TCREUR_Public/101018.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, October 18, 2010, Vol. 11, No. 205



NEMOPTIC: Placed in Liquidation in Versailles


DELPHIN KREUZFAHRTEN: Files for Insolvency; Vessel Seized by Owner
MILLIPORE CORPORATION: Moody's Keeps 'Ba2' Rating on Senior Notes
QIMONDA AG: Seeks to Intervene In Row Over Units IP Deal


DANAOS CORPORATION: Sets November 8 Annual Meeting of Shareholders
WIND HELLAS: Weather Finance to Pick Preferred Bidder Soon


ALLIED IRISH: Completes Public Offering of Exchangeable Notes
* IRELAND: Sligo Properties Prices Slashed in Receivership Sale


ZHAIKMUNAI LP: S&P Puts 'B-' Rating on CreditWatch Positive


BALTIC INTERNATIONAL: Moody's Affirms 'E+' Bank Strength Rating
PRIVATBANK AS: Moody's Affirms 'E+' Bank Financial Strength Rating
TRASTA KOMERCBANKA: Moody's Affirms 'E+' Bank Strength Rating


RAPSOD TRADE: S&P Withdraws 'D' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
RASPADSKAYA OAO: Moody's Confirms 'B1' Corporate Family Rating
SEVERSTAL OAO: S&P Gives Stable Outlook; Affirms 'BB-' Rating


ABENGOA SA: S&P Assigns 'B+' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating
BBVA RMBS: Moody's Lowers Rating on C Certificate to Caa1 (sf)
CABLEUROPA SAU: S&P Affirms 'B-' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
CAIXA D'ESTALVIS: Moody's Withdraws 'D' Bank Strength Rating


MAKIEVKA STEEL: Ukrainian Court Initiates Bankruptcy Case

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DA GREEN & SON: Goes Into Administration
DUNDEE FOOTBALL CLUB: Goes Into Administration
HENDERSON MORLEY: Former Shareholders Angry Over Asset Sale
INVERESK PAPER COMPANY: Placed Into Receivership, 35 Jobs at Risk
KCA DEUTAG: Lenders Mull US$200 Million Cash Injection

LIVERPOOL FOOTBALL: Sale Blocked After Board Obtains TRO in Texas
PORTSMOUTH FOOTBALL: Plans to Exit Administration Blocked
SEALUMET LIMITED: Creditors' Meeting Slated for October 20
WHITE TOWER: Administrators Have 18 Months to Sell Aviva Office


* BOND PRICING: For the Week October 11 to October 15, 2010



NEMOPTIC: Placed in Liquidation in Versailles
Raphael Tillet, writing for ActuaLitte, reports that Nemoptic was
put into liquidation by the court of Versailles, after it failed
to present a mature technology and accumulated debts.

Nemoptic is a French research and development company engaged on a
project to drive digital LCD.  It is based in Magny les Hameaux,


DELPHIN KREUZFAHRTEN: Files for Insolvency; Vessel Seized by Owner
Lloyd's List reports Delphin Kreuzfahrten has filed for insolvency
after its chartered vessel, Delphin Voyager, was arrested by its
Greek owner in Piraeus last week in a row over unpaid charter

Lloyd's List relates Athens-based Restis Group, better known as a
leading dry bulk and tanker owner, said it acted because of the
German operator's "failures time and time again to pay hire".

According to Lloyd's List, Restis was chasing allegedly unpaid
hire for its solitary cruise vessel amounting to EUR2.4 million
(US$3.4 million), which is already likely to have climbed.  In
total, the six-year charter was due to run up to the end of
October 2012, Lloyd's List notes.

Restis put the blame squarely on the German cruise operation's
financial difficulties and said it had been patient in the face of
payment troubles it traced back to 2009, Lloyd's List discloses.

A spokesman for the Greek owner told Lloyd's List that it had
twice granted the operator moratoria on payments and had "tried to
help", but was forced to take action after Delphin allegedly broke
the latest agreement, said to have been signed only two weeks ago.

Delphin Kreuzfahrten is a German cruise operator.

MILLIPORE CORPORATION: Moody's Keeps 'Ba2' Rating on Senior Notes
Moody's Investors Service commented that the Ba2 (LGD5,72%) rating
of the EUR250 million 5.875% Senior Notes of Millipore
Corporation, due in 2016, is likely to be aligned with the Baa2
issuer and senior unsecured rating of Merck KGaA, assuming the
provision of an unconditional guarantee by Merck.

On March 2, 2010, Moody's place the ratings of Millipore on review
for possible upgrade following the announcement that they would be
acquired by Merck KGaA.

Based in Darmstadt, Germany, Merck KGaA is a diversified group
with worldwide operations in pharmaceuticals (including original
drugs and healthcare products) and in the specialty value-added
chemicals markets.  It also holds a worldwide leadership position
in liquid crystal production.  Merck recorded revenues of EUR7.7
billion in 2009.

Millipore Corporation, headquartered in Billerica, Massachusetts,
is a leading bioprocess and bioscience products and services
company.  The Bioprocess division offers solutions that optimize
development and manufacturing of biologics.  The Bioscience
division provides high performance products and application
insights that improve laboratory productivity.  For fiscal year
2009, Millipore had revenues of almost US$1.7 billion.

QIMONDA AG: Seeks to Intervene In Row Over Units IP Deal
Bankruptcy Law360 reports that Qimonda AG, which recently struck a
multimillion-dollar intellectual property deal with its bankrupt
U.S. subsidiaries, wants a chance to defend the agreement against
a bankruptcy appeal from Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. and Elpida
Memory Inc.

Qimonda AG filed motions to intervene Monday in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Delaware, Law360 says.

                          About Qimonda AG

Qimonda AG (NYSE: QI) -- is a leading
global memory supplier with a diversified DRAM product portfolio.
The Company generated net sales of EUR1.79 billion in financial
year 2008 and had -- prior to its announcement of a repositioning
of its business -- approximately 12,200 employees worldwide, of
which 1,400 were in Munich, 3,200 in Dresden and 2,800 in
Richmond, Va.

Qimonda AG commenced insolvency proceedings in a local court in
Munich, Germany, on January 23, 2009.  On June 15, 2009, QAG filed
a petition (Bankr. E.D. Va. Case No. 09-14766) for relief under
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

Qimonda North America Corp., an indirect and wholly owned
subsidiary of QAG, is the North American sales and marketing
subsidiary of QAG.  QNA is also the parent company of Qimonda
Richmond LLC.  QNA and QR sought Chapter 11 protection (Bankr.
D. Del. Case No. 09-10589) on Feb. 20, 2009.  Mark D. Collins,
Esq., Michael J. Merchant, Esq., and Maris J. Finnegan, Esq.,
at Richards Layton & Finger PA, represent the Debtors.
Roberta A. DeAngelis, the United States Trustee for Region 3,
appointed seven creditors to serve on an official committee of
unsecured creditors.  Jones Day and Ashby & Geddes represent the
Committee.  In its bankruptcy petition, Qimonda Richmond, LLC,
estimated more than US$1 billion in assets and debts.  The
information, the Debtors said, was based on Qimonda Richmond's
financial records which are maintained on a consolidated basis
with Qimonda North America Corp.


DANAOS CORPORATION: Sets November 8 Annual Meeting of Shareholders
Danaos Corporation will hold its 2010 Annual Meeting of
Stockholders on Monday, November 8, 2010 at 10:00 a.m. Greek local
time at the offices of the Company's manager, Danaos Shipping Co.
Ltd., in Piraeus, Greece.

The notice of annual meeting of stockholders, proxy statement,
proxy card and the Company's 2009 Annual Report to Stockholders,
as well as its Annual Report on Form 20-F, are available

At the meeting, these items will be considered:

  1) To elect two directors to hold office until the annual
     meeting of stockholders in 2013 and one director to hold
     office until the annual meeting of stockholders in 2011
     and, in each case, until their respective successors have
     been duly elected and qualified;

  2) To ratify the appointment of the Company's independent
     auditors; and

  3) To transact such other business as may properly come
     before the 2010 Annual Meeting and any adjournments or
     postponements thereof.

                     About Danaos Corporation

Headquartered in Piraeus, Greece, Danaos Corporation (NYSE: DAC)
-- is an international owner of
containerships, chartering its vessels to many of the world's
largest liner companies.  The Company operates through a number of
subsidiaries incorporated in Liberia and Cyprus.  As of May 31,
2010, the Company had a fleet of 45 containerships aggregating
193,629 TEUs, making the Company among the largest containership
charter owners in the world, based on total TEU capacity.

The Company's balance sheet at June 30, 2010, showed
US$3.124 billion in total assets, US$2.934 billion in total
liabilities, and stockholders' equity of US$189.8 million.

                          *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on June 22, 2010,
PricewaterhouseCoopers S.A., in Athens, Greece, expressed
substantial doubt about the Company's ability to continue as a
going concern after auditing the Company's financial statements
for the year ended December 31, 2009.  The Company noted of the
Company's inability to comply with financial covenants under
its current debt agreements as of December 31, 2009, and its
negative working capital deficit.

WIND HELLAS: Weather Finance to Pick Preferred Bidder Soon
John Detrixhe at Bloomberg News, citing a statement, reports that
Weather Finance III may choose a preferred bidder in the
restructuring of Wind Hellas Telecommunications SA "in the near

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 1,
2010, Bloomberg News, citing three people with knowledge of the
matter, said Wind Hellas Telecommunications' senior-secured
bondholders were in the lead to acquire Greece's third-largest
mobile phone operator.  Bloomberg noted the people said that while
a bid by Telenor ASA, the Nordic region's largest phone company,
was preferred by lenders of Wind Hellas, bondholders aren't
satisfied with the offer, terms of which couldn't be determined.
Wind Hellas, which was bought out of bankruptcy less than 12
months ago by Egyptian billionaire Naguib Sawiris, is controlled
by creditors after it deferred payments on a EUR250 million
(US$341 million) revolving credit facility in June and missed an
interest payment on its EUR1.2 billion of floating-rate notes,
Bloomberg disclosed.  One of the people said an offer by Mr.
Sawiris wasn't considered adequate, according to Bloomberg.

                        About WIND Hellas

Headquartered in Athens, Greece, WIND Hellas Telecommunications
S.A. -- provides mobile voice and data
services to about 6 million consumer and business customers
throughout Greece.  The company enables international roaming in
155 countries for travelling subscribers through agreements with
other carriers.  It also provides cellular and satellite-based
vehicle management and tracking services.  WIND Hellas is owned by
investment firm Weather Investments, a company led by Cairo-based
Orascom Telecom's founder and chairman, Naguib Sawiris.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 1,
2010, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its
long-term corporate credit ratings on Greek mobile
telecommunications operator WIND Hellas Telecommunications S.A.
and related entities to 'D' from 'SD'.  Simultaneously, S&P
withdrew all S&P's ratings on the group.


ALLIED IRISH: Completes Public Offering of Exchangeable Notes
Bloomberg News reports that Allied Irish Banks Plc completed a
public offering of contingent mandatorily exchangeable notes
exchangeable for shares of M&T Bank Corp.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 13,
2010, The Financial Times reports said Allied Irish Banks was
seeking to raise EUR5.4 billion (GBP4.7 billion, US$7.6 billion)
in a placing and open offer to shareholders to bring its core tier
one capital ratio to 8% by the year end.  The FT disclosed brokers
calculate the government could end up with more than 90%, with the
capital hole the bank is seeking to cover 20 times bigger than the
current market value of the bank.  The National Pension Reserve
Fund already owns 18% of Allied Irish Banks after the bank was
blocked by other creditors from paying the coupon on the
government's EUR3.5 billion preference share investment, the FT

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c., together with its subsidiaries -- conducts retail and commercial banking
business in Ireland.  It also provides corporate lending and
capital markets activities from its head office at Bankcentre and
from Dublin's International Financial Services Centre.  The Group
also has overseas branches in the United States, Germany, France
and Australia, among other locations.  The business of AIB Group
is conducted through four operating divisions: AIB Bank Republic
of Ireland division, Capital Markets division, AIB Bank UK
division, and Central & Eastern Europe division.  In February
2008, the Group acquired the AmCredit mortgage business in the
Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.  In September
2008, the Group also acquired a 49.99% shareholding in BACB.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 23,
2010, Moody's Investors Service affirmed AIB's long-term bank
deposit and debt ratings.  These are A1 for long-term bank
deposits and senior debt, A2 for dated subordinated debt, Ba3 for
undated subordinated debt, B1 for cumulative tier 1 securities and
Caa1 for non-cumulative tier 1 securities.  Moody's said the
outlook on these ratings is stable.  AIB's bank financial strength
rating of D, which maps to Ba2 on the long term rating scale, with
a positive outlook was unaffected by the rating action.

* IRELAND: Sligo Properties Prices Slashed in Receivership Sale
Further signs of the economic climate will be evident in Sligo
when a receivership sale of properties gets underway, Ocean FM

According to the report, citing the Irish Independent, there are
six homes on the market in Coolaney all at reduced prices due to a
receivership sale.  The report relates that some fully finished
houses will also be put on the market at reduced prices of
EUR100,000 each.

It's the second time in recent months that properties in So. Sligo
have featured in the national media with knock down property
prices, the report notes.


ZHAIKMUNAI LP: S&P Puts 'B-' Rating on CreditWatch Positive
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it placed its 'B-' long-
term corporate credit rating on Kazakhstan-based oil and gas
producer Zhaikmunai LP on CreditWatch with positive implications.

S&P also assigned a preliminary 'B' long-term issue rating to
financing vehicle Zhaikmunai Finance B.V.'s proposed long-term
senior fixed-income notes, guaranteed by Zhaikmunai.  S&P assigned
the notes a recovery rating of '3', reflecting S&P's expectation
of material (50%-70%) recovery for noteholders in the event of a
payment default.

The preliminary rating on the pending notes issue is subject to
the successful issuance of the notes and S&P's review of final
documentation.  Any change in the amount or terms of the notes
issue could affect the current corporate credit and issue ratings.

"The CreditWatch positive status reflects the possibility that S&P
could upgrade Zhaikmunai by one notch if it successfully completes
the proposed notes issue under the terms and conditions S&P has
received from the company and it uses the proceeds to repay all
existing debt," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Lucas

Zhaikmunai reported first-half 2010 sales of US$75 million and
EBITDA of about US$43 million.  Its market capitalization stood at
about US$1.8 billion on Oct. 12, 2010.

S&P classifies Zhaikmunai's business risk profile as "vulnerable"
given the company's:

* Current low production: 7,260 barrels per day on average, all
  oil, in first-half 2010.

Remaining uncertainty and execution risks with respect to the
major production step-up plan.  Notably, the still to be concluded
gas pricing arrangement under an offtake contract with state-owned
entities, even if a major part of future profits from the
increased production resides in condensate output rather than gas.
S&P understands that the core infrastructure--the gas treatment
unit--is not yet fully operational.

Exposure to volatile oil prices, mitigated to some extent by
hedges.  High transportation costs that reduce realized prices.
Modest share of producing reserves--19% of proven reserves in July
2009.  Only 49% were developed.  Reserves concentration in
northern Kazakhstan, in a single field.  Exposure to country risk,
notably with risks of changes to currently favorable taxation.
These constraints are mitigated by:

S&P's expectations for a material near-term increase in production
and cash flow in 2011, which factor in recent company statements
that near-term completion of the GTU remains on track.
The company's midsize resource base.The company's profitability
stemming chiefly from oil and oil condensates, which carry higher
prices than gas, combined with good quality, more expensive crude
oil.  S&P's favorable view of the company's track record,
including several years of small but rising crude oil production,
strongly increased reserves, and the building and ownership of
key, efficient infrastructure, notably including a gas pipeline
from the condensate fields to Kazakhstan's major pipeline network.
The announcement by the company in its bond offering that the
majority owner, a Belgian entrepreneur, has completed the sale of
a 27% stake in Zhaikmunai to KazStroyServices, reducing its stake
to 40.5%.  In terms of gas price and country risk, S&P think this
change in ownership structure could help improve Zhaikmunai's
business profile since KSS is an influential Kazakh company.
S&P classifies Zhaikmunai's financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged" given:

The company's currently weak, albeit improving, credit metrics.
At end-June 2010, the adjusted ratio of funds from operations to
debt stood at about 17% and debt to EBITDA was 3.5x,compared with
10% and 4x, respectively, at the same date in 2009.  Free
operating cash flow continued to be largely negative in the 12
months to end-June 2010 in view of the sizable capital expenditure
for the GTU and other infrastructure.  Financial difficulties the
company encountered in 2009.  A collapse in oil prices led to
covenant breaches.  Banks froze Zhaikmunai's available lines and
cash until September 2009, when it successfully issued $300
million of equity.  This delayed GTU construction by over six
months.  The company's liquidity, which S&P assess as "less than
adequate" and the risk of covenant breaches from year-end 2010 if
the GTU or the step-up in production are delayed.

These factors partly offset these constraints:

Zhaikmunai's improved cash balances and leverage following its
September 2009 equity increase, carried out largely through its
existing institutional investor base.

S&P's expectations for improved metrics starting in fourth-quarter
2010 and in particular in 2011, assuming Zhaikmunai successfully
brings the GTU and related condensate and gas production online
before year-end 2010.  The possibility that S&P's 2010 adjusted
ratios of FFO to debt could reach about 20% and debt to EBITDA
about 3x.

The current high oil prices that could in S&P's view result in
higher oil and condensate revenues, and consequently cash flows,
than under its base scenario.

The positive CreditWatch implications reflect the possibility that
S&P could raise the rating on Zhaikmunai by one notch to 'B' and
assign a stable outlook.  The potential upgrade would hinge on the
successful issue of the proposed notes, in line with the terms and
conditions set out in preliminary documentation S&P received from
Zhaikmunai, and its use of the proceeds to refinance all existing
debt.  S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch status shortly after
completion of the proposed notes issue.


BALTIC INTERNATIONAL: Moody's Affirms 'E+' Bank Strength Rating
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the E+ bank financial
strength rating and the B3 long-term debt and deposit ratings of
Baltic International Bank.  The outlook on BIB's BFSR and long-
term deposit ratings remains negative; The bank's Not Prime short-
term rating was affirmed.

                        Ratings Rationale

BIB's BFSR remains positioned in the E+ category, reflecting: (i)
its modest private banking franchise; (ii) the very high borrower
concentration (iii) the level of problem loans in the customer
loan portfolio; (iv) weak pre-provision profitability; and (v) a
highly concentrated, non-resident deposit base.  In addition,
BIB's B3 long-term deposit rating continues to reflect Moody's
assessment that there is no probability of systemic support in the
event of a stress situation.

BIB benefitted from a 30% increase in its equity base in 2009
(from LVL12.3 million to LVL16.0 million), and the bank's focus on
maintaining its loan portfolio at less than 30% of assets has to
some extent shielded its performance compared to some of its
peers.  Nevertheless, the negative outlook on the BFSR and long-
term deposit rating primarily reflects Moody's expectation that a
highly concentrated asset allocation in low-yielding bank deposits
(as well as the potential for further deterioration in asset
quality) will continue to weigh negatively on BIB's performance.
Moody's believes that it will take some time for sustainable
profitability to be restored.

BIB's ratings could be negatively affected if (i) credit quality
weakens to a greater extent than envisaged in Moody's stressed-
case scenario, which would exert pressure on BIB's capitalization;
or (ii) any sign of significant deposit withdrawals leading to
large-scale asset reductions.  Furthermore, given BIB's
deteriorating net interest margin, Moody's will continue to
monitor BIB's asset allocation strategy.

A revision to a stable outlook for BIB's BFSR and long-term
deposit ratings could stem from a significant reduction in problem
loan levels and a sustainable improvement in pre-provision
profitability as well as a reduction of deposit and borrower

Moody's previous rating action on BIB was implemented on 25 June
2009, when the long-term deposit rating was downgraded to B3 from

Headquartered in Riga, Latvia, Baltic International Bank reported
total consolidated assets of around LVL193 million (EUR275
million) at the end of June 2010.

PRIVATBANK AS: Moody's Affirms 'E+' Bank Financial Strength Rating
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the E+ bank financial
strength rating and the B2 long-term debt and deposit ratings of
PrivatBank.  The outlook on the bank's BFSR and long-term deposit
ratings remains negative.  The bank's Not Prime short-term rating
was also affirmed.

                         Rating Rationale

PrivatBank's BFSR remains positioned in the E+ category,
reflecting: (i) a modest private banking franchise; (ii) very high
borrower concentration in the bank's deposits and the customer
loan portfolio; (iii) very high level of problem loans, which
account for almost half of the customer loan portfolio; (iv) a
negative net interest margin at the end of June 2010 and declining
pre-provision profitability; and (v) limited risk management and

In addition, the bank's B2 long-term deposit rating continues to
reflect Moody's assessment that there is a moderate probability of
parental support from Ukraine's Privatbank Commercial Bank
(B3/NP/D-), which owns 75% of the bank's capital, which results in
a one-notch uplift from the B3 baseline credit assessment (BCA).
Furthermore, Moody's continues to believe that there is no
probability of systemic support for PrivatBank in the event of a
stress situation.

The negative outlook on the BFSR and long-term deposits primarily
reflects Moody's expectation that downward pressure on the bank's
net interest margin as well as the potential for further
deterioration in asset quality will continue to weigh negatively
on the bank's performance and that it will take time for
sustainable profitability to be restored.

PrivatBank's ratings could be negatively affected if (i) credit
quality weakens beyond current levels, which already exceed
Moody's stressed-case scenario, thereby exerting pressure on the
bank's replenished capitalization level; or (ii) further weakening
in the bank's pre-provision income.  Any sign of significant
deposit withdrawals could also have a negative effect on the
bank's ratings.

A revision to a stable outlook for PrivatBank's BFSR and long-term
deposit ratings could stem from a significant reduction in problem
loan levels and a sustainable improvement in pre-provision
profitability as well as a reduction of deposit and borrower

Moody's previous rating action on PrivatBank was implemented on 12
December 2008, when the long-term deposit rating was downgraded to
B2 from B1.

Headquartered in Riga, Latvia, PrivatBank reported total
consolidated assets of around LVL238 million (EUR339 million) at
the end of June 2010.

TRASTA KOMERCBANKA: Moody's Affirms 'E+' Bank Strength Rating
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the E+ bank financial
strength rating and the B3 long-term debt and deposit ratings of
Trasta Komercbanka.  The outlook on the bank's BFSR and long-term
deposit ratings remains negative.  The bank's Not Prime short-term
rating has been affirmed.

                         Rating Rationale

Trasta Komercbanka's BFSR remains positioned in the E+ category,
reflecting: (i) a modest private banking franchise; (ii) high
borrower concentration in bank deposits and customer loans ; (iii)
very high level of problem loans in the customer loan portfolio;
(iv) declining pre-provision profitability; and (v) a
concentrated, non-resident deposit base.  In addition, the bank's
B3 long-term deposit rating continues to reflect Moody's
assessment that there is no probability of systemic support in the
event of a stress situation.

Moody's notes positively the bank's improved capitalization (Tier
1 ratio improved from 9.7% at end 2008 to 14.3% at end 2009
following asset reduction).  However, the negative outlook on the
BFSR and long-term deposits primarily reflects Moody's expectation
that a concentrated asset allocation in low-yielding bank
deposits, combined with the potential for asset quality issues
will continue to weigh negatively on the bank's performance, and
may delay the bank's return to sustainable profitability.

Trasta Komercbanka's ratings could be negatively affected if (i)
credit quality weakens to a significantly greater extent than that
envisaged in Moody's stressed-case scenario, which could exert
pressure on the bank's capitalization; or (ii) there is any sign
of significant deposit withdrawals leading to large scale asset

A revision to a stable outlook for Trasta Komercbanka's BFSR and
long-term deposit ratings could stem from a significant reduction
in problem loan levels and a sustainable improvement in pre-
provision profitability as well as a reduction of deposit and
borrower concentrations.

Moody's previous rating action on Trasta Komercbanka was
implemented on 25 June 2009, when the long-term deposit rating was
downgraded to B3 from B2.

Headquartered in Riga, Latvia, Trasta Komercbanka reported total
consolidated assets of around LVL210 million (EUR299 million) at
the end of June 2010.


RAPSOD TRADE: S&P Withdraws 'D' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'D' (Default)
long-term corporate credit rating on Russian outdoor advertiser
Rapsod Trade Ltd. (Gallery Media) and related entities.

At the same time, the 'D' issue rating and associated recovery
rating on the US$175 million senior secured notes maturing in
2013, issued by Gallery Capital, were also withdrawn.  Prior to
the withdrawal, the recovery rating on the notes was left
unchanged at '4', although S&P understands that the capital
restructuring may ultimately result in a recovery marginally ahead
of S&P's 30%-50% range for recovery expectations for senior
secured noteholders in the event of a payment default.

The withdrawal of all S&P's ratings has been made at the group's
request, as the holding company Rapsod Trade Ltd. is no longer
part of the group's corporate structure following the recent
approval by U.K. courts of its capital restructuring, using
schemes of arrangement.  At the time of the withdrawal, it is
S&P's understanding that the group had no rated debt outstanding.

Under the terms of the restructuring, the total debt of the group
was reduced to US$100.3 million from US$342.2 million, while
holders of US$161.5 million face value of the senior secured
notes, which exclude US$13.5 million of notes being previously
held by the group, received 68% of the equity in a new holding
company, Gallery Media Holding Ltd., and 90% of $100.3 million of
new 10% notes due 2015.  About US$13 million face value of old
senior secured notes held by the group were cancelled as part of
the restructuring.

RASPADSKAYA OAO: Moody's Confirms 'B1' Corporate Family Rating
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the B1 corporate family
rating for Raspadskaya and the B1 rating for the Loan
Participation Notes due in May 2012 issued by Raspadskaya
Securities totaling US$300 million.  At the same time Moody's
Interfax Rating Agency, which is majority owned by Moody's, has
confirmed Raspadskaya's national scale rating.  The outlook
to all ratings is negative.

                        Ratings Rationale

This rating action concludes the review initiated on May, 12, 2010
when the company was placed under review for a possible downgrade
following the explosions at the largest mine of the company which
accounted for an app. 70% of the total production volume.

The review focus was identified as: (i) the potential length and
extent of interruption of production at the Raspadskaya mine and
the possible mitigates that other producing assets of the company
or existing inventories could bring to revenue flow, (ii) the
ensuing revenue loss and financial consequences if such suspension
of mine operations was to last for an extended period, (iii) the
importance of investments and expenses that may be required to re-
launch the mine's operation, and (iv) the potential company's
liability arising from this event.

The B1 CFR reflects Moody's view that the currently benign
operating environment for coal mining with undersupply of premium
coal and historically high prices should allow Raspadskaya to
weather the low output period until restart of production at the
Raspadskaya mines without material cash flow shortfalls compared
to the weak fiscal year 2009 while absorbing the larger part of
repair and reconstruction cost in operating cash flows.  The
rating is supported by Raspadskaya's low operating cost and
conservative capital structure tempered by liquidity management
that relies on cash balances and continued support by its bank

Raspadskaya had entered this troubled period for its operations
with a strong financial profile supported by conservative credit
metrics, a solid cost competitiveness with high margins potential,
and a good cash position which provides some degree of protection
to negative developments.  Raspadskaya estimates that the cost to
rebuild the affected mine will not exceed app.  US$280 million,
most of which as increased operating expenses, and is planning to
restart operations there in the last quarter of 2010.  Though the
1H 2010 performance was strong, the agency comments that it
largely reflects strong pre-accident (which occurred in May 2010)
performance on the back of increase in prices.  The negative
outlook is premised on: (i) the expected weakening of cash flow
generation linked with the unavailability for production of the
principal mine of the company for several months and the fact that
the restart of operations at the Raspadskaya mine is likely to be
only progressive, which increases the dependence on market prices
for coal remaining high; (ii) the remaining uncertainties
associated with repair work to be completed on time and on budget;
and (iii) the possible delays in expected volumes increases at
other mines to mitigate the loss of production from Raspadskaya

The company benefits from favorable market conditions for mining
companies in 2010 with current prices for coal concentrate in
Russia at app.  US$120/t (for Raspadskaya grades of coal), ie much
better than in 2009, which should support a reasonably solid cash
flow generation and help the company to maintain healthy credit
metrics despite the Raspadskaya mine interruption.  Furthermore,
3Q 2010 operating performance indicates that the price assumption
for the full year could hold allowing the company to have decent
financial metrics in spite of the significant loss in volumes of
coal produced.  For 2011 volumes are expected by Raspadskaya to
pick up from the start of the year ollowing a substantial but
progressive recovery at Raspadskaya mine and increased production
at other mines.

Moody's also expects that the cost for reconstruction of the
damaged mine will primarily be absorbed in its operating costs.
At the end of 1H 2010 Raspadskaya had US$286 million in cash
balances and short-term deposits which would be available to fund
potential cost overruns.

In order to maintain the current rating, Moody's would expect that
the issue of maturing US$300 million LPN in 2012 will be addressed
in a timely manner.

Negative pressure would develop on the rating should the major
assumptions supporting the current rating not materialize, ie that
(i) the company may not be able to re-start limited operations at
Raspadskaya mine by the end of 2010; (ii) that the effective costs
and capital expenditures for the restoration of the affected mine
may materially exceed management estimates; and (iii) the company
may not be able to generate positive free cash flow on an on-going
basis because of either continued low production rates or a
collapse of coal prices or a combination of both.

The last rating action was on May 12, 2010 when Moody's placed OAO
Raspadskaya's B1 corporate family rating and B1 rating for Loan
Participation Notes due in 2012 issued by Raspadskaya Securities
and totaling US$300 million on review for possible downgrade.  At
the same time Moody's Interfax Rating Agency, which is majority
owned by Moody's, placed Raspadskaya's national scale rating
on review for possible downgrade.  The action reflected the
uncertainties surrounding the impact of the recent accident at
Raspadskaya mine in Kemerovo region on the company's operating
performance going forward.

Raspadskaya is one of the largest Russian coking coal producer and
is among the top 10 coking coal producers globally with a coal
production volume of 9.41 mln t in 2008 and 10.56 mln t in 2009
and sales of 7,03 mln t of coal concentrate in 2008 and 7,72 mln t
of coal concentrate in 2009.  In 1H 2010 the company mined 4.8
million t of coal and produced 3.8 million t of concentrate.

The company's production assets consist of three underground
mines, one open-pit, a coal preparation plant, and one more mine
is currently under construction, as well as a coal transportation
network and a number of integrated infrastructure companies.  All
the assets are located in Kuzbass Basin (Kemerovo region, Russia).
The company is controlled by management and Evraz Group (rated B1,
stable outlook) through equal stakes in Corber Enterprises Ltd.
which holds an 80% stake in Raspadskaya.  In 2009 the company
reported revenue of US$497 million (59% decrease Y-o-Y) and US$255
million of EBITDA (71% decrease Y-o-Y) based on audited
consolidated financial statements.  In 1H 2010 Raspadskaya
generated US$466 million in revenue, a 215 % increase and US$330
million in EBITDA, a 61% increase vs. 2H 2009.

                     Regulatory Disclosures

Information sources used to prepare the credit rating are these:
parties involved in the ratings, parties not involved in the
ratings, public information, confidential and proprietary Moody's
Investors Service's information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the
purposes of maintaining a credit rating.

MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, MOODY'S is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.

SEVERSTAL OAO: S&P Gives Stable Outlook; Affirms 'BB-' Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised its
outlook on Russia-based steelmaker OAO Severstal and on Severstal
Columbus LLC, a U.S. steel producer and a wholly owned, indirectly
held subsidiary of Severstal, to stable from negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'BB-' long-term corporate
credit and issue ratings on Severstal and the 'B' long-term
corporate credit and issue ratings on Severstal Columbus.
Furthermore, the 'ruAA-' Russia national scale rating on Severstal
was affirmed.

In addition, S&P assigned an issue rating of 'BB-' to the proposed
Loan Participation Notes to be issued by special purpose vehicle
Steel Capital S.A.  The issue rating on the proposed LPNs is
subject to S&P's receipt of the final documentation.

S&P also assigned a 'BB-' issue rating to the Russian ruble 15
billion bonds due 2013 issued by Severstal in February 2010.  The
recovery rating on the ruble bonds is '3', indicating S&P's
expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.

Furthermore, S&P withdrew the 'B' corporate credit rating on
Severstal Columbus Escrow LLC, at the company's request, due to
the transfer of the US$525 million 10.25% bond due 2018 to
Severstal Columbus.

"The outlook revision on Severstal reflects S&P's view that due to
stabilizing steel markets and management's corrective actions,
Severstal should maintain credit metrics in line with the
ratings," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Alex Herbert.
"The outlook revision on Severstal Columbus reflects both its
improving performance and S&P's opinion of the stronger ability of
Severstal and other group entities to provide support to Severstal

Higher profitability and cash flow in the 12 months to June 30,
2010, coupled with stable adjusted debt enabled Severstal to
improve its credit metrics to a more comfortable level.  The ratio
of adjusted debt to EBITDA was about 2.5x and funds from
operations to adjusted debt was about 30% at the end of June 2010.
Even taking into account the planned increase in capital
expenditures to US$1.3 billion in 2010, and the potential renewal
of dividend payments (which were omitted in 2009 and 2010 due to
the financial crisis), S&P anticipates that credit metrics will
stay healthy in the coming quarters, with FFO to adjusted debt of
above 30% and EBITDA to adjusted debt of about 2x in 2010.

S&P will focus on Severstal's financial policy on capex,
acquisitions, and dividends, as well as on the company's efforts
to continue a turnaround in North America.  S&P will also monitor
the eventual sale of Lucchini, an underperforming Italian
operation, to a third-party buyer, and the potential need for
Severstal to support Lucchini, which S&P does not factor into the
ratings.  The ratings have only moderate headroom for

S&P could envisage upside potential in the short-to-mid term if
the improvement in profitability and credit metrics is
sustainable.  S&P does not factor in a potential spin-off or IPO
of the company's gold assets, which have been discussed in the
press, but such actions could be positive, depending on whether
the proceeds are distributed to shareholders or stay within the

Downside pressure could stem from a substantial deterioration of
conditions in the steel industry (which S&P does not factor in),
persistently negative FOCF, or large debt-financed acquisitions or
shareholder distributions.


ABENGOA SA: S&P Assigns 'B+' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it assigned its 'B+' long-
term issuer credit rating to Abengoa S.A., a global engineering
and construction, technology, and energy group headquartered in
Spain.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned Abengoa's outstanding EUR300
million senior unsecured bonds due in 2015 and EUR500 million
senior unsecured bonds due in 2016 S&P's issue rating of 'B+.' S&P
also assigned its recovery rating of '4' to this debt, indicating
its expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery for bondholders in
the event of a payment default.

In addition, S&P assigned its 'B+' issue rating to the proposed
US$600 million (about EUR430 million) senior unsecured notes
maturing in 2017 to be issued by Abengoa Finance S.A.U., a
financing arm of Abengoa, and guaranteed by Abengoa S.A.  and some
of its subsidiaries.  The recovery rating on the proposed notes is

"The ratings on Abengoa reflect S&P's assessment of its business
risk profile as fair, together with its assessment of its
financial risk profile as aggressive," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Jose R. Abos.

S&P's assessment of the business risk profile reflects its view of
the group's reliance on self-sponsored, mostly majority owned
projects, for about half of the revenues of its largest division,
E&C, which generated 45% of consolidated group EBITDA (or around
35% of total EBITDA excluding project companies financed on a
nominally nonrecourse basis) in 2009, and the bulk of the cash
flow contribution to service the debt at Abengoa S.A., (or parent
level).  S&P's business risk score also incorporates its view of
the group's still mostly immature portfolio of projects,
especially in solar power generation.  According to Abengoa, very
limited cash will likely be upstreamed as dividends from the
projects to the parent in the foreseeable future, which S&P views
as a weakness.  These projects are mostly funded through nominally
nonrecourse debt, although S&P believes the group is likely to
support some of the transactions if they do not perform as
planned, because they showcase its engineering and technological

The business risk score further takes into account Abengoa's
exposure to some low-margin and commoditized businesses, such as
ethanol in the U.S. According to Abengoa, the company already
completed its investment program in bioenergy by mid 2010, after
having invested, in this business, around 40% of its EUR5 billion
capital expenditures carried out in the past three years.  S&P
considers that this business has low synergies compared with the
rest of the group's activities.

S&P believes Abengoa's satisfactory mix of businesses partially
offsets the weaknesses S&P just described.  Its businesses include
some growing positions in sectors with more stable and predictable
sources of revenue, its technical abilities and proprietary
technology--which in S&P's view create comparative advantages,
especially in the solar businesses--and above-average

S&P assess Abengoa's financial profile as "aggressive," factoring
in S&P's view of its financial policies.  These have translated
into rapid business growth, funded mostly with recourse and non-
recourse debt.  On Dec. 31, 2009, Abengoa's reported gross
financial debt totaled EUR6.4 billion (or EUR7.6 billion including
financial gross debt, adjustments for derivatives instruments,
factoring transactions, and financial guarantees).  Fifty-five
percent of the total reported debt represented recourse debt or
unsecured borrowings, mostly at the holding company level,
highlighting its reliance on cash flow contributions from its
subsidiaries, the bulk of which at this point comes from the E&C
segment.  Furthermore, the group has a challenging capital
expenditure plan amounting to EUR4.9 billion to fund until 2012,
although S&P understands it has some flexibility in its

Furthermore, Abengoa's fairly complex corporate structure, which
includes intercompany loan transactions among subsidiaries and
with the parent company, makes the assessment of cash circulation
more difficult, in S&P's view.

In its analysis, S&P has taken into account both Abengoa on a
fully consolidated basis (including consolidation of all
contractually nonrecourse commitments contracted by Abengoa-
managed projects) and also excluding the projects financed on a
contractually nonrecourse basis.  S&P acknowledge that neither of
these stances reflects the exact scope of the group's profits and
commitments: S&P believes the group will have strong economic
incentives to support some of its contractually non-recourse
transactions, although this support is likely to be limited in
extent and scope to the projects on which its reputation and know-
how is established.  The ultimate support contribution could vary
depending on the specific situation of the nonrecourse subsidiary
in need of support.  Because of this, S&P assess the reality of
the group's commitments as somewhere in between the full
consolidation of the nonrecourse obligations and the
unconsolidated obligations.

In both calculations, Abengoa presents tight cash flow protection
measures, which, in S&P's view, result mainly from the group's
rapid debt-funded expansion, combined with a still mild
contribution from projects: Standard & Poor's consolidated
calculation of adjusted debt to EBITDA was 10.2x at year-end 2009,
while S&P's unconsolidated calculation of adjusted debt to EBITDA
(without considering contractually nonrecourse debt) was 5.7x at
the same date.  S&P's adjusted debt figures for Abengoa include
reported financial gross debt (including or excluding nonrecourse
debt depending on whether S&P talks about consolidated or
unconsolidated calculations, respectively), plus financial
guarantees granted to subsidiaries and the used factoring lines,
as well as the net amount of fair value hedges.

"The stable outlook on Abengoa reflects Standard & Poor's
expectations that, although the group will likely not generate
free operating cash flows in the next couple of years due to its
significant capital expenditure plan program, the group will
timidly improve its leverage ratios already in 2010 and gradually
thereafter.  S&P believes this will occur at both parent level and
at corporate subsidiaries, as well as at the projects financed on
a nonrecourse basis, and keep adjusted debt to EBITDA below 10x
already from the end of 2010," said Mr. Abos.

S&P could lower the rating on Abengoa if S&P perceive that its
aggressive financial risk profile persists and its cash flow
metrics weaken further, translating into adjusted consolidated
debt to EBITDA above 10x.  Also, rating downside could occur if
the group's business fundamentals weaken due to the sale of a more
stable business to fund investments, or if it continues increasing
its participation in what S&P views as more volatile segments,
thus pressuring refinancing needs from 2012 onward.  On the other
hand, S&P could take a positive rating action if S&P see a
strengthening cash flow contribution or dividend from the parent's
business units, as well as more broadly diversified cash flows,
and a lower dependence on refinancing for the future.  For the
consolidated performance, any rating upside would in S&P's view
follow sizable deleveraging, combined with stronger cash flow
generation, assuming S&P does not change its assessment of
Abengoa's business risk profile.

-- EUR107.8M C Certificate, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

BBVA RMBS: Moody's Lowers Rating on C Certificate to Caa1 (sf)
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of all notes
issued by BBVA RMBS 2, FTA and BBVA RMBS 4, FTA.

Issuer: BBVA RMBS 2 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos

  -- EUR2400M A2 Certificate, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously
     on Nov 30, 2009 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

  -- EUR387.5M A3 Certificate, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously
     on Nov 30, 2009 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

  -- EUR1050M A4 Certificate, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously
     on Nov 30, 2009 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

  -- EUR112.5M B Certificate, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously
     on Nov 30, 2009 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

  -- EUR100M C Certificate, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
     Nov 30, 2009 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

Issuer: BBVA RMBS 4 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos

  -- EUR2740M A1 Certificate, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously
     on Nov 30, 2009 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

  -- EUR960M A2 Certificate, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
     Nov 30, 2009 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

  -- EUR1050.5M A3 Certificate, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously
     on Nov 30, 2009 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

  -- EUR41.7M B Certificate, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously
     on Nov 30, 2009 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

  -- EUR107.8M C Certificate, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously
     on Nov 30, 2009 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating action concludes the review and takes into
consideration the worse-than-expected performance of the
collateral.  It also reflects Moody's negative sector outlook for
Spanish RMBS and the weakening of the macro-economic environment
in Spain, including high unemployment rates.

The ratings of the notes take into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined
the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement and the lifetime losses (expected
loss), as well as the transactions structure and any legal
considerations as assessed in Moody's cash- flow analysis.  The
expected loss and the Milan Aaa CE are the two key parameters used
by Moody's to calibrate its loss distribution curve, used in the
cash-flow model to rate European RMBS transactions.

Portfolio expected Loss: Moody's has reassessed its lifetime loss
expectation for BBVA RMBS 2 and BBVA RMBS 4 taking into account
the collateral performance to date as well as the current
macroeconomic environment in Spain.  BBVA 2 and 4 are performing
worse than Moody's expectations as of closing.  The share of non-
defaulted loans more than 90 days in arrears has recently
stabilised, in line with market trend and helped by the low
interest rates.  However, delinquent loans have rolled to defaults
and cumulative defaults have risen rapidly, reaching 2.05% of
original pool balance in BBVA 2 and 2.62% of original pool balance
in BBVA 4 as at August 2010, up from 0.97% and 1.23% respectively
a year earlier.  Cumulative defaults figures include loans
delinquent for more than 12 months as well as loans corresponding
to repossessions taking place before being 12 month in arrears.
The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment in Spain, Moody's expects the portfolio
credit performance in these two transactions to continue to be be
under stress, as Spanish unemployment remains elevated and the
housing market is still relatively weak.  Furthermore, Moody's
believes that the tightening of Spanish fiscal policies is likely
to constrain further Spanish households finances.  On the basis of
the increase trend in defaults in the two transactions and Moody's
negative sector outlook for Spanish RMBS, Moody's have updated the
portfolios expected loss assumptions to 2.28% of original pool
balance in BBVA 2 and 2.71% of original pool balance in BBVA 4, up
from 0.52% and 0.54% at closing.

MILAN Aaa CE: Moody's has assessed the loan-by-loan information
for the outstanding portfolios to determine the MILAN Aaa CE.
Moody's has increased its MILAN Aaa CE assumptions to 9.5% for
BBVA 2 and 10.5% for BBVA 4, up from 4.15% and 4.30% respectively
at closing.  The increase in the MILAN Aaa CE reflects the
exposure to loans originated via brokers (23.52% and 15%) and
loans originated to new residents (7.76% and 6.95%).  It also
considers the exposure to special mortgage products features such
as semi-bullet loans (having the possibility of a last installment
of 10/30% of the loan amount), representing 18.57 % of the current
pool for BBVA 2 and 65.7% of the current pool for BBVA 4, as well
as loans that could enjoy a payment holiday, representing 72.16 %
of the current pool balance for BBVA 2 and 78.61% of the current
pool balance for BBVA 4 (as of July 2010 only 0.38% of the current
pool balance in BBVA 2 and 0.92% in BBVA 4 was in payment

The rating addresses the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and principal with
respect of the notes by the legal final maturity.  Moody's ratings
only address the credit risk associated with the transaction.
Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

BBVA 2 and 4 closed in March and November 2007 respectively.  The
transactions are backed by a portfolio of first-ranking mortgage
loans originated by BBVA (Aa2/P-1) and secured on residential
properties located in Spain.  The loans were originated between
2003 and 2006 in the case of BBVA 2 and between 2000 and 2007 in
BBVA 4, with current weighted average loan-to-value standing at
69.5% and 69%.  As mentioned above, a significant share of the
securitized mortgage loans was originated via brokers and loans to
non-Spanish nationals are also included in the pool.  BBVA acts as
servicer, paying agent and swap counterparty to the transactions.

Hedging agreements: according to the swap agreement the swap
counterparty receives the interest actually collected from the
loans and pays the sum of the weighted average coupon on the notes
plus 65 bps in the case of BBVA 2 and 50 bps in the case of BBVA
4, over a notional calculated as the daily average outstanding
amount of the loans not more than 90 days in arrears.  The
servicing fee is also covered by the swap counterparty.

Reserve funds and Principal Deficiencies: the increasing levels of
defaulted loans has ultimately caused the full depletion of the
reserve funds and both transactions are currently experiencing an
unpaid PDL.  In BBVA 2 the current unpaid PDL is equal to EUR3.14
million corresponding to 3.14% of the most junior note class.  In
BBVA 4 the current unpaid PDL is equal to EUR31.49 million which
corresponds to 29.2% of the most junior note class.

Both transactions include interest deferral triggers based on
cumulative defaults, set for class B and C at 12% and 10% for BBVA
2 and 8.5% and 5% for BBVA 4.  Moody's notes that repossessions
corresponding to loans less than 12 months in arrears at the time
they were repossessed are not considered for the interest deferral
trigger calculation, As of August 2010 these trigger levels were
equal to 1.71% and 2.19% for BBVA 2 and BBVA 4 respectively,.

Note amortization: The amortization of the mezzanine and junior
notes is likely to remain sequential as a consequence of a pro-
rata amortization trigger breach, namely the reserve fund not
being at target level.  In both transactions the amortization of
the Class A notes can switch from sequential to pro rata if at the
Determination Date the ratio of the Outstanding Balance of non-
defaulted Mortgage Loans more than 90 days in arrears, increased
by the Mortgage Loan Principal repayment income amount received
during the Determination Period preceding the relevant payment
date, to (2) the sum of the Outstanding Principal Balance of Class
A notes (A2, A3 and A4 for BBVA 2 and A1, A2 and A3 for BBVA 4),
is less than or equal to 1.The Aaa pro-rata amortization trigger
has remained close to its breach level during the last year in
both transactions standing at 1.05 for BBVA 2 and 1.02 for BBVA 4
as of the last Determination Date.  Moody's notes that in loss
scenarios at or above the expected case these triggers are
breached and has therefore positioned the ratings of Class A notes
at the same level in each of the two deals.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

                     Regulatory Disclosures

The ratings have been disclosed to the rated entity or its
designated agents and issued with no amendment resulting from that

Information sources used to prepare the credit ratings are these:
parties involved in the ratings, parties not involved in the
ratings, public information, confidential and proprietary Moody's
Investors Service information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the purpose
of maintaining a credit rating.

Moody's Investors Service may have provided Ancillary or Other
Permissible Service(s) to the rated entity or its related third
parties within the three years preceding the Credit Rating Action.

MOODY'S adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources MOODY'S considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, MOODY'S is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.

CABLEUROPA SAU: S&P Affirms 'B-' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it affirmed its 'B-' long-
term corporate credit rating on Spanish cable operator Cableuropa
S.A.U.  The outlook remains stable.

In addition, S&P assigned a 'B-' issue rating to the proposed
EUR500 million senior secured notes, to be issued by special
purpose vehicle Nara Cable Funding Ltd. (Nara Funding; not rated).
S&P understands that the notes proceeds will be passed through to
Cableuropa, via a back-to-back loan.  S&P assigned a 'B-' issue
rating to this proposed loan, the SPV Tranche 1 facility.  The
recovery rating on the proposed loan is '3', reflecting S&P's
expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.

S&P has affirmed all other issue ratings and the related recovery
ratings remain unchanged.

"S&P's rating actions follow Cableuropa's proposed notes issue
through SPV Nara Funding," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Guillaume Trentin.  "S&P understands Cableuropa intends to use the
proceeds of the issue, if successfully completed, to refinance
part of its large EUR3.1 billion bank debt."

After the completion of the partial refinancing of its bank debt
in May 2010, S&P see this as a further positive step by Cableuropa
to improve its debt maturity profile and financial flexibility.
The proposed transaction would enable the company to prepay the
?116 million currently drawn under its Tranche E facility and
further reduce Tranche A and B amortizations over the next two
years, resulting in a proforma debt maturity profile in line with
its cash flow generation until June 2013.

Furthermore, S&P views the company's ability to refinance part of
its senior bank debt through the capital markets, as contemplated,
as an important consideration for the rating because this would in
S&P's opinion demonstrate the company's ability to bring in new
lenders, as opposed to turning to existing lenders to roll over
their exposure as it did earlier this year.

Nevertheless, S&P estimates the company will continue to face a
large liquidity wall of about ?1.9 billion in June 2013 and about
?0.7 billion in December 2013 and ?0.5 billion in 2014, after
using proceeds from the proposed notes to repay part of the debt
maturing between 2010 and 2013.  S&P therefore anticipates that
such large maturities will likely require further substantial

Cableuropa recorded a mixed performance in the first half of 2010,
reporting a 3.6% decline in consolidated revenues to ?741 million,
owing to economic and competitive pressures.  The core residential
direct access segment, however, demonstrated sound operating
resilience, posting broadly stable revenues and maintaining a
steady subscriber base year on year.

On June 30, 2010, Cableuropa reported gross consolidated debt of
close to ?4.0 billion.

Cableuropa's refinancing and covenant-related risks still
constrain the rating, in S&P's opinion.  The rating also reflects
S&P's view that the macroeconomic and competitive environment for
Cableuropa's core telecommunication and pay-TV services in Spain
remains difficult, that the company generates modest FOCF, and
that it carries high debt leverage.

However, supportive factors for the rating include Cableuropa's
position as Spain's No. 2 facility-based provider of triple-play
services, the sound operating resilience of its core residential
segment, and the company's successful track record of improving
its profitability to a solid level and steadily raising cash flow
generation since 2008.

"The stable outlook mainly reflects S&P's view that Cableuropa
will likely meet its financial obligations until the second
quarter of 2013," said Mr.  Trentin, "and it also factors in S&P's
expectations for resilient operating performances and continued
positive free cash flow generation, despite current operating

S&P views Cableuropa's highly leveraged capital structure as
somewhat short-dated, because of the high debt maturities in 2013
and 2014.  Therefore, S&P will closely monitor the evolution of
the company's debt maturity profile, which will likely remain
important for the rating for some time.

S&P believes a positive rating action is possible over the next 12
months, if Cableuropa achieves further significant refinancing of
its high 2013 and 2014 debt maturities, and maintains sound
operating performances.

Conversely, S&P might take a negative rating action if operating
performance does not meet S&P's expectations in terms of EBITDA
and FOCF improvement, which could lead in turn to weaker financial
flexibility to face debt amortizations or to significantly lower
covenant headroom.

CAIXA D'ESTALVIS: Moody's Withdraws 'D' Bank Strength Rating
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn these ratings of Caixa
d'Estalvis de Terrassa: (i) the bank financial strength rating of
D; (ii) the long-term and short-term foreign-currency deposit
ratings of Baa2 and Prime-2, respectively; (iii) the senior
subordinated debt ratings of Baa3; and (iv) the junior
subordinated debt rating of Ba2.  The outlook on all ratings was

The ratings have been withdrawn following Caixa Terrassa's merger
with Caixa Manlleu and Caixa Sabadell, forming the group Caixa
d'Estalvis unio de caixes de Manlleu, Sabadell I Terrassa (not
rated by Moody's).  As a result of the merger, the deposits and
debt obligations of Caixa Terrassa were transferred to UNNIM.

The last rating action on Caixa Terrassa's debt was implemented on
23 February 2010, when its junior subordinated debt (Upper Tier 2)
was confirmed at Ba2.  The latest rating action on Caixa Terrassa
itself was implemented on 15 June 2009, when Moody's downgraded
the BFSR to D (mapping to a BCA of Ba2) from C- (mapping to a BCA
of Baa1), the long-term deposit rating to Baa2 from A3, and
affirmed the short-term debt at Prime-2.  Its senior subordinated
debt was downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1,and junior subordinated debt
downgraded to Ba2 from Baa1.  All rating outlooks were changed to

Caixa d'Estalvis de Terrassa is headquartered in Terrassa
(Catalonia), Spain.  As at 30 June 2010, total assets (unaudited)
amounted to EUR12.8 billion.


MAKIEVKA STEEL: Ukrainian Court Initiates Bankruptcy Case
PHNC reports a Ukrainian court initiated on Oct. 11 a bankruptcy
case against Makievka Steel at the request of Enakievo
Metallurgical Plant, a Metinvest subsidiary.

Makievka Steel is currently in the process of being acquired by
Metinvest, according to PHNC.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DA GREEN & SON: Goes Into Administration
DA Green and Son in Whaplode has gone into administration.

According to Spalding Today, a statement on the Web site reads:
"On October 14, 2010, R. Grant, S. Wilson and A. O'Keefe were
appointed Joint Administrators of D A Green & Sons Limited (the
Company).  All Joint Administrators are licensed to act as
Insolvency Practitioners by the Insolvency Practitioners
Association.  The Joint Administrators act as agents of the
Company and without personal liability."

DA Green and Son is a construction firm who worked on a series of
high profile national projects.  The firm has worked at a number
of high profile sights including Heathrow Approach, Trent Bridge
cricket ground and Harlequins rugby club.

DUNDEE FOOTBALL CLUB: Goes Into Administration
Agence France-Presse reports that Dundee Football Club was placed
into administration on October 14, 2010, after failing to pay a
GBP365,000 (US$583,525) tax bill.  The report relates that Dundee
had no option but to accept administration after being unable to
negotiate the payment and the process was finally confirmed on

According to AFP, a statement on the club's official Web site
read: "Dundee FC is now officially in administration. Papers were
lodged at the Court of Session in Edinburgh October 1, 2010.
Bryan Jackson of PKF will now assume control of the club."

The report notes that Dundee had been waiting for director and
main financial backer Calum Melville to deposit GBP200,000 in a
bank account to allow the club to function through the period of
administration.  It is the second time in seven years that the
former European Cup semi-finalists have been placed in
administration, the report says.

Meanwhile, AFP notes that PFA Scotland chief executive Fraser
Wishart visited Dens Park to talk the players through the
administration process and there is serious doubt over the future
of manager Gordon Chisholm and his assistant Billy Dodds.

Dundee Football Club -- offers
companies opportunity to combine business with pleasure through
the first class facilities available at Dens Park.  It can provide
the vehicle for a company to entertain your customers and clients,
while enjoying the excitement of professional football at its

HENDERSON MORLEY: Former Shareholders Angry Over Asset Sale
Graeme Brown at Birmingham Post reports that angry shareholders
are calling for an investigation into the conduct of Henderson
Morley following the sale of some of its assets to former
directors.  The report relates that the company's shares were
suspended last month after a funding crisis saw it plunge into

According to Birmingham Post, some investors have lost six-figure
sums because of the collapse, with hardly any prospect that they
will get any of their money back.  The report notes that just days
after Henderson Morley went into administration on September 8,
directors Andrew Knight and Ian Pardoe bought the assets under
another company called Dawnglow.

Dawnglow, the report says, agreed a deal for GBP105,000 for the
firm's patents and a further GBP15,000 for laboratory equipment,
office equipment and furniture.

However, Birmingham Post, shareholders claim they were misled
about the value of the assets and have criticized the directors
for the remuneration packages they were awarded.  Figures reveal
that the highest-paid director received GBP136,904 for the year to
April 2009, the report discloses.

Birmingham Post says that Tom Winnifrith, of Rivington Street
Holdings, owner of Sharecrazy, which was paid to do Henderson
Morley's PR and latterly act as its broker, said it had also lost

According to the report, Mr. Winnifrith said in a blog: "Creditors
will probably get nothing once the preferred creditor A Knight and
the administrator have been paid.  In effect Andrew Knight has
bought the assets -- not the liabilities -- of Henderson Morley, a
company that has over the years raised almost GBP10 million, for
GBP120,000.  Over the years Knight has told all of us how valuable
his IP was.  Yet the administrator says that an independent report
it commissioned said it was worth just GBP50,000 to GBP250,000.
How does Knight explain its sudden precipitous loss of value?"
The administrator reveals in a letter to creditors that a number
of IP patents lapsed on August 23 ? when Henderson shares were
still trading ? with more lapsing on August 30 and in mid
September. Why did Henderson not, as it should have done, notify
the market of this?"

Birmingham Post discloses that it is understood administrator
Chantrey Vellacott was first approached by Thomas Horton
solicitors acting for Henderson Morley on August 6 but was
formally appointed on September 8 -- the same day Dawnglow made
the offer.

The report relates that a letter from joint administrator Craig
Povey, to creditors explained why they weren't able to continue
trading the business and sells it as a going concern.  It said:
"Without a substantial injection of funds being put into the
companies at day one of the administrators, continued trading
would not have been possible.  It has been noted that the cashburn
was approximately GBP90,000 per month with little or no chance of
revenue generation in the short to medium term, as the companies
were still at pre-revenue stage."

The Financial Services Authority, AIM Team and the Department for
Business Innovation and Skills said it could not confirm or deny
whether an investigation would be carried out, the report adds.

Henderson Morley is a biotechnology firm that developed anti-viral
drugs, vaccines and biological products.

INVERESK PAPER COMPANY: Placed Into Receivership, 35 Jobs at Risk
Helen Morris at reports that Inveresk is in
receivership after Ernst & Young was appointed to the company last
week, putting the jobs of its 35 staff at risk.  Andrew Davison,
Colin Dempster and Chris Marsden from Ernst & Young were appointed
joint receivers on October 8, 2010.

"The joint receivers will continue to trade the business while we
consider all options, including selling the business as a going
concern," the report quoted Mr. Davidson as saying.

According to the report, an unnamed company spokeswoman said that
it is understood that there had been no redundancies at this stage
as the receiver continues to trade the business.

Headquartered in Musselburgh, Scotland, Inveresk Paper Company was
incorporated in 1922.  Inveresk has a mill in Somerset, which
produces speciality products for niche markets.  The company also
has a registered office in Stirling, and a site in Singapore.

KCA DEUTAG: Lenders Mull US$200 Million Cash Injection
Patricia Kuo at Bloomberg News reports that KCA Deutag Drilling
Group Ltd.'s lenders including BlackRock Inc. plans to inject at
least US$200 million into the company.

According to Bloomberg, people familiar with the situation said on
Oct. 12 KCA's junior lenders, which also include GoldenTree Asset
Management LLP, TCW Group Inc. and Western Asset Management Co.,
plan to make second-lien loans to pay down the company's senior
debt.  Bloomberg notes the people said the investors may also
provide working capital facilities.

Bloomberg relates KCA started talks with lenders to renegotiate
debt Aug. 12 after canceling a bond sale that would have repaid
junior loans.  Senior lenders agreed to waive terms that restrict
leverage ratios for three months, Bloomberg discloses.

Aberdeen-based KCA DEUTAG Drilling Limited is a major land driller
with more than 60 land rigs operating worldwide and is the largest
offshore drilling contractor in the UK sector of the North Sea.
KCA DEUTAG has more than 30 offshore platforms and 10 mobile
offshore drilling rigs (including jackups) in the North Sea, the
Caspian Sea, Angola, and Sakhalin. It is also active in the Middle
East, Africa, and Asia.  Not just a contractor, it also designs,
engineers, and constructs platform rigs.  KCA DEUTAG delivers rigs
primarily to large international operators in the oil and gas
industry.  The company is a subsidiary of Abbot Group, a major UK-
based oil field services concern.

LIVERPOOL FOOTBALL: Sale Blocked After Board Obtains TRO in Texas
Tariq Panja at Bloomberg News reports that Liverpool Football
Club's board said a temporary restraining order obtained in Texas
on Tuesday by owners Tom Hicks and George Gillett blocked the sale
of the English Premier League soccer club to the operators of the
Boston Red Sox.

The Liverpool owners are trying to stop the forced sale of the 18-
time English soccer champion and are asking for US$1.6 billion in
damages from their lender, Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc, and
independent board members, Bloomberg discloses.  State District
Judge Jim Jordan in Dallas issued the order and scheduled
arguments in the case for Oct. 25, Messrs. Hicks and Gillett said
Tuesday in an e-mailed statement, according to Bloomberg.

Bloomberg relates the legal move came hours after the American
pair lost a case in London to RBS that cleared the way for a sale.
Bloomberg notes Chairman Martin Broughton and the other two
independent directors, Ian Ayre and Christian Purslow, said the
order stopped them from selling to New England Sports Ventures
LLC, which agreed on Oct. 6 to buy the team for GBP300 million
(US$475 million).

According to Bloomberg, Messrs. Hicks and Gillett allege in their
filing in the Texas court that the directors were "acting merely
as pawns of RBS, wholly abdicating the fiduciary responsibilities
that they owed in the sale."

Bloomberg recounts Messrs. Hicks and Gillett tried to stop the
sale to John W. Henry and Tom Werner's New England group by
changing the independent directors, but Justice Christopher Floyd
on Tuesday ruled they had to reinstate the ousted members.  Mr.
Broughton, as cited by Bloomberg, said the owners would lose about
GBP140 million if the New England group's bid goes through.

Messrs. Hicks and Gillett were granted a six-month extension to
repay a GBP237 million-pound loan by lenders RBS and Wells Fargo &
Co. in April, with the agreement that the club be put up for sale
and Mr. Broughton appointed, Bloomberg relates.

                        Bankruptcy Threat

Bloomberg says RBS could put the club into bankruptcy.  Liverpool,
which has a global fan base, would be the second team in England?s
top league to go into administration, a form of protection from
creditors, Bloomberg notes.  That would bring a nine-point
deduction from the Premier League, Bloomberg states.

"I think it will force the bank into a situation where they say we
might have to put this in administration and take it from there,"
said Danny Davis, Esq., a partner at London law firm Mishcon de
Reya specializing in sports business law and insolvency, according
to Bloomberg.

                     About Liverpool Football

Liverpool Football Club and Athletic Grounds owns and operates one
of the more popular and most successful franchises in the UK
Premier League.  Known as The Reds, Liverpool has won 18 first
division titles and seven FA Cups since it was founded by John
Houlding in 1892.  In addition to the football club, the company
owns and operates Anfield Stadium, Liverpool's home ground.  The
company generates revenue primarily through sponsorships,
broadcasting fees, and ticket sales.  The company was acquired by
US businessmen George Gillett and Tom Hicks in 2007.

PORTSMOUTH FOOTBALL: Plans to Exit Administration Blocked
Portsmouth Football Club Limited has been dealt a setback in their
bid to exit administration, after the Football League blocked the
club's latest proposals, BBC News reports.

According to the report, the League has said it requires
clarification on four issues before it will agree to hand Pompey's
golden share back.  Portsmouth Football Club went into
administration in February with debts of around GBP120 million.

According to the report, the club said that they have stated they
will now consider the feedback from the League.

Manager Steve Cotterill told BBC Radio Solent: "We need to blow
some of these dark clouds away from this club.  We've had them
over us for more than 12 months now.  Let somebody else have the
spotlight for a while.  We've been under it perhaps for the wrong
reasons, and lots of people want to throw mud at you.  When you
haven't got a lot to bat back with, some of that mud will stick."

                     About Portsmouth Football

Portsmouth Football Club Ltd. --
operates Portsmouth FC, a professional soccer team that plays in
the English Premier League.  Established in 1898, the club boasts
two FA Cups, its last in 2008, and two first division
championships.  Portsmouth FC's home ground is at Fratton Park;
the football team is known to supporters as Pompey.  Dubai
businessman Sulaiman Al-Fahim purchased the club from Alexandre
Gaydamak in 2009.  A French businessman of Russian decent,
Gaydamak had controlled Portsmouth Football Club since 2006.

SEALUMET LIMITED: Creditors' Meeting Slated for October 20
Sealumet Limited will hold an insolvency meeting of creditors on
October 20, 2010, at 10:30 a.m.  The meeting will be held at the
2nd Floor, Titchfield House, 69/85 Tabernacle Street, in London.

Based in Rainham in Kent, United Kingdom, Sealumet Limited
supplies stainless steel banding, wing seals, expansion springs
and fixings for the thermal insulation industry.

WHITE TOWER: Administrators Have 18 Months to Sell Aviva Office
Peter Woodifield at Bloomberg News reports that administrators for
a London office tower formerly owned by Simon Halabi have been
given an additional 18 months to sell the property.  The building
is the head office of Aviva Plc, the U.K.'s second-largest insurer
and is situated in London's main financial district, Bloomberg

Bloomberg relates eight other properties previously owned by Mr.
Halabi were sold in June and July.  A package of bonds sold
against the towers in 2006 defaulted last year after the buildings
fell in value by almost 50%, Bloomberg discloses.

The administrators had their appointment extended by the High
Court in London to April 2012, Bloomberg says, citing a statement
by CB Richard Ellis Group Inc. on Thursday.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, Bloomberg
News said the bonds, issued by White Tower 2006-3 Plc, defaulted
when a revaluation a year ago showed the buildings' value had
fallen by almost 50%.

White Tower 2006-3 Plc was incorporated in 2006 and is based in
London, United Kingdom.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week October 11 to October 15, 2010

  Issuer               Coupon     Maturity   Currency     Price
  ------               ------     --------   --------     -----

RAIFF ZENTRALBK         4.500    9/28/2035       EUR      63.96

FORTIS BANK             8.750    12/7/2010       EUR      14.90

PETROL AD-SOFIA         8.375   10/26/2011       EUR      73.63

MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000    6/30/2017       ZAR      66.66
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000   10/30/2017       AUD      69.56
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500    9/24/2020       CAD      70.90
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.250    6/28/2040       CAD      23.99
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500    3/17/2025       CAD      56.22
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000    2/27/2018       AUD      68.48
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000   11/21/2016       NZD      72.32

AIR FRANCE-KLM          4.970     4/1/2015       EUR      15.48
ALCATEL SA              4.750     1/1/2011       EUR      16.65
ALCATEL-LUCENT          5.000     1/1/2015       EUR       3.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG        6.720     1/1/2015       EUR       4.87
ATOS ORIGIN SA          2.500     1/1/2016       EUR      53.44
BNP PARIBAS            10.050    7/24/2012       USD      64.27
CALYON                  6.000    6/18/2047       EUR      52.24
CAP GEMINI SOGET        3.500     1/1/2014       EUR      45.01
CAP GEMINI SOGET        1.000     1/1/2012       EUR      44.61
CLUB MEDITERRANE        6.110    11/1/2015       EUR      17.37
CLUB MEDITERRANE        4.375    11/1/2010       EUR      49.94
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY        1.000   12/23/2024       EUR      69.42
EURAZEO                 6.250    6/10/2014       EUR      57.31
FAURECIA                4.500     1/1/2015       EUR      23.38
GROUPE VIAL             2.500     1/1/2014       EUR      20.86
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125    7/31/2014       EUR      16.23
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125    7/31/2015       EUR      13.68
NEXANS SA               4.000     1/1/2016       EUR      64.32
PEUGEOT SA              4.450     1/1/2016       EUR      32.76
PUBLICIS GROUPE         3.125    7/30/2014       EUR      39.11
PUBLICIS GROUPE         1.000    1/18/2018       EUR      48.04
RHODIA SA               0.500     1/1/2014       EUR      48.25
SOC AIR FRANCE          2.750     4/1/2020       EUR      21.03
SOITEC                  6.250     9/9/2014       EUR       9.43
TEM                     4.250     1/1/2015       EUR      55.77
THEOLIA                 2.700     1/1/2041       EUR      12.10
VALEO                   2.375     1/1/2011       EUR      47.15
ZLOMREX INT FIN         8.500     2/1/2014       EUR      57.88
ZLOMREX INT FIN         8.500     2/1/2014       EUR      57.88

DEUTSCHE BK LOND        0.500    8/25/2017       BRL      53.77
ESCADA AG               7.500     4/1/2012       EUR      17.99
IKB DEUT INDUSTR        4.080   12/20/2035       EUR      68.20
L-BANK FOERDERBK        0.500    5/10/2027       CAD      50.81
LB BADEN-WUERTT         5.250   10/20/2015       EUR      32.40
QIMONDA FINANCE         6.750    3/22/2013       USD       3.69
SOLON AG SOLAR          1.375    12/6/2012       EUR      37.60
UNICREDIT BANK A        1.000   12/30/2049       EUR      13.54

HELLENIC REP I/L        2.900    7/25/2025       EUR      55.98
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.300    7/25/2030       EUR      53.30
HELLENIC REPUB          5.000    8/22/2016       JPY      67.55
HELLENIC REPUB          5.200    7/17/2034       EUR      68.52
HELLENIC REPUB          5.250     2/1/2016       JPY      71.26
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.300    3/20/2026       EUR      69.52
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.700    3/20/2024       EUR      68.57
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500    9/20/2037       EUR      59.86
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600    9/20/2040       EUR      59.80
NATIONAL BK GREE        3.875    10/7/2016       EUR      76.85

AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000    2/12/2030       EUR      73.92
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000     3/1/2030       EUR      73.90
ALLIED IRISH BKS        5.250    3/10/2025       GBP      60.65
ALLIED IRISH BKS        5.625   11/29/2030       GBP      61.50
BANK OF IRELAND         5.450     3/1/2030       EUR      74.70
BANK OF IRELAND         4.625    2/27/2019       EUR      76.79
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.360   10/12/2029       EUR      74.22
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.400    11/6/2029       EUR      74.28
DEPFA ACS BANK          0.500     3/3/2025       CAD      35.64
DEPFA ACS BANK          4.900    8/24/2035       CAD      65.91
DEPFA ACS BANK          5.125    3/16/2037       USD      74.64
DEPFA ACS BANK          5.125    3/16/2037       USD      74.64
DEPFA BANK PLC          3.150     4/3/2018       EUR      73.83
IRISH NATIONWIDE       13.000    8/12/2016       GBP      40.25
IRISH NATIONWIDE        5.500    1/10/2018       GBP      44.91

COMUNE DI MILANO        4.019    6/29/2035       EUR      74.36

ARCELORMITTAL           7.250     4/1/2014       EUR      29.52
CRC BREEZE              5.290     5/8/2026       EUR      63.50
GLOBAL YATIRIM H        9.250    7/31/2012       USD      72.88
HELLAS III              8.500   10/15/2013       EUR       3.00
IIB LUXEMBOURG         11.000    2/19/2013       USD      60.00
INTL INDUST BANK        9.000     7/6/2011       EUR      14.25
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000    4/30/2014       EUR      58.34
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000    4/30/2014       EUR      58.02

APP INTL FINANCE       11.750    10/1/2005       USD       0.01
ARPENI PR INVEST        8.750     5/3/2013       USD      43.88
ARPENI PR INVEST        8.750     5/3/2013       USD      39.42
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500    2/24/2025       CAD      55.26
BRIT INSURANCE          6.625    12/9/2030       GBP      67.05
ELEC DE CAR FIN         8.500    4/10/2018       USD      56.25
FRIESLAND BANK          4.210   12/29/2025       EUR      73.98
INDAH KIAT INTL        12.500    6/15/2006       USD       0.01
IVG FINANCE BV          1.750    3/29/2017       EUR      74.39
NATL INVESTER BK       25.983     5/7/2029       EUR      31.56
NED WATERSCHAPBK        0.500    3/11/2025       CAD      55.32
RBS NV EX-ABN NV        6.316    6/29/2035       EUR      72.50
SIDETUR FINANCE        10.000    4/20/2016       USD      65.38
TJIWI KIMIA FIN        13.250     8/1/2001       USD       0.01

EKSPORTFINANS           0.500     5/9/2030       CAD      43.95
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500    9/24/2014       BRL      72.12
NORSKE SKOGIND          7.125   10/15/2033       USD      63.00
NORSKE SKOGIND          7.125   10/15/2033       USD      63.00

POLAND-REGD-RSTA        2.810   11/16/2037       JPY      62.48
REP OF POLAND           2.648    3/29/2034       JPY      65.44
REP OF POLAND           3.300    6/16/2038       JPY      69.52
REP OF POLAND           3.220     8/4/2034       JPY      71.24

PARPUBLICA              3.567    9/22/2020       EUR      69.97
PARPUBLICA              4.200   11/16/2026       EUR      67.51
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.100    4/15/2037       EUR      72.90

A-ENGINEERING          15.000   10/30/2014       RUB      75.00
ACBK-INVEST             8.000    4/14/2011       RUB      75.00
AIRUNION RRJ            0.000   12/16/2010       RUB       0.11
APK ARKADA             17.500    5/23/2012       RUB       0.38
ARIZK                   3.000   12/20/2030       RUB      52.78
ARKTEL-INVEST          12.000     4/9/2012       RUB       1.00
BARENTSEV FINANS       20.000     7/4/2011       RUB       1.10
CB STROYCREDIT          9.500     8/1/2011       RUB      75.00
CNRG FINANCE           15.800   10/23/2012       RUB      76.00
DIPOS                   8.000    6/19/2012       RUB      75.00
DIRECT INVESTMEN       12.000   12/18/2015       RUB      78.00
DVTG-FINANS            17.000    8/29/2013       RUB       8.00
EESK                    8.740     4/5/2012       RUB      75.00
EMALIANS-FINANS        10.970     7/8/2011       RUB      75.00
ENERGOSPETSSNAB         8.500    5/30/2016       RUB     100.03
EUROKOMMERZ            16.000    3/15/2011       RUB       0.01
EXPERTGROUP            12.000   12/17/2012       RUB      93.60
FINANCEBUSINESSG       12.500    6/22/2011       RUB     100.00
FINANCEBUSINESSG       10.000     7/1/2013       RUB     100.00
GAZEKS-FINANS          14.000   12/16/2010       RUB      75.00
GLAVSTROY-FINANS        1.000    3/17/2011       RUB      75.00
GRADOSTROY-INVES       11.000     3/3/2011       RUB     100.50
HORTEX-FINANS          13.000    8/14/2013       RUB      96.00
IART                   12.000     8/4/2013       RUB       5.00
IAZS                   11.000    12/8/2010       RUB       2.00
INPROM                  9.500    5/18/2011       RUB      40.02
INTERGRAD              15.000     7/9/2014       RUB     100.00
INTERSOFT              10.070    3/31/2025       RUB     100.15
IZHAVTO                18.000     6/9/2011       RUB      11.31
KOMOS GROUP            13.500    7/21/2011       RUB      75.00
KOSMOS-FINANS          10.200    6/16/2011       RUB      75.00
KRAYINVESTBANK          8.500     8/5/2011       RUB      76.00
KUBANSKAYA NIVA        15.500    2/20/2014       RUB     100.40
LADYA FINANS           13.750    9/13/2012       RUB      99.98
LEASING TECH           15.000   10/24/2014       RUB     100.03
LR-INVEST              13.750    7/17/2012       RUB      99.97
M-INDUSTRIYA           12.250    8/16/2011       RUB      30.34
M-INDUSTRIYA           14.250    7/10/2013       RUB      60.00
MACROMIR-FINANS         7.750     7/3/2012       RUB       0.02
MAIN ROAD OJSC         10.200     6/3/2011       RUB      33.00
MIG-FINANS              0.100     9/6/2011       RUB       1.02
MIRAX                  17.000    9/17/2012       RUB      15.50
MIRAX                  14.990    5/17/2011       RUB      21.01
MOSKOMMERTSBANK         1.000    6/12/2013       RUB      75.00
MOSKOMMERTSBANK        12.000    2/15/2011       RUB     101.10
MOSMART FINANS          0.010    4/12/2012       RUB       2.00
MOSOBLGAZ              12.000    5/17/2011       RUB      72.50
MOSOBLTRUSTINVES       20.000    3/26/2011       RUB       6.99
MOSSELPROM FINAN       14.000    4/10/2014       RUB      75.00
NATIONAL CAPITAL       12.500    5/20/2011       RUB     100.00
NEW INVESTMENTS        12.000     7/7/2011       RUB     104.50
NOK                    10.000    9/22/2011       RUB       1.01
NOK                    12.500    8/26/2014       RUB       3.01
NOMOS-LEASING          12.000     7/8/2011       RUB     100.00
NOVOROSSIYSK           13.000    12/9/2011       RUB       3.00
NSH-FINANCE            13.000   12/15/2011       RUB     100.00
NUTRINVESTHOLDIN       11.000    6/30/2014       RUB      22.22
OJSC FCB               11.000     8/7/2012       RUB     100.00
PEB LEASING            14.000    9/12/2014       RUB     100.00
PENSION FUND REA        5.000     5/7/2019       RUB      23.00
PROMNESTESERVICE        9.500    12/5/2014       RUB     100.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA        1.000   12/17/2012       RUB       1.00
PROMTRACTOR-FINA        0.010   10/18/2011       RUB      71.44
PROTEK-FINANS          12.000    11/2/2011       RUB      75.00
RAF-LEASING            12.500    2/21/2012       RUB     100.02
RAZGULYAY-FINANS       12.500   10/23/2013       RUB       5.00
REAL LEASING INV       15.000   12/19/2014       RUB     100.03
REGIONENERGO            8.500    5/30/2016       RUB     100.03
RFA-INVEST             10.000    11/4/2011       RUB      96.05
RIATO                  13.750     6/3/2013       RUB      99.00
RMK PARK PLAZA         10.000     1/8/2013       RUB      75.00
RVK-FINANS              9.500    7/21/2011       RUB      75.00
RYBINSKKABEL            0.010    2/28/2012       RUB       0.50
SAHO                   15.000    5/21/2012       RUB      20.00
SATURN                 10.000     6/6/2014       RUB       5.00
SENATOR                14.000    5/18/2012       RUB      75.00
SEVENTH CONTINE         9.250    6/14/2012       RUB       1.76
SEVKABEL-FINANS        10.500    3/27/2012       RUB       3.40
SIBUR                   7.300    3/13/2015       RUB     100.25
SIBUR                   9.250    3/13/2015       RUB     104.00
SIBUR                   9.000    3/13/2015       RUB     102.25
SIBUR                  13.500    3/13/2015       RUB     108.00
SPETSSTROYFINANC        8.500    5/30/2016       RUB     100.03
SVOBODNY SOKOL         18.000    5/24/2011       RUB      40.01
SYNTERRA                0.010     8/1/2013       RUB     110.00
TECHNONICOL-FINA       13.000    9/25/2013       RUB     100.00
TECHNONICOL-FINA       13.500    9/11/2013       RUB      24.02
TECHNONICOL-FINA       13.000    9/19/2013       RUB     100.00
TENZOR-FINANS          16.500   10/16/2012       RUB     100.00
TERNA-FINANS            1.000    11/4/2011       RUB       1.00
TGK-2                   9.000    9/17/2013       RUB      97.00
TK FINANS              12.600     9/5/2011       RUB     100.00
TRANSCREDITFACTO       12.000    11/1/2012       RUB     100.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000    12/3/2015       RUB     100.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000    12/3/2015       RUB     100.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000    12/3/2015       RUB     100.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000    12/3/2015       RUB     100.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000    12/3/2014       RUB     100.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000    12/3/2014       RUB     100.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000    12/3/2014       RUB     100.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000    12/3/2014       RUB     100.00
TRANSFIN-M             10.750    8/10/2012       RUB     101.05
TRANSGAZSERVICE         9.500   11/26/2014       RUB     100.00
TVER VAGONOSTRO         7.000    6/12/2013       RUB      99.84
UNITED HEAVY MAC       13.000    8/30/2011       RUB      75.00
URALSVYAZINFORM        10.500   11/17/2011       RUB     101.50
VESTER-FINANS          15.250    8/11/2011       RUB       2.01
VKM-LEASING FINA        1.000    5/18/2011       RUB       1.10
VMK-FINANCE            16.000    5/21/2014       RUB     100.00
ZAO EUROPLAN           10.000    8/11/2011       RUB      75.00

AYT CEDULAS CAJA        3.750    6/30/2025       EUR      73.24
BANCAJA                 1.500    5/22/2018       EUR      65.03
BANCAJA EMI SA          2.755    5/11/2037       JPY      46.48
BANCO GUIPUZCOAN        1.500    4/18/2022       EUR      63.00
CAIXA TERRASSA          1.500    3/12/2022       EUR      57.56
CAJA CASTIL-MAN         1.500    6/23/2021       EUR      57.81
CEDULAS TDA 6           3.875    5/23/2025       EUR      75.11
CEDULAS TDA A-6         4.250    4/10/2031       EUR      72.44
COMUN AUTO CANAR        3.900   11/30/2035       EUR      74.80
GENERAL DE ALQUI        2.750    8/20/2012       EUR      73.64

SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   12/17/2027       USD      60.80
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.000    8/12/2011       USD       9.92
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    9/29/2015       BRL      64.87
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.000    8/28/2011       USD       9.56

UBS AG                 13.300    5/23/2012       USD       4.05
UBS AG                 14.000    5/23/2012       USD       8.83
UBS AG                 10.580    6/29/2011       USD      38.71
UBS AG JERSEY          10.000   10/25/2010       USD      56.30
UBS AG JERSEY          13.900    1/31/2011       USD      34.74
UBS AG JERSEY          14.640    1/31/2011       USD      36.44
UBS AG JERSEY          16.170    1/31/2011       USD      12.87
UBS AG JERSEY          10.000    2/11/2011       USD      59.90
UBS AG JERSEY          15.250    2/11/2011       USD      11.63
UBS AG JERSEY          11.000    2/28/2011       USD      68.49
UBS AG JERSEY          12.800    2/28/2011       USD      34.09
UBS AG JERSEY          10.990    3/31/2011       USD      31.46
UBS AG JERSEY          10.820    4/21/2011       USD      21.34
UBS AG JERSEY          11.030    4/21/2011       USD      20.51
UBS AG JERSEY          10.280    8/19/2011       USD      35.91
UBS AG JERSEY          10.360    8/19/2011       USD      52.91
UBS AG JERSEY          11.150    8/31/2011       USD      38.18
UBS AG JERSEY           9.350    9/21/2011       USD      64.71
UBS AG JERSEY           9.450    9/21/2011       USD      50.04
UBS AG JERSEY          10.140   12/30/2011       USD      14.63
UBS AG JERSEY           3.220    7/31/2012       EUR      56.08
UBS AG LONDON          14.870   12/28/2010       EUR      71.10
UBS AG LONDON          14.680   12/28/2010       EUR      71.06
UBS AG LONDON          14.370   12/28/2010       EUR      71.00
UBS AG LONDON          14.980   12/28/2010       EUR      71.12

BANK OF SCOTLAND        6.984     2/7/2035       EUR      72.46
BARCLAYS BK PLC        13.800    5/27/2011       USD      52.08
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.400    7/31/2012       USD      11.07
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.800    7/31/2012       USD      28.33
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.650    1/31/2012       USD      41.50
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.350    1/23/2012       USD      20.10
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.550    1/23/2012       USD      11.70
BARCLAYS BK PLC         7.610    6/30/2011       USD      52.50
BARCLAYS BK PLC        12.950    4/20/2012       USD      22.60
BRADFORD&BIN BLD        4.910     2/1/2047       EUR      64.90
BRADFORD&BIN BLD        5.750   12/12/2022       GBP      44.17
BRADFORD&BIN BLD        5.500    1/15/2018       GBP      44.97
BRADFORD&BIN PLC        7.625    2/16/2049       GBP      46.72
BRADFORD&BIN PLC        6.625    6/16/2023       GBP      45.51
EFG HELLAS PLC          5.400    11/2/2047       EUR      68.75
EFG HELLAS PLC          6.010     1/9/2036       EUR      35.50
ENTERPRISE INNS         6.375    9/26/2031       GBP      73.21
F&C ASSET MNGMT         6.750   12/20/2026       GBP      74.03
HBOS PLC                6.000    11/1/2033       USD      70.12
HBOS PLC                6.000    11/1/2033       USD      70.12
NOMURA BANK INTL        0.800   12/21/2020       EUR      69.69
NORTHERN ROCK           5.750    2/28/2017       GBP      75.41
PRINCIPALITY BLD        5.375     7/8/2016       GBP      69.92
PUNCH TAVERNS           6.468    4/15/2033       GBP      71.87
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        6.316    6/29/2030       EUR      69.29
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       10.000    2/15/2045       USD      74.80
SPIRIT ISSUER           5.472   12/28/2028       GBP      71.20
TXU EASTERN FNDG        6.450    5/15/2005       USD       2.38
TXU EASTERN FNDG        6.750    5/15/2009       USD       2.48
UNIQUE PUB FIN          6.464    3/30/2032       GBP      64.37
WESSEX WATER FIN        1.369    7/31/2057       GBP      33.49


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter -- Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick,
Maryland USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine
T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

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of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *