TCREUR_Public/110214.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, February 14, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 31



AMAGERBANKEN A/S: Swedbank Has No Exposure to Bankruptcy
AMAGERBANKEN AS: Moody's Cuts Bank Financial Strength Rating to E


HYPO REAL ESTATE: German Expert Commission Recommends Liquidation
MARSEILLE-KLINIKEN: S&P Lowers LT Corporate Credit Rating to 'B'


OTE PROPERTIES: Board Opts for Dissolution & Liquidation
PIRAEUS BANK: Fitch Assigns Ratings on Mortgage Covered Bonds


BANK OF IRELAND: Receives 38% Take-Up for Sub. Debt Exchange Offer
BANK OF IRELAND: Moody's Junks Ratings on Junior Securities
BANK OF IRELAND: S&P Cuts Ratings on Subordinated Debt Instruments
EBS BUILDING: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Tier 1 Instruments to 'C'
MURRAY NOLAN: High Court Agrees to Appoint Examiner


ARES FINANCE: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to 'CCC-'
FIAT SPA: Moody's Confirms 'Ba1' Corporate Family Rating


BTA BANK: Ex-Chair Can't Use Conspiracy Claim in Embezzlement Case


FAB CBO: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to 'B+ (sf)'
UPCB FINANCE: Moody's Puts 'Ba3' Rating on USUS$1BB Sr. Sec. Notes


BANK SOLIDARNOST: Moody's Affirms 'E+' Financial Strength Rating


* SPAIN: Weaker Banks Must Raise Tier 1 Core Capital to 10%


* Fitch Reports Positive Outlook on Various Turkish Banks

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ABSOLUTE DESIGN: Goes Into Voluntary Creditors Liquidation
ANTRAC LTD: To be Placed Into Administration
BRITISH BOOKSHOPS: Could Stay on High Street Amid Administration
CATTLES PLC: Fitch Affirms Long-Term Issuer Default Rating at 'C'
CHEQUERS HOTEL: Goes Into Administration, Seeks Buyer

DREEMORE DEVELOPMENTS: Director Faces 13-Year Disqualification
EDWARDS LTD: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating to New First Lien Loans
EDWARDS GROUP: S&P Affirms Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating at 'B+'
EMI GROUP: Terra Firma's Guy Hands Mulls Acquisition
EMI GROUP: Highly Leveraged Businesses May Use Pre-Pack Strategy

PROMETHEUS PRESS: Goes Into Administration, Axes 29 Jobs
UNIQ PLC: Pension Regulator Clears Proposed Restructuring
WAKEFIELD TRINITY: Spirit of 1873 Acquires Firm
* UK: Construction Firm Failures Jump 20% in 4th Quarter of 2010


* Moody's: Defaults and Recoveries Underscore Severity of Crisis
* Moody's: Global Default Rate Falls to 2.8% in January
* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 31 to February 4, 2011



AMAGERBANKEN A/S: Swedbank Has No Exposure to Bankruptcy
Toby Alder at Bloomberg News reports that Swedbank AB said it has
no exposure to the Amagerbanken A/S bankruptcy.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 8,
2011, Bloomberg News said Amagerbanken was taken over by the state
after a surge in losses on property loans prevented it from
meeting a deadline to prove it was still solvent.  The
government's bailout fund, Financial Stability, said in an
e-mailed statement on Feb. 6 that it will take over the bank's
clients, branches, assets and commitments of DKK15.2 billion
(US$2.76 billion), Bloomberg disclosed.  It won't take over
remaining commitments of about DKK13.2 billion, which include
about DKK5.6 billion back by the government, Bloomberg noted.  The
Danish bank said in a separate statement that it failed to meet
solvency requirements after a thorough analysis of its loan book
revealed loan-impairment charges of DKK3.14 billion in the fourth
quarter in addition to the DKK729 million of bad debt the bank
wrote down in the first nine months of 2010, according to
Bloomberg.  The bank asked the Copenhagen stock exchange to
suspend trading of its shares and bonds, Bloomberg stated.
Amagerbanken is the first Danish bank to be bailed out after the
country's initial rescue program for its lenders expired Sept. 30
last year, when the government's unlimited guarantee on deposits
expired, Bloomberg noted.  "The final losses, caused by
Amagerbanken, are yet to be determined," Bloomberg quoted Economy
and Business Affairs Minister Brian Mikkelsen as saying in a
statement.  "Losses in Amagerbanken will be borne by the
stockholders and holders of subordinated debt."  Mr. Mikkelsen, as
cited by Bloomberg, said deposits exceeding EUR100,000
(US$136,150) and other unsecured and unsubordinated creditors,
including the individual government guarantee for senior debt,
stand to bear losses.  In a press release, Amagerbank said the
bank on Feb. 6 decided to file a petition with the bankruptcy
court.  The current board of directors and management
of the bank will resign, as the appointed bankruptcy trustee will
act as management in the company.  In order for the bank to
maintain its banking license after the bankruptcy, the bank has
applied for and obtained an extension of the deadline for meeting
the solvency requirements to March 6, 2011.

Amagerbanken A/S is a regional bank based in Copenhagen, Denmark.
The bank provides a range of banking services to both private and
business customers, specializing in the customized car and home
loans, asset management and pensions.  As of December 31, 2009, it
operated through 25 branches, as well as three wholly owned
subsidiaries: Ejendomsaktieselskabet Matr. 4285,
Ejendomsaktieselskabet Matr. 3825 and Investeringsanpartsselskabet

AMAGERBANKEN AS: Moody's Cuts Bank Financial Strength Rating to E
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Bank Financial
Strength Rating of Amagerbanken A/S to E from D- (mapping to
baseline credit assessments of Ca and Ba3, respectively).
Concurrently, Moody's downgraded the long-term bank deposit
ratings to Ca from Ba2.  The Non-Prime short-term ratings are not
affected and the outlooks for the BFSR and the deposit ratings are
stable.  The Aaa ratings on the bank's debt securities
individually guaranteed by the Kingdom of Denmark remain

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's rating action follows the announcement by Financial
Stability -- the Danish government-backed bank-support vehicle --
that, effective 6 February 2011, a newly created subsidiary of
Financial Stability acquired all the assets and part of the
liabilities of Amagerbanken.  The transfer follows Amagerbanken's
own assessment of the need for an additional DKK3.1 billion
(USUS$575 million) writedown following further deteriorated credit
assessments and weakening collateral values.  This writedown
results in negative equity of approximately DKK654 million
(USUS$120million) and Amagerbanken's management has been
unsuccessful in efforts to obtain new capital funding.

The transfer effectively wipes out Amagerbanken's equity,
subordinated debt and hybrid core capital and according to
Financial Stability, provides an expected loss of around 41% for
depositors (outside of Denmark's deposit-guarantee scheme) and
providers of senior unsecured debt.

The revised E BFSR (mapping to a Ca BCA) reflects the fact that
after the transfer of its assets and the aforementioned
liabilities, Amagerbanken has filed for bankruptcy and its
customer operations will be carried out by the new subsidiary of
Financial Stability.  Amagerbanken has obtained an extension on
its solvency requirement to March 6, 2011, in order to maintain
its banking license.  Moody's notes that the deposit ratings and
the BFSR of Amagerbanken will be withdrawn once the bank
surrenders its banking license.

The downgrade of Amagerbanken's deposit ratings to Ca from Ba2
reflects the expected 41% loss for non-guaranteed depositors and
senior creditors following the transfer.  During a period of three
months, additional recoveries on the bank's assets may lead to
additional liabilities being transferred to the new bank, which
will reduce the expected loss.  However, Moody's current
expectation is that the probability of any substantial reduction
in loss is low, reflected by the stable outlook on the Ca deposit

Moody's most recent rating action on Amagerbanken was implemented
on September 28, 2010, when it downgraded the bank's deposit
rating to Ba2 from Baa3 and upgraded the BFSR to D- from E+,
reflecting the expiry of the general Danish government guarantee
and the implemented capital and liquidity injections.

Based on Amager, Denmark, Amagerbanken reported consolidated
assets of DKK33.3 billion (USUS$6 billion) as of end-September


HYPO REAL ESTATE: German Expert Commission Recommends Liquidation
A German expert commission has recommended that Hypo Real Estate
should be wound down, Reuters reports, citing two sources familiar
with the matter.

"The experts can see only slim chances that a privatization of HRE
would become a success," Reuters quotes one of the people with
knowledge of a report drafted on behalf of the German government
by the expert commission as saying.

According to Reuters, the source noted that due to overcapacity in
the markets where nationalized mortgage lender and state financier
HRE is active, the experts concluded that a sale would not yield
higher proceeds than a liquidation.

Reuters relates that the sources said the expert commission judged
that both HRE and ailing public-sector bank WestLB were "not
indispensable" for the German economy and could be wound down.

HRE, as cited by Reuters, said in a statement that given
restructuring successes, a reprivatization was the option that
would maximize value, adding: "We expect that (core bank) pbb will
be profitable in 2011."

According to Reuters, sources said that WestLB is nearing a deal
that will keep key parts under public-sector control, but leave
other units to be scooped up by investors.

The European Union's competition chief, Joaquin Almunia, has set a
Feb. 15 deadline to resolve the issue, Reuters discloses.

                       Restructuring Talks

Separately, Reuters' Gernot Heller reports that talks on the
future of WestLB are deadlocked amid a dispute between savings
banks and regional landesbanks.

"The talks on a restructuring model for WestLB have hit a wall,"
Reuters quotes the German official as saying in the talks, citing
a serious dispute between savings and landesbanks.  The official
requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the discussions,
Reuters notes.

According to Reuters, a sale process for the whole bank is also
under way, with bids due by Feb. 11, but sources have said the
owners are not confident a broader deal can be struck.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 1,
2011, Reuters said WestLB is headed for a breakup as time runs out
to find a solution for the bank as a whole.  Two people familiar
with the matter told Reuters on Jan. 30 that if no buyer for the
whole lender can be found -- and at present no potential
candidates are in sight -- all risky assets will be split off and
a core bank doing business with savings banks will remain.  The
sources said WestLB businesses such as investment banking and
international banking will be wound down unless a buyer turns up,
adding the WestLB's bad bank is likely to be used for this
purpose, according to Reuters. The European Commission has
demanded a change of ownership at WestLB by the end of 2011, in
return for a state bailout the lender got in the financial crisis,
Reuters noted.

                           About WestLB

Headquartered in Duesseldorf, Germany, WestLB AG (DAX:WESTLB)
-- provides financial advisory, lending,
structured finance, project finance, capital markets and private
equity products, asset management, transaction services and real
estate finance to institutions.  In the United States, certain
securities, trading, brokerage and advisory services are provided
by WestLB AG's wholly owned subsidiary WestLB Securities Inc., a
registered broker-dealer and member of the NASD and SIPC.
WestLB's shareholders are the two savings banks associations in
NRW (25.15% each), two regional associations (0.52% each), the
state of NRW (17.47%) and NRW.BANK (31.18%), which is owned by NRW
(64.7%) and two regional associations (35.3%).

MARSEILLE-KLINIKEN: S&P Lowers LT Corporate Credit Rating to 'B'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had lowered its
long-term corporate credit rating on Germany-based private
nursing-care provider Marseille-Kliniken AG to 'B'.  The outlook
is negative.

"Marseille closed its fiscal year 2010 on June 30, 2010, with an
unexpectedly weak fourth quarter," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Olaf Toelke.

While part of the deterioration was due to one-off charges and
write-downs connected to the sale of the rehabilitation division,
the company's good operating progress in the first nine months of
the fiscal year was significantly impaired by a weak last quarter
in the core nursing care division.

Thus, while year-end debt reduced in line with expectations,
reflecting deconsolidation of the divested division and
application of disposal proceeds to debt reduction, the operating
performance was weaker than expected.  Consequently, Marseille did
not achieve a performance in line with what S&P deems to be
appropriate for a 'B+' rating in its fiscal year 2010 (as
expressed by a lease-adjusted total debt to earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization and rents of 5.5x).

S&P has calculated fiscal 2010 leverage of 7.7x, allowing for
EUR9 million in one-off charges, which S&P added back to operating
profit.  Furthermore, the first quarter of the current fiscal 2011
did not result in meaningfully different metrics.  Marseille has
thus not managed to achieve significant deleveraging progress in
the past two years, despite the help of the disposal proceeds and
some positive sales momentum.

On the positive side, Marseille's new management is in the process
of improving the company's liquidity profile, which was formerly
characterized by Marseille's heavy reliance on uncommitted short-
term bank lines, which S&P viewed as a rating constraint.  S&P
also note new management's changed strategic focus on
consolidating its business positions, which is a further ratings

The rating thus continues to reflect a highly leveraged financial
profile, including high lease-adjusted debt levels and a still
less-than-adequate liquidity profile.  The rating is supported by
Marseille's good competitive position in highly fragmented
markets, and the well predictable growth in future nursing-care
needs.  The market is, however, subject to regulation, public
price setting, and reimbursement negotiations with public
insurance funds.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's concerns regarding Marseille's
future deleveraging, given that management has not built a good
track record of this, as well as the company's ability to improve
its liquidity profile to "adequate".  S&P views fully adjusted
leverage of below 7x by the end of fiscal 2011, and about 6x for
fiscal 2012 as commensurate with the present rating.

"A downgrade could follow if S&P considered that Marseille had
made insufficient progress in reaching these adjusted leverage
levels within the next 12 months," said Mr. Toelke.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if leverage and its
assessment of the company's financial policy significantly
improved and the company was able to maintain credit metrics in
line with what S&P deems commensurate with the rating.


OTE PROPERTIES: Board Opts for Dissolution & Liquidation
The Hellenic Telecommunications Organization SA (OTE SA) on Feb. 9
disclosed that, following the decision of OTE Estate's Board of
Directors, the Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of
its subsidiary OTE Properties REIC has decided to proceed with the
dissolution and liquidation of OTE Properties REIC.

OTE Properties REIC, the real estate investment company of the OTE
Group, had received in June 2008 an operation license from the
Hellenic Capital Markets Commission with a final deadline to be
listed on the Athens Stock Exchange by October 7, 2011.

The current economic and financial environment, characterized by
lack of liquidity and oversupply of commercial real estate is not
favorable for the development of real estate investment companies.
This is also evidenced by the steep fall in the index of listed
real estate companies during the previous year.  Given these
developments, a listing of the real estate investment company on
the Athens Stock Exchange would not constitute the optimal move
from a strategic point, in the context of a value release from the
Group's substantial real estate assets.

The dissolution of OTE Properties REIC does not affect in any way
the broader strategy of OTE to extract value from its significant
real estate assets, a strategy implemented by its subsidiary OTE

                            About OTE

OTE Group -- is a Greek telecommunications
organization and one of the pre-eminent players in Southeastern

Apart from serving as a full service telecommunications group in
the Greek telecoms market, OTE Group has also expanded during the
last decade its geographical footprint throughout South East
Europe, acquiring stakes in the incumbent telecommunications
companies of Romania and Serbia, and establishing mobile
operations in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania.  At present,
companies in which OTE Group has an equity interest employ about
32,000 people in four countries, and its portfolio of solutions
ranges from fixed and mobile telephony to Internet applications,
satellite, maritime communications and consultancy services.

Listed on the Athens Stock Exchange, the company trades under the
ticker HTO.  Following OTE's delisting  from NYSE, OTE ADSs
(American Depositary  Shares) trade in  the  OTC (Over  The
Counter) market  under  the ticker  HLTOY.  OTE continues to
report to SEC.

PIRAEUS BANK: Fitch Assigns Ratings on Mortgage Covered Bonds
Fitch Ratings has assigned Piraeus Bank's ('BB+'/Negative/'B')
first issue of mortgage covered bonds an 'A-' rating.  The bonds
have a nominal amount of EUR1.25 billion and have been issued
under a EUR3 billion direct issuance mortgage covered bonds
program.  The bonds will mature in February 2014 and benefit from
an extended maturity date of ten years after the expected due
date.  The bonds were issued under the Greek Covered Bond Law and
are direct and unconditional obligations of Piraeus.

The rating is based on Piraeus' Long-term Issuer Default Rating of
'BB+' and a Discontinuity-Factor of 45%, the combination of which
allows the mortgage covered bonds to achieve a maximum rating of
'BBB' on a probability of default basis, provided over-
collateralization is sufficient to sustain the corresponding
stress scenario.  In addition, defaulted covered bonds could
benefit from recoveries from the cover pool, which Fitch reflects
through an uplift of up to two notches, depending on the level of

Fitch gives credit to the level of OC provided by a dynamic asset
coverage test.  The ACT ensures that Piraeus' covered bonds cannot
exceed 89.4% of the adjusted balance of the cover pool (the asset
percentage).  The agency found this asset percentage to be
sufficient to support stresses in a 'BBB' rating scenario and to
provide outstanding recoveries on the covered bonds in an 'A-'
scenario, hence allowing the covered bonds to be rated 'A-'.  The
ACT is in addition to Greek Covered Bond Law, which limits
outstanding covered bonds to 95% of the nominal value of the cover
pool.  To date, the asset percentage stands at 85.6%, which
translates to a nominal OC of 16.8% between the cover pool and
outstanding covered bonds.

The D-Factor of 45% is mainly driven by Fitch's assessment of the
liquidity gaps that would arise following a default of the issuer,
but also takes into account the comfort gained from the asset
segregation mechanism provided by the Greek Covered Bond Law, a
provision for the appointment of a substitute servicer by the
trustee or the Bank of Greece, as well as Piraeus' operational
capacity.  Piraeus' covered bonds benefit from a 10-year
extendible maturity in the event of an issuer default, at the end
of which a large portion of the cover pool would have been paid
down, leaving only a small portion to be refinanced.  Fitch
believes this timeframe justifies a limited differential between
the IDR and the covered bonds rating on a PD basis and has thus
assigned a D-Factor of 45% to the program.

This constitutes an exception from the determination of the Fitch
D-Factor as a weighted score of four components, namely asset
segregation, liquidity gaps, alternative management and covered
bonds oversight.  This criteria deviation is largely due to the
non-investment grade rating of the country of the assets, and the
resulting challenging environment for the sale of a Greek mortgage
loan portfolio in case of need.

As of October 2010, the cover pool consisted of 19,206 residential
mortgage loans originated by Piraeus across Greece, with a
weighted average original loan-to-value ratio of 64.9% and a
weighted average current LTV of 58.4%.  In an 'A-' scenario, Fitch
calculated a cumulative weighted average frequency of foreclosure
for the cover assets of 26.15% and a weighted average recovery
rate of 75.86%.  The cover pool is geographically concentrated
around the metropolitan area of Athens (38.5%), in line with the
Greek population distribution.

Fitch compared the cash flows from the cover pool in a wind-down
situation, subject to stressed default and losses, and under the
management of a third party, to the payments due under the covered
bonds.  Maturity mismatches were assumed to be bridged through a
portfolio sale occurring at a discounted sale price.  The effects
of a selected assets required amount clause were factored into the
agency's analysis.  The weighted average residual maturities of
cover assets and liabilities are 20.1 and 3.0 years, respectively.

All else being equal, Piraeus' covered bonds rating could be
maintained at 'A-' only if the issuer rating remains at 'BB+'.


BANK OF IRELAND: Receives 38% Take-Up for Sub. Debt Exchange Offer
Irene Chapple at Dow Jones Newswires reports that the Bank of
Ireland Thursday said it had received offers to exchange C$138
million-worth of subordinated bonds.

According to Dow Jones, in a regulatory statement the bank said it
had received a 38% take-up from creditors.

The offer was made Feb. 2 for two lower tier two securities worth
around C$366 million, Dow Jones relates.  The exchange offer
covered the bank's C$221.3 million of subordinated notes due
September 2015, and C$145.2 million worth of bonds due in
September 2018, Dow Jones discloses.  The tendered notes will be
exchanged for new bonds paying 6.75% and maturing in January 2012,
with a choice of the debt denominated either in Canadian dollars
or euros, Dow Jones states.

Headquartered in Dublin, Bank of Ireland -- provides a range of banking and
other financial services.  These include checking and deposit
services, overdrafts, term loans, mortgages, business and
corporate lending, international asset financing, leasing,
installment credit, debt factoring, foreign exchange facilities,
interest and exchange rate hedging instruments, executor, trustee,
life assurance and pension and investment fund management, fund
administration and custodial services and financial advisory
services, including mergers and acquisitions and underwriting.
The Company organizes its businesses into Retail Republic of
Ireland, Bank of Ireland Life, Capital Markets, UK Financial
Services and Group Centre.  It has operations throughout Ireland,
the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 20,
2011, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the
lower Tier 2 subordinated debt issued by Bank of Ireland (trading
name of the Governor & Company of the Bank of Ireland; BOI;
BBB+/Watch Neg/A-2), which had been subject to the exchange offer,
to 'CCC' from 'D'.  S&P said this 'CCC' rating reflects the fact
that BOI will need to raise further equity capital before
February to reach the EUR2.2 billion target, and S&P's view that
there is a clear and present risk that these instruments could be
subject to further restructuring-like action in order to achieve

BANK OF IRELAND: Moody's Junks Ratings on Junior Securities
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the junior securities of
Bank of Ireland.  Dated subordinated debt is downgraded to Ca from
B2, junior subordinated debt and cumulative tier 1 instruments are
downgraded to Ca (hyb) from B3 (hyb) and the bank's non-cumulative
tier 1 instruments are downgraded to Ca (hyb), from Caa1 (hyb).
In addition the offer to exchange two Canadian dollar dated
subordinated bonds for one-year government guaranteed senior debt
at a substantial discount to the par value has been classed as a
distressed exchange.  The bank is rated Baa2/P-2 for bank deposits
and senior debt and has a D bank financial strength rating.  The
outlook is negative.

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of the bank's junior securities reflects Moody's
view that the bank may, as a result of the bank's still
substantial capital requirement, continue to look to raise capital
through further exchanges or buybacks on its more junior classes
of debt.  This is because as part of the revised capital
requirements in Ireland the bank is required to raise EUR2.2
billion by the end of February - a previous exchange in December
on other dated subordinated instruments raised approximately
EUR700 million of this requirement.  The bank is discussing a
number of structures with the Irish government to raise the
capital prior to the end of February but Moody's understands that
the bank will then look to raise capital from shareholders,
following the publication of the results of the Central Bank of
Ireland's capital and liquidity reviews.  Moody's therefore
believes that the bank may use further exchanges or buybacks to
reduce the amount of capital that it needs to raise from
shareholders.  The Ca rating also reflects that any further
exchange carried out by the bank would also almost certainly be
classified as a distressed exchange.  Previously the ratings had
incorporated an assumption that, following the exchange of the
majority of the dated subordinated debt in December that further
exchanges or buybacks were less likely.

The exchange offer on the two Canadian dollar dated subordinated
notes -- for which a previous exchange into new subordinated notes
took place in September 2010 is classed as distressed as a result
of (i) the high discount to the nominal value (ranging from 41% to
48%), and (ii) the potential that absent this exchange losses
could be imposed on the securities through the legislation
recently introduced by the Irish government.  The Ca rating is in
line with the loss to the nominal value of the bonds.  A
distressed exchange is defined as an offer by an issuer to
creditors of a new or restructured debt, or a new package of
securities, cash or assets, that amount to a diminished financial
obligation relative to the original obligation with the effect of
allowing the issuer to avoid a bankruptcy or payment default.
According to Moody's, a distressed exchange is a form of default.
Moody's includes distressed exchanges in its definition of default
in order to capture credit events whereby issuers effectively fail
to meet their debt service obligations, but yet do not actually
file for bankruptcy or miss an interest or principal payment.

BANK OF IRELAND: S&P Cuts Ratings on Subordinated Debt Instruments
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its
ratings on the two Canadian dollar-denominated lower Tier 2
subordinated debt instruments issued by Bank of Ireland (trading
name of the Governor & Company of the Bank of Ireland).

The 'BB+/B' counterparty credit ratings on BOI remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed on
Nov. 26, 2010.  The rating action does not affect issuances by BOI
which are guaranteed by the Republic of Ireland (A-/Watch Neg/A-

The downgrade of the lower Tier 2 debt rating reflects S&P's
opinion that this exchange offer is a "distressed exchange" and a
de facto restructuring, in accordance with its criteria.  There is
no related rating action on the counterparty credit ratings
because there is no default on nonregulatory capital issues.

On Feb. 2, 2011, BOI announced an exchange offer for two of its
remaining 11 lower Tier 2 instruments.  It has offered bondholders
the opportunity to exchange any or all of their existing notes at
various rates, ranging from 52 to 59 cents on the dollar, into a
new 11-month senior government guaranteed bond.

The other nine instruments had been subject to a similar exchange
offer in December 2010.  As in that case, S&P considers this offer
to be a "distressed exchange" because:

* Bondholders stand to receive significantly less than the
  original promise; and

* In the light of the government's powers under Irish bank
  reorganization legislation and BOI's own circumstances as an
  institution which S&P assess as having a weak stand-alone credit
  profile and needing to raise more capital, S&P considers that
  there is a realistic possibility of a government-enforced
   default through coercive burden-sharing on the instruments
  subject to the exchange, over the near-to-medium term.

BOI has been told by the Irish financial regulator that it must
raise EUR2.2 billion of new equity by end-February 2011.  If BOI
is unable to raise all the EUR2.2 billion itself, the government
has said that it is prepared to provide the balance.  According to
S&P's calculations, BOI generated additional equity Tier 1 capital
of about EUR0.8 billion in December 2010 through the exchange
offer and the sale of Bank of Ireland Asset Management.  S&P
anticipates that this new exchange offer could generate a further
EUR0.1 billion.  BOI has said that it is discussing a number of
structures with the government to raise the balance by end-
February.  BOI is seeking to facilitate a subsequent offering to
stockholders once the outcomes of the regulator's Prudential
Capital Assessment Review and Prudential Liquidity Assessment
Review are known.  These reviews are due to be completed by end-
March 2011.

S&P expects to raise the ratings on the instruments subject to the
exchange offer to 'CCC' at the end of the offer period.  This
reflects the fact that BOI still needs to raise further equity
capital to reach the end-February target, and the possibility that
this target may yet increase as a result f the PCAR.

The ratings on BOI remain on CreditWatch with negative
implications, where they were placed on Nov. 26, 2010, pending the
outcome of the sovereign rating review and S&P's assessment of the
potential for extraordinary support following the announcement of
the impact of the PCAR and PLAR on BOI.

EBS BUILDING: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Tier 1 Instruments to 'C'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the tier 1 instruments of
EBS Building Society (issued through EBS Capital No1 S.A.) one
further notch to C (hyb) from Ca (hyb).  This follows the
announcement of an offer from EBS Building Society to buy back its
dated subordinated and tier 1 debt for cash at substantial
discounts to the par value.  Moody's would classify the exchange
offer on the dated subordinated debt as a distressed exchange.
The society is rated Baa3/P-3 for bank deposits and senior debt
and has a D- bank financial strength rating (mapping to Ba3 on the
long-term scale).  The dated subordinated debt of the bank is
rated Ca.  The outlook on the ratings is negative.

                        Ratings Rationale

Under the exchange offer EBS is offering to purchase for cash its
outstanding dated subordinated debt which totals approximately
EUR213 million at a discount of 70% to the nominal value of the
debts.  This transaction will be classed as distressed as a result
of (i) the extremely high discount to the nominal value (70%), and
(ii) the potential that absent these exchange losses would be
imposed on the dated subordinated debt.  Moody's would also note
that if the take-up on this offer is not viewed as high enough by
the government then one potential outcome could be that losses are
still imposed on those debtholders who do not participate.  This
is now possible as a result of the legislation introduced in
December 2010 by the Irish government that provides the ability to
impose losses on subordinated liabilities, outside of bankruptcy.
The legislation was established as a result of the increased
pressure on the Irish government to share some of the capital
burden of restructuring the Irish banking sector with more junior
creditors, in view of the strain which the sizeable capital
injections have placed on the Irish government's finances.  A
distressed exchange is defined as an offer by an issuer to
creditors of a new or restructured debt, or a new package of
securities, cash or assets, that amount to a diminished financial
obligation relative to the original obligation with the effect of
allowing the issuer to avoid a bankruptcy or payment default.
According to Moody's, a distressed exchange is a form of default.
Moody's includes distressed exchanges in its definition of default
in order to capture credit events whereby issuers effectively fail
to meet their debt service obligations, but yet do not actually
file for bankruptcy or miss an interest or principal payment.

The dated subordinated debt of EBS was downgraded to Ca on
December 20, 2010.  This reflected Moody's view that the society
was highly likely to carry out an exchange or buyback and such
transaction would almost certainly be classified as a distressed

The downgrade of the tier 1 instruments to C (hyb) also reflects
the extremely high discount to the nominal value (87.5%) and the
potential that absent these exchange losses would be imposed on
the debt.  These instruments were downgraded to Ca (hyb) on June
3, 2010 as a result of the terms of the Special Investment Share
and the Promissory Note (the mechanisms used by the government to
inject capital), the society is prohibited from making any
discretionary payments on its existing regulatory capital
instruments and Moody's understanding that this clause may remain
in place for the lifetime of the Promissory Note and therefore it
is possible that there will be a multi-year period in which coupon
payments are omitted.

MURRAY NOLAN: High Court Agrees to Appoint Examiner
The Irish Times reports that the High Court has agreed to appoint
an examiner to Murray Nolan Ltd.

According to The Irish Times, the examiner must report back to the
court after a month to outline whether he believes extending the
examinership further is viable.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 8,
2011, The Irish Times said Simon Coyle of Mazars was appointed
interim examiner on the ex-parte application of the company late
last month.  The Irish Times disclosed an independent accountant
believed the company could survive as a going concern provided
certain conditions were met.  The company has debts of some
EUR5.6 million, according to The Irish Times.  If wound up, the
company asserted it would have a deficit of some EUR4.4 million
but would have a deficit of some EUR735,283 on a going concern
basis, The Irish Times noted.  The company said that among the
causes of its difficulties were falling sales, a reduction in the
collection rate of outstanding debtors and problems with its
Christmas hamper business, The Irish Times related.  Bank of
Ireland opposed the continuation of court protection for Murray
Nolan as it did not believe the firm had a reasonable prospect of
survival, The Irish Times disclosed.  The bank, as cited by the
The Irish Times, said that while the company had identified a
potential investor who might invest some EUR500,000, three times
that sum was required and described the company's cash flow
projections for the examinership period "optimistic and

Murray Nolan is involved in the door-to-door selling of goods on
credit.  The company, with registered offices at Clonee, Co Meath,
employs 55 people directly while 65 self-employed commission-based
sales agents handle door-to-door sales of goods including clothing
and homeware.  It is owned by Michael Murray and Tom Nolan.


ARES FINANCE: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to 'CCC-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
ARES FINANCE S.r.l.'s class E and F notes.  The rating actions
reflect S&P's assessment of the short-term recovery prospects on
the underlying assets.  The final legal maturity date for ARES
FINANCE is in March 2011.

S&P's review was based on the expected timing of distributions of
proceeds following the forced sale of the assets or agreed out-of-
court arrangements, the short-term recovery prospects for the
remaining assets in the nonperforming loan (NPL) portfolios, an
analysis of recent collection patterns, and S&P's discussions with
the special servicer.

Although the underlying portfolios' unresolved gross book value
remains high relative to the balance of the outstanding rated
notes, the pace of collections has abated over time.  While the
servicer has reported recoveries that, in terms of amounts
recovered per resolved asset, are greater than the initially
forecast base case, the timing of such recoveries has been
substantially slower than initially planned.

Most of the outstanding GBV is in the final stages of the
resolution process.  There are currently EUR29.5 million of
collections expected from already agreed court distributions or
DPOs (discounted payoffs).  This is equivalent to 110% of the
outstanding rated notes.

The timing of release of funds from the court, however, is
unknown.  S&P believes that there is a real risk that funds will
not be available to meet the full obligations at final legal
maturity and, as a result, S&P has lowered its ratings to reflect
this increased risk.

This transaction includes a condition whereby the outstanding
notes are canceled at maturity, with the result that S&P
understand that noteholders will have no rights to pursue unpaid
principal after the maturity date.  This condition is also a
feature of ARES FINANCE 2 S.A.

ARES FINANCE S.r.l. is backed by a pool of secured and unsecured
NPLs originated in Italy by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA (AA-
/Stable/A-1+).  In S&P's experience, collections under NPL
portfolios tend to be volatile, as they largely depend on the
recovery activity carried out by the transaction's special
servicer, as well as the broader economic environment.  Archon
Group Italia S.r.l./Societe Gestione Crediti is the special
servicer for both transactions and has S&P's commercial and
residential special servicer ranking of "STRONG".

                           Ratings List

                        ARES FINANCE S.r.l.
         EUR633.2 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

                          Ratings Lowered

              Class       To               From
              -----       --               ----
              E           CCC- (sf)        B (sf)
              F           CCC- (sf)        CCC (sf)

FIAT SPA: Moody's Confirms 'Ba1' Corporate Family Rating
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the Ba1 Corporate Family
Ratings of Fiat S.p.A. and its rated subsidiaries Fiat Finance &
Trade and Fiat Finance North America, as well as assigned a Ba1
Probability of Default Rating.  The short-term ratings are Not-
Prime and the outlook is negative.  This rating action concludes
the review for possible downgrade, initiated on July 21, 2010,
following the finalization of the de-merger of Fiat Industrial.

                        Ratings Rationale

The confirmation of the rating was prompted by Fiat's better-than-
anticipated operating performance, cash flow generation and lower
level of net debt in 2010.  On a pro-forma basis, Fiat post
demerger reported a trading profit margin in the industrial
business of 2.9% compared with 2.1% in 2009 and a positive free
cash flow of around EUR0.4 billion as a result of continued tight
control of capital expenditures and working capital.  The group's
pro-forma reported net industrial debt improved to EUR0.5 billion
at 31 December 2010 compared with EUR1.6 billion at 30 September

Fiat's ratings benefit from its leading market positions in Brazil
(with an approximate 25% market share), as the company's major
source of profits and cash flows in the past years.  Fiat Group
also benefits from a dominant domestic Italian market presence
(with an approximate 30% market share).  The group generates
approximately two thirds of its revenues in these two countries
and is therefore especially vulnerable to a drop-off in demand in
either one of these regions.  This very limited geographic
diversification is a key weakness to its current rating.

The rating also reflects (i) Fiat's business risk, with a pure
focus on the highly cyclical automotive industry including a 25%
stake in Chrysler Group and the activities of Magneti Marelli
(automotive components) and Teksid (supplier of engine blocks) as
well as of Comau (robotics for the auto industry) and Fiat
Powertrain Automotive (mostly an internal supplier of engines);
and (ii) Moody's view of an ageing product portfolio in Europe
resulting from the absence of recent new volume model launches.
This has led to an overall relatively infrequent model renewal
rate compared with its direct peers, thus constraining the group's
competitive position.  This was also reflected in last year's
market share losses in Europe and in Fiat's important home market

Moody's anticipates that Fiat will be able to contain further
market share losses within the next two years before regaining
market shares in Europe, based on an attractive renewed model

The Ba1 rating also takes into consideration a substantial
increase in capital expenditures in the current year and beyond,
compared with a reduced level in 2010, in order to develop and
launch attractive new volume models to the market.  Moody's
anticipates that this will accelerate from 2012 onwards.

In addition, the rating considers the risks and opportunities
associated with its participation in Chrysler.  In the medium
term, a successful integration of Chrysler could lead to a better
allocation and utilization of production capacity and synergies
resulting from the sharing of its distribution network.  However,
this involves material execution risk.  Any sizeable cash
investment from Fiat into Chrysler for raising its stake beyond
35% would increase the negative pressure on the rating.

The negative outlook reflects (i) Fiat's challenge to sustain its
current market shares in Europe, including market shares in its
important domestic Italian market given a lack of major new volume
model launches in the current year; and (ii) Moody's moderate
base-case scenario assumptions on light-vehicle demand in Western
Europe (down by 1% in 2011 compared with 2010), with Fiat's
domestic Italian market anticipated to decline by 0.5% and market
demand in Brazil to be at the same level in 2011 as in 2010, which
could undermine the group's targeted revenue and profitability
improvements.  In January 2011, Italian registrations fell 21%
year-on-year and Fiat's sales declined by 28%.  New car
registrations in Brazil increased by 14% in January year-on-year,
but declined by 37% compared with December.  In addition, the
negative outlook considers Moody's expectation that rising capital
expenditures will likely result in some negative FCFs for Fiat in
the next two years.

Furthermore, contrary to Moody's prior assumptions that Fiat will
not invest any cash into Chrysler short to medium term, the
likelihood is high that Fiat will exercise its call option to
raise its stake in Chrysler to above 50%, resulting in a
significant event risk to the current ratings, which is also
reflected in the negative outlook.  Fiat holds a primary call
option named "Incremental Equity Call Option" to acquire up to a
16% of Chrysler's equity, exercisable January 2013 to June 2016.
However, Fiat may exercise the incremental equity call option if
the two outstanding loans at Chrysler -- granted by UST and the
Government of Canada for approximately USUS$5.8 billion -- are
repaid.  Recent statements from Fiat and Chrysler's CEO indicate
that this event could occur in the near term.  The consideration
that Fiat has to pay for a 16% stake will be determined on the
basis of an EBITDA multiple that will not exceed Fiat's EBITDA
multiple at the time of the exercise of the option, or in case of
Chrysler being a listed company on the basis of Chrysler's market

The ratings could be downgraded if the group is unable to (i)
sustain the recent improvements in its profitability, cash flow
metrics and leverage resulting in Debt/EBITDA of 4.0x or higher in
2011; (ii) sustain a sizeable cash absorption; and (iii) preserve
a healthy liquidity profile with a balanced debt maturity

Also, any cash investment from Fiat into Chrysler, e.g., to
exercise the incremental call option, could trigger a rating

A rating upgrade within the next 12-18 months is currently
unlikely, but the outlook could be stabilized if Fiat demonstrates
an ability to sustain the positive trajectory in its profitability
and credit metrics, which should be evidenced by (i) EBITA margins
trending towards 3.5% in 2011; and (ii) Debt/EBITDA below 3.5x.

Fiat's sources of liquidity for the next 12-month period primarily
include cash & marketable securities on balance sheet of EUR13.2
billion as well as potential cash flow generation from operations.
Moody's notes that all committed credit lines of EUR1.0 billion
with a residual tenor exceeding 12 months were fully drawn at
fiscal year-end 2010.  These sources should be sufficient to cover
Fiat's cash needs over the same period consisting of short-term
debt maturities of EUR5.6 billion, capital expenditures in the
range of EUR4.0-4.5 billion, working capital funding, day-to-day
needs, as well as expected dividend payments of EUR150 million.


Issuer: Fiat Finance & Trade Ltd.

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned


Issuer: Fiat Finance & Trade Ltd.

  -- Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Reinstated to
     LGD4, 55%

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Reinstated to LGD4,

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Reinstated to LGD4,

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Reinstated to LGD4,

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Reinstated to LGD4,

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Reinstated to LGD4,

Issuer: Fiat Finance Canada Ltd.

  -- Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Reinstated to
     LGD4, 55%

Issuer: Fiat Finance North America Inc.

  -- Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Reinstated to
     LGD4, 55%

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Reinstated to LGD4,

Issuer: Fiat S.p.A.

  -- Probability of Default Rating, Reinstated to Ba1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Fiat Finance & Trade Ltd.

  -- Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Fiat Finance Canada Ltd.

  -- Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Fiat Finance North America Inc.

  -- Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Fiat S.p.A.

  -- Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review


Issuer: Fiat Finance & Trade Ltd.

  -- Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at
     (P)NP, (P)Ba1

  -- Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at
     (P)NP, (P)Ba1

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Ba1

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Ba1

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Ba1

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Ba1

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Ba1

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Ba1

Issuer: Fiat Finance Canada Ltd.

  -- Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at

Issuer: Fiat Finance North America Inc.

  -- Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at
     (P)NP, (P)Ba1

  -- Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at
     (P)NP, (P)Ba1

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Ba1

Issuer: Fiat S.p.A.

  -- Corporate Family Rating, Confirmed at Ba1

Moody's most recent rating action on Fiat was a review for
possible downgrade of its Ba1 CFR on July 21, 2010, triggered by
the company's plan to spin-off its Industrial activities Case New
Holland, Iveco and the industrial and marine business of Fiat

Headquartered in Torino, Italy, Fiat S.p.A. (rated Ba1/negative
outlook) is one of Italy's leading industrial groups and one of
Europe's largest automotive manufacturers by unit sales.  On
January 1, 2011, the group completed the demerger of its capital
goods activities, mainly Iveco and CNH (Ba3/stable), into a
separate company, called Fiat Industrial.  On a pro-forma basis,
the new Fiat S.p.A. generated consolidated revenues of EUR35.9
billion and reported a trading profit of EUR1.1 billion in 2010.


BTA BANK: Ex-Chair Can't Use Conspiracy Claim in Embezzlement Case
Erik Larson at Bloomberg News reports that Judge Nigel Teare ruled
on Thursday in London that Mukhtar Ablyazov, ex-chairman of the
BTA Bank JSC, can't use allegations of a presidential conspiracy
to avoid bank claims he embezzled as much as US$4 billion.

According to Bloomberg, Judge Teare ruled that BTA seeks to
recover assets for its creditors, including Royal Bank of Scotland
Group Plc, and the lawsuits are unrelated to the takeover of the
bank or Mr. Ablyazov's disputes with Kazakhstan President
Nursultan Nazarbayev.

"The claims are those of the bank," Bloomberg quotes Judge Teare
as saying in the ruling.  "They are not the claims of the
government of Kazakhstan, which is said to have brought about the
nationalization in breach of international law and human rights."

The ruling applies to four of Almaty-based BTA's six U.K. lawsuits
accusing Mr. Ablyazov of conspiring with associates to siphon
money from the bank through a series of fraudulent loans and share
sales before it was bailed out during the financial crisis and
defaulted on US$12 billion of debt, Bloomberg notes.

BTA in December won a U.K. appeals court ruling that forced Mr.
Ablyazov to place his assets, estimated at US$5 billion, into
receivership, Bloomberg recounts.

The case is: JSC BTA Bank v. Mukhtar Ablyazov, [2011] EWHC 202
(Comm), Royal Courts of Justice (London).

                          About BTA Bank

BTA Bank AO (BTA Bank JSC), formerly Bank TuranAlem AO -- is a Kazakhstan-based financial institution,
which is involved in the provision of banking and financial
products for private and corporate clients.

The BTA Group is one of the leading banking groups in the
Commonwealth of Independent States and has affiliated banks in
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey.
In addition, the Bank maintains representative offices in Russia,
Ukraine, China, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom.
The Bank has no branch or agency in the United States, and its
primary assets in the United States consist of balances in
accounts with correspondent banks in New York City.

As of November 30, 2009, the Bank employed 5,043 people inside
and 4 people outside Kazakhstan.  It has no employees in the
United States.  Most of the Bank's assets, and nearly all its
tangible assets, are located in Kazakhstan.

JSC BTA Bank, also known as BTA Bank of Kazakhstan, commenced
insolvency proceedings in the Specialized Financial Court of
Almaty City, Republic of Kazakhstan.  Anvar Galimullaevich
Saidenov, the Chairman of the Management Board of BTA Bank, then
filed a Chapter 15 petition (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 10-10638) on
Feb. 4, 2010, estimating more than US$1 billion in assets and

On March 9, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported
that JSC BTA Bank was granted relief in the U.S. under Chapter 15
when the bankruptcy judge in New York recognized the Kazakh
proceeding as the "foreign main proceeding."  Consequently,
creditor actions in the U.S. were permanently halted, forcing
creditors to prosecute their claims and receive distributions
in Kazakhstan.

In the U.S., the Foreign Representative is represented by Evan C.
Hollander, Esq., Douglas P. Baumstein, Esq., and Richard A.
Graham, Esq. -- -- at White & Case LLP in
New York City.

Bloomberg News reported that the Specialized Financial Court of
Almaty approved BTA Bank's debt restructuring on Aug. 31, 2010,
trimming its obligations from US$16.7 billion to US$4.2 billion,
and extending its longest maturity dates to 20 year from eight.
Creditors who hold 92% of BTA's debt approved the restructuring
plan in May.  BTA reportedly distributed US$945 million in cash to
creditors and new debt securities including US$5.2 billion of
recovery units (representing an 18.5% equity stake) and US$2.3
billion of senior notes on Sept. 1, 2010.  BTA forecasts profit of
slightly more than US$100 million in 2011, Chief Executive Officer
Anvar Saidenov told reporters in Almaty.


FAB CBO: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to 'B+ (sf)'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on FAB CBO 2003-1 B.V.'s
class A-1E, A-1F, A-2aE, A-2bE, and A-2F notes.  At the same time,
S&P lowered the ratings on the class A-3E and A-3F notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the credit
deterioration S&P has observed in the transaction's underlying
portfolio as well as the application of its updated counterparty
criteria.  In its opinion, the ratings S&P has now assigned are
not constrained by its updated counterparty criteria.

The two largest asset classes in FAB CBO 2003-1's portfolio are
European prime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS;
approximately 30% of the portfolio balance), and corporate CDOs
including SME CLOs (approximately 37% combined).  The majority of
the assets are mezzanine tranches of securitizations.

FAB CDO 2003-1 is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation of
structured finance securities transaction that closed in July

At 0.7% of the portfolio, the balance of assets that S&P considers
as defaulted in S&P's analysis remains relatively low.  However,
S&P note that the balance of assets rated within the 'CCC' rating
category ('CCC+', 'CCC,' and 'CCC-') now represents about 14% of
the portfolio.  Assets within the 'CCC' rating category are mostly
corporate CDOs.  According to S&P's analysis, assets rated below
investment grade now account for about 55% of the portfolio.

Given the proportion of corporate CDOs in the portfolio, S&P
considered it appropriate to analyze the transaction using two
versions of CDO Evaluator, the current version of CDO Evaluator
and the version of CDO Evaluator that was used before S&P's
criteria update for corporate CDOs in September 2009.

S&P note that the transaction's class A-1 notes have continued to
amortize as the transaction enters its third year of amortization.
According to the latest available trustee report of November 2010,
the class A-1E and A-1F outstanding balances are about 56% of
original issuance amounts.  In S&P's view, the amortization of the
notes has resulted in an overall increase in credit enhancement
available to all classes of notes.  Nonetheless, in S&P's opinion
this increase in credit enhancement is insufficient to
counterbalance the increase in the scenario default rates
determined in S&P's analysis.

As a result of these developments, the ratings on the class A-1E,
A-1F, A-2aE, A-2bE, A-2F, A-3E, and A-3F notes were, in S&P's
view, no longer commensurate with the available credit
enhancement.  S&P therefore lowered and removed from CreditWatch
negative its ratings on the class A-1 and A-2 notes, and lowered
its ratings on the class A-3 notes.

                           Ratings List

                        FAB CBO 2003-1 B.V.
           EUR308.8 Million Asset-Backed Floating, Fixed
                       and Zero Coupon Notes

       Ratings Lowered and Removed From Creditwatch Negative

       Class          To                 From
       -----          --                 ----
       A-1E           AA+ (sf)           AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
       A-1F           AA+ (sf)           AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
       A-2aE          A- (sf)            AA (sf)/Watch Neg
       A-2bE          A- (sf)            AA (sf)/Watch Neg
       A-2F           A- (sf)            AA (sf)/Watch Neg

                          Ratings Lowered

       Class          To                 From
       -----          --                 ----
       A-3E           B+ (sf)            BB+ (sf)
       A-3F           B+ (sf)            BB+ (sf)

UPCB FINANCE: Moody's Puts 'Ba3' Rating on USUS$1BB Sr. Sec. Notes
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive Ba3 rating to
the new USUS$1 billion senior secured Notes, due 2020, issued by
UPCB Finance III Limited.  The final terms of the Notes are in
line with the draft reviewed for the provisional (P)Ba3 rating for
the Notes.

UPCB Finance III, incorporated in Cayman Islands, a trust-owned
special purpose vehicle, will on-lend the proceeds on a senior
secured basis into the UPC Holding BV group.  UPC carries a Ba3

                        Ratings Rationale

The Ba3 rating on the notes reflects Moody's view that the senior
secured on-lending establishes a claims position for holders of
the new notes that is broadly equivalent to that of existing
lenders under the UPC Bank Facility.

UPC is a pan-European cable provider, a principal subsidiary of
Liberty Global Inc.  In 2009, the company generated EUR3.45
billion in revenues and EUR1.66 billion in reported operating cash


BANK SOLIDARNOST: Moody's Affirms 'E+' Financial Strength Rating
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the E+ Bank Financial
Strength Rating, B3/Not Prime long-term and short-term local and
foreign currency bank deposit ratings of bank Solidarnost, and
maintains a negative outlook on the bank's ratings.  At the same
time, Moody's Interfax Rating Agency has affirmed the
long-term national scale credit rating of Solidarnost.
Moscow-based Moody's Interfax is majority owned by Moody's, a
leading global rating agency.

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's ratings affirmation reflects Solidarnost's weak financial
fundamentals, particularly its weak recurring income capacity,
which failed to cover the bank's administrative expenses in 2010
according to the bank's unaudited profit and loss statement under
Russian Accounting Standards as at end-December 2010.  The
affirmation also takes into account the high share of short-term
funding and the bank's risky lending practices.  The rating agency
cautions that Solidarnost's capital buffer might be depleted and
become insufficient in the next few years if these negative
developments in the bank's business are not addressed.

However, Moody's acknowledges that Solidarnost's market position
demonstrated some improvements in 2010, which supported its
liquidity; moreover, the relatively seamless rehabilitation of
Potencial (the regional bank which Solidarnost bailed out in 2008)
has also indirectly supported Solidarnost's overall business and
reputation.  The possible Solidarnost's merger with bank Potencial
is viewed rating neutral at this time and is already incorporated
in Solidarnost's ratings.

According to Moody's, Solidarnost's ratings have limited upward
potential in the medium term.  Any revision of the outlook to
stable from negative would require an improvement in the bank's
recurring income capacity and sustainable reduction in risk
concentrations in the assets and liabilities.  Conversely,
negative pressure could be exerted on Solidarnost's ratings due to
a significant decline in liquidity or a substantial further
deterioration of the bank's asset quality.

Moody's previous rating action on Solidarnost was on November 20,
2008, when the rating agency affirmed Solidarnost at B3/E+, with a
negative outlook.

Headquartered in Samara, Russia, Solidarnost reported total non-
consolidated assets of RUB17.7 billion (USUS$583 million) and
total shareholders' equity of RUB2.5 billion (USUS$82 million),
according to its YE2010 unaudited report under Russian Accounting


* SPAIN: Weaker Banks Must Raise Tier 1 Core Capital to 10%
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard at The Telegraph reports that Spain has
imposed draconian rules on its saving banks and is preparing for
part-nationalization of the industry to restore confidence and
boost the country's defenses against contagion from the debt
crisis in Portugal.

According to The Telegraph, the weaker banks, or "cajas", must
raise Tier 1 core capital to 10% by September if they depend on
wholesale capital markets for more than a fifth of their funding
or if less than a fifth of their shares are in private hands.  If
they fail to do so, the government will seize control through the
state bailout fund (FROB), The Telegraph states.

The demands are even tougher than the broad-brush plans unveiled
last month, The Telegraph notes.

The Telegraph relates that the move comes after yields on
Portuguese 10-year bonds punched to a post-EMU high of 7.66%,
renewing fears of a spill-over into Spain.

Jose Manuel Campa, Spain's economy secretary and the architect of
the financial overhaul, acknowledged that the most vulnerable
cajas are unlikely to find private investors, The Telegraph
disclosed.  "It will be a challenge.  They have not taken part in
the equity markets for some time," he told The Telegraph.

Only five of the 17 cajas meet the 10% rule, The Telegraph states.

Mr. Campa, The Telegrpah says, is hopeful that cajas will be able
to raise "a big chunk" from investors given the strides made in
cleaning up their books.  The Telegraph notes that the secretary
said fresh capital of EUR20 billion will be enough to restore the
caja industry to health, disputing claims by City analysts that
EUR40 billion to EUR80 billion will be needed."

According to The Telegraph, there is a risk that Spain may have
missed a chance once again to "get ahead" of the crisis.  A report
last week by the world's Financial Stability Board (FSB) said the
sheer scale of Spain's property bubble had overwhelmed the
country's seemingly tough rules on loss provisions, The Telegraph

The Telegraph notes that while the FSB praised Spain's latest
efforts to strengthen its banking system, there was a sting in the
tail.  According to The Telegraph, the report said that "Such
determined actions became necessary partly because of the delay in
addressing earlier the structural weaknesses of savings banks."

The Spanish media reports that the cajas have yet to come clean on
EUR80 billion of exposure to property loans, and are under fresh
scrutiny by central bank inspectors, The Telegraph recounts.


* Fitch Reports Positive Outlook on Various Turkish Banks
Fitch Ratings says in a newly published report that the majority
of Turkish banks (15 of 28) that it rates currently have a
Positive Outlook, indicating that these ratings could potentially
be upgraded during the next 18 months.

This reflects the revision in November 2010 of the Outlook on
Turkey's 'BB+' sovereign ratings to Positive from Stable.  A
sovereign upgrade would likely drive upgrades of both state-owned
banks, due to the sovereign's increased ability to provide support
to them, and some foreign-owned banks, as reduced transfer and
convertibility risks would lead to an upgrade of the 'BBB-'
Country Ceiling.  A sovereign upgrade would also confirm improved
operating conditions for the country's banks and reduced risks of
macroeconomic instability.  Fitch would expect this to help
several of the country's systemically important, well managed,
privately-owned banks to further strengthen their franchises and
improve their financial profiles, potentially also driving ratings
upgrades of those banks.

More generally, the Individual ratings of Turkish banks continue
to be supported by the sound fundamentals of the system.  The
sector is well capitalized, primarily funded by deposits,
profitable and highly liquid.  Turkish banks were largely
unaffected by the global financial crisis and regulators have not
needed to extend any emergency support measures.  The country's
strong "V-shaped" recovery (Fitch estimates GDP growth at 8% in
2010, and forecasts a 5% expansion in 2011) also supports the
favorable outlook for the banking sector.

In the report, entitled 'Turkish Banking Sector Outlook' and
available at, Fitch says that although the
outlook for Turkish banks is generally favorable, they will also
face significant challenges in 2011.  Firstly, the sharp reduction
in interest rates, which are now negative in real terms, combined
with mounting competition in the banking sector, is causing
margins to fall.  Fitch expects banks to partially offset this
margin pressure by continued strong loan growth in 2011,
especially within retail portfolios.  Moderate impairment charges
should support bottom line results in 2011 but banks' performance
this year is likely to be worse than the strong results achieved
in 2010.

Fitch expects system loan growth of around 25% for 2010 and 2011.
In Fitch's view, Turkish banks are relatively well positioned to
manage this growth without a marked build up in asset quality
risks, given (i) the favorable economic backdrop; (ii) the
currently moderate degree of leverage in the banking sector; (iii)
the absence, to date, of notable property price inflation; (iv)
the ban on foreign currency retail lending; (v) banks' generally
sound credit risk management systems; and (vi) the regulator's
focus on preventing excessive credit growth.  Nevertheless, a
rapid build up of credit presents challenges for any banking
system, particularly if it is sustained over a number of years.
Fitch therefore believes that ensuring prudent management of this
growth will also need to be an important area of focus for Turkish
banks in 2011 and beyond.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ABSOLUTE DESIGN: Goes Into Voluntary Creditors Liquidation
Business Cornwall reports that Absolute Design (Cornwall) Ltd has
gone into liquidation.

Business Cornwall relates that following the company entry into
voluntary creditors liquidation on February 2, the majority of the
staff, including founder Helen Blake, have been retained to work
for two new companies that have been formed as result of the
liquidation, Absolute Graphics (Cornwall) Ltd and Absolute
Interiors (Cornwall) Ltd.

"The reason for the fully planned 'birth' is to separate the two
main functions of the Absolute business and allow both to flourish
in their own right. Given the current economic climate, the new
Absolute structures allow the operation a crucial opportunity to
write off a number of significant bad debts and realize a range of
effective financial benefits," the company said in a statement,
according to Business Cornwall.

"The alterations have also allowed the injection of vital fresh
investment and a new director for both companies, allowing Helen
Blake to once again become much more involved in the creative
direction and delivery of all work.

"The new companies have immediately established themselves and are
seamlessly continuing the award winning work that has made the
team famous. Almost all of the original agency staff are
transferring over to the new businesses which will continue to
operate side-by-side, constantly generating exciting new brands,
design work and interiors for a number of prestigious plc clients
as well as the St Moritz Hotel, St Austell Brewery, The Lands End
Hotel and The Queensberry Hotel (Bath.)"

Absolute Design (Cornwall) Ltd is a Falmouth-based design agency.

ANTRAC LTD: To be Placed Into Administration
Rachel Constantine at Business Sale reports that Antrac Ltd
Managing Director Anthony Small said the company is to be placed
into administration.

The report relates that Mr. Small told the staff the company --
which trades as Cox Waste Management -- had suffered tremendously
in the wake of the collapses of major construction companies
during the recession.

Mr. Small said that he had tried everything possible to prevent
the administration, but was ultimately unable to avoid it,
according to Business Sale.  "I have a notice of intention to
appoint an administrator but I have not done it yet.  I will be,
and I expect that will happen next week.  When a larger firm like
Rok Plc was placed in administration last year it indirectly
affected Antrac Ltd because we were dealing with customers of
theirs who were slower to pay or wanted to be paid quicker -- it
created nervousness out there," Business Sale quoted Mr. Small.

The skip hire side of the business has already been bought out by
Exeter-based Devon Contract Waste, who said they had managed to
retain seven jobs and maintain service to the existing client base
without interruption, the report adds.

Antrac Ltd is Devon waste management company.

BRITISH BOOKSHOPS: Could Stay on High Street Amid Administration
Claire Cromie at this is Sussex reports that Bookseller said
British Bookshops and Stationers could be here to stay on the high
streets of Tunbridge Wells, Crowborough and Uckfield.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 10,
2011, Insider Media Limited said that WH Smith has bought 22
stores and intellectual property from British Bookshops and
Stationers.  The report related that the deal was for a GBP1.05
million in cash.  No stock has been purchased.  According to a
TCREUR report on Jan. 17, 2011, The Bookseller said that British
Bookshops and Stationers have gone into administration with
recovery specialists Zolfo Cooper appointed on Jan. 13, 2011.  No
redundancies were made on the appointment of joint administrators
Simon Appell, Fraser Gray, and Stuart Mackellar, according to The
Bookseller.  The report related that the business will continue to
trade as normal.

This is Sussex says that the acquired stores, based across the
south of England, will trade under their current name for the time
being, WH Smith said.  The report relates that about 200 workers
will transfer to WH Smith in a phased takeover program beginning
on Feb. 22.

British Bookshops and Stationers' history goes back to 1938 when
the first Sussex Stationers opened in Haywards Heath.  Brothers
Michael and Jonathan Chowen bought the shop in 1971 for GBP600 and
slowly expanded it to 50 shops throughout the Southeast,
incorporating books into the stock and renaming the chain British
Bookshops, Sussex Stationers.   The firm employs 300 people across
the south of England.

CATTLES PLC: Fitch Affirms Long-Term Issuer Default Rating at 'C'
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Cattles PLC's Long-term Issuer Default
Rating at 'C' and Short-term IDR at 'C' and simultaneously
withdrawn the ratings.  The company's senior unsecured bonds have
been affirmed at Long-term 'C' and Recovery Rating 'RR6'.  Fitch
will no longer provide ratings or analytical coverage of Cattles.

The agency has withdrawn rating coverage as the public information
and disclosure available to Fitch are no longer considered
sufficient to maintain rating coverage.

On February 1, 2010, Cattles' creditors, including the senior
unsecured bondholders (GBP350 million due 2014 ISIN XS0181857847
and GBP400 million due 2017 ISIN XS0308397149), agreed to a
proposed restructuring plan for the company under which Cattles
will receive GBP49 million from its main subsidiary, Welcome
Financial Services Limited.  On the basis of known creditors as at
December 31, 2010, this is equivalent to a recovery rate of 2.2%,
which is consistent with an 'RR6' rating.

CHEQUERS HOTEL: Goes Into Administration, Seeks Buyer
Hanna Sharpe at Business Sale reports that Chequers Hotel is up
for sale following its fall to administration.  The report relates
that a buyer is being sought for the hotel after it fell into
administration following slow trading.

The hotel is continuing to trade while administrators Baker Tilly
hunt for a buyer, according to Business Sale.

Business Sale notes that Baker Tilly Restructuring & Recovery's
Matthew Wild and Andrew Sheridan are aiming to sell the business
as a going concern.

"Our team and the company's staff will be working flat out in our
attempts to carry on the businesses and find suitable purchasers
to take the business forward," Business Sale quoted Mr. Wild as

The report notes that Baker Tilly said it has plans to roll out a
number of promotional deals and discounts in a bid to increase the
current level of trade and entice future customers.  The last
known financial report revealed that the Chequers Hotel had a
turnover of around GBP112,000, Business Sale discloses.

Chequers Hotel is based in the heart of the South Downs in West

DREEMORE DEVELOPMENTS: Director Faces 13-Year Disqualification
The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment has accepted a
disqualification undertaking for 13 years from Craig Eric Bennett
of Gosford Castle, Markethill, County Armagh in respect of his
conduct as a director of Dreemore Developments Limited.

The Company was incorporated in August 2005, and carried on the
business of (a) retail consisting of five shops/supermarkets
trading as Bennett's Mace, and (b) property development until it
went into administrative receivership on February 2, 2009, with
estimated assets of GBP8,591,000 (subject to fixed and floating
charges), no preferential creditors, liabilities of GBP11,004,000
to floating charge holders, liabilities of GBP2,898,000 to
unsecured creditors and estimated deficiency as regards creditors
of GBP5,311,000.  After taking into account the losses incurred by
members (shareholders, including the directors) of the company,
the total estimated deficiency was GBP10,061,000.

The Department accepted the disqualification undertaking from
Mr. Bennett on January 20, 2011, based on the following unfit
conduct which solely for the purposes of the disqualification
procedure was not disputed:

   a) submitting a materially inaccurate Statement of Affairs for
      the Company;

   b) breaching his fiduciary duty to the Company by:

      i) selling the trade of the five shops to BC (NI) Limited, a
         connected company, at an undervalue;

     ii) failing to provide a valuation for the shops or its
         details despite requests;

    iii) agreeing to a deferred payment scheme with BC (NI)
         Limited despite the Company having severe cash flow

     iv) selling the only trading aspect of the company still
         running when the development aspect of the company had
         relatively ceased, leaving the company with no way to
         service it's debts;

      v) allowing the Company to continue to pay the suppliers of
         the five shops and also retaining the debt which should
         have transferred to BC (NI) Limited;

   c) misappropriating company monies in breach of his duty to the
      Company by:

      i) using GBP400,000 forwarded by Northern Bank for the
         purchase of property for other purposes;

     ii) paying GBP92,799.28 to Hire Purchase providers for
         agreements not under the Company;

    iii) entering the Company into a lease agreement with Lombard
         to the value of EUR187,938 in respect of till systems at
         locations outside of the remit of the Company and located
         at sites owned by another company of which he was a

     iv) entering the Company into a lease agreement with Barclays
         Asset Finance in respect to 13 CCTV systems to the value
         of GBP170,000 with the systems installed at locations
         outside of the remit of the Company.

   d) Paying himself GBP374,233.22 in remuneration which was is in
      excess of what the Company could afford to pay at the time;

   e) providing misleading information on assets to the
      administrative receiver;

   f) failing to comply with Article 229(1) of the Companies
      (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 in that he failed to maintain
      and/or preserve and/or deliver up proper accounting

   g) attempting to prefer creditors by proposing a transfer of
      property in lieu of payment or part payment in respect of
      debts owed to certain creditors;

   h) making no attempt to pay monies owed to the Company for
      properties sold to him by the Company;

   i) failing to comply with his obligation under Articles 296,
      360 and 390 of the Companies (NI) Order 1986 in that he
      failed to maintain and deliver up statutory records;

   j) causing and permitting the Company to misuse a bank account
      by tendering 352 checks and direct debits to the value of
      GBP1,463,782, which were subsequently returned unpaid.

The Department has accepted 34 Disqualification Undertakings and
the Court has made 3 orders disqualifying 3 directors in the
financial year commencing April 1, 2010.

EDWARDS LTD: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Rating to New First Lien Loans
Moody's Investor's Service assigned a (P) B3 rating to the
proposed up to USUS$280 million New First Lien Term Loans to be
borrowed by Edwards (Cayman Islands II) Ltd, Cayman Islands, and
placed under review for possible downgrade the B2 rating of the
company's Existing First Lien Term Loan.  The rating for this
instrument is expected to be aligned to the rating of the USUS$280
million New First Lien Term Loans raised upon closing.  At the
same time the rating agency affirmed the Ba2 rating for the
company's Superpriority Revolver and the Caa1 rating of its Second
Lien Term Loan as well as the B2 Corporate Family Rating and the
B2 Probability of Default Rating for Edwards Group Limited,
Crawley / UK.  The rating outlook has been changed to stable from

Moody's issues provisional ratings for debt instruments in advance
of the final sale of securities or conclusion of credit
agreements.  Upon a conclusive review of the final documentation,
Moody's will endeavor to assign a definitive rating to the
different capital instruments.  A definitive rating may differ
from a provisional rating.

                        Ratings Rationale

The rating action follows Edwards' announcement to suggest to its
First Lien lenders an Amendment and Restatement of its credit
facilities including these key changes:

   (i) An extension of all or part of the Existing First Lien Term
Loans by two years to May 2016;

  (ii) The lenders' consent that the company may borrow up to
USUS$280 million New First Lien Term Loans with maturity in May

(iii) Permission to repay the existing Second Lien Term Loans;

  (iv) Permission to a dividend payment of up to USUS$230 million,
USUS$80 million thereof to be used to repay the Vendor Loan Note;

   (v) Re-Definition of a distributions basket for future dividend
payments; and

  (vi) An option for the company to refinance existing First Lien
Term Loans and/or Revolving Credit Commitments by issuing new
first or second lien notes or loans.

The stabilization of the outlook reflects the negative impact on
the rating from the distribution of a large portion of the cash
reserves the company has built since the low point seen in mid
2009 and in view of future dividend payments which will limit free
cash flow generation compared to the status before where Edwards
was able to retain free cash flow in full and over time could
build a cash buffer for the challenges of cyclical swings.
However, in Moody's assessment, Edwards will be able to keep a
minimum cash cushion of USUS$100 million and should be able to
swiftly increase its cash position on the back of a currently
benign economic environment and as a result of efficiency measures
taken.  One important consideration in this respect is the absence
of any financial covenants in the legal documentation of the
credit facilities which provides the company with flexibility to
deal with cyclical swings.  With regard to the revolver Moody's
notes that this facility matures in May 2013 and that a stable B2
Corporate Family Rating would require a timely extension or
replacement not less than 12 months before maturity.

The B2 Corporate Family Rating reflects (i) Edwards Group's
leading market positions and strong competitive position, (ii)
continuous initiatives to innovate products and reduce costs
including the transition of most of the manufacturing operations
to low cost countries as well as (iii) Moody's expectation for a
sustainable improvement in key credit metrics during the economic
recovery despite the company's exposure to volatile end markets.
However, these factors are balanced by (i) the relatively low
product diversity, (ii) high dependency on cyclical swings, and
(iii) the shift in the company's financial policy towards more
shareholder orientation.

The (P) B3 rating for the First Lien Debt instruments reflects its
structural positioning in the group's debt structure as well as a
material volume increase in this class of debt.  As a result of
the refinancing of the Second Lien debt by an increase in First
Lien loans, the relative positioning of the First Lien instruments
is weakened since only GBP4 million lease rejection claims have a
weaker position in the waterfall, while the superpriority
revolver, trade claims and secured loans at the operating entities
in Korea and the Czech Republic are considered to have a stronger
position.  The rating review of the B2 rating for the Existing
First Lien Term Loans will focus on the success of the suggested
amendment and restatement.  If this get's the necessary consent,
the rating for these instruments is expected to be aligned to the
rating of the USUS$280 million New First Lien Term Loans raised
upon closing.

Upside rating pressure could build again if the company is able to
(i) to rebuild a solid liquidity cushion sufficient to comfortably
cover cyclical swings in free cash flow generation as well as (ii)
sustain current profitability levels with reported operating
margins in the medium to high teens, which the group is expected
to achieve in 2011 supported by currently favorable industry
conditions and targeted growth initiatives and cost savings and
efficiency improvements resulting from its ongoing restructuring
program.  The latter should allow the group to further improve
cash generation and cash coverage ratios, as indicated by FFO /
Debt above 10% and a positive free cash flow supporting a
reduction in leverage.

Downward rating pressure would arise if (i) Edwards were unable to
sustain its current profitability metrics, as indicated by
reported operating profit margin; (ii) operating profit interest
coverage as reported failed to show a continuing upward slope from
the current level of 3.7x (October 2009 - September 2010) or (iii)
the group was unable to retain its cash position at a minimum
level of USUS$100 million.  Also, indications that leverage could
exceed 5.5x Net debt / EBITDA or interest cover fall materially
below 2x EBITA could trigger a downward migration.


Issuer: Edwards (Cayman Island II) Limited

  -- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Downgraded to LGD1, 09%
     from LGD1, 06%

  -- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Downgraded to LGD4, 66%
     from LGD3, 44%

On Review for Possible Downgrade:

Issuer: Edwards (Cayman Island II) Limited

  -- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Placed on Review for
     Possible Downgrade, currently B2


Issuer: Edwards (Cayman Island II) Limited

  -- Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned a range of 66
     - LGD4 to (P)B3

  -- Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned a range of 66
     - LGD4 to (P)B3

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Edwards (Cayman Island II) Limited

  -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

Issuer: Edwards Group Limited

  -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

Edwards Group Limited, headquartered in Crawley / United Kingdom,
formerly known as BOC Edwards, is a spin-off from Linde which sold
the company following the takeover of BOC in May 2007.  The
current major shareholders are CCMP Capital and Unitas Capital.
The company has a global leading position in the manufacturing of
highly engineered vacuum and abatement systems.  The company
produces over 5,000 products ranging from simple vacuum gauges to
complex vacuum solutions for silicon semiconductor and flat panel
display processing serving approximately 750 Semiconductor, 500
Emerging Technologies and 20,000 General Vacuum customers.  During
the first nine months of 2010 Edwards generated revenues of GBP464
million (approximately USUS$711 million) from continuing
operations.  Edwards (Cayman Island II) Ltd, Cayman Islands, is a
sub-holding of the group, indirectly 100 % owned by Edwards Group

EDWARDS GROUP: S&P Affirms Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating at 'B+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it affirmed its 'B+' long-
term corporate credit rating on U.K.-based Edwards Group Ltd., a
leading worldwide supplier of vacuum technology.  The outlook is

At the same time, S&P assigned a 'B+' rating to the proposed
USUS$280 million new first-lien term loan, maturing in May 2016
and issued by Edwards' subsidiary Edwards (Cayman Islands II) Ltd.
In addition, S&P affirmed the 'B+' issue rating on the existing
USUS$430 million first-lien term loan, issued by Edwards (Cayman
Islands II) Ltd.  The recovery rating on both first-lien loans is
'3', indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery
for secured bondholders in the event of a payment default.

Furthermore, S&P affirmed the 'BB' issue rating on the USUS$100
million super-senior revolving credit facility, maturing in
May 2013 and issued by Edwards (Cayman Islands II) Ltd. The
recovery rating on the RCF is '1', indicating Standard & Poor's
expectation of very high (90%-100%) recovery for lenders in the
event of a payment default.

Upon completion of the refinancing, S&P expects to withdraw its
'B-' issue rating on the USUS$185 million second-lien payment-in-
kind toggle loan, due 2014, which will be repaid with the proceeds
from the new term loan.

"The affirmation of the corporate credit rating reflects S&P's
view that the proposed refinancing, amendment of its credit
agreement, and the company's proposed dividend payment are still
compatible with its assessment of Edwards' financial risk profile,
which S&P continue to view as "aggressive" under its criteria,"
said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Matthias Raab.  Moreover,
while S&P expects the dividend of up to USUS$150 million to reduce
Edwards' cash on hand, S&P expects to continue assessing the
company's liquidity as adequate under its criteria, following the

Pro forma the closing of the refinancing in the first quarter of
2011, S&P understand that Edwards' gross financial indebtedness
(including some additional mortgages and equipment leases) amounts
to about USUS$729 million.

"The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Edwards will generate
solid free cash flow over the next 18 months, supported by further
revenue growth in its Semiconductor Equipment segment and higher
revenues from growth initiatives and new product launches," said
Mr. Raab.  Although S&P anticipates that Edwards' credit measures
will improve further in the near term, S&P considers that rating
upside is limited at this stage due to S&P's expectation that
Edwards' private-equity sponsors could pursue an aggressive
financial policy.

In December 2010, Edwards announced that it would purse an initial
public offering in the course of 2011.  In S&P's opinion, this
could support rating upside potential, particularly if such a
transaction results in debt reduction, reduces the influence of
the group's private equity owners and S&P's perception of the
risks of aggressive shareholder distributions or credit-negative
changes in the capital structure.

EMI GROUP: Terra Firma's Guy Hands Mulls Acquisition
Stephen Morris and Anne-Sylvaine Chassany at Bloomberg News report
that British financier Guy Hands said he is considering buying EMI
Group Ltd. a week after Citigroup Inc. seized control of the
record label from his private equity firm.

Bloomberg relates that Mr. Hands said in a speech to business
owners in Guernsey on Feb. 8, his first public appearance since
losing his stake in EMI, "It's a question of price."

"Terra Firma and Citigroup agreed on what EMI was worth back in
2007.  We clearly both got it wrong.  Now, we disagree quite
strongly about what it's worth," Mr. Hands, as cited by Bloomberg,
said.  "They are going to auction it, and we will see if they can
get more for it than we offered."

"We got convinced that if EMI is split up between publishing and
recording, it will die as a company," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Hands
as saying at the dinner for 70 people organized by the Young
Business Group of Guernsey.  "You've really got to keep the two
together so that you have the stability of publishing's earnings
versus the volatility of the recorded music division."

Mr. Hands didn't detail how he would fund any acquisition of EMI,
Bloomberg notes.   Terra Firma, which raised a EUR5.4 billion
(US$7.4 billion) pool in 2007, has about EUR2 billion left to
invest, Bloomberg discloses.

                        Citigroup Takeover

As reported on Feb. 3, 2011, by the Troubled Company Reporter-
Europe, Bloomberg News said Citigroup Inc. seized control of EMI
after the record label struggled to meet the terms of loans used
to finance its takeover by Mr. Hands, opening the way for a sale
of the company.  Citigroup said in a statement on Feb. 2 that the
U.S. bank, which funded Mr. Hands' takeover in 2007, will own all
of EMI after the debt-for-equity swap, according to Bloomberg.
The deal will reduce London-based EMI's debt by 65% to GBP1.2
billion (US$1.94 billion), Bloomberg disclosed.  The agreement may
lead to a sale of a record label of the Beatles and Pink Floyd,
Bloomberg noted.  Warner Music Group Corp. and BMG Rights are
among bidders that have expressed interest in EMI's publishing and
recorded assets, Bloomberg said.  Bloomberg, citing Needham & Co.,
said EMI may fetch about US$2 billion in a sale, narrowly covering
its US$1.94 billion debt.  Laura Martin, an analyst at Needham in
Pasadena, California, as cited by Bloomberg, said private equity
firms KKR & Co. and Apollo Group Inc., as well as Sony/ATV Music
Publishing, are likely to seek EMI's publishing unit.

EMI Group Ltd. -- is the fourth
largest record company in terms of market share (behind Universal
Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, and Warner Music Group).
It houses recorded music segment EMI Music and EMI Music
Publishing.  EMI Music distributes CDs, videos, and other formats
primarily through imprints and divisions such as Capitol Records
and Virgin, and sports a roster of artists such as The Beastie
Boys, Norah Jones, and Lenny Kravitz.  EMI Music Publishing, the
world's largest music publisher, handles the rights to more than a
million songs.  EMI Music operates through regional divisions (EMI
Music North America, International, and UK & Ireland).  Private
equity firm Terra Firma owns EMI.

EMI GROUP: Highly Leveraged Businesses May Use Pre-Pack Strategy
Christopher Spink at Reuters reports that the UK's largest
pre-pack administration in which EMI Group's executives in effect
wrested control of the music company from private equity firm
Terra Firma may prompt financial sponsors of other highly
leveraged businesses to review their groups' structures to prevent
such management seizures.

Citigroup took control of EMI through the largest pre-pack
administration seen in the UK at GBP3.4 billion, Reuters relates.
The move was triggered when Roger Faxon, the chief executive of
EMI, declared a holding company insolvent and unable to service
its debts, Reuters notes.

The scheme to put Maltby Investments Limited into administration
appears to have been hatched in the middle of last year by
Mr. Faxon, Reuters states.  In June, Terra Firma founder Guy Hands
persuaded his fund's investors to put up GBP105 million, in three
quarterly slugs, to ensure Maltby Capital, EMI's ultimate holding
company, cleared its covenant tests at the end of the last
financial year, Reuters discloses.

According to Reuters, a person familiar with the situation said
that at the same time as Terra Firma's equity cure in the middle
of last year, the board of Maltby Investments Limited, the top
company in the five-tier structure with exposure to the debt, had
been changed.

"Before there were three non-executive directors, who were Terra
Firma representatives, and two executive directors: Roger Faxon
and EMI's finance director," the source, as cited by Reuters,
said.  "That was changed to the two executive directors last

In mid-January, Ruth Prior, EMI's chief financial officer, and
Mr. Faxon approached PwC with a plan to appoint the accountant
administrator to Maltby Investments, Reuters recounts.

Under UK insolvency law, administrators can be appointed by either
creditors or the directors of the company concerned if they
believe it is technically insolvent, Reuters discloses.  As the
top company in the structure with exposure to the debt, Mr. Faxon
and Ms. Prior could act without interference from Terra Firma,
Reuters notes.

"The specific fact pattern was rather rare in that the board was
not swamped by Terra Firma directors," Reuter quotes another
person involved in the deal as saying.  "Terra Firma must have
known it was a possibility but the firm was not expecting it to be
done when it happened."

The administration enabled PwC to sell Maltby Investments' assets
to principal creditor Citigroup, Reuters says.  The assets are
immediate subsidiary Maltby Acquisitions Limited, which in turn
owns EMI, according to Reuters.

Before the administration, Maltby Investments was in turn owned by
Maltby Holdings Limited, which is itself wholly owned by Maltby
Capital, the top company in the structure, Reuters notes.  "This
has a 'wider' board with full representation from Terra Firma,"
the first source said, according to Reuters.

Reuters says restructuring specialists are now seeing if the
strategy can be replicated at other over-leveraged businesses to
force equity owners to give up control of such "zombie" companies
to their creditors.

"Many businesses have debts that are greater than their enterprise
value.  Under the constitution of most companies that makes them
technically insolvent," Reuters quotes a person familiar with the
situation as saying.

EMI Group Ltd. -- is the fourth
largest record company in terms of market share (behind Universal
Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, and Warner Music Group).
It houses recorded music segment EMI Music and EMI Music
Publishing.  EMI Music distributes CDs, videos, and other formats
primarily through imprints and divisions such as Capitol Records
and Virgin, and sports a roster of artists such as The Beastie
Boys, Norah Jones, and Lenny Kravitz.  EMI Music Publishing, the
world's largest music publisher, handles the rights to more than a
million songs.  EMI Music operates through regional divisions (EMI
Music North America, International, and UK & Ireland).  Private
equity firm Terra Firma owns EMI.

PROMETHEUS PRESS: Goes Into Administration, Axes 29 Jobs
Tim Sheahan at PrintWeek reports that Julian Marsh, managing
director of Minotaur Group, which trades as Prometheus Press, has
said the company "gave 110% but sadly that wasn't good enough"
after going into administration with the loss of 29 jobs.

RSM Tenon was appointed as administrator on Feb. 3, and is
currently looking for buyers for the goodwill of the business,
according to PrintWeek.

The report notes Mr. Marsh said that the company "simply ran out
of cash".  "We were squeezed both ways and maybe we tried to grow
too quickly.  Perhaps we were too focused on growing the business
when we also should have been growing our sales," he added.

Headquartered in Tonbridge, Minotaur Group, which trades as
Prometheus Press, is a trade printer company.

UNIQ PLC: Pension Regulator Clears Proposed Restructuring
Uniq plc on Feb. 9 disclosed that a proposed Restructuring, to
provide a solution to the legacy pension deficit, has been cleared
by the Pensions Regulator.  The proposed Restructuring is subject
to approval by Shareholders and the sanction of the High Court.

Key points of the proposed Restructuring:

    * The Pension Trustee has agreed to release the Company from
its pension debt in exchange for a 90.2% shareholding in the
Company and a cash payment to the Pension Scheme (before deduction
of certain expenses) of GBP14 million

    * The proposed Restructuring removes the substantial pension
buy-out deficit of more than GBP400 million from the Company

    * The Restructuring will be implemented by means of a
"regulated apportionment arrangement" and through a scheme of
arrangement which requires approval from Shareholders and the
sanction of the High Court

    * A new GBP25 million bank facility will be made available
conditional upon the scheme of arrangement becoming effective

    * The PPF has confirmed its non-objection on the basis that
the Restructuring is implemented before March 31, 2011

    * The existing Shareholders will retain 9.8% of the Company
following the Restructuring

    * As a result of the free float requirements under the Listing
Rules, the Company proposes to move its share listing to AIM

    * The Pension Trustee and the Pension Protection Fund have
stated their intention to review opportunities and strategies to
realise all or part of the 90.2% shareholding in the Company

Geoff Eaton, Chief Executive, commented: "Gaining clearance from
the Pensions Regulator for the proposed Restructuring is the
result of over 18 months' hard work.  The pension solution will
release the business from the huge legacy pension burden, while
realising the best possible outcome for pension members and
achieving some value for our shareholders."

Chris Martin, Independent Trustee Services Limited, Chairman of
the Trustee, commented: "After an exhaustive process, throughout
which we have worked closely with our advisory team, the Trustee
Board has concluded that the proposed Restructuring is the best
outcome possible for the Pension Scheme.  The Trustee has been
focused entirely on securing the highest benefits affordable for
our 21,000 members."

Summary proposed timetable

Shareholder and Court meetings - February 25, 2011

Uniq Shares suspended from trading - March 17, 2011

Capital reorganization effective - March 18, 2011

Admission to AIM - April 1, 2011

Uniq plc -- is a United Kingdom chilled
food producer.  The Company operates in two divisions: Food to Go
and Desserts.  Food to Go operations are located at Northampton
(sandwiches) and Spalding (dressed salads).  Desserts segment
operates from Minsterley and Evercreech, producing trifles,
twinpot desserts, yoghurts and cottage cheese.  During the year
ended December 31, 2009, the Company disposed of all its European
operations in Northern Europe (Germany, the Netherlands and
Poland) and in France.  On March 13, 2009, the Company sold its
United Kingdom chilled fish business, Pinneys of Scotland.  On
October 7, 2009, the Company completed the sale of its French
chilled and frozen convenience food business, Marie SAS.  In April
2010, the Company completed the sale of Uniq Deutschland GmbH and
Uniq Lisner Sp. Z.o.o., the German and Polish businesses, to IFR
Capital plc.  Its subsidiaries include Uniq (Holdings) Limited and
Uniq Prepared Foods Limited.

WAKEFIELD TRINITY: Spirit of 1873 Acquires Firm
BBC News reports that Wakefield Trinity Wildcats have been taken
over by Spirit of 1873 Ltd, a group run by businessman Andrew
Glover.  The report relates that the rescue deal is subject to the
Rugby Football League's final written confirmation that Mr. Glover
passes a fit and proper person test.

The news comes after fellow Yorkshire businessman Steve Parkin
decided not to proceed with his bid, according to BBC News.

The report notes that the Wildcats entered administration on
Friday and as a result, will be deducted up to six Super League
points.  The terms of the agreement will see the Wildcats playing
at their long-time Belle Vue home for the 2011 season, BBC News

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 3,
2011, BBC News said that Wakefield Trinity is to go into
administration to avoid a winding-up petition brought by Her
Majesty's Revenue and Customs.  The report related that the club
is thought to owe more than GBP300,000 in unpaid tax.  BBC News
noted that the Wildcats could now start the new season with an
automatic six-point penalty, the statutory punishment, under Rugby
Football League rules, for any club entering administration.

Wakefield Trinity Wildcats is a professional rugby league club
that plays in the European Super League and is based in Wakefield.
It achieved promotion in 1999 and has remained in the League
since.  The club is known to its fans as 'Wakey', 'Trinity',
'Wildcats', or historically 'The Dreadnoughts'.

* UK: Construction Firm Failures Jump 20% in 4th Quarter of 2010
---------------------------------------------------------------- reports that the number of construction firms that
went into administration rose 20% in the last three months of 2010
compared with the third quarter.

The Construction Index, citing data from Insolvency Service, said
there were 82 construction companies falling into administration
in the fourth quarter of 2010, up from 68 in the third quarter.
This was the first increase in construction administrations for
eight quarters.  The last quarter that saw an increase in
construction administrations was Q4 2008, when 156 construction
companies went into administration.  The Construction Index
discloses that throughout 2010, 323 construction companies went
into administration, down from 427 in 2009.

Although the increase does not bode well for the construction
industry at a time of falling output, it is 9% below the same
period in 2009, when 90 firms were pushed into administration, and
way below the worst point of the recession when 156 firms went
under at the end of 2008, according to  The report
relates that the bulk of the figures are made up of smaller firms,
especially in the general contracting sector, which comprised 67%
of the total in Q4 2010.

"The severe weather conditions in the latter part of 2010 played a
key part in the failure of some construction companies where a
halt in activity over a number of weeks was enough to tip them
over the edge," quoted Rupert Rawcliffe,
construction director at Grant Thornton, as saying.

The report notes that a stricter approach towards firms in trouble
and owing tax to HM Revenue and Customs also had an impact,
according to Phil Pierce, partner at Baker Tilly Restructuring and

"Many contractors are still using company voluntary arrangements
to allow continuation of trade and for the survival of the
business.  Most likely, many will have combined it with Time to
Pay (TTP) with HMRC.  However, it appears HMRC may be coming under
stricter guidelines in situations where a company is unable to
meet its tax liabilities.  Recent figures indicate that the number
of TTP arrangements has almost halved in 2010.  The real state of
affairs, we suspect, will only be seen as the year unfolds," quoted Mr. Pierce as saying.

The report notes that the increase in administrations in the
sector coincides with a 3.3% fall in construction sector output
during the final quarter of 2010.  This decline surprised many
economists who were expecting the economy as a whole to grow
between 0.1% and 0.8% in Q4 when in fact it registered a 0.5%
fall, the report adds.

According to The Construction Index, there were 290 compulsory
liquidations of construction companies in the fourth quarter of
2010, compared to 293 in the third quarter and 295 in the same
period of 2009.  In 2010, there were 1,307 construction companies
forced into liquidation, compared to 1,059 in 2009, The
Construction Index notes.

The Construction Index further discloses that receiverships in the
industry totalled 35 in the fourth quarter of 2010, down from 48
in the third quarter.  For the year as a whole, 181 construction
companies went into receivership, down from 245 in 2009.


* Moody's: Defaults and Recoveries Underscore Severity of Crisis
The incidents of defaults among financial institutions during the
recent financial crisis was unprecedented, according to Moody's
latest annual analysis of defaults and recoveries.

The period 2008-2010 saw 111 financial companies default,
including 72 debt issuers holding US$318 billion of bonds and
loans in the 2008-2010 period.

By comparison, there were only 96 defaults, affecting US$46
billion of debt, of Moody's-rated financial companies in the
period 1983
-- 2007.  Of these, 36 defaults took place during the U.S. Savings
and Loans Crisis of 1989-1991, affecting US$6 billion of debt.

"Historically, defaults in the financial sector were fairly low
except during the Savings and Loan crisis," says Sharon Ou,
Assistant Vice President at Moody's Investors Service who authored
the report. "Financial institution defaults during the recent
crisis were unprecedented both in number and volume."

The default rate for all Moody's-rated financial institutions rose
sharply during 2008-2009 and reached its cyclical peak of 2.7% in
August 2009, according to the Moody's report.  It surpassed the
previous record of 2.3% set during the Savings & Loan Crisis.
While relatively fewer financial institutions are speculative
grade, among those firms the default rate topped out at 11.5%
during the recent crisis, below the 1989-1991 peak of 19.5% when
there were far fewer speculative-grade-rated financial issuers.

In addition to being at unprecedented levels, defaults during the
recent crisis have also been more globally distributed.  During
the crisis more than half of the financial institutions that
defaulted were located in Europe, a region that historically had
seen very few financial institution defaults.

Specifically, during the past three years 56% of defaults have
been located in Europe, compared to only 6% before 2008.  About
half the recent defaults were Ukrainian banks, which imposed
deposit freezes in October 2008.  In contrast to Europe, North
America saw its share drop to only 37% in this cycle relative to
79% before 2008.

The recent financial crisis also saw a unique phenomenon in credit
differentiation among various classes of debt, which was in part
due to different levels of support governments offered to senior
debt liabilities versus junior ones.

Recovery rates on defaulted bonds during the crisis have held up
surprisingly well, boosted by 15 distressed exchanges.  For
example, the average recovery rate for senior unsecured bonds has
been 35.2% during 2008-2010, which is just slightly off the 1983-
2007 average of 39.4%. Financial institutions engaged in
distressed exchanges during the recent crisis, which propped up
the recovery rate.

Looking into 2011, Moody's Credit Transition Model (CTM), which
forecasts rating transitions, predicts that the default rate among
speculative-grade financial institutions which issue debt will
stabilize under the baseline economic scenario to a range of 1.5%
- 3.0%.  Under a more pessimistic scenario, CTM forecasts the
default rate rebounding from its current 3.0% level to 6.5%.

Available on "Defaults and Recoveries for Financial
Institution Debt Issuers, 1983-2010" documents the default,
recovery and rating transitions of Moody's-rated financial
institutions since 1983.

* Moody's: Global Default Rate Falls to 2.8% in January
The trailing 12-month global declined to 2.8% in January, down
from its revised 3.2% level in December, according to Moody's
Investors Service in its monthly default report.  A year ago,
the global default rate stood dramatically higher at 12.6%.

No Moody's-rated corporate debt issuer defaulted in January, the
first time there has been no default during a month since June
2007.  By comparison, there were eight defaults in January 2010.

"We continue to expect stable, low default rates for the near
future," said Albert Metz, Moody's Director of Credit Policy
Research.  "Default rates would move upwards, however, should
financing become scarce, particularly in Europe."

Moody's forecasting model predicts that the global speculative-
grade default rate will decline to 1.5% by January 2012.  The
model did a satisfactory job in projecting the rise and fall in
default rates during the most recent credit cycle.  For example,
the model anticipated at the beginning of last year that the
global default rate would fall sharply to 3.3% by year end and the
actual rate came in at 3.2%.

By region the model says the default rate will decline to 1.7%
among U.S. speculative-grade issuers and to 1.1% among European
speculative-grade issuers.

By industry, Moody's expects default rates to be highest in the
Hotel, Gaming, & Leisure sector in the U.S. and the Media:
Advertising, Printing & Publishing sector in Europe.

In the U.S., the speculative-grade default rate edged lower in
January, to 3.0% from the revised December level of 3.4%.  At this
time a year ago, the U.S. default rate stood 13.7%.

In Europe, the default rate among speculative-grade issuers was
2.3% in January, unchanged from the revised level for December. A
year ago, the European default rate was at 10.5%.

When measured on dollar volume basis, the global speculative-grade
bond default rate remained unchanged at 1.6% from December to
January.  A year ago, the global dollar-weighted default rate
stood at 16.4%.

In the U.S., the dollar-weighted speculative-grade bond default
rate ended January at 1.5%, down slightly from 1.6% in December.
The same rate was 16.8% in January 2010.

In Europe, the dollar-weighted speculative-grade bond default rate
was 1.9% in January, unchanged from its revised level for
December.  At this time last year, the rate was 12.2%.

Moody's speculative-grade corporate distress index -- a measure of
the percentage of high-yield issuers that have debt trading at
distressed levels -- fell from December's level of 10.5% to 8.6%
in January.  A year ago, the index was higher at 19.4%.

Among U.S. leveraged loans, the trailing 12-month default rate
fell from 2.8% in December to 2.5% in January.  A year ago, the
loan default rate was 11.5%.

Moody's "January Default Report" is now available, as are Moody's
other default research reports, in the Rating Analytics section of

* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 31 to February 4, 2011

Issuer                Coupon   Maturity  Currency   Price
------                ------   --------  --------   -----

BA CREDITANSTALT       5.470   8/28/2013      EUR    67.13
OESTER VOLKSBK         4.810   7/29/2025      EUR    56.38
OESTER VOLKSBK         4.170   7/29/2015      EUR    66.88
RAIFF ZENTRALBK        4.500   9/28/2035      EUR    79.30

PETROL AD-SOFIA        8.375  10/26/2011      EUR    71.75

DANMARK SKIBSKRD       2.000  11/15/2024      DKK    74.28
KOMMUNEKREDIT          0.500    2/3/2016      TRY    73.95
KOMMUNEKREDIT          0.500  12/14/2020      ZAR    41.10

MUNI FINANCE PLC       1.000  11/21/2016      NZD    72.03
MUNI FINANCE PLC       1.000  10/30/2017      AUD    67.77
MUNI FINANCE PLC       1.000   6/30/2017      ZAR    58.00
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500  11/25/2020      ZAR    43.07
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500   3/17/2025      CAD    53.73
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.250   6/28/2040      CAD    23.71
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500   9/24/2020      CAD    68.70
MUNI FINANCE PLC       1.000   2/27/2018      AUD    66.38
MUNI FINANCE PLC       0.500    2/9/2016      ZAR    70.36

AIR FRANCE-KLM         4.970    4/1/2015      EUR    15.83
ALCATEL-LUCENT         5.000    1/1/2015      EUR     3.92
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG       6.720    1/1/2015      EUR     5.11
ATOS ORIGIN SA         2.500    1/1/2016      EUR    54.90
CALYON                 6.000   6/18/2047      EUR    26.80
CAP GEMINI SOGET       3.500    1/1/2014      EUR    43.55
CAP GEMINI SOGET       1.000    1/1/2012      EUR    44.31
CGG VERITAS            1.750    1/1/2016      EUR    29.81
CIE FIN FONCIER        3.250  12/30/2044      EUR    71.14
CLUB MEDITERRANE       5.000    6/8/2012      EUR    18.51
CLUB MEDITERRANE       6.110   11/1/2015      EUR    19.95
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY       1.000  12/23/2024      EUR    61.27
EURAZEO                6.250   6/10/2014      EUR    57.59
FAURECIA               4.500    1/1/2015      EUR    29.46
MAUREL ET PROM         7.125   7/31/2015      EUR    16.08
MAUREL ET PROM         7.125   7/31/2014      EUR    17.90
NEXANS SA              4.000    1/1/2016      EUR    69.75
ORPEA                  3.875    1/1/2016      EUR    47.53
PEUGEOT SA             4.450    1/1/2016      EUR    34.74
PUBLICIS GROUPE        1.000   1/18/2018      EUR    49.83
PUBLICIS GROUPE        3.125   7/30/2014      EUR    41.58
RHODIA SA              0.500    1/1/2014      EUR    49.16
SOC AIR FRANCE         2.750    4/1/2020      EUR    21.79
SOITEC                 6.250    9/9/2014      EUR    10.71
TEM                    4.250    1/1/2015      EUR    58.88
THEOLIA                2.700    1/1/2041      EUR    11.12

DEUTSCHE BK LOND       0.500   8/25/2017      BRL    54.57
EUROHYPO AG            6.490   7/17/2017      EUR     8.69
HSH NORDBANK AG        4.375   2/14/2017      EUR    60.97
IKB DEUT INDUSTR       4.080  12/20/2035      EUR    58.77
KFW                    3.276   6/10/2035      USD    73.78
L-BANK FOERDERBK       0.500   5/10/2027      CAD    48.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT        2.500   1/30/2034      EUR    63.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT        5.250  10/20/2015      EUR    30.00
Q-CELLS                6.750  10/21/2015      EUR     3.75
SOLON AG SOLAR         1.375   12/6/2012      EUR    30.90
WESTLB AG              3.350  10/19/2026      EUR    66.90

ATHENS URBAN TRN       5.008   7/18/2017      EUR    67.85
ATHENS URBAN TRN       4.851   9/19/2016      EUR    73.36
HELLENIC REP I/L       2.300   7/25/2030      EUR    49.00
HELLENIC REP I/L       2.900   7/25/2025      EUR    49.19
HELLENIC REPUB         5.200   7/17/2034      EUR    66.83
HELLENIC REPUB         6.140   4/14/2028      EUR    62.20
HELLENIC REPUB         5.000   8/22/2016      JPY    64.65
HELLENIC REPUB         4.590    4/8/2016      EUR    67.23
HELLENIC REPUB         5.000   3/11/2019      EUR    60.03
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.600   9/20/2040      EUR    58.04
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.500   9/20/2037      EUR    57.99
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.300   3/20/2026      EUR    64.15
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.500  10/22/2019      EUR    69.96
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.700   3/20/2024      EUR    63.49
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.900  10/22/2022      EUR    70.68
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.250   6/19/2020      EUR    71.13
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.675   10/9/2017      EUR    65.98
HELLENIC REPUBLI       6.000   7/19/2019      EUR    69.55
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.959    3/4/2019      EUR    68.65
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.014   2/27/2019      EUR    64.18
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.600   7/20/2018      EUR    65.14
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.590    4/3/2018      EUR    64.22
HELLENIC REPUBLI       5.900   4/20/2017      EUR    70.71
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.300   7/20/2017      EUR    66.14
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.700   7/20/2015      EUR    69.12
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.702   9/30/2015      EUR    70.04
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.700  11/10/2015      EUR    68.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI       3.600   7/20/2016      EUR    65.91
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.020   9/13/2016      EUR    66.96
HELLENIC REPUBLI       4.225    3/1/2017      EUR    66.02
NATIONAL BK GREE       3.875   10/7/2016      EUR    75.19

AIB MORTGAGE BNK       5.000   2/12/2030      EUR    57.30
AIB MORTGAGE BNK       5.580   4/28/2028      EUR    63.32
AIB MORTGAGE BNK       5.000    3/1/2030      EUR    57.06
ALLIED IRISH BKS       10.75   3/29/2017      USD    29.95
ALLIED IRISH BKS       5.625  11/29/2030      GBP    25.20
ALLIED IRISH BKS       7.875    7/5/2023      GBP    25.28
ALLIED IRISH BKS       11.50   3/29/2022      GBP    24.92
ALLIED IRISH BKS       12.50   6/25/2019      EUR    23.63
ALLIED IRISH BKS       12.50   6/25/2019      GBP    25.92
ALLIED IRISH BKS       10.75   3/29/2017      EUR    25.43
ALLIED IRISH BKS       5.625  11/12/2014      EUR    69.00
BANK OF IRELAND        5.600   9/18/2023      EUR    47.76
BANK OF IRELAND        4.875   1/22/2018      GBP    49.27
BANK OF IRELAND        10.75   6/22/2018      GBP    60.63
BANK OF IRELAND        9.250    9/7/2020      GBP    60.02
BANK OF IRELAND        10.00   2/12/2020      GBP    63.82
BANK OF IRELAND        10.00   2/12/2020      EUR    64.54
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.450    3/1/2030      EUR    66.32
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.400   11/6/2029      EUR    66.37
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.760    9/7/2029      EUR    69.48
BK IRELAND MTGE        5.360  10/12/2029      EUR    66.04
DEPFA ACS BANK         5.125   3/16/2037      USD    61.15
DEPFA ACS BANK         4.900   8/24/2035      CAD    63.15
DEPFA ACS BANK         6.000   10/7/2035      USD    71.87
DEPFA ACS BANK         0.500    3/3/2025      CAD    32.94
DEPFA ACS BANK         5.100  12/20/2024      USD    73.73
DEPFA ACS BANK         5.125   3/16/2037      USD    60.86
DEPFA ACS BANK         3.250   7/31/2031      CHF    71.38
IRISH GOVT             5.000  10/18/2020      EUR    74.40
IRISH GOVT             4.500   4/18/2020      EUR    72.91
IRISH GOVT             5.400   3/13/2025      EUR    71.88
IRISH LIFE PERM        4.250    4/9/2015      EUR    74.76
IRISH NATIONWIDE       13.00   8/12/2016      GBP    13.25
IRISH NATIONWIDE       5.500   1/10/2018      GBP    13.49
IRISH NATIONWIDE       6.250   6/26/2012      GBP    40.75

ABRUZZO REGION         4.450    3/1/2037      EUR    72.76
BEATRICE FOODS         1.000  11/19/2026      USD    45.00
CITY OF TURIN          5.270   6/26/2038      EUR    65.25
CO BRAONE              4.567   6/30/2037      EUR    74.81
CO CASTELMASSA         3.960   3/31/2026      EUR    72.36
SARDINIA REGION        4.022  11/28/2035      EUR    70.69
SARDINIA REGION        4.383  12/20/2034      EUR    74.26
TELECOM ITALIA         5.250   3/17/2055      EUR    73.60

ARCELORMITTAL          7.250    4/1/2014      EUR    33.50
BREEZE FINANCE         6.708   4/19/2027      EUR    64.75
DEXIA BQ INT LUX       2.390   12/7/2021      EUR    69.27
ESPIRITO SANTO F       6.875  10/21/2019      EUR    67.96
IIB LUXEMBOURG         11.00   2/19/2013      USD    13.49
LIGHTHOUSE INTL        8.000   4/30/2014      EUR    34.00
LIGHTHOUSE INTL        8.000   4/30/2014      EUR    34.48
UBI BANCA INT          8.750  10/29/2012      EUR    71.50

APP INTL FINANCE       11.75   10/1/2005      USD     0.01
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500    3/3/2021      NZD    58.18
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500   6/27/2018      CAD    74.37
BK NED GEMEENTEN       0.500   2/24/2025      CAD    51.93
BRIT INSURANCE         6.625   12/9/2030      GBP    66.60
ELEC DE CAR FIN        8.500   4/10/2018      USD    57.30
NATL INVESTER BK       25.98    5/7/2029      EUR    22.05
NED WATERSCHAPBK       0.500   3/11/2025      CAD    53.36
NIB CAPITAL BANK       4.510  12/16/2035      EUR    63.31
RABOBANK               2.805   8/28/2020      AUD    74.67
SIDETUR FINANCE        10.00   4/20/2016      USD    73.50
TJIWI KIMIA FIN        13.25    8/1/2001      USD     0.01

EKSPORTFINANS          0.500    5/9/2030      CAD    41.64
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500   1/27/2016      ZAR    74.43
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500  12/18/2015      ZAR    71.87
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500   9/24/2014      BRL    73.11
KOMMUNALBANKEN         0.500    3/1/2016      ZAR    71.20
NORSKE SKOGIND         7.125  10/15/2033      USD    72.13
NORSKE SKOGIND         7.125  10/15/2033      USD    72.13

CAIXA GERAL DEPO       5.380   10/1/2038      EUR    67.15
METRO DE LISBOA        4.061   12/4/2026      EUR    74.42
PORTUGUESE OT'S        4.100   4/15/2037      EUR    68.81
REFER                  4.675  10/16/2024      EUR    70.62
REFER                  4.250  12/13/2021      EUR    74.59
REFER                  4.047  11/16/2026      EUR    67.14

APK ARKADA             17.50   5/23/2012      RUB     0.38
ARIZK                  3.000  12/20/2030      RUB    51.12
ARKTEL-INVEST          12.00    4/9/2012      RUB     0.05
BARENTSEV FINANS       20.00    7/4/2011      RUB     1.60
BASHKIRENERGO          8.300    3/9/2011      RUB    75.01
CENTREINVEST GRO       9.250   6/24/2014      RUB    75.00
DVTG-FINANS            17.00   8/29/2013      RUB     3.01
EMALIANS-FINANS        10.97    7/8/2011      RUB    97.00
EUROKOMMERZ            16.00   3/15/2011      RUB     0.01
HCF BANK               7.100  10/12/2011      RUB   100.00
IZHAVTO                18.00    6/9/2011      RUB    11.31
M-INDUSTRIYA           12.25   8/16/2011      RUB    29.06
MAGNIT OJSC            8.250    9/9/2013      RUB    75.00
MAGNIT OJSC            8.250    9/9/2013      RUB    75.00
MDM BANK               12.75  11/29/2012      RUB   107.96
MIG-FINANS             0.100    9/6/2011      RUB     1.00
MIRAX                  17.00   9/17/2012      RUB    33.21
MIRAX                  14.99   5/17/2011      RUB    43.27
MOSMART FINANS         0.010   4/12/2012      RUB     1.81
MOSOBLGAZ              12.00   5/17/2011      RUB    72.50
MOSOBLTRUSTINVES       20.00   3/26/2011      RUB     6.99
NOK                    12.50   8/26/2014      RUB     5.01
NOK                    10.00   9/22/2011      RUB    54.00
PEB LEASING            14.00   9/12/2014      RUB    75.00
POLYPLAST              19.00   6/21/2011      RUB   100.70
PROMPEREOSNASTKA       1.000  12/17/2012      RUB     0.01
RFC-LEASING            13.00  10/27/2011      RUB    75.00
RUSSIAN STANDARD       7.750   4/13/2012      RUB    99.93
RYBINSKKABEL           0.010   2/28/2012      RUB     1.00
SAHO                   10.00   5/21/2012      RUB     0.03
SATURN                 8.500    6/6/2014      RUB    93.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS        10.50   3/27/2012      RUB     3.40
SOUTHERN STOCK C       9.000   4/29/2014      RUB    75.00
SVOBODNY SOKOL         0.100   5/24/2011      RUB     1.31
TECHNOSILA-INVES       7.000   5/26/2011      RUB     3.00
TERNA-FINANS           1.000   11/4/2011      RUB    18.50
TRANSCREDITFACTO       12.00   6/11/2012      RUB    75.00
UTK                    11.00  10/17/2012      RUB    75.01
UTK                    7.800   5/30/2012      RUB    75.00
WIMM-BILL-DANN         7.450   2/27/2013      RUB   100.15
ZHILSOTSIPOTEKA-       9.000   7/26/2011      RUB    75.00

AYT CEDULAS CAJA       3.750  12/14/2022      EUR    68.25
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       4.750   5/25/2027      EUR    70.00
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       4.250  10/25/2023      EUR    70.92
AYT CEDULAS CAJA       3.750   6/30/2025      EUR    62.30
BANCAJA                1.500   5/22/2018      EUR    60.16
BANCO GUIPUZCOAN       1.500   4/18/2022      EUR    49.64
CAJA CASTIL-MAN        1.500   6/23/2021      EUR    60.83
CAJA MADRID            4.000    2/3/2025      EUR    73.88
CAJA MADRID            5.755   2/26/2028      EUR    58.09
CAJA MADRID            4.125   3/24/2036      EUR    65.84
CEDULAS TDA 6          3.875   5/23/2025      EUR    63.37
CEDULAS TDA A-5        4.250   3/28/2027      EUR    63.87
CEDULAS TDA A-6        4.250   4/10/2031      EUR    59.61
COMUN AUTO CANAR       3.900  11/30/2035      EUR    66.95
COMUN AUTO CANAR       4.200  10/25/2036      EUR    70.19
COMUNIDAD BALEAR       4.063  11/23/2035      EUR    64.52
GEN DE CATALUNYA       4.690  10/28/2034      EUR    74.63
GENERAL DE ALQUI       2.750   8/20/2012      EUR    72.95
IM CEDULAS 5           3.500   6/15/2020      EUR    72.26
JUNTA ANDALUCIA        4.250  10/31/2036      EUR    66.86
JUNTA LA MANCHA        3.875   1/31/2036      EUR    61.20
LA CAIXA               3.875   2/17/2025      EUR    75.28
XUNTA DE GALICIA       4.025  11/28/2035      EUR    71.92

SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500    3/3/2016      ZAR    64.74
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500  12/21/2015      ZAR    65.76
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500  12/17/2027      USD    49.27
SWEDISH EXP CRED       9.000   8/12/2011      USD    10.42
SWEDISH EXP CRED       9.000   8/28/2011      USD    10.90
SWEDISH EXP CRED       8.000  10/21/2011      USD    10.09
SWEDISH EXP CRED       8.000   11/4/2011      USD     8.92
SWEDISH EXP CRED       2.000   12/7/2011      USD     9.81
SWEDISH EXP CRED       8.000   1/27/2012      USD    10.01
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500   9/29/2015      BRL    64.43
SWEDISH EXP CRED       0.500   1/25/2028      USD    49.17

UBS AG                 13.70   5/23/2012      USD    14.05
UBS AG                 13.30   5/23/2012      USD     4.23
UBS AG                 14.00   5/23/2012      USD     9.70
UBS AG                 10.58   6/29/2011      USD    39.79
UBS AG JERSEY          10.36   8/19/2011      USD    53.38
UBS AG JERSEY          9.350   9/21/2011      USD    70.88
UBS AG JERSEY          10.28   8/19/2011      USD    35.71
UBS AG JERSEY          11.00   2/28/2011      USD    69.69
UBS AG JERSEY          13.00   6/16/2011      USD    50.13
UBS AG JERSEY          10.50   6/16/2011      USD    73.14
UBS AG JERSEY          10.99   3/31/2011      USD    30.98
UBS AG JERSEY          12.80   2/28/2011      USD    33.19
UBS AG JERSEY          9.450   9/21/2011      USD    51.03
UBS AG JERSEY          9.230  12/30/2011      USD    14.16
UBS AG JERSEY          10.14  12/30/2011      USD    15.28
UBS AG JERSEY          3.220   7/31/2012      EUR    53.08
UBS AG JERSEY          11.15   8/31/2011      USD    39.97
UBS AG JERSEY          15.25   2/11/2011      USD    11.17

BANK OF SCOTLAND       5.772    2/7/2035      EUR    74.03
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.51   5/31/2011      USD    13.00
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.000   6/30/2011      USD    43.17
BARCLAYS BK PLC        7.500   9/22/2011      USD    17.09
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.500   8/31/2012      USD    30.09
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.800   9/22/2011      USD    16.64
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.550   1/23/2012      USD    11.58
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.35   1/23/2012      USD    21.34
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.250   1/31/2012      USD     9.71
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.750   9/22/2011      USD    73.50
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.65   1/31/2012      USD    45.71
BARCLAYS BK PLC        8.950   4/20/2012      USD    16.30
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.250   8/31/2012      USD    35.52
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.80   7/31/2012      USD    27.95
BARCLAYS BK PLC        9.400   7/31/2012      USD    11.51
BARCLAYS BK PLC        13.05   4/27/2012      USD    27.08
BRADFORD&BIN BLD       5.750  12/12/2022      GBP    44.33
BRADFORD&BIN BLD       5.500   1/15/2018      GBP    45.44
BRADFORD&BIN BLD       2.875  10/16/2031      CHF    72.28
BRADFORD&BIN BLD       4.910    2/1/2047      EUR    65.75
BRADFORD&BIN PLC       7.625   2/16/2049      GBP    48.23
BRADFORD&BIN PLC       6.625   6/16/2023      GBP    44.18
CO-OPERATIVE BNK       5.875   3/28/2033      GBP    69.58
DISCOVERY EDUCAT       1.948   3/31/2037      GBP    66.45
EFG HELLAS PLC         6.010    1/9/2036      EUR    24.13
EFG HELLAS PLC         5.400   11/2/2047      EUR    50.38
F&C ASSET MNGMT        6.750  12/20/2026      GBP    74.15
HBOS PLC               6.000   11/1/2033      USD    66.20
HBOS PLC               6.000   11/1/2033      USD    66.20
HBOS PLC               4.500   3/18/2030      EUR    72.94
HEALTHCARE SUPP        2.067   2/19/2043      GBP    69.45
NEWCASTLE BLD SC       6.625  12/23/2019      GBP    66.66
NOMURA BANK INTL       0.800  12/21/2020      EUR    63.07
NORTHERN ROCK          4.574   1/13/2015      GBP    76.01
NORTHERN ROCK          5.750   2/28/2017      GBP    70.33
PUNCH TAVERNS          8.374   7/15/2029      GBP    58.05
PUNCH TAVERNS          6.468   4/15/2033      GBP    45.13
PUNCH TAVERNS          7.567   4/15/2026      GBP    57.99
ROYAL BK SCOTLND       6.316   6/29/2030      EUR    67.76
RSL COMM PLC           9.875  11/15/2009      USD     3.90
SKIPTON BUILDING       5.625   1/18/2018      GBP    69.85
SKIPTON BUILDING       6.750   5/30/2022      GBP    66.55
UNIQUE PUB FIN         6.464   3/30/2032      GBP    63.87
WESSEX WATER FIN       1.499  11/29/2058      GBP    74.64
WESSEX WATER FIN       1.369   7/31/2057      GBP    31.12
YORKSHRE BLD SOC       6.375   4/26/2024      GBP    78.75


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than USUS$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is USUS$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are USUS$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *