TCREUR_Public/101210.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, December 10, 2010, Vol. 11, No. 244

                            Headlines


B E L G I U M

BELARUSIAN REPUBLICAN: Fitch Raises Insurer Strength Rating to 'B'
EXPORT-IMPORT: Fitch Upgrades Insurer Strength Rating to 'B'


C R O A T I A

ZAGREBACKA BANKA: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Foreign Currency Rating


G E R M A N Y

KUKA AG: S&P Assigns 'B' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating


G R E E C E

TITAN CEMENT: S&P Puts 'BB+' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
WIND HELLAS: U.K. Court Okays Bondholder-Led Restructuring Plan


H U N G A R Y

MAV ZRT: Moody's Downgrades Corporate Family Rating to 'Ba3'


I C E L A N D

TRYGGINGAMIDSTODIN HF: S&P Affirms 'BB' Counterparty Credit Rating


I R E L A N D

ALLIED IRISH: Set to Pay Out EUR40 Mil. Bonuses Despite Bailout
BANK OF IRELAND: Commences Debt Exchange Offer
EDUCATIONAL BUILDING: EU Commission Doubts Institution's Viability
MCINERNEY HOLDINGS: Lenders Seek Longer-Term Receivership Process
ULSTER BANK: Transfers EUR6-Bil. Tracker Mortgages to Core Unit

WHELAN GROUP: Former Workers Hit Out at Nama for Role in Wind-Up


I T A L Y

BANCA AGRILEASING: Moody's Cuts Bank Strength Rating to 'D+'


L U X E M B O U R G

INTELSAT JACKSON: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Rating on US$2.85BB Loan


R O M A N I A

* Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Long-Term Ratings on Republic of Udmurtia
* Fitch Affirms Ratings on Five Romanian Banking Institutions


R U S S I A

X5RETAIL GROUP: S&P Puts 'BB-' Rating on CreditWatch Negative


S W I T Z E R L A N D

UNITED TRUST OF SWITZERLAND: U.S. Court Appoints Roper as Receiver


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BLUE STAR: Darren Terence Brookes Appointed as Liquidator
CRUSADERS: Appoints Rod Findlay as Chief Executive Officer
LANDSBANKI GUERNSEY: Goes Into Liquidation
LAPLAND UK: Reopens a Year After Falling Into Administration
ROYAL BANK: Fuller Public Explanation Needed on GBP45BB Bailout

RUSS HILL: Britannia Hotels Acquires Hotel Out of Administration
WHINSTONE CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Five Notes to 'B2 (sf)'
WINDSOR & ETON: Gets Winding-Up Reprieve, Draws Up CVA Proposal
* UK: Small Businesses in Wales Continue to Fall Insolvent


X X X X X X X X

* Moody's: Global Default Rate Fell to 3.3% in November 2010
* S&P Takes Rating Actions on 21 European Synthetic CDO Tranches
* BOOK REVIEW: Hospital Turnarounds -- Lessons in Leadership


                            *********


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B E L G I U M
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BELARUSIAN REPUBLICAN: Fitch Raises Insurer Strength Rating to 'B'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the Insurer Financial Strength Ratings
of two Belarusian state-owned insurers -- Belarusian Republican
Unitary Insurance Company (Belgosstrakh) and Export-Import
Insurance Company of Belarus (Eximgarant) to 'B' from 'B-'.  The
Outlook on both ratings is Stable.

The upgrades and Stable Outlook of the state-owned insurers
reflect Fitch's opinion that the ability of the Belarusian
authorities to provide support to these entities has strengthened
since the height of the global financial crisis.  The stronger
performance of the Belarusian economy, which reported 6.6% GDP
growth in 9M10 compared to 0.2% in 2009, supports Fitch's view of
a more stable near-term outlook for sovereign finances.  Fitch
also considers the commitment of the local authorities to support
Belgosstrakh and Eximgarant as strong, taking into account the
track record of such support in the past and the relevant
guarantees set in the local regulatory framework.  Belgosstrakh's
and Eximgarant's ratings will continue to be affected if Fitch
considers there are any changes in the financial condition of the
Republic of Belarus.

Fitch notes Belgosstrakh's and Eximgarant's strong coverage of the
regulatory solvency ratio and views the insurers' risk-adjusted
capital position as commensurate with the rating level.  This is
partially offset by the significant concentration of the insurers'
investments in state-owned enterprises and banks, which could
potentially significantly reduce capital adequacy in the event of
financial instability at the sovereign level.

Belgosstrakh was founded in 1921 and is the largest insurer by
premium volume in Belarus with a 56% share of the local non-life
insurance sector in H110, BYR324 billion in net premiums written
and BYR1,335 billion in total assets.  Belgosstrakh has 7 branches
and 119 representative offices covering all Belarusian regional
centres, including Minsk.

Eximgarant was founded in 2001 in the framework of a government
program aimed at promoting national export operations.  Eximgarant
was the sixth-largest insurer in Belarus by premium volume at end-
H110, with BYR22 billion in net written premiums and BYR502
billion in total assets.  Eximgarant is a member of the Prague
club of the International Union of Credit and Investment Insurers,
which includes the largest export credit and investments insurers
from developed and developing countries.


EXPORT-IMPORT: Fitch Upgrades Insurer Strength Rating to 'B'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the Insurer Financial Strength Ratings
of two Belarusian state-owned insurers -- Belarusian Republican
Unitary Insurance Company (Belgosstrakh) and Export-Import
Insurance Company of Belarus (Eximgarant) to 'B' from 'B-'.  The
Outlook on both ratings is Stable.

The upgrades and Stable Outlook of the state-owned insurers
reflect Fitch's opinion that the ability of the Belarusian
authorities to provide support to these entities has strengthened
since the height of the global financial crisis.  The stronger
performance of the Belarusian economy, which reported 6.6% GDP
growth in 9M10 compared to 0.2% in 2009, supports Fitch's view of
a more stable near-term outlook for sovereign finances.  Fitch
also considers the commitment of the local authorities to support
Belgosstrakh and Eximgarant as strong, taking into account the
track record of such support in the past and the relevant
guarantees set in the local regulatory framework.  Belgosstrakh's
and Eximgarant's ratings will continue to be affected if Fitch
considers there are any changes in the financial condition of the
Republic of Belarus.

Fitch notes Belgosstrakh's and Eximgarant's strong coverage of the
regulatory solvency ratio and views the insurers' risk-adjusted
capital position as commensurate with the rating level.  This is
partially offset by the significant concentration of the insurers'
investments in state-owned enterprises and banks, which could
potentially significantly reduce capital adequacy in the event of
financial instability at the sovereign level.

Belgosstrakh was founded in 1921 and is the largest insurer by
premium volume in Belarus with a 56% share of the local non-life
insurance sector in H110, BYR324 billion in net premiums written
and BYR1,335 billion in total assets.  Belgosstrakh has 7 branches
and 119 representative offices covering all Belarusian regional
centres, including Minsk.

Eximgarant was founded in 2001 in the framework of a government
program aimed at promoting national export operations.  Eximgarant
was the sixth-largest insurer in Belarus by premium volume at end-
H110, with BYR22 billion in net written premiums and BYR502
billion in total assets.  Eximgarant is a member of the Prague
club of the International Union of Credit and Investment Insurers,
which includes the largest export credit and investments insurers
from developed and developing countries.


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C R O A T I A
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ZAGREBACKA BANKA: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Foreign Currency Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Zagrebacka banka d.d.'s
long-term global local currency deposit rating to Baa2 from Baa1.
The rating action reflects a weakening in the bank's position
within the D+ bank financial strength range, which now maps to a
Ba1 baseline credit assessment, down from a Baa3.

At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed ZABA's D+ BFSR
and its foreign currency deposit ratings at Ba1/Not Prime.  Its
Prime-2 local currency rating is also affirmed.  The outlook on
all ratings is now stable.

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of the local currency rating was driven by: (i) the
deterioration in the bank's asset quality, which is expected to
continue into at least the first half of 2011; (ii) pressures on
the bank's bottom-line profit arising from elevated provisioning
charges and expectations that the bank will face challenges in
maintaining interest rate margins in a low interest-rate
environment; (iii) elevated single-party exposures to the Baa3-
rated sovereign and state-owned enterprises (partly reflecting the
lack of good credit alternatives under weakened market
conditions); as well as (iv) enduring concerns regarding currency-
induced credit risk (throughout the banking sector) arising from
extensive foreign currency or foreign currency-linked lending.

Moody's notes that ZABA's YE2009 results reflected a rise in
impaired loans to 5.9% of total loans (from 4.0% in the prior
year) while NPLs (defined as impaired loans plus non-impaired
loans past due by over 90 days) stood at 6.9%.  Moreover, the rise
in loan loss provisions recorded in the bank's June 2010 summary
financials suggests that asset quality pressures have persisted
during the year.  As Croatia's GDP is projected to contract by
1.5% in 2010, NPLs in the system have yet to peak.  In addition,
any recovery in 2011 is expected to be slow, which together with
the time lag between negative economic developments and credit
delinquencies, means that pressure on asset quality is likely to
persist at least into the first half of 2011 and maintain loan
loss provision charges at above historical norms.

Although June 2010 summary financials suggest that the bank was
able to defend its net interest margins, Moody's expects that in
the near term this will remain a challenge given the public policy
of maintaining low interest rates to support economic growth.
Credit growth in 2010 was mainly driven by corporate lending,
including loans to the sovereign or state-owned companies.  Retail
credit was stagnant in view of the deterioration of Croatian
households' credit standing, reflecting higher unemployment and
recessionary pressures on income.  On aggregate, this caused
ZABA's high sovereign exposure to edge upwards, albeit marginally.
Moreover, Moody's notes that although exchange rate pressures on
the local currency have eased since Q1 2009, an aggravation of
Croatia's external imbalances could revive such pressures.  As the
bulk of ZABA's loans are in foreign currency or are foreign
currency-linked, it bears currency-induced credit risk, as
unhedged borrowers may face repayment difficulties in the event of
devaluation.

However, Moody's ratings for ZABA continue to be supported by its
strong and defendable franchise, robust capitalization and strong
retail funding base.  In addition, the rating agency notes that
despite Croatia's protracted recession, the bank has thus far
remained profitable.

Moody's previous rating action on Zagrebacka Banka was implemented
on December 1, 2009, when the rating agency downgraded the bank's
GLC deposit ratings to Baa1/Prime-2 (negative outlook) from
A2/Prime-1 and changed the outlook on its BFSR to stable from
negative.

Headquartered in Zagreb, the Zagrebacka Banka group reported total
assets (un-audited) of HRK108 billion (EUR15.1 billion) as of June
2010.


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KUKA AG: S&P Assigns 'B' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'B'
long-term corporate credit rating to Germany-based industrial
automation and robotics manufacturer KUKA AG.  The outlook is
stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned a 'B-' issue rating to KUKA's 8.75%
EUR202 million second-lien secured notes due 2017.  The recovery
rating on the notes is '5', indicating S&P's expectation of modest
(10%-30%) recovery in the event of a payment default.

"The ratings reflect S&P's view of the company's weak business
risk profile and highly leveraged financial risk profile," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Abigail Klimovich.  "In S&P's
opinion, the ratings are constrained by KUKA's high exposure to
the cyclical auto industry and, consequently, weak and volatile
operating margins.  Further constraints include KUKA's difficult
position as a supplier to price-aggressive original equipment
manufacturers; and limited geographic, end-market, and customer
diversity."

These constraints are partly offset by KUKA's strong and leading
market positions in its niche markets and longstanding
relationships with OEMs, which provide high barriers to entry for
competitors.  In addition, KUKA benefits from end-market
diversity, albeit on a weak level, and from the plans of its main
customer OEMs to expand into emerging markets, one of the main
engines for growth in the auto industry.

According to S&P's calculations (and pro forma for the completed
refinancing), KUKA's total Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt was
EUR278 million on Sept. 30, 2010.  This translates into a high
adjusted total debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 6.7x that S&P anticipates
KUKA should achieve by the end of 2010.  On a net basis, adjusting
for EUR95 million of surplus cash (with EUR50 million of cash
reserved for ongoing operational needs), S&P calculates that
adjusted debt and leverage will be EUR181 million and 4.4x,
respectively, by the end of 2010.

In S&P's view, KUKA is likely to generate about EUR34 million of
funds from operations in 2010 and achieve positive EBITDA.
Furthermore, S&P thinks that KUKA should post high double-digit
EBITDA growth in the next 18 months due to increased capacity
utilization on the back of improving demand and the benefits of a
restructuring program undertaken in 2009 and 2010.  As a result,
S&P anticipates that KUKA's adjusted ratio of net debt to EBITDA
will be less than 4.5x, and FFO to debt will be in the low to mid
double-digit territory by the end of 2011.  S&P views these two
ratios as compatible with the rating over the medium term,
provided that KUKA's operating performance and cash flow
generation do not weaken.

Although it is not S&P's base-case assessment at this stage, the
ratings could come under pressure if KUKA's credit measures were
to fail to improve from their current levels as a result of cost
savings failing to outweigh the effect of the lower-margin
projects undertaken by KUKA Systems in 2009 and 2010, or if there
were a significant decline in new order activity.  The ratings
could also come under pressure if headroom under the interest
coverage covenant were to decline materially.

S&P views rating upside as unlikely in the next 18 months, given
the group's highly leveraged capital structure and the fact that
the ratings already factor in a strengthening of credit metrics.


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TITAN CEMENT: S&P Puts 'BB+' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it placed the 'BB+'
long-term corporate credit and issue ratings on Titan Cement Co.
S.A. on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The CreditWatch placement follows S&P's assessment of the
potential negative implications for Titan if the nongovernmental
holders of the debt of the Hellenic Republic (Greece; BB+/Watch
Neg/B) are not paid in full and on time.

"S&P notes that its criteria do not include a sovereign ceiling or
require us to cap the ratings on Titan at the level of the
sovereign rating," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Terence
Smiyan.  "Nevertheless, a possible further deterioration of the
sovereign's creditworthiness could have direct and/or indirect
negative consequences for Titan that cannot be judged and assessed
fully in the context of the current low visibility on, and
substantial uncertainty over, Titan's home market of Greece.  Such
consequences could expose the group to risks beyond pure end-
market industry exposure, in S&P's view."

Titan's home market remains significant in the group's geographic
spread and accounted for about 37% of sales and 38% of group
EBITDA in 2009, including exports.  In S&P's view, the group has a
sound ability to export a meaningful stake of its excess
production.  Nevertheless, consumer confidence, availability of
credit, interest rates, GDP projections, and tax levels, among
other things, remain important drivers of Titan's future
performance and are likely to be severely affected should there be
a reduction in the probability of nongovernmental sovereign
bondholders being paid both in full and on time.

S&P notes that Titan's performance so far this year has been in
line with S&P's projections for both credit metrics and the
industry downturn in Greece (with a 13% decline in sales in the
first nine months of 2010).  S&P considers Titan's credit metrics
to be strong for the current rating, with rolling 12-month funds
from operations to debt of 26.5% at the end of September 2010.
The group's EBITDA generation remained stable in comparison with
the same period last year, at EUR260 million.

S&P aims to review the CreditWatch placement within the next three
months, after assessing whether a possible further deterioration
of the sovereign's creditworthiness could have a direct and/or
indirect negative bearing on Titan.

S&P could affirm the ratings should a review of the potential
risks lead us to believe that there would not be any material
implications on the group's credit metrics and/or S&P's assessment
of its liquidity.

Based on current information, at this stage, S&P does not
anticipate a ratings downgrade of more than one notch.


WIND HELLAS: U.K. Court Okays Bondholder-Led Restructuring Plan
---------------------------------------------------------------
Lindsay Fortado at Bloomberg News reports that Wind Hellas
Telecommunications SA's bondholder-led plan to restructure the
company by injecting EUR420 million (US$555 million) and writing
off debt in exchange for control of the company was approved by a
London court.

"This is a fair scheme in the circumstances," Judge Richard Arnold
said in approving the request on Wednesday, according to
Bloomberg.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 20,
2010, Bloomberg News said Wind Hellas's senior bondholders were
picked as preferred bidders for the Greek mobile phone operator in
the second time the company has been sold in a year.  Wind
Hellas's senior secured floating-rate noteholders, owed about
EUR1.2 billion (US$1.67 billion), will inject EUR420 million and
write off debt in exchange for the company, Bloomberg said, citing
Wind's parent Weather Finance III Sarl, the holding company of
Egyptian billionaire Naguib Sawiris.  Weather Finance said in a
statement that under the bondholders' proposal, Wind Hellas's
GBP250 million-revolver will be repaid in full, while the
company's senior secured notes and EUR355 million of subordinated
bonds will be written off, according to Bloomberg.  The statement
said the bondholder group includes Mount Kellett Capital Partners
(Ireland) Ltd., Taconic Capital Advisers UK LLP, Providence Equity
Capital Markets LLC, Anchorage Capital Group LLC, Angelo Gordon &
Co and Eton Park International LLP, Bloomberg disclosed.

On Nov. 8, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, citing
Bloomberg News, reported that Wind Hellas's senior bondholders
were approved by a London court as the bidders that should decide
the outcome of the company's second restructuring in a year.
Bloomberg disclosed Judge Guy Newey at the High Court of Justice
on Nov. 4 approved that choice and said the London court was the
right one to oversee the restructuring.

                        About WIND Hellas

Headquartered in Athens, Greece, WIND Hellas Telecommunications
S.A. -- http://www.wind.com.gr/-- provides mobile voice and data
services to about 6 million consumer and business customers
throughout Greece.  The company enables international roaming in
155 countries for travelling subscribers through agreements with
other carriers.  It also provides cellular and satellite-based
vehicle management and tracking services.  WIND Hellas is owned by
investment firm Weather Investments, a company led by Cairo-based
Orascom Telecom's founder and chairman, Naguib Sawiris.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 25,
2010, Fitch Ratings downgraded Greek mobile operator WIND Hellas
Telecommunications S.A.'s Long term Issuer Default rating to 'RD'
from 'C'.  Fitch said the downgrade follows the company's
announcement of the selection of a preferred bidder in the
restructuring of the company's capital base following the
Standstill Agreement entered into with its lenders on June 30,
2010.


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MAV ZRT: Moody's Downgrades Corporate Family Rating to 'Ba3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2 the
corporate family rating and probability-of-default rating of MAV
Zrt Hungarian State Railways.  The outlook on the ratings is
negative.  This rating action follows Moody's downgrade of the
Republic of Hungary's local and foreign currency ratings to Baa3
from Baa1 on December 6, 2010.

                        Ratings Rationale

"This rating action was triggered by the combined effect of on the
ratings of the downgrade of the Sovereign rating and Moody's
concerns on the negative effect that a deterioration of the
domestic economic landscape may have on group liquidity, in light
of the sizeable debt repayments due in 2011," says Marco Vetulli,
a Moody's Vice President and lead analyst for MAV.

Moody's one-notch downgrade of MAV's ratings to Ba3 reflects the
combination of these inputs:

  -- A BCA of 17 (on a scale of 1 to 21, where 1 represents the
     lowest credit risk and 17 equates to Caa1)

  -- Hungary's sovereign rating of Baa3, which Moody's downgraded
     on 6 December 2010

  -- Very high dependence

  -- High support

"Moody's assessment of MAV's very high dependence on the Hungarian
government reflects: (i) the strong operational and financial
linkages between MAV and the government, with direct and indirect
government transfers representing more than 50% of the group's
revenues; (ii) the reliance of the group and its sole shareholder
on Hungary as a revenue base; and (iii) the exposure of MAV and
the government to common risks such as exchange rate volatility,"
continues Mr. Vetulli.

Moody's assessment of high support reflects: (i) MAV's critical
role in the Hungarian economy; (ii) its 100% state ownership; and
(iii) its tight control by the Hungarian state, with government-
nominated representatives dominating its Board of Directors and
Supervisory Board.  Although the Hungarian government does not
explicitly guarantee MAV's obligations, notwithstanding its non-
interventionist history, it currently provides significant support
to the group in the form of equity contributions, loan guarantees
(a large portion of MAV's debt is supported by government
guarantee), cost reimbursement and subsidies (in November 2010 the
group received HUF23 billion for 2010 instead of the originally
planned HUF18.6 billion).  Therefore, Moody's believes it is
likely that Hungary would bail out MAV if the group were to
default in the near future.

A BCA of 17 (equivalent to a Caa1) reflects these constraints: (i)
MAV's weak stand-alone credit quality as a result of its record of
material operating losses; (ii) the likely continued deterioration
in MAV's financial position based on further significant capital
expenditure commitments (although Moody's understands that capex
is implemented only when the group is able to fund it) and higher
future maintenance costs for an ageing fleet (although the rating
agency recognizes that the group has started to renew its fleet);
(iii) MAV's heavy debt repayment schedule, starting in 2011, and
the group's weakening liquidity position as a result; and (iv) a
change in the degree of stability of the operating environment due
to the financial crisis.

However, more positively, the BCA of 17 also reflects: (i) MAV's
low business risk profile, based on both its monopoly position as
the Hungarian railways' infrastructure manager and its "quasi-
monopoly" position in railway passenger transportation in Hungary;
(ii) the relatively stable stream of revenues derived by MAV from
state cost reimbursements; (iii) the importance of railways as a
means of transportation to the Hungarian economy; and (iv) the
high degree of control and monitoring of MAV by the Hungarian
government.

The negative outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's view that,
going forward, the level of support provided to MAV by the
government might be restricted, at a time when the group's
liquidity remains under pressure due to the sizeable debt
repayments due in 2011 (as outlined in Moody's most recent press
release on MAV, dated July 26, 2010).  The outlook could be
stabilized if MAV is able to allay Moody's concerns regarding the
group's liquidity profile and refinancing risk.

A further downgrade of MAV's ratings could be triggered by a
downgrade of Hungary and/or a perceived or actual weakening in the
close links between MAV and its government shareholders.  In
addition to these two factors, Moody's could adjust MAV's BCA
downwards if further concerns about liquidity were to arise.

Upward pressure on the ratings is currently limited.  However, an
upgrade of the ratings of Hungary or an improvement in the
country's underlying BCA could result in positive pressure on
MAV's ratings.  Further positive rating pressure on MAV's BCA
could develop if the group successfully improves its average debt
maturity profile by extending the majority of its next three years
debt maturities.

Moody's most recent rating action on MAV was implemented on
July 26, 2010, when the outlook on the group's Ba2 CFR was changed
to negative from stable.

Headquartered in Budapest, Hungary, MAV is 100% government-owned
and the country's vertically integrated incumbent national railway
operator.  In FY 2009, MAV reported revenues of HUF121.5 billion
(around EUR433 million) and received HUF164 billion in
reimbursements and HUF20 billion in customer subsidies from the
government.


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TRYGGINGAMIDSTODIN HF: S&P Affirms 'BB' Counterparty Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised its
outlook to positive from stable on Icelandic property casualty
insurer Tryggingamidstodin hf.  At the same time, S&P also
affirmed its 'BB' long-term counterparty credit and insurer
financial strength ratings on the company.

The ratings on TM reflect the group's high industry and country
risk and marginal financial flexibility, offset by adequate
investments and historically marginal, but improving, operating
performance.

"Standard & Poor's regards TM's investment portfolio as adequate,
reflecting the high credit and market risk in Iceland and the
company's high, if reduced, investment leverage," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Linas Grigaliunas.  "In S&P's view, TM's
operating performance has historically been marginal, but is
improving."

Historically, TM has exhibited high combined ratios and a strong
dependence on investment returns, however, its operating
performance improved in 2009.  This trend has continued into 2010;
in the first three quarters of the year, TM sustained a combined
ratio below 100% for the first time in many years.  Nevertheless,
S&P has yet to be convinced about the sustainability of improved
earnings over the longer term, and the continued above-average
exposure to equities means that earnings are still exposed to some
volatility.  S&P also consider the Icelandic insurance market's
industry and economic risk profile to be high relative to other
insurance markets.

S&P views TM's financial flexibility as marginal.  Although S&P's
previous concerns relating to TM's parent, Stodir hf. (not rated),
have been largely resolved.  S&P believes that Stodir's owners--
the unrated Icelandic banks Glitnir Bank, Arion Bank, and New
Landsbanki--have limited ability to provide capital support to TM.

The positive outlook reflects S&P's expectation that TM's
management will see more-tangible positive results from its
strategy and will sustain the recent improvement in operating
performance.  S&P anticipates a net combined ratio under 105% for
2010 and closer to 100% for the first half of 2011.  S&P further
expects this improvement in earnings to contribute to a growth in
capital adequacy above that required to sustain any growth in
premium to bring capital adequacy closer to the 'BBB' range, as
measured by S&P's risk-adjusted capital model.

Should TM meet these expectations, S&P would consider raising the
ratings by one notch.  Conversely, if the operating performance or
capital adequacy were to deteriorate, S&P would likely revise the
outlook back to stable or even lower the rating.


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ALLIED IRISH: Set to Pay Out EUR40 Mil. Bonuses Despite Bailout
---------------------------------------------------------------
Harry Wilson and Louise Armitstead at The Telegraph reports that
Allied Irish Banks is set to pay out EUR40 million (GBP34 million)
in bonuses to its investment banking staff despite the Irish
lender edging closer to near total state ownership amid the
country's financial crisis.

According to The Telegraph, up to 2,400 Dublin-based employees of
Allied Irish's capital markets business will share the windfall,
which is likely to inflame public opinion in Ireland just weeks
after the government was forced to accept an EUR85 billion bail-
out package.

At present, Allied Irish is 19% owned by the Irish state, but this
stake is expected to rise to more than 90% after a second capital
increase designed to shore up the troubled bank as part of a
wholesale recapitalization of the indebted Irish banking sector,
The Telegraph notes.

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c., together with its subsidiaries --
http://www.aibgroup.com/-- conducts retail and commercial banking
business in Ireland.  It also provides corporate lending and
capital markets activities from its head office at Bankcentre and
from Dublin's International Financial Services Centre.  The Group
also has overseas branches in the United States, Germany, France
and Australia, among other locations.  The business of AIB Group
is conducted through four operating divisions: AIB Bank Republic
of Ireland division, Capital Markets division, AIB Bank UK
division, and Central & Eastern Europe division.  In February
2008, the Group acquired the AmCredit mortgage business in the
Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.  In September
2008, the Group also acquired a 49.99% shareholding in BACB.

                           *     *     *

On Dec. 8, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported
that DBRS downgraded the Dated Subordinated Debt and Undated
Subordinated Debt ratings of Allied Irish Banks p.l.c. (AIB or the
Group) to 'B' from 'A' to reflect the elevated risk of adverse
action by the government.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 7,
2010, Moody's Investors Service placed on review for possible
downgrade the D bank financial strength rating of Allied Irish
Banks.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 1,
2010, Fitch Ratings downgraded Allied Irish Banks plc's lower tier
2 subordinated debt to 'B' from 'BB'.  It also downgraded AIB's
upper tier 2 to 'CC' from 'B' Rating Watch Negative and tier 1
debt securities to 'CC' from 'B-' RWN and 'CCC'.  The ratings of
the UT2 and T1 securities were removed from RWN.


BANK OF IRELAND: Commences Debt Exchange Offer
----------------------------------------------
Jennifer Hughes, Sharlene Goff, Anousha Sakoui and Tracy Alloway
at The Financial Times report that Bank of Ireland has begun its
efforts to raise the EUR2.2 billion of fresh capital demanded by
officials with a debt exchange offer that could net the lender
almost a third of that amount.

According to the FT, the bank, which is offering a series of its
junior debtholders just over half the face value of their
investments, has been given until the end of February to raise the
capital.  The capital raising is part of a EUR10 billion (GBP8.4
billion) backstop for Ireland's struggling banks agreed as part of
the broader EUR85 billion bail-out arranged last month with the
International Monetary Fund and the European Union, the FT notes.

The FT says Bank of Ireland will hope that a successful exchange,
which offers an average 53% of the bonds' face value, could boost
its chances of raising the full EUR2.2 billion privately.  If it
fails, it would have to accept state funds -- a move that would
push it into majority government ownership, the FT states.

The bank is planning to set out a more detailed capital raising
plan by the end of this year, the FT discloses.  This is likely to
include details of a rights issue as well as plans to attract new
investors, possibly through a larger share placing, according to
the FT.

The FT relates that analysts doubt that Bank of Ireland can raise
the full EUR2.2 billion through private means.  However, the
lender is keen to keep the government's stake -- which is
currently 36% -- below 50%, the FT notes.

The deal includes holders of nine bonds at between 46% and 57.5%
of face value, the FT says.  It will accept tenders worth up to
EUR1.5 billion of the total EUR3.1 billion worth of outstanding
bonds named in the offer, the FT discloses.  In exchange, they
will receive new 13-month government guaranteed senior securities,
the FT states.

Headquartered in Dublin, Bank of Ireland --
http://www.bankofireland.com/-- provides a range of banking and
other financial services.  These include checking and deposit
services, overdrafts, term loans, mortgages, business and
corporate lending, international asset financing, leasing,
installment credit, debt factoring, foreign exchange facilities,
interest and exchange rate hedging instruments, executor, trustee,
life assurance and pension and investment fund management, fund
administration and custodial services and financial advisory
services, including mergers and acquisitions and underwriting.
The Company organizes its businesses into Retail Republic of
Ireland, Bank of Ireland Life, Capital Markets, UK Financial
Services and Group Centre.  It has operations throughout Ireland,
the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 8,
2010, DBRS downgraded the Dated Subordinated Debt ratings of The
Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland (Bank of Ireland or
the Group), to BB from 'A' to reflect the elevated risk of adverse
action by the government.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 4,
2010, Moody's Investors Service assigned A3/P-2 bank deposit
ratings and a D+ bank financial strength rating to Bank of Ireland
(UK) plc.  Moody's said the outlook is stable.


EDUCATIONAL BUILDING: EU Commission Doubts Institution's Viability
------------------------------------------------------------------
Arthur Beesley at The Irish Times reports that the European
Commission in Brussels has expressed doubt about the viability of
the Educational Building Society (EBS) and challenged core
elements of the Government's restructuring plan for the
nationalized lender.

According to The Irish Times, as an in-depth inquiry by EU
competition commissioner Joaquin Almunia proceeds into the State's
support for the institution, correspondence with the Government
shows the commission has questioned whether the Government's
assumptions about the prospects for its business are reasonable.

The Irish Times relates that correspondence, published in the
Official Journal of the European Union, reveals the EU's executive
branch has taken issue with the Government's claim that mortgage
lending will continue to be curtailed for several years as banks
retrench and foreign institutions stay out of the market.  The
Government claims EBS is important for the supply of retail
mortgages as competition dries up, The Irish Times notes.

The Irish Times says the correspondence shows the commission
"doubts whether the lack of supply on the mortgage lending market
will really last several years and whether it adequately justifies
the limited restructuring undertaken by EBS".

Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan has been trying to sell the EBS
for months but the deadline for final bids was extended into the
new year after the EUR85 billion EU-IMF bailout plan set out
higher capital targets for all Irish lenders, The Irish Times
discloses.  The society must raise EUR463 million in new capital
to satisfy conditions laid down in the bailout deal, a sum that is
in addition to the EUR525 million it required under a previous
target, The Irish Times states.

In a letter to the Government in the weeks before the bailout, the
commission cast doubt over a key strand of the rescue plan which
then rested on a pledge of EUR875 million from the State, The
Irish Times recounts.

Inviting third-party submissions to Mr. Almunia's inquiry, the EU
executive branch said it doubted whether that level of aid was the
minimum necessary as capital ratios in the EBS remained
"noticeably above" the minimum requirement set by the Financial
Regulator, The Irish Times discloses.

"The commission has doubts on the viability of EBS, and also
currently doubts whether the aid is limited to the minimum and
whether the measures limiting the distortion of competition are
sufficient," it said, according to The Irish Times.

In a reference to its official policy on bank rescues, the
commission went on to express doubts at this stage that the
restructuring plan fulfills all the conditions laid down in a
communique on financial sector restructuring, The Irish Times
notes.

EBS is Ireland's largest building society.  Servicing more than
400,000 members, it distributes its products through a branch and
franchised agency network as well as handling direct business both
over the telephone and via the Internet.  EBS Building Society
provides mortgage lending, savings, investments, and insurance
products in Ireland.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 7,
2010, Moody's Investors Service placed on review for possible
downgrade the D bank financial Strength rating of EBS Building
Society.


MCINERNEY HOLDINGS: Lenders Seek Longer-Term Receivership Process
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Haffenden and Mario Oliviero at The Financial Times report
that two sources close to the situation told Debtwire that
McInerney Holdings' lenders are determined to fight hard against a
plan submitted by the Irish examiner, which offers a cash payout
just above the homebuilder's liquidation value.

According to the FT, the sources said the company filed for
examinership in August after its overdraft facilities were
inexplicably withdrawn at short notice, leaving it with no option
but to seek insolvency protection.  Oaktree Capital appeared as a
white knight, offering to invest in the business and enter into
talks with court-appointed examiner William O'Riordan regarding a
restructuring plan, the FT discloses.

The FT notes that the company's banks however, led by Bank of
Ireland, Anglo Irish and KBC Ireland, opposed the imposition of
the examinership process.  The three banks claim a longer-term
receivership process would give them greater recoveries, the FT
discloses.  KPMG was lined up as receiver, but Irish Judge Frank
Clark ruled against lenders and confirmed Mr. O'Riordan as
examiner on Sept. 14, the FT recounts.  Since then, the banks have
continued their push against the examiner-led process and are due
back in commercial court later this month to plead their case
against confirmation of the Oaktree-backed plan, the FT relates.

The FT says should the banks successfully convince the court to
back away from the restructuring plan in favor of a longer work
out approach, it could add significant uncertainty to the
country's insolvency process.

Complicating matters, debt claims against McInerney that are held
by Bank of Ireland and Anglo Irish may be transferred into
Ireland's National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) before the
examinership process is complete, according to the FT.  Such a
move would hand control in negotiations to the Irish Government-
backed asset management agency, the FT states.

The FT says Oaktree's initial outline offered lenders better terms
than anticipated under a NAMA transfer, leaving around EUR50
million of McInerney's approximate EUR114 million debt burden in
place.  But the banks pushed for better terms, opting instead to
resist the process and retain hope of eventual receivership, the
FT states.

Based on an independent valuation report, the offer on the table
for creditors of McInerney Homes and McInerney Contracting Ltd
provides EUR27 million in cash from Oaktree placed in an escrow
account, according to the FT.  The FT says of this sum, EUR25
million will be made available to the senior banks, and EUR2
million would be distributed to "general creditors".  If
successful, Oaktree will pay the legal costs of examinership and
the valuation, providing the company with a EUR5 million working
capital facility and a EUR15 million landbank acquisition
facility, the FT notes.  According to the FT, the sources said
most of the 13 classes of creditors voted in favor of the scheme
on Nov. 26, but the banks opposed it.

The FT relates that the sources and the lawyer explained that the
judge then must decide if the plan is fair and equitable to other
creditors and not unfair and prejudicial to any parties.  The
seniority and the size of the impaired class voting in favor will
take no precedent when presenting the plan to the court, the FT
states.  "But once it is in front of a judge, the rights of more
senior classes come into play," the FT quoted the lawyer as
saying.

According to the FT, in the event McInerney's bank lenders hold
out to aspire for 10-year receivership and better recoveries at
the upcoming confirmation hearing, they will be required to
provide evidence of their original claims made under oath.  The FT
relates that the first source said the banks will also have to
provide greater detail related to their previous claim that the
receivership could deliver EUR90 million of value over ten years.
According to the FT, the same source said that in the event of a
transfer to NAMA, the banks would unlikely receive above EUR40
million to EUR45 million.  The FT notes that sources said the
initial Oaktree plan offered EUR50 million of retained debt, but
this offer is no longer on the table.

McInerney Holdings plc -- http://www.mcinerneyholdings.eu/-- is a
home builder and regional home builder in the North and Midlands
of England.  It also undertakes commercial and leisure projects in
Ireland, United Kingdom and Spain.  It operates in Ireland, the
United Kingdom and Spain.  The main trading activities of the
Company's Irish home building business during the year ended
December 31, 2008, consisted of construction of private houses,
trading in developed sites and land, development of residential
land for third-parties and in joint-ventures, and contracting for
third-parties.  The Company's commercial property development
division, Hillview Developments Ltd (Hillview), develops
industrial units in the Greater Dublin area.  Hillview completed
1,223 square meters of industrial units as of December 31, 2008.
Its Spanish division, Alanda Group, is developing freehold
apartment schemes.  As of December 31, 2008, the Company completed
1,359 private and contracting residential units in Ireland, the
United Kingdom and Spain.


ULSTER BANK: Transfers EUR6-Bil. Tracker Mortgages to Core Unit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Simon Carswell at The Irish Times reports that Ulster Bank has
reversed the transfer of EUR6 billion in tracker mortgages into
its non-core or internal "bad bank" and instead moved all
commercial property, land and development loans totaling a similar
sum into the quarantined unit.

Last year, Ulster Bank, which is owned by part-nationalized UK
bank Royal Bank of Scotland, split its GBP50 billion (EUR59
billion) loan book into core and non-core units, The Irish Times
notes.  The bank will run down the non-core unit over time.

According to The Irish Times, RBS chief executive Stephen Hester
told a parliamentary hearing in London that RBS plans to shrink
the loan book at Ulster Bank to about GBP30 billion under the
plan.

Last year, Ulster Bank moved GBP15 billion in loans into the "non-
core" unit to focus its ongoing banking operations on the
remaining loans of GBP35 billion left in the core unit, The Irish
Times discloses.

The Irish Times says the reversal of the transfer of loss-making
tracker mortgages means that Ulster Bank will focus on
residential, corporate and small business loans in future,
cleansing the core unit of the most toxic loans -- about EUR6
billion in land, property and development loans.

The bank decided to move the tracker mortgages back into the core
business as they were performing no differently to other mortgages
left in the core unit, The Irish Times notes.

Ulster Bank, the third-largest full-service bank in the Irish
market, participated in the UK government's asset protection
scheme to cover potential losses on the bank's most toxic loans,
The Irish Times discloses.  The bank moved about GBP25 billion in
loans into the scheme, which allowed the lender to pass the first
losses onto the government and share any further losses with the
government over time, according to The Irish Times.

                        About Ulster Bank

Ulster Bank Group -- http://www.ulsterbank.ie/-- is a wholly
owned subsidiary of the enlarged RBS group.  First Active, a
leading mortgage provider, was acquired by Ulster Bank Group in
January 2004 in a EUR887 million transaction.  Serving personal
and small business customers, Ulster Bank Retail Markets provides
Branch Banking and Direct Banking throughout the Republic of
Ireland and Northern Ireland.  Ulster Bank Corporate Markets
caters for the banking needs of business and corporate customers,
treasury and money market activities, asset financing, wealth
management, ebanking and international services, with a continued
focus on providing customer choice and value.

                           *     *     *

Ulster Bank continues to carry a D- bank financial strength rating
from Moody's Investors Service with negative outlook.  The rating
was downgraded in December 2009.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 28,
2009, the D- BFSR reflects Moody's view that the bank will require
further capital over the next couple of years in managing its
problem loans in the very challenging Irish economy.  The outlook
on the BFSR is negative, indicating the significant uncertainty
about the speed and magnitude of further asset quality
deterioration on Ulster Bank's asset quality.  According to
Moody's base loss estimates and further capital injections in the
near future, Ulster Bank should remain adequately capitalized,
however analyzing the bank's exposure to Moody's stressed loss
estimates reveals the potential for significant further capital
shortfalls.


WHELAN GROUP: Former Workers Hit Out at Nama for Role in Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------------------------
Gordon Deegan at The Irish Times reports that workers made
redundant with the collapse of the Whelan Group on Wednesday
expressed their anger at the National Asset Management Agency's
role in the liquidation of the quarrying group.

The Irish Times relates that on Wednesday, more than 100 former
Whelan Group employees attended a meeting with court-appointed
liquidator Moore Stephens Nathans at the West County Hotel in
Ennis to collect their P45 slips and to establish their statutory
entitlements.

According to The Irish Times, West Clare man, Gerard O'Brien, who
worked for the Whelan Group for nine years, said Nama had "hung us
out to dry".

Clare Fianna Fail TD Timmy Dooley confirmed Wednesday that he had
written to Nama chairman Frank Daly to ascertain the rationale
behind the agency's decision to oppose the Whelan Group entering
examinership, The Irish Times discloses.

In his letter, Mr. Dooley, as cited by The Irish Times, said: "It
seems to me that examinership would at least have provided an
opportunity for the company to prepare a viability plan which
could have seen some return to creditors and potential to save
some jobs."

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 7,
2010, The Irish Times said the Court ordered the wind up of five
companies in the Whelan group after the directors of the companies
on Dec. 3 withdrew their petition for court protection.  The Irish
Times disclosed the five companies in liquidation are Whelan Group
(Ennis) Ltd; Whelans Limestone Quarries (Contracts) Ltd; Whelans
Limestone Quarries Ltd; Whelans Quarries (Carraigtwohill) Ltd and
Shannon Explosives Ltd.  The companies have some 2,000 creditors
with the largest secured creditor being the Nama which has taken
over some EUR50 million debts owed to Anglo Irish Bank and opposed
examinership due to the proposed large write down of secured
debts, according to The Irish Times.

The Whelan Group is one of the largest concrete suppliers in
Ireland.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCA AGRILEASING: Moody's Cuts Bank Strength Rating to 'D+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Banca Agrileasing's
standalone Bank Financial Strength Rating to D+ from C-, and its
long-term deposit rating of Banca Agrileasing to Baa1 from A3.
The bank's BFSR now maps to a baseline credit assessment of Ba1 on
the long-term rating scale, from Baa2 previously.  The short-term
deposit rating is unchanged at Prime-2.  The outlook on all
ratings has been changed to stable from negative.

These ratings were downgraded:

  -- Long-term deposit and debt ratings to Baa1 from A3;
  -- Bank Financial Strength Rating to D+ from C-;
  -- Subordinated debt rating to Baa2 from Baa1;
  -- Tier III MTN to P(Baa2) from P(Baa1);
  -- Junior Subordinate rating to Baa3 from Baa2.

The outlook has been changed to stable from negative.

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating action reflects primarily the bank's growing problem
loans (87% of equity and loan loss reserves in June 2010) compared
with its weak Tier 1 capital ratio of 5.4%.  The deterioration in
asset quality is however in line with the Italian banking system,
and reflects the weak economic conditions, and is mitigated by the
ownership of collateral in the leasing contracts.  The low capital
adequacy is a result of group policy, thus making Agrileasing more
dependent on potential ongoing capital support.  In addition, the
bank's mission as a group product company, whose primary goal is
not to maximize profit, contributes to the low level of internal
capital generation (annualized net income was 0.2% of risk-
weighted assets in June 2010).  The general pressure on profits in
the Italian banking system was partly offset, in Agrileasing's
case, by the interest rate floor on the bank's leasing contracts.
The rating agency however said that, even taking into account
these explanation for Agrileasings modest profitability and
capital adequacy in particular, its financial fundamentals are
such as to position the bank's BFSR and BCA at the D+/Ba1 level.

Moody's notes that Agrileasing's BFSR is supported by the bank's
widening role as the central leasing institute and more recently
also the corporate bank of the 420 small Italian co-operative
credit banks.  As such, it is the fourth-largest leasing company
in Italy, with a 6.8% market share.  The rating is also supported
by ongoing co-operative support, particularly for intra-group
funding -- on which the bank is increasingly reliant - and risk
management.

Moody's said that it believes that the probability of co-operative
support is high for Agrileasing, given that it is a central
institution of Italian co-operative credit banks.  However, the
probability of systemic support is low, given the bank's small
size and wholesale nature.  The above results in a three-notch
uplift of the deposit rating from the BCA.

The BFSR could be upgraded if the bank's financials improve, in
particular Tier 1 above 7% and net income above 1% or RWA.  The
bank's deposit ratings may be upgraded if the bank's BFSR is
upgraded or if support - such as that deriving from a legally
binding support agreement- from the BCC sector was assessed as
more likely.

The BFSR could be downgraded in the event of (i) further
deterioration in the bank's financial profile, such as a net loss;
or (ii) significant expansion into higher-risk products outside of
its traditional leasing products, particularly if not accompanied
by appropriate policies, procedures, controls, systems and
expertise.  A downgrade of Agrileasing's BFSR could lead to a
lower deposit rating.  In addition, any material financial
deterioration of Italian co-operative credit banks could also lead
to a deposit downgrade.

Moody's last rating action on Banca Agrileasing was implemented on
February 9, 2010, when the ratings for the bank's junior
subordinated debt and EMTN program (Upper Tier 2) were downgraded
to Baa2 from Baa1.

Based in Rome, Agrileasing had total assets of EUR9.4 billion in
June 2010.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


INTELSAT JACKSON: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Rating on US$2.85BB Loan
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a B1 rating to Intelsat Jackson
Holdings S.A.'s new US$2.85 billion credit facilities, comprised
of a US$2.35 billion 6-year senior secured term loan and US$500
million revolver.  At the same time, Intelsat S.A.'s Caa1
corporate family and probability of default ratings were affirmed
as was the SGL-3 speculative grade liquidity rating (indicating
adequate liquidity).  The rating outlook is stable.

Jackson is an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of Intelsat, the
senior most company in the Intelsat corporate family for which
Moody's maintain ratings; per usual practice, the CFR (Caa1) and
PDR (Caa1) are in the name of Intelsat.  The new credit
facilities, together with the proceeds of a new US$500 million
secured note issue, replace facilities at Intelsat Corporation and
Intelsat Subsidiary Holding Company S.A., the two quasi operating
companies in the Intelsat family.  A concurrent plan of
reorganization will relocate a significant proportion of Corp's
and SubHoldCo's assets to a new legal entity that will participate
in a comprehensive multi legal entity guarantee structure for the
benefit of the new credit facilities -- on a senior secured basis
-- as well as certain existing Jackson obligations that benefit
from existing guarantees - on a senior unsecured basis (Jackson
has also issued senior unsecured debt that is not guaranteed).

Despite apparent pre-reorganization differences in leverage, owing
to operational matters, capital expenditure planning, and transfer
pricing mechanisms, Moody's were of the view that the two quasi-
operating companies had similar credit profiles and had applied
Moody's loss given default methodology in a manner that treated
them as having equivalent credit profiles.  Upon completion of the
contemplated transactions, the new facilities are in substantially
the same collective position as they were prior thereto, as the
corporate family's senior-most obligations.  Consequently, the new
facilities are rated at the same B1 level as the facilities they
replace.

Moody's views consolidating the Corp and SubHoldCo financing silos
as a positive event that simplifies financial reporting,
regulatory filings, cash flow and asset attribution, and financial
covenant compliance monitoring.  However, Intelsat's consolidated
cash flow and debt are substantially unaffected by the
transaction.  Accordingly, the CFR and PDR were affirmed, and the
stable ratings outlook remains unchanged.  As well, the
transaction does not impact the relative size of the family's
stratified pools of debt.  Consequently, existing instrument
ratings were also affirmed (see ratings listing below; ratings for
instruments that are being replaced will be withdrawn in due
course).  Moody's note that the family's legal entity structure
continues to be quite complex and income tax planning is
aggressive -- related risks, while not quantifiable, continue to
have a background ratings' impact.

As well, the transaction is a positive liquidity event,
consolidating cash and current assets against which borrowing
capacity is margined.  Upon closing, Intelsat will have some $651
million of cash (the actual at September 30) and an undrawn
revolver of US$500 million.  Consequently, while Moody's
anticipate capital expenditures will cause the company to be
approximately cash flow neutral over the next four quarters, there
is access to funding.  With the new facilities, Moody's expect
ample financial covenant compliance cushion.  As well, the company
has assets that can be sold for cash to supplement liquidity
should the need arise.  Accordingly, should the transaction close
on the basis expected, Moody's expect to upgrade Intelsat's
speculative grade liquidity rating to SGL-2 (good liquidity) from
SGL-3 (adequate liquidity).

This summarizes Moody's ratings and the rating actions for
Intelsat:

Assignments:

Issuer: Intelsat Jackson Holdings S.A. (formerly Intelsat Jackson
Holdings, Ltd.)

  -- Senior Secured Guaranteed Credit Facilities, Assigned B1
     (LGD1, 6%)

Other Ratings and Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Intelsat S.A. (formerly Intelsat, Ltd.)

  -- Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed at Caa1

  -- Probability of Default Rating, Affirmed at Caa1

  -- Outlook, Affirmed at Stable

  -- Speculative Grade Liquidity Rating, Affirmed at SGL-3
     (expected to be upgraded to SGL-2 after closing)

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed at Caa3
     with the LGD Assessment Revised to (LGD6, 96%) from (LGD6,
     95%)

Issuer: Intelsat (Luxembourg) S.A. (formerly Intelsat (Bermuda),
Ltd.)

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed at Caa3
     with the LGD Assessment Revised to (LGD5, 83%) from (LGD5,
     84%)

Issuer: Intelsat Jackson Holdings S.A. (formerly Intelsat Jackson
Holdings, Ltd.)

  -- Senior Unsecured Guaranteed Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed
     at B3 with the LGD Assessment Revised to LGD3, 35% from LGD3,
     33%

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed at Caa2
     (LGD4, 65%)

Issuer: Intelsat Intermediate Holding Company S.A. (formerly
Intelsat Intermediate Holding Company, Ltd.)

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed at Caa2
     (LGD4, 59%)

Issuer: Intelsat Subsidiary Holding Company S.A. (formerly
Intelsat Subsidiary Holding Company, Ltd.)

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed at B3 with
     the LGD Assessment Revised to LGD3, 35% from LGD3, 33%

Issuer: Intelsat Corporation

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed at B3 with
     the LGD Assessment Revised to LGD3, 35% from LGD3, 33%

                         Rating Rationale

Intelsat's corporate family and probability of default ratings are
Caa1 and the ratings outlook is stable.  While Intelsat has a
strong business profile that features a large 50-plus satellite
fleet covering 99% of the globe's populated regions, growing
demand stemming from the world's seemingly insatiable appetite for
broadband capacity, a stable contract-based revenue stream with a
strong $9.3 billion revenue backlog (nearly 5 years of revenue)
booked with well-regarded customers, Moody's are concerned that
the company's capital structure may not be sustainable over a
prolonged period.  Financial leverage is elevated (LTM Debt-to-
EBITDA incorporating Moody's standard adjustments is 8.6x) as a
consequence of debt-financed ownership changes and a recent run of
significant capital expenditures.  As a result, annual interest
costs of nearly $1.4 billion consume a substantial ~ 80% of the
nearly $1.7 billion EBITDA stream.  This leaves only ~$250 million
to fund capital expenditures (unadjusted figures), and since
Moody's estimate average annual maintenance capital expenditures
to be ~$835 million, it is clear the company has to either
increase its EBITDA stream or decrease interest expense.  In turn,
Moody's are skeptical that cash flow can increase at an
appropriate rate and magnitude.  However, the resulting elevated
expectation of default or equivalent-to-default events is tempered
by the company's strong business profile and the relatively solid
and stable cash flow stream that results; this argues for a low
probability of near-term default.  This background also serves to
highlight the very important role that the company's liquidity
arrangements play.  The ability to address temporary FCF
shortfalls without jeopardizing overall financing arrangements is
crucial.

                          Rating Outlook

As noted above, the ratings outlook is stable.  With growing
EBITDA and liquidity sufficient to fund the next several quarters,
downwards rating pressure is manageable.  However, until positive
free cash flow can be anticipated to be sustained, upwards ratings
momentum is limited.

                What Could Change the Rating -- Up

A ratings upgrade is not expected until Intelsat can substantiate
the ability to be cash flow self-sustaining.  Given the current
debt load, this should be observed when EBITDA approaches $2.4
billion and Debt/EBITDA approaches and then falls below 6.5x.
Upon this milestone being observed/anticipated and supported by
trends that are expected to be sustained, and presuming solid
liquidity arrangements, upwards rating pressure would result.

               What Could Change the Rating -- Down

In the near term, Intelsat's rating is tied to its liquidity
arrangements; they will provide the initial warnings of the
company's plan coming under stress.  In this regard financial
covenants (and restricted payment baskets) will be key.  Should
applicable cushions be permanently eroded, downwards ratings
actions may be required.

                        Corporate Profile

Headquartered in Luxembourg, Intelsat is the largest fixed
satellite service operator in the world and is privately held by
financial investors.


=============
R O M A N I A
=============


* Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Long-Term Ratings on Republic of Udmurtia
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russia's Republic of Udmurtia Long-term
foreign and local currency ratings of 'BB+', a short-term foreign
currency rating of 'B' and a National Long-term rating of
'AA(rus)'.  The Outlooks for the Long-term ratings are Stable.
The agency also has assigned a Long-term local currency rating of
'BB+' and National Long-term rating of 'AA(rus)' to the Republic
of Udmurtia's three outstanding domestic bond issues, totaling
RUB5.5 billion.

The ratings reflect Udmurtia's track record of sound operating
performance, which remained strong despite mild deterioration in
2009-2010, moderate direct risk with low immediate refinancing
risk and strong liquidity position.  However, the ratings also
factor in Udmurtia's high tax concentration in the primary sector,
and contingent risk stemming from public sector entities.

Fitch notes that maintaining a sound budgetary performance, with
operating margins at above 15% and containment of the region's
indebtedness, including contingent risk at a manageable level,
would be positive for the republic's ratings.  Conversely, loose
fiscal management, with significant widening of the deficit
leading to deteriorated budgetary performance and an increased
debt burden would be negative for the ratings.

During 2005-2009, the republic maintained a strong operating
balance averaging 19% of operating revenue annually, underpinned
by increasing tax proceeds.  Tax proceeds were negatively affected
during the economic downturn in 2009.  However, an increase of
current transfers from the federal budget and control over
operating expenditure helped to keep operating balance sound at
16.7% of operating revenue.  Despite a gradual recovery of tax
proceeds, the region's operating performance is expected to
deteriorate in 2010, due to lower current transfers from the
federal government.  Fitch forecasts a full-year operating margin
of about 12.5% and a further increase to 13%-14% in 2011 and 2012.

Maintaining high capital expenditure in an environment of negative
revenue trends caused a significant increase in the republic's
direct risk to RUB9.8 billion by end-2010 (2008: RUB2.9 billion).
However, the debt burden remained moderate with direct risk
totaling 29% of current revenue at end-2010.  The total
debt/current balance payback ratio remained strong at about three
years, which is less than debt maturity.  Despite increasing debt
stock, it is spread out until 2015 and the region is not facing
immediate refinancing risk.  A strong liquidity position also
mitigates the debt burden.

The republic is also exposed to contingent risk stemming from the
extensive broad public sector.  Guarantees issued by the republic
and its PSEs financial debt totaled RUB4.5 billion at January 1,
2010.

Udmurtia is located in the east of the European part of Russia.
It accounted for 0.9% of national GDP in 2008 and for 1.1% of the
population.  The region has a strong industrial sector, which is
dominated by oil extraction, metallurgy and machine building.


* Fitch Affirms Ratings on Five Romanian Banking Institutions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of five Romania-based banks
controlled by foreign shareholders following its annual review of
the banks.

The banks' Issuer Default Ratings are all based on institutional
support from their ultimate controlling shareholders.  The agency
has also affirmed the institutions' Individual Ratings.  A full
breakdown of rating actions is provided at the end of this
comment.

In Fitch's view, the Romanian banking system has suffered from
continued economic contraction in 2010.  Following the sharp 7.1%
contraction in 2009, the agency expects GDP to continue to shrink
by 2.0% in 2010, returning to growth of 2.5% only in 2011.  The
IMF support package secured in May 2009 is still on track, but
economic growth has been negatively affected by government-
initiated wage cuts and tax increases.

The economic contraction negatively affected the banking system's
asset quality during 2009 and 9M10.  Doubtful and loss category
loans have already reached 20.2% of total loans at end- Q310 (from
6.5% at end-2008).  Fitch considers that non-performing loans are
likely to increase until mid-2011, when they could peak.  Although
the depreciation of the Romanian new leu against the euro has
remained limited, any sharp or prolonged currency depreciation
would exert further pressure on the banking system's asset
quality, given the high proportion of FX lending (63% at end-
Q310).  Intense competition for customer deposits due to a global
shortage of liquidity, has forced banks' funding costs upwards.

At the same time, Romanian banks' credit profiles are supported by
generally still solid margins (notwithstanding the increase in
funding costs) and acceptable capital ratios (the sector reported
a total regulatory capital ratio of 14.59% at end-Q310).  After
two years of subdued loan growth, the system's liquidity is
comfortable, which should give banks significant financial
flexibility in working out asset quality problems.  The system's
loans/deposits ratio was a rather high 122% at end-Q310, although
wholesale funding is mostly from parent banks, which reduces
refinancing risks.

Banca Comerciala Romana S.A.'s 'BBB' Long-term IDRs and '2'
Support rating reflect Fitch's view of the potential support that
would be likely to be forthcoming, if needed, from its controlling
shareholder, Erste Group Bank AG ('A' /Stable).  The 'D'
Individual Rating reflects weakened asset quality and the impact
of much higher loan impairment charges on operating profitability;
more moderate revenue generation in the subdued economy; and
reliance on collateral to mitigate potential credit risk from
unreserved bad loans.  This is balanced by a strong domestic
franchise, good efficiency and comfortable liquidity.  BCR is the
largest bank in Romania by total assets and is 69.31% owned by
Erste.

BRD-Groupe Societe Generale S.A.'s 'BBB' Long-term IDR and '2'
Support Rating reflect Fitch's view of the potential support that
would be likely to be forthcoming, if needed, from its controlling
shareholder, Societe Generale ('A+'/Stable).  As Fitch has not
undertaken a full review of the bank, an Individual Rating has not
been assigned.  BRD is the second-largest bank in Romania by total
assets and is 59.36% owned by SG.

UniCredit Tiriac Bank S.A.'s 'BBB' Long-term IDR and '2' Support
Rating reflect Fitch's view of the potential support that would be
likely to be forthcoming, if needed, from its ultimate parent
Unicredit S.p.A. ('A'/Negative), through its fully owned
subsidiary UniCredit Bank Austria AG ('A'/Stable).  The 'D'
Individual Rating reflects growing concerns over the bank's asset
quality and concentrated lending in the real estate and
construction sectors.  It also takes into account the bank's
profitability to date, efficiency, limited market risk and
comfortable liquidity.  UCTB is the fifth-largest bank in Romania
by total assets.  It is 50.61%-owned by UniCredit Bank Austria AG,
which is 99.9%-owned by Unicredit S.p.A., one of Europe's largest
banks.

Banca Romaneasca S.A.'s 'BB+' Long-term IDR and '3' Support Rating
reflect Fitch's view of the potential support that would be likely
to be forthcoming, if needed, from its controlling shareholder,
National Bank of Greece S.A. (Long-Term IDR 'BBB-'/Negative;
Individual Rating 'D').  The 'D' Individual Rating reflects its
declined profitability, deterioration in asset quality and limited
franchise, as well as strong capitalisation, comfortable liquidity
and limited market risk.  BROM is a small bank in Romania and is
89%-owned by NBG, the largest bank in Greece by asset size.

ProCredit Bank (Romania)'s 'BB+' Long-Term IDRs and '3' Support
Rating reflect Fitch's view of the potential support that would be
likely to be forthcoming, if needed, from the bank's main
shareholder, ProCredit Holding AG (rated 'BBB-'/Stable) and also
from a group of international financial institutions that are key
voting shareholders due to the group's specialized development
focus.  The bank's 'D/E' Individual Rating reflects its small
scale, high cost base, deterioration in asset quality and limited
internal capital generation capability.  These factors are
counterbalanced by the bank being part of the ProCredit network,
its close monitoring of risks and group supervision, comfortable
liquidity and well-diversified lending and funding.  PCBR is a
small bank in Romania, forming part of the global network of
ProCredit banks and focused on micro-, small- and medium-sized
enterprises.

The rating actions are:

Banca Comerciala Romana S.A.

  -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'BBB';
     Outlooks Stable

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'

  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D'

BRD-Groupe Societe Generale S.A.

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'

UniCredit Tiriac Bank S.A.

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'

  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D'

Banca Romaneasca S.A.

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB+'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'

ProCredit Bank (Romania)

  -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'BB+';
     Outlook Stable

  -- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B'

  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D/E'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'


===========
R U S S I A
===========


X5RETAIL GROUP: S&P Puts 'BB-' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had placed its
'BB-' long-term corporate credit rating on X5Retail Group N.V.,
owner of Russia's largest grocery retail network, on CreditWatch
with negative implications, meaning that S&P could either lower or
affirm the ratings following the completion of its review.

At the same time, S&P placed its 'B-' long-term corporate credit
rating and 'ruBBB' Russia national scale rating on Russian
discount food retailer Open Joint Stock Co. Trade House Kopeyka on
CreditWatch with positive implications, meaning that S&P could
either raise or affirm the ratings following the completion of
S&P's review.

"The CreditWatch placement on both companies follows the
announcement by X5 that it will acquire a 100% interest in
Kopeyka," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Anton Geyze.

The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's uncertainty about the
potential implications of X5's acquisition of Kopeyka.

If the transaction proceeds, S&P could affirm or lower the rating
on X5, depending on X5's financial policy on liquidity, leverage,
capital expenditures, and possible future acquisitions.  S&P
believes that the substantial incremental debt that would be added
to X5's balance sheet to fund the transaction will weaken key
credit metrics below its expectations at the current rating level
and might also weaken the combined entity's liquidity position.
However, S&P's rating decision will be based on X5's ability to
deleverage and on the expected timing of said deleveraging, as
well as X5's future liquidity management.

Furthermore, if the transaction proceeds, S&P could raise or
affirm the rating on Kopeyka, depending on its view of the parent-
subsidiary link between X5 and Kopeyka.

Applying its corporate criteria, S&P believes economic incentive
is the most important factor on which to base its judgment about
the degree of linkage between X5 and Kopeyka.

The rating on X5 is constrained by the group's aggressive growth
strategy and financial policy, as well as its "less-than-adequate"
liquidity and exposure to a volatile emerging market economy and
currency, in S&P's view.

These risks are offset by X5's position as Russia's largest
grocery retailer, its diversified store formats, demonstrated
effectiveness in cost control, and potential support from the
owner, Russia-based financial-industrial conglomerate Alfa Group
Consortium (not rated).

The ratings on Kopeyka reflect the company's "less-than-adequate"
liquidity, high leverage, and structurally weak free operating
cash flow, in its view.  S&P also consider that the company has
historically displayed limited transparency, although S&P believes
its corporate governance is improving.

"S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placements on both X5 and
Kopeyka within the next three months," said Mr. Geyze.  "S&P will
meet with X5's and Kopeyka's management teams to evaluate each
company's respective financial policy and the potential impact
that the combination would have on each company's credit profile
if the acquisition goes forward as planned."


=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


UNITED TRUST OF SWITZERLAND: U.S. Court Appoints Roper as Receiver
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Reed O'Connor has appointed Richard B. Roper, III, Esq., at
Thompson & Knight LLP, as receiver for the defendants in the case
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. MILLENNIUM BANK,
UNITED TRUST OF SWITZERLAND S.A., UT of S, LLC, MILLENNIUM
FINANCIAL GROUP, WILLIAM J. WISE, d/b/a STERLING ADMINISTRATION,
d/b/a sterling investment services, d/b/a millennium aviation,
KRISTI M. HOEGEL, a/k/a KRISTI M. CHRISTOPHER, a/k/a BESSY LU,
JACQUELINE S. HOEGEL, a/k/a JACQULINE S. HOEGEL, a/k/a JACKIE S.
HOEGEL, PHILIPPE ANGELONI, and BRIJESH CHOPRA, Defendants, and
UNITED T OF S, LLC, STERLING I.S., LLC, MATRIX ADMINISTRATION,
LLC, JASMINE ADMINISTRATION, LLC, LYNN P. WISE, DARYL C. HOEGEL,
RYAN D. HOEGEL, and LAURIE H. WALTON, Relief Defendants, Case Nos.
09-CV-050-O and 10-MC-0091 (N.D. Texas).

A copy of the Court's December 6, 2010 order is available at
http://is.gd/inhCIat Leagle.com.

Among the Receiver's rights is that he may place the estate of any
non-individual parties in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 30, 2009, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
obtained an emergency court order halting a US$68 million Ponzi
scheme involving the sale of fictitious high-yield certificates of
deposit by Caribbean-based Millennium Bank.  The SEC alleged that
the scheme targeted U.S. investors and misled them into believing
they were putting their money in supposedly safe and secure CDs
that purportedly offered returns that were up to 321% higher than
legitimate bank-issued CDs.  The SEC's complaint alleged that
William J. Wise of Raleigh, N.C., and Kristi M. Hoegel of Napa,
Calif., orchestrated the scheme through Millennium Bank, its
Geneva, Switzerland-based parent United Trust of Switzerland S.A.,
and U.S.-based affiliates UT of S, LLC and Millennium Financial
Group.  In addition, the SEC has charged Jacqueline S. Hoegel (who
is the mother of Kristi Hoegel), Brijesh Chopra, and Philippe
Angeloni for their roles in the scheme.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BLUE STAR: Darren Terence Brookes Appointed as Liquidator
---------------------------------------------------------
DebtManagementToday.co.uk reports that Blue Star Financial
Services Ltd was placed in liquidation on November 25, 2010.
Darren Terence Brookes of Milner Boardman & Partners was appointed
liquidator.

Ian Guy, the controversial former director of a failed debt
management company Relax Group, has been named as a director of
Blue Star Financial, DebtManagementToday.co.uk says.

Mr. Guy, DebtManagementToday.co.uk notes, has headed up a string
of dissolved businesses, including Relax Group, Debts.co.uk Ltd
and 1st Advice Ltd.

Blue Star Financial Services Ltd is a Doncaster-based credit
brokerage.  The company offers debt adjusting, counselling and
collecting services, as well as mortgages and claims management.
Blue Star Financial Services also traded under the names In Touch
Financial Solutions, debt3options and Mortgagereview.  It had 37
staff members.


CRUSADERS: Appoints Rod Findlay as Chief Executive Officer
----------------------------------------------------------
Andy Wilson at guardian.co.uk reports that the Crusaders have
appointed one of the key figures behind Super League's
controversial licensing process, Rod Findlay, as their new chief
executive as a statement of the Welsh club's intent to secure a
long-term future following their recent spell in administration.

Mr. Findlay helped to draw up the criteria under which the first
set of 14 three-year licenses were handed out ahead of the 2009
season, when he was working as the Rugby Football League's in-
house lawyer, according to guardian.co.uk.

Guardian.co.uk says that Mr. Findlay confirmed that the club will
still be known as the Crusaders, although he did not rule out the
addition of Wales to their name, which will be confirmed when they
have finally emerged from administration as a new entity in the
coming days.  The club is expected to start next season with a
deduction of up to six points, which will be determined at an RFL
board meeting on Friday, the report notes.

Meanwhile, Guardian.co.uk relates, Mr. Findlay confirmed that the
new coach Iestyn Harris is expected to sign "a couple more
players" following the loss of Nick Youngquest and Weller Hauraki.
Mr. Harris has appointed Barry Eaton as his assistant, the report
adds.

Crusaders is a Welsh professional rugby league club based in
Wrexham, North Wales.

                          *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on November 5,
2010, The Sun said that the Crusaders has gone into administration
on November 3, 2010, after former owner Leighton Samuel served a
writ on the Welsh club for GBP360,000.  According to the report,
the news came hours after the Rugby League Players' Association
threatened legal action over missed pension payments.  The Sun
related that the Super Leaguers will lose a minimum of nine points
before the new season starts in February.


LANDSBANKI GUERNSEY: Goes Into Liquidation
------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Landsbanki Guernsey Ltd. has gone into
liquidation after being placed into administration in 2008 due to
the collapse of its parent company.

Guernsey's Royal Court agreed the former administrators be
appointed as liquidators on December 7, 2010, BBC News says.

According to BBC News, more than 1,600 people had money deposited
in Landsbanki Guernsey when it collapsed, around a third of whom
were living in the Channel Islands.

BBC News notes that savers have so far received up to 67.5 pence
in the pound back from their deposits.

The liquidators, Richard Garrard and Lee Manning, said that after
a further payment of up to 7.5p in the pound early in 2011, there
would be one further payment, according to BBC News.

The Guernsey Financial Services Commission said Landsbanki
Guernsey had to surrender its banking license because it had
insufficient capital to be licensed.

                 About Landsbanki Guernsey Ltd.

Landsbanki Guernsey Ltd. -- http://www.landsbanki.co.gg/-- is
engaged in retail banking.  It is a subsidiary of Iceland-based
financial institution Landsbanki Islands hf.

Rick Garrard and Lee Manning of Deloitte were appointed as Joint
Administrators of Landsbanki Guernsey Limited on October 7, 2008.


LAPLAND UK: Reopens a Year After Falling Into Administration
------------------------------------------------------------
Anna White at Kent Online reports that Lapland UK has reopened for
Christmas, less than a year after it fell into administration.
Lapland UK Directors Alison and Mike Battle are confident they
will stay open after ticket sales increased this season, Kent
Online relates.

The attraction's future looked bleak when it was forced into
administration in January but things are now looking bright with a
new business plan and financial backing, Kent Online notes.  The
site, Kent Online relates, is being run by a new company, LUK
Events Ltd, and ticket prices have been slashed by up to 40%
compared to last year.

Lapland UK's plunge into administration wasn't helped by severe
snowfall in December of last year, which caused the park to close
on December 18 and 19, Kent Online recounts.

Kent Online relates that the majority of families who had bought
tickets for those two days were given a full refund and were
offered to re-book the following week.  When the company was
placed in administration, the customers who had not yet received a
refund were told to contact firm Kallis & Co, the report notes.

A spokesman for Kallis & Co said that customer refunds are
"pending the settlement of Lapland's insurance claim for any
losses incurred due to the closure of the business due to adverse
weather," Kent Online adds.

Lapland UK is the award winning recreation of Father Christmas'
arctic homeland, where families enjoy a 4-5 hour magical
experience that celebrates a child's belief in Father Christmas.


ROYAL BANK: Fuller Public Explanation Needed on GBP45BB Bailout
---------------------------------------------------------------
Harry Wilson at The Daily Telegraph reports that Lord Turner,
chairman of the Financial Services Authority, agreed that a fuller
public explanation of how Royal Bank of Scotland ended up
requiring a GBP45 billion state bail-out is needed.

"I feel uncomfortable with the present position and I recognize
and respect the public desire to know what the story was, to have
the history of why taxpayers ended up having to rescue RBS," The
Daily Telegraph qutoed Mr. Turner as saying.

The Daily Telegraph relates that addressing the controversy
created by the report's suppression, Lord Turner said the FSA's
18-month investigation into RBS was never designed to provide
taxpayers with an explanation for the bank's collapse.  "Our
internal reports were designed to see if there was a case for an
enforcement action, not to tell the full story.  To produce one
all-encompassing account of what occurred, a report would need to
add several further elements," Mr. Turner said, according to The
Daily Telegraph.

Meanwhile, BBC News reports that Mr. Turner said the bosses of
failed banks could face having two years' pay clawed back from
them.  He told the BBC's business editor, Robert Peston, that he
was attracted to imposing such a sanction.  According to BBC, Mr.
Turner said the rule -- which is already in place in the US --
would discourage banks from taking excessive risks.

Mr. Turner's comments come after Vince Cable attacked the FSA for
not releasing its report on RBS, BBC News cites.

According to BBC, Mr. Cable wrote to Mr. Turner to demand details
of the investigation into what went wrong at RBS, which the
government had to bail-out in October 2008.  The government
currently holds an 80% stake in the lender, BBC notes.

Mr. Turner told BBC's business editor that he was open to the idea
of publishing such reports in the future, but also noted that its
study on RBS was difficult to publish because the investigation
was broken down into separate parts.

The FSA was widely criticized for saying that its review of RBS
had found no grounds for punishing the banks' senior directors at
the time, or the company itself, BBC discloses.  The financial
watchdog's investigation of RBS was carried out by its enforcement
department, BBC notes.  It separately looked at a number of
issues, ranging from RBS's ill-timed decision to buy Dutch bank
ABN in 2007, to the control mechanisms in RBS's markets division,
and whether it gave investors accurate information, BBC states.

In addition to the idea of forcing failed bank bosses to pay back
some of their remuneration, Lord Turner argues that in some cases
they could be automatically disqualified from working in the
banking sector, BBC relates.

                             About RBS

The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc (NYSE:RBS) --
http://www.rbs.com/-- is a holding company of The Royal Bank of
Scotland plc (Royal Bank) and National Westminster Bank Plc
(NatWest), which are United Kingdom-based clearing banks.  The
company's activities are organized in six business divisions:
Corporate Markets (comprising Global Banking and Markets and
United Kingdom Corporate Banking), Retail Markets (comprising
Retail and Wealth Management), Ulster Bank, Citizens, RBS
Insurance and Manufacturing.  On October 17, 2007, RFS Holdings
B.V. (RFS Holdings), a company jointly owned by RBS, Fortis N.V.,
Fortis SA/NV and Banco Santander S.A. (the Consortium Banks) and
controlled by RBS, completed the acquisition of ABN AMRO Holding
N.V. (ABN AMRO).  In July 2008, the company disposed of its entire
interest in Global Voice Group Ltd.


RUSS HILL: Britannia Hotels Acquires Hotel Out of Administration
----------------------------------------------------------------
Janet Harmer at Caterer Search reports that Russ Hill hotel has
been bought out of administration by Britannia Hotels for an
undisclosed sum.

Previously owned by Spring Park Hotels prior to going into
administration, Russ Hill hotel in Charlwood, Surrey, will now
undergo a complete refurbishment of the bedrooms, conference and
banqueting facilities, bar and restaurant, according to Caterer
Search.

Caterer Search notes that Philip Gibson, a partner at Edward
Symmons Hospitality & Leisure, the agent that sold the hotel, said
there was significant interest in Russ Hill.  "Gatwick remains an
important strategic location for hotel operators and Russ Hill is
a good fit in the Britannia portfolio," Caterer Search quoted Mr.
Gibson as saying.

Russ Hill hotel is a 130-bedroom establishment near Gatwick
Airport.


WHINSTONE CAPITAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Five Notes to 'B2 (sf)'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's downgrades UK RMBS notes issued by Whinstone Capital
Management Limited and Whinstone 2 Capital Management Limited.

Issuer: Whinstone Capital Management Limited

  -- GBP35M B1 Certificate, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously
     on Nov 16, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- EUR67.8M B2 Certificate, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously
     on Nov 16, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- US$40.3M B3 Certificate, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously
     on Nov 16, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- GBP21M C1 Certificate, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
     Nov 16, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- EUR115.2M C2 Certificate, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously
     on Nov 16, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- US$32M C3 Certificate, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
     Nov 16, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Whinstone 2 Capital Management Limited

  -- GBP80M C1 Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun
     20, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  -- EUR129M C2 Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun
     20, 2006 Assigned Ba2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Whinstone is a transaction closed in November 2005, under which
Northern Rock Asset Management plc receives credit protection on
the Issuer Reserve Funds of the transactions issued out of Funding
of Granite Master Trust.

Whinstone 2 is a transaction closed in June 2006, under which NRAM
receives credit protection on a certain portion of the Granite
Master Issuer Reserve Fund and the Funding 2 Reserve Fund that are
both part of the Granite Master Trust.

The rating actions take into account worse than expected
collateral performance within Granite, which has resulted in
increased loss expectations for the mortgage portfolio, continued
draws on the Granite Funding reserve fund, and low excess spread
observed in the trust as a whole.

The ratings of the notes take into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined
the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement and the portfolio expected loss,
as well as the transaction structure as assessed in Moody's cash
flow analysis.  The expected loss and the MILAN Aaa CE are the two
key parameters used by Moody's to calibrate its loss distribution
curve, which is one of the core inputs in the cash-flow model it
uses to rate RMBS transactions.

Portfolios Expected Loss: Moody's has reassessed its lifetime loss
expectation for the portfolio backing Granite master trust taking
into account the collateral performance to date.  The portfolio
has been performing worse than Moody's initial assumptions.
Cumulative losses amount to 0.94% of the original portfolio
balance, repossessions over the last 12 months represent
approximately 1.25% of the outstanding portfolio balance with
average loss severity in 2010 of 22%, and the arrears levels in
the portfolio are relatively high -- currently 90+ days
delinquencies constitute 5.68% of the outstanding portfolio.
Furthermore, the Granite master trust portfolio has been affected
by the adverse macroeconomic conditions, such as increase in
unemployment and house price depreciation, as well as by the
negative selection of loans remaining in the pool and these
factors are expected to impact future performance.  Considering
the current amount of realised losses, and completing a roll-rate
and severity analysis for the non-defaulted portion of the
portfolio, Moody's has increased its total loss expectations to
2.5% of the current portfolio balance.

MILAN Aaa CE: Moody's has assessed the loan-by-loan information
for the portfolio and has increased Moody's MILAN Aaa CE
assumption to 23.0%.  This increase reflects (i) the weighted
average loan-to-value of 78.87% with 63% of the pool having LTV
higher than 80%,(ii) the presence in the pool of 37% of Interest
Only mortgage loans, and (iii) the high portion of Together
mortgage loans (38.5%) that historically have shown an adverse
performance.

The other factors that have lead to the rating actions are: (i)
the continuing draws on Funding reserve fund, which currently is
at GBP49,124,401 (1.42% of Funding notes outstanding), whereas the
required amount is GBP57,670,313 (1.67% of Funding notes
outstanding) and (ii) the increased WA note coupon of Funding and
Funding 2 (0.19% and 0.24%respectively) that is expected to
increase to 0.25% and 0.70% respectively in a year at current CPR
levels.

The rating addresses the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for payment of principal with respect of the
notes by the legal final maturity.  Moody's ratings only address
the credit risk associated with the transaction.  Other non-credit
risks have not been addressed, but may have a significant effect
on yield to investors.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence report had a
neutral impact on the rating.


WINDSOR & ETON: Gets Winding-Up Reprieve, Draws Up CVA Proposal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Maidenhead Advertiser Online reports that Windsor & Eton Football
Club was granted a 56-day reprieve by London's High Court on
Wednesday morning from the winding up petition brought against it
by Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs.

Windsor & Eton was given the extra time after it went to court and
showed it has viable plans to move the club forward over the next
few years, according to Maidenhead Advertiser Online.  The report
relates that the club presented a proposal to enter into a Company
Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) with its creditors, and pay off its
debt over a period of three years.

Lawyers for the club also told the court about the plans which
have been drawn up by potential new owner Kevin Stott, Maidenhead
Advertiser Online notes.

Maidenhead Advertiser Online says the club will now call a meeting
with its creditors to arrange the CVA.

Windsor & Eton Football Club is an English association football
club based in Windsor, Berkshire, currently playing in the
Southern League Premier Division.


* UK: Small Businesses in Wales Continue to Fall Insolvent
----------------------------------------------------------
South Wales Argus, citing trade credit insurance firm Atradius,
reports that small businesses in Wales are continuing to be
squeezed despite the level of insolvencies reaching a plateau.

According to South Wales Argus, businesses in the region are
continuing to fall insolvent which is not only devastating for the
company itself but has a sometimes fatal knock-on effect along the
supply chain.

"Insolvencies continue to be a problem for Welsh businesses,"
South Wales Argus quoted Mary Ravenscroft, regional manager of
Atradius in Wales as saying.

"This is an uncomfortable truth, which must be urgently addressed
because when a business goes insolvent, the knock-on effect is
felt like a shockwave up and down the supply chain.

"Firms go under owing thousands or even millions to creditors,
good businesses, who subsequently also end up sinking as a result.

"SMEs are hit particularly hard when one of their customers goes
insolvent.  For some, it may be the final straw or their main
customer which means that they are in serious trouble when the
company goes insolvent."


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Moody's: Global Default Rate Fell to 3.3% in November 2010
------------------------------------------------------------
The trailing 12-month global speculative-grade default rate
dropped to 3.3% in November 2010, down from a level of 3.7% in
October, said Moody's Investors Service in a new report.  A year
ago, the global default rate stood much higher at 13.6%.

The ratings agency's default rate forecasting model now predicts
that the global speculative-grade default rate will fall to 2.9%
by the end of this year before declining further to 1.8% by
November 2011.  "We continue to expect stable, low default rates
for the near future," said Albert Metz, Moody's Director of Credit
Policy Research.  "However, there are risks that defaults may
increase, particularly if financing becomes scarce in the European
markets."

In the U.S., the speculative-grade default rate edged lower from
3.6% in October to 3.5% in November.  At this time last year, the
U.S. default rate reached the highest level in this cycle at
14.7%.  Meanwhile, the European default rate among speculative-
grade issuers declined to 1.9% in November from 2.8% in October
2010. The default rate in Europe stood at 11.5% in November 2009,
which was also the peak in the financial crisis.

Among U.S. speculative-grade issuers, Moody's forecasting model
foresees the default rate falling to 3.1% by December 2010, then
sliding further to 2.1% a year from now. In Europe, Moody's
forecasting model projects the speculative-grade default rate to
end this year at 2.0% before dropping to 1.2% in November next
year.

A total of seven Moody's-rated corporate debt issuers have
defaulted in November, which sends the year-to-date default count
to 52.  In comparison, a total of 257 defaults were recorded in
the comparable time period last year. All of November's defaults
were by North American issuers except for Anglo Irish Bank
Corporation Limited, which is based in Ireland.

Across industries over the coming year, default rates are expected
to be highest in the Hotel, Gaming, & Leisure sector in the U.S.
and Media: Advertising, Printing and Publishing sector in Europe.

Measured on a dollar volume basis, the global speculative-grade
bond default rate remained unchanged at 1.4% from October to
November.  Last year, the global dollar-weighted default rate was
noticeably higher at 19.6% in November 2010.

In the U.S., the dollar-weighted speculative-grade bond default
rate ended at 1.3% in November, up from the level of 1.1% in
October.  The comparable rate was 20.1% in November 2009. In
Europe, the dollar-weighted speculative-grade bond default rate
fell to 1.7% in November from 2.4% in October.  At this time last
year, the European speculative-grade bond default rate was 14.0%.
Moody's speculative-grade corporate distress index -- which
measures the percentage of rated issuers that have debt trading at
distressed levels -- came in at 11.5% in November, down from a
level of 14.1% in October.  A year ago, the index was much higher
at 24.2%.

In the leveraged loan market, three Moody's-rated loan issuers
defaulted in November, lifting the year-to-date loan default count
to 22. The trailing 12 month U.S. leveraged loan default rate fell
from 3.6% in October to 3.3% in November. A year ago, the loan
default rate stood much higher at 12.0%.

Moody's "November Default Report" is now available -- as are
Moody's other default research reports -- in the Ratings Analytics
section of Moodys.com.


* S&P Takes Rating Actions on 21 European Synthetic CDO Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took credit rating actions on
21 European synthetic collateralized debt obligation tranches.
Specifically, S&P has lowered its ratings on 15 tranches and
affirmed its ratings on six tranches.

The rating actions are part of S&P's regular monthly review of
synthetic CDOs, focusing in particular, on certain 'CCC-' rated
assets.  The actions incorporate, among other things, the effect
of recent rating migration within reference portfolios and recent
credit events on several corporate entities.

Where losses in a portfolio have already exceeded the available
credit enhancement or where, in S&P's opinion, it is highly likely
that this will occur once final valuations are known, S&P has
lowered its ratings to 'CC' because S&P considers the likelihood
that the noteholders will not receive their full principal to be
high, but has not yet happened.

S&P has lowered its ratings to 'D' for those tranches where S&P
has been notified that losses have written down the entire tranche
to zero, and they will be redeemed with noteholders not receiving
full principal.

S&P will remove from the Global SROC Report any transactions whose
ratings S&P has lowered to 'CC' or 'D'.

In addition, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the tranches for
which S&P believes credit enhancement is still at a level
consistent with their current ratings.

For those transactions to which its updated criteria don't apply,
S&P has run its analysis on the appropriate CDO Evaluator models
(versions 2.7 and 4.1).  For the transactions to which S&P's
updated criteria do apply, S&P has run its analysis on CDO
Evaluator version 5.1

                          What Is SROC?

One of the main steps in S&P's rating analysis is the review of
the credit quality of the securitized assets.  SROC is one of the
tools S&P uses for this purpose when rating and surveilling
ratings assigned to most synthetic CDO tranches.  SROC is a
measure of the degree by which the credit enhancement (or
attachment point) of a tranche exceeds the stressed loss rate
assumed for a given rating scenario.  It is comparable across
different tranches of the same rating.

Changes in SROC capture any developments in the major influences
on a tranche's creditworthiness: The credit quality of a reference
portfolio, improvement or deterioration of ratings in the
reference portfolio, credit events, and time decay.  When SROC is
100%, S&P believes there is exactly sufficient credit enhancement
to maintain the rating on a tranche.

When SROC is less than 100%, it indicates that the current credit
enhancement may not be sufficient to maintain the current tranche
rating, in S&P's opinion.  If the SROC is less than 100%, but the
90 day projection indicates that the SROC would return to a level
above 100% at that time, S&P usually maintain the rating at its
current level and it remains on CreditWatch negative.
However, where there is a difference of several notches in the
rating level at which the SROC is passing and the level at which
SROC passes in 90 days, rather than maintaining its current rating
and keeping the CreditWatch negative placement, S&P may decide to
lower the rating and keep it on CreditWatch negative.  If, on the
other hand, the projection indicates that the SROC would remain
below 100%, S&P may lower the rating subject to its criteria.

If the current SROC of a tranche would be greater than 100% at a
higher rating level than the current rating, S&P may upgrade
subject to its criteria.


* BOOK REVIEW: Hospital Turnarounds -- Lessons in Leadership
------------------------------------------------------------
Editors: Terence F. Moore and Earl A. Simendinger
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 244 pages
Price: US$34.95
Review by Henry Berry

Hospital Turnarounds - Lessons in Leadership is a compilation of
twelve essays on the many approaches that have been taken to
resuscitate hospitals in distressed situations.  Most of the
essayists are CEOs or presidents of hospitals or healthcare
organizations, and their stories are all different and compelling
in their own way.  The hospitals differ in their size,
marketplace, facilities, and services offered. The causes of their
distress vary and the strategies that were used to overcome them
are wide-ranging.  All-in-all, it makes for an engaging collection
of success stories

The authors have extensive experience in the healthcare system,
and nearly all have held top leadership posts in several public
and private hospitals.  Most importantly, all have been involved
in successful turnarounds at some time in their careers.  Two of
the authors are from the field of marketing, which can play a
significant role in hospital turnarounds.

The number of troubled hospitals rises and falls over time,
depending on many factors, including the state of the U.S.
economy.  There are always some hospitals in a distressed
situation or teetering close to it.  In spite of the fact that
healthcare is a basic need in U.S. society, hospitals are
constantly vulnerable to financial problems because of
competition, changing medical technology, new approaches to
healthcare from improved drugs and public awareness, and medical
malpractice lawsuits.  Any or all of these factors can be
financially crippling and, even if the financial impact is
minimized, a hospital's reputation can be damaged.  Like any other
business organization, hospitals can also run into difficulty
because of poor management or labor problems.

The first and last chapters, "Introduction" and "Turnarounds: An
Epilogue," respectively, are written by the co-editors.  The
balance of the chapters contain first-hand accounts of hospital
turnarounds, with the authors asked by the co-editors to "document
the role of the various publics."  The authors do this, offering
their assessment of the role of the board of directors, medical
staff, management team, volunteers, and other relevant "publics"
in the respective turnarounds.  A common thread in this book is
that the import and activities of these publics were different in
every turnaround. Each turnaround had to address its own grievous,
overriding problem or set of problems.  Each turnaround had its
own cast of characters who brought different backgrounds and
skills to the turnaround.  As a result, each path taken to
overcoming the distressed situation was different.

No matter what the cause or causes of a hospital's distressed
situation, in nearly every case the problems were first realized
when a financial problem became apparent.  Thus, turnarounds are
inevitably focused on improving a hospital's financial situation.
As one of the authors notes, "A turnaround is most often the
result of increased revenues and decreased expenses."  The
approach taken by some of the authors was to focus on
"[increasing] revenues to improve the operating margins of their
organizations."  Many other turnarounds were accomplished by
focusing on reducing expenses.  Invariably, however, a combination
of both was needed and working toward these paired objectives
required a new strategic thinking and the development of
operational capabilities that prepared the hospital for long-term
survival in continually changing market conditions.  One author's
prescription for success was, "Upward communication, fluidity of
organizational structure, a reduction of unnecessary bureaucratic
rules and policies, and ambitious yet realistic goals and
objectives."  These practices are present in healthy companies and
usually missing in distressed companies.  Implementation of these
business practices is essential for a hospital to return to a
favorable financial footing.

Another author addressed "organizational burnout," which must be
corrected if a hospital is to survive.  Burnout is evident when
"the sum of an organization's actual output is decreasing over
time when compared with its potential output."  The challenge
facing hospital executives and turnaround specialists is to reduce
-- and ideally, eliminate -- the gap between actual and potential
output.  The smaller the gap, the more efficient, productive, and
healthy the organization.

These are just a few of the observations and lessons provided in
this collection of essays.  Through engaging first-person accounts
of rescue stories, the reader learns what a turnaround is all
about, how to diagnose a distressed situation, and how to
formulate a strategy that implements specific corrective actions.

Terence F. Moore has been involved in the Michigan hospital system
as President and CEO of Mid-Michigan Health, Board Member of the
Michigan Hospital Association, and Chair of the East Michigan
Hospital Association.  He is also a fellow of the American College
of Healthcare Executives.  Earl A. Simendinger is a professor of
management at the College of Business at the University of Tampa
who for 20 years was a hospital administrator.  Also a fellow in
the American College of Healthcare Executives, he has written many
books and articles on management and organizational development.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *