, Social Security numbers, financial account information, and
other account and personal information, that it had acquired and
stored for its business purposes.
On Feb. 9, 2024, cybercriminals gained unauthorized access to the
Defendant's internal computer networks. The Defendant detected the
intrusion on May 29, 2024. Before that discovery, the
cybercriminals accessed and exfiltrated the PII of 7,640,112
individuals, including that of Plaintiff and Class Members. The
Defendant's failure to implement adequate and reasonable measures
to protect Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII, failure to timely
detect the Data Breach, failure to take adequate steps to prevent
and stop the Data Breach, failure to disclose the material facts
that it did not have adequate security practices in place to
safeguard the PII, and failure to provide timely and adequate
notice of the Data Breach—caused substantial harm and injuries to
Plaintiff and Class Members across the United States, the Plaintiff
contends.
Until notified of the breach, the Plaintiff and Class Members had
no idea their PII had been compromised, and that they were, and
continue to be, at significant risk of identity theft and various
other forms of personal, social, and financial harm. The risk will
remain for the rest of their lives, added the suit.
Plaintiff Nieves is a victim of the Data Breach. Mr. Nieves
received an e-mail dated June 26, 2024, from Affirm advising him of
the Data Breach.
Evolve Bank is a national banking and financial institution that
offers financial services to its customers including checking
accounts, savings accounts, debit cards, personal loans, and
financial management services, including through the Affirm
Card.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Stephanie A. Casey, Esq.
Julie Braman Kane, Esq.
Sabrina S. Saieh, Esq.
COLSON HICKS EIDSON, P.A.
255 Alhambra Circle, Penthouse
Coral Gables, FL 33134
Telephone: (305) 476-7400
E-mail: scasey@colson.com
julie@colson.com
sabrina@colson.com
EVOLVE BANK: Fails to Safeguard Clients' Info, St-Louis Says
------------------------------------------------------------
CARMELOT ST-LOUIS, JORDAN BELL, CHARLIE ANDERSON, DAVID HENDERSON,
and JOSE MORAN, on behalf of themselves individually and all others
similarly situated v. EVOLVE BANK & TRUST, an Arkansas corporation,
Case No. 2:24-cv-02786-SHL-cgc (E.D. Ark., Oct. 17, 2024) sues the
Defendant for its failure to properly secure and safeguard
personally identifiable information including, Plaintiffs' and
Class Members' name, Social Security Number, date of birth, account
information and/or other personal information.
In late May 2024, the Defendant claims that an unauthorized party
accessed Defendant's computer network. The Defendant disregarded
the rights of Plaintiffs and Class Members by intentionally,
willfully, recklessly, and/or negligently failing to take and
implement adequate and reasonable measures to ensure that the
Private Information of Plaintiffs and Class Members was
safeguarded. The Defendant further disregarded their rights by
failing to take available steps to prevent an unauthorized
disclosure of data, and failing to follow applicable, required, and
appropriate protocols, policies, and procedures for the encryption
of data, even for internal use, the Plaintiffs contend.
Because of the Data Breach, the Plaintiffs and Class Members
suffered ascertainable losses in the form of the loss of the
benefit of their bargain, out-of-pocket expenses, and the value of
their time reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate the effects of
the attack and the substantial and imminent risk of identity theft,
the suit alleges.
Mr. St-Louis is a Citizen of Margate, Florida and intends to remain
there throughout this litigation. He received notice from the
Defendant when it lost his PII.
Evolve is a banking institution incorporated and chartered under
the laws of Arkansas.[BN]
The Plaintiffs are represented by:
Martha Tucker Ayres, Esq.
TABLE LAW PLLC
Markham Executive Center
10201 W. Markham St., Suite 311
Little Rock, AR 72205
Telephone: (501) 491-0300
- and -
Jarrett L. Ellzey, Esq.
ELLZEY & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
1105 Milford Street
Houston, TX 77006
Telephone: (888) 350-3931
Facsimile: (888) 276-3455
E-mail: jarrett@ellzeylaw.com
EVOLVE BANK: Fails to Secure Customers' Info, Ritchey Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JULIE RITCHEY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated V. EVOLVE BANK AND TRUST, Case No. 2:24-cv-02787-SHL-cgc
(E.D. Ark., Oct. 17, 2024) alleges that the Defendant failed to
properly secure and safeguard the personally identifiable
information of approximately 7,640,112 individuals1, including
their names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, driver's
license numbers, federal/state identification card numbers, tax
identification numbers, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses,
bank account numbers, and other financial account information.
On June 26, 2024 the Defendant announced that it was "currently
investigating a cybersecurity incident involving a known
cybercriminal organization that appears to have illegally obtained
and released on the dark web the data and personal information of
some Evolve retail bank customers and financial technology
partners' customers." The affected individuals include Evolve's
direct customers and the customers of Evolve's current and former
financial technology ("fintech") partners, whom Defendant refers to
as "end users."
As a direct result of the Data Breach, the Plaintiff and Class
Members have suffered fraud and will continue to be exposed to a
heightened and imminent risk of fraud and identity theft,
potentially for the rest of their lives. The Plaintiff and Class
Members must now and in the future closely monitor their financial
accounts to guard against identity theft, the lawsuit asserts.
The Plaintiff and Class Members may also incur out-of-pocket costs
for purchasing credit monitoring services, identity theft
protection services, credit freezes, credit reports, and other
protective measures to deter and detect identity theft, added the
lawsuit.
The Plaintiff provided her PII to the Defendant in connection with
her personal account and credit card with point-of-sale installment
loan company, Affirm Holdings, Inc.
Evolve is a full-service financial services company that
specializes in payment processing solutions and banking.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Randall K. Pulliam, Esq.
Joseph Henry (Hank) Bates, III, Esq.
CARNEY BATES & PULLIAM, PLLC
One Allied Drive, Suite 1400
Little Rock, AR 72202
Telephone: (501) 312-8500
E-mail: rpulliam@cbplaw.com
hbates@cbplaw.com
- and -
Nada Djordjevic, Esq.
DICELLO LEVITT LLP
Ten North Dearborn St., Sixth Floor
Chicago, IL 60602
Telephone: (312) 214-7900
E-mail: ndjordjevic@dicellolevitt.com
- and -
Joshua Neuman, Esq.
POGUST GOODHEAD LLC
Eight Tower Bridge
161 Washington St Suite 250
Conshohocken, PA 19428
Telephone: (610) 941-4204
E-mail: jneuman@pogustgoodhead.com
FIRST FEDERAL: Parties Must Confer Class Cert Deadlines
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Summey v. First Federal
Foundation, Inc., Case No. 6:24-cv-01862 (M.D. Fla., Filed Oct. 16,
2024), the Hon. Judge Paul G. Byron entered an order directing the
parties to confer regarding deadlines pertinent to a motion for
class certification and advise the Court of agreeable deadlines in
their case management report.
-- The deadlines should include a deadline for
(1) disclosure of expert reports - class action, plaintiff and
defendant;
(2) discovery - class action;
(3) motion for class certification;
(4) response to motion for class certification; and
(5) reply to motion for class certification.
The suit alleges violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.[CC]
GEICO GENERAL: Marcelletti Must File Class Cert Bid by Feb. 4
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOHN MARCELLETTI, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, v. GEICO
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 6:23-cv-06211-EAW-MWP
(W.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Marian Payson entered an order as
follows:
1. Class Focused Fact Discovery Deadlines:
The Court will not strictly bifurcate merits discovery from
class discovery.
The parties have proposed an initial six-month period of
non-
expert fact discovery wherein the parties will focus on
obtaining the fact discovery they believe is necessary
relating
to Plaintiff's anticipated motion for class certification.
As such, the Court orders that the period of class focused
non-
expert fact discovery shall end on Jan. 6, 2025.
2. Class Certification Briefing/Class-Based Expert Discovery:
a. Plaintiff shall file his motion for class certification
and
supporting papers (including any expert
reports/declarations
in support thereof) by Feb. 4, 2025.
b. If Plaintiff files any expert reports/declarations in
support
of his class certification motion, Defendant shall have
until
March 25, 2025, to depose Plaintiff's experts.
c. Defendant shall file its papers in opposition to
Plaintiff's
motion for class certification (including any expert
reports/declarations in support thereof) by April 8, 2025.
d. A hearing on Plaintiff's class certification motion to be
scheduled by the Court at its earliest convenience after
July
29, 2025.
GEICO writes private passenger automobile insurance in all 50 U.S.
states and the District of Columbia.
A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 16, 2024, is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=qNrxBs at no extra
charge.[CC]
GENERAL MILLS: Haver Suit Remanded to San Diego Superior Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California remands the lawsuit styled DIANA
HAVER, on behalf of herself, all others similarly situated, and the
general public, Plaintiff v. GENERAL MILLS, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 3:24-cv-01269-CAB-MMP (S.D. Cal.), to the Superior Court of the
State of California for the County of San Diego.
Plaintiff Diana Haver filed her putative class action lawsuit in
San Diego County Superior Court. Her case theory is that Defendant
General Mills deceptively marketed "Fruit Snacks" to contain "Real
Fruit Juice," when, according to the Plaintiff, the snacks in
question were sweetened entirely with added sugars.
The Plaintiff brought claims under the California Unfair
Competition Law (UCL) and the California False Advertising Law
(FAL) in state court seeking both injunctive relief and equitable
relief in the form of disgorgement and restitution.
The Defendant removed to federal court, claiming jurisdiction under
the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), and the Plaintiff moved for
remand.
Judge Bencivengo finds that the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction under the CAFA. Judge Bencivengo opines that the
Defendant has met that burden here. First, the Defendant removed
this cause from the state court within 30 days. Moreover, the
Plaintiff alleges that the putative class consists of "at least
thousands of members." Similarly, there is no question that one
class member (Plaintiff) is diverse from the sole Defendant: they
are residents of California and both Minnesota and Delaware
respectively.
The only open issue is whether the amount in controversy exceeds
$5,000,000. The Plaintiff has not pleaded a request for damages.
Instead, the Plaintiff seeks restitution and disgorgement of (among
other monetary gains) revenues, profits, and earnings from the sale
of the relevant product.
According to a declaration submitted by a General Mills finance
manager responsible for marketing and sales data for the
Defendant's products across California, total in-state sales of the
fruit snacks in question during the class period exceeded $5
million. From this uncontested evidence, the Court is satisfied
that this lawsuit meets the jurisdictional threshold set by CAFA.
Judge Bencivengo finds that the Plaintiff lacks Article III
standing for her request for injunctive relief. The Plaintiff has
not pleaded any concrete intention to purchase the relevant product
in the future--and, thus, has failed to overcome a standing
requirement imposed by the Ninth Circuit.
As the Plaintiff does not have Article III standing to maintain her
claim for injunctive relief in federal court, the Court remands
that claim for adjudication at the state level.
The Court also lacks equitable jurisdiction over the remaining
claims; hence, remand is appropriate. Although the Court shares the
Defendant's concern for "end-runs" around federal statutes, the
principles of federalism and proper judicial administration point
to remand where this Court cannot offer the Plaintiff any relief
under purely state causes of action.
In ruling that remand is appropriate, the Court finds persuasive
those opinions by lower courts in this Circuit that have addressed
the same issues head on and have come to the same conclusion.
Judge Bencivengo opines that the Defendant's jurisdictional waiver
argument is unavailing. The Court is exercising its inherent
authority (as recognized in Cate) when petitioned as a court of
equity.
Judge Bencivengo holds that the Plaintiff lacks Article III
standing to maintain its claim for injunctive relief, and the Court
lacks equitable jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's remaining claims
in equity. As such, the Court grants the Plaintiff's motion. The
case is remanded to the Superior Court of San Diego County
(originally filed as Case No. 37-2024-00028888-CU-BT-CTL).
A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 11, 2024, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4w9prrkj from PacerMonitor.com.
GEO GROUP: Parties in Gonzalez Seek to Seal Roster of Detainees
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as HUGO GONZALEZ, JOSE BACA,
ERICK LOPEZ, MARIO MANJARREZ, and RICARDO SANDOVAL GUADARRAMA, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, v. The GEO
Group, Inc., a Florida corporation, DOES 1-10, Case No.
2:22-cv-04014-JGB-SHK (C.D. Cal.), the Parties ask the Court to
enter an order sealing the roster of detainees filed in support of
GEO's opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.
On Oct. 15, 2024, GEO filed its opposition to Plaintiffs' motion
for class certification. In support of its opposition, GEO relies
on a roster of detainees showing the certain housing units to which
they were assigned on the date of the incident in question.
The roster contains information about the detainees, including
their A-numbers, countries of origin and dates of arrival in the
country. Because of this identifying information, a compelling
reason exists for the roster not to be disclosed to the public.
GEO Group provides rehabilitation programs to individuals while
in-custody and post-release into the community.
A copy of the Parties' motion dated Oct. 16, 2024, is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=RoA64h at no extra
charge.[CC]
The Plaintiffs are represented by:
Catherine Sweetser, Esq.
Tessa R. Baizer, Esq.
UCLA LAW CLINICS
385 Charles E Young Drive
East Los Angeles, CA 90095
E-mail: csweetser@sshhzlaw.com
baizer@law.ucla.edu
- and -
Paul Hoffman, Esq.
John Washington, Esq.
SCHONBRUN SEPLOW HARRIS
HOFFMAN & ZELDES LLP
200 Pier Avenue, #226
Hermosa Beach, CA 90245
Telephone: (310) 396-0731
E-mail: hoffpaul@aol.com
jwashington@sshhzlaw.com
- and -
Barrett S. Litt, Esq.
Lindsay Battles, Esq.
McLANE, BEDNARSKI & LITT,
LLP
975 East Green Street
Pasadena, CA 91106
Telephone: (626) 844-7660
E-mail: blitt@mbllegal.com
lbattles@mbllegal.com
The Defendant is represented by:
Susan E. Coleman, Esq.
Deann R. Rivard, Esq.
BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP
444 South Flower Street, Suite 2400
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2953
Telephone: (213) 236-0600
Facsimile: (213) 236-2700
E-mail: scoleman@bwslaw.com
drivard@bwslaw.com
- and -
Joseph L. Mcgeady, Esq.
Ariel N. Redfern, Esq.
Marshall C. Wallace, Esq.
ALLEN MATKINS LECK GAMBLE MALLORY & NATSIS LLP
One America Plaza
600 West Broadway, 27th Floor
San Diego, CA 92101-0903
Telephone: (619) 233-1155
Facsimile: (619) 233-1158
E-mail: jmcgeady@allenmatkins.com
aredfern@allenmatkins.com
mwallace@allenmatkins.com
GOAUTO INSURANCE: Williams Appeals Suit Dismissal to 5th Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
KIMBERLY WILLIAMS, et al. are taking an appeal from a court order
dismissing their lawsuit entitled Kimberly Williams, et al.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. GoAuto Insurance Company, et al., Defendants, Case
No. 3:21-cv-00092, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Louisiana.
As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
challenge whether Defendant GoAuto Insurance Company's procedure
for cancelling policies complies with Louisiana Revised Statute
section 9:3550, which governs the cancellation due to non-payment
of financed automobile insurance policies.
On Jan. 15, 2024, the Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment and the Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on the deficiencies in GoAuto's cancellation procedures.
On Sept. 25, 2024, Judge Brian A. Jackson granted the Defendants'
motion for summary judgment and denied the Plaintiffs' motion for
partial summary judgment. The Plaintiffs' claims against the
Defendants were dismissed with prejudice.
In sum, the Court held that GoAuto's cancellation procedure
complies with the statute because the request for cancellation is
delivered to GoAuto by a "private carrier," and the request is
"received" by GoAuto. Additionally, because under the statute, the
cancellation will be effective at 12:01 a.m. on the day after the
grace period ends, it is irrelevant that GoAuto's system marks the
policies as cancelled before the notices of cancellation are
received.
The appellate case is captioned Williams v. GoAuto Insurance, Case
No. 24-30646, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, filed on October 9, 2024. [BN]
Plaintiffs-Appellants KIMBERLY WILLIAMS, et al., individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented by:
Roy L. Bergeron, Jr., Esq.
SIMIEN & SIMIEN, L.L.C.
7908 Wrenwood Boulevard
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
Telephone: (225) 932-9221
Defendants-Appellees GOAUTO INSURANCE COMPANY, et al. are
represented by:
Loretta Gallaher Mince, Esq.
FISHMAN HAYGOOD, L.L.P.
201 Saint Charles Avenue
Place Saint Charles
New Orleans, LA 70170
Telephone: (504) 586-5252
- and -
Michael A. Patterson, Esq.
LONG LAW FIRM, L.L.P.
1800 City Farm Drive
Building 6
Baton Rouge, LA 70806
Telephone: (225) 922-5110
- and -
Harry Joseph Philips, Jr., Esq.
TAYLOR, PORTER, BROOKS & PHILLIPS, L.L.P.
450 Laurel Street
Baton Rouge, LA 70801
Telephone: (225) 381-0276
HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA: Santoro Suit Removed to C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Clark Santoro, an individual, and others
similarly situated v. HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, a California company;
DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, Case No. 24STCV13867 was removed from
the Superior Court of California for Los Angeles County, to the
United States District Court for the Central District of
California, on Oct. 18, 2024, and assigned Case No. 2:24-cv-09003.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that on or about March 1, 2024,
he visited Hyundai's website, www.hyundaiusa.com, and that, while
Plaintiff was on the website, Hyundai purportedly installed
"sophisticated software," which Plaintiff claims constitutes a
"trap and trace device," in violation of California's Invasion of
Privacy Act ("CIPA"). Plaintiff asserted that, as a result of
Hyundai's alleged conduct, Hyundai is subject to civil liability
and statutory penalties and that he is entitled to injunctive
relief and statutory damages.[BN]
The Defendants are represented by:
Matthew D. Pearson, Esq.
Michael A. Kushner, Esq.
BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP
600 Anton Blvd., Suite 900
Costa Mesa, CA 92626-7221
Phone: 714.754.6600
Facsimile: 714.754.6611
Email: mpearson@bakerlaw.com
mkushner@bakerlaw.com
INTEGRITY TREE: Beckett Seeks Unpaid OT Wages Under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------
TYLER BECKETT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. INTEGRITY TREE SERVICES, LLC, Case No. 1:24-cv-01086
(W.D. Mich., Oct. 17, 2024) seeks to recover unpaid overtime
compensation, under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The suit alleges that the Plaintiff and those similarly situated
regularly worked in excess of 40 hours a week and were paid some
overtime for those hours, but at a rate that did not include the
Defendant's per diem pay, shift differentials, or bonuses as
required by the FLSA.
As a result of these prima facie FLSA violations, the Defendant is
liable to the Plaintiff and those similarly situated for unpaid
wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorney's fees and costs,
interest, and any other relief deemed appropriate by the Court,
says the suit.
Plaintiff Beckett has been employed by the Defendants since August
of 2022. The Plaintiff worked out of Everett, Pennsylvania but
travelled for work Sunday night through Thursday to multiple job
site locations throughout the Midwest, primarily in Ohio, New York,
Indiana, and West Virginia.
Integrity Tree Services is a team of tree care professionals
performing a full spectrum of vegetation management services for
utilities.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Jesse L. Young, Esq.
Kevin J. Stoops, Esq.
SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C.
141 E. Michigan Avenue, Suite 600
Kalamazoo, MI 49007
Telephone: (269) 250-7500
E-mail: jyoung@sommerspc.com
kstoops@sommerspc.com
- and -
Jonathan Melmed, Esq.
Meghan Higday, Esq.
MELMED LAW GROUP, P.C.
1801 Century Park East, Suite 850
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: (310) 824-3828
E-mail: jm@melmedlaw.com
mh@melmedlaw.com
JWS ACQUISITIONS: Bid for Class Cert. Modified to May 23, 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Nirmala Moonsawmy, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, v. JWS
Acquisitions, LLC, Case No. 1:23-cv-04198-LMM (N.D. Ga.), the Hon.
Judge Leigh Martin May entered a scheduling order as follows:
Close of Discovery: April 25, 2025
Motion for Class Certification: May 23, 2025
JWS is a small, family-owned real estate investment company.
A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 16, 2024, is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=zYfkxf at no extra
charge.[CC]
KIA CORP: Faces Langerhans Suit Over Defective Sliding Side Doors
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RACHEL LANGERHANS and ANDREW LANGERHANS, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. KIA CORPORATION and
KIA AMERICA, INC., Defendants, Case No. 1:24-cv-02994 (D. Md.,
October 15, 2024) is a class action against the Defendants for
breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, fraud,
unjust enrichment, and violation of the Maryland Consumer
Protection Act.
The Defendants design, manufacture, advertise, market, and sell
vehicles, including the 2022-2023 Kia Carnival. They advertise and
market Class vehicles' automatic sliding side doors as a convenient
feature that allows people to easily enter or exit the vehicle or
load or unload cargo.
Allegedly, the Class vehicles suffer from a defect whereby the
automatic sliding side doors close with excessive force, presenting
a serious risk of bodily injury to anyone in the path of the
closing door. The Defect is caused by a defective "pinch sensor"
installed along the rubber seal on the edge of the Class vehicles'
doors. Had Plaintiffs and other Class vehicle owners known about
the defect, they would not have purchased a Class Vehicle or would
have paid substantially less for it, says the suit.
Kia Corporation is a South Korean multinational automobile
manufacturer.[BN]
The Plaintiffs are represented by:
Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
Mark D. Patronella, Esq.
MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
412 H Street NE, Ste. 302
Washington, DC, 20002
Telephone: (202) 470-3520
E-mail: nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com
jrathod@classlawdc.com
mpatronella@classlawdc.com
- and -
Daniel C. Levin, Esq.
Nicholas J. Elia, Esq.
LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN
510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Telephone: (215) 592-1500
Facsimile: (215) 592-4663
E-mail: dlevin@lfsblaw.com
nelia@lfsblaw.com
KOOTENAI HEALTH: Speelman Breach Suit Removed to D. Idaho
---------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as SARAH SPEELMAN and TY MILLER,
individually and on behalf of a minor child and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, v. KOOTENAI HEALTH INC., KOOTENAI CLINIC
LLC, KOOTENAI OUTPATIENT SURGERY, LLC and KOOTENAI OUTPATIENT
IMAGING, LLC, Case No. CV28-24-5587 (Filed Aug. 19, 2024) was
removed from the District Court for the First Judicial District for
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai to the United
States District Court for the District of Idaho on Oct. 17, 2024.
The District of Idaho Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:24-cv-00490-DKG to the proceeding.
The suit asserts seven causes of action including negligence,
negligence per se, breach of implied contract, breach of fiduciary
duty, unjust enrichment, invasion of privacy, and declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief.
The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of:
"All persons whose Private Information was compromised as a
result of the Data Breach that is the subject of the Notice of
Data Breach published by Defendants on or about Aug. 12, 2024."
Kootenai Health provides comprehensive medical services to patients
in northern Idaho and throughout the Inland Northwest.[BN]
The Defendants are represented by:
Tyler J. Anderson, Esq.
Stacey L. Beaumont, Esq.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
877 West Main Street, Suite 200
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 954-5221
E-mail: tanderson@hawleytroxell.com
sbeaumont@hawleytroxell.com
- and -
Casie D. Collignon, Esq.
Daniel M. Kavouras, Esq.
Desiree N. Hunter-Reay, Esq.
BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP
1801 California Street, Suite 4400
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 861-0600
Facsimile: (303) 861-7805
E-mail: ccollignon@bakerlaw.com
dkavouras@bakerlaw.com
dhunterreay@bakerlaw.com
LABORATORY CORP: Wins Bid for Arbitration; Wiggins Suit Stayed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned MICHAEL WIGGINS AND TERI STEVENS,
Plaintiffs v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS,
Defendant, Case No. 2:24-cv-00648-WB (E.D. Pa.), Judge Wendy
Beetlestone of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania grants the Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration
and Stay Proceedings.
Plaintiffs Michael Wiggins and Teri Stevens have sued the
healthcare company Laboratory Corporations of America Holdings
("LabCorp"), alleging on behalf of a putative class of similarly
situated customers that LabCorp shared sensitive patient health
information with Google in violation of, inter alia, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act.
Relying on the Federal Arbitration Act, LabCorp now moves to compel
individual arbitration and stay this action pending the outcome of
those proceedings.
LabCorp is a provider of clinical laboratory services headquartered
in Burlington, North Carolina. The company offers a patient portal
on its website, which enables users to, among other things,
schedule medical tests, review the results of those tests, and pay
bills.
To receive access to the patient portal, users must first register
on LabCorp's website and provide certain information, such as their
name, date of birth, mailing address, phone number, and email
address. Users must also check a box towards the bottom of the
registration screen (underneath a heading marked "Authorization")
affirming that they "have read, understand and agree to the LabCorp
Terms of Use and Web Privacy Statement." This affirmation appears
in text adjacent to the checkbox.
As of 2019, the phrases "Terms of Use" and "Web Privacy Statement"
are written in blue text--which stands in contrast to the white
background and surrounding black text on the rest of the account
registration screen--and are designed to operate as clickable
hyperlinks that take the user to the relevant document.
Plaintiffs Stevens and Wiggins created accounts on the LabCorp
patient portal in 2019 and 2022 respectively and, in doing so,
checked the box in the "Authorization" section. They describe a
similar interface with a pop-up window on the patient portal in May
2023. At the time they and other users logged into the patient
portal for the first time the system displayed a pop-up window
alerting them of an "IMPORTANT UPDATE" related to "Changes to
[LabCorp's] Patient Portal User Agreement."
LabCorp states that the "Terms of Use" hyperlink on the account
registration screen was designed to direct users to its
then-operative user agreement (the "User Agreement"). Both
iterations of the User Agreement that were in effect when Wiggins
and Stevens registered for the patient portal provided that users
"agree to be bound by this agreement when you click 'I agree'
and/or continue to access or use the Patient Portal. If you do not
understand or agree to be bound by this agreement, do not access or
use the Patient Portal."
Among the terms laid out in the User Agreement is a mandatory
arbitration provision, which users are advised, in bold, "requires
the use of arbitration on an individual basis and limits the
remedies available to you in the event of disputes or claims in
connection with this Agreement or the Patient Portal."
Additionally, the User Agreement included a class action waiver,
which stated that the parties "may bring claims against the other
only in your or its individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or
class member in any purported class or representative proceeding."
On May 9, 2023, LabCorp issued a modified version of the User
Agreement (the "Modified Agreement") and alerted users through the
pop-up window. The Modified Agreement included a near-identical
arbitration provision and class action waiver.
Shortly after, the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint, LabCorp moved
to compel arbitration and stay this case pending arbitration. In
its motion, LabCorp pointed to the arbitration provision in the
User Agreement, which it maintains governs the Plaintiffs' LabCorp
patient portal accounts, arguing that the Plaintiffs entered into
valid arbitration agreements with LabCorp when they successfully
registered for online accounts.
Because that registration process required the Plaintiffs to check
the box affirming that they "have read, understand and agree to the
LabCorp Terms of Use and Web Privacy Statement," LabCorp maintained
that the Plaintiffs assented to the terms contained therein.
Separately, LabCorp asserted that the arbitration provision
incorporated the AAA Rules such that any dispute as to the scope of
the parties' agreement to arbitrate must be delegated to an
arbitrator.
The Court denied LabCorp's motion without prejudice and allowed the
Plaintiffs to conduct limited discovery regarding: (1) the issue of
whether this matter must be submitted for arbitration; and, (2) any
jurisdictional issues that will be raised by the parties. Upon
completion of discovery, LabCorp renewed its Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Stay Proceedings, which Motion is now before the
Court.
The Plaintiffs rely heavily on this Court's opinion in Kirkham v.
TaxAct, Inc., 2024 WL 1143481, at *2-4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2024) to
argue that the User Agreement and Modified Agreement do not require
that this matter be arbitrated. As a threshold issue, they read
TaxAct to preclude the delegation of gateway questions of
arbitrability to an arbitrator unless the arbitration provision in
the operative agreement explicitly states that the rules of
organizations such as the AAA or the Judicial Arbitration and
Mediations Services ("JAMS") are "incorporated by reference."
Judge Beetlestone finds the mandatory arbitration provision
included in the Modified Agreement is well "within the same
universe of terms" as the User Agreement given that LabCorp
included a nearly identical provision in the User Agreement.
Accordingly, leaving aside the issue of whether the modified
provision is enforceable, Judge Beetlestone holds it is binding
against the Plaintiffs.
For these reasons, the Court grants LabCorp's Motion to compel
arbitration and the action will be stayed pending resolution of the
arbitration proceedings.
A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated Oct. 11,
2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/24y568ep from
PacerMonitor.com.
A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 11, 2024, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4d95f8v5 from PacerMonitor.com.
LENOVO GROUP: Court Stays Hermanson, et al. Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------
Judge Jeffrey S. White of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California granted Lenovo (United States),
Inc.'s motion to dismiss or stay the case captioned as MARK
HERMANSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LENOVO GROUP LIMITED, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 23-cv-05890-JSW (N.D. Calif.).
The Court vacates the hearing set for November 1, 2024.
According to Lenovo, Plaintiff Chen has not pursued discovery
specific to his claims in this case. Chen and the Axelrod
Plaintiffs have attempted to coordinate discovery. The Axelrod
Plaintiffs also filed their motion for class certification, which
Lenovo has opposed.
Lenovo again argues that this case should be stayed pending
resolution of Axelrod. After weighing the equities of the case, a
district court may exercise its discretion to dismiss a duplicative
later-filed action, to stay that action pending resolution of the
previously filed action, to enjoin the parties from proceeding with
it, or to consolidate both actions.
The Court considers the nature of the putative classes when
considering whether to stay one class action in favor of another.
To determine whether one case is "duplicative" of another case,
courts use the four-factor transaction test developed in the
context of claim preclusion. Lenovo continues to focus on whether
this case and Axelrod arise out of the same transactional nucleus
of facts.
Judge White says, as the Court previously concluded, the plaintiffs
in Axelrod and Chen challenge the allegedly misleading manner, in
which Lenovo advertises the prices of products on its website. Some
of the claims do differ, and Chen purchased his product on August
26, 2023, which weighs against staying claims for damages. However,
the Court has already stayed Hermanson and Lin's claims, and Chen
has not persuaded the Court that his proposed injunctive release
class does not significantly overlap with the injunctive relief
requested in Axelrod.
The Court has considered the subsequent developments in both cases
and, in the exercise of its discretion, concludes that the equities
weigh in favor of staying Chen's claims pending a ruling on the
Axelrod Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. At that time,
the Court will consider whether the stay should be lifted.
A copy of the Court's Order dated October 15, 2024, is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=QtSxdl
LENS.COM: Court Grants Nail Until Oct. 31 to Amend Class Complaint
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled Adam Nail, Plaintiff v. Lens.com, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 2:24-cv-01149-JAD-EJY (D. Nev.), Judge
Jennifer A. Dorsey of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Nevada issued an Order granting the Defendant's motion to dismiss
in part with leave to amend by Oct. 31, 2024.
Plaintiff Adam Nail sues Lens.com and ten "Doe" Defendants on
behalf of a putative class, alleging that Lens.com deliberately
conceals extra fees added to purchases made on its website,
violating the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California's
False Advertising Law, and California's Unfair Competition Law.
Lens.com moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), arguing that Nail's claims are barred by a choice-of-law
provision in the Lens.com website's terms of use, that Nail's
requests for equitable relief are inadequately pled, and that Nail
lacks Article III standing for injunctive relief.
Because the Court finds that Nail has not pled facts to support any
of his equitable relief requests, Judge Dorsey grants Lens.com's
motion to dismiss his requests for injunctive relief, restitution,
and disgorgement with leave to amend, but denies the motion in all
other respects.
Mr. Nail purchased contact lenses from the Lens.com website twice:
once in January 2021 and again in November 2022. He alleges that
Lens.com surreptitiously adds an extra charge to purchases made on
its website. According to Nail, Lens.com deliberately hides this
additional fee to make the actual cost of a purchase 50–80%
higher than the advertised price.
A consumer, who clicks on a Lens.com advertisement (on Google or
another search engine), will see the advertised price displayed on
the Lens.com website as he views the product page, enters
information about his prescription, and checks his "shopping cart."
But a "taxes & fees" charge then appears on the
shipping-information page, beneath a "continue" button. Nail
asserts that this added charge is entirely a "processing fee," but
a consumer can only learn that by requesting a "Full Receipt" from
a Lens.com customer representative.
Judge Dorsey notes that Nail does not specify whether he was aware
of the fee before completing his purchases, though he alleges that
he and other similarly situated Lens.com customers have been misled
and unfairly induced to pay hidden fees by this "bait and switch
scheme."
Mr. Nail filed this lawsuit against Lens.com on behalf of himself
and a putative class of consumers, alleging violations of the
California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), California's False
Advertising Law (FAL), and California's Unfair Competition Law
(UCL) in California state court. Lens.com removed the matter to the
Central District of California and then successfully moved to
transfer it to this Court.
Lens.com now moves to dismiss Nail's complaint under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6), arguing that he fails to state
a plausible claim because his California-law-based claims violate
the choice-of-law provision in Lens.com's terms of use. It offers
additional arguments for dismissal of Nail's requests for equitable
relief, asserting that they are inadequately pled and that Nail
lacks Article III standing to seek injunctive relief.
Judge Dorsey finds that the choice-of-law provision in Lens.com's
terms of use does not apply to Nail's claims, and that those claims
do not fail the reasonable-consumer test. Judge Dorsey opines that
Nail has pled sufficient facts to survive a reasonable-consumer
test dismissal at this nascent stage in this litigation, and so,
Lens.com's motion to dismiss is denied based on the
reasonable-consumer test.
Judge Dorsey also finds that Nail has not pled facts to support his
requests for equitable relief. Nail has not shown that he is at
risk of future injury, so he has not established Article III
standing for injunctive relief. Judge Dorsey holds that Nail's
request for restitution is dismissed because he has not shown that
he lacks an adequate legal remedy.
As its final challenge, Lens.com notes Nail's "vague references to
disgorgement" in the complaint and insists that any equitable claim
for disgorgement and any related unjust-enrichment claims under the
UCL must be dismissed. Nail does not respond to this argument. Nail
doesn't include disgorgement in his prayer for relief, but he does
allege that he is entitled to disgorgement under two of his causes
of action.
The Court's Local Rule 7-2(d) provides that the failure of an
opposing party to file points and authorities in response to any
motion, except a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 or a motion for
attorney's fees, constitutes a consent to the granting of the
motion.
Judge Dorsey applies this rule, deems the Plaintiff's failure to
respond to Lens.com's argument as consent to granting it, and
dismisses Nail's disgorgement requests.
Judge Dorsey grants Nail leave to amend his complaint to supplement
the facts supporting his requests for equitable relief as explained
in this Order.
Accordingly, the Court grants in part Lens.com's motion to dismiss.
Nail's requests for injunctive relief, restitution, and
disgorgement are dismissed with leave to amend by Oct. 31, 2024.
A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 11, 2024, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/r94s34mr from PacerMonitor.com.
LINDE GAS: Maheia Class Suit Removed From Sup. Ct. to C.D. Cal.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as DORICK MAHEIA, an individual,
on behalf of himself and on behalf of all persons similarly
situated, v. LINDE GAS & EQUIPMENT, INC., a corporation; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Case No. 24STCV34847 (Filed Sept. 16, 2024),
was removed from the Superior Court of the State California for the
County of Los Angeles to the United States District Court for the
Central District of California on Oct. 17, 2024.
The Central California District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:24-cv-08976 to the proceeding.
The Complaint asserts the following nine causes of action: (1)
Unfair Business Practices; (2) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages; (3)
Failure to Pay Overtime Wages; (4) Failure to Provide Meal Periods;
(5) Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Periods; (6) Failure to
Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements; (7) Failure to Provide
Wages When Due; (8) Failure to Indemnify Employees for
Expenditures; and (9) Failure to Pay Sick Pay Wages.
The Plaintiff filed this action on behalf of
"all individuals who are or previously were employed by the
Defendant in California, including any employees staffed with
the Defendant by a third party, and classified as nonexempt
employees (the "CALIFORNIA CLASS") at any time during the
period beginning four (4) years prior to the filing of this
Complaint and ending on the date as determined by the Court
(the "CALIFORNIA CLASS PERIOD")."
Linde Gas is a provider of industrial gases, applications, products
and services.[BN]
The Defendants are represented by:
Shiva Shirazi Davoudian, Esq.
Lauren Manso, Esq.
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
2049 Century Park East, 5th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067.3107
Telephone: (310) 553-0308
Facsimile: (800) 715-1330
E-mail: sdavoudian@littler.com
lmanso@littler.com
LITTLE CAESAR: Court Extends Case Schedule in Cuevas Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOSE CUEVAS, on behalf of
himself, all others similarly situated, and on behalf of the
general public, v. LITTLE CAESAR ENTERPRISES, INC.; and DOES
through 10, inclusive, Case No. 3:23-cv-03166-RFL (N.D. Cal.), the
Parties ask the Court to enter an order extending the case schedule
as follows.
1. Motion for Class Certification:
a. Motion due by April 4, 2025.
b. Responses due by May 2, 2025.
c. Replies due by May 23, 2025. d. Motion for Class
Certification Hearing set for June 17, 2025.
2. Motion to Invalidate Arbitration Agreements, Restrict
Defendant's Communication, and send Corrective Notice
a. Responses due by Nov. 12, 2024.
b. Replies due by Nov. 26, 2024.
c. Motion to Invalidate Arbitration Agreement Hearing set for
Dec. 10, 2024.
Little Caesar is an American multinational chain of pizza
restaurants.
A copy of the Parties' motion dated Oct. 16, 2024, is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=3gY63j at no extra
charge.[CC]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Mark Yablonovich, Esq.
Monica Balderrama, Esq.
Tony Roberts, Esq.
LAW OFFICES OF MARK YABLONOVICH
9465 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 300
Beverly Hills, CA 90212-2511
Telephone: (310) 286-0246
Facsimile: (310) 407-5391
E-mail: Mark@Yablonovichlaw.com
Monica@Yablonovichlaw.com
Tony@Yablonovichlaw.com
- and -
Bevin Allen Pike, Esq.
Daniel Jonathan, Esq.
Trisha K. Monesi, Esq.
CAPSTONE LAW APC
1875 Century Park East, Suite 1000
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: (310) 556-4811
Facsimile: (310) 943-0396
E-mail: Bevin.Pike@capstonelawyers.com
Daniel.Jonathan@capstonelawyers.com
Trisha.Monesi@capstonelawyers.com
The Defendants are represented by:
Ellen M. Bronchetti, Esq.
Lindsay E. Hutner, Esq.
Priya E. Singh, Esq.
GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
12760 High Bluff Drive, Suite 240
San Diego, CA 92130
Telephone: (619) 848-2523
E-mail: Ellen.Bronchetti@gtlaw.com
Lindsay.Hutner@gtlaw.com
Priya.Singh@gtlaw.com
LIVE NATION ENTERTAINMENT: Brain Suit Transferred to D. Montana
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Christopher M. Brain, Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Live Nation
Entertainment, Inc., and Ticketmaster, LLC, Case No. 2:24-cv-06125
was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, to the U.S. District Court for the District
of Montana on Oct. 18, 2024.
The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:24-cv-00144-BMM to the
proceeding.
The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract for Contract
Dispute.
Ticketmaster Entertainment, LLC -- https://www.ticketmaster.com/ --
is an American ticket sales and distribution company based in
Beverly Hills, California.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Adam T. Hoover (SBN 243226)
Marc G. Reich (SBN 159936)
REICH RADCLIFFE & HOOVER LLP
2030 Main Street, Suite 1300
Irvine, CA 92614
Phone: (949) 975-0512
Email: mgr@reichradcliffe.com
adhoover@reichradcliffe.com
- and -
Gregory M. Egleston, Esq.
GAINEY MCKENNA & EGLESTON
260 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
New York, NY 10016
Phone: (212) 983-1300
Email: gegleston@gme-law.com
The Defendants are represented by:
Daniel Scott Carlton, Esq.
PAUL HASTINGS LLP
515 S. Flower Street, Ste 25th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Phone: (213) 683-6113
Email: scottcarlton@paulhastings.com
- and -
James Pearl, Esq.
PAUL HASTINGS LLP
1999 Avenue of the Stars
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Phone: (310) 620-5700
Fax: (310) 620-5891
Email: jamespearl@paulhastings.com
- and -
Raymond Stockstill, IV, Esq.
PAUL HASTINGS, LLP
695 Town Center Drive, Ste. 17th Floor
Costa Mesa, CA 92626-1924
Phone: (714) 668-6204
Fax: (714) 979-1921
Email: beaustockstill@paulhastings.com
LLOYD'S OF LONDON: Wins Bid for Partial Summary Judgment in Drennen
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge J. Paul Oetken of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York issued an Opinion and Order granting the
Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the
Fees Exclusion in the lawsuit styled ROWENA DRENNEN, et al.,
Plaintiffs v. CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S OF LONDON, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:23-cv-03385-JPO (S.D.N.Y.).
The lawsuit is an adversary proceeding filed against Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, as well as several other excess
insurers, in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case In re Residential
Capital, LLC, No. 12-12020 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.). The adversary
proceeding is captioned as Drennen v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's of London, No. 15-1025 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.). The current
operative complaint is the Third Amended Adversary Complaint
("TAC").
Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation, comprising two
opinions of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York, on cross-motions for summary judgment:
Drennen v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London (In re
Residential Cap.), 610 B.R. 725 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) (Lane, J.);
Drennen v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London (In re
Residential Cap.), Ch. 11 No. 12-12020, Adv. No. 15-1025, 2022 WL
17836560 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2022) (Jones, J.).
As part of the Report and Recommendation, the bankruptcy court
recommended that partial summary judgment be granted in favor of
the Plaintiffs on the ground that Clause II.C.9 of the policy (the
"Fees Exclusion") does not bar the Plaintiffs' claims. For the
reasons set forth in this Opinion and Order, the Court declines to
adopt the bankruptcy court's Report and Recommendation with respect
to the Fees Exclusion and, instead, grants partial summary judgment
for the Defendants on the applicability of the Fees Exclusion.
The Plaintiffs comprise two groups of class action plaintiffs--the
Mitchell Class and the Kessler Class (collectively, "Class
Plaintiffs")--along with the ResCap Liquidating Trust (the
"Trust"). The Class Plaintiffs' claims arise from certain
origination and closing fees (the "Fees") paid by members of those
class actions in connection with second mortgages obtained from
several lenders (the "Originating Banks").
The Class Plaintiffs asserted in the underlying lawsuits that the
Fees were unlawful. Residential Funding Company, LLC ("RFC"),
"formerly known as GMAC-Residential Funding Corporation or
Residential Capital Corporation," an indirect subsidiary of General
Motors Corporation ("GM"), operated as a financial services company
that purchased, packaged, and securitized or directly resold
mortgages issued by the Originating Banks, which had charged the
Fees. No one argues that RFC itself received or paid any of the
Fees; instead, "the Class Plaintiffs sought to hold RFC
derivatively liable for the acts of the Originating Banks pursuant
to 15 U.S.C. Section 1641(d), and directly liable for acts that RFC
itself performed" after the Fees had been paid.
In the instant adversary proceeding, the Plaintiffs seek to recover
from RFC's insurers--the Defendants in this action--pursuant to a
professional liability insurance policy (the "Policy").
The Mitchell Plaintiffs sued RFC in the Circuit Court of Jackson
County, Missouri, alleging that RFC was derivatively liable for
loans issued by the Originating Banks in violation of state and
federal law. Following trial, RFC was found liable, based on its
own conduct in failing to exercise due diligence in purchasing the
loans from the Originating Banks, as well as derivatively liable
based on the Originating Banks' charging of the Fees. RFC was
ordered to pay $4,329,048 in compensatory damages and approximately
$92,000,000 in punitive damages.
After losing at trial in the Mitchell class action, RFC paid
$8,500,000 to settle the related Missouri cases and incurred
approximately $4,800,000 in defenses costs. The appellate court
affirmed the compensatory damages award but vacated the punitive
damages award and remanded for retrial. RFC settled the
compensatory damages claims and related attorney's fees for
$15,648,868.12, and after filing for bankruptcy in 2012, it settled
the punitive damages claims for $14,500,000.
The Kessler litigation comprises several related class actions
concerning the Fees charged on second-mortgage loans that were
consolidated under the multi-district litigation (MDL) statute in
the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania. The Kessler cases were pending when RFC filed for
bankruptcy.
In May 2012, RFC filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. In December 2013, the bankruptcy court confirmed a
Chapter 11 plan, which, among other things, approved the Mitchell
Settlement, resulting in an allowed claim against the estate for
$14.5 million and assigned the Class the rights to pursue the claim
against RFC's insurers, which are the Defendants in this action.
The bankruptcy court also approved a settlement of the Kessler
cases for $300,000,000, with approximately $27,000,000 of that
amount to be paid by RFC and the remainder amount assigned to the
Kessler Class as a claim against RFC's insurers. That bankruptcy
plan also established the Trust "to liquidate and distribute RFC's
remaining assets to unsecured creditors, and assigned to the Trust
any rights RFC had to recover $6.1 million from the Insurers for
defenses costs in the [Mitchell] Action, as well as RFC's rights to
payment from the Insurers for the $15.6 million in compensatory
damages that RFC paid to the [Mitchell] Class before the bankruptcy
filing." The Trust was also assigned the right to recover
$4,800,000 in defense costs that RFC incurred in defending and
settling the related Missouri cases.
As part of the plan, the Kessler settlement became an allowed claim
and was approved by the Bankruptcy Court. Like in the Mitchell
class action, the Trust was assigned any right of RFC to recover
$7,900,000 in defense costs sustained defending the Kessler
litigation, as well as the $4,800,000 in defense costs sustained in
defending and settling the related Missouri actions.
The Kessler settlement and the Mitchell punitive damages settlement
were assigned to the Kessler Class and Mitchell Class,
respectively. The Trust was assigned all other insurance rights,
including the above defense costs and "the cost of the Mitchell
appeal bond; RFC's payment of the Mitchell compensatory damages
judgment and the Mitchell plaintiffs' attorney' fees award; and
RFC's payment of the settlements in the Related Missouri Actions."
On Feb. 4, 2015, the Plaintiffs filed an adversary complaint in the
bankruptcy court seeking declaratory judgments and money damages
for liabilities owed to the Kessler and Mitchell Classes; defense
costs in defending the Kessler and Mitchell actions and related
actions; punitive damages; and costs and attorney's fees in the
present litigation. The current operative complaint is the Third
Amended Complaint, which, in addition to the relief sought in the
original complaint, also seeks from Lloyd's and the Excess Insurers
consequential damages stemming from lost prejudgment interest,
attorney's fees, and other recoverable consequential damages
suffered by RFC and the Plaintiffs.
Soon after the Plaintiffs filed the original adversary complaint,
on April 8, 2015, the Defendants moved to withdraw the bankruptcy
reference (Ch. 11 No. 12-12020, No. 8063; Case No. 15-CV-2712, ECF
No. 1.) The Plaintiffs opposed that motion, arguing that the
proceedings at issue were "core" and that judicial efficiency
compelled permitting the bankruptcy court to pass first on the
insurance coverage issues.
This Court held that, though the present proceedings against the
Insurers are "non-core," withdrawing the reference at that stage of
the proceeding would cause undue delay to the parties and would
waste judicial resources (In re Residential Cap., LLC, No.
15-CV-2712, 2015 WL 9302834, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2015)). The
parties returned to the bankruptcy court, which for eight years
supervised the entirety of all pretrial activities, including fact
and expert discovery and dispositive motions.
Those proceedings concluded in the parties' filing several "motions
for summary judgment," including briefs and statements of
undisputed fact, detailed responses and replies to both, and
hundreds of exhibits and deposition excerpts. The bankruptcy court
also heard nearly two days of argument on those motions, based on
which Judges Lane and Jones issued preliminary rulings on the
motions for summary judgment that constitute the Report and
Recommendation now before this Court.
Following the bankruptcy court's issuance of the Report and
Recommendation, the Plaintiffs moved to withdraw the bankruptcy
reference on April 21, 2023. The Defendants did not oppose the
motion outright--agreeing that this case must return to the
District Court because the Bankruptcy Court is without
constitutional authority to conduct a trial in this case (if one is
required) or to enter a final judgment on any claim--but asked that
it be held in abeyance pending the resolution of objections in the
bankruptcy court.
This Court granted the motion to withdraw on May 12, 2023, agreeing
that the bankruptcy court had finished its work and completed the
Report and Recommendation, and set a schedule for filing
objections--including refiling those already filed in the
bankruptcy court. Dozens of objections and responses were filed
from May to July 2023.
Judge Oetken notes that the coverage at issue arises out of
Insuring Clause I.D.(a) of the Policies for errors and omissions
liability. It is undisputed that RFC was both an "Assured" and a
"Professional Liability Assured" under the Policies. The Policies
contain a number of exclusions, including the Fees exclusion, which
excludes from coverage any claim for premiums, return premiums,
fees, commissions, costs, expenses or other charges paid or payable
by or to the Assured....
The parties agree that (i) "fees" includes the Fees charged by the
Originating Banks giving rise to RFC's liability in the prepetition
litigation in this case, (ii) RFC--but not the Originating
Banks--is an "Assured," and (iii) RFC did not pay or receive any of
the Fees in question. Thus, the text of the Fees Exclusion on its
own does not reach the type of liability for which the Plaintiffs
seek coverage from the Insurer Defendants.
Instead, the Insurer Defendants argue that the scope of the Fees
Exclusion is expanded by the "Deemer Clause." The Class Plaintiffs
argue that there is significance in calling this clause a "deemer"
clause, as opposed to a "legally responsible" clause, since the
former implies that the clause operates to add a category of
"Assured."
The Court does not agree that the word "deem" implies that the
clause operates only according to the Plaintiffs' proposed
interpretation, and refers to the clause as the "Deemer Clause" for
the sake of consistency with the bankruptcy court orders. The Court
concludes that the Deemer Clause unambiguously applies to the Fees
Exclusion notwithstanding that exclusion's use of the definite
article "the" before "Assured."
The Plaintiffs' first argument in the alternative is that the
Deemer Clause applies only to persons or entities "for whose
conduct an Assured is legally responsible," and that "legally
responsible" requires supervision or control rising to the level of
agency. The Court concludes that this first alternative argument
was waived and, on the merits, is an incorrect interpretation of
the phrase "legally responsible" as used in the Deemer Clause.
Given that the only reasonable interpretation of the Deemer Clause
and the Fees Exclusion is that they exclude coverage claims for
fees paid to persons or entities for whose conduct RFC was legally
responsible in rendering or failing to render Professional
Services, Judge Oetken opines that it remains only to apply that
language to the request for coverage here.
Judge Oetken holds that all that the Fees Exclusion concerns is the
recipient or payer of the fees, not who bears ultimate liability
for them. Thus, the Defendants are entitled to partial summary
judgment with respect to the Fees Exclusion, over which there is no
genuine dispute of material fact.
For these reasons, the Court rules that the Defendants' objections
to the bankruptcy court's Report and Recommendation are sustained
in part, and the Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment is
granted with respect to the Fees Exclusion.
The Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a motion for partial
summary judgment is denied as moot. The Clerk of Court is directed
to close the motion at ECF No. 211.
The parties are directed to confer and file a joint status letter
on Oct. 21, 2024, regarding the effect of this decision on the
remaining objections to the Report and Recommendation and the
issues to be tried.
A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Oct. 11,
2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/5scrb2zw from
PacerMonitor.com.
MARBA PRODUCT: Faces Fidan Wage-and-Hour Suit in D.N.J.
-------------------------------------------------------
BERNAN SUNBUL FIDAN, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MARBA PRODUCT, LLC and AHMET CAN,
Defendants, Case No. 2:24-cv-09788 (D.N.J., October 15, 2024) is an
action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the laws of the
state of New Jersey, to remedy Defendants' violations of the
wage-and-hour provisions of the federal and state statutes that
have deprived Plaintiff of her lawfully earned wages and benefits.
According to the complaint, the Defendants have been and are still
trampling the federal and state interests in pursuit of their own
profits, saving significant amounts in earned wages and benefits,
implementation of policies, by failing to make, keep, and preserve
accurate records, including but not limited to, hours worked each
workday and total hours worked each workweek, as required by the
FLSA and New Jersey statutes, and supporting federal and state
regulations.
This action further seeks to remedy Defendants' intentional
creation of a hostile work environment, unlawful discrimination,
harassment, retaliation and unlawful adverse actions towards
Plaintiff based on her ethnic background, disability and failure to
provide a reasonable accommodation in violation of the New Jersey
Law Against Discrimination.
The Plaintiff started her employment with Defendants in September
2022 as a production worker, and later became a dough maker in the
same production department. He is still employed as a non-exempt
employee.
Marba Product, LLC is a New Jersey domestic for-profit limited
liability company organized and operating under the laws of the
state.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Rudy A. Dermesropian, Esq.
LAW OFFICES OF RUDY A. DERMESROPIAN, LLC
810 Seventh Avenue, Suite 405
New York, NY 10019
Telephone: (646) 586-9030
Facsimile: (646) 586-9005
MDL 3113: Transfer of Two Suits to Apple Antitrust Row Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton, Acting Chair of the U.S. Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation, denied the transfer of two lawsuits,
specifically, (i) PHANTOMALERT v. APPLE INC., C.A. No. 1:24−00786
(D.D.C.), and (ii) CORONAVIRUS REPORTER CORPORATION, ET AL. v.
APPLE INC., C.A. No. 1:24−00053 (D. Wyo.) to the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey for inclusion in IN RE: APPLE
INC. SMARTPHONE ANTITRUST LITIGATION, MDL No. 3113.
The panel concluded that centralization will not serve the
convenience of the parties and witnesses or further the just and
efficient conduct of the litigation. The panel pointed out that the
actions in the MDL allege that Apple has monopolized or attempted
to monopolize the smartphone market by controlling the creation and
distribution of apps compatible with the iPhone and suppressing
technologies that would make the iPhone more compatible with
competitors' devices. Plaintiffs in the MDL are iPhone or Apple
Watch purchasers who claim that Apple has resisted technologies
such as "super apps," cloud streaming gaming apps, messaging,
smartwatches, and digital wallets, which allegedly resulted in
supracompetitive iPhone and Apple Watch prices and degraded
functionality.
Meanwhile, the focus of the two actions before the Panel is
significantly different, ruled the panel. Plaintiff in the
PhantomALERT action alleges that its COVID-19 tracking app was
rejected for distribution through the App Store on unreasonable and
pretextual grounds, largely because Apple viewed the app as
competing with Apple's own proposed COVID-19 tracking app.
Plaintiff is an app developer rather than a device purchaser. The
market allegedly at issue is "the App Store," and the injury
alleged is the rejection of plaintiff's app. The Coronavirus
Reporter action, as originally brought, was substantially similar
to PhantomALERT. It too was brought by app developers and
challenged the rejection or alleged "ranking suppression" by Apple
of plaintiffs' proposed apps.
On July 26, 2024, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in
Coronavirus Reporter, which attached and incorporated by reference
the complaint in United States v. Apple Inc., a civil antitrust
enforcement action filed in the District of New Jersey in March
2024 that preceded the MDL litigation. As a result, the amended
complaint in the Coronavirus Reporter action now includes
allegations and claims that ostensibly overlap with the MDL.
"Plaintiffs argue that this overlap makes transfer appropriate, but
we are not persuaded," the panel wrote in its ruling. "The primary
focus of the Coronavirus Reporter action is Apple's control over
access to the App Store, and the action was brought to challenge
Apple's rejection of plaintiffs' (and other developers') apps--not
supracompetitive prices or less functional iPhones. Thus, the
plaintiffs, market, and injuries at issue are distinct from those
in the MDL. If transferred, the Coronavirus Reporter action would
raise new market definition and class certification issues, and
involve separate factual and expert discovery. . . The lengthy
history of the litigation between the Coronavirus Reporter
plaintiffs and Apple also weighs against transfer."
A full-text copy of the court's October 3, 2024 transfer order is
available at
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/MDL-3113-Order_Denying_Transfer-9-24.pdf
MDL 3113: Whiteside v. Apple Transferred to D.N.J.
--------------------------------------------------
Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton, Acting Chair of the U.S. Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation, transfers the case captioned
"Whiteside v. Apple Inc.," C.A. No. 3:24−02699 (N.D. Cal.) the U.
S. District Court for the District of New Jersey and, with the
consent of that court, assigned to Judge Julian X. Neals for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings in "In re: Apple
Inc. Smartphone Antitrust Litigation," MDL No. 3113.
Defendant Apple Inc. and nearly all responding plaintiffs either
support or do not oppose centralization, although they differ as to
the appropriate transferee district. Plaintiff on the other hand
moves to vacate the conditional transfer order principally by
arguing that federal jurisdiction is lacking over his case and that
the transferor court should be permitted to rule on his pending
motion for remand to state court.
The actions in the MDL share common questions of fact arising from
allegations that Apple has monopolized or attempted to monopolize
the smartphone market by controlling the creation and distribution
of apps compatible with the iPhone and suppressing technologies
that would make the iPhone more compatible with competitors'
devices.
"Whiteside involves virtually identical allegations and thus falls
within the scope of the MDL," rules the panel.
Plaintiff does not dispute that his action shares factual questions
with the MDL but moved to vacate the conditional transfer order
principally by arguing that federal jurisdiction is lacking over
his case and that the transferor court should be permitted to rule
on his pending motion for remand to state court. Plaintiff also
argued that transfer is not warranted because he asserts claims
under California law rather than under federal antitrust law.
"Jurisdictional objections generally do not present an impediment
to transfer," the panel opined. Moreover, the panel pointed out
that "[t]he presence of additional or differing legal theories is
not significant . . . when the actions arise from a common factual
core." In any event, as Apple points out, there are multiple
actions in the MDL that also assert claims under California law, it
added.
A full-text copy of the court's October 3, 2024 transfer order is
available at
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/MDL-3113-Transfer_Order-9-24.pdf
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OH: Court Refuses to Dismiss Summit Sun Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael J. Newman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Western Division, Dayton, denies the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the lawsuit styled SUMMIT SUN INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Plaintiff v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Defendant,
Case No. 3:24-cv-00031-MJN-CHG (S.D. Ohio).
The lawsuit is a civil class action case, premised on federal
question jurisdiction, in which Plaintiff Summit Sun Investments,
LLC, through counsel, seeks damages, declaratory and injunctive
relief, attorneys' fees and costs, and unjust enrichment against
Defendant Montgomery County Board of Commissioners for violating
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Ohio
law.
The Plaintiff alleges it purchased a Dayton property without title
issues. When the Plaintiff contacted the Defendant to turn on the
property's water, the Defendant required the Plaintiff to pay the
previous owner's unpaid water bills before the Defendant would turn
the water service back on at the property.
This case is before the Court on the Defendant's Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. In response to the motion, the
Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition, and the Defendant
replied.
Having carefully and thoroughly considered the pleadings and
briefing in support of, and in opposition to, the Defendant's
motion, along with the procedural posture of this case, Judge
Newman holds that the efficient and appropriate way forward is to
permit discovery to occur and consider the parties' arguments on
summary judgment, not earlier at the motion-to-dismiss phase of
litigation.
Judge Newman explains that proceeding in this manner will ensure
that the Court reviews these arguments only after appropriate
discovery has been completed and will guarantee that the Court's
consideration of the parties' arguments is not premature.
Accordingly, the Court denies the Defendant's motion to dismiss.
A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 11, 2024, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3pzycz27 from PacerMonitor.com.
NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP: Pelosi Suit Transferred to D. Montana
----------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Chrystal Pelosi, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. THE NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP LLC,
Case No. 3:24-cv-08814 was transferred from the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey, to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Montana on Oct. 18, 2024.
The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:24-cv-00168-BMM to the
proceeding.
The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract for Breach of
Contract.
Neiman Marcus Group -- https://www.neimanmarcusgroup.com/ -- is one
of the largest multi-brand luxury integrated retailers in the
U.S.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Kenneth J. Grunfeld (PA#84121)
KOPELOWITZ OSTROW FERGUSON WEISELBERG GILBERT
65 Overhill Road
Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004
Phone: (954) 525-4100
Email: grunfeld@kolawyers.com
NEW TSI: Faces Tordi-Devine Suit Over Unauthorized Info Access
--------------------------------------------------------------
ALEX TORDI-DEVINE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NEW TSI HOLDINGS, INC. D/B/A NYSC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:24-cv-07340 (E.D.N.Y., October 18, 2024) is a
class action against the Defendant for negligence, breach of
implied contract, unjust enrichment, breach of confidence,
violation of the New York Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and
declaratory judgment.
The case arises from the Defendant's failure to properly secure and
safeguard the personally identifiable information of the Plaintiff
and similarly situated individuals stored within its network
systems following a data breach on or about July 27, 2024. The
Defendant also failed to timely notify the Plaintiff and similarly
situated individuals about the data breach. As a result, the
private information of the Plaintiff and Class members was
compromised and damaged through access by and disclosure to unknown
and unauthorized third parties, says the suit.
New TSI Holdings, Inc., doing business as NYSC, is a company that
owns and operates a chain of sports clubs, doing business in New
York. [BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Samuel J. Strauss, Esq.
Raina C. Borrelli, Esq.
STRAUSS BORRELLI PLLC
980 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 1610
Chicago, IL 60611
Telephone: (872) 263-1100
Facsimile: (872) 263-1109
Email: sam@straussborrelli.com
raina@straussborrelli.com
- and -
Kim E. Richman, Esq.
RICHMAN LAW & POLICY
1 Bridge St. Suite 83
Irvington, NY 10533
Telephone: (914) 693-2018
Email: krichman@richmanlawpolicy.com
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY: Seeks to Adjourn Class Cert Oral Argument
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Hall-Landers v. New York
University, Case No. 1:20-cv-03250-GBD-SLC (S.D.N.Y.), the
Defendant asks to enter an order:
(1) that the Court adjourn oral argument on the plaintiff's
Motion
for Class Certification scheduled for Oct. 30, 2024 at 10:00
am
until after the plaintiff's class certification motion is
fully
briefed; and
(2) in the event that the Court intends to rely upon the
Plaintiff's expert reports in ruling upon class
certification,
that the Court allow for the parties to file motions under
Federal Rule 702.
Absent adjournment of oral argument, the Court and NYU will not be
able first to review the plaintiff's reply brief and rebuttal
expert reports, which are due on that same day. NYU would be
prejudiced by arguing the motion without knowing the factual and
legal arguments the plaintiff will raise in their reply brief or
rebuttal reports.
To the extent the Court intends to rely on the plaintiff's expert
reports, NYU asks that the Court first set a schedule on Rule 702
motions. The plaintiff has deposed NYU’s rebuttal experts
already, and NYU is scheduled to depose the plaintiff’s experts
on November 15 and 19.
NYU submits that, in the event the Court will rely upon the
plaintiff’s experts, argument on the motion for class
certification should be adjourned until NYU receives the
plaintiff’s experts’ rebuttal reports, has an opportunity to
depose the plaintiff’s experts, and the parties brief Rule 702
motions.
If the Court decides not to rely on plaintiff’s expert reports,
an appropriate schedule could be set to avoid unnecessary
litigation over Rule 702. NYU is prepared to discuss this,
including a potential schedule, at the October 30 conference, which
as noted, could still proceed as scheduled but without oral
argument on the pending motion.
This is NYU's first request for an adjournment of the oral
argument. The parties have conferred, and the plaintiff does not
consent to this request. NYU is available for oral argument on the
Motion on November 20 or 21, 2024.
New York University is a private institution that was founded in
1831.
A copy of the Defendant's motion dated Oct. 16, 2024, is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=1i0AdT at no extra
charge.[CC]
The Defendant is represented by:
Keara M. Gordon, Esq.
DLA Piper LLP (US)
1251 Avenue of the Americas, 27th Floor
New York, NY 10020-1104
Telephone: (212) 335-4632
Facsimile: (212) 884-8632
E-mail: keara.gordon@us.dlapiper.com
PARAGON 28: Artificially Inflated Stock Price, Tiedt Suit Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
NICHOLAS TIEDT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PARAGON 28, INC., ALBERT DACOSTA, STEPHEN M.
DEITSCH, KRISTINA WRIGHT, and ERIK MICKELSON, Defendants, Case No.
1:24-cv-02898 (D. Colo., October 18, 2024) is a class action
against the Defendants for violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder.
According to the complaint, the Defendants made materially false
and misleading statements regarding Paragon's business, operations,
and prospects in order to trade Paragon common stock at
artificially inflated prices between May 5, 2023, and September 20,
2024. Specifically, the Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that Paragon: (a) understated
its Adjusted EBITDA losses; (b) overstated its net inventories; (c)
understated required provisions for excess and obsolete inventory;
(d) understated its cost of goods sold; (e) overstated gross
profit; (f) understated operating loss; (g) understated net loss;
(h) lacked adequate disclosure controls and procedures and internal
control over financial reporting; (i) would be required to restate
its financial statements to conform with generally accepted
accounting principles; and (j) as a result of the foregoing
Defendants' positive statements about the company's business,
operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.
When the truth emerged, the price of the company's shares fell to
$0.30 (-4.3 percent) on September 23, 2024, damaging investors,
including the Plaintiff.
Paragon 28, Inc. is a technology company located in Englewood,
Colorado. [BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Reed R. Kathrein, Esq.
HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
715 Hearst Avenue, Suite 300
Berkeley, CA 94710
Telephone: (510) 725-3000
Facsimile: (510) 725-3001
Email: reed@hbsslaw.com
- and -
Brian J. Schall, Esq.
THE SCHALL LAW FIRM
2049 Century Park East, Suite 2460
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: (310) 301-3335
Facsimile: (310) 388-0192
Email: brian@schallfirm.com
PERMIAN RESOURCES: Ford Cty. Sues Over Gasoline Price-Fixing
------------------------------------------------------------
FORD COUNTY, KANSAS on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PERMIAN RESOURCES CORP. F/K/A CENTENNIAL
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT, INC.; CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORPORATION;
CONTINENTAL RESOURCES INC.; DIAMONDBACK ENERGY, INC.; EOG
RESOURCES, INC.; HESS CORPORATION; OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION; and PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES COMPANY, Defendants,
Case No. 1:24-cv-01042 (D.N.M., October 15, 2024) arises from
Defendants' conspiracy to coordinate, and ultimately constrain,
domestic shale oil production, which has had the effect of fixing,
raising, and maintaining the price of gasoline in and throughout
the United States.
According to the complaint, the Defendants' agreement to limit
their respective shale production volumes has had the effect of
fixing and/or stabilizing at an artificially high-level U.S. (and
global) crude oil prices, which in turn fixed and/or stabilized
gasoline prices in the United States at an artificially high level.
The Defendants' cartel is a per se unlawful restraint of trade
under numerous state antitrust and competition laws. The Plaintiff
and the Class have suffered substantial harm from the
supracompetitive prices they paid for gasoline as a direct and
proximate result of the cartel to constrain domestic production of
shale oil in the United States. They bring this suit to recover
that loss.
Plaintiff, Ford County, Kansas is a duly organized county in the
state of Kansas which purchased gasoline on approximately a weekly
basis in Kansas during the Class Period.
Permian Resources Corporation, known as Centennial Resource
Development, is an oil and gas production company that acquires and
processes shale oil in Texas and New Mexico before selling the
resulting shale oil into the U.S. domestic market where it is
refined and disseminated across the country.[BN]
The Plaintiffs are represented by:
Christopher A. Dodd, Esq.
DODD LAW OFFICE, LLC
500 Marquette Ave. NW, Suite 1330
Albuquerque, NM 87102
Telephone: (505) 475-2742
E-mail: chris@doddnm.com
- and -
Rex A. Sharp, Esq.
Isaac L. Diel, Esq.
W. Greg Wright, Esq.
Brandon C. Landt, Esq.
Hammons P. Hepner, Esq.
SHARP LAW LLP
4820 W. 75th Street
Prairie Village, KS 66208
Telephone: (913) 901-0505
E-mail: rsharp@midwest-law.com
idiel@midwest-law.com
gwright@midwest-law.com
blandt@midwest-law.com
hhepner@midwest-law.com
- and -
Dave Rebein, Esq.
REBEIN BROTHERS, PA
810 Frontivew
Dodge City, KS 67801
Telephone: (620) 227-8126
E-mail: David@rbr3.com
- and -
Glenn I. Kerbs, Esq.
Samantha F. Sweley, Esq.
KERBS LAW OFFICE, LLC
1715 Central Avenue
Dodge City, KS 67801
Telephone: (620) 225-0238
E-mail: gkerbs@kerbslaw.com
ssweley@kerbslaw.com
PROCTER & GAMBLE: Court Narrows Claims in Bounthon, et al. Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Araceli Martinez-Olguin of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California granted in part and denied
in part with leave to amend the Procter & Gamble Company's motion
to dismiss the second amended complaint filed by plaintiffs
Britanny Bounthon, Viviana Rivera, and Gina Allen in the case
captioned as BRITTANY BOUNTHON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE PROCTER
& GAMBLE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 23-cv-00765-AMO (N.D.
Calif.).
Plaintiffs commenced this action on February 21, 2023. P&G moved to
dismiss Plaintiffs' initial complaint on April 14, 2023. By
stipulation of the parties, Plaintiffs filed a first amended
complaint in lieu of opposing the motion to dismiss. On June 23,
2023, P&G moved to dismiss the first amended complaint. After full
briefing, the Court granted P&G's motion with leave to amend.
Plaintiffs filed the operative second amended complaint on February
21, 2024.
In it, Plaintiffs assert claims for (1) violation of consumer
protection statutes (under the laws of California, Florida,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey,
New York, and Washington), (2) violation of the California
Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code Secs. 1750, et seq.,
(3) violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code Secs. 17200, et seq., (4) violation of the California
False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Secs. 17500, et seq.,
and (5) "unjust enrichment/quasi-contract." Plaintiffs, who each
purchased the Products in California, seek to represent the
following proposed classes:
Nationwide Class: "During the fullest period allowed by law, all
persons who purchased the Tampon Products in the United States
within the applicable statute of limitations for personal use and
not resale, until the date notice is disseminated."
Multi-State Consumer Protection Class: "During the fullest period
allowed by law, all persons who purchased the Tampon Products in
the States of California, Florida, Illinois, New York,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey,
Washington within the applicable statute of limitations for
personal use
California Class: "During the fullest period allowed by law, all
persons who purchased the Tampon Products in the State of
California within the applicable statute of limitations for
personal use and not resale, until the date notice is
disseminated." and not resale, until the date notice is
disseminated."
On April 11, 2024, P&G moved to dismiss the second amended
complaint and filed an accompanying request for judicial notice.
P&G's request for judicial notice is granted.
P&G moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' second amended complaint on eight
grounds: (i) Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege that
P&G's tampon products contain unsafe levels of harmful PFAS; (ii)
Plaintiffs lack Article III standing; (iii) Plaintiffs have
insufficiently alleged reliance; (iv) the challenged
misrepresentations cannot mislead a reasonable consumer; (v)
Plaintiffs' omission-based allegations fail the particularity
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b); (vi)
Plaintiffs' claim under the UCL's unlawful prong fails for lack of
an underlying violation of law; (vii) Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment
claim rises and falls with their other purportedly deficient claims
and separately fails because Plaintiffs do not allege that they
lack an adequate remedy at law; and (viii) P&G seeks dismissal of
claims asserted on behalf of putative class members who purchased
Tampon Products outside of California and rely on the laws of other
states for their causes of action.
The Court held a hearing on P&G's motion on October 10, 2024.
In this case, each Plaintiff alleges that she was deprived of the
benefit of her bargain, thus incurring "financial damages at the
point-of-sale stemming from her purchase and/or overpayment for the
Products." Each Plaintiff alleges that she relied on P&G's
representations about the Tampon Products and "would not have
purchased the Products, or would not have purchased them on the
same terms, if the true facts had been known." Each Plaintiff also
seeks to recover the overpayment. These allegations track those
found sufficient in Bowen, and the Court finds them sufficient to
establish standing. Accordingly, P&G's motion to dismiss for lack
of standing is denied.
P&G next attacks the sufficiency of Plaintiffs' allegations that
the Tampon Products contain harmful PFAS. Its challenge to these
allegations is two-fold. First, P&G argues that Plaintiffs fail to
plausibly allege that the presence of organic fluorine is
indicative of the presence of PFAS. Second, it contends that even
if Plaintiffs' allegations about the significance of organic
fluorine were credited, their allegations about the findings of
their TOF testing do not adequately establish that the PFAS levels
detected in the Tampon Products are harmful.
Plaintiffs counter that P&G merely "cherry picks allegations from
the SAC to support its conclusion that Plaintiffs' testing results
fail to support a conclusion that exposure can pose a danger to
human health." They rely on TOF testing to demonstrate the presence
of PFAS in the Tampon Products. However, the exhibits Plaintiffs
cite in their complaint call into question this very inference.
Even if Plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that organic fluorine
shows the presence of PFAS in the Tampon Products, they have failed
to plausibly allege PFAS are present in the Products at a harmful
level. Plaintiffs allege that their testing detected PFAS levels of
30 parts per million, with higher concentrations in the aggregate.
Even if taken as true, Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege
that these levels are harmful. Because the sources on which
Plaintiffs rely undercut the plausibility of their claims of the
harmfulness of certain PFAS levels, their reliance on the cases the
Court previously found distinguishable remains misplaced.
The documents that are incorporated by reference establish that
Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege that the presence of
organic fluorine plausibly indicates the presence of PFAS or that
the PFAS concentrations they detected through their organic
fluorine testing exceed trace amounts or rise to a harmful level.
In light of these pleading deficiencies, the Court grants the
motion to dismiss and does not reach the remaining arguments P&G
advances in its motion.
A copy of the Court's Order dated October 15, 2024, is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=v3b5Jf
R1 RCM: Filing for Class Certification Bids Due May 30, 2025
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Locke v. R1 RCM, INC., et
al., Case No. 6:23-cv-01904 (D. Or., Filed Dec. 18, 2023), the Hon.
Judge Mustafa T. Kasubhai entered an order adopting the Defendants'
proposed case management schedule:
(1) Class Certification Discovery Deadline: Jan. 24, 2025
(2) Class Certification Expert Disclosure Feb. 28, 2025
& Report Deadline:
(3) Rebuttal Class Certification Expert April 4, 2025
Disclosure & Report Deadline:
(4) Class Certification Expert Discovery May 2, 2025
Deadline:
(5) Deadline to File Motion for Class May 30, 2025
Certification/Motion to Deny Class
Certification:
(6) Class Certification Motions Response June 27, 2025
Deadline:
(7) Class Certification Motions Reply July 18, 2025
Deadline:
The suit alleges violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.
R1 is an American 'revenue cycle management' company servicing
hospitals, health systems and physician groups across the United
States.[CC]
ROCKFORM TOOLING: Northrup Files Suit in Ill. Cir. Ct.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rockform Tooling and
Machinery Inc. The case is styled as Dennis Northrup, as
Representative Class Similarly Situated Person v. Rockform Tooling
and Machinery Inc., Case No. 2024-LA-0000308 (Ill. Cir. Ct.,
Winnebago Cty, Oct. 18, 2024).
The case type is stated as "Tort - Intentional."
Rockform Tooling & Machinery, Inc. -- http://www.rockform.com/--
distributes tools and supplies to the fastener and metal forming
industries.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Jordan Richards, Esq.
USA EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS - JORDAN RICHARDS, PLLC
7210 E State Street
Rockford, IL 61108
Phone: 800-483-0998
RURAL MEDIA: Discloses Video Info to 3rd Party, Wissel Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
ELLYSE WISSEL, MICHELLE ANDERSON, and MCLAIN MOTT, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. RURAL
MEDIA GROUP, INC., Defendant, Case No. 4:24-cv-00999-P (N.D. Tex.,
October 18, 2024) is a class action against the Defendant for
violations of Video Privacy Protection Act.
According to the complaint, the Defendant has disclosed to
unrelated third parties, including Meta Platforms, Inc., formerly
known as Facebook, Inc.; Alphabet, Inc., formerly known as Google;
and Yahoo! Inc., the personally identifying video viewing
information of its website visitors, including the Plaintiffs.
Specifically, the Defendant disclosed the video's name, the URL of
the webpage hosting the video, and the video's unique numerical
identifier. As a result, the Defendant violated the Plaintiffs' and
the Class members' statutorily protected privacy rights, says the
suit.
Rural Media Group, Inc. is a video service provider with a
principal place of business in Omaha, Nebraska. [BN]
The Plaintiffs are represented by:
Patrick M. W. Arnold, Esq.
WALLS LANDRY BAKER & OLIVER, PLLC
5910 North Central Expressway, Ste. 1560
Dallas, TX 75206
Telephone: (214) 265-1231
Facsimile: (972) 280-7634
Email: parnold@wlbofirm.com
- and -
Tyler K. Somes, Esq.
HEDIN LLP
1100 15th Street NW, Ste. 04-108
Washington, DC 20005
Telephone: (202) 900-3332
Facsimile: (305) 200-8801
Email: tsomes@hedinllp.com
RYDER INTEGRATED: Bobro Suit Removed to N.D. Illinois
-----------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Anthony Bobro and Kevin Dennis, individually and
on behalf of other persons similarly situated v. RYDER
TRANSPORTATION SOLUTIONS, LLC and RYDER INTEGRATED LOGISTICS, INC.,
Case No. 2024CH06742 was removed from the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois, to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, on Oct. 18, 2024, and assigned Case
No. 1:24-cv-10807.
The Plaintiffs' Complaint purports to assert a single cause of
action under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act
("BIPA") asserting that Ryder uses "biometric cameras to analyze
Plaintiffs' driving behaviors" and those of other Illinois-based
drivers, while they were "driving for Defendants within Cook
County, purportedly in violation of the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act, ("BIPA").[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
William H. Beaumont, Esq.
Aaron S. Welo, Esq.
BEAUMONT LLC
107 W. Van Buren, Suite 209
Chicago, IL 60605
Email: whb@beaumont-law.com
asw@beaumont-law.com
- and -
Eugene Y. Turin, Esq.
MCGUIRE, LAW, P.C.
55 W. Wacker Dr., 9th Fl.
Chicago, IL 60601
Email: eturin@mcgpc.com
The Defendants are represented by:
Melissa A. Siebert, Esq.
Cozen O'Connor, Esq.
COZEN O'CONNOR
123 N. Wacker Drive Suite 1800
Chicago, IL 60606
Phone: (312) 474-7900
Email: msiebert@cozen.com
SAFECO INSURANCE: Must Produce Requested Data in Moshier Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Senior Judge Douglas L. Reyes of the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona granted plaintiff's motion to compel in
the case captioned as Jodi Moshier, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Safeco
Insurance Company of America, Defendant, No. CV-23-00225-PHX-DLR
(D. Ariz.),
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Safeco Insurance Company of
America failed in the past to stack Uninsured Motorist Coverage and
Underinsured Motorist Coverage limits as required by Arizona's
Uninsured Motorist Act. Plaintiffs claim that the insurance
benefits paid by Safeco to every member of the putative class were
wrongfully capped at the maximum amount of the single-vehicle
UM/UIM benefits.
Plaintiffs have employed experts to model damages. Plaintiffs'
experts need a limited sample of data regarding Safeco's past
UM/UIM settlement payments along with third-party bodily injury
settlement payments to demonstrate how such damages can be modeled
on a class-wide basis. At issue are Plaintiffs' Requests for
Production Nos. 40, 41, and 43, in which Plaintiffs request that
Safeco produce all data reflecting the amounts of all private
passenger automobile and motorcycle (1) UM/UIM claim settlements
paid by Safeco for the past six years (RFP 40), (2) liability
insurance claim settlements paid to third parties by Safeco for the
past six years (RFP 41), and (3) liability claim settlements for
the past six years (RFP 43).
In their motion to compel, Plaintiffs state that to limit the
burdens associated with gathering and producing such data,
Plaintiffs would accept a limited sample of the data at the class
certification stage (approximately 200 rows of data per coverage
type). Plaintiffs argue that the data is relevant and necessary for
the presentation of their damages model, and that it can be
produced by Safeco with minimal effort.
Safeco objects to producing data about the settlement payments
primarily on relevance grounds. Safeco argues that the data
Plaintiffs seek could not show that Safeco breached its contract
with any putative class member or improperly handled any putative
class member's claim because the data sought is not data about any
putative class members' claims. Safeco argues that each putative
class member must prove the damages they would have been legally
entitled to recover under the policy and then prove that Safeco
underpaid their UM or UIM benefits.
Even if the Court determines that non-claimant specific data is
relevant to a claimant's claim, Safeco argues the motion should be
denied because the data sought is not representative of any
plaintiff's claim or any putative member's injury. Safeco points
out that personal settlements do not define the amount of a
claimant's legally recoverable injury because evaluating personal
injury claims is not an exact science.
Safeco also argues that the liability settlement data is not
relevant because it involves fundamentally different types of
claims than UM and UIM claims. UM and UIM claims are first-party
claims, while liability claims are third-party claims.
Finally, Safeco argues that Plaintiffs are not required to prove
their case through common proof at the class certification stage.
Aside from relevance, Safeco argues that it should not be required
to produce the data because such production would impose an undue
burden and Safeco has an obligation under Arizona law to keep the
requested information confidential.
Plaintiffs represent that their experts need Safeco's data
concerning its settlement of past bodily injury and UM/UIM claims
to calculate class-wide damages using the representative approach.
Plaintiffs represent that their expert's model will use the
distribution of past settlement payments that were not reduced by
any cap to estimate the distribution curve for all the class
members' claims and calculate the probable aggregate of settlements
that would have been made to the class under what they claim are
the correct stacked policy limits. With that data, their experts
can utilize established statistical tools such as Kaplan-Meier
curves and Weibull mixture models and attempt to show that the
aggregate damages can be calculated for all insureds whose benefits
were limited by caps.
According to the Court, there is no general prohibition against
proving class-wide damages through the representative approach,
where statistical evidence is used to prove class claims.
The Court finds Plaintiffs' requested data relevant.
Safeco argues that there is a burden to producing the requested
data. However, it does not describe the burden. Safeco has not
established an unreasonable or disproportionate burden in producing
the data, the Court concludes.
A copy of the Court's Order dated October 15, 2024, is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=wmSEgw
SAN DIEGO, CA: Settlement in Bloom, et al. Suit Gets Final Court OK
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Anthony J. Battaglia of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California granted plaintiffs'
motions for final approval of the settlement and for attorneys'
fees in the case captioned as MICHAEL BLOOM, STEPHEN CHATZKY, TONY
DIAZ, VALERIE GRISCHY, PENNY HELMS, BENJAMIN HERNANDEZ, DOUG
HIGGINS, SUZONNE KEITH, GERALD STARK, ANNA STARK, and DAVID WILSON,
individually and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, Defendant, Case No.:
17-cv-02324-AJB-DEB (S.D. Calif.).
The Court also ordered that:
1. The claims of Plaintiffs and Class Members are hereby released
as against Defendant consistent with Paragraph 12 of the Settlement
Agreement;
2. The City pay $15,000 in monetary damages to each of the nine
current Named Plaintiffs, and $7,500 to each of the seven Class
Representatives within thirty (30) days of this Order;
3. Without affecting the finality of this Final Approval Order, the
Court retains jurisdiction over implementation of the settlement
for a period of three years, with enforcement delegated to
Magistrate Judge Butcher;
4. This action be dismissed with prejudice, with each side to bear
its own costs and attorneys' fees except as provided by the
Settlement Agreement and the Court's Orders;
5. This document constitutes a final judgment and separate document
for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a); and
6. The Clerk of Court is ordered to close this case.
On November 15, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint
against the City, alleging violations of the constitutional and
statutory rights of San Diego residents, including those with
disabilities who rely on their vehicles for shelter and cannot
access alternative housing. The operative complaint specifically
challenges two of the City's ordinances: one prohibiting
recreational vehicle parking from 2:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m., and
another prohibiting vehicle human habitation in most areas of San
Diego any time of the day or night.
On March 18, 2024, the Court preliminarily approved the Settlement
Agreement and the proposed class notice, and further directed that
the notice be distributed.
Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs' unopposed motions for
final approval of class action settlement and for attorneys' fees.
Defendant City of San Diego has filed notices of non-opposition as
to each motion. The deadline to object to the Settlement was July
10, 2023, and class member Christopher Scott Endres filed an
Opposition to the Settlement. The Court held a hearing on
Plaintiffs' Final Approval Motion on October 10, 2024, at 2:00
p.m.
Mr. Endres raises an objection to the proposed settlement,
asserting "the settlement falls short of delivering justice and
equity."
In his objection, Mr. Endres also provides a proposed alternative
settlement, which includes such terms as a permanent injunction to
enjoin the City from enforcing the ordinances, an award of $700
million in compensatory damages, implementing sustainable housing
programs, forgiving all tickets issued under the ordinances and
ensuring the return of impounded property, and holding city council
members, the mayor, and other officials
accountable for their roles in enforcing the ordinances.
In its Preliminary Approval Order, the Court addressed each of the
fairness factors in turn and found all the pertinent factors
weighed in favor of approving the Settlement. Among other criteria,
the ticket forgiveness, expanded and improved safe parking program,
and an amended VHO training bulletin restricting VHO enforcement to
settle and resolve all claims in the action by or on behalf of the
potentially over 800 Class Members against the City is a fair,
reasonable, and appropriate settlement amount to resolve all claims
in this action.
Under the Parties' proposed settlement, every class member,
including Plaintiffs, will benefit from the same policy changes
that will protect class members from unrestricted enforcement of
the VHO and OVO. The only difference in recovery between the
Plaintiffs and other class members is a service award in the amount
of $7,500 for each of the Plaintiffs who were appointed Class
Representatives and $15,000 to each Named Plaintiff for damages.
The Settlement Agreement, however, preserves unnamed class members'
rights to sue for individual damages, in contrast to Named
Plaintiffs, who otherwise waive the right to sue for additional
damages.
One Class Member, Mr. Endres, has filed an objection against the
settlement. In response, Plaintiffs assert that with respect to the
issue of compensatory damages for class members, the Settlement
Agreement does not prevent Mr. Endres from suing the City for his
own damages. Moreover, the Settlement Agreement's release of claims
on behalf of class members for equitable relief only lasts three
years, and so Mr. Endres is free to sue the City for additional
equitable relief after the period of reserved jurisdiction expires.
Plaintiffs assert all class representatives support the Settlement
Agreement and believe it is fair, and that the reaction from other
class members to the proposed settlement has been overwhelmingly
positive.
During the October 10, 2024 hearing, Mr. Endres was given an
opportunity to voice his objections to the Settlement Agreement.
Plaintiffs' counsel and the Court emphasized the narrow scope of
the instant action, and that Mr. Endres and other class members are
free to independently file suit for damages. Plaintiffs' counsel
further highlighted that the instant case did not seek damages, but
rather was for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs' counsel and the Court
are unaware of any other objections to the proposed Settlement
Agreement.
Because no pertinent facts have changed, the Court reaffirms and
incorporates by reference its analysis of the Rule 23(e)
requirements as set forth in its Preliminary Approval Order.
Accordingly, the Court finds the settlement to be "fair,
reasonable, and adequate" pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(e).
Plaintiffs' counsel request attorneys' fees and costs for a total
of $2,950,000. Of this Agreed Amount, $2,845,567.06 is requested
for attorneys' fees and $104,432.94 is requested for costs and
expenses. Because Plaintiffs have reduced their own request by 53%,
the Court ultimately finds Plaintiffs' request of $2,845,567.06 to
be reasonable.
The Court finds the individual damages award to the Named
Plaintiffs to compensate Plaintiffs' claims is reasonable given the
alleged individual harms each Plaintiff experienced.
The Settlement Agreement provides each of the seven Class
Representative will receive $7,500, totaling $52,500 Further, each
of the nine Named Plaintiff will also receive $15,000 in individual
monetary damages under the Settlement Agreement, totaling $135,000.
The Court finds the individual damages award to the Named
Plaintiffs to compensate Plaintiffs' claims is reasonable given the
alleged individual harms each Plaintiff experienced.
A copy of the Court's Order dated October 14, 2024, is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=VpxNSl
SEA WORLD: Joseph Suit Removed to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Steven Joseph, an individual, on behalf of
himself and all persons similarly situated v. SEA WORLD LLC, a
Limited Liability Company; SEAWORLD PARKS & ENTERTAINMENT, INC., a
Corporation; and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, Case No. 24CU011286C was
removed from the Superior Court of the State of California for the
County of San Diego, to the United States District Court for the
Central District of California, on Oct. 18, 2024, and assigned Case
No. 3:24-cv-01937-MMA-KSC.
The Plaintiff's Complaint alleges nine causes of action, in
Violation of Cal. Lab. Codes and the Applicable IWC Wage Order,
including Unfair Competition; Failure to Pay Minimum Wages; Failure
to Pay Overtime Wages; Failure to Provide Required Meal Periods;
Failure to Provide Required Rest Periods; Failure to Provide
Accurate Itemized Wage Statements; Failure to Reimburse Employees
for Required Expenses; Failure to Provide Wages When Due; and
Failure to Pay Sick Pay Wages.[BN]
The Defendants are represented by:
Aaron H. Cole, Esq.
Sona P. Patel, Esq.
OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Phone: 213-239-9800
Facsimile: 213-239-9045
Email: aaron.cole@ogletree.com
sona.patel@ogletree.com
SINGULARITY FUTURE: Seeks Dismissal of Crivellaro Suit
------------------------------------------------------
Singularity Future Technology Ltd. disclosed in its Form 10-K for
the fiscal year ended June 30, 2024, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on October 15, 2024 that on November 20, 2023,
the company filed a motion to dismiss a putative class action filed
by Piero Crivellaro against the company and other defendants in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
which is fully-briefed and awaiting the court's determination.
On December 9, 2022, Crivellaro, purportedly on behalf of the
persons or entities who purchased or acquired publicly traded
securities of the company between February 2021 and November 2022,
alleged violations of federal securities laws related to alleged
false or misleading disclosures made by the company in its public
filings. The plaintiff seeks unspecified damages, plus interest,
costs, fees, and attorneys' fees.
Singularity Future Technology Ltd. is into the arrangement of
transportation of freight & cargo based in New York.
SNAPPLE BEVERAGE: Court Refuses to Dismiss Fried Consumer Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Chief Judge Dana M. Sabraw of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California denies the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the lawsuit entitled ALBERT FRIED, on behalf of himself,
all others similarly situated, and the general public, Plaintiff v.
SNAPPLE BEVERAGE CORP., Defendant, Case No. 3:24-cv-00653-DMS-DDL
(S.D. Cal.).
The Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of himself, all
others similarly situated, and the public. The Plaintiff is a
consumer of the Defendant's juice, tea, and element beverages
("Products"). Specifically, he claims to have regularly drunk the
Defendant's Apple Juice, Peach Tea, and Lemon Tea. He alleges that
the Defendant's labeling of its Products as "ALL NATURAL" is false
and misleading because the Products contain manufactured citric
acid ("MCA") and coloring agents.
The Plaintiff's Complaint asserts six causes of action: (1)
violation of the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); (2) violation of
the False Advertising Law ("FAL"); (3) violation of the Consumers
Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"); (4) breach of express warranties under
Cal. Com. Code Section 2313(1); (5) breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability under Cal. Com. Code Section 2314; and (6)
unjust enrichment.
As a preliminary matter, the parties have requested judicial
notice. While the Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of two FDA
warning letters issued in 2001, the Defendant seeks judicial notice
of labels on its Products. Because these requests are unopposed,
the Court grants them.
The Plaintiff alleges violations of California's consumer
protection statutes: UCL, FAL, and CLRA.
At this point in the proceedings, Judge Sabraw holds that the
Plaintiff need not prove he can satisfy the reasonable consumer
test for this is generally a question of fact, which requires
consideration and weighing of evidence from both sides and which
usually cannot be made on demurrer.
The Plaintiff makes two arguments as to why the Defendant's "ALL
NATURAL" labeling violates California's consumer protection
statutes. First, he alleges that the use of juice concentrates "for
color" is unnatural. Second, he contends that the use of citric
acid renders the Defendant's Products unnatural.
Judge Sabraw finds that the Plaintiff's allegation regarding what a
reasonable consumer would assume is too conclusory and lacks a
factual foundation to support any determination as to what
reasonable consumers do (or do not) believe. Even acknowledging
that FDA guidance is relevant to the Plaintiff's allegations, the
Court finds that the guidance alone is insufficient to show that
members of the public are likely to be deceived.
The Plaintiff's failure to plead any additional factual evidence of
reasonable consumers' beliefs is fatal to his argument, Judge
Sabraw says. Further, the Juices' ingredient lists clarify any
misunderstanding a reasonable consumer would have. As such, the
Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that reasonable consumers would
be deceived by the "ALL NATURAL" label on the Defendant's Products
simply because they contain juice concentrates for color.
The Plaintiff next contends that the Defendant's Products are
unnatural because they contain MCA. To support this contention, he
cites the Defendant's website, which states both that citric acid
is "a food ingredient derived from starch" and "is present in
citrus fruits." In response, the Defendant argues that the
Plaintiff has failed to allege that the type of citric acid used by
the Defendant is artificial and that MCA is "derived from natural
sources."
The Court agrees with the Plaintiff. Judge Sabraw opines that the
Defendant is incorrect that the Plaintiff fails to
allege--anywhere--that the citric acid in Snapple Juice Drinks is
artificial or synthetic. The Plaintiff's Complaint links MCA to the
Defendant's Products three times. Accordingly, because the
Plaintiff states plausible claims under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA, the
Motion to Dismiss is denied.
Judge Sabraw also finds that the Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged
at this stage that (1) the Product labels convey to reasonable
consumers that the Products are "ALL NATURAL," and that (2) the
Products nonetheless contain MCA, an industrial chemical, contrary
to the Defendant's representations. Accordingly, the Court denies
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the breach of express warranties
claim.
Judge Sabraw further finds, among other things, that the Plaintiff
has plausibly alleged that the Defendant has not conformed with its
affirmation that its Products are "ALL NATURAL," and that the
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged fraudulent misrepresentations at
this stage.
Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claim
for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and the
unjust enrichment claim.
A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 11, 2024, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4kubu5a3 from PacerMonitor.com.
STAPLES THE OFFICE: Giordani Suit Removed to C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Kristofer Giordani, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated v. STAPLES THE OFFICE SUPERSTORE‚ LLC;
and DOES 1 to 100‚ inclusive, Case No. CVRI2405151 was removed
from the Superior Court of California, County of Riverside, to the
United States District Court for the Central District of
California, on Oct. 18, 2024, and assigned Case No. 5:24-cv-02224.
The Complaint contains seven causes of action against Defendant
alleging violations of California Labor Codes for unpaid minimum
wages, unpaid overtime, failure to authorize or permit meal
periods, failure to authorize or permit rest periods, non-compliant
wage statements, wages not timely paid upon termination, and
unlawful business practices.[BN]
The Defendants are represented by:
Tritia M. Murata, Esq.
David P. Zins, Esq.
Maya Harel, Esq.
Natalie E. Fox, Esq.
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
865 South Figueroa Street, 24th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90017-2566
Phone: (213) 633-6800
Fax: (213) 633-6899
Email: TritiaMurata@dwt.com
DavidZins@dwt.com
MayaHarel@dwt.com
NatalieFox@dwt.com
STEELSCAPE WASHINGTON: Class Cert Bid Extended to April 8, 2025
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MICHAEL JENKINS,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, v.
STEELSCAPE WASHINGTON LLC, a Washington limited liability company,
Case No. :24-cv-05127-TMC (W.D. Wash.), the Hon. Judge Tiffany
Cartwright entered an order that the Parties jointly request that
the deadline for Plaintiff's motion for class certification be
extended by five (5) months, from Nov. 8, 2024 to April 8, 2025.
-- The parties stipulate and agree that good cause supports their
request given the time and resources expended to engage in a
negotiated settlement.
On October 1, the parties attended mediation, but could not reach a
negotiated resolution. Just days after the mediation, counsel met
and conferred about the case schedule and the status of discovery.
During the conference, counsel agreed that the current deadline of
November 8, 2024 for Plaintiff’s anticipated motion for class
certification does not allow sufficient time to supplement pending
discovery requests and conduct the additional discovery necessary
to prepare for class certification briefing.
Steelscape is a national supplier of metallic-coated and
pre-painted steel in a number of colors, textures and prints.
A copy of the Court's order dated Oct. 16, 2024, is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=C9ehMN at no extra
charge.[CC]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Lindsay L. Halm, Esq.
Adam J. Berger, Esq.
Andrew D. Boes, Esq.
SCHROETER, GOLDMARK & BENDER
401 Union Street, Suite 3400
Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone: (206) 622-8000
E-mail: halm@sgb-law.com
berger@sgb-law.com
boes@sgb-law.com
The Defendant is represented by:
Todd L. Nunn, Esq.
K&L GATES LLP
925 Fourth Avenue, Suite 2900
Seattle, WA 98104-1158
Telephone: (206) 623-7580
E-mail: todd.nunn@klgates.com
STREAMLINE FINISHES: Ramirez Labor Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as GUSTAVO PENA RAMIREZ, an
individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
STREAMLINE FINISHES, INC., a California Corporation, and DOES 1
through 50, Case No. 30-2024-01385168-CU-OE-CXC (Filed March 13,
2024), was removed from the Superior Court of California, County of
Orange, to the United States District Court for the Central
District of California on Oct. 17, 2024.
The Central California District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
8:24-cv-02249 to the proceeding.
The suit alleges eight class action claims for minimum wage
violations, overtime wage violations, meal period violations, rest
period violations, wage statement penalties, waiting time
penalties, failure to reimburse necessary business expenses, and
unfair competition.
Streamline Finishes is a construction company based in Santa Ana,
CA and specializes in Project Management and Coordination.[BN]
The Defendants are represented by:
Katherine C. Den bleyker, Esq.
Anne Osborn, Esq.
O'HAGAN MEYER LLP
550 S. Hope Street, Suite 2400
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Telephone: (213) 647-0005
E-mail: kdenbleyker@ohaganmeyer.com
aosborn@ohaganmeyer.com
TAFT STETTINIUS: Court Dismisses 2nd Amended Fiecke-Stifter Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned Sandra K. Fiecke-Stifter and The Estate of
Doris M. Fasching, by and through Personal Representative Sandra
Fiecke-Stifter, Plaintiffs v. Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP,
Defendant, Case No. 0:22-cv-03056-ECT-DTS (D. Minn.), Judge Eric C.
Tostrud of the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota
grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss, and dismisses the
Corrected Second Amended Complaint with prejudice.
Plaintiff Sandra K. Fiecke-Stifter alleges that Defendant Taft
Stettinius & Hollister violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act by foreclosing on a home that had been owned by Sandra's late
mother, Doris M. Fasching. MidCountry Bank was the lender, note
holder, and mortgagee. Taft represented MidCountry in the
nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Sandra alleges that MidCountry
foreclosed without a present right to possession in violation of
Section 1692f(6)(A) of the FDCPA.
Taft moves to dismiss, and Judge Tostrud holds that the motion will
be granted.
According to Judge Tostrud, under the mortgage's terms, there was a
default because Sandra made late payments on the note. Sandra's
various arguments for why MidCountry lacked a present right to
possession despite this default are not persuasive. MidCountry was
not required to give a notice of default before foreclosing under
the terms of the mortgage. Nor was it required to accelerate the
loan.
Although Sandra may have had a right to cure (until MidCountry
exercised its right to accelerate the note), this is beside the
point, because she never completely cured the default after
MidCountry commenced the foreclosure, Judge Tostrud opines. And
although a violation of Minnesota foreclosure-by-advertisement
statutes may have rendered the foreclosure void, a void foreclosure
does not mean MidCountry lacked a present right to possession.
Doris owned a home in Hutchinson, Minnesota. She and her husband
took out a line of credit from MidCountry, secured against the
home. When Doris died in September 2021, predeceased by her
husband, she was current on all payments. Sandra continued to
reside in the home after Doris's death and made payments on the
loan.
On Feb. 1, 2022, MidCountry initiated a
foreclosure-by-advertisement proceeding. MidCountry appointed Taft
as its attorney to foreclose on the property. The property was sold
at a sheriff's auction on April 7, 2022. Sandra later redeemed the
property.
In December 2022, Sandra brought this case as a prospective class
action against MidCountry and Taft. After filing an Amended
Complaint, Sandra's claims against MidCountry were dismissed
without prejudice. Sandra moved to amend, seeking to revive her
claims against MidCountry and bolster her FDCPA claim against Taft.
Magistrate Judge Schultz denied Sandra's request to revive her
claims against MidCountry but allowed Sandra to amend her FDCPA
claim against Taft.
In the operative Corrected Second Amended Complaint, Sandra claims
Taft violated Sections 1692f(6)(A) and (C) of the FDCPA because
MidCountry lacked a present right to possession when Taft
foreclosed on the home (on MidCountry's behalf).
Judge Tostrud notes that the fighting issue here is whether
MidCountry had a "present right to possession" when it foreclosed
the property. Sandra offers two theories to explain why MidCountry
lacked a present right to possession under Minnesota law: (1)
Sandra was not in default on the note; and (2) MidCountry violated
Minn. Stat. Section 580.30, a Minnesota
foreclosure-by-advertisement statute.
Sandra alleges that she was not in default. But Sandra's own
allegations plainly show that she failed to make payments when
payments were due, Judge Tostrud notes. Therefore, she was in
default as defined by the terms of the mortgage. And her conclusory
allegations to the contrary are not plausible, Judge Tostrud
holds.
Sandra does not dispute this basic reading of the Corrected Second
Amended Complaint--that she made late payments. But she contends
that MidCountry lacked the right to foreclose, and thus, a present
right to possession, despite these late payments.
Judge Tostrud opines that Sandra's interpretation of the mortgage
is inconsistent with the plain language of Section 9. Assuming
MidCountry was required to accept Sandra's late December and
February payments, the default was never completely cured, and
therefore, MidCountry never lost its present right to possession
under Sandra's cure theory, Judge Tostrud explains.
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and
proceedings here, the Court grants Defendant Taft Stettinius &
Hollister LLP's Motion to Dismiss. The Corrected Second Amended
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Oct. 11,
2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/yjwnvkut from
PacerMonitor.com.
Carl E. Christensen -- carl@clawoffice.com -- Christopher Wilcox --
chris@clawoffice.com -- Christensen Sampsel PLLC, in Minneapolis,
MN, and Thomas J. Lyons Jr. -- tommy@consumerjusticecenter.com --
Consumer Justice Center P.A., in Vadnais Heights, MN, for
Plaintiffs Sandra K. Fiecke-Stifter and The Estate of Doris M.
Fasching.
Jason R. Asmus -- jasmus@taftlaw.com -- Justin P. Weinberg --
jweinberg@taftlaw.com -- Schaan Barth -- sbarth@taftlaw.com -- Taft
Stettinius & Hollister LLP, in Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant Taft
Stettinius & Hollister LLP.
TAKARA SAKE: Tunick Suit Seeks Class Certification
--------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as COLBY TUNICK, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, v. TAKARA SAKE USA INC.,
Case No. 3:23-cv-00572-TSH (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will move the
Court on March 6, 2025, for class certification pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23 (b)(2) and (b)(3).
The Plaintiff moves this Honorable Court for an Order as follows:
1. That this case is certified to proceed to the merits as a
class
action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on all
causes of action set forth in Plaintiff’s First Amended
Class
Action Complaint filed against the Defendant on behalf of the
following Class:
"All persons who, during the Class Period, purchased one or
more
of the Products in California for purposes other than resale
at
a retail location or online."
Excluded from the Class are: (i) Defendant, its assigns,
successors, and legal representatives; (ii) any entities in
which Defendant has controlling interests; (iii) federal,
state,
and/or local governments, including, but not limited to,
their
departments, agencies, divisions, bureaus, boards, sections,
groups, counsels, and/or subdivisions; and (iv) any judicial
officer presiding over this matter and person within the
third
degree of consanguinity to such judicial officer. (the
“Class”).
2. The Plaintiff Colby Tunick is appointed as Class
Representative.
3. That Joshua Nassir, Benjamin Heikali, Ruhandy Glezakos, and
Katherine Phillips of Treehouse Law, LLP, and Ryan J.
Clarkson,
Bahar Sodaify, Alan Gudino, and Samuel M. Gagnon of Clarkson
Law
Firm, P.C., are appointed as Class Counsel pursuant to Fed.
R.
Civ. P. 23(g).
Takara focuses on producing and distributing "Sho Chiku Bai" brand
of sake, alongside other products.
A copy of the Plaintiff's motion dated Oct. 17, 2024, is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=dngRkn at no extra
charge.[CC]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Joshua Nassir, Esq.
Benjamin Heikali, Esq.
Ruhandy Glezakos, Esq.
Katherine Phillips, Esq.
TREEHOUSE LAW, LLP
3130 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 555
Santa Monica, CA 90403
Telephone: (310) 751-5948
E-mail: jnassir@treehouselaw.com
bheikali@treehouselaw.com
rglezakos@treehouselaw.com
kphillips@treehouselaw.com
- and -
Ryan J. Clarkson, Esq.
Alan Gudino, Esq.
Bahar Sodaify, Esq.
Samuel M. Gagnon, Esq.
CLARKSON LAW FIRM, P.C.
22525 Pacific Coast Highway
Malibu, CA 90265
Telephone: (213) 788-4050
Facsimile: (213) 788-4070
E-mail: rclarkson@clarksonlawfirm.com
bsodaify@clarksonlawfirm.com
agudino@clarksonlawfirm.com
sgagnon@clarksonlawfirm.com
TESLA INC: Suit Filed in C.D. California
----------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Tesla Inc., et al.
The case is styled as Jane Doe, an individual, and all those
similarly situated v. Tesla Inc., Brookfield Properties USA II
Retail, Inc. doing business as: Galleria At Tyler, Does 1-100,
inclusive, Case No. 5:24-cv-02226-JAK-SP (C.D. Cal., Oct. 18,
2024).
The nature of suit is stated as Motor Vehicle Prod. Liability.
Tesla, Inc. -- https://www.tesla.com/ -- is an American
multinational automotive and clean energy company.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Andrew J. Knez, Esq.
Fred J. Knez, Esq.
Matthew James Knez, Esq.
KNEZ LAW GROUP LLP
3890 10th Street
Riverside, CA 92506
Phone: (951) 742-7681
Fax: (951) 742-7685
Email: andrewknez@knezlaw.com
fredknez@knezlaw.com
matthewknez@knezlaw.com
TEXONA MARKETING: Sends Unwanted Telemarketing Calls, Wilson Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
PETER WILSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TEXONA MARKETING LLC D/B/A COLLINS
GHOSTWRITING, Defendant, Case No. 4:24-cv-04003 (S.D. Tex., October
18, 2024) is a class action against the Defendant for violation of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.
According to the complaint, the Defendant placed telemarketing
calls, including text messages, to telephone numbers on the
National Do Not Call Registry, including the Plaintiff's number,
without prior consent. As a result of the Defendant's misconduct,
the privacy of the Plaintiff and similarly situated consumers have
been violated.
Texona Marketing LLC, doing business as Collins Ghostwriting, is a
marketing agency, with its principal place of business in Houston,
Texas. [BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Andrew Roman Perrong, Esq.
PERRONG LAW LLC
2657 Mount Carmel Avenue
Glenside, PA 19038
Telephone: (215) 225-5529
Facsimile: (888) 329-0305
Email: a@perronglaw.com
- and -
Anthony Paronich, Esq.
PARONICH LAW, P.C.
350 Lincoln St., Suite 2400
Hingham, MA 02043
Telephone: (617) 485-0018
Facsimile: (508) 318-8100
Email: anthony@paronichlaw.com
THS GROUP: Jennings' Unlawful Ads Suit Removed to D.N.J.
--------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as ALONA JENNINGS; YOLAND BROWN;
FANTASIA HILLIARD; BRINDA MOORE; SHIRITA MOORE; and CECILIA SMITH;
v. THS GROUP LLC; SPHW COMPANY INC.; DAVID SERUYA; DOES 1-100; and
ROES 1- 1000; Case No. MID-L-5277-24 (Filed Sept. 16, 2024), was
removed from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division,
Middlesex County, to the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey on Oct. 17, 2024.
The New Jersey District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:24-cv-09879-JKS-JRA to the proceeding.
The suit alleges unlawful advertising and solicitation of
professional services via email within the State of California, in
violation of California's Anti-Spam Law, codified under California
Business and Professions Code section 17529.5.
The Plaintiffs seek to recover only statutory damages in excess of
$100,000.00 exclusive of costs and attorneys' fees.[BN]
The Defendants are represented by:
Edward S. Antar, Esq.
44 Court Street, Suite 1207
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Telephone: (212) 388-0900
E-mail: edward@antar.law
TICKETMASTER LLC: Howitt Suit Transferred to D. Montana
-------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Steven Jeffrey Howitt, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Ticketmaster LLC, Live
Nation Entertainment, Inc., Snowflake Inc., Case No. 2:24-cv-06530
was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, to the U.S. District Court for the District
of Montana on Oct. 18, 2024.
The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:24-cv-00145-BMM to the
proceeding.
The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.
Ticketmaster Entertainment, LLC -- https://www.ticketmaster.com/ --
is an American ticket sales and distribution company based in
Beverly Hills, California.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Ryan J. Clarkson, Esq.
Yana Hart, Esq.
Tiara Avaness, Esq.
CLARKSON LAW FIRM, P.C.
22525 Pacific Coast Highway
Malabu, CA 90265
Phone: (213) 788-4050
Email: rclarkson@clarksonlawfirm.com
yhart@clarksonlawfirm.com
tavaness@clarksonlawfirm.com
- and -
Lynda J. Grant, Esq.
THE GRANT LAW FIRM PLLC
521 Fifth Avenue, 17th Floor
New York, NY 10175
Phone: (212) 292-4441
Fax: (212) 292-4442
Email: lgrant@grantfirm.com
- and -
Melissa R. Emert, Esq.
KANTROWITZ GOLDHAMER AND GRAIFMAN PC
135 Chestnut Ridge Road, Suite 200
Montvale, NJ 07645
Phone: (845) 356-2570
Fax: (845) 356-4335
Email: memert@kgglaw.com
The Defendants are represented by:
Daniel Scott Carlton, Esq.
PAUL HASTINGS LLP
515 S. Flower Street, Ste 25th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Phone: (213) 683-6113
Email: scottcarlton@paulhastings.com
- and -
James Pearl, Esq.
PAUL HASTINGS LLP
1999 Avenue of the Stars
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Phone: (310) 620-5700
Fax: (310) 620-5891
Email: jamespearl@paulhastings.com
- and -
Raymond Stockstill, IV, Esq.
PAUL HASTINGS, LLP
695 Town Center Drive, Ste. 17th Floor
Costa Mesa, CA 92626-1924
Phone: (714) 668-6204
Fax: (714) 979-1921
Email: beaustockstill@paulhastings.com
TRANSUNION RISK: Fails to Secure Personal Info, Gonzalez Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
ALEJANDRO GONZALEZ, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TRANSUNION RISK AND ALTERNATIVE
DATA SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:24-cv-10296 (N.D. Ill.,
October 15, 2024) is a class action against Defendant for its
failure to properly secure and safeguard Plaintiff's and other
similarly situated customers' sensitive personally identifiable
information, including their names, Social Security numbers,
driver’s license numbers, and dates of birth.
According to Defendant, it identified suspicious activity related
to attempts to access data files and consumer accounts for certain
of its products and started an in-depth investigation into the
matter beginning on July 24, 2024. Once Defendant finished its
investigation, on September 10, 2024, Defendant concluded that
individuals misrepresented themselves to gain access to Defendant's
products and, by extension, the PII of Plaintiff and Class Members
between February 8, 2024, and July 31, 2024.
The complaint asserts that Defendant disregarded the rights of
Plaintiff and Class Members by intentionally, willfully,
recklessly, or negligently failing to ensure it had adequate and
reasonable safeguards and measures in place to protect the PII of
Plaintiff and Class Members.
The Plaintiff and Class Members seek to remedy these harms and
prevent any future data compromise on behalf of themselves and all
similarly situated persons whose personal data was compromised and
stolen as a result of the data breach and who remain at risk due to
Defendant's inadequate data security practices.
Transunion Risk and Alternative Data Solutions is a subsidiary of
TransUnion, a consumer credit reporting agency.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Jeff Ostrow, Esq.
Kristen Lake Cardoso, Esq.
KOPELOWITZ OSTROW P.A.
One West Las Olas Blvd., Suite 500
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
Telephone: (954) 525-4100
E-mail: ostrow@kolawyers.com
cardoso@kolawyers.com
- and -
Mariya Weekes, Esq.
MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS
GROSSMAN, PLLC
201 Sevilla Avenue, 2nd Floor
Coral Gables, FL 33134
Telephone: (786) 879-8200
E-mail: mweekes@milberg.com
- and -
John Heenan, Esq.
HEENAN & COOK, Esq.
1631 Zimmerman Trail
Billings, MT 59102
Telephone: (406) 839-9091
E-mail: john@lawmontana.com
TRAVELERS CO: Faces Chirinian Suit Over Tobacco Use Penalty
-----------------------------------------------------------
CARLIE CHIRINIAN, on behalf of herself, and all others similarly
situated v. THE TRAVELERS COMPANIES, INC. and THE TRAVELERS
ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE, Case No. 0:24-cv-03956 (D. Minn., Oct.
17, 2024) contends that the Defendants improperly impose a wellness
penalty for tobacco use on all participants who use tobacco in
violation of Employee Retirement Income Security Act 702.
According to the complaint, the Defendants is charging some
participants more than others based on a health status-related
factor by imposing a discriminatory wellness penalty for tobacco
use on participants (and their dependents) who use tobacco, and by
withholding wellness incentives from those participants.
Notwithstanding, the Travelers Trusteed Employee Benefit Plan
imposes an unlawful tobacco surcharge on participants, which fails
to offer the requisite reasonable alternative standard as mandated
by law. While the Plan allows participants to qualify for a
non-smoker discount through tobacco cessation programs, it imposes
stringent requirements, including deadlines for enrolling and
completing the program. The Plan also fails to clearly communicate
these options and requirements to employees in a timely and
transparent manner, says the suit.
Further, the Plan neglects to adequately inform employees that they
may qualify for an alternative standard if it is unreasonably
difficult or medically inadvisable to meet the cessation program
requirements, and it fails to notify participants that the
recommendations of their personal physician will be accommodated.
This failure to communicate is common across all Plan
communications.
The Plaintiff brings this lawsuit individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated Plan participants and beneficiaries, seeking to
recover the unlawfully charged tobacco surcharges and to obtain
plan-wide equitable relief to prevent Travelers from continuing to
collect these improper fees in violation of ERISA.
Ms. Chirinian was an employee of Travelers until earlier this year
who was paying smoker rates for health insurance offered through
her employer during the applicable limitations period.
Travelers provides a broad range of insurance products and services
across multiple sectors, including personal, commercial, and
specialty lines, and operates throughout the U.S. and
internationally.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Philip J. Krzeski, Esq.
CHESTNUT CAMBRONNE PA
100 Washington Avenue South, Suite 1700
Minneapolis, MN 55401
Telephone: (612) 339-7300
E-mail: pkrzeski@chestnutcambronne.com
- and -
Oren Faircloth, Esq.
David J. DiSabato, Esq.
SIRI & GLIMSTAD LLP
745 Fifth Avenue, Suite 500
New York, NY 10151
Telephone: (212) 532-1091
E-mail: ofaircloth@sirillp.com
ddisabato@sirillp.com
TRUGREEN LIMITED: McClain Files TCPA Suit in M.D. Florida
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against TruGreen Limited
Partnership. The case is styled as Shi-Larie McClain, individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated v. TruGreen Limited
Partnership, Case No. 3:24-cv-01081 (M.D. Fla., Oct. 18, 2024).
The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.
TruGreen -- https://www.trugreen.com/ -- originally known as
ChemLawn and later as TruGreen ChemLawn, is the largest lawn
treatment company in the United States.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Ryan Lee McBride, Esq.
KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP APC
2221 Camino Del Rio S., Suite 101
San Diego, CA 92108
Phone: (800) 400-6808
Email: ryan@kazlg.com
UNIT MANAGER EVANS: Lovett Files Suit in S.D. Ohio
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Unit Manager Evans,
et al. The case is styled as Kelvin R. Lovett, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Unit Manager Evans, C/O
Scott, C/O Buckler, Sgt Mayes, Capt. Yates, Lt Williams, C.M. J
Ware, Warden W Cool. Capt. Crabtree, Case No. 2:24-cv-04081-JLG-SKB
(S.D. Ohio, Oct. 18, 2024).
The nature of suit is stated as Prisoner Civil Rights.[BN]
The Plaintiff appears pro se.
UNITED PARCEL: Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand Yelp Law Case Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Dale S. Fischer of the United States District Court for the
Central District of California granted plaintiffs' motion to remand
the case captioned as AMBER ANDERSON, an individual; CHAKA THEUS,
an individual; RONALD LATHROP, an individual; ANITRA HALL, an
individual; BRIAN FELSEN, an individual; and ARASH MAGHBOULEH, an
individual, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE OF AMERICA, INC., a
corporation; UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., a corporation; and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive, Defendants, No. 2:24-cv-00096-DSF-SSC (C.D.
Calif.).
On November 22, 2023, Plaintiffs filed this putative class action
in Los Angeles Superior Court, alleging that UPS's Website Terms of
Use contains a non-disparagement clause in violation of California
Civil Code section 1670.8 (the Yelp Law). UPS removed the case on
January 5, 2024 under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1332(d)(2).
On March 13, 2024, UPS moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for
failure to state a claim. On May 17, 2024, the Court granted UPS's
motion to dismiss with leave to amend, ordering Plaintiffs to file
an amended complaint by June 17, 2024. Plaintiffs timely filed a
first amended complaint, and on July 22, 2024, UPS moved to dismiss
the FAC for failure to state a claim. On August 15, 2024,
Plaintiffs moved for remand, arguing that the FAC does not assert
that Plaintiffs have suffered an "injury in fact" as required to
satisfy Article III standing requirements.
The Court finds Plaintiffs' allegations do not satisfy the
constitutional minimum injury in fact required to establish Article
III standing.
Merely alleging a violation of the Yelp Law, without any
allegations of further harm does not establish a concrete injury in
fact. Because that is precisely what Plaintiffs have done in the
FAC, they do not have standing in this case, the Court states.
UPS argues that Plaintiffs have alleged an economic injury—the
quintessential injury-in-fact—by expressly alleging that they are
entitled to damages and restitution. The Court disagrees with UPS's
expansive interpretation of the allegations in the FAC.
UPS contends that Plaintiffs' allegations that they seek and are
entitled to restitution amounts to an allegation that the UPS
Defendants improperly took money or property from them and that
they are entitled to its return because that is the meaning of the
word restitution.
According to the Court, the mere fact that the FAC contains a
generic request for restitution and damages, rather than
exclusively requesting civil penalties is not enough to establish a
concrete injury in fact.
Judge Fischer concludes that because Plaintiffs have not alleged
that they suffered an injury that is concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent there is no case or controversy for the Court to
resolve" and this action falls outside the confines of the federal
judicial power under Article III of the Constitution. In the
absence of standing, remand is mandatory.
A copy of the Court's Order dated October 15, 2024, is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=lzefke
UNITED STATES: Court Denies Bridgeland's Bid to Stay Powers v. VA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled JEFFREY POWERS, et al., Plaintiffs v. DENIS
RICHARD MCDONOUGH, in his official capacity as Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-08357-DOC-KS
(C.D. Cal.), Judge David O. Carter of the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California denies Bridgeland Oil's motion
to stay.
Bridgeland moved pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 62(c)
for an order (1) staying enforcement of the Court's order that
Bridgeland "cap" the Sawtelle-2 well pending appeal (the "Cap
Order"), and (2) at minimum, staying enforcement of the Cap Order
until such time as the Court of Appeal may rule on a stay.
The Court denies Bridgeland Oil's Motion to Stay but amends its
previous Order Mandating Bridgeland Oil to Cap Sawtelle 2. After
hearing oral arguments on this matter, the Court no longer requires
Bridgeland to cap Sawtelle 2.
However, the Court still requires Bridgeland to stop slant drilling
private oil leases from the West LA VA campus by Oct. 25, 2024.
The Plaintiffs in this case are Joseph Fields, Lavon Johnson,
National Veterans Foundation, Joshua Robert Petitt, Jeffrey Powers,
Deavin Sessom, and Laurieann Wright. They bring claims on behalf of
a Class consisting of "all homeless veterans with Serious Mental
Illness [SMI] or Traumatic Brain Injuries [TBI], who reside in Los
Angeles County" and a Subclass consisting of "all Class Members
whose income (including veterans disability benefits) exceeds 50
percent of the Area Median Income."
The Plaintiffs' first claim for relief (Olmstead claim) asserts
that Federal Defendants violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act by not providing class members their disability healthcare
benefits "in the most integrated setting appropriate to their
needs," causing them to be "institutionalized or placed at risk of
institutionalization." In other words, the Plaintiffs seek
permanent supportive housing so that they can avoid being
segregated from others.
Pursuant to the Court's Order granting their partial motion for
summary judgment, the Plaintiffs have established their second
claim for relief under the Rehabilitation Act. There, the Court
held that Federal Defendants' practice of contracting with housing
developers that use income eligibility requirements that disqualify
the most disabled veterans from housing is facially
discriminatory.
The Plaintiffs' third claim for relief asserts that Federal
Defendants violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act denying
the Plaintiffs a reasonable accommodation they need -- Permanent
Supportive Housing -- to access their healthcare services at
VAGLAHS, solely because of their disabilities.
On the Plaintiffs' fourth claim regarding the creation and
enforcement of a charitable trust at the Grounds, the Court
previously found that the 1888 Deed created a charitable trust and
that the government assumed enforceable duties pursuant to the West
Los Angeles Leasing Act of 2016 and the West Los Angeles VA Campus
Improvement Act of 2021. The Court left for trial the question of
whether the VA had breached its duty.
The Plaintiffs' fifth claim for relief arises under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and alleges that three land
deals the VA entered on the West LA VA Grounds violate the West Los
Angeles Leasing Act's requirement that leases to third parties on
the campus "principally benefit veterans and their families."
In this case before the Court, unhoused veterans with disabilities
demand housing on the West Los Angeles VA campus. Their demand is
not new, Judge Carter says. Over a decade ago, in 2011, a similar
group of unhoused veteran plaintiffs brought a nearly identical
suit, seeking shelter and housing on land given to the federal
government in the 1800s for the purpose of establishing a home for
disabled veterans (Valentini v. Shinseki, 860 F. Supp. 2d 1079
(C.D. Cal. 2012)).
According to Judge Carter, in the years since 2011, the Obama
administration, the Trump administration, and the Biden
administration have each promised that they would act swiftly to
eradicate veteran homelessness in America. Yet, today,
approximately 3,000 homeless veterans live in the Los Angeles area
alone.
Each administration since 2011 has been warned -- by the VA's own
Office of the Inspector General, federal courts, and veterans --
that they were not doing enough to house veterans in Los Angeles.
Despite these warnings, the VA has not made good on its promise to
build housing for veterans. Instead, it has continued leasing
portions of the West Los Angeles campus to a private school, UCLA's
baseball team, an oil company, and other private interests. The
cost of the VA's inaction is veterans' lives.
Judge Carter writes: "Over the past five decades, the West LA VA
has been infected by bribery, corruption, and the influence of the
powerful and their lobbyists, and enabled by a major educational
institution in excluding veterans' input about their own lands. It
has allowed the drastic reduction of the size of the original plot
of land deeded in 1888 to be an Old Soldiers' Home. In a series of
lengthy, renewable leases, the VA authorized leaseholders to build
permanent athletic facilities -- after permitting these concrete
structures to be built on veterans' land, the VA now points to the
waste that would be incurred by tearing them down. In effect, the
VA has quietly sold off these lands just as surely as granting a
quitclaim deed."
The VA argues they are out of space, and that the lack of available
acreage precludes any increase to the 1,200 units they have
promised to open on the West LA campus by 2030. They contend that
any injunctive relief by the Court would burden the VA financially
and deprive them of the flexibility they need to solve the complex
issue of veteran homelessness. The problem, however, is one of the
VA's own making. The VA must remediate its mishandling of this
resource so that the land may once again be available for its
intended purpose: the housing of veterans.
Throughout this trial, the VA and United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") have highlighted their recent
policy changes and their progress in reducing veteran homelessness.
Many of these changes, however, were only made once this lawsuit
was revived. One policy change was announced by HUD on the third
day of this trial, after the Court found the Defendants had
discriminated against the most injured and traumatized veterans by
counting their disability payments as income and thus disqualifying
them from housing.
Now, the West LA VA promises they finally have a plan that will end
veteran homelessness in Los Angeles -- but only if the Plaintiffs
leave them alone and the Court does not issue an injunction. After
years of broken promises, corruption, and neglect, it is no
surprise that veterans are unwilling to take them at their word.
The Court finds the Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief in
the form of additional housing at the Grounds and termination of
the illegal land-use agreements. The Court concludes that the VA's
agreements with the Brentwood School, Safety Park, and Bridgeland
violate the Leasing Act. Therefore, under the APA, the Court voids
the leases with the Brentwood School, Safety Park, and Bridgeland.
A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 11, 2024, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5n69vpaf from PacerMonitor.com.
UNITED STATES: Court Issues Post-Trial Opinion in Powers v. VA
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge David O. Carter of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California issued a Post-Trial Opinion in the lawsuit
titled JEFFREY POWERS, et al., Plaintiffs v. DENIS RICHARD
MCDONOUGH, in his official capacity as Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-08357-DOC-KS (C.D.
Cal.).
The Plaintiffs in this case are Joseph Fields, Lavon Johnson,
National Veterans Foundation, Joshua Robert Petitt, Jeffrey Powers,
Deavin Sessom, and Laurieann Wright. They bring claims on behalf of
a Class consisting of "all homeless veterans with Serious Mental
Illness or Traumatic Brain Injuries, who reside in Los Angeles
County" and a Subclass consisting of "all Class Members whose
income (including veterans disability benefits) exceeds 50 percent
of the Area Median Income."
The Plaintiffs' first claim for relief (Olmstead claim) asserts
that Federal Defendants violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act by not providing class members their disability healthcare
benefits "in the most integrated setting appropriate to their
needs," causing them to be "institutionalized or placed at risk of
institutionalization." In other words, the Plaintiffs seek
permanent supportive housing so that they can avoid being
segregated from others.
Pursuant to the Court's Order granting their partial motion for
summary judgment, the Plaintiffs have established their second
claim for relief under the Rehabilitation Act. There, the Court
held that Federal Defendants' practice of contracting with housing
developers that use income eligibility requirements that disqualify
the most disabled veterans from housing is facially
discriminatory.
The Plaintiffs' third claim for relief asserts that Federal
Defendants violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act denying
the Plaintiffs a reasonable accommodation they need -- Permanent
Supportive Housing -- to access their healthcare services at
VAGLAHS, solely because of their disabilities.
On the Plaintiffs' fourth claim regarding the creation and
enforcement of a charitable trust at the Grounds, the Court
previously found that the 1888 Deed created a charitable trust and
that the government assumed enforceable duties pursuant to the West
Los Angeles Leasing Act of 2016 and the West Los Angeles VA Campus
Improvement Act of 2021. The Court left for trial the question of
whether the VA had breached its duty.
The Plaintiffs' fifth claim for relief arises under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and alleges that three land
deals the VA entered on the West LA VA Grounds violate the West Los
Angeles Leasing Act's requirement that leases to third parties on
the campus "principally benefit veterans and their families."
In this case before the Court, unhoused veterans with disabilities
demand housing on the West Los Angeles VA campus. Their demand is
not new, Judge Carter says. Over a decade ago, in 2011, a similar
group of unhoused veteran plaintiffs brought a nearly identical
suit, seeking shelter and housing on land given to the federal
government in the 1800s for the purpose of establishing a home for
disabled veterans (Valentini v. Shinseki, 860 F. Supp. 2d 1079
(C.D. Cal. 2012) ("Valentini I")).
According to Judge Carter, in the years since 2011, the Obama
administration, the Trump administration, and the Biden
administration have each promised that they would act swiftly to
eradicate veteran homelessness in America. Yet, today,
approximately 3,000 homeless veterans live in the Los Angeles area
alone.
Each administration since 2011 has been warned -- by the VA's own
Office of the Inspector General, federal courts, and veterans --
that they were not doing enough to house veterans in Los Angeles.
Despite these warnings, the VA has not made good on its promise to
build housing for veterans. Instead, it has continued leasing
portions of the West Los Angeles campus to a private school, UCLA's
baseball team, an oil company, and other private interests. The
cost of the VA's inaction is veterans' lives.
Judge Carter writes: "Over the past five decades, the West LA VA
has been infected by bribery, corruption, and the influence of the
powerful and their lobbyists, and enabled by a major educational
institution in excluding veterans' input about their own lands. It
has allowed the drastic reduction of the size of the original plot
of land deeded in 1888 to be an Old Soldiers' Home. In a series of
lengthy, renewable leases, the VA authorized leaseholders to build
permanent athletic facilities -- after permitting these concrete
structures to be built on veterans' land, the VA now points to the
waste that would be incurred by tearing them down. In effect, the
VA has quietly sold off these lands just as surely as granting a
quitclaim deed."
The VA argues they are out of space, and that the lack of available
acreage precludes any increase to the 1,200 units they have
promised to open on the West LA campus by 2030. They contend that
any injunctive relief by the Court would burden the VA financially
and deprive them of the flexibility they need to solve the complex
issue of veteran homelessness. The problem, however, is one of the
VA's own making. The VA must remediate its mishandling of this
resource so that the land may once again be available for its
intended purpose: the housing of veterans.
Throughout this trial, the VA and United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") have highlighted their recent
policy changes and their progress in reducing veteran homelessness.
Many of these changes, however, were only made once this lawsuit
was revived. One policy change was announced by HUD on the third
day of this trial, after the Court found the Defendants had
discriminated against the most injured and traumatized veterans by
counting their disability payments as income and thus disqualifying
them from housing.
Now, the West LA VA promises they finally have a plan that will end
veteran homelessness in Los Angeles -- but only if the Plaintiffs
leave them alone and the Court does not issue an injunction. After
years of broken promises, corruption, and neglect, it is no
surprise that veterans are unwilling to take them at their word.
The Court finds the Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief in
the form of additional housing at the Grounds and termination of
the illegal land-use agreements. The Court concludes that the VA's
agreements with the Brentwood School, Safety Park, and Bridgeland
violate the Leasing Act. Therefore, under the APA, the Court voids
the leases with the Brentwood School, Safety Park, and Bridgeland.
The VA's persistent unlawful leasing decisions and the warnings of
the VA Office of Inspector General ("OIG") about misuse warrants an
injunction prohibiting the VA from entering new land-use agreements
with the Brentwood School, Safety Park, Bridgeland, and UCLA, Judge
Carter opines. Further, any renegotiation of these four leases
would be futile.
The Court holds that it is virtually impossible for leases for a
private school's athletic facilities, a parking lot near Brentwood
businesses, an oil drilling operation, and a UCLA baseball stadium
to principally benefit veterans. Accordingly, Federal Defendants
are enjoined from entering into new land use agreements with the
Brentwood School, Safety Park, Bridgeland Resources, and UCLA.
A full-text copy of the Court's Post-Trial Opinion dated Oct. 11,
2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/3uec59hp from
PacerMonitor.com.
UNITED STATES: Final Judgment & Injunction Issued in Powers v. VA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge David O. Carter of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California issued a Final Judgment and Permanent
Injunction in the lawsuit captioned JEFFREY POWERS, et al.,
Plaintiffs v. DENIS RICHARD MCDONOUGH, in his official capacity as
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, et al., Defendants, Case No.
2:22-cv-08357-DOC-KS (C.D. Cal.).
The Plaintiffs in this case are Joseph Fields, Lavon Johnson,
National Veterans Foundation, Joshua Robert Petitt, Jeffrey Powers,
Deavin Sessom and Laurieann Wright. They bring claims on behalf of
a certified Class consisting of "all homeless veterans with Serious
Mental Illness [SMI] or Traumatic Brain Injuries [TBI], who reside
in Los Angeles County and homeless veterans who have been or remain
unhoused or are at risk of being unhoused and a Subclass consisting
of "all Class Members whose income (including veterans disability
benefits) exceeds 50 percent of the Area Median Income."
The Plaintiffs' operative Amended Complaint was filed on May 15,
2023. On April 5, 2024, Complainant-in-Intervention BRIDGELAND
RESOURCES, LLC ("Bridgeland") filed its operative Complaint in
Intervention for declaratory relief against the Plaintiffs. The
Court certified the Class and Subclass on May 3, 2024.
On July 14, 2024, the Court granted partial summary judgment in
favor of the Plaintiffs. The Court conducted a bench trial that
began on Aug. 6, 2024, and concluded on Aug. 30, 2024. On Sept. 6,
2024, the Court filed its "POST-TRIAL OPINION; FINDINGS OF FACT &
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW" ("Post-Trial Opinion").
Consistent with the Court's prior opinions and orders, including
its Post-Trial Opinion, this final judgment resolves all claims
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
Judge Carter ordered, adjudged and decreed that judgment be entered
in favor of the Plaintiffs and the certified Class and Subclass on
the First through Third Causes of Action against Defendants DENIS
RICHARD MCDONOUGH, in his official capacity, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs; ROBERT MERCHANT, in his official capacity, Director, VA
Greater Los Angeles Healthcare System, KEITH HARRIS, in his
official capacity, Senior Executive Homelessness Agent, VA Greater
Los Angeles Healthcare System, and ADRIANNE TODMAN, in her official
capacity, Acting Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; that
judgment be entered in favor of the Plaintiffs and the certified
Class and Subclass on the Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action against
Defendants MCDONOUGH, MERCHANT, and HARRIS, in their official
capacities; and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendants
MCDONOUGH, MERCHANT, and HARRIS, in their official capacities, on
the Fifth Cause of Action.
The Court also enters judgment for the Plaintiffs and the certified
Class and Subclass on the Seventh Cause of Action against
Defendants MCDONOUGH, MERCHANT, AND HARRIS, in their official
capacities, regarding only the Safety Park lease, and for
Defendants MCDONOUGH, MERCHANT, and HARRIS, in their official
capacities, on the Seventh Cause of Action in all other respects.
Finally, the Court enters judgment for the Plaintiffs and the
certified Class and Subclass against BRIDGELAND on the First Cause
of Action contained in Bridgeland's Complaint in Intervention.
The Court also rules that Defendants DENIS RICHARD MCDONOUGH, in
his official capacity, Secretary of Veterans Affairs; ROBERT
MERCHANT, in his official capacity, Director, VA Greater Los
Angeles Healthcare System, and KEITH HARRIS, in his official
capacity, Senior Executive Homelessness Agent, VA Greater Los
Angeles Healthcare System, and Defendant Adrianne Todman, in her
official capacity, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban
Development violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. Section 794, and their respective successors, are
permanently enjoined, and prohibited from engaging in conduct,
consistent with the terms of the Court's Post-Trial Opinion.
The Court further rules, among other things, that John Hueston and
Michelle Martinez are appointed in accordance with the Court's
Order Appointing Special Monitor entered on Sept. 11, 2024, to
ensure timely and comprehensive compliance with this Judgment,
which includes injunctive relief in the form of additional housing
at the West LA VA Grounds and termination of unlawful land-use
agreements.
The Court retains jurisdiction over this action until 2030 or until
VA completes the construction of Permanent Supportive Housing
identified in the Court's Post-Trial Opinion, whichever is later
for the purpose of enforcing this final judgment and permanent
injunction.
A full-text copy of the Court's Final Judgment and Permanent
Injunction dated Oct. 11, 2024, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/msps9rnv from PacerMonitor.com.
UNITED STATES: Injunction Issued on Brentwood Lease in Powers v. VA
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JEFFREY POWERS, et al., Plaintiffs v. DENIS
RICHARD MCDONOUGH, in his official capacity as Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:22-cv-08357-DOC-KS
(C.D. Cal.), Judge David O. Carter of the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California issued a Permanent Injunction on
former Brentwood School leased grounds.
The Plaintiffs in this case are Joseph Fields, Lavon Johnson,
National Veterans Foundation, Joshua Robert Petitt, Jeffrey Powers,
Deavin Sessom, and Laurieann Wright. They bring claims on behalf of
a Class consisting of "all homeless veterans with Serious Mental
Illness or Traumatic Brain Injuries, who reside in Los Angeles
County" and a Subclass consisting of "all Class Members whose
income (including veterans disability benefits) exceeds 50 percent
of the Area Median Income."
The Plaintiffs' first claim for relief (Olmstead claim) asserts
that Federal Defendants violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act by not providing class members their disability healthcare
benefits "in the most integrated setting appropriate to their
needs," causing them to be "institutionalized or placed at risk of
institutionalization." In other words, the Plaintiffs seek
permanent supportive housing so that they can avoid being
segregated from others.
Pursuant to the Court's Order granting their partial motion for
summary judgment, the Plaintiffs have established their second
claim for relief under the Rehabilitation Act. There, the Court
held that Federal Defendants' practice of contracting with housing
developers that use income eligibility requirements that disqualify
the most disabled veterans from housing is facially
discriminatory.
The Plaintiffs' third claim for relief asserts that Federal
Defendants violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act denying
the Plaintiffs a reasonable accommodation they need -- Permanent
Supportive Housing -- to access their healthcare services at
VAGLAHS, solely because of their disabilities.
On the Plaintiffs' fourth claim regarding the creation and
enforcement of a charitable trust at the Grounds, the Court
previously found that the 1888 Deed created a charitable trust and
that the government assumed enforceable duties pursuant to the West
Los Angeles Leasing Act of 2016 and the West Los Angeles VA Campus
Improvement Act of 2021. The Court left for trial the question of
whether the VA had breached its duty.
The Plaintiffs' fifth claim for relief arises under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and alleges that three land
deals the VA entered on the West LA VA Grounds violate the West Los
Angeles Leasing Act's requirement that leases to third parties on
the campus "principally benefit veterans and their families."
On May 15, 2023, the Plaintiffs filed this action and their First
Amended Complaint is now the operative Complaint. On Jan. 31, 2024,
Third Party Brentwood School was given notice of this action by the
Federal Defendants pursuant to the Order of the Court, and did not
seek to intervene in the action. On May 3, 2024, the Court issued
its Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify the Class and
Subclass.
The matter proceeded to a court trial and on Sept. 6, 2024, the
Court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
thereafter issued other ancillary and supplemental orders
concerning injunctive relief, including with respect to the lease
for, use of, and disposition of the Veterans Administration land
that is the subject of a lease with Brentwood School.
The Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law includes the
conclusion and holding that the Brentwood School "lease violates
the VA's fiduciary duty to veterans because the lease principally
benefits the Brentwood School, not veterans. Accordingly, the lease
is void. To ensure the land is put to a use that principally
benefits veterans, the Court will determine an exit strategy for
the Brentwood School's 22 acres following the hearing on injunctive
relief."
Brentwood School has participated in the hearing on injunctive
relief and other conferences with the Plaintiffs'/Class counsel,
the Monitor, and the Court. Brentwood School has agreed to a
settlement agreement that would ensure its prompt implementation
and the immediate accrual of benefits to veterans and their
families.
The U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs ("VA") was invited to be
part of the Brentwood School Settlement Agreement, the VA has
chosen to object. The VA was substantially in agreement with an
earlier version of the Brentwood School Settlement Agreement other
than the sections addressing the Court's continuing jurisdiction
and the VA's scope of appeal as it relates to Brentwood School. The
Brentwood School Settlement Agreement is contingent upon the Court
entering an order that the VA and Brentwood School enter into a
form of enhanced use/facilities sharing agreement or lease that
permits Brentwood School to use the VA land.
Brentwood School understands and recognizes that the 22.06 acres of
land at issue in the Brentwood School Settlement Agreement (the
"Former Brentwood School Leased Grounds") does not belong to
Brentwood School and, through the Brentwood School Settlement
Agreement, Brentwood School is being granted the right to share
access to the land. The principal focus of the 22.06-acre enhanced
facilities use sharing agreement with Brentwood School that is the
subject to the Brentwood School Settlement Agreement is so that
Veterans and their families will have access and use as set forth
here. It is unlikely that at least for the near term, the VA would
build or be in a position to maintain the athletic facilities that
are currently on the 22.06 acres in Brentwood School's absence.
The Plaintiffs initiated the Class Action against the VA alleging
multiple violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. Section 794 for discrimination and denial of
meaningful access, Breach of Fiduciary Duty as Trustee of
Charitable Trust seeking both injunctive relief and mandamus
relief, violation of the Administrative Procedure Act in connection
with the West Los Angeles Leasing Act of 2016 and its 2021
amendment and an accounting ("Allegations in FAC"). Brentwood
School is not a party to the Class Action.
The VA has jurisdiction and control of certain real property and
facilities known as the West Los Angeles Campus, in Los Angeles,
California (hereinafter the "WLA Campus" or "WLA CAMPUS"), which
provides services and benefits to the nation's Veterans. The
portion of the larger WLA Campus property that is subject to the
Brentwood School Settlement Agreement consists of approximately
22.06 acres of real property at the WLA CAMPUS.
The Plaintiffs allege one of the driving issues in the Class Action
is the desire and need for housing on the WLA Campus for disabled
veterans. The West Los Angeles Leasing Act of 2016 (H.R. 5936)
hereinafter referred to as "the West LA Leasing Act," authorizes
the VA to grant and/or enter into certain agreements consistent
with the terms and conditions set forth therein.
The Court has approved in principle the Brentwood School Settlement
Agreement and agrees and finds that it complies with the West LA
Leasing Act and that it principally benefits veterans.
The Plaintiffs and the Court have determined that the Brentwood
School Settlement Agreement contemplated and the consideration to
be provided from Brentwood School is consistent with VA's mission
and operations, and will help revitalize the WLA Campus for the
benefit of Veterans and their families. The Plaintiffs recognize
that Brentwood School will be a key partner in the support of
Veterans on the WLA Campus and that preserving the relationship
with Brentwood School is in everyone's best interest.
Brentwood School is a not-for-profit (501c3) independent school. It
owns 8 acres of land contiguous to the WLA Campus. VA has allowed,
through various informal and formal agreements, Brentwood School to
use portions of the WLA Campus since the mid-1970s. The Plaintiffs
contend the VA first began allowing Brentwood School to use its
property in the mid-1970s, the same period that the campus's focus
shifted away from housing veterans. The Plaintiffs contend for the
first two decades of the parties' relationship, Brentwood School
used VA land for student parking, as well as for some school and
athletic events, pursuant to a series of temporary arrangements.
The Plaintiffs contend the Brentwood School never paid any rent to
the VA for these uses -- they occupied veterans' land for free. The
Plaintiffs contend and the Court found in its Order that in the
late 1990s, Brentwood School wanted to create a "more formal,
permanent, and long-term association with the VA."
The Court found in its Sept. 6, 2024 Post Trial Opinion; Findings
of Fact & Conclusions of Law that in or about 1999, the VA and
Brentwood School entered into an Enhanced Sharing Agreement for
Brentwood School to build athletic facilities on 22 acres of the
West Los Angeles VA Grounds. The Enhanced Sharing Agreement's term
was ten years, with a mutual option to extend it for an additional
decade.
After this agreement was signed, Brentwood School initially spent
approximately $15 million developing their athletic facilities,
which now include three baseball fields, a workout tent, a stadium
field and track, a basketball/volleyball pavilion, pool, and tennis
courts. The completed facilities included an aquatic center
featuring an Olympic-sized pool named after two donors who gifted
the school $10 million. Given the size of the investment that the
Brentwood School put into its facilities, it must have had some
understanding with the VA that it would be a permanent occupant of
the land, notwithstanding its time-limited lease.
The Parties to the Brentwood School Settlement Agreement agree that
they do not need to take a position as to whether they agree or
disagree with the Court's rulings in order to enter into the
Brentwood School Settlement Agreement, which is intended to ensure
Veterans and their families principally benefit from the land and
athletic facilities on the 22.06 acres, allowing Brentwood to use
the 22.06 acres of veteran land during certain hours and under
certain conditions and for renewing one year terms unless certain
VA needs are determined to exist.
It is possible, but far from certain, that all or a portion of the
22.06 acres that are the subject of the Brentwood School Settlement
Agreement may be required for disabled Veteran housing at some
point in the future.
The Parties agree that in light of the Court's rulings in the Class
Action, in order for Brentwood School to be able to continue to use
the 22.06 acres, the VA needs to have the ability to terminate part
or all of Brentwood School's use of the 22.06 acres going forward.
After consideration of all the pleadings and papers, the arguments
of counsel, and the evidence admitted at trial, and the Court
having issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the
Court having conducted supplemental hearings on Sept. 25, 26, Oct.
2, 4, 7 8, and 11, the Court finds and orders that there is no just
reason for delay as to Veterans Administration and its affiliated
individual defendants in the entry of a permanent injunction and
the entry of judgment thereon regarding the Former Brentwood School
Leased Grounds, only.
Judgment on the Permanent injunction as to the Former Brentwood
School Leased Grounds, will be entered as part of the Final
Judgment in this Action as to all other parties and claims. The
Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and
over the parties. No notice is required to be given to any person
or class of persons as a matter of law or procedure to permit the
entry of this permanent injunction.
With respect to any payments made pursuant to the Brentwood School
Settlement Agreement, all such payments will be received in or
transferred without deduction or offset to the VA Lease Revenue
Fund with the sole purpose of directing the settlement payments
under the Brentwood School Settlement Agreement to the VA Lease
Revenue Fund to ensure that the sole and exclusive purpose of and
use of these funds by VA is to provide temporary supportive housing
and permanent supporting housing and related community services to
veterans on the WLA Campus.
Any use of the settlement funds other than for the purposes
enumerated in this paragraph are specifically prohibited, unless
otherwise ordered by the Court. The settlement proceeds so
deposited will only be used and applied to the costs associated
with, in the first instance, temporary supportive housing and, if
funds remain thereafter, to permanent supportive housing on the WLA
Campus.
As part of the Court's continuing jurisdiction over this matter
generally and over the implementation of the settlement terms in
this Settlement Agreement, the Court will regularly and
periodically review VA's compliance with the terms of this
Injunction and the settlement agreement, the VA's compliance with
the Court's Post Trial Opinion and any and all emergency orders
issued subsequent to the Court's Post Trial Opinion. The Court may,
at its election, direct the Court Monitor to periodically evaluate
the scope and extent of VA's compliance with the settlement terms
in this Settlement Agreement and report his findings to the Court.
The VA is ordered to negotiate with and enter into an enhanced
use/facilities sharing agreement/lease (the "Real Property
Agreement," sometimes referred to as a lease) with Brentwood School
in a form to be agreed upon by those parties, and approved by the
Court consistent with the Brentwood School Settlement Agreement
with the input of the Plaintiffs and the Class by and through their
counsel, the term of such agreement being one (1) year and subject
to renewing one year terms on the same contractual agreement,
except as set forth therein and herein.
The Brentwood School Settlement Agreement also provides, among
other things, that Brentwood School will have the continuing right,
subject to the other terms set forth herein and in the Brentwood
School Settlement Agreement, to use the lower softball field (also
known as MacArthur field). However, VA is entitled to revoke
Brentwood School's right to access and use of MacArthur field
subject to 45 days' written notice. Once the 45 days expire,
Brentwood School will have no further obligations with respect to
MacArthur field as otherwise required under the lease such as
maintenance as of the grounds, the facilities, the infrastructure,
paying for any utilities, etc.
The Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this
Injunction.
A full-text copy of the Court's Permanent Injunction dated Oct. 11,
2024, is available at https://tinyurl.com/pbvwevxt from
PacerMonitor.com.
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Can Compel Arbitration in Ortega, et al. Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Jon S. Tigar of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California granted the defendants' motion to
compel arbitration in the case captioned as THERESA ORTEGA, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC., et al., Defendants, Case
No. 23-cv-05596-JST (N.D. Calif.).
Before the Court is a motion to compel arbitration by Defendants
UnitedHealth Group, Inc., Optum Services, Inc., and Optum Car,
Inc.
Plaintiffs Theresa Ortega and Gabriela Rocha, both residents of
California, are former employees of Defendants who worked at
Defendants' California locations. They bring this action
individually and on behalf of a class, alleging that Defendants
failed to provide sufficient notice before terminating their
employment, among other claims.
Ortega was hired in April 2023 as an administrative assistant to
the facilities director, while Rocha was hired in April 2023 as a
registration clerk. Upon beginning their employment, Plaintiffs
each received an offer letter and an arbitration agreement, which
they signed electronically.
On or around August 2023, Defendants conducted a widespread layoff
that impacted about 700 employees in California and over 1,000
employees nationally. Ortega and Rocha were informed on August 10,
2023 that they were being laid off effective August 24, 2023.
Plaintiffs allege that "Defendants did not provide the proper
60-days' notice or payment in lieu of notice as required to
institute a mass layoff of the workforce under California and
federal law." They now bring nine claims, including:
(1) violation of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 2101, et seq.;
(2) violation of the California WARN Act, Cal. Lab. Code Secs.
1400 et seq.;
(3) violation of Cal. Lab. Code Sec. 206;
(4) violation of Cal. Lab. Code Sec. 206.5;
(5) violation of Cal. Lab. Code Sec. 203;
(6) violation of Cal. Lab. Code Sec. 226;
(7) declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Secs. 2201-02;
(8) violation of California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code Secs. 17200 et seq.; and
(9) violation of the Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Lab.
Code Secs. 2699 et seq.
Defendants now bring this motion to compel arbitration, arguing
that Ortega and Rocha "entered into valid mutual agreements to
arbitrate disputes arising out of or relating to their employment
with Defendants."
Plaintiffs do not dispute that they each electronically signed an
arbitration agreement, which includes a delegation clause. However,
Plaintiffs argue the Court should not compel arbitration because
the delegation clause is not clear and unmistakable.
The crux of Plaintiffs' argument is that one provision of the
arbitration agreement leaves gateway issues such as arbitrability
and enforceability to the arbitrator, while other provisions allow
the court to rule on these matters. Plaintiffs contend that Section
B of the arbitration agreement purports to delegate enforceability
and voidability issues to the arbitrator, while Section D-15 allows
either party to bring 'an action in a court of competent
jurisdiction to compel arbitration,' and
Section D-14 is silent on who can determine enforceability issues.
Defendants respond that the agreement clearly delineates between
"covered disputes" that are subject to arbitration and certain
provisions—namely, the Class Action Waiver and PAGA Waiver—that
are "carved out" from the arbitration policy and may be determined
only by a court. Phrased slightly differently, they contend that
"other than the validity of the Class Action Waiver and PAGA
Waiver, the arbitrability of all of Plaintiffs' claims, including
the gateway issues, is expressly delegated to the arbitrator."
The Court agrees with Defendants that the agreement contains a
clear and unmistakable delegation of gateway issues of the
arbitrability of Plaintiffs' claims to an arbitrator.
Plaintiffs make no arguments concerning the unconscionability of
the delegation clause. Accordingly, the Court declines to consider
whether the delegation provision itself is unconscionable.
Defendants request that the court dismiss or strike the class
claims, as Plaintiffs agreed to a Class Action Waiver and
specifically agreed that they would have no right or authority for
any dispute to be bought, heard, decided, or arbitrated as a class
and/or collective action.
Plaintiffs contend that the "arbitration agreement is
unconscionable" and thus the class claims (and indeed all claims)
must be found void as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration agreement in this case is
substantively unconscionable because it: (1) requires Plaintiffs to
pay expenses that they would not be required to pay if they were in
court related to witnesses' expenses; (2) imposes severe
limitations on discovery; (3) mandates the parties and the
arbitrator keep the arbitration proceedings confidential; and (4)
contains a PAGA waiver.
The Court declines to find that Plaintiffs' potential witness
expenses are substantively unconscionable.
The Court declines to find that the discovery limits are
substantively unconscionable.
The Court finds the confidentiality provision within the
arbitration agreement does not render it substantively
unconscionable.
Finally, Plaintiffs aver that the PAGA Waiver is substantively
unconscionable. Defendants disagree, arguing that "PAGA claims may
be split between individual and non-individual claims by agreements
to arbitrate, and courts must enforce agreements to arbitrate PAGA
claims on an individual basis."
The Court sends plaintiffs' individual claims to arbitration,
dismisses the class claims, and stays the remaining proceedings
pending arbitration.
A copy of the Court's Order dated October 15, 2024, is available at
https://urlcurt.com/u?l=RCe6KH
URBAN NATURAL: Harrell Seeks Equal Website Access for the Blind
---------------------------------------------------------------
ALFONSO HARRELL, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Urban Natural Home, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 2:24-cv-09796 (D.N.J., October 15, 2024) arises from the
Defendant's failure to make its digital properties, including
website, urbannatural.com, accessible to Plaintiff and other
legally blind individuals, which violates the effective
communication and equal access requirements of Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.
Upon visiting Defendant's website, the Plaintiff quickly became
aware of Defendant's failure to maintain and operate its website in
a way to make it fully accessible for himself and for other blind
or visually-impaired people. Due to Defendant's failure to build
the website in a manner that is compatible with screen access
programs, the Plaintiff was unable to understand and properly
interact with the Website and was thus denied the benefit of
purchasing the bedroom furniture, that Plaintiff wished to acquire
from the website, says the suit.
The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
its website will become and remain accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers.
Urban Natural Home, Inc. operates the website that sells tables,
sofas, beds, matrasses, pillows, stools, cabinets, dinnerware,
rugs, vases, bookcases, and other decor items.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Uri Horowitz, Esq.
OROWITZ LAW PLLC
14441 70th Road
Flushing, NY 11367
Telephone: (718) 705-8706
Facsimile: (718) 705-8705
E-mail: Uri@Horowitzlawpllc.com
USAA FEDERAL SAVINGS: Solana Suit Removed to E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Gerardo Solana, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. USAA FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK, Case
No. 525020/2024 was removed from the Supreme Court of Kings County,
New York, to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, on Oct. 18, 2024, and assigned Case No.
1:24-cv-07334.
The Plaintiff alleges that an unauthorized third party gained
access to USAA FSB's systems between December 20, 2022, and May 18,
2023, and exfiltrated personally identifiable information of
certain USAA FSB members. The Plaintiff asserts a negligence claim
on behalf of a putative class of "all persons whose PII was
accessed and/or exfiltrated during the Incident," which Plaintiff
alleges to include approximately 18,000 individuals.[BN]
The Defendants are represented by:
Matthew D. Pearson, Esq.
Michael A. Kushner, Esq.
BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP
600 Anton Blvd., Suite 900
Costa Mesa, CA 92626-7221
Phone: 714.754.6600
Facsimile: 714.754.6611
Email: mpearson@bakerlaw.com
mkushner@bakerlaw.com
UST TESTING: Villasenor Suit Removed from Sup. Ct. to N.D. Cal.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as JUAN R. VILLASENOR, SALVADOR
VILLASENOR, MARIO GALVAN, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, v. UST TESTING SERVICES, INC., a California
corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Case No. C24-02032
(Filed Aug. 1, 2024), was removed from the Contra Costa Superior
Court, to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California on Oct. 17, 2024.
The Northern California District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:24-cv-07254 to the proceeding.
The suit alleges Labor Code violations, including failure to pay
all minimum wages; failure to pay all overtime wages; failure to
provide meal periods; failure to authorize and permit rest period
violations; failure to provide to indemnify necessary business
expenses; failure to timely pay final wages at termination; failure
to provide accurate itemized wages statements; and unfair
competition.
The Plaintiffs pursue a class action on behalf of themselves and
the following putative classes:
"[a]ll hourly-paid and non-exempt employees who work or worked
for the Defendant in California from roughly Aug. 1, 2020
through the date when notice of class certification to the
Class is sent."
UST Testing provides high quality piping, mechanical, structural &
civil labor.[BN]
The Defendant is represented by:
Wesley A. Krueger, Esq.
Celine Sim, Esq.
LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP
633 West 5th Street, Suite 4000
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Telephone: (213) 250-1800
Facsimile: (213) 250-7900
E-mail: Wesley.Krueger@lewisbrisbois.com
Celine.Sim@lewisbrisbois.com
VGW HOLDINGS: Plaintiff's Motion to Remand in Kennedy Suit Nixed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia denied the Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand and Motion for Discovery in the case captioned as Destiny
Kennedy, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. VGW Holdings Limited, et al., Defendants (N.D. Ga.).
The Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Notice of Supplemental
Authority is also denied.
The Plaintiff initiated this action in the Superior Court of Fulton
County on March 7, 2024 to recover financial losses pursuant to
O.C.G.A. Sec. 13-8-3, which she sustained playing the Defendants'
online casino games. The Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of
Georgia citizens who suffered financial losses playing the
Defendants' online casino games. The Defendants removed the action
to the District Court on May 17, 2024 and the Plaintiff filed the
Motion to Remand that is presently before the District Court on
June 13, 2024.
The Plaintiff notes that the Defendants have cited the Class Action
Fairness Act as the basis for removal to the District Court and
argue that the Defendants' claim in their Notice of Removal that
"there are at least 100 players in Georgia who made a purchase
during the Relevant Time Period" cannot be verified without first
conducting limited jurisdictional discovery to ensure removal was
proper. The Plaintiff further contends that the Defendants refer to
aggregated "purchases" to meet the jurisdictional amount in
controversy, but O.C.G.A Sec. 13-8-3 refers to losses rather than
purchases, and not all purchases on the Defendants' platforms would
have resulted in losses. The Plaintiff thus requests remand or, in
the alternative, limited jurisdictional discovery to determine
whether the removal complied with 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332(d)(2).
The Defendants oppose the Motion, arguing that the notice of
removal they filed demonstrates that this Court has jurisdiction
under CAFA. They argue that the District Court recently rejected
the Plaintiff's very same purchases vs. losses argument and that
the same conclusion is required in this case. Additionally, the
Defendants argue that jurisdictional discovery is not warranted
because the Plaintiff has not identified any information that
contradicts the declaration of Michael Thunder, the general counsel
of VGW Holdings Ltd., and has no ground on which to dispute its
contents.
In a declaration attached to the notice of removal, Mr. Thunder
stated that he reviewed purchase data and confirmed that (1) there
are more than 100 Georgia users of the Defendants' platforms who
made purchases in the Defendants' games between September 7, 2023,
and March 7, 2024, and (2) the total amount of in-game purchases by
all Georgia users during that time period exceeded the $5,000,000
jurisdictional threshold.
In the Plaintiff's complaint, she alleges that she is seeking "a
judgment for all money paid or property delivered to each and all
of the Defendants as authorized by O.C.G.A. Sec. 13-8-3(b) for the
monetary losses incurred" by the Plaintiff and the proposed class.
The Plaintiff's concession that she is seeking a judgment for "all
money paid" to the Defendants aligns with Mr. Thunder's statement
that the "total amount of in-game purchases" of all Georgia users
during the relevant time period exceeded $5,000,000. Thus, the
Plaintiff's challenge to the amount in controversy lacks merit, the
Court finds.
Second, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is entitled to
jurisdictional discovery to "verify" whether the numerosity and
amount in controversy requirements are actually met, the Court
finds. The Plaintiff has not raised a genuine dispute with regard
to the Defendants' statements that their records demonstrate that
both requirements are met, and instead seeks discovery to confirm
that they are, the Court states.
Judge Thrash concludes, "In other words, the Plaintiff has no
reason to believe that the Defendants' statements about its
purchase records are inaccurate. Without any evidence or contention
that a genuine dispute exists with regard to the numerosity and
amount in controversy requirements, the Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that jurisdictional discovery is warranted. Therefore,
because the amount in controversy and the numerosity requirements
are clearly stated in the notice of removal and supporting
declaration of Mr. Thunder and are supported by the Plaintiff's
allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds that it has subject
matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec.
1332(d)(2), (d)(11) and that removal was proper pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1441 and Sec. 1446. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion
to Remand and Motion for Discovery should be denied."
A copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated October 15, 2024, is
available at https://urlcurt.com/u?l=sPVT7Z
WALGREENS BOOTS: Faces Bhaila Securities Suit Over SEC Disclosure
------------------------------------------------------------------
Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q report
for the fiscal year ended August 31, 2024, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 15, 2024, that on
July 12, 2024, a purported shareholder filed a putative class
action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois captioned "Bhaila v. Walgreens Boots Alliance,
Inc.," (24-cv-05907) against the company and certain of its
executives alleging that defendants violated securities laws by
disseminating materially false and misleading statements and/or
concealing material adverse facts concerning the company's pharmacy
division.
The complaints seek monetary damages for alleged losses caused by
decreases in the company's share price following disclosure of the
company's performance and business outlook.
Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. is a retail company based in
Illinois.
WALGREENS BOOTS: Faces Labor Union Suit Over SEC Disclosure
-----------------------------------------------------------
Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q report
for the fiscal year ended August 31, 2024, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 15, 2024, that on
September 17, 2024, a purported shareholder filed a putative class
action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois captioned "Westchester Putnam Counties Heavy &
Highway Laborers Local 60 Benefits Fund v. Walgreens Boots
Alliance, Inc.," (24-cv-08559) alleging that the company and
certain current and former executives violated securities laws by
disseminating materially false and misleading statements and/or
concealing material adverse facts relating to the company's U.S.
Healthcare segment.
The complaints seek monetary damages for alleged losses caused by
decreases in the company's share price following disclosure of the
company's performance and business outlook.
Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. is a retail company based in
Illinois.
WEST VIRGINIA: Court Grants Steele's Bid for Return of Filing Fee
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Chief Judge Frank W. Volk of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia, Beckley, directs the Clerk of
Court to return the Plaintiff's partial filing fee in the lawsuit
entitled LACOSTA STEELE, Plaintiff v. SGT. MINOR, C/O KITTLE, CO
GRANT, ADMIN STAFF, MEDICAL STAFF, and ROOM/CELL PLACEMENT WARDEN,
Defendants, Case No. 5:22-cv-00445 (S.D.W. Va.).
Pending is Plaintiff Lacosta Steele's Letter-Form Motion to Dismiss
and Request for Return of Filing Fee, filed Sept. 6, 2024. This
action was previously referred to the Honorable Omar J. Aboulhosn,
United States Magistrate Judge, for submission of proposed findings
and a recommendation ("PF&R"). Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn filed his
PF&R on Sept. 17, 2024.
Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn recommended that the Court grant the
Plaintiff's Motion, deny as moot the Defendants' pending Motions to
Dismiss, and dismiss this action.
Objections in this case were due on Oct. 4, 2024. No objections
were filed.
Accordingly, the Court adopts the PF&R, denies as moot Defendant CO
Grant and Sgt. Minor's Motion to Dismiss, denies as moot
Defendant Warden's Motion to Dismiss, and orders the Plaintiff's
Final Amended Complaint be dismissed without prejudice and that
this matter be removed from the Court's docket.
Lastly, considering the Plaintiff's representations that she was
unaware she was initiating both an individual action and a class
action, her pro se status, and her lack of legal knowledge, the
Court orders the Plaintiff's request for the return of her partial
filing fee ($302.10) be granted.
The Court directs the Clerk to return the Plaintiff's partial
filing fee, and further directs that no additional payments of the
previously ordered $350.00 filing fee be collected in this matter.
As of the date of this writing, the Plaintiff has made six payments
towards the $350 filing fee, totaling $302.10.
The Court directs the Clerk to transmit a copy of this Order to any
counsel of record and any unrepresented party.
A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Oct. 11, 2024, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2fv34jsd from PacerMonitor.com.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2024. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
*** End of Transmission ***