TCREUR_Public/110304.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Friday, March 4, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 45

                            Headlines



C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to 'B3'


F R A N C E

LABCO SAS: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Rating to Senior Secured Notes


G E R M A N Y

KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: S&P Gives Positive Outlook; Keeps 'BB-' Rating


I C E L A N D

LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Wholesale Depositors Fight for Claims
LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Cost to Cover Icesave Claims Put at ISK32BB
* ICELAND: Corporate Bankruptcies Down 8% in January 2011


I R E L A N D

CORSAIR FINANCE: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR200MM Notes to 'Ba2'
EBS BUILDING: IL&P Still Open to Merger of Banking Division
FOUR PIZZA: High Court Approves Survival Scheme
PALMER SQUARE: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to CC (sf)


* IRELAND: Seeks Lower Interest Rate on Bailout; Rules Out Default


I T A L Y

BANCA CARIM: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings


L A T V I A

LIDO: Owner Declared Insolvent by Aizkraukle District Court


M A L T A

FIMBANK PLC: Fitch Affirms Long-Term Issuer Default Rating at 'BB'


P O R T U G A L

* PORTUGAL: To Launch New Austerity Measures Amid Default Fears


S P A I N

CAJA INGENIEROS: Fitch Assigns 'BB+sf' Rating to Class C Notes
IM BANKOA: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba2 (sf)' Rating to Class C Notes
SERIE AYT: Moody's Assigns 'C(sf)' Rating to Class D Notes


T U R K E Y

* Moody's Retains 'Ba2' Issuer Rating on Municipality of Istanbul


U K R A I N E

METINVEST BV: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to Medium Term Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ARROGANT CAT: Goes Into Administration, Puts 3 Stores on Sale
DEUTSCHE PFANDBRIEFBANK: S&P Cuts Rating on Various Notes to 'B'
EXCELL COMMUNICATIONS: MD Resignation No Impact on Firm's Demise
METRIX SECURITIES: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Class E Notes to 'B1'
PETER SCOTT: To Take On an Extra 20 Employees

PUNCH TAVERNS: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Three Classes of Notes to BB-
VIRGIN MEDIA: Moody's Assigns Rating to New Senior Secured Notes
WIGAN ATHLETIC: Auditor Expresses Going Concern Doubt
* UK: Banks Could Be Allowed to Fail to Avoid Taxpayer Bailouts


X X X X X X X X

* EUROPE: Basel to Discuss CoCo Bond Proposals Next Weeks
* BOOK REVIEW: Performance Evaluation of Hedge Funds




                            *********


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C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
===========================


CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the corporate family rating
of Central European Media Enterprises Ltd to B3 from B2 and its
EUR148 million senior notes due 2014 to Caa1 from B3.  The rating
on the EUR170 million senior secured notes due 2017 issued by CET
21 spol. s.r.o. is unchanged at Ba3.  The outlook on CME's ratings
is stable.

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrade to B3 reflects (i) CME's high financial leverage of
over 10.0x net adjusted debt to EBITDA as of December 2010; (ii)
its negative free cash flow profile; and (ii) Moody's view that
meaningful de-leveraging remains largely dependent on a still
fragile recovery in Central and Eastern European advertising
markets.  In addition, Moody's understands a return to cash flow
breakeven for the group may imply the need for CME to successfully
effect reductions in capital expenditures, working capital and the
rescheduling of programming commitments over the course of 2011,
which in Moody's view entail a degree of execution risk.

Moody's notes that in 2010 the TV advertising spend in CME's
markets continued to decline at a quarterly average of 5%, hence
at a slower pace than in 2009.  CME showed a 6% decline in
revenues and a 16% decline in EBITDA in the period, when excluding
the contribution of bTV Bulgaria, acquired in April 2010.  While a
recovery in private consumption and advertising markets is
expected for 2011, Moody's cautions that the pace of that recovery
remains uncertain at this stage.

The B3 corporate family rating continues to recognize (i) the
strong competitive positions that CME enjoys in its markets --
ranging from 40% to 78% market share; and (ii) CME's improved
business risk profile following the disposal of Ukraine operations
and the acquisition of bTV in Bulgaria, with an expectations of
positive EBITDA contribution bTV in 2011.

Moody's notes that following the refinancing undertaken in October
2010 by way of issuance of the EUR170 million senior secured notes
at CET21 and the recent completion of a private exchange for
US$206 million of its outstanding convertible notes due 2013, the
next debt maturities are coming due in 2013, in the amount of
US$234 million.

The Ba3 rating on the EUR170 million senior secured notes due 2017
issued by CET21 remain unchanged as Moody's believes the notes
continue to benefit from (i) priority ranking ahead of a
significant amount of senior notes issued by CME; and (ii) from
strong collateral.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that CME will
maintain its strong market positions and that CME's markets are
showing signs of a bottoming out.

A meaningful loss in market position or a failure to de-leverage
towards 7.0x net adjusted debt to EBITDA by the end of 2011 could
put pressure on CME's ratings.

A strong recovery such that leverage falls well below 7.0x on a
sustainable basis, could exert upward pressure on CME's ratings.

CME, a Bermuda-incorporated company, is the indirect parent
company of CET Group, of which it owns 100%.  CME is a vertically
integrated media company with networks and content production
units in six Central and Eastern European countries.  Launched in
1994, CME now operates 23 channels.  For the year ending
Dec. 31, 2010, CME generated net revenues of US$737 million and
OIBDA of US$107 million.

The CET Group is an entertainment and media company that operates
broadcasting, content and new media businesses in the Czech
Republic and in Slovakia.  The CET Group's main television
channels include TV NOVA (Czech Republic) and TV MARKIZA (Slovak
Republic), which are market leaders based on their all-day and
prime-time audience shares since 1994 and 1996, respectively.
During the year ending 31 December 2009, TV NOVA and TV MARKIZA
had prime-time audience shares of 47% and 33%, respectively.  Over
the same period, the CET Group generated net revenues of US$378
million and OIBDA of US$142 million; and in the six months ending
June 30, 2010, the company generated net revenues of US$170
million and OIBDA of US$53 million.


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F R A N C E
===========


LABCO SAS: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Rating to Senior Secured Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Labco SAS's senior secured notes a
final rating of 'BB-' and super senior revolving credit facility a
final rating of 'BB'.

The company's Long-term Issuer Default Rating is 'B+' with a
Stable Outlook.


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G E R M A N Y
=============


KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: S&P Gives Positive Outlook; Keeps 'BB-' Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised its
outlook on German cable operator Kabel Deutschland GmbH to
positive from stable.  At the same time, the 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit rating on the company was affirmed.

"The outlook revision reflects the fact that KDG's credit measures
have improved faster than S&P had expected, primarily owing to the
use of excess cash for debt reduction, which formed part of the
company's recent capital structure optimization," said Standard &
Poor's credit analyst Matthias Raab.

In the nine months ending Dec. 31, 2010, KDG's revenues increased
by 6.9% year on year and EBITDA, as adjusted by the company,
climbed 11.1%, primarily as a result of higher revenues from HSI
and telephony services.  As of Dec. 31, 2010, the number of
subscribers taking HSI and telephony services increased by 28%
year on year to 1.3 million and monthly average revenues of these
subscribers increased slightly by 2.8% to EUR28.6, despite fierce
competition from fixed-line telecommunication operators.  In
addition, KDG generated EUR34 million FOCF in the nine months
ending Dec. 31, 2010, despite a large negative seasonal working
capital change of EUR144 million and a one-off cash outflow
totalling EUR34 million, which was related to the redemption of
its 2014 senior notes and amendment fees.

"The positive outlook reflects the likelihood that S&P could raise
the rating in the next 12 to 18 months if KDG's credit measures
continue to improve as a result of continued earnings growth and
the application of free cash flow toward debt reduction," added
Mr. Raab.


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I C E L A N D
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LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Wholesale Depositors Fight for Claims
---------------------------------------------------------
Omar R. Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News reports that Johannes Karl
Sveinsson, a member of the committee negotiating claims stemming
from Landsbanki Islands hf's 2008 failure, said wholesale
depositors at the bank are fighting to ensure their claims aren't
ranked behind regular deposits.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Sveinsson said at a press briefing on
Wednesday that should the District Court of Reykjavik rule that
ISK147 billion (US$1.27 billion) in wholesale loans aren't regular
deposits, which were granted priority status after Iceland passed
an emergency bill in 2008, "it will reduce the financial burden of
the Treasury."

Bloomberg relates that Larus Blondal, another member of the
negotiating committee, said a ruling against wholesale depositors
would mean "the Treasury will not incur any cost" from covering
depositor claims, once Landsbanki's assets are liquidated.

                     About Landsbanki Islands

Landsbanki Islands hf, also commonly known as Landsbankinn in
Iceland, is an Icelandic bank.  The bank offered online savings
accounts under the "Icesave" brand.  On October 7, 2008, the
Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority took control of
Landsbanki and two other major banks.

Landsbanki filed for Chapter 15 protection on Dec. 9, 2008 (Bankr.
S.D. N.Y. Case No.: 08-14921).  Gary S. Lee, Esq., at Morrison &
Foerster LLP, represents the Debtor.  When it filed for protection
from its creditors, it listed assets and debts of more than
US$1 billion each.


LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Cost to Cover Icesave Claims Put at ISK32BB
---------------------------------------------------------------
Omar R. Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News reports that revised
calculations published by the Finance Ministry on Wednesday showed
that the Icelandic government faces costs of ISK32 billion
(US$277 million) to cover British and Dutch depositor claims
stemming from the failure of Landsbanki Islands hf.

According to Bloomberg, the Finance Ministry said that the
previous estimate put the costs at ISK47 billion.

Landsbanki assets are now valued at ISK1.175 trillion, enough to
cover 89% of the depositor claims, Bloomberg says, citing the
statement.

More than 350,000 British and Dutch depositors in Icesave,
as the high-yielding Landsbanki accounts were called, risked
losing their savings when the bank collapsed along with the rest
of Iceland's over-leveraged banking system more than two years
ago, Bloomberg relates.

Icelanders will vote on the depositor claims bill at an April 9
referendum after President Olafur R. Grimsson refused to sign an
accord agreed with the British and Dutch governments in
December, Bloomberg discloses.

                     About Landsbanki Islands

Landsbanki Islands hf, also commonly known as Landsbankinn in
Iceland, is an Icelandic bank.  The bank offered online savings
accounts under the "Icesave" brand.  On October 7, 2008, the
Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority took control of
Landsbanki and two other major banks.

Landsbanki filed for Chapter 15 protection on Dec. 9, 2008 (Bankr.
S.D. N.Y. Case No.: 08-14921).  Gary S. Lee, Esq., at Morrison &
Foerster LLP, represents the Debtor.  When it filed for protection
from its creditors, it listed assets and debts of more than
US$1 billion each.


* ICELAND: Corporate Bankruptcies Down 8% in January 2011
---------------------------------------------------------
Iceland Review reports that in January 2011, 95 companies in
Iceland entered into bankruptcy proceedings compared to 103 in
January 2010, which is an almost 8% decrease between years.

According to Icelandic Review, most bankruptcies took place in the
construction sector.


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I R E L A N D
=============


CORSAIR FINANCE: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR200MM Notes to 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken this rating action on notes
issued by Corsair Finance (Ireland) No. 2 Limited, a
collateralized debt obligation transaction referencing a static
portfolio of corporate entities:

Issuer: Corsair Finance (Ireland) No. 2 Limited

  -- EUR200M Series 13 Floating Rate Secured Portfolio Credit -
     Linked Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 22,
     2010 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the deterioration of the credit quality of the reference
portfolio.  The transaction is exposed to Anglo Irish Bank
Corporation Plc which has suffered a credit event since the last
rating action in July 2010.  The 10 year weighted average rating
factor of the portfolio, adjusted with forward looking measures
and based on senior unsecured debt ratings, has deteriorated from
114 to 234, equivalent to an average rating of the current
portfolio of Baa1.  In downgrading the rating of the tranche,
Moody's has taken into account that the reference portfolio is
100% exposed to the Banking and Finance industry sectors.
Furthermore 95% of the reference portfolio is exposed to
subordinated debt including Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks
p.l.c., of which subordinated debt of both are currently rated Ca.
Approximately 28% of the reference portfolio is exposed to
entities in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, countries of
which some have experienced multi notch downgrades since the last
rating action.  The transaction has 4.83 years to maturity.

Because of the high concentration of subordinated debt in the
reference portfolio, in its base case Moody's used subordinated
debt ratings as inputs in the CDOROM.

Moody's also performed sensitivity analysis consisting in modeling
Moody's market implied rating in place of the corporate
fundamental rating to derive the default probability of each
corporate name in the reference portfolio.  Moody's market implied
ratings are derived from observable CDS spread on each corporate
name and mapped to Moody's rating scale.  The gap between a Market
implied rating and a Moody's corporate fundamental rating is an
indicator of the extent of the divergence of credit view between
Moody's and the market on each referenced name in the CSO
portfolio.  This run generated a result that was 7 notches lower
than the one modeled under the base case run.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, and
specific documentation features.  All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Moody's analysis of corporate CSOs is subject to uncertainties,
the primary sources of which includes complexity, governance and
leverage.  Although the CDOROM model capture many of the dynamics
of the Corporate CSO structure, it remains a simplification of the
complex reality.  Of greatest concern are (a) variations over time
in default rates for instruments with a given rating, (b)
variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular
seniority/security characteristics and (c) uncertainty about the
default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference
pool.  Similarly on the legal/structural side, the legal analysis
although typically based in part on opinions (and sometimes
interpretations) of legal experts at the time of issuance, is
still subject to potential changes in law, case law and the
interpretations of courts and (in some cases) regulatory
authorities.  Although the impact of these decisions is mitigated
by structural constraints, anticipating the quality of these
decisions necessarily introduces some level of uncertainty in
Moody's assumptions.  Given the tranched nature of Corporate CSO
liabilities, rating transitions in the reference pool may have
leveraged rating implications for the ratings of the Corporate CSO
liabilities, thus leading to a high degree of volatility.  All
else being equal, the volatility is likely to be higher for more
junior or thinner liabilities.  The base case scenario modeled
fits into the central macroeconomic scenario predicted by Moody's
of a sluggish recovery scenario of the corporate universe.  Should
macroeconomics conditions evolves towards a more severe scenario
such as a double dip recession, the CSO rating will likely be
downgraded to an extent depending on the expected severity of the
worsening conditions.


EBS BUILDING: IL&P Still Open to Merger of Banking Division
-----------------------------------------------------------
Geoff Percival at Irish Examiner reports that Irish Life &
Permanent (IL&P) has said it remains open to the idea of forming
some kind of merger between its banking division and the EBS
Building Society even if as expected it loses out in the race to
acquire the latter business.

Irish Examiner notes that while the EBS sale process hasn't been
completed, IL&P's rival bidder, the consortium led by Dublin-based
company Cardinal Asset Management and backed by US billionaire
investor Wilbur Ross, is in pole position.

According to Irish Examiner, speaking at the presentation of
IL&P's annual results on Wednesday, group chief executive Kevin
Murphy conceded the group hadn't been successful in its pursuit of
the EBS, but said that management was keeping "open-minded" on the
matter.

Mr. Murphy, as cited by Irish Examiner, said a strong banking
network in Ireland is reliant on smaller banks merging, and added
that IL&P would be "actively participating" in any strategic
opportunities that become available.  IL&P said that there are a
range of possibilities with regard to Permanent TSB and the EBS
including potentially selling the former to the EBS's new owners
or merging the two entities, Irish Examiner notes.  Mr. Murphy
stressed that IL&P would be willing to talk to Cardinal on the
matter, Irish Examiner relates.

IL&P is keeping its rights issue plans on hold until more is known
of the Central Bank's updated capital requirement guidelines for
the banks -- due at the end of this month -- and until a firm
strategic option presents itself, Irish Examiner states.

                       Capital Injection

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 17,
2010, The Irish Times said that the Irish government injected a
further EUR525 million into EBS.  The new funding came through
special investment shares issued to Minister for Finance
Brian Lenihan, The Irish Times disclosed.  The shares give
Mr. Lenihan control of the building society, including the
composition of the board and passing of members' resolutions, The
Irish Times noted.

EBS Building Society is Ireland's largest building society.
Servicing more than 400,000 members, it distributes its products
through a branch and franchised agency network as well as handling
direct business both over the telephone and via the Internet.
EBS Building Society provides mortgage lending, savings,
investments, and insurance products in Ireland.

                         *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 14,
2011, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the tier 1 instruments
of EBS Building Society (issued through EBS Capital No1 S.A.) one
further notch to C (hyb) from Ca (hyb).  This follows the
announcement of an offer from EBS Building Society to buy back its
dated subordinated and tier 1 debt for cash at substantial
discounts to the par value.  Moody's would classify the exchange
offer on the dated subordinated debt as a distressed exchange.
The society is rated Baa3/P-3 for bank deposits and senior debt
and has a D- bank financial strength rating (mapping to Ba3 on the
long-term scale).  The dated subordinated debt of the bank is
rated Ca.  Moody's said the outlook on the ratings is negative.


FOUR PIZZA: High Court Approves Survival Scheme
-----------------------------------------------
Vivion Kilfeather at Irish Examiner reports that the High Court on
Tuesday approved a survival scheme for the Four Star Pizza
takeaway chain.

Irish Examiner relates that Mr. Justice Brian McGovern was told
Gonville Ltd. had agreed to invest EU500,000 in Four Star's parent
company, Zowington, and its largest creditor, National Irish Bank,
had issued a facility letter to refinance a debt to it of EUR4.65
million.  According to Irish Examiner, the court was told that
Gonville has bought the Irish and British franchise rights of the
pizza chain and half of its investment will go directly into the
Four Star Pizza Ltd.

Examiner Neil Hughes was appointed last November to the takeaway
chain after the court heard it was insolvent and unable to pay its
debts, Irish Examiner recounts.  Irish Examiner relates Rossa
Fanning, counsel for the examiner, said following the
examinership, Mr. Hughes found the there was a reasonable prospect
of survival for the company which employs around 450 people
indirectly and 25 directly.

Irish Examiner notes that the counsel said the number of stores
which will continue trading is 37 following the closure of some
stores and the repudiation of a number of leases.  According to
Irish Examiner, Mr. Fanning said the value put on the company was
around EUR5 million and in the event up a winding up situation,
there would be a significant write-down on that value.  A winding
up would leave an "enormous deficit" of EUR3.8 million, Irish
Examiner states.

Mr. Justice McGovern, as cited by Irish Examiner, said he was
satisfied to approve the survival scheme and allow the company to
continue as a going concern.

In a statement on Tuesday, Gonville said Four Star's future was
now secured, Irish Examiner notes.

Four Star Pizza, which has 42 stores, was the second largest take-
out franchise in the 32 counties.


PALMER SQUARE: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Classes of Notes to CC (sf)
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Palmer Square PLC's class A2-A and A2-B notes.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its ratings on Palmer Square's class A1-AE, A1-A, A1-
B, B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, D-1, and D-2 notes.

The rating actions reflect S&P's assessment of the continuing
deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying asset
portfolio that S&P has observed in recent months.

The portfolio comprises U.S. prime and subprime residential
mortgage-backed securities, including RMBS issued between the
fourth quarter of 2005 and the fourth quarter of 2007 (as the
"affected collateral"), collateralized loan obligations,
collateralized debt obligations backed by affected collateral, and
CDOs of structured finance securities.

Since its review in April 2010, S&P has observed that the
transaction's credit profile has continued to deteriorate.  The
balance of assets considered as defaulted in S&P's analysis
currently stands at US$177.4 million, representing about 18% of
the collateral balance, compared with 14% in April 2010.

S&P's analysis indicates that there is no credit enhancement
currently available for any of the rated classes of notes.  S&P
also note that all of the transaction's overcollateralization
ratio tests continued their decline and all test ratios are
substantially below 100%.

The transaction remains in a pre-enforcement scenario, since
triggering an event of default in February 2009 due to the failure
of the class A-1 event of default overcollateralization ratio
test.  According to the transaction documents, this implies that
Palmer Square continues to distribute available interest and
principal proceeds according to the transaction's pre-enforcement
priority of payments.

From the latest available note valuation report of January 2011,
S&P sees that classes A-1 and A-2 have received their full
interest payment, while all classes of B, C, and D notes continued
to defer their interest payments.  In S&P's view, full payment of
interest and principal on the class B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, D-1, and
D-2 notes remains highly unlikely.  S&P has therefore affirmed its
ratings on these notes at 'CC (sf)'.

Although the class A-2 notes received their full interest payment
on the last payment date of January 2011, full repayment of
principal is highly unlikely, in S&P's view, as it depends on the
receipt of nearly full recoveries on all defaulted assets.  S&P
has therefore lowered its rating on these notes to 'CC (sf)'.

The most recent note valuation report shows that the class A-1
notes received full interest payment on the last payment date in
January 2011.  In addition, these notes have continued to amortize
as the transaction has entered its second year of amortization.
The remaining outstanding principal balance of the class A-1 notes
is about 84% of their initial principal amount.  Nonetheless, full
repayment of these notes is likely to depend on recoveries
received from the defaulted assets.  S&P has therefore affirmed
its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the class A-1 notes because S&P believes
that noteholders are currently vulnerable to nonpayment.

                          Ratings List

                        Palmer Square PLC
       US$1.255 Billion Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

                         Ratings Lowered

                               Rating*
                               ------
             Class       To                 From
             -----       --                 ----
             A2-A        CC (sf)            CCC- (sf)
             A2-B        CC (sf)            CCC- (sf)


                        Ratings Affirmed

                      Class       Rating
                      -----       ------
                      A1-A        CCC- (sf)
                      A1-B        CCC- (sf)
                      A1-AE       CCC- (sf)
                      B-1         CC (sf)
                      B-2         CC (sf)
                      C-1         CC (sf)
                      C-2         CC (sf)
                      D-1         CC (sf)
                      D-2         CC (sf)

* The ratings on the classes of A notes address the timely payment
  of interest and ultimate repayment of principal.  The ratings on
  the classes of B, C, and D notes address the ultimate payment of
  interest and principal.


* IRELAND: Seeks Lower Interest Rate on Bailout; Rules Out Default
------------------------------------------------------------------
Emmet Oliver at Irish Independent reports that Dr. Patrick
Honohan, the governor of the Central Bank, on Tuesday night said
there is likely to be "movement" on lowering the interest rate on
Ireland's EUR85 billion bailout package and defaulting is not an
option.

Mr. Honohan also admitted for the first time that if the
government knew how bad Anglo Irish's losses would become, that
bank wouldn't have been included in the September 2008 guarantee,
Irish Independent relates.

According to Irish Independent, Mr. Honohan, appointed by outgoing
Finance Minister Brian Lenihan, said negotiations on the bailout
package could take place on and off over ten years, as Ireland and
Europe had a "shared interest" in restoring growth.

Meanwhile, the EU Commissioner for Economic and Monetary affairs
Olli Rehn on Tuesday said that senior bondholders of Irish banks
must not be forced to "share the pain" -- but the interest on
Ireland's bailout loans should come down, Irish Independent
discloses.

Mr. Rehn, as cited by Irish Independent, said renegotiation of the
banks' debt is "not on the cards nor on the agenda".


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I T A L Y
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BANCA CARIM: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it affirmed its 'BB-/B'
long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Italy-based
Banca Carim - Cassa di Risparmio di Rimini SpA.  At the same time,
the ratings were removed from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where they had been placed Oct. 7, 2010, following
the announcement by the Italian Finance Ministry that Banca Carim
has been placed under extraordinary administration.  The outlook
is negative.  S&P then withdrew all ratings on Banca Carim at its
request.

"The affirmation reflects S&P's view that Banca Carim's still-good
local franchise in its home territory of Rimini, on Italy's East
coast, supports the current ratings," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Francesca Sacchi.  "Constraining rating factors, in
S&P's opinion, include Banca Carim and subsidiary Credito
Industriale Sammarinese's weak asset quality metrics and sizable
loan concentrations by single borrower, and in the local hotel,
real estate, and construction sectors."

In addition, Banca Carim's presence in the Republic of San Marino
in S&P's view increases its reputational, financial, and operating
risks, given the challenges that San Marino's banking sector is
currently facing.  Banca Carim's funding position, which has
historically been a rating strength, has also weakened since the
Italian finance ministry placed it under extraordinary
administration.  Still, Banca Carim's funding position is adequate
in S&P's opinion for the current ratings.

At the time of withdrawal, the negative outlook reflected the
possibility that S&P would have lowered the long-term rating by
one or more notches if Banca Carim were unable to preserve its
Tier 1 ratio comfortably above the minimum regulatory requirement,
in the event it were forced to sell its equity stake in Credito
Industriale Sammarinese at a price significantly lower than the
latter's book value.  CIS is a small bank, located in San Marino,
operating as an ongoing performing institution, specializing in
corporate and private banking.

The negative outlook also factored in S&P's possible downgrade of
Banca Carim if, on completion of the administrators' examination,
credit losses significantly exceeded its current estimate.  In
S&P's opinion, any additional credit losses that emerge following
the extraordinary administrators' examination of Banca Carim's
loan portfolio could further weigh on its capitalization.
However, in S&P's base-case scenario, the Tier 1 ratio, after
deducting these losses, would still remain slightly above 6%.
Lastly, further weakening of Banca Carim's funding position could
also have triggered a negative rating action.

In S&P's opinion, Banca Carim's still-good local franchise means
that it could be attractive asset for financially stronger banking
groups.  Most of the recent restructurings of Italian banks with
significant retail deposits have led to mergers between banks.  In
such a situation S&P would have assessed the potential support
that Banca Carim would likely receive.


===========
L A T V I A
===========


LIDO: Owner Declared Insolvent by Aizkraukle District Court
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Baltic Times, citing news agency LETA, reports that the
Aizkraukle District Court on Feb. 24 declared Lido owner
Gunars Kirsons insolvent.

According to The Baltic Times, the full verdict will be available
on March 7.

The Baltic Times relates that Normunds Uljanskis, who will act as
the bankruptcy administrator, said that according to the
bankruptcy procedures, Mr. Kirsons' property will be seized and
sold.  He also pointed out that the property sales' plan will be
submitted to the Enterprise Register.

Mr. Kirsons' creditors will be requested to specify their claims,
The Baltic Times says.

On Sept. 28, 2010, Riga's Vidzeme District Court satisfied
Mr. Kirsons' request to apply out-of-court legal protection for
Lido, The Baltic Times recounts.  According to The Baltic Times,
Mr. Kirsons, quoted in the magazine Otkritiy Gorod, said that by
filing for insolvency, he had hoped to save his Lido empire.  "I
went the personal bankruptcy route deliberately so that they would
leave me alone five years," he explained in the interview.

Mr. Kirsons hoped to buy time and turn around his fortunes, as he
was hit by a combination of excessive borrowing and Latvia's
floundering economy, The Baltic Times states.  The Baltic Times
notes that the businessman attributed blame for business errors
equally to himself and to "the government and the bank".

Lido operated with a turnover of LVL18.2 million (EUR26 million)
and losses of LVL603,342 in 2009, The Baltic Times discloses.  The
company's main creditor is DnB Nord Bank, The Baltic Times says,
citing the company's 2009 annual report.

Lido is a Latvian catering, restaurant and leisure company.


=========
M A L T A
=========


FIMBANK PLC: Fitch Affirms Long-Term Issuer Default Rating at 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Malta-based Fimbank's ratings at
Long-term Issuer Default 'BB', Short-term IDR 'B', Individual
'C/D', and Support '5'.  The Support Rating Floor is affirmed at
'No Floor'.  The Outlook on the Long-term IDR is Stable.

FIM's ratings reflect its small size, significant but declining
exposure to counterparties in emerging and developing countries
and concentrations in assets and liabilities.  The ratings also
take into account FIM's good management, its resilient core
profitability and asset quality, and near-term plans to strengthen
capital.

Although operating profit/average equity and operating
profit/average assets ratios are improving, they remained subdued
in H110 at 5.8% and 0.9% respectively, reflecting the only partial
recovery of trade-finance markets combined with low interest
rates.  Fitch expects FIM's performance to gradually improve in
2011, driven by more dynamic trade-finance business and increasing
commodity prices.  Loan impairment charges, which absorbed 39% of
pre-impairment profit in H110, may suffer in 2011 from the bank's
exposure to uncertain counterparties, although the bank has
demonstrated its ability to maintain credit costs in line with its
credit loss absorption capacity.

FIM is significantly exposed to emerging markets through its
lending and forfaiting books and securities portfolio.  However,
the short-term nature of trade-finance transactions related to the
lending and forfaiting books mitigates country risk.  While FIM's
appetite for credit risk is material, the bank has adequately
managed it to date.  FIM's impaired-loan ratio remained at an
acceptable 3.6% at end-H110, despite asset quality deterioration
at the bank's subsidiary in Dubai.  The reserve coverage ratio is
sound (109.9% at end-H110).  Fitch does not expect a material
deterioration in asset quality figures at end-2010, given the
bank's recovery forecasts and tightening of credit policies at the
Dubai-based subsidiary.

FIM remains wholesale-funded, although its recent focus on
attracting deposits from its client base has reduced its reliance
on the interbank market (client deposits represented a moderate
44% of non-equity funding at end-H110).  There is no significant
reliance on capital market for funding.  FIM's liquidity remains
adequate owing to the short-term nature of assets and liabilities,
in addition to some 20% of assets invested in cash and other
liquid items.

Fitch views FIM's capitalization, as measured by the agency's
defined core capital/risk weighted assets ratio (18.6% at end-
H110) and regulatory capital ratios (Tier 1 and total regulatory
capital ratio at 19.9% and 26.2% at end-H110, respectively) as
only adequate given the bank's exposure to credit risk, with high
concentration by obligor, and to operational risk.  Given the
bank's risk profile and its risk appetite, Fitch considers that it
must conduct its business with high capital ratios.  The bank is
considering fresh cash injections in H111, which should allow the
Tier 1 ratio to stabilize at the 18% mark.

FIM, created in 1994, is a niche bank that specializes in
international trade finance, forfaiting, ship finance and
factoring.  It fully owns a forfaiting subsidiary, London
Forfaiting Company, and has interests in factoring ventures with
local operators in emerging countries.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


* PORTUGAL: To Launch New Austerity Measures Amid Default Fears
---------------------------------------------------------------
Patricia Kowsman at The Wall Street Journal reports that Finance
Minister Fernando Teixeira dos Santos on Monday said that
Portugal's plan to cut its budget deficit could be hurt by a rise
in oil prices and raw materials, but the government is ready to
launch new austerity measures to stay on track.

"We have correction mechanisms that will allow us to meet the
targets we have set," the Journal quotes Mr. Teixeira dos Santos
as saying at a Reuters-Radio TSF conference in Lisbon.  "Whatever
happens, we will not miss the budget targets we have established."

Investors are keeping a close eye on budget numbers being released
by the country, which has pledged to cut this year's deficit to
4.6% of gross domestic product from about 7% last year, the
Journal notes.  The deficit stood at 9.3% in 2009, raising fears
that Portugal could default on its debt-repayment obligations, the
Journal discloses.

The government last year launched a series of austerity measures
designed to shrink its expenditures and increase revenue, mostly
through salary cuts in the public sector and tax increases, the
Journal recounts.

Pressure on Portugal to seek an international bailout, however,
has been rising despite the government saying it is meeting -- and
sometimes beating -- deficit targets, the Journal states.


=========
S P A I N
=========


CAJA INGENIEROS: Fitch Assigns 'BB+sf' Rating to Class C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned final ratings to Caja Ingenieros TDA 1,
Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' mortgage-backed floating-rate
notes due in May 2049:

  -- EUR229,166,820.36 Class A2 notes (ISIN ES0364376014) 'AAsf';
     Outlook Stable; Loss Severity rating of 'LS-1'

  -- EUR5,400,000 Class B notes (ISINES0364376022) 'A+sf'; Outlook
     Stable; Loss Severity rating of 'LS-3'

  -- EUR5,400,000 Class C notes (ISIN ES0364376030) 'BB+sf';
     Outlook Stable; Loss Severity rating of 'LS-3'

The final ratings are based on the quality of the collateral, the
underwriting and servicing of the mortgage loans, available credit
enhancement, the integrity of the transaction's legal and
financial structure and Titulizacion de Activo S.G.F.T. S.A.'s
administrative capabilities.

The ratings address the payment of interest on the notes according
to the terms and conditions of the documentation, subject to a
deferral trigger for the Class B and C notes, as well as the
repayment of principal by the legal maturity date for each note.

The transaction is a cash flow securitization of a static pool of
first-ranking mortgage loans originated and serviced in Spain by
Caja de Ingenieros (not rated by Fitch), that originally closed in
July 2009.  Upon the assignment of final ratings by Fitch, the
transaction documents have been amended to reflect Fitch's
applicable criteria.

As of October 2010, the static pool comprised 1,653 prime first
ranking residential mortgage loans to individuals backed by first
and second home properties in Spain.  The collateral risk
characteristics are those of a prime portfolio with all loans
originated by the branch network of Caja Ingenieros, 99.4% granted
to Spanish borrowers, with a current LTV of 58.67%, although
79.29% of the pool balance is concentrated in Caja Ingenieros'
home region, Cataluna.  Performance to date is excellent, with no
arrears over 90 days reported as of January 2011.

The securitization vehicle has issued floating-rate securities,
which pay sequentially on a quarterly basis.  According to the
transaction documents, interest payments on the class B and C
notes could be deferred upon the occurrence of a deferral trigger
linked to cumulative defaults.  The transaction is exposed to
basis and interest rate reset risk as it is unhedged, which is
uncommon for Spanish RMBS.  Fitch has factored this feature into
its modelling of the future cash flows.

In terms of counterparty risk the transaction is highly exposed to
Banco Cooperativo Espanol, 'A'/Stable/'F1', which acts as notes
financial agent, issuer treasury account and back-up collateral
servicer.  Additionally, given the role of Caja Ingenieros as
collateral servicer, the transaction is also exposed to the
potential commingling risk derived from a servicing disruption.
In order to mitigate this risk, at closing, Caja Ingenieros placed
a dynamic cash deposit at the issuer treasury account held by the
financial agent of an amount equivalent to two months of principal
and interest collections.  To additionally mitigate this risk, BCE
has been nominated as back-up servicer, and will take over
collateral servicing responsibilities when requested by the
Gestora.

As of March 2011, total CE for the class A2 notes, equivalent to
14.51% of the outstanding collateral balance, is provided by the
subordination of the class B (2.25%) and C notes (2.25%), plus a
reserve fund of 10.01%.  CE for the class B notes is provided by
subordination of the class C notes plus the reserve fund, and CE
for the class C notes is provided by the reserve fund.

The fund is regulated by Spanish Securitization Law 19/1992 and
Royal Decree 926/1998.  Its sole purpose is to transform into
fixed-income securities a portfolio of mortgage participations
("participaciones hipotecarias", PHs) and Mortgages Certificates
(Certificados de Transmision de Hipoteca, CTHs) acquired from Caja
Ingenieros.  The PHs were subscribed by Titulizacion de Activo
S.G.F.T. S.A. on behalf of the fund whose sole function is to
manage asset-backed notes on behalf of the fund.


IM BANKOA: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba2 (sf)' Rating to Class C Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
notes issued by IM Bankoa MBS 1 FTA:

  -- EUR492.9M A Notes, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  -- EUR21.2M B Notes, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)
  -- EUR15.9M C Notes, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The ratings of the notes take into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined
the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement and the portfolio expected loss.

Moody's analyzed the portfolio based upon two sub-pools factoring
the debtor characteristics (individuals & SME).  For the SME
subpool (9.8% of the outstanding pool), Moody's derived its
default distribution using its ABS SME approach, based on the
default probability contribution of each single borrower, and the
correlation among the different industries represented in the
portfolio.  For the RMBS subpool, Moody's ran its MILAN analysis
for RMBS.  Moody's combined the loss distributions for the
subpools in its cashflow analysis assuming 100% correlation
between both pools.

The expected portfolio loss of 4.4% of the current portfolio
balance and the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement of 15.0% served as
input parameters for Moody's cash flow model, which was based on a
probabilistic lognormal distribution as described in the report
"The Lognormal Method Applied to ABS Analysis", published in
September 2000.

The key drivers for the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement number, which
is higher than MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement in Spanish RMBS
transactions, are (i) 9.8% of the portfolio are loans granted to
SMEs, (ii) the relatively low pool granularity, with the top 20
borrowers representing 6.0% of the portfolio, (iii) non
residential properties represent 11.1% of the portfolio and (iv)
the very high concentration in the Basque Country region (86.6%).

The key drivers for the portfolio expected loss which is in line
with similar transactions are (i) the performance of mortgage
loans granted to individuals and SMEs in the sellers' book, and
(ii) the expected higher volatility on non residential property
prices.  The assumed expected loss corresponds to an assumption of
approximately 12.5% cumulative default rate in the portfolio.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and principal with
respect of the notes by the legal final maturity.  Moody's ratings
only address the credit risk associated with the transaction.
Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

The transaction closed in June 2009 and was initially not rated by
Moody's.  The initial amount of the Class A notes issued at
closing was EUR492.9 million.  The outstanding Class A balance as
of the last payment date in December 2010 is approximately EUR430.

The Reserve Fund was initially funded at 5.0% of the portfolio
amount as of closing.  The Reserve Fund is currently funded at
5.7% of the total notes outstanding (100% of its target level) and
may start to amortize three years after closing (18 months from
now) to 10.0% of the outstanding balance of the notes, subject to
performance conditions.  The total credit enhancement, excluding
excess spread, for the Class A notes is currently 13.7%.

The notes are backed by a pool of prime Spanish mortgages granted
to individuals (90.2%) and SMEs (9.8%) by Bankoa (A1, Prime-1).
The properties are mainly residential (88.9%), with the remaining
part being commercial properties.  As of Dec. 31, 2010, the
mortgage pool balance consists of approximately EUR460.5 million.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium, which is in line with
the score assigned for the Spanish RMBS sector.  The V Score was
negatively impacted by the exposure of this transaction to SMEs.
V Scores are a relative assessment of the quality of available
credit information and of the degree of dependence on various
assumptions used in determining the rating.  High variability in
key assumptions could expose a rating to more likelihood of rating
changes.  The V-Score has been assigned accordingly to the report
"V-Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the Major EMEA RMBS
Sectors" published in April 2009.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: At the time the rating was
assigned, the model output indicated that Class A notes would have
achieved a Aaa even if the expected loss was as high as 6.6% and
the MILAN Aaa CE as high as 18.0% and all other factors were
constant.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.  The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended to
measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time,
but rather how the initial rating of the security might have
differed if key rating input parameters were varied.  Parameter
Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are calculated
by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary rating model.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction.


SERIE AYT: Moody's Assigns 'C(sf)' Rating to Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive credit ratings
to these classes of notes issued by Serie AyT Colaterales Global
Hipotecario Caja Cantabria I, FTA:

  -- EUR203.5M A Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
  -- EUR12.7M B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)
  -- EUR10.3M C Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Caa1 (sf)
  -- EUR3.5M D Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned C (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

The ratings of the notes takes into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined
the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement and the portfolio expected loss.
The expected portfolio loss of 4.50% and the MILAN Aaa required
Credit Enhancement of 14.00% served as input parameters for
Moody's cash flow model, which is based on a probabilistic
lognormal distribution as described in the report "The Lognormal
Method Applied to ABS Analysis", published in September 2000.

The key drivers for the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement, which is in
line with other prime Spanish RMBS deals, are the high weighted-
average current LTV of 80.27%, with 57.60% of loans above 80% LTV,
the high geographical concentration in Cantabria of 80% of the
pool mitigated by the high weighted average seasoning of 5.07
years.

The key drivers for the expected loss, which is lower than the one
for other High LTV Spanish transactions, are the stable
performance for this transaction since closing in July 2008, the
static historical information on delinquencies and recoveries
received from the originator for its global mortgage book,
balanced by the expected higher volatility for High LTV loans, and
the weak economic conditions in Spain.

The strengths of the structure are (i) a reserve fund fully funded
upfront equal to 3.50% of the initial notes balance (it currently
represents 3.59% of the outstanding balance of the notes) to cover
potential shortfall in interest and principal, and (ii) a strong
interest rate swap in place which provides a guaranteed excess
spread (0.50%) above Euribor to the transaction.

The rating addresses the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and principal with
respect of the classes of notes A and B by the legal final
maturity, and payment of interest and principal with respect of
the class of notes C and D by the legal final maturity.

Moody's ratings only address the credit risk associated with the
transaction.  Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but
may have a significant effect on yield to investors.

The transaction closed in July 2008 and was initially not rated by
Moody's.  The initial notes balance issued at closing (shown above
next to the assigned rating) amounted to EUR230 million.  The
outstanding notes balance as of the last payment date in September
2010 amounts to EUR203 million.

Moody's rating analysis of the notes is based on the transaction
structure after the last payment date in September 2010.  The next
payment date will take place in March 2011.  The V Score for this
transaction is Medium, which is in line with the V score assigned
for the Spanish RMBS sector.  Only three sub components underlying
the V Score deviate from the average for the Spanish RMBS sector.
The Sector's Historical Downgrade Rate, Transaction Complexity and
Experience of Parties are assessed as Medium, which are higher
than the Low/Medium V score assigned for the Spanish RMBS sector
for those sub components.  This is due to the exposure of the
transaction to High LTV's which have suffered more downgrades than
traditional mortgages pools in recent years and because High LTV
loans are more exposed to house price declines.  In addition Caja
Cantabria, the originator and servicer has limited previous
securitization experience.

V-Scores are a relative assessment of the quality of available
credit information and of the degree of dependence on various
assumptions used in determining the rating.  High variability in
key assumptions could expose a rating to more likelihood of rating
changes.  The V-Score has been assigned accordingly to the report
"V-Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the Major EMEA RMBS
Sectors" published in April 2009.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: the model output indicated that
Class A would have achieved Aaa even if expected loss was as high
as 13.5% (3.0x base case) assuming Milan Aaa CE at 14.0% (base
case) and all other factors remained the same.  The model output
further indicated that the Class A would not have achieved Aaa
with Milan Aaa CE of 16.8% (1.2x base case), and expected loss of
4.5% (base case).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.  The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended to
measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time,
but rather how the initial rating of the security might have
differed if key rating input parameters were varied.  Parameter
Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are calculated
by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary rating model.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction.


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


* Moody's Retains 'Ba2' Issuer Rating on Municipality of Istanbul
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In its annual report on the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul,
Moody's Investors Service says that the Turkish municipality's Ba2
issuer rating reflects its pivotal role in the national economy,
its active fiscal management and its robust balance sheet.
However, the Ba2 rating also reflects IMM's high and fast-growing
debt burden (both direct and indirect) in the context of high
exposure to financial market volatility.  Going forward, the
rating agency notes that IMM's large capital expenditure program
will somewhat constrain budgetary flexibility and will continue to
lead to large borrowing requirements.

Moody's notes that Istanbul's budget remains exposed to state-
induced revenue dynamics and any room for fiscal flexibility going
forward will ultimately lie on its ability to leverage its large
asset base.  The active management of municipal-related companies
helped IMM to manage operating-expenditure pressure for service
provision in a context of fluctuating state resources, thus
maintaining robust operating surpluses to help finance its large
investment requirements.

"After flat year-on-year growth in 2009, the rebound in Istanbul's
tax income has supported its financial recovery in 2010.  However,
its infrastructure-led strategy will continue to exert pressure on
the municipality's budgetary performance and will foster an
increase in the financial leverage of the municipality and its
related companies," said Francesco Soldi, Moody's lead analyst for
IMM and author of the report.  "Notwithstanding these open issues,
IMM's budget remains sustainable in view of its robust balance
sheet, including valuable real and financial assets."

At YE2010, IMM's direct and indirect debt exposure represented a
high 128% of the city's operating income.  "The city's debt
structure exposes the municipality to high and volatile debt
service costs, with negative implications for its liquidity
position and medium-term fiscal flexibility," added Mr. Soldi.
Whilst the rating agency notes a normalization in funding
conditions from the peak of the financial crisis, IMM's
debt-service requirements are expected to remain high going
forward, thereby constraining fiscal flexibility.

IMM's Ba2 rating currently carries a positive outlook, in line
with Turkish Republic.  In its analysis, Moody's highlights that
future rating upgrades would depend on positive movements in the
country's rating, as well as IMM's ability to leverage its large
asset base, maintain its expenditure flexibility and to adequately
manage fiscal challenges.

The issuance of this credit report by Moody's Investors Service is
an annual update to the markets and is not a formal action to
alter the credit rating of the issuer.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


METINVEST BV: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to Medium Term Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive B2 senior
unsecured rating and LGD-4 to a first take-down ofUS$750 million
under the Medium Term Notes Program totaling US$1 billion for the
Issuance of 8.75% Loan Participation Notes maturing in 2018 issued
by Metinvest B.V.  The final terms of the Notes are in line with
the drafts reviewed for the provisional (P)B2 instrument rating
assignment.

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's definitive rating on this debt obligation is in line with
the provisional rating assigned on Jan. 21, 2011.  Moody's
RATING RATIONALE was set out in a press release issued on that
date.

Moody's previous rating action on Metinvest was implemented on 21
January 2011, when the rating agency upgraded Metinvest's senior
unsecured rating to B2, assigned a (P)B2 rating to the proposed
MTN program and the envisaged bond and affirmed the corporate
family rating at B2 and the national scale rating at A2.

The rating incorporates Metinvest's ability to generate positive
cash flows, even in times of a severe downturn as observed in
2009, its good business profile with vertical integration, its
large iron ore reserves as one of the largest producers of iron
ore in the world and the geographically advantageous location of
some of its major assets.  On the negative side the rating takes
into account (i) Metinvest's dependence on highly volatile spot
markets for semi-finished steel products, which can lead to
significant swings in operating performance through the cycle of
evolving and unpredictable business, (ii) the fiscal and legal
environment of Ukraine, (iii) Metinvest's continued weak short
term liquidity position (iv) the company's dependence on exports
and therefore its exposure to protectionist barriers in some of
its export markets, (v) Metinvest's ambitions to seek further
external growth and (vi) possible shareholder friendly actions,
such as increasing dividend payouts, given the high degree of
shareholder concentration.  Despite Metinvest's high degree of
exports it still remains subject to trade barriers and other
government interference given that most of the company's
production facilities are located within the Ukraine.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Global Steel
Industry published in January 2009, and Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Metinvest B.V. is a major asset of Ukrainian investment holding
company System Capital Management.  SCM has a 75% share in
Metinvest, the other shareholder is SMART group.  Metinvest's
major operations are located in the Ukraine and consist of steel
production facilities, iron ore and coal mines.  It is the largest
fully vertically integrated mining and steel business in Ukraine.
In the nine months ended Sept. 30, 201,  Metinvest -- inter alia-
produced 25.3 million tonnes of iron ore products, and 8.1 million
tones of semi-finished and finished steel products and generated
turnover of US$6.8 billion..


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ARROGANT CAT: Goes Into Administration, Puts 3 Stores on Sale
-------------------------------------------------------------
FashionUnited reports that Arrogant Cat has put its three London
based stores up for sale as the company's retail arm has fallen
into administration.  The report relates that the company's
business has hit cash flow problems following the recession and a
dip in trade, however the wholesale operation will continue to run
as normal irrespective of the administration issue.

Jason Baker from FRP Advisory is handling the administration,
according to FashionUnited.  The report relates that the
administrators hope to find a sale imminently.  "There are
currently no plans for redundancies and the business will continue
to operate as normal.  It is a strong brand, has a loyal clientele
and excellent trading locations; we are very hopeful of selling
the business as a going-concern," FashionUnited quotes Mr. Barker
as saying.

Arrogant Cat is the clothing line launched in 2001.


DEUTSCHE PFANDBRIEFBANK: S&P Cuts Rating on Various Notes to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
all classes of notes in Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG's Estate UK-3
commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction.  At the same
time, S&P has kept on CreditWatch negative the ratings on the
class A1+ and A2 notes and removed from CreditWatch negative the
ratings on the class B, C, D, and E notes.

On Oct. 26, 2010, S&P placed all classes of notes in this
transaction on CreditWatch negative after S&P received information
indicating downward revaluations of properties backing two loans
in the pool.  On Jan. 18, 2011, S&P also placed the ratings on the
class A1+, A2, and B notes on CreditWatch negative due to its
updated counterparty criteria becoming effective.

S&P has carried out an analysis of the transaction and conducted
site visits of some assets.  As a result of its review, S&P has
revised downward its recovery expectations for the largest loan in
the pool, namely Loan 3 (reference 140 039), which accounts for
40% of the pool balance.  S&P considers that this loan may suffer
losses and S&P has taken the rating action in this context.

The balance of the securitized portion of Loan 3 is GBP175
million.  This loan also has debt (GBP64 million) that sits
outside the transaction.  Because this further debt ranks pari
passu with the securitized loan, S&P has factored this further
debt into its analysis.  The reported whole-loan loan-to-value
ratio for this loan is 153%, according to the most recent servicer
report for the quarter ending Nov. 30, 2010.  The reported whole-
loan debt service coverage ratio is 1.24x.  The loan is current in
its payment obligations but it has breached the LTV ratio covenant
and is in special servicing as a result.  Its scheduled maturity
date is April 2013.

This loan is backed by three shopping centers, respectively in
North East England, Wales, and Yorkshire and the Humber.

The first shopping center backing this loan is in a town with a
population of around 100,000 in North East England.  It stands in
the prime retail area in the center of the town.  The shopping
center is currently almost fully let and has a mix of retail
tenants.  It is anchored by several prime retailers, and it has a
weighted-average lease term of roughly 6.5 years.  S&P understands
that retail activity in this shopping center has remained strong,
even through the economic downturn since 2008.  While rising
capitalization rates have, in its view, adjusted market values
downward since closing, S&P does not expect this asset to
encounter difficulties in the near future in keeping its strong
and diversified portfolio of tenants.  Although a new leisure
retail complex in the town is expected to open in the near-to-
medium term, in view of the shopping center's prime location in
this town and its tenant mix, S&P considers this will not
significantly affect its footfall.  Therefore, S&P categorize this
property as a better-than-average asset.

The second shopping center backing this loan stands in a strong
retail market in Wales.  It was built in the 1990s and it sits on
the main shopping thoroughfare.  Its in-place tenants include a
few prime retailers, and it has a weighted-average lease term of
only 3.4 years.  The shopping center is suffering from significant
vacancies (about 25% of the space appeared vacant on inspection).
The micro-location is a pedestrian retail street and a new
shopping center that opened in recent years is located in the
vicinity.  This new center has attracted high-quality tenants, in
S&P's view, anchored by prime retailers.  It has expanded the
prime retail area, in its opinion, and created an oversupply of
retail space.  While S&P believes the subject shopping center is
what S&P would categorize as an average-quality asset, S&P
considers that income is likely to remain under stress in view of
current vacancies and the competition posed by the newer shopping
center.  These stresses are likely to be compounded, in S&P's
view, by the general economic climate, which may adversely affect
retail demand.  S&P believes it may be a few years until the
shopping center is again fully let.  Accordingly, S&P has revised
downward S&P's expectation of recoverable proceeds from this
property.

The third shopping center backing this loan is located in a small
town in Yorkshire and the Humber.  It was constructed
predominantly in 1983-1984 and refurbished in recent years.  S&P
estimates that at least GBP2 million in leases (33% of the total
income) are expired and are rolling monthly.  It is also facing
new competition from a nearby shopping center which is due to open
this year.  S&P believes the town in which it is located may not
readily support two large shopping centers.  Given the current
average age of this property, the short leases remaining, the
potential competition from a new shopping center, and the
potential for the current U.K. economic environment to depress
retail demand, S&P has revised its view significantly downward on
recoverable proceeds of this property.

S&P understands that the special servicer is in discussion with
the borrower to restructure Loan 3.  The special servicer has a
recent track record of successfully restructuring loans or
improving loan credit metrics through asset sales or equity
injections.  However, Loan 3 is a large loan and two of its three
assets face considerable challenges, in S&P's view.  Accordingly,
S&P believes it may be difficult to restructure this loan and
there are scenarios S&P sees in which S&P could expect significant
losses on this loan.

The loan matures in 2013 and the notes mature in 2022.  In a
scenario in which the loan is foreclosed prior to or at loan
maturity, and the assets are sold, S&P would expect losses in view
of the particular challenges faced by two of the assets.  In a
scenario in which structural changes are made--for example,
through equity injections or the trapping of excess cash from the
performing shopping centers to pay down the loan while an
alternative strategy is developed and implemented for the third
asset--losses may be lower.

S&P awaits further details from Deutsche Pfandbriefbank with
regard to this loan.

Four loans in the pool have repaid.  The remaining loans are
backed by properties throughout the U.K. S&P has reviewed each
loan based on reported data.  They range in size from GBP9 million
to GBP57 million, and have maturity profiles ranging from 2011 to
2019.  They are of good credit quality, in S&P's view, as they are
moderately leveraged loans backed by a combination of long leases,
strong tenants, and good locations.  Although some of these loans
have suffered LTV ratio breaches, the breaches were cured by
equity injections from their respective sponsors or, in the case
of Loan 7, asset sales.

The downgrades reflect S&P's view of the reduced creditworthiness
of the underlying loan portfolio--principally S&P's revised
recovery expectation for the largest loan securing the
transaction, Loan 3.

S&P has kept on CreditWatch negative the ratings on the class A1+
and A2 notes for credit reasons pending an update on the workout
strategy for Loan 3.  S&P may again lower its ratings on the
notes, depending on further information to be provided by Deutsche
Pfandbriefbank.  The class A1+ notes also remain on CreditWatch
negative for counterparty reasons.

Estate UK-3 is a synthetic CMBS transaction.  Hypo Real Estate
Bank International (now known as Deutsche Pfandbriefbank) issued
the notes in February 2007.  The notes are backed by nine loans
(as against 13 from closing), which in turn are secured on 106
commercial properties, including retail (38.6%) and offices
(20.0%).  The properties are spread throughout the U.K., mainly in
south east England (24.8%, excluding London), Yorkshire and
Humberside (17.2%), and London (17.9%).

                          Ratings List

                   Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG
  GBP113.68 Million Floating-Rate Amortizing Credit-Linked Notes
                          (Estate UK-3)

        Ratings Lowered And Kept On CreditWatch Negative

                        Rating
                        ------
       Class     To                   From
       -----     --                   ----
       A1+       AA (sf)/Watch Neg    AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
       A2        BBB (sf)/Watch Neg   AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

      Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

                        Rating
                        ------
       Class     To                   From
       -----     --                   ----
       B         B (sf)               AA (sf)/Watch Neg
       C         B (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
       D         B (sf)               BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
       E         B (sf)               BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg


EXCELL COMMUNICATIONS: MD Resignation No Impact on Firm's Demise
----------------------------------------------------------------
Mobile Magazine reports that former MD of Excell Communications
Stuart Box insisted that his resignation from Excell
Communications in September 2010 had no impact on the company's
demise in December.

"I left Excell after 18 months away for personal reasons.  There
is no connection between me leaving and the company going into
administration.  I could not have known that the main distributor
would withdraw their support to the new owner following my
departure (that being the motivating factor in the company's
administration), not least since the new owner had run the
business in my absence during that 18 month period," Mobile
Magazine quotes Mr. Box as saying.

Mr. Box sold the company to fellow director Richard Canfer-Taylor
on Sept. 30, 2010, Mobile Magazine recounts.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 21,
2010, Business Credit Management said Excell Communications
Limited was placed into administration on December 6, 2010 and
David Moore and Gary Lee of Begbies Traynor were appointed Joint
Administrators.

A creditors' report shows the firm was hit by cashback claims
estimated to be between GBP600,000 and GBP1.3 million, Mobile
Magazine.

The company was also dealt a blow by Midland Communications'
decision to withhold around 100,000 in commissions, shortly after
the company was sold to Canfer-Taylor.

"The administration of Excell Communications has had a devastating
effect on both me and my family, and I have sympathy for those
that have lost money as a result.  I myself am a large creditor of
Excell Communications and hold several personal guarantees against
the business.  Therefore, the administration of that company has
significant ongoing financial implications for me and my family as
well."


METRIX SECURITIES: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Class E Notes to 'B1'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded its ratings of 13 classes
of notes issued by Metrix Securities P.L.C.

Issuer: Metrix Securities P.L.C. - Series 2006-1

  -- GBP110M Series 2006-1 Class A1 Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa1 (sf)

  -- EUR738M Series 2006-1 Class A2 Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa1 (sf)

  -- US$2249M Series 2006-1 Class A3 Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2009 Downgraded to
     Aa1 (sf)

  -- GBP5.8M Series 2006-1 Class B1 Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2009 Downgraded to
     A3 (sf)

  -- EUR15.8M Series 2006-1 Class B2 Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2009 Downgraded to
     A3 (sf)

  -- US$18M Series 2006-1 Class B3 Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2009 Downgraded to
     A3 (sf)

  -- GBP4.1M Series 2006-1 Class C1 Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 (sf)

  -- EUR15.5M Series 2006-1 Class C2 Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 (sf)

  -- US$14M Series 2006-1 Class C3 Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2009 Downgraded to
     Baa3 (sf)

  -- GBP17.5M Series 2006-1 Class D1 Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba3 (sf)

  -- EUR18.6M Series 2006-1 Class D2 Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2009 Downgraded
     to Ba3 (sf)

  -- GBP26.3M Series 2006-1 Class E1 Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 (sf)

  -- EUR26.3M Series 2006-1 Class E2 Floating Rate Notes due 2018,
     Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2009 Downgraded to
     Caa2 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

This transaction, which closed in November 2006, is a synthetic
balance sheet CDO referencing a pool of corporate loans originated
by HSBC Bank plc.  Moody's has used the internal credit scores
assigned to the borrowers by the originator to determine the
default probabilities of the obligors in the transaction.  The
replenishment period terminated in November 2010.  Thereafter the
underlying portfolio substantially amortized to a current size of
GBP322.7 million.

The rating actions taken on the notes result primarily from the
delevering of the class A notes, which have been paid down by
approximately 85% since the last rating action.

This fast amortization largely compensates for the effect of the
credit deterioration currently experienced by the underlying
portfolio.  Such deterioration is observed through a decline in
the average credit rating as measured through the portfolio
weighted average rating factor 'WARF' which in the January 2011
report was 2085 compared to the 1,255 (753 including 815 mil of
cash) of the last rating action (April 2009) .  According to the
January 2011 manager's report, roughly GBP135.3 million (32.6%) of
assets in the pool are below the minimum required credit rating.
This includes a 6.2% bucket of the portfolio mapped to a Moody's
equivalent rating of C while only GBP23.9 million (5.8%) loans are
reported as actual defaults in the January 2011.  This gap between
actual and expected defaults relates to the conservatism embedded
in the mapping.

As a consequence of amortization, the outstanding portfolio is
increasingly concentrated.  There are currently 23 corporate
entities referenced in the portfolio, with the six largest
obligors accounting for roughly the 66% of the entire pool, a
country concentration of 86% in the UK and a 58% exposure to the
Financial Insurance and Real Estate sector.  The weighted average
life of the portfolio is 1.95.

As a base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
including a 2-notch stress on the 4 largest obligors.  A weighted-
average recovery rate of 37 % (excluding Ca assets) was used.  In
addition, the global correlation was increased from 3% to 5%
reflect the high level of geographical concentration of the
underlying loans in the UK and the fact that they are all
originated and serviced by HSBC.  Because the mapping used to
analyze this transaction was performed more than two years ago, an
additional stress was applied to capture potential deviations from
the established mapping.

In addition, given that mapped ratings do not carry credit
indicators such as ratings reviews and outlooks, one sensitivity
run consisted in applying a half notch stress to the mapping
scale.  Large single exposure to obligors were also considered for
the analysis and applied a stress applicable to concentrated pools
with non publicly rated issuers as per the report titled "Updated
Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions"
published in October 2009.  The model output for the most senior
tranche would not be impacted by more than 2 notches in any
sensitivity run compared to the base case.

Moody's investors service applied the Montecarlo simulation
framework within CDOROM.  These models are available on
http://www.moodys.com/under Products and Solutions -- Analytical
models, upon return of a signed free licensed agreement.

Moody's did not run a separate loss and cash flow analysis other
than the one already done using the CDOROM model.  For a
description of the analysis, refer to the methodology and the
CDOROM user guide on Moody's Web site.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


PETER SCOTT: To Take On an Extra 20 Employees
---------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Peter Scott & Company, which went into
administration last year before being taken over by a duffle-coat
maker, is to take on an extra 20 staff.

Peter Scott, based in Hawick, was left with a skeleton staff of
just 15 when it was taken over by Gloverall in July.

The firm, which now has 50 employees, said it planned to increase
that number gradually to more than 70.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, Mr. Nimmo and
Gary Fraser of KPMG were appointed joint administrators of Peter
Scott on May 27, 2010, at the request of the company directors.
At the time of appointment, 119 of the company's 140 employees
were made redundant.

The company is anticipating orders of more than 100,000 units for
its autumn/winter collection, according to BBC News.   The report
relates that it has made a radical change in layout to improve
efficiency and has been running at almost maximum capacity
recently, the firm said.

Based in Hawick, Peter Scott & Company manufactures high-quality
clothing including cashmere, lambswool and blended knitwear
garments for both high street retail and the golf industry.


PUNCH TAVERNS: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Three Classes of Notes to BB-
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded all Punch Taverns Finance Plc's
issued notes and placed them on Rating Watch Negative.

The downgrades reflect the transaction's considerable
underperformance compared with the agency's assumptions made at
the time of the last review (March 2010).  Punch A is a whole
business securitization of 3,089 leased and tenanted pubs across
the UK owned by Punch Taverns Group.

Fitch expects the performance of Punch A to remain exposed to UK
economic conditions and factors specific to the pub industry.
Moreover, compared to managed pubs, the pub operators of tenanted
estates (like in Punch A) have less influence over the operations
and the offering of the pubs; thus making it more difficult to
adjust swiftly to changing consumer behavior through -- for
example -- better food offering.  The combination of rising
unemployment, higher retail price inflation, the increase of VAT
to 20%, alcohol duties and uncertainties about the political and
regulatory agenda will continue to affect the health of the pub
industry and add uncertainty about the level at which performance
will stabilize.  However, the primary reason for placing the notes
on RWN is because of Punch Group's ongoing operational and capital
structure review and the general ambiguity surrounding its
conclusion.

Since Fitch's last rating action in March 2010, the overall
performance of the portfolio has continued to decline at a similar
pace, while Fitch expected the rate of decline to slow down.
Fitch's estimated trailing 12 month revenues per pub have remained
broadly flat, but EBITDA per pub dropped by 9.3%.  These numbers
disregard the EBITDA support provided by the parent company which
amounts to GBP21.5 million during the past four quarters,
primarily enhancing the borrower's beer profit margins.  Fitch
understands that the main motivation for this support is to keep
the transaction from breaching its independent consultant covenant
(EBITDA debt-service-coverage ratio of 1.35x).  An independent
consultant could review the financial position of the borrower and
make recommendations about the steps to be taken to ensure that
the noteholders receive timely payments of principal and interest.
These recommendations can become binding if the DSCR drops below
1.30x.  This covenant would have been breached without the parent
support.  Fitch expects that this support will cease during 2011.

However, even including the support injected into the transaction,
the restricted payments conditions were triggered with the EBITDA
DSCR dropping below 1.5x.  Conversely, the transaction's cash-
trapping ability is limited as tax payments due on the accrual of
interest on subordinated loans are exempt from the RPC test and
hence can still be up-streamed to the parent.  Cash injections
being made by the parent have consequently been retrieved.  Fitch
views the current inability to trap an adequate amount of cash as
negative.

A large number of pubs have been sold over the past four quarters
(ca.  11%).  Outstanding debt has also decreased through scheduled
repayments and prepayments, albeit at a lower rate than the
reduction in pubs.  This is mainly due to the difficulties of
selling pubs in the current market combined with the rising costs
of prepaying, especially the floating rate notes.  Because of the
low interest rate environment, swap breakage costs have grown
considerably.  Furthermore, if the DSCR fell below 1.35x, part of
any disposal proceeds would have to be applied to the prepayment
of the floating rate notes first, thus making it even more
challenging to deleverage the transaction.  Unsurprisingly, EBITDA
leverage has also grown, edging towards 10x, which gives rise to
concerns about the remaining equity left in the transaction.
Fitch expects the EBITDA multiple to rise well above 10x later
this year and believes it is increasingly likely that the
financial covenant (EBITDA DSCR of 1.25x) will be breached during
2011 (assuming support will cease).  EBITDA is likely to remain
under pressure mainly due to the rising costs of goods sold
(affecting beer margins) and operating costs (e.g.  due to rising
costs for short leaseholds and higher repairs and maintenance
expense, etc).

The already stretched DSCR (Fitch estimates it to be 1.29x based
on rolling two quarters without EBITDA support) is based on
comparatively small scheduled amortization payments, which are
going to step up significantly from 2015 onwards, reaching about
GBP175 million in 2016.  Fitch believes it is unlikely that free
cash flows generated by the portfolio will be sufficient to cover
debt service on the more junior notes at this time.  However,
there is some uncertainty about the future shape of the debt
profile as it is difficult to predict which tranches will be
prepaid and cancelled.  The borrower is likely to seek to dispose
of its non-core estate, ca. 700 pubs which have been performing
far below the company's expectations.

Fitch will also closely monitor the outcome of the strategic
review currently being undertaken by Punch Taverns Plc and its
potential repercussions for the securitization.  Fitch understands
that Punch Taverns will make further announcements by end of March
2011.

Fitch used its UK whole business securitization criteria to review
the transaction's structure, financial data and cash flow
projections and to stress-test each of the rated instruments.

The rating actions are:

  -- GBP270.0m class A1(R) fixed-rate notes due 2022: downgraded
     to 'A+' from 'AA'; RWN

  -- GBP272.0m class A2(R) fixed-rate notes due 2020: downgraded
     to 'A+' from 'AA'; RWN

  -- GBP122.0m class M1 fixed-rate notes due 2026: downgraded to
     'BBB-' from 'A+'; RWN

  -- GBP398.7m class M2(N) floating-rate notes due 2029:
     downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'A+'; RWN

  -- GBP99.8m class B1 fixed-rate notes due 2026: downgraded to
     'BB-' from 'BBB-'; RWN

  -- GBP123.2m class B2 fixed-rate notes due 2029: downgraded to
     'BB-' from 'BBB-'; RWN

  -- GBP159m class B3 floating-rate notes due 2031: downgraded to
     'BB-' from 'BBB-'; RWN

  -- GBP103.3m class C(R) fixed-rate notes due 2033: downgraded to
     'B+' from 'BB+'; RWN

  -- GBP103.6m class D1 floating-rate notes 2032: downgraded to
     'B' from 'BB'; RWN


VIRGIN MEDIA: Moody's Assigns Rating to New Senior Secured Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive Baa3 rating to
the new senior secured Notes, due 2021, issued in two distinct
tranches of GBP650 million and US$500 million by Virgin Media
Secured Finance Plc, a subsidiary of Virgin Media Inc.  The final
terms of the Notes are in line with the draft reviewed by Moody's
for the provisional (P)Baa3 rating for the proposed Notes.

Moody's notes that Virgin Media will be using GBP533 million of
the proceeds towards repaying senior secured term loan A thereby
taking out the scheduled amortization on the TLA in 2011 through
the end of 2014.  The company will be using further GBP367 million
of the proceeds towards repaying a significant portion of the
GBP675 million TLB due in 2015.  The remainder of the net proceeds
will be kept for general corporate purposes.

                        Ratings Rationale

The (P) Baa3 rating on the Notes reflects the fact that the
transaction is broadly neutral to net debt and does not change
Virgin Media's Ba1 Corporate Family Rating.  The rating further
reflects the relative ranking of the proposed Notes within the
company's capital structure as they will rank pari-passu with the
senior secured bank debt at Virgin Media's subsidiary, Virgin
Media Investment Holdings Limited and the senior secured notes at
Virgin Media Secured Finance Plc (each rated Baa3).

Virgin Media, headquartered in Hook, Hampshire, is the largest
cable operator in the UK with revenues of to GBP3.9 billion in
2010.


WIGAN ATHLETIC: Auditor Expresses Going Concern Doubt
-----------------------------------------------------
Tariq Panja at Bloomberg News reports that Wigan Athletic's
auditor said there's "material uncertainty" about the soccer
team's future as a going concern without infusions from its
millionaire owner Dave Whelan.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Whelan is converting into equity
GBP48 million (US$78 million) of loans to the team from his
family's companies.

The team has the league's second-lowest attendance and posted a
loss of GBP4 million for the year ended May 31 2010, 31% narrower
than a year earlier, Bloomberg says, citing a filing at Companies
House.  Sales declined 7% to GBP43 million.

Bloomberg notes that Wigan's statement that it will continue to
post losses, its reliance on Whelan's funding and ongoing talks
with Barclays Plc about the future of a GBP20 million loan led its
auditor Fairhurst to say in the accounts that there's "material
uncertainty which may cast significant doubt about the company's
ability to continue as a going concern."

The club forecasts losses for the next two years, Bloomberg
states.

Wigan Athletic Football Club is an English Premier League
association football team based in Wigan, Greater Manchester.


* UK: Banks Could Be Allowed to Fail to Avoid Taxpayer Bailouts
---------------------------------------------------------------
Tony Aynsley, writing for bobsguide, reports that the governor of
the Bank of England has warned that financial institutions could
be allowed to collapse following Britain's impending regulatory
overhaul in order to avoid future taxpayer bailouts.

According to bobsguide, speaking before the House of Commons
Treasury Select Committee, Mervyn King insisted that the central
bank -- which will assume some oversight duties from the outgoing
Financial Services Authority (FSA) -- would ensure bank failures
did not "cause havoc".

bobsguide relates that Mr. King told the panel "The objective of
supervision is to recognize that banks will fail."

"Our role is not to stop them failing, it is to make sure that if
they fail, they do not contaminate the rest of the economic and
financial sector," bobsguide quotes Mr. King as saying.

Under plans unveiled by the UK's coalition government last June,
the FSA is expected to be scrapped and replaced by the new
Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential Regulatory Authority by
2012, bobsguide notes.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EUROPE: Basel to Discuss CoCo Bond Proposals Next Weeks
---------------------------------------------------------
Jim Brunsden at Bloomberg News reports that International
regulators will next week consider allowing contingent convertible
bonds to count toward additional capital requirements for
systemically important banks whose failure would roil the global
economy.

According to Bloomberg, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
will discuss the potential for so-called CoCo bonds to contribute
to regulatory capital as an alternative to issuing shares or
retaining more earnings, which banks say may stymie economic
recovery by cutting their ability to lend.

The extra capital "has to be available to absorb losses before the
bank fails, and obviously common equity meets fully that
standard," Bloomberg quotes Stefan Walter, the Basel group's
secretary general, as saying in an interview ahead of the
March 8-9 meeting of the committee.  "We're now also assessing
CoCos and the possibility of this type of instrument fulfilling
part of the loss-absorbency requirement."

A global agreement by the Basel committee may expand the market
for CoCos, following Credit Suisse Group AG's sale of instruments
worth US$2 billion last month, Bloomberg says.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Walter said that regulators are
examining "possible concrete minimum criteria that CoCos would
have to fulfill," to form part of the reserves.  "We're already
reviewing some preliminary proposals" next week, Mr. Walter, as
cited by Bloomberg, said.  "Much more concrete proposals" will
then follow in June.


* BOOK REVIEW: Performance Evaluation of Hedge Funds
----------------------------------------------------
Edited by Greg N. Gregoriou, Fabrice Rouah, and Komlan Sedzro
Publisher: Beard Books
Hardcover: 203 pages
Listprice: US$59.95
Review by Henry Berry

Hedge funds can be traced back to 1949 when Alfred Winslow Jones
formed the first one to "hedge" his investments in the stock
market by betting that some stocks would go up and others down.
However, it has only been within the past decade that hedge funds
have exploded in growth.  The rise of global markets and the
uncertainties that have arisen from the valuation of different
currencies have given a boost to hedge funds.  In 1998, there
were approximately 3,500 hedge funds, managing capital of about
US$150 billion. By mid-2006, 9,000 hedge funds were managing
US$1.2 trillion in assets.

Despite their growing prominence in the investment community,
hedge funds are only vaguely understood by most people.

Performance Evaluation of Hedge Funds addresses this shortcoming.
The book describes the structure, workings, purpose, and goals of
hedge funds.  While hedge funds are loosely defined as "funds with
no rules," the editors define these funds more usefully as
"privately pooled investments, usually structured as a partnership
between the fund managers and the investors."  The authors then
expand upon this definition by explaining what sorts of
investments hedge funds are, the work of the managers, and the
reasons investors join a hedge fund and what they are looking for
in doing so.

For example, hedge funds are characterized as an "important
avenue for investors opting to diversify their traditional
portfolios and better control risk" -- an apt characterization
considering their tremendous growth over the last decade.  The
qualifications to join a hedge fund generally include a net worth
in excess of $1 million; thus, funds are for high net-worth
individuals and institutional investors such as foundations, life
insurance companies, endowments, and investment banks.  However,
there are many individuals with net worths below $1 million that
take part in hedge funds by pooling funds in financial entities
that are then eligible for a hedge fund.

This book discusses why hedge funds have become "notorious as
speculating vehicles," in part because of highly publicized
incidents, both pro and con.  For example, George Soros made
$1 billion in 1992 by betting against the British pound.
Conversely, the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCP)
imploded in 1998, with losses totalling $4.6 billion.
Nonetheless, these are the exceptions rather than the rule, and
the editors offer statistics, studies, and other research showing
that the "volatility of hedge funds is closer to that of bonds
than mutual funds or equities."

After clarifying what hedge funds are and are not, the book
explains how to analyze hedge fund performance and select a
successful hedge fund.  It is here that the book has its greatest
utility, and the text is supplemented with graphs, tables, and
formulas.

The analysis makes one thing clear: for some investors, hedge
funds are an investment worth considering.  Most have a
demonstrable record of investment performance and the risk is low,
contrary to common perception. Investors who have the necessary
capital to invest in a hedge fund or readers who aspire to join
that select club will want to absorb the research, information,
analyses, commentary, and guidance of this unique book.

Greg N. Gregoriou teaches at U. S. and Canadian universities and
does research for large corporations. Fabrice Rouah also teaches
at the university level and does financial research.  Komlan
Sedzro is a professor of finance at the University of Quebec and
an advisor to the Montreal Derivatives Exchange.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


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