TCREUR_Public/100226.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, February 26, 2010, Vol. 11, No. 040

                            Headlines



F I N L A N D

M-REAL OYJ: Moody's Gives Stable Outlook; Affirms 'Caa1' Rating


F R A N C E

NATIXIS SA: To Sell Coface for Up to EUR1.5 Billion
PERNOD RICARD: Moody's Changes Outlook on Ba1 Rating to Positive


G E R M A N Y

ARCANDOR AG: Karstadt Creditors Back Restructuring Plan
COMMERZBANK AG: Posts EUR1.86 Bil. Net Loss in Fourth Qtr. 2009
COMMERZBANK AG: May Opt for Share Sale to Repay State Aid
PERI-WERK ARTUR: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Corporate Family Rating
SMART SME: Moody's Junks Rating on Class E Notes From 'Ba2'


I R E L A N D

CHEYNE FINANCE: Moody's Withdraws 'Ca' Ratings on Two Notes
CORK CITY: Goes Into Liquidation After Rescue Plan Failed
JEAN SCENE: Creditors to Meet on March 5 to Appoint Liquidator


I T A L Y

PARMALAT SPA: Investor Seeks Dividends From Lawsuit Settlements


N E T H E R L A N D S

PALLAS CDO: S&P Junks Ratings on Two Classes of Notes from BBB-
SCHOELLER ARCA: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Corporate Family Rating
SCHOELLER ARCA: S&P Assigns 'CCC+' Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating
SELLABAND: Nears Deal with Potential Buyer, Trustee Says


P O R T U G A L

CIMPOR CIMENTOS: S&P Retains CreditWatch Negative on Ratings


S P A I N

AYT CAIXA: Moody's Junks Rating on Series D Notes From 'Ba3'
MADRID RMBS: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'


U K R A I N E

KREDITPROMBANK: Creditors Convert US$400 Mil. Debt Into Shares


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

3I GROUP: Sells Ambrea for EUR850MM; CEO Eyes Zero Net Debt
BNP PARIBAS: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on Credit Default Swaps
BRITISH AIRWAYS: Balpa Seeks Ruling on Pilots' Holiday Pay Row
BRITISH SEAFOOD: Goes Into Administration After Credit Withdrawn
CHESHAM BUILDING: Merges with Skipton Building Society

ETHEL AUSTIN: 114 Stores to Cease Trading; 1,048 Jobs Affected
JOHN CHARCOL: Bought Out of Administration in Pre-Pack Deal
KAUPTHING SINGER: Sports Direct Buys Rights to Blacks Stake
LITHOGRAPHICS: Shuts Down Business Following Liquidation
MG ROVER: Parliamentary Investigation Into Collapse Called Off

NORTHERN ROCK: Deposit Guarantee to Be Lifted in Three Months
PARK ROW: FSA Fines Former CEO; Secures GBP7.8MM for Customers
SOVEREIGN OILFIELD: Board Appoints PwC as Administrators
WATKINS BOOKS: In Administration; 11 Jobs Affected

* UK: Business Insolvencies Hit Lowest Rate in January 2010


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Megamergers - Corporate America's Billion-Dollar




                         *********



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F I N L A N D
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M-REAL OYJ: Moody's Gives Stable Outlook; Affirms 'Caa1' Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on the ratings
of M-real Oyj to stable from negative.  At the same time, it has
affirmed M-real's Caa1 Corporate Family Rating, the Caa1
Probability of Default Rating, Caa1 senior unsecured debt ratings,
the Caa1 senior unsecured MTN program rating and the Caa1 senior
unsecured guaranteed MTN program rating of its majority-owned
subsidiary Metsa Group Financial Services Oy.

"The change in outlook to stable reflects the recent stabilization
in operating performance and cash flow generation visible in H2
2009, which Moody's expects will be sustained despite continued
challenging market conditions in the paper and packaging
industry," said Christian Hendker, Moody's lead analyst for the
European Paper and Forest Products Sector.  "Free cash flow at
break-even levels, as well as the proceeds of asset disposals have
gradually strengthened M-real's liquidity profile, which should be
sufficient to cover short term debt maturities, provided that
M-real continues to gradually improve its cash flow generation."

M-real's operating performance came under pressure in 2009 due to
an unprecedented cyclical contraction in demand for office and
speciality paper and consumer packaging products in the company's
core markets.  EBITDA and funds from operations turned positive
again in H2 2009, as demand started to recover, especially in the
consumer packaging segment and more recently in the office paper
division.  This was also supported by tight capacity management,
benefits of cost reduction measures and lower input costs.

Moody's expects that M-real's performance improvements will be
sustained, supported by further demand recovery, and implemented
prices increases, which should outweigh rising input costs and
ongoing restructuring initiatives.  Translated into adequate free
cash flow generation, these performance improvements should
contribute to gradual improvements of M-real's relatively weak
credit metrics and underpin a more solid positioning in the Caa1
rating category.

The company's current liquidity profile is characterized by about
EUR500 million of cash as of the end of December 2009, which was
supported by a EUR300 million cash inflow on the back of the
restructuring of the group's ownership in the Finnish pulp company
Mets„-Botnia at the end of 2009.  The cash cushion was applied
during January for an early redemption of EUR250 million of notes
due in December 2010.  The residual cash cushion should be
sufficient to cover debt maturities of around EUR150 million over
2010 and a further EUR100 million in 2011, provided that M-real
continues to generate at least break even free cash flows.  In
addition, Moody's understands that M-real has access to up to
EUR279 million under the Finnish Pension loans.

The rating could be downgraded if: i) M-real is unable to bring
relief to cash consumption and interest coverage; or ii) the
company's liquidity profile unexpectedly erodes.

Moody's believes that upward pressure on the rating could develop
after a track record of stable operating profitability and cash
flow generation over the next quarters.  Indicators would be
positive funds from operations, an EBITDA-margin moving to the
mid-single digits, leverage in terms of Debt/EBITDA moving to
below 7 times and RCF/Debt towards the low single digits.

The last rating action was on February 13, 2009, when Moody's
downgraded M-real to Caa1 with a negative outlook from B3 with a
negative outlook.

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: M-real Oyj

  -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: Metsa Group Financial Services Oy

  -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Change of LGD Assessment:

Issuer: M-real Oyj

  -- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, LGD rate changed
     to LGD4, 56% from LGD4, 53%

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, LGD rate changed to
     LGD4, 56% from LGD4, 53%

Issuer: Metsa Group Financial Services Oy

  -- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, LGD rate changed
     to LGD4, 56% from LGD4, 53%

M-real, with headquarters in Espoo, Finland, is among Europe's
largest integrated paper and forest products companies with sales
of EUR2.4 billion per the last 12 months ending December 31, 2009.
Core activities include consumer packaging, office papers and
specialty papers.


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F R A N C E
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NATIXIS SA: To Sell Coface for Up to EUR1.5 Billion
---------------------------------------------------
Fabio Benedetti-Valentini at Bloomberg News, citing La Tribune,
reports that Natixis SA is seeking to sell its unprofitable
credit-insurance unit Coface SA for as much as EUR1.5 billion
(US$2.03 billion).

According to Bloomberg, La Tribune said Natixis, which is being
advised by Rothschild, may sell all of Coface or plan an initial
public offering in which the French bank may reduce its stake in
Coface below 50%.

Bloomberg notes the newspaper said among potential buyers,
investment fund Advent International has met Coface's management.

                            Guarantee

Citing Bloomberg News, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe
reported on Aug. 28, 2009, that Natixis received a guarantee from
its parent covering about EUR35 billion (US$50 billion) of risky
assets.  According to Bloomberg, Natixis Chief Executive Officer
Laurent Mignon said BPCE, the Paris-based bank that controls 72%
of Natixis, agreed to absorb most of the losses that might stem
from its structured credit holdings in exchange for a premium that
will cost Natixis about EUR48 million a year.

                         About Natixis SA

Natixis SA -- http://www.natixis.com/-- is a France-based bank
offering various services and engaged in different activities.
Its main activities comprise corporate and investment banking,
asset management, receivables management, private equity and
private banking, retail banking and other services.  The Bank is
active in a number of countries in Europe, the Americas, Africa,
Asia and Oceania.  As of December 31, 2008, Natixis SA had a
number of subsidiaries, including Ixis Corporate & Investment
Bank, Ixis Asset Management Group, Coface and Natixis Asset
Management, among others.

                           *     *     *

Natixis SA continues to carry a 'D' bank financial strength rating
from Moody's Investors Service with a stable outlook.


PERNOD RICARD: Moody's Changes Outlook on Ba1 Rating to Positive
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service changed the outlook on the Ba1 corporate
family rating and senior unsecured rating of Pernod Ricard SA to
positive from stable.

"The outlook change has been prompted by the company's efforts to
improve its financial risk profile and accelerate the reduction in
indebtedness resulting from the acquisition of Vin & Sprit in July
2008 with a view to achieving a ratio of Net Debt to EBITDA
(before Moody's adjustments) close to its self imposed target of 4
times by fiscal year ending June 2011," said Yasmina Serghini-
Douvin, a Moody's Assistant Vice President -- Analyst.  "This
rating action also takes into account management's successful
execution of its strategy and integration of the purchased assets,
despite the weaker demand for premium alcoholic beverages in all
key spirits markets."

Pernod Ricard reported a 3% net sales decline and flat operating
profit (on an organic basis) in the six-month period to
December 31, 2009.  Positive price and mix effects have supported
top line growth, in particular for the company's Top 15 brands,
although pressures on volumes and down trading in the more mature
US and some Western European countries continued.  These were not
fully offset by the growing demand in Asia and the rest of the
world, which have been the largest contributor to the company's
profit growth in the past 18 months.  Looking ahead, Pernod Ricard
anticipates a better performance in the second half of this year
(ending June 30, 2010) -- after an improvement in Q2 versus Q1
already -- leading to an organic growth in its profit from
recurring operations of between 1% and 3% for the full year.  It
has also confirmed its target of a cumulative free cash flow
generation from recurring operations of EUR3.0 billion in the
three years to 2010/11.

Whilst Moody's adjusted Debt to EBITDA ratio was still weak for
the rating category in the 12 month period to December 31, 2009,
estimated at 6.5x compared to 6.3x at June 30, 2009, this slight
deterioration primarily reflects the adverse effects on
profitability in the first half of the current year from foreign
currency movements, in particular the sharp devaluation in
Venezuelan peso and depreciation in US dollar or Russian Ruble.
Moody's expects the leverage ratio to improve to below 6x this
year and to move towards 4.5x in FY ending June 2011.

In terms of liquidity, Moody's positively notes that Pernod Ricard
has repaid part of the acquisition financing put in place in 2008
for the acquisition of Vin & Sprit, using in particular the
proceeds from the EUR1.0 billion rights issue executed in 2009 and
those from the non-strategic assets disposal program (of which
EUR0.8 billion has been completed to date).  As a result, the
company has limited debt maturing in the next 12 months.  The next
significant bond maturities will be GBP450 million notes (April
2011) issued by Allied Domecq Financial Services Ltd and
guaranteed by Pernod Ricard SA and a EUR600 million bond (June
2011).  Moreover, Pernod Ricard has access to EUR1.9 billion of
undrawn credit facilities.

The positive outlook reflects Moody's expectation of a
continuation in Pernod Ricard's more conservative financial
policy, which should support a further improvement in credit
metrics in the next 12 months towards the targets set by Moody's
for an investment-grade rating, i.e. an adjusted Debt to EBITDA
ratio sustainably below 4.5x and a Retained Cash-Flow to Net Debt
ratio above 10%.

Moody's last rating action on Pernod Ricard was a downgrade of its
ratings to Ba1/Not Prime from Baa3/Prime-3 on July 24, 2008.

Incorporated in Paris, France, Pernod Ricard is the world's second
largest alcoholic beverages company.  It generated sales of
EUR7.2 billion for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2009.


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G E R M A N Y
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ARCANDOR AG: Karstadt Creditors Back Restructuring Plan
-------------------------------------------------------
Anousha Sakoui at The Financial Times reports that creditors to a
portfolio of stores let by German retailer Karstadt have agreed to
a restructuring.

The FT relates the restructuring comes after Karstadt filed for
insolvency last June.

The agreement by creditors was needed as part of the insolvency
administrator's plan to restructure the business and avoid the
risk of a liquidation of the property portfolio, the FT notes.

According to the FT, a majority of holders of EUR1.13 billion
(US$1.5 billion) in CMBS, called Fleet Street Finance Two, issued
to finance department stores occupied by Karstadt, agreed to
extend the maturity of their bonds in the first European
restructuring of its kind.

In exchange for extending the maturity of the bonds by three years
to July 2017 and relaxing loan to value covenants on the
financing, bondholders will receive an additional 52 basis points
of margin of interest paid, the FT states.  In addition, any
excess cash from rent or a sale would be used to repay the
securitization ahead of other stakeholders, the FT says.

                        About Arcandor AG

Germany-based Arcandor AG (FRA:ARO) -- http://www.arcandor.com/--
formerly KarstadtQuelle AG, is a tourism and retail group.  Its
three core business areas are tourism, mail order services and
department store retail.  The Company's business areas are covered
by its three operating segments: Thomas Cook, Primondo and
Karstadt.  Thomas Cook Group plc is a tour operator with
operations in Europe and North America, set up as a result of a
merger between MyTravel and Thomas Cook AG.  It also operates the
e-commerce platform, Thomas Cook, supporting travel services.
Primondo has a portfolio of European universal and specialty mail
order companies, including the core brand Quelle.  Karstadt
operates a range of department stores, such as cosmopolitan
stores, including KaDeWe (Kaufhaus des Westens), Karstadt
Oberpollinger and Alsterhaus; Karstadt brand department stores;
Karstadt sports department stores, offering sports goods in a
variety of retail outlets, and a portal, karstadt.de that offers
online shopping, among others.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, a local court
in Essen formally opened insolvency proceedings for Arcandor on
September 1, 2009.  The proceedings started for the Arcandor
holding company and for 14 units, including the Karstadt
department-store chain and Primondo mail-order division.

Arcandor filed for bankruptcy protection after the German
government turned down its request for loan guarantees.  On
June 8, 2009, the government rejected two applications for help by
the company, which employs 43,000 people.  The retailer sought
loan guarantees of EUR650 million (US$904 million) from Germany's
Economy Fund program.  It also sought a further EUR437 million
from a state-owned bank.


COMMERZBANK AG: Posts EUR1.86 Bil. Net Loss in Fourth Qtr. 2009
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jann Bettinga at Bloomberg News reports that Commerzbank AG posted
a net loss for the three months ended Dec. 31 of EUR1.86 billion
(US$2.53 billion) after writing down investments related to bond
insurers.

According to Bloomberg, the bank, which was forced to tap Germany
for EUR18.2 billion amid the global financial crisis, said
writedowns tied to monoline insurers, cutting risks and generally
"difficult markets" caused a trading loss of EUR561 million, wider
than analysts' projections for a loss of EUR210 million.

Commerzbank recorded a EUR300-million charge tied to bond insurers
in the fourth quarter, with Chief Financial Officer Eric Strutz
saying he doesn't expect any more significant related writedowns,
Bloomberg discloses.

The 2009 loss "reflects the effects of the ongoing economic and
financial market crisis, and the crisis is not yet over,"
Bloomberg quoted Chief Executive Officer Martin Blessing as saying
in a statement Tuesday.  He repeated a target to return to
profitability no later than in 2011, Bloomberg notes.

Bloomberg relates Mr. Strutz said on a conference call Tuesday a
loss this year is "realistic".

Headquartered in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, Commerzbank AG --
https://www.commerzbank.com/ -- is the parent company of a
financial services group active around the world.  The group's
operating business is organized into six segments providing each
other with mutually beneficial synergies: Private and Business
Customers, Mittelstandsbank, Central and Eastern Europe ,
Corporates & Markets, Commercial Real Estate and Public Finance
and Treasury.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 18,
2010, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it affirmed its
'CCC' debt ratings on various Tier 1 hybrid capital instruments
issued by Germany-based Commerzbank AG (A/Negative/A-1) and
related entities.  The instruments affected were issued by
Commerzbank Capital Funding Trust I, II, and III and Dresdner
Capital Funding Trust I, III, and IV.  These rating actions follow
S&P's review of different scenarios for upcoming coupon payments,
which S&P believes could lead to positive or negative rating
implications.

The affirmation of S&P's ratings on Dresdner FTs' instruments
reflects its view that Commerzbank would likely be able to conform
with regulatory capital requirements, which is a condition for
making coupon payments.  However, S&P consider it possible that
regulatory intervention may prevent a coupon payment, considering
that Commerzbank has received substantial amounts of state aid to
prevent a default.  The next coupon payment will be that of
Dresdner Capital Funding Trust IV on March 31, 2010.  In S&P's
view, the Commerzbank FTs' and Dresdner FTs' instruments rank
equally.  Consequently, S&P would likely raise the ratings on all
of them if coupon payments are made.  S&P would lower the ratings
to 'C' if S&P believes that Commerzbank would not be in a position
to make the payment on March 31, 2010.

Coupon payments on Commerzbank FTs' instruments could be suspended
if Commerzbank records a balance-sheet loss on an unconsolidated
basis, which S&P consider likely for 2009.  The rating affirmation
reflects its view that coupon payments might be possible if
Commerzbank were to make coupon payments on the Dresdner FTs'
instruments.  This is because S&P could consider Commerzbank FTs'
instruments to be on par with those of Dresdner FTs.  An
alternative scenario could be that regulators no longer recognize
the Dresdner FTs' instruments as Tier 1 capital.  In such a
scenario, a coupon payment on Dresdner FTs' instruments would
likely be possible and could lead to positive rating actions on
the Dresdner FTs instruments.  However, S&P believes this would
not trigger a coupon payment on Commerzbank FTs' instruments.  If
Commerzbank were to miss coupon payments on the Commerzbank FTs
instruments, S&P would likely lower the ratings to 'C', but raise
them if the payments are made.


COMMERZBANK AG: May Opt for Share Sale to Repay State Aid
---------------------------------------------------------
Jann Bettinga at Bloomberg News reports that Commerzbank AG said
it's not planning a share sale but is keeping the option open to
help pay back state aid.

"We're not currently thinking about it," Bloomberg quoted
Commerzbank Chief Executive Officer Martin Blessing as saying at a
press conference in Frankfurt Wednesday.  Mr. Blessing, as cited
by Bloomberg, said a capital increase is one of several options
that could be considered, and proceeds from possible asset sales,
retained earnings and excess capital may also be used to repay
government funds.

Bloomberg recalls Commerzbank was forced to tap Germany for
EUR18.2 billion (US$24.7 billion) amid the global financial
crisis.  Bloomberg notes Mr. Blessing said the aid included a
capital injection of EUR16.4 billion, the so- called silent
participation, which the bank plans to start paying back in 2012
at the latest.

Headquartered in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, Commerzbank AG --
https://www.commerzbank.com/ -- is the parent company of a
financial services group active around the world.  The group's
operating business is organized into six segments providing each
other with mutually beneficial synergies: Private and Business
Customers, Mittelstandsbank, Central and Eastern Europe ,
Corporates & Markets, Commercial Real Estate and Public Finance
and Treasury.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 18,
2010, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC' debt
ratings on various Tier 1 hybrid capital instruments issued by
Commerzbank AG (A/Negative/A-1) and related entities.  The
instruments affected were issued by Commerzbank Capital Funding
Trust I, II, and III and Dresdner Capital Funding Trust I, III,
and IV.  These rating actions follow S&P's review of different
scenarios for upcoming coupon payments, which S&P believes could
lead to positive or negative rating implications.

The affirmation of S&P's ratings on Dresdner FTs' instruments
reflects its view that Commerzbank would likely be able to conform
with regulatory capital requirements, which is a condition for
making coupon payments.  However, S&P consider it possible that
regulatory intervention may prevent a coupon payment, considering
that Commerzbank has received substantial amounts of state aid to
prevent a default.  The next coupon payment will be that of
Dresdner Capital Funding Trust IV on March 31, 2010.  In S&P's
view, the Commerzbank FTs' and Dresdner FTs' instruments rank
equally.  Consequently, S&P would likely raise the ratings on all
of them if coupon payments are made.  S&P would lower the ratings
to 'C' if S&P believes that Commerzbank would not be in a position
to make the payment on March 31, 2010.

Coupon payments on Commerzbank FTs' instruments could be suspended
if Commerzbank records a balance-sheet loss on an unconsolidated
basis, which S&P consider likely for 2009.  The rating affirmation
reflects its view that coupon payments might be possible if
Commerzbank were to make coupon payments on the Dresdner FTs'
instruments.  This is because S&P could consider Commerzbank FTs'
instruments to be on par with those of Dresdner FTs.  An
alternative scenario could be that regulators no longer recognize
the Dresdner FTs' instruments as Tier 1 capital.  In such a
scenario, a coupon payment on Dresdner FTs' instruments would
likely be possible and could lead to positive rating actions on
the Dresdner FTs instruments.  However, S&P believes this would
not trigger a coupon payment on Commerzbank FTs' instruments.  If
Commerzbank were to miss coupon payments on the Commerzbank FTs
instruments, S&P would likely lower the ratings to 'C', but raise
them if the payments are made.


PERI-WERK ARTUR: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Corporate Family Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba1 corporate family
rating of Peri-Werk Artur Schwoerer GmbH & Co. KG and the long
term senior unsecured rating of the EUR 250 million bond issued by
Peri GmbH and changed the outlook to positive.

The decision has been prompted by the fact that the company's
leverage metrics proved to be very resilient in the current
economic downturn indicating that Peri has a sustainable business
model and is able to adjust its operations quickly to a changing
demand pattern.  Going forward Moody's expects Peri's
profitability to recover from current low levels although Peri's
markets will remain under pressure in 2010.  Therefore leverage
and cash flow metrics could be in line with an investment grade
rating by year end 2010, despite the weak overall construction
markets.  The company benefits from the flexibility in its product
offering for either rental or sale of its formwork products.

Moody's remains cautious about the future development in the
construction markets and believes that first signs of a recovery
might only be expected in the second half of 2010 at the earliest.
The decline in non-residential construction is unlikely to be
absorbed by the increase in infrastructure spending through
governmental incentive programs.  Also residential construction is
not expected to show a major turnaround.

The increase in the share of turnover from its rental operations
has helped the company to partly offset declining formwork and
scaffolding sales.  Overall reduced capacity utilization -- both
in production and in the rental business enabled Peri to reduce
its capital expenditure strongly from EUR377 million in 2008 to
EUR225 million per the last twelve months end of September 2009.
In addition, Peri was able to adjust its operations and cost
structure to the changing demand pattern (-18% revenues LTM per
end of September 2009).

Free Cash flow generation has been very strong in 2009 although
Funds from operations declined compared to 2008.  The release of
working capital of EUR108 million in the first nine month till
September 2009, which is expected to further increase in Q4 2009
led to a solid operating cash flow generation -- and hence high
free cash flow which has been used to reduce the company's debt
position.  Since the release of net working capital generally is a
one-time effect, CFO in 2010 will be much weaker.  However,
improved cost structures and some improvement in a few markets
should help Peri to generate stable funds from operations leading
to an RCF/ Net Debt towards the mid forties and the Debt/ EBITDA
remaining at around 2.0x in 2010.

Peri maintains a good short term liquidity position for the next
18 months.  The rating assumes that Peri will in a timely manner
put in place a strategy how to refinance its EUR 250 million bond,
which is coming due in December 2011.

Moody's also notes that Peri's FFO and EBITDA reflect -- in line
with what can be observed with other companies active in the
rental business -- revenues and cash inflows from rental
activities but only to a limited amount the costs and cash outflow
related to the production of rental assets.  As a consequence,
Moody's expects Peri to show relatively higher EBITDA margins, but
also higher debt levels when compared to other companies not
active in rental business and as compared to the ratios required
in the manufacturing methodology.

The rating could be upgraded in the next 12 -- 18 months if the
company achieves an EBITA/interest ratio of at least 2.5x, RCF/Net
debt ratio of above 45% and a debt/EBITDA of around 2.0x.  Though
these metrics would need to be sustainable for consideration of a
rating upgrade, Moody's notes that the interest coverage would
also be expected to strengthen further as the profitability
recovers.

The current rating and outlook also assume that -- despite the
weak markets -- Peri will manage its rental stock in accordance
with the market demand and will invest sufficiently in its rental
park to prevent a deterioration in the quality of its overall
rental fleet.

Moody's last rating action on Peri was an upgrade to Ba1 with a
stable outlook on 15 May 2007.

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: PERI GmbH

  -- Outlook, Changed To Positive From Stable

Issuer: Peri-Werk Artur Schwoerer GmbH & Co. KG

  -- Outlook, Changed To Positive From Stable

Based in Weissenhorn, Germany, family-owned Peri-Werk Artur
Schw”rer GmbH & Co. KG is one of the world's leading developers,
manufacturers and suppliers of formwork systems for cast-in-place
concrete and one of the world's leading providers of related
engineering and technical services.  Peri reported revenues of
around EUR1.0 billion on a last twelve months basis per Q3 2009.


SMART SME: Moody's Junks Rating on Class E Notes From 'Ba2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term credit
ratings of these notes issued by SMART SME CLO 2006-1 Ltd.:

  -- EUR87,000,000 Class A Notes due 2016, downgraded to Aa1 from
     Aaa; previously on 23 March 2009 placed under review for
     possible downgrade;

  -- EUR118,900,000 Class B Notes due 2016; downgraded to A2 from
     Aa2; previously on 23 March 2009 placed under review for
     possible downgrade;

  -- EUR45,000,000 million Class C Notes due 2016; downgraded to
     Baa3 from A2; previously on 23 March 2009 placed under review
     for possible downgrade;

  -- EUR49,300,000 million Class D Notes due 2016; downgraded to
     Ba3 from Baa2; previously on 23 March 2009 placed under
     review for possible downgrade; and

  -- EUR58,000,000 million Class E Notes due 2016; downgraded to
     Caa1 from Ba2; previously on 23 March 2009 placed under
     review for possible downgrade.

Moody's initially assigned definitive ratings in December 2006.
The rating action concludes the review which was initiated on 23
March 2009 as a result of Moody's revision of its methodology for
SME granular portfolios in EMEA (published on 17 March 2009).

As a result of its revised methodology, Moody's has reviewed its
assumptions for SMART SME CLO 2006-1 Ltd. collateral portfolio,
taking into account anticipation of performance deterioration of
the pool in the current down cycle for German, Italian and Spanish
small and medium-sized entities.  The deterioration of these
economies has been reflected in Moody's negative sector outlook
for the German and Spanish SME securitization transactions (see
"EMEA ABS & RMBS: 2009 review & 2010 Outlook," 27 January 2009).
Moody's considered also the evolution of the borrowers' internal
ratings in the portfolio and the performance of the transaction.
Cumulative defaults as of 31 December 2009 are still in line with
expectations at closing and had reached 1.3% of the original pool
balance.

Moody's now considers that the default probability of the pool of
SME debtors for SMART SME CLO 2006-1 Ltd. is equivalent to a Ba3
rating with four years of the transaction's life remaining.
Replenishment criteria allow for maximum concentrations of SME
loans of 24% from Spain and 12% from Italy.  The remaining part of
the portfolio can be replenished with German SME loans.  The
assumed portfolio default probability is calculated as a weighted-
average of the assumptions for the country sub-portfolios, taking
into account the base assumption for each country, specific
portfolio characteristics, and the originator quality.  Moody's
assumes a portfolio quality equivalent to a Ba3/B1 rating for
Spain, Ba3 for Germany, and Ba2 for Italy in this transaction.
The revised assumptions have translated into a cumulative mean
default assumption of 9.8% of the current portfolio balance over
the remaining four year weighted-average life of the transaction
and a coefficient of variation (defined as the ratio between the
standard deviation and the mean) of 40%.  Moody's original mean
default assumption was 10.14% over seven years, which corresponded
to a Ba2 rating, and the coefficient of variation was 38%.  The
average recovery rate assumption remains unchanged at 60%.  In its
analysis, Moody's used a normal inverse default distribution and
distributed recoveries, whereas initially it applied a lognormal
default distribution and fixed recoveries.

SMART SME CLO 2006-1 Ltd. is a synthetic SME transaction
originated by Deutsche Bank in December 2006.  The Class A to
Class E notes were issued to back a credit default swap related to
a portfolio of SME loans originated in Germany, Spain and Italy.
Replenishments take place monthly until the credit default swap
terminates in December 2013.  As of December 2009, the exposure to
Spanish SMEs was 23% and the main sector concentration across all
three countries was in the "real estate" sector, with
approximately 16% of the maximum reference portfolio amount.

Moody's ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by
the legal final maturity of the notes.  Moody's ratings address
only the credit risks associated with the transaction.  Other non-
credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a significant
effect on yield to investors.

Moody's is closely monitoring the transaction.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


CHEYNE FINANCE: Moody's Withdraws 'Ca' Ratings on Two Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service withdrew these ratings assigned to
commercial paper note programs issued by Cheyne Finance PLC and
Cheyne Finance LLC:

Issuer: Cheyne Finance PLC and Cheyne Finance LLC

  -- Long term rating of US CP Programme of Cheyne Finance LLC,
     Withdrawn; previously on Jul 15, 2008 Downgraded to Ca

  -- Long term rating of Euro CP Programme of Cheyne Finance PLC,
     Withdrawn; previously on Jul 15, 2008 Downgraded to Ca

Due to an administrative oversight, Moody's inadvertently assigned
long term ratings to Cheyne's CP programmes which were only
intended to carry short term ratings.

The current short term ratings of Not Prime assigned to the
programs are unaffected.


CORK CITY: Goes Into Liquidation After Rescue Plan Failed
---------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that League of Ireland club Cork City was wound
up in the High Court after a plan to take over the debts of the
Leeside club was thwarted.

The Football Association's Independent Licencing Committee
unanimously rejected an application for a Premier Division license
for the club, the report says.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 29,
2009, Cork City owed Revenue Commissioners roughly EUR440,000.
The report disclosed Cork City Investment FC Ltd. attempted to
negotiate a schedule of payments but the High Court's Ms. Justice
Mary Laffoy acknowledged that the club was "in reality" insolvent
and that she had "no option" but to grant the order sought by the
tax authorities.


JEAN SCENE: Creditors to Meet on March 5 to Appoint Liquidator
--------------------------------------------------------------
Brian O'Mahony at Irish Examiner.com reports that creditors of The
Jean Scene (Ireland) retail clothing company will meet at The
Holiday Inn, Pearse Street, Dublin, on March 5 to consider the
appointment of a liquidator for the company.

The move was confirmed Wednesday by a spokesman for Grant
Thornton, which acts as auditor to the group, the report relates.

According to the report, it is understood that up to 22 of the
estimated 30 plus retail outlets that dealt in men's and women's
jeans and footwear have been rebranded as Joseph's Stores.  It is
not known whether the 22 stores understood to have been rebranded
will escape the liquidation process, the report notes.

Citing results posted to the Companies Registration Office, the
report discloses profits of over EUR1 million in 2008 turned into
losses of almost EUR500,000 in the year to end January 2009.  Over
that 12-month period, the accounts show a very sharp rise in the
amount due to creditors when increased from EUR3.3 million to
EUR5.8 million year on year, the report says.

It is understood that trading in the past 12 months has proved
equally difficult for the group, the report states.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


PARMALAT SPA: Investor Seeks Dividends From Lawsuit Settlements
---------------------------------------------------------------
Armorel Kenna at Bloomberg News reports that Mackenzie Cundill
Investment Management Ltd., Parmalat SpA's largest investor, said
the company should turn over the US$1.5 billion it has left over
from lawsuit settlements to shareholders through stock buybacks or
dividends.

"Mackenzie Cundill would prefer to see cash returned to
shareholders in the form of share repurchases or dividends,"
rather than being spent on mergers and acquisitions, said David
Tiley, who helps manage US$13.5 billion at Mackenzie Cundill in
Vancouver, according to Bloomberg.  Mr. Tiley, as cited by
Bloomberg, said the fund holds more than 7.7% of Parmalat and may
buy more.

Parmalat has recovered about EUR2 billion (US$2.7 billion) in
legal settlements from banks and auditors, whom it accused of
sustaining the fraud that led to Italy's biggest corporate
bankruptcy in 2003, Bloomberg recounts.  In bankruptcy
proceedings, Parmalat disclosed more than EUR14 billion of debt,
about eight times the amount reported by its former management,
Bloomberg notes.

Bloomberg relates Mr. Tiley said the dairy company could pay an
extraordinary dividend, which must be approved at a shareholders
meeting.

                       About Parmalat S.p.A.

Headquartered in Milan, Italy, Parmalat S.p.A. --
http://www.parmalat.net/-- sells nameplate milk products
that can be stored at room temperature for months.  It also has
about 40 brand product lines, which include yogurt, cheese,
butter, cakes and cookies, breads, pizza, snack foods and
vegetable sauces, soups and juices.

The Company's U.S. operations filed for Chapter 11 protection on
February 24, 2004 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 04-11139).  Gary
Holtzer, Esq., and Marcia L. Goldstein, Esq., at Weil Gotshal &
Manges LLP, represent the Debtors.  When the U.S. Debtors filed
for bankruptcy protection, they reported more than US$200 million
in assets and debts.  The U.S. Debtors emerged from bankruptcy on
April 13, 2005.

Parmalat S.p.A. and its Italian affiliates filed separate
petitions for Extraordinary Administration before the Italian
Ministry of Productive Activities and the Civil and Criminal
District Court of the City of Parma, Italy on December 24, 2003.
Dr. Enrico Bondi was appointed Extraordinary Commissioner in
each of the cases.  The Parma Court has declared the units
insolvent.

On June 22, 2004, Dr. Bondi filed a Sec. 304 Petition, Case No.
04-14268, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York.

Parmalat has three financing arms: Dairy Holdings Ltd., Parmalat
Capital Finance Ltd., and Food Holdings Ltd.  Dairy Holdings and
Food Holdings are Cayman Island special-purpose vehicles
established by Parmalat S.p.A.  The Finance Companies are under
separate winding up petitions before the Grand Court of the Cayman
Islands.  Gordon I. MacRae and James Cleaver of Kroll (Cayman)
Ltd. serve as Joint Provisional Liquidators in the cases.  On
January 20, 2004, the Liquidators filed Sec. 304 petition, Case
No. 04-10362, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York.  In May 2006, the Cayman Island
Court appointed Messrs. MacRae and Cleaver as Joint Official
Liquidators.  Gregory M. Petrick, Esq., at Cadwalader, Wickersham
& Taft LLP, and Richard I. Janvey, Esq., at Janvey, Gordon,
Herlands Randolph, represent the Finance Companies in the Sec. 304
case.

The Honorable Robert D. Drain presided over the Parmalat Debtors'
U.S. cases.  On June 21, 2007, the U.S. Court granted Parmalat
permanent injunction.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


PALLAS CDO: S&P Junks Ratings on Two Classes of Notes from BBB-
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Pallas CDO II B.V.'s class A1a, A1d, A2, B, C, D1a, and D1b notes
and the class P, Q, R, and X combination notes.  At the same time,
S&P removed the ratings on the class D1a, D1b, and Q notes from
CreditWatch negative.

The rating actions reflect S&P's view on deterioration in the
credit quality of the underlying portfolio.

Looking at the ratings that S&P consider appropriate in its
analysis of the underlying portfolio, the percentage of assets
rated below "investment-grade" (i.e., below 'BBB-') has more than
doubled since the transaction became effective in August 2007.
According to S&P's analysis, about 47% of the assets are currently
rated below investment-grade compared with about 20% on the
effective date.  Out of those, about 20% are rated 'B+' and below.
(These percentages take into account the adjustments for assets on
CreditWatch negative, as S&P describe below.) The amount of assets
that S&P consider as defaulted in its analysis (assets rated 'CC'
and 'D') is currently about EUR4.5 million.

S&P's analysis also shows that about 14% of the portfolio is
currently on CreditWatch negative.  On April 6, 2009, S&P
published revised assumptions governing structured finance assets
with ratings on CreditWatch held within collateralized debt
obligation transactions.  Under these revised assumptions, S&P
adjusted downward ratings on CreditWatch negative by three notches
or more.

From the trustee's latest available information S&P note that the
transaction currently fails all its overcollateralization tests
(class A/B, C, and D).  In S&P's view, this is mainly due to
reductions that the transaction documents require parties to apply
to the principal balance of assets rated 'B+' and lower in their
calculation of the overcollateralization ratio.  According to the
documents, failure of the overcollateralization tests requires the
issuer to pay down the notes sequentially -- starting with the
class A1 notes--to bring the tests back into compliance.  This has
led to a deferral of interest payments on the class C, D1a, and
D1b on the last two payments dates.

The transaction's documents also include an event of default
overcollateralization test.  Using the combined class A1 and A2
notes' balance, an event of default is triggered if the
overcollateralization ratio falls below 100%.  According to the
latest available trustee report of January 2010, the class A
overcollateralization test result is about 104%.

Should an event of default occur the notes may be declared
immediately due and payable.  It is S&P's understanding that in
such circumstances, under the terms and conditions of the notes,
the portfolio can be liquidated and the proceeds used to repay the
notes only if the anticipated proceeds are sufficient to redeem
all the rated notes in full, including current and deferred
interest due on the mezzanine notes.  In the absence of portfolio
liquidation, S&P expects that principal and interest proceeds will
continue to be applied according to the transaction document's
priority of payments.

S&P's ratings on the class P, Q, R, and X combo notes address the
ultimate payment of principal.

At closing, the class P combo notes comprised EUR4.5 million of
class C and EUR1.6 million of subordinated notes; the class R
combo notes comprised EUR4 million of class C and EUR1 million of
subordinated notes; and the class Q combo notes comprised
EUR12 million of class D1b and EUR8 million of subordinated notes.

At closing, the class X combination notes comprised a
EUR7.5 million synthetic component and EUR5 million of
subordinated notes.  The synthetic component refers to the rights
of the class X noteholders with respect to the cash flows received
from (i) a EUR7.5 million structured finance asset backed by a
portfolio of student loans and (ii) a pay-as-you-go credit default
swap under which the issuer has sold protection on its class D1a
notes.  The issuer is to make any payments due under the swap from
the proceeds of the underlying structured finance asset and the
premium received from the swap counterparty.  From the transaction
manager's information, S&P notes that the issuer is currently
paying to the swap counterparty the interest shortfalls arising
from the deferral of interest on the class D1a notes.  This
reduces the funds available to repay the class X noteholders.  To
date S&P has not been notified of any credit event that has
occurred under the swap.

S&P notes that the principal balances of the class P, Q, R, and X
combination notes have reduced since closing as the issuer has
applied funds received from the respective underlying classes to
reduce their principal balances.  However, S&P understands
distributions to the combination noteholders have now halted as a
result of the overcollateralization test breaches and the
consequential deferral of interest due to the underlying
components.

As a result of these developments S&P is lowering the ratings on
the class A1a, A1d, A2, B, C, D1a, D1b notes and the class P, Q,
R, and X combination notes.

Pallas CDO II is a European cash flow CDO of structured finance
securities (including residential and commercial mortgage-backed
securities and collateralized loan obligations) transaction that
closed in October 2006.

                           Ratings List

                        Pallas CDO II B.V.
   EUR498.6 Million Senior Secured Fixed- and Floating-Rate Notes

                         Ratings Lowered

                                   Rating
                                   ------
             Class           To                 From
             -----           --                 ----
             A-1-a           AA                 AAA
             A-1-d           AA                 AAA
             A-2             A+                 AAA
             B               A-                 AA
             C               BB+                A
             P combo(1)      BB+                A-
             R combo(1)      BB+                A-
             X combo(1)      CCC                BBB-

      Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

                              Rating
                              ------
        Class           To                 From
        -----           --                 ----
        D-1-a           BB-                BBB-/Watch Neg
        D-1-b           BB-                BBB-/Watch Neg
        Q combo(1)      CCC                BBB-/Watch Neg

(1) The ratings on the class P, R, Q and X combination notes
    address the ultimate repayment of principal only.  They do not
    address the likelihood of the notes being called but if the
    notes are called the rating would only address the repayment
    of the principal amount of the rated components.


SCHOELLER ARCA: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Corporate Family Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a B3 corporate family rating
and Caa1 probability of default rating to Schoeller Arca Systems
Holding B.V.  It also assigned debt ratings ranging from Ba3 to
Caa3 to various bank facility tranches.  The ratings outlook is
stable.

The debt ratings assigned are: Ba3 to the EUR2.5 million A2
tranche due April 2010; B2 to the EUR33 million A1 tranche due
October 2013, the EUR 83 million B1 tranche due December 2014 and
the EUR2 million revolver due 2014; and Caa3 to the
EUR18.5 million B2 tranche due December 2014.

The CFR incorporates the material reduction in the group's debt
following a financial restructuring that concluded in December
2009.  However, credit metrics including leverage and free cash
flow generation still remain weak.  The ratings also incorporate
the company's relatively low scale; weak liquidity profile; and a
very high concentration of customer risk with iGPS.

Schoeller Arca specializes in the production of plastic returnable
packaging.  The returnable segment is a relatively small part of
the global packaging market, although the company appears to have
relatively high market share within this niche.

Although the company's products are used by a variety of end-
industries, and it has a wide customer base, Schoeller Arca has a
high degree of concentration risk.  About half of its revenue is
from pallets.  These are sold predominantly in the US, solely to
iGPS -- a private company established around 2006 to develop a new
plastic pooling market.  Moody's understands that the current
contract with iGPS expires in 2013.  Although the pallets business
provides relatively low margins, this high level of exposure to a
single customer with a limited history is a material credit
weakness.  Further, Moody's has not had access to the financial
statements of iGPS to verify its ability to meet its obligations
to the company.

The recent economic downturn reduced the group's Ebitda,
necessitating a restructuring in which over EUR200 million of debt
was written off and One Equity Partners injected
EUR50 million of new equity.  The company retained about
EUR139 million debt -- including EUR19 million that is PIK -- and
2009 adjusted pro-forma leverage is about 4.4x.  However, with low
Ebitda margins, Moody's anticipates that free cash flow generation
and reduction in net debt will be limited over the near term.

The Caa1 PDR incorporates the company's weak liquidity profile.
The company retains cash of only about EUR10 million, and has a
EUR2 million revolver.  With limited free cash flow and required
debt amortization (including EUR5 million in 2010), the company
has limited standalone financial flexibility.  Furthermore,
liquidity may be challenged by potentially material working
capital variations, including from variations in raw material
costs that are correlated to the oil price.  However, Moody's
understands that One Equity Partners has internal approvals to
provide some additional limited funding to Schoeller Arca should
this be necessary for liquidity purposes.  The company also has
some interest rate hedging in place.  A successful refinancing of
the majority of its debt around 2013/14 may also depend on the
company's ability to continue revenues from iGPS once the existing
contract formally expires and/or replace it with revenues from
other customers and products.

The ratings assigned to the debt tranches reflect their ranking
according to an intercreditor agreement, through the application
of Moody's LGD approach -- with Tranche A2 being effectively super
senior, and Tranche B2 being subordinated to all other tranches.

Schoeller Arca has not yet finalized any audited accounts for
2009.  Accounts available for 2008 were for Magnum SAS Acquisition
B.V, the holding company prior to the restructuring.

Schoeller Arca Systems Holding B.V. is a packaging company based
in the Netherlands.  The company was formed in 2009 to accommodate
a financial restructuring of the Schoeller Arca group.  It is
owned 60% by One Equity Partners and 40% by Schoeller Industries.
On a pro-forma unaudited basis, the group generated EUR464 million
revenue in 2009.


SCHOELLER ARCA: S&P Assigns 'CCC+' Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it assigned its 'CCC+'
long-term corporate credit rating to The Netherlands-based plastic
returnable packaging manufacturer and marketer Schoeller Arca
Systems Holding B.V.  The outlook is negative.

S&P assigned a 'B+' rating to the EUR2.5 million super-senior A2
tranche of the term loan A issued by SAS Holding and its
subsidiary Schoeller Arca Systems Services B.V., which is three
notches above the corporate credit rating.  The recovery rating on
this loan is '1+', indicating S&P's expectation of full (100%)
recovery for super senior lenders in the event of a payment
default.

Furthermore, S&P assigned a 'B-' rating to the EUR116 million
senior secured facilities issued by SAS Holding and certain
subsidiaries.  The recovery rating on this loan is '2', indicating
S&P's expectation of substantial (70%-90%) recovery for senior
secured lenders in the event of a payment default.  Senior secured
debt comprises the A1 tranche of the amortizing term loan (TLA 1)
and B1 tranche of the term loan B (TLB 1).

S&P has also assigned a 'CCC-' rating to SAS Holding's
subordinated term loan B2 tranche.  The recovery rating on this
loan is '6', indicating S&P's expectation of negligible (0%-10%)
recovery for contractually subordinated secured lenders in the
event of a payment default.

"The corporate credit rating reflects S&P's view of SAS Holding's
weak liquidity with cash as its only source, its high customer
concentration, and the company's weakened profitability over the
past two years," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Eve Greb.

The rating is supported by S&P's view of SAS Holding's leading
niche market position as the largest manufacturer of reusable
plastic containers in Europe and the U.S. In addition, SAS Holding
benefits from medium- to long-term customer contracts.

S&P classifies the group's business risk profile as "weak" given
the company's high customer concentration, with the top three
customers accounting for about 60% of total 2009 revenues.  In
addition, the company's profitability has weakened over the past
two years because of the economic downturn in Europe.

These risks are partly offset by the relatively high barriers for
competitors to enter this business.  S&P believes that secondary
plastic packaging will experience positive growth, although
earnings are likely to be exposed to fluctuations in raw material
costs.

S&P assesses SAS Holding's financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged", reflecting S&P's view of the company's very weak
liquidity position, its low free cash flow over the past few
quarters, and its relative leverage post restructuring in December
2009, with pension and lease-adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 4.5x
and EBITDA cash interest coverage of about 2.2x.

S&P believes that credit protection measures are likely to improve
over time in the event of a market recovery and slightly lower
debt levels.  However, in the short term, credit protection
measures could deteriorate, in S&P's opinion, if the downturn
continues or if S&P see a further drop in the market.

"The outlook on SAS Holding is negative because S&P believes there
is a risk that the still difficult markets and likely negative
working capital movements could impair the company's ability to
gradually improve its liquidity," said Ms. Greb.


SELLABAND: Nears Deal with Potential Buyer, Trustee Says
--------------------------------------------------------
Digital Music News reports that Sellaband has found a buyer after
filing for bankruptcy in Amsterdam.

Digital Music News relates in a statement posted front-and-center
on sellaband.com Tuesday afternoon, appointed trustee Paul Schaink
communicated through CEO Johan Vosmeijer that the acquisition is
moving through late-stage details.

"The trustee wishes to inform the 'Sellaband community' that,
apart from a few technicalities, the completion of a transaction
with a potential buyer of the business, is to be expected soon, in
order to make a fresh start, safeguarding both the rights of
Believers and Artists," Digital Music News quoted Mr. Vosmeijer as
saying.

Earlier Tuesday, one former Sellaband business partner told
Digital Music News that the company started missing payments, and
ultimately failed to meet its obligations.

Sellaband, a major fan-financed startup alongside Slicethepie,
Pledge Music, and others, recently struggled to raise enough
financing for Public Enemy, Digital Music News notes.  Instead of
the targeted $250,000, arguably an oversized amount, the Chuck D-
led project got stuck in the $60,000s, Digital Music News
discloses.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


CIMPOR CIMENTOS: S&P Retains CreditWatch Negative on Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that its ratings on
Portuguese cement manufacturer Cimpor Cimentos de Portugal
S.G.P.S. S.A., remain on CreditWatch with negative implications
where they were placed on Dec. 18, 2009.

S&P is maintaining the ratings on CreditWatch following recent
changes to the shareholder structure of Cimpor that were announced
yesterday by the issuer.  The Brazil-based cement company Camargo
Correa Cimentos S.A. (BB/Watch Neg/--) group has agreements to
receive 28.6% of the voting rights, which it bought from Bipadosa
and Teixeira Duarte (both not rated).  These transactions will
reportedly be finalized by March 25, 2010.  CCC has announced that
it is likely to increase its stake by another 3% to 31.7%.
Brazilian diversified conglomerate Votorantim Participacoes S.A.
(VPar; BBB/Negative/--) now directly holds 21.2% of the voting
rights, which it purchased from Lafarge S.A. (BBB-/Stable/A-3).
Based on a shareholder agreement with Caixa Geral de Depositos
S.A. (Caixa; A+/Negative/A-1), which holds 9.6% of the share
capital, VPar effectively has 30.8% of the total votes.

An unsolicited takeover bid for Cimpor announced by Companhia
Siderurgica Nacional (BB+/Watch Neg/--) in December was
unsuccessful.

Overall, S&P believes that the new shareholder structure could
benefit the group as it could support a stable strategy and
resolves reported disagreements between the previous shareholders.
In addition, the new owners have a somewhat stronger financial
standing than some of the previous owners.

"For the time being, however, S&P believes that there remain risks
for Cimpor," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Sabine Gromer.
These include reported regulatory investigations in both Brazil
and Portugal and any shareholder agreement between the two leading
shareholders, or between one of the two and other existing
shareholders, that could trigger a change of control clause for a
total of EUR1.3 billion of the group's debt under the current
credit documentation.  This could lead to a mandatory offer to all
shareholders.

S&P understands from Cimpor management that should there be no
changes to the current shareholder structure outlined above, there
would not be a change of control trigger event.  In an existing
shareholder agreement, VPar and Caixa limited their participation
in Cimpor to 32%.

In S&P's view, Cimpor's current stand-alone credit metrics support
a 'BBB-' credit rating.

"S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placement once S&P has
obtained a better understanding of the new shareholder structure,
its business and financial implications for Cimpor, and the
likelihood of a change of control being triggered," said
Ms.  Gromer.


=========
S P A I N
=========


AYT CAIXA: Moody's Junks Rating on Series D Notes From 'Ba3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of the Series A,
B, C, and D notes issued by AyT Caixa Galicia Empresas I, FTA, to
Aa1, A3, Ba3, Caa3, from Aaa, Aa3, A3, and Ba3, respectively.

The rating action concludes the review for possible downgrade
initiated on 23 March 2009.  All the aforementioned ratings had
been initially assigned definitive ratings by Moody's in November
2007.

Moody's initially placed the above-mentioned notes on review
following the introduction of the revised methodology for granular
SME portfolios in Europe, Middle East and Africa, as described in
the Rating Methodology report "Moody's Probability of Default
assumptions in the Rating Analysis of Granular Small and Mid-sized
Enterprise Portfolios in EMEA", published on 17 March 2009.
During the review process the transaction performance has
deteriorated and the downgrades also takes into account the
weaker-than-expected collateral performance of the pool of loans
backing the notes, which led to reserve fund draws over the last 2
quarters.

As part of its review, Moody's considered the potential for
further performance deterioration in the current economic cycle,
and the exposure of the transaction to the real estate sector
(either through security in the form of a mortgage or debtors
operating in these markets).  The deterioration of the Spanish
economy has been reflected in Moody's negative sector outlook for
Spanish SME securitization transactions.

                     Collateral Performance

Outstanding 90+ days delinquencies (i.e.  the balance of loans
with arrears for more than 90 days) were at 2.0% of the portfolio
current balance, as of January 2010.  While this has fallen from
the peak of 2.5% reported in April 2009, Moody's notes that the
cumulative balance of defaulted loans has now increased to 1.0%
from 0.8% in October 2009 (a loan is considered in default if it
has been in arrears for more than 12 months).  This would indicate
that a significant portion of 90+ days delinquencies roll over
into default.  In addition, the reserve fund has been drawn on
several payment dates, decreasing to 80% of its target balance in
January 2010.  To date, this transaction has been performing worse
than the Spanish SME index published by Moody's ("Spanish SME Q3
2009 Indices," November 2009).

             Revised Default Probability Assumptions

Moody's first revised its assumption for the default probability
of the Spanish SME debtors to an equivalent rating in the single
B-range for debtors operating in the building and real estate
sector, and in the low Ba-range for non-real-estate debtors.  As
of January 2010, the concentration in the building and real estate
sector was approximately 18% of the pool balance based on loan-
level data.

In addition, Moody's made DP adjustments to reflect the size of
the debtors companies, notching down its rating proxy on a portion
of the debtors to reflect additional default risk associated with
micro-sized SMEs.

Moody's equivalent rating for loans in arrears for more than 30
days was also notched down depending on the length of time the
loans had been in arrears, and it was notched up for those
performing loans not in the building and real estate sector
originated prior to 2006, depending on their actual seasoning.

Following the above-mentioned adjustments, the portfolio's overall
DP equivalent rating was assumed at Ba3/B1.  As a result,
considering an estimated weighted-average remaining life of 4.5
years, this translates into an increased cumulative mean default
assumption of 12.5% of the current outstanding portfolio amount.
Expressed as a percentage of the original portfolio balance,
Moody's revised cumulative mean default rate is 8.7%, compared to
an initial assumption of 4.3% at closing.  Moody's also revised
the coefficient of variation assumption to 45% from 51%, assuming
an implied asset correlation of around 7% vs.  a 5% at closing.

              Recovery and Other Rating Assumptions

Moody's has maintained its initial mean recovery expectation of
55%, which takes into account the line-by-line analysis of the
collateral characteristics backing the mortgage loans (53% of the
current portfolio) as well as the lack of recovery data available.
Moody's also tested the sensitivity of results to recovery
assumptions in a 50-60% range.  Stochastic recoveries were
modelled assuming a 20% standard deviation.

The constant prepayment rate assumption used in Moody's cash flow
model has decreased to 5% from 12% at closing which is more in
line with recently reported prepayment rate data.

              Securitized Portfolio Characteristics

AyT Caixa Galicia Empresas I is a securitization fund, which
purchased a pool of loans granted to Spanish SMEs by Caixa
Galicia.  At closing, in November 2007, the portfolio consisted of
12,671 loans.  The loans were originated between 1989 and 2006,
with a weighted average seasoning of 2.5 years and a weighted
average remaining term of 9.7 years.  Geographically, the pool was
concentrated in Galicia (63%), Catalu¤a (7%), and Madrid (6%).  At
closing, the concentration in the real estate sector was around
19% of the original pool balance.

As of January 2010, the number of loans in the portfolio amounted
to 8,535 and the weighted average remaining term was 9.0 years.
The concentration levels per industry and region are similar to
the levels at closing with a slightly lower exposure in the
building and real estate sector equal to 18% of current portfolio,
which is below the sector-average concentration in the SME ABS
portfolios.  The pool factor was 54%.

                 Moody's Rating and Methodologies

Moody's ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by
the legal final maturity of the notes.  Moody's ratings address
only the credit risks associated with the transaction.  Other non-
credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a significant
effect on yield to investors.

Moody's is closely monitoring the transaction.  To obtain a copy
of Moody's New Issue Report or periodic Performance Overviews,
please visit Moody's website at www.moodys.com or contact Moody's
Client Service Desk in London (+44-20-7772 5454)

Detailed rating actions

  -- EUR379.6 million series A notes due 2045, downgraded to Aa1
     from Aaa; previously assigned Aaa on 26 November 2007

  -- EUR41.6 million series B notes due 2045, downgraded to A3
     from Aa3; previously on 23 March 2009 placed under review for
     downgrade

  -- EUR27.1 million series C notes due 2045, downgraded to Ba3
     from A3; previously on 23 March 2009 placed under review for
     downgrade

  -- EUR24.5 million series D notes due 2045, downgraded to Caa3
     from Ba3; previously on 23 March 2009 placed under review for
     downgrade


MADRID RMBS: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D' its credit
rating on MADRID RMBS III, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' class
C notes following missed interest payments on this class on the
February 22 interest payment date.  At the same time, S&P lowered
its rating on the class B notes to 'B' and kept unchanged its
ratings on the class A2, A3, D, and E notes.

The mortgage portfolio underlying this transaction has generated
high delinquency levels.  As of the end of December, delinquencies
-- defined as arrears greater than 90 days (including outstanding
defaulted loans) -- were 11.27% of the current collateral balance.

Cumulative defaults as a percentage of the original pool balance
increased to 14.78% in December 2009 from 5.81% in December 2008.
As a result of the high level of defaults and a structural
mechanism requiring a full provisioning for defaulted loans,
Madrid RMBS III has depleted its cash reserve.  The transaction
currently shows a principal deficiency of about EUR67.15 million,
representing 3% of the outstanding collateral balance.

It is worth noting, that levels of arrears in all categories are
decreasing in this transaction.  Delinquencies of 30-60 days and
60-90 days have dramatically decreased since Q4 2008 and Q1 2009,
respectively.  And levels of loans in arrears more than 90 days
have decreased to 11.27% of the current balance in the last
reporting quarter from its peak of about 16% in Q2 2009.

Defaults in this securitization are defined as arrears greater
than six months, which is generally more conservative than in
other Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities transactions
that S&P rate.

When the level of cumulative defaulted loans in this
securitization reaches certain levels, the priority of payments
changes so as to postpone interest payments to the related class
of notes and divert these funds to amortize the most senior class
of notes.  The class C, D, and E notes have already breached their
trigger levels and this has caused missed interest payments on
these notes.  The triggers level for the class B notes is 20.3%.
Based on the information received on the evolution of
delinquencies in this pool, in S&P's opinion the class B notes
will not breach their trigger in the near term.

MADRID RMBS III issued the notes in July 2007.  A portfolio of
residential mortgage loans secured over properties in Spain backs
the notes in this transaction.  Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad
de Madrid originated and services the mortgage loans.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


KREDITPROMBANK: Creditors Convert US$400 Mil. Debt Into Shares
--------------------------------------------------------------
Concorde Capital, citing daily Kommersant, reports that
Kreditprombank agreed with two dozen foreign creditors, including
Cargill and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
to convert US$400 million in debt into shares.

According to the report, the transaction, which could be finalized
by July, will be structured as an additional share issue.

Current shareholders are set to retain 51% of the bank, the report
notes.

Kreditprombank was Ukraine's 18th largest bank by assets as of
January 1, according to statistics from the National Bank of
Ukraine.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


3I GROUP: Sells Ambrea for EUR850MM; CEO Eyes Zero Net Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
Helen Power at The Times reports that 3i Group plc has raised
EUR850 million (GBP745 million) from the sale of its stake in
Scandinavian healthcare group Ambrea on Tuesday as it continued to
repair its battered balance sheet.

3i, which had been pursuing a float for Ambea, instead secured a
sale to the Nordic operation of the Triton private equity firm,
the report notes.  According to the report, 3i decided that it
could get a better price from a secondary sale of its company than
from a stock market flotation.

The report relates the sale comes as Michael Queen, 3i's chief
executive, steps up his efforts to repair the private equity
house's finances by paying down its debt pile.  Philip Yea,
Mr. Queen's predecessor, was ousted last year as the listed
investment fund's debts spiraled and its share price nosedived
amid concerns about its balance sheet, the report recounts.

The Financial Times' Martin Arnold says Mr. Queen has cut the
group's net debt by more than half to GBP845 million.  He has said
the group should have zero net debt, the FT notes.

3i Group plc -- http://www.3i.com-- is a mid-market private
equity business.  The Company focuses on buyouts, growth capital
and infrastructure.  It invests across Europe, Asia and North
America.  The Company, together with its subsidiaries, manages a
number of funds established with institutions and other investors
to make equity and equity-related investments predominantly in un-
quoted businesses in Europe and Asia.  It also advises 3i
Infrastructure plc, an investment company, which invests in
infrastructure assets.  The Company invests in sectors, such as
business services, consumer financial services, general
industrial, healthcare, media, oil, gas and power, technology and
infrastructure.  3i Investments plc acts as an investment manager
to the Company.  In April 2009, the Company sold off its remaining
stake of about 4% in ProStrakan Group Plc.


BNP PARIBAS: Moody's Withdraws Ratings on Credit Default Swaps
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced the withdrawal of its credit
ratings on credit default swaps entered into By BNP Paribas,
London Branch.

The Bifrost Investment PLC swaps were terminated following the
restructuring of Iliad Investments PLC Series 8 and Series 14.
The swaps BNP Paribas - Cassiopeia 2004-2 and BNP Paribas, London
Branch - Lyra 2004-1 were terminated by the parties.  Please refer
to Moody's Withdrawal Policy on moodys.com

Issuer: BNP Paribas, London Branch - Lyra 2004-1

  -- US$15M Mezzanine Credit Default Swap - Lyra 2004-1 Bond,
     Withdrawn; previously on Mar 6, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1

Issuer: BNP Paribas - Cassiopeia 2004-2

  -- US$15M Mezzanine Credit Default Swap - Cassiopeia 2004-2
     Bond, Withdrawn; previously on Mar 6, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2

Issuer: BNP Paribas, London Branch - Bifrost 4

  -- EUR60M Class A MZ 7 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2

  -- EUR60M Class B MZ 7 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1

  -- EUR70M Class E MZ 10 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to A1

  -- EUR60M Class F MZ 10 Year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3

Issuer: BNP Paribas, London Branch - Bifrost 5

  -- EUR60M Class A MZ 7 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Mar 31, 2003 Assigned Aaa

  -- EUR60M Class B MZ 7 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3

  -- EUR70M Class E MZ 10 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1

  -- EUR60M Class F MZ 10 Year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to A2

Issuer: BNP Paribas London Branch - Bifrost 6

  -- EUR60M Class A MZ 7 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3

  -- EUR60M Class B MZ 7 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3

  -- EUR70M Class E MZ 10 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to A3

  -- EUR60M Class F MZ 10 Year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2

Issuer: BNP Paribas, London Branch - Bifrost 7

  -- EUR60M Class A MZ 7 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to A2

  -- EUR60M Class B MZ 7 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2

  -- EUR70M Class E MZ 10 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2

  -- EUR60M Class F MZ 10 Year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to B1

Issuer: BNP Paribas, London Branch - Bifrost Legolas 1

  -- EUR60M Class A MZ 7 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3

  -- EUR60M Class B MZ 7 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3

  -- EUR70M Class E MZ 10 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to A3

  -- EUR60M Class F MZ 10 Year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2

Issuer: BNP Paribas, London Branch - Bifrost Legolas 2

  -- EUR60M Class A MZ 7 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Apr 6, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1

  -- EUR60M Class B MZ 7 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to A2

  -- EUR70M Class E MZ 10 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2

  -- EUR60M Class F MZ 10 Year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1

Issuer: BNP Paribas, London Branch - Bifrost Legolas 3

  -- EUR60M Class A MZ 7 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1

  -- EUR60M Class B MZ 7 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to A3

  -- EUR70M Class E MZ 10 year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to A1

  -- EUR60M Class F MZ 10 Year Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3

Issuer: BIFROST Series 11 to 20

  -- EUR160M 7A 11 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to A2

  -- EUR130M 7B 11 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- EUR75M 7C 11 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to B3

  -- EUR55M 7D 11 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3

  -- EUR185M 10A 11 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1

  -- EUR150M 10B 11 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- EUR91M 10C 11 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- EUR67.5M 10D 11 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3

  -- EUR160M 7A 12 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1

  -- EUR125M 7B 12 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to A3

  -- EUR82.5M 7C 12 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- EUR50M 7D 12 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to B1

  -- EUR185M 10A 12 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to A1

  -- EUR135M 10B 12 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3

  -- EUR100M 10C 12 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to B1

  -- EUR65M 10D 12 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- EUR160M 7A 13 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1

  -- EUR130M 7B 13 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to A3

  -- EUR75M 7C 13 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3

  -- EUR62.5M 7D 13 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to B1

  -- EUR195M 10A 13 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to A1

  -- EUR135M 10B 13 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3

  -- EUR100M 10C 13 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to B1

  -- EUR75M 10D 13 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- EUR160M 7A 14 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2

  -- EUR130M 7B 14 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2

  -- EUR80M 7C 14 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- EUR50M 7D 14 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- EUR185M 10A 14 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to A2

  -- EUR135M 10B 14 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- EUR105M 10C 14 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- EUR60M 10D 14 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3

  -- EUR160M 7A 15 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1

  -- EUR125M 7B 15 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to A2

  -- EUR80M 7C 15 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- EUR57.5M 7D 15 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to B2

  -- EUR195M 10A 15 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3

  -- EUR135M 10B 15 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3

  -- EUR80M 10C 15 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to B1

  -- EUR65M 10D 15 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- EUR160M 7A 16 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to A3

  -- EUR125M 7B 16 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- EUR67.5M 7C 16 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- EUR55M 7D 16 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3

  -- EUR195M 10A 16 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2

  -- EUR135M 10B 16 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to B1

  -- EUR80M 10C 16 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3

  -- EUR65M 10D 16 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3

  -- EUR160M 7A 17 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1

  -- EUR125M 7B 17 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1

  -- EUR67.5M 7C 17 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2

  -- EUR50M 7D 17 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to B3

  -- EUR175M 7A 18 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to A3

  -- EUR115M 7B 18 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2

  -- EUR70M 7C 18 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to B3

  -- EUR65M 7D 18 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3

  -- EUR190M 10A 18 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2

  -- EUR135M 10B 18 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to B1

  -- EUR80M 10C 18 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- EUR65M 10D 18 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Feb 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3

  -- EUR175M 7A 19 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     May 19, 2009 Downgraded to A3

  -- EUR125M 7B 19 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     May 19, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3

  -- EUR75M 7C 19 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     May 19, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

  -- EUR62.5M 7D 19 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     May 19, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

  -- EUR190M 10A 19 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     May 19, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3

  -- EUR135M 10B 19 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     May 19, 2009 Downgraded to B2

  -- EUR80M 10C 19 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     May 19, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3

  -- EUR175M 7A 20 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Oct 14, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa

  -- EUR117.5M 7B 20 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to A1

  -- EUR75M 7C 20 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1

  -- EUR62.5M 7D 20 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- EUR190M 10A 20 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Aa3

  -- EUR135M 10B 20 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2

  -- EUR80M 10C 20 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2

  -- EUR65M 10D 20 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to B2

  -- EUR65M 10D 19 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     May 19, 2009 Downgraded to Ca

  -- EUR190M 10A 17 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to A1

  -- EUR150M 10B 17 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1

  -- EUR80M 10C 17 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to B2

  -- EUR65M 10D 17 Credit Default Swap, Withdrawn; previously on
     Aug 28, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2


BRITISH AIRWAYS: Balpa Seeks Ruling on Pilots' Holiday Pay Row
--------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that British Airways plc is due in court to fight
a union's attempt to change its policy on holiday pay for pilots.

According to the report, pilots' union Balpa has gone to the
Supreme Court to argue that total pay -- including allowances --
must be used in the calculation, not just basic salary.

BA is resisting the claim, which could result in each of the
15,000 members of its staff getting an average of GBP600 a year
more, the report says.

The report recalls that four years ago the union won a judgment
from an employment tribunal on the issue, but the case eventually
moved to the Court of Appeal which backed BA's side of the
argument.

Now the new Supreme Court is being asked for its ruling, the
report notes.

"We have always been of the view that our holiday pay arrangements
are generous and comply with legislative requirements," the report
quoted a BA spokesperson, as saying.  "We will continue to resist
the claim strongly."

The case will also affect cabin crew holiday pay, the report
states.  In total about 3,000 BA pilots and 12,000 cabin crew
could each get an average of GBP600 a year extra, the report
discloses.  That would cost BA about GBP9 million, according to
the report.

                      About British Airways

Headquartered in Harmondsworth, England, British Airways Plc,
along with its subsidiaries, (LON:BAY) -- http://www.ba.com/-- is
engaged in the operation of international and domestic scheduled
air services for the carriage of passengers, freight and mail and
the provision of ancillary services.  The Company's principal
place of business is Heathrow.  It also operates a worldwide air
cargo business, in conjunction with its scheduled passenger
services.  The Company operates international scheduled airline
route networks together with its codeshare and franchise partners,
and flies to more than 300 destinations worldwide.  During the
fiscal year ended March 31, 2009 (fiscal 2009), the Company
carried more than 33 million passengers.  It carried 777,000 tons
of cargo to destinations in Europe, the Americas and throughout
the world.  In July 2008, the Company's subsidiary, BA European
Limited (trading as OpenSkies), acquired the French airline,
L'Avion.

                           *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 12,
2009, Moody's Investors Service placed the Ba3 Corporate Family
and Probability of Default Ratings of British Airways plc and the
senior unsecured and subordinate ratings of B1 and B2 under review
for possible downgrade.

Moody's said the rating action reflects the continued weakening in
profitability in the first half of FY2010 (to September 2009),
with an operating loss of GBP111 million reported versus a profit
of GBP140 million a year earlier (post restructuring charges), and
Moody's view that losses in FY2010 will likely be higher than in
FY2009.  This comes in spite of lower operating costs, notably for
fuel, as demand in the industry remains very depressed, while the
company has successfully reduced its employee and selling costs.
Reported net debt remained constant during the period, partly
benefiting from a positive exchange rate impact, although Moody's
debt metrics also incorporate the full value of the convertible
notes issued in August 2009.


BRITISH SEAFOOD: Goes Into Administration After Credit Withdrawn
----------------------------------------------------------------
Martin Arnold at The Financial Times reports that British Seafood
has gone into administration after banks withdrew trade credit.

According to the FT, the collapse of the company, which went into
administration on Friday, has wiped out private equity group 3i's
stake, which it valued at GBP81 million at the end of September.

According to the FT, 3i said while many of the company's
subsidiaries have gone into administration, Five Star Fish, the
Grimsby-based fish processing business, which British Seafood
acquired three years ago, is continuing to trade as a going
concern.

"This is a fundamentally good business," 3i told the FT.  "The
problem is that trade credit has become harder to raise from
banks.  The company used trade credit to secure delivery of
products and it provided an important bridge between paying
suppliers and being paid by its customers.  We worked hard to use
3i's banking relationships to help the business.  But certain
banks have decided to no longer provide this kind of finance."

British Seafood relied on trade credit to pay its suppliers, the
FT says.  At the end of 2008 it had drawn GBP181.3 million of
trade facilities from banks that were secured against trade
debtors, the FT discloses.

British Seafood is an importer of fish from Asia.  The company
employed 163 people in 2008, according to the FT.


CHESHAM BUILDING: Merges with Skipton Building Society
------------------------------------------------------
Patrick Hosking at The Times reports that Chesham Building Society
agreed to be taken over by Skipton Building Society.

According to the report, Chesham, which was founded in 1845, said
that it had been badly squeezed by economic and interest rate
conditions and was loss-making at the operating level last year.

Skipton, the report says, has promised to keep Chesham's three
branches and an agency in Tring open for at least 12 months.

There will be no compulsory redundancies among branch staff, but
some head office employees will lose their jobs, the report
states.  The Chesham name will remain on passbooks, the report
states.

The deal will require approval from both Chesham members and the
Financial Services Authority, the report notes.

Chesman has 20,000 members and three branches in the
Buckinghamshire commuter towns of Chesham, Aylesbury and Little
Chalfont, according to The Times.


ETHEL AUSTIN: 114 Stores to Cease Trading; 1,048 Jobs Affected
--------------------------------------------------------------
MCR, the administrators of value clothing retailer Ethel Austin
and its sister company Au Naturale, has confirmed the imminent
closure of 114 stores.

This follows a statement earlier this month announcing that 129
retail outlets were to begin closing down sales.  Most of the 114
stores will cease trading by the end of February and a total of
1,048 positions will be made redundant.

Geoff Bouchier, joint administrator and partner of MCR, stated:
"In light of the current economic climate these stores identified
for closure did not attract a purchaser.  Regrettably, as a result
of their current financial performance, these stores will shortly
cease to trade."

The remaining 162 stores will continue to operate as usual while a
purchaser for the rest of the businesses as a going concern is
sought.  "We are still hopeful of selling the remaining business
and discussions are ongoing with a number of interested parties.

The dealings relating to the closure stores will not effect the
operations of the continuing stores," added Mr. Bouchier.

Ethel Austin is one of Britain's value clothing retailers with a
nationwide network of nearly 300 stores extending from Scotland to
the South West, and from Wales to the South East.  The business
was established more than 70 years ago and has grown to become one
of Britain's leading value clothing retailers with a national
presence.


JOHN CHARCOL: Bought Out of Administration in Pre-Pack Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jamie Dunkley at The Daily Telegraph reports that John Charcol has
been bought out of administration in a pre-pack deal.

The report relates the company entered administration late on
Monday night before being bought by Towergate Financial for a
"nominal fee" shortly afterwards.  Towergate is thought to have
beaten off a rival bid from Jon Moulton's new investment vehicle
Better Capital, the report notes.

The report says John Charcol found itself heavily indebted after
the economic crisis hit the UK housing market.  Despite a series
of staff cuts, office closures and refinancing measures it was
unable to restructure and has not filed accounts at Companies
House since the beginning of last year, the report discloses.

According to the report, under the terms of the deal, more than
100 John Charcol staff and directors -- including chief executive
John Garfield -- will transfer to Towergate, whose own chief
executive Ian Darby was formerly chairman at the mortgage broker.

John Charcol -- http://www.charcol.co.uk/-- is a UK mortgage
broker.


KAUPTHING SINGER: Sports Direct Buys Rights to Blacks Stake
-----------------------------------------------------------
Bloomberg News reports that Sports Direct International Plc said
Feb. 22 in an e-mailed statement it bought the rights to a 28.5%
stake in Blacks Leisure Group Plc from the joint administrators
for Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander Ltd., Ernst & Young LLP.

Esther Bintliff at The Financial Times reports the stake became
the property of Ernst & Young when Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander
-- which held and partly financed the shares -- went into
administration.

                          Negotiations

According to the FT, Blacks Leisure has begun talks with Sports
Direct after the retailer, founded by Mike Ashley, threatened to
vote against a planned GBP20 million fundraising.

The FT relates Blacks said that it had adjourned Wednesday's
emergency meeting, which was due to vote on the fundraising, "for
an indefinite period" while it engaged in active discussions with
Sports Direct.

Sports Direct declined to comment on why it had blocked the
proposed fundraising, which Blacks intended to use to refurbish
its aged portfolio of stores, repay a GBP7.5 million facility and
open new outlets, the FT notes.

Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander is the U.K. unit of collapsed
Icelandic lender Kaupthing Bank hf.


LITHOGRAPHICS: Shuts Down Business Following Liquidation
--------------------------------------------------------
Adam Hooker at Print Week reports that Lithographics has closed
its doors after being placed into liquidation.

The report recalls Begbies Traynor was appointed as liquidator to
the Worcester-based company on February 18, resulting in the loss
of six jobs.

"There are no assets to sell off and we are now winding down the
company," the report quoted a spokeswoman for Begbies as saying.

Lithographics was a book and brochure printer based in Worcester.
The company offered a number of services, specializing in student
handbooks, wirobound and perfect-bound books, according to Print
Week.


MG ROVER: Parliamentary Investigation Into Collapse Called Off
--------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Lea and Suzy Jagger at The Times report that a
parliamentary investigation into the businessmen who oversaw the
collapse of MG Rover has been called off after it emerged that
Lord Mandelson is close to commencing legal proceedings to have
them banned from being company directors.

According to the report, the Business Innovation and Skills select
committee, which scrutinizes Lord Mandelson's department, which
had intended to open the inquiry into MG Rover, will instead turn
its attention to an investigation into the Business Secretary's
handling of the Kraft takeover of Cadbury.

The committee had planned on calling the so-called Phoenix four,
who ran MG Rover for five years up to 2005 to parliamentary
hearings next month, the report recalls.  However, Peter Luff, the
Conservative MP who chairs the committee, said the evidence
session had been postponed after hearing of the Business
Secretary's planned proceedings, the report notes.

"We decided that in light of the fact that court proceedings
appear likely, it would not be right for us to proceed with the
evidence session.  However, this is a postponement, not a
cancellation.  Should proceedings not go ahead we will call in the
four directors at the earliest opportunity.  We also reserve the
right to call them to give evidence once any legal proceedings
have concluded," the report quoted Mr. Luff as saying.

It is understood that a legal case against the four -- John
Towers, Nick Stephenson, Peter Beale and John Edwards -- is now
closer after Lord Mandelson's officials received legal
representations from the men, who were directors of Phoenix
Venture Holdings, the company that took over MG Rover for GBP10 in
2000.

                           About MG Rover

Headquartered in Birmingham, United Kingdom, MG Rover Group
Limited -- http://www1.mg-rover.com/-- produced automobiles under
the Rover and MG brands, together with engine maker Powertrain
Ltd.  Previously owned by Phoenix Venture Holdings, the company
faced huge losses in recent years, reaching GBP64.1 million in
2004, which were blamed on reduced sales.

MG Rover collapsed on April 8, 2005, after a tie-up with China's
largest carmaker, Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp., failed to
materialize.  Ian Powell, Tony Lomas and Rob Hunt, partners in
PricewaterhouseCoopers, were appointed as joint administrators.
The crisis left 6,000 people jobless, and caused a domino effect
on related businesses, particularly in the West Midlands.  Days
later, eight European subsidiaries -- MG Rover Deutschland GmbH;
MG Rover Nederland B.V.; MG. Rover Belux S.A./N.V.; MG Rover
Espana S.A.; MG Rover Italia S.p.A.; MG Rover Portugal-
Veiculos e Pecas LDA; Rover France S.A.S., and Rover Ireland
Limited -- were placed into administration.


NORTHERN ROCK: Deposit Guarantee to Be Lifted in Three Months
-------------------------------------------------------------
Martin Waller at Times Online reports that the Treasury has
indicated Wednesday morning that the government guarantee
protecting retail deposits with Northern Rock, in place since
September 2007 to prevent a run on the bank when it was ailing,
will be scrapped in three months.

The guarantee, which protects 100% of a customer's saving, had
been under review since the start of the year, and it had been
expected to be lifted in due course, the report notes.

According to the report, up to GBP50,000 per person on any bank
account is still guaranteed by the independent Financial Services
Compensation Scheme.  The report says a three-month notice period
was agreed as one of the conditions for the European Commission's
approval of its ongoing state aid.

The move helps to clear the way for sale of Northern Rock, now
split into a "good" bank and a "bad" bank, the report states.

Gary Hoffman, the chief executive of Northern Rock, confirmed to a
local newspaper this week that informal talks had taken place with
interested parties but said there was no formal sales process
under way, the report notes.

                       About Northern Rock

Headquartered in Newcastle upon Tyne, England, Northern Rock plc
-- http://www.northernrock.co.uk/-- deals with mortgages, savings
accounts, loans and insurance.  The company also promotes secured
loans to its existing mortgage customers.  The company had more
than US$200 billion in assets at the end of June 2007.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 11,
2009, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised the rating on
Northern Rock's dated subordinated lower Tier 2 debt to 'BB' from
'CCC'.  The ratings on its perpetual subordinated debt and
preference shares were unaffected.  S&P said the outlook is
stable.


PARK ROW: FSA Fines Former CEO; Secures GBP7.8MM for Customers
--------------------------------------------------------------
Caroline Binham at Bloomberg News reports that Peter Sprung, the
former chief executive officer of Royal Liver Assurance Ltd.'s
Park Row Associates was fined GBP49,000 (US$76,000) by the British
regulator for poor sales advice.

Bloomberg relates the Financial Services Authority said in a
statement Wednesday the regulator secured as much as GBP7.8
million in compensation for the customers of Park Row Associates
after an investigation into how the network advised on sales and
pension products.

According to Bloomberg, the FSA said Park Row escaped a fine of
GBP2.4 million because it is in liquidation and can't afford to
pay.

"Park Row failed to take adequate action to address failings in
systems and controls to ensure its advisers were giving customers
suitable advice, despite the real risk of customer harm,"
Bloomberg quoted Margaret Cole, the FSA's enforcement director, as
saying the in the statement.

Park Row Associates is a network of UK independent financial
advisers.


SOVEREIGN OILFIELD: Board Appoints PwC as Administrators
--------------------------------------------------------
The Board of Sovereign Oilfield Group plc, having carefully
considered the financial position of the Company, has appointed
John Bruce Cartwright and Graham Frost of PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP to act as Administrators of the Company with immediate effect.

The board has been in continued discussions with its lending
consortium to renegotiate the terms of its existing loans as the
Board has been uncertain that the Group's future trading
performance will be able to support the current levels of debt.
The Company has received a number of enforcement orders from its
creditors and without continued support from the lending
consortium it is unable to meet these payments.

Charles Stanley Securities, the Company's nominated adviser for
the purposes of the AIM Rules for Companies, has tendered its
resignation as the Company's Nominated Adviser and Broker, with
immediate effect.

If Sovereign Oilfield Group Plc has failed to appoint a
replacement Nominated Adviser within one month, the admission of
the Company's shares to trading on AIM will be cancelled at 7:00
a.m. on March 25, 2010.

Headquartered in Aberdeen, Sovereign Oilfield Group Plc --
http://www.sovereign-oil.com/-- provides engineering products,
technical services, and human resources to the oil and gas sector
through 14 operating subsidiaries.  The Company operates in two
principal areas of activity, that of fabrication and manufacturing
services, and selling and renting drilling equipment.  Its
customers include oil and gas companies, and smaller oilfield
engineering companies and other oilfield service companies.  On
April 18, 2007, sovereign acquired Labtech services limited and
associated companies, and Vertec Limited and its subsidiary.
Labtech services limited and Vertec Limited specialize in the
design, engineering and manufacture of onshore and offshore
cabins, containers, baskets, air conditioning and refrigeration
units.  On February 28, 2007, the Company acquired Findgolden
Limited and its subsidiaries, RDT Precision Engineers Limited and
Roller Precision Products Limited.  On January 22, 2007, it
acquired Forfab Limited.


WATKINS BOOKS: In Administration; 11 Jobs Affected
--------------------------------------------------
Catherine Neilan at The Bookseller.com reports that Watkins Books
has gone into administration, resulting in the loss of 11 jobs.

According to the report, the bookshop, which was founded in 1897
and moved to Cecil Court in 1901, closed down on February 23,
following the appointment of administrator Harris Lipman.

It is understood that trading had been slower than usual, for a
number of reasons including increased online competition and the
bad weather, the report notes.  The report says the company was
hit by a Capital Gains Tax bill of GBP500,000, which it had been
appealing against.

The landlord Gasgoyne Holdings and administrator are now
attempting to find a buyer for the business, the report discloses.

"The landlord is keen to keep Watkins alive and here in Cecil
Court," the report quoted Tim Bryars, secretary of the Cecil Court
Association as saying.  "We hope a buyer will be found to keep the
shop here . . . We think it could be bought as a viable going
concern."


* UK: Business Insolvencies Hit Lowest Rate in January 2010
-----------------------------------------------------------
The latest Insolvency Index from Experian(R), the global
information services company, reveals a positive picture in
January, with the rate of business failures falling to its lowest
point since June 2007.

Businesses across the UK saw an 2.1% improvement in their combined
financial strength score[1], from 79.46 in January 2009 to 81.16
January 2010.  The rate of insolvencies[2] fell to 0.07 %in
January 2010, with seven in every 10,000 businesses going under.
This compares to an insolvency rate of 0.09% in January 2009 and
0.11% in December 2009.

Rolf Hickmann, Managing Director of pH, an Experian company, said:
"It's encouraging to discover that not since the current financial
crunch started have so few firms become insolvent in a single
month.  While it is too early to predict whether we are fully out
of the woods, this does hint at an improvement in the health of UK
businesses, something which is reinforced by the financial
strength view provided by January's data."

Other key highlights include:

As in January 2009, businesses in the South West continued to be
the most robust, holding the best financial strength score during
January 2010.

The North East saw its insolvency rate decrease by over 30% from
0.19% to 0.12% in January, subsequently losing its position as the
region with the highest rate.

Yorkshire, with 0.13%, witnessed the highest rate of failures in
January.

Scotland, the only region to see a year-on-year increase in
insolvencies, was beaten by Wales to having the lowest rate of
business failures in January (0.06%).

Businesses in Greater London saw the highest year-on-year
improvement in their financial health (from 77.85 to 80.02).
However, they also had the lowest overall financial strength score
of any region.

The highest insolvency rates during January 2010 were among
businesses with 11 to 100 employees (0.19%).

1 to 2 employee firms had the lowest rate of insolvencies (0.04%).

The largest businesses, those with over 501 employees, continue to
have the best financial strength score (84.22).  They were also,
however, the only types to see a year-on-year decline, albeit
marginal, in the score (down from 84.57).

Businesses with 51 to 100 employees hold the worst average
financial strength score (80.06), although they did see a small
year-on-year improvement (from 79.92).

Breweries (0.42%) and plastics and rubber companies (0.26%) saw
the highest insolvency rates in January 2010, although these are
based on a handful of firms failing within small sectors.  With
335 insolvencies the Business Services sector saw the highest
volume of failures, although this represented just 0.06 %of its
population.

[1] The financial strength score predicts the likelihood of a
business failing in the next 12 months, with 100 being the least
likely to default and 1 being the most likely.

[2] The insolvency rate is calculated by comparing the number of
businesses that failed with the total business population in Great
Britain.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Megamergers - Corporate America's Billion-Dollar
              Takeovers
---------------------------------------------------------------
Author: Kenneth M. Davidson
Publisher: Beard Books
Hardcover: 427 pages
Listprice: US$34.95
Review by Henry Berry

Megamergers are nothing new to the business world. One of the
first occurred in 1901, when Carnegie Steel merged with several
rival steel corporations, resulting in the billion-dollar United
States Steel. Since then, megamergers have been a part of American
business.  However, the author notes that megamergers have
historically "occurred sporadically and been understandable" on
face value.  By contrast, in recent decades there has been a
"current wave of large mergers [that] is unprecedented."
In Megamergers - Corporate America's Billion-Dollar Takeovers,
Davidson looks at the unprecedented number of megamergers
occurring today and considers whether this signals a change in the
thinking of U.S. business leaders.  Legislators, corporate
executives, mergers specialists, and anyone else involved in, or
affected by, megamergers will find this book enlightening.
An announcement of a merger is usually accompanied with the
pronouncements  that it will result in greater synergies,
operational efficiencies, and improved servicing of markets.
Davidson questions whether this has, in fact, been the case.  He
analyzes the subsequent financial performance of the corporate
behemoths produced by these megamergers and concludes that the
majority of them were not justifiable nor, ultimately, productive.

Davidson is an admitted skeptic about the value of mergers to the
overall economy and to employees, stockholders, and consumers.  He
is critical of the overly optimistic rationales prevalent in
today's business climate that lead many businesspersons into
mergers.  For the most part, though, he keeps his biases in check.
He rejects many of the common criticisms of mergers.  For example,
he finds unpersuasive the argument that mergers should be rejected
on the ground that they undermine market competitiveness.  Nor,
does he say, is it worthwhile to revisit the ongoing debate over
whether "risk arbitrageurs are good guys or bad guys."

The author states that his "first intention [is] to paint a
picture of what is happening [to] clarify the issues involved and
areas of dispute."  He offers a balanced examination of the
megamerger phenomenon, particularly as it pertains to the energy
and financial services industries.  He goes beyond seeing
megamergers only as phenomena of contemporary corporate culture,
and his analyses go beyond mere statistics.  Megamergers have
their roots not only in business ambitions and current trends, but
also in human nature.  Recognizing this, the author also addresses
the psychology underlying megamergers.  As noted in the section
"The Acquisition Imperative," mergers present a temptation to the
decision-making executives of successful companies "look[ing]
beyond their product and consider[ing] the disposal of excess
profits."  Davidson explains why a merger appears to many
executives to be a better option than distributing profits to
shareholders, starting new businesses, or investing in securities.

The informed perspective Davidson offers in this book, first
published in 2003, is just as relevant today.  It is a book that
brings new wisdom to old ways of thinking about megamergers.

An attorney for the U. S. Federal Trade Commission for 25 years,
Kenneth M. Davidson has also been a corporate attorney and a
visiting law professor.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.

                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter -- Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick,
Maryland USA.  Valerie C. Udtuhan, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine
C. Tumanda-Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *