TCREUR_Public/101013.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Wednesday, October 13, 2010, Vol. 11, No. 202

                            Headlines



A U S T R I A

RAIFFEISEN ZENTRALBANK: Moody's Assigns Provisional 'D+' BFSR


B U L G A R I A

MOSTSTROY AD: Insolvency Filing a Deliberate Plot, Spassov Says


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

ECM REAL ESTATE: Averts Bankruptcy as Bondholders Okay Debt Plan


D E N M A R K

INCENTIVE AS: Creditors Sue Ex-Compass Co-Heads Over N&W Deal


F R A N C E

RENAULT SA: S&P Puts 'BB' Credit Rating on CreditWatch Positive


G E R M A N Y

HYPO REAL ESTATE: Fitch Upgrades Individual Rating to 'D'
PORTFOLIO GREEN: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'B2 (sf)'
TITAN EUROPE: S&P Junks Rating on Class E Notes From 'BB- (sf)'


G R E E C E

* GREECE: Loan Extension Hinges on Other Member Nations
* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Subordinated Debt on Four Greek Banks


I R E L A N D

AER ARANN: Has Investment Deal With Stobart; Examinership Extended
ALLIED IRISH: Government Won't Impose Losses on Bondholders
ALLIED IRISH: To Raise EUR5.4 Billion in Placing & Open Offer
BANK OF IRELAND: Government Won't Impose Losses on Bondholders
CALYPSO CAPITAL: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Series 2010-1 Notes

QUINN INSURANCE: Liberty Mutual & Travelers on Bidder Shortlist
* IRELAND: Expects Cash Pile to Stave Off Greek-Style Rescue


I T A L Y

SAGRANTINO ITALY: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Notes
VENUS-1 FINANCE: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class E Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

HOLLAND MORTGAGE: Moody's Assigns B1 (sf) Rating on Class E Notes


P O R T U G A L

SAGRES SOCIEDADE: S&P Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to 'B- (sf)'


R U S S I A

INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL: Moody's Downgrades Debt Ratings to 'C'
MDM BANK: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Rating to Senior Unsecured Debt
NIZHNIY NOVGOROD: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Ratings to Domestic Bonds
VENTRELT HOLDINGS: Fitch Affirms Issuer Default Rating at 'BB-'
* RUSSIA: Regional Government Bailouts on "Case-By-Case" Basis

* TVER OBLAST: S&P Changes Outlook to Stable; Affirms 'B+' Rating
* S&P Raises Rating on Russian City of Surgut to 'BB/ruAA'


S P A I N

AYT COLATERALES: Moody's Assigns 'C (sf)' Rating to Class D Notes
CAJA DE AHORROS: Moody's Cuts Financial Strength Rating to 'D+'
CAJA ESPANA: Moody's Assigns 'D+' Financial Strength Rating
* SPAIN: Second Round of Savings Bank Consolidations Expected


U K R A I N E

AVANGARDCO INVESTMENTS: Fitch Puts 'B' Rating on Senior Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

GENERAL MOTORS: "Committed" to Securing Luton Plant's Future
HKR MANCHESTER: Placed Into Administration
LIVERPOOL FOOTBALL: League Could Dock Points in Administration
MANCHESTER UNITED: Posts Annual Pre-Tax Loss of GBP79.6 Million
ROYAL BANK: JPMorgan Buys RBS Sempra Commodities' Trading Book

* SCOTLAND: Number of Firms Going Into Administration Drops 36%
* UK: Banks Set to Accelerate Sale of Distressed Assets




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A U S T R I A
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RAIFFEISEN ZENTRALBANK: Moody's Assigns Provisional 'D+' BFSR
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken multiple rating actions on
entities within the Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich Group.

These actions follow the group's announcement that it is changing
its corporate structure through an intra-group transfer of most of
the commercial banking assets and liabilities of its top
institution -- Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich AG -- to its
majority-owned, stock-market quoted subsidiary, Raiffeisen
International Bank Holding AG.  This entity will be renamed
Raiffeisen Bank International upon closing of the transaction.

The rating actions anticipate the successful closing of the
transaction.

Moody's has assigned to RBI a provisional long-term debt and
deposit rating of (P)A1, a provisional short-term debt rating of
(P)Prime-1, and a provisional (P)D+ Bank Financial Strength
Rating, mapping into a baseline credit assessment of Baa3.  All
these rating actions are contingent on the closing of the
transaction.

The outlook on the provisional long-term debt and deposit ratings
is stable, and the outlook on the provisional BFSR is positive.

At the same time, Moody's has re-assessed RZB's current (and the
entity's future) credit profile.  RZB's A1 long-term debt and
deposit ratings and its D+ BFSR (mapping into a BCA of Baa3) have
been affirmed.  Although the outlook on the debt and deposit
ratings remains stable, the BFSR outlook was changed to positive
from negative.  The Prime-1 short-term ratings were affirmed.

Contingent upon the closing of the transaction, Moody's has
assigned RZB a provisional (P)A2 issuer rating with a stable
outlook, reflecting the future status of RZB as a pure bank
holding company and the structurally subordinated nature of its
senior obligations relative to the direct obligations of its
subsidiaries.

Moody's has also assigned a provisional (P)A1 rating to RZB's
long-term senior unsecured debt.  This rating is contingent on the
debt benefiting from an unconditional and irrevocable guarantee
from RBI.  The outlook on the rating is stable.

The ratings of the subordinated and hybrid instruments are
discussed below.

Moody's will separately review any potential impact on the current
ratings of the subsidiaries of RBI, which are not covered in this
press release.  RZB's Aaa rating for obligations that are
guaranteed by the Republic of Austria remained unaffected by the
rating actions.

                        Ratings Rationale

In Q4 2010, the RZB Group will undergo a transformation whereby
all of RZB's commercial banking activities and most its
liabilities will be transferred to RBI, the stock-quoted holding
company for the group's international activities in Central &
Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States.

With the asset transfer, RZB will raise its current 72.8% stake in
RBI to 78.0%.  Upon completion of the transaction, RBI will
operate as an Austrian-regulated banking institution.  On a pro
forma basis, its assets will increase to EUR148 billion, up from
EUR78 billion as of June 2010.

RZB will assume supervisory and control functions over RBI, in
addition to the role as the central bank for the RZB Group's
owners -- the co-operative sector or Raiffeisenlandesbanks in
Austria.  With a marginal earnings contribution from these
activities, RZB's earnings will depend almost exclusively on
income streams from RBI.  The capital requirements of RBI's still-
expanding franchise in CEE and CIS will weigh on any potential
dividends to RZB.

RZB is expected to retain total assets of close to EUR30 billion,
down from EUR93 billion as per the YE 2009 individual accounts.
While most of its liabilities will move to RBI -- in particular,
its market funds and customer deposits -- securities of EUR8
billion will stay with RZB until maturity in 2020 benefitting from
a guarantee of RBI, which is reflected in Moody's provisional
ratings.

                       Provisional Ratings

Following the transaction, RBI will have effectively assumed all
of RZB's previous businesses, except for the central bank
function.  This function makes a marginal contribution to
earnings, but is relevant to the overall group due to the funding
provided by the Raiffeisen sector of EUR16 billion according to
June 2010 financials.  Moody's understands that RZB will pass
these resources on to RBI for a stable funding base.

RBI's provisional BFSR of (P)D+ recognizes its strong retail and
corporate franchises throughout Austria, CEE and CIS, which
provides for good earnings diversification by geography as well as
business segments.  However, performance depends heavily on the
CEE franchise that the group has successfully established in the
region.

According to pro forma financials as of June 2010, RBI's
capitalization is adequate for its risk profile, with a Tier 1
ratio of 9%.  Moody's further notes that the group performed well
during the economic crisis, and that credit losses recorded in
2009 and year-to-date were somewhat below the rating agency's
base-case stress expectations.  More importantly, performance was
far better than in Moody's stress-case scenario, which supports
the BFSR at the current level.

Corporate governance, previously considered a constraint to the
intrinsic strength of the rating, has clearly improved from the
grouping of RZB Group's major business activities into a stock-
quoted company, thereby reducing the overall complexity of the
group.

These strengths are counterbalanced by modest overall
profitability after catering for risk costs and by challenges to
asset quality.  In particular, Moody's remains concerned that
economic volatility and uncertainty will persist in some of RBI's
core markets, such as Russia and Ukraine.  Given the nature of
RBI's sizeable exposure to the less granular corporate sector, the
predictability of expected losses or write-down requirements
remains an issue.  However, the rating agency considers that
further loan impairments can be absorbed at the bank's D+ BFSR
level -- hence, the positive outlook.

RBI's provisional (P)A1 long-term debt and deposit ratings benefit
from the support mechanisms available to members of the Raiffeisen
co-operative banking sector (Kundengarantiegemeinschaft), which
has been extended to RBI in the context of the transaction, but
not to its Eastern European subsidiaries.  The rating further
reflects a high probability of systemic support, reflecting RBI's
sizeable market share in Austria as well as the Raiffeisen
sector's considerable importance to Austria's banking system.
Together, these factors support a five-notch uplift to RBI's
provisional long-term debt and deposit ratings, as well as the
stable outlook.

The provisional (P)A2 issuer rating on RZB -- RBI's parent company
--incorporates two main elements: (i) the long-term debt and
deposit ratings of RBI of (P)A1; and (ii) the structural
subordination of the senior obligations of RZB regarding the
senior unsecured obligations of its major operating entity RBI,
resulting in a one-notch difference between the bank and the
holding company.  However, Moody's notes the absence of any
meaningful double leverage at the holding-company level and
considers that RBI will be able to continue to generate adequate
earnings that will allow for uninterrupted dividend payments,
enabling RZB to at least meet its payment obligations.  The
outlook on the provisional issuer rating follows from the stable
outlook on RBI's provisional long term debt and deposit rating.
Following the closing of the transaction, Moody's is likely to
withdraw the BFSR of RZB.

RZB's provisional (P)A1ratings on the backed debt securities of
RZB are based on the unconditional and irrevocable nature of the
guarantee and payment undertaking, which allows for the
(P)A1ratings assigned to RBI to be passed through to the eligible
securities.

    Interim Affirmation of RZB Ratings Pending the Transaction

For the time being (and pending the transaction), the D+ BFSR of
RZB was affirmed following the re-assessment of RZB's credit
profile on the basis of its consolidated audited 2009 annual
accounts as well as unaudited interim financials as of June 2010,
reflecting its solid franchises, good business diversification and
overall satisfactory financials.  Given that RZB's current profile
is highly compatible with that of RBIs after the transaction, the
credit strengths and challenges as outlined above apply, as does
the positive outlook.

At the same time, Moody's affirms RZB's A1 long-term debt and
deposit ratings with a stable outlook, reflecting the same sector
and systemic support assumptions as for RBI's provisional long-
term debt and deposit ratings as outlined above.

      Subordinated Debt Ratings of A2 Affirmed Respectively,
                        New (P)A3 Assigned

Moody's has also affirmed the rating of A2 on RZB's rated senior
subordinated debt, one notch below the senior debt and deposit
rating.  For banks in Austria, Moody's continues to incorporate
systemic support in its ratings of dated subordinated debt to the
same extent as in its senior debt ratings.  This reflects the
absence of a resolution framework in Austria that would allow for
the imposition of losses on dated subordinated creditors outside
of a liquidation.

The provisional (P)A2 ratings for RZB's backed subordinated debt
after the transaction reflect the unconditional and irrevocable
subordinated payment undertaking of RBI, which allows for the
provisional (P)A2 ratings assigned to RBI to be passed through to
RZB.

Downgrade of Hybrids To Ba1 Respectively New (P)Ba1 Assigned on
               Revised Sector Support Assumptions

Moody's downgraded the ratings on non-cumulative preferred
securities issued by RZB to Ba1 from Baa2, three notches below the
Adjusted BCA, reflecting their deeply subordinated claims in
liquidation and the non-cumulative coupon-skip mechanism tied to
the breach of a balance-sheet loss trigger.

* RZB Finance (Jersey) II Limited (XS0173287862)
* RZB Finance (Jersey) III Limited (XS0193631040)
* RZB Finance (Jersey) IV Limited (XS0253262025)

Junior subordinated debt (Ergaenzungskapital notes) was downgraded
to Ba1 from Baa2, which is three notches below the Adjusted BCA,
reflecting the debt's junior subordinated claim in liquidation and
cumulative deferral features tied to the breach of a net loss
trigger.

* Raiffeisen Zentralbank AG: Ergaenzungskapital notes
  (XS0326967832)

The downgrade of RZB's hybrid capital and junior subordinated debt
instruments follows a reassessment of the financial strength of
the Raiffeisen banking group while the probability of support is
still assessed as very high in deriving RZB's Adjusted BCA, which
now stands at Baa1.

This downgrade is independent from the transaction.  The Adjusted
BCA is Moody's starting point for rating hybrid securities and
reflects the bank's standalone credit strength, including parental
or cooperative support, if applicable.  The Adjusted BCA excludes
systemic support expectations.

RZB's provisional backed (P)Ba1ratings for hybrid securities are
based on the unconditional and irrevocable guarantee and payment
undertaking of RBI, which allows for the provisional (P)Ba1
ratings assigned to RBI to be passed through to the eligible
securities.

Moody's is issuing the provisional ratings on RBI and RZB's backed
senior unsecured debt in advance of the successful completion of
the intra-group transfer of RZB's commercial banking activities;
these provisional ratings represent Moody's preliminary opinion
only.  Upon a conclusive review of the completion of the
transaction and the documentation of the backed senior unsecured
obligations, Moody's will endeavor to assign definitive ratings
that could differ from the provisional ratings.

            Previous Rating Actions and Methodologies

Moody's previous rating action on RZB was taken on 25 February
2010, when RZB's hybrids securities ratings were downgraded to
Baa2 from Baa1.

RZB is domiciled in Vienna, Austria.  At the end of June 2010, it
had total consolidated assets of EUR152.2 billion and equity of
EUR11 billion, according to IFRS.  The group's core capital Tier 1
ratio was 9.3%, according to BIS standards.

RBI, which will be domiciled in Vienna, Austria, had total
consolidated assets of EUR148 billion and equity of EUR10.1
billion, according to unaudited pro-forma IFRS figures as June
2010.

                     Regulatory Disclosures

Information sources used to prepare the credit rating are these:
parties involved in the ratings, public information, confidential
and proprietary Moody's Investors Service's information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the
purposes of assigning a credit rating.

The rating has been disclosed to the rated entity or its
designated agents and issued with no amendment resulting from that
disclosure.

MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, MOODY'S is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


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B U L G A R I A
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MOSTSTROY AD: Insolvency Filing a Deliberate Plot, Spassov Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
Novinite.com reports that Mincho Spassov, a lawyer and former MP,
told the Bulgarian National Radio that Moststroy AD's insolvency
filing is the result of a deliberate plot, hatched by unscrupulous
businessmen.

"For me this is an example of a deliberate bankruptcy, to which
unfair businessmen resort sometimes to achieve certain goals,"
Mincho Spassov told the Bulgarian National Radio, according to
Novinite.com.

Novinite.com notes Mr. Spassov said the move aims to restructure
the profitable units of an enterprise and put them into companies,
in which the owner is a shareholder, leaving the liabilities in
the old company and to the harm of creditors.

Separately, Novinite.com relates Bulgarian billionaire Vassil
Bozhkov has denied reports that he controls Moststroy.

"Vassil Krumov Bozhkov holds a 21.07% stake in Moststroy AD, which
does not allow him to control the activities of the company
single-handedly," says a statement, circulated to the media, by
Nove Holding, whose president Bozhkov is, according to
Novinite.com.

Novinite.com notes the statement stresses that "what happens with
Moststroy AD will in no way have an impact on the business of Mr.
Bozhkov or his projects in the country and abroad".

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 11,
2010, Bloomberg News said Moststroy filed for insolvency after all
its bank accounts were frozen because of unpaid debts.  Bloomberg
disclosed Moststroy said it has no funds to repay a loan borrowed
from the United Bulgarian Bank, a unit of the National Bank of
Greece SA, which was due on May 31.  Its construction machines and
other equipment leased from Interlease EAD have been seized by
Interlease, which has canceled the
contracts, Moststroy, as cited by Bloomberg, said.

Moststroy AD is a construction company based in Bulgaria.  The
company participates in the construction of the country's high-
profile Trakiya motorway.


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C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
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ECM REAL ESTATE: Averts Bankruptcy as Bondholders Okay Debt Plan
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ladka Bauerova and Krystof Chamonikolas at Bloomberg News report
that ECM Real Estate Investments AG avoided bankruptcy as
bondholders rejected a proposal for an early redemption of euro-
denominated bonds and approved a draft debt-reorganization plan.

Bloomberg relates ECM on Monday said on its Web site that at a
meeting on Oct. 7, the bondholders approved the appointment of
Ernst & Young as restructuring adviser.  They will vote on the
final version of the debt-overhaul plan on Nov. 4, ECM, as cited
by Bloomberg, said in a separate release.

"The company has warded off the threat of bankruptcy for the
moment," Prague-based analyst Miroslav Adamkovic at Komercni Banka
AS, a unit of Societe Generale SA, wrote in a report on Monday,
according to Bloomberg.  "But the restructuring plan has not yet
been approved nor has the financing of launched projects been
resolved, which are the two main conditions for the company's
survival."

As reported by Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 12, 2010,
Czech daily newspaper Lidove Noviny, as cited by Bloomberg News,
said ECM's total debt exceeds CZK7 billion (US$400 million).

ECM Real Estate Investments AG is the property developer that
built Prague's tallest building.


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D E N M A R K
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INCENTIVE AS: Creditors Sue Ex-Compass Co-Heads Over N&W Deal
-------------------------------------------------------------
Martin Arnold at The Financial Times reports that Paul Soldatos
and John Clark, two former co-heads of private equity group
Compass Partners, are being sued by the creditors of Incentive AS,
a bankrupt Danish holding company, seeking more than EUR30 million
(GBP26 million) in damages for a deal they completed five years
ago.

According to the FT, Messrs. Soldatos and Clark have been summoned
to appear in a Luxembourg court by the trustees for Incentive.  It
claims that Compass is refusing to pay the sum awarded by an
arbitration tribunal last year, the FT discloses.

The FT relates the dispute centers on Compass's EUR625 million
sale of N&W Global Vending, one of Europe's biggest makers of food
and drink vending machines, to Merrill Lynch Private Equity and
Argan Capital in 2005.  Incentive, the FT says, claims it should
have received a follow-on payment from the deal under the terms of
an earlier agreement for Compass to buy Wittenborg, a vending
machine maker that became part of N&W, from the Danish holding
company.

The FT says before N&W was sold, Compass moved Wittenborg from one
of its holding companies to another, paying Incentive EUR33.1
million of proceeds from the internal switch.  But the Danish
group claims it was forced into accepting this deal and would have
received EUR77 million from the later N&W sale if it had not been
forced out a year earlier, according to the FT.

Incentive launched arbitration proceedings against Compass in
2006, the FT recounts.  Two years later the arbitration tribunal
awarded it EUR26.3 million in damages plus interest after finding
Compass had acted in "bad faith" by not consulting Incentive over
the internal switch, according to the FT.

The FT notes people close to the private equity group point out
that the four holding companies being sued by Incentive have all
been liquidated and there are no parent company guarantees that
make it liable for claims against them.

Incentive has struggled to serve a court summons to Mr. Clark, who
lives in the US, the FT notes.  It is also suing N&W, which is now
owned by Barclays Private Equity and Investcorp, as well as Alter
Domus, the law firm that worked for Compass on its internal switch
of the vending machine assets, the FT states.

Incentive AS is headquartered in Copenhagen.


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F R A N C E
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RENAULT SA: S&P Puts 'BB' Credit Rating on CreditWatch Positive
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it placed its 'BB' long-
term corporate credit rating on French automaker Renault S.A. on
CreditWatch with positive implications.  The 'B' short-term rating
was affirmed.  At the same time, S&P placed its 'BBB-/A-3' long-
term and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Renault's
subsidiary RCI Banque on CreditWatch with positive implications.

This follows the Oct. 6 announcement by Renault that it would sell
its series B shares in Volvo (publ), AB (BBB-/Negative/A-3) for a
total consideration of about EUR3 billion.  According to the
company, the deal is expected to be closed in the near future.
S&P understands that the company will use the proceeds from the
sale to repay financial debt over the next few quarters.

"S&P believes this will enable Renault to clearly exceed its
target, communicated earlier this year, to reduce its net
financial debt on the industrial side to below EUR3 billion," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Barbara Castellano.

In the first half of 2010, Renault's operating performance
improved significantly on the same period of last year.  The group
operating margin was 4%, while the auto division operating margin
was 2.2%, supported by a sharp increase in unit sales by 21.7% in
the first half of the year.

For the full year 2010, S&P expects that Renault's unit sales will
be hit by weak European demand.  However, Renault's unit
registrations in Europe in the first eight months of this year
have been well above the market average, up by 13.1% compared with
a 3.5% decline for the EU market as a whole.  S&P expects the
company to maintain this advantage over the next few months as the
benefits of new products, including the new Renault Megane, take
full effect.

In light of these considerations, S&P believes that Renault's auto
operating margin as of year-end 2010 will be lower than in the
first half of the year but still in positive territory.  In light
of its healthy cash generation in the first half of the year, with
EUR1.4 billion reported for the industrial operations, and S&P's
anticipation of positive momentum in Renault's sales in the second
half of 2010, S&P believes that Renault will be able to achieve
free operating cash flow and credit ratios well above the
expectations S&P had for it at the start of this year.

S&P plans to resolve the CreditWatch placement within the next few
weeks.  "In its rating assessment S&P will review its base-case
scenario for the current year and the medium-term impact of the
cash proceeds from the sale of the Volvo series B shares on
Renault's financial risk profile," said Ms. Castellano.  S&P will
also review any potential impact on RCI Banque.  At this stage,
S&P expects that any upgrade would be limited to one notch.


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G E R M A N Y
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HYPO REAL ESTATE: Fitch Upgrades Individual Rating to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Hypo Real Estate Holding AG's and
Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG's Long-term Issuer Default Ratings at
'A-', Short-term IDRs at 'F1' and Support Ratings at '1'.  The
Outlooks for the Long-term IDRs are Stable.  At the same time,
Fitch has upgraded HRE Holding's Individual rating to 'D' from 'F'
and simultaneously withdrawn it.  Fitch has assigned PBB an
Individual rating of 'D'.

Fitch has also taken rating actions on HRE Holding's subsidiary
Depfa Bank plc, and on its respective subsidiaries Depfa ACS Bank
and Hypo Public Finance Bank puc.  The Long-term IDRs, Short-term
IDRs and Support ratings of all three banks were downgraded to
'BBB+' from 'A-', 'F2' from 'F1' and '2' from '1', respectively.
The Outlooks for the Long-term IDRs are Negative.  Depfa Bank
plc's Individual rating was upgraded to 'D' from 'F'.

Fitch has simultaneously affirmed PBB's and Depfa Bank plc's
hybrid tier 1 securities at 'CC'.  The Recovery Rating of these
notes is 'RR5'.  Also, Fitch has affirmed the guaranteed notes
issued by PBB that are being transferred to FMS Wertmanagement
(FMS, rated 'AAA'/Stable), a run-off institution legally separate
from HRE Group, at 'F1+'.  The rating is based on the
unconditional and irrevocable guarantee provided by the German
Financial Market Stabilisation Fund, which acts on behalf of the
Federal Republic of Germany (rated 'AAA'/Stable).

A full rating breakdown is provided at the end of this
announcement.

The rating actions follow Depfa subgroup's and PBB's transfer of
EUR173bn (notional amount) assets into FMS.  FMS benefits from
support from the SoFFin, and ultimately from the FRG.

The affirmation of HRE Holding's and PBB's ratings is based on
Fitch's view that there continues to be an extremely high
probability of support from their 100%-owner SoFFin.  Although
PBB, which is positioned as the core bank within the HRE group, is
targeted for re-privatization at some stage, Fitch does not expect
this to happen in the foreseeable future.

In addition, because of the state aid received by HRE Holding and
its subsidiaries, the EC has initiated a formal investigation,
which SoFFin and management expect to be concluded during H111.
The possibility exists that sanctions beyond the group's
restructuring plan may be imposed, including, in extremis, a wind-
down of the whole group.  This is not Fitch's central case;
however, if it occurs, Fitch would expect an orderly wind-down of
the group under state ownership.  In such a scenario, Fitch would
review its ratings, but the downside risk for PBB's IDRs and
senior unsecured debt ratings should be limited.  PBB is one of
the largest issuers of Pfandbriefe, even after the asset transfer,
and Germany's public authorities have demonstrated willingness to
support Pfandbrief issuers to safeguard the standing of
Pfandbriefe.  This strong implicit support is expressed in Fitch's
Support Rating Floor for PBB.  While such a scenario would have
limited impact on senior creditors, the impact on subordinated
debtholders may be more severe.

PBB's and Depfa Bank plc's subordinated debt ratings reflect
Fitch's expectation that the entities will stay as going concerns
and that support, if ever needed, would be forthcoming.
Therefore, Fitch expects that the banks will continue to fulfill
their contractual obligations regarding subordinated debt issues.
Fitch considers the risk that the German authorities would enforce
burden-sharing on subordinated debt holders to be currently remote
given that there is no enforceable resolution scheme to facilitate
this.

The draft bank resolution legislation currently under discussion
in the German parliament and recent changes to Irish legislation
with respect to specifically named banks means that Fitch does not
rule out a potential weakening of the German authorities' current
propensity to support subordinated debt obligations.  However, the
agency is not currently rating on this basis.

The downgrade of Depfa Bank plc's, Depfa ACS Bank's and Hypo
Public Finance Bank's IDRs and Support ratings reflect Fitch's
view that the likelihood of indirect support flowing through to
the Irish banks from the FRG has been weakened by the asset
transfer to FMS.  The previously strong intercompany business,
including channelling substantial external liquidity support from
the German state to Depfa Bank plc through PBB has declined
following the asset transfer.

However, the 'BBB+' ratings indicate that Fitch considers there to
be a strong operational and economic link between Depfa subgroup
and FMS.  This relates to the structure of the asset transfer
through funded sub-participations, as well as service level
agreements between Depfa subgroup and FMS, which have an initial
maturity of three years.

The Negative Outlooks on Depfa subgroup's Long-term IDRs reflect
Fitch's view that the links between Depfa subgroup and FMS will
gradually weaken.  This could negatively affect Fitch's view on
the likelihood of support.  Although Fitch does not anticipate any
significant changes for a number of years, if they occur, they may
trigger a downgrade of Depfa's ratings by more than one notch.  In
this context, Depfa subgroup is not conducting any new business
and is running off its assets as they mature as well as through
selective sales.  In Fitch's view, Depfa subgroup is a going
concern in solvent wind-down.

The upgrade of HRE Holding's and Depfa Bank plc's Individual
ratings and the assignment of a 'D' Individual rating to PBB
reflect Fitch's view that the standalone financial strength of the
entities has improved due to the transfer of non-performing and
non-strategic assets.  This transfer is not only reducing the
banks' credit risks, but is also improving their funding and
liquidity profiles.  Furthermore, Fitch expects that the banks
will have more comfortable capital levels (also taking into
account an envisaged further capital increase of PBB), which
should provide a sufficient buffer to absorb any further losses
that are likely to occur.  Therefore, Fitch expects that the banks
will be less likely to require additional support beyond the
measures already announced.

HRE Holding's Individual rating has been withdrawn, as the
restructuring of the group into two distinct operating units in
Germany and Ireland means that a combined integrated group
Individual rating at the holding company level no longer makes
sense.

The downgrade of Depfa ACS Bank has no impact on the covered bonds
rating, as the combination of the new Long-term IDR of 'BBB+' and
the programme's Discontinuity Factor (9.5%) still enable it to
reach a 'AA+' rating on a probability of default basis and a 'AAA'
rating after incorporating recoveries given default.

The rating actions of the affected entities are:

Hypo Real Estate Holding AG:

* Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Stable
* Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
* Individual rating: upgraded to 'D' from 'F' and withdrawn
* Support rating: affirmed at '1'
* Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A-'

Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG:

* Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Stable

* Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

* Support rating: affirmed at '1'

* Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A-'

* SoFFin-guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'F1+'

* Subordinated notes (lower tier 2): affirmed at 'BBB+'

* Hybrid capital instruments: affirmed at 'CC'; Recovery Rating
  'RR5'

DEPFA Bank plc:

* Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative

* Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'

* Individual rating: upgraded to 'D' from 'F'

* Support rating: downgraded to '2' from '1'

* Support Rating Floor: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A-'

* Subordinated notes (lower tier 2): downgraded to 'BBB' from
  'BBB+'

* Hybrid capital instruments: affirmed at 'CC'; Recovery Rating
  'RR5'

DEPFA ACS Bank:

* Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative
* Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'
* Support rating: downgraded to '2' from '1'

Hypo Public Finance Bank puc:

* Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A-'; Outlook Negative
* Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'
* Support rating: downgraded to '2' from '1'

In Fitch's rating criteria, a bank's standalone risk is reflected
in Fitch's Individual ratings and the prospect of external support
is reflected in Fitch's Support ratings.  Collectively, these
ratings drive Fitch's Long- and Short-term IDRs.


PORTFOLIO GREEN: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'B2 (sf)'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Classes B, C and D
Notes issued by Portfolio GREEN German CMBS GmbH (amounts
reflecting initial outstandings):

  -- EUR40M Class B Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2050,
     Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2010 Aa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR40M Class C Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2050,
     Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2010 A2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR35M Class D Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2050,
     Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 3, 2010 Baa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The ratings of the Classes A, E, F and G are not affected by this
rating action.  Moody's does not rate the Class H Notes.

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating action concludes the review for possible downgrade of
the Classes B, C and D Notes initiated on 3 September 2010.  The
rating downgrade has been prompted by (i) the deterioration and
increased volatility of the cash flows generated by the properties
securing the two largest borrower groups, (ii) the weakened credit
quality of the total pool, resulting from reduced property values
to date and Moody's expectations regarding property value
performance and lending markets going forward, and (iii) the
uncertainty and magnitude of fees and expenses incurred by
transaction parties and the outcome of the pending court
proceedings initiated by a borrower.

The magnitude of the rating actions is mainly driven by Moody's
reassessment of the two largest borrower groups (41% of the
current pool).  Both borrower groups suffer from significant cash
flow deterioration compared to initial cash flows and Moody's
expectations.  According to the most recent update by the Sub-
Servicer, the sole tenant (Deutsche Bahn AG, Aa1) of the office
property securing the loans in borrower group G13 (32% of the
current pool) recently signed a new lease commencing on 1 January
2011.  The new lease will run until 31 December 2018 and the
annual rental cash flow for the property will be approximately
EUR6.9 million, a reduction of 35% compared to the previous lease.
Given the secondary nature of the property and the reduced rental
income, Moody's has adjusted its value to EUR95.2 million,
resulting in a new Loan-to-Value ratio of 102% for the borrower
group.  The current underwriter's LTV ratio for the borrower group
is 82%.

The cash flows of the senior living and hotel property securing
the two loans of the second largest borrower group G11 (9% of the
current pool) have declined to EUR1.0 million, a drop of 67%
compared to the net operating income as of closing of the
transaction.  The lower than anticipated cash flow was caused by
increased vacancies and a general rent reduction due to expansion
and maintenance works at the property.  Going forward, there
remains significant uncertainty about the level of cash flow
because rent levels are subject to annual re-negotiations between
the borrower and the tenant.  The property is not generating
sufficient cash flow to cover the debt service payment, but to
date, the sponsor has been covering the shortfall.  As yet, no
public information is available as to whether the rental income
will increase again in the next year.  Given the reduction of
income and the level of uncertainty for future cash flows, Moody's
has adjusted its value to EUR24.1 million, resulting in a LTV
ratio of 117%.  The current U/W LTV ratio for the borrower group
is 56%.

Moody's has a higher default risk assessment and loss expectation
for the loans associated with these two borrower groups.  Given
their relative size within the pool (41% of current pool), the two
largest borrower groups significantly contribute to the total
expected loss of the whole pool.

In the event of a default of the loans associated with the two
largest borrower groups, Moody's expects an orderly work-out
strategy involving some modifications to further deleverage the
loans with the aim of a refinancing at a later point in time.

In its rating review, Moody's has also analyzed the remaining pool
(59% of the current pool).  Given the granular nature of the
remaining portion of the underlying loan pool, Moody's is only
provided with a limited amount of data compared to other EMEA CMBS
transactions.  Therefore in its analysis of the remaining pool,
Moody's applied a generic approach in order to determine the
default probabilities.  Moody's has assumed effective value
declines on the portfolio since the peak of the market in 2007,
which has increased both the default risk assessment as well as
loss severity of the remaining loans in the pool.

The transaction's exposure to loans with reset dates in the next
five years is considerable.  Approximately 79% of the loans in the
current portfolio have their reset dates between 2010 and 2015.
As Moody's expects a slow recovery of property values in Germany,
most of the loans will be still highly leveraged at their
respective reset dates.  Although most loans in the pool have very
long terms, Moody's believes that interest rate resets pose an
additional risk to the borrowers, given the uncertainty of future
interest rates and the limited availability of alternative
financing for the loans.

Moody's estimates that compared to the U/W values at closing in
2007, the values of the entire property portfolio securing this
transaction have declined on a weighted average basis by 27%
through mid-2010.  Based on Moody's assessment of the total pool,
the weighted average Moody's LTV ratio is approximately 100%.

Due to the additional leverage, the higher portfolio risk
assessment has a relatively larger impact on the expected loss of
the mezzanine classes than on the expected loss of the most senior
Class A Notes.  This is because the Class B, C and D Notes are
subordinated classes in the transaction's capital structure and
the credit enhancement levels for these classes is less pronounced
than for the Class A Notes.  As a result, the downgraded classes
are particular sensitive to a non-performance of the two largest
borrower groups.

Moody's rating review also includes the analysis of potential
implications of the drawings under the liquidity facility of the
Issuer to date and in particular on the July 2010 IPD and the
pending court proceedings concerning the validity of the transfer
of a loan receivable initiated by a borrower.

On the IPD in July 2010, an amount of EUR4.1 million was drawn
from the liquidity facility.  The drawing mainly resulted from (i)
lesser collections for the collection period preceding the July
2010 IPD and, (ii) fees and expenses incurred on the Portfolio
over the course of the transaction from the cut off date up to the
July 2010 IPD, but only accurately reflected in the reports for
the July 2010 IPD, together with legal fees and Portfolio Prime
Servicing expenses, incurred during the collection period
immediately preceding the July 2010 IPD.

Moody's analyzed historical collection and distribution ratios on
the transaction level.  Over the last four payment periods,
Moody's noticed tightened excess spread levels or even negative
excess spreads within the transaction.  In Moody's view the
tightening of excess cash flows is the result of higher than
expected fees and expenses arising on transaction level and mainly
caused by legal, servicer and Issuer fees.  In the short-term,
Moody's anticipates continuing negative spread in the transaction
and ultimately further drawings under the liquidity facility.
However, in the long run, the persistence of the negative spread
in the transaction is not yet visible.

Furthermore the court proceeding at the Federal Court of Justice
(Bundesgerichtshof), initiated by a borrower protesting against
the validity of the transfer of the loan receivable of
approximately EUR1.1 million to the Collateral Agent, is still
pending.  The proceedings at, both, the District Court
(Landgericht) and the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandgericht)
ended with rulings against the borrower.  In case the outcome of
the proceeding is positive for the borrower, the most junior Class
H Notes may be depleted by a principal amount of up to EUR1.1
million.

Within the scope of its analysis, Moody's considered certain
stress tests to evaluate the potential impact on the ratings by a
depletion of the Class H Notes resulting from a loss of the
invalid transfer of the loan receivable and the further negative
carry on transaction level.  Moody's expects only a very limited
credit impact resulting from these circumstances.

There could be upgrade rating pressure in case of (i) a
significant improvement of the cash flows received under the
property of the second largest borrower group, (ii) the repayment
of one or both of the two largest borrower groups on their
respective reset dates and (iii) a faster than expected repayment
rate of the total portfolio.

In this transaction, Lehman Brothers Bankhaus AG (as "Seller")
sold its economic interest in claims for interest and principal
under a portfolio of mortgage loans granted to individual and
corporate borrowers in Germany to the Issuer.  The legal title in
the underlying loans and respective collateral was ultimately
transferred to the Collateral Agent (Florian (No. 3) GmbH).  The
initial 416 mortgage loans with a principal balance of EUR585.4
million were combined into 98 borrower groups.  The loans are
secured by commercial properties, including office (40% of the
current pool), retail (15%), residential (13%), mixed-use (13%)
and other types including hotel and nursing homes (19%) located in
Germany.

Since closing of the transaction in November 2007, the number of
loans decreased to 256, the number of borrower groups decreased to
61 and the outstanding balance decreased to EUR300.5 million (51%
of the total balance at closing) as per last interest payment date
in July 2010.  Approximately 31% of the current loan pool is
represented by the largest borrower group (G13) with a total loan
balance of currently EUR97.3 million.  The average size of a
borrower group of the remaining 69% of the pool is approximately
EUR3.4 million.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 month.

Moody's notes that the depth of information at property and tenant
level and on sponsors of the loans provided in the investor
reports is below average compared to other EMEA CMBS transactions
due to confidentiality reasons.  Accordingly, there is additional
uncertainty regarding the underlying assumptions used in the
rating process.

                     Regulatory Disclosures

The rating has been disclosed to the rated entity or its
designated agents and issued with no amendment resulting from that
disclosure.

Information sources used to prepare the credit rating are these:
parties involved in the ratings, public information and
confidential and proprietary Moody's Investors Service's
information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the
purposes of maintaining a credit rating.

MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, MOODY'S is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


TITAN EUROPE: S&P Junks Rating on Class E Notes From 'BB- (sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Titan Europe 2006-5 PLC's class C, D, and E notes in anticipation
of interest shortfalls.

S&P has previously lowered its rating on the class F notes to 'D
(sf)' following the default of the DIVA loan, the transfer of the
loan to special servicing, and the failure to meet the interest
obligation on the bond.

S&P has taken the rating action to address its revised
expectations of the issuer's ability to meet its obligations under
the class C, D, and E notes in the context of the Quartier 206
loan default and special servicing.

This loan is secured on a retail and office property on
Friedrichstrasse in Berlin, Germany.  S&P views the location in
Berlin's central business district as favorable for retailers as
well as office tenants, due to its close proximity to public
transport and other shopping alternatives.  The building is
partially occupied and retail tenants include Gucci, Louis
Vuitton, and Yves Saint Laurent.

Approximately 50% of the space is rented to tenants that are
related to the loan sponsor.  In S&P's analysis of this
transaction, S&P has viewed this as exposing the loan to
significant concentration risk, which began to materialize in
early 2010, when these tenants stopped making rental payments.
This has led to a shortfall in amounts available to the borrower
to meet loan-level obligations, for example:

* Swap payments to the swap counterparty;
* Special servicing fees to the special servicer;
* Securitized loan interest to the issuer; and
* Junior loan interest to the junior lender.

The issuer made a liquidity drawing to enable the borrower to
fully meet the swap payment obligations and accordingly the full
securitized loan interest.  However, S&P understands that
liquidity was not available, according to the document terms, to
fund the special servicing fees--with the result that these were
paid out of issuer funds in priority to the notes.  The class C,
D, E, and F notes have suffered interest shortfalls as a result
and unpaid amounts due on these classes have been deferred.

S&P notes, in the context of the other troubled loan in this
transaction (the DIVA loan), that the incurrence of special
servicing fees has not had the same impact in every case.  This
loan defaulted in 2008 when the borrowers went into insolvency;
the loan was transferred to special servicing in that year.  Since
then, funds for payment of debt service at loan level have been
released on an irregular basis, and insufficient funds have been
received on a number of loan interest payment dates to meet the
loan-level obligations in full.

However, on some of these IPDs note interest was not deferred,
which indicates that special servicing fees did not trigger note
shortfalls on those IPDs.  On these occasions with respect to the
DIVA case, S&P understands the interest payments at the loan level
were applied in a different order to that in the Quartier 206
loan; namely, special servicing fees were paid in priority to swap
payments, allowing the borrower to draw liquidity for the
resulting shortfall in swap payments, thereby avoiding a shortfall
that would have otherwise occurred under the securitized loan, and
in turn under the notes.  S&P understands that the transaction
documentation allows liquidity drawings for these costs.

It is unclear to us why the same procedure did not apply for the
Quartier 206 loan or the other occasions when this arose under the
DIVA loan, given that the priority of payment rules appear to be
the same in the intercreditor agreements (namely, the agreements
between borrower, senior lender (issuer), and junior lender) for
these two loans.

S&P's ratings address timely payment of interest (along with
repayment of the note principal no later than the note maturity
date).  S&P believes the likelihood of recurring note interest
shortfalls has increased for the class C, D, and E notes as a
result of the Quartier 206 loan default, and S&P has therefore
lowered its ratings on these classes.

S&P also understands that the property securing the Quartier 206
loan was revalued in January 2010 at EUR96.3 million, compared
with a 2006 value of EUR181.0 million -- a 47% decline.  S&P
considers that this may be a conservative estimate when compared
with other prime retail and office properties, where S&P has
observed value declines of 10% or less in the same time period

S&P also notes, in the case of the DIVA loan, a January 2009
property valuation of EUR193.9 million, which compares to a day 1
value of EUR308.13 million.  Based on this alone, S&P considers
that the junior notes may incur principal losses.

Titan Europe 2006-5 is a commercial mortgage-backed securities
transaction that has seven loans, secured on commercial and
residential real estate assets in Germany.

                          Ratings List

                    Titan Europe 2006-5 PLC
EUR660.969 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

                        Ratings Lowered

                                Rating
                                ------
              Class       To               From
              -----       --               ----
              C           BB- (sf)         BB+ (sf)
              D           B- (sf)          BB (sf)
              E           CCC- (sf)        BB- (sf)

                       Ratings Unaffected

                      Class       Rating
                      -----       ------
                      A1          AAA (sf)
                      A2          AAA (sf)
                      A3          A+ (sf)
                      B           BBB+ (sf)
                      F           D (sf)
                      X           AAA (sf)


===========
G R E E C E
===========


* GREECE: Loan Extension Hinges on Other Member Nations
-------------------------------------------------------
The International Monetary Fund is prepared to give Greece more
time to repay its loan to the institution if European nations,
which provided the bulk of a joint EUR110 billion (US$154 billion)
package, decide to do so first, Sandrine Rastello and Rebecca
Christie at Bloomberg News report, citing Managing Director
Dominique Strauss-Kahn.

Greek officials are doing "exactly what they need to do" to rein
in spending and meet the benchmarks set out as a condition of aid,
Mr. Strauss-Kahn said in a television interview with Bloomberg HT
on Saturday.  Mr. Strauss-Kahn, as cited by Bloomberg, said
whether Greece needs the extension depends on the state of the
global economy.

Bloomberg notes IMF documents shows Greece's gross borrowing needs
will rise to EUR70.8 billion in 2014 from EUR53.2 billion the year
before as repayments the EU and the fund increase.

Bloomberg notes Mr. Strauss-Kahn said he expected IMF member
nations would reach an agreement over the next two weeks on how to
change the fund's governing structure to give emerging-market
nations a bigger voice.

Separately, Bloomberg News' Simon Kennedy reports Greek Finance
Minister George Papaconstantinou said his country has avoided
bankruptcy and has placed its budget on a sustainable path.


* S&P Downgrades Ratings on Subordinated Debt on Four Greek Banks
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered by one notch
its ratings on the nondeferrable subordinated debt guaranteed by
four rated Greek banks (see ratings list below for entities
affected).

The rating action corrects a misapplication of S&P's criteria when
S&P lowered the counterparty credit ratings on these banks to
speculative grade in April this year.

As a result of this correction, S&P now rate Greek banks'
nondeferrable subordinated debt two notches below their CCRs.

S&P typically rate banks' conventional nondeferrable subordinated
debt one notch below the CCR for investment-grade issuers and two
notches lower when the CCR is speculative grade.  This is to
reflect its view that the nondeferrable subordinated debt shares a
similar default risk to senior debt, but is generally subordinated
in administration, insolvency, or similar proceedings.

                         NBG Finance PLC

                                            To          From
                                            --          ----
      Nondeferrable subordinated debt       BB-        BB
       (Guaranteed by National Bank of Greece S.A.)

                          EFG Hellas PLC

                                            To          From
                                            --          ----
      Nondeferrable subordinated debt       B+         BB-
       (Guaranteed by EFG Eurobank Ergasias S.A.

                     Alpha Credit Group PLC

                                            To          From
                                            --          ----
      Nondeferrable subordinated debt       B+         BB-
       (Guaranteed by Alpha Bank A.E.)

                    Piraeus Group Finance PLC

                                            To          From
                                            --          ----
      Nondeferrable subordinated debt       B+         BB-
       (Guaranteed by Piraeus Bank S.A.)

      N.B. This list does not include all ratings affected.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


AER ARANN: Has Investment Deal With Stobart; Examinership Extended
------------------------------------------------------------------
Ciaran Hancock at The Irish Times reports that UK-listed company
Stobart on Monday said that it has agreed to make an investment in
Aer Arann, a move that should allow the Irish airline to exit
examinership.  According to The Irish Times, this will give the
company a "small stake" in Aer Arann, which was placed into
examinership in August, in the form of a convertible preference
share.

It is understood that current owner, Galway businessman Padraig
O'Ceidigh will continue to be Aer Arann's majority shareholder and
the management team, led by chief executive Paul Schutz, will
remain in place, The Irish Times states.

The Irish Times relates sources said the total investment in Aer
Arann could top EUR4 million.  This would be used for working
capital and to repay creditors of the airline, The Irish Times
notes.

The Irish Times relates the High Court on Monday extended the
examinership at Aer Arann until October 22.  The Irish Times
explains this allows the examiner, Grant Thornton's Michael
McAteer, time to finalize a scheme of arrangement with creditors,
who are owed about EUR18 million.

Aer Arann's creditors include Allied Irish Banks, the Dublin
Airport Authority, the Revenue Commissioners, and aircraft
manufacturer ATR, The Irish Times discloses.

Aer Arann operates 13 aircraft.  It employs 320 people at its
bases in Dublin and Galway, as well as in Shannon, Cork, Waterford
and the Isle of Man.


ALLIED IRISH: Government Won't Impose Losses on Bondholders
-----------------------------------------------------------
Suzanne Lynch and Simon Carswell at The Irish Times report that
the National Treasury Management Agency moved to reassure senior
and subordinated bondholders in Allied Irish Banks and Bank of
Ireland that their investments would be honored.

The Irish Times relates the agency, which manages the State's
debt, took the unusual step of issuing a statement clarifying the
Irish government's position on the repayment of bank debt.

According to The Irish Times, the agency said in a statement that
Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan had no plans to impose losses
on senior bondholders in any credit institution in the State
through any legislative measures.

The Irish Times notes the agency said the Minister had advised
that "prospective resolution and reorganization legislation,
insofar as it affects subordinated debt in issue, will apply only
to such debt in issue from institutions which are not listed on a
recognized stock exchange, are in 100 per cent State control and
cannot survive in the absence of total State support."

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c., together with its subsidiaries --
http://www.aibgroup.com/-- conducts retail and commercial banking
business in Ireland.  It also provides corporate lending and
capital markets activities from its head office at Bankcentre and
from Dublin's International Financial Services Centre.  The Group
also has overseas branches in the United States, Germany, France
and Australia, among other locations.  The business of AIB Group
is conducted through four operating divisions: AIB Bank Republic
of Ireland division, Capital Markets division, AIB Bank UK
division, and Central & Eastern Europe division.  In February
2008, the Group acquired the AmCredit mortgage business in the
Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.  In September
2008, the Group also acquired a 49.99% shareholding in BACB.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 23,
2010, Moody's Investors Service affirmed AIB's long-term bank
deposit and debt ratings.  These are A1 for long-term bank
deposits and senior debt, A2 for dated subordinated debt, Ba3 for
undated subordinated debt, B1 for cumulative tier 1 securities and
Caa1 for non-cumulative tier 1 securities.  Moody's said the
outlook on these ratings is stable.  AIB's bank financial strength
rating of D, which maps to Ba2 on the long term rating scale, with
a positive outlook was unaffected by the rating action.


ALLIED IRISH: To Raise EUR5.4 Billion in Placing & Open Offer
-------------------------------------------------------------
John Murray Brown at The Financial Times reports that Allied Irish
Banks is having to raise EUR5.4 billion (GBP4.7 billion, US$7.6
billion) in a placing and open offer to shareholders to bring its
core tier one capital ratio to 8% by the year end.

According to the FT, brokers calculate the government could end up
with more than 90%, with the capital hole the bank is seeking to
cover 20 times bigger than the current market value of the bank.

The National Pension Reserve Fund is underwriting the issue, the
FT discloses.  It already owns 18% of Allied Irish Banks after the
bank was blocked by other creditors from paying the coupon on the
government's EUR3.5 billion preference share investment, the FT
notes.  The NPRF will convert EUR1.7 billion of the preference
shares and make a EUR3.7 billion cash investment, the FT says.

The ultimate structure will keep the state's voting shares below
75% in line with European Union listing requirements, and the
government's stated aim to retain a public flotation, according to
the FT.  This is seen as the government's best route to disposing
of its investment, the FT says.

After Anglo Irish Bank, Allied Irish Banks had the biggest
property exposure, taking EUR10.8 billion of losses on the land
and development loans now being transferred to the National Asset
Management Agency, the government's bad bank, the FT states.

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c., together with its subsidiaries --
http://www.aibgroup.com/-- conducts retail and commercial banking
business in Ireland.  It also provides corporate lending and
capital markets activities from its head office at Bankcentre and
from Dublin's International Financial Services Centre.  The Group
also has overseas branches in the United States, Germany, France
and Australia, among other locations.  The business of AIB Group
is conducted through four operating divisions: AIB Bank Republic
of Ireland division, Capital Markets division, AIB Bank UK
division, and Central & Eastern Europe division.  In February
2008, the Group acquired the AmCredit mortgage business in the
Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.  In September
2008, the Group also acquired a 49.99% shareholding in BACB.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 23,
2010, Moody's Investors Service affirmed AIB's long-term bank
deposit and debt ratings.  These are A1 for long-term bank
deposits and senior debt, A2 for dated subordinated debt, Ba3 for
undated subordinated debt, B1 for cumulative tier 1 securities and
Caa1 for non-cumulative tier 1 securities.  Moody's said the
outlook on these ratings is stable.  AIB's bank financial strength
rating of D, which maps to Ba2 on the long term rating scale, with
a positive outlook was unaffected by the rating action.


BANK OF IRELAND: Government Won't Impose Losses on Bondholders
--------------------------------------------------------------
Suzanne Lynch and Simon Carswell at The Irish Times report that
the National Treasury Management Agency moved to reassure senior
and subordinated bondholders in Allied Irish Banks and Bank of
Ireland that their investments would be honored.

The Irish Times relates the agency, which manages the State's
debt, took the unusual step of issuing a statement clarifying the
Irish government's position on the repayment of bank debt.

According to The Irish Times, the agency said in a statement that
Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan had no plans to impose losses
on senior bondholders in any credit institution in the State
through any legislative measures.

The Irish Times notes the agency said the Minister had advised
that "prospective resolution and reorganization legislation,
insofar as it affects subordinated debt in issue, will apply only
to such debt in issue from institutions which are not listed on a
recognized stock exchange, are in 100 per cent State control and
cannot survive in the absence of total State support."

Headquartered in Dublin, Bank of Ireland --
http://www.bankofireland.com/-- provides a range of banking and
other financial services.  These include checking and deposit
services, overdrafts, term loans, mortgages, business and
corporate lending, international asset financing, leasing,
installment credit, debt factoring, foreign exchange facilities,
interest and exchange rate hedging instruments, executor, trustee,
life assurance and pension and investment fund management, fund
administration and custodial services and financial advisory
services, including mergers and acquisitions and underwriting.
The Company organizes its businesses into Retail Republic of
Ireland, Bank of Ireland Life, Capital Markets, UK Financial
Services and Group Centre.  It has operations throughout Ireland,
the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States.

                         *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 15,
2010, Moody's Investors Service upgraded the bank financial
strength rating of Bank of Ireland to D+ from D.  The D+ maps to
Baa3 on the long-term scale and the D mapped to Ba2.  The outlook
on the BFSR is stable.  The other ratings of the bank, including
the A1 (stable)/Prime-1 bank deposit and senior debt ratings, are
affirmed.  The BFSR of ICS Building Society was also upgraded to
D+ (mapping to Baa3 on the long-term scale) from D/Ba2, in line
with that of its parent.  The outlook on the A2 long-term bank
deposit rating of the society was changed to negative.

Moody's said in addition to the ongoing burden stemming from the
impairment of the non-NAMA assets, the D+ BFSR also incorporates
other challenges facing the bank such as (i) the wind-down of the
large portfolio of non-core assets of which the largest part is
the UK intermediary distributed mortgage book (EUR30 billion at
end-June 2010) and, along with that, a reduction in the bank's
relatively high utilization of wholesale funding; (ii) the sale of
businesses due to European Commission requirements in return for
approval of the state aid; and (iii) the risk of a further
downturn in the economies of Ireland and the UK.


CALYPSO CAPITAL: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Series 2010-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has assigned a
preliminary 'BB (sf)' credit rating to the series 2010-1, class A
notes to be issued under the EUR1.5 billion principal-at-risk
variable-rate note program, Calypso Capital Ltd., sponsored by AXA
Global P&C.  This will be the first series of notes to be issued
under this program.

Calypso Capital is a special-purpose company incorporated under
the laws of Ireland.  All of its issued and outstanding share
capital will be held in trust for charitable purposes by
Wilmington Trust SP Services (Dublin) Ltd.

AXA Global P&C, a wholly-owned subsidiary of AXA, which is a
global multiline provider of insurance.  It is proposing to enter
into this transaction to receive a multiyear source of reinsurance
capacity for certain European windstorm events.  The transaction
covers European windstorms that pass through Belgium, Denmark,
France (excluding overseas territories), Germany, Ireland,
Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Switzerland, and the U.K.

The proceeds of the notes will serve to provide Axa with a source
of industry loss-based cover for windstorms in Europe over a
three-year period.


QUINN INSURANCE: Liberty Mutual & Travelers on Bidder Shortlist
---------------------------------------------------------------
InsolvencyJournal.ie, citing The Sunday Business Post's Ian Kehoe,
reports that Liberty Mutual and Travelers, two of the biggest
insurance companies in the world, are on the shortlist to purchase
Quinn Insurance.

According to The Sunday Business Post, the two companies are on a
five-name shortlist, along with Anglo Irish Bank and two other,
unknown, bidders.

Anglo has decided not to form an "alliance" with Quinn founder
Sean Quinn, or any of his family, The Sunday Business Post notes.

The family had expected to be part of the Anglo bid, The Sunday
Business Post relates, "arguing that it was the only way they
could foreseeably pay down the family's EUR2.8 billion debt
mountain."

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 7,
2010, Belfast Telegraph said that the family of Mr. Quinn has said
it is committed to repaying all its debts.  Belfast Telegraph
disclosed the board of the insurance-to-cement Quinn group --
effectively Mr. Quinn's family -- was responding to newspaper
reports that nationalized Anglo Irish Bank had written off EUR2.3
billion of the EUR3 billion owed by the Derrylin-born tycoon and
his family.  "It has not sought, or been offered as part of any
consensual restructuring of the family's indebtedness, any write-
off whatsoever of any of the debt due," a statement on the Quinn
Group Web site said, according to Belfast Telegraph.  Belfast
Telegraph noted the family also said a proposal from Anglo Irish
Bank to take over Quinn Insurance, which was placed into
administration in April, would generate substantial returns.

Quinn Insurance has more than 20% of the motor and health
insurance market in Ireland.  Employing almost 2,800 people in
Britain and Ireland, it was founded in 1996 and entered the UK
market in 2004.


* IRELAND: Expects Cash Pile to Stave Off Greek-Style Rescue
------------------------------------------------------------
Dara Doyle at Bloomberg News reports that Ireland expects its
EUR20 billion (US$28 billion) cash pile to stave off a Greek-style
rescue, as the government taps the funds to avoid paying record
rates to borrow.

According to Bloomberg, the government canceled next week's debt
auction and another scheduled for November after the yield on 10-
year Irish bonds rose to a record 454 basis points above benchmark
German bunds.  Bloomberg relates Finance Minister Brian Lenihan
has said Ireland is "fully funded" through the middle of 2011.
The country has EUR4.4 billion of bonds maturing next year,
compared with about EUR27 billion in Greece, Bloomberg discloses.

Bloomberg says Mr. Lenihan plans to travel to New York this week
to convince investors that Ireland will fix its financial system
without bankrupting the state.  The government's bill to bail out
the nation's banks may reach EUR50 billion, stoking concern that
it would become the first nation after Greece to seek aid and draw
from the EUR750 billion rescue fund set up by the European Union
and International Monetary Fund set up in May, Bloomberg notes.

Mr. Lenihan will lay out his plan next month to narrow the budget
deficit to 3% of the gross domestic product by the end of 2014,
Bloomberg states.  The fiscal deficit is set to increase to 32% of
GDP this year with the government's pledge to inject funds into
lenders led by Anglo Irish Bank Corp., according to Bloomberg.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


SAGRANTINO ITALY: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Sagrantino Italy S.r.l.'s notes.  The
transaction is a securitization of 11 portfolios of non-performing
loans originated in Italy by a number of banks and financial
institutions, most of which had been previously securitised in
other transactions, both public and private.

  -- EUR23.7m class A (IT0004294820) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- EUR86.5m class B (IT0004294838) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- EUR48m class C (IT0004294846) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- EUR24.5m class D (IT0004294853) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Negative

  -- EUR32.7m class E (IT0004295025) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
     Negative

The affirmation of the notes follows a satisfactory review of the
performance of the transaction to date.

Cumulative collections remain approximately 40% lower than the
amount anticipated by the servicer, Pirelli RE Credit Servicing
S.p.A. (rated 'RSS2+IT'/'CSS2+IT'), in the business plan at
closing (December 2007) and also 35% lower than Fitch's original
base case assumptions.  However, performance has been stable over
the past year.  Recovery rates on secured claims (42.8%) remain in
line with Fitch's expectations and delays experienced in the
recovery timing have already been taken into account in last
year's downgrade.

As of the July 2010 interest payment date, the reported gross book
value of the portfolio was EUR1,429.2 million, down from EUR2,576
million at closing.  The portfolio is mainly concentrated in
central and southern Italy and the majority of claims are backed
by loans advanced to corporate borrowers.  Cumulative recoveries
to date on fully closed claims amount to EUR181.2 million on a GBV
of EUR1,148 million.  Recoveries on unsecured loans amount to only
3.4%, although the proportion of unsecured loans remaining in the
portfolio (by GBV) has fallen to 10% from 28% at closing.

The most recent servicer business plan, which was updated six
months ago, assumes further delays in expected collections and a
3% increase in cumulative collections.  Fitch notes that
cumulative collections are already 4% below these new assumed
levels.


VENUS-1 FINANCE: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Venus-1 Finance S.r.l.'s five classes
of notes.  Venus-1 Finance S.r.l. is a securitization of two
portfolios of non-performing loans, Monviso 1 and Monviso 2.

  -- EUR19.7m class A (IT0004148026) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- EUR8.2m class B (IT0004148034) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- EUR6.3m class C (IT0004148042) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- EUR9.1m class D (IT0004148059) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- EUR6.5m class E (IT0004148067) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Stable

The affirmation of the notes follows a satisfactory review of the
performance of the transaction to date.

As of the June 2010 interest payment date, the reported gross book
value of the portfolio was EUR254.7 million, down from EUR303.2
million at closing, while cumulative total collections were
EUR57.4 million.  The recovery rate from the work-out of closed
positions remains robust at 93.1%.

While total collections continue to be below the servicer's
original business plan and the last revised business plan received
by Fitch, the performance of the transaction has continued to
improve over the last two years.  Total collections stand at 88%
of the original business plan versus 82% as of June 2009 and 76%
as of June 2008.  This, along with the robust recoveries as a
percentage of GBV, is commensurate with the current ratings.

The portfolios were originated in Italy by Sanpaolo IMI Group, now
part of the Intesa Sanpaolo group ('AA-'/Stable/'F1+'), and were
acquired in 2005 by ABN AMRO Bank N.V. (ated 'A+'/Stable/'F1+')
and FBS Luxembourg S.a.r.l., which acquired a small portion of the
Monviso 1 portfolio of EUR1 million.  At closing, the portfolio
was made up of predominantly unsecured NPLs, with 30,120 unsecured
claims outstanding (94% of all claims at closing) and 1,925
secured claims (6%).


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


HOLLAND MORTGAGE: Moody's Assigns B1 (sf) Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive credit ratings
to these classes of notes issued by Holland Mortgage Backed Series
(HERMES) XVII B.V. on 14 May 2009:

  -- Aaa (sf) to the EUR3,045,000,000 Senior Class A Mortgage
     Backed Floating Rate Notes 2009 due 2046

  -- Aa1 (sf) to the EUR59,500,000 Mezanine Class B Mortgage
     Backed Floating Rate Notes 2009 due 2046

  -- Aa1 (sf) to the EUR108,500,000 Mezanine Class C Mortgage
     Backed Floating Rate Notes 2009 due 2046

  -- Aa3 (sf) to the EUR175,000,000 Junior Class D Mortgage
     Backed Floating Rate Notes 2009 due 2046

  -- B1 (sf) to the EUR112,000,000 Subordinated Class E Mortgage
     Backed Floating Rate Notes 2009 due 2046

The transaction closed in May 2009 and was initially not rated by
Moody's.  The notes issued at closing amounted to EUR3.5 billion.

The transaction represents the seventeenth securitization of Dutch
residential mortgage loans originated and serviced by SNS Bank
N.V. (A3/P-2); BLG Hypotheekbank N.V (Not Rated) and SNS Regio
Bank N.V. (Not Rated) under the name HERMES.  The latter two are
wholly owned subsidiaries of SNS Bank N.V. and benefit from a 403
guarantee from SNS REAAL (Baa1).  The assets supporting the notes,
which amount to around EUR3.5 billion, are prime mortgage loans
secured on residential properties located in the Netherlands.

                        Ratings Rationale

The ratings of the notes takes into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined
the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement and the portfolio expected loss,
as well as the transaction structure and any legal considerations
as assessed in Moody's cash flow analysis.

The expected portfolio loss of 0.75% and the MILAN Aaa required
Credit Enhancement of 8.00% served as input parameters for Moody's
cash flow model, which is based on a probabilistic lognormal
distribution as described in the report "The Lognormal Method
Applied to ABS Analysis", published in September 2000.

The key driver for the relatively high MILAN Aaa Credit
Enhancement number is (i) a higher than the average originator
adjustment and (ii) given the structure is revolving Moody's has
modelled to the portfolio limits, notably (a) the weighted-average
LTfV of 88.2% (currently 87.5%) and (b) 88.6% limit on interest
only loans (currently 83.3%).

The key drivers for the portfolio expected loss are (i) the weak
performance of the sellers books and precedent HERMES transactions
and (ii) benchmarking with comparable transactions in the Dutch
RMBS market.  Given the historical performance of the Dutch RMBS
market and the originator's precedent transactions (in which pools
with similar risk characteristics have been securitized), Moody's
believes the assumed expected loss is appropriate for this
transaction.

Another key characteristic of this transaction is that
approximately 30.2% of the portfolio is linked to life insurance
policies (life mortgage loans), which are exposed to set-off risk
in case an insurance company goes bankrupt.  The seller has not
provided loan-by-loan insurance company counterparty data and
instead provided a partial list of counterparty names that provide
life insurance policies in the pool.  Based on the available data
over 70% of the counterparty exposure is linked to policies
provided by SNS REAAL N.V. and Fortis ASR Levensverzekeringen N.V.

The rating addresses the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and principal with
respect to the notes by the legal final maturity.  Moody's ratings
only address the credit risk associated with the transaction.
Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

The V-Score for this transaction is Medium, indicating a higher
score compared to the V-Score assigned for the Dutch prime RMBS
sector of Low/Medium, mainly due to the fact that (i) swap
counterparty does not meet Moody's first trigger rating
requirements.  As a consequence, under the swap documents SNS Bank
is required to post collateral.  However, the value of the swap as
calculated by the swap provider is currently "in the money" for
the swap provider resulting in no collateral required to be posted
as of now; (ii) no-loan-by loan information on insurance company
counterparty data and (iii) precedent transactions are
underperforming the Dutch RMBS market benchmark.  V-Scores are a
relative assessment of the quality of available credit information
and of the degree of dependence on various assumptions used in
determining the rating.  High variability in key assumptions could
expose a rating to more likelihood of rating changes.  The V-Score
has been assigned accordingly to the report "V-Scores and
Parameter Sensitivities in the Major EMEA RMBS Sectors" published
in April 2009.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the portfolio expected loss
was increased from 0.75% of current balance to 2.3% of current
balance, the model output indicates that the Class A/B/C/D/E notes
have been Aaa/Aa1/Aa1/A3/B3 assuming that MILAN Aaa Credit
Enhancement remains at 8.0% and all other factors remain equal.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.  The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended to
measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time,
but rather how the initial rating of the security might have
differed if key rating input parameters were varied.  Parameter
Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are calculated
by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary rating model.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account one or
more third party due diligence reports on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction and the due diligence
reports had a neutral impact on the rating.

                     Regulatory Disclosures

Information sources used to prepare the credit rating are these:
parties involved in the ratings, parties not involved in the
ratings, public information, confidential and proprietary Moody's
Investors Service information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the
purposes of assigning a credit rating.

MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, MOODY'S is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


SAGRES SOCIEDADE: S&P Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to 'B- (sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on the class C, D, and E
notes in SAGRES Sociedade de Titularizacao de Creditos, S.A.'s
series Chaves SME CLO No. 1.  At the same time, S&P affirmed and
removed from CreditWatch negative the ratings on the class A and B
notes.

The rating actions follow a review of the credit assumptions
underlying the cash flow analysis of the transaction.  The main
reason for S&P's review has been the increase in defaults in the
underlying portfolio, which have exceeded its base case
assumptions made at closing.  Following a review of the credit
quality of the portfolio, S&P has increased its default base case
and have performed a cash flow analysis based on these revised
inputs.

S&P's analysis indicates that the senior notes retain sufficient
credit enhancement to maintain their current ratings.  For these
notes, the effect of the increase in defaults appears to have been
offset by the amortization of the class A notes since August 2009
(following a breach of the transaction's purchase condition).
However, for the junior notes, S&P's analysis indicates that the
current levels of credit enhancement are no longer sufficient to
support the ratings.  S&P has therefore lowered its ratings on
these notes accordingly.

The transaction has seen an increase in the number of defaults
since the beginning of 2009.  Although Q3 2009 marked the high-
point of defaults, they have continued to be significant.  The
transaction has allocated defaults to the relevant principal
deficiency ledgers.  Since S&P's rating action in June 2010,
further defaults have been allocated to the PDLs.  The PDLs for
classes D and E are now fully loaded, while that of class C is
loaded to 5.6% of the note balance.  On the August 2010 payment
date, interest payments to the class D and E notes were deferred.
Classes C, D, and E are deferrable-interest notes and their
ratings address the ultimate payment of interest and principal.

The transaction benefits from excess spread, which is available to
reduce the PDL balances.  However, this has not been sufficient to
fully counteract the increase associated with the defaulted loans.

Chaves is a cash securitization of loans granted by Banco
Portugues de Negocios to its small and midsize enterprise clients.
The transaction closed in December 2006.

                          Ratings List

       SAGRES Sociedade de Titularizacao de Creditos, S.A.
EUR616.57 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Securitisation Notes
                    (Chaves SME CLO No. 1)

      Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

                           Rating
                           ------
          Class      To             From
          -----      --             ----
          C          BBB (sf)       A- (sf)/Watch Neg
          D          BB (sf)        BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
          E          B- (sf)        BB- (sf)/Watch Neg

     Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

                           Rating
                           ------
          Class      To             From
          -----      --             ----
          A          AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
          B          AA (sf)        AA (sf)/Watch Neg


===========
R U S S I A
===========


INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL: Moody's Downgrades Debt Ratings to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term local and
foreign currency debt and deposit ratings of International
Industrial Bank to C from Caa2.  The bank's E bank financial
strength rating and Not Prime short-term local and foreign
currency deposit ratings were affirmed.  All ratings are now at
their lowest possible levels and the outlook on the global scale
ratings is stable.

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of the debt and deposit ratings to C reflects
Moody's expectation that IIB's senior unsecured creditors will
incur a loss of more than 50%, with the exception of private
individuals with deposits at the bank up to RUB700,000 (which are
eligible for 100% repayment by the State Corporation Deposit
Insurance Agency.  According to Moody's, the rating action was
triggered by the withdrawal of IIB's banking license by the
Central Bank of Russia on 5 October 2010 "due to misrepresentation
of financial reporting figures and inability to meet its
obligations to creditors".  The rating action concludes the review
with direction uncertain on the affected ratings initiated by
Moody's on 30 June 2010.

The previous rating action on IIB was on 30 June 2010 when Moody's
downgraded these ratings: long-term debt and deposit ratings to
Caa2 from B3, and BFSR to E from E+.  At that time, the bank's
Caa2 long-term ratings were also placed on review with direction
uncertain, while the E BFSR and Not-Prime short-term debt and
deposit ratings carried stable outlook.

Domiciled in Moscow, Russia, International Industrial Bank
reported total unaudited unconsolidated assets of RUB120 billion
according to local accounting standards as at September 2010.

                     Regulatory Disclosures

Information source used to prepare the credit rating is these:
public information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the
purposes of maintaining a credit rating.

MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, MOODY'S is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


MDM BANK: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Rating to Senior Unsecured Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's assigns a Ba2 long-term global local currency debt rating
to MDM Bank's senior unsecured debt.  The rating carries a stable
outlook.  Any subsequent local currency senior unsecured debt
issuance by MDM Bank will be rated at the same rating level
subject to there being no material change in the bank's overall
credit rating.

The Ba2 rating was assigned to these debt instruments:

  -- RUB3,000M Senior Unsecured Regular Bonds due 2011
  -- RUB5,000M Senior Unsecured Regular Bonds due 2012
  -- RUB6,203M Senior Unsecured Regular Bonds due 2015

                        Ratings Rationale

The assigned rating is in line with MDM Bank's global local
currency deposit rating of Ba2.  This rating is underpinned by the
bank's positioning among the leading Russian financial
institutions, its diversified business profile with expertise in
both corporate and retail banking, widespread distribution
network, sound corporate governance and risk management practices,
historically adequate efficiency and operating profitability, as
well as the bank's good capitalization levels.  At the same time,
MDM Bank's rating is constrained by the challenging macroeconomic
environment in Russia and globally, which particularly heighten
credit risk for the bank, and the substantial, albeit gradually
improving, concentrations of the bank's loan book and customer
funding base.  Finally, the rating does not incorporate any
expectation of systemic support from the authorities in case of
need.

Headquartered in the city of Novosibirsk, the Russian Federation,
MDM Bank reported -- as at 31 December 2009 -- total assets of
US$13.3, total equity of US$2.0 billion and net IFRS loss of US$46
million.

                     Regulatory Disclosures

Information sources used to prepare the credit rating are these:
parties involved in the ratings, parties not involved in the
ratings, public information, confidential and proprietary Moody's
Investors Service's information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the
purposes of assigning a credit rating.

MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, MOODY'S is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


NIZHNIY NOVGOROD: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Ratings to Domestic Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the Nizhniy Novgorod Region's RUB5bn
domestic bond (ISIN RU000A0JR2H0), due 7 October 2015, final
ratings of Long-term local currency 'B+' and National Long-term
'A(rus)'.

The region's Long-term foreign and local currency ratings are both
'B+'.  The region has a Short-term foreign currency rating of 'B'
and a National Long-term rating of 'A(rus)'.  The Outlooks on the
Long-term ratings are Stable.

The bond has a fixed step-down coupon.  The initial coupon rate
was set by the issuer at 8.5%.  The principal will be amortized by
30% of the initial bond issue value on 3 October 2013, and by
another 40% on 2 October 2014.  The remaining 30% will be redeemed
on 7 October 2015.  The proceeds from the bond will be used to
refinance maturing debt and to fund capital expenditure.

The Nizhniy Novgorod Region is located in the central part of the
Russian Federation.  It contributed 1.74% of the RF's GDP in 2008
and accounted for 2.35% of the country's population.


VENTRELT HOLDINGS: Fitch Affirms Issuer Default Rating at 'BB-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ventrelt Holdings Ltd's Long-term
foreign currency Issuer Default Rating and Long-term local
currency IDR at 'BB-' and its National Long-term rating at
'A+(rus)'.  The Outlooks for all the Long-term ratings are Stable.
The Group operates in Russia under the name of Rosvodokanal.

Fitch has also affirmed the senior unsecured rating of RVK-Finance
LLC's RUB1.75 billion bond at 'BB-'.  The bond issued by RVK-
Finance LLC, a wholly-owned indirect subsidiary of Ventrelt
Holdings, benefits from sureties provided on a joint and several
basis by RVK-Invest LLC, Krasnodar Vodokanal LLC, Tyumen Vodokanal
LLC and Kaluzhsky oblastnoy vodokanal LLC, which are all wholly-
owned indirect subsidiaries of Ventrelt Holdings.

The ratings reflect the existing regulatory framework in the
Russian Federation, the Group's strong market position, its
moderate leverage and its existing short-term funding structure.

To date, water and sewage tariffs in Russian cities are negotiated
annually between the water utility company and the city
administration.  Tariffs take into consideration operating
expenditure budgets and envisaged capital expenditure programs,
essentially representing a cost-plus mechanism.  The ageing
infrastructure in the Russian Federation needs upgrading, for
which some municipalities are increasingly relying on private
companies and their operating expertise, as well as investment
commitments.  The changes in concession legislation introduced in
2010 provide for, among other things, long-term utility tariffs
that, when fully implemented, would increase earnings visibility
in the sector and improve the legal status and protection of
concessionaires.  Until then, Fitch's assessment of the sector's
business risk will be based on the existing regulatory framework.

The Group's Net Debt/EBITDA for FY09 was around 1.4x.  In order to
better capture operational performance, Fitch calculates Net
Debt/connection fee adjusted EBITDA of 2.4x (deducting the capital
element included within EBITDA).  This measure is expected to
remain below 4x at all times.  In addition, interest cover has
fallen to around 3.0x with the Group taking on additional debt
over time and interest costs rising during 2009.  The latter has
reversed over 2010 and, therefore, interest cover should
strengthen in the short to medium term.  Fitch's forecasts assume
that macroeconomic conditions in Russia do not allow for large
tariff increases in the near future and, therefore, capital
expenditures will be contained at levels commensurate with
available cash flow, and, to a limited extent, long-term bank
borrowings.

In 2008, the Group entered into a 13-year RUB1.5 billion term loan
with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  All
other funding is short-term, including the outstanding bonds
issued by RVK-Finance LLC, which mature in July 2011, and
borrowings from Russian banks.  In line with other Fitch-rated
entities, the refinancing risk is judged to be acceptable due to
the moderate financial gearing of the Group, the long-term
contractual arrangements with municipalities to provide essential
infrastructure services and the implicit support from a number of
banks, including OJSC Alfa-Bank ('BB'/Stable), an entity under the
common control with the Group, and Russian state-controlled banks
that can be expected to participate in municipality-related
financings.

Rosvodokanal is the leading private operator in the Russian water
market.  The Group's management system provides for monthly
reporting of performance of the operating companies.  Dedicated
head office functions examine performance against annual budgets
and provide technical expertise.  This oversight distinguishes
Rosvodokanal from the majority of Russian water utilities, which
are municipality-owned, over-staffed, and technically-oriented,
with an inadequate focus on efficiency, cost recovery and other
related commercial and management practices.


* RUSSIA: Regional Government Bailouts on "Case-By-Case" Basis
--------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Abelsky at Bloomberg News reports that Russian Deputy Finance
Minister Dmitry Pankin said the country will decide on a "case-by-
case" basis whether to bail out regional governments to avoid
defaults.

Bloomberg relates Standard & Poor's said in an Oct. 4 report that
regional governments may default in the next two years as federal
authorities scale back emergency aid provided during the crisis.

Ruling out allowing a regional government to default would be
"unacceptable," though the federal government reserves the right
to extend emergency aid, Mr. Pankin, as cited by Bloomberg, said.
"Of course, we have support levers, we can provide budget loans."

Low-interest federal loans granted to finance regional deficits
will be reduced by 20% next year after a 15% cut in 2010, S&P
estimates, according to Bloomberg.


* TVER OBLAST: S&P Changes Outlook to Stable; Affirms 'B+' Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had revised its
outlook on Russian Tver Oblast to stable from negative.  At the
same time, the 'B+' long-term issuer credit and 'ruA+' Russian
national scale ratings were affirmed.  The recovery rating on the
republic's unsecured debt remains unchanged at '3'.

"The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that Tver Oblast's
expected debt service has decreased following the improvement of
its debt structure," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Alexandra Balod.  "Combined with recovering financial performance
and adequate liquidity levels, it is likely to reduce refinancing
risks."

The ratings reflect S&P's view of the oblast's low revenue and
expenditure flexibility and predictability; only modest operating
margins compared with expected debt service; and its low wealth
levels.  The ratings are supported by the oblast's favorable
location between Moscow and St. Petersburg, moderate economic
diversification, and low contingent liabilities.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Tver Oblast will
maintain a cautious debt and liquidity policy, resulting in debt
service below 10% of adjusted operating revenues.  It also factors
in S&P's expectation of moderate economic and budget revenue
growth, resulting in modest operating margins and limited direct
debt accumulation beyond refinancing needs.

"A positive rating action could result from a further decrease in
refinancing risks and debt burden, achieved by extending debt
maturities; stronger-than-forecast budgetary performance; or
improved liquidity," said Ms. Balod.

Conversely, S&P might consider downgrading the oblast if it
accumulates short-term debt, which would lead to higher-than-
forecast debt service and further expose it to refinancing.
Deterioration of the liquidity position and weaker-than-expected
budgetary performance, stemming from an inability to control
operating-spending growth, could also pressure the ratings.


* S&P Raises Rating on Russian City of Surgut to 'BB/ruAA'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had raised its
long-term issuer credit and Russia national scale ratings on the
Russian City of Surgut to 'BB/ruAA' from 'BB-/ruAA-'.  The outlook
is stable.

"The upgrade is based on S&P's reassessment of the city's
liquidity position in light of its recently updated methodology
for rating local and regional governments," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Karen Vartapetov.

The ratings on Surgut are constrained by S&P's view of the city's
stagnating economy and low fiscal flexibility and predictability,
especially in the context of the upcoming mayoral elections and
the development of financial polices toward the city by Khanty-
Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug (BBB-/Negative/--; Russia national scale
'ruAAA').  These weaknesses are exacerbated by the city's and
KMAO's high reliance on the oil industry, which is dominated by
OJSC Surgutneftegas (not rated).

These constraints are mitigated, in S&P's view, by Surgut's low
debt burden, high wealth levels, better infrastructure quality
than the Russian average, and competent and prudent management.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that, despite stagnating
revenues, Surgut's efforts to control operating expenditures
should support its positive budgetary performance.  It also
incorporates S&P's assumption that Surgut will likely maintain low
debt and that its liquidity position will not likely deteriorate
significantly.

"S&P would consider raising the ratings if Surgut's operating
balance and free cash flow were to structurally improve and if
there were more clarity in intergovernmental fiscal relations
between KMAO and Surgut, and if the city's prudent budget and debt
policies continue after the mayoral elections," said Mr.
Vartapetov.

Conversely, S&P could take negative rating actions if the
operating balance were to dip into the red in 2010 and 2011 or if
debt service were to increase more than S&P anticipate, putting
additional pressure on Surgut's liquidity position.


=========
S P A I N
=========


AYT COLATERALES: Moody's Assigns 'C (sf)' Rating to Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive credit ratings
to these classes of notes issued by AyT Colaterales Global
Hipotecario Caja Vital I, FTA:

  -- Aaa (sf) to the EUR175,300,000 Class A Mortgage Backed
     Floating Rate Notes due 2047

  -- Ba3 (sf) to the EUR12,600,000 Class B Mortgage Backed
     Floating Rate Notes due 2047

  -- B3 (sf) to the EUR8,200,000 Class C Mortgage Backed
     Floating Rate Notes due 2047

  -- C (sf) to the EUR3,800,000 Class D Mortgage Backed Floating
     Rate Notes due 2047

                        Ratings Rationale

The ratings of the notes takes into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined
the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement and the portfolio expected loss,
as well as the transaction structure and any legal considerations
as assessed in Moody's cash flow analysis.  The expected portfolio
loss of 3.50% and the MILAN Aaa required Credit Enhancement of
14.00% served as input parameters for Moody's cash flow model,
which is based on a probabilistic lognormal distribution as
described in the report "The Lognormal Method Applied to ABS
Analysis", published in September 2000.

The key drivers for the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement number, which
is lower than other prime Spanish RMBS deals with High Loan to
Value ratios, are (i) the weighted-average current LTV of 83.14%,
with 67.86% of loans above 80% LTV and 21.93% of loans above 90%
LTV (no loans above 100% LTV), (ii) the relatively high borrower
concentration (top 20 represents 4.53%) and geographical
concentration (Basque Country represents 56.92%) and (iii) the
weighted average seasoning of 5.13 years.

The key drivers for the expected loss are (i) the already
available performance for this very same transaction, which is
better than the average reported in the Spain index, (ii) the
static historical information on delinquencies and recoveries
received from the originator for its global mortgage book and
(iii) the weak economic conditions in Spain.  Given the historical
performance of the transaction and the originator's mortgage book,
Moody's believes the assumed expected loss is appropriate for this
transaction.

The strengths of the structure are (i) a reserve fund fully funded
upfront equal to 1.57% of the initial notes balance (it currently
represents 1.79% of the outstanding balance of the notes) to cover
potential shortfall in interest and principal, and (ii) a strong
interest rate swap in place which provides a guaranteed excess
spread (0.50%) above Euribor to the transaction.

The rating addresses the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and principal with
respect of the classes of notes A, B and C by the legal final
maturity, and payment of interest and principal with respect of
the class of notes D by the legal final maturity.  Moody's ratings
only address the credit risk associated with the transaction.
Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

The transaction closed in July 2007 and was initially not rated by
Moody's.  The initial notes balance issued at closing (shown above
next to the assigned rating)) amounted to EUR199 million.  The
outstanding notes balance as of the last payment date in May 2010
amounts to EUR175 million.

Moody's rating analysis of the notes is based on the transaction
structure after the last payment date in May 2010.  The next
payment date will take place in November 2010.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium, which is in line with
the V score assigned for the Spanish RMBS sector.  Only three sub
components underlying the V Score deviate from the average for the
Spanish RMBS sector.  Issuer/Sponsor/Originator's Historical
Performance Variability is Low/Medium, which is lower than the
Medium V score assigned for the Spanish RMBS sector for this sub
component because the performance is better than the average
reported in the Spain index.  The Sector's Historical Downgrade
Rate and Transaction Complexity are assessed as Medium, which are
higher than the Low/Medium V score assigned for the Spanish RMBS
sector for those sub components.  This is due to the exposure of
the transaction to HLTV's which have suffered more downgrades than
traditional mortgages pools in recent years and because HLTV loans
are more exposed to house price declines.  V-Scores are a relative
assessment of the quality of available credit information and of
the degree of dependence on various assumptions used in
determining the rating.  High variability in key assumptions could
expose a rating to more likelihood of rating changes.  The V-Score
has been assigned accordingly to the report "V-Scores and
Parameter Sensitivities in the Major EMEA RMBS Sectors" published
in April 2009.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: the model output indicated that
Class A would have achieved Aaa even if expected loss was as high
as 10.5% (3.0x base case) assuming Milan Aaa CE at 14.0% (base
case) and all other factors remained the same.  Classes B, C and D
would have achieved
The model output further indicated that the Class A would not have
achieved Aaa with Milan Aaa CE of 16.8% (1.2x base case), and
expected loss of 3.5% (base case).  Classes B, C and D would have
achieved Ba3, B3 and
Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.  The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended to
measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time,
but rather how the initial rating of the security might have
differed if key rating input parameters were varied.  Parameter
Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are calculated
by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary rating model.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence reports had
a neutral impact on the rating.

                     Regulatory Disclosures

The rating has been disclosed to the rated entity or its
designated agents and issued with no amendment resulting from that
disclosure.

Information sources used to prepare the credit rating are these:
parties involved in the ratings, parties not involved in the
ratings, public information, confidential and proprietary Moody's
Investors Service information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the
purposes of assigning a credit rating.

MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, MOODY'S is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


CAJA DE AHORROS: Moody's Cuts Financial Strength Rating to 'D+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the deposit ratings of
Caja de Ahorros de Asturias y Sociedades Dependientes to A3/Prime-
2 from A2/Prime-1 and the standalone financial strength rating to
D+ (mapping to a Baa3 on the long-term rating scale) from C.  The
outlook on the ratings has changed to stable from negative.

          Rationale for Downgrading the Standalone BFSR

Moody's said that the downgrade of Cajastur's standalone financial
strength rating to D+ from C primarily reflects (i) the
deterioration of Cajastur's financial profile following the
acquisition of most of the assets and liabilities of Caja Castilla
La Mancha (not publicly rated; CCM had been intervened by the Bank
of Spain in March 2009 as a consequence of its weak financial
performance); this increases Cajastur's vulnerability to a further
decline in asset quality of the combined portfolio, given CCM's
weak underwriting track record; (ii) the significant challenge of
integrating a clearly failed bank of close to double its own size,
which will test the management capabilities and bench strength of
Cajastur; (iii) also the challenge to integrate different
underwriting cultures and to raise synergies of two large
organizations in different regions.  These significant credit
challenges are partially offset by the degree of "ringfencing" of
CCM's non-performing loans and other troubled assets that it has
received from the savings banks' Deposit Guarantee Fund.

This rating action does not yet incorporate Cajastur's likely role
in the formation of a new entity with three other savings banks
expected to be concluded in the next few months.

Despite the strong benefits derived from the ringfencing of CCM's
troubled assets via the Asset Protection Scheme, Moody's stress
scenarios indicate that Cajastur's resilience to further asset
quality deterioration has weakened, mainly due to lower
capitalization ratios.  These scenarios were comfortably withstood
before the acquisition of CCM and were a key driver of the
relatively high standalone ratings of C (which translated to an A3
rating on the long-term rating scale).  The group's Tier 1 capital
ratio, as of December 2009, deteriorated to 8.3% from 12.8%
following the acquisition.  This has weakened Cajastur's ability
to withstand Moody's base-case and stress-case scenario.  This is
despite the fact that the combined effect of loan-loss reserves
and the EPA provide a full coverage of Moody's estimated losses in
the hedged portfolio even in Moody's stress-case scenario;
however, the unhedged portfolio still contains the potential for
losses, albeit at a much lower expected level given its positive
performance throughout the crisis, and the entity would be
significantly challenged to maintain adequate capital ratios under
the rating agency's most stressed scenario.

In addition, the potential for synergies and the benefit of
Cajastur's more cautious risk management to the acquired entity
will be challenged by the fact that Cajastur is acquiring an
institution much larger than itself -- around EUR23 billion of
acquired assets, compared with Cajastur's EUR15.5 billion as of
December 2009 -- and with a much weaker financial profile.

                    Details of the Transaction

Cajastur was selected in the public tender offer for CCM in
October 2009, and the acquisition process has recently been
completed, with the incorporation of the public deed whereby most
of CCM assets and liabilities are transferred to Banco Castilla-La
Mancha.  The transaction will become effective retroactively
starting 1 January 2010.

Cajastur's offer depended on an asset-protection scheme covering
those losses arising in the most risky part of CCM's credit
portfolio, as identified by Cajastur, and including almost all of
the non-performing loans and other types of troubled loans.  As of
December 2009, the portfolio hedged by the EPA totalled EUR6.9
billion, additionally benefiting from EUR1.2 billion of existing
loan loss reserves.  Over the course of the next five years, the
EPA will assume losses from this asset portfolio, beyond those
covered by loan-loss reserves, for a maximum of EUR2.5 billion.
In addition, the EPA will cover losses arising beyond this time
horizon, as assessed by an independent third party, as well as
those arising from contingent risks on troubled loans and
subordinated loans granted to CCM subsidiaries acquired by
Cajastur.  The rest of CCM's credit portfolio, EUR11.2 billion of
performing loans, falls outside the scope of the EPA.

          Rationale for Downgrading the Deposit Rating

The significant impact on the Cajastur's standalone credit-
worthiness (by three notches on the long-term scale, from A3 to
Baa3) also resulted in a one-notch downgrade of Cajastur's deposit
ratings to A3 from A2.  Moody's continue to believe that in the
current volatile environment there continues to be a high
likelihood of systemic support from the Spanish government for
Cajastur's debt and deposits, as well as for many other Spanish
Cajas.  Moody's also note that a three-notch uplift for Cajastur's
deposit ratings expose these ratings to any signs of weakening of
the support willingness and ability, which could result in further
downward pressure.

           Potential Triggers for an Upgrade/Downgrade

Positive rating pressure could stem from:

  -- Indications that the challenges around the integration of a
     much bigger institution are being successfully achieved,
     which could be observed in the transfer of Cajastur's sounder
     financial profile, specially in terms of asset quality and
     efficiency, to the newly acquired institution.

  -- Lower-than-expected asset quality deterioration resulting in
     lower losses in the unhedged portion of Cajastur's portfolio
     (estimated at EUR1,165 billion in Moody's base-case scenario
     and EUR2,311 in Moody's severely stressed scenario)

  -- An improvement of the bank's capital adequacy ratios, which
     significantly deteriorated after the acquisition of CCM,
     boosting the bank's resilience against asset quality
     deterioration in Moody's severely stressed scenario
     (indicated by a Tier 1 and Tangible Common Equity ratio above
     6% and 5.8%, respectively).

  -- A reduction in Cajastur's credit risk concentration, with the
     top 20 borrowers amounting to less than 750% of pre-provision
     income;

Downward rating pressure could most likely result from:

  -- A greater-than-expected deterioration in asset quality beyond
     the estimations assumed in Moody's stress tests. This relates
     specially to the unhedged portion of the acquired portfolio,
     where Moody's expect a lower level of losses;

  -- A deterioration in CCM's franchise value and brand name --
     that will continue to be managed by Cajastur -- in the region
     of Castilla-La Mancha following the acquisition

  -- Deterioration of Cajastur's sound liquidity position, which
     was not materially impacted following the integration of CCM

                     Regulatory Disclosures

Information sources used to prepare the credit rating are these:
parties involved in the ratings, and confidential and proprietary
Moody's Investors Service's information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the
purposes of maintaining a credit rating.

The rating has been disclosed to the rated entity or its
designated agents and issued with no amendment resulting from that
disclosure.

MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, MOODY'S is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


CAJA ESPANA: Moody's Assigns 'D+' Financial Strength Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned Baa1/Prime-2/D+ ratings
with a stable outlook to the new entity called Caja Espana de
Inversiones, Salamanca y Soria, Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad.
The D+ standalone Bank Financial Strength Rating maps to a Ba1 on
the long-term scale.  Moody's rates the subordinated debt of the
new entity at Baa2 and the preferred shares at B2, both with a
stable outlook.

This new entity is the result of the merger of Caja Espa¤a de
Inversiones ("old", previously rated Baa1/Prime-2/E+, negative
outlook) with the neighboring Caja de Ahorros de Salamanca y Soria
(previously rated A3/Prime-2/D+, negative outlook).  The merger is
effective since 1 October 2010.  The deposit and debt obligations
of the two savings banks have been assumed by the new Caja Espana,
and the two savings banks have ceased to exist upon completion of
the merger on October 1st, so all the other ratings of these
individual entities are subsequently withdrawn.

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's views this merger as broadly credit positive for the new
Caja Espana.  (i) The restructuring and streamlining of the new
entity's greater regional presence, (ii) improved provisioning
levels against non-performing assets and (iii) the EUR525 million
capital injection in the form of preferred shares from the Fondo
de Restructuracion Ordenada Bancaria (Spain's fund for orderly
bank restructuring), are all contributing to strengthening the
credit profile of this new entity.  However, at this point in
time, Moody's believes that further positive rating pressure is
constrained primarily by the overall moderate degree of
capitalization, even when taking into account the capital
injection from the FROB (Tier 1 capital is expected to be at 9.4%
at FYE 2010).

             Rationale for the BFSR of the New Group

In assigning the D+ (Ba1) BFSR to the new savings bank, Moody's
has focused on the assessment of the creditworthiness of the
resulting merged entity, which the rating agency considers to be
stronger on a standalone basis than the sum of its parts, with
Caja Duero and Caja Espana -- old having been rated D+ and E+
respectively.

The new entity will receive public funds from the FROB amounting
to EUR525 million, equivalent to 1.8% of its risk-weighted assets,
which together with the loan-loss provisioning efforts and the
write-offs carried out by the two savings banks before the merger,
will serve to strengthen the solvency of the new entity.

The new entity will also benefit from the cost savings that will
arise from the restructuring plan that has been approved by the
two existing savings banks, and whose implementation will be
closely followed by the Bank of Spain.  The restructuring plan
entails a 15% reduction of the new group's combined workforce, and
branch closures that will affect 23% of the new entity's existing
networks.

Notwithstanding the clear benefits of the capital injection and
restructuring, Moody's believes that the new group faces
challenges that will have to be borne with a moderate Tier 1
capital ratio of around 9.4%.  In the rating agency's view, this
should be sufficient for the savings bank to absorb any further
losses under its base-case scenario.  However, given the uncertain
macroeconomic outlook as well as remaining uncertainties over its
real-estate asset quality, the recapitalization may not have
sufficiently immunized the bank against a more conservative
scenario.  Although the EUR525 million funds from the FROB are
estimated to cover the bulk of loan-loss provisioning requirements
for the next few years, the rating agency notes that internal
capital generation from recurrent sources will be limited by a
very challenging domestic operating environment of subdued growth
and a downward pressure on margins -- on the back of low interest
rates and relatively high non-earning assets.  As a result,
Moody's assigned a BFSR of D+, indicating that the new savings
bank may have a remaining marginal vulnerability against more
adverse scenarios.

                 Rationale for the Debt Ratings

The new entity's rating of Baa1/Prime-2 incorporates Moody's
assumption of ongoing exceptional systemic support.  In this
respect, Moody's believes that the Spanish government is generally
both willing and able to support its banking system and the new
entity in particular, as and when required.

In addition, the Baa1/Prime-2 debt ratings reflect Moody's long-
term view as part of its ongoing stance to "look through" the
current crisis to the specific franchise characteristics of the
new group as it emerges out of this environment.  On the one hand,
Moody's believes that the new Caja Espa¤a has the longer-term
potential for a higher standalone rating to develop over time,
which should support the Baa1 rating even in a future scenario of
more uncertain systemic support.  At the same time, Moody's notes
that the assignment of a higher rating has been limited since the
materialized support in form of the FROB capital injection did not
result in a significantly higher standalone strength of the new
entity.  This reduced likelihood of a fast reversal of the
standalone rating would however have been required to underpin a
higher debt rating.

The stable outlook is commensurate with Moody's favorable view on
the merger process, which will entail significant restructuring,
stronger coverage of problem loans by loan loss provisions and
higher capital adequacy levels following the FROB's capital
injection.  In assigning a stable outlook to all of the savings
bank's ratings Moody's has taken into account the execution risks
associated with the merger process as well as the operating
environment in Spain, which will remain challenging throughout
2011.  Notwithstanding, Moody's will closely monitor the
accomplishment of the financial plan that has been presented
following the merger process.  Any significant negative deviation
from this plan could exert downward pressure on the BFSR, and thus
on its debt ratings.

The last rating action on Caja Duero was on 7 October 2010, when
Moody's downgraded Caja Duero's government-backed debt ratings to
Aa1 with stable outlook from Aaa.

Moody's implemented the previous rating action on Caja Espa¤a -
old on 15 June 2009, when it downgraded the BFSR to E+ (mapping to
a BCA of B1) from C- (mapping to a BCA of Baa2), and changed the
outlook to negative.  The bank's long-term debt and deposit rating
was downgraded to Baa1 from A3, and the outlook changed to
negative.  Its senior subordinated debt was lowered to Baa2 from
Baa1, and the outlook changed to negative, while the short-term
debt and deposit ratings were affirmed at P-2.  At that time, Caja
Duero's ratings were also downgraded to A3/Prime-2/D+ (Ba1) with a
negative outlook from A2/Prime-1/C.

Headquartered in Salamanca, Spain, Caja Duero reported total
consolidated assets of EUR21.4 billion as at 31 December 2009.

Headquartered in Leon, Spain, Caja Espana - old reported total
assets of EUR24.7 billion as at 31 December 2009.

The combined entity will be headquartered in Leon and will have
combined assets ofEUR46.4 billion.

                     Regulatory Disclosures

Information sources used to prepare the credit rating are these:
parties involved in the ratings, public information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the
purposes of assigning a credit rating.

The rating has been disclosed to the rated entity or its
designated agents and issued with no amendment resulting from that
disclosure.

MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, MOODY'S is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


* SPAIN: Second Round of Savings Bank Consolidations Expected
-------------------------------------------------------------
Victor Mallet at The Financial Times reports that only months
after two emergency rescues and a wrenching series of mergers
among Spanish cajas de ahorros or savings banks, a second round of
consolidation is being predicted by the country's bankers,
officials and financial analysts.

The FT says with Spain's economy still stagnant after the global
crisis and the collapse of the domestic housing bubble, commercial
banks and unlisted cajas have been amassing unwanted real estate
on their books, while bad loan ratios rise and the pie of
profitable banking business continues to shrink.

The FT relates following the collapses of the relatively small
Caja Castilla La Mancha and CajaSur, the central bank successfully
bullied the original 45 cajas into a series of mergers over the
summer that has reduced the number of holding groups to 18 -- with
the help of nearly EUR11 billion (US$15.3 billion) from the Fund
for Orderly Bank Restructuring, or Frob, and EUR3.8 billion from a
deposit guarantee fund.

According to the FT, the economic climate is so gloomy and the
cajas have made such slow progress with cutting costs, laying off
staff and closing branches, that further steps to rationalize one
of Europe's most overbanked nations -- the country has some 44,000
bank branches -- are seen as inevitable.


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U K R A I N E
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AVANGARDCO INVESTMENTS: Fitch Puts 'B' Rating on Senior Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Avangardco Investments Public Limited's
planned US$250 million-US$300 million notes an expected foreign-
currency senior unsecured rating of 'B' and an expected Recovery
Rating of 'RR4'.

Avangardco has Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default
Ratings of 'B' respectively, and a National Long-term of
'A+(ukr)'.  The Outlooks on these ratings are Stable.

The final ratings on the planned notes are contingent upon the
receipt of final documents conforming to information already
received by Fitch.

The company states that it will use the bond proceeds to repay up
to US$170 million of existing short-term secured debt, mainly
borrowed from commercial bank Finansova Initsiatyva, a related-
party bank owned by Oleg Bakhmatyuk who is also the controlling
shareholder of Avangardco, and to boost the group's cash
liquidity.  Excess proceeds will support working capital and
capital expenditures for the remainder of 2010 and 2011.  In
addition, the company will be looking to support future liquidity
by procuring new facilities from top Ukrainian banks to fund grain
purchase.  The company's strategy envisages that future cash will
be deposited with leading Ukrainian banks, including major
Ukrainian subsidiaries of international banks, further reducing
its reliance on Finansova Initsiatyva.

The notes are senior obligations of Avangardco and benefit from
upstream unsecured guarantees (which are suretyships under
Ukrainian law) from several operating subsidiaries currently
representing 75% of consolidated net sales and operating profits,
and 79% of group assets.  In particular, Fitch expects group
surety-providers LLC Imperovo, CJSC Agrofirma Avis and APP CJSC
Chornobaivske, which currently represent 26%, 13% and 29% of group
net sales, profits and assets respectively, to increase their
strategic importance to the group by 2012 following the completion
of their expansion plans.

Avangardco will on-lend the gross bond proceeds to the surety
providers via proceeds loans.  The issuer's obligations under the
notes will be secured by a first-ranking assignment of the
issuer's rights as lender under the proceeds loans while each
surety provider will be jointly and severally liable for the
repayment of all monies under such proceeds loans.

The terms of the notes contain limitations on incurring additional
indebtedness based on a consolidated gross debt/EBITDA ratio of
less than 3x by end-2010 (changed to net debt/EBITDA below 3x from
2011) except for a carve-out of US$25 million included within the
definition of permitted debt.  Noteholders will rank junior to all
present and future senior secured indebtedness of the surety
providers although the indenture imposes restrictions upon surety
providers and the issuer to incur new liens.  Other draft
conditions include restrictions to pay dividends and effect asset
disposals.  Noteholders also benefit from a put option at 101 (1%
over par) upon a change of control of the issuer, and cross-
default with other debt borrowed by the issuer or any of its
restricted subsidiaries, above a minimum threshold of US$10m.

Using conservative assumptions under Fitch's going-concern
Recovery Ratings approach, with 35% discounted EBITDA and a
distressed enterprise value/EBITDA multiple of 4.5x, the agency's
analysis results in above-average recovery prospects for
noteholders.  As per Fitch's "Country-specific Treatment of
Recovery Ratings", the Recovery Rating is capped at 'RR4',
reflecting recoveries between 31% and 50%, due to the Ukrainian
jurisdiction of the guarantors even though the notes are governed
by English law.  Thus the foreign-currency senior unsecured rating
is the same as the Long-term foreign-currency IDR.


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U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
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GENERAL MOTORS: "Committed" to Securing Luton Plant's Future
------------------------------------------------------------
Graham Ruddick at The Daily Telegraph reports that General Motors
says it is "committed" to manufacturing at Luton despite doubts
over the plant's future and a sharp tumble in revenues at the
site.

The Daily Telegraph says the future of Luton -- the base of
Vauxhall for more than 100 years -- and its workforce of around
1,500 people is uncertain because an agreement between GM Europe
and Renault to manufacture commercial vehicles at the plant
expires in 2013.

New accounts filed at Companies House reveal that IBC Vehicles,
the joint venture between GM Europe and Renault, saw its sales
collapse by almost a third in 2009 to GBP601 million as the
commercial vehicle market was ravaged by the recession, The Daily
Telegraph discloses.

The Daily Telegraph relates Nick Reilly, chief executive of
Vauxhall, said he was "confident" about securing the future of the
Luton plant and that GM "has some ideas for some other things" if
production of the commercial vehicles is moved elsewhere.

                       About General Motors

With its global headquarters in Detroit, Michigan, General Motors
Company -- http://www.gm.com/-- is one of the world's largest
automakers.  GM employs 205,000 people in every major region of
the world and does business in some 157 countries.  GM and its
strategic partners produce cars and trucks in 31 countries, and
sell and service these vehicles through the following brands:
Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, FAW, GMC, Daewoo, Holden, Jiefang,
Opel, Vauxhall and Wuling.  GM's largest national market is China,
followed by the United States, Brazil, Germany, the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Italy.  GM's OnStar subsidiary is the
industry leader in vehicle safety, security and information
services.

General Motors Co. is 60.8% owned by the U.S. Government.  It was
formed to acquire the operations of General Motors Corporation
through a sale under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 363 following Old GM's
bankruptcy filing.  The deal was closed on July 10, 2009, and Old
GM changed its name to Motors Liquidation Co.  Old GM remains
subject to a pending Chapter 11 reorganization case before the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York.

At June 30, 2010, GM had $131.899 billion in total assets,
US$101.00 billion in total liabilities, US$6.998 billion in
preferred stock, and US$23.901 billion in stockholders' equity.

                     About Motors Liquidation

General Motors Corporation and three of its affiliates filed for
Chapter 11 protection on June 1, 2009 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case
No. 09-50026).  The Honorable Robert E. Gerber presides over the
Chapter 11 cases.  Harvey R. Miller, Esq., Stephen Karotkin, Esq.,
and Joseph H. Smolinsky, Esq., at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP,
assist the Debtors in their restructuring efforts.  Al Koch at AP
Services, LLC, an affiliate of AlixPartners, LLP, serves as the
Chief Executive Officer for Motors Liquidation Company.  GM is
also represented by Jenner & Block LLP and Honigman Miller
Schwartz and Cohn LLP as counsel.  Cravath, Swaine, & Moore LLP is
providing legal advice to the GM Board of Directors.  GM's
financial advisors are Morgan Stanley, Evercore Partners and the
Blackstone Group LLP.

The U.S. Trustee has appointed an Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors and a separate Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
Holding Asbestos-Related Claims.  Lawyers at Kramer Levin Naftalis
& Frankel LLP serve as bankruptcy counsel to the Creditors
Committee.  Attorneys at Butzel Long serve as counsel regarding
supplier contract matters.  FTI Consulting, Inc., serves as
financial advisors to the Creditors Committee.  Elihu Inselbuch,
Esq., at Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, represents the Asbestos
Committee.  Legal Analysis Systems, Inc., serves as asbestos
valuation analyst.

Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., publishes General Motors
Bankruptcy News.  The newsletter tracks the Chapter 11 proceeding
undertaken by General Motors Corp. and its various affiliates.
(http://bankrupt.com/newsstand/or 215/945-7000)


HKR MANCHESTER: Placed Into Administration
------------------------------------------
The Manchester office of Dublin-based HKR Architects has been
placed into administration as its directors launch a new business,
Manchester Confidential reports.  The report relates that Hale
accountancy firm Milner Boardman & Partners was appointed to run
HKR Manchester as director Phil Doyle and the management team of
Matthews, Paul Norbury, Carly Grice and Adam Thornton start a new
firm called 5Plus.

According to the report, the move is part of a restructuring by
its parent firm.  The business, the report says, has moved from
the Pinnacle in King Street to Grange House on John Dalton Street.
"Our international project wins reflect our focus on increased
geographic diversity.  We will serve our UK and international
client base from our expanded London office," the report quoted
Chief Executive Jerry Ryan as saying.

HKR Manchester is the Manchester office of Dublin-based HKR
Architects.  The business employs 15 people in Manchester.

LIVERPOOL FOOTBALL: League Could Dock Points in Administration
--------------------------------------------------s------------
The Premier League could still dock nine points from Liverpool
Football Club and Athletic Grounds in the event it is forced into
administration, Liverool Echo reports.

According to the report, while the football club business itself
is sound, the debts are held by parent company Kop Football.  The
report notes that league bosses are yet to decide whether the two
can be separated, making a nine-point deduction a possibility.

However, the report says, the club's situation is being seen as
different from that of Portsmouth that went into administration
with a number of debts including cash owed to the taxman.

But the league cannot be seen to make a special case for the Reds
either, the report notes.

The report adds that in the event of a nine-point deduction the
club would be able to appeal saying it did all it could to avoid
the situation of going into administration.

                        About Liverpool Football

Liverpool Football Club and Athletic Grounds owns and operates one
of the more popular and most successful franchises in the UK
Premier League.  Known as The Reds, Liverpool has won 18 first
division titles and seven FA Cups since it was founded by John
Houlding in 1892.  In addition to the football club, the company
owns and operates Anfield Stadium, Liverpool's home ground.  The
company generates revenue primarily through sponsorships,
broadcasting fees, and ticket sales.  The company was acquired by
US businessmen George Gillett and Tom Hicks in 2007.


MANCHESTER UNITED: Posts Annual Pre-Tax Loss of GBP79.6 Million
---------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Manchester United, hit by one-off finance
charges and reduced revenues from the sale of players, has posted
an annual pre-tax loss of GBP79.6 million.

BBC notes the loss for the 12 months to June 30 compares with a
profit of GBP48 million for the year before, when revenues were
boosted by the GBP80 million sale of Cristiano Ronaldo.

According to BBC, the club's one-off finance charges during the
past year totaled GBP67 million.  It also paid GBP40 million in
interest payments, BBC discloses.  BBC says the one-off finance
charges are linked to Manchester United's GBP504 million bond
issue back in January, which enabled the club to pay back most of
its bank debt.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 27,
2010, Goal.com, citing The Guardian, said that Manchester United's
owners, the Glazer family, were facing up to more financial issues
relating to their business interests in the U.S.  Goal.com
disclosed four more of the shopping malls owned by the family had
fallen into default on their mortgages, meaning that nine in total
had defaulted -- with four of those actually going bankrupt.
Goal.com said a further 29 out of the 68 malls owned by the
Glazers' First Allied Corporation were now so empty of
retail units that the revenue they generate did not cover the
mortgage payments.  The interest rate charged on United's enormous
'payment-in-kind debts' is set to rise from 14.25% to 16.25% this
month, so the news comes at a bad time for the Glazers, Goal.com
noted.  "They show that the Glazer family's only significant other
business is making almost no money, and certainly not generating
the cash to reduce United's massive debts," Goal.com investment
analyst Andy Green as saying.  "The family's shopping malls are
afflicted by low occupancy rates, more have fallen into default,
and whatever Manchester United chief executive David Gill says,
there appears no doubt that Manchester United itself will be
made to service these useless debts and pay huge interest
payments, all money which could have been spent signing players."
United are saddled with huge debts as a result of the takeover by
the Glazers, Goal.com said.

Manchester United Limited -- http://www.manutd.com-- operates
Manchester United Football Club, one of the most popular and
successful soccer teams in the world.  Man U is currently the top
soccer team the UK's Premier League, boasting 18 championships and
11 FA Cup titles.  Manchester United generates revenue primarily
through ticket sales at venerable Old Trafford stadium, as well as
through broadcasting rights and sales of Red Devils merchandise.
Man U was founded as Newton Heath in 1878 before changing its name
in 1902.  It is owned by American tycoon Malcolm Glazer, whose
holdings include the Tampa Bay Buccaneers NFL team and a majority
stake in Zapata.


ROYAL BANK: JPMorgan Buys RBS Sempra Commodities' Trading Book
--------------------------------------------------------------
Gregory Meyer at The Financial Times reports that JPMorgan Chase
is set to become one of North America's largest natural gas
traders with the purchase of RBS Sempra Commodities' trading book.

The FT relates the US bank has agreed to pay about US$220 million
to take over North American gas and power deals from the joint
venture partly owned by Royal Bank of Scotland.  The UK bank was
ordered to divest its stake by the European Commission in return
for state bail-out funding, the FT notes.

The sale announced on Thursday "will complete the divestiture of
the last of the principal assets" of RBS Sempra, RBS's joint
venture partner, Sempra Energy, said, according to the FT.  The FT
says JPMorgan is not hiring the 300 people who remain at RBS
Sempra, down from 1,100 when the entire unit first went up for
sale.  RBS, as cited by the FT, said it still is considering
"various alternatives for the modest level of residual assets and
liabilities of the business."

                            About RBS

The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc (NYSE:RBS) --
http://www.rbs.com/-- is a holding company of The Royal Bank of
Scotland plc (Royal Bank) and National Westminster Bank Plc
(NatWest), which are United Kingdom-based clearing banks.  The
company's activities are organized in six business divisions:
Corporate Markets (comprising Global Banking and Markets and
United Kingdom Corporate Banking), Retail Markets (comprising
Retail and Wealth Management), Ulster Bank, Citizens, RBS
Insurance and Manufacturing.  On October 17, 2007, RFS Holdings
B.V. (RFS Holdings), a company jointly owned by RBS, Fortis N.V.,
Fortis SA/NV and Banco Santander S.A. (the Consortium Banks) and
controlled by RBS, completed the acquisition of ABN AMRO Holding
N.V. (ABN AMRO).  In July 2008, the company disposed of its entire
interest in Global Voice Group Ltd.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 29,
2010, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its
ratings on "may pay" Tier 1 securities issued or guaranteed by The
Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC (A/Stable/A-1) to 'C' from 'CC'.
At the same time, the rating on the RBSG-related security issued
by Argon Capital PLC was similarly lowered to 'C' from 'CC'.  The
counterparty credit ratings and stand-alone credit profiles of
RBSG and subsidiaries, and the ratings on other debt securities
issued by these entities, were unaffected.


* SCOTLAND: Number of Firms Going Into Administration Drops 36%
---------------------------------------------------------------
Perry Gourley at The Scotsman reports that the number of companies
going into administration in the first nine months of 2010 is down
by 36 percent on the same period last year.

According to the report, figures released by Deloitte showed that
the statistics covering the year to date also represent a 20
percent fall on the same period in 2006 -- the last full year
before the financial downturn began.

"[While] the economy holds its breath for the outcome of the
spending review, these figures offer a glimmer of hope.  For the
first time since the financial crisis began, we're beginning to
see a consistent drop in the numbers of companies hitting the
wall," the report quoted Deloitte in Scotland partner John Reid as
saying.

The report says that the biggest drop was seen in the retail
sector, with administrations down 50 percent on the same nine
month period in 2009 and falling in each of the first three
quarters of this year.


* UK: Banks Set to Accelerate Sale of Distressed Assets
-------------------------------------------------------
Sarah White and Steve Slater at Reuters report that restructuring
experts said at a Reuters Summit last week that Britain's banks
are set to accelerate the sale of distressed assets or portfolios
of loans.

According to Reuters, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds and others
are showing more interest in selling businesses or loans to shrink
their balance sheets, especially as new capital rules will make
holding them even more of a burden.  Both the part-nationalized
banks are keen to shed non-core assets to try and unclog their
balance sheets, Reuters discloses.  Those deals could prompt other
banks across Europe to follow suit, and is likely to tempt more
hedge funds or investors looking for a distressed or bargain
asset, Reuters states.

Banks were reluctant to sell assets at fire-sale prices during the
financial crisis as that would have forced them to take a big
financial hit, but most are more able to withstand a loss now
after rebuilding capital, Reuters notes.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.

                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter -- Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick,
Maryland USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine
T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


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