TCREUR_Public/110411.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Monday, April 11, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 71



CMA CGM: Launches US$800MM Bond Issue to Institutional Investors
CMA CGM: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba3' Corporate Family Rating


BAYERNLB: Expects to Reach State Aid Deal Before Summer
LANDESBANK BADEN: To Kick Off Sale of German Property Portfolio
TITAN EUROPE: S&P Cuts Ratings on Three Classes of Notes to 'CCC-'


LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Explores Options for Stake in Iceland Foods


ALLIED IRISH: S&P Keeps 'BB/B' Ratings on CreditWatch Negative
MCINERNEY HOMES: Oaktree to Push Through with Investment Plan
* IRELAND: 396 Corporate Insolvencies Recorded in First Quarter


CAPE NATIXIS: Put Under Extraordinary Administration


LECTA SA: S&P Affirms 'B+' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating


REDE FERROVIARIA: Moody's Downgrades Rating to 'Ba2'
POLO SECURITIES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Sr. Sec. Notes to 'Ba2'
* Moody's Takes Multiple Rating Actions on Portuguese Banks


TINKOFF CREDIT SYS: Moody's Upgrades Ratings to B2; Outlook Stable


* SWEDEN: Requires General Legislation for Banks, Nyberg Says


INTERPIPE LTD: Fitch Affirms Senior Unsecured Rating at 'C'

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CONNAUGHT PLC: Lenders to Recover Less Than 30% of Loans
DECO SERIES: S&P Affirms 'BB (sf)' Rating on Class C Notes
FERREXPO PLC: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to US$500-Mil. Notes
HAWTIN PLC: Anglo Claim Prompts Administration
JJB SPORTS: To Raise GBP65 Million Through Placing & Open Offer

KEMBLE WATER: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Senior Secured Rating
R&D CONSTRUCTION: In Administration; 220 Jobs at Risk
* UK: Corporate Insolvencies Down 4.5% in First Quarter 2011
* UK: Company Voluntary Arrangements in Retail Sector Up 15%


* BOND PRICING: For the Week April 4 to April 8, 2011



CMA CGM: Launches US$800MM Bond Issue to Institutional Investors
Robert Wright at The Financial Times reports that CMA CGM on
April 5 launched an US$800 million bond issue to institutional

Turkey's Yildirim Group in February injected US$500 million into
CMA CGM to fund its ambitious program of ship purchases, the FT

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 28,
2011, Bloomberg News said CMA is reorganizing its debt after
freight prices collapsed in the global economic slump and shippers
were forced to take delivery of new vessels ordered before the
crisis, Bloomberg relates.  It opened talks with lenders to
restructure US$5.2 billion of obligations in September 2009,
Bloomberg disclosed.

France-based CMA CGM -- ships freight
PDQ.  The marine transportation company is one of the world's
leading container carriers.  Through subsidiaries it operates a
fleet of about 370 vessels that serve more than 400 ports around
the globe, and it maintains a network of about 650 facilities in
about 150 countries.  In addition to hauling containers by sea,
CMA CGM provides logistics services, arranging the transportation
of containerized freight by river, road, and rail.  The company's
tourism division arranges cruises and other travel services.
Jacques Saade founded the company in 1978.

CMA CGM: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba3' Corporate Family Rating
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)Ba3
corporate family rating (CFR) and probability of default rating
(PDR) to CMA CGM S.A. Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a
provisional (P)B2 senior unsecured rating and a Loss Given Default
(LGD) assessment of LGD5 - 85% to the company's proposed issuance
of US$800 million worth of senior unsecured notes due in 2017 and
in 2019.  The outlook on the ratings is stable.

The assigned ratings are provisional because they are contingent
on CMA CGM's successful conclusion of its financial restructuring
and issuance of an US$800 million bond offering by the end of
April 2011.  Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the
final sale of securities, and these ratings represent only Moody's
preliminary opinion on the transaction. Upon a conclusive review
of the transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will
endeavor to assign a definitive CFR and rating to the securities.
A definitive rating may differ from a provisional rating.

                        Ratings Rationale

"The (P)Ba3 CFR reflects the current weakness of CMA CGM's credit
metrics despite its strong business profile," says Marco Vetulli,
Vice President, Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for CMA
CGM.  "Moody's expects that the company's still sizeable capital
investment plan will limit its free cash flow generation and, as
result, that its credit metrics will remain weak in the near
future, thus constraining the upside potential of the rating in
the near term," continues Mr. Vetulli.

"In addition, the rating reflects the need for CMA CGM to
reinforce its capital structure in order to meet the contrasting
challenges of (i) improving its financial profile (e.g.
deleveraging); and (ii) making the necessary investments to
maintain its current market share in a more mature operating
environment," adds Mr. Vetulli.

The entry of a new shareholder (the Turkish group Yildirim)
represents the company's first step towards diversifying its
capital structure, but in Moody's view, this is not sufficient on
its own to achieve the required improvement.

More positively, the rating reflects CMA CGM's strong business
profile due to its leading market positions gained from the
successful commercial and operational strategies implemented by
its management and good cash flow generation.

In addition, the rating is supported by the company's strong asset
base, with a fleet market value of approximately US$4.9 billion as
of the end of December 2010, according to independent third-party

Moreover, as a general factor that affects the industry, Moody's
has taken into account the reliance of container shipping
operators on short-term contracts, which imply a greater exposure
to cyclical trends, although CMA CGM has a meaningful amount of
revenues under contract representing good revenue visibility.
This represents a negative factor for the rating of container
shipping companies, given their high operating leverage and,
therefore, high degree of sensitivity to revenue shifts (as
illustrated by the 2009 recession).

The provisional (P)B2 rating (LGD5 - 85%) on the senior unsecured
notes is two notches lower than CMA CGM's CFR.  The differential
reflects that the proposed bond issuance, which will be
subordinated to all of CMA CGM's secured debt, will rank "pari
passu" with senior unsecured debt already in the company's capital
structure.  Moreover, the subordinated bonds redeemable in
preferred shares (Obligations Remboursable en Actions de
PrŠfŠrence, or "ORA") subscribed for by Yildirim will be
subordinated to all of CMA CGM's senior unsecured debt, including
the company's proposed notes.

The stable outlook on CMA CGM's ratings reflects Moody's view that
after the market recovery, the agreement signed with Yildirim
Holding and the signing of the restructuring agreements with the
banks, CMA CGM will have stabilized its capital structure and
liquidity profile.  Moreover, Moody's notes that the container
shipping market is expected to report a satisfactory year in 2011
(although it will be less exceptional than in 2010); therefore,
the rating agency expects CMA CGM to perform relatively well in
such conditions.

The ratings and outlook also reflect Moody's expectation that,
going forward, CMA CGM will maintain: (i) financial leverage,
measured in terms of debt/EBITDA, of around 5.5x (as adjusted by
Moody's for operating leases and pension items); (ii) a retained
cash flow (RCF)/net debt ratio above 10%; and (iii) a free cash
flow/debt ratio above 3%.

Given that CMA CGM's immediate target will be to demonstrate its
ability to maintain an adequate financial profile, Moody's
considers it unlikely that any upward pressure would be exerted on
the company's rating in the short term.  However, upward pressure
could materialize over time as a result of: (i) a reduction in the
company's financial leverage below 4.0x; (ii) an RCF/net debt
ratio above the mid-teens; and (iii) an increase in its
EBIT/interest coverage ratio above 3.0x on sustainable basis.

Downward pressure on the rating could potentially result from
deteriorating market conditions leading to financial leverage
increasing towards 6.0x and/or EBIT/interest expense coverage
falling below 1.5x, together with weak or negative free cash flow
and/or a deterioration in CMA CGM's liquidity profile.

The ratings assigned by Moody's are:

   -- Provisional CFR of (P)Ba3

   -- Provisional PDR of (P)Ba3

   -- Provisional senior unsecured rating on the proposed US$800
      million notes issuance of (P)B2, LGD5 - 85%.

Moody's last rating action on CMA CGM was implemented on June 8,
2009, when the rating agency withdrew all of the company's ratings
for business reasons, at its own request.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Global
Shipping Industry published in December 2009, and Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S.,
Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Marseille, France, CMA CGM is the third-largest
container shipping company in the world (measured in twenty-foot
equivalent units, or "TEU").  The company generated revenues of
around US$15 billion for the year ended Dec. 31, 2010.


BAYERNLB: Expects to Reach State Aid Deal Before Summer
James Wilson in Frankfurt and Chris Bryant at The Financial Times
report that Bayerische Landesbank's chief executive said a deal
with the European Commission over the bank's state aid was "at the
top of the agenda."

The FT relates that Gerd Hausler said BayernLB was "fully within
the time frame" set by the commission.  "We are optimistic we can
reach an agreement before the summer break," the FT quotes
Mr. Hausler as saying on March 30.

BayernLB is one of four German banks still seeking a deal with
Brussels over the measures they must take to compensate for state
aid received during the financial crisis, the FT notes.  BayernLB
received EUR10 billion (US$14 billion) of capital from Bavaria's
regional government to survive the crisis, the FT recounts.

                          About BayernLB

Bayerische Landesbank a.k.a BayernLB --
acts as the principal bank to the state of Bavaria and as the
central clearing house for the 75 Bavarian sparkassen (savings
banks).  Also serving corporations, national and local
governments, financial institutions, and real estate firms, the
bank offers a variety of services, including financing, security
underwriting and trading, and risk management.  It provides retail
and private banking services for individuals through its Internet
bank, Deutsche Kreditbank, and through banking subsidiaries in
central and southeastern Europe.  BayernLB's Landesbank Saar
subsidiary (75% owned) provides financing to small and midsized
businesses in the German state of Saarland and in France.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 30,
2011, BayernLB's Prime-1 short-term rating and D- BFSR, with a
stable outlook, were affirmed by Moody's Investors Service.  In
addition, the outlook on the bank's upper tier 2 and silent
participations was changed to positive from stable.  The
affirmation of BayernLB's D- BFSR, which corresponds to a
baseline credit assessment of Ba3, with a stable outlook, took
into account its return to profitability in 2010 after years of
severe losses.  In particular, the BFSR is constrained by: (i) the
bank's developing franchise and risk-management practices; (ii)
the ongoing de-risking and downsizing of the balance sheet; (iii)
the limited visibility in terms of profitability and capital
generation; and (iv) the outcome of the pending EU investigation
into the bank's business and financial profile, which is expected
by mid-2011.

LANDESBANK BADEN: To Kick Off Sale of German Property Portfolio
Global Insolvency, citing Dow Jones Daily Bankruptcy Review,
reports that German state-controlled lender Landesbank Baden-
Wuerttemberg's spokesman said the bank will likely kick off the
sale of its German residential property portfolio worth about
EUR1.3 billion (US$1.8 billion) this summer.

According to Global Insolvency, the LBBW spokesman said the bank
"is preparing the sale of LBBW Immobilien's residential real
estate, as required by the EU."  However, the LBBW spokesman said
a final decision over the details of the sale "will likely take
until the summer of 2011," considering legal aspects and the
complexity of the issue involved, Global Insolvency notes.

Global Insolvency relates that a spokeswoman for LBBW's real-
estate unit, LBBW Immobilien GmbH, also said the plan is to offer
the portfolio in mid-2011.  Under a restructuring plan approved by
the European Commission in December 2009, LBBW agreed to downsize
substantially and sell 14 stakeholdings or subsidiaries by the end
of 2013 at the latest, Global Insolvency discloses.  Among others,
the businesses that Stuttgart-based LBBW put up for sale includes
the residential property of LBBW Immobilien GmbH, Global
Insolvency states.  The portfolio has a book value of around
EUR1.3 billion, according to LBBW Immobilien's latest annual
report, Global Insolvency points out.

TITAN EUROPE: S&P Cuts Ratings on Three Classes of Notes to 'CCC-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' its
credit ratings on Titan Europe 2006-2 PLC's class D, E, and F
notes.  "At the same time, we affirmed our 'CCC- (sf)' rating
on the class G notes and placed our ratings on the class A, B, and
C notes on CreditWatch negative," S&P said.

This rating action follows the recent announcement of the
restructuring of the underlying Velvet loan.  This is one of four
loans in the transaction and accounts for 22% of the total loan
balance.  The three other loans -- Margaux, Petrus, and Labrador
-- also mature within the next two years.

The Velvet loan has a senior loan balance of EUR145.8 million and
is secured on multifamily housing assets in Germany.  The borrower
did not pay the amounts due at maturity in January.  The loan has
not met any debt service payments since the July 2010 interest
payment date and has been in special servicing since 2009.

A special notice published by the issuer in March 2011 announced
that the special servicer has agreed to an extension of the Velvet
loan term to Jan. 18, 2013, three years prior to the note maturity
date.  The special servicer has also agreed to defer the
borrower's obligation to pay interest under the loan until that

"We understand the rationale for this agreement is to free up cash
for the borrower to spend capital expenditure on the properties
and therefore improve the marketability and value of the assets,
and, in turn, recovery proceeds from asset sales.  We do not have
information on how much free cash flow will now be available for
this capital expenditure," S&P elaborated.

"Based on our understanding of the documents, we believe the
interest deferral will likely have a direct impact on the notes.
Our interpretation is that the issuer cannot draw liquidity until
January 2013 -- the new due date for the interest -- because
drawings can only be made under the liquidity facility to cover
shortfalls between interest due and interest paid.  Since
publishing the first notice in March, the issuer has published a
further notice and restructuring presentation, which confirms that
the issuer will make no liquidity drawing in respect of the Velvet
loan," S&P noted.

S&P continued, "In view of the size of this loan, we anticipate
interest shortfalls on the notes could be substantial.  The
servicer has indicated to us that interest shortfalls are likely
to occur on the class D notes and below in the capital structure.
Accordingly, we have lowered (or affirmed) our ratings on these
classes to 'CCC- (sf)' and we will likely lower to 'D (sf)' our
ratings on these classes should the interest shortfalls occur."

"We have less certainty about the impact of the interest deferral
on the class A, B, and C notes.  We have considered historical
receipts from the three other loans to assess the likely future
loan receipts against note interest obligations.  There are
scenarios in which these notes are unaffected; there are even
scenarios in which the class D notes and below would not suffer
Shortfalls," S&P noted.

"However, we are unable to forecast with certainty the interest
that will be payable to the class X noteholders on future interest
payment dates.  The restructuring presentation indicates that the
interest payable on this class will decline substantially, but
does not provide more detail.  With the class X notes in mind, we
believe there are scenarios in which the class A, B, and C
notes could also suffer shortfalls," S&P stated.

"For this reason, we have placed the ratings on the class A, B,
and C notes on CreditWatch negative.  If shortfalls occur on those
classes, we could also lower our ratings to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

The class H and J notes are already at 'D (sf)' due to prior
interest shortfalls.

"We have made the rating actions in the context of potential note
interest shortfalls.  As far as note principal shortfalls are
concerned, our current opinion is that -- absent a further
deterioration in property market values -- recoveries from the
four remaining loans would likely be sufficient to repay the class
D notes and above in full at or before the note maturity date.
Therefore, absent the interest shortfall, our rating on the class
D notes would likely remain at the previous level of 'BB (sf)'.
By contrast, for the class E notes and below, we see a high
likelihood of ultimate principal losses," S&P noted.

"As a general matter, we believe that loan interest deferrals can
have a direct impact on notes in cases when arrangements permit
the issuer to draw liquidity only to cover shortfalls between
interest due and interest received.  Loan restructurings in
European CMBS that include such features therefore may lead
to downgrades of the kind we have taken," S&P stated.

Titan Europe 2006-2 was initially backed by seven loans, all
secured on German multifamily housing assets -- approximately
28,000 units in total.  Three loans have prepaid and the
outstanding note issuance amount has now reduced to EUR669.4
million from EUR862.1 million at closing.

Ratings List

Titan Europe 2006-2 PLC
EUR862.169 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Class                Rating
            To                       From

Ratings Placed on CreditWatch Negative

A           A (sf)/Watch Neg         A (sf)
B           BBB (sf)/Watch Neg       BBB (sf)
C           BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg      BBB- (sf)

Ratings Lowered

D           CCC- (sf)                BB (sf)
E           CCC- (sf)                B- (sf)
F           CCC- (sf)                CCC (sf)

Rating Affirmed

G           CCC- (sf)

Ratings Unaffected

H           D (sf)
J           D (sf)


LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: Explores Options for Stake in Iceland Foods
Andrea Felsted at The Financial Times reports that the Resolution
Committee of Landsbanki Islands hf. said it had begun the process
of evaluating its options with regard to its 66% stake in Iceland

According to the FT, the Resolution Committee is believed to be
looking for a price tag of GBP1.8 billion to GBP2 billion for the
business, and will interview investment banks over the coming

Malcolm Walker, the founder and chief executive of Iceland Foods,
who with management owns about 26% of the company, is expected to
be one of the bidders for the chain, and has pre-emption rights,
the FT says.  He made a GBP1 billion offer last year, which offer
remains on the table, the FT discloses.  Mr. Walker, however, may
be reluctant to pay the full price the Resolution Committee seeks,
the FT notes.

The FT relates that the Resolution Committee said its core
objective was to maximize the value of assets controlled by the
bank on behalf of creditors.

                     About Landsbanki Islands

Landsbanki Islands hf, also commonly known as Landsbankinn in
Iceland, is an Icelandic bank.  The bank offered online savings
accounts under the "Icesave" brand.  On October 7, 2008, the
Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority took control of
Landsbanki and two other major banks.

Landsbanki filed for Chapter 15 protection on Dec. 9, 2008 (Bankr.
S.D. N.Y. Case No.: 08-14921).  Gary S. Lee, Esq., at Morrison &
Foerster LLP, represents the Debtor.  When it filed for protection
from its creditors, it listed assets and debts of more than
US$1 billion each.


ALLIED IRISH: S&P Keeps 'BB/B' Ratings on CreditWatch Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it took various rating
actions on the four domestically owned Irish banks and three
foreign-owned banks operating in Ireland which it rates.  "This
follows our review of the results of the Irish government's
Financial Measures Programme, comprising a Prudential Capital
Assessment (PCAR) and a Prudential Liquidity Assessment (PLAR), as
well as the announced restructuring of the Irish banking sector
and our revised ratings on the Republic of Ireland (BBB+/Stable/A-
2)," S&P said.  The rating actions on the four domestically owned
Irish banks and three foreign-owned banks are:

    * The 'BB/B' counterparty credit ratings on Allied Irish Banks
      PLC (AIB) remain on CreditWatch with negative implications,
      as do the 'BB-/B' ratings on AIB's wholly owned U.K.
      subsidiary, AIB Group (UK) PLC (AIB UK).  "We continue to
      factor a two-notch uplift for Irish government support into
      the counterparty credit ratings on AIB above its 'b+' SACP,"
      S&P said.

    * The 'BB+/B' ratings of Bank of Ireland (BOI) remain on
      CreditWatch with negative implications.  "We continue to
      factor a two-notch uplift for Irish government support into
      the counterparty credit ratings on BOI above its 'bb-'
      SACP," S&P noted.

    * "As a result of the planned restructuring of Irish Life &
      Permanent PLC (IL&P), which will lead to the disposal of its
      life operations, we have lowered the ratings to 'BB+/B' from
      'BBB-/A-3'.  This reflects our view that there will likely
      be no material support by Irish Life Assurance PLC (ILA;
      BBB-/Watch Dev/--) of IL&P.  The IL&P ratings remain on
      CreditWatch with negative implications.  We continue to
      factor a two-notch uplift for Irish government support into
      the counterparty credit ratings on IL&P above its revised
      'bb-' SACP.  In addition, we have lowered IL&P's lower Tier
      2 subordinated debt rating to 'CCC' from 'B' given the
      government's stated intention to include subordinated
      debtors in the recapitalization of Irish banks," S&P

    * "We have lowered the long-term counterparty credit rating on
      Anglo Irish Bank Corp. (Anglo), which we consider a
      government-related entity (GRE) under our criteria, by one
      notch to 'CCC+' from 'B-'.  This reflects our view of
      Anglo's reduced importance to the Irish government.  We have
      also removed the ratings from CreditWatch with negative
      implications.  The outlook is negative," S&P noted.

    * The rating actions do not affect the ratings on debt issues
      of AIB, BOI, IL&P, and Anglo, which are guaranteed by the
      Republic of Ireland.

    * "We have lowered the counterparty credit ratings on Barclays
      Bank Ireland PLC (BBI) to 'A-/A-2' from 'A/A-1' to reflect
      the weakened creditworthiness of the Irish sovereign, and
      removed the BBI ratings from CreditWatch with negative
      implications.  We have maintained our view of BBI's 'core'
      status to its parent.  The outlook is stable," S&P noted.

    * "We have lowered the long-term ratings on Ulster Bank Ltd.
      (UBL) and core Irish subsidiary, Ulster Bank Ireland Ltd.
      (UBIL) to 'BBB+' from 'A-'," S&P said.   As a result of the
      weakened creditworthiness of the Irish sovereign, group
      support above UBL and UBIL's 'bb+' SACP is now capped at
      three notches.  The UBL and UBIL ratings remain on
      CreditWatch with negative implications.

    * The 'BBB+/A-2' ratings on KBC Bank Ireland PLC (KBCI), which
      incorporate two notches of group support above KBCI's 'bbb-'
      SACP, remain on CreditWatch with negative implications.

"In our opinion, the Programme and bank restructuring announcement
represent a credible first step by the Irish government toward the
eventual rebuilding of investor confidence in the deeply troubled
Irish banking system.  "Moreover, the level of detail and
transparency presented in the Programme appears to us to
compare well with that presented by peer European banking systems
to date.  Nevertheless, we believe that it will likely be many
years before the Irish banking system starts to approach the
creditworthiness of peer European systems.  Our Banking Industry
Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) on Ireland remains in Group 6,
which is the lowest of any developed country globally, with the
exception of Greece, which we lowered to Group 7 on March 31,
2011," S&P related.

The Programme comprises the PCAR and the PLAR and was applied to
AIB, BOI, IL&P, and EBS Building Society (not rated).  The PCAR
takes into account independently estimated loan losses over the
three-year period 2011-2013 under base (EUR20 billion) and adverse
scenarios (EUR27.7 billion), estimated from a bottom-up analysis
of loan books.  In addition, the PCAR takes into account a top-
down stress test that models the impact on banks' balance sheets
and income statements.  Additional capital buffers are applied to
take account of lifetime loan losses and other contingencies.

The PLAR outlines plans to reduce the banks' loan-to-deposit ratio
to 122.5% by end-2013.  Under the Programme, banks will segment
their businesses into 'core' and 'non-core' portfolios, and all
assets will reportedly remain within the existing legal entity.
The main aim of the Programme is to deleverage loan portfolios by
EUR72.6 billion by 2013.  Deleveraging will give rise to losses on
exit, which will create a need for further capital.  This
assumption is included in the PCAR.  In total, the gross
additional capital requirement for the four banks is
EUR24 billion.  This amount is intended to enable the banks to
remain above a minimum 10.5% core Tier 1 ratio under the base
scenario and above 6.0% under the adverse scenario, plus an
additional protective buffer.

This capital injection, if none is garnered from private sources
or other capital actions, would be on top of the EUR46.3 billion
that the government has already injected into these banks (and
Anglo and Irish Nationwide Building Society (INBS)).

The Irish government has determined that AIB and BOI will be the
two core pillars of its banking system, together with the
remaining foreign-owned banks.  Both AIB and BOI will reportedly
become significantly more domestically focused with limited
nonretail and commercial banking activities.  The government will
facilitate AIB's take-over of EBS, which was previously being bid
for by a U.S. private equity firm and IL&P.  "We note that the
U.K. subsidiaries of both AIB and BOI will remain part of their
respective core businesses, albeit that their U.K. business as a
whole will be reduced in size and scope.  In contrast, IL&P will
reportedly be required to sell its life insurance subsidiary, ILA,
and we understand that the Irish government does not view IL&P as
a pillar of the banking system.  Separately, Anglo and INBS
(whose deposit books were sold to AIB and IL&P, respectively, in
February 2011) will reportedly be merged and wound down over
several years," S&P stated.

S&P said in its view, positive factors for the ratings on the four
domestically owned Irish banks and three foreign-owned banks

    * "Our opinion that the assumptions underlying the stress
      testing of capitalization are robust and have contributed to
      a stable outlook on the Irish sovereign ratings," S&P said.

    * The very large planned capital injections, which demonstrate
      the Irish government's continued support of certain banks
      and that this support is trending from potential to actual

    * "The announced deleveraging and restructuring, which in our
      view appear to be both practical and plausible measures,
      given what we view to be the limited palatable options
      available to the Irish government," S&P related.

    * "The fact that there is now a plan of action, which we
      believe reduces uncertainty and allows bank management to
      plan ahead accordingly," S&P said.

Nevertheless, S&P believes that significant credit weaknesses and
uncertainties remain:

    * S&P continues to view Ireland's BICRA as very weak.

    * Even under the Programme's base scenario, the PCAR starkly
      highlights the weak asset quality across all the loan
      portfolios of the Irish banks.  "The elevated loan losses
      modeled under the PCAR will negatively impact bank
      profitability for the next three years at least, in our
      view," S&P related.

    * "Furthermore, while the assumptions appear robust, in our
      opinion this is merely the latest of several capital
      assessments over the past 12 months and may yet prove to be
      insufficient if economic circumstances turn out to be more
      severe than those modeled," S&P said.

    * The PLAR allows for a sizable systemwide haircut on asset
      disposals by 2013.  "Depending on market conditions, in
      particular those outside of Ireland, it is possible that
      this may prove to be too low an assumption, even if we think
      that these transactions are possible to consummate," S&P

    * "Even if the banks delever as planned, we consider that the
      banks may remain reliant on Irish central bank funding
      sources," according to S&P.

    * "We believe that implementation risk could follow the bank
      Restructuring," S&P said.

    * The exact future role for the banking operations of IL&P has
      not been fully clarified, in S&P's opinion.

    * "The two-pillar approach to the system may lead to
      unintended  competition concerns for the authorities in the
      medium term, in our view," S&P related.

    * Details on the timing of the capital injections and the
      exact nature of those capital instruments have not yet been
      announced.  "We understand, however, that the banks'
      management must soon submit their capital plans to
      the regulator," S&P noted.

    * "We also note that no medium-term arrangements for the
      provision of Irish central bank liquidity facilities have
      been announced," S&P related.

    * "Finally, while the political will to impose burden sharing
      on senior unguaranteed bondholders has reportedly
      diminished, the sheer scale of the planned changes means, in
      our view, that this risk has not completely dissipated," S&P

                      CreditWatch Status

"We are maintaining the CreditWatch negative on AIB, BOI, and
IL&P.  The CreditWatch negative indicates our view of the
difficulties associated with the ambitious restructuring plan, the
need for additional details about the timing and nature of the
capital injections, and the impact of the aggressive deleveraging
plans on each bank's SACP.  We have maintained the CreditWatch on
UBL, UBIL, and KBCI because we are of the view that the tougher
Irish regulatory requirements and significant changes elsewhere in
the Irish banking system may weigh on their SACPs.  We expect to
resolve the CreditWatch on all five banks within three months.  We
expect that the counterparty credit ratings may be affirmed or
lowered by one or two notches," S&P stated.

                     Domestically Owned Banks

"We view the liquidity of AIB, BOI, and IL&P as very weak.  Even
though in our view the PCAR/PLAR result provides clarity as to how
much the Irish central bank believes is the sovereign's maximum
contingent liability, we believe the Irish banking system has a
long way to go to recover," S&P related.

The Irish government has now reportedly allocated about EUR19
billion (reportedly a net figure after taking account of burden
sharing by subordinated bondholders) of the EUR35 billion
originally earmarked for the banking sector as part of the EU-IMF
restructuring agreement.  The willingness and ability of Ireland
to provide further extraordinary support to its banking system in
the future may therefore have been somewhat reduced.
"Nonetheless, our view of the potential for future extraordinary
government support is reflected in a two-notch uplift above the
respective SACP on AIB, BOI, and IL&P, which incorporates support
received to date or that is pending and clearly identified," S&P
stated.  These include:

    * Injections of equity and hybrid capital under previous
      recapitalization efforts;

    * National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) tranches already
      transferred or due to be completed shortly;

    * Ongoing funding and liquidity support by the ECB and Central
      Bank of Ireland; and

    * Capital injections announced on March 31, 2011, because they
      are quantified and the government is committed (and able)
      to provide these injections

                        Allied Irish Banks PLC

"We consider AIB to be a highly systemically important
institution.  This view is further supported by the Irish
government's view of AIB as a pillar in the future of Irish
banking.  The ratings remain on CreditWatch while we consider
the SACP and notches of extraordinary government support in light
of the PCAR result and deleveraging challenges," S&P related.

                        Bank of Ireland

"Along with AIB, BOI is viewed by the Irish government as a pillar
in the future of the Irish banking sector and in our view remains
a highly systemically important institution.  The ratings remain
on CreditWatch as we consider the SACP and notches of
extraordinary government support in light of the PCAR result and
deleveraging challenges," according to S&P.

                     Irish Life & Permanent PLC

"The rating actions on IL&P reflect our review of its SACP in
light of the announcement that its life company will be sold.
Unlike the case of AIB and BOI, the government has not explicitly
defined IL&P as a key pillar of the Irish banking market.
Nevertheless, we still view IL&P to be highly systemically
important.  We have maintained two notches of extraordinary
government support into the ratings on IL&P.  We have also lowered
the dated subordinated debt ratings on IL&P to 'CCC' because the
Irish government has clearly included burden sharing on
subordinated debt in its recapitalization plans.  Based on the
experience that we have observed at Anglo, AIB, and BOI, we see a
'clear and present risk' that subordinated bondholders of IL&P are
likely to suffer loss.  IL&P's ratings remain on CreditWatch
negative as we assess the impact of the restructuring,
deleveraging, and PCAR results on the future of IL&P's banking
entity," S&P stated.

                    Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd.

"The rating actions on Anglo reflect our opinion that, despite a
'strong' link to the government, this GRE is now of 'limited
importance' in accordance with our GRE criteria and that there is
only a "moderate" likelihood of extraordinary support.
Accordingly, we have lowered Anglo's counterparty credit rating to
'CCC+', one notch above its 'ccc' SACP.  We take the GRE approach
for the ratings on Anglo, in contrast to those of the other
domestically owned Irish banks for whom we apply our systemic
importance criteria.  This is because we expect Anglo to be wound
down over a period of years and remain in government ownership
throughout that period.  We have removed Anglo's ratings from
CreditWatch and assigned a negative outlook, as the government has
stated that there is no immediate need for additional capital for
either Anglo or INBS, but that a further assessment will be
available in May," S&P stated.

             Foreign-Owned, Domestically Active Banks

"We have also analyzed the implications of the weakened
creditworthiness of the Irish sovereign on the three foreign-
owned, domestically active Irish banks that we rate: BBI, KBCI,
and UBIL.  While not supported by the Irish government, we rate
these banks higher than their domestically owned peers due
to our views on the likelihood of parental support and our view of
their modestly stronger SACPs.  In particular, BBI, KBCI, and UBIL
have not seen the sort of stress experienced by their domestic
peers, particularly regarding access to funding.  However, under
our ratings methodology, we only maintain ratings on financial
institutions above that of the sovereign in exceptional
circumstances.  We typically do this only where we conclude that
the operating and financial characteristics of an entity provide a
high probability that it can meet its debt obligations even
when the sovereign cannot," S&P stated.

                  Barclays Bank Ireland PLC

"We lowered the long-term ratings on BBI to 'A-' from 'A' and the
outlook is stable in line with the sovereign.  Unlike its peers,
BBI's outlook is stable because we see no reason to change our
view of its 'core' group status.  Given the exceptional
circumstances we see, we have not lowered the BBI ratings to
be in line with the 'BBB+' sovereign credit rating, instead
allowing a one-notch differential," S&P noted.  This is because:

    * S&P believes that BBI or its parent should be able to find
      sufficient foreign or local currency funding to repay its
      liabilities and all deposits;

    * In S&P's view, BBI would be very easily supported by its
      parent due to its small relative size and the fact that the
      parent is highly rated, not being a government-supported
      institution itself; and

    * BBI's core status reflects S&P's view that substantial
      support would be forthcoming from the parent.

         Ulster Bank Ireland Ltd., Ulster Bank Ltd.

The rating action on UBIL and UBL follows the weakened
creditworthiness of the Irish sovereign.  This is because:

    * S&P considers UBIL to be core to U.K.-incorporated UBL,
      being about 70% of the consolidated assets, and highly
      integrated.  S&P therefore believes that a deterioration of
      UBIL would weaken UBL, and a downgrade of UBIL would most
      certainly lead to a downgrade of UBL; and

    * While some of the factors cited with regard to BBI apply in
      this case, S&P does not see a convincing case to rate UBL
      above the Irish sovereign, not least because UBL is
      strategically important to a parent that is itself

The ratings on UBIL and UBL remain on CreditWatch negative pending
a further review and analysis of the SACPs in light of the high
stress factors applied to the domestic banks in the PCAR analysis
and the significant changes elsewhere in the Irish banking system.

                       KBC Bank Ireland PLC

"While some of the factors cited with regard to BBI apply to KBCI,
we do not see a convincing case to rate KBCI above the Irish
sovereign, not least because we view KBCI as strategically
important as opposed to core to a parent that is itself
government-supported.  We continue to provide two notches of
parental support, which are not constrained by the sovereign
credit rating of 'BBB+', compared with KBCI's SACP of 'bbb-',"
S&P stated.

The ratings on KBCI remain on CreditWatch negative pending a
review and analysis of its SACP in light of the high stress
factors applied to the domestic banks in the PCAR analysis and the
significant changes elsewhere in the Irish banking system.

Ratings List

Downgraded; CreditWatch Action; Ratings Affirmed
                              To                          From
Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating   CCC+/Negative/C      B-/Watch Neg/C

Allied Irish Banks PLC
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB/Watch Neg/B       BB/Watch Neg/B

AIB Group (UK) PLC
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB-/Watch Neg/B      BB-/Watch Neg/B

Irish Life & Permanent PLC
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB+/Watch Neg/B      BBB-/Watch

Bank of Ireland
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB+/Watch Neg/B      BB+/Watch Neg/B

KBC Bank Ireland PLC
Counterparty Credit Rating   BBB+/Watch Neg/A-2   BBB+/Watch

Barclays Bank Ireland PLC
Counterparty Credit Rating   A-/Stable/A-2        A/Watch Neg/A-1

Ulster Bank Ireland Ltd.
Ulster Bank Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating   BBB+/Watch Neg/A-2  A-/Watch Neg/A-2

NB: This list does not include all ratings affected.

MCINERNEY HOMES: Oaktree to Push Through with Investment Plan
Barry O'Halloran at The Irish Times reports that US fund Oaktree
Capital's plans to invest in McInerney Homes will not be affected
by the decision of Lloyds and Royal Bank of Scotland to take
control of the group's British business.

The Irish Times relates that Lloyds and Royal Bank of Scotland
appointed KPMG as administrators to McInerney's British businesses
on April 5 on foot of a EUR90 million debt.

Most of McInerney's Irish business is under court protection
pending the outcome of an appeal against the High Court's recent
refusal to approve a rescue plan for the business prepared by
examiner Bill O'Riordan of PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Irish Times

Oaktree Capital is backing the plan, which could involve an
investment of up to EUR48 million, The Irish Times says.  It is
understood the fund is still interested in investing in the Irish
business, despite the banks' move against the British operations,
The Irish Times notes.

Oaktree originally planned to invest in McInerney's Irish and
British divisions, but those plans changed as the examinership
process, which began last September, dragged on, The Irish Times

The fund believes the Irish business, which specializes in
building family homes in established residential centers, offers
the best long-term value, according to The Irish Times.

The British banks' move will not affect the Supreme Court appeal,
which is due to go ahead early next month, The Irish Times states.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 12,
2011, The Irish Times said the High Court turned down a proposed
rescue plan for McInerney Homes because it was unfairly
prejudicial to its bank creditors.  The Irish Times disclosed that
in the High Court, Mr. Justice Frank Clarke said he would not
sanction a rescue plan for the company, backed by potential
investor, Oaktree Capital, which proposed offering the banks
EUR25 million in full and final settlement of the debt.  Mr.
Justice Clarke ruled that the plan, drawn up by examiner, Bill
O'Riordan of Pricewaterhousecoopers, was unfairly prejudicial to
the interests of the bank syndicate, which had opposed both the
examinership and the rescue plan, according to The Irish Times.
The syndicate proposes to put the company in receivership and
recover its money by building houses on McInerney's sites around
the Republic and selling them, The Irish Times noted.

McInerney Homes is an Irish housebuilder.

* IRELAND: 396 Corporate Insolvencies Recorded in First Quarter
New statistics released by show that more
than 33 companies went out of business per week during the first
quarter of 2011.

According to, the total number of corporate
insolvencies for the first three months is 396.  The figures are
just slightly down on Q1 last year's total of 409, notes.

The first quarter results for 2011 show that of the 396
insolvencies the industry worst affected was construction, which
accounted for over 28% of the total, with retail and hospitality
both accounting for 14%, discloses.  Retail
has seen an increase from 37 insolvencies in the last quarter of
2010 to 54 insolvencies in the first quarter for 2011 with
hospitality jumping just 5 from 51 insolvencies in the last
quarter of 2010 to 56 in the first quarter of 2011, according to

"The trend in retail is worrying in that corporate retail
insolvencies have increased significantly in the first quarter
accounting for 14% of the overall total of insolvencies.  The
increase in the first quarter total of hospitality failures is not
surprising bearing in mind the continued downward pressure on
pricing and lack of consumer confidence,"
quotes Ken Fennell, a partner of kavanaghfennell, the firm who
compile the data, as saying.

Creditors' Voluntary Liquidations accounted for 77% of all
insolvencies for the first three months of 2011 while Court
Liquidations accounted for just 7%, notes.
The first quarter of 2011 saw six applications for Court
protection granted by the High Court accounting for 1% of the
overall total, relates.  Receivership totals
have increased over 11% from 52 to 58 when compared with the last
quarter of 2010 and accounted for 15% of first quarter 2011
failures, according to


CAPE NATIXIS: Put Under Extraordinary Administration
Gilles Castonguay at Dow Jones Newswires reports that Italy's
finance ministry has put Cape Natixis SGR SpA under extraordinary
administration on Wednesday after irregularities were discovered
in the management of its two funds.

According to Dow Jones, a spokeswoman for French bank Natixis on
Thursday said the irregularities were first discovered during an
audit by the Bank of Italy.  She said Natixis is awaiting for the
outcome of the final audit by the central bank, Dow Jones notes.

Cape Natixis was founded in 2003 by Italy's Cimino & Associati
Private Equity SpA, or Cape, and Natixis Private Equity


LECTA SA: S&P Affirms 'B+' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had revised the outlook
on Luxembourg-based paper producer Lecta S.A. to stable from
negative.  At the same time, all ratings, including the 'B+' long-
term corporate credit rating, were affirmed.

"The outlook revision primarily reflects Lecta's improved
operating and financial performance in 2010, which has translated
into credit measures that are strong according to our guidance for
the 'B+' level," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Jacob Zachrison.

"It also reflects the group's strengthened liquidity position,
which, combined with our expectations of a relatively stable
operating environment in 2011, has reduced the risk of
underperformance over the near term," S&P said.

"However, we do not exclude the risk of aggressive actions to
create shareholder value over the near term, because of our
assessment of Lecta's financial policies as 'aggressive', and its
substantial cash position.  Nevertheless, based on Lecta's current
financial performance, we currently consider that Lecta has room
for expansionary spending in the form of bolt-on acquisitions or
dividends, unless it results in adjusted funds from operations
(FFO) to debt falling below 12%," S&P noted.

"We do not factor in any potentially negative or positive credit
impact from an exit by the current owners into our assessment of
the ratings, as we would consider such a development to be 'event
risk.'  We note, however, that the company has publicly stated
that management has been given board authorization to identify
exit opportunities for the current owners.  A sale of the company
or a recapitalization would trigger a review of the ratings,"
according to S&P.

The ratings continue to reflect the company's exposure to the
cyclical, competitive, and challenging European coated woodfree
paper market.  "They also reflect what we see as an 'aggressive'
financial risk profile.  We consider these weaknesses to be partly
offset by a good market position, including major cost advantages
derived from the company's proximity to key end-markets; access to
a modern, flexible asset base; and a focused business and
financial strategy.  In addition, we view Lecta's strong liquidity
position as a key supportive factor for the ratings," S&P related.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Lecta's credit
measures will remain in line with our guidance levels, even if the
company should spend parts of its cash balances.  Given our
assessment of Lecta's business risk profile, we see a ratio of FFO
to debt of above 12% and adjusted debt to EBITDA of below 5x as
commensurate with a 'B+' rating.  The stable outlook does
not factor in any event risk associated with an exit of the
current owners.  A sale of the company or a recapitalization would
trigger a review of the ratings," S&P elaborated.

"Ratings pressure would most likely arise if Lecta were to
increase its leverage to the extent that credit metrics were to
deteriorate below our guidance levels.  Over the short to medium
term, negative ratings pressure could also arise due to operating
factors, for example severe input cost inflation with limited
compensation in the form of higher selling prices," S&P noted.

"We view ratings upside as limited, even if credit measures were
to improve from current levels, given our assessment of the
group's financial policies as 'aggressive'," said Mr. Zachrison.


REDE FERROVIARIA: Moody's Downgrades Rating to 'Ba2'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of a number
of Portuguese government-related issuers following the recent
downgrade of the ratings of the government of the Republic of
Portugal from A3 to Baa1, on review for further possible
downgrade.  All ratings remain on review for further possible
downgrade, in line with the ratings of the government of RoP.

The rating downgrades are:

   -- Parpublica-Participacoes Publicas (SGPS), SA to Ba1 from

   -- Rede Ferroviaria Nacional REFER, EPE to Ba2 from Baa2

   -- REFER's bonds that are guaranteed by the government of RoP
      to Baa1 from A3

   -- Radio e Televisao de Portugal S.A. to Ba2 from Baa3

   -- Comboios de Portugal to Ba2 from Baa3

The rating agency has also lowered to 18 (Caa2 equivalent) from 17
(Caa1 equivalent) the Baseline Credit Assessment of RTP, and to 19
(Caa3 equivalent) from 18 the BCAs of REFER and CP.  The BCA is a
measure of the company's stand-alone financial strength (without
the assumed benefit of government support).

The rating agency has also assigned corporate family ratings and
probability of default ratings to Parpublica, REFER, RTP and CP in
line with the relevant bond ratings, and the issuer ratings of all
of the above companies are being withdrawn in accordance with
Moody's ratings policy.

All of the above companies are government-related issuers, which
have a very strong element of government support incorporated
within their ratings in accordance with Moody's rating methodology
for such entities.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions follow Moody's downgrade from A3 to Baa1, on
review for further downgrade of the ratings of the government of
the RoP, which was driven by the following: (1) the uncertain
political outlook following the resignation of the government,
after the rejection by the parliament of the additional budget
measures announced on 11 March and resulting reduction in the
speed and decisiveness of policy making; (2) the short- and
medium-term funding challenges, set in the context of the recently
agreed European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which contemplates debt
restructuring as a distinct possibility; and (3) the medium-term
implications of last week's revisions to the estimates for the
budget deficit and outstanding government debt for fiscal

It is very unlikely that the long term debt markets will reopen to
the Portuguese government or to the Portuguese banks to any
meaningful extent until the government is able to take action to
dispel doubts over its commitment and ability to implement the
fiscal program.  That in turn raises the probability that the
government will remain reliant on its Eurozone partners for
support once the EFSF expires and the ESM is introduced.  While
the review period is intended to allow time to assess the
implications of recent announcements by the European authorities
for the medium term credit environment in Europe, it seems
increasingly clear that any ESM lending will first require a
solvency analysis undertaken by EU officials, and if there are
doubts over a government's solvency -- which could be the case if
Portugal were to remain reliant on support funding for a sustained
period -- private creditors would be expected to bear losses as a
condition of continued support.

In that context Moody's has widened the rating differential of all
of the above companies with the sovereign.  The rating
differentials between these GRIs and the sovereign is now three
notches for Parpublica, and four notches for REFER, CP and RTP.
The widening of these rating differentials primarily reflects
Moody's view that it is now somewhat less likely that RoP would
provide timely financial support to the GRIs (expressed as a move
in Moody's support assumption from "very high" to "high" for CP,
REFER and RTP), given the possible claims on RoP's increasingly
stretched resources in current financial conditions.  Moody's
notes that the Portugal government rating is currently sustained
by the agency's view that Eurozone members assistance would be
forthcoming if Portugal needed funds on an expedited basis.  At
the same time the GRI's could become one step removed in such a
case as their own access to government support could become
contingent to EU decision makers.

At the same time Moody's has concluded that debt market conditions
in Portugal are such that it is increasingly likely that the GRIs
will require support from RoP over the short to medium term and
the risk of such support being provided on a timely basis is the
primary driver of this rating action.  The risk that timely
financial support will not be provided to all GRIs is considered
higher at a time when demand for such support is more acute
combine to make it somewhat less likely that support will be
forthcoming on a timely basis; nonetheless such support is still
highly likely to be provided.  Moody's does not see a material
difference in the level of support potentially available to REFER,
CP and RTP, and given the weak standalone credit quality, the
Moody's support assumption embedded within the rating has the
highest weight in our decision.  Hence, while standalone credit
profiles differ slightly, final ratings are at the same level.
Parpublica continues to be rated through credit substitution (ie
as, in effect, an arm of government) and is rated one notch higher
than the other GRIs reflecting primarily its lower short-term
funding needs.

Parpublica is the government's industrial holding arm in strategic
companies and therefore relies on political objectives.  Its Ba1
rating is notched down from the sovereign bond rating, reflecting
Moody's view that the company's ownership structure (100% state-
owned) together with the very significant financial, strategic and
management control exerted by the government (which, for example,
appoints members of the Management Board and Audit Committee)
justifies determination of the rating through credit substitution.
Parpublica's greater self-sufficiency for funding justifies a
marginally higher rating than that applied to the other GRIs
covered by this action.

REFER's Ba2 rating reflects the following combination of inputs:
(a) A BCA of 19 (Caa3 equivalent), (b) the Baa1 local currency
rating of RoP, (c) Very High Dependence, and (d) High Support.
REFER's BCA has been downgraded to 19 (Caa3 equivalent) from 18
(Caa2 equivalent), reflecting its worsening liquidity position and
high likelihood that it will require extraordinary support from
RoP in the near term to fund cash requirements.  The BCA reflects
Moody's view that, on a standalone basis, REFER would be very
challenged to cover its financing requirements given the
constraints in the debt markets and increased debt costs in
Portugal.  REFER has a very weak financial profile and a debt
burden which is substantially more than can be supported by
generated cash flow. REFER has significant funding requirements
over the next 12 months to meet interest expense, its capital
expenditure program, and debt refinance requirements and very
little alternate liquidity and is dependent on the continued
availability of short term funding.  The maturity of a Government
guaranteed EUR300 million Schuldshein loan in early April 2011 is

CP's Ba2 rating reflects the following combination of inputs: (a)
A BCA of 19 (Caa3 equivalent), (b) the Baa1 local currency rating
of RoP, (c) Very High Dependence, and (d) High Support.  REFER's
BCA has been downgraded to 19 (Caa3 equivalent) from 18 (Caa2
equivalent), reflecting its worsening liquidity position and high
likelihood that it will require extraordinary support from RoP in
the near term to fund cash requirements.  The BCA reflects Moody's
view that, on a standalone basis, CP would be very challenged to
cover its financing requirements given the constraints in the debt
markets and increased debt costs in Portugal.  It also reflects
that CP has a very weak financial profile and a debt burden which
is substantially more than can be supported by generated cash
flow.  It is therefore dependent on the continued availability of
short term funding to meet its interest costs over the next 12
months, finance its capital expenditure program and refinance
maturing debt including EUR260 million of banks loans in the third
quarter 2011.

RTP's Ba2 rating reflects the following combination of inputs: (a)
A BCA of 18 (Caa2 equivalent), (b) the Baa1 local currency rating
of RoP, (c) Very High Dependence, and (d) High Support. RTP's BCA
has been downgraded to 18 (Caa2 equivalent) from 17 (Caa1
equivalent), reflecting its worsening liquidity position as a
result of a covenant breach under its senior unsecured bank
facility.  The covenant breach, which was due to the downgrade of
the rating of the RoP, will imply a renegotiation of some terms of
the loan with the lenders, primarily an increased interest rate.
As part of the review process, Moody's will assess the impact on
RTP's financial profile of an increased interest expense on its

In line with the today's action and the ratings remaining on
review for further possible downgrade, Moody's does not expect
positive pressure to be exerted on the ratings of these entities
in the short term.

The ratings remain on review for further possible downgrade, and
the review will not be concluded until the review of the rating of
the government of RoP is concluded.  The trajectory of the GRIs'
ratings in the future could be impacted inter alia by any future
downwards moves in the rating of the government of RoP, and
Moody's perception of the likelihood of extraordinary support
being provided to the GRIs by RoP though the agency underlines
that each of the GRIs own liquidity situation, as well as the
contingency plans of each company will need to be assessed
separately.  Any expectation that such extraordinary support will
not be forthcoming on a timely basis could cause further downwards
moves in the GRI's ratings to close to their standalone credit

For additional information on rating factors, please refer to the
individual issuer credit opinions, available on

            Previous Rating Action & Methodology Used

Please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on for the last rating action and the rating history
of each issuer.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Government-
Related Issuers: Methodology Update published in July 2010, and
Government Owned Rail Network Operators published in April 2009.

Parpublica is a state-owned industrial holding company domiciled
in Lisbon, Portugal.  Parpublica's main role is the management of
equity stakes held by the Portuguese state in Portuguese companies
of public or strategic interest in terms of restructuring of the
corresponding sector.  The Minister of Finance acts on behalf of
the state, in its capacity as sole shareholder of Parpublica.  As
of March 2011, Parpublica's direct equity holdings portfolio had a
book value of approximately EUR5 billion.  The largest holdings
are in Energias de Portugal, S.A. (EDP), GALP Energia, REN --
Redes Energeticas Nacionais, TAP airline and ANA.

Rede Ferroviaria Nacional - REFER, E.P.E. is a special status
corporation set up by Portuguese Decree Law to upgrade, operate
and maintain substantially all of Portugal's heavy rail
infrastructure.  REFER is owned 100% by the Republic of Portugal
and has a special legal status (Entidade Publica Empresarial, or
"EPE") that defines its role as a company undertaking activities
of public interest.  By law, REFER may not be privatized, and
Moody's does not consider likely any change of status and
subsequent privatization given the company's financial position,
its role within the railway industry, and its public policy

CP, headquartered in Lisbon, Portugal, is the national railway
incumbent, controlling 90% of the passenger market.  CP is 100%
owned by the Portuguese government though the Ministry of Finance
and it has a special legal status (Entidade Publica Empresarial,
or "EPE") that defines its role as a company undertaking
activities of public interest.  In fiscal year 2009, CP reported
revenues of EUR312 million.

RTP is a corporation, duly incorporated under domestic law, and
therefore subject to standard Portuguese commercial law.  RTP is
100% owned by the Portuguese state through the General Directorate
of Treasury and Finance, and has operated Portugal's public
service broadcasting channels under a concession from the
government since 1996.

POLO SECURITIES: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Sr. Sec. Notes to 'Ba2'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded by two notches to Ba2
from Baa3 the following transactions of Polo Securities II Ltd.
and Polo III -- CP Finance Ltd.:(i) EUR250 million worth of senior
secured notes due in June 2014 issued by Polo II; and (ii) EUR100
million worth of senior secured notes due in June 2013 and EUR300
million worth of senior secured notes due in 2015 issued by Polo
III.  Concurrently, Moody's placed the ratings on review for
possible downgrade.

The downgrade and the review for possible downgrade of the ratings
assigned to the notes issued by Polo II and Polo III follows a
similar action on Comboios de Portugal's ratings that in turn
follows the earlier downgrade of the rating of the government of
the Republic of Portugal from A3 to Baa1, on review for further
downgrade.  RoP is Comboios de Portugal's sole shareholder.  The
review will also include the relative position of the instrument
within the capital structure.

All the notes are insured by the US monoline insurer MBIA
Assurance S.A. (B3 financial strength rating).

                        Ratings Rationale

The credit profile of the Issuers and Comboios de Portugal are
correlated because the proceeds of the notes were on-lent by the
Issuers to CP, pursuant to three different loan agreements.
Therefore, the obligations of Polo II and Polo III are secured by
an assignment of rights under those loan agreements to the
trustee, which represents the interests of all the stakeholders of
the transactions.

"Moody's expects the ratings on Polo II and Polo III to move in
line with the senior unsecured CP's rating, given the nature of
the transactions" says Marco Vetulli, a Moody's Vice President-
Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for Polo II and Polo III.

"The rating agency therefore believes that the review will not be
concluded before the completion of Moody's review of CP's rating,"
concludes Mr. Vetulli.

                Last Rating Action & Methodologies

The last rating action on Polo II and Polo III was implemented on
March 15, 2010, when Moody's downgraded the ratings of the Polo
transactions from A3 to Baa3 with a negative outlook.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Moody's
Global Passenger Railway Companies Rating Methodology, published
in December 2008, Government Related Issuers: Methodology Update,
published in July 2010, and Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA,
published in June 2009.

Polo Securities II Limited and Polo III -- CP Finance Limited,
incorporated in Jersey, are two finance conduits that raise
finance and on-lend the proceeds to CP, pursuant to loan
agreements.  Headquartered in Lisbon, Portugal, CP is 100% owned
by the Portuguese government through the Ministry of Finance and
is the national railway incumbent.  In fiscal year 2009, CP
reported revenues of EUR312 million.

* Moody's Takes Multiple Rating Actions on Portuguese Banks
Moody's Investors Service has taken multiple rating actions on
Portuguese banks, including downgrades by one or more notches of
the senior debt and deposit ratings of seven banks and downgrades
of the standalone credit assessment for five of these banks.

The rating actions follow the downgrade of Portugal's debt ratings
and also reflect the weakened standalone credit profile of most
Portuguese banks.

The key drivers for the rating actions are:

  (i) The weakened standalone financial strength of most banks;

(ii) The sovereign's reduced financial strength, which raises the
      probability that the government may limit its future support
      for banks; and

(iii) The sovereign faces harder choices, at a time when the
      support environment for smaller banks is weakening across

These rating actions have been taken:

  (i) The senior unsecured debt and deposit ratings for seven
      banks have been downgraded, including a single-notch
      revision for one (Caixa Economica Montepio Geral) and
      downgrades of two or more notches of six banks (Caixa Geral
      de Depositos, Banco Comercial Portugues, Banco Espirito
      Santo, Banco BPI, Banco Santander Totta and Banco Portugues
      de Negocios).

(ii) The short-term senior debt and deposit ratings of these
      seven banks have been downgraded by one notch.

(iii) The standalone credit assessments of five banks have been
      downgraded by one or two notches. The standalone credit
      assessments for two banks remain unchanged.

(iv) The senior subordinated debt ratings of six banks have been
      downgraded by one to three notches.

  (v) The junior subordinated debt and preference share ratings of
      five banks have been downgraded by one or two notches, in
      line with the downgrade of the standalone credit

(vi) The government-backed rated senior debt of four institutions
      has been downgraded to Baa1, and kept under review for
      possible downgrade.

The rating actions conclude the review of most Portuguese banks'
standalone bank financial strength ratings (BFSRs), which Moody's
initiated on Dec. 9, 2010.  The outlook is negative on most banks'
standalone credit profiles, given the challenging operating
environment in Portugal.  The ratings on most banks' senior debt
and deposits remain on review for possible further downgrade,
reflecting the ongoing review for possible downgrade of the
sovereign's rating.

The review of Itau BBA International and Espirito Santo Financial
Group ratings will be concluded in the next weeks, in separate
rating actions, as the sovereign rating action does not have a
direct impact on these institutions.  Moreover, Moody's will
continue its analysis of Banif and expects to conclude its pending
review on the ratings separately.

Additional information on today's rating action will be published
in a Special Comment "Key Drivers of Moody's Rating Action on
Portuguese Banks" on

A full list of affected ratings can be found at this link:

Ratings Rationale

The different rating actions announced are best understood as two
separate analytical processes, each following a relatively
straightforward rationale: (i) the downgrades of the standalone
credit profiles and (ii) our lower government support assumptions
due to the sovereign's reduced financial strength.

Rationale for the Downgrade of the Standalone Credit Assessments

In Moody's view, the standalone credit assessments of most
Portuguese banks have weakened due to reduced funding flexibility,
weakening profitability and asset-quality deterioration.  The
weakening credit strength of Portuguese banks is driven by the
challenging operating environment and a loss of market confidence
that is closely correlated with the sovereign's credit challenges.

These weakening financial fundamentals have led to one or two-
notch downgrades of the standalone credit assessments for five
Portuguese banks (leading to a decline in the average, un-weighted
standalone credit strength of Portuguese banks to D/Ba2 from
D+/Ba1), while the standalone BFSRs for two banks remain unchanged
for these reasons.

Moody's has taken differentiated actions for the BFSRs of the
following banks:

  (i) Downgraded the standalone credit assessments for Banco
      Espirito Santo (BES), Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP) and
      Banco Santander Totta (BST) by two notches, reflecting:

      * High dependence on wholesale funding, resulting in a high
        reliance on ECB funding while access to wholesale markets
        remains restricted

      * For BST, its relatively high standalone BFSR (previously
        at C/A3) had been based on its intrinsic strengths.
        However, with the challenges in the operating environment
        and the negative pressure on liquidity, asset quality and
        earnings, BST's intrinsic strengths may no longer be
        sufficient to fully offset these pressures at the high
        rating level of C. Moody's continues to view this bank as
        having the strongest standalone creditworthiness.
        However, as a reflection of these pressures, Moody's has
        lowered the BFSR by one notch to C- (now translating into
        Baa2 on the long-term scale) two notches below the
        previous standalone credit assessment.

      * For BCP, its low financial flexibility -- as evidenced by
        its high reliance on ECB funding (at 14% of total assets)
        -- as well as its sharp deterioration in asset quality,
        with a NPL ratio at the end of 2010 of 4.5% (110bp above
        the system average, according to Bank of Portugal
        criteria) and the ongoing pressures from its Greek
        subsidiary, Millennium Bank. We have lowered the BFSR by
        one notch to D from D+, now translating into a Ba2, two
        notches below the previous standalone credit assessment of

      * For BES, its higher exposure to international capital
        markets activities -- and its high reliance on market
        funds, particularly short-term funding -- heighten its
        vulnerability to an extended period of a lack of
        confidence in Portugal.  Moody's has lowered its BFSR by
        one notch to D+ from C-, now translating into Ba1, two
        notches below the previous standalone credit assessment of

(ii) Downgraded the standalone credit assessments for CGD and BPI
      by one notch.  This reflects their lower transition risk to
      a more severe economic environment and their relatively
      better flexibility compared to other Portuguese banks to
      withstand restricted access to capital markets.

(iii) Moody's has left unchanged its standalone credit assessments
      for Montepio and BPN:

      * Montepio benefits from a better-than-average liquidity
        position, a retail deposit-oriented funding profile, and
        continued profitability despite high provisioning levels.
        Its stable franchise provides a level of protection
        against the challenging environment, particularly against
        disruption in the wholesale funding markets. These sources
        of strength underpin the stable standalone credit profile
        at D/Ba2.

      * BPN's weak standalone profile at E/Caa1 already reflects
        very weak credit fundamentals and is unlikely to drop
        further, provided that the government provides ongoing
        support to this fully government-owned entity.

Rationale for the Lower Support Assumptions and the Downgrade of
the Senior Debt and Deposit Ratings

Moody's has reduced the level of government support embedded in
its ratings of Portuguese banks.  The key drivers for the rating
actions are:

  (i) The reduced financial strength of the sovereign -- the
      Portuguese government was recently downgraded across two
      separate rating actions to Baa1 from A1, with the rating
      remaining on review for further downgrade -- raises the
      probability that the government may be unable to provide
      future support for banks.  All other variables being equal,
      the sovereign is less able to support the banking sector --
      a factor reflected one for one in a one-notch reduction in
      support across the sector, including the largest banks.

(ii) The sovereign faces harder choices, at a time when the
      support environment for smaller banks is weakening across
      Europe.  The increased pressure on the government's
      financial strength increases the likelihood that it may need
      to make difficult choices in the coming months and years,
      balancing the desire to support the banks against the need
      to protect its own balance sheet.  There is, more generally,
      increasing uncertainty regarding the willingness of
      authorities in Europe to continue to support senior
      creditors of institutions below the first tier in their
      domestic markets over the medium term.  This uncertainty has
      further reduced Moody's systemic support assumptions for two
      Portuguese institutions with weaker market shares.  In this
      respect, the rating actions partly reflect the agency's
      recently-announced broader reassessment of authorities'
      willingness to support senior debt issued by smaller
      financial institutions in Europe.  And the sovereign's loss
      of financial strength makes it hard to justify very high
      levels of support even for larger institutions.

Going forward, the rating agency is differentiating three groups
of Portuguese banks in terms of how much "systemic uplift"
(additional notches over their standalone credit strength) their
ratings receive due to government support:

   * Group 1: Caixa Geral de Depositos and Banco Portugues de
     Negocios (BPN) with three notches of systemic uplift.  Caixa
     Geral de Depositos is fully government-owned with a
     dominating deposit share and has an exceptionally high
     likelihood of government support.  Systemic support for Banco
     Portugues de Negocios (BPN) reflects the government's full
     ownership and role as caretaker of this failed bank

   * Group 2: Banks with very high likelihood of support (two
     notches of uplift). Banks in this group -- Banco Espirito
     Santo and Banco Comercial Portugues --have national networks
     with strong deposit or loan shares.

   * Group 3: Banks with high to moderate likelihood of support
     (one or no notches of uplift). This group -- Banco BPI, Banco
     Santander Totta (BST) and Caixa Economica Montepio Geral
     (Montepio) -- represents the second tier of Portuguese banks,
     with lower national market shares or a more regional
     presence.  These banks receive one or no notches of systemic

For all Portuguese banks, the government support-driven uplift
implied in their ratings has declined. This, combined with the
reduced standalone credit strength, have been the major drivers of
today's rating actions.

          Ratings Rationale for Senior Subordinated Debt

Moody's has downgraded the senior subordinated debt ratings of six
banks in line with the downgrade of these banks' senior unsecured
debt ratings.  Moody's has not yet removed systemic support for
subordinated debt issuances in Portugal, but expects to assess
this during Q2 2011 alongside other European countries affected by
European regulations and legislation.  If at that time, Moody's
assessment results in the partial or full removal of systemic
support for subordinated debt, any further downgrades of
subordinated debt would likely be limited to a maximum of three
notches, given the reduction of the systemic support rating uplift
discussed above.

    Ratings Rationale for the Downgrade of Hybrid Instruments

Moody's has downgraded the junior subordinated debt of four banks
(two by one notch and two by two notches), as well as the
preferred shares of four banks (two by one notch and two by two
notches).  In 2010, Moody's removed all systemic support from the
ratings of junior subordinated debt and other hybrids in Portugal
and rated these instruments in view of the banks' standalone
financial strength, but incorporated support from parents or co-
operatives and similar groups.

                    Government Guaranteed Debt

Moody's has downgraded the government-backed rated senior debt of
four institutions to Baa1, and has kept them under review for
possible downgrade.  This action follows the downgrade to Baa1 (on
review for possible downgrade) of the Portuguese government bond
ratings, announced on April 5, 2011.  The government-backed Baa1
ratings assigned are based on the unconditional guarantee from the
Portuguese government.

                What Could Change the Ratings - Up

An improvement in the banks' standalone BFSRs could exert upward
pressure on the banks' debt and deposit ratings.  This could be
driven by a more favorable operating environment that would have a
positive impact on the banks' fundamentals.  In this case, Moody's
would expect to see improvements in asset quality, profitability
and liquidity metrics, banks regaining access to market funding
and solvency levels improving.

              What Could Change the Ratings - Down

All domestic banks' debt and deposit ratings continue to benefit
from systemic support and therefore remain dependent on the
creditworthiness of the Portuguese government and our support
assumptions.  A reduction in parental support for BST could exert
downward pressure on its debt ratings.  There could be negative
rating actions on BFSRs, if the operating environment in Portugal
deteriorates much more than currently anticipated by the
Portuguese and international authorities.

These ratings have been affected:

               Previous Rating Action and Methodology

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March

Previous rating actions on Portuguese banks took place on
Dec. 9 and 21, 2010, when Moody's placed on review for possible
downgrade the deposit, senior debt and subordinated debt ratings
of all Portuguese banks and the standalone BFSRs and hybrids of
most Portuguese banks.


TINKOFF CREDIT SYS: Moody's Upgrades Ratings to B2; Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the long-term local and
foreign-currency deposit ratings of Tinkoff.Credit Systems (TCS)
to B2 from B3.  TCS's global local-currency senior unsecured debt
ratings were also upgraded to B2 from B3.  This rating action
reflects the fact that the mapping of the bank's E+ Bank Financial
Strength Rating (BFSR) was raised from B3 to B2 on the long-term

Concurrently, Moody's Interfax Rating Agency raised TCS's long-
term National-Scale Rating (NSR) to from Moscow-
based Moody's Interfax is majority owned by Moody's, a leading
global rating agency.  The outlook on all TCS's long-term ratings
is stable, whilst the NSR carries no specific outlook.

                         Ratings Rationale

"The upgrade of TCS's ratings reflects the bank's improvement in
diversifying and lengthening its funding base over the past year.
These improvements render TCS's resource base more sustainable,
and helped TCS to restore its business growth, which is essential
for maintaining profitability and operating efficiency, especially
considering the intensifying competition within the Russian credit
card market," says Semyon Isakov, a Moody's Assistant Vice-
President and lead analyst for the bank.

At year-end 2010, TCS's customer deposits accounted for 48.2% of
total liabilities compared with 7.1% at year-end 2009.  Moody's
notes that this rapid increase has helped TCS to decrease its
reliance on capital markets funding.  Moreover, in 2010 and early
2011, TCS attracted RUB6 billion in domestic bonds that helped it
to (i) substantially lengthen the duration of its funding base by
up to three years; (ii) reduce average cost of funding; and (iii)
refinance maturing debts, thereby positively affecting its
liquidity profile.

Addressing funding issues and attracting additional long-term
resources allowed TCS to restore growth in its credit card
business.  In 2010, its net loan book grew 82% and totaled
US$316 million. Despite the rapid growth of the loan book, problem
loan data indicate improving trends in non-performing loans (NPLs)
which were at 3.3% as at year-end 2010, down from 7.1% as at year-
end 2009 -- although these are masked by rapid growth in the loan
book.  TCS classifies NPLs as those loans 90+ days overdue.
Moody's cautioned that it will be important for the bank to
maintain close control over the risks associated with such rapid
loan growth.

However, Moody's notes that competition is intensifying in the
Russian credit card market, which is TCS's only business line.  As
a small, rapidly growing monoline bank with credit cards as the
key lending product, Moody's considers that TCS's business
performance is highly vulnerable to adverse shifts in the
operating environment.  Fierce competition can result in a
reduction in loan interest rates, which would negatively affect
net interest margins, TCS's core revenue source.

Moody's sees limited upward potential for TCS's ratings in the
short to medium term, as a higher rating would require fundamental
improvements, such as a higher market share and a cheaper and a
more diversified resource base combined with sound performance
results and a better competitive position for TCS.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency's National Scale Ratings (NSRs) are
intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt
issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants
to better differentiate relative risks.  NSRs differ from Moody's
global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".ru" for Russia.  For further information
on Moody's approach to national scale ratings, please refer to
Moody's Rating Implementation Guidance published in August 2010
entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale Ratings to Global Scale

              About Moody's and Moody's Interfax

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency (MIRA) specializes in credit risk
analysis in Russia.  MIRA is controlled by Moody's Investors
Service, a leading provider of credit ratings, research and
analysis covering debt instruments and securities in the global
capital markets.  Moody's Investors Service is a subsidiary of
Moody's Corporation (NYSE: MCO).

The previous rating action on TCS was implemented on Nov. 24,
2010, when Moody's assigned a B3 long-term global local-currency
debt rating to TCS's senior unsecured debt.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, TCS reported -- under audited
IFRS -- total assets of US$405.1 million as of Dec. 31, 2010 and
net profit of US$9.1 million.


* SWEDEN: Requires General Legislation for Banks, Nyberg Says
RTT News reports that Riksbank Deputy Governor Lars Nyberg said
Sweden requires general legislation that is applicable to all
banks in the country as they can not be allowed to go bankrupt
like normal companies.

RTT relates that in a speech at Stockholm, he said that the
legislation must ensure that shareholders and creditors will foot
the bill if the bank is mismanaged and becomes insolvent.

In addition, the regulation should allow the state to intervene at
an early stage, RTE discloses.  According to RTT, Mr. Nyberg noted
that the state needs to have special tools that must give the
authorities the possibility to sell and restructure a bank.

Sweden has no special regulations for banks that are not
systemically important, RTT states.


INTERPIPE LTD: Fitch Affirms Senior Unsecured Rating at 'C'
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ukraine-based pipes and railway wheels
producer Interpipe Limited's (Interpipe) Long-term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) of 'RD' (Restricted Default).  The agency has
simultaneously affirmed Interpipe's senior unsecured rating of 'C'
and Recovery Rating of 'RR6'.  Fitch has withdrawn the company's
Short-term IDR of 'D'.

The rating actions reflect Interpipe's ongoing negotiations with
its lenders to restructure existing debt.  The downgrade to 'RD'
in December 2009 reflected the uncured payment default on some of
Interpipe's bank debt facilities, and the company's confirmation
of its cross-default on its major bank debt facilities and US$200
million Eurobonds, which were due to mature on Aug. 2, 2010.  The
'RR6' Recovery Rating on Interpipe's senior unsecured notes
indicates poor recovery prospects in the event of default.  The
Short-term IDR has been withdrawn due to lack of relevance to the
rated entity.

In September 2010, the company received consent from bondholders
to reschedule the bond's maturity to 2017 and increase the coupon
rate to 10.25% from 8.75%.  In addition, the company paid a one-
off payment equal to 1.25% of the par value of outstanding bond to
bondholders for their early consent to the proposed terms by 25
August 2010 and a 0.5% payment for consenting after that date.

In November 2010, Interpipe and its lenders agreed on the main
terms and conditions with regard to restructuring the company's
bank liabilities with the new interest rate of Libor + 600bp
adjustable in line with changes in the debt/LTM EBITDA ratio (for
all facilities except the US$93 million SACE group-backed
facility).  The agreement also envisages that the company's
shareholders will inject US$65 million of cash equity and provide
additional financial support, bringing the total value of
assistance to over US$100 million, while the bank has agreed to
extend the loan maturities to 2015-2017 The agreement is yet to be

As at end-2010, Interpipe had total debt of US$887 million, of
which 51% was secured by company assets and future sales proceeds.
Fitch is concerned about the company's liquidity due to the
significant capital commitments under its electrical arc furnace
(EAF) construction program and uncertainties regarding final
details of the restructuring of its bank debt.  The company has
not yet published signed 2008 and 2009 IFRS accounts.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CONNAUGHT PLC: Lenders to Recover Less Than 30% of Loans
Alistair Gray and Anousha Sakoui at The Financial Times report
that bankers to Connaught plc are likely to salvage an unusually
small fraction of the sums they are owed, prompting administrators
to offer a discount on their fees.

According to documents seen by the FT, a consortium of lenders led
by the Royal Bank of Scotland is expected to recover less than 30%
of their loans.  The FT notes that because such loans rank highly
in the priority of repayment, banks would typically expect to claw
back at least 70% on them.

The FT relates that administrators at KPMG, who have spent 14,685
hours dealing with the collapsed social housing maintenance group,
have offered a "significant discount" to their GBP6.64 million fee
"given the size of the time costs relative to overall

The Accountancy and Actuarial Discipline Board, the disciplinary
body for accountants, has launched an investigation into PwC's
role in handling statements at Connaught, whose accounts it
audited since 2006, the FT relates.

Unsecured creditors, meanwhile, are likely to be all but wiped
out, the FT discloses.  Following the discovery last autumn of
50,000 invoices that had not been processed or recognized in the
creditors' ledger, administrators now estimate that the amount
owed to unsecured creditors totals more than GBP90 million, the FT

According to the FT, administrators said in a report sent to
creditors last week that there were "no listings" for records held
in about 10,000 boxes and that it would take them until the end of
June to sort through the documents.

Secured lenders, which include Lloyds Banking Group, may recoup
value from a future sale of Connaught's environmental division, of
which they took control last month, the FT states.

The FT says administrators are due to report to the Department for
Business, Innovation and Skills, on the conduct of directors.

                       About Connaught plc

Connaught plc -- is a United
Kingdom-based company engaged in the provision of integrated asset
services to the public and private sectors.  The Company operates
in two business segments: social housing and compliance.  Social
Housing segment provide social housing landlords throughout the
United Kingdom with a range of planned and response maintenance
services, as well as compliance and estate management.  The
Compliance segment provides safety, health and risk management
solutions.  It has information, advisory, training and servicing
capabilities to provide integrated compliance solution throughout
the United Kingdom.  On July 22, 2009, the Company completed the
acquisition of UK Fire (International) Limited and Igrox Limited.
On September 15, 2008, the Company completed the acquisition of
Lowe Group Holdings Ltd.  On November 26, 2008, the Company
completed the acquisition of certain assets of Predator Pest
Control Plc.

                            *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 9,
2010, Bloomberg News said Connaught Plc appointed partners from
KPMG as administrators after the business as a whole failed to
secure "sufficient support" to trade as a going concern.
Bloomberg disclosed the company said in a statement on Sept. 8
that KPMG's Richard Heis, Richard Hill and Richard Fleming were
appointed administrators to Exeter, England-based Connaught Plc,
and Heis, Mark Firmin, Brian Green and David Costley-Wood were
appointed joint administrators to Connaught Partnerships Ltd.
Connaught Environmental Ltd. and their subsidiaries were not put
into administration, Bloomberg noted.

The TCR-Europe, citing Business Sale, reported on Feb. 4, 2011,
that private equity group Better Capital acquired 50% of the
compliance division of Connaught plc.  According to Business Sale,
GBP15 million has been put forward by Better Capital to finance
the acquisition and pay for restructuring efforts.

DECO SERIES: S&P Affirms 'BB (sf)' Rating on Class C Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit rating on DECO Series 2005-UK
Conduit 1 PLC's class C notes, following updated information on
the largest loan in the transaction, the CPI loan.

"In December 2010, we placed the class C notes on CreditWatch
negative due to uncertainties around whether or not the largest
loan in the transaction, the CPI loan, had repaid at maturity.  At
that time, we felt that the class C notes could potentially be at
risk of an interest shortfall.  Since then, we understand that the
CPI loan did not repay at maturity and was subsequently
transferred to special servicing," S&P related.

In addition, these events relating to the three other specially
serviced loans have occurred:

    * The final asset securing the Metropolitan loan has been

    * An asset securing the Kashani loan has been sold.

    * The Mondeal loan repaid and final recoveries were applied on
      the January interest payment date (IPD).

These three loans contributed to interest shortfalls on previous
IPDs.  As a result of these events, the level of unpaid interest
on the class D notes decreased to GBP4,000 on the January IPD,
from GBP92,000 on the October IPD.  "We note that the asset sales
have resulted in principal losses, which is reflected in our 'D
(sf)' rating on the class E notes," S&P noted.

"As of the next IPD, absent a default on any of the remaining
loans, we expect only the Kashani and CPI loans to be in special
servicing," S&P continued.

"As for interest shortfalls on future payment dates, we expect
that special servicing fees on the Kashani loan will continue to
cause interest shortfalls.  In addition, as a result of the
appraisal reduction mechanism (which limits liquidity drawings
that would otherwise be available), we believe that shortfalls in
loan-level income will continue to cause interest shortfalls on
the notes," S&P stated.

"With respect to the CPI loan, we do not expect that this loan
will cause interest shortfalls on future payment dates.  We
understand that in instances where there is insufficient loan
income to fund special servicing fees, the cost would be funded by
amounts otherwise due to the junior lender.  Furthermore, as a
result of the CPI loan-level interest decreasing from a fixed rate
of 5.64% to a floating rate, which as of the January IPD was
1.79%, we do not anticipate there being insufficient income to
fund special servicing fees, as the loan benefits from excess cash
that has not been released to the borrower," according to S&P.

"In view of these recent events, we expect that as a result of
special servicing fees and shortfalls in loan interest on the
Kashani loan, interest shortfalls could occur for the class D and
E notes.  We do not expect interest shortfalls to occur on the
class C notes, and accordingly we have affirmed and removed from
CreditWatch negative our 'BB (sf)' rating on this class of
notes," S&P explained.

DECO Series 5-UK Conduit 1 closed in April 2006 and is backed by
10 loans (down from 28 at closing) secured against commercial
properties in the U.K.  The legal final maturity of the notes,
totaling GBP66.7 million, is July 2017.

Ratings List

Class                Rating
            To                    From

DECO Series 2005-UK Conduit 1 PLC
GBP236.057 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

C           BB (sf)               BB (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Unchanged

A           AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
B           AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
D           CCC- (sf)
E           D (sf)

FERREXPO PLC: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to US$500-Mil. Notes
Fitch Ratings has assigned Ferrexpo Plc's (Ferrexpo) US$500
million 7.875% 2016 guaranteed notes a final senior unsecured
rating of 'B' and Recovery Rating of 'RR4'.

Assignment of the final ratings follows a review of final
documentation materially conforming to the draft documentation
previously reviewed.  The final rating is in line with Ferrexpo's
Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'B'.

HAWTIN PLC: Anglo Claim Prompts Administration
The Board of Hawtin PLC disclosed that following the enlodgement
of a claim for GBP3 million by Anglo Irish Bank Corporation
Limited ("AIBC") under a parent company guarantee provided by the
Company in relation to Millennium Plaza, Cardiff, the property
owned by Hawtin's subsidiary, Crown Investments Limited which led
to the suspension of the Company's shares on March 29, 2011, that
it has not been possible to enter into any negotiations with AIBC.

The Board on April 4 appointed PwC as administrators to Hawtin.
The main secured creditors of the Company are Bank of Scotland
plc, which is owed some GBP31.4 million (including SWAPS
liabilities), and Principality Building Society, which is owed
some GBP1.4 million.  These liabilities are secured against some
GBP31.2 million of property.  Hawtin has for some time tightly
controlled expenditure and whilst trade creditors are not
material, the Company is unable to pay the unsecured claim by AIBC
of GBP3 million, nor will it be able to meet claims from Guinevere
Limited in respect of GBP2.85 million of unsecured loan notes.

The appointment of PwC does not affect Hawtin's subsidiaries
Norfleet Properties (Holdings) Limited, Purabuild Limited, Hawtin
Park Developments Limited, Holywell Properties (Holdings) Limited
and Foxleap Limited which will continue to trade.  It is the
intention of the director of Crown, which is registered in Jersey,
to liquidate that company with immediate effect.  As detailed
above, Crown was the owner of Millenium Plaza, Cardiff to which
AIBC appointed an LPA Receiver in November 2010 and which the
Company believes has subsequently been sold.

Having received shareholder approval at the General Meeting on
March 31, 2011, Hawtin was in the final stages of agreeing the
sale of all its subsidiaries, excepting Crown, to Gracelands
Investments Limited. These negotiations will now be passed to the
administrator for consideration.

Having enabled the progress of the documentation of the proposed
sale to be brought to a near conclusion and ensured that third
party creditors have been controlled over the past months, both
the non-executive directors have resigned their positions at
Hawtin with immediate effect to enable the administrator to bring
matters to a speedy conclusion.

Hawtin operates primarily as an investment property manager.

JJB SPORTS: To Raise GBP65 Million Through Placing & Open Offer
JJB Sports plc disclosed that that it is proposing to raise gross
proceeds of GBP65 million (approximately GBP60 million net of
expenses), through a firm placing and a placing and open offer
involving the issue of 162,500,000 New Ordinary Shares at an issue
price of 40 pence per share.

    * The Capital Raising will be by way of a Firm Placing and
      Placing and Open Offer supported by Harris Associates,
      Crystal Amber, Invesco Asset Management and Bill & Melinda
      Gates Foundation Trust and fully underwritten byNumis.

    * The net proceeds of approximately œ60 million after expenses
      provide management with greater operational flexibility and,
      in particular, will allow the Company to reduce its reliance
      on the availability of supplier credit and provide the
      necessary funds for the implementation of the Group's
      revised business plan.

    * The Company intends to issue 97,093,649 New Ordinary Shares
      pursuant to the Firm Placing (comprising 59.7% of the total
      number of New Ordinary Shares to be issued pursuant to the
      Capital Raising) and 65,406,351 New Ordinary Shares pursuant
      to the Placing and Open Offer (comprising the remaining

    * The issue price of 40 pence per New Ordinary Share
      represents a premium of 40.4% to the Closing Price of 28.5
      pence per Ordinary Share on April 5, 2011 (being the last
      Dealing Day prior to the date of announcement of the Capital

    * The Capital Raising is conditional on, among other things,
      the approval of Shareholders at a General Meeting to be held
      at 11:00 a.m. on April 26, 2011.  Details relating to the
      General Meeting are contained in the Prospectus which it is
      intended will be posted to Qualifying Shareholders (other
      than Excluded Shareholders) on April 6, 2011.

    * Lazard is acting as joint financial adviser and sponsor and
      Numis is acting as joint financial adviser, bookrunner and
      underwriter to the Company in connection with the Capital

    * In addition and as announced on 15 March 2011, the Company
      has reached agreement with its lender, Bank of Scotland plc,
      for the provision of a committed working capital facility of
      GBP25 million through to May 31, 2014, subject to the
      completion of certain conditions precedent including the
      receipt of proceeds under the Capital Raising.

    * The New Ordinary Shares are expected to be admitted to the
      Official List and to trading on the London Stock Exchange's
      main market and the proceeds of the Capital Raising received
      by the Company on April 27, 2011.  Following receipt of the
      proceeds and assuming the CVA Proposal has not been
      challenged, the Company expects the Amended BoS Facility to
      become effective and to implement the CVA proposal on April
      27, 2011.  Following completion of the restructuring and
      refinancing, the Company expects to cancel its admission to
      the Official List and to trading on the London Stock
      Exchange's main market and to be admitted to listing and
      trading on AIM on April 28, 2011.

    * Richard Manning, Legal & Operations Director and Company
      Secretary, will leave the Board at the Company's 2011 AGM in
      July 2011.  In the interim period, Richard will work with
      the Board to ensure a smooth handover of his
      responsibilities.  As previously announced on February 2,
      2011, Alan Benzie, non-executive director, had signalled an
      intention to stand down from the Board.  Mr. Benzie has now
      confirmed that he will leave the Board at the Company's 2011
      AGM in July 2011.

Commenting on the Capital Raising, Mike McTighe, JJB Chairman,
said: "After the approval of our CVA proposals by creditors and
shareholders in March, I am delighted that we are today confirming
the details of this capital raising with the support of our four
largest shareholders.  Together with the implementation of the CVA
and continued availability of our banking facilities with BoS,
this fundraising will mark the end of our financial restructuring
process.  Once complete, it will allow the Company to press on
with the next stage of implementing its revised business plan and
allow management to focus solely on the turnaround of the group's
retail business."

JJB Sports plc (JJB Sports) is a sports retailer supplying branded
sports and leisure clothing, footwear and accessories.  JJB Sports
is a high street sports retailer, with 250 stores in the United
Kingdom and Eire.  It provides a range of products covering United
Kingdom sports.  The Company stocks all its sports brands,
supported by its own-brand and exclusive ranges.  The Company's
segment includes the Company's retail operations, including any
retail stores, which are attached to fitness clubs.  The Company
operates in two geographic segments: the United Kingdom and Eire.
The Company's subsidiaries include Blane Leisure Limited, Sports
Division (Eireann) Limited, Golf TV Limited, TV Sports Shop
Limited, Original Shoe Company Limited and Qubefootwear Limited.
The Company sold its fitness club operations on March 25, 2009.

KEMBLE WATER: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Senior Secured Rating
Fitch Ratings has assigned Kemble Water Finance Limited (Kemble
Water) a final senior secured rating of 'BB'.  The company's Long-
term Issuer Default Rating is 'BB-' with a Stable Outlook.  The
agency has also assigned Thames Water (Kemble) Finance PLC's
GBP400 million bond issue, which is guaranteed by Kemble Water, a
final senior secured rating of 'BB'.

R&D CONSTRUCTION: In Administration; 220 Jobs at Risk
Dominic Jeff at The Scotsman reports that R&D Construction has
gone into administration, putting 220 jobs at risk.

The Scotsman relates that Andrew Davison and Colin Dempster of
Ernst & Young were called in as administrators to the firm and its
parent company Robison & Davidson (Holdings) on Thursday.
According to The Scotsman, the administrators said a review is
under way into the financial position at the company.

"Difficult trading conditions arising from low demand in the
private housing market that were further exacerbated by the harsh
winter necessitated our appointment.  We are currently undertaking
a full review of the company's financial position," The Scotsman
quotes Mr. Davison as saying.

R&D Construction is based in Dumfries.  It is the main contractor
for a multi-million-pound new-build program in the Dumfries and
Stranraer areas, led by Dumfries and Galloway Housing Partnership

* UK: Corporate Insolvencies Down 4.5% in First Quarter 2011
The latest PwC analysis into corporate insolvency numbers
demonstrates that the decline in the level of insolvencies
witnessed in 2010 has continued into the first quarter of 2011.
In total, 3,657 companies became insolvent in the first quarter of
2011 compared to 3,829 in the last quarter of 2010 -- a 4.5%
decrease.  The level of insolvencies fell by 14% compared to the
first quarter of 2010.  Also a comparison of the level of
corporate insolvencies in the last 12 months to the first quarter
of 2011 compared to the last 12 months to the last quarter of 2010
again points to a decreasing trend (15.7% fall).

Mike Jervis, partner in the business recovery services practice at
PwC, commented:

"The improving picture in the UK of declining levels of corporate
failure should not lead to complacency.  The UK economy is by no
means out of the woods yet as evidenced by the recent anaemic
economic data and retailers' profit warnings.  The impact of the
Government's public sector spending cuts, which have yet to be
felt, are likely to have a further adverse effect on consumer
spending and especially on those companies supplying the public

"The trend of falling corporate insolvency levels during the
recent recession has been rather atypical but this is partly due
to a combination of factors which have provided breathing space
for many struggling businesses. Persistently low interest rates,
increased time to pay agreements by HMRC, and a supportive
attitude from secured lenders anxious to avoid the potential
crystallization of losses on their balance sheet, have all

Which sectors are struggling the most?

The worst affected sectors continue to include construction (614
companies), manufacturing (452), retail (448), hospitality &
leisure (239) and real estate (139).  However, each of these
sectors showed a marked improvement when compared to the same
quarter in 2010.  It is notable that the level of insolvencies
within these sectors (apart from real estate) increased from the
levels experienced in the last quarter of 2010.  This trend may be
expected to continue within these particular sectors when the
cumulative effects of the spending cuts begin to impact the UK

Across the UK . . .

PwC's analysis shows that London continues to have the highest
number of insolvencies with 831 but compared to the same quarter
in 2010, shows a 22.7% decline in volume.  In addition, the level
of insolvencies in London also dropped by 10.9% from the last
quarter of 2010.

The North East, East Midlands and Wales have seen rises in the
number of insolvencies since the last quarter of 9.3%, 22% and 25%
respectively.  Wales, in particular, appears to be showing a
worsening trend with insolvency levels this quarter increasing by
29.5% compared to the same quarter in 2010.  A comparison of the
level of insolvencies in the last 12 months to the first quarter
of 2011 with the last 12 months to the last quarter of 2010 again
points to an increasing trend (8.9% rise).

The most improvement has been recorded in the East where the
number of insolvencies has dropped by 17.1% since the last

The attached diagram illustrates the insolvency levels by region
in the first quarter of 2011 compared to the last quarter of 2010.

                            About PwC

PwC -- firms provide industry-focused
assurance, tax and advisory services to enhance value for their
clients.  More than 161,000 people in 154 countries in firms
across the PwC network share their thinking, experience and
solutions to develop fresh perspectives and practical advice.

* UK: Company Voluntary Arrangements in Retail Sector Up 15%
The number of retailers using company voluntary arrangements
(CVA), a form of insolvency procedure, to renegotiate their debts
has jumped 15% over the last year, from 41 in 2009 to 47 in 2010,
says Wilkins Kennedy of the Top 22 accountancy firm.

Landlords often contest CVAs because they usually suffer worse
losses than other creditors as a result of the restructuring of
the company's rental obligations.  Some landlords are also
concerned that CVAs are abused by retailers to break rental
agreements and avoid paying debts.

The increase in CVAs has bucked the trend in insolvencies in the
retail industry, which overall declined by 18% to 1,290 in 2010.

Anthony Cork, Director at Wilkins Kennedy, comments: "The first
wave of the recession picked off the weakest retailers, though
with disposable incomes being squeezed by inflation, it might
still be a while before the retail sector hits the bottom."

"So while insolvencies might have slowed down slightly, I expect
that the increase in retail CVAs has yet to reach its peak."

"Rents are a major overhead for retailers, which means that rescue
plans tend to involve rent renegotiations and/or the disposal of
unprofitable shops.  This means that landlords invariably take the
biggest hit."

"Giving up leases that should have provided them with a revenue
stream for up to 10-15 years is a huge concession for landlords to
make.  It exposes them to the risk of being stuck with shops they
can't re-let and for which they still have to pay business rates."

"The fact that landlords are increasingly prepared to accept CVAs
suggests that recent experiences have taught them that allowing a
company to go into administration is an even bigger risk."

JJB Sports' second CVA in two years has again ignited the debate
over whether CVAs have become an instrument for perfectly viable
retailers to renegotiate their rental liabilities.  But despite
the bad press, Wilkins Kennedy says that CVAs have some benefits
for creditors, which administration does not provide.

Explains Anthony Cork: "With a CVA, creditors have a clearer view
of what they can expect to get back, and, most importantly, they
get to vote on the proposal before it has taken place.  In an
administration, the creditors may find that they are notified only
after a sale has been completed. This leaves them with a lot of

"If creditors engage in a dialogue with a company via a CVA, they
will probably get a better deal from it.  They're much more likely
to recover more money from a business that is still a going
concern than one that has ceased trading."

While an increasing number of creditors are open to discussing
CVAs, many still prefer to put businesses into administration to
get their money back.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week April 4 to April 8, 2011

Issuer                Coupon    Maturity  Currency    Price
------                ------    --------  --------    -----

IMMOFINANZ              4.250    3/8/2018      EUR      4.22
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.810   7/29/2025      EUR     74.13
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.900   8/18/2025      EUR     74.63
RAIFF ZENTRALBK         4.500   9/28/2035      EUR     75.40

KOMMUNEKREDIT           0.500    2/3/2016      TRY     68.23

MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.250   6/28/2040      CAD     22.91
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500   9/24/2020      CAD     68.14
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500   4/27/2018      ZAR     60.50
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000   2/27/2018      AUD     66.16
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000   6/30/2017      ZAR     60.88
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500   4/26/2016      ZAR     70.35
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500    2/9/2016      ZAR     69.98
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500   3/17/2025      CAD     54.02

AIR FRANCE-KLM          4.970    4/1/2015      EUR     14.72
ALCATEL-LUCENT          5.000    1/1/2015      EUR      4.68
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG        6.720    1/1/2015      EUR      5.80
ATOS ORIGIN SA          2.500    1/1/2016      EUR     56.20
BNP PARIBAS            10.050   7/24/2012      USD     59.62
CALYON                  6.000   6/18/2047      EUR     28.55
CAP GEMINI SOGET        1.000    1/1/2012      EUR     45.76
CAP GEMINI SOGET        3.500    1/1/2014      EUR     45.78
CGG VERITAS             1.750    1/1/2016      EUR     31.96
CLUB MEDITERRANE        6.110   11/1/2015      EUR     20.34
CLUB MEDITERRANE        5.000    6/8/2012      EUR     17.08
EURAZEO                 6.250   6/10/2014      EUR     59.20
FAURECIA                4.500    1/1/2015      EUR     28.77
INGENICO                2.750    1/1/2017      EUR     45.79
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125   7/31/2015      EUR     17.93
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125   7/31/2014      EUR     19.20
NEXANS SA               4.000    1/1/2016      EUR     73.86
ORPEA                   3.875    1/1/2016      EUR     48.91
PEUGEOT SA              4.450    1/1/2016      EUR     33.68
PUBLICIS GROUPE         1.000   1/18/2018      EUR     49.41
PUBLICIS GROUPE         3.125   7/30/2014      EUR     41.01
RHODIA SA               0.500    1/1/2014      EUR     51.70
SOC AIR FRANCE          2.750    4/1/2020      EUR     21.00
SOITEC                  6.250    9/9/2014      EUR     12.34
TEM                     4.250    1/1/2015      EUR     58.52
THEOLIA                 2.700    1/1/2041      EUR     11.55

ESCADA AG               7.500    4/1/2012      EUR     16.00
EUROHYPO AG             3.830   9/21/2020      EUR     71.88
EUROHYPO AG             6.490   7/17/2017      EUR      7.75
IKB DEUT INDUSTR        5.625   3/31/2017      EUR     13.00
L-BANK FOERDERBK        0.500   5/10/2027      CAD     48.84
LB BADEN-WUERTT         2.500   1/30/2034      EUR     63.22
SOLON AG SOLAR          1.375   12/6/2012      EUR     65.19
TUI AG                  2.750   3/24/2016      EUR     58.52

ATHENS URBAN TRN        5.008   7/18/2017      EUR     61.62
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.851   9/19/2016      EUR     63.77
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.301   8/12/2014      EUR     72.25
HELLENIC RAILWAY        7.350    3/3/2015      JPY     73.68
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.300   7/25/2030      EUR     47.66
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.900   7/25/2025      EUR     50.92
HELLENIC REPUB          5.000   3/11/2019      EUR     57.58
HELLENIC REPUB          4.590    4/8/2016      EUR     60.41
HELLENIC REPUB          6.140   4/14/2028      EUR     58.95
HELLENIC REPUB          5.200   7/17/2034      EUR     61.02
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500   9/20/2037      EUR     54.67
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.300   3/20/2026      EUR     59.77
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.700   3/20/2024      EUR     58.74
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.250   6/19/2020      EUR     65.47
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500    7/1/2014      EUR     72.56
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.985   7/25/2014      EUR     70.28
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.161   9/17/2019      EUR     59.07
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.959    3/4/2019      EUR     63.02
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.500   8/20/2014      EUR     70.99
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.113   9/30/2014      EUR     70.10
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.700   7/20/2015      EUR     64.61
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.000   7/19/2019      EUR     63.23
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.100   8/20/2015      EUR     69.60
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.702   9/30/2015      EUR     64.42
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500   5/20/2014      EUR     70.93
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.900   4/20/2017      EUR     65.23
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.225    3/1/2017      EUR     60.41
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.014   2/27/2019      EUR     58.92
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600   7/20/2018      EUR     60.82
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.600   7/20/2016      EUR     61.05
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.590    4/3/2018      EUR     58.71
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.675   10/9/2017      EUR     60.37
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.300   7/20/2017      EUR     60.96
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600   9/20/2040      EUR     54.56
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.020   9/13/2016      EUR     61.37
NATIONAL BK GREE        3.875   10/7/2016      EUR     73.18

AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000   2/12/2030      EUR     59.18
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.580   4/28/2028      EUR     65.32
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000    3/1/2030      EUR     59.15
ALLIED IRISH BKS       12.500   6/25/2019      GBP     25.61
ALLIED IRISH BKS       10.750   3/29/2017      USD     26.25
ALLIED IRISH BKS       11.500   3/29/2022      GBP     25.00
ALLIED IRISH BKS       10.750   3/29/2017      EUR     27.20
ALLIED IRISH BKS        7.875    7/5/2023      GBP     22.01
ALLIED IRISH BKS       12.500   6/25/2019      EUR     25.62
BANK OF IRELAND         4.875   1/22/2018      GBP     50.00
BANK OF IRELAND         4.625   2/27/2019      EUR     55.89
BANK OF IRELAND        10.000   2/12/2020      GBP     65.61
BANK OF IRELAND         9.250    9/7/2020      GBP     64.00
BANK OF IRELAND        10.000   2/12/2020      EUR     67.65
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.450    3/1/2030      EUR     71.11
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.400   11/6/2029      EUR     70.63
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.760    9/7/2029      EUR     73.88
DEPFA ACS BANK          4.900   8/24/2035      CAD     61.11
DEPFA ACS BANK          5.125   3/16/2037      USD     65.90
DEPFA ACS BANK          5.125   3/16/2037      USD     65.24
DEPFA ACS BANK          0.500    3/3/2025      CAD     33.55
HYPO PUBLIC FIN         5.400   3/26/2024      EUR     20.88
IRISH GOVT              5.400   3/13/2025      EUR     72.60
IRISH GOVT              4.500   4/18/2020      EUR     72.00
IRISH GOVT              4.400   6/18/2019      EUR     73.38
IRISH LIFE & PER        4.625    5/9/2017      EUR     35.01
IRISH NATIONWIDE        6.250   6/26/2012      GBP     87.75

ABRUZZO REGION          4.450    3/1/2037      EUR     72.67
CITY OF ROME            5.345   1/27/2048      EUR     74.53
CITY OF TURIN           5.270   6/26/2038      EUR     66.20
CITY OF VENICE          4.265   3/26/2026      EUR     69.53
CITY OF VENICE          4.265   3/26/2026      EUR     69.53
CO BRAONE               4.567   6/30/2037      EUR     63.77
CO CASTELMASSA          3.960   3/31/2026      EUR     66.67
COMUNE DI MILANO        4.019   6/29/2035      EUR     61.53
DEXIA CREDIOP           4.500   11/8/2024      EUR     73.93
REGION OF UMBRIA        5.087   6/15/2037      EUR     68.54
TELECOM ITALIA          5.250   3/17/2055      EUR     73.53
UNICREDITO ITALI        5.832   2/15/2035      EUR     78.33

ARCELORMITTAL           7.250    4/1/2014      EUR     31.18
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000   4/30/2014      EUR     36.90
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000   4/30/2014      EUR     37.17

APP INTL FINANCE       11.750   10/1/2005      USD      0.01
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   3/17/2016      TRY     68.38
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   4/27/2016      TRY     70.60
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   3/29/2021      NZD     59.19
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   2/24/2025      CAD     52.67
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   3/29/2021      USD     68.10
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500    3/3/2021      NZD     59.48
BRIT INSURANCE          6.625   12/9/2030      GBP     65.68
ELEC DE CAR FIN         8.500   4/10/2018      USD     57.38
NATL INVESTER BK       25.983    5/7/2029      EUR     26.05
NED WATERSCHAPBK        0.500   3/11/2025      CAD     53.53
SIDETUR FINANCE        10.000   4/20/2016      USD     73.01
TJIWI KIMIA FIN        13.250    8/1/2001      USD      0.01

EKSPORTFINANS           0.500    5/9/2030      CAD     40.64
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500   3/24/2016      ZAR     71.25
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500   1/27/2016      ZAR     72.06
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500    3/1/2016      ZAR     71.54
TRICO SHIPPING         13.875   11/1/2014      USD     73.00

CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.400   10/8/2019      EUR     73.23
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.250   1/27/2020      EUR     72.93
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.320    8/5/2021      EUR     74.89
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.380   10/1/2038      EUR     61.23
COMBOIOS DE PORT        5.700    2/5/2030      EUR     73.63
METRO DE LISBOA         4.061   12/4/2026      EUR     59.28
METRO DE LISBOA         4.799   12/7/2027      EUR     69.39
PARPUBLICA              3.567   9/22/2020      EUR     58.29
PORTUGUESE OT'S         3.850   4/15/2021      EUR     68.79
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.100   4/15/2037      EUR     64.71
REFER                   4.000   3/16/2015      EUR     61.95

1ST MTGE AGENT A        6.940   2/15/2039      RUB    100.20
APK ARKADA             17.500   5/23/2012      RUB      0.38
ARKTEL-INVEST          12.000    4/9/2012      RUB      0.01
ATOMSTROYEXPORT-        7.750   5/24/2011      RUB     75.00
BALTINVESTBANK          9.000   9/10/2015      RUB     75.00
BANK SOYUZ              7.750    5/2/2011      RUB     75.00
BARENTSEV FINANS       20.000    7/4/2011      RUB      1.10
CREDIT EUROPE BK       11.500   6/28/2011      RUB     75.00
DVTG-FINANS            17.000   8/29/2013      RUB      6.00
EMALIANS-FINANS        10.970    7/8/2011      RUB     75.00
ENERGOSPETSSNAB         8.500   5/30/2016      RUB     75.00
ENERGOSTROY-FINA       12.000   5/20/2011      RUB     75.00
FINANCEBUSINESSG       12.500   6/22/2011      RUB     75.00
FINANCEBUSINESSG       10.000    7/1/2013      RUB     75.00
FORMAT                 17.000   12/6/2012      RUB     75.00
GRACE DIAMOND          15.000    6/7/2012      RUB     75.00
IZHAVTO                18.000    6/9/2011      RUB     11.31
KARUSEL FINANS         12.000   9/12/2013      RUB     75.00
LADYA FINANS           13.750   9/13/2012      RUB     75.00
LLC VICTORIA FIN        8.000   2/12/2013      RUB     75.00
LSR-INVEST              9.250   7/14/2011      RUB     75.00
M-INDUSTRIYA           12.250   8/16/2011      RUB     24.52
MAGNIT OJSC             8.250    9/9/2013      RUB     75.00
MAIN ROAD OJSC         10.200    6/3/2011      RUB     75.00
MEDVED-FINANS          14.000   8/16/2013      RUB     75.00
MIG-FINANS              0.100    9/6/2011      RUB      1.00
MIRAX                  17.000   9/17/2012      RUB     27.01
MIRAX                  14.990   5/17/2011      RUB     30.34
MOSMART FINANS          0.010   4/12/2012      RUB      1.81
MOSOBLGAZ              12.000   5/17/2011      RUB     72.50
NATIONAL CAPITAL       12.500   5/20/2011      RUB     75.00
NATIONAL CAPITAL       13.000   9/25/2012      RUB     75.00
NAUKA-SVYAZ            12.500   6/27/2013      RUB     75.00
NOK                    12.500   8/26/2014      RUB      1.04
NOK                    10.000   9/22/2011      RUB     15.00
NOVOROSSIYSK           13.000   12/9/2011      RUB     75.00
NOVYE TORGOVYE S       15.000   4/26/2011      RUB     31.01
OBYEDINEONNYE KO       10.750   5/16/2012      RUB     75.00
PEB LEASING            14.000   9/12/2014      RUB     75.00
PERVYI OBIEDINEO       10.000   4/24/2013      RUB     75.00
REGIONENERGO            8.500   5/30/2016      RUB     75.00
RUSSIAN SEA            10.000   6/14/2012      RUB     75.00
SAHO                   10.000   5/21/2012      RUB     10.00
SEVERNAYA KAZNA         1.000    8/1/2011      RUB     75.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS        10.500   3/27/2012      RUB      3.40
SIBUR                   8.000   3/13/2015      RUB     75.00
SIBUR                  13.500   3/13/2015      RUB     75.00
SIBUR                  10.470   11/1/2012      RUB     75.00
SIBUR                   7.300   3/13/2015      RUB     75.00
SIBUR                   9.250   3/13/2015      RUB     75.00
SISTEMA-HALS            8.500    4/8/2014      RUB     90.00
SISTEMA-HALS            8.500   4/15/2014      RUB     75.00
SOUTHERN STOCK C        9.000   4/29/2014      RUB     75.00
SPETSSTROYFINANC        8.500   5/30/2016      RUB     75.00
SPURT                  11.250   5/31/2012      RUB     75.00
SVOBODNY SOKOL          0.100   5/24/2011      RUB      2.20
TALIO-PRINCEPS         16.000   5/17/2012      RUB     75.00
TATTELECOM              8.250   11/1/2012      RUB     84.07
TECHNONICOL-FINA       13.500   9/11/2013      RUB     75.00
TECHNONICOL-FINA       13.000   9/19/2013      RUB     75.00
TECHNONICOL-FINA       13.000   9/25/2013      RUB     75.00
TECHNOSILA-INVES        7.000   5/26/2011      RUB      0.01
TEKHNOPROMPROEKT        8.500   9/28/2016      RUB     75.00
TERNA-FINANS            1.000   11/4/2011      RUB      0.02
TRANSCREDITFACTO       12.000   6/11/2012      RUB     75.00
TRANSCREDITFACTO       12.000   11/1/2012      RUB     75.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000   12/3/2014      RUB     75.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000   12/3/2014      RUB     75.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000   12/3/2014      RUB     75.00
TRANSFIN-M             11.000   12/3/2014      RUB     75.00
UNITAIL                12.000   6/22/2011      RUB     99.50
URALELEKTROMED          8.250   2/28/2012      RUB     75.00
VKM-LEASING FINA        1.000   5/18/2011      RUB      0.02
VTB NAT MTGE AGE       10.500   2/26/2039      RUB     75.00
ZAO EUROPLAN           10.000   8/11/2011      RUB     75.00
ZHILSOTSIPOTEKA-        9.000   7/26/2011      RUB     75.00

AYT CEDULAS CAJA        4.750   5/25/2027      EUR     72.57
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        3.750   6/30/2025      EUR     65.13
AYUNTAM DE MADRD        4.550   6/16/2036      EUR     65.38
BANCAJA                 1.500   5/22/2018      EUR     64.76
CAJA CASTIL-MAN         1.500   6/23/2021      EUR     58.83
CAJA MADRID             4.125   3/24/2036      EUR     66.42
CAJA MADRID             5.755   2/26/2028      EUR     63.90
CAJA MADRID             4.000    2/3/2025      EUR     74.95
CEDULAS TDA 6           3.875   5/23/2025      EUR     66.49
CEDULAS TDA A-5         4.250   3/28/2027      EUR     67.80
CEDULAS TDA A-6         4.250   4/10/2031      EUR     64.34
COMUNIDAD ARAGON        4.646   7/11/2036      EUR     66.64
COMUNIDAD MADRID        4.300   9/15/2026      EUR     66.64
GEN DE CATALUNYA        4.220   4/26/2035      EUR     63.58
GEN DE CATALUNYA        5.400   5/13/2030      EUR     72.37
GEN DE CATALUNYA        5.325   10/5/2028      EUR     73.06
GEN DE CATALUNYA        5.219   9/10/2029      EUR     71.17
GENERAL DE ALQUI        2.750   8/20/2012      EUR     68.14
IM CEDULAS 5            3.500   6/15/2020      EUR     74.45
INSTITUT CATALA         4.250   6/15/2024      EUR     71.91
JUNTA ANDALUCIA         5.150   5/24/2034      EUR     68.59
JUNTA LA MANCHA         3.875   1/31/2036      EUR     52.70

SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    3/3/2016      ZAR     66.03
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   1/25/2028      USD     50.38
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500    3/5/2018      AUD     66.37
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.000   8/12/2011      USD     10.23
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.000   8/28/2011      USD     10.74
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000   11/4/2011      USD      8.28
SWEDISH EXP CRED        2.000   12/7/2011      USD      9.95
SWEDISH EXP CRED        2.130   1/10/2012      USD      9.57
SWEDISH EXP CRED        6.500   1/27/2012      USD      9.53
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000   1/27/2012      USD     10.07
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.000    3/9/2012      USD      9.73
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.000    3/9/2012      USD     10.23
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.750   3/23/2012      USD     10.13

UBS AG                  9.250   3/20/2012      USD     14.76
UBS AG                 13.700   5/23/2012      USD     14.05
UBS AG                 10.070   3/23/2012      USD     36.65
UBS AG                 13.300   5/23/2012      USD      4.23
UBS AG                 14.000   5/23/2012      USD      9.70
UBS AG                 10.580   6/29/2011      USD     39.47
UBS AG                 10.530   1/23/2012      USD     39.05
UBS AG JERSEY          10.280   8/19/2011      USD     35.25
UBS AG JERSEY          11.150   8/31/2011      USD     39.48
UBS AG JERSEY           9.350   9/21/2011      USD     70.88
UBS AG JERSEY          10.360   8/19/2011      USD     53.45
UBS AG JERSEY           9.450   9/21/2011      USD     51.03
UBS AG JERSEY          10.500   6/16/2011      USD     71.69
UBS AG JERSEY           3.220   7/31/2012      EUR     53.87
UBS AG JERSEY          13.000   6/16/2011      USD     49.96

BANK NADRA              8.000   6/22/2017      USD     73.00
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.350   1/23/2012      USD     22.03
BARCLAYS BK PLC         2.500   5/24/2017      USD     10.47
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.500   8/31/2012      USD     29.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.250   8/31/2012      USD     35.46
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.800   7/31/2012      USD     27.11
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.400   7/31/2012      USD     11.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC        12.950   4/20/2012      USD     23.59
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.650   1/31/2012      USD     45.65
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.250   1/31/2012      USD      9.71
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.550   1/23/2012      USD     11.32
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.800   9/22/2011      USD     16.39
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.750   9/22/2011      USD     73.22
BARCLAYS BK PLC         7.500   9/22/2011      USD     17.05
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.600   7/21/2011      USD     39.76
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.000   6/30/2011      USD     43.42
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.510   5/31/2011      USD     12.92
BARCLAYS BK PLC        13.000   5/23/2011      USD     23.99
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.950   5/23/2011      USD     64.38
BRADFORD&BIN BLD        4.910    2/1/2047      EUR     71.67
CO-OPERATIVE BNK        5.875   3/28/2033      GBP     71.12
DISCOVERY EDUCAT        1.948   3/31/2037      GBP     67.17
EFG HELLAS PLC          6.010    1/9/2036      EUR     31.13
EFG HELLAS PLC          5.400   11/2/2047      EUR     37.75
HBOS PLC                6.000   11/1/2033      USD     73.26
HBOS PLC                6.000   11/1/2033      USD     73.26
HEALTHCARE SUPP         2.067   2/19/2043      GBP     69.79
MAX PETROLEUM           6.750    9/8/2013      USD     60.22
NORTHERN ROCK           5.750   2/28/2017      GBP     69.97
PUNCH TAVERNS           6.468   4/15/2033      GBP     46.38
PUNCH TAVERNS           8.374   7/15/2029      GBP     62.00
PUNCH TAVERNS           7.567   4/15/2026      GBP     61.07
UNIQUE PUB FIN          6.464   3/30/2032      GBP     62.50
WESSEX WATER FIN        1.369   7/31/2057      GBP     31.94


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *