TCREUR_Public/101223.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, December 23, 2010, Vol. 11, No. 253

                            Headlines



B U L G A R I A

MOSTSTROY AD: Sofia Court Rejects Insolvency Application


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

KONGRESOVE CENTRUM: Prague City Councilors Approve CZK10 Mil. Loan
METAZ: To Be Put Up for Sale; Several Investors Express Interest


F R A N C E

CREDIT AGRICOLE: Moody's Affirms 'D' Bank Strength Rating
FCT ERIDAN: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Class B Notes


G E R M A N Y

EVONIK INDUSTRIES: Moody's Gives Positive Outlook on Ba1 Ratings
LOYALTY PARTNER: S&P Puts 'B' Rating on CreditWatch Positive
PFLEIDERER AG: Inks Standstill Agreement with Banks


H U N G A R Y

MALEV ZRT: European Commission to Probe Government Aid


I R E L A N D

ANGLO IRISH: Subordinated Bondholders Agree to Swap Notes
ANGLO IRISH: High Court Overturns Ex-Chief's Home-Share Transfer
EIRCOM GROUP: Chief Financial Officer Peter Cross Steps Down
MCINERNEY GROUP: High Court Set to Rule on Rescue Plan on Jan. 10
ULSTER BANK: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'E'

* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Irish Banking Entities


N E T H E R L A N D S

SCHOELLER ARCA: S&P Affirms 'CCC' LT Corporate Credit Rating


R U S S I A

BANK ROSSIYA: Fitch Raises Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'B'
EVRAZ GROUP: Moody's Gives Positive Outlook; Affirms 'B1' Rating
GAZBANK JSCB: Moody's Gives Stable Outlook on 'B3' Ratings
PROMSVYAZBANK OJSC: Fitch Upgrades Issuer Default Rating to 'BB-'
VTB CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'D'

* S&P Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Issuer Rating on Leningrad Oblastleni
* S&P Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Issuer Rating on Sverdlovsk Oblast
* S&P Assigns 'B+' Long-Term Debt Rating to Tver Oblast


S L O V E N I A

SCT: On Brink of Bankruptcy, Economist Says


S P A I N

AYT COLATERALES: Moody's Assigns Caa3 (sf) Rating to Class D Notes
AYT COLATERALES: Moody's Assigns Ca (sf) Rating on Class D Notes


T U R K E Y

EUROBANK TEKFEN: Moody's Reviews 'Ba2' Global Deposit Rating
TURKIYE KALKINMA: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'D'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

HIGHLANDS INSURANCE: Policyholders Receive Full Payout
MONTROSE PARTNERS: Provisional Liquidator Appointed
PUNCH TAVERNS: Fitch Comments on Media Speculation Over Strategy
SPINNAKA: Goes Into Administration, Fails to Obtain PI Cover


X X X X X X X X

* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars




                            *********


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B U L G A R I A
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MOSTSTROY AD: Sofia Court Rejects Insolvency Application
--------------------------------------------------------
Novinite.com reports that the Sofia City Court has rejected the
application for insolvency by Moststroy AD.

According to Novinite.com, experts commented that the court has
decided not to presume insolvency as the company has sufficient
assets.

Moststroy AD has already appealed the ruling, Novinite.com says.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 11,
2010, Bloomberg News said Moststroy filed for insolvency after all
its bank accounts were frozen because of unpaid debts.  Bloomberg
disclosed Moststroy said it had no funds to repay a loan borrowed
from the United Bulgarian Bank, a unit of the National Bank of
Greece SA, which was due on May 31.  Its construction machines and
other equipment leased from Interlease EAD were seized by
Interlease, which canceled the contracts, Moststroy, as cited by
Bloomberg, said.

Moststroy AD is a construction company based in Bulgaria.  The
company participates in the construction of the country's high-
profile Trakiya motorway.


===========================
C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
===========================


KONGRESOVE CENTRUM: Prague City Councilors Approve CZK10 Mil. Loan
------------------------------------------------------------------
CTK, citing Prague Mayor Bohuslav Svoboda, reports that Prague
city councilors on Dec. 21 approved a CZK10 million loan to
Kongresove centrum Praha.

CTK relates that Mr. Svoboda said the loan should prevent the firm
from becoming insolvent.

According to CTK, Mr. Svoboda said the Prague city council wants
to hold talks again about how to clear the company of its debts,
which stood at around CZK2.1 billion.

Kongresove centrum Praha is the company operating the Prague
congress center.


METAZ: To Be Put Up for Sale; Several Investors Express Interest
----------------------------------------------------------------
Metaz will be put up for sale, with several investors having
already expressed their interest in the firm, CTK reports, citing
insolvency administrator Vladimira Jechova Vapenikova.

According to CTK, the bankrupt company owes around CZK260 million
to 240 creditors.

CTK relates that Mr. Vapenikova said around 100 of the current 250
employees are to be laid off by the end of this year following a
decline in production.

Metaz is a bankrupt castings and steel maker based in the Czech
Republic.


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F R A N C E
===========


CREDIT AGRICOLE: Moody's Affirms 'D' Bank Strength Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the long-term debt and deposit
ratings of Credit Agricole SA at Aa1, while its bank financial
strength rating was lowered to C+ from B-.  At the same time,
Moody's affirmed the BFSR of its subsidiary Credit Agricole
Corporate and Investment Bank at D and its long-term debt and
deposit ratings at Aa3.  The BFSR of LCL, another CASA subsidiary,
was also affirmed at C+, while its long-term debt and deposit
ratings were affirmed at Aa1.

The outlook on all these ratings and BFSRs were revised to stable
from negative.  The outlook on the long-term debt and deposit
ratings of most other rated CASA subsidiaries is also revised to
stable.  All short-term ratings were affirmed.

After the previous rating actions on February 4, 2009, CASA and
CACIB were left with negative outlooks on their long-term debt and
deposit ratings and BFSRs, on the back of potentially significant
additional impairments on CACIB's structured credit portfolios in
the event that the global capital markets would remain stressed.
The announcement reflects Moody's opinion that although CACIB
remains exposed to additional impairments on these portfolios over
time, their magnitude is expected to be more limited going forward
and that CACIB will not require further support from Groupe Credit
Agricole.  This is the principal reason for revising the outlook
on CACIB's BFSR to stable.

Moody's added that, while CACIB's risk profile has steadily
improved with pro-active provisioning and natural time decay on
its structured credit portfolios, a deficient risk management
history and still-large legacy assets leave it exposed to
potential earnings volatility, all of which is more consistent
with a BFSR of D.  The rating agency also noted that CACIB's loan
portfolio has sizable concentrations in a number of sectors,
including shipping finance and commercial real estate, which may
still come under pressure if the global economic recovery fails to
be sustained.  These exposures could also contribute to earnings
volatility over the medium term.  Despite these challenges,
Moody's said that CACIB's BFSR remains supported by its good
liquidity situation, its strong position in corporate banking in
France, and leading institutional equities brokerage platforms in
Europe and Asia.

CACIB's debt and deposit ratings of Aa3 reflect the fact that
although CACIB is a wholly owned subsidiary of CASA, it is not
directly covered by GCA's mutualist support mechanisms.  The
ratings differential between CASA's debt and deposit ratings of
Aa1 and CACIB's debt and deposit ratings of Aa3 recognizes that
group support for CACIB falls short of a full guarantee.
Nonetheless, CACIB's debt and deposit ratings still benefit from a
very high probability of group support from CASA and the group due
to CACIB's strategic importance to the group.  These ratings thus
enjoy an eight-notch uplift from the bank's baseline credit
assessment of Ba2.

Moody's notes that in 2010, CACIB was progressively less of a
burden on GCA's overall profitability and efficiency than in the
previous years.  In addition, the regional banks' retail
activities demonstrated a marked resilience during the financial
crisis and should continue to provide a largely-recurring earnings
stream going forward.  These are the principal reasons to revise
the outlook on CASA's debt and deposit ratings to stable from
negative.

However, Moody's has lowered CASA's BFSR from B- to C+, which
translates into a baseline credit assessment of A2, in order to
better align it with its published two-step BFSR and Joint-Default
Analysis methodologies.  Given the relative heavier weight of
CACIB and the group's international operations in CASA -- which
consolidates only 25% of the regional banks in its accounts --
than in GCA, as well as the correspondingly lower importance of
more stable retail banking activities, Moody's has decided to
position CASA's BFSR one notch down, closer to that of CACIB.  The
outlook on the BFSR is revised to stable.

Moody's continues to recognize the integration between CASA and
the regional banks through the mutualist support mechanisms, which
together with a very high probability of systemic support
translates into a four-notch uplift for CASA's long-term senior
debt and deposit ratings of Aa1.

As LCL continues to benefit from its integration in and support
from the group, its long-term debt and deposit ratings are in line
with those of CASA at Aa1, and its debt and deposit outlook is
raised to stable.

In respect of the Group's main operating units, these rating
actions have been taken:

  -- Credit Agricole SA's BFSR lowered to C+ from B-.  Debt and
     deposit ratings affirmed; the outlooks on all ratings were
     revised to stable.  Prime-1 short-term rating affirmed.

  -- Credit Agricole CIB's BFSR as well as debt and deposit
     ratings affirmed; the outlooks on all ratings were revised to
     stable.  Prime-1 short-term rating affirmed.

  -- LCL's BFSR as well as deposit and debt ratings affirmed; the
     outlook on long-term debt ratings were revised to stable.
     Prime-1 short-term rating affirmed.

In respect of the Group's other subsidiaries, these rating actions
have been taken:

  -- Credit Agricole SA, London Branch's Aa1 deposit and senior
     unsecured debt ratings and Aa2 subordinated debt ratings were
     affirmed and the outlook was revised to stable.

  -- The deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings of the 36 rated
     Caisses Regionales de Credit Agricole Mutuel (CRCAM) were
     affirmed at Aa1 and the outlook was revised to stable.

  -- CA Preferred Funding Trust's A3 backed preferred stock rating
     was affirmed and the outlook was revised to stable.

  -- CA Preferred Funding Trust II's A3 backed preferred stock
     rating was affirmed and the outlook was revised to stable.

  -- Credit Agricole CIB New York Branch's long-term deposit
     rating and deposit note rating were affirmed at Aa3 and the
     outlook was revised to stable.

  -- Credit Agricole CIB Tokyo Branch's long-term deposit rating
     was affirmed at Aa3 and the outlook was revised to stable.

  -- Credit Agricole CIB Financial Products (Guernsey) Ltd's
     backed senior unsecured debt rating was affirmed at Aa3 and
     the outlook was revised to stable.

  -- Credit Agricole CIB Finance (Guernsey) Ltd's backed senior
     unsecured debt ratings was affirmed at Aa3 and the outlook
     was revised to stable.

  -- Credit Agricole CIB Financial Solutions' backed senior
     unsecured debt ratings was affirmed at Aa3 and the outlook
     was revised to stable.

  -- CL Capital Trust's A3 backed preferred stock rating was
     affirmed and the outlook was revised to stable.

All short-term debt and deposit ratings are unchanged.

No rating action has been taken on the Group's following
subsidiaries:

  -- CIB Credit Agricole, PJSC (ex-Calyon Bank Ukraine)
  -- Credit Agricole North America (ex-Calyon North America)
  -- Cassa di Risparmio di Parma e Piacenza
  -- Banca Popolare Friuladria
  -- Credit Uruguay Banco SA
  -- Credit du Maroc
  -- Credit Lyonnais Australia Limited
  -- Lukas Bank SA
  -- FGA Capital SpA
  -- Banque Saudi Fransi
  -- Emporiki Bank of Greece SA
  -- Bankoa SA

The last rating action on CASA, CACIB and LCL was on 4 February
2009, when Moody's downgraded CASA's, CACIB's and LCL's respective
BFSRs to B-, D and C+ and CACIB's deposit and senior unsecured
debt ratings to Aa3.  All BFSR and debt and deposit ratings were
assigned negative outlooks at the time, apart from LCL's BFSR
outlook which was kept stable.

Headquartered in Paris, CASA reported IFRS consolidated assets of
EUR1.72 trillion at end-September 2010 and net income (Group
share) of EUR742 million in the third quarter of 2010.  The Credit
Agricole Group disclosed net income (Group share) of EUR3.3
billion in the first nine months of 2010, up by 84% versus the
same period in 2009.  At end-September 2010, the Group reported
total consolidated assets of EUR1.86 trillion.

Headquartered in Paris La Defense, CACIB had total assets of
EUR879 billion at end-June 2010.  The bank recorded a net income
(group share) of EUR508 million for the first half of 2010.

Headquartered in Paris, LCL had total assets of EUR108 billion at
end-2010.  In H1 2010, the bank reported net profit (Group share)
of EUR319 million.


FCT ERIDAN: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Class B Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned FCT Eridan 2010-01's EUR598.5 million
class A notes and EUR103.55 million class B notes final ratings:

  -- Class A EUR598.5m notes assigned 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable,
     Loss Severity Rating 'LS-2'

  -- Class B EUR103.55m notes assigned 'BB+sf', Outlook Stable,
     Loss Severity Rating LS-3

The transaction is a securitization of a static portfolio of
equipment loans granted to professionals in France and originated
by BRED Banque Populaire (the originator/servicer, rated
'A+'/Stable/'F1+').

The class A notes benefit from 37% credit enhancement, provided in
the form of subordination from the class B notes and the unrated
class S notes, as well as the overcollateralization achieved
through the deferred purchase price of the receivables.  The class
B notes benefit from 26.1% credit enhancement, provided from the
subordinated class S notes and the overcollateralization.  Fitch
notes that the credit enhancement in this transaction does not
include a cash reserve, which could provide short-term liquidity.

The notes will amortize pro-rata, although Fitch gained comfort
from default, prepayment and cumulative loss triggers in place for
the transaction, which would end the pro-rata amortization of the
notes and trigger sequential amortization in times of moderate
stress.

Fitch has tested the class A and B notes' ability to withstand
various stresses.  The agency notes that under sequential and
accelerated amortization scenarios, the class B notes will
experience temporary interest shortfalls due to the fully
sequential nature of the notes in the waterfalls, as allowed under
the transaction documentations.

For its analysis, Fitch was provided with loan-by-loan data for
the reference portfolio by the originator, as well as historical
performance data dating back to Q198.  The data used was reviewed
by Fitch and considered sufficient for the assigned ratings.
BRED Banque Populaire is performing the role of account bank,
servicer and swap counterparty for the transaction.  The
transaction document's counterparty replacement triggers are in
line with Fitch's counterparty criteria.


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G E R M A N Y
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EVONIK INDUSTRIES: Moody's Gives Positive Outlook on Ba1 Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has changed its outlook to positive from stable on all
outstanding ratings of Evonik Industries AG.  All outstanding
ratings remain unchanged.

The change in outlook was prompted by Evonik Industries'
announcement of a sale of a 51% stake in its energy business for
an enterprise value of EUR3.77 billion as well as by the group's
continued robust operating performance since Moody's assigned
Moody's rating in September 2010.

The sale of a 51% stake in Steag and the full deconsolidation of
the business is credit positive (remaining 49% stake will be
equity accounted and is expected to be sold over the medium term).
The deleveraging impact from the sale will be modest (pro forma of
the sale and full deconsolidation of Steag RCF / Net debt is
estimated at around 25% versus approximately 22% on an LTM
September 2010 basis) but the transaction will de-risk the
business profile of the group as Steag is seen as a relatively
small utility with a very limited fuel mix and modest geographical
diversification.  Moody's also notes that the energy business is
relatively capital intensive and has to some extent constrained
the capital allocation to Evonik Industries' chemicals franchise.
Lastly the deconsolidation of Steag is further evidence that the
management of Evonik Industries continues to address structural
subordination issues, an expectation that Moody's had factored in
the absence of notching of the senior unsecured instrument rating.

Evonik Industries' liquidity position is strong.  The group had
EUR1.3 billion of cash & marketable securities plus EUR200 million
in near cash assets on balance sheet at September 30, 2010.  In
addition Evonik Industries has access to a fully undrawn
EUR1.5 billion revolving credit facility with ample covenant
headroom.  Main liquidity needs over the next twelve months mainly
consisting of capex, working capital requirements and dividends
are expected to be funded from operating cash flows.

Continued strong operating performance coupled with a prudent
balance sheet management leading to Adjusted Net Debt / EBITDA of
below 3.5x and Adjusted RCF / Net Debt of above 15% on a
sustainable basis would exert positive pressure on the ratings.

A sharp deterioration in the operating environment and / or shift
in the group's organic and external growth strategy leading to
sustained negative free cash flow generation and / or a
deterioration in Adjusted Net Debt / EBITDA to sustainably above
4.5x would lead to negative pressure on the ratings.  The agency
would also expect Evonik to maintain Adjusted RCF / Net Debt in
the low double digit to avert negative pressure on the ratings.

The last rating action on Evonik Industries AG was on
September 21, 2010, when Moody's assigned a first time Ba1
Corporate Family rating and a Ba1 instrument rating to EUR750
million of Senior Unsecured Notes issued by Evonik Industries AG.

Evonik Industries AG, headquartered in Essen, Germany, is the
holding company of the Evonik Group, which holds interests in
chemicals (considered as core business), energy and real estate
businesses.  While the roots of the company date back to 1843, the
group in its current legal form was established in 2007 when the
so-called white division of RAG AG was separated from the mining
activities of the group and incorporated under EI.  Evonik is
majority owned by RAG Foundation, which was set up to fund
liabilities relating to the termination of RAG's mining activities
until 2018.  Funds of the financial investor CVC Capital Partners
have acquired a 25,01% stake in EI in 2008.  EI reported revenues
of EUR13.1 billion and an EBITDA of EUR2 billion for the fiscal
year ended December 31, 2009.  The company employed 38,361 people
at fiscal year-end 2009.


LOYALTY PARTNER: S&P Puts 'B' Rating on CreditWatch Positive
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had placed its 'B'
long-term corporate credit rating on Germany-based Loyalty Partner
GmbH, a provider of customer loyalty management services, on
CreditWatch with positive implications following an announcement
that U.S.-based American Express Co. (BBB+/Stable/A-2) plans to
acquire the company.

"The CreditWatch placement reflects the possibility that the
rating on Loyalty Partner could be raised if the acquisition
materializes given the higher rating on and credit quality of
Amex," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Alf Stenqvist.

The proposed acquisition has no impact on the ratings on Amex.

According to the announcement by Amex, Loyalty Partner will become
a subsidiary of Amex, and will be part of Amex's International
Consumer and Small Businesses Service group.  The proposed
acquisition is priced at EUR496 million (US$660 million),
comprising an upfront cash purchase price of EUR425 million and an
equity interest of EUR71 million held by Loyalty Partner's
management, but to be purchased by Amex over the next five years.
The purchase, which is subject to regulatory approval, is expected
to close in the first quarter of 2011.

The rating on Loyalty Partner continues to reflect S&P's view of
the group's existing highly leveraged financial risk profile, and
the limited scale of its operations, including limited product,
geographic, and customer diversification.  The rating also
reflects S&P's view of the risks associated with the group's
international development strategy, which requires large upfront
expansion costs.  These risks are mitigated by Loyalty Partner's
leading market position in the multi-loyalty card program market
in Germany and its long-term contracts with leading blue-chip
partners in various consumer spending sectors.  Both these factors
support recurring revenue streams.

S&P aim to resolve the CreditWatch placement once the transaction
is closed.  S&P will evaluate the effect of the proposed
acquisition on Loyalty Partner's credit profile.  This will
include a review of Loyalty Partner's future capital structure,
and a discussion with Amex's management regarding factors such as
the strategic importance of Loyalty Partner's assets, and Amex's
willingness to provide financial support.



PFLEIDERER AG: Inks Standstill Agreement with Banks
---------------------------------------------------
Andreas Cremer at Bloomberg News, citing an e-mailed statement,
reports that Pfleiderer AG said it has signed a "standstill
agreement" with banks valid until March 31, 2011.

According to Bloomberg, the company said lenders have agreed not
to exercise rights to terminate credit lines within that period.

Headquartered in Neumarkt, Germany, Pfleiderer AG --
http://www.pfleiderer.com/-- is a producer and supplier of
engineered wood products.  It acts as a partner for wood trade
outlets, interior designers, the building and do-it-yourself
trade, and the furniture industry in more than 80 countries
worldwide.  The Company offers a range of base products, such as
raw chipboard and particleboard, tongue and groove board, medium-
density fiberboard and high- density fiberboard, and surfaced
products, such as melamine-faced chipboard, high-pressure
laminates and post-forming elements, laminate flooring and a range
of films and surfacings.  The Company operates through three
geographical segments: Western Europe, including Germany and
Sweden; Eastern Europe, consisting of Poland and Russia, and North
America, comprised of Canada and the United States.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 26,
2010, Fitch Ratings downgraded Pfleiderer AG's Long-term Issuer
Default Rating to 'B-' from 'B'.  The rating remains on Rating
Watch Negative.  At the same time, the agency has downgraded the
company's EUR275 million undated subordinated fixed- to floating-
rate capital securities to 'C' from 'CC' and removed them from
RWN.  In addition, the Short-term IDR of 'B' has been placed on
RWN.  The Recovery Rating on the capital securities is 'RR6'.

Fitch said the downgrade reflects increased leverage and an
overall stretched financial profile for the rating level, as a
result of materially weaker-than-expected 2009 operating
profitability and cash generation.


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H U N G A R Y
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MALEV ZRT: European Commission to Probe Government Aid
------------------------------------------------------
Nikki Tait at The Financial Times reports that European
competition authorities are to probe government aid given to Malev
Zrt., which was nationalized again this year after a short period
of private ownership.

According to the FT, competition officials at the European
Commission said they were doubtful that Malev could have obtained
financing on the markets on the same terms provided by the
Hungarian authorities.

The FT relates that the commission has conducted a preliminary
investigation into the issue and on Tuesday listed specific areas
where it has concerns.  These include the takeover by the
government of a 2003 loan to Malev four years later, a cash
handling facility provided for 12 months in the context of the
abortive sale of Malev's ground-handling facility, deferred tax,
shareholder loans in the course of 2010, the conversion of those
shareholder loans in Malev shares, and capital increases in
February and September this year, the FT discloses.

EU officials said they also had doubts that these measures were
compatible with the special state-aid rules that cover the rescue
and restructuring of companies that are in financial difficulties,
the FT notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 31,
2010, Bloomberg News, citing Nepszabadsag, said that Malev could
be forced into bankruptcy by the government to free it from debt.
The newspaper said bankruptcy would help avoid having to repay
EUR100 million (US$123 million) Malev, which was renationalized
this year, owes the Russian state development bank
Vnesheconombank, according to Bloomberg.

Malev Zrt. is the flag carrier and principal airline of Hungary.


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I R E L A N D
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ANGLO IRISH: Subordinated Bondholders Agree to Swap Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
John Glover at Bloomberg News reports that Anglo Irish Bank Corp.
said holders of more than 90% of its subordinated bonds due 2014
and 2016 agreed to swap the notes at a discount, after the
government changed the law to force creditors to help pay for bank
bailouts.

According to Bloomberg, the bank said in a statement investors
agreed to exchange EUR307 million (US$404 million) of its so-
called lower Tier 2 bonds due 2014 and EUR459.5 million of
similarly ranked notes maturing 2016 at an 80% discount to par
value.  By accepting the swap, holders agreed to changes in
conditions that will wipe out investors refusing to take part,
Bloomberg notes.

Anglo Irish offered to buy back a total EUR825 million of bonds in
exchange for one-year government-guaranteed notes that pay 375
basis points more than the euro interbank offered rate, or
Euribor, Bloomberg discloses.  In an offer last month, holders of
EUR750 million of subordinated bonds due 2017 agreed to the same
terms, Bloomberg relates.

The lender is convening bondholder meetings this week to insert
clauses into the bonds' documentation giving it the right to repay
the notes left outstanding at 1 cent per 1,000-euro face amount,
Bloomberg says.

Anglo Irish Bank Corp PLC -- http://www.angloirishbank.com/--
operates in three core areas: business lending, treasury and
private banking.  The Bank's non-retail business is made up of
more than 11,000 commercial depositors spanning commercial
entities, charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit
unions and other non-bank financial institutions.  The Company's
retail deposits comprise demand, notice and fixed term deposit
accounts from personal savers with maturities of up to two years.
Non-retail deposits are sourced from commercial entities,
charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit unions and
other non-bank financial institutions.  In addition, at Sept. 30,
2008, its non-retail deposits included deposits from Irish
Life Assurance plc.  The Private Bank offers tailored products and
solutions for high net worth clients and operates the Bank's
lending business in Ireland and the United Kingdom.

                        *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 1,
2010, DBRS downgraded the ratings of the Euro Dated Subordinated
Notes (specifically the EUR325.2 million Floating Rate
Subordinated Notes due 2014, EUR500 million Callable Subordinated
Floating Rate Notes due 2016 and the EUR750 million Dated
Subordinated Floating Rate Notes due 2017) (collectively referred
to as the 2017 Notes) issued by Anglo Irish Bank Corporation
Limited (Anglo Irish or the Bank) to 'D' from 'C'.  DBRS said the
downgrade follows the execution of the Bank's note exchange offer.
The default status for the exchanged and now-extinguished 2017
Notes reflects DBRS's view that bondholders were offered limited
options, which, as discussed in DBRS's press release dated
October 25, 2010, is considered a default per DBRS policy.

On Oct. 29, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported
that Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on
Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd.'s nondeferrable dated subordinated
debt (lower Tier 2) securities to 'D' from 'CCC'.  The downgrade
of the lower Tier 2 debt rating reflects S&P's opinion that the
bank's exchange offer is a "distressed exchange" and tantamount to
default in accordance with its criteria.


ANGLO IRISH: High Court Overturns Ex-Chief's Home-Share Transfer
----------------------------------------------------------------
Tim Healy at Irish Independent reports that the High Court on
Tuesday formally overturned the transfer by former Anglo Irish
Bank CEO David Drumm of his half-share in the former family home
into the sole ownership of his wife.

According to Irish Independent, in court proceedings against
Mr. Drumm and his wife Lorraine, Anglo had sought to overturn the
May 2009 transfer of ownership of the property at Abington,
Malahide, Co Dublin, arguing it was a fraud on creditors.  The
Drumms insisted it was for tax reasons, Irish Independent notes.

Irish Independent relates that Mr. Justice Peter Kelly made an
order setting aside "ab initio" (from the beginning or as if it
had never happened) the May 2009 transfer of the property from the
joint ownership of David and Lorraine Drumm into the sole name of
Mrs. Drumm.

The judge also continued an order restraining Mrs. Drumm from any
dealings in relation to Abington pending the lodging of
appropriate documents concerning the property with the Property
Registration Authority so as to give effect to the orders of Ms.
Justice Dunne, Irish Independent discloses.  Once those documents
are lodged, the order should be lifted, he directed, according to
Irish Independent.

Those orders bring to an end the court proceedings against Mr. and
Mrs. Drumm over the house transfer, Anglo already having secured
the costs of those proceedings against Mrs. Drumm by agreement,
Irish Independent notes.

Anglo's Commercial Court action against Mr. Drumm over EUR8
million unpaid loans, and his counterclaim for EUR2.6 million,
remains outstanding, Irish Independent states.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 19,
2010, Bloomberg News said Mr. Drumm filed for bankruptcy, months
after the bank sought repayment of loans from him.  Bloomberg
disclosed Mr. Drumm, who resigned from the Dublin-based bank in
December 2008, listed assets and liabilities at US$1 million to
US$10 million on Oct. 14 in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Boston.
Anglo Irish Bank's lawyers told a court in Dublin in December that
the bank is seeking repayment of loans valued at about EUR8
million (US$11.3 million) from Mr. Drumm, according to Bloomberg.
His liabilities are primarily business debts, Bloomberg said,
citing the Oct. 14 filing under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code.

Anglo Irish Bank Corp PLC -- http://www.angloirishbank.com/--
operates in three core areas: business lending, treasury and
private banking.  The Bank's non-retail business is made up of
more than 11,000 commercial depositors spanning commercial
entities, charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit
unions and other non-bank financial institutions.  The Company's
retail deposits comprise demand, notice and fixed term deposit
accounts from personal savers with maturities of up to two years.
Non-retail deposits are sourced from commercial entities,
charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit unions and
other non-bank financial institutions.  In addition, at Sept. 30,
2008, its non-retail deposits included deposits from Irish
Life Assurance plc.  The Private Bank offers tailored products and
solutions for high net worth clients and operates the Bank's
lending business in Ireland and the United Kingdom.

                        *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 1,
2010, DBRS downgraded the ratings of the Euro Dated Subordinated
Notes (specifically the EUR325.2 million Floating Rate
Subordinated Notes due 2014, EUR500 million Callable Subordinated
Floating Rate Notes due 2016 and the EUR750 million Dated
Subordinated Floating Rate Notes due 2017) (collectively referred
to as the 2017 Notes) issued by Anglo Irish Bank Corporation
Limited (Anglo Irish or the Bank) to 'D' from 'C'.  DBRS said the
downgrade follows the execution of the Bank's note exchange offer.
The default status for the exchanged and now-extinguished 2017
Notes reflects DBRS's view that bondholders were offered limited
options, which, as discussed in DBRS's press release dated
October 25, 2010, is considered a default per DBRS policy.

On Oct. 29, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported
that Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on
Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd.'s nondeferrable dated subordinated
debt (lower Tier 2) securities to 'D' from 'CCC'.  The downgrade
of the lower Tier 2 debt rating reflects S&P's opinion that the
bank's exchange offer is a "distressed exchange" and tantamount to
default in accordance with its criteria.


EIRCOM GROUP: Chief Financial Officer Peter Cross Steps Down
------------------------------------------------------------
Ciaran Hancock at The Irish Times reports that Eircom Group Chief
Financial Officer Peter Cross has become the latest senior
executive to leave the company.

According to The Irish Times, a spokesman for Eircom said chief
executive Paul Donovan had assumed responsibility for finance as
an interim measure.

The Irish Times says the departure of Mr. Cross will surprise
many.  The role of CFO is hugely important at Eircom given that it
has debts of about EUR4 billion and has indicated that it could
breach its financial covenants within the next 12 months, The
Irish Times notes.

Mr. Cross had played a significant role in much of the
restructuring that has taken place at Eircom over the past 18
months, including a deal with its trade unions that should
eliminate the deficit in its pension scheme, The Irish Times
discloses.

Mr. Cross joined Eircom in July 2007 from BT, where he was CFO of
its OpenReach wholesale division in the UK, The Irish Times
relates.  He is the latest member of the senior management team to
leave Eircom, The Irish Times states.

Headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, Eircom Group --
http://www.eircom.ie/-- is an Irish telecommunications company,
and former state-owned incumbent.  It is currently the largest
telecommunications operator in the Republic of Ireland and
operates primarily on the island of Ireland, with a point of
presence in Great Britain.


MCINERNEY GROUP: High Court Set to Rule on Rescue Plan on Jan. 10
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Barry O'Halloran at The Irish Times reports that the High Court
will rule on the EUR48 million rescue proposal for McInerney on
Jan. 10 after the latest stage in the examinership process ended
on Tuesday.

The group's Irish business has been under High Court protection
from its creditors and in the charge of examiner Bill O'Riordan of
PricewaterhouseCoopers since September, The Irish Times relates.

According to The Irish Times, Mr. Justice Frank Clarke told the
parties on Tuesday that he will deliver his ruling on the rescue
plan -- known as a scheme of arrangement -- put forward by Mr.
O'Riordan on Jan. 10.  The Irish Times says the proposals involve
a new investor, Oaktree Capital, paying a syndicate of three
banks, Anglo Irish, Bank of Ireland and KBC, EUR25 million cash in
full settlement of a secured EUR113 million debt.  Creditors other
than the banks will get EUR2 million, unsecured creditors will be
paid 7 per cent of what they are owed, The Irish Times discloses.

If the judge rules against the plan, it will mean that McInerney's
Irish business will end up in either receivership or liquidation,
The Irish Times notes.  If he rules in its favor, it will mean
that US-based Oaktree will take over McInerney's Irish business,
The Irish Times notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 22,
2010, The Irish Times said the High Court on Monday heard that the
banks seeking to have McInerney placed in receivership would be
unlikely to get a better deal than the EUR25 million offer
currently on the table if they went ahead with their plan.
The banks plan to take over McInerney's land bank and sites, build
new homes and sell them over a period of 11 years, according to
The Irish Times.  Mr. O'Riordan, as cited by The Irish Times, said
the banks' plans take no account of the discount that would have
to apply because the houses would effectively be sold by a
receiver.  He also said that calculations include no margin for
whichever company actually builds, nor do they take into account
other costs, The Irish Times noted.

                         About McInerney

McInerney Holdings plc -- http://www.mcinerneyholdings.eu/-- is a
home builder and regional home builder in the North and Midlands
of England.  It also undertakes commercial and leisure projects in
Ireland, United Kingdom and Spain.  It operates in Ireland, the
United Kingdom and Spain.  The main trading activities of the
Company's Irish home building business during the year ended
December 31, 2008, consisted of construction of private houses,
trading in developed sites and land, development of residential
land for third-parties and in joint-ventures, and contracting for
third-parties.  The Company's commercial property development
division, Hillview Developments Ltd (Hillview), develops
industrial units in the Greater Dublin area.  Hillview completed
1,223 square meters of industrial units as of December 31, 2008.
Its Spanish division, Alanda Group, is developing freehold
apartment schemes.  As of December 31, 2008, the Company completed
1,359 private and contracting residential units in Ireland, the
United Kingdom and Spain.


ULSTER BANK: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'E'
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ireland-based Ulster Bank Limited's
Long-term Issuer Default Rating at 'A+' with a Stable Outlook,
Short-term IDR at 'F1+', Support Rating at '1' and Individual
Rating at 'E'.  Fitch has also affirmed the ratings of UBL's fully
owned subsidiaries, Ulster Bank Ireland Limited and Ulster Bank
Finance plc.  A full list of ratings is at the end of this
comment.

The IDRs and the Support Ratings for UBL and UBIL continue to
reflect the extremely high probability of support from their
ultimate shareholder, The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (RBS, rated
'AA-'/Stable/F1+) whose ratings in turn reflect the support of the
UK authorities.  The affirmation of the Individual Ratings reflect
the challenging operating environment and continuing pressure on
asset quality, which will necessitate further capital injections
by RBS.

UBL's overexposure to the troubled Irish property market
contributed to an elevated level of impairments in 9M10 (GBP785
million in the core business and GBP1.9 billion in the non-core
business).  UBL has received significant amounts of additional new
equity since end-2009.  Taking into account continuing asset
quality pressures, Fitch believes that further capital injections
will be necessary in 2011.  In 2010, pre-impairment operating
profit has benefited from cost reductions, but Fitch expects the
challenging operating environment to lead to large impairment
charges in 2011.  However, a gradual wind down of the non-core
loan book (about GBP15.5 billion at end-Q310) should reduce risk-
weighted assets over the medium to longer term and improve both
capital ratios and the funding gap.

UBL is part of RBS Group and operates in Northern Ireland and
Ireland.  It offers a wide range of financial services to retail
and corporate customers, while benefiting from RBS's products,
procedures and IT systems.

The ratings actions are:

Ulster Bank Ltd:

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+'; Outlook Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'E'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

Ulster Bank Finance plc:

  -- Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1+'

Ulster Bank Ireland Limited:

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+'; Outlook Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'E'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
  -- Senior unsecured long term notes: affirmed at 'A+'
  -- Senior unsecured short term notes: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'A'


* Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Various Irish Banking Entities
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of several
Irish banks further to last week's five-notch downgrade of the
Irish government's bond ratings to Baa1 with a negative outlook
from Aa2.  The rating actions can be summarized:

* Moody's has downgraded the bank deposit ratings, the senior debt
  ratings, the bank financial strength ratings and most junior
  securities of Allied Irish Banks, Bank of Ireland, EBS Building
  Society, Irish Life & Permanent and Irish Nationwide Building
  Society.

* Moody's has also downgraded the deposit ratings and BFSRs of the
  subsidiaries of Bank of Ireland, ICS Building Society and Bank
  of Ireland (UK).

* In addition, the senior debt and bank deposit ratings of Anglo
  Irish Bank have been downgraded.

* The debt guaranteed under the Irish government's Eligible
  Liabilities Scheme has also been downgraded.  This refers to the
  backed senior debt of five institutions -- Allied Irish, Anglo
  Irish, BoI, EBS and IL&P.

These actions conclude the reviews initiated in October, November
and December 2010.

For full details of the rating actions, please refer to the list
provided at the end of this release.

                        Overall Rationale

Moody's concludes that the banks' debt ratings are affected by the
downgrade of the Irish government, as the high degree of systemic
support from the government had so far largely mitigated the
pressure stemming from a much weaker standalone credit profile of
these banks.  The downgrade of the Irish government to Baa1
reflects Moody's view of the revised capacity of the government to
extend support to its banking sector -- over and above the
contingency fund set aside as part of the EU/IMF package.
However, at this point Moody's continues to assume a very high,
willingness of the government to provide such support for senior
bondholders.

Commenting on the downgrade of the banks' standalone financial
strength ratings Ross Abercromby, Vice President and lead analyst
for Irish banks at Moody's Investors Service, said: "The downgrade
of the standalone ratings of BoI (to D), and of Allied Irish, IL&P
and EBS (to D-) reflects their ongoing high reliance on external
support for day-to-day funding, the uncertain evolution of their
respective franchises amidst an expected far-reaching
restructuring of the entire sector, and likely further pressure on
asset quality as a result of the government's austerity measures.
These challenges are only partially offset by the significant
recapitalization of these banks, which in itself is a clear credit
positive."

          Rating Rationale for Downgrade of Senior Debt

The senior unsecured debt ratings of Allied Irish, BoI, EBS and
IL&P have been downgraded by three to five notches to Baa2 and
Baa3 (Allied Irish, EBS, IL&P).  The outlook on these ratings is
negative in line with the outlook on the government bond rating
and on the BFSRs.

Moody's views these four institutions as being systemically
important for the Irish government as evidenced by the substantial
support that they have received over the past two years.  While
the senior ratings have been downgraded as a result of the
downgrade of the Irish Government (Moody's measures the Irish
government's ability to support its banks at the same level as
Ireland's own debt rating), the senior obligations of these bank's
continue to benefit from three notches of uplift from the bank's
stand-alone ratings and continue to be investment grade.  This is
due to a combination of several factors:

(i) In addition to the EUR8 billion of capital that will be
injected into the four banks (Moody's notes that some of this
capital may be raised privately), the EU/IMF package has provided
a structure that will allow the Irish government to call on a
EUR25 billion contingency fund if further capital is required.  In
Moody's view, this would cover all of the lifetime losses of these
four banks both in Moody's base and stress case scenarios.

(ii) Moody's expects that, over the foreseeable future, Irish
banks are likely to continue to face very difficult conditions in
the wholesale markets and will therefore continue to rely on
central bank funding.  In this regard, Moody's believes that the
authorities will remain a reliable source of funding for these
four banks until progress is made on the restructuring of the
banking sector and market confidence can be restored.

The senior debt ratings of Anglo Irish and INBS have been
downgraded by three notches to Ba3 (negative outlook) from Baa3.
In line with the downgrade of the other banks' senior ratings,
these downgrades reflect not only the reduced ability of the
government to support the senior debt in the future, but also the
reduced systemic importance of these banks as implied by the plans
to wind them down over the longer term.  At the Ba3 level, the
ratings continue to incorporate significant systemic support (with
a four-notch uplift from their standalone rating).  However,
Moody's no longer considers their credit profile to be
commensurate with an investment-grade rating.

Deposits at Anglo Irish and INBS are now rated Baa3 (negative
outlook).  This reflects Moody's understanding that the deposits
of the two institutions are likely to be transferred or sold to
other banks in the system, the lowest of which are now rated Baa3.

The senior ratings do not incorporate the potential for a
restructuring of the debt.  Moody's says that, in the event of a
change in the clear commitment by the Irish government to abstain
from imposing losses on senior creditors, it is likely that these
ratings could be further downgraded.  In light of the negative
outlook on all the senior debt ratings, Moody's currently does not
see any upward rating pressure, which would most likely be
conditional on an upgrade of the government rating.

       Rating Rationale for Downgrade of Junior Securities

As a result of the substantial support that the Irish government
has provided to the banking sector, and the strain which the
sizeable capital injections has placed on the Irish government's
finances, the government is introducing legislation that will
allow losses to be imposed on the subordinated liabilities of the
six institutions covered by the guarantee (Allied Irish, Anglo
Irish, BoI, EBS, IL&P and INBS).  Moody's has therefore taken
rating actions on the subordinated liabilities of the four banks
(all junior securities at Anglo Irish and INBS are already rated
C).  For Allied Irish, which will be almost fully owned by the
government, and EBS which is already 100% owned by the government,
the junior securities -- including in the case of Allied Irish the
dated subordinated debt, junior subordinated debt and Tier 1
securities -- have all been downgraded to Ca.  This reflects
Moody's view that any exchange carried out by these institutions
would almost certainly be classified as a distressed exchange.  In
the absence of an exchange, it is likely that the government would
impose losses.

Moody's believes that the situation differs for Bank of Ireland
and IL&P.  IL&P has not received any state aid from the government
and its need for capital is deemed to be less than that of the
other institutions.  As a result, the likelihood of losses being
imposed is lower.  However, as the bank has received substantial
funding support in the form of the guarantees, use of the
legislation cannot be ruled out.  Given this uncertainty, Moody's
has downgraded the dated subordinated debt to B2 and the junior
subordinated debt to B3, which are two and three notches,
respectively, below the bank's standalone rating.  If a distressed
exchange was to take place or losses are imposed, Moody's says
that the ratings could well be downgraded further to reflect the
actual level of losses incurred.

Bank of Ireland has now completed an exchange offer on the
majority of its dated subordinated debt.  Moody's has classified
this transaction as a distressed exchange and consequently has
downgraded the affected securities to Ca.  In a few days the
rating on these securities will be upgraded to B2, in line with
the rating of the dated subordinated debt that is not included in
the exchange offer.  Although the B2 rating reflects Moody's view
that the use of the legislation cannot be ruled out, the rating
agency believes that, as a result of the exchange, this likelihood
is lower than it is for Allied Irish and EBS.  This also reflects
the fact that Bank of Ireland has received less state aid,
relative to the size of its balance sheet.  Junior subordinated
debt and cumulative Tier 1 securities of BoI have been downgraded
to B3, while the non-cumulative preference shares remain rated
Caa1.

   Rating Rationale for Downgrade of Banks' Standalone Ratings

In Moody's opinion, the EU/IMF support package for Ireland and its
banking system is positive for the capital profiles of Irish
banks, making available significant funds for bank
recapitalizations that will in turn provide a significantly
improved buffer to absorb any future loan losses.  The aim is to
instill greater investor confidence and underpin the banks'
financial fundamentals.

The government also reaffirmed its intention to restructure the
Irish banking system.  While Moody's believes that such a
restructuring will strengthen the overall position of the system,
the rating agency notes that it leaves each of the banks,
individually, in an uncertain position.  More generally, the
operating environment for Irish banks remains highly volatile and
uncertain, and therefore asset quality and earnings performance in
the sector is likely to remain extremely weak.  In addition, the
four banks remain under significant short-term funding pressure,
and are highly reliant on external support.  As a result of these
factors, the standalone BFSR of BoI has been downgraded to D
(mapping to Ba2 on the long-term scale) and the BFSRs of Allied
Irish, IL&P and EBS have been downgraded to D- (mapping to Ba3).
The higher BFSR of BoI reflects Moody's opinion that it is likely
to be the first bank to recover from the current crisis as a
result of its stronger franchise and stronger business model, and
that it may need less restructuring than some of the other banks.
The rating outlook on the BFSRs is negative, reflecting the
difficult economic condition, the funding issues and the
challenges facing the banks to deleverage in a difficult
environment.

The BFSR of INBS has been downgraded to E (mapping to Caa1) as a
result of the plans to transfer the deposits out of the
institution and wind down the assets that remain on the balance
sheet after the transfers to NAMA.  Moody's had previously
expected the institution to be sold as a whole.  The outlook on
INBS's E BFSR is stable.

   Rating Rationale for Downgrade of Government-Guaranteed Debt

Moody's has downgraded the backed senior debt of the five
institutions -- Allied Irish, Anglo Irish, BoI, EBS and IL&P --
that have issued public debt under the Eligible Liabilities
Guarantee scheme to Baa1 (negative outlook) from Aa2.  This action
is in line with the downgrade of the Irish government's bond
rating to Baa1 from Aa2.  The backed-Baa1 ratings assigned are
based on the unconditional and irrevocable guarantee from the
Irish government (Please refer to press release entitled "Moody's
to assign backed-Aa1/Prime-1 ratings to debt securities covered by
the Irish government's new guarantee", published on January 7,
2010.) In addition, in the case of the commercial paper program of
AIB North America, Inc, the guaranteed long-term rating is
downgraded to Baa1 (negative outlook), from A1.  Due to a clerical
error this had continued to be rated A1 as opposed to the rating
of the Irish government from the introduction of the guarantee.

        Bank of Ireland Subsidaries Downgraded to Baa3/P-3

Given that ICS Building Society and Bank of Ireland (UK) are both
highly integrated subsidiaries of Bank of Ireland, they both have
the same standalone rating as BoI.  Their BFSRs have therefore
been downgraded to D, with a negative outlook (mapping to Ba2 on
the long-term scale) from D+ (mapping to Baa3 on the long-term
scale.)  The potential for parental support from Bank of Ireland,
and in the case of BoI (UK), the potential for systemic support
from the UK reflecting the importance of the deposit franchise it
has as part of its joint venture with the Post Office, has limited
the downward pressure on these institutions.  As a result the bank
deposit ratings are downgraded to Baa3/P-3 for both institutions.
The outlook is negative, in line with that on BoI.  In the case of
ICS, the negative outlook additionally reflects the need to sell
the institution over a multi-year period following negotiations
with the European Commission.

          Other Banks Are Unaffected by the Actions

The ratings of the other Irish banks are unaffected by the rating
actions as they are not being supported as part of the Irish
government's guarantee schemes.  Instead, the rating uplift in
their deposit and senior debt ratings primarily stems from
parental support.  These banks include KBC Bank Ireland (Baa2
negative; D-/Ba3 negative); Bank of Scotland (Ireland) (Baa1,
negative; D-/Ba3 negative); Ulster Bank Ireland (A2, negative; D-
/Ba3 negative); Zurich Bank (A1, review for possible upgrade; D-
/Ba3 negative); and Hewlett Packard International Bank (A2,
stable; C-/Baa1 stable).

The bank rating actions are:

* Allied Irish Banks: Senior debt and bank deposits downgraded to
  Baa3/P-3 from A1/P-1, dated subordinated debt to Ca from Ba3,
  undated subordinated debt and cumulative Tier 1 securities to Ca
  from B1, and non-cumulative preference shares to Ca from Caa1.
  The BFSR is downgraded to D- (mapping to Ba3) from D (Ba2).
  Government guaranteed debt is downgraded to Baa1/P-2.  The
  outlook is negative.

* Anglo Irish Bank: Senior debt downgraded to Ba3/Not-Prime from
  Baa3/P-3 and bank deposits to Baa3/P-3 from A3/P-1.  Government
  guaranteed debt is downgraded to Baa1/P-2.  The outlook is
  negative.

* Bank of Ireland: Senior debt and bank deposits downgraded to
  Baa2/P-2 from A1/P-1, dated subordinated debt to B2 from Ba1,
  undated subordinated debt and cumulative Tier 1 securities to B3
  from Ba3.  Non-cumulative preference shares remain rated Caa1.
  The BFSR is downgraded to D (mapping to Ba2) from D+ (Baa3).
  Government guaranteed debt is downgraded to Baa1/P-2.  The
  outlook is negative.  Dated subordinated debt currently being
  exchanged is downgraded to Ca, but will be upgraded to B2 in a
  few days.

* EBS Building Society: Senior debt and bank deposits downgraded
  to Baa3/P-3 from A3/P-2, dated subordinated debt to Ca from Ba3.
  Non-cumulative preference shares remain rated Ca.  The BFSR is
  downgraded to D- (mapping to Ba3) from D (Ba2).  Government
  guaranteed debt is downgraded to Baa1/P-2.  The outlook is
  negative.

* Irish Life & Permanent: Senior debt and bank deposits downgraded
  to Baa3/P-3 from A3/P-2, dated subordinated debt to B2 from Ba3,
  undated subordinated debt to B3 from B1.  The BFSR is downgraded
  to D- (mapping to Ba3) from D (Ba2).  Government guaranteed debt
  is downgraded to Baa1/P-2.  The outlook is negative.

* Irish Nationwide Building Society: Senior debt downgraded to
  Ba3/Not-Prime from Baa3/P-3 and bank deposits are confirmed at
  Baa3.  The BFSR is downgraded to E (mapping to Caa1) from E+
  (B3).  The outlook is negative.

* Bank of Ireland (UK): Senior debt and bank deposits downgraded
  to Baa3/P-3 from A3/P-2. The BFSR is downgraded to D (mapping to
  Ba2) from D+ (Baa3).

* ICS Building Society: Senior debt and bank deposits downgraded
  to Baa3/P-3 from A2/P-1. The BFSR is downgraded to D (mapping to
  Ba2) from D+ (Baa3).


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


SCHOELLER ARCA: S&P Affirms 'CCC' LT Corporate Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed all of
its ratings on The Netherlands-based plastic packaging
manufacturer Schoeller Arca Systems Holding B.V., including S&P's
'CCC' long-term corporate credit rating.  At the same time, S&P
removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where they had been placed
with negative implications on Sept. 17, 2010.  The outlook is
negative.

"The affirmation primarily reflects what S&P view as a
stabilization of SAS's liquidity position," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Alexander Gusterman.

However, S&P still consider its liquidity to be "weak" and a
factor that weighs negatively on the ratings.  The negative
outlook reflects S&P's uncertainty about SAS's ability to maintain
or improve its liquidity situation through an improvement of its
operating performance and cash flow generation.  It also reflects
S&P's belief that headroom under existing financial covenants is
likely to become extremely tight, and that a breach in June 2011
remains a risk.  The current liquidity situation has resulted from
the limited liquid resources made available to the company during
a restructuring in 2009, as well as from poor operating cash flow
generation following the restructuring.  During the third quarter
of 2010, the company secured a EUR15 million factoring facility,
which helped to stabilize its liquidity position somewhat.

"The negative outlook on SAS reflects the risk of a continued weak
operating performance and that cyclical working capital movements
could impair the company's ability to gradually improve its
liquidity," said Mr. Gusterman.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


BANK ROSSIYA: Fitch Raises Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'B'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Russia-based Bank Rossiya's Long-term
Issuer Default Rating to 'B' from 'B-' and National Rating to
'BBB(rus)' from 'BB-(rus)'.  The ratings have been removed from
Rating Watch Positive and assigned Stable Outlook.  A full
breakdown of rating actions is provided at the end of this
comment.

The upgrade reflects BR's increased size after its merger with
similar-sized Gazenergoprombank in August 2010, potentially
allowing some economies of scale.  This also allows BR to work
with those larger clients who consider only big loan
participations from banks, and enables it to increase exposure to
existing borrowers with sound credit quality.  Gazenergoprombank's
significant settlement business with Gazprom entities, which is
likely to remain in BR, is another positive factor.

Another rating driver is potential support from the bank's major
subsidiaries -- these are reasonably cash-rich and rated in the
'BB' range -- and its owners.  There is a long track record of
such support being provided, but Fitch believes this will be
reliant, apart from financial abilities, on good relations among
the major stakeholders.

Thirdly the upgrade takes into account improvements during the
crisis in Russian banking system infrastructure, in particular as
regards banks' ability to access liquidity.

The ratings also acknowledge BR's strong earnings generation,
robust liquidity buffer and low impairments due to high-quality
borrowers, including subsidiaries and partners of large state-
owned companies.

Rating constraints are the bank's concentrated funding base,
moderate capitalization and the limited transparency of the
group's debt-financed media acquisitions, which despite there
being no direct recourse to BR, may still bear a significant
contingent liability risk for the bank should they need to be
supported.  Sobinbank, a banking subsidiary inherited from
Gazenergoprombank, poses another contingent risk for BR given its
asset quality problems and modest capitalization.

At end-9M10, BR's (excluding Sobinbank) non-performing loans
(loans overdue by over 90 days) were only 2.6% of the portfolio,
while rolled-over loans made up 10.7% (all were performing).
Sobinbank had much higher NPLs and limited loss absorption
capacity, estimated by Fitch at about 9%.  BR's base expectations
are for Sobinbank's future pre-impairment profits (it is currently
near break-even) to gradually build up reserves, which Fitch
currently finds insufficient.  However, the agency believes
capital contributions may still be needed.

Following acquisitions of media assets in 2008-2009, the debt
burden at media subsidiaries level has increased to about RUB13bn
and Q410 and 2011 repayments are material.  BR's management
expects these borrowings to be extended and/or refinanced without
the bank's direct involvement.  However, in Fitch's view, there is
still a risk that the bank may eventually need to provide support.
Already, Fitch estimates BR's lending to subsidiaries to be
material.

BR's funding base post-merger has become more concentrated, with
about 60% of total funding sourced from three groups of legally-
and/or economically-related customers.  However, some of these
companies are from within BR's subsidiaries and shareholders'
businesses, mitigating the liquidity risk.

BR also holds significant liquid assets, including the large high-
quality securities book inherited from Gazenergoprombank.
However, this should be viewed in light of the concentrated
funding base and over RUB20bn of interbank placements, which Fitch
believes may be restricted.  At end-9M10, available liquidity
(cash, non-restricted bank deposits and liquid securities) covered
customer funding by about 50%.

BR's regulatory capital ratio was 14.9% at end-9M10.  This
represents a moderate buffer for any potential asset quality
deterioration -- reserves could be increased to about 15% before
the regulatory capital adequacy ratio hits the minimum 10% level.
The consolidated equity is undermined by significant goodwill that
mainly arose from the acquisition of media assets.  This is
mitigated to some extent by robust earnings generation of BR's
subsidiary Insurance Company of Gas Industry SOGAZ ('BB+'/Stable),
one of the country's largest insurance groups.  Fresh equity
injections are not anticipated in 2011; however, RUB5 billion of
tier 2 capital was provided in Q410.

Post-merger, BR has become a top 20 bank in Russia by assets.  Its
operations are concentrated in north-west Russia and in the Moscow
region.  It is majority-owned by local businessmen; of these, the
largest stake (28.6%) is owned by Yuri Kovalchuk.
The rating actions are:

  -- Long-term IDR: upgraded to 'B' from 'B-'; off RWP; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  -- National Long-term rating: upgraded to 'BBB(rus) from 'BB-
     (rus)'; off RWP; Outlook Stable

  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D/E'; off RWP

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'.


EVRAZ GROUP: Moody's Gives Positive Outlook; Affirms 'B1' Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's changed Evraz Group S.A.'s rating outlook to positive from
stable.  At the same time, Moody's affirmed the B1 corporate
family rating and the B2 ratings for the company's Senior
Unsecured Notes totaling US$2,242 million.

The change to a positive outlook was prompted by improvements in
operating performance and credit metrics that Evraz achieved since
the trough of the steel markets, and in particular during 2010.
1H 2010 audited financial results indicate improved profitability
with an LTM 30/06/10 EBITDA margin of 16.5%, which allowed the
company to reduce leverage from 6.4x at the end of 2009 to 4.4x
LTM 30/06/10 with the agency expecting a further reduction towards
3.5x-3.6x by the end of 2010, although gross debt remains largely
unchanged.  This performance is supported by improving market
fundamentals at key markets for Evraz including Russia and North
America.  In spite of significant increases in raw material prices
for iron ore and coking coal, a high level of vertical integration
allowed the company to sustain margins pressure and capitalize on
the market recovery.

Furthermore, Moody's recognizes the efforts made by Evraz to
further strengthen its liquidity profile and extend debt
maturities with no significant debt maturities over the next two
years.  Over the recent months, the company has successfully
raised US$1.45 billion of new financing including a PXF facility
totaling US$950 million and a RUR15 billion Russian rouble bond
(approx. US$500 million).  It is expected that the company will
continue to withhold dividend payments and should be able to
generate free cash flow in 2010 and 2011, which would be
instrumental in reducing the absolute level of debt going forward.

In addition, Moody's believes that the company will achieve
sufficient headroom under the existing financial covenants based
on 2010 full year results.

The rating continues to reflect the view that, at the end of 2010,
Evraz will still display somewhat weak financial metrics
reflecting the fact that the steel industry has only demonstrated
gradual signs of recovery and has not yet reached a pre-crisis
level of prices and production volumes.  While improving operating
performance will strengthen these metrics in the near-term,
Moody's continues to note the high level of Evraz's debt, which at
30/06/10 was US$8.3 billion (with Moody's adjustments), or
approximately US$500 per tonne of steel produced.  Refinancing
risk is also relatively high as the company has about US$2.0
billion of maturities in each of 2013, 2014 and 2015.

At the same time, the rating reflects that Evraz is a strong
global competitor with a cost efficient asset base and a business
profile that has gained geographical diversity in the past few
years, thereby reducing its dependence on Russia.

The rating could be upgraded if Evraz continues to maintain a good
liquidity position and further improves its debt maturity profile,
at the same time maintaining reasonable profitability and positive
free cash generation, such as net Debt/EBITDA converging toward
3.5x by the end of 2010.  Furthermore, Moody's would like to see
evidences that leverage trends below 3.0x by the end of 2011 and
there is adequate headroom under maintenance covenants.

The rating can be downgraded if the company is unable to maintain
adequate liquidity or generate sufficient headroom under the
maintenance covenants, as well as to generate FCF above US$250
million in the next 12 months.

Evraz Group is one of the largest vertically integrated steel
companies in Russia (by volume and assets) with assets also in
Europe, North America and South Africa.  In the first 9 months of
2010, it produced 11.4 million tonnes of steel products, and
reported revenue of US$9.7 billion (37% increase Y-o-Y) and EBITDA
of US$1.77 billion (102% increase Y-o-Y).

Evraz's principal assets are steel plants in Russia, Europe, North
America, South Africa and Ukraine, iron ore and processing
facilities, as well as coal mines, logistics and trading assets.


GAZBANK JSCB: Moody's Gives Stable Outlook on 'B3' Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on the B3 long-
term global local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings of Gazbank
JSCB to stable from negative, and has affirmed all of the bank's
global-scale ratings.  At the same time, Moody's Interfax Rating
Agency affirmed Gazbank's Baa3.ru national-scale credit rating.
Moscow-based Moody's Interfax is majority-owned by Moody's.

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's says that the outlook change was prompted by a combined
improvement in (i) Gazbank's asset composition and risk
management; (ii) stabilization of the bank's financial metrics;
and (iii) stabilization of the operating environment in the bank's
domicile region.

In 2010, Gazbank improved the quality of its margin lending, which
represented 22% of its total loan book, with these loans now being
partially pledged by securities.  Moody's also notes that
according to Gazbank's unaudited financial statements (under
Russian Accounting Standards or RAS), the bank remained
profitable, with a return on average assets of 0.3% in the first
three quarters of 2010 and 0.4% in 2009.  The bank's capital
adequacy is also stable, at 15.0% as of Q3 2010 (according to RAS)
and the bank has increased its provisioning level to 8.6% as of Q3
2010 from 6.5% as of year-end 2009.

Nonetheless, Moody's notes that Gazbank continues to maintain high
borrower concentration (the 20 largest credit exposures account
for around 300% of Tier 1 capital), which, together with its high
exposure to margin lending, constitutes significant credit risk.

Moody's observes that the bank's asset quality was also supported
by a gradually reviving regional economy, which had improved due
to the government's significant support to a large regional car
producer (AvtoVAZ), including a successful "old-car scrappage"
program.  However, if this program is not extended into 2011, the
region's operating environment could deteriorate.  Any further
deterioration in the operating environment would affect the bank's
asset quality.

Moody's previous rating action on Gazbank was implemented on
April 28, 2009, when the rating agency downgraded the bank's
deposit ratings to B3 (negative outlook) from B2.

Headquartered in Samara, Russia, Gazbank reported total assets of
RUB22 billion (US$700 million) and total shareholders' equity of
RUB3.2 billion as at Q3 2010, according to unaudited Russian
Accounting Standards.


PROMSVYAZBANK OJSC: Fitch Upgrades Issuer Default Rating to 'BB-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Promsvyazbank's Long-term Issuer
Default Rating to 'BB-' from 'B+'.  The Outlook is Stable.  A full
list of rating actions is provided at the end of this release.

The upgrade reflects stabilization of the bank's asset quality and
its gradually increasing capital buffer due to rising net income
and an expected RUB4bn equity injection in H111.  Its currently
comfortable liquidity position should also give the bank
significant financial flexibility in working out remaining asset
quality problems, thus helping to avoid crystallization of losses.

The upgrade also takes into account the general improvements
during the crisis in Russian banking system infrastructure, in
particular as regards banks' ability to access liquidity.  The
sizable franchise and position of the bank as the second largest
privately-owned institution in Russia also support the ratings.

At the same time, the key constraint to the ratings remains PSB's
relatively low loss absorption capacity, particularly under
Russian Accounting Standards.  In addition, asset quality remains
weak, with potentially significant impairment and high risk
exposures in both the loan book and the bank's holdings of fixed
assets.  The highly concentrated corporate portfolio (largest 20
credit exposures to equity ratio was 218% at end-Q310) make the
capital position vulnerable to further deterioration, or
impairment recognition, in the bank's largest loans.

PSB's reported NPLs (non-performing loans, defined as loans over
90 days overdue) stabilized during 2010 and stood at 12.5% at end-
Q310 and were 98%-covered by provisions.  Loans with revised
original terms fell to 15% at the same date from 26% at end-2009.
An indirect asset quality indicator -- the gap between interest
and fees & commissions income accrued through the profit and loss
accounts and that actually received through the cash flow
statement -- declined to 7% in 9M10 from 17% in 2009.
At the same time, in Fitch's view, several of the bank's largest
loans represent relatively high risk exposures, although these are
not classified as NPLs and carry quite low impairment reserves.
Furthermore, the bank's properties were equal to a substantial
RUB28.8bn, or 65% of equity, at end-Q310, more than at peers.  In
particular, this reflects construction in progress (26% of
equity), which the bank intends to use as its head office, and
speculative land and property investments (13% of equity).  In
Fitch's view, the operations of the bank's shareholders in the
real estate and construction industry could represent a potential
contingent risk for the bank.

The regulatory capital ratio at end-November 2010 increased
somewhat, supported by income generated in H210, but still remains
tight at 11.4%.  The bank expects the regulatory ratio to
moderately strengthen and stay in the medium-term around 12%,
which is realistic, in Fitch's view, given some flexibility the
bank enjoys in determining reserve levels.  Basel I capital ratios
are generally higher than regulatory ratios and at end-Q310 stood
at 10.5% (tier 1) and 15.2% (total); the bank is covenanted to
maintain a total Basel I capital ratio of 12%.  Loss absorption
capacity, as measured by the amount of additional provisions that
the bank can create before its capital ratios fall to minimum
levels established by the regulator or covenanted in public
borrowings, was RUB7bn (equal to 2.0% of loans) under local
standards at end-November, or RUB19bn (5.7%) under Basel I rules
at end-Q310.

Liquidity is comfortable, with cash and equivalents, unpledged
securities and the net short-term interbank position at end-Q310
equal to 25% of liabilities or 37% of customer balances.

Refinancing risk on domestic and international capital markets is
significantly mitigated by maturity diversification.

Upside potential for the ratings is limited at present in light of
the upgrade.  Downward pressure can arise from significant
deterioration in asset quality, which would put pressure on the
bank's capital.

The rating actions are:

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
     Outlook Stable

  -- Senior unsecured rating: upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+'

  -- Senior unsecured debt: upgraded to 'BB-'from 'B+'; Recovery
     Rating 'RR4' withdrawn

  -- Subordinated debt: upgraded to 'B+' from 'B-'; Recovery
     Rating 'RR6' withdrawn

  -- Individual: affirmed at 'D'

  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '4'

  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'B'


VTB CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'D'
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed VTB Capital plc.'s Long-term Issuer
Default Rating at 'BBB-', Short-term IDR at 'F3', Support Rating
at '2' and Individual Rating at 'D'.

The affirmation of the bank's Long-term IDR reflects Fitch's view
that there is a high probability of support from its parent, Bank
VTB (rated 'BBB'/Stable; the second-largest Russian bank with
85.5% state-ownership) and, ultimately, the Russian authorities,
in case of need.  VTB owns 95.4% of VTB Capital plc.  Any movement
in VTB's IDR would likely affect the ratings of its subsidiary.

The Individual Rating reflects VTBC's modest operating
profitability; asset quality concerns, mainly relating to VTBC's
legacy loan book; moderate market risk; and significant funding
concentration.  It also reflects VTBC's currently strong
capitalization, boosted by VTB; major organizational and
managerial improvements; and relatively strong UK regulation.

Profitability so far is modest, under pressure from high operating
costs and loan impairment charges related to the legacy loan book.
Management targets over US$40 million net profit for 2010, which
translates to an ROAE of 6.4%.  Fitch believes there is potential
to improve profitability in the longer term, as business gains
scale, but this is yet to be demonstrated.

The main source of credit risk is the legacy loan book (US$600
million at end-H110), which contains US$246 million of gross non-
performing loans (NPLs; over 90 days overdue) and a further
restructured performing exposure of US$92 million.  VTBC agreed
the sale of US$100 million of NPLs by end-2010 at a net value of
about US$50 million.  Considering an extra planned US$35 million
reserve charge in H210, residual US$146 million NPLs will be
covered by 95%.

Market risk is currently moderate, stemming from a securities book
of relatively high-quality (US$635 million at end-H110), newly
generated reverse repo exposure (US$467 million at end-H110) and
derivatives trading.  Although the latter is mostly customer
driven, there is a certain degree of proprietary trading.  Fitch
was informed by VTBC's management that the latter will remain
limited and the bank aims to develop customer driven trading
activities.

Liquidity remains acceptable, although funding concentration is
rather high, with about one-third sourced from a single Russian
counterparty at end-H110.  This risk is mitigated by potential
support from VTB.

VTBC's capitalization is strong, with its total capital adequacy
ratio standing at 21.7% at end-H110, representing a sizable
cushion against potential additional impairment.


* S&P Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Issuer Rating on Leningrad Oblastleni
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had revised its
outlook on Leningrad OblastLeni to positive from stable, while
affirming the 'BB' long-term issuer credit ratings and 'ruAA'
Russian national scale ratings.

"The outlook revision reflects S&P's expectation of strong
economic and revenue growth in Leningrad Oblast over the medium
term," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Boris Kopeykin.

The ratings on Leningrad Oblast, located in the northwest of the
Russian Federation (foreign currency BBB/Stable/A-3, local
currency BBB+/Stable/A-2, Russia national scale ruAAA), reflect
its good growth prospects, low debt, and strong liquidity
position.

Leningrad Oblast suffers from low financial flexibility and
predictability in the context of the Russian intergovernmental and
tax systems.  Economic concentration and continuous pressure on
expenditure further constrain the ratings.

As with other Russian regions, Leningrad Oblast's revenue and
expenditure flexibility and the predictability of its financials
are constrained by the weak predictability and unsupportive nature
of the Russian intergovernmental system.  A 1%-2% decrease in
operating revenue and an increase in salary spending of a similar
magnitude will likely be imposed on the region in 2011 following
federally driven reforms in social tax.

The oblast demonstrated stronger resilience to the recent economic
downturn than most of its Russian peers because of its favorable
situation surrounding the City of St.  Petersburg (BBB/Stable/--),
its location on Russia's main transit routes to the EU, and its
economic structure.  Gross Regional Product declined by less than
1% in 2009, while S&P expects it to grow by about 5% in 2010.
Continual inflows of investments in energy generation,
manufacturing, transport, and communication help to bolster the
oblast's economy.  Thanks to these advantages, S&P anticipates
that the oblast will report economic growth above the national
average in 2011-2013, which is likely to support budget revenue
growth and financial performance.  However due to pressure on the
expenditure side, S&P think that the oblast's operating balance
could decline to about 2%-4% of operating revenues in 2011-2012
from levels of 8%-10% expected in 2010.  S&P anticipates that
deficits after capital accounts, if any, will stay within 5%-7% of
total revenues in 2011-2012, compared with the 3% surplus expected
in 2010.

However, the oblast's economy remains concentrated; 10 major
taxpayers provide almost 30% of tax revenues.  This leaves the
revenue base, and consequently future performance, at risk.

The oblast's direct debt is low, and S&P does not expect it to
exceed 20%-25% of operating revenues by year-end 2012.  S&P
expects tax-supported debt to stay within 25%-30% of consolidated
revenues through 2013.


* S&P Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Issuer Rating on Sverdlovsk Oblast
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it revised its outlook on
Russian Sverdlovsk Oblast to positive from stable.  The 'BB' long-
term issuer credit rating was affirmed.

"S&P has revised the outlook based on the oblast's projected low
debt and continued strong liquidity," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Felix Ejgel.  "Despite rising capital spending, S&P
believes the Oblast may achieve better budgetary performance than
S&P currently foresee in its base-case scenario if the oblast
government demonstrates a commitment to containing operating
spending growth or if the oblast's economy recovers faster than
S&P expect.

The rating on Sverdlovsk Oblast, which is located in the Urals
Federal District of the Russian Federation (foreign currency
BBB/Stable/A-3; local currency BBB+/Stable/A-2; Russia national
scale 'ruAAA') is constrained by limited budget predictability and
flexibility, with spending pressure likely leading to a weakening
of the oblast's budgetary performance.

The oblast's creditworthiness benefits from a low debt burden and
strong liquidity, which S&P project will loosen moderately over
the next two to three years.  The oblast's substantial industrial
capital stock in the Russian context also supports the rating.

S&P believes that high infrastructure needs, especially in the
transport sector, will continue to weigh on the oblast's budgetary
performance.  In S&P's base-case scenario, S&P believes that in
2011-2013 the oblast's deficit after capital accounts will widen
and average about 10% of total revenues.  Under this scenario, S&P
believes the oblast's capital expenditures will gradually reach a
solid 20% of total expenditures by 2013.

Nevertheless, given that Sverdlovsk Oblast paid off its direct
debt by 2008, its debt-raising capacity remains large.  Even the
relatively active debt accumulation projected in S&P's base-case
scenario for 2011-2013 will not push the oblast's tax-supported
debt over 30% of consolidated operating revenues over the next
three years.

"S&P could raise the rating, if, in line with its upside-case
scenario, the oblast continues to demonstrate prudence in its
financial policy that would likely lead to an operating surplus
resulting in about 10% of operating revenues on average in 2011-
2013," said Mr. Ejgel." This would allow the oblast to address its
main infrastructure requirements (including those at the municipal
level) with only moderate deficits after capital accounts of about
5% of total revenues.  S&P's upside-case scenario also
incorporates maintenance of a strong liquidity position."


* S&P Assigns 'B+' Long-Term Debt Rating to Tver Oblast
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has assigned its
'B+' long-term debt rating, 'ruA+' Russia national scale rating,
and '3' recovery rating to a proposed Russian ruble3 billion
(almost US$100 million) senior unsecured fixed-coupon amortizing
bond to be issued by Tver Oblast (B+/Stable/--; Russia national
scale rating 'ruA+').

The proposed issue, which the region intends to place on Dec. 21,
2010, will have 20 fixed coupon payments (to be defined at
placement) and an amortizing repayment schedule maturing in 2015.
On Dec. 16, 2014, 35% of the principal will be repaid, with the
remaining 65% set to be redeemed on Dec. 15, 2015.

"The ratings on the bond mirror those on the oblast," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Alexandra Balod.

The ratings on Tver Oblast reflect S&P's view of the oblast's low
revenue and expenditure flexibility and predictability in an
international context--as is the case with other Russian regions--
its only modest operating margins compared with expected debt
service, and its low wealth levels.  S&P considers the ratings to
be supported by the oblast's favorable location between the cities
of Moscow (BBB/Stable/--) and St. Petersburg (BBB/Stable/--),
moderate economic diversity, and low contingent liabilities.


===============
S L O V E N I A
===============


SCT: On Brink of Bankruptcy, Economist Says
-------------------------------------------
STA reports that economist Joze P. Damijan has said it is just a
matter of time before SCT will go bankrupt.

According to STA, Mr. Damijan's colleague Rasto Ovin believes
there is still hope for the company that employs around 2,000
workers.

STA relates that the Economy Ministry said on Dec. 16 it will not
help SCT to avoid potential receivership or court-mandated debt
restructuring in response to several reports that company has
trouble with liquidity.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 22,
2010, STA said a subsidiary of SCT filed for receivership with the
Ljubljana District Court.

SCT is a construction company based in Slovenia.


=========
S P A I N
=========


AYT COLATERALES: Moody's Assigns Caa3 (sf) Rating to Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive credit ratings
to these classes of notes issued by AyT Colaterales Global
Hipotecario Caixa Galicia II, FTA:

  -- EUR855.0M Class A Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
     2058, Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR44.6M Class B Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
     2058, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  -- EUR38.0M Class C Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
     2058, Assigned B1 (sf)

  -- EUR12.4M Class D Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
     2058, Assigned Caa3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The ratings of the notes takes into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined
the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement and the portfolio expected loss,
as well as the transaction structure and any legal considerations
as assessed in Moody's cash flow analysis.  The expected portfolio
loss of 3.50% and the MILAN Aaa required Credit Enhancement of
13.00% served as input parameters for Moody's cash flow model,
which is based on a probabilistic lognormal distribution as
described in the report "The Lognormal Method Applied to ABS
Analysis", published in September 2000.

The key drivers for the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement number, which
is in line with other prime Spanish RMBS deals, are (i) the
weighted-average current LTV of 74.13%, with 40.75% of loans above
80% LTV, (ii) the high geographical concentration (Galicia
represents 30%) and (iii) the weighted average seasoning of 3.98
years.

The key drivers for the expected loss are (i) the performance for
this transaction since closing in June 2008, which is better than
the average reported in the Spain index, (ii) the static
historical information on delinquencies and recoveries received
from the originator for its global mortgage book and (iii) the
weak economic conditions in Spain.  Given the historical
performance of the transaction and the originator's mortgage book,
Moody's believes the assumed expected loss is appropriate for this
transaction.

The strengths of the structure are (i) a reserve fund fully funded
upfront equal to 3.50% of the initial notes balance (it currently
represents 4.99% of the outstanding balance of the notes) to cover
potential shortfall in interest and principal, and (ii) a strong
interest rate swap in place which provides a guaranteed excess
spread (0.50%) above Euribor to the transaction.

The rating addresses the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and principal with
respect of the classes of notes A, B and C by the legal final
maturity, and payment of interest and principal with respect of
the class of notes D by the legal final maturity.

Moody's ratings only address the credit risk associated with the
transaction.  Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but
may have a significant effect on yield to investors.

The transaction closed in June 2008 and was initially not rated by
Moody's.  The initial notes balance issued at closing (shown above
next to the assigned rating) amounted to EUR950 million.  The
outstanding notes balance as of the last payment date in
October 2010 amounts to EUR666 million.

Moody's rating analysis of the notes is based on the transaction
structure after the last payment date in October 2010.  The next
payment date will take place in April 2011.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium, which is in line with
the V score assigned for the Spanish RMBS sector.  Only two sub
components underlying the V Score deviate from the average for the
Spanish RMBS sector.  The Sector's Historical Downgrade Rate and
Transaction Complexity are assessed as Medium, which are higher
than the Low/Medium V score assigned for the Spanish RMBS sector
for those sub components.  This is due to the exposure of the
transaction to HLTV's which have suffered more downgrades than
traditional mortgages pools in recent years and because HLTV loans
are more exposed to house price declines.  V-Scores are a relative
assessment of the quality of available credit information and of
the degree of dependence on various assumptions used in
determining the rating.  High variability in key assumptions could
expose a rating to more likelihood of rating changes.  The V-Score
has been assigned accordingly to the report "V-Scores and
Parameter Sensitivities in the Major EMEA RMBS Sectors" published
in April 2009.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: the model output indicated that
Class A would have achieved Aaa even if expected loss was as high
as 10.5% (3.0x base case) assuming Milan Aaa CE at 15.6% (1.2x
base case) and all other factors remained the same.  Classes B, C
and D would have achieved
The model output further indicated that the Class A would not have
achieved Aaa with Milan Aaa CE of 18.2% (1.4x base case), and
expected loss of 3.5% (base case).  Classes B, C and D would have
achieved Ba1, B1 and
Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.  The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended to
measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time,
but rather how the initial rating of the security might have
differed if key rating input parameters were varied.  Parameter
Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are calculated
by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary rating model.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence report had a
neutral impact on the rating.


AYT COLATERALES: Moody's Assigns Ca (sf) Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive credit ratings
to these classes of notes issued by AyT Colaterales Global
Hipotecario Caixa Galicia I, FTA:

  -- EUR826.2M Class A Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
     2047 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR36.9M Class B Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
     2047, Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- EUR21.6M Class C Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
     2047, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  -- EUR15.3M Class D Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
     2047, Assigned Ca (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The ratings of the notes takes into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined
the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement and the portfolio expected loss,
as well as the transaction structure and any legal considerations
as assessed in Moody's cash flow analysis.  The expected portfolio
loss of 3.00% and the MILAN Aaa required Credit Enhancement of
11.00% served as input parameters for Moody's cash flow model,
which is based on a probabilistic lognormal distribution as
described in the report "The Lognormal Method Applied to ABS
Analysis", published in September 2000.

The key drivers for the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement number, which
is in line with other prime Spanish RMBS deals, are (i) the
weighted-average current LTV of 70.83%, with 33.29% of loans above
80% LTV, (ii) the high geographical concentration (Galicia
represents 42%) and (iii) the weighted average seasoning of 4.97
years.

The key drivers for the expected loss are (i) the performance for
this transaction since closing in March 2008, which is better than
the average reported in the Spain index, (ii) the static
historical information on delinquencies and recoveries received
from the originator for its global mortgage book and (iii) the
weak economic conditions in Spain.  Given the historical
performance of the transaction and the originator's mortgage book,
Moody's believes the assumed expected loss is appropriate for this
transaction.

The strengths of the structure are (i) a reserve fund fully funded
upfront equal to 2.45% of the initial notes balance (it currently
represents 3.18% of the outstanding balance of the notes) to cover
potential shortfall in interest and principal, and (ii) a strong
interest rate swap in place which provides a guaranteed excess
spread (0.50%) above Euribor to the transaction.

The rating addresses the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and principal with
respect of the classes of notes A, B and C by the legal final
maturity, and payment of interest and principal with respect of
the class of notes D by the legal final maturity.  Moody's ratings
only address the credit risk associated with the transaction.
Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

The transaction closed in March 2008 and was initially not rated
by Moody's.  The initial notes balance issued at closing (shown
above next to the assigned rating) amounted to EUR900 million.
The outstanding notes balance as of the last payment date in
July 2010 amounts to EUR693 million.

Moody's rating analysis of the notes is based on the transaction
structure after the last payment date in July 2010.  The next
payment date will take place in January 2011.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium, which is in line with
the V score assigned for the Spanish RMBS sector.  Only two sub
components underlying the V Score deviate from the average for the
Spanish RMBS sector.  The Sector's Historical Downgrade Rate and
Transaction Complexity are assessed as Medium, which are higher
than the Low/Medium V score assigned for the Spanish RMBS sector
for those sub components.  This is due to the exposure of the
transaction to HLTV's which have suffered more downgrades than
traditional mortgages pools in recent years and because HLTV loans
are more exposed to house price declines.  V-Scores are a relative
assessment of the quality of available credit information and of
the degree of dependence on various assumptions used in
determining the rating.  High variability in key assumptions could
expose a rating to more likelihood of rating changes.  The V-Score
has been assigned accordingly to the report "V-Scores and
Parameter Sensitivities in the Major EMEA RMBS Sectors" published
in April 2009.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: the model output indicated that
Class A would have achieved Aaa even if expected loss was as high
as 9.0% (3.0x base case) assuming Milan Aaa CE at 11.0% (base
case) and all other factors remained the same.  Classes B, C and D
would have achieved

The model output further indicated that the Class A would not have
achieved Aaa with Milan Aaa CE of 13.2% (1.2x base case), and
expected loss of 3.0% (base case).  Classes B, C and D would have
achieved Baa3, Ba3 and

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.  The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended to
measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time,
but rather how the initial rating of the security might have
differed if key rating input parameters were varied.  Parameter
Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are calculated
by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary rating model.

Moody's Investors Service received and took into account a third
party due diligence report on the underlying assets or financial
instruments in this transaction and the due diligence reports had
a neutral impact on the rating.


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


EUROBANK TEKFEN: Moody's Reviews 'Ba2' Global Deposit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible
downgrade the Ba2 (with a negative outlook) long-term global
local-currency deposit rating of Eurobank Tekfen A.S.
Concurrently, Moody's changed to stable from positive the Ba3
long-term foreign-currency deposit ratings of the bank.

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating action follows Moody's placing on review for possible
downgrade of the D Bank Financial Strength Rating of Greek EFG
Eurobank Ergasias which is the parent of Turkish Eurobank Tekfen.

The parent bank's D BFSR currently translates into a baseline
credit assessment of Ba2, which serves as a reference point from
which to impute bank rating uplift as a result of possible
parental support.  EFG is Eurobank Tekfen's controlling
shareholder with 70% ownership.  Based on the assumption of a
moderate probability of parental support, Eurobank Tekfen's Ba2
long-term local currency rating currently benefits from a one-
notch uplift from the bank's Ba3 BCA (mapping from a D-BFSR).

As stated in Moody's press release of May 7, 2010, any further
downward rating action on EFG's BFSR would result in the removal
of the one-notch rating uplift incorporated in Eurobank Tekfen's
long-term GLC deposit rating.  This was reflected in the negative
outlook assigned to the Ba2 GLC deposit rating at the time.

The outlook of the foreign-currency deposit rating was changed to
stable from positive due to the placing of Eurobank Tekfen's GLC
deposit rating on review.  At present, the bank's foreign-currency
deposit rating is constrained by the Ba3 foreign-currency deposit
ceiling for Turkey, which carries a positive outlook.

However, Eurobank Tekfen's foreign-currency rating will no longer
be constrained by this applicable rating ceiling and has been
equalized with Eurobank Tekfen's D- BFSR -- mapping to a BCA of
Ba3 - and its stable outlook.

       Previous Rating Actions and Principal Methodologies

The last rating action on Eurobank Tekfen A.S. was implemented on
May 7, 2010, when the outlook of the long-term GLC deposit rating
was downgraded to Ba2, with a negative outlook, from Ba1.

Headquartered in Istanbul, Turkey, Eurobank Tekfen A.S. had total
assets (audited) of TRY4.1 billion (US$2.7 billion) under BRSA, at
the end of December 2009.


TURKIYE KALKINMA: Fitch Affirms Individual Rating at 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Individual Ratings of four Turkish
state-owned or state-controlled banks: T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S.
(Ziraat, Individual Rating 'C/D'), Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi T.A.O.
(Vakifbank, 'C/D'), Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. (Halkbank, 'C/D')
and Turkiye Kalkinma Bankasi A.S. (Kalkinma, 'D').  The banks'
other ratings are unaffected by these rating actions.  On
December 1, 2010, Fitch affirmed the Long-term Issuer Default
Ratings of the four banks, and revised the Outlooks to Positive
from Stable.  The IDRs of these banks are equalized with those of
the Turkish sovereign.

Ziraat's 'C/D' Individual Rating takes into account the bank's
strong funding profile emanating from the core savings deposit
base, strong franchise in retail banking segments, its sound asset
quality and capitalization.  With leading market shares in retail
and agricultural lending segments, Ziraat is the largest bank in
Turkey by total assets with market shares of 19.9% in deposits and
10.2% in loans at end-Q310 and is fully owned by the Turkish
Treasury.

Vakifbank's 'C/D' Individual Rating reflects a well-established
franchise in Turkey, a good retail deposit base and improving
asset quality and adequate capitalization.  Vakifbank is 58.45%
owned by the General Directorate of Foundations, which is fully-
controlled and managed by the Turkish state.  Vakifbank is the
sixth-largest bank in Turkey by total assets, with market shares
of 8.3% in deposits and 9% in loans at end-Q310.

Halkbank's 'C/D' Individual Rating reflects an established
franchise, stable core deposit base, strong profitability, tested
asset quality during the economic downturn and adequate
capitalization.  It also reflects potential risks associated with
above-average loan growth.  Halkbank is a state-controlled bank, a
25% stake in the bank was floated in May 2007.  The precise timing
for full privatization is not yet known.  Halkbank is the seventh-
largest bank in Turkey by total assets, with a 9.1% share of
deposits and 8.8% share in loans at end-Q310.

Kalkinma's 'D' Individual Rating reflects concentrations in the
loan portfolio and weak efficiency, which puts pressure on
profitability.  It also reflects the bank's solid capitalization,
comfortable liquidity, access to long-term funding and the
competitive advantage of receiving funding or funding guarantees
from the Treasury.  Kalkinma is a small non-deposit-taking
development and investment bank, in which the Turkish Treasury
owns 99%.  Kalkinma focuses on providing medium- and long-term
project finance and working capital loans in geographical areas
that have been identified by the government as high priority.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


HIGHLANDS INSURANCE: Policyholders Receive Full Payout
------------------------------------------------------
Leigh Jacksonat at Post Online reports that Highlands Insurance
Company UK direct policyholders have had their claims paid
following the company's administration in 2007.  The report
relates that HIC UK was placed into administration in November
2007, after the directors concluded that the company was
insolvent, with gross technical insurance liabilities of
approximately GBP77 million.

According to Post Online, a scheme of arrangement designed to deal
with the direct insurance business of Highlands UK and to
facilitate the resolution of a long-standing legal dispute with
Highlands Insurance Company in the US, became effective in August
2009.

"The successful and timely implementation of this innovative
Scheme is an important milestone in the company's closure plan and
it is pleasing that all direct policyholders' claims will shortly
be paid in full.  It is now anticipated that a further scheme of
arrangement, dealing with the claims of Highlands UK's reinsurance
creditors, will be issued early in 2011," Post Online quoted Dan
Schwarzmann, partner at PwC and joint administrator of Highlands
UK, as saying.

                   About Highlands Insurance

Highlands Insurance Company (U.K.) Ltd. is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Highlands Holdings (U.K.) Ltd., which is in turn a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Highlands Insurance Group Inc., a U.S.
based Company.  On October 25, 2007, the Debtor's directors
presented an application to the High Court of Justice, Chancery
Division, Companies Court to place the Debtors into administration
under the U.K. Insolvency Act of 1986.  On November 1, 2007, the
High Court granted the application.

Highlands Insurance Company (U.K.) Ltd. filed for Chapter 15
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 07-13970) on Dec. 18, 2007, through its
duly authorized foreign representatives.  When the company filed
for Chapter 15, they listed assets between US$50 million and
US$100 million and debts of more than US$100 million.

The ultimate parent company of Highlands UK is Highlands Insurance
Group Inc., incorporated in the State of Delaware, USA which,
since October 2002 has (together with several subsidiaries) been
subject to bankruptcy proceedings in Delaware, USA.


MONTROSE PARTNERS: Provisional Liquidator Appointed
---------------------------------------------------
The petitions to wind up Montrose Partners Limited and The
Montrose Partnership Limited were presented following confidential
enquiries carried out by Company Investigations, part of the
Insolvency Service, under section 447 of the Companies Act 1985,
as amended.

On the application of the Secretary of State, the Official
Receiver has been appointed by the Court as provisional liquidator
of both companies.  The role of the Official Receiver is to
protect the assets and financial records of the companies pending
determination of the petitions.  The provisional liquidator also
has the power to investigate the affairs of the companies insofar
as it is necessary to protect the assets including any third party
or trust monies or assets in the possession of or under the
control of the companies.

As the matter is before the Court no further information will be
made available until the petitions are determined.  The petitions
are listed for hearing on July 6, 2011.

Montrose Partners Limited was incorporated on August 21, 2009.
The registered office of the company is at Union House, 65-69
Shepherds Bush Green, Shepherds Bush, London, W12 8TX.  The
recorded directors of the company are Mr. Jose Emilio Gongora and
Mr. Dean Benjamin Straker.

The Montrose Partnership Limited was incorporated on 28 October
2009.  The registered office of the company is at Hendford Manor,
Yeovil, Somerset, BA20 1UN.  The sole recorded director of the
company is Mr. Jose Emilio Gongora.

The petitions to wind up the companies were presented on
December 16, 2010, under the provisions of section 124A of the
Insolvency Act 1986.

The Official Receiver was appointed as provisional liquidator of
the companies on December 17, 2010.

Company Investigations, part of the Insolvency Service, carries
out confidential enquiries on behalf of the Secretary of State for
Business, Innovation & Skills.


PUNCH TAVERNS: Fitch Comments on Media Speculation Over Strategy
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings notes the increased media coverage of Punch Taverns
Plc's securitized debt in anticipation of the conclusion, expected
in Q1 2011, of the Punch group's operational and capital structure
review.  Fitch is in regular contact with Punch and may take
rating action, if deemed necessary, when it receives more definite
information about Punch's intentions.

Fitch understands that all options are currently being considered
as Punch is reported to have hired both financial and strategic
advisers.  However, the agency has not yet been made aware of any
favoured option.  Amidst the wide-spread speculation, Fitch notes
that the company's performance has improved lately with the Q1
(financial year 2012) interim results showing an uptick in sales
in managed pubs (which should benefit Spirit Issuer Plc (Spirit)
securitized debt) and a slowdown in performance deterioration in
the tenanted estate.  However, both Punch Taverns Finance Plc
(Punch A) and Punch Taverns Finance B Ltd (Punch B) transactions
comprise tenanted pubs and Fitch expects these to remain stressed.

Overall, Fitch continues to view the pub sector as under pressure,
particularly the tenanted model due to its less flexible business
model and mainly wet-led offering.  The agency expects consumers'
discretionary spending to remain curbed in 2011; notably due to
the public funding cuts potentially resulting in more job losses.
In addition, the UK pub industry continues to suffer from the
relentless competition from the off-trade, the duty tax increases
(combined with inflation and VAT increases), and change in
consumer behavior.

Currently the ratings for Punch securitized notes are as follow:

Punch A:

  -- Class A1(R) fixed-rate notes due 2022: 'AA', Outlook Negative

  -- Class A2(R) fixed-rate notes due 2020: 'AA', Outlook Negative

  -- Class A3(N) floating-rate notes due 2015: 'AA', Outlook
     Negative

  -- Class M1 fixed-rate notes due 2026: 'A+', Outlook Negative

  -- Class M2(N) floating-rate notes due 2029: 'A+', Outlook
     Negative

  -- Class B1 fixed-rate notes due 2026: 'BBB-', Outlook Negative

  -- Class B2 fixed-rate notes due 2029: 'BBB-', Outlook Negative

  -- Class B3 floating-rate notes due 2031: 'BBB-', Outlook
     Negative

  -- Class C(R) fixed-rate notes due 2033: 'BB+', Outlook Negative

  -- Class D1 floating-rate notes 2032: 'BB', Outlook Negative

Punch B:

  -- Class A3 fixed-rate notes due 2022: 'A-', RWN
  -- Class A6 fixed-rate notes due 2024: 'A-', RWN
  -- Class A7 fixed-rate notes due 2033: 'A-', RWN
  -- Class A8 floating-rate notes due 2033: 'A-', RWN
  -- Class B1 fixed-rate notes due 2025: 'BBB', RWN
  -- Class B2 fixed-rate notes due 2028: 'BBB', RWN
  -- Class C1 floating-rate notes due 2035: 'BBB-', RWN

Spirit:

  -- Class A1 notes due 2028: 'BB', Outlook Negative
  -- Class A2 notes due 2031: 'BB', Outlook Negative
  -- Class A3 notes due 2021: 'BB', Outlook Negative
  -- Class A4 notes due 2027: 'BB', Outlook Negative
  -- Class A5 notes due 2034: 'BB', Outlook Negative


SPINNAKA: Goes Into Administration, Fails to Obtain PI Cover
------------------------------------------------------------
Mortgage Strategy reports that Spinnaka has entered into
administration after it failed to obtain professional indemnity
insurance.  The report relates that Pure Panel Management has
bought the assets of the surveyor in a pre-pack administration.

Mortgage Strategy notes that David Gillam, who was listed as a
director at Spinnaka, was appointed to Pure Panel Management's
board on November 25 and will lead the new company.   The report
relates that all staff at Spinnaka have been retained and Mr.
Gillam, who claims he is the largest creditor, said that he fully
expects all creditors to be paid.

"Sadly the directors had no choice other than to place Spinnaka
into administration once it became clear that it would not be able
to obtain PII cover at renewal.  But the company has traded
profitably for the last 15 months after two years of losses and a
number of clients have encouraged me to try to preserve employment
for Spinnaka's loyal staff and to continue to provide a service
via a new vehicle," Mortgage Strategy quoted Mr. Gillam as saying.

Pure has obtained the appropriate PII cover and will source
valuations on behalf of lenders and brokers, and manage the
process by which valuations are returned to the instructing source
using both Quest and xit2, the report adds.

Headquartered in Newcastle upon Tyne, Spinnaka is involved in
surveying & valuing Activities, Architectural and engineering
activities and related technical consultancy.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars
---------------------------------------------

January 26-28, 2011
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     TMA Distressed Investing Conference
        Aria Las Vegas
           Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

Jan. 27-28, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Rocky Mountain Bankruptcy Conference
        Westin Tabor Center, Denver, Colo.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Feb. 3-5, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Caribbean Insolvency Symposium
        Westin Casuarina Resort & Spa, Grand Cayman Island
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Feb. 24-25, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Valcon
        Four Seasons Las Vegas, Las Vegas, Nev.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Mar. 4, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Bankruptcy Battleground West
        Hyatt Regency Century Plaza, Los Angeles, Calif.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Mar. 7-9, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Conrad Duberstein Moot Court Competition
        Duberstein U.S. Courthouse, New York, N.Y.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Mar. 10, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Nuts and Bolts - Florida
        Tampa, Fla.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Mar. 10-12, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     SUCL/ Alexander L. Paskay Seminar on
     Bankruptcy Law and Practice
        Marriott Tampa Waterside, Tampa, Fla.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Mar. 17-19, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Byrne Judicial Clerkship Institute
        Pepperdine University School of Law, Malibu, Calif.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Mar. 31-Apr. 3, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Annual Spring Meeting
        Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center,
        National Harbor, Md.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

April 27-29, 2011
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     TMA Spring Conference
        JW Marriott, Chicago, IL
           Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

May 5, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Nuts and Bolts - New York City
        Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
        New York, N.Y.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

May 6, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     New York City Bankruptcy Conference
        Hilton New York, New York, N.Y.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

June 6, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Canadian-American Cross-Border Insolvency Symposium
        Fairmont Royal York, Toronto, Ont.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

June 9-12, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Central States Bankruptcy Workshop
        Grand Traverse Resort and Spa, Traverse City, Mich.
              Contact: http://www.abiworld.org/

July 21-24, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Northeast Bankruptcy Conference
        Hyatt Regency Newport, Newport, R.I.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

July 27-30, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Southeast Bankruptcy Workshop
        The Sanctuary at Kiawah Island, Kiawah Island, S.C.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Aug. 4-6, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Mid-Atlantic Bankruptcy Workshop
        Hotel Hershey, Hershey, Pa.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Oct. 14, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     NCBJ/ABI Educational Program
        Tampa Convention Center, Tampa, Fla.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Oct. __, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     International Insolvency Symposium
        Dublin, Ireland
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Oct. 25-27, 2011
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     Hilton San Diego Bayfront, San Diego, CA
        Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

Dec. 1-3, 2011
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     23rd Annual Winter Leadership Conference
        La Quinta Resort & Spa, La Quinta, Calif.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Apr. 19-22, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Annual Spring Meeting
        Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center,
        National Harbor, Md.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

July 14-17, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Southeast Bankruptcy Workshop
        The Ritz-Carlton Amelia Island, Amelia Island, Fla.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Aug. 2-4, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Mid-Atlantic Bankruptcy Workshop
        Hyatt Regency Chesapeake Bay, Cambridge, Md.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Nov. 29 - Dec. 2, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Winter Leadership Conference
        JW Marriott Starr Pass Resort & Spa, Tucson, Ariz.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Frauline S. Abangan and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2010.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
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contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *