TCREUR_Public/110225.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, February 25, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 40



DEXIA SA: Net Income Down 72% to EUR56MM in Fourth Quarter 2010


LEVADIA METALL: Owner Opts for Bankruptcy After Rescue Plan Fails


COMMERZBANK AG: Earns EUR1.4BB in 2010; Expects to Repay State Aid
DEUTSCHE POSTBANK: Posts EUR80-Mil. Net Loss in 4th Qtr. 2010
HELLA KGAA: Moody's Upgrades Corporate Family Rating From 'Ba1'
TALISMAN 1: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class G Notes to 'D (sf)'
WESTLB AG: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'E+' BFSR to Developing


LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Icesave Dispute Legally Unclear, Grimmson Says


ANGLO IRISH BANK: DBRS Cuts Non-Guaranteed Debt Rating to 'B'
ASHFORD CASTLE: Has Combined Losses of EUR39 Million
BANK OF IRELAND: Sells Fund Administration Unit to Northern Trust
BANK OF IRELAND: S&P Raises Ratings on Hybrid Instruments to 'CC'
FOUR STAR: Michael Holland to Take Over Under Rescue Plan


NXP BV: S&P Puts 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating on CreditWatch Positive


PROBUSINESSBANK OAO: Moody's Assigns E+ Financial Strength Rating


GC FTGENCAT: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCsf'
SANTANDER CONSUMER: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class D Notes


AKBANK TAS: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba1' Rating to Eurobond Issuance
DOGUS HOLDING: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB'


UKREXIMBANK JSC: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating to Sr. Unsec. Notes

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALL TRANSPORT: Goes Into Administration, Owes Up to GBP500,000
ANTRAC: Goes Into Administration, Owes More Than GBP400,000
CLARKSON HILL: Ex Advisers Gain Investment Permissions
E-CLEAR: Serious Fraud Office Drops Probe on Firm
FLYGLOBESPAN: Serious Fraud Office Ends Probe Into Collapse

JJB SPORTS: CSC to Oppose Company Voluntary Arrangement
SUSTAINABLE AGGREGATES: Goes Into Administration
VIRGIN MEDIA: Moody's Upgrades Corporate Family Rating to 'Ba1'
WREXHAM FOOTBALL CLUB: Fans Has Seven Days to Save Club
WTA GLOBAL: Owed GBP100,000++ Before Falling Into Administration


* BOOK REVIEW: Partners: Forming Strategic Health Care Alliances



DEXIA SA: Net Income Down 72% to EUR56MM in Fourth Quarter 2010
Jennifer A. Johnson at Bloomberg News reports that Dexia SA, the
lender to local governments that was rescued by France and
Belgium, said its net income for the fourth quarter of 2010
plunged 72% to EUR56 million.

Dexia missed the EUR148 million average estimate of eight analysts
surveyed by Bloomberg.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 12,
2010, Dexia is in the midst of a restructuring imposed upon it by
the European Commission, which wants it to reduce its balance
sheet size to mitigate having received a EUR6 billion bail-out at
the height of the financial crisis.

                         About Dexia SA

Dexia SA -- is a Belgian bank specialized
in retail banking and local public finance.  The Bank offers a
range of banking services for individual customers, small and
medium-sized enterprises and institutional clients.  It has four
divisions: Asset Management, Personal Financial Services, Treasury
and Financial Markets, and Investor Services.  The Asset
Management division offers products ranging from traditional and
alternative funds to socially responsible investments.  The
Personal Financial Services segment focuses on banking and
insurance products, including both life and non-life insurance
products.  Through its Treasury and Financial Markets division,
Dexia is present in the capital markets and provides support to
the entire Group.  The Investor Services segment offers various
services to shareholders, such as fund and pension administration.
Through its subsidiaries, Dexia SA is active in over 30 countries,
including Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Turkey, France, Australia
and Japan.


LEVADIA METALL: Owner Opts for Bankruptcy After Rescue Plan Fails
Toomas Hobemagi at Aripaev reports that Estonian businessman
Viktor Levada has been forced to seek bankruptcy of his metal
trading company Levadia Metall OU.

Aripaev relates that Mr. Levada said he did everything possible to
rescue the company and jobs, but had no option after the creditors
refused to approve the company's restructuring plan.

According to Aripaev, Mr. Levada noted that the key reason for the
company's bankruptcy was a dramatic change in the attitude of
banks to their customers, which was amplified by the recession and
fall in prices of raw materials.

Levadia Metall OU is headquartered in Tartu.


COMMERZBANK AG: Earns EUR1.4BB in 2010; Expects to Repay State Aid
James Wilson at The Financial Times reports that Commerzbank AG
expects to repay a significant amount of state aid this year after
it made better than expected annual profits for the first time
since the financial crisis began.

Commerzbank received more than EUR16 billion of hybrid capital
from the government, which also took a 25% equity stake in a 2009
bail-out in return for a further EUR1.8 billion, according to the
FT.  The bank, which has a market capitalization of EUR8.3
billion, needed support after acquiring troubled rival Dresdner
Bank, the FT recounts.

The FT relates that Commerzbank Chief Executive Martin Blessing
said the bank made operating profits of EUR1.4 billion last year
and expected "significantly higher" operating profits this year.
He said it should repay at least 10% of the hybrid capital
outstanding, the FT notes.

Analysts expect Commerzbank to repay more, and the bank may pave
the way for a large equity capital increase at its annual meeting
in May, the FT discloses.

According to the FT, Mr. Blessing said that cutting risk-weighted
assets and reducing the bank's core tier one ratio could help
repayment along with retained profits.

Commerzbank's results have sparked criticism because it recorded a
EUR1.2 billion loss under accounting rules and under the bail-out
terms will not pay any interest for last year on the capital
provided by Berlin, the FT states.  The difference was largely due
to a EUR1.9 billion writedown on the book value of the Eurohypo
subsidiary under German rules, the FT notes.

Headquartered in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, Commerzbank AG -- is the parent company of a
financial services group active around the world.  The group's
operating business is organized into six segments providing each
other with mutually beneficial synergies: Private and Business
Customers, Mittelstandsbank, Central and Eastern Europe,
Corporates & Markets, Commercial Real Estate and Public Finance
and Treasury.

DEUTSCHE POSTBANK: Posts EUR80-Mil. Net Loss in 4th Qtr. 2010
Oliver Suess at Bloomberg News reports that Deutsche Postbank AG
said it expects to return to profitability "on a sustainable
basis" after posting a fourth-quarter loss.

Bloomberg relates that the bank said in an e-mailed statement on
Wednesday that the net loss was EUR80 million (US$110 million) in
the three months ended December 2010, compared with a deficit of
EUR99 million in the year-earlier period.  Provisions for risky
loans fell to EUR112 million from EUR308 million, Bloomberg

According to Bloomberg, fourth-quarter net interest income -- the
difference between what a bank brings in from loans and pays on
deposits -- rose to EUR664 million from EUR621 million.

Headquartered in Bonn, Germany, Deutsche Postbank AG reported
total assets of EUR231.5 billion as of the end of September 2010,
according to Moody's Investors Service.

                         *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 6,
2010, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Deutsche Postbank AG's D+
bank financial strength rating.  Moody's changed the outlook on
several of Postbank's hybrid securities to positive from negative.
The rating announcement follows Deutsche Bank (Aa3/C+ stable)
becoming Postbank's single largest shareholder with a stake of
49.95%, after the voluntary public takeover offer-period expired
on November 24, 2010.   Moody's affirmed the D+ BFSR, which maps
to a Baseline Credit Assessment of Baa3, as Postbank remains
vulnerable given its weak intrinsic profitability and large
exposure to higher-risk loans and investments.  The outlook on the
BFSR remains negative.

HELLA KGAA: Moody's Upgrades Corporate Family Rating From 'Ba1'
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Hella KGaA Hueck & Co by
one notch to Baa3 from Ba1 and has converted its corporate family
rating into a long-term issuer rating in line with Moody's policy
for issuers that have moved from speculative grade to investment
grade.  In addition, Moody's has upgraded to Baa3 from Ba1 the
ratings on Hella's EUR300 million worth of senior notes (due in
2014) and JPY12 billion worth of senior notes (due in 2032).
Furthermore, the rating agency has upgraded Hella's short-term
issuer rating to Prime-3 from Not-Prime.  The outlook on the
ratings is positive.

                        Ratings Rationale

"The upgrade reflects the rapid recovery of Hella's profitability
and leverage ratios following the severe downturn in the
automotive industry in 2009.  Indeed, the company's recovery has
been faster than Moody's anticipated in 2009 when it downgraded
Hella's rating to Ba1," said Rainer Neidnig, a Moody's Assistant
Vice President and lead analyst for Hella.  "The positive outlook
reflects Moody's view that a rating upgrade is possible over the
next 12-18 months if Hella is able to sustain its current profit
margins and credit metrics," adds Mr. Neidnig.

On Jan. 31, 2010, Hella reported unaudited results for the first
half of the fiscal year 2010/11.  The group's sales increased by
27% compared with the previous year, to EUR2.06 billion, and its
reported EBITDA amounted to EUR252 million, compared with
EUR173 million in H1 2009/10.  On a Moody's adjusted basis, Hella
exhibited an EBIT margin of 6.4% for the last 12 months ending
November 2010, which compares with 5.0% in FY 2009/10 and 0.7%
during the industry downturn in FY 2008/09.

In Moody's view, this strong earnings recovery is a result not
only of the higher levels of sales, but also of the benefits of
the cost-saving and efficiency improvement measures implemented by
the group in recent years.  On a Moody's adjusted basis, Hella's
debt/EBITDA ratio further improved to 2.2x on an LTM basis
compared with 2.7x in FY 2009/10 and 4.3x in FY 2008/09.  Free
cash flow generation was slightly negative (EUR37 million) in the
LTM period, owing to (i) a substantial increase in working
capital, which Moody's does not expect to recur at similar levels
in future, (ii) a return of capital expenditures to historical
levels following a relatively moderate reduction in FY 2009/10 and
(iii) the resumption of dividend payments (EUR 20 million)
following years of no distributions to shareholders.

Hella's Baa3 rating continues to benefit from the group's market-
leading positions in lighting technology, in the European
independent aftermarket as well as in original equipment
electronics.  The rating also takes into consideration the size of
Hella's Aftermarket & Special OE division (accounting for 26% of
the group's H1 2010/11 revenues), which is less cyclical than its
original automotive equipment activities and which supports
revenue and profitability stability during the economic cycle.
Hella's rating benefits further from the group's track record in
adjusting its cost structure and improving its operational
efficiency.  In addition, Moody's notes positively the group's
efforts to diversify both its customer base and its geographical

However, Moody's cautions that Hella remains exposed to the
cyclicality of automotive production volumes, given that 74% of
the group's revenues (H1 2010/11) are derived from parts and
components for the original equipment manufacture of cars and
light vehicles.  In addition, Hella has exposure to potentially
volatile costs for raw materials and components, including
plastics and metals, which it needs to manage accordingly.
Moreover, the entire automotive supply industry has historically
been subject to intense competition and significant price pressure
from OEM customers, which requires the continuous optimization of
efficiency, processes and costs.  Lastly, Hella will need to
continue making significant investments in research and
development in order to offer innovative product solutions.

In order to remain adequately positioned at Baa3, Hella would need
to maintain: (i) positive FCF generation; (ii) a debt/EBITDA ratio
markedly below 3.0x; and (iii) an EBIT/interest expense ratio
above 3.0x.

The positive outlook on Hella's ratings reflects the possibility
of a rating upgrade over the next 12-18 months, if Hella is able
to maintain its profitability and credit metrics at current levels
on a sustainable basis.

Moody's could consider upgrading Hella's ratings if the company
were to maintain on a sustainable basis (i) a debt/EBITDA ratio
close to 2.25x and (ii) an EBIT margin above 5%.  Moreover, an
upgrade would require Hella to achieve: (i) further positive FCF
generation; (ii) an RCF/net debt ratio close to mid 30%; and (iii)
a continued balanced financial policy.

Moody's could consider downgrading Hella if (i) the group's
profitability were to come under pressure, resulting in negative
FCF; and (ii) its debt/EBITDA ratio were to weaken to materially
above 3.0x.


Issuer: Hella KGaA Hueck&Co

  -- Issuer Rating, Upgraded to P-3 from NP

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to Baa3
     from Ba1

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to Baa3
     from Ba1


Issuer: Hella KGaA Hueck&Co

  -- Issuer Rating, Assigned Baa3
  -- Issuer Rating, Assigned Baa3


Issuer: Hella KGaA Hueck&Co

  -- Probability of Default Rating, Withdrawn, previously rated

  -- Corporate Family Rating, Withdrawn, previously rated Ba1

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Withdrawn,
     previously rated LGD4, 51%

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Withdrawn,
     previously rated LGD4, 51%

Headquartered in Lippstadt, Germany, Hella KGaA Hueck & Co. is a
leading supplier of automotive lighting and electronics components
for the automotive industry.  In total, these activities, which
are undertaken by Hella's Original Equipment division, accounted
for 74% of revenues generated by the group in H1 2010/11 (fiscal
year ends on May 31, 2011).  Moreover, Hella has a strong position
in the European aftermarket, i.e. the distribution and wholesale
of spare parts and components, and also supplies non-automotive
manufacturers with components for the production of original
equipment (e.g. in the agriculture, mining, bus or marine
segment).  These activities are undertaken by Hella's Aftermarket
& Special OE division, which accounted for 26% of revenues
generated by the company in H1 2010/11.  Europe remains the most
important region for Hella, accounting for 71% of its H1 2010/11
revenues.  However, given the number of cars produced in Europe
that are exported, Hella's reliance on the European market is
notably lower.

Hella is family owned and revenues for the last-twelve-month
period ending November 2010 were EUR3.8 billion.  The company
employs approximately 23,000 people at more than 70 manufacturing
facilities, production subsidiaries and joint ventures in more
than 30 countries.

TALISMAN 1: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class G Notes to 'D (sf)'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various rating actions on
all of Talisman 1 Finance PLC's classes of notes, following the
repayment of the largest loan in the pool.

Specifically, S&P:

  -- Lowered to 'D (sf)' its rating on the class G notes;

  -- Raised to 'A+ (sf)' its ratings on the class D, E, and F
     notes; and

  -- Withdrew its ratings on the class A, B, C, and X notes.  At
     the time of withdrawal, the class A, B, and X notes were on
     CreditWatch negative.

The Prime Commercial loan, which was one of the two remaining
loans in the transaction, repaid in full (in principal and
interest) on the last note interest payment date, following the
sale of the two properties backing the Prime Commercial loan in
December 2010.  The loan had been in special servicing since its
maturity date in January 2010, when the borrower failed to repay
the loan.  Only the senior portion of the Prime Commercial loan
was securitized in Talisman 1 Finance.

The special servicer used a portion of the proceeds to discharge
its liquidation fee, and it allocated the remaining proceeds on a
pro rata basis between the issuer and the junior lender, resulting
in a principal loss of EUR1.7 million for the issuer and
EUR0.5 million for the junior lender.  The EUR1.7 million loss was
applied to the class G notes on the last note IPD.

In S&P's analysis, based on the provisions in the transaction
documentation, S&P assumed that net proceeds available to the
lenders would be distributed on a sequential basis between the
issuer (as senior lender) and the junior lender.  S&P understands
that the special servicer in this case instead applied net
proceeds pro rata, because it believed this to be a different
situation as the loan was ultimately repaid in full.

The only loan now left in the pool is Alpha.  The Alpha loan is
secured on a shopping center in Berlin and approximately 376
residential units in Munster.  The loan matured in April 2010 but
the borrower failed to repay it at the maturity date.  The loan is
in special servicing.  The loan is now paying floating three-month
EURIBOR plus a margin plus default interest, and the excess cash
is applied toward repayment of the loan.  Neither the borrower-
level swap nor the basis swap was replaced.  S&P understands that
special servicing fees are covered by the loan default interest.
In S&P's opinion, the properties are of average quality, but are
well positioned within their respective markets.  The reported
securitized loan-to-value ratio is 63.91%, based on a market
valuation from March 2010.  Although S&P expects the borrower to
repay the loan in full, a minor loss of about EUR0.3 million may
again affect the class G notes if the special servicer charges its
liquidation fee at loan resolution.

As a consequence of the repayment of the Prime Commercial loan,
the class A, B, and C notes were repaid in full and the class D
notes were partially repaid on the last IPD.  In view of the
repayments, S&P has withdrawn the ratings on the class A, B, and C

S&P has raised its ratings on classes D, E, and F because their
relative creditworthiness has improved, in its view, following the
repayment of the Prime Commercial loan.  Also, S&P has lowered its
rating on the class G notes to 'D (sf)', in view of the loss
applied to those notes.

Under S&P's criteria relating to counterparty risk (see
"Counterparty And Supporting Obligations Methodology And
Assumptions," published Dec. 6, 2010), without a replacement
framework for a counterparty when its creditworthiness
deteriorates, and absent other mitigating factors, the maximum
ratings achievable for structured finance securities are typically
no higher than the counterparty's issuer credit rating.  When
documents reflect a framework from any previous Standard & Poor's
counterparty criteria, the maximum rating that can be achieved
absent other mitigating factors is the counterparty's rating plus
one notch.  In this transaction, the transaction documents do not
contain replacement language from previous Standard & Poor's
criteria and, as the rating on the liquidity facility provider and
the account bank provider (Royal Bank of Scotland PLC and Bank of
America, respectively) is 'A+', the maximum rating that can be
achieved in the absence of replacement arrangements that comply
with its criteria, is 'A+'.  The ratings on the classes D, E, and
F notes are limited accordingly.

At closing in May 2005, Talisman 1 Finance acquired four loans
secured on 30 properties in Germany.  Since closing, three of the
loans have fully repaid and the outstanding note balance is
EUR23.3 million (down from EUR554.3 million at closing).  The
final maturity date of the notes is in January 2014.

                           Ratings List

                     Talisman 1 Finance PLC
      EUR554.35 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-
                     and Variable-Rate Notes

                         Rating Lowered

            Class      To                    From
            -----      --                    ----
            G          D (sf)                BB+ (sf)

                          Ratings Raised

            Class      To                    From
            -----      --                    ----
            D          A+ (sf)               BBB+ (sf)
            E          A+ (sf)               BBB (sf)
            F          A+ (sf)               BBB- (sf)

                        Ratings Withdrawn

       Class      To                    From
       -----      --                    ----
       A          NR                    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
       B          NR                    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
       C          NR                    AA- (sf)
       X          NR                    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

WESTLB AG: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'E+' BFSR to Developing
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on WestLB AG's
E+ standalone bank financial strength rating to developing from
stable and the outlook on the A3 senior debt and deposit ratings
to developing from negative.  Concurrently, Moody's has changed to
developing from stable the outlook on WestLB's B3-rated profit
participation certificates and Caa1-rated silent participations.
WestLB's Prime-1 short-term rating has been affirmed.  Moody's
ratings for WestLB's grandfathered debt of Aa1 are unaffected.

The change of the outlook follows reports that a plan for a
further downsizing -- coupled with an internal separation of
WestLB into four organizationally independent business units --
has been submitted to the European Commission for approval.  In
Moody's view, the organizational restructuring has been proposed
to pave the way for a partial, orderly unwinding of WestLB, which
(i) enhances predictability surrounding the bank's future; and
(ii) implies a level of protection for bondholders in a wind-down

                        Ratings Rationale

The revised restructuring plan submitted by WestLB on Feb. 15,
2011 to the EC not only includes more far-reaching downsizing and
restructuring targets, but also elements that appear to be
proposed in preparation for a fall-back plan to cover the
eventuality that WestLB might be unable to comply with the
required change in (at least the majority of) the bank's current
ownership by the end of 2011.

Moody's understands that the restructuring plan still follows the
bank's preferred option of a further significant downsizing of
WestLB that would be pursued in addition to the previously agreed
sale of the bank.  However, the reorganization also entails a
separation for different businesses that, at a later stage, could
serve the purpose of an orderly breaking-up and partial unwinding
of WestLB.  This, in particular, would benefit from the support of
its current shareholders -- most prominently the Federal State of
North-Rhine Westphalia (Aa1 stable), as well as the German savings
banks' sector (S-Finanzgruppe / Aa2 stable) and the Federal
Government (Aaa stable).

"While the news lifts some of the earlier rating pressures,
ratings could still move in either direction," said Katharina
Barten, a Moody's senior credit officer and lead analyst for
WestLB.  "At this stage, Moody's cannot be certain that WestLB
will find a new owner and, if not, what the exact implications
would be for bond investors and depositors," Ms. Barten added.
According to the agency, an orderly unwinding of parts of WestLB
would follow, only if the sale of the whole bank fails and/or if
the EC does not approve the latest restructuring plan.

Although very few details about the new plan have been unveiled to
date, Moody's takes the view that the plan may assist in (i)
closing the EC's as yet unresolved state-aid ruling; (ii) avoiding
a potentially non-orderly resolution of WestLB; and (iii) paving
the way for parts of WestLB to be also legally separated at a
later stage, and transferred to a new entity that would likely be
wholly-owned (and potentially supported by) the S-Finanzgruppe.

       A Full Sale of WestLB Potentially Bears the Highest
                       Risk for Investors

Reportedly, there are several bidders that have expressed interest
in fully acquiring WestLB.  These bidders have not been officially
disclosed at this stage and therefore it is difficult to make
assumptions regarding WestLB's medium-term business and risk
profile.  If it were privatized and held by less supportive or
financially weaker owners, Moody's cautions that WestLB's ratings
could experience a multi-notch downgrade.  The rating agency takes
the view that privatization is less likely, given the current
adverse market conditions for the sale of sizeable banks.

                     Risk for Hybrid Holders:
             Low Predictability, High Transition Risk

WestLB's hybrids experienced coupon losses or deferrals in 2009
and a write-down of principal on these instruments, following a
net loss for the year (based on German GAAP accounts).  Although
these instruments are principally loss-absorbing in a liquidation
scenario with a relatively high risk of a partial or even full
loss, Moody's has reservations as to whether a loss can be imposed
in an orderly unwinding.  In this context, Moody's notes that
neither the EC, nor the German government, has ever intervened in
a bank's contractual obligations towards investors in hybrid
capital instruments.

Nonetheless, the rating agency cautions that the uncertainty of
the current situation and the materially weakened support in
Germany for all subordinated classes of debt and capital
instruments result in major transition risk for the ratings of
WestLB's hybrid instruments.

Moody's last rating action on WestLB was on Feb. 17, 2011, when
Moody's downgraded WestLB's EMTN program rating for senior
subordinated debt to (P)B1 from (P)Baa1 and subsequently withdrew
this rating.

Domiciled in Dusseldorf, Germany, WestLB reported total assets of
EUR220 billion as of Sept. 30, 2010, and a pretax loss for the
first nine months of EUR33 million.


LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Icesave Dispute Legally Unclear, Grimmson Says
Omar R. Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News reports that Iceland
President Olafur R. Grimsson said his country may not owe the U.K.
and Netherlands the US$5 billion needed to settle depositor claims
because the dispute remains legally unclear.

"The legal side of the matter is that it's not at all clear,"
Mr. Grimsson said in an interview with Bloomberg Television's
Maryam Nemazee on Wednesday.  "The problem is that the legal
nature of the European banking formulation has not been thoroughly
thought out."

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Grimsson said that still, the question
remains "whether private citizens, taxpayers, should be obliged to
repay the losses created by a private bank."

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 24,
2011, Bloomberg News said that polls indicate Iceland's voters may
back a depositor claims accord with the U.K. and Netherlands as
the cost of an international court battle threatens to set back
the island's struggle to emerge from financial ruin.  Bloomberg
disclosed that a poll published by Reykjavik-based MMR on Monday
showed 57.7% of voters would back the bill, which Mr. Grimsson on
Feb. 20 said must go to a referendum.  Iceland's ability to settle
the US$5 billion depositor claims dispute will determine its
chances of patching up international investor ties and restoring
diplomatic relations with two European Union members as it embarks
on membership talks, Bloomberg said.  Should voters reject the
depositor accord, the dispute will be sent to the Luxembourg-based
court under the European Free Trade Association, Bloomberg noted.
Ingolfur Bender, head of research at Islandsbanki hf, as cited by
Bloomberg, said in a note to clients that losing the case would
probably lead to a more expensive settlement for Iceland and "it
can be considered a given that further delay will affect foreign
capital market access."  The Surveillance Authority has already
sent Iceland a letter of formal notice that it is obliged to cover
about EUR20,000 for each foreign Icesave depositor, a decision the
country's parliamentary budget committee has said is binding,
according to Bloomberg.  That means a referendum can only be held
on the terms of repayment, Bloomberg stated.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 22,
2011, Bloomberg News said that the latest so-called Icesave
accord, named after the high-yielding accounts offered by
Landsbanki, would cost the state Icelanders to about ISK47 billion
(US$404 million), while the remaining debt will be covered using
the proceeds of Landsbanki assets, the negotiating committee
representing Iceland said in December.  The British and Dutch
governments bore the initial cost of backing the depositor claims,
Bloomberg noted.  More than 350,000 British and Dutch Icesave
account holders risked losing their savings when Landsbanki
collapsed along with the rest of Iceland's over-leveraged banking
system in 2008, Bloomberg disclosed.

                    About Landsbanki Islands

Landsbanki Islands hf, also commonly known as Landsbankinn in
Iceland, is an Icelandic bank.  The bank offered online savings
accounts under the "Icesave" brand.  On October 7, 2008, the
Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority took control of
Landsbanki and two other major banks.

Landsbanki filed for Chapter 15 protection on Dec. 9, 2008 (Bankr.
S.D. N.Y. Case No.: 08-14921).  Gary S. Lee, Esq., at Morrison &
Foerster LLP, represents the Debtor.  When it filed for protection
from its creditors, it listed assets and debts of more than
US$1 billion each.


ANGLO IRISH BANK: DBRS Cuts Non-Guaranteed Debt Rating to 'B'
DBRS Inc. (DBRS) has downgraded the non-guaranteed senior debt and
deposits ratings of Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Limited (Anglo
Irish or the Bank), including its Issuer Rating to B (high) from
BBB (low).  Concurrently, DBRS has downgraded the non-guaranteed
short-term debt and deposit ratings of Anglo Irish to R-4 from R-2
(middle).  All non-government guaranteed ratings remain Under
Review with Negative Implications, where they were placed on
Sept. 10, 2010.  Today's rating action does not impact the various
Government Guaranteed debt and deposit ratings of Anglo Irish,
which remain at A (high) with a Negative trend.

The rating action follows the recent announcements by the Irish
Government related to the fourth iteration of the restructuring
plan for Anglo Irish.  Unlike previous proposals, the updated
plan removes Anglo Irish's deposit gathering abilities and
calls for a quick sale of the Bank's deposits and other assets,
including NAMA senior bonds.  Moreover, the proposed plan includes
the amalgamation of Anglo Irish and Irish Nationwide Building
Society (INBS, not rated by DBRS) into a merged entity regulated
by the Central Bank of Ireland, which will workout of the loan
book over a period of years.

The downgrade reflects DBRS's view that by selling off the
deposits and certain other assets, Anglo Irish's financial
position is further weakened, thereby increasing the likelihood of
adverse actions towards senior bondholders.  In addition, DBRS
sees these actions as further advancing the "wind-down" of this
institution.  While DBRS acknowledges that the Bank received a
commitment of support in December 2010 in the form of an increase
of EUR6.4 billion to the promissory note, given the level of
discussion in the current election process in Ireland, DBRS sees
increased risk of "burden sharing" by senior bondholders in
financial institutions that are in "wind-down" mode.

Presently, DBRS estimates that Anglo Irish has approximately
EUR3.0 billion of non-guaranteed senior debt outstanding, most of
which matures over the next 24 months, with very little resources
to repay this debt, short of additional government support.  As
such, any change in support will impact the Bank's ability to
repay this debt.  Nevertheless, the current ratings still consider
a level of anticipated support as Anglo Irish remains a regulated

Anglo Irish's financial situation continues to deteriorate.  The
Bank reported a loss of EUR17.6 billion for 2010, largely
attributable to EUR11.5 billion of losses related to the disposal
of loans to NAMA and impairment charges of EUR7.8 billion.  The
Bank has extremely limited ability to generate income. Anglo Irish
generated only EUR1.8 billion of operating profit before
impairment charges and loss on disposals to NAMA, most of which
was generated by gains resulting from liability
management exercises related to subordinated bonds.  The Bank is
totally dependent on various central bank facilities for funding.
The removal of the NAMA bonds, which are likely pledged to the
ECB, may cause an additional draw from the emergency liquidity
facility provided by the Central Bank of Ireland.

The non-government guaranteed ratings remain Under Review with
Negative Implications reflecting the lack of specific details
regarding the final form of the restructuring.  DBRS will complete
its review when additional details become available.
Additionally, any changes to the status of the Bank's structure or
additional actions by the government or the Bank suggesting burden
sharing will have a significant negative impact on the ratings.

ASHFORD CASTLE: Has Combined Losses of EUR39 Million
Gordon Deegan at The Irish Times reports that Ashford Castle
Estate Ltd. recorded combined pretax losses totaling EUR39 million
in 2009 and 2008.

According to The Irish Times, filings just filed to the Companies
Office show that ACEL, which is owned by Galway businessman Gerry
Barrett, recorded a pretax loss of EUR16.1 million in 2009, and
this followed a pretax loss of EUR23.1 million in the 13 months to
the end of December 2008.

The Irish Times says auditors for the company, Deloitte Touche
state that ACEL is dependent on the financial support of the
National Assets Management Agency (Nama), its non-Nama bank and
the continuing support of its fellow group companies to be able to
continue as a going concern.

The directors disclose the company owes EUR29.8 million to other
companies within Mr. Barrett's Edward Holdings Group and the
accounts show that the company owes an additional EUR29.2 million
in bank loans, The Irish Times relates.

Ashford Castle Estate Ltd. is a five-star hotel in Co Mayo.

BANK OF IRELAND: Sells Fund Administration Unit to Northern Trust
Ciara O'Brien at The Irish Times reports that Bank of Ireland has
confirmed the sale fund administration unit Bank of Ireland
Securities Services to US-based Northern Trust in a deal that
could be worth up to EUR60 million.

According to The Irish Times, the sale is subject to regulatory
clearance and will generate about EUR40 million in equity tier 1
capital for the bank.

The Irish Times relates that Northern Trust said the deal is
expected to be completed in the second quarter of the year.

Bank of Ireland is currently trying to raise EUR2.2 billion core
tier 1 capital by the end of this month, as required by the
Central Bank as part of Ireland's bailout by the European Union
and International Monetary Fund, The Irish Times notes.

Headquartered in Dublin, Bank of Ireland -- provides a range of banking and
other financial services.  These include checking and deposit
services, overdrafts, term loans, mortgages, business and
corporate lending, international asset financing, leasing,
installment credit, debt factoring, foreign exchange facilities,
interest and exchange rate hedging instruments, executor, trustee,
life assurance and pension and investment fund management, fund
administration and custodial services and financial advisory
services, including mergers and acquisitions and underwriting.
The Company organizes its businesses into Retail Republic of
Ireland, Bank of Ireland Life, Capital Markets, UK Financial
Services and Group Centre.  It has operations throughout Ireland,
the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 17,
2011, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it raised its
ratings on the two Canadian dollar-denominated lower Tier 2
subordinated debt instruments issued by Bank of Ireland (trading
name of the Governor & Company of the Bank of Ireland) to 'CCC'
from 'D'.

"This 'CCC' rating reflects BOI's ongoing need to raise further
equity capital to reach the EUR2.2 billion target set by the Irish
financial regulator, and the possibility that this target may yet
increase as a result of the regulator's Prudential Capital
Assessment Review exercise," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Giles Edwards.  "The Irish government has said that if BOI cannot
raise all this equity, the government will provide the balance."

BANK OF IRELAND: S&P Raises Ratings on Hybrid Instruments to 'CC'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it raised its ratings
on the hybrid debt instruments issued by Bank of Ireland (trading
name of the Governor & Company of the Bank of Ireland) and
subsidiaries to 'CC' from 'C'.  S&P's 'BB+/B' counterparty credit
ratings on BOI are unaffected, but remain on CreditWatch with
negative implications.

On Jan. 19, 2010, BOI announced that, at the request of the
European Commission, BOI would for one year defer all coupon
payments on its Tier 1 and upper Tier 2 capital instruments which
it was not legally obliged to pay.  This request was linked to
BOI's receipt of state aid from the Irish government and its need
to subsequently file a restructuring plan, which required EC
approval.  BOI should not make coupon payments unless under a
binding legal obligation to do so.  As a result, S&P lowered its
ratings on affected instruments to 'CC' immediately, and
thereafter individually to 'C' when each of them missed their next
coupon payment.

On Feb. 18, 2011, BOI announced that it would restart coupon
payments on its three classes of preference shares, which includes
the EUR1.8 billion preference shares that it issued to the Irish
government, making the next payment due Feb. 21, 2011.  S&P
understands that these coupons have now been paid.

S&P understands that BOI has similarly restarted payments on other
hybrid instruments since Feb. 1, 2011, making all due back-
payments on cumulative instruments and current coupon payments.

Bearing in mind the contractual terms of the instruments,
including minimum notice periods for deferral of coupons, S&P
understands that all except one of the rated instruments is now
being serviced.  The exception is the preferred securities issued
by BOI Capital Funding No. 4, which has a coupon due on
April 3, 2011.  While that payment remains somewhat uncertain, S&P
currently expect that it will be serviced.  As a result, in line
with its criteria, S&P has raised its ratings on all the rated
hybrids from 'C'.

By rating the hybrid instruments at 'CC', they are one category
below S&P's 'CCC' rating on the lower Tier 2 instruments issued by

These low ratings reflect the fact that BOI still needs to raise
about EUR1.4 billion further equity capital to reach the
EUR2.2 billion target set by the Irish financial regulator, and
the possibility that this target may yet increase as a result of
the regulator's Prudential Capital Assessment Review exercise, due
to be announced around end-March.  The Irish government has said
that if BOI is unable to raise all this equity, the government
will provide the balance.

S&P notes that where the government provides financial support to
a bank, the Bank Stabilization Act provides the Irish Minister for
Finance with explicit powers to force burden-sharing on
subordinated bondholders if he considers that doing so is
necessary to restore the bank's financial position.  These powers
include the modification of rights as regards the payment of
interest, the repayment of principal, events of default, and the
timing of obligations.

The ratings on BOI remain on CreditWatch with negative
implications, where they were placed on Nov. 26, 2010, pending the
outcome of the sovereign rating review and S&P's assessment of the
potential for extraordinary support following the announcement of
the impact of the PCAR and Prudential Liquidity Assessment
Review on BOI.

FOUR STAR: Michael Holland to Take Over Under Rescue Plan
Barry O'Halloran at The Irish Times reports that hotelier
Michael Holland plans to buy the Four Star Pizza franchise in
Ireland and Britain as part of a rescue plan for the chain, which
has been under High Court protection from its creditors since

The Irish Times relates that the court heard on Tuesday that
Gonville Ltd., a company Mr. Holland controls, has agreed to take
over the takeaway chain, which employs 400 people.

According to a statement, the company was allowed to repudiate
leases on a number of its outlets and renegotiate better terms
with the landlords, Irish Times notes.

Gonville, The Irish Times says, will release further details of
its proposals when Four Star's examiner, Neil Hughes of Hughes
Blake, puts his rescue plan to the court on Tuesday.  The court
will approve this plan unless a creditor or creditors can show it
is unfairly prejudicial to their interests, The Irish Times

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 24,
2011, The Irish Times said that Four Star first approached the
court for examinership protection back in mid November, citing
onerous lease costs that put a strain on franchise-holders,
coupled with a 30% fall in like-for-like sales over the last three
years amid fierce rival competition and heavy discounting, Irish


NXP BV: S&P Puts 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating on CreditWatch Positive
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had placed its
'B-' long-term corporate credit rating on Dutch semiconductor
manufacturer NXP B.V. on CreditWatch with positive implications.

"The CreditWatch placement reflects that NXP's continued operating
margins improvements in the fourth quarter of 2010 and solid free
operating cash flow generation in 2010 were above S&P's
expectations," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Matthias

Furthermore, on Dec. 22, 2010, NXP signed a definitive agreement
whereby Knowles Electronics Holdings Inc. will purchase NXP's
Sound Solutions business for gross proceeds of US$855 million,
which would significantly improve NXP's liquidity profile, in its
view.  The disposal is subject to regulatory approval and expected
to close in the first quarter of 2011.  NXP announced that it
plans to use the disposal proceeds to reduce its high
indebtedness.  On Dec. 31, 2010, NXP reported gross consolidated
debt of US$4.7 billion.

S&P currently expect NXP's still high leverage to decline
moderately in 2011, primarily based on its anticipation of further
debt redemptions and higher EBITDA generation.  Based on NXP's
fourth-quarter 2010 results, S&P calculate that lease- and
pension-adjusted gross debt represented about 5x EBITDA for the
past 12 months and about 4x for the fourth quarter annualized.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch in the next three months,
after meeting with NXP's management.  At this stage, S&P believes
that S&P could raise the long-term corporate credit rating by one
notch, to 'B'.

Factors influencing the outcome of the CreditWatch resolution are
likely to include, in its opinion, S&P's perception of NXP's:
Potential to sustain its revenues and margins and further improve
cash generation in the next 24 months, Likely use of the proceeds
from the Sound Systems disposal; and Debt maturity management.

Furthermore, S&P will assess to what extent the expected disposal
of Sound Solutions and application of sales proceeds for debt
reduction would change recovery assumptions in S&P's hypothetical
default case.

"S&P anticipate that NXP's significant debt maturities in 2013-
2015, still high gross leverage, potentially volatile operating
performance, and aggressive financial policy track record will
likely keep the rating in the 'B' category in the medium term,"
said Mr.  Raab.


PROBUSINESSBANK OAO: Moody's Assigns E+ Financial Strength Rating
Moody's Investors Service has assigned these global scale ratings
to Probusinessbank: an E+ bank financial strength rating, and B2
long-term and Not Prime short-term local and foreign currency
deposit ratings.  Concurrently, Moody's Interfax Rating Agency
assigned a long-term National Scale Rating to the bank.
Moscow-based Moody's Interfax is majority-owned by Moody's, a
leading global rating agency.  The outlook on the long-term global
scale ratings is stable, while the NSR carries no specific

Moody's assessment is primarily based on Probusinessbank's audited
financial statements for 2009 prepared under IFRS.  At the same
time, the rating agency cautions that its assessment, in part,
incorporates information from Probusinessbank's non-audited
interim statements under IFRS for the first nine months of 2010.

                        Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, Probusinessbank's E+ BFSR, which translates
into a Baseline Credit Assessment of B2, reflects: (i) the bank's
low capital adequacy level; (ii) very high market risk exposure
due to significant investments in real estate and equities
exceeding 100% of Tier 1 capital; (iii) very high appetite for
risk and (iv) aggressive expansion plans that impair operating
efficiency and render the bank potentially vulnerable to
operational risks.

However, Moody's notes that Probusinessbank's ratings are
underpinned by (i) the bank's established franchise in the retail
segment on the local markets of Saratov, Yekaterinburg and Kaluga
regions where it operates through its subsidiary banks;(ii)
healthy net interest margin and (iii) single-name concentrations
that are lower than the Russian average.

Probusinessbank's B2 local and foreign-currency deposit ratings
incorporate Moody's assessment of no probability of systemic
support, and are based on the bank's BCA of B2.

According to Moody's, any possible upgrade of Probusinessbank's
ratings will be contingent on the bank's ability to improve its
capital position, including by means of decreasing market risk
appetite, and higher internal capital generation capacity stemming
from healthier core profitability.

Conversely, the rating agency observes that negative pressure
could be exerted on Probusinessbank's BFSR and long-term deposit
ratings in the event of (i) a material impairment of assets,
leading to contraction of capital or (ii) mismanagement of its
strategy which envisages deliver growth rates higher than market

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Probusinessbank reported
unaudited IFRS total assets of RUB93.4 billion (US$3.1 billion),
shareholder equity of RUB9.5 billion (US$311 million) and net
income of RUB708 million (US$23 million) at end-September 2010.


GC FTGENCAT: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCsf'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded GC FTGENCAT Sabadell 1, Fondo de
Titulizacion de Activos's notes:

  -- EUR345.6m Class A(G) notes; downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AA-sf';
     Outlook Negative; Loss Severity rating 'LS-1'

  -- EUR19.8m Class B notes; downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf';
     assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR3'

  -- EUR5.7m Class C notes; downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf',
     Recovery Rating revised to 'RR6'

The downgrade reflects the transaction's continued poor
performance over the past year and the expectation that while its
performance appears to be stabilizing, it is unlikely to improve.
Over the past year, the reserve fund has continued to be drawn,
thus reducing the available credit enhancement for the junior
notes.  The reserve fund now appears to have stabilized at
slightly over EUR4.5 million, around half the EUR9.5m target.  The
depleted reserve fund means the junior tranches are exposed to any
further spikes in defaults.

Fitch expects performance to remain under pressure over the short
to medium term, with late-state delinquencies remaining elevated.
To date, recoveries have been minimal and when they do start
coming in, Fitch expects them to be low.  Despite the fact that
credit enhancement levels have risen as the transaction amortizes,
Fitch believes the levels of credit enhancement are not
commensurate with the current ratings, given the transaction's
exposure to obligor concentration risk.  As at end December-2010
the Class A(G) note had approximately 14.3% of credit enhancement
(from subordination and the reserve fund), the Class B note had
approximately 4.8% of enhancement and the Class C note had
approximately 2.1%.  Consequently, Fitch has downgraded the class
A(G) notes to the rating of the Generalitat de Catalunya
(Autonomous Community of Catalonia;'A'/Negative/'F1') which
guarantees these notes.  The class B notes have been downgraded to
reflect the limited protection offered by the depleted reserve
fund and by the thin class C tranche.  The class C notes have been
further downgraded to reflect the limited protection offered by
the depleted reserve fund.

The transaction benefits from 65bps of excess spread under the
interest rate swap with Banco de Sabadell ('A'/Stable/'F1').
However, in the past this has been insufficient to cover all the
defaults that have occurred (resulting in repeated draws on the
reserve fund).  Fitch expects the excess spread provided by the
interest rate swap to continue to be insufficient to cover the
defaults that are expected to materialize over the medium term.

The transaction is a cash flow securitization of a pool of finance
leases on real estate and certain other assets originated in Spain
by Banco de Sabadell.  Only the lease receivables portion of the
lease contracts are securitized (any residual value component has
not been securitized).  All obligors are small and medium-sized
enterprises located in the region of Catalunya, the home region of
the originator.

SANTANDER CONSUMER: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class D Notes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all classes of Santander Consumer Spain

  -- EUR356.5m Class A asset-backed floating rate notes due 2021:
     affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable; assigned Loss Severity
     Rating of 'LS1'

  -- EUR99.4m Class B asset-backed floating rate notes due 2021:
     affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable; assigned Loss Severity
     Rating of 'LS3'

  -- EUR37.8m Class C asset-backed floating rate notes due 2021:
     affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable; assigned Loss Severity
     Rating of 'LS3'

  -- EUR35.7m Class D asset-backed floating rate notes due 2021:
     affirmed at 'CCCsf'; assigned Recovery Rating 'RR4'

The affirmations reflect the performance of the transaction to
date, which has remained in line with the agency's base case
assumptions since outset.  The class A note has repaid 37% of its
initial outstanding balance.  Credit enhancement for the class A,
B and C notes has increased to 37.97%, 18.75% and 11.40% from
24.70%, 10.50% and 5.10% respectively.

The reserve fund has remained at EUR35.7 million since closing,
which represents 5.1% of the original principal balance of the
notes.  The reserve fund will be permitted to reduce to the lower
of: i) 5.10% of the original class A to D notes' balance; and ii)
the higher of: a) 10.20% of the outstanding class A to D notes'
balance; and b) 2.55% of the original class A to D notes' balance,
subject to certain conditions.  These include that more then two
years must have passed since closing of the transaction and that
the balance of loans more than 90 days in arrears is less than 2%
of outstanding non-defaulted collateral (currently 3%).
Therefore, the reserve fund is not currently permitted to amortize
and is unlikely to do so in the near future.

Since closing, all losses have been provisioned in the transaction
structure and no amounts remain outstanding in the transactions'
PDLs.  However, excess spread for the transaction has dropped to
0.4% from 2.7% over the past two quarters as delinquencies have
begun to migrate to defaults.

Delinquencies greater than 30 days currently stand at 6.31%,
stabilizing over recent quarters as loans have moved through to
default.  The cumulative net default rate has remained well below
Fitch's base case value for the transaction, with a value of 0.67%
compared to base case of 6.69% at the same point in seasoning.

The transaction is a securitization of a static pool of consumer
and auto loans granted by Santander Consumer E.F.C., S.A., a
wholly-owned and fully integrated subsidiary of Santander Consumer
Finance ('AA'/Stable/'F1+'), to individuals and SMEs in Spain.
All the loans were originated following Santander Consumer
E.F.C.,S.A.'s guidelines in the course of its normal business.


AKBANK TAS: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba1' Rating to Eurobond Issuance
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional foreign
currency senior unsecured debt rating of (P)Ba1 to the proposed
Eurobond issuance (the notes) by Akbank T.A.S.  The outlook on the
rating is positive.

                        Ratings Rationale

The debt issuance is being offered under Rule 144A -- DTC,
Regulation S.  The terms and conditions of the notes include
(amongst other things) a negative pledge and a cross-default
clause.  The notes will be unconditional, unsubordinated and
unsecured obligations and will rank pari passu with all Akbank's
other senior unsecured obligations.  The rating of the notes and
-- any subsequent foreign-currency senior unsecured bonds issued -
- is in line with Akbank's senior unsecured foreign currency debt

Moody's foreign currency debt ratings are subject to the foreign
currency bond ceiling assigned to the country in which the issuer
is based.  As a result, even though Akbank's global local currency
deposit rating of Baa1 is higher than the foreign currency bond
ceiling for Turkey, Akbank's foreign currency senior unsecured
debt rating is constrained by and thus equal to this ceiling.

An upgrade of the foreign currency bond ceiling would result in an
upgrade of the rating of the notes since it is constrained by its
applicable ceiling.  A downgrade of the foreign currency bond
ceiling -- or a downgrade of Akbank's GLC deposit rating below
that of the foreign currency bond ceiling for Turkey -- would
result in a downgrade of the rating of the notes.

The rating of the notes is provisional and represents Moody's
preliminary opinion only.  Upon a conclusive review of the
documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign a definitive rating
to the notes.  A definitive rating may differ from a provisional
rating.  A rating is not a recommendation to purchase, sell or
invest in any securities.

Moody's previous rating action on Akbank was on Oct. 7, 2010, when
it changed the outlook to positive from stable on the Ba3 foreign-
currency deposit ratings and the Ba1 foreign-currency debt

Akbank is headquartered in Istanbul, Turkey, and at the end of
June 2010 had total assets of US$71.1 billion.

DOGUS HOLDING: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it raised its long-
term corporate credit rating on Turkey-based operating holding
company Dogus Holding A.S. to 'BB' from 'BB-'.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term corporate rating on Dogus.
The outlook is stable.

"The rating upgrade reflects what S&P considers as Dogus' limited
leverage compared with that of its peers, management commitments
to control and maintain leverage at a low level, and its view on
the liquidity, quality, and diversity of Dogus' asset portfolio,"
said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Itzik Maissi.

The rating action also reflects an improvement in the performance
of Dogus' operating subsidiaries, notably Turkiye Garanti Bankasi
A.S. (Garanti; BB/Positive/--) and Dogus Otomotiv Servis A.S. (not

The ratings on Dogus continue to reflect S&P's perception of
still-high country risks in Turkey, where Dogus' investments are
concentrated, the challenging operating and macroeconomic
environment for Dogus' nonfinancial investments, and the company's
large concentration in Garanti.  Mitigating these negative factors
are the financial flexibility offered by Dogus' sizable portfolio
of listed equity stakes (mainly Garanti and Dogus Otomotiv), the
company's influence over Garanti, and management's commitment to
control and limit leverage at low levels.

Garanti is currently Dogus' largest shareholding.  However, on the
close of a deal with Spain-based Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria,
S.A. (AA/Negative/A-1+) due in the first half of 2011 pending
regulatory approval, Dogus will own and control Garanti jointly
with BBVA (each holding 24.9%).  S&P understands that Dogus
expects to receive about US$2 billion from the sale of 6.3% of
Garanti shares, which will likely, in S&P's opinion, result in
Dogus moving to a net cash position.

S&P views Dogus' financial risk profile as "significant."
According to S&P's calculations, Dogus' loan-to-value ratio was
23% as of Dec. 31, 2010, in line with its maximum threshold of 30%
that S&P currently factor into the ratings.  S&P notes that the
LTV ratio at the holding level (excluding subsidiaries' debt) is
significantly lower.

Operating cash flow at the holding company level is strong for the
ratings, in S&P's view.  In 2010 Dogus had positive net cash flow
at the holding level, and S&P believes this will continue in the
near to medium term.

In S&P's opinion, the company has significant headroom under its
current balance sheet-related covenants.

"The stable outlook reflects Standard & Poor's assessment that
Dogus will likely follow a somewhat conservative financial
strategy and maintain low gearing and "adequate" liquidity," said
Mr. Maissi.

S&P sees limited potential for an upgrade due to what S&P views to
be the company's relatively weak portfolio characteristics, as
reflected in significant asset concentration risk.  Moreover, due
to Dogus' vast exposure to the Turkish economy, S&P sees its
foreign-currency long-term rating on the Republic of Turkey
(foreign currency BB/Positive/B; local currency BB+/Positive/B) as
a cap on its long-term rating on Dogus.  The ratings on Dogus
could come under downward pressure if Dogus pursues a more
aggressive growth strategy or financial policy than S&P currently
factor in, leading to an LTV ratio in excess of 30%.


UKREXIMBANK JSC: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating to Sr. Unsec. Notes
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a rating of Ba3 to the
local-currency senior unsecured deposit-linked notes of
Ukreximbank.  The size of the issuance is UAH2.385 billion
(equivalent of US$300 million) and the coupon is 11%.  The three-
year limited-recourse notes were issued by Biz Finance PLC, a UK-
based special-purpose vehicle, for the sole purpose of funding a
deposit with Ukreximbank.  The outlook for the rating is stable.

                        Ratings Rationale

The Ba3 rating of the notes is based on the fundamental credit
quality of the underlying obligor, Ukreximbank, rated Ba3/NP/D-,
with a stable outlook.

Under the terms of the transaction, the noteholders will provide
funds to Biz Finance PLC in US dollars, which then will be
converted to Ukrainian Hrivnia and deposited with Ukreximbank.
Interest on the deposit will be calculated and payable in Hrivnia
and then converted into US dollars at the prevailing spot rate.
The converted funds in US dollars will be transferred to the
noteholders.  When the deposit matures, its principal will also be
paid in Hrivnia and then will be converted to US dollars at the
prevailing spot rate and transferred to noteholders.  Consequently
noteholders bear the risk of foreign exchange rate fluctuations.

According to the terms and conditions of the notes, Ukreximbank
must comply with a number of covenants, including negative-pledge
covenants, limitations on mergers, disposals, transactions with
affiliates and minimum capital-adequacy maintenance.

Moody's previous rating action on Ukreximbank was implemented on
Jan. 17, 2011, when Moody's changed to stable from negative the
outlook on Ukreximbank's D- BFSR and the outlook on the bank's Ba3
local-currency deposit rating.

Headquartered in Kyiv, Ukraine, Ukreximbank reported (under IFRS),
total assets, equity and net income of US$8.23 billion, US$2.13
billion and US$2.6 million, respectively at end-H1 2010.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALL TRANSPORT: Goes Into Administration, Owes Up to GBP500,000
MRW News reports that insolvency practitioner SFP has appointed
administrators to All Transport Haulage Services.  The report
relates that SFP said the company is "the latest in a series of
waste disposal, road haulage and transport sector businesses to
fail in recent months."

All Transport ran up GBP500,000 of debts because of high fuel
prices and has ceased trading, according to MRN News.  The report
relates that at its peak, the Company had an annual turnover of
GBP2 million.

All Transport Haulage Services is based in Ashford, Middlesex.

ANTRAC: Goes Into Administration, Owes More Than GBP400,000
MRW News reports that insolvency practitioner SFP has appointed
administrators to Antrac.

Antrac had accrued debts of more than GBP400,000, which led to its
demise, according to MWR News.  The report relates that SFP is
currently overseeing the sale of Antrac's assets to pay off

The majority of its assets, which include skips and waste disposal
equipment, have been sold to a local skip hire company, the report

Antrac is a Devonshire-based skip hire and waste disposal company.

CLARKSON HILL: Ex Advisers Gain Investment Permissions
MoneyMarketing reports that the initial groups of former Clarkson
Hill advisers to join Merchant House Financial Services and
Moneygate have been granted full investment permissions from the
Financial Service Authority (FSA).

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 27,
2011, CityWire said that the cost of the failure of national IFA
Clarkson Hill could be shouldered by the Financial Services
Compensation Scheme (FSCS) unless advisers at the firm join
Merchant House Financial Services.  Clarkson Hill, of which Mike
Robinson was a director, went into administration in December and
it was revealed to have a potential liability of GBP4.8 million in
consumer redress due to unsuitable investments in unregulated
collective investment services (Ucis) and other high-risk
products, according to CityWire.

MoneyMarketing notes that Merchant House acquired some of Clarkson
Hill's assets after it was put into administration.  The report
relates that Merchant House then became an appointed
representative of TenetConnect.

MoneyMarketing discloses that TenetConnect authorized 150 former
Clarkson Hill advisers for mortgage and protection permissions in
January.  But investment advisers, who require CF30 authorisation,
were subject to a more rigorous due diligence process which caused
a delay in reinstating their investment permissions, the report

Some 15 Clarkson Hill advisers that joined Merchant House have now
been granted full investment permissions, with a further 18
advisers expected to gain authorization in the next 24 hours and
around 70 advisers expected to be reauthorized within the next
week, MoneyMarketing adds.

E-CLEAR: Serious Fraud Office Drops Probe on Firm
Sophie Griffiths at ttglive reports that The Herald newspaper said
the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) has ended its eight-month probe
into credit card processing company E-Clear due to "insufficient

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 21,
2010, Mr. Justice Vos at the High Court on Jan. 19 approved the
order for the administration of E-Clear, following the failure of
the company to submit evidence of funds on Jan. 15.  BDO was
appointed administrator.  According to the Times, papers shown to
the High Court in London on Jan. 19 said that E-Clear had less
than GBP10 million in two bank accounts, while the personal
account of the owner, Cypriot entrepreneur Elias Elia, was empty.
The Times disclosed Simon Mortimer, QC, for
PricewaterhouseCoopers, said that E-Clear had not complied with an
order made by the court to prove that it had the GBP35 million
owed to Scottish airline Globespan, the Times said.  E-Clear's
role was to process credit card payments made mainly by
holidaymakers and eventually to pass the money collected to travel
companies such as Globespan, according to the Times.  However, at
some point last year, the payments to travel firms dried up,
causing many to collapse, the Times said.

Investigators from the SFO are understood to have started looking
into E-Clear in May 2010, ttglive recounts.

However, the report notes, the newspaper said witnesses who had
been interviewed in connection with the company's financial
affairs, received letters from the SFO to say that they had ended
the probe.

The Insolvency Service is understood to be continuing with a
separate probe into E-Clear and Mr. Elia, who is currently facing
a High Court action by BDO, which is acting as administrators for
E-Clear, ttglive discloses.

The report relates that BDO is trying to force Mr. Elia to give up
GBP4.3 million, which BDO claims he owes the company and its
creditors.  Mr. Elia is contesting the action, ttglive adds.

FLYGLOBESPAN: Serious Fraud Office Ends Probe Into Collapse
Airwise reports that the UK's Serious Fraud Office has ended its
investigation into a company blamed for the collapse of

Airwise relates that the Serious Fraud Office said it ended its
eight month investigation into credit card processing company
E-Clear because there was "insufficient evidence" to proceed.

E-Clear, the London-based company owned and run by Cypriot
entrepreneur Elias Elia went into administration in January 2010
owing an estimated GBP127 million (US$$206 million), Airwise
discloses.  E-Clear's collapse followed that of Flyglobespan and
its parent company, Globespan, a few weeks earlier which had left
thousand of UK holidaymakers stranded abroad, Airwise notes.

PricewaterhouseCoopers, Globespan's receivers linked the collapse
of the Scottish travel company and airline to the conduct of E-
Clear, Airwise recounts.  According to Airwise, PwC said E-Clear
had withheld about GBP25 million of Flyglobespan fares while
negotiating to buy the company.

It is understood that the Insolvency Service is continuing a
separate enquiry into E-Clear and Mr. Elia, Airwise states.

Flyglobespan was a British low-cost airline based in Edinburgh,

JJB SPORTS: CSC to Oppose Company Voluntary Arrangement
James Davey at Reuters reports that Capital Shopping Centres, the
largest mall owner, said it would vote against JJB Sports plc's
proposed company voluntary arrangement.

According to Reuters, JJB has said it needs creditors, including
landlords, to back its second company voluntary arrangement, which
affects four outlets owned by CSC, in as many years or it will
likely go into administration.

JJB Sports plc (JJB Sports) is a sports retailer supplying branded
sports and leisure clothing, footwear and accessories.  JJB Sports
is a high street sports retailer, with 250 stores in the United
Kingdom and Eire.  It provides a range of products covering United
Kingdom sports.  The Company stocks all its sports brands,
supported by its own-brand and exclusive ranges.  The Company's
segment includes the Company's retail operations, including any
retail stores, which are attached to fitness clubs.  The Company
operates in two geographic segments: the United Kingdom and Eire.
The Company's subsidiaries include Blane Leisure Limited, Sports
Division (Eireann) Limited, Golf TV Limited, TV Sports Shop
Limited, Original Shoe Company Limited and Qubefootwear Limited.
The Company sold its fitness club operations on March 25, 2009.

SUSTAINABLE AGGREGATES: Goes Into Administration
RecyclingToday reports that several news reports said that
Sustainable Aggregates Ltd has gone into administration.

Under the company's initial business plan, it would be able to
recycle close to 100% of the construction and demolition waste
into a cementitious binder produced by SMR UK Ltd., a sister
company of Sustainable Aggregates, according to RecyclongToday.

Headquartered in United Kingdon, Sustainable Aggregates Ltd was
created with the goal of recycling close to 100% of C&D into a
reusable material.

VIRGIN MEDIA: Moody's Upgrades Corporate Family Rating to 'Ba1'
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the corporate family and
probability-of-default ratings of Virgin Media Inc. to Ba1 (from
Ba2).  The ratings for the senior secured bank facilities and
senior secured notes have concurrently been upgraded to Baa3 (from
Ba1) and for the senior unsecured notes to Ba2 (from Ba3).  The
outlook for all ratings for Virgin Media and its rated
subsidiaries is stable.

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's decision to upgrade the CFR to Ba1 with a stable outlook
is based on: (i) the solid operating performance of the company;
(ii) its continued progress and focus towards de-leveraging to
approximately 3.0x net debt/ OCF (operating income before
depreciation, amortization, goodwill and intangible asset
impairments and restructuring and other charges) -- as calculated
by Virgin Media, over the next two to three years; and (iii) its
growing free cash flow generation.

During 2010, Virgin Media's revenues grew by 5.8% helped by solid
growth across all its business segments.  The company's OCF
improved by 12% to GBP1.5 billion and its free cash flow (as
calculated by Virgin Media) increased by over 24% to GBP412

"Given its technologically superior network, solid market position
in the UK and despite intense competition -- Moody's believes that
Virgin Media is likely to continue to maintain good operating
momentum over the medium term" said Gunjan Dixit, Moody's lead
analyst for Virgin Media.

As of December 31, 2010 Virgin Media leverage came down to 4.2x
Gross Debt to EBITDA as adjusted by Moody's.  The agency expects
this ratio to trend visibly below 4x by the end of 2011 helped not
only by OCF growth but also by company's continued financial
discipline.  After executing the conversion hedges to effectively
increase the strike price on 90% of its convertible senior notes
(due 2016) to US$ 35 for a cost of approximately GBP205 million,
the agency notes that Virgin Media is left with GBP120 million
under its capital returns program for debt reduction to be
effected through open market and/ or privately negotiated

Virgin Media aims to maintain its cash capex between 15% to 17% of
revenues over 2011.  In Moody's opinion, Virgin Media's strong
free cash flow generation (as defined by Moody's) and comfortable
liquidity position should sufficiently allow it to undertake the
remaining portion of its share buyback program of GBP213 million
by August 2011 while continuing to de-lever.  Going forward, the
agency would expect Virgin Media to continue to give priority to
its medium term leverage target of 3.0x while accommodating
reasonable amount of share buybacks.

Any upward pressure towards investment grade is unlikely to occur
in the short to medium term and would require amongst other things
(i) Gross Debt/ EBITDA ratio (as calculated by Moody's) trending
towards 3.0x; (ii) FCF/ Debt (as calculated by Moody's) above 10%
on a sustained basis; (iii) further simplification of the
company's borrowing structure; and (iv) evidence that Virgin Media
can continue to sustain and improve its market position despite
intense competition and amidst the gradually increasing
convergence of broadband with television in the UK.

The rating could come under downward pressure if the company's
operating performance deteriorates substantially and/or its
Debt/EBITDA (as calculated by Moody's) remains above 4x at the end
of 2011 together with constrained free cash flow generation (as
defined by Moody's).

The last rating action on Virgin Media was implemented on
July 28, 2010, when Moody's had upgraded Virgin Media's CFR to Ba2
with a positive outlook.

Virgin Media, headquartered in Hook, Hampshire, is the largest
cable operator in the UK with revenues of to GBP3.9 billion in

WREXHAM FOOTBALL CLUB: Fans Has Seven Days to Save Club
Daily reports that Wrexham football club owner Geoff
Moss has warned fans they have just seven days to make a bid for
the club and save it from administration.  The report relates that
Mr. Moss is refusing to pump any more cash into the struggling
side and says it is down to fans to step in and save it before it
is too late.

Mr. Moss, who has been in charge at the Racecourse for five years,
told the Daily Post he has decided to "retreat as quickly as
possible" because of threats being made to his family.  "If the
fans are going to make a bid, it needs to be in the next seven
days.  There are bills and wages to pay and the fans need to step
forward and save the club.  We are willing to run with all ideas,
because the survival of Wrexham football club is the most
important thing.  But Ian (Roberts) and I cannot win whatever we
do now, so it is best for us to retreat as quickly as possible,"
Daily quotes Mr. Moss as saying.

Mr. Moss also confirmed the historic Racecourse ground is also
being offered for sale as part of the package, according to Daily

The report notes that Cllr Phil Wynn made an "SOS appeal" to
supporters to take the plunge and form a consortium to take charge
at the Racecourse.  Daily relates that an offer to buy
the club was withdrawn by businessmen Rob Bickerton, Tony Allan
and Jon Harris earlier this week, and Mr. Moss said he and Mr.
Roberts had failed to reach an agreement with two other potential

Daily discloses that Cllr Wynn, who represents the
town's Brynyffynnon ward, said: "At the end of the day, if the
fans want to be running the club then this is their moment.  We
have had confirmation that a chartered accountant, who is also a
Wrexham fan, will be going in to look at the accounts this week.
If the figures are as bad as we think, then we will need five or
six people to come forward with about GBP50,000 each to keep the
club surviving until the end of the season.  Then we will need
names and addresses of those who are willing to buy shares and
details of exactly how many they are prepared to take on.  I am
making an SOS appeal to all the supporters.  The message now has
got to be 'Cometh the hour, cometh the fans'"

However, the report notes, Lindsay Jones, from the Wrexham
Supporters Trust, said he suspected Mr. Moss was "playing the
panic game" and fans would not be pushed into a deal.

The trust has been in talks with Wrexham Council over the
possibility of taking over the Racecourse as a community-run
stadium and members were due to meet club bosses next week.

"The club can confirm they have been in discussions with a fans
lead consortium, with a view to taking over the football club,
Racecourse and Colliers Park," the club said in a statement
obtained by the news agency.

WTA GLOBAL: Owed GBP100,000++ Before Falling Into Administration
Manchester Confidential reports that WTA Global Holdings owed the
council more than GBP100,000 when it went into administration.

A newly-filed report from administrators at Begbies Traynor show
that WTA Global Holdings ran up a string of Manchester-based
creditors before its collapse, according to Manchester
Confidential.  The report relates that the firm owed:

   * the city council GBP112,000,
   * city centre management arm Cityco GBP5,800,
   * City TV station Channel M GBP33,000;
   * Bury-based Events Security Services GBP61,000
   * Hyde-based Leisure Technical Consultants GBP32,000,
   * Marketing Manchester GBP2,800, and
   * the nearby Mitre Hotel GBP300.

Peninsula Business Services, owned by Fred Done, is on the list of
creditors for GBP2,700, according to Manchester Confidential.  The
report relates that the administrators said none of the creditors
are expected to get their money back.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on
Jan. 14, 2011, Insider Media Limited said WTA Global Holdings was
bought out of administration saving 85 jobs in the process.  The
report related that John Kelly and Nigel Price, partners in
Begbies Traynor Birmingham office, were appointed joint
administrators on Dec. 23, 2010, to WTA Global Holdings, which
traded as World Tourist Attractions.  Mr. Kelly confirmed that the
business has now been sold to Elliot Hall, the sole director of
WTA Global Holdings, according to Insider Media Limited.

Headquartered in Sutton Coldfield, WTA Global Holdings is the
failed business behind Birmingham's Big Wheel.  WTA Global
Holdings also operated five other observation wheels across the


* BOOK REVIEW: Partners: Forming Strategic Health Care Alliances
Editors: Arnold D. Kaluzny, Howard S. Zuckerman, and Thomas C.
Ricketts, III, with the assistance of Geoffrey B. Walton
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 255 pages
List Price: US$34.95
Review by Henry Berry

The content of Partners: Forming Strategic Alliances in Health
Care comes from a November 1993 conference in Chapel Hill, NC,
that was held in conjunction with the Clinton Administration's
proposals for sweeping change in the nation's healthcare system.
The conference was attended by 80 of the nation's top healthcare
administrators, academicians, physicians, and lawyers.

In a foreword to the book, which is a reprint of a 1995
publication, Kenneth F. Thorpe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Health Policy at the Department of Health and Human Services at
the time, conveys the Clinton Administration's position that
strategic alliances are of particular value in healthcare.  Not
surprisingly, strategic alliances were to play an important role
in the Administration's proposals for healthcare reform.  The
Administration's approach did not get far politically and thus did
not bring reform.  Nonetheless, the healthcare field has come to
recognize the pertinence and value of strategic alliances, which
have been embraced in business fields where change in consumer
interests, technology, research, delivery systems, and other areas
is ongoing.  In sections that are well-organized, both topically
and with internal references, the fundamentals and benefits of
strategic alliances are explained.  The book also offers
instructive experiences in forming and administering such

Strategic alliances were not simply an approach touted by the
Clinton Administration as a way of effecting healthcare reform.
Nor were strategic alliances a theory arising from the business
conditions and challenges at the time.  Strategic alliances were,
instead, a widespread arrangement to deal with the business
environment of the early 1990s.  This environment continues to
this day, with no end in sight. For the most part, today's
healthcare industry is characterized by new, often problematic,
opportunities and challenges in greatly expanding markets that can
be changed overnight by a financial report or research finding,
new legislation and regulation, or the introduction of new
technology.  Howard Zuckerman, one of the editors, expresses it
well, saying that the healthcare industry is a "turbulent
environment [where] companies around the globe and across a
multitude of industries are turning to alliances as a cooperative,
interorganizational mechanism for adaptation."  Strategic
alliances uniquely enable participating organizations to extend
their operational reach and work toward desirable strategic ends.
Strategic alliances have thus become more than an ad hoc
arrangement to help healthcare organizations get through a tough
stretch or resolve a pressing problem.  Strategic alliances have
been incorporated into the healthcare field as an ever-present
operational and strategic consideration.  In the contemporary
environment of continual change and unpredictable developments,
many organizations face circumstances where strategic alliance is
necessary to stay timely and competitive.  As Mr. Zuckerman notes,
"Strategic alliances are designed to achieve strategic purposes
not attainable by a single organization, providing flexibility and
responsiveness while retaining the basic fabric of participating

The rationale to form strategic alliances is the same for
healthcare organizations as it is for other business entities.
Organizations form strategic alliances because they recognize
their value in engendering flexibility and bringing access to an
ever-broadening array of resources and markets.  As Barry Stein,
president of Goodmeasure, Inc., notes, these are not trivial
benefits, but are essential considerations of any corporation that
hopes to remain relevant and vibrant.  Healthcare organizations of
all sizes and in all markets can enjoy the benefits offered by
strategic alliances.  Says Mr. Stein, "Alliances tend to be
particularly important in unfamiliar markets.  For larger
organizations trying to enter local markets, it is sound practice
to build local alliances because local knowledge and connections
are valuable.  Smaller organizations in local markets can take
advantage of network ties outside their traditional boundaries to
tap broader or perhaps global sources of materials, capital, or

While strategic alliances offer enhanced operational capabilities
and higher strategic goals to practically every healthcare
organization, such advantages are not gained automatically.  Apart
from whether strategic alliances prove fruitful, the inevitable
management issues can be difficult to resolve.  If an alliance is
to be workable and beneficial, certain challenges have to be met
by experienced, capable businesspersons.  Some alliances come
apart; and some do not fulfill their purposes. Even for strategic
alliances that work, the management complexities are enormous.  As
one participant in the conference observed, the "rewards . . .
must be incredible to justify all the extra short-term costs that
go along with them." Partners: Forming Strategic Alliances in
Health Care identifies the pros and cons of strategic alliances
and offers advice and commentary on how to eliminate or minimize
difficulties so healthcare organizations can partake of the
rewards that strategic alliances singularly make possible.

Arnold D. Kaluzny, Howard S. Zuckerman, and Thomas C. Ricketts III
are all professors in university health policy and administration
departments.  Geoffrey B. Walton is a top executive with Strategic
Integration and Practice Operations at Sun Health, an Arizona


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *