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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, October 1, 2010, Vol. 11, No. 194

                            Headlines



B E L G I U M

CARMEUSE HOLDING: S&P Gives Positive Outlook; Affirms 'B+' Rating


F I N L A N D

UPM-KYMMENE CORP: S&P Puts 'B' Rating on CreditWatch Negative


F R A N C E

DEXIA CREDIT: Fitch Downgrades Individual Rating to 'D'


G E R M A N Y

ARCANDOR AG: Berggruen Sets Aside EUR400MM for Karstadt Unit
HECKLER & KOCH: Moody's Reviews 'B2' Corporate Family Rating
HOLZPELLETWERKE TANGERMUNDE: Provisional Receiver Appointed
* GERMANY: Half of Solar Energy Companies May Face Bankruptcy


G R E E C E

WIND HELLAS: Bondholders Emerge as Lenders' Preferred Bidder
WIND HELLAS: S&P Downgrades Corporate Credit Rating to 'D'


I C E L A N D

* ICELAND: Ex-PM Geir Haarde to Be Indicted Over Role in Crisis


I R E L A N D

ANGLO IRISH: S&P Junks Rating on Nondeferrable Subordinated Debt
CHARLEVILLE CREDIT: Gets EUR4.3 Million Bailout Due to Bad Debts


I T A L Y

BANCO POPOLARE: Mulls Sale of Two Units for EUR3 Billion


K A Z A K H S T A N

* KAZAKHSTAN: S&P Says Banks May Write Off Up to 15% of Loans


L A T V I A

LIDO: Submits Request for Bankruptcy Protection


M O L D O V A

EVENTIS TELECOM: Fails to Attract Buyers


N E T H E R L A N D S

KPNQWEST NV: Administrators Sue Qwest & KPN Over 2002 Bankruptcy


R U S S I A

BANK OF MOSCOW: Fitch Puts 'D' Individual Rating on Negative Watch


S P A I N

CAIXA PENEDES: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class Notes at 'BBsf'
CAJA DE AHORROS: Fitch Upgrades Individual Rating to 'E'
FONCAIXA FTGENCAT: Fitch Affirms 'Ccsf' Rating on Class E Notes
FONDO DE TITULIZACION: S&P Puts Ratings on CreditWatch Negative
GC FTGENCAT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Class D Notes at 'Csf'


U K R A I N E

RODOVID BANK: Seeks UAH5.8 Billion Additional Capital From Ukraine


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

A1 PAPER: 41 Jobs Cut as Firm Goes Into Administration
BRITISH AIRWAYS: Inks Transatlantic Revenue-Sharing Agreement
CONNAUGHT PLC: Lovell Secures Agreements With 42 Clients
DUNDEE FOOTBALL CLUB: Fans Should Bail Out Club, Melville Says
DUNDEE FOOTBALL CLUB: Trying to Secure Rescue Package

DUNDEE FOOTBALL CLUB: Fabrizio Ravanelli is Ready to Help Club
EIRLES TWO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to 'D'
FARQUHAR & JAMIESON: Goes Into Administration
MIDLAND STEEL: Placed in Administration; 45 Jobs Lost
PASSIONATE PUB: Goes Into Liquidation as Lender Pulls Out Support

PUBFOLIO: Goes Into Administration Owing More Than GPB50 Million
WHITEHAVEN RL CLUB: Taxman Files Petition to Wind Up Club
* UK: Coastal Towns and Cities Top Insolvency List
* Credit Rating Agencies Need Tight Supervision, IMF Report Says


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: The Health Care Marketplace




                         *********



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B E L G I U M
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CARMEUSE HOLDING: S&P Gives Positive Outlook; Affirms 'B+' Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had revised its
outlook on Belgium-based lime and limestone producer Carmeuse
Holding S.A. to positive from stable.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed the 'B+' long-term corporate credit rating as well as the
'B+' senior secured debt ratings.  The related recovery rating of
'3' is unchanged.

"The outlook revision reflects a much improved operating
environment and a strong volume rebound in the first and second
quarters of 2010," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Per
Karlsson.

In the first half of 2010, reported EBITDA improved to $120
million, up by about 45% from the corresponding period of 2009.
S&P now forecast that adjusted funds from operations to debt will
improve to about 20% over 2010-2012.  Any decision to raise the
long-term corporate credit rating to 'BB-' would, however, be
subject to improvements in Carmeuse's debt maturity profile given
bulky maturities of bank debt in the second half of 2012.  In this
respect S&P understand from management that the company will seek
to refinance its debt well in advance.

In its view, Carmeuse's business risk profile has improved,
although S&P continue to assess it as "fair".  S&P base this
assessment on the company's apparent ability to withstand the
recent financial downturn better than S&P previously expected.
This was thanks to a general cutting of both fixed and variable
costs.  This in turn helped protect operating margins, which
remained relatively stable at 18%-20% throughout the downturn.  In
addition, S&P take comfort from the fact that about 50% of sales
are to relatively stable end markets, such as the flue gas
treatment market.  A key weakness remains the company's exposure
to highly cyclical end markets, such as steel and construction,
which account for the remainder of sales.

S&P continue to qualify Carmeuse's financial risk profile as
"aggressive" because of the company's high levels of adjusted
debt, modest de-leveraged potential in view of high capital
intensity, and concentrated bank debt maturity profile in the
second half of 2012.  Consequently S&P qualify Carmeuse's
liquidity as "less than adequate" under its criteria.  In
addition, S&P qualify the group's financial policy as fairly
"aggressive", reflecting potential for further external growth if
and when metrics improve.  Carmeuse's debt as adjusted by Standard
& Poor's at June 30, 2010 stood at about ?970 million, calculated
as reported debt of ?750 million plus adjustments of ?220 million
consisting of operating lease adjustments, pensions, debt raised
against carbon dioxide allowances and securitization receivables.
Credit supportive factors include expected adequate headroom under
a revolving credit facility (due June 2012), and fair credit
ratios with adjusted FFO to debt forecast at about 20%.

In the first half of 2010, Carmeuse generated FFO of about ?90
million, which easily covered capital spending of ?40 million.  In
its base case, S&P expects that fixed cost reductions implemented
in 2009 will help increase EBITDA generation.  Some further upside
exists, if volumes completely recover to pre-downturn levels.
Given the cyclicality of many of the company's end-markets, S&P
remain cautious and assumed adjusted FFO to adjusted debt of about
20% over the next few years.

The positive outlook reflects potential for a one-notch upgrade
over the next 12 months, if the company manages to lengthen its
debt profile.


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F I N L A N D
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UPM-KYMMENE CORP: S&P Puts 'B' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had placed all of
its ratings on Finland-based forest products company UPM-Kymmene
Corp., including the 'BB' long-term corporate credit rating, on
CreditWatch with negative implications.  The 'B' short-term rating
was affirmed.

"The CreditWatch placement primarily reflects the potentially
negative impact on UPM-Kymmene's financial risk profile, should an
acquisition of Myllykoski Group occur and if such an acquisition
is debt-financed," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Alf
Stenqvist.

The impact on UPM-Kymmene's business risk would also need to be
further examined, and could potentially be slightly negative
initially, as S&P note that Myllykoski currently has clearly lower
operating margins than UPM-Kymmene, although the impact would also
depend on any positive effects from increased market
consolidation.  Furthermore, the CreditWatch placement reflects
S&P's uncertainties about UPM-Kymmene's future acquisition
strategies in light of this potential transaction.

At this stage, there is very limited information available about
the structure of any potential transaction, including purchase
price, financing, and whether Myllykoski's alliance partner Rhein
Papier Gmbh will be part of the transaction.  S&P note that as of
June 30, 2010, Myllykoski reported total borrowings of ?712
million.  In S&P's understanding, this amount does not include
Rhein Papier's debt.

S&P will monitor developments and update the CreditWatch status
once more information becomes available.


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F R A N C E
===========


DEXIA CREDIT: Fitch Downgrades Individual Rating to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings of
Dexia and its three core operating subsidiaries, Dexia Credit
Local, Dexia Bank Belgium and Dexia Banque Internationale a
Luxembourg, all at 'A+' with Stable Outlooks.  Fitch has
simultaneously affirmed all four entities' Short-term IDRs at
'F1+', Support ratings at '1' and Support Rating Floors at 'A+'.
At the same time, the entities' Individual ratings have been
downgraded to 'D' from 'C/D' and removed from Rating Watch
Negative, on which they were placed on 12 March 2009.  A full list
of the ratings appears at the end of this announcement.

The downgrade of the Individual ratings reflects Fitch's concerns
regarding the significant challenges faced by Dexia and its three
core operating subsidiaries relating to the pace and cost of the
ongoing deleveraging and reduction in short-term funding to
improve a funding structure largely geared towards wholesale
markets.  In addition, the already poor Fitch Eligible Capital
ratio has deteriorated given the increase in negative revaluation
reserves and profitability remains under pressure.

Dexia has implemented an ambitious deleveraging process aimed at
reducing its balance sheet by EUR180 billion by end-2014 from end-
June 2010.  Given the uncertain economic outlook and the unsettled
financial markets, the agency expects that this process will be
challenging and will negatively affect the bank's performance.  In
addition, Dexia is actively reducing the use of short-term
resources for its funding needs.  These strategic decisions,
crucial to the viability of Dexia's business model, were taken by
management and endorsed by the European Commission in the
restructuring plan agreed in February 2010.  This restructuring
plan was a consequence of the substantial state aid Dexia received
in 2008.

Dexia's operating performance remained modest in H110.  Fitch does
not expect much improvement in the medium term, as Dexia's funding
costs remain high compared with the overall yield of its assets.
Furthermore, the lengthening of funding maturity, albeit
necessary, will nevertheless come with a price.
Dexia's Fitch Eligible Capital ratio (1.55% at end-June 2010) is
much lower than the Tier 1 capital (12.2% at the same date), as
the former includes substantial negative available-for-sale
revaluation reserves (EUR-10.4 billion), which do not affect
regulatory capital.  Negative revaluation reserves increased in
H110, largely owing to substantial credit spread widening on
peripheral European sovereign holdings (EUR26 billion at end-
Q110).  Although negative revaluation reserves do not necessarily
translate into losses, the agency views these reserves as too
large compared with the bank's consolidated equity.

Dexia's and its three core operating subsidiaries' Long- and
Short-term IDRs remain underpinned by their Support Rating Floors
of 'A+'.  The Support Rating Floors reflect Fitch's belief that,
given Dexia's public ownership and systemic importance, there is
an extremely high probability that support from the states of
Belgium, France and Luxembourg would be forthcoming, if needed.

Fitch has upgraded the rating of the hybrid securities
XS02732302572 issued by Dexia Funding Luxembourg to 'B' from 'CCC'
and has placed the securities on RWN.  The upgrade reflects the
fact that Dexia has indicated that the next coupon due 2 November
2010 will be payable despite the EC constraint to defer coupons on
Dexia's hybrid securities until 2011 (as part of the restructuring
plan) unless payment is contractually mandatory which has become
the case for the next coupon date.  However, Fitch has placed
these securities on RWN to reflect potential uncertainties
regarding the deferral of the following coupon.

The rating actions are:

Dexia:

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+'; Outlook Stable

  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'

  -- Individual rating: downgraded to 'D' from 'C/D'; removed from
     Rating Watch Negative

  -- Support rating: affirmed at '1',

  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A+'

Dexia Credit Local (DCL):

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+'; Outlook Stable

  -- Senior debt: affirmed at 'A+'

  -- Market linked notes: affirmed at 'A+emr'

  -- Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'A'

  -- Hybrid securities: affirmed at 'CCC'

  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'

  -- Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1+'

  -- Individual rating: downgraded to 'D' from' C/D'; removed from
     Rating Watch Negative

  -- Support rating: affirmed at '1',

  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A+'

  -- State guaranteed debt: affirmed at 'AA+'

  -- State guaranteed market linked notes: affirmed at 'AA+emr'

Dexia Banque Internationale a Luxembourg (DBIL):

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+'; Outlook Stable

  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'

  -- Senior debt: affirmed at 'A+'

  -- Market linked notes: affirmed at 'A+emr'

  -- Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'A'

  -- Hybrid securities: 'B'; maintained on Rating Watch Negative

  -- Individual rating: downgraded to 'D' from 'C/D'; removed from
     Rating Watch Negative

  -- Support rating: affirmed at '1'

  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A+'

  -- State guaranteed debt: affirmed at 'AA+'

Dexia Bank Belgium (DBB):

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+'; Outlook Stable

  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'

  -- Senior debt: affirmed at 'A+'

  -- Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt: affirmed at 'A-'

  -- Individual rating: downgraded to 'D' from 'C/D'; removed from
     Rating Watch Negative

  -- Support rating: affirmed at '1'

  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A+'

  -- State guaranteed debt: affirmed at 'AA+'

Dexia Funding Luxembourg:

  -- Hybrid securities: upgraded to 'B' from 'CCC'; Placed on
     Rating Watch Negative

Dexia Funding Netherlands:

  -- Senior debt: affirmed at 'A+'
  -- Market linked notes: affirmed at 'A+emr'
  -- Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'A'

Dexia Financial Products:

  -- Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1+'

Dexia Delaware LLC:

  -- Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1+'

Dexia Municipal Agency:

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+'; Outlook Stable
  -- Support rating: affirmed at '1'
  -- Covered bonds rated 'AAA': unaffected by the rating action


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G E R M A N Y
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ARCANDOR AG: Berggruen Sets Aside EUR400MM for Karstadt Unit
------------------------------------------------------------
Christine Harper at Bloomberg News reports that Nicolas Berggruen,
who is acquiring Arcandor AG's German department-store chain
Karstadt AG, said he's already invested about EUR73 million of the
EUR400 million (US$545 million) he's budgeted to spend on the
stores in five years.

"These are investments that are really mostly capital expenditures
to refresh the stores," Mr. Berggruen said last week in an
interview during a visit to New York, according to Bloomberg.
"Right now I think the business just needs care and stability and
direction, not confusion.  We want to be very focused."

Bloomberg relates to buy Karstadt, Mr. Berggruen had to outbid two
competitors and then negotiate for lower rents with the Highstreet
partnership, owner of most of Karstadt's real estate, whose
shareholders include Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Deutsche Bank
AG.  He succeeded in part because he doesn't plan to close or sell
any stores, which won support from the German government, labor
unions and local communities, Bloomberg notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 29,
2010, Bloomberg News, citing Financial Times Deutschland, said
Karstadt's insolvency plan, due to be finalized this week, may be
imperiled by objections filed by two creditors.  Bloomberg
disclosed the newspaper said Gilde Group, which seeks payment of a
EUR71,000 (US$95,560) claim, and Dawnay Day, which seeks several
million euros, would need to retract their objections to clear the
way for investor Mr. Berggruen to take over the operations as
planned on Sept. 30.  Bloomberg noted FTD reported that legal
proceedings over the objections, including appeals, would drag on
for months so only a settlement could prevent an impasse.

On Sept. 6, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, citing
Bloomberg News, reported that an Essen court approved the sale of
Karstadt to Mr. Berggruen, ending insolvency procedures which
started in June 2009.  Bloomberg disclosed the court released its
decision by e-mail after Mr. Berggruen's bid for the insolvent
retailer was accepted by two groups of creditors on Sept. 2.
Holders of so-called mezzanine financing, a combination of debt
and equity, backed the offer hours after the transaction was
approved by creditors of Karstadt's biggest landlord, the
Highstreet partnership, according to Bloomberg.  Bloomberg
recalled Mr. Berggruen signed a contract to acquire Karstadt on
June 8 and then held talks with the retailers' landlords about
lower rents.

                        About Arcandor AG

Germany-based Arcandor AG (FRA:ARO) -- http://www.arcandor.com/--
formerly KarstadtQuelle AG, is a tourism and retail group.  Its
three core business areas are tourism, mail order services and
department store retail.  The Company's business areas are covered
by its three operating segments: Thomas Cook, Primondo and
Karstadt.  Thomas Cook Group plc is a tour operator with
operations in Europe and North America, set up as a result of a
merger between MyTravel and Thomas Cook AG.  It also operates the
e-commerce platform, Thomas Cook, supporting travel services.
Primondo has a portfolio of European universal and specialty mail
order companies, including the core brand Quelle.  Karstadt
operates a range of department stores, such as cosmopolitan
stores, including KaDeWe (Kaufhaus des Westens), Karstadt
Oberpollinger and Alsterhaus; Karstadt brand department stores;
Karstadt sports department stores, offering sports goods in a
variety of retail outlets, and a portal, karstadt.de that offers
online shopping, among others.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, a local court
in Essen formally opened insolvency proceedings for Arcandor on
September 1, 2009.  The proceedings started for the Arcandor
holding company and for 14 units, including the Karstadt
department-store chain and Primondo mail-order division.  Arcandor
filed for bankruptcy protection after the German government turned
down its request for loan guarantees.  On June 8, 2009, the
government rejected two applications for help by the company,
which employs 43,000 people.  The retailer sought loan guarantees
of EUR650 million (US$904 million) from Germany's Economy Fund
program.  It also sought a further EUR437 million from a state-
owned bank.


HECKLER & KOCH: Moody's Reviews 'B2' Corporate Family Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed the ratings of Heckler & Koch
GmbH on review for possible downgrade.

While Moody's acknowledges the continued solid operating
performance of HK over recent quarters and its only moderately
leverage capital structure, the rating review for possible
downgrade is focused on HK's financial policy and refinancing
strategy in light of the future liquidity needs linked with the
looming partial refinancing requirement of EUR120 million senior
notes due in July 2011, given the initiation of dividend payouts
of around EUR13 million and an unrestricted cash position of
around EUR19 million per end of June 2010.

The review will also assess to what extent the company's current
financial policy is impacted by considerations of its ultimate
shareholder Heckler & Koch Beteiligungs GmbH.  HKB has on its own
a maturity of its currently outstanding EUR153 million PIK notes
in March 2013, and appears increasingly reliant on cash flows of
its only noteworthy remaining investment HK.  In addition, the
early refinancing of the senior notes before its final maturity
date is indirectly limited by restrictions under the PIK Notes at
the shareholder level, as HKB is obliged to prepay the PIK notes
on a pro rata basis in the event of an optional redemption of the
Heckler & Koch senior notes before final maturity date in 2011.

Moody's currently does not consider approximately EUR153 million
of outstanding PIK notes at the shareholder level of HKB as part
of the restricted group debt, considering that the PIK notes have
no direct contractual claim as a creditor on cash flows or assets
of the borrowing group HK.  Moody's will review to what extent
this parent financial obligation should be weighed in the
company's credit assessment and possibly impact the recovery
prospect of the rated debt, should the pressure on the restricted
group persist to divert cash flows to service funding needs of the
holding company HKB.

Moody's anticipates to conclude the rating review within the next
weeks.  An incorporation of PIK notes as financial debt could
negatively impact credit metrics and result in a rating downgrade.

On Review for Possible Downgrade:

Issuer: Heckler & Koch GmbH

  -- Probability of Default Rating, Placed on Review for Possible
     Downgrade, currently B1

  -- Corporate Family Rating, Placed on Review for Possible
     Downgrade, currently B2

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on Review for
     Possible Downgrade, currently B2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Heckler & Koch GmbH

  -- Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Positive

The last rating action on HK was implemented on 11 September 2009,
when Moody's affirmed the company's B2 CFR, its B1 PDR and the B2
rating on its senior secured notes, and changed the outlook for
the CFR to positive from stable.

Headquartered in Oberndorf, Germany, Heckler & Koch GmbH is a
leading defence contractor in the small arms sector, with a strong
brand and number-one market positions in the supply of assault
rifles, (sub)machine guns and grenade launchers.  In 2009, the
company generated revenues of EUR235 million.

MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, MOODY'S is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


HOLZPELLETWERKE TANGERMUNDE: Provisional Receiver Appointed
-----------------------------------------------------------
EUWID Wood Products and Panels reports that Holzpelletwerke
Tangermunde filed an application for the institution of insolvency
proceedings at the competent district court in Stendal.  The court
appointed lawyer Dr. Lucas F. Flother as provisional receiver.

EUWID says the Stendal public prosecutor is also investigating the
sole shareholder Michael Kruthoffer on suspicion of undue
insolvency delay.

The investment bank of the state of Saxony-Anhalt, which had
subsidized the building of the works with a sum of EUR1.3 million,
is also demanding reimbursement of the approved funds, EUWID adds.


* GERMANY: Half of Solar Energy Companies May Face Bankruptcy
-------------------------------------------------------------
UPI, citing a market study compiled by consultants Roland Berger,
reports that only half of Germany's 50 major solar energy
companies will survive the accelerating price war in the
photovoltaic industry.

According to UPI, the analysts write that because of a "threefold
threat of low-cost competition from Asia, declining sales at home
and a dwindling presence in the world's growth markets" many
German firms will have to offshore their production to low-cost
regions or face bankruptcy.

"The photovoltaic market is getting tougher and tougher," Torsten
Henzelmann, a green-tech expert at Roland Berger, said in a
statement accompanying the release of the study, according to UPI.
"The German PV companies have excellent technological
capabilities, but they are not properly prepared for the difficult
market climate."

UPI notes Mr. Henzelmann added he expects that "only about half of
Germany's 50 or so larger solar power companies will survive in
the next five years."

According to UPI, the study found that only six of the 16 largest
German solar power companies have healthy finances and a strong
strategic position when facing growing competition.  The remaining
firms are ill-prepared, mostly because they lack production size,
market access and prestige, UPI discloses.


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G R E E C E
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WIND HELLAS: Bondholders Emerge as Lenders' Preferred Bidder
------------------------------------------------------------
Wind Hellas Telecommunications SA's senior-secured bondholders are
in the lead to acquire Greece's third-largest mobile phone
operator, Jacqueline Simmons and Kate Haywood at Bloomberg News
report, citing three people with knowledge of the matter.

Bloomberg notes the people said that while a bid by Telenor ASA,
the Nordic region's largest phone company, is preferred by lenders
of Wind Hellas, bondholders aren't satisfied with the offer, terms
of which couldn't be determined.

Wind Hellas, which was bought out of bankruptcy less than 12
months ago by Egyptian billionaire Naguib Sawiris, is controlled
by creditors after it deferred payments on a EUR250 million
(US$341 million) revolving credit facility in June and missed an
interest payment on its EUR1.2 billion of floating-rate notes,
Bloomberg discloses.

Bloomberg relates one of the people said an offer by Mr. Sawiris
isn't considered adequate.

According to Bloomberg, the people said Wind and its adviser,
Morgan Stanley, will pick a preferred bidder by Oct. 14.

The people, as cited by Bloomberg, said the process isn't over and
the bondholders may not end up the preferred bidders.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 20,
2010, Bloomberg News said that Mr. Sawiris made a binding offer to
buy Wind Hellas Telecommunications SA after the company was put up
for sale when it failed to make debt payments.  Bloomberg
disclosed Mr. Sawiris said in a telephone interview that the bid
includes a fresh cash component and a partial debt-for-equity swap
with creditors giving up some of their claims in exchange for
shares in a restructured company.

                        About WIND Hellas

Headquartered in Athens, Greece, WIND Hellas Telecommunications
S.A. -- http://www.wind.com.gr/-- provides mobile voice and data
services to about 6 million consumer and business customers
throughout Greece.  The company enables international roaming in
155 countries for travelling subscribers through agreements with
other carriers.  It also provides cellular and satellite-based
vehicle management and tracking services.  WIND Hellas is owned by
investment firm Weather Investments, a company led by Cairo-based
Orascom Telecom's founder and chairman, Naguib Sawiris.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 7,
2010, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its
long-term corporate credit ratings on Greek mobile
telecommunications operator WIND Hellas Telecommunications S.A.
and related entities to 'SD' from 'CC'.  S&P said the downgrade to
'SD' (selective default) mainly reflects the group's agreement
with some of its lenders to defer until Nov. 5, 2010, under the
terms of the standstill agreement, a EUR17.5 million amortization
payment under its RCF and payments due on July 15, 2010 relating
to hedging contracts.  The downgrade also reflects S&P's view that
the group's capital structure has become unsustainable in the
short to medium term, and consequently that WIND Hellas is highly
likely to undergo a capital restructuring in the very short term,
the second in about eight months.


WIND HELLAS: S&P Downgrades Corporate Credit Rating to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has lowered its
long-term corporate credit ratings on Greek mobile
telecommunications operator WIND Hellas Telecommunications S.A.
and related entities to 'D' from 'SD'.  Simultaneously, S&P
withdrew all S&P's ratings on the group.

Prior to the withdrawal of all ratings, S&P also:
Lowered to 'D' from 'CC' its debt ratings on the ?1.2 billion
senior secured notes issued by Hellas Telecommunications
(Luxembourg) V S.C.A., and left unchanged its '4' recovery rating
on the notes, indicating its expectation of average (30%-50%)
recovery in the event of a payment default.  Lowered to 'D' from
'C' its debt ratings on the ?355 million notes issued by Hellas
Telecommunications (Luxembourg) III S.C.A., and left unchanged its
'6' recovery rating on the notes, indicating its expectation of
negligible (0%-10%) recovery.

"The downgrade to 'D' (default) mainly reflects S&P's view that,
given the recent progress on the group's capital restructuring,
the group is very unlikely to honor its upcoming coupon payment
due in mid-October 2010 under its ?355 million senior unsecured
notes," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Melvyn Cooke.

The downgrade also reflects the group's agreement, in late July
2010, with the required 75% majority of its senior secured
noteholders, to defer until Nov.  5, 2010, under the terms of the
standstill agreement, interest payments due under the notes.  The
agreement had been previously also approved by lenders under
WIND's ?250 million revolving credit facility and under hedging
contracts.  Holders of the group's unsecured notes due 2013 are
not part of the standstill agreement.

The withdrawal of all S&P's ratings on the group reflects the
situation of default and the ensuing lack of market interest in
the group's outstanding debt instruments.  At the time of the
withdrawal, the group had about ?1.577 billion of rated debt
outstanding.

As part of the standstill agreement, management has also announced
that it will pursue strategic alternatives for its capital
structure, and S&P understand that it has recently received six
final binding offers for the group's assets and will announce the
chosen preferred bidder by Oct. 14, 2010.


=============
I C E L A N D
=============


* ICELAND: Ex-PM Geir Haarde to Be Indicted Over Role in Crisis
---------------------------------------------------------------
Omar R. Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News reports that Iceland's
former Prime Minister Geir H. Haarde, who led the island from boom
to bust two years ago, became the first political leader to be
indicted for mismanagement of economic affairs during the
financial crisis.

Bloomberg relates parliament on Tuesday voted 33 to 30 to charge
Mr. Haarde, 59, in Reykjavik.  Lawmakers decided not to charge
former Finance Minister Arni M. Mathiesen, former Business
Minister Bjorgvin G. Sigurdsson and former Foreign Minister
Ingibjorg Solrun Gisladottir, Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, the committee of nine lawmakers said
Mr. Haarde, who was prime minister from 2006 until the beginning
of 2009, must be held responsible for "violations committed from
February 2008 through the beginning of October of the same year,
by intent or gross neglect, mostly violations against the laws of
ministerial responsibility" as well as breaches of the penal code.
The same charges were brought against the other three, Bloomberg
states.

The committee was appointed after a separate commission
investigating the causes of the 2008 crisis in April found that
the government, central bank and financial regulator had all been
"negligent" in their failure to address some of the factors that
exacerbated the collapse, Bloomberg notes.

Bloomberg recounts Kaupthing Bank hf, Landsbanki Islands hf and
Glitnir Bank hf all collapsed within weeks of each other in
October 2008 after they were unable to secure enough short-term
funds to continue their operations.  The state was forced to step
in and take control of the domestic assets to create new local
units, Bloomberg discloses.

Bloomberg says the commission alleged that Messrs. Haarde,
Sigurdsson and Mathiesen didn't exert enough pressure on the banks
to shrink their balance sheets after they amassed debts equivalent
to 10 times Iceland's economic output, a development the
commission said was key in fuelling the financial collapse.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


ANGLO IRISH: S&P Junks Rating on Nondeferrable Subordinated Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its rating
on Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd.'s nondeferrable dated subordinated
debt (lower Tier 2) securities to 'CCC' from 'B'.  The 'BBB/A-2'
counterparty credit ratings on Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd. (Anglo)
remain on CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were
placed on Jan. 26, 2010.  Issuance guaranteed by the Republic of
Ireland (AA-/Negative/A-1+) is not affected by the rating action.

"The downgrade reflects S&P's opinion that the likelihood of a
liability management exercise in respect of Anglo's lower tier 2
instruments has increased," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Nigel Greenwood.

Mr. Greenwood continued: "S&P has seen reports that Anglo would
like to carry out a liability management exercise, subject to
regulatory and European Commission (EC) approval, in respect of
its lower Tier 2 instruments, which totaled ?1.72 billion on June
30, 2010.  S&P also note that while Ireland's minister of finance
has made a number of forthright public statements strongly
supporting Anglo's senior obligations, he has not done so in
respect of these subordinated obligations."

In S&P's view, there is a "clear and present risk" of a
restructuring and S&P has therefore lowered this issue rating to
'CCC' from 'B', in accordance with its criteria.  If the bank
announces an exchange offer, S&P would expect to characterize it
as a "distressed exchange" and lower the rating to 'D', in
accordance with its criteria.  This action would have no impact on
the counterparty credit ratings unless there was a default on
nonregulatory capital issues.

S&P's 'BBB/A-2' counterparty credit ratings on Anglo reflect its
expectations of ongoing support from the Irish government, which
includes the minister of finance's public statements on the senior
obligations.

S&P plan to resolve the CreditWatch placement when S&P receive
details of the capital injection into Anglo and the outcome of the
EC review of Anglo's restructuring plan.  S&P has seen reports
that the capital raising details will be announced shortly and it
is expected that the EC review will be completed this year.

Based upon S&P's current understanding of the government's support
and its plan to split and wind-down Anglo, upon resolution of the
CreditWatch, S&P expects to classify Anglo as a government-related
entity.  Under its GRE criteria, S&P would expect to assign
ratings to Anglo no higher than the existing 'BBB/A-2'.  Depending
upon its view of Anglo's role and link to the government, and its
view of its stand-alone credit profile, S&P could lower the
ratings by one or more notches.

S&P's assessment will include consideration of the medium-term
importance of Anglo to the government, the intentions of the
latter with respect to Anglo's various classes of debt, and the
future financial and business profile of Anglo.


CHARLEVILLE CREDIT: Gets EUR4.3 Million Bailout Due to Bad Debts
----------------------------------------------------------------
Charlie Weston at Irish Independent reports that Charleville
Credit Union has had to be given access to EUR4.3 million from a
bailout fund after a spike in bad debt provisions.

According to Irish Independent, the credit union has been provided
with the guarantee, with the money to be given to it if some of
its loans are not recovered within two years.

Irish Independent says a deficit of EUR5.5 million was recorded
after the union was forced to put aside extra provisions for bad
debts, due to the severe drop in the value of properties which
loans were secured against.

The guarantee was provided out of the EUR125 million savings
protection scheme (SPS) run by the Irish League of Credit Unions,
Irish Independent notes.

Charleville Credit Union Ltd. is based in Co Cork.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCO POPOLARE: Mulls Sale of Two Units for EUR3 Billion
--------------------------------------------------------
Alessandra Migliaccio at Bloomberg News, citing MF, reports that
Banco Popolare SC may sell units Credito Bergamasco and Cassa di
Risparmio di Lucca, Pisa e Livorno for around EUR3 billion.

According to Bloomberg, MF reported the bank is also considering a
EUR2 billion capital increase as an alternative to asset sales.

Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa is an Italy-based banking
company.  It offers a range of banking products and services,
including current and savings accounts, online banking, telephone
banking, investments, mutual funds, financial advice, credit and
debit cards and insurance.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 30,
2010, Moody's Investor Services changed the outlook to negative
from stable on the A2 long-term deposit rating and on the Prime-1
short-term deposit rating of Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa
and has downgraded the bank financial strength rating to D+ from
C- (which now translates to a Baa3 on the long-term rating scale).

Moody's commented that the downgrade and the negative outlook on
the deposit ratings of Banco Popolare reflect the significant
challenges that it faces.  Against an operating environment that
has become less accommodating for most Italian banks, Banco
Popolare needs to finalize the restructuring and integration of
its acquisitions, while at the same time it needs to establish a
profitable, well capitalized business model.  The obstacles it
faces towards this are significant: it has low capital levels, and
its internal capital generation is constrained by its low
profitability, whereas external capital raising in the market is
difficult with the company's corporate structure.  Disposal of
non-core assets could strengthen capital levels, but further
impact the bank's ability to generate sustainable profit and
weaken its franchise, according to Moody's.

While the bank is continuing to take measures aimed at de-risking
its operations and improving profitability, efficiency and
capital, Moody's believes that the achievement of these goals
however remains a significant challenge, and that further downward
rating pressure cannot be excluded if no visible progress is made.

Moody's said any lack of improvement in the bank's financial
profile, and a failure to reach a Core Tier 1 ratio above 7% in a
short timeframe in particular, could prompt Banco Popolare's BFSR
to become more weakly positioned in the D+ category, or even
result in a further lowering of the BFSR itself.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


* KAZAKHSTAN: S&P Says Banks May Write Off Up to 15% of Loans
-------------------------------------------------------------
Nariman Gizitdinov at Bloomberg News reports that Standard &
Poor's said Kazakh banks may have to write off 10% to 15% of loans
after four of the former Soviet republic's lenders defaulted last
year.

"We expect the loan portfolio to fall by about 10 percent in the
next 12 months if banks proceed with adequate write-offs,"
Ekaterina Trofimova, a Paris-based S&P bank analyst, said in an
interview in Almaty on Tuesday.  "If write-offs are minimal, as in
the last two years, then total gross loans could grow by about 10
percent in the next 12 months."

"Write-offs may be higher than 15 percent if the quality of
potentially recoverable loans decreases," Ms. Trofimova said,
according to Bloomberg.

Bloomberg relates the Agency for Financial Supervision said on its
website on Sept. 24, citing preliminary data, Kazakhstan's 38
banks reported that loans overdue by more than 90 days reached
KZT2.34 trillion (US$15.9 billion) in the year through August.
Bloomberg notes the regulator said total assets declined an annual
1.2% in the period to KZT11.97 trillion, while total loans slumped
10.3% to KZT9.12 trillion.

According to Bloomberg, the agency said the share of "hopeless"
loans on banks' books was 23.6% as of Sept. 1, while
"questionable" loans accounted for 50.7% of the total and
"standard" loans for 25.7%.  Bloomberg discloses the agency said
excluding BTA Bank, Alliance Bank and Temirbank, which all
defaulted last year, the share of bad loans was 10.3%.


===========
L A T V I A
===========


LIDO: Submits Request for Bankruptcy Protection
-----------------------------------------------
The Baltic Times, citing Nozare.lv, reports that Lido has
submitted a request for legal protection to protect the interests
of its creditors, employees and clients.

The report says the program for the out-of-court remedy process
will ensure meeting liabilities of the company.

Lido continues to operate, as the request does not change the
company's flow of its daily functions, the report notes.

Lido is a Latvian catering, restaurant and leisure company.


=============
M O L D O V A
=============


EVENTIS TELECOM: Fails to Attract Buyers
----------------------------------------
A tender to find a buyer for Moldova-based Eventis Telecom has
failed to attract a single bid despite interest from Deutsche
Telekom, Telecom Italia and Vimpelcom, TeleGeography reports
citing Russian daily newspaper Kommersant.

TeleGeography says the company's asking price was MDL113.5 million
(USD10 million).

Eventis Mobile, which at its peak managed to secure just 1% of the
Moldovan subscriber base, was declared insolvent by a Chisinau
court in March this year with debts of USD7.5 million.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


KPNQWEST NV: Administrators Sue Qwest & KPN Over 2002 Bankruptcy
----------------------------------------------------------------
Martijn van der Starre at Bloomberg News reports that Qwest
Communications International Inc., Royal KPN NV and 12 executives
were sued by KPNQwest NV's administrators over the company's 2002
bankruptcy and EUR4.2 billion (US$5.7 billion) of unpaid debt.

Bloomberg relates KPNQwest's court appointed administrators at law
firm Houthoff Buruma on Wednesday said in an e-mailed statement
that the defendants have to appear Jan. 19 in a district court in
the Dutch city of Haarlem.  Bloomberg notes they said the
administrators hold the companies and executives responsible for
the bankruptcy.

"An investigation by the administrators shows that the bankruptcy
was caused by mismanagement and inadequate supervision," the
administrators said, according to Bloomberg.

KPNQwest was declared bankrupt in 2002 after building a 60-city
phone and Internet network just before prices for
telecommunications services collapsed, Bloomberg recounts.

The administrators, as cited by Bloomberg, said the company didn't
change strategy and tripled its investments in the network, even
though market prices had fallen by as much as 80% by 1999, the
year KPNQwest was founded.

According to Bloomberg, Stefan Simons, a spokesman for KPN, said
the company is reviewing the subpoena.

KPNQwest NV is a joint venture of Royal KPN NV and Qwest
Communications International Inc.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


BANK OF MOSCOW: Fitch Puts 'D' Individual Rating on Negative Watch
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed the ratings of Bank of Moscow, including
its Long-term Issuer Default Rating of 'BBB-', on Rating Watch
Negative.  The rating actions follow the dismissal of the Mayor of
Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, by President Dmitry Medvedev.  A full list
of rating actions is provided at the end of this commentary.

The RWNs on the Issuer Default and Support ratings reflect Fitch's
view that there is a risk of deterioration in the relationship
between the bank and the city following the appointment of THE new
mayor and city government.  This view takes into account the close
association between the bank and the outgoing city administration,
the significant volumes of business between the bank and entities
closely associated with the current city authorities and the
apparently quite confrontational nature of the change of power in
the city.

At the same time, BOM's Long-term IDR has been maintained at its
current 'BBB-' level, reflecting Fitch's current base case
expectation that the city will remain supportive of the bank.
This takes into account the city's majority ownership (it owns
46.48% of BOM directly and controls a further 17.32% through
Stolichnaya Insurance Group), the historical ties between the bank
and the city (including BOM's participation in various city
programs, eg. funding of municipal infrastructure projects and
residential construction under the city's orders; participation in
THE city's SME and social support programs; it is also one of the
four banks authorized to hold city deposits), its leading market
position (fifth largest bank in Russia, with a 4% market share in
retail deposits in Moscow) and the fact that it bears the city's
name.

The Long-term IDR will be affirmed if the new city authorities
express their commitment to support the bank and if any weakening
of the bank's standalone profile following the change of mayor
turns out to be manageable.  However, the rating could be
downgraded if the incoming city authorities' support stance
towards the bank is considerably weaker than that of their
predecessors.

The RWN on the 'D' Individual rating reflects significant and
increased exposure to companies which are closely associated with
the outgoing city administration, or which have up until now
benefited from the support of the city and/or whose viability may
depend at least to some extent on the city's backing (there are
several such entities within the largest 20 credit exposures).
Should the financial positions of these obligors be impacted by
the change in the city administration, this may have negative
implications for the bank's asset quality and could lead to a
downgrade of the Individual rating.  However, all of these
exposures have hard collateral behind them, which mitigates credit
risks to some extent.

The RWN on the Individual rating also considers potential calls on
BOM's liquidity following the high profile dismissal of the mayor,
should some creditors seek to reduce their exposure to the bank.
As a mitigating factor, however, Fitch considers the bank's solid
liquidity buffer (comprising cash, net interbank placements and
securities eligible for refinancing with the central bank) of
about US$6.3 billion at September 28, 2010, although this was
partially enhanced by city funding (US$3.2 billion or 13% of
liabilities).  The available liquidity could cover 33% of customer
funding.  However, Fitch notes that the bank's funding base is
rather concentrated with the top five corporate depositors
(including a large foreign entity) accounting for US$5.0 billion
or 20% of liabilities.  Fitch has been informed that some of these
deposits are long-term.  The capital position of the bank has been
strengthened following a RUB21.7 billion equity injection in July
2010, in which the city participated, and the regulatory capital
ratio stood at a solid 18.3% at end-August 2010.  Reserve coverage
of the loan book was moderate, at 8.8%, but could have been
increased to about 18% before the capital ratio would have fallen
to the regulatory 10% minimum.  Reported NPLs (loans overdue by 90
days or more) were a modest 3.1% at end-H110, but this should be
considered in light of some loan restructuring, some loans with
bullet principal repayments and the hitherto support of some of
the bank's borrowers by the city government.

The rating actions are:

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'BBB-' placed on RWN
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: 'F3' placed on RWN
  -- National Long-term rating: 'AA+(rus)' placed on RWN
  -- Support rating: '2' placed on RWN
  -- Individual rating: 'D' placed on RWN
  -- Senior unsecured debt: 'BBB-'/'AA+(rus)' placed on RWN
  -- Subordinated debt: 'BB+' placed on RWN


=========
S P A I N
=========


CAIXA PENEDES: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class Notes at 'BBsf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed cash flow securitization CAIXA PENEDES
FTGENCAT 1 TDA, FTA:

  -- EUR117,876,030 Class A1: at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable; Loss
     Severity Rating is 'LS-2'

  -- EUR130,840,109 Class A2 (CA): at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable;
     removed Loss Severity Rating 'LS-2'

  -- EUR92,900,000 Class B: at 'A-sf', Outlook Stable; Loss
     Severity Rating is 'LS-3'

  -- EUR41,600,000 Class C: at 'BBsf', Outlook Stable; Loss
     Severity Rating is 'LS-3'

The review was driven by the downgrade of Catalonia, the
guarantor, to 'A' from 'A+', on September 17, 2010.

The affirmation of the transactions reflects the relatively low
delinquencies and high prepayments over the last 12 months.  The
credit enhancement now stands at 11.2% for the junior notes and
46.3% for the senior notes, compared with 8.3% and 34.4%
respectively, a year ago.  The reserve fund remains fully funded
at EUR42.7 million.

The affirmation for the guaranteed tranche Class A2 (CA) reflects
the high level of credit enhancement available which allows the
tranche to support a rating in excess of the guarantor's
creditworthiness.  Fitch does not assign LS ratings on guaranteed
tranches, hence the 'LS-2' rating for the Class A2 (CA) has been
removed.

This transaction is a cash flow securitization of a static pool of
2,148 secured and unsecured loans granted by Caixa d'Estalvis del
Penedes to small and medium- sized enterprises in Spain.  The
issuer is legally represented and managed by Titulizacion de
Activos S.G.F.T., S.A., a limited liability company incorporated
under Spanish law, the activities of which are limited to the
management of securitization funds.

The transaction remains concentrated by industry with real estate
and building and construction, accounting for more than 40% and
Catalonia region accounts for almost all the loans underlying the
cash flow securitization.  However, the LTV is currently 55% and
the level of mortgage collateral now amounts to 98% of the loan
balance.

The Issuer Report Grade remains at 'Three Stars' to reflect its
satisfactory investor reporting.  Fitch notes that the investor
reports provide on a monthly basis many details regarding the key
features of the deal and its structure alongside key portfolio
stratification relevant to Fitch's concentration analysis.
However, the reports lack information such as triggers for
counterparties involved in the transaction.


CAJA DE AHORROS: Fitch Upgrades Individual Rating to 'E'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Caja de Ahorros de Asturias' Long-
term Issuer Default Rating to 'A- from 'A' and Short-term IDR to
'F2' from 'F1', reflecting integration risks and a deterioration
of the group's funding and liquidity profile as well as capital
ratios following completion of the acquisition of the retail
banking activities of Caja de Ahorros de Castilla-La Mancha.  The
acquisition has been made through Cajastur's existing bank
subsidiary Banco Liberta, SA, now renamed Banco de Castilla-La
Mancha.  The agency has simultaneously upgraded and withdrawn
various of CCM's ratings and assigned ratings to Banco CCM based
on support from its parent.

At the same time, based on the high probability of their
integration plans to form a cross-guarantee banking group, Fitch
has placed Cajastur's and Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de
Extremadura's Long-term IDRs and Individual Ratings on Rating
Watch Negative and Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo's Long-term
IDR on Rating Watch Evolving, largely to reflect integration and
execution risks as well as funding, liquidity and capital
pressures faced by the resulting entity amid the difficult
operating environment in Spain and ongoing challenges to access
the wholesale markets for many Spanish issuers.  These banks'
Short-term IDRs have been placed on RWN for the same reasons.  A
full list of rating actions is detailed at the end of this
announcement.

Banco CCM, which is 75%-owned by Cajastur and 25%-owned by CCM,
now transformed into a foundation, is the acquirer of the bulk of
CCM's retail banking assets and liabilities.  The IDRs and debt
ratings assigned to Banco CCM are based on the high probability of
support from Cajastur as the majority shareholder as expressed in
Banco CCM's Support rating of '2'.  Banco CCM assumes unsecured
senior, lower and upper tier 2 subordinated liabilities of CCM, as
well as liabilities linked to CCM's multi-issuer covered bonds.
CCM's high risk unlisted equity investment portfolio, some related
loans and the pool of foreclosed real estate assets have been left
outside the transaction.

The RWE on Banco CCM's Long-term IDR should be seen in the context
of the potential four-cajas integration plan.  If the integration
plan does not go ahead, Banco CCM's Long-term IDR could be aligned
to that of Cajastur in the short-to-medium term as it becomes more
integrated into the group.  However, if the four-cajas integration
plan succeeds and once more details become available, Banco CCM's
IDRs will be re-assessed based on the final IDRs of the new group
and its support made available to Banco CCM.

Fitch placed CCM on Rating Watch Positive, when it was the subject
of regulatory intervention by the Bank of Spain on March 29, 2009,
due to asset quality, solvency and liquidity issues.  Following
the acquisition, CCM's IDRs and Support ratings have been upgraded
based on support from Cajastur and, along with its Individual
rating, have been simultaneously withdrawn given that CCM has
ceased to exist as a financial institution.  CCM's debt ratings
have also been upgraded and are now listed under Banco CCM, their
obligor.  The rating of CCM's EUR1.3 billion preference shares
(entirely subscribed by the savings banks' deposit guarantee fund
- DGF) has been withdrawn following full amortization.

The downgrade of Cajastur's IDRs reflect risks from integrating a
much larger entity (EUR24bn of asset at CCM versus EUR15 billion
at Cajastur end-H110) with a highly-leveraged balance sheet,
sizable exposure to the real estate and construction sectors and
significant wholesale funding dependence.

Fitch takes comfort from Cajastur's good management to take on
this transaction, geographic diversification brought by CCM,
potential cost and revenue synergies, and, most notably, a large
asset protection scheme of EUR2.5 billion provided by the cajas'
deposit guarantee fund over 38% of CCM's earmarked credit risk
exposures, in addition to large loan impairment reserves built so
far at CCM.

Despite the presence of the APS, Cajastur will continue to be
challenged to manage credit risks derived from the group's
significant exposure to the real estate and construction sectors
(excluding loans covered by the APS, lending exposure to these
sectors equated roughly 20% of total loans at end-H110, which is
below the sector average) and single-name risk concentration from
combined equity/credit risks.  Its impaired/total loans ratio was
around 2.4% at end-H110, excluding loans covered by the APS.

Also, Cajastur's leverage and liquidity position are negatively
affected by the integration of CCM (net of APS funds and loan
impairment reserves, loans/deposits ratio was around 140% at end-
H110), but its potential to use the hitherto limited ECB-
discounting and state-guaranteed debt facilities partly mitigate
concerns.  Cajastur's capital ratios are also affected by the
acquisition (tier 1 capital ratio declined to around 8.3% at end-
H110 from 12.7% at end-2009), but still remain sound and benefit
from the presence of the APS.

The Rating Watches on Cajastur, CAM and Caja Extremadura reflect
the high probability of the four-cajas integration, following the
approval by their respective General Assemblies and that of Caja
de Ahorros de Santander y Cantabria to form a banking group with
formal cross-guarantee mechanisms via an Institutional Protection
Scheme.  The SIP contract will comprise a legally-binding cross-
guarantee mechanism encompassing solvency, liquidity and earnings.

Fitch will resolve the Rating Watches once the SIP is established,
all approvals are received and further integration details become
available, which are anticipated by year-end 2010.  The agency
expects to align the IDRs and Individual ratings of CAM, Cajastur
and Caja Extremadura upon SIP completion.  Should the process not
take place, Fitch will review each member caja as a separate
entity.

The resulting group will create Spain's third-largest banking
group within the cajas sector and, as such, increase the
likelihood of state support, in case of need.  This is reflected
in the RWP on the respective cajas' Support ratings and Support
Rating Floors.  An upgrade of the Support ratings of these banks
to '2' would mean a minimum Support Rating Floor (and, hence,
Long-term IDR) of 'BBB-' for these entities and the resulting
group.

Fitch views positively the creation of a more diversified and
larger group.  It also recognizes that the integration could help
realize revenue and cost synergies from staff and branch
restructuring to support future performance and internal capital
generation.  However, the agency also notes that the new group
will continue to have exposure to the real estate/construction
sectors (roughly 25% of aggregate total loans), asset quality
pressures and wholesale funding reliance.

Some comfort is provided by the fact that debt maturities appear
manageable as the group deleverages and as liquidity is received
from the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring, as well as from the
cajas' deposit guarantee fund through the APS protection afforded
to Cajastur linked to its acquisition of most of the assets and
liabilities of CCM.  In addition, the group will have around 9% of
total assets in unencumbered ECB-eligible assets at the outset, on
an aggregate basis and potential to issue state-guaranteed issues
to end-December 2010.

The SIP will seek EUR1,493 million in temporary capital support
from FROB in preference shares convertible into shares, which
qualify as regulatory tier 1 capital.  Additionally, positive
revaluation reserves on investments and fixed assets will also
feed into the consolidated entity's core capital.  The new group
expects to generate earnings to return FROB funds within a five-
year time-frame.

While restructuring costs will be gradually absorbed through the
profit and loss statement, FROB funds will enable the new entity
to anticipate potential impairments of the loan book against
equity, thus reducing future loan impairment charges.

The SIP will have EUR131bn of total assets and roughly EUR6.5bn of
equity, and a market share of deposits of around 5% in Spain.
CAM, Cajastur (including Banco CCM) and Caja Extremadura were
Spain's 4th-, 8th- and 34th-largest cajas by end-2009 assets,
respectively.  These institutions are largely retail-focused in
Alicante, Asturias, Castilla-La Mancha and Extremadura.  However,
the new banking group will also have a sound national franchise
due to a widespread branch network.

The rating actions are:

CAM:

  -- Long-term IDR: 'BBB+', placed on RWE
  -- Short-term IDR: 'F2', placed on RWN
  -- Individual rating: 'C', placed on RWE
  -- Support rating: '3', placed on RWP
  -- Support Rating Floor: 'BB+', placed on RWP
  -- Senior Unsecured Debt: 'BBB+', placed on RWE
  -- Subordinated debt: 'BBB', placed on RWE
  -- Upper tier 2 subordinated debt: 'BBB-', placed on RWE
  -- Preference shares: 'BB', placed on RWE
  -- State-guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'AA+'

Cajastur:

  -- Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A-' from 'A', placed on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1', placed on RWN
  -- Individual rating: 'B/C', placed on RWN
  -- Support rating: '3', placed on RWP
  -- Support Rating Floor: 'BB+' placed on RWP
  -- State-guaranteed debt: affirmed at 'AA+'

Banco de Castilla-La Mancha:

  -- Long-term IDR: rated 'BBB+', placed on RWE
  -- Short-term IDR: rated 'F2' placed on RWN
  -- Support rating: rated '2'
  -- Senior unsecured debt: 'BBB+', placed on RWE
  -- Lower Tier 2 subordinated debt: 'BBB' placed on RWE
  -- Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt: 'BBB-' placed on RWE

Caja de Ahorros de Castilla-La Mancha:

  -- Long-term IDR: upgraded to 'BBB+' from 'BB+'; removed from
     RWP; withdrawn

  -- Short-term IDR: upgraded to 'F2' from 'B'; removed from RWP;
     withdrawn

  -- Individual rating: upgraded to 'E' from 'F'; withdrawn

  -- Support rating: upgraded to '2' from '3'; removed from RWP;
     withdrawn

  -- Support Rating Floor: 'BB+'; removed from RWP; withdrawn

  -- Senior unsecured debt: upgraded to 'BBB+' from 'BB+'; revised
     to RWE from RWP; transferred to Banco CCM

  -- Lower Tier 2 subordinated debt: upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BB';
     revised to RWE from RWP; transferred to Banco CCM

  -- Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt: upgraded to 'BBB-' from
     'CCC/RR4'; placed on RWE; transferred to Banco CCM

  -- Preferred stock: affirmed at 'CC/RR5'; withdrawn

Caja Extremadura:

  -- Long-term IDR: 'A-', placed on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR: 'F2', placed on RWN
  -- Individual rating: 'B/C', placed on RWN
  -- Support rating: '3', placed on RWP
  -- Support Rating Floor: 'BB+', placed on RWP

The impact, if any, from the rating action, on Cajastur's covered
bonds will be detailed in a separate comment.


FONCAIXA FTGENCAT: Fitch Affirms 'Ccsf' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Foncaixa FTGENCAT 3 FTA and Foncaixa
FTGENCAT 3 and 4 FTA notes:

Foncaixa FTGENCAT 3 FTA:

  -- EUR226,993,414 class A(G) notes (ISIN ES0337937017): affirmed
     at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- EUR10,700,000 class B notes (ISIN ES0337937025): affirmed at
     'Asf'; Outlook Stable'; Loss Severity Rating is 'LS-3'

  -- EUR7,800,000 class C notes (ISIN ES0337937033): affirmed at
     'BBsf; Outlook Stable'; Loss Severity Rating is 'LS-3'

  -- EUR6,500,000 class D notes (ISIN ES0337937041): affirmed at
     'Bsf'; Outlook Negative; Loss Severity Rating is 'LS-3'

  -- EUR6,500,000 class E notes (ISIN ES0337937058): affirmed at
     'CCsf'; assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR1'

Foncaixa FTGENCAT 4 FTA

  -- EUR262,554,923 Series A(G) notes (ISIN ES0338013016):
     affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable

  -- EUR9,600,000 Series B notes (ISIN ES0338013024): affirmed at
     'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable; Loss Severity Rating is 'LS-4'

  -- EUR7,200,000 Series C notes (ISIN ES0338013032): affirmed at
     'BBsf'; Outlook Negative; Loss Severity Rating is 'LS-4'

  -- EUR6,000,000 Series D notes (ISIN ES0338013040): affirmed at
     'Bsf'; Outlook Negative; Loss Severity Rating is 'LS-4'

  -- EUR6,000,000 Series E notes (ISIN ES0338013057): affirmed at
     'CCsf' ; assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR2'

The review is driven by the downgrade of Catalonia -- the
guarantor of certain notes of the transaction -- to 'A' from 'A+'
on September 17, 2010.  The affirmation for the guaranteed
tranches reflects the sufficient level of protection available
which allows them to support a rating above the guarantor's
creditworthiness.

In these transaction Caja de Ahorros y Pensiones de Barcelona (La
Caixa) serves as account bank holding the reserve fund, servicer,
swap CP and paying agent.

La Caixa was downgraded on September 20, 2010 to 'A+'/'F1' from
'AA-'/'F1+' although this is not in breach of any of the rating
triggers in the transactions and is consistent with the agency's
counterparty criteria.

The affirmation Foncaixa FTGENCAT 3 FTA reflects the low levels of
delinquencies and defaults coupled with a fully funded reserve
fund that has not stepped down since closing.  Delinquencies over
90 days stand at 1.4% (over 180 days delinquencies being 0.4%) and
the default rate is 1.5% of the current pool.  Also, the
sequential de-leveraging of the transaction has more than doubled
the credit enhancement for all the tranches.

Similar to Foncaixa FTGENCAT 3 FTA, the Series 4 saw low levels of
delinquencies and defaults, with 0.7% of the pool more than 90
days delinquent (0.4% over 180 days) and another 0.7% defaulted.
The reasons for the lower ratings on the senior tranches compared
with Series 3 and the additional Negative Outlook for the Class C
are the under-funded reserve fund, standing at 94% of its minimum
required amount, and the fact that the positive effect of de-
leveraging is slightly more limited than in Foncaixa 3 which has
the benefit of an additional year of amortization.

The transactions represents cash flow securitizations of a static
portfolio of loans to small- and medium-sized Spanish enterprises
granted by Caja de Ahorros y Pensiones de Barcelona (La Caixa,
rated 'A+'/Stable/'F1').

Foncaixa FTGENCAT 3 and Foncaixa FTGENCAT 4 are special-purpose
vehicle incorporated under the laws of Spain with limited
liability.  Their sole purpose is to acquire the portfolio of
loans as collateral for the issuance of fixed-income securities.
The assets of Foncaixa FTGENCAT 3 and Foncaixa FTGENCAT 4 were
acquired on its behalf by GestiCaixa S.G.F.T., S.A., a special-
purpose management company with limited liability and incorporated
under the laws of Spain.

An Issuer Report Grade of 'Two Stars' has been assigned to both
transactions to reflect basic reporting.  Despite reporting on a
monthly basis and containing consistent relevant information, and
key drivers for the credit analysis, the reports lack counterparty
details and triggers as well as loan to value calculations.


FONDO DE TITULIZACION: S&P Puts Ratings on CreditWatch Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed on CreditWatch negative
its credit ratings on all classes of notes in Fondo de
Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 3 and Fondo de
Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 5, and the class A,
B, and C notes of Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander
Hipotecario 4.  At the same time, S&P lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' its
ratings on the class D and E notes in Santander Hipotecario 4.

S&P lowered its ratings on the class F notes in the three
transactions to 'D (sf)' in July 2009 after missed interest
payments.

S&P's credit analysis, which S&P based on the most recent
transaction information S&P has received, showed a continuous
deterioration in the performance of the underlying collateral.  In
S&P's view, this has increased the likelihood of negative rating
actions on the affected classes.

In particular, as of the last payment date for each transaction
(July 2010 for Santander Hipotecario 3 and 4, and August 2010 for
Santander Hipotecario 5), defaulted loans (defined as loans in
arrears for more than 18 months) were at 2.80%, 5.35%, and 2.76%
of the outstanding balance of assets for Santander Hipotecario 3,
4, and 5, respectively.  This compares with 2.08%, 3.81%, and
0.19% on the previous payment dates (April 2010 for Santander
Hipotecario 3 and 4, and May 2010 for Santander Hipotecario 5).

This, together with the lack of reserve fund amounts since October
2008 for Santander Hipotecario 3 and 4, and since August 2009 for
Santander Hipotecario 5, has generated an increase in principal
deficiency amounts.  This reflects the continuous weakening of the
most senior notes' credit enhancement, if S&P take into account
the short seasoning of the transactions (Santander Hipotecario 3
and 4 were issued in April and October 2007, and Santander
Hipotecario 5 in November 2008).  In particular, the level of
principal deficiency over the outstanding balance of the class B
to E notes has increased to 65.62%, 115.3%, and 23.50%,
respectively, on the latest payment date for each transaction.

Moreover, when the percentage of cumulative defaulted loans over
the original balance of the class A to E notes in these
securitizations reaches a certain level, the priority of payments
changes so as to postpone interest payments to the related class
of notes and divert these funds to amortize the most senior class
of notes.  Specifically:

* For Santander Hipotecario 3, the trigger levels for the class B,
  C, D, and E notes are 14%, 11%, 7%, and 6%, respectively.

* For Santander Hipotecario 4, the trigger levels for the class B,
  C, D, and E notes are 15.7%, 12.0%, 8.0%, and 7.7%,
  respectively.

* For Santander Hipotecario 5, the trigger levels for the class B,
  C, D, and E notes are 21.5%, 16.5%, 11.5%, and 9.0%,
  respectively.

As of the last payment date for each transaction, the ratio of
cumulative defaults over the original balance was 3.68%, 6.42%,
and 2.75% for Santander Hipotecario 3, 4, and 5, respectively, up
from 1.68%, 2.29%, and 0.00% a year before.  S&P believes that the
triggers in Santander Hipotecario 4 for the class D and E notes
may be reached in the near future, due to the proximity of these
two classes' triggers to the current level of cumulative defaults.
This has resulted in the downgrade of these two classes of notes.

The portfolios in these three transactions securitized mortgages
granted to individuals for the acquisition of residential
properties and with loan-to-value ratios higher than 80%.  Banco
Santander S.A. originated the loans.

                           Ratings List

     Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 3
            ?2.8 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate

              Ratings Placed On CreditWatch Negative

                                 Rating
                                 ------
            Class      To                      From
            -----      --                      ----
            A1         AA- (sf)/Watch Neg      AA- (sf)
            A2         AA- (sf)/Watch Neg      AA- (sf)
            A3         AA- (sf)/Watch Neg      AA- (sf)
            B          BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg      BB+ (sf)
            C          BB (sf)/Watch Neg       BB (sf)
            D          B (sf)/Watch Neg        B (sf)
            E          B- (sf)/Watch Neg       B- (sf)

                        Rating Unaffected

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        F          D (sf)

     Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 4
            ?1.23 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate

                         Ratings Lowered

                                 Rating
                                 ------
            Class      To                      From
            -----      --                      ----
            D          CCC- (sf)               B (sf)
            E          CCC- (sf)               B- (sf)

              Rating Placed On CreditWatch Negative

                                 Rating
                                 ------
            Class      To                      From
            -----      --                      ----
            A1         AA- (sf)/Watch Neg      AA- (sf)
            A2         AA- (sf)/Watch Neg      AA- (sf)
            A3         AA- (sf)/Watch Neg      AA- (sf)
            B          BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg      BB+ (sf)
            C          BB (sf)/Watch Neg       BB (sf)

                        Rating Unaffected

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        F          D (sf)

    Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 5
            ?1.4 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate

               Rating Placed On CreditWatch Negative


                                 Rating
                                 ------
            Class      To                      From
            -----      --                      ----
            A          AA (sf)/Watch Neg       AA (sf)
            B          A (sf)/Watch Neg        A (sf)
            C          BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg     BBB- (sf)
            D          BB (sf)/Watch Neg       BB (sf)
            E          B (sf)/Watch Neg        B (sf)

                        Rating Unaffected

                        Class      Rating
                        -----      ------
                        F          D (sf)


GC FTGENCAT: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Class D Notes at 'Csf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed collateralized debt obligation GC
FTGENCAT Caixa Sabadell 1, FTA's notes:

  -- EUR159,105,864 Class A(G): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook
     Negative

  -- EUR11,700,000 Class B: affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable';
     Loss Severity Rating is 'LS-4'

  -- EUR11,800,000 Class C: affirmed at 'CCsf'; assigned a
     Recovery Rating of 'RR2'

  -- EUR4,500,000 Class D: affirmed at 'Csf'; assigned a Recovery
     Rating of 'RR3'

The review for the transaction was driven by the downgrade of
Catalonia -- the guarantor of certain notes of the transaction --
to 'A' from 'A+' on September 17, 2010.

The affirmation reflects the increasing levels of credit
enhancement, the high recovery rate of 70% and a reserve fund
which is 98% of its minimum required amount.  The guaranteed
tranche Class A(G) now supports a rating above the guarantor's
creditworthiness.  Fitch believes that the Class A(G)'s 15.3%
credit enhancement provides sufficient protection against the
agency's expectation of portfolio losses.

However, the Class A(G)'s Outlook Negative reflects the high
default and delinquency volatility which nearly exhausted the
reserve fund in January 2010 as defaults peaked in August 2009.

GC FTGENCAT Caixa Sabadell 1, FTA is a securitization of a pool
which at closing amounted to EUR300 million and consisted of 1,344
secured and unsecured loans granted to SMEs originated by Caixa
Sabadell (now Caixa d'Estalvis Unio de Caixes Manlleu, Sabadell I
Terrassa, rated 'BBB-'/ Stable/'F3' as of July 2, 2010).  The
collateral is 100% concentrated in the region of Catalonia.  The
transaction closed in October 2006.

The transaction is backed about 85% backed by mortgage collateral,
mitigating the industry concentration in building and materials
(41%) and the regional concentration in Catalonia.

An Issuer Report Grade of 'Two Stars' has been assigned to the
transaction to reflect basic reporting.  Despite being delivered
on a monthly basis and containing consistent relevant information
and key drivers for the credit analysis the report lack
counterparty details and triggers as well as loan to value
calculations.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


RODOVID BANK: Seeks UAH5.8 Billion Additional Capital From Ukraine
------------------------------------------------------------------
Daryna Krasnolutska at Bloomberg News reports that Interfax news
service, citing a regulator's statement, said Ukraine's central
bank is asking the government to put an additional UAH5.8 billion
(US$730,368) into the statutory capital of PAT Rodovid Bank.

Bloomberg relates the government bailed out Rodovid in July 2009.
The central bank this month extended its temporary management of
Rodovid through Dec. 15, Bloomberg discloses.

Rodovid Bank is based in Kiev.  The net assets of the bank were
estimated at UAH16,952.2 million as of January 1, 2010, the
credits and debts of clients were valued at UAH5,355.5 million,
and the equity of shareholders was estimated at UAH4,336.4
million, according to Ukrainian News Agency.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


A1 PAPER: 41 Jobs Cut as Firm Goes Into Administration
------------------------------------------------------
A1 Paper has made 41 jobs redundant as it goes into administrative
receivership, Express & Star reports.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on
September 28, 2010, printweek.com said that A1 Paper has gone into
appointed insolvency practitioners Grant Thornton to the company.
The report related that administrators Jeremy Birch and David
Bennett were appointed to the company on September 8, 2010.
According to printweek.com, a statement on the company's Web site
said that the "affairs, business and property of A1 Paper" were
being handled by the administrators.

According to Express & Star, the firm is struggling to get credit
with suppliers.  The report notes that the business had a turnover
of almost GBP10 million for the year ending December 31, 2008.
However, the report relates, a fall in demand caused by increasing
reliance on email and global factors affecting the price and
availability of paper was blamed for the collapse.

The company said they were left with no option but to make staff
redundant, Express & Star discloses.  A skeleton staff of five
still employed at the site will also go once work there is
complete, the report adds.

                        About A1 Paper

Headquartered in Roebuck Street, Paper merchant A1 Paper is an
independent business that was formed 40 years ago.  The company is
a member of the Associated Independent Merchant Stockists (AIMS).


BRITISH AIRWAYS: Inks Transatlantic Revenue-Sharing Agreement
-------------------------------------------------------------
John O'Doherty at The Financial Times report that the long-awaited
revenue-sharing agreement between British Airways, Iberia and
American Airlines could begin as early as next week, after BA
disclosed on Wednesday that the final agreement to begin the
venture had now been signed.

According to the FT, under the terms of the agreement, a share of
the revenue from a transatlantic flight booked by one of the three
carriers will redound to that carrier, even if the flight is not
ultimately operated by that carrier.

The three airlines estimate the combined value of their
transatlantic business is worth US$7 billion (GBP4.4 billion) in
annual revenues, the FT discloses.

The FT says the revenue sharing will begin in October, although
British Airways declined to specify the exact date.

                      About British Airways

Headquartered in Harmondsworth, England, British Airways Plc,
along with its subsidiaries, (LON:BAY) -- http://www.ba.com/-- is
engaged in the operation of international and domestic scheduled
air services for the carriage of passengers, freight and mail and
the provision of ancillary services.  The Company's principal
place of business is Heathrow.  It also operates a worldwide air
cargo business, in conjunction with its scheduled passenger
services.  The Company operates international scheduled airline
route networks together with its codeshare and franchise partners,
and flies to more than 300 destinations worldwide.  During the
fiscal year ended March 31, 2009 (fiscal 2009), the Company
carried more than 33 million passengers.  It carried 777,000 tons
of cargo to destinations in Europe, the Americas and throughout
the world.  In July 2008, the Company's subsidiary, BA European
Limited (trading as OpenSkies), acquired the French airline,
L'Avion.

                           *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 19,
2010, Moody's Investors Service lowered to B1 from Ba3 the
Corporate Family and Probability of Default Ratings of British
Airways plc; and the senior unsecured and subordinate ratings to
B2 and B3, respectively.  Moody's said the outlook is stable.
This concludes the review that was initiated on November 10, 2009.
The rating action reflects Moody's view that credit metrics will
not be commensurate with the previous rating category in the
medium term.  Moody's expect furthermore that metrics will be
burdened in the foreseeable future by the company's significant
pension deficit, which was at GBP2.6 billion for the APS and NAPS
schemes combined as of September 2009 (under IAS).  Moody's
nevertheless understand that under the current agreement with the
trade unions, the cash contributions to these deficits will be
frozen at GBP330 million per year for three years, subject to
approval by the Pensions Regulator and the trustees.


CONNAUGHT PLC: Lovell Secures Agreements With 42 Clients
--------------------------------------------------------
Forty-two housing associations and local authorities have so far
agreed to transfer contracts previously held with Connaught PLC to
Lovell, Inside Housing reports.

According to the report, Lovell paid GBP28 million for the right
to discuss the transfer of an estimated 100 Connaught PLC
contracts, after the contractor called in the administrators
earlier this month.  The report relates that initial indications
suggested Lovell would struggle to persuade clients to transfer
their contracts, with some citing concerns over procurement law.
A week after Lovell agreed the deal it had yet to take over any
contracts, the report notes.

However, Inside Housing says, Lovell has now said "agreements in
principle" have been secured with 42 former Connaught PLC clients,
with more expected to follow this week.

                        About Connaught plc

Connaught plc -- http://www.connaught.plc.uk/-- is a United
Kingdom-based company engaged in the provision of integrated asset
services to the public and private sectors.  The Company operates
in two business segments: social housing and compliance.  Social
Housing segment provide social housing landlords throughout the
United Kingdom with a range of planned and response maintenance
services, as well as compliance and estate management.  The
Compliance segment provides safety, health and risk management
solutions.  It has information, advisory, training and servicing
capabilities to provide integrated compliance solution throughout
the United Kingdom.  On July 22, 2009, the Company completed the
acquisition of UK Fire (International) Limited and Igrox Limited.
On September 15, 2008, the Company completed the acquisition of
Lowe Group Holdings Ltd.  On November 26, 2008, the Company
completed the acquisition of certain assets of Predator Pest
Control Plc.


DUNDEE FOOTBALL CLUB: Fans Should Bail Out Club, Melville Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
Aberdeen millionaire Calum Melville reportedly claimed that Dundee
Football Club fans should bail out the crisis-hit club, Evening
Express reports.

According to the report, Mr. Melville has ploughed GBP1.6 million
into the club in the last 18 months.

Mr. Melville, the report notes, claimed that club fans' groups
should also generate funds to save the club.  The report relates
that the club face plunging into administration after being hit
with an outstanding tax bill for GBP365,000.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
September 29, 2010, Mail Online said that Dundee Football Club
could be plunged into administration for the second time in just
seven years after it emerged they owe the taxman money.  According
to the report, the club has fallen behind in payments over the
last 19 months and has been hit by a demand for the balance to be
cleared immediately.  The report related Director Calum Melville
has revealed the club could call in the administrators within
weeks.

Evening Express notes that Jim Duffy, who was manager when Dundee
went into administration in 2003, said: "It is completely unfair
for [Mr.] Melville to ask the fans to bail the club out again.
Dundee is run by a board of directors, not the supporters, so why
should the fans have to answer for what goes on financially?"

Dundee Football Club -- http://www.thedees.co.uk/--  offers
companies opportunity to combine business with pleasure through
the first class facilities available at Dens Park.  It can provide
the vehicle for a company to entertain your customers and clients,
while enjoying the excitement of professional football at its
best.


DUNDEE FOOTBALL CLUB: Trying to Secure Rescue Package
-----------------------------------------------------
Robert Thomson at The Press and Journal reports that Dundee
Football Club is trying to piece together a rescue package to
stave off the threat of administration.  The report relates that
the club has enlisted the services of financial expert Blair Nimmo
to advise it on a way out of its money troubles.  Mr. Nimmo
believes alternatives to going into administration can be found,
the report says.

According to The Press and Journal, local businessmen pledged
GBP75,000 towards the club's outstanding tax bill of GBP365,000,
and it is hoped that if Aberdeen-based director Calum Melville
comes forward with a six-figure sum, a compromise deal may be
possible with HM Revenue and Customs.

The Press and Journal relates that tax officials have served the
club with notice that they want payment in full to cover a period
between January and April this year, when the club failed to pay a
PAYE and National Insurance bill.  The report relates that policy
in such circumstances is for HMRC to demand full payment but, with
the club owing GBP1.5million to directors Mr. Melville and Bob
Brannan and landlord John Bennett, hopes are growing that HMRC
will not force the club under.

The Press and Journal notes that administration would mean the
Treasury missing out on virtually all of the money it is due.

The club's hopes of escaping administration now hinge on whether
businessman Mr. Melville, who is thought to have spent in excess
of GBP1million trying to get the Dark Blues back to the Scottish
Premier League, is willing to part with more money, the report
relates.

The Press and Journal notes that Mr. Melville not without his own
problems as he attempted to resign from the club's board last
week, on the day of an employment tribunal involving former boss
Jocky Scott.

Dundee Football Club -- http://www.thedees.co.uk/-- offers
companies opportunity to combine business with pleasure through
the first class facilities available at Dens Park.  It can provide
the vehicle for a company to entertain your customers and clients,
while enjoying the excitement of professional football at its
best.


DUNDEE FOOTBALL CLUB: Fabrizio Ravanelli is Ready to Help Club
--------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Thomson at The Scotsman reports that former Dundee Football
Club striker Fabrizio Ravanelli pledged to dip into his own pocket
to help the club.  The report relates Mr. Ravanelli signed for
Dundee during the crazy days of Giovanni Di Stefano's reign in the
boardroom but only made five appearances before the club went into
administration with debts of GBP23 million.

According to The Scotsman, Mr. Ravanelli was one of 15 players
sacked by Dundee in 2003 and had to leave Scotland without the
money he'd been promised for the two-year deal signed just weeks
before.

However, The Scotsman notes, despite leaving in such sad
circumstances the Mr. Ravanelli is willing to do all he can to
help Dundee as they battle against going into administration for a
second time.

The Scotsman notes that the club appears to be winning the fight
to stave off calling in the administrators but, even if they
don't, Mr. Ravanelli is confident the club won't die and cites
Serie A side Fiorentina, who were relegated in 2006 after going
bust, as an example of what can happen.

Dundee Football Club -- http://www.thedees.co.uk/-- offers
companies opportunity to combine business with pleasure through
the first class facilities available at Dens Park.  It can provide
the vehicle for a company to entertain your customers and clients,
while enjoying the excitement of professional football at its
best.


EIRLES TWO: S&P Downgrades Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC-
(sf)' and subsequently withdrew its credit ratings on Eirles Two
Ltd.'s ?27.5 million variable-rate secured series 227 notes and
US$9 million class D variable-rate series 294 notes.

The downgrades to 'D (sf)' follow confirmation that losses from
credit events in the underlying portfolios exceeded the available
credit enhancement and the tranche notionals.  This means that on
the early termination date, the noteholders did not receive full
principal.  S&P subsequently withdrew the ratings assigned to
these notes, having recently received confirmation that the
transactions redeemed early.

These transactions are European synthetic high-grade structured
finance collateralized debt obligations.


FARQUHAR & JAMIESON: Goes Into Administration
---------------------------------------------
Ryan Taylor at The Shetland Times reports that attempts to find a
rescue package for ailing building firm Farquhar & Jamieson have
failed to bear fruit.  The report notes that the company has gone
out of business just days after six members of staff were paid
off.

According to The Shetland Times, hopes for the company's long-term
future had hinged on 11th-hour discussions last week.  However, on
September 24, 2010, chartered accountants Campbell Dallas of
Paisley were appointed provisional liquidators.

The Shetland Times notes that provisional liquidator Derek Forsyth
said it had emerged Farquhar & Jamieson was in no position to
continue trading.  The report relates that attempts would be made
to recover the company's assets to help pay back creditors.

"The background to this is the directors realized last week that
they were having financial difficulties, caused by the downturn in
the construction sector.  We had a meeting with them and it
emerged liquidation was the only way forward for them.  The
company had laid people off, but latterly there were between 16
and 20 people working for them ? a number of those being sub-
contractors," The Shetland Times quoted Mr. Forsyth as saying.

Mr. Forsyth, The Shetland Times notes, said that the company's
plight told a "very typical story" of how new business was
currently hard to come by in the building sector, adding that in
its latter stages the company only had one contract.  The downturn
in its operations was exacerbated by the prolonged winter which
caused delays, he added.

Mr. Forsyth said that he had been given a list of creditors he
urged anyone who thinks they may be owed money to contact his
office in Paisley, The Shetland Times adds.

South Mainland building firm Farquhar & Jamieson ????


MIDLAND STEEL: Placed in Administration; 45 Jobs Lost
-----------------------------------------------------
The Construction Index reports that Midland Steel Structures has
called in the administrators after a sharp fall in orders.

According to the report, the company sacked most of its workforce
-- 45 workers -- but has retained 15 workers to complete existing
contracts.

Insolvency specialist Poppleton and Appleby has been appointed to
run the business, and is currently in negotiations with the
company?s main clients, the Construction Index says.

The Construction Index relates administrator Andrew Turpin said
the company appears to have suffered a severe drop in orders due
to the downturn in the property market and public sector cuts
which have hit expected building programmes.

Founded in 1979, Midland Steel Structures is a Coventry-based
fabricator.


PASSIONATE PUB: Goes Into Liquidation as Lender Pulls Out Support
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Charity at the Morning Advertiser reports that Passionate Pub
Company has gone into liquidation after banker Royal Bank of
Scotland withdrew its support.

According to the Morning Advertiser, the firm said it had been
severely affected by the smoking ban, changes in the market with
the move towards food sales, and price competition from
supermarkets.

It is understood that the liquidator has returned six Enterprise
leases and a Mitchells & Butlers franchise, the Morning Advertiser
says.

"Trading has been difficult over the last three years and, despite
a successful turnaround working with our landlords and bank in
2008 to cut costs and concentrate on a smaller number of more
profitable pubs, the market has continued to drop, especially in
the sector within which we trade and in the northern geography," a
company spokesman told the Morning Advertiser.

"We sought support from our main landlords Enterprise Inns and
also Mitchells & Butlers to make for a workable plan," the
spokesman said.

"In our subsequent discussions we understood that provided the
bank?s position did not worsen, then an orderly wind down of the
business would be preferable as the fall-back.  However the bank
decided that it could not support that concept without immediate
"clear evidence" of an improving position. The directors felt they
were not in a position to give this evidence without the benefit
of evaluation of the assets, and regrettably the bank withdrew the
facility," the spokesman added, according to the Morning
Advertiser.

Passionate Pub Company operates 26 pubs across United Kingdom.


PUBFOLIO: Goes Into Administration Owing More Than GPB50 Million
----------------------------------------------------------------
Hamish Champ at The Publican reports that Pubfolio has gone into
administration owing its banks in excess of GBP50 million.  The
report relates that another smaller operator, Goldtry, has also
gone into administration, which it is being handled by accountants
PricewaterhouseCoopers.

According to The Publican, David Chubb, of PwC, said it would be
business as usual for the pubs while buyers were sought.  The
report relates that management of the sites had been handed over
to Pebble Management, headed by industry veteran Ted Kennedy.
"Pubfolio was unable to meet all of its financial commitments,"
the report quoted Mr. Chubb as saying, who confirmed there is no
rush to sell the pubs affected.  "If we get a blinding offer for
the pubs we will take it, otherwise we are in hurry to sell," he
added.

The Publican notes Mr. Chubb said that the group's bank, Anglo
Irish Bank, is content to look at all the options. "We don't have
to sell next week, or even next year. It wants the best outcome to
get back its money," the report quoted Mr. Chubb as saying.

The group's business model was to sell chunks of the estate to
property investment outfits, but with the collapse in the property
market three years ago, prices -- and the appetite of developers
-- faded away, The Publican says.

The Publican notes that its pubs have been fed onto the market in
recent years with varying degree of success; two years ago more
than 40 of Pubfolio's sites were remarketed at significantly lower
prices than previously in order to shift them.  The report relates
that observers said the group's pubs had been "slaughtered" by the
smoking ban, as well as rising utility costs, factors which led to
revenues across the estate falling by between 25 and 30% in recent
years.

Anglo Irish Bank, The Publican discloses, has had its own set of
financial troubles in recent months and is currently in the
process being wound up by the Irish government at a reported cost
of EUR25bn (FBP21.3 billion) over 15 years.  The report relates
that the move into administration means County Estate Management
will no longer manage the Pubfolio estate and now looks after
around 150 pubs.

                          About Pubfolio

Headquartered in Trowbridge, Pubfolio is a pub operator.  Pubfolio
established itself at the beginning of 2005 after completing on a
deal to buy 545 pubs of the old Innspired estate from Punch
Taverns for GBP162 million.


WHITEHAVEN RL CLUB: Taxman Files Petition to Wind Up Club
---------------------------------------------------------
Martin Morgan at News and Star reports that the taxman has
petitioned for a winding up order for Whitehaven Rugby League Club
over a GBP64,000 tax bill.

According to News and Star, club representatives were desperately
bidding to persuade HM Revenue & Customs to withdraw the petition,
but, if unsuccessful, Haven could face a costly court battle to
try to have it thrown out.  The report relates that the club was
thought to be protected from a petition -- the most serious action
that can be taken against a company -- as they were in
administration, although the picture is confused.

News and Star says Chairman Dick Raaz revealed that Haven was set
to go into administration within the following 10 days.  The
report says that the date was later revised and Mr. Raaz declared
the club would take the plunge on September 20, 2010, the day
after Haven's reserve-grade Grand Final success.

A notice of intent to go in to administration could also block the
HMRC move, and Mr. Raaz signed this document earlier this month,
in the presence of a lawyer, News and Star discloses.

Mr. Raaz, News and Star relates, is understood to have ploughed
over GBP100,000 in to the Recre without looking for a return.  But
the club still has a massive legacy debt of around GBP300,000, the
report relates.

"There's not a lot I can say at this point. We are just working to
resolve everything," the report quoted James Rogerson, of
prospective administrators RSM Tenon, as saying.

Meanwhile, News and Star relates that a probe into Copeland
Council's involvement in the club is to be undertaken by chief
executive Paul Walker.  The authority is financially exposed to
the tune of œ125,000 after standing as guarantor for a loan to the
club and for a bank overdraft facility, the report notes.  It will
find out in due course how much of that sum it stands to lose, it
adds.

"At [Monday's] internal overview and scrutiny committee, elected
members agreed to a recommendation that as chief executive, I
should consider the questions raised regarding the council's
involvement in Whitehaven RLFC, on behalf of the committee," News
and Star quoted Mr. Walker as saying.  "This is an important issue
for the authority, and therefore I will consider these questions
in full and will present my findings and any recommendations
formally to the committee at its meeting of November 22," he
added.

TAGLINE???

* UK: Coastal Towns and Cities Top Insolvency List
--------------------------------------------------
Goldie Momen Putrym at Sky News Online reports that Britain's
coastal towns and cities have the highest proportion of
bankruptcies.

Sky News relates that accounting firm Wilkins Kennedy found four
out of the top five places that topped the insolvency list last
year were former port towns or holiday resorts.

According to Sky News, Hull topped the poll with 51 people
declared insolvent for every 10,000 residents, followed by
Blackpool with 49, and Plymouth and Eastbourne at 46 and 44
respectively.  With the exception of Eastbourne, the cities topped
the personal insolvencies list in 2008 as well, Sky News notes.

This year's figures are more than double that in the capital which
has 20 per 10,000 people, Sky News adds.


* Credit Rating Agencies Need Tight Supervision, IMF Report Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that International Monetary Fund's (IMF) half-
yearly Financial Stability Report has said credit rating agencies
should be more tightly supervised.

BBC relates the IMF says agencies have an impact on funding costs
for debt issuers, and can affect financial stability.  They can
also influence fund managers about which bonds to hold, BBC notes.

The report says that although there are 70 agencies worldwide only
three -- Moody's, Fitch, and Standard and Poor's -- have a global
scope.

"Sovereign credit ratings have inadvertently contributed to
financial instability," says the summary, according to BBC.  "This
is because ratings are embedded in various rules, regulations and
triggers, so that downgrades can lead to destabilizing knock-on
and spillover effects in financial markets."

BBC notes it also said rating agencies should also be discouraged
from delaying rating changes.

BBC says in addition, policymakers should continue efforts to
reduce their reliance on credit ratings, "and wherever possible
remove or replace references to ratings in laws and regulations,
and in central bank collateral policies".


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: The Health Care Marketplace
------------------------------------------
Author: Warren Greenberg, Ph.D.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 179 pages
List Price: US$34.95
Review by Henry Berry

Mr. Greenberg is an economist who analyzes the healthcare field
from the perspective that "health care is a business [in which]
the principles of supply and demand are as applicable . . . as to
other businesses."  This perspective does not ignore or minimize
the question of the quality of health, but rather focuses sharply
on the relationship between the quality of healthcare and economic
factors and practices.

For better or worse, the American healthcare system to a
considerable degree embodies the beliefs, principles, and aims of
a free-market capitalist economic system driven by competition.
In the early sections of The Health Care Marketplace, Mr.
Greenberg takes up the question of how physicians and how
hospitals compete in this system.  Competition among physicians
takes place locally among primary care physicians and on a wider
geographical scale among specialists.  There is competition also
between M.D.s and allied practitioners: for example, between
ophthalmologists and optometrists and between psychiatrists and
psychologists.  Regarding competition between physicians in a fee-
for-service practice and those in managed care plans, Mr.
Greenberg cites statistics and studies that there was lesser
utilization of healthcare services, such as hospitalization and
tests, with managed care plans.

Some of the factors affecting the economics of different areas of
the healthcare field are self-evident, albeit may be little
recognized or little realized by consumers.  One of these factors
is physician demeanor.  Most readers would see a physician's
demeanor as a type of personality exhibited during the course of
the day.  But after the author notes that "[c]ompetition also
takes place in professional demeanor, location, and waiting time,"
the word "demeanor" takes on added meaning.  The demeanor of a
big-city plastic surgeon, for example, would be markedly different
from that of a rural pediatrician.  Thus, demeanor has a
relationship to the costs, options, services, and payments in the
medical field, and also a relationship to doctor education and
government funding for public health.

Greenberg does not follow his economic data and summarizations
with recommendations or advice.  He leaves it to the policymakers
to make decisions on the basis of the raw economic data and
indisputable factors such as physician demeanor.  Nor does he take
a political position when he selects what data to present or
emphasize.  It is this apolitical, unbiased approach that makes
The Health Care Marketplace of most value to readers interested in
understanding the economics of the healthcare field.

Without question, a thorough understanding of the factors
underlying the healthcare marketplace is necessary before changes
can be made so that the health needs of the public are better met.
Conditions that are often seen as intractable because they are
regarded as social or political problems such as the overcrowding
of inner-city health centers or preferential treatment of HMOs
are, in Greenberg's view, problems amenable to economic solutions.
According to the author, the basic economic principle of supply-
and-demand goes a long way in explaining exorbitantly high medical
costs and the proliferation of specialists.

Mr. Greenberg's rigorous economic analysis similarly yields an
informative picture of the workings of other aspects of the
healthcare field.  Among these are hospitals, insurance, employee
health benefits, technology, government funding of health
programs, government regulation, and long-term health care.  In
the closing chapter, Mr. Greenberg applies his abilities as a
keen-eyed observer of the economic workings of the U.S. healthcare
field to survey healthcare systems in three other countries:
Canada, Israel, and the Netherlands.  "An analysis of each of the
three systems will explain the relative doses of competition,
regulation, and rationing that might be used in financing of
health care in the United States," he says.  But even here, as in
his economic analyses of the U.S. healthcare system, Greenberg
remains nonpartisan and does not recommend one of these three
foreign systems over the other.  Instead he critiques the
Canadian, Israel, and Netherlands systems -- "none [of which]
makes use of the employer in the provision of health insurance,"
he says -- to prompt the reader to look at the present state and
future of U.S. healthcare in new ways.

The Health Care Marketplace is not a book of limited interest, and
the author's focus on the economics of the health field does not
make for dry reading.  Healthcare is a central concern of every
individual and society in general.  Mr. Greenberg's book clarifies
the workings of the healthcare field and provides a starting point
for addressing its long-recognized problems and moving down the
road to dealing effectively with them.

Warren Greenberg is Professor of Health Economics and Health Care
Sciences at George Washington University, and also a Senior Fellow
at the University's Center for Health Policy Research.  Prior to
these positions, in the 1970s he was a staff economist with the
Federal Trade Commission.  He has written a number of other books
and numerous articles on economics and healthcare.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.

                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter -- Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick,
Maryland USA.  Joy A. Agravante, Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O.
Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *