TCREUR_Public/101229.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Wednesday, December 29, 2010, Vol. 11, No. 260

                            Headlines



A U S T R I A

KOMMUNALKREDIT AUSTRIA: Fitch Upgrades Individual Rating to 'D'


B U L G A R I A

UNITED BULGARIAN: Fitch Puts 'BB+' Long-Term IDR on Negative Watch


D E N M A R K

SKYKON AS: Files for Insolvency After Restructuring Talks Failed


G E R M A N Y

DUREVE LIMITED: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating on Class C-1 Notes


G R E E C E

DRYSHIPS INC: Inks US$770 Million Tanker Agreement
DRYSHIPS INC: Board Approves Share Purchase Program


I R E L A N D

ALLIED IRISH: Government Gets Court OK to Inject EUR3.7 Billion
IVORY CDO: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC (sf)'
MCKILLEN COMPANIES: Supreme Court Reserves Judgment on Nama Case
OCELOT CDO: S&P Affirms 'B- (sf)' Rating on Class D Notes
TITAN EUROPE: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCCsf'

ZOE GROUP: Paid EUR1.4MM to Secured Creditors During Receivership


I T A L Y

SEAT PAGINEGIALLE: S&P Downgrades Corporate Credit Rating to 'B-'
STT HOLDING: S&P Downgrades Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating to 'BB'


K A Z A K H S T A N

DBK LEASING: Moody's Assigns (P)'Ba3' Rating to Domestic Bonds
HALYK SAVINGS: S&P Gives Stable Outlook; Affirms 'B+' Rating
* S&P Raises Ratings on Various Kazakh Government-Related Entities


L U X E M B O U R G

DEUTSCHE BANK: S&P Assigns 'BB+ (sf)' Rating to Class A4 Notes
LOGWIN AG: S&P Affirms 'B' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
ORANGE SA: Mobistar Conditionally Waives EUR30 Million Debt


N E T H E R L A N D S

CANDIDE FINANCING: Moody's Reviews Ba3 (sf)-Rated EUR5MM Notes
HOLLAND MORTGAGE: Moody's Reviews Ba2 (sf)-Rated EUR18MM Notes
LANCELOT 2006: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'Bsf'
LYONDELL CHEMICAL: Says Interplastic Refuses to Pay US$2 Million
PANGAEA ABS: S&P Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'B (sf)'


P O R T U G A L

* Moody's Reviews Ratings on 25 Portuguese SF Transactions


R O M A N I A

BANCA ROMANEASCA: Fitch Puts 'BB+' Long-Term IDR on Negative Watch


R U S S I A

ENERGOGARANT JSIC: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Counterparty Credit Rating
NOVIKOMBANK JSCB: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Senior Unsec. Debt
TRANSOIL LLC: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Corporate Family Rating
TRANSSIBERIAN RE: Fitch Withdraws 'B+' Insurer Strength Rating
TRANSSIBERIAN RE: AM Best Upgrades Financial Strength Rating to B

VNESHPROMBANK OOO: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Long-Term Deposit Ratings
* S&P Affirms 'BB-' Issuer Credit Rating to Russian City of Ufa
* S&P Affirms 'B' Issuer Rating on Russia's Novgorod Oblast


S P A I N

AYT COLATERALES: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating to Class B Notes


S W E D E N

OCTAPHARMA NORDIC: Moody's Cuts Long-Term Issuer Rating to 'Ba1'


S W I T Z E R L A N D

UBS AG: Moody's Downgrades Rating on EUR14 Million Notes to 'B2'


T U R K E Y

ALBARAKA TURK: Fitch Downgrades Issuer Default Rating to 'B+'


U K R A I N E

PROMINVESTBANK JSC: Moody's Upgrades Local Deposit Rating to 'Ba3'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

1ST FOR FENCING: Goes Into Provisional Liquidation
BELLACHAT TRANCHE: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to EUR200 Mil. Swap
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE: Concludes Company Voluntary Arrangement
CHRISTOPHER GADD: Owner to Launch Legal Action v. SRA Over Closure
DEXION COMMODITIES: To Put Forward Winding-Up Proposals

IA GLOBAL: Closes Acquisition of PowerDial Systems and Services
KENSINGTON MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class B2 Notes
KIDDERMINSTER HARRIERS: Chris Swan Withdraws Rescue Bid
LANDMARK 1: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'Bsf'
MONEY PARTNERS: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Ratings on Three Tranches

PUNCH TAVERNS: Bondholder Group Selects Rothschild as Adviser
RADICLE PROJECTS: Places Australian Unit Into Administration
SHIELD FINANCE: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating to US$324 Mil. Senior Loan


X X X X X X X X

* Moody's Reviews Rating s on 53 Tranches from 14 European CLOs




                            *********


=============
A U S T R I A
=============


KOMMUNALKREDIT AUSTRIA: Fitch Upgrades Individual Rating to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Austria-based Kommunalkredit Austria
AG's Long-term Issuer Default Rating at 'A' with a Stable Outlook.
Simultaneously, the agency has upgraded KA's Individual Rating to
'D' from 'E'.  At the same time, the agency has affirmed KA Finanz
AG's Long-term IDR at 'A+' with Stable Outlook.

The 'A' rating of KF's subordinated (lower tier 2) bonds has been
placed on Rating Watch Negative pending European Commission
approval of KF's restructuring plan, expected in H111.  A full
list of ratings for both KA and KF is provided at the end of this
release.

KA and KF are the result of a demerger of former Kommunalkredit
Austria (KA Old) in November 2009.  KA Old, a wholesale-funded
public sector lender, was acquired by the Republic of Austria
(rated 'AAA'/Stable) in November 2008 following severe funding and
liquidity difficulties.  KF, the legal successor of KA Old, holds
KA Old's non-core assets and will be wound down over time.  KA
holds KA Old's core public sector assets and continues to write
new business, predominately in Austria and neighboring countries.
At end-Q310, both banks were 99.78% owned by the Republic of
Austria.

KA's and KF's ratings, apart from KA's Individual Rating, are
based on Fitch's view that due to the banks' close affiliation
with the Austrian government, there is an extremely high
likelihood of ongoing support from the Austrian state.  KA's (but
not KF's) ratings are furthermore underpinned by KA's importance
as a municipal lender and a public service provider on behalf of
the Austrian state.

The one-notch differential between KA's and KF's Long-term IDR
reflects Fitch's belief that KF will remain government-owned until
it has been wound down (unlike KA).  The necessary EC ruling has
not been finalized yet but considering that KF is a non-competing
entity in run-off mode, Fitch does not anticipate the ruling
(expected in H111) to require the state to sell off KF in the
short to medium term.  However, should the ruling impose such or
similar conditions, Fitch would take appropriate negative rating
action.

KA's restructuring plan foresees a privatization of the bank in
2012 or 2013.  The Stable Outlook on KA's Long-term IDR indicates
that Fitch does not expect a privatization in the short term.  The
agency will review the Outlook closer to an actual privatization
date.  If a potential buyer is rated lower than 'A+', this would
likely have a negative impact on KA's Long-term IDR.

The upgrade of KA's Individual Rating to 'D' takes into account
the bank's progress in implementing its revised business model.
However, it also reflects Fitch's view that KA will be challenged
to maintain an adequate funding profile once the Austrian state
starts privatizing KA.

The RWN on KF's subordinated (lower tier 2) bonds reflects the
potential risk that in its restructuring plan approval, the EC, in
the context of a "burden sharing" concept, could require
subordinated debt investors to carry losses.  While Fitch (and
KF's management) views the possibility of this happening as
remote, should the EC decide to transfer losses onto subordinated
debt holders, this would result in a multiple-notch downgrade of
KF's subordinated bonds.  The RWN will be resolved once the EC
ruling has been made public.

KA is predominately exposed to credit and funding/liquidity risks.
Credit risk in its EUR17.6 billion balance sheet (at end-H110) is
predominately to Austrian and other Western European public sector
entities.  Considerable concentration risk is to some extent
mitigated by the quality of KA's credit exposures.  Management
intends to run a well-controlled liquidity policy with a
significant proportion of long-term funding to account for KA's
typically long-dated assets, which, in Fitch's view, is
challenging in the current funding environment.  KA aims to
maintain a core Tier 1 ratio above 10% (15.6% at end-H110) which
Fitch considers acceptable, although KA's capital ratios should be
viewed in the context of low risk weightings for public-sector
lending.

At end-H110, KF's EUR22.1 billion total assets predominately
related to non-Austrian (and other non-core) public sector bonds
and loans.  At the same time, KF also held a CDS portfolio of
around EUR10bn.  Around 93% of CDS exposure related to sovereign
risk and 92.5% to counterparties within the EU.  KF is
intentionally funded short term and through government-guaranteed
bond issuances.  Despite significantly negative IFRS equity, at
end-H110 KF remained compliant with regulatory capital ratios
(calculated under Austrian GAAP, which treats CDS as financial
guarantees and parts of the fair-valued assets at cost).  The
Austrian state has committed to maintaining a Tier 1 ratio of 7%
as long as the bank's former owners remain invested in KF's
participation capital.

The rating actions are:

Kommunalkredit Austria AG

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
  -- Individual Rating: upgraded to 'D' from 'E'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A'
  -- Senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'A'
  -- Senior market-linked notes: affirmed at 'Aemr'
  -- Government guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'AAA'

KA Finanz AG

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+'; Outlook Stable

  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A+'

  -- Senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'A+'

  -- Subordinated (lower tier 2) notes: 'A' placed on Rating Watch
     Negative

  -- Junior subordinated: affirmed at 'C'/Recovery Rating 'RR5'
     Government guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'AAA'


===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


UNITED BULGARIAN: Fitch Puts 'BB+' Long-Term IDR on Negative Watch
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings of
several subsidiaries of National Bank of Greece S.A. and EFG
Eurobank Ergasias S.A. on Rating Watch Negative.

The rating actions follow the placement of NBG and Eurobank's LT
IDRs on RWN.  The subsidiaries' IDRs are based on potential
institutional support from their respective Greek parent
companies.

The RWN on NBG and Eurobank's subsidiaries reflects Fitch's view
that while the banks' propensity to support their international
banking subsidiaries remains unchanged, their ability to do so
could be declining.  The outcome will depend on the resolution of
the RWN on the parent banks.  If NBG and Eurobank's ratings are
downgraded, it would likely affect the subsidiaries' ratings.

The rating actions are:

NBG's subsidiaries:

United Bulgarian Bank

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'BB+' placed on RWN
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'
  -- Individual Rating: unaffected at 'D'.

Banca Romaneasca S.A.

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'BB+' placed on RWN
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'
  -- Individual Rating: unaffected at 'D'.

The South African Bank of Athens

  -- National Long-term Rating: 'BBB+' (zaf) placed on RWN
  -- National Short-term Rating: 'F2' (zaf) placed on RWN
  -- Support Rating affirmed at '3'

Eurobank's subsidiaries:

Eurobank EFG Bulgaria AD

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'BB+' placed on RWN
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'
  -- Individual Rating: unaffected at 'D'.


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D E N M A R K
=============


SKYKON AS: Files for Insolvency After Restructuring Talks Failed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Skykon A/S, a customer of Muehlhan, has -- by its own account --
filed for insolvency.  The talks about the restructuring of the
company, which has been in financial difficulties since October,
have failed.  Expensive acquisitions and a decreased demand in
relation to the financial crisis had caused the company's
situation.

For Muehlhan this means an additional implementation of allowances
on the accounts receivables in the amount of up to EUR1.5 million.
Of the receivables against Skykon of overall EUR1.9 million,
EUR0.4 million have been booked as bad debt losses in the third
quarter 2010 already.

The production in Denmark and Scotland will continue for the time
being.  Since October, Muehlhan works at both locations directly
for the end customers, well-known wind turbine manufacturers.

                           About Muehlhan

The Muehlhan Group is a global specialist in high-quality surface
protection and industrial services.

                           About Skykon

Denmark-based Skykon A/S is supplier for the wind industry.


=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


DUREVE LIMITED: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating on Class C-1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Dureve Limited Series 2010-1 final
ratings as listed below.  This transaction is a re-securitization
of the class A1 of Euromax V ABS PLC, which is a managed
securitization of European structured finance assets, primarily
commercial and residential mortgage-backed securities.

  -- EUR43m Class Senior A-1 Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2095:
     assigned 'Asf'; Outlook Stable

  -- EUR39m Class Senior A-2 Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2095:
     assigned 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable

  -- EUR30m Class Mezzanine B Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2095: assigned 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable

  -- EUR12m Class Subordinated C-1 Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2095: assigned 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable

  -- EUR57.6m Class Subordinated C-2 Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2095: not rated

The rating of the class A-1 notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and ultimate payment of principal at the legal maturity
in November 2095.  The rating of the class A-2 and B notes address
the ultimate payment of interest and principal at the legal
maturity.  The rating of the class C-1 notes addresses the
ultimate payment of principal at the legal maturity.

The ratings reflect the high credit enhancement level of the rated
classes as a result of the subordination of Dureve's class C-2
notes and the other classes junior to class A1 (rated 'CCCsf') of
Euromax 5.  The class A-1, A-2, B and C-1 of Dureve have credit
enhancement of 84%, 70%, 59% and 55%, respectively.  The Dureve
rated classes can sustain a significant amount of losses and a
Stable Outlook has been assigned.

At a high rating stress level, a shortfall of interest payment on
the class A1 of Euromax 5 can occur and would trigger an event of
default for the Euromax 5 transaction but would not trigger an
event of default for Dureve.  In addition, Dureve, the majority-
owner of the controlling class, cannot enforce Euromax 5
collateral if the portfolio liquidation proceeds result in
insufficient proceeds to fully repay the Dureve rated notes.

An Issuer Report Grade of 2 stars has been assigned based on an
investor report template provided by the arranger.  The template
does not provide counterparty ratings and rating triggers.

At closing, Dureve used the issuance note proceeds to purchase the
whole amount of the class A1 notes of Euromax 5.  In return,
Dureve has all the right, title and interest of the class A1 of
Euromax 5.  In Dureve's payment priorities, class A-1 principal is
subordinated to class A-1 to B interest payment.  The notional of
classes A-1 to C-2 are redeemed sequentially starting from class
A-1.


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G R E E C E
===========


DRYSHIPS INC: Inks US$770 Million Tanker Agreement
--------------------------------------------------
DryShips Inc. has entered into agreements with a first class
Korean shipyard to purchase 12 high specification newbuilding
tankers at a total purchase price of about US$770 million,
including over US$3 million per vessel in extra items.

The deliveries of the vessels are scheduled as follows:

  * Six newbuilding Aframax tankers with following deliveries:
    four in 2011 and two in 2012

  * Six newbuilding Suezmax tankers with following deliveries:
    one in 2011, two in 2012 and three in 2013.

The Company has made initial payments of about US$120 million
against these newbuilding contracts from cash on hand.  The
Company intends to finance the remaining capital commitments,
which include delivery installments of about 70% of each vessel's
price, with cash on hand and bank debt.  The Company intends to
position its tanker investments for a spinoff or initial public
offering.

                      About DryShips Inc.

Based in Greece, DryShips Inc. -- http://www.dryships.com/--
-- owns and operates drybulk carriers and offshore oil
deep water drilling units that operate worldwide.  As of September
10, 2010, DryShips owns a fleet of 40 drybulk carriers (including
newbuildings), comprising 7 Capesize, 31 Panamax and 2 Supramax,
with a combined deadweight tonnage of over 3.6 million tons and
6 offshore oil deep water drilling units, comprising of 2 ultra
deep water semisubmersible drilling rigs and 4 ultra deep water
newbuilding drillships.

DryShips's common stock is listed on the NASDAQ Global Select
Market where it trades under the symbol "DRYS".

The Company's balance sheet at Sept. 30, 2010, showed
US$5.80 million in total assets, US$1.90 million in total current
liabilities, US$1.10 million in total noncurrent liabilities, and
stockholders' equity of US$2.80 million.

On November 25, 2010, DryShips Inc. entered into a waiver letter
for its US$230.0 million credit facility dated September 10, 2007,
as amended, extending the waiver of certain covenants through
December 31, 2010.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on Sept. 29, 2010,
the Company said it is currently in negotiations with its lenders
to obtain waivers, waiver extensions or to restructure its debt.
As of June 30, 2010, the Company's theoretical exposure (current
portion of long-term debt less cash and cash equivalents less
restricted cash) amounted to US$761.4 million.


DRYSHIPS INC: Board Approves Share Purchase Program
---------------------------------------------------
DryShips Inc. said its Board of Directors has approved a share
purchase program for up to a total of US$25.0 million of common
stock of its majority-owned subsidiary Ocean Rig UDW Inc., which
may be purchased from time to time through March 31, 2011.

Share purchases by the Company will be made for cash in open
market transactions in Norway on the OTC market maintained by the
Norwegian Association of Stockbroking Companies at prevailing
market prices or in privately negotiated transactions; provided
that the maximum price shall be US$17.50 per share.  The timing
and amount of purchases under the program will be determined by
management based upon market conditions and other factors.

The program does not require the Company to purchase any specific
number or amount of Ocean Rig UDW Inc. common stock and may be
suspended or reinstated at any time in the Company's discretion
and without notice.

                      About DryShips Inc.

Based in Greece, DryShips Inc. -- http://www.dryships.com/--
-- owns and operates drybulk carriers and offshore oil
deep water drilling units that operate worldwide.  As of September
10, 2010, DryShips owns a fleet of 40 drybulk carriers (including
newbuildings), comprising 7 Capesize, 31 Panamax and 2 Supramax,
with a combined deadweight tonnage of over 3.6 million tons and
6 offshore oil deep water drilling units, comprising of 2 ultra
deep water semisubmersible drilling rigs and 4 ultra deep water
newbuilding drillships.

DryShips's common stock is listed on the NASDAQ Global Select
Market where it trades under the symbol "DRYS".

The Company's balance sheet at Sept. 30, 2010, showed US$5.80
million in total assets, US$1.90 million in total current
liabilities, US$1.10 million in total non current liabilities, and
stockholders' equity of US$2.80 million.

On November 25, 2010, DryShips Inc. entered into a waiver letter
for its US$230.0 million credit facility dated September 10, 2007,
as amended, extending the waiver of certain covenants through
December 31, 2010.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on Sept. 29, 2010,
the Company said it is currently in negotiations with its lenders
to obtain waivers, waiver extensions or to restructure its debt.
As of June 30, 2010, the Company's theoretical exposure (current
portion of long-term debt less cash and cash equivalents less
restricted cash) amounted to US$761.4 million.


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I R E L A N D
=============


ALLIED IRISH: Government Gets Court OK to Inject EUR3.7 Billion
---------------------------------------------------------------
Eamon Quinn and Paul J. Davies at The Financial Times report that
the Irish government took a further step towards complete
ownership of Allied Irish Banks as it won court approval on
Dec. 23 to inject EUR3.7 billion (US$4.85 billion) into the bank.

According to the FT, Finance Minister Brian Lenihan said the
capital injection from the country's National Pension Reserve Fund
would effectively raise the government's stake to 92.8% in AIB
early next year from the 18.6% it holds after last year's
investment of EUR3.5 billion.

The FT notes that while the move had been widely expected since
the broader EUR35 billion European-backed bail-out of Ireland was
concluded at the end of November, it still leaves AIB needing to
raise a further EUR6.1 billion to meet capital requirements
imposed as a condition of the bail-out.

More than half -- or EUR3.5 billion -- of that will come from the
government converting the preferred shares it bought last year
into common equity, the FT states.  AIB will still have to find
the remaining EUR2.6 billion from other means, including
discounted buy-backs, or swaps of junior bonds, according to
analysts, or entirely wipe out the remaining private shareholders,
the FT notes.

The FT relates that Mr. Lenihan said AIB's shares will be shifted
to the Irish Stock Exchange's junior Enterprise Securities Market,
to ensure private shareholders retain access to public trading.
Its London listing will be cancelled, the FT discloses.

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c., together with its subsidiaries --
http://www.aibgroup.com/-- conducts retail and commercial banking
business in Ireland.  It also provides corporate lending and
capital markets activities from its head office at Bankcentre and
from Dublin's International Financial Services Centre.  The Group
also has overseas branches in the United States, Germany, France
and Australia, among other locations.  The business of AIB Group
is conducted through four operating divisions: AIB Bank Republic
of Ireland division, Capital Markets division, AIB Bank UK
division, and Central & Eastern Europe division.  In February
2008, the Group acquired the AmCredit mortgage business in the
Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.  In September
2008, the Group also acquired a 49.99% shareholding in BACB.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 22,
2010, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that lowered its
rating on Allied Irish Banks PLC's nondeferrable subordinated debt
(lower Tier 2) securities to 'CCC' from 'B'.  S&P said he 'BBB/A-
2' counterparty credit ratings on AIB remain on CreditWatch with
negative implications where they were placed on Nov. 26, 2010.
Issuance guaranteed by the Republic of Ireland (A/Watch Neg/A-1)
is not affected by the rating action.  "The downgrade reflects
S&P's opinion that the likelihood of a liability management
exercise by AIB in respect of its lower Tier 2 instruments has
increased.  If the bank announces an exchange offer, S&P would
expect to characterize it as a "distressed exchange"," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Nigel Greenwood.


IVORY CDO: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC (sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
the class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, and E notes issued by Ivory CDO Ltd.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the credit
deterioration of the underlying portfolio, which provides cash
flows for the payments on the notes.  S&P's analysis also shows
that the balance of assets rated in the 'CCC' category ('CCC+',
'CCC', and 'CCC-') has increased to 8% of the total collateral in
November 2010 from 1% in August 2009 when S&P last reviewed this
transaction.  This has led to an increase in the scenario default
rates at each rating level.

The class A, B, C, D, and E notes' overcollateralization ratios
have declined further since S&P's last review, with all ratios
standing substantially below 100%.  As a result, interest payments
due to the class C, D, and E notes have been deferred.

None of S&P's ratings were affected by the largest obligor default
test or the largest industry default test, which S&P introduced as
part of S&P's criteria update.

S&P's most recent rating actions on Ivory CDO took place in August
2009 when S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2, and B
notes and lowered its ratings on the class C, D, and E notes.

Ivory CDO is a cash CDO of asset-backed securities managed by
Chenavari Credit Partners LLP that closed in July 2007.

                           Ratings List

                          Ivory CDO Ltd.
         EUR200 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

                         Ratings Lowered

                                Rating
                                ------
            Class       To                  From
            -----       --                  ----
            A-1         AA+ (sf)            AAA (sf)
            A-2         AA- (sf)            AAA (sf)
            B           BBB+ (sf)           AA (sf)
            C           BB+ (sf)            BBB+ (sf)
            D           CCC+ (sf)           B- (sf)
            E           CCC (sf)            CCC+ (sf)


MCKILLEN COMPANIES: Supreme Court Reserves Judgment on Nama Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
Mary Carolan at The Irish Times reports that a seven-judge Supreme
Court has reserved judgment on the action by property investor
Paddy McKillen aimed at preventing the National Assets Management
Agency (Nama) from acquiring EUR2.1 billion loans made to himself
and his companies.

According to The Irish Times, judgment is not expected to be
delivered before the new law term opens on January 11.

The Irish Times relates that the court heard closing arguments on
Dec. 22 in the appeal by Mr. McKillen against a decision of a
three-judge High Court last month rejecting the challenge by
himself and 15 of his companies to the acquisition of their loans
with Bank of Ireland.

The case has implications for EUR2.1 billion loans held by the
McKillen companies with the participating institutions in Nama,
Irish Times notes.  The agency has argued the loans acquisition is
necessary because that extent of exposure to the financial
institutions participating in Nama created a "systemic risk" to
those institutions, The Irish Times discloses.  The appeal was
listed for three days but concluded on Dec. 22 after a six-day
hearing, The Irish Times recounts.

In closing arguments for Mr. McKillen, Shane Murphy SC, as cited
by The Irish Times, said Nama had characterized the McKillen loans
as performing, with interest being paid even on expired loans.
Addressing claims by the State that some of the loans involved
breached loan to value ratios, he said it was the practice of
banks in such situations not to serve demands for repayment but to
seek to renegotiate the loans, The Irish Times notes.


OCELOT CDO: S&P Affirms 'B- (sf)' Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
six and lowered its ratings on two synthetic collateralized debt
obligation tranches issued by Ocelot CDO I PLC under the Ocelot
CDO II program.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed its credit
ratings on another two tranches.

S&P has raised its ratings on the notes in series 2005-01, 2006-2,
2006-03, 2005-02, 2005-06, and 2006-04 because S&P believes the
likelihood of breaching the threshold has reduced since its last
rating action on Feb. 23, 2010.  In S&P's opinion, the attachment
point for these series of notes is commensurate with higher
ratings than those S&P previously assigned.

S&P has lowered its ratings on the notes in series 2005-04 and
2005-08 because S&P believes the likelihood of the attachment
point being breached has increased since its last rating action on
Feb. 23, 2010.  In S&P's opinion, the attachment point for these
series of notes is consistent with lower ratings than those S&P
previously assigned.

At the same time S&P affirmed its ratings on the notes in series
2005-03 and 2005-07.

                           Ratings List

                          Ratings Raised

                         Ocelot CDO I PLC

EUR20 Million Class A Floating-Rate Mezzanine Notes Series 2005-01
                           (Ocelot II)

                                Rating
                                ------
        Class        To                         From
        -----        --                         ----
        A            BBB+ (sf)                  BBB- (sf)

EUR50 Million Class A Floating-Rate Mezzanine Notes Series 2006-02
                            (Ocelot CDO II)

                                Rating
                                ------
        Class        To                         From
        -----        --                         ----
        A            BBB+ (sf)                  BBB- (sf)

EUR2 Million Class A Floating-Rate Mezzanine Notes Series 2006-03
                            (Ocelot CDO II)

                                Rating
                                ------
        Class        To                         From
        -----        --                         ----
        A            BBB+ (sf)                  BBB- (sf)

EUR50 Million Class B Floating-Rate Mezzanine Notes Series 2005-02
                            (Ocelot II)

                                Rating
                                ------
        Class        To                         From
        -----        --                         ----
        B            BBB- (sf)                  BB (sf)

      EUR1.225 Million Class B Floating-Rate Mezzanine Notes
                        Series 2005-06
                        (Ocelot CDO II)

                                Rating
                                ------
        Class        To                         From
        -----        --                         ----
        B            BBB-p (sf)                 BBp (sf)

EUR1 Million Class C Floating-Rate Mezzanine Notes Series 2006-04
                         (Ocelot CDO II)

                                Rating
                                ------
        Class        To                         From
        -----        --                         ----
        C            BBB- (sf)                  BB (sf)

                        Ratings Affirmed

                        Ocelot CDO I PLC

EUR2 Million Class C Floating-Rate Mezzanine Notes Series 2005-03
                         (Ocelot CDO II)

                                Rating
                                ------
        Class        To                         From
        -----        --                         ----
        C            BB- (sf)                   BB- (sf)

EUR78 Million Class C Floating-Rate Mezzanine Notes Series 2005-07
                         (Ocelot CDO II)

                                Rating
                                ------
        Class        To                         From
        -----        --                         ----
        C            BB-p (sf)                  BB-p (sf)

                         Ratings Lowered

                        Ocelot CDO I PLC

EUR3 Million Class D Floating-Rate Mezzanine Notes Series 2005-04
                         (Ocelot CDO II)

                                Rating
                                ------
        Class        To                         From
        -----        --                         ----
        D            B- (sf)                    B (sf)

       EUR0.61 Million Class D Floating-Rate Mezzanine Notes
                         Series 2005-08
                         (Ocelot CDO II)

                                Rating
                                ------
        Class        To                         From
        -----        --                         ----
        D            B-p (sf)                   Bp (sf)


TITAN EUROPE: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCCsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Titan Europe 2006-2 plc's class A to
C notes and affirmed the class D to J notes.  The rating actions
are:

  -- EUR377.9m Class A (XS0254356990) downgraded to 'BBB-sf' from
     'BBB+sf'; Outlook Negative

  -- EUR61.7m Class B (XS0254357378) downgraded to 'Bsf' from
     'BBsf'; Outlook Negative

  -- EUR44.1m Class C (XS0254357881) downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
     'Bsf'; assigned Recovery Rating (RR) 'RR4'

  -- EUR23.1m Class D (XS0254357964) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; 'RR6'

  -- EUR57.5m Class E (XS0254358004) affirmed at 'CCsf'; 'RR6'

  -- EUR37.4m Class F (XS0254358699) affirmed at 'CCsf'; 'RR6'

  -- EUR29.3m Class G (XS0254648263) affirmed at 'CCsf'; 'RR6'

  -- EUR28.2m Class H (XS0254647612) affirmed at 'CCsf'; 'RR6'

  -- EUR11.5m Class J (XS0254653180) affirmed at 'CCsf'; 'RR6'

The downgrades and Negative Outlooks are driven by the continued
under-performance and ongoing operational/management-related
difficulties faced by the collateral securing the remaining four
loans.

All four loans are subject to ongoing, albeit in some instances
waived, technical or monetary events of default.  Two loans are in
primary servicing (following loan restructures), while the other
two are in special servicing.  Despite some minor improvements,
all four loans are still effectively distressed debt positions.
In addition, liquidity facility drawings have been required every
quarter since the July 2009 interest payment date to cover
interest shortfalls under the loans, special servicer fees and
interest due to the class X notes.

The cross-defaulted (but not cross-collateralized) Margaux and
Petrus loans (72% of the pool) were both restructured and removed
from the servicer's watchlist in Q310.  The two restructures have
similar terms including, amongst others, new interest rate swaps,
one-year loan extensions, and all surplus cash to be invested in
the properties.  Both loans were in breach of their 1.15x debt
service coverage cash trap triggers at the time of the last review
in September 2009.  As of the October 2010 IPD, both DSCRs have
improved, to 1.36x and 1.65x, respectively, and all trapped
surplus funds were released.  However, Fitch notes that rental
arrears greater that 30 days have been disregarded for the
purposes of calculating the DSCR and that both portfolios continue
to suffer increasing arrears levels (17% and 19.5%, respectively).
These rental arrears are exceptionally high, if not unheard of,
for professionally managed multifamily portfolios.
The sponsor continues to inject new equity for capital
expenditure.  Since closing, a total of EUR7.2m and EUR2.5m has
been injected into the Margaux and Petrus portfolios,
respectively.  While vacancy rates remain high (at 24% and 11%,
respectively), they have been on an improving trend over the past
year.  This reflects the positive effect of ongoing capex works,
especially in the case of the Petrus portfolio.
Despite the ongoing capex works and resulting improvement in
vacancy rates, the persisting high rental arrears give rise to
significant concerns about the effectiveness of the portfolios'
management strategies.  Due to the poor collateral performance and
high Fitch LTVs, Fitch doubts that these loans will be
successfully refinanced at their extended maturity dates.  While
the remaining tail period until the legal final maturity in
January 2016 provides sufficient time to complete a workout; Fitch
expects a significant loss to be realized on both loans.
Fitch will continue to monitor the performance of the transaction.


ZOE GROUP: Paid EUR1.4MM to Secured Creditors During Receivership
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Liam Carroll's Zoe group paid EUR1.4 million to secured creditors
in the first year of its receivership, Barry O'Halloran at The
Irish Times reports, citing documents filed in the companies'
office.

The Irish Times relates that Mr. Carroll's property development
business collapsed last year owing its banks EUR1.2 billion after
two failed attempts to have it placed in examinership and under
High Court protection failed.  State toxic loans agency, Nama,
subsequently took over loans due to AIB, Anglo Irish Bank, Bank of
Ireland and the EBS, The Irish Times recounts.

According to The Irish Times, documents filed by David Carson of
Deloitte, the receiver appointed by Bank of Ireland, show that
EUR1.45 million was distributed to secured creditors over two six-
month periods between October 2009 and 2010.

The inter-locking companies in Mr. Carroll's business, known
collectively as the Zoe group, owed Bank of Ireland EUR113
million, The Irish Times notes.

AIB, which the State effectively took over on Dec. 23, was the
largest lender to Zoe, which owed it EUR489 million, or 40.8% of
the group's overall debt, The Irish Times discloses.  Bank of
Scotland (Ireland) followed with a EUR321 million debt, The Irish
Times states.  Other lenders included: Ulster Bank, EUR82 million;
Anglo Irish Bank, EUR38 million; KBC Bank Ireland, EUR23 million
and EBS, EUR8.5 million, according to The Irish Times.

The Irish Times says a number of other receivers were appointed to
the group, but none of the documents they have filed at this stage
show any distributions were made to creditors.

Zoe's efforts to get court protection and to be placed in
examinership last year failed because the group was unable to show
that it would have a reasonable chance of survival were this to
happen, The Irish Times relates.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


SEAT PAGINEGIALLE: S&P Downgrades Corporate Credit Rating to 'B-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered to 'B-'
from 'B' its long-term corporate credit rating on Italy-based
international publisher of classified directories SEAT
PagineGialle SpA.  The outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P lowered to 'B' from 'B+' its senior secured
debt ratings on SEAT's first-lien term debt, revolving credit
facility, and notes.  The recovery ratings on these debt
instruments are unchanged at '2', indicating S&P's expectation of
substantial (70%-90%) recovery in the event of a payment default.

S&P also lowered to 'B-' from 'B' its debt rating on the second-
lien notes issued by related entity Lighthouse International Co.
S.A.  The recovery rating on these notes is unchanged at '4',
indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery in the
event of a payment default.

"The downgrade mainly reflects S&P's opinion that SEAT continues
to face a difficult operating environment and an excessively
leveraged capital structure, which could negatively affect the
group's liquidity position," said Standard & poor's credit analyst
Carlo Castelli.  "Moreover, S&P believes that SEAT faces
significant challenges in refinancing the debt maturities looming
for 2012-2013.  SEAT's markets remain affected by tough
conditions, due to the shift in small and midsize enterprises'
advertising expenses from print to online, stiff competition on
the Internet, and sluggish economic growth in Italy."

S&P believes that SEAT's weak operating performance, combined with
high interest costs, may materially affect its free operating cash
flow generation.  This could undermine the group's liquidity
position and ability to pay down debt.  Above all, S&P believes
that SEAT's ability to access the capital markets at reasonable
prices in order to refinance upcoming maturities is limited, as
demonstrated by the recent EUR200 million senior secured bond
issuance at almost 13% yield to maturity.

In S&P's view, rating pressures should gradually accelerate as the
group comes closer to its significant debt maturities in June 2012
and 2013.  S&P also believe that liquidity may come under renewed
pressure over the next 12 months if the group fails to stabilize
its operating performance.  The ratings could be lowered again
during 2011 in the absence of any significant refinancing action,
resulting in an extension of 2012 debt maturities.

The implementation of a new ABS program would be a meaningful, but
insufficient step to stabilize the group's liquidity profile.  S&P
will monitor closely any risk of debt restructuring?--which S&P
views as tantamount to default under S&P's criteria--as the group
approaches mid-2012; S&P is not aware of any tangible step in this
direction, however.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if SEAT were able to
stabilize its operating performance in the course of the next 12
months and if it were to succeed in implementing measures to
alleviate the refinancing risk in 2012-2013.  However, such a
revision would also be dependent on the group avoiding wiping out
its cash flow generation to fund interest costs and maintain
adequate covenant headroom.


STT HOLDING: S&P Downgrades Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it has lowered to 'BB'
from 'BBB' its long-term issuer credit rating on the Italian city
of Parma's investment company STT Holding SpA, and placed the
rating on CreditWatch developing.

"The rating action follows S&P's reassessment of the link between
STT and Parma, in accordance with S&P's criteria for government-
related entities," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Lorenzo
Pareja.

S&P's former 'BBB' rating on STT, which S&P considers to be a
government-related entity because it is 100% owned by Parma, was
based on S&P's opinion that there was an "extremely high"
likelihood that the city would provide timely and sufficient
extraordinary support to STT in the event of financial distress.
It was underpinned by S&P's view of the "very important role" STT
played for, and the "integral link" the company had with Parma.
According to S&P's criteria, this integral link denotes a track
record of considerable and timely support in all circumstances on
the part of the government, which includes the city setting up the
means to avoid liquidity constraints.  However, S&P note that STT
and its subsidiaries have increasingly suffered from weak
liquidity, particularly since an EUR84 million bond placement was
delayed in early November 2010.  According to the company, Parma
finished renegotiating several of STT's financial obligations,
some of which were due by year-end 2010.

S&P now believes that there is a "very high" likelihood that Parma
would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to STT
in the event of financial distress.  S&P's opinion is based on its
view that STT's:

Link with Parma is "very strong"--, which is one level below
"integral", according to its criteria.  S&P base its view on
Parma's track record of very strong support "in most
circumstances".  In S&P's opinion, the city is actively
renegotiating STT's financial obligations, exerts full control and
monitoring over its activities, and has repeatedly provided
transfers to the group.  The local government's reputation would
be negatively affected if STT found itself in financial distress.
Role for its owner is "very important".  In S&P's opinion, STT
plays a key role in developing the city's investment strategy and
meeting the government's political and economic objectives.  STT's
main responsibility is carrying out--either directly or through
its subsidiaries--Parma's most visible and important projects,
including the city's main urban renewal initiatives, the building
of premises for administrative entities of the European Commission
(particularly the European Food Security Agency, or EFSA), and the
promotion of Parma's industrial development by setting up
industrial parks.  S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch
placement within the next month.

"To do so, S&P will reassess STT's SACP in view of the solutions
that Parma has found to cover the company's current and future
funding needs," said Mr. Pareja.

If S&P decide that STT's SACP is at the middle or upper part of
the 'b' category, S&P could consider an upgrade.  Conversely, S&P
could downgrade STT if S&P assess that its SACP is within the
boundaries of the 'ccc' category.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


DBK LEASING: Moody's Assigns (P)'Ba3' Rating to Domestic Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)Ba3 long-
term local currency debt rating to the KZT15 billion
(approximately US$102 million) domestic bond program of DBK
Leasing.  The outlook on local currency debt rating is stable.
Any subsequent senior debt issuance by DBKL will be rated at the
same rating level subject to there being no material change in the
bank's overall credit rating.

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating assigned is in line with DBKL's global local currency
issuer rating of Ba3.  Moody's notes that the obligations of DBKL
to make payments under the senior unsecured bond issue will rank
-- at all times -- at least pari-passu with the claims of all
other unsecured and unsubordinated creditors of the company,
except for those claims that are preferred by any relevant law.

Nonetheless, the ratings of DBKL's domestic bond program do not
immediately apply to any individual notes issued under the
program.  The assignment of any such ratings is subject to Moody's
satisfactory review of the terms and conditions set forth in the
final prospectuses, supplements or offering memorandums of the
bonds to be issued.

DBKL's Baseline Credit Assessment of B3 is constrained by high
credit risk concentrations, the company's low profitability and
the possibility of politically motivated decisions given its
indirect state ownership.  However, the stand-alone rating is
underpinned by strong capital cushion, strong liquidity position
and access to funding from its parent -- Development Bank of
Kazakhstan.

DBKL's issuer rating, in turn, incorporates four main elements:
(i) the company's BCA of B3; (ii) Moody's assessment of the very
high probability of parental support in the event of need, given
the company's 100% ownership by DBK, its relatively moderate size
(and thus, greater probability that DBK will provide support) and
its good fit within its parent's strategy; (iii) high dependence
on DBK, which has provided it with all funding and capital to
date; and (iv) DBK's BCA of 11-13 (on a scale of 1 to 21, where 1
represents lowest credit risk).  As a result, Moody's assessment
of parental support results in a three-notch uplift from DBK
Leasing's B3 BCA.

Moody's previous rating action on DBKL was on May 4, 2010, when
the rating agency confirmed the company's Ba3 long-term local and
foreign currency issuer ratings.

Headquartered in Astana, Kazakhstan, DBK Leasing reported total
assets of KZT35.6 billion (US$240 million) and total equity of
KZT8.6 billion (US$58.2 million) under audited IFRS as at YE2009.


HALYK SAVINGS: S&P Gives Stable Outlook; Affirms 'B+' Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised its
outlook on Kazakhstan-based Halyk Savings Bank of Kazakhstan to
stable from negative.  At the same time, the 'B+' long-term and
'B' short-term counterparty credit ratings were affirmed.

"The outlook revision reflects S&P's belief that asset quality
pressure at the bank has started to ease due to the gradual
improvements in the domestic economy, which in turn is helping to
stabilize its earnings and capital," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Magar Kouyoumdjian.

The ratings on Halyk reflect the high-risk economic and banking
environment in the Republic of Kazakhstan (foreign currency
BBB/Stable/A-3, local currency BBB+/Stable/A-2; National Scale
Rating kzAAA/--/--); the bank's weak asset quality and associated
high credit provisioning, which has placed a significant burden on
profitability; and high single-name concentration in corporate
loans and deposits.  These concerns are partly mitigated by
Halyk's good customer franchise and leading market position,
particularly in retail banking; adequate liquidity and
capitalization; and funding and regulatory capital support from
the state because of the bank's systemic importance.

Despite Standard & Poor's classification of Halyk as a
systemically important bank in Kazakhstan, the ratings on the bank
reflect its stand-alone credit profile, and include no uplift for
extraordinary parental or government support, which S&P considers
as uncertain in the future.  However, through its wealth fund,
Samruk-Kazyna, the government allocated around US$1 billion for
Halyk to help it to weather the crisis.  Of this amount, US$400
million was allocated to common and preferred shares.  In late-
March 2009, Samruk-Kazyna bought 20.91% of the bank's common
shares (for US$180 million) and a further US$220 million was
invested in preferred shares by mid-2009, which in S&P's view has
helped improve Halyk's capitalization.  The bank's 54.4% majority
owner, JSC Holding Group Almex (not rated) is planning to exercise
its option to buy back Samruk-Kazyna's stake in Halyk in early
2011.

The stable outlook on Halyk reflects S&P's view that asset quality
pressure is easing, the economy is gradually emerging from a
slowdown, and market turbulence is subsiding.  As a result, the
bank's earnings and capitalization are now likely to stabilize
going forward.  If S&P observe further escalation in market
turbulence that leads to a reversal of this trend, S&P could
revise the outlook back to negative, with the potential for a
downgrade.  S&P considers this scenario unlikely, however.

The potential for an upgrade in the short term is limited,
however, at least until domestic market pressure eases
considerably.  If and once that happens, improvements in risk
management and asset quality, a significant reduction in single-
name depositor concentrations, and sustained adequate financial
performance could lead to an upgrade.


* S&P Raises Ratings on Various Kazakh Government-Related Entities
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it raised its ratings on
several Kazakhstan-based government-related entities and their
subsidiaries following its upgrade of the Republic of Kazakhstan
(foreign currency BBB/Stable/A-3, local currency BBB+/Stable/A-2;
national scale rating 'kzAAA').

The rating actions are based on S&P's GRE methodology.

S&P raised its long-term corporate credit ratings on railway
company Kazakhstan Temir Zholy to 'BBB-' from 'BB+', reflecting
its expectation of "very high" likelihood of extraordinary
government support.  S&P's assessment of KTZ's stand-alone credit
quality remains at 'b+'.  S&P also raised its rating on KTZ's
100%-owned subsidiary JSC Kaztemirtrans to 'BBB-' because S&P
continue to equalize it with its rating on the parent.  S&P
revised the outlook on these entities to stable from positive.  At
the same time, S&P raised the Kazakh national scale ratings on KTZ
and KTT to 'kzAA' from 'kzAA-'.

S&P also raised its rating on the oil and gas group JSC NC
KazMunayGas to 'BBB-' from 'BB+', based on its expectation of
"extremely high" likelihood of extraordinary government support
and its assessment of stand-alone credit quality at 'b'.  The
national scale rating was raised to 'kzAA' from 'kzAA-'.  The
outlook remains stable.

Meanwhile S&P has withdrawn its '4' recovery ratings on KMG, KTT,
and KTZ, because Standard & Poor's does not assign recovery
ratings to Kazakhstan-based issuers rated 'BBB-' and higher.

Following the action on the parent, S&P raised its ratings on
KMG's 100%-owned gas transportation subsidiary KazTransGas to 'BB'
from 'BB-'.  This rating remains two notches below S&P's rating on
the parent.  The outlook is stable.

S&P affirmed its ratings on KMG's subsidiaries, 60%-owned oil
company JSC KazMunaiGas Exploration Production and 100%-owned oil
pipeline KazTransOil, at 'BB+', one notch below its rating on the
parent, both with a stable outlook.  S&P considers KMGEP and KTO
to be more strategically important for the group and to have a
relatively higher stand-alone credit quality than KTG, hence the
difference between the ratings on the subsidiaries.  Still, the
ratings on the subsidiaries remain below those on the parent
because their link with the state is indirect and, in S&P's view,
the benefits of potential extraordinary state support may not
fully filter through to them given KMG's relatively weak stand-
alone credit quality and high debt.

S&P has left unchanged its ratings and outlook on the postal
operator Kazpost (JSC) (BB/Stable/--, national scale rating
'kzA+'), on Kazakh Agrarian Credit Corp. (BB/Stable/B, 'kzA+'), on
Kazakhtelecom (JSC) (BB/Stable/--; 'kzA'), and on Kazakhstan
Electricity Grid Operating Co. (JSC) (KEGOC; BB+/Stable/--).

S&P continue to assess the likelihood of extraordinary state
support as "very high" for KEGOC, "high" for Kazpost and Kazakh
Agrarian Credit Corp., and "moderately high" for Kazakhtelecom.
S&P assess the stand-alone credit quality for KEGOC, Kazpost, and
Kazakh Agrarian Credit Corp. at 'b' and for Kazakhtelecom at 'bb-
'.  Under S&P's GRE methodology, the upgrade of the sovereign
rating does not trigger any automatic rating actions on these four
entities, as its assessments of their stand-alone credit quality
or likelihood of extraordinary state support remain unchanged.

KTZ, KEGOC, KMG, Kazpost, and Kazakhtelecom are effectively 100%-
owned by the government of Kazakhstan through the holding company
Samruk-Kazyna.  S&P analyze these entities based on its
methodology for GREs rather than for parent-subsidiary links,
because S&P believes these entities will benefit from a certain
degree of extraordinary state support, and S&P currently view
Samruk-Kazyna as effectively an extension of the government.

                           Ratings List

                            Upgraded

                     Kazakhstan Temir Zholy

                        JSC Kaztemirtrans

                                To                From
                                --                ----
    Issuer credit rating       BBB-/Stable/--    BB+/Positive/--
     Kazakhstan national scale  kzAA              kzAA-

                       JSC NC KazMunayGas

                                To                From
                                --                ----
     Issuer credit rating       BBB-/Stable/--    BB+/Stable/--
     Kazakhstan national scale  kzAA              kzAA-

                           KazTransGas

                                 To               From
                                 --               ----
     Issuer credit rating        BB/Stable/--     BB-/Stable/--

                        Ratings Withdrawn

                     Kazakhstan Temir Zholy
                       JSC Kaztemirtrans
                       JSC NC KazMunayGas

                                    To                 From
                                    --                 ----
         Recovery rating            NR                 4

                        Ratings Affirmed

             JSC KazMunaiGas Exploration Production
                           KazTransOil

   Issuer credit rating                             BB+/Stable/--

                        Ratings Unchanged

                          Kazpost (JSC)

    Issuer credit rating                             BB/Stable/--
    Kazakhstan national scale                        kzA+

                   Kazakh Agrarian Credit Corp.

   Issuer credit rating                             BB/Stable/B;
   Kazakhstan national scale                        kzA+

                       Kazakhtelecom (JSC)

  Issuer credit rating                             BB/Stable/--;
  Kazakhstan national scale                        kzA

         Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Co. (JSC)

  Issuer credit rating                             BB+/Stable/--

       N.B. This list does not include all ratings affected.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


DEUTSCHE BANK: S&P Assigns 'BB+ (sf)' Rating to Class A4 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its credit ratings to
Deutsche Bank Luxembourg S.A.'s resecuritization notes series 50.

This transaction represents the second public resecuritizations of
a European commercial mortgage-backed securities bond.

In this transaction, the seller, Deutsche Bank AG, sold to
Deutsche Bank Luxembourg a portion of the class A commercial
mortgage-backed floating-rate notes issued by GEMINI (ECLIPSE
2006-3) PLC.  The issuance of the series 50 notes funded the
purchase.

The ratings reflect S&P's opinion of the expected performance of
the underlying collateral, the transaction structure, and the
payment priorities.

S&P has previously publicly rated three fiduciary issuances from
Deutsche Bank Luxembourg in Europe, each previously backed by
structured finance securities.

The scheduled maturity date of series 50 is in July 2019.

                           Ratings List

                   Deutsche Bank Luxembourg S.A.
    GBP175.84 Million Resecuritization Fiduciary Notes Series 50

        Class          Rating             Amount (mil. GBP)
        -----          ------             -----------------
        A1             A+ (sf)                  45.00
        A2             A (sf)                   15.00
        A3             BBB (sf)                 10.00
        A4             BB+ (sf)                 14.50
        A5             NR                       91.34

                         NR -- Not rated.


LOGWIN AG: S&P Affirms 'B' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its 'B'
long-term corporate credit and 'B-' subordinated debt ratings on
Luxembourg-based logistics service provider Logwin AG.  At the
same time, the ratings were removed from CreditWatch, where they
were placed with positive implications on Nov. 11, 2010.  The
outlook is stable.

The recovery rating on the subordinated notes is unchanged at '5',
indicating S&P's expectation of modest (10%-30%) recovery in the
event of a payment default.

"The rating affirmation reflects S&P's view of Logwin's small base
of operating profits, which S&P believes provides limited downside
protection and renders the company susceptible to adverse market
conditions," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Jebby Jacob.
"Although the disposal of Logwin's Road & Rail business in the
first quarter of 2010 has helped to curtail operating losses, S&P
considers the group's reported EBITDA for the 12 months ending
Sept. 30, 2010, to be relatively small at EUR30.8 million, with a
thin EBITDA margin of 2.4%.  However, the capital increase of ?40
million directed toward the partial bond redemption has improved
Logwin's financial risk profile, which S&P now views as aggressive
under S&P's criteria.  Even so, S&P believes that any further
financial improvement will stem from Logwin's ability to expand
its operating profits, in particular from a recovery of its
currently underperforming Solutions business."

S&P note that post the partial redemption of the bonds, Logwin's
credit measures should improve, with the pro forma ratio of
adjusted funds from operations to debt rising to about 23%, from
19.3% currently, and the ratio of adjusted debt to EBITDA down to
5.2x from the current 6.1x.  S&P calculate these pro forma ratios
using Standard & Poor's-adjusted ratios as of Sept. 30, 2010,
further adjusting them for EUR40 million of debt repayment.  The
adjustments for the remaining EUR25 million used to repay debt are
already incorporated as part of S&P's surplus cash adjustment.

In S&P's view, continued recovery of the global economy and
associated trading volumes will enable Logwin to maintain its
current level of operating profits over the near term.  S&P also
factor in that the gains from improved profitability and lower
interest costs will be partially offset by higher capital
expenditures following the minimal spending levels achieved
through the economic crisis.

S&P could consider a higher rating if there were to be a material
improvement in Logwin's consolidated operating profits, and a
sustained upward trend in FOCF generation.  Equally, S&P could
consider a negative rating action if an unexpected deterioration
in market conditions were to lead to a material weakening in
Logwin's cash flows and liquidity position.


ORANGE SA: Mobistar Conditionally Waives EUR30 Million Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
Mobistar has decided to conditionally waive a debt of EUR30
million owed by his subsidiary Orange S.A. in Luxembourg.
Mobistar has also reversed certain provisions on the investment
deduction for sustainable investments.  The two decisions result
in a decrease in tax costs and a EUR14 million improvement of the
consolidated net result for 2010.  The most recent guidance for
the consolidated net result does not take this positive impact
into account.  Finally, Mobistar's Board of Directors has approved
the re-financing of the long-term credit facility for an amount of
EUR450 million.

In order to optimize the balance sheet structure of his subsidiary
Orange S.A. in Luxembourg, Mobistar has decided to conditionally
waive the debt of EUR30 million owed by Orange S.A.  This decision
follows a positive opinion of the "Dienst Voorafgaande
Beslissingen in fiscale zaken / Service des Decisions Anticipees
en matiere fiscale".  This debt waiver results in an extraordinary
write-off for Mobistar S.A. and an extraordinary result for Orange
S.A. (Luxembourg).  Thanks to this rearrangement, Mobistar's
subsidiary in Luxembourg strengthens its balance sheet structure
and can move ahead with its growth strategy.

Mobistar also reversed certain provisions on the investment
deduction for sustainable investments, since it obtained the
necessary tax certificates for the financial years 2007, 2008 and
2009.

Both elements increase the consolidated net profit by
EUR14 million for the financial year 2010 by lowering the
consolidated tax cost.  This positive impact was not taken into
consideration in the consolidated net result guidance (between
EUR225 and EUR245 million) as presented with the half-year results
in July 2010.

Mobistar's Board of Directors has also approved the re-financing
of one of its credit facilities, with expiry date of December 31,
2010.  The new credit facility, with expiry date of December 31,
2015, amounts to EUR450 million with an interest rate of EURIBOR +
65 Bps.  The agreement strengthens the long-term financing of
Mobistar's growth activities.

Mobistar (euronext brussels:MOBB), one of the main players on the
Belgian and Luxembourg telecommunications market, is active in
mobile and landline telecommunications, ADSL and other markets
with high growth potential.  The company develops innovative
products and services for the residential and professional
markets.  Mobistar is quoted on the Brussels Stock Exchange and is
part of the France Telecom group.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CANDIDE FINANCING: Moody's Reviews Ba3 (sf)-Rated EUR5MM Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed under review for possible
upgrade these four classes of notes issued by these Dutch RMBS
transaction:

  -- Stichting Eleven Cities 3 B.V.: Classes B, C, D and E

The review was prompted by the better-than-expected performance of
the collateral backing the notes as well as credit enhancement
build-up since closing.  Moody's expects to conclude its rating
review within six months.

Also Moody's Investors Service has placed under review for
possible downgrade these seven classes of notes issued by these
Dutch RMBS transactions:

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) XIII B.V.: Class E

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) XIV B.V.: Classes C,
     D and E

  -- Candide Financing 2006 B.V.: Class E

  -- European Mortgage Securities VII B.V. Compartment 2007-I:
     Classes E and F

Moody's Investors Service has updated loss assumptions in the 8
Dutch RMBS transactions listed below (the affected transactions)
and has taken no rating action, in consideration of the sufficient
levels of credit enhancement currently available in the
structures.

  -- Saecure 4 B.V.
  -- Saecure 5 B.V.
  -- Candide Financing 2005 B.V.
  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) VIII B.V.
  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) IX B.V.
  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) X B.V
  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) XI B.V.
  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) XII B.V

Moody's has increased its lifetime loss assumption in the affected
transactions, as the performance of the underlying mortgage
portfolios to date has been worse than previously assumed.  The
lifetime loss and the MILAN Aaa credit enhancement are the key
parameters used by Moody's to calibrate its loss distribution
curve, which is one of the core inputs in Moody's cash-flow model.

The review of Stichting Eleven Cities 3, Hermes XIII, Hermes XIV,
Candide Financing 2006, and European Mortgage Securities VII B.V.
Compartment 2007-I and the update of the loss assumptions in the
affected transactions follows a portfolio review of the
performance of 101 Moody's rated non-master trust Dutch RMBS
transactions (including NHG and synthetic transactions).  The list
of transactions included in the portfolio review can be found
under this link

Moody's has also factored into its analysis the stable outlook for
Dutch RMBS.  The sector outlook reflects these expectations of key
macro-economic indicators: GDP to increase by 1.8% in 2010 and by
1.4% in 2011, unemployment to rise to approximately 5.6% in 2010
from 4.8% in 2009 before falling to 5.3% in 2011, house prices to
remain relatively flat over the next year.  For transaction
specific performance, please refer to Moody's Performance
Overviews available on www.moodys.com.

                      Transaction Overviews

  -- Stichting Eleven Cities 3 B.V. closed in June 2007.  Loans
     more than 90 days in arrears correspond to 0.42% of the
     current portfolio balance, while cumulative losses amount to
     0.01% of the original portfolio balance.  The transaction has
     a current pool factor of 70%. The credit enhancement of Class
     B notes has increased to 9.38% from 6.52% at closing, of
     class C note to 6.48% from 4.51%, of class D note to 3.60%
     from 2.51 and of class E note to 1.44% from 1.01% at closing.

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) XIII B.V. closed in
     March 2007.  Loans more than 90 days in arrears correspond to
     1.08% of the current portfolio balance, while cumulative
     losses amount 0.15% of the original portfolio balance (inc.
     replenishments if applicable).

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) XIV B.V closed in
     September 2007. Loans more than 90 days in arrears correspond
     to 1.22% of the current portfolio balance, while cumulative
     losses amount to 0.10% of the original portfolio balance
     (inc. replenishments if applicable).

  -- Candide Financing 2006 B.V. closed in November 2006.  Loans
     more than 90 days in arrears correspond to 0.75% of the
     current portfolio balance, while cumulative losses amount to
     0.18% of the original portfolio balance (inc. replenishments
     if applicable).

  -- European Mortgage Securities VII B.V. Compartment 2007-I
     closed in August 2007.  Loans more than 90 days in arrears
     correspond to 1.45% of the current portfolio balance, while
     cumulative losses amount to 0.07% of the original portfolio
     balance (inc. replenishments if applicable).

  -- Saecure 4 B.V. closed in June 2004.  Loans more than 90 days
     in arrears correspond to 1.04% of the current portfolio
     balance, while cumulative losses amount to 0.31% of the
     original portfolio balance (inc. replenishments if
     applicable).  Taking into account the performance of the
     underlying mortgage portfolio to date, Moody's has increased
     its lifetime loss expectations to 0.70% of the original
     portfolio balance and it has maintained its Milan AaaCE at
     8.00% of the current portfolio balance.

  -- Saecure 5 B.V. closed in April 2005.  Loans more than 90 days
     in arrears correspond to 0.81% of the current portfolio
     balance, while cumulative losses amount to 0.24% of the
     original portfolio balance (inc. replenishments if
     applicable).  Taking into account the performance of the
     underlying mortgage portfolio to date, Moody's has increased
     its lifetime loss expectations to 0.70% of the original
     portfolio balance and it has maintained its Milan AaaCE at
     6.79% of the current portfolio balance.

  -- Candide Financing 2005 B.V. closed in May 2005.  Loans more
     than 90 days in arrears correspond to 0.74% of the current
     portfolio balance, while cumulative losses amount to 0.28% of
     the original portfolio balance (inc. replenishments if
     applicable).  Taking into account the performance of the
     underlying mortgage portfolio to date, Moody's has increased
     its lifetime loss expectations to 0.70% of the original
     portfolio balance and it has maintained its Milan AaaCE at
     7.75% of the current portfolio balance.

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) VIII B.V. closed in
     June 2004.  Loans more than 90 days in arrears correspond to
     1.97% of the current portfolio balance, while cumulative
     losses amount to 0.75% of the original portfolio balance
     (inc. replenishments if applicable). Taking into account the
     performance of the underlying mortgage portfolio to date,
     Moody's has increased its lifetime loss expectations to 0.90%
     of the original portfolio balance and it has maintained its
     Milan AaaCE at 7.00% of the current portfolio balance.

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) IX B.V. closed in
     February 2005.  Loans more than 90 days in arrears correspond
     to 1.63% of the current portfolio balance, while cumulative
     losses amount to 0.58% of the original portfolio balance
     (inc. replenishments if applicable).  Taking into account the
     performance of the underlying mortgage portfolio to date,
     Moody's has increased its lifetime loss expectations to 0.90%
     of the original portfolio balance and it has maintained its
     Milan AaaCE at 6.42% of the current portfolio balance.

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) X B.V closed in
     September 2005. Loans more than 90 days in arrears correspond
     to 1.46% of the current portfolio balance, while cumulative
     losses amount to 0.58% of the original portfolio balance
     (inc. replenishments if applicable).  Taking into account the
     performance of the underlying mortgage portfolio to date,
     Moody's has increased its lifetime loss expectations to 0.90%
     at closing of the original portfolio balance and it has
     maintained its Milan AaaCE at 6.59% of the current portfolio
     balance.

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) XI B.V. closed in
     February 2006.  Loans more than 90 days in arrears correspond
     to 1.27% of the current portfolio balance, while cumulative
     losses amount to 0.49% of the original portfolio balance
     (inc. replenishments if applicable).  Taking into account the
     performance of the underlying mortgage portfolio to date,
     Moody's has increased its lifetime loss expectations to 0.90%
     of the original portfolio balance and it has maintained its
     Milan AaaCE at 6.54% of the current portfolio balance.

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) XII B.V closed in
     October 2006.  Loans more than 90 days in arrears correspond
     to 0.85% of the current portfolio balance, while cumulative
     losses amount to 0.21% of the original portfolio balance
     (inc. replenishments if applicable).  Taking into account the
     performance of the underlying mortgage portfolio to date,
     Moody's has increased its lifetime loss expectations to 0.90%
     of the original portfolio balance and it has maintained its
     Milan AaaCE at 6.00% of the current portfolio balance.

                         Review Process

In identifying the affected transactions, Moody's conducted a
portfolio review of 101 Moody's rated non-master trust Dutch RMBS
transactions.  The list of transactions included in the portfolio
review can be found under this link.

During the analysis, the rating agency took into account the
performance of the collateral to date, its deviation from Moody's
expectations as well as the levels of credit enhancement available
to absorb the future projected losses on the respective
portfolios.  Within the Dutch RMBS sector the mortgage portfolios
in the 8 affected transactions have shown a deviation from Moody's
performance expectations.  After taking into account the level of
credit enhancement in each structure, Moody's has taken no rating
action on the affected transactions due to the current level of
credit enhancement sufficiently supporting the current ratings of
the notes.

The full review of the ratings of class E in Hermes XIII, classes
C, D, and E in Hermes XIV, class E in Candide Financing 2006,
classes E and F in European Mortgage Securities VII B.V.
Compartment 2007-I, and classes B, C, D and E in Stichting Eleven
Cities 3 will take into account the current capital structure of
the transactions.  As part of its detailed transaction review,
Moody's will reassess its lifetime loss expectation reflecting the
collateral performance to date as well as the future macro-
economic environment.  Moody's will also request updated loan-by-
loan information to revise its MILAN Aaa credit enhancement.
Loan-by-loan information will also allow Moody's to validate its
assumptions with regards to which loans have a higher default
propensity.  The lifetime loss and the MILAN Aaa credit
enhancement are the key parameters used by Moody's to calibrate
its loss distribution curve, which is one of the core inputs in
Moody's cash-flow model.

                      List of Affected Notes

Issuer: Candide Financing 2006 B.V.

  -- EUR5M E Certificate, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Nov 17, 2006 Definitive
     Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: European Mortgage Securities VII B.V. Compartment 2007-I

  -- EUR24.5M E Certificate, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Aug 31, 2007 Assigned Baa1
      (sf)

  -- EUR38.55M F Certificate, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Aug 31, 2007 Assigned Baa3
      (sf)

Issuer: Holland Mortgage Backed Series (Hermes) XIII B.V.

  -- EUR36.4M E Certificate, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Mar 29, 2007 Definitive
     Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: HOLLAND MORTGAGE BACKED SERIES (HERMES) XIV B.V.

  -- EUR54M C Certificate, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Sep 28, 2007 Definitive
     Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

  -- EUR14M D Certificate, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Sep 28, 2007 Definitive
     Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- EUR18M E Certificate, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Sep 28, 2007 Definitive
     Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Stichting Eleven Cities No. 3

  -- EUR18.6M B Certificate, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Jun 7, 2007 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- EUR18.5M C Certificate, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Jun 7, 2007 Definitive Rating
     Assigned A1 (sf)

  -- EUR8.4M D Certificate, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Jun 7, 2007 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Baa1 (sf)

  -- EUR5.5M E Certificate, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Jun 7, 2007 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Moody's ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by
the legal final maturity of the notes.  Moody's ratings address
only the credit risks associated with the transactions.  Other
non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

Moody's will continue to monitor closely the above transactions.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

The ratings have been disclosed to the rated entity or its
designated agents and issued with no amendment resulting from that
disclosure.

Information sources used to prepare the credit ratings are these:
parties involved in the ratings, parties not involved in the
ratings, public information, and confidential and proprietary
Moody's Investors Service information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the purpose
of maintaining a credit rating.

Moody's adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources Moody's considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, Moody's is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


HOLLAND MORTGAGE: Moody's Reviews Ba2 (sf)-Rated EUR18MM Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed under review for possible
upgrade these four classes of notes issued by these Dutch RMBS
transaction:

  -- Stichting Eleven Cities 3 B.V.: Classes B, C, D and E

The review was prompted by the better-than-expected performance of
the collateral backing the notes as well as credit enhancement
build-up since closing.  Moody's expects to conclude its rating
review within six months.

Also Moody's Investors Service has placed under review for
possible downgrade these seven classes of notes issued by these
Dutch RMBS transactions:

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) XIII B.V.: Class E

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) XIV B.V.: Classes C,
     D and E

  -- Candide Financing 2006 B.V.: Class E

  -- European Mortgage Securities VII B.V. Compartment 2007-I:
     Classes E and F

Moody's Investors Service has updated loss assumptions in the 8
Dutch RMBS transactions listed below (the affected transactions)
and has taken no rating action, in consideration of the sufficient
levels of credit enhancement currently available in the
structures.

  -- Saecure 4 B.V.
  -- Saecure 5 B.V.
  -- Candide Financing 2005 B.V.
  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) VIII B.V.
  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) IX B.V.
  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) X B.V
  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) XI B.V.
  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) XII B.V

Moody's has increased its lifetime loss assumption in the affected
transactions, as the performance of the underlying mortgage
portfolios to date has been worse than previously assumed.  The
lifetime loss and the MILAN Aaa credit enhancement are the key
parameters used by Moody's to calibrate its loss distribution
curve, which is one of the core inputs in Moody's cash-flow model.

The review of Stichting Eleven Cities 3, Hermes XIII, Hermes XIV,
Candide Financing 2006, and European Mortgage Securities VII B.V.
Compartment 2007-I and the update of the loss assumptions in the
affected transactions follows a portfolio review of the
performance of 101 Moody's rated non-master trust Dutch RMBS
transactions (including NHG and synthetic transactions).  The list
of transactions included in the portfolio review can be found
under this link

Moody's has also factored into its analysis the stable outlook for
Dutch RMBS.  The sector outlook reflects these expectations of key
macro-economic indicators: GDP to increase by 1.8% in 2010 and by
1.4% in 2011, unemployment to rise to approximately 5.6% in 2010
from 4.8% in 2009 before falling to 5.3% in 2011, house prices to
remain relatively flat over the next year.  For transaction
specific performance, please refer to Moody's Performance
Overviews available on www.moodys.com.

                      Transaction Overviews

  -- Stichting Eleven Cities 3 B.V. closed in June 2007.  Loans
     more than 90 days in arrears correspond to 0.42% of the
     current portfolio balance, while cumulative losses amount to
     0.01% of the original portfolio balance.  The transaction has
     a current pool factor of 70%. The credit enhancement of Class
     B notes has increased to 9.38% from 6.52% at closing, of
     class C note to 6.48% from 4.51%, of class D note to 3.60%
     from 2.51 and of class E note to 1.44% from 1.01% at closing.

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) XIII B.V. closed in
     March 2007.  Loans more than 90 days in arrears correspond to
     1.08% of the current portfolio balance, while cumulative
     losses amount 0.15% of the original portfolio balance (inc.
     replenishments if applicable).

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) XIV B.V closed in
     September 2007. Loans more than 90 days in arrears correspond
     to 1.22% of the current portfolio balance, while cumulative
     losses amount to 0.10% of the original portfolio balance
     (inc. replenishments if applicable).

  -- Candide Financing 2006 B.V. closed in November 2006.  Loans
     more than 90 days in arrears correspond to 0.75% of the
     current portfolio balance, while cumulative losses amount to
     0.18% of the original portfolio balance (inc. replenishments
     if applicable).

  -- European Mortgage Securities VII B.V. Compartment 2007-I
     closed in August 2007.  Loans more than 90 days in arrears
     correspond to 1.45% of the current portfolio balance, while
     cumulative losses amount to 0.07% of the original portfolio
     balance (inc. replenishments if applicable).

  -- Saecure 4 B.V. closed in June 2004.  Loans more than 90 days
     in arrears correspond to 1.04% of the current portfolio
     balance, while cumulative losses amount to 0.31% of the
     original portfolio balance (inc. replenishments if
     applicable).  Taking into account the performance of the
     underlying mortgage portfolio to date, Moody's has increased
     its lifetime loss expectations to 0.70% of the original
     portfolio balance and it has maintained its Milan AaaCE at
     8.00% of the current portfolio balance.

  -- Saecure 5 B.V. closed in April 2005.  Loans more than 90 days
     in arrears correspond to 0.81% of the current portfolio
     balance, while cumulative losses amount to 0.24% of the
     original portfolio balance (inc. replenishments if
     applicable).  Taking into account the performance of the
     underlying mortgage portfolio to date, Moody's has increased
     its lifetime loss expectations to 0.70% of the original
     portfolio balance and it has maintained its Milan AaaCE at
     6.79% of the current portfolio balance.

  -- Candide Financing 2005 B.V. closed in May 2005.  Loans more
     than 90 days in arrears correspond to 0.74% of the current
     portfolio balance, while cumulative losses amount to 0.28% of
     the original portfolio balance (inc. replenishments if
     applicable).  Taking into account the performance of the
     underlying mortgage portfolio to date, Moody's has increased
     its lifetime loss expectations to 0.70% of the original
     portfolio balance and it has maintained its Milan AaaCE at
     7.75% of the current portfolio balance.

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) VIII B.V. closed in
     June 2004.  Loans more than 90 days in arrears correspond to
     1.97% of the current portfolio balance, while cumulative
     losses amount to 0.75% of the original portfolio balance
     (inc. replenishments if applicable). Taking into account the
     performance of the underlying mortgage portfolio to date,
     Moody's has increased its lifetime loss expectations to 0.90%
     of the original portfolio balance and it has maintained its
     Milan AaaCE at 7.00% of the current portfolio balance.

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) IX B.V. closed in
     February 2005.  Loans more than 90 days in arrears correspond
     to 1.63% of the current portfolio balance, while cumulative
     losses amount to 0.58% of the original portfolio balance
     (inc. replenishments if applicable).  Taking into account the
     performance of the underlying mortgage portfolio to date,
     Moody's has increased its lifetime loss expectations to 0.90%
     of the original portfolio balance and it has maintained its
     Milan AaaCE at 6.42% of the current portfolio balance.

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) X B.V closed in
     September 2005. Loans more than 90 days in arrears correspond
     to 1.46% of the current portfolio balance, while cumulative
     losses amount to 0.58% of the original portfolio balance
     (inc. replenishments if applicable).  Taking into account the
     performance of the underlying mortgage portfolio to date,
     Moody's has increased its lifetime loss expectations to 0.90%
     at closing of the original portfolio balance and it has
     maintained its Milan AaaCE at 6.59% of the current portfolio
     balance.

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) XI B.V. closed in
     February 2006.  Loans more than 90 days in arrears correspond
     to 1.27% of the current portfolio balance, while cumulative
     losses amount to 0.49% of the original portfolio balance
     (inc. replenishments if applicable).  Taking into account the
     performance of the underlying mortgage portfolio to date,
     Moody's has increased its lifetime loss expectations to 0.90%
     of the original portfolio balance and it has maintained its
     Milan AaaCE at 6.54% of the current portfolio balance.

  -- Holland Mortgage Backed Series (HERMES) XII B.V closed in
     October 2006.  Loans more than 90 days in arrears correspond
     to 0.85% of the current portfolio balance, while cumulative
     losses amount to 0.21% of the original portfolio balance
     (inc. replenishments if applicable).  Taking into account the
     performance of the underlying mortgage portfolio to date,
     Moody's has increased its lifetime loss expectations to 0.90%
     of the original portfolio balance and it has maintained its
     Milan AaaCE at 6.00% of the current portfolio balance.

                         Review Process

In identifying the affected transactions, Moody's conducted a
portfolio review of 101 Moody's rated non-master trust Dutch RMBS
transactions.  The list of transactions included in the portfolio
review can be found under this link.

During the analysis, the rating agency took into account the
performance of the collateral to date, its deviation from Moody's
expectations as well as the levels of credit enhancement available
to absorb the future projected losses on the respective
portfolios.  Within the Dutch RMBS sector the mortgage portfolios
in the 8 affected transactions have shown a deviation from Moody's
performance expectations.  After taking into account the level of
credit enhancement in each structure, Moody's has taken no rating
action on the affected transactions due to the current level of
credit enhancement sufficiently supporting the current ratings of
the notes.

The full review of the ratings of class E in Hermes XIII, classes
C, D, and E in Hermes XIV, class E in Candide Financing 2006,
classes E and F in European Mortgage Securities VII B.V.
Compartment 2007-I, and classes B, C, D and E in Stichting Eleven
Cities 3 will take into account the current capital structure of
the transactions.  As part of its detailed transaction review,
Moody's will reassess its lifetime loss expectation reflecting the
collateral performance to date as well as the future macro-
economic environment.  Moody's will also request updated loan-by-
loan information to revise its MILAN Aaa credit enhancement.
Loan-by-loan information will also allow Moody's to validate its
assumptions with regards to which loans have a higher default
propensity.  The lifetime loss and the MILAN Aaa credit
enhancement are the key parameters used by Moody's to calibrate
its loss distribution curve, which is one of the core inputs in
Moody's cash-flow model.

                      List of Affected Notes

Issuer: Candide Financing 2006 B.V.

  -- EUR5M E Certificate, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Nov 17, 2006 Definitive
     Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: European Mortgage Securities VII B.V. Compartment 2007-I

  -- EUR24.5M E Certificate, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Aug 31, 2007 Assigned Baa1
      (sf)

  -- EUR38.55M F Certificate, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Aug 31, 2007 Assigned Baa3
      (sf)

Issuer: Holland Mortgage Backed Series (Hermes) XIII B.V.

  -- EUR36.4M E Certificate, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Mar 29, 2007 Definitive
     Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: HOLLAND MORTGAGE BACKED SERIES (HERMES) XIV B.V.

  -- EUR54M C Certificate, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Sep 28, 2007 Definitive
     Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

  -- EUR14M D Certificate, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Sep 28, 2007 Definitive
     Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- EUR18M E Certificate, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on Sep 28, 2007 Definitive
     Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Stichting Eleven Cities No. 3

  -- EUR18.6M B Certificate, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Jun 7, 2007 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  -- EUR18.5M C Certificate, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Jun 7, 2007 Definitive Rating
     Assigned A1 (sf)

  -- EUR8.4M D Certificate, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Jun 7, 2007 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Baa1 (sf)

  -- EUR5.5M E Certificate, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Jun 7, 2007 Definitive Rating
     Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Moody's ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by
the legal final maturity of the notes.  Moody's ratings address
only the credit risks associated with the transactions.  Other
non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

Moody's will continue to monitor closely the above transactions.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

The ratings have been disclosed to the rated entity or its
designated agents and issued with no amendment resulting from that
disclosure.

Information sources used to prepare the credit ratings are these:
parties involved in the ratings, parties not involved in the
ratings, public information, and confidential and proprietary
Moody's Investors Service information.

Moody's Investors Service considers the quality of information
available on the issuer or obligation satisfactory for the purpose
of maintaining a credit rating.

Moody's adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources Moody's considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, Moody's is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


LANCELOT 2006: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'Bsf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Lancelot 2006 B.V.'s class B and C
notes, affirmed the class A and D notes and downgraded the class E
notes.  The rating actions are:

  -- EUR279.8m Class A (XS0275569225) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- EUR21.0m Class B (XS0275579703) upgraded to 'AAAsf' from
     'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- EUR19.5m Class C (XS0275581279) upgraded to 'AAsf' from
     'Asf'; Outlook Stable

  -- EUR19.5m Class D (XS0275581949) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- EUR12.0m Class E (XS0275582590) downgraded to 'Bsf' from
     'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

The upgrades were driven by the high level of redemptions, which
means the portfolio has shrunk to EUR351.8 million (208 loans)
from EUR600.0 million (356 loans) at closing in December 2006.
The combination of scheduled amortization and partial redemptions
(EUR125.2 million), full redemptions (EUR111.6 million) and loan
repurchases (EUR11.4 million) has resulted in an average constant
prepayment rate of 14% since closing.

The downgrade of the class E notes was driven by continuing
uncertainty about Dutch commercial real estate market values,
combined with the high loan-to-value ratios of some of the larger
loans in the portfolio.  Information on the value of the
collateral supporting the loans has not been updated since
closing, but approximately 13% of the portfolio currently report
LTVs of 72% and above.

As all principal funds are allocated to the notes on a fully
sequential basis, the high level of redemptions has resulted in a
significant improvement in credit enhancement.  This has been
further helped by the reserve fund having reached its target
amount of EUR4.2 million.  The class A notes, in particular, have
seen an improvement in credit enhancement to 21.4% from 12.0%
since closing.

The credit metrics of the collateral pool remain strong.  Arrears,
defaults and losses have all been reported at 0% since closing,
while overdrafts have never gone above 1% of the pool balance.
The weighted-average LTV ratio has decreased to 50.9% from 57.9%
since closing.  While it is unclear whether this is due to
amortization, improving values, or a combination of the two, Fitch
expects scheduled amortization (less than one-third of loans are
interest-only) to continue to decrease leverage.  Finally, the
long WA remaining loan term of 15.9 years (less than 5% of the
pool is scheduled to mature in the next three years) insulates the
transaction from current market conditions.

Fitch will continue to monitor the performance of the transaction.


LYONDELL CHEMICAL: Says Interplastic Refuses to Pay US$2 Million
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lyondell Chemical Co. has accused Interplastic Corp. of unlawfully
refusing to pay US$2 million in debt the newly solvent company
claims it is owed under contracts forged prior to its January 2009
bankruptcy filing, according to Bankruptcy Law360.

LyondellBasell Industries is one of the world's largest polymers,
petrochemicals and fuels companies.  Luxembourg-based Basell AF
and Lyondell Chemical Company merged operations in 2007 to form
LyondellBasell Industries, the world's third largest independent
chemical company.  LyondellBasell became saddled with debt as part
of the US$12.7 billion merger.  Len Blavatnik's Access Industries
owned the Company prior to its bankruptcy filing.

On January 6, 2009, LyondellBasell Industries' U.S. operations,
led by Lyondell Chemical Co., and one of its European holding
companies -- Basell Germany Holdings GmbH -- filed voluntary
petitions to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code to facilitate a restructuring of the company's debts.  The
case is In re Lyondell Chemical Company, et al., Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Lead Case No. 09-10023).  Seventy-nine Lyondell entities filed for
Chapter 11. Luxembourg-based LyondellBasell Industries AF S.C.A.
and another affiliate were voluntarily added to Lyondell
Chemical's reorganization filing under Chapter 11 on April 24,
2009.

Deryck A. Palmer, Esq., at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, in
New York, served as the Debtors' bankruptcy counsel.  Evercore
Partners served as financial advisors, and AlixPartners and its
subsidiary AP Services LLC, served as restructuring advisors.
AlixPartners' Kevin M. McShea acted as the Debtors' Chief
Restructuring Officer.  Clifford Chance LLP served as
restructuring advisors to the European entities.

LyondellBasell emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in
May 2010, with a plan that provides the Company with US$3 billion
of opening liquidity.  A new parent company, LyondellBasell
Industries N.V., incorporated in the Netherlands, is the successor
of the former parent company, LyondellBasell Industries AF S.C.A.,
a Luxembourg company that is no longer part of LyondellBasell.
LyondellBasell Industries N.V. owns and operates substantially the
same businesses as the previous parent company, including
subsidiaries that were not involved in the bankruptcy cases.
LyondellBasell's corporate seat is Rotterdam, Netherlands, with
administrative offices in Houston and Rotterdam.


PANGAEA ABS: S&P Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'B (sf)'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit rating on
PANGAEA ABS 2007-1 B.V.'s class A notes.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its ratings on the class B, C, and D notes.

The rating actions follow the application of S&P's updated
criteria for corporate CDOs to the portion of the pool that
comprises leveraged loan-based CDO assets.  S&P's rating actions
also incorporate its assessment of the credit performance in the
transaction portfolio, and a cash flow analysis incorporating all
the assets in the portfolio.

S&P has observed an increase in the scenario default rates for
this transaction, due in part to the application of its corporate
CDO criteria, and an increase in 'CCC' rated assets in the
portfolio.

S&P has also subjected the capital structure to a cash flow
analysis to determine the break-even default rate for each rated
class of notes.  In this analysis, S&P used the reported portfolio
balance, weighted-average spread, and weighted-average recovery
rates.  S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using
alternative default patterns, levels, and timing for each
liability rating category (i.e., 'AAA', 'AA', and 'BBB'), in
conjunction with different interest stress scenarios.  From this
analysis, S&P obtained BDRs for each rated class of notes.

In its opinion, while the class A notes have paid down, the
increase in the SDRs is no longer commensurate with the rating
previously assigned to the class A notes.  S&P has therefore
lowered the rating on the class A notes to 'AA- (sf)' from 'AA
(sf)'.

S&P is of the view that the existing credit enhancement in this
transaction is commensurate with the current ratings on the class
B, C, and D notes.  As a result, S&P has affirmed its ratings on
these classes.

PANGAEA 2007-1 ABS CDO is a cash flow collateralized debt
obligation of European structured finance assets, involving
largely commercial mortgage-backed securities, leveraged loan-
based CDO assets, residential mortgage-backed securities, and
consumer asset-backed securities.  It closed in March 2007.

                           Ratings List

                      PANGAEA ABS 2007-1 B.V.
         EUR309.2 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

                         Rating Lowered
                                Rating
                                ------
                Class       To            From
                -----       --            ----
                A           AA- (sf)      AA (sf)

                        Ratings Affirmed

                      Class       Rating
                      -----       ------
                      B           A (sf)
                      C           BBB (sf)
                      D           B (sf)


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


* Moody's Reviews Ratings on 25 Portuguese SF Transactions
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible
downgrade the ratings of notes of 25 Portuguese structured finance
transactions.  Ratings under review include the Aaa (sf) ratings
on two RMBS, the ratings of most of the mezzanine and junior notes
in 21 other RMBS transactions, and the ratings of six notes in
four ABS transactions.  Moody's provides the detailed list of the
rating actions at the end of this press release.

The rating actions reflect Moody's expectation of further asset
performance deterioration, because of the uncertainties around
Portugal's longer-term economic vitality.  On 21 December 2010,
Moody's placed on review for possible downgrade Portugal's A1
rating, citing Portugal's sluggish growth, downward pressure on
GDP growth, heightened funding costs and the financial impact of
support to the banking sector.

The vulnerability of the Portuguese financial sector to continued
loss of funding and higher impairments is another important factor
in the rating actions for transactions that lacked strong features
to mitigate operational risk.  On 21 December 2010, Moody's
widened the review of Portuguese bank ratings announced on 9
December, which now extends to all rated Portuguese banks.

On June 22, 2010, Moody's placed on review for possible downgrade
Aaa (sf) and Aa (sf) ratings in 23 Portuguese RMBS and three
Portuguese ABS, having placed Portugal's rating on review for
possible downgrade in May.  At that time, the review of the RMBS
and ABS focused on the resilience of these notes to extreme loss
scenarios in the context of a sovereign and banking crisis.  The
notes in these 26 transactions, as well as in the additional 2
RMBS and 2 ABS transactions only affected by the action, will
remain on review for possible downgrade until Moody's has
concluded its review of the Portuguese government and bank
ratings.

Moody's notes that Aaa (sf) rated notes in 2 Portuguese RMBS and 4
ABS transactions are not currently on review.  In these
transactions, the credit quality of the assets, the credit
enhancement supporting the notes and the level of operational risk
remain consistent with Moody's highest ratings.  However,
sovereign or bank rating downgrades that exceed Moody's current
expectation would put increased pressure on all Portuguese
structured finance ratings.

               Key Factors Considered in the Review

                      Asset Pool Performance

Despite the more stable performance of Portuguese RMBS recently,
Moody's expects increasing delinquencies and losses going forward.
"The performance of the outstanding 29 Portuguese RMBS
transactions has stabilized in recent months, and average 60-plus
delinquencies have remained at 1.4% since July 2010" says Maria
Turbica, an Analyst at Moody's.  Average outstanding defaults have
also stabilized around 1.7%.  However, "Moody's anticipates
further deterioration of RMBS asset performance in the context of
its forecast for very weak economic growth for Portugal in the
next two years and as a consequence of fiscal tightening policy"
adds Mrs. Turbica.  In addition, house prices have resumed falling
in the second half of 2010, dropping 1.3% year-on-year in October
2010.

Moody's analysis will reflect its expectation of the increased
delinquencies and losses.  Moody's will re-assess its life-time
loss assumptions for the outstanding RMBS transactions, which it
expects will mostly affect mezzanine and junior notes.  Moody's
has not placed on review the A2 (sf) rated note in Pelican
Mortgages No.1 PLC because its high credit enhancement is
sufficient to withstand significantly higher than expected losses.

"We expect performance of ABS transactions to deteriorate in the
context of weakening macro-economic conditions and implementation
of austerity measures", explains Ariel Weil, a Vice President-
Senior Analyst at Moody's.  Comparing the current credit
enhancement levels in all the Portuguese transactions it rates to
their current and anticipated future performance, Moody's placed
on review for possible downgrade the Class C and D notes of Nova
Finance No. 4 and the most senior outstanding tranche in Chaves
SME CLO 1.  "We did not place on review ABS notes that have credit
enhancement levels sufficient to protect against Moody's
anticipated deterioration in asset performance" says Mr. Weil.

                        Operational Risks

Following the review for possible downgrade of all Portuguese bank
ratings, key factors in the review of the ABS and RMBS include
operational risk and whether structural features in the
transactions mitigate this risk.  In its analysis, Moody's will
assess the linkage of the notes to the servicer's credit quality.

Rating reviews on two banks have resulted in actions on the RMBS
transactions that they service.  The review of the senior note
ratings in Azor Mortgage Public Limited Company and Pelican
Mortgage No.1 PLC follows the review for downgrade of their
respective servicers, BANIF- Banco Internacional do Funchal, S.A.
(Baa3/P-3) and Caixa Economica Montepio Geral (Baa3/P-3).  There
are currently no mitigants in place to counter the operational
risk in these transactions, such as a back-up servicer or a back-
up servicer trigger, and therefore payment disruptions could
occur.

For two ABS transactions, the rating review reflects the
operational risk associated with the unrated servicers.  The
review of the Aa3 (sf) rated notes in the LTR Finance No. 6 and 8
transactions and the A1 (sf) rated notes in LTR 8 reflects
weaknesses in the operational risk mitigating structural features.
Moody's already downgraded the senior notes of the LTR
transactions in May 2010 to reflect operational risk concerns.
The review reflects the weakening of the banking sector in
Portugal for both rated and unrated financial institutions.
Moody's has not placed the ratings of the senior notes of LTR 5 on
review because the rating agency expects the issuer to fully
redeem the notes within the next three months based on their
recent pace of amortization.

Moody's will conclude its review of Portuguese structured finance
transactions after it concludes its review of the ratings of the
Portuguese government bonds and Portuguese banks.

                     Detailed rating actions

                               ABS

Issuer: Chaves SME CLO No. 1

  -- A Certificate, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Jul 9, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

Issuer: NOVA Finance No. 4 Limited

  -- C Certificate, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Dec 21, 2007 Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- D Certificate, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Downgrade; previously on Dec 21, 2007 Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: LTR Finance No. 6 plc

  -- A Notes, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on May 7, 2010 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Issuer: LTR Finance No. 8 Limited

  -- Senior Facility Certificate, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Downgrade; previously on May 7, 2010 Downgraded to
     Aa3 (sf)

  -- Mezzanine Facility Certificate, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Downgrade; previously on May 7, 2010 Confirmed
     at A1 (sf)

                               RMBS

Issuer: Atlantes Mortgage No. 1 PLC

  -- B, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb 19, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- C, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb 19, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
      (sf)

  -- D, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Feb 19, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2
      (sf)

Issuer: Azor Mortgages Public Limited Company

  -- A, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov 25, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
      (sf)

  -- B, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov 25, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2
      (sf)

  -- C, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov 25, 2004 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1
      (sf)

Issuer: Douro Mortgages No. 1 Notes

  -- C, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov 23, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

  -- D, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov 23, 2005 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa1
      (sf)

Issuer: DOURO MORTGAGES No. 2

  -- C, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct 3, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- D, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct 3, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
      (sf)

Issuer: HIPOTOTTA No 5 plc

  -- C, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 23, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

  -- D, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 23, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
      (sf)

  -- E, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 23, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3
      (sf)

Issuer: HIPOTOTTA No. 10 LIMITED

  -- C, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Aug 5, 2009 Assigned A3 (sf)

  -- D, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Aug 5, 2009 Assigned Ba1 (sf)

  -- E, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Aug 5, 2009 Assigned B1 (sf)

Issuer: Hipototta No. 8 Limited

  -- C, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jul 28, 2008 Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- D, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jul 28, 2008 Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- E, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jul 28, 2008 Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Hipototta No.7 Limited

  -- C, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 10, 2008 Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- D, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 10, 2008 Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  -- E, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 10, 2008 Assigned B1 (sf)

Issuer: HIPOTOTTA No1.  PLC

  -- B, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Aug 5, 2003 Assigned A1 (sf)

  -- C, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Aug 5, 2003 Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Lusitano Mortgages No. 1 PLC

  -- C, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec 16, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- D, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec 16, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
      (sf)

  -- E, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec 16, 2002 Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: Lusitano Mortgages No. 2 PLC

  -- C, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov 4, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

  -- D, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov 4, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
      (sf)

  -- E, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov 4, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Issuer: LUSITANO MORTGAGES No. 3 PLC

  -- C, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sep 29, 2008 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- D, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sep 29, 2008 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Magellan Mortgages No. 1 Public Limited Company

  -- B, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec 19, 2001 Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

  -- C, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec 19, 2001 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
      (sf)

Issuer: Magellan Mortgages No. 2 plc

  -- B, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct 27, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

  -- C, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Oct 27, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
      (sf)

Issuer: Magellan Mortgages No. 3 plc

  -- B, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sep 11, 2009 Downgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- C, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sep 11, 2009 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- D, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sep 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Magellan Mortgages No. 4 plc

  -- C, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jul 18, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- D, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jul 18, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
      (sf)

Issuer: Navigator Mortgage Finance No. 1 plc

  -- C, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Jun 12, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

Issuer: Nostrum Mortgages 2003-1 PLC

  -- B, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov 20, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  -- C, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Nov 20, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
      (sf)

Issuer: Pelican Mortgages No. 1 Plc

  -- A, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec 19, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa
      (sf)

  -- C, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Dec 19, 2002 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
      (sf)

Issuer: Pelican Mortgages No. 2 Plc

  -- B, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sep 29, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

  -- C, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Sep 29, 2003 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
      (sf)

Issuer: Pelican Mortgages No.3 plc

  -- C, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

  -- D, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
     previously on Mar 30, 2007 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3
      (sf)

Moody's adopts all necessary measures so that the information it
uses in assigning a credit rating is of sufficient quality and
from sources Moody's considers to be reliable including, when
appropriate, independent third-party sources.  However, Moody's is
not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify
or validate information received in the rating process.


=============
R O M A N I A
=============


BANCA ROMANEASCA: Fitch Puts 'BB+' Long-Term IDR on Negative Watch
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings of
several subsidiaries of National Bank of Greece S.A. and EFG
Eurobank Ergasias S.A. on Rating Watch Negative.

The rating actions follow the placement of NBG and Eurobank's LT
IDRs on RWN.  The subsidiaries' IDRs are based on potential
institutional support from their respective Greek parent
companies.

The RWN on NBG and Eurobank's subsidiaries reflects Fitch's view
that while the banks' propensity to support their international
banking subsidiaries remains unchanged, their ability to do so
could be declining.  The outcome will depend on the resolution of
the RWN on the parent banks.  If NBG and Eurobank's ratings are
downgraded, it would likely affect the subsidiaries' ratings.

The rating actions are:

NBG's subsidiaries:

United Bulgarian Bank

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'BB+' placed on RWN
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'
  -- Individual Rating: unaffected at 'D'.

Banca Romaneasca S.A.

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'BB+' placed on RWN
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'
  -- Individual Rating: unaffected at 'D'.

The South African Bank of Athens

  -- National Long-term Rating: 'BBB+' (zaf) placed on RWN
  -- National Short-term Rating: 'F2' (zaf) placed on RWN
  -- Support Rating affirmed at '3'

Eurobank's subsidiaries:

Eurobank EFG Bulgaria AD

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'BB+' placed on RWN
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'
  -- Individual Rating: unaffected at 'D'.


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R U S S I A
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ENERGOGARANT JSIC: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Counterparty Credit Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it assigned its 'BB-'
long-term counterparty credit and insurer financial strength
ratings to Russia-based Energogarant JSIC.  At the same time, S&P
assigned its 'ruAA-' Russia national scale rating to the company.
The outlook is stable.

"The ratings reflect S&P's view of high industry risks in the
Russian insurance market and Energogarant's limited financial
flexibility," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Victor
Nikolskiy.  "These negative factors are compensated by
Energogarant's modest, but established, market position and
marginal capitalization."

Energogarant was established in 1992 as the captive insurer of RAO
EES, which was then Russia's electricity monopoly operator.
During the reform of the Russian energy sector, Energogarant lost
this status.  However, it continued to insure risks coming from
companies in the energy sector, which made up 25% of gross
premiums written in 2009, while diversifying into other business
lines.  Energogarant is ultimately controlled by two individuals,
its CEO and the head of the board of directors.

With GPW of RUR2.7 billion (about US$90 million) in first-half
2010, Energogarant is ranked among the top 25 Russian insurers and
has a modest market share of 1%.

S&P considers Energogarant's competitive position to be supported
by the company's expertise in corporate lines of business and,
increasingly, personal lines.  However, it is under pressure from
high industry risks in Russia and a relatively small premiums
base.

Energogarant's operating performance is marginal, in S&P's view.
Loss ratios are relatively stable, but the net expense ratio is
high, due to high distribution expenses, typical for a company of
Energogarant's size and existing distribution channel system.  In
S&P's view, Energogarant's investments are marginal, reflecting
high exposure to credit and concentration risks in the Russian
banking sector.

With a small capital base of RUB2.4 billion (about $80 million),
Energogarant's capitalization is, in S&P's view, marginal,
supported by good quality reinsurance protection and conservative
net retention levels.

Financial flexibility, in S&P's view, is limited.  Although S&P
believes that the shareholders have the ability to provide
Energogarant with additional financial support in times of
distress, the willingness and timeliness of this support is
uncertain.

"The outlook is stable because S&P expects Energogarant to
maintain its competitive position in corporate lines while
diversifying into personal lines and maintaining at least marginal
capitalization," said Mr. Nikolskiy.  "This also incorporates
S&P's expectation that Energogarant will continue to expand for
the next three years and post combined ratios of more than 100%."

S&P expects investment quality to stay at least marginal.
Investment profits are likely to stay at least at current levels,
fueled by increasing volumes in the investment portfolio, despite
lower investment returns.

Positive rating actions could follow if Energogarant's competitive
position were to strengthen significantly and the company shows
positive technical results, mainly owing to decreasing acquisition
expenses.

Conversely, significant deterioration in earnings, investment
quality, and capitalization could lead to negative rating actions.


NOVIKOMBANK JSCB: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Senior Unsec. Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B2 long-term global local
currency debt rating to Novikombank's senior unsecured debt.  The
rating carries a stable outlook.  Any subsequent senior debt
issuance by NB will be rated at the same rating level subject to
there being no material change in the bank's overall credit
rating.

The rating of B2 was assigned to this debt instrument:

  * RUB2 000 M Senior Unsecured Regular Bond due 25/11/2013

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating assigned by Moody's is in line with NB's global local
currency deposit rating of B2, which is, in turn, based on the
bank's E+ BFSR (mapping to a Baseline Credit Assessment of B2).

The rating is constrained by (i) NB's susceptibility to political
risks over the medium-to-long term; (ii) the relatively high
single-name concentrations on both sides of the balance sheet; and
(iii) corporate governance deficiencies.  The rating is
underpinned by: (i) NB's strengthening niche franchise, which
benefits from NB's strategic cooperation with Russia's State
Corporation "Russian Technologies"; (ii) its adequate liquidity
and stable funding base; and (iii) its sufficient capitalisation
and loan loss provisioning levels.

Headquartered in Moscow, NB bank reported total unaudited assets
of RUB44.5 billion under IFRS as at June 30, 2010.


TRANSOIL LLC: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Corporate Family Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba3 corporate family
rating and a Ba3 probability of default rating to Transoil LLC, a
Russian major rail-based oil and oil products transportation
business.  The rating outlook is stable.  At the same time,
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency, which is majority-owned by
Moody's, has assigned an Aa3.ru national scale credit rating to
the company.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's and Moody's Interfax, the Ba3 global scale
rating reflects Moody's expectations with regard to Transoil's
global default probability and loss recovery, while the Aa3.ru NSR
reflects the standing of the company's credit quality relative to
its domestic peers.

The Ba3/Aa3.ru CFR assigned to Transoil mainly balances the high
industry and client concentration risks of the company's business
of a tank car operator with the advantages of its sustainable
position of one of the leaders in the rail-based oil and oil
products transportation segment that services Russia's strong oil
industry.  The rating factors in the company's strong cash
generation ability, relatively low leverage measured by
debt/EBITDA and cushion under most of its financial metrics, which
should allow to accommodate a somewhat limited visibility of
future dividend payments within the current rating.

In more details the ratings positively reflect: (i) the expected
sustainable demand for rail-based oil products transportation
services from the domestic oil industry; (ii) Transoil's solid
market position supported by its established relationships with a
few large Russian oil companies, modern tank car fleet and
barriers for new market entrants in terms of both client
confidence and the scale of investments; (iii) manageable leverage
within the current rating going forward, given the company's
largely discretionary investment plans reasonably covered by its
solid operating cash flow; (iv) broadly conservative financial
profile and the management's commitment to cap leverage at 1.2x
unadjusted debt/EBITDA.

The ratings are constrained by: (i) high industry- and client
concentration of Transoil's business, thus vulnerable to oil
prices, developments of both the domestic oil industry and of the
few oil companies; (ii) increasing competition from the new oil
and oil products pipeline routes in the medium and particularly in
the long run and potentially from Russian Railways' spinoff
Freight One, which may pressure Transoil's transportation volumes
and margins going forward; (iii) limited visibility of the
company's long-term dividend policy and the risk of continued
significant dividend payments that may reduce the company's
financial flexibility; (iv) a relatively high Debt-to-Book-
Capitalization ratio, which may be risky, if the debt were to
grow, contrary to the company's current plan; (v) highly
concentrated ownership of the company, which creates the risk of
quick shifts in its strategy and development plans; (vi) generally
higher risk and uncertainty of operating in Russia's somewhat
volatile legal, regulatory and political environment.

Transoil is well-positioned in the oil and oil products segment of
Russia's rail-based freight transportation market.  The company is
a major tank car operator in Russia, the second largest, after the
universal rail car fleet operator Freight One, in terms of tank
car fleet size and oil and oil products transportation volumes.
At the same time, Transoil's market share in terms of the
transportation volumes is estimated at around 26%, which is
broadly comparable to that of Freight One.  Transoil benefits from
the sustainable demand for its services from Russia's oil
industry, with the company's business having been resilient to the
recent crisis.  However, the company's industry focus may limit
its business growth and margins in the long run, given the
competitive environment and limited growth prospects in the
respective market segment, while making the company exposed to oil
prices and fluctuations of the oil industry.  Transoil's
significant client concentration, with three domestic oil
companies accounting for around 80% of its revenue, reinforces its
overall concentration risk.  Nevertheless the latter is viewed as
manageable within the current rating, taking into account (i) the
track record of the company's established relationship with its
key customers, (ii) its sustainable margins and strong operating
cash flow, which has been sufficient to fund its capex, (iii) a
relatively low leverage measured as 2.0x Debt/EBITDA and (iv)
strong interest and debt coverage metrics, with EBITA/Interest at
5.2x and FFO/Net Debt at 40.7% (all the ratios incorporate Moody's
standard adjustments and are calculated on the LTM H1 2010 basis).

Given its modern fleet and having reasonably invested in it,
Transoil sees its current capex program (RUB15.7 billion for 2011-
2013) as almost fully discretionary.  Transoil will implement the
program depending on the market environment.  No significant M&As
in addition to a related-party transaction to acquire a company
that has leased out its locomotives and tank cars to Transoil, are
reportedly under consideration.  However in Moody's view,
Transoil's financial flexibility and evolution of its financial
profile may be additionally challenged by the dividend policy of
its private shareholders.  Large dividend payments of the past
have left the company with FCF negative, though without damage to
its business development or financial standing.  Moody's notes the
risk of limited visibility of the dividend policy going forward.
In Moody's view, Transoil's ability to maintain its financial
profile and be financially flexible depends on its shareholders'
willingness to cap dividend requirements.  The agency notes that
the company's RCF/Net Debt of around 17.4% and Debt/Book
Capitalization of 71% on the LTM H1 2010 basis are weaker than
expected from a Ba3-rated company in the emerging markets.
However, the agency understands that these ratios are manageable
by the company and planned to become more in line with the current
rating in the short term, with RCF/Net Debt to increase to around
30% and Debt/Book Capitalization be down to around 60%.  Moody's
takes some comfort from the management's commitment to a
conservative financial policy supported by the expected dividend
payments at levels which should allow the company to become FCF
positive and develop without new borrowings in line with the
company's plans.

Transoil's liquidity is acceptable but dependent on its cash
generation ability, actual investments over the next 12 months
compared to the planned ones and dividend payments.  The company
does not have committed long-term credit facilities, only a short
term revolving line to address short-term liquidity needs.  The
company's cash reserves as of the beginning of Q4 2010 more than
covered its short-term debt obligations.  The risk of increasing
dividend payments is somewhat mitigated by the company's
investment flexibility.

The stable rating outlook reflects Moody's expectation that
Transoil should be able to maintain a financial profile
commensurate with its current rating in the 12-18 months.

The rating could be upgraded, should there be a sustainably
growing demand for rail-based oil and oil products transportation
services for the company to diversify its client base, ensure a
long-term business growth and increase its cash flow generation,
with the EBITA margin around 20%, robust positive free cash flow,
Debt to EBITDA of materially below 2.0x and RCF to Net Debt of
above 40%.

The rating would be under pressure should the company happen to
lose any of its few major clients or market fundamentals become
weaker and Transoil's cash generation ability deteriorate, with
(i) EBITA margins falling materially below 13%, (ii) Debt/EBITDA
trending towards 2.5x and above; (iii) RCF/Net Debt decreasing
materially below 30%.  The group's shareholders deviation from its
plan to cap dividend payments and, as a result, the company's
failure to have RCF/Net Debt improved to 30% would negatively
affect the rating.  Pressure on liquidity profile would put
downward pressure on the rating as well.

Transoil's rating was assigned by evaluating factors Moody's
believe relevant to its credit profile, including i) the business
risk and market position within key business segments; ii)
management's strategy, iii) the financial profile, and iv) the
2009 and H1 2010 performance and projections over the near to
intermediate term.  These attributes were compared against other
companies both within and outside of Transoil's key business
segment and Transoil's ratings are believed to be comparable to
those of other issuers of similar credit risk.

Headquartered in St. Petersburg, Transoil is one of Russia's
largest tank car operators, privately owned, with RUB50.7 billion
(US$1.6 billion) in revenues in 2009.


TRANSSIBERIAN RE: Fitch Withdraws 'B+' Insurer Strength Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Russian-based Reinsurance Company
Transsiberian Reinsurance Corporation's 'B+' Insurer Financial
Strength rating with Negative Outlook and National IFS 'A-(rus)'
rating with Negative Outlook.

Fitch has withdrawn the ratings as Transsib Re has chosen to stop
participating in the rating process.  Therefore Fitch no longer
has sufficient information to maintain the ratings.  Accordingly,
Fitch will no longer provide ratings or analytical coverage for
Transsib Re.

Transsib Re was established in 1992.  Shareholding control rests
with management, although the shareholding structure is broad.
Transsib Re has four offices in Russia and one in the Czech
Republic and writes business in Russia, CIS and other emerging
European and Asian markets.  At 9M10, its gross assets stood at
RUB1 billion and gross premiums written totaled RUB537 million.


TRANSSIBERIAN RE: AM Best Upgrades Financial Strength Rating to B
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. Best Europe - Rating Services Limited has upgraded the
financial strength rating to B (Fair) from B- (Fair) and issuer
credit rating to "bb" from "bb-" of OJSC Transsiberian Reinsurance
Corporation (Transsib Re) (Russia).  The outlook for both ratings
has been revised to stable from positive.

The rating actions reflect Transsib Re's improving risk-adjusted
capitalization, good business position and its good but declining
underwriting performance.  The main offsetting rating factors are
its weak enterprise risk management and ongoing investment
volatility.

Transsib Re benefited from a significant capital injection in late
2010 with additional money expected in early 2011.  The Company's
risk-adjusted capitalization has improved as a result and will be
further augmented by the retention of profits.  A.M. Best believes
that Transsib Re is taking steps to improve its limited capital
flexibility, which has hindered it in the past.  In order to
comply with Russian regulatory requirements that will come into
force in mid 2012, Transsib Re will continue to be dependent on
retained earnings.

Transsib Re is one of the major reinsurance companies in Russia by
premium income.  Net written premiums (NWP) are expected to
continue declining by 7% in 2010 and reach RUB607 million by year
end.  This is a continuation of the trend started in 2009 when NWP
fell by 14% and is part of a decision to reduce the company's
exposure in softening market conditions.  A.M. Best expects gross
written premiums to be in the area of RUB800 to RUB820 million in
2010.

A.M. Best believes that based on 2010 results so far, underwriting
performance is likely to be marginal, but investment performance
is likely to stabilize due to the reduced equity exposure and
tentative financial market improvements.  During 2009, Transsib
Re's underwriting performance remained good, despite the
challenging market conditions.  The company's claims ratio fell to
65.2% in 2009 as a result of its withdrawal from unprofitable
contracts, and Transsib Re has seen an improvement in its
investment income in 2009 while experiencing some ongoing
unrealized losses.

The company still does not have a functioning capital model.  It
has commissioned a consulting firm to begin modeling its own
risks, and A.M. Best believes that although this process is in its
initial stages, it could improve enterprise risk management in the
future if successfully implemented.


VNESHPROMBANK OOO: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Long-Term Deposit Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B2/Not-Prime long and
short-term global local currency deposit ratings and a B2 long-
term global local currency senior unsecured debt rating to
Vneshprombank.  The ratings carry a stable outlook.  Any
subsequent senior debt issuance by Vneshprombank will be rated at
the same rating level subject to there being no material change in
the bank's overall credit rating.

The debt rating of B2 was assigned to these debt instruments:

  -- RUB1.5 billion Senior Unsecured Regular Bond due 14 November
     2012

  -- RUB3.0 billion Senior Unsecured Regular Bond due 30 November
     2013

                        Ratings Rationale

The ratings assigned by Moody's are in line with Vneshprombank's
baseline credit assessment of B2, which is, in turn, based on the
bank's E+ BFSR (mapping to a BCA of B2).  The rating does not
incorporate any expectation of systemic or shareholder support for
Vneshprombank in case of need.

According to Moody's, the BFSR is constrained by the absence of
significant franchise diversification due to the peculiar
characteristics of the boutique model which results in significant
levels of concentration on both sides of the balance sheet.  The
BFSR is also restricted by succession risk as a significant
portion of the bank's franchise is susceptible to key person risk.
At the same time, the BFSR is supported by the bank's (i)
established customer base and moderate risk appetite which
resulted in a better-than-industry-average asset quality and (ii)
access to funding and liquidity during crisis times.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russian Federation, Vneshprombank
reported total audited consolidated assets of US$1.6 billion under
IFRS at year-end-2009.


* S&P Affirms 'BB-' Issuer Credit Rating to Russian City of Ufa
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it affirmed its 'BB-'
long-term issuer credit rating and 'ruAA-' Russia national scale
rating on the Russian City of Ufa.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'BB-' and 'ruAA-' senior
unsecured debt ratings to the city's planned three-year Russian
RUR750 million (about US$24 million) bond, which it intends to
place on Dec. 28, 2010.  The bond will have six fixed semi-annual
coupons and will mature in December 2013.  S&P also assigned a
recovery rating of '3' to the proposed bond, indicating its
expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.

"The affirmation reflects S&P's expectation that Ufa's budgetary
performance will be relatively sound in the medium term, despite a
temporary deterioration in 2010," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Alexandra Balod.

Ufa is the administrative center of the Republic of Bashkortostan
(BB+/Stable/--) in the Urals region of the Russian Federation
(foreign currency BBB/Stable/A-3; local currency BBB+/Stable/A-2;
Russia national scale, 'ruAAA').

The ratings reflect S&P's view of Ufa's limited financial
flexibility, owing to its dependence on federal and regional
authorities' decisions, high capital-expenditure requirements, and
volatile free cash reserves.  S&P's assumption that the city's
debt burden will remain modest in the medium term and that its
financing needs will stay relatively low, as well as the
probability of financial support from Bashkortostan, support the
ratings.

Transfers comprise about 35% of Ufa's operating revenues, which
contributes to the limited financial predictability and volatility
of the city's budgetary performance.  Nevertheless, in 2011-2012,
S&P expects Ufa to receive higher subsidies from Bashkortostan,
which enjoys a comfortable liquidity position.  Together with a
modest economic recovery, underpinning the city's tax base, this
should support the city's financial performance

S&P believes Ufa's operating balance will turn positive despite a
temporary deterioration in 2010, but remain less than 5% of
operating revenues in the medium term, owing to higher operating
expenditures, primarily from personnel-related and utility costs.

S&P's base-case scenario assumes that Ufa's capital program will
largely depend on capital transfers from higher-tier budgets and
will make up about 15% of the city's total expenditures.  S&P
expects deficits after capital accounts to stay at a still low 2%-
5% of total revenues in 2010-2012.

After the bond placement in 2010, S&P expects Ufa's tax-supported
debt to remain low relative to that of international peers and to
not exceed 25% of total revenues over the next three years.  S&P
understands that the city plans to continue incurring medium-term
debt, which should keep its debt service at less than 5% in 2011-
2012.  Apart from direct debt, the city's tax-supported debt
includes guarantees to support municipal utilities' investment
projects.

"The outlook is stable because S&P believes that the city will
achieve a moderately positive operating performance and maintain
its investments in local infrastructure, while keeping its debt
burden low," said Ms. Balod.  "The stable outlook also
incorporates S&P's assumption that Bashkortostan will provide
higher financial support in the form of direct subsidies to
support Ufa's budgetary performance in 2011-2012."

Should the city's financial performance remain weak in line with
S&P's downside scenario, due to a change in financial relations
with Bashkortostan, especially if accompanied by weaker liquidity
and short-term debt accumulation that might expose Ufa to
refinancing risks, S&P could lower the ratings.

The ratings could be raised if Ufa's budgetary performance
significantly improves beyond S&P's base-case forecast and the
city maintains a sustainable cash position, together with improved
visibility of its financial relations with Bashkortostan.


* S&P Affirms 'B' Issuer Rating on Russia's Novgorod Oblast
-----------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 23, 2010, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its
'B' long-term issuer credit and 'ruA' Russian national scale
ratings on Russia's Novgorod Oblast.  S&P subsequently withdrew
the ratings at the issuer's request.  The outlook was negative at
the time of withdrawal.

The ratings reflected the oblast's relatively poor, volatile, and
concentrated economy, low fiscal flexibility, and weak budgetary
performance.  Novgorod Oblast's favorable location between
Russia's two largest cities and modest direct debt mitigated these
constraints.


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S P A I N
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AYT COLATERALES: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating to Class B Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings to AyT Colaterales Global
Hipotecario, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Serie AyT
Colaterales Global Hipotecario BBK II, Fondo de Titulizacion de
Activos' mortgage-backed floating-rate notes due in June 2043:

  -- EUR780.238.272,45 Class A notes (ISIN ES0312273362) 'AA-sf';
     Outlook Stable; Loss Severity rating of 'LS-1'

  -- EUR30.500.000,00 Class B notes (ISIN ES0312273370) 'BBsf';
     Outlook Stable; Loss Severity rating of 'LS-3'

The final ratings are based on the quality of the collateral, the
underwriting and servicing of the mortgage loans, available credit
enhancement, the integrity of the transaction's legal and
financial structure and Ahorro y Titulizacion, S.A., S.G.F.T.'s
administrative capabilities.

This transaction is a cash flow securitization of a static pool of
first-ranking Spanish mortgage loans originated and serviced by
Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa that originally closed in April 2008.  Fitch
considers the RMBS portion of the portfolio to be above average
risk due to the high loan-to-value ratios.  The loans in the
portfolio have an average original LTV of 80.2%, and an average
current LTV of 66.3%, which exhibits an average Spanish RMBS risk
profile due to moderate original LTV.  In addition, in line with
the entity's origination procedures, some of the loans in the
portfolio are originated by brokers and there is also geographical
concentration in the Basque Country.

Fitch has also incorporated the transaction's recent performance
into its analysis.  As of December 2010, according to the gestora,
0.95% of the current portfolio balance was in arrears over 90
days.  Additionally, the transaction has provisioned loans in
arrears over 18 months of EUR1.9 million with the proceeds of the
mortgages.  In Fitch's view, the transaction benefits from
significant excess spread which covered the balance of written-off
loans.  The excess spread will continue providing support to the
transaction and reducing the cost of carry of non-performing
loans.

Despite the portfolio's credit risk, Fitch believes all of the
characteristics of the loans in this transaction have been
incorporated when calculating weighted average frequency of
foreclosure and weighted average recovery rate, and the available
credit enhancement for the senior notes can withstand Fitch's 'AA-
' rating stresses.  Fitch modelled different default vectors
combined with different prepayment vectors (high/low) and
different interest rate environments (rising/stable/decreasing).
Assumptions used under individual scenarios were in accordance
with Fitch's cash flow analysis criteria for RMBS.

As of December 2010, total CE for the class A notes, equivalent to
7.10% of the outstanding collateral balance, was provided by the
subordination of class B (3.70%), unrated class C (0.85%), and
unrated class D (0.85%) plus a reserve fund of 1.70%.  Similarly,
CE for the class B notes is provided by the subordination of the
unrated class C and unrated class D notes plus the reserve fund.

The fund is regulated by Spanish Securitisation Law 19/1992 and
Royal Decree 926/1998.  Its sole purpose is to transform into
fixed-income securities a portfolio of mortgage certificates
("certificados de transmision hipotecaria", CTHs and
"participaciones hipotecarias", PHs) acquired from the 21 sellers.
The CTHs were subscribed by Europea de Titulizacion S.G.F.T, S.A.,
whose sole function is to manage asset-backed notes on behalf of
the fund.

The ratings address the timely payment of interest on the notes
according to the terms and conditions of the documentation,
subject to a deferral trigger for the class B, C and D notes, as
well as the repayment of principal by the legal maturity date for
each note.


===========
S W E D E N
===========


OCTAPHARMA NORDIC: Moody's Cuts Long-Term Issuer Rating to 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Octapharma Nordic AB's
long-term issuer rating to Ba1 from Baa3 and, concurrently,
withdrawn its issuer rating and assigned a Ba1 corporate family
rating and Ba1 probability-of-default rating to the company.  In
addition, Moody's has changed the outlook on the ratings to
negative.  The rating action concludes the review for possible
downgrade initiated on September 29, 2010.

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrade reflects the ongoing review process by the US Food
and Drug Administration and by the European Medicines Agency into
Octapharma's products octagam 5% and octagam 10%, following the
reporting of serious side-effects as a result of the
administration of octagam 5%.  The agency now believes that it may
take longer than it initially expected to bring the product back
on market.  Given the importance of the recall -- the octagam
franchise generated approximately 50% of Octapharma's sales before
the recall -- as well as the remaining uncertainty as regards
timing for returning the products to market, Moody's believes that
the company profile is at this time no longer commensurate with an
investment grade rating.  The lack of sales of octagam is
currently exerting pressure on Octapharma's cash flow generation;
however, Moody's recognises that if and when the company is able
to resell the products, its credit metrics should improve back to
strong levels.

Further to the downgrade, Octapharma's Ba1 rating continues to
incorporate (i) the company's conservative financial policy and
risk-averse approach, having operated without any debt for several
years; and (ii) favorable market dynamics, with growth expected
from emerging markets, earlier diagnosis of patients and line
extensions of existing products.  In addition, the rating factors
in high barriers to entry, including the high degree of capital-
intensiveness and regulatory constraints, which mitigate
Octapharma's relatively small size in a consolidating industry and
its high degree of concentration in terms of activity (plasma-
derived products only) and product (octagam generates around 50%
of the company's total sales).

The negative outlook reflects the possibility of delays in the
review process and therefore increased pressure on Octapharma's
profits and cash flows, which could exert further downward
pressure on the rating.  Moody's could consider stabilising the
outlook if and when octagam returns to market either in the EU or
the US.

Octapharma's issuer rating is being withdrawn because an issuer
rating normally applies to an investment grade only.  Moody's has
withdrawn the issuer rating for its own business reasons.

Established in 1983, Octapharma is privately owned by the
Marguerre family.  The company is one of the largest commercial
providers of plasma derivatives worldwide and its business model
consists of the collection, extraction, purification and
subsequent marketing of proteins.  Octapharma generated sales of
EUR1 billion in 2009.


=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


UBS AG: Moody's Downgrades Rating on EUR14 Million Notes to 'B2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken action on these two credit
linked notes issued by UBS AG.

Issuer: UBS AG

  -- Ser 857, EUR1.83m FIX Credit-Linked Zero Cpn Euro Medium
     Term Notes, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade:
     previously on December 14, 2009 Downgraded to A3.

  -- Ser 1755, EUR14m FIX Zero Cpn Euro Medium Term Notes,
     Downgraded to B2: previously on December 8, 2010 Ba3 Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

The transactions are two credit linked notes issued by UBS AG.
Series 1755 is referencing the subordinated debt of Irish Life &
Permanent plc, currently rated B2 and Series 857 is referencing
the subordinate debt of Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A.,
currently rated Aa3 on review for possible downgrade.

The rating action on Series 1755 is a response to the downgrade to
B2 from Ba3 under review for possible downgrade of the subordinate
rating of Irish Life & Permanent plc on 20th December 2010.

Moody's also explained that the review taken on Series 857 is a
response to the Aa3 of the subordinate rating of Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. being placed on review for possible
downgrade on December 20, 2010.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


ALBARAKA TURK: Fitch Downgrades Issuer Default Rating to 'B+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Turkey-based Albaraka Turk Katilim
Bankasi A.S.'s ratings:

  -- Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating: downgraded
     to 'B+' from 'BB-'; Outlook Stable

  -- Long-term local currency IDR: downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB-';
     Outlook Stable

  -- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B'

  -- National Long-term rating: downgraded to 'BBB+(tur)' from
     'A+(tur)'; Outlook Stable

  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D'

  -- Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '3'

The downgrade reflects Fitch's revised view of potential support
from its majority shareholder, Bahrain-based Albaraka Banking
Group.  While Fitch believes ABG has a strong propensity to
support, its ability to do so can not be relied upon, given its
structure as a group of diversified subsidiaries spread across
different sub-investment grade countries and Albaraka Turk's large
size relative to the group.  For this reason, the Support Rating
has been downgraded to '5' from '3', and Albaraka Turk's IDRs and
National Rating are now driven by its intrinsic strength.  The
'B+' Long-term IDR reflects the bank's small size and
concentration risks in its loan book, particularly in construction
sector lending.  Robust profitability, minimal market risk and low
NPL ratios are rating positives.

Albaraka Turk is 54.1%-owned by ABG, a leading Islamic banking
group.  Albaraka Turk offers interest-free banking services mainly
to its corporate and SME customers.  It is a small bank with a
0.8% share in total banking system assets, ranking 20th among
Turkey's 49 financial institutions in 9M10.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


PROMINVESTBANK JSC: Moody's Upgrades Local Deposit Rating to 'Ba3'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the local currency deposit
rating of Prominvestbank to Ba3 from B2.  Its Bank Financial
Strength Rating of E+ was affirmed but now maps to a Baseline
Credit Assessment of B2, up from the previously assigned B3.  All
rating carry a stable outlook.  Concurrently, the rating agency
upgraded the bank's long-term National Scale Rating to Aa1.ua from
A2.ua.  National scale ratings carry no specific outlook.

At the same time, the rating agency has assigned a provisional Ba3
global scale local currency long-term senior unsecured debt rating
to PIB, as well as an Aa1.ua long-term National Scale Rating to
the local currency-denominated bonds amounting to UAH1.5 million
that the banks intend to issue.  The bonds will represent a senior
unsecured claim on the bank and will be issued with a final
maturity of two-three years.  The outlook for the global rating is
stable, while the NSR carries no specific outlook.

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's notes that the raising of the BCA to B2 from B3 reflects
the recovery of PIB's lending and deposit-taking franchise as well
as its stable liquidity profile and strong capital adequacy
levels.  As per IFRS management accounts for Q2 2010 (unaudited),
the bank recorded net income of UAH263 million (US$33 million)
driven by renewed lending in 2010 and stabilization of loan book
quality, resulting in recovery of provisions.  PIB also
demonstrated 11% growth in the loan book and 16% growth in
deposits from January to October 2010.  Thus the bank recovered
its market franchise which was damaged in late 2008.  PIB reported
strong capital adequacy ratios aided by recovery in net income as
well as capital injections, with total regulatory CAR at 16.9% as
at July 1, 2010, which together support the bank's potential
losses absorption capacity.

PIB is almost fully owned by state-owned corporation
Vnesheconombank (VEB, rated Baa1), which bailed out the bank in
late 2008 and provided capital and liquidity support to restore
the bank's operations.  The parent announced its strategy to run
Ukrainian subsidiary in line with VEB's general strategy to
support development of Russian economy and trading balance
including ongoing development of trading turnover and joint
infrastructure projects between neighbor Russian and Ukrainian
governments and companies.

Moody's views positively the steps that have already been taken as
part of implementation of the strategy such as approval the list
of strategic clients and projects fitting key strategic objectives
and participation in inter-country commission for infrastructure
development.  The rating agency believes this is an indication of
closer strategic fit of PIB to its parent, and thus is likely to
result in a higher probability of support from VEB to PIB in case
of need.  Thus, the rating agency assessed such probability as
high leading to two-notch uplift of PIB's local currency deposit
rating to Ba3 from the bank's BCA of B2.

Moody's provisional Ba3 rating for the bonds is based on PIB's
fundamental credit quality and factors in the bank's ability to
fulfill its long-term obligations.  The obligations include those
associated with the put option that the bondholders will,
according to the terms of the issue, be able to exercise in order
to sell the bonds back to the bank.  Moody's notes that if the
bank's credit quality were to deteriorate at these times, the
exercise of the put options might exert additional pressure on its
financial condition.

Moody's previous rating action on PIB was on November 2, 2009,
when the BFSR was upgraded to E+ from E, its long-term local
currency and foreign currency bank deposit ratings were upgraded
to B2 from Caa2, and its NSR was upgraded to A2.ua from B3.ua.

Based in Kyiv, Ukraine, PIB reported total unaudited IFRS assets
of UAH28 billion as at July 1, 2010, and net income of UAH263
million for Q2 2010.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


1ST FOR FENCING: Goes Into Provisional Liquidation
--------------------------------------------------
1st for Fencing Ltd has gone into provisional liquidation with one
of its key businesses -- the 100 Aker Wood garden centre and
bistro in Melrose -- shut up shop Friday, according to The
Southern Reporter.

The Southern relates that founder and managing director Mark
Riddell's application to wind up his business, which has a
workforce of 26, was granted at Selkirk Sheriff Court and it is
now being run by Edinburgh insolvency experts and accountants Aver
in their role as interim liquidators.

"We are acting in the best interests of creditors, so we have
agreed that 1st Fencing Ltd should complete ongoing contract work
in its order book into the new year when we will apply for
interim, then full, liquidator status," The Southern quoted
Emma Porter of Aver as saying.  "We are trying to find buyers for
parts of the business, but I expect the 100 Aker Wood centre to
close down at Christmas," she added.

Ms. Porter said she was unable to reveal the level of the firm's
indebtedness at this stage, The Southern notes.

1st for Fencing Ltd grew to become one of the region's market
leaders in erection of fencing and timber decking, opening the 100
Aker Wood visitor centre at Annay Road seven years ago and later
adding a popular bistro.


BELLACHAT TRANCHE: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to EUR200 Mil. Swap
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB+srp (sf)'
portfolio swap risk rating to the EUR200 million unfunded credit
default swap, Bellachat Tranche B, arranged by BNP Paribas.

A swap risk rating takes into consideration only the
creditworthiness of the reference portfolio.  It does not address
either counterparty risk (protection buyer/seller) or the specific
amount of termination payments that would be payable under the
swap transaction.

Under the terms of the swap, BNP Paribas, London acts as
protection buyer.  BNP Paribas, Resource and Portfolio Management
acts as protection seller.  The swap references the iTraxx Europe
Series 7, 3%-6% tranche.  As a result of succession events, the
attachment point is now 2.99395161% and the exhaustion point is
6.01814516%.  In S&P's opinion, the attachment point is sufficient
to support a 'BB+srp (sf)' rating.

S&P based its 'srp' ratings on the analysis using its latest
applicable CDO Evaluator model version 5.1

                          Ratings List

                   Swap Risk Ratings Assigned

                       Credit Default Swap

  -- EUR200 Million Unfunded Credit Default Swap Bellachat
     Tranche: BBB+srp (sf)


CHAMBER OF COMMERCE: Concludes Company Voluntary Arrangement
------------------------------------------------------------
The Mid Yorkshire Chamber of Commerce has concluded its CVA a year
earlier than planned and with full repayments to all creditors who
claimed.

The voluntary arrangement officially ended on December 13 when
court-appointed joint supervisors filed a Certificate of
Completion.

When the CVA was agreed back in January 2010, creditors allowed
the Chamber two years to pay back 78p in the pound.

Just a year into the arrangement and the Chamber has exceeded its
original offer by paying the full debt back to creditors.

In an almost unprecedented move an extra 22p has been paid on top
of the initial amount approved eleven months ago.

Andrew Choi, Executive Director at the Chamber said: "We exist to
protect the interests of business so it was only right and proper
that we pay back the full amount.

"Pursuing a CVA was the responsible thing to do so that we could
continue to support our members and fulfill our obligations to
creditors."

The Chamber still has offices in Halifax, Huddersfield and
Wakefield.

"We are committed to retaining a presence in each area so that we
are accessible to businesses and can represent their interests
locally," continued Mr. Choi.

During the CVA-period the Chamber took steps to put in place a
leaner structure so that they could focus on delivering membership
services.

This has proven to be a successful strategy and the Chamber has
returned to profit.

The organization has continued to provide export facilities that
meet national standards set by the British Chambers of Commerce
annually.

And they have maintained a lively networking and events program as
well as assisting more than 400 companies with the childcare
vouchers scheme.

David Horsman, Chamber Chairman, said: "I would like to thank our
members and patrons who have continued to support us over the last
year."

"I would also particularly pay tribute to Andrew, his team and the
board of directors who have worked hard to ensure not only a
satisfactory outcome to the CVA but the full restoration of the
Chamber of Commerce."

Founded over 150 years ago, The Mid Yorkshire Chamber of Commerce
and Industry Ltd is a membership services company that exists to
protect and develop the interests of business in the metropolitan
areas of Calderdale, Kirklees and Wakefield.  It is a part of the
British Chambers of Commerce national network that covers the
whole of the UK and work with International Chambers of Commerce.


CHRISTOPHER GADD: Owner to Launch Legal Action v. SRA Over Closure
------------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Smith at Andover Advertiser reports that Southampton-based
solicitor Chris Gadd said he was launching High Court proceedings
for "substantial damages" against the Solicitors' Regulatory
Authority for shutting down his firm.

Andover Advertiser relates that Christopher Gadd Limited was
closed down last year following a probe into the earlier collapse
of another practice Mr. Gadd was a partner in, WB Legal.

According to Andover Advertiser, the SRA found Christchurch based
WB Legal, which went into administration in March 2009, had failed
to comply with accounting rules and that Mr. Gadd and another
solicitor Paul Windsor had failed to comply with the Solicitors
Code of Conduct.  Another partner, Mark Bronzite, was banned from
acting as a solicitor without SRA approval, Andover Advertiser
recounts.

Speaking after he was recently suspended for six months by a
Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal, Mr. Gadd, as cited by Andover
Advertiser, said the SRA had "no substantive evidence" to close
his limited company last December.  According to Andover
Advertiser, he said the closure had a "devastating effect,"
resulting in the firm's administration, causing job losses and
"unnecessary angst" to clients as well as costing suppliers tens
of thousands of pounds.

"I have received no adequate explanation from the SRA either then
or since as to why my firm was closed.  As a result I have no
option other than to pursue them through the courts," Andover
Advertiser quoted Mr. Gadd as saying.

Christopher Gadd Limited was a personal injury firm.  It had
offices in Millbrook and Christchurch.


DEXION COMMODITIES: To Put Forward Winding-Up Proposals
-------------------------------------------------------
The Board of Dexion Commodities Limited disclosed that it intends
to put forward proposals for the winding down of the Company
which, if approved, will lead to the realization of the Company's
portfolio and subsequent liquidation of the Company.  It is
expected that a circular will be sent to Shareholders in February
2011 setting out details of the proposals and convening an
extraordinary general meeting at which the proposals will be put
to Shareholders for their approval.

                            Background

While not forming part of the Company's investment objective or
policy, the Company has targeted absolute annualized returns in
excess of 10% over the medium term with annualized volatility of
6-9% over the medium term.  However, in the period October 1, 2009
to November 30 (Berlin: NBXB.BE - news) 2010 (and based on the
estimated November NAV published on December 8, 2010) the
Company's continuing portfolio has failed to meet those targeted
returns, with annualized returns in that period being -2.20%
(Sterling), -2.19% (Eur) and -2.05% (USD) and with annualized
volatility of 5.21%, 5.08% and 5.16% respectively.  Furthermore,
in the period July 1, 2010 to December 10, 2010 the Company's
Shares have traded at average discounts of 15.08%, 13.57% and
11.45%, respectively to their NAVs.

Given the small size of the Company's asset base, the Board has
been, and continues to be, unwilling to further reduce those
assets through the repurchase of Shares and hence the Company's
ability to reduce the share price discount is severely limited.
Accordingly, in the absence of a significant change in either
market conditions or the Company's performance, it is likely that
the discount management provisions will be triggered in early July
2011, necessitating a continuation vote for the Company.

After consultations with the Company's investment manager and
major Shareholders and given:

    * the Company's performance since the 2009 reorganization;

    * the small size of the Company's asset base;

    * the share price discount at which the Shares continue to
      trade;

    * the likelihood of a redemption offer being required later in
      2011;

    * the limited liquidity in the Shares; and

    * the Company's expense base (as a closed ended fund listed on
      the main market of the London Stock Exchange compared to its
      assets,

The Board has concluded there is insufficient Shareholder support
for the Company pursuing its investment objective with its
existing investment policy.

                          The Proposals

It is the Board's current intention that proposals, which would be
recommended by the Board, should be put to Shareholders by way of
ordinary resolution at a general meeting of the Company, expected
to be convened in February 2011, for a change to the Company's
investment policy to facilitate an orderly winding-down.  Once
substantially all of the assets attributable to the continuing
portfolio have been realized, a further meeting will be convened
to approve the appointment of a liquidator to the Company.

(a) Realization of the continuing portfolio

Subject to the relevant Shareholder resolution(s) being passed at
the extraordinary general meeting, the Company's investment
objective and investment policy would be amended to reflect the
objective of realizing the Company's continuing portfolio.  The
new investment objective and policy of the Company would be to
realize the Company's existing investments in an orderly and
timely manner, with a view to distributing cash to Shareholders
(in accordance with their rights to distributions on a winding up
as set out in the Articles) at appropriate times as sufficient
investments are realized.  The Company would not make any new
investments (other than cash and near cash equivalent securities).

The Company will consider whether its currency hedging program
would continue in accordance with the existing mandate.

The realization timetable for the Company's investments is being
agreed with the Investment Adviser and the relevant investee funds
but the Investment Adviser anticipates that approximately 98% of
the investments in the continuing portfolio (using NAVs at
November 30, 2010) could be realized by April 30, 2011, with
payment to investors being made as soon as possible thereafter.

(b) Liquidation of the Company

The Shares are currently listed on the Official List and traded on
the main market of the London Stock Exchange.  During the process
of realizing the Company's portfolio, it is expected that the
Shares would continue to be listed and traded on the London Stock
Exchange until such time as the Company no longer meets the
requirements of the Listing Rules (whether by reason of an
insufficient spread of investments or otherwise), at which time it
is anticipated that the Company would request that the listing for
each class of Shares be suspended and subsequently cancelled. At
that point the Shares would no longer be capable of being traded
on the London Stock Exchange.

At the time that suspension of the Company's shares was sought, or
shortly prior thereto, the Board would convene a meeting to
consider a resolution for the winding-up of the Company and the
appointment of a liquidator.  On any such winding-up resolution
being passed, the Company would request that the listing of the
Shares be suspended and subsequently cancelled (if this had not
already occurred).

A further announcement setting out details of the proposed
realization and liquidation process will be made in due course.

Dexion Commodities Limited, formerly Dexion Alpha Strategies
Limited, is a closed-ended investment company.  The Company's
investment objective is to maximize medium-term returns in a
manner commensurate with acceptable risk management.  It focuses
on achieving its objectives through investment in an actively
managed diversified portfolio of underlying funds across a range
of alternative investment strategies, which targeted emerging
and/or under-exploited sources of alpha.  The Company seeks to
achieve its investment objective for the continuing portfolio
through an investment policy that focuses upon commodity, energy,
and environmental strategies accessed, directly or indirectly,
through a multi-manager, multi-strategy portfolio of commodities
themed hedge funds.  The investment adviser of the Company is MAN
Investments (CH) AG.


IA GLOBAL: Closes Acquisition of PowerDial Systems and Services
---------------------------------------------------------------
IA Global Inc. announced the closing of the acquisition of
PowerDial Systems, Ltd., a VOIP System Company, and PowerDial
Services, Ltd, a VOIP Service Company, from Innovative Software
Direct Plc, a U.K. company listed on the PLUS Market.

UK-based PowerDial is an IT company providing VOIP and Asset and
Annuity solutions covering all aspects of convergence, including
voice, data, wireless and cable.  They provide physical networks,
onsite IT equipment, and applications that control the performance
and integrity of networks and the data on those networks.  In
FY2009, PowerDial reported revenues of $2.7 million and expects to
grow in FY2010 and beyond.  PowerDial was acquired for 2,400,000
shares of IAGI common stock at $1.00 per share, with additional
shares available for meeting certain performance metrics, for
raising funds for acquisition of additional VOIP, IT or telecom
companies and for the settlement of an ISD note payable.

"We are delighted to add this valuable communications services
component to our growing portfolio of global companies.  PowerDial
represents significant growth potential by providing an IT
business solutions platform that can be scaled both geographically
and by adding key technology components," stated Brian Hoekstra,
CEO of IA Global, Inc.

                        About IA Global

San Francisco, Calif.-based IA Global, Inc. (OTCQB: IAGI.OB)
-- http://www.iaglobalinc.com/-- is a global services and
outsourcing company focused on growing existing businesses and
expansion through global mergers and acquisitions.  The Company is
utilizing its current partnerships to acquire growth businesses in
target sectors and markets at discounted prices.  The Company is
actively engaging in discussions with businesses that would
benefit from our business acumen and marketing expertise,
knowledge of Asian Markets, and technology infrastructure.

The Company's balance sheet at Sept. 30, 2010, showed
$4.65 million in total assets, US$3.30 million in total current
liabilities, US$2.79 million in long-term debt, and a
stockholders' deficit of US$1.45 million.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on July 20, 2010,
Sherb & Co., LLP, in New York, expressed substantial doubt about
the Company's ability to continue as a going concern, following
the Company's results for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2010.
The independent auditors noted that the Company has incurred
significant operating losses, and has a working capital deficit as
of March 31, 2010.


KENSINGTON MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class B2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlooks to Stable from Negative on
three tranches of Money Partners Securities Plc series and six
tranches of Kensington Mortgage Securities Plc - Series 2007-1.
The agency has also affirmed the ratings of all the MPS series and
KMS.

Both the KMS and MPS series are collateralized by UK non-
conforming residential mortgages, with a significant proportion of
self-certified borrowers ranging from 46.8% (MPS2) to 54.4% (MPS1)
and 65.4% for KMS.  The underlying portfolios also comprise large
volumes of second-charge loans, ranging from 10.5% (MPS3) to 15.5%
(MPS4) and 7.6% in KMS, which Fitch believes to be the main driver
of the volatility seen in loss severities.  The affirmation of
their ratings, however, reflects improved performances of the
underlying portfolios as seen in the October 2010 collateral
reports.

While the respective cash reserves for KMS and MPS2 remain fully
funded, replenishment of the reserve funds has been taking place
in the rest of the MPS series.  With the decline in interest
rates, and subsequent improvement in borrower affordability, the
level of repossessions and losses incurred from the sale of
repossessed properties has declined compared with levels seen in
2009.  As a result, the issuers now have sufficient funds to
replenish their reserves.

Improved borrower affordability is evidenced by the stabilization
in three-month plus arrears across all the five transactions, as
well as improved collection rates as seen on the quarterly MPS
reports.  As of October 2010, loans in arrears by more than three
months ranged from 30.7 % (MPS1) to 33.9% (MPS4) and 27.7% for
KMS.  Collection rates as seen on the MPS quarterly reports ranged
from 85.3% (MPS2) to 87.7% (MPS3) as of October 2010 (and November
2010 for MPS2) compared with 75.6% (MPS2) to 82.7% (MPS1) a year
ago.

While the stable trend in arrears is in line with other UK non-
conforming transactions rated by Fitch, the actual levels of
delinquencies seen in these transactions are significantly higher.
These high levels of arrears pose a risk to the future performance
of the assets.  An increase in interest rates is expected to
negatively impact the ability of borrowers to meet payments and
could subsequently lead to even higher rates of defaults and
losses.  This is reflected in the Negative Outlooks on the M1
notes (MPS4), M2 notes (MPS3 and MPS4) and B1 notes (MPS2, MPS3
and MPS4).

The transaction structures include pro-rata amortization triggers,
some of which have already been breached and are not expected to
be cured.  This means that note amortization will remain
sequential over the life of the transactions.  Further, reserve
fund amortization triggers have already been breached for all four
MPS and KMS transactions.  For both these reasons, further
increase in credit support is expected and is thus reflected in
the affirmation of the notes.

The rating actions are:

Money Partners Securities 1 Plc

  -- Class A2a (ISIN XS0226128329) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; Loss Severity (LS) Rating 'LS-3'

  -- Class A2b (ISIN XS0226129566) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-3'

  -- Class A2c (ISIN XS0226156536) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-3'

  -- Class M1 (ISIN XS0226131117) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; LS rating revised to 'LS-3' from 'LS-4'

  -- Class M2a (ISIN XS0226131463) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; LS rating revised to 'LS-3' from 'LS-4'

  -- Class M2b (ISIN XS0226131620) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; LS rating revised to 'LS-3' from 'LS-4'

  -- Class B1 (ISIN XS0226132198) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Stable; LS rating revised to 'LS-3' from 'LS-4'

  -- Class B2 (ISIN XS0226132271) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; 'LS-4'

Money Partners Securities 2 Plc

  -- Class A2a (ISIN XS0236411780) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-2'

  -- Detachable A2a-2011 coupons (ISIN XS0236521968) affirmed at
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- Class A2c (ISIN XS0236412754) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-2'

  -- Detachable A2c-2011 coupons (ISIN XS0236528468) affirmed at
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- Class M1a (ISIN XS0236413307) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook
     Stable; LS rating revised to 'LS-3' from 'LS-4'

  -- Class M1b (ISIN XS0236413489) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook
     Stable; LS rating revised to 'LS-3' from 'LS-4'

  -- Class M2a (ISIN XS0236740501) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; 'LS-3'

  -- Class M2b (ISIN XS0236742036) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; 'LS-3'

  -- Class B1 (ISIN XS0236413646) affirmed at 'BB-sf; Outlook
     Negative; 'LS-4'

Money Partners Securities 3 Plc

  -- Class A2a (ISIN XS0254114712) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-2'

  -- Detachable A2a-2011 coupons (ISIN XS0254124430) affirmed at
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- Class A2b (ISIN XS0254121337) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-2'

  -- Detachable A2b-2011 coupons (ISIN XS0254126567) affirmed at
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- Class A2c (ISIN XS0254122814) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-2'

  -- Detachable A2c-2011 coupons (ISIN XS0254129314) affirmed at
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- Class M1a (ISIN XS0254130080) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-3'

  -- Class M1b (ISIN XS0254130676) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-3'

  -- Class M2a (ISIN XS0254130916) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Negative; 'LS-4'

  -- Class M2b (ISIN XS0254131484) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Negative; 'LS-4'

  -- Class B1a (ISIN XS0254132375) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-5' from 'LS-4'

  -- Class B1b (ISIN XS0254132458) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Negative, LS rating revised to 'LS-5' from 'LS-4'

  -- Class B2a (ISIN XS0254132706) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Rating 'RR4'

  -- Class B2b (ISIN XS0254307605) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Rating 'RR4'

Money Partners Securities 4 Plc

  -- Class A1a (ISIN XS0274950368) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-2'

  -- Detachable A1a-2012 coupons (ISIN XS0275153392) affirmed at
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- Class A1b (ISIN XS0274965556) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-2'

  -- Detachable A1b-2012 coupons (ISIN XS0275154796) affirmed at
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- Class M1a (ISIN XS0274969384) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-4' from 'LS-3'

  -- Class M1b (ISIN XS0274970713) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-4' from 'LS-3'

  -- Class M2a (ISIN XS0274972685) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Negative; 'LS-4'

  -- Class M2b (ISIN XS0274974111) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Negative; 'LS-4'

  -- Class B1a (ISIN XS0274978450) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Negative; 'LS-5'

  -- Class B1b (ISIN XS0274979185) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Negative; 'LS-5'

  -- Class B2 (ISIN XS0274980191) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Rating 'RR4'

Kensington Mortgage Securities plc - series 2007-1:

  -- Class A2 (ISIN XS0292638334): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; Loss Severity (LS)Rating revised to 'LS-2' from 'LS-
     1'

  -- Class A2 DAC (XS0292642369): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Class A3a (ISIN XS0292638920): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-5'
     from 'LS-1'

  -- Class A3a DAC (XS0292644142): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Class A3b (ISIN XS0292652756): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-5'
     from 'LS-1'

  -- Class A3b DAC (XS0292651949): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Class A3c (ISIN XS0292640660): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-5'
     from 'LS-1'

  -- Class A3c DAC (XS0292653051): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Class M1a (ISIN XS0292639225): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-4'
     from 'LS-3'

  -- Class M1b (ISIN XS0292651196): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-4'
     from 'LS-3'

  -- Class M2b (ISIN XS0292639654): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-4'
     from 'LS-3'

  -- Class B1a (ISIN XS0292639902): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Rating of 'RR4'

  -- Class B1b (ISIN XS0292651436): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Rating of 'RR4'

  -- Class B2 (ISIN XS0292640157): affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
     Rating of 'RR6'


KIDDERMINSTER HARRIERS: Chris Swan Withdraws Rescue Bid
-------------------------------------------------------
Colin Stoner at Birmingham Mail reports that Kidderminster
Harriers must search again for a new financial savior after
businessman Chris Swan pulled out of buying the club.

According to Birmingham Mail, Harriers face the real threat of
having to go into administration -- which would bring an automatic
ten-point penalty -- as they need to find GBP150,000 to pay wages,
tax, PAYE and National Insurance before the end of the month.

Birmingham Mail relates having met with shareholders, he was told
the two major shareholders -- Aggborough Holdings and Mrs. Jane
Murrant -- would be happy to sell what would amount to 86% of the
shares for GBP1.  But the sticking point was to repay loans of
GBP75,000 to acting chairman David Reynolds and GBP50,000 to new
director Mark Serrell, who had rescued the club in October after a
boardroom takeover, Birmingham Mail notes.  Both Messrs. Reynolds
and Serrell said they would pass on GBP25,000 each to the
supporters trust, KHIST, to benefit the club, Birmingham Mail
recounts.  But when the eight-point offer was put to Mr. Swan he
decided not to follow it up, Birmingham Mail discloses.

According to Birmingham Mail, Mr. Swan said rather than repaying
the loans, he would invest the money in the club.

"The club is in a critical state but we are still talking to
people and are working hard to make sure the club has a future,"
Birmingham Mail quoted Mr. Serrell as saying.

Kidderminster Harriers F.C. is an English association football
team based in Kidderminster, Worcestershire formed in 1886.  It
currently plays in the Conference National and has played at
Aggborough Stadium since they were formed.


LANDMARK 1: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'Bsf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlook on Landmark 1's three most
junior tranches to Stable from Negative and affirmed all tranches:

  -- Class Aa (ISIN XS0258051191): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; Loss Severity Rating (LS) of 'LS-2'

  -- Class Aa DAC 2011 (ISIN XS0258051357): affirmed at 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable

  -- Class Ac (ISIN XS0260674725): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-2'

  -- Class Ac DAC 2011 (ISIN XS0260674998): affirmed at 'AAAsf';
     Outlook Stable

  -- Class B (ISIN XS0260675888): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-3'

  -- Class Ca (ISIN XS0258052165): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; 'LS-4'

  -- Class Cc (ISIN XS0261199284): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; 'LS-4'

  -- Class D (ISIN XS0258052751): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; 'LS-4'

Landmark 1, like most other UK non-conforming transactions, has
seen a general improvement in the performance of the underlying
collateral over the last year.  In Fitch's opinion, the main
driver for this improvement has been the sustained period of low
interest rates, which allow mortgage payments to be more
affordable.  Since the last rating action in October 2009, loans
that are three months or greater in arrears have decreased to
27.8% from 33.1% of the outstanding collateral balance.  Even with
this improvement, these arrears levels are still high and remain a
risk to the transaction.

The volume of new repossessions per quarter has been relatively
stable over the last 18 months at between 0.8% and 1.6% of the
outstanding collateral balance, although it did reach 2.1% in
December 2009.  The volume of unsold repossessions is at a more
manageable current level of 3.0% compared with the high of 5.1% in
March 2009.

Previously, the excess spread available was insufficient to offset
losses, either due to the volume of loans incurring losses per
quarter or because loss severities on those loans were so high,
over 30% in some cases.  This has hindered the replenishment of
the reserve fund up to its target level of GBP3 million, although
in three of the last four quarters it has marginally increased to
stand at GBP2.56 million.  Furthermore, the two detachable coupons
are due to redeem in June 2011, which should result in higher
available excess spread.

These positive developments over the last year have left the
junior notes in an improved position, and Fitch has therefore
revised the Outlook on the junior tranches to reflect the
increased protection.


MONEY PARTNERS: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Ratings on Three Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlooks to Stable from Negative on
three tranches of Money Partners Securities Plc series and six
tranches of Kensington Mortgage Securities Plc - Series 2007-1.
The agency has also affirmed the ratings of all the MPS series and
KMS.

Both the KMS and MPS series are collateralized by UK non-
conforming residential mortgages, with a significant proportion of
self-certified borrowers ranging from 46.8% (MPS2) to 54.4% (MPS1)
and 65.4% for KMS.  The underlying portfolios also comprise large
volumes of second-charge loans, ranging from 10.5% (MPS3) to 15.5%
(MPS4) and 7.6% in KMS, which Fitch believes to be the main driver
of the volatility seen in loss severities.  The affirmation of
their ratings, however, reflects improved performances of the
underlying portfolios as seen in the October 2010 collateral
reports.

While the respective cash reserves for KMS and MPS2 remain fully
funded, replenishment of the reserve funds has been taking place
in the rest of the MPS series.  With the decline in interest
rates, and subsequent improvement in borrower affordability, the
level of repossessions and losses incurred from the sale of
repossessed properties has declined compared with levels seen in
2009.  As a result, the issuers now have sufficient funds to
replenish their reserves.

Improved borrower affordability is evidenced by the stabilization
in three-month plus arrears across all the five transactions, as
well as improved collection rates as seen on the quarterly MPS
reports.  As of October 2010, loans in arrears by more than three
months ranged from 30.7 % (MPS1) to 33.9% (MPS4) and 27.7% for
KMS.  Collection rates as seen on the MPS quarterly reports ranged
from 85.3% (MPS2) to 87.7% (MPS3) as of October 2010 (and November
2010 for MPS2) compared with 75.6% (MPS2) to 82.7% (MPS1) a year
ago.

While the stable trend in arrears is in line with other UK non-
conforming transactions rated by Fitch, the actual levels of
delinquencies seen in these transactions are significantly higher.
These high levels of arrears pose a risk to the future performance
of the assets.  An increase in interest rates is expected to
negatively impact the ability of borrowers to meet payments and
could subsequently lead to even higher rates of defaults and
losses.  This is reflected in the Negative Outlooks on the M1
notes (MPS4), M2 notes (MPS3 and MPS4) and B1 notes (MPS2, MPS3
and MPS4).

The transaction structures include pro-rata amortization triggers,
some of which have already been breached and are not expected to
be cured.  This means that note amortization will remain
sequential over the life of the transactions.  Further, reserve
fund amortization triggers have already been breached for all four
MPS and KMS transactions.  For both these reasons, further
increase in credit support is expected and is thus reflected in
the affirmation of the notes.

The rating actions are:

Money Partners Securities 1 Plc

  -- Class A2a (ISIN XS0226128329) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; Loss Severity (LS) Rating 'LS-3'

  -- Class A2b (ISIN XS0226129566) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-3'

  -- Class A2c (ISIN XS0226156536) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-3'

  -- Class M1 (ISIN XS0226131117) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; LS rating revised to 'LS-3' from 'LS-4'

  -- Class M2a (ISIN XS0226131463) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; LS rating revised to 'LS-3' from 'LS-4'

  -- Class M2b (ISIN XS0226131620) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; LS rating revised to 'LS-3' from 'LS-4'

  -- Class B1 (ISIN XS0226132198) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Stable; LS rating revised to 'LS-3' from 'LS-4'

  -- Class B2 (ISIN XS0226132271) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; 'LS-4'

Money Partners Securities 2 Plc

  -- Class A2a (ISIN XS0236411780) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-2'

  -- Detachable A2a-2011 coupons (ISIN XS0236521968) affirmed at
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- Class A2c (ISIN XS0236412754) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-2'

  -- Detachable A2c-2011 coupons (ISIN XS0236528468) affirmed at
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- Class M1a (ISIN XS0236413307) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook
     Stable; LS rating revised to 'LS-3' from 'LS-4'

  -- Class M1b (ISIN XS0236413489) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook
     Stable; LS rating revised to 'LS-3' from 'LS-4'

  -- Class M2a (ISIN XS0236740501) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; 'LS-3'

  -- Class M2b (ISIN XS0236742036) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; 'LS-3'

  -- Class B1 (ISIN XS0236413646) affirmed at 'BB-sf; Outlook
     Negative; 'LS-4'

Money Partners Securities 3 Plc

  -- Class A2a (ISIN XS0254114712) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-2'

  -- Detachable A2a-2011 coupons (ISIN XS0254124430) affirmed at
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- Class A2b (ISIN XS0254121337) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-2'

  -- Detachable A2b-2011 coupons (ISIN XS0254126567) affirmed at
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- Class A2c (ISIN XS0254122814) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-2'

  -- Detachable A2c-2011 coupons (ISIN XS0254129314) affirmed at
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- Class M1a (ISIN XS0254130080) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-3'

  -- Class M1b (ISIN XS0254130676) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-3'

  -- Class M2a (ISIN XS0254130916) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Negative; 'LS-4'

  -- Class M2b (ISIN XS0254131484) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Negative; 'LS-4'

  -- Class B1a (ISIN XS0254132375) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-5' from 'LS-4'

  -- Class B1b (ISIN XS0254132458) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Negative, LS rating revised to 'LS-5' from 'LS-4'

  -- Class B2a (ISIN XS0254132706) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Rating 'RR4'

  -- Class B2b (ISIN XS0254307605) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Rating 'RR4'

Money Partners Securities 4 Plc

  -- Class A1a (ISIN XS0274950368) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-2'

  -- Detachable A1a-2012 coupons (ISIN XS0275153392) affirmed at
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- Class A1b (ISIN XS0274965556) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; 'LS-2'

  -- Detachable A1b-2012 coupons (ISIN XS0275154796) affirmed at
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- Class M1a (ISIN XS0274969384) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-4' from 'LS-3'

  -- Class M1b (ISIN XS0274970713) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-4' from 'LS-3'

  -- Class M2a (ISIN XS0274972685) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Negative; 'LS-4'

  -- Class M2b (ISIN XS0274974111) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     Negative; 'LS-4'

  -- Class B1a (ISIN XS0274978450) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Negative; 'LS-5'

  -- Class B1b (ISIN XS0274979185) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Negative; 'LS-5'

  -- Class B2 (ISIN XS0274980191) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Rating 'RR4'

Kensington Mortgage Securities plc - series 2007-1:

  -- Class A2 (ISIN XS0292638334): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable; Loss Severity (LS)Rating revised to 'LS-2' from 'LS-
     1'

  -- Class A2 DAC (XS0292642369): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Class A3a (ISIN XS0292638920): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-5'
     from 'LS-1'

  -- Class A3a DAC (XS0292644142): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Class A3b (ISIN XS0292652756): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-5'
     from 'LS-1'

  -- Class A3b DAC (XS0292651949): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Class A3c (ISIN XS0292640660): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-5'
     from 'LS-1'

  -- Class A3c DAC (XS0292653051): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable

  -- Class M1a (ISIN XS0292639225): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-4'
     from 'LS-3'

  -- Class M1b (ISIN XS0292651196): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-4'
     from 'LS-3'

  -- Class M2b (ISIN XS0292639654): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
     revised to Stable from Negative; LS rating revised to 'LS-4'
     from 'LS-3'

  -- Class B1a (ISIN XS0292639902): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Rating of 'RR4'

  -- Class B1b (ISIN XS0292651436): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Rating of 'RR4'

  -- Class B2 (ISIN XS0292640157): affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
     Rating of 'RR6'


PUNCH TAVERNS: Bondholder Group Selects Rothschild as Adviser
-------------------------------------------------------------
Anousha Sakoui and Rose Jacobs at The Financial Times report that
a group of Punch Taverns bondholders has selected Rothschild as an
adviser for future talks with the company.

According to the FT, the committee, made up of members of the
Association of British Insurers, is believed to include investors
in different parts of Punch's three securitizations -- which
together account for the company's GBP3 billion-plus net debt.

Rothschild's appointment follows meetings this month, organized
through the ABI, in which bondholders consulted a range of
advisers, including Ernst & Young and Houlihan Lokey, an
investment bank, the FT relates.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 21,
2010, the FT said almost all of Punch's pubs are backed by debt,
and a default would leave bondholders in control of more than
5,500 pubs.  Other possible solutions being considered are a
renegotiation of covenants, deferral of debt payments or a partial
debt-for-equity swap, according to the FT.  A restructuring of the
funding vehicles Punch owns could be complex, as each has issued
several tranches of bonds with different order of priority, some
of which have been guaranteed by bond insurers, the FT noted.

Punch Taverns plc -- http://www.punchtaverns.com/-- is a pub
company in the United Kingdom, with over 8,400 pubs across its
leased and managed portfolio.  The Company is engaged in the
trading activities in the operation of public houses either under
the leased model or as directly managed by the Company.  The
leased model involves the granting of leases to tenants who
operate the pub as their own business, paying rent to the Company,
purchasing beer and other drinks from it and entering into profit
sharing arrangements for income from leisure machines.  Pubs that
are directly managed involve the employment of a manager to
operate each managed pub and the Group receives all revenues
generated by the pub and is responsible for costs.  During the
fiscal year ended August 23, 2008, Punch Taverns plc acquired 20
pubs and 39 pubs were sold.


RADICLE PROJECTS: Places Australian Unit Into Administration
------------------------------------------------------------
Radicle Projects Plc has placed Radicle Projects Pty Ltd, the
Company's principal trading subsidiary, into voluntary
administration.  Consequently, trading in the Company's ordinary
shares was immediately suspended pending clarification of the
Company's financial position.  Stephen J. Parbery, Brett S. Lord
and Craig D. Crosbie of PPB Advisory, were appointed as Joint &
Several Administrator of Radicle Pty.

Following a recent final meeting with the creditors of Radicle
Pty, the administrator has been authorized to undertake a sale of
the realizable assets of Radicle Pty for the benefit of creditors.
The realizable value of these assets is not yet clear and the
disposal process is expected to take several months.

"The Board is continuing to consider the options now available to
it, including the possibility that the Radicle Projects be placed
into administration.  However the Board is in discussions with two
unquoted Australian companies regarding a possible reverse take-
over of the Company," Radicle Projects said.

"These discussions are at an early stage and the eventual outcome
is as yet uncertain."

The Company is due to publish its report and accounts for the year
to June 30, 2010, on or before December 31, 2010.  Radicle
Projects said that in current the circumstances it will not be
possible to complete the 2010 audit nor publish the accounts
before December 31, 2010.

Radicle Projects Plc is a United Kingdom-based company.  The
Company is engaged in acquiring interests in a range of operations
in horticulture, viticulture and forestry projects across
Australia.



SHIELD FINANCE: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating to US$324 Mil. Senior Loan
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'B+'
rating to the US$324 million-equivalent senior secured facilities
issued by Shield Finance Co. S.A.R.L, one notch higher than the
corporate credit rating on the guarantor, Sophos Ltd. (B/Stable/).
At the same time S&P assigned a recovery rating of '2' to these
facilities, reflecting S&P's expectation of substantial (70%-90%)
recovery for noteholders in the event of a payment default.

The issue and recovery ratings are supported by S&P's valuation of
Sophos as a going concern under its hypothetical default scenario.
This reflects S&P's view of the group's relatively high revenue
visibility and leading market position in the integrated IT
security and data protection software and applications market.
S&P derive additional rating support from S&P's assessment of the
debtholders' security package as comprehensive, with the group's
intellectual property constituting a material part of this
security.  S&P estimates Sophos' stressed enterprise value to be
about US$250 million at its simulated point of default in 2014.

According to S&P's hypothetical default scenario, a default occurs
in 2014, due to slow revenue growth and low profitability on
account of a relatively high proportion of fixed costs.  S&P
incorporate about US$15 million of annual debt amortization into
its analysis.

S&P's issue and recovery ratings do not incorporate event risk
linked to reputational damage.  Should such an event occur, the
business would be liquidated, in S&P's view, which would leave
negligible value for the debtholders.

                           Ratings List

                   Ratings to Final from Prelim

                    Shield Finance Co. S.A.R.L.

                          Senior Secured

                                        To           From
                                        --           ----
  EUR61.9 mil fltg rate bank ln due     B+           B+ (prelim)
  06/15/2016*
   Recovery Rating                      2            2 (prelim)

                                        To           From
                                        --           ----
  US$20 mil fltg rate bank ln due       B+           B+ (prelim)
  06/15/2016*
   Recovery Rating                      2            2 (prelim)

                                        To           From
                                        --           ----
  US$229.4 mil fltg rate bank ln due    B+           B+ (prelim)
  06/15/2016*
   Recovery Rating                      2            2 (prelim)

* Guaranteed by Shield BidCo Ltd., Shield HoldCo Ltd., and Sophos
  Ltd.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Moody's Reviews Rating s on 53 Tranches from 14 European CLOs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the ratings of 53 tranches in
14 European CLOs under review for possible upgrade.  The rating
actions are summarized in an Excel spreadsheet, which is posted as
a link at the bottom of this announcement.

Moody's explained that the rating review considers the positive
implications of improvement in certain deal collateral quality
metrics since the time of the previous rating actions, including
WARF (weighted average rating factor) and OC
(overcollateralization) levels.  In identifying this list of
transactions and tranches, Moody's examined the OC and WARF levels
in conjunction with the current tranche rating level as well as
the significance of changes in the key performance metrics.

Moody's also paid attention to deals that have shown the largest
positive moves in key metrics since last rating action, structural
features and other deal characteristics in the consideration of
the actions.  Moody's recognizes that improved credit performance
of the underlying collateral and favorable market conditions have
had a positive impact on European CLOs.  In many transactions
Moody's observed successful reinvestment of principal repayments
and sale proceeds into substitute assets with below-par purchase
price and/or higher ratings.  The CLOs also typically benefited
from a reduction in par value haircuts due to a decrease in
exposure to defaulted securities and/or Caa-rated securities.

Moody's says that the review affects a majority of junior notes
because they have one or more of these attributes:

* Adequate OC coverage for the affected notes, which was
  considered in relation to the WARF level;

* A substantial improvement in OC and WARF levels since last
  rating action;

* The affected notes have either never deferred interest or have
  resumed paying interest;

* Sufficient OC test "cushion" exists for the notes senior to the
  affected notes, which makes it less likely for the affected
  notes to defer interest in the near future;

* Some of the affected notes benefit from a "turbo" amortization
  feature that enables them to delever ahead of more senior notes
  under certain conditions.

While in many cases not all tranches from the same deal are placed
under watch for upgrade, Moody's will review the entire capital
structure when it conducts full analysis of each deal and take
rating action when warranted.  Moody's endeavors to complete full
analysis of all affected deals within 90 days.

The deals affected are collateralized loan obligations backed
primarily by portfolios of senior secured loans.

A list of the reviews associated with this announcement may be
found at:

Issuer: Bacchus 2006-1 plc

  -- EUR34M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
     Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on Apr 16, 2010 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- EUR25.54M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2022, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Apr 16, 2010 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- EUR14.8M Class X Combination Notes, Ca (sf) Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Apr 16, 2010
     Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- EUR5M Class W Combination Notes, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade; previously on Apr 16, 2010 Downgraded
     to B3 (sf)

  -- EUR69M Class Y Combination Notes, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade; previously on Apr 16, 2010 Downgraded
     to Ca (sf)

Issuer: CELF Loan Partners IV plc

  -- EUR42M Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2023, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Oct 23, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- EUR39M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2023, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Oct 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- EUR33M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Note
     due 2023, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Oct 23, 2009 Confirmed at B1 (sf)

  -- EUR25.5M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2023, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Oct 23, 2009 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: EUROCREDIT CDO VII PLC

  -- EUR31.2M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2023, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Aug 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- EUR29.1M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2023, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Aug 18, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- EUR19.8M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2023-1, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Aug 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  -- EUR8M Class Q Combination Notes due 2023, Caa1 (sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Aug 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  -- EUR15M Class R Combination Notes due 2023, Ba3 (sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Aug 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- EUR3M Class V Combination Notes due 2023, Caa2 (sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Aug 18, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: Hamlet I Leveraged Loan Fund B.V.

  -- EUR222M Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on Feb 10, 2010 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- EUR78M Class B Subordinated Notes due 2020, B1 (sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Feb 10, 2010
     Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Harvest CLO III plc

  -- EUR30.75M Euro 30,750,000 Class C-1 Senior Subordinated
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Ba2 (sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 15, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- EUR12M Euro 12,000,000 Class C-2 Senior Subordinated
     Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2021, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 15, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- EUR16.75M Euro 16,750,000 Class D-1 Senior Subordinated
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2021, B2 (sf) Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 15, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- EUR9.25M Euro 9,250,000 Class D-2 Senior Subordinated
     Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2021, B2 (sf) Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 15, 2009
     Downgraded to B2 (sf)

  -- EUR15.75M Euro 15,750,000 Class E-1 Senior Subordinated
     Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Caa3 (sf) Placed
     Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 15, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- EUR3M Euro 3,000,000 Class E-2 Senior Subordinated Deferrable
     Fixed Rate Notes due 2021, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 15, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa3 (sf)

  -- EUR10M Euro 10,000,000 Class V Combination Notes due 2021, B3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on
     Dec 15, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Hudson CLO 1 B.V.

  -- EUR27.5M Class A-3 Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2023, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Dec 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  -- EUR24M Class B-1 Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2023, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Dec 11, 2009 Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Iron Hill CLO Limited

  -- US$14.007M Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2025, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Aug 18, 2009 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- US$16.342M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2025, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Aug 18, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Laurelin B.V.

  -- EUR36M Class C Notes, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Aug 28, 2009 Upgraded to Baa1
      (sf)

  -- EUR24M Class D Notes, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade; previously on Aug 28, 2009 Upgraded to Ba2
      (sf)

Issuer: Leopard CLO V B.V.

  -- EUR13M Class E-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2023, Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Nov 17, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- EUR3M Class E-2 Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2023,
     Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Nov 17, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- EUR7M Class F Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
     2023-1, Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Nov 17, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Magi Funding I plc

  -- EUR33.8M Euro 33,800,000 Class B Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2021, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Nov 24, 2009 Confirmed at Ba3 (sf)

  -- EUR7.5M Euro 7,500,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2021, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Nov 24, 2009 Confirmed at B3 (sf)

Issuer: Prospero CLO I B.V.

  -- US$15.3M US$15,300,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating
     Rate Notes Due 2017, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Dec 23, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- US$15.3M US$15,300,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable
     Interest Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- US$15.3M US$15,300,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable
     Interest Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  -- US$7.7M US$7,700,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable
     Interest Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under
     Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 23, 2009
     Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Prospero CLO II B.V.

  -- US$25M B Notes, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Jan 7, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- US$15M C Notes, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Jan 7, 2010 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- US$13.5M D Notes, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade; previously on Jan 7, 2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: RMF Euro CDO III PLC

  -- EUR252M Class I Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, due 2021,
     Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously
     on Nov 20, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- EUR20.1M Class II Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, due
     2021, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Nov 20, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  -- EUR14.7M Class III Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes,
     due 2021, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Nov 20, 2009 Confirmed at Baa3 (sf)

  -- EUR23.3M Class IV Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes,
     due 2021, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Nov 20, 2009 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: RMF Euro CDO IV PLC

  -- EUR15.3M Class III Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes,
     due 2022, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Nov 26, 2009 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

  -- EUR21.6M Class IV-A Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes,
     due 2022, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Nov 26, 2009 Confirmed at B2 (sf)

  -- EUR12.6M Class V Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes,
     due 2022, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Nov 26, 2009 Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

  -- EUR3.5M Class IV-B Deferrable Mezzanine Fixed Rate Notes, due
     2022, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
     previously on Nov 26, 2009 Confirmed at B2 (sf)

  -- EUR6M Class R Combination Notes, due 2022 Notes, Caa3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Nov
     26, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

  -- EUR6M Class S Combination Notes, due 2022 Notes, B3 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Nov
     26, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  -- EUR4M Class Q Combination Notes, due 2022 Notes, Caa1 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Nov
     26, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
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Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
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Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

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