TCREUR_Public/110207.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Monday, February 7, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 26



KREMIKOVTZI AD: Third Auction for Assets Scheduled for Today
* DENMARK: Bail-Out Entity to Merge Failed Banks Into One Unit


LEHMAN BROTHERS: Settles LB Bankhaus Intercompany Claims
WESTLB AG: Peter Schneider Sees Split as Sensible Option


MAGYAR TELECOM: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'B2' CFR to Negative
* HUNGARY: Jan. Mandatory Corporate Liquidation Procedures Up 2.1%


SALISBURY INT'L: S&P Cuts Rating on Class A1 Notes to 'CCC- (sf)'
* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on Six Irish Banking Entities


BTA BANK: Files US$1.2-Bil. Suit Against Ex-Chair Mukhtar Ablyazov


SWEDMILK MACEDONIA: Creditors May Opt for Liquidation


HARBOURMASTER CLO: Fitch Withdraws 'B' Rating on Class S1 Notes
UPCB FINANCE: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating to New Sr. Sec. Notes


CABLEUROPA SAU: S&P Raises Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating to 'B'
CASSIOPEIA QEX: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class B Notes to 'C (sf)'
ONO FINANCE: Moody's Assigns 'Caa2' Rating to EUR295-Mil. Notes


BIZ FINANCE: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to Limited Recourse Notes
UKRAINE AUTO: Fitch Upgrades Rating on Class B Notes to 'Bsf'

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALTE LIEBE: S&P Downgrades Rating on EUR102-Mil. Notes to 'B-'
EMI GROUP: Investors Split Over Support for Another Fund
FALKIRK FOOTBALL: Averts Liquidation; Faces Cash Flow Problems
GMAC UK: Fitch Affirms Short-Term Issuer Default Rating at 'B'
HMV GROUP: Alexander Mamut Explores Options; Permira Mulls Offer

IXL 2008: Goes Into Administration, Makes 66 Jobs Redundant
JERMON LIMITED: Goes Into Administration
JJB SPORTS: Feb. 24 Deadline Set for Restructuring Plan
WEST TOWER: Placed Into Administration
YELL GROUP: Shareholders Agree to New Strategy


* EUROPE: Euro States Should Be Allowed to Default on Debt
* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 31 to February 4, 2011



KREMIKOVTZI AD: Third Auction for Assets Scheduled for Today
------------------------------------------------------------ reports that Bulgaria has regrouped the assets of
Kremikovtzi steel mill to cut their price and will auction them
for a third time today after failing to attract any bidders in two
previous auctions.

According to, Tsvetan Bankov, the factory's receiver,
told Bloomberg agency in Sofia, "This time we're selling the pre-
production and steel production assets and we have taken out part
of the transport infrastructure." relates that Mr. Bankov said the plant's remaining
assets, valued at about BGN300 million, which include some 300
service apartments, lands and mines, are being sold at separate

Two prior auctions were held over the fall, but failed because
actually no one turned out to bid for Kremikovtzi, which is
considered the pride of communist-era industry in Bulgaria, recounts.  Unlike the first closed-bid auction, the
second was with direct bidding, notes.  The starting
price was BGN452,414, 008, down by 20% over the initial tag at the
first tender, which also failed due to lack of prospective buyers, disclosed.

For February's bid, the initial price will drop even further (with
31% from the initial one), and will be set at BGN395 million,
according to

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 29,
2010, Bloomberg News, citing a report from the receiver, said the
mill's assets total BGN840 million, while debt was estimated at
BGN1.9 billion.  Bloomberg recalled the Sofia City Court declared
Kremikovtzi bankrupt on May 31, 2010.  The Sofia-based plant was
placed in receivership in 2008 after failing to pay suppliers and
investors holding BGN325 million (US$422 million) of bonds,
Bloomberg disclosed.  Creditors rejected a restructuring plan in
October 2009, opting to be repaid under insolvency laws, Bloomberg
recounted.  Bloomberg noted that of the total liabilities, 42% are
owed to state-run power and gas utilities, the state railways and
tax authorities.

                        About Kremikovtzi

Kremikovtzi AD Sofia -- is a
Bulgaria-based company principally engaged in the steel industry.
Its production capacity includes a complete steel production
cycle, from ore mining to finished products, such as hot rolled
and cold rolled products (coils, slabs, plates, blooms and
billets), different thickness wire rods and tubes.  The Company's
product range also includes coke and chemical products, flat
products, ferro-alloys and metallurgical lime, and other products.
The Company operates through a number of subsidiaries, including
Ferosplaven zavod EOOD, NLA 2000 EOOD, Kremikovtzi Rudodobiv AD,
Metalresource OOD and others.  The Company is 71%-owned by
Finmetals Holding AD.

* DENMARK: Bail-Out Entity to Merge Failed Banks Into One Unit
Christian Wienberg at Bloomberg News reports that the Financial
Stability Company, the Danish government's bail-out entity, will
merge its failed lenders into one unit as part of a reorganization
following the expiration of the country's first bank package.

According to Bloomberg, the entity on Friday said in an e-mail
that it will also merge its real estate assets into one unit, its
mortgages into one branch and its debts and guarantees into a
fourth division.

The Copenhagen-based entity owns 10 failed lenders, of which it
has sold some healthy parts, Bloomberg discloses.


LEHMAN BROTHERS: Settles LB Bankhaus Intercompany Claims
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and the insolvency administrator for
Lehman Brothers Bankhaus AG, the second largest of LBHI's foreign
affiliates, have reached an agreement settling all intercompany
relationships between the U.S. Debtors and LB Bankhaus.  The
agreement, which is subject to approval in the U.S. Chapter 11
proceedings and in the German proceeding, provides for the
allowance of LB Bankhaus' claims in the approximate amount of
US$6.6 billion.  LB Bankhaus also said it is supportive of the
First Amended Joint Chapter 11 plan filed on January 26, 2011.

Bryan Marsal, LBHI's Chief Executive Officer, said: "This
agreement is a milestone in the resolution of the Lehman
proceedings and is in line with our overall approach to favor
compromises with affiliates and avoid lengthy and costly
litigation.  We look forward to continuing our conversations with
affiliates and other stakeholders in the coming months as we move
forward toward confirmation of the amended plan."

Dr. Michael C. Frege, in his capacity as insolvency administrator
for LB Bankhaus, stated: "We have worked for many months with LBHI
to reach this mutually satisfactory settlement of all intercompany
issues between our two estates.  In addition, LB Bankhaus is
supportive of the First Amended Joint Chapter 11 plan and the
approval of the Debtors' Disclosure Statement and hopes the
process will now move forward expeditiously."

                      About Lehman Brothers

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. -- was the
fourth largest investment bank in the United States.  For more
than 150 years, Lehman Brothers has been a leader in the global
financial markets by serving the financial needs of corporations,
governmental units, institutional clients and individuals

Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy September 15, 2008
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 08-13555).  Lehman's bankruptcy petition
disclosed US$639 billion in assets and US$613 billion in debts,
effectively making the firm's bankruptcy filing the largest in
U.S. history.  Several other affiliates followed thereafter.

The Debtors' bankruptcy cases are handled by Judge James M. Peck.
Harvey R. Miller, Esq., Richard P. Krasnow, Esq., Lori R. Fife,
Esq., Shai Y. Waisman, Esq., and Jacqueline Marcus, Esq., at Weil,
Gotshal & Manges, LLP, in New York, represent Lehman.  Epiq
Bankruptcy Solutions serves as claims and noticing agent.

Dennis F. Dunne, Esq., Evan Fleck, Esq., and Dennis O'Donnell,
Esq., at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, in New York, serve
as counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.
Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin Capital, Inc., is the Committee's
investment banker.

On September 19, 2008, the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch, Judge of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered
an order commencing liquidation of Lehman Brothers, Inc., pursuant
to the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act (Case
No. 08-CIV-8119 (GEL)).  James W. Giddens has been appointed as
trustee for the SIPA liquidation of the business of LBI

The Bankruptcy Court has approved Barclays Bank Plc's purchase
of Lehman Brothers' North American investment banking and
capital markets operations and supporting infrastructure for
US$1.75 billion.  Nomura Holdings Inc., the largest brokerage
house in Japan, purchased LBHI's operations in Europe for US$2
plus the retention of most of employees.  Nomura also bought
Lehman's operations in the Asia Pacific for US$225 million.

                 International Operations Collapse

Lehman Brothers International (Europe), the principal UK trading
company in the Lehman group, was placed into administration,
together with Lehman Brothers Ltd, LB Holdings PLC and LB UK RE
Holdings Ltd.  Tony Lomas, Steven Pearson, Dan Schwarzmann and
Mike Jervis, partners at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, have been
appointed as joint administrators to Lehman Brothers International
(Europe) on September 15, 2008.  The joint administrators have
been appointed to wind down the business.

Lehman Brothers Japan Inc. and Lehman Brothers Holdings Japan Inc.
filed for bankruptcy in the Tokyo District Court on September 16.
Lehman Brothers Japan Inc. reported about JPY3.4 trillion
(US$33 billion) in liabilities in its petition.

Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., publishes Lehman Brothers
Bankruptcy News.  The newsletter tracks the Chapter 11 proceeding
undertaken by Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., and other insolvency
and bankruptcy proceedings undertaken by its affiliates.
( 215/945-7000)

WESTLB AG: Peter Schneider Sees Split as Sensible Option
Global Insolvency, citing Dow Jones Daily Bankruptcy Review,
reports that Peter Schneider, president of the savings banks
association of the German state of Baden Wuerttemberg, on
Tuesday said that splitting up WestLB AG would be the most
sensible scenario for the bank.

According to Global Insolvency, Mr. Schneider said one of the
possible scenarios for WestLB is limiting it to the tasks of a
central bank for the local regional savings banks, selling off
other units and winding down the rest in the bank's existing bad
bank, dubbed EAA.  As a consequence, WestLB would meet one of the
key demands by the European Commission to lower the total assets
on its balance sheet, Global Insolvency discloses.

Global Insolvency, citing Mr. Schneider, says the "new" WestLB
could have total assets of between EUR50 billion and EUR60 billion
on its balance sheet compared to some EUR220 billion it had as of
Sept. 30, 2010.

Mr. Schneider acknowledged that central questions still need to be
addressed in the proposed model, Global Insolvency notes.  It is
still unclear if European Union authorities would approve such a
plan and how the costs of such a split would be divided, according
to Global Insolvency.  However, there seems to be no alternative
to this solution, he said, adding that a "super-buyer" for the
whole of WestLB isn't in sight, Global Insolvency notes.

Mr. Schneider, as cited by Global Insolvency, said that a
reduction of the size of WestLB would only be an interim step.
Mr. Schneider, who represents Germany's biggest regional savings
banks association, expects a decision on the future of WestLB to
be made in coming days, Global Insolvency states.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 1,
2011, Reuters said WestLB is headed for a breakup as time runs out
to find a solution for the bank as a whole.  Two people familiar
with the matter told Reuters on Jan. 30 that if no buyer for the
whole lender can be found -- and at present no potential
candidates are in sight -- all risky assets will be split off and
a core bank doing business with savings banks will remain.  The
sources said WestLB businesses such as investment banking and
international banking will be wound down unless a buyer turns up,
adding the WestLB's bad bank is likely to be used for this
purpose, according to Reuters.  Reuters noted that talks between
the owners over who will cover the costs are still ongoing.  The
deadline for the remaining four bidders to submit offers in an
auction was Feb. 11, Reuters disclosed.  The European
Commission has demanded a change of ownership at WestLB by the end
of 2011, in return for a state bailout the lender got in the
financial crisis, Reuters stated.

                         About WestLB

Headquartered in Duesseldorf, Germany, WestLB AG (DAX:WESTLB)
-- provides financial advisory, lending,
structured finance, project finance, capital markets and private
equity products, asset management, transaction services and real
estate finance to institutions.  In the United States, certain
securities, trading, brokerage and advisory services are provided
by WestLB AG's wholly owned subsidiary WestLB Securities Inc., a
registered broker-dealer and member of the NASD and SIPC.
WestLB's shareholders are the two savings banks associations in
NRW (25.15% each), two regional associations (0.52% each), the
state of NRW (17.47%) and NRW.BANK (31.18%), which is owned by NRW
(64.7%) and two regional associations (35.3%).


MAGYAR TELECOM: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'B2' CFR to Negative
Moody's Investors Service has changed the Outlook on Magyar
Telecom B.V.'s ratings to negative from stable.

The change in outlook reflects Moody's views that Invitel's
operating and financial performance have been further challenged
in 2010 by (i) the prolonged downturn in Hungary and (ii)
continuing strong competitive pressures exercised by the incumbent
telecom operator and the main cable players in the country.

At the same time, the B2 CFR continues to reflect (i) the
company's overall sound profitability levels -- close to 50%
reported EBITDA margin -- and (ii) Invitel's resulting positive
free cash flow profile.

In the first nine months of 2010, group revenues declined by 9%
year-on-year (in local currency terms), mainly driven by the
decline in voice services as line churn continues and cross-
segment customers migrate to lower cost packages.  In addition
Moody's notes that growth from broadband Internet services has
been weaker than previously anticipated, showing low single-digit
growth rate in the subscriber base and an average revenue per user
continuing to decline.

In October 2010, Invitel disposed of its International wholesale
activities outside Hungary for approximately EUR200 million net
proceeds to focus its business strategy towards the Hungarian
market.  Whilst part of the proceeds were used to reduce the
company's indebtedness, Moody's notes that Invitel recently
acquired a medium-sized cable player in Hungary (Fibernet), out of
a fragmented cable market.  Moody's views Invitel's current
business profile and market position as one that is likely to
remain vulnerable to competition, mainly driven by triple-play
offerings from the largest cable players and sees limited growth
prospects for the company going forward.

Moody's notes that in Q4 2010, the Hungarian government passed a
law to levy extra taxes on a number of industries including
telecommunications, based on a percentage of revenue formula.
Invitel is therefore expected to pay an estimated EUR35 million in
total over 3 years starting in 2010.  While expected to reduce
Invitel's cash flow generation capacity and financial flexibility,
Moody's expects the company to (i) continue to generate positive
cash flows in the future and (ii) pursue debt reductions by way of
debt buybacks (and subsequent cancellations) at around par, using
the remainder of Invitel International's sale proceeds such that
group leverage will remain closer to 3.0x Debt to EBITDA.

The use of cash to reduce debt is expected to result in a
liquidity profile that does not leave ample flexibility to
accommodate further unexpected cash calls.  The next material
scheduled debt repayment is for the EUR100 million FRNs due in
April 2013.

A further deterioration in operating performance reducing the
company's EBITDA and free cash flow generation combined with a
weaker liquidity profile could lead to a downgrade of Invitel's
ratings.  The current rating and outlook does not allow for any
further extraordinary taxation imposed by the Government.

Whilst Invitel's ratings are currently constrained by the
company's relatively limited financial flexibility, the outlook
could stabilize following tangible signs of a stabilizing market
environment, combined with meaningful growth in Internet and
broadband, and sustained free cash flow generation.

The last rating action was implemented on December 7, 2009, when
Moody's assigned a provisional (P)B1, LGD4/54% rating to the
proposed EUR340 million senior secured notes to be issued by
Magyar telecom B.V. and the company's CFR was upgraded to B2 from
B3, with a stable outlook.

Headquartered in Budaors, Hungary, Invitel is the second-largest
fixed-line telecommunications provider in Hungary.  Invitel is
100% owned by Mid-Europa Partners.

* HUNGARY: Jan. Mandatory Corporate Liquidation Procedures Up 2.1%
MTI-Econews, citing company information provider Opten, reports
that the number of mandatory liquidation procedures launched
against Hungarian companies came to 1,352 in January, 2.1% more
than in the same month a year earlier.

According to MTI, the number of voluntary liquidations climbed 32%
to 1,166 in January from a year earlier.


SALISBURY INT'L: S&P Cuts Rating on Class A1 Notes to 'CCC- (sf)'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' from
'CCC+ (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch negative its credit
rating on Salisbury International Investments Ltd.'s EUR10 million
class A1 floating-rate portfolio credit-linked (Boubaki) series
2008-003 notes.  S&P subsequently withdrew the rating.

The downgrade reflects that the transaction fails the largest
obligor default test at each rating level down to the 'CCC- (sf)'
level.  The largest obligor default test was one of the two
supplemental stress tests S&P introduced as part of its criteria

S&P subsequently withdrew the rating following the arranger's
notification to us that the issuer has recently repurchased the
notes for cancellation.

Salisbury's series 2008-003 is a European collateralized debt
obligation of corporates arranged by Citigroup Global Markets Ltd.
It closed on March 3, 2008, and has a scheduled maturity date of
March 20, 2013.

* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on Six Irish Banking Entities
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has taken various
rating actions on six Irish banks.  This follows a review of S&P's
Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment on Ireland, which S&P has
revised downward to Group 6 from Group 4, a review of the
extraordinary support that S&P factor into the ratings on the
banks from the Republic of Ireland (A-/Watch Neg/A-2), and its
expectations for their own stand-alone credit profiles.

S&P has lowered the counterparty credit ratings on Anglo Irish
Bank Corp. to 'B-/C' from 'B/B'.  The ratings remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

S&P has lowered the counterparty credit ratings on Allied Irish
Banks PLC to 'BB/B' from 'BBB/A-2'.  S&P has also lowered its
ratings on AIB's wholly owned U.K. subsidiary, AIB Group (UK) PLC
to 'BB-/B' from 'BBB-/A-3'.  The ratings remain on CreditWatch
with negative implications.  S&P now factor two notches of support
(rather than four previously) into the counterparty credit ratings
on AIB above its revised 'b+' SACP.

S&P has lowered the counterparty credit ratings on Bank of Ireland
to 'BB+/B' from 'BBB+/A-2'.  The ratings remain on CreditWatch
with negative implications.  S&P now factors two notches of
support (rather than four previously) into the counterparty credit
ratings on BOI above its revised 'bb-' SACP.

S&P has lowered the counterparty credit ratings on Irish Life &
Permanent PLC to 'BBB-/A-3' from 'BBB/A-2'.  The ratings remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition, S&P has
lowered IL&P's lower Tier 2 subordinated debt rating by two
notches to 'B' from 'BB-'.  S&P has lowered its view of the SACP
of IL&P's banking operations to 'bb-' from 'bb', but maintain two
notches of support above the revised 'bb' SACP of IL&P (which in
turn incorporates a one-notch uplift for its view of the better
financial strength of its life operations).

S&P has lowered the long-term counterparty credit ratings on
Ulster Bank Ltd. and core Irish subsidiary, Ulster Bank Ireland
Ltd., to 'A-/A-2' from 'A/A-1'.  The ratings remain on CreditWatch
with negative implications.  In addition, S&P has lowered UBL's
SACP by one notch to 'bb+' from 'bbb-'.

S&P has lowered the long-term counterparty credit rating on KBC
Bank Ireland PLC by one notch to 'BBB+' from 'A-' and affirmed the
short-term counterparty credit rating at 'A-2'.  The ratings
remain on CreditWatch with negative implications.  In addition,
S&P has lowered KBCI's SACP by one notch to 'bbb-' from 'bbb'.

                     Domestically Owned Banks

The rating actions primarily reflect S&P's reassessment of
Ireland's BICRA, and a review of the number of notches of
extraordinary support that S&P factor into the rated domestically
owned Irish banks.

The revision downwards of the BICRA reflects S&P's revised view of
banking industry and country risk in Ireland.  This revision was
an important factor in the one-notch downgrade of the Irish
sovereign ratings.  The ratings on Ireland remain on CreditWatch
negative as S&P believes that uncertainties remain regarding the
size of additional capital needs for Ireland's largely state-owned
financial sector.

In addition to potential negative implications from a further
sovereign downgrade, the domestically owned bank ratings remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications, indicating its view that
the potential extraordinary support that S&P factors into the
counterparty credit ratings on the banks may diminish further.

In S&P's view, liquidity is very weak.  All of the domestically
owned Irish banks rely on central bank funding sources and S&P
sees no obvious solution emerging from the authorities to resolve
this problem in the near term.  Nevertheless, in S&P's view there
is the potential for the very low investor confidence in the Irish
banking system to start to stabilize in the coming weeks in the
event that the forthcoming publication of the regulatory capital
stress test review and the prudential liquidity assessment review
provide more certainty than hitherto.  Even then, S&P sees a long
journey of recovery for the Irish banking system and believe that
downside risk remains.

S&P considers that both the willingness and ability of Ireland to
provide extraordinary support to its banking system has reduced.
S&P reflect this potential for future support in notches above a
bank's SACP, which incorporates support received to date or that
is pending and, S&P believes, clearly identified.  These include:

    * Injections of equity and hybrids under previous
      recapitalization efforts;

    * National Asset Management Agency tranches already

    * Funding and liquidity support via the ELG (Eligible
      Liabilities Guarantee) scheme and repurchase agreement
      lending by the European Central Bank and Central Bank of

    * Remaining NAMA tranches due to complete by the end of the
      first quarter of 2011; and

    * Capital injections announced in November 2010--some of which
      remain to be completed.  Because they are quantified, S&P
      believes the government is committed (and able) to provide
      these injections and that they will happen very soon.

S&P's view of the reduced willingness of the Irish government to
provide extraordinary support reflects S&P's perception of
increased political acceptance for burden sharing (with respect to
senior unsecured unguaranteed bonds).  S&P's view of its reduced
ability to support incorporates the downgrade of the Irish

In December 2010, the Irish government introduced a legislative
regime to deal proactively with distressed financial institutions.
S&P considers that this has resulted in legislation that is
similar in impact to the U.K.'s Banking Act.  Until end-2012, it
gives the authorities wide-ranging powers over distressed
financial institutions, for example to change bank management,
force subordinated debt-for-equity swaps, and transfer out assets
and/or liabilities.

While these powers have not yet been used, S&P expects that they
may be exercised in order to facilitate the wind-down of Anglo and
Irish Nationwide Building Society (not rated).  Furthermore, S&P
considers that the combination of the government's evident desire
for providers of bank debt regulatory capital to take part in
burden-sharing and the authorities' new ability to enforce this
means that there is a realistic possibility of a government-
enforced default on these instruments through coercive burden-
sharing.  In recent months, S&P has treated lower tier 2 liability
management exercises by Anglo, BOI, and AIB to be "distressed
exchanges" in accordance with S&P's criteria.

In S&P's view, the current government stance regarding burden-
sharing by bondholders has been clearly delineated: subordinated
investors are clearly at high risk, senior are not at present
directly threatened.  However, S&P believes that the impending
general election, due February 25, and the stated stance of
opposition parties to revisit the topic, have introduced greater

By contrast, S&P also notes the stated desire of the EU that
senior bank bondholders should remain whole.

On balance, with the exception of Anglo, which is now rated 'B-',
S&P's base case remains that there is still a fairly small
prospect of senior unsecured unguaranteed bonds in rated
institutions being forced into a coercive default.  The fact that
S&P's ratings on the domestically owned Irish banks explicitly
include two notches of support above the banks' SACPs bears this
view out.  However, having previously factored in four notches of
support into the ratings on AIB and BOI (which was higher than
that provided to most other supported bank ratings in Europe), S&P
has reduced the available uplift for government support to two
notches for highly systemically important domestically owned Irish
banks.  S&P may further review this position based on political or
regulatory developments.

                    Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd.

The rating actions on Anglo reflect S&P's first-time
classification of Anglo as a government-related entity in
accordance with its criteria.  S&P takes this approach for the
ratings on Anglo, in contrast to those of the other domestically
owned Irish banks for whom S&P apply its systemic importance
criteria, because S&P expects Anglo to be wound down over a period
of years and remain in government ownership throughout that
period.  S&P classifies Anglo as a GRE with an "important" role
and a "strong" link to the government.  Accordingly, S&P considers
that there is a "moderately high" likelihood of extraordinary
government support and therefore the 'B-' long-term counterparty
credit rating is two notches above the 'ccc' SACP.  The ratings
remain on CreditWatch negative pending publication of the final
details of the government's plan for Anglo's wind-down, expected
within the next three months, which may lead to a further
incremental increase in S&P's view of the risk of burden sharing.

                     Allied Irish Banks PLC

The rating actions on AIB reflect S&P's reassessment of its SACP
in light of its revised view of Ireland's BICRA.  They also
reflect a reduction in the notches of extraordinary support that
S&P factor into the ratings on AIB.  S&P considers AIB to be a
highly systemically important institution.  The ratings remain on
CreditWatch pending the outcome of the sovereign rating review and
S&P's assessment of the potential for extraordinary support
following the announcement of the impact of PCAR 2011 and PLAR on

                          Bank of Ireland

The rating actions on BOI reflect S&P's reassessment of its SACP
in light of its revised view of Ireland's BICRA.  It also reflects
a reduction in the notches of extraordinary support that S&P
factor into the ratings on BOI.  S&P considers BOI to be a highly
systemically important institution.  The ratings remain on
CreditWatch pending the outcome of the sovereign rating review and
S&P's assessment of the potential for extraordinary support
following the announcement of the impact of PCAR 2011 and PLAR on

                    Irish Life & Permanent PLC

The rating actions on IL&P reflect S&P's reassessment of its SACP
in light of its revised view of Ireland's BICRA.  S&P considers
IL&P to be highly systemically important.  S&P has maintained the
two notches of extraordinary support that S&P factor into the
ratings on IL&P, which is now the same level as S&P has for AIB
and BOI, because the differences that S&P observe in the potential
for burden sharing among the three appear to be minor.  S&P has
lowered the subordinated debt ratings on IL&P by two notches, thus
expanding the differential from the counterparty credit rating to
five notches from four, because S&P sees greater pressures for
burden sharing on subordinated debt than S&P does for senior debt.
Based upon the experience that S&P has observed at Anglo, AIB, and
BOI, subordinated bondholders may suffer loss.  The ratings remain
on CreditWatch pending the outcome of the sovereign rating review
and S&P's assessment of the potential for extraordinary support
following the announcement of the impact of PCAR 2011 and PLAR on

             Foreign-Owned, Domestically Active Banks

S&P has also considered the implications of the BICRA revision and
the sovereign downgrade on the two foreign-owned, domestically
active banks that S&P rate: KBCI and UBIL.  While not supported by
the Irish government, these banks are typically rated higher than
their domestically owned peers due to S&P's views on the
likelihood of parental support and its view of their modestly
stronger SACPs.  In particular, in S&P's view, these banks have
not seen the sort of stress experienced by their domestic peers,
particularly in terms of access to funding.

                       KBC Bank Ireland PLC

The rating actions on KBCI reflect S&P's reassessment of its SACP
in light of its revised view of Ireland's BICRA.  The ratings
remain on CreditWatch negative pending the outcome of the
sovereign rating review.  This is because:

* S&P views the bank as strategically important as opposed to core
  to a parent that is itself government-supported; and

* While S&P still rates KBCI lower than the sovereign, the
  sovereign rating may yet be lowered by more than one notch, in
  which case S&P would likely lower the ratings on KBCI.

            Ulster Bank Ireland Ltd., Ulster Bank Ltd.

The rating actions on UBIL reflect S&P's reassessment of its SACP
in light of its revised view of Ireland's BICRA.  The ratings
remain on CreditWatch negative pending the outcome of the
sovereign rating review.  This is because:

* S&P considers that UBIL is core to U.K.-incorporated UBL, being
  about 70% of the consolidated assets, and highly integrated, and
  that a deterioration of UBIL would weaken UBL;

* S&P views UBL as strategically important as opposed to core to a
  parent that is itself government-supported;

* UBIL is now rated the same as the sovereign, and if the
  sovereign rating is lowered again, S&P would likely lower the
  ratings on UBIL; and

* If S&P lowered the ratings on UBIL S&P would likely do the same
  to those on UBL.

                           Ratings List

        Downgraded; CreditWatch Action; Ratings Affirmed

                   Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd.

                               To                  From
                               --                  ----
Counterparty Credit Rating    B-/Watch Neg/C      B/Watch Neg/B
Senior Unsecured              B-/Watch Neg        B/Watch Neg

                      Allied Irish Banks PLC

                             To                  From
                             --                  ----
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB/Watch Neg/B      BBB/Watch Neg/A-2
Senior Unsecured            BB/Watch Neg/       BBB/Watch Neg

                        AIB Group (UK) PLC

                            To                  From
                            --                  ----
Counterparty Credit Rating  BB-/Watch Neg/B     BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3

                    Irish Life & Permanent PLC

                             To                  From
                             --                  ----
Counterparty Credit Rating   BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3  BBB/Watch Neg/A-2
Senior Unsecured            BBB-/Watch Neg      BBB/Watch Neg
Subordinated                B/Watch Neg         BB-/Watch Neg

                     Irish Life Assurance PLC

                             To                  From
                             --                  ----
Counterparty Credit Rating  BBB-/Watch Neg/--   BBB/Watch Neg/--
Financial Strength Rating   BBB-/Watch Neg      BBB/Watch Neg/--
Junior Subordinated         BB/Watch Neg        BB+/Watch Neg

                          Bank of Ireland

                            To                  From
                            --                  ----
Counterparty Credit Rating  BB+/Watch Neg/B     BBB+/Watch Neg/A-2
Senior Unsecured           BB+/Watch Neg       BBB+/Watch Neg

                        KBC Bank Ireland PLC

                              To                  From
                              --                  ----
Counterparty Credit Rating    BBB+/Watch Neg/A-2  A-/Watch Neg/A-2
Senior Unsecured             BBB+/Watch Neg      A-/Watch Neg

                     Ulster Bank Ireland Ltd.
                         Ulster Bank Ltd.

                              To                  From
                              --                  ----
Counterparty Credit Rating   A-/Watch Neg/A-2    A/Watch Neg/A-1

       NB: This list does not include all ratings affected.


BTA BANK: Files US$1.2-Bil. Suit Against Ex-Chair Mukhtar Ablyazov
Elizabeth Amon at Bloomberg News reports that BTA Bank JSC, the
Kazakh lender that defaulted during the financial crisis, sued its
former chairman Mukhtar Ablyazov for US$1.2 billion over claims he
embezzled money through fraudulent loans and share sales.

The lawsuit, filed Jan. 21 in London, is BTA's sixth complaint
accusing Mr. Ablyazov, who fled to the U.K., of conspiring with
associates to siphon at least US$3.3 billion from the bank before
it was taken over by the Kazakh government and defaulted on
US$12 billion of debt, according to Bloomberg.

The new claim relates to "purported loans" between BTA and various
third parties, as well as various share purchase agreements
involving the bank in 2007, according to a claim filed in the
case, reports Bloomberg.  Documents listing full details of the
new lawsuit haven't been made public, Bloomberg notes.

BTA in December won a U.K. appeals court ruling that forced
Mr. Ablyazov to place his assets, estimated at US$5 billion, into
receivership, Bloomberg relates.  The bank prevailed after
accusing Mr. Ablyazov of violating a freezing order by failing to
reveal all of his business deals, including his ownership in
Moscow's Eurasia Tower, a 75-story building now under
construction, Bloomberg recounts.

The case is JSC BTA Bank v. Mukhtar Ablyazov, 11-79, High Court of
Justice Queens Bench Division.

                          About BTA Bank

BTA Bank AO (BTA Bank JSC), formerly Bank TuranAlem AO -- is a Kazakhstan-based financial institution,
which is involved in the provision of banking and financial
products for private and corporate clients.

The BTA Group is one of the leading banking groups in the
Commonwealth of Independent States and has affiliated banks in
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey.
In addition, the Bank maintains representative offices in Russia,
Ukraine, China, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom.
The Bank has no branch or agency in the United States, and its
primary assets in the United States consist of balances in
accounts with correspondent banks in New York City.

As of November 30, 2009, the Bank employed 5,043 people inside
and 4 people outside Kazakhstan.  It has no employees in the
United States.  Most of the Bank's assets, and nearly all its
tangible assets, are located in Kazakhstan.

JSC BTA Bank, also known as BTA Bank of Kazakhstan, commenced
insolvency proceedings in the Specialized Financial Court of
Almaty City, Republic of Kazakhstan.  Anvar Galimullaevich
Saidenov, the Chairman of the Management Board of BTA Bank, then
filed a Chapter 15 petition (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 10-10638) on
Feb. 4, 2010, estimating more than US$1 billion in assets and

On March 9, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported
that JSC BTA Bank was granted relief in the U.S. under Chapter 15
when the bankruptcy judge in New York recognized the Kazakh
proceeding as the "foreign main proceeding."  Consequently,
creditor actions in the U.S. were permanently halted, forcing
creditors to prosecute their claims and receive distributions
in Kazakhstan.

In the U.S., the Foreign Representative is represented by Evan C.
Hollander, Esq., Douglas P. Baumstein, Esq., and Richard A.
Graham, Esq. -- -- at White & Case LLP in
New York City.

Bloomberg News reports that the Specialized Financial Court of
Almaty approved BTA Bank's debt restructuring on Aug. 31, 2010,
trimming its obligations from US$16.7 billion to US$4.2 billion,
and extending its longest maturity dates to 20 year from eight.
Creditors who hold 92% of BTA's debt approved the restructuring
plan in May.  BTA reportedly distributed US$945 million in cash to
creditors and new debt securities including US$5.2 billion of
recovery units (representing an 18.5% equity stake) and US$2.3
billion of senior notes on Sept. 1, 2010.  BTA forecasts profit of
slightly more than US$100 million in 2011, Chief Executive Officer
Anvar Saidenov told reporters in Almaty.


SWEDMILK MACEDONIA: Creditors May Opt for Liquidation
SeeNews, citing daily Vecer, reports that Swedmilk Macedonia may
face liquidation after its creditors rejected a proposal for a
restart of production.

SeeNews relates that a local court initiated a bankruptcy
procedure for Swedmilk in June 2009, over a debt of EUR32 million
(US$43.6 million).  According to SeeNews, the daily said that the
company's creditors will decide within 15 days whether to call a
public tender to sell the factory or to opt for liquidation.
SeeNews notes that the daily said one of the creditors, NLB
Tutunska Banka, claims an unpaid debt of EUR10 million from

Swedmilk Macedonia manufactures and markets dairy products.
Swedmilk Macedonia is based in Macedonia.  As of February 3, 2009,
Swedmilk Macedonia operates as a subsidiary of Fenix Energy USA


HARBOURMASTER CLO: Fitch Withdraws 'B' Rating on Class S1 Notes
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Harbourmaster CLO 7 B.V. Class S1
Combination notes' rating:

Harbourmaster CLO 7 B.V.:

  -- Class S1 combination notes (ISIN XS0273895200): 'Bsf' Rating
     Watch Negative; withdrawn

The combination notes have been exchanged for their underlying
component notes, and subsequently cancelled.

UPCB FINANCE: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating to New Sr. Sec. Notes
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive Ba3 rating to
the new EUR750 million senior secured Notes, due 2020, issued by
UPCB Finance II Limited.  The final terms of the Notes are in line
with the draft reviewed for the provisional (P)Ba3 rating for the

UPCB Finance II, incorporated in Cayman Islands, a trust-owned
special purpose vehicle, will on-lend the proceeds on a senior
secured basis into the UPC Holding BV group.  UPC carries a Ba3

                        Ratings Rationale

The Ba3 rating on the notes reflects Moody's views that the senior
secured on-lending establishes a claims position for holders of
the new notes that is broadly equivalent to that of existing
lenders under the UPC Bank Facility.

UPC is a pan-European cable provider, a principal subsidiary of
Liberty Global Inc.  In 2009, the company generated EUR3.45
billion in revenues and EUR1.66 billion in reported operating cash


CABLEUROPA SAU: S&P Raises Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating to 'B'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has raised to 'B'
from 'B-' its long-term corporate credit rating on Spanish cable
operator Cableuropa S.A.U.

At the same time, S&P raised to 'B' from 'B-' the rating on the
senior secured notes issued by special-purpose vehicle Nara Cable
Funding Ltd. The rating on the unsecured notes issued by financing
vehicle ONO Finance II PLC was raised to 'CCC+' from 'CCC'.  The
recovery rating on this debt is unchanged at '6', indicating S&P's
expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.

S&P removed all ratings from CreditWatch with positive
implications, where they had been placed on Jan. 21, 2010.  The
outlook is stable.

These rating actions follow Cableuropa's reported successful
issuance of EUR460 million of unsecured notes due 2019.
Cableuropa will use the proceeds to refinance its unsecured notes
maturing in 2014.

"S&P sees this transaction as a further positive and important
step for Cableuropa to improve its debt maturity profile and
financial flexibility," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Guillaume Trentin.

It builds on a partial refinancing of bank debt in May 2010 and a
EUR700 million senior secured notes issuance to prepay some bank
debt in October 2010.  S&P believes that Cableuropa is now in a
more favorable position to refinance its large bank facilities
maturing in 2013.  Following the subordinated debt refinancing,
S&P understand that Cableuropa has no meaningful debt maturities
between 2013 and 2018.

On Sept. 30, 2010, Cableuropa reported gross consolidated debt of
close to EUR3.8 billion.

"The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Cableuropa will post
resilient operating performance in its core residential segment
and maintain solid profitability over the next 12 months," said
Mr. Trentin.

This should result in steadily increasing free operating cash flow
and moderate deleveraging to less than 5x adjusted total debt to

In addition, the stable outlook reflects S&P's view that
Cableuropa is likely to meet its financial obligations over the
next two years and its expectations that the company will
proactively work over the next 12 months on the refinancing of a
substantial part (or all) of its 2013 senior bank debt maturities.

S&P will closely monitor the evolution of the group's debt
maturity profile, which S&P expects to remain an important rating
driver over the next two years.

Given the high refinancing needs in 2013 and limited growth
prospects stemming from a highly competitive market and Spain's
prolonged economic recession, S&P believes a positive rating
action over the coming year would likely require the refinancing
of Cableuropa's 2013 maturities, coupled with improving covenant
headroom prospects.

Conversely, the ratings are likely to come under pressure over the
next 12-18 months if the company does not make significant
progress in addressing its 2013 debt maturities, resulting in
mounting refinancing risk.  Operating performance that does not
meet the company's business plan, leading in turn to weaker
financial flexibility to face debt amortization or tight covenant
headroom, could also result in a negative rating action.

CASSIOPEIA QEX: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class B Notes to 'C (sf)'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of the class
B notes issued by Cassiopeia QEX B.V.:

  -- EUR69.2M B Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 21,
     2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating action takes into consideration the worse-than-expected
performance of the collateral and the resulting reduction in
credit enhancement.  It also reflects Moody's negative sector
outlook for Spanish RMBS and the weakening of the macro-economic
environment in Spain projected for 2011, including high
unemployment rates and expected further house price declines.

            Further Deterioration in Pool Performance

Moody's has updated expected loss assumption to 25% of original
pool balance for Cassiopeia transaction; this is the highest level
in the Spanish RMBS segment, reflecting the high risk profile of
this portfolio and its very weak performance.

As of October 2010, loans more than 90 days in arrears not in
foreclosure reached 15.68% of current pool balance.  The
cumulative defaults had increased to 41.20% of the original
portfolio balance from 32.7% as of the previous rating review in
October 2009.  Loans in foreclosure process increased to 32.8% of
the initial portfolio balance from 11% in October 2009.
Recoveries have been limited to date, reaching only 12.4% of
cumulative defaults.

The last pool cut received included updated valuations for some of
the properties backing the loans.  These valuations were on
average 36.4% lower than the original valuations provided at
closing.  In its analysis, Moody's has considered that, for the
vast majority of the defaulted loans, the properties will need to
be sold through an auction process, which will reduce further the
sale proceeds below the updated property values.

As mentioned in the press release issued on October 21, 2009,
Banesto as servicer is accelerating the process of classifying
loans as defaulted when more than 90 days in arrears if no
collections are expected in the future.  According to the
transaction documents, a loan is classified as defaulted when more
than 510 days in arrears or if it has otherwise reasonably been
classified as such by Banesto and referred to Banesto's non-
performing loans division.

             Defaults Have Reduced Credit Enhancement

As of closing, the main source of credit enhancement on the junior
notes was an over-collateralization equal to 6.6% of the initial
portfolio.  The sudden increase in defaults has eliminated this
over-collateralization and created an unpaid principal deficiency
ledger (PDL) of EUR175.29 million (or 38.54% of the initial
portfolio) as of October 2010.  Currently, there is no credit
support on Classes B, C and D and the repayment of these notes
will depend on the amounts recovered on the defaulted loans.

The cash reserve in the deal (5.1% of the initial portfolio) can
be used to cover any interest shortfall on Series A, and it could
be used to cover PDL only at maturity (with priority to Series A).
Since April 2009, the Class B, C and D notes are no longer
receiving any interest payment as the interest deferral triggers
were hit.  These triggers are based on unpaid PDL (20%, 12% and 6%
respectively for Classes B, C and D) and Moody's does not expect
these breaches to be cured.

                  Risky Portfolio Characteristics

Cassiopeia QEX B.V. closed in July 2008 and pool factor as of
October 2010 was 51.78%.  In this transaction, the seller (UBS AG
London Branch) assigned to the issuer (Cassiopeia QEX B.V.) the
economic interest ("Participaciones Hipotecarias" and
"Certificados de Transmisión Hipotecaria") on a portfolio of
Spanish mortgage loans originated by Banesto and purchased by UBS
AG London Branch in 2007.  The securitised portfolio comprised
2,597 first-ranking mortgage loans secured on residential
properties located in Spain, for an overall amount of EUR454
million.  All the mortgage loans in this transaction were
originated through brokers, and the vast majority (87.5%) had a
loan-to-value ratio over 80%.  Additionally, the purchase
agreement between UBS and Banesto prioritized loans in arrears or
previously in arrears as eligibility criteria in the portfolio
selection process.

Moody's ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by
the legal final maturity of the notes (April 2048).  Moody's
ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction.  Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but
may have a significant effect on yield to investors.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.

ONO FINANCE: Moody's Assigns 'Caa2' Rating to EUR295-Mil. Notes
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive Caa2 rating to
the EUR295 million 11.125% Senior Notes due 2019 and US$225
million 10.875% Senior Notes due 2019 issued by ONO Finance II
Plc.  The final terms of the notes are in line with the drafts
reviewed for the provisional ratings assignments.  ONO's B3
corporate family rating and all other ratings remain unchanged.
The outlook on the ratings is positive.

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's most recent rating action on ONO was implemented on
January 21, 2011, when the rating agency assigned a provisional
(P) Caa2 rating to the proposed senior notes to be issued by ONO
Finance II Plc.

Headquartered in Madrid, Cableuropa, S.A.U. is Spain's largest
cable operator and leading alternative provider of
telecommunications, broadband and internet and pay-TV services.
It is the only cable operator with national coverage.  In FY 2009,
ONO reported revenues of around EUR1.5 billion and EBITDA of
EUR730 million.


BIZ FINANCE: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to Limited Recourse Notes
Fitch Ratings has assigned Biz Finance PLC's issue of
UAH2,385,050,000 (US$300 million equivalent) 11% fixed-rate
limited recourse notes a Long-term rating of 'B' and a Recovery
Rating of 'RR4'.

The notes, due in February 2014, will be used solely for financing
a deposit, denominated, funded and repayable in Ukrainian hryvnia,
but settled in US dollars, to be placed with Ukraine-based JSC The
State Export-Import Bank of Ukraine (Ukreximbank).  Ukreximbank is
rated Long-term Issuer Default Rating 'B', Short-term IDR 'B',
Individual Rating 'D', Support Rating '4', Support Rating Floor
'B', and National Long-term rating 'AA-(ukr)'.  The Outlooks on
both the Long-term IDR and National Long-term rating are Stable.

Ukreximbank's IDRs, National Long-term and Support ratings are
underpinned by potential support from the Ukrainian authorities,
in case of need, based on the bank's state ownership and policy
role.  The ratings also take into consideration the ability of the
Ukrainian authorities to provide such support, which remains
limited, as indicated by the sovereign's Long-term IDR of 'B'.

Biz Finance PLC, a UK-based company, will only pay noteholders
amounts (principal and interest) received from Ukreximbank under
the deposit agreement.  The claims under the deposit agreement
will rank at least equally with the claims of other senior
unsecured and unsubordinated creditors of Ukreximbank, save those
preferred by relevant laws.  Under Ukrainian law, the claims of
retail depositors rank above those of other senior unsecured
creditors.  At end-Q310, retail depositors accounted for around
22% of Ukreximbank's non-equity funding, according to the bank's
local GAAP accounts.

Fitch notes that the noteholders will assume the foreign exchange
risk in connection with the payment in US dollars on the notes as
all the payments of interest and principal will be made with
reference to the UAH-US$ exchange rate.  If the UAH depreciates
during the transaction's lifetime, the US dollar interest and
principal payments on the notes will decrease accordingly, thereby
reducing the US dollar amount of the original investment made by
the noteholders into the notes.

Noteholders will not be able to receive principal repayments of
the notes during the first year after their issue, even if they
may be entitled to demand prepayment or acceleration in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the notes.  This is the result of
a current resolution of the National Bank of Ukraine, which
prohibits withdrawing or demanding repayment of deposits by non-
residents until the first anniversary of the date on which the
deposit was made.  Accordingly, the deposit agreement stipulates
that as restricted by the current Ukrainian legislation and to the
extent that such restriction continues to remain in effect, the
minimum term of the deposit may be one year from the deposit
placement date.

At end-Q310, Ukreximbank was the second-largest bank in Ukraine by
total assets.  It primarily serves corporate entities mainly
focused on export and import activities.  The state, represented
by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, is the only shareholder in
the bank.

UKRAINE AUTO: Fitch Upgrades Rating on Class B Notes to 'Bsf'
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Ukraine Auto Loan Finance No. 1 PLC's
notes' ratings:

  -- US$22.6m class A notes: upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BB-sf';
     Outlook Stable; assigned Loss Severity rating 'LS-1'

  -- US$18.7m class B notes: upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf';
     Outlook Stable; assigned LS rating 'LS-1'

The rating actions are driven by Fitch's upgrade of Ukraine's
sovereign rating and Country Ceiling to 'B' in July 2010 (affirmed
September 2010) which reflected signs of economic growth, lower
financial volatility, stabilization of the domestic political
environment following presidential elections and the signing of a
new IMF lending agreement.  The transaction has also experienced
significant amortization since the end of the revolving period
(May 2009) and the collateral performance has remained in line
with base case assumptions since closing.

The transaction funds a portfolio of auto loans originated within
the Ukraine by CJSC Privatbank (rated 'B'/Stable), the largest
privately-owned bank in the country.  It closed in May 2008 and
the class A notes have currently amortized to 26% of their
original balance.

The loans funded are denominated and disbursed in US dollars,
which introduces two risks.  Firstly, given any future economic
stresses, authorities may restrict or suspend the expatriation of
foreign currency, leading to a liquidity shock for the issuer.
The Class A notes benefit from a cash reserve and a transfer &
convertibility insurance initially sized to cover 18 months of
interest payments.  Since the amortization period began, the
interest coverage has increased and in Fitch's view is sufficient
to support a three-notch uplift above the Country Ceiling.  The
upgrade of the Class A notes therefore maintains this differential
above the new Country Ceiling.

Secondly, if economic conditions deteriorate, the government may
attempt to alleviate the financial burden of household borrowers
by, for example, a forced redenomination of US dollar loans, such
as those funded by this securitization, into the local currency.
Depending on the conversion rate used and the subsequent exchange
rate movements, any intervention could lead to collections falling
short of their expected amounts in US dollars.  The transaction
has no structural protection against this risk.

Credit enhancement has increased since the beginning of the
amortization period, and now stands at 55.26% for the Class A
notes, up 30% from 25.8% at closing, and 15.29% for the Class B
notes (8.8% at closing).  Credit enhancement is calculated using a
reserve of US$1.65 million, as once 50% of the Class A notes have
been repaid, any amount exceeding 4% of the Class A and Class B
note balance should be released from the reserve, subject to a
floor of US$1 million.  The cumulative defaults stood at 0.96% as
at 10 November 2010, well below the Fitch base case value of
1.65%.  The transaction also has 2.83% available excess spread.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALTE LIEBE: S&P Downgrades Rating on EUR102-Mil. Notes to 'B-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its debt rating
on the EUR102 million senior secured amortizing notes due 2025
issued by Jersey-based, special-purpose vehicle Alte Liebe 1 Ltd.
to 'B-' from 'BB-' and removed it from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where S&P placed it on June 25, 2010.  The outlook
is negative.

Subsequent to the downgrade, S&P suspended the notes' rating as
S&P considered that, given the lack of reported operating
underperformance, S&P does not have sufficient information (for
example, regarding the future long-term operating and financial
forecasts of the project) to maintain appropriate surveillance on
the rating.  However, following discussion with the project
company, S&P does expect to receive relevant information, although
the timing of the information is still unknown.

The notes continue to have an unconditional and irrevocable
guarantee of payment of scheduled interest and ultimate principal
from Ambac Assurance U.K. Ltd. (not rated), the controlling
creditor.  Under Standard & Poor's criteria, a rating on monoline-
insured debt reflects the higher of the rating on the monoline (in
case it is rated) or Standard & Poor's underlying rating.
Therefore, the long-term debt rating on the notes reflects the

"The downgrade reflects S&P's view that Alte Liebe 1's
creditworthiness deteriorated materially during 2010 following
continued lower-than-expected wind levels.  These low wind levels
resulted in a significant deterioration in the company's liquidity
and financial strength," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Jose Abos.

Alte Liebe 1 is a special-purpose vehicle with no operating
assets, owned by a charitable trust and based in Jersey.  It
issued the notes to partially fund the construction of six wind
farms in Germany with a capacity of 142 megawatts.  Alte Liebe 1
on-lent the note proceeds under individual loan agreements with
the respective wind farms, which used the funds to refinance the
existing bank debt.  The proceeds from the notes were also used to
fund various liquidity reserves, including a reserve account at
each wind farm with a balance equal to the relevant wind farm's
first-year debt service under its respective loan agreement.

The negative outlook at the time of the rating suspension
reflected S&P's views about the potential for continuing
unfavorable wind conditions, substantially below the levels
established in the original base case.  S&P is of the view that,
should wind conditions remain depressed, reserve accounts in
respect of the individual wind farms are likely to be depleted and
not be able to make good any principal payment shortfall by one or
more of the Alte Liebe 1 wind farms.  Shortfalls in these reserve
accounts, in S&P's view, could be difficult to replenish unless
wind conditions are restored to levels not seen over the past few
years.  Given the notes' flexible repayment profile--with timely
payment of interest, but ultimate payment of principal in 2025--
S&P views an interest payment default on the notes as unlikely
over the medium term, provided that no wind farm loan agreement is

Standard & Poor's would consider reinstating the rating should S&P
receives sufficient, relevant, and timely information from the
relevant parties in relation to Alte Liebe that would allow the
rating agency to analyze the likely future long-term performance
of the project and provided that S&P can expect the necessary
information to be reported in a timely manner in the future.

EMI GROUP: Investors Split Over Support for Another Fund
Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Salamander Davoudi and Lina Saigol at
The Financial Times report that investors are split over
supporting Terra Firma's Guy Hands in raising another private
equity fund following a heavy loss on EMI Group.

"I would be gobsmacked if he managed to raise another fund," the
FT quoted one UK private equity executive, as saying, arguing that
Mr. Hands had made too many enemies.

Others disagree, the FT notes.  "Quite a lot of investors remain
loyal to Guy and are ready to back him for another fund," says
Jon Moulton, the founder of private equity group Better Capital,
according to the FT.  "Their views are it was a foolish, bad deal,
done in a rush and that he fought too hard to keep it.  But if you
look at the rest of the fund it's pretty decent and the overall
numbers look quite good."

The biggest criticism is that Mr. Hands invested 30% of two funds
in EMI, the FT discloses.  Supporters say this aggressive funding
was intended to be a temporary bridge, allowing Terra Firma to
move quickly on the auction and then bring in other investors, the
FT notes.  For a few months, potential co-investors showed strong
appetite but this vanished as markets shook in late 2007, the FT
relates.  At the height of the credit bubble in 2007, Terra Firma
paid GBP4 billion for EMI, but the deal soon started to unravel,
the FT recounts.  Frozen credit markets also left Citigroup, which
backed Mr. Hands' GBP4.2 billion EMI buy-out, unable to refinance
its bridge loan, whose onerous terms sealed EMI's fate, the FT

Mr. Hands has admitted that he did a bad deal and underestimated
the fallout from his sharp-elbowed approach to artists in an
industry he saw as bloated, the FT notes.

But supporters say other factors were beyond his control: currency
swings that turned his initial GBP2.5 billion loan into a GBP3.4
billion burden; and the unexpected discovery that EMI's historic
numbers had been flattered by high returns of unsold CDs, the FT

Mr. Hands heavy loss on EMI "is a blow, but it's against a record
of a large number of successes," Mr. Moulton, as cited by the FT,

Terra Firma's first fund has returned a profit, the FT discloses.
According to the FT, despite its EMI losses, Terra Firma Capital
Partners II's cash-on-cash multiple -- a measure of industry
returns -- is also positive, albeit unimpressive at 1.74 times.
The fund's more lucrative investments include German autobahn
service stations and the Odeon and UCI cinemas, the FT notes.

TFDA, a German residential real estate fund, has a cash-on-cash
multiple of 1.3 times, but TFCP III -- which includes a cattle
ranch and an aircraft leasing company -- is under water, the FT

Mr. Hands has EU1.4 billion (GBP1.2 billion) left to invest in
that fund and everything hinges on its performance, the FT states.

                        Citigroup Takeover

As reported on Feb. 3, 2011, by the Troubled Company Reporter-
Europe, Bloomberg News said Citigroup Inc. seized control of EMI
after the record label struggled to meet the terms of loans used
to finance its takeover by Guy Hands, opening the way for a sale
of the company.  Citigroup said in a statement on Tuesday that the
U.S. bank, which funded Mr. Hands' takeover in 2007, will own all
of EMI after the debt-for-equity swap, according to Bloomberg.
The deal will reduce London-based EMI's debt by 65% to GBP1.2
billion (US$1.94 billion), Bloomberg disclosed.  The agreement may
lead to a sale of a record label of the Beatles and Pink Floyd,
Bloomberg noted.  Warner Music Group Corp. and BMG Rights are
among bidders that have expressed interest in EMI's publishing and
recorded assets, Bloomberg said.  Bloomberg, citing Needham & Co.,
said EMI may fetch about US$2 billion in a sale, narrowly covering
its US$1.94 billion debt.  Laura Martin, an analyst at Needham in
Pasadena, California,  as cited by Bloomberg, said private equity
firms KKR & Co. and Apollo Group Inc., as well as Sony/ATV Music
Publishing, are likely to seek EMI's publishing unit.

EMI Group Ltd. -- is the fourth
largest record company in terms of market share (behind Universal
Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, and Warner Music Group).
It houses recorded music segment EMI Music and EMI Music
Publishing.  EMI Music distributes CDs, videos, and other formats
primarily through imprints and divisions such as Capitol Records
and Virgin, and sports a roster of artists such as The Beastie
Boys, Norah Jones, and Lenny Kravitz.  EMI Music Publishing, the
world's largest music publisher, handles the rights to more than a
million songs.  EMI Music operates through regional divisions (EMI
Music North America, International, and UK & Ireland).  Private
equity firm Terra Firma owns EMI.

FALKIRK FOOTBALL: Averts Liquidation; Faces Cash Flow Problems
Stephen Halliday at reports that Falkirk
Football Club has staved off a winding-up petition from Her
Majesty's Revenue and Customs and insists it is "business as
usual" at the club despite admitting to cash flow problems. relates that the HMRC asked the Court of
Session in Edinburgh to order Falkirk to be wound up and a
liquidator appointed.  The club issued a statement on Jan. 31
claiming they had not been notified of the petition, which was
lodged on Jan. 24.

It is understood, however, that several Falkirk directors have
injected money into the club over the past week in order to avoid
HMRC action, notes.  "Falkirk FC was surprised
and shocked to read in the press that HMRC have issued a winding-
up order on the club," quoted the club as
saying in the statement. "No formal notification of this action
has been received."

"We can confirm that all VAT payments are up to date and that we
have reached agreement with HMRC [Tues]day that any remaining
outstanding PAYE payments will be paid in a mutually-agreed
timescale," the Club, as cited by, said.
"Accordingly, the winding-up order will be fully rescinded.  The
club would like to issue a reassurance to all of our supporters
and business partners that the club remains in a strong financial
position with no bank debt. It is very much business as usual."

Falkirk Football Club is a Scottish football club based in
Falkirk, playing in the Scottish Football League.

GMAC UK: Fitch Affirms Short-Term Issuer Default Rating at 'B'
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the long-term Issuer Default Rating of
Ally Financial Inc. to 'BB' from 'B'; the Rating Outlook is
revised to Stable from Positive.

The upgrade reflects the risk-reduction efforts undertaken by the
company in its mortgage operations, demonstration of consistent
operating profitability in all reportable segments, improved
funding flexibility offered by the deposit-raising ability and
economical access to public/private debt markets, and maintenance
of solid liquidity and capital levels.

Since late 2009, Ally has been active in de-risking its mortgage
business which was a drag on the company's earnings for the past
few years.  In 2010, the company completed the sale of its
European mortgage operations, shedding US$11 billion in assets and
contingent liabilities, sold its struggling resort finance
portfolio with US$1 billion in unpaid principal balance and
continued to manage its remaining legacy mortgage assets, selling
US$2.5 billion in 2010 with gains to carrying value.  Furthermore,
Ally's wholly-owned mortgage subsidiary Residential Capital LLC
reached important rep and warranty settlements with government
sponsored enterprises, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, which
effectively caps future rep and warranty losses on GSE exposure.
Ally still continues to face potential losses on non-GSE exposure
associated with private label securities and monoline insurers,
but Fitch believes that future rep and warranty losses should be
manageable in the context of Ally's repurchase reserves, core
earnings and capital base.  Repurchase reserve stood at
US$830 million at Dec. 31, 2010 against outstanding claims of
US$888 million and included the US$462 million settlement with
Fannie Mae in the fourth quarter of 2010 (4Q'10).  Fitch believes
that the company will prudently add to its reserves in light of
any pick-up in claim activity.

Operating performance has been strong with the company reporting
US$1.1 billion in net earnings in 2010, compared to a loss of
US$10.3 billion in 2009.  All three operating segments
(automotive, mortgage and insurance) were profitable throughout
the year.  Improved results are a factor of strong growth in auto
originations, continued improvement in credit trends, lower
interest expense due to favorable funding mix, and strong fee
margins in new mortgage originations.  Fitch expects positive
earnings generation in 2011, although profits are likely to be
below 2010 levels as higher yielding, higher risk assets roll off
and the asset mix shifts toward lower yielding but better quality
auto and mortgage originations.

Credit quality has continued its positive trend quarter-over-
quarter.  In the auto space, replacement of lower quality older
vintage loans with higher quality originations combined with a
strong used-car market is having a favorable impact on credit
metrics.  In the mortgage space, credit quality has improved and
is performing within expectations, following the strategic actions
taken by the company in 4Q'09.  Overall, non-performing loans
totaled US$1.5 billion at Dec. 31, 2010, down significantly from
US$2.7 billion in 2009.  Net charge-offs were US$240 million in
4Q'10 compared to US$3.9 billion in 4Q'09.  Allowance as a
percentage of NPLs was a strong 124% at Dec. 31, 2010, compared to
91% in the prior year.  While the mortgage portfolio could be
susceptible to further decline in home prices and macroeconomic
risks, it is becoming a smaller and more manageable part of the
total receivables and loan portfolio.  Fitch believes that the
auto-finance portfolio, which at Dec. 31, 2010 accounted for
US$96 billion or about 80% of Ally's total loan and lease
portfolio, should help further stabilize overall portfolio credit

Capital ratios improved during 2010, despite the consolidation of
US$19 billion of off-balance-sheet assets on Jan. 1, 2010, in
accordance with SFAS 166/167.  Tier 1 capital ratio improved 85
basis points year-over-year to 15.0%, driven by positive earnings,
reduction in higher risk-weighted assets primarily related to the
sale of European mortgage assets (US$11 billion) and amortization
of the lease portfolio (US$6.9 billion), offset by strong auto and
mortgage originations during the year.  Furthermore, tier 1 common
capital increased 65% to US$12.7 billion in 2010, following the
U.S. Treasury's 4Q'10 conversion of US$5.5 billion from mandatory
convertible preferred to common equity.  The tier 1 common capital
ratio was 8.6% at Dec. 31, 2010, up significantly from 4.8% a year
earlier.  The strengthening of the tier 1 common ratio provides
additional protection to absorb contemplated regulatory changes
and any unexpected macroeconomic risk.

The parent's available liquidity, which includes cash,
unencumbered investment securities, and unused committed capacity,
was US$23.8 billion at Dec. 31, 2010, which represents
approximately 20% of total loans and lease portfolio.  Liquidity
is currently being conservatively managed in light of the upcoming
debt maturities over the next few years.  On a consolidated basis,
Ally has US$9.5 billion and US$12.6 billion in unsecured debt due
in 2011 and 2012, respectively.  Fitch believes that Ally will be
able to refinance these maturing debt obligations with a
combination of balance sheet liquidity, future asset sales and
deposit growth.

Following the 4Q'10 MCP conversion, Treasury is now a 74%
shareholder of Ally.  Fitch has downgraded the Support rating to
'5' to reflect its view that the Treasury investment is not
considered to be long-term and is likely to be replaced by third
party capital.

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's expectation for continuation
of actions to further de-risk the legacy mortgage business,
consistent operating profitability and maintenance of solid
capital and liquidity levels.  The recognition of higher than
expected rep and warranty losses that results in a material
decline in tangible capitalization, declines in operating
performance due to asset quality deterioration, and/or weakening
of the liquidity profile could pressure ratings.  Conversely,
improved market share and growth in the core auto finance
franchise, better credit metrics in the residential mortgage
business, expansion of the banking franchise along with the growth
in the bank's deposit funding base while maintaining a
conservative capital and liquidity posture, could lead to upward
rating momentum.

Ally is one of the world's largest automotive financial services
companies with approximately US$172 billion of assets at Dec. 31,
2010.  Founded in 1919 as a wholly owned subsidiary of General
Motors Corporation (currently General Motors Company, or GM), Ally
is the official preferred source of financing for GM, Chrysler,
Saab, Suzuki, Fiat, and Thor Industries vehicles and offers a full
suite of automotive financing products and services in key markets
around the world.  Ally's other business units include mortgage
operations and commercial finance, and through its subsidiary,
Ally Bank, it offers online retail banking products.  On Dec. 24,
2008, Ally became a bank holding company under the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956.

Fitch has taken these rating actions with a Stable Outlook:

Ally Financial Inc.

  -- Long-term IDR upgraded to 'BB' from 'B',
  -- Senior unsecured upgraded to 'BB' from 'B/RR4',
  -- Senior shelf upgraded to 'BB' from 'B/RR4',
  -- Short-term debt affirmed at 'B',
  -- Individual upgraded to 'C/D' from 'D',
  -- Support downgraded to '5' from '4',
  -- Support Floor downgraded to 'NF' from 'B',
  -- Long-term FDIC guaranteed debt affirmed at 'AAA';
  -- Short-term FDIC guaranteed debt affirmed at 'F1+'.

GMAC International Finance B.V.

  -- Long-term IDR upgraded to 'BB' from 'B',
  -- Senior unsecured upgraded to 'BB' from 'B/RR4',
  -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B',
  -- Short-term debt affirmed at 'B'.

GMAC Bank GmbH

  -- Long-term IDR upgraded to 'BB' from 'B',
  -- Senior unsecured upgraded to 'BB' from 'B/RR4',
  -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B',
  -- Short-term debt affirmed at 'B'.

Ally Credit Canada Limited

  -- Long-term IDR upgraded to 'BB' from 'B',
  -- Senior unsecured upgraded to 'BB' from 'B/RR4',
  -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B',
  -- Short-term debt affirmed at 'B'.

GMAC Financial Services NZ Limited

  -- Long-term IDR upgraded to 'BB' from 'B',
  -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B',
  -- Short-term debt affirmed at 'B'.

GMAC Australia LLC

  -- Long-term IDR upgraded to 'BB' from 'B',
  -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B',
  -- Short-term debt affirmed at 'B'.

GMAC (U.K.) plc

  -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B',
  -- Short-term debt affirmed at 'B'.

Ratings Withdrawn:

GMAC Australia (Finance) Ltd

  -- Short-term IDR 'B';
  -- Short-term debt 'B'.

HMV GROUP: Alexander Mamut Explores Options; Permira Mulls Offer
David Altaner at Bloomberg News reports that Sky News said a
shareholder was looking at options for HMV Group Plc including a
breakup of the company.

According to Bloomberg, Sky News reported that Alexander Mamut,
who owns 6.1% of HMV's shares, hired Credit Suisse Group AG to
consider options.  Bloomberg notes that Sky said Mr. Mamut may
also consider a purchase of its Waterstone's bookstore unit.

Separately, Retail Week, as cited by Bloomberg, said Permira
Advisers LLP was considering a possible offer.  According to
Bloomberg, the trade magazine said Roger Parry, who was involved
with the leveraged buyout firm's 2006 bid for HMV, may be working
with Permira.

Bloomberg relates that in a Jan. 31 note to investors, Oriel
Securities analysts led by Ben Hunt wrote HMV could be worth
between GBP141 million (US$228 million) and GBP186 million in a
breakup, yet only to a third party.

HMV, Bloomberg says, is closing 60 stores after saying that an
April banking covenant test will be "tight" following
disappointing holiday-season sales.

An HMV spokesman, Paul Barker, said last month that Waterstone's
has not been put up for sale, Bloomberg recounts.

Meanwhile, Suzanne Lynch at the Irish Times reports that
Waterstone's was set to close two of its three Dublin stores last
Sunday, affecting 50 jobs.  The multi-storey outlets on Dawson
Street and at the Jervis Center would close, according to The
Irish Times.  Waterstone's on Tuesday said the closure of the two
Dublin stores would have no impact on the company's other stores
in Drogheda and Cork, The Irish Times notes.  Waterstone's is also
closing nine other branches in the UK in addition to the closure
of two stores in Dublin, The Irish Times says.

The Irish Time relates that in January, HMV said it was planning
to close 40 HMV stores and 20 Waterstone's outlets across Britain
and Ireland this year.  So far nine of the 40 HMV stores targeted
for closure have shut, while the closure of 14 of the 20
Waterstone's shops have been announced, The Irish Times states.

HMV has 16 shops in the Republic and 11 in Northern Ireland, The
Irish Times discloses.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 24,
2011, Reuters said HMV appointed accountancy firm KPMG to advise
on its debt and help it meet an April test of its borrowing rules.
Reuters disclosed that a source familiar with the situation on
Jan. 20 said that KPMG, already an adviser to HMV, was given the
additional task of tackling the company's debt, reported as
GBP152 million when it published half-year results in December.
HMV issued a profit warning last month and said meeting April's
test of its borrowing rules would be tight, Reuters noted.

United Kingdom-based HMV Group plc is engaged in retailing of pre-
recorded music, video, electronic games and related entertainment
products under the HMV and Fopp brands, and the retailing of books
principally under the Waterstone's brand.  The Company operates in
four segments: HMV UK & Ireland, HMV International, HMV Live and
Waterstone's.  HMV International consists of HMV Canada, HMV Hong
Kong and HMV Singapore.  Waterstone's is a bookseller, which
operates through 314 stores and a transactional Web site for the
sale of both physical and e-books for download.  The Company has
operations in seven countries, with principal markets being the
United Kingdom and Canada.  Its retail businesses operate through
417 stores in the United Kingdom, Canada, Hong Kong and Singapore.
On January 29, 2010, the Company completed the acquisition of MAMA
Group Plc.  Its subsidiaries include HMV Canada Inc, HMV Guernsey
Limited, HMV Hong Kong Limited and HMV (IP) Limited.

IXL 2008: Goes Into Administration, Makes 66 Jobs Redundant
BBC News reports that IXL 2008 Limited has gone into
administration cutting 66 jobs in the process.

According to the BBC News, administrators ReSolve Partners LLP
said IXL continued to trade with a skeleton workforce, which was
fulfilling "existing orders."  The report relates that the there
are plans are to sell the business as a going concern.

BBC News recalls that the company's previous owner, Setten and
Durward, was placed in administration in February 2008, but 150
jobs were saved when the firm was bought as a going concern by
ZCOM Limited two months later.

Headquartered in Llandrindod Wells, IXL 2008 Limited makes lever
arch files, box files and ring binders which are sold worldwide.

JERMON LIMITED: Goes Into Administration
Clare Weir at Belfast Telegraph reports that Jermon Limited has
gone into administration.

Tom Keenan of Keenan Corporate Finance was appointed administrator
to Jermon Limited by First Trust and other banks, according to
Belfast Telegraph.  The report relates that Jermon Limited is
landlord for a number of key retail and office properties in
Belfast, including the Scottish Mutual Building in Donegall Square
South, HMV and TK Maxx in Donegall Arcade and Mothercare in Castle

The report notes that tenants and creditors of Jermon Limited have
received letters telling them of the administration.

Headquartered in Ireland, Jermon Limited is a property company
that owned a string of prominent retail and office buildings in
Belfast.  Former pharmacist Peter Dolan formed the Jermon group of
companies in 1997.

JJB SPORTS: Feb. 24 Deadline Set for Restructuring Plan
Claer Barrett at The Financial Times reports that JJB Sports,
which is raising GBP31.5 million from shareholders to stave off
bankruptcy, is preparing a restructuring plan that could involve
the closure of more than 100 stores.

According to the FT, JJB could lose the support of its lender,
Bank of Scotland, this month if a turnaround plan does not meet
its approval.

The bank has set a deadline of Feb. 24 for JJB's board to present
a credible restructuring plan, one week after its shareholders are
due to vote through the GBP31.5 million fundraising, the FT

The FT relates that people familiar with the situation said this
would involve raising additional finance and shedding more than
100 stores through a second company voluntary agreement to stem
losses, currently in the region of GBP4 million a month.  This
restructuring must be executed before May, the next key selling
peak for the business, when it will need to draw down funds to
restock stores with sports clothing and equipment for the summer
season, the FT states.

The FT notes that in return for waiving covenant tests until April
30, JJB must satisfy a stock cover test on the last day of each
month, to ensure it is liquidating stock in a timely manner to
generate cash flow.

The company, as cited by the FT, said the GBP31.5 million was "the
first stage" of the recovery plan.

In 2009, JJB used a CVA deal with creditors to walk away from
leases on 140 stores, the FT recounts.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 4,
2011, the Financial Times said JD Sports Fashion confirmed it is
in talks about a possible takeover bid for rival JJB.  The FT
disclosed Bury-based JD Sports said that it was in "early stage
discussions with the board of JJB Sports," but added there was "no
certainty that an offer will be made . . . nor as to the terms."
In a separate announcement, JJB announced a long-awaited placing
to raise GBP31.5 million from shareholders, the FT related.  The
placing, which is not underwritten, will give the business enough
cash to continue as a going concern until the end of March,
according to the FT.  After that, "the company could experience a
funding shortfall," JJB, as cited by the FT, said.  Slightly more
than half of the placing proceeds will be used to make "immediate
payments to creditors" with the balance funding trading losses and
enabling the purchase of new stock, the FT noted.

JJB Sports plc (JJB Sports) is a sports retailer supplying branded
sports and leisure clothing, footwear and accessories.  JJB Sports
is a high street sports retailer, with 250 stores in the United
Kingdom and Eire.  It provides a range of products covering United
Kingdom sports.  The Company stocks all its sports brands,
supported by its own-brand and exclusive ranges.  The Company's
segment includes the Company's retail operations, including any
retail stores, which are attached to fitness clubs.  The Company
operates in two geographic segments: the United Kingdom and Eire.
The Company's subsidiaries include Blane Leisure Limited, Sports
Division (Eireann) Limited, Golf TV Limited, TV Sports Shop
Limited, Original Shoe Company Limited and Qubefootwear Limited.
The Company sold its fitness club operations on March 25, 2009.

WEST TOWER: Placed Into Administration
Alistair Houghton at reports that West Tower
Liverpool Limited has gone into administration with the
appointment of Grant Thornton as administrator.

Joint administrator Les Ross said West Tower had been hit by the
fall in property values and had struggled to meet bank borrowing,
according to

"We'd like to reassure all existing and future occupants that West
Tower will continue to function normally, with services provided
by the present managing agent Braemar Group.  It will be business
as normal for the people who live in and use West Tower.  Over the
coming days and weeks we will be considering the most appropriate
strategy for the site but it's worth saying that we recognize the
value of West Tower and its unique position in the city," the
report quoted Mr. Ross as saying.

The report notes that Panoramic Restaurant located on the 34th
floor is owned by a different company and is unaffected by the

West Tower Liverpool Limited owns the 40-storey building on Brook
Street overlooking the city's waterfront.  The tower, which was
built by Liverpool property developer Beetham, contains 123
apartments, 106 of which are lent to tenants.

YELL GROUP: Shareholders Agree to New Strategy
Salamander Davoudi and Miles Johnson at The Financial Times report
that shareholders in Yell Group plc have agreed to a new strategy
for the company.

According to the FT, the strategy includes a rationalization of
the business, further cost-cutting and heftier investment in

Yell, the FT says, has also been approached by buyers interested
in different parts of the group, which spans the UK, Latin
America, Spain and the US.  But any sale is considered unlikely
this year because of poor market conditions, the FT notes.

Michael Pocock, the new chief executive, held meetings with
investors last month, the FT recounts.  He is drawing up a
detailed battle plan to drive down Yell's GBP2.9 billion debt pile
and reposition the business, the FT states.  The conclusions of
the review are to be unveiled in June, the FT notes.

The directories business has struggled in a difficult economic and
competitive environment, and there are concerns that the business
model is no longer viable in the Internet age, the FT relates.

"Yell has been terrible, absolutely awful.  Cash flow has been
better due to cutting costs but you can't do that forever, so we
want to see some top-line growth as well," the FT quoted one
shareholder as saying.

Standard & Poor's on Feb. 3 downgraded Yell's credit rating
further into "junk" (subinvestment grade) territory and revised
its outlook from stable to negative, the FT relates.  According to
the FT, the rating agency said Yell was unlikely to meet its
guidance on earnings, debt and banking covenant headroom in 2011-
12.  Full-year earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and
amortization are forecast to be about GBP520 million in the year
to March and are expected to fall further next year, the FT

"Yell has to implement a strict cost-savings program to bring its
earnings back up to GBP450 million or GBP460 million in 2012," the
FT quoted one media analyst as saying.  "They will come within a
whisker of breaching their covenants over the next 12 months, so
they have to do enough cost-cutting to avoid a breach."

                           About Yell Group

Headquartered in Reading, England, Yell Group plc -- is an international directories
business operating in the classified advertising market through
printed, online, and phone media in the U.K. and the US.  Yell
also owns 100% of TPI (renamed "Yell Publicidad"), the largest
publisher of yellow and white pages in Spain, with operations in
certain countries in Latin America.  Yell's revenue for the twelve
months ended March 31, 2008, was GBP2,219 million and its
Adjusted EBITDA was GBP738.9 million.


* EUROPE: Euro States Should Be Allowed to Default on Debt
Jann Bettinga and Holger Elfes at Bloomberg News report that
Andreas Schmitz, chairman of the management board at HSBC
Trinkaus, said euro-region countries should be able to default on
their debt as a way to tackle fiscal crises.

"Companies can file for insolvency, private individuals can file
for insolvency," Bloomberg quoted Mr. Schmitz as saying in an
interview at the company's headquarters in Dusseldorf, Germany.
"States, too, may file for insolvency, we've seen that in the
past.  It's a mystery to me why this shouldn't apply to euro

Bloomberg relates that European governments are stepping up
efforts to narrow budget deficits after the region's sovereign-
debt crisis threatened to trigger defaults and undermine the euro.
Leaders are considering boosting the EUR750-billion (US$1
trillion) rescue fund and adopting more stringent deficit rules to
avoid future turmoil after rescues of Greece and Ireland,
Bloomberg discloses.

Mr. Schmitz, as cited by Bloomberg, said the euro region's
troubles aren't a result of the financial-market crisis, which
forced governments to bail out banks with billions of euros in
taxpayer money.  Bloomberg notes that Mr. Schmitz, who is also the
president of the Association of German Banks, said "The debt
crisis was already a problem before that, it was merely made
visible more quickly through the financial rescue packages for the
financial sector."

* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 31 to February 4, 2011

Issuer                Coupon    Maturity Currency   Price
------                ------    -------- --------   -----

BA CREDITANSTALT        5.470   8/28/2013     EUR    70.63
BAWAG                   7.548   2/18/2035     EUR    67.64
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.170   7/29/2015     EUR    67.50
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.810   7/29/2025     EUR    55.00
RAIFF ZENTRALBK         4.500   9/28/2035     EUR    79.74

KOMMUNEKREDIT           0.500    2/3/2016     TRY    74.26

MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.250   6/28/2040     CAD    23.66
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500   3/17/2025     CAD    53.95
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500   9/24/2020     CAD    68.86
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000   2/27/2018     AUD    66.74
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500    2/9/2016     ZAR    72.99
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000   6/30/2017     ZAR    57.31

AIR FRANCE-KLM          4.970    4/1/2015     EUR    16.28
ALCATEL-LUCENT          5.000    1/1/2015     EUR     3.45
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG        6.720    1/1/2015     EUR     4.88
ATOS ORIGIN SA          2.500    1/1/2016     EUR    55.27
CALYON                  6.000   6/18/2047     EUR    26.34
CAP GEMINI SOGET        3.500    1/1/2014     EUR    43.70
CAP GEMINI SOGET        1.000    1/1/2012     EUR    44.12
CGG VERITAS             1.750    1/1/2016     EUR    29.84
CLUB MEDITERRANE        5.000    6/8/2012     EUR    17.40
CLUB MEDITERRANE        6.110   11/1/2015     EUR    19.18
EURAZEO                 6.250   6/10/2014     EUR    58.10
FAURECIA                4.500    1/1/2015     EUR    27.49
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125   7/31/2014     EUR    18.15
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125   7/31/2015     EUR    16.09
NEXANS SA               4.000    1/1/2016     EUR    66.82
ORPEA                   3.875    1/1/2016     EUR    47.32
PEUGEOT SA              4.450    1/1/2016     EUR    33.91
PUBLICIS GROUPE         1.000   1/18/2018     EUR    48.45
PUBLICIS GROUPE         3.125   7/30/2014     EUR    38.88
RHODIA SA               0.500    1/1/2014     EUR    49.41
SOC AIR FRANCE          2.750    4/1/2020     EUR    22.01
SOITEC                  6.250    9/9/2014     EUR    10.51
TEM                     4.250    1/1/2015     EUR    58.20
THEOLIA                 2.700    1/1/2041     EUR    10.68

DEUTSCHE BK LOND        3.000   5/18/2012     CHF    66.36
DEUTSCHE BK LOND        0.500   8/25/2017     BRL    54.45
ESCADA AG               7.500    4/1/2012     EUR    19.49
HSH NORDBANK AG         4.375   2/14/2017     EUR    62.47
L-BANK FOERDERBK        0.500   5/10/2027     CAD    48.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT         2.500   1/30/2034     EUR    65.13
QIMONDA FINANCE         6.750   3/22/2013     USD     4.00
SOLON AG SOLAR          1.375   12/6/2012     EUR    28.12

ATHENS URBAN TRN        5.008   7/18/2017     EUR    69.45
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.851   9/19/2016     EUR    73.71
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.900   7/25/2025     EUR    49.34
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.300   7/25/2030     EUR    49.99
HELLENIC REPUB          4.590    4/8/2016     EUR    69.20
HELLENIC REPUB          5.200   7/17/2034     EUR    68.22
HELLENIC REPUB          5.000   8/22/2016     JPY    64.73
HELLENIC REPUB          5.000   3/11/2019     EUR    61.56
HELLENIC REPUB          6.140   4/14/2028     EUR    66.77
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.300   3/20/2026     EUR    65.10
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.700   7/20/2015     EUR    70.38
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.650   9/30/2015     EUR    70.97
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.600   7/20/2016     EUR    67.09
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.020   9/13/2016     EUR    68.21
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.225    3/1/2017     EUR    67.32
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.900   4/20/2017     EUR    72.36
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.300   7/20/2017     EUR    67.77
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.675   10/9/2017     EUR    67.36
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.590    4/3/2018     EUR    65.65
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600   7/20/2018     EUR    66.82
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.014   2/27/2019     EUR    65.74
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.959    3/4/2019     EUR    70.26
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.000   7/19/2019     EUR    71.32
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.250   6/19/2020     EUR    73.40
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.700   3/20/2024     EUR    64.28
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500   9/20/2037     EUR    58.85
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600   9/20/2040     EUR    58.85
NATIONAL BK GREE        3.875   10/7/2016     EUR    74.04

AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000   2/12/2030     EUR    55.62
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000    3/1/2030     EUR    55.58
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.580   4/28/2028     EUR    61.78
ALLIED IRISH BKS       12.500   6/25/2019     EUR    30.42
ALLIED IRISH BKS       12.500   6/25/2019     GBP    29.39
ALLIED IRISH BKS       10.750   3/29/2017     EUR    30.41
ALLIED IRISH BKS       11.500   3/29/2022     GBP    29.89
ALLIED IRISH BKS        7.875    7/5/2023     GBP    31.78
ALLIED IRISH BKS       10.750   3/29/2017     USD    30.45
BANK OF IRELAND         4.875   1/22/2018     GBP    52.91
BANK OF IRELAND        10.000   2/12/2020     GBP    66.22
BANK OF IRELAND        10.750   6/22/2018     GBP    68.49
BANK OF IRELAND         5.600   9/18/2023     EUR    43.54
BANK OF IRELAND         9.250    9/7/2020     GBP    61.59
BANK OF IRELAND        10.000   2/12/2020     EUR    67.32
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.450    3/1/2030     EUR    63.71
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.400   11/6/2029     EUR    63.80
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.760    9/7/2029     EUR    66.84
DEPFA ACS BANK          6.000   10/7/2035     USD    73.13
DEPFA ACS BANK          5.125   3/16/2037     USD    61.82
DEPFA ACS BANK          3.250   7/31/2031     CHF    74.38
DEPFA ACS BANK          0.500    3/3/2025     CAD    33.05
DEPFA ACS BANK          4.900   8/24/2035     CAD    63.45
DEPFA ACS BANK          5.125   3/16/2037     USD    61.64
DEPFA BANK PLC          3.150    4/3/2018     EUR    71.03
EBS BLDG SOCIETY        4.992   3/19/2015     EUR    75.17
IRISH GOVT              4.500   4/18/2020     EUR    73.79
IRISH GOVT              5.400   3/13/2025     EUR    72.73
IRISH LIFE PERM         4.250    4/9/2015     EUR    74.24
IRISH NATIONWIDE       13.000   8/12/2016     GBP    15.13

ABRUZZO REGION          4.450    3/1/2037     EUR    72.64
CITY OF TURIN           5.270   6/26/2038     EUR    65.19
CO BRAONE               4.567   6/30/2037     EUR    74.56
CO CASTELMASSA          3.960   3/31/2026     EUR    72.69
TELECOM ITALIA          5.250   3/17/2055     EUR    73.92
ARCELORMITTAL           7.250    4/1/2014     EUR    32.49
BREEZE FINANCE          6.708   4/19/2027     EUR    64.75
DEXIA BQ INT LUX        2.390   12/7/2021     EUR    69.02
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000   4/30/2014     EUR    36.88
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000   4/30/2014     EUR    37.75
APP INTL FINANCE       11.750   10/1/2005     USD     0.01
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   2/24/2025     CAD    52.14
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   6/27/2018     CAD    74.81
BRIT INSURANCE          6.625   12/9/2030     GBP    66.55
DGS INTL FIN BV        10.000    6/1/2007     USD     0.01
ELEC DE CAR FIN         8.500   4/10/2018     USD    57.13
INDAH KIAT INTL        12.500   6/15/2006     USD     0.01
NATL INVESTER BK       25.983    5/7/2029     EUR    17.10
NED WATERSCHAPBK        0.500   3/11/2025     CAD    53.40
NED WATERSCHAPBK        2.927   6/30/2045     EUR    70.25
Q-CELLS INTERNAT        5.750   5/26/2014     EUR    74.57
RABOBANK                2.805   8/28/2020     AUD    74.65
SIDETUR FINANCE        10.000   4/20/2016     USD    73.50
TJIWI KIMIA FIN        13.250    8/1/2001     USD     0.01

EKSPORTFINANS           0.500    5/9/2030     CAD    41.82
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500   9/24/2014     BRL    72.98
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500   1/27/2016     ZAR    74.46
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500    3/1/2016     ZAR    71.20

REP OF POLAND           4.250   7/20/2055     EUR    71.93
REP OF POLAND           2.648   3/29/2034     JPY    66.64

CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.380   10/1/2038     EUR    67.38
METRO DE LISBOA         4.061   12/4/2026     EUR    74.19
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.100   4/15/2037     EUR    70.81

APK ARKADA             17.500   5/23/2012     RUB     0.38
ARKTEL-INVEST          12.000    4/9/2012     RUB     0.05
BARENTSEV FINANS       20.000    7/4/2011     RUB     1.60
CENTREINVEST GRO        9.250   6/24/2014     RUB   101.70
DVTG-FINANS            17.000   8/29/2013     RUB     3.01
EUROKOMMERZ            16.000   3/15/2011     RUB     0.01
IZHAVTO                18.000    6/9/2011     RUB    11.31
M-INDUSTRIYA           12.250   8/16/2011     RUB    28.09
MIG-FINANS              0.100    9/6/2011     RUB     1.00
MIRAX                  14.990   5/17/2011     RUB    37.06
MIRAX                  17.000   9/17/2012     RUB    35.01
MOSMART FINANS          0.010   4/12/2012     RUB     1.81
MOSOBLGAZ              12.000   5/17/2011     RUB    72.50
MOSOBLTRUSTINVES       20.000   3/26/2011     RUB     6.99
NOK                    12.500   8/26/2014     RUB     5.01
NOK                    10.000   9/22/2011     RUB    40.00
PEB LEASING            14.000   9/12/2014     RUB    75.00
POLYPLAST              19.000   6/21/2011     RUB   101.00
RAILTRANSAUTO          17.500   12/4/2013     RUB    75.00
RUSSIAN STANDARD        7.750   4/13/2012     RUB    99.96
RYBINSKKABEL            0.010   2/28/2012     RUB     1.00
SAHO                   10.000   5/21/2012     RUB     0.08
SATURN                  8.500    6/6/2014     RUB     5.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS        10.500   3/27/2012     RUB     3.40
SOUTHERN STOCK C        9.000   4/29/2014     RUB    75.00
SVOBODNY SOKOL          0.100   5/24/2011     RUB     1.31
TECHNOSILA-INVES        7.000   5/26/2011     RUB     0.01
TERNA-FINANS            1.000   11/4/2011     RUB    18.50
VESTER-FINANS          15.250   8/11/2011     RUB     1.30
VKM-LEASING FINA        1.000   5/18/2011     RUB     0.07
ZHILSOTSIPOTEKA-        9.000   7/26/2011     RUB    75.00

AYT CEDULAS CAJA        4.750   5/25/2027     EUR    68.38
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        3.750   6/30/2025     EUR    61.36
AYUNTAM DE MADRD        4.550   6/16/2036     EUR    74.03
BANCAJA                 1.500   5/22/2018     EUR    60.39
BANCAJA EMI SA          2.755   5/11/2037     JPY    75.07
BANCO GUIPUZCOAN        1.500   4/18/2022     EUR    63.45
CAJA CASTIL-MAN         1.500   6/23/2021     EUR    63.82
CAJA MADRID             4.125   3/24/2036     EUR    65.69
CAJA MADRID             5.755   2/26/2028     EUR    56.34
CAJA MADRID             4.000    2/3/2025     EUR    73.56
CAJA MEDITERRANE        4.600   7/31/2020     EUR    71.75
CEDULAS TDA 6           3.875   5/23/2025     EUR    62.27
CEDULAS TDA A-5         4.250   3/28/2027     EUR    62.96
CEDULAS TDA A-6         4.250   4/10/2031     EUR    57.97
GENERAL DE ALQUI        2.750   8/20/2012     EUR    72.63
IM CEDULAS 5            3.500   6/15/2020     EUR    72.60
IM CEDULAS 7            4.000   3/31/2021     EUR    74.39
JUNTA LA MANCHA         3.875   1/31/2036     EUR    61.07

SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.000   8/12/2011     USD    10.42
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.000   8/28/2011     USD    10.72
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000   11/4/2011     USD     9.09
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   1/25/2028     USD    49.97
SWEDISH EXP CRED        2.000   12/7/2011     USD     9.81
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000   1/27/2012     USD    10.01
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   9/29/2015     BRL    64.29

UBS AG                 13.300   5/23/2012     USD     4.21
UBS AG                 13.700   5/23/2012     USD    14.15
UBS AG                 10.580   6/29/2011     USD    39.00
UBS AG                 14.000   5/23/2012     USD     9.70
UBS AG JERSEY           3.220   7/31/2012     EUR    54.13
UBS AG JERSEY           9.450   9/21/2011     USD    51.03
UBS AG JERSEY           9.350   9/21/2011     USD    70.88
UBS AG JERSEY          11.150   8/31/2011     USD    39.97
UBS AG JERSEY          10.360   8/19/2011     USD    53.28
UBS AG JERSEY          10.280   8/19/2011     USD    35.71
UBS AG JERSEY          13.000   6/16/2011     USD    50.13
UBS AG JERSEY          10.500   6/16/2011     USD    73.14
UBS AG JERSEY          10.820   4/21/2011     USD    21.09
UBS AG JERSEY          16.160   3/31/2011     USD    42.07
UBS AG JERSEY          10.990   3/31/2011     USD    30.98
UBS AG JERSEY          11.400   3/18/2011     USD    25.01
UBS AG JERSEY          12.800   2/28/2011     USD    33.19
UBS AG JERSEY          11.000   2/28/2011     USD    69.69
UBS AG JERSEY          15.250   2/11/2011     USD    11.17
UBS AG JERSEY          10.000   2/11/2011     USD    58.25

BANK NADRA              8.000   6/22/2017     USD    67.18
BANK OF SCOTLAND        5.772    2/7/2035     EUR    73.87
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.500   8/31/2012     USD    29.92
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.950   4/20/2012     USD    16.30
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.250   8/31/2012     USD    35.59
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.800   7/31/2012     USD    27.94
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.400   7/31/2012     USD    11.51
BARCLAYS BK PLC        13.050   4/27/2012     USD    27.08
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.750   9/22/2011     USD    73.50
BARCLAYS BK PLC         7.500   9/22/2011     USD    17.09
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.000   6/30/2011     USD    43.17
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.510   5/31/2011     USD    13.00
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.800   9/22/2011     USD    16.43
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.550   1/23/2012     USD    11.51
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.350   1/23/2012     USD    21.34
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.250   1/31/2012     USD     9.81
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.950   5/23/2011     USD    65.68
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.650   1/31/2012     USD    45.71
BRADFORD&BIN BLD        5.500   1/15/2018     GBP    45.53
BRADFORD&BIN PLC        6.625   6/16/2023     GBP    43.80
BRADFORD&BIN PLC        7.625   2/16/2049     GBP    48.21
CO-OPERATIVE BNK        5.875   3/28/2033     GBP    69.01
DISCOVERY EDUCAT        1.948   3/31/2037     GBP    66.71
EFG HELLAS PLC          6.010    1/9/2036     EUR    24.00
EFG HELLAS PLC          5.400   11/2/2047     EUR    50.75
ENTERPRISE INNS         6.375   9/26/2031     GBP    75.63
HBOS PLC                4.500   3/18/2030     EUR    70.95
HBOS PLC                6.000   11/1/2033     USD    66.71
HBOS PLC                6.000   11/1/2033     USD    66.71
HEALTHCARE SUPP         2.067   2/19/2043     GBP    69.84
NORTHERN ROCK           5.750   2/28/2017     GBP    71.07
NORTHERN ROCK           4.574   1/13/2015     GBP    76.08
PUNCH TAVERNS           7.567   4/15/2026     GBP    50.80
PUNCH TAVERNS           6.468   4/15/2033     GBP    39.38
PUNCH TAVERNS           8.374   7/15/2029     GBP    52.85
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        6.316   6/29/2030     EUR    67.76
SKIPTON BUILDING        6.750   5/30/2022     GBP    67.80
SKIPTON BUILDING        5.625   1/18/2018     GBP    69.68
TXU EASTERN FNDG        6.750   5/15/2009     USD     2.88
UNIQUE PUB FIN          6.464   3/30/2032     GBP    63.78
WESSEX WATER FIN        1.369   7/31/2057     GBP    31.39
YORKSHRE BLD SOC        6.375   4/26/2024     GBP    74.01


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne G. Lopez, Frauline S. Abangan and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *