TCREUR_Public/101216.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, December 16, 2010, Vol. 11, No. 248

                            Headlines



F R A N C E

REXEL SA: S&P Upgrades Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB-'


G E R M A N Y

EOP BIODIESEL: Fails to Strike Deal With Bank; Declares Insolvency
LHB INTERNATIONALE: Fitch Affirms 'D/E' Individual Rating
TELE COLUMBUS: Gets U.K. Court Approval for Debt-for-Equity Swap


G R E E C E

GLITNIR BANK: US Judges Tosses Fraud Case Against Johannesson
* GREECE: EU Commission Approves Extension of Rescue Package


I R E L A N D

ALLIED IRISH: Government May Need to Inject EUR3.5 Bil. Capital
ANDERSON VALLEY: Moody's Cuts Rating on US$30.4MM Notes to C (sf)
ANDERSON VALLEY: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR7.6MM Notes to 'C (sf)'
JAZZ III: S&P Downgrades Rating on P Combo Notes to 'B+ (sf)'
ROBECO CDO: Moody's Junks Rating on EUR50MM Combination Notes

STARTS PLC: S&P Withdraws 'CCC- (sf)' Rating on $15 Mil. Notes
* IRELAND: Banks Repaid EUR68.8 Billion to Senior Bondholders


K A Z A K H S T A N

EURASIA INSURANCE: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Rating to 'BB'


L U X E M B O U R G

BREEZE FINANCE: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'B-'
CRC BREEZE: Fitch Gives Negative Outlook; Affirms 'B-' Rating


N E T H E R L A N D S

ING GROEP: Moody's Affirms Preferred Stock Rating at 'Ba1'


R U S S I A

* Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Long-Term Ratings to Russia's Tula Region
* S&P Assigns 'BB+' Issuer Credit Rating to Chelyabinsk Oblast


S P A I N

AYT COLATERALES: Moody's Assigns 'C (sf)' Rating on Class D Notes
CAJASOL: Fitch Cuts Rating on Upper Tier 2 Sub. Debt to 'BB+'


U K R A I N E

* S&P Downgrades Ukrainian City of Odessa's Rating to 'CCC-'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DRACO PLC: S&P Affirms Low-B Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
KIDDERMINSTER HARRIERS: Seeks Financial Aid From Investors
MAYPOLE GROUP: Marco Pierre White in Talks Over Group
ROYAL BANK: FSA to Seek Permission to Release Report on Collapse
UK BANKRUPTCY: Insolvency Service Orders Liquidation

* UK: Bank Bailouts Cost Taxpayers GBP1.5 Billion a Year


X X X X X X X X


* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars


                            *********


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F R A N C E
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REXEL SA: S&P Upgrades Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has upgraded its
long-term corporate credit rating on France-based electrical parts
distributor Rexel S.A. to 'BB-' from 'B+'.  The recovery rating
remains unchanged at '4'.  The 'B' short-term corporate credit
rating was affirmed.  S&P removed the long-term rating from
CreditWatch, where it was placed with positive implications on
Oct. 5, 2010.

"S&P's upgrade reflects Rexel's continuously strong operating
performance so far in 2010 and S&P's expectations that the company
will continue to meet S&P's credit metrics for the 'BB-' rating at
year-end and be able to sustain them thereafter," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Eric Tanguy.

For the first nine months of 2010, the company reported operating
income of EUR359 million, representing a 4.1% margin on sales, a
noticeable improvement from the relatively low 2.3% for the same
period in 2009.  The EBITA margin strengthened to 4.8% (or 4.6% on
a constant and copper-price-adjusted basis), from 4.2% in 2009.
The company reported flat revenues on a like-for-like basis.
Ongoing effects of the company's cost savings played a part in the
improvement of profitability measures.  Management twice revised
upward its full-year guidance on EBITA margin for 2010, to 4.9% on
a constant and copper-price-adjusted basis.  In light of Rexel's
performance for the first nine months, S&P believes this objective
is readily achievable and would put the company on track to return
almost to the level of profitability achieved in 2008 when it
reported a 5.0% EBITA margin.

The company reported net debt of EUR2.4 billion on Sept. 30, 2010,
showing a small EUR150 million year-on-year decrease, with sound
free cash flow generation to date and limited capital intensity
more than covering a negative currency movement of around EUR142
million over the period.

"The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Rexel will continue
to generate sound cash flow from operations and sizable
discretionary cash flow after capital expenditures next year that
it will use partly for deleveraging," said Mr. Tanguy.

Barring very large acquisitions or a change in financial policy
that may be dictated by a change in ownership, S&P think Rexel can
sustainably maintain credit metrics commensurate with the 'BB-'
rating, such as adjusted FFO to debt above 12% and adjusted debt
to EBITDA of less than 5x.

There could be downward pressure on the rating if credit metrics
weaken materially.  This would likely require double-digit market
deterioration in 2011 or a sharp fall in profitability measures,
which S&P currently do not envisage, or a change in financial
policy and of its current focus on debt reduction that may be
caused by a change in main shareholders or very aggressive
acquisitions.  The upside for the rating is in S&P's opinion
currently limited and will be conditional on its gaining greater
visibility about the company's possible shareholding structure in
the medium term.


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G E R M A N Y
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EOP BIODIESEL: Fails to Strike Deal With Bank; Declares Insolvency
------------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that EOP Biodiesel AG has declared insolvency
after failing to reach agreement with its banks about finance.

Insolvency proceedings had been opened at its district court,
Reuters says.  According to Reuters, provisional insolvency
administrator Horst Piepenburg said in a statement the company had
a good chance of continued existence.

Reuters discloses that EOP produces 132,000 tonnes of biodiesel
annually at a plant in Pritzwalk in eastern Germany.  In October,
the company stopped biodiesel production following damage to a
gear unit at its oil mill.

The company said false past strategy had been too much of a burden
combined with the impact of the accident, Reuters reports.  It was
still hoped production could resume when repairs to the oil mill
were completed, the company added.

The company had in past years invested heavily in east European
expansion, Reuters notes.

According to Reuters, the mill produces rapeseed oil which is then
processed into biodiesel.  Without the rapeseed oil, the company
said it could not fulfill biodiesel deliveries to customers.

EOP Biodiesel AG is a Germany-based biodiesel producer.


LHB INTERNATIONALE: Fitch Affirms 'D/E' Individual Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and simultaneously withdrawn Germany-
based LHB Internationale Handelsbank AG's ratings:

  -- Long-term Issuer Default Rating at 'BBB-'
  -- Short-term IDR at 'F3'
  -- Support at '2'
  -- Individual rating at 'D/E'
  -- The Outlook on the Long-term IDR is Stable

LHB's Long- and Short-term IDRs and Support rating are based on
the high probability of support from its Slovenian owner, Nova
Ljubljanska Banka (rated 'A-'/Stable), despite NLB's intention to
withdraw from the German market, which has been redefined as a
non-strategic area of business under NLB's new business strategy.

The Individual rating reflects the risks of LHB's current
strategic reorientation, historically low, and, since 2009,
negative profitability, weak asset quality, dependence on
wholesale funding and repeated capital support from NLB.  A
significant and sustainable improvement of LHB's performance
appears highly unlikely without the bank's set-up being
fundamentally amended.

Frankfurt-based LHB is a niche bank focusing on trade-related
lending, other short-term financing and to a lesser extent payment
transactions.  Its current core geographic areas comprise Germany,
Serbia and Croatia.  Major client groups are SMEs and financial
institutions which are not actively served by LHB's larger
competitors.

LHB's ratings are no longer considered by Fitch to be relevant to
the agency's coverage.


TELE COLUMBUS: Gets U.K. Court Approval for Debt-for-Equity Swap
----------------------------------------------------------------
Isabell Witt at Bloomberg News reports that Tele Columbus GmbH got
approval to restructure EUR1 billion (US$1.2 billion) of loans
from a U.K. court.

Bloomberg relates that the High Court in London ruled on Tuesday
that the company can use the English legal system to reduce its
borrowings in a debt-for-equity swap.

According to Bloomberg, under the plan, lenders will get an equity
stake in exchange for writing down EUR324 million of debt to leave
the company with EUR623 million of borrowings.

Tele Columbus will use a scheme of arrangement under the U.K.
Companies Act, which allows debtors to make changes with at
least 75% of voting creditors, Bloomberg says.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 21,
2010, Bloomberg News said the proposal to swap Tele Columbus's
debt for equity outside of the courts failed to get unanimous
consent.  Creditors led by York Capital Management LLC, Bank of
Ireland Plc and GoldenTree Asset Management LP agreed to freeze
loan payments this year, Bloomberg disclosed.

Tele Columbus -- http://www.telecolumbus.de/-- is a cable TV,
Internet, and phone service provider.  With more than 2 million
subscribers, Tele Columbus is among Germany's top cable providers
(behind Kabel Deutschland and Unitymedia).  It offers analog and
digital cable, high-speed Internet, and cable telephone service.
Both Tele Columbus and PrimaCom are owned by holding company Orion
Cable; Tele Columbus has a presence across northern and western
Germany, while PrimaCom's customers are focused in the eastern
part of the country.  Orion Cable is owned by a holding company
controlled by investment banking firm Nikolaus & Co.  Tele
Columbus was founded in 1985.


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G R E E C E
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GLITNIR BANK: US Judges Tosses Fraud Case Against Johannesson
-------------------------------------------------------------
Rowena Mason at The Telegraph reports that a New York judge has
thrown out a legal case against Jon Asgeir Johannesson, who had
claimed he was the architect of a US$2 billion (GBP1.2 billion)
fraud.

According to The Telegraph, the court decided the case should not
be tried in the U.S., because most of the key players are
Icelanders and it revolves around the collapse of the Icelandic
banks.

The lawsuit was brought by the failed bank Glitnir, which went
down in 2008, and still owes British councils GBP200 million, The
Telegraph discloses.

Mr. Johannesson, a former billionaire, bought up much of the
British high street, including stakes in House of Fraser and
Debenhams, before his Baugur investment firm went bust last year,
The Telegraph relates.  His companies were major shareholders in
Glitnir, and Baugur received vast loans to finance his retail
investments before the bank collapsed, The Telegraph states.

According to The Telegraph, the lawsuit had alleged: "A cabal of
businessmen, led by convicted white-collar criminal Jon Asgeir
Johannesson, engaged in a sweeping conspiracy to wrest control of
Iceland's Glitnir Bank to fill their pockets and prop up their own
failing companies."

It is likely that Glitnir will continue its case in Reykjavik, The
Telegraph says.

Mr. Johannesson strongly denies all claims against him, The
Telegraph notes.

                        About Glitnir Banki

Headquartered in Reykjavik, Iceland, Glitnir banki hf --
http://www.glitnir.is/-- offers an array of financial services to
corporation, financial institutions, investors and individuals.

Iceland's government took control of Glitnir, along with two other
financial institutions -- Landsbanki Islands hf and Kaupthing Bank
hf -- after it failed to obtain short-term funding.  The District
Court of Reykjavik granted a Moratorium order on Glitnir on
Nov. 24 2008.  Glitnir said the Moratorium is not a bankruptcy
proceeding and does not affect its banking licenses or its ability
to operate as a bank.  The Moratorium is a specialized proceeding
under Icelandic law designed to provide it with appropriate global
protection from legal action taken by its creditors, Glitnir
pointed out.

Steinunn Gudbjarsdottir, as the duly authorized foreign
representative for Glitnir banki hf, sought creditor protection
for the bank under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on
November 26, 2008 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 08-14757).  According
to Bloomberg, Glitnir's assets in the United States comprised of
bank accounts and loans provided to U.S. companies.  The company,
Bloomberg citing papers filed with the Court, issued 22 short- and
long-term notes for about US$7 billion in the country.


* GREECE: EU Commission Approves Extension of Rescue Package
------------------------------------------------------------
BreakingNews.ie reports that Greece has won European Union
regulatory approval to extend its bailout scheme for another six
months, up to June of next year.

BreakingNews.ie relates that the EU Commission granted the
extension to Greece's rescue package, saying it was remedying a
"serious disturbance" in the country's economy.

It has also allowed similar schemes across the 27-country bloc to
be extended, BreakingNews.ie notes.


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I R E L A N D
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ALLIED IRISH: Government May Need to Inject EUR3.5 Bil. Capital
---------------------------------------------------------------
Joanna Ossinger at Bloomberg News reports that Stephen Lyons, an
analyst with Dublin-based securities firm Davy, said that Ireland
may need to inject EUR3.5 billion (US$4.7 billion) of capital into
Allied Irish Banks Plc by the end of the year, leaving it with a
90% stake in the nation's second-largest lender.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 15,
2010, the state already has an 18.77% stake in Allied Irish, and
said it's prepared to take control if necessary, according to
Bloomberg News.  Ireland's second-largest lender was ordered in
March by the regulator to raise EUR7.4 billion by the end of the
year, with the Finance Ministry ready to step in if the Dublin-
based bank failed, Bloomberg disclosed.

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c., together with its subsidiaries --
http://www.aibgroup.com/-- conducts retail and commercial banking
business in Ireland.  It also provides corporate lending and
capital markets activities from its head office at Bankcentre and
from Dublin's International Financial Services Centre.  The Group
also has overseas branches in the United States, Germany, France
and Australia, among other locations.  The business of AIB Group
is conducted through four operating divisions: AIB Bank Republic
of Ireland division, Capital Markets division, AIB Bank UK
division, and Central & Eastern Europe division.  In February
2008, the Group acquired the AmCredit mortgage business in the
Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.  In September
2008, the Group also acquired a 49.99% shareholding in BACB.

                           *     *     *

On Dec. 8, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported
that DBRS downgraded the Dated Subordinated Debt and Undated
Subordinated Debt ratings of Allied Irish Banks p.l.c. (AIB or the
Group) to 'B' from 'A' to reflect the elevated risk of adverse
action by the government.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 7,
2010, Moody's Investors Service placed on review for possible
downgrade the D bank financial strength rating of Allied Irish
Banks.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 1,
2010, Fitch Ratings downgraded Allied Irish Banks plc's lower tier
2 subordinated debt to 'B' from 'BB'.  It also downgraded AIB's
upper tier 2 to 'CC' from 'B' Rating Watch Negative and tier 1
debt securities to 'CC' from 'B-' RWN and 'CCC'.  The ratings of
the UT2 and T1 securities were removed from RWN.


ANDERSON VALLEY: Moody's Cuts Rating on US$30.4MM Notes to C (sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded its ratings of three
classes of notes issued by Anderson Valley CDO P.L.C.

The transaction is a corporate synthetic CDO featuring some cash-
like features (excess spread and a more sophisticated priority of
payments including interest diversion tests).

The affected notes are listed below:

Issuer: Anderson Valley CDO P.L.C

  -- US$70M Class S-1 Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously
     on Dec 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- US$42M Class S-2 Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously
     on Dec 22, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- US$30.4M Class E-1 Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     Sep 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The transaction features an event of default provision that sets a
net loss threshold at 10% of the initial notional portfolio
amount.  All of the notes become due and payable at their
redemption prices (i.e., Event of Default under the notes) should
the net loss threshold be breached and should the controlling
class (the super-senior swap counterparty, which is buying
protection on the unfunded portion of the portfolio) exercise its
right to proceed with the acceleration.

The rating actions are the result of increased net loss suffered
by the transaction, which now amounts to 9.16% (from 7.6% in last
rating action), only leaving 0.83% loss buffer before breaching
the net loss trigger.  Consequent to this net loss increase, Class
E-1 is expected to receive no recovery.

Although Moody's considers that the conditions to trigger an event
of default are almost certain to be met, it is uncertain if the
controlling class will opt to exercise its right to proceed with
the acceleration; and it will depend upon the controlling class'
assessment of the cost of unwinding the super senior swap.  Should
the transaction accelerate, the losses on the Class S-1 and Class
S-2 (together, "Class S") notes are expected to be severe.  The
Class S notes are junior to the super-senior credit default swap,
which represent 86% of the portfolio notional amount.  The
unwinding of the super-senior credit default swap is exposed to a
substantial market value risk.

As of October 29, 2009 trustee report, US$260 million of Aaa rated
cash asset is available, with US$60 million drawn from the
liquidity line.  The liquidity line was used to cover losses
without selling cash assets but in turn resulted in a reduction of
the subordination.  The current available cash amount therefore is
approximately US$200 million.  Moody's ran sensitivity analysis
assuming differing levels of market value loss upon super senior
swap unwind and note acceleration.  In cases where the swap
unwinding cost exceed the current available cash amount, the note
holders would not receive any recoveries.

Both the EOD risk and the draw of the liquidity facility result
from the credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.
Currently 4.8% of the portfolio is composed of entities rated Caa1
and below, including MBIA Insurance Corporation, MGM Mirage, iStar
Financials and PMI Group Inc.

Under these methodologies, Moody's relied on a simulation based
framework.  Moody's therefore used CDOROM, to generate default and
recovery scenarios for each asset in the portfolio.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


ANDERSON VALLEY: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR7.6MM Notes to 'C (sf)'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded its ratings of two
classes of notes issued by Anderson Valley CDO II P.L.C.

The transaction is a corporate synthetic CDO featuring some cash-
like features (excess spread and a more sophisticated priority of
payments including interest diversion tests).

The affected notes are listed below:

Issuer: Anderson Valley CDO II (Euro)

  -- EUR28M Class S-1 Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously
     on Dec 22, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- EUR7.6M Class E-1 Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
     Sep 3, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The transaction features an event of default provision that sets a
net loss threshold at 10% of the initial notional portfolio
amount.  All of the notes become due and payable at their
redemption prices (i.e., Event of Default under the notes) should
the net loss threshold be breached and should the controlling
class (the super-senior swap counterparty, which is buying
protection on the unfunded portion of the portfolio) exercise its
right to proceed with the acceleration.

The rating actions are the result of increased net loss suffered
by the transaction, which now amounts to 9.34% (from 6.9% in last
rating action), only leaving 0.66% loss buffer before breaching
the net loss trigger.  Consequent to this net loss increase, Class
E-1 is expected to receive no recovery.

Although Moody's considers that the conditions to trigger an event
of default are almost certain to be met, it is uncertain, if the
controlling class will opt to exercise its right to proceed with
the acceleration; and it will depend upon the controlling class'
assessment of the cost of unwinding the super senior swap.  Should
the transaction accelerate, the losses on the Class S-1 notes are
expected to be severe.  The Class S-1 notes are junior to the
super-senior credit default swap, which represent 86% of the
portfolio notional amount.  The unwinding of the super-senior
credit default swap is exposed to a substantial market value risk.

As of 29 October 2009 trustee report, EUR67.8 million of Aaa rated
cash asset is available, with EUR18.9 million drawn from the
liquidity line.  The liquidity line was used to cover losses
without selling cash assets but in turn resulted in a reduction of
the subordination.  The current available cash amount therefore is
approximately EUR48.9 million.  Moody's ran sensitivity analysis
assuming differing levels of market value loss upon super senior
swap unwind and note acceleration.  In cases where the swap
unwinding cost exceed the current available cash amount, the note
holders would not receive any recoveries.

Both the EOD risk and the draw of the liquidity facility result
from the credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio.
Currently 4.8% of the portfolio is composed of entities rated Caa1
and below, including MBIA Insurance Corporation, MGM Mirage, iStar
Financials and PMI Group Inc.

Under these methodologies, Moody's relied on a simulation based
framework.  Moody's therefore used CDOROM, to generate default and
recovery scenarios for each asset in the portfolio.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


JAZZ III: S&P Downgrades Rating on P Combo Notes to 'B+ (sf)'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions on Jazz III CDO (Ireland) PLC's outstanding EUR171.04
million rated notes.  Specifically, S&P:

* Lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on
  nine classes; and

* Affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its rating on one
  class.

Jazz III CDO (Ireland) is a hybrid cash/synthetic arbitrage
structure.  The collateral manager can purchase cash obligations
(bond and loans), enter into a total return swap, and/or enter
into credit default swaps (either to buy or sell protection).

Of the ratings S&P lowered, the class B-1, C-1, D-1, D-2, E-1, and
E-2 tranche ratings were constrained by the application of the
largest obligor default test, a supplemental stress test S&P
introduced as part of its criteria update.  Class A-1 was affected
by the largest industry default test, another of S&P's
supplemental stress tests.

                           Ratings List

                    Jazz III CDO (Ireland) PLC
     EUR228.9 Million Fixed- and Floating-Rate Notes Series 1

      Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

                            Rating
                            ------
      Class       To                    From
      -----       --                    ----
      A-1         A+ (sf)               AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
      B-1         BBB+ (sf)             AA (sf)/Watch Neg
      C-1         BB+ (sf)              A (sf)/Watch Neg
      D-1         BB+ (sf)              BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
      D-2         BB+ (sf)              BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
      E-1         B+ (sf)               BB (sf)/Watch Neg
      E-2         B+ (sf)               BB (sf)/Watch Neg
      N Combo     BB+ (sf)              BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
      P Combo     B+ (sf)               BB (sf)/Watch Neg

      Rating Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

                            Rating
                            ------
      Class       To                    From
      -----       --                    ----
      S           AAA (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

                         NR -- Not rated.


ROBECO CDO: Moody's Junks Rating on EUR50MM Combination Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded its ratings of on class
of combination notes issued by Robeco CDO VIII Ltd.  The
transaction is a managed synthetic CDO referencing corporate and
sovereign names.  Payments of interest and ultimately principal
are made in accordance with a covenanted priority of payments
sequence.

Issuer: Robeco CDO VIII Ltd

  -- EUR50M Combination Notes due 2011 Notes, Downgraded to Caa3
     (sf); previously on Mar 30, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's explained that the action effected is the result of the
deteriorated situation of the transaction.  Although the credit
quality of the portfolio has slightly improved, as reported in the
Trustee Report dated November 9, 2010, the Outstanding Loss Amount
has reached EUR16.85 million, effectively wiping out the most
subordinated tranche and affecting Class B.  As a result, losses
incurred on the Combination Note reach 12.5%.  Given that (i) the
portfolio manager still has ability to trade and hence increase
losses to the transaction, (i) there is one cash asset (1.25% of
the portfolio) whose maturity exceeds that of the transaction, so
if issuer of this obligation fails to call it before transaction
maturity, the transaction will be exposed to market value risk
upon unwinding the portfolio, and (iii) the time remaining to
maturity is less than one year, Moody's considers the Combination
Note has an expected recovery between 65% and 80%.

In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
with an adjusted weighted average rating factor of 580, and a
weighted average recovery rate of 31.9%.  Standard correlation
assumptions applicable to corporate assets in the CDOROMTM model
have been used.

In terms of sensitivity, an extra loss of EUR7.8 million (4.9% of
the portfolio) would drive the rating one notch lower, while a
recovery of EUR1.85 million through captured excess spread or
trading gains would drive the rating one notch higher.

As this transaction features interest and principal priorities of
payments, Moody's used CDOROMTM , to generate default and recovery
scenarios for each asset in the portfolio and then, Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model in order to compute the associated loss to each
tranche in the structure.  The description of this model can be
found in the methodology "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in August 2009.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


STARTS PLC: S&P Withdraws 'CCC- (sf)' Rating on $15 Mil. Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'CCC- (sf)' credit
rating on STARTS (Ireland) PLC's $15 million credit-linked
floating-rate notes series 2006-23.

The withdrawal follows recent notification to us that the issuer
had fully repurchased the notes.


* IRELAND: Banks Repaid EUR68.8 Billion to Senior Bondholders
-------------------------------------------------------------
Simon Carswell at The Irish Times reports that Minister for
Finance Brian Lenihan has said Irish banks repaid EUR68.8 billion
to senior bondholders and EUR1.4 billion to subordinated
bondholders as their full debt fell due under the two-year blanket
guarantee which ended in September.

The Irish Times says this meant that no bondholder had to share in
the EUR60 billion recapitalization costs of the domestic banks.

"As is normal practice when bonds mature, they are repaid -- in
this instance all were senior bonds and all were Government
guaranteed.  Furthermore, under Irish law senior debt obligations
rank equally with deposits and other creditors," Mr. Lenihan said,
according to The Irish Times.

In reply to a parliamentary question from Labour finance
spokeswoman Joan Burton, Mr. Lenihan said that EUR124 billion of
senior unsecured bank debt was covered under the guarantee, The
Irish Times notes.

A further EUR12 billion of dated subordinated debt was also
guaranteed on September 30, 2008, The Irish Times discloses.

Mr. Lenihan, as cited by The Irish Times, said that EUR25 billion
of senior bank debt was issued under the extended Eligible
Liabilities Guarantee, which covers bonds of up to five years but
does not cover subordinated debt.  He said subordinated
bondholders in the Irish banks had absorbed losses of about EUR7
billion, The Irish Times notes.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


EURASIA INSURANCE: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Rating to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had raised its
long-term counterparty credit and financial strength ratings on
Kazakh insurer Eurasia Insurance Co. to 'BB' from 'BB-'.  The
outlook is stable.  At the same time, the Kazakhstan national
scale rating was raised to 'kzA' from 'kzA-'.

"The upgrade reflects what S&P see as a general improvement in the
company's financial profile, mainly trough improvements in the
quality and liquidity of the investment portfolio," said Standard
& Poor's credit analyst Victor Nikolskiy.  "In addition, there has
been an improvement in relative capitalization, given less-rapid
growth in prospective exposures than S&P previously anticipated;
and its view of improved macroeconomic growth prospects and a
stabilizing operating environment in Kazakhstan."

The ratings continue to reflect economic and industry risks in the
domestic market.  Although it has reduced, high credit risk--in
particular exposure to the domestic banking sector--still affects
Eurasia, given its large cash deposits with banks.

"The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that improved
macroeconomic growth prospects in Kazakhstan over the medium term
and the stabilized operating environment have reduced the pressure
on Eurasia's financial and business profiles," added
Mr. Nikolskiy.

It also incorporates S&P's view that Eurasia will maintain its
position as the leading commercial insurer in Kazakhstan, with a
good operating performance, good capitalization relative to
moderate business growth, and maintenance of at least the current
quality across the investment portfolio.

S&P would take a negative rating action if Eurasia's asset quality
or operating performance were to deteriorate significantly or if
economic and industry risk in the CIS region were to intensify
again.

A positive rating action would depend on the quality of
investments and on improvements in Eurasia's competitive position.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


BREEZE FINANCE: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'B-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Breeze Finance S.A.'s class A and B
notes.  The Outlook on both classes of notes is Negative.

  -- EUR251.9m class A (XS0294895999) downgraded to 'BB-' from
     'BB'; Outlook Negative

  -- EUR79m class B (XS0294895726) downgraded to 'B-' from 'B';
     Outlook Negative

The downgrades reflect Fitch's opinion that the original energy
production forecasts over-estimated the portfolio's actually
achievable energy yield.  The resulting forecasted debt service
coverage ratio places both tranches at the lower end of the
respective rating categories when compared with similar wind farm
transactions rated by Fitch.  The Negative Outlooks on both
classes of notes primarily reflect the transaction's continuing
underperformance against base case expectations as well as the
current lack of clarity on the possible consequences on Breeze 3
of some German insolvency law provisions.

Fitch is aware that certain German insolvency law provisions
referring to the concept of "over-indebtedness" (Ueberschuldung)
may have negative consequences on the rights of Breeze 3's
noteholders.  These provisions foresee that if a German legal
entity is either unable to pay its obligations when due, or if its
liabilities exceed its assets, then management must promptly file
for insolvency.  The German Breeze 3 borrower is currently "over-
indebted" as a result of high depreciation in the early years of
project operation and lower than expected debt amortization.
Therefore, the strict interpretation of the insolvency law would
have required the company to subordinate funds at the end of 2009
(in effect, a form of debt-for-equity swap) in order to avoid the
legal obligation to file for insolvency.  This situation was
avoided due to the relaxation of the insolvency law in 2008, when
the test for "over-indebtedness" was mitigated by adding an
exception in the case of an overall positive prognosis for
business continuation.

This change is expected to last until 2013, after which there
remains uncertainty about the insolvency law provisions and their
impact on the German Breeze 3 borrower.  Fitch is aware that the
market expectation is for the revised provisions to remain in
place or at least for the 2013 time limit to be extended.
However, the agency lacks clarity at this point on the extent of
the remedies that the German Breeze 3 borrower may eventually need
to put in place to preserve its solvency position and will seek to
develop an active dialogue with the issuer on this matter.


CRC BREEZE: Fitch Gives Negative Outlook; Affirms 'B-' Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised its Outlook on CRC Breeze Finance S.A.'s
EUR36m class B notes (XS0253496441) to Negative and affirmed the
rating at 'B-'.  Fitch has also affirmed the EUR252m class A notes
(XS0253493349) at 'BB-' with a Negative Outlook.

The rating actions primarily reflect the current lack of clarity
on the possible consequences on Breeze 2 of some German insolvency
law provisions as well as the transaction's continuing
underperformance against base case expectations.

As anticipated by Fitch at the time of the July 2010 review, net
revenues from the operation of the wind farms proved insufficient
to make the full debt service payment on the class A and class B
notes at the November 2010 payment date.  The funds available to
Breeze 2 were enough to meet the debt service obligations on Class
A only (without drawings on the dedicated cash reserve).  The
scheduled EUR3.6 million interest and principal payments on Class
B were deferred, resulting in a cumulated Class B deferred amount
of around EUR6 million since transaction closing.  The class A
debt service reserve account remains partially funded at
approximately EUR11 million (against the required EUR13.2 million)
following the November 2009 drawing.

Breeze 2 has informed Fitch that it is currently investigating its
position with respect to the German insolvency law provisions
referring to the concept of "over-indebtedness" (Ueberschuldung).
These foresee that if a German legal entity is either unable to
pay its obligations when due, or if its liabilities exceed its
assets, then the management must promptly file for insolvency.
The German Breeze 2 borrower is currently "over-indebted" as a
result of high depreciation in the early years of project
operation and lower than expected debt amortization.  Therefore,
strict interpretation of the insolvency law would have required
the company to subordinate funds at the end of 2009 (in effect, a
form of debt-for-equity swap) in order to avoid the legal
obligation to file for insolvency.  This situation was avoided due
to the relaxation of the insolvency law in 2008, when the test for
"over-indebtedness" was mitigated by adding an exception in the
case of an overall positive prognosis for business continuation.

This change is expected to last until 2013 after which there
remains uncertainty about the insolvency law provisions and their
impact on the German Breeze 2 borrower.  Fitch is aware that the
market expectation is for the revised provisions to remain in
place or at least for the 2013 time limit to be extended.
However, the agency lacks clarity at this point on the extent of
the remedies that the German Breeze 2 borrower may eventually need
to put in place to preserve its solvency position.  Breeze 2 is
currently developing an updated and revised financial model aimed
at forecasting with greater precision the company's future
financial and accounting position.  Fitch expects to employ this
tool and to engage in discussions with Breeze 2 during H111 to
assess more precisely the possible impacts of the German
borrower's position on the rights of class A and class B
noteholders.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ING GROEP: Moody's Affirms Preferred Stock Rating at 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the A2 insurance financial
strength ratings of the US life insurance subsidiaries of ING
Groep N.V. (senior debt at A1, stable) and the Baa1 senior rating
of ING Verzekeringen N.V., but changed the outlook on these
ratings to negative from developing.  Other insurance-affiliated
ratings were also affirmed with a negative outlook, with the
exception of the A1 senior debt rating of Lion Connecticut
Holding, Inc. which is guaranteed by ING Group, and has a stable
outlook, the Ba1 preferred stock rating of Equitable of Iowa
Capital Trust II and the Ba1 subordinated debt of ING Insurance,
whose outlooks are positive.

The rating affirmation and outlook change to negative follow a
number of ING Group announcements regarding its insurance
operations, including a new 'base plan' for two separate listings
-- one US focused and one European led IPO -- by 2012, as well as
sizable charges in 3Q10 and expected in 4Q10 related to its U.S.
insurance operations.

Commenting on the rating affirmation for ING US, Moody's said it
was based on the group's well-established, and in some cases,
strong positions in certain sectors of the U.S. retirement
services and life insurance markets, as well as strong regulatory
capital adequacy, as measured by NAIC Risk Based Capital Ratios.
According to Vice President and Senior Credit Officer, Laura
Bazer: "Parental capital support received by ING US, particularly
during the financial crisis, together with additional macro
hedging for its legacy variable annuity (VA) business, has helped
the company rebuild capitalization as it moves towards public
ownership." Moody's would expect ING Group to continue to provide
support to ING US -- in the form of commercial paper and other
debt guarantees, capital and/or liquidity, if it should be needed,
at least until the IPO is completed.

The rating agency also noted positively ING US' recent initiatives
to exit or de-emphasize non-core, and/or underperforming
businesses (i.e., reinsurance, institutional investment products,
etc.), although this will also result in a smaller, less
diversified business.  The A2 IFS rating on the U.S. subsidiaries
represents their stand-alone, intrinsic credit profile, given ING
Group's plans for their ultimate divestiture.

Commenting on the change in outlook for ING US to negative from
developing, Moody's said it was triggered by ING Group's
clarification of its divestiture plan for its global insurance
operations.  In the past, Moody's had placed greater weight on the
possibility of a trade sale among divestiture options.  Given ING
Group's focus on an IPO for ING US, the developing outlook --
which had incorporated the possibility of a sale of ING US to a
higher-rated acquirer -- is no longer appropriate.

Instead, the rating agency said a negative outlook is now
appropriate because - although core earnings have shown recent
signs of improvement -- ING US's net income remains weak, due to
both continuing legacy variable annuity issues, as well as above-
average investment losses, largely from structured securities.
Charges taken in 3Q10 and expected in 4Q10 will continue to
depress earnings and internal capital generation.  Moody's pointed
out that the outlook on ING US' ratings would have been negative
as of October 2009, excluding the possibility of a trade sale.
The current negative outlook also incorporates the uncertainty and
execution risk associated with the IPO process.

In terms of the change in outlook of ING Insurance -- the holding
company for the insurance subsidiaries globally -- Moody's said
that the negative outlook primarily reflects pressures on the US
insurance operations.  Given the uncertainty about the ultimate
structure of the group following the divestiture of the insurance
operations, the senior debt rating of ING Insurance currently
reflects the combined credit strength of the group's various
insurance operating entities.

The Ba1 preferred stock rating of Equitable of Equitable of Iowa
Capital Trust II and the Ba1 subordinated debt of ING Insurance
reflect Moody's opinion on the risk of coupon deferral on these
hybrid securities.  The positive outlook reflects the possibility
that this rating may be upgraded when the execution risk
associated with the group's restructuring process diminishes.

These factors could result in a downgrade of ING US' ratings: 1)
the erosion of ING US' business franchise and distribution,
resulting in declining core retirement product and life insurance
sales and operating earnings; 2) returns on capital consistently
in the low single digits; 3) asset losses of $1 billion in 2011;
4) RBC ratio falling below 325%; or 5) consolidated financial
leverage above 30% and earnings coverage below 4x.

Because the outlook is negative, an upgrade of ING US' ratings is
not likely.  However, these factors could bring it back to stable:
1) improvement in core product earnings and stabilization of non-
core product earnings (i.e., legacy VA), resulting in consistent
return on capital in the mid-single digits; 2) RBC consistently at
or above 325%; and 3) financial leverage of less than 30% and
earnings coverage of greater than 4x.

These ratings were affirmed with a negative outlook from
developing:

  -- ING Life Insurance & Annuity Company: insurance financial
     strength rating at A2;

  -- ING USA Annuity and Life Insurance Company: insurance
     financial strength rating at A2, short-term insurance
     financial strength ratings at P-1;

  -- Security Life of Denver Insurance Company: insurance
     financial strength rating at A2;

  -- Reliastar Life Insurance Company: insurance financial
     strength rating at A2;

  -- Reliastar Life Insurance Company of New York: insurance
     financial strength rating at A2;

  -- ING USA Global Funding Trust 3: senior secured debt rating
     A2;

  -- ING Security Life Institutional Funding: senior secured
     rating at A2 and P(A2);

  -- ING Verzekeringen N.V.: senior debt rating at Baa1; short-
     term rating for commercial paper at (P)Prime-2;

  -- ING America Insurance Holdings, Inc.: senior debt rating
      (guaranteed by ING Verzekeringen N.V.) at (P)Baa1; rating
     for Euro commercial paper (guaranteed by ING Verzekeringen
     N.V.) at (P)Prime-2; rating for U.S. commercial paper
      (guaranteed by ING Verzekeringen N.V.);

  -- Lion Connecticut Holdings, Inc.: long-term issuer rating at
     Baa2.

This rating was affirmed with a stable outlook:

  -- Lion Connecticut Holdings, Inc.: senior unsecured debt rating
      (guaranteed by ING Groep NV) at A1.

These ratings were affirmed with a positive outlook:

  -- Equitable of Iowa Companies Capital Trust II: Ba1 cumulative
     preferred stock (with optional coupon deferral provision)
     rating.;

  -- ING Verzekeringen NV: Ba1 cumulative dated subordinated debt
     securities with optional coupon deferral provision.

ING Life Insurance & Annuity Company, ING USA Annuity and Life
Insurance Company, Reliastar Life Insurance Company, Reliastar
Life Insurance Company of New York, and Security Life of Denver
Insurance Company are all wholly indirectly-owned life insurance
subsidiaries of ING Groep, N.V.  Based in Amsterdam, ING Groep
N.V. had total assets of EUR1,261 billion at 3Q10 and reported net
income of EUR2.78 billion for the nine months ending September 30,
2010.

Based in Amsterdam, ING Verzekeringen N.V., had total consolidated
assets amounting to EUR326 billion at end-September 2010 and
reported a net loss of EUR588 million on a consolidated basis for
the nine months ending September 30, 2010.

The last rating actions on ING Insurance and ING US took place on
October 27, 2009, when Moody's downgraded the insurance financial
strength ratings of ING Group's US life insurance operating
companies to A2 from A1 and ING Verzekeringen's senior debt to
Baa1 from A2 and assigned a developing outlook.  ING
Verzekeringen's short-term Prime-1 debt rating was also downgraded
to Prime-2.  The last rating actions on the subordinated
securities took place on February 2, 2010, when Moody's confirmed
the Ba1 ratings of ING Verzekeringen NV's subordinated debt
securities and Equitable of Iowa Companies Capital Trust II's
preferred stocks with a positive outlook.  The B1 rating of ING
Capital Funding Trust III's trust preferred securities was also
confirmed with a positive outlook.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


* Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Long-Term Ratings to Russia's Tula Region
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russia's Tula Region Long-term foreign
and local currency ratings of 'BB-', a Short-term foreign currency
rating of 'B' and a National Long-term rating of 'A+(rus)'.  The
Outlooks for the Long-term ratings are Stable.

The ratings on Tula Region reflect the relatively small scale of
its budget, the deterioration of operating performance in 2009 and
the short-term profile of its outstanding debt.  However, the
ratings also factor in the expected recovery of budget performance
in 2010, moderate direct risk burden and low contingent
liabilities.

Fitch notes that the recovery of budgetary performance and
maintaining the operating margin at about 10%, coupled with a
lengthening of the debt maturity profile would be rating positive.
Conversely, continuing weak budgetary performance caused by an
inability to control operating expenditure growth and a
significant increase in the debt burden would lead to downward
rating pressure.

In 2009, the region's budget performance deteriorated due to the
overall economic downturn.  Tax proceeds, the major source of
region's operating revenue, declined by 19%.  Tula recorded a
deficit before debt variation of 7.9% of total revenue and
negative current balance in 2009.  Based on economic recovery
trends and actual execution of the budget during the first nine
months of 2010, Fitch expects the region to restore its operating
performance in 2010.  The operating margin should increase to 6.8%
in 2010 (2009: 0.2%), driven by tax revenue growth, and to 7%-8%
in 2011 and 2012.

The region's direct risk almost tripled in 2009 and 2010 and
reached RUB6.6 billion (2008: RUB2.1 billion).  Despite a
significant increase of the debt burden in absolute terms, in
relative amounts, it remains manageable, accounting for 23% of
current revenue in 2010.  However, the region's debt has a short
maturity horizon by international standards, as it is mostly
composed of bank loans with one-year maturity.

Fitch expects a deficit before debt variation averaging 6% of
total revenue for 2010-2012, which means increase of Tula's direct
risk to RUB10 billion in absolute debt amount or to about 30% of
current revenue in 2012.  Contingent liabilities, which includes
guarantees issued and debt of public sector entities will remain
low.

Tula is located in the centre of the European part of the Russian
Federation.  The region possesses a well diversified and
industrialized local economy.  It benefits from close proximity to
Moscow, the country's capital.  It accounted for 0.7% of the RF's
GDP in 2008 and 1.1% of its population.


* S&P Assigns 'BB+' Issuer Credit Rating to Chelyabinsk Oblast
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had assigned its
'BB+' long-term issuer credit rating and 'ruAA+' Russia national
scale rating to Chelyabinsk Oblast, an industrial region in
Russia's Urals Federal District.  The outlook is stable.

"The ratings are constrained by the oblast's economic
concentration and exposure to a single taxpayer, which results in
high revenue and budgetary performance volatility," said Standard
& Poor's credit analyst Alexandra Balod.

Financial flexibility is low under Russia's developing, imbalanced
system of interbudgetary relations.

The oblast's strong liquidity position, low debt burden, and
demonstrated ability to control expenditures support the ratings.

"The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that resumed tax revenue
growth would support Chelyabinsk Oblast's budgetary performance,
and that management would maintain the oblast's strong liquidity
position and low debt burden in line with its conservative plans,"
added Ms. Balod.

S&P could raise the ratings if the oblast improves its financial
performances, underpinning them with clear, documented policies
with the view to structurally reducing its exposure to the
financial and cash volatility that currently stems from economic
concentration.

S&P could lower the ratings if the oblast depletes its ample cash
reserves, especially as a result of loosened control over
expenditures and deterioration of financial performance, or if the
debt burden increases significantly beyond S&P's forecasts.


=========
S P A I N
=========


AYT COLATERALES: Moody's Assigns 'C (sf)' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive credit ratings
to these classes of notes issued by AyT Colaterales Global
Hipotecario Caja Granada I, FTA

  -- Aa2 (sf) to the EUR369,100,000 Class A Mortgage Backed
     Floating Rate Notes due 2047

  -- Ba1 (sf) to the EUR18,000,000 Class B Mortgage Backed
     Floating Rate Notes due 2047

  -- Caa3 (sf) to the EUR8,000,000 Class C Mortgage Backed
     Floating Rate Notes due 2047

  -- C (sf) to the EUR4,800,000 Class D Mortgage Backed Floating
     Rate Notes due 2047

                        Ratings Rationale

The ratings of the notes takes into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined
the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement and the portfolio expected loss,
as well as the transaction structure and any legal considerations
as assessed in Moody's cash flow analysis.  The expected portfolio
loss of 3.00% and the MILAN Aaa required Credit Enhancement of
11.00% served as input parameters for Moody's cash flow model,
which is based on a probabilistic lognormal distribution as
described in the report "The Lognormal Method Applied to ABS
Analysis", published in September 2000.

The key drivers for the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement number, which
is in line with other prime Spanish RMBS deals, are (i) the
weighted-average current LTV of 68.74%, with 24.19% of loans above
80% LTV, (ii) the high geographical concentration (Andalusia
represents 86%) and (iii) the weighted average seasoning of 5.01
years.

The key drivers for the expected loss are (i) the already
available performance for this very same transaction, which is
worse than the average reported in the Spain index, (ii) the
static historical information on delinquencies and recoveries
received from the originator for its global mortgage book and
(iii) the weak economic conditions in Spain.  Given the historical
performance of the transaction and the originator's mortgage book,
Moody's believes the assumed expected loss is appropriate for this
transaction.

The strengths of the structure are (i) a reserve fund fully funded
upfront equal to 1.50% of the initial notes balance (it currently
represents 1.60% of the outstanding balance of the notes) to cover
potential shortfall in interest and principal, and (ii) a strong
interest rate swap in place which provides a guaranteed excess
spread (0.60%) above Euribor to the transaction.

The rating addresses the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and principal with
respect of the classes of notes A and B by the legal final
maturity, and payment of interest and principal with respect of
the classes of notes C and D by the legal final maturity.  Moody's
ratings only address the credit risk associated with the
transaction.  Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but
may have a significant effect on yield to investors.

The transaction closed in December 2007 and was initially not
rated by Moody's.  The initial notes balance issued at closing
(shown above next to the assigned rating) amounted to EUR399.9
million.  The outstanding notes balance as of the last payment
date in November 2010 amounts to EUR294.3 million.

Moody's rating analysis of the notes is based on the transaction
structure after the last payment date in November 2010.  The next
payment date will take place in May 2011.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium, which is in line with
the V score assigned for the Spanish RMBS sector.  No sub
components underlying the V Score deviate from the average for the
Spanish RMBS sector.  V-Scores are a relative assessment of the
quality of available credit information and of the degree of
dependence on various assumptions used in determining the rating.
High variability in key assumptions could expose a rating to more
likelihood of rating changes.  The V-Score has been assigned
accordingly to the report "V-Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in
the Major EMEA RMBS Sectors" published in April 2009.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: the model output indicated that
Class A would have achieved Aa2 even if expected loss was as high
as 9.0% (3.0x base case) assuming Milan Aaa CE at 11.0% (base
case) and all other factors remained the same.  Classes B, C and D
would have achieved
The model output further indicated that the Class A would not have
achieved Aa2 with Milan Aaa CE of 15.4% (1.4x base case), and
expected loss of 3.0% (base case).  Classes B, C and D would have
achieved Ba1,
Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.  The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended to
measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time,
but rather how the initial rating of the security might have
differed if key rating input parameters were varied.  Parameter
Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are calculated
by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary rating model.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence report had a
neutral impact on the rating.


CAJASOL: Fitch Cuts Rating on Upper Tier 2 Sub. Debt to 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros San
Fernando de Guadalajara, Huelva, Jerez y Sevilla's Long-term
Issuer Default rating to 'BBB' from 'A-' and Short-term IDR to
'F3' from 'F2'.  At the same time, the agency has affirmed its
Individual rating at 'C', Support rating '3' and Support Rating
Floor 'BB+'.  The Outlook on the Long-term IDR is Negative.  A
full list of rating actions is detailed at the end of this
comment.

The rating actions reflect the deterioration in the caja's asset
quality, which has suffered from a sharp downturn in the Spanish
economy and property sector, with an impaired loans ratio of 7% at
end-H110 (9.4% including foreclosed assets), exposure to the
construction and real estate sectors (21% of lending) and revenue
pressure from low interest rates and subdued lending and the need
to continue to build up loan impairment reserves, amid muted
growth prospects of the Spanish economy.  The caja also needs to
reduce its cost base, which will put pressure on performance,
although it has scope to realize some capital gains.

The ratings also consider the caja's sound franchise in its home
provinces, good banking revenues, low single name risk
concentration, adequate funding and liquidity and good capital
base, although Fitch eligible capital is supported by hybrid
instruments and revaluation reserves.

In mid-November 2010, Cajasol and Banca Civica Group (an
institutional protection scheme formed by three cajas: Caja de
Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Navarra, Caja Geral de Cajarias and
Caja de Ahorros Municipal de Burgos; rated 'A-'/Stable) announced
their agreement to consolidate their businesses.  Fitch will take
action on Cajasol's and Banca Civica's ratings once more detailed
information becomes available and approval has been given by the
caja's general assemblies.

The caja's pre-impairment profitability decreased slightly in
H110, due to the narrowing of its net interest margin (NIM)
resulting from higher funding costs.  However, net interest income
is protected by 66% of lending having interest rate floors.  On
the other hand, profitability was affected by high loan impairment
charges, partly covered by the release of a generic reserve, and
provisions for foreclosed assets.  Fitch expects impairments to
remain high, but the caja still has some generic reserves.

Cajasol's loan portfolio is granular, with 54% of the loan book to
individuals and low-risk concentration in single names.  There is
concentration in the real estate and construction sectors, albeit
having declined to 21% of loans at end-H110 from 25% at end-Q109,
helped by asset foreclosures.  Asset quality indicators were worst
than its peers' as the region in which the caja mainly operates
has been more affected by the recession and unemployment.

Cajasol is mainly funded by a large deposit base, which together
with bonds placed to retail customers, represented 79% of end-H110
loans (excluding securitization and mediation loans).  Wholesale
funding maturities are generally diversified.  For 2011 and 2012,
the caja expects to offset them with growth in deposits and debt
securities redemptions.  At end-Q310, the caja had EUR1.2bn
available-to-discount assets at the ECB and could increase them by
EUR3.3bn.

Cajasol, headquartered in Seville (Andalusia), is Spain's 12th-
largest caja by total end-H110 assets.  It is retail focused, with
717 branches and 4,486 staff at end-H110.

The rating actions on the Cajasol and its debt issues are:

  -- Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A-'; Outlook
     Negative

  -- Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F3' from 'F2'

  -- Individual rating: affirmed at 'C'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'

  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BB+'

  -- Senior unsecured debt: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'A-'

  -- Upper tier 2 subordinated debt: downgraded to 'BB+' from
     'BBB'

  -- Preferred Stock: downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BBB-'

  -- State-guaranteed debt: affirmed at 'AA+'

In Fitch's rating criteria, a bank's standalone risk is reflected
in Fitch's Individual ratings and the prospect of external support
is reflected in Fitch's Support ratings.  Collectively these
ratings drive Fitch's Long- and Short-term IDRs.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


* S&P Downgrades Ukrainian City of Odessa's Rating to 'CCC-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its long-
term issuer credit rating on the Ukrainian City of Odessa to 'CCC-
' from 'CCC+'.  At the same time, S&P lowered its Ukraine national
scale rating on the city to 'uaCCC-' from 'uaBB'.  In addition,
the ratings have been placed on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

"The negative rating actions reflect S&P's belief that the
likelihood of Odessa securing a timely refinancing for its foreign
currency-denominated bank loan is low," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Karen Vartapetov.

In S&P's opinion, a failure to secure refinancing is likely to
translate into a debt restructuring.  However, S&P note that the
current terms of the restructuring plan, as recently drafted by
the city's assembly, would fall into the category of what S&P
classify as a distressed exchange offer.  This, in S&P's view,
would be the equivalent of a default.

The City of Odessa is facing material refinancing needs.  By the
end of December 2010, the amount of debt maturing will total Swiss
franc 10 million (Ukrainian hryvnia UAH80 million); a portion of
which is a bullet repayment from the CHF50 million bank loan and
the remaining tranche of a 2005 bond issue totaling UAH5 million.

"S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placement within the next
few weeks," said Mr. Vartapetov.  "Further rating actions could
depend on the terms of the debt restructuring proposed to the
city's creditors."


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


DRACO PLC: S&P Affirms Low-B Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised and removed from
CreditWatch positive its credit ratings on DRACO (ECLIPSE 2005-4)
PLC's class B and C notes.  At the same time, S&P affirmed the
ratings on the other classes of notes.

The rating actions follow the prepayment of the Trafalgar loan in
August (three years ahead of its scheduled maturity date), which
occurred as a result of the sale of the underlying property
securing that loan.  The loan was the second-largest loan in the
pool, with an outstanding securitized debt balance of GBP95.34
million (representing 36.8% of the pool by balance).

The cash manager applied the loan proceeds to the notes in
October: Half to the class A notes and half on a pro rata basis to
all six classes of notes.  As a consequence, in S&P's view the
credit characteristics of the class B and C notes have improved
and S&P has raised its ratings on the class B and C notes
accordingly.  S&P placed these classes of notes on CreditWatch
positive in anticipation of the partial note redemption.

DRACO (ECLIPSE 2005-4) is a U.K. true sale transaction that closed
in December 2005.  At close, the issuer acquired five loans
secured by 36 properties in the U.K. Since closing, two of the
loans have fully repaid and the outstanding note balance is
GBP163.7 million.  The final maturity date of the notes falls in
October 2017.

                           Ratings List

                    DRACO (ECLIPSE 2005-4) PLC
GBP284.978 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

       Ratings Raised and Removed From CreditWatch Positive

                           Rating
                           ------
           Class      To             From
           -----      --             ----
           B          AA+ (sf)       AA (sf)/Watch Pos
           C          AA- (sf)       A (sf)/Watch Pos

                         Ratings Affirmed

                       Class      Rating
                       -----      ------
                       A          AAA (sf)
                       D          BBB (sf)
                       E          BB+ (sf)
                       F          BB (sf)


KIDDERMINSTER HARRIERS: Seeks Financial Aid From Investors
----------------------------------------------------------
Footballtradedirectory.com reports that Kidderminster Harriers
Football Club has appealed to investors in order to find
GBP150,000 the club needs before the end of December.

If the club were to find such funds, they would then need to find
a further GBP50,000 by the end of January.

"We're taking all avenues we possibly can at the moment and are
talking to potential investors.  But I have to say that at this
present moment in time it is looking like a very tall order,"
Harriers director Mark Serrell told BCC Sport, according to the
report.

According to footballtradedirectory.com, the club has appealed to
fans and together with the Kidderminster Harriers Independent
Supporters Trust (KHIST) is asking fans to donate a minimum of
GBP100, although treasurer Steve Millington conceded there has
been little interest.

"We have had a very limited response so far to be honest but that
is no more than I would have expected given the time of year," he
told BBC Hereford and Worcester, footballtradedirectory.com
reports.  "We're always hopeful that more people will come
forward."

Footballtradedirectory.com adds that Harriers will face a
Conference panel over their Financial Reporting Initiative
relating to the 2009-10 season.


MAYPOLE GROUP: Marco Pierre White in Talks Over Group
-----------------------------------------------------
Paul Charity at Morning Advertiser reports, citing industry
sources, that Marco Pierre White has emerged as the front-runner
to snap up the five-strong Maypole Group from administration.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on October 29,
2010, The Publican said that Baker Tilly Restructuring and
Recovery has been appointed as administrators of Maypole Group plc
after it has gone into administration.

Morning Advertiser relates that Maypole fell into administration
in October after Clydesdale bank demanded the immediate repayment
of its loans.  It was delisted from the Alternative Investment
Market last week, the report says.

Mr. White, the famous chef, is believed to have entered a period
of exclusivity to buy the group of rural country inns, which would
be likely to operate as part of his joint venture with independent
pub company Powder Train,

Maypole Group plc was founded in November 2003, with the intention
of being an acquisition vehicle for UK countryside hotels with
restaurants or pubs attached.


ROYAL BANK: FSA to Seek Permission to Release Report on Collapse
----------------------------------------------------------------
Harry Wilson at The Telegraph reports that the Financial Services
Authority is to contact Royal Bank of Scotland to get its
permission for the public release of a report into the bank's
collapse.

According to The Telegraph, Hector Sants, chief executive of the
FSA, will ask RBS Chief Executive Stephen Hester whether he has
any objection to the results of the regulator's 18-month
investigation being made public.

Mr. Sants' move came after Andrew Tyrie MP, chairman of the
Treasury Select Committee, wrote on Monday to FSA chairman Lord
Adair Turner asking why more of the report could not be made
public, The Telegraph notes.

The Telegraph relates that in a speech on Tuesday night, Mr. Tyrie
said he had received confirmation from the FSA that it would be
pursuing the matter with RBS.

"It is in the public interest that as much as possible of the
findings of this investigation be made public.  All of those
involved in regulation need to learn the lessons from the
catalogue of mistakes which necessitated a huge taxpayer-funded
bail-out," wrote Mr. Tyrie in his letter to Lord Turner, according
to The Telegraph.

RBS's consent is seen as an important part of the process of
making the FSA's investigation public, although several other
confidential sources will have to be contacted for the full
investigation to be made public, The Telegraph notes.

Under the terms of the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000,
individuals and organizations contributing to an FSA investigation
must give their permission before a report can be made public, The
Telegraph states.

Mr. Tyrie's intervention follows a letter last week from Business
Secretary Vince Cable to Lord Turner asking him to account for the
regulator's reasons for not making more of its investigations
public, The Telegraph relates.

The public furor followed a one-page release from the FSA nearly
two weeks ago in which it said it had completed its investigation
into RBS's failure and had found no grounds to pursue any
enforcement action against any of the bank's senior managers or
directors, The Telegraph recounts.

                            About RBS

The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc (NYSE:RBS) --
http://www.rbs.com/-- is a holding company of The Royal Bank of
Scotland plc (Royal Bank) and National Westminster Bank Plc
(NatWest), which are United Kingdom-based clearing banks.  The
company's activities are organized in six business divisions:
Corporate Markets (comprising Global Banking and Markets and
United Kingdom Corporate Banking), Retail Markets (comprising
Retail and Wealth Management), Ulster Bank, Citizens, RBS
Insurance and Manufacturing.  On October 17, 2007, RFS Holdings
B.V. (RFS Holdings), a company jointly owned by RBS, Fortis N.V.,
Fortis SA/NV and Banco Santander S.A. (the Consortium Banks) and
controlled by RBS, completed the acquisition of ABN AMRO Holding
N.V. (ABN AMRO).  In July 2008, the company disposed of its entire
interest in Global Voice Group Ltd.


UK BANKRUPTCY: Insolvency Service Orders Liquidation
----------------------------------------------------
Newsco Insider reports that UK Bankruptcy Ltd has been ordered
into liquidation following an investigation by The Insolvency
Service.

Newsco Insider relates that UK Bankruptcy attracted clients
through advertising and referrals from another official looking
Web site called 'IVA Council'.

According to Newsco Insider, the Insolvency Service investigation
found that the company derived majority of its income from fees
charged to clients.  The report says that the fees, often running
into thousands of pounds, bore no correlation to the work
undertaken or the extent of the clients' level of debt.  The
advice given was often very basic and could easily have been
obtained for free, Newsco Insider adds.

Newsco Insider says the investigation also found evidence that
some clients allowed the company to maximize the amount of fees
charged to their cards, in return for which they were given "cash
back."

Between about October 2007 and June 2008, the core business of UK
Bankruptcy was generated by leads provided by an organization
called the IVA Council, an unincorporated association which
purported to be a voluntary independent body that monitored the
insolvency industry, Newsco Insider reports.

In reality, Newsco Insider relates, IVA Council was a marketing
tool that generated leads for UK Bankruptcy by suggesting to
individuals that they had been "mis-sold" an Individual Voluntary
Arrangement (IVA) and they would be better placed financially by
petitioning for their own bankruptcy.  Newsco Insider says clients
referred via the IVA Council were almost invariably persuaded by
the UK Bankruptcy to discontinue an existing IVA and enter into
bankruptcy.

Dorset-based UK Bankruptcy Ltd advertised itself as a 'one stop
shop' for dealing with bankruptcy.


* UK: Bank Bailouts Cost Taxpayers GBP1.5 Billion a Year
--------------------------------------------------------
Philip Aldrick at The Telegraph, citing the National Audit Office,
reports that supporting Britain's banks is costing the taxpayer
roughly GBP1.5 billion a year on top of the hundreds of billions
of pounds of state funds that remain at risk following the
industry's bail-out.

According to The Telegraph, a forensic review by the NAO found
that the Government is paying more on the debt taken to rescue the
banks in 2008 than the banks are paying in fees and interest.  For
the two years the rescue schemes have been in place, the debt has
cost the Treasury GBP10 billion but income from the banks has been
only GBP9.91 billion, The Telegraph discloses.

The Telegraph notes that although the net burden so far has been
just GBP90 million, the NAO said income has been flattered by a
one-off GBP2.5 billion payment from Lloyds Banking Group to escape
the Asset Protection Scheme (APS).  Fees from the guarantee
schemes are also expected to fall as they run down, it added,
further draining the Treasury of income, The Telegraph states.

The Government's bank rescue debts amount to GBP124 billion, with
GBP67 billion of capital injected into the lenders and GBP57
billion of loans provided, The Telegraph says.  The net cost of
financing the debt next year, which an NAO spokesman confirmed
would be about GBP1.5 billion unless the bank shares are sold or
the loans repaid, will be more than the GBP1.15 billion the
Treasury expects to raise from its new bank levy, The Telegraph
states.

The Telegraph relates that the NAO suggested the Treasury would
only break-even, saying: "The most likely scenario is that there
will be no overall loss on the main guarantees, namely, the APS,
Special Liquidity or Credit Guarantee [SLS and CGS]."  According
to The Telegraph, the report also warns "that the Treasury will
probably be paying for the support it has provided to UK banks for
years to come".


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars
---------------------------------------------

Jan. 26-28, 2011
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     TMA Distressed Investing Conference
        Aria Las Vegas
           Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

Jan. 27-28, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Rocky Mountain Bankruptcy Conference
        Westin Tabor Center, Denver, Colo.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Feb. 3-5, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Caribbean Insolvency Symposium
        Westin Casuarina Resort & Spa, Grand Cayman Island
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Feb. 24-25, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Valcon
        Four Seasons Las Vegas, Las Vegas, Nev.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Mar. 4, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Bankruptcy Battleground West
        Hyatt Regency Century Plaza, Los Angeles, Calif.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Mar. 7-9, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Conrad Duberstein Moot Court Competition
        Duberstein U.S. Courthouse, New York, N.Y.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Mar. 10, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Nuts and Bolts - Florida
        Tampa, Fla.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Mar. 10-12, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     SUCL/ Alexander L. Paskay Seminar on
     Bankruptcy Law and Practice
        Marriott Tampa Waterside, Tampa, Fla.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Mar. 17-19, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Byrne Judicial Clerkship Institute
        Pepperdine University School of Law, Malibu, Calif.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Mar. 31-Apr. 3, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Annual Spring Meeting
        Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center,
        National Harbor, Md.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

April 27-29, 2011
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     TMA Spring Conference
        JW Marriott, Chicago, IL
           Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

May 5, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Nuts and Bolts - New York City
        Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
        New York, N.Y.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

May 6, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     New York City Bankruptcy Conference
        Hilton New York, New York, N.Y.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

June 6, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Canadian-American Cross-Border Insolvency Symposium
        Fairmont Royal York, Toronto, Ont.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

June 9-12, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Central States Bankruptcy Workshop
        Grand Traverse Resort and Spa, Traverse City, Mich.
              Contact: http://www.abiworld.org/

July 21-24, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Northeast Bankruptcy Conference
        Hyatt Regency Newport, Newport, R.I.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

July 27-30, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Southeast Bankruptcy Workshop
        The Sanctuary at Kiawah Island, Kiawah Island, S.C.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Aug. 4-6, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Mid-Atlantic Bankruptcy Workshop
        Hotel Hershey, Hershey, Pa.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Oct. 14, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     NCBJ/ABI Educational Program
        Tampa Convention Center, Tampa, Fla.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Oct. __, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     International Insolvency Symposium
        Dublin, Ireland
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Oct. 25-27, 2011
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     Hilton San Diego Bayfront, San Diego, CA
        Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

Dec. 1-3, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     23rd Annual Winter Leadership Conference
        La Quinta Resort & Spa, La Quinta, Calif.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Apr. 19-22, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Annual Spring Meeting
        Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center,
        National Harbor, Md.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

July 14-17, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Southeast Bankruptcy Workshop
        The Ritz-Carlton Amelia Island, Amelia Island, Fla.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Aug. 2-4, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Mid-Atlantic Bankruptcy Workshop
        Hyatt Regency Chesapeake Bay, Cambridge, Md.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Nov. 29 - Dec. 2, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Winter Leadership Conference
        JW Marriott Starr Pass Resort & Spa, Tucson, Ariz.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne G. Lopez, Frauline S. Abangan and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *