/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/110221.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
E U R O P E
Monday, February 21, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 36
Headlines
C Z E C H R E P U B L I C
SAZKA AS: Penta, E-Invest Eye 51% Stake in Exchange for Funds
D E N M A R K
* Moody's Takes Various Rating Actions on Various Danish Banks
G E R M A N Y
BLUEBONNET FINANCE: S&P Affirms 'BB (sf)' Rating on Class E Notes
G R E E C E
* GREECE: Approves Restructuring Plan for Public Transport Sector
I R E L A N D
ANGLO IRISH: Fitch Downgrades Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB-'
CAIRN EURO: S&P Affirms 'CCC+ (sf)' Rating on Class C Notes
EIRCOM GROUP: Mulls Sale & Leaseback of Exchange Buildings
JUNO LTD: Moody's Junks Rating on EUR69.15-Mil. Class B Notes
MCINERNEY GROUP: To Appeal High Court Ruling on Rescue Plan
N E T H E R L A N D S
SKYLINE 2007: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCCsf'
R U S S I A
BANK OF MOSCOW: Shareholders Plan to Put 40% Stake Up for Sale
S P A I N
NUEVA RUMASA: 10 Main Companies on Brink of Bankruptcy
FTPYME BANCAJA: S&P Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCC- (sf)'
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
AUTO WINDSCREENS: 400 Hasland Employees Fight to Keep Their Jobs
BARTON CIVIL: Goes Into Administration Following Clients Collapsed
BEETHAM HOTELS: Goes Into Administration, Makes No Job Cuts
CROSLAND VK: Appoints Kay Johnson Gee as Liquidator
PRIVET CAPITAL: Devonshire Desserts Buys Polestar Factory
X X X X X X X X
* BOND PRICING: For the Week February 14 to February 18, 2011
*********
===========================
C Z E C H R E P U B L I C
===========================
SAZKA AS: Penta, E-Invest Eye 51% Stake in Exchange for Funds
-------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Laca at Bloomberg News, citing Hospodarske Noviny, reports
that Penta Investments and E-Invest, which agreed to bail out
Sazka AS, want a 51% stake in exchange for their funds.
According to Bloomberg, the newspaper said that the original
agreement between Sazka, Penta and E-Invest was that the investors
would loan money to Sazka shareholders to boost the company's
capital.
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 11,
2011, Petr Rafaj, chairman of the anti-monopoly office (UOHS), as
cited by CTK, said that the UOHS would examine the entry of
Penta and E-Invest into Sazka to find out whether the transaction
was in line with the competition rules. Mr. Rafaj said that it
may be a merger that has to be approved by the UOHS or even a
cartel agreement CTK disclosed. The UOHS chairman said the anti-
monopoly office will require more information about the
transaction from the firms since it only had the information that
was published in the media, according to CTK. Jan Tuna and Martin
Danko, the spokespersons for Sazka and Penta, respectively, said
that both companies were ready to cooperate with the UOHS in
whatever manner they can, CTK noted.
On Feb. 9, 2011, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, citing
Reuters, related that Sazka said it had agreed to take
on Penta Investments and E-Invest as financial partners who would
take operating control of Sazka and a share of future profits but
no equity in the firm. "We are ready to invest as much as will be
needed to end the insolvency proceedings against Sazka as soon as
possible," Reuters quoted E-Invest chief Martin Ulcak as saying.
"The strategic partnership is for 15 years and there is roughly
over CZK2 billion (US$112.7 million) needed now. We have the
capacity to cover that." Penta chief Marek Dospiva said the
investors would provide money to pay off a missed EUR4 million
January payment on the principle of Sazka's 215 million euro bond
CZ025854705= and that the bond would be likely repaid by 2021 as
planned, Reuters disclosed. Reuters noted that Mr. Dospiva, whose
firm owns a majority stake in betting firm Fortuna, said Fortuna's
plans for its own lottery plan were unaffected and that Penta
would look for synergies with Sazka.
Sazka AS is a provider of lotteries and sport betting games in the
Czech Republic.
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D E N M A R K
=============
* Moody's Takes Various Rating Actions on Various Danish Banks
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken various rating actions on a
number of Danish banks. These actions follow the bankruptcy and
transfer of Amagerbanken to a government-backed entity, Financial
Stability, on February 6, 2011, demonstrating both the willingness
and ability of the Danish government to use resolution tools
provided under new legislation to impose losses on depositors and
senior creditors in a bankruptcy.
The long-term ratings of Danske Bank A/S, Spar Nord Bank A/S, FIH
Erhvervsbank A/S, Ringkjobing Landbobank A/S and BankNordik P/F
were downgraded, and the long-term ratings of Danske Bank, FIH
Erhvervsbank, and BankNordik remain on review for further possible
downgrade. The long-term ratings of Nordea Bank Danmark A/S,
Sydbank A/S, and Jyske Bank A/S were placed on review for possible
downgrade, and the outlooks on the standalone bank financial
strength ratings of Spar Nord Bank A/S, FIH Erhvervsbank A/S, and
BankNordik P/F were changed to negative from stable. The short-
term ratings of Spar Nord Bank and FIH Erhvervsbank were also
downgraded, and the short-term rating of BankNordik was placed on
review for possible downgrade.
Systemic Support Assumptions Reduced to Low From High
"The rating actions reflect a reduction in Moody's systemic
support assumptions for Danish banks," says Oscar Heemskerk, Vice
President. "Last week's bankruptcy of Amagerbanken demonstrated
both the willingness and ability of the government to allow
depositors and senior creditors of Danish banks to take losses in
bankruptcy, where bank operations are continued as a going
concern." As a consequence, Moody's has reduced the systemic
support assumptions it uses for Danish banks, downgrading the
senior debt and deposit ratings of five banks by between 1 and 2
notches and removing systemic support from all but the four
largest banks in Denmark.
To date, Moody's considered the probability of government support
for Danish banks to be high, reflecting the absence of deposit
losses in the past 20 years, the importance of the Danish banking
system for the national economy, and the support the government
has extended in the recent past, including substantial volumes of
bank debt guaranteed by the government in support of the banks.
However, the enactment of the Bank Package III law in October 2010
provides a framework for the resolution of ailing banks in which
losses can be allocated not only to core equity, hybrid capital,
and subordinated debt, but also to senior debt and deposits.
Combined with its implementation with respect to Amagerbanken in
February 2011, this law implies that the Danish government is now
far less willing to continue to support bank creditors at the
expense of tax payers than it was only a few months ago.
Consequently, Moody's have changed Moody's assumption on systemic
support to 'low' for Denmark, the lowest category within Moody's
systemic support framework.
Moody's expects to learn more over the coming months of the
implications of the Danish government's actions for the Danish
financial system, which may in turn shed light on the feasibility
of maintaining a less supportive stance in future. Moody's will
therefore undertake a further assessment of the Danish
government's intentions over the coming months, in line with
Moody's recent publication "Supported Bank Debt Ratings at Risk of
Downgrade Due to New Approaches to Bank Resolution".
Consequently, debt and deposit ratings of the four banks that
retain systemic uplift in their ratings -- Danske Bank (A1
incorporating two notches of systemic support), Nordea Bank
Danmark (Aa2 incorporating two notches of systemic support), Jyske
Bank (A1 incorporating one notch of systemic support), and Sydbank
(A1 incorporating one notch of systemic support) -- have been
placed on review for further possible downgrade. The review
reflects Moody's opinion that the Danish law and practice are
substantially different to Moody's historical expectations on
government support, while taking into account the size and
systemic importance of these banks.
Negative Outlook on Standalone Financial Strength Ratings
Reflects Possible Funding Pressure
The change in outlooks to negative from stable on three banks'
standalone bank financial strength ratings -- FIH Erhvervsbank (D
BFSR mapping to a Ba2 baseline credit assessment, BCA), Spar Nord
Bank (C-/Baa1), and BankNordik (C-/Baa2) --, results in all Danish
banks now having negative outlooks for their BFSRs. This view is
guided by the expectation that, following Amagerbanken's
bankruptcy, Danish banks' funding will be more vulnerable to
investor and depositor transfers.
In Moody's opinion, Amagerbanken's bankruptcy and the resulting
losses will raise depositors' and creditors' awareness of the risk
of loss, particularly in Denmark. Moody's foresee increased
pressure on Danish banks' funding, both from local unguaranteed
depositors (amounts above EUR100,000 equivalent) and from
international investors (approximately 40% of deposits and inter-
bank funding). For a number of banks, this pressure will be in
addition to substantial future refinancing needs, since the
government's individual guarantees expire before the end of 2013
(for the rated banks with government guaranteed funding, on
average more than 20% of total funding benefits from an individual
government guarantee). Moody's now maintain negative outlooks on
all Danish banks' standalone bank financial strength ratings, and
will evaluate these additional pressures as they unfold over the
coming months.
An in-depth discussion of the changes to Moody's support
assumptions for Denmark, along with a description of the Bank
Package III laws, will be published shortly in a Moody's Special
Comment.
Rating Actions in Summary
BankNordik P/F
- Outlook on C- BFSR (Baa2 BCA) changed to negative from stable
- Long-term bank deposit rating downgraded to Baa1 from A3; the
rating is placed on review for possible downgrade. During the
review period Moody's will reassess the probability of support
from the Faroe Islands local government (rated Aa2 stable) to
the bank.
- P-2 short-term bank deposit rating on review for possible
downgrade
- Aaa government-guaranteed debt is not affected
Danske Bank A/S
- C BFSR (A3 BCA) is not affected and continues to have a
negative outlook
- Long-term senior unsecured debt, issuer, and deposit ratings
downgraded by one notch to A1 from Aa3. The ratings continue
to benefit from two notches of systemic support and remain on
review for possible downgrade.
- P-1 short-term ratings not affected.
- Baa2 (hyb) junior subordinated, Baa3 (hyb)Tier 1 hybrid, and
Aaa government-guaranteed debt rating are not affected
FIH Erhvervsbank A/S
- Outlook on D BFSR (Ba2 BCA) changed to negative from stable
- Long-term senior unsecured debt and deposit rating downgraded
to Ba1 from Baa3. The ratings remain on review for possible
downgrade. The review will focus on Moody's assessment of the
probability of parental support from the bank's new owners.
- Short-term ratings downgraded to Non Prime from P-3.
- Outlook on B2 (hyb) junior subordinated debt changed to
negative
Jyske Bank A/S
- C+ BFSR (A2 BCA) is not affected and continues to have a
negative outlook
- A1 long-term senior unsecured and deposit ratings placed on
review for possible downgrade. The ratings benefit from one
notch of systemic support.
- P-1 short-term ratings not affected
- Baa1 (hyb) junior subordinated debt and Baa2 (hyb) Tier 1
hybrid ratings are not affected
Sydbank A/S
- C+ BFSR (A2 BCA) is not affected and continues to have a
negative outlook
- A1 long-term senior unsecured and deposit ratings placed on
review for possible downgrade. The ratings benefit from one
notch of systemic support.
- P-1 short-term ratings not affected
- Baa1 junior subordinated debt and Baa2 (hyb) Tier 1 hybrid
ratings are not affected
Spar Nord Bank A/S
- Outlook on C- BFSR (Baa1 BCA) changed to negative from stable
- Long-term senior unsecured and deposit ratings downgraded to
Baa1 from A2. The ratings no longer benefit from systemic
support uplift. The outlook on the long term ratings was
changed to negative.
- Short-term ratings are downgraded to P-2 from P-1
- Outlook on Baa3 junior subordinated debt and Ba1 (hyb) Tier 1
hybrid ratings changed to negative
- Aaa government-guaranteed debt is not affected
Nordea Bank Danmark A/S
- C BFSR (A3 BCA) not affected and continues to have a negative
outlook
- Aa2 long-term senior unsecured, issuer and deposit ratings
placed on review for possible downgrade. The ratings benefit
from one notch of systemic support.
- P-1 short-term ratings not affected
Ringkjobing Landbobank
- C+ BFSR (A2 BCA) not affected and continues to have a negative
outlook
- Long-term bank deposit rating downgraded to A2 from A1. The
rating no longer benefits from systemic support uplift. The
outlook on the long term ratings continues to be negative.
- P-1 short term ratings not affected
Previous Rating Actions
Moody's most recent rating action on BankNordik P/F was
implemented on September 6, 2010, when it concluded the review for
possible downgrade by confirming the C- BFSR and A3 long-term and
Prime-2 short-term deposit ratings.
Moody's most recent rating action on Danske Bank A/S was
implemented on February 26, 2010, when it downgraded the Junior
Subordinated Debt to Baa2 from A3 and the Tier 1 Securities to
Baa3 from Baa1.
Moody's most recent rating action on FIH Erhvervsbank A/S was
implemented on January 14, 2011, when it maintained the review for
possible downgrade of the Baa3 long term debt and deposit and
Prime-3 short term ratings and affirmed the D BFSR with a stable
outlook.
Moody's most recent rating action on Jyske Bank A/S was
implemented on February 26, 2010, when it downgraded the Junior
Subordinated Debt to Baa1 from A3 and the Tier 1 Securities to
Baa2 from Baa1.
Moody's most recent rating action on Sydbank A/S was implemented
on February 26, 2010, when it downgraded the Junior Subordinated
Debt to Baa1 from A3 and the Tier 1 Securities to Baa2 from Baa1.
Moody's most recent rating action on Spar Nord Bank A/S was
implemented on February 26, 2010, when it downgraded the Junior
Subordinated Debt to Baa3 from Baa2.
Moody's most recent rating action on Nordea Bank Denmark A/S was
implemented on September 8, 2009, when it downgraded the BFSR to C
from B- (negative outlook) and the long term debt and deposit
rating to Aa2 from Aa1.
Moody's most recent rating action on Ringkjobing Landbobank A/S
was implemented on September 8, 2009, when it confirmed the C+
BFSR and A1 long term deposit rating with a negative outlook.
Based in Torshavn, Faroe Islands, BankNordik reported consolidated
assets of DKK 15.7 billion (EUR2 billion) as of end-September 30,
2010.
Based in Copenhagen, Denmark, Danske Bank reported consolidated
assets of DKK3,214 billion (EUR431 billion) as of end-December 31,
2010.
Based in Copenhagen, Denmark, FIH Erhvervsbank reported
consolidated assets of DKK 109 billion (EUR15 billion) as of end-
December 31, 2010.
Based in Silkeborg, Denmark, Jyske Bank reported consolidated
assets of DKK 249 billion (EUR33 billion) as of end-September 30,
2010.
Based in Aabenraa, Denmark, Sydbank reported consolidated assets
of DKK 154 billion (EUR21 billion) as of end-September 30, 2010.
Based in Aalborg, Denmark, Spar Nord Bank reported consolidated
assets of DKK67 billion (EUR9 billion) as of end-December 31,
2010.
Based in Copenhagen, Denmark, Nordea Bank Denmark reported
consolidated assets of DKK1,077 billion (EUR145 billion) as of
end-June 30, 2010.
Based in Ringkjobing, Denmark, Ringkjobing Landbobank reported
consolidated assets of DKK18 billion (EUR2 billion) as of end-
December 31, 2010.
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G E R M A N Y
=============
BLUEBONNET FINANCE: S&P Affirms 'BB (sf)' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
the class B, C, and D notes issued by Bluebonnet Finance PLC, a
German commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction. At the
same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB (sf)' rating on the class E notes.
The rating actions follow the substantial repayment of the
underlying loan portfolio and the sequential application of the
proceeds to these notes, which has led to improved levels of
credit enhancement.
At closing in 2006, the underlying loan portfolio consisted of
3,864 performing, subperforming, and nonperforming commercial real
estate loans. Of the loans, 2,180 remain outstanding. S&P notes
that the share of nonperforming loans in the pool has increased to
59% from 49% at closing, while the performing loans share has
reduced to 14% from 26%.
The gross book value--which is the value of combined claims
against the borrowers in the loan pool--has reduced by 31.7% to
EUR1.89 billion, from EUR2.77 billion at closing. In the same
time period, the issuer's obligation under the notes has reduced
by 77.4% and now stands at EUR303 million.
This positive development is one of the reasons for the note
upgrades.
As part of S&P's assessment of the issuer's ability to meet its
principal obligations, S&P has estimated the income that will be
available from the loans under stressed scenarios, to test the
sensitivity of the cash flow to the timing and level of
collections.
In assessing the issuer's ability to meet ongoing interest
obligations under the notes where no liquidity arrangements are
available, S&P has also considered the income from ongoing cash
flows (funds collected other than collections from the workout of
the commercial real estate loans--i.e., interest payments, rents,
etc.).
The scheduled maturity date of the loan that secures the notes is
December 2011. This loan has a two-year extension option, subject
to conditions that in S&P's view are likely to be met.
Accordingly, in S&P's view the loan is likely to be extended.
Under S&P's criteria relating to counterparty risk, without a
replacement framework for a counterparty when its creditworthiness
deteriorates, and absent other mitigating factors, the maximum
ratings achievable for structured finance securities are typically
no higher than the counterparty's issuer credit rating. When
documents reflect a framework from any previous Standard & Poor's
counterparty criteria, the maximum rating that can be achieved is
the counterparty's rating plus one notch. In this transaction,
the transaction documents have replacement language under previous
Standard & Poor's criteria. As the rating on the hedging
counterparty and the account bank provider (both Citibank N.A.) is
'A+', the maximum rating that can be achieved in the absence of
replacement arrangements that comply with S&P's current criteria,
is 'AA-'. The rating on the class B notes is limited accordingly.
Bluebonnet Finance is the first CMBS deal S&P has rated that
includes nonperforming loans secured by real estate across
Germany. The outstanding principal balance of the transaction is
EUR300 million.
Ratings List
Bluebonnet Finance PLC
EUR1.34 Billion Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes
Ratings Raised
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
B AA- (sf) A (sf)
C A (sf) BBB (sf)
D BBB- (sf) BB (sf)
Rating Affirmed
Class Rating
----- ------
E BB (sf)
===========
G R E E C E
===========
* GREECE: Approves Restructuring Plan for Public Transport Sector
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Agence France-Presse reports that the Greek parliament approved
controversial plans to restructure the debt-ridden public
transport sector in Athens, which have sparked a series of strikes
by workers since December.
According to AFP, the plans involve merging the five companies
running public transport in the capital into two organizations and
shifting some 1,500 staff out of a total workforce of over 11,000
to other state agencies.
Fares have also gone up by between 20 and 30%, while bonuses that
helped push salaries up by 43% between 2004 and 2009 will also be
ended, AFP says.
AFP relates that the government disclosed the five companies had
combined losses of US$755 million in 2009 and an accumulated debt
of EUR3.8 billion.
The government bill to streamline public transport is part of
emergency measures to slash state deficits that nearly bankrupted
the Greek economy last year, AFP notes.
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I R E L A N D
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ANGLO IRISH: Fitch Downgrades LT Issuer Default Rating to 'BB-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Anglo Irish Bank Corp's and Irish
Nationwide Building Society's Long-term and Short-term Issuer
Default Ratings to 'BB-' and 'B' from 'BBB-' and 'F3',
respectively, and maintained them on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).
Anglo and INBS's Support Ratings have also been downgraded to '3'
from '2' and maintained on RWN.
At the same time, the agency has placed all support-driven ratings
of Allied Irish Banks, Bank of Ireland, and Irish Life and
Permanent on RWN and maintained EBS Building Society's ratings on
RWN. A full list of rating actions appears at the end of this
release.
The RWN on the support-driven ratings of AIB, BOI, and ILP
reflects the greater uncertainty regarding the implementation of
the previously announced recapitalization plans and the higher
political risk in relation to further support available from the
Irish authorities to the Irish banking sector and specifically to
senior unsecured unguaranteed creditors of the Irish domestic
banks.
The rating actions follow the announcement made by the Irish
Department of Finance on 9 February 2011 that the government is
postponing further capital injections in AIB, BOI and EBS until
after the upcoming election on 25 February. At end-November 2010,
the Irish authorities agreed under the EU/IMF Programme of
Financial Support to ensure that AIB, BOI, EBS and ILP would be
capitalized to at least a 12% core Tier 1 capital level, by end-
February for AIB, BOI and EBS, and by end-May for ILP. The issue
of recapitalization will now have to be addressed by the incoming
government.
Overall, Fitch continues to believe the risks of the sovereign and
the domestic banks are strongly interlinked, not least given the
banks' extensive reliance on government-guaranteed and central
bank funding. A senior debt default or coercive debt exchange,
particularly at AIB or BOI, could have expensive ramifications for
sovereign finances due to the potential implications for funding
stability and unintended legal consequences. It would also likely
have negative repercussions for the fragile euro zone bank funding
markets beyond Ireland's border, meaning it would probably also be
undesirable at a 'higher' European level.
BOI, AIB and EBS's IDRs remain investment grade, reflecting the
close correlation between their default risk and that of the Irish
sovereign. The RWN is due to Fitch's concerns about higher
political risks that might influence the high level of support
being made available to the banks. The greater systemic
importance of the largest two banks means their IDRs remain
closest to those of the Irish sovereign ratings.
Given Anglo and INBS's relatively small proportion of senior
unsecured unguaranteed debt in their funding mix and Fitch's view
that the authorities would want to minimize the risk of a
disorderly (e.g. accelerated) wind-down of these institutions,
Fitch believes the Irish authorities are still likely to want to
avoid a default or coercive burden sharing for the banks' senior
unsecured, unguaranteed creditors. However, political risks mean
Fitch considers the probability of further support to be
'moderate', rather than 'high', meaning these banks' IDRs are no
longer considered consistent with investment grade ratings.
Fitch notes that Anglo and INBS need to be capitalized banking
institutions to be able to continue to access the central bank
funding that is so critical to their orderly wind-down and to
minimizing potential further costs to the Irish taxpayer. The
Irish authorities have a meaningful presence on both sides of
these banks' balance sheets by way of guaranteed and central bank
funding and, on the asset side, about EUR31bn of government
promissory notes injected as capital.
On 8 February 2011, the Irish Minister for Finance obtained
direction orders from the High Court in respect of Anglo and INBS
in relation to the transfer of deposits and certain assets of
these institutions to a third party via an auction process. The
transfer of deposits to a third institution potentially allows the
authorities more flexibility to impose losses on Anglo's and
INBS's senior creditors, but in itself is not a driver of Fitch's
rating action on the banks.
The rating actions are:
Anglo Irish Bank Corporation
-- Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BBB-'; RWN
maintained
-- Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'F3'; RWN maintained
-- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'E'
-- Support Rating: downgraded to '3' from '2'; RWN maintained
-- Support Rating Floor: downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BBB-'; RWN
maintained
-- Short-term debt: downgraded to 'B' from 'F3'; RWN maintained
-- Senior unsecured downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BBB-'; RWN
maintained
-- Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'C'
-- Upper tier 2 subordinated notes: affirmed at 'C'
-- Tier 1 notes: affirmed at 'C'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term notes: affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term notes: affirmed at 'F2'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed commercial paper: affirmed at 'F2'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term deposits: affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term deposits: affirmed at 'F2'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term interbank liabilities:
affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term interbank liabilities:
affirmed at 'F2'
-- Market linked securities: downgraded to 'BB-emr' from 'BBB-
emr'; RWN maintained
Anglo Irish Mortgage Bank
-- Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BBB-'; RWN
maintained
-- Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'F3' RWN maintained
-- Support Rating: downgraded to '3' from '2'; RWN maintained
Irish Nationwide Building Society
-- Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BBB-'; RWN
maintained
-- Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'F3' RWN maintained
-- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'E'
-- Support Rating: downgraded to '3' from '2'; RWN maintained
-- Support Rating Floor: downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BBB-'; RWN
maintained
-- Senior unsecured notes: downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BBB-'; RWN
maintained
-- Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'C'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term deposits: affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term deposits: affirmed at 'F2'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term interbank liabilities:
affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term interbank liabilities:
affirmed at 'F2'
Allied Irish Banks
-- Long-term IDR: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
-- Short-term IDR: 'F2'; placed on RWN
-- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'E'
-- Support Rating: '2'; placed on RWN
-- Support Rating Floor: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
-- Senior unsecured notes: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
-- Short-term debt: 'F2'; placed on RWN
-- Lower tier 2 subordinated debt: affirmed at 'CCC'
-- Upper tier 2 subordinated notes: affirmed at 'CC'
-- Tier 1 notes: affirmed at 'CC'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term notes: affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term notes: affirmed at 'F2'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed commercial paper: affirmed at 'F2'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term deposits: affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term deposits: affirmed at 'F2'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term interbank liabilities:
affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term interbank liabilities:
affirmed at 'F2'
AIB Bank (CI) Limited
-- Long-term IDR: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
-- Short-term IDR: 'F2'; placed on RWN
-- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'E'
-- Support Rating: '2'; placed on RWN
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term notes: affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term notes: affirmed at 'F2'
AIB Group (UK) PLC
-- Long-term IDR: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
-- Short-term IDR: 'F2'; placed on RWN
-- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'E'
-- Support Rating: '2'; placed on RWN
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term notes: affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term notes: affirmed at 'F2'
Bank of Ireland
-- Long-term IDR: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
-- Short-term IDR: 'F2'; placed on RWN
-- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D/E'
-- Support Rating: '2'; placed on RWN
-- Support Rating Floor: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
-- Senior unsecured notes: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
-- Short-term debt: 'F2'; placed on RWN
-- Upper tier 2 subordinated notes: 'B', RWN maintained
-- Preference shares: affirmed at 'CCC'
-- Subordinated debt: 'BB'; placed on RWN
-- Sovereign-guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term deposits: affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term deposits: affirmed at 'F2'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term interbank liabilities:
affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term interbank liabilities:
affirmed at 'F2'
Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank
-- Long-term IDR: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
-- Short-term IDR: 'F2'; placed on RWN
-- Support Rating: '2'; placed on RWN
Bank of Ireland UK Plc
-- Long-term IDR: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
-- Short-term IDR: 'F2'; placed on RWN
-- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D/E'
-- Support Rating: '2'; placed on RWN
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term deposits: affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term deposits: affirmed at 'F2'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term interbank liabilities:
affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term interbank liabilities:
affirmed at 'F2'
EBS Building Society
-- Long-term IDR: 'BBB-'; RWN maintained
-- Short-term IDR: 'F3'; RWN maintained
-- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'E'
-- Support Rating: '2', RWN maintained
-- Support Rating Floor: 'BBB-'; RWN maintained
-- Senior unsecured notes: 'BBB-'; RWN maintained
-- Short-term debt: 'F3'; RWN maintained
-- Preferences shares: affirmed at 'CCC'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term notes: affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term notes: affirmed at 'F2'
-- Sovereign guaranteed commercial paper: affirmed at 'F2'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term deposits: affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term deposits: affirmed at 'F2'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term interbank liabilities:
affirmed at 'BBB+'
-- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term interbank liabilities:
affirmed at 'F2'
EBS Mortgage Finance
-- Long-term IDR: 'BBB-'; RWN maintained
-- Short-term IDR: 'F3'; RWN maintained
-- Support Rating: '2', RWN maintained
Irish Life & Permanent
-- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D/E'
-- Support Rating: '2', placed on RWN
CAIRN EURO: S&P Affirms 'CCC+ (sf)' Rating on Class C Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on
all classes of CAIRN EURO ABS CDO I PLC's notes. At the same
time, S&P removed from CreditWatch negative S&P's ratings on the
class X, A1S, and A1J notes.
The rating actions follow a review of the transaction, which
included applying S&P's revised counterparty criteria as well as
conducting credit and cash flow analyses.
In S&P's opinion, the current levels of available credit support
for all classes of notes are sufficient to maintain its current
ratings on the notes, and S&P has therefore affirmed its ratings
on all classes of notes in this transaction.
In addition, S&P's analysis concluded that the ratings on classes
X, A1S, and A1J are consistent with its updated counterparty
criteria. S&P has therefore removed from CreditWatch negative its
ratings on these classes of notes. S&P placed these ratings on
CreditWatch on Jan. 18 when its updated counterparty criteria
became effective.
CAIRN EURO ABS CDO I's portfolio comprises primarily European
prime and subprime residential mortgage-backed securities,
commercial mortgage-backed securities, and to a lesser extent
collateralized debt obligations and other structured finance
assets.
Ratings List
CAIRN EURO ABS CDO I PLC
EUR354.75 Million Floating-Rate Notes
Ratings Affirmed and Removed From Creditwatch Negative
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
X AAA (sf) AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A1S AA (sf) AA (sf)/Watch Neg
A1J AA (sf) AA (sf)/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed
Class Rating
----- ------
A2 A+ (sf)
A3 BBB- (sf)
B B+ (sf)
C CCC+ (sf)
EIRCOM GROUP: Mulls Sale & Leaseback of Exchange Buildings
----------------------------------------------------------
Ciaran Hancock at The Irish Times reports that Eircom Group has
engaged DTZ to conduct a feasibility study on the possible sale
and leaseback of some of its exchange buildings as it seeks to
free up cash for the business.
According to The Irish Times, it is understood that a number of
prominent sites in Dublin have been identified for its latest sale
and leaseback deals.
The Irish Times relates that informed sources said the company is
hoping to raise up to EUR50 million from the transaction.
"DTZ has been engaged as part of Eircom's ongoing property review
to conduct a feasibility study to explore various options with
some of our properties, which may or may include the possible sale
and leaseback of some exchange buildings," The Irish Times quotes
the company as saying.
Eircom still owns a large number of exchanges in Dublin that could
potentially release cash to the business, according to The Irish
Times.
It is understood that discussions have already taken place between
DTZ and potential interested parties, The Irish Times notes.
Covenant Breach
Eircom is seeking to restructure its near EUR4 billion debt, The
Times discloses. In November, it signaled it could breach its
banking covenants within 12 months, The Irish Times recounts.
Ratings agency Moody's has suggested a breach could come by the
end of June, The Irish Times notes.
Eircom will publish its half-year financial results on March 1,
The Irish Times discloses. It is also expected to provide an
update to the market about a possible covenant breach, The Irish
Times states.
The Irish Times says a board meeting is scheduled for Feb. 28.
Two representatives from Singapore-based STT are expected to
attend, according to The Irish Times. One possible solution to a
covenant breach would be an injection of new equity by STT, which
took control of Eircom in January 2010, and the employee Esot, The
Irish Times notes. It has been speculated that up to EUR300
million could be injected into the business by shareholders, The
Irish Times says.
Headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, Eircom Group --
http://www.eircom.ie/-- is an Irish telecommunications company,
and former state-owned incumbent. It is currently the largest
telecommunications operator in the Republic of Ireland and
operates primarily on the island of Ireland, with a point of
presence in Great Britain.
JUNO LTD: Moody's Junks Rating on EUR69.15-Mil. Class B Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Class A Notes and
Class B Notes issued by Juno (Eclipse 2007-2) LTD (amount reflects
initial outstandings):
-- EUR677.25M Class A Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously
on Oct 6, 2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
-- EUR69.15M Class B Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously
on Oct 6, 2009 Downgraded to B3 (sf)
At the same time, Moody's affirmed the Aaa (sf) rating of the
Class X Notes. Moody's does not rate the Class C, Class D and
Class E Notes issued by Juno (Eclipse 2007-2) LTD. The action
takes into account Moody's updated central scenarios as described
in Moody's Special Report "EMEA CMBS: 2011 Central Scenarios."
Ratings Rationale
The key parameters in Moody's analysis are the default probability
of the securitized loans (both during the term and at maturity) as
well as Moody's value assessment for the properties securing these
loans. Moody's derives from those parameters a loss expectation
for the securitized pool. Based on Moody's revised assessment,
the loss expectation for the pool has increased since the last
review in October 2009.
The rating downgrade of the Class A and Class B Notes is due to a
deterioration in pool performance as reflected by cash flow issues
faced by several borrowers. Five loans totaling 63% of the
current pool balance is currently in special servicing, of which
three loans (19.8%) have shown a payment default as per the last
Note IPD in November 2010. Additionally, Moody's has increased
its refinancing default risk expectation and loss assessment for
the loans given the high proportion of loan maturities in 2011
(45% of the current pool balance). Moody's considered in its re-
assessment of the refinancing risk (i) the continuing upward yield
pressure for non-prime properties (ii) the subdued lending market,
especially for non-prime properties, and (iii) a slower than
previously expected recovery of the lending market.
Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time
to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan re-prepayments or a decline in subordination
due to realized losses.
Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macro-economic environment and continued weakness in the
occupational and lending markets. Moody's anticipates (i) delayed
recovery in the lending market persisting through 2012, while
remaining subject to strict underwriting criteria and heavily
dependent on the underlying property quality, (ii) values will
overall stabilize but with a strong differentiation between prime
and secondary properties, and (iii) occupational markets will
remain under pressure in the short term and will only slowly
recover in the medium term in line with the anticipated economic
recovery. Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
'hooked-shaped' for 2011; Moody's expects sluggish recovery in
most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth
rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.
Moody's Portfolio Analysis
As of the November 2010 Note IPD, the transaction's total pool
balance is EUR769.7 million down by 11% since closing due to
repayments and prepayments. Fifteen out of the originally 17
loans are remaining. Based on the underwriter's market value as
of November 2010, 35% of the properties are located in Germany,
26% in Sweden, 23% in Italy and 16% in France and Belgium. The
property types by U/W market values are retail (43.5%), office
(26.4%), logistics (16.5%) and residential (13.6%).
The largest loan is the Keops Portfolio loan (28.5% of the current
pool). The loan is secured by a mixed office/industrial portfolio
located across Sweden. The loan has been in special servicing
since November 2009 due to the LTV default covenant breach. The
current U/W whole loan LTV is 102%. A standstill agreement is in
place with the borrower until end of February 2011 in order to
allow for the preparation of a disposal strategy. The special
servicer is investigating alternative strategies including
enforcement. The loan maturity is in October 2011. Moody's is
expecting high losses for this loan given Moody's whole loan LTV
of 129%.
The second largest loan (Neumarkt, 15.9%) had a payment default at
the November 2010 Note IPD. The loan is secured by a shopping
centre in Cologne and it has been in special servicing since July
2009 as a result of cash flow deteriorations. The vacancy rate
has increased from 7% at closing to currently 13%. About 28% of
the current rental income is subject to lease expiry in 2013.
Consequently, Moody's has adjusted its sustainable cash flow
expectations to derive a value which results in an expected
Moody's LTV at loan maturity in August 2013 of 143%. This
compares to the UW LTV of 111% which is based on a November 2009
valuation. Moody's expects high losses for this loan.
The SCI Clichy Loan (14.6%) is secured by one office property
close to Paris. The loan has been in special servicing since
August 2009. The vacancy rate has increased to 38% from fully let
at closing. Debt service is currently topped-up by a reserve.
Moody's LTV at loan maturity in November 2011 is 165%. Moody's
expects high losses for this loan.
Two loans are currently on the servicer's watchlist: The fourth
largest loan (Obelisco Portfolio, 10.7%), secured by a mixed
office/industrial portfolio in Italy is in breach of the ICR cash
trap covenant. The fifth largest loans (Petersbogen, 9.2%),
secured by a shopping centre in Leipzig is in breach of the LTV
default covenant. Moody's expected loss for the Obelisco
Portfolio is low given the assessed LTV of 67% at loan maturity in
December 2015. Moody's expects substantial losses with respect to
the Petersbogen loan. Moody's LTV at loan maturity is 114%. The
underlying value assessment is incorporating that almost half of
the current rental income is subject to lease expiry in 2011.
The five largest loans combined contribute to 78% of the total
pool. The remaining ten loans contribute between 0.3% and 4.6% to
the total pool, respectively. Out of those loans, the Senior and
the Junior Den Tir Loan (3.2% and 0.7%) have shown a payment
default at the November 2010 Note IPD. The Senior Den Tir Loan
represents an A-Note piece and the Junior Den Tir Loan is a B-Note
piece of the Den Tir whole loan. The underlying shopping centre
in Antwerp is facing significant cash flow deteriorations.
Moody's current A-Loan LTV for this loan is 275% and the whole
loan LTV is 335%.
All principal proceeds are allocated fully sequentially in this
transaction as the sequential payment trigger has been hit.
Therefore, credit enhancement through subordination is increasing
for the Class A Notes over time.
Refinancing Risk: Five loans (representing 45% of the pool balance
as per November 2010 IPD) have their maturity in 2011, five loans
(30%) in 2012 and 2013 and the remainder beyond 2014. Moody's
considers the property portfolio to be of average quality.
Moody's adjustment of the refinancing risk assessment is primarily
due to its current expectations that commercial real estate
lending will remain scarce over the next two to three years. As
highlighted in the Moody's Special Report "EMEA CMBS: 2011 Central
Scenarios, Moody's assumes that CRE lending will slowly resume
over the coming years but it will remain subject to strict
underwriting criteria and depend heavily on the quality of the
underlying properties. European non-prime property values are
still under pressure given the scarcity of financing for this
market segment and hence a meaningful recovery of non-prime
property values is not expected before 2012/13. Given the average
quality of the property portfolio coupled with the refinancing
profile of this transaction, Moody's believes that this
transaction is particularly exposed to the recovery of the lending
market over the next two to three years.
Portfolio Loss Exposure: Moody's expects a very high amount of
losses on the securitized portfolio, stemming mainly from the
performance and the refinancing profile of the securitized
portfolio. Given the default risk profile and the anticipated
work-out strategy for defaulted and potentially defaulting loans,
these expected losses are likely to crystallize only towards the
end of the transaction term. The current subordination levels of
24.4% for the Class A, and 15.5% provide protection against these
expected losses. However, the likelihood of higher than expected
losses on the portfolio has increased substantially, which results
in the rating action.
MCINERNEY GROUP: To Appeal High Court Ruling on Rescue Plan
-----------------------------------------------------------
Barry O'Halloran at The Irish Times reports that McInerney is
considering appealing a High Court ruling that has left the
company facing the likelihood it will be placed in receivership
early this week.
It is understood the company's executives are considering
appealing the decision to the Supreme Court, according to The
Irish Times.
The Irish Times relates that in the High Court on Thursday,
Mr. Justice Frank Clarke refused to approve a proposed rescue plan
for the group, which has been in examinership since September.
The proposal included an offer of EUR25 million in full settlement
of a EUR113 million debt owed to a syndicate of three banks,
State-owned Anglo Irish, Bank of Ireland and Belgian lender KBC,
The Irish Times discloses. According to The Irish Times, the
judge ruled the proposal was unfairly prejudicial to the interests
of KBC. The decision means it will be open to the banks to
appoint a receiver to the company once the judge has made final
orders relating to the case today, The Irish Times notes.
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 12,
2011, The Irish Times said that the bank syndicate proposed to put
McInerney in receivership and recover its money by building houses
on the company's sites around the Republic and selling them. The
banks calculate that doing this over a period of up to 11 years
would yield a cash flow of EUR75 million, which would ultimately
lead to them recovering EUR50 million of their debt, The Irish
Times disclosed.
About McInerney
McInerney Holdings plc -- http://www.mcinerneyholdings.eu/-- is a
home builder and regional home builder in the North and Midlands
of England. It also undertakes commercial and leisure projects in
Ireland, United Kingdom and Spain. It operates in Ireland, the
United Kingdom and Spain. The main trading activities of the
Company's Irish home building business during the year ended
December 31, 2008, consisted of construction of private houses,
trading in developed sites and land, development of residential
land for third-parties and in joint-ventures, and contracting for
third-parties. The Company's commercial property development
division, Hillview Developments Ltd (Hillview), develops
industrial units in the Greater Dublin area. Hillview completed
1,223 square meters of industrial units as of December 31, 2008.
Its Spanish division, Alanda Group, is developing freehold
apartment schemes. As of December 31, 2008, the Company completed
1,359 private and contracting residential units in Ireland, the
United Kingdom and Spain.
=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================
SKYLINE 2007: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCCsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Skyline 2007 B.V.'s notes:
-- EUR2,539.5m Class A (NL0000886935) downgraded to 'Asf' from
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
-- EUR162.0m Class B (XS0304009847) downgraded to 'BBBsf' from
'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
-- EUR133.5m Class C (XS0304022279) downgraded to 'BBsf' from
'Asf'; Outlook Negative
-- EUR121.5m Class D (XS0304022436) downgraded to 'Bsf' from
'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative
-- EUR43.5m Class E (XS0304022865) downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
'BBsf'; Recovery Rating RR5
The downgrades were driven by the high level of balloon risk in
the transaction: almost half of the loan pool is scheduled to
mature in the next three years, leaving the transaction heavily
exposed to current lending conditions. Due to the uncertainty
surrounding refinancing options for secondary Dutch commercial
real estate, the class C and D notes have a Negative Outlook,
while the class most exposed to potential losses (class E) is
rated 'CCCsf' and 'RR5'.
The transaction has been in its revolving period since closing in
July 2007, with all principal receipts (EUR2.82 billion)
reinvested in additional loans. Of this principal, EUR898.1
million consisted of prepayments and EUR334.1 million of scheduled
repayments, with a further EUR1.58 billion representing loan
repurchases (at par) by the originator (FGH Bank, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Rabobank, rated 'AA+'/'F1+' with Stable Outlook).
Based on scheduled and unscheduled principal payments since
closing, Fitch estimates that the quarterly repayment rate has
been on a declining trend since closing and currently stands at
1.5% (vs 6.7% at the first IPD).
The majority of the reported quarterly arrears are technical, i.e.
payments less than 30 days overdue and resolved in due course.
The balance of loans over 30 days in arrears has not exceeded 0.7%
since closing. To a certain degree, the low arrears ratio is a
reflection of the high rate of portfolio churn: to date, over 50%
of the original pool balance has been repurchased, prior to the
respective maturity date when refinancing would be tested. As a
result of substitutions with newly-originated loans, by weighted
average seasoning and term to maturity, the January 2011 portfolio
has not materially changed since closing. Fitch expects that as
the pool begins to season, the rate of loan default will rise,
exposing noteholders to balloon risk. Although the changed
vintage profile of the pool has enhanced loan quality, it will
take a significant recovery in Dutch real estate markets to avoid
eventual loan losses, the risk of which accounts for Fitch's
rating action.
Fitch will continue to monitor the performance of the transaction.
===========
R U S S I A
===========
BANK OF MOSCOW: Shareholders Plan to Put 40% Stake Up for Sale
--------------------------------------------------------------
Henry Meyer at Bloomberg News, citing Vedomosti, reports that Bank
of Moscow shareholders including Chief Executive Officer Andrei
Borodin plans to offer their 40% stake in the lender at an
auction.
According to Bloomberg, the Moscow-based newspaper on Wednesday
said that the sale may take place this month.
The city of Moscow, which controls the lender, has plans to sell
its stake to state-run VTB Group, Bloomberg notes.
AKB Bank Moskvy OAO (Bank Moskvy OAO or Bank of Moscow OJSC) --
http://www.bm.ru/-- is a Russia-based financial institution,
which offers a wide range of services to its clients including
corporate banking, retail banking and investment banking services.
The Bank operates through numerous branches. It is a part of the
Association of Russian Banks (ARB) and other organizations. In
addition, AKB Bank Moskvy OAO has 13 subsidiaries and two
affiliated companies. As of May 14, 2009, the Bank was
43.99%-owned by the Moscow City Government.
* * *
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 1,
2010, Fitch Ratings placed Bank of Moscow's 'D' individual rating
and 'BB+' subordinated debt rating on Rating Watch Negative.
The rating actions followed the dismissal of the Mayor of
Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, by President Dmitry Medvedev.
=========
S P A I N
=========
NUEVA RUMASA: 10 Main Companies on Brink of Bankruptcy
------------------------------------------------------
Sinikka Tarvainen at Duetsche Presse Agentur reports that
thousands of Spanish investors on Friday were fearing for their
savings after the Nueva Rumasa conglomerate said that its 10 main
companies were close to bankruptcy.
According to DPA, the economic daily Expansion and other media
disclosed that about 5,000 investors have bought Nueva Rumasa
shares or promissory notes for the worth of an estimated EUR140
million (US$190 million).
DPA relates that Jose Maria Ruiz-Mateos, Nueva Rumasa's founder
and owner, said the company will now enter talks with its
creditors and launch a restructuring operation in an attempt to
avoid bankruptcy.
The conglomerate, which has more than 10,000 employees, comprises
dozens of companies in fields including foodstuffs, tourism,
construction and the Rayo Vallecano football club, DPA discloses.
The companies are regrouped in a loose structure which does not
constitute a holding company, DPA states. The financial
operations were organized in such a way that they escaped the
control of the stock market watchdog CNMV, which issued several
warnings to investors, advising them to check on Nueva Rumasa's
financial solidity, DPA notes.
Nueva Rumasa S.A. is based in Madrid, Spain.
FTPYME BANCAJA: S&P Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCC- (sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
FTPYME Bancaja 6, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' class B and C
notes due to asset performance deterioration. For the same
reason, S&P has updated the CreditWatch negative status of S&P's
ratings on the class A2 and A3 (G) notes, which were already on
CreditWatch negative due to its updated counterparty criteria.
S&P also affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class D notes.
The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of FTPYME Bancaja 6's
performance, which is based on the most recent transaction
documentation received after the December 2010 payment date. S&P
has observed continuing deterioration in the performance of the
underlying collateral.
In particular, as of the last payment date, defaulted loans
(defined as loans in arrears for more than 18 months) comprised
11.20% of the outstanding balance of assets compared to 4.57% in
December 2009.
S&P placed the class A2 and A3 (G) ratings on CreditWatch negative
on Jan. 18, 2011, when S&P's updated counterparty criteria became
effective. Given the recently reported level of defaults, S&P has
updated the CreditWatch status of the notes to additionally take
account of the performance deterioration.
The rating actions on the class B and C notes follow S&P's
analysis of the issuer's priority of payments and the potential
impact of recent developments on cash flows available to service
classes B and C. S&P notes that the issuer's priority of
payments changes when the cumulative total of defaulted loans
calculated as a percentage of the original balance of the A1, A2,
A3 (G), B, and C notes reaches certain trigger levels.
The change in payment priorities when trigger levels are breached
diverts interest payments due on subordinated notes to help
amortize the most senior class of notes. However, interest may
still be paid on classes B and C if there are sufficient available
amounts in the reserve fund.
For the class B and C notes, the triggers are set at 5.75% and
3.75%, respectively. As of the last payment date, the ratio of
cumulative defaults over the original balance was 4.34%. While
interest due on class C was therefore diverted in the priority of
payments, sufficient amounts remained in the reserve fund to pay
timely interest on the notes.
According to S&P's analysis, the continuing depletion of the
reserve fund makes it increasingly likely that the issuer may not
have sufficient funds to pay interest in full on the class C notes
on one of the payment dates in the next 12 months.
In addition, the growing level of defaults in the portfolio has,
in S&P's opinion, increased the likelihood that the class B
trigger may be breached in the coming months. S&P's rating on the
class B and C notes addresses timely payment of interest. S&P's
analysis indicates a growing likelihood of payment default on
classes B and C. S&P has therefore lowered its rating on the
class B notes to 'CCC (sf)' and its rating on the class C notes to
'CCC- (sf)'.
S&P has affirmed its rating of 'D (sf)' on the class D notes,
which defaulted on interest on the June 2009 payment date.
FTPYME Bancaja 6 is an SME CLO transaction originated by Caja de
Ahorros de Valencia, Castellon y Alicante (Bancaja). Its
portfolio comprises secured and unsecured loans granted to small
and medium-sized entities, mainly concentrated in the originator's
home market of Valencia. The transaction closed in September
2007.
Ratings List
FTPYME Bancaja 6, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR1.028 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes
Ratings Lowered
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
B CCC (sf) BB (sf)
C CCC- (sf) B- (sf)
Ratings Placed on Creditwatch Negative
Rating
------
Class To From
----- -- ----
A2 AAA (sf)/Watch Neg AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
A3 (G) AAA (sf)/Watch Neg AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
Rating Affirmed
Class Rating
----- ------
D D (sf)
===========================
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
===========================
AUTO WINDSCREENS: 400 Hasland Employees Fight to Keep Their Jobs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Derbyshire Times reports that a battle is underway to save 400 at
risk jobs after Auto Windscreens went into administration.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 16,
2011, guardian.co.uk said that Auto Windscreens has gone into
administration and threatens 1,100 jobs in the process. The
report related that majority of the company's staff were told to
stop working after administrators from Deloitte were appointed.
Stunned staff at Hasland was left devastated after learning the
firm was in crisis, according to Derbyshire Times. The report
relates that administrators are in "urgent" talks with key
stakeholders and interested parties in a bid to rescue the
business, which said it had suspended all operations temporarily,
as jobs hang in the balance.
Derbyshire Times notes that town leaders are joining forces in a
bid to safeguard jobs at Auto Windscreens. The report notes that
staff at the firm have been left in limbo after the business hit
financial difficulties.
Chesterfield MP Toby Perkins told the Derbyshire Times that he had
met with business minister Mark Prisk to call on the Government to
meet with him and Deloitte to discuss ways of rescuing the firm.
"If we were to lose 400 jobs [it] would be catastrophic for
Chesterfield. There's a strong possibility that we're going to
lose these jobs and we need to fight to try and prevent that
happening," Derbyshire Times quotes Mr. Perkins as saying.
The report discloses that the president of Chesterfield Trades
Union Congress, James Eaden, said the news was "disturbing" and
added: "We need to fight for every job."
Chesterfield-based Auto Windscreens works for major motor
insurers, fleet businesses and private companies. It has 68
fitting centres across the UK, 550 mobile units, a distribution
centre in Aston, Birmingham, and a call centre.
BARTON CIVIL: Goes Into Administration Following Clients' Collapse
------------------------------------------------------------------
Iain Laing at The Journal reports that Barton Civil Engineering
has gone into administration following the collapse of its biggest
clients.
The company was a main sub-contractor for Exeter-based building
services company Rok Plc, which went into administration at the
end of last year, according to The Journal. The report relates
that when Rok Plc failed, Barton Civil had a significant debt due
to it from Rok Plc and ongoing works for Rok Plc and potential
future work for Rok Plc, which left Barton Civil with a major hole
in its order books.
The Journal notes that as new orders dried up, Barton Civil was
left with cash flow problems.
David Willis of Stockton-on-Tees firm BWC Business Solutions is
handling the administration.
Mr. Willis, The Journal notes, said that he hoped that the firm,
which employs 25 people, can be sold as a going concern. "We have
appointed independent agents to market the company. Details have
been sent to 50 other businesses operating in the same sector and
there have been expressions of interest from half a dozen firms so
far but no firm offers as yet. If a sale is not achieved within
the course of the next week or two it is unlikely one will be,"
The Journal quotes Mr. Willis as saying.
Headquartered in Gateshead, Barton Civil Engineering is a
groundworks firm with 25 staff. The company worked for several
local authorities, NHS trusts and universities in the North East.
BEETHAM HOTELS: Goes Into Administration, Makes No Job Cuts
-----------------------------------------------------------
Manchester Evening News reports that Beetham Hotels Manchester has
gone into administration, with KPMG as its administrators. The
report relates that the hotel continues to trade as normal and no
redundancies have been made.
"We would like to reassure customers that it is business as usual.
We are confident of securing a sale in the near future. Hilton
Worldwide is continuing to manage the day to day operations at the
hotel, with our support," Manchester Evening quotes Brian Green,
head of restructuring for KPMG in the North West, as saying.
The report notes that the appointment of administrators is over
the hotel company only, not the rest of the building.
Beetham Hotels Manchester is a Liverpool-based property company
with a management agreement with Hilton Worldwide. The hotel has
340 staff.
CROSLAND VK: Appoints Kay Johnson Gee as Liquidator
---------------------------------------------------
Adam Hooker at PrintWeek reports that Crosland VK has gone into
liquidation after its assets and business were sold back to
previous directors. Jonathan Avery-Gee of Kay Johnson Gee was
appointed liquidator of the company on Jan. 25, 2011.
PrintWeek relates that the company ceased trading on Dec. 31,
2010, with the business's plant and machinery, furniture and
equipment, motor vehicles, stock and goodwill sold the same day to
Crosland Laser Guarding for GBP50,000. The report states that the
asset valuation was carried out by an independent valuer prior to
its appointment.
PrintWeek, citing a notice sent to creditors, discloses that
Crosland VK directors John Briggs and John Cunningham are the
shareholders of the new business, which was formed on Oct. 1,
2010. All staff were transferred to the new business under the
Transfer of Undertaking Protection of Employment Regulations
(TUPE), PrintWeek reports.
"The sale of the assets preserved 11 jobs, which saved
[GBP]120,000 in redundancy, pay in lieu of notice and holiday
pay," the report quotes Gordon Rees at Kay Johnson Gee as saying.
According to PrintWeek, the creditors' letter claimed that
Crosland's turnover began to decrease in 2008 when the economy
began to enter into a recession, with Crosland's customers
unwilling to commit to capital spending.
The company left behind GBP519,000 of liabilities, including
GBP65,349 in respect of PAYE and GBP56,822 in VAT.
Crosland VK is a finishing equipment distributor.
PRIVET CAPITAL: Devonshire Desserts Buys Polestar Factory
---------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Privet Capital's former Polestar factory at
Okehampton has been sold to Devonshire Desserts.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 2,
2011, BBC News said that about 200 staff awaited disclosure on the
future of a Devon dessert factory. The report said some workers
at Polestar Foods in Okehampton were not paid and a sister factory
in Warwickshire has gone into administration. BBC News noted that
owner Privet Capital had said it would be speaking to staff and
was taking the situation "extremely seriously".
Administrator FRP Advisory said Devonshire Desserts was the "one
viable offer" for the factory, according to BBC News.
It is not yet known if Devonshire Desserts will be able to re-
employ some of the former staff, BBC News notes.
Headquartered in United Kingdom, Privet Capital is a private
equity firm.
===============
X X X X X X X X
===============
* BOND PRICING: For the Week February 14 to February 18, 2011
-------------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price
------ ------ -------- -------- -----
AUSTRIA
-------
BA CREDITANSTALT 5.470 8/28/2013 EUR 66.88
BAWAG 3.000 2/18/2035 EUR 68.59
OESTER VOLKSBK 4.170 7/29/2015 EUR 66.63
OESTER VOLKSBK 4.810 7/29/2025 EUR 56.25
RAIFF ZENTRALBK 4.500 9/28/2035 EUR 80.04
CZECH REPUBLIC
--------------
CZECH REPUBLIC 3.800 4/11/2015 CZK 102.70
DENMARK
-------
KOMMUNEKREDIT 0.500 2/3/2016 TRY 73.50
FINLAND
-------
MUNI FINANCE PLC 0.500 3/17/2025 CAD 53.80
MUNI FINANCE PLC 0.500 9/24/2020 CAD 68.78
MUNI FINANCE PLC 1.000 2/27/2018 AUD 66.53
MUNI FINANCE PLC 1.000 6/30/2017 ZAR 58.91
MUNI FINANCE PLC 0.500 2/9/2016 ZAR 66.19
MUNI FINANCE PLC 0.250 6/28/2040 CAD 23.63
FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM 4.970 4/1/2015 EUR 15.71
ALCATEL-LUCENT 5.000 1/1/2015 EUR 4.36
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG 6.720 1/1/2015 EUR 5.09
ATOS ORIGIN SA 2.500 1/1/2016 EUR 55.78
BNP PARIBAS 10.050 7/24/2012 USD 59.62
CALYON 6.000 6/18/2047 EUR 30.80
CAP GEMINI SOGET 1.000 1/1/2012 EUR 46.02
CAP GEMINI SOGET 3.500 1/1/2014 EUR 45.93
CGG VERITAS 1.750 1/1/2016 EUR 29.66
CLUB MEDITERRANE 6.110 11/1/2015 EUR 19.61
CLUB MEDITERRANE 5.000 6/8/2012 EUR 18.50
EURAZEO 6.250 6/10/2014 EUR 58.69
FAURECIA 4.500 1/1/2015 EUR 30.60
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2014 EUR 17.92
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2015 EUR 16.12
NEXANS SA 4.000 1/1/2016 EUR 70.29
ORPEA 3.875 1/1/2016 EUR 47.81
PEUGEOT SA 4.450 1/1/2016 EUR 34.20
PUBLICIS GROUPE 1.000 1/18/2018 EUR 49.74
PUBLICIS GROUPE 3.125 7/30/2014 EUR 42.05
RHODIA SA 0.500 1/1/2014 EUR 49.56
SOC AIR FRANCE 2.750 4/1/2020 EUR 21.74
SOITEC 6.250 9/9/2014 EUR 10.71
TEM 4.250 1/1/2015 EUR 58.58
THEOLIA 2.700 1/1/2041 EUR 10.88
GERMANY
-------
DEUTSCHE BK LOND 3.000 5/18/2012 CHF 66.42
EUROHYPO AG 6.490 7/17/2017 EUR 8.63
HSH NORDBANK AG 4.375 2/14/2017 EUR 60.97
KFW 3.276 6/10/2035 USD 74.67
L-BANK FOERDERBK 0.500 5/10/2027 CAD 48.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT 2.500 1/30/2034 EUR 64.97
SOLON AG SOLAR 1.375 12/6/2012 EUR 37.46
GREECE
------
ATHENS URBAN TRN 4.851 9/19/2016 EUR 72.26
ATHENS URBAN TRN 5.008 7/18/2017 EUR 66.45
HELLENIC REP I/L 2.300 7/25/2030 EUR 49.53
HELLENIC REP I/L 2.900 7/25/2025 EUR 49.91
HELLENIC REPUB 6.140 4/14/2028 EUR 64.90
HELLENIC REPUB 5.000 3/11/2019 EUR 61.90
HELLENIC REPUB 4.590 4/8/2016 EUR 68.40
HELLENIC REPUB 5.000 8/22/2016 JPY 64.87
HELLENIC REPUB 5.200 7/17/2034 EUR 65.73
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.675 10/9/2017 EUR 64.63
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.300 7/20/2017 EUR 64.19
HELLENIC REPUBLI 5.900 4/20/2017 EUR 69.12
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.225 3/1/2017 EUR 64.78
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.600 9/20/2040 EUR 56.04
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.500 9/20/2037 EUR 56.09
HELLENIC REPUBLI 5.959 3/4/2019 EUR 67.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.590 4/3/2018 EUR 62.82
HELLENIC REPUBLI 5.014 2/27/2019 EUR 62.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.500 5/20/2014 EUR 74.71
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.700 3/20/2024 EUR 61.78
HELLENIC REPUBLI 5.300 3/20/2026 EUR 62.45
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.020 9/13/2016 EUR 65.79
HELLENIC REPUBLI 6.000 7/19/2019 EUR 67.54
HELLENIC REPUBLI 3.600 7/20/2016 EUR 64.21
HELLENIC REPUBLI 3.702 9/30/2015 EUR 69.02
HELLENIC REPUBLI 3.700 7/20/2015 EUR 67.96
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.113 9/30/2014 EUR 74.49
HELLENIC REPUBLI 6.250 6/19/2020 EUR 69.64
HELLENIC REPUBLI 3.985 7/25/2014 EUR 74.44
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.500 7/1/2014 EUR 74.63
HELLENIC REPUBLI 4.600 7/20/2018 EUR 63.53
NATIONAL BK GREE 3.875 10/7/2016 EUR 75.00
IRELAND
-------
AIB MORTGAGE BNK 5.000 2/12/2030 EUR 58.45
AIB MORTGAGE BNK 5.000 3/1/2030 EUR 58.19
AIB MORTGAGE BNK 5.580 4/28/2028 EUR 64.51
ALLIED IRISH BKS 10.750 3/29/2017 USD 28.95
ALLIED IRISH BKS 10.750 3/29/2017 EUR 25.43
ALLIED IRISH BKS 5.250 3/10/2025 GBP 22.37
ALLIED IRISH BKS 7.875 7/5/2023 GBP 23.40
ALLIED IRISH BKS 11.500 3/29/2022 GBP 25.43
ALLIED IRISH BKS 12.500 6/25/2019 GBP 25.41
ALLIED IRISH BKS 12.500 6/25/2019 EUR 25.43
BANK OF IRELAND 9.250 9/7/2020 GBP 60.65
BANK OF IRELAND 10.000 2/12/2020 EUR 67.08
BANK OF IRELAND 10.000 2/12/2020 GBP 63.58
BANK OF IRELAND 10.750 6/22/2018 GBP 60.96
BK IRELAND MTGE 5.760 9/7/2029 EUR 68.66
BK IRELAND MTGE 5.450 3/1/2030 EUR 65.47
BK IRELAND MTGE 5.400 11/6/2029 EUR 65.53
DEPFA ACS BANK 0.500 3/3/2025 CAD 32.98
DEPFA ACS BANK 5.250 3/31/2025 CAD 74.79
DEPFA ACS BANK 5.125 3/16/2037 USD 63.33
DEPFA ACS BANK 4.900 8/24/2035 CAD 63.08
DEPFA ACS BANK 5.125 3/16/2037 USD 63.15
DEPFA ACS BANK 6.000 10/7/2035 USD 74.38
DEPFA BANK PLC 3.150 4/3/2018 EUR 74.00
IRISH GOVT 4.400 6/18/2019 EUR 74.51
IRISH GOVT 5.400 3/13/2025 EUR 71.50
IRISH GOVT 4.500 4/18/2020 EUR 72.51
IRISH LIFE PERM 4.250 4/9/2015 EUR 74.48
IRISH NATIONWIDE 13.000 8/12/2016 GBP 11.50
IRISH NATIONWIDE 6.250 6/26/2012 GBP 39.00
IRISH NATIONWIDE 5.500 1/10/2018 GBP 9.99
ITALY
-----
ABRUZZO REGION 4.450 3/1/2037 EUR 73.37
CITY OF TURIN 5.270 6/26/2038 EUR 65.90
CO CASTELMASSA 3.960 3/31/2026 EUR 73.17
LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL 7.250 4/1/2014 EUR 33.35
BREEZE FINANCE 6.708 4/19/2027 EUR 64.75
DEXIA BQ INT LUX 2.390 12/7/2021 EUR 70.88
IIB LUXEMBOURG 11.000 2/19/2013 USD 13.49
LIGHTHOUSE INTL 8.000 4/30/2014 EUR 35.98
LIGHTHOUSE INTL 8.000 4/30/2014 EUR 35.88
NETHERLANDS
-----------
APP INTL FINANCE 11.750 10/1/2005 USD 0.01
BK NED GEMEENTEN 0.500 3/3/2021 NZD 58.61
BK NED GEMEENTEN 0.500 2/24/2025 CAD 52.06
BRIT INSURANCE 6.625 12/9/2030 GBP 66.68
ELEC DE CAR FIN 8.500 4/10/2018 USD 56.58
NATL INVESTER BK 25.983 5/7/2029 EUR 22.63
NED WATERSCHAPBK 0.500 3/11/2025 CAD 53.09
RABOBANK 2.805 8/28/2020 AUD 74.47
RBS NV EX-ABN NV 6.316 6/29/2035 EUR 72.31
SIDETUR FINANCE 10.000 4/20/2016 USD 73.50
TJIWI KIMIA FIN 13.250 8/1/2001 USD 0.01
NORWAY
------
EKSPORTFINANS 0.500 5/9/2030 CAD 41.63
KOMMUNALBANKEN 0.500 9/24/2014 BRL 69.61
KOMMUNALBANKEN 0.500 3/1/2016 ZAR 71.21
KOMMUNALBANKEN 0.500 1/27/2016 ZAR 74.93
PORTUGAL
--------
CAIXA GERAL DEPO 5.380 10/1/2038 EUR 67.86
METRO DE LISBOA 4.061 12/4/2026 EUR 64.78
METRO DE LISBOA 4.799 12/7/2027 EUR 70.37
PORTUGUESE OT'S 4.100 4/15/2037 EUR 69.13
APK ARKADA 17.500 5/23/2012 RUB 0.38
ARKTEL-INVEST 12.000 4/9/2012 RUB 0.05
BARENTSEV FINANS 20.000 7/4/2011 RUB 1.60
CENTREINVEST GRO 9.250 6/24/2014 RUB 101.80
DVTG-FINANS 17.000 8/29/2013 RUB 3.01
ENERGOSTROY-FINA 12.000 5/20/2011 RUB 75.00
EUROKOMMERZ 16.000 3/15/2011 RUB 0.01
IZHAVTO 18.000 6/9/2011 RUB 11.31
KARUSEL FINANS 12.000 9/12/2013 RUB 75.00
LADYA FINANS 13.750 9/13/2012 RUB 75.00
LLC VICTORIA FIN 8.000 2/12/2013 RUB 75.00
M-INDUSTRIYA 12.250 8/16/2011 RUB 29.69
MIG-FINANS 0.100 9/6/2011 RUB 1.00
MIRAX 14.990 5/17/2011 RUB 43.03
MIRAX 17.000 9/17/2012 RUB 43.02
MOSCOW BANK R&D 8.500 3/28/2013 RUB 75.00
MOSMART FINANS 0.010 4/12/2012 RUB 1.81
MOSOBLGAZ 12.000 5/17/2011 RUB 72.50
MOSOBLTRUSTINVES 20.000 3/26/2011 RUB 6.99
NATIONAL CAPITAL 12.500 5/20/2011 RUB 75.00
NOK 12.500 8/26/2014 RUB 0.04
NOK 10.000 9/22/2011 RUB 55.03
OBYEDINEONNYE KO 10.750 5/16/2012 RUB 75.00
PEB LEASING 14.000 9/12/2014 RUB 75.00
RUSSIAN STANDARD 7.750 4/13/2012 RUB 100.21
RYBINSKKABEL 0.010 2/28/2012 RUB 1.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS 10.500 3/27/2012 RUB 3.40
SISTEMA-HALS 8.500 4/8/2014 RUB 75.00
SISTEMA-HALS 8.500 4/15/2014 RUB 75.00
SOUTHERN STOCK C 9.000 4/29/2014 RUB 75.00
SVOBODNY SOKOL 0.100 5/24/2011 RUB 1.31
TALIO-PRINCEPS 16.000 5/17/2012 RUB 75.00
TECHNOSILA-INVES 7.000 5/26/2011 RUB 0.04
TERNA-FINANS 1.000 11/4/2011 RUB 18.50
TRANSCREDITFACTO 12.000 6/11/2012 RUB 75.00
TRANSFIN-M 10.750 8/10/2012 RUB 75.00
TRANSFIN-M 9.750 8/13/2013 RUB 75.00
TRANSFIN-M 9.750 8/13/2013 RUB 75.00
VKM-LEASING FINA 1.000 5/18/2011 RUB 0.02
VOSTOCHNY EXPRES 12.500 3/7/2013 RUB 100.40
VTB-LEASING FINA 6.650 8/2/2017 RUB 100.05
ZAO EUROPLAN 10.000 8/11/2011 RUB 75.00
ZHILSOTSIPOTEKA- 9.000 7/26/2011 RUB 75.00
SPAIN
-----
AYT CEDULAS CAJA 3.750 6/30/2025 EUR 63.95
AYT CEDULAS CAJA 4.750 5/25/2027 EUR 71.26
AYUNTAM DE MADRD 4.550 6/16/2036 EUR 73.30
BANCAJA 1.500 5/22/2018 EUR 60.53
BANCO GUIPUZCOAN 1.500 4/18/2022 EUR 50.03
CAJA CASTIL-MAN 1.500 6/23/2021 EUR 67.77
CAJA MADRID 4.125 3/24/2036 EUR 67.74
CAJA MADRID 5.755 2/26/2028 EUR 64.91
CEDULAS TDA 6 3.875 5/23/2025 EUR 64.85
CEDULAS TDA A-5 4.250 3/28/2027 EUR 65.96
CEDULAS TDA A-6 4.250 4/10/2031 EUR 61.60
GENERAL DE ALQUI 2.750 8/20/2012 EUR 73.30
IM CEDULAS 5 3.500 6/15/2020 EUR 73.59
JUNTA LA MANCHA 3.875 1/31/2036 EUR 63.39
SWEDEN
------
SWEDISH EXP CRED 0.500 9/29/2015 BRL 63.95
SWEDISH EXP CRED 9.000 8/28/2011 USD 11.19
SWEDISH EXP CRED 8.000 11/4/2011 USD 8.92
SWEDISH EXP CRED 2.000 12/7/2011 USD 9.81
SWEDISH EXP CRED 9.000 8/12/2011 USD 10.41
SWEDISH EXP CRED 0.500 1/25/2028 USD 49.59
SWEDISH EXP CRED 8.000 1/27/2012 USD 10.01
SWEDISH EXP CRED 0.500 3/3/2016 ZAR 64.95
SWITZERLAND
-----------
UBS AG 13.700 5/23/2012 USD 14.05
UBS AG 10.580 6/29/2011 USD 40.14
UBS AG 13.300 5/23/2012 USD 4.25
UBS AG 14.000 5/23/2012 USD 9.70
UBS AG 10.530 1/23/2012 USD 40.91
UBS AG JERSEY 11.150 8/31/2011 USD 39.83
UBS AG JERSEY 9.350 9/21/2011 USD 70.88
UBS AG JERSEY 10.280 8/19/2011 USD 35.71
UBS AG JERSEY 13.000 6/16/2011 USD 50.13
UBS AG JERSEY 10.500 6/16/2011 USD 73.14
UBS AG JERSEY 10.990 3/31/2011 USD 30.98
UBS AG JERSEY 12.800 2/28/2011 USD 33.19
UBS AG JERSEY 11.000 2/28/2011 USD 69.69
UBS AG JERSEY 9.450 9/21/2011 USD 51.03
UBS AG JERSEY 10.360 8/19/2011 USD 53.45
UBS AG JERSEY 3.220 7/31/2012 EUR 56.11
UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
BANK OF SCOTLAND 5.772 2/7/2035 EUR 73.43
BARCLAYS BK PLC 9.400 7/31/2012 USD 11.51
BARCLAYS BK PLC 13.050 4/27/2012 USD 27.08
BARCLAYS BK PLC 9.500 8/31/2012 USD 30.45
BARCLAYS BK PLC 9.250 8/31/2012 USD 35.46
BARCLAYS BK PLC 13.000 5/23/2011 USD 23.99
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.510 5/31/2011 USD 13.01
BARCLAYS BK PLC 9.000 6/30/2011 USD 43.42
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.800 7/31/2012 USD 27.80
BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.950 4/20/2012 USD 16.30
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.650 1/31/2012 USD 45.71
BARCLAYS BK PLC 9.250 1/31/2012 USD 9.71
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.350 1/23/2012 USD 21.34
BARCLAYS BK PLC 7.500 9/22/2011 USD 17.09
BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.750 9/22/2011 USD 73.50
BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.550 1/23/2012 USD 11.51
BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.800 9/22/2011 USD 16.64
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.950 5/23/2011 USD 65.04
BRADFORD&BIN BLD 5.500 1/15/2018 GBP 45.36
BRADFORD&BIN BLD 4.910 2/1/2047 EUR 66.64
BRADFORD&BIN PLC 6.625 6/16/2023 GBP 45.68
BRADFORD&BIN PLC 7.625 2/16/2049 GBP 46.98
CO-OPERATIVE BNK 5.875 3/28/2033 GBP 69.56
DISCOVERY EDUCAT 1.948 3/31/2037 GBP 66.73
EFG HELLAS PLC 5.400 11/2/2047 EUR 54.75
EFG HELLAS PLC 6.010 1/9/2036 EUR 23.50
HBOS PLC 6.000 11/1/2033 USD 66.66
HBOS PLC 4.500 3/18/2030 EUR 72.94
HBOS PLC 6.000 11/1/2033 USD 66.66
HEALTHCARE SUPP 2.067 2/19/2043 GBP 69.59
MAX PETROLEUM 6.750 9/8/2012 USD 61.17
NORTHERN ROCK 4.574 1/13/2015 GBP 76.41
NORTHERN ROCK 5.750 2/28/2017 GBP 70.25
PRINCIPALITY BLD 5.375 7/8/2016 GBP 71.97
PUNCH TAVERNS 7.567 4/15/2026 GBP 58.24
PUNCH TAVERNS 8.374 7/15/2029 GBP 58.20
PUNCH TAVERNS 6.468 4/15/2033 GBP 46.79
ROYAL BK SCOTLND 6.316 6/29/2030 EUR 67.68
SKIPTON BUILDING 5.625 1/18/2018 GBP 69.85
SKIPTON BUILDING 6.750 5/30/2022 GBP 66.55
UNIQUE PUB FIN 6.464 3/30/2032 GBP 64.58
WESSEX WATER FIN 1.369 7/31/2057 GBP 31.75
YORKSHRE BLD SOC 6.375 4/26/2024 GBP 74.01
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.
Copyright 2011. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754.
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