TCREUR_Public/110606.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Monday, June 6, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 110

                            Headlines



A U S T R I A

A-TEC INDUSTRIES: Essar, Astorg, Penta Among Interested Bidders


D E N M A R K

CONTAINERSHIP CO: Files Chapter 15 in New York
CONTAINERSHIP CO: Chapter 15 Case Summary


G E R M A N Y

FORCE TWO: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC'
TMW IMMOBILIEN: Faces Liquidation; Dissolution in May 2014


G R E E C E

* GREECE: Moody's Cuts Bond Ratings to 'Caa1'; Outlook Negative


I R E L A N D

ERC IRELAND: Moody's Downgrades CFR to 'Caa2'; Outlook Negative
DYLAN HOTEL: Still Dependent on "Key Lender" Despite Profit
* IRELAND: EU Commission Extends Bank Guarantee Scheme


L U X E M B O U R G

CLARENVILLE CDO: Moody's Lifts Class A-2 Notes Rating From 'Ba1'
PROLOGIS EUROPEAN: Moody's Changes Outlook on Ba1 CFR to Positive


N E T H E R L A N D S

GRESHAM CAPITAL: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class C Notes to 'Ba1'
KBC NV: Mulls Changes to Restructuring Plan
MESDAG BV: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class D Notes to 'Caa3'
PDM CLO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'Caa2'


R O M A N I A

MEVA: Reorganization Plan Based on Flanco Model
* BRASOV CITY, ROMANIA: Fitch Affirms BB+ LT Foreign Curr. Rating
* ORADEA CITY, ROMANIA: Fitch Affirms BB+ LT Foreign Curr. Rating


R U S S I A

ACRON JSC: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Rating to RUB7.5-Billion Bonds
* IRKUSTK OBLAST: S&P Upgrades Issuer Credit Ratings to 'BB'


S P A I N

CONSUMO BANCAJA: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'CCsf'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ASSESTCO: Northern Bank Seeks Firm's GBP1.3 Million Debt
AUCHEN CASTLE: Two Businessmen Rescue Hotel From Administration
CLUB DIANA: Goes Into Administration, Makes 30 Jobs Redundant
C R GIBBS & SONS: Goes Into Administration, Axes 49 Jobs
PLYMOUTH ARGYLE: Fans Show Concern Over Administration Process

SPORT MEDIA: David Sullivan Pays GBP50,000 for Sport Media Control
VON ESSEN: Puts Sites on Market for GBP200 Million


X X X X X X X X

* EUROPE: Bank "Stress Tests" Face Delay on Data Inaccuracies
* BOND PRICING: For the Week May 30 to June 3, 2011


                            *********




=============
A U S T R I A
=============


A-TEC INDUSTRIES: Essar, Astorg, Penta Among Interested Bidders
---------------------------------------------------------------
Zoe Schneeweiss at Bloomberg News, citing Format magazine, reports
that Essar Group of India, French private equity firm Astorg
Partners, and Penta Investments Ltd. are among the companies
potentially interested in bidding for A-Tec Industries AG.

According to Bloomberg, Format magazine said a list of ten
interested buyers has been reduced to six.  Bloomberg notes an
unidentified A-Tec manager, as cited by Format, said that the
other three parties are a London investment company and companies
from China and India.

Should A-Tec fail to find a buyer by June 30, the company will be
sold off in parts, Bloomberg relates, citing the Format report.

On Oct. 22, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, citing
Bloomberg News, reported that A-Tec sought court clearance to
reorganize debt after losing access to its line of credit because
of an Australian power-station project's financial difficulties.
Bloomberg disclosed A-Tec said in a statement on Oct. 20 that the
company filed for self-administered reorganization proceedings at
the Vienna Commercial Court and appointed trustees for
bondholders.  The company has a EUR798 million (US$1.11 billion)
revolving credit facility and EUR302 million in outstanding bonds,
according to Bloomberg data.

A-TEC Industries AG engages in plant construction, drive
technology, machine tools, and minerals and metals businesses in
Europe and internationally.  The company is based in Vienna,
Austria.


=============
D E N M A R K
=============


CONTAINERSHIP CO: Files Chapter 15 in New York
-----------------------------------------------
Containership Co., a company formed in 2009 to operate container
ships between China and Los Angeles, filed for Chapter 15
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 11-12622) on May 31 in
Manhattan.

The Chapter 15 petition was signed by Jorgen Hauschildt, as court
appointed receiver or reconstructor in the bankruptcy proceeding
before the Copenhagen Maritime & Commercial Court, Bankruptcy
Division, Denmark.

The Company, which has its corporate headquarters in Norway and
operational head office in Denmark, owns one and charters five
container vessels.  The Debtor is estimated to have $1 million to
$10 million in assets and up to $50 million in liabilities in the
Chapter 15 petition.

The Company filed under Chapter 15 in the U.S. so that the U.S.
bankruptcy judge can prevent creditors from seizing the vessels
when they come to the U.S.  The petitioner wants the U.S. Court to
recognize the Danish bankruptcy proceeding as the "foreign main
proceeding."

Containership Co. was founded with $25 million from a private
placement.  It first sailed in April 2010 and ran up to $7.4
million in losses last year before taxes on revenues of
$83.8 million.

Mr. Hauschildt relates that in recent months, the Company's profit
margin began to decline as it experienced a decrease in budgeted
freight rates and increasing competition from Transpacific
container liner operators, resulting in emptier sailings.  The
Company was also adversely affected by increased fuel prices.
"Unless there is a significant turnaround in the global economy,
the financial condition of the Company will continue to
deteriorate," he said.


CONTAINERSHIP CO: Chapter 15 Case Summary
-----------------------------------------
Chapter 15 Petitioner: Jorgen Hauschildt

Chapter 15 Debtor: The Containership Company (TCC) A/S
                   Baltikavez 24
                   2100 Copenhagen
                   Denmark

Chapter 15 Case No.: 11-12622

Type of Business: The debtor is a company based in Denmark that
                  provides container shipping services.

Chapter 15 Petition Date: May 31, 2011

Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court
       Southern District of New York (Manhattan)

Judge: Sean H. Lane

Debtor's Counsel: Jeremy O. Harwood, Esq.
                  BLANK ROME, LLP
                  405 Lexington Avenue
                  New York, NY 10174
                  Tel: (212) 885-5000
                  Fax: (212) 885-5001
                  E-mail: jharwood@blankrome.com

Estimated Assets: $1,000,001 to $10,000,000

Estimated Debts: $10,000,001 to $50,000,000

The Debtor did not file a list of creditors together with its
petition.


=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


FORCE TWO: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings in
the German mezzanine small and midsize enterprise (SME)
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction of FORCE Two
Limited Partnership.

The rating action is the result of a review that examined both
portfolio performance as well as the level of single-obligor
concentration risk.

"With regard to performance, we have analyzed the latest portfolio
delinquencies, deferrals, and cumulative defaults. As recorded in
the investor reports, there have been two principal deficiency
events since the last rating action in December 2009 with an
aggregate amount of EUR8 million. The principal deficiency ledger
increased to EUR7.4 million from EUR6.5 million over the same
period as a result of recoveries and available excess spread," S&P
said.

As of the last investor report from April 2011, the company
backing the largest profit participation agreement in the asset
pool is in "special care management," denoting that the issuer's
advisor considers an insolvency is possible. The largest obligor
accounts for about 6.6% of the total portfolio. Additionally,
three of the top 10 obligors in the pool making up 16.36% of the
performing balance carry an "early warning" classification by the
servicer -- the first sign of deteriorating performance. "We have
taken the advisor's views on these companies into account in our
review," S&P said.

"For single-obligor concentration risk, we have analyzed the
effect of the default of the largest obligor in accordance with
our rating criteria. In this analysis we first calculate the
performing balance of the assets, which we adjust for any
recoveries yet to come in and for expected excess spread. In
the next step we look at top obligor concentrations and evaluate
the net impact of subsequent defaults on the supporting balance
after expected recoveries. Finally, we examine whether the post-
default supporting balance is sufficient to cover the outstanding
balance of the notes at the time," S&P explained.

"In our view, the class A notes could withstand the default of the
five or six largest obligors and still fully repay principal at
maturity. We do not believe, however, that such a level of
resilience is commensurate with an investment-grade rating. We
have lowered the rating to 'BB+ (sf)' accordingly," S&P noted.

"The class B and C notes could withstand two or three defaults in
the top obligor pool, in our view. We consider this to be in line
with the 'B' rating category. The one notch difference between the
classes reflects the fact that the class B notes should generally
be able to withstand one obligor default more than the class C
notes," according to S&P.

"We believe that the two junior classes of notes are currently in
the most serious situation. In the event of default of the largest
obligor, the class E supporting balance would most likely turn
negative. The default of one further obligor would likely turn the
coverage on the class D notes negative. In our view, ratings in
the 'CCC' category are appropriate for these classes," S&P said.

"While we have explicitly incorporated the potential default of
the largest obligor into the current analysis, due to the nature
of the underlying asset pool and the high level of concentrations
present, any further defaults could put the ratings on the notes
under pressure again," S&P added.

Ratings List

Class               To                       From

FORCE Two Limited Partnership
EUR214.5 Million Fixed- And Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered
A                   BB+ (sf)                 BBB (sf)
B                   B+ (sf)                  BB (sf)
C                   B (sf)                   BB- (sf)
D                   CCC+ (sf)                B (sf)
E                   CCC (sf)                 B- (sf)


TMW IMMOBILIEN: Faces Liquidation; Dissolution in May 2014
----------------------------------------------------------
Richard Lowe at IPE reports that TMW Immobilien Weltfonds is the
latest German open-ended real estate fund (GOEF) to be liquidated,
as TMW Pramerica Property Investment looks to focus on closed-end
spezialfonds going forward.

According to IPE, the global real estate fund will be dissolved
and phased out by May 2014, making it the latest fund to be closed
permanently after Degi Europe, KanAM US-Grundinvest, and Morgan
Stanley P2 Value announced similar fates.

It is further evidence that the GOEF industry is undergoing a
structural shift and will return to its traditional business model
of focusing on German private investors rather than institutional
capital, IPE says.

IPE relates that TMW Pramerica Property Investment said the
decision to the liquidate the Fund was based on it having
insufficient liquidity to pay redemption requests.

The fund manager, as cited by IPE, said it assumed the Fund's net
assets of approximately EUR730 million could be sold on reasonable
terms.


===========
G R E E C E
===========


* GREECE: Moody's Cuts Bond Ratings to 'Caa1'; Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Greece's local and
foreign currency bond ratings to Caa1 from B1, and assigned a
negative outlook to the ratings. The rating action concludes the
review for possible downgrade that the rating agency initiated on
May 9, 2011.

The main triggers for the downgrade are:

1. The increased risk that Greece will fail to stabilize its debt
   position, without a debt restructuring, in light of (1) the
   ever-increasing scale of the implementation challenges facing
   the government, (2) the country's highly uncertain growth
   prospects and (3) a track record of underperformance against
   budget consolidation targets.

2. The increased likelihood that Greece's supporters (the IMF, ECB
   and the EU Commission, together known as the "Troika") will, at
   some point in the future, require the participation of private
   creditors in a debt restructuring as a precondition for funding
   support.

Taken together, these risks imply at least an even chance of
default over the rating horizon. Moody's points out that, over
five-year investment horizons, around 50% of Caa1-rated
sovereigns, non-financial corporate and financial institutions
have consistently met their debt service requirements on a timely
basis, while around 50% have defaulted.

Greece's Caa1 rating incorporates Moody's assumption that current
negotiations between the Greek government and the Troika will
result in further official support for the Greek government and
the announcement of additional austerity and structural reform
measures.

The negative outlook on the Caa1 rating reflects Moody's view that
the country's very large debt burden, the significant
implementation risks in its structural reform package, and the
country's ongoing need for external support skew risks of future
rating actions to the downside.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The first trigger for the downgrade is Moody's view that Greece is
increasingly likely to fail to stabilize its debt ratios within
the timeframe set by previously announced fiscal consolidation
plans. The Greek government failed to achieve a number of the
fiscal consolidation targets in 2010 as a result of fiscal
shortfalls (both spending cuts and revenue collections) at the
general government level and persistent weaknesses in tax
collection. It has also become readily apparent that, under
current policies, Greece is unlikely to meet its previously
announced budget targets for 2011. These shortfalls have occurred
in part because GDP growth has been weak -- in fact, the recession
was deeper than was expected in 2010, and 2011 growth forecasts
have been revised downwards. Moreover, in the coming weeks,
Moody's expects the announcement of further fiscal austerity
measures, which are likely to depress growth in 2011. This may in
turn further weaken the political consensus within Greece to
endure all the adjustments mandated by the reform package.

The expectation of a repeated failure to meet targets carries two
implications. First, Greece is unlikely to return to the credit
markets in 2012 for funding, and will require additional financial
assistance from the Troika in order to avoid a default. The quid
pro quo for such assistance will inevitably be further fiscal
austerity and economic reform measures that will be necessary to
address the shortcomings of the program to date. Second, Moody's
believes that raising the austerity bar still higher will further
increase implementation risk for the Greek program.

Heightened implementation risk in turn underpins the other key
driver of today's downgrade to Caa1. Namely that the increased
likelihood that the Troika will make the provision of financial
assistance to Greece over the medium term conditional on a debt
restructuring, in which private sector creditors would absorb some
economic losses. Moody's believes that the public discussion about
current policy options -- including the possibility that financial
assistance to Greece may be delayed or suspended -- indicates that
officials' cost-benefit analysis of a Greek restructuring is
shifting.

HEIGHTENED IMPLEMENTATION RISK OF PROGRAMME INCREASES DEFAULT RISK

In light of recent comments by EU and IMF officials, Moody's
believes that Greece is running out of options, and that
heightened implementation risk inherent in any new program also
increases the probability of a default event. This view is
supported by the following observations:

   -- Greece's large debt burden means that, even under the most
      positive scenarios, the country's debt sustainability will
      remain vulnerable to adverse macroeconomic developments,
      shocks to the Greek financial system or shifts in market
      sentiment for years to come. This will be true even if
      additional liquidity support is given to the government and
      if the full EUR50 billion privatization program is
      implemented on schedule. Regardless of how strong the
      incentives to prevent Greece from defaulting, the longer the
      reform program takes to be seen to be having its desired
      effect on debt sustainability and the longer that Greece
      needs to rely on support from the Troika, the more likely a
      default becomes.

   -- Further fiscal austerity is likely to deepen and prolong the
      recession and further undermine domestic political support
      for the reform program. A failure to secure broad political
      support for the country's fiscal and economic reform package
      would threaten the program and increase policy instability.

Nevertheless, Moody's does not believe that a restructuring of
Greece's debt is inevitable. This is because a default in the
short term would very likely be highly destabilizing, and the full
impact on Europe's capital markets would be hard to predict and
harder still to control. The fallout would have implications for
the creditworthiness of issuers across Europe. These factors
represent an incentive for Greece's supporters to continue to
support the country, at least for a few more years.

Further funding does not make it easier for the government to
comply with the fiscal and structural reform programs, but it does
buy the government time to implement these plans and allow
positive domestic dynamics to build. While it is not Moody's base
case assumption, the large volume of structural economic reform in
the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has the potential to
reinvigorate the economy and generate substantially higher
economic growth over the medium term. Moreover, the Greek state
has substantial assets in excess of the EUR50 billion
privatization target that could in principle be mobilized to
reduce debt. Of course, this would require the Greek government to
be willing to sell these assets and willing buyers to be found for
them.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Greece's Caa1 rating incorporates Moody's assumption that further
official support will be available to the Greek government over
the short term, and that additional austerity and structural
reform measures will be announced over the next month.

Moody's would downgrade Greece's rating further if it transpired
that the Greek government's compliance with the conditions
stipulated in the MoU is materially weakening, and that, as a
result, there is a rising risk that additional funding will not be
forthcoming. Any announcement of a program that includes
conditions that satisfy Moody's definition of default would also
lead to further downgrades.

Moody's would upgrade Greece's rating if the pace of fiscal
consolidation and/or structural reform implementation were to
proceed much more rapidly than Moody's currently expects. An
upgrade could also follow if key drivers of the debt dynamics --
such as economic growth, interest rates, privatization revenues or
the ability to generate large primary surpluses -- were seen to be
evolving in a way that would significantly accelerate the pace of
debt reduction.

PREVIOUS RATING ACTION & METHODOLOGY USED

Moody's previous rating action on Greece was implemented on May 9,
2011, when the rating agency placed Greece's government bond
ratings on review for possible downgrade. Prior to that, Moody's
last rating action on Greece was taken on March 7, 2011, when the
rating agency downgraded Greece's government bond ratings to B1
from Ba1 and assigned a negative outlook.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in September 2008.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


ERC IRELAND: Moody's Downgrades CFR to 'Caa2'; Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Caa2 from Caa1 the
corporate family rating (CFR) of ERC Ireland Finance Ltd, an
indirect parent company of eircom Group Ltd. Concurrently, Moody's
has downgraded ERCIF's probability of default rating (PDR) to Caa3
from Caa2.

Moody's has also downgraded these ratings:

  (i) ERCIF's EUR350 million worth of senior unsecured notes due
      in 2016 to Ca from Caa3

(ii) ERC Ireland Holdings Ltd's ("ERCIH") EUR350 million second-
      lien term loan to Ca from Caa3

(iii) ERCIH's EUR3.3 billion senior secured facility to Caa1 from
      B3

The outlook on the ratings is negative.

                        Ratings Rationale

"This rating action reflects Moody's expectation that eircom will
implement a debt restructuring exercise in the short term, in
light of its expected covenant breach during the next quarter,"
says Ivan Palacios, a Moody's Vice President-Senior analyst and
lead analyst for eircom.

While eircom reported full compliance with all its financial
covenants as of 31 March 2011, the management team publicly
recognized in its Q3 2010/11 results that it is likely that the
company will breach its financial covenants with its lenders
within the next three months. eircom is in discussions with its
shareholders and intends that discussions will take place with its
relevant lenders with respect to the overall financial position of
the group and its response to any covenant breach.

In Moody's view, it is unlikely that eircom will be able to avoid
restructuring its balance sheet which could result in a loss for
current debtholders, given the company's expected covenant breach
in the short term and its unsustainable capital structure. Such a
debt restructuring could be considered a distressed exchange and,
by implication, a default under Moody's methodologies.

Moody's considers eircom's capital structure to be unsustainable
in light of the company's weakening operating performance and the
rating agency's expectation of an even more accelerated decline in
EBITDA in the coming 12 months. This expectation is based on the
very weak underlying fundamentals of the Irish economy, the
intense competition in the market and the impact of regulation. In
fact, eircom's consolidated revenues declined by 10.5% in Q3
2010/11 compared with the previous year, while its consolidated
quarterly EBITDA fell 6% to EUR160 million, despite the company
cutting costs by 13% over the period.

The negative outlook on the ratings reflects eircom's uncertain
operating and financial prospects.

Moody's would consider downgrading the ratings if eircom's
discussions with lenders were to conclude with a debt
restructuring involving a discounted offer on debt components of
the company's capital structure.

Upward pressure on the ratings is unlikely over the short term,
given the negative outlook. However, the rating outlook could be
stabilized if eircom were to proactively manage the covenant
situation while maintaining its current financial profile, with a
debt/EBITDA ratio (as adjusted by Moody's) of around 5.5x. Upward
pressure could be exerted on the rating over the medium term if a
material equity injection were to allow the company to rebalance
its capital structure and maintain adequate headroom under
financial covenants.

           Last Rating Action & Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating ERCIF was the "Global
Telecommunications Industry Rating Methodology", published in
December 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default
for Speculative Grade Issuers in the US, Canada, and EMEA,
published June 2009.

ERCIF (previously known as BCM Ireland Finance Ltd) and ERCIH
(previously known as BCM Ireland Holdings Ltd) are holding
companies of eircom, the principal provider of fixed-line
telecommunications services in Ireland and, following its
acquisition of Meteor, the third-largest mobile operator in the
country. In the year ended 30 June 2010, eircom generated revenues
of EUR1.82 billion and adjusted EBITDA (as reported by the
company) of EUR679 million.


DYLAN HOTEL: Still Dependent on "Key Lender" Despite Profit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Donal O'Donovan at Irish Independent reports that Dylan Hotel made
profits of EUR5 million in 2009, but only after a EUR7 million
debt was forgiven.

In fact, the hotel made an operating loss of EUR1.1 million in
2009, Irish Independent says, citing accounts just filed with the
Companies Office.

The hotel was able to record a "profit" for the year after another
Seamus Ross-owned company forgave a EUR7 million debt owed by the
hotel, Irish Independent notes.  The debt was owed to Menolly
Homes, a major construction company owned by Mr. Ross, Irish
Independent discloses. The accounts show the debt forgiveness was
one element of a complicated set of transactions between firms in
the Menolly Group, Irish Independent notes.

Even with so much of its debt written off, the Dylan Hotel is
dependent on a "key lender" to remain in operation, the accounts
state, according to Irish Independent.

Dylan Hotel is situated in Dublin 4.


* IRELAND: EU Commission Extends Bank Guarantee Scheme
------------------------------------------------------
Simon Carswell at The Irish Times reports that the European
Commission has approved an extension of the Government bank
guarantee, the Eligible Liabilities Guarantee scheme, until the
end of the year.

The scheme was extended last November until the end of this year
subject to EU approval under state aid rules, The Irish Times
points out.  The Commission only approves guarantee schemes on a
six-month basis, the report notes.

According to The Irish Times, any bonds or deposits issued or
"rolled over" before the end of the year will be guaranteed until
they are due to be repaid, up to a maximum period of five years.

The ELG scheme also covers deposits of more than EUR100,000, while
the Government's deposit protection scheme covers deposits under
that amount, The Irish Times discloses.

Some EUR110.6 billion of bank liabilities were covered under ELG
at the end of March 2011, The Irish Times says, citing the most
up-to-date figures.

The Irish Times relates that Minister for Finance Michael Noonan
said the extension of the guarantee was necessary to facilitate
the restructuring of the banking system under the terms of the
EU-IMF bailout.

Mr. Noonan, as cited by The Irish Times, said that the banks'
restructuring plans will "demonstrate their intention to
progressively reduce and ultimately eliminate their reliance on
the State guarantee".

State aid approval for the extension of the guarantee was sought
following advice from the Central Bank governor and the National
Treasury Management Agency, The Irish Times states.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


CLARENVILLE CDO: Moody's Lifts Class A-2 Notes Rating From 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the four
classes of notes issued by Clarenville CDO S.A rated by Moody's.

Issuer: Clarenville CDO S.A.

   -- EUR145M (EUR88.9M outstanding as of Apr 2011) Class A-1a
      Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, due 2016 Bond, Upgraded
      to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 30, 2009 Downgraded to A1
      (sf)

   -- US$55.5M (US$34.0M outstanding as of Apr 2011) Class A-1b
      Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, due 2016 Bond, Upgraded
      to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 30, 2009 Downgraded to A1
      (sf)

   -- GBP25M (GBP11.0M outstanding as of Apr 2011) Class A-1c
      Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, due 2016 Bond, Upgraded
      to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 30, 2009 Downgraded to A1
      (sf)

   -- EUR13M Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, due
      2016 Bond, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 30, 2009
      Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

                       Ratings Rationale

Clarenville CDO S.A., issued in February 2004, is a managed multi-
currency cash-flow CLO managed by PIMCO that has been in
amortization phase since March 2009. The underlying pool in this
transaction amounts to EUR187.1million with 76% exposure to
European borrowers and 88% to senior secured loans. The collateral
assets and liabilities are denominated in EUR, GBP and US$.

According to Moody's, the upgrade rating actions taken on the
notes are primarily a result of increased overcollateralization
levels. Since the last rating action in December 2009, the OC
ratios of all classes have increased following a deleveraging of
the transaction, moving from 127% in November 2009 for class A to
137.5% in April 2011 (as per investors reports). All OC tests are
passing and none of the notes have deferred any interest. Moody's
notes that the transaction documentation does not define OC test
haircuts for assets rated Caa and below.

The reported weighted average rating factor at 2,722 in April 2011
has reduced below the level of 2,861 in November 2009. However,
this reported WARF understates the actual improvement in credit
quality because of the technical transition related to rating
factors of European corporate credit estimates, as announced in
the press release published by Moody's on 1 September 2010. The
proportion of securities from issuers rated Caa1 and below has
decreased from 14.66% in November 2009 to 10.49% in April 2011,
the diversity score reported by the trustee has decreased from
45.8 to 39.8, the weighted average spread has increased from 2.84%
to 3.22% and the weighted-average recovery rate has remained
nearly unchanged at 50.9% compared to 50.7% in November 2009.

The transaction was structured with the aim of partially matching
the liabilities and assets in each currency ("natural hedge").
However, US$ and GBP assets are currently exceeding US$ and GBP
liabilities, while EUR denominated liabilities are under covered
by EUR denominated assets. To mitigate this imbalance, the
transaction features amortizing cross currency swaps maturing in
2014 for a total notional amount of approx. EUR13 million. After
accounting for these hedges the sum of Class A1-c and Class A2 are
over collateralized in terms of EUR collateral by 27%, Class A1-b
is over collateralized in in terms of US$ collateral by 74%, and
Class A1-c is over collateralized in terms of GBP collateral by
35%.

In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
with an adjusted weighted average rating factor of 4,116 (versus
4,374 at last rating action), an average recovery of 50.9% (versus
50.7% at last rating action), a diversity score of 39 (versus 44
at last rating action), and an average spread of 3.22% (versus
2.84% at last rating action).

Moody's also ran sensitivity analyses on key parameters for the
rated notes. For example, Moody's modelled the impact of a 5%
lower average recovery rate in which case the model outputs would
change by less than a notch for Class A1 and by 1 notch for Class
A2.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. The CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the transaction's
deleveraging pace, 2) the manager's decisions to work out or sell
defaulted assets and the resulting recoveries achieved on
defaulted assets, 3) liquidation values achieved on the portion of
long-dated assets, 4) foreign exchange risk introduced by the
portion of unhedged assets, and 5) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009. Under this methodology, Moody's used its Binomial
Expansion Technique, whereby the pool is represented by
independent identical assets, the number of which is being
determined by the diversity score of the portfolio. The default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
a cash flow model where the default probabilities are subject to
stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability
being reviewed. The default probability range is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool, and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority and jurisdiction of the assets in the collateral pool.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs", key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Moody's also notes that around 45% of the collateral pool consists
of debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed through
Moody's credit estimates.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, and the collateral manager's track record.
All information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


PROLOGIS EUROPEAN: Moody's Changes Outlook on Ba1 CFR to Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook to positive from
stable for ProLogis European Properties' Ba1 Corporate Family
Rating, Probability of Default Rating and backed senior unsecured
debt rating of debt issued by its guaranteed subsidiary ProLogis
International Funding. At the same time, Moody's has affirmed
PEPR's existing ratings.

                        Ratings Rationale

The change to positive outlook was triggered by ProLogis' (PLD,
Baa2 RUR direction uncertain) recent significant increase in its
ownership of PEPR and further supported by: (i) the gradual
improvement in PEPR's leverage (total debt/gross assets, as
adjusted by Moody's) over the past two years to 53% post Q1 2011
from over 55% at FYE2009, (ii) its public commitment to continue
reducing leverage to below 50% using retained distributable cash
flow; (iii) its proven ability to retain good tenant occupancy
rates throughout the economic downturn, thereby underpinning
rental income and cash flow; (iv) fixed charge cover above 2.0;
and (v) the preservation of an adequate liquidity profile.

In Moody's opinion, the importance of ProLogis' increased
ownership to around 90% (from around 30%) relates directly to its
newfound ability to control the management of the fund. Under
existing management regulations, 67% of unit holders' votes are
required to sanction any modifications of the regulations. It is
therefore now possible for PEPR to take the steps necessary that
would allow it to issue equity, i.e. more units, should it need to
shore up its capital structure in future. PEPR was unable to do
this during the global financial crisis due to PEPR's
incorporation as an FCP (fonds communs de placement) instead of a
SICAF (societe d'investissement a capital fixe). By changing to a
SICAF structure, PEPR would be able to issue ordinary equity at an
issue price below IFRS NAV per unit and improve its funding
flexibility.

The Ba1 rating is supported by PEPR's prime logistics property
portfolio, which is geographically diverse, well-located and
modern, with resilient occupancy rates. The decline in global
trade through 2009 and still subdued European economic activity
has had a negative impact on occupier demand, which has put
downward pressure on rental income over the past couple of years.
Mitigating this is the absence of an over-supply of newly
developed properties, which we believe is likely to support
occupancy rates. More recently, the logistics property industry
has shown signs of renewed activity, and PEPR's management has
positioned the company to benefit from the anticipated, albeit
mild, recovery towards the end of 2011/beginning 2012.

The positive outlook reflects our view that the logistics property
market has reached the point of inflexion and that PEPR's
management will continue to successfully renew existing leases
and/or re-let its properties, thereby maintaining its high level
of occupancy. The outlook also reflects our expectation that PEPR
will continue deleveraging by applying retained earnings to the
reduction of debt levels.

Upward pressure on the rating could arise if (i) the headroom for
the 60% loan-to-value leverage and capital structure requirements
returns to more generous levels thereby further improving PEPR's
liquidity profile; (ii) leverage, assessed by Moody's as total
adjusted debt and preferred equity to total assets, reduces to 50%
or less on a sustainable basis; and (iii) fixed charge cover
(defined as EBITDA/gross interest expense plus capitalized
interest and ground rents, as adjusted by Moody's) will improve to
at least 2.2x.

Negative rating pressure would occur from further earnings
deterioration, such that fixed charge coverage trends below 2.0x,
or values fall such that Moody's adjusted leverage ratio moves to
60%, or there are any liquidity challenges or covenant breaches.
The latter could result in a multiple-notch downgrade.

The principal methodology used in rating PEPR was the Rating
Methodology for REITs and Other Commercial Property Firms,
published July 2010. Other methodologies that may have been
considered in the process of rating this issuer can also be found
on Moody's website.

Established in Luxembourg, PEPR is a Luxembourg-registered real
estate FCP. It owns and manages industrial properties across
Europe. At March 31, 2011, PEPR holds a portfolio of modern
distribution facilities with gross assets of EUR2.9 billion. At
May 18, 2011, the US-based industrial property REIT, ProLogis, had
a stake of around 90% in PEPR's capital.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


GRESHAM CAPITAL: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class C Notes to 'Ba1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Gresham Capital CLO II.

Issuer: Gresham Capital CLO II B.V.

   -- EUR121.5M Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2026 (currently EUR 77.6M outstanding), Upgraded to Aa1
      (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- EUR75M Senior Secured Floating Rate Variable Funding Notes
      due 2026 (currently EUR 54.6M outstanding), Upgraded to Aa1
      (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2009 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

   -- EUR22.8M Class B Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes,
      Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2009 Downgraded
      to Baa1 (sf)

   -- EUR17.1M Class C Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2026, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2009
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- EUR5M Class S1 Combination Notes due 2026, Upgraded to Baa3
      (sf); previously on Nov 23, 2009 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

                         Ratings Rationale

Gresham Capital CLO II B.V., issued in October 2006, is a
multicurrency CLO managed by Investec Bank Plc. This transaction
has 1.5 years remaining till the end of the reinvestment period on
20 November 2012. The underlying portfolio of approximately EUR
218 million is composed of 92% senior secured loans and is
denominated in EUR and GBP.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result
primarily from the amortization of the Class A and Variable
Funding Notes by approximately EUR 41.8 million and GBP 30.2
million in total since the rating action in November 2009. The
manager used available unscheduled principal proceeds to redeem
the most senior notes. This contributed to an increase of all
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in November
2009. As of the latest trustee report dated May 6, 2011, the Class
A, Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 149.4%, 128.9%, 116.8%, 108.1% and 100.5%
respectively, versus October 2009 levels of 129.3%, 115.9%,
107.5%, 101.2% and 95.9% respectively. Under the transaction
documents, the calculation of overcollateralization ratios is
based on FX rate at closing date to convert GBP assets and
liabilities to EUR, rather than spot rate as often used in
multicurrency CLOs.

In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
with WARF of 4340 (versus modelled WARF of 4276 at last rating
action). The base case diversity score, weighted average spread
and weighted-average recovery rate were respectively 32, 3.0% and
61.0%.

Moody's also ran sensitivity analysis on key parameters for the
rated notes. For instance, if the modelled WARF was increased by
200 or the performing par was decreased by 5%, the model outputs
of all classes would be not affected by more than a notch.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) pace of the
delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds which may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and 2)
divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009. Other methodologies and factors that may have been
considered in the process of rating this issuer can also be found
on Moody's website.

Under this methodology, Moody's used its Binomial Expansion
Technique, whereby the pool is represented by independent
identical assets, the number of which is being determined by the
diversity score of the portfolio. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in a cash flow
model where the default probabilities are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability range is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool, and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority and jurisdiction of the assets in the collateral pool.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs", key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par amount,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Moody's also notes that around 58.8% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


KBC NV: Mulls Changes to Restructuring Plan
-------------------------------------------
Frances Robinson at Dow Jones Newswires reports that KBC NV on
Wednesday said that it is mulling changes to its restructuring
plan, but it is too early to give a date for repaying state aid.

"KBC confirms that, as good business practice and as a reflection
of sound management, it is currently pro-actively examining what
the added value of certain changes to its strategic plan could
be," Dow Jones quotes the bank as saying in an emailed statement.
According to Dow Jones, it stressed, though, that "[as of June 1,
2011,) there is no change of strategy and KBC is executing the
strategic plan it announced in November 2009."

Belgian business daily De Tijd reported earlier that the group
plans to sell Polish businesses Kredyt Bank and Warta instead of
carrying out an initial public offering of its Czech subsidiary
CSOB, and repay the state aid it received from the Belgian
government by the end of this year, Dow Jones relates.

                        About KBC Groep NV

Headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, KBC Groep NV a.k.a KBC Group
NV (EBR:KBC) -- http://www.kbc.com/-- is engaged in banking,
insurance and wealth management for private banking clients,
retail customers and medium-sized enterprises.  It has expertise
in asset management and the financial markets.  The company's
activity is composed of five divisions: the Belgium, the Central &
Eastern Europe and Russia (CEER), the Merchant Banking, the
European Private Banking, and the Shared Services & Operations
business units.  Each of these units has its own management
committee and oversees both the banking and the insurance
activities.  The company is active in Belgium and in other
selected countries, including Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Czech
Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Russia.  KBC Groep NV also
operates to a less extent in the United States and in Southeast
Asia.  The company has three subsidiaries: KBC Bank, KBC Insurance
and KBL European Private Bankers.


MESDAG BV: Moody's Downgrades Rating on Class D Notes to 'Caa3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded these Classes of Notes
issued by MESDAG (Charlie) B.V. (amounts reflect initial
outstandings):

   -- EUR355M Class A Notes, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
      Dec 14, 2010 Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR44.7M Class B Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously
      on Dec 14, 2010 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR44.7M Class C Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
      Dec 14, 2010 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR39.4M Class D Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously
      on Dec 14, 2010 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

Moody's does not rate the Class E and X Notes.

The rating action takes into account Moody's updated central
scenarios as described in Moody's Special Report "EMEA CMBS: 2011
Central Scenarios".

                        Ratings Rationale

The key parameters in Moody's analysis are the default probability
of the securitized loans, both during the term and at maturity, as
well as Moody's value assessment for the properties securing these
loans. Moody's derives from those parameters a loss expectation
for the securitized pool. Based on Moody's revised assessment of
the parameters, the loss expectation for the pool has increased
substantially since the last review in November 2009.

The rating action concludes the review for possible downgrade that
was initiated in December 2010. The review action was prompted by
the payment defaults and transfer to special servicing of the TOR
and Schiphol loans, the exposure to near term refinancing risk of
the Dutch Offices I and Schiphol loans, and the deterioration in
the pool's overall collateral performance.

The rating downgrades are due to (i) Moody's increased expected
loss assessment for the TOR loan in view of the results of the
valuation of the properties as of December 2010 and amid
continuing uncertainties regarding the level of cash flows
generated by the portfolio, the special servicing strategy and the
administration process of the borrowers, (ii) the anticipation of
a loss allocation of approximately EUR2.1M to Class E following
the discounted pay off of the defaulted Schiphol loan, which will
reduce subordination of the rated Notes, and (iii) Moody's
increased refinancing default risk and loss assessment for the
remaining loans in the pool.

In Moody's view the re-assessment is justified by (i) the
continuing upward yield pressure for secondary properties in the
German and Dutch residential and commercial property markets, and
(ii) the significant uncertainty with respect to the path and
timing for a recovery of the lending market.

Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely
range of collateral performance over the medium term. From time to
time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations.
Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key
parameters may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is
stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated during the current
review. Even so, deviation from the expected range will not
necessarily result in a rating action. There may be mitigating or
offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral
performance, such as increased subordination levels due to
amortization and loan re- prepayments or a decline in
subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed
macro-economic environment and continued weakness in the
occupational and lending markets. Moody's anticipates (i) delayed
recovery in the lending market persisting through 2012, while
remaining subject to strict underwriting criteria and heavily
dependent on the underlying property quality, (ii) property values
will overall stabilize but with a strong differentiation between
prime and secondary properties, and (iii) occupational markets
will remain under pressure in the short term and will only slowly
recover in the medium term in line with the anticipated economic
recovery. Overall, Moody's central global scenario remains
'hooked-shaped' for 2011; Moody's expects sluggish recovery in
most of the world's largest economies, returning to trend growth
rate with elevated fiscal deficits and persistent unemployment
levels.

                    Moody's Portfolio Analysis

MESDAG (Charlie) B.V. closed in April 2007 and represents the
true-sale securitization of initially nine (currently seven)
mortgage loans originated by NIBC. The loans are secured by first-
ranking legal mortgages over initially 149 (currently 127)
commercial and residential properties located in Germany (86% of
current underwriter's market value) and The Netherlands (14% of
current underwriter's market value). The pool's property type
composition is mainly residential (63%), office (10%), with the
remainder a mixed use component of residential and office uses.

As of the April 2011 interest payment date, the transaction's
total pool balance was EUR418 million down by 15% since closing
due to scheduled amortization, the prepayment of the NRW loan and
the recent discounted pay off of the Schiphol loan. All interest
and principal proceeds are now applied sequentially to the Classes
of Notes since the transfer to special servicing of the TOR and
Schiphol loans in November 2010, which constituted a Sequential
Prepayment Trigger Event.

The three largest loans in the pool are the TOR loan, the Berlin
loan and the Tommy loan, which together contribute 83.2% of the
total current securitized balance. The other 4 remaining loans
together contribute 16.8% of the total securitized balance. The
current loan Herfindahl index is 3.3, compared to 4.1 at closing.

The TOR loan (44.6% of the current pool) was transferred to
special servicing in November 2010 following a loan payment
default and the appointment of receivers over the TOR borrower and
all the other subsidiaries of the sponsor Speymill Deutsche
Immobilien Company. The loan is secured by a portfolio of 82
residential and mixed use properties in Germany with a
concentration in Berlin. The portfolio was valued at about EUR190M
as of December 2010, which implies a Loan-to-Value ratio of 98%
for a current loan outstanding amount of EUR186.7 million. Moody's
estimated property value of EUR184 million accounts for (i) the
secondary quality and average location of the buildings and (ii)
some uncertainty regarding the actual net cash flows generated by
the portfolio. The reported interest coverage ratio has
deteriorated since even before the default of the loan, and the
receiver who is now controlling the borrower did not pay interest
at the last two interest payment dates. It is currently uncertain
whether the portfolio is producing enough net cash flows to pay
the loan interest on top of necessary CAPEX and net borrower swap
costs. The interest payment default contributed to an interest
shortfall at issuer level and as a consequence the issuer had to
draw on the liquidity facility for the last two quarters. The
special servicer is currently evaluating different options to
maximize final recovery, amongst which a loan restructuring or an
outright disposal of the portfolio. In Moody's view, a fast sale
of the portfolio is the most likely outcome especially in a
situation where the loan is not paying interest current. The
Moody's LTV ratio is now 101% and accounting for liquidation costs
and future potential interest non-payment, the expected loss of
the TOR loan is now very high.

The Berlin loan (29.0% of the current pool) and the Tommy loan
(9.6% of the current pool) have been assessed with regards to the
current German property and lending markets situation. Despite a
moderate increase in expected default probability at maturity of
the loans, the overall probability of default and the expected
loss of these two loans remain relatively low. In contrast, the
other 4 loans remaining in the pool are now all presenting a
significantly higher refinancing risk than at Moody's previous
review. This is especially the case for the Dutch Offices I loan
(7.8% of the current pool), which matures in December 2011 with a
current reported LTV ratio of 81%.

The Schiphol loan (2.4% of the pool at closing) was transferred to
special servicing in November 2010. In April 2011, the special
servicer accepted a discounted pay off for the loan of EUR9
million, against a then outstanding loan amount of EUR10.9
million. The EUR8.8 million net recoveries were applied
sequentially and contributed to redeem the Class A Notes at the
April 2011 interest payment date. The approximately EUR2.1M net
loss stands to the credit of the principal deficiency ledger and
is expected to be allocated to Class E (NR). Although the fast
resolution via a loan discounted pay off is a better outcome than
anticipated when the ratings were placed under review for possible
downgrade, the loss absorbed by Class E erodes the subordination
of the Classes of Notes that were not repaid from the Schiphol
loan proceeds, and notably Classes C and D. Additionally some non-
payment of interest from the Schiphol loan added to the recent
liquidity facility drawings.

Moody's expects a substantial amount of losses on the securitized
portfolio, stemming primarily from losses on the TOR Loan. Moody's
expects very high losses for the Class E and Class D of Notes
given the sequential allocation of proceeds. The current
subordination levels of the Classes A, B and C of Notes provide
some protection against those expected losses. However, the
likelihood of higher than originally expected losses on the
portfolio has increased considerably, which results in the rating
action.

                       Rating Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Real Estate Analysis for CMBS in EMEA: Portfolio
Analysis (MORE Portfolio)" published April 2006. Other methodology
and factors considered can be found in "Update on Moody's Real
Estate Analysis for CMBS Transaction in EMEA" published June 2005.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months. Moody's does not have access
to the underlying portfolio information relating to the non
recoverable costs.

The updated assessment is a result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
transactions. Moody's prior review is summarized in a Press
Release dated November 23, 2009. The last Performance Overview for
this transaction was published on May 19, 2011.


PDM CLO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'Caa2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by PDM CLO I Limited:

Issuer: PDM CLO I Limited

   -- EUR208,500,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2023 (currently EUR202,553,709 outstanding), Upgraded to
      Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2009 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- EUR11,250,000 Class B Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2023, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2009
      Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- EUR17,250,000 Class C Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2023, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2009
      Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

   -- EUR16,500,000 Class D Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2023, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2009
      Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- EUR13,500,000 Class E Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2023, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 6, 2009
      Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

                      Ratings Rationale

PDM CLO I is a managed cash CLO with exposure to European senior
secured loans (77%), structured finance securities (5%), mezzanine
obligations, high yield bonds and senior unsecured loans (18% in
aggregate).

According to Moody's, the rating actions are the result of an
improvement in the credit quality of the underlying portfolio.
This is reflected by the decrease in the weighted average rating
factor (or 'WARF') and the reduction in the proportion of obligors
rated Caa1 or worse between June 2009 and April 2011. The decrease
in reported WARF understates the actual credit quality improvement
because of the technical transition related to rating factors of
European corporate credit estimates, as announced in the press
release published by Moody's on September 1, 2010. In addition OC
Test levels have increased over the same period.

In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
with an adjusted WARF of 3630 (versus a WARF of 4760 in August
2009), a diversity score of 32, a weighted average recovery rate
of 56.80% and a weighted average spread of 2.89%.

In addition to its base case analysis, Moody's tested the
sensitivity of the transaction to a one year increase in the
weighted average life (WAL), to capture the potential impact of
asset maturity extensions and reinvestment. Furthermore, Moody's
ran cases with a WARF of 3228, a level consistent with a default
probability stress of 15% . In all analysis, the impact on the
notes was less than 1 notches from the base case model outputs.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behaviour and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
   transaction is whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal
   proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
   accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
   and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have
   significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
   assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
   defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
   the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility
   in market prices.

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Under this principal methodology, Moody's used its Binomial
Expansion Technique, whereby the pool is represented by
independent identical assets, the number of which being determined
by the diversity score of the portfolio. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in a cash flow
model where the default probabilities are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability range is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool, and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority and jurisdiction of the assets in the collateral pool.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model .

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs", key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third-party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


=============
R O M A N I A
=============


MEVA: Reorganization Plan Based on Flanco Model
-----------------------------------------------
Ziarul Financiar reports that the reorganization of Meva,
controlled by Cristian Burci, could be done based on the model of
home appliances retailer Flanco, whose assets were taken over by
an investor and registered to a new company, with the new
shareholder structure that also included creditor banks.

According to ZF, Meva's reorganization plan was approved by the
General Meeting of Creditors, according to Casa de Insolventa
Transilvania, the company's court-appointed administrator.  It
provides for the commercial operations to be continued, the sale
of the company's tangible and intangible assets, paying out the
debt to creditors in installments, as well as keeping the 250
employees, according to the latest data supplied by the insolvency
firm, ZF states.

ZF says restructuring will be done in 18 months.  In the coming
period, there will be a vote on the reorganization plans of Astra
Vagoane Arad and Romvag rolling stock plants, also held by
Mr. Burci, ZF discloses.

"We want to bring in a new investor, and register the assets to a
new company.  This way, one gets rid of the company's debts.
Meva's reorganization could be done using Flanco's model," ZF
quotes Radu Lotrean, managing partner of the insolvency firm, as
saying.

He did not wish to comment on what the new shareholder structure
could look like, nor on Cristian Burci's role in it, ZF notes.  At
Flanco, the former shareholders are not part of the new company,
according to ZF.

Meva is a rolling stock manufacturer based in Romania.


* BRASOV CITY, ROMANIA: Fitch Affirms BB+ LT Foreign Curr. Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Romanian City of Brasov's Long-term
foreign currency rating at 'BB+', Long-term local currency rating
at 'BBB-' and Short-term foreign currency rating at 'B'. The
Outlooks for the Long-term ratings are Stable.

The ratings reflect the city's strongly rebalanced budgetary
performance, which benefited from a supportive national policy
framework for local governments, and its restored overall
financial flexibility, despite challenging economic conditions in
the local and national context. In 2010 the operating margin
strengthened further, supported by transfers, which underpinned
the resilience of revenue, and tightly disciplined operating
expenditure.

The city implemented cost-cutting initiatives resulting in a
leaner organizational structure and rationalization of staff
costs. Further improvement of fiscal performance remains reliant
on stronger tax revenue, which mainly depends on local and
national economic recovery. Financial flexibility was restored
reflecting reduced direct risk and improved fiscal balances with
the operating margin recovering to 16% at end-2010 from below 10%
in 2009. Direct debt is set to stabilize in 2011-2013, with the
payback ratio falling to 2.3 years in 2010. This is generally
forecast to remain around three years in this period. Fitch
projects debt servicing as a proportion of the current revenue to
stabilize around 30% until 2014.

Romania's economy declined by 1.2% in 2010, after significantly
contracting by 7.1% in 2009. According to Fitch estimates, GDP
should grow by 1.5% in 2011 and 3.5% in 2012, still below the
average growth rate of 6.8% in 2004-2008. Romania's highly
centralized national budgetary system ensures adequate support and
control from the central government. Under the austerity measures
implemented in the face of the national economic contraction, the
state ensured budgetary rebalancing in local government finances
through subsidies and regulatory measures, including expenditure
control.

Brasov, in central Romania, is the capital of and largest city in
Brasov County and has about 278,000 residents. The city is a
popular tourist destination and has a strategic location in the
heart of the country. In addition to locally generated tax
revenue, the city's budget also benefits from central government
transfers. The city's responsibilities are service driven and
include education and social services.


* ORADEA CITY, ROMANIA: Fitch Affirms BB+ LT Foreign Curr. Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Romanian City of Oradea's Long-term
foreign currency rating at 'BB+', Long-term local currency rating
at 'BBB-' and Short-term foreign currency rating at 'B'. The
Outlooks for the Long-term ratings are Stable. The rating actions
affects about RON268m of direct debt outstanding at end-2010, as
well as future borrowings.

The ratings reflect Oradea's developing economy, sustainable
investment plans aiming to improve local infrastructure, its sound
financial performance and solid track record of state support and
control for Romanian cities. It also reflects the limited
budgetary flexibility and the strong increase in debt over the
past four years.

A positive change in the sovereign ratings provided budgetary
performance and debt, as well as debt servicing ratios remain at
current levels, would lead to an upgrade. An operating margin
below 10% and debt exceeding 100% of current revenue or a
distortion and/ or debt servicing ratios would trigger a negative
rating action. Any downward rating action on Romania will be
automatically reflected in Oradea's ratings.

Romania's economy declined by 1.2% in 2010, after significantly
contracting by 7.1% in 2009. According to Fitch estimates, GDP
should recover by 1.5% in 2011 and 3.5% in 2012, still below the
average growth rate of 6.8% in 2004-2008. This development is not
yet fully reflected in the city's economy, as the tax base remains
robust and labor market conditions even improved. However, some
risks remain, as local governments may not take advantage of the
co-funding provided by the central government last year and the
economic growth may remain below pre-crisis levels.

The operating margin remained at around 18% in 2010, driven by
higher grants from central government and reduced personnel costs.
The reduction of staff cost is viewed as positive by Fitch, as the
state controls salaries and sets quality standards for public
services provided by the city. According to the city's forecast,
operating performance is expected to remain at this level and the
current balance will be sufficient to cover capital expenditure 2x
in 2011 and 2012.

Debt further increased by about 23% in 2010, to RON268 million,
but Oradea maintains strong debt and debt service coverage ratios.
After the exceptionally high payback taken place in 2009, 2010
direct debt servicing fell to 5.2% of current revenue (2009:18.1%)
while debt accounted for 65% of current revenue (2009: 55%) but a
still low 3.9 years of current balance. The city plans to contract
a new RON25 million loan in 2011 and has not yet made full use of
a RON15m and a EUR10.36 million loan already contracted.

Although financial rigidity remains high, Romanian's highly
centralized budgetary system ensures adequate control and support
from the state, the latter reflected in last year's budgetary
performance. Central government also provides additional subsidies
to support local infrastructure projects.

Oradea is located in north-west Romania. It is the capital and,
with about 204,500 residents, the largest city in Bihor County.
Using the county as a proxy, the local wealth level is slightly
above the national average, whose GDP per capita accounts in turn
for 46% (in Purchasing Power Standards) of the EU27 average in
2009.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


ACRON JSC: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Rating to RUB7.5-Billion Bonds
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russia-based fertilizer producer JSC
Acron's 10-year RUB7.5 billion domestic bond issue a senior
unsecured rating of 'B+' and a Recovery Rating of 'RR4'.

Acron has issued the notes in two tranches of RUB3.75 billion,
which are the company's fourth and fifth issues on the domestic
bond market. They are structured as unsecured and unsubordinated
obligations of the issuer and do not contain any financial or
other covenants. They are subject to a bondholder put option at
par after three years (May 29, 2014) and carry a 7.95% coupon rate
for the first six semi-annual coupons.

The proceeds from the notes will be used to refinance debt and
fund capex requirements. This is in line with Fitch's expectations
and with Acron's stated financing strategy.

Acron's gross debt amounted to RUB35.9 billion at year-end 2010,
RUB13.1 billion of which was due within one year. Short-term debt
includes the group's second RUB3.5 billion bond, which could be
subject to a bondholder put option on September 26, 2011. The new
10-year bond issue will enhance and extend the company's debt
maturity profile.

Acron is currently constructing a new phosphate mine with planned
peak spending of US$150 million-US$200 million in 2011. Phase I of
the project is expected to be completed in the first half of 2012
after a total investment of US$400 million.

Fitch notes that Acron has been active in the debt markets in
2011. In February 2011, the company's three-year pre-export
financing (PXF) club loan originated in July 2010 was increased to
US$425 million from US$300 million. The additional US$125 million
was used for refinancing and working capital purposes. In May
2011, Acron and VTB Bank (Austria) AG signed a five-year US$175
million PXF term loan.


* IRKUSTK OBLAST: S&P Upgrades Issuer Credit Ratings to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its issuer credit
ratings on Irkutsk Oblast to 'BB' from 'BB-'. "At the same time,
we raised the national scale rating on the oblast to 'ruAA' from
'ruAA-'. The outlook is stable. The recovery rating on
the oblast's unsecured debt is unchanged at '3'," S&P said.

The ratings on the oblast are based on its limited financial
flexibility and predictability and relatively high contingent
liabilities and high infrastructure needs. "The oblast's
creditworthiness is supported by a decrease in its debt. Debt
levels are likely to remain low over the medium term, due to
consistently solid budgetary performance, and a diverse economy,
which we believe has good long-term economic growth potential,"
S&P stated.

Since mid-2008, the oblast's government has applied prudent cost-
containment measures. These measures -- combined with additional
federal-government subsidies, redistribution of municipal revenues
in favor of the oblast budget, and unplanned tax proceeds thanks
to the diversified economy -- have helped the oblast improve its
financial indicators during and after the economic downturn. In
2009 and 2010, with operating surplus averaging 13% of operating
revenue and strong surplus after capital accounts, the oblast
managed to achieve its strongest budgetary performance of the last
decade.

Irkutsk oblast has high infrastructure needs because of its vast
territory and severe climate conditions. The oblast's long-term
financial planning is still developing and its consistently
prudent financial management may be disrupted by Russia's
developing and unbalanced institutional framework, which devolves
limited financial flexibility to local and regional governments
(LRGs).

"The stable outlook reflects our view that continuation of
currently prudent financial practices may help the oblast absorb
spending pressure in the medium term with only moderate weakening
of its solid financial, debt, and liquidity indicators," according
to S&P.

"We could raise the ratings over the next 12 months if the oblast
either stabilizes its cash position above the projected annual
debt service or streamlines its currently cautious financial
practices in the medium-term financial policy. If the oblast
starts to address infrastructure needs, thereby alleviating
pressure on its budget, or the region's municipalities improve
their financial performance, it would also contribute to a
positive rating action," S&P noted.

Conversely, if the oblast's financial policy stance were to weaken
due to rising political and social pressures, leading to a
marginal operating surplus in 2011-2012 and either a deterioration
of its currently strong liquidity position or the rapid
accumulation of tax-supported debt (approaching 60% of the
oblast's consolidated revenues), it could weaken the rating.


=========
S P A I N
=========


CONSUMO BANCAJA: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'CCsf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Consumo Bancaja 1 FTA's ratings:

   -- EUR65.6m class A notes: affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook revised
      to Stable from Negative; Loss Severity (LS) Rating 'LS-1'

   -- EUR14.7m class B notes: affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Negative;
      LS Rating 'LS-3'

   -- EUR19.2m class C notes: affirmed at 'CCCsf'; assigned
      Recovery Rating 'RR4'

   -- EUR12.9m class D notes: affirmed at 'CCsf'; assigned
      Recovery Rating 'RR6'

The affirmation reflects the fact that although the transaction
has been performing below Fitch's expectations, it has not
deteriorated substantially since the last rating action and has
continued to amortize sequentially. Credit enhancement for the
senior classes has increased and the agency believes that this is
adequate for protecting the current ratings. However, the class D
uncollateralized note is likely to incur losses, as the reserve
fund is currently fully drawn. Moreover, the agency does not
consider it likely that recoveries and excess spread will be
enough to fully replenish the reserve.

Defaults have been substantially higher than Fitch's expectations.
The cumulative default ratio (CDR) was 4.39% in April 2011 and the
cumulative loss ratio (CLR) was 3.91%. Fitch's original base case
figures for the same period of seasoning were 2.68% and 1.43%,
respectively. To date, recoveries amount to 10.96% of the
cumulative defaulted amount, less than a quarter of Fitch's
expectation, which was 46.68%. The reserve fund was fully funded
at closing at EUR12.9 million. It began being withdrawn on the
February 2008 interest payment date (IPD) and was zero as of the
August 2010 IPD. The transaction's principal deficiency ledger
(PDL) is EUR1.6 million.

The gap between expected losses and actual losses has been sharply
widening. The dramatic change in Spain's economic conditions is
likely to be the main driver of the striking difference between
expectations and actual performance.

Fitch has revised its assumptions on the expected defaults and
recoveries in its forecast model to reflect the current loss
severity incorporating the current delinquency trend. Several
scenarios have been assessed with different stresses applied.
Expected default rates between 7% and 9.5% have been applied, as
well as recoveries between 15% and 65%. Resulting expected losses
have been compared with the current available credit enhancement
at each rating level in accordance with Fitch's 'EMEA Consumer ABS
Rating Criteria'.

Consumo Bancaja 1 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos is a true sale
securitisation of a pool of consumer and auto loans originated in
Spain by Caja de Ahorros de Valencia Castellon y Alicante
(Bancaja, the seller, servicer, swap provider and formerly account
bank; rated 'A-'/Stable/'F2') in June 2006. The proportion of auto
loans was 44% at closing. The revolving period, which was due to
end in August 2008, terminated in May 2008 due to an early
amortization event. The notes have amortized sequentially and the
outstanding value of the notes was 15.9% of its original balance
as of last IPD in February 2011.

At closing, the credit enhancement (CE) for this transaction was
7.80% for class A, 5.35% for class B and 2.15% for class C. As of
the February 2011 IPD, CE levels were 32.45%, 17.68% and -1.61%,
respectively.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ASSESTCO: Northern Bank Seeks Firm's GBP1.3 Million Debt
--------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that the Northern Bank has started legal action
to recover GBP1.3 million from AssetCo, a company that owns
London's fire engines.

The action could force AssetCo into administration, according to
BBC News.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 24,
2011, the Observer said that there are fears that AssetCo is
heading for administration, a move that could see the capital's
fire engines sold off.  The Observer noted that AssetCo has seen
its share price collapse amid fears it is running out of money.
If the company ends up in the hands of its creditor banks, they
will have the right to sell off the appliances, according to The
Observer.  The Observer related that the Fire Brigade Union has
raised concerns about public safety if the company enters
administration.  "The creditors are going to have first call on
the assets.  There's a real risk here that the fire service are
not going to have access to the engines," The Observer quoted FBU
spokesman Duncan Milligan as saying.

BBC News notes that AssetCo recently ran into financial problems
and the Belfast-based Northern Bank has confirmed that it has
lodged a creditor's petition to try to recover the GBP1.3 million
it said it is owed.  BBC News notes that if the money is not paid,
AssestCo could move towards insolvency and possible
administration.

If the Northern Bank's debt is not re-paid, the petition will be
heard at the end of the month, BBC News says.


AUCHEN CASTLE: Two Businessmen Rescue Hotel From Administration
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sharon Liptrott at Dumfries & Galloway Standard reports that
Auchen Castle Hotel, which went into administration almost a year
ago, was bought for an undisclosed sum by Annan wedding
photographer Alister Lynn and Lockerbie's Dryfesdale Hotel owner
Glen Wright.

The businessmen duo plans to create 12 new jobs initially and will
add another eight by next year, according to Dumfries & Galloway
Standard.

The Auchen Castle was bought by Pierre-Alban Guy, the founder of
PAG Hotels, for GBP3.3 million in 2008, according to Dumfries &
Galloway Standard.  However, the report relates, the business went
into administration in July last year when the Santander bank
called in KPMG.

Dumfries & Galloway Standard notes that administrators invited
offers of GBP1.25 million initially but slashed it to GBP1 million
when no buyers came forward for the 28-bedroom hotel, which has
its own loch.  Its sister venture, Castle Venlaw Hotel, in Peebles
also went into administration.

Both hotels, which retained 30 staff between them, have remained
open for business throughout the proceedings under guidance from
Convivial Management Services Limited, Dumfries & Galloway
Standard says.

Auchen Castle Hote is a four-star Auchen Castle Hotel near Moffat.


CLUB DIANA: Goes Into Administration, Makes 30 Jobs Redundant
-------------------------------------------------------------
Evening Telegraph reports that Club Diana was closed by
administrators on June 4.

Thirty staff members were made redundant and dozens of people who
had organized their events at the club have been told by a letter
from the administrators that their agreements with the club no
longer stand, according to Evening Telegraph.

"I am devastated.  The bank came in and said we had to sell the
club.  They wanted more capital back than we could afford to pay
them, and the administrators just turned up.  It has come as a
huge shock as it doesn't make any sense.  We had a diary full of
events.  We have got so many functions booked and it is awful to
think that these people have booked and now won't have their
event.  It makes me sick to think of bankers and their bonuses
when small businesses are being treated like this," Evening
Telegraph quoted club owner Ray Adams as saying.  "I am trying to
find an investor, but nothing is guaranteed," he added.

Club Diana is located in Finedon Road, Wellingborough.


C R GIBBS & SONS: Goes Into Administration, Axes 49 Jobs
--------------------------------------------------------
Business Credit Management reports that C R Gibbs & Sons
(Sheffield) Ltd has gone into administration with the loss of 49
jobs.

John Russell and Chris White, partners at The P&A Partnership,
Sheffield, who were appointed joint administrators on May 31, have
confirmed that the business had ceased trading and that all
employees have been made redundant, according to Business Credit
Management.

"C R Gibbs & Sons is a well respected Sheffield business that has
unfortunately been a casualty of both the downturn in the
construction sector and cuts in the public sector.  The majority
of its contracts were within the public sector, including schools,
universities and NHS Trusts.  P&A have been offering support by
assisting staff with claim forms for redundancy payments and other
entitlements," Business Credit Management quoted Chris White as
saying.

C R Gibbs & Sons (Sheffield) Ltd is a Sheffield construction
company.


PLYMOUTH ARGYLE: Fans Show Concern Over Administration Process
--------------------------------------------------------------
plymouth.vitalfootball.co.uk reports that there is a growing
concern amongst the Plymouth Argyle Football Club fan base
regarding the way the administration process for the club has been
handled.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on March 8, 2011,
guardian.co.uk related that Plymouth Argyle Football Club has been
placed into administration by the high court.  An unnamed Argyle
director is understood to have applied to the court for a stay of
the administration process, according to guardian.co.uk.  The
report related that Plymouth Argyle hoped that a buyer could be
found to take over the club as a solvent entity, but the judge
overruled the application.  guardian.co.uk noted that after the
hearing, Plymouth Argyle said Brendan Guilfoyle, Christopher White
and John Russell of The P&A Partnership have been appointed as
administrators.  Mr. Guilfoyle, who was the preferred choice of
Peter Ridsdale, Plymouth's de facto chief executive, conducted the
administration process at Crystal Palace.  HM Revenue & Customs
had wanted a creditor-driven administration in which it appoints
the insolvency practitioner, guardian.co.uk added.

plymouth.vitalfootball.co.uk notes that Mr. Guilfoyle set a number
of deadlines for a potential buyer of the club to be found with
the first of those deadlines being March 17.  However, the
deadlines kept being set and then missed.  The delay caused the
administration process to be in a situation where it is already
June, but the ownership of the club still hasn't been completely
settled, the report relays.

plymouth.vitalfootball.co.uk notes that affinity Sports Finance,
led by former Argyle directors Keith Todd and Sir Roy Gardner,
were the first potential bidders to show their hand, quickly
followed by Truro City chairman Kevin Heaney in partnership with
Cineworld.  The two groups quickly faded, the report cites, but
James Brent and Paul Buttivant then became the front two in the
race to become the preferred bidder.

Mr. Brent was a reluctant bidder; more of a back-stop bid if all
else fails but proved his funding to Mr. Guilfoyle, according to
plymouth.vitalfootball.co.uk.  Questions regarding the
administration process began to surface because Mr. Guilfoyle
refused to acknowledge Mr. Buttivant's proof of funding despite
several legal experts agreeing that in any other business, Mr.
Buttivant's proof of funding would be accepted, the report states.

Mr. Guilfoyle was also adamant that the funding would need to be
paid upfront, plymouth.vitalfootball.co.uk says.

plymouth.vitalfootball.co.uk notes that with Mr. Buttivant's bid
refused and no other bid in sight, Mr. Guilfoyle has set in motion
the Company Voluntary Agreement whereby unsecured creditors would
receive 0.77p in the pound from Mr. Brent.

plymouth.vitalfootball.co.uk discloses that Mr. Brent was set to
take over; but on the day of the CVA meeting on May 6, Mr.
Guilfoyle surprisingly announced that a mysterious Irish
consortium had offered the secured creditors more money and had
won Preferred Bidder status at the last minute.

It was later discovered that the exclusivity deal had only just
been signed and that the funding would be paid in milestone
payments, according to plymouth.vitalfootball.co.uk.  The report
notes that the concern amongst the Green Army reached another
level when Mr. Guilfoyle admitted that the Irish group had no
interest in football but were property developers.

The Irish Group, plymouth.vitalfootball.co.uk relates, used a
Dublin-based financial company called BCK Wealth Management as
their representative but this could just be a front.

The questions regarding the way the administration process for the
Club has been handled keep on coming because after paying their
first GBP150,000 milestone payment, there is speculation that the
Preferred Bidder is late with their second installment,
plymouth.vitalfootball.co.uk adds.

                     About Plymouth Argyle

Plymouth Argyle Football Club, commonly known as Argyle, or by
their nickname, The Pilgrims, is an English professional football
club based in Central Park, Plymouth.  It plays in Football League
One, the third division of the English football league system.


SPORT MEDIA: David Sullivan Pays GBP50,000 for Sport Media Control
------------------------------------------------------------------
guardian.co.uk reports that David Sullivan paid just GBP50,000 to
take control of the Sunday Sport, according to documents filed to
Companies House by the administrators tasked with finding a buyer.
Sunday Sport is a subsidiary of Sports Media Group (SMG).

The documents also show that Richard Desmond forced Sunday Sport
into administration by abruptly refusing to continue to print the
title without full payment of debts, confirming a story previously
published by MediaGuardian.co.uk, according to guardian.co.uk.

guardian.co.uk notes that Mr. Sullivan also paid GBP2,500 for
"certain chattel assets from Sunday Sport", as well as GBP4,000
towards the legal costs of the sale accrued by the administrators.
In addition, Mr. Sullivan agreed to pay an outstanding debt of
GBP46,000 owed to Sport Newspapers by a company, Quietlynn, that
was "owned by a party associated" to the business that acquired
the Sunday Sport, guardian.co.uk relates.

MediaGuardian.co.uk also revealed that while BDO was in talks to
sell SMG a going concern, its printers -- which were owed more
than GBP400,000 -- pushed for full payment, effectively causing
the business to cease trading, guardian.co.uk adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 27,
2011, The Press Association said Sunday Sport will return to
newsstands next month after former owner David Sullivan revealed
that he and former staff had set up a private joint venture to
save Sunday Sport publication and it will be relaunched on May 8.
The paper faced falling into the annals of tabloid obscurity after
its parent company Sport Media Group PLC (SMG) -- which also owned
the sister title Daily Sport -- went into administration earlier
this month, The Press Association related.  Daily Sport is still
in the hands of administrators.  SMG disclosed that Dermot Power
and Patrick Lannagan, business restructuring partners at BDO LLP,
were appointed joint administrators to Sport Media Group plc and
two of its wholly owned subsidiaries, Sport Newspapers Limited and
Moresport Limited, on April 4, 2011, by the Directors of the
Companies.  According to a separate TCREUR report on April 4,
2011, citing Reuters, SMG said it had ceased trading and would go
into administration because it was unable to pay its debts.

Sport Media Group is the publisher of the Daily Sport and Sunday
Sport newspapers.


VON ESSEN: Puts Sites on Market for GBP200 Million
--------------------------------------------------
Somerset Guardian reports that some of most stunning hotels in
West England have been put up for sale, after their parent company
went into administration.

Thornbury Castle, The Royal Crescent Hotel in Bath and the Mount
Somerset near Taunton are among the 26 hotels put up for sale by
administrations of the Von Essen group, according to Somerset
Guardian.  The report relates that they are being marketed for
around GBP200 million by Christie & Co, who says the venues fall
into the categories of classic, luxury family and country hotels.

Somerset Guardian notes that the company's managing director Chris
Day said there have already been enquiries from potential
operators.  One of the Group's hotels, Hunstrete House, near
Keynsham, has since gone out of business with 12 full-time members
of staff losing their jobs.  The remaining hotels are still open
for business.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 25,
2011, BBC News said the holding company of the von Essen hotel
chain has appointed accountants Ernst & Young as administrators.
SoGlos.com related that von Essen is reported to have debts of
more than GBP25 million.  SoGlos.com noted that while
administrators have been appointed and the portfolio of hotels are
expected to be sold off either as a group or as individual
properties, the hotels are all expected to continue to trade as
usual.  "It is business as normal for the hotels and customers of
von Essen Hotels can continue to enjoy their stay," The Northern
Echo quoted Angela Swarbrick, joint administrator, as saying.

von Essen hotel chain owns 28 luxury hotels in the UK and France.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EUROPE: Bank "Stress Tests" Face Delay on Data Inaccuracies
-------------------------------------------------------------
The results of Europe's latest round of bank "stress tests" will
be delayed until July as European regulators worry that banks and
their national supervisors submitted overly optimistic data, David
Enrich at The Wall Street Journal reports, citing people familiar
with the matter.

The European Banking Authority previously had planned to publish
the test results later this month, the Journal discloses.
According to the Journal, that is getting pushed back as the EBA
requires banks to resubmit data about how they would fare in an
economic downturn.

The tests, under way since March, are designed to gauge the
financial health of 91 banks from 21 countries across the European
Union, the Journal says.  The goal is to help defuse the
continent's financial crisis by easing fears that many banks are
vulnerable to huge unforeseen losses, the WSJ states.
Institutions whose capital cushions are deemed too thin to
withstand a deteriorating economic environment will be required to
raise more funds or shed assets or business lines, according to
the Journal.

In April, banks started submitting data about how their balance
sheets would perform under the hypothetical economic scenarios
prepared by the EBA with help from the European Central Bank and
other regulators, the Journal recounts.  An initial check by the
EBA found numerous instances of bank submissions that included
obvious inaccuracies or missing data, the Journal says, citing
people familiar with the matter.

The Journal notes that people familiar with the matter said EBA
officials' preliminary conclusion is that many banks submitted
data that tended to play down their vulnerabilities to an economic
slowdown.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week May 30 to June 3, 2011
---------------------------------------------------

Issuer                 Coupon   Maturity Currency    Price
------                 ------   -------- --------    -----

AUSTRIA
-------
BA CREDITANSTALT         5.000  3/22/2029     EUR     73.01
IMMOFINANZ               4.250   3/8/2018     EUR      4.16
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.900  8/18/2025     EUR     61.63
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.160  5/20/2025     EUR     70.48
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.810  7/29/2025     EUR     58.50
OESTER VOLKSBK           4.750  4/30/2021     EUR     70.59
OESTER VOLKSBK           5.270   2/8/2027     EUR     73.59
RAIFF LB OBEROST         4.620  9/17/2030     EUR     67.68
RAIFF ZENTRALBK          4.500  9/28/2035     EUR     77.51

CZECH REPUBLIC
--------------
SAZKA                    9.000  7/12/2021     EUR     65.75

DENMARK
-------
KOMMUNEKREDIT            0.500   2/3/2016     TRY     70.05
MUNI FINANCE PLC         1.000  6/30/2017     ZAR     63.50
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500   2/9/2016     ZAR     70.35
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500  4/26/2016     ZAR     69.50
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500  4/27/2018     ZAR     57.89
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500  9/24/2020     CAD     69.35
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.500  3/17/2025     CAD     53.93
MUNI FINANCE PLC         0.250  6/28/2040     CAD     21.79
MUNI FINANCE PLC         1.000  2/27/2018     AUD     71.53

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM           4.970   4/1/2015     EUR     14.22
ALCATEL-LUCENT           5.000   1/1/2015     EUR      4.54
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG         6.720   1/1/2015     EUR      6.21
ATOS ORIGIN SA           2.500   1/1/2016     EUR     53.90
CALYON                   6.000  6/18/2047     EUR     11.38
CAP GEMINI SOGET         3.500   1/1/2014     EUR     43.26
CAP GEMINI SOGET         1.000   1/1/2012     EUR     43.47
CGG VERITAS              1.750   1/1/2016     EUR     31.84
CLUB MEDITERRANE         5.000   6/8/2012     EUR     15.80
CLUB MEDITERRANE         6.110  11/1/2015     EUR     19.97
EURAZEO                  6.250  6/10/2014     EUR     61.13
FAURECIA                 4.500   1/1/2015     EUR     31.19
INGENICO                 2.750   1/1/2017     EUR     45.37
MAUREL ET PROM           7.125  7/31/2014     EUR     20.90
MAUREL ET PROM           7.125  7/31/2015     EUR     20.22
NEXANS SA                4.000   1/1/2016     EUR     70.74
ORPEA                    3.875   1/1/2016     EUR     47.26
PEUGEOT SA               4.450   1/1/2016     EUR     33.54
PUBLICIS GROUPE          1.000  1/18/2018     EUR     48.88
PUBLICIS GROUPE          3.125  7/30/2014     EUR     38.60
RHODIA SA                0.500   1/1/2014     EUR     51.74
SOC AIR FRANCE           2.750   4/1/2020     EUR     20.82
SOITEC                   6.250   9/9/2014     EUR     11.29
TEM                      4.250   1/1/2015     EUR     56.79
THEOLIA                  2.700   1/1/2041     EUR     11.89

GERMANY
-------
DEUTSCHE BK LOND         2.250  9/20/2020     EUR     73.50
EUROHYPO AG              3.830  9/21/2020     EUR     70.75
EUROHYPO AG              6.490  7/17/2017     EUR      6.88
HSH NORDBANK AG          4.375  2/14/2017     EUR     74.52
IKB DEUT INDUSTR         6.550  3/31/2012     EUR     17.83
IKB DEUT INDUSTR         5.625  3/31/2017     EUR     15.00
IKB DEUT INDUSTR         6.500  3/31/2012     EUR     18.00
L-BANK FOERDERBK         0.500  5/10/2027     CAD     48.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT          2.800  2/23/2037     JPY     70.32
LB BADEN-WUERTT          2.500  1/30/2034     EUR     57.88
QIMONDA FINANCE          6.750  3/22/2013     USD      2.75
SOLON AG SOLAR           1.375  12/6/2012     EUR     42.94
TUI AG                   2.750  3/24/2016     EUR     53.98

GREECE
------
ATHENS URBAN TRN         4.851  9/19/2016     EUR     54.41
ATHENS URBAN TRN         5.008  7/18/2017     EUR     53.52
ATHENS URBAN TRN         4.301  8/12/2014     EUR     60.55
ATHENS URBAN TRN         4.057  3/26/2013     EUR     71.53
HELLENIC REP I/L         2.900  7/25/2025     EUR     42.27
HELLENIC REP I/L         2.300  7/25/2030     EUR     40.17
HELLENIC REPUB           5.000  3/11/2019     EUR     55.35
HELLENIC REPUB           4.625  6/25/2013     USD     77.29
HELLENIC REPUB           4.590   4/8/2016     EUR     60.33
HELLENIC REPUB           2.125   7/5/2013     CHF     73.00
HELLENIC REPUB           5.200  7/17/2034     EUR     59.69
HELLENIC REPUB           6.140  4/14/2028     EUR     60.18
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.506  3/31/2013     EUR     72.95
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.600  5/20/2013     EUR     73.09
HELLENIC REPUBLI         7.500  5/20/2013     EUR     75.74
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.900   7/3/2013     EUR     70.12
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.427  7/31/2013     EUR     68.11
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.000  8/20/2013     EUR     67.33
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.520  9/30/2013     EUR     67.08
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.500  1/11/2014     EUR     66.21
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.500  5/20/2014     EUR     61.69
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.500   7/1/2014     EUR     62.15
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.985  7/25/2014     EUR     57.60
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.500  8/20/2014     EUR     61.31
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.113  9/30/2014     EUR     58.00
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.700  7/20/2015     EUR     56.83
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.100  8/20/2015     EUR     61.50
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.702  9/30/2015     EUR     57.01
HELLENIC REPUBLI         3.600  7/20/2016     EUR     57.07
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.020  9/13/2016     EUR     57.32
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.225   3/1/2017     EUR     56.03
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.900  4/20/2017     EUR     57.45
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.300  7/20/2017     EUR     52.91
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.675  10/9/2017     EUR     55.01
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.590   4/3/2018     EUR     52.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.014  2/27/2019     EUR     52.10
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.959   3/4/2019     EUR     55.66
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.000  7/19/2019     EUR     53.80
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.161  9/17/2019     EUR     51.63
HELLENIC REPUBLI         6.250  6/19/2020     EUR     54.58
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.700  3/20/2024     EUR     47.14
HELLENIC REPUBLI         5.300  3/20/2026     EUR     47.38
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.500  9/20/2037     EUR     43.80
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.600  9/20/2040     EUR     44.01
HELLENIC REPUBLI         4.600  7/20/2018     EUR     53.08
NATIONAL BK GREE         3.875  10/7/2016     EUR     66.92

IRELAND
-------
AIB MORTGAGE BNK         5.580  4/28/2028     EUR     55.91
AIB MORTGAGE BNK         5.000  2/12/2030     EUR     49.89
AIB MORTGAGE BNK         5.000   3/1/2030     EUR     49.85
ALLIED IRISH BKS         4.000  3/19/2015     EUR     73.83
ALLIED IRISH BKS        10.750  3/29/2017     USD     22.11
ALLIED IRISH BKS        10.750  3/29/2017     EUR     22.17
ALLIED IRISH BKS        12.500  6/25/2019     EUR     24.62
ALLIED IRISH BKS        12.500  6/25/2019     GBP     25.23
ALLIED IRISH BKS        11.500  3/29/2022     GBP     21.95
ALLIED IRISH BKS         7.875   7/5/2023     GBP     25.14
ANGLO IRISH BANK         4.000  4/15/2015     EUR     74.04
BANK OF IRELAND          3.780   4/1/2015     EUR     73.78
BANK OF IRELAND          9.250   9/7/2020     GBP     30.01
BANK OF IRELAND         10.000  2/12/2020     EUR     35.01
BANK OF IRELAND         10.000  2/12/2020     GBP     35.90
BANK OF IRELAND          4.625  2/27/2019     EUR     30.01
BANK OF IRELAND         10.750  6/22/2018     GBP     36.00
BANK OF IRELAND          4.875  1/22/2018     GBP     30.00
BANK OF IRELAND          3.585  4/21/2015     EUR     72.73
BK IRELAND MTGE          5.760   9/7/2029     EUR     53.10
BK IRELAND MTGE          5.450   3/1/2030     EUR     50.20
DEPFA ACS BANK           0.500   3/3/2025     CAD     36.33
DEPFA ACS BANK           5.125  3/16/2037     USD     71.01
DEPFA ACS BANK           5.125  3/16/2037     USD     71.44
EBS BLDG SOCIETY         4.992  3/19/2015     EUR     69.13
EBS BLDG SOCIETY         4.000  2/25/2015     EUR     74.50
IRISH GOVT               4.400  6/18/2019     EUR     66.73
IRISH GOVT               4.600  4/18/2016     EUR     74.75
IRISH GOVT               5.400  3/13/2025     EUR     65.75
IRISH GOVT               4.500  4/18/2020     EUR     65.88
IRISH LIFE & PER         4.625   5/9/2017     EUR     19.65
IRISH LIFE PERM          4.820  3/22/2015     EUR     67.73
IRISH NATIONWIDE         6.250  6/26/2012     GBP     84.25

ITALY
-----
CO BRAONE                4.567  6/30/2037     EUR     73.43
COMUNE DI MILANO         4.019  6/29/2035     EUR     66.37
REP OF ITALY             1.850  9/15/2057     EUR     75.53

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL            7.250   4/1/2014     EUR     28.02
INTL INDUST BANK         9.000   7/6/2011     EUR      7.62
LIGHTHOUSE INTL          8.000  4/30/2014     EUR     38.44
LIGHTHOUSE INTL          8.000  4/30/2014     EUR     38.48

NETHERLANDS
-----------
APP INTL FINANCE        11.750  10/1/2005     USD      0.02
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500  3/29/2021     USD     71.06
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500   3/3/2021     NZD     61.49
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500  5/25/2016     TRY     69.72
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500  3/29/2021     NZD     61.10
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500  6/22/2021     ZAR     47.35
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500  5/12/2021     ZAR     44.12
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500  2/24/2025     CAD     55.34
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500  3/17/2016     TRY     69.79
BK NED GEMEENTEN         0.500  4/27/2016     TRY     69.33
BRIT INSURANCE           6.625  12/9/2030     GBP     65.60
DGS INTL FIN BV         10.000   6/1/2007     USD      0.01
ELEC DE CAR FIN          8.500  4/10/2018     USD     58.59
KPNQWEST BV              8.125   6/1/2009     USD      0.05
NATL INVESTER BK        25.983   5/7/2029     EUR     19.96
NED WATERSCHAPBK         0.500  3/11/2025     CAD     55.82
Q-CELLS INTERNAT         5.750  5/26/2014     EUR     71.55
RBS NV EX-ABN NV         2.910  6/21/2036     JPY     69.63
SIDETUR FINANCE         10.000  4/20/2016     USD     74.60
TJIWI KIMIA FIN         13.250   8/1/2001     USD      0.01

NORWAY
------
EKSPORTFINANS            0.500   5/9/2030     CAD     40.13
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500   3/1/2016     ZAR     73.22
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500  1/27/2016     ZAR     73.68
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500  5/25/2018     ZAR     61.81
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500  5/25/2016     ZAR     71.82
KOMMUNALBANKEN           0.500  3/24/2016     ZAR     72.87
SPAREBANKEN RGLD         4.170  12/7/2035     EUR     74.17

PORTUGAL
--------
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.455  8/20/2017     EUR     71.56
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.750  2/14/2016     EUR     69.06
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         5.380  10/1/2038     EUR     58.40
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         5.980   3/3/2028     EUR     72.25
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         5.320   8/5/2021     EUR     63.05
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.250  1/27/2020     EUR     73.06
CAIXA GERAL DEPO         4.400  10/8/2019     EUR     63.15
COMBOIOS DE PORT         5.700   2/5/2030     EUR     70.25
METRO DE LISBOA          4.061  12/4/2026     EUR     56.90
METRO DE LISBOA          4.799  12/7/2027     EUR     61.06
MONTEPIO GERAL           5.000   2/8/2017     EUR     57.75
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.100  4/15/2037     EUR     59.99
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.450  6/15/2018     EUR     70.24
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.750  6/14/2019     EUR     69.41
PORTUGUESE OT'S          4.800  6/15/2020     EUR     68.48
PORTUGUESE OT'S          3.850  4/15/2021     EUR     63.72
REFER                    4.000  3/16/2015     EUR     65.07

RUSSIA
------
APK ARKADA              17.500  5/23/2012     RUB      0.38
BALTINVESTBANK           9.000  9/10/2015     RUB     75.00
BARENTSEV FINANS        20.000   7/4/2011     RUB      1.10
CB STROYCREDIT           9.500   8/1/2011     RUB     75.00
CREDIT EUROPE BK        11.500  6/28/2011     RUB     75.00
DIPOS                    6.000  6/19/2012     RUB     75.00
DVTG-FINANS             17.000  8/29/2013     RUB      5.20
EESK                     8.740   4/5/2012     RUB     75.00
EMALIANS-FINANS         10.970   7/8/2011     RUB     75.00
FINANCEBUSINESSG        12.500  6/22/2011     RUB     75.00
FINANCEBUSINESSG        10.000   7/1/2013     RUB     75.00
FORMAT                  17.000  12/6/2012     RUB     75.00
GLOBEX BANK              8.100  7/22/2013     RUB    100.60
GSS                      9.250  3/26/2017     RUB     75.00
INVESTTORGBANK           9.500  10/8/2012     RUB    100.60
IZHAVTO                 18.000   6/9/2011     RUB     11.31
KARUSEL FINANS          12.000  9/12/2013     RUB     75.00
KIT FINANCE CAPI        11.000  6/10/2014     RUB     75.00
KOMOS GROUP             13.500  7/21/2011     RUB     75.00
KOSMOS-FINANS           10.200  6/16/2011     RUB     97.51
KRAYINVESTBANK           8.500   8/5/2011     RUB     75.00
LLC VICTORIA FIN         8.000  2/12/2013     RUB     75.00
M-INDUSTRIYA            12.250  8/16/2011     RUB     22.02
MIA                      7.400  7/17/2014     RUB     99.00
MIG-FINANS               0.100   9/6/2011     RUB      1.00
MIRAX                   17.000  9/17/2012     RUB     18.00
MOSCOW BANK R&D          7.000  3/28/2013     RUB     75.00
MOSMART FINANS           0.010  4/12/2012     RUB      1.81
NATIONAL CAPITAL        13.000  9/25/2012     RUB     75.00
NAUKA-SVYAZ             12.500  6/27/2013     RUB     75.00
NOK                     10.000  9/22/2011     RUB     25.02
NOK                     12.500  8/26/2014     RUB      0.04
NOVOROSSIYSK            13.000  12/9/2011     RUB     75.00
PEB LEASING             14.000  9/12/2014     RUB     99.99
PERVYI OBIEDINEO         9.500  6/29/2011     RUB    100.20
PERVYI OBIEDINEO         8.100  4/24/2013     RUB     75.00
PETROCOMMERCE BK         7.750  8/22/2012     RUB     75.00
PROMNESTESERVICE         7.750  12/5/2014     RUB     75.00
RMK PARK PLAZA          10.000   1/8/2013     RUB     75.00
ROSSELKHOZBANK           7.800   2/9/2018     RUB    101.50
RUSSIAN STANDARD         7.750  4/13/2012     RUB    100.30
RVK-FINANS               9.500  7/21/2011     RUB     75.00
SAHO                    10.000  5/21/2012     RUB     60.00
SATURN                   8.500   6/6/2014     RUB     93.00
SENATOR                 10.000  5/18/2012     RUB     90.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS         10.500  3/27/2012     RUB      3.40
SIBIRSKAYA AGRAR        17.000  9/12/2012     RUB    105.00
SIBUR                    7.300  3/13/2015     RUB     75.00
SIBUR                    8.000  3/13/2015     RUB     75.00
SIBUR                    9.250  3/13/2015     RUB     75.00
SIBUR                   13.500  3/13/2015     RUB     75.00
SINERGIA                 8.000  8/18/2014     RUB     75.00
SISTEMA-HALS             8.500  4/15/2014     RUB     75.00
SISTEMA-HALS             8.500   4/8/2014     RUB     75.00
SVOBODNY SOKOL           0.100  5/24/2011     RUB     70.00
TECHNONICOL-FINA        13.500  9/11/2013     RUB     75.00
TECHNONICOL-FINA        13.500   3/7/2012     RUB     75.00
TECHNONICOL-FINA        13.000  9/25/2013     RUB     75.00
TECHNONICOL-FINA        13.000  9/19/2013     RUB     75.00
TEKHNOPROMPROEKT         8.500  9/28/2016     RUB     75.00
TERNA-FINANS             1.000  11/4/2011     RUB      3.00
TGK-4                    8.000  5/31/2012     RUB     75.00
TRANSFIN-M              14.000  7/10/2014     RUB     75.00
TRANSFIN-M               9.750  8/13/2013     RUB     75.00
TRANSFIN-M               9.750  8/13/2013     RUB     75.00
UNIMILK FINANS          14.000   9/6/2011     RUB    100.01
UNITAIL                 12.000  6/22/2011     RUB     75.00
VTB 24                   4.500   2/5/2013     RUB     75.01
VTB NAT MTGE AGE        10.500  2/26/2039     RUB     75.00
ZAO EUROPLAN            10.000  8/11/2011     RUB     75.00
ZHILSOTSIPOTEKA-         9.000  7/26/2011     RUB     75.00


SPAIN
-----
AYT CEDULAS CAJA         4.750  5/25/2027     EUR     73.27
AYT CEDULAS CAJA         3.750  6/30/2025     EUR     65.86
AYUNTAM DE MADRD         4.550  6/16/2036     EUR     68.55
BANCAJA                  1.500  5/22/2018     EUR     65.20
BANCO PASTOR             4.550  7/31/2020     EUR     73.15
CAJA CASTIL-MAN          1.500  6/23/2021     EUR     63.24
CAJA MADRID              5.755  2/26/2028     EUR     74.34
CAJA MADRID              4.125  3/24/2036     EUR     66.79
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO         3.875  5/23/2025     EUR     67.13
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO         4.250  4/10/2031     EUR     62.43
CEDULAS TDA A-5          4.250  3/28/2027     EUR     67.26
COMUNIDAD ARAGON         4.646  7/11/2036     EUR     71.71
COMUNIDAD MADRID         4.300  9/15/2026     EUR     69.69
GEN DE CATALUNYA         5.219  9/10/2029     EUR     74.78
GEN DE CATALUNYA         4.220  4/26/2035     EUR     67.23
GENERAL DE ALQUI         2.750  8/20/2012     EUR     72.30
INSTITUT CATALA          4.250  6/15/2024     EUR     72.71
JUNTA ANDALUCIA          5.150  5/24/2034     EUR     73.10
JUNTA LA MANCHA          3.875  1/31/2036     EUR     55.62

SWEDEN
------
SWEDISH EXP CRED         2.000  12/7/2011     USD     10.23
SWEDISH EXP CRED         8.000  11/4/2011     USD      7.76
SWEDISH EXP CRED         9.000  8/28/2011     USD     10.58
SWEDISH EXP CRED         9.000  8/12/2011     USD     10.20
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500  6/29/2016     TRY     70.15
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500  6/14/2016     ZAR     71.51
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500   3/3/2016     ZAR     70.69
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500   3/5/2018     AUD     69.73
SWEDISH EXP CRED         0.500  1/25/2028     USD     50.30
SWEDISH EXP CRED         9.250  4/27/2012     USD      9.66
SWEDISH EXP CRED         9.750  3/23/2012     USD     10.00
SWEDISH EXP CRED         7.000   3/9/2012     USD      9.88
SWEDISH EXP CRED         7.500  2/28/2012     USD      9.82
SWEDISH EXP CRED         8.000  1/27/2012     USD      9.64
SWEDISH EXP CRED         6.500  1/27/2012     USD      9.17
SWEDISH EXP CRED         2.130  1/10/2012     USD     10.07
SWEDISH EXP CRED         7.000   3/9/2012     USD     10.30

SWITZERLAND
-----------
UBS AG                  10.530  1/23/2012     USD     39.91
UBS AG                   8.720  3/20/2012     USD     32.30
UBS AG                   9.250  3/20/2012     USD     14.58
UBS AG                  10.070  3/23/2012     USD     36.44
UBS AG                  13.300  5/23/2012     USD      4.11
UBS AG                  13.700  5/23/2012     USD     13.09
UBS AG                  10.580  6/29/2011     USD     39.36
UBS AG JERSEY            3.220  7/31/2012     EUR     48.51
UBS AG JERSEY           10.500  6/16/2011     USD     71.69
UBS AG JERSEY           13.000  6/16/2011     USD     49.96
UBS AG JERSEY           11.150  8/31/2011     USD     39.02

UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
BANK NADRA               8.000  6/22/2017     USD     75.11
BANK OF SCOTLAND         5.772   2/7/2035     EUR     73.02
BARCLAYS BK PLC         10.650  1/31/2012     USD     45.65
BARCLAYS BK PLC         12.950  4/20/2012     USD     23.90
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.400  7/31/2012     USD     11.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC         10.800  7/31/2012     USD     27.52
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.250  8/31/2012     USD     35.47
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.500  8/31/2012     USD     29.53
BARCLAYS BK PLC          2.500  5/24/2017     USD     10.47
BARCLAYS BK PLC         10.600  7/21/2011     USD     39.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          7.500  9/22/2011     USD     17.05
BARCLAYS BK PLC          8.750  9/22/2011     USD     73.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          8.800  9/22/2011     USD     16.39
BARCLAYS BK PLC          9.250  1/31/2012     USD      9.64
BRADFORD&BIN BLD         5.500  1/15/2018     GBP     48.50
CO-OPERATIVE BNK         5.875  3/28/2033     GBP     72.35
EFG HELLAS PLC           5.400  11/2/2047     EUR     29.63
EFG HELLAS PLC           6.010   1/9/2036     EUR     31.50
ESPRIT TELECOM          10.875  6/15/2008     USD      0.01
HEALTHCARE SUPP          2.067  2/19/2043     GBP     72.88
MAX PETROLEUM            6.750   9/8/2013     USD     52.69
NORTHERN ROCK            5.750  2/28/2017     GBP     74.00
PUNCH TAVERNS            6.468  4/15/2033     GBP     55.01
PUNCH TAVERNS            8.374  7/15/2029     GBP     63.11
PUNCH TAVERNS            7.567  4/15/2026     GBP     64.85
ROYAL BK SCOTLND         6.316  6/29/2030     EUR     66.40
RSL COMM PLC            12.000  11/1/2008     USD      1.88
SKIPTON BUILDING         6.750  5/30/2022     GBP     71.50
SKIPTON BUILDING         5.625  1/18/2018     GBP     78.16
UNIQUE PUB FIN           6.464  3/30/2032     GBP     65.18
WESSEX WATER FIN         1.369  7/31/2057     GBP     31.51


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *