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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     A S I A   P A C I F I C

          Friday, June 12, 2020, Vol. 23, No. 118

                           Headlines



A U S T R A L I A

BULKBUILD PTY: Second Creditors' Meeting Set for June 19
EDGE HOLDINGS: KPMG Appointed as Administrators
ISLAND RESORTS: Second Creditors' Meeting Set for June 18
MYHOUSE: Global Retail Brands Buys Firm Out of Administration
VIRGIN AUSTRALIA: Experts Warn Bondholders 'Will Get Nothing'

VIRGIN AUSTRALIA: To Double Domestic Flying as it Seeks Cash Boost


C H I N A

CHINA VAST: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' LT ICR
HUAI'AN TRAFFIC: Fitch Affirms BB LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
KANGDE XIN: Founder Faces New Probe Over Bond Disclosure Breaches
LUCKIN COFFEE: Court Freezes Founder's Stake in Limousine Business
MGM CHINA: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to New $500MM Unsec. Notes

RADIANCE GROUP: S&P Rates USD Senior Unsecured Notes 'B-'
SINIC HOLDINGS: Fitch Assigns B+ Rating to New USD Sr. Notes
SINIC HOLDINGS: Moody's Assigns B2 CFR, Outlook Stable
SINIC HOLDINGS: S&P Assigns 'B' Long-Term ICR, Outlook Stable
ZHANGZHOU TRANSPORTATION: Fitch Affirms LT IDRs at 'BB+'



I N D I A

4S SPINTEX: Ind-Ra Moves 'B+' LT Issuer Rating to Non-Cooperating
ABDUL JALEEL: CRISIL Migrates B Debt Ratings from Not Cooperating
BHAARATHI SPINTEX: Ind-Ra Moves 'BB+' LT Rating to Non-Cooperating
BHAGYODAYA TROKHOS: CRISIL Moves D Debt Ratings to Not Coop.
BHAIRAVNATH HITECH: CRISIL Moves 'B' Debt Ratings to Not Coop.

CAIRN INDIA: Fitch Places B+ LT IDR on Rating Watch Negative
CHAKKRA COAL: CRISIL Migrates B Debt Rating to Not Cooperating
DEWA PROJECTS: CRISIL Keeps 'D' Debt Ratings in Not Cooperating
DHANASHREE AGRO: CRISIL Moves D Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating
J-MARKS EXIM: Insolvency Resolution Process Case Summary

KAMTANATH FOOD: CRISIL Keeps B+ Debt Ratings in Not Cooperating
MHETRE FOODS: CRISIL Migrates D Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating
N.S. CASHEW: CRISIL Lowers Rating on INR2.5cr Cash Loan to B+
NEESARG MOTORS: CRISIL Moves B+ INR6.25cr Debt Rating to Not Coop.
NEESARG MOTORS: CRISIL Moves B+ INR6.25cr Debt to Not Coop.

PRIMO AUTOMATION: CRISIL Moves B+ Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating
PRINCE CONSTRUCTION: CRISIL Hikes Rating on INR4.60cr Loan to B+
REGAL TRADING: Ind-Ra Moves BB+ LT Issuer Rating to Non-Cooperating
S.S. CONSTRUCTIONS: CRISIL Moves B- Debt Rating to Not Coop.
SARASWATI VEHICLES: CRISIL Moves B+ Debt Ratings to Not Coop.

SARVESH RICE: CRISIL Keeps 'D' Debt Ratings in Not Cooperating
SATYA EXPORTS: CRISIL Migrates B+ Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating
SHREEJI FOODS: CRISIL Lowers Rating on INR16cr Loan to 'B+'
SHRI SHANKAR SAHAKARI: CRISIL Keeps D Debt Rating in Not Coop.
SHRI SWAMI SAMARTH: CRISIL Moves B Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating

SRI SAI SRINIVASA: CRISIL Moves B Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating
STRONG BONDS: CRISIL Migrates B+ Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating
SUBHANI SEEDS: CRISIL Migrates B+ Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating
SUN-TECH TRANSFORMERS: CRISIL Moves B Debt Ratings to Not Coop.
SUPREME PACKERS: CRISIL Assigns 'B' Rating to INR1.5cr Loan

SWASTIC INDUSTRIES: CRISIL Cuts Rating on INR6.50cr Loan to B+
TAIKO PLASTIC: CRISIL Migrates B Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating
TIRUMALA AUTOMOTIVES: CRISIL Moves B+ Debt Ratings to Not Coop.
UHK MANPOWER: CRISIL Migrates B+ Debt Rating to Not Cooperating
XL LABORATORIES: CRISIL Lowers Rating on INR6.0cr Loan to B+

YUGA BUILDERS: CRISIL Keeps 'B Debt Rating in Not Cooperating


I N D O N E S I A

GARUDA INDONESIA: Narrowly Avoided Default w/ $500M Bond Extension


J A P A N

MITSUI E&S: Egan-Jones Lowers FC Senior Unsecured Rating to CCC
TOKYO ELECTRIC: Egan-Jones Lowers Senior Unsecured Ratings to BB
UNITIKA LTD: Egan-Jones Lowers Senior Unsecured Ratings to CCC+


M A C A U

MGM CHINA: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to New Senior Notes Due 2025


N E W   Z E A L A N D

ANTARES RESTAURANT: BK Failed Under Debt Weight, Low Profit Margins


S I N G A P O R E

HYFLUX LTD: Lenders Seek to Put Firm Under Judicial Management


S R I   L A N K A

BIMPUTH FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Nat'l LT Rating to B+(lka), Outlook Neg
IDEAL FINANCE: Fitch Upgrades National LT Rating to BB-(lka)


T H A I L A N D

THAI AIRWAYS: Rehabilitation May Take Up to 7 years, Advisor Says

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A U S T R A L I A
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BULKBUILD PTY: Second Creditors' Meeting Set for June 19
--------------------------------------------------------
A second meeting of creditors in the proceedings of Bulkbuild Pty
Ltd has been set for June 19, 2020, at 10:30 a.m. at the offices of
Hall Chadwick Chartered Accountants, Level 4, at 240 Queen Street,
in Brisbane, Queensland.  

The purpose of the meeting is (1) to receive the report by the
Administrator about the business, property, affairs and financial
circumstances of the Company; and (2) for the creditors of the
Company to resolve whether the Company will execute a deed of
company arrangement, the administration should end, or the Company
be wound up.

Creditors wishing to attend are advised proofs and proxies should
be submitted to the Administrator by June 18, 2020, at 5:00 p.m.

Marcus Watters and Ginette Muller of Hall Chadwick were appointed
as administrators of Bulkbuild Pty on June 4, 2020.

EDGE HOLDINGS: KPMG Appointed as Administrators
-----------------------------------------------
Hayden Leigh White and Thomas Donald Birch of KPMG were appointed
as administrators of Edge Holdings No 7 Pty Ltd on June 10, 2020.

ISLAND RESORTS: Second Creditors' Meeting Set for June 18
---------------------------------------------------------
A second meeting of creditors in the proceedings of Island Resorts
Pty Ltd has been set for June 18, 2020, at 2:30 p.m. via
teleconference.

The purpose of the meeting is (1) to receive the report by the
Administrator about the business, property, affairs and financial
circumstances of the Company; and (2) for the creditors of the
Company to resolve whether the Company will execute a deed of
company arrangement, the administration should end, or the Company
be wound up.

Creditors wishing to attend are advised proofs and proxies should
be submitted to the Administrator by June 17, 2020, at 4:00 p.m.

Glenn Thomas O'Kearney of GT Advisory & Consulting was appointed as
administrator of Island Resorts on May 14, 2020.

MYHOUSE: Global Retail Brands Buys Firm Out of Administration
-------------------------------------------------------------
Heather McIlvaine at Inside Retail reports that Global Retail
Brands has added another homewares brand to its portfolio with the
acquisition of 60-year-old retail chain MyHouse, which was placed
into voluntary administration in March.

The cost of the deal was not disclosed, the report notes. It
includes the MyHouse brand, intellectual property, online store and
stock, as well as 23 physical stores that are still trading.

According to Inside Retail, Global Retail Brands plans to reopen 11
of the 13 MyHouse stores closed by administrators later this month
and offer full-time, part-time and casual employment to around 250
MyHouse staff.

"We’re looking forward to re-opening MyHouse stores today and
helping many team members get back to what they do best –
providing great service to MyHouse customers," the report quotes
Steven Lew, Global Retail Brands’ executive chairman, as saying
in a statement about the acquisition.

Started in 1956, MyHouse built a reputation for offering great
value bed linen, bedding, bath towels and home decor. But recently,
it struggled to keep up with higher fixed costs and increased
competition in the online shopping space, Inside Retail states.

Inside Retail relates that attempts at cost-cutting over the past
12 months proved unsuccessful, and with the added challenge of
social distancing restrictions during the global coronavirus
pandemic, the company decided to appoint administrators on March
19.

But now, following its acquisition by Global Retail Brands, the
NSW-based MyHouse business may be set for expansion.

According to the report, Mr. Lew said he sees potential to add an
additional 25 stores nationally this calendar year, should the
right store locations and rental opportunities present themselves.

He is also looking to review and expand the MyHouse product and
category ranges and targeting 50 per cent online penetration.

"We look forward to bringing the business back to life by investing
in the brand, the team, the online experience and the store
network," the report quotes Mr. Lew as saying.

Global Retail Brands owns and operates a network of 180 stores and
online platforms across a number of homewares brands, including
House in Australia and the UK, Robins Kitchen, Baccarat, Your Home
Depot, PetHouse and The Custom Chef.

MyHouse is a linen, bathroom and homewares retailer.  Michael
Brereton and Sean Wengel of William Buck were appointed as
administrators of MyHouse (Aust) on March 19, 2020.

VIRGIN AUSTRALIA: Experts Warn Bondholders 'Will Get Nothing'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Patrick Hatch at The Sydney Morning Herald reports that bondholders
risk walking away from a Virgin Australia fire sale empty handed,
with aviation restructuring experts predicting the airline's new
owner will leave nothing on the table for institutions and hundreds
of "mum and dad" investors.

According to the Herald, the dire warning for holders of AUD2
billion worth of Virgin's unsecured debt came as the airline's
administrator Deloitte told the Morrison government that more
financial support was needed to ensure the sale process did not
fail, including an extension of the JobKeeper program.

The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age can reveal an attempt to
rally unsecured creditors together around a plan to preserve their
interest in the business has been wound up after it failed to
attract creditors or Deloitte to its cause.

The Herald says the Australia Connected Aviation Partners (ACAP)
consortium was brought together by Sydney-based corporate
leadership firm Spiique, and wanted to develop a "plan B" that
creditors could fall back on if the package Deloitte put forward in
August was unacceptable or fell over.

The Herald relates that Spiique co-founder David Hewish said the
group was concerned all the value in Virgin - and the upside from a
future recovery -- would be handed over to its new investors.

"Our suggestion was to do something to create an alternative -- to
fix the business plan with the support of the stakeholders and then
compare that with whatever the sale process creates," the Herald
quotes Mr. Hewish, a restructuring veteran formerly with EY and
KordaMentha, as saying.  "It would have created a floor that was an
alternative to liquidation."

According to the Herald, ACAP's proposal included bondholders
converting their debt to equity in the company, rolling it over
into a recapitalised business or taking a cash dividend. Virgin
could have been sold at a later date - and for a better price --
once the business had been more comprehensively restructured.

ACAP had the financial backing of wealthy American entrepreneur and
venture capitalist Augie Fabela, who co-founded the NASDAQ-listed
telecommunications group VEON, and recruited executives, including
former Aer Lingus CEO Dermot Mannion and former AMP Bank CEO Sally
Bruce to its team, the report states.

But ACAP wound down on June 9 after failing to attract interest
from larger creditors and being denied access to the sale process
by Deloitte because it did not have secured funding, the Herald
relays.

According to the Herald, Mr. Hewish said he spoke to several
institutional bondholders who were "preparing for the worst" and
were resigned to the fact they will not recover any of the money
they are owed.

"The most likely outcome is . . . there will be nothing for
distribution to the creditors," the report quotes Mr. Hewish as
saying.   

"It feels like a AUD1 deal because there’s too many balls in the
air -- what are the [wage agreements] going to be for the staff,
what are the leasing arrangements going to be for the leased
aircraft.

"I just can’t see how anyone could convince their investment
committee to handover a couple of hundred million dollars to be
distributed to the former creditors."

Virgin's bondholders include large institutional investors as well
as hundreds of "mum and dad" retail investors, many of whom bought
in as recently as November, when Virgin raised AUD900 million to
take back full ownership of its frequent flyer business, the report
discloses.

Sydney based advisory Faraday is trying to organise Virgin's
bondholders. But having "meekly stood by the sidelines and done
nothing", Mr. Hewish said bondholders would have to either accept
Deloitte's deal or let Virgin go into liquidation, the report
relays.

Separately, Deloitte wrote to the government on June 9 asking it to
extend the Jobkeeper wage subsidy for airlines to give Virgin's
shortlisted suitors -- Bain Capital and Cyrus Capital Partners --
confidence to make binding bids. It also asked for a consumer
ticket guarantee to give the public confidence in the airline,
which collapsed in April owing AUD6.8 billion.

The Herald says Bain and Cyrus have until June 22 to lodge binding
bids and Deloitte will put a preferred rescue package to a
creditors' vote in mid-August. There is growing concern among
bondholders about how much of their investment they will recover.

                       About Virgin Australia

Brisbane, Queensland-based Virgin Australia is Australia's
second-largest airline. It commenced services in 2000 as Virgin
Blue, wholly owned by the Virgin Group.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Asia Pacific on April
22, 2020, Bloomberg News related that Virgin Australia Holdings
Ltd. became Asia's first airline to fall to the coronavirus after
the outbreak deprived the debt-burdened company of almost all
income.  Administrators at Deloitte, who have taken control of the
Brisbane-based carrier, aim to restructure the business and find
new owners within months.  More than 10 parties have expressed an
interest, Deloitte related on April 21.  

Virgin Australia, which has furloughed 80% of its 10,000 workers,
will continue to operate some flights for essential workers,
freight and the repatriation of Australians, Bloomberg said. The
airline's frequent flyer program is a separate company and is not
in administration.

Richard John Hughes, John Greig, Vaughan Strawbridge and Sal Algeri
of Deloitte were appointed as administrators of Virgin Australia,
et al., on April 20, 2020.

The company owes AUD6.8 billion to lenders, bondholders, aircraft
lessors, trade creditors and employees.

On April 29, 2020, the company and certain affiliates filed
petitions pursuant to Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York.

VIRGIN AUSTRALIA: To Double Domestic Flying as it Seeks Cash Boost
------------------------------------------------------------------
Patrick Hatch at The Sydney Morning Herald reports that Virgin
Australia will double its bare-bones domestic capacity over the
next month as travel demand starts to recover from the COVID-19
pandemic, allowing the collapsed airline to start generating cash
again while its administrators try to sell the business.

According to the Herald, Virgin is currently operating at 6 per
cent of its pre-pandemic capacity, or 76 return flights a week, and
said on June 11 it would gradually increase that to 13 per cent, or
160 flights a week, by early July.

The Herald relates that the airline joins Qantas in ramping up its
flying as COVID-19 travel restrictions ease, with the larger rival
flagging its capacity could hit 40 per cent by late July if state
borders open.

Virgin went into voluntary administration in April owing AUD6.8
billion and there have been concerns about whether it has enough
money to avoid going into liquidation before a new owner is
installed, the report notes.

Its administrators Deloitte said in May that Virgin had AUD100
million remaining which would run out by the end of June, the
Herald recalls. Returning planes to the skies and selling tickets
will help to slow Virgin's cash burn and also enable it to get some
of its 8,000 stood down employees back to work.

A Virgin spokesman said the airline had "worked with the
administrators to identify profitable routes whereby we can
continue flying during the administration process," the Herald
relays.

Some flights are being underwritten by the federal government's
Domestic Aviation Network Program, which was extended over the
weekend, he said.

Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia are yet
to say when they will open their borders, despite the urging of
Prime Minister Scott Morrison, who wants interstate travel to
resume in July for the sake of the tourism industry and the broader
economy, the report says.

Two shortlisted bidders -- Bain Capital and Cyrus Capital Partners
-- have until June 22 to make binding offers for Virgin, and
Deloitte will present one of those to a vote of creditors in
mid-August, the report notes.

                      About Virgin Australia

Brisbane, Queensland-based Virgin Australia is Australia's
second-largest airline. It commenced services in 2000 as Virgin
Blue, wholly owned by the Virgin Group.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Asia Pacific on April
22, 2020, Bloomberg News related that Virgin Australia Holdings
Ltd. became Asia's first airline to fall to the coronavirus after
the outbreak deprived the debt-burdened company of almost all
income.  Administrators at Deloitte, who have taken control of the
Brisbane-based carrier, aim to restructure the business and find
new owners within months.  More than 10 parties have expressed an
interest, Deloitte related on April 21.  

Virgin Australia, which has furloughed 80% of its 10,000 workers,
will continue to operate some flights for essential workers,
freight and the repatriation of Australians, Bloomberg said. The
airline's frequent flyer program is a separate company and is not
in administration.

Richard John Hughes, John Greig, Vaughan Strawbridge and Sal Algeri
of Deloitte were appointed as administrators of Virgin Australia,
et al., on April 20, 2020.

The company owes AUD6.8 billion to lenders, bondholders, aircraft
lessors, trade creditors and employees.

On April 29, 2020, the company and certain affiliates filed
petitions pursuant to Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York.



=========
C H I N A
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CHINA VAST: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' LT ICR
-------------------------------------------------------------
On June 10, 2020, S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on China
VAST Industrial Urban Development Co. Ltd. to stable from positive.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' long-term issuer credit
rating on VAST and its 'B-' long-term issue rating on the company's
outstanding senior unsecured notes.

S&P said, "We revised the outlook on VAST to stable from positive
to reflect a slowdown in the company's diversification progress and
development of industrial parks besides Longhe. This is because the
company is focusing on conserving cash flow amid the current
economic headwinds.

"In our view, VAST's revenue and cash flows from parks excluding
Longhe are unlikely to grow significantly over the next two years
because the company is reducing investments in other regions". At
present, VAST has 10 industrial parks under planning and operation,
of which Longhe is the core revenue contributor. VAST has a 50-year
contract with the local government of Langfang city, Hebei
province, for Longhe and exclusive development rights to 80% of
residential and commercial land sales inside the park.

For other parks contracted more recently, VAST does not have such
revenue-sharing agreements and derives most of its revenue and cash
flow in the form of "cost-plus" government rebates on investments
for primary land development. Therefore, future revenue and cash
flow on these projects will be correlated to current land
development spending. Moreover, government rebates typically have
an extended cash collection cycle.

VAST's reliance and concentration risk on Longhe is unlikely to
significantly improve over the next two years. Land development
revenue from newer parks is likely to contribute less than 20% of
the segment revenue. VAST has started slowing down primary
development and infrastructure investments in newer parks since
2019 and is likely to suppress these further in 2020 and 2021. In
2019, land development revenue from parks except Longhe was only
about one-third of that of 2018. Segment contribution from those
newer parks declined to 13%, from 33% in 2018.

The concentration risk will continue to constrain the rating on
VAST. In 2015-2016, when the government suspended all land sales at
Longhe during the finalization of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei
integrated development plan, the company's revenue and EBITDA
contracted by more than 40%.

S&P said, "We expect VAST to lay more emphasis on expanding its
industry development services in newer parks. This segment
generates revenue by attracting business investments and receives a
portion of the investment consideration from local governments as
rebates. The industry development services business is much less
capital intensive and has significantly higher margins. However, it
will take time to scale up. In 2019, revenue contribution from this
segment was less than 1%, and we expect it to stay less than 5%
over the next two years even with strong growth.

"We believe Longhe will continue to contribute significantly to
VAST's operations and cash flow. We estimate the park's
contribution to total land development revenue will increase to
above 90% for 2020 and 2021, from 87% in 2019. This is based on our
expectation that Longhe's land sales revenue will exceed Chinese
renminbi (RMB) 2.5 billion in 2020, from RMB 1.95 billion in 2019.
We envisage a significant improvement in Longhe's land sales in
2020, partly owing to a delay in auctions originally slated for the
end of 2019 as well as an increase in land supply in the second
half of 2020.

"The reducing contribution of low-margin land development revenue
from newer parks has improved VAST's overall profitability, in our
view. We expect the company's EBITDA margin to gradually rise to
more than 60% in 2020 and 2021, compared with 59% in 2019 and 52%
in 2018. VAST's non-core parks typically command a thin gross
margin of 15%-20% owing to their "cost-plus" model, whereas Longhe
maintains a margin of more than 70%.

"We believe VAST's property development business remains a useful
supplement to the company's revenues and cash flow. However, given
the small number of projects and concentration in Langfang, cash
collection from this segment is inherently lumpy and subject to
local policy risks. We expect flat property revenue booking in 2020
owing to limited contracted sales in 2018 and 2019. Revenue from
this segment is likely to be less than 10% of the total in 2020 and
2021. We expect an uptick of contracted sales in 2020 and 2021
because VAST plans sizable new project launches and due to looser
policy restrictions in Langfang. However, fluctuations in sales
execution and lumpy cash collection will likely continue.

"VAST will likely continue to enlarge its positive operating cash
flow over the next 12-18 months underpinned by the solid
performance at Longhe. We expect the company to keep debt growth
under control. We believe net positive operating cash flow from
Longhe will continue to expand, supported by the project's short
cash collection cycle of about two to three months after land
auction sales by the government. Therefore we expect VAST's
leverage (debt-to-EBITDA ratio) to improve to 3.5x-3.7x in 2020-21,
from about 4.0x in 2019, with total debt staying at RMB7
billion-RMB7.5 billion in 2020-2021.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that VAST will
continue to generate positive operating cash flow helped by solid
performance of Longhe, and mildly improve leverage over the next
12-18 months.

"The outlook also reflects our view that the company will slow down
investments in non-Longhe parks to conserve cash outflow and
control debt growth.

"We believe VAST has a good degree of downside buffer. However, we
could lower the rating if the company cannot maintain positive
operating cash flow and if debt leverage rises above 4.0x for a
prolonged period. This could be due to weaker land and property
sales than we expect. Such a scenario could occur as a result of
weak macroeconomic conditions or policy interference, lengthened
collection periods of trade receivables associated with land
development, or aggressive construction spending or other
investments that significantly increase debt.

"We could upgrade VAST if the company has steady land sales at
Longhe, accelerated cash inflow from other parks, and moderately
expands its other industrial parks to reduce reliance on Longhe.
Indication of such improvement would be: (1) the ratio of debt to
EBITDA staying consistently below 4.0x; and (2) company's
geographical diversification materially improving such that other
industrial parks consistently contribute 25% of EBITDA and
operating cash flow, resulting in sustainably positive operating
cash flow."


HUAI'AN TRAFFIC: Fitch Affirms BB LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Huai'an Traffic Holding Co., Ltd.'s
(HATH) Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings
at 'BB'. The Outlook is Stable.

Fitch has also affirmed HATH's USD300 million 6% notes due 2022 at
'BB'. The bonds are issued directly by HATH and are rated at the
same level as its Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default
Rating.

HATH is based in Huai'an, a city in eastern China. The company,
which is 100% owned by the Huai'an State-owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission, is the municipality's only platform
to fund, invest, construct and maintain transportation
infrastructure such as toll and municipal roads, and bridges. The
company also engages in transportation logistics, commercial
trading and other businesses including restaurant operations,
tourism and advertising.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'Very Strong' Status, Ownership and Control: HATH is registered as
a limited liability company under China's Company Law. Under the
company's current legal status, its major decisions, including M&A,
spin-offs, bankruptcy and liquidation, require verification and
approval from the municipal government. The Huai'an government sets
the course of HATH's strategic development, appoints most of its
senior management, and signs off on its major decisions. Its
financing plan and debt level are also closely monitored by the
municipality. HATH is also required to report its operational and
financial results to the municipality on a regular basis.

'Moderate' Support Track Record and Expectations: The government
mainly supports HATH via annual subsidies, which help to finance
the company's operation of the local airport, tram services and
other transportation facilities. These subsidies are limited
compared with the company's revenue. Transfers and grants were
equivalent to around 9% of revenue in 2019. Assets and capital
injections in 2017, 2018 and 2019 were minimal.

'Moderate' Socio-Political Implications of Default: HATH is the
municipality's only investment and financing platform for
transportation-related infrastructure and its activities include
developing, financing, operating and managing toll roads, airports
and ship locks in Huai'an. However, the essential services can
still be provided even if a default occurs, as there are other
government-related entities or private-sector companies that can
act as substitutes for HATH.

'Strong' Financial Implications of Default: HATH is a frequent
domestic bond issuer and a major borrower from the province's key
state-owned banks. Fitch believes a default by HATH will have
negative consequences for the creditworthiness of Huai'an
municipality, reducing its access to funding from banks and capital
markets. However, HATH's increasing diversification into
construction, trading, logistics, shipping, catering, tourism and
other businesses limit the direct financial implications for
Huai'an municipality in the case of a default.

'b' Standalone Credit Profile: Fitch assesses HATH's revenue
defensibility as 'Weaker' under Fitch's Public Sector,
Revenue-Supported Entities Rating Criteria, based on the demand and
pricing characteristics that influence revenue volatility. Fitch
considers operating risk as 'Midrange', based on the company's
operating profile such as predictability and volatility of costs,
key resource cost risks and HATH's ability to manage cost increases
over time. HATH's financial profile has been characterized by large
capex and high leverage in the past three years with net
debt/EBITDA of around 49x at end-2019. Fitch expects this to
continue in the medium term. However, HATH has strong funding
access to bank loans and capital markets, which mitigates its
refinancing risk.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

An upgrade of Fitch's internal credit view of Huai'an
municipality's ability to provide subsidies, grants or other
legitimate resources allowed under China's policies and
regulations, as well as an increase in incentives for the
municipality to provide support to HATH, including stronger
socio-political and financial implications of a default by HATH and
a stronger track record of support, may trigger positive rating
action on HATH.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

A downgrade of Fitch's internal credit view of Huai'an
municipality's ability to provide subsidies, grants or other
legitimate resources allowed under China's policies and
regulations, as well as a weaker assessment of the socio-political
and financial implications of a default by HATH, a weaker track
record of support by the municipality, or a dilution of the
government's shareholding would lead to negative rating action.

An improvement or deterioration in the Standalone Credit Profile or
the liquidity position of HATH would also affect the ratings.

Any change in HATH's IDR will result in a similar change in the
rating of the notes.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).

KANGDE XIN: Founder Faces New Probe Over Bond Disclosure Breaches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Caixin Global reports that scandal-plagued Kangde Xin Composite
Material Group Co. Ltd. and its founder, Zhong Yu, are facing a new
wave of investigations, this time over violations of information
disclosure regulations in the bond market.

Caixin relates that the laminating film manufacturer, based in
Zhangjiagang city in the eastern province of Jiangsu, is already
awaiting the outcome of an inquiry into the authenticity and
accuracy of its financial statements stemming from its failure to
repay the principal and interest on CNY1.5 billion ($212.2 million)
of bonds, a probe that exposed a massive financial and accounting
fraud.

According to Caixin, Kangde Xin did not provide any further details
of the investigation in its filing to the Shenzhen stock exchange
on June 10, although it said that two other company officials,
Chairman Ji Fuxing and supervisor Zhou Guifen, are also being
probed. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) informed
the group about the investigation on June 9, it said. Ji is also a
vice president at Kangde Xin’s parent company, Kangde Group.

Separately, Xu Qiang, believed to be a former finance director of
Kangde Group, is also being investigated over the same violations,
Caixin notes. Shenzhen-listed CECEP Solar Energy Technology Co.
Ltd., where Xu is now and independent director, made the disclosure
in a filing on June 10. The statement said the probe does not
involve CECEP itself, the company said.

Caixin says the CSRC’s new investigation added to the problems
facing Kangde Xin, which is struggling to survive after a bond
default in January 2019 led to the commission’s initial
investigation that uncovered financial irregularities. About CNY15
billion of cash and bank deposits shown on the company’s
financial statements turned out to be an illusion, and an
investigation by the commission found that sales and other
documents had been systematically faked over a four-year period,
which had inflated profits by a total of CNY11.9 billion, according
to Caixin.

China Kangde Xin Composite Material Group Co., Ltd. --
http://www.kangdexin.com/-- engages in laminating film and
photoelectric materials, 3D, and Internet applications businesses
worldwide. It offers printing substrates, environmental laminating
films, 3D grating materials, 3D imaging technology, automatic
coating equipment, and electronic display equipment under the
Kangde Film and KDX brand names for the printing and packaging, and
decoration markets.

LUCKIN COFFEE: Court Freezes Founder's Stake in Limousine Business
------------------------------------------------------------------
Caixin Global reports that the 10.05% of shares in limousine
services provider Ucar Inc. held by Lu Zhengyao, founder of
scandal-plagued coffee chain Luckin, have been frozen under order
by a Beijing court, Ucar disclosed on June 10.

According to Caixin, Mr. Lu's holding of 270 million shares was
frozen in two batches, one on April 9 and the other on April 28,
with a restriction period of three years. Ucar did not disclose who
requested the move, nor the reason for granting the order.

While Mr. Lu, who also goes by Charles Lu, directly holds 10.05% of
Ucar's shares, he exercises control over about 40% of the company
through various other connected holdings, Caixin says.

                        About Luckin Coffee

Based in China, Luckin Coffee Inc. (NASDAQ: LK) --
https://www.luckincoffee.com/ --- has pioneered a technology-driven
retail network to provide coffee and other products of high
quality, high affordability, and high convenience to customers.
Empowered by big data analytics, AI, and proprietary technologies,
the Company pursues its mission to be part of everyone's everyday
life, starting with coffee.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Asia Pacific on April
7, 2020, China Daily said that Luckin Coffee Inc, the so-called
rival to Starbucks in China, has exposed itself to the risks of
delisting and even bankruptcy due to severe fabrication of sales
data, experts said.

China Daily related that the Nasdaq-listed Chinese coffee chain saw
its share price crash more than 75 percent to $6.40 on April 2
after the company disclosed that its earnings results were
substantially inflated. It dropped nearly 15 percent more in the
first two hours of trading on April 3.

Liu Jian, chief operating officer and a director of the company,
and several employees reporting to him, had engaged in misconduct,
including fabricating transactions, a company statement said on
April 2.

The aggregate sales associated with fabricated transactions amount
to around CNY2.2 billion (US$310 million) during the April to
December period last year, according to Luckin's preliminary
internal investigation, the statement said.

MGM CHINA: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to New $500MM Unsec. Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Ba3 rating to MGM China
Holdings Limited's proposed $500 million senior unsecured notes due
2025. MGM China Holdings Limited is a 55.95% owned discretely
financed publicly traded subsidiary of MGM Resorts International.
MGM's Ba3 corporate family rating, Ba3-PD probability of default
rating, and existing Ba3 rated senior unsecured notes are
unchanged. The Ba3 ratings on MGM China's existing senior unsecured
notes is unchanged. MGM's speculative-grade liquidity rating of
SGL-2 is unchanged. The outlook remains negative.

Proceeds from the proposed $500 million senior unsecured notes, net
of fees and expenses, will be used to repay a portion of the
amounts outstanding under the revolving credit facility and for
general corporate purposes to further enhance the company's
liquidity in China. The additional liquidity is beneficial to
improve flexibility to manage in the current weak operating
environment including reduced visitation levels, but the
incremental debt is a credit negative increase in leverage to help
further cover the company's current cash burn.

Assignments:

Issuer: MGM China Holdings Limited

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned Ba3 (LGD4)

RATINGS RATIONALE

MGM's Ba3 corporate family rating reflects the meaningful earnings
decline over the next few months expected from efforts to contain
the coronavirus and the potential for a slow recovery once
properties reopen. The rating is supported by MGM's large scale, a
diversified presence on the Las Vegas Strip across multiple
customer segments, a solid position within several regional
markets, and its presence in the large Macau market with favorable
long-term prospects. MGM is constrained by its concentration in Las
Vegas, and exposure to the Macau gaming market that is experiencing
volatility. MGM also faces ramp-up risk associated with recent
resort developments - MGM Cotai (opened in Q1 2018) and MGM
Springfield (opened in August 2018) and the redeveloped Park MGM
(completed in December 2018) and the integration of the recent
Empire City and MGM Northfield Park acquisitions.

MGM's speculative-grade liquidity rating is SGL-2 reflecting the
expected decline in earnings and cash flow. As of March 31, 2020,
the company, excluding MGM China and MGM Growth Properties LLC, had
$3.9 billion ($4.6 billion including MGM's April bond offering) of
cash and cash investment balances, including approximately $1.5
billion drawn under its revolving credit facility. As of March 31,
2020 MGM China, had total liquidity of $805 million, including $381
million of cash and $424 million of revolver availability. MGM
China also obtained an additional $300 million revolver post Q1
close. The proposed bond offering would further bolster MGM China's
liquidity. Moody's estimates the company could maintain sufficient
internal cash sources after maintenance capital expenditures to
meet required annual amortization and interest requirements
assuming a sizeable decline in annual EBITDA. The expected EBITDA
decline will not be ratable over the next year and because EBITDA
and free cash flow will be negative for an uncertain time period,
liquidity and leverage could deteriorate quickly over the next few
months.

The rapid and widening spread of the coronavirus outbreak,
deteriorating global economic outlook, falling oil prices, and
asset price declines are creating a severe and extensive credit
shock across many sectors, regions and markets. The combined credit
effects of these developments are unprecedented. The gaming sector
has been one of the sectors most significantly affected by the
shock given its sensitivity to consumer demand and sentiment. More
specifically, the weaknesses in MGM's credit profile, including its
exposure to travel disruptions and discretionary consumer spending
have left it vulnerable to shifts in market sentiment in these
unprecedented operating conditions and MGM remains vulnerable to
the outbreak continuing to spread.

Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety. The action reflects the impact on MGM of the breadth
and severity of the shock, and the broad deterioration in credit
quality it has triggered.

The negative outlook reflects the uncertain duration and recovery
from the coronavirus-related earnings and cash flow pressure, which
will lead to higher debt (from the revolver draw or other debt
offerings) and leverage even when property earnings recover.
Earnings will decline due to the disruption in casino visitation
resulting from efforts to contain the spread of the coronavirus
including recommendations from federal, state and local governments
to avoid gatherings and avoid non-essential travel. These efforts
include mandates to close casinos on a temporary basis. The
negative outlook also reflects the negative effect on consumer
income and wealth stemming from job losses and asset price
declines, which will diminish discretionary resources to spend at
casinos once this crisis subsides. MGM remains vulnerable to travel
disruptions and unfavorable sudden shifts in discretionary consumer
spending and the uncertainty regarding the timing of facility
re-openings and the pace at which consumer spending at the
company's properties will recover.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING

While not anticipated in the near term due to the current weak
operating environment, ratings could be upgraded if: consolidated
debt/EBITDA is sustained below 5.0x, EBITDA/fixed charges
(including interest, rent expense, etc.) remains above 2.0x; the
company maintains sufficient liquidity to support both recourse and
non-recourse subsidiaries; operating results of MGM China
operations, including MGM Cotai, track to estimated levels and
share repurchases are funded with asset sale proceeds or cash on
hand rather than debt. The credit ratios required for an upgrade
also takes into account that reported credit metrics may experience
some variability due to the timing of new resort openings and the
closing of the announced and potential acquisitions.

Ratings could be downgraded if liquidity deteriorates or if Moody's
anticipates MGM's earnings declines to be deeper or more prolonged
because of actions to contain the spread of the coronavirus or
reductions in discretionary consumer spending. If consolidated
gross debt/ EBITDA is sustained above 6.0x, EBITDA/fixed charges
declines below 1.75x or the company deviates materially from its
financial policy goals, the ratings could be downgraded.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Gaming Industry
published in December 2017.

MGM owns and operates casino resorts in Las Vegas, Nevada;
Springfield, Massachusetts; and, through its majority ownership
stake of MGM China Holdings Limited, the MGM Macau resort and
casino and MGM Cotai, which opened in February 2018. MGM also owns
50% of CityCenter in Las Vegas and a majority stake in MGM Growth
Properties LLC (MGP), a real estate investment trust formed in
April 2016. MGM has entered into a long-term triple net master
lease with MGP pursuant to which the company leases and operates 14
properties for MGP. Consolidated net revenue for the year ended
December 31, 2019 was approximately $12.9 billion.

RADIANCE GROUP: S&P Rates USD Senior Unsecured Notes 'B-'
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B-' long-term issue rating to the
proposed U.S. dollar-denominated senior unsecured notes that
Radiance Group Co. Ltd. (B/Positive/--) will unconditionally and
irrevocably guarantee. Radiance Capital Investments Ltd., a special
purpose financing vehicle of Radiance Group, will issue the notes.

The rating on the notes is subject to our review of the final
issuance documentation. The China-based property developer intends
to use the proceeds to refinance its existing debt.

S&P said, "We rate the guaranteed notes one notch below the issuer
credit rating on Radiance Group to reflect subordination risk,
similar to the company's outstanding senior unsecured notes. As of
end-2019, Radiance Group's capital structure consists of Chinese
renminbi (RMB) 37.2 billion in secured debt and RMB11.9 billion in
unsecured debt. The secured debt ratio is 65% after considering
external guarantees to third parties of RMB8 billion as unsecured
debt. After we include the unsecured debt at the subsidiary level
and guarantees as priority debt, the priority debt ratio is above
80%, higher than our notching-down threshold of 50%.

"We believe the proposed new issuance will add to Radiance Group's
liquidity buffer and help it establish its presence in the offshore
debt capital market. In January this year, the company issued
US$300 million in guaranteed senior notes with a 10.5% coupon.

"The positive rating outlook on the issuer credit rating on
Radiance Group reflects our view that the company will improve its
leverage over the next 12 months. We also expect Radiance Group to
maintain a stable capital structure and good funding access."


SINIC HOLDINGS: Fitch Assigns B+ Rating to New USD Sr. Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned China-based homebuilder Sinic Holdings
(Group) Company Limited's (B+/Stable) proposed US dollar senior
notes a 'B+' rating, with a Recovery Rating of 'RR4'.

The notes are rated at the same level as Sinic's senior unsecured
rating because they constitute its direct and senior unsecured
obligations. Sinic intends to use the net proceeds from the issue
to primarily refinance its existing debt.

Sinic's rating is supported by its diverse land bank, healthy
contracted sales growth, fast sales churn and good margin. Sinic's
leverage - defined by net debt (including guarantees to joint
ventures (JV) and associates)/adjusted inventory - of 57% in 2019
is high for a 'B+' rating, which makes it a rating constraint. This
is mitigated by its quality land bank that is sufficient for
development over the next three-to-four years. This allows
flexibility in land acquisition in the next 24 months. Fitch
believes its leverage will fall gradually with its fast-churn
model, and stay below 55% in the forecast period to 2023. At the
same time, Sinic has a short operating history and a limited record
in a downcycle.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong Position in Jiangxi: Sinic has strong brand recognition in
Jiangxi province and its capital, Nanchang, and was the province's
top-selling developer from 2017 to 2019. It was also among the
top-five developers in Guangdong province's Huizhou by contracted
sales in 2019. Sinic has been diversifying outside of its home
market in Jiangxi and has strengthened its presence in the Greater
Bay Area, the Yangtze River Delta and central-western China.

It had 117 projects in 36 cities across China by end-2019, with 10%
of its land in Tier 1 cities and 55% in Tier 2 cities. Sinic's
attributable contracted sales rose by 30% in 2019 to CNY45.1
billion, with an average selling price (ASP) of CNY13,083 per sq m,
mainly driven by gross floor area (GFA) sold.

High Leverage: Sinic had CNY10.0 billion in net debt on its
consolidated balance sheet and also provided CNY8.6 billion in
guarantees for its JVs and associates as of end-2019. The
attributable aggregated leverage at the JVs is higher than that of
its consolidated accounts. Fitch has included the guarantees to JVs
in calculating Sinic's leverage of 57% at end-2019. (If Fitch were
to exclude the guarantees, Sinic's leverage would have been around
30% at end-2019, lower than that of many B+ peers). Fitch expects
its leverage to decline gradually and stay below 55% in the
forecast period, as the company plans to spend no more than 50% of
its sales proceeds on land acquisition and provide fewer debt
guarantees to its JVs.

Significant Minority Shareholders: Total non-controlling interest
in Sinic's balance sheet increased to CNY6.7 billion in 2019, from
CNY0.8 billion in 2018, as minority shareholders injected capital
into Sinic's projects. Non-controlling interest accounted for 45.2%
of total equity in 2019, which is relatively high among peers. This
reduces Sinic's financial flexibility compared with homebuilders
with lower non-controlling interest, which can potentially dispose
of stakes in projects to reduce leverage.

Short Operating History: Sinic only acquired its first piece of
land in 2010 and started to expand nationally from its home market,
Nanchang, in 2016, when the Chinese property sector was in an
upcycle. Its ability to weather a downturn is still untested. Its
recent effort to expand outside of its home market in Jiangxi is
also subject to execution risk. The company has operations in 21
cities with only one project each, which may lead to higher
operating costs.

Adequate Land Bank: Sinic's attributable unsold land reserves of
10.4 million sq m at end-2019 are sufficient for development over
the next three-to-four years. This means the company is not under
immediate pressure to replenish its land bank to sustain contracted
sales growth, which gives it more room to lower its leverage and
control its land cost. Fitch believes cautious land acquisition
will help its EBITDA margin stay above 28% in 2020 and above 24% in
the forecast period.

Improved Access to Funding: Sinic's cost of funding has been
relatively high at more than 9%, but Fitch expects this to fall as
more expensive trust loans are replaced with lower-cost financing.
Its IPO in November 2019 also improved its access to funding. The
proportion of bank borrowings increased over the past three years
and bank loans made up 57% of its debt as of end-2019. The company
continues to replace costly onshore trust and asset-management
company loans with onshore and offshore funding including bonds,
asset-backed securities and syndicated loans.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Sinic's business profile is supported by its leading market
position in Jiangxi, healthy margins, and operating scale. Its
attributable contracted sales scale of CNY45 billion in 2019 is
larger than that of Fantasia Holdings Group Co., Limited
(B+/Stable) and Hopson Development Holdings Limited (B+/Stable).
Sinic's contracted sales scale is 15% larger than that of Hong Kong
JunFa Property Company Limited (B+/Stable). Sinic's better
land-bank quality is evident from its higher ASP in 4M20. Sinic's
land bank is also more widely spread across China compared with
Junfa's land bank, which is highly concentrated in Kunming. Sinic
has a higher churn rate in terms of contracted sales to total debt
but a lower EBITDA margin. Junfa has much stronger recurring income
interest coverage and lower leverage.

Sinic's ratings are mainly constrained by its financial profile.
The company's CNY8.6 billion in guarantees to its JVs and
associates accounted for 25% of total debt on its consolidated
balance sheet. Its leverage, including guarantees to JVs and
associates, of 57% at end-2019 is higher than that of most of its
'B+' rated peers, which have leverage below 50%.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Its Rating Case for the Issuer

  - Land-bank life will stay above three years in 2020-2023

  - GFA acquired is 0.9x-1.0x of its GFA sold in 2020-2023

  - ASP to rise 20% in 2020 and 2% per year in 2021-2023

  - Development-property cost of goods sold kept at 71% of sales in
2020-2023

  - Selling, general and administrative expenses at 4.3% of
contracted sales in 2020-2023

  - Dividend payout ratio of 25% in 2020-2023

Recovery Assumptions:

  - 25% haircut to net inventory and JV proportionately
consolidated adjusted inventory in light of Sinic's EBITDA margin
of around 25%-30%

  - 70% haircut to investment properties

  - 30% haircut to account receivables

  - 60% standard haircut to net property, plant and equipment

  - No haircut on restricted cash

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

  - Leverage (net debt/adjusted inventory) sustained below 45%

  - EBITDA margin, after adding back capitalized interest in cost
of goods sold, above 25% for a sustained period

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

  - Leverage (net debt/adjusted inventory) above 55% for a
sustained period

  - EBITDA margin, after adding back capitalized interest in cost
of goods sold, below 20% for a sustained period

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Adequate Liquidity: Sinic's short-term debt amounted to CNY11.6
billion, or 44% of its total debt, as of end-December 2019.
Available cash to short-term debt was 0.9x. Its total cash of
CNY16.6 billion, after taking into account restricted cash, was
enough to cover its short-term debt by a multiple of 1.4x. Sinic's
debt maturities are concentrated in 2020-2022 with 43% of its debt
maturing in 2021 and 13% in 2022.

The company is committed to improving its debt-maturity profile and
capital structure through broadening its financing channels to
support its long-term growth sustainably. Sinic's IPO in 2019
reduces its reliance on debt financing. It plans to lengthen its
debt-maturity profile through various funding options, such as both
onshore and offshore issuance, and refinancing trust loans with
bank syndicated loans.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).

SINIC HOLDINGS: Moody's Assigns B2 CFR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a first-time B2 corporate
family rating (CFR) to Sinic Holdings (Group) Company Limited.

The outlook is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

"Sinic's B2 CFR reflects the company's 1) leading market position
in property development in Nanchang and Huizhou, 2) strong sales
execution in its key markets, and 3) its good liquidity supported
by its fast asset turnover strategy," says Celine Yang, a Moody's
Assistant Vice President and Analyst.

"However, Sinic's B2 CFR is constrained by 1) its geographic
concentration and execution risks associated with its rapid
expansion beyond its core markets amid a challenging operating
environment, 2) its relatively short operating track record and 3)
its developing funding access, constraining its financial
flexibility," adds Yang, who is also Moody's lead analyst for
Sinic.

Sinic has an established brand name in developing mass market
residential properties in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province since 2010.
The company derived contracted sales of RMB20.3 billion in 2019, or
45% of the company's total attributable sales from Nanchang that
year. This sales value makes Sinic one of the top property
developers in the city. Similarly, Sinic became one of the top 10
developers in Huizhou by sales value in 2019, with contracted sales
of RMB8.1 billion in the year.

Sinic's total attributable contracted sales grew strongly by 30% to
RMB45.1 billion in 2019, driven by strong growth in both its core
and new markets, such as Wuhan, Ganzhou and Changsha. Moody's
expects Sinic's attributable contracted sales will grow to around
RMB50 billion in the next 12-18 months, supported by its sufficient
saleable resources and proven execution capability.

On the other hand, Sinic's geographic concentration in Nanchang and
Huizhou exposes it to economic and regulatory uncertainties in
these two cities. Nanchang and Huizhou represented more than 50% of
Sinic's attributable land bank by gross floor area as of year-end
2019.

In addition, its rapid expansion outside the Nanchang and Huizhou
markets will increase its execution risks because of its short
track record in these regions. For example, the company expanded
rapidly by entering 11 new cities in 2019, but the profitability
and growth sustainability of these new markets remain uncertain.

The B2 CFR is also constrained by its volatile and moderating
credit metrics. Moody's expects that Sinic's leverage, as measured
by revenue/adjusted debt, will weaken to 65%-70% over the next
12-18 months from 77% in 2019, as the company debt funds its strong
business growth. Similarly, its EBIT/interest coverage will fall to
about 2.5x-3.0x from 3.7x over the same period.

Sinic's operating scale and financial metrics were weak in 2018 but
improved significantly in 2019, driven in part by its rapid growth
over a relatively short period.

Furthermore, Sinic is still establishing and developing its funding
channels, as reflected by its high reliance on trust and entrusted
loans. Such loans accounted for around half of its total reported
debt at December 31, 2019, with is high relative to many of its
rated Chinese property peers.

These borrowings usually bear higher interest rates and are
associated with higher refinancing risk than bank loans or
capital-markets related financing.

Nonetheless, Moody's expects the company's funding access will
improve as it strives to diversify its funding channels, as
illustrated by its issuance of offshore 364-day USD280 million
notes in Q1 2020, and as it deepens its strategic relationships
with banks in China.

Sinic's liquidity is good, with its reported cash balance of
RMB16.6 billion as of year-end 2019 covering about 142% of its
short-term debt. The company's cash holdings, together with Moody's
estimated operating cash flow, will cover its maturing debt and
committed land and other payments over the next 12-18 months.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the company
will continue to grow its business while maintaining adequate
liquidity and stable credit metrics.

In terms of governance, Moody's has taken into account its
concentrated ownership by Mr. ZHANG Yuanlin, who, together with his
family, controlled an approximate 83.19% equity interest in Sinic
at the end of December 2019. It also considers the company's
history of significant related party transactions with other
companies controlled by Mr. ZHANG or his family members, which
mainly took place before Sinic's listing in November 2019.

These risks are mitigated by the presence of three independent
non-executive directors out of a total of six, with the audit and
remuneration committees chaired by independent non-executive
directors, and by the presence of other internal governance
structures and standards, as required under the Corporate
Governance Code for companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange. Moreover, Sinic has indicated that it will reduce related
party transactions over the next 2-3 years.

In addition, Moody's has considered the coronavirus outbreak and
the potential impact on China's property sector in this assessment.
Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
environmental, social and governance (ESG) framework, given the
substantial implications for public health and safety.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING

Moody's could upgrade Sinic's rating if the company: (1) executes
its business plans and grows in scale; (2) maintains its credit
metrics, including EBIT/interest overage above 2.0x-2.5x and
revenue/adjusted debt above 60%-65% on a consistent basis; (3)
maintains adequate liquidity, with cash/ short-term debt
consistently above 1.25x; and (4) diversifies and strengthens its
funding channels.

On the other hand, Moody's could downgrade the rating if (1)
Sinic's contracted sales weaken; (2) its liquidity deteriorates; or
(3) the company accelerates its land acquisitions, thereby
weakening its financial metrics beyond Moody's expectations.

Financial metrics indicative of a downgrade includes: (1)
EBIT/interest below 1.5x; (2) revenue/adjusted debt below 50%; or
(3) a weaker liquidity position or higher refinancing risk, such
that cash/short-term debt falls below 1.0x on a sustained basis.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Homebuilding and
Property Development Industry published in January.

Sinic Holdings (Group) Company Limited. is a Jiangxi-based
residential property developer. As of December 31, 2019, Sinic had
an attributable land bank of around 10.4 million square meters,
covering 36 cities in China. Its attributable contracted sales
reached RMB45.1 billion in 2019, with around 93% of revenue
generated from residential property development. The company listed
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in November 2019, raising net
proceeds of HKD2.2 billion.

SINIC HOLDINGS: S&P Assigns 'B' Long-Term ICR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
On June 10, 2020, S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B' long-term
issuer credit rating to Sinic Holdings (Group) Co. Ltd.

The rating reflects Sinic's young development history, moderately
high leverage, as well as significant exposure to Nanchang and the
wider Jiangxi province in China. Its recent expansion into other
regions in China, such as the Greater Bay Area (GBA) and Yangtze
River Delta (YRD), will likely entail more execution risk for the
company.

Sinic is a midsize Chinese property developer that has grown
substantially in the past few years. Although the company had total
attributable sales of Chinese renminbi (RMB) 45 billion in 2019,
one-third of its land bank and half of its contracted sales were
from the provincial capital of Jiangxi. Such concentration in a
single city leaves the company vulnerable to market volatility and
policy changes.

S&P said, "We believe the high concentration also makes it more
difficult for Sinic to obtain longer-term or standard financing
from banks and that it may resort to nonbank financing to expand,
as it has in the past. The weighted average maturity of its debt
was only 1.8 years and interest costs were also high at 9.2% in
2019. However, we believe Sinic will reduce nonbank financing
(i.e., trust loans) to 25%-30% of total debt in 2020 from 36% in
2019. This reflects its active seeking of other funding channels
including the domestic and U.S. dollar capital markets."


S&P believes Sinic will utilize more joint ventures (JVs) to manage
execution risks outside its home market in achieving
diversification. Despite high execution risks with new partners and
especially in new cities, the company has gained some experience in
using JVs in the past two years in some GBA and YRD cities.

However, extensive use of JVs would cause a lower consolidation of
new projects and a further drag on consolidated revenue growth.
Sinic's sizable contracted liabilities of RMB34 billion at end-2019
indicate a large amount of unbooked revenue, which should temper
the risks over the next 12-18 months, in S&P's view.

Sinic's geographic concentration may improve as its contracted
sales in Jiangxi province will likely drop to only 25%-30% in 2020,
from about 50% in 2019. At the same time, the YRD portion will rise
to 20%-25% this year, from 11% in 2019. GBA and Central and Western
China will contribute roughly 25% each in 2020. S&P estimates
Sinic's attributable contracted sales will grow by 10%-15% to
around RMB50 billion in 2020.

S&P said, "We also expect Sinic's leverage growth to be moderate,
with reasonable land spending over the next one to two years. We
project the company's debt-to-EBITDA ratio will climb to 5.5x-6.0x
in 2020 and 2021, from 4.8x in 2019. The increase is driven by
continued land replenishment needs to diversify outside Jiangxi.
Land acquisitions in 2019 have already demonstrated substantial
branching out, with only 15% spent in Jiangxi, versus 44% in YRD
and 17% in GBA.

"Sinic's profitability, in our view, will remain largely stable,
and only mildly edge down over the next 12-18 months, due to the
declining recognition of low-cost land reserves in Nanchang and
Huizhou. We estimate the company's gross profit margin will drop to
26%-28% in 2020 and 2021, from 30% in 2019 and 37% in 2018. With
more exposure to stronger tier cities, new land purchased versus
the average selling price also increased to around 40% in 2019,
compared with around 30% for its existing land bank, signaling some
compression in profitability in its project pipeline."

Despite the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic in the first quarter of
2020, contracted sales have fully recovered with year-to-date
estimated attributable sales reaching RMB15 billion-RMB17 billion,
representing 30%-35% of the company's 2020 annual target.

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Sinic
will continue to diversify its operations outside Nanchang and
maintain its steady growth and profitability over the next one to
two years. We expect the company's leverage to be moderately higher
to support growth but remain reasonable given its land spending.

"Although unlikely given its buffer, we could lower the rating on
Sinic if the company's consolidated or see-through debt-to-EBITDA
ratios stay above 8x without signs of improvement. This may happen
if the company fails to control debt growth during its expansion,
or there is material slippage in revenue recognition."

S&P could raise the rating if:

-- Sinic demonstrates sustainability in its improved leverage with
consolidated and see-through debt to EBITDA remaining below 6.0x;

-- The company's capital structure improves to a more stable
profile with a weighted average maturity of two years or above;
and

-- The company continues to substantially improve its geographic
diversity such that its concentration lessens to a level comparable
with 'B+' rated peers.

ZHANGZHOU TRANSPORTATION: Fitch Affirms LT IDRs at 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed China-based Zhangzhou Transportation
Development Group Co., Ltd.'s Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency
Issuer Default Ratings and senior unsecured note rating at 'BB+'.
The Outlook is Stable.

ZTDG is a key government-related entity in Zhangzhou city within
Fujian province. It is responsible for developing the city's toll
roads, railways, bus operations and urban infrastructure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'Very Strong' Status, Ownership and Control: ZTDG is wholly owned
by the Zhangzhou municipal government through Zhangzhou State-owned
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. The government
appoints its board members, approves its major decisions and
controls its operational and financing activities. Major events,
including strategic development, acquisitions, disposals, long-term
plans and major capex, require government approval.

'Strong' Support Record: ZTDG has a solid government support record
as the city's major GRE. It has received around CNY8 billion in
asset and capital injections from the government since its
inception in 2011, which represents over 20% of its total assets.
It has also received government subsidies of CNY665 million in
2019, CNY205 million in 2018 and CNY369 million in 2017. Fitch
expects government support to continue.

'Moderate' Socio-Political Implications of Default: ZTDG plays an
important role in Zhangzhou's bus operations as well as railway,
toll road and urban infrastructure construction, but its default
may not immediately disrupt its business activity and would have a
moderate socio-political impact on the municipal government.

'Strong' Financial Implications of Default: ZTDG has received
substantial borrowings from state-owned banks and the debt markets
in previous few years. A financial default by ZTDG would damage the
government's reputation and affect funding for other local GREs.
The government has a strong incentive to avoid the company's
default.

'b' Standalone Credit Profile: ZTDG's Standalone Credit Profile is
assessed under the agency's Public Sector, Revenue-Supported
Entities Rating Criteria. Fitch assesses revenue defensibility at
'Weaker', as the company conducts public services, where pricing is
constrained by the government. Operating risk is assessed at
'Midrange', because the company has identified cost drivers and
government provides cover its operating loss. The financial profile
is assessed at 'Weaker', due to the company's high leverage, with
net debt/EBITDA of around 20x at end-2019. Fitch expects leverage
to rise to over 30x in the next five years under the rating case.
The weak credit profile is mitigated by strategic government links,
which encourage financial support for the company.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

The ratings are assessed under Fitch's GRE Rating Criteria,
reflecting Zhangzhou municipality's ownership and oversight, 'Very
Strong' government control, 'Strong' government support, as well as
'Moderate' socio-political and 'Strong' financial implications of a
company default. These factors indicate the government has a strong
incentive to provide extraordinary support to the company, if
needed.

ZTDG's IDRs were derived from the four factors under Fitch's GRE
Rating Criteria and the Standalone Credit Profile of 'b' under its
Public Sector, Revenue-Supported Entities Rating Criteria.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

The ratings could be upgraded if Fitch revises its perception of
Zhangzhou municipality's ability to provide subsidies, grants or
other legitimate resources allowed under the country's policies and
regulations.

Positive rating action could also arise from a revised assessment
of the government support record as well as the socio-political and
financial implication of a company default.

A change of ZTDG's Standalone Credit Profile could also affect the
ratings.

Any change in ZTDG's IDRs will result in a similar change in the
rating of its notes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

The ratings could be downgraded if Fitch revises its perception of
Zhangzhou municipality's ability to provide subsidies, grants or
other legitimate resources allowed under the country's policies and
regulations.

A downgrade could also be triggered by a weakening of the
socio-political and financial implications of a default, a weaker
support record and expectation from the government, or a dilution
of the municipality's shareholding.

Any change in ZTDG's IDRs will result in a similar change in the
rating of its notes.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Public Finance issuers have a
best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile
of rating transitions, measured in a positive direction) of three
notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating
downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating
transitions, measured in a negative direction) of three notches
over three years. The complete span of best- and worst-case
scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA'
to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on
historical performance.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).



=========
I N D I A
=========

4S SPINTEX: Ind-Ra Moves 'B+' LT Issuer Rating to Non-Cooperating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
India Ratings and Research (Ind-Ra) has migrated 4S Spintex India
Private Limited's Long-Term Issuer Rating to the non-cooperating
category. The issuer did not participate in the rating exercise
despite continuous requests and follow-ups by the agency.
Therefore, investors and other users are advised to take
appropriate caution while using these ratings. The rating will now
appear as 'IND B+ (ISSUER NOT COOPERATING)' on the agency's
website.

The instrument-wise rating actions are:

-- INR60 mil. Fund-based working capital limit migrated to non-
     cooperating category with IND B+ (ISSUER NOT COOPERATING) /
     IND A4 (ISSUER NOT COOPERATING) rating; and

-- INR 109.5 mil. Term loan due on February 2026 migrated to non-
     cooperating category with IND B+ (ISSUER NOT COOPERATING)
     rating.

Note: ISSUER NOT COOPERATING: The ratings were last reviewed on
June 7, 2019. Ind-Ra is unable to provide an update, as the agency
does not have adequate information to review the ratings.

COMPANY PROFILE

Incorporated in August 2012, 4S Spintex manufactures carded cotton
yarn.


ABDUL JALEEL: CRISIL Migrates B Debt Ratings from Not Cooperating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Due to inadequate information, CRISIL, in line with SEBI
guidelines, had migrated the rating of Abdul Jaleel MM (AJ) to
CRISIL B/Stable Issuer Not Cooperating'. However, the management
has subsequently started sharing requisite information, necessary
for carrying out comprehensive review of the rating.  Consequently,
CRISIL is migrating the rating on bank facilities of AJ to 'CRISIL
B/Stable' from 'CRISIL B/Stable Issuer Not Cooperating' and
reassigned its 'CRISIL A4' rating to the short-term bank
facilities.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Bank Guarantee          2        CRISIL A4 (Reassigned)

   Cash Credit             4        CRISIL B/Stable (Migrated
                                    from 'CRISIL B/Stable ISSUER
                                    NOT COOPERATING')

   Long Term Loan          1        CRISIL B/Stable (Migrated
                                    from 'CRISIL B/Stable ISSUER
                                    NOT COOPERATING')

   Proposed Long Term      3        CRISIL B/Stable (Migrated
   Bank Loan Facility               from 'CRISIL B/Stable ISSUER
                                    NOT COOPERATING')

The ratings reflect the firm's modest scale of operations in the
highly fragmented construction industry, limited scale of
operations owing to presence in a single state and a below-average
financial risk profile. These rating weaknesses are partially
offset by the long-standing industry experience of its promoter.

Key Rating Drivers & Detailed Description

Weaknesses:

* Modest scale of operations in a highly fragmented industry: AJ's
scale of operations is modest, as reflected in its estimated
revenues of around INR6 crore in fiscal 2020. This is due to
tender-based nature of operations. This also results in volatility
in revenue profile and also makes the firm susceptible to
volatility in operating margins as the same vary across various
tenders. Furthermore, the civil construction industry is highly
fragmented and marked by low entry barriers, due to which AJ faces
intense competition from other players. CRISIL believes that the
modest scale of its operations will continue to impinge on the
credit profile of AJ.

* Limited scalability owing to presence in a single state:  The
firm undertakes all of its projects in Kerala, limiting the scale
of operations to new projects across a limited geography. Any
events such as slowdown in the infrastructure spending in Kerala or
operational delays may affect the flow of orders for the firm and
thus impact its revenue growth. The operations of AJ shall remain
constrained owing to its presence in a single state.

* Below-average financial risk profile:  AJ's financial risk
profile is marked by a small net worth, of less than 2.5 crores
estimated for fiscal 2020. Moreover, the capital structure of the
firm exhibits moderate level of gearing, as marked by total outside
liabilities to tangible net worth (TOLTNW) ratio estimated at 2
times as on March 31, 2020. With interest coverage ratio of less
than 2 times and net cash accruals to total debt (NCATD) of 5%
estimated for fiscal 2020, the firm's debt protection metrics
remain average. CRISIL believes that AJ's financial risk profile
shall continue to remain below-average in the medium term.

Strength:

* Promoter's long-standing experience in the civil construction
industry:  Mr. Abdul Jaleel MM has more than three decades of
experience in the civil construction industry. The promoter's
extensive industry experience has helped AJ bag projects frequently
from PWD. CRISIL believes that AJ shall continue to benefit over
the medium term from its promoter's extensive industry experience
and its strong revenue visibility.

Liquidity Stretched

Liquidity will remain stretched, with annual cash accrual expected
at INR0.1-0.2 crore over the medium term, against minimal debt
obligation. Bank limit utilisation was high, averaging more than 90
percent for the 12 months through March 2020.

Outlook: Stable

CRISIL believes that AJ will benefit over the medium term from the
experience of its promoters in civil construction industry.

Rating Sensitivity factors

Upward factors

* Sustained improvement in scale of operation and order book

* Improvement in working capital cycle with GCA days of less than
200 days

Downward factors

* Decline in scale of operation or operating margin

* Stretch in working capital cycle

AJ is a proprietorship firm involved in civil construction works
such as construction of roads, bridges and construction and
maintenance for irrigation facilities in Kerala. The firm is
managed by Mr. Abdul Jaleel MM.

BHAARATHI SPINTEX: Ind-Ra Moves 'BB+' LT Rating to Non-Cooperating
------------------------------------------------------------------
India Ratings and Research (Ind-Ra) has migrated Bhaarathi Spintex
India Private Limited's Long-Term Issuer Rating to the
non-cooperating category. The issuer did not participate in the
rating exercise despite continuous requests and follow-ups by the
agency. Therefore, investors and other users are advised to take
appropriate caution while using these ratings. The rating will now
appear as 'IND BB+ (ISSUER NOT COOPERATING)' on the agency's
website.

The instrument-wise rating actions are:

-- INR192.5 mil. Fund-based working capital limit migrated to
     non-cooperating category with IND BB+ (ISSUER NOT
     COOPERATING) / IND A4+ (ISSUER NOT COOPERATING) rating;

-- INR155.6 mil. Term loan due on June 2024 migrated to non-
     cooperating category with IND BB+ (ISSUER NOT COOPERATING)
     rating; and

-- INR13.6 mil. Non-fund-based working capital limit migrated to
     non-cooperating category with IND A4+ (ISSUER NOT
     COOPERATING) rating.

Note: ISSUER NOT COOPERATING: The ratings were last reviewed on May
13, 2019. Ind-Ra is unable to provide an update, as the agency does
not have adequate information to review the ratings.

COMPANY PROFILE

BSIPL was incorporated in 2011 and commenced operations in 2012,
and has an installed spindle capacity of 21,600 spindles. The
company produces cotton yarn in the count range of 16s-40s.


BHAGYODAYA TROKHOS: CRISIL Moves D Debt Ratings to Not Coop.
------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of Bhagyodaya
Trokhos Private Limited (BTPL) to 'CRISIL D/CRISIL D Issuer not
cooperating'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Cash Credit            13        CRISIL D (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Channel Financing       3        CRISIL D (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Proposed Long Term      2.25     CRISIL D (ISSUER NOT
   Bank Loan Facility               COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Standby Line            1.75     CRISIL D (ISSUER NOT
   of Credit                        COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with BTPL for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated February 29, 2020 and
March 19, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of BTPL, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on BTPL is
consistent with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for
Assessing Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or
lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of BTPL to 'CRISIL D/CRISIL D Issuer not cooperating'.

BTPL was incorporated in 2006. The company is the exclusive
authorized dealer for TML's light commercial vehicles (LCVs) in
Bellary, Koppal, and Raichur.

BHAIRAVNATH HITECH: CRISIL Moves 'B' Debt Ratings to Not Coop.
--------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of Bhairavnath
Hitech Agro Private Limited (BHAPL) to 'CRISIL B/Stable/CRISIL A4
Issuer not cooperating'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Bank Guarantee        .23        CRISIL A4 (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Cash Credit          9.66        CRISIL B/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Proposed Long Term   4.53        CRISIL B/Stable (ISSUER NOT
   Bank Loan Facility               COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Term Loan            3.58        CRISIL B/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with BHAPL for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated March 31, 2020, May 8,
2020 and May 13, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic
communication. However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of BHAPL, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on BHAPL is
consistent with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for
Assessing Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or
lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of BHAPL to 'CRISIL B/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not
cooperating'.

BHAPL was incorporated in 1995, promoted by Mr Prasad Bhagat and Mr
Krishnaji Bhagat. The company, based in Pune, Maharashtra, is
engaged in poultry farming.

CAIRN INDIA: Fitch Places B+ LT IDR on Rating Watch Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed Cairn India Holdings Limited's (CIHL)
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'B+' on Rating Watch
Negative (RWN).

The action follows the announcement by Vedanta Resources Limited
(VRL) of its intention to delist the shares of its Indian
subsidiary and CIHL's parent, Vedanta Limited (VLTD). CIHL's rating
is aligned with the credit profile of VLTD, which owns 100% of
CIHL, reflecting their strong linkages.

Should the delisting succeed, Fitch will assess the linkage between
VRL and VLTD as 'Strong', rather than 'Moderate', and the agency
will view the group as a single economic block, as VRL will own
100% of VLTD, which will hold 100% of CIHL. This will result in
Fitch assessing the VLTD's credit profile based on the consolidated
VRL group, which Fitch believes is weaker.

VLTD's creditors currently have good access to its operating cash
flow due to limits on cash leakages, and being structurally and
jurisdictionally closer to operating companies. But the delisting
will give VRL greater access to the operating cash flows of VLTD
and CIHL. The absence of minority investors could also increase
leakages outside the VRL Group, though Fitch has not considered any
cash leakage from VLTD or CIHL, aside from the dividends to VRL. It
also could increase governance risks, in respect of intercompany
transactions, given concentrated shareholding.

The delisting will nonetheless simplify the complex group
structure. VRL group will benefit from cash savings from lower
dividend payments to minority shareholders, which could support
liquidity and the group's deleveraging over the long term. However,
the potential for deleveraging is a function of the transaction
price. The current INR87.5 per share offer price would mean that
VRL could add around USD2.1 billion of debt to finance the purchase
of shares in its subsidiaries, and the amount could increase if the
price rises. The current weak and volatile macro environment may
pressure commodity prices below Fitch's current expectations; this
or weaker than Fitch expected operational performance could stymie
company's plans to deleverage over FY21-FY23.

Fitch will resolve the RWN at the conclusion of the proposed
delisting process and once Fitch has information on the final
delisting price and capital structure.


KEY RATING DRIVERS

CIHL's Rating Aligned with VLTD: Fitch assesses the operating and
strategic linkages between CIHL and VLTD as 'Strong' and aligns its
rating to the credit profile of VLTD in line with Fitch's Parent
and Subsidiary Rating Linkage criteria. After VLTD's proposed
delisting, Fitch will align VLTD's credit profile with that of the
consolidated VRL group as the ownership changes will lead Fitch
assess the linkage between VLTD and VRL as 'Strong', rather than
the current assessment of 'Moderate'.

Fitch assesses VLTD's credit profile as better than that of the
consolidated VRL group as Fitch believes significant minority
stakeholders and limits on cash leakages provide VLTD's creditors
with better access to its operating cash flow. However, VRL's full
ownership of VLTD after the delisting will give VRL full access to
VLTD's operating cash flows. The linkage assessment is also driven
by strong operating ties as VLTD and the group share common
management.

Delisting Price Affects Capital Structure: VRL intends to delist
50.1%-owned VLTD and indicated an initial offer price of INR87.5
per share. The last traded price was INR105.10 on June 8, 2020 and
the current book value is INR222 per share. VRL would need USD2.1
billion to acquire the shares it does not own in VLTD at the offer
price, which Fitch believes it will fully fund via debt. The
additional debt is balanced by reduction in cash leakage, although
there the risk that the delisting price could be higher and
consequently incremental debt negates the benefit.

Impact on Financial Metrics: Fitch believes that the debt required
to finance the delisting would pressure the group's consolidated
credit metrics in the near term, but would lead to cash savings for
VRL from lower minority dividend leakage, which could facilitate
deleveraging over the long term. However, the deleveraging
potential depends on the transaction price and financing structure,
and Fitch's assumptions of major operational improvements over the
next few years, including volume ramp-up and cost rationalization,
which face downside risks from lower commodity prices amid the
coronavirus pandemic.

'b+' Standalone Profile: CIHL's production scale, based on its 35%
share of the Rajasthan O&G block, is small at about 60,000 barrels
of oil equivalent per day (boepd), comparable with that of oil and
gas producers in the 'B' rating category. However, CIHL benefits
from the low costs of the Rajasthan block, with sustainable
operating costs of around USD7.5/barrel (bbl) and finding and
development costs of USD5.0-6.0/bbl, with further flexibility to
cut costs. The cost position is significantly lower than that of
peers and underpins CIHL's positive free cash flow, despite its
forecast for lower oil prices, and its strong financial profile.

Production-Sharing Agreement Risk: The extension of VLTD's
production-sharing agreement at the Rajasthan block for another 10
years hinges on the resolution of audit issues in its cost
recovery. The company believes the demand notice to be unwarranted
and hasn't made any provisions in respect to these demands. Amid
the coronavirus pandemic, the government permitted the company to
continue operations at the Rajasthan Block, which was originally
expiring in mid-May, until the extension is signed or three-months,
whichever is earlier. Fitch treats the risk around agreement
extension as event risk.

Fitch does not expect a significant impact on CIHL's standalone
profile, even if the regulator decides against VLTD and CIHL has to
pay its share of compensation demanded by the government, which can
be up to USD182 million.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

CIHL's ratings are aligned with those of parent VLTD. Similarly,
the rating on Thailand's PTT Exploration and Production Public
Company Limited (BBB+/Stable) is equalized with that of its parent,
PTT Public Company Limited (BBB+/Stable), reflecting Fitch's
assessment of 'Strong' operating and strategic linkages between the
two companies. Fitch also aligns India-based Hindustan Petroleum
Corporation Limited's (BBB-/Stable) rating with the credit profile
of its largest shareholder, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
Limited, with the linkages between the two entities assessed as
'Strong'.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Its Rating Case for the Issuer

Commodity prices to average as below in FY21, FY22 and FY23:

  - Zinc at USD1,925/t, USD2,000/t and USD2,000/t, respectively,
and aluminum at USD1,570/t, USD1,650/t and USD1,825/t

  - 62 Fe CFR benchmark iron ore price to average at USD71/t,
USD60/t and USD59/t, respectively

  - Brent crude to average USD36/bbl, USD46/bbl and USD52/bbl,
respectively

Sales:

  - Zinc sales in India of 708 thousand tons (kt) in FY20, 786kt in
FY21 and 913kt in FY22 as shaft commissioning at the Rampur Agucha
mine supports a higher production run-rate.

  - Zinc sales in Gamsberg, South Africa, of 128kt in FY20, 200kt
in FY21 and 235kt in FY22, as the quarterly production run-rate is
ramping up to 45kt in 4QFY20, from around 25kt in 1QFY20.

  - Aluminum sales of 1,936kt in FY20, 2,003kt in FY21 and 2,063kt
in FY22, supported by commissioning of new electrolysis pots and
capacity ramp-up.

  - Oil production from Rajasthan block at 160,000 boepd for FY21
and FY22. Gas production from Rajasthan block of 130 million
standard cubic feet per day (mmcfd) in FY21 and 187mmcfd in FY22.
This reflects a gradual ramp-up of production at the projects,
which have almost completed construction.

  - EBITDA margin around 29% in FY20-FY22, as structural
improvement in the cost of production at some mine's offsets the
weakness in commodity prices.

  - Capex of USD1.0 billion in FY21 at VRL, which is lower than its
previous expectation of USD1.8 billion due to the coronavirus
pandemic. Assumption of capex of USD1.4 billion in FY22 is
unchanged.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Rating Watch Negative will be resolved when the transaction is
completed and Fitch has further information on the future capital
structure of the group.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

  - The ratings could be affirmed if the privatization is not
successful and VLTD's linkages with VRL remain unchanged

  - The privatization is completed such that the delisting price
leads to the interest coverage of the VRL consolidated group,
measured by operating EBITDA / interest, remaining above 2.3x for a
sustained period.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

  - The privatization is completed and VLTD's linkages with VRL
strengthen, but its interest coverage is below 2.3x for a sustained
period.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Adequate Liquidity Position: Fitch expects CIHL to maintain
sufficient liquidity to repay its amortizing loan due at the
subsidiary level with internal cash flow without any refinancing
support. Free cash flow should remain positive and sufficient to
take care of the loan's repayment schedule, given the deferment of
capex in FY21, even during the low oil-price environment.

CRITERIA VARIATION

Fitch applies its Parent and Subsidiary Rating Linkage criteria to
derive the credit profile of VLTD. Where Fitch assesses 'Strong' or
'Moderate' linkages between a weaker parent and stronger
subsidiary, the criteria establish that the IDRs for both are
likely to be based on the consolidated credit profile. VRL's fully
consolidated financials reflect cash leakages to significant
minority shareholders in its key assets, notably VLTD. Fitch
believes that VLTD's creditors have better access to its operating
cash flow than VRL and there are some limits on cash leakages.
These support VLTD's credit profile being assessed as better than
the consolidated group profile.

However, with the delisting of VLTD, VRL would have easier access
to VLTD's operating cash flow and the flexibility to increase the
dividend pay-out substantially, which leads us to assess the credit
profiles of VLTD and VRL to be on a par and in line with the
criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

CIHL has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Governance Structure,
which reflects issues related to overall board structure and
composition and effective management control. Its assessment does
not factor in any cash leakage from VLTD or CIHL, aside from the
dividends to VRL. CIHL had invested in a Volcan structured product
in January 2019, and subsequently unwound profitably in August
2019. The transaction had resulted in a strong reaction from
various investors at the group and VRL since committed to abstain
from similar transactions in future. However, absence of large and
vocal minority investors at VLTD post delisting would make it
easier for VRL's shareholder Volcan Investment Limited to access
the opcos' cash for its liquidity needs

Except for the matters discussed above, the highest level of ESG
credit relevance, if present, is a score of 3. This means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity(ies), either due to their nature or to the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).

CHAKKRA COAL: CRISIL Migrates B Debt Rating to Not Cooperating
--------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of Chakkra Coal
India Private Limited (CCIPL) to 'CRISIL B/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer
not cooperating'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Bill Discounting       7.5       CRISIL B/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Inland/Import          6.0       CRISIL A4 (ISSUER NOT
   Letter of Credit                 COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Overdraft              2.5       CRISIL A4 (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with CCIPL for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated April 29, 2020, May
08, 2020 and May 13, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic
communication. However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of CCIPL, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on CCIPL is
consistent with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for
Assessing Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or
lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of CCIPL to 'CRISIL B/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not
cooperating'.

Established in 2001, as a proprietorship, CCIPL was reconstituted
as a private limited company in 2012. The company trades in
domestic and imported coal, primarily in the 5300 to 6000 gross
calorific value category. Operations are managed by Mr G Vinodh
Kumar and Ms A Lakshmi.

DEWA PROJECTS: CRISIL Keeps 'D' Debt Ratings in Not Cooperating
---------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL Ratings said the rating for the bank facilities of Dewa
Projects Private Limited (DPPL) continues to remain in the 'Issuer
Not Cooperating' category.

                   Amount
   Facilities   (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------   -----------     -------
   Term Loan         287        CRISIL D (ISSUER NOT COOPERATING)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with DPPL for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated October 31, 2019 and
April 30, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of DPPL, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on DPPL is
consistent with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for
Assessing Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or
lower'.

Based on the last available information, the ratings on bank
facilities of DPPL continues to be 'CRISIL D Issuer not
cooperating'.

DPPL was established in April 2005. The company is constructing
residential apartments at Marine Drive, Kochi. The project which is
being developed at an estimated cost of over INR4,600 crore, is in
the early phase of construction. The company has been promoted by
Mr Venugopalan Nair, a Kuwait-based non-resident Indian.

DHANASHREE AGRO: CRISIL Moves D Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating
---------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of Dhanashree
Agro Products Private Limited (DAPPL) to 'CRISIL D/CRISIL D Issuer
not cooperating'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Bank Guarantee         1.2       CRISIL D (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Cash Credit           60         CRISIL D (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Letter of Credit       1.5       CRISIL D (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Long Term Loan        60         CRISIL D (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with DAPPL for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated February 29, 2020, May
8, 2020 and May 13, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic
communication. However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of DAPPL, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on DAPPL is
consistent with 'Scenario 2' outlined in the 'Framework for
Assessing Consistency of Information with CRISIL BBB' category or
lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of DAPPL to 'CRISIL D/CRISIL D Issuer not cooperating'.

DAPPL (formerly, Lakshmi Sugar Mills Company Pvt Ltd), incorporated
in September 1940, is promoted by the Sawhney family. It is one of
the oldest sugar manufacturing companies in Uttarakhand. It has a
sugar factory at Iqbalpur in Haridwar.

J-MARKS EXIM: Insolvency Resolution Process Case Summary
--------------------------------------------------------
Debtor: J-Marks Exim (India) Pvt Ltd

        Registered office:
        58 & 59, 1st Floor
        Nakshatra Cine Shoppe
        Ranade Road
        Dadar West
        Mumbai 400028

Insolvency Commencement Date: May 26, 2020

Court: National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench

Estimated date of closure of
insolvency resolution process: November 22, 2020

Insolvency professional: Mukesh Verma

Interim Resolution
Professional:            Mukesh Verma
                         C 112, Manish Rose
                         CHS, Building No. 29
                         Manish Nagar
                         Andheri West
                         Mumbai 400053
                         E-mail: ip.mukeshverma@gmail.com
                                 cirp.jmarks@gmail.com

Last date for
submission of claims:    June 19, 2020


KAMTANATH FOOD: CRISIL Keeps B+ Debt Ratings in Not Cooperating
---------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL Ratings said the rating for the bank facilities of Kamtanath
Food Product Private Limited (KFPPL) continues to remain in the
'Issuer Not Cooperating' category.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Cash Credit            4         CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING)

   Long Term Loan         8         CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with KFPPL for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated October 15, 2019 and
April 30, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of KFPPL, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on KFPPL is
consistent with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for
Assessing Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or
lower'.

Based on the last available information, the ratings on bank
facilities of KFPPL continues to be 'CRISIL B+/Stable Issuer not
cooperating'.

Established in May 2017 by Mr Nitin Agarwal, Mr Neelesh Jain, Mr
Bal Kishan Sahu, and Ms Tripti Gautam, KFPPL is setting up a rice
processing unit at Dabra, Madhya Pradesh, with an installed
capacity of 6912 tonne per annum. The company is expected to
commence commercial operation from December 2017.

MHETRE FOODS: CRISIL Migrates D Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating
---------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of Mhetre Foods
Private Limited (MFPL) to 'CRISIL D Issuer not cooperating'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)    Ratings
   ----------       -----------    -------
   Cash Credit            4        CRISIL D (ISSUER NOT
                                   COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Long Term Loan         7.5      CRISIL D (ISSUER NOT
                                   COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with MFPL for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated May 13, 2020 and May
18, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of MFPL, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on MFPL is
consistent with 'Scenario 2' outlined in the 'Framework for
Assessing Consistency of Information with CRISIL BBB' category or
lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of MFPL to 'CRISIL D Issuer not cooperating'.

Incorporated in 2011, MFPL processes vegetables and commenced
operations in September 2015. The company, promoted by Mr Dilip
Mhetre, Mr Prakash Mhetre and Mr Vikas Mhetre, is based in Daund
(Maharashtra).

N.S. CASHEW: CRISIL Lowers Rating on INR2.5cr Cash Loan to B+
-------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has revised the ratings on bank facilities of N.S. Cashew
Company (NSCC) to 'CRISIL B+/Stable Issuer not cooperating' from
'CRISIL BB-/Stable'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Cash Credit           2.5        CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Revised from
                                    'CRISIL BB-/Stable ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING')

   Foreign Bill          0.5        CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
   Discounting                      COOPERATING; Revised from
                                    'CRISIL BB-/Stable ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING')

   Packing Credit       6.0         CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Revised from
                                    'CRISIL BB-/Stable ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING')

   Proposed Long Term   3.5         CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
   Bank Loan Facility               COOPERATING; Revised from
                                    'CRISIL BB-/Stable ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING')

CRISIL has been consistently following up with NSCC for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated October 15, 2019 and
April 30, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of NSCC, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on NSCC is
consistent with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for
Assessing Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or
lower'.

Based on the last available information, the ratings on bank
facilities of NSCC revised to 'CRISIL B+/Stable Issuer not
cooperating' from 'CRISIL BB-/Stable'.

Set up as a proprietorship firm in 2007, NSCC processes raw cashew
nuts and sells cashew kernels. Operations are managed by the
proprietor, Mr. Rasheed Navas.

NEESARG MOTORS: CRISIL Moves B+ INR6.25cr Debt Rating to Not Coop.
------------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of Neesarg Motors
(NM) to 'CRISIL B+/Stable Issuer not cooperating'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Cash Credit/          6.25       CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
   Overdraft                        COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)
   facility             

CRISIL has been consistently following up with NM for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated April 29, 2020, May 8,
2020 and May 13, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic
communication. However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of NM, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on NM is consistent
with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for Assessing
Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of NM to 'CRISIL B+/Stable Issuer not cooperating'.

Established in 2008, Neesarg Motors (NM) is a Honda Motorcycle &
Scooter India Pvt Ltd Company Limited. (Honda) dealer of two
wheeler and a service provider of Tata Motors in Palanpur, Gujarat.
NM has 3 Honda authorized showrooms and provides 3S  (Sales,
Service and Spares) facilities and 1 Tata service centre in
Palanpur. The company is promoted by Mr Yasin Banglawala.

NEESARG MOTORS: CRISIL Moves B+ INR6.25cr Debt to Not Coop.
-----------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of Neesarg Motors
(NM) to 'CRISIL B+/Stable Issuer not cooperating'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Cash Credit/          6.25       CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
   Overdraft                        COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)
   facility             

CRISIL has been consistently following up with NM for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated April 29, 2020, May 8,
2020 and May 13, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic
communication. However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of NM, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on NM is consistent
with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for Assessing
Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of NM to 'CRISIL B+/Stable Issuer not cooperating'.

Established in 2008, Neesarg Motors (NM) is a Honda Motorcycle &
Scooter India Pvt Ltd Company Limited. (Honda) dealer of two
wheeler and a service provider of Tata Motors in Palanpur, Gujarat.
NM has 3 Honda authorized showrooms and provides 3S  (Sales,
Service and Spares) facilities and 1 Tata service centre in
Palanpur. The company is promoted by Mr Yasin Banglawala.

PRIMO AUTOMATION: CRISIL Moves B+ Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of Primo
Automation Systems Private Limited (PASPL) to 'CRISIL
B+/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not cooperating'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Bank Guarantee        1.54       CRISIL A4 (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Cash Credit           7.50       CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Long Term Loan         .96       CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with PASPL for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated May 13, 2020 and May
18, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of PASPL, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on PASPL is
consistent with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for
Assessing Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or
lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of PASPL to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not
cooperating'.

Set up in 2000, by Mr Rajagopalan PASPL provides welding automation
solutions to various manufacturers.

PRINCE CONSTRUCTION: CRISIL Hikes Rating on INR4.60cr Loan to B+
----------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has upgraded its ratings on the bank facilities of Prince
Construction (PC) to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4' from 'CRISIL
D/CRISIL D'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Bank Guarantee         3         CRISIL A4 (Upgraded from
                                    'CRISIL D')

   Cash Credit            0.75      CRISIL B+/Stable (Upgraded
                                    from 'CRISIL D')

   Proposed Long Term     4.60      CRISIL B+/Stable (Upgraded
   Bank Loan Facility               from 'CRISIL D')

   Term Loan              0.15      CRISIL B+/Stable (Upgraded
                                    from 'CRISIL D')

Upgrade in ratings reflects track record of timely repayment of
debt in at least last six months. It also takes into considerations
its sustained moderate business risk profile

The ratings continues to reflect extensive experience of the firm's
promoters in the civil construction industry, and its above-average
financial risk profile because of low gearing, moderate total
outside liability to tangible networth (TOL/TNW) and healthy debt
protection metrics, despite small networth. These strengths are
partially offset by small scale of operations in a fragmented
industry, with intense competition exerting pressure on revenue
visibility and profitability.

Key Rating Drivers & Detailed Description

Weakness:

* Small scale of operations in fragmented industry, with intense
competition exerting pressure on revenue visibility and
profitability: PC operates in a tender-based business, and faces
competition not only from companies in Jharkhand and Bihar, but
also from large pan-India players. While large players operate in
several sectors including roads, hydel projects, irrigation,
thermal plants, and urban infrastructure, mid-sized and small
players specialize in one or two business segments. Order book has
been hovering at around INR40-45 crores in last three years through
fiscal 2020 comprising of limited sectors such as roads, bridges
and buildings, provides limited revenue visibility; while intense
competition constrains its profitability levels.

Strengths:

* Extensive experience of promoters in civil construction: The firm
is promoted by Bihar-based Yadav family, which has been the civil
construction business for over a decade. PC has executed a large
number of projects for state and central government bodies.

* Above-average financial risk profile: The financial risk profile
is driven by low gearing and healthy debt protection metrics.
Networth was moderate, at INR5.62 crores (estimated at around INR9
crore as on March 31, 2020), and gearing was 1.12 times (estimated
at 0.21 time as on March 31, 2020) as on March 31, 2019. Interest
coverage ratio was 4.74 times (estimated at 17 times in fiscal
2020) and net cash accruals to adjusted debt of 0.11 time (2.27
times) in fiscal 2019.

Liquidity Stretched
Liquidity profile of the firm is stretched as reflected in almost
fully utilised bank lines in last 12 months through March, 2020.
The firm is estimated to have generated accruals of around INR4.3
crore which were used to repay its long term with no cushion.
However, going forward the firm is expected to generate around
INR1.5-2 crore over the medium term against nominal repayment of
around INR12 lakh in fiscal 2021. Current ratio are estimated to be
adequate at around 1.12 time as on March 31, 2020.

Outlook: Stable

CRISIL believes PC will benefit from its experienced management.

Rating Sensitivity factors

Upward factors

* Improvement in scale of operation to upward of INR50 crore while
sustaining its profitability margins

* Improvement in the liquidity as indicated by either enhancement
in bank lines or increase in the cushion

Downward factors

* Decline in the scale of operation to below INR10 crore along with
decline in profitability

* Delay in realization of debtors leading to stretch in liquidity.

PC, set up in 2012 as partnership firm, undertakes civil
construction work, mainly for roads, bridges, and buildings. It is
also a dealer of Escort India Ltd's rollers and cranes. It is based
in Jamui, Bihar, and its operations are managed by Mr. Laldhari
Yadav and Mr Onkar Yadav.

REGAL TRADING: Ind-Ra Moves BB+ LT Issuer Rating to Non-Cooperating
-------------------------------------------------------------------
India Ratings and Research (Ind-Ra) has migrated Regal Trading
Private Limited's (RTPL) Long-Term Issuer Rating of 'IND BB+' to
the non-cooperating category and has simultaneously withdrawn it.

The instrument-wise rating actions are:

-- INR150 mil. Fund-based limit * migrated to the non-cooperating

     category and withdrawn; and

-- INR150 mil. Non-fund-based limit# migrated to the non-
     cooperating category and withdrawn.

* Migrated to 'IND BB+'(ISSUER NOT COOPERATING)'/'IND A4+ (ISSUER
NOT COOPERATING)' before being withdrawn
# Migrated to 'IND A4+ (ISSUER NOT COOPERATING)' before being
withdrawn

KEY RATING DRIVERS

RTPL did not participate in the rating exercise despite continuous
requests and follow-ups by the agency.

Ind-Ra is no longer required to maintain the ratings, as it has
received a no-objection certificate from the rated facilities'
lender. This is consistent with the Securities and Exchange Board
of India's circular dated March 31, 2017, for credit rating
agencies.

COMPANY PROFILE

Incorporated in 1989, RTPL is engaged in the trading of timber and
plywood.


S.S. CONSTRUCTIONS: CRISIL Moves B- Debt Rating to Not Coop.
------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of S.S.
Constructions (SSC) to 'CRISIL B-/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not
cooperating'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Bank Guarantee         4         CRISIL A4 (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Overdraft              3         CRISIL B-/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with SSC for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated May 13, 2020 and May
18, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of SSC, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on SSC is consistent
with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for Assessing
Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of SSC to 'CRISIL B-/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not
cooperating'.

Established in 2010, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh-based, SSC, a
partnership of Mr Manoj Kumar and Mr Vinod Kumar, undertakes civil
construction projects.

SARASWATI VEHICLES: CRISIL Moves B+ Debt Ratings to Not Coop.
-------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of Saraswati
Vehicles LLP (SVL) to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not
cooperating'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Bank Guarantee         .2        CRISIL A4 (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Cash Credit           9.7        CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Proposed Cash         1.6        CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
   Credit Limit                     COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with SVL for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated May 13, 2020 and May
18, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of SVL, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on SVL is consistent
with 'Scenario 2' outlined in the 'Framework for Assessing
Consistency of Information with CRISIL BBB' category or lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of SVL to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not
cooperating'.

SVL is a partnership firm established in July 2009 and founded by
Mr Satyam Agarwal and Ms Shyama Agarwal in Mirzapur. The firm has
distributorship of tractors manufactured by Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd
and New Holland India, and passenger cars of Maruti Suzuki India
Ltd.

SARVESH RICE: CRISIL Keeps 'D' Debt Ratings in Not Cooperating
--------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL Ratings said the rating for the bank facilities of Sarvesh
Rice Mill Private Limited (SRMPL) continues to remain in the
'Issuer Not Cooperating' category.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Bank Guarantee        0.50       CRISIL D (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING)

   Cash Credit           5.25       CRISIL D (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING)

   Proposed Term Loan    3.55       CRISIL D (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING)

   Term Loan            10.70       CRISIL D (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with SRMPL for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated October 15, 2019 and
April 30, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of SRMPL, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on SRMPL is
consistent with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for
Assessing Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or
lower'.

Based on the last available information, the ratings on bank
facilities of SRMPL continues to be 'CRISIL D/CRISIL D Issuer not
cooperating'.

SRMPL, incorporated in 2009, processes par-boiled rice at its
facility in Bardhaman, West Bengal. Its operations are managed by
Mr. Ritesh Agarwal and Ms. Vasudha Agarwal.

SATYA EXPORTS: CRISIL Migrates B+ Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of Satya Exports
(SE) to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not cooperating'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Cash Credit            5         CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Export Packing         7         CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
   Credit                           COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Letter of Credit       1         CRISIL A4 (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Proposed Long Term     0.5       CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
   Bank Loan Facility               COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Standby Line           0.5       CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
   of Credit                        COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with SE for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated May 13, 2020 and
May 18, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of SE, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on SE is consistent
with 'Scenario 2' outlined in the 'Framework for Assessing
Consistency of Information with CRISIL BBB' category or lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of SE to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not
cooperating'.

SE was set up in 2000 as a partnership firm by Mr Nunna Venkata
Sudhakar and his family. Based in Prakasam in Andhra Pradesh, SE
processes and exports granite and quartz.

SHREEJI FOODS: CRISIL Lowers Rating on INR16cr Loan to 'B+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has revised the ratings on bank facilities of Shreeji Foods
Private Limited (SFPL) to 'CRISIL B+/Stable Issuer not cooperating'
from 'CRISIL BB-/Stable'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Overdraft              16        CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Revised from
                                    'CRISIL BB-/Stable ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING')

CRISIL has been consistently following up with SFPL for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated October 15, 2019 and
April 17, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of SFPL, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on SFPL is
consistent with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for
Assessing Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or
lower'.

Based on the last available information, the ratings on bank
facilities of SFPL revised to 'CRISIL B+/Stable Issuer not
cooperating' from 'CRISIL BB-/Stable'.

Established in 1993 as a proprietorship firm as 'Shreeji
Enterprises' and later reconstituted as a private limited company
in 2007, SFPL is engaged into trading of dairy products like
skimmed milk powder (SMP), butter, cream and ghee. Based in
Hyderabad (Telangana), the company is promoted and managed by Mr.
Samir R Damani and Mr.Dhaval R Damani.

SHRI SHANKAR SAHAKARI: CRISIL Keeps D Debt Rating in Not Coop.
--------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL Ratings said the rating for the bank facilities of Shri
Shankar Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Limited (SSSSKL) continues to
remain in the 'Issuer Not Cooperating' category.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Short Term Loan        25        CRISIL D (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with SSSSKL for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated October 15, 2019 and
April 30, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of SSSSKL, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on SSSSKL is
consistent with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for
Assessing Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or
lower'.

Based on the last available information, the ratings on bank
facilities of SSSSKL continues to be 'CRISIL D Issuer not
cooperating'.

SSSSKL was established in 1968 as a co-operative society by the
late Mr. Shankarrao Mohite-Patil. Its manufacturing facility is at
Sadashivnagar in Solapur, Maharashtra. It has installed sugar cane
crushing capacity of 2500 tonne per day, a 30-kilolitre-per-day
distillery, and a 20-megawatt cogeneration plant.


SHRI SWAMI SAMARTH: CRISIL Moves B Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating
------------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of Shri Swami
Samarth Shetkari Wa Vinkari Sahakari Soot Girni Niyamit (SS
Samarth) to 'CRISIL B/Stable Issuer not cooperating'.

                        Amount
   Facilities         (INR Crore)   Ratings
   ----------         -----------   -------
   Proposed Long Term     2.34      CRISIL B/Stable (ISSUER NOT
   Bank Loan Facility               COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Working Capital        8.00      CRISIL B/Stable (ISSUER NOT
   Facility                         COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with SS Samarth for
obtaining information through letters and emails dated May 13, 2020
and May 18, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of SS Samarth, which restricts
CRISIL's ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's
credit quality. CRISIL believes information available on SS Samarth
is consistent with 'Scenario 2' outlined in the 'Framework for
Assessing Consistency of Information with CRISIL BBB' category or
lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of SS Samarth to 'CRISIL B/Stable Issuer not
cooperating'.

Samarth Shetkari was set up in 1984 as a co-operative society. It
manufactures cotton yarn in Sholapur, Maharashtra, and is currently
chaired by Mr Gurunath Raju Shivdare.

SRI SAI SRINIVASA: CRISIL Moves B Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of Sri Sai
Srinivasa Agro Tech Industries (SSSAI) to 'CRISIL B/Stable Issuer
not cooperating'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Cash Credit            5.5       CRISIL B/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Proposed Long Term     0.5       CRISIL B/Stable (ISSUER NOT
   Bank Loan Facility               COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with SSSAI for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated May 13, 2020 and May
18, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of SSSAI, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on SSSAI is
consistent with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for
Assessing Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or
lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of SSSAI to 'CRISIL B/Stable Issuer not cooperating'.

Incorporated in 2009, SSSAI mills and processes paddy into rice.
The manufacturing plant is in Renigunta, Telangana. Mr. Shashi
Kiran and Mr. Uday Kiran and their families are the partners.

STRONG BONDS: CRISIL Migrates B+ Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating
----------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of Strong Bonds
Polyseal Private Limited (SBPPL) to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4
Issuer not cooperating'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Cash Credit            4         CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Letter of Credit       1         CRISIL A4 (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with SBPPL for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated February 29, 2020 and
March 19, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of SBPPL, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on SBPPL is
consistent with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for
Assessing Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or
lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of SBPPL to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not
cooperating'.

Incorporated in August 1990, West Bengal-based SBPPL, manufactures
synthetic resin, which is primarily used in fibre reinforced
plastic components. The company however commenced operations in
1992. Mr Sumit Datta and Mr Mainak Datta are the directors.

SUBHANI SEEDS: CRISIL Migrates B+ Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of Subhani Seeds
(SS) to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not cooperating'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Overdraft              5         CRISIL A4 (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Proposed Long Term     3         CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
   Bank Loan Facility               COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with SS for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated February 29, 2020 and
March 19, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of SS, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on SS is consistent
with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for Assessing
Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of SS to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not
cooperating'.

SS was established in 2004 as a proprietorship firm, based in
Kurnool, Andhra Pradesh by Mr. Mohamooda Bee. The firm trades in
various agricultural commodities such as pulses, seeds, etc.

SUN-TECH TRANSFORMERS: CRISIL Moves B Debt Ratings to Not Coop.
---------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of Sun-Tech
Transformers (ST) to 'CRISIL B/Stable Issuer not cooperating'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Bill Discounting      5          CRISIL A4 (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Cash Credit           1.5        CRISIL B/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Proposed Long Term    0.5        CRISIL B/Stable (ISSUER NOT
   Bank Loan Facility               COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with ST for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated February 29, 2020 and
March 19, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of ST, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on ST is consistent
with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for Assessing
Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of ST to 'CRISIL B/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not
cooperating'.

ST was established in 1991 as a partnership firm, and is currently
managed by Mr Chandrasekaran, Mr Siva Kumar, and Ms Ambika. The
firm assembles and sells transformers to TNEB.

SUPREME PACKERS: CRISIL Assigns 'B' Rating to INR1.5cr Loan
-----------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has assigned its 'CRISIL B/Stable' rating to the long-term
bank facility of Supreme Packers (SP).

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Cash Credit           1.5        CRISIL B/Stable (Assigned)

The rating reflects the firm's exposure to intense competition in
the paper manufacturing industry and to risk associated with its
ongoing project. These weaknesses are partially offset by the
extensive industry experience of SP's partners.

Key Rating Drivers & Detailed Description

Weaknesses

* Exposure to intense competition resulting in modest profitability
margins: The flexible paper packaging industry is highly fragmented
because of low entry barrier following small capital and technology
requirements, low gestation period, easy availability of raw
materials, and lack of product differentiation.

* Susceptibility to moderate project risk: The firm is undertaking
a capital expenditure programme of INR10 crore in the next fiscal
to add capacity and improve productivity. Timely project completion
and stabilisation of operations are key rating sensitivity factors.
Disbursement of term loans and working capital facility on time and
funding support from the partners will also remain critical.

Strength

* Extensive experience of the partners: Presence of over 20 years
in the paper packaging industry has enabled the partners to
understand market dynamics and establish healthy relationships with
suppliers and customers.

Liquidity Stretched

Cash accrual of over INR46 lakh yearly will tightly match yearly
term debt obligation of INR45-64 lakh in fiscals 2021 and 2022.
Bank limit utilisation is expected to remain high over the medium
term to support increasing working capital requirement. Funding
support from the partners is likely to provide cushion to liquidity
and will remain a key monitorable.

Outlook: Stable

CRISIL believes SP will continue to benefit from the extensive
experience of its partners and established relationships with
clients.

Rating Sensitivity factors

Upward factors

* Sustained growth in revenue while maintaining profitability,
leading to cash accrual over INR1 crore

* Lower-than-expected bank limit utilisation providing cushion to
liquidity

Downward factors

* Delay in project execution or slower-than-expected ramp up
resulting in accrual below INR40 lakh

* Decline in operating profitability

SP was established in 1995 as a partnership firm by Mr Vinay
Aggarwal and Mr Hetram Aggarwal. It manufactures paper and paper
products such as corrugated boxes at its facility in Haryana.

SWASTIC INDUSTRIES: CRISIL Cuts Rating on INR6.50cr Loan to B+
--------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has revised the ratings on bank facilities of Swastic
Industries (SI) to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not
cooperating' from 'CRISIL BB-/Stable/CRISIL A4+'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Bank Guarantee        .15        CRISIL A4 (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Revised from
                                    'CRISIL A4+ ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING')

   Cash Credit          6.50        CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Revised from
                                    'CRISIL BB-/Stable ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING')

   Term Loan             .59        CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Revised from
                                    'CRISIL BB-/Stable ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING')

CRISIL has been consistently following up with SI for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated October 15, 2019 and
April 30, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of SI, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on SI is consistent
with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for Assessing
Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or lower'.

Based on the last available information, the ratings on bank
facilities of SI revised to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not
cooperating' from 'CRISIL BB-/Stable/CRISIL A4+'.

Established in 1986, as a partnership firm, SI manufactures
irrigation equipment and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipes and
fittings at its facility in Dhulagarh, West Bengal and Raipur,
Chhattisgarh. Mr. Mayur Jhawar and Ms. Kusum Jhawar are the
partners of the firm and activities are managed by Mr. Mayur
Jhawar. The firm sells its products under the brand 'Swastic'.

TAIKO PLASTIC: CRISIL Migrates B Debt Ratings to Not Cooperating
----------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of Taiko Plastic
Technologies Private Limited (TPTPL) to 'CRISIL B/Stable Issuer not
cooperating'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Cash Credit           3.5        CRISIL B/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Term Loan            11.5        CRISIL B/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with TPTPL for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated February 29, 2020 and
March 19, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of TPTPL, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on TPTPL is
consistent with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for
Assessing Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or
lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of TPTPL to 'CRISIL B/Stable Issuer not cooperating'.

Incorporated in 2017, TPTPL is setting up a unit to manufacture
tarpaulin in Valsad, Gujrat. The company is promoted by Mr. Hemant
Phatak and Ms. Rituja Phatak who have more than 2 decades of
experience in manufacturing of tarpaulin.

TIRUMALA AUTOMOTIVES: CRISIL Moves B+ Debt Ratings to Not Coop.
---------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of Tirumala
Automotives (TA) to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not
cooperating'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Bank Guarantee        3.15       CRISIL A4 (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Channel Financing     2.35       CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Open Cash Credit     11.50       CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with TA for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated May 13, 2020 and May
18, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of TA, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on TA is consistent
with 'Scenario 4' outlined in the 'Framework for Assessing
Consistency of Information'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of TA to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not
cooperating'.

Incorporated in September, 2012, and based in Ongole (Andhra
Pradesh), TA is a sole authorized dealer of BAL for 2 wheelers and
3 wheelers in Prakasam and Chittor district, respectively. It is
also the sole authorized dealer of John deere tractors in Prakasam
and Chittoor district and of TML for passenger vehicles in Praksam
district. The firm is managed by Mr. K Sridhar.

UHK MANPOWER: CRISIL Migrates B+ Debt Rating to Not Cooperating
---------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank facilities of UHK Manpower
Services Private Limited (UHK) to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4
Issuer not cooperating'.

                        Amount
   Facilities         (INR Crore)   Ratings
   ----------         -----------   -------
   Proposed Long Term       3       CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
   Bank Loan Facility               COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

   Proposed Short Term      2       CRISIL A4 (ISSUER NOT
   Bank Loan Facility               COOPERATING; Rating Migrated)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with UHK for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated May 13, 2020 and May
18, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of UHK, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on UHK is consistent
with 'Scenario 2' outlined in the 'Framework for Assessing
Consistency of Information with CRISIL BBB' category or lower'.

Therefore, on account of inadequate information and lack of
management cooperation, CRISIL has migrated the rating on bank
facilities of UHK to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer not
cooperating'.

UHK, incorporated in 2001 by Mr Uttam Mistry, is a Kolkata company
that provides facility service management such as manpower
management.

XL LABORATORIES: CRISIL Lowers Rating on INR6.0cr Loan to B+
------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL has revised the ratings on bank facilities of XL
Laboratories Private Limited (XLPL) to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4
Issuer not cooperating' from 'CRISIL BB/Stable/CRISIL A4+'.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Bank Guarantee        1.5        CRISIL A4 (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Revised from
                                    'CRISIL A4+ ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING')

   Cash Credit            .1        CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Revised from
                                    'CRISIL BB ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING')

   Export Packing        6.0        CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
   Credit                           COOPERATING; Revised from
                                    'CRISIL BB ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING')

   Proposed Long Term    1.84       CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
   Bank Loan Facility               COOPERATING; Revised from
                                    'CRISIL BB ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING')

   Proposed Term Loan    2          CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Revised from
                                    'CRISIL BB ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING')

   Term Loan             4.04       CRISIL B+/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING; Revised from
                                    'CRISIL BB ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING')

CRISIL has been consistently following up XLPL for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated December 31, 2019 and
April 11, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of XLPL, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on XLPL is
consistent with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for
Assessing Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or
lower'.

Based on the last available information, the ratings on bank
facilities of XLPL revised to 'CRISIL B+/Stable/CRISIL A4 Issuer
not cooperating' from 'CRISIL BB/Stable/CRISIL A4+'.

XLPL was set up in 2000 by Mr Ashok Bhargava. The company
manufactures pharmaceutical products at its facilities in Bhiwadi
(Rajasthan). XLPL sells these products under its XL brand.

YUGA BUILDERS: CRISIL Keeps 'B Debt Rating in Not Cooperating
-------------------------------------------------------------
CRISIL Ratings said the rating for the bank facilities of Yuga
Builders (YB) continues to remain in the 'Issuer Not Cooperating'
category.

                      Amount
   Facilities       (INR Crore)     Ratings
   ----------       -----------     -------
   Term Loan             13.5       CRISIL B/Stable (ISSUER NOT
                                    COOPERATING)

CRISIL has been consistently following up with YB for obtaining
information through letters and emails dated October 15, 2019 and
April 11, 2020 among others, apart from telephonic communication.
However, the issuer has remained non cooperative.

'The investors, lenders and all other market participants should
exercise due caution while using the rating assigned/reviewed with
the suffix 'ISSUER NOT COOPERATING'. These ratings lack a forward
looking component as it is arrived at without any management
interaction and is based on best available or limited or dated
information on the company.

Detailed Rationale

Despite repeated attempts to engage with the management, CRISIL
failed to receive any information on either the financial
performance or strategic intent of YB, which restricts CRISIL's
ability to take a forward looking view on the entity's credit
quality. CRISIL believes information available on YB is consistent
with 'Scenario 1' outlined in the 'Framework for Assessing
Consistency of Information with CRISIL BB' category or lower'.

Based on the last available information, the ratings on bank
facilities of YB continues to be 'CRISIL B/Stable Issuer not
cooperating'.

Set up in 2006, YB is a partnership firm and an equal joint venture
between Yuga Homes Ltd (YHL) and Consolidated Construction
Consortium Ltd (CCCL). The firm develops residential real estate in
Chennai. Operations are managed by Mr. R Viswanathan.



=================
I N D O N E S I A
=================

GARUDA INDONESIA: Narrowly Avoided Default w/ $500M Bond Extension
------------------------------------------------------------------
Nikkei Asian Review reports that Indonesia's flagship carrier
Garuda Indonesia has narrowly avoided defaulting on its $500
million Islamic bonds after agreeing with its creditors to extend
the maturity of the debt.

The Nikkei says the deal was agreed on June 10 in a virtual meeting
between the company and its bondholders. A statement from Garuda
said that creditors holding $454 million, or 90.88% of the
outstanding amount, voted in favor of the company proposal of a
three-year extension.

According to the Nikkei, the agreement offers a glimmer of hope in
an industry that has been devastated by the coronavirus pandemic.
For the state-controlled carrier, the deal has allowed it to escape
the fate that awaits Thai Airways International, which is facing a
major overhaul under Thai bankruptcy proceedings, the report says.

The Islamic bonds, or sukuk, were issued in 2015, and matured on
June 3, with a seven-day grace period, the Nikkei discloses.

The report says Garuda announced last year that it would issue
sukuk bonds to refinance the $500 million debt, but the sale was
canceled after the company was unable to complete procedures in
time.

When CEO Irfan Setiaputra took charge at Garuda in January, the
carrier seemed to have turned a corner after it reported a modest
profit of $6.9 million last year, following two straight years of
losses. But by this time, the coronavirus outbreak was spreading
across Southeast Asia, the report relates.

The new CEO -- the company's fifth since 2014 -- found he had a
problem on his hands that no other chief at any airline had ever
faced before.

Garuda has yet to disclose its first-quarter earnings, but a
company insider told the Nikkei Asian Review previously that as a
result of travel bans across the world, operating revenue in the
first three months of the year likely "decreased by approximately
33%" from a year ago.

Garuda was hit particularly hard by Saudi Arabia's suspension of
pilgrimages to Mecca and its own government's travel ban to and
from China. Mecca trips typically make up 15% of the carrier's
revenues, while China travel accounts for another 5%.

A company document released in May showed that the number of
passengers fell 45% year-on-year in the first four months of 2020.
It said that operating revenue plunged 89% in April from a year
ago.

"The pandemic has also led to negative cash flows," according to
the statement cited by the Nikkei.

According to the Nikkei, Indonesia has begun loosening its
coronavirus restrictions, and domestic flights are now allowed to
operate at a 70% capacity from 50% before, the transportation
ministry said on June 9. But passengers will need to prove they
have tested negative for COVID-19. This will be a major challenge
in a country where testing capabilities are limited and as such,
passenger numbers are unlikely to recover for some time.

That puts Garuda between a rock and a hard place, the report says.
Even with the extension of the $500 million sukuk bonds, it still
has $1 billion dollars worth of long- and short-term debt that will
mature by the end of this year, the Nikkei relates citing data from
FactSet. At the end of 2019, the airline had just $299 million in
cash and cash equivalents.

The Nikkei notes that Setiaputra has taken measures to reduce
overheads, including the firing of 135 contract pilots. The company
is also looking to double down on its cargo business, with the aim
of increasing revenue from this segment by 10% this year to partly
offset low passenger demand.

The government has promised Garuda IDR8.5 trillion ($600 million)
in soft loans, which it wants to deploy as "working capital,
efficiencies plans, and to make Garuda be more competitive with a
healthier cost structure," according to Setiaputra, the Nikkei
relays. The cash injection is expected within the third quarter of
this year.

But Setiaputra is hoping that Garuda will receive the injection
sooner, pointing to the company's depleting resources. He told
media in an online conference on June 5: "Garuda's condition is now
getting very critical," the Nikkei relays.

Headquartered in Jakarta, Indonesia, government-owned airline PT
Garuda Indonesia -- http://www.garuda-indonesia.com/-- currently
has a fleet of about 77 aircraft offering service to some 27
domestic and 33 international destinations.  Under its Citilink
brand, it serves 10 other domestic routes.  Garuda also ships about
200,000 tons of cargo a month and operates a computerized tracking
system.



=========
J A P A N
=========

MITSUI E&S: Egan-Jones Lowers FC Senior Unsecured Rating to CCC
---------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on June 2, 2020, downgraded the foreign
currency senior unsecured rating on debt issued by Mitsui E&S
Holdings Corporation to CCC from CCC+.

Headquartered in Japan, Mitsui E&S Holdings Co., Ltd. offers
shipbuilding services. The Company mainly builds and repairs
ships.



TOKYO ELECTRIC: Egan-Jones Lowers Senior Unsecured Ratings to BB
----------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on June 4, 2020, downgraded the foreign
currency and local currency senior unsecured ratings on debt issued
by Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings to BB from BB+.

Headquartered Chiyoda City, Tokyo, Japan, Tokyo Electric Power
Company Holdings, Incorporated generates, transmits, and
distributes electricity.


UNITIKA LTD: Egan-Jones Lowers Senior Unsecured Ratings to CCC+
---------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on June 5, 2020, downgraded the foreign
currency and local currency senior unsecured ratings on debt issued
by Unitika Limited to CCC+ from B-.

Headquartered in Osaka, Japan, Unitika Limited manufactures and
sells synthetic fibers and textile products used as apparel and
industrial materials.




=========
M A C A U
=========

MGM CHINA: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to New Senior Notes Due 2025
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB-' issue-level rating to
Macau-based casino resort owner and operator MGM China Holdings
Ltd.'s proposed senior notes due 2025 and placed the issue-level
rating on CreditWatch with negative implications. MGM China
Holdings Ltd. is a majority owned subsidiary of MGM Resorts
International.

S&P expects the company to use the proceeds from the proposed notes
to repay a portion of the outstanding borrowings under its
revolving credit facility and for general corporate purposes,
including to bolster its liquidity amid the COVID-19 pandemic. As
of May 31, 2020, MGM China had total available liquidity of about
$941 million, including $265 million in cash and $676 million of
available revolver capacity. The company estimates that its monthly
cash outflows in a zero-revenue scenario total about $65 million,
including run-rate operating costs, development and maintenance
capital expenditure, and interest expense. Pro forma for the
proposed notes and assuming an offering size of $500 million, MGM
China has extended its liquidity runway to approximately 22 months
in an almost zero revenue environment compared with about 14.5
months as of May 31, 2020.

The CreditWatch listing reflects the significant anticipated stress
on MGM Resorts' revenue and cash flow across its portfolio this
year. S&P said, "We could lower our ratings on MGM Resorts and MGM
China over the near term if we no longer believe the coronavirus
will be contained by mid-year and travel restrictions lifted such
that we expect its properties can begin to recover and leverage can
recover inside of rating thresholds. We plan to resolve the
CreditWatch placement when we can evaluate how the continued travel
and visa restrictions and property closures might affect Macau, Las
Vegas, and regional gaming visitation and revenue this year, as
well as how the global recession, the continued implementation of
social distancing and other health and safety measures, and
potential lingering travel fears might affect consumer
discretionary spending at the company's casinos in 2020 and 2021.
We also plan to assess how quickly MGM's EBITDA and cash flow
generation might recover later this year and into next year as well
as how quickly the company's credit measures will improve following
the significant spike in its leverage in 2020. In the event we
conclude that it is unlikely MGM Resorts will be able to improve
consolidated leverage below 5.5x in 2021, we could lower our
ratings on parent MGM Resorts and potentially MGM China."

ISSUE RATINGS--SUBORDINATION RISK ANALYSIS

S&P said, "We apply our subordination risk criteria to rate MGM
China's unsecured notes in lieu of assigning recovery ratings
because we do not assign recovery ratings to debt issued in Macau.
Macau is a jurisdiction for which we have not published an
insolvency report and have not ranked because, to date, there is
limited historical precedent for a large-scale bankruptcy filing of
a foreign-owned entity in Macau. The jurisdiction is a special
administrative region of the People's Republic of China.
Furthermore, even if lenders have a good claim with a registerable
interest in the real estate, we believe there is significant
uncertainty surrounding the application of the insolvency process
and lenders' ability to realize asset value in this jurisdiction."

Capital structure

MGM China's capital structure solely comprises unsecured debt,
including two revolvers and several series of unsecured notes.
Analytical conclusions

S&P rates the unsecured notes 'BB-', the same level as its issuer
credit rating on MGM China, because there are no significant
elements of subordination risk present in its capital structure.




=====================
N E W   Z E A L A N D
=====================

ANTARES RESTAURANT: BK Failed Under Debt Weight, Low Profit Margins
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Stuff.co.nz reports that Burger King's fall in New Zealand was
driven by debt and a lack of innovation, experts say.

Stuff, citing Stastica.com, relates that globally the
American-owned giant has about 18,800 restaurants, earning US$1.78
billion (NZ$2.9 billion) in revenue in 2019.  But in April, the
company that owns the Burger King franchisor in New Zealand was
placed in receivership by its financiers.

After negotiations with landlords, creditors and the franchise
holder, a compromise was reached, allowing the restaurants to
remain open while a buyer was found, according to Stuff.

Five Burger King restaurants, Lambton Quay, Courtenay Place in
Wellington and Queen Street, Takapuna and West City in Auckland,
will be closed as part of the deal, the report relays.

So where did it go so wrong for one of the most recognizable fast
food brands in the world?, Stuff says.

Burger King opened in New Zealand in 1993, and had 83 restaurants
employing more than 2,600 staff.  

The chain held 14.9 per cent of the competitive fast food market in
2018, Stuff discloses citing research company Roy Morgan.

Burger King sat just behind Domino's pizza chain which held 15 per
cent of the market and KFC, with 17.7 per cent, but well behind
McDonald's 33.3 per cent, the report notes.

The franchise was owned by Antares Restaurant Group, which was
bought by US private equity firm Blackstone Group in 2011.

But Infometrics senior economist Brad Olsen said Burger King in New
Zealand struggled to be more than a cheap option with razor-thin
margins, Stuff relates.

"That low cost structure is very hard to maintain for many
businesses and certainly for Burger King, those low margins have
been quite difficult, particularly as we have higher minimum wage
increases coming through in recent years," Stuff quotes Mr. Olsen
as saying.

Other fast food restaurants, like McDonald's, have turned towards
slightly more premium products to draw in customers, Mr. Olsen
said.

McDonald's added premium burgers to its menu in 2003, including
larger burgers, salads and barista coffee.

Burger King has remained, in many people's minds, as the more
budget conscious option, with its NZ$5 burgers and a menu that
didn't change for a long time, Mr. Olsen, as cited by Stuff, said.

"That's hard with the minimum wage increase and a lot of the
margins on Burger King's offerings are relatively low. All those
things have coupled together to make it a very hard operating
environment."

The spread of the coronavirus and subsequent lockdown could well
have been the thing to tip it over, Mr. Olsen said, adds Stuff.



=================
S I N G A P O R E
=================

HYFLUX LTD: Lenders Seek to Put Firm Under Judicial Management
--------------------------------------------------------------
Marissa Lee at The Business Times reports that a group of bank
lenders is seeking to put Hyflux under judicial management (JM),
after two years of a court-sanctioned restructuring process that
has continued to leave creditors empty-handed.

An unsecured working group (UWG) of banks comprising Mizuho, KfW,
Bangkok Bank, BNP Paribas, Standard Chartered Bank, CTBC Bank and
the Korea Development Bank plans to revive their earlier
application to be carved out of Hyflux's debt moratorium, a
Singapore High Court heard during Hyflux's case management
conference on June 11, BT relates.

Hyflux is currently under a debt moratorium under Section 211B of
the Companies Act, which gives it court protection from creditors
until July 30.

If a carve-out is approved, the UWG banks plan to file an
application to appoint judicial managers over Hyflux to replace the
present management, according to BT.

BT relates that the UWG had first applied for a carve-out in May
last year, but failed to win approval from the court. Hyflux
resisted the application, arguing that judicial management
applications often end with the company in liquidation.

However, Justice Aedit Abdullah said last year that the application
could be revived if circumstances change. "A moratorium is supposed
to be a temporary solution," he said then, adding that Hyflux
cannot be given a "blank cheque".

Hyflux's next pre-trial conference is expected to take place by
July 30, before the moratorium expires, the report notes.

                           About Hyflux

Singapore-based Hyflux Ltd -- https://www.hyflux.com/ -- provides
various solutions in water and energy areas worldwide. The company
operates through two segments, Municipal and Industrial. The
Municipal segment supplies a range of infrastructure solutions,
including water, power, and waste-to-energy to municipalities and
governments. The Industrial segment supplies infrastructure
solutions for water to industrial customers.  It has business
operations across Asia, Middle East and Africa.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Asia Pacific on May
24, 2018, Hyflux Ltd. said that the Company and five of its
subsidiaries, namely Hydrochem (S) Pte Ltd, Hyflux Engineering Pte
Ltd, Hyflux Membrane Manufacturing (S) Pte. Ltd., Hyflux Innovation
Centre Pte. Ltd. and Tuaspring Pte. Ltd. have applied to the High
Court of the Republic of Singapore pursuant to Section 211B(1) of
the Singapore Companies Act to commence a court supervised process
to reorganize their liabilities and businesses.  The Company said
it is taking this step in order to protect the value of its
businesses while it reorganises its liabilities.

The Company engaged WongPartnership LLP as legal advisors and Ernst
& Young Solutions LLP as financial advisors in this process. On
Jan. 29, WongPartnership applied to discharge themselves due to
difficulties relating to "loss of confidence and good cause" in
working with the client.  The Company subsequently appointed
Clifford Chance and Cavenagh Law as its legal advisers in WongP's
place.

In November 2019, Hyflux entered into a restructuring deal with
United Arab Emirates-based utility Utico FZC, according to Reuters.



=================
S R I   L A N K A
=================

BIMPUTH FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Nat'l LT Rating to B+(lka), Outlook Neg
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings Lanka has downgraded Bimputh Finance PLC's National
Long-Term Rating to 'B+(lka)' from 'BB-(lka)'. The Outlook is
Negative. The rating action is driven by the deterioration of
Bimputh's credit profile, even though the action follows the
recalibration of the Sri Lankan National Ratings scale. The
recalibration reflects changes in the relative creditworthiness
among Sri Lankan issuers following Fitch's downgrade of the
sovereign rating to 'B-'/Negative from 'B'/Negative on April 24,
2020.

The downgrade of Bimputh's rating mainly reflects a further
significant capital impairment resulting in losses at the
pre-impairment operating profit level and increasing credit costs,
which are significantly higher than its previous expectations.

The Negative Outlook reflects the possibility for further downside
risks from the economic fallout from the coronavirus outbreak. The
economic fallout is likely to exacerbate the capital impairment
through further pressure on Bimputh's already-weak profitability,
and heightened risk to its funding profile.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Bimputh's rating reflects its higher-than-peer leverage due to weak
capitalization and profitability, and increased pressure on funding
conditions. The rating also captures its weakening asset quality,
which Fitch believes could intensify in the current challenging
operating environment.

Fitch believes Bimputh's current capitalization and leverage is not
commensurate with its high-risk appetite stemming from its
substantial exposure to microfinancing and SME lending, which tends
to be more vulnerable to economic conditions. Fitch sees a risk
that Bimputh's leverage - measured by the debt/tangible equity
ratio - may rise further to above 10x in the medium term if
profitability remains weak, particularly in light of current
adverse operating conditions. Bimputh's leverage has already been
on an increasing trend due mainly to continued losses in the
financial year ended March 2019 (FY19) and 9MFY20, where the ratio
spiked to 8.7x by end-3QFY20 from 4.6x at FYE18 (FYE19: 6.5x).

Furthermore, sharp erosion of Bimputh's equity has widened the
required new equity capital to meet the Sri Lankan regulator's
enhanced capital requirement of LKR2.5 billion by the extended
deadline December 31, 2021. Fitch estimates that Bimputh requires
around LKR 1.6 billion to meet the final threshold, which is higher
than its previous estimate of LKR 1.35 billion at FYE19. Fitch
believes that the prospects of a capital infusion are hindered by
the pandemic and Bimputh's weak operating performance.

Fitch expects Bimputh's asset quality to weaken further on the back
of economic fallout of coronavirus outbreak. Bimputh entered the
crisis with a significantly weaker asset-quality position than its
better-rated peers. Sharp accumulation of bad loans and contraction
of the loan book pushed Bimputh's reported six-month regulatory
gross non-performing loan (NPL) ratio to 27.6% by end-3QFY20 - the
weakest NPL ratio among Fitch-rated peers - from 16.8% at FYE19.
Loan-loss allowance coverage remains weak, covering around 56% of
NPLs and exposing Bimputh to greater provisioning risk.

Bimputh's profitability is likely to remain negative in the short
to medium term, due to weak pre-impairment operating profits (PPOP)
and rising credit costs, putting pressure on the company's thin
capital buffers. Pressure on loan growth and declining interest
rates has squeezed Bimputh's PPOP buffers, reducing its ability to
absorb rising credit costs. Consequently, Bimputh's pretax return
on assets ratio further weakened to -6.2% by end 3QFY20 from -3.5%
at FYE19.

Fitch expects Bimputh's weak financial profile and the current
stressed market conditions to weigh on its funding and liquidity
profile. Bimputh's share of unsecured debt in its funding mix
continued to decline alongside a contracting deposit base, further
reducing its financial flexibility. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka
(CBSL) has imposed regulatory sanctions on Bimputh by way of a
deposit cap of LKR 2.05 billion due to the non-compliance with the
interim minimum capital requirement.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Positive rating action appears unlikely in the near term in light
of the ongoing macroeconomic pressure and its expectation of
further deterioration in the company's credit profile. In the
longer term, an upgrade is contingent on a sustained improvement in
Bimputh's credit metrics, especially its capital buffers, to be
more commensurate with its risk appetite, stronger pre-impairment
profit and better asset quality through an economic cycle.

The Outlook would be revised to Stable if Fitch assesses that the
downside risks to Bimputh's credit profile have abated, especially
where there is structural improvement in profitability and
normalisation of asset quality, reducing pressure on its capital
buffers.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Further capital impairment due to sustained deterioration of
profitability and asset quality, in the absence of a material
capital infusion, may trigger negative rating action. The inability
to raise new capital to meet regulatory requirements could also
lead to operational and funding-access constraints that would be
negative for the rating.

Issuer Disclosure on Regulatory Action

A deposits cap of LKR 2.05 Billion has been placed by the CBSL
until Bimputh meets the required core capital as per the CBSL
Direction No. 02 of 2017 - Minimum Core Capital.

The "Issuer Disclosure on Regulatory Action" sub-heading was
provided by the issuer and is included pursuant to applicable
regulatory requirements. Fitch Ratings Lanka is not responsible for
the contents of such information.

IDEAL FINANCE: Fitch Upgrades National LT Rating to BB-(lka)
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings Lanka has upgraded Ideal Finance Limited's National
Long-Term Rating to 'BB-(lka)', from 'B+(lka)'. The rating is on
Rating Watch Positive (RWP).

The upgrade is supported by an improved credit profile, but follows
the recalibration of Sri Lanka's national ratings scale to reflect
changes in the relative creditworthiness of Sri Lankan issuers
after Fitch downgraded the country's sovereign rating to
'B-'/Negative', from 'B'/Negative, on April 24, 2020.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade reflects improved capitalization following the
introduction of new capital after an initial LKR1.1 billion
investment in February 2020 from India's Mahindra & Mahindra
Financial Services Limited (MMFSL). This strengthens the company's
standalone profile and bolsters loss-absorption buffers against Sri
Lanka's challenging operating environment. The Central Bank of Sri
Lanka has also removed the LKR700 million cap on total deposits due
to Ideal's compliance with the interim minimum capital
requirement.

The RWP reflects Fitch's belief that Ideal's rating could benefit
from the change in shareholding and increased probability of
support once MMFSL's effective control is established in light of
MMFSL's potentially stronger credit profile. MMFSL will
progressively invest LKR2 billion (approximately USD11 million) to
acquire a 58.2% stake in Ideal in three tranches up to 2021. Fitch
expects the minimum regulatory capital requirement of LKR2.5
billion for finance companies to be met at the end of the
transaction, at which point Fitch expects MMFSL to have acquired
effective control of Ideal.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Fitch expects to resolve the RWP once Fitch concludes its
assessment of MMFSL's ability to provide support to Ideal and have
greater clarity on the linkages between Ideal and MMFSL. Fitch will
maintain the RWP beyond the typical six-month horizon, with
parental support likely to be factored into the rating once MMFSL
has acquired effective control of Ideal. Fitch's view of support
will include an assessment the level of strategic importance of the
Sri Lankan market and Ideal to MMFSL, the extent of integration,
branding and provision of broader funding support.

Fitch will remove the RWP if the investment is not completed. The
rating would then remain driven by Ideal's intrinsic credit
profile.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Ideal's rating is currently driven by its standalone profile.
Negative rating action could occur if a severe deterioration in the
operating environment, beyond its base-case expectations, were to
diminish the company's asset quality, profitability and capital
adequacy, leading to downward pressure on Ideal's standalone
profile.



===============
T H A I L A N D
===============

THAI AIRWAYS: Rehabilitation May Take Up to 7 years, Advisor Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that the rehabilitation of flag carrier Thai
Airways International Pcl may take up to seven years, the airline's
legal advisor said on June 8.

After the bankruptcy court allows the rehabilitation, its planners
may take five months to a year to draw up the plan, Kitipong
Urapeepatanapong, told a news briefing, Reuters relays. The
rehabilitation timeframe would be five years, extendable for up to
two years.

After courts approve the plan, an administrator will be appointed.
Thai Airway's first hearing is scheduled for August 17, Reuters
discloses.

"The Thai Airways rehabilitation plan should conclude within 7
years, which can include debt to equity conversions, selling assets
or an equity injection," Reuters quotes Urapeepatanapong as
saying.

                         About Thai Airways

Thai Airways International PCL (BAK:THAI) --
http://www.thaiairways.co.th/-- is the national carrier of
Thailand.  The company provides air transportation, freight and
mail services on domestic and international routes including Asia,
Europe, North America, Africa and South West Pacific. The Company
is a state enterprise which is controlled by the government and
partly owned by the public.

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Asia Pacific on May 21,
2020, Reuters said Thailand's cabinet approved a plan to
restructure troubled Thai Airways International Pcl's finances
through a bankruptcy court, the Southeast Asian country's prime
minister said on May 19.  The plan for a court-led restructuring of
the national carrier replaces a previous proposal of a
government-backed rescue package that was heavily criticised in the
country.

Thai Airways on May 27 said it appointed board members as
rehabilitation planners in a bankruptcy court submission.

Thai Airways posted losses every year after 2012, except in 2016.
In 2019, it reported losses of THB12.04 billion.


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Asia Pacific is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2020.  All rights reserved.  ISSN: 1520-9482.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed
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