TCREUR_Public/100315.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Monday, March 15, 2010, Vol. 11, No. 051

                            Headlines



F R A N C E

PERNOD RICARD: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Senior Unsecured Rating


G E R M A N Y

ARCANDOR AG: No Deadline Set for Karstadt Sale, Spokesman Says
LANDESBANK SAAR: Moody's Corrects Ratings on Sr. Debt Securities
LEHMAN BROTHERS: Europe Arm Sues Bankhaus for Return of US$1BB
UNICREDIT BANK: Moody's Cuts Rating on Hybrid Securities to Ba1
WESTLB AG: Moody's Corrects Ratings on Senior Debt Securities


I R E L A N D

ANGLO IRISH: Chairman Designate Says Bank Could Be Refloated
APHEX CAPITAL: S&P Withdraws Junk Ratings on 16 Classes of Notes
EIRLES TWO: Moody's Withdraws Junk Ratings on Two Notes
FURNITURE DEPOT: High Court Appoints Provisional Liquidator
LINEN SUPPLY: Emerges From Examinership

STATEFORD LTD: Court Enters EUR26 Mil. Summary Judgment Order
WOOD-PRINTCRAFT: High Court Grants Court Protection


I T A L Y

LYONDELL CHEMICAL: Parent to Shut PP Plant in Italy
PARMALAT SPA: Judge Okays Deloitte, Grant Thornton Settlements
PARMALAT SPA: Italian Police Seizes Founder's Yacht


N E T H E R L A N D S

CHAPEL 2003-I: Moody's Junks Rating on Class D Notes From 'Baa3'
CHAPEL 2007-I: Moody's Junks Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
MONASTERY 2004-I: Moody's Junks Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
MONASTERY 2006-I: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba3'


R U S S I A

RED & BLACK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class C Notes
RUSSIAN MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class C Notes at 'BB-'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BOVEY JOINERY: In Voluntary Liquidation; Ceases Trading
DNA PRINTING: Bought Out of Administration By Greenshoots Print
GO MOBILE: In Administration; 44 Shops Moved to Another Unit
HARRY NEAL: Interior Services Group Hires Former Directors
LEHMAN BROTHERS: RSM Fines for Failings on Structured Products

NORTEL NETWORKS: Fights UK Fund Trustee's Bid to Sidestep Stay
PORTSMOUTH FOOTBALL: U.K. Revenue & Customs Ends Tax Challenge
PRINT WRIGHT: Bought Out of Administration By Greenshoots Print
PUNCH TAVERNS: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class C(R) Notes to 'Ba1'


X X X X X X X X

* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 22 Tranches of European CDOs

* BOND PRICING: For the Week March 8 to March 12, 2010




                         *********



===========
F R A N C E
===========


PERNOD RICARD: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Senior Unsecured Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned France-based spirits company Pernod
Ricard SA's prospective six year benchmark issue of EUR-
denominated notes an expected senior unsecured rating of 'BB+'.
Pernod's Long-term Issuer Default Rating is 'BB+', its Short-term
IDR is 'B' and the Outlook on the Long-term IDR is Stable.

The expected rating is contingent upon receipt of final documents
conforming to information already received by Fitch.

Pernod intends to use the proceeds of the notes for refinancing
existing short-term and medium-term debt in the region of
EUR1 billion.  The notes will constitute senior unsecured
obligations of Pernod and will rank equally with all other present
and future unsecured debt of Pernod.

Pernod's Long-term IDR reflects its strong business profile as the
number two player in the global spirits industry, with
geographically diverse operations, a product portfolio that
includes powerful brands in the major international categories of
consumption such as wine and spirits, as well as good pricing
point diversification.

Pernod's leverage of 5.5x, calculated on the basis of last twelve
month figures as of end December 2009, remains high for the
current 'BB+' rating.  Also, since the start of the economic
crisis, consumption of premium and above-premium wines and spirits
has suffered from consumers trading to cheaper products and going
out less.  In Europe and the USA, markets that account for
approximately 60% of the company's profits, there currently
remains little visibility of a sustained economic recovery.

Nonetheless, Fitch is comforted by company management's
demonstrated commitment to reduce leverage, via a EUR1 billion
equity raising conducted in 2009, the achievement of asset
disposals of EUR0.8 billion and reduced dividend payments
(benefiting FY10 cash flow).  The company generated a strong Free
Cash Flow of EUR0.6 billion in the financial year ended in June
2009.  Additionally, H110 results reported for the period ending
December 2009 demonstrate, despite the persistence of a difficult
trading environment, a good degree of resilience in Pernod's
profits.  H110 operating profit was unchanged in organic terms
compared to the previous year's comparable period.


=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


ARCANDOR AG: No Deadline Set for Karstadt Sale, Spokesman Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
Holger Elfes at Bloomberg News reports that Thomas Schulz, a
spokesman for Arcandor AG's insolvency administrator Klaus-Hubert
Goerg, said that the German retailer's department store chain
Karstadt has no deadline yet for its sale to an investor.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Schuliz denied a Handelsblatt report
-- which cited unidentified people close to potential bidders --
that Karstadt will be sold by May 31."

"I warned the newspaper not to write down such a deadline,"
Bloomberg quoted Mr. Schulz as saying in an interview Friday.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Schulz added that the detailed plan
for the sales process will be published early next week.

                        About Arcandor AG

Germany-based Arcandor AG (FRA:ARO) -- http://www.arcandor.com/--
formerly KarstadtQuelle AG, is a tourism and retail group.  Its
three core business areas are tourism, mail order services and
department store retail.  The Company's business areas are covered
by its three operating segments: Thomas Cook, Primondo and
Karstadt.  Thomas Cook Group plc is a tour operator with
operations in Europe and North America, set up as a result of a
merger between MyTravel and Thomas Cook AG.  It also operates the
e-commerce platform, Thomas Cook, supporting travel services.
Primondo has a portfolio of European universal and specialty mail
order companies, including the core brand Quelle.  Karstadt
operates a range of department stores, such as cosmopolitan
stores, including KaDeWe (Kaufhaus des Westens), Karstadt
Oberpollinger and Alsterhaus; Karstadt brand department stores;
Karstadt sports department stores, offering sports goods in a
variety of retail outlets, and a portal, karstadt.de that offers
online shopping, among others.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, a local court
in Essen formally opened insolvency proceedings for Arcandor on
September 1, 2009.  The proceedings started for the Arcandor
holding company and for 14 units, including the Karstadt
department-store chain and Primondo mail-order division.

Arcandor filed for bankruptcy protection after the German
government turned down its request for loan guarantees.  On
June 8, 2009, the government rejected two applications for help by
the company, which employs 43,000 people.  The retailer sought
loan guarantees of EUR650 million (US$904 million) from Germany's
Economy Fund program.  It also sought a further EUR437 million
from a state-owned bank.


LANDESBANK SAAR: Moody's Corrects Ratings on Sr. Debt Securities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has corrected the ratings of four senior
debt securities issued by Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg,
Landesbank Saar and WestLB AG.

These debts fall under the grandfathering of
"Gewaehrtraegerhaftung" (a guarantee obligation):

The ratings of two senior debt securities issued by LBBW and
guaranteed by the Land of Baden-Wuerttemberg (rated Aaa) were
corrected to Aaa from Aa2:

* CHF10 million 3.1% German Bond, Series 200 due July 2015 (ISIN:
  DE000LBW1ME1)

* US$25 million 5.15%/4.26% German Bond, Series 228 due 2015
  (ISIN: DE000LBW1T92)

The rating of a senior debt security issued by SaarLB and
guaranteed by the State of Saarland (unrated) was corrected to Aa1
from A1:

* EUR200 million 5.375% German Bond, Series 223 due June 2011
  (ISIN: DE0002842234)

The rating of a senior debt security issued by WestLB and
guaranteed by the Land of North Rhine-Westfalia (rated Aa1) was
corrected to Aa1 from A2:

* EUR5 million 4.125% German Bond, due April 2012 (ISIN:
  DE000WLB1WN1)

These securities were issued before July 19, 2005 and mature
before January 1, 2016, and therefore qualify for the
grandfathering arrangement ("Anstalts- und
Gewaehrtraegerhaftung").

Initially, Moody's had rated the four securities at the same level
as the issuers' other unsecured securities.  However, according to
Moody's methodology, the guarantee should have been taken into
consideration.  Based on a review of the terms of the instruments
and taking into consideration the guarantee, Moody's has corrected
the ratings of these securities.  The ratings carry a stable
outlook.

             Rating History and Moody's Methodologies

The last rating action on LBBW was on July 23, 2009, when Moody's
downgraded LBBW's BFSR to C- from C, its senior debt and deposit
ratings to Aa2 from Aa1 and its rating for senior subordinated
debt to Aa3 from Aa2.

The last rating action on SaarLB was on November 19, 2009, when
Moody's maintained the review of its D+ BFSR.  The review was
initiated on May 13, 2009.  The senior debt and deposit ratings
were affirmed at A1.

The last rating action on WestLB was on December 8, 2009, when
Moody's placed the A2 senior unsecured debt and deposit ratings
and the A3 subordinated debt ratings on review for possible
downgrade.  The outlook on its E+ BFSR was changed to "developing"
from "negative."

Domiciled in Stuttgart, Germany, LBBW reported total assets of
EUR440 billion at September 30, 2009 and a consolidated net loss
for the nine months of EUR620 million.

Domiciled in Saarbruecken, Germany, SaarLB reported total assets
of EUR19.9 billion at June 30, 2009, and a consolidated net profit
for the six months of EUR8.7 million.

Domiciled in Duesseldorf, Germany, WestLB reported total assets of
EUR258.8 billion at September 30, 2009, and a consolidated net
profit for the nine months of EUR184 million.


LEHMAN BROTHERS: Europe Arm Sues Bankhaus for Return of US$1BB
--------------------------------------------------------------
PricewaterhouseCoopers, administrators for Lehman Brothers
International Europe, sued German affiliate, Lehman Brothers
Bankhaus, for the return of US$1 billion in client money it held
when the investment bank collapsed, Bloomberg News reported on
February 16.

The first hearing on the matter, according to PwC, was scheduled
for July 6 in Frankfurt.

LBIE's claim against Lehman Brothers Bankhaus may affect how much
claimants, whose money was supposed to be held in ring-fenced
accounts by LBIE, will get back, according to a judgment in
London in December 2009, Bloomberg related.  PwC "have been
unable even to hazard a guess" as to what portion of the
US$1 billion LBIE had deposited with Bankhaus will be returned,
Justice Michael Briggs said in the judgment, which dictated how
client money held by LBIE should be returned, as quoted by
Bloomberg.

                      About Lehman Brothers

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. -- http://www.lehman.com/-- was the
fourth largest investment bank in the United States.  For more
than 150 years, Lehman Brothers has been a leader in the global
financial markets by serving the financial needs of corporations,
governmental units, institutional clients and individuals
worldwide.

Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy September 15, 2008
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 08-13555).  Lehman's bankruptcy petition
listed US$639 billion in assets and US$613 billion in debts,
effectively making the firm's bankruptcy filing the largest in
U.S. history.  Several other affiliates followed thereafter.

The Debtors' bankruptcy cases are handled by Judge James M. Peck.
Harvey R. Miller, Esq., Richard P. Krasnow, Esq., Lori R. Fife,
Esq., Shai Y. Waisman, Esq., and Jacqueline Marcus, Esq., at Weil,
Gotshal & Manges, LLP, in New York, represent Lehman.  Epiq
Bankruptcy Solutions serves as claims and noticing agent.

On September 19, 2008, the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch, Judge of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered
an order commencing liquidation of Lehman Brothers, Inc., pursuant
to the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act (Case
No. 08-CIV-8119 (GEL)).  James W. Giddens has been appointed as
trustee for the SIPA liquidation of the business of LBI

The Bankruptcy Court has approved Barclays Bank Plc's purchase of
Lehman Brothers' North American investment banking and capital
markets operations and supporting infrastructure for
US$1.75 billion.  Nomura Holdings Inc., the largest brokerage
house in Japan, purchased LBHI's operations in Europe for US$2
plus the retention of most of employees.  Nomura also
bought Lehman's operations in the Asia Pacific for US$225 million.

               International Operations Collapse

Lehman Brothers International (Europe), the principal UK trading
company in the Lehman group, was placed into administration,
together with Lehman Brothers Ltd, LB Holdings PLC and LB UK RE
Holdings Ltd.  Tony Lomas, Steven Pearson, Dan Schwarzmann and
Mike Jervis, partners at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, have been
appointed as joint administrators to Lehman Brothers International
(Europe) on September 15, 2008.  The joint administrators have
been appointed to wind down the business.

Lehman Brothers Japan Inc. and Lehman Brothers Holdings Japan Inc.
filed for bankruptcy in the Tokyo District Court on September 16.
Lehman Brothers Japan Inc. reported about JPY3.4 trillion
(US$33 billion) in liabilities in its petition.

Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., publishes Lehman Brothers
Bankruptcy News.  The newsletter tracks the Chapter 11 proceeding
undertaken by Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., and other insolvency
and bankruptcy proceedings undertaken by its affiliates.
(http://bankrupt.com/newsstand/or 215/945-7000)


UNICREDIT BANK: Moody's Cuts Rating on Hybrid Securities to Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded its ratings on several hybrid
securities of UniCredit Bank AG, in line with its revised
Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrids and Subordinated Debt published
in November 2009.

The ratings of UniCredit Bank's non-cumulative preferred
securities were thus downgraded to Baa3 and Ba1 from A3.  This
concludes the review for possible downgrade initiated on 18
November 2009.  The rating outlook for UniCredit Bank and its
subsidiaries remains stable and all other ratings on UniCredit
Bank and its subsidiaries remain unchanged.

Prior to the global financial crisis, Moody's had incorporated
into its ratings an assumption that support provided by national
governments and central banks to shore up a troubled bank would,
to some extent, benefit the subordinated debt holders as well as
the senior creditors.  The systemic support for these instruments
has not been forthcoming in many cases.  The revised methodology
largely removes previous assumptions of systemic support,
resulting in the rating action.  In addition, the revised
methodology generally widens the notching on a hybrid's rating
that is based on the instrument's features.

                     Rating Action in Detail

The starting point in Moody's revised approach to rating hybrid
securities is the Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment (Adjusted
BCA).  The Adjusted BCA reflects the bank's standalone credit
strength, including parental and/or cooperative support, if
applicable.  The Adjusted BCA excludes systemic support
expectations.

The Adjusted BCA for UniCredit Bank is Baa1 and includes some
uplift reflecting parental support expectations from UniCredit
SpA.

These hybrid securities from UniCredit Bank are affected:

* Non-cumulative preferred securities were downgraded to Baa3,
  which is two notches below the Adjusted BCA, reflecting their
  deeply subordinated claim in liquidation and non-cumulative
  coupon skip mechanism tied to the breach of a regulatory minimum
  requirement trigger -- whereas HVB Funding Trust VI has an
  additional regulatory intervention trigger.

* Issuer: HVB Funding Trust I (ISIN: US404398AA77)

* Issuer: HVB Funding Trust II (ISIN: XS0102826673)

* Issuer: HVB Funding Trust III (ISIN: US404399AA50)

* Issuer: HVB Funding Trust VI (ISIN: XS0126207728)

* Non-cumulative preferred securities issued by HVB Funding Trust
  VIII (ISIN: DE0008512021) were downgraded to Ba1, which is three
  notches below the Adjusted BCA, reflecting its deeply
  subordinated claim in liquidation and non-cumulative coupon skip
  mechanism linked to a balance sheet loss trigger.

                        Rating Withdrawals

Moody's withdrew the ratings of these instruments:

* Issuer: Perent Funding Limited (ISIN: DE0006482102)
* Issuer: HVB Funding Trust VII (ISIN: XS0135162948)

The A3 ratings of these instruments have been withdrawn due to
their redemptions.

The last rating action on UniCredit Bank was on November 19, 2009,
when Moody's affirmed UniCredit Bank's BFSR at C- and its senior
debt and deposit ratings at A1.  All ratings carry a stable
outlook.


WESTLB AG: Moody's Corrects Ratings on Senior Debt Securities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has corrected the ratings of four senior
debt securities issued by Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg,
Landesbank Saar and WestLB AG.

These debts fall under the grandfathering of
"Gewaehrtraegerhaftung" (a guarantee obligation):

The ratings of two senior debt securities issued by LBBW and
guaranteed by the Land of Baden-Wuerttemberg (rated Aaa) were
corrected to Aaa from Aa2:

* CHF10 million 3.1% German Bond, Series 200 due July 2015 (ISIN:
  DE000LBW1ME1)

* US$25 million 5.15%/4.26% German Bond, Series 228 due 2015
  (ISIN: DE000LBW1T92)

The rating of a senior debt security issued by SaarLB and
guaranteed by the State of Saarland (unrated) was corrected to Aa1
from A1:

* EUR200 million 5.375% German Bond, Series 223 due June 2011
  (ISIN: DE0002842234)

The rating of a senior debt security issued by WestLB and
guaranteed by the Land of North Rhine-Westfalia (rated Aa1) was
corrected to Aa1 from A2:

* EUR5 million 4.125% German Bond, due April 2012 (ISIN:
  DE000WLB1WN1)

These securities were issued before July 19, 2005 and mature
before January 1, 2016, and therefore qualify for the
grandfathering arrangement ("Anstalts- und
Gewaehrtraegerhaftung").

Initially, Moody's had rated the four securities at the same level
as the issuers' other unsecured securities.  However, according to
Moody's methodology, the guarantee should have been taken into
consideration.  Based on a review of the terms of the instruments
and taking into consideration the guarantee, Moody's has corrected
the ratings of these securities.  The ratings carry a stable
outlook.

             Rating History and Moody's Methodologies

The last rating action on LBBW was on July 23, 2009, when Moody's
downgraded LBBW's BFSR to C- from C, its senior debt and deposit
ratings to Aa2 from Aa1 and its rating for senior subordinated
debt to Aa3 from Aa2.

The last rating action on SaarLB was on November 19, 2009, when
Moody's maintained the review of its D+ BFSR.  The review was
initiated on May 13, 2009.  The senior debt and deposit ratings
were affirmed at A1.

The last rating action on WestLB was on December 8, 2009, when
Moody's placed the A2 senior unsecured debt and deposit ratings
and the A3 subordinated debt ratings on review for possible
downgrade.  The outlook on its E+ BFSR was changed to "developing"
from "negative."

Domiciled in Stuttgart, Germany, LBBW reported total assets of
EUR440 billion at September 30, 2009 and a consolidated net loss
for the nine months of EUR620 million.

Domiciled in Saarbruecken, Germany, SaarLB reported total assets
of EUR19.9 billion at June 30, 2009, and a consolidated net profit
for the six months of EUR8.7 million.

Domiciled in Duesseldorf, Germany, WestLB reported total assets of
EUR258.8 billion at September 30, 2009, and a consolidated net
profit for the nine months of EUR184 million.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


ANGLO IRISH: Chairman Designate Says Bank Could Be Refloated
------------------------------------------------------------
Ciara O'Brien at The Irish Times reports that Anglo Irish Bank's
chairman designate Alan Dukes has said the bank could be refloated
into the private sector in the future.

According to the report, Mr. Dukes said closing the bank down
immediately would hit taxpayers to a much larger extent than
keeping the bank in operation and potentially producing a viable
business bank.

The bank's closure would result in losses of more than EUR20
billion, the report says.

"Closing down the bank at this point would crystallize losses that
can otherwise be spread over a period of years," the report quoted
Mr. Dukes as saying.  "Keeping the bank afloat, it will require
capital assistance from the Government.  [But] it would be much
less than that [EUR20 billion]."

The report relates Mr. Dukes, who will take over as chairman when
Donal O'Connor steps down later this year, said it would be more
rational to allow the bank to develop as a more viable entity that
could be floated in the future with a potential net benefit to the
taxpayer.  He admitted there would be cases where the bank would
not be able to recover all the money it is owed, the report notes.

Anglo Irish Bank Corp PLC -- http://www.angloirishbank.com/--
operates in three core areas: business lending, treasury and
private banking.  The Bank's non-retail business is made up of
more than 11,000 commercial depositors spanning commercial
entities, charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit
unions and other non-bank financial institutions.  The Company's
retail deposits comprise demand, notice and fixed term deposit
accounts from personal savers with maturities of up to two years.
Non-retail deposits are sourced from commercial entities,
charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit unions and
other non-bank financial institutions.  In addition, at September
30, 2008, its non-retail deposits included deposits from Irish
Life Assurance plc.  The Private Bank offers tailored products and
solutions for high net worth clients and operates the Bank's
lending business in Ireland and the United Kingdom.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 3,
2010, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the dated subordinated
debt of Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Ltd to Ba1, from Baa1.  The
ratings remain on review for possible downgrade.  The downgrade of
the dated subordinated debt reflects the risk that the potential
for losses on the dated subordinated debt has increased given the
likely restructuring of the bank.  In addition the review for
possible downgrade on the A3/Prime-1 bank deposit and senior debt
ratings and on the Caa2 rated junior subordinated debt is
maintained.  The C debt rating on the bank's Tier 1 securities,
the Aa1 (negative outlook) rating on the debt guaranteed by the
Irish government, and the E bank financial strength rating (BFSR
-- mapping to a baseline credit assessment of Caa1) are unaffected
by this rating action.  The A3/Prime-1 bank deposit and senior
debt ratings, the Baa1 dated subordinated debt rating and the Caa2
junior subordinated debt rating were originally placed on review
for possible downgrade on December 8 2009.


APHEX CAPITAL: S&P Withdraws Junk Ratings on 16 Classes of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its credit ratings on
16 Aphex Capital PLC notes and one Aphex Pacific Capital Ltd.
note.

The withdrawals follow the arranger's recent notification to us
that the issuer has fully redeemed the notes.

The Aphex Capital transactions are European collateralized debt
obligations that reference other CDOs (so-called "CDO-squared"
transactions).  The Aphex Pacific Capital transaction is a CDO
that references investment-grade corporate entities.

                           Ratings List

                        Ratings Withdrawn

                        Aphex Capital PLC

      JPY500 Million DESIGN Secured Portfolio Credit-Linked
                     Fixed-Rate Notes 2005-14

                              Rating
                              ------
                     To                  From
                     --                  ----
                     NR                   CCC-

        EUR40 Million DESIGN Secured Portfolio Fixed-Rate
                    Credit-Linked Notes2005-17

                              Rating
                              ------
                     To                  From
                     --                  ----
                     NR                   CCC-

        EUR32 Million DESIGN Secured Portfolio Fixed-Rate
                    Credit-Linked Notes 2005-18

                              Rating
                              ------
                     To                  From
                     --                  ----
                     NR                   CCC+

      EUR20 Million BANTRY DESIGN Secured Callable Portfolio
             Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes 2006-19

                              Rating
                              ------
                     To                  From
                     --                  ----
                     NR                   CCC-

      EUR28 Million BANTRY DESIGN Secured Callable Portfolio
             Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes 2006-20

                              Rating
                              ------
                     To                  From
                     --                  ----
                     NR                   CCC-

      EUR42 Million BANTRY DESIGN Secured Callable Portfolio
             Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes 2006-21

                              Rating
                              ------
                     To                  From
                     --                  ----
                     NR                   CCC-

      EUR10 Million BANTRY DESIGN Secured Callable Portfolio
             Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes 2006-22

                              Rating
                              ------
                     To                  From
                     --                  ----
                     NR                   CCC-

         EUR15 Million MANICHE Secured Callable Portfolio
             Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes 2006-25

                              Rating
                              ------
                     To                  From
                     --                  ----
                     NR                   CCC-

         EUR50 Million MANICHE Secured Callable Portfolio
             Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes 2006-26

                              Rating
                              ------
                     To                  From
                     --                  ----
                     NR                   CCC-

         EUR35 Million MANICHE Secured Callable Portfolio
             Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes 2006-27

                              Rating
                              ------
                     To                  From
                     --                  ----
                     NR                   CCC-

        EUR15 Million Kalgoorlie Secured Callable Portfolio
             Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes 2006-28

                              Rating
                              ------
                     To                  From
                     --                  ----
                     NR                   CCC-

       EUR60 Million Kalgoorlie Secured Callable Portfolio
             Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes 2006-29

                              Rating
                              ------
                     To                  From
                     --                  ----
                     NR                   CCC-

        EUR25 Million Kalgoorlie Secured Callable Portfolio
             Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes 2006-30

                              Rating
                              ------
                     To                  From
                     --                  ----
                     NR                   CCC-

          EUR15 Million SENWAI Secured Callable Portfolio
             Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes 2006-31

                              Rating
                              ------
                     To                  From
                     --                  ----
                     NR                   CCC-

         EUR55 Million SENWAI Secured Callable Portfolio
            Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes 2006-32

                              Rating
                              ------
                     To                  From
                     --                  ----
                     NR                   CCC-

         EUR30 Million SENWAI Secured Callable Portfolio
             Credit-Linked Floating-Rate Notes 2006-33

                              Rating
                              ------
                     To                  From
                     --                  ----
                     NR                   CCC-

                    Aphex Pacific Capital Ltd.

           JPY500 Million Secured Portfolio Fixed-Rate
                      Credit-Linked Notes 4

                              Rating
                              ------
                     To                  From
                     --                  ----
                     NR                   CCC-

                          NR -- Not Rated


EIRLES TWO: Moody's Withdraws Junk Ratings on Two Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken these rating actions on notes
issued by Eirles Two Limited under Series 87 and 88.

  -- EUR20M Eirles Two Limited Series 87 Floating Rate Portfolio
     Credit linked Notes Secured Notes due 2011 Notes, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 20, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1

  -- EUR40M Eirles Two Limited Series 88 Floating Rate Portfolio
     Credit Linked Secured Notes due 2011 Notes, Withdrawn;
     previously on Feb 20, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2

The rating actions follow the repurchase and subsequent
cancellation of the notes on February 23, 2010.  The notes were
repurchased in exchange of the delivery of the underlying
collateral to noteholders.  No swap termination payments were
required as a result of cancellation.


FURNITURE DEPOT: High Court Appoints Provisional Liquidator
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Irish Times reports that the High Court has appointed a
provisional liquidator to Furniture Depot Kilkenny Ltd., which is
insolvent, mainly due to the downturn in the retail trade.

The report relates Ms. Justice Mary Laffoy appointed David Van
Dessel of Kavanagh Fennell as provisional liquidator.

According to the report, the court was told the company has
liabilities over assets of EUR2.2 million but that figure, in a
winding-up situation, would rise to almost EUR4 million.

The company had a loss in its draft accounts for 2009 of more than
EUR1.8 million, the report discloses.

Furniture Depot Kilkenny Ltd. is a furniture company.  It has five
outlets based at Carrickmines, Dublin; Tullamore, Co Offaly; Naas,
Co Kildare; Kilkenny and Waterford.


LINEN SUPPLY: Emerges From Examinership
---------------------------------------
Galway Advertiser reports that Linen Supply of Ireland has
confirmed that it has emerged from the examinership process it
entered in September 2009.

According to Galway Advertiser, it is expected that the company
will soon begin distributing a EUR5.4 million redundancy fund to
more than 260 workers who were made redundant last year.

Galway Advertiser recalls during the examinership, LSI sought
permission to repudiate or cancel leases held with several
landlords.  Galway Advertiser notes that while the High Court
refused the company permission, the Supreme Court subsequently
ruled that leases are contracts within the meaning of examinership
legislation and thus could be repudiated.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 12,
2010, The Irish Times said the High Court approved Linen Supply of
Ireland's scheme of arrangement, securing 350 jobs.

Citing Independent.ie, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe
reported on Sept. 22, 2009, that the High Court's Judge John
MacMenamin appointed Kieran Wallace of KPMG as interim examiner to
Linen Supply of Ireland after he was told that the company was
insolvent.  Independent.ie said the company blamed its
difficulties on a depressed hospitality sector, a dramatic decline
in hotel occupancies, a significant margin squeeze by hoteliers
and suppliers, and a competitive operating environment.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, citing The Sunday Business
Post Online, reported on Dec. 9, 2009, that under the rescue
scheme prepared by the firm's examiner, all of the firm's
preferential creditors would be paid in full, while unsecured
creditors would receive 30% of their debts.  The company has
liabilities of EUR61 million, according to the Post.

Linen Supply of Ireland provides textile rental and laundry
services to the hospitality industry.


STATEFORD LTD: Court Enters EUR26 Mil. Summary Judgment Order
-------------------------------------------------------------
Mary Carolan at The Irish Times reports that Mr. Justice Peter
Kelly has granted Bank of Scotland Ireland's application for
summary judgment order of EUR26 million against Liam Moran and
Vincent Maguire over guarantees on loans to their Dublin-based
property company Stateford Ltd.

The report says there was no appearance by or on behalf of either
Mr. Moran or Mr. Maguire when the case by BoSI against them came
before Mr. Justice Kelly at the Commercial Court Thursday.

According to the report, the judge said he was satisfied the
proceedings had been served on both men and the time for entering
an appearance had expired.

The BoSI proceedings arose from guarantees allegedly provided by
the defendants over a EUR21.2 million loan given in June 2006 to
Stateford to part-fund the purchase of a site at Cross Guns
Bridge, Phibsborough, Dublin, the report relates.

The bank also claimed under further facilities advanced in July
2007 and June 2008 to refinance the existing loans, the report
notes.

The report recalls in May 2009, the High Court ordered the winding
up of Stateford, and a liquidator was appointed.  In November
2009, the bank demanded immediate repayment of the loans, plus
interest, but no repayment was made, after which it sought
judgment against the defendants under the guarantees provided by
them, the report recounts.


WOOD-PRINTCRAFT: High Court Grants Court Protection
---------------------------------------------------
Mary Carolan at The Irish Times reports that the High Court's
Mr. Justice Peter Kelly has granted court protection to
Wood-Printcraft Ltd.  According to the report, Wood-Printcraft has
run into difficulties, including the allocation of large State
printing contracts to companies based abroad.

The judge granted the application by Gary McCarthy, for the
company, to appoint George Maloney as examiner, the report says.

The report relates the judge said he was satisfied -- on evidence
put before him including the view of an independent accountant --
that there was a reasonable prospect of survival of the company,
provided certain conditions were met, including restructuring,
cutting staff and procuring a merger or investment.

The judge noted two serious expressions of interest had been
received without the examiner even advertising for investors, the
report discloses.

The judge also took into account the company's directors, members
of the Ring and Daly families, had injected funds into it and had
said they would make up any shortfall in cash flow if it occurred
during examinership, the report states.

Without protection, the company believed it would be unable to
obtain paper and its business would have to cease within four
weeks, the report notes.

Wood-Printcraft Ltd. is a Dublin-based printing company.  The
company published the Belfast Agreement and has links to James
Joyce's novel Ulysses.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


LYONDELL CHEMICAL: Parent to Shut PP Plant in Italy
---------------------------------------------------
LyondellBasell Industries announced a project to cease the
production of polypropylene (PP) at Terni, Italy.  The company has
started the employee consultation process regarding a project to
permanently shut down the unit.

"Demand for polypropylene continues to be affected by global
economic conditions and the resulting market environment has made
facilities such as Terni no longer economically viable.  We expect
to be able to meet projected customer demand for polypropylene
(including local customers in Terni) with product supplied from
our other facilities in Italy," said Anton De Vries,
LyondellBasell's senior vice president, Olefins and Polyolefins ?
Europe, Asia and International.  LyondellBasell said that PP
production activities in Italy will be focused on the company's
world-scale sites at Ferrara and Brindisi.

The Terni plant has a nameplate capacity of 255 KT per year.  In
conjunction with the shutdown project, LyondellBasell has started
consultation with representatives of the employees to determine
the appropriate path forward for the employees at the site.  The
plant currently has approximately 120 permanent employees.

                      About Lyondell Chemical

LyondellBasell Industries is one of the world's largest polymers,
petrochemicals and fuels companies.  It is the global leader in
polyolefins technology, production and marketing; a pioneer in
propylene oxide and derivatives; and a significant producer of
fuels and refined products, including biofuels.  Through research
and development, LyondellBasell develops innovative materials and
technologies that deliver exceptional customer value and products
that improve quality of life for people around the world.
Headquartered in The Netherlands, LyondellBasell --
http://www.lyondellbasell.com/-- is privately owned by Access
Industries.

Basell AF and Lyondell Chemical Company merged operations in 2007
to form LyondellBasell Industries, the world's third largest
independent chemical company.  LyondellBasell became saddled with
debt as part of the US$12.7 billion merger.  On January 6, 2009,
LyondellBasell Industries' U.S. operations and one of its European
holding companies -- Basell Germany Holdings GmbH -- filed
voluntary petitions to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code to facilitate a restructuring of the company's
debts.  The case is In re Lyondell Chemical Company, et al.,
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 09-10023).  Seventy-nine Lyondell
entities, including Equistar Chemicals, LP, Lyondell Chemical
Company, Millennium Chemicals Inc., and Wyatt Industries, Inc.
filed for Chapter 11.  In May 2009, one of the cases was dismissed
-- Case No. 09-10068 -- because it is duplicative of Case No. 09-
10040 relating to Debtor Glidden Latin America Holdings.

The Hon. Robert E. Gerber presides over the case.  Deryck A.
Palmer, Esq., at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, in New York,
serves as the Debtors' bankruptcy counsel.  Evercore Partners
serves as financial advisors, and Alix Partners and its subsidiary
AP Services LLC, serves as restructuring advisors.  AlixPartners'
Kevin M. McShea acts as the Debtors' Chief Restructuring Officer.
Clifford Chance LLP serves as restructuring advisors to the
European entities.  Lyondell Chemical estimated that consolidated
assets total US$27.12 billion and debts total US$19.34 billion as
of the bankruptcy filing date.

Lyondell has obtained approximately US$8 billion in DIP financing
to fund continuing operations.  The DIP financing includes two
credit agreements: a US$6.5 billion term loan, which comprises a
US$3.25 billion in new loans and a US$3.25 billion roll-up of
existing loans; and a US$1.57 billion asset-backed lending
facility.

Luxembourg-based LyondellBasell Industries AF S.C.A. and another
affiliate were voluntarily added to Lyondell Chemical's
reorganization filing under Chapter 11 on April 24, 2009, in order
to seek protection against claims by certain financial and U.S.
trade creditors.  On May 8, 2009, LyondellBasell Industries added
13 non-operating entities to Lyondell Chemical Company's
reorganization filing under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code.  All of the entities are U.S. companies and were added to
the original Chapter 11 filing for administrative purposes.  The
filings will have no impact on current business or operations as
none of the entities manufactures or sells products.

Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., publishes Lyondell Bankruptcy
News.  The newsletter tracks the Chapter 11 proceeding undertaken
by Lyondell Chemical Company and its various affiliates.
(http://bankrupt.com/newsstand/or 215/945-7000)


PARMALAT SPA: Judge Okays Deloitte, Grant Thornton Settlements
--------------------------------------------------------------
David Glovin at Bloomberg News reports that U.S. District Judge
Lewis Kaplan in New York on Thursday approved settlements of
lawsuits accusing Grant Thornton LLP and Deloitte & Touche LLP of
helping the Italian dairy Parmalat Finanziaria SpA defraud
investors.

According to Bloomberg, under settlements that became public on
Nov. 19, the accounting firms agreed to pay a total of US$15
million to settle the lawsuits.

Deloitte, based in New York, will pay US$8.5 million, and
Chicago-based Grant Thornton will pay US$6.5 million, Bloomberg
says citing court papers from November.

Bloomberg recalls Parmalat Finanziaria filed for bankruptcy in
December 2003 after what investors claimed was a lengthy fraud.
The successor company shortened its name to Parmalat SpA and
returned to the stock market in 2005, Bloomberg relates.
Investors sued Parmalat, its banks and auditors over the company's
implosion, Bloomberg recounts.  Investors in the group lawsuit
alleged that Parmalat's auditors should be held responsible for
the fraud, a claim the auditors denied, Bloomberg notes.

                      About Parmalat S.p.A.

Headquartered in Milan, Italy, Parmalat S.p.A. --
http://www.parmalat.net/-- sells nameplate milk products
that can be stored at room temperature for months.  It also has
about 40 brand product lines, which include yogurt, cheese,
butter, cakes and cookies, breads, pizza, snack foods and
vegetable sauces, soups and juices.

The Company's U.S. operations filed for Chapter 11 protection on
February 24, 2004 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 04-11139).  Gary
Holtzer, Esq., and Marcia L. Goldstein, Esq., at Weil Gotshal &
Manges LLP, represent the Debtors.  When the U.S. Debtors filed
for bankruptcy protection, they reported more than US$200 million
in assets and debts.  The U.S. Debtors emerged from bankruptcy on
April 13, 2005.

Parmalat S.p.A. and its Italian affiliates filed separate
petitions for Extraordinary Administration before the Italian
Ministry of Productive Activities and the Civil and Criminal
District Court of the City of Parma, Italy on December 24, 2003.
Dr. Enrico Bondi was appointed Extraordinary Commissioner in
each of the cases.  The Parma Court has declared the units
insolvent.

On June 22, 2004, Dr. Bondi filed a Sec. 304 Petition, Case No.
04-14268, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York.

Parmalat has three financing arms: Dairy Holdings Ltd., Parmalat
Capital Finance Ltd., and Food Holdings Ltd.  Dairy Holdings and
Food Holdings are Cayman Island special-purpose vehicles
established by Parmalat S.p.A.  The Finance Companies are under
separate winding up petitions before the Grand Court of the Cayman
Islands.  Gordon I. MacRae and James Cleaver of Kroll (Cayman)
Ltd. serve as Joint Provisional Liquidators in the cases.  On
January 20, 2004, the Liquidators filed Sec. 304 petition, Case
No. 04-10362, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York.  In May 2006, the Cayman Island
Court appointed Messrs. MacRae and Cleaver as Joint Official
Liquidators.  Gregory M. Petrick, Esq., at Cadwalader, Wickersham
& Taft LLP, and Richard I. Janvey, Esq., at Janvey, Gordon,
Herlands Randolph, represent the Finance Companies in the Sec. 304
case.

The Honorable Robert D. Drain presided over the Parmalat Debtors'
U.S. cases.  On June 21, 2007, the U.S. Court granted Parmalat
permanent injunction.


PARMALAT SPA: Italian Police Seizes Founder's Yacht
---------------------------------------------------
Flavia Krause-Jackson at Bloomberg News reports that the 16-meter
(53-foot) yacht Boobies owned by Parmalat SpA founder Calisto
Tanzi was seized by police almost seven years after the collapse
of Italy's biggest dairy company led authorities on a hunt for his
assets.

Bloomberg relates finance police said in an e-mailed statement the
yacht was found in a "known" shipyard located inland near La
Spezia, a beach resort in northwest Liguria.

According to Bloomberg, the police said no details were disclosed
about the value of the boat, which may be sold to reimburse
outstanding creditors.

Bloomberg recalls Mr. Tanzi was sentenced in 2008 to 10 years in
prison for misleading investors about the health of Parmalat.

                      About Parmalat S.p.A.

Headquartered in Milan, Italy, Parmalat S.p.A. --
http://www.parmalat.net/-- sells nameplate milk products
that can be stored at room temperature for months.  It also has
about 40 brand product lines, which include yogurt, cheese,
butter, cakes and cookies, breads, pizza, snack foods and
vegetable sauces, soups and juices.

The Company's U.S. operations filed for Chapter 11 protection on
February 24, 2004 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 04-11139).  Gary
Holtzer, Esq., and Marcia L. Goldstein, Esq., at Weil Gotshal &
Manges LLP, represent the Debtors.  When the U.S. Debtors filed
for bankruptcy protection, they reported more than US$200 million
in assets and debts.  The U.S. Debtors emerged from bankruptcy on
April 13, 2005.

Parmalat S.p.A. and its Italian affiliates filed separate
petitions for Extraordinary Administration before the Italian
Ministry of Productive Activities and the Civil and Criminal
District Court of the City of Parma, Italy on December 24, 2003.
Dr. Enrico Bondi was appointed Extraordinary Commissioner in
each of the cases.  The Parma Court has declared the units
insolvent.

On June 22, 2004, Dr. Bondi filed a Sec. 304 Petition, Case No.
04-14268, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York.

Parmalat has three financing arms: Dairy Holdings Ltd., Parmalat
Capital Finance Ltd., and Food Holdings Ltd.  Dairy Holdings and
Food Holdings are Cayman Island special-purpose vehicles
established by Parmalat S.p.A.  The Finance Companies are under
separate winding up petitions before the Grand Court of the Cayman
Islands.  Gordon I. MacRae and James Cleaver of Kroll (Cayman)
Ltd. serve as Joint Provisional Liquidators in the cases.  On
January 20, 2004, the Liquidators filed Sec. 304 petition, Case
No. 04-10362, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York.  In May 2006, the Cayman Island
Court appointed Messrs. MacRae and Cleaver as Joint Official
Liquidators.  Gregory M. Petrick, Esq., at Cadwalader, Wickersham
& Taft LLP, and Richard I. Janvey, Esq., at Janvey, Gordon,
Herlands Randolph, represent the Finance Companies in the Sec. 304
case.

The Honorable Robert D. Drain presided over the Parmalat Debtors'
U.S. cases.  On June 21, 2007, the U.S. Court granted Parmalat
permanent injunction.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CHAPEL 2003-I: Moody's Junks Rating on Class D Notes From 'Baa3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investor Service has downgraded the ratings of 15 classes
of notes issued by Chapel 2003-I B.V., Chapel 2007-I B.V.,
Monastery 2004-I B.V. and Monastery 2006-I B.V originated by DSB.
Most ratings remain on review for further possible downgrade.  A
detailed list of the affected tranches can be found at the end of
the press release.

The rating action results from revisions of the defaults and loss
assumptions of the underlying pool backing the notes in the four
transactions taking into consideration the current credit
enhancement level of each class of notes.  The ratings remain
under review for possible downgrade because of the uncertainties
about servicing as no long-term solution has yet been concluded.
In addition, there are uncertainties related to possible due care
complaints on the loans in the pools.

                           Background

All the affected tranches have been on review for possible
downgrade since October 13, 2009, following the announcement of
the implementation of emergency regulations in relation to DSB
Bank N.V. on October 12, 2009, and the subsequent bankruptcy of
DSB on October 19, 2009.  DSB was the seller and is the servicer
in the RMBS transactions Monastery 2004-I B.V. and Monastery 2006-
I B.V. and the ABS transactions Chapel 2003-I B.V. and Chapel
2007-I B.V.  Moody's initially lowered the ratings of senior notes
in these transactions to Aa2 (November 11, 2009) and kept all the
notes on review due to uncertainties relating to the servicing
transition for back-up servicing arrangements, operational risk,
set-off and asset performance.

All payments have been made in full and timely on all Interest
Payment Dates on all four transactions since the bankruptcy of
DSB.

       Revised Performance Assumptions Chapel Transactions

The collateral backing the ABS consists of a combination of second
lien mortgage loans and consumer loans to Dutch borrowers.  Both
transactions had a 3-year substitution period during which time
all principal collections are first used to purchase substitute
loans -- subject to set criteria.  The substitution period for
Chapel 2003 expired in November 2006 whereas for Chapel 2007 it
has ended with DSB's bankruptcy.

Both transactions have had relatively high levels of arrears
compared to other EMEA consumer transactions.  In Chapel 2003,
loans that are 60+ days in arrears, have been consistently over
6.0%, as a percentage of current balance (before clearance through
PDL), since February 2008.  Also, Chapel 2007 showed levels of
loans that are 60+ days in arrears (before clearance through PDL),
which have been above Moody's initial expectations before DSB's
bankruptcy; current level standing at 1.8% Both transactions
currently have a reserve fund draw, which is primarily due to
rising delinquencies following the bankruptcy of DSB.

Moody's revision of default assumptions for both Chapel 2003 and
Chapel 2007 transactions takes into consideration the
deterioration of arrears, which have increased since DSB's
bankruptcy.  In addition, Moody's has conducted a roll-rate
analysis on the respective pool for each transaction in order to
derive its updated assumptions.  Moody's assumed a relatively
lower roll rate to default for the loans which are less than 30
days in arrears considering the likely technical nature of these
arrears.

This analysis resulted in a revised mean default assumption of
4.8% of current pool balance for Chapel 2003 and 4% for Chapel
2007.  Expressed as a percentage of the original pool balance plus
replenishments, Moody's revised cumulative mean default rate is
2.9%, compared to an initial assumption of 1.7% at closing and
revised to 2.25% in October 2007 for Chapel 2003 and 3.5% of
original pool balance plus replenishments, compared to an initial
assumption of 2.5% at closing for Chapel 2007.

Moody's has lowered its default volatility assumption (ratio
between the standard deviation and the mean) to 50% for both
transactions compared to 80% for Chapel 2003 as of last review
date and 60% for Chapel 2007 at closing.  Moody's recovery rate
for defaulted loans remained unchanged at 15% for Chapel 2003 and
was lowered to 15% from 20% for Chapel 2007.

      Revised Performance Assumptions Monastery Transactions

The underlying collateral in these two transactions consists of
first and sequential ranking Dutch residential mortgage loans.
The weighted average loan to foreclosure value for the portfolios
is 107% for Monastery 2004-I and 113% for Monastery 2006-I.  The
majority of loans are interest only: 63% of current portfolio
balance for Monastery 2004-I and 67% for Monastery 2006-I.

The loans in arrears by more than 60 days amount to approximately
5.8% of the current portfolio balance in Monastery 2004-I, and
3.8% in Monastery 2006-I.  Although a significant portion of the
increase in arrears is due to the bankruptcy, before this the
arrears levels in these two Monastery transactions were higher
than their peers in the Dutch prime RMBS market.  Therefore,
Moody's believes that while the rate of increase will not continue
in the long-term, it will still be above that of the Dutch prime
RMBS index overall.

The loss expectation and the MILAN Aaa CE are the two key
parameters used by Moody's to calibrate the loss curve, which is
one of the inputs into Moody's RMBS cash-flow model.  In line with
the analysis for the ABS transactions, Moody's conducted a roll
rate analysis on the respective pool for each transaction in order
to derive updated expected loss assumptions.  As with the ABS
transactions, Moody's assumed a relatively lower roll rate to
default for the loans which are less than 30 days in arrears
considering the likely technical nature of these arrears.  This
analysis led to revised expected loss assumptions for both the
RMBS transactions.  For Monastery 2004-I, the revised expected
loss as a percentage of original portfolio balance is 0.9% (vs.
0.5% at close), and 1.2% for Monastery 2006-I (vs. 0.5% at close).
The cumulative losses realized since closing amounts to 0.10% of
original portfolio balance in Monastery 2004-I and 0.11% in
Monastery 2006-I.  Historically not all losses in these RMBS
transactions have been realized, because the servicer continues
the recovery process after foreclosure of the property.  This
leads to an understatement of the reported realized losses in the
transaction.  When analyzing the revised expected loss
assumptions, Moody's took the servicer's practice into
consideration.

Moody's has increased the MILAN Aaa CE for both RMBS transactions.
For Monastery 2004-I the revised MILAN Aaa CE is 15.0% (vs. 9.25%
at close) and 16.3% for Monastery 2006-I (vs. 7.90% at close).
The current credit enhancement under the senior most notes equals
21.7% of the mortgage-backed note balance in Monastery 2004-I and
12.1% in Monastery 2006-I.

                    Servicing and Collections

DSB is still performing servicing activities for all four
transactions.  The bankruptcy trustee is looking into several
options for the transfer of servicing the mortgage and consumer
loan book to a third party, either through a transfer to a single
third party or a sale of the servicing activities as part of the
settlement of the bankruptcy estate.  Meanwhile, DSB is continuing
to service the loan books with approximately 200 full-time
equivalent employees employed by DSB and retention arrangements in
place until end of 2010.

The back-up servicers have performed their due diligence analysis.
Moody's has been advised that the back-up servicers would take
over the servicing if requested and that a transfer would take
approximately three months.

Direct debit orders in place prior to bankruptcy became invalid
post-bankruptcy.  DSB instructed all borrowers to re-initiate new
direct debits.  As of end-January 2010, 76% of all borrowers had
returned their new direct debit instructions whilst the remainder
pay by wire transfer.  Wire transfers and direct debit are
collected in an account in the name of DSB.  As per a post-
bankruptcy agreement, the bankruptcy trustee has agreed that all
collections related to securitized assets received into DSB's bank
accounts will be transferred to the respective issuers.  Moody's
has been advised that the new direct debit instructions give the
option to debit the borrowers from a different account which would
simplify the process in case of a servicing transfer at a later
stage.

                         Deposit Set-Off

Moody's has been advised that clients of DSB with deposits have
received compensation payments via the Dutch Deposit Guarantee
Scheme.  Initially, Moody's concern was that these payments would
be made net of any debt the borrower might have with DSB, which
could have led to losses on securitized loans due to set-off.
However, Moody's has been advised that the payments have been made
gross of any debt the borrower might have, which mitigated the
risk of any losses arising from deposit set-off.  Therefore,
Moody's did not model deposit set-off.

                       Due Care Complaints

DSB has received complaints from borrowers related to its lending
practice.  Furthermore, several consumer activist organizations
have urged borrowers to send complaints arguing that DSB has not
applied due care towards these borrowers, allowing high LTV and/or
debt to income, and/or potentially in combination with unnecessary
and/or inappropriately priced insurance products.

Moody's understands that a number of borrowers in the securitized
pools have made complaints, some of which could potentially turn
into claims.  The bankruptcy trustees have a high priority of
assessing the received complaints on their merits.  If some or all
of the complaints turn out to be valid claims, the borrowers could
be entitled to damages.  Although it is being argued that these
damages would have to be paid from the bankruptcy estate, Moody's
believes that there is a possibility that these damages could also
lead to set-off in the underlying loans.  At present the validity
and magnitude of these due care complaints is uncertain.

The rating action does not factor in the potential loss resulting
from any valid due care complaints.  This uncertainty is one of
the reasons why all the ratings in all the transactions remain on
review for possible downgrade.

                           Moratorium

Moody's notes that the moratorium that was in place for two months
has not been extended.  Currently no moratorium is in force.  The
risks mentioned in the press release dated November 11, 2009 are
no longer applicable following the expiration of the moratorium.

The classes of notes affected by the rating actions are:

Issuer: Chapel 2003 B.V.

  -- Class A, Aa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class B, downgraded to A1 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Aa2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class C, downgraded to Baa2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from A2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class D, downgraded to Caa1 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Baa3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

Issuer: Chapel 2007 B.V.

  -- Class A1, Aa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class A2, downgraded to Aa3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Aa2; previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class B, downgraded to A2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Aa2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class C, downgraded to Baa2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from A1; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class D, downgraded to Ba3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from A3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class E, downgraded to Caa2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Baa3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class F, downgraded to C from B3; previously on 13 October
     2009 placed on review for possible downgrade

Issuer: Monastery 2004-I B.V.

  -- Class A, Aa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class B, Aa3 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class C, A2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class D, Baa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class E, downgraded to Ba2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Baa3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class F, downgraded to Caa3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Ba3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class G, downgraded to Caa3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from B2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

Issuer: Monastery 2006-I B.V.

  -- Class A, Aa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class B, downgraded to Aa3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Aa2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class C, downgraded to Baa2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from A2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class D, downgraded to Ba3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Baa3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade.


CHAPEL 2007-I: Moody's Junks Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investor Service has downgraded the ratings of 15 classes
of notes issued by Chapel 2003-I B.V., Chapel 2007-I B.V.,
Monastery 2004-I B.V. and Monastery 2006-I B.V originated by DSB.
Most ratings remain on review for further possible downgrade.  A
detailed list of the affected tranches can be found at the end of
the press release.

The rating action results from revisions of the defaults and loss
assumptions of the underlying pool backing the notes in the four
transactions taking into consideration the current credit
enhancement level of each class of notes.  The ratings remain
under review for possible downgrade because of the uncertainties
about servicing as no long-term solution has yet been concluded.
In addition, there are uncertainties related to possible due care
complaints on the loans in the pools.

                           Background

All the affected tranches have been on review for possible
downgrade since October 13, 2009, following the announcement of
the implementation of emergency regulations in relation to DSB
Bank N.V. on October 12, 2009, and the subsequent bankruptcy of
DSB on October 19, 2009.  DSB was the seller and is the servicer
in the RMBS transactions Monastery 2004-I B.V. and Monastery 2006-
I B.V. and the ABS transactions Chapel 2003-I B.V. and Chapel
2007-I B.V.  Moody's initially lowered the ratings of senior notes
in these transactions to Aa2 (November 11, 2009) and kept all the
notes on review due to uncertainties relating to the servicing
transition for back-up servicing arrangements, operational risk,
set-off and asset performance.

All payments have been made in full and timely on all Interest
Payment Dates on all four transactions since the bankruptcy of
DSB.

       Revised Performance Assumptions Chapel Transactions

The collateral backing the ABS consists of a combination of second
lien mortgage loans and consumer loans to Dutch borrowers.  Both
transactions had a 3-year substitution period during which time
all principal collections are first used to purchase substitute
loans -- subject to set criteria.  The substitution period for
Chapel 2003 expired in November 2006 whereas for Chapel 2007 it
has ended with DSB's bankruptcy.

Both transactions have had relatively high levels of arrears
compared to other EMEA consumer transactions.  In Chapel 2003,
loans that are 60+ days in arrears, have been consistently over
6.0%, as a percentage of current balance (before clearance through
PDL), since February 2008.  Also, Chapel 2007 showed levels of
loans that are 60+ days in arrears (before clearance through PDL),
which have been above Moody's initial expectations before DSB's
bankruptcy; current level standing at 1.8% Both transactions
currently have a reserve fund draw, which is primarily due to
rising delinquencies following the bankruptcy of DSB.

Moody's revision of default assumptions for both Chapel 2003 and
Chapel 2007 transactions takes into consideration the
deterioration of arrears, which have increased since DSB's
bankruptcy.  In addition, Moody's has conducted a roll-rate
analysis on the respective pool for each transaction in order to
derive its updated assumptions.  Moody's assumed a relatively
lower roll rate to default for the loans which are less than 30
days in arrears considering the likely technical nature of these
arrears.

This analysis resulted in a revised mean default assumption of
4.8% of current pool balance for Chapel 2003 and 4% for Chapel
2007.  Expressed as a percentage of the original pool balance plus
replenishments, Moody's revised cumulative mean default rate is
2.9%, compared to an initial assumption of 1.7% at closing and
revised to 2.25% in October 2007 for Chapel 2003 and 3.5% of
original pool balance plus replenishments, compared to an initial
assumption of 2.5% at closing for Chapel 2007.

Moody's has lowered its default volatility assumption (ratio
between the standard deviation and the mean) to 50% for both
transactions compared to 80% for Chapel 2003 as of last review
date and 60% for Chapel 2007 at closing.  Moody's recovery rate
for defaulted loans remained unchanged at 15% for Chapel 2003 and
was lowered to 15% from 20% for Chapel 2007.

      Revised Performance Assumptions Monastery Transactions

The underlying collateral in these two transactions consists of
first and sequential ranking Dutch residential mortgage loans.
The weighted average loan to foreclosure value for the portfolios
is 107% for Monastery 2004-I and 113% for Monastery 2006-I.  The
majority of loans are interest only: 63% of current portfolio
balance for Monastery 2004-I and 67% for Monastery 2006-I.

The loans in arrears by more than 60 days amount to approximately
5.8% of the current portfolio balance in Monastery 2004-I, and
3.8% in Monastery 2006-I.  Although a significant portion of the
increase in arrears is due to the bankruptcy, before this the
arrears levels in these two Monastery transactions were higher
than their peers in the Dutch prime RMBS market.  Therefore,
Moody's believes that while the rate of increase will not continue
in the long-term, it will still be above that of the Dutch prime
RMBS index overall.

The loss expectation and the MILAN Aaa CE are the two key
parameters used by Moody's to calibrate the loss curve, which is
one of the inputs into Moody's RMBS cash-flow model.  In line with
the analysis for the ABS transactions, Moody's conducted a roll
rate analysis on the respective pool for each transaction in order
to derive updated expected loss assumptions.  As with the ABS
transactions, Moody's assumed a relatively lower roll rate to
default for the loans which are less than 30 days in arrears
considering the likely technical nature of these arrears.  This
analysis led to revised expected loss assumptions for both the
RMBS transactions.  For Monastery 2004-I, the revised expected
loss as a percentage of original portfolio balance is 0.9% (vs.
0.5% at close), and 1.2% for Monastery 2006-I (vs. 0.5% at close).
The cumulative losses realized since closing amounts to 0.10% of
original portfolio balance in Monastery 2004-I and 0.11% in
Monastery 2006-I.  Historically not all losses in these RMBS
transactions have been realized, because the servicer continues
the recovery process after foreclosure of the property.  This
leads to an understatement of the reported realized losses in the
transaction.  When analyzing the revised expected loss
assumptions, Moody's took the servicer's practice into
consideration.

Moody's has increased the MILAN Aaa CE for both RMBS transactions.
For Monastery 2004-I the revised MILAN Aaa CE is 15.0% (vs. 9.25%
at close) and 16.3% for Monastery 2006-I (vs. 7.90% at close).
The current credit enhancement under the senior most notes equals
21.7% of the mortgage-backed note balance in Monastery 2004-I and
12.1% in Monastery 2006-I.

                    Servicing and Collections

DSB is still performing servicing activities for all four
transactions.  The bankruptcy trustee is looking into several
options for the transfer of servicing the mortgage and consumer
loan book to a third party, either through a transfer to a single
third party or a sale of the servicing activities as part of the
settlement of the bankruptcy estate.  Meanwhile, DSB is continuing
to service the loan books with approximately 200 full-time
equivalent employees employed by DSB and retention arrangements in
place until end of 2010.

The back-up servicers have performed their due diligence analysis.
Moody's has been advised that the back-up servicers would take
over the servicing if requested and that a transfer would take
approximately three months.

Direct debit orders in place prior to bankruptcy became invalid
post-bankruptcy.  DSB instructed all borrowers to re-initiate new
direct debits.  As of end-January 2010, 76% of all borrowers had
returned their new direct debit instructions whilst the remainder
pay by wire transfer.  Wire transfers and direct debit are
collected in an account in the name of DSB.  As per a post-
bankruptcy agreement, the bankruptcy trustee has agreed that all
collections related to securitized assets received into DSB's bank
accounts will be transferred to the respective issuers.  Moody's
has been advised that the new direct debit instructions give the
option to debit the borrowers from a different account which would
simplify the process in case of a servicing transfer at a later
stage.

                         Deposit Set-Off

Moody's has been advised that clients of DSB with deposits have
received compensation payments via the Dutch Deposit Guarantee
Scheme.  Initially, Moody's concern was that these payments would
be made net of any debt the borrower might have with DSB, which
could have led to losses on securitized loans due to set-off.
However, Moody's has been advised that the payments have been made
gross of any debt the borrower might have, which mitigated the
risk of any losses arising from deposit set-off.  Therefore,
Moody's did not model deposit set-off.

                       Due Care Complaints

DSB has received complaints from borrowers related to its lending
practice.  Furthermore, several consumer activist organizations
have urged borrowers to send complaints arguing that DSB has not
applied due care towards these borrowers, allowing high LTV and/or
debt to income, and/or potentially in combination with unnecessary
and/or inappropriately priced insurance products.

Moody's understands that a number of borrowers in the securitized
pools have made complaints, some of which could potentially turn
into claims.  The bankruptcy trustees have a high priority of
assessing the received complaints on their merits.  If some or all
of the complaints turn out to be valid claims, the borrowers could
be entitled to damages.  Although it is being argued that these
damages would have to be paid from the bankruptcy estate, Moody's
believes that there is a possibility that these damages could also
lead to set-off in the underlying loans.  At present the validity
and magnitude of these due care complaints is uncertain.

The rating action does not factor in the potential loss resulting
from any valid due care complaints.  This uncertainty is one of
the reasons why all the ratings in all the transactions remain on
review for possible downgrade.

                           Moratorium

Moody's notes that the moratorium that was in place for two months
has not been extended.  Currently no moratorium is in force.  The
risks mentioned in the press release dated November 11, 2009 are
no longer applicable following the expiration of the moratorium.

The classes of notes affected by the rating actions are:

Issuer: Chapel 2003 B.V.

  -- Class A, Aa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class B, downgraded to A1 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Aa2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class C, downgraded to Baa2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from A2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class D, downgraded to Caa1 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Baa3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

Issuer: Chapel 2007 B.V.

  -- Class A1, Aa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class A2, downgraded to Aa3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Aa2; previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class B, downgraded to A2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Aa2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class C, downgraded to Baa2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from A1; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class D, downgraded to Ba3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from A3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class E, downgraded to Caa2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Baa3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class F, downgraded to C from B3; previously on 13 October
     2009 placed on review for possible downgrade

Issuer: Monastery 2004-I B.V.

  -- Class A, Aa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class B, Aa3 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class C, A2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class D, Baa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class E, downgraded to Ba2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Baa3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class F, downgraded to Caa3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Ba3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class G, downgraded to Caa3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from B2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

Issuer: Monastery 2006-I B.V.

  -- Class A, Aa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class B, downgraded to Aa3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Aa2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class C, downgraded to Baa2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from A2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class D, downgraded to Ba3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Baa3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade.


MONASTERY 2004-I: Moody's Junks Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investor Service has downgraded the ratings of 15 classes
of notes issued by Chapel 2003-I B.V., Chapel 2007-I B.V.,
Monastery 2004-I B.V. and Monastery 2006-I B.V originated by DSB.
Most ratings remain on review for further possible downgrade.  A
detailed list of the affected tranches can be found at the end of
the press release.

The rating action results from revisions of the defaults and loss
assumptions of the underlying pool backing the notes in the four
transactions taking into consideration the current credit
enhancement level of each class of notes.  The ratings remain
under review for possible downgrade because of the uncertainties
about servicing as no long-term solution has yet been concluded.
In addition, there are uncertainties related to possible due care
complaints on the loans in the pools.

                           Background

All the affected tranches have been on review for possible
downgrade since October 13, 2009, following the announcement of
the implementation of emergency regulations in relation to DSB
Bank N.V. on October 12, 2009, and the subsequent bankruptcy of
DSB on October 19, 2009.  DSB was the seller and is the servicer
in the RMBS transactions Monastery 2004-I B.V. and Monastery 2006-
I B.V. and the ABS transactions Chapel 2003-I B.V. and Chapel
2007-I B.V.  Moody's initially lowered the ratings of senior notes
in these transactions to Aa2 (November 11, 2009) and kept all the
notes on review due to uncertainties relating to the servicing
transition for back-up servicing arrangements, operational risk,
set-off and asset performance.

All payments have been made in full and timely on all Interest
Payment Dates on all four transactions since the bankruptcy of
DSB.

       Revised Performance Assumptions Chapel Transactions

The collateral backing the ABS consists of a combination of second
lien mortgage loans and consumer loans to Dutch borrowers.  Both
transactions had a 3-year substitution period during which time
all principal collections are first used to purchase substitute
loans -- subject to set criteria.  The substitution period for
Chapel 2003 expired in November 2006 whereas for Chapel 2007 it
has ended with DSB's bankruptcy.

Both transactions have had relatively high levels of arrears
compared to other EMEA consumer transactions.  In Chapel 2003,
loans that are 60+ days in arrears, have been consistently over
6.0%, as a percentage of current balance (before clearance through
PDL), since February 2008.  Also, Chapel 2007 showed levels of
loans that are 60+ days in arrears (before clearance through PDL),
which have been above Moody's initial expectations before DSB's
bankruptcy; current level standing at 1.8% Both transactions
currently have a reserve fund draw, which is primarily due to
rising delinquencies following the bankruptcy of DSB.

Moody's revision of default assumptions for both Chapel 2003 and
Chapel 2007 transactions takes into consideration the
deterioration of arrears, which have increased since DSB's
bankruptcy.  In addition, Moody's has conducted a roll-rate
analysis on the respective pool for each transaction in order to
derive its updated assumptions.  Moody's assumed a relatively
lower roll rate to default for the loans which are less than 30
days in arrears considering the likely technical nature of these
arrears.

This analysis resulted in a revised mean default assumption of
4.8% of current pool balance for Chapel 2003 and 4% for Chapel
2007.  Expressed as a percentage of the original pool balance plus
replenishments, Moody's revised cumulative mean default rate is
2.9%, compared to an initial assumption of 1.7% at closing and
revised to 2.25% in October 2007 for Chapel 2003 and 3.5% of
original pool balance plus replenishments, compared to an initial
assumption of 2.5% at closing for Chapel 2007.

Moody's has lowered its default volatility assumption (ratio
between the standard deviation and the mean) to 50% for both
transactions compared to 80% for Chapel 2003 as of last review
date and 60% for Chapel 2007 at closing.  Moody's recovery rate
for defaulted loans remained unchanged at 15% for Chapel 2003 and
was lowered to 15% from 20% for Chapel 2007.

      Revised Performance Assumptions Monastery Transactions

The underlying collateral in these two transactions consists of
first and sequential ranking Dutch residential mortgage loans.
The weighted average loan to foreclosure value for the portfolios
is 107% for Monastery 2004-I and 113% for Monastery 2006-I.  The
majority of loans are interest only: 63% of current portfolio
balance for Monastery 2004-I and 67% for Monastery 2006-I.

The loans in arrears by more than 60 days amount to approximately
5.8% of the current portfolio balance in Monastery 2004-I, and
3.8% in Monastery 2006-I.  Although a significant portion of the
increase in arrears is due to the bankruptcy, before this the
arrears levels in these two Monastery transactions were higher
than their peers in the Dutch prime RMBS market.  Therefore,
Moody's believes that while the rate of increase will not continue
in the long-term, it will still be above that of the Dutch prime
RMBS index overall.

The loss expectation and the MILAN Aaa CE are the two key
parameters used by Moody's to calibrate the loss curve, which is
one of the inputs into Moody's RMBS cash-flow model.  In line with
the analysis for the ABS transactions, Moody's conducted a roll
rate analysis on the respective pool for each transaction in order
to derive updated expected loss assumptions.  As with the ABS
transactions, Moody's assumed a relatively lower roll rate to
default for the loans which are less than 30 days in arrears
considering the likely technical nature of these arrears.  This
analysis led to revised expected loss assumptions for both the
RMBS transactions.  For Monastery 2004-I, the revised expected
loss as a percentage of original portfolio balance is 0.9% (vs.
0.5% at close), and 1.2% for Monastery 2006-I (vs. 0.5% at close).
The cumulative losses realized since closing amounts to 0.10% of
original portfolio balance in Monastery 2004-I and 0.11% in
Monastery 2006-I.  Historically not all losses in these RMBS
transactions have been realized, because the servicer continues
the recovery process after foreclosure of the property.  This
leads to an understatement of the reported realized losses in the
transaction.  When analyzing the revised expected loss
assumptions, Moody's took the servicer's practice into
consideration.

Moody's has increased the MILAN Aaa CE for both RMBS transactions.
For Monastery 2004-I the revised MILAN Aaa CE is 15.0% (vs. 9.25%
at close) and 16.3% for Monastery 2006-I (vs. 7.90% at close).
The current credit enhancement under the senior most notes equals
21.7% of the mortgage-backed note balance in Monastery 2004-I and
12.1% in Monastery 2006-I.

                    Servicing and Collections

DSB is still performing servicing activities for all four
transactions.  The bankruptcy trustee is looking into several
options for the transfer of servicing the mortgage and consumer
loan book to a third party, either through a transfer to a single
third party or a sale of the servicing activities as part of the
settlement of the bankruptcy estate.  Meanwhile, DSB is continuing
to service the loan books with approximately 200 full-time
equivalent employees employed by DSB and retention arrangements in
place until end of 2010.

The back-up servicers have performed their due diligence analysis.
Moody's has been advised that the back-up servicers would take
over the servicing if requested and that a transfer would take
approximately three months.

Direct debit orders in place prior to bankruptcy became invalid
post-bankruptcy.  DSB instructed all borrowers to re-initiate new
direct debits.  As of end-January 2010, 76% of all borrowers had
returned their new direct debit instructions whilst the remainder
pay by wire transfer.  Wire transfers and direct debit are
collected in an account in the name of DSB.  As per a post-
bankruptcy agreement, the bankruptcy trustee has agreed that all
collections related to securitized assets received into DSB's bank
accounts will be transferred to the respective issuers.  Moody's
has been advised that the new direct debit instructions give the
option to debit the borrowers from a different account which would
simplify the process in case of a servicing transfer at a later
stage.

                         Deposit Set-Off

Moody's has been advised that clients of DSB with deposits have
received compensation payments via the Dutch Deposit Guarantee
Scheme.  Initially, Moody's concern was that these payments would
be made net of any debt the borrower might have with DSB, which
could have led to losses on securitized loans due to set-off.
However, Moody's has been advised that the payments have been made
gross of any debt the borrower might have, which mitigated the
risk of any losses arising from deposit set-off.  Therefore,
Moody's did not model deposit set-off.

                       Due Care Complaints

DSB has received complaints from borrowers related to its lending
practice.  Furthermore, several consumer activist organizations
have urged borrowers to send complaints arguing that DSB has not
applied due care towards these borrowers, allowing high LTV and/or
debt to income, and/or potentially in combination with unnecessary
and/or inappropriately priced insurance products.

Moody's understands that a number of borrowers in the securitized
pools have made complaints, some of which could potentially turn
into claims.  The bankruptcy trustees have a high priority of
assessing the received complaints on their merits.  If some or all
of the complaints turn out to be valid claims, the borrowers could
be entitled to damages.  Although it is being argued that these
damages would have to be paid from the bankruptcy estate, Moody's
believes that there is a possibility that these damages could also
lead to set-off in the underlying loans.  At present the validity
and magnitude of these due care complaints is uncertain.

The rating action does not factor in the potential loss resulting
from any valid due care complaints.  This uncertainty is one of
the reasons why all the ratings in all the transactions remain on
review for possible downgrade.

                           Moratorium

Moody's notes that the moratorium that was in place for two months
has not been extended.  Currently no moratorium is in force.  The
risks mentioned in the press release dated November 11, 2009 are
no longer applicable following the expiration of the moratorium.

The classes of notes affected by the rating actions are:

Issuer: Chapel 2003 B.V.

  -- Class A, Aa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class B, downgraded to A1 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Aa2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class C, downgraded to Baa2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from A2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class D, downgraded to Caa1 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Baa3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

Issuer: Chapel 2007 B.V.

  -- Class A1, Aa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class A2, downgraded to Aa3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Aa2; previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class B, downgraded to A2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Aa2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class C, downgraded to Baa2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from A1; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class D, downgraded to Ba3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from A3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class E, downgraded to Caa2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Baa3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class F, downgraded to C from B3; previously on 13 October
     2009 placed on review for possible downgrade

Issuer: Monastery 2004-I B.V.

  -- Class A, Aa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class B, Aa3 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class C, A2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class D, Baa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class E, downgraded to Ba2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Baa3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class F, downgraded to Caa3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Ba3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class G, downgraded to Caa3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from B2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

Issuer: Monastery 2006-I B.V.

  -- Class A, Aa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class B, downgraded to Aa3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Aa2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class C, downgraded to Baa2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from A2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class D, downgraded to Ba3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Baa3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade.


MONASTERY 2006-I: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investor Service has downgraded the ratings of 15 classes
of notes issued by Chapel 2003-I B.V., Chapel 2007-I B.V.,
Monastery 2004-I B.V. and Monastery 2006-I B.V originated by DSB.
Most ratings remain on review for further possible downgrade.  A
detailed list of the affected tranches can be found at the end of
the press release.

The rating action results from revisions of the defaults and loss
assumptions of the underlying pool backing the notes in the four
transactions taking into consideration the current credit
enhancement level of each class of notes.  The ratings remain
under review for possible downgrade because of the uncertainties
about servicing as no long-term solution has yet been concluded.
In addition, there are uncertainties related to possible due care
complaints on the loans in the pools.

                           Background

All the affected tranches have been on review for possible
downgrade since October 13, 2009, following the announcement of
the implementation of emergency regulations in relation to DSB
Bank N.V. on October 12, 2009, and the subsequent bankruptcy of
DSB on October 19, 2009.  DSB was the seller and is the servicer
in the RMBS transactions Monastery 2004-I B.V. and Monastery 2006-
I B.V. and the ABS transactions Chapel 2003-I B.V. and Chapel
2007-I B.V.  Moody's initially lowered the ratings of senior notes
in these transactions to Aa2 (November 11, 2009) and kept all the
notes on review due to uncertainties relating to the servicing
transition for back-up servicing arrangements, operational risk,
set-off and asset performance.

All payments have been made in full and timely on all Interest
Payment Dates on all four transactions since the bankruptcy of
DSB.

       Revised Performance Assumptions Chapel Transactions

The collateral backing the ABS consists of a combination of second
lien mortgage loans and consumer loans to Dutch borrowers.  Both
transactions had a 3-year substitution period during which time
all principal collections are first used to purchase substitute
loans -- subject to set criteria.  The substitution period for
Chapel 2003 expired in November 2006 whereas for Chapel 2007 it
has ended with DSB's bankruptcy.

Both transactions have had relatively high levels of arrears
compared to other EMEA consumer transactions.  In Chapel 2003,
loans that are 60+ days in arrears, have been consistently over
6.0%, as a percentage of current balance (before clearance through
PDL), since February 2008.  Also, Chapel 2007 showed levels of
loans that are 60+ days in arrears (before clearance through PDL),
which have been above Moody's initial expectations before DSB's
bankruptcy; current level standing at 1.8% Both transactions
currently have a reserve fund draw, which is primarily due to
rising delinquencies following the bankruptcy of DSB.

Moody's revision of default assumptions for both Chapel 2003 and
Chapel 2007 transactions takes into consideration the
deterioration of arrears, which have increased since DSB's
bankruptcy.  In addition, Moody's has conducted a roll-rate
analysis on the respective pool for each transaction in order to
derive its updated assumptions.  Moody's assumed a relatively
lower roll rate to default for the loans which are less than 30
days in arrears considering the likely technical nature of these
arrears.

This analysis resulted in a revised mean default assumption of
4.8% of current pool balance for Chapel 2003 and 4% for Chapel
2007.  Expressed as a percentage of the original pool balance plus
replenishments, Moody's revised cumulative mean default rate is
2.9%, compared to an initial assumption of 1.7% at closing and
revised to 2.25% in October 2007 for Chapel 2003 and 3.5% of
original pool balance plus replenishments, compared to an initial
assumption of 2.5% at closing for Chapel 2007.

Moody's has lowered its default volatility assumption (ratio
between the standard deviation and the mean) to 50% for both
transactions compared to 80% for Chapel 2003 as of last review
date and 60% for Chapel 2007 at closing.  Moody's recovery rate
for defaulted loans remained unchanged at 15% for Chapel 2003 and
was lowered to 15% from 20% for Chapel 2007.

      Revised Performance Assumptions Monastery Transactions

The underlying collateral in these two transactions consists of
first and sequential ranking Dutch residential mortgage loans.
The weighted average loan to foreclosure value for the portfolios
is 107% for Monastery 2004-I and 113% for Monastery 2006-I.  The
majority of loans are interest only: 63% of current portfolio
balance for Monastery 2004-I and 67% for Monastery 2006-I.

The loans in arrears by more than 60 days amount to approximately
5.8% of the current portfolio balance in Monastery 2004-I, and
3.8% in Monastery 2006-I.  Although a significant portion of the
increase in arrears is due to the bankruptcy, before this the
arrears levels in these two Monastery transactions were higher
than their peers in the Dutch prime RMBS market.  Therefore,
Moody's believes that while the rate of increase will not continue
in the long-term, it will still be above that of the Dutch prime
RMBS index overall.

The loss expectation and the MILAN Aaa CE are the two key
parameters used by Moody's to calibrate the loss curve, which is
one of the inputs into Moody's RMBS cash-flow model.  In line with
the analysis for the ABS transactions, Moody's conducted a roll
rate analysis on the respective pool for each transaction in order
to derive updated expected loss assumptions.  As with the ABS
transactions, Moody's assumed a relatively lower roll rate to
default for the loans which are less than 30 days in arrears
considering the likely technical nature of these arrears.  This
analysis led to revised expected loss assumptions for both the
RMBS transactions.  For Monastery 2004-I, the revised expected
loss as a percentage of original portfolio balance is 0.9% (vs.
0.5% at close), and 1.2% for Monastery 2006-I (vs. 0.5% at close).
The cumulative losses realized since closing amounts to 0.10% of
original portfolio balance in Monastery 2004-I and 0.11% in
Monastery 2006-I.  Historically not all losses in these RMBS
transactions have been realized, because the servicer continues
the recovery process after foreclosure of the property.  This
leads to an understatement of the reported realized losses in the
transaction.  When analyzing the revised expected loss
assumptions, Moody's took the servicer's practice into
consideration.

Moody's has increased the MILAN Aaa CE for both RMBS transactions.
For Monastery 2004-I the revised MILAN Aaa CE is 15.0% (vs. 9.25%
at close) and 16.3% for Monastery 2006-I (vs. 7.90% at close).
The current credit enhancement under the senior most notes equals
21.7% of the mortgage-backed note balance in Monastery 2004-I and
12.1% in Monastery 2006-I.

                    Servicing and Collections

DSB is still performing servicing activities for all four
transactions.  The bankruptcy trustee is looking into several
options for the transfer of servicing the mortgage and consumer
loan book to a third party, either through a transfer to a single
third party or a sale of the servicing activities as part of the
settlement of the bankruptcy estate.  Meanwhile, DSB is continuing
to service the loan books with approximately 200 full-time
equivalent employees employed by DSB and retention arrangements in
place until end of 2010.

The back-up servicers have performed their due diligence analysis.
Moody's has been advised that the back-up servicers would take
over the servicing if requested and that a transfer would take
approximately three months.

Direct debit orders in place prior to bankruptcy became invalid
post-bankruptcy.  DSB instructed all borrowers to re-initiate new
direct debits.  As of end-January 2010, 76% of all borrowers had
returned their new direct debit instructions whilst the remainder
pay by wire transfer.  Wire transfers and direct debit are
collected in an account in the name of DSB.  As per a post-
bankruptcy agreement, the bankruptcy trustee has agreed that all
collections related to securitized assets received into DSB's bank
accounts will be transferred to the respective issuers.  Moody's
has been advised that the new direct debit instructions give the
option to debit the borrowers from a different account which would
simplify the process in case of a servicing transfer at a later
stage.

                         Deposit Set-Off

Moody's has been advised that clients of DSB with deposits have
received compensation payments via the Dutch Deposit Guarantee
Scheme.  Initially, Moody's concern was that these payments would
be made net of any debt the borrower might have with DSB, which
could have led to losses on securitized loans due to set-off.
However, Moody's has been advised that the payments have been made
gross of any debt the borrower might have, which mitigated the
risk of any losses arising from deposit set-off.  Therefore,
Moody's did not model deposit set-off.

                       Due Care Complaints

DSB has received complaints from borrowers related to its lending
practice.  Furthermore, several consumer activist organizations
have urged borrowers to send complaints arguing that DSB has not
applied due care towards these borrowers, allowing high LTV and/or
debt to income, and/or potentially in combination with unnecessary
and/or inappropriately priced insurance products.

Moody's understands that a number of borrowers in the securitized
pools have made complaints, some of which could potentially turn
into claims.  The bankruptcy trustees have a high priority of
assessing the received complaints on their merits.  If some or all
of the complaints turn out to be valid claims, the borrowers could
be entitled to damages.  Although it is being argued that these
damages would have to be paid from the bankruptcy estate, Moody's
believes that there is a possibility that these damages could also
lead to set-off in the underlying loans.  At present the validity
and magnitude of these due care complaints is uncertain.

The rating action does not factor in the potential loss resulting
from any valid due care complaints.  This uncertainty is one of
the reasons why all the ratings in all the transactions remain on
review for possible downgrade.

                           Moratorium

Moody's notes that the moratorium that was in place for two months
has not been extended.  Currently no moratorium is in force.  The
risks mentioned in the press release dated November 11, 2009 are
no longer applicable following the expiration of the moratorium.

The classes of notes affected by the rating actions are:

Issuer: Chapel 2003 B.V.

  -- Class A, Aa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class B, downgraded to A1 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Aa2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class C, downgraded to Baa2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from A2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class D, downgraded to Caa1 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Baa3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

Issuer: Chapel 2007 B.V.

  -- Class A1, Aa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class A2, downgraded to Aa3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Aa2; previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class B, downgraded to A2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Aa2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class C, downgraded to Baa2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from A1; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class D, downgraded to Ba3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from A3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class E, downgraded to Caa2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Baa3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class F, downgraded to C from B3; previously on 13 October
     2009 placed on review for possible downgrade

Issuer: Monastery 2004-I B.V.

  -- Class A, Aa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class B, Aa3 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class C, A2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class D, Baa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class E, downgraded to Ba2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Baa3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade

  -- Class F, downgraded to Caa3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Ba3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class G, downgraded to Caa3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from B2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

Issuer: Monastery 2006-I B.V.

  -- Class A, Aa2 unchanged remains on review for possible
     downgrade, previously on November 11, 2009 downgraded to Aa2
     on review for possible downgrade

  -- Class B, downgraded to Aa3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Aa2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class C, downgraded to Baa2 on review for possible downgrade,
     from A2; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review for
     possible downgrade

  -- Class D, downgraded to Ba3 on review for possible downgrade,
     from Baa3; previously on October 13, 2009 placed on review
     for possible downgrade.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


RED & BLACK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of Red & Black Prime Russia
MBS No.1 Limited's notes, while revising the Outlooks on the class
A and B notes to Stable from Negative.  The rating actions are:

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0294882823) affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook revised
     to Stable from Negative; assigned Loss Severity (LS) rating
     of 'LS-1'

  -- Class B (ISIN XS0294883987) affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; assigned 'LS-2'

  -- Class C (ISIN XS0294884282) affirmed at 'BB+'; Outlook
     Stable; assigned 'LS-2'

The affirmation of the transaction's ratings and revision of the
class A and B notes' Outlooks to Stable reflects Fitch's revision
of Russia's sovereign rating to Stable from Negative on January
22, 2010 (Fitch rates Russia's Long-term Issuer Default Rating at
'BBB', and its Short-term IDR at 'F3') The rating action with
respect to Red & Black Prime Russia MBS No.1 Limited further
reflects the good performance of the transaction since closing.
The transaction is a securitization of mortgage loans originated
by DeltaCredit Bank which is wholly owned by Societe Generale
('A+'/Stable /'F1+').

The sovereign rating and Country Ceiling of the Russian Federation
represent reference points for the rating of the notes in line
with Fitch's "Criteria for Existing Asset Securitization in
Emerging Markets -- Sovereign Constraints", dated March 17, 2008.
Accordingly, the revision of Russia's sovereign Outlook suggests a
stabilization of sovereign risk which bodes well for Red & Black
Prime Russia MBS No.1 Limited and other securitizations in the
country.

The transaction has posted cumulative defaults of 1.0% since
closing in April 2007 while the annual excess spread has averaged
around 3.4%.  The notes have amortized by more than 50% since
closing due to high prepayments which have averaged around 17.2%.
Overall, the transaction has performed in line with the agency's
original expectations at closing.


RUSSIAN MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class C Notes at 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of Russian Mortgage Backed
Securities 2006-1 S.A.'s notes while revising the Outlook of the
class A notes to Stable from Negative.  The rating actions are:

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0254447872) affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook revised
     to Stable from Negative; assigned Loss Severity (LS) rating
     of 'LS-1'

  -- Class B (ISIN XS0254451395) affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable; assigned 'LS-2'

  -- Class C (ISIN XS0254451551) affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
     Stable; assigned 'LS-3'

The affirmation of the transaction's ratings and revision of the
class A notes' Outlook to Stable reflects Fitch's revision of
Russia's sovereign rating to Stable from Negative on January 22,
2010 (Fitch rates Russia's Long-term Issuer Default Rating at
'BBB', and its Short-term IDR at 'F3').  The rating action further
reflects the good performance of the transaction since closing in
July 2006.  The transaction is a securitization of mortgage loans
originated by Bank VTB (JSC) (rated 'BBB'/Outlook Stable/ F3), the
second-largest bank in Russia which is majority-owned by the
Russian State

The sovereign rating and Country Ceiling of the Russian Federation
represent reference points for the rating of the notes in line
with Fitch's "Criteria for Existing Asset Securitization in
Emerging Markets -- Sovereign Constraints", dated March 17, 2008.
Accordingly, the revision of Russia's sovereign Outlook suggests a
stabilization of sovereign risk which bodes well for Russian
Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-1 S.A. and other securitizations
in the country.

The transaction has so far performed in line with Fitch's original
expectations at closing.  The transaction has posted cumulative
defaults of 1.7% since closing while the annual excess spread has
averaged around 3.1% since closing.

The prepayment rates have averaged around 19.7% since closing,
leading to a rapid amortization of the transaction combined with
an increase in the available credit enhancement.  Currently, the
credit enhancement is 35.2% for class A, 14.0% for class B and
7.0% for class C.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BOVEY JOINERY: In Voluntary Liquidation; Ceases Trading
-------------------------------------------------------
Bovey Joinery has gone into voluntary liquidation,
thisissouthdevon.co.uk reports.  It is unclear how many jobs have
been lost and how much is owed to creditors, the report notes.

According to the report, accountancy and business recovery
practice Lameys said a meeting will be held with creditors in due
course.

"We have been contacted by the directors of the company to assist
with placing the company into voluntary liquidation," the report
quoted Peter Simkin, an insolvency manager at Lameys, as saying.

"The company has ceased trading.  Assets will now be liquidized
and sold off to make payments to the creditors of the company.

"Lameys has been assisting the directors with this process.
Liquidators will also be appointed at a later date.

"A meeting with creditors is to be held in due course."

Bovey Joinery has been established for 20 years.  The company
provides specialist joinery for listed buildings, reproduction and
architectural work, according to thisissouthdevon.co.uk.


DNA PRINTING: Bought Out of Administration By Greenshoots Print
---------------------------------------------------------------
Helen Morris at Print Week reports that DNA Printing Solutions has
been bought out of administration by Greenshoots Print and Direct
Mail.

The report recalls the company, which employs 10 people, went into
administration on February 10.  The name of the administrator was
unknown at the time of writing, the report notes.


GO MOBILE: In Administration; 44 Shops Moved to Another Unit
------------------------------------------------------------
Iain Humphrey has placed his Go Mobile retail business into
administration; 23 shops will be closed, mobilenews reports.

The report says the remaining 44 shops have been moved into his
Shebang Distribution business.

According to the report, administrator Business Recovery and
Insolvency is to handle payment to affected staff and creditors,
of which Shebang Distribution, owed around GBP1 million, or 65% of
total amount due.

The report relates Mr. Humphrey said he opted for administration
as shops sold to retailer JAG in 2008 were returned, and under-
performed.  Twenty stores were shut down in 2008, and re-opened as
Mr. Humphrey failed to renegotiate the leases, the report recalls.


HARRY NEAL: Interior Services Group Hires Former Directors
----------------------------------------------------------
Construction News reports that Interior Services Group chief
executive David Lawther said the contractor had taken on directors
from Harry Neal Ltd. in a bid to increase its presence in the
capital's high-end residential market.

According to Construction News, Mr. Lawther said ISG had not taken
on any other elements of the business, which entered liquidation
on February 18 despite the presence of four potential buyers for
the high-end residential specialist.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 3,
2010, Building, a UK publication said Harry Neal, which had debts
of around GBP12 million, went into liquidation after it failed to
be bought by one of four firms looking to make an offer, resulting
in the loss of 120 jobs.  Building disclosed the company's
directors appointed liquidators UHY Hacker Young.

Harry Neal Ltd. was founded in 1886 and focused largely on
refurbishment work for historic buildings in London, such as
Somerset House and Garrick Club, according to Building.  The
company had a GBP40-million turnover in 2008.


LEHMAN BROTHERS: RSM Fines for Failings on Structured Products
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) has fined RSM Tenon
Financial Services Limited (Tenon) GBP700,000 for significant
failings in its advice and sales processes relating to Lehman-
backed structured products, and for having poor systems and
controls to prevent unsuitable advice in its structured product
and pension switching business.

This is the first enforcement action resulting from the FSA's
review of the marketing and distribution of structured products,
particularly those backed by Lehman Brothers, concluded in October
2009.  The FSA found that, in relation to its sales of Lehman-
backed structured products between November 2007 and August 2008,
Tenon failed to treat some of its customers fairly.  It breached
Principle 3 of the FSA's Principles for Businesses by failing to
take reasonable care to organize and control its affairs
responsibly and effectively, and Principle 9 by failing to take
reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its advice to its
customers. Specifically, the FSA found that Tenon:

    * failed to fully assess the risks of structured products
      and ensure advisers considered those risks when providing
      advice to customers;

    * failed to provide suitable advice to its customers and/or
      failed to demonstrate the suitability of its advice by
      recording insufficient personal and financial information
      on customers' files; and

    * failed to implement and maintain appropriate compliance
      monitoring to control the use of non-compliant direct
      offer financial promotions.

In addition, in relation to Tenon's structured products and
pension switching business more generally, the FSA found that the
firm failed to have effective risk management systems in place to
manage and control its affairs -- and ultimately failed to
prevent or minimise the risk of unsuitable sales.

As a result of these failings, the FSA has imposed a fine of
GBP700,000 on the firm.  In addition, Tenon will:

    * conduct a past business review of all its sales of Lehman-
      backed structured products. Customers that received
      unsuitable advice will be able to sell their product to
      Tenon and have the money they invested reimbursed plus
      interest;

    * review sales of other structured products between 1
      November 2007 and 1 December 2009, and pay appropriate
      redress where unsuitable advice was given;

    * conduct a review of pension switching business it
      transacted between 6 April 2006 and 1 December 2009 to
      assess the suitability of recommendations made to
      customers and, if appropriate, implement a customer
      redress programme; and

    * instruct a skilled person to undertake a review of its
      current sales and compliance processes relating to the
      sale of all investment products, to assess their
      appropriateness and the suitability of recommendations
      made to customers.

The FSA will oversee the firm's past business reviews and
redress process, and an independent third party will review the
actions taken by the firm.

Margaret Cole, FSA director of enforcement and financial crime,
said: "Firms giving investment advice must ensure they fully
assess clients' needs and make suitable recommendations -- they
must also have the necessary systems and controls in place to
demonstrate this.  We take failure in this area very seriously
and the fine and other actions announced today demonstrate our
commitment to credible deterrence.

"This is the first action we have taken for advice failings
relating to Lehman-backed structured products following our
recent review, and we acted swiftly and decisively in order to
return money to investors as quickly as possible.  We will
continue to take tough action where we find evidence that firms
are giving unsuitable advice to investors."

Tenon co-operated fully with the FSA and agreed to settle at an
early stage of the FSA's investigation, therefore qualifying for a
30% reduction in penalty.  Were it not for this discount, the FSA
would have imposed a financial penalty of GBP1 million.

                      About Lehman Brothers

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. -- http://www.lehman.com/-- was the
fourth largest investment bank in the United States.  For more
than 150 years, Lehman Brothers has been a leader in the global
financial markets by serving the financial needs of corporations,
governmental units, institutional clients and individuals
worldwide.

Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy September 15, 2008
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 08-13555).  Lehman's bankruptcy petition
listed US$639 billion in assets and US$613 billion in debts,
effectively making the firm's bankruptcy filing the largest in
U.S. history.  Several other affiliates followed thereafter.

The Debtors' bankruptcy cases are handled by Judge James M. Peck.
Harvey R. Miller, Esq., Richard P. Krasnow, Esq., Lori R. Fife,
Esq., Shai Y. Waisman, Esq., and Jacqueline Marcus, Esq., at Weil,
Gotshal & Manges, LLP, in New York, represent Lehman.  Epiq
Bankruptcy Solutions serves as claims and noticing agent.

On September 19, 2008, the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch, Judge of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered
an order commencing liquidation of Lehman Brothers, Inc., pursuant
to the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act (Case
No. 08-CIV-8119 (GEL)).  James W. Giddens has been appointed as
trustee for the SIPA liquidation of the business of LBI

The Bankruptcy Court has approved Barclays Bank Plc's purchase of
Lehman Brothers' North American investment banking and capital
markets operations and supporting infrastructure for
US$1.75 billion.  Nomura Holdings Inc., the largest brokerage
house in Japan, purchased LBHI's operations in Europe for US$2
plus the retention of most of employees.  Nomura also
bought Lehman's operations in the Asia Pacific for US$225 million.

               International Operations Collapse

Lehman Brothers International (Europe), the principal UK trading
company in the Lehman group, was placed into administration,
together with Lehman Brothers Ltd, LB Holdings PLC and LB UK RE
Holdings Ltd.  Tony Lomas, Steven Pearson, Dan Schwarzmann and
Mike Jervis, partners at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, have been
appointed as joint administrators to Lehman Brothers International
(Europe) on September 15, 2008.  The joint administrators have
been appointed to wind down the business.

Lehman Brothers Japan Inc. and Lehman Brothers Holdings Japan Inc.
filed for bankruptcy in the Tokyo District Court on September 16.
Lehman Brothers Japan Inc. reported about JPY3.4 trillion
(US$33 billion) in liabilities in its petition.

Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., publishes Lehman Brothers
Bankruptcy News.  The newsletter tracks the Chapter 11 proceeding
undertaken by Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., and other insolvency
and bankruptcy proceedings undertaken by its affiliates.
(http://bankrupt.com/newsstand/or 215/945-7000)


NORTEL NETWORKS: Fights UK Fund Trustee's Bid to Sidestep Stay
--------------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reports that Nortel Networks Corp. is fighting renewed
attempts by the trustee of its U.K. pension fund to participate in
a U.K. pension administrative proceeding over a claimed US$3
billion shortfall in the fund despite the automatic stay imposed
by the bankruptcy court.

Nortel Networks (OTCBB:NRTLQ) -- http://www.nortel.com/--
delivers communications capabilities that make the promise of
Business Made Simple a reality for the Company's customers.  The
Company's next-generation technologies, for both service provider
and enterprise networks, support multimedia and business-critical
applications.  Nortel's technologies are designed to help
eliminate the barriers to efficiency, speed and performance by
simplifying networks and connecting people to the information they
need, when they need it.

Nortel Networks Corp., Nortel Networks Inc., and other affiliated
corporations in Canada sought insolvency protection under the
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act in the Ontario Superior Court
of Justice (Commercial List).  Ernst & Young was appointed to
serve as monitor and foreign representative of the Canadian Nortel
Group.

The Monitor sought recognition of the CCAA Proceedings in the U.S.
by filing a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 09-10164).  Mary Caloway,
Esq., and Peter James Duhig, Esq., at Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney
PC, in Wilmington, Delaware, serves as the Chapter 15 petitioner's
counsel.

Nortel Networks Inc. and 14 affiliates filed separate Chapter 11
petitions on January 14, 2009 (Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 09-10138).
Judge Kevin Gross presides over the case.  James L. Bromley, Esq.,
at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, LLP, in New York, serves as
general bankruptcy counsel; Derek C. Abbott, Esq., at Morris
Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP, in Wilmington, serves as Delaware
counsel.  The Chapter 11 Debtors' other professionals are Lazard
Freres & Co. LLC as financial advisors; and Epiq Bankruptcy
Solutions LLC as claims and notice agent.

Certain of Nortel's European subsidiaries also made consequential
filings for creditor protection.  The Nortel Companies related in
a press release that Nortel Networks UK Limited and certain
subsidiaries of the Nortel group incorporated in the EMEA region
have each obtained an administration order from the English High
Court of Justice under the Insolvency Act 1986.  The applications
were made by the EMEA Subsidiaries under the provisions of the
European Union's Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 on
Insolvency Proceedings and on the basis that each EMEA
Subsidiary's centre of main interests is in England.  Under the
terms of the orders, representatives of Ernst & Young LLP have
been appointed as administrators of each of the EMEA Companies and
will continue to manage the EMEA Companies and operate their
businesses under the jurisdiction of the English Court and in
accordance with the applicable provisions of the Insolvency Act.

Several entities, particularly, Nortel Government Solutions
Incorporated have material operations and are not part of the
bankruptcy proceedings.

As of September 30, 2008, Nortel Networks Corp. reported
consolidated assets of US$11.6 billion and consolidated
liabilities of US$11.8 billion.  The Nortel Companies' U.S.
businesses are primarily conducted through Nortel Networks Inc.,
which is the parent of majority of the U.S. Nortel Companies.  As
of September 30, 2008, NNI had assets of about US$9 billion and
liabilities of US$3.2 billion, which do not include NNI's
guarantee of some or all of the Nortel Companies' about
US$4.2 billion of unsecured public debt.

Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., publishes Nortel Networks
Bankruptcy News.  The newsletter tracks the Chapter 11 proceeding
and ancillary foreign proceedings undertaken by Nortel Networks
Corp. and its various affiliates.  (http://bankrupt.com/newsstand/
or 215/945-7000)


PORTSMOUTH FOOTBALL: U.K. Revenue & Customs Ends Tax Challenge
--------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Elser at Bloomberg News reports that U.K. tax officials have
ended their challenge to Portsmouth soccer club's filing for
administration, a form of bankruptcy.

Revenue & Customs "would expect that now that the issue of
validity is no longer in question, the administrator will be able
to make early and real progress with the administration in order
to get the best and most equitable return for all creditors,"
Bloomberg quoted the London-based agency as saying Thursday in an
e-mailed statement.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, Bloomberg
News said Portsmouth on Feb. 26 became the first team in England's
Premier League to go into administration after U.K. authorities
tried to force its closure over unpaid tax of GBP12.1 million.

Portsmouth Football Club Ltd. -- http://www.portsmouthfc.co.uk/--
operates Portsmouth FC, a professional soccer team that plays in
the English Premier League.  Established in 1898, the club boasts
two FA Cups, its last in 2008, and two first division
championships.  Portsmouth FC's home ground is at Fratton Park;
the football team is known to supporters as Pompey.  Dubai
businessman Sulaiman Al-Fahim purchased the club from Alexandre
Gaydamak in 2009.  A French businessman of Russian decent,
Gaydamak had controlled Portsmouth Football Club since 2006.


PRINT WRIGHT: Bought Out of Administration By Greenshoots Print
---------------------------------------------------------------
Helen Morris at Print Week reports that Print Wright has been
bought out of administration by Greenshoots Print and Direct Mail.

The report recalls Print Wright ceased trading on February 16.
Jeremy Woodside and Ben Barrett, of RSM Tenon, were appointed
joint administrators to the company, the report recounts.

According to the report, a spokeswoman for the administrator said
the Ipswich-based company was closed after RSM Tenon was appointed
by an asset based lender.

The report relates Greenshoots Print and Direct Mail managing
director Mark Brown said that Print Wright's specialist machines
and hand-bookbinding facilities had been bought as part of the
purchase.

Print Wright is based in Ipswich.  The litho and digital business
has a turnover of GBP2 million, according to Print Week.  It
employs 35 people.


PUNCH TAVERNS: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class C(R) Notes to 'Ba1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded these classes of Notes
issued by Punch Taverns Finance plc (amounts reflect initial
outstanding):

  -- GBP200M Class M1 Secured Notes due 2026, Downgraded to A2;
     previously on Oct 27, 2009 A1 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- GBP400M Class M2(N) Floating Rate Secured Notes due 2029,
     Downgraded to A2; previously on Oct 27, 2009 A1 Placed Under
     Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- GBP140M Class B1 Secured Notes due 2026, Downgraded to Baa2;
     previously on Oct 27, 2009 Baa1 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- GBP150M Class B2 Secured Notes due 2029, Downgraded to Baa2;
     previously on Oct 27, 2009 Baa1 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- GBP175M Class B3 Floating Rate Secured Notes due 2031,
     Downgraded to Baa2; previously on Oct 27, 2009 Baa1 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- GBP215M Class C(R) Secured Notes due 2033, Downgraded to Ba1;
     previously on Oct 27, 2009 Baa3 Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

Moody's does not rate the Class D1 Notes issued by Punch Taverns
Finance plc.  The ratings of the Class A2(R) Notes, Class A3(N)
Notes, Class M2(N) Notes and Class B3 Notes are based on the
underlying rating of the Notes and are no longer based on the
financial guarantee policy provided by AMBAC Assurance UK Limited
(Caa2).

Punch Taverns Finance plc represents a whole-business
securitization of a portfolio of 3,659 leased pubs (as of Q4 2009)
located across the UK.  The transaction closed in March 1998 and
has been subject to tap issuances in October 2000, November 2003
and July 2007.

The downgrades conclude the review for possible downgrade that was
initiated in October 2009.  The rating review was prompted by
increased concerns regarding the medium-term cash flow generation
ability of the Issuer's pub portfolio as evidenced by (i) the
declining annual EBITDA trend on the securitized portfolio; and
(ii) the decreasing operating and profit margins on the estate.

During its review process, Moody's focused its analysis on the
securitized pub portfolio's ability to generate sufficient cash
flow over the medium-term relative to the outstanding total debt
in the transaction.  In this respect, Moody's also took into
account possible further debt prepayments and note cancellations
by the Sponsor (Punch Taverns plc) of the transaction.

The downgrades are mainly driven by:

i) The observed declining trend of the EBITDA per pub in the
securitized portfolio over the past year.  On a per pub basis, the
FY 2009 normalized turnover declined by 4% and the FY 2009
normalized EBITDA declined by 9%, to GBP59,600 compared to the
same period last year; and

ii) Moody's expectation that the EBITDA per pub in the transaction
will further decline by approximately 5% to 10% in 2010.  Moody's
anticipates that performance will further deteriorate in the short
term, for the pub sector in general and for this transaction in
particular.  Moody's expects that beer sales will continue to
decline and profit margins further decrease due to changing beer
consumption habits and the continuing economic downturn.  In
Moody's view, the EBITDA on a per pub basis might only stabilize
in the course of 2011 and should remain stable in 2012.

To date, the negative effect of the performance deterioration has
been partially mitigated by the de-leveraging resulting from
Notes' buy-backs and cancellations.  Moody's expects that the
Sponsor of the transaction will continue to dispose of assets from
the underlying portfolio using the disposal proceeds mainly to
further de-leverage the transaction through loan prepayments as
well as repurchase and cancellation of debt.

Debt buy-backs and cancellations are generally viewed as
beneficial for the remaining outstanding Notes if the structure
effectively de-leverages, i.e. if the outstanding debt reduces
faster than the portfolio cash flow.  Future debt repurchase will
depend on the availability and purchase prices of the Notes in the
secondary market, as well as any further expenses including
hedging breakage costs.

Moody's understands that the Borrower has flexibility in choosing
which classes of Notes to purchase, irrespective of seniority.
Therefore, Moody's notes that there might be some rating
variability with respect to changes in the capital structure of
the transaction as a result of further debt cancellations.
However, should the DSCR fall below 1.35x, the Borrower would have
to apply parts of any disposal proceeds towards prepayment of the
loans.  Such prepayments would be allocated to the Notes in their
respective order of seniority, the floating rate Notes first and
the fixed rate Notes thereafter.

As of end-FY 2009, the DSCR for the rolling one quarter was 1.52x
and for the rolling four quarter was 1.55x.  Both ratios were
above the default covenant of 1.25x, but declining and getting
close to the restricted payment trigger of 1.50x.

Further de-leveraging is also expected from scheduled
amortization, with continuing amortization on Class M1 and
amortization starting on Class A2 (R) in October 2010.

Although beneficial in the long run, this additional amortization
will put extra pressure on the DSCR.  Therefore in its review,
Moody's also considered scenarios in which the restricted payment
trigger (1.50x) would be hit on the test date in August 2010, and
excess cash would get trapped at the Issuer level.  In this case,
Moody's assumed that part of the surplus cash generated by the
portfolio would be used to prepay debt, which would help stabilize
DSCR above the default trigger of 1.25x.

Moody's initially analyzed and monitors this transaction using its
rating approach for whole business transactions.  In this
approach, a sustainable annual free cash flow is derived over the
medium to long term horizon of the transaction, and then
multipliers are applied to such cash flows in order to reach the
debt which could be issued at the targeted long-term rating level
for the Notes.  There has been no rating action on the underlying
ratings of the Notes in the transaction since the tap issuance in
July 2007.  The most recent Performance Overview for this
transaction was published on December 22, 2009.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 22 Tranches of European CDOs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various rating actions on
22 tranches in European synthetic collateralized debt obligations.

Specifically, S&P:

* Lowered its ratings on two tranches;

* Lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on 12
  tranches;

* Lowered and kept on CreditWatch negative its rating on one
  tranche;

* Lowered, removed from CreditWatch negative, and placed on
  CreditWatch positive its ratings on two tranches;

* Removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on two tranches;
  and

* Raised its ratings on three tranches.

The rating actions follow S&P's recent rating action on the
underlying collateral to which the transaction is credit-linked or
the reference entity in the transaction.

                           Ratings List

                         Ratings Lowered

                           Claris Ltd.
EUR10 Million CMS Indexed Rate Credit-Linked Notes Series 56/2005

                               Rating
                               ------
                      To                  From
                      --                  ----
                      BBB-                BBB

                 Royal Bank of Scotland PLC (The)
        GBP150 Million TelSec Credit-Linked Notes Series 4169

                               Rating
                               ------
                      To                  From
                      --                  ----
                      BBB-                BBB

      Ratings Lowered and Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                    Aquarius + Investments PLC
        EUR100 Million Secured-Senior Floating-Rate Series 1

                          Rating
                          ------
                 To                  From
                 --                  ----
                 BB-                 AA-/Watch Neg

                           Aria CDO I
         CHF58.4 Million, EUR31.5 Million, GBP4 Million,
            US$17.4 Million Floating-Rate Secured Notes
           (Issued By Aria CDO I (Cayman Islands) Ltd.)

                              Rating
                              ------
         Class        To                  From
         -----        --                  ----
         Series 2     AA-                 AAA/Watch Neg
         Series 4     BBB-                BBB/Watch Neg
         Series 5     BBB-                BBB/Watch Neg
         Series 6     BBB-                BBB/Watch Neg
         Series 7     BBB-                BBB/Watch Neg

                            Aria CDO I
       GBP412.38 Million Fixed-Rate Managed Portfolio Notes
     (Issued By Aria CDO I (Ireland No.2) PLC And Aria CDO I
                          (Ireland) PLC)

                              Rating
                              ------
         Class        To                  From
         -----        --                  ----
         Snr          AA-                 AAA/Watch Neg
         Sub          AA-                 AAA/Watch Neg

                       Classic Finance B.V.
      EUR50 Million Secured Variable-Rate Notes Series 2004-3

                          Rating
                          ------
                 To                  From
                 --                  ----
                 CCC-                BB+/Watch Neg

                         Eirles Two Ltd.
       $50 Million Floating-Rate Secured Notes Series 120

                          Rating
                          ------
                 To                  From
                 --                  ----
                 BB+                 AAA/Watch Neg

                       Lunar Funding V PLC
  GBP50 Million Secured Asset-Backed Credit-Linked Notes Series 11
                          (Raphael CDO I)

                          Rating
                          ------
                 To                  From
                 --                  ----
                 BBB-                AA/Watch Neg

                       Sceptre Capital B.V.
      EUR40 Million CMS-Linked Repackaged "PowerTranche" Notes
                          Series 2006-5

                          Rating
                          ------
                 To                  From
                 --                  ----
                 CCC-                B-/Watch Neg

          Rating Lowered and Kept On Creditwatch Negative

                        Helium Capital Ltd.
         EUR4.5 Million Secured Fixed Rate Notes, Series 37

                          Rating
                          ------
                 To                  From
                 --                  ----
                 B+/Watch Neg        BB-/Watch Neg

       Ratings Lowered, Removed From Creditwatch Negative,
                 and Placed On Creditwatch Positive

                            Aria CDO I
          CHF58.4 Million, EUR31.5 Million, GBP4 Million,
             $17.4 Million Floating-Rate Secured Notes
            (Issued By Aria CDO I (Cayman Islands) Ltd.)

                              Rating
                              ------
         Class        To                  From
         -----        --                  ----
         Series 1     A+/Watch Pos        AAA/Watch Neg
         Series 3     A+/Watch Pos        AAA/Watch Neg

            Ratings Removed From Creditwatch Negative

                            Aria CDO I
          CHF58.4 Million, EUR31.5 Million, GBP4 Million,
           US$17.4 Million Floating-Rate Secured Notes
           (Issued By Aria CDO I (Cayman Islands) Ltd.)

                              Rating
                              ------
         Class        To                  From
         -----        --                  ----
         Series 8     BB-                 BB-/Watch Neg

                       Pisces Finance Ltd.
              CLP2.7 Billion Secured Inflation-Linked
        and Credit-Linked Fixed-Rate Notes Series 2006-02

                          Rating
                          ------
                 To                  From
                 --                  ----
                 BBB-                BBB-/Watch Neg

                         Ratings Raised

                          Cloverie PLC
  US$10 Million Inflation and Currency-Linked Credit-Linked Notes
                         Series 2006-12

                               Rating
                               ------
                      To                  From
                      --                  ----
                      BBB+                BBB

                          Cloverie PLC
                 CLP7.598 Billion Inflation-Linked
             and Empresa Nacional de Electricidad S.A.
     Credit-Linked Variable Rate Secured Notes Series 2007-53

                               Rating
                               ------
                      To                  From
                      --                  ----
                      BBB+                BBB

                        Elva Funding PLC
US$10 Million Secured Variable Interest Rate Notes Series 2005-1

                               Rating
                               ------
                      To                  From
                      --                  ----
                      A-                  BBB+


* BOND PRICING: For the Week March 8 to March 12, 2010
------------------------------------------------------

Issuer                Coupon   Maturity Currency Price
------                ------   -------- -------- -----

ARMENIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES        8.750 10/27/2014     EUR  81.05

AUSTRIA
-------
BA CRED WOHNBAUB        4.250   1/2/2014     EUR 105.70
BA CRED WOHNBAUB        4.000 10/19/2019     EUR 102.46
BA CRED WOHNBAUB        4.125  9/15/2017     EUR 103.98
BA CRED WOHNBAUB        4.000   3/8/2018     EUR 102.41
BA CRED WOHNBAUB        4.000  9/25/2014     EUR 104.16
BANK AUST WOHNBK        4.875   7/1/2010     ATS 100.55
BANK AUST WOHNBK        5.000   7/5/2012     EUR 106.03
BANK AUST WOHNBK        4.375  8/16/2011     EUR 102.63
CA IMMO ANLAGEN         4.125  11/9/2014     EUR  93.35
CONWERT IMMO INV        1.500 11/12/2014     EUR  92.80
CONWERT IMMO INV        5.250   2/1/2016     EUR  97.11
IMMO-BANK AG            4.000   1/1/2018     EUR 102.38
IMMO-BANK AG            4.100  3/27/2023     EUR 100.15
IMMO-BANK AG            4.000   1/1/2017     EUR 102.38
IMMO-BANK AG            4.000   1/1/2016     EUR 102.38
IMMO-BANK AG            4.000   1/1/2015     EUR 102.38
IMMO-BANK AG            4.625   1/1/2015     EUR 102.38
IMMO-BANK AG            5.000   1/1/2013     ATS 102.38
IMMO-BANK AG            4.500   1/1/2014     EUR 101.25
IMMO-BANK AG            4.750   1/1/2013     EUR 102.38
IMMO-BANK AG            5.000   1/1/2012     EUR 102.38
IMMO-BANK AG            4.000   1/1/2012     ATS 101.25
IMMO-BANK AG            4.625   1/1/2011     ATS 102.21
IMMO-BANK AG            4.400 11/28/2023     EUR 102.40
IMMO-BANK AG            4.000  3/27/2023     EUR  99.25
IMMO-BANK AG            4.200 12/28/2023     EUR 101.58
IMMO-BANK AG            4.750 11/15/2022     EUR  93.53
IMMO-BANK AG            4.250   1/1/2021     EUR 102.38
IMMO-BANK AG            4.200  7/14/2020     EUR 102.38
IMMO-BANK AG            4.000  5/29/2020     EUR  99.93
IMMO-BANK AG            4.000 12/20/2019     EUR  90.33
IMMO-BANK AG            4.000  1/25/2019     EUR  96.48
IMMO-BANK AG            4.000   1/1/2016     EUR 102.38
IMMO-BANK AG            3.800   1/1/2018     EUR  92.25
IMMO-BANK AG            3.500   1/1/2018     EUR  99.56
IMMO-BANK AG            4.450  7/21/2023     EUR 102.38
IMMOFINANZ              1.250 11/19/2017     EUR  85.79
IMMOFINANZ              7.000 12/22/2011     EUR 127.56
IMMOFINANZ IMMOB        2.750  1/20/2014     EUR  85.37
KOMMUNALKREDIT          4.440 12/20/2030     EUR  65.25
KOMMUNALKREDIT          4.900  6/23/2031     EUR  68.38
OESTER VOLKSBK          5.270   2/8/2027     EUR  96.80
OESTER VOLKSBK          5.450   8/2/2019     EUR  61.88
RAIFF ZENTRALBK         4.500  9/28/2035     EUR  90.29
S-WOHNBAUBANK AG        3.800   6/2/2016     EUR 102.90
S-WOHNBAUBANK AG        3.800  4/10/2014     EUR 103.49
S-WOHNBAUBANK AG        4.625  4/13/2011     ATS 102.61
S-WOHNBAUBANK AG        4.875  11/7/2010     ATS 101.50
S-WOHNBAUBANK AG        3.800 10/29/2017     EUR 102.01
S-WOHNBAUBANK AG        5.000 12/29/2010     EUR 101.93
S-WOHNBAUBANK AG        3.800  4/30/2017     EUR 102.43
S-WOHNBAUBANK AG        4.000   2/6/2015     EUR 104.80
S-WOHNBAUBANK AG        4.400 10/22/2011     EUR 103.18

BELGIUM
-------
EURONAV SA              6.500  1/31/2015     USD 113.02
NYRSTAR                 7.000  7/10/2014     EUR 158.86
SAGERPAR                2.950  4/27/2012     EUR 103.66
UCB SA                  4.500 10/22/2015     EUR 112.75

BULGARIA
--------
PETROL AD-SOFIA         8.375 10/26/2011     EUR  47.27

CZECH REPUBLIC
--------------
SAZKA                   9.000  7/12/2021     EUR  69.42

DENMARK
-------
DANMARK SKIBSKRD        2.000 11/15/2024     DKK  74.11
TRYG FORSIKRING         4.500 12/19/2025     EUR  73.98

FINLAND
-------
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000 11/21/2016     NZD  71.42
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500  3/17/2025     CAD  49.16
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.250  6/28/2040     CAD  22.05
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500  9/24/2020     CAD  63.49
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000  2/27/2018     AUD  64.29
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000 10/30/2017     AUD  65.57
TALVIVAARA              5.250  5/20/2013     EUR  96.87

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM          4.970   4/1/2015     EUR  15.38
ALCATEL SA              4.750   1/1/2011     EUR  16.22
ALCATEL-LUCENT          5.000   1/1/2015     EUR   3.55
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG        6.720   1/1/2015     EUR   4.89
ARTEMIS CONSEIL         2.000  7/31/2011     EUR 146.72
ATOS ORIGIN SA          2.500   1/1/2016     EUR  53.35
AXA SA                  3.750   1/1/2017     EUR 235.74
CALYON                  6.000  6/18/2047     EUR  45.75
CAP GEMINI SOGET        1.000   1/1/2012     EUR  43.93
CAP GEMINI SOGET        3.500   1/1/2014     EUR  43.80
CLUB MEDITERRANE        4.375  11/1/2010     EUR  49.13
CMA CGM                 5.500  5/16/2012     EUR  60.62
CMA CGM SA              7.250   2/1/2013     USD  58.63
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY        1.000 12/23/2024     EUR  61.45
ESSILOR INT'L           1.500   7/2/2010     EUR  90.77
EURAZEO                 6.250  6/10/2014     EUR  58.45
FAURECIA                4.500   1/1/2015     EUR  20.10
GIE PSA TRESORER        6.000  9/19/2033     EUR  85.57
GROUPE VIAL             2.500   1/1/2014     EUR  18.84
ILIAD SA                2.200   1/1/2012     EUR  90.72
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125  7/31/2014     EUR  18.17
NEOPOST SA              3.750   2/1/2015     EUR  85.47
NEXANS SA               1.500   1/1/2013     EUR  82.25
NEXANS SA               4.000   1/1/2016     EUR  66.43
PEUGEOT SA              4.450   1/1/2016     EUR  30.84
PUBLICIS GROUPE         3.125  7/30/2014     EUR  35.99
PUBLICIS GROUPE         1.000  1/18/2018     EUR  45.80
RALLYE SA               3.250   7/1/2013     EUR  93.82
RHODIA SA               0.500   1/1/2014     EUR  44.37
SOC AIR FRANCE          2.750   4/1/2020     EUR  20.88
SOITEC                  6.250   9/9/2014     EUR  11.93
TEM                     4.250   1/1/2015     EUR  58.13
THEOLIA                 2.000   1/1/2014     EUR  13.81
UNIBAIL RODAM SE        3.500   1/1/2015     EUR 187.28
VALEO                   2.375   1/1/2011     EUR  46.41
VILMORIN ET COMP        4.500   7/1/2015     EUR 159.52
ZLOMREX INT FIN         8.500   2/1/2014     EUR  34.13
ZLOMREX INT FIN         8.500   2/1/2014     EUR  35.00

GERMANY
-------
CELESIO FINANCE         3.750 10/29/2014     EUR 123.35
COLONIA REAL EST        1.875  12/7/2011     EUR  85.60
DEUTSCHE BK LOND        1.000  3/31/2027     USD  44.43
DT LUFTHANSA AG         1.250   1/4/2012     EUR 100.17
ESCADA AG               7.500   4/1/2012     EUR  17.74
EUROHYPO AG             5.000  5/15/2027     EUR  94.15
HSH NORDBANK AG         4.375  2/14/2017     EUR  68.43
KFW                     3.250  6/27/2013     EUR 104.78
KFW                     1.500  7/30/2014     EUR 116.30
L-BANK FOERDERBK        0.500  5/10/2027     CAD  44.30
LAND HESSEN             3.250 10/14/2015     EUR 103.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT         2.935  7/14/2036     JPY  74.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT         2.500  1/30/2034     EUR  64.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT         5.250 10/20/2015     EUR  34.10
NIEDERSACHSEN           3.500  2/22/2016     EUR 103.91
NORDRHEIN-WEST          3.500 11/16/2015     EUR 104.12
QIMONDA FINANCE         6.750  3/22/2013     USD   5.25
RENTENBANK              1.000  3/29/2017     NZD  71.27
SACHSEN - ANHALT        3.375   6/1/2015     EUR 103.72
SGL CARBON AG           0.750  5/16/2013     EUR  92.88
SGL CARBON SE           3.500  6/30/2016     EUR 110.45
SOLON AG SOLAR          1.375  12/6/2012     EUR  37.03
TUI AG                  5.500 11/17/2014     EUR  89.70
TUI AG                  2.750   9/1/2012     EUR  84.49
VAC FINANZ              9.250  4/15/2016     EUR  50.00
VAC FINANZ              9.250  4/15/2016     EUR  50.00

GREECE
------
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.300  7/25/2030     EUR  71.81
HELLENIC REPUB          3.000  4/30/2019     JPY  74.00
YIOULA GLASSWORK        9.000  12/1/2015     EUR  56.22
YIOULA GLASSWORK        9.000  12/1/2015     EUR  54.50

HUNGARY
-------
HUNGARIAN STATE         4.400  9/25/2014     EUR 107.52
REP OF HUNGARY          2.110 10/26/2017     JPY  72.45

IRELAND
-------
ALLIED IRISH BKS        5.250  3/10/2025     GBP  72.05
ALLIED IRISH BKS        5.625 11/29/2030     GBP  70.13
DEPFA ACS BANK          5.125  3/16/2037     USD  74.24
DEPFA ACS BANK          0.500   3/3/2025     CAD  32.99
DEPFA ACS BANK          5.125  3/16/2037     USD  74.04
DEPFA ACS BANK          4.900  8/24/2035     CAD  64.77
UT2 FUNDING PLC         5.321  6/30/2016     EUR  73.56

ITALY
-----
BANCO POPOLARE          4.750   6/1/2010     EUR 100.31
BENI STABILI            2.500 10/27/2011     EUR  98.56
BULGARI SPA             5.375   7/8/2014     EUR 136.72
COMUNE DI MILANO        4.019  6/29/2035     EUR  74.47
IGD                     2.500  6/28/2012     EUR  92.77
RISANAMENTO             1.000  5/10/2014     EUR  86.19
UBI BANCA SPCA          5.750  7/10/2013     EUR 110.91

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ACERGY SA               2.250 10/11/2013     USD 105.47
ARCELORMITTAL           5.000  5/15/2014     USD 151.50
ARCELORMITTAL           7.250   4/1/2014     EUR  35.70
BREEZE                  4.524  4/19/2027     EUR  85.14
CONTROLINVESTE          3.000  1/28/2015     EUR 102.56
EVRAZ GROUP SA          7.250  7/13/2014     USD 191.33
FINMECCANICA FIN        0.375   8/8/2010     EUR  99.13
GLOBAL YATIRIM H        9.250  7/31/2012     USD  71.40
HELLAS III              8.500 10/15/2013     EUR  35.92
INTRALOT LUX SA         2.250 12/20/2013     EUR  90.69
KLOCKNER & CO           1.500  7/27/2012     EUR  89.92
KLOECKNER & CO          6.000   6/9/2014     EUR 131.70
KUD FIN SERV HLD        1.625  10/5/2012     CHF  96.21
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000  4/30/2014     EUR  66.94
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000  4/30/2014     EUR  66.78
NELL AF SARL            8.375  8/15/2015     EUR  22.42
QIAGEN FINANCE          1.500  8/18/2024     USD 181.22
QIAGEN FINANCE          3.250  5/16/2026     USD 129.94
SONATA SECURIT          1.500  12/9/2010     CHF 107.12
SWATCH GP FIN LU        2.625 10/15/2010     CHF 124.17
TEMENOS LUX             1.500  3/21/2013     CHF 159.45
TMK BONDS SA            5.250  2/11/2015     USD 106.64
UBI BANCA INT           8.750 10/29/2012     EUR  97.92

NETHERLANDS
-----------
AI FINANCE B.V.        10.875  7/15/2012     USD  73.50
AIR BERLIN FINAN        9.000  8/25/2014     EUR 106.10
AIR BERLIN FINAN        1.500  4/11/2027     EUR  77.72
APP INTL FINANCE       11.750  10/1/2005     USD   0.01
ARPENI PR INVEST        8.750   5/3/2013     USD  64.25
ARPENI PR INVEST        8.750   5/3/2013     USD  64.25
ASM INTL NV             5.250  5/15/2010     USD 133.55
ASM INTL NV             4.250  12/6/2011     USD 128.64
ASM INTL NV             4.250  12/6/2011     USD 118.36
ASM INTL NV             6.500  11/6/2014     EUR 127.70
ASTANA FINANCE          9.000 11/16/2011     USD  25.97
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500  6/27/2018     CAD  71.62
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500  2/24/2025     CAD  48.47
BLT FINANCE BV          7.500  5/15/2014     USD  71.00
BLT FINANCE BV          7.500  5/15/2014     USD  70.63
BRIT INSURANCE          6.625  12/9/2030     GBP  71.93
DGS INTL FIN BV        10.000   6/1/2007     USD   0.01
ELEC DE CAR FIN         8.500  4/10/2018     USD  61.75
EM.TV FINANCE BV        5.250   5/8/2013     EUR   5.19
INFINEON TECH           7.500  5/26/2014     EUR 214.01
IVG FINANCE BV          1.750  3/29/2017     EUR  67.02
KAZKOMMERTS FIN         8.500  6/13/2017     USD  82.83
MTU AERO ENGINES        2.750   2/1/2012     EUR 105.07
NATL INVESTER BK       25.983   5/7/2029     EUR  40.72
NED WATERSCHAPBK        0.500  3/11/2025     CAD  48.80
PARGESA                 1.750  6/15/2014     CHF  93.51
PARGESA                 1.700  4/27/2013     CHF  95.51
PORTUGAL TEL FIN        4.125  8/28/2014     EUR 106.30
PRAKTIKER BV            2.250  9/28/2011     EUR  94.95
Q-CELLS INTERNAT        5.750  5/26/2014     EUR  58.86
Q-CELLS INTERNAT        1.375  2/28/2012     EUR  59.73
RABOBANK                0.250 12/18/2014     CHF  99.60
RABOBANK                0.125  12/4/2014     CHF 100.51
RABOBANK                1.000  1/31/2012     GBP  98.95
RBS NV EX-ABN NV        2.910  6/21/2036     JPY  74.00
RBS NV EX-ABN NV        1.875 10/27/2010     EUR  99.18
RBS NV EX-ABN NV        7.540  6/29/2035     EUR  76.69
SALZGITTER FIN B        1.125  10/6/2016     EUR 109.39
SUEDZUCKER INT          2.500  6/30/2016     EUR 118.66
TEMIR CAPITAL           9.000 11/24/2011     USD  29.97
TEMIR CAPITAL           9.500  5/21/2014     USD  31.25
TURANALEM FIN BV        8.000  3/24/2014     USD  40.56
TURANALEM FIN BV        8.250  1/22/2037     USD  42.27
TURANALEM FIN BV        7.875   6/2/2010     USD  36.25
TURANALEM FIN BV        8.000  3/24/2014     USD  37.10
TURANALEM FIN BV        6.250  9/27/2011     EUR  41.22
TURANALEM FIN BV        8.500  2/10/2015     USD  40.94
TURANALEM FIN BV        8.250  1/22/2037     USD  41.68
TURANALEM FIN BV        7.750  4/25/2013     USD  40.87
USG PEOPLE              3.000 10/18/2012     EUR 100.60
WERELDHAVE NV           2.500  3/23/2011     EUR  99.08
WERELDHAVE NV           4.375  9/16/2014     EUR 111.80
EKSPORTFINANS           0.500   5/9/2030     CAD  37.83
MARINE HARVEST          4.500  2/23/2015     EUR 103.70

NORWAY
------
NORSKE SKOGIND          7.000  6/26/2017     EUR  67.87

POLAND
------
POLAND-REGD-RSTA        2.810 11/16/2037     JPY  62.53
REP OF POLAND           2.648  3/29/2034     JPY  67.96
REP OF POLAND           2.620 11/13/2026     JPY  72.62
PARPUBLICA              3.250 12/18/2014     EUR  99.52
PARPUBLICA              2.690 12/16/2010     EUR 100.58

RUSSIA
------
KAZAN ORGSINTEZ         9.250 10/30/2011     USD  89.53
MRSK URALA              8.150  5/22/2012     RUB  55.55
TGK-4                   7.600  5/31/2012     RUB  59.03

SPAIN
-----
ABENGOA SA              4.500   2/3/2017     EUR  95.89
ABENGOA SA              6.875  7/24/2014     EUR 119.04
BANCAJA EMI SA          2.755  5/11/2037     JPY  66.51
BBVA SUB CAP UNI        2.750 10/22/2035     JPY  69.91
COMUN AUTO CANAR        3.900 11/30/2035     EUR  73.88
FCC FOM CONST           6.500 10/30/2014     EUR  98.13
GENERAL DE ALQUI        2.750  8/20/2012     EUR  57.20
LA CAIXA                3.500  6/19/2011     EUR 101.34
MINICENTRALES           4.810 11/29/2034     EUR  65.18
PESCANOVA SA            6.750   3/5/2015     EUR 101.56
SOL MELIA SA            5.000 12/18/2014     EUR 104.26

SWEDEN
------
INDUSTRIVARDEN          2.500  2/27/2015     EUR 107.89
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500 12/17/2027     USD  48.34

SWITZERLAND
-----------
ALLREAL HOLDING         1.875   6/2/2010     CHF 100.07
ALLREAL HOLDING         2.125  10/9/2014     CHF 101.56
BALOISE HOLDING         1.500 11/17/2016     CHF 109.31
CLARIANT AG             3.000   7/7/2014     CHF 168.53
GEBERIT AG              1.000  6/14/2010     CHF 189.70
GRAUBUNDNER KANT        1.000   7/3/2013     CHF 104.24
GRAUBUNDNER KANT        2.000   5/8/2014     CHF 106.71
SWISS LIFE HOLD         0.625  6/10/2010     CHF  99.73
SWISS PRIME SITE        1.875  1/20/2015     CHF 103.78
UBS AG JERSEY           9.500  8/31/2010     USD  66.35
UBS AG JERSEY           9.000  5/18/2010     USD  60.95
UBS AG JERSEY           9.000  6/11/2010     USD  59.54
UBS AG JERSEY           9.000   7/2/2010     USD  59.85
UBS AG JERSEY           9.000  7/19/2010     USD  59.55
UBS AG JERSEY           9.350  7/27/2010     USD  60.25
UBS AG JERSEY           9.000  8/13/2010     USD  64.55
UBS AG JERSEY          10.000 10/25/2010     USD  66.05
UBS AG JERSEY          13.900  1/31/2011     USD  36.36
UBS AG JERSEY          14.640  1/31/2011     USD  38.90
UBS AG JERSEY          16.170  1/31/2011     USD  13.77
UBS AG JERSEY          10.000  2/11/2011     USD  61.42
UBS AG JERSEY          15.250  2/11/2011     USD  12.17
UBS AG JERSEY           8.250  2/28/2011     USD  68.94
UBS AG JERSEY          12.800  2/28/2011     USD  35.35
UBS AG JERSEY          11.330  3/18/2011     USD  18.23
UBS AG JERSEY          11.400  3/18/2011     USD  25.54
UBS AG JERSEY          10.990  3/31/2011     USD  30.20
UBS AG JERSEY          16.160  3/31/2011     USD  45.04
UBS AG JERSEY          10.820  4/21/2011     USD  22.37
UBS AG JERSEY          11.030  4/21/2011     USD  21.50
UBS AG JERSEY          10.650  4/29/2011     USD  16.12
UBS AG JERSEY          10.500  6/16/2011     USD  72.18
UBS AG JERSEY          13.000  6/16/2011     USD  50.53
UBS AG JERSEY          10.360  8/19/2011     USD  53.59
UBS AG JERSEY          11.150  8/31/2011     USD  40.25
UBS AG JERSEY           9.350  9/21/2011     USD  67.10
UBS AG JERSEY          10.140 12/30/2011     USD  14.55
UBS AG JERSEY           3.220  7/31/2012     EUR  58.77

UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
3I GROUP PLC            3.625  5/29/2011     GBP 100.20
ALPHA CREDIT GRP        2.940   3/4/2035     JPY  62.53
AMDOCS LIMITED          0.500  3/15/2024     USD  77.00
ANGLO AMERICAN          4.000   5/7/2014     USD 164.56
AUTONOMY CORP           3.250   3/4/2015     GBP 110.69
BANK OF SCOTLAND        6.984   2/7/2035     EUR  73.62
BANK OF SCOTLAND        2.359  3/27/2029     JPY  73.16
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.550  1/23/2012     USD  10.82
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.600  7/21/2011     USD  42.09
BARCLAYS BK PLC         7.610  6/30/2011     USD  54.15
BARCLAYS BK PLC        11.650  5/20/2010     USD  48.86
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.350  1/23/2012     USD  25.77
BRADFORD&BIN BLD        5.500  1/15/2018     GBP  25.42
BRADFORD&BIN BLD        5.750 12/12/2022     GBP  24.69
BRADFORD&BIN PLC        7.625  2/16/2049     GBP  14.96
BRADFORD&BIN PLC        6.625  6/16/2023     GBP  17.45
BRITISH AIRWAYS         5.800  8/13/2014     GBP 140.41
BROADGATE FINANC        5.098   4/5/2033     GBP  74.19
CABLE & WIRELESS        5.750 11/24/2014     GBP 108.50
CHELSEA BUILDING        5.875   3/7/2019     GBP  52.51
EFG HELLAS PLC          2.760  5/11/2035     JPY  69.10
EMS INTL FINANCE        2.500  4/23/2010     CHF 100.12
ENTERPRISE INNS         6.375  9/26/2031     GBP  74.57
F&C ASSET MNGMT         6.750 12/20/2026     GBP  67.51
GLOBAL CROSS FIN       10.750 12/15/2014     USD 111.31
HBOS PLC                4.500  3/18/2030     EUR  71.86
HOCHSCHILD MININ        5.750 10/20/2014     USD 107.14
INEOS GRP HLDG          7.875  2/15/2016     EUR  71.75
INEOS GRP HLDG          7.875  2/15/2016     EUR  71.96
INEOS GRP HLDG          8.500  2/15/2016     USD  72.89
INEOS GRP HLDG          8.500  2/15/2016     USD  72.57
INMARSAT                1.750 11/16/2017     USD 118.50
ITV PLC                 4.000  11/9/2016     GBP 112.48
LIBERTY INTERNAT        3.950  9/30/2010     GBP  98.69
LOUIS NO1 PLC          10.000  12/1/2016     EUR  76.50
NATL GRID GAS           1.771  3/30/2037     GBP  44.92
NATL GRID GAS           1.754 10/17/2036     GBP  46.42
NBG FINANCE PLC         2.755  6/28/2035     JPY  68.19
NOMURA BANK INTL        0.800 12/21/2020     EUR  59.98
NORTHERN ROCK           9.375 10/17/2021     GBP  68.85
NORTHERN ROCK           4.574  1/13/2015     GBP  68.90
NORTHERN ROCK           6.375  12/2/2019     GBP  98.81
NORTHERN ROCK           5.750  2/28/2017     GBP  60.75
OJSC BANK NADRA         9.250  6/28/2010     USD  27.50
PENNON GROUP PLC        4.625  8/20/2014     GBP 112.36
PETROPAVLOVSK 20        4.000  2/18/2015     USD 105.44
PUNCH TAVERNS           6.468  4/15/2033     GBP  70.03
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        4.243  1/12/2046     EUR  62.94
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        9.500   4/4/2025     USD  59.94
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        4.700   7/3/2018     USD  73.00
RSL COMM PLC            9.875 11/15/2009     USD   3.00
SAINSBURY PLC           4.250  7/16/2014     GBP 114.79
SPIRIT ISSUER           5.472 12/28/2028     GBP  73.69
TUI TRAVEL PLC          6.000  10/5/2014     GBP 107.30
TXU EASTERN FNDG        6.450  5/15/2005     USD   0.02
TXU EASTERN FNDG        6.750  5/15/2009     USD   3.13
UNIQUE PUB FIN          6.464  3/30/2032     GBP  64.17
UNIQUE PUB FIN          7.395  3/28/2024     GBP  76.30
UNIVERSAL BLDG          6.375  8/23/2015     GBP  54.74
VEDANTA RESOURCE        4.000  3/30/2017     USD 107.15
VEDANTA RESOURCE        5.500  7/13/2016     USD 131.11
WESSEX WATER FIN        1.369  7/31/2057     GBP  21.16


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.

                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter -- Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick,
Maryland USA.  Valerie C. Udtuhan, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine
C. Tumanda, Joy A. Agravante and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *