TCREUR_Public/101222.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

         Wednesday, December 22, 2010, Vol. 11, No. 252

                            Headlines



A U S T R I A

A-TEC INDUSTRIES: Breakup Could Push Creditor Payout Ratio Up
A-TEC INDUSTRIES: Hitachi Zosen Acquires AE&E Inova Unit


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

SAZKA AS: Czech Billionaire May File Insolvency Case Against Sazka
SAZKA AS: Target of Hostile Takeover by Competitor, CEO Says
SAZKA AS: S&P Downgrades Corporate Credit Rating to 'CC'


G E R M A N Y

FORCE TWO: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to 'Caa1 (sf)'
PROMISE-I MOBILITY: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to Caa3
PROMISE-I MOBILITY: Moody's Junks Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
PROMISE-I MOBILITY: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to Caa3
TUI AG: S&P Changes Outlook to Stable; Affirms 'B-' Ratings

VAC FINANZIERUNG: Moody's Raises Corporate Family Rating to 'B3'


G R E E C E

HELLENIC SECURITISATION: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1' Ratings on Notes
* Moody's Reviews Deposit and Debt Ratings of Six Greek Banks
* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Bonds Issued by Greek Banks


H U N G A R Y

VERTESI: Bankruptcy Protection Extended Until January 7


I R E L A N D

ALLIED IRISH: EU Commission to Approve Polish Unit Sale This Week
ALLIED IRISH: S&P Junks Rating on Subordinated Debt Securities
BANK OF IRELAND: Hires Credit Suisse to Advise on Rights Issue
BARD ARANN: Goes Into Receivership
DUNCANNON CRE: Partial Repurchase Won't Affect Fitch's Ratings

EIRLES TWO: S&P Downgrades Rating on US$50 Mil. Notes to 'CC'
HRS DEVELOPMENT: Goes Into Receivership
MCINERNEY GROUP: Banks Unlikely to Recover More Under Receivership
* IRELAND: Cold Spell May Push Firms Into "Premature Bankruptcy"


I T A L Y

ATLANTE FINANCE: Change Swap Won't Affect Fitch's Ratings
PARMALAT S.P.A.: Creditors Convert Warrants for 60,932 Shares
PARMALAT S.P.A.: Inks EUR7.4 Mil. Settlement With UGF Banca
SESTANTE FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Four Tranches to 'CCsf'


N E T H E R L A N D S

METINVEST BV: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to Guaranteed Notes


R U S S I A

KRASNAYA POLYANA: Seeks State Aid; Owes RUR40 Million
SVYAZINVESTNEFTEKHIM OAO: Moody's Gives Stable Outlook on Ratings
* Fitch Assigns 'B+' Ratings on Russian City of Astrakhan
* Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Ratings on Russian Kaluga Region


S L O V E N I A

SCT: Subsidiary Files Receivership in Ljubljana Court
* Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Slovenian Banks


S P A I N

MBS BANCAJA: Moody's Assigns (P)'Caa2' Rating on Class B Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BLUESTONE SECURITIES: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Ratings on Three Tranches
BRAINSPARK PLC: Winding Up Petition Dismissed
CORNERSTONE TITAN: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class D Notes
ELPHINSTONE: Creditors Likely to Receive Tiny Fraction of Claims
KIDDERMINSTER HARRIERS: Chris Swan Could Still Acquire Club

LEHMAN BROTHERS: Service Pact With European Administrators Okayed
MAILCOM (UK): Goes Into Administration
RADIO MALDWYN: Liquidator May Ink Sale Deal With Buyer Next Month
R&R ICE: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to Senior Secured Notes
SDI FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Series 1 Notes to 'Ba1'

SIMCLAR GROUP: Sam Russell Gets GBP360,000 in 'Unlawful Payments'




                            *********


=============
A U S T R I A
=============


A-TEC INDUSTRIES: Breakup Could Push Creditor Payout Ratio Up
-------------------------------------------------------------
Boris Groendahl at Bloomberg News reports that Austrian newspaper,
Die Presse, citing unidentified bondholders of A-Tec Industries
AG, said the company could pay up to 75% of its liabilities if its
assets are sold one-by-one.

According to Bloomberg, the newspaper said the bondholder group
will push for approving a breakup of the company in a Dec. 22
bondholder meeting, rather than trying to seek a buyer for the
entire group, which would yield less than the 75%.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 20,
2010, Die Presse, citing a valuation by Deloitte, said a breakup
of the company would improve the quota for creditors to 36% from
30%, according to Bloomberg.  Bloomberg disclosed the Vienna-based
newspaper said a sale of the Emco tool-making unit and Brixlegg
copper division would generate about EUR200 million (US$265
million).

On Oct. 22, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, citing
Bloomberg News, reported that A-Tec sought court clearance to
reorganize debt after losing access to its line of credit because
of an Australian power-station project's financial difficulties.
Bloomberg disclosed A-Tec said in a statement on Oct. 20 that the
company filed for self-administered reorganization proceedings at
the Vienna Commercial Court and appointed trustees for
bondholders.  Bloomberg said A-Tec has 90 days under Austrian law
to seek an agreement with lenders, after which it can seek full
protection from creditors.  The company has a EUR798 million
(US$1.11 billion) revolving credit facility and EUR302 million of
outstanding bonds, according to Bloomberg data.

A-Tec Industries AG is an engineering company based in Vienna,
Austria.


A-TEC INDUSTRIES: Hitachi Zosen Acquires AE&E Inova Unit
--------------------------------------------------------
Carolyn Bandel at Bloomberg News reports that Japanese industrial
machinery maker Hitachi Zosen Corp. said it acquired all shares of
AE&E Inova AG after its parent A-Tec Industries AG's insolvency.

According to Bloomberg, Hitachi Zosen on Monday said in an e-
mailed statement that Inova, which has about 380 employees in
Zurich and Buchs, was sold for an undisclosed amount.

On Oct. 22, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, citing
Bloomberg News, reported that A-Tec sought court clearance to
reorganize debt after losing access to its line of credit because
of an Australian power-station project's financial difficulties.
Bloomberg disclosed A-Tec said in a statement on Oct. 20 that the
company filed for self-administered reorganization proceedings at
the Vienna Commercial Court and appointed trustees for
bondholders.  Bloomberg said A-Tec has 90 days under Austrian law
to seek an agreement with lenders, after which it can seek full
protection from creditors.  The company has a EUR798 million
(US$1.11 billion) revolving credit facility and EUR302 million of
outstanding bonds, according to Bloomberg data.

A-Tec Industries AG is an engineering company based in Vienna,
Austria.


===========================
C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
===========================


SAZKA AS: Czech Billionaire May File Insolvency Case Against Sazka
------------------------------------------------------------------
Ladka Bauerova at Bloomberg News reports that Czech billionaire
Radovan Vitek may file an insolvency case against lottery provider
Sazka AS in January next year if the company doesn't pay its debt.

According to Bloomberg, Hospodarske Noviny, citing Vitek, said
Vitek bought Sazka's debt, worth almost 900 million koruna (US$47
million), from Raiffeisen Bank International AG and Komercni Banka
AS and may offer to buy up debt from other stockholders, notably
Fortis Bank NV.  Bloomberg relates the newspaper said Vitek is
interested in gaining control over Sazka's real estate.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 20,
2010, Bloomberg News said Sazka AS started talks with bondholders
on debt restructuring.  Sazka said in a letter published on the
Czech National Bank Web site that the company is unable to meet
interest payments to bondholders in full.  Hospodarske Noviny,
citing Sazka, reported last week that the company will pay only
EUR4 million (US$5.3 million) to creditors on Jan. 12 compared
with the EUR13.2 million payment due.

Sazka AS is a provider of lotteries and sport betting games in the
Czech Republic.



SAZKA AS: Target of Hostile Takeover by Competitor, CEO Says
------------------------------------------------------------
Lenka Ponikelska at Bloomberg News reports that Sazka AS Chief
Executive Officer Ales Husak that the company has become the
target of a hostile takeover attempt from a competitor.

According to Bloomberg, Sazka is preparing a plan to restructure
debt after saying last week it is unable to meet payments to
bondholders that are due in January.  Bloomberg says the company
will set up a common account for all its activities to make its
cash flow more transparent, sell properties and provide a schedule
of installments to creditors.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 20,
2010, Bloomberg News, citing Hospodarske Noviny, said that the
company will pay only EUR4 million (US$5.3 million) to creditors
on Jan. 12 compared with the EUR13.2 million payment due.

Sazka AS is a provider of lotteries and sport betting games in the
Czech Republic.


SAZKA AS: S&P Downgrades Corporate Credit Rating to 'CC'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has lowered to
'CC' from 'CCC+' its long-term corporate credit rating on Czech
gaming company SAZKA a.s.  The ratings remain on CreditWatch but
S&P has revised the CreditWatch implications to negative from
developing.  The ratings were originally placed on CreditWatch on
Nov. 25, 2009.

At the same time, S&P lowered to 'CC' from 'CCC+' the issue rating
on the EUR215 million 9.00% secured amortizing bonds due 2021.

"The downgrade reflects the notice to bondholders that SAZKA
issued on Dec. 16, 2010, advising that it may only be able to make
a partial repayment of principal and interest due on Jan. 12,
2011, on its EUR215 million bonds maturing 2021," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Nicolas Baudouin.

As part of the same notice, SAZKA informed the bond trustee that
it has initiated negotiations with creditors with a view to
resolving this situation and restructuring existing permitted
debt.

"The downgrade further reflects the requirement for SAZKA to reach
an agreement with four of its senior creditors to obtain a roll-
over of short-term loans coming to maturity in the last two weeks
of the month of December 2010," said Mr. Baudouin.

If one or several of these creditors were to refuse a further
extension of loans granted to SAZKA, this could create a real risk
of near term default, in S&P's view.

S&P take the view that there is a materially higher probability of
default than before, unless SAZKA can successfully secure a
further extension of its unsecured bank lines.  S&P notes that the
group has been in discussions with its unsecured creditors for
over 12 months now, so far without agreement on a more medium-term
refinancing package.

S&P aim to resolve the CreditWatch placement once there is clarity
on the refinancing of SAZKA's short-term debt and the payment of
the Jan. 12, 2011, interest coupon and principal.

SAZKA's extremely stretched liquidity could trigger a default in
the very near future.

S&P could lower the ratings to 'D' (default) or 'SD' (selective
default) if SAZKA were to fail to meet any of its obligations.
S&P could also lower the corporate credit ratings to 'D' upon a
completion of a distressed exchange offer, which under Standard &
Poor's methodology means any offer constituting less than the
original promise without adequate offsetting compensation.

S&P could take a positive rating action if SAZKA succeeds in
renewing its bank lines on a more medium-term basis and secures
the necessary funding to meet its immediate future obligations.

The ratings on SAZKA continue to reflect S&P's view of the
company's extremely fragile liquidity and highly leveraged
financial profile, which results from its funding of the
construction of the O2 Arena, an 18,000-seat sports and
entertainment complex in Prague.  The ratings are also constrained
by S&P's view of the company's aggressive financial policy and
history of weak cash returns on capital investment.  Support for
the ratings is provided by the sustainable, cash-generative nature
of SAZKA's well-established domestic lottery business, which is
covered by Czech lottery law.  SAZKA has a 94% share of the
domestic lottery market, and more than 6% of the domestic gaming
market.  Still, the cash flows that the operating activities
generate are insufficient to cope with the short-term maturities.


=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


FORCE TWO: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to 'Caa1 (sf)'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service took these rating actions on notes
issued by Force Two Limited Partnership

Issuer: FORCE TWO Limited Partnership

  -- EUR150.2M A Notes, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct
     1, 2009 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR12.3M B Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct
     1, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf) and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR13M C Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 1,
     2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR11.9M D Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 1,
     2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR9.7M E Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct
     1, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf) and Remained On Review for
     Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

Force Two is a German SME CLO referencing a static portfolio of
German profit participations ("Genussrechte") with a scheduled
maturity of January 2014.  Some of the 'Genussrechte' obligations
in the portfolio have certain features of equity including
subordination and linkage of payments to financial performance of
the obligor such as interest deferral features and contingent
coupon components (type A obligations).  Such obligations can be
written down depending on financial performance of the obligor and
may extend redemption beyond the legal final maturity of the
transaction which is 4 years after its scheduled maturity date.
These obligations make up 26.5% of the outstanding pool.
Obligations which have not redeemed at par plus accrued interest
by the scheduled maturity of the transaction will be extended up
to the earlier of 13 years and the date on which all payments due
under the profit participation agreement have been made.  If such
payments have not been made before the legal maturity of the
transaction in January 2018, this is likely to lead to a loss for
Force Two.

According to Moody's the rating actions are driven by 1) the
revision of IKB's internal rating scale and process used to assess
the creditworthiness of SME borrowers and 2) deterioration in the
credit quality of the pool.

Force Two has experienced EUR5 million of defaults since the last
rating action (October 2009) and is due to experience a distressed
sale on a further EUR5 million before year end which will result
in a 20% cash recovery with potential for a further 20% in
proceeds.  All previously unpaid interest from this issuer has now
been repaid.  Not including this proposed sale, the principal
deficiency ledger has been reduced from EUR5.8 million at last
rating action to EUR2.68 million in the latest investor report,
dated 25 October 2010.

In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
with a stressed weighted average default probability to scheduled
maturity (January 2014) of 17.7%.  This is consistent with the
default probability level of a B2 rating.  Moody's notes that the
transaction benefits from a material level of excess spread that
has allowed it to substantially cure the PDL and will continue to
partially mitigate the impact of potential new defaults.

In order to assess the default probabilities of each of the
borrowers in the pool, Moody's relies on the internal credit
scores assigned to each borrower by Equinotes Management GmbH, as
Advisor to the transaction, following the IKB rating process and
methodology for SME obligors.  Following the recent revision by
IKB of its internal credit score scale, which provides a more
detailed assessment of credit risk levels, Moody's revisited its
mapping to IKB credit scores i.e.  the way the bank's internal
credit scores are translated into Moody's idealized default
probabilities.  The greater conservativeness embedded in IKB's
revised credit scores drives IKB internal ratings to map to higher
Moody's default probabilities and therefore has a negative impact
on the ratings of the notes.

Moody's has changed its approach to stressing type A obligations.
At closing Moody's modelled the risk of such assets using a rating
migration approach that assessed the likelihood that debtors would
default on or defer fixed remunerations and/or principal payments.
Instead, Moody's now applies a haircut to the coupons and extends
the expected lives of such assets, with a severity reflecting the
current rating of each obligor.

Moody's also incorporated information provided by the manager in
the latest investor reports to account for more recent information
on the performance of the underlying obligors.  Various additional
scenarios have been considered for the analysis and include the
application of stresses applicable to concentrated pools with non
publicly rated issuers, as outlined in Moody's Methodology,
"Updated approach to the usage of credit estimates in rated
transactions" (October 2009).

The key assumptions Moody's used were these:

1.  Default rates for these pools will likely remain at elevated
    levels, despite improvements in the German economy.

2.  Recoveries on the subordinated loans may be close to zero in
    the majority of cases, particularly when the issuer files for
    insolvency.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the ability of the
underlying obligors to refinance the subordinated bullet loans
that make up the securitized pools.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties include:

1) Low portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
   depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few
   large obligors that are rated non investment grade, especially
   when they experience jump to default. Due to the pool's lack of
   granularity, Moody's supplement its base case scenario with
   individual scenario analysis.

2) The additional risk presented by the interest deferral and
   principal write-down features for some of the assets in the
   pool.

3) There is the potential for elevated refinancing difficulty
   regarding the subordinated debt instruments in this portfolio,
   particularly among obligors with weaker credit quality.

Under this methodology, Moody's relies on a simulation based
framework.  Moody's therefore used CDOROMTM, to generate default
and recovery scenarios for each asset in the portfolio, and then
Moody's EMEA Cash-Flow model in order to compute the associated
loss to each tranche in the structure.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


PROMISE-I MOBILITY: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of six
classes of notes issued by Promise-I Mobility 2006-1 and the
rating of 1 credit default swap between KfW and Promise-I Mobility
2006-1.

This transaction is a synthetic balance sheet collateralized loan
obligation of senior corporate loans to SME borrowers mostly
incorporated in Germany.  All loans were originated by IKB
Deutsche Industriebank AG.

The affected notes are listed below:

Issuer: IKB Promise-I Mobility 2006-1 GmbH

  -- EUR2159.5M Super Senior Swap Notes, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf);
     previously on Nov 5, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR0.5M Class A+ Notes, Downgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on
     Nov 5, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- EUR67.2M Class A Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
     Nov 5, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- EUR21.6M Class B Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
     Nov 5, 2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- EUR36.0M Class C Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously
     on Nov 5, 2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- EUR46.8 M Class D Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously
     on Nov 5, 2010 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

  -- EUR10.8M Class E Notes, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on
     Nov 5, 2010 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are mainly driven by: 1) the negative credit
migration since the last rating actions in May 2009 as evident
from the latest investors report dated November 2010, the
deterioration of the asset pool reflected in the occurrence of
additional credit events -- an increase of EUR14 million - and the
proportion of obligors whose default probability is consistent
with a Caa rating (4.64%) and 2) the revision of IKB's internal
rating scale and process used to assess the creditworthiness of
SME borrowers.

In order to assess the default probabilities of each of the
borrowers in the pool, Moody's relies on the internal credit
scores assigned to each borrower by IKB as originator of the
transaction.  Following the recent revision by IKB of its internal
credit score scale which provides a more detailed assessment of
credit risk levels, Moody's revisited its mapping to IKB credit
scores i.e.  the way the bank's internal credit scores are
translated into Moody's idealized default probabilities.  The
greater conservativeness embedded in IKB's revised credit scores
drives IKB internal ratings to map to higher Moody's default
probabilities and therefore has a negative impact on the ratings
of the notes.

As a base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
with a weighted average rating factor of 1622 (Ba3) including
assets mapping to a Ca rating, which translated into 1438 (Ba3)
when such assets were excluded.  A weighted average recovery rate
of 54.4 % was used in this analysis.

Moody's also noted that the replenishment period for this
transaction is ending in December 2010.  The current pool amounts
to EUR2.39 billion and is expected to amortize over the next 4
years with 59% of the securitized loans having a weighted average
life of 2-2.5 years.

Moody's additionally ran sensitivity analyses on key parameters
for the rated notes.  Among these, Moody's considered the impact
of recovery rates deviating by plus or minus 5% from their mean
value of 54.4 % assumed in the base case and observed that the
model results for all tranches would likely be impacted by not
more than two notches.  Moody's also considered the impact of
further stresses to large single exposures: a downgrade of the
mapped rating of the largest obligor (1%) in the pool from Ba2 to
Caa2 had an impact of less than one notch on the model output of
the rated notes.  This sensitivity is mostly driven by the
characteristics of the current capital structure, which features
relatively thin tranche sizes (typically under 2% of the pool for
B to E notes).  In addition, the level of credit enhancement below
the rated tranches provides little cushion, as the first loss
piece represents only 2% of the pool compared to 1% of the pool
currently subject to credit event and delinquencies.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


PROMISE-I MOBILITY: Moody's Junks Ratings on Two Classes of Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded the ratings of three classes of notes
issued by Promise-I Mobility 2005-2.  This transaction is a
synthetic balance sheet collateralized loan obligation of senior
corporate loans to SME borrowers incorporated in mostly Germany.
All loans were originated by IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG.

The affected notes are listed below:

Issuer: PROMISE-I Mobility 2005-2 PLC

  -- EUR0.5M Class A+ Floating Rate Credit Linked Notes Notes,
     Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010 Aaa (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR54.9M Class A Floating Rate Credit Linked Notes Notes,
     Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010 A3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR21.6M Class B Floating Rate Credit Linked Notes Notes,
     Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010 Baa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR22.5M Class C Floating Rate Credit Linked Notes Notes,
     Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010 Ba2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR21.6M Class D Floating Rate Credit Linked Notes Notes,
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010 B2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR14.4M Class E Floating Rate Credit Linked Notes-2 Notes,
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 5, 2010 Caa2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are mainly driven by: 1) the deterioration of
the asset pool reflected in the occurrence of additional credit
events (increase by EUR36 million), the negative credit migration
since the last rating actions in May 2009 as evident from the
latest investors report dated 15 October 2010 and the high
proportion of obligors whose default probability is consistent
with a Caa rating (10.63%) and 2) the revision of IKB's internal
rating scale and process used to assess the creditworthiness of
SME borrowers.

The Aaa rating of class A+ was maintained, while classes A and B
saw their ratings maintained given the short weighted average life
of these tranches (0.98 year for class A+, 1.31 for class A and
1.5 for class B) and the strengthening of the credit enhancement
level due to the relatively low level of losses experienced by the
portfolio in relation to its initial size (0.2 %) coupled with
fast and substantial amortization of the portfolio (46%
amortization since December 2009 when redemption of notes
started).

In order to assess the default probabilities of each of the
borrowers in the pool, Moody's relies on the internal credit
scores assigned to each borrower by IKB as originator of the
transaction.  Following the recent revision by IKB of its internal
credit score scale which provides a more detailed assessment of
credit risk levels, Moody's revisited its mapping to IKB credit
scores i.e. the way the bank's internal credit scores are
translated into Moody's idealized default probabilities.  The
greater conservativeness embedded in IKB's revised credit scores
drives IKB internal ratings to map to higher Moody's default
probabilities and therefore has a negative impact on the ratings
of the notes.

As a base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
with a weighted average rating factor of 2451 (B2) including
assets mapping to a Ca rating, which translated into 1972 (B1)
when such assets were excluded.  A weighted average recovery rate
of 51.6%% was used in this analysis.

Moody's additionally ran sensitivity analyses on key parameters
for the rated notes.  Among these, Moody's considered the impact
of recovery rates deviating by plus or minus 5% from their mean
value of 51.6 % assumed in the base case and observed that the
model results for all tranches would likely be impacted by not
more than 1 notch.  Moody's also considered the impact of further
stresses to large single exposures: a downgrade of the mapped
rating of the largest obligor (1.2%) in the pool from Ba2 to Caa2
had less than 1 notch impact on the model results compare to the
base case.  Moody's also noted that the passage of time had a
positive impact on the model output of the senior notes assuming
obligors credit quality remained the same as shown by sensitivity
runs 3 months from now under which the model results of classes A,
B and C improve by about 1 notch compare to the base case.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


PROMISE-I MOBILITY: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of five
classes of notes issued by Promise-I Mobility 2008-1.  This
transaction is a synthetic balance sheet collateralized loan
obligation of senior corporate loans to SME borrowers incorporated
in Germany.  All loans were originated by IKB Deutsche
Industriebank AG.

The affected notes are listed below:

Issuer: Promise-I Mobility 2008-1 GmbH

  -- EUR0.5M A1+ Notes, Confirmed at Aaa (sf); previously on Nov
     5, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR0.5M A2+ Notes, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov
     5, 2010 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR16.9M B Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov
     5, 2010 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR11.7M C Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 5,
     2010 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR15.1M D Notes, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov
     5, 2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR13.5M E Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov
     5, 2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

These rating actions are mainly driven by: 1) the negative credit
migration since the last rating actions in May 2009 as evident
from the latest investors report dated 20 November 2010, the
deterioration of the asset pool reflected in the occurrence of
additional credit events (increase by EUR8 million), and the
proportion of obligors whose default probability is consistent
with a Caa rating (7.13%) and 2) the revision of IKB's internal
rating scale and process used to assess the creditworthiness of
SME borrowers.

The Aaa rating of class A1+ was maintained given the strengthening
of the credit enhancement below it due to the relatively low level
of losses experienced by the portfolio in relation to its initial
size (0.3 %) coupled with substantial amortization of the
portfolio (47% amortization since closing).

In order to assess the default probabilities of each of the
borrowers in the pool, Moody's relies on the internal credit
scores assigned to each borrower by IKB as originator of the
transaction.  Following the recent revision by IKB of its internal
credit score scale which provides a more detailed assessment of
credit risk levels, Moody's revisited its mapping to IKB credit
scores i.e.  the way the bank's internal credit scores are
translated into Moody's idealized default probabilities.  The
greater conservativeness embedded in IKB's revised credit scores
drives IKB internal ratings to map to higher Moody's default
probabilities and therefore has a negative impact on the ratings
of the notes.

As a base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
with a weighted average rating factor of 1700 (Ba3) including
assets mapping to a Ca rating, which translated into 1585 (Ba3)
when such assets were excluded.  A weighted average recovery rate
of 53.8% was used in this analysis.

Moody's additionally ran sensitivity analyses on key parameters
for the rated notes.  Among these, Moody's considered the impact
of recovery rates deviating by plus or minus 5% from their mean
value of 53.8 % assumed in the base case and observed that the
model results for all tranches would likely be impacted by about 1
notch.  Moody's also considered the impact of further stresses to
large single exposures: a downgrade of the mapped rating of the
largest obligor (1.25%) in the pool from Baa2 to Caa2 had less
than 1 notch impact on the model results compare to the base case.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


TUI AG: S&P Changes Outlook to Stable; Affirms 'B-' Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised its
outlook on Germany-based tourism and shipping conglomerate TUI AG
to stable from negative.  At the same time, the 'B-' long-term
corporate credit rating, along with the 'B-' senior unsecured debt
and 'CCC-' junior subordinated debt ratings, on TUI were affirmed.
The recovery rating of '4' on the senior unsecured debt, and '6'
on the junior subordinated debt, are unchanged.

"The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that improved conditions
in the HL shipping business and recent financing measures by TUI
AG and its subsidiaries and associates, including shareholder loan
repayments by both HL and tourism subsidiary TUI Travel PLC, have
improved TUI's near-term liquidity position," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Philip Temme.

Stronger conditions in shipping enabled HL to cancel its former
state loan guarantees and to repay EUR507 million of the loans it
had received from TUI.  TUI's cash position was further enhanced
by EUR759 million of shareholder loan repayments from TTP during
calendar 2010.

With lease-adjusted EBITDA in financial 2010 of just under EUR800
million, and debt (adjusted for leases, pensions, contingent
liabilities and other financial commitments) of about EUR7.2
billion, TUI's leverage of about 9.0x remains extremely high, in
S&P's opinion.

The ratings on TUI reflect S&P's view of its holding company
status, highly leveraged financial risk profile, short-term debt
maturities, reliance on ongoing refinancing and asset streamlining
measures, ongoing significant exposure to noncore shipping
associate HL, and complex structure and cash flow leakage to
minorities.  They also reflect the seasonality and cyclicality of
tourism, which faces ongoing margin pressures, threats to
discretionary consumer spending in some markets, and high event
risks.  Business risks are mitigated in part by TUI's market-
leading position in European tourism, by geographically well-
diversified sales, and by the recovery in shipping.

In S&P's view, recent positive financing momentum and improved
performance at HL strengthen TUI's ability to fund its near-term
liabilities.  However, liquidity remains less than adequate over
the medium term.  In S&P's opinion, TUI is dependent on the pace
of loan repayments from HL (or other measures to extract capital
invested in HL), as well as on asset-streamlining measures.

TUI remains highly leveraged and so susceptible to unexpected
operating shocks.  The current rating and outlook assume the group
remains committed to deleveraging and that it will maintain strong
discipline over dividends, capital spending, and mergers and
acquisitions.  A successful flotation of HL in 2011, if combined
with a partial sale of TUI's stake, could provide rating upside if
proceeds are primarily devoted to deleveraging.  S&P is unlikely
to raise the ratings until medium-term funding is assured and the
group brings lease-adjusted net debt to EBITDA sustainably below
6.0x.  Ratings could be lowered in the event of liquidity-related
stress.


VAC FINANZIERUNG: Moody's Raises Corporate Family Rating to 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the Corporate Family Rating and
the Probability of Default Rating of VAC Finanzierung GmbH to B3
from Caa1.  The rating of the EUR135 million Senior Secured Notes
maturing 2016 (of which EUR55 million are outstanding) were
upgraded to Caa1 (LGD4, 63%) from Caa2 (LGD4, 64%).  The outlook
was changed to stable from positive.

                        Ratings Rationale

"The upgrade of the CFR to B3 acknowledges the recent rebound in
order intake across all divisions resulting in strong improvements
in the company's operating performance and credit metrics in line
with Moody's expectation for the lower single B rating category.
The upgrade also considers improved end-market conditions and
favorable global demand trends for magnetic products which should
enable VAC to at least sustain recent improvements" said Anke
Rindermann, Moody's lead analyst for VAC.  At the same time,
Moody's notes that raw material prices for key input factors such
as nickel, cobalt and rare earth metals have increased
significantly over 2010, however automatic pass-on clauses in the
majority of its contracts enabled the group to recover most of the
volatility.  In addition, Moody's noted favorably that VAC has
negotiated a return into the regular tariff agreement for its
German operations, by thus eliminating the risk of extended labor
negotiations and potential disputes following the maturity of the
company's special tariff agreement per year end 2010.  This will,
however, also lead to an increase in the company's cost base
potentially reducing the pace of further margin improvements going
forward.

On the back of a cyclical recovery with improved order intake
across all major end customer industries, VAC was able to clearly
turnaround operating performance as indicated by sales growth of
46% while EBITDA more than doubled in the first nine months of
2010 compared to the same period last year.  Subsequently,
leverage in terms of Debt/EBITDA reduced to clearly below 6 times,
in line with Moody's requirements for the B3 rating category.
Moody's note however, that due to a significant working capital
build up on the back of higher volumes and increased raw material
prices, free cash flow generation is expected to be moderate for
2010.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that the recent
performance improvements are sustainable with VAC being able to
prudently manage its volatile input cost exposure, enabling the
company to continue positive free cash flow generation, albeit at
a relatively low level.  In addition, Moody's assumes that VAC
preserves its adequate liquidity cushion including sufficient
headroom under financial covenants and that it proactively
addresses a refinancing of the RCF which matures in 2012 and which
is currently undrawn.

More fundamentally, the B3 CFR considers (i) the group's solid
market positioning as an integrated manufacturer of magnetic
products with state of the art, customized production processes
and technological expertise in niche market segments for magnetic
products, (ii) its broad customer diversification across various
industries, with long-standing and sole supplier relationships
with key customers, (iii) good segmental diversification across
market segments and broad product diversity, as well as (iv) an
adequate liquidity profile following the financial restructuring
including ample headroom under financial covenants.

At the same time, the rating is constrained by (i) the small
absolute scale of the group, evidenced by a revenue base of around
EUR315 million in the last twelve months ending September 2010,
(ii) a concentration of sales on the European market, where VAC
generates about 70% of sales and (iii) a still highly leveraged
capital structure, even after the financial restructuring,
although Moody's note that about 40% of indebtedness results from
Moody's adjustments related to pensions and operating leases.

Moody's would consider a further rating upgrade if VAC was able to
establish a track record of material free cash flow generation and
sustain a gross debt/ EBITDA ratio below 5x with EBITA-Interest
cover above 2 times.  An upgrade would also require visibility
regarding a timely refinancing on the back of expected limited
free cash flow generation.

Negative rating pressure would build should VAC not be able to
generate at least break even Free Cash Flow or should current
financial ratios not be sustained as indicated by Debt/EBITDA
moving towards 6x and EBITA/Interest Coverage towards 1.5x.

Upgrades:

Issuer: VAC Finanzierung GmbH

  -- Probability of Default Rating, Upgraded to B3 from Caa1

  -- Corporate Family Rating, Upgraded to B3 from Caa1

  -- Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to Caa1,
     LGD4, 63% from Caa2, LGD4, 64%

  -- Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to Caa1,
     LGD4, 63% from Caa2, LGD4, 64%

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: VAC Finanzierung GmbH

  -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

Headquartered in Hanau, Germany, Vacuumschmelze GmbH & Co KG has a
solid and well established market position in the design and
manufacturing of magnetic products.  In the last twelve months
ending September 2010, the company generated revenues of EUR315
million.


===========
G R E E C E
===========


HELLENIC SECURITISATION: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1' Ratings on Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service took a rating review on repack notes
issued by Hellenic Securitisation S.A. Series 2

Issuer: Hellenic Securitisation S.A.

  -- EUR295M Hellenic Securitisation S.A. - Series 2 EUR
     295,000,000 5.875 per cent Asset Backed Notes due 2011 Notes,
     Ba1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on
     Jun 16, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1

                         Review Rationale

This rating is based on the ability of the Hellenic Republic to
guarantee the obligations due under the notes as per the
receivables purchase agreement.  The Hellenic Republic
unconditionally undertakes to pay sufficient funds to the issuer
and trustee to enable the issuer to make up any shortfalls in
funds to pay debt service.  The underlying receivables are the
dividends that the CDLF (Consignment Deposits and Loans Fund) of
Greece pays each year to the Greek State.  The CDLF comprises of
loans granted to civil servants and municipalities.

Moody's explained that the rating review taken is the result of
the Ba1 rating of the Greek government being placed under review
for possible downgrade on December 16, 2010.


* Moody's Reviews Deposit and Debt Ratings of Six Greek Banks
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible
downgrade the deposit and debt ratings of these six Greek banks:
National Bank of Greece SA, EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA, Alpha Bank
AE, Piraeus Bank SA, Agricultural Bank of Greece and Attica Bank
SA.  In addition, the standalone bank financial strength ratings
of NBG, Eurobank and Alpha, have been placed on review for
possible downgrade.

                        Ratings Rationale

The action follows Moody's decision on December 16 to place
Greece's Ba1 government bond ratings on review for possible
downgrade.  Under Moody's methodology, a government's credit
strength serves as a key input in assessing the capacity of a
country to support its banking system which, in turn, can provide
uplift to the deposit and debt ratings of a bank.

"The announcement reflects the possibility that a lowering of the
Greek government bond rating may prompt Moody's to reassess the
level of systemic support uplift which is currently embedded in
the ratings of these banks," explains Constantinos Kypreos, Vice
President - Senior Analyst in Moody's Financial Institutions Group
and the lead analyst for Greek banks.

Specifically, a possible downgrade of the government's rating
could lead to a downward adjustment to the country's systemic
support indicator, which is the measure Moody's uses to determine
bank rating uplift due to systemic support considerations.  The
Baa3 SSI for Greece is currently positioned one notch above the
national government's debt rating.  The SSI denotes the
government's capacity to provide support to its banking system
beyond that indicated by its own rating level, as it incorporates
a range of (financial and non-financial) tools at its disposal,
including elements of support now available through EU/ECB
programmes.

Moody's also notes that the BFSRs of (i) NBG (D+, mapping to a Ba1
baseline credit assessment); (ii) Eurobank (D, mapping to a Ba2
BCA); and (iii) Alpha (D, mapping to a Ba2 BCA), were placed on
review for possible downgrade.  The review of these standalone
ratings was prompted in part by the banks' material exposure to
Greek government securities, amid increased uncertainty over the
government's ability to reduce its debt to sustainable levels over
the medium term (please refer to Moody's Press Release on Greece
published on December 16).  The total government exposure of NBG,
Eurobank and Alpha ranges from 80% to over 200% of their capital
base.

The review of these banks' BFSRs will also consider their limited
funding options and high dependence on ECB funding, which Moody's
believes could remain elevated in 2011.  Finally, the additional
fiscal adjustments now being implemented by the government may
place further strain on the banks' asset quality.  The sector's
non-performing loans as a percentage of gross loans reached 10% in
September 2010, up from 7.7% in December 2009.

Moody's notes that the standalone ratings of the other rated banks
in Greece are substantially lower than those of NBG, Eurobank and
Alpha -- they all have low E+ BFSRs (mapping into a BCA of B1 or
B2), with negative outlooks -- levels that already capture Moody's
concerns noted above.  Therefore, no actions on the BFSRs of
Piraeus, ATE or Attica Bank are envisaged at this time.

     Ratings of Foreign Bank Subsidiaries Remain Unaffected

The deposit and debt ratings of Emporiki Bank of Greece SA (Baa3),
General Bank of Greece SA (Baa3), and Marfin Egnatia Bank (Baa3)
are not affected, because their ratings benefit significantly from
parental support.  Moody's continues to monitor the on-going
support and commitment of the foreign parent banks, as these
remain a critical consideration in the ratings of these three
banks.

The specific rating changes implemented are:

National Bank of Greece SA, NBG Finance plc, and National Bank of
Greece Funding Limited:

The BFSRs of D+, deposit and senior debt ratings of Ba1,
subordinated debt rating of Ba2, backed (government-guaranteed)
senior unsecured rating of Ba1, and preferred stock (Hybrid Tier
1) rating of B1 have been placed on review for possible downgrade.

EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA, EFG Hellas plc, EFG Hellas (Cayman
Islands) Limited, and EFG Hellas Funding Limited:

The BFSRs of D, deposit and senior debt ratings of Ba1,
subordinated debt rating of Ba2, backed (government-guaranteed)
senior unsecured rating of Ba1, and preferred stock (Hybrid Tier
1) rating of B2 have been placed on review for possible downgrade.

Alpha Bank AE, Alpha Credit Group plc, Alpha Group Jersey Limited:

The BFSRs of D, deposit and senior debt ratings of Ba1,
subordinated debt rating of Ba2, backed (government-guaranteed)
senior unsecured rating of Ba1, and preferred stock (Hybrid Tier
1) rating of B2 have been placed on review for possible downgrade.

Piraeus Bank SA and Piraeus Group Finance plc:

The deposit and senior debt ratings of Ba1, subordinated debt
rating of Ba2, and backed (government-guaranteed) senior unsecured
rating of Ba1, have been placed on review for possible downgrade.

Agricultural Bank of Greece SA and ABG Finance International plc:

The deposit and senior debt ratings of Ba2 and subordinated debt
rating of Ba3 have been placed on review for possible downgrade.

Attica Bank SA and Attica Funds plc:

The deposit rating of Ba2 and subordinated debt rating of Ba3 have
been placed on review for possible downgrade.

The previous rating actions on the above-mentioned Greek banks
were implemented on June 15, 2010, when several downward rating
actions were taken.

All of the six rated banks affected by the review are
headquartered in Athens, Greece (data below is as of end-September
2010).

  -- National Bank of Greece SA reported total assets of EUR123.5
     billion

  -- EFG Eurobank Ergasias reported total assets of EUR86.5
     billion

  -- Alpha Bank SA reported total assets of EUR67.7 billion

  -- Piraeus Bank SA reported total assets of EUR57.5 billion

  -- Agricultural Bank of Greece SA reported total assets of
     EUR31.9 billion

  -- Attica Bank SA reported total assets of EUR4.8 billion


* Moody's Takes Rating Actions on Bonds Issued by Greek Banks
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken these rating actions on
covered bonds issued by Greek banks:

  -- Mortgage covered bonds issued by Alpha Bank A.E.
     under its Direct Issuance Global Covered Bond Programme:
     Baa3, placed on review for possible downgrade; previously on
     23 July 2010, definitive Baa3 rating assigned (new rating);

  -- Mortgage covered bonds issued by EFG Eurobank Ergasias S.A.
      ("Eurobank EFG") under its EUR5 billion Covered Bond
     Programme: Baa3, placed on review for possible downgrade;
     previously on 15 June 2010, downgraded to Baa3;

  -- Mortgage covered bonds issued by Eurobank EFG under its EUR3
     billion Global Covered Bond Programme: Baa3, placed on review
     for possible downgrade; previously on 15 June 2010,
     downgraded to Baa3;

  -- Mortgage covered bonds issued by Marfin Egnatia Bank S.A.
     under its Residential Mortgage Loan Covered Bond Programme:
     A3, placed on review for possible downgrade; previously on 16
     July 2010, downgraded to A3;

  -- Mortgage covered bonds issued by National Bank of Greece S.A.
     under its EUR10 billion Global Covered Bond Programme: Baa3,
     placed on review for possible downgrade; previously on 15
     June 2010, downgraded to Baa3;

  -- Mortgage covered bonds issued by NBG under its EUR15 billion
     Covered Bond Programme II: Baa3, placed on review for
     possible downgrade; previously on 24 June 2010, definitive
     Baa3 rating assigned (new rating).

The timely payment indicators of these covered bond programs are
"Very Improbable".

The current ratings assigned to the existing covered bonds of the
above programs can expected to be assigned to all subsequent
covered bonds issued under the relevant program and any future
rating actions are expected to affect all covered bonds issued
under the program.  If there are any exceptions to this, Moody's
will in each case publish details in a separate press release.

The rating assigned by Moody's addresses the expected loss posed
to investors.  Moody's ratings address only the credit risks
associated with the transaction.  Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.

                        Ratings Rationale

These rating actions on the covered bonds were prompted by Moody's
rating actions on the issuer ratings of several banks and on the
local- and foreign-currency government bond ratings of Greece:

  -- Greece: Ba1, placed on review for possible downgrade on 16
     December 2010;

  -- Alpha: Ba1, placed on review for possible downgrade on 17
     December 2010;

  -- Eurobank EFG: Ba1, placed on review for possible downgrade on
     17 December 2010;

  -- NBG: Ba1, placed on review for possible downgrade on 17
     December 2010.

The credit strength of the issuers is a main determining factor of
the covered bond ratings.  Therefore, if the issuer ratings are
under pressure, the issuers may only have a limited ability to
stabilize the covered bond ratings.

Furthermore, the review of Greece's government bond ratings was
prompted by an increased uncertainty over the economic situation
within that country.  In turn, this leads to uncertainty over the
future performance of the cover-pool assets backing the relevant
covered bond program.

In the case of Marfin, Moody's uses the rating of Marfin's parent
-- Marfin Popular Bank Public Company limited (rated Baa2) -- as
the "issuer rating" in its covered bond analysis.  The reason for
this is that the parent provides a guarantee to Marfin's covered
bonds.  Although the rating of the guarantor is not on review, the
cover pool comprises Greek loans, and therefore Moody's has
included Marfin's covered bonds in the review of the ratings
assigned to the other Greek covered bond programs.

                  Key Rating Assumptions/Factors

Covered bond ratings are determined after applying a two-step
process: an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework analysis.

EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's determines a rating based on the expected
loss on the bond.  The primary model used is Moody's Covered Bond
Model (COBOL) which determines expected loss as a function of the
issuer's probability of default, measured by the issuer's rating
of Ba1, and the stressed losses on the cover pool assets following
issuer default.

TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a "timely payment indicator" which
indicates the likelihood that timely payment will be made to
covered bondholders following issuer default.  The effect of the
TPI framework is to limit the covered bond rating to a certain
number of notches above the issuer's rating.

                       Sensitivity Analysis

The robustness of a covered bond rating largely depends on the
credit strength of the issuer.

The number of notches by which the issuer's rating may be
downgraded before the covered bonds are downgraded under the TPI
framework is measured by the TPI Leeway.

Based on the current TPI of "Very Improbable" the TPI Leeway for
the covered bonds issued by Alpha, Eurobank EFG and NBG is two
notches, meaning that the issuer ratings would need to be
downgraded to B1 before the covered bonds are downgraded.  For
Marfin, the TPI leeway is one notch, meaning that the guarantor
rating would need to be downgraded to Ba1 before the covered bonds
are downgraded, all other variables being equal.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain limited circumstances.  Some examples might be (i) a
sovereign downgrade negatively affecting both the issuer's senior
unsecured rating and the TPI; (ii) a multiple-notch downgrade of
the issuer; or (iii) a material reduction in the cover pool's
value.


=============
H U N G A R Y
=============


VERTESI: Bankruptcy Protection Extended Until January 7
-------------------------------------------------------
MTI-Econews, citing business daily Napi Gazdasag's Monday issue,
reports that Vertesi spokesman Peter Mamusits said the bankruptcy
protection procedure for the power plant has been extended from
the middle of December until January 7.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, MTI said
Vertesi filed for bankruptcy protection in late August.  The plant
would have had to pay more than EUR6 million to energy traders by
the end of August had it not filed for bankruptcy protection,
according to MTI

Vertesi is a unit of the state-owned Hungarian Electricity Works.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


ALLIED IRISH: EU Commission to Approve Polish Unit Sale This Week
-----------------------------------------------------------------
John Mulligan at Irish Independent reports that the European
Commission is expected to give its seal of approval this week to
the planned EUR3.1 billion acquisition by Spanish financial giant
Banco Santander of Allied Irish Bank's Polish operations.

According to Irish Independent, the commission is due to deliver
the findings of its first-stage review by Wednesday and is likely
to say that it has given the green light to the purchase of Bank
Zachodni WBK by Santander.

AIB owns slightly more than 70% of Bank Zachodni WBK, with
Santander forking out close to EUR3 billion in cash for the
business.  Santander is also acquiring AIB's 50% stake in BZ WBK
Asset Management for an additional EUR150 million in cash, Irish
Independent discloses.  AIB will record a EUR2.5 billion gain from
the sales, Irish Independent states.

AIB's Polish operations are the only profitable part of its
business, Irish Independent notes.

Last month, AIB was instructed to raise an additional EUR5.3
billion by the Government and the Central Bank in order to boost
its core Tier 1 ratio to 14% so that it could absorb future
financial shocks, Irish Independent relates.

The Government has pledged to subscribe for the incremental
capital requirement that AIB does not raise from other sources,
Irish Independent says.  That will leave taxpayers owning the bulk
of AIB compared to the 18.6% stake they already own, Irish
Independent notes.

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c., together with its subsidiaries --
http://www.aibgroup.com/-- conducts retail and commercial banking
business in Ireland.  It also provides corporate lending and
capital markets activities from its head office at Bankcentre and
from Dublin's International Financial Services Centre.  The Group
also has overseas branches in the United States, Germany, France
and Australia, among other locations.  The business of AIB Group
is conducted through four operating divisions: AIB Bank Republic
of Ireland division, Capital Markets division, AIB Bank UK
division, and Central & Eastern Europe division.  In February
2008, the Group acquired the AmCredit mortgage business in the
Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.  In September
2008, the Group also acquired a 49.99% shareholding in BACB.

                           *     *     *

On Dec. 8, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported
that DBRS downgraded the Dated Subordinated Debt and Undated
Subordinated Debt ratings of Allied Irish Banks p.l.c. (AIB or the
Group) to 'B' from 'A' to reflect the elevated risk of adverse
action by the government.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 7,
2010, Moody's Investors Service placed on review for possible
downgrade the D bank financial strength rating of Allied Irish
Banks.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 1,
2010, Fitch Ratings downgraded Allied Irish Banks plc's lower tier
2 subordinated debt to 'B' from 'BB'.  It also downgraded AIB's
upper tier 2 to 'CC' from 'B' Rating Watch Negative and tier 1
debt securities to 'CC' from 'B-' RWN and 'CCC'.  The ratings of
the UT2 and T1 securities were removed from RWN.


ALLIED IRISH: S&P Junks Rating on Subordinated Debt Securities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has lowered its
rating on Allied Irish Banks PLC's nondeferrable subordinated debt
(lower Tier 2) securities to 'CCC' from 'B'.  The 'BBB/A-2'
counterparty credit ratings on AIB remain on CreditWatch with
negative implications where they were placed on Nov. 26, 2010.
Issuance guaranteed by the Republic of Ireland (A/Watch Neg/A-1)
is not affected by the rating action.

"The downgrade reflects S&P's opinion that the likelihood of a
liability management exercise by AIB in respect of its lower Tier
2 instruments has increased.  If the bank announces an exchange
offer, S&P would expect to characterize it as a "distressed
exchange"," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Nigel Greenwood.

The Irish parliament has approved legislation that provides powers
to the Minister for Finance to make subordinated debt orders, so
that the government can achieve burden sharing by subordinated
creditors in institutions which have received state support.

In addition, AIB stated on Nov. 30, 2010, that it is required by
its regulator to raise EUR9.8 billion in core Tier one capital by
end-February 2011.  This represents an addition of EUR5.265
billion beyond that previously required, and follows the Nov. 28,
2010 announcement by the Irish government on the program for the
recovery of the banking system that is one of the conditions of
its joint EU-IMF program.

S&P also note that AIB's domestic peer, Bank of Ireland
(BBB+/Watch Neg/A-2; whose own additional capital-raising
requirements are significantly less than that of AIB), has
recently carried out a lower Tier 2 debt exchange.

Given the above, in S&P's view there is a "clear and present risk"
of a restructuring and S&P has therefore lowered these instruments
to 'CCC' from 'B', in accordance with its criteria.  AIB reported
outstanding lower Tier 2 debt of EUR4.1 billion on June 30, 2010.
If the bank announces an exchange offer, S&P would expect to
characterize it as a "distressed exchange" and lower the ratings
on these instruments to 'D', in accordance with S&P's criteria.
S&P expects this action would have no impact on the counterparty
credit ratings unless there was a default on nonregulatory capital
issues.

The counterparty credit ratings on AIB reflect S&P's view on the
substantial support that is being provided by the Irish government
and central bank authorities.  S&P considers AIB's liquidity to be
very weak.

The long-term counterparty credit rating on AIB incorporates a
four-notch uplift from S&P's view of its 'bb-' stand-alone credit
profile.  This reflects S&P's view of AIB's high systemic
importance and its belief that AIB will receive additional support
over and above that already announced, if required.  The SACP
takes into account all existing support, the forthcoming capital
injection in totality, and completion of the remaining transfers
of its most problematic property and construction-related loans to
the National Asset Management Agency.

S&P considers that the asset quality of AIB's remaining post-NAMA
loan book is weak and that margin pressures will persist, and S&P
don't expect AIB's weak funding profile to materially improve in
the foreseeable future.  While AIB's SACP currently benefits from
its strong domestic market position, S&P notes that there is
significant strategic uncertainty as the Irish government is in
the process of a comprehensive restructuring of the retail banking
system, this being a key pillar of its EU-IMF program agreement.

The ratings on AIB were placed on CreditWatch with negative
implications on Nov. 26, 2010, pending the outcome of a sovereign
rating review.  S&P views the fortunes of the Irish sovereign to
be intertwined with those of the banking system and a downgrade of
the sovereign may impact S&P's ratings on AIB.  The ratings on AIB
could be lowered in particular if S&P considers that the ability
and willingness of the authorities to support AIB is diminishing.
The ratings could also be lowered if S&P considers that the
prospects for AIB's 'bb-' stand-alone credit profile will
deteriorate further.  This may arise, for example, from a forced
change in its domestic business profile, or a further
deterioration in its funding profile.


BANK OF IRELAND: Hires Credit Suisse to Advise on Rights Issue
--------------------------------------------------------------
Laura Noonan at Irish Independent reports that Bank of Ireland has
hired investment bank Credit Suisse to advise it on an imminent
attempt to tap private investors for about EUR1.3 billion.

According to Irish Independent, sources insisted on Monday night
that the bank's capital-raising plans had not yet been finalized
and were not likely to be finalized for several days.

Irish Independent relates that the comments come as BoI fights
against the clock to raise another EUR2.2 billion by the end of
February so the bank can meet new capital targets.

The bank, which booked EUR700 million from a successful debt buy-
back exercise last week, is expected to attempt to raise the
remaining EUR1.3 billion from a rights issue to existing
shareholders and a private placement, Irish Independent, says.

Headquartered in Dublin, Bank of Ireland --
http://www.bankofireland.com/-- provides a range of banking and
other financial services.  These include checking and deposit
services, overdrafts, term loans, mortgages, business and
corporate lending, international asset financing, leasing,
installment credit, debt factoring, foreign exchange facilities,
interest and exchange rate hedging instruments, executor, trustee,
life assurance and pension and investment fund management, fund
administration and custodial services and financial advisory
services, including mergers and acquisitions and underwriting.
The Company organizes its businesses into Retail Republic of
Ireland, Bank of Ireland Life, Capital Markets, UK Financial
Services and Group Centre.  It has operations throughout Ireland,
the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 8,
2010, DBRS downgraded the Dated Subordinated Debt ratings of The
Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland (Bank of Ireland or
the Group), to BB from 'A' to reflect the elevated risk of adverse
action by the government.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 4,
2010, Moody's Investors Service assigned A3/P-2 bank deposit
ratings and a D+ bank financial strength rating to Bank of Ireland
(UK) plc.  Moody's said the outlook is stable.


BARD ARANN: Goes Into Receivership
----------------------------------
Gavin Daly at The Sunday Business Post Online reports that Bard
Arann Teoranta went into receivership after its owner amassed
significant debts from property development.  The report relates
that the Bank of Ireland has appointed a receiver, Liam Dowdall of
accountancy firm Smith & Williamson Freaney, to the company.

Bard Arann is owned by James Clancy, the head of Clanview
Construction.  Earlier this year, Mr. Clancy was sent to Mountjoy
Prison for 14 days for contempt of court amid questions about his
financial affairs, according to The Sunday Business Post Online.

The Sunday Business Post Online also discloses that Mr. Dowdall
has seized two boats, Clann Eagle and Clann na hOileain, and will
appoint agents to sell them in a bid to recover some of the bank's
debts.

According to filings at the Companies Registration Office, Bank of
Ireland loaned Bard Arann Teoranta EUR2.4 million in May 2006,
secured with a charge over Clann na hOileain, the report says.

The report relates that the ferry company has not operated in
recent times and Bard Arann Teoranta has not filed accounts for
several years.  The Sunday Business Post Online says that its most
recent figures show accumulated losses of EUR1.5 million at the
end of June 2006.  The company valued its assets at EUR4.3
million, but owed almost EUR6 million to creditors, the report
adds.

Headquartered in Galway, Bard Arann Teoranta operated passenger
ferries to the Aran Islands.  The company traded as Aran Islands
Direct from Rossaveal in Connemara.


DUNCANNON CRE: Partial Repurchase Won't Affect Fitch's Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says that the recently proposed partial repurchase
of Duncannon CRE CDO I PLC's class A notes will not in itself
impact the rating of the notes.

The notes are rated:

  -- EUR4.6m class X: 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative

  -- EUR188.0m class A: 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative; Loss Severity
     Rating 'LS-3'

  -- EUR95.3m class RCF: 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative; 'LS-4'

  -- EUR40.0m class B: 'CCCsf'

  -- EUR40.7m class C-1: 'CCsf'

  -- EUR20.4m class C-2: 'CCsf'

  -- EUR20.8m class D-1: 'Csf'

  -- EUR20.8m class D-2: 'Csf'

  -- EUR20.9m class D-3: 'Csf'

  -- EUR21.4m class E-1: 'Csf'

  -- EUR21.5m class E-2: 'Csf'

As per Condition 7 (h) of the Duncannon CRE CDO I PLC prospectus,
the issuer may at any time, at the direction of the portfolio
manager, purchase senior or mezzanine notes in the open market or
in privately negotiated transactions, at a price not exceeding the
notes' par value.  Under the proposed buyback, the repurchase of
EUR15 million of the class A notes will be undertaken at a
discounted purchase price.  The repurchased notes will
subsequently be cancelled, thereby marginally increasing the
available credit enhancement to all rated notes.  The proposed
buyback follows earlier buybacks of class A notes in 2009 and
2010.

The repurchase will be funded using cash available in the
principal collection account.  As of November 2010, approximately
EUR21.6 million is available in the principal collection account.
Generally, proceeds in the principal collection account can be
used by the portfolio manager to invest in new portfolio assets,
limited by the eligibility criteria, or they may be distributed to
noteholders, if no such investment opportunity exists.  Due to the
funding of the proposed repurchase of the class A notes, the
amount of principal proceeds available for immediate distribution
to the remaining noteholders will be substantially lower.  At the
same time, noteholders will benefit from an increase in credit
enhancement due to the relative increase of assets compared with
liabilities in the structure.

The second senior and mezzanine par value tests are currently
breaching their limits.  Fitch notes that all par value ratios
will improve as a result of the repurchase.  Consequently, the
amount of interest required to be diverted on future payment dates
to the senior notes to cure the par value tests may be reduced.


EIRLES TWO: S&P Downgrades Rating on US$50 Mil. Notes to 'CC'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit rating to
'CC (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' on Eirles Two Ltd.'s US$50 million
variable-rate secured notes (Builder CDO 2004-1) series 218.  S&P
then withdrew its rating at the issuer's request.

S&P's rating action on the series 218 notes follows S&P's view
that losses from credit events in the underlying portfolio could
exceed the available credit enhancement.

At the same time, S&P lowered its credit ratings to 'D (sf)' from
'CCC- (sf)' on Eirles Two's US$24 million class B series 292, $11
million class C series 293, and US$11 million class E series 295
variable-rate secured notes.

S&P's rating actions follow the arranger's notification to us that
losses from credit events in the underlying reference portfolio
have exceeded the available credit enhancement and led to a
principal loss for the noteholders.

                          Ratings List

                         Ratings Lowered

                         Eirles Two Ltd.
US$24 Million Class B Variable-Rate Secured Notes Series 292

                                    Rating
                                    ------
          Class               To               From
          -----               --               ----
          B                   D (sf)           CCC- (sf)

  US$11 Million Class C Variable-Rate Secured Notes Series 293

                                    Rating
                                    ------
          Class               To               From
          -----               --               ----
          C                   D (sf)           CCC- (sf)

US$11 Million Class E Variable-Rate Secured Notes Series 295

                                    Rating
                                    ------
          Class               To               From
          -----               --               ----
          E                   D (sf)           CCC- (sf)

                   Rating Lowered and Withdrawn

US$50 Million Variable-Rate Secured Notes (Builder CDO 2004-1)
                           Series 218

                                    Rating
                                    ------
          Class               To               From
          -----               --               ----
          --                  CC (sf)          CCC- (sf)
          --                  NR               CC (sf)


HRS DEVELOPMENT: Goes Into Receivership
---------------------------------------
Gavin Daly at The Sunday Business Post Online reports that HRS
Developments has gone into receivership with bank debts of more
than EUR30 million.  Bank of Scotland (Ireland) appointed
receivers to the company.

The firm has been involved in a legal battle with Esso Ireland
over a EUR4.7 million deal to buy filling stations in Rathfarnham
in Dublin and Ballina, Co Mayo, according to The Sunday Business
Post Online.

The report notes that the most recent accounts for HRS show it had
an outstanding bank loan of EUR30.8 million at the end of 2008,
and "is in ongoing negotiations with Bank of Scotland (Ireland)".

There were five charges registered over company assets, including
service stations and sites in Galway, Clare, Tipperary, Limerick
and Cork, The Sunday Business Post Online says.

The Sunday Business Post Online notes that the three shareholders
in the company -- John Sweeney, Padraic Rhatigan and David Hogan -
had also given "joint and several guarantees'' as security for the
borrowings.  The report relates that the three men were each owed
almost EUR1.2 million by the company at the end of 2008.

HRS is now under the control of Paul Mee and Simon Coyle of
accountancy firm Mazars, the report adds.

HRS Developments is a filling station business.  The company
controls Esso filling stations and development sites in several
counties.


MCINERNEY GROUP: Banks Unlikely to Recover More Under Receivership
------------------------------------------------------------------
Barry O'Halloran at The Irish Times reports that the High Court
heard on Monday that Anglo Irish, Bank of Ireland and KBC, who are
seeking to have McInerney placed in receivership, would  be
unlikely to get a better deal than the EUR25 million offer
currently on the table if they went ahead with their plan.

According to The Irish Times, a bidder for the group, US private
equity fund Oaktree Capital, is offering the banks EUR25 million
cash in full and final settlement of their debt, but the banks,
which are owed EUR113 million, want to place the group in a "long-
term" receivership, which they say could recover up to EUR75
million.

The Irish Times relates that McInerney's examiner, Bill O'Riordan
of PricewaterhouseCoopers, told the High Court on Monday the
banks' receivership plan could not possibly deliver a better
return than EUR25 million.

The banks plan to take over McInerney's land bank and sites, build
new homes and sell them over a period of 11 years, The Irish Times
discloses.  According to The Irish Times, Mr. O'Riordan said the
banks' plans take no account of the discount that would have to
apply because the houses would effectively be sold by a receiver.
He also says that calculations include no margin for whichever
company actually builds, nor do they take into account other
costs, The Irish Times notes.

The court cannot approve the EUR25 million offer by Oaktree, which
forms part of the rescue plan by Mr. O'Riordan, if one group of
creditors can show it would fare better in a receivership or
liquidation, The Irish Times says.

The case continues.

                         About McInerney

McInerney Holdings plc -- http://www.mcinerneyholdings.eu/-- is a
home builder and regional home builder in the North and Midlands
of England.  It also undertakes commercial and leisure projects in
Ireland, United Kingdom and Spain.  It operates in Ireland, the
United Kingdom and Spain.  The main trading activities of the
Company's Irish home building business during the year ended
December 31, 2008, consisted of construction of private houses,
trading in developed sites and land, development of residential
land for third-parties and in joint-ventures, and contracting for
third-parties.  The Company's commercial property development
division, Hillview Developments Ltd (Hillview), develops
industrial units in the Greater Dublin area.  Hillview completed
1,223 square meters of industrial units as of December 31, 2008.
Its Spanish division, Alanda Group, is developing freehold
apartment schemes.  As of December 31, 2008, the Company completed
1,359 private and contracting residential units in Ireland, the
United Kingdom and Spain.


* IRELAND: Cold Spell May Push Firms Into "Premature Bankruptcy"
----------------------------------------------------------------
Frances McDonnell at The Irish Times reports that the Centre for
Economics and Business Research has warned that that Artic
conditions in Northern Ireland could push struggling businesses
close to the brink into "premature bankruptcy."

According to The Irish Times, retailers, who rely on pre-Christmas
trade for the bulk of annual turnover, may grab the headlines but
firms hit by staff absences and delivery problems are also bearing
the brunt of the impact of the cold spell.

The Irish Times relates that CEBR said the recession means more
businesses than usual are "close to the verge of bankruptcy."  It
says businesses facing a combination of lost daily production and
delayed payments could face difficulties on profits and cash flow,
The Irish Times notes.

According to The Irish Times, the CEBR believes such a double
whammy might propel some struggling businesses into "premature
bankruptcy."

The Irish Times notes that according to economic research to be
published later this month, the plunge in temperatures might just
be the tip of the iceberg when it comes to what businesses are
struggling to contend with in the current economic climate.

Cash-flow problems, falling sales and rising overheads are just
some of the issues identified by companies across Ireland in a new
survey commissioned by the business development body
InterTradeIreland, The Irish Times discloses.  Its latest
quarterly business survey shows many businesses have experienced a
significant decline in demand, The Irish Times states.

Smaller firms, those with 10 or less staff, are among those
struggling most while companies operating in the leisure, hotel,
catering and construction sectors are having the hardest time of
all, The Irish Times says.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


ATLANTE FINANCE: Change Swap Won't Affect Fitch's Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says that Atlante Finance s.r.l.'s ratings are
unaffected by the proposal to change swap counterparty in the
transaction.

The notes are rated:

  -- EUR453m Class A (IT0004069032): 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable; 'LS-
     1'

  -- EUR28m Class B (IT0004069040): 'Asf'; Outlook Stable; 'LS-3'

  -- EUR136m Class C (IT0004069057): 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative; 'LS-
     2'

The role of swap counterparty was proposed to be transferred by
novation to Royal Bank of Scotland (rated 'AA-'/Stable/'F1+') from
ABN Amro.  In Fitch's view, Atlante Finance s.r.l.'s ratings will
not be affected by the change of swap counterparty as the swap
novation from ABN Amro to RBS is on materially the same terms and
conditions.


PARMALAT S.P.A.: Creditors Convert Warrants for 60,932 Shares
-------------------------------------------------------------
Parmalat S.p.A. communicated November 23 that, following the
allocation of shares to creditors of the Parmalat Group, the
subscribed and fully paid up share capital has now been increased
by 60,932 euros to 1,732,867,403 euros from 1,732,806,471 euros.
The share capital increase is due to the exercise of 60,932
warrant.

    [The latest status of the share allotment is]:

    -- 8,217,604 shares representing approximately 0.5% of the
       share capital are still in a deposit account c/o Parmalat
       S.p.A., of which:

       * 6,030,154 or 0.4% of the share capital, registered in
         the name of individually identified commercial
         creditors, are still deposited in the intermediary
         account of Parmalat S.p.A. centrally managed by Monte
         Titoli (compared with 6,275,327 shares as at
         October 28, 2010);

       * 2,187,450 or 0.1% of the share capital registered in
         the name of the Foundation -- Fondazione Creditori
         Parmalat -- of which:

          (i) 120,000 shares representing the initial share
              capital of Parmalat S.p.A. (unchanged);

         (ii) 2,067,450 or 0.1% of the share capital that
              pertain to currently undisclosed creditors
              (compared with 2,035,099 shares as at October 28,
              2010).

                      About Parmalat S.p.A.

Headquartered in Milan, Italy, Parmalat S.p.A. --
http://www.parmalat.net/-- sells nameplate milk products that can
be stored at room temperature for months.  It also has about 40
brand product lines, which include yogurt, cheese, butter, cakes
and cookies, breads, pizza, snack foods and vegetable sauces,
soups and juices.

The Company's U.S. operations filed for Chapter 11 protection
on February 24, 2004 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 04-11139).  Gary
Holtzer, Esq., and Marcia L. Goldstein, Esq., at Weil Gotshal
& Manges LLP, represent the Debtors.  When the U.S. Debtors
filed for bankruptcy protection, they reported more than
US$200 million in assets and debts.  The U.S. Debtors emerged
from bankruptcy on April 13, 2005.

Parmalat S.p.A. and its Italian affiliates filed separate
petitions for Extraordinary Administration before the Italian
Ministry of Productive Activities and the Civil and Criminal
District Court of the City of Parma, Italy on December 24, 2003.
Dr. Enrico Bondi was appointed Extraordinary Commissioner in
each of the cases.  The Parma Court has declared the units
insolvent.

On June 22, 2004, Dr. Bondi filed a Sec. 304 Petition, Case No.
04-14268, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York.

Parmalat has three financing arms: Dairy Holdings Ltd., Parmalat
Capital Finance Ltd., and Food Holdings Ltd.  Dairy Holdings and
Food Holdings are Cayman Island special-purpose vehicles
established by Parmalat S.p.A.  The Finance Companies are under
separate winding up petitions before the Grand Court of the Cayman
Islands.  Gordon I. MacRae and James Cleaver of Kroll (Cayman)
Ltd. serve as Joint Provisional Liquidators in the cases.  On
January 20, 2004, the Liquidators filed Sec. 304 petition, Case
No. 04-10362, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York.  In May 2006, the Cayman Island
Court appointed Messrs. MacRae and Cleaver as Joint Official
Liquidators.  Gregory M. Petrick, Esq., at Cadwalader, Wickersham
& Taft LLP, and Richard I. Janvey, Esq., at Janvey, Gordon,
Herlands Randolph, represent the Finance Companies in the Sec. 304
case.

The Honorable Robert D. Drain presided over the Parmalat Debtors'
U.S. cases.  On June 21, 2007, the U.S. Court granted Parmalat
permanent injunction.


PARMALAT S.P.A.: Inks EUR7.4 Mil. Settlement With UGF Banca
-----------------------------------------------------------
Parmalat SpA communicates that a settlement has been agreed to
with UGF Banca SpA (formerly, Unipol Banca SpA) respecting to the
claims related to the pre-insolvency period of Parmalat Group.  In
consideration of the agreement, UGF Banca has paid to Parmalat SpA
an amount of 7,358,000 Euros and a contribution to the legal fees.
Parmalat withdraws all claims and actions vis-a-vis UGF Banca.

As part of the settlement, UGF has waived the right to file proof
of claim in reference to the amount paid against the companies in
Extraordinary Administration, part of the "Concordato."

                      About Parmalat S.p.A.

Headquartered in Milan, Italy, Parmalat S.p.A. --
http://www.parmalat.net/-- sells nameplate milk products that can
be stored at room temperature for months.  It also has about 40
brand product lines, which include yogurt, cheese, butter, cakes
and cookies, breads, pizza, snack foods and vegetable sauces,
soups and juices.

The Company's U.S. operations filed for Chapter 11 protection
on February 24, 2004 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 04-11139).  Gary
Holtzer, Esq., and Marcia L. Goldstein, Esq., at Weil Gotshal
& Manges LLP, represent the Debtors.  When the U.S. Debtors
filed for bankruptcy protection, they reported more than
US$200 million in assets and debts.  The U.S. Debtors emerged
from bankruptcy on April 13, 2005.

Parmalat S.p.A. and its Italian affiliates filed separate
petitions for Extraordinary Administration before the Italian
Ministry of Productive Activities and the Civil and Criminal
District Court of the City of Parma, Italy on December 24, 2003.
Dr. Enrico Bondi was appointed Extraordinary Commissioner in
each of the cases.  The Parma Court has declared the units
insolvent.

On June 22, 2004, Dr. Bondi filed a Sec. 304 Petition, Case No.
04-14268, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York.

Parmalat has three financing arms: Dairy Holdings Ltd., Parmalat
Capital Finance Ltd., and Food Holdings Ltd.  Dairy Holdings and
Food Holdings are Cayman Island special-purpose vehicles
established by Parmalat S.p.A.  The Finance Companies are under
separate winding up petitions before the Grand Court of the Cayman
Islands.  Gordon I. MacRae and James Cleaver of Kroll (Cayman)
Ltd. serve as Joint Provisional Liquidators in the cases.  On
January 20, 2004, the Liquidators filed Sec. 304 petition, Case
No. 04-10362, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York.  In May 2006, the Cayman Island
Court appointed Messrs. MacRae and Cleaver as Joint Official
Liquidators.  Gregory M. Petrick, Esq., at Cadwalader, Wickersham
& Taft LLP, and Richard I. Janvey, Esq., at Janvey, Gordon,
Herlands Randolph, represent the Finance Companies in the Sec. 304
case.

The Honorable Robert D. Drain presided over the Parmalat Debtors'
U.S. cases.  On June 21, 2007, the U.S. Court granted Parmalat
permanent injunction.


SESTANTE FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Four Tranches to 'CCsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded ten and affirmed seven tranches from
the four Sestante Finance S.r.l. RMBS transactions.  At the same
time, the Outlook on three tranches has been revised to Negative
from Stable.  A complete breakdown of the rating actions is
available at the end of this comment.

The downgrades in Sestante Finance S.r.l. 2 (SF2), Sestante
Finance S.r.l. 3 (SF3) and Sestante Finance S.r.l. 4 (SF4) and the
change of the class C Outlook to Negative in Sestante Finance
S.r.l. are a reflection of the continued high level of defaulted
loans in each portfolio and the subsequent decline in credit
support to the rated notes as the cash reserve fund is utilized to
cover defaulted loans.  Fitch expects defaults to remain high and
to put further pressure on the available excess revenue.  A
significant portion of the pools include increasing installment
loans, which represent a tail risk to the transaction.  In
addition, the majority of the loans are linked to floating rates,
leaving the borrower exposed to interest rate increases.

The high volume of period defaults has put significant pressure on
the cash flows of these deals over the past two years.  As of the
last interest payment date of December 2010 for SF1 and October
2010 for SF2, SF3 and SF4, cumulative gross defaults have been
ranging between 4.7% of the initial pool balance (SF1) and 8%
(SF4).  To date, reported recoveries on defaulted loans have
remained low.

The structures include a principal deficiency ledger through which
period defaults, defined as loans in arrears by 12 or more months,
are written off using available excess cash, reducing the cost of
carry of non-performing loans.  To date, the gross excess spread
generated from the cash flows has not been sufficient to write off
all period defaults.  As a result the cash reserve in SF1 has been
drawn since the June 2009 IPD and, as of the September IPD stood
at EUR15.9 million, down from its target amount of EUR21 million.
Further defaults are expected to occur over the next IPDs, which
has led to the revision of the outlook on the class C notes to
Negative from Stable.

For SF2, SF3 and SF4, the level of defaults has resulted in a much
larger decline in available support, with the cash reserves fully
depleted between April and October 2009.  This has led to an
outstanding PDL balance of EUR5 million, EUR9.9 million and EUR20
million, respectively, which has undermined the credit support on
the rated notes.  Fitch expects the PDL balance on all three
transactions to continue to increase over the next 6 to12 months.
Consequently, SF2's class C1 and C2 notes and SF3's class C1 notes
have been downgraded below investment grade.

Credit enhancement for SF4's class A1 and A2 notes, net of PDL
balance, has declined to 7.2% from 9% at close, while the class B,
C1 and C2 notes have been left with no CE to date.  Fitch does not
expect the CE to be rebuilt in the near future and the cash flow
on the deal will be highly dependant on timing and volume of
recoveries.  For this reason, all five tranches have been
downgraded and a Negative Outlook has been assigned.

Fitch has been informed that the servicer of the four transactions
will be changed to Italfondiario S.p.A. ('RPS2-'/'RSS1-') from
Meliorbanca S.p.A. ('BBB+'/Stable /'F2') Fitch anticipates that
the servicing of the portfolios should see some improvement,
although this will be at an increased cost to the transactions.
The timing and volume of recoveries will be crucial for restoring
the credit support in all four transactions.

The rating actions are:

Sestante Finance S.r.l (Sestante 1):

  -- Class A1 (ISIN IT0003604789): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; assigned a Loss Severity (LS) rating of 'LS-1';

  -- Class A2 (ISIN IT0003604813): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; assigned 'LS-1';

  -- Class B (ISIN IT0003604839): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook
     Stable; assigned 'LS-2';

  -- Class C (ISIN IT0003604854): affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook
     revised to Negative from Stable; assigned 'LS-2';

Sestante Finance 2 S.r.l (Sestante 2):

  -- Class A (ISIN IT0003760136): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Negative; assigned 'LS-1';

  -- Class B (ISIN IT0003760193): downgraded to 'BBB-sf' from
     'BBB+sf'; Outlook Negative; assigned 'LS-3';

  -- Class C1 (ISIN IT0003760227): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
     'Bsf'; assigned a Recovery Rating (RR) of 'RR4';

  -- Class C2 (ISIN IT0003760243): downgraded to 'CCsf' from
     'CCCsf'; assigned 'RR5';

Sestante Finance S.r.l - 3 (Sestante 3):

  -- Class A (ISIN IT0003937452): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Negative; assigned 'LS-1';

  -- Class B (ISIN IT0003937486): downgraded to 'BB+sf' from
     'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative; assigned 'LS-3';

  -- Class C1 (ISIN IT0003937510): downgraded to 'CCsf' from
     'CCCsf'; assigned 'RR4';

  -- Class C2 (ISIN IT0003937569): affirmed at 'CCsf'; assigned
     'RR5';

Sestante Finance S.r.l - 4 (Sestante 4):

  -- Class A1 (ISIN IT0004158124): downgraded to 'AAsf' from
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative; assigned 'LS-1';

  -- Class A2 (ISIN IT0004158157): downgraded to 'AAsf' from
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Negative; assigned 'LS-1';

  -- Class B (ISIN IT0004158165): downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'Asf';
     Outlook Negative; assigned 'LS-3';

  -- Class C1 (ISIN IT0004158249): downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'BB-
     sf'; Outlook Negative; assigned 'RR4';

  -- Class C2 (ISIN IT0004158264): downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'BB-
     sf'; assigned 'RR5';


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


METINVEST BV: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to Guaranteed Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned METINVEST B.V.'s US$500 million 10.25%
2015 Guaranteed Notes a final senior unsecured rating of 'B'.  The
Recovery Rating for Metinvest's senior unsecured debt is 'RR4'.

Assignment of the final rating follows the review of final
documentation conforming with the draft documentation previously
reviewed.  The final rating is in line with Metinvest's Long-term
foreign currency Issuer Default Rating of 'B'.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


KRASNAYA POLYANA: Seeks State Aid; Owes RUR40 Million
-----------------------------------------------------
Alissa de Carbonnel at Reuters reports that the Krasnaya Polyana
poultry farm drowned its fuzzy day-old chicks by the hundreds of
thousands in garbage cans this week and posted videos of the
slaughter online in a bid to attract state aid.

Reuters relates that the videos posted on YouTube showed sobbing
factory workers chucking trays full of peeping, yellow chicks into
rusty barrels and drowning them alive in freezing water.

According to Reuters, the head of the Krasnaya Polyana poultry
farm in the Kursk region, some 540 kilometers (340 miles)
southwest of Moscow, said it has been forced to slaughter over one
million chickens after it ran out of money for feed.

In the video appeal to Russia's ruling tandem, farm director
Vladimir Butkeyev pleaded for Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and
President Dmitry Medvedev to step in and save workers' jobs,
warning that he would have to fire his 1,700 workers amid debts of
RUR40 million (US$1.3 million), Reuters discloses.

"On December 10, we had to start putting to death over one million
chickens and shutting down the factory, with over 1,000 people to
lose their jobs on the eve of New Year's," Reuters quotes
Mr. Butkeyev as saying.  "We don't have any other options left."

Closure of the farm, which accounts for some 55% of the region's
poultry production and up to one-third of the local budget, would
deal a major blow to the rural region's economy, Reuters states.

The Krasnaya Polyana poultry farm is located in the Kursk region,
some 540 kilometers (340 miles) southwest of Moscow.


SVYAZINVESTNEFTEKHIM OAO: Moody's Gives Stable Outlook on Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on the Ba1
corporate family and probability of default ratings of OAO
Svyazinvestneftekhim, a holding company for the Republic of
Tatarstan's key assets, to stable from negative, following the
recent change in the outlook on the rating of the Republic of
Tatarstan to stable from negative.  At the same time, Moody's made
the similar change to the outlook on the existing Ba1 rating of
the US$250 million LPNs issued by Edel Capital S.A. for the sole
purpose of financing its loan to SINEK Capital S.A., a subsidiary
of SINEK, and guaranteed by the Republic of Tatarstan.

By virtue of its current ownership structure (SINEK is 100%-owned
by the government of the Republic of Tatarstan), SINEK is
considered a government-related issuer.  In accordance with
Moody's GRI rating methodology, the Ba1 rating of SINEK
incorporates uplift for potential government support to its
standalone credit quality reflected by SINEK's Baseline Credit
Assessment of 15 (on a scale of 1 to 21, where 15 is equivalent to
a B2).  The uplift results from the credit quality of the
government of the Republic of Tatarstan and Moody's assessments of
high probability of government support and very high default
dependence between SINEK and the government.

Moody's assessment of SINEK's BCA, government support and
dependence remains unchanged at this stage.  Therefore, the rating
action solely reflects the impact of the rating action on the
Republic of Tatartstan, as applied through Moody's GRI
methodology.

The rating and the outlook remain dependent on those of the
Republic of Tatarstan and very sensitive to changes in support
from the Republic.  Moody's expectation is that SINEK will
maintain its role of the Republic of Tatarstan's asset manager
that attracts funds to implement the Republic's strategy.

Given the stable outlook on the Republic's rating, no upward
pressure on SINEK's ratings is currently envisaged.

A negative change in the Republic's rating or outlook would
negatively affect the ratings and outlook of SINEK and Edel
Capital's LPNs.  A decrease of support from the Republic will have
a negative impact on SINEK's unguaranteed ratings as well.
Moody's understands that SINEK's debt currently is largely
directly guaranteed or lent by the Republic and expects this debt
structure to sustain going forward, assuming the Republic to
directly support the company's new borrowings, if any, going
forward.  Should a share of SINEK's debt not guaranteed and/or not
lent by the Republic materially exceed 10%, this could result in a
reduction of Moody's support assumption for the company and hence
prompt a downgrade of SINEK's unguaranteed ratings.  The company's
BCA could be downgraded, if the agency were to see an increasing
risk that the cash interest cover ratio would decrease materially
below 7x going forward and the company's short-term and/or total
debt coverage by its cash and respective term deposits with
related-party Ak Bars bank would be under pressure, in particular
as a result of the bank's deteriorating creditworthiness.

The previous rating action on SINEK was implemented on June 8,
2009, when Moody's changed the outlook on the company's ratings to
negative from stable following the change in the outlook on the
rating of the Republic of Tatarstan to negative from stable.

SINEK was set up in 2003 as a 100% state owned investment holding
company of the Republic of Tatarstan to hold its stakes industrial
and financial businesses, essentially in the sector of oil
production, petrochemicals, power generation and
telecommunications.  SINEK's three largest investments (Tatneft,
Tatenergo and Nizhnekamskneftekhim) account for about 90% of its
portfolio valuation (US$6.2 billion as of December 31, 2009 and
US$6.3 billion as of June 30, 2010).  Dividends from Tatneft
accounted for about 80% of SINEK's 2009 US GAAP dividend income.


* Fitch Assigns 'B+' Ratings on Russian City of Astrakhan
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the Russian City of Astrakhan Long-term
foreign and local currency ratings of 'B+', a Short-term foreign
currency rating of 'B' and a National Long-term rating of
'A(rus)'.  The Outlooks for the Long-term ratings are Stable.

The ratings factor in the city's relatively high direct risk with
short-term maturity and its low self-financing capacity of capital
expenditure.  The ratings also consider Astrakhan's diversified
economy, satisfactory budgetary performance and low contingent
risk stemming from its broad public sector.

Fitch notes that the improvement of budgetary performance with
sustainable operating margin at about 10%, coupled with a
lengthening of the debt maturity profile significantly beyond a
12-month horizon leading to reduced refinancing risk would be
rating positive.  Conversely, failure to improve the direct risk
payback ratio and non-extension of the debt maturity profile would
lead to downward rating pressure.

Astrakhan's budgetary performance was satisfactory in 2006-2009
with an operating margin of 5.8% by end-2009 (2008: 8.7%).  The
city's self-financing capacity on capex is constrained by the
relatively low current balance, which covered only 3.2% of capital
outlays in 2009 (2008: 6.0%).  However, capital transfers from the
region, relating to the 450th anniversary of Astrakhan Region,
allowed the city to maintain a high level of capex, which averaged
at 50.9% of its total spending in 2007-2008 (2009: 32.6%).  Fitch
expects Astrakhan to improve its operating margin to about 7%-8%
level by end-2010 and 10%-12% in the medium term, which would lead
to a gradual improvement of the city's capex self-financing
capacity.

The city's direct risk increased to RUB1.4 billion in 2009 (2005:
RUB800 million) as Astrakhan co-financed development projects in
2007-2009.  An overall increase in direct risk up to RUB1.8
billion is expected by end-2010.  Bank loans with 12 months to
maturity comprised 93% of the city's direct risk in 2009, exposing
Astrakhan to significant refinancing risk.  Immediate refinancing
needs by end-2010 are fully covered by outstanding liquidity,
while the city will need to refinance RUB950 million worth of
loans maturing by H111.  The city's exposure to contingent risk,
stemming from minor debt of public sector entities, is very low.

The city's economy is well-diversified and benefits from its
capital status of Astrakhan Region and concentration of
businesses.  The City of Astrakhan is located in the south of the
central part of Russia, in the upper mouth of the Volga River.
The city's population of 0.5 million accounted for 50% of the
region's population and 0.4% of Russia's total population.


* Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Ratings on Russian Kaluga Region
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Russian Kaluga Region's Outlooks to
Positive from Stable and affirmed the region's Long-term foreign
and local currency ratings at 'BB-' respectively.  Its other
ratings have been affirmed at Short-term foreign currency 'B' and
National Long-term 'A+(rus)'.

The revision of the Outlook reflects Fitch's expectation that
Kaluga will benefit from the rapid development of the region's
economy, via higher tax revenue and greater flexibility in
refinancing outstanding debt obligations.  The ratings factor in
the region's overall sound budgetary performance, which is
expected to recover from the moderate deterioration seen in 2009.
The ratings also consider the region's increasing total risk,
though its profile is long-term.  The ratings could be upgraded if
the region strengthens its budgetary performance to an operating
margin of around 15% and also if total risk stabilizes.

The region's economy has been developing rapidly, due to an influx
of large international investors into the region.  After a
temporary economic downturn in 2009, Kaluga has demonstrated fast
economic recovery driven by processing industries.  In H110 the
region's industrial output grew 42.4% y-o-y, the fastest among
Russian Federation regions.  Based on this the administration
forecasts GRP will grow 14.6% y-o-y, recovering to 2008's growth
rate.  In 2011-2013 GRP is forecasted by the administration to
grow 7% annually, in line with Fitch's expectations.

The region's operating balance deteriorated in 2009 due to
depressed tax revenue, but still remained satisfactory at 9.5% of
operating revenue.  The region was able to constrain operating
expenditure, which increased only 4% y-o-y in 2009, compared with
a growth of nearly 30% in 2006-2008.  Fitch believes the operating
balance will improve to 15% of operating revenue in 2010 on the
back of a recovery of tax proceeds.  Budgetary performance is
expected to further improve in 2011-2012 on economic growth, with
likely operating margins of 16%-18%.

The region's direct risk totals RUB11.4 billion in the year to
date, after rising gradually from about RUB1 billion in 2005.  The
increase was driven by the liabilities of public sector entities,
particularly those of the Development Corporation of Kaluga
Region.  Nevertheless, total risk is expected to remain manageable
at 42% of current revenue in 2010.  Repayment risk is mitigated by
a debt maturity profile that stretches till 2019, which is long
compared with national peers'.  Kaluga intends to stabilize its
direct risk in over the medium-term, while DCKR has no plans to
incur new debt.

DCKR was established by the region for the purpose of local
economic development and promote investment, particularly from
large overseas companies.  Over the last two years DCKR took on
two amortizing bank loans totaling RUB5.6 billion to finance
infrastructure development in the region's industrial zone.  The
region provides subsidies to DCKR to cover both principal debt and
interest payment.


===============
S L O V E N I A
===============


SCT: Subsidiary Files Receivership in Ljubljana Court
-----------------------------------------------------
STA reports that a subsidiary of SCT has filed for receivership
with the Ljubljana District Court, amidst reports that more will
follow suit.


* Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Various Slovenian Banks
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Slovenia's Abanka Vipa d.d.'s Long-
term Issuer Default Rating to 'BBB-' from 'BBB' and Gorenjska
Banka's Long-term IDR to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'.  The downgrades
reflect deterioration in asset quality at the banks.  At the same
time, the agency has affirmed the Long-term IDRs of Banka Koper
('A+'), Nova Ljubljanska Banka ('A-') and Nova Kreditna Banka
Maribor ('A-'), reflecting the continued potential for shareholder
support.  The Outlook on the Long-term IDRs of all five banks is
Stable.  NLB's 'C/D' Individual rating has been placed on Rating
Watch Negative.  A full list of rating actions is provided at the
end of this commentary.

Slovenian banks' asset quality has deteriorated sharply, in
particular driven by exposures to the construction sector and to
holding companies, where leverage is generally high.  According to
the National Bank of Slovenia, the ratio of exposures to non-
financial companies overdue by 90 days stood at 9.5% at end of
August 2010 (end-2009: 6.6%).  Fitch believes further asset
quality problems are likely in 2011, given ongoing weaknesses in
the operating environment.  However, the pace of asset quality
deterioration should slow, in the agency's view, as loan books
season and the economy returns to moderate growth.  The agency
forecasts a 1.9% expansion of GDP in 2011 after expected 1.1%
growth in 2010.

Performance has been weak and capital has come under pressure at
most banks, although loss absorption cushions remain significant
at some institutions, and the sector's aggregate Tier 1 ratio was
9.3% at end-Q310.  Dependence on wholesale funding is significant,
with the system's loans/deposits ratio at 146% at end-Q310 (albeit
down from 163% at end-2008).  The sector faces foreign debt
repayments in 2011 and 2012 of around EUR2 billion and EUR4
billion, respectively, equal to around 4% and 8.5% of system
liabilities as at end-Q310.  However, sector liquidity is
comfortable at present and should be sufficient to support these
repayments, in Fitch's view.  Access to funding from the European
Central Bank is a further important positive rating factor.

The downgrades of Abanka and Gorenjska reflect their asset quality
deterioration, high single name concentrations and pressured
profitability.  However, the banks' ratings also consider stable
national (Abanka) and regional (Gorenjska) franchises, and capital
and liquidity cushions which are comfortable at Gorenjska and
still reasonable at Abanka.  The banks' Stable Outlooks reflect
Fitch's view that existing capital should be sufficient to absorb
further loan losses, while Abanka's existing liquidity cushion
should enable it to manage considerable wholesale funding
repayments in 2012.  However, any further significant pressure on
capital and/or liquidity at either institution could result in
further negative rating action.

NLB, NKBM and Koper have also suffered asset quality
deterioration.  At NLB and NKBM this is putting pressure on
capital.  Koper's capital position remains adequate, but should be
considered in light of high single name concentrations.  However,
the IDRs of NLB, NKBM and Koper remain underpinned by the
potential for support from their ultimate majority shareholders:
the Republic of Slovenia ('AA'/Stable) for NLB and NKBM and Intesa
Sanpaolo ('AA-'/Stable) for Koper.

NLB's and NKBM's Long-term IDRs have been affirmed with Stable
Outlooks, reflecting Fitch's base case expectation that the
Slovenian authorities will remain major shareholders of the two
banks, and that the banks will be able to raise new equity, as
required, to strengthen their capital positions.  However, if
delays in providing capital support to NLB continue and/or if
equity injections result in a significant reduction in the
government's stake in either of the banks, their support-driven
ratings could come under negative pressure.  The RWN on NLB's
Individual rating reflects the bank's weak capital position and
asset quality, and the potential for the rating to be downgraded
if the bank's capital position is not supported in the near term.
Rating actions are:

Abanka:

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'BBB-' from
     'BBB'; Outlook Stable

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'

  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'C'

  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BB+'

  -- Guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'AA'

  -- Hybrid capital instruments: downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'

Gorenjska:

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'BBB' from
     'BBB+'; Outlook Stable

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'F3' from 'F2'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'

  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'C'

  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BB+'

Koper:

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'A+'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'C'

NLB:

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'A-'; Stable
     Outlook

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

  -- Individual Rating: 'C/D'; on RWN

  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A-'

  -- Guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'AA'

NKBM:

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'A-'; Stable
     Outlook

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'C/D'

  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A-'

  -- Hybrid capital instruments: affirmed at 'BB'


=========
S P A I N
=========


MBS BANCAJA: Moody's Assigns (P)'Caa2' Rating on Class B Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by MBS Bancaja 8 FTA:

  -- (P)Aaa (sf) to the EUR274,500,000 Class A notes due 2064
  -- (P)Caa2 (sf) to the EUR175,500,000 Class B notes due 2064

                        Ratings Rationale

The ratings of the notes take into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined
the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement and the portfolio expected loss,
the transaction structure and any legal considerations.

The expected portfolio loss of 14.5% of original balance of the
portfolio at closing and the MILAN Aaa required Credit Enhancement
of 36.5% served as input parameters for Moody's cash flow model,
which is based on a probabilistic lognormal distribution as
described in the report "The Lognormal Method Applied to ABS
Analysis", published in September 2000.

The key drivers for the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement number, which
is higher than MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement in other Spanish RMBS
transactions, are (i) 18% of the pool correspond to refinanced
loans from previously underperforming loans by the same originator
(originator took pre-emptive action by refinancing ), (ii) the
weighted average loan-to-value of 84.4%, (iii) 10% of the pool is
in arrears up to 30 days as of cut-off date, (iv) non residential
properties represent 4.4% of the portfolio and (v) the high
concentration in Valencia region (40.3%).

The key drivers for the portfolio expected loss are (i) the
performance of high LTV loans as well as refinancing loans in the
sellers' book, (ii) 10% of the pool is in arrears up to 30 days as
of cut-off date, and (iii) the higher volatility on non
residential property prices.  The assumed expected loss
corresponds to an assumption of approximately 29% cumulative
default rate in the portfolio (assuming recovery is realized with
a lag after the default).  Given the historical performance of the
high LTV loans in the seller's book, Moody's believes the assumed
expected loss is appropriate for this transaction.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and principal with
respect of the Class A notes by the legal final maturity and for
ultimate payment of interest and principal with respect to the
Class B notes, by the final legal final maturity.  Moody's ratings
only address the credit risk associated with the transaction.
Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

The notes are backed by a pool of prime Spanish mortgages granted
to individuals (by Bancaja (A3, Prime-2).  The properties are
mainly residential (95.6%), with the remaining part being
commercial properties.  At closing the mortgage pool balance will
consist of approximately EUR450 million mortgage loans.  The
Reserve Fund will be funded at 5.0% of the total notes outstanding
and may start to amortize three years after closing to 10.0% of
the outstanding balance of the notes, subject to performance
conditions.  The total credit enhancement for the Class A notes is
44.0%.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High, which is higher
than the V score assigned for the Spanish RMBS sector.  Four
subcomponents of the V Score have been assessed worse than the
average for the sector and worse also in comparison with other
recently issued High LTV Spanish RMBS.  Sector Historical
Downgrade Rate performance variability score is Medium/High, which
is higher than a score of Medium for the Spanish RMBS sector,
reflecting that High LTV deals in Spain have shown worse
performance than the market index.  The variability score for
Quality of Historical Data is Medium/High mainly because there is
no historical information in the market on the performance of
refinancings of delinquent loans.  Issuer/Sponsor/Originator's
historical variability score is Medium/High since previous RMBS
deals from this originator show worse performance than the market
index.  The score for Transaction Complexity is Medium/High
because high LTV deals are more exposed to house price declines,
thus increasing the volatility on actual losses and this pool
contains loans with adverse risk elements.  V-Scores are a
relative assessment of the quality of available credit information
and of the degree of dependence on various assumptions used in
determining the rating.  High variability in key assumptions could
expose a rating to more likelihood of rating changes.  The V-Score
has been assigned accordingly to the report "VScores and Parameter
Sensitivities in the Major EMEA RMBS Sectors" published in April
2009.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: At the time the rating was
assigned, the model output indicated that Class A notes would have
achieved a Aaa even if the expected loss was as high as 23.2%
assuming MILAN Aaa CE as high at 47.5% and all other factors were
constant.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.  The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended to
measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time,
but rather how the initial rating of the security might have
differed if key rating input parameters were varied.  Parameter
Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are calculated
by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary rating model.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence report had a
neutral impact on the rating.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BLUESTONE SECURITIES: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Ratings on Three Tranches
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one and affirmed 15 tranches from the
Bluestone Securities PLC series UK non-conforming RMBS.  The
Outlooks on six tranches have been revised to Stable from
Negative.  The rating action reflects improved collateral
performance and Fitch's expectation that this will continue in the
short-term.

Regardless of the originator, the collateral portfolios within the
Bluestone series transactions have benefitted from improved
borrower affordability due to low interest rates.  Since August
2009, all the transactions began experiencing declines in overall
reported arrears and period repossessions, thus limiting the
number of properties sold and realized losses.  This has allowed
credit enhancement to improve as reserve funds were replenished
and also, partly, reduced the future risk as fewer borrowers are
now in arrears.  Fitch is, however, cautious as to the future
performance of these pools given the potential sensitivity to
future interest rate rises.

The reserve funds in both Bluestone 2006-1 and 2007-1 had been
utilized due to increased loss severities during 2008 and 2009.
Along with falling losses, the expiration of interest-only strips
featured in these transactions have allowed excess spread to flow
through the transaction and clear amounts debited to principal
deficiency ledgers and rebuild the reserve funds.

Although the reserve funds on these two transactions have been
replenishing, drawn reserve funds have prevented these two later
vintage transactions from switching to pro rata amortization of
their respective notes.  However, the agency notes that sequential
amortization will promote further growth in credit enhancement
levels and support senior notes.  Fitch expects the reserve funds
of both transactions to continue to rebuild during 2011.

For Bluestone 2005, Fitch notes that the transaction is currently
paying pro-rata and does not have a trigger based on portfolio
size to revert to sequential.  This leaves the transaction exposed
to the potential scenario whereby the class A notes are
securitized by a small number of loans.  Fitch expects that the
transaction is highly likely to see reserve fund draws as the
portfolio gets smaller, due to the proportion of senior fees in
comparison to interest revenue, and that this would cause the
transaction to revert to sequential amortization.  If this does
not occur and the transaction size continues to drop Fitch will
assess the transaction's ability to cover the potential default
and subsequent loss of loans in the pool in one interest payment
date to ensure that the class A notes have enough support to
maintain their rating.

Rating actions are:

Bluestone Securities plc (Series 2005-1):

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0222339631) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; assigned Loss Severity Rating of 'LS-1'

  -- Class B (ISIN XS0222339391) affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook
     Stable; assigned Loss Severity Rating of 'LS-3'

  -- Class C (ISIN XS0222338740) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Stable; assigned Loss Severity Rating of 'LS-3'

  -- Class D (ISIN XS0222338153) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Stable; assigned Loss Severity Rating of 'LS-5'

Bluestone Securities plc (Series 2006-1):

  -- Class A1 (ISIN XS0264881508) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; assigned Loss Severity
     Rating of 'LS-2'

  -- Class A2 (ISIN XS0264881920) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; assigned Loss Severity
     Rating of 'LS-2'

  -- Class B (ISIN XS0264882654) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; assigned Loss Severity
     Rating of 'LS-3'

  -- Class C (ISIN XS0264882902) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
     Negative; assigned Loss Severity Rating of 'LS-3'

  -- Class D (ISIN XS0264883207) upgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'CCsf';
     assigned Recovery Rating 'RR3'

  -- Class E (ISIN XS0264883546) affirmed at 'CCsf'; assigned
     Recovery Rating 'RR4'

Bluestone Securities plc (Series 2007-1):

  -- Class A2 (ISIN XS0300920237) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; assigned Loss Severity
     Rating of 'LS-2'

  -- Class Az (ISIN XS0300920583) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; assigned Loss Severity
     Rating of 'LS-5'

  -- Class B (ISIN XS0300920823) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; assigned Loss Severity
     Rating of 'LS-3'

  -- Class C (ISIN XS0300921128) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; assigned
     Recovery Rating 'RR3'

  -- Class Da (ISIN XS0300921474) affirmed at 'CCsf'; assigned
     Recovery Rating 'RR4'

  -- Class Db (ISIN XS0301241039) affirmed at 'CCsf'; assigned
     Recovery Rating 'RR4'


BRAINSPARK PLC: Winding Up Petition Dismissed
---------------------------------------------
Brainspark plc on December 16 disclosed that, further to the
announcements of 18 November, 21 October and 12 October, the
winding up petition against it has now been dismissed.

                       About Brainspark Plc

Brainspark plc (AIM: BSP) is an AIM listed investment company
pursuing a dynamic strategy to create a comprehensive portfolio of
companies primarily encompassing the interactive media, leisure,
entertainment and financial services sectors mainly in Italy but
also other European countries.  Its core investment is B'Parks &
Leisure, the owner of a site in northern Italy with plans for the
development of a large theme park. The company may be either a
passive or active investor and Brainspark's investment rationale
ranges from acquiring minority positions with strategic influence
through to larger controlling positions.


CORNERSTONE TITAN: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlook on Cornerstone Titan 2005-1
plc's select CMBS notes and affirmed all tranches as detailed
below.

  -- GBP58.1m class A1 (XS0227570834) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- GBP58.5m class A2 (XS0229452890) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- GBP27.2m class B (XS0227571139) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative

  -- GBP33.4m class C (XS0227571642) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative

  -- GBP54.4m class D (XS0227571725) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Negative

The Outlook change reflects the stable performance of the
transaction over the last 12 months.  The portfolio remains
dominated by the Eagle Office loan (88% of the outstanding loan
balance), a loan maturing in 2012 that is secured by three office
properties located in London's financial district and midtown sub-
markets, each entirely or predominantly single-let to large
international law or financial services firms.  Given its scale,
this loan's performance will largely determine the performance of
the rated notes.

The income generated by the three office properties securing Eagle
Office almost entirely comes from three investment-grade tenants
with a weighted average lease length of around six years.  The
perceived likelihood of lease renewal will be central to the
borrower's chances of refinancing the loan.  While the loan
benefits from some amortization, its large balance (currently
GBP221 million) and senior leverage (Fitch's estimate of exit LTV
is 94%) present challenges.

The GBP6.7 million Jubilee Way loan (2.7%) remains distressed, and
is in special servicing following an interest coverage ratio
covenant breach in April 2009.  As anticipated by Fitch, the loan
defaulted at maturity in July 2010; it has since been accelerated,
with law of property receivers devising an exit strategy for the
issuer.  Given the mortgaged property's persistent cash flow
difficulties and tertiary nature, the loan is likely to suffer a
substantial loss, already reflected in the reported LTV of 180%.

The Trevelyan House loan (6.5%) was extended by two years when it
reached maturity in July 2009.  As a prerequisite, all excess
income after debt service is used to pay down debt (via a cash
sweep).  These unscheduled amortization payments have reduced the
loan's outstanding balance by around 10% since 12 months ago.  The
Secretary of State for the Environment, the sole tenant in the
office building in Victoria securing the loan, in May agreed to
extend its lease by a further 10 years (with a five-year break
option), which significantly reduces the risk of loss.  Fitch now
estimates an LTV of 72%, which is in line with an expectation of
successful redemption in July 2011.

The Bentima House loan (2.5%) secured by a single, multi-tenanted
office building located in the City of London, has remained stable
over the last year.  The loan has a reported ICR of 2.99x, a
reported debt service coverage ratio of 1.19x and an LTV of 46.2%.


ELPHINSTONE: Creditors Likely to Receive Tiny Fraction of Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
Joe Watson at The Press and Journal reports that unsecured
creditors of Elphinstone appear likely to receive only a tiny
fraction of the tens of millions of pounds it owes them.

The bleak forecast is made in an administration report for
Glasgow-based Elphinstone Holdings, its nine subsidiaries and an
associated business, according to The Press and Journal.

The Press and Journal relates that the report, which was released
from Companies House, reveals the group suffered a GBP19.6 million
pre-tax loss in the 18 months to June 30, 2010, largely the result
of it having to write down the value of its land holdings.  It
also shows the scale of its debts for the first time, The Press
and Journal notes.

Unsecured creditors are due GBP1.8 million by Elphinstone
Holdings, GBP6.2 million by Elphinstone Elgin, GBP10.3 million by
Elphinstone Estates, GBP7.1 million by Elphinstone Baillieston,
GBP3.7 million by Elphinstone Barcapel, GBP7.7 million by
Commodore Homes (Lanarkshire), GBP36.8 million by Elphinstone
Land, GBP1.8 million by UA Group, GBP13,000 by Patteron SPV,
GBP300,000 by Elphinstone Halls and GBP600,000 from Elphinstone
Homes (Yorkhill), The Press and Journal discloses.

The group, which has 18 sites and an 800-acre land bank across
Scotland, was put into administration in September when KPMG
partners Blair Nimmo and Gary Fraser were appointed, The Press and
Journal recounts.

The administrators agree GBP2,000 is likely to be shared among
unsecured creditors of Elphinstone Elgin and that there is the
possibility of a 6p in the pound dividend from Elphinstone
Estates, although this depends on how much it receives from other
businesses within the group, The Press and Journal says.

According to The Press and Journal, Elphinstone Land may be able
to pay a dividend to its creditors, mainly other group companies,
but the administrators said in the report it is difficult at this
time to say how much it will amount to.  A small dividend is
likely from Elphinstone Halls too, The Press and Journal notes.

Elphinstone is a Glasgow-based land development company.


KIDDERMINSTER HARRIERS: Chris Swan Could Still Acquire Club
-----------------------------------------------------------
Express & Star reports that Warwickshire-based businessman Chris
Swan could change his mind and hand Kidderminster Harriers
Football Club a lifeline if the club come to him to reopen
takeover talks.

The financial situation at Aggborough moved a step closer to
boiling point on December 21, 2010, with Kidderminster Harriers
running out of time to raise the GBP150,000 they need by the end
of next week to avoid going into administration, according to
Express & Star.  The report relates that all in all, a GBP200,000
cash injection is needed between now and February to keep the club
afloat.

Express & Star notes that the current board of directors confirmed
that they had met with Mr. Swan, a property tycoon to discuss a
potential takeover, with all of the major shareholders present.

However, the report says, unnamed sources have alleged that
current chairman David Reynolds, who took the majority
shareholding from his predecessor Barry Norgrove in return for a
GBP93,000 investment into the club two months ago, wants his money
back before relinquishing control.  The financial situation at
Aggborough is that dire that players and club staff might not be
paid before Christmas, the sources added.

But, Mr. Swan could be the answer to Kidderminster Harriers'
problems, he insists they must now make the next move and adhere
to his clauses for a deal to go through, Express & Star adds.

Kidderminster Harriers Football Club is an English association
football team based in Kidderminster, Worcestershire formed in
1886.  They currently play in the Conference National and have
played at Aggborough Stadium since they were formed.


LEHMAN BROTHERS: Service Pact With European Administrators Okayed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. received approval from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York of a new
services agreement with the administrators of its European units.

The agreement was hammered out to provide LBHI continued access
to the information systems of its U.K.-based units to support the
valuation and unwinding of derivatives trades that were booked
through those information systems.

The U.K.-based Lehman units include Lehman Brothers Europe
Limited, Lehman Brothers International Europe, Lehman Brothers
Holdings Plc and Lehman Brothers Ltd.  These companies had been
placed in administration following the bankruptcy filing of LBHI.

LBHI previously entered into a transition services agreement with
the administrators to unwind their assets in U.K.  The TSA
expired on November 14, 2010, prompting LBHI to seek for
temporary extension of the TSA, on the condition that the company
seeks approval of the new services agreement.

Under the new agreement, the services to be provided to LBHI
include systems access and data provision necessary for the
company to continue unwinding derivatives trades that were
originally booked through its London-based systems.  The company
will also be provided other data to support potential or ongoing
litigation, alternative dispute resolution proceedings, among
other things.

A full-text copy of the new services agreement is available for
free at http://bankrupt.com/misc/LBHI_NSAAdministrators.pdf

                       About Lehman Brothers

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. -- http://www.lehman.com/-- was the
fourth largest investment bank in the United States.  For more
than 150 years, Lehman Brothers has been a leader in the global
financial markets by serving the financial needs of corporations,
governmental units, institutional clients and individuals
worldwide.

Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy September 15, 2008
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 08-13555).  Lehman's bankruptcy petition
disclosed US$639 billion in assets and US$613 billion in debts,
effectively making the firm's bankruptcy filing the largest in
U.S. history.  Several other affiliates followed thereafter.

The Debtors' bankruptcy cases are handled by Judge James M. Peck.
Harvey R. Miller, Esq., Richard P. Krasnow, Esq., Lori R. Fife,
Esq., Shai Y. Waisman, Esq., and Jacqueline Marcus, Esq., at Weil,
Gotshal & Manges, LLP, in New York, represent Lehman.  Epiq
Bankruptcy Solutions serves as claims and noticing agent.

On September 19, 2008, the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch, Judge of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered
an order commencing liquidation of Lehman Brothers, Inc., pursuant
to the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act (Case
No. 08-CIV-8119 (GEL)).  James W. Giddens has been appointed as
trustee for the SIPA liquidation of the business of LBI

The Bankruptcy Court has approved Barclays Bank Plc's purchase
of Lehman Brothers' North American investment banking and
capital markets operations and supporting infrastructure for
US$1.75 billion.  Nomura Holdings Inc., the largest brokerage
house in Japan, purchased LBHI's operations in Europe for US$2
plus the retention of most of employees.  Nomura also bought
Lehman's operations in the Asia Pacific for US$225 million.

                 International Operations Collapse

Lehman Brothers International (Europe), the principal UK trading
company in the Lehman group, was placed into administration,
together with Lehman Brothers Ltd, LB Holdings PLC and LB UK RE
Holdings Ltd.  Tony Lomas, Steven Pearson, Dan Schwarzmann and
Mike Jervis, partners at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, have been
appointed as joint administrators to Lehman Brothers International
(Europe) on September 15, 2008.  The joint administrators have
been appointed to wind down the business.

Lehman Brothers Japan Inc. and Lehman Brothers Holdings Japan Inc.
filed for bankruptcy in the Tokyo District Court on September 16.
Lehman Brothers Japan Inc. reported about JPY3.4 trillion
(US$33 billion) in liabilities in its petition.

Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., publishes Lehman Brothers
Bankruptcy News.  The newsletter tracks the Chapter 11 proceeding
undertaken by Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., and other insolvency
and bankruptcy proceedings undertaken by its affiliates.
(http://bankrupt.com/newsstand/or 215/945-7000)


MAILCOM (UK): Goes Into Administration
--------------------------------------
Tim Sheahan at Print Week reports that Mailcom (UK) has gone into
administration on December 17, 2010, with FRP Advisory.  The
report relates FRP Advisory is understood to have sold the
company's order book to OTM.

According to Print Week, OTM has confirmed that it has acquired
assets representing around 35% of Mailcom's business and that
around 30 members of Mailcom (UK)'s staff will transfer to OTM
under TUPE regulations.

Records filed at Companies House revealed that Mailcom (UK) Chief
Executive Neil Shotton resigned as a director on August 4, 2010,
while Michael Coles and Andrew Shotton were both appointed as
directors on the same day, Print Week notes.

Print Week says that industry sources have cited the loss of a
major contract with Santander as a potential contributing factor
in the company's demise.

In April this year, the report recounts, the business and assets
of Mailcom PLC were sold in a pre-pack deal for GBP1 million to
Mailcom (UK) after the entire business was places into
administration.  Print Week relates that nearly 80 staff lost
their jobs at the company's other facility in Boldon, Tyne and
Wear when administrators from Bond & Partners were appointed to
the site.

The report notes that Mailcom PLC left GBP1 million worth of debt
behind, taking the total amount of debt the entity had dumped to
GBP4.5 million.  The report relates that on June 19, 2009 Mailcom
(North) went into administration, leaving GBP3.5 million owed to
unsecured creditors.  It was sold to Mailcom PLC for GBP85,000,
the report adds.

Mailcom (UK) is based on Milton Keynes.


RADIO MALDWYN: Liquidator May Ink Sale Deal With Buyer Next Month
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that a potential buyer has been found for Radio
Maldwyn, which went into liquidation last week, with hopes it
could be back on air in the new year.

BBC News relates that insolvency firm Irwin and Company said a
buyer had been found and subject to contract a deal would be
struck next month.

Gerald Irwin of Irwin and Company said he had received offers for
Radio Maldwyn from a community group, two radio stations and
someone who ran a radio station, according to BBC News.

Founded in 1993, Radio Maldwyn broadcasts across mid Wales from a
studio in Newtown.  Radio Maldwyn's shareholders were sent a
notice of insolvency last month and voted to wind up the company
at a meeting last week.


R&R ICE: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to Senior Secured Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive B2 rating to
the EUR350 million 8.375% senior secured notes due 2017 issued by
R&R Ice Cream plc.  The Notes are guaranteed on a senior secured
basis by the issuer's main operating subsidiaries and benefit from
a first-lien pledge over the clear majority of group assets.

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's definitive rating on this debt obligation confirms the
provisional rating assigned on October 25, 2010.  Moody's
Rating Rationale was set out in a press release issued on this
date.

The note proceeds have been used to repay approximately EUR150
million indebtedness under existing bank facilities which have
been cancelled subsequently.  In addition, proceeds were applied
to refinance a EUR60 million bridge facility put in place to fund
the recent Rolland acquisition as well as to repay certain
obligations owed to shareholder Oaktree amounting to EUR48
million.  The remainder was used to cover transaction related fees
and expenses and to bolster the group's cash position.

R&R Ice Cream Limited, headquartered in Northallerton (UK), is the
largest pure-play ice cream manufacturer in Europe and produces
ice cream mainly for take-home consumption with a smaller presence
in the impulse purchases market.  The product portfolio includes
both private label production, representing the clear majority of
volumes and sales value, and, to a lesser extent, branded ice
cream such as Kelly's and Landliebe as well as products sold under
the Nestle brand in the UK (under licensing agreement).  In the
twelve months ending June 2010, R&R (excluding Rolland) generated
sales of EUR405 million, which increases to EUR508 million pro
forma for the Rolland acquisition.


SDI FUNDING: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Series 1 Notes to 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of these notes
issued by SDI Funding PLC.

Issuer: SDI Funding PLC Series 1

  -- GBP300M Series 1 iTraxx(R) SDITM-75 Credit-Linked Secured
     Notes due 2016, Downgraded to Ba1; previously on Dec 21, 2005
     Assigned A3

                        Ratings Rationale

This transaction represents the repackaging of three bank deposits
with a synthetic link to the iTraxx(R) SDI(TM)-75 index.  The
Index consists of 75 issuers of Sterling debt.

The SPV enters into deposit agreements with The Royal Bank of
Scotland plc (Aa3/P-1), Barclays Bank PLC (Aa3/P-1), HSBC Bank plc
(Aa2/P-1) and four credit default swaps with each of the above
banks and also Deutsche Bank AG (Aa3/P-1).  Under the CDS's the
SPV sells protection to each bank in relation to the Index in
return for a premium payment from the banks.  The SPV also enters
into an interest rate swap with RBS.

Under the interest rate swap, the SPV will pay to RBS interest
received under the deposits and the premium received under the
CDS's and RBS will pay the fixed amount due under the Notes.  At
maturity, Noteholders will receive the principal amount of the
Notes subject to reductions as specified in the transaction
documents such as partial redemption or credit events.

Moody's explained that the action effected is the result of the
deterioration of the credit quality of the reference portfolio.
In particular the reference portfolio includes an exposure to the
subordinate debt of Allied Irish Banks, plc which was downgraded
to Ba3 on October 6, 2010, and then placed on review for further
downgrade on November 25, 2010.  Further, the Index suffered two
credit events and therefore the notes were written down
accordingly.  The first one was the subordinate debt of Bradford &
Bingley plc on September 29, 2008, and the second one was the
senior unsecured of CIT Group Inc. on July 16, 2009.  The notes
were also partially redeemed in October 2010.  Together with the
losses from the credit events, the current outstanding notional of
the transaction is GBP291,960,000.  Due to an administrative
oversight, Moody's did not previously take into account these
credit events, which may have had a negative impact on the ratings
at the relevant time.

The rating of this transaction reflects Moody's analysis of the
current average credit quality of the reference entities
constituting the Index and the credit risk of the counterparties.
Following the credit events the rating addresses the expected loss
on the prevailing outstanding notional of the Index and no longer
reflects the credit risk of the defaulted reference entities that
have been removed from the Index.

Moody's performed sensitivity analysis to take into account three
reference entities which are no longer carrying a public rating:
BAA Limited, Imperial Tobacco Overseas B.V. and J Sainsbury plc.
These sensitivity runs assume Caa credit quality, single B credit
quality and their last rating prior to withdrawal.  Moody's also
took into account scenarios assuming various notch downgrades on
the subordinate debt of Allied Irish Banks, plc.  In all cases,
the results are consistent with the assigned rating.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


SIMCLAR GROUP: Sam Russell Gets GBP360,000 in 'Unlawful Payments'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Williamson at The Herald Scotland reports that Sam Russell
appears to have received another GBP360,000 dividends that were
paid unlawfully by his Simclar electronics group, new filings
show.

According to The Herald Scotland, Mr. Russell was in line to get
the lion's share of a GBP400,000 dividend payment that Simclar
made in 2007, and which the group has conceded was "technically
unlawful."  The dividend is disclosed in Simclar Group's 2007
accounts, filed at Companies House, the report notes.

Mr. Russell previously received GBP180,000 out of a GBP200,000
dividend paid in 2006 that was also technically unlawful as the
holding company had run up losses, the report notes.

News of the payment will focus attention on Simclar, which The
Herald Scotland revealed is embroiled in a multi-million pound
legal battle with liquidators to the Simclar Ayrshire subsidiary.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on
September 28, 2010, The Herald Scotland reports that liquidators
to the Simclar Ayrshire business that Sam Russell put into
administration in 2007 will continue their multi-million pound
legal battle with the wealthy entrepreneur in November.  According
to the report, lawyers for the liquidators and Mr. Russell's
Simclar Group agreed to reconvene in six weeks for a hearing that
could pave the way for his actions to come under lengthy scrutiny
in court.  The report related that it is understood that the
liquidators, from PricewaterhouseCoopers, are seeking the recovery
of dividends they claim were paid unlawfully by Simclar Group in
2006.  A court was told that the original claim has been amended
to include GBP18 million in respect of the transfer of the
ownership of a Chinese subsidiary -- from Simclar Ayrshire to the
group, The Herald Scotland noted.

The Herald Scotland notes Mr. Russell sat in court throughout a
three-hour hearing, the outcome of which could have a decisive
influence on the case.  The December 21, 2010's hearing considered
a claim by lawyers for the defenders that the action is a waste of
time, the report relates.

The defenders, the report notes, said that Simclar Group
voluntarily undertook to pay the amounts owed to Bank of Scotland
by the Ayrshire subsidiary that were owing after the
administration of the firm was completed.  Simclar Group later
made a payment to the bank, the report relates.

The Herald Scotland says that the defenders claim that the effect
of the payment was to transfer the bank's rights to Dunfermline-
based Simclar Group.  The report relates that this would mean that
any money that the defenders would be required to pay if they lose
the action will be payable to Simclar Group, and make the action
"circular".

"It is absolutely clear the group intervened on their own behalf.
Ayrshire neither sought nor consented to the agreement that the
group entered into with the bank," The Herald Scotland quoted
Richard Keen, counsel for the liquidators, as saying.

Mr. Keen, the report notes, said Simclar Group had not wanted what
he called the "pre-pack" administration of Simclar Ayrshire to
"imperil the group's residual banking arrangements".  The group
had acquired assets from Simclar Ayrshire while it was in
administration, he added.

Counsel for the defenders said because parties acted in their own
interests did not mean they could not enjoy the same rights as
other, the report adds.

Lord Hodge is expected to rule on the "circularity" claim in the
new year.

                     About Simclar Group

Headquartered in Dunfermline, Scotland, The Simclar Group --
http://www.simclar.com/-- is a global solutions provider,
offering complete manufacturing and fulfillment services to
customers.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Frauline S. Abangan and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *