TCREUR_Public/110228.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, February 28, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 41



GERRESHEIMER AG: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating From 'BB+'


* GREECE: Greek Insolvency is Inevitable, Experts Say


STAR MENU: Put Up for Sale; March 18 Deadline Set for Bids


ANGLO IRISH: To Sell EUR9-Bil. Deposit Book to Allied Irish Bank
EIRCOM GROUP: Senior Debt Holders Appoint Advisers
IRISH NATIONWIDE: Transfer Assets & Liabilities to Irish Life
ML MEYRICK: Has Combined Losses of EUR53.2 Million in 2009 & 2008
* Fitch Says Irish Debt Risks Tightly Linked to Sovereign Risk


AEGON NV: Mulls EUR750-Mil. Share Issue to Repay Government Aid
HAMLET I: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class B Sub. Notes to 'Ba2'


BANKINTER 4: Moody's Assigns '(P)B3(sf)' Rating to Series C Notes
HIPOCAT 17: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'B3 (sf)'


* TURKEY: JCR Affirms 'BB' Rating on Foreign and LC Currency Loan

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AUTO WINDSCREENS: To Cut More Than 1,000 Staff Jobs
C H SEYMOUR: Placed in Liquidation; 48 Workers Lose Jobs
CONNAUGHT PLC: Norwich MPs Call for a Local Inquiry
DJ BROADY: Goes Into Administration, Cuts 39 Jobs
INTERNATIONAL POWER: Fitch Lifts Issuer Default Rating From 'BB'

JERMON DEVELOPMENTS: Placed in Court-Ordered Liquidation
PORTSMOUTH FOOTBALL: Executive Says Firm Attracts 5 Parties
ROYAL BANK: Net Loss Down to GBP1.1 Billion in 2010
TURBO ALPHA: S&P Gives Developing Outlook; Affirms 'CCC' Rating

VIRGIN MEDIA: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Senior Notes
VIRGIN MEDIA: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB'


* S&P Updates Annual Study of Sovereign Defaults
* S&P: European CMBS Signs of Recovery Confined to Prime Market
* BOND PRICING: For the Week February 21 to February 25, 2011



GERRESHEIMER AG: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating From 'BB+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it raised its long-
term corporate credit rating on Germany-based specialty packaging
supplier Gerresheimer AG and its fully-owned subsidiary
Gerresheimer Holdings GmbH to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'.  At the same
time, S&P raised its issue rating on the senior unsecured debt to
'BBB-' from 'BB+' and removed the recovery rating because S&P does
not apply a recovery analysis to investment-grade debt.  The
outlook is stable.

"The rating action follows Gerresheimer's improved financial
profile and credit measures, combined with management's track
record of maintaining what S&P views as a disciplined financial
policy, in particular during difficult trading conditions," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Izabela Listowska.

The ratings remain supported by Gerresheimer's "satisfactory"
business risk profile, which is underpinned by its leading market
positions, good geographic and customer diversity, and stable
operating margins.  These positive factors are partly offset by
Gerresheimer's acquisitive track record and its fairly high, and
partly growth related, capital spending, which S&P think will
continue to weigh on free operating cash flow.

"The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Gerresheimer's
improved cash flow generation and financial risk profile will
remain consistent with a 'BBB-' rating," said Ms. Listowska.  "It
also reflects the company's fairly resilient business and sound
position to take advantage of fast-expanding and high-margin
sectors with value-added pharmaceutical applications."


* GREECE: Greek Insolvency is Inevitable, Experts Say
FOCUS Information Agency, citing Austrian Die Presse daily,
reports that a rising number of experts believe that Greece's
insolvency is inevitable.

According to FOCUS Information Agency, the Ifo Institute for
Economic Research in Munich expects that Greece will be at the
brink of insolvency again by 2013 at the latest, when the bailout
package of the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will
expire and the country will need support again.

FOCUS Information Agency says economists now even see the country
leaving the euro area as a realistic perspective.  Another option
would be a radical cut in wages and prices.


STAR MENU: Put Up for Sale; March 18 Deadline Set for Bids
MTI-Econews, citing the business daily Napi Gazdasag, reports that
liquidator Vectigalis has called a tender for the sale of Star

According to MTI, bailiff Marta Peter told the newspaper that
Star Menu had debts of HUF2.1 billion when the company went into
liquidation in January of this year.

MTI relates that Mr. Peter said the tender has an asking price of
HUF2.4 billion for the sale of Star Menu's 31,000-square-meter
plant near Sarmellek in Western Hungary as well as the company's
food recipes, market, and property rights.

The deadline for submission of bids in the tender is March 18, MTI

Star Menu generated revenue of HUF266.7 million in 2009, compared
to revenue of HUF509.1 million in 2009, sustaining net losses of
HUF386.8 million in 2009, compared to net losses of HUF532.2
million in 2008, MTI discloses.

Star Menu is a ready-to-eat food company based in Hungary.


ANGLO IRISH: To Sell EUR9-Bil. Deposit Book to Allied Irish Bank
Brian O'Mahony at Irish Examiner reports that Anglo Irish Bank is
to sell most of its deposit book to Allied Irish Banks in a
further move by the government to wind down the institutions.

According to Irish Examiner, AIB said that the total amount of
deposits moving across to the bank is about EUR9 billion.  AIB
bank will pay Anglo EUR3.5 billion for use of those deposits.

AIB said the deal involves the transfer of about EUR7.1 billion
deposits in Ireland and Britain, the purchase of senior NAMA bonds
and the purchase of 100% of Anglo's operations in the Isle of Man
for EUR2 million.

Anglo Irish Bank Corp PLC --
operates in three core areas: business lending, treasury and
private banking.  The Bank's non-retail business is made up of
more than 11,000 commercial depositors spanning commercial
entities, charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit
unions and other non-bank financial institutions.  The Company's
retail deposits comprise demand, notice and fixed term deposit
accounts from personal savers with maturities of up to two years.
Non-retail deposits are sourced from commercial entities,
charities, public sector bodies, pension funds, credit unions and
other non-bank financial institutions.  In addition, at Sept. 30,
2008, its non-retail deposits included deposits from Irish
Life Assurance plc.  The Private Bank offers tailored products and
solutions for high net worth clients and operates the Bank's
lending business in Ireland and the United Kingdom.

                       *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 1,
2010, DBRS downgraded the ratings of the Euro Dated Subordinated
Notes (specifically the EUR325.2 million Floating Rate
Subordinated Notes due 2014, EUR500 million Callable Subordinated
Floating Rate Notes due 2016 and the EUR750 million Dated
Subordinated Floating Rate Notes due 2017) (collectively referred
to as the 2017 Notes) issued by Anglo Irish Bank Corporation
Limited (Anglo Irish or the Bank) to 'D' from 'C'.  DBRS said the
downgrade follows the execution of the Bank's note exchange offer.
The default status for the exchanged and now-extinguished 2017
Notes reflects DBRS's view that bondholders were offered limited
options, which, as discussed in DBRS' press release dated
October 25, 2010, is considered a default per DBRS policy.

On Oct. 29, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported
that Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on
Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd.'s non-deferrable dated subordinated
debt (lower Tier 2) securities to 'D' from 'CCC'.  The downgrade
of the lower Tier 2 debt rating reflects S&P's opinion that the
bank's exchange offer is a "distressed exchange" and tantamount to
default in accordance with its criteria.

EIRCOM GROUP: Senior Debt Holders Appoint Advisers
Suzanne Lynch at The Irish Times reports that holders of Eircom
Group's senior debt have appointed restructuring experts Houlihan
Lokey as advisers as they prepare to negotiate with the company
about billions of euro of outstanding debt.

It is believed four representatives of Singapore-based STT are
holding intensive meetings with various Eircom stakeholder groups
including Eircom management and board, the employee Esot, and
union representatives, according to The Irish Times.

It is expected no definitive resolution to the complex financial
problems facing the company will be reached ahead of the
publication of the company's half-year results, although the
company is expected to provide an update to the market about a
possible breach of covenant, The Irish Times notes.

Eircom is seeking to restructure close to EUR4 billion in debt,
the majority of which is senior debt, Irish Times says.  Eircom's
debt has been downgraded a number of times by various ratings
agencies and has been trading at a heavy discount in the markets,
with speculation that some form of debt buy-back may be on the
cards, The Irish Times states.

Discussions last week were centering on how to address the
company's debt pile, which threatens to bring down the company,
The Irish Times relates.

According to The Irish Times, management is seeking to make
savings of EUR90 million in labor costs over the next three years,
which may involve further job losses.

Some level of cash injection is seen as almost inevitable, and it
has been speculated that up to EUR300 million could be injected
into the business by shareholders, The Irish Times discloses.
This could include the provision of EUR200 million in new equity
by STT and possibly up to EUR100 million by the Esot, which owns
35% of the company, The Irish Times notes.

The appointment of Houlihan Lokey by senior lenders to the company
signals the growing urgency around the debt issue, The Irish

Junior bondholders have already appointed advisers, according to
The Irish Times.

Headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, Eircom Group -- is an Irish telecommunications company,
and former state-owned incumbent.  It is currently the largest
telecommunications operator in the Republic of Ireland and
operates primarily on the island of Ireland, with a point of
presence in Great Britain.

IRISH NATIONWIDE: Transfers Assets & Liabilities to Irish Life
-------------------------------------------------------------- reports that Irish Nationwide Building Society has
transferred selected assets and liabilities into Irish Life &
Permanent plc, which comprise EUR3.6 billion of INBS deposits and
the shares in INBS' Isle of Man subsidiary. relates that the move came after Thursday's
Transfer Order under the Credit Institutions (Stabilisation) Act
2010 issued by the High Court.

Up to 237 employees of INBS have transferred to Irish Life &
Permanent with the selected INBS deposits, notes.

Irish Nationwide Building Society, headquartered in Dublin, had
total assets of EUR14.4 billion at year-end 2008.

                          *     *     *

Irish Nationwide Building society continues to carry Moody's
Investors Service's 'E' bank financial strength rating and 'C'
subordinated debt rating with negative outlook.

Irish Nationwide also carries Fitch's 'E' bank financial strength
rating and 'C' subordinated debt rating.  The individual rating
was upgraded from 'F' in September 2010.  Fitch said the
upgrade of INBS's Individual Rating to 'E' recognized the
government's injection of EUR2.7 billion capital into the society,
but also acknowledged that the society was still likely to require
further external support.

ML MEYRICK: Has Combined Losses of EUR53.2 Million in 2009 & 2008
Gordon Deegan at Irish Examiner reports that ML Meyrick Ltd.
recorded losses totaling EUR53.2 million in 2009 and 2008.

According to Irish Examiner, accounts just filed by ML Meyrickshow
the chief factor behind the losses was the company writing down
the value of its property asset by EUR50 million from
EUR70 million to EUR20 million in the two years to the end of
December 2009.

The accounts disclose that ML Meyrick owes EUR79.9 million to a
group company, KH Kitty Hall Holdings, Irish Examiner notes.

The Meyrick is part of Galway businessman, Gerry Barrett's
Edward Holdings Group, and accounts just filed by 23 of the
group's 27 Irish-based companies to the Companies Office outline
the deterioration of the group's finances in the two-year period
to the end of December 2009, Irish Examiner discloses.

Irish Examiner relates that auditors Deloitte & Touche confirm
that a number of the companies are in a liability position and are
dependent on the financial support of the National Assets
Management Agency (NAMA) and the continuing support of group
companies to be able to continue as a going concern.

According to Irish Examiner, a note attached to the accounts of
the companies states that: "Bank loans in those group companies,
together with other group loans, were transferred to NAMA in
February 2010.  The group has submitted a business plan to NAMA.
The successful implementation of the business plan is dependent on
the support of NAMA and discussions with NAMA in this regard are

"Until this matter is finalized, it remains a material uncertainty
which may cast significant doubt upon the company's ability to
continue as a going concern and therefore, the company may be
unable to realise its assets and discharge its liabilities in the
normal course of business."

ML Meyrick Ltd. operates the four-star Meyrick Hotel in Galway's
Eyre Square.

* Fitch Says Irish Debt Risks Tightly Linked to Sovereign Risk
Fitch Ratings continues to believe that the risks facing Irish
domestic banks and the Irish sovereign are tightly interlinked.
As speculation has intensified that an incoming government may
impose losses on senior unsecured unguaranteed creditors at Irish
banks, Fitch examines the possible options in a new special
report, entitled "Irish Senior Bank Creditors - Can Ireland Do it
the Danish Way?"

In Fitch's view, formal bankruptcy or liquidation of Irish banks
is the least probable outcome, not least for reasons of cost and
contagion risk.  Factors that could make liquidation an expensive
option include the large amount of government guaranteed
obligations relative to the senior unsecured unguaranteed
obligations; the need to keep Irish domestic banks solvent to
preserve the large amount of funding from ECB and Central Bank of
Ireland; and the subordinated status of government equity and
preference stock investments in banks.

Fitch also believes that the Irish authorities are still likely to
want to avoid other coercive ways of imposing losses on the banks'
senior unsecured unguaranteed creditors, such as through a
coercive tender offer or legislative means other than liquidation.
The practical and economic consequences of coercive actions may be
very significant, while the amount of unsecured unguaranteed debt
-- especially at Anglo Irish Bank (Anglo, 'BB-'/Rating Watch
Negative) and Irish Nationwide Building Society (INBS, 'BB-'/
Rating Watch Negative) - and potential savings may not justify the

A voluntary tender offer for senior unsecured unguaranteed debt
would pose the least risk in terms of unintended legal or economic
consequences.  If implemented against a background of extreme
uncertainty it could result in a reasonably favorable uptake,
particularly for Anglo/INBS.  Fitch estimates this approach would
be likely to generate no more than EUR1 billion in case of
Anglo/INBS and less than EUR2 billion for the system as a whole.
While valuable, such sums are dwarfed by the cost to date of
bailing out the banks.

The Long-term IDRs of the two largest Irish banks, Allied Irish
Bank and Bank of Ireland, are both 'BBB'/Rating Watch Negative,
one notch below the sovereign's 'BBB+' Long-term IDR.  This
reflects their systemic importance and Fitch's opinion of the
close correlation between their default risk and that of the Irish
sovereign.  Fitch considers the risk of senior debt default or
coercive tender/exchange to be relatively higher for Anglo and
INBS than for other banks, as indicated by their 'BB-'/Rating
Watch Negative ratings.  However, the potential costs of coercive
burden sharing by senior creditors could far outweigh the
financial benefits even for Anglo/INBS.  Fitch also notes that
because of the EU/IMF program needed by Ireland, any decision may
ultimately be significantly influenced by political forces outside
the country.


AEGON NV: Mulls EUR750-Mil. Share Issue to Repay Government Aid
According to The Financial Times' Matt Steinglass, Aegon plans to
raise EUR750 million (US$1 billion) in a share capital increase in
order to pay back government aid after reporting fourth-quarter
profits that beat analysts' estimates.

Aegon, the FT says, will issue 173.6 million new shares, amounting
to 10% of its total outstanding equity, to repay the Dutch
government which currently holds EUR1.5 billion worth of
securities it used to guarantee the company's balance sheet during
the financial crisis.

Alex Wynaendts, Aegon's chief executive, said the company would
pay the government EUR2.25 billion including a 50% premium by the
end of June, "market conditions permitting."

The FT relates that the company said the remainder of the
EUR2.25 billion would be generated through "internal sources" and
said it was in talks with an unnamed party interested in buying
its US-based life reinsurance operations.

Aegon announced a sharp rise in profits for 2010 to EUR1.76
billion, compared with EUR209 million in 2009, the FT discloses.
Underlying earnings for the year were up 65% to EUR1.972 billion,
the FT states.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 19,
2010, The Financial Times said that Aegon agreed to a series of
commercial controls, including a pledge not to offer the three
most competitive interest rates, in return for final approval from
Brussels of the EUR3-billion bailout it received from the Dutch
government during the financial crisis.  The group already repaid
EUR1 billion, the FT disclosed.

                           About AEGON

As an international life insurance, pension and investment company
based in The Hague, AEGON has businesses in more than 20 markets
in the Americas, Europe and Asia.  AEGON companies employ roughly
29,000 people and have more than 40 million customers across the

HAMLET I: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class B Sub. Notes to 'Ba2'
Moody's Investors Service has taken these rating actions on notes
issued by Hamlet I Leveraged Loan Fund B.V.

  -- EUR222M Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010 Aa2 (sf)
     Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR78M Class B Subordinated Notes due 2020, Upgraded to Ba2
     (sf); previously on Dec 23, 2010 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review
     for Possible Upgrade

                        Ratings Rationale

Hamlet I is a cash CDO of leveraged loans with exposure
predominately to European senior secured loans with a small amount
of bonds (6.52%).  The reinvestment period ended on May 15, 2010.
All accumulated excess spread is now diverted to pay down the
class B notes until the principal amount outstanding is reduced to

The upgrade rating actions taken on the notes is a result of the
improvement in credit quality of the portfolio and an increase in
overcollateralization levels of the rated notes since the last
rating action.  As of the latest collateral administrator report
dated January 2011, the class A OC ratio is 141.12% compared to
134.81% in January 2010.  In addition, the weighted average rating
factor, has improved to 2781 as of January 2011, from 2890 in
January 2010.  The transaction has also experienced a decrease in
both the defaulted assets and the proportion of securities rated
Caa1 and below from 5.58% to 0% and from 16.12% to 13.63%
respectively, over the same period.

The class B notes is exposed to the first losses in the portfolio
and benefits from the excess spread available in the CLO
structure.  The rating of such notes addresses the ultimate
repayment of the Rated Balance in respect of class B notes on or
before the legal maturity (in 2020), where the "Rated Balance" is
equal, at any time, to the principal amount of such notes on the
issue date (EUR78 million) minus the aggregate of all payments
made from the issue date to such date, either through interest or
principal payments.  The rating on class B notes is not an opinion
about the ability of the issuer to pay interest.  The rating
action on class B notes factors a sensitivity scenario whereby
excess spread available class B notes has been reduced by 25%,
because those are volatile and can be affected by uncapped junior

In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
with an adjusted WARF of 3644, a diversity score of 31 and a
weighted-average recovery rate of 63.11%.

Furthermore, Moody's tested the sensitivity of model results to
key parameters for the rated notes.  Among these, Moody's observed
that if the WARF was changed up or down by 200, the model results
for Class A would be affected by less than half a notch and for
Class B notes would not deviate by more than 1 notch.

Under this methodology, Moody's used its Binomial Expansion
Technique, whereby the pool is represented by independent
identical assets, the number of which is being determined by the
diversity score of the portfolio.  The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in a cash flow
model where the default probabilities are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.  The default probability range is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool, and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool.  The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority and jurisdiction of the assets in the collateral pool.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.


BANKINTER 4: Moody's Assigns '(P)B3(sf)' Rating to Series C Notes
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
Notes issued by Bankinter 4 FTPYME, Fondo de Titulización de

Issuer: Bankinter 4 FTPYME, FTA

  -- EUR160M Series A1 Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf) (currently
     EUR31.16M outstanding)

  -- EUR174.4M Series A2(G) Notes, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf) and Placed
     Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  -- EUR19.6M Series A3 Notes, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

  -- EUR30M Series B Notes, Assigned (P)B1 (sf)

  -- EUR16M Series C Notes, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Bankinter FTPYME 4 is a securitization of loans granted to small-
and medium-sized enterprises by Bankinter (A1/P-1, Rating under
review for possible downgrade).  Bankinter is acting as Servicer
of the loans while Europea de Titulizacion S.G.F.T., S.A. is the
Management Company.

The transaction closed in September 2008 and was initially not
rated by Moody's.  The initial notes balance issued at closing
(shown above next to the assigned rating) amounted to
EUR400 million.  The outstanding notes balance as of the last
payment date in January 2011 amounts to EUR271.16 million.

Moody's rating analysis of the notes is based on the transaction
structure after the last payment date in January 2011.  The next
payment date will take place in April 2011.

The pool of underlying assets was, as of December 2010, composed
of a portfolio of 1,207 non-written off contracts (originated
between 1997 and 2008) granted to obligors located in Spain., The
portfolio has a weighted average seasoning of 3.8 years and a
weighted average remaining term of 12.3 years.  Around 88.24% of
the outstanding of the portfolio is secured by first-lien mortgage
guarantees over different types of properties (mainly residential
and commercial).  Geographically, the pool is located mostly in
Madrid (30.18%), Andalucia (14.4%), Catalonia (12.2%) and Valencia

According to Moody's, this deal benefits from several credit
strengths (i) 88.24% of the portfolio is secured over first-lien
real estate properties; (ii) there is a swap hedging interest rate
risks; (iii) Series A2(G) benefits from the guarantee of the
Kingdom of Spain for interest and principal payments.  The
expected loss associated with Series A2(G) notes is consistent
with a Aa3 (sf) rating regardless of the Spanish Treasury

Moody's notes that the transaction features a number of credit
weaknesses, including: (a) According to Moody's industry
classification there is 37% exposure to the Construction and
Building sector; (b) 5.51% of the pool is more than 30 days in

These characteristics were reflected in Moody's analysis and
ratings, where several simulations tested the available 30.50%
total credit enhancement and reserve fund (as of January 2011) to
cover potential shortfalls in interest or principal envisioned in
the transaction structure.

Moody's analysis focused primarily on (i) an evaluation of the
underlying portfolio of loans; (ii) historical performance
information and other statistical information; (iii) the credit
enhancement provided via excess-spread, the cash reserve and the
subordination of the notes.

The resulting key assumptions of Moody's analysis for this
transaction are a mean default rate between a range of 22.2%-23.5%
and a stochastic mean recovery rate of 61%.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High, which is in line
with the score assigned for the Spanish SME sector and
representative of the volatility and uncertainty in the Spanish
SME sector.  V-Scores are a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and of the degree of dependence on
various assumptions used in determining the rating.  For more
information, the V-Score has been assigned accordingly to the
report "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the EMEA Small-to-
Medium Enterprise ABS Sector" published in June 2009.

Moody's also ran sensitivities around key parameters for the rated
notes.  For instance, if the assumed default probability range of
22.2%-23.5% used in determining the initial rating was changed to
31.9%-34.0% and the recovery rate of 61% was changed to 41%, the
model-indicated rating for the Series A1 would have remained Aaa
(sf), while Series A2(G), Series A3, Series B and Series C ratings
of Aa3 (sf), Aa3 (sf), B1 (sf) and B3 (sf) would have changed to
Ba3 (sf), Ba3 (sf), Caa3 (sf) and C (sf).  The sensitivity
analysis for Series A2(G) does not take into consideration the
benefit from the Spanish government guarantee.

HIPOCAT 17: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'B3 (sf)'
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of Hipocat 17
FTA's class A notes, confirmed the ratings of class B and
downgraded the ratings of the class C notes.  These rating actions
follow Moody's review of the recent structural changes to
Hipocat 17 and concluded that these amendments have both positive
and negative impact on the ratings, depending on the ranking of
the notes:

  -- EUR1070.8 million Class A, upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously
     on 21 December 2010, rated A1 (sf)

  -- EUR4.4 million Class B, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on 21
     December 2010, rated Baa2 (sf)

  -- EUR24.8 million Class C, downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     21 December 2010, rated B2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The structural amendments relates to an increase in credit
enhancement for the class A notes.  The increase was implemented
in the current capital structure by decreasing the size of the
class A and increasing the size of tranche B.  To decrease the
size of class A, an amount of bonds will be fully amortized on a
extraordinary payment date, as described in the amendment.  The
reduction of class A will be funded by a Loan B from Catalunya
Caixa.  As a result of these changes, Class A benefits from more
credit enhancement, Class B remains equal and it is not affected
by the changes and Class C is negatively impacted because it will
receive less spread.  In the new structure, tranche B absorbs more
spread because is the outstanding principal will be higher than in
the past.  Loan B is not rated and ranks pari passu with class B.
Loan B and the Class B notes will amortize pro rata.

The ratings of the notes also take into account the credit quality
of the underlying mortgage loan pools, from which Moody's
determined the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement (MILAN Aaa CE) and the
lifetime losses (expected loss), as well as the transaction
structure and any legal considerations as assessed in Moody's cash
flow analysis.  The expected loss and the Milan Aaa CE are the two
key parameters used by Moody's to calibrate its loss-distribution
curve, used in the cash-flow model to rate European RMBS

Portfolio Expected Loss:

Hipocat 17 is still performing in line with the revised
assumptions as of December.  Cumulative write-offs rose to 1.52%
of original pool balance in October 2010, up from 1.13% a year
earlier.  The share of 90+ day arrears was 0.56% at the end of
October 2010.  The reserve fund in Hipocat 17 is currently at its
target level.

Moody's expects the portfolio's credit performance to continue to
be under stress, as Spanish unemployment remains elevated.
Moody's believes that the anticipated tightening of Spanish fiscal
policies is likely to weigh on the recovery in the Spanish labor
market and further constraint Spanish households finances.
Moody's also has concerns over the timing and degree of future
recoveries in a weaker Spanish housing market.  On the basis of
the rapid increase in defaults in the transaction and Moody's
negative sector outlook for Spanish RMBS, Moody's have updated the
portfolio expected loss assumption to 2.6% from 1.2%.

Milan Aaa CE:

Moody's assessed the loan-by-loan information Hipocat 17 in
December 2010 to determine the MILAN Aaa CE.  Milan Aaa CE for
Hipocat 17 was increased to 9.00%, up from 3.75%.  The increase in
the MILAN Aaa CE reflects the high geographical concentration in
Catalonia and the concentration of loans originated to new

The rating addresses the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and principal with
respect of the notes by the legal final maturity.  Moody's ratings
only address the credit risk associated with the transaction.
Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

Transaction Features:

Hipocat 17 closed in December 2008.  The transaction is backed by
a portfolio of first-ranking mortgage loans originated by Caixa
Catalunya, now part of Caixa d'Estalvis de Catalunya, Manresa I
Tarragona (A3/P-2 on review for possible downgrade) and secured on
residential properties located in Spain.  The new entity, Caixa
d'Estalvis de Catalunya, Manresa I Tarragona, has been operative
since July 1, 2010.  Moody's was informed that the servicing of
Caixa Catalunya's mortgage portfolio will remain on Caixa
Catalunya's servicing platform.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


* TURKEY: JCR Affirms 'BB' Rating on Foreign and LC Currency Loan
Japan Credit Rating Agency has affirmed its 'BB' ratings on the
Republic of Turkey's foreign and local currency long-term senior
debts.  The outlook of the ratings is stable.

The ratings primarily reflect the country's significantly
improving fiscal position as compared with the one during its
economic crisis in 2001 thanks to the structural reforms
implemented by the Turkish government under its standby
arrangement with the IMF as well as prudential fiscal and monetary
policies carried out by the government, and the stability of the
country's financial system which has similarly improved through
the IMF-supported reforms.  Backed by these factors, the Turkish
economy displayed resilience to external shocks caused by the
global financial crisis from late 2008 to early 2009, attaining a
self-sustained recovery without relying on supports of the IMF.
Meanwhile, the ratings are constrained by the structural
instability of Turkey's external balance and resultant weakness in
its foreign currency liquidity position.

The rating outlook is stable.  The Turkish economy bottomed out in
the first quarter of 2009, posting a double-digit growth in the
first half of 2010 on recovery of consumer spending and corporate
investment on top of recoupment of inventory investment which had
substantially fallen in the previous year.  The growth apparently
decelerated in the second half of 2010 as exports slowed down and
inventory investment returned to normal. On a full-year basis, the
growth rate well exceeded an estimated 7% due in part to the high
expansion in the first half.  In 2011, the growth rate is expected
to decelerate to the 4% level, given the tapering base effect and
the continuing sluggishness of European economies, Turkey's major
export destinations.  The current account deficit decreased
markedly in 2009 on a reduced trade deficit mainly brought by
slower import and lower oil prices.  However, it widened again as
the economy picked up in 2010.  Hence the foreign currency
liquidity position deteriorated.  Its future trends need to be

On the political front, the referendum carried out in September
2010 resulted in a 58% voter support for the government's proposed
constitutional amendment for reform of the judicial system.  It is
crucial for the government to materialize the favorable result of
referendum to a greater political stability.  JCR holds that in
order for Turkey to make a sustainable economic development in the
medium to long term the country needs to steadfastly implement its
medium-term economic programs, inter alia a further improvement of
the fiscal position, and its reforms aiming at EU membership and
thereby maintain its political and social stability as well as
international confidence on her.

(1) Macroeconomic trends

The Turkish economy had grown an average 6.9% per year in real GDP
terms for five years until 2007.  However, it decelerated sharply
in 2008 as the impact of the global financial crisis rapidly
spread to its real economy, being forced to contract 4.7% in 2009.
The economy hit a rock bottom in the first quarter of 2009.  On a
quarterly basis, it posted double-digit growth rates in the first
and second quarter of 2010 on recovery of consumer spending and
corporate investment on top of recoupment of inventory investment
which had substantially fallen in the previous year.  The growth
decelerated in the second half of 2010 as exports slowed down and
inventory investment came back to normal.  In fact, the growth
rate slowed to 5.5% in the third quarter of the year.
Nonetheless, the economy grew an estimated 7% or higher on a full-
year basis due partly to a high expansion in the first half.  JCR
expects the growth rate to slow to the 4% level in 2011, when
there will be no base effect and the European economies, Turkey's
major export markets, will remain weak.

(2) Public finance and financial system

The government's fiscal position has significantly improved to
this day as compared with the country's economic crisis in 2001.
Much of the improvement came from the structural reforms and other
efforts the government made under its standby arrangement with the
IMF as well as prudential fiscal and monetary policies carried out
by the government.  The inflation rate which had exceeded 100% in
1994 fell to a single digit in 2004.  This helped to slash the
interest expenses/revenue ratio from 79.7% in 2001 to an estimated
19.6% in 2010.  In 2009, the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio surged to
5.5% from 1.8% in the previous year due to the stimulus measures.
As a result, the public debt/GDP ratio also rose to 45.5% in 2009
from 39.5% the year before.  However, the ratio turned declining
again to 41.5% in 2010 against the background of the high
economic growth and the government's measures.  The government
should be able to keep its public debt position at a manageable
level in the future, presuming the country's economic recovery.
The stability of the financial system has also been enhanced
through the IMF-supported reforms.  Banks that had run into
management difficulties have been rebuilt or liquidated under the
State Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF).  Twenty banks were initially
placed under the SDIF, but only two out of those twenty banks
remained placed as of the end of January 2011.  The banking
sector's nonperforming loan ratio declined to 3.7% at the end of
2010 from 12.1% at the end of 2001 right after the global
financial crisis.  The stability of the banking system has been
strengthened, with its capital adequacy ratio kept high at 18.9%.
Meanwhile, the privatization of state-owned banks which hold a
substantial share in the banking sector remains to be seen.  The
banking sector is required to promote a greater deposit
mobilization and financial intermediation to expedite the
country's corporate investments, thereby bolstering sustainable
economic development in the future.

(3) External balance

A concern on the Turkish economy in the recent years is the
widening current account deficit due mainly to bigger trade
deficits stemming from an expanded savings-investment gap.  In
2009, the current account deficit narrowed substantially on a
sharply reduced trade deficit brought by slower imports amid the
plunge of oil prices and a steep economic downturn in the second
half of 2008.  However, in 2010 it was inevitable for the deficit
to widen again as the trade deficit started to increase amid the
economic recovery.  The foreign exchange reserves swelled on
increased capital inflows in 2010, but the short-term external
debt grew at a faster pace.  As a result, the foreign exchange
reserves/short-term external debt coverage ratio further decreased
in 2010 from 1.4 times at the end of 2009.  With the current
account deficit expected to keep increasing, the country needs to
ensure a stable inflow of international capital centering on
foreign direct investment (FDI).  Its future developments need to
be closely followed.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AUTO WINDSCREENS: To Cut More Than 1,000 Staff Jobs
BBC News reports that more than 1,000 Auto Windscreens workers in
Derbyshire and the West Midlands are to lose their jobs.

As reported in the Troubled Company reporter-Europe on Feb. 16,
2011, said that Auto Windscreens has gone into
administration.  The report related that majority of the company's
staff were told to stop working after administrators from Deloitte
were appointed.  The company will be talking to major customers in
an effort to find funds to continue trading and will be looking
for a buyer, according to

Auto Windscreens had already been in talks about raising
additional funds, but an agreement could not be reached in time,
BBC News reports.

"Our focus at the outset was to seek funding for a trading period
and to run an intensive marketing period in an attempt to save the
business as a going concern.  We approached the major customers to
seek urgent funding but unfortunately none of these customers were
able to assist in the circumstances.  In the absence of any
funding and no going concern offer, we have had no alternative but
to close the business, leading to 1,042 staff being made
redundant," BBC News quotes Chris Farrington, of Deloitte, as

Chesterfield-based Auto Windscreens works for major motor
insurers, fleet businesses and private companies.  It has 68
fitting centres across the UK, 550 mobile units, a distribution
centre in Aston, Birmingham, and a call centre.

C H SEYMOUR: Placed in Liquidation; 48 Workers Lose Jobs
The Eastbourne Herald reports that C H Seymour Limited, which had
two shops in Seaford, has been placed into liquidation after it
closed both stores a month ago.

Customers were left shocked after electrical retailer C H Seymour
in Sutton Park Road and Clear-View in the High Street ceased
trading at the end of January, according to Eastbourne Herald.

Eastbourne Herald says C H Seymour Limited was also trading as
Clear-View and Top of the Town.

The Eastbourne Herald relates that following the closures, a
meeting took place on February 15 and the company was placed into
liquidation.  Ian Vickers and Chris Stevens, of FRP Advisory LLP,
the specialist restructuring, recovery and insolvency firm, were
appointed joint liquidators.

"Further to our instruction on January 28 and a review of the
company's finances, due to the extent of its liabilities, it was
not feasible to attempt to rescue the company and liquidation was
regrettably the only option," Eastbourne Herald quotes Mr. Vickers
as saying.  "Following our appointment as joint liquidators to C H
Seymour Limited on 15 February 2011, we will now take steps to
realise the assets of the company for the benefit of its

The closures affected stores in Hailsham, Bexhill and other areas
of Sussex were also affected, leaving a total of 48 people
redundant, Eastbourne Herald adds.

East Sussex-based C H Seymour Ltd is a supplier of electrical
contractor services.

CONNAUGHT PLC: Norwich MPs Call for a Local Inquiry
BBC News reports that two Norwich MPs have urged their
constituents to come forward if they have evidence against the
collapsed social housing contractor Connaught plc.

BBC News relates that the company's directors are facing an
investigation by the Insolvency Service after the firm's failure.
MPs Chloe Smith and Simon Wright have also called for a local

According to BBC News, the termination of the contract between
Connaught and Norwich City Council led to the loss of 300 jobs and
delays in repairs to council tenant's homes.

"People are still angry and aggrieved at how Connaught fell and
took with it so many Norwich jobs," BBC News quotes conservative
MP for Norwich South Chloe Smith as saying.  "I urge ex-employees
of Connaught and any local firms affected by the collapse now to
give in any remaining evidence they may have."

The Liberal Democrat MP for Norwich South, Simon Wright, is also
backing the call, BBC News says.

BBC News quotes Mr. Wright as saying that, "There are still many
questions that remain unanswered both by the city council and by

"I would urge any individuals or creditors with concerns to write
to myself or Chloe Smith as MPs, or to contact the administrators
KPMG direct as soon as possible.  The more evidence there is for
the administrators, the more authoritative their report can be,"
Mr. Wright said, according to BBC News.

BBC News notes that administrators KPMG will report to government
ministers by March 8 on whether or not the conduct of Connaught's
directors makes them unfit to manage companies in the future.

                        About Connaught plc

Connaught plc -- is a United
Kingdom-based company engaged in the provision of integrated asset
services to the public and private sectors.  The Company operates
in two business segments: social housing and compliance.  Social
Housing segment provide social housing landlords throughout the
United Kingdom with a range of planned and response maintenance
services, as well as compliance and estate management.  The
Compliance segment provides safety, health and risk management
solutions.  It has information, advisory, training and servicing
capabilities to provide integrated compliance solution throughout
the United Kingdom.  On July 22, 2009, the Company completed the
acquisition of UK Fire (International) Limited and Igrox Limited.
On September 15, 2008, the Company completed the acquisition of
Lowe Group Holdings Ltd.  On November 26, 2008, the Company
completed the acquisition of certain assets of Predator Pest
Control Plc.

                            *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 9,
2010, Bloomberg News said Connaught Plc appointed partners from
KPMG as administrators after the business as a whole failed to
secure "sufficient support" to trade as a going concern.
Bloomberg disclosed the company said in a statement on Sept. 8
that KPMG's Richard Heis, Richard Hill and Richard Fleming were
appointed administrators to Exeter, England-based Connaught Plc,
and Heis, Mark Firmin, Brian Green and David Costley-Wood were
appointed joint administrators to Connaught Partnerships Ltd.
Connaught Environmental Ltd. and their subsidiaries were not put
into administration, Bloomberg noted.

The TCR-Europe, citing Business Sale, reported on Feb. 4, 2011,
that private equity group Better Capital acquired 50% of the
compliance division of Connaught plc.  According to Business Sale,
GBP15 million has been put forward by Better Capital to finance
the acquisition and pay for restructuring efforts.

DJ BROADY: Goes Into Administration, Cuts 39 Jobs
This is Hull & East Riding reports that DJ Broady has gone into
administration and made 39 jobs redundant in the process.  The
report relates that staff had already been working reduced hours
since December.

An unnamed worker said that "the company still has to sort out our
pay," according to this is Hull & East Riding.

The report notes that the firm's sister company, Robin Concrete,
is still trading, and efforts are being made to keep the business

DJ Broady called in the administrators on Feb. 21, 2011.

This is Hull & East Riding discloses that joint administrators
Adrian Allen and Alec Pillmoor, partners at Baker Tilly
Restructuring and Recovery LLP, said the business had suffered
from a combination of factors, including a reduction in orders
from the public sector.

DJ Broady has been operating in Hull for 30 years.  The company
has been involved in the demolition of some high-profile
buildings, including the Boulevard stadium in west Hull, and
Pepi's bar on Hull Marina.

INTERNATIONAL POWER: Fitch Lifts Issuer Default Rating From 'BB'
Fitch Ratings has upgraded International Power PLC's Issuer
Default Rating to 'BBB-' from 'BB' following the completion of its
acquisition by GDF SUEZ (not rated by Fitch).

GSZ has acquired 70% equity in IPR for its power generation and
mid-stream energy assets and has paid GBP1.4 billion in cash as a
special dividend to IPR's shareholders.  The combined company now
owns approximately 41 GW (net) of generating capacity around the
globe, of which approximately 63% has mid to long-term power sale
contracts, improving cash flow predictability and reducing
exposure to merchant risk.  Fitch had placed IPR's ratings on
Rating Watch Positive on Aug. 10, 2010, following the announcement
that GSZ was acquiring 70% of IP's voting stock in a reverse
takeover transaction.

The key factors driving the upgrade include credit strengthening
support worth one notch from a well-capitalized parent, improved
capital market access, and sufficient liquidity.  The upgrade also
incorporates the parent's financing plan for IPR, which will
reduce the project level debt on merchant assets by approximately
GBP1.8 billion, will provide a GBP250 million line of credit for
short-term capital needs, and will fund GBP700 million through a
line of credit and cash for guarantees and the liquidity needs of
the trading activity at IPR.  These actions should lower external
financing needs and related costs for IPR while financially
integrating it with GSZ.  In Fitch's opinion, IPR will be a
critical component in GSZ's business structure, accounting for
approximately 25% of the group's consolidated EBITDA, supporting
strong financial commitment from GSZ.  Additionally, IPR's cash
flow will benefit from improved synergies by combining the
operations of the two generation companies.

Fitch expects IPR's leverage, based on a consolidated FFO/net debt
ratio, to improve to 21% by 2013 from approximately 17% in 2011
and interest coverage, based on EBITDAR/interest ratio, to range
between 4.5x to 5x over the same forecast period, which is
commensurate with a standalone 'BB+' Long-term IDR.

Fitch's rating concerns include currency and geopolitical risks
for IPR's investments in developing economies, stringent
environmental regulations affecting cash flow from the fossil-fuel
fired generating assets, and exposure to earnings volatility for
the majority of its US, UK, and other merchant assets.  These
assets represent approximately 37% of the total generating
capacity.  Although natural gas will be the single largest fuel
source at the combined company, at around 60%, a pass-through of
fuel clause in the majority of long-term power sale agreements
mitigates single-fuel source related risks.

The Stable Outlook takes into account the hedges in place to
reduce merchant risk, predictability of cash flow from contracted
assets, and declining capacity-growth related capital

IPR is a leading independent power generation company with over 66
GW (gross) of generating capacity spread over five continents.
The business is divided into six core regions: North America, UK-
Europe, Middle East Turkey and Africa, Latin America, Asia, and
Australia.  IPR was formed during the privatization of the UK
electricity market that began in 1990.  On Feb. 3, 2011, GSZ
acquired 70% of IPR in a reverse takeover transaction in which GSZ
transferred its international electricity generation and other
mid-stream assets to the company.  The company has approximately
22 GW (gross) of new electricity generating assets under

International Power (Jersey) Finance III LTD is a financing
subsidiary of IPR and was set up as a financing vehicle to issue
convertible debt for its parent.  The debt (EUR700 million
convertible bonds maturing in 2015) is guaranteed by its parent.
IPJIII benefits from a parent company guarantee and its unsecured
debt rating reflects equalization with IPR's Long-term IDR.

The rating actions are:


  -- IDR upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB', off RWP, Stable Outlook
  -- Unsecured debt rating upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB', off RWP


  -- Unsecured debt rating upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB', off RWP

JERMON DEVELOPMENTS: Placed in Court-Ordered Liquidation
BBC News reports that the High Court in Belfast has placed Jermon
Developments and Jermon Properties into liquidation.  The main
company in the group, Jermon Ltd, was placed into administration
in January.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 11,
2011, BBC News said that Bank of Scotland Ireland has effectively
repossessed a helicopter owned by Jermon Developments Limited.
BBC News said the Bank of Scotland and other banks appointed
receivers to various assets held by the company, which assets
included an Augusta A109A Mk2 helicopter.  According to BBC News,
the other assets in receivership are the Springhill Shopping
Centre in Bangor, the Clarendon House office block in Belfast, a
shop unit at Castle Place in Belfast and two properties in the
centre of Dungannon.

Headquartered in Dungannon, Northern Ireland, Jermon Developments
Limited, specialized in property development, commercial
development, retail development, leisure development and
industrial development.

BBC News reports that Mervyn McAlister, the developer who had
planned to build what would have been Belfast's tallest
skyscraper, has been declared bankrupt.  The order was granted by
the High Court in Belfast, the report relates.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 11,
2011, BBC News said that Anglo Irish Bank has appointed a receiver
to two sites owned by the prominent County Antrim developer Mervyn
McAlister.  The report related that the sites at Greenhall Highway
in Coleraine and Dunlady Road in Dundonald were the property of
McAlister Construction Ltd.  The company has a registered address
at a firm of accountants at Queen Street in Coleraine, according
to BBC News.  Mr. McAlister is the sole shareholder.  BBC News
recounted that Mr. McAlister, a house builder and hotel owner,
came to prominence in 2007, when he announced plans to build a 37
storey skyscraper in Belfast which would have been the tallest
building in the city.  However, the report related, the
development was blocked by planners, a decision Mr. McAlister is

BBC News notes that Mr. McAlister's various companies are
continuing to trade.

PORTSMOUTH FOOTBALL: Executive Says Firm Attracts 5 Parties
SkySports reports that Portsmouth Football Club Ltd. Chief
Executive Officer David Lampitt has claimed that there are five
different groups who have expressed an interest in taking control
of the club.

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 1, 2010,
Bloomberg said that Portsmouth Football went into administration
after U.K. authorities tried to force its closure over unpaid
taxes.  UHY Hacker Young Michael Kiely, Peter Kubik and Andrew
Andronikou were appointed joint administrators to the company and
the football club.

Owner Balram Chainrai returned for a second spell at the helm of
the south coast outfit as they exited administration but remains
hopeful of handing over the reins, according to SkySports.

Mr. Lampitt, the report notes, confirmed that several consortiums
have expressed a desire to secure control, but they are yet to
demonstrate they have the necessary finances available.  SkySports
relates Mr. Lampitt accepts that it could still be some time
before a new face is found for the club's boardroom.  "Since last
spring there has been a consistent level of interest.  Now we have
four, maybe even five, interested parties.  But we are still in a
situation where nobody has proven funds and my anticipation is it
won't be a particularly quick process," the report quotes Mr.
Lampitt as saying.

                  About Portsmouth Football

Portsmouth Football Club Ltd. --
operates Portsmouth FC, a professional soccer team that plays in
the English Premier League.  Established in 1898, the club boasts
two FA Cups, its last in 2008, and two first division
championships.  Portsmouth FC's home ground is at Fratton Park;
the football team is known to supporters as Pompey.  Dubai
businessman Sulaiman Al-Fahim purchased the club from Alexandre
Gaydamak in 2009.  A French businessman of Russian decent,
Gaydamak had controlled Portsmouth Football Club since 2006.

ROYAL BANK: Net Loss Down to GBP1.1 Billion in 2010
Gavin Finch and Jon Menon at Bloomberg News report that Royal Bank
of Scotland Group Plc, missed analyst estimates as losses from
Ireland climbed and profit from investment banking shrank.

Bloomberg relates the bank said in a statement on Thursday that
the net loss was GBP1.1 billion (US$1.78 billion) compared with a
loss of GBP3.6 billion in 2009.  That was worse than the GBP406.5
million median loss estimated by 11 analysts surveyed by

Irish loan-losses almost doubled, rising by GBP512 million to
GBP1.16 billion, while operating profit at the investment-banking
unit fell by GBP2.2 billion, Bloomberg discloses.

According to Bloomberg, the bank said that overall bad loan
provisions fell to 9.3 billion pounds from GBP13.9 billion.

The bank, which received a GBP45.5 billion taxpayer rescue, the
biggest in the world, has cut about 27,000 jobs and disposed of
more than GBP100 billion of assets since Stephen Hester replaced
Fred Goodwin as chief executive officer during the financial
crisis of November 2008, Bloomberg recounts.

RBS, 83% owned by the government, had GBP205 billion of risky
assets insured by the government under the Asset Protection Scheme
at the end of the third quarter, Bloomberg notes.

                           About RBS

The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc (NYSE:RBS) -- is a holding company of The Royal Bank of
Scotland plc (Royal Bank) and National Westminster Bank Plc
(NatWest), which are United Kingdom-based clearing banks.  The
company's activities are organized in six business divisions:
Corporate Markets (comprising Global Banking and Markets and
United Kingdom Corporate Banking), Retail Markets (comprising
Retail and Wealth Management), Ulster Bank, Citizens, RBS
Insurance and Manufacturing.  On October 17, 2007, RFS Holdings
B.V. (RFS Holdings), a company jointly owned by RBS, Fortis N.V.,
Fortis SA/NV and Banco Santander S.A. (the Consortium Banks) and
controlled by RBS, completed the acquisition of ABN AMRO Holding
N.V. (ABN AMRO).  In July 2008, the company disposed of its entire
interest in Global Voice Group Ltd.

TURBO ALPHA: S&P Gives Developing Outlook; Affirms 'CCC' Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised the
outlook on U.K.-based oil services company Turbo Alpha Ltd. to
developing from negative.  At the same time, the long-term
corporate credit rating on Turbo Alpha was affirmed at 'CCC'.

The 'CCC' issue ratings on Turbo Alpha's senior secured bank
facilities were also affirmed.  The associated recovery ratings
are unchanged at '3', indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful
(50%-70%) recovery in the event of a payment default.

"The outlook revision reflects S&P's understanding that Turbo
Alpha (the owner of the oil services group KCA Deutag, previously
known as Abbot Group Ltd.) has reached a consensual restructuring
agreement in principle with its stakeholders," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Paul Watters.  "S&P understands that closing
remains subject to the documentation being drawn up."

In broad outline, S&P understands that the proposed restructuring
agreement provides for more than US$500 million of additional
equity from the shareholder Pamplona Capital Management and the
mezzanine lenders.  S&P believes that Turbo Alpha intends to use
this equity partly to prepay senior lenders at par, with the
balance used to provide additional liquidity and funds to grow KCA
Deutag's business.

In addition, as part of the proposed restructuring agreement, the
mezzanine lenders to Turbo Alpha's indirect parent Turbo Beta Ltd.
(not rated) have agreed to undertake a debt-for-equity swap that
will provide them with majority ownership of the whole business.
The current senior loan documentation contains a cross-default
clause that references the mezzanine loans at Turbo Beta.  On the
basis of the proposed agreement, waiving this cross-default clause
should not be detrimental to the senior lenders and consequently,
under S&P's criteria, would not constitute a default for Turbo
Alpha.  Failure to obtain such a waiver could accelerate debt
repayment at the Turbo Alpha level.

S&P understands that a negotiated restructuring to stabilize Turbo
Alpha's capital structure to the benefit of the senior lenders is
on track to close by the end of March 2011 or shortly thereafter.

S&P believes that a conclusion of the restructuring on a
consensual basis would likely stabilize the group's liquidity
position for the near to medium term.  Together with a more
sustainable capital structure, this could result in us raising the
long-term corporate credit rating on Turbo Alpha, possibly by more
than one notch.

However, if the agreement is not concluded and this leads to a
payment default, a distressed exchange, or some other type of
reorganization that S&P considers detrimental to the senior
lenders at Turbo Alpha, S&P is likely to downgrade Turbo Alpha to

VIRGIN MEDIA: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Senior Notes
Fitch Ratings has assigned Virgin Media Inc.'s proposed multi-
tranche senior secured notes transaction an expected rating of

The final rating of the notes is subject to completion of the deal
and all final terms conforming to information already received by

The purpose of the notes, to be issued by Virgin Media Secured
Finance plc, a wholly owned subsidiary of Virgin Media, is to
repay up to GBP750 million of Virgin Media's GBP1.675 billion
senior secured bank facilities.  The proposed transaction is
expected to be largely leverage-neutral as some of the company's
senior bank facilities will be replaced with longer-dated SSNs.
After this transaction, Virgin Media may not have any debt
repayments until June 2015, depending on the final amount raised.

The SSNs will be guaranteed on a senior basis by Virgin Media,
Virgin Media Investment Holdings Limited and most of its
subsidiaries, and most of the subsidiaries of Virgin Media
Communications Limited.  The notes will effectively rank pari
passu with Virgin Media's senior secured bank facility.

Virgin Media's Long-term Issuer Default Rating is 'BB+' with a
Stable Outlook, and its Short-term IDR is 'B'.  Virgin Media's
other instrument ratings are:

  -- Virgin Media Investment Holdings senior secured bank
     facilities: 'BBB-'

  -- Virgin Media Secured Finance Plc 2018 senior secured bonds:

  -- Virgin Media Finance Plc 2014, 2016 and 2109 senior notes:

VIRGIN MEDIA: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it raised its long-term
corporate credit rating on U.K. cable operator Virgin Media Inc.
to 'BB' from 'BB-'.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned a 'BBB-' issue rating to the
proposed GBP750 million-equivalent secured notes to be issued by
Virgin Media Secured Finance PLC (not rated), a subsidiary of VMI.
S&P raised the issue rating on the existing senior secured
facilities issued by Virgin Media Investment Holdings Ltd. and
other subsidiaries of VMI, and the issue rating on existing
ť1.5 billion-equivalent senior secured notes, issued by VMI, to
'BBB-' from 'BB+', two notches higher than the corporate credit
rating on VMI.  The recovery rating on all this debt is '1',
indicating S&P's expectation of very high (90%-100%) recovery for
senior secured lenders in the event of a payment default.

S&P also raised the issue ratings on Virgin Media Finance PLC's
(VMF) debt to 'BB-' from 'B+', and on VMI's unsecured convertible
bond to 'B+' from 'B'.  The respective recovery ratings of '5' and
'6' on these instruments remain unchanged.

"The upgrade reflects VMI's solid operating performance in 2010
and S&P's expectation that moderate revenues and EBITDA growth
over the next 12 months will support the company's good free
operating cash flow generation," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Guillaume Trentin.

This, combined with greater visibility on the direction and
thresholds of management's financial policy, will likely result in
an adjusted gross debt-to-EBITDA ratio below 4.0x in the coming
quarters, compared to an estimated 4.3x (3.9x on a net-debt basis)
at end-December 2010.  Furthermore, S&P anticipates that VMI's
credit measures could also benefit from some debt prepayment in
2011, either with sizable cash available on balance sheet or
excess cash generated, in line with the company's reaffirmed
"Capital Return Programme."

VMI reported good results across all operating divisions in 2010,
producing year-on-year revenue growth of 5.8%.  The primary
drivers included continued healthy average revenue per user and
customer increases in the company's core residential cable
division.  For 2011, S&P project that increased take-up of bundled
('triple or quadruple play") products and premium services should
translate into mid-to-low single-digit growth in revenues.  In
light of the company's good operating leverage, this in turn will
likely lead to a slight improvement in profitability, although S&P
still sees the EBITDA margin below 40%, and continued solid FOCF
generation that will likely exceed the GBP409 million generated in

Importantly, S&P believes that management will fine tune
shareholder returns so as to remain within its financial policy
parameters.  Management has recently reaffirmed its target of a
leverage ratio of net debt to operating cash flow (akin to EBITDA)
of approximately 3.0x by 2012-2013.  S&P think this ratio target
will likely consistently translate into a fully adjusted ratio
within the 3.5x-4x range.

"The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that VMI is likely to
continue to post moderate revenues and EBITDA growth from
increasing bundled products and advanced services penetration,
which in turn will likely result in sustained meaningful FOCF
generation," said Mr. Trentin.

The outlook also factors in S&P's expectation that the company
will reduce rapidly and then maintain an adjusted leverage below
4.0x, while adapting its shareholder returns to meet its
deleveraging objectives.   In the event of a slowdown in operating
performance or cash generation, S&P anticipates that management
would curtail its share repurchases.

Adopting a more aggressive financial policy than S&P currently
expect--which could arise from increasing returns to shareholders
prior to improving headroom under the credit metrics--or any
deterioration in operating performance or FOCF generation in the
face of excessive market competition would likely put downward
pressure on the ratings.

S&P believes rating upside is unlikely in the next 12 months,
given that the ratings already factor in strengthening credit
metrics.  VMI's current financial policy, in terms of its leverage
target and shareholder returns, could prevent a further reduction
of adjusted leverage to 3.0x-3.5x, which is the range S&P deem
adequate to consider rating upside.


* S&P Updates Annual Study of Sovereign Defaults
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services' sovereign ratings have been
effective indicators of default risk of governments worldwide on
relative and absolute bases, according to the latest annual study
on the performance and default rates of its global sovereign
ratings, published Feb. 23.  The study, titled "Sovereign Defaults
And Rating Transition Data, 2010 Update," shows that since 1975,
on average only 1.0% of investment-grade sovereigns (those rated
'BBB-' and above) have defaulted on their foreign-currency
obligations within 15 years compared with 28.6% of those in the
speculative-grade category.

"Default rates rise as sovereign ratings decline across time
horizons," said John Chambers, chairman of Standard & Poor's
sovereign rating committee.

"For example, since 1975, the average 15-year cumulative default
rates for sovereign foreign-currency ratings are zero for the
'AAA', 'AA', and 'A' categories and 5.6%, 17.5%, and 42.8% for the
'BBB' through 'B' categories."

Jamaica was the only rated sovereign to default in 2010.  Standard
& Poor's revised its ratings on Jamaica to 'SD' (selective
default) from 'CCC' on Jan. 14, 2010, following its announced
exchange for foreign-currency and local-currency government debt
governed under domestic law.  After its debt restructuring, S&P
assigned 'B-' sovereign ratings to Jamaica on Feb. 24, 2010.

The study uses transition matrices, Lorenz curves, and cumulative
default statistics to examine the correlation between Standard &
Poor's sovereign ratings and actual sovereign defaults.  The study
also concludes that:

   -- Sovereign ratings have been more stable at higher rating

   -- Over the last 15 years, SY&P has raised more foreign-
      currency sovereign credit ratings than S&P has lowered,
      though downgrades far outnumbered upgrades in 2008 and 2009,
      and the ratio of negative to positive rating outlooks
      suggest they could again in 2011.

   -- Sovereign ratings are no more volatile than other credit
      ratings; large rating movements in either direction are the
      exception and not the rule, even over several years.

   -- The relative rank ordering of sovereign ratings is

   -- The sovereign rating default experience is in line with
      reference default rates proposed under the Basel II
      guidelines, even though default rates for individual years
      vary widely.

The article tracks the incidence of default and rating changes for
sovereign governments between 1975 and 2010.  First published in
March 1999 and updated annually, the report includes rating data
on the 126 sovereigns Standard & Poor's rated at year-end 2010.
It also includes data on the autocorrelation of rating actions.

* S&P: European CMBS Signs of Recovery Confined to Prime Market
Signs of recovery are being reported in European commercial real
estate but are confined to the prime end of the market, according
to Standard & Poor's European CMBS bulletin.

According to S&P, "Because the European commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) universe is predominantly secured by secondary
assets, we believe that loan maturity performance will remain
under pressure in 2011.  Reports of asset sales over the past 12
months indicate that the secondary market is lagging behind the
prime market in a number of jurisdictions."

-- In the U.K., for instance, asset sales have picked up since
their trough in 2009, in part because trophy assets that promise
income security are currently in demand from foreign and
institutional investors.  But the secondary market remains weak,
in S&P's view, and constrained by the lack of finance for anything
but the best quality stock.

-- For Germany, which suffered less severe peak-to-trough declines
than the U.K., S&P also anticipates there will be high demand for
core properties with low risk.  However, the limited supply of
such properties is likely to be a constraining factor on
investment activity.

-- In the French property market, investors appear to remain
cautious and selective with a strong concentration of asset
acquisitions in the greater Paris region.

Against this background, European CMBS loan performance in January
continued the trend S&P reported in its last bulletin: More loans
failed to meet maturity obligations and either fell into default
or extended.  S&P's February data received to date repeats this
pattern.  At the note level, in addition to the actions S&P took
as a result of its updated counterparty criteria, S&P also raised
our ratings on tranches in two transactions -- both small loan
transactions -- in view of loan pay-downs and stable performance.

* BOND PRICING: For the Week February 21 to February 25, 2011

Issuer                Coupon     Maturity  Currency    Price
------                ------     --------  --------    -----

BA CREDITANSTALT        5.470    8/28/2013      EUR     67.00
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.170    7/29/2015      EUR     66.75
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.810    7/29/2025      EUR     57.13
RAIFF ZENTRALBK         4.500    9/28/2035      EUR     79.75

KOMMUNEKREDIT           0.500     2/3/2016      TRY     72.66

MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500     2/9/2016      ZAR     65.68
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000    2/27/2018      AUD     65.71
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500    9/24/2020      CAD     69.90
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500    3/17/2025      CAD     54.86
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000    6/30/2017      ZAR     58.60
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.250    6/28/2040      CAD     23.90

AIR FRANCE-KLM          4.970     4/1/2015      EUR     15.28
ALCATEL-LUCENT          5.000     1/1/2015      EUR      4.18
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG        6.720     1/1/2015      EUR      5.07
ATOS ORIGIN SA          2.500     1/1/2016      EUR     54.30
BNP PARIBAS            10.050    7/24/2012      USD     59.62
CALYON                  6.000    6/18/2047      EUR     31.04
CAP GEMINI SOGET        3.500     1/1/2014      EUR     45.66
CAP GEMINI SOGET        1.000     1/1/2012      EUR     45.79
CGG VERITAS             1.750     1/1/2016      EUR     31.38
CLUB MEDITERRANE        6.110    11/1/2015      EUR     19.22
CLUB MEDITERRANE        5.000     6/8/2012      EUR     17.18
EURAZEO                 6.250    6/10/2014      EUR     58.08
FAURECIA                4.500     1/1/2015      EUR     29.90
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125    7/31/2014      EUR     17.90
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125    7/31/2015      EUR     16.11
NEXANS SA               4.000     1/1/2016      EUR     68.64
ORPEA                   3.875     1/1/2016      EUR     48.68
PEUGEOT SA              4.450     1/1/2016      EUR     33.26
PUBLICIS GROUPE         1.000    1/18/2018      EUR     49.18
PUBLICIS GROUPE         3.125    7/30/2014      EUR     40.99
RHODIA SA               0.500     1/1/2014      EUR     49.50
SOC AIR FRANCE          2.750     4/1/2020      EUR     21.67
SOITEC                  6.250     9/9/2014      EUR     10.45
TEM                     4.250     1/1/2015      EUR     57.79
THEOLIA                 2.700     1/1/2041      EUR     10.86

DEUTSCHE BK LOND        3.000    5/18/2012      CHF     65.92
EUROHYPO AG             6.490    7/17/2017      EUR      8.50
HSH NORDBANK AG         4.375    2/14/2017      EUR     59.48
L-BANK FOERDERBK        0.500    5/10/2027      CAD     49.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT         2.500    1/30/2034      EUR     66.10
SOLON AG SOLAR          1.375    12/6/2012      EUR     37.28

ATHENS URBAN TRN        5.008    7/18/2017      EUR     66.07
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.851    9/19/2016      EUR     70.78
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.300    7/25/2030      EUR     49.71
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.900    7/25/2025      EUR     50.60
HELLENIC REPUB          5.250     2/1/2016      JPY     70.43
HELLENIC REPUB          6.140    4/14/2028      EUR     64.42
HELLENIC REPUB          5.000    8/22/2016      JPY     65.21
HELLENIC REPUB          4.590     4/8/2016      EUR     67.68
HELLENIC REPUB          5.000    3/11/2019      EUR     60.19
HELLENIC REPUB          5.200    7/17/2034      EUR     67.99
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600    9/20/2040      EUR     55.54
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500    9/20/2037      EUR     55.61
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.300    3/20/2026      EUR     61.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.700    3/20/2024      EUR     60.58
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600    7/20/2018      EUR     63.64
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.250    6/19/2020      EUR     69.15
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.000    7/19/2019      EUR     67.46
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.959     3/4/2019      EUR     66.27
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.014    2/27/2019      EUR     61.94
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.590     4/3/2018      EUR     62.18
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.675    10/9/2017      EUR     63.98
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.300    7/20/2017      EUR     63.27
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.900    4/20/2017      EUR     68.23
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.225     3/1/2017      EUR     64.16
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.020    9/13/2016      EUR     65.16
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.600    7/20/2016      EUR     63.76
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.702    9/30/2015      EUR     68.39
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.700    7/20/2015      EUR     67.76
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.113    9/30/2014      EUR     73.89
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.985    7/25/2014      EUR     73.87
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500    5/20/2014      EUR     74.13
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500     7/1/2014      EUR     74.11
NATIONAL BK GREE        3.875    10/7/2016      EUR     73.77

AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.580    4/28/2028      EUR     65.07
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000    2/12/2030      EUR     59.04
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000     3/1/2030      EUR     59.01
ALLIED IRISH BKS       12.500    6/25/2019      GBP     26.76
ALLIED IRISH BKS       11.500    3/29/2022      GBP     24.43
ALLIED IRISH BKS        7.875     7/5/2023      GBP     23.24
ALLIED IRISH BKS        5.250    3/10/2025      GBP     22.37
ALLIED IRISH BKS       10.750    3/29/2017      EUR     24.38
ALLIED IRISH BKS       12.500    6/25/2019      EUR     24.75
ALLIED IRISH BKS       10.750    3/29/2017      USD     28.95
BANK OF IRELAND        10.750    6/22/2018      GBP     61.13
BANK OF IRELAND         4.625    2/27/2019      EUR     53.53
BANK OF IRELAND        10.000    2/12/2020      EUR     64.84
BANK OF IRELAND         9.250     9/7/2020      GBP     58.94
BANK OF IRELAND        10.000    2/12/2020      GBP     63.83
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.400    11/6/2029      EUR     65.45
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.450     3/1/2030      EUR     65.80
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.760     9/7/2029      EUR     68.56
DEPFA ACS BANK          5.125    3/16/2037      USD     63.79
DEPFA ACS BANK          4.900    8/24/2035      CAD     63.84
DEPFA ACS BANK          0.500     3/3/2025      CAD     33.75
DEPFA ACS BANK          5.125    3/16/2037      USD     64.09
DEPFA BANK PLC          3.150     4/3/2018      EUR     74.84
IRISH GOVT              4.400    6/18/2019      EUR     73.47
IRISH GOVT              4.500    4/18/2020      EUR     71.59
IRISH GOVT              5.400    3/13/2025      EUR     70.42
IRISH NATIONWIDE       13.000    8/12/2016      GBP      6.63
IRISH NATIONWIDE        5.500    1/10/2018      GBP      9.99
IRISH NATIONWIDE        6.250    6/26/2012      GBP     29.50

ABRUZZO REGION          4.450     3/1/2037      EUR     72.64
CITY OF TURIN           5.270    6/26/2038      EUR     65.48
CO BRAONE               4.567    6/30/2037      EUR     74.43
CO CASTELMASSA          3.960    3/31/2026      EUR     73.18
COMUNE DI MILANO        4.019    6/29/2035      EUR     69.22
TELECOM ITALIA          5.250    3/17/2055      EUR     74.91

ARCELORMITTAL           7.250     4/1/2014      EUR     32.07
BREEZE FINANCE          4.524    4/19/2027      EUR     75.00
DEXIA BQ INT LUX        2.390    12/7/2021      EUR     71.60
IIB LUXEMBOURG         11.000    2/19/2013      USD     13.49
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000    4/30/2014      EUR     35.90
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000    4/30/2014      EUR     35.25

APP INTL FINANCE       11.750    10/1/2005      USD      0.01
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500    3/17/2016      TRY     71.53
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500    2/24/2025      CAD     53.10
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500     3/3/2021      NZD     59.75
BRIT INSURANCE          6.625    12/9/2030      GBP     66.25
ELEC DE CAR FIN         8.500    4/10/2018      USD     55.37
NATL INVESTER BK       25.983     5/7/2029      EUR     22.38
NED WATERSCHAPBK        2.927    6/30/2045      EUR     69.75
NED WATERSCHAPBK        0.500    3/11/2025      CAD     53.77
RABOBANK                2.805    8/28/2020      AUD     75.17
SIDETUR FINANCE        10.000    4/20/2016      USD     73.50
TJIWI KIMIA FIN        13.250     8/1/2001      USD      0.01

EKSPORTFINANS           0.500     5/9/2030      CAD     41.83
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500    1/27/2016      ZAR     72.02
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500    3/24/2016      ZAR     71.00
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500     3/1/2016      ZAR     71.23

REP OF POLAND           2.648    3/29/2034      JPY     65.36

CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.380    10/1/2038      EUR     68.67
METRO DE LISBOA         4.799    12/7/2027      EUR     71.18
METRO DE LISBOA         4.061    12/4/2026      EUR     65.52
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.100    4/15/2037      EUR     68.73
APK ARKADA             17.500    5/23/2012      RUB      0.38
ARKTEL-INVEST          12.000     4/9/2012      RUB      0.05
BALTINVESTBANK          9.000    9/10/2015      RUB     75.00
BANK KEDR              12.800    7/22/2011      RUB     75.00
BARENTSEV FINANS       20.000     7/4/2011      RUB      1.60
CENTREINVEST GRO        9.250    6/24/2014      RUB    101.60
DVTG-FINANS            17.000    8/29/2013      RUB      3.01
ENERGOSTROY-FINA       12.000    5/20/2011      RUB     75.00
EUROKOMMERZ            16.000    3/15/2011      RUB      0.01
IZHAVTO                18.000     6/9/2011      RUB     11.31
KARUSEL FINANS         12.000    9/12/2013      RUB     75.00
KIT FINANCE CAPI       11.000    4/17/2014      RUB     75.00
KVART-FINANS           12.000    10/5/2011      RUB     75.00
LADYA FINANS           13.750    9/13/2012      RUB     75.00
LLC VICTORIA FIN        8.000    2/12/2013      RUB     75.00
M-INDUSTRIYA           12.250    8/16/2011      RUB     29.83
MAGNIT OJSC             8.250     9/9/2013      RUB     75.00
MAGNIT OJSC             8.250     9/9/2013      RUB     75.00
MEDVED-FINANS          14.000    8/16/2013      RUB     75.00
MIG-FINANS              0.100     9/6/2011      RUB      1.00
MIRAX                  14.990    5/17/2011      RUB     47.01
MIRAX                  17.000    9/17/2012      RUB     43.04
MOSMART FINANS          0.010    4/12/2012      RUB      1.81
MOSOBLGAZ              12.000    5/17/2011      RUB     72.50
MOSOBLTRUSTINVES       20.000    3/26/2011      RUB      6.99
NATIONAL CAPITAL       12.500    5/20/2011      RUB     75.00
NOK                    10.000    9/22/2011      RUB      7.55
OBYEDINEONNYE KO       10.750    5/16/2012      RUB     75.00
PEB LEASING            14.000    9/12/2014      RUB     75.00
RUSSIAN STANDARD        7.750    4/13/2012      RUB     75.00
RYBINSKKABEL            0.010    2/28/2012      RUB      1.00
SAHO                   10.000    5/21/2012      RUB      2.11
SATURN                  8.500     6/6/2014      RUB      1.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS        10.500    3/27/2012      RUB      3.40
SISTEMA-HALS            8.500    4/15/2014      RUB     75.00
SISTEMA-HALS            8.500     4/8/2014      RUB     75.00
SOUTHERN STOCK C        9.000    4/29/2014      RUB     75.00
SVOBODNY SOKOL          0.100    5/24/2011      RUB      1.31
TALIO-PRINCEPS         16.000    5/17/2012      RUB     75.00
TECHNOSILA-INVES        7.000    5/26/2011      RUB      0.04
TERNA-FINANS            1.000    11/4/2011      RUB      5.02
TRANSCREDITFACTO       12.000    6/11/2012      RUB     75.00
TRANSFIN-M             10.750    8/10/2012      RUB     75.00
TRANSFIN-M              9.750    8/13/2013      RUB     75.00
TRANSFIN-M              9.750    8/13/2013      RUB     75.00
VKM-LEASING FINA        1.000    5/18/2011      RUB      0.02
VOSTOCHNY EXPRES       12.500     3/7/2013      RUB    100.25
VTB BANK                7.600    3/15/2013      RUB    100.30
WIMM-BILL-DANN          7.450    2/27/2013      RUB    100.10
ZAO EUROPLAN           10.000    8/11/2011      RUB     75.00
ZHILSOTSIPOTEKA-        9.000    7/26/2011      RUB     75.00

AYT CEDULAS CAJA        4.750    5/25/2027      EUR     72.97
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        3.750    6/30/2025      EUR     65.05
AYUNTAM DE MADRD        4.550    6/16/2036      EUR     71.11
BANCAJA                 1.500    5/22/2018      EUR     60.81
BANCO GUIPUZCOAN        1.500    4/18/2022      EUR     50.28
CAJA CASTIL-MAN         1.500    6/23/2021      EUR     62.07
CAJA MADRID             5.755    2/26/2028      EUR     63.35
CAJA MADRID             4.000     2/3/2025      EUR     75.64
CAJA MADRID             4.125    3/24/2036      EUR     68.47
CEDULAS TDA 6           3.875    5/23/2025      EUR     66.17
CEDULAS TDA A-5         4.250    3/28/2027      EUR     66.63
CEDULAS TDA A-6         4.250    4/10/2031      EUR     63.11
COMUNIDAD ARAGON        4.646    7/11/2036      EUR     74.77
GEN DE CATALUNYA        4.220    4/26/2035      EUR     71.80
GENERAL DE ALQUI        2.750    8/20/2012      EUR     73.01
IM CEDULAS 5            3.500    6/15/2020      EUR     74.00
JUNTA LA MANCHA         3.875    1/31/2036      EUR     63.87

SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    9/29/2015      BRL     64.02
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500     3/3/2016      ZAR     65.46
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    1/25/2028      USD     50.64
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.000    8/12/2011      USD     10.08
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.000    8/28/2011      USD     10.74
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000    11/4/2011      USD      8.92
SWEDISH EXP CRED        2.000    12/7/2011      USD     10.09
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000    1/27/2012      USD     10.10

UBS AG                 10.580    6/29/2011      USD     40.19
UBS AG                 13.300    5/23/2012      USD      4.25
UBS AG                 10.530    1/23/2012      USD     39.51
UBS AG                 14.000    5/23/2012      USD      9.70
UBS AG                 13.700    5/23/2012      USD     14.05
UBS AG JERSEY          10.500    6/16/2011      USD     73.14
UBS AG JERSEY          11.000    2/28/2011      USD     69.69
UBS AG JERSEY          12.800    2/28/2011      USD     33.19
UBS AG JERSEY          10.990    3/31/2011      USD     30.98
UBS AG JERSEY          13.000    6/16/2011      USD     50.13
UBS AG JERSEY          10.280    8/19/2011      USD     35.71
UBS AG JERSEY          10.360    8/19/2011      USD     53.45
UBS AG JERSEY          11.150    8/31/2011      USD     39.66
UBS AG JERSEY           9.350    9/21/2011      USD     70.88
UBS AG JERSEY           9.450    9/21/2011      USD     51.03
UBS AG JERSEY           3.220    7/31/2012      EUR     52.82

BANK OF SCOTLAND        5.772     2/7/2035      EUR     72.77
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.350    1/23/2012      USD     22.03
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.250    8/31/2012      USD     35.46
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.500    8/31/2012      USD     30.45
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.650    1/31/2012      USD     45.71
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.250    1/31/2012      USD      9.71
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.550    1/23/2012      USD     11.32
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.800    7/31/2012      USD     28.00
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.800    9/22/2011      USD     16.64
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.750    9/22/2011      USD     73.50
BARCLAYS BK PLC         7.500    9/22/2011      USD     17.15
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.000    6/30/2011      USD     43.42
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.510    5/31/2011      USD     13.01
BARCLAYS BK PLC        13.000    5/23/2011      USD     23.99
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.950    5/23/2011      USD     65.04
BARCLAYS BK PLC        13.050    4/27/2012      USD     27.08
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.400    7/31/2012      USD     11.51
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.950    4/20/2012      USD     16.30
BRADFORD&BIN BLD        5.500    1/15/2018      GBP     45.36
BRADFORD&BIN BLD        4.910     2/1/2047      EUR     66.17
BRADFORD&BIN PLC        7.625    2/16/2049      GBP     46.98
BRADFORD&BIN PLC        6.625    6/16/2023      GBP     45.68
CO-OPERATIVE BNK        5.875    3/28/2033      GBP     69.08
DISCOVERY EDUCAT        1.948    3/31/2037      GBP     67.45
EFG HELLAS PLC          6.010     1/9/2036      EUR     25.13
EFG HELLAS PLC          5.400    11/2/2047      EUR     53.63
HBOS PLC                4.500    3/18/2030      EUR     72.54
HBOS PLC                6.000    11/1/2033      USD     67.28
HBOS PLC                6.000    11/1/2033      USD     67.28
HEALTHCARE SUPP         2.067    2/19/2043      GBP     70.60
MAX PETROLEUM           6.750     9/8/2012      USD     60.91
NORTHERN ROCK           4.574    1/13/2015      GBP     75.95
NORTHERN ROCK           5.750    2/28/2017      GBP     70.00
PRINCIPALITY BLD        5.375     7/8/2016      GBP     73.97
PUNCH TAVERNS           8.374    7/15/2029      GBP     58.54
PUNCH TAVERNS           7.567    4/15/2026      GBP     58.42
PUNCH TAVERNS           6.468    4/15/2033      GBP     46.79
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        6.316    6/29/2030      EUR     67.68
SKIPTON BUILDING        5.625    1/18/2018      GBP     70.60
SKIPTON BUILDING        6.750    5/30/2022      GBP     65.81
UNIQUE PUB FIN          6.464    3/30/2032      GBP     64.68
WESSEX WATER FIN        1.369    7/31/2057      GBP     32.07
YORKSHRE BLD SOC        6.375    4/26/2024      GBP     97.06


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *