TCREUR_Public/090918.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, September 18, 2009, Vol. 10, No. 185

                            Headlines

A U S T R I A

IMMOFINANZ AG: Eyes Immoeast Merger by 2010; Insolvency Risk Down
PFEIFFER PETER: Claims Filing Deadline is September 24


F R A N C E

TREES SA: Moody's Withdraws 'B2' Rating on Loan Facility


G E R M A N Y

ARCANDOR AG: Completes Sale of Thomas Cook Shares
HELLA KGAA: Moody's Comments on Results for Fiscal Year 2008/09
RUWEL GMBH: Exits From Insolvency; Has Asian Partner


I C E L A N D

KAUPTHING BANK: Debenhams Eyes Aurora's Two UK Fashion Brands


I R E L A N D

ALLIED IRISH: Seeks to Raise EUR2 Billion; NAMA to Buy Loans
INDEPENDENT NEWS: Not Selling South African Unit
KBC BANK: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on EUR5 Bil. Certificates
STANTON VINTAGE: S&P Withdraws 'D' Ratings on 5 Classes of Notes
ZOE GROUP: Court Orders Liquidation of Two Companies

* IRELAND: NAMA Proposes to Pay EUR54 Bln for Banks' Risky Loans


I T A L Y

ALITALIA SPA: Bankruptcy Commissioner to Auction Art Collection
MARIELLA BURANI: To Hold Meeting to Discuss Financing Options


K A Z A K H S T A N

BTA BANK: Tells Clients to Transfer Deposits by Oct. 16
COMMERCE COM: Creditors Must File Claims by September 24
ESIK AGRO: Creditors Must File Claims by September 24
FORBOS LLP: Creditors Must File Claims by September 24
KAZAGROGARANT JSC: S&P Downgrades Issuer Credit Rating to 'BB-'

KAZAKHSTAN TEMIR: S&P Affirms Corporate Credit Rating at 'BB+'
KAZPOST JSC: S&P Affirms Issuer Credit Rating at 'BB'
MORTGAGE GUARANTEE: S&P Downgrades Issuer Credit Rating to 'BB-'
PKF SUNKAR: Creditors Must File Claims by September 24
TURKUAZ TOURISM: Creditors Must File Claims by September 24


K Y R G Y Z S T A N

KYRGYZ RUS: Creditors Must File Claims by September 30


N E T H E R L A N D S

FORTIS BANK: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Subordinated Securities
ING GROEP: Head Says Dutch State Guarantee Meets Requirements


P O R T U G A L

BANCO COMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Bank Financial Strength Rating to D+
BANIF: Moody's Cuts Bank Financial Strength Rating to D-
CAIXA ECONOMICA: Moody's Cuts Bank Financial Strength Rating to D


R U S S I A

BLOK-S CJSC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
GLAZOVSKIY PLYWOOD: Under External Mngt Bankruptcy Procedure
KILMEZ-LES LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
MERA LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
NAV-DREV LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21

REM-SERVIS LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
SEVERSTAL OAO: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Senior Unsecured Rating
SMT-5 LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
STROITEL LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
STROY-URAL LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21

STROY-MET-KON: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
STROY-TEKH LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
TALETS-STROY LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21


S L O V A K    R E P U B L I C

SKYEUROPE HOLDING: Files for Bankruptcy Protection


S W I T Z E R L A N D

ANDASTRA HOLDING: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
BELENUS HOLDING: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
CREA GMBH: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
EICHMATT WOHNBAU: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
ELEKTRO GEBRUEDER: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21

FROIDEVAUX EICHER: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
GLORYNS AG: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
PALMEN-APOTHEKE AG: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
POLYTAG TECHNOLOGY: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
RUYSDAEL AG: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21

STRECKTECH AG: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
SUTTER CORNEL: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
VR SERVICE: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
WERZ AG: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21


T U R K E Y

VESTEL ELEKTRONIK: Fitch Affirms Issuer Default Ratings at 'B'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BANK OF SCOTLAND: Moody's Corrects Rating on Three Instruments
BRITISH AIRWAYS: To Terminate 125 Temporary Cabin Crew
BUSINESS MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Rating Class B1 & B2 Notes to 'B1'
CATTLES PLC: Completes Sale of Cattles Invoice Finance
CATTLES PLC: Talks on Standstill Agreement Progresses

CREDIT-LINKED ENHANCED: S&P Raises Rating on 6 Notes to 'CCC'
EUROHOME UK: Fitch Comments on Expected Depletion of Reserve Fund
ITV PLC: Competition Commission Retains CRR Undertakings
ITV PLC: S&P Downgrades Corporate Credit Rating to 'B+'
RMF EURO: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Tranches

UK COAL: Mulls GBP100 Mln Share Sale to Reduce Debt


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: A Short Historical Introduction to the Law of Real


                         *********



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A U S T R I A
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IMMOFINANZ AG: Eyes Immoeast Merger by 2010; Insolvency Risk Down
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Boris Groendahl at Reuters reports that Immofinanz AG still has
not found a suitable way to execute a merger with subsidiary
Immoeast AG.

Reuters relates Eduard Zehetner, CEO of both Immofinanz and
Immoeast, told Austrian newspaper WirtschaftsBlatt in an interview
"A possible timeframe is from 2010 onwards.  We are investigating
how this is legally and technically possible -- we haven't found a
solution yet."

                             Insolvency

According to Reuters, Mr. Zehetner also said the risk for
Immofinanz to become insolvent "has dropped from 90% last year to
10% " after the group slashed its development pipeline, sold
assets and restructured debt.

IMMOFINANZ AG -- http://www.immofinanz.at/-- is an Austrian real
estate company that invests in private and commercial properties.
Its core activities are the rental and overall management of its
portfolio, the identification of sound investments and the
diversification of its portfolio both geographically and across
the different sectors of the property market.  The Company focuses
on operations in German-speaking countries of Austria, Germany and
Switzerland, but is also active in Central, Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe.  As of April 30, 2009 the IMMOFINANZ AG managed a
portfolio of 1.711 properties, covering a usable floor area of
9,487,910 square meters.  Its properties include apartments,
hotels, offices, retail outlets and garages.  The Company operates
through numerous direct and indirect as well as majority owned and
wholly owned subsidiaries, including IMMOAUSTRIA Immobilien
Anlagen GmbH, IMMOEAST AG and IMMOWEST, among others.


PFEIFFER PETER: Claims Filing Deadline is September 24
------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of Pfeiffer Peter Baunebengewerbe have until
September 24, 2009, to file their proofs of claim.

A court hearing for examination of the claims has been scheduled
for October 1, 2009 at 9:00 a.m.

For further information, contact the company's administrator:

         Dr. Wilhelm Hausler
         Neunkirchner Str. 17
         2700 Wiener Neustadt
         Austria
         Tel: 02622/23221
         Fax: 02622/23221-22
         E-mail: wilhelm.haeusler@rechtsexperte.at


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F R A N C E
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TREES SA: Moody's Withdraws 'B2' Rating on Loan Facility
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's withdrew its rating of the loan facility granted to Trees
S.A. under Series 87.  Moody's has withdrawn this rating for
business reasons.

Issuer: Trees S.A.  Series 87

* Series 87 - Loan Facility, Withdrawn; previously on Apr 28, 2009
  Upgraded to B2


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G E R M A N Y
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ARCANDOR AG: Completes Sale of Thomas Cook Shares
-------------------------------------------------
Under the leadership of Bayerische Landesbank, the creditor banks
of the insolvent Arcandor AG (ISIN DE0006275001) have notified the
administrator appointed over Arcandor's assets that all of the
shares in Thomas Cook Group plc (ISIN GB00B1VYCH82) in respect of
which Arcandor and Karstadt Quelle Freizeit GmbH had granted share
charges to the financing banks in the context of the corporate
group's financing have been realized upon completely and with
legal effect for the purposes of repaying the corporate group
financing.  Neither Arcandor nor any of the entities in which it
holds an interest now hold any shares in Thomas Cook.

                      Insolvency Proceedings

On Sept. 2, 2009, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, Citing
Bloomberg News, reported that a local court in Essen formally
opened insolvency proceedings for the Arcandor on Sept. 1.
Bloomberg disclosed the proceedings started for the Arcandor
holding company and for 14 units, including the Karstadt
department-store chain and Primondo mail-order division.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, on June 9,
2009, Arcandor filed for bankruptcy protection after the German
government turned down its request for loan guarantees.  On June
8, 2009, the government rejected two applications for help by the
company, which employs 43,000 people.  The retailer sought loan
guarantees of EUR650 million (US$904 million) from Germany's
Economy Fund program.  It also sought a further EUR437 million
from a state-owned bank.

                        About Arcandor AG

Germany-based Arcandor AG (FRA:ARO) -- http://www.arcandor.com/--
formerly KarstadtQuelle AG, is a tourism and retail group.  Its
three core business areas are tourism, mail order services and
department store retail.  The Company's business areas are covered
by its three operating segments: Thomas Cook, Primondo and
Karstadt.  Thomas Cook Group plc is a tour operator with
operations in Europe and North America, set up as a result of a
merger between MyTravel and Thomas Cook AG.  It also operates the
e-commerce platform, Thomas Cook, supporting travel services.
Primondo has a portfolio of European universal and specialty mail
order companies, including the core brand Quelle.  Karstadt
operates a range of department stores, such as cosmopolitan
stores, including KaDeWe (Kaufhaus des Westens), Karstadt
Oberpollinger and Alsterhaus; Karstadt brand department stores;
Karstadt sports department stores, offering sports goods in a
variety of retail outlets, and a portal, karstadt.de that offers
online shopping, among others.


HELLA KGAA: Moody's Comments on Results for Fiscal Year 2008/09
---------------------------------------------------------------
Rainer Neidnig, Lead Analyst for Hella, said: "Hella's preliminary
results for fiscal 2008/09 are overall in line with Moody's
expectations and the current rating.  While Hella obviously could
not escape the industry downturn which resulted in a notable
decline in revenues, Moody's note positively that the reported
operating result could be maintained above break-even levels
despite the recessionary environment.  In Moody's view the main
driver for Hella's resilient performance has been the company's
aftermarket business which has proven to be less cyclical and
which management aims to develop further."

On September 15, Hella announced preliminary results for the
fiscal year 2008/09 ended May 2009.  Revenues declined by 17% to
EUR3.3 billion driven by the severe impact of the recession on new
car demand.  EBIT as reported by Hella amounted to EUR49 million.
Although this is a significant decline of EUR102 million to the
comparable figure in 2007/08, Moody's considers Hella's
performance to be resilient given the very challenging
environment.  Apart from Hella's sizeable and less cyclical
aftermarket business, Moody's views the company's swift action to
mitigate the downturn and improvements in its operating efficiency
to be the main factors that allowed maintaining operating profit
above break-even.  Although Moody's are of the opinion that the
market environment will remain challenging for Hella as incentive
driven new car demand is phasing out, Moody's continue to see the
rating adequately positioned at Ba1 with a stable outlook in light
of the announced preliminary results.

Moody's further notes that Hella successfully refinanced its core
EUR650 million syndicated credit facility (due 08/2010) with a
forward start agreement of EUR550 million with a maturity in
August 2012.  Moody's views positively that Hella has proactively
approached the 2010 maturity and considers the company's liquidity
to be adequate.

Headquartered in Lippstadt, Germany, Hella KGaA Hueck & Co is one
of the leading automotive suppliers in automotive lighting and
electronics components, and holds a strong position in the
aftermarket.  The company employs approximately 23,000 people at
70 locations in more than 30 counties.


RUWEL GMBH: Exits From Insolvency; Has Asian Partner
----------------------------------------------------
Christoph Hammerschmidt at EE Times Europe reports that Ruwel GmbH
has emerged from insolvency after BlueBay Asset Management, the
single remaining investor, found an Asian partner for the
the PCB manufacturer.

According to the EE Times, together with partner, the company
plans to establish a new business model.  EE Times relates Ruwel
marketing manager Frank Hoiboom said while the company will
continue sales, technical support and production ramp-up for PCBs
in its plant in Germany, the high-volume production will take
place in a Asia for cost reasons.

EE Times discloses the company currently has an order backlog for
at least four months of production.  It has re-hired 26 of its
former staff, and plans to add another 40 to 50 jobs over the
months to come, EE Times notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 6,
2009, Geldern, Germany-based Ruwel filed for insolvency
amid the auto industry slump, putting about 600 jobs at risk.


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I C E L A N D
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KAUPTHING BANK: Debenhams Eyes Aurora's Two UK Fashion Brands
-------------------------------------------------------------
Debenhams Plc is considering buying Karen Millen and Oasis, U.K.
fashion brands owned by Aurora Fashions Ltd., Sarah Shannon at
Bloomberg News reports, citing a person familiar with the matter.

Bloomberg recalls the clothing lines were forced into
administration when Iceland's banking system collapsed.

Aurora, held by Kaupthing Bank Hf and former managers, bought the
brands from administrators in March.  The owner of the clothing
lines before Aurora, Mosaic Fashions Hf, entered bankruptcy
protection in March following newspaper reports that it owed
creditor Kaupthing GBP450 million in the wake of Iceland's
financial crisis, Bloomberg recounts.

Bloomberg relates a spokesman at Aurora, who declined to be
identified, said Kaupthing sees the business as a long-term
investment and it has no intention of disposing of any assets.

Officials at Debenhams declined to comment.

                         About Kaupthing Bank

Headquartered in Reykjavik, Kaupthing Bank --
http://www.kaupthing.com-- is Iceland's largest bank and among
the Nordic region's 10 largest banking groups.  With operations in
more than a dozen countries, the bank offers a range of services
including retail banking, corporate finance, asset management,
brokerage, private banking, treasury, and private wealth
management.  Kaupthing was created by the 2003 merger of
Bunadarbanki and Kaupthing Bank.  In October 2008 the Icelandic
government assumed control of Kaupthing Bank after taking similar
measures with rivals Landsbanki and Glitnir.

In a ruling of the District Court of Reykjavik issued on
November 24, 2008, Kaupthing Bank hf. was granted a moratorium on
payments until February 13, 2009.  On February 19, the moratorium
was extended until November 13, 2009.  The court appointed a
Winding-up Committee for the bank on May 25, 2009, whose tasks
include dealing with claims against the bank while the moratorium
remains in effect and after winding-up proceedings have commenced
at the end of the moratorium period.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on Nov. 30, 2008,
Olafur Gardasson, assistant for Kaupthing Bank hf., in a
proceeding under Act No. 21/1991, pending before the Reykjavik
District Court, and foreign representative of the Debtor, filed a
petition under chapter 15 of title 11 of the United States Code in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York commencing the Debtor's chapter 15 case ancillary to the
Icelandic Proceeding and seeking recognition for the Icelandic
Proceeding as a "foreign main proceeding" under the Bankruptcy
Code and relief in aid of the Icelandic Proceeding.


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ALLIED IRISH: Seeks to Raise EUR2 Billion; NAMA to Buy Loans
------------------------------------------------------------
Ian Guider and Dara Doyle at Bloomberg News report that Allied
Irish Banks Plc said it may raise capital from investors and asset
sales after taking losses on loans it's selling to Ireland's
so-called bad bank.

According to Bloomberg, Allied Irish will seek to raise about EUR2
billion (US$2.94 billion).

The bank, Bloomberg discloses, will transfer EUR24 billion of
loans to Ireland's National Asset Management Agency.  Bloomberg
relates the bank said the discount on the loans it will sell to
NAMA will be less than the 30% being applied across the industry
by Irish Finance Minister Brian Lenihan.  Bloomberg relates
Mr. Lenihan said Wednesday losses on the loans will "likely" leave
some banks short of capital.

The price NAMA is paying will determine how much lenders must
write down assets on their balance sheets, Bloomberg notes.

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c., together with its subsidiaries --
http://www.aibgroup.com/-- conducts retail and commercial banking
business in Ireland.  It also provides corporate lending and
capital markets activities from its head office at Bankcentre and
from Dublin’s International Financial Services Centre.  The Group
also has overseas branches in the United States, Germany, France
and Australia, among other locations.  The business of AIB Group
is conducted through four operating divisions: AIB Bank Republic
of Ireland division, Capital Markets division, AIB Bank UK
division, and Central & Eastern Europe division.  In February
2008, the Group acquired the AmCredit mortgage business in the
Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.  In September
2008, the Group also acquired a 49.99% shareholding in BACB.

                         *      *      *

Allied Irish Banks plc continues to carry a 'D' individual rating
from Fitch Ratings.  The rating was downgraded by Fitch to its
current level from 'C' in February 2009.


INDEPENDENT NEWS: Not Selling South African Unit
------------------------------------------------
Renee Bonorchis at Bloomberg News, citing Business Day, reports
that Tony Howard, the head of Independent News Media plc's South
African operations, said the the company is not planning to sell
the South African unit.

Bloomberg relates the newspaper said Mr. Howard was responding to
reports that a group of three companies in South Africa had held
talks with Independent News about buying the local operations.

                        Debt Restructuring

On Sept. 15, 2009, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, citing
The Financial Times, reported that IN&M is considering giving its
bondholders 45% of the company's equity to extinguish part of
their debt.  Citing people with knowledge of the plan, the FT
disclosed the plan -- which has yet to be agreed upon by the
company, its lenders and two key shareholders -- would avoid the
need for shareholder approval because the share issue has already
been authorized.  According to the FT, talks between IN&M and its
creditors are now focused on how much bond debt will be exchanged
for the 45% stake and how much to raise in a rights offering to
repay the balance of the EUR200 million (GBP171 million) bond debt
that IN&M failed to repay in May.

                 About Independent News & Media

Headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, Independent News & Media PLC
(ISE:IPD) -- http://www.inmplc.com/-- is engaged in printing and
publishing of metropolitan, national, provincial and regional
newspapers in Australia, India, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa
and the United Kingdom.  It also has radio operations in Australia
and New Zealand, and outdoor advertising operations in Australia,
New Zealand, South-East Asia and across Africa.  The Company also
has online operations across each of its principal markets.  The
Company has three business segments: printing, publishing, online
and distribution of newspapers and magazines and commercial
printing; radio, and outdoor advertising.  INM publishes over 200
newspaper and magazine titles, delivering a combined weekly
circulation of over 32 million copies with a weekly audience of
over 100 million consumers.  In March 2008, it acquired The Sligo
Champion.  During the year ended December 31, 2007, the Company
acquired the remaining 50% interest in Toowoomba Newspapers Pty
Ltd.


KBC BANK: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on EUR5 Bil. Certificates
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of the
EUR5 billion Global Euro-Commercial Paper and Certificate of
Deposit Programme of KBC Bank Ireland to Prime-1 from Prime-2.
The upgrade follows the establishment of an unconditional and
irrevocable guarantee for the programme, provided by the bank's
parent, KBC Bank, acting through its Dublin branch.

KBC Bank Ireland is rated Baa2/P-2 for bank deposits and senior
debt and has a bank financial strength rating of D-.  KBC Bank
N.V. is rated Aa3/P-1 for bank deposits and senior debt and has a
bank financial strength rating of C+.

Moody's last rating action on KBC Bank Ireland was on April 8,
2008, when the bank deposit and senior debt ratings were
downgraded to Baa2/P-2 from A2/P-1 and the BFSR was downgraded to
D- from C-.

Headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, KBC Bank Ireland reported
consolidated assets of EUR21.1 billion at end-2008.


STANTON VINTAGE: S&P Withdraws 'D' Ratings on 5 Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its credit ratings on
all the rated notes issued by Stanton Vintage CDO PLC.

In May 2009, S&P lowered all the rated notes issued by Stanton
Vintage to 'D' following S&P's receipt of a note valuation report
from the trustee.  The report showed that the liquidation proceeds
following enforcement were insufficient to repay principal or
interest on any of the rated notes.

The rating actions reflect S&P's view that no further proceeds
remain to distribute principal and interest to the noteholders, as
the transaction has now terminated.

                           Ratings List

                     Stanton Vintage CDO PLC
               US$159.6 Million Floating-Rate Notes

                         Ratings Withdrawn

                                   Ratings
                                   -------
                Class         To             From
                -----         --             ----
                A             NR              D
                B             NR              D
                C             NR              D
                D             NR              D
                E             NR              D

                         NR — Not rated.


ZOE GROUP: Court Orders Liquidation of Two Companies
----------------------------------------------------
Herald.ie reports that the High Court has ordered to liquidate two
of Zoe Group's companies, Vantive Holdings and Morston Investments
Ltd.

Herald.ie relates Mr. Justice Frank Clarke granted the group's
legal team a further eight days stay on his order, during which
they intend appealing his decision to the Supreme Court.
According to Herald.ie, Judge Clarke said a provisional liquidator
had already been appointed by the court and he directed that he
now become official liquidator of the companies with powers to act
restrained only by the eight day stay granted by the court or
further order of the Supreme Court.  According to Bloomberg News'
Ian Guider, Judge Clarke put a hold on liquidation until Sept. 22.

Judge Clarke refused to grant any stay on the order he made last
week refusing to appoint an examiner to the Liam Carroll-
controlled companies, Herald.ie discloses.  The judge, as cited by
Herald.ie, said the Zoe companies had already had the protection
of the court for 56 days, due to continuing court proceedings
which had been brought by their failure to provide the necessary
evidence supporting examinership at the earliest opportunity.

The judge had been told Zoe intended to appeal to the Supreme
Court his refusal to appoint an examiner which, together with the
court's winding up orders, were interconnected, Herald.ie notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, Mr. Carroll
had sought court protection for Zoe because ACC Bank had
threatened to take insolvency proceedings against his companies to
recoup loans worth EUR136 million.


* IRELAND: NAMA Proposes to Pay EUR54 Bln for Banks' Risky Loans
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ian Guider and Dara Doyle at Bloomberg News report that Ireland
plans to spend EUR54 billion (US$79 billion) buying real-estate
loans to purge the country's financial system of toxic assets.

Bloomberg relates Irish Finance Minister Brian Lenihan said in a
speech in parliament in Dublin Wednesday the government's new
National Asset Management Agency proposes to pay a 30% discount on
the EUR77-billion book value of the loans.  Mr. Lenihan, as cited
by Bloomberg, said the current market value of the debt is about
EUR47 billion.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Lenihan told lawmakers Allied Irish
will transfer EUR24 billion of loans to NAMA, while Anglo Irish
will shift EUR28 billion of loans and Bank of Ireland will move
EUR16 billion.  The finance minister said the remainder will come
from two smaller lenders, EBS and Irish Nationwide, Bloomberg
notes.

The price NAMA is paying for the loans will determine how much
lenders must write down assets on their balance sheets, Bloomberg
says.  Bloomberg discloses Mr. Lenihan said some may need to raise
extra capital.

Charles Forelle at The Wall Street Journal reports that the bad
bank plan, aimed at restarting stalled lending, faced fierce
opposition when it was unveiled by Mr. Lenihan in parliament
session parliament Wednesday.  According to Dow Jones, it is
likely to face weeks of debate.  The ruling party doesn't have a
majority in parliament, and the plan is reviled by opposition
parties, which say Ireland is overpaying and heaping costs on the
taxpayer to benefit bankers, Dow Jones discloses.

Fine Gael and other critics have called for measures such as
splitting banks into "good banks" and "bad banks," or even broad
nationalization, Dow Jones notes.


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ALITALIA SPA: Bankruptcy Commissioner to Auction Art Collection
---------------------------------------------------------------
Marco Bertacche at Bloomberg News reports that Augusto Fantozzi,
Alitalia SpA's bankruptcy commissioner, is to auction off the
airline's art collection in December.

Bloomberg relates Finarte Casa d'Aste SpA said in a release
Wednesday Mr. Fantozzi appointed the Milan-based auction house to
sell about 200 works, including a Gino Severini picture
commissioned by the airline for its Paris office in the 1950s.
According to Bloomberg, the bankruptcy commissioner will seek to
raise at least EUR1 million from the auction.

Mr. Fantozzi, Bloomberg discloses, has been trying to sell
unprofitable assets to repay creditors and a EUR300-million state
loan that the European Commission ruled illegal.

                           About Alitalia

Based in Rome, Alitalia S.p.A. -- http://www.alitalia.it/--
provides air travel services for passengers and air transport of
cargo on national, international and inter-continental routes,
including United States, Canada, Japan and Argentina.  The Italian
government owns 49.9% of Alitalia.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on November 7,
2008, Alitalia S.p.A. filed for Chapter 15 protection with the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York.
Italy's national airline experienced financial difficulties for a
number of years caused, in large measure, by a combination of
competition from low-cost air carriers, poor management and
onerous union obligations, according to papers filed with the
court.

Despite a EUR1.4 billion state-backed restructuring in 1997,
Alitalia posted net losses of EUR256 million and EUR907 million in
2000 and 2001 respectively.  Alitalia posted EUR93 million in net
profits in 2002 after a EUR1.4 billion capital injection.  The
carrier booked annual net losses of EUR520 million in 2003,
EUR813 million in 2004, EUR168 million in 2005, EUR625.6 million
in 2006, and EUR494.64 million in 2007.

In the petition filed October 29, 2008, Prof. Augusto Fantozzi,
the appointed administrator, said the airline's financial
difficulties have been and exacerbated by spiraling fuel prices.

On August 29, 2008, Alitalia declared insolvency and filed for
commencement of extraordinary administration procedure at the
Tribunal of Rome.  Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi
appointed Mr. Fantozzi as extraordinary commissioner.
Under the Bankruptcy Bill, the Administrator has supplanted the
directors and other management of Alitalia.


MARIELLA BURANI: To Hold Meeting to Discuss Financing Options
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jerrold Colten at Bloomberg News reports Mariella Burani Fashion
Group SpA will hold an extraordinary shareholders' meeting to
discuss financing options.

According to Bloomberg, the company in a statement Wednesday
also said it continues to hold talks with creditors on a debt
moratorium and restructuring.

                             Standstill

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, Bloomberg
News said Burani requested a standstill agreement from
creditors in May to allow it to halt loan payments as it
restructures debt.  Bloomberg disclosed on Aug. 30 the company
reached an agreement with some banks to postpone debt payments
by 24 months.

                            Going Concern

On Sept. 2, 2009, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, citing
Bloomberg News, reported Burani was halted in Milan trading after
the company's auditor Mazars LLP cited "significant elements of
uncertainty" about the business as a going concern following a
decline in sales.  The company posted a net loss of EUR142.1
million (US$203 million) in the first half of 2009, compared with
net income of EUR4 million a year earlier, while revenue fell 24%
to EUR246.1 million, Bloomberg said.  Citing Borsa Italiana, the
manager of Italy's stock exchange, Bloomberg said Burani shares,
which have fallen 75% this year, were halted for an "undetermined
period".  According to Bloomberg, Burani said Mazars couldn't
express an opinion on the fashion company's accounts.

Mariella Burani Fashion Group SpA -- http://www.mariellaburani.it/
-- is an Italy-based company, operating in the fashion market.  It
designs, produces and distributes a range of apparel, knitwear,
leather accessories, jewelry and footwear.  The Company divides
its operation into four divisions: Clothing Division, Leather
Division, Digital Fashion and Fashion Jewellery.  The Company’s
brand portfolio comprises the Company's own brands, such as
Mariella Burani, Rene Lezard, Amuleti J, Blossom Burani, Ter et
Bantine, Braccialini, FrancescoBiasia, Baldinini, Coccinelle,
Sebastian, Facco Gioielli, Valente, Rosato and Calgaro, among
others, and the licensed brands: Vivienne Westwood (Anglomania),
Emmanuel Ungaro (Fuchsia), Alviero Martini, Thierry Mugler
(Mugler), Patrizia Pepe (bimbo), Missoni, Warner Bros, Miss Sixty,
Sweet Years, Gherardini e John Galliano, among others.  Among the
subsidiaries there are: Mariella Burani Retail Srl, Antichi
Pelletteri SpA, Coccinelle Store France SA and Mandarina Duck
Gmbh.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


BTA BANK: Tells Clients to Transfer Deposits by Oct. 16
-------------------------------------------------------
Nariman Gizitdinov at Bloomberg News reports that BTA Bank told
clients who hold 13 types of deposits to transfer them to other
products by Oct. 16 or have their interest rates cut to 0.1%.

According to Bloomberg, the bank circulated a statement to
customers at a branch in Almaty.  The bank said Platinum, Formula
of Success, Pension and Child deposits that are held in single
currencies will be discontinued.

The bank, which is trying to restructure US$10.3 billion of debt,
didn't provide further details on the accounts affected, according
to Bloomberg.

                        Debt Restructuring

On Sept. 11, 2009, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, citing
Bloomberg News, reported BTA creditors hired Deloitte & Touche LLP
and Baker & McKenzie LLP to advise them on the debt restructuring
following the bank's default earlier this year.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 9,
2009, Bloomberg News said BTA's creditors may lose as much as
82.25% under a debt restructuring plan proposed by the lender.
Bloomberg disclosed the bank proposed four options, including
paying a maximum of US$1 billion to buy back debt at 17.75% of
face value.

BTA Bank AO (BTA Bank JSC), formerly Bank TuranAlem AO --
http://bta.kz/-- is a Kazakhstan-based financial institution,
which is involved in the provision of banking and financial
products for private and corporate clients.  The Bank has in its
offer personal banking services, comprised of current accounts,
savings accounts, term deposits, safety deposit boxes, money
transfer services, credit facilities, and corporate banking
services, including business accounts, credit facilities, treasury
services, letters of guarantee, letters of credit, foreign
exchange services, remittances and other solutions, as well as
debt and credit cards, card services and electronic banking
services.  The Bank has 14 subsidiaries and six affiliated
companies.  It offers its services through a network of numerous
regional branches, cash settlement centers throughout Kazakhstan
and international representative offices located in Ukraine,
Russia, China and the United Arab Emirates.


COMMERCE COM: Creditors Must File Claims by September 24
--------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of LLP Commerce Com have until September 24, 2009, to
submit proofs of claim to:

         Neusypov Str. 26/2-4
         Uralsk
         West Kazakhstan
         Kazakhstan

The Specialized Inter-Regional Economic Court of West Kazakhstan
commenced bankruptcy proceedings against the company on June 22,
2009 after finding it insolvent.

The Court is located at:

         The Specialized Inter-Regional
         Economic Court of West Kazakhstan
         Seifullin Str. 37
         Uralsk
         West Kazakhstan
         Kazakhstan


ESIK AGRO: Creditors Must File Claims by September 24
-----------------------------------------------------
Creditors of LLP Esik Agro Mash have until September 24, 2009, to
submit proofs of claim to:

         The Specialized Inter-Regional
         Economic Court of Almaty
         Tauelsyzdyk Str. 53
         Taldykorgan
         Almaty
         Kazakhstan
         Tel: 8 701 255 64-22

The court commenced bankruptcy proceedings against the company on
June 1, 2009, after finding it insolvent.


FORBOS LLP: Creditors Must File Claims by September 24
------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of LLP Forbos have until September 24, 2009, to submit
proofs of claim to:

         Jumabaev Str. 102-25
         Petropavlovsk
         North Kazakhstan
         Kazakhstan

The Specialized Inter-Regional Economic Court of North Kazakhstan
commenced bankruptcy proceedings against the company on June 18,
2009, after finding it insolvent.

The Court is located at:

         The Specialized Inter-Regional
         Economic Court of North Kazakhstan
         Brusilovsky Str. 60
         Petropavlovsk
         North Kazakhstan
         Kazakhstan


KAZAGROGARANT JSC: S&P Downgrades Issuer Credit Rating to 'BB-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had lowered its
long-term issuer credit and Kazakhstan national scale ratings on
KazAgroGarant, a state-owned niche market guarantee provider based
in the Republic of Kazakhstan (foreign currency BBB-/Stable/A-3;
local currency BBB/Stable/A-3; Kazakhstan national scale 'kzAAA')
to 'BB-' and 'kzA-' from 'BB' and 'kzA'.  The outlook is stable.
The short-term issuer credit rating is affirmed at 'B'.

The ratings were removed from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where they had been placed on CreditWatch on June
16, 2009.  Before the CreditWatch placement, the outlook was
stable.

"The downgrade and removal from CreditWatch follow S&P's
application of S&P's revised methodology for rating government-
related entities and also result from KazAgroGarant's weakened
stand-alone credit profile," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Boris Kopeykin.

The ratings on KazAgroGarant reflect S&P's expectations of a
"moderately high" likelihood of timely and sufficient
extraordinary support to KazAgroGarant from the Kazakh government
in case of financial distress, as well as KazAgroGarant's "weak"
stand-alone credit profile, which S&P assess at 'B'.

The ratings continue to be constrained by KazAgroGarant's untested
business model; the exposure of its investments to the Kazakh
banking sector; and a high guarantee risk concentration, with the
largest guarantee larger than the company's actual capital.

In accordance with S&P's criteria for government-related entities,
its view of a "moderately high" likelihood of extraordinary
government support is based on S&P's assessment of
KazAgroGarant's:

"Limited importance" for the government.  This is because the
company is small and has just over Kazakhstani tenge (KZT) 2
billion in capital and KZT4.5 billion worth of guarantees issued.
The company's public-policy mandate is relatively narrow:
KazAgroGarant is one of eight government-related entities
(subsidiaries of KazAgro Holding) that the government created to
support the agricultural sector.  Its specific purpose is to be
the only provider of warehouse receipt guarantees on agricultural
commodities.  There is a track record of government support to
KazAgroGarant in the form of recurring capital injections,
although the equity increase planned for 2009 was postponed until
2010.

"Very strong" link with the Kazakh government.  The Kazakhstan
government wholly owns KazAgroGarant through KazAgro Holding and
its subsidiaries, and privatization is not on the agenda.  The
government tightly monitors KazAgroGarant's activities through
KazAgro Holding.

The 'B' stand-alone credit profile reflects KazAgroGarant's
untested business model; the exposure of its investments to the
Kazakh banking sector; and a high guarantee risk concentration,
with the largest guarantee larger than the company's actual
capital.  However it also incorporates the ongoing support from
the Kazakh government in the form of capital injections and
KazAgroGarant's commitment to a policy of "no direct debt" and, so
far, no calls on its guarantees.

The outlook on KazAgroGarant is stable because the outlook on the
Republic of Kazakhstan is stable.  S&P expects the government to
continue to expand KazAgroGarant's capital, although the exact
amount of injections for 2010-2011 might fluctuate.  Furthermore,
S&P does not expect any changes in the policy and regulatory
framework that would challenge S&P's expectations of a "moderately
high" probability of support to KazAgroGarant from the government
in case of financial distress.

"A negative rating action on Kazakhstan, or a change in S&P's
expectations of extraordinary support to KazAgroGarant from the
government due to signs of weakening government support, could
pressure the ratings," said Mr. Kopeykin.

A weakening stand-alone credit profile caused by significant
deterioration in capitalization levels or investment portfolio
quality could also lead to negative rating actions.

Ratings upside could result from a stronger sovereign credit
profile, or a higher probability of extraordinary government
support for KazAgroGarant, which S&P does not currently expected.


KAZAKHSTAN TEMIR: S&P Affirms Corporate Credit Rating at 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+' long-term
corporate credit and 'kzAA-' Kazakhstan national scale ratings on
both Kazakhstan Temir Zholy and its 100% subsidiary JSC
Kaztemirtrans.  At the same time, the ratings on KTZ and KTT were
removed from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they
were placed on June 16, 2009.  The outlooks on both KTZ and KTT
are stable.  Before the CreditWatch placement, the outlooks were
stable.

The 'BB+' rating on the senior unsecured bonds issued by
Kazakhstan Temir Zholy Finance B.V. was affirmed and removed from
CreditWatch with negative implications, and the '4' recovery
rating is unchanged.

"The affirmation and removal from CreditWatch reflects S&P's
expectations of a "very high" probability of timely and sufficient
extraordinary financial support from the state for KTZ, KTT's 100%
parent and Kazakhstan's national railway company," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Sergei Gorin.

This is based on S&P's assessment of KTZ's:

"Very important" role in Kazakhstan's economy as a national
railroad company, playing a key role in Kazakhstan's national
transport sector; and"Very strong" link with the Kazakh
government, illustrated by the state's ongoing support, which
includes state subsidies to the passenger transportation segment
and guarantees on some of KTZ'S debt, as well as government
cofinancing of the investment burden in rail infrastructure and
100% ownership with no privatization risk in the short to medium
term.

At the same time, there is a degree of uncertainty of how exactly
the mechanisms of government support would operate in Kazakhstan's
economic environment.  This uncertainty is reflected in S&P's one-
notch deviation from its standard correlation for entities with a
"very high" likelihood of extraordinary support.

KTZ's stand-alone credit profile reflects S&P's view of the
company's "fair" business risk profile and "significant" financial
risk profile.  In S&P's view, the stand-alone credit profile is
constrained by the company's obsolete assets and aggressive
investment program and Kazakhstan's opaque regulatory regime.
Ongoing rail-sector restructuring, the risk of commodity traffic
volatility, and competition from oil pipelines further constrain
the company's stand-alone credit profile.

These risks are mitigated by the company's vertically integrated
business model, which combines monopoly rail infrastructure and
profitable freight transport operations; a strong market and
competitive position in the national transport sector; and strong
ongoing government financial support.

The stable outlook reflects that on the sovereign.

"A positive track-record of government support to government-
related entities could buoy the ratings on KTZ in the future,"
said Mr. Gorin.

A stronger-than-expected operational and financial performance,
together with successful cash accumulation for the upcoming
maturities and a strengthening of the banking sector could create
upside potential for the ratings.

If in S&P's view KTZ's liquidity position deteriorates or if there
are indications of lower state support, S&P could lower its
assessment of the company's stand-alone credit profile and/or
lower the corporate credit ratings on the company.


KAZPOST JSC: S&P Affirms Issuer Credit Rating at 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its
'BB' long-term issuer credit and 'kzA+' Kazakhstan national scale
ratings on Kazpost (JSC), the state-owned national postal operator
in Kazakhstan.  The outlook is stable.

The ratings were removed from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where they had been placed on June 16, 2009.  Before
the CreditWatch placement, the outlook was stable.

"The removal from CreditWatch and affirmation reflect S&P's
expectations of a "high" likelihood that the Kazakh government
will provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to the
company in case of financial distress," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Boris Kopeykin.

The ratings continue to be constrained by Kazpost's plans to
increase its unguaranteed debt and its rising reliance on its own
funds to finance its massive capital-investment program.

In accordance with S&P's criteria for government-related entities,
its view of a "high" likelihood of extraordinary government
support is based on S&P's assessment of Kazpost's:

"Important role" as a mail delivery and pension payments provider
for the government. Kazpost provides about 50% of national mail
services and delivers more than 45% of pensions and social
assistance payments in the country.  Kazpost has a near-monopoly
in rural areas (where 43% of Kazakhstan's population lives) with
its 3,500 outlets including 2,900 outlets in rural areas.  As the
national postal operator, Kazpost must provide universal mail
services throughout Kazakhstan and is the exclusive deliverer of
high-value or top-secret goods for the Kazakh government.  The
company also participates in various state programs, including an
e-government project, and manages the issuance of postage stamps.
S&P also base this opinion on the track record of support to
Kazpost in the form of recurring capital injections.

"Very strong" link with Kazakhstan's government.  Kazakhstan's
government wholly owns Kazpost through Samruk-Kazyna holding, and
privatization is not on the agenda.  The government tightly
monitors Kazpost's activities through Samruk-Kazyna.  The only
outstanding loan that Kazpost currently has is guaranteed by the
government, although the government does not plan to guarantee the
company's future borrowings.

The stable outlook on Kazpost mirrors that on the Republic of
Kazakhstan (foreign currency BBB-/Stable/A-3; local currency
BBB/Stable/A-3; Kazakhstan national scale rating 'kzAAA').  S&P
expects the government to continue to expand Kazpost's capital,
although the exact amount of injections for 2010-2012 might
fluctuate.  Furthermore, S&P does not expect any changes in the
policy and regulatory framework that would challenge S&P's
expectations of a "high" probability of timely and sufficient
support to Kazpost from the government in case of financial
distress.

"A negative rating action on Kazakhstan, or a change in S&P's
expectations of extraordinary support to the company could
pressure the ratings on Kazpost," said Mr. Kopeykin.

A faster-than-now-expected accumulation of unguaranteed debt, or
lower-than-now-planned financial results could also result in
ratings downside.

Ratings upside could result from a stronger sovereign credit
profile, and/or a higher probability of extraordinary support,
which S&P does not currently expect.  An upgrade might also follow
a strengthening of the company's stand-alone credit profile,
including higher ongoing support from the government in the form
of capital injections and consequently lower-than-now-expected
borrowings in 2009-2012.


MORTGAGE GUARANTEE: S&P Downgrades Issuer Credit Rating to 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had lowered its
long-term issuer credit and Kazakhstan national scale ratings on
Mortgage Guarantee Fund of Kazakhstan (JSC), a specific type of
mortgage insurance provider 100% owned by the Republic of
Kazakhstan (foreign currency BBB-/Stable/A-3; local currency
BBB/Stable/A-3; Kazakhstan national scale 'kzAAA') to 'BB-' and
'kzA-' from 'BB' and 'kzA'.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, the ratings were removed from CreditWatch, where
they had been placed with negative implications on June 16, 2009.
Before the CreditWatch placement, the outlook was stable.

"The downgrade and removal from CreditWatch follow S&P's
application of S&P's revised methodology for rating government-
related entities," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Boris
Kopeykin.

The ratings reflect S&P's expectations of a "moderately high"
likelihood of timely and sufficient extraordinary support to MGFK
from the Kazakh government in case of financial distress.

The ratings also incorporate MGFK's weak stand-alone credit
profile, which S&P assess at 'B'.  This opinion is based on the
company's short track record, weak and volatile financial
position, and limited scale of operations, although it has a lack
of debt and a commitment to a policy of "no debt".

In accordance with S&P's criteria for government-related entities,
its view of a "moderately high" likelihood of extraordinary
government support is based on S&P's assessment of MGFK's:

"Limited importance" for the government.  This is because the
company is small and has just over Kazakhstani tenge
(KZT) 4 billion in capital (US$28 million).  The company has a
relatively narrow public policy mandate.  MGFK is a specific type
of mortgage insurance provider, the main role of which is to
provide guarantees on loans provided under the state-sponsored
mortgage program.  MGFK is involved in several state-sponsored
housing program and has participated in about 60% of apartment
purchases concluded as part of these programs, guaranteeing about
KZT50 billion.  But in total its guarantees cover only about 7.5%
of all mortgages issued in Kazakhstan.  S&P's view on MGFK's
"limited" role also incorporates the past track record of support
to MGFK in the form of recurring capital injections, with the most
recent one provided in 2007.  S&P expects the company to be
involved in future government-sponsored mortgage programs.

"Very strong" link with the Kazakh government.  The Kazakhstan
government wholly owns MGFK through Samruk-Kazyna holding.
Privatization of MGFK was being discussed, but was cancelled in
late 2008.  The government tightly monitors MGFK's activities
through Samruk-Kazyna.  The holding company has just appointed a
new board and is likely to finally set the updated strategy for
MGFK in November-December 2009.

The 'B' stand-alone credit profile reflects MGFK's short track
record, weak and volatile financial position, with losses
reported, and limited scale of operations.  As of July 1, 2009,
MGFK had guaranteed mortgage loans worth about KZT50 billion
(US$340 million).  Mortgage insurance provided under the state-
sponsored programs comprises about 90% of MGFK's portfolio, and
should remain at a similar level until 2010.  The stand-alone
rating also incorporates MGFK's commitment to a policy of "no
direct debt" and that so far, no calls have been made on its
guarantees.

The outlook on MGFK is stable because the outlook on Kazakhstan is
stable.  S&P expects the government to continue to expand MGFK's
capital in the medium term.  Furthermore, S&P does not expect any
changes in the policy and regulatory framework that would
challenge S&P's expectations of a "moderately high" probability of
support to MGFK from the government in case of financial distress.

"A negative rating action on Kazakhstan, or a change in S&P's
expectations of timely and sufficient extraordinary support to
MGFK from the government because of weakening government support,
could pressure the ratings," said Mr. Kopeykin.

The rating could also come under pressure should MGFK's financial
position and liquidity deteriorate compared with currently
expected levels.

Ratings upside could result from a stronger sovereign credit
profile, or a higher probability of extraordinary support.


PKF SUNKAR: Creditors Must File Claims by September 24
------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of LLP PKF Sunkra P have until September 24, 2009, to
submit proofs of claim to:

         Pobeda Ave. 5
         Pavlodar
         Kazakhstan

The Specialized Inter-Regional Economic Court of Pavlodar
commenced bankruptcy proceedings against the company on June 25,
2009 after finding it insolvent.

The Court is located at:

         The Specialized Inter-Regional
         Economic Court of Pavlodar
         Djambulskaya Str. 6
         Pavlodar
         Kazakhstan
         Tel: 8 (7182)32-38-46


TURKUAZ TOURISM: Creditors Must File Claims by September 24
-----------------------------------------------------------
LLP Turkuaz Tourism Network is currently undergoing liquidation.
Creditors have until September 24, 2009, to submit proofs of claim
to:

         Rayimbek Ave. 160a
         Almaty
         Kazakhstan


===================
K Y R G Y Z S T A N
===================


KYRGYZ RUS: Creditors Must File Claims by September 30
------------------------------------------------------
LLC Kyrgyz Rus Nefte Him is currently undergoing liquidation.
Creditors have until September 30, 2009, to submit proofs of claim
to:

         Orozbekov Str. 52/54
         Office 2B
         Bishkek
         Kyrgyzstan
         Tel: (+ 996 312) 62-73-36
              (+ 996 312) 62-73-38


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


FORTIS BANK: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Subordinated Securities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed the 'BB'
issue rating on the convertible and subordinated hybrid equity-
linked securities of Fortis Bank SA/NV (AA-/Negative/A-1+).  S&P
removed the rating from CreditWatch with developing implications
where it was placed on May 29, 2009.

The affirmation reflects S&P's understanding that the bank does
not expect to amend the terms and conditions of the CASHES in the
foreseeable future.  As a consequence, current contractual terms
of the CASHES hold and remain linked to the creditworthiness of
Fortis N.V. and Fortis SA/NV (both rated BBB-/Stable/A-3, together
Fortis, Fortis Bank's previous shareholder).  As an example of
this link, interest payments on the CASHES are dependent on
whether or not dividends are paid on Fortis shares, and not on
Fortis Bank shares.  For this reason, and although the CASHES are
on Fortis Bank's balance sheet, S&P applied its weak-link approach
to rate the CASHES two notches below the long-term counterparty
credit rating on Fortis, as S&P generally do for issues of
insurance holding companies.  S&P therefore aligned the issue
rating on the CASHES with that on Fortis Bank's FRESH instruments,
payment on both hybrids being, in S&P's view and based on current
information, determined by the ability and willingness of Fortis
to honor its commitments.

Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the creditworthiness of
the CASHES instruments.  Fortis communicated in 2009 its intent to
reduce the complexity of the group's organization and therefore
the ties with previous subsidiaries, which, according to S&P's
understanding, could, at a certain point in time, have an impact
on the CASHES instruments' creditworthiness.


ING GROEP: Head Says Dutch State Guarantee Meets Requirements
-------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Steen and Nikki Tait at The Financial Times report that
Nout Wellink, head of ING Groep NV, dismissed concerns by the
European Commission that an impaired asset deal between the
government and the Dutch lender may have been too generous.

According to the FT, Brussels, which broadened its probe Monday,
is questioning whether the price paid by the Dutch government --
equivalent to 90% of the face value -- is justified.

"We have scrupulously validated the transaction and we are of the
opinion that the transaction meets the requirements," the FT
quoted Mr. Wellink as saying.  "We fully endorse the transaction
as completed."

ING, as cited by the FT, said discussions with commission
officials were continuing.

As reported yesterday by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, the
European Commission has extended, under EC Treaty state aid rules,
its investigation of the illiquid asset back-up facility provided
by the Dutch State to the financial group ING.  The Commission has
also extended its temporary clearance of the measure until the
assessment of the measure is finalized.  The Commission initially
authorised the measure for six months for reasons of financial
stability on March 31, while opening an in-depth investigation to
analyse the complex measure in light of the Commission's Impaired
Assets Communication.  On the basis of the information provided so
far, the Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of the
measure with the Impaired Assets Communication, in particular as
regards valuation and burden sharing.  This decision is without
prejudice to the final outcome of the investigation.

In January 2009, the Dutch State and ING implemented a so-called
illiquid assets back-up facility for a portfolio of US$39 billion
(EUR30 billion) par value worth of US residential mortgage-backed
securities , mostly backed by so-called Alt-A mortgage loans.

Under the transaction, the Dutch State buys the right to receive
future cash flows on 80% of the above-mentioned portfolio, .

The Commission has assessed the measure under its guidance
Communication on the treatment of asset relief measures.  Taking
account of input from external experts, the Commission considers
that the valuation seems at this stage not conservative enough.
In addition, the Commission found that a significant proportion of
securities were valued above purchase price.  Therefore, the
Commission continues to have doubts that the price paid by the
Dutch Government, equivalent to a transfer price of 90% of the
face value, is justified.  Should the Dutch authorities not be in
a position to address the Commission's concerns in a convincing
manner, the Commission's final decision on the compatibility of
the facility with EU state aid rules would have to require
increasing the remuneration of the Dutch State.

Headquartered in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, ING Groep N.V. --
http://www.ing.com/-- is a global financial institution offering
banking, investments, life insurance and retirement services.  The
Company serves more than 85 million private, corporate and
institutional customers in Europe, North and Latin America, Asia
and Australia.  ING has six business lines: Insurance Europe,
Insurance Americas, Insurance Asia/Pacific, Wholesale Banking,
Retail Banking and ING Direct.  In July 2008, the Company
completed the acquisition of CitiStreet LLC, a retirement plan and
benefit service and administration company in United States.  In
November 2008, ING Groep N.V. increased its stake in joint venture
Billington Holdings PLC from 50% to 100%.  In February 2009, the
Company announced that it closed the sale of its Taiwanese life
insurance business to Fubon Financial Holding Co. Ltd.  In April
2009, the Company sold its non-state pension fund business and its
holding company in Russia to Aviva plc.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


BANCO COMERCIAL: Moody's Cuts Bank Financial Strength Rating to D+
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the debt and deposit ratings
of three Portuguese banks and downgraded the senior unsecured debt
and deposit ratings of four Portuguese banks and the issuer rating
of one holding company, four by one notch and one by two notches.
At the same time, Moody's lowered the bank financial strength
ratings of seven banks -- three by one notch, three by two notches
and one by three notches.  This rating action concludes Moody's
review for possible downgrade on several Portuguese banks,
initiated on April 6, 2009.

"The rating action incorporates Moody's expectation of a
heightened probability of systemic support during the ongoing
crisis, which should help to offset some of the challenges the
Portuguese banks are facing, notably asset quality deterioration,
pressure on profitability and selective challenges in risk
management., which is evidenced by high borrower concentration
levels and some related-party lending," explained Olga Cerqueira,
Moody's lead analyst for Portuguese banks.

Macroeconomic indicators were revised downwards by the Bank of
Portugal and it now expects GDP to contract by 3.5%.  The IMF
forecasts a 4% contraction in GDP and an unemployment rate of 9.6%
in 2009.  In Q2 2009, GDP contracted by 3.7% (a 0.3% increase q-o-
q) and the unemployment rate reached 9.1%, from 7.6% at the end of
2008.  Moody's notes that the modest growth of the Portuguese
economy in the past five years has translated into a less abrupt
downward adjustment than that suffered by other European economies
that experienced stronger expansions.  Nevertheless, and despite
the moderate growth in lending in the past few years, household
and corporate indebtedness levels in Portugal are among the
highest in Europe.  Together with the severe contraction in the
export sector and rising unemployment, this will continue to
adversely affect banks' asset quality and Moody's expects
delinquencies to continue to increase.  Asset quality indicators
deteriorated significantly in H1 2009, with the problem loan ratio
reported by the Bank of Portugal increasing to 2.8% at the end of
June 2009 from 2% at the end of December 2008.

Despite almost all Portuguese banks having strengthened or being
in the process of strengthening their regulatory capital levels,
in line with the Bank of Portugal's recommendation that they
should have Tier 1 capital ratios in excess of 8% by 30 September
2009, Moody's considers that this might not be sufficient to
absorb the losses on the credit portfolios of a couple of
institutions that now have BFSRs at D and D-.  These entities may
therefore require further capital injections.

Due to the heightened probability of systemic support in this
crisis, Moody's notes that the impact of the BFSR downgrades has
not translated into equivalent downgrades of the banks' senior
debt and deposit ratings, with three out of seven banks having
their senior ratings confirmed, three having their senior ratings
downgraded by one notch and only one having their senior ratings
downgraded by two notches.

The moderate downgrade of the banks' senior ratings reflects
Moody's expectation that government support would be forthcoming
for these institutions, given the importance of these banks to the
domestic banking system, should such support become necessary.
Such support has already been demonstrated by the EUR4 billion
recapitalization that the Portuguese government put in place at
the end of 2008, but which has not yet been used by any
institution.

                        Rating of Hybrids

The downgrades of the hybrid securities were in line with Moody's
current methodology, i.e.  the magnitude of the downgrades were in
line with the downgrades of the senior debt ratings for banks with
BFSRs above D+ and the downgrades were widened by one notch for
junior subordinated debt and preferred securities of banks now
rated D+ or lower.  Moody's published a Request for Comment in
July 2009 on its proposed changes to banks' subordinated capital
ratings.  If implemented in their proposed form, the changes could
lead to multi-notch downgrades of hybrids.

                     Rating Actions in Detail

Moody's has taken these rating actions:

                     Caixa Geral De Depositos

Moody's downgraded CGD's BFSR by one notch to C- (mapping to a
Baa2 baseline credit assessment, BCA) from C.  The outlook on the
BFSR is negative.  The downgrade primarily reflects CGD's lower
profitability levels, pressured capitalization under a worse-than-
anticipated scenario and deterioration in its historically worse-
than-average asset quality indicators.  CGD's profitability has
been under pressure due to: (i) the low interest environment and
the slow pace of the re-pricing of its loan book; (ii) pressure
from its insurance operations; (iii) its relatively sizeable
portfolio of securities that have also weighted negatively on its
capital; and (iv) the large increase in impairment levels.  CGD's
asset quality is weaker than the average for Portuguese rated
banks, with a reported problem loan ratio of 2.67% in June 2009.
Despite the very large component of mortgages to individuals (53%)
in its domestic portfolio, expected losses under the base and
stressed scenarios are higher than the average due to Moody's
anticipation of worsening asset quality, particularly in
corporates and the ELs from the securities portfolios.  Despite
reporting Tier 1 and core capital ratios of 8.34% and 8.15% at the
end of June 2009, CGD's capitalization would come under pressure
under a worse-than-anticipated scenario, underpinning Moody's
negative outlook on its BFSR.

In Moody's view, CGD, as a fully government-owned bank, will also
face some challenges related to its role as a fundamental
financial intermediary in the depressed Portuguese economy.

CGD's LT debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to Aa2 from Aa1.
The outlook on these is also negative.  Short-term ratings were
affirmed at Prime-1.  The downgrade reflects the downgrade of the
BFSR.  The uplift for CGD's long-term ratings from its Baa2 BCA
continues to reflect Moody's view of its full probability of
systemic support, given its dominant position in Portugal and its
100% government ownership.

CGD's senior and junior subordinated debt was downgraded to Aa3
from Aa2 and its preferred securities were downgraded to A1 from
Aa3.  All these ratings have a negative outlook.

                     Banco Comercial Portugues

Moody's downgraded BCP's BFSR to D+ (mapping to a Baa3 BCA) from
C+.  The outlook on the BFSR is negative.  The downgrade primarily
reflects: (i) the sharp deterioration in BCP's asset quality, with
the problem loan ratio (according to the Bank of Portugal's
definition) increasing to 2.6% from 1.4% in December 2008 and the
rating agency's expectation that the deterioration will continue
beyond these levels; (ii) Moody's expectation of higher losses
from its Polish operations and adverse pressure from its
international operations (particularly Poland), which made a
negligible contribution to consolidated net income in H1 2009;
(iii) the relatively weak performance of BCP's retail banking
operations in Portugal, which is likely to continue, with a
decline of 55% in net income in H1 2009; and (iv) the relatively
weak tangible common equity, due to the high component of hybrids
and minority interests.

In addition, BCP continues to finance some of its shareholders, a
situation inherited from the past and that Moody's acknowledges
the current management wants to reduce, but that in the rating
agency's view continues to pose a risk for BCP, particularly in
the current economic crisis.

While BCP would remain adequately capitalized under Moody's
anticipated scenario, it would very likely need more capital under
the worse-than-anticipated scenario.  This, together with
uncertainties in some of its international operations and Moody's
expectation of adverse credit trends in its domestic operations,
underpin the negative outlook on the BFSR.

BCP's debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to A1 from Aa3.
The outlook on these is also negative.  Despite the multi-notch
downgrade of the BFSR, the several notches of uplift that the debt
and deposit ratings receive from the BCA reflect the key systemic
importance of BCP as the largest privately owned Portuguese bank
and therefore Moody's assessment of a very high probability of
systemic support, which provides some stability to the rating.

Short-term ratings were affirmed at Prime-1.  BCP's senior
subordinated debt was downgraded to A2 from A1, with a negative
outlook.  BCP's Tier 1 capital instruments were downgraded to Baa1
from A2, with a negative outlook.

Furthermore, the deposit ratings of Bank Millennium were
downgraded to Baa2/P-3 with negative outlook from A3/P-2.  The
downgrade is based on the rating action of the parent bank Banco
Commercial Portugues and concludes the review for possible
downgrade initiated in April 2009.  The Bank financial strength
rating of D was not affected.

                       Banco Espirito Santo

Moody's downgraded BES's BFSR to C- (mapping to a Baa1 BCA) from
C+.  The outlook on the BFSR is stable.  The downgrade primarily
reflects: (i) BES's asset quality deterioration, with the problem
loan ratio (according to the Bank of Portugal's definition)
increasing to 2.09% from 1.58% in December 2008 and the worsened
prospects for the corporate sector, which represents almost 70% of
BES's loan book; (ii) the higher volatility of its earnings due to
its relatively large appetite for market risk; (iii) Moody's
expectation of continuing pressure from its operations in Spain,
which account for 9% of the loan book and made an adverse
contribution to net income in H1 2009; and (iv) the ongoing
increase in credit impairments, which will continue to reduce
bottom-line profitability.

With the EUR1.2 billion capital increase in April 2009, BES
strengthened its capital ratios and, even under Moody's worse-than
expected scenario, BES would remain modestly capitalized.  Despite
the rating agency's anticipation of adverse credit trends for the
bank, its risk absorption capacity under Moody's scenario of more
severe stress underpins the stable outlook on the BFSR.

BES's debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to A1 from Aa3.
The outlook is stable.  The downgrade reflects the two-notch
downgrade of the BFSR.  The uplift from the Baa1 BCA reflects the
key systemic importance of BES for the Portuguese financial system
and therefore Moody's assessment of a very high probability of
systemic support.

Short-term ratings were affirmed at Prime-1.  BES's senior and
junior subordinated debt was downgraded by one notch to A2, with a
stable outlook.  BES's Tier 1 capital instruments were also
downgraded by one notch to A3, with a stable outlook.

The potential impact of BES's downgrade on other rated
subsidiaries will be discussed in separate press releases.

                  Espirito Santo Financial Group

Moody's downgraded ESFG's issuer rating to A3, with stable
outlook, from A2.  The downgrade reflects the downgrade of BES to
A1/P-1/C-, which is ESFG's main operating subsidiary and accounted
for 90% of ESFG's operating income in H1 2009.  The stable outlook
is aligned with BES's stable outlook.  Moody's downgraded the
short-term ratings of ESFG's ECP programme to Prime-2 from Prime-
1.  Moody's downgraded the preferred securities to Baa2, with
stable outlook, from Baa1.

                           Banco BPI

Moody's downgraded BPI's BFSR by one notch to C- (mapping to a
Baa2 BCA) from C.  The outlook on the BFSR is negative.  The
downgrade primarily reflects BPI's: (i) modest performance in its
domestic operations, with a 60% drop in net income; (ii)
increasing dependence on its Angolan operations to support its
profitability; (iii) asset quality deterioration, with the problem
loan ratio (according to Bank of Portugal's definition) increasing
to 1.8% at the end of June 2009 from 1.2% at the end of 2008
(which still comparing favorably with the ratios of its main
peers); (iv) relatively weak tangible common equity as result of
minority interests, hybrids and some negative fair value reserves
on its fixed-income portfolio; and (v) exposure to some Spanish
corporates through its branch in Madrid.

Under Moody's anticipated scenario, BPI would remain adequately
capitalized, but under the stressed scenario, tangible common
equity would fall below minimum levels, resulting in a one-notch
downgrade of the BFSR, which thus explains the negative outlook.
Moody's notes that BPI has one of the lowest ELs among rated
Portuguese banks, as result of its lower-than-average exposure to
the construction and real estate sectors and its better-than-
average asset quality indicators, but will monitor closely
developments in the bank's asset quality during the remainder of
2009 and in 2010.  BPI's debt and deposit ratings were confirmed
at A1 and the outlook was changed to negative.  The confirmation
reflects the modest one-notch downgrade of the BFSR and Moody's
assessment that the probability of systemic support in the event
of need is very high, resulting in the debt and deposit ratings
receiving a three-notch uplift from the Baa2 BCA.

Short-term ratings were affirmed at Prime-1.  BPI's senior and
junior subordinated debt was confirmed at A2, with a negative
outlook.  BPI's preferred securities were confirmed at Baa1, with
a negative outlook.

                       Banco Santander Totta

Moody's downgraded BST's BFSR by one notch to C (mapping to an A3
BCA) from C+.  The outlook on the BFSR is negative.  The downgrade
primarily reflects: (i) the deteriorating operating environment,
which will continue to adversely affect asset quality -- the Bank
of Portugal problem loan ratio increased to 1.24% at the end of
June 2009 from 0.8% at the end of December 2008, still very low
when compared with some of its lower-rated peers; (ii) the ongoing
profitability pressure due to the low interest rate environment,
the lower revenues from fee and commission income than in the past
and higher provisioning requirements; and (iii) its relatively low
tangible common-equity when compared with that of its
international peers with higher BFSRs.

Both under Moody's anticipated and stressed scenarios, BST would
display adequate financial fundamentals.  Its resilience under the
Moody's stressed scenario explains why its ratings are different
to those of other Portuguese banks.  The low ELs when compared
with those of its domestic peers are the result of: (i) BST's
exposure being confined to the loan book, as it has no securities
that are stressed; (ii) its above-average asset quality
indicators; and (iii) the large portion (50%) of mortgages with
lower loss expectations in the loan book.

BST's debt and deposit ratings were confirmed at Aa3 and the
outlook was changed to negative.  The confirmation reflects the
modest one-notch downgrade of the BFSR, Moody's assessment that
the probability of systemic support in case of need is very high
and a high probability of parental support from Santander (rated
B-/Aa2/Prime-1).  The negative outlook on both the BFSR and the
debt and deposit ratings reflects both the weakening credit
environment and the negative outlook on the parent's ratings.

Short-term ratings were affirmed at Prime-1.  BST's senior and
junior subordinated debt was confirmed at A1, with a negative
outlook.  BST's preferred securities were confirmed at A2, with a
negative outlook.

                   Caixa Economica Montepio Geral

Moody's downgraded Montepio's BFSR to D (mapping to a Ba2 BCA)
from C- (mapping to a Baa2 BCA).  The outlook on the BFSR is
negative.  The downgrade primarily reflects: (i) the sharp
deterioration in asset quality indicators with the Bank of
Portugal problem loan ratio increasing to 3.96% at the end of June
2009 from 2.90% at the end of December 2008; (ii) the low risk
absorption capacity, with capital levels very strained under
Moody's anticipated scenario; and (iii) high exposure to the real
estate and construction sectors, which account for 25% of the loan
portfolio.

Montepio has a strong franchise in the mortgage and construction
business, with mortgages to individuals accounting for 59% of the
loan book and construction and real estate accounting for 25% of
the loan book.  Montepio's ELs are high when compared with those
of its domestic peers due to its worse-than-average asset quality
indicators (3.96% versus 2.8% for the system) and its high
exposure to the real estate and construction sectors.
Consequently, despite a EUR100 million capital increase in 2009,
which boosted the Tier 1 ratio to 8.7%, Montepio would display
weak financial fundamentals under Moody's anticipated scenario.

In H1 2009, Montepio reported a significant increase (+62%) in
pre-provision income as result of good growth in net interest
income, some extraordinary gains and several cost-cutting
initiatives.  That notwithstanding, credit impairments continue to
rise and the ability to generate internal capital through
recurrent earnings may not, in Moody's view, be sufficient to
absorb the credit losses on its loan and securities portfolios.
Under Moody's worse-than-anticipated scenario, Montepio would
display a significant shortfall in capital, which explains the
negative outlook on the BFSR.

Montepio's debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to Baa1 from
A2, with a negative outlook, driven by the downgrade of the BFSR
and incorporating Moody's assessment of a high probability of
systemic support, which results in several notches of uplift from
the Ba2 BCA.

Short-term ratings were downgraded to Prime-2 from Prime-1.
Montepio's senior subordinated debt was downgraded to Baa2, with a
negative outlook, and the junior subordinated debt was downgraded
to Baa3, with a negative outlook.

                               Banif

Moody's downgraded Banif's BFSR to D- (mapping to a Ba3 BCA) from
D+ (mapping to a Baa3 BCA), with a negative outlook.  The
downgrade primarily reflects: (i) the bank's low capitalization
level -- with Tier 1 and core capital ratios of 7.7% and 6.2% at
the end of June 2009 -- and that of its group (with a Tier 1
capital of 6.46%), when compared with the ELs on its loan and
securities portfolios --under Moody's anticipated scenario,
capital levels, particularly tangible common equity, could be very
pressurized; (ii) the significant decline in profitability in the
past 18 months, with no profits at the bank level in H1 2009;
(iii) the deterioration in asset quality indicators with the Bank
of Portugal problem loan ratio increasing to 2.79% at the end of
June 2009 from 1.84% at the end of December 2008.

Banif Group is in the process of strengthening its capital ratios
through the acquisition of a well-capitalized car finance company
and a capital increase from its major shareholders, which it
intends to strengthen its solvency levels at the bank level.
Despite the expected capital increase, Moody's considers that the
risks that this operation indirectly brings to Banif -- it could
be required to support the company in the event of need -- offset
the capital that this transaction brings to the group; this is
already factored into the BFSR.  The downgrade also incorporates
Banif's high level of related-party lending to several group
companies.  Moody's acknowledges that lending to group companies
is not a new issue, but could, particularly given the current
difficult times, further pressurize Banif's already weak solvency
levels.

Under Moody's worse-than-anticipated scenario, Banif displays a
significant shortfall in capital, which underpins both its D- BFSR
and the negative outlook.  Banif's debt and deposit ratings were
confirmed at Baa1 and the outlook was changed to negative.
Despite the two-notch downgrade of the BFSR, Moody's assesses a
high probability of systemic support for Banif given its very
strong franchise in the Azores and Madeira and its national
presence.  This results in the ratings receiving several notches
of uplift from the Ba3 BCA.  Short-term ratings were confirmed at
Prime-2.  Banif's senior and junior subordinated debt was
confirmed at Baa2 and Baa3, with negative outlook, respectively,
and its preferred securities were confirmed at Ba1, with negative
outlook.  The potential impact of Banif's downgrade on other rated
subsidiaries will be discussed in separate press releases.

Moody's last rating action on Caixa Geral de Depositos was on
6 April 2009, when the bank's ratings were placed on review for
possible downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Banco Comercial Portugues was on
6 April 2009, when the bank's ratings were placed on review for
possible downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Banco Espirito Santo was on 6 April
2009, when the bank's ratings were placed on review for possible
downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Espirito Santo Financial Group was
on 6 April 2009, when the issuer rating was downgraded and placed
on review for further possible downgrade.  Moody's last rating
action on Banco BPI was on 6 April 2009, when the bank's ratings
were placed on review for possible downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Banco Santander Totta was on 6 April
2009, when the bank's ratings were placed on review for possible
downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Caixa Economica Montepio Geral was
on 6 April 2009, when the bank's ratings were placed on review for
possible downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Banif was on 6 April 2009, when the
bank's ratings were downgraded and placed on review for further
possible downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Bank Millennium was on 7 April 2009
when the A3 and Prime-2 long- and short-term deposit ratings were
placed on review for possible downgrade.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Caixa Geral de Depositos had (unaudited)
total assets of EUR118.2 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Oporto, Banco Comercial Portugues had (unaudited)
total assets of EUR93.8 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Banco Espirito Santo had total assets of
EUR81.4 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Luxembourg, Espirito Santo Financial Group had
(unaudited) total assets of EUR84.7 billion at the end of June
2009.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Banco BPI had total assets of
EUR43.5 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Banco Santander Totta had total assets of
EUR43.5 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Caixa Economica Montepio Geral had total
assets of EUR17.3 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Funchal, Banif SA had (unaudited) total assets of
EUR11.1 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Warsaw, Poland, Bank Millennium reported IFRS
consolidated total assets of PLN47.1 billion (EUR11.4 billion) and
net profit of PLN413 million (EUR100.2 million) at the end of
December 2008.


BANIF: Moody's Cuts Bank Financial Strength Rating to D-
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the debt and deposit ratings
of three Portuguese banks and downgraded the senior unsecured debt
and deposit ratings of four Portuguese banks and the issuer rating
of one holding company, four by one notch and one by two notches.
At the same time, Moody's lowered the bank financial strength
ratings of seven banks -- three by one notch, three by two notches
and one by three notches.  This rating action concludes Moody's
review for possible downgrade on several Portuguese banks,
initiated on April 6, 2009.

"The rating action incorporates Moody's expectation of a
heightened probability of systemic support during the ongoing
crisis, which should help to offset some of the challenges the
Portuguese banks are facing, notably asset quality deterioration,
pressure on profitability and selective challenges in risk
management., which is evidenced by high borrower concentration
levels and some related-party lending," explained Olga Cerqueira,
Moody's lead analyst for Portuguese banks.

Macroeconomic indicators were revised downwards by the Bank of
Portugal and it now expects GDP to contract by 3.5%.  The IMF
forecasts a 4% contraction in GDP and an unemployment rate of 9.6%
in 2009.  In Q2 2009, GDP contracted by 3.7% (a 0.3% increase q-o-
q) and the unemployment rate reached 9.1%, from 7.6% at the end of
2008.  Moody's notes that the modest growth of the Portuguese
economy in the past five years has translated into a less abrupt
downward adjustment than that suffered by other European economies
that experienced stronger expansions.  Nevertheless, and despite
the moderate growth in lending in the past few years, household
and corporate indebtedness levels in Portugal are among the
highest in Europe.  Together with the severe contraction in the
export sector and rising unemployment, this will continue to
adversely affect banks' asset quality and Moody's expects
delinquencies to continue to increase.  Asset quality indicators
deteriorated significantly in H1 2009, with the problem loan ratio
reported by the Bank of Portugal increasing to 2.8% at the end of
June 2009 from 2% at the end of December 2008.

Despite almost all Portuguese banks having strengthened or being
in the process of strengthening their regulatory capital levels,
in line with the Bank of Portugal's recommendation that they
should have Tier 1 capital ratios in excess of 8% by 30 September
2009, Moody's considers that this might not be sufficient to
absorb the losses on the credit portfolios of a couple of
institutions that now have BFSRs at D and D-.  These entities may
therefore require further capital injections.

Due to the heightened probability of systemic support in this
crisis, Moody's notes that the impact of the BFSR downgrades has
not translated into equivalent downgrades of the banks' senior
debt and deposit ratings, with three out of seven banks having
their senior ratings confirmed, three having their senior ratings
downgraded by one notch and only one having their senior ratings
downgraded by two notches.

The moderate downgrade of the banks' senior ratings reflects
Moody's expectation that government support would be forthcoming
for these institutions, given the importance of these banks to the
domestic banking system, should such support become necessary.
Such support has already been demonstrated by the EUR4 billion
recapitalization that the Portuguese government put in place at
the end of 2008, but which has not yet been used by any
institution.

                        Rating of Hybrids

The downgrades of the hybrid securities were in line with Moody's
current methodology, i.e.  the magnitude of the downgrades were in
line with the downgrades of the senior debt ratings for banks with
BFSRs above D+ and the downgrades were widened by one notch for
junior subordinated debt and preferred securities of banks now
rated D+ or lower.  Moody's published a Request for Comment in
July 2009 on its proposed changes to banks' subordinated capital
ratings.  If implemented in their proposed form, the changes could
lead to multi-notch downgrades of hybrids.

                     Rating Actions in Detail

Moody's has taken these rating actions:

                     Caixa Geral De Depositos

Moody's downgraded CGD's BFSR by one notch to C- (mapping to a
Baa2 baseline credit assessment, BCA) from C.  The outlook on the
BFSR is negative.  The downgrade primarily reflects CGD's lower
profitability levels, pressured capitalization under a worse-than-
anticipated scenario and deterioration in its historically worse-
than-average asset quality indicators.  CGD's profitability has
been under pressure due to: (i) the low interest environment and
the slow pace of the re-pricing of its loan book; (ii) pressure
from its insurance operations; (iii) its relatively sizeable
portfolio of securities that have also weighted negatively on its
capital; and (iv) the large increase in impairment levels.  CGD's
asset quality is weaker than the average for Portuguese rated
banks, with a reported problem loan ratio of 2.67% in June 2009.
Despite the very large component of mortgages to individuals (53%)
in its domestic portfolio, expected losses under the base and
stressed scenarios are higher than the average due to Moody's
anticipation of worsening asset quality, particularly in
corporates and the ELs from the securities portfolios.  Despite
reporting Tier 1 and core capital ratios of 8.34% and 8.15% at the
end of June 2009, CGD's capitalization would come under pressure
under a worse-than-anticipated scenario, underpinning Moody's
negative outlook on its BFSR.

In Moody's view, CGD, as a fully government-owned bank, will also
face some challenges related to its role as a fundamental
financial intermediary in the depressed Portuguese economy.

CGD's LT debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to Aa2 from Aa1.
The outlook on these is also negative.  Short-term ratings were
affirmed at Prime-1.  The downgrade reflects the downgrade of the
BFSR.  The uplift for CGD's long-term ratings from its Baa2 BCA
continues to reflect Moody's view of its full probability of
systemic support, given its dominant position in Portugal and its
100% government ownership.

CGD's senior and junior subordinated debt was downgraded to Aa3
from Aa2 and its preferred securities were downgraded to A1 from
Aa3.  All these ratings have a negative outlook.

                     Banco Comercial Portugues

Moody's downgraded BCP's BFSR to D+ (mapping to a Baa3 BCA) from
C+.  The outlook on the BFSR is negative.  The downgrade primarily
reflects: (i) the sharp deterioration in BCP's asset quality, with
the problem loan ratio (according to the Bank of Portugal's
definition) increasing to 2.6% from 1.4% in December 2008 and the
rating agency's expectation that the deterioration will continue
beyond these levels; (ii) Moody's expectation of higher losses
from its Polish operations and adverse pressure from its
international operations (particularly Poland), which made a
negligible contribution to consolidated net income in H1 2009;
(iii) the relatively weak performance of BCP's retail banking
operations in Portugal, which is likely to continue, with a
decline of 55% in net income in H1 2009; and (iv) the relatively
weak tangible common equity, due to the high component of hybrids
and minority interests.

In addition, BCP continues to finance some of its shareholders, a
situation inherited from the past and that Moody's acknowledges
the current management wants to reduce, but that in the rating
agency's view continues to pose a risk for BCP, particularly in
the current economic crisis.

While BCP would remain adequately capitalized under Moody's
anticipated scenario, it would very likely need more capital under
the worse-than-anticipated scenario.  This, together with
uncertainties in some of its international operations and Moody's
expectation of adverse credit trends in its domestic operations,
underpin the negative outlook on the BFSR.

BCP's debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to A1 from Aa3.
The outlook on these is also negative.  Despite the multi-notch
downgrade of the BFSR, the several notches of uplift that the debt
and deposit ratings receive from the BCA reflect the key systemic
importance of BCP as the largest privately owned Portuguese bank
and therefore Moody's assessment of a very high probability of
systemic support, which provides some stability to the rating.

Short-term ratings were affirmed at Prime-1.  BCP's senior
subordinated debt was downgraded to A2 from A1, with a negative
outlook.  BCP's Tier 1 capital instruments were downgraded to Baa1
from A2, with a negative outlook.

Furthermore, the deposit ratings of Bank Millennium were
downgraded to Baa2/P-3 with negative outlook from A3/P-2.  The
downgrade is based on the rating action of the parent bank Banco
Commercial Portugues and concludes the review for possible
downgrade initiated in April 2009.  The Bank financial strength
rating of D was not affected.

                       Banco Espirito Santo

Moody's downgraded BES's BFSR to C- (mapping to a Baa1 BCA) from
C+.  The outlook on the BFSR is stable.  The downgrade primarily
reflects: (i) BES's asset quality deterioration, with the problem
loan ratio (according to the Bank of Portugal's definition)
increasing to 2.09% from 1.58% in December 2008 and the worsened
prospects for the corporate sector, which represents almost 70% of
BES's loan book; (ii) the higher volatility of its earnings due to
its relatively large appetite for market risk; (iii) Moody's
expectation of continuing pressure from its operations in Spain,
which account for 9% of the loan book and made an adverse
contribution to net income in H1 2009; and (iv) the ongoing
increase in credit impairments, which will continue to reduce
bottom-line profitability.

With the EUR1.2 billion capital increase in April 2009, BES
strengthened its capital ratios and, even under Moody's worse-than
expected scenario, BES would remain modestly capitalized.  Despite
the rating agency's anticipation of adverse credit trends for the
bank, its risk absorption capacity under Moody's scenario of more
severe stress underpins the stable outlook on the BFSR.

BES's debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to A1 from Aa3.
The outlook is stable.  The downgrade reflects the two-notch
downgrade of the BFSR.  The uplift from the Baa1 BCA reflects the
key systemic importance of BES for the Portuguese financial system
and therefore Moody's assessment of a very high probability of
systemic support.

Short-term ratings were affirmed at Prime-1.  BES's senior and
junior subordinated debt was downgraded by one notch to A2, with a
stable outlook.  BES's Tier 1 capital instruments were also
downgraded by one notch to A3, with a stable outlook.

The potential impact of BES's downgrade on other rated
subsidiaries will be discussed in separate press releases.

                  Espirito Santo Financial Group

Moody's downgraded ESFG's issuer rating to A3, with stable
outlook, from A2.  The downgrade reflects the downgrade of BES to
A1/P-1/C-, which is ESFG's main operating subsidiary and accounted
for 90% of ESFG's operating income in H1 2009.  The stable outlook
is aligned with BES's stable outlook.  Moody's downgraded the
short-term ratings of ESFG's ECP programme to Prime-2 from Prime-
1.  Moody's downgraded the preferred securities to Baa2, with
stable outlook, from Baa1.

                           Banco BPI

Moody's downgraded BPI's BFSR by one notch to C- (mapping to a
Baa2 BCA) from C.  The outlook on the BFSR is negative.  The
downgrade primarily reflects BPI's: (i) modest performance in its
domestic operations, with a 60% drop in net income; (ii)
increasing dependence on its Angolan operations to support its
profitability; (iii) asset quality deterioration, with the problem
loan ratio (according to Bank of Portugal's definition) increasing
to 1.8% at the end of June 2009 from 1.2% at the end of 2008
(which still comparing favorably with the ratios of its main
peers); (iv) relatively weak tangible common equity as result of
minority interests, hybrids and some negative fair value reserves
on its fixed-income portfolio; and (v) exposure to some Spanish
corporates through its branch in Madrid.

Under Moody's anticipated scenario, BPI would remain adequately
capitalized, but under the stressed scenario, tangible common
equity would fall below minimum levels, resulting in a one-notch
downgrade of the BFSR, which thus explains the negative outlook.
Moody's notes that BPI has one of the lowest ELs among rated
Portuguese banks, as result of its lower-than-average exposure to
the construction and real estate sectors and its better-than-
average asset quality indicators, but will monitor closely
developments in the bank's asset quality during the remainder of
2009 and in 2010.  BPI's debt and deposit ratings were confirmed
at A1 and the outlook was changed to negative.  The confirmation
reflects the modest one-notch downgrade of the BFSR and Moody's
assessment that the probability of systemic support in the event
of need is very high, resulting in the debt and deposit ratings
receiving a three-notch uplift from the Baa2 BCA.

Short-term ratings were affirmed at Prime-1.  BPI's senior and
junior subordinated debt was confirmed at A2, with a negative
outlook.  BPI's preferred securities were confirmed at Baa1, with
a negative outlook.

                       Banco Santander Totta

Moody's downgraded BST's BFSR by one notch to C (mapping to an A3
BCA) from C+.  The outlook on the BFSR is negative.  The downgrade
primarily reflects: (i) the deteriorating operating environment,
which will continue to adversely affect asset quality -- the Bank
of Portugal problem loan ratio increased to 1.24% at the end of
June 2009 from 0.8% at the end of December 2008, still very low
when compared with some of its lower-rated peers; (ii) the ongoing
profitability pressure due to the low interest rate environment,
the lower revenues from fee and commission income than in the past
and higher provisioning requirements; and (iii) its relatively low
tangible common-equity when compared with that of its
international peers with higher BFSRs.

Both under Moody's anticipated and stressed scenarios, BST would
display adequate financial fundamentals.  Its resilience under the
Moody's stressed scenario explains why its ratings are different
to those of other Portuguese banks.  The low ELs when compared
with those of its domestic peers are the result of: (i) BST's
exposure being confined to the loan book, as it has no securities
that are stressed; (ii) its above-average asset quality
indicators; and (iii) the large portion (50%) of mortgages with
lower loss expectations in the loan book.

BST's debt and deposit ratings were confirmed at Aa3 and the
outlook was changed to negative.  The confirmation reflects the
modest one-notch downgrade of the BFSR, Moody's assessment that
the probability of systemic support in case of need is very high
and a high probability of parental support from Santander (rated
B-/Aa2/Prime-1).  The negative outlook on both the BFSR and the
debt and deposit ratings reflects both the weakening credit
environment and the negative outlook on the parent's ratings.

Short-term ratings were affirmed at Prime-1.  BST's senior and
junior subordinated debt was confirmed at A1, with a negative
outlook.  BST's preferred securities were confirmed at A2, with a
negative outlook.

                   Caixa Economica Montepio Geral

Moody's downgraded Montepio's BFSR to D (mapping to a Ba2 BCA)
from C- (mapping to a Baa2 BCA).  The outlook on the BFSR is
negative.  The downgrade primarily reflects: (i) the sharp
deterioration in asset quality indicators with the Bank of
Portugal problem loan ratio increasing to 3.96% at the end of June
2009 from 2.90% at the end of December 2008; (ii) the low risk
absorption capacity, with capital levels very strained under
Moody's anticipated scenario; and (iii) high exposure to the real
estate and construction sectors, which account for 25% of the loan
portfolio.

Montepio has a strong franchise in the mortgage and construction
business, with mortgages to individuals accounting for 59% of the
loan book and construction and real estate accounting for 25% of
the loan book.  Montepio's ELs are high when compared with those
of its domestic peers due to its worse-than-average asset quality
indicators (3.96% versus 2.8% for the system) and its high
exposure to the real estate and construction sectors.
Consequently, despite a EUR100 million capital increase in 2009,
which boosted the Tier 1 ratio to 8.7%, Montepio would display
weak financial fundamentals under Moody's anticipated scenario.

In H1 2009, Montepio reported a significant increase (+62%) in
pre-provision income as result of good growth in net interest
income, some extraordinary gains and several cost-cutting
initiatives.  That notwithstanding, credit impairments continue to
rise and the ability to generate internal capital through
recurrent earnings may not, in Moody's view, be sufficient to
absorb the credit losses on its loan and securities portfolios.
Under Moody's worse-than-anticipated scenario, Montepio would
display a significant shortfall in capital, which explains the
negative outlook on the BFSR.

Montepio's debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to Baa1 from
A2, with a negative outlook, driven by the downgrade of the BFSR
and incorporating Moody's assessment of a high probability of
systemic support, which results in several notches of uplift from
the Ba2 BCA.

Short-term ratings were downgraded to Prime-2 from Prime-1.
Montepio's senior subordinated debt was downgraded to Baa2, with a
negative outlook, and the junior subordinated debt was downgraded
to Baa3, with a negative outlook.

                               Banif

Moody's downgraded Banif's BFSR to D- (mapping to a Ba3 BCA) from
D+ (mapping to a Baa3 BCA), with a negative outlook.  The
downgrade primarily reflects: (i) the bank's low capitalization
level -- with Tier 1 and core capital ratios of 7.7% and 6.2% at
the end of June 2009 -- and that of its group (with a Tier 1
capital of 6.46%), when compared with the ELs on its loan and
securities portfolios --under Moody's anticipated scenario,
capital levels, particularly tangible common equity, could be very
pressurized; (ii) the significant decline in profitability in the
past 18 months, with no profits at the bank level in H1 2009;
(iii) the deterioration in asset quality indicators with the Bank
of Portugal problem loan ratio increasing to 2.79% at the end of
June 2009 from 1.84% at the end of December 2008.

Banif Group is in the process of strengthening its capital ratios
through the acquisition of a well-capitalized car finance company
and a capital increase from its major shareholders, which it
intends to strengthen its solvency levels at the bank level.
Despite the expected capital increase, Moody's considers that the
risks that this operation indirectly brings to Banif -- it could
be required to support the company in the event of need -- offset
the capital that this transaction brings to the group; this is
already factored into the BFSR.  The downgrade also incorporates
Banif's high level of related-party lending to several group
companies.  Moody's acknowledges that lending to group companies
is not a new issue, but could, particularly given the current
difficult times, further pressurize Banif's already weak solvency
levels.

Under Moody's worse-than-anticipated scenario, Banif displays a
significant shortfall in capital, which underpins both its D- BFSR
and the negative outlook.  Banif's debt and deposit ratings were
confirmed at Baa1 and the outlook was changed to negative.
Despite the two-notch downgrade of the BFSR, Moody's assesses a
high probability of systemic support for Banif given its very
strong franchise in the Azores and Madeira and its national
presence.  This results in the ratings receiving several notches
of uplift from the Ba3 BCA.  Short-term ratings were confirmed at
Prime-2.  Banif's senior and junior subordinated debt was
confirmed at Baa2 and Baa3, with negative outlook, respectively,
and its preferred securities were confirmed at Ba1, with negative
outlook.  The potential impact of Banif's downgrade on other rated
subsidiaries will be discussed in separate press releases.

Moody's last rating action on Caixa Geral de Depositos was on
6 April 2009, when the bank's ratings were placed on review for
possible downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Banco Comercial Portugues was on
6 April 2009, when the bank's ratings were placed on review for
possible downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Banco Espirito Santo was on 6 April
2009, when the bank's ratings were placed on review for possible
downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Espirito Santo Financial Group was
on 6 April 2009, when the issuer rating was downgraded and placed
on review for further possible downgrade.  Moody's last rating
action on Banco BPI was on 6 April 2009, when the bank's ratings
were placed on review for possible downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Banco Santander Totta was on 6 April
2009, when the bank's ratings were placed on review for possible
downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Caixa Economica Montepio Geral was
on 6 April 2009, when the bank's ratings were placed on review for
possible downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Banif was on 6 April 2009, when the
bank's ratings were downgraded and placed on review for further
possible downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Bank Millennium was on 7 April 2009
when the A3 and Prime-2 long- and short-term deposit ratings were
placed on review for possible downgrade.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Caixa Geral de Depositos had (unaudited)
total assets of EUR118.2 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Oporto, Banco Comercial Portugues had (unaudited)
total assets of EUR93.8 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Banco Espirito Santo had total assets of
EUR81.4 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Luxembourg, Espirito Santo Financial Group had
(unaudited) total assets of EUR84.7 billion at the end of June
2009.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Banco BPI had total assets of
EUR43.5 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Banco Santander Totta had total assets of
EUR43.5 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Caixa Economica Montepio Geral had total
assets of EUR17.3 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Funchal, Banif SA had (unaudited) total assets of
EUR11.1 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Warsaw, Poland, Bank Millennium reported IFRS
consolidated total assets of PLN47.1 billion (EUR11.4 billion) and
net profit of PLN413 million (EUR100.2 million) at the end of
December 2008.


CAIXA ECONOMICA: Moody's Cuts Bank Financial Strength Rating to D
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the debt and deposit ratings
of three Portuguese banks and downgraded the senior unsecured debt
and deposit ratings of four Portuguese banks and the issuer rating
of one holding company, four by one notch and one by two notches.
At the same time, Moody's lowered the bank financial strength
ratings of seven banks -- three by one notch, three by two notches
and one by three notches.  This rating action concludes Moody's
review for possible downgrade on several Portuguese banks,
initiated on April 6, 2009.

"The rating action incorporates Moody's expectation of a
heightened probability of systemic support during the ongoing
crisis, which should help to offset some of the challenges the
Portuguese banks are facing, notably asset quality deterioration,
pressure on profitability and selective challenges in risk
management., which is evidenced by high borrower concentration
levels and some related-party lending," explained Olga Cerqueira,
Moody's lead analyst for Portuguese banks.

Macroeconomic indicators were revised downwards by the Bank of
Portugal and it now expects GDP to contract by 3.5%.  The IMF
forecasts a 4% contraction in GDP and an unemployment rate of 9.6%
in 2009.  In Q2 2009, GDP contracted by 3.7% (a 0.3% increase q-o-
q) and the unemployment rate reached 9.1%, from 7.6% at the end of
2008.  Moody's notes that the modest growth of the Portuguese
economy in the past five years has translated into a less abrupt
downward adjustment than that suffered by other European economies
that experienced stronger expansions.  Nevertheless, and despite
the moderate growth in lending in the past few years, household
and corporate indebtedness levels in Portugal are among the
highest in Europe.  Together with the severe contraction in the
export sector and rising unemployment, this will continue to
adversely affect banks' asset quality and Moody's expects
delinquencies to continue to increase.  Asset quality indicators
deteriorated significantly in H1 2009, with the problem loan ratio
reported by the Bank of Portugal increasing to 2.8% at the end of
June 2009 from 2% at the end of December 2008.

Despite almost all Portuguese banks having strengthened or being
in the process of strengthening their regulatory capital levels,
in line with the Bank of Portugal's recommendation that they
should have Tier 1 capital ratios in excess of 8% by 30 September
2009, Moody's considers that this might not be sufficient to
absorb the losses on the credit portfolios of a couple of
institutions that now have BFSRs at D and D-.  These entities may
therefore require further capital injections.

Due to the heightened probability of systemic support in this
crisis, Moody's notes that the impact of the BFSR downgrades has
not translated into equivalent downgrades of the banks' senior
debt and deposit ratings, with three out of seven banks having
their senior ratings confirmed, three having their senior ratings
downgraded by one notch and only one having their senior ratings
downgraded by two notches.

The moderate downgrade of the banks' senior ratings reflects
Moody's expectation that government support would be forthcoming
for these institutions, given the importance of these banks to the
domestic banking system, should such support become necessary.
Such support has already been demonstrated by the EUR4 billion
recapitalization that the Portuguese government put in place at
the end of 2008, but which has not yet been used by any
institution.

                        Rating of Hybrids

The downgrades of the hybrid securities were in line with Moody's
current methodology, i.e.  the magnitude of the downgrades were in
line with the downgrades of the senior debt ratings for banks with
BFSRs above D+ and the downgrades were widened by one notch for
junior subordinated debt and preferred securities of banks now
rated D+ or lower.  Moody's published a Request for Comment in
July 2009 on its proposed changes to banks' subordinated capital
ratings.  If implemented in their proposed form, the changes could
lead to multi-notch downgrades of hybrids.

                     Rating Actions in Detail

Moody's has taken these rating actions:

                     Caixa Geral De Depositos

Moody's downgraded CGD's BFSR by one notch to C- (mapping to a
Baa2 baseline credit assessment, BCA) from C.  The outlook on the
BFSR is negative.  The downgrade primarily reflects CGD's lower
profitability levels, pressured capitalization under a worse-than-
anticipated scenario and deterioration in its historically worse-
than-average asset quality indicators.  CGD's profitability has
been under pressure due to: (i) the low interest environment and
the slow pace of the re-pricing of its loan book; (ii) pressure
from its insurance operations; (iii) its relatively sizeable
portfolio of securities that have also weighted negatively on its
capital; and (iv) the large increase in impairment levels.  CGD's
asset quality is weaker than the average for Portuguese rated
banks, with a reported problem loan ratio of 2.67% in June 2009.
Despite the very large component of mortgages to individuals (53%)
in its domestic portfolio, expected losses under the base and
stressed scenarios are higher than the average due to Moody's
anticipation of worsening asset quality, particularly in
corporates and the ELs from the securities portfolios.  Despite
reporting Tier 1 and core capital ratios of 8.34% and 8.15% at the
end of June 2009, CGD's capitalization would come under pressure
under a worse-than-anticipated scenario, underpinning Moody's
negative outlook on its BFSR.

In Moody's view, CGD, as a fully government-owned bank, will also
face some challenges related to its role as a fundamental
financial intermediary in the depressed Portuguese economy.

CGD's LT debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to Aa2 from Aa1.
The outlook on these is also negative.  Short-term ratings were
affirmed at Prime-1.  The downgrade reflects the downgrade of the
BFSR.  The uplift for CGD's long-term ratings from its Baa2 BCA
continues to reflect Moody's view of its full probability of
systemic support, given its dominant position in Portugal and its
100% government ownership.

CGD's senior and junior subordinated debt was downgraded to Aa3
from Aa2 and its preferred securities were downgraded to A1 from
Aa3.  All these ratings have a negative outlook.

                     Banco Comercial Portugues

Moody's downgraded BCP's BFSR to D+ (mapping to a Baa3 BCA) from
C+.  The outlook on the BFSR is negative.  The downgrade primarily
reflects: (i) the sharp deterioration in BCP's asset quality, with
the problem loan ratio (according to the Bank of Portugal's
definition) increasing to 2.6% from 1.4% in December 2008 and the
rating agency's expectation that the deterioration will continue
beyond these levels; (ii) Moody's expectation of higher losses
from its Polish operations and adverse pressure from its
international operations (particularly Poland), which made a
negligible contribution to consolidated net income in H1 2009;
(iii) the relatively weak performance of BCP's retail banking
operations in Portugal, which is likely to continue, with a
decline of 55% in net income in H1 2009; and (iv) the relatively
weak tangible common equity, due to the high component of hybrids
and minority interests.

In addition, BCP continues to finance some of its shareholders, a
situation inherited from the past and that Moody's acknowledges
the current management wants to reduce, but that in the rating
agency's view continues to pose a risk for BCP, particularly in
the current economic crisis.

While BCP would remain adequately capitalized under Moody's
anticipated scenario, it would very likely need more capital under
the worse-than-anticipated scenario.  This, together with
uncertainties in some of its international operations and Moody's
expectation of adverse credit trends in its domestic operations,
underpin the negative outlook on the BFSR.

BCP's debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to A1 from Aa3.
The outlook on these is also negative.  Despite the multi-notch
downgrade of the BFSR, the several notches of uplift that the debt
and deposit ratings receive from the BCA reflect the key systemic
importance of BCP as the largest privately owned Portuguese bank
and therefore Moody's assessment of a very high probability of
systemic support, which provides some stability to the rating.

Short-term ratings were affirmed at Prime-1.  BCP's senior
subordinated debt was downgraded to A2 from A1, with a negative
outlook.  BCP's Tier 1 capital instruments were downgraded to Baa1
from A2, with a negative outlook.

Furthermore, the deposit ratings of Bank Millennium were
downgraded to Baa2/P-3 with negative outlook from A3/P-2.  The
downgrade is based on the rating action of the parent bank Banco
Commercial Portugues and concludes the review for possible
downgrade initiated in April 2009.  The Bank financial strength
rating of D was not affected.

                       Banco Espirito Santo

Moody's downgraded BES's BFSR to C- (mapping to a Baa1 BCA) from
C+.  The outlook on the BFSR is stable.  The downgrade primarily
reflects: (i) BES's asset quality deterioration, with the problem
loan ratio (according to the Bank of Portugal's definition)
increasing to 2.09% from 1.58% in December 2008 and the worsened
prospects for the corporate sector, which represents almost 70% of
BES's loan book; (ii) the higher volatility of its earnings due to
its relatively large appetite for market risk; (iii) Moody's
expectation of continuing pressure from its operations in Spain,
which account for 9% of the loan book and made an adverse
contribution to net income in H1 2009; and (iv) the ongoing
increase in credit impairments, which will continue to reduce
bottom-line profitability.

With the EUR1.2 billion capital increase in April 2009, BES
strengthened its capital ratios and, even under Moody's worse-than
expected scenario, BES would remain modestly capitalized.  Despite
the rating agency's anticipation of adverse credit trends for the
bank, its risk absorption capacity under Moody's scenario of more
severe stress underpins the stable outlook on the BFSR.

BES's debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to A1 from Aa3.
The outlook is stable.  The downgrade reflects the two-notch
downgrade of the BFSR.  The uplift from the Baa1 BCA reflects the
key systemic importance of BES for the Portuguese financial system
and therefore Moody's assessment of a very high probability of
systemic support.

Short-term ratings were affirmed at Prime-1.  BES's senior and
junior subordinated debt was downgraded by one notch to A2, with a
stable outlook.  BES's Tier 1 capital instruments were also
downgraded by one notch to A3, with a stable outlook.

The potential impact of BES's downgrade on other rated
subsidiaries will be discussed in separate press releases.

                  Espirito Santo Financial Group

Moody's downgraded ESFG's issuer rating to A3, with stable
outlook, from A2.  The downgrade reflects the downgrade of BES to
A1/P-1/C-, which is ESFG's main operating subsidiary and accounted
for 90% of ESFG's operating income in H1 2009.  The stable outlook
is aligned with BES's stable outlook.  Moody's downgraded the
short-term ratings of ESFG's ECP programme to Prime-2 from Prime-
1.  Moody's downgraded the preferred securities to Baa2, with
stable outlook, from Baa1.

                           Banco BPI

Moody's downgraded BPI's BFSR by one notch to C- (mapping to a
Baa2 BCA) from C.  The outlook on the BFSR is negative.  The
downgrade primarily reflects BPI's: (i) modest performance in its
domestic operations, with a 60% drop in net income; (ii)
increasing dependence on its Angolan operations to support its
profitability; (iii) asset quality deterioration, with the problem
loan ratio (according to Bank of Portugal's definition) increasing
to 1.8% at the end of June 2009 from 1.2% at the end of 2008
(which still comparing favorably with the ratios of its main
peers); (iv) relatively weak tangible common equity as result of
minority interests, hybrids and some negative fair value reserves
on its fixed-income portfolio; and (v) exposure to some Spanish
corporates through its branch in Madrid.

Under Moody's anticipated scenario, BPI would remain adequately
capitalized, but under the stressed scenario, tangible common
equity would fall below minimum levels, resulting in a one-notch
downgrade of the BFSR, which thus explains the negative outlook.
Moody's notes that BPI has one of the lowest ELs among rated
Portuguese banks, as result of its lower-than-average exposure to
the construction and real estate sectors and its better-than-
average asset quality indicators, but will monitor closely
developments in the bank's asset quality during the remainder of
2009 and in 2010.  BPI's debt and deposit ratings were confirmed
at A1 and the outlook was changed to negative.  The confirmation
reflects the modest one-notch downgrade of the BFSR and Moody's
assessment that the probability of systemic support in the event
of need is very high, resulting in the debt and deposit ratings
receiving a three-notch uplift from the Baa2 BCA.

Short-term ratings were affirmed at Prime-1.  BPI's senior and
junior subordinated debt was confirmed at A2, with a negative
outlook.  BPI's preferred securities were confirmed at Baa1, with
a negative outlook.

                       Banco Santander Totta

Moody's downgraded BST's BFSR by one notch to C (mapping to an A3
BCA) from C+.  The outlook on the BFSR is negative.  The downgrade
primarily reflects: (i) the deteriorating operating environment,
which will continue to adversely affect asset quality -- the Bank
of Portugal problem loan ratio increased to 1.24% at the end of
June 2009 from 0.8% at the end of December 2008, still very low
when compared with some of its lower-rated peers; (ii) the ongoing
profitability pressure due to the low interest rate environment,
the lower revenues from fee and commission income than in the past
and higher provisioning requirements; and (iii) its relatively low
tangible common-equity when compared with that of its
international peers with higher BFSRs.

Both under Moody's anticipated and stressed scenarios, BST would
display adequate financial fundamentals.  Its resilience under the
Moody's stressed scenario explains why its ratings are different
to those of other Portuguese banks.  The low ELs when compared
with those of its domestic peers are the result of: (i) BST's
exposure being confined to the loan book, as it has no securities
that are stressed; (ii) its above-average asset quality
indicators; and (iii) the large portion (50%) of mortgages with
lower loss expectations in the loan book.

BST's debt and deposit ratings were confirmed at Aa3 and the
outlook was changed to negative.  The confirmation reflects the
modest one-notch downgrade of the BFSR, Moody's assessment that
the probability of systemic support in case of need is very high
and a high probability of parental support from Santander (rated
B-/Aa2/Prime-1).  The negative outlook on both the BFSR and the
debt and deposit ratings reflects both the weakening credit
environment and the negative outlook on the parent's ratings.

Short-term ratings were affirmed at Prime-1.  BST's senior and
junior subordinated debt was confirmed at A1, with a negative
outlook.  BST's preferred securities were confirmed at A2, with a
negative outlook.

                   Caixa Economica Montepio Geral

Moody's downgraded Montepio's BFSR to D (mapping to a Ba2 BCA)
from C- (mapping to a Baa2 BCA).  The outlook on the BFSR is
negative.  The downgrade primarily reflects: (i) the sharp
deterioration in asset quality indicators with the Bank of
Portugal problem loan ratio increasing to 3.96% at the end of June
2009 from 2.90% at the end of December 2008; (ii) the low risk
absorption capacity, with capital levels very strained under
Moody's anticipated scenario; and (iii) high exposure to the real
estate and construction sectors, which account for 25% of the loan
portfolio.

Montepio has a strong franchise in the mortgage and construction
business, with mortgages to individuals accounting for 59% of the
loan book and construction and real estate accounting for 25% of
the loan book.  Montepio's ELs are high when compared with those
of its domestic peers due to its worse-than-average asset quality
indicators (3.96% versus 2.8% for the system) and its high
exposure to the real estate and construction sectors.
Consequently, despite a EUR100 million capital increase in 2009,
which boosted the Tier 1 ratio to 8.7%, Montepio would display
weak financial fundamentals under Moody's anticipated scenario.

In H1 2009, Montepio reported a significant increase (+62%) in
pre-provision income as result of good growth in net interest
income, some extraordinary gains and several cost-cutting
initiatives.  That notwithstanding, credit impairments continue to
rise and the ability to generate internal capital through
recurrent earnings may not, in Moody's view, be sufficient to
absorb the credit losses on its loan and securities portfolios.
Under Moody's worse-than-anticipated scenario, Montepio would
display a significant shortfall in capital, which explains the
negative outlook on the BFSR.

Montepio's debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to Baa1 from
A2, with a negative outlook, driven by the downgrade of the BFSR
and incorporating Moody's assessment of a high probability of
systemic support, which results in several notches of uplift from
the Ba2 BCA.

Short-term ratings were downgraded to Prime-2 from Prime-1.
Montepio's senior subordinated debt was downgraded to Baa2, with a
negative outlook, and the junior subordinated debt was downgraded
to Baa3, with a negative outlook.

                               Banif

Moody's downgraded Banif's BFSR to D- (mapping to a Ba3 BCA) from
D+ (mapping to a Baa3 BCA), with a negative outlook.  The
downgrade primarily reflects: (i) the bank's low capitalization
level -- with Tier 1 and core capital ratios of 7.7% and 6.2% at
the end of June 2009 -- and that of its group (with a Tier 1
capital of 6.46%), when compared with the ELs on its loan and
securities portfolios --under Moody's anticipated scenario,
capital levels, particularly tangible common equity, could be very
pressurized; (ii) the significant decline in profitability in the
past 18 months, with no profits at the bank level in H1 2009;
(iii) the deterioration in asset quality indicators with the Bank
of Portugal problem loan ratio increasing to 2.79% at the end of
June 2009 from 1.84% at the end of December 2008.

Banif Group is in the process of strengthening its capital ratios
through the acquisition of a well-capitalized car finance company
and a capital increase from its major shareholders, which it
intends to strengthen its solvency levels at the bank level.
Despite the expected capital increase, Moody's considers that the
risks that this operation indirectly brings to Banif -- it could
be required to support the company in the event of need -- offset
the capital that this transaction brings to the group; this is
already factored into the BFSR.  The downgrade also incorporates
Banif's high level of related-party lending to several group
companies.  Moody's acknowledges that lending to group companies
is not a new issue, but could, particularly given the current
difficult times, further pressurize Banif's already weak solvency
levels.

Under Moody's worse-than-anticipated scenario, Banif displays a
significant shortfall in capital, which underpins both its D- BFSR
and the negative outlook.  Banif's debt and deposit ratings were
confirmed at Baa1 and the outlook was changed to negative.
Despite the two-notch downgrade of the BFSR, Moody's assesses a
high probability of systemic support for Banif given its very
strong franchise in the Azores and Madeira and its national
presence.  This results in the ratings receiving several notches
of uplift from the Ba3 BCA.  Short-term ratings were confirmed at
Prime-2.  Banif's senior and junior subordinated debt was
confirmed at Baa2 and Baa3, with negative outlook, respectively,
and its preferred securities were confirmed at Ba1, with negative
outlook.  The potential impact of Banif's downgrade on other rated
subsidiaries will be discussed in separate press releases.

Moody's last rating action on Caixa Geral de Depositos was on
6 April 2009, when the bank's ratings were placed on review for
possible downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Banco Comercial Portugues was on
6 April 2009, when the bank's ratings were placed on review for
possible downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Banco Espirito Santo was on 6 April
2009, when the bank's ratings were placed on review for possible
downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Espirito Santo Financial Group was
on 6 April 2009, when the issuer rating was downgraded and placed
on review for further possible downgrade.  Moody's last rating
action on Banco BPI was on 6 April 2009, when the bank's ratings
were placed on review for possible downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Banco Santander Totta was on 6 April
2009, when the bank's ratings were placed on review for possible
downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Caixa Economica Montepio Geral was
on 6 April 2009, when the bank's ratings were placed on review for
possible downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Banif was on 6 April 2009, when the
bank's ratings were downgraded and placed on review for further
possible downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Bank Millennium was on 7 April 2009
when the A3 and Prime-2 long- and short-term deposit ratings were
placed on review for possible downgrade.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Caixa Geral de Depositos had (unaudited)
total assets of EUR118.2 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Oporto, Banco Comercial Portugues had (unaudited)
total assets of EUR93.8 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Banco Espirito Santo had total assets of
EUR81.4 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Luxembourg, Espirito Santo Financial Group had
(unaudited) total assets of EUR84.7 billion at the end of June
2009.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Banco BPI had total assets of
EUR43.5 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Banco Santander Totta had total assets of
EUR43.5 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Caixa Economica Montepio Geral had total
assets of EUR17.3 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Funchal, Banif SA had (unaudited) total assets of
EUR11.1 billion at the end of June 2009.

Headquartered in Warsaw, Poland, Bank Millennium reported IFRS
consolidated total assets of PLN47.1 billion (EUR11.4 billion) and
net profit of PLN413 million (EUR100.2 million) at the end of
December 2008.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


BLOK-S CJSC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
-------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of CJSC Blok-S (Construction)have until September 21,
2009, to submit proofs of claims to:

         V. Vokhmentsev
         Temporary Insolvency Manager
         Post User Box 57
         Vorovskogo Str. 11A
         620076 Yekaterinburg
         Russia

The Arbitration Court of Chelyabinskaya commenced bankruptcy
supervision procedure.  The case is docketed under Case No. ?76-
9137/2009-52-154.

The Debtor can be reached at:

         CJSC Blok-S
         Apt. 22
         Truda Str. 165
         454080 Chelyabinsk
         Russia


GLAZOVSKIY PLYWOOD: Under External Mngt Bankruptcy Procedure
------------------------------------------------------------
The Arbitration Court of Udmurtia has commenced external
management bankruptcy procedure on LLC Glazovskiy Plywood Factory.
The Case is docketed under No. ?71–12580/2008-G26.

The External Insolvency Manager is:

         F.Farakhutdinov
         Mayakovskogo Str. 18
         Izhevsk
         426028 Udmurtia
         Russia

The Debtor can be reached at:

         LLC Glazovskiy Plywood Factory
         Sovetskaya Str. 49
         Glazov
         427620 Udmurtia
         Russia


KILMEZ-LES LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
----------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of LLC Kilmez-Les-Prom (TIN 4310004002, PSRN
1024300953016) have until September 21, 2009, to submit proofs of
claims to:

         S. Omelyusik
         Temporary Insolvency Manager
         Office 14
         Gertsena Str. 15
         610002 Kirov
         Russia

The Arbitration Court of Kirovskaya will convene at 9:00 a.m. on
December 17, 2009, to hear bankruptcy supervision procedure.  The
case is docketed under Case No. ?28–9640/2009–249/6.

The Debtor can be reached at:

         LLC Kilmez-Les-Prom
         Naberezhnaya Str. 26
         Kilmez
         Kilmezskiy
         612950 Kirovskaya
         Russia


MERA LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
----------------------------------------------------
Creditors of LLC Mera (TIN 7805132348, PSRN 1037811005429)
(Construction) have until September 21, 2009, to submit proofs of
claims to:

         Yu. Baranovskaya
         Insolvency Manager
         Room 1
         Nevskiy prospect 81
         Saint-Petersburg
         Russia

The Arbitration Court of Saint-Petersburg commenced bankruptcy
proceedings against the company after finding it insolvent.  The
case is docketed under Case No. ?56–32891/2009.

The Debtor can be reached at:

         LLC Mera
         Ivana Chernykh Str. 4
         198095 Saint-Petersburg
         Russia


NAV-DREV LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
--------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of LLC Nav-Drev (TIN 5223033672, PSRN 1075247000400)
(Wood-Processing) have until September 21, 2009, to submit proofs
of claims to:

         A .Gasparyan
         Insolvency Manager
         Polevaya Str. 6/1-72
         Kstovo
         607650 Novgorodskaya
         Russia
         Tel: 89030415375.

The Arbitration Court of Nizhegorodskaya commenced bankruptcy
proceedings against the company after finding it insolvent.  The
case is docketed under Case No. ?43–32848/08–36–289.

The Debtor can be reached at:

         LLC Nav-Drev
         Klubnaya Str. 5
         Navashino
         Nizhegorodskaya
         Russia


REM-SERVIS LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
----------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of LLC Rem-Servis (TIN 1835044874, PSRN 1021801651244)
(Construction) have until September 21, 2009, to submit proofs of
claims to:

         V. Kiryanov
         Temporary Insolvency Manager
         50 let Pionerii Str. 26
         426033 Izhevsk
         Udmurtia
         Russia

The Arbitration Court of Udmurtia commenced bankruptcy supervision
procedure.  The case is docketed under Case No. ?71–7148/2009.

The Debtor can be reached at:

         LLC Rem-Servis
         M. Gorkogo Str. 64
         Izhevsk
         Udmurtia
         Russia


SEVERSTAL OAO: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Senior Unsecured Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned OAO Severstal's RUB15 billion bond
issue an expected senior unsecured rating of 'B+'.  The final
rating is contingent on Fitch's receipt of final documents
conforming to information already received.  The issue forms part
of Severstal's new RUB45 billion domestic bond issue program which
is assigned a senior unsecured rating of 'B+'.  At the same time,
the agency has assigned Severstal a Long-term local currency
Issuer Default Rating of 'B+'.  All ratings are placed on Rating
Watch Negative.

Severstal's other ratings are Long-term foreign currency IDR 'B+';
senior unsecured 'B+'; National Long-term 'A(rus)' and Short-term
IDR 'B'.  All ratings except for the Short-term IDR are on RWN.
The Recovery Rating for the senior unsecured debt, including the
upcoming bond issue, is 'RR4'.

The RUB45 billion program will be split into several tranches: the
first issue is anticipated to be limited to RUB15 billion with
scheduled completion before end-September 2009.  The agency does
not expect the company to issue the full amount of the announced
program.  The maximum tenor of each tranche is three years and
includes a put option after two years.  Severstal plans to use the
net proceeds from the notes to refinance existing debt and for
general corporate purposes.  The draft bond prospectus does not
contain any financial or other covenants.

In Q209, Severstal reported that its revenue increased to US$2.9
billion from US$2.8 billion in Q109 and a narrower loss of US$5
million from the US$156 million seen in Q109.  Higher capacity
utilization rates (90%+ in Russia and 60%+ in US/Europe),
stabilizing product prices and lower input prices underpinned the
results, with Russian steel and mining operations delivering a
combined EBITDA of US$328 million, up from US$129 million in Q109.
Nevertheless, for FY09, Fitch expects a 40%-45% year-on-year fall
in revenue and an EBITDAR margin below 10%.  As a result, net
leverage is expected to deteriorate to around 8x-9x (FY08: 0.9x),
and funds from operations interest coverage is forecast to fall to
1.4x-1.6x (FY08: 22.6x).

Fitch considers Severstal's current liquidity position to be
adequate.  At end-Q209, Severstal had cash and short-term deposits
of US$2.6 billion, and undrawn committed facilities of US$782
million against a total debt of US$7.5 billion, of which US$1.6
billion is due during Q309-Q210.

The RWN continues to reflect uncertainty regarding the outcome of
negotiations with lenders in respect of potential covenant
breaches under its various facilities.  Fitch expects to resolve
the RWN by January 2010.  In resolving the RWN, the agency will
assess the success of measures announced by management to reduce
financial and operational risks, including covenant waiver
negotiations, and expected developments in Severstal's key
markets.


SMT-5 LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
-----------------------------------------------------
Creditors of LLC SMT-5 Construction Company (TIN 5506042540, PSRN
1025501256220) have until September 21, 2009, to submit proofs of
claims to:

         A. Petrov
         Temporary Insolvency Manager
         Office 1
         5Armii Str. 4
         644122 Omsk
         Russia

The Arbitration Court of Omskaya will convene at 11:30 a.m. on
November 3, 2009, to hear bankruptcy supervision procedure.  The
case is docketed under Case No. ?46–13916/2009.

The Debtor can be reached at:

         LLC SMT-5
         20 let RKKA Str. 304A
         644027 Omsk
         Russia


STROITEL LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
--------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of LLC Stroitel (TIN 5501106430) (Construction) have
until September 21, 2009, to submit proofs of claims to:

         V.Velichko
         Insolvency Manager
         Post User Box 7627
         644099 Omsk
         Russia

The Arbitration Court of Omskaya commenced bankruptcy proceedings
against the company after finding it insolvent.  The case is
docketed under Case No. ?46–9025/2009.

The Debtor can be reached at:

         LLC Stroitel
         Prospect Mira 185
         Omsk
         Russia


STROY-URAL LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
----------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of LLC Stroy-Ural-Mash (TIN 7422029770) (Construction
and Machinery) have until September 21, 2009, to submit proofs of
claims to:

         M. Moiseev
         Insolvency Manager
         Post User Box 483
         Degtyarsk
         623270 Sverdlovskaya
         Russia

The Arbitration Court of Chelyabinskaya commenced bankruptcy
proceedings against the company after finding it insolvent.  The
case is docketed under Case No. ?76-6232/2009-20-13/48-136.

The Debtor can be reached at:

         LLC Stroy-Ural-Mash
         Semenova Str. 22-819
         Ozersk
         456300 Chelyabinskaya
         Russia


STROY-MET-KON: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
---------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of OJSC Stroy-Met-Kon (TIN 6148000349, PSRN
1026102158170) (Metal Structures Plant) have until September 21,
2009, to submit proofs of claims to:

         T. Ukrainskaya
         Temporary Insolvency Manager
         Office 81
         Izvilistaya Str. 10A
         344091 Rostov-on-Don
         Russia

The Arbitration Court of Rostovskaya commenced bankruptcy
supervision procedure.  The case is docketed under Case No. ?53–
11657/2009.

The Debtor can be reached at:

         OJSC Stroy-Met-Kon
         Metallistov Str. 1
         Krasnuy Sulin
         Rostovskaya
         Russia


STROY-TEKH LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
----------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of LLC Stroy-Tekh (TIN 5611016691, PSRN 1025601720165)
(Construction) have until September 21, 2009, to submit proofs of
claims to:

         L. Novoselova
         Temporary Insolvency Manager
         Apt. 73
         Tereshkovoy Str. 249/1
         460050 Orenburg
         Russia

The Arbitration Court of Orenburgskaya will convene at 9:00 a.m.
on December 8, 2009, to hear bankruptcy supervision procedure.
The case is docketed under Case No. ?47–5945/2009.

The Court is located at:

         The Arbitration Court of Orenburgskaya
         Volodarskogo Str. 39
         Orenburg
         Russia


TALETS-STROY LLC: Creditors Must File Claims by September 21
------------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of LLC Talets-Stroy (TIN 3528106890)(Construction) have
until September 21, 2009, to submit proofs of claims to:

         A. Makhov
         Insolvency Manager
         Apt. 7
         Svobody Str. 7
         Babaevo
         162482Vologodskaya
         Russia

The Arbitration Court of Vologodskaya commenced bankruptcy
proceedings against the company after finding it insolvent.  The
case is docketed under Case No. ?13–2396/2009.

The Debtor can be reached at:

         LLC Talets-Stroy
         Cherepovets
         Vologodskaya
         Russia


==============================
S L O V A K    R E P U B L I C
==============================


SKYEUROPE HOLDING: Files for Bankruptcy Protection
--------------------------------------------------
The management board of SkyEurope Holding AG has filed an
application for the opening of bankruptcy proceedings of SkyEuro
Holding AG.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 10,
2009, the district court of Bratislava opened bankruptcy
proceedings against SkyEurope Airlines, a.s., the operating
subsidiary of SkyEurope Holding.

As reported in The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, on Aug. 31
the airline filed for bankruptcy protection due to the lack of
sufficient interim funding to finance ongoing operations.

Headquartered in Bratislava, Slovakia, SkyEurope Holding AG --
http://www.skyeurope.com/-- is a low-cost passenger airline with
bases in the Czech Republic, Austria and Slovakia.  It offers a
route network of 38 destinations in 18 countries from its bases in
Prague, Vienna and Bratislava.  The Company's fleet consists of 14
Boeing 737-700NG aircrafts. SkyEurope Holding AG operates through
subsidiaries and affiliated companies: SkyEurope Airlines, a.s.,
SkyEurope Asset Management (Ireland), SkyEurope Asset Management
Hungary Kft., SkyEurope Airlines Hungary Kft, SkyEurope Airlines
A.S., Spolka Akcyjna, Oddzial w Polsce, SkyEurope Airlines, a.s. -
organizacni slozka and GroundEurope Kft.


=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


ANDASTRA HOLDING: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
--------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of Andastra Holding AG are requested to file their
proofs of claim by September 21, 2009, to:

         Elmar Birgelen Treuhandbuero
         Seestrasse 121
         8702 Zollikon
         Switzerland

The company is currently undergoing liquidation in Zollikon.  The
decision about liquidation was accepted at an extraordinary
general meeting held on April 24, 2009.


BELENUS HOLDING: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
-------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of Belenus Holding AG are requested to file their proofs
of claim by September 21, 2009, to:

         Elmar Birgelen Treuhandbuero
         Seestrasse 121
         8702 Zollikon
         Switzerland

The company is currently undergoing liquidation in Zollikon. The
decision about liquidation was accepted at an extraordinary
general meeting held on April 24, 2009.


CREA GMBH: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
-------------------------------------------------
Creditors of Crea GmbH are requested to file their proofs of claim
by September 21, 2009, to:

         Heidi Buchert
         Angelstrasse 9B
         8330 Pfaeffikon
         Switzerland

The company is currently undergoing liquidation in Wetzikon.  The
decision about liquidation was accepted at a shareholders' meeting
held on July 29, 2009.


EICHMATT WOHNBAU: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
--------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of Eichmatt Wohnbau AG are requested to file their
proofs of claim by September 21, 2009, to:

         Mueller Treuhand GmbH
         Dorfstrasse 13
         6264 Pfaffnau
         Switzerland

The company is currently undergoing liquidation in Oftringen.  The
decision about liquidation was accepted at an extraordinary
general meeting held on July 17, 2009.


ELEKTRO GEBRUEDER: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
---------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of Elektro Gebrueder Naef AG are requested to file their
proofs of claim by September 21, 2009, to:

         Elektro Gebrueder Naef AG
         Kapplerstrasse 71
         9642 Ebnat-Kappel
         Switzerland

The company is currently undergoing liquidation in Ebnat-Kappel.
The decision about liquidation was accepted at an extraordinary
general meeting held on July 30, 2009.


FROIDEVAUX EICHER: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
---------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of Froidevaux, Eicher & Hofmann AG are requested to file
their proofs of claim by September 21, 2009, to:

         Daniel Dula
         Buchholzstrasse 32
         6314 Unteraegeri
         Switzerland

The company is currently undergoing liquidation in Kuesnacht ZH.
The decision about liquidation was accepted at an extraordinary
general meeting held on August 3, 2009.


GLORYNS AG: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
--------------------------------------------------
Creditors of Gloryns AG are requested to file their proofs of
claim by September 21, 2009, to:

         Wirtschaftspruefung Trevisca AG
         Liquidator
         Zugerstrasse 74
         6340 Baar
         Switzerland

The company is currently undergoing liquidation in Baar.  The
decision about liquidation was accepted at an extraordinary
general meeting held on April 2, 2009.


PALMEN-APOTHEKE AG: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
----------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of Palmen-Apotheke AG are requested to file their proofs
of claim by September 21, 2009, to:

         Maria de Lourdes Pavlicek-Lucas
         Liquidator
         Monbijoustrasse 24
         3011 Bern
         Switzerland

The company is currently undergoing liquidation in Bern.  The
decision about liquidation was accepted at a general meeting held
on July 21, 2009.


POLYTAG TECHNOLOGY: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
----------------------------------------------------------
Creditors of Polytag Technology AG are requested to file their
proofs of claim by September 21, 2009, to:

         Pkf Consulting AG, liquidator
         Lavaterstr. 40
         8002 Zurich
         Switzerland

The company is currently undergoing liquidation in Maennedorf.
The decision about liquidation was accepted at an extraordinary
general meeting held on July 15, 2009.


RUYSDAEL AG: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
---------------------------------------------------
Creditors of Ruysdael AG are requested to file their proofs of
claim by September 21, 2009, to:

         Dr. Egbert Wilms
         Holbeinstrasse 31
         8032 Zurich
         Switzerland

The company is currently undergoing liquidation in Zug.  The
decision about liquidation was accepted at a general meeting held
on June 26, 2009.


STRECKTECH AG: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
-----------------------------------------------------
Creditors of Strecktech AG are requested to file their proofs of
claim by September 21, 2009, to:

         Rudolf Mosimann
         Baarerstrasse 78
         6300 Zug
         Switzerland

The company is currently undergoing liquidation in Zug.  The
decision about liquidation was accepted at an extraordinary
general meeting held on June 25, 2009.


SUTTER CORNEL: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
-----------------------------------------------------
Creditors of Sutter Cornel AG are requested to file their proofs
of claim by September 21, 2009, to:

         Sutter Cornel AG
         Ochsenwis
         9656 Alt St. Johann
         Switzerland

The company is currently undergoing liquidation in Alt St. Johann.
The decision about liquidation was accepted at an extraordinary
general meeting held on August 3, 2009.


VR SERVICE: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
--------------------------------------------------
Creditors of vR Service GmbH are requested to file their proofs of
claim by September 21, 2009, to:

         Aldeba Treuhand und Revision AG
         Steinenring 46
         4051 Basel
         Switzerland

The company is currently undergoing liquidation in Basel.  The
decision about liquidation was accepted at a shareholders' general
meeting held on July 15, 2009.


WERZ AG: Claims Filing Deadline is September 21
-----------------------------------------------
Creditors of Werz AG are requested to file their proofs of claim
by September 21, 2009, to:

         Werz AG in Liquidation
         Ettenhauserstrasse 67
         8620 Wetzikon
         Switzerland

The company is currently undergoing liquidation in Wetzikon.  The
decision about liquidation was accepted at a general meeting held
on March 6, 2009.


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


VESTEL ELEKTRONIK: Fitch Affirms Issuer Default Ratings at 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Turkey-based Vestel Elektronik Sanayi
ve Ticaret A.S.'s Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer
Default Ratings at 'B'.  The Outlooks on both IDRs are Stable.
Fitch has also affirmed the senior unsecured rating of Vestel
Electronics Finance Ltd.'s guaranteed US$225 million 8.75% notes
due in 2012 at 'B'.  The Recovery Rating on the notes is 'RR4'.

The ratings reflect the recent improvements in Vestel's financial
profile, such as improved operating margins and reduced short
foreign currency position.  These improvements are counter-
balanced by the company's slightly higher total leverage and
Fitch's concerns over its ability to maintain its operating
margins and liquidity profile at around the same levels as of end-
H109.  Vestel reported a 9% contraction in revenue to TRY1.9
billion while increasing its EBITDA margin to 15% in H109 from 9%
in H108 as it benefited from operating cost savings.  The company
reported TRY9.1 million net profit (H108: TRY74.9 million net
loss).

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's assessment that Vestel should
be able to maintain its leverage and coverage metrics at their
respective FY08 levels based on Fitch's forecast operating
profitability and leverage levels.

Vestel increased its net debt to TRY579 million at end-H109 from
TRY368 million at FYE08.  Out of total debt of TRY814.9 million,
TRY421.9 million was due within 12 months, most of which was
short-term trade finance bank credits.  A major portion of the
TRY393 million long-term debt stock at end-H109 is Vestel's
US$225 million 2012 bond.  The bond covenants stipulate that
Vestel must remain under 4x consolidated gross debt/EBITDA and
maintain over 2.25x fixed charge coverage.  Vestel was in
compliance with these covenants as of end-H109, although Fitch
notes the limited headroom under both covenants.

Fitch notes the TRY160 million (approximately US$100 million) cash
injection by the majority shareholder, Collar Holding, through a
rights issue in April 2009.  Vestel had a US$77 million short
foreign currency position at end-H109, which was significantly
lower than the US$565.8 million at end-2008.  Fitch notes
positively that Vestel has recently been using more hedging
instruments to manage its foreign currency exposure.

Vestel is a manufacturer of television sets with TRY4.7 billion
consolidated sales and TRY428.1 million EBITDA, including
TRY1.3 billion sales and TRY121 million EBITDA in the white goods
manufacturing business in FY08.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BANK OF SCOTLAND: Moody's Corrects Rating on Three Instruments
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has corrected the rating of three
instruments issued by Bank of Scotland plc, to Baa1 (negative
outlook) from Ba1 (review for downgrade).

The issues affected are these: (i) a GBP300 million subordinated
bond maturing on 15 May 2021 (ISIN XS0066120915),
(ii) a GBP100 million subordinated bond maturing on 17 January
2014 (ISIN GB0004037171; and (iii) a GBP150 million subordinated
bond maturing February 2018 (ISIN XS0041971275).

These instruments are dated senior subordinated bonds with no
deferral features, but on June 22, 2009, they were downgraded to
Baa2 (negative outlook) from Baa1 (review for downgrade) along
with Bank of Scotland's junior subordinated instruments.  They
were then downgraded to Ba1 (review for downgrade) on September 9,
2009, as Moody's took further rating action on Bank of Scotland's
cumulative junior subordinated debt and cumulative preferred
securities.

These instruments are dated senior subordinated bonds with no
deferral features and should be rated Baa1as with Bank of
Scotland's other senior subordinated instruments, and Moody's has
now corrected the ratings.

Based in London, Lloyds Banking Group plc reported total assets of
GBP1.06 trillion as of June 30, 2009.


BRITISH AIRWAYS: To Terminate 125 Temporary Cabin Crew
------------------------------------------------------
David Robertson at The Times reports that British Airways plc has
told its temporary cabin crew that their contracts will be
terminated at the end of next month.

The Times relates a total of 125 non-permanent staff were e-mailed
on Monday and told that they would no longer be employed from
October 31.  According to the Times, a further 140 full-time cabin
crew have accepted voluntary redundancy and will leave the company
at the same time.

The airline has warned that compulsory redundancies might be
required, the Times notes.

Separately, The Times discloses union leaders have told British
Airways cabin crew to "hold firm" against the airline's attempts
to cut their pay and change their contracts.  The Times relates in
a message to BA's 14,000 cabin crew, the British Airlines Stewards
and Stewardesses Association (BASSA), the union, said that this
was was not the time to cut a deal.

According to the Times, the crew were told "Hold firm and stay
strong.  We feel now the wind is behind us and before long
everything BA have been plotting and scheming will be exposed as
nothing more than an opportunistic and farcical scam".

On Aug. 4, 2009, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, citing
the Wall Street Journal, reported BA posted a pretax loss of
GBP148 million (US$247.2 million) for the quarter ended June 30,
compared with a profit of GBP37 million a year earlier, citing
declining passenger numbers and cargo volumes.  According to the
WSJ, the airline's revenue fell 12% to GBP1.98 billion.  BA, as
cited by the WSJ, said it was hit mainly by falling numbers of
passengers flying business and first class during the economic
downturn, lower average revenue per passenger and lower fuel
surcharges.

                       About British Airways

Headquartered in Harmondsworth, England, British Airways Plc,
along with its subsidiaries, (LON:BAY) -- http://www.ba.com/-- is
engaged in the operation of international and domestic scheduled
air services for the carriage of passengers, freight and mail and
the provision of ancillary services.  The Company's principal
place of business is Heathrow.  It also operates a worldwide air
cargo business, in conjunction with its scheduled passenger
services.  The Company operates international scheduled airline
route networks together with its codeshare and franchise partners,
and flies to more than 300 destinations worldwide.  During the
fiscal year ended March 31, 2009 (fiscal 2009), the Company
carried more than 33 million passengers.  It carried 777,000 tons
of cargo to destinations in Europe, the Americas and throughout
the world.  In July 2008, the Company's subsidiary, BA European
Limited (trading as OpenSkies), acquired the French airline,
L'Avion.

                           *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 12,
2009, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its
'BB' debt rating to the proposed GBP350 million senior unsecured
convertible bonds to be issued by U.K.—based airline British
Airways PLC (BA; BB/Negative/--).


BUSINESS MORTGAGE: Moody's Cuts Rating Class B1 & B2 Notes to 'B1'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken these rating actions on Notes
issued by Business Mortgage Finance No. 5 plc (amounts reflecting
initial outstanding):

-- GBP100 million Class A1 Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes
    due 2039, confirmed at Aaa; previously on 23 April 2009 Aaa
    placed under review for possible downgrade;

-- EUR180 million Class A2 Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes
    due 2039, confirmed at Aaa; previously on 23 April 2009 Aaa
    placed under review for possible downgrade;

-- Detachable A1 Coupons, confirmed at Aaa; previously on 23
    April 2009 Aaa placed under review for possible downgrade;

-- Detachable A2 Coupons, confirmed at Aaa; previously on 23
    April 2009 Aaa placed under review for possible downgrade;

-- GBP27 million Class M1 Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes
    due 2039, downgraded to A3; previously on 23 April 2009 A2
    placed under review for possible downgrade;

-- EUR36.5 million Class M2 Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes
    due 2039, downgraded to A3; previously on 23 April 2009 A2
    placed under review for possible downgrade;

-- GBP12 million Class B1 Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes
    due 2039, downgraded to B1; previously on 23 April 2009 Ba1
    placed under review for possible downgrade;

-- EUR11.5 million Class B2 Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes
    due 2039, downgraded to B1; previously on 23 April 2009 Ba1
    placed under review for possible downgrade; and

-- Mortgage Early Redemption Certificates, confirmed at Aaa;
    previously on 18 October 2006 assigned Aaa definitive ratings.

In total, approximately GBP39 million and EUR48 million of CMBS
bonds were affected by the downgrade action.  Moody's does not
rate the Class C Notes issued by BMF5.  As described under sub-
heading 3, "Rating Rationale", the action taken has been due to
Moody's revising its expected loss projection for the transaction
as a whole.

1) Transaction Overview

Business Mortgage Finance No. 5 plc represents the fifth true-sale
securitisation by UK lender Commercial First of a pool initially
comprising 1,135 loans, mainly to individuals and secured by
first-ranking mortgages over mixed-use commercial properties
across the UK.

The transaction features 10 classes of notes, of which the Class C
is not rated by Moody's.  The floating rate notes are issued in
both Euros and in GBP, while the underlying loans are 100% GBP
denominated.  The transaction has (i) hedging to mitigate basis
risk, interest rate risk, and cross-currency risk between the
underlying loan contracts and the Notes; (ii) a liquidity facility
of GBP30.14 million; and (iii) a cash reserve fund, currently with
an available balance of GBP7.51 million and a target balance of
GBP12.81 million.  The transaction is now amortizing principal
sequentially; however pro-rata amortization of the Notes is
permitted when certain performance related tests have been met.

2) Transaction Performance History

Moody's has observed arrears rates increasing in the pool since
closing.  At the August 2009 payment date, 38.3% of the pool was
in arrears by at least one full installment.  GBP66.49 million or
29.5% of the pool was 3 or more months scheduled monthly payments
late, and all such loans were classed as being "in litigation".
For 76 loans litigation was in the initial stages, for 92 loans a
possession order had been obtained and for 41 loans the properties
were already in the possession of the servicer.  Litigation cases
in the quarter ending 15 May 2009 represented GBP66.95 million
with 216 cases, or 29.2% of the pool balance.

In total 51 loans in the pool, with an original balance of
GBP11.22 million have suffered a loss, and cumulative losses have
been GBP4.18 million.  The principal balance of loans with losses
as a proportion of the pool represents 4.98% of total current loan
principal balance and 4.15% of aggregate original principal
balance.  Losses as a proportion of the current pool balance are
1.85% and of the original pool balance are 1.39%.

However, the relatively high loan interest margins in the
transaction and the collection activities of the servicer, have
mitigated a large proportion of the losses so far, with losses
after such amounts ("excess spread") being GBP1.74 million.  In
other words; approximately 58% of the lifetime losses have been
absorbed by the excess spread so far, and were not passed onto the
Issuer.  The un-absorbed losses were met by deductions to the
reserve fund, and no principal deficiency balance has been
recorded on any class of Notes so far.

Loans which are in arrears are, on average, still paying part of
their installment, which explains why excess spread has been able
to absorb losses while delinquency rates have been so high.  Loans
which began April 2008 in arrears, and which became more
delinquent in the 12 months until April 2009, paid on average 50%
of their scheduled monthly installment due.  Loans which became
delinquent for the first time within the last 12 months paid 80%
on average, whereas loans which were reducing arrears balances
during that period were able to pay 131% on average.

Moody's analysis of the monthly payment history between April
2008 and April 2009 of the loans in the pool has indicated that
the current trend is for loans to become more delinquent on
average.  Excluding arrears of less than GBP150, of the loans
which were in arrears in April 2008 (GBP90.96 million by principal
balance), 59.5% became more delinquent in terms of the absolute
amount owed by April 2009.  In contrast, 13.1% prepaid out of
arrears, and 27.4% managed to reduce the delinquent amount by at
least one pound.  However, during this period, there were several
new cases of loans becoming delinquent: a total loan balance of
GBP46.8 million as at April 2008 was affected.

3) Rating Rationale

The rating action on the Class M and B Notes was prompted by these
factors: (i) the higher than expected arrears levels and the lower
than expected build up in the reserve fund compared with Moody's
expectations at closing; and (ii) Moody's concerns about
continuing falling real estate values and a challenging economic
backdrop for small businesses across the country.  Long-term
affordability of the loans and the achievable sales prices upon
loan foreclosure are expected to be impaired for the forseeable
future.

As mentioned in section 2 above, despite relatively high arrears
levels, the collection activity of the servicer, has allowed a
significant amount of losses to be absorbed so far.  Hence in its
analysis, Moody's considered the historical collection performance
of the servicer, when re-assessing the ratings of the sub-
investment grade classes of Notes.  In other words, the Class B
ratings will remain sensitive to the performance of the servicer
in maintaining or improving its collection rates over time.

The ratings of the Class A Notes and of the Class A Detachable
Coupons were confirmed due to the available subordination and
liquidity which protect them even in the increased expected
default and loss scenarios currently anticipated by Moodys.  The
MERC Notes were also confirmed, as Moody's has not altered its
view of the ability of the Issuer to pass on early redemption fees
to MERC Note holders.

The analysis for the ratings of the Notes as a whole was based on
an updated poolcut and the recent performance history of each
loan.  Moody's analysis concluded that the expected future default
rate in the pool is now both higher than at closing and more
front-loaded than was anticipated at closing.  The expectation of
front loaded default rates is due to the general economic backdrop
for this sector (negative outlook over the next few years),
combined with a lack of / reduction in availability of credit.

Losses upon default were also rebased, by considering what would
be the likely achievable sales price in the event of a forced sale
over the next two to six years.  Commercial and residential
property values across the UK have fallen significantly in recent
times and Moody's expects only moderate recovery by 2011.  Moody's
estimates that the value of the properties securing this
transaction have declined by 30-50% since the properties were last
valued, depending on the particular location and quality of the
real estate asset concerned.  This means that, with average pool
LTVs of 70.8% (the loan balance is updated, valuations are not
updated and are from 2006 or 2007) and after senior expenses,
losses are likely to materialize in the expected case if the
defaulted loans would be enforced.  Therefore, Moody's believes
that the servicer's strategy going forwards will be to delay
enforcement where possible, as a strategy to maximize future loan
recoveries by continuing to make collections, even partially, in
the near term.

4) Moody's Portfolio Analysis

As at the August 2009 interest payment date, the most common
property type in the pool was a mixed-use commercial property,
with a commercial use unit on the ground floor, and a flat or
maisonette for residential use situated directly above it.
However, the types of properties in the pool are very diverse:
comprising everything from farmland to health clinics.  The top 3
regional concentrations by loan current balance in August 2009
were: 21.1% South East, 12.3% South West and 11.5% North West.
Greater London represented 11%.  There were no significant
borrower concentrations in the pool, and the loan Herfindahl Index
was over 500.

In terms of loan characteristics, 94.5% are Libor-linked floating
rate loans, while 5.5% are fixed rate for a period ending not
after 31 January 2010 whereupon they revert to a Libor-linked
floating rate of interest.  All loans amortise in full, to mature
on average by 11 April 2033.  The average loan size at end April
2009 was GBP227,645 and the average LTV 73% based on the at
origination values.  The average loan margin at end April 2009 was
4.1%.


CATTLES PLC: Completes Sale of Cattles Invoice Finance
--------------------------------------------------------
Following approval of the shareholders at the General Meeting
on August 27, 2009, the Board of Directors of Cattles plc said
that it has completed the sale of the entire issued share capital
of Cattles Invoice Finance Limited (together with its subsidiary
Cattles Invoice Finance (Oxford) Limited) to ABS FS Limited, a
company controlled by funds managed by AnaCap Financial Partners.

The consideration for the Disposal is GBP10.8 million in cash
(which is equal to the expected net asset value of CIF Group as at
completion of the Disposal) plus the repayment of inter company
loans of GBP59.6 million, subject to final adjustments, on a pound
for pound basis, for the net assets and inter company balances as
at completion, after the preparation of completion accounts, and
subject to certain retentions as described in the circular to
shareholders dated August 11, 2009.

The proceeds of the Disposal will, after deduction of Disposal
related costs and the amounts to be paid into the retention
account, be used to repay bank indebtedness of approximately
GBP65.6 million in consideration for the release of the bank
guarantees previously given by Cattles Invoice Finance Limited and
Cattles Invoice Finance (Oxford) Limited.  This forms part of the
Board's strategy of working closely with Cattles' debt providers
to sustain their support for the Cattles group's action to
stabilise its financial position, preserve liquidity and reshape
significantly the continuing Cattles group.

Cattles is still in constructive discussions with its key
financial creditors to obtain a standstill agreement.

Cattles plc -- http://www.cattles.co.uk/-- is a financial
services company specializing in providing consumer credit to non-
standard customers in United Kingdom.  The Company also provides
debt recovery services to external clients and its consumer credit
business, and working capital finance for small- and medium-sized
businesses.  It also has a car retail operation, which is an
introducer of hire purchase customers to its consumer credit
business.  Its business divisions include Welcome Financial
Services, The Lewis Group and Cattles Invoice Finance.  Welcome
Financial Services consists of three businesses: Welcome Finance,
Shopacheck and Welcome Car Finance.  Shopacheck provides short-
term home collected loans to some 260,000 customers through 52
branches.  The Lewis Group provides debt recovery and
investigation services, serving both external clients and Welcome
Financial Services.  In September 2007, it announced the
acquisition of a debt portfolio of United Kingdom credit card,
loan and overdraft receivables.


CATTLES PLC: Talks on Standstill Agreement Progresses
-----------------------------------------------------
In response to press comment, Cattles plc on Wednesday confirmed
that it is progressing its discussions to agree a standstill
agreement with representatives of its key financial creditors.  A
draft of the heads of terms for a standstill agreement is now
being considered by the key financial creditors and by the board
of Cattles and relevant subsidiaries.

It is not certain that these financial creditors will approve the
heads of terms or that a standstill agreement will be successfully
concluded.  Cattles said does not consider it appropriate to
comment on specific provisions in the draft heads of terms at this
time.   However, the company said will continue to discharge its
obligation to update the market as appropriate on any
developments.

Cattles plc -- http://www.cattles.co.uk/-- is a financial
services company specializing in providing consumer credit to non-
standard customers in United Kingdom.  The Company also provides
debt recovery services to external clients and its consumer credit
business, and working capital finance for small- and medium-sized
businesses.  It also has a car retail operation, which is an
introducer of hire purchase customers to its consumer credit
business.  Its business divisions include Welcome Financial
Services, The Lewis Group and Cattles Invoice Finance.  Welcome
Financial Services consists of three businesses: Welcome Finance,
Shopacheck and Welcome Car Finance.  Shopacheck provides short-
term home collected loans to some 260,000 customers through 52
branches.  The Lewis Group provides debt recovery and
investigation services, serving both external clients and Welcome
Financial Services.  In September 2007, it announced the
acquisition of a debt portfolio of United Kingdom credit card,
loan and overdraft receivables.


CREDIT-LINKED ENHANCED: S&P Raises Rating on 6 Notes to 'CCC'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to 'CCC' from 'CCC-' its
credit rating on the EUR25 million series 6 notes issued by
Credit-Linked Enhanced Asset Repackagings PLC.

This rating action follows an adjustment to the reference
portfolio notional amount, the lower band, and upper band.  These
are now sufficient, in S&P's opinion, to support a 'CCC' rating.

The reference portfolio notional will now be EUR833,333,333.00,
down from EUR2.5 billion.  The lower band will be adjusted to
EUR58,333,333.30 from EUR250 million, and the upper band to
EUR83,333,333.30 from EUR280 million.

In addition, the portfolio management agreement will terminate,
and the deal will become self-managed by CNP Assurances
(AA/Negative/--).  CNP Assurances may only make substitutions
subject to a credit deterioration event being determined, and is
further restricted by the eligibility criteria in place.


EUROHOME UK: Fitch Comments on Expected Depletion of Reserve Fund
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says that the rating actions taken on July 27, 2009
incorporated an expectation that the reserve fund of Eurohome UK
Mortgages 2007-2 would be fully depleted.

In the investor report for September 2009, Eurohome UK 2007-2, saw
a further reserve fund draw of GBP2.5 million, leaving the junior
tranche of this deal with no credit support and an outstanding
principal deficiency balance of more than GBP780,000, i.e.  20.9%
of the class B2 notes.  Eurohome UK 2007-1 has also seen a further
reserve fund draw in the amount of GBP672,121, and as of the
September 2009 investor report 26.9% of the target reserve fund
amount remained outstanding.  The key driver behind these reserve
fund draws remains the high level of losses generated from the
sale of repossessed properties.  In addition, given the low
interest rate environment, the presence of a fixed rate swap in
Eurohome UK 2007-2 is channelling some of the revenue received
from fixed rate borrowers out of the deal.

According to the latest investor reports, in Q309 the servicer
sold GBP5.9 million (Eurohome UK 2007-1) and GBP14.9 million
(Eurohome UK 2007-2) worth of repossessed properties, generating
losses to the amount of GBP2 million and GBP5.9 million in
Eurohome UK 2007-1 and Eurohome UK 2007-2 respectively.  This,
together with a decline in the volume of repossessed properties in
Q309, has resulted in a further decline in the outstanding balance
of repossessed properties in both transactions.  Fitch believes
the fall in repossessed properties reflects the decline in
interest rates as it improves borrower affordability across most
UK non-conforming transactions, reducing the need for
repossession.  A continued reduction in repossessions could prove
positive for the transactions if it is a result of improved
borrower payments.

Despite the continued decline in arrears levels, Fitch still has
concerns over the performance of the underlying collateral, and
believes, that the two deals will continue to generate losses.
The agency expects further reserve fund draws in Eurohome UK 2007-
1, and is of the opinion that this deal is also likely to see its
reserve fund fully depleted in the forthcoming payment dates.

The current ratings of these two transactions are:

Eurohome UK Mortgages 2007-1 plc:

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0290416527) rated 'A'; Outlook Stable; Loss
     Severity Rating 'LS-1'

  -- Class M1 (ISIN XS0290417418) rated 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
     Loss Severity Rating 'LS-4'

  -- Class M2 (ISIN XS0290419380 rated 'B'; Outlook Negative; Loss
     Severity Rating 'LS-4'

  -- Class B1 (ISIN XS0290420396) rated 'CCC'; Recovery Rating
     'RR3'

  -- Class B2 (ISIN XS0290420982): rated 'CC'; Recovery Rating
     'RR6'

  -- Class C (ISIN XS0290421956) rated 'C'; Recovery Rating 'RR6'

  -- MERCS (ISIN XS0290550929) rated 'AAA'; Outlook Stable

Eurohome UK Mortgages 2007-2 plc:

  -- Class A1(A) (ISIN XS0311688054) rated 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
     Loss Severity Rating 'LS-1'

  -- Class A1(B) (ISIN XS0311689532) rated 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
     Loss Severity Rating 'LS-1'

  -- Class A2 (ISIN XS0311691272) rated 'AAA'; Outlook Stable;
     Loss Severity Rating 'LS-1'

  -- Class A3 (ISIN XS0311693484) rated 'A'; Outlook Stable; Loss
     Severity Rating 'LS-3'

  -- Class M1 (ISIN XS0311694029) rated 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
     Loss Severity Rating 'LS-3'

  -- Class M2 (ISIN XS0311695182) rated 'B'; Outlook Negative;
     Loss Severity Rating 'LS-4'

  -- Class B1 (ISIN XS0311695778) rated 'CC'; Recovery Rating
     'RR4'

  -- Class B2 (ISIN XS0311697394) rated 'CC'; Recovery Rating
     'RR6'

  -- Class C (ISIN XS0311699507) rated 'C'; Recovery Rating 'RR6'


ITV PLC: Competition Commission Retains CRR Undertakings
--------------------------------------------------------
The Competition Commission (CC) is consulting on possible changes
to ITV's Contract Rights Renewal (CRR) Undertakings.  Those
Undertakings were given to protect advertisers from the loss of
competition in the sale of TV advertising, following the merger of
Carlton and Granada in 2003/4.

In May this year, the CC was asked by the Office of Fair Trading
(OFT) to review the Undertakings and specifically whether
circumstances had changed sufficiently since 2003 to warrant their
removal or variation.

In its Provisional Decision published Tuesda at www.competition-
commission.org.uk, the CC has found that ITV1's continuing ability
to reach large numbers of viewers, and the strong bargaining
position this gives it with media buyers, requires the retention
of the CRR Undertakings, although some variations might be
justified.

CC Deputy Chairman and Chairman of the CRR Review Group, Diana
Guy, said: "ITV1 has seen a decline in its share of both viewers
and advertising revenues since 2003 and there are now more
alternatives for advertisers.  However, ITV remains crucial for
advertisers looking to reach large number of viewers, particularly
if this needs to be done rapidly.

"The media agencies, through whom the vast majority of TV
advertising is bought, need access to ITV1 for their advertiser
clients.  As a result they cannot withdraw all their business from
ITV1.  However, we found that if they try to reduce their
proportion of expenditure on ITV1 they could be faced with
significantly less attractive terms for their remaining ITV1
business.  Because of this the changes in the market since 2003
have not increased the bargaining strength of agencies.  It is
therefore our view that a remedy needs to stay in place.

"However, we are considering whether some variations might be
justified in light of the changed circumstances since 2003, and
possible unintended effects of the CRR Undertakings in practice.
Although there may be a case for change, exactly how we do it is
far from clear cut.  We are wary of any measures that will
increase complexity or will depart from the transparent and
measurable virtues of the current system. So we would welcome
views from all interested parties as we consider any potential
changes in detail.

"With the provisional decision, the CC has also published for
consultation a Notice of possible variations to the CRR
Undertakings."

These include a proposal to widen the definition of ITV1 to
include any ITV+1 or ITV1 High Definition channel that ITV decides
to launch.  The CC is also seeking views on—or alternatives to—
other possible variations, both alternative ways of addressing the
competition concerns and possible measures to address the
unintended effects which may have arisen as a result of the CRR
Undertakings.
The CC will now consider responses to these documents before
publishing its final decision which it aims to do by the end of
the year.

                         ITV's Response

ITV said it welcomes Wednesday's provisional report from the
Competition Commission and its recognition of the case for the
reform of CRR.

ITV said Wednesday's report acknowledges that "there have been
significant changes to the television industry since 2003" and
explains that the Commission will now "examine possible variations
of the undertakings to take account of the changes that have
occurred."  The report also acknowledges the changes in ITV's
market position and the fact that the SOCI ratchet and the right
of rollover for contracts have had unintended consequences.

ITV has argued that the advertising market has been transformed
since the introduction of CRR.  With the uptake of digital
broadcasting the number of multi-channel households has more than
doubled from 42% in 2002 to over 88% by the end of 2008.  This
means ITV1's airtime is now substitutable and that the market can
self regulate.

Michael Grade, Executive Chairman of ITV plc, said: "We look
forward to engaging with the Competition Commission over the next
three weeks to identify which post-CRR option best serves the
interests of ITV Plc, its viewers and advertisers."

Mr. Grade added: "We would like to put on record our appreciation
of the time and effort the Competition Commission has put into
this review to date and we look forward to the completion of the
review in time for the upcoming deal season."

                           About ITV plc

ITV plc -- http://www.itvplc.com/-- is a United Kingdom-based
advertising funded broadcaster.  The Company also operates as an
advertising funded media owner in the United Kingdom across all
media, including television, radio, press, cinema, outdoor and the
Internet.  As a producer, ITV makes hours of network television.
Its digital channels include ITV2, ITV3, ITV4 and Citv.  ITV also
makes programs for the BBC, Channel 4, five, Sky and other
broadcasters.  ITV produces programs watched on screens from San
Francisco to Sydney.  In addition, it produces a range of products
related to ITV programs, such as digital video disks (DVDs) and
computer games.  Its online properties include itv.com,
itvlocal.com and Friends Reunited

                           *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 11,
2009, Moody's Investors Service said that it downgraded ITV plc's
senior unsecured ratings and its Corporate Family Rating to B1
(from Ba3).  The rating outlook for ITV is stable.

On Aug. 11, 2009, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported
that Fitch Ratings affirmed ITV plc's Long-term Issuer Default
Rating at 'BB-', and maintained the rating Outlook at Negative.
The agency also affirmed ITV's senior unsecured rating at
'BB-'.


ITV PLC: S&P Downgrades Corporate Credit Rating to 'B+'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has lowered its
long-term corporate credit and senior unsecured debt ratings on
U.K. private TV broadcaster ITV PLC to 'B+' from 'BB-'.  The
outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term corporate credit
rating on ITV.  The '4' recovery rating on all of ITV's
outstanding bonds is unchanged.  The '4' recovery rating indicates
S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery for unsecured
creditors in the event of a payment default.

"The downgrade reflects S&P's view that ITV's credit measures will
likely be materially weaker than expected in 2009, and stand to
remain weak in 2010," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Melvyn
Cooke.  "We base S&P's opinion on ITV's lower-than-expected first-
half 2009 performance and its ballooning pension deficits."

Although S&P had previously anticipated the group's Standard &
Poor's adjusted gross debt to EBITDA ratio to return below 7x in
2009 and to about 5x in 2010--mostly on the back of ITV's planned
material reductions in programming costs and other expenses--S&P
now believe these ratios are likely to be significantly higher in
both years.

"Our negative outlook reflects the possibility that, in the case
of a prolonged weakness in the U.K. advertising market that could
spill into the better part of 2010, ITV may experience further
delays in materially improving profitability and credit measures
in 2010.

The outlook also integrates S&P's uncertainties about the future
levels of ITV's pension deficit.  Under S&P's scenario for weak
economic recovery, S&P believes this deficit is likely to remain
high over the next few quarters.  S&P also factor in S&P's
anticipation that ITV's liquidity will remain adequate and that
the group will continue to successfully defend its audience and
advertising market shares over the medium term.

S&P could lower the ratings if ITV were unable to meaningfully
reduce adjusted debt to EBITDA to about 6x, from the expected very
high year-end 2009 levels, and if the group were unable to
maintain positive free cash flow generation.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if ITV were able to
materially improve operating margins and credit measures in line
with the current rating expectations, as detailed above, while
preserving its competitive position in the U.K. advertising
market.

S&P does not see any upward rating movement at this point, given
the expected operational challenges facing ITV in S&P's economic
scenario over the next few quarters.  Any positive momentum,
would, however, likely stem from substantially better-than-
expected advertising and economic conditions in the U.K.


RMF EURO: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed one and downgraded four tranches of RMF
Euro CDO S.A.'s notes, and removed four tranches from Rating Watch
Negative.  The agency has assigned Loss Severity ratings to all
five tranches.  The rating actions are:

  -- EUR205 million class A (ISIN: XS0156515982): affirmed at
     'AAA'; assigned a Negative Outlook and a Loss Severity Rating
     of LS-2

  -- EUR31 million class B-1 (ISIN: XS015651911): downgraded to
     'BB' from 'A-'; off RWN; assigned a Negative Outlook and a
     Loss Severity Rating of LS-3

  -- EUR5 million class B-2 (ISIN: XS0156520719): downgraded to
     'BB' from 'A-'; off RWN; assigned a Negative Outlook and a
     Loss Severity Rating of LS-3

  -- EUR22 million class C (ISIN: XS0156524034): downgraded to 'B'
     from 'BBB'; off RWN; assigned a Negative Outlook and a Loss
     Severity Rating of LS-4

  -- EUR3 million Combination Notes (ISIN XS0156575374):
     downgraded to 'B' from 'BBB'; off RWN; assigned a Negative
     Outlook

The rating actions reflect the recent clustering of leveraged loan
defaults and increasing 'CCC'-rated asset exposure in the
portfolio.  Since September 2008, the transaction has suffered its
first five defaults.  The cumulative default rate represents 8% of
the target par amount of the transaction.  The achieved recovery
rates for defaulted assets which have completed their workout
process were lower than anticipated by Fitch.  In addition, 13% of
the portfolio now consists of 'CCC+' or lower rated obligors
compared to 1% one year ago.  The exposure to 'CCC+' and below
rated assets when adjusting for assets on Negative Outlook or RWN
is 27%, compared to 8% a year ago.  As a result of negative
portfolio migration, the class C redemption test is now breached.

The remaining credit enhancement of the class B and class C notes
is no longer deemed consistent with investment-grade rating
definitions.  As a result, Fitch has downgraded these classes to
'BB' and 'B' respectively.  For example, the CE available to the
class C notes can only protect against the default of eight
average size assets or two of the largest risk contributors.  As a
result of portfolio losses, this coverage level is a significantly
weaker level than a year ago when the class C note could survive
the loss of 24 average risk contributors.  The performance of
these tranches is highly dependent on portfolio recovery
prospects.  Although both downgraded notes remain current on
interest payments and some credit protection still remains,
Fitch's long term outlook remains Negative.

The affirmation of the class A notes reflects the robust credit
support driven primarily by overcollateralisation with limited
benefit from excess spread.  The coverage of the class A note is
significantly higher than subordinate notes.  The credit
enhancement supporting the class A notes can protect against the
default of 57 average obligors or 34 of the largest risk
contributors.

Given this transaction's high sensitivity to underlying loan
recovery rates and significant exposure to underlying assets on
Negative Outlook, Fitch's long term outlook for this transaction
is Negative across the transaction's capital structure.


UK COAL: Mulls GBP100 Mln Share Sale to Reduce Debt
---------------------------------------------------
Alistair Holloway at Bloomberg News reports that UK Coal Plc plans
to sell new shares to raise GBP100 million (US$165 million) and
reduce debt.

Bloomberg relates the company said in a statement Wednesday it
will sell 142 million shares, equal to about 90% of the existing
stock, at 75 pence each.

The company, Bloomberg discloses, had GBP190.8 million of debt as
of June 27.

According to Bloomberg, UK Coal said Peel Holdings Plc, the
company's largest investor with a 28% stake, agreed to buy a
portion of the share sale, which is being underwritten by
Evolution Securities Ltd. and Numis Securities Ltd.

                              Breach

Robert Lindsay at Times Online reports that the company said that,
without the fundraising, it might breach a debt covenant due to be
tested next month.  "Should the capital raising not proceed, the
company believes that there may be a breach of the loan-to-value
covenant to be tested in October 2009," Times Online quoted the
company as saying.  It might also fail a debt test due on
December 26, Times Online notes.

According to Times Online, the deal, which must be approved by
shareholders at a meeting on October 9, is a condition the banks
required before they would agree to extend the due dates on four
loan facilities totalling GBP172 million, two of which were due to
be repaid in September next year.

UK Coal plc -- http://www.ukcoal.com/-- is a United Kingdom-based
company engaged in surface and underground coal mining, property
regeneration and management, and power generation.  The Company
operates four deep mines, located in Central and Northern England.
Its deep mines business consists of Daw Mill (Warwickshire),
Kellingley (Yorkshire) and Thoresby and Welbeck (Nottinghamshire).
The Company had five active surface mines. Total surface mining
reserves and resources are estimated at approximately 55 million
tons.  The Company owns approximately 45,000 acres (18,200
hectares) of predominantly agricultural land.  During the year
ended December 31, 2008, it acquired 50% of UK Strategic
Partnership Limited as a joint venture company with Strategic
Sites Limited for the development of certain investment
properties.  In January 2009, it sold 50% share in Coal4Energy
Limited to Hargreaves Services PLC.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: A Short Historical Introduction to the Law of Real
              Property
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Author:  J. John Lawler and Gail Gates Lawler
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 204 pages
List Price: US$34.95
by Henry Berry

The authors introduce real property law -- more commonly known
today as real estate law -- by noting that it has always been a
daunting field for law students because its subject matter and
concepts lie outside "the ambit of personal experience or general
knowledge."  Real property is thus different from the fields of
contracts, torts, agencies, and crimes, all of which a law student
has an intuitive familiarity with and personal exposure to from
newspapers, books, conversation, family matters, and the like.
Real property, on the other hand, has always attracted a
disproportionately low number of law students because it is
difficult to relate to.  Study of real property is made even more
difficult by a plethora of unfamiliar legal terms such as
"velleinage," "mesne tenant," "copyhold lands," "mortmain,"
"derogation," and "seisin."

In this work, the authors offer an approach for gaining a solid
understanding of real property law and how it applies to personal
and business endeavors.  The Lawlers begin with a general
organization and then proceed to specific legal terms.  Most
important is the historical context the book offers.  "Real
Property Law can be understood only in the light of its historical
evolution," they assert.  The Lawlers quote noted Supreme Court
justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Benjamin Cardozo to give
support to their assertions.  "A page of history is worth a volume
of logic," Holmes wrote in a 1921 ruling.  Cardozo, in his 1921
work, Nature of the Judicial Process states, "[C]ontingent
remainders . . . private trusts . . . [these and other] heads of
the law are intelligible only in the light of history, and get
from history the impetus which must shape their subsequent
development."

What Holmes and Cardozo had to say about the crucial place of
history in shaping law applies especially to real property law.
Criminal law can be grasped by understanding the appropriate
relationship among members of a society; contractual law can be
grasped by recognizing the importance of clear, specified, and
binding obligations between parties.  Real property law, however,
can be grasped only by understanding its origins and historical
development and learning its arcane vocabulary.  No one has
firsthand experience with the many kinds of properties and the
innumerable local laws that arise when dealing in real estate law.
Properties can reflect the desires of individual owners as well as
the design ideas of individual architects.  A town land use
ordinance, for example, will differ widely between the arid
Southwest and the temperate, more populated Northeast.

The Lawlers offer the right approach to introduce real property
law.  As they realize, rooting the range of unfamiliar terms and
concepts in the social conditions of different eras and the
related circumstances of landowners, landholders, and tenants not
only renders the terms and concepts interesting, but also imparts
a familiarity in a way that memorization cannot.  First published
in 1940, this book understandably does not deal with environmental
issues and issues of public domain that have become significant in
real estate law in recent years.  Nonetheless, these newer
principles and concepts can be comprehended only with knowledge of
the historical perspective and terminology that the authors
present.  That this work is not complete in its subject matter is
no detraction from its standing as a singular, particularly
effective introduction to real property law.

J. John Lawler and Gail Gates Lawler were attorneys in
Pennsylvania.  John Lawler was a professor of law at the
University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  Gail Lawler practiced law
in Philadelphia.

                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.

                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter -- Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick,
Maryland USA.  Valerie C. Udtuhan, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine
C. Tumanda, Joy A. Agravante and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2009.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
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of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *