CAR_Public/991019.MBX                C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

               Tuesday, October 19, 1999, Vol. 1, No. 180

                                 Headlines

ALZA CORP: Cohen, Milstein Files Suit In Illinois Re Merger With Abbott
AMERICAN KENNEL: NY Ct Sees No Antitrust In New Breed Standard For Labs
ARTHUR DORE: Says His Co Not Liable For Bilking At Cheese Plant Sold
AVADO BRANDS: Specificity Is Required For PSLRA, 11th Cir Remands Case
AVATAX CORP: May Settle Preferred Stockholders' Suit In Del. Re Merger

AVATEX CORP: Goes On Fighting TX Shareholders Suit; Class Status Denied
AVATEX CORP: Hearing For Stockholders' Suit Set For Nov. 30
BEAR STEARNS: Agrees to Pay Customers Of Defunct Brokerage Baron $3.5M
CA STATE: Settles With Civil Rights Gps. Re Proposition 187 And 5 Suits
CENDANT CORP: Intends To Proceed With Settlement For NJ Securities Suit

DYNAMEX INC: Milberg Weiss Files Amended Securities Complaint In Texas
GENERAL ELECTRIC: Class Status Denied In Georgia PCB Contamination Case
HOLOCAUST VICTIMS: German Claims Chief In Washington For Talks
INDIAN TRUST: Fd Judge Sets Nov 1 Deadline For Progress On Settlement
LEESBURG CITY: Asks Fd Ct To Dismiss Florida Black Employees' Bias Suit

MARCOS FAMILY: Philippine Ct Rejects Transfer Of Marcos Money To Hawaii
MATTEL INC: Entwistle & Cappucci File Securities Suit In CA
MATTEL INC: Seeger Weiss Files Securities Suit In California
NEWELL RUBBERMAID: Bull & Lifshitz File Securities Suit In Illinois
NEWELL RUBBERMAID: Wechsler Harwood Files Securities Suit In Illinois

ONODA CEMENT: S Korean-American Sues Defunct Japanese Co in LA Sup Ct
PRUDENTIAL, ARTHUR ANDERSEN: Milberg Files Securities Suit In Maryland
RAYTHEON COMPANY: Cohen, Milstein Announces Securities Suit In MA
STARNET COMMUNICATIONS: Bernstein Litowitz Files Dela. Securities Suit
SUN HEALTHCARE: Files For Bankruptcy

SUPERIOR COURT: CA Ap Ct Oks Classwide Arbitration In Blue Cross Case
TOWNE SERVICES: Bernstein Litowitz Files Securities Suit In Georgia
WINN-DIXIE: Fla. Grocery Chain To Settle Employees Race And Gender Suit


* AAIA Sends Letters To State Policymakers Upon Ct Ruling On State Farm

                              *********

ALZA CORP: Cohen, Milstein Files Suit In Illinois Re Merger With Abbott
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The following Notice is issued by the law firm of Cohen, Milstein,
Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C. on behalf of its client, who on October 15,
1999, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois on behalf of all owners of the common
stock of ALZA Corporation as of August 16, 1999, the record date for the
vote on approval of a proposed merger between ALZA and Abbott
Laboratories. Named as defendants are Abbott (NYSE:ABT), ALZA
(NYSE:AZA), and the Chairmen of the two respective corporations.

The Complaint charges that defendants violated federal securities laws
by failing to inform ALZA shareholders, in connection with the
shareholder vote on the proposed merger, of material facts concerning
Abbott's continuing negotiations on the terms of a consent order with
the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") to resolve FDA allegations that
Abbott's Lake County, Illinois Diagnostic Division manufacturing
facilities are not in compliance with federal regulations. Following the
vote, Abbott disclosed, among other things, that if the "discussions
(concerning the consent decree) are not successful, the government has
advised the company that it will file a complaint for injunctive relief
which would include the cessation of manufacturing and sale for a period
of time of a number of diagnostic products." Abbott's Diagnostics
Division accounted for about 22 percent, or $ 2.79 billion, of Abbott's
total sales in Abbott announced these continuing difficulties with the
FDA after the close of U.S. securities markets on September 28, 1999,
just seven days after ALZA's shareholders approved the merger. As a
result of the disclosures, Abbott stock, which had been trading at $
43.00 per share at the time of the September 21, 1999 merger vote, fell
to close at $ 37.50 on September 29, 1999. ALZA common stock, which had
been trading at $ 50.25 as of the date of the merger vote, also declined
to close at $ 43.625 per share on September 29, 1999.

If you are a member of the Class who owned ALZA Corporation common stock
as of August 16, 1999, you may move the Court, not later than sixty (60)
days from October 7, 1999, to serve as lead plaintiff for the Class. In
order to serve as lead plaintiff, you must meet certain legal standards.
Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C. is plaintiff's counsel. If
you have any questions about this Notice or the action, or with regard
to your rights, please contact the following attorneys: Steven J. Toll
or Tamara J. Driscoll at 888/240-1238 or 206/521-0080, 999 Third Avenue,
Seattle, Washington 98104. Fax, 206/521-0166 stoll@cmht.com /
tdriscoll@cmht.com TICKERS: NYSE:ABT NYSE:AZA


AMERICAN KENNEL: NY Ct Sees No Antitrust In New Breed Standard For Labs
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JESSUP v. AMERICAN KENNEL CLUB, INC. SUMMARY U.S. District Court:
S.D.N.Y. ANTITRUST

Plaintiff owners and breeders of purebred Labrador Retriever dogs
brought a class action, claiming that rival breeders and sellers of Labs
conspired to cause defendant Labrador Retriever Club to recommend and
defendant American Kennel Club to adopt a new rule regarding breed
standards for AKC-registered purebred Championship Stock Labrador
Retrievers. Allegedly, the new standard set a height requirement that
effectively excluded the shorter Labs of English bloodlines bred by
plaintiffs from the market and favored the taller American version of
Labs bred by plaintiffs' competitors. Granting defendants' motion for
summary judgment, the court concluded that the evidence failed to raise
an inference that defendants were involved in an anti-competitive
conspiracy and participated in an illegitimate standard-setting process.

Judge Griesa

JESSUP v. AMERICAN KENNEL CLUB, INC. QDS:02761515 - This is a class
action antitrust suit for damages and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs,
owners and breeders of purebred Labrador Retriever dogs ("Labs"), claim
that rival breeders and sellers of Labs conspired to cause one
defendant, the Labrador Retriever Club ("LRC"), to recommend, and the
other defendant, the American Kennel Club ("AKC"), to adopt, a new rule
concerning breed standards for AKC-registered, purebred Championship
Stock Labrador Retrievers ("Champion Labs"). The new breed standard
requires Labs to be of a certain height in order to compete in AKC dog
shows for the title of Champion Lab. The attainment of that title
increases the market value of a purebred Lab. Plaintiffs allege that the
new rule operates to exclude from the market for Champion Labs a large
number of the dogs that plaintiffs breed from English bloodlines, but
includes in the market the narrower and taller Labs more recently
developed in the United States that are bred and sold by plaintiffs'
competitors.

Plaintiffs and defendants have filed cross-motions for summary judgment
on claims 1-5 of the complaint alleging violations of the Sherman Act @@
1 and 2, 15 U.S.C. @@ 1, 2. Claims 6 and 7 alleging state corporate law
violations are not addressed by these motions.

Defendants' motion is granted and plaintiffs' cross-motion is denied.
Claims 1-5 are dismissed. The court declines to retain jurisdiction over
the state law claims (6 and 7). Accordingly, the entire action is
dismissed without prejudice to plaintiffs to renew the state law claims
in state court.

                                Facts

Plaintiff class representatives are six individual owners, breeders and
sellers of purebred Labs. Defendant AKC is a not-for-profit corporation
chartered by the New York Legislature for the protection and advancement
of purebred dogs. Membership in the AKC consists of more than 500 dog
clubs from across the country. The AKC's chartered purposes include
advancement of the breeding, exhibition and maintenance of the purity of
purebred dogs, as well as the adoption and enforcement of rules
regulating and governing competitive dog shows. The bulk of the AKC's
revenues are generated through registration fees and show entries at AKC
dog shows and at performance events. The AKC does not compete or engage
in the breeding, selling or showing of Labs.

The AKC currently registers 145 breeds of purebred dogs. The majority of
these registered breeds each have parent clubs which assume primary
responsibility for promoting and advancing each club's particular breed.
The LRC is a not-for-profit corporation and the parent club for the
Labrador Retriever breed. The LRC's membership consists of several
hundred individual Lab enthusiasts from across the country. The LRC does
not compete or engage in the breeding, selling or showing of Labs.

Pursuant to the AKC's constitution, each registered breed's parent club
has the responsibility of defining the standard for its breed. The
"standard" for a given breed of purebred dog, including that of the
Labrador Retriever, refers to a detailed, written, descriptive account
of the physical characteristics -- for instance, size, shape and coat --
as well as movement and temperament, that are considered definitive of
that breed. The breed standards are then used by judges at
AKC-registered dog shows to measure and compare the quality of dogs
competing in the shows. A particular physical characteristic included in
the breed standard may be stated in one of two ways. It may simply be
expressed as a recomrmendation or preference which AKC judges can then
use to compare the quality of dogs competing in a show; or it may be
stated as mandatory such that a dog that does not exhibit that
characteristic is disqualified from competition in the show.

The AKC's constitution provides that the amendment or revision of a
breed standard by the parent club for that breed does not become
effective until it is approved by the AKC's board of directors. The
LRC's constitution provides that amendments to the Labrador Retriever
breed standard must be approved by the members of the LRC, and that such
amendments only become effective after their subsequent approval by the
AKC board of directors.

In practice, the LRC's recommendation, and AKC's adoption, of an
amendment to the Labrador Retriever breed standard pursuant to their
respective charters follows a multi-staged process, as the facts in this
case demonstrate. First, a revision committee within the LRC drafts the
proposed amendment and then votes by a majority to present the amendment
for a vote by the LRC membership at large. A majority vote by the
members of the LRC in favor of the amendment then operates to recommend
the change to the AKC board of directors which must also vote by
majority to adopt the amendment before it becomes effective.

The issues in this case involve a 1994 amendment to the breed standard
for Labrador Retrievers. The breed standard in effect prior to the 1994
amendment was approved by the AKC in 1957. The 1957 standard stated in
pertinent part:

Height at Shoulders -- Dogs -- 22-1/2 inches to 24-1/2 inches; bitches
-- 21-1/2 inches to 23-1/2 inches.

As plaintiffs observe, the text of the 1957 height specification for the
Labrador Retriever breed provided no express guidance as to whether it
was intended merely as a recommendation or as a mandatory requirement
for the breed. Plaintiffs contend that the shorter Labs from English
bloodlines, bred and owned by plaintiffs, do not generally rise to the
height described in the standard, whereas the taller American Labs do.
The practical result of the 1957 standard was that, prior to the 1994
amendment, the height specification for Labs was not enforced as a
strict requirement for purebred Labs to enter and compete in
AKC-sponsored dog shows. Because height is only one of many attributes
that are judged at the shows, dogs such as those belonging to
plaintiffs, that fell below the height standard, were able to place and
even win in dog show competitions based on superior quality in other
facets of the breed standard.

Beginning in 1987, the AKC undertook a program with the help of the
various breed parent clubs to conform all breed standards to a
standardized format for order and content, using standardized
terminology.

In August 1989 the LRC submitted to the AKC board of directors a
proposed, revised Labrador Retriever breed standard that had been
drafted and approved by the LRC Revision Committee and approved by the
vote of 72 percent of the LRC membership that participated in the vote.
The proposal incorporated various changes not challenged in the present
case. It retained the same height specification from the breed standard
that was passed in 1957, again with no express statement as to whether
the specification was a recommendation or mandatory.

Following submission of the proposed revised standard to the AKC board,
the AKC received a number of letters in opposition to the revisions. The
AKC subsequently returned the proposed standard to the LRC in November
1989 for further consideration of the criticisms raised.

In January 1993 the AKC board of directors received a second proposed
revised standard from the LRC which had been approved by 68 percent of
the LRC members voting. The second proposed standard again retained the
original height specification from the 1957 breed standard. However, the
new proposal provided for the first time that compliance with the height
specification was mandatory. Specifically, it provided that any
deviation from the height specification would constitute a disqualifying
fault, meaning that a judge in a dog show would disqualify a dog not
conforming to the height specified in the standard. Again, the AKC
received letters in opposition to the new breed standard. The
submissions on the present motions do not expressly state that this
opposition related to the mandatory height requirement, but the
implication is that at least part of the opposition related to this
subject. The LRC membership subsequently approved several amendments to
the second proposed revised standard, providing with respect to the
height requirement that: (1) the requirement would not apply to dogs
less than 12 months old; and (2) dogs 1/2 inch outside the height
standard would not be disqualified on the basis of height.

The amended second proposed revised standard was submitted to the AKC
board of directors in November 1993. The AKC again received letters in
opposition to the proposal -- presumably objecting to the height
requirement. The AKC then published the proposal in its own publication
and solicited comment on the proposed standard.

On February 2, 1994, before the AKC voted on the proposed standard, the
members of its board of directors received a letter from Richard Gross,
prospective counsel for the dissenting members of the LRC and certain
other Lab breeders and owners who opposed the proposed height
requirement. The letter advised the board that these individuals were
considering bringing a lawsuit alleging antitrust violations if the
height requirement were adopted. The letter went on to itemize several
ways in which the LRC had failed to comply with established procedures
for adopting a new breed standard, and insisted that the proposal then
before the AKC did not reflect the majority position of the LRC
membership. Specifically, the letter complained to the AKC -- as
plaintiffs now argue to the court on the present motion -- that the
inclusion of a height requirement within the breed standard was not
subject to an open notice and comment procedure among Lab breeders.

In February 1994, the AKC board of directors approved the amended,
second revised standard by a vote of 10 to 1. The new standard became
effective on March 31, 1994, thenceforth requiring dogs to be between
22-1/2 inches and 24-1/2 inches tall and bitches between 21-1/2 inches
and 23-1/2 inches tall in order to be entered in competition at
AKC-registered dog shows, except that dogs less than 12 months old, and
dogs 1/2 inch outside the height standard, would not be disqualified on
the basis of height.

Plaintiffs contend that the new height requirement does not properly
establish the height standard of the Labrador Retriever breed, precisely
because the shorter Labs bred and owned by plaintiffs from English
bloodlines do not grow to that size. As noted above, though the height
dimensions under the 1994 amendment are the same as they have been since
1957, because the new standard makes the height specification mandatory,
the dimensions included within the standard themselves have become
critical for plaintiffs in a way that was not previously the case when
plaintiffs' dogs were free to enter competition despite being below the
height specified by the breed standard. Plaintiffs assert that certain
irregularities in the process through which the LRC recommended the new
breed standard to the AKC explain why a rule that is not properly
representative of the breed nevertheless became a part of the breed
standard.

The evidence plaintiffs present to the court of alleged irregularities
in the LRC standard-setting process consists of an affidavit from David
Schnare, a director, life member and former president of the LRC and
owner and judge of AKC-registered Champion Labs, and a portion of the
deposition testimony from Bernard Ziessow, chairman of the LRC standard
revision committee which drafted the proposed standard.

Schnare states that he conducted an investigation into the procedural
history of the LRC breed standard recommendation, through which he
discovered not only that there was no opportunity for public comment on
the new height requirement, but that the requirement was adopted into
the proposed standard by only a slim margin in a committee meeting
regarding which certain committee members who opposed the height
requirement were not given sufficient notice to attend. According to
Schnare, normally the committee's activities were carried out through
the mail rather than in a meeting, thus allowing broader participation.

Ziessow testified at deposition that he did not seek input concerning
the proposed revised standard from anyone outside the revision
committee. Plaintiffs contend that Ziessow is their competitor in the
breeding and selling of purebred Labs and that the committee proceedings
were kept from the public in order to prevent plaintiffs from having a
say in the process, thus advancing the anti-competitive purpose of their
competitors. There is no indication on the record, however, that closing
the committee's work to the public was contrary to established committee
practice or a violation of the LRC's bylaws.

With respect to the AKC's decision to adopt the second, revised standard
containing the new height requirement, Schnare states in his affidavit
that the official vote of 10 to 1 by the board followed a "straw vote."
According to Schnare, during the straw vote, the second, revised
standard passed by only a single vote that was cast by AKC director and
LRC president, Nelson Sills, who plaintiffs claim is also their
competitor in the market for purebred Labs.

Schnare further states in his affidavit that the directors of the AKC
did not give careful consideration to all the views and objections to
the standards that the AKC received, and did not adequately account for
the comments received during the AKC's own comment period. He concludes
that the AKC board's decision to adopt the standard may have been flawed
by political vote trading, and in any event that the AKC failed to
create an adequate record of its deliberations to assess what
considerations went into the vote.

Both parties have submitted voluminous other materials addressing the
issue of market definition for purposes of applying the antitrust laws,
and what, if any, adverse effect the new height requirement has had on
the relevant market. It is not necessary, however, for purposes of the
motions to set forth these materials.

                              Discussion

Plaintiffs allege five theories of antitrust liability. Claims 1 and 5
fall under @ 1 of the Sherman Act, which forbids unreasonable contracts,
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of interstate trade or
commerce. 15 U.S.C. @ 1. Plaintiffs allege that the AKC and LRC
conspired or combined with dog owners and breeders who are plaintiffs'
competitors to adopt a height requirement that would effectively exclude
plaintiffs from the market for Champion Labs. Plaintiffs claim that the
new height requirement constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade
and is a concerted refusal by the AKC and LRC to deal with plaintiffs.

Claims 3 and 4 fall under @ 2 of the Sherman Act which forbids actions
by a single party, as well as conspiracies and combinations, that
monopolize or attempt to monopolize a part of interstate trade or
commerce. 15 U.S.C. @ 2. Claim 3 alleges that defendants' adoption of
the new height requirement constitutes exclusionary conduct designed to
prevent plaintiffs' dogs from competing for Champion Lab status, with
the intent to enable plaintiffs' competitors to monopolize the market
for Champion Labs. Claim 4 alleges that defendants conspired with
plaintiffs' competitors to utilize the AKC's monopoly power over the
certification of Champion Labs to enhance the market position of
plaintiffs' competitors.

Claim 5 is alleged under both @ 1 and @ 2 of the Sherman Act. The claim
is that defendants conspired with plaintiffs' competitors to deprive
plaintiffs of a facility essential to plaintiffs' ability to compete in
the market for Champion Labs.

With the exception of the third claim concerning exclusionary conduct
with the intent to monopolize, all of plaintiffs' claims share a common
element of conspiracy. Specifically, the conspiracy alleged in the
complaint is that plaintiffs' competitors in the market for Champion
Labs conspired with the LRC and the AKC to have the LRC recommend, and
the AKC adopt, the new height requirement for the Labrador Retriever
breed. The anti-competitive objective of the conspiracy, plaintiffs
allege, was to preclude the shorter, English version of Labs bred by
plaintiffs from competing for the title of AKC Champion Labs at AKC dog
shows, thus enabling plaintiffs' competitors to charge a higher price
for their taller American version of Labs which remain eligible to
compete for that title.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because
there is no evidence to support plaintiffs' allegation of a conspiracy
by the LRC and AKC with plaintiffs' competitors. Plaintiffs respond that
they are entitled to summary judgment on this issue because the evidence
regarding the standard-setting process undertaken by the LRC and AKC in
adopting the challenged height requirement demonstrates conclusively
that there was a conspiracy.

To prove a conspiracy under @ 1 or @ 2 of the Sherman Act, plaintiffs
must establish that there was an agreement by two or more parties to
accomplish a specific illegal objective, be it to restrain trade under @
1, or to monopolize or attempt to monopolize trade or commerce under @
2. Evidence of a conspiracy can, of course, take the form of
circumstantial evidence of defendants' conduct from which the existence
of an anti-competitive agreement can be inferred. Invamed, Inc. v. Barr
Laboratories, 22 F. Supp. 2d 210, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

Plaintiffs do not purport to have direct evidence of an express
agreement to restrain or monopolize trade between the AKC and LRC and
plaintiffs' competitors. Rather, they contend that an unlawful agreement
can be inferred from the circumstantial evidence concerning how
defendants amended the Labrador Retriever breed standard to include the
challenged height requirement.

When plaintiffs' proof of a conspiracy relies on circumstantial evidence
of defendants' conduct, in the summary judgment context, the Supreme
Court has instructed that if defendants can demonstrate that they had no
rational economic motive to participate in an anti-competitive
conspiracy, and that the conduct at issue is consistent with permissible
activity under the antitrust laws, such conduct does not give rise to an
inference of conspiracy unless plaintiffs come forward with evidence
that tends to exclude permissible explanations for the conduct. See
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
596-97 (1986); H. L. Hgyden Co. v. Siemens Medical Systems, 879 F.2d
1005, 1014 (2d Cir. 1989).

The evidence before the court fails to raise an inference that the AKC
and LRC, in adopting the challenged height requirement, were
participants in an anticompetitive conspiracy with plaintiffs'
competitors.

Defendants are not-for-profit corporations that exist for the purpose of
maintaining definitive and uniform breed standards for purebred dogs.
The LRC deals strictly with purebred Labs, while the AKC deals with all
varieties of purebred dogs including Labs. As such, the AKC and LRC are
not competitors in the alleged market for Champion Labs, and plaintiffs
have expressly admitted that the LRC and AKC's economic interests, if
anything, would favor more not less competition among breeders, which
would lead to greater revenues from registration and entry fees at the
various dog shows. Defendants therefore have no inherent economic motive
to participate in an anti-competitive conspiracy with plaintiffs'
competitors.

Moreover, there has never been any question in this case that the LRC
and AKC's recommendation and adoption, respectively, of uniform breed
standards is a legitimate, and indeed necessary, function to promote
competition in the breeding and exhibition of purebred dogs. Without
some definitive breed standard set by the LRC and AKC, there could not
be competition among Lab owners and breeders because there would be no
uniform standard against which to measure the relative quality of
Labrador Retrievers. The multi-stage process at the LRC and the AKC for
amending the Labrador Retriever breed standard has been described above.
Plaintiffs do not challenge the existence or purpose of the AKC and LRC,
nor do they contest the legitimacy of the democratic process through
which the two organizations amend the Labrador Retriever breed standard.

Plaintiffs' antitrust claims instead hinge entirely on the contention
that there were certain irregularities in the amendment process adding
the mandatory feature to the height standard and that these alleged
irregularities raise an inference that the AKC and LRC conspired with
plaintiffs' competitors in adopting the revision.

Under the standard for summary judgment set forth by the Supreme Court,
however, defendants' lack of an anti-competitive motive and the
legitimacy of these organizations' basic activity in setting uniform
breed standards require that plaintiffs come forward with evidence
tending to show that the adoption of the new height requirement in this
case was not the product of a legitimate standard- setting process. This
plaintiffs fail to do.

Plaintiffs rely, first, on the contention that two key figures in the
adoption of the new height requirement were also competitors of
plaintiffs in the market for Champion Labs. The first is Ziessow, the
chairman of the LRC Standard Revision Committee which drafted the
proposed standard, and the second is Nelson Sills, an AKC director and
LRC president, who, plaintiffs claim, cast the decisive vote for
adoption of the standard by the AKC.

It should be remembered that the height measurement specifications for
Labs have been in place for many years. The only change recently made
was to make the standard mandatory, with the qualifications described
earlier. There is no evidence to indicate that Ziessow and Sills, and
all the others who advocated and voted for the change did not have a
right to do so as part of the normal process which would go into any
establishment of standards. Moreover, any standards inevitably provide
competitive advantages to dogs that meet the standards and corresponding
disadvantages to dogs that do not meet the standards.

In any event, viewing the actions of Ziessow and Sills, in the light
most favorable to plaintiffs, as self-serving and anti-competitive, the
fact remains that 68 percent of the LRC membership approved the new
height requirement while the AKC board of directors voted to adopt the
requirement by as much as 10 to 1. At the very least, the AKC adopted
the height requirement by a vote of 6 to 5, assuming, as plaintiffs
contend, that there was an unofficial straw vote that preceded the
official vote, the latter serving simply to memorialize the board's
decision. Thus, the fact that Ziessow chaired the LRC Revision Committee
and that Sills may have cast the deciding vote during the AKC straw vote
does not create an inference of an agreement to achieve an unlawful
objective on the part of a majority of the LRC membership at large, or
the other 5 AKC-board members during the straw vote, and 9 members
during the final vote, all of whom voted in favor of the new
requirement. There is simply nothing, apart from mere speculation, to
suggest that the votes of the LRC membership and the AKC board of
directors in favor of the height requirement was the result of an
anticompetitive agreement rather than a legitimate exercise of the
permissible function that defendants are authorized to perform in
setting uniform breed standards.

Plaintiffs contend, however, that there were several irregularities in
how the LRC came to include the height requirement in the proposed,
revised breed standard. Specifically, plaintiffs provide the affidavit
of David Schnare who states that the LRC did not provide public notice
and opportunity for comment on the new height requirement, that the
requirement was adopted by the LRC by only a slim margin in a committee
meeting of which certain committee members who opposed the requirement
were not given sufficient notice to attend, and that usually such
committee activities were carried out by mail rather than in person. In
addition, plaintiffs point to the deposition testimony of Ziessow who
admitted that he did not seek input concerning the proposed height
requirement from anyone outside the LRC revision committee.

Assuming in favor of plaintiffs that all of this occurred and was
contrary to the articles or by-laws or established practices governing
past LRC Revision Committee activities, a conclusion that is not
apparent from plaintiffs' submissions, the fact remains that the
majority of the LRC membership voted to recommend the proposed revised
breed standard to the AKC. Moreover, the antitrust laws are not intended
as a device to review the details of parliamentary procedure. In any
event, the majority vote of the LRC membership provided a safeguard
against plaintiffs' contention that Ziessow may have manipulated the
Revision Committee into serving his own anticompetitive objectives.

With respect to the AKC vote in favor of the height requirement, apart
from the fact of Sills' participation discussed above, plaintiffs simply
speculate in their statement of uncontested fact that:

The AKC Directors decision process was open to mischief and may have
been flawed by political vote trading, thus considering issues not
properly related to the decisions before it, when considering the
standard.

Plaintiffs offer nothing further to impeach the AKC vote. Such
speculation cannot substitute for plaintiffs' burden to present evidence
tending to exclude the possibility that the new height requirement was
adopted by the AKC pursuant to its legitimate, standard-setting
function.

The proposed revisions in the Labrador Retriever breed standard were
returned several times by the AKC to the LRC for review in light of the
criticisms raised by its opponents. After a majority of the LRC
membership voted in favor of the new mandatory height standard, the AKC
solicited still further comment on the new requirement through its own
publication. Only then was the requirement adopted by majority vote of
the AKC board of directors. Thus, both the proponents and opponents of
the new requirement had significant opportunity to advocate and oppose
it, and ultimately, for those among them who were members of the LRC or
AKC board, to vote for or against it.

The court finds that there is no triable issue of fact as to whether the
LRC and AKC engaged in a conspiracy with plaintiffs' competitors in the
recommendation and adoption of the new height requirement. Summary
judgment is therefore granted to defendants on claims 1, 2, 4 and 5.

Summary judgment is also granted to defendants on claim 3. Although this
claim does not allege a conspiracy between defendants and plaintiffs'
competitors, it rests on the allegation that defendants sought to
exclude plaintiffs from the market for Champion Labs with the intent to
enable plaintiffs' competitors to monopolize that market. For the same
reasons that the record is devoid of evidence of an anti-competitive
conspiracy, it is also devoid of evidence of any specific intent on the
part of defendants in passing the new breed standard to provide
plaintiffs' competitors with a monopoly in the market for Champion Labs.
Claim 3 is therefore dismissed.

                        State Corporate Law Claims

Claims 6 and 7 are only asserted against the LRC and allege violations
of New York Not-For Profit Corporation Law, the LRC's by-laws and breach
of fiduciary duty. Neither party has made a motion with respect to these
claims. Because there are no federal claims remaining in the action,
however, the court declines to maintain jurisdiction over these claims.
Claims 6 and 7 are therefore dismissed without prejudice to re-assert
them in state court.

                               Conclusion

For the above reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is
granted and plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied. The
remaining state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.
(New York Law Journal 9-2-1999)


ARTHUR DORE: Says His Co Not Liable For Bilking At Cheese Plant Sold
--------------------------------------------------------------------
The man who sold a cheese plant to owners who later bilked farmers says
he will appeal a decision finding his company liable. He says debts
stemming from cheese plant he sold aren't his problem.

Bay City businessman Arthur P. Dore sold the Pinconning plant to
Earthsafe Enterprises in 1994. In May, a jury found that Earthsafe's
main owners, Christopher Grisel of North Richland Hills, Texas, and Alan
Mikell of Tulsa, Okla., schemed to sell farmers' products at
below-market prices, buy the products back and then sell them again for
a profit.

Grisel and Mikell are to be sentenced Oct. 26.

But last month, Midland County Circuit Court Judge Paul J. Clulo ruled
that Dore & Associates Contracting Inc. is liable for more than $ 2
million that dairy farmers never received. Though Dore no longer owned
the plant, his name was on the operating license. "I think the judge is
wrong," Dore said. "I'm appealing this. This is not over. It's a long
time before the fat lady sings."

Dore's plan for an appeal did not surprise Steven Liddle, the attorney
representing 200 milk providers in the class-action lawsuit. "I knew
they were going to file an appeal because the liability is so large," he
said. "Dore & Associates have nothing to do but file an appeal because
they're desperate."

Earthsafe was using Dore's operating license, with Dore's permission,
because the Michigan Department of Agriculture had not authorized one
for Earthsafe.

Court documents show that Grisel and Mikell had a $ 3.1-million loan
agreement with Dore that said Dore would not try to retrieve money from
them in case of default. If the plant closed, Dore would lose his money.

"Those guys were bouncing checks to the farmers and they want to blame
me," Dore said. "It's crazy. I'm between a rock and a hard place. The
owners paid me every month, so I couldn't kick them out." Dore said the
court should overturn its ruling against his company because the state
should not have let the plant stay open after its license expired.

Liddle said that doesn't make Dore any less liable. "They're using
hyper-technical interpretations of the law to get around the clear
intent of the law," he said.

The Agriculture Department closed the plant in March 1995 after it
learned of financial problems. The plant reopened after Mikell and
Grisel told the state they would repay debts and pay for future milk in
cash.

The plant was closed permanently when the owners failed to comply with a
temporary license the state issued in June 1995. (The Detroit News
10-14-1999)


AVADO BRANDS: Specificity Is Required For PSLRA, 11th Cir Remands Case
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), a
securities fraud plaintiff must plead scienter with particular facts
that give rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted in a
severely reckless manner, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit
held on Sept. 3. Bryant v. Avado Brands Inc., No. 98-9253.

Shareholders filed a class action against Avado Brands Inc., a
restaurant chain owner, and several of its officers, alleging that the
defendants made false and misleading statements and material omissions
in order to inflate the value of the company's stock. The district court
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.

Reversing and remanding, Chief Judge R. Lanier Anderson III said,
"Motive and opportunity...do not constitute a substantive standard;
rather, motive and opportunity are specific kinds of evidence, which
along with other evidence might contribute to an inference of
recklessness or willfulness." (The National Law Journal 9-20-1999)


AVATAX CORP: May Settle Preferred Stockholders' Suit In Del. Re Merger
----------------------------------------------------------------------
In April 1998, three lawsuits were filed by certain of the Corporation's
preferred stockholders relating to the proposed merger of the
Corporation into Xetava. First on April 23, 1998, Elliott Associates,
L.P. ("Elliott") filed a lawsuit against the Corporation, Xetava and
seven of the Corporation's directors in the Delaware Court of Chancery.
In this lawsuit, Elliott sought to enjoin the proposed merger by
alleging that (i) the proposed merger required the consent of the
holders of the Corporation's preferred stock, (ii) the individual
defendants' actions in approving the merger breached their fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty, and (iii) the individual defendants further
breached the fiduciary duties by structuring the merger in a manner
calculated to entrench themselves in office. Second, on April 23, 1998,
Harbor Finance Partners, Ltd. and Anvil Investment Partners, L.P.
(collectively, "Harbor") filed a purported class action lawsuit,
allegedly on behalf of the holders of the Corporation's two series of
preferred stock, against the Corporation and the same seven individual
defendants in the Delaware Court of Chancery. In this lawsuit, Harbor
alleged the same allegations contained in the first two counts of the
Elliott lawsuit, and further alleged that (i) the defendants breached
the implied covenant of good faith in the "organic corporate documents"
applicable to the preferred stock and (ii) the defendants' actions
constituted an anticipatory breach of such documents. Third, on April
29, 1998, Robert Strougo filed a lawsuit against the Corporation and the
seven individual defendants in the Delaware Court of Chancery, which was
substantially identical to the Harbor lawsuit.

In August 1998, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in these lawsuits that
the holders of the Corporation's convertible preferred stock have the
right to vote separately as a class on the proposed merger of the
Corporation into Xetava, as it was structured and announced by the
Corporation on April 14, 1998.

On June 18, 1999 the Corporation announced an agreement with the
plaintiffs to settle and dismiss the lawsuits in connection with the
revised proposed merger of Xetava into the Corporation. The settlement
of the lawsuits is subject to various conditions, including the approval
of the Delaware Court of Chancery and the closing of the proposed merger
transaction, which in turn is subject to various conditions, including
the approval of the transaction by the Corporation's common and two
series of preferred stockholders, voting separately as a class.


AVATEX CORP: Goes On Fighting TX Shareholders Suit; Class Status Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Corporation and certain of its current and former officers and
directors have been named in a series of purported class action lawsuits
that were filed and subsequently consolidated under Zuckerman, et al. v.
FoxMeyer Health Corporation, et al., in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, Case No.
396-CV-2258-T. The lawsuit purports to be brought on behalf of
purchasers of the Corporation's common and its Series A and convertible
preferred stocks during the period July 19, 1995 through August 27,
1996. On May 1, 1997, plaintiffs in the lawsuit filed a consolidated
amended class action complaint, which alleges that the Corporation and
the defendant officers and directors made misrepresentations of material
facts in public statements or omitted material facts from public
statements, including the failure to disclose purportedly negative
information concerning its National Distribution Center and Delta
computer systems and the resulting impact on the Corporation's existing
and future business and financial condition.

On March 31, 1998, the Court denied the Corporation's motion to dismiss
the amended complaint in the lawsuit. Discovery is proceeding in the
lawsuit, and the parties are awaiting a ruling on the plaintiffs' class
certification motion. The Corporation intends to continue to vigorously
defend itself in the lawsuit.

The Corporation and its Co-Chairmen and Co-Chief Executive Officers have
also been named as defendants in Grossman v. FoxMeyer Health Corp., et
al., Cause No. 96-10866-J, in the 191st Judicial Court of Dallas County,
Texas. As initially filed, the lawsuit purports to be brought on behalf
of all holders of the Corporation's common stock during the period
October 30, 1995 through July 1, 1996, and seeks unspecified money
damages. Plaintiff asserts claims of common law fraud and negligent
misrepresentation, based on allegations that she was induced not to sell
her shares by supposed misrepresentations and omissions that are
substantially the same as those alleged in the Zuckerman action
described above.

On September 28, 1997, the Court denied the Corporation's motion for
summary judgment in the lawsuit. On August 10, 1999, however, the Court
entered an Order Denying Class Certification, in which it ruled that
only some elements necessary for class certification were met and denied
the plaintiff's motion to certify a class of holders of the
Corporation's stock for purposes of the litigation. The Corporation
intends to continue to vigorously defend itself in the lawsuit.


AVATEX CORP: Hearing For Stockholders' Suit Set For Nov. 30
-----------------------------------------------------------
On June 5, 1998, Steven Mizel IRA and Anvil Investment Partners, L.P.
filed a lawsuit, allegedly on behalf of the Corporation, against seven
of the Corporation's current directors and three of its former directors
who were members of its Personnel and Compensation Committee, under No.
602773198 in the Supreme Court of New York, County of New York. The
plaintiffs were originally two holders of the Corporation's Series A
preferred stock, and the lawsuit relates primarily to agreements and
transactions between the Corporation and its Co-Chairmen and Co-Chief
Executive Officers, Abbey Butler and Melvyn Estrin.

The plaintiffs allege that, in connection with such agreements and
transactions, (i) the defendants breached their fiduciary duty to the
Corporation's stockholders, (ii) the compensation arrangements between
the Corporation and Messrs. Butler and Estrin constitute corporate
waste, and the defendants caused the Corporation's subsidiaries and
affiliates to improperly purchase the Corporation's common stock based
on confidential non-public information. The plaintiffs seek damages,
injunctive relief and an accounting.

In January 1999, a stipulation was executed providing that the
litigation, insofar as brought by Stephen Mizel IRA, was voluntarily
discontinued with prejudice. In April 1999, the Court denied the
remaining plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint to allege additional
claims. In October 1999, the defendants moved for summary judgment, and
a hearing on the motion is set on November 30, 1999. The Corporation has
been paying the defense costs of the defendants in accordance with
Delaware General Corporation Law, the Corporation's charter and by-laws,
and the terms and conditions of Indemnification Agreements between the
Corporation and certain of the defendants.


BEAR STEARNS: Agrees to Pay Customers Of Defunct Brokerage Baron $3.5M
----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Bear Stearns Securities Corporation, the Wall Street brokerage firm
subsidiary that processes securities transactions for thousands of
smaller firms, has agreed to pay an additional $3.5 million to cover
losses incurred by customers of A. R. Baron & Company, a defunct
brokerage firm whose trades it cleared.

The payment settles the claims against Bear Stearns brought by the
trustee appointed to liquidate A. R. Baron. It brings to $42 million the
total fines, restitution and court costs the firm has agreed to pay in
that matter.

R. Baron, which went out of business in 1996, was the subject of a
three-year criminal investigation by Manhattan District Attorney Robert
M. Morgenthau. Calling the firm a criminal enterprise, Mr. Morgenthau
convened a grand jury in 1997 to hear evidence in the matter and won
convictions of 13 Baron officers and employees for securities fraud. Mr.
Morgenthau said $75 million had been lost by investors who traded with
Baron.

The investigation into Baron led prosecutors to Bear Stearns Securities,
which cleared Baron's trades and provided the firm with the capital it
needed to operate. Following the investigation into Bear Stearns's role
in the Baron fraud, prosecutors and the Securities and Exchange
Commission charged the big brokerage firm with fraud. Without admitting
or denying the charges, Bear Stearns agreed to pay $25 million to settle
the case.

James W. Giddens, a partner at Hughes Hubbard & Reed in New York and the
trustee charged with overseeing the liquidation of Baron, demanded that
Bear Stearns return all clearing fees and other funds transferred by
Baron to the giant Wall Street brokerage during the period Bear Stearns
Securities cleared Baron's trades. The trustee said the $3.5 million
settlement, which is subject to court approval, represented a
substantial portion of those funds.

The $3.5 million payment by Bear Stearns is in addition to the $30
million restitution fund the firm was required to establish for former
A. R. Baron customers as part of its settlement agreement with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Manhattan District Attorney.
That agreement, announced in August, also required Bear Stearns to pay
$1 million to New York State, $1 million to New York City and $1.5
million to the District Attorney's office to cover the costs of the
investigation.

"This settlement brings us substantially closer to our goal of paying
100 percent of the losses suffered by A. R. Baron customers," Mr.
Giddens said. The trustee said that customers of Baron had submitted
claims for losses estimated at more than $40 million.

The Baron trustee has also brought more than 100 lawsuits seeking $450
million from former Baron employees, insiders and favored customers who
profited through their relationship with Baron. Those suits have yielded
almost $3 million and are expected to bring in more money that can be
returned to investors who lost money trading through Baron.

The Bear Stearns settlement with the trustee will not affect the
individual lawsuits and arbitration cases which have been brought
against the firm for losses suffered in the Baron failure. Those cases,
as well as a class action suit, are still pending. (The New York Times
10-18-1999)


CA STATE: Settles With Civil Rights Gps. Re Proposition 187 And 5 Suits
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
An agreement has been reached between California's state government and
several civil rights groups. The two parties have agreed to drop legal
challenges involving the state's controversial Proposition 187 - a 1994
initiative that sought to end public service, including education, to
illegal immigrants. The voter-approved legislation had been found
largely unconstitutional. Under the agreement, the state will drop its
appeal of the decision and the plaintiffs in five current suits against
Proposition 187 will not file any additional lawsuits. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit approved the agreement.

Several Arizona school districts have sued the state over lack of
funding. The schools allege that the state has not fully funded school
renovation efforts as required by law. The lawsuit stems from a new
finance system that was enacted by the state. The system's funding
formula is believed to be inaccurate since it was based on incomplete
figures from the districts. While monies were set aside for renovation
projects, the schools claim it is not enough. They declare a difference
of over 50 million, for the past and newly started fiscal years.

Michigan expands its school choice program. Students can now attend
schools outside of their county of residence, according to a measure
signed by the governor last month. Participation in the program is
voluntary, although about half the state's districts are involved. It is
expected that transportation costs may limit the effects of the new law.

California can continue to test prospective teachers. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit has upheld the state's right to administer a
basic skills test as an employment-screening device. This decision
upholds the district court's previous ruling. The test had been called
discriminatory in a lawsuit filed by the Association of Mexican-American
Educators in 1992. The appellate court ruled that the test is not
covered under federal civil rights law because its administrators
receive no federal funds.

A lack of AP classes could result in a claim of discrimination. The ACLU
has filed a class-action suit on behalf of four students, claiming that
their school's lack of advanced placement courses is discriminatory and
has hindered their efforts to attend top universities. The suit focuses
on one high school, but the ACLU hopes it will be used as a test case to
change policies across California and the country. The suit claims that
predominately Black and Latino high schools deprive their students of
educational opportunities by not having as many advanced placement
offerings as predominantly White schools.

In the wake of Davis, a college level sexual harassment suit may have an
impact for all school levels. A federal appeals court has ruled that a
public university is not constitutionally immune from a lawsuit alleging
it failed to protect a student from harassment. The university had
claimed immunity under the 11th Amendment that protects the government
and its entities from lawsuits except in cases of gross negligence or an
abuse of power. The defendant refuted this claim by arguing that the
university had given up this immunity when it received federal funding
under Title IX, which prohibits sex discrimination at public
institutions. The U.S. Supreme Court has not directly heard this issue,
though it did refuse to review a similar case. In that instance, the
lower court had ruled that the university was not liable under Title IX.
This disparity among the courts may eventually raise the issue at the
high court level. (Your School and the Law 8-17-1999)


CENDANT CORP: Intends To Proceed With Settlement For NJ Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The following is taken from the report by the Company for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 1999 filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission as of date October 12, 1999 (Former Conformed Name: Cuc
International Inc /De/ Date Of Name Change: 19920703; Former Conformed
Name: Comp U Card International Inc., Date Of Name Change: 19870914):

Since the April 15, 1998 announcement of the discovery of accounting
irregularities in the former business units of CUC 70 lawsuits claiming
to be class actions, two lawsuits claiming to be brought derivatively on
the Company's behalf and several individual lawsuits and arbitration
proceedings have been commenced in various courts and other forums
against the Company and other defendants by or on behalf of persons
claiming to have purchased or otherwise acquired securities or options
issued by CUC or the Company between May 1995 and August 1998. The Court
has ordered consolidation of many of the actions.

On March 17, 1999, the Company reached a final agreement to settle the
class action lawsuit that was brought on behalf of the holders of Income
or Growth FELINE PRIDES ("PRIDES") securities who purchased their
securities on or prior to April 15, 1998, the date on which the Company
announced the discovery of accounting irregularities in the former
business units of CUC. Under the terms of the final agreement only
holders who owned PRIDES at the close of business on April 15, 1998 will
be eligible to receive a new additional "Right" for each PRIDES security
held. Right holders may (i) sell them or (ii) exercise them by
delivering to the Company, three Rights together with two PRIDES in
exchange for two New PRIDES (the "New PRIDES"), for a period beginning
upon distribution of the Rights and concluding upon expiration of the
Rights (February 2001).

The terms of the New PRIDES will be the same as the original PRIDES
except that the conversion rate will be revised so that, at the time the
Rights are distributed, each New PRIDES will have a value equal to
$17.57 more than each original PRIDES, or, in the aggregate,
approximately $351.0 million. The final agreement also requires the
Company to offer to sell four million additional PRIDES (having
identical terms to currently outstanding PRIDES) to holders of Rights
for cash, at a value which will be based on the valuation model that
will be utilized to set the conversion rate of the New PRIDES. The
offering of additional PRIDES will be made only pursuant to a prospectus
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). The
arrangement to offer additional PRIDES is designed to enhance the
trading value of the Rights by removing up to six million Rights from
circulation via exchanges associated with the offering and to enhance
the open market liquidity of New PRIDES by creating four million New
PRIDES via exchanges associated with the offering. If holders of Rights
do not acquire all such additional PRIDES, under certain circumstances
they will be offered to the public. Under the settlement agreement, the
Company also agreed to file a shelf registration statement for an
additional 15 million special PRIDES, which could be issued by the
Company at any time for cash. However, during the last 30 days prior to
the expiration of the Rights in February 2001, the Company will be
required to offer these special additional PRIDES to holders of Rights
at a price in cash equal to 105% of their theoretical value. The special
PRIDES, if issued, would have the same terms as the currently
outstanding PRIDES and could be used to exercise Rights.

Based on an average market price of $17.53 per share of Company common
stock, (calculated based on the average closing price per share of
Company common stock for the consecutive five-day period ended September
30, 1999) the effect of the issuance of the New PRIDES will be to
distribute approximately 19 million more shares of Company common stock
when the mandatory purchase of Company common stock associated with the
PRIDES occurs in February 2001.

On June 15, 1999, the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey entered an order and judgment approving the settlement
described above and awarding fees to counsel to the class. One objector,
who objected to a portion of the settlement notice concerning fees to be
sought by counsel to the class, has filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit from the District Court order approving
the settlement and awarding fees to counsel to the class. Although under
the settlement the Rights are required to be distributed following the
conclusion of court proceedings, including appeals, the Company believes
that the appeal is without merit. As a result, the Company presently
intends to distribute the Rights in October 1999 after the effectiveness
of the registration statement filed with the SEC covering the New
PRIDES.

The SEC and the United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey
are conducting investigations relating to the matters referenced above.
The SEC advised the Company that its inquiry should not be construed as
an indication by the SEC or its staff that any violations of law have
occurred. As a result of the findings from the investigations, the
Company made all adjustments considered necessary which are reflected in
its restated financial statements. Although the Company can provide no
assurances that additional adjustments will not be necessary as a result
of these government investigations, the Company does not expect that
additional adjustments will be necessary.

Other than with respect to the PRIDES class action litigation, the
Company does not believe it is feasible to predict or determine the
final outcome or resolution of these proceedings or investigations or to
estimate the amounts or potential range of loss with respect to these
proceedings or investigations. In addition, the timing of the final
resolution of the proceedings or investigations is uncertain. The
possible outcomes or resolutions of the proceedings could include a
judgement against the Company or settlements and could require
substantial payments by the Company. Management believes that material
adverse outcomes with respect to such proceedings or investigations
could have a material impact on the Company's financial position,
results of operations or cash flows. AVATEX CORP: May Settle 1994
Delaware Suit Re Proposed FoxMeyer Merger

On March 1, 1994, the Corporation and FoxMeyer announced that the
Corporation had proposed a merger in which FoxMeyer would be merged with
and into a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Corporation, making FoxMeyer a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the Corporation. Shortly after the
announcement, class action lawsuits were filed against the Corporation,
FoxMeyer and certain of FoxMeyer's officers and directors in the
Delaware Court of Chancery. Following a number of procedural matters,
and the execution (and subsequent withdrawal) of a Memorandum of
Understanding dated June 30, 1994 under which the litigation would be
dismissed, the litigation was consolidated and an amended complaint was
filed on February 13, 1996.

The amended complaint alleged that the defendants breached their
fiduciary duties to FoxMeyer's shareholders by agreeing to the merger at
an unfair price and at a time designed so that the Corporation could
take advantage of, among other things, an alleged substantial growth in
the business of FoxMeyer. The complaint also alleged that the proxy
statement issued in connection with the merger failed to disclose
certain matters relating to the proposed merger. In fiscal 1999, the
parties reached a tentative settlement of the lawsuit in which the
Corporation will pay the class the amount of $1,450,000, a portion of
which will be paid by the directors' insurance carrier. The settlement
is subject to definitive documentation and approval by the Delaware
Court of Chancery.


DYNAMEX INC: Milberg Weiss Files Amended Securities Complaint In Texas
----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Following is an Announcement by the Law Firm of Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP:

Notice is hereby given that a second amended complaint has been filed in
connection with an action pending in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, on behalf of all
persons who purchased the common stock of Dynamex Inc. (NASDAQ: DYMX)
between September 18, 1997, and September 17, 1999, inclusive, including
all persons or entities that purchased Dynamex common stock pursuant or
traceable to a registration statement and prospectus issued in
connection with a secondary offering of Dynamex common stock (the
"Secondary Offering") which occurred on or about May 14, 1998. This
second amended complaint extends the class period set forth in the first
amended complaint, which had been filed on behalf of those who had
purchased Dynamex common stock between December 3, 1997, and November 2,
1998. The amended complaint charges Dynamex, certain officers and
directors of the Company, certain underwriters of the Secondary
Offering, Deloitte & Touche, and Deloitte & Touche LLP with violations
of one or more of the following: Sections 11, 12(a)(2) and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

In particular, the amended complaint alleges that Dynamex engaged in
accounting practices which were violative of Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles, thereby artificially inflating its reported
financial results, and failed to disclose the integration difficulties
it was experiencing with respect to various companies which it had
acquired. Because of the issuance of a series of false and misleading
statements during the Class Period, the price of Dynamex stock was
artificially inflated. On November 2, 1998, defendants partially
disclosed their failure to comply with GAAP, supplementing this
disclosure with a September 17, 1999 announcement and restatement of
earnings which disclosed the fact that such violations were more
extensive than it had previously disclosed. As a result, trading in the
stock has been halted. Prior to these disclosures, Dynamex completed
numerous acquisitions using its artificially inflated common stock as
currency and sold $ 36 million of common stock in the Secondary
Offering.

Plaintiffs are represented by the law firms Milberg Weiss, Spector &
Roseman, P.C., and Stanley, Mandel & Iola. If you wish to discuss this
action or have any questions concerning this notice or your rights or
interests with respect to these matters, please contact Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach ("Milberg Weiss"), Steven G. Schulman or Samuel
H. Rudman, One Pennsylvania Plaza, 49th Floor, New York, New York
10119-0165, by telephone 1-800-320-5081 or via e-mail:
classact@microweb.com or visit our website at www.milberg.com.


GENERAL ELECTRIC: Class Status Denied In Georgia PCB Contamination Case
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
A Georgia federal trial court has rejected a class certification motion
in a polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) contamination case after finding
that the named plaintiff failed to produce common proof of liability
(Edwin Watters v. General Electric Co., No. 4:98-cv-0195-HLM, N.D. Ga.).
(Text of Order in Section C. Mealey's Document # 15-990901-113.)

Edwin Watters is a Georgia resident who filed a proposed class action
complaint on behalf of property owners asserting claims of negligence,
nuisance, trespass, strict liability and punitive damages for PCB
contamination.

Defendant General Electric Co. manufactured electrical transformers at
its plant in Georgia. Approximately 12 percent of the transformers
manufactured each year at the plant contain a dielectric fluid called
Pyranol, a soup of PCBs and chlorinated benzenes. Watters maintains that
spills occasionally leaked from GE's plant into surrounding areas
through surface runoff or a pipe leading to a local river. Further,
Watters asserts that GE also disposed of material containing PCBs in two
onsite landfills.

In a May class certification motion, Watters sought to certify a class
consisting of all people, firms, or other entities who presently own
property within a certain designated area.

                                Order

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia said in an
Aug. 23 order that it previously held that Watters' proposed class
action satisfied the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality
and adequacy of class representation. The court further noted that it
previously decided that a class action would be a superior means of
adjudicating the class claims. Therefore, the court continued, the only
remaining issue to be decided is whether questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members.

"The punitive class claims in this case involve property damages, not
physical injuries. Claims for property damages, to be sure, raise far
less complicated issues than those presented by claims seeking to
recover for physical harms. Nevertheless, many courts remain reluctant
to certify such mass environmental tort claims as class actions," the
court said.

The court found that Watters is not prepared to present common proof
related to the existence and extent of PCB contamination within the
proposed class area. The court further found that Watters is not
prepared to offer common proof of property damages.

"These issues are significant elements of Plaintiff's claims, and sit at
the heart of the dispute between the parties. Although individualized
proof of damages, in itself, is not enough to compel the Court to deny
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class certification, Plaintiffs' failure to
produce common proof of liability convinces the Court that questions
common to the members of the class would not predominate at trial over
questions peculiar to the individual members," the court decided.

Therefore, the court held that Watters failed to satisfy requirements
for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).

GE is represented by Robert L. Berry of Brinson, Askew, Berry, Seigler,
Richardson & Davis in Rome, Ga., and Steven R. Kuney and Robert J.
Shaughnessy of Williams & Connolly in Washington, D.C. Plaintiffs are
represented by John Bell, Pamela S. James and Lames L. Bentley III of
Bell & James in Augusta, Ga., and Robert K. Finnell in Rome, Ga.
(Mealey's Litigation Report: Emerging Toxic Torts 9-1-1999)


HOLOCAUST VICTIMS: German Claims Chief In Washington For Talks
--------------------------------------------------------------
Germany's chief Holocaust claims negotiator flew to Washington for talks
aimed at breaking a stalemate over compensation for Nazi victims
proposed by German industry. A government statement said veteran former
minister Otto Lambsdorff would meet U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary
Stuart Eizenstat before negotiations between victims' lawyers and some
of Germany's top companies.

Sixteen firms have proposed a compensation fund aimed at pre-empting
huge U.S. class action suits against them by former Nazi-era slave
workers and other Holocaust victims. An industry spokesman told Reuters
he was optimistic progress could be made on resolving key legal issues
at the Thursday meeting.

Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's government has said it wants the fund to
be launched by the symbolic date of September 1, marking the 60th
anniversary of the outbreak of World War Two. But victims' lawyers are
unhappy with the terms offered so far.

Talks on the fund -- proposed in February by firms including carmakers
BMW and DaimlerChrysler, chemicals group BASF and Deutsche Bank -- have
in particular foundered on the question of guarantees the companies want
to protect them from future claims.

Lambsdorff, a former economics minister and himself a lawyer, was
appointed Bonn's chief mediator after his predecessor, Bodo Hombach, was
named Balkans reconstruction coordinator for the European Union.
The 72-year-old, a leading liberal who has retired from active politics,
has maintained close links with German business.

Lawyers for Holocaust survivors, many of them now very old, have accused
the firms of stalling negotiations by not laying out how much the fund
would be worth and focusing on their own quest for protection from
future claims.

Washington lawyer Michael Hausfeld said his firm planned to release
graphic documents of Nazi-era abuses by German companies on the Internet
in an attempt to add moral pressure on the firms before the talks.

Wolfgang Gibowski, spokesman for the German industry side, dismissed the
suggestion that the firms were being obstructive by concentrating on the
issue of "legal closure," adding that this had been agreed as the
subject of the meeting. "I find Mr Hausfeld's complaints somewhat
strange," he said, noting that they did not help the negotiating
atmosphere.

Gibowski said the German firms were keen to explore a proposal whereby
Germany and the United States would sign an international treaty that
would guarantee the companies protection from future claims.

Despite the obvious tensions with representatives of the Holocaust
survivors, he said industry negotiators were nonetheless optimistic of
progress being made. "All sides are clearly interested in a solution...I
believe we will make progress towards a solution," he said. (From
Reuters in Bonn)


INDIAN TRUST: Fd Judge Sets Nov 1 Deadline For Progress On Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------------
A federal judge has given lawyers for the Interior Department and U.S.
Treasury and attorneys representing thousands of Native Americans until
Nov. 1 to show that they are close to reaching agreement on overhauling
the government's long-troubled Indian trust fund system.

U.S. District Judge Royce C. Lamberth, impatient with federal efforts to
clean up a nearly 170-year history of mismanagement that has cost Native
Americans billions of dollars in lost income, said that he will take
firm action unless progress toward a mediated settlement is soon
apparent.

Lamberth, in an order made public, said that George Washington
University law professor Stephen Saltzburg was named earlier this month
to mediate issues arising from a six-week summer trial that illuminated
the government's gross mismanagement of $ 350 million a year from sales
of natural resources on Native Americans' land.

It was understood that the private negotiations were requested by
government lawyers, with the concurrence of Native American attorneys.

If progress is not apparent by early November, Lamberth said, he will
issue an opinion that legal sources expect would excoriate the
government and perhaps award monetary damages to 300,000 Native
Americans. The case is the largest class-action lawsuit in history
against the federal government.

"The parties will appear before the court . . . on Nov. 1, 1999, at
which time the court will decide whether mediation should continue or
whether at that time the court should release its opinion regarding the
trial that concluded July 1999," Lamberth's order said.

Attorneys in the case and Saltzburg declined comment on the order,
citing a stern warning by Lamberth that "discussions and communications
including documents will be confidential." "This is a totally
confidential process," Saltzburg said, declining to answer questions.

The trust funds were established in the 1830s during the Andrew Jackson
administration, part of a government effort to compensate individual
Native Americans for use of their land while weakening tribal control of
valuable assets.

The government is supposed to manage the accounts and pass along
royalties from the sale of petroleum, timber and other natural
resources. The government said it deposited about $ 350 million a year
into the accounts. But officials have been unable to give an accounting
of where all the money has gone, citing destroyed or damaged documents
and an antiquated record system.

Native American plaintiffs, who filed their lawsuit in 1996, contend
that the court should grant them millions of dollars in lost income,
order a full accounting by the government and ensure a complete overhaul
of the system.

Some legal authorities believe that, although the court can order a
complete restructuring of the system, only the U.S. Court of Claims can
award large damages for past mismanagement.

Congress was made aware of the problem in 1994 and passed legislation to
require massive reforms in the trust system. But the intended revisions
never took root, largely because of bureaucratic bickering within the
Interior Department, which oversees most issues affecting Native
Americans.

Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt told the court last summer that efforts
to reform the trust are in the works. Although the situation is complex,
reforms will be well underway by the time President Clinton leaves
office in January 2001, without any intervention by the federal court,
Babbitt testified.

The lawsuit covers individual trust accounts of Native Americans in
every state west of the Mississippi River. Most of those affected in
California are members of the Hoopa and Klamath tribes in the northern
part of the state.

However, if the current suit is successful, hundreds of tribes with
so-called tribal accounts--as opposed to the individual accounts
involved in the current lawsuit--are prepared to follow up with similar
class actions. These tribes include "dozens all throughout Southern
California," said Native American lawyer Keith Harper. (Los Angeles
Times 10-15-1999)


LEESBURG CITY: Asks Fd Ct To Dismiss Florida Black Employees' Bias Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The city has asked a federal court to dismiss a discrimination lawsuit
filed on behalf of eight black employees. The plaintiffs - all but one
of whom still work for the city - say they were paid less, received
limited or no training and were denied promotions. Joining the employees
in the action is the Tri-City National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People.

In an Oct. 8 motion, city attorneys said the plaintiffs' attorney, Larry
H. Colleton, failed to serve the city notice of the lawsuit within the
required 120-day time period. Colleton filed the lawsuit with the U.S.
District Court in Ocala on April 30, but did not serve the city until
Sept. 16, according to the motion.

The city also is asking the court to eliminate the NAACP as a plaintiff
and toss out class-action allegations that would allow a larger group to
join the suit. The NAACP also was behind a 1992 discrimination lawsuit
filed against the city and Leesburg Regional Medical Center. That case
was settled for $2.9 million.

The plaintiff-employees have experience with the city ranging from three
and 20 years. They are George Roundtree, Albert English, Wayne Taylor,
Andrew Allen, Charles Jones, Betty Graham, Virginia Samuels and former
employee Rhonda Dudley. Colleton could not be reached for comment. (The
Orlando Sentinel 10-15-1999)


MARCOS FAMILY: Philippine Ct Rejects Transfer Of Marcos Money To Hawaii
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
A Philippine court blocked the transfer of $150 million from the Swiss
bank accounts of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos to nearly 10,000
Filipino victims who suffered human rights abuses under the Marcos
regime.

The money was to be used to pay a settlement between the Marcos estate
and the victims, who won a class action lawsuit in Hawaii that demanded
compensation for the murder, torture and disappearance of suspected
political dissidents under Marcos.

But the anti-graft court ruled the agreement could end up wrongly
freeing the Marcos estate from further responsibility. The court said
the settlement -- which would prevent future human rights claims against
the Marcos family and remove a freeze on its assets worldwide -- would
release the family from any further court inquiry, thereby removing "a
powerful tool to ferret out that Marcos wealth."

Jerry Barican, spokesman for President Joseph Estrada, said the
government will ask the court to reconsider its decision. Both the
government and the Marcos family have agreed to set aside $150 million
of $590 million in Marcos' Swiss bank accounts to compensate the
plaintiffs.

The Swiss deposits, alleged to be part of Marcos' ill-gotten wealth, are
being held in an escrow account in a Philippine bank. The Estrada
government hopes to reach a separate agreement with the Marcos family on
sharing the remainder of the $590 million.

Marcos' widow, Imelda, has asked the anti-graft court to release the
money, saying her family is committed to help "the less fortunate, in
the interest of peace, reconciliation and unity."

Marcos fled into exile in Hawaii after his rule was toppled in a revolt
in 1986. He died in Honolulu three years later.

On April 29, the U.S. Federal District Court in Honolulu approved the
$150 million settlement between the Marcos estate and the 9,539
plaintiffs in the lawsuit.

But the settlement has been rejected by Selda, a group that represents a
large number of the victims, because of one clause inserted by the
Marcoses saying the family has never been charged with human rights
violations.

Selda's lawyer, Romeo Capulong, said the Philippine court's decision was
a "victory of the victims themselves and a vindication of the principles
we have fought for."

He said the victims he represents will continue their efforts "to
recover compensation and uphold the findings of the Hawaii court jury in
the landmark decision" finding Marcos liable for human rights
violations.

The jury initially awarded $2 billion, but subsequent negotiations ended
in February with the $150 million settlement. Capulong said the ruling
could pave the way for new negotiations.


MATTEL INC: Entwistle & Cappucci File Securities Suit In CA
-----------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to Section 21(D)(a)(3)(A)(i) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act"), Entwistle & Cappucci LLP, a prominent New
York law firm specializing in securities litigation, hereby gives notice
that a class action lawsuit for violations of the federal securities
laws has been filed against Mattel, Inc. (NYSE: MAT), The Learning
Company, Inc. and certain of its officers and/or directors in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California. The
lawsuit was brought on behalf of all persons who purchased Mattel common
stock between February 1, 1999 and October 1, 1999, inclusive.

The complaint charges Mattel, The Learning Company and certain of its
officers and/or directors during the relevant time period with
violations of the Exchange Act. The action arises out of a scheme to
enable Mattel to acquire The Learning Company and to enable the top two
officers of The Learning Company to pocket over $11 million as a result
of the acquisition. Specifically, the complaint alleges that, during the
Class Period, defendants artificially inflated Mattel common stock by
falsifying The Learning Company's and Mattel's reported pro forma
revenues, net income and earnings per share.

The complaint further alleges that defendants falsely represented that
The Learning Company constituted "an excellent strategic fit" with
Mattel's business and that its acquisition would be immediately
"accretive" to Mattel's 1999 and 2000 results. However, on October 4,
1999, just a few months after The Learning Company acquisition closed,
Mattel disclosed, for the first time, that The Learning Company had
incurred millions in product returns and bad debt write-offs and that
The Learning Company would incur a $50-$100 million loss rather than the
large profit forecast for its 3rd Quarter 1999. As a result, Mattel's
1999 earnings will be under $1.20 per share rather than the forecasted
$1.50 per share. Upon these revelations, Mattel common stock collapsed,
falling to $11-7/8 per share on huge volume of 29.96 million shares.

Plaintiff is represented by the law firm of Entwistle & Cappucci LLP.
If you purchased Mattel common stock during the Class Period, February
1, 1999 through October 1, 1999, you may move the Court to serve as a
lead plaintiff no later than December 6, 1999, if you so choose. In
order to serve as lead plaintiff, however, you must meet certain legal
requirements.

If you wish to discuss this action, wish to participate in the action as
a class representative, or have any questions concerning this notice, or
your rights or interests with respect to this matter, please contact
plaintiff's counsel, Vincent R. Cappucci, Esq. of Entwistle & Cappucci
LLP, 400 Park Avenue, 16th Floor, New York, New York 10022 (Telephone:
212-894-7200; E-mail: mboyle@entwistle-law.com)


MATTEL INC: Seeger Weiss Files Securities Suit In California
------------------------------------------------------------
The following was announced by Seeger Weiss LLP:

Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i), Seeger Weiss LLP hereby gives
notice that on October 15, 1999, a class action lawsuit was filed in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California on
behalf of all persons who purchased the publicly traded securities of
Mattel, Inc. (NYSE: MAT; "Mattel" or the "Company"), from February 1,
1999, through October 1, 1999, inclusive, and who were damaged thereby.

The complaint charges Mattel, The Learning Company Inc. and certain of
its officers and directors with violations of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. This action arises out of a scheme to enable Mattel to
acquire The Learning Company. This scheme enabled defendants to get
approval of the acquisition by The Learning Company's shareholders and
by Mattel's shareholders and enabled the top two officers of The
Learning Company to receive over $ 11 million due to the sale of The
Learning Company to Mattel. Defendants' alleged false statements
artificially inflated Mattel stock during the Class Period to as high as
$ 30-5/16 per share during the critical acquisition pricing period
between 4/99-5/99 by falsifying The Learning Company's and Mattel's
reported pro forma revenues, net income and EPS and by falsely
representing that The Learning Company represented an excellent
strategic fit with Mattel's business and that its acquisition would be
accretive to Mattel's 1999 and 2000 results. However, on October 4,
1999, just a few months after The Learning Company acquisition closed,
Mattel disclosed that The Learning Company had incurred millions in
product returns and bad debt write-offs and that The Learning Company
would incur a $ 50-$ 100 million loss rather than the large profit
forecast for 3rdQ 1999. As a result, Mattel's 1999 earnings will be less
than $ 1.20 per share rather than the forecasted $ 1.50, which Mattel's
CEO had stated she was firmly committed to just weeks before this
10/4/99 announcement. Mattel stock collapsed upon these revelations,
falling to $ 11-7/8 on 10/4/99 on huge volume of 29.96 million shares.

Plaintiff is represented by the law firm of Seeger Weiss LLP. If you are
a member of the Class described above, you may, not later than 60 days
from October 7, 1999, move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff of the
class, if you so choose. In order to serve as lead plaintiff, however,
you must meet certain legal requirements.

If you wish to discuss this Action or have any questions concerning this
notice or your rights or interests with respect to these matters, please
contact Christopher A. Seeger or David R. Buchanan, Esq. of Seeger Weiss
LLP, 40 Wall Street, New York, New York 10005, by telephone 212-584-0700
or via e-mail: cseeger@seegerweiss.com or dbuchanan@seegerweiss.com
TICKERS: NYSE:MAT


NEWELL RUBBERMAID: Bull & Lifshitz File Securities Suit In Illinois
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The following was released by Bull & Lifshitz LLP:

Notice is hereby given that on October 15, 1999, a securities class
action lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois against Newell Rubbermaid Inc. (NYSE: NWL)
(formerly Newell Co.) and certain officers and directors of the Company
on behalf of all persons and entities who purchased the stock of Newell
or Newell Rubbermaid during the period October 21, 1998 and September 3,
1999, inclusive, or exchanged Rubbermaid Incorporated ("Rubbermaid")
(formerly NYSE:RBD) stock for Newell Rubbermaid stock, or were issued
Newell Rubbermaid stock pursuant to a joint proxy/registration and
prospectus statement (the "Joint Proxy Statement").

The complaint alleges that defendants violated the federal securities
laws, including Sections 10(b) and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended, by making false and misleading statements in press
releases, filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including
the Joint Proxy Statement concerning, among other things, the Company's
business, financial condition, earnings and prospects of Newell
Rubbermaid. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that the Company failed
to disclose the adverse impact deep price discounts offered by
Rubbermaid salespeople to customers would have on the earnings of Newell
Rubbermaid.

Plaintiff is represented in this class action by the New York law firms
of Wechsler Harwood Halebian & Feffer LLP and Bull & Lifshitz, LLP.
If you purchased Newell Rubbermaid or Newell shares during the Class
Period or were issued Newell Rubbermaid common stock for your Newell or
Rubbermaid shares you may, not later than 60 days from today, move the
court to serve as a lead plaintiff, provided you meet certain legal
requirements. If you wish to discuss this action, or have any questions
concerning this notice or your rights or interests with respect to this
matter, please contact the following:

Wechsler Harwood Halebian & Feffer LLP: 488 Madison Avenue, New York New
York 10022 Telephone: 1-877-935-7400 (toll free) Robert I. Harwood, Esq.
rharwood@whhf.com; Jeffrey M.. Haber, Esq. jhaber@whhf.com; or

BULL & LIFSHITZ LLP classlaw1@aol.com Joshua M. Lifshitz, Esq. Peter D.
Bull, Esq. 246 West 38th Street New York, New York 10018 Phone: (212)
869-9449 or for out-of-state 1-888-893-1844 (toll free). TICKER:
NYSE:NWL


NEWELL RUBBERMAID: Wechsler Harwood Files Securities Suit In Illinois
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The following was released by Wechsler Harwood Halebian & Feffer LLP:

Notice is hereby given that on October 15, 1999, a securities class
action lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois against Newell Rubbermaid Inc. (NYSE: NWL)
(formerly Newell Co.) and certain officers and directors of the Company
on behalf of all persons and entities who purchased the stock of Newell
or Newell Rubbermaid during the period October 21, 1998 and September 3,
1999, inclusive, or exchanged Rubbermaid Incorporated ("Rubbermaid")
(formerly NYSE:RBD) stock for Newell Rubbermaid stock, or were issued
Newell Rubbermaid stock pursuant to a joint proxy/registration and
prospectus statement (the "Joint Proxy Statement").

The complaint alleges that defendants violated the federal securities
laws, including Sections 10(b) and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended, by making false and misleading statements in press
releases, filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including
the Joint Proxy Statement concerning, among other things, the Company's
business, financial condition, earnings and prospects of Newell
Rubbermaid. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that the Company failed
to disclose the adverse impact deep price discounts offered by
Rubbermaid salespeople to customers would have on the earnings of Newell
Rubbermaid.

Plaintiff is represented in this class action by the New York law firms
of Wechsler Harwood Halebian & Feffer LLP and Bull & Lifshitz, LLP.
If you purchased Newell Rubbermaid or Newell shares during the Class
Period or were issued Newell Rubbermaid common stock for your Newell or
Rubbermaid shares you may, not later than 60 days from October 15, 1999,
move the court to serve as a lead plaintiff, provided you meet certain
legal requirements. If you wish to discuss this action, or have any
questions concerning this notice or your rights or interests with
respect to this matter, please contact the following: Wechsler Harwood
Halebian & Feffer LLP: 488 Madison Avenue, New York New York 10022
Telephone: 1-877-935-7400 (toll free) Robert I. Harwood, Esq.
rharwood@whhf.com; Jeffrey M.. Haber, Esq. jhaber@whhf.com; or BULL &
LIFSHITZ LLP classlaw1@aol.com Joshua M. Lifshitz, Esq. Peter D. Bull,
Esq. 246 West 38th Street New York, New York 10018 Phone: (212) 869-9449
or for out-of-state 1-888-893-1844 (toll free). TICKER: NYSE:NWL


ONODA CEMENT: S Korean-American Sues Defunct Japanese Co in LA Sup Ct
---------------------------------------------------------------------
A South Korean-American has filed a class-action suit at the Los Angeles
Superior Court against now-defunct Onoda Cement Co., Taiheiyo Cement
Corp. and Taiheiyo's U.S. subsidiaries, alleging he was a slave laborer
for the companies during World War II.

In 1943, Jae Won Jeong was a student of Economics at Hosei University in
Tokyo when he and his classmates were conscripted for mandatory military
service. Jeong refused to be drafted, according to the suit, filed
Monday.

In January 1944, he was forcibly taken to Hamkyung Province, in present
day North Korea, where he labored for two years for Onoda Cement, which
was later merged into what is now Taiheiyo Cement, enduring physical and
mental hardship, it said.

Jeong, now 77, has joined other plaintiffs in filing under a new
California law that gives the courts jurisdiction to hear slave labor
cases, and extends the statute of limitations.

Jeong's case, however, stands out as it is the first time a South
Korean-American has sued a Japanese business entity under the new law,
according to his attorneys. "Our goal is not to go back to the issues,
but for the first and last time to learn a lesson from past history for
the benefit of the history of today and tomorrow," said Hawoon Shin,
Jeong's attorney.

Onoda Cement merged with Chichibu Cement Co. in October 1994 to become
Chichibu Onoda Cement Corp., which merged with Nihon Cement Co. in
October 1998 to create Japan's largest cement company, Taiheiyo Cement.

Officials at Taiheiyo Cement's public relations department said they
cannot comment on the suit because they do not know its contents.

Other South Korean-Americans who were forced into labor by Japanese
companies during the war are expected to join the suit, judicial sources
said. (Japan Weekly Monitor 10-11-1999. This is the full text: Copyright
1999 Kyodo News International, Inc.)


PRUDENTIAL, ARTHUR ANDERSEN: Milberg Files Securities Suit In Maryland
----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Following is an Announcement by the Law Firm of Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP:

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff Ken Recupito filed a class action
lawsuit against Prudential Securities Inc. ("Prudential") and Arthur
Andersen LLP ("AA") on September 30, 1999, in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland, on behalf of all persons who
purchased or otherwise acquired the common stock of Criimi Mae Inc.
(NYSE: CMM), in an offering pursuant to a registration statement dated
October 21, 1997, including a prospectus dated January 20, 1998 and
supplemented on January 23, 1998 (the "Prospectus").

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions concerning this
notice or your rights or interests with respect to these matters, or if
you wish to obtain a copy of the complaint, please contact, at Milberg
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach ("Milberg Weiss"), Paul Young or Bruce
Bernstein at One Pennsylvania Plaza, 49th Floor, New York, New York
10119-0165, by telephone 1-800-320-5081 or via e-mail:
endfraud@mwbhlny.com or visit our website at www.milberg.com.

The Complaint charges Prudential with violations of Sections 11 and
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act"). The
Complaint alleges that Prudential made a series of materially false and
misleading statements in CMI's Registration Statement and Prospectus
regarding trends in the Company's business, including CMI's substantial
investments in commercial mortgage backed securities and the risks
associated with using such Securities as collateral for its investments.

The Complaint further alleges that Prudential, as a seller, offeror,
and/or solicitor of sales of the shares offered pursuant to the
Registration Statement and Prospectus, participated in the preparation
of the materially false and misleading statements contained therein. As
a result of these materially false and misleading statements, plaintiff
alleges that the price of CMI's common stock sold in the offering was
artificially inflated.

The Complaint also charges AA with violating Section 11 of the
Securities Act. The Complaint alleges that AA, CMI's independent auditor
at all relevant times to this litigation, is liable to plaintiff and the
Class because of its certification and consent of the materially false
and misleading financial statements contained in the Company's
Registration Statement and Prospectus. As a result of AA's certification
and consent of the materially false and misleading financial statements,
plaintiff alleges that the price of CMI's common stock was artificially
inflated.

The lawsuit filed is related to a class action captioned In re Criimi
Mae Inc. Securities Litigation, Master File No. DKC 98-3373, in which an
Amended and Consolidated Class Action Complaint was filed in the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland on April 23, 1999. In
that action, the complaint charged individuals who had been officers of
CMI for violations of Sections 10(B), 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. Proposed
co-lead counsel in that action are Abbey, Gardy & Squitieri, LLP, Cohen,
Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C., Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach LLP, and Weiss & Yourman.

Plaintiff is represented by Milberg Weiss, among others. If you are a
member of the class described above you may, not later than sixty days
from September 30, 1999, move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff of
the class, if you so choose. In order to serve as lead plaintiff,
however, you must meet certain legal requirements. CONTACT: Milberg
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP Shareholder Relations Dept. E-Mail:
endfraud@mwbhlny.com 1-800-320-5081 TICKERS: NYSE:CMM


RAYTHEON COMPANY: Cohen, Milstein Announces Securities Suit In MA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The following Notice is issued by the law firm of Cohen, Milstein,
Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C. on behalf of its client, who on Oct. 15, 1999,
filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts on behalf of purchasers of the common stock of Raytheon
Company (NYSE:RTNa and RTNb) during the period of Aug. 18, 1999 through
and including Oct, 11, 1999.

The complaint charges that Raytheon and certain officers and directors
of the company during the relevant time period violated federal
securities laws, by, among other things, misrepresenting and failing to
disclose material information concerning the company's operations and
misled investors about the size of its restructuring charge, cost
overruns and delays in certain defense contracts as well as its
statements about expected 1999 financial results.

If you are a member of the Class who purchased Raytheon common stock
between Aug. 18, 1999 and Oct. 11, 1999, you may move the Court, not
later than sixty (60) days from Oct. 14, 1999, to serve as lead
plaintiff for the Class. In order to serve as lead plaintiff, you must
meet certain legal standards. CONTACT: Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll,
P.L.L.C. Andrew N. Friedman or Robert Smits, 888/240-0775 Fax,
202/408-4699 afriedman@cmht.com or rsmits@cmht.com TICKERS: NYSE:RTNa
NYSE:RTNb


STARNET COMMUNICATIONS: Bernstein Litowitz Files Dela. Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------------
The following is an announcement by the law firm of Bernstein Litowitz
Berger & Grossmann LLP

Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(I), Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossmann LLP hereby gives notice that on October 15, 1999, a class
action lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware on behalf of purchasers of the common stock of
Starnet Communications International, Inc. (NASD Over- the-Counter
Bulletin Board:SNMM), from March 11, 1999 through August 20, 1999,
inclusive.

The complaint charges Starnet, and certain of its officers and
directors, with violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as well as SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

Specifically, the complaint alleges that, during the Class Period,
Starnet issued materially false and misleading statements concerning the
nature of the Company's business, and concealed potential liabilities
stemming from its operations. While issuing these materially false and
misleading statements, several top officers and directors of the Company
sold thousands of shares of Starnet common stock to the public, reaping
millions of dollars in proceeds from these sales while in possession of
material adverse, undisclosed information. Following the disclosure of
the true status of the Company's business, the price of Starnet common
stock plummeted by approximately 69% from its closing price of $ 13 1/8
per share on August 19, to close at $ 4 1/16 per share on August 20.

Plaintiff is represented by the law firm of Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossmann LLP ("Bernstein Litowitz"). If you are a member of the Class
described above, you may, not later than 60 days from the date of this
notice, move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff for the class, if you
so choose. In order to serve as lead plaintiff, however, you must meet
certain legal requirements. CONTACT: Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossmann LLP Ava C. Thorin 212/554-1429 TICKERS: NASD:SNMM


SUN HEALTHCARE: Files For Bankruptcy
------------------------------------
If you have an interest in chapter 11 filings by Sun Healthcare Group,
Inc., and its 183 debtor affiliates, you can pick-up a free copy of the
first issue of SUN HEALTHCARE BANKRUPTCY NEWS, posted at
http://www.bankrupt.com/sunhealthcare.txt


SUPERIOR COURT: CA Ap Ct Oks Classwide Arbitration In Blue Cross Case
---------------------------------------------------------------------
A recent California appeals court decision in the case of Blue Cross of
California vs Superior Court, the court ruled that the Federal
Arbitration Act, which covers most commercial disputes that are subject
to arbitration, does not preempt the state's case law that lets the
court certify classes for arbitration.

A recent California appeals court decision in the case of Blue Cross of
California vs Superior Court, the court ruled that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), which covers most commercial disputes that are
subject to arbitration, does not preempt the state's case law that lets
the court certify classes for arbitration. The result of this decision
is that courts in California may order classwide arbitration unless the
parties' agreement specifically prohibits it. However, this decision is
inconsistent with part of the FAA, which allows courts to enforce
arbitration agreements only in accord with terms of the agreement. In
this instance Blue Cross never agreed to arbitrate disputes with its
health plan subscribers as a class. In fact, the medical insurer's
contract cited by each claimant required dispute arbitration of disputes
that arose from the contract, not of all similar disputes raised by
other health plan subscribers. The Blue Cross decision may encourage
plaintiffs elsewhere to seek class treatment in arbitration suits, and
this could eventually trigger the need for resolution by the Supreme
Court. Further, this decision may make businesses less willing to enter
into arbitration agreements at all, particularly those involving
consumers.

                  Keep Class Actions Out of Arbitration
                          by Jeffrey W. Sarles

Arbitration has become an enormously popular means of resolving disputes
because it generally is faster, cheaper, and less complicated than
litigation. But unless the courts leave it alone, arbitration soon will
look an awful lot like litigation.

One of the features of arbitration that has made it so attractive to so
many commercial parties is the opportunity to resolve contractual
disputes individually. This one-on-one process underlies the efficiency
of arbitral dispute resolution and avoids the risk of company-breaking
awards based on the aggregated claims of numerous claimants.

A recent California appellate court ruling threatens these benefits. In
Blue Cross of Cal. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 779 (App. 1998),
review denied Jan. 13, 1999, the court held that the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA), which governs most commercial disputes subject to
arbitration, does not preempt California case law authorizing courts to
certify classes for arbitration. Blue Cross is the first decision by a
state or federal court that holds such classwide treatment consistent
with the FAA.

The impact of the Blue Cross decision is that California courts now may
order classwide arbitration unless the agreement of the parties
expressly prohibits it. Thus, if the statutory standards for class
certification are met, the trial court in Blue Cross may certify a class
of arbitration claimants to bring all their claims, which challenge the
lawfulness of exclusions in Blue Cross health plans, in one arbitral
proceeding.

The ruling in Blue Cross appears flatly inconsistent with Section 4 of
the FAA, which authorizes courts to enforce arbitration agreements only
"in accordance with the terms of the agreement" between the parties.
Blue Cross never agreed to arbitrate disputes with its health plan
subscribers on a classwide basis. To the contrary, the contract invoked
by each of the claimants mandated arbitration of disputes arising out of
that contract - not of all similar disputes raised by other health plan
subscribers.

The decision in Blue Cross conflicts with the conclusions of the few
federal courts that have addressed the issue of classwide treatment of
arbitration claims. The Seventh Circuit ruled that a court may not order
classwide arbitration unless the applicable agreements authorize it,
because doing so would "disrupt" the parties' "negotiated risk/benefit
allocation" and direct "a different sort of arbitration." Champ v.
Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 275 (1995). The California decision
likely will embolden plaintiffs in other jurisdictions to seek classwide
treatment of arbitrable disputes, and a continuing divergence of views
may ultimately require Supreme Court resolution.

Clearly, the stakes are high. The California ruling permits plaintiffs
to aggregate their small individual claims and threaten an award of
enormous classwide damages from a single arbitral decisionmaker. The
exceedingly limited and narrow judicial review of arbitration awards
makes such an outcome considerably more troubling that in judicial
litigation, which offers the protection of searching review on appeal.
Thus, the threat of classwide arbitration is even more likely than in
the judicial arena to unduly pressure defendants into settling meritless
claims.

Moreover, the removal of protection against classwide arbitrations will
tend to make businesses wary about entering into arbitration agreements
at all, especially with consumers. A backslide away from arbitration and
a renewed turn toward traditional litigation of consumer disputes will
prove costly both to businesses and consumers.

Contracting parties still can protect against the danger of arbitral
class actions by expressly precluding such class treatment in their
arbitration agreements. But given the widespread use of "generic"
arbitration clauses in commercial contracts, such express preclusion is
unlikely to become widespread.

What is needed is a recognition by the courts that arbitration is
different from litigation and should remain so. Illinois courts, for
example, unlike their federal counterparts, refuse to uphold punitive
damages awards by arbitrators unless the parties' agreement expressly
authorized the arbitrator to award such damages. See Ryan v. Kontrick,
1999 WL 167522 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. Mar. 26, 1999). Commercial parties
have been flocking to arbitration both to reduce costs and to reduce the
risk of runaway juries, exorbitant punitive damages, and - perhaps the
scariest feature of litigation - class actions that threaten enormous
payouts to thousands or even millions of plaintiffs. The courts should
respect agreements to arbitrate and avoid these risks. They should not
blight the arbitration landscape with the worst features of litigation.
(Business and Management Practices, Mondaq Business Briefing - Mayer,
Brown & Platt, US, September 16, 1999)


TOWNE SERVICES: Bernstein Litowitz Files Securities Suit In Georgia
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The following is an announcement by the law firm of Bernstein Litowitz
Berger & Grossmann LLP:

Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 77z-1(a)(3)(A)(I), Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossmann LLP hereby gives notice that on October 12, 1999, a class
action lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia on behalf of purchasers of the common stock
of Towne Services, Inc., pursuant to the Company's secondary public
offering of common stock (the "Offering") on or about June 23, 1999.

The complaint charges Towne and certain of its officers and directors
with violations of Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933.
Specifically, the complaint alleges that the prospectus and registration
statement for the Offering, declared effective on June 23, 1999,
contained material omissions relating to problems that the Company had
experienced immediately prior to the Offering in transferring its
corporate headquarters and customer management and data processing
facilities to a new location in Georgia.

Plaintiff is represented by the law firm of Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossmann LLP, and the Law Offices of Bruce G. Murphy. If you are a
member of the Class described above, you may, not later than 60 days
from the date of this notice, move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff
for the class, if you so choose. In order to serve as lead plaintiff,
however, you must meet certain legal requirements. CONTACT: Bernstein
Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP Ava C. Thorin, (212) 554-1429


WINN-DIXIE: Fla. Grocery Chain To Settle Employees Race And Gender Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
It will be a few days yet, while a federal judge sorts through the
paperwork, before Winn-Dixie Stores employees know the timetable for
processing a class-action settlement filed on their behalf.

Lawyers for the Jacksonville-based grocery store chain and 13 present
and former employees laid out a proposed $33 million settlement for U.S.
District Judge Ralph Nimmons Jr. It would resolve claims of unfair
treatment based on race and gender.

The settlement includes a 135-day timetable under which Nimmons would
approve the case as a class action, approve a settlement on a
preliminary basis while information was sent to current and former
employees, then hold a final hearing to approve the settlement, maybe
sometime in mid-December.

"These are matters I will want to peruse, " Nimmons said. He said he
would " issue an order as soon as possible."

The litigation in the case dates to 1996 in Alabama. It was moved to
Winn-Dixie's home base when lawyers for the 13 plaintiffs filed suit in
federal district court. The proposed settlement, worked out ahead of
time with Winn-Dixie's lawyers, was filed at the same time.

As many as 50,000 current and former Winn-Dixie employees could be
affected by the settlement.  (The Florida Times-Union)


* AAIA Sends Letters To State Policymakers Upon Ct Ruling On State Farm
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Automotive Aftermarket Industry Association (AAIA) cautioned state
policymakers not to overreact to the Illinois court verdict against
State Farm Insurance Company and offered to draft model pro-consumer
legislation.

In a letter to more than 1,000 state legislative leaders and members of
insurance committees in all 50 states, AAIA president Gene Gardner
addressed the recent Illinois court verdict by outlining the
association's position on crash parts. "State policymakers need to see
what can be learned from the trail deliberations. The primary lesson
learned here is that greater disclosure to consumers serves the public
by creating a fairer and more competitive marketplace in the crash
repair industry."

AAIA is the trade association for 2,700 member companies who
manufacture, distribute and sell motor vehicle parts, accessories,
tools, equipment, materials and supplies. In his letter to state
legislators, Gardner explained that AAIA-member companies support
greater consumer awareness through disclosure.

"The availability of independently produced replacement parts by the
aftermarket has helped control the rising cost of vehicle service, crash
repair and ultimately, insurance rates," said Gardner.

AAIA supports the following disclosures regarding crash parts:

Insurance companies should disclose to policyholders, at the time they
purchase their policies, the extent of coverage and the options provided
by those policies regarding the type of replacement sheet metal parts,
whether made by the vehicle manufacturer or an aftermarket manufacturer,
that will be used in the repair of covered damages.

Prior to repair of a vehicle, autobody shops should disclose to the
vehicle owner the identity of the manufacturer of any part, and all
applicable warranties for that part, that will be used in the repair of
the damaged vehicle.

"Through disclosure, consumers will be given greater choice. And by
choice we mean that the car owner should be able to choose the
appropriately priced crash part based on their vehicle's age, value and
condition," said Gardner.

"As our industry has grown, consumers have voted for competition with
their wallets, patronizing the independent aftermarket three-to-one over
the car companies and their franchised dealers. The availability of
independently produced replacement parts has helped control the rising
cost of vehicle service, crash repair, and ultimately, insurance rates,"
said Gardner.

               Facts About The Automotive Aftermarket

The following definitions have been prepared by the Automotive
Aftermarket Industry Association (AAIA) to help clarify terminology used
in news reports about the recent Illinois class action court decision
against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. This information
is intended to help dispel some misconceptions about the aftermarket as
a result of the extensive coverage of this court case.

                      Automotive Aftermarket

The automotive aftermarket encompasses every product and service for
maintaining, repairing, accessorizing and customizing a motor vehicle
once it leaves the assembly line. Included are replacement parts,
accessories, lubricants, fuel, tools and equipment, tires, appearance
products and repairs. The aftermarket is an integrated network of mostly
independent, privately-owned companies that manufacture, remanufacture,
distribute, retail and install parts and products for consumers. OE
Parts: Original equipment parts are parts manufactured by or for the
company that builds the original motor vehicle. Non-OE Parts: These
parts, also known as aftermarket parts, are manufactured by companies
other than the original carmaker. Many companies produce parts for car
companies, but also sell parts under their own brand name in the
aftermarket. Crash Parts: Exterior sheet metal parts or "outer shell"
body parts used to replace parts damaged in collisions, such as hoods,
fenders, doors, and trunk lids.

Automotive Aftermarket Statistics U.S. motor vehicle aftermarket retail
sales are $264 billion in 1999. Crash parts sales are less than 2
percent of this number, or approximately $5 billion. Original equipment
crash parts sales comprise about 75 percent of total crash parts sales.
Recycled and salvaged parts account for 10 percent. Aftermarket crash
parts account for the remaining 15 percent. Aftermarket crash parts
typically cost from 20 to 65 percent less than original equipment parts.

                               *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by Bankruptcy
Creditors' Service, Inc., Princeton, NJ, and Beard Group, Inc.,
Washington, DC.  Theresa Cheuk and Peter A. Chapman, editors.

Copyright 1999.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be
reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $575 for six months delivered via e-mail.

Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the
term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are $25 each.  For
subscription information, contact Christopher Beard at 301/951-6400.


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