TCREUR_Public/101215.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

         Wednesday, December 15, 2010, Vol. 11, No. 247

                            Headlines



B E L A R U S

BTA BELARUS: Fitch Raises Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'B-'


F R A N C E

BELVEDERE SA: Makes Preliminary Payment to Bondholders


G E R M A N Y

TUI AG: Net Income Boosted by Hapag-Lloyd Stake Sale


H U N G A R Y

APPONYI CASTLE: Placed in Liquidation Sale


I C E L A N D

KAUPTHING BANK: Final Ruling on EDGE Claims Expected in Mid-2011


I R E L A N D

ALLIED IRISH: Won't Pay Bonuses After Government Intervention
ANGLO IRISH: US Trustee Allowed to Sell Ex-Chief's Dublin Home
BANK OF IRELAND: Moody's Comments on Distressed Exchange Offer
CORSAIR FINANCE: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR25MM Notes to 'Caa3'
DEKANIA EUROPE: S&P Junks Ratings on Three Classes of Notes

IRISH LIFE: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Subordinated Debt to 'BB+'
JAZZ III: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E-1 Notes to 'B+ (sf)'
TALISMAN-7 FINANCE: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to B-
TITAN EUROPE: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to 'CCsf'
* IRELAND: 34% of Firms Face High Risk of Failure, Experian Says

* Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Banks in Ireland


K A Z A K H S T A N

BTA BANK: Fitch Upgrades Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'B-'


L A T V I A

NORVIK BANKA: Moody's Reviews 'B1' Long-Term Deposit Ratings


L U X E M B O U R G

EUROMAX IV: S&P Cuts Ratings on Six Classes of Notes to 'D'


N E T H E R L A N D S

MESDAG BV: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Two Tranches to 'CCsf'
X5 RETAIL: Moody's Reviews 'B1' Corporate Family Rating


P O L A N D

BANK MILLENNIUM: Moody's Retains 'D' Financial Strength Rating


S P A I N

AYT COLATERALES: Moody's Assigns (P)C (sf) Rating on Class D Notes
CIRSA GAMING: Moody's Gives Positive Outlook; Affirms 'B2' Rating


U K R A I N E

RODOVID BANK: Administration Extended for Three Months
* S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Ukrainian City of Lugansk


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ASHTON MORTON: Set for Administration; BDO Called In
CEVA GROUP: Moody's Assigns '(P)B1' Rating to US$450 Mil. Notes
EUROPEAN DIRECTORIES: Insolvency Filing Hits Junior Lenders
KENT INT'L: Travelodge Acquires Hotel Following Administration
RADIO MALDWYN: Shareholders Vote to Appoint Liquidators

WESTLER FOODS: Goes Into Administration
* UK: Failure Rate of "Very High Risk" Businesses Drops to 4%
* UK: Sports and Social Clubs Brace For Tough Trading Condition


X X X X X X X X


* EUROPE: Sovereign Default Costlier Than Debt Restructuring


                            *********


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B E L A R U S
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BTA BELARUS: Fitch Raises Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'B-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Kazakh BTA Bank's and its majority-
owned subsidiary BTA Belarus's ratings.  The Long-term foreign
currency Issuer Default Ratings of both entities have been
upgraded to 'B-'.  The Outlook is Stable.  The rating actions
follow the completion of the restructuring of BTA Bank's
liabilities in September 2010.  A full rating breakdown is
provided at the end of this comment.

BTA's ratings reflect significant uncertainty surrounding the
value of its assets, and concerns over the viability of its
business model, given structural balance sheet weaknesses and the
erosion of its market positions since 2008.  The ratings also
account for the long-term nature of its current funding structure
and support provided to the bank by its majority shareholder,
Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna.

The value of BTA's assets is a key rating concern.  Fitch
recognizes significant potential for the release of provisions on
some heavily impaired exposures, but also sees the risk of further
provisioning on the performing part of the portfolio.  This means
that BTA's capital position is likely to be subject to significant
fluctuations in the coming months as the bank continues to work
through its asset quality problems.

Although the restructuring has enabled BTA to comply with Kazakh
regulatory capital requirements, reported equity under end-Q310
management IFRS accounts was weak (with 1.3% equity-to-assets
ratio compared to 5% under local GAAP).  The difference is largely
attributable to the overstatement of BTA's investments in
associates under local GAAP.  The regulatory capital also benefits
from waivers provided by the FMSA to the restructured banks.  In
particular, BTA is allowed to account for its investments in
Samruk-Kazyna bonds at their notional value rather than their fair
value for the purposes of regulatory capital.

Despite the debt restructuring, BTA remains highly leveraged, with
a 135% loans-to-deposits ratio at end-Q310 (271% if excluding
deposits placed by Samruk-Kazyna).  The corporate deposit-taking
franchise has been severely damaged since 2008.  Samruk-Kazyna's
deposits account for the bulk of corporate funding.

Fitch incorporates into BTA's ratings the probability that support
would be provided to the bank by the Kazakh government in case of
need.  However, the ratings also reflect Fitch's view that the
bank does not represent a strategic investment for Samruk-Kazyna,
and Fitch's expectation that potential state support is likely to
diminish as the government proceeds with the planned sale of the
bank in the medium term.  A sale of the bank would lead Fitch to
review the IDRs.

BTAB was excluded from the restructuring process at its parent.
Although its liabilities structure has been changed to reduce
reliance on BTA, its Long-term IDR is driven by support from the
parent.  Fitch views positively that BTA continued to provide
capital support to BTAB while being restructured.  BTAB's ratings
also now benefit from a cross-default clause embedded in the
documentation of BTA's newly issued debt.  The clause can be
trigged by any BTA subsidiary's default on any indebtedness in
excess of US$10 million.

BTA is now one of the three largest banks in Kazakhstan.  The bank
defaulted in 2009 mainly because of a high level of bad loans.
Following restructuring, it is now controlled by government-owned
Sovereign Wealth Samruk-Kazyna (81.5%), with the other 18.5% held
by creditors affected by the restructuring.

The rating actions are:

BTA

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'B-' from 'RD';
     Outlook Stable

  -- Long-term local currency IDR: upgraded to 'B-'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'B' from 'RD'

  -- Short-term local currency IDR: upgraded to 'B' from 'RD'

  -- Individual Rating: upgraded to 'E' from 'F'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

  -- Senior unsecured debt: upgraded to 'B-' from 'C'; Recovery
     Rating is 'RR4'

  -- Subordinated debt: upgraded to 'CC'; Recovery Rating is 'RR6'

BTAB

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'B-' from 'CCC';
     Stable Outlook

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'B' from 'C'

  -- Individual rating: affirmed at 'E'

  -- Support rating: affirmed at '5'


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F R A N C E
===========


BELVEDERE SA: Makes Preliminary Payment to Bondholders
------------------------------------------------------
Heather Smith at Bloomberg News reports that Belvedere SA made a
preliminary payment to bondholders of EUR23 million (US$30.8
million) and postponed its sale of units including Marie Brizard
and Polish distributors, which had been part of its court-approved
bankruptcy recovery plan.

According to Bloomberg, Belvedere on Monday said it paid the
bondholders EUR23 million on Nov. 10, an amount that had been
reduced by the appeals court in Dijon, France.  The company also
delayed the sale of the assets prescribed under the recovery plan
in favor of selling some U.S.-based assets and cutting its debt,
Bloomberg says, citing a statement on the firm's Web site.

Bloomberg relates that Belvedere said EUR18 million of the payment
to bondholders was put in a separate account, pending a challenge
at the country's highest appeals court.

The decision to postpone the sales of Marie Brizard and the
distributors was announced in September after the appeals court
decision, Bloomberg notes.

Belvedere's recovery plan was approved in November 2009, detailing
steps including asset sales, Bloomberg discloses.  The company
bought Marie Brizard, whose brands include Old Lady's Gin and
Tullamore Dew Whiskey, in 2005, in part by issuing Floating Rate
Notes, Bloomberg recounts.  Bloomberg says Belvedere violated
terms of the notes, which led it to file for court protection from
creditors.

Belvedere SA -- http://www.belvedere.fr/-- is a France-based
company engaged in the production and distribution of beverages.
The Company's range of products includes vodka and spirits, wines,
and other beverages, under such brands as Sobieski, William Peel,
Marie Brizard, Danzka and others.  Belvedere SA operates through
its subsidiaries, including Belvedere Czeska, Belvedere
Scandinavia, Belvedere Baltic, Belvedere Capital Management,
Sobieski SARL and Sobieski USA, among others.  It is present in a
number of countries, such as Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Denmark,
France, Spain, Russia, Ukraine, the United States and others.  In
addition, the Company holds a minority stake in Abbaye de
Talloires, involved in the hotel and wellness center.


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G E R M A N Y
=============


TUI AG: Net Income Boosted by Hapag-Lloyd Stake Sale
----------------------------------------------------
Holger Elfes at Bloomberg News reports that TUI AG said profit at
Hapag-Lloyd AG boosted its full-year operating result as the
company prepares to sell the rest of its stake in the shipping
line.

According to Bloomberg, TUI on Tuesday said that Hapag contributed
EUR150 million (US$201 million) to net income compared with a loss
of EUR174 million a year earlier.  Profit in the year through
September fell 40% to EUR102 million, or 30 cents a share, as the
prior-year figures included a EUR1.1 billion gain on the sale of a
majority stake in the container line, Bloomberg discloses.

TUI sold about 57% of Hapag to a Hamburg-based group of investors
last year, Bloomberg relates.  It aims to sell the remaining 43%
to focus on building its position as Europe's largest holiday
provider, Bloomberg says.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 9,
2010, The Financial Times said that the owners of Hapag-Lloyd
confirmed on Dec. 7 that they are to launch an initial public
offering for the company, barely a year after it sought government
help to survive.  The FT disclosed that TUI and the Albert Ballin
consortium said they had appointed Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs
and Greenhill to advise them on the potential public listing of
Hapag-Lloyd, Germany's largest container carrier.  The listing
would allow TUI, which has long said it intends to withdraw from
container shipping, to reduce its shareholding, according to the
FT.  It would also potentially allow a realignment of
shareholdings within members of the Albert Ballin consortium,
assembled in 2008 to prevent the line from being taken over by
Singapore's Neptune Orient Lines, the FT noted.  Following the
conversion of a complex series of hybrid instruments created
during the 2008 sale of a stake in Hapag-Lloyd to Albert Ballin,
the consortium at the end of this year will control 50.2% of the
shares, the FT stated.  TUI holds the remainder, the FT said.

                         About Hapag-Lloyd

Hapag-Lloyd AG -- http://www.hapag-lloyd.com/-- is the
transportation arm of German tourism giant TUI.  Subsidiary Hapag-
Lloyd Container Line, which accounts for most of Hapag-Lloyd's
sales, operates a fleet of about 135 containerships.  Overall,
Hapag-Lloyd Container Line's vessels have a capacity of more than
490,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU).  The unit's routes
link Europe, Asia, the Americas, and Africa.  In addition to
freight transportation, Hapag-Lloyd offers luxury ocean and river
cruises under its Hapag-Lloyd Cruises brand.  TUI sold Hapag-
Lloyd's container operations to a German investment group in March
2009.

                            About TUI

TUI AG -- http://www.tui-group.com/en/-- is a Germany-based
company mainly engaged in the tourism sector, focusing on the
markets of Central, Northern and Western Europe.  TUI owns a
network of travel agencies and tour operators, including air
tours, Thomson, First Choice and TUI Deutschland.  It also
operates several airlines, including Corsairfly, Thomsonfly and
First Choice Airways, among others.  The Company is structured
into three segments: TUI Travel, TUI Hotels and Resorts, and
Cruises.  TUI Travel comprises the Company's distribution, tour
operating, airline and incoming activities and services over 30
million customers in 180 countries.  The TUI Hotels and Resorts
division offers a portfolio of 238 hotels, located in Spain,
Greece, Egypt, France, Turkey, Tunisia, the Balearics and the
Caribbean, among others.  The Cruises sector comprises Hapag-Lloyd
Kreuzfahrten GmbH and TUI Cruises which provide luxury cruises,
and cruises within the German-speaking countries, respectively.

                            *   *   *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 29,
2010, Moody's Investors Service affirmed the Corporate Family
Rating and Probability of Default Rating of TUI AG at Caa1; the
unsecured rating and the subordinated ratings were also affirmed
at Caa2 and Caa3, respectively.  Moody's said the outlook was
changed to stable from negative.


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H U N G A R Y
=============


APPONYI CASTLE: Placed in Liquidation Sale
------------------------------------------
Realdeal.hu reports that Apponyi Castle is being sold off as its
owner, Hermelin Termal Kastelyszallo Zrt, is wound up as a result
of the crisis.  According to napi.hu, the target price of the
currently unused four-star hotel is EUR6.47 million.

Realdeal.hu says that the 6,469-sqm complex stands in a 5.6-
hectare ancient park and includes a 31-room Baroque castle built
in 1760 and renovated in 2001, thermal baths, a wellness center,
four conference rooms, a restaurant, a cafe and a chapel.
Applicants who intend to continue using the complex as a hotel
will be given preference, Realdeal.hu notes.

Apponyi Castle is one of Hungary's more posh castle hotels.


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I C E L A N D
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KAUPTHING BANK: Final Ruling on EDGE Claims Expected in Mid-2011
----------------------------------------------------------------
Omar R. Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News, citing an e-mailed
statement, reports that Kaupthing Bank hf's winding-up committee
said there are 21 cases regarding disputed so-called EDGE claims
before Iceland's District Court.

According to Bloomberg, the statement said that lawyers
representing creditors and the winding-up committee have agreed
that two of the cases regarding priority disputes will be put
forward while the rest of the proceedings will be stayed.

Bloomberg relates that the committee said final court rulings are
expected in the middle of next year.

                      About Kaupthing Bank

Headquartered in Reykjavik, Kaupthing Bank --
http://www.kaupthing.com/-- is Iceland's largest bank and among
the Nordic region's 10 largest banking groups.  With operations in
more than a dozen countries, the bank offers a range of services
including retail banking, corporate finance, asset management,
brokerage, private banking, treasury, and private wealth
management.  Kaupthing was created by the 2003 merger of
Bunadarbanki and Kaupthing Bank.  In October 2008 the Icelandic
government assumed control of Kaupthing Bank after taking similar
measures with rivals Landsbanki and Glitnir.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter on Nov. 30, 2008,
Olafur Gardasson, assistant for Kaupthing Bank hf., in a
proceeding under Act No. 21/1991, pending before the Reykjavik
District Court, and foreign representative of the Debtor, filed a
petition under chapter 15 of title 11 of the United States Code in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York commencing the Debtor's chapter 15 case ancillary to the
Icelandic Proceeding and seeking recognition for the Icelandic
Proceeding as a "foreign main proceeding" under the Bankruptcy
Code and relief in aid of the Icelandic Proceeding.


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I R E L A N D
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ALLIED IRISH: Won't Pay Bonuses After Government Intervention
-------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that executives at Allied Irish Banks will not
receive backdated bonuses totaling EUR40 million (GBP33 million)
after an intervention from the Irish Finance Minister Brian
Lenihan.

BBC relates that the bank's board made the decision after Mr.
Lenihan threatened to withhold state funding.  According to BBC,
in a letter, he said financial aid would be conditional on the
non-payment of bonuses "no matter when they may have been earned".

AIB has already had a EUR3.5 billion bail-out, BBC notes.

The bank was due to send bonus checks totaling EUR40 million
(GBP33 million) to 2,400 senior members of staff on December 17
for work carried out in 2008 as a result of a High Court ruling
earlier this year, BBC states.  An employee had taken the legal
action to force the bank to pay him his bonus, BBC discloses.

According to BBC, AIB said its legal advice had been that it was
obliged to pay the bonuses but that the minister's intervention
overtook that obligation.

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c., together with its subsidiaries --
http://www.aibgroup.com/-- conducts retail and commercial banking
business in Ireland.  It also provides corporate lending and
capital markets activities from its head office at Bankcentre and
from Dublin's International Financial Services Centre.  The Group
also has overseas branches in the United States, Germany, France
and Australia, among other locations.  The business of AIB Group
is conducted through four operating divisions: AIB Bank Republic
of Ireland division, Capital Markets division, AIB Bank UK
division, and Central & Eastern Europe division.  In February
2008, the Group acquired the AmCredit mortgage business in the
Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.  In September
2008, the Group also acquired a 49.99% shareholding in BACB.

                           *     *     *

On Dec. 8, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported
that DBRS downgraded the Dated Subordinated Debt and Undated
Subordinated Debt ratings of Allied Irish Banks p.l.c. (AIB or the
Group) to 'B' from 'A' to reflect the elevated risk of adverse
action by the government.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 7,
2010, Moody's Investors Service placed on review for possible
downgrade the D bank financial strength rating of Allied Irish
Banks.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 1,
2010, Fitch Ratings downgraded Allied Irish Banks plc's lower tier
2 subordinated debt to 'B' from 'BB'.  It also downgraded AIB's
upper tier 2 to 'CC' from 'B' Rating Watch Negative and tier 1
debt securities to 'CC' from 'B-' RWN and 'CCC'.  The ratings of
the UT2 and T1 securities were removed from RWN.


ANGLO IRISH: US Trustee Allowed to Sell Ex-Chief's Dublin Home
--------------------------------------------------------------
Vivion Kilfeather at The Irish Examiner reports that Kathleen
Dwyer, the US trustee administering the bankruptcy of former Anglo
Irish Bank Chief Executive David Drumm, was granted an order in
the High Court to sell off Mr. Drumm's EUR2.3 million home in
Malahide, Co Dublin on Tuesday.

The Irish Examiner relates that the court has ruled it is in the
interests of Mr. Drumm's creditors for the Irish courts to assist
a US official in her administration of Mr. Drumm's bankruptcy.
There was no reason of public policy to refuse to make such an
"order in aid," Ms. Justice Elizabeth Dunne found, according to
The Irish Examiner.

In her application to the High Court for an order in aid,
Ms. Dwyer, as cited by The Irish Examiner, said the effect of
Mr. Drumm's filing the bankruptcy petition was immediately to
render him a bankrupt under the law of the US.

Ms. Dwyer also said the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Massachusetts has exclusive jurisdiction over his bankruptcy with
all his assets vested in her as trustee, The Irish Examiner notes.

In her judgment on Tuesday, Ms. Justice Dunne noted the trustee,
in seeking an order in aid, could not rely on the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Act 1988 as the Irish Government has not made any
order applying the relevant order in aid provisions of that act to
the US or other countries with which Ireland has many links, The
Irish Examiner recounts.  The judge accepted arguments by Bernard
Dunleavy, for the trustee, there is an equivalence between the
bankruptcy code in the US and in Ireland, The Irish Examiner
notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 19,
2010, Bloomberg News said Mr. Drumm filed for bankruptcy, months
after the bank sought repayment of loans from him.  Bloomberg
disclosed Mr. Drumm, who resigned from the Dublin-based bank in
December 2008, listed assets and liabilities at US$1 million to
US$10 million on Oct. 14 in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Boston.
Anglo Irish Bank's lawyers told a court in Dublin in December that
the bank is seeking repayment of loans valued at about EUR8
million (US$11.3 million) from Mr. Drumm, according to Bloomberg.
His liabilities are primarily business debts, Bloomberg said,
citing the Oct. 14 filing under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code.

                     About Anglo Irish Bank

Anglo Irish Bank Corp PLC -- http://www.angloirishbank.com/--
operates in three core areas: business lending, treasury and
private banking.  The Bank's non-retail business is made up of
more than 11,000 commercial depositors spanning commercial
entities, charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit
unions and other non-bank financial institutions.  The Company's
retail deposits comprise demand, notice and fixed term deposit
accounts from personal savers with maturities of up to two years.
Non-retail deposits are sourced from commercial entities,
charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit unions and
other non-bank financial institutions.  In addition, at Sept. 30,
2008, its non-retail deposits included deposits from Irish
Life Assurance plc.  The Private Bank offers tailored products and
solutions for high net worth clients and operates the Bank's
lending business in Ireland and the United Kingdom.

                        *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 1,
2010, DBRS downgraded the ratings of the Euro Dated Subordinated
Notes (specifically the EUR325.2 million Floating Rate
Subordinated Notes due 2014, EUR500 million Callable Subordinated
Floating Rate Notes due 2016 and the EUR750 million Dated
Subordinated Floating Rate Notes due 2017) (collectively referred
to as the 2017 Notes) issued by Anglo Irish Bank Corporation
Limited (Anglo Irish or the Bank) to 'D' from 'C'.  DBRS said the
downgrade follows the execution of the Bank's note exchange offer.
The default status for the exchanged and now-extinguished 2017
Notes reflects DBRS's view that bondholders were offered limited
options, which, as discussed in DBRS's press release dated
October 25, 2010, is considered a default per DBRS policy.

On Oct. 29, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported
that Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on
Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd.'s nondeferrable dated subordinated
debt (lower Tier 2) securities to 'D' from 'CCC'.  The downgrade
of the lower Tier 2 debt rating reflects S&P's opinion that the
bank's exchange offer is a "distressed exchange" and tantamount to
default in accordance with its criteria.


BANK OF IRELAND: Moody's Comments on Distressed Exchange Offer
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has commented on Bank of Ireland's offer
to exchange dated subordinated debt for government guaranteed
senior debt at a substantial discount to the par value.  The bank
is rated A1/P-1 for bank deposits and senior debt and has a D+
bank financial strength rating.  All of the ratings are on review
for possible downgrade.

If the exchange occurs on the announced terms, Moody's would
likely classify this transaction as a distressed exchange and
downgrade the affected securities to Ca.  The ratings would then
potentially be upgraded shortly afterwards, at the conclusion of
the current review, to the rating level for the bank's dated
subordinated securities.  A distressed exchange is defined as an
offer by an issuer to creditors of a new or restructured debt, or
a new package of securities, cash or assets, that amount to a
diminished financial obligation relative to the original
obligation with the effect of allowing the issuer to avoid a
bankruptcy or payment default.  According to Moody's, a distressed
exchange is a form of default.  Moody's includes distressed
exchanges in its definition of default in order to capture credit
events whereby issuers effectively fail to meet their debt service
obligations, but yet do not actually file for bankruptcy or miss
an interest or principal payment.

The dated subordinated debt of Bank of Ireland is currently on
review for possible downgrade as a result of the Irish
government's confirmation that it will introduce legislation to
allow losses to be imposed on subordinated debt.  This is a result
of the increased pressure on the Irish government to share some of
the capital burden of restructuring the Irish banking sector with
more junior creditors, in view of the strain which the sizeable
capital injections have placed on the Irish government's finances.

Moody's commented on December 2, when the securities were placed
on review for possible downgrade, that any deeply discounted
exchanges would very likely be viewed as a distressed exchange.
This transaction is likely to be classed as distressed as a result
of (i) the high discount to the nominal value (ranging from 42.5%
to 54%), and (ii) the potential that absent this exchange losses
would be imposed on the dated subordinated debt through the
legislation to be introduced by the Irish government.

The bank's junior subordinated debt, its cumulative tier 1
securities and non-cumulative preference shares, rated Ba3, B1 and
Caa1 respectively, remain on review for possible downgrade.  These
securities, as well as two Canadian dollar denominated dated
subordinated securities, are not part of this exchange offer and
therefore Moody's will conclude on these ratings in conjunction
with the review on the senior ratings.

Bank of Ireland is headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, and at end-
June 2010, had total assets of EUR180.5 billion.


CORSAIR FINANCE: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR25MM Notes to 'Caa3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service took this rating action on a note issued
by Corsair Finance (Ireland) No 4 Limited, a cross-subordination
CDO square referencing eight static portfolios of corporate and
sovereign entities.

Issuer: Corsair Finance (Ireland) No 4 Limited

  -- EUR25M Series 5 Floating Rate Secured Callable Portfolio
     Credit-Linked Notes due 2014, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf);
     previously on Mar 6, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1(sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference
portfolio.  The 10 year weighted average rating factor, excluding
Ca/C rated names, of the inner CDO portfolios currently ranges
between 728 and 939, equivalent to an average rating of Ba1.  In
the last rating action, the portfolio WARF for each inner CDO
ranged between 654 and 876, equivalent to average rating of Ba1.
The transaction has 3.59 years to maturity.

The transaction is exposed to several reference entities that
suffered credit events since March 2009, in particular Takefuji
Corporation, Thomson S.A., Chemtura Corporation, Ambac Financial
Group, Inc., Aiful Corporation and CIT Group Inc. These entities
are referenced in several inner CDOs and therefore have a
significant impact on the expected loss of the outer CDO tranche.
The Telecommunications, Retail and Banking sectors are the most
represented in the inner portfolios, weighting on average 9.25%,
7.88%, and 6.25%, respectively, of the inner portfolios notional.

Moody's also performed sensitivity analysis consisting in modeling
Moody's market implied rating in place of the corporate
fundamental rating to derive the default probability of each
corporate name in the reference portfolio.  Moody's market implied
ratings are derived from observable CDS spread on each corporate
name and mapped to Moody's rating scale.  The gap between a Market
implied rating and a Moody's corporate fundamental rating is an
indicator of the extent of the divergence of credit view between
Moody's and the market on each referenced name in the CSO
portfolio.  This run generated a result that was consistent with
the one modeled under the base case run.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, and
specific documentation features.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic
Obligations", key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis may
be different from the manager/arranger's reported numbers.  In
particular, rating assumptions for all publicly rated corporate
credits in the underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review
for Possible Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or
"Negative Outlook".

Moodys did not run a separate loss and cash flow analysis other
than the one already done using the CDOROM model.

Moody's analysis of corporate CSOs is subject to uncertainties,
the primary sources of which includes complexity, governance and
leverage.  Although the CDOROM model capture many of the dynamics
of the Corporate CSO structure, it remains a simplification of the
complex reality.  Of greatest concern are (a) variations over time
in default rates for instruments with a given rating, (b)
variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool.  Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions (and sometimes
interpretations) of legal experts at the time of issuance, is
still subject to potential changes in law, case law and the
interpretations of courts and (in some cases) regulatory
authorities.  Although the impact of these decisions is mitigated
by structural constraints, anticipating the quality of these
decisions necessarily introduces some level of uncertainty in
Moody's assumptions.  Given the tranched nature of Corporate CSO
liabilities, rating transitions in the reference pool may have
leveraged rating implications for the ratings of the Corporate CSO
liabilities, thus leading to a high degree of volatility.  All
else being equal, the volatility is likely to be higher for more
junior or thinner liabilities.  The base case scenario modeled
fits into the central macroeconomic scenario predicted by Moody's
of a sluggish recovery scenario of the corporate universe.  Should
macroeconomics conditions evolves towards a more severe scenario
such as a double dip recession, the CSO rating will likely be
downgraded to an extent depending on the expected severity of the
worsening conditions.

The base case scenario modeled fits into the central macroeconomic
scenario predicted by Moody's of a sluggish recovery scenario of
the corporate universe.  Should macroeconomics conditions evolves
towards a more severe scenario such as a double dip recession, the
CSO rating will likely be downgraded to an extent depending on the
expected severity of the worsening conditions.


DEKANIA EUROPE: S&P Junks Ratings on Three Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Dekania Europe CDO I PLC's class C, D, P, Q, and R notes.  S&P
also affirmed its ratings on the class A1, A2, A3, B1, and B2
notes.  At the same time, S&P removed from CreditWatch developing
its ratings on the class A2, A3, B1, B2, C, D, P, Q, and R notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction in light
of recent portfolio developments.

Two assets, representing approximately 8% of the portfolio, had
neither a public nor private credit rating from us when S&P
reviewed the transaction in November 2009.  At the time, S&P used
a conservative ratings estimate, pending application and receipt
of a credit estimate, and placed all the notes, apart from class
A1, on CreditWatch developing.  While one of these two assets now
has a credit estimate from us, the other, which represents 4.14%
of the pool, has had no public or private rating from us since S&P
withdrew its rating in September 2009.  Given the continued risk
the unrated asset could pose to the transaction, S&P assumed its
creditworthiness to be vulnerable.  Everything else being equal,
this assumption has had a limited impact on its overall analysis.

However, the portfolio has deteriorated since S&P's last review
due to the default of an asset, representing approximately 4.14%
of the pool, for which S&P expects there to be limited recovery
based on the most recent collateral administrator report.

S&P has also considered in its analysis two of the principal
features of the portfolio:

* The terms of the securities generally provide for the payment of
  periodic distributions to be deferrable; and

* They can be dated or, as in the case of approximately 10% of the
  Dekania Europe CDO I portfolio, undated.

In both cases, the assets typically feature a call date allowing
the obligor to redeem the bond in advance of its final maturity,
where this is available.

A number of bonds, accounting for approximately 35% of the pool,
have reached their first call date in the past year.  However, the
respective obligors have not redeemed the bonds in any of these
cases.  While S&P is aware that the call feature is optional, S&P
views such behavior as an indication of uncertainty about the
portfolio's amortization pattern and default probability.

In S&P's opinion, the relative likelihood of default for the class
A1, A2, A3, B1, and B2 notes is still commensurate with its
current ratings.  Therefore, S&P has affirmed its ratings on these
tranches and removed from CreditWatch developing the A2, A3, B1,
and B2 tranches.  S&P's 'AA+ (sf)' rating on the class A1 notes
continues to reflect its assessment of Assured Guaranty (UK)
Ltd.'s (AA+/Stable/--) financial guarantee.  S&P's affirmations
reflect its view that these tranches have adequate credit support
to maintain their current ratings.  The credit deterioration will
accelerate the diversion of excess spread toward redemption of the
senior classes.  Furthermore, these tranches' sensitivity to the
extension risk from the underlying assets is circumscribed, as
shown by S&P's analysis of different amortization scenarios.

S&P has lowered and removed from CreditWatch developing its
ratings on classes C and D.  S&P believes the notes' reduced
credit enhancement is no longer sufficient to sustain their
current ratings.  Furthermore, the issuer's ability to meet its
obligations toward the class C and D noteholders is increasingly
vulnerable to the pool's amortization profile.  Therefore, the
recent experience of obligors in the portfolio not exercising the
call dates have left the class C and D noteholders more exposed
than the senior noteholders to extension risk.

The class P, Q, and R combination notes include components of the
class C and D notes and, as a result, have been affected following
the downgrades of their components.

Dekania Europe I CDO is collateralized by a portfolio of
subordinated debt securities issued primarily by European
insurance companies and banks.  The majority of assets are hybrid
capital securities issued to provide the issuer with a resource to
protect policyholders or depositors by absorbing losses incurred
during the conduct of the business.

                           Ratings List

                     Dekania Europe CDO I PLC
          EUR274 Million Fixed- And Floating-Rate Notes

           Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch

                              Rating
                              ------
   Class             To                      From
   -----             --                      ----
   C                 B+ (sf)                 BB+ (sf)/Watch dev
   D                 CCC+ (sf)               BB- (sf)/Watch dev
   Combo P           B- (sf)                 BB (sf)/Watch dev
   Combo Q           CCC+ (sf)               BB- (sf)/Watch dev
   Combo R           CCC+ (sf)               BB- (sf)/Watch dev

          Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch

                              Rating
                              ------
   Class             To                      From
   -----             --                      ----
   A2                A- (sf)                 A- (sf)/Watch dev
   A3                A- (sf)                 A- (sf)/Watch dev
   B1                BBB (sf)                BBB (sf)/Watch dev
   B2                BBB (sf)                BBB (sf)/Watch dev

                         Ratings Affirmed

                    Class             Rating
                    -----             ------
                    A1                AA+ (sf)


IRISH LIFE: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Subordinated Debt to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Irish Life Assurance plc's Insurer
Financial Strength rating to 'BBB+' from 'A-' and Long-term Issuer
Default Rating to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'.  The Outlooks are Negative.
Irish Life's subordinated debt was also downgraded to 'BB+' from
'BBB-'.

Irish Life is the main insurance subsidiary of Irish Life &
Permanent Plc.  ILP's Individual rating was downgraded to 'D/E'
from 'D' and its Support Rating affirmed at '2'.  The Irish
sovereign's rating was yesterday downgraded to 'BBB+'/Stable from
'A+'/Negative.

The downgrade of Irish Life's ratings and Negative Outlook reflect
the deterioration in the macro-economic environment in Ireland.
The impact of the Irish government's austerity package, high
unemployment and reduced consumer confidence could trigger higher
policyholder lapse rates and lower sales volumes, threatening
Irish Life's profitability.  The company is also exposed to
increased investment risk as it has shareholder exposure to Irish
sovereign debt and other Irish investments.

The downgrade also reflects the capital which Irish Life will
provide to ILP through a EUR100 million securitization, which will
reduce Irish Life's financial flexibility and future profits.

Despite the downgrade, Irish Life's ratings continue to reflect
the positive rating factors of its strong standalone
capitalization (regulatory solvency ratio of 178% at end- Q310),
comparatively low-risk business and strong market position.  The
business returned to profit in 2009 on an Irish GAAP basis with a
result of EUR4 million.  A significant reduction in the cost base
has also been made.  However, Fitch expects profit margins and
earnings to remain under pressure for a number of years.

Irish Life's rating could be further downgraded if the Irish
macro-economic situation deteriorates further or has a greater-
than-expected impact on persistency or new business, or if the
company does not remain profitable.


JAZZ III: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E-1 Notes to 'B+ (sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions on Jazz III CDO (Ireland) PLC's US$288,250,000 rated
notes.  Specifically, S&P:

* Lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on
  seven classes; and

* Affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its rating on one
  class.

Jazz III CDO (Ireland) is a hybrid cash/synthetic arbitrage
structure.  The collateral manager can purchase cash obligations
(bond and loans), enter into a total return swap, and/or enter
into credit default swaps (either to buy or sell protection).

Of the ratings S&P lowered, the class B-1, B-2, C-1, D-1, and E-1
tranche ratings were constrained by the application of the largest
obligor default test, a supplemental stress test S&P introduced as
part of its criteria update.  Class A-1 was affected by the
largest industry default test, another of S&P's supplemental
stress

                           Ratings List

                   Jazz III CDO (Ireland) PLC
       US$388.875 Million Fixed- and Floating-Rate Notes

      Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

                             Rating
                             ------
       Class       To                    From
       -----       --                    ----
       A-1         A+ (sf)               AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
       B-1         A- (sf)               AA (sf)/Watch Neg
       B-2         A- (sf)               AA (sf)/Watch Neg
       C-1         BBB+ (sf)             A (sf)/Watch Neg
       D-1         BB+ (sf)              BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
       E-1         B+ (sf)               BB (sf)/Watch Neg
       Q Combo     A- (sf)               AA (sf)/Watch Neg

      Rating Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

                             Rating
                             ------
       Class       To                    From
       -----       --                    ----
       S           AAA (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg


TALISMAN-7 FINANCE: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to B-
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
all classes of notes in Talisman-7 Finance Ltd.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of all remaining loans
backing Talisman-7 and its observation of continuing deterioration
in credit quality of some of the loans.

S&P previously lowered most of its ratings in this transaction to
reflect its increased loss expectations for some of the loans.
S&P's most recent rating action dates from Dec. 15, 2009, when S&P
lowered its ratings on the class B to I notes.

Since then, S&P has observed increasing risks from certain loans,
which result from deteriorating values and/or the cash flow
generating capability of the underlying real estate assets.  The
following events and developments have occurred since S&P's
previous review and have led to the rating actions:

The Mozart loan defaulted and was transferred to special
servicing.  S&P anticipated this at the time of its last rating
action and at that time S&P assumed a substantially depressed
recovery.  S&P's recovery assumptions now remain more or less
unchanged.

The Wagner loan defaulted and was transferred to special
servicing.  S&P has revised downward its view of the property
value, and consequently the likely recovery from a potential loan
workout in view of the absence of any reduction in the vacancy of
the asset.

The Bach loan properties were revalued, which led to a breach of
the loan-to-value ratio covenant.  The servicer has informed us
that certain measures were put in place to mitigate this and that
the covenant is no longer in breach.  S&P's recovery assumptions
remain unchanged.

S&P has revised downward its opinion of the property values for
certain other loans (the Hof loan, the Haydn loan, the Brahms
loan, and the Bruckner loan).

S&P's view of the creditworthiness of the Handel loan has not
materially changed.

The special servicer calculated an appraisal reduction for the
Wagner loan and the Mozart loan, which reduced the size of the
liquidity commitment (as opposed to size of individual drawings
that can be made).  Therefore, all shortfalls can currently be
funded by the liquidity facility and no note interest shortfalls
are expected in the near term.

                         The Mozart Loan

The Mozart loan is now the largest loan in the pool and is secured
against a portfolio of 100 properties located across Germany with
concentrations in North Rhine-Westphalia (30% by latest value) and
Hesse (25%).

The whole loan has a current balance of EUR893 million and is
split into a EUR779 million senior loan and a series of fully
subordinated junior loans for a combined EUR114 million.  Talisman
7 owns a 75% share in the senior loan, i.e., an amount of EUR584
million.  The other 25% share of the senior loan is held by a
third party and ranks pari passu to the securitized portion.

The senior and whole-loan reported LTV ratios have increased to
108.3% and 124.2%, respectively, based on a property valuation
commissioned in May 2010.  The reported Day 1 whole-loan interest
coverage ratio of 1.17x has fallen to 0.85x, due mainly to an
increase in expenses following tenant expiries and rent-free
periods on new and renewed leases.  The portfolio is now
approximately 37% vacant by net lettable area.

The loan was transferred to special servicing in April 2010 and
the parties entered into a number of standstill agreements, the
most recent of which is scheduled to expire on Dec. 15, 2010.  The
servicer has informed us that the current strategy is to
restructure the loan and to allow the borrower to implement an
asset sales strategy.

The borrower has received indicative bids for eight assets.
However, given that the LTV ratios are above 100%, sales proceeds
at open market value will likely fail to cover the respective
allocated loan amounts and loan leverage will be unlikely to
reduce.

These events have not changed S&P's view of the creditworthiness
of the loan or its recovery assumptions, as S&P anticipated a loan
default at the time of its last rating action.

                         The Wagner Loan

This loan is secured on a 36-building technology park in Bergisch-
Gladbach, Germany.  The majority of the accommodation is office,
with smaller ancillary areas including storage, workshop,
production, and retail.  The site is within a 30-35 minute drive
to international airports and the city center of Cologne is
approximately 10km to the west.

According to the latest tenancy schedule S&P has received, there
are 160 leases in place, excluding parking spaces, and lettings
are mostly on a short-term basis (one to five years).

The loan defaulted in March 2010 following breaches of the whole-
loan ICR covenant at 1.2x and the LTV ratio covenant at 92.5%.  In
August 2010, the loan was transferred to special servicing.

The Technology Park is a secondary asset, in S&P's view, and
therefore it is not attracting the prime rental rates achievable
in the main business districts of nearby Cologne.  The short lease
terms and high vacancy rate render the asset comparably management
intensive, in S&P's view.

In the period since loan origination, S&P has observed market
value declines for this type of property to be above the average
for commercial real estate assets in Germany, due to the location
and risk of declining rental income.  This, in S&P's view, will
negatively affect the recoveries from a potential loan workout.

Even though S&P's loss expectations for the largest loan in the
pool (Mozart) remain unchanged, given the deteriorating
performance of other loans in the pool and its revised view of the
value of some loans in the pool, S&P has lowered the ratings on
all classes of notes.  The downgrades are, however, limited to one
or two notches.

Talisman-7 is a commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction,
which closed in June 2007.  It was originally backed by 10 loans
secured on commercial and residential real estate assets in
Germany.  The largest loan at closing (the Beethoven loan, 37.7%
of the initial pool) has prepaid.  The current note balance has
reduced by 44% to EUR1,021.8 million, from EUR1,826.1 million at
closing.  As a consequence of the Mozart loan default, all note
repayments will now be made sequentially.

                          Ratings List

                     Talisman-7 Finance Ltd.
EUR1.826 Billion Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

                         Ratings Lowered

                                 Rating
                                 ------
               Class       To               From
               -----       --               ----
               A           AA+ (sf)         AAA (sf)
               B           A+ (sf)          AA (sf)
               C           BBB+ (sf)        A (sf)
               D           BB+ (sf)         BBB (sf)
               E           BB (sf)          BB+ (sf)
               F           BB- (sf)         BB (sf)
               G           B+ (sf)          BB- (sf)
               H           B (sf)           B+ (sf)
               I           B- (sf)          B+ (sf)
               J           B- (sf)          B (sf)
               X           AA+ (sf)         AAA (sf)


TITAN EUROPE: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to 'CCsf'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded all classes of Titan Europe 2006-3
notes and removed them from Rating Watch Negative:

  -- EUR382.5m Class A (XS0257767631) downgraded to 'AAsf' from
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative

  -- EUR237.5m Class B (XS0257768522) downgraded to 'BBsf' from
     'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative

  -- EUR50.2m Class C (XS0257769090) downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
     'BBsf'; Recovery Rating of RR2 assigned

  -- EUR54.8m Class D (XS0257769769) downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
     'Bsf'; Recovery Rating of RR6 assigned

  -- EUR36.7m Class E (XS0257770007) downgraded to 'CCsf' from
     'CCCsf'; Recovery Rating revised to RR6 from RR5

  -- EUR29.1m Class F (XS0257770775) downgraded to 'CCsf' from
     'CCCsf'; Recovery rating RR6

The rating actions were primarily driven by the ongoing
deterioration of the collateral, as evidenced by the high loan-to-
value ratios on the underlying loans.  Of the 14 loans, nine have
Fitch LTVs in excess of 100%.  In addition, lease expiries,
arrears and tenant defaults are continuing to put pressure on
collateral income.  One-third of the collateral balance (the
Quelle Nuremberg, SQY Quest and Monnet loans) is in default, with
a further 15% on the servicer's watchlist.  By contrast, a higher
64% of the portfolio is on Fitch's watchlist.  The difference
mainly relates to upcoming loan maturities: 32% of the collateral
is scheduled to mature during 2011.

The Quelle Nuremberg loan (12% of the pool) is secured by a
242,000 sq m office property in Nuremberg, Germany, which was
previously wholly occupied by Quelle AG.  Following the insolvency
of the tenant in June 2009, the asset is now 61% let (by surface
area) on various leases generating EUR2 million of gross rental
income, all expiring before the end of 2010.  Despite these
interim leases, net rental income has been insufficient to cover
debt service payments for the last five payment dates and EUR5.7
million of unpaid interest and principal has been accrued.  A
January 2010 re-valuation showed a 88% decline since the last
valuation in January 2009.  Redevelopment costs of EUR175 million
(required to attract new tenants) are stated as the main driver of
the substantial fall in value.  This results in a reported A-note
and whole loan LTV of 745% and 823%, respectively.  The borrower
is continuing to work with local authorities in order to initiate
a redevelopment of the property.  However, the collateral's
location, size, quality and limited current usage potential lead
Fitch to expect only minimal recoveries for this loan.

The SQY Quest Shopping Centre loan (13% of the pool) is secured by
a shopping centre constructed in 2005, located 20km south-west of
Paris.  Income has deteriorated since closing, primarily due to
rental arrears, which currently stand at EUR4.8 million, compared
to contracted rent of EUR6.5 million.  Consequently, the borrower
has been unable to make debt service payments since April 2009.
EUR8 million of unpaid interest and principal has been accumulated
to date.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in May
2009.  The special servicer is working with the borrower to
achieve a sale.  The borrower has signed an exclusivity agreement
with a bidder and expects to receive a binding offer upon
completion of the due diligence process.  In conjunction, the
special servicer is exploring the possibility of a share sale to
the bidder and a loan restructuring.  Given the extent of the
deterioration to date, Fitch expects a loss to be realized on loan
regardless of the workout method adopted by the special servicer.

The Monnet loan (8% of the pool) is secured by six German and two
Belgian office properties.  The assets are multi-let and have a
vacancy rate of 25% and a weighted-average lease term of 3.4
years.  The loan was transferred to special servicing in September
2009 following to a breach of the 1x DSCR covenant.  Income
remains under pressure due to rent reductions and the expiry of a
rental guarantee covering approximately one-third of income;
consequently, an interest shortfall occurred at the October
payment date.  Discussions are ongoing with the special servicer
regarding a workout proposal submitted by the borrower.  However,
both the reported and Fitch LTVs are in excess of 150%, indicating
that a substantial loss is likely to be incurred on the loan.

Fitch will continue to monitor the performance of the transaction.


* IRELAND: 34% of Firms Face High Risk of Failure, Experian Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Niamh Hennessy at The Irish Examiner, citing data compiled by
financial data experts Experian, reports that one in three Irish
firms is at risk of failing.

According to The Irish Examiner, in Ireland 34% of firms were at a
high risk of failure at the end of September, compared with just
19% in Britain and the US.

The Irish Examiner notes that figures from Experian show that
there were signs of improvement in Ireland's business community in
the third quarter of the year.  It said that since the start of
this year, the proportion of businesses at "very high risk" of
failure within the next 12 months has fallen by 5% to 14%, The
Irish Examiner discloses.  Over the same period, the number of
"high risk" business has fallen by 11%, while there was a 15%
increase in "very low risk" firms, The Irish Examiner states.

The Irish Examiner says the failure rate for Irish businesses also
improved during the third quarter with 386 Irish firms failing at
a rate of 2.1 in every 1,000 firms.

The manufacturing, construction, motor and transport sectors,
which struggled in the initial stages of the downturn, have
stabilized, with some even seeing their rate of failures drop,
according to The Irish Examiner.  Despite this Experian said
Ireland's business community is still far weaker than it was at
the start of last year, The Irish Examiner notes.


* Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Banks in Ireland
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Allied Irish Banks plc's and Bank of
Ireland's Long- and Short-term Issuer Default Ratings to 'BBB'
from 'A-' and 'F2' from 'F1', following yesterday's downgrade of
the Irish sovereign.  The Outlook on the Long-term IDRs is Stable.

Fitch has also downgraded the guaranteed debt of AIB, BoI, Anglo
Irish Bank Corporation Ltd, EBS Building Society and Irish
Nationwide Building Society to 'BBB+'/'F2' from 'A+'/'F1'.  A full
list of ratings is included at the end of this statement.

Fitch has also downgraded AIB's, BoI's, ILP's and EBS' Individual
ratings, while AIB's lower tier 2 subordinated debt securities
have been downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B'.

Before these actions, the IDRs of the Irish banks were all at
their Support Rating Floors, reflecting support received from the
sovereign following severe business strains.  With the downgrade
of the Irish sovereign (see "Fitch Downgrades Ireland to 'BBB+';
Outlook Stable" on www.fitchratings.com) given its reduced
financial flexibility, Fitch believes that the level of support
that the sovereign can provide to its largest banks has
diminished, resulting in a downward revision of AIB's and BoI's
Support Rating Floors, which in turn has resulted in a downgrade
of their IDRs.  At the same time, Fitch has reduced the number of
notches separating the IDRs and the Support Ratings Floors of
Irish domestic banks from the sovereign's IDRs because of the
large proportion of the banking sector liabilities that the
sovereign guarantees and the commitment that it has expressed to
providing further capital to Irish domestic banks.  As a result,
the agency has decided against downgrading the Long-term IDRs at
Anglo, EBS and INBS.  Anglo and INBS remain on Rating Watch
Negative, while the agency has revised the Watch on EBS to
Negative from Evolving.

The revision of the RWE to Rating Watch Negative on EBS reflects
Fitch's view that it is now unlikely that EBS will be acquired by
a higher rated entity.  The Stable Outlook on AIB's and BoI's
Long-term IDRs reflects the Stable Outlook on the sovereign.  The
removal of AIB Group (UK) plc's ratings from Rating Watch Evolving
and the Stable Outlook reflects AIB's decision to abandon the sale
process for its UK subsidiary.

The downgrade of AIB, BoI, EBS and ILP's Individual ratings
reflects the new capital requirements announced by the Central
Bank of Ireland for these institutions, as well as intensified
funding pressures.  The Individual ratings of the subsidiaries of
these companies (AIB Bank (CI) Limited, AIB Group (UK) PLC and
Bank of Ireland UK Plc) reflect the Individual ratings of their
respective parents and have therefore been downgraded to the same
level as their parents.  The higher Individual ratings at BoI and
ILP reflect the smaller proportion of government-sourced capital
in these institutions (none in the case of ILP).

The downgrade of AIB's lower tier 2 subordinated debt instruments
reflects Fitch's view that there is now an increased likelihood
that burden sharing will be applied to these securities.  Fitch
notes the Irish Minister for Finance's statement on 1 December,
which stated that where an institution receives substantial and
significant state assistance to maintain its solvency ratios, an
approach similar to that for Anglo's subordinated debt will have
to be considered.

In accordance with its methodology, Fitch considers the exchange
offer announced by BOI on December 8, 2010 for its lower tier two
securities to be non-coercive.  Hence, the ratings of these
securities were affirmed.

Taking into account that Fitch no longer differentiates between
the ratings of EBS's senior unsecured debt and unguaranteed member
deposits the ratings of EBS unguaranteed member deposits are no
longer considered by Fitch to be relevant to the agency's coverage
and have been affirmed and withdrawn.

A complete list of ratings is below:

Allied Irish Banks

  -- Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A-'; Outlook Stable

  -- Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'

  -- Individual Rating: downgraded to 'E' from 'D/E'

  -- Support Rating: downgraded to '2' from '1'

  -- Support Rating Floor: revised to 'BBB' from 'A-'

  -- Senior unsecured notes: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A-'

  -- Sovereign guaranteed notes: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A+'

  -- Short-term debt: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'

  -- Lower tier 2 subordinated debt: downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B'

  -- Upper tier 2 subordinated notes: affirmed at 'CC'

  -- Tier 1 notes: affirmed at 'CC'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term notes: downgraded to 'BBB+'
     from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term notes: downgraded to 'F2'
     from 'F1'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed commercial paper: downgraded to 'F2'
     from 'F1'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term deposits: downgraded to 'BBB+'
     from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term deposits: downgraded to 'F2'
     from 'F1'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term interbank liabilities:
     downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term interbank liabilities:
     downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'

AIB Bank (CI) Limited

  -- Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A-'; Outlook Stable

  -- Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'

  -- Individual Rating: downgraded to 'E' from 'D/E'

  -- Support Rating: downgraded to '2' from '1'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term notes: downgraded to 'BBB+'
     from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term notes: downgraded to 'F2'
     from 'F1'

AIB Group (UK) PLC

  -- Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A-'; off RWE,
     Outlook Stable

  -- Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'; off RWE

  -- Individual Rating: downgraded to 'E' from 'D/E'

  -- Support Rating: downgraded to '2' from '1'; off RWN

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term notes: downgraded to 'BBB+'
     from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term notes: downgraded to 'F2'
     from 'F1'

Anglo Irish Bank Corporation

  -- Long-term IDR: 'BBB-' remains on RWN

  -- Short-term IDR: 'F3' remains on RWN

  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'E'

  -- Support Rating: '2' remains on RWN

  -- Support Rating Floor: 'BBB-', remains on RWN

  -- Short-term debt: 'F3', remains on RWN

  -- Senior unsecured Long-term: 'BBB-', remains on RWN

  -- Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'C'

  -- Upper tier 2 subordinated notes: affirmed at 'C'

  -- Tier 1 notes: affirmed at 'C'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term notes: downgraded to 'BBB+'
     from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term notes: downgraded to 'F2'
     from 'F1'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed commercial paper: downgraded to 'F2'
     from 'F1'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term deposits: downgraded to 'BBB+'
     from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term deposits: downgraded to 'F2'
     from 'F1'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term interbank liabilities:
     downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term interbank liabilities:
     downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'

  -- Market linked securities: 'BBB-emr'; remains on RWN

Anglo Irish Mortgage Bank

  -- Long-term IDR: 'BBB-'; remains on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR: 'F3', remains on RWN
  -- Support Rating: '2', remains on RWN

Bank of Ireland

  -- Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A-'; Outlook Stable

  -- Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'

  -- Individual Rating: downgraded to 'D/E' from 'C/D'

  -- Support Rating: downgraded to '2' from '1'

  -- Support Rating Floor: revised to 'BBB' from 'A-'

  -- Senior unsecured notes: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A-'

  -- Short-term debt: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'

  -- Upper tier 2 subordinated notes: 'B', remains on RWN

  -- Preference shares: affirmed at 'CCC'

  -- Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BB'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed notes: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term deposits: downgraded to 'BBB+'
     from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term deposits: downgraded to 'F2'
     from 'F1'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term interbank liabilities:
     downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term interbank liabilities:
     downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'

Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank

  -- Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A-', Outlook Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'
  -- Support Rating: downgraded to '2' from '1'

Bank of Ireland UK Plc

  -- Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A-', Outlook Stable

  -- Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1';

  -- Individual Rating: downgraded to 'D/E' from 'C/D'

  -- Support Rating: downgraded to '2' from '1'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term deposits: downgraded to 'BBB+'
     from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term deposits: downgraded to 'F2'
     from 'F1'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term interbank liabilities:
     downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term interbank liabilities:
     downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'

EBS Building Society

  -- Long-term IDR: 'BBB-'; revised RWE to RWN

  -- Short-term IDR: 'F3'; revised RWE to RWN

  -- Individual Rating: downgraded to 'E' from 'D/E'

  -- Support Rating: '2', remains on RWN

  -- Support Rating Floor: 'BBB-'; revised RWE to RWN

  -- Senior unsecured notes: 'BBB-'; revised RWE to RWN

  -- Short-term debt: 'F3'; revised RWE to RWN

  -- Member deposit notes: affirmed at 'BBB-', and withdrawn

  -- Preferences shares: affirmed at 'CCC'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term notes: downgraded to 'BBB+'
     from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term notes: downgraded to 'F2'
     from 'F1'

  -- Sovereign guaranteed commercial paper: downgraded to 'F2'
     from 'F1'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term deposits: downgraded to 'BBB+'
     from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term deposits: downgraded to 'F2'
     from 'F1'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term interbank liabilities:
     downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term interbank liabilities:
     downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'

EBS Mortgage Finance

  -- Long-term IDR: 'BBB-'; revised RWE to RWN
  -- Short-term IDR: 'F3'; revised RWE to RWN
  -- Support Rating: '2'; remains on RWN

Irish Life & Permanent

  -- Individual Rating: downgraded to 'D/E' from 'D'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'

Irish Nationwide Building Society

  -- Long-term IDR: 'BBB-', remains on RWN

  -- Short-term IDR: 'F3', remains on RWN

  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'E'

  -- Support Rating: '2', remains on RWN

  -- Support Rating Floor: 'BBB-', remains on RWN

  -- Senior unsecured notes: 'BBB-', remains on RWN

  -- Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'C'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed notes: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term deposits: downgraded to 'BBB+'
     from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term deposits: downgraded to 'F2'
     from 'F1'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term interbank liabilities:
     downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A+'

  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term interbank liabilities:
     downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


BTA BANK: Fitch Upgrades Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Kazakh BTA Bank's and its majority-
owned subsidiary BTA Belarus's ratings.  The Long-term foreign
currency Issuer Default Ratings of both entities have been
upgraded to 'B-'.  The Outlook is Stable.  The rating actions
follow the completion of the restructuring of BTA Bank's
liabilities in September 2010.  A full rating breakdown is
provided at the end of this comment.

BTA's ratings reflect significant uncertainty surrounding the
value of its assets, and concerns over the viability of its
business model, given structural balance sheet weaknesses and the
erosion of its market positions since 2008.  The ratings also
account for the long-term nature of its current funding structure
and support provided to the bank by its majority shareholder,
Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna.

The value of BTA's assets is a key rating concern.  Fitch
recognizes significant potential for the release of provisions on
some heavily impaired exposures, but also sees the risk of further
provisioning on the performing part of the portfolio.  This means
that BTA's capital position is likely to be subject to significant
fluctuations in the coming months as the bank continues to work
through its asset quality problems.

Although the restructuring has enabled BTA to comply with Kazakh
regulatory capital requirements, reported equity under end-Q310
management IFRS accounts was weak (with 1.3% equity-to-assets
ratio compared to 5% under local GAAP).  The difference is largely
attributable to the overstatement of BTA's investments in
associates under local GAAP.  The regulatory capital also benefits
from waivers provided by the FMSA to the restructured banks.  In
particular, BTA is allowed to account for its investments in
Samruk-Kazyna bonds at their notional value rather than their fair
value for the purposes of regulatory capital.

Despite the debt restructuring, BTA remains highly leveraged, with
a 135% loans-to-deposits ratio at end-Q310 (271% if excluding
deposits placed by Samruk-Kazyna).  The corporate deposit-taking
franchise has been severely damaged since 2008.  Samruk-Kazyna's
deposits account for the bulk of corporate funding.

Fitch incorporates into BTA's ratings the probability that support
would be provided to the bank by the Kazakh government in case of
need.  However, the ratings also reflect Fitch's view that the
bank does not represent a strategic investment for Samruk-Kazyna,
and Fitch's expectation that potential state support is likely to
diminish as the government proceeds with the planned sale of the
bank in the medium term.  A sale of the bank would lead Fitch to
review the IDRs.

BTAB was excluded from the restructuring process at its parent.
Although its liabilities structure has been changed to reduce
reliance on BTA, its Long-term IDR is driven by support from the
parent.  Fitch views positively that BTA continued to provide
capital support to BTAB while being restructured.  BTAB's ratings
also now benefit from a cross-default clause embedded in the
documentation of BTA's newly issued debt.  The clause can be
trigged by any BTA subsidiary's default on any indebtedness in
excess of US$10 million.

BTA is now one of the three largest banks in Kazakhstan.  The bank
defaulted in 2009 mainly because of a high level of bad loans.
Following restructuring, it is now controlled by government-owned
Sovereign Wealth Samruk-Kazyna (81.5%), with the other 18.5% held
by creditors affected by the restructuring.

The rating actions are:

BTA

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'B-' from 'RD';
     Outlook Stable

  -- Long-term local currency IDR: upgraded to 'B-'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'B' from 'RD'

  -- Short-term local currency IDR: upgraded to 'B' from 'RD'

  -- Individual Rating: upgraded to 'E' from 'F'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

  -- Senior unsecured debt: upgraded to 'B-' from 'C'; Recovery
     Rating is 'RR4'

  -- Subordinated debt: upgraded to 'CC'; Recovery Rating is 'RR6'

BTAB

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'B-' from 'CCC';
     Stable Outlook

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'B' from 'C'

  -- Individual rating: affirmed at 'E'

  -- Support rating: affirmed at '5'


===========
L A T V I A
===========


NORVIK BANKA: Moody's Reviews 'B1' Long-Term Deposit Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the B1 long-term local- and
foreign-currency deposit ratings of Norvik Banka (Latvia) on
review for possible downgrade.  The E+ bank financial strength
rating and the bank's Not Prime short-term rating were affirmed.
The outlook on the bank's BFSR remains negative.

                        Ratings Rationale

The review for possible downgrade of Norvik's deposit ratings
reflects Moody's increased concerns regarding the bank's: (i)
weakening profitability levels, with net interest income declining
as a proportion of operating income; (ii) high industry and
borrower concentration in its loan book; (iii) a high level of
problem loans in the customer loan portfolio combined with low
provisioning of those loans; and (iv) a high non-resident deposit
base.  The bank's deposit rating is equal to the baseline credit
assessment (BCA), as in Moody's opinion there is very low
probability of systemic support in the event of need.

During the review, Moody's will monitor the bank's profitability
(as provided in its 2010 results) and its asset quality in order
to assess whether the bank might require increased provisioning.
Increases in provisioning may negatively affect the bank's future
profitability.

Moody's notes that Norvik Banka's exposure to the real-estate
sector (both residential and commercial) accounts for about 20% of
total lending, or 100% of its Tier 1 capital.  In addition, the
bank is exposed to the transport and shipping sector, which
accounts for 30% of total lending (or 145% of its Tier 1 capital).
Moody's expects that both these segments are likely to continue to
be adversely affected by the weak business environment in Latvia,
as reflected by elevated non-performing loan levels.

However, Moody's positively notes that the bank remained
profitable throughout the crisis contrary to Latvian banking
system as a whole which experienced losses.

Given the review for possible downgrade, a revision to a stable
outlook for Norvik Banka's BFSR and long-term deposit ratings is
not likely in the short term.  Over time, rating stabilisation
could stem from a significant reduction in problem loan levels and
a sustained improvement in profitability, especially in core
earnings, as well as a reduction in loan book concentrations.

Moody's previous rating action on Norvik Banka was implemented on
June 25, 2009, when the BFSR was downgraded to E+ (with a BCA of
B1) from D- (BCA of Ba3) and the bank's local- and foreign-
currency deposit ratings were downgraded to B1 from Ba3.

Headquartered in Riga, Latvia, Norvik Banka reported total
consolidated assets of around LVL555 million (EUR793 million) at
the end of June 2010.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


EUROMAX IV: S&P Cuts Ratings on Six Classes of Notes to 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CC
(sf)' its credit ratings on six classes of EUROMAX IV MBS S.A.'s
notes and one class of Barbican No. 1 Ltd.'s series 2006-1 notes.
At the same time, S&P lowered to 'CC (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its
ratings on the class A1 single, A1 delayed, and class A1 fltg
notes in EUROMAX IV MBS.

The rating action follows S&P's receipt of a letter dated Dec. 7,
2010 from EUROMAX IV MBS' receivers to the transaction's
noteholders.  The letter notes that following the auction of
collateral assets held on Dec. 3, based on available information
the combination of sale proceeds and cash held in accounts will be
sufficient to make distributions only to the class A1 noteholders
and prior-ranking creditors.

In S&P's opinion, there will now be no further distributions to
classes A2, B, C, D, or the F1 and F2 combination notes.  Given
these classes have outstanding issuance, S&P has lowered its
ratings to 'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)'.  S&P also notes from the
transaction's October payment date report that classes A2 and B
are currently in interest default.

Based on available information, S&P considers it highly unlikely
that sale proceeds and cash held in accounts will be sufficient to
fully repay the class A1 noteholders.  S&P has therefore lowered
to 'CC (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its ratings on classes A1 single, A1
delayed, and A1 fltg.

To repay its noteholders, Barbican No. 1 series 2006-1 relies on
cash flows from the EUROMAX IV MBS class B and subordinated notes.
Since, in its view, Barbican No. 1 series 2006-1 will now receive
no further cash flows from its underlying assets, S&P has lowered
to 'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' its ratings on its notes.

EUROMAX IV MBS is a collateralized debt obligation that closed in
October 2005.  The transaction's portfolio primarily comprised
European residential mortgage-backed securities and commercial
mortgage-backed securities.  Following an event of default under
the conditions of the notes that occurred in February 2010, the
trustee appointed receivers under the trust deed in September
2010.

                          Ratings List

                         Ratings Lowered

                       EUROMAX IV MBS S.A.
          EUR206.45 Million Secured Floating-Rate Notes

                                 Rating
                                 ------
             Class         To              From
             -----         --              ----
             A1 single     CC (sf)         CCC- (sf)
             A1 delayed    CC (sf)         CCC- (sf)
             A1 fltg       CC (sf)         CCC- (sf)
             A2            D (sf)          CC (sf)
             B             D (sf)          CC (sf)
             C             D (sf)          CC (sf)
             D             D (sf)          CC (sf)
             F1 Combo      D (sf)          CC (sf)
             F2 Combo      D (sf)          CC (sf)

                       Barbican No. 1 Ltd.
     EUR4.9 Million EUROMAX IV Combination Notes Series 2006-1

                                  Rating
                                  ------
              Class         To              From
              -----         --              ----
              2006-1        D (sf)          CC (sf)


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


MESDAG BV: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Two Tranches to 'CCsf'
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three and affirmed two tranches of
MESDAG (Charlie) B.V.'s commercial mortgage-backed floating rate
notes:

  -- EUR308.3m class A (XS0289819889): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Negative

  -- EUR40.3m class B (XS0289822677): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Negative

  -- EUR40.3m class C (XS0289823568): downgraded to 'BBsf' from
     'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative

  -- EUR35.6m class D (XS0289824533): downgraded to 'CCsf' from
     'Bsf'; assigned a Recovery Rating (RR) of 'RR4'

  -- EUR8.8m class E (XS0289824889): downgraded to 'CCsf' from
     'CCCsf'; 'RR6'

The downgrade of the class C, D and E notes and the assigned
recovery ratings on the D and E notes reflect the deteriorating
performance of a large proportion of the loans since the last
review.  The transaction remains exposed to balloon risk due to
the upcoming maturities of the Schipol (2010) and Dutch Offices I
(2011) loans (together accounting for 10.1% of the pool) and the
uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the other loan in special
servicing, TOR (43% of the pool).  This primarily accounts for the
negative rating action on the C, D and E notes and the maintenance
of a Negative Outlook on classes A, B and C.

Since the last review, the TOR and Schiphol loans have been
transferred to special servicing following payment defaults on
each of the loans.  Ernst & Young has been appointed as receivers
of the charge over shares of the TOR borrowers, while with regards
to the Schiphol loan, in addition to the borrower failing to fully
meet a cash sweep obligation, the lease (scheduled to expire later
this month) has yet to be extended, which places into question a
refinancing by year-end.

Reported net income across the Tommy Loan (10% of the pool) has
declined by 18% over the past 12 months, reflecting a revision in
the reporting of irrecoverable costs rather than an actual decline
in cash flow of such a magnitude.  In contrast, Dutch Office I's
performance (7.6% of the pool) has actually deteriorated since the
last review, with a 25% fall in rental income following several
large lease expiries and the attendant increase in vacancy (to
11.7% by ERV).

Since closing in April 2007, one loan has prepaid, leaving eight
outstanding.  Coupled with scheduled amortization, this has
reduced the pool balance to EUR433.4 million, from EUR493.7
million at closing.  The loans are secured by a mixture of assets
across Germany (84.3% by market value) and the Netherlands (15.7%)
with significant exposure to the Berlin multifamily market (44%).
The portfolio currently comprises 128 properties with a total MV
of EUR619 million.


X5 RETAIL: Moody's Reviews 'B1' Corporate Family Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the B1 corporate family and
probability of default rating of X5 Retail Group N.V. on review
for possible downgrade.  At the same time, Moody's Interfax Rating
Agency, which is majority-owned by Moody's, has launched a similar
review of the A1.ru national scale credit rating of X5.

The review follows the announcement that X5 signed an agreement to
acquire OJSC Trade House Kopeyka, a discount food retailer in
Russia, in a RUB51.5 billion (around US$1,661 million) transaction
structured as cash payment for 100% of the equity of Kopeyka and
assumption of net debt of no more than RUB16.5 billion (around
US$532 million).  X5 expects to fund the transaction by a 5-year
rouble-denominated credit facility equivalent to US$1 billion and
by utilizing headroom under other long-term facilities with
Sberbank, Russia's leading state-controlled bank.  The transaction
was approved by the Russian Federal Anti-Monopoly Service and is
expected to be closed in the second half of December 2010.

Moody's recognizes X5's solid business fundamentals of a leading
player in Russia's food retail market and the company's reasonable
operating performance.  Moody's views the Kopeya acquisition
transaction as well fit into X5's growth strategy in the very
fragmented domestic market.  The key benefits include (i) X5's
strengthened position in its best performing discounter format and
in Russia's most attractive regional markets of the city of Moscow
and the Moscow region; and (ii) opportunities to improve margins
and increase cash flow generation due to the economy of scale and
improved operating efficiency.  The pro-forma LTM H1 2010 retail
turnover and EBITDA are estimated to be respectively 20% and 16%
above X5's respective standalone turnover and EBITDA.

However, the transaction is large and debt-funded.  So the review
reflects the expected transaction-driven weakening of the
company's financial profile beyond the tolerance level set for
Moody's B1 for businesses operating in the emerging markets and
the currently limited visibility of the management's appetite for
further growth in leverage.  If X5 were to follow a very ambitious
capex program, its deleveraging towards the level supportive for
the B1 might not take place within 12-18 months after the close of
the transaction, while at the same time pressuring the company's
liquidity within the current rating category.  Moody's understands
that X5 is reasonably flexible with its investments and the pace
of a recovery of its financial profile within the current rating
category is to a high degree the issue of its management's choice
and commitment.  X5 has not provided specific investment guidance
for the 2011 and for a medium-term period but it has confirmed its
plans to aggressively grow.  So Moody's has launched the ratings
review process to further assess the prospect, the timing and
degree of a recovery of the company's financial profile.

Moody's anticipates that following the transaction the company's
end-2010 pro-forma Debt/EBITDA could rise to around 4.8x, while
EBITA/Interest and RCF/Net Debt could weaken towards 2.2x and
below 15%, respectively (all ratios incorporate Moody's standard
adjustments), thereby materially deviating from Moody's rating
guidance for the leverage trending below 4x, EBITA/Interest above
2.5x and RCF/Net Debt at around 20%.  Moody's notes the execution
and integration risks associated with the transaction.  However,
the agency see these as manageable within the current rating
level, taking into account X5's expertise in the soft discounter
format and its track record of both the implemented acquisitions
and negotiations and interactions with Kopeyka before the
transaction.

Moody's would view X5's post-transaction liquidity profile as
satisfactory, but for the uncertainty with its capex plans and
appetite to leverage.  The agency would expect X5's end-2010 post-
transaction debt-maturity profile to be long-term, factoring in
the available acquisition facility and assumed Kopeyka's debt.
X5's end-2010 short-term debt is expected to be represented by
put-option obligations under its domestic bond of RUR8 billion
(around US$258 million), which should account for less than 10% of
the end-2010 total debt of around US$3.4 billion in dollar terms.
These obligations are more than covered by unused funds under
long-term committed facilities available for the company.
However, Moody's notes that X5's liquidity position may become
increasingly dependent on the company's cash flow generation
ability going forward, should X5 significantly increase its capex
plans.  At the same time, the agency sees the discretionary nature
of the company's capex as a mitigant of the risk of liquidity
issues.  Moody's notes the company's reasonable headroom under its
financial covenants and expects X5 to be able to maintain it at
least at 20% within the current rating.

During its review process, Moody's will focus on the company's
integration cost budget and its capex plan for 2011-2012, the
management's commitment to deleveraging under Moody's ratings
guidance and the expected pace of the deleveraging, and the likely
liquidity profile evolution.

X5's ratings could be cut if there were concerns that X5 might not
be able or willing to reduce its leverage towards around 4x and
restore EBITA/Interest and RCF/Net Debt to above 2.5x and around
20%, respectively in the intermediate term.  Concerns over a
material deterioration of the liquidity profile, including reduced
headroom under covenants below 20%, could also prompt a downgrade
of the ratings.  However, taking into account X5's solid business
fundamentals and benefits from the transactions, the global scale
rating is unlikely to be downgraded by more than one notch if at
all.

The last rating action on X5 was implemented on August 21, 2008,
when Moody's changed the outlook on the B1/A1.ru ratings to stable
from positive.

Headquartered in the Netherlands, X5 is the leading multi-format
Russian food retailer.  X5's 2009 net revenues were US$ 8.7
billion, with soft discounter format, supermarkets and
hypermarkets accounting for around 50%, 31% and 19%, respectively.
X5 is a member of the Alfa Group Consortium, one of a few Russia-
focused private industrial and financial conglomerates.  The
parent company of the consortium is the ultimate parent company of
X5.  Alfa Group beneficiary shareholders control 47.9% of X5,
while the management of the latter holds 1.9%.


===========
P O L A N D
===========


BANK MILLENNIUM: Moody's Retains 'D' Financial Strength Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the Baa2 long-term deposit
ratings of Bank Millennium (BCP's Polish subsidiary) on review for
possible downgrade.  The short-term rating of Prime-3 and the Bank
Financial Strength Rating of D were not affected by this rating
action.

Moody's said that the review on Bank Millennium will focus on
assessing the parent's ability (which is reflected by the parent's
BFSR) to support Bank Millennium, as the adverse global economic
conditions are affecting the operating environment of the
Portuguese parent.  However, Moody's note that BCP has been a
supportive parent during the crisis as evidenced by maintaining
its shareholding (65%) in the subsidiary during the recent capital
increase of PLN1 billion (EUR245 million) in February 2010.

Bank Millennium's deposit ratings benefit from three notches of
uplift due to Moody's assessment of the high probability of
parental support as well as due to the high probability of
systemic support as the sixth largest bank in Poland in terms of
total assets.

These ratings have been placed on review for possible downgrade:

Bank Millennium:

  -- Local currency deposit ratings of Baa2
  -- Foreign currency deposit ratings of Baa2

Headquartered in Warsaw, Poland, Bank Millennium reported IFRS
consolidated total assets of PLN44.8 billion (EUR10.8 billion) as
at June- 2010.


=========
S P A I N
=========


AYT COLATERALES: Moody's Assigns (P)C (sf) Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional credit ratings
to these classes of notes issued by AyT Colaterales Global
Hipotecario Caja Granada I, FTA

  -- (P) Aa2 (sf) to the EUR369,100,000 Class A Mortgage Backed
     Floating Rate Notes due 2047

  -- (P) Ba1 (sf) to the EUR18,000,000 Class B Mortgage Backed
     Floating Rate Notes due 2047

  -- (P) Caa3 (sf) to the EUR8,000,000 Class C Mortgage Backed
     Floating Rate Notes due 2047

  -- (P) C (sf) to the EUR4,800,000 Class D Mortgage Backed
     Floating Rate Notes due 2047

                        Ratings Rationale

The ratings of the notes takes into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined
the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement and the portfolio expected loss,
as well as the transaction structure and any legal considerations
as assessed in Moody's cash flow analysis.  The expected portfolio
loss of 3.00% and the MILAN Aaa required Credit Enhancement of
11.00% served as input parameters for Moody's cash flow model,
which is based on a probabilistic lognormal distribution as
described in the report "The Lognormal Method Applied to ABS
Analysis", published in September 2000.

The key drivers for the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement number, which
is in line with other prime Spanish RMBS deals, are (i) the
weighted-average current LTV of 68.74%, with 24.19% of loans above
80% LTV, (ii) the high geographical concentration (Andalusia
represents 86%) and (iii) the weighted average seasoning of 5.01
years.

The key drivers for the expected loss are (i) the already
available performance for this very same transaction, which is
worse than the average reported in the Spain index, (ii) the
static historical information on delinquencies and recoveries
received from the originator for its global mortgage book and
(iii) the weak economic conditions in Spain.  Given the historical
performance of the transaction and the originator's mortgage book,
Moody's believes the assumed expected loss is appropriate for this
transaction.

The strengths of the structure are (i) a reserve fund fully funded
upfront equal to 1.50% of the initial notes balance (it currently
represents 1.60% of the outstanding balance of the notes) to cover
potential shortfall in interest and principal, and (ii) a strong
interest rate swap in place which provides a guaranteed excess
spread (0.60%) above Euribor to the transaction.

The rating addresses the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and principal with
respect of the classes of notes A and B by the legal final
maturity, and payment of interest and principal with respect of
the classes of notes C and D by the legal final maturity.  Moody's
ratings only address the credit risk associated with the
transaction.  Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but
may have a significant effect on yield to investors.

The transaction closed in December 2007 and was initially not
rated by Moody's.  The initial notes balance issued at closing
(shown above next to the assigned rating) amounted to EUR399.9
million.  The outstanding notes balance as of the last payment
date in November 2010 amounts to EUR294.3 million.

Moody's rating analysis of the notes is based on the transaction
structure after the last payment date in November 2010.  The next
payment date will take place in May 2011.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium, which is in line with
the V score assigned for the Spanish RMBS sector.  No sub
components underlying the V Score deviate from the average for the
Spanish RMBS sector.  V-Scores are a relative assessment of the
quality of available credit information and of the degree of
dependence on various assumptions used in determining the rating.
High variability in key assumptions could expose a rating to more
likelihood of rating changes.  The V-Score has been assigned
accordingly to the report "V-Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in
the Major EMEA RMBS Sectors" published in April 2009.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: the model output indicated that
Class A would have achieved Aa2 even if expected loss was as high
as 9.0% (3.0x base case) assuming Milan Aaa CE at 11.0% (base
case) and all other factors remained the same.  Classes B, C and D
would have achieved
The model output further indicated that the Class A would not have
achieved Aa2 with Milan Aaa CE of 15.4% (1.4x base case), and
expected loss of 3.0% (base case).  Classes B, C and D would have
achieved Ba1,
Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.  The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended to
measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time,
but rather how the initial rating of the security might have
differed if key rating input parameters were varied.  Parameter
Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are calculated
by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary rating model.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence report had a
neutral impact on the rating.


CIRSA GAMING: Moody's Gives Positive Outlook; Affirms 'B2' Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to positive from stable the
outlook on the ratings of Cirsa Gaming Corporation S.A. and
related rated entities.  Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed these
ratings of Cirsa: the B2 corporate family rating and probability-
of-default rating; the B3 rating on the company's EUR400 million
worth of 8.75% senior notes, due in 2018, issued by Cirsa Funding
Luxembourg S.A.; and the B3 rating on the company's EUR230 million
worth of 7.875% senior notes, due in 2012, issued by Cirsa Capital
Luxembourg S.A.

"The change in outlook reflects Cirsa's strong operating
performance, which has led to an improvement in its credit
metrics," says Ivan Palacios, a Moody's Vice President-Senior
Analyst and lead analyst for Cirsa.

"In addition, the outlook change reflects the company's publicly
stated intention to maintain reported leverage at around 3.0x net
debt/EBITDA over the medium term, compared with the existing
guidance of below 4.0x," says Mr. Palacios, adding, "It also
assumes that Cirsa will maintain general access to the capital
markets and that, over the short term, it will successfully
address the refinancing of the EUR230 million bond due in July
2012."

Cirsa's unaudited results for the quarter ended September 2010
revealed that the company achieved last-12-months consolidated
EBITDA of EUR245 million in this period.  This represented a 17%
increase compared with the EUR209 million reported in FY 2009.
The company expects to report EBITDA growth of 23% in FY 2010,
improving on the guidance shared with the market at the beginning
of the year.

Cirsa's improved performance, primarily in the casino and bingo
divisions, has been achieved despite a challenging macroeconomic
environment in Spain, and has allowed the company to reduce its
leverage (net debt/EBITDA as reported by Cirsa on the basis of the
unaudited results) to 3.3x in September 2010 from 3.7x in December
2009.  After factoring in Moody's adjustments for operating
leases, Cirsa's debt/EBITDA ratio (as adjusted by Moody's) stood
at 4.3x in September 2010.

The positive outlook incorporates Moody's expectation of a
continued improvement in Cirsa's credit metrics and leverage
reduction.  In the rating agency's view, the company is likely to
achieve these improvements mainly as a result of a growing EBITDA
base, driven by projects that have started generating revenues in
2010 such as Casino de Rosario in Argentina, Casino de Valencia in
Spain, the Mexican electronic bingo halls, and the Video Lottery
Terminals project in Italy.

Upward rating pressure will depend on the company's ability to
operate under a financial profile that is consistent with credit
metrics such as (i) a debt/EBITDA ratio (as adjusted by Moody's)
below 4.0x; and (ii) an EBIT/interest coverage ratio above 2.0x on
a sustainable basis.

Conversely, downward pressure could be exerted on the rating if
Cirsa's leverage were to increase above 5.0x on an adjusted basis
or if the company's EBIT/interest coverage ratio were to decline
below 1.2x, whether as a result of a change in financial policy or
a deterioration in operating performance.  The rating could also
come under pressure if Moody's were to consider Cirsa's liquidity
to have become inadequate to support the company's operating
performance or debt servicing.  Furthermore, failure to
successfully refinance the 2012 bond well in advance of its
contractual maturity could also lead to downward pressure on the
rating.

Moody's previous rating action on Cirsa was implemented on
June 11, 2010, when the rating agency confirmed the company's
ratings with a stable outlook.

Headquartered in Terrassa, Spain, Cirsa is a leading Spanish
gaming company, with substantial operations in Italy and Latin
America.  Cirsa reported net operating revenues of approximately
EUR1.2 billion and EBITDA of EUR245 million in LTM ended September
2010.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


RODOVID BANK: Administration Extended for Three Months
------------------------------------------------------
Daryna Krasnolutska at Bloomberg News, citing Interfax-Ukraine
news agency, reports that Ukraine's central bank said it will
extend administration of PAT Rodovid Bank for three months.

According to Bloomberg, Interfax said the administration is
extended from Dec. 16 through March 15.

Bloomberg relates that the news agency said that Yuriy Raytburg
will remain as an administrator in Rodovid.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 15,
2010, Bloomberg News, citing Ekonomicheskie Izvestia newspaper,
said that the International Monetary Fund urged the Ukrainian
government and the central bank to liquidate Rodovid.

Rodovid Bank is based in Kiev.  The net assets of the bank were
estimated at UAH16,952.2 million as of January 1, 2010, the
credits and debts of clients were valued at UAH5,355.5 million,
and the equity of shareholders was estimated at UAH4,336.4
million, according to Ukrainian News Agency.


* S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Ukrainian City of Lugansk
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its
'B-' long-term issuer credit and 'uaBBB-' Ukraine national scale
ratings, and its '4' recovery rating on the Ukrainian City of
Lugansk based on the currently available data.  S&P subsequently
withdrew the ratings.  The outlook was stable at the time of
withdrawal.

"S&P withdrew the ratings because S&P considers that S&P no longer
receive sufficiently timely and adequate information from Lugansk
in order to further monitor its issuer, issue, and recovery
ratings on the city," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Karen
Vartapetov.

At the time of withdrawal, based on the data S&P had at that time,
the ratings incorporated its base-case scenario, which reflected
its opinion of the city's poor liquidity, low financial
flexibility and predictability stemming from a weak
intergovernmental system, a weak and concentrated economy affected
by the recent market turmoil, and the poor financial position of
municipal utilities.  The ratings were supported by what S&P saw
as Lugansk's modest debt and relatively prudent management in the
local context.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ASHTON MORTON: Set for Administration; BDO Called In
----------------------------------------------------
The Lawyer reports that Ashton Morton Slack has filed to go into
administration.  The Lawyer relates that administrators BDO was
appointed on December 10, 2010, on the administration of the firm,
which had a turnover of GBP7.5 million in 2008 and which also
advises on business, personal injury and private client work.  BDO
partners Dermot Power and Graham Newton are advising.

According to The Lawyer, the news of the current financial
troubles comes three months after Ashton Morton relaunched
Northchurch Financial, a financial services venture with Burley
Financial Services.  Northchurch Financial is understood not to be
affected by any potential administration, the report relates.

The Lawyer says that the law firm was also one of 30 outfits that
made money from providing advice to coalminers who suffered from
respiratory diseases and vibration white finger.  However, the
report discloses, it was found to have been overpaid and was
subsequently forced to repay GBP1.45 million of the revenues
(September 3, 2007).

Last year, four partners -- Jeremy Brooke, Edward Hartley, John
Hodgson and Balginder Kaur -- were referred to the Solicitors
Disciplinary Tribunal by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA)
in respect of their handling of the miners' compensation claims,
the report notes.

The Lawyer adds that two of the partners in question were fined
GBP8,000 each and two were fined GBP4,000 each and were ordered to
pay costs.

Headquartered in Sheffield, Ashton Morton Slack is a five-partner
conveyancing firm.


CEVA GROUP: Moody's Assigns '(P)B1' Rating to US$450 Mil. Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)B1 rating
to the issuance of US$450 million senior secured Notes, due 2017,
by CEVA Group plc.  It has also changed the rating outlook to
positive from stable.

                        Ratings Rationale

The (P)B1 rating on the new Notes reflects that they will rank
pari passu with the existing senior secured facilities (rated B1).
The Notes will be senior to the priority lien Notes (rated Caa1)
issued in October 2009 and to the junior priority Notes (rated
Caa1) issued in March 2010.

The proceeds of the issuance are intended to repay a portion of
the indebtedness under the senior secured credit facilities as
part of the conditions of the recent facility amendment.

The outlook change was prompted by the associated completion of an
amend and extend agreement to the senior secured credit
facilities, leading to an improved debt maturity profile, with no
material near-term debt maturities.  "The change in outlook to
positive from stable reflects Moody's recognition of the company's
ability to access the capital markets and the associated
refinancing of part of the key 2013 debt maturities", says Douglas
Crawford, Moody's lead analyst for CEVA.

The Notes will be jointly and severally guaranteed on a senior
basis by the same subsidiaries that guarantee the senior secured
credit facilities.  At December 31, 2009, these represented 76% of
total assets (58% of total revenue or 50% of total EBITDA before
exceptional items).  Moody's notes that EBITDA guarantor coverage
is weak, although this was negatively affected by the group's
operating difficulties in the US.  The EBITDA generated by the
guarantor group was historically above 50%.

CEVA's Corporate Family Rating and Probability of Default Rating
remain unchanged at Caa1.  This reflects Moody's concerns
regarding the group's leverage in the context of its currently
thin operating margins, which are the result of difficulties
experienced by the logistics market and of strong competition
within the industry.  The rating is also impacted by the high cost
of servicing the group's debt, which may limit near-term free cash
flow generation.  However, the rating is supported by the group's
brand recognition as one of the largest logistics service
providers and its global presence, servicing many of the largest
blue-chip companies in the world, although with a limited market
share in absolute terms.  The positive outlook also reflects
Moody's expectation that improved market conditions in the broader
logistics industry could result in key credit metrics,
particularly financial leverage, reducing over the medium term.

Moody's believes the ratings could potentially be upgraded if
there is improvement in the company's EBITDA generation leading to
financial leverage trending towards 7x and EBITA interest cover
above 1x.  Any upgrade would also anticipate sustained
improvements in the liquidity profile of the group (through sound
cash flow generation) and include an assessment of market
conditions.  A rating downgrade could occur as a result of a
deterioration in one, or a combination of these: (i) market
conditions; (ii) CEVA's liquidity position; (iii) the group's
operating margins; (iv) its cash flow generation; and (v) Moody's
perception of the potential recovery rate for debt holders in the
event of a default

Rating assigned:

Issuer: CEVA Group plc

  - New senior secured Notes rating assigned to new US$450 million
    Notes at (P)B1.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
securities and these ratings reflect Moody's preliminary credit
opinion regarding the transaction only.  Upon a conclusive review
of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign a
definitive rating to the notes.  A definitive rating may differ
from a provisional rating.

Moody's assigned CEVA's ratings by evaluating factors that the
rating agency believes are relevant to the credit profile of the
issuer, such as: (i) the business risk and competitive position of
CEVA; (ii) the capital structure and financial risk profile of the
company; (iii) the projected performance of the company over the
short to medium term; and (iv) management's track record and
tolerance for risk.  Having compared CEVA's attributes with those
of other issuers both within and outside of its core industry,
Moody's believes the company's ratings to be comparable to those
of other issuers of similar credit risk.

CEVA Group plc, based in the Netherlands, is the fourth-largest
integrated logistics provider in the world in terms of revenues
(EUR6.5 billion as at September 30, 2010 on a last-12-months
basis).  CEVA's activities include the former Contract Logistics
business acquired from TNT N.V. during 2006 and the Freight
Management business of EGL, a US-based company that the group
acquired in August 2007.  Apollo, a US-based equity fund, and its
affiliates are the largest shareholders of CEVA, holding
approximately 92% of shares as at Q3 2010.


EUROPEAN DIRECTORIES: Insolvency Filing Hits Junior Lenders
-----------------------------------------------------------
Isabell Witt at Bloomberg News reports that European Directories
BV's insolvency filing in the U.K. last week brings mezzanine debt
losses on LBO loans in the last two years to more than US$1
billion, pushing up borrowing costs on new junior-ranking loans.

Bloomberg says European Directories, whose EUR2 billion (US$2.7
billion) filing Dec. 6 ranks as the largest administration in the
U.K. this year, left mezzanine loan holders with no recovery.

According to Bloomberg, mezzanine lenders to European Directories
lost EUR75 million and second-lien holders lost EUR15 million
after the company relocated its headquarters to London from
Amsterdam.

Mezzanine lenders are already demanding higher interest margins on
new deals as defaults peaked last year, Bloomberg states.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 9,
2010, Bloomberg News said a London judge allowed European
Directories to reorganize its EUR2 billion (US$2.7 billion) debts
in the U.K. in a pre-packaged administration.  A pre-packaged
administration is a pre-arranged plan between a company and
certain creditors to reorganize debt.  Bloomberg said the move
allows lenders, including Lloyds Banking Group Plc and Royal Bank
of Scotland Group Plc, to take over the company in a debt-for-
equity swap.  Macquarie Group Ltd., the private-equity firm that
owned European Directories, will lose its shares under the plan,
according to Bloomberg.  European Directories, the banks and other
senior lenders including Allied Irish Banks Plc and Bank of New
York Mellon Corp.'s Alcentra, agreed to the debt plan in July
after the company missed payments, Bloomberg disclosed.  Second-
lien lenders AMP Capital Investors Ltd. and Hastings Fund
Management Ltd. challenged the plan in September but failed to get
the backing of the U.K. Court of Appeals, Bloomberg said.

European Directories -- http://www.europeandirectories.com/-- is
a pan-European local search and lead generation group with its
headquarters located in London.  The company has 4,750 employees
and over 700,000 customers.


KENT INT'L: Travelodge Acquires Hotel Following Administration
--------------------------------------------------------------
Rob Moore at Business Sale reports that hotel giant Travelodge has
acquired Kent International following its fall into receivership.

According to Business Sale, Travelodge's UK development director,
Tony O'Brien, said, "We have long coveted a site in Ramsgate and
when we were informed that the Kent International had gone into
receivership we acted immediately."  The report relates that it
has leased the hotel from Morden College trustees, who purchased
the hotel from previous owner Rosslane Investments following its
fall into receivership.

"Located on Harbour Parade the hotel is in a prime location and,
following the GBP2-million refurbishment we are undertaking, I am
sure it will quickly become one of the most popular hotels in
Ramsgate," Business Sale quoted Mr. O'Brien as saying.

The former Kent International hotel has now been closed to guests
until next summer in order to allow extensive renovation and
refurbishment to take place, Business Sale adds.

Kent International is a small hotel in Ramsgate.  Currently, it
comprises 57 bedrooms, a restaurant, banqueting suite, two bars
and three meeting rooms.


RADIO MALDWYN: Shareholders Vote to Appoint Liquidators
-------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Radio Maldwyn has gone into liquidation
following an extraordinary general meeting.

BBC News says shareholders of Radio Maldwyn, which has been
broadcasting from a studio in Newtown, Powys, since 1993, were
sent a notice of insolvency last month.

According to BBC News, the meeting approved two resolutions -- to
wind up the company and to appoint liquidators.

The meeting heard a number of companies and a community group have
declared an interest in buying Radio Maldwyn, according to BBC
News.


WESTLER FOODS: Goes Into Administration
---------------------------------------
Insider Media Limited reports that Westler Foods has gone into
administration after it was unable to finance a GBP15 million hole
in its defined benefit pension scheme.  The report relates that
Howard Smith and Mark Firmin, of KPMG's restructuring practice,
were appointed as joint administrators on December 10, 2010, and
are seeking a buyer for the business.

According to Insider Media Limited, nine staff, who are not
directly involved in production, have been made redundant.

The administration was triggered by the company's inability to
fund its defined benefit pension scheme, the report notes.
Insider Media Limited says that an evaluation in early 2009 found
a funding gap of more than GBP15 million that the company has
since sought to address.  However, despite attempts involving
internal and external investment, this has not proved possible,
the report says.

"This is an uncommon and unfortunate situation of a well run and
profitable business being compelled to enter insolvency
specifically because of the scale of its pension deficit.  The
company has a number of extremely interesting contracts so we are
trading the business as a going concern while seeking a buyer,"
Insider Media Limited quoted Howard Smith, joint administrator and
KPMG restructuring associate partner, as saying.

Headquartered in Malton, Westler Foods is a food producer company.
The business employs almost 200 people at its Yorkshire site in
the production of a range of canned and pouched food products for
a series of brand names in addition to its own branded foodservice
offerings, including Westlers, Multi Menu, Tyne, BigMex,
Chesswood, Wayfayrer, Military Rations and Compleat.


* UK: Failure Rate of "Very High Risk" Businesses Drops to 4%
-------------------------------------------------------------
Niamh Hennessy at The Irish Examiner, citing data compiled by
financial data experts Experian, reports that in the United
Kingdom the proportion of "very high risk" businesses has fallen
by over 20% since the start of 2010 to 4% at the end of the third
quarter.

According to The Irish Examiner, figures from Experian show that
British business failures also continued to fall, with 5,259 firms
or 2.7% in every 1,000 failing.


* UK: Sports and Social Clubs Brace For Tough Trading Condition
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Coventry Telegraph reports that insolvency specialists are
anticipating a surge in the number of sports and social clubs
looking for help to avoid catching a business cold this winter.

The Telegraph relates that experts at Cranfield Business Recovery,
in Coventry city centre, said sports and social clubs were feeling
the winter chill and it is working to help many from becoming
ghosts of Christmas past.

According to the report, the company has already seen a four-fold
increase in the number of clubs approaching it for help to guide
them through the tough economic climate.

"I think nationally we've seen sports and social clubs facing
increasingly difficult trading conditions which has resulted in a
significant number ceasing to trade," the Telegraph quotes
Tony Mitchell, managing director of Cranfield Business Recovery,
as saying.  "Over the festive period, sports and social clubs have
traditionally been hives of activity and, although this may well
happen this year, January and February will be a tough trading
period."


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EUROPE: Sovereign Default Costlier Than Debt Restructuring
------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Deen at Bloomberg News reports that European Central Bank
governing council member Christian Noyer said countries pay a
higher price for defaulting on debt than by repaying it,
reinforcing the ECB view that euro nations should rule out
financial restructuring.

"People forget to look at what happens when a country defaults,
which is something I have been studying for several decades,"
Mr. Noyer said Saturday in a speech in Paris, according to
Bloomberg.  "Financial markets make you pay for the default with
higher interest rates.  They make you pay for the present value of
losses, plus a big premium with the uncertainty linked to that.
You pay much more by defaulting than by not defaulting."

Debate over whether countries such as Greece and Ireland can or
should meet their commitments to bondholders has roiled financial
markets in recent weeks as they struggle to sustain debt burdens
that will equal or exceed 100 percent of gross domestic product in
coming years, Bloomberg relates.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
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Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
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Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *