TCREUR_Public/101015.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, October 15, 2010, Vol. 11, No. 204

                            Headlines



F R A N C E

CMA CGM: Nears Deal with Yildirim on 20% Stake Purchase


G E R M A N Y

FLEET STREET: Fitch Keeps 'CCCsf' Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
IKB DEUTSCHE: Lone Star Funds Seeks Strategic Partner
TUI AG: S&P Raises Rating on Unsecured Bonds to 'B-'


I R E L A N D

ALO KAVANAGH CARS: Goes Into Receivership
ANGLO IRISH: Bondholders Don't Want to Pay for Bailout Losses
BANK OF SCOTLAND: Independent Firm to Wind Down Irish Unit
N-TSAR - CORIOLANUS: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Various Notes to 'Dsf'

* IRELAND: Bank Senior Bondholders Must Consider Impairment Talks


R U S S I A

BANK ST. PETERSBURG: Moody's Changes Outlook on D- BFSR to Stable
INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL: Fitch Changes Issuer Rating to 'D'
SWEDBANK OJSC: Moody's Withdraws 'Ba3' Long-Term Deposit Ratings


S P A I N

ABENGOA FINANCE: Moody's Assigns (P)'Ba3' Rating on Senior Notes
CAJA ESPANA: Moody's Takes Rating Action on Mortgage Bonds
PRISA: Liberty Merger Attractive Investment, T2 Partners Says


U K R A I N E

VAB BANK: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'E' Rating to Positive

* Moody's Changes Outlook on 14 Ukrainian Banks to Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DUNDEE FOOTBALL CLUB: Former Director Wants to Control Club
EXOVA GROUP: S&P Assigns 'B' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
LEISURE AND GAMING: May Go Into Administration After Failed Sale
LLOYDS BANKING: To Eliminate 4,500 Jobs in IT Operations
NEW PARK BRADFORD: Goes Into Administration With GBP8MM Debt

PRINCIPALITY BUILDING: Moody's Gives Pos. Outlook on 'D-' Rating
RALLS BUILDERS: Falls Into Administration With GBP2 Million Debts
STAINTON COACHES: Goes Into Administration; 35 Jobs Made Redundant

* UK: Bank-Bailouts Good Investment for Taxpayers
* UK: PwC Says Many Charities May Go Belly-Up


X X X X X X X X

* EUROPE: Regulators May Take Control Banks Under EU Plan

* BOOK REVIEW: Declining Demand, Divestiture & Corporate Strategy




                         *********


===========
F R A N C E
===========


CMA CGM: Nears Deal with Yildirim on 20% Stake Purchase
-------------------------------------------------------
David Whitehouse at Bloomberg News, citing French daily Les Echos,
reports that CMA CGM SA is close to an accord under which Turkish
family-owned company Yildirim would pay US$500 million for a 20%
stake.

According to Bloomberg, the newspaper said the agreement could be
reached as soon as the end of this week and the payment would be
made at the end of November.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, citing Bloomberg News, had
reported that CMA CGM, which is reorganizing EUR5.4 billion (US$7
billion) of debt, had until July 26, 2010, to put together a new
investor group.  Bloomberg disclosed CMA CGM began talks with
creditors in September 2009 to reorganize and avoid insolvency
after breaching covenants on most of its debt.  Bloomberg said
under France's court-sponsored conciliation procedure, a company's
failure to meet the deadline for an agreement with creditors makes
it harder to raise new funds and leaves it vulnerable to
insolvency if broken covenants are invoked.

France-based CMA CGM -- http://www.cma-cgm.com/-- ships freight
PDQ.  The marine transportation company is one of the world's
leading container carriers.  Through subsidiaries it operates a
fleet of about 370 vessels that serve more than 400 ports around
the globe, and it maintains a network of about 650 facilities in
about 150 countries.  In addition to hauling containers by sea,
CMA CGM provides logistics services, arranging the transportation
of containerized freight by river, road, and rail.  The company's
tourism division arranges cruises and other travel services.
Jacques Saade founded the company in 1978.



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


FLEET STREET: Fitch Keeps 'CCCsf' Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has maintained the Rating Watch Negative on the
outstanding classes of Fleet Street Finance 2 p.l.c. CMBS.  The
current ratings are shown below.

The Karstadt insolvency plan was implemented following the formal
approval of the German insolvency court on 30 September 2010 and
Karstadt's shares have been transferred to its new owner,
Berggruen Holdings Limited.  Since Fitch's last rating action in
April 2010, a further two extraordinary general meetings have been
held (in July and September), during which the class A noteholders
approved further amendments to the master lease agreement and the
finance documents.  Due to an appraisal reduction the class B, C
and D noteholders lost their right to attend and vote at any
noteholder meeting.  Moreover, also as a result of the appraisal
reduction, the liquidity facility has reduced to EUR57.8 million
from EUR78.6 million.

Fitch will resolve the RWN following a satisfactory legal review
of, amongst others, the latest amendments to the Senior Loan
Agreement, the Intercreditor Agreement between the Senior loan and
the Mezzanine Facility as well as the Karstadt Master Lease
Agreement, which all became effective in the first week of October
2010.  The agency will also review documentation relating to the
implementation of hedging arrangements at loan level and
transaction level during their respective extension periods.

The notes issued by Fleet Street Finance 2 plc are currently
rated:

  -- EUR711.6m class A (XS0268932836) rated 'BBB-sf'; RWN
  -- EUR166.5m class B (XS0268933487) rated 'Bsf'; RWN
  -- EUR140.1m class C (XS0268934451) rated 'CCCsf'; RWN
  -- EUR96.9m class D (XS0268934618) rated 'CCsf'; RWN


IKB DEUTSCHE: Lone Star Funds Seeks Strategic Partner
-----------------------------------------------------
Jann Bettinga at Bloomberg News reports that Lone Star Funds is
looking for a strategic partner for IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG,
about two years after the U.S. private-equity firm agreed to buy
the struggling lender.

"Lone Star has decided to seek a strategic partner for IKB to
further develop IKB's product range," Bloomberg quoted the Dallas-
based company as saying in an e-mailed statement on Wednesday.

According to Bloomberg, Lone Star said it hired investment bank
Perella Weinberg Partners LP to carry out the search.

Bloomberg notes Bruno Scherrer, Lone Star's head of European
investments, told Handelsblatt newspaper the private-equity firm
and Perella Weinberg will present potential partners to IKB in
November and a transaction might take place in the first quarter
of 2011.

                             Bailout

IKB became Germany's first casualty of the U.S. subprime-mortgage
crisis in 2007 after investments in asset-backed securities
soured, requiring a government-led bailout, Bloomberg relates.
Lone Star agreed in August 2008 to take control of the Dusseldorf-
based lender and said at the time it expected to own its holding
for at least two years, Bloomberg recounts.  IKB later received
guarantees of as much as EUR12 billion (US$17 billion) from
Germany's Soffin bank-rescue fund to help steer the bank through
the global financial crisis, Bloomberg states.

                          Landesbanken

James Wilson at The Financial Times also reports Lone Star could
also consider deals in Germany's Landesbanken sector, which is
under pressure to consolidate and restructure after several
institutions needed bail-outs.

According to the FT, Mr. Scherrer said: "We would expect interest
from strategic buyers both in and outside Germany.  This is a
cleaned-up bank with a good franchise with German exporters and
other corporate clients.

"And we have seen how German industry has recovered remarkably
strongly from the crisis."

                 About IKB Deutsche Industriebank

IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG -- http://www.ikb.de/-- is a
Germany-based banking company, which specializes in the field of
long-term financing.  It offers a range of financial products and
services directed at medium-sized domestic as well as
international companies and project partners.  The Company's
focuses on the two segments Corporate Customers, including
domestic corporate financing, especially lending, but also product
leasing and private equity; and Real Estate Customers, which
provides customized financing solutions as well as related
services for industrial real estate.  As of March 31, 2009, it
operated through direct and indirect subsidiaries, including the
wholly owned IKB Capital Corporation and IKB Equity Finance GmbH,
among others; its two majority owned subsidiaries; as well as two
affiliated companies.  The Company's subsidiaries are located in
Germany, the United States, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria,
the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovakia and
Romania.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 21,
2009, Moody's Investors Service confirmed the Baa3 long-term debt
and deposit ratings, Ba2 subordinated debt ratings and Prime-3
short-term rating of IKB Deutsche Industriebank, reflecting
Moody's assessment of a very high probability of ongoing external
support.  The outlook on the senior and junior debt ratings
remains negative.  IKB's E bank financial strength rating, mapping
to a stand-alone baseline credit assessment of Caa1, was affirmed,
with a stable outlook.  Moody's downgraded the upper Tier 2 junior
subordinated instruments issued by IKB and its vehicle ProPart
Funding Ltd to C from Ca, the lowest level on Moody's rating
scale, and the Tier 1 instruments issued by IKB Funding Trust I &
II and Capital Raising GmbH to Ca from Caa3.  Moody's said the
outlook on the instruments is stable.


TUI AG: S&P Raises Rating on Unsecured Bonds to 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has revised to '4'
from '5' its recovery rating on the unsecured bonds issued by TUI
AG (B-/Negative/--).  The recovery rating of '4' indicates S&P's
expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery for bondholders in an
event of a payment default.  S&P also raised the issue rating on
the unsecured bonds to 'B-' from 'CCC+'.  The issue rating on the
unsecured bonds is now at the same level as TUI's corporate credit
rating.

The recovery rating on TUI's EUR300 million perpetual notes
remains unchanged at '6', indicating S&P's expectation of
negligible (0%-10%) recovery for bondholders in an event of a
payment default.  The issue rating on these notes remains
unchanged at 'CCC-', three notches below the corporate credit
rating on TUI.  The wider, downward notching compared with S&P's
standard issue rating scale is due to the perpetual notes'
deferability.

S&P's revision of the recovery rating on the senior unsecured
bonds to '4' primarily reflects S&P's view of the high likelihood
TUI will receive full shareholder loan repayments from 35.3%-owned
TUI Travel (TTP, in which TUI has 54.9% voting rights; not rated)
and partial repayment of some of the significant shareholder loan
it has extended to shipping associate Hapag-Lloyd (BB-/Stable/--),
in which it will shortly have a 49.8% stake.  S&P further believes
that TUI will most likely use the majority of the proceeds from
these shareholders loan repayments to address its 2010 and 2011
maturities.

S&P believes that TTP's GBP400 million bond issue in April 2010
and HL's recent successful $700 million bond issue will facilitate
shareholder loan repayments to TUI as the parent company for both
entities.  This has led us to revise S&P's hypothetical default
scenario on TUI, the outstanding amount of debt at TUI at S&P's
simulated point of default, and its stressed enterprise value for
the company.

Previously, S&P had assumed that TUI's hypothetical payment
default would mainly be triggered by HL defaulting and S&P had
therefore given no value to TUI's shareholder loans to HL or to
its equity stake in the latter.  Additionally, given former
uncertainties regarding TTP's refinancing plans and shareholder
loan repayment schedule, S&P's previous stressed enterprise value
of EUR750 million ascribed no value to TUI's shareholder loans to
TTP, and a haircut to the then equity valuation of TTP, which is a
separately-listed entity.

Following recent successful refinancing measures and improvements
in the operating context for the shipping business, S&P has
revised its hypothetical default scenario for the TUI group.  S&P
now believeS that this would most likely be triggered by limited
success with its asset streamlining program contributing to a
potential inability to refinance its substantial debt maturities
due in 2012.

S&P has valued TUI taking into account these:

* TUI's shares in TTP, using the same 40% haircut as previously
  and updating its valuation; Significant consideration for HL's
  industrial assets and two Hamburg office buildings occupied by
  HL but owned by TUI, which S&P anticipates will be sold in the
  near future;

* A meaningful discount on TUI's equity stake in HL given S&P's
  view of the latter's considerable level of debt, potentially
  leaving limited value for equity holders in a simulated
  distressed sale of HL; and

* Partial consideration of TUI's hotel and cruise shipping assets
  reflecting S&P's view of the slow recovery in Spain (where most
  of TUI's hotels are located) and the discount that might be
  applied in a distressed sale scenario.  Under these assumptions,
  S&P has simulated a default in 2012, at which S&P points its
  estimate that TUI's net stressed enterprise value would be about
  EUR1.6 billion, after deducting enforcement costs.

S&P then deduct from the EUR1.63 billion net stressed value about
EUR175 million of finance leases, as well as priority bank lines
(assumed to be fully drawn), and pre-petition interest.  This
leaves about EUR1.46 billion of residual value for the pari passu
unsecured lenders and bondholders, totaling about EUR2.8 billion
(including pre-petition interest).  The outstanding debt at
default reflects S&P's view that the company will likely
successfully address its 2010 and 2011 bond maturities, based on a
combination of refinancing measures and repayment from cash
resources.  S&P believes that the company will use some of the
proceeds from TTP's and HL's shareholder loan repayments to pay
down holding company debt.

Despite coverage marginally higher than 50% on the unsecured
bonds, S&P's recovery rating of '4' (30%-50% recovery) on the
unsecured bonds reflects its view of TUI's complex capital
structure and some remaining uncertainties regarding TUI's planned
use of the material cash balances which S&P anticipates following
planned shareholder loan repayments.  S&P could further revise
upwards its recovery expectations on TUI's unsecured instruments
should TUI consistently use its balance sheet cash to repay its
debt, in excess of its assumptions.

                          Ratings List

                            Upgraded

                             TUI AG

                                         To                 From
                                         --                 ----
  Senior Unsecured                       B-                 CCC+
    Recovery Rating                      4                  5

                        Ratings Affirmed

                             TUI AG

           Junior Subordinated                    CCC-
            Recovery Rating                       6


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


ALO KAVANAGH CARS: Goes Into Receivership
-----------------------------------------
Alo Kavanagh Cars closed its doors after 27-years in business
after it has been forced into receivership, Irish Trucker News
reports.

According to the report, receivers Smith and Williamson Freaney
confirmed that the business was closing down and that 17 people
would be out of work.

Alo Kavanagh Cars, the report notes, owed short-term creditors
almost GBP1.8 million and long-term creditors almost GBP1.9
million.

The report says that the company suffered losses of almost
GBP680,000 last year and over GBP800,000 in 2008 while the two
directors, Mr. Kavanagh and Derek Kelly, were paid salaries
totaling GBP275,000 between them in 2009.

At the time the records were filed, the report adds, the company
had almost GBP500,000 worth of cars on its forecourts,
considerably down on the same figure for 2008 when it was holding
GBP1.2 million worth of cars.

Headquartered in Sandyford Industrial Estate, Dublin, Alo Kavanagh
Cars specialized in the sale of new and used Mercedes cars and
light commercials and was renowned for its customer satisfaction.


ANGLO IRISH: Bondholders Don't Want to Pay for Bailout Losses
-------------------------------------------------------------
Neil Shah at Dow Jones Newswires reports that a group of Anglo
Irish Bank Corp. creditors is fiercely resisting government
efforts to have them help pay for the bank's bailout, complicating
Ireland's already fractious banking-system rescue.

Investors holding roughly EUR500 million (US$695.8 million) of
Anglo Irish's riskiest bonds -- about one-fifth of such debt --
are challenging the government's position this week in meetings
being run by investment bank Houlihan Lokey, Dow Jones says,
citing a person involved in the efforts.

Dow Jones notes bondholders argue that the government has no legal
standing to force them to take a loss while the banks continue to
operate as state-owned entities.

Dow Jones relates last month, Ireland's central bank said it could
cost the government as much as EUR50 billion to bail out Irish
banks, a bill that is driving Ireland's budget deficit to 32% of
its gross domestic output this year, the highest for any member of
the euro zone since the currency was launched in 1999.

Dow Jones says Ireland's treatment of bond investors could set a
precedent for future debt restructurings of bonds issued by
nationalized banks.  Dublin officials hope to reduce their bank-
bailout costs by getting holders of Anglo Irish's subordinated
bonds to voluntarily sell their EUR2.4 billion of debt back to
Ireland at a hefty loss, resulting in a multibillion-euro gain for
the government, according to Dow Jones.

Anglo Irish's creditors likely face an uphill battle: Finance
Minister Brian Lenihan has repeatedly said the bank's subordinated
bondholders should suffer losses to help pay for the bailout, Dow
Jones discloses. Dow Jones recounts Mr. Lenihan has said Anglo
Irish's "senior" bond investors, who rank higher in a liquidation,
will be honored in full.

Anglo Irish Bank Corp PLC -- http://www.angloirishbank.com/--
operates in three core areas: business lending, treasury and
private banking.  The Bank's non-retail business is made up of
more than 11,000 commercial depositors spanning commercial
entities, charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit
unions and other non-bank financial institutions.  The Company's
retail deposits comprise demand, notice and fixed term deposit
accounts from personal savers with maturities of up to two years.
Non-retail deposits are sourced from commercial entities,
charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit unions and
other non-bank financial institutions.  In addition, at September
30, 2008, its non-retail deposits included deposits from Irish
Life Assurance plc.  The Private Bank offers tailored products and
solutions for high net worth clients and operates the Bank's
lending business in Ireland and the United Kingdom.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 17,
2010, Fitch Ratings affirmed Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Ltd.'s
Individual Rating at 'E'.  It also affirmed its ratings on the
bank's Lower Tier 2 Subordinated Notes at 'CCC' and Tier 1 Notes
at 'C'.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 15,
2010, Moody's Investors Service said that it is maintaining its
review for possible downgrade on the A3/P-1 deposit and senior
debt ratings, and on the Ba1 subordinated debt rating of Anglo
Irish Bank Corporation.  The junior subordinated debt is
downgraded to C from Caa2.  The backed-Aa2 rating (stable outlook)
on the government guaranteed debt, the C rating on the bank's tier
1 securities and the E bank financial strength rating -- mapping
to Caa1 on the long-term scale -- are unaffected by this rating
action.


BANK OF SCOTLAND: Independent Firm to Wind Down Irish Unit
----------------------------------------------------------
BreakingNews.ie reports that Lloyds Banking Group on Wednesday
said it has reached agreement with the management team at Bank of
Scotland Ireland about setting up the independent company that
will handle the wind-down of BoSI's Irish operations.

According to BreakingNews.ie, the independent service company will
be responsible for supporting and administering the BoSI loan book
into the future following the announcement in August that BoSI is
to close.

BreakingNews.ie notes Lloyds said it has signed a Heads of Terms
commercial agreement with BoSI management which it said was a
"significant milestone" in the establishment of the new company.

The bank said it was now in discussions with BoSI management and
is presently focused on finalizing the working relationship that
will apply between the two parties, BreakingNews.ie relates.

On Tuesday, workers at BoSI voted overwhelmingly in favor of
industrial action over the bank's failure to provide clarity on
its winding down plans, Bloomberg discloses.

Bank of Scotland (Ireland) bank provides banking services like
commercial loans, commercial and asset finance, and investment
services.  In 2006 it launched a retail banking division, Halifax,
with such offerings as mortgages, personal loans, credit cards,
and savings products.  The bank has more than 40 locations
throughout Ireland. Halifax was launched via Bank of Scotland
(Ireland)'s purchase of ESB's retail outlets in 2005.  In 2009
Bank of Scotland (Ireland) became part of Lloyds Banking Group,
which was formed by the merger of Lloyds TSB and the bank's former
parent, HBOS.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 28,
2010, Moody's Investors Service confirmed the bank deposit ratings
of Bank of Scotland (Ireland) at Baa1/Prime-2 and the bank
financial strength rating at D- (mapping to a baseline credit
assessment of Ba3).  Moody's said the outlook on the BFSR and the
long-term ratings is negative.

Moody's said the D- BFSR reflects the weak underlying performance
of the entity, which has large concentrations in commercial
property in Ireland, a capital and funding position that is
dependent on its parent and the challenges the bank faces to run-
off of the significant exposure to the domestic commercial real
estate market and to close the retail and intermediary businesses.


N-TSAR - CORIOLANUS: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Various Notes to 'Dsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken various rating actions on the tranches of
the N-Tsar, Tsar, Builder 2, Coriolanus transactions.

These structured finance collateralized debt obligations have
experienced a number of credit events.  As a result, the tranches
are left with very limited or no credit enhancement.  In some
cases, the transactions have been unwound completely following the
credit events settlement.  Recoveries have been zero for all the
credit events that have been settled so far.  Where losses have
yet to be settled, Fitch has affirmed the ratings of the tranches
pending valuation.  The rating actions are:

N-Tsar - Coriolanus Limited Series 49 Repackaged 2044 note:

  -- US$5,000,000 class G notes: downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
     rating withdrawn

N-Tsar - Coriolanus Limited Series 81:

  -- US$5,000,000 class C notes: downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
     rating withdrawn

N-Tsar - Eirles Two Series 101, 102, 103, 104:

  -- EUR66,500,000 Series 101: downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
     rating withdrawn

  -- US$105,000,000 Series 102: downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
     rating withdrawn

  -- US$66,500,000 Series 103: downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
     rating withdrawn

  -- US$31,500,000 Series 104: downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
     rating withdrawn

N-Tsar - Portfolio CDS:

  -- US$55,629,528 class B: downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
     rating withdrawn

  -- US$87,836,097 class C: downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
     rating withdrawn

  -- US$55,629,528 class D: downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
     rating withdrawn

  -- US$26,350,829 class E: downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
     rating withdrawn

Tsar 05:

  -- US$4,128,681,552 class A: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- US$87,518,421class B: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- US$39,383,289 class C: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- US$39,383,289 class D: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- US$26,255,526 class E: affirmed at 'Csf'

Tsar 05 - Eirles 2 Series 117:

  -- EUR10,000,000 series 117 notes: affirmed at 'Csf'

Tsar 05 - Eirles 4 Series 10:

  -- EUR15,000,000 series 10 notes: affirmed at 'Csf'

Tsar 05 - Eirles 4 Series 15 & 16:

  -- US$5,000,000 series 15: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- US$5,000,000 series 16: affirmed at 'Csf'

Tsar 05 - Eirles 4 Series 48 and 54:

  -- US$5,000,000 series 54: affirmed at 'Csf'

Tsar 05 - Eirles 4 Series 9:

  -- US$126,000,000 series 9: affirmed at 'Csf'

Tsar 05 - Eirles Two Limited Series 110:

  -- EUR10,000,000 series 110: affirmed at 'Csf'

Tsar 15 CDO Eirles Two Ltd Series 223-227:

  -- EUR27,500,000 series 223 C-1: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- EUR42,750,000 series 224 C-2: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- EUR26,125,000 series 225 D-1: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- EUR26,125,000 series 226 D-2: downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'
  -- EUR25,500,000 Series 227 E: downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'

Tsar 8:

  -- US$35,605,431 class C: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- US$16,865,730 class D: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- US$6,558,895 class E: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- US$29,983,521 class F: affirmed at 'Csf'

Tsar 8 - repack Eirles 74-77:

  -- US$12,250,000 series 74: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- US$25,000,000 series 75: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- US$25,000,000 series 76: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- US$35,000,000 series 77: affirmed at 'Csf'

Tsar 04 (ANTS) CDS + Eirles 4 Limited Series 6, 7 & 8:

  -- US$30,000,000 class A: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- US$13,750,581 class E: affirmed at 'Csf'

Builder 2 - Eirles Two Series 143,144,145,160:

  -- EUR21,000,000 series 160: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- US$37,200,000 series 143: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- US$35,700,000 series 144: affirmed at 'Csf'
  -- US$7,100,000 series 145: affirmed at 'Csf'

Coriolanus Limited Series 77:

  -- US$17,000,000 class C notes: downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
     rating withdrawn

Eirles Two Series 219:

  -- US$20,000,000 class A notes: affirmed at 'Csf'

The rating downgrades to 'Dsf' follow the settlement of certain
credit events.  N-Tsar - Coriolanus Limited Series 49 Repackaged
2044 Note, N-Tsar - Coriolanus Limited Series 81, Series 227 E
(Tsar 15 CDO Eirles Two Ltd), and Coriolanus Limited Series 77
have all been completely written down and hence have no recovery.
Series 226 D-2 (Tsar 15 CDO Eirles Two Ltd) has been partially
written down.  With more defaults on the distressed assets in the
underlying Tsar 15 CDO Eirles Two Ltd portfolio, Fitch expects no
recovery on Series 226 D-2.  In addition, the ratings for N-Tsar -
Coriolanus Limited Series 49 Repackaged 2044 Note, N-Tsar -
Coriolanus Limited Series 81, and Coriolanus Limited Series 77
have been withdrawn as a result of defaults on all tranches in the
capital structure.

The ratings for N-Tsar - Eirles Two Series 101, 102, 103, 104 and
N-Tsar - Portfolio CDS (Classes B, C, D, E) have been downgraded
to 'Dsf' and withdrawn as a result of debt restructuring affecting
all tranches.  N-Tsar - Eirles Two Series 101, 102, 103, 104 were
repurchased in February 2010 in exchange for charged assets and
the corresponding N-Tsar - Portfolio CDS (Classes B, C, D, E) were
cancelled.  Fitch believes these tranches would have eventually
defaulted if they have not been repurchased by the counterparty.

The rating affirmations at 'Csf' reflect pending valuations for
Tsar 05 (Classes A, B, C, D, E); Tsar 05 - Eirles 2 Series 117;
Tsar 05 - Eirles 4 Series 10; Tsar 05 - Eirles 4 Series 15 and 16;
Tsar 05 - Eirles 4 Series 54; Tsar 05 - Eirles 4 Series 9; Tsar 05
- Eirles Two Limited Series 110; Tsar 15 CDO Eirles Two Ltd Series
223-225; Tsar 8 (Classes C, D, E, F); Tsar 8 - repack Eirles 74-
77; Tsar 04 (ANTS) CDS (Classes A, E); Builder 2 - Eirles Two
Series 143,144,145,160; and Eirles Two Series 219.

Fitch has assigned Issuer Report Grades of Two Stars to reflect
the "basic" investor reporting on these transactions: Tsar 05,
Tsar 05 - Eirles 2 Series 117, Tsar 05 - Eirles 4 Series 10, Tsar
05 - Eirles 4 Series 15 & 16, Tsar 05 - Eirles 4 Series 48 and 54,
Tsar 05 - Eirles 4 Series 9, Tsar 05 - Eirles Two Limited Series
110, Tsar 15 CDO Eirles Two Ltd Series 223-227, Tsar 8, Tsar 8 --
repack Eirles 74-77, Tsar 04 CDS + Eirles 4 Limited Series 6, 7 &
8, Builder 2 - Eirles Two Series 143,144,145,160, and Eirles Two
Series 219 .  Fitch notes that the investor reports are consistent
with cumulative credit events and portfolio profile tests.
However, the reports lack other information, such as counterparty
triggers, current liability structure or performance commentary.
Deutsche Bank AG, the swap counterparty, has indicated that the
reporting format is dictated by the transaction documents.

The related transactions are CDOs referencing portfolios of
primarily US asset-backed securities.


* IRELAND: Bank Senior Bondholders Must Consider Impairment Talks
-----------------------------------------------------------------
John Glover at The Irish Examiner reports that strategists at BNP
Paribas said senior bondholders of Irish banks should agree to
talk about accepting impairments now because they may face greater
losses in future.

The Irish Examiner relates Finance Minister Brian Lenihan is
raising the possibility of talks with investors in senior debt
while arguing it "isn't viable" to inflict losses.

"There's been a sort of gentlemen's agreement so far that senior
bank bondholders don't take losses," said Gregory Venizelos, a
credit strategist at the bank in London, according to The Irish
Examiner.

"The realization may be setting in that with Anglo Irish it may be
worth getting out now at a bit of a discount than a few years down
the line finding the rescue didn't work and losing more."

Ireland plans legislation that's expected to force junior
noteholders of nationalized banks to accept a loss, The Irish
Examiner discloses.  With elections due to take place by 2012,
holders of senior bonds may have another reason to agree to talks
now because the government may not survive, The Irish Examiner
says, citing Mr. Venizelos.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


BANK ST. PETERSBURG: Moody's Changes Outlook on D- BFSR to Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on the D- bank
financial strength rating and Ba3 long-term global foreign
currency deposit rating of Bank St. Petersburg to stable from
negative.  The outlook on BSPB's senior unsecured debt rating of
Ba3 and the bank's subordinated debt rating of B1 was also changed
to stable from negative.

                        Ratings Rationale

"The rating action reflects recently stabilized asset quality and
gradual relieving of the loan loss provisioning burden that has
been materially eroding BSPB's profits since late 2008," says
Semyon Isakov, a Moody's Assistant Vice-President -- Analyst and
lead analyst for the bank.  "BSPB's ability to attract additional
capital amid the worst of the market turbulence not only enabled
the bank to bolster its capital position but also to grow its
business which has positively affected the bank's efficiency and
recurring earning power and helped BSPB to absorb mounting credit
losses," adds Mr.  Isakov.

BSPB's recent IFRS reports indicate that the volume of problem
loans -- measured as overdue and impaired loans -- has stabilized
after peaking at 17.5% in Q3 2009, and as at end-June 2010 was
14.0%.  Although some additional loans may migrate from "watch
list" loans to problem loans, Moody's said that it considers that
the current 11.1% level of loan loss provisions, 14.9% Basel I
capital adequacy level and strong recurring earning power create a
cushion against potential further asset quality threats that is
commensurate with the bank's current BFSR.

Moody's acknowledged that competition in the corporate segment --
BSPB's core business line -- is intensifying, leading to
contraction of the sector's net interest margin; however, the
rating agency also noted the bank's strong cost efficiency.  In
the first half of 2010 the bank's cost-to-income ratio was 25%,
which is superior to those of its domestic peers.  The rating
agency added that such a high efficiency buffer should help the
bank to withstand growing competition in the sector.

Despite the positive developments mentioned above, Moody's noted
that the current ratings of BSPB continue to be constrained by the
high level of concentration on the both sides of the balance
sheet, a still developing risk-management culture, and dependence
of the bank's business on key management and shareholders.
Moody's also noted the highly volatile operating environment and
the concentration of the bank's business on a single region of
Russia.

Moody's previous rating action on BSPB was on 17 August 2009, when
-- following the rating review process -- the agency confirmed the
bank's D- BFSR and Ba3 debt and deposit ratings with negative
outlook.

Headquartered in St. Petersburg, Russian Federation, BSPB reported
-- as at 30 June 2010 -- total assets of RUB239 billion, total
equity of RUB25.5 billion and net IFRS profit of RUB1.1 billion
(reviewed by auditors).


INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL: Fitch Changes Issuer Rating to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Russia-based International Industrial
Bank's Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings
to 'D' from 'RD'.  Simultaneously, Fitch has downgraded the
Recovery Rating assigned to IIB's senior unsecured debt to 'RR5'
from 'RR4'.  A full rating breakdown is provided at the end of
this announcement.

The revision of the Long-term IDRs reflects the full cessation of
the bank's business activity following the revocation of its
banking license and entry into external administration.

The downgrade of the Recovery Rating reflects Fitch's view that
recoveries for senior unsecured creditors in the now likely
liquidation scenario will probably be below average, or in the
range of 11-30%.  This view is based on the bank's apparently very
weak asset quality, given the very limited cash generation of its
loan book and the generally unsecured nature of the bank's
lending, and some risk that bondholders will ultimately recover
less from IIB than some of the bank's other senior creditors.
Fitch also understands that there is significant uncertainty
around both IIB's asset quality and how the bank will be managed
and/or liquidated, following its entry into administration.

The rating actions are:

  -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: revised to 'D'
     from 'RD'

  -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at C'; Recovery Rating
     downgraded to 'RR5' from 'RR4'

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: revised to 'D' from 'RD'

  -- Individual rating: affirmed at 'F'

  -- Support rating: affirmed at '5'

  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

  -- National Long-term rating: revised to 'D(rus)' from 'RD(rus)'

  -- Senior unsecured domestic debt: affirmed at 'C(rus)'

At end-H110, IIB was the 30th-largest bank in Russia by total
assets.  Sergey Pugachev, a member of the upper house of the
Russian Parliament, controls an 81% stake in the bank.  On 6 July
2010, Fitch downgraded IIB's Long-term IDR to 'RD', following the
bank's default on its EUR200 million eurobond.


SWEDBANK OJSC: Moody's Withdraws 'Ba3' Long-Term Deposit Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn Swedbank OJSC's (Russia)
Ba3 long-term and Not Prime short-term local- and foreign-currency
deposit ratings and its E+ Bank Financial Strength Rating.  Before
this withdrawal, Swedbank Russia's long-term deposit ratings
carried a negative outlook and the outlook on the BFSR was stable.
Concurrently, Moody's Interfax Rating Agency has withdrawn the
long-term national scale rating of Aa3.ru, which did not carry any
specific outlook.

Moody's has also withdrawn Swedbank's B1 long-term and Not Prime
short-term local-currency deposit rating, the B3 long-term and Not
Prime short-term foreign-currency deposit rating, the E BFSR and
the Aa3.ua NSR.  Before this withdrawal, the long-term deposit
ratings carried a negative outlook and the outlook on the BFSR was
stable.  The NSR did not carry any specific outlook.

The rating withdrawal does not reflect a change in the companies'
creditworthiness.  Swedbank Russia and Swedbank Ukraine had no
outstanding debt rated by Moody's at the time of the withdrawal.

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the credit ratings for
business reasons.

Moody's most recent rating action on Swedbank Russia was on 16
November 2009 when Moody's assigned Ba3 long-term and Not Prime
short-term local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings with a
negative outlook and an E+ BFSR with a stable outlook.  Moody's
Interfax Rating Agency assigned a NSR of Aa3.ru.

Moody's most recent rating action on Swedbank Ukraine was on 28
May 2009 when Moody's downgraded the long-term local-currency
deposit rating to B1 (negative outlook) from Ba2, the BFSR to E
(stable outlook) from E+ and affirmed the B3 long-term foreign-
currency deposit rating (negative outlook).  The Not Prime short-
term ratings were affirmed and the NSR was downgraded to Aa3.ua
from Aa1.ua.

Headquartered in Moscow, Swedbank Russia reported total assets of
US$1.91 billion at YE 2009 according to the bank's IFRS financial
report.

Headquartered in Kiev, Ukraine, Swedbank Ukraine reported total
assets of US$1.73 billion at YE 2009 according to local accounting
standards.

                     Regulatory Disclosures

MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, MOODY'S is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


=========
S P A I N
=========


ABENGOA FINANCE: Moody's Assigns (P)'Ba3' Rating on Senior Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a (P)Ba3 (LGD3, 47%) rating
to the proposed US$600 million senior notes due 2017 that are to
be issued by Abengoa Finance, S.A.U. and guaranteed by Abengoa
S.A.

                        Ratings Rationale

The Ba3 CFR for Abengoa S.A. reflects the combination of its well-
established industrial operations and a diversified portfolio of
concessions in the energy, water treatment and industrial services
sectors.  Together, the two segments benefit from the underlying
growth in environmental applications, (renewable energies,
industrial recycling and electrical power transmission), and the
visibility that regulated returns generally provide.  These
factors have allowed Abengoa to develop a track record of solid
growth and robust margins.  Compared to these positive operating
trends, Moody's sees the relatively immature concession portfolio
with significant investments requirements as a burden to the
group.  While relatively diversified by industry and region, a
large part of the 50 units portfolio had not yet commenced
operation at FYE2009 and dividend distributions to Abengoa were
marginal so far.  Moody's understands that the proceeds of the
notes issuance will be used to extend debt maturities and repay
revolving credit facility initially, so that leverage should not
materially be affected.

Moody's maintains its guidance for the stable outlook on Abengoa's
rating which reflects the expectation that (i) Abengoa will
sustain its sound market position across business segments, with a
resilient operating performance through the cycle; and (ii)
projects under concessions and disciplined capital spending will
boost the earnings contributions from this portfolio going
forward.  As a result, the rating agency would expect Abengoa to
reduce the reported gross debt/EBITDA (including R&D expenses)
ratio of its non-concession segments to below 4.5x (5.2x as of
2009), and the net debt/EBITDA ratio of the group overall
including limited-recourse debt to below 6.0x (as adjusted by
Moody's, 7.1x as of 2009).

The proposed notes of Abengoa Finance, S.A.U., a newly created
company, will be guaranteed by Abengoa S.A. and the same operating
subsidiaries of the group that guarantee the outstanding bonds of
Abengoa plus by eight new regional subsidiaries.  This structure
creates, in Moody's view, a credit profile comparable to the
outstanding bonds with no material impact attributed to the new
guarantors, because of their regional focus and limited scale.
The Ba3 (LGD3, 47%) rating of the notes reflects the application
of Moody's Loss Given Default methodology, wher they are ranked at
the top, together with the existing senior bonds, syndicated loans
and the working capital facilities of Abengoa's operating
subsidiaries.

Abengoa S.A. is a vertically integrated environment and energy
group whose activities span from biofuels, metal recycling and
plant engineering to utility type operation of solar energy
plants, electricity transmission networks and water treatment
plants.  Headquartered in Seville, Spain, Abengoa generated EUR2.8
billion revenues in the first half 2010.

                     Regulatory Disclosures

Information sources used to prepare the credit rating are these:
parties involved in the ratings, confidential and proprietary
Moody's Investors Service's information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the
purposes of assigning a credit rating.

The rating has been disclosed to the rated entity or its
designated agents and issued with no amendment resulting from that
disclosure.

MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, MOODY'S is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


CAJA ESPANA: Moody's Takes Rating Action on Mortgage Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken this rating action on the
mortgage covered bonds assumed by a new entity called Caja Espana
de Inversiones, Salamanca y Soria, Caja de Ahorros y Monte de
Piedad (rated Baa1/P-2/D+, stable outlook).  Caja Espana is the
result of the merger of Caja Espana de Inversiones (previously
rated Baa1/P-2/E+, negative outlook) with Caja de Ahorros de
Salamanca y Soria (Caja Duero, previously rated A3/P-2/D+,
negative outlook).

  -- Mortgage covered bonds assumed by new Caja Espana: Aa1, new
     rating

  -- Mortgage covered bonds issued by Caja Duero: downgraded to
     Aa1 and subsequently withdrawn; previously rated Aaa on 3
     December 2009

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating actions were prompted by Moody's decision to rate the
new Caja Espana senior unsecured ratings at Baa1 (see Moody's
press release dated 8 October 2010).

The merger was effective as of 1 October 2010.  Caja Espana has
assumed the deposit and debt obligations of the CEI and Caja Duero
-- including both entity's existing CHs --and these two banks
ceased to exist when the merger was completed.

Moody's understands that the new cover pool backing the Caja
Espana's CHs is the result of the amalgamation of CEI and Caja
Duero's pools.  Therefore, Moody's has taken a combined view on
each of the individual pools of the former banks.  The combination
of the new issuer ratings at Baa1 and Timely Payment Indicator of
"Probable" now constrain the covered bonds at a maximum rating of
Aa1.  Consequently, the ratings of Caja Duero's covered bonds were
downgraded to Aa1, before being withdrawn.

The covered bonds constitute direct, unconditional and senior
obligations of Caja Espana and are secured by the issuer's entire
mortgage loan pool (excluding securitized loans).

The rating takes into account these factors:

(1) The credit strength of Caja Espana (Baa1/P-2/D+).

(2) The structure created by the transaction documents in
    combination with the legal framework for Spanish covered
    bonds.

(3) The credit quality of the assets securing the payment
    obligations of the issuer under the covered bonds.  All the
    cover assets are residential or commercial mortgages
    originated in Spain.

(4) Sizeable amounts of over-collateralization.  On a statutory
    level this is 25%, and total over-collateralization as of end-
    March 2010 was 167%.  The over-collateralization level needed
    to maintain the current rating is 45%.

Moody's has assigned a TPI of "Probable" to the covered bonds.

The ratings assigned by Moody's address the expected loss posed to
investors.  Moody's ratings address only the credit risks
associated with the transaction.  Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.

The Aa1rating assigned to the existing covered bonds is expected
to be assigned to all subsequent covered bonds issued by Caja
Espana under this program and any future rating actions are
expected to affect all such covered bonds.  Should there be any
exceptions to this, Moody's will in each case publish details in a
separate press release.

                 Key Rating Assumptions/Factors

Covered bond ratings are determined after applying a two-step
process: expected loss analysis and TPI framework analysis.

Expected Loss: Moody's determines a rating based on the expected
loss on the bond.  The primary model used is Moody's Covered Bond
Model (COBOL) which determines expected loss as a function of the
issuer's probability of default, measured by its rating of Baa1,
and the stressed losses on the cover pool assets following issuer
default.

The Cover Pool Losses for this program are 38.3%.  This is an
estimate of the losses Moody's currently models in the event of
issuer default.  Cover Pool Losses can be split between Market
Risk of 20.2% and Collateral Risk of 18.1%.  Market Risk measures
losses as a result of refinancing risk and risks related to
interest-rate and currency mismatches (these losses may also
include certain legal risks).  Collateral Risk measures losses
resulting directly from the credit quality of the assets in the
cover pool.  Collateral Risk is derived from the Collateral Score
which for this program is currently 27%.

Tpi Framework: Moody's assigns a TPI which indicates the
likelihood that timely payment will be made to covered bondholders
following issuer default.  The effect of the TPI framework is to
limit the covered bond rating to a certain number of notches above
the issuer's rating.

                      Sensitivity Analysis

The robustness of a covered bond rating largely depends on the
credit strength of the issuer.

The number of notches by which the issuer's rating may be
downgraded before the covered bonds are downgraded under the TPI
framework is measured by the TPI Leeway.  Based on the current TPI
of "Probable" the TPI Leeway for this program is zero notches,
meaning the issuer rating would need to be downgraded to Baa2
before the covered bonds are downgraded, all other things being
equal.

A multiple notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain limited circumstances.  Some examples might be (i) a
sovereign downgrade negatively affecting both the issuer's senior
unsecured rating and the TPI; (ii) a multiple notch downgrade of
the issuer; or (iii) a material reduction of the value of the
cover pool.

                     Regulatory Disclosures

Information sources used to prepare the credit rating are these:
parties involved in the ratings, parties not involved in the
ratings, public information, confidential and proprietary Moody's
Investors Service information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the
purposes of maintaining a credit rating.

The rating has been disclosed to the rated entity or its
designated agents and issued with no amendment resulting from that
disclosure.

MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, MOODY'S is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


PRISA: Liberty Merger Attractive Investment, T2 Partners Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
Nikolaj Gammeltoft at Bloomberg News reports that hedge fund T2
Partners LLC said Liberty Acquisition Holdings Corp. and Promotora
de Informaciones SA are attractive investments as the companies
prepare to merge.

Bloomberg relates T2 co-founder Glenn Tongue said investors should
buy stock in Prisa, as the Madrid-based company is known, and
stocks or warrants in Liberty, a "blank check company" created for
the purpose of buying or merging with a business, because the
three instruments will gain if the two companies merge.

Prisa, Bloomberg says, aims to take over Liberty to gain US$870
million in cash to reduce debt, which swelled after an expansion
into television services and threatened the company's viability.
In exchange for the cash, Liberty investors will get a stake of
more than 50%, Bloomberg discloses.

Shareholders of New York-based Liberty, led by Nicolas Berggruen
and Martin Franklin, haven't voted on the deal in which they could
swap each Liberty share for 1.5 Prisa Class A shares, 3 Class B
convertible shares and 50 cents in cash, Bloomberg notes.  Prisa's
stock will be worth about EUR2.78 in a merger, Bloomberg states

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Tongue said the deal will probably
close in about a month.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 15,
2010, The Financial Times said Prisa was hit hard by the global
financial crisis and advertising downturn.  The FT disclosed that
coming immediately after a string of expensive acquisitions, the
recession left the company precariously over-leveraged and under
creditor pressure to sell assets.  Citing the latest investor
presentation, the FT said the group aims to cut net debt from
EUR4.75 billion, or 7.7 times ebitda now, to EUR2.2 billion, or
3.5 times historical ebitda, over the next few years.

Promotora de Informaciones S.A. -- http://www.prisa.com/-- is a
Spain-based holding company engaged in various media activities.
The Company has six business areas: publishing, education and
training (Grupo Santillana publishes textbooks and books of
general interest); press (El Pais Internacional is engaged in the
distribution of news material and services to other newspapers and
publications worldwide); radio (Union Radio is a group
broadcasting worldwide); audiovisual (PRISA offers services and
products, including Pay TV, thorough the satellite platform
DIGITAL+, and free-to-view through the channel Cuatro); online
(Prisacom is committed to the development of multimedia content
with broadcasting for Internet-based TV) as well as commercial &
marketing (Sogecable Media SA manages all the advertising on the
Company and its group's media).  The Company is present in 22
countries, such as Portugal, Brazil or the United States.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


VAB BANK: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'E' Rating to Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to positive from stable the
outlook for VAB's (i) bank financial strength rating of E; (ii)
long-term foreign and local-currency bank deposit ratings of Caa1
and foreign-currency senior unsecured debt rating of Caa1.  At the
same time the National Scale Rating was upgraded to Ba1.ua from
Ba2.ua.  The NSR carries no specific outlook.

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating action reflects (i) VAB's capitalization, currently
well in excess of minimum regulatory levels (with a total CAR of
14.4% as of Q2 2010) -- although it is currently under pressure
from low recurring profitability; (ii) the shareholders'
commitment to inject a further UAH550 million of Tier 1 capital by
year-end 2010; and (iii) an adequate level of loan-loss provisions
(17.95% of total loans as of Q2 2010), which in Moody's opinion
provides a sufficient coverage for expected losses from the
deteriorated loan book.  Moody's believes that VAB's asset quality
will not materially deteriorate as the existing problem loans have
already materialized and Moody's do not expect more loans to
migrate into the problem category.

The rating agency also takes into account the history of
shareholder support to VAB, as evidenced by US$19 million capital
increase in 2009 and the commitment to inject new Tier 1 equity by
the end of 2010.  However, Moody's note that VAB remains loss-
making on both a pre-provision and a post-provision basis given a
significant squeeze in margins (its net interest margin dropped to
low 1.3% level in H1 2010 from 5.1% in 2009) and a decline in fees
income.  VAB thus continues to require an additional buffer to
protect its capital from depletion by recurring losses.

Going forward the ratings could be upgraded if the planned capital
injection materializes.  Whilst VAB's shareholders stated their
intention to inject capital into the bank in 2010, this statement
does not amount to an irrevocable commitment on their part.
Another pre-requisite for a rating upgrade would be a sustained
track-record of profitable performance by the bank, which would be
evidence of VAB's ability to generate capital internally.

Moody's previous rating action on VAB Bank was implemented on 8
September 2009, when the rating agency downgraded VAB's ratings to
Caa1/E/Ba2.ua from B2/E+/A3.ua.

Headquartered in Kyiv, VAB reported total assets of US$840 million
as of 30 June 2010 (under IFRS) and a net loss of US$31 million
for H1 2010.

                     Regulatory Disclosures

Information sources used to prepare the credit rating are these:
parties involved in the ratings, public information, confidential
and proprietary Moody's Investors Service's information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the
purposes of maintaining a credit rating.

MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, MOODY'S is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


* Moody's Changes Outlook on 14 Ukrainian Banks to Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook to stable from
negative on the B3 long-term foreign currency deposit ratings of
fourteen Ukrainian banks.  The outlook on three Ukrainian banks'
outstanding foreign currency debt ratings of B1 has also been
changed to stable from negative.  These rating actions have been
prompted by the recent change in outlook on Ukraine's sovereign
ceilings to stable from negative.  These ceilings act as a
constraint for the foreign currency deposit and debt ratings
assigned to banks.  The long-term foreign currency and debt and
deposit ratings of other rated Ukrainian banks, whose ratings were
not constrained by the country ceilings, were not affected by this
rating action.

                        Rating Rationale

Moody's rating actions were triggered by the change of outlook to
stable from negative on (i) Ukraine's foreign currency bank
deposit ceiling of B3 and (ii) Ukraine's foreign currency bond
ceiling of B1:

Specifically, the outlook on B3 foreign currency deposit ratings
of these banks was changed to stable from negative:

* CIB Credit Agricole, PJSC
* OTP Bank Ukraine
* Privatbank Commercial Bank CJSC
* Ukreximbank
* Ukrsibbank
* Raiffeisen Bank Aval
* Subsidiary Bank Sberbank of Russia
* First Ukrainian International Bank, CJSC
* Forum Bank
* Pivdennyi Bank, JSCB
* Savings Bank of Ukraine
* Dongorbank
* Prominvestbank
* Ukrgasbank

The outlook on the foreign currency debt ratings of B1 of these
banks was changed to stable from negative:

* Privatbank Commercial Bank CJSC
* Ukreximbank
* Ukrsibbank

Moody's previous rating action on CIB Credit Agricole was
implemented on 12 May 2009, when Moody's downgraded the long-term
global foreign currency deposit rating to B3 (from B2) with a
negative outlook.

Moody's previous rating action on OTP Ukraine was implemented on 8
September 2009, when Moody's downgraded the bank's BFSR from D to
D-.

Moody's previous rating action on Privatbank was implemented on 22
June 2009, when Moody's downgraded the bank's term global local
currency deposit rating to Ba3 (negative) from Ba1 (stable).

Moody's previous rating action on Ukreximbank was implemented on
22 June 2009, when Moody's downgraded the bank's term global local
currency deposit rating to Ba3 (negative) from Ba1 (stable).

Moody's previous rating action on Ukrsibbank was implemented on 8
September 2009, when Moody's downgraded the bank's BFSR from D to
D-.

Moody's previous rating action on Raiffeisen Bank Aval was
implemented on 8 September 2009, when Moody's downgraded the
bank's BFSR from D to D-.

Moody's previous rating action on Subsidiary Bank Sberbank of
Russia was implemented on 12 May 2009, when Moody's downgraded the
long-term global foreign currency deposit rating to B3 (from B2)
with a negative outlook.

Moody's previous rating action on First Ukrainian International
Bank was implemented on 23 December 2009, when Moody's confirmed
First Ukrainian International Bank's long-term local currency
deposit and foreign currency senior unsecured debt ratings of B2,
as well as its National Scale Rating of A3.ua.

Moody's previous rating action on Forum Bank was implemented on 12
May 2009, when Moody's downgraded the long-term global foreign
currency deposit rating to B3 (from B2) with a negative outlook
and the long-term foreign currency debt to B1 (from Ba3) with a
negative outlook.

Moody's previous rating action on Pivdennyi Bank was implemented
on 12 May 2009, when Moody's downgraded the long-term global
foreign currency deposit rating to B3 (from B2) with a negative
outlook.

Moody's previous rating action on Savings Bank of Ukraine was
implemented on 22 June 2009, when Moody's downgraded the long-term
global local currency deposit and debt ratings to B2 (negative)
from Ba1 (stable) and the national scale rating was downgraded to
A2.ua from Aa1.ua.

Moody's previous rating action on Dongorbank was implemented on 12
May 2009, when Moody's downgraded the long-term global foreign
currency deposit rating to B3 (from B2) with a negative outlook.

Moody's previous rating action on Prominvestbank was implemented
on 2 November 2009, when Moody's upgraded the long-term global
scale local currency deposit rating to B2 and its foreign currency
deposit rating to B3 from Caa2.  At the same time, PIB's bank
financial strength rating was upgraded to E+ from E, it's Not
Prime short-term global scale local and foreign currency deposit
ratings were affirmed, and the National Scale rating was upgraded
to A2.ua from B3.ua.

Moody's previous rating action on Ukrgasbank was implemented on 7
August 2009, when Moody's confirmed these ratings of Ukrgasbank:
E+ bank financial strength rating, B3 long-term global scale local
and foreign currency deposit ratings and Baa3.ua National Scale
Rating.  The bank's Not Prime short-term global scale local and
foreign currency deposit ratings were affirmed.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


DUNDEE FOOTBALL CLUB: Former Director Wants to Control Club
-----------------------------------------------------------
Former Dundee Football Club Director Giovanni di Stefano has
reiterated his desire to assume "full and authoritarian control"
of the stricken club, Bridlington Free Press reports.  The report
relates that the club are to go into administration for the second
time in seven years after failing to negotiate a deal to pay a
GBP365,000 tax bill.

According to the report, Mr. Di Stefano was on the board when
Dundee went into administration in November 2003, and resigned two
months later.  However, the report relates, he remains aggrieved
about the manner in which he was asked to step down and he
released a statement outlining his position.

The report discloses that accountancy company PKF confirmed that
they had been asked to act as administrator by the board after a
failure to negotiate a deal with HMRC despite director Calum
Melville pledging GBP200,000 for the fund.

"Conservative estimates place the figure involved to discharge
liabilities and continue the club as a going concern to complete
the season at some GBP2million, perhaps even more.  Owning a
football club is a passion not a profitable concern and since Mr.
Melville has already pledged some GBP200,000 it is by far short of
what is required (a) to avoid administration (b) to complete the
season and more important (c) to avoid civil and /or criminal
prosecution for running an insolvent enterprise.  Since none of
the directors have had the heart to state the position as it is
then I do so in order that the supporters can truly understand the
de facto position.  If this club indeed goes into administration I
will contact the administrator with a view to acquiring the
'goodwill' element of the club in order to ensure that it
maintains its sporting status with the SFL and if, underlining if,
agreements can be reached with players/staff/grounds," the report
quoted Mr. Di Stefano as saying.

Mr. Di Stefano claimed he was wrongly blamed for the club's
failure to attract investment when he quit in 2004, and added:
"There will be no repeats in the event of my taking full and
authoritarian control of the club," the report adds.

Dundee Football Club -- http://www.thedees.co.uk/-- offers
companies opportunity to combine business with pleasure through
the first class facilities available at Dens Park.  It can provide
the vehicle for a company to entertain your customers and clients,
while enjoying the excitement of professional football at its
best.


EXOVA GROUP: S&P Assigns 'B' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'B'
long-term corporate credit rating to U.K.-based testing services
provider Exova Group Ltd.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned a 'B-' issue rating to group
subsidiary Exova Ltd.'s proposed GBP155 million senior unsecured
notes.  The recovery rating on this instrument is '5', indicating
S&P's expectation of modest (10%-30%) recovery for senior
unsecured creditors in the event of a payment default.  The issue
rating on the proposed notes is subject to S&P's review of the
final documentation for the bond.

In addition, S&P assigned a 'BB-' issue rating to Exova Ltd.'s
cumulative GBP136 million senior bank facilities (excluding term
loan A).  The recovery rating on these facilities is '1',
indicating S&P's expectation of very high (90%-100%) recovery for
secured creditors in the event of a payment default.

"The ratings on U.K.-based testing services provider Exova reflect
S&P's view of the group's highly leveraged financial risk profile,
limited scale of operations, and relatively limited short-term
cost-base flexibility," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Mohammed Fayek.  "The ratings also reflect the risks associated
with the group's acquisitive strategy, albeit limited to small
bolt-on acquisitions, to build critical mass and geographic
presence."

Exova's weaknesses are partially mitigated by its solid business
position, the group serving in a profitable and relatively stable
industry, and by sound geographic and client-base diversity.  The
ratings are also supported by Exova's reputable track record, with
solid accreditations and client-specific approvals that provide
some barriers to entry.

With revenues of GBP221 million in 2009, Exova benefits from
leading positions in laboratory-based testing services across
Europe (50% of 2009 revenues), the Americas (35%), and the Middle
East and Asia (15%).  The group serves a diversified client base,
operating in specialized and relatively profitable market segments
such as aerospace and defense (17% of 2009 revenues), oil and gas
(12%), general engineering (9%), and food production (8%), among
others.

In S&P's view, Exova's operating performance will remain
relatively stable in the near term due to the ongoing demand for
its services.  S&P anticipates a slight improvement in credit
measures in the near to medium term, supported by continued mid-
single-digit organic growth accompanied by limited acquisitive
growth, with no additional debt funding.

Downside rating risk is most likely to arise from a change in
Exova's acquisition strategy toward debt-financed acquisitions or
from a significant decline in organic growth rates toward zero or
negative growth.  Upside rating potential is constrained by the
group's highly leveraged financial risk profile.


LEISURE AND GAMING: May Go Into Administration After Failed Sale
----------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Hutchinson at Betting Industry News reports that Leisure
and Gaming may go into administration following its failure to
complete a sale of its Betshop business.  The report relates that
the company thought it had agreed a sale of the Italian betting
shop and kiosk business for an initial consideration of GBP1.9
million.

According to the report, the sale to Pefaco, a Spanish online
betting operator, could have raised as much as GBP4.4 million if
certain targets had been met.  The company warned shareholders in
September that if the sale did not go through then administrators
may have to be called in because the company would run out of
cash, the report notes.

The report discloses that in a Stock Exchange statement Leisure
and Gaming said: "On September 28, 2010, the company disclosed the
adjournment of the General Meeting convened on that date until
10:00 a.m. on October 12, 2010.  The adjournment was to give the
Company time to conclude a share purchase agreement with Grupo
Pefaco SL on the terms set out in the Company's circular to
shareholders dated 10 September 2010.  Since then, the Company has
not concluded definitive terms with Pefaco and the Resolutions to
be put to the reconvened General Meeting are redundant.  The terms
of exclusivity with Pefaco have also expired without renewal.  The
Directors are still in talks with Pefaco but are responding to
contact with other parties who have expressed an interest to
acquire the Betshop business since the expiry of the exclusivity
period.  While that remains a real possibility, following demand
for repayment by the Company's bankers on October 6, 2010, the
Company is working to see if a solvent solution can be achieved
avoiding administration.  Further resolutions will need to be put
to shareholders if an alternative process emerges."

                    About Leisure and Gaming

Leisure and Gaming plc is a holding company with major assents in
the global interactive betting and gaming industry.  Its interests
span from software development to marketing.

Leisure and Gaming plc was incorporated in England and Wales in
August 2004.  Its registered holders are BNY Norwich Union
Nominees Ltd, Chase GA Group Nominees Ltd, Chase Nominees Ltd,
CUIM Nominee Ltd, and Vidacos Nominees Ltd.


LLOYDS BANKING: To Eliminate 4,500 Jobs in IT Operations
--------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Lloyds Banking Group is to cut about 4,500
jobs in its IT operations.

BBC relates it said 1,600 would be roles held by permanent staff
with a further 1,150 working on temporary contracts.  The other
1,750 jobs are held overseas, BBC notes.

According to BBC, the bank said the cuts, to happen by 2012, were
part of its integration of IT operations between Lloyds and HBOS.

It is the latest round of job losses at the bank, which is 41%-
owned by the government, after a GBP20 billion rescue in 2008, BBC
states.

In 2009, the bank made an operating loss of GBP6.3 billion, almost
unchanged on the GBP6.7 billion it lost in 2008, BBC discloses.
Part of these losses were due to the costs of taking over HBOS
during the financial crisis, BBC says.

                       Stock-Market Flotation

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 21,
2010, The Irish Times said the Lloyds Banking Group was working on
plans for a stock-market flotation of the chain of 600 branches it
is being forced to sell by the European Commission.  The Irish
Times disclosed the float would create a new British bank with 5%
of the retail banking sector and an estimated market value of
between GBP3 billion and GBP4 billion.  Lloyds, 42% owned by
taxpayers, has been given four years to sell the business, which
it was ordered to divest as the price for receiving state aid at
the peak of the financial crisis, The Irish Times said.  The Irish
Times noted fears were mounting that it would struggle to find a
buyer.  Lloyds was examining the float as a back-up plan, The
Irish Times stated states.  Under the plan, Lloyds would fund the
new company until it was strong enough to support itself,
according to The Irish Times.

                 About Lloyds Banking Group PLC

Lloyds Banking Group PLC, formerly Lloyds TSB Group plc,
(LON:LLOY) -- http://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/-- is a United
Kingdom-based financial services group providing a range of
banking and financial services, primarily in the United Kingdom,
to personal and corporate customers.  The Company operates in
three divisions: UK Retail Banking, Insurance and Investments, and
Wholesale and International Banking.  Its main business activities
are retail, commercial and corporate banking, general insurance,
and life, pensions and investment provision.  The Company also
operates an international banking business with a global footprint
in 40 countries.  Services are offered through a number of brands,
including Lloyds TSB, Halifax, Bank of Scotland, Scottish Widows,
Clerical Medical and Cheltenham & Gloucester.  On January 16,
2009, Lloyds Banking Group plc acquired HBOS plc.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 17,
2010, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its
rating on a GBP56.472 million 6.475% preference share issue by
Lloyds Banking Group (A/Stable/A-1) to 'C' from 'CC' following the
first missed coupon payment.  The rating action was the
first of S&P's forthcoming rating actions on over 40 hybrid
instruments issued by Lloyds and related entities with
discretionary coupon payments.  According to S&P, each security
would be lowered to 'C' from 'CC' on the date of the first coupon
payment to be missed.


NEW PARK BRADFORD: Goes Into Administration With GBP8MM Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
New Park (Bradford) Limited has been taken into administration
owing creditors GBP8 million, Shelley DeBere at Bridging and
Commercial reports.  The report relates that the company has
fallen victim to the recession.

According to the report, the company, registered to Jubilee
Business Park in Wakefield, is now in the hands of joint
administrators Adrian Berry and Daniel Butters.  The report
relates that in a bid to recover money for creditors, including
the original founders Yorkshire Bank, the administrators are
trying to rent and sell the remaining unsold apartments as quickly
as possible.

Seventy per cent of the 106 flats had been pre-sold before the
project's completion, and the administrators are now working to
complete those sales and manage the remaining 30 per cent, the
report posts.

New Park (Bradford) Limited is a property developer.  New Park
(Bradford), which once transformed a derelict Bradford warehouse
into a block of flats, was originally set up as a consortium to
carry out the first phase of the Woolston Warehouse project --
consisting of 106 apartments near the city centre.


PRINCIPALITY BUILDING: Moody's Gives Pos. Outlook on 'D-' Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on the D- bank
financial strength ratings of Principality Building Society from
negative to positive.  In the same rating action, the outlook on
the debt ratings of Baa2/P-2 were changed from negative to stable.
The outlook on the junior subordinated debt rating of B3 were also
changed to positive from negative in line with the outlook on the
BFSR.  The D- BFSR, mapping to a standalone rating of Ba3 on the
long-term scale as well as the Baa2 /P-2 senior debt and deposit
ratings were affirmed.

                        Ratings Rationale

Marjan Riggi, VP/Senior Credit Officer and Moody's lead analyst
for Principality, said that the change in the BFSR outlook to
positive follows the consistent improvements in the society's
earnings performance as well as its management of the riskier
exposures in its loan portfolio, particularly of its commercial
and second-charge loans.  The positive trends include: a) steadily
improving net interest margin over the last 18 months despite a
challenging low interest rate environment--net interest margins of
1.69% in FYE2009 and 1.38% in FYE2008 are one of the strongest in
the building society sector; b) consistent earnings performance
supported by strong net interest margins and good management of
arrears (pre-provision income of GBP55.2 million in FYE2009 vs.
GBP46.2million in FYE2008); c) positive trend in cost-to-income
ratio (52.1% in FYE2009 vs.  58.0% in FYE2008 and 64.4% in
FYE2007); and d) good asset quality performance in comparison to
peers, especially of its commercial, buy-to-let and prime
(excluding the second-charge prime lending) portfolios, which
account for approximately 85% of its total loan portfolio and have
performed better than originally expected.  Furthermore, despite
strong competition among the UK building societies and banks for
customer deposits, Principality increased its net retail customer
deposits over the FYE2009 (6.6% growth in net retail deposits),
further strengthening its franchise in the region.

Moody's notes that Principality, like most building societies in
the UK, has a strong liquidity profile, with 100% of its gross
loans being funded by its retail deposits.  The retail deposit
funding is underpinned by the society's strong Welsh franchise,
with its extensive branch network, and strong brand name.

Moody's stated that the positive outlook on Principality's D- BFSR
reflects its strong regional franchise, improving earnings
performance and good asset quality which have been particularly
resilient in the face of the downturn in the UK economic
environment.  The positive outlook also take into account
Principality's capital base, which although relatively small
compared to some of the larger building societies, provides
adequate buffer to withstand potential losses arising from its
loan portfolio, under Moody's forward looking scenarios.

On changing the outlook on the senior debt ratings from negative
to stable, Moody's commented that Principality's current Baa2 debt
ratings benefit from 4 notches of uplift from its standalone debt
rating of Ba3.  This incorporates a significant amount of extra-
ordinary systemic support which was reflective of Moody's
assumption for a much higher probability of support to UK banks
and building societies during the financial crisis.  However, as
the standalone credit strength of the society improves and the UK
gradually recovers from the recession, Moody's will accordingly
remove the extra-ordinary support from the senior debt ratings of
banks and building societies and will move toward a "normalised"
level of support within Moody's "low-support country" framework.
Therefore, Moody's expect that an upgrade of Principality's BFSR
will not necessarily lead to an upgrade of its senior debt/deposit
rating which is reflected in the change of the outlook on these
ratings to stable rather than positive.

The change in outlook of the subordinated debt ratings to positive
from negative is in line with Moody's notching practice for
subordinated debt ratings in the UK which are linked to the
standalone debt ratings and do not incorporate any systemic
support.

Moody's further commented that highlighted by the positive outlook
on the BFSR, continued improvement in Principality's asset quality
and consistency in the society's earnings performance and capital
retention would put positive pressure on the ratings.  On the
other hand, if the expected losses from the society's loan book
were to deteriorate beyond Moody's forward loss scenarios, or if
concentration of its riskier commercial portfolio increases beyond
its current levels this could put downward pressure on the
ratings.  Moreover, a material reduction in its profitability and
efficiency ratios could also put downward pressure on the ratings.

The last rating action on Principality was on 3 July 2009, when
the rating on its dated subordinated debt was downgraded to B3
from B1.

Principality, headquartered in Cardiff, Wales, had total assets of
GBP6.3 billion as at end-June 2010.


RALLS BUILDERS: Falls Into Administration With GBP2 Million Debts
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Constantine at Sale Business Report says that Ralls
Builders has been placed into administration with GBP2 million
worth of debts owed to more than 300 creditors.

According to the report, administrator James Tickell, from
Portland Business and Financial Solutions, said that the firm had
simply fallen victim to the current economic hardships affecting
so many businesses in the construction sector.  "There's no one
reason.  It's just a consequence of working in the difficult
current climate.  It's been incurring losses for this year, and
has basically run out of money," the report quoted Mr. Tickell as
saying.

Headquartered in Denmead, Ralls Builders is a building firm.  The
family-run firm, which had been in business for 121 years, focused
primarily on repairs and maintenance, refurbishment, design and
build, new build and extensions.  Over the years, the firm has
worked on a number of high-profile projects in the Portsmouth and
Fareham area including Stubbington Ark animal shelter, Guildhall
Square and Portsmouth Dockyard.  It employed 26 staff directly and
had a large number of external subcontractors who relied on the
firm.  The firm is still run by the Ralls family.  Two of the
present directors, Nick and Will Ralls, are great-grandsons of the
founder.


STAINTON COACHES: Goes Into Administration; 35 Jobs Made Redundant
------------------------------------------------------------------
Thirty-five jobs have been lost after Stainton Coaches went into
administration, News and Stars reports.

According to the report, Stainton Coaches, of Kendal, ceased
trading after it was unable to get finance to pay off hire-
purchase agreements on its vehicles.

"I don't blame anyone else but myself.  I have been running the
company for the last 12 years, with advice from banks.  Now we've
got into a situation where we have needed help and they have
refused," the report quoted Business Director Chris Stainton as
saying.

Accountants advised that the business was short of funds required
to pay hire purchase fees for the company's 24-strong fleet.

Founded in 1921, Stainton Coaches provided Cumbria and the
surrounding area with European tour travel, as well as private
coach hire, school coach services and trip organization.


* UK: Bank-Bailouts Good Investment for Taxpayers
-------------------------------------------------
BBC Scotland reports that Truett Tate, a director of Lloyds
banking group, has suggested British taxpayers should be delighted
with the opportunity to invest billions in stricken banks.

Mr. Truett told the BBC Scotland investigations team that he knew
many people who would "love that kind of return on their
investment".

His comments come after a BBC poll found 64% people did not
believe the government could prevent another crash.

About 70% of those polled also said they did not trust Britain's
bankers, BBC discloses.

The UK taxpayer currently has a 41% share in Lloyds Banking Group
and an 83% share in the Royal Bank of Scotland, BBC notes.


* UK: PwC Says Many Charities May Go Belly-Up
---------------------------------------------
David Ainsworth at Third Sector, citing Ian Oakley-Smith, an
insolvency practitioner at PricewaterhouseCoopers, reports that an
increase in charity insolvencies is likely to be one result of the
public sector spending cuts expected in the coalition government's
comprehensive spending review.

According to Third Sector, Mr. Oakley-Smith, an insolvency
practitioner at PricewaterhouseCoopers, said he had not yet seen
an increase in charities being forced into insolvency or an
emergency merger, but had seen an "increase in anxiety" among
charities.

"So many charities are dependent on public sector funding for so
much of their income, that I expect a new round of insolvencies
and mergers when many grants come to an end in the spring," Third
Sector quoted Mr. Oakley-Smith as saying.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EUROPE: Regulators May Take Control Banks Under EU Plan
---------------------------------------------------------
Ben Moshinsky at Bloomberg News reports that regulators may be
given powers to take control of banks that fail to meet capital
requirements, under European plans to step in earlier during
financial crises.

Supervisors may appoint a "special manager" to take over a bank
that doesn't meet capital standards and hasn't submitted "a
credible restoration plan," the European Commission said in a
document obtained by Bloomberg.  Regulators would also be given
the power to suspend dividends or fire senior managers, Bloomberg
notes.

Bloomberg says the plans contained in the document, which may be
altered before they are proposed by the commission on Oct. 20,
would also allow regulators to force banks to sell risky
businesses if their bank's capital falls below the regulatory
minimum.

The appointment of a special manager wouldn't affect shareholder
rights, the document said, according to Bloomberg.  Regulators
would also have to test whether rescuing a failing bank would
better serve the public interest than closing it down, the EU, as
cited by Bloomberg, said in the document.

The commission is considering a mechanism to force unsecured
creditors of a failing bank to accept losses so the lender can
continue to function as a going concern without accessing public
funds, Bloomberg discloses.


* BOOK REVIEW: Declining Demand, Divestiture & Corporate Strategy
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Author: Kathryn Rudie Harrigan
Publisher: Beard Books, Washington, D.C. 2003
(reprint of 1980 book published by D.C. Heath and Company). 424
pages. US$34.95 trade paper, ISBN 1-58798-196-3.

Product life cycle is at the center of this book.  Every product
-- including services -- has a life cycle.  A typical life cycle
has ups and downs.  In this typical cycle which is an inherent
part of being in business, there is no serious, concentrated
thought that a product is in irreversible decline leading to its
end.  There may be the concern of this at the margins of
management's recognition of a down phase of the typical cycle.
But few companies know how to or are willing to face the fact that
a product is not going to pull out of a decline.

Ms. Harrigan deals comprehensively and professionally with this
subject most businesspersons are reluctant to come to grips with.
Admitting that a product is in its "endgame" (a term Ms. Harrigan
uses frequently) goes against the grain of most businesspersons;
who in general are disposed to be optimistic about prospects, have
a stake in the success of a product and a company, have
experienced down phases of a business cycle before, and want to
rise to the challenge of keeping a product viable.  Thus the
reasons management usually does not recognize an endgame involve
experience, identity, hopefulness, faulty research or data, and
analytic failures. The author takes up each of these.  She is
equally pertinent and constructive for psychological and technical
aspects of the subject.

While there are similarities to a down phase and an endgame, there
are technicalities and signs which help management to distinguish
the difference.  Ms. Harrigan gives these as fewer competitors,
constriction of varieties of a product, withdrawal from smaller
markets, and the reduction of promotional and developmental
budgets by competitors.  Ms. Harrigan shows that product endgame
is ordinarily part of decline or endgame of an industry sector.
Management looks to competitors and also changes in the sector for
unmistakable signs of a product endgame.

Though criteria for recognizing an endgame apply to any business
sector, strategies for dealing with it vary from sector to sector.
Thus besides advising company leaders how to recognize an endgame,
Ms. Harrigan gives examples of endgame management over a broad
range of industries using particular and in many cases well-known
companies and brands.  Consumer products industries are baby
foods, cigars, electric percolators, and rayons.  Soda ash and
acetylene are manufacturers of products for industrial use and
consumer goods which are not so well known outside of their
sectors.  Within these industries, one runs across the names of
Consolidated Cigar, Mirro Aluminum, Beech-Nut Foods, Gerber
Products, Allied Chemical, and Carbide Process, Ms. Harrigan
covers each industry by an overview of it and the conditions
bringing about the endgame, description of the endgame for
industries in it, and an analysis citing mistaken and helpful
measures taken by management under the circumstances.

In all, 60 companies in seven industry sectors are studied.  Ms.
Harrigan has gathered enough diversified material and organized
and analyzed it so thoroughly and knowledgeably that she is able
to make comparisons among not only the different sectors, but also
industries within them for the comprehension and applicability of
endgame circumstances and strategies for company management.  When
she first wrote this book about 1980, it had a leading influence
on establishing the new field of endgame management.  Endgames are
inevitable in any modern economy.  Ms. Harrigan tells how managers
can face the unique, usually unwelcome challenges of these to
lessen adverse effects as much as possible.

An award-winning scholar and author of many articles and books,
Kathyrn Rudie Harrigan is the Henry Kravis Professor of Business
Leadership at Columbia University.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.

                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter -- Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick,
Maryland USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine
T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *