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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Wednesday, June 8, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 112

                            Headlines



A U S T R I A

JOWOOD ENTERTAINMENT: Wingefors Mulls Acquisition of Firm


B E L A R U S

BELARUSIAN NAT'L: S&P Cuts LT Counterparty Credit Rating to 'B'


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

SAZKA AS: Panel With Ability to Remove CEO Ales Husak Falls Apart


D E N M A R K

AMAGERBANKEN: EU Commission Temporarily Approves Rescue Aid
EIK BANK: European Commission Approves Liquidation Aid


G E R M A N Y

QIMONDA AG: US$11.75MM Settlement With G2 Technology Approved


G R E E C E

ALPHA BANK: Moody's Cuts Ratings of Covered Bonds to 'Ba3'
ARIADNE SA: Moody's Junks Ratings on Notes to 'Caa1' From 'B1'
NAT'L BANK OF GREECE: Moody's Downgrades Debt Rating to 'B3'
RIDENCO COMMERCIAL: Negotiations with Creditors Ongoing


I C E L A N D

KAUPTHING BANK: Sells US$181-Mil. Lehman Claim to Alandsbanken


I R E L A N D

BANK OF IRELAND: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Junior Securities to 'C'
IRISH LIFE: S&P Cuts Rating on Lower Tier 2 Debt to 'D'
TBS INTERNATIONAL: Joseph Royce Owns 42.6% of Class A Shares
TBS INTERNATIONAL: Gregg McNelis Holds 15.6% of Class A Shares


I T A L Y

MELIORBANCA SPA: Moody's Withdraws 'D' Bank Finc'l Strength Rating
PARMALAT SPA: Bondi Seeks Remand of Grant Thornton Suits to Ill.
PARMALAT SPA: Founder Jailed After Conviction in Market Abuse Case


N E T H E R L A N D S

LUNAR FUNDING: Moody's Upgrades Rating on EUR10MM Notes to 'Ba1'
NIBC BANK: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Debt Securities to 'Ba2 (hyb)'
SULFINDO: Fitch Withdraws 'B(exp)' Rating on Senior Notes


R O M A N I A

ATLAS TELECOM: Goes Insolvent; Has Over EUR70MM Debt
ILEFOR: Declared Insolvent; Administrator Appointed


R U S S I A

SAMARA OBLAST: S&P Affirms Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating at 'BB+'


S W E D E N

QUINN INVESTMENTS: KPMG Seeks to Install Receiver for Sweden Firm


S P A I N

FONDO DE TITULIZACION: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'D'
* SPAIN: May Offer Asset Protection Schemes for Bank Takeovers


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M\

BORDERS UK: More than 200 Former Workers to Get 90-day Pay Award
DONALDSON & MCCONNELL: Goes Into Administration, Axes 102 Jobs
GEORGINA GOODMA: Goes Into Administration, Seeks Buyer
HMV GROUP: Executes New GBP220MM Refinancing Deal with Lenders
IMJACK PLC: June 16 Meeting Scheduled to Approve CVA Terms

LEEK FINANCE: S&P Withdraws Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
SOUTHERN CROSS: Landlords Mull Orderly Wind-Down
SPRINGSBOARD LTD: In Liquidation; Closes Community Center
VEDANTA RESOURCES: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Ratings to New Bonds


                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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JOWOOD ENTERTAINMENT: Wingefors Mulls Acquisition of Firm
--------------------------------------------------------
According to Bloomberg News' Zoe Schneeweiss, Austria Press
Agency, citing JoWooD Entertainment AG's insolvency supervisor
Helmut Platzgummer, reported that Wingefors Invest AB is acquiring
JoWood.

JoWooD Entertainment was founded in 1995, and is the publisher of
titles such as the Painkiller, Spellforce and Gothic series.  The
company is based in Austria.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 11,
2011, JoWooD applied for a procedure of capital reorganization at
the Commercial Court Vienna in accordance with Art. 167 IO/
Insolvency Statute.

                  About JoWood Entertainment

Based in Austria, JoWooD Entertainment AG --
http://corporate.jowood.com/-- formerly JoWooD Productions
Software AG, develops and distributes computer/video games and
entertainment software on a global basis.  The publisher is best
known for titles such as Arcania Gothic 4 and Torchlight.


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B E L A R U S
=============


BELARUSIAN NAT'L: S&P Cuts LT Counterparty Credit Rating to 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
counterparty credit and insurer financial strength ratings on
Belarusian National Reinsurance Organization (Belarus Re) to 'B'
from 'B+' and placed them on CreditWatch with negative
implications following a similar rating action on the Republic of
Belarus.

"The downgrading of Belarus Re and the CreditWatch placements
follow our rating actions on the sovereign local and foreign
currency ratings on the Republic of Belarus (see 'Belarus Ratings
Placed On CreditWatch Negative On Financing Uncertainty; Long-Term
Local Currency Rating Lowered To 'B',' published on May 27, 2011).
It also reflects our concerns regarding the financial stability of
the Belarusian banking sector due to the current macroeconomic
situation and an economic downturn in Belarus. Almost 90% of
Belarus Re's investments are placed in Belarusian government-owned
banks," S&P stated.

"In line with our methodology, we would not normally assign
domestic insurers a rating higher than the local currency rating
on the sovereign in which they are domiciled," according to S&P.

"The rating on Belarus Re reflects its stand-alone credit profile.
We believe that the possibility of extraordinary government
support in case of need is currently limited, given that rising
general government debt and decreasing fiscal flexibility has
harmed the sovereign's creditworthiness. However, in accordance
with our criteria for government-related entities, we continue to
assess Belarus Re's role in the Belarusian economy as 'important,'
because it enjoys a monopoly position in the Belarus insurance
market as the sole provider of reinsurance protection. We also
consider Belarus Re's link with the Belarusian government as 'very
strong' because the government owns 100% of Belarus Re via the
Belarusian Ministry of Finance," S&P noted.

The Belarusian ruble (BYR) to the U.S. dollar rate was devalued to
4930 on May 24, 2011, from 3155 the day before. The devaluation
significantly heightens immediate liquidity and more-prolonged
credit risks for the banking sector.

Belarus Re's choice of investments is limited under Belarusian
law. In 2010, its investment portfolio consisted mainly of
deposits at government-owned banks (86%) and bonds (2%) issued by
government-owned banks. Belarus Re placed 12% of the deposits with
BPS-Bank which is owned by the Savings Bank of the Russian
Federation (Sberbank; not rated). "We believe the current risks in
the banking sector could weaken the quality of Belarus Re's
investment portfolio," S&P stated.

The ratings on Belarus Re continue to reflect Standard & Poor's
view of the high economic and industry risks of operating in the
Republic of Belarus. These rating constraints are offset by
Belarus Re's adequate capitalization; competitive advantages from
its monopoly position in Belarus' reinsurance market; significant
regulatory authority stipulated by legislation; and marginal
operating results.

S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch placement within three months,
once the CreditWatch on the sovereign has been resolved.

"Further rating actions on Belarus Re could result from changes to
the local currency sovereign credit ratings on Belarus--if we
lowered the local currency sovereign credit rating on Belarus
further, we would likely take a similar rating action on Belarus
Re," S&P noted.

If the sovereign ratings are affirmed at the current level,
Belarus Re's ratings will likely be affirmed as a consequence.


===========================
C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
===========================


SAZKA AS: Panel With Ability to Remove CEO Ales Husak Falls Apart
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CTK, citing Hospodarske noviny, reports that the hopes of Sazka
creditors and insolvency administrator Josef Cupka to remove Sazka
CEO Ales Husak have fallen through as the board of directors has
virtually ceased to exist.

CTK relates that HN said only the board of directors can remove
Mr. Husak during bankruptcy proceedings in line with the company's
articles of association.

According to CTK, HN said that out of the original seven members
of the board, three have remained and another three would be
needed to make a quorum and possibly remove Mr. Husak from his
current post.

CTK notes that server iDNES.cz said Mr. Husak is the only person
left on the Sazka board.  The information was confirmed for CTK by
the insolvency administrator's spokesperson spokeswoman Lenka
Ticha.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, CTK related
that Sazka's bankruptcy took effect on May 30.  The decision on
Sazka's bankruptcy was made at a meeting of its creditors on May
27, CTK disclosed.  Under bankruptcy, the Sazka board of directors
loses its right to handle the company's assets, which will now be
administered by an insolvency administrator, CTK noted.  Sazka's
management wants to turn to court to defend itself against the
decision on bankruptcy, CTK said.

Sazka AS is a provider of lotteries and sport betting games in the
Czech Republic.


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D E N M A R K
=============


AMAGERBANKEN: EU Commission Temporarily Approves Rescue Aid
-----------------------------------------------------------
The European Commission has granted temporary approval, under EU
State aid rules, to Danish support towards the liquidation of
Amagerbanken, which was declared bankrupt in February 2011.  The
aid is limited to what is necessary to facilitate an orderly
wind-up of the Amagerbanken, the country's 8th largest bank, which
has been in trouble since it was severely hit by the 2008
financial crisis.

The liquidation of the bank is being carried out in accordance
with the Danish scheme for winding-up financial institutions in
distress.  The plan involves measures that require swift
Commission approval, which is being granted provisionally.

The Commission found that the measures, comprising a conditional
agreement on the transfer of assets and certain liabilities, a
liquidity facility agreement and a subordinated loan, are
temporarily compatible with Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union as set out in the Commission's
guidance on aid for banks during the crisis.  Those guidelines
provide that a state aid should be proportionate to the objective,
well targeted and limited to the minimum necessary.  This is the
case for Amagerbanken.

Another criteria is that the private sector should contribute to
the state aid effort.  In that case, the bank, its shareholders
and its subordinated debt holders are contributing sufficiently.
Finally, measures will be taken to limit the negative spill-over
effects for other competitors.  The measures in favor of
Amagerbanken are approved for six months or, if the Danish
authorities submit a wind-up plan within six months, until the
Commission has adopted a final decision on that plan.

                         About Amagerbanken

Amagerbanken, the 8th largest bank in Denmark, was hit in 2008 by
the financial crisis and needed to refinance it on the market, in
order to balance necessary asset write-downs.  After continuous
unsuccessful efforts to obtain new financing or to find other
solutions, Amagerbanken was declared bankrupt on February 7, 2011.
Previously, February 6, 2011, Amagerbanken had entered into a
conditional transfer agreement with the Danish publicly owned
Financial Stability Company (FSC), as part of the Danish bank
wind-up scheme.

The activities of Amagerbanken will be wound up in accordance with
the scheme, whereby all assets and certain liabilities have been
transferred to Amagerbanken as 2011 A/S, the "New Bank", which is
owned by the FSC.  These assets transferred to the New Bank will
be either sold or wound-down.

In September 2010, the Commission authorized a resolution scheme
for the handling of distressed banks in Denmark.  In total, four
banks are going or have gone through this liquidation in Denmark:
Roskilde, Fionia, EIK and Amagerbanken.


EIK BANK: European Commission Approves Liquidation Aid
------------------------------------------------------
The European Commission has cleared under EU State aid rules the
Danish support towards the liquidation of Eik Bank, as it provided
for an orderly wind-up of the bank and foresees sufficient
safeguards to limit distortions of competition.  The bank, which
until 2010 was the biggest financial institution in the Faroe
Island with significant retail and corporate banking activities in
the rest of Denmark, came into severe liquidity and solvency
difficulties due to excessive lending in risky projects and
entered into an agreement with the Danish scheme for the winding-
up of financial institutions in distress.

As part of the winding up agreement, some activities were offered
for sale in a public tender while others were transferred to the
publicly owned Danish Financial Stability Company in order to be
either sold or liquidated.  Denmark's declared objective is that
the liquidation will be finalized within a maximum of five years.

The winding-up of Eik Bank is being carried out in line with the
general principles of the Danish guarantee scheme authorized by
the Commission on October 10, 2008.

The Commission found that the liquidation support measures,
comprising asset and liability transfers, liquidity facility
agreements, credit facilities, capital injections and a loss
guarantee, are compatible with the internal market pursuant to
Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union as set out in the Commission's guidelines on aid measures
for the restructuring of banks during the crisis.  In particular,
the aid is limited to what is necessary to carry out an orderly
wind-up of the bank.  Moreover, the fact that the parts of the
bank which are not sold will not pursue any new activities but
merely phase out the ongoing operations will limit potential
distortions of competition.

                           Background

Until September 2010, Eik Banki P/F was the first bank on Faroe
Island, with 50% market share and a fully owned subsidiary, Eik
Bank Danmark A/S, registered in Copenhagen.  In summer 2010, both
Eik Banki P/F and Eik Bank Danmark A/S had to face severe
liquidity and solvency problems due to excessive lending in some
risky real estate projects.  Not being able to raise the necessary
additional capital required by the Danish Financial supervisory
authority, the banks entered into a winding up agreement with the
FSC on September 30 of last year.


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G E R M A N Y
=============


QIMONDA AG: US$11.75MM Settlement With G2 Technology Approved
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Rochelle, the bankruptcy columnist for Bloomberg News,
reports that Qimonda North America Corp. received no objections to
the proposed settlement where G2 Technology Inc. will pay US$11.75
million for the release of claims arising from an alleged breach
of contract.

Mr. Rochelle recounts that following the Chapter 11 filing in
February 2009, Qimonda initiated an arbitration against G2,
seeking US$8.4 million.  The creditors' committee took over and
prosecuted the arbitration.  The arbitrator awarded Qimonda the
full amount sought plus pre-judgment interest.  The total award
worked out to US$12.27 million.  G2 agreed to settle and pay
US$11.75 million.

                          About Qimonda AG

Qimonda AG (NYSE: QI) -- http://www.qimonda.com/-- is a leading
global memory supplier with a diversified DRAM product portfolio.
The Company generated net sales of EUR1.79 billion in financial
year 2008 and had -- prior to its announcement of a repositioning
of its business -- approximately 12,200 employees worldwide, of
which 1,400 were in Munich, 3,200 in Dresden and 2,800 in
Richmond, Va.

Qimonda AG commenced insolvency proceedings in a local court in
Munich, Germany, on Jan. 23, 2009.  On June 15, 2009, QAG filed
a petition (Bankr. E.D. Va. Case No. 09-14766) for relief under
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

Qimonda North America Corp., an indirect and wholly owned
subsidiary of QAG, is the North American sales and marketing
subsidiary of QAG.  QNA is also the parent company of Qimonda
Richmond LLC.  QNA and QR sought Chapter 11 protection (Bankr.
D. Del. Case No. 09-10589) on Feb. 20, 2009.  Mark D. Collins,
Esq., Michael J. Merchant, Esq., and Maris J. Finnegan, Esq.,
at Richards Layton & Finger PA, represent the Debtors.
Roberta A. DeAngelis, the United States Trustee for Region 3,
appointed seven creditors to serve on an official committee of
unsecured creditors.  Jones Day and Ashby & Geddes represent the
Committee.  In its bankruptcy petition, Qimonda Richmond, LLC,
estimated more than US$1 billion in assets and debts.  The
information, the Debtors said, was based on Qimonda Richmond's
financial records which are maintained on a consolidated basis
with Qimonda North America Corp.


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G R E E C E
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ALPHA BANK: Moody's Cuts Ratings of Covered Bonds to 'Ba3'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken these rating actions on
covered bonds issued by Greek banks:

- Covered bonds issued by Alpha Bank A.E. (Alpha) under its Direct
  Issuance Covered Bond Programme (Alpha Direct Issuance CB):
  downgraded to Ba3 on review for possible downgrade; previously
  on 12 May 2011, Baa3 placed on review for possible downgrade;

- Mortgage covered bonds issued by EFG Eurobank Ergasias S.A.
  under its EUR5 billion Covered Bond Programme (EFG CB I):
  downgraded to Ba3 on review for possible downgrade; previously
  on 17 December 2010, Baa3 placed on review for possible
  downgrade;

- Mortgage covered bonds issued by Eurobank EFG under its EUR3
  billion Global Covered Bond Programme (EFG CB II): downgraded to
  Ba3 on review for possible downgrade; previously on 17 December
  2010, Baa3 placed on review for possible downgrade;

- Covered bonds issued by National Bank of Greece S.A. (NBG) under
  its Global Covered Bond Programme (NBG CB I): downgraded to Ba3
  on review for possible downgrade; previously on 17 December
  2010, Baa3 placed on review for possible downgrade;

- Covered bonds issued by NBG under its Covered Bond Programme II
  (NBG CB II): downgraded to Ba3 on review for possible downgrade;
  previously on 12 May 2011, Baa3 placed on review for possible
  downgrade.

All covered bonds remain on review for possible downgrade. The
timely payment indicators (TPIs) are "Improbable" for Alpha Direct
Issuance CB, EFG CB I, EFG CB II and NBG CB II and "Very
Improbable" for NBG CB I.

                       Ratings Rationale

The rating actions are prompted by the downgrades of the sovereign
rating of Greece to Caa1 from B1 on review for possible downgrade
on 1 June 2011 and the relevant issuer ratings on 3 June 2011. The
issuer ratings downgrades were:

- Alpha Bank: downgraded to B3 from Ba3 on review for possible
  downgrade;

- Eurobank EFG: downgraded to B3 from Ba3 on review for possible
  downgrade; and

- National Bank of Greece: downgraded to B3 from Ba3 on review for
  possible downgrade.

Following the downgrades of the issuers to B3, Moody's has lowered
the covered bond ratings in line with the TPI framework. With a
TPI of Improbable, the covered bonds would be capped at Ba2; with
a TPI of Very Improbable, the cap is Ba3. For the ratings of deals
with TPIs of Improbable, the TPI framework may suggest that a Ba2
rating is achievable. However, given the uncertainties reflected
in the sovereign rating of Caa1, Moody's has limited the rating of
the covered bonds to Ba3.

The ratings assigned to all covered bonds remain on review whilst
Moody's reviews certain aspects of its expected loss modelling.
During this review, Moody's will consider the appropriate stresses
that should be applied when exceeding a sovereign rating by up to
four notches (for details of such stresses, see Moody's Special
Report "Assessing the Impact of the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis
on Structured Finance Transactions" published April 2011). If the
updated expected loss modelling leads to results lower than the
currently assigned ratings, the covered bonds may be downgraded
further.

The current ratings assigned to the existing covered bonds of the
above programs can be expected to be assigned to all subsequent
covered bonds issued under the relevant program and any future
rating actions are expected to affect all covered bonds issued
under the program. If there are any exceptions to this, Moody's
will in each case publish details in a separate press release.

The rating assigned by Moody's addresses the expected loss posed
to investors. Moody's ratings address only the credit risks
associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.

                 Key Rating Assumptions/Factors

Covered bond ratings are determined after applying a two-step
process: an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework analysis.

EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's determines a rating based on the expected
loss on the bond. The primary model used is Moody's Covered Bond
Model (COBOL) which determines expected loss as a function of the
issuer's probability of default, measured by the issuer's senior
unsecured rating, and the stressed losses on the cover pool assets
following issuer default.

TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a "timely payment indicator" (TPI)
which indicates the likelihood that timely payment will be made to
covered bondholders following issuer default. The effect of the
TPI framework is to limit the covered bond rating to a certain
number of notches above the issuer's rating.

                     Sensitivity Analysis

The robustness of a covered bond rating largely depends on the
credit strength of the issuer.

The number of notches by which the issuer's rating may be
downgraded before the covered bonds are downgraded under the TPI
framework is measured by the TPI Leeway. The ratings of all Greek
covered bonds have been lowered to Ba3, which represents the
lowest point in the TPI table. Covered bonds of issuers rated
below B3 are not subject to restriction due to the TPI.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain limited circumstances. Some examples might be (i) a
sovereign downgrade negatively affecting both the issuer's senior
unsecured rating and the TPI; (ii) a multiple-notch downgrade of
the issuer; or (iii) a material reduction in the cover pool's
value.

For further details on TPI Leeway across all covered bond programs
rated by Moody's, please refer to "Moody's EMEA Covered Bonds
Monitoring Overview", published quarterly. These figures are based
on the reporting by the issuer and are subject to change over
time.

The principal methodology used for these ratings is Moody's
Approach to Rating Covered Bonds published in March 2010.


ARIADNE SA: Moody's Junks Ratings on Notes to 'Caa1' From 'B1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Caa1 (sf) from B1 (sf)
the ratings of the notes issued by Ariadne S.A. and Titlos plc.
Ariadne and Titlos are two asset-backed transactions sponsored by
the government of Greece. The downgrades follow Moody's downgrade
to Caa1 from B1 of the Greek government bonds ratings on June 1,
2011.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Ariadne

Moody's methodology for rating this transaction is primarily based
on the effective guarantee of the Greek government rather than on
the value of the lottery receivables backing the notes. Moody's
rating analysis also considers the benefit of the non-amortizing
liquidity reserve. However, as of the latest reporting date
(January 2011) that reserve had decreased to EUR5.7 Million
against a target of EUR10 Million.

Titlos

Moody's methodology for rating this transaction considers a full
linkage to the rating of Greece. The ratings of the notes issued
by Titlos are fully linked to the credit quality of the Greek
government and, in addition, are also exposed to that of the
National Bank of Greece (NBG) in its capacity as swap
counterparty, cash manager, and account bank. The transaction is
the securitization of a swap agreement (the Hellenic Swap) that
relies on payments by the Greek government. Titlos has also
entered into two swaps with NBG (the NBG swaps) to match payments
coming from the Hellenic Swap with payments required under the
notes.

Methodologies and factors that may have been considered in the
process of rating these notes are available on
http://www.moodys.comin the Rating Methodologies sub-directory
under the Research & Ratings tab.

List of rating actions

Issuer: Ariadne S.A. Secured Notes

   -- EUR650M A Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on May
      10, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Titlos plc

   -- EUR5100M A Certificate, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously
      on May 10, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of these
transactions in the past six months.


NAT'L BANK OF GREECE: Moody's Downgrades Debt Rating to 'B3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the deposit and senior debt
ratings of these eight Greek banks:

* National Bank of Greece SA (NBG), to B3 from Ba3

* EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA (Eurobank), to B3 from Ba3

* Alpha Bank AE (Alpha), to B3 from Ba3

* Piraeus Bank SA (Piraeus), to B3 from Ba3

* Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE), to B3 from B1

* Attica Bank SA, to B3 from B1

* Emporiki Bank of Greece (Emporiki) to B1 from Baa3

* General Bank of Greece (Geniki) to B1 from Baa3

These actions follow Moody's downgrade of Greece's sovereign
rating to Caa1 from B1. All of the banks' deposit and debt ratings
carry a negative outlook, in line with the negative outlook on the
sovereign debt ratings.

The rating actions conclude the review for possible downgrade
Moody's initiated on May 10, 2011.

                      Ratings Rationale

The main factors driving the rating actions on domestically owned
Greek banks are as follows:

1. The rising likelihood of a sovereign debt restructuring, which
   is reflected in the rating action on the Greek sovereign.

2. The high default correlation between Greece and Greek banks. In
   the adverse scenario of a sovereign debt restructuring, Greek
   banks would be directly impacted via: (1) a reduction in the
   value of their Greek government bond (GGB) portfolios, which
   would significantly weaken their capitalization metrics; (2)
   the erosion of their funding sources owing to a potential
   acceleration in deposit withdrawals and uncertainties regarding
   continued access to European Central Bank (ECB) liquidity; and
   (3) the deterioration of already weakened asset quality under
   increasingly adverse economic conditions.

3. Potential for continued support from the European Commission,
   ECB and IMF. Offsetting these factors, the rating action also
   takes into account the possibility that the three
   intergovernmental bodies assisting Greece (together known as
   the Troika) will extend support to Greek banks in the event of
   a sovereign debt restructuring.

Rising likelihood of sovereign debt restructuring

The principal trigger for the action is Moody's decision on
June 1, 2011 to downgrade Greece's local and foreign currency bond
ratings to Caa1, from B1, and assign a negative outlook to those
ratings. The downgrade of the sovereign reflects the increased
risk that Greece will fail to stabilize its debt position, without
a debt restructuring, in light of (1) the ever-increasing scale of
the implementation challenges facing the government, (2) the
country's highly uncertain growth prospects and (3) a track record
of underperformance against budget consolidation targets. The
rating action also reflects the increased likelihood that the
Troika will, at some point in the future, require the
participation of private creditors in a debt restructuring as a
precondition for funding support. Taken together, these risks
imply at least an even chance of default over the rating horizon.
To put Greece's ratings in perspective, over a five-year horizons
on average about 50% of sovereigns, non-financial corporates and
financial institutions rated Caa1 by Moody's have consistently met
their debt service requirements on a timely basis, while about 50%
have defaulted.

    High default correlation between Greece and Greek banks

Within this context, the banking rating actions signal the
increasing convergence of default risks between the Greek
government and the standalone financial strength of Greek banks
via three key risk transmission channels:

(1) Direct exposures to GGBs for all rated domestically owned
    Greek banks are high, ranging from approximately 50% to 330%
    of Tier 1 capital, and amount to a direct and immediate
    channel of risk transfer. In a sovereign debt restructuring
    with a significant haircut, all of these exposures are
    material enough to severely damage the capitalization levels
    of domestically owned Greek banks.

(2) Under a scenario of sovereign debt restructuring, loss of
    market confidence would likely trigger an acceleration in
    deposit outflows and potential loss in access to ECB repo
    funding, which currently finances approximately 20% of the
    sector's asset base. Private-sector deposits in the Greek
    banking system declined by EUR6.6 billion, or 2.8% of total
    deposits, in the first quarter of 2011. Although some
    withdrawals in recent months could be seasonal in nature,
    Moody's notes that the deposit base has decreased by 17% since
    the beginning of 2010. Accelerated deposit outflows, driven by
    contagion effects that would likely override any
    differentiation among banks based on their exact direct
    exposure levels, would trigger an increased need for ECB
    liquidity at a time when access to such funding may not remain
    intact.

(3) Further deterioration in Greece's economic outlook, which we
    would expect under a sovereign debt restructuring, would exert
    longer-term pressure on the banking sector's already weakened
    asset quality and profitability metrics. Specifically, a
    dampening of growth--leading to higher unemployment, reduced
    consumer disposable income and weakened corporate
    profitability--would aggravate the upward trend in non-
    performing loans that began in 2008, and absorb an elevated
    proportion of the banks' pre-provision earnings.

Potential for continued support from the Troika

While revising downward its ratings on Greek banks, Moody's also
recognizes the continued potential for the Troika to extend
systemic support to the Greek banks in the event of a sovereign
debt restructuring. Moody's view of potential support reflects the
balance of incentives facing the European authorities.

On the one hand, they have a strong incentive to try to avoid the
highly destabilizing impact of systemic Greek banking defaults on
both the domestic economy and European capital markets. The
immediate impact of default would, moreover, fall directly on the
ECB, which is the Greek banking system's largest single creditor
holding about 20% of the system's liabilities.

On the other hand, there is a clear desire on the part of the
European authorities to avoid providing further support to
European banking systems, given: (1) the potentially very sizeable
exposure such action could result in should the banks face a
sustained loss of deposits; and (2) the precedent such action
would set for banks in other weak Eurozone Member States.

The balance of judgment between these considerations is reflected
in the one notch of uplift in the senior debt and deposit ratings
of the domestically owned banks compared to their standalone
credit strength, leading to the banks being rated one notch higher
than the Greek debt rating.

                    Foreign-Owned Subsidiaries

The main triggers for the rating actions on foreign-owned banks --
Emporiki Bank of Greece (majority owned by Credit Agricole SA
(Aa1/C+)) and General Bank of Greece SA (majority owned by Societe
Generale (Aa2/C+)) -- are similar to those of the domestically
owned banks, but with different weightings to the credit drivers.
These banks maintain relatively low direct exposures to GGBs
compared to system averages, and that they do not depend on ECB
funding; nevertheless, these banks display very weak asset quality
indicators relative to other rated Greek banks and have been loss-
making since 2008, rendering them vulnerable to further
deterioration in the operating environment. Furthermore, in the
event of a sovereign debt restructuring, a loss in market
confidence and contagion would likely also impact these banks in
terms of deposit outflows. Accordingly, in the current situation,
Moody's considers the standalone credit strength of these banks to
be in line with that of the domestically owned banks.

Nevertheless, the deposit and debt ratings of Emporiki and Geniki
continue to receive significant uplift from Moody's assessment of
a very high probability of capital and liquidity support from
their French parents, if necessary. The parents continue to
provide strong support in an increasingly uncertain and difficult
operating environment, which is reflected in these banks' deposit
and senior debt ratings being three notches above the Greek
sovereign's debt rating.

   Removal of Systemic Support from Subordinated Debt Ratings

Moody's considers it unlikely that, if required, the external
support incorporated in the deposit and senior debt ratings of
Greek banks would be extended to subordinated debt holders. This
reflects policies already enacted by certain European governments
to move away from full creditor protection in favor of market
discipline. Accordingly, in line with these developments, Moody's
is no longer incorporating systemic support in the subordinated
debt ratings of Greek banks, which are now notched off the banks'
standalone financial strength ratings (adjusted for parental
support in the case of the French-owned banks).

The Specific Rating Changes Implemented Are:

National Bank of Greece SA, NBG Finance plc, and National Bank of
Greece Funding Limited:

  - Bank financial strength rating (BFSR) downgraded to E, mapping
    into a BCA of Caa1

  - Long-term deposit ratings and senior unsecured debt ratings
    downgraded to B3 from Ba3

  - Subordinated debt ratings downgraded to Caa2 from B1

  - Backed (government-guaranteed) senior unsecured ratings
    downgraded to B3 from Ba3

  - Preferred stock (Hybrid Tier 1) downgraded to Ca (hyb) from B3
    (hyb)

  All the above ratings, with the exception of the BFSR, carry a
  negative outlook

EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA, EFG Hellas plc, EFG Hellas (Cayman
Islands) Limited, and EFG Hellas Funding Limited:

  - BFSR downgraded to E, mapping into a BCA of Caa1

  - Long-term deposit ratings and senior unsecured debt ratings
    downgraded to B3 from Ba3

  - Subordinated debt ratings downgraded to Caa2 from B1

  - Backed (government-guaranteed) senior unsecured MTN downgraded
    to B3 from Ba3

  - Preferred stock (Hybrid Tier 1) downgraded to Ca (hyb) from
    Caa1 (hyb)

  All the above ratings, with the exception of the BFSR, carry a
  negative outlook

Alpha Bank AE, Alpha Credit Group plc and Alpha Group Jersey
Limited:

  - BFSR downgraded to E, mapping into a BCA of Caa1

  - Long-term deposit ratings and senior unsecured debt ratings
    downgraded to B3 from Ba3

  - Subordinated debt ratings downgraded to Caa2 from B1

  - Backed (government-guaranteed) senior unsecured ratings
    downgraded to B3 from Ba3

  - Preferred stock (Hybrid Tier 1) downgraded to Ca (hyb) from B3
    (hyb)

  All the above ratings, with the exception of the BFSR, carry a
  negative outlook

Piraeus Bank SA, Piraeus Group Finance plc, and Piraeus Group
Capital Limited:

  - BFSR downgraded to E, mapping into a BCA of Caa1

  - Long-term deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings downgraded
    to B3 from Ba3

  - Backed (government-guaranteed) senior unsecured ratings
    downgraded to B3 from Ba3

  - Subordinated debt ratings downgraded to Caa2 from B1

  - Preferred stock (Hybrid Tier 1) downgraded to Ca (hyb) from
    Caa1(hyp)

  All the above ratings, with the exception of the BFSR, carry a
  negative outlook

Agricultural Bank of Greece SA and ABG Finance International plc:

  - BFSR downgraded to E, mapping into a BCA of Caa1

  - Long-term deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings downgraded
    to B3 from B1

  - Subordinated debt ratings downgraded to Caa2 from B2

  All the above ratings, with the exception of the BFSR, carry a
  negative outlook

Attica Bank SA and Attica Funds plc:

  - BFSR downgraded to E, mapping into a BCA of Caa1

  - Long-term deposit ratings downgraded to B3 from B1

  - Subordinated debt ratings downgraded to Caa2 from B2

  All the above ratings, with the exception of the BFSR, carry a
  negative outlook

Emporiki Bank of Greece SA and Emporiki Group Finance plc:

  - BFSR downgraded to E, mapping into a BCA of Caa1

  - Deposit and senior debt ratings downgraded to B1 from Baa3

  - Short term rating downgraded to Not-prime from Prime-3

  - Subordinated debt ratings downgraded to B2 from Ba1

  All the above ratings, with the exception of the BFSR, carry a
  negative outlook

General Bank of Greece SA:

  - BFSR downgraded to E, mapping into a BCA of Caa1

  - Deposit ratings downgraded to B1/Not-prime from Baa3/Prime-3

  All the above ratings, with the exception of the BFSR, carry a
  negative outlook.

All banks affected by the review are headquartered in Athens,
Greece:

  - National Bank of Greece SA reported (unaudited) total assets
    of EUR117.8 billion as of March 2011

  - EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA reported (unaudited) total assets of
    EUR80.5 billion as of March 2011

  - Alpha Bank SA reported (unaudited) total assets of EUR64.0
    billion as of March 2011

  - Piraeus Bank SA reported (unaudited) total assets of EUR56.6
    billion as of March 2011

  - Agricultural Bank of Greece SA reported (unaudited) total
    assets of EUR28.9 billion as of March 2011

  - Emporiki Bank of Greece SA reported (unaudited) total assets
    of EUR27.8 billion as of March 2011

  - Attica Bank SA reported (unaudited) total assets of EUR4.6
    billion as of March 2011

  - General Bank of Greece SA reported (unaudited) total assets of
    EUR4.0 billion as of March 2011

The principal methodologies used in rating these banks were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March
2007, and Moody's Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrid Securities and
Subordinated Debt published in November 2009.


RIDENCO COMMERCIAL: Negotiations with Creditors Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------------
Woodland Designs Plc on May 27 disclosed that that the Mediator
for the reconciliation procedure of article 99 of N.3588/2007 of
the associated Greek company Ridenco Commercial SA submitted a
report to the Athens Court of First Instance, which says that no
agreement has been reached between Ridenco Commercial and its
creditors as of May 17, 2011, on reservations for the submission
of the relevant memo in case a significant fact occurs until
September 21, 2011, when the requests on the extension of the
reconciliation will be discussed.  At the current stage, the
negotiations between Ridenco Commercial and its creditors continue
with the contribution of the consultant of Ridenco Group, Deloitte
Business Solutions SA.


=============
I C E L A N D
=============


KAUPTHING BANK: Sells US$181-Mil. Lehman Claim to Alandsbanken
--------------------------------------------------------------
Linda Sandler at Bloomberg News, citing a court filing, reports
that Kaupthing Bank hf sold a US$181 million claim on bankrupt
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. to Alandsbanken Sveige AB of
Stockholm.

                      About Kaupthing Bank

Headquartered in Reykjavik, Kaupthing Bank --
http://www.kaupthing.com/-- is Iceland's largest bank and among
the Nordic region's 10 largest banking groups.  With operations in
more than a dozen countries, the bank offers a range of services
including retail banking, corporate finance, asset management,
brokerage, private banking, treasury, and private wealth
management.  Kaupthing was created by the 2003 merger of
Bunadarbanki and Kaupthing Bank.  In October 2008, the Icelandic
government assumed control of Kaupthing Bank after taking similar
measures with rivals Landsbanki and Glitnir.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, on Nov. 30,
2008, Olafur Gardasson, assistant for Kaupthing Bank hf, filed a
petition under Chapter 15 of title 11 of the United States Code in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York commencing the Debtor's Chapter 15 case ancillary to the
Icelandic Proceeding and seeking recognition for the Icelandic
Proceeding as a "foreign main proceeding" under the Bankruptcy
Code and relief in aid of the Icelandic Proceeding.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


BANK OF IRELAND: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Junior Securities to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the dated subordinated
debt of Bank of Ireland (BoI), EBS Building Society (EBS) and
Irish Life & Permanent (IL&P) one further notch to C from Ca. In
addition, the undated subordinated debt EMTN programme rating of
IL&P, and the undated subordinated debt and tier 1 instruments of
Bank of Ireland have also been downgraded to C (hyb) from Ca
(hyb). This follows the announcement of offers from EBS and IL&P,
and details of an offer to be made shortly by BoI, to buy back the
junior securities of the banks for cash at very high discounts to
the par value. BoI will also offer an equity conversion option.

EBS and IL&P are rated Ba2/N-P for bank deposits, Ba3/N-P for
senior debt and have D- standalone bank financial strength ratings
(mapping to Ba3 on the long-term scale). The outlook is negative.
BoI is rated Ba1/N-P for bank deposits, Ba2/N-P for senior debt
and has a D standalone bank financial strength rating (mapping to
Ba2 on the long-term scale). The outlook is negative.

                       Ratings Rationale

Under the exchange offers, the banks are offering to purchase for
cash the outstanding dated subordinated debt at a discount of 80%
to the nominal value of the debts (92% in the case of one IL&P
bond), and in the case of BoI also offering to purchase for cash
the outstanding Tier 1 debt securities at a discount of 90%. These
transactions will be classed by Moody's as a "Distressed Exchange"
as a result of (i) the extremely high discount to the nominal
value, and (ii) the coercive nature of the offer. Moody's notes
that the offers are extremely coercive as a result of the
potential that noteholders choosing to not participate in the
exchanges could face losses of over 99% to the original nominal
value. Moody's would also note that if the take-up on the offers
is not viewed as high enough by the government then losses
compared to the original promise will be imposed under the Credit
Institutions (Stabilisation) Act 2010. Moody's notes that the
Irish government recently used this legislation to obtain from the
High Court a Subordinated Liabilities Order (SLO) in respect of
Allied Irish Banks that will result in the terms and conditions of
the debts being adjusted resulting in a diminished financial
obligation.

A distressed exchange is defined as an offer by an issuer to
creditors of a new or restructured debt, or a new package of
securities, cash or assets, that amount to a diminished financial
obligation relative to the original obligation with the effect of
allowing the issuer to avoid a bankruptcy or payment default.
According to Moody's, a distressed exchange is a form of default.
Moody's includes distressed exchanges in its definition of default
in order to capture credit events whereby issuers effectively fail
to meet their debt service obligations, but yet do not actually
file for bankruptcy or miss an interest or principal payment.

All three institutions are headquartered in Dublin, Ireland.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Moody's
Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrid Securities and Subordinated Debt
published in November 2009, and Incorporation of Joint-Default
Analysis into Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology
published in March 2007.

Other methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Approach to
Evaluating Distressed Exchanges published in March 2009, and
Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in
published in November 2009.


IRISH LIFE: S&P Cuts Rating on Lower Tier 2 Debt to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on the
affected lower Tier 2 subordinated debt instruments issued by
Irish Life & Permanent PLC (ILP; BB+/Watch Neg/B) to 'D' from
'CCC'.

The 'BB+/B' counterparty credit ratings on ILP remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed on
Nov. 26, 2010. The rating action does not affect issuances by ILP
which are guaranteed by the Irish government.

On May 31, 2011, ILP announced its intent to launch a tender offer
for its remaining lower Tier 2 instruments. The offer was
subsequently formally launched on June 2, 2011. The offer covers
the majority of ILP's outstanding lower Tier 2 instruments. ILP
has offered bondholders the opportunity to tender any or all of
their existing notes for cash at a rate of between 8.6 and 20
cents on the euro.

"The downgrade of these lower Tier 2 debt ratings reflects our
opinion that this exchange offer is a 'distressed exchange' and a
de facto restructuring, in accordance with our criteria (see
'Rating Implications Of Exchange Offers And Similar
Restructurings, Update,' published May 12, 2009, on
RatingsDirect). There is no related rating action on the
counterparty credit ratings because there is no default on
nonregulatory capital issues," S&P stated.

S&P considers this to be a "distressed exchange" because:

    * Bondholders stand to receive significantly less than the
      original promise; and

    * "In the light of the Irish government's clearly expressed
      stance regarding burden-sharing by subordinated bondholders
      in troubled Irish institutions, and ILP's own circumstances
      as an institution which we assess to have a weak stand-alone
      credit profile and to need to raise more capital, we
      consider that there is a realistic possibility of a
      government-enforced default through coercive burden-sharing
      on the instruments subject to the exchange, over the near-
      to-medium term," S&P related.

"Depending on investor demand, ILP anticipates exchanging up to
EUR798 million of its remaining lower Tier 2 instruments as part
of this offer. We calculate that this could create additional
equity Tier 1 capital of up to EUR630 million. Further to the
Prudential Capital Assessment Review (PCAR) exercise (see 'Various
Rating Actions Taken On Irish Banks Following Financial Measures
Programme And Bank Restructuring Plan,' published on April 5,
2011), ILP was told by the Irish financial regulator that it must
raise EUR4 billion of new equity by end-July 2011. ILP has said
that it consequently intends to pursue an asset disposal program
and a liability management exercise--the latter now being
underway. The Irish government has said that if ILP is unable to
raise all this equity itself, the government will provide the
balance," S&P continued.

It is currently unclear whether a rump of untendered securities
will remain after the tender offer closes. "If a rump persists, in
line with our criteria we will consider at what level those
securities should be rated. ILP has said that it expects that the
government would take whatever steps it considers necessary to
maximize burden sharing by any remaining subordinated
noteholders," S&P related.

S&P added, "We note the requirement on ILP to raise more capital
than the current offer will generate, and also the government's
clearly expressed preference that subordinated bondholders are
subject to burden-sharing. We therefore think it likely that the
one rated ILP lower Tier 2 instrument not subject to the offer
could be subject to a 'distressed exchange' in the near future. As
a result, we have lowered the rating to 'CC' from 'CCC'."


TBS INTERNATIONAL: Joseph Royce Owns 42.6% of Class A Shares
------------------------------------------------------------
In an amended Schedule 13D filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, Joseph E. Royce disclosed that he
beneficially owns 12,658,164 Class A ordinary shares of TBS
International plc, representing 42.6% of the share outstanding.
Elaine M. Royce also owns 4,778,958 Class A ordinary shares.  A
full-text copy of the filing is available for free at:

                      http://is.gd/7Viudq

                  About TBS International plc

Dublin, Ireland-based TBS International plc (NASDAQ: TBSI)
-- http://www.tbsship.com/-- provides worldwide shipping
solutions to a diverse client base of industrial shippers through
its Five Star Service: ocean transportation, projects, operations,
port services and strategic planning.  The TBS shipping network
operates liner, parcel and dry bulk services, supported by a fleet
of multipurpose tweendeckers and handysize/handymax bulk carriers,
including specialized heavy-lift vessels and newbuild tonnage.
TBS has developed its franchise around key trade routes between
Latin America and China, Japan and South Korea, as well as select
ports in North America, Africa, the Caribbean and the Middle East.

The Company reported a net loss of US$247.76 million on US$411.83
million of total revenue for the year ended Dec. 31, 2010,
compared with a net loss of US$67.04 million on US$302.51 million
of total revenue during the prior year.

The Company's balance sheet at March 31, 2011, showed US$681.39
million in total assets, US$406.22 million in total liabilities
and US$275.17 million in total shareholders' equity.

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP expressed substantial doubt about the
Company's ability to continue as a going concern.  PwC believes
that the Company will not be in compliance with the financial
covenants under its credit facilities during 2011, which under the
agreements would make the debt callable.  According to PwC, this
has created uncertainty regarding the Company's ability to fulfill
its financial commitments as they become due.

As reported in the TCR on Feb. 8, 2011, TBS International on
Jan. 31, 2011, announced that it had entered into amendments to
its credit facilities with all of its lenders, including AIG
Commercial Equipment, Commerzbank AG, Berenberg Bank and Credit
Suisse and syndicates led by Bank of America, N.A., The Royal Bank
of Scotland plc and DVB Group Merchant Bank (the "Credit
Facilities").  The amendments restructure the Company's debt
obligations by revising the principal repayment schedules under
the Credit Facilities, waiving any existing defaults, revising the
financial covenants, including covenants related to the Company's
consolidated leverage ratio, consolidated interest coverage ratio
and minimum cash balance, and modifying other terms of the Credit
Facilities.

The Company currently expects to be in compliance with all
financial covenants and other terms of the amended Credit
Facilities through maturity.

As a condition to the restructuring of the Company's credit
facilities, three significant shareholders who also are key
members of TBS' management agreed on Jan. 25, 2011, to provide up
to US$10 million of new equity in the form of Series B Preference
Shares and deposited funds in an escrow account to facilitate
satisfaction of this obligation.  In partial satisfaction of this
obligation, on Jan. 28, 2011, these significant shareholders
purchased an aggregate of 30,000 of the Company's Series B
Preference Shares at US$100 per share directly from TBS in a
private placement.


TBS INTERNATIONAL: Gregg McNelis Holds 15.6% of Class A Shares
--------------------------------------------------------------
In a Schedule 13D filing of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Gregg L. McNelis disclosed that he beneficially owns
3,242,354 Class A ordinary shares of TBS International plc,
representing 15.6% of the shares outstanding.  A full-text copy of
the regulatory filing is available for free at http://is.gd/eO7RXw

                    About TBS International plc

Dublin, Ireland-based TBS International plc (NASDAQ: TBSI)
-- http://www.tbsship.com/-- provides worldwide shipping
solutions to a diverse client base of industrial shippers through
its Five Star Service: ocean transportation, projects, operations,
port services and strategic planning.  The TBS shipping network
operates liner, parcel and dry bulk services, supported by a fleet
of multipurpose tweendeckers and handysize/handymax bulk carriers,
including specialized heavy-lift vessels and newbuild tonnage.
TBS has developed its franchise around key trade routes between
Latin America and China, Japan and South Korea, as well as select
ports in North America, Africa, the Caribbean and the Middle East.

The Company reported a net loss of US$247.76 million on US$411.83
million of total revenue for the year ended Dec. 31, 2010,
compared with a net loss of US$67.04 million on US$302.51 million
of total revenue during the prior year.

The Company's balance sheet at March 31, 2011, showed US$681.39
million in total assets, US$406.22 million in total liabilities
and US$275.17 million in total shareholders' equity.

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP expressed substantial doubt about the
Company's ability to continue as a going concern.  PwC believes
that the Company will not be in compliance with the financial
covenants under its credit facilities during 2011, which under the
agreements would make the debt callable.  According to PwC, this
has created uncertainty regarding the Company's ability to fulfill
its financial commitments as they become due.

As reported in the TCR on Feb. 8, 2011, TBS International on
Jan. 31, 2011, announced that it had entered into amendments to
its credit facilities with all of its lenders, including AIG
Commercial Equipment, Commerzbank AG, Berenberg Bank and Credit
Suisse and syndicates led by Bank of America, N.A., The Royal Bank
of Scotland plc and DVB Group Merchant Bank (the "Credit
Facilities").  The amendments restructure the Company's debt
obligations by revising the principal repayment schedules under
the Credit Facilities, waiving any existing defaults, revising the
financial covenants, including covenants related to the Company's
consolidated leverage ratio, consolidated interest coverage ratio
and minimum cash balance, and modifying other terms of the Credit
Facilities.

The Company currently expects to be in compliance with all
financial covenants and other terms of the amended Credit
Facilities through maturity.

As a condition to the restructuring of the Company's credit
facilities, three significant shareholders who also are key
members of TBS' management agreed on Jan. 25, 2011, to provide up
to US$10 million of new equity in the form of Series B Preference
Shares and deposited funds in an escrow account to facilitate
satisfaction of this obligation.  In partial satisfaction of this
obligation, on Jan. 28, 2011, these significant shareholders
purchased an aggregate of 30,000 of the Company's Series B
Preference Shares at US$100 per share directly from TBS in a
private placement.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


MELIORBANCA SPA: Moody's Withdraws 'D' Bank Finc'l Strength Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn all ratings of Meliorbanca
for business reasons. This rating action does not reflect a change
in the bank's creditworthiness. Meliorbanca had no rated debt
outstanding at the time of the withdrawal.

At the time of withdrawal, Meliorbanca's ratings were:

  - Long-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Baa3
    with stable outlook

  - Short-term local and foreign currency ratings of Prime-3

  - Standalone Bank Financial Strength Rating (BFSR) of D with
    stable outlook; the BFSR maps to Ba2 on the long-term scale

                        Ratings Rationale

Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the credit rating for its
own business reasons.

Moody's most recent rating action on Meliorbanca was on June 18,
2009 when all the bank's ratings were affirmed with stable
outlook.

The bank is headquartered in Milan, Italy.  At December 31, 2010
it had total assets of EUR2.2 billion.


PARMALAT SPA: Bondi Seeks Remand of Grant Thornton Suits to Ill.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Parmalat Capital Finance Limited and Dr. Enrico Bondi, who was
appointed Extraordinary Commissioner in each of the Parmalat
cases, ask the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York to abstain from hearing the two lawsuits filed against
Grant Thornton International and Grant Thornton, LLP, among other
defendants.

Parmalat and Dr. Bondi also ask the District Court
to remand the cases to the Cook County, Illinois, state court
where they were originally filed.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit previously
remanded the cases to the District Court.  The Appeals Court also
vacated the District Court's order denying mandatory abstention
under Section 1334(c)(2) of the Judiciary and Judicial
Procedures.

The Appeals Court specifically held that the impact of the state
court proceedings on a securities class action is immaterial to
the question of timely adjudication unless it would prolong the
administration or liquidation of the foreign estates.

The Appeals Court held that four factors come into play in
evaluating timeliness:

  (1) the backlog of the state court's calendar relative to the
      federal court's calendar;

  (2) the complexity of the issues presented and the respective
      expertise of each forum;

  (3) the status of the title 11 bankruptcy proceeding to which
      the state law claims are related; and

  (4) whether the state court proceeding would prolong the
      administration or liquidation of the estate.

Kathleen M. Sullivan, Esq., at Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan
LLP, in New York, in support of the request for abstention and
remand, argues that each of the four factors points strongly
toward a conclusion that the Illinois State Court will "timely
adjudicate" the Grant Thornton cases, and, therefore, abstention
is required.

Ms. Sullivan contends that current statistics suggest that the
Illinois courts might well act more expeditiously than their
federal counterparts given that the case would be adjudicated by
the Cook County, Illinois Commercial Calendar Section, whose
calendar delivers quicker resolution of cases than do the courts
outside of that Section in the General Law Division.  She adds
that the average duration of civil cases in the Illinois state
courts is only minimally longer than in the New York District
Court, where the Grant Thornton cases would be tried in the
absence of abstention given its transfer under Section 1404(a) of
the Judiciary and Judicial Procedures.

Ms. Sullivan further argues that the complexity of the issues
presented and the expertise of each forum clearly favors
abstention because one of the key issues in this case -- the
defense of in pari delicto -- is a matter of Illinois state law
and there is some doubt as to the nature and reach of the
defense.

"Resolving unsettled issues of Illinois state agency and tort law
is an essential threshold task in these cases that is far more
clearly within the competence of the Illinois courts than the
federal courts," Ms. Sullivan contends.

Ms. Sullivan also asserts that the status of the related
bankruptcy proceedings weighs strongly in favor of abstention
because those proceedings were brought not in connection with any
domestic reorganization or liquidation, but rather under Section
304 of the Bankruptcy Code for the limited purpose of protecting
the foreign bankruptcy estates from U.S. suits.

Abstention would not unduly prolong the administration or
liquidation of the foreign estates, Ms. Sullivan notes.  She adds
that Old Parmalat successfully reorganized several years ago into
New Parmalat, and, she points out, New Parmalat does not need the
proceeds from the litigation to survive; any proceeds will be
distributed according to a fixed procedure when received by New
Parmalat, no matter when that occurs.

Similarly, the Joint Official Liquidators in the Caymans are
determining which claims to allow against the Parmalat estate,
but the process will go forward whatever the outcome of PCFL's
case against Grant Thornton, et al., and any proceeds from the
case will be distributed to approve claimants no matter when that
outcome is reached, Ms. Sullivan tells the Court.

                  Grant Thornton Entities Object

Parmalat and Dr. Bondi's continued argument for abstention should
be rejected for what it is -- a blatant attempt to get a second
bite at the apple, James L. Bernard, Esq., at Stroock & Stroock &
Lavan LLP, in New York, argues, on behalf of the Grant Thornton
Entities.

"After more than five years of motion practice in this Court,
Plaintiffs now hope to start over in Cook County," Mr. Bernard
says.

Mr. Bernard argues that the mandatory abstention provision is not
designed to give litigants a do-over.  He says Congress provided
for mandatory abstention only where the case can be "timely
adjudicated" in state court but under the analysis by the Appeals
Court; that is not so here.

The Appeals Court's decision begins by affirming that the New
York District Court does, in fact, have jurisdiction over these
cases, Mr. Bernard points out.  It then turns to mandatory
abstention, articulating factors that bear on how quickly the
case can be adjudicated in state court relative to federal court
and whether that pace is sufficiently swift, given the need for
timely administration of the estate, he adds.

Under this analysis, sending these cases to state court would be
flatly inconsistent with the timely administration of the
estates, Mr. Bernard contends.  He argues that statistics show
that litigation in Cook County is materially slower than in
federal court and that problem is only magnified when the legal,
factual, and "present tense" procedural posture of these cases is
taken into account.

Parmalat and Dr. Bondi's demand for abstention carries with it
the promise that issues already resolved by the District Court
will be relitigated before a judge with no previous expertise in
the case, Mr. Bernard argues.  Thus, no matter what one assumes
about the outcome of the in pari delicto issue on appeal, these
cases will almost certainly face unnecessary delay if they are
remanded to state court, he further argues.

Mr. Bernard relates that Parmalat and Dr. Bondi's only answer is
to suggest that they are now indifferent to timely adjudication,
given the late stage of their foreign bankruptcies, but that is
inconsistent with their prior representations in the U.S. Courts.

A disappointed litigant cannot invoke mandatory abstention merely
by claiming indifference to the time it would take to litigate in
state court, Mr. Bernard argues.

For these reasons, the Grant Thornton Entities assert that the
Court should refuse mandatory abstention and allow the cases to
proceed in federal court.

                      About Parmalat S.p.A.

Headquartered in Milan, Italy, Parmalat S.p.A. --
http://www.parmalat.net/-- sells nameplate milk products that can
be stored at room temperature for months.  It also has about 40
brand product lines, which include yogurt, cheese, butter, cakes
and cookies, breads, pizza, snack foods and vegetable sauces,
soups and juices.

Parmalat S.p.A. and its Italian affiliates filed separate
petitions for Extraordinary Administration before the Italian
Ministry of Productive Activities and the Civil and Criminal
District Court of the City of Parma, Italy on Dec. 24, 2003.  Dr.
Enrico Bondi was appointed Extraordinary Commissioner in each of
the cases.  The Parma Court declared the units insolvent.

On June 22, 2004, Dr. Bondi, on behalf of the Italian entities,
sought protection from U.S. creditors by filing a petition under
Sec. 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No.
04-14268).

Parmalat's U.S. operations filed for Chapter 11 protection on
Feb. 24, 2004 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 04-11139).  Gary Holtzer,
Esq., and Marcia L. Goldstein, Esq., at Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP,
represented the U.S. Debtors.  When the U.S. Debtors filed for
bankruptcy protection, they reported more than US$200 million in
assets and debts.  The U.S. Debtors emerged from bankruptcy on
April 13, 2005.

Three special-purpose vehicles established by Parmalat S.p.A. --
Dairy Holdings Ltd., Parmalat Capital Finance Ltd., and Food
Holdings Ltd. -- commenced separate winding up proceedings before
the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands.  Gordon I. MacRae and James
Cleaver of Kroll (Cayman) Ltd. were appointed liquidators in the
cases.  On Jan. 20, 2004, the Liquidators filed a Sec. 304
petition (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 04-10362).  Gregory M. Petrick,
Esq., at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, and Richard I. Janvey,
Esq., at Janvey, Gordon, Herlands Randolph, represented the
Finance Companies in the Sec. 304 case.

The Honorable Robert D. Drain presided over the Parmalat Debtors'
U.S. cases and Sec. 304 cases.  In 2007, Parmalat obtained a
permanent injunction in the Sec. 304 cases.


PARMALAT SPA: Founder Jailed After Conviction in Market Abuse Case
------------------------------------------------------------------
Parmalat S.p.A. founder, Calisto Tanzi, was jailed in Parma,
Italy, on May 5 after an Italian court's May 4 definitive ruling
in a market abuse case stemming from the dairy company's collapse
in 2003, Bloomberg News reported, citing news agency Ansa.

Mr. Tanzi's sentence was reduced to eight years from 10 years in
prison, according to Bloomberg.

                      About Parmalat S.p.A.

Headquartered in Milan, Italy, Parmalat S.p.A. --
http://www.parmalat.net/-- sells nameplate milk products that can
be stored at room temperature for months.  It also has about 40
brand product lines, which include yogurt, cheese, butter, cakes
and cookies, breads, pizza, snack foods and vegetable sauces,
soups and juices.

Parmalat S.p.A. and its Italian affiliates filed separate
petitions for Extraordinary Administration before the Italian
Ministry of Productive Activities and the Civil and Criminal
District Court of the City of Parma, Italy on Dec. 24, 2003.  Dr.
Enrico Bondi was appointed Extraordinary Commissioner in each of
the cases.  The Parma Court declared the units insolvent.

On June 22, 2004, Dr. Bondi, on behalf of the Italian entities,
sought protection from U.S. creditors by filing a petition under
Sec. 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No.
04-14268).

Parmalat's U.S. operations filed for Chapter 11 protection on
Feb. 24, 2004 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 04-11139).  Gary Holtzer,
Esq., and Marcia L. Goldstein, Esq., at Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP,
represented the U.S. Debtors.  When the U.S. Debtors filed for
bankruptcy protection, they reported more than US$200 million in
assets and debts.  The U.S. Debtors emerged from bankruptcy on
April 13, 2005.

Three special-purpose vehicles established by Parmalat S.p.A. --
Dairy Holdings Ltd., Parmalat Capital Finance Ltd., and Food
Holdings Ltd. -- commenced separate winding up proceedings before
the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands.  Gordon I. MacRae and James
Cleaver of Kroll (Cayman) Ltd. were appointed liquidators in the
cases.  On Jan. 20, 2004, the Liquidators filed a Sec. 304
petition (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 04-10362).  Gregory M. Petrick,
Esq., at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, and Richard I. Janvey,
Esq., at Janvey, Gordon, Herlands Randolph, represented the
Finance Companies in the Sec. 304 case.

The Honorable Robert D. Drain presided over the Parmalat Debtors'
U.S. cases and Sec. 304 cases.  In 2007, Parmalat obtained a
permanent injunction in the Sec. 304 cases.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


LUNAR FUNDING: Moody's Upgrades Rating on EUR10MM Notes to 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of one class of
note issued by Lunar Funding I Ltd Series 2.

Issuer: Lunar Funding I Limited - Series 2

   -- EUR10,000,000 Secured Asset-Backed Notes due 2019, Upgraded
      to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 27, 2010 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

                        Ratings Rationale

Lunar Funding I Series 2 is a repackaging of (i) EUR5 million
Super Senior Swap of Skye CLO I Limited collateralized by the
4.625% Bank Nederland Gemeenten notes due 2013 and (ii) the Class
Q Combination Secured Credit-Linked Notes due 2019 of Skye CLO.
Class Q Combination Notes comprises EUR3 million of the unrated
equity tranche of Skye CLO and EUR2 million of the Class E tranche
of Skye CLO. The rating of the notes issued by Lunar Funding I
Series 2 addresses the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity as a proportion of the Rated Balance, where
the Rated Balance is equal, at any time, to the principal amount
of those notes at the closing date minus the aggregate of all
payments they received from the closing date to the most recent
payment date, either through interest or principal payments.

The current rated balance of Lunar Funding I Series 2 is
approximately EUR7.4 million. Despite the amortization of the
super senior swap of Skye CLO I, Lunar Funding I Ltd Series 2
continues to hold the EUR5 million collateral made of Bank
Nederland Gemeenten notes. This collateral will be liquidated
completely at maturity in July 2013.

According to Moody's, the rating action taken on Lunar Funding I
Ltd Series 2 notes, results primarily from the amortization of the
underlying portfolio in Skye CLO I Ltd. Since the last rating
action in August 2010 the size of the Super Senior Swap has
reduced by approximately EUR30 million from EUR54.3 million in
August 2010 to EUR24.3 million in the March 2011 according to data
reported by the trustee. As a consequence, overcollateralization
ratios have increased from 160.4% to 177.6% for Class B, from
121.2% to 125.8% for Class D and from 104.3% to 105.8% for Class E
between August 2010 and March 2011.

In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
with a weighted average recovery rate of 56%, a weighted average
spread of 3.12% and a stressed default probability consistent with
a weighted average rating factor (WARF) of 4117. The standard
asset correlation framework as set in CDOROM has been used.

In addition to its base case analysis, Moody's also tested the
impact of the passage of time on the notes by modelling the
current portfolio one year forward. Moody's observed that the
benefit for the notes was less than 1 notch from the base case
model outputs.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by (1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and (2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1. Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
   depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few
   large obligors, especially when they experience jump to
   default. Due to the deal's low diversity score and lack of
   granularity, Moody's simulated the defaults and recovery rates
   in the underlying portfolio of Skye CLO I Ltd using Moody's
   CDOROM software.

2. Portfolio amortization: Deleveraging of the transaction may
   accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
   which may have significant impact on the notes' rating.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2009.

Under these methodologies, Moody's relies on a simulation based
framework. Moody's therefore used CDOROM to generate default and
recovery scenarios for each asset in the portfolio, and then
Moody's EMEA Cash-Flow model in order to compute the associated
loss to each tranche in the structure.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" and "Annual Sector Review (2009): Global CLOs", key
model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted
average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


NIBC BANK: Moody's Cuts Ratings on Debt Securities to 'Ba2 (hyb)'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's downgraded NIBC Bank N.V.'s long-term debt ratings to Baa3
from Baa2 and the short-term ratings to P-3 from P-2. This
resulted from a downgrade of the Bank Financial Strength Rating
(BFSR) to D+ from C-, and in the standalone Baseline Credit
Assessment (BCA) to Baa3 from Baa2. As was previously the case,
Moody's does not incorporate potential systemic support into the
ratings which continue to reflect Moody's assessment of the
standalone strength of NIBC. The perpetual and preferred debt
securities of NIBC were also downgraded to Ba2 (hyb) from Ba1
(hyb). The outlook was revised to stable from negative.

                        Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of the BFSR reflects a number of factors which we
believe fit better into the 'D' category than the 'C' category in
the BFSR scale, despite some recent improvements. This rating
level reflects in particular the bank's material refinancing
challenge over the coming years as government guaranteed debt
falls due, its still limited franchise in competitive markets, its
relatively high risk profile, and its volatile income statement.
These weaknesses are partly offset by significant holdings of
liquid assets, strong capital ratios, a solid track record of
expertise in its niche markets, and fair efficiency.

Moody's believes in particular that the large amount of
government-guaranteed funding issued by NIBC -- 31% of its funding
base at December 31, 2010 -- still presents a material challenge
for the bank. While we believe that NIBC will be able to refinance
these sums and maintain its growth objectives, this ambition
relies to a certain extent on significant secured funding issuance
coupled with further rapid growth in its retail deposit base. We
further note that unsecured term funding is likely to be
uneconomic at present. In addition, although current liquidity
appears ample (NIBC held cash and liquid assets of EUR3 billion at
December 31, 2010, a figure which has since grown), this in part
reflects the build-up of reserves in anticipation of the
maturities of government-guaranteed debts, of which EUR2.4 billion
falls due before March 2012. We believe that NIBC's plan to
further increase its stock of over EUR5 billion of retail savings,
which are wholly sourced via the internet from the Netherlands and
Germany under its NIBC Direct branding, is achievable given its
small existing presence. However we consider that this could
become progressively harder and that such funding is likely to be
structurally more volatile than branch-based deposits.

Moody's also believes that NIBC's franchise, although benefiting
from a sound track record and established expertise in niche
segments, is relatively concentrated and is likely to continue to
face pressure from competition as industry risk appetite recovers.
This narrow focus, compared to larger, more diversified
institutions, contributes in Moody's view to a more volatile
income statement and greater vulnerability to unexpected shocks.
Although the current reported cost/income ratio for the business
lines of 50% is fair by broad standards, we do not consider it
especially strong for a bank which operates principally in high
return markets through a limited number of offices and without a
developed branch network.

Moody's notes that NIBC's risk experience has been largely
favorable and consider that the bank benefits from a seasoned team
of risk professionals. However, NIBC's EUR9.9 billion corporate
credit risk exposure is skewed towards the commercial real estate,
shipping finance and leveraged loan markets, in addition to some
EUR340 million of private equity investments. Moody's considers
these segments to be classically risky and despite NIBC's
considerable expertise, deterioration in single names or broader
economic weakness could trigger sharp rises in loss experience, in
Moody's view, and indeed loss rates and NPLs continued to rise in
2010. The higher quality EUR9.8 billion mortgage book has a very
different risk profile, with a loss rate of just 8bp in 2010,
although here too we are cautious due to the high loan-to-value
ratios which are a feature of the Dutch market.

These concerns are partly mitigated by relatively high
capitalization, with a Core Tier 1 ratio of 13.5% reported for 31
March, 2011. This should not be dramatically challenged by the
forthcoming implementation of Basel 3, yet does not fully
compensate for the more concentrated and higher risk nature of the
bank's loan book.

Moody's does not factor potential external support, from the
government or elsewhere, into Moody's ratings, which therefore
reflect Moody's assessment of the bank's standalone credit
strength. Despite the establishment of a meaningful retail deposit
base, as discussed above, the share of national savings remains
modest at around 1%. The mortgage market share, at about 2%, is
entirely intermediary-sourced and is therefore not indicative of a
deep retail franchise, which might otherwise contribute to
potential systemic support.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's view that NIBC's BFSR is
appropriately positioned at the D+ level, Moody's expectation that
profitability should continue to recover further, and that the
bank is adequately prepared for its refinancing challenge.

Commenting on what could change the BFSR down, Moody's noted that
any evidence of weakened liquidity or inability to successfully
improve the funding mix may result in a lower BFSR. Additionally,
downward pressure on the bank's BFSR could stem from a further
deterioration in asset quality or material unexpected losses.

The Long-Term and Short-Term Debt and Deposit ratings would be
downgraded in the event of a downgrade of the BFSR.

Commenting on what could change the rating up, Moody's noted that
reduced reliance on wholesale funding and a demonstratively stable
deposit base could exert upward pressure on NIBC's BFSR. The Long-
Term Deposit and Debt ratings would also be upgraded as a result
of an upgrade of the BFSR.

NIBC's Capital Securities

The perpetual debt securities issued by NIBC Bank were downgraded
to Ba2 (hyb) from Ba1 (hyb). This action follows Moody's current
Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrids and Subordinated Debt,
published in November 2009, and was triggered by the downgrade of
NIBC's BFSR to D+ (BCA : Baa3) with stable outlook.

The starting point in Moody's revised approach to rating hybrid
securities is the Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment (Adjusted
BCA). The Adjusted BCA reflects the bank's standalone credit
strength, including parental and/or cooperative support, if
applicable. The Adjusted BCA excludes systemic support.

The Adjusted BCA of Baa3 for NIBC Bank is the same as the BCA
since no parental and/or cooperative support are applicable. (The
adjusted BCA is also the same as the long-term deposit and debt
rating since NIBC Bank does not benefit from systemic support
under Moody's analysis.)

The two notch differential between the rating on the perpetual
debt securities and the Adjusted BCA reflects the instruments'
deeply subordinated claim in liquidation and coupon deferral
mechanism, which is optional subject to a dividend pusher. Moody's
adds that unpaid coupons are cumulative and must be settled
through an alternative coupon settlement mechanism (ACSM). The
outlook on the perpetual debt securities is stable.

These ratings have been downgraded and assigned a stable outlook:

  - NIBC Bank N.V -- US$128 million 5.817 % Perpetual Debt
    Securities (ISIN: US62914EAA29) at Ba2 (hyb)

  - NIBC Bank N.V -- US$149 million 7.625% Fixed Rate Preferred
    Securities (ISIN XS0269908074) at Ba2 (hyb)

  - NIBC Bank N.V -- US$100 million Perpetual Debt Securities
    (ISIN XS0215294512) at Ba2 (hyb)

  - NIBC Bank N.V -- EUR50 million Perpetual Debt Securities (ISIN
    XS0249580357) at Ba2 (hyb)

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March
2007 and Moody's Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrid Securities and
Subordinated Debt published in November 2009.

Headquartered in The Hague, The Netherlands, NIBC had total assets
of EUR28 billion and shareholders' equity of EUR1.8 billion at
December 31, 2010.


SULFINDO: Fitch Withdraws 'B(exp)' Rating on Senior Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn the expected 'B(exp)' rating on
Sulfindo Netherland B.V.'s proposed USD senior secured notes,
which were to be guaranteed by PT Sulfindo Adiusaha ('B'/Stable).

This action follows Sulfindo's decision to not proceed with the
proposed bond issue.


=============
R O M A N I A
=============


ATLAS TELECOM: Goes Insolvent; Has Over EUR70MM Debt
----------------------------------------------------
Adrian Seceleanu at Ziarul Financiar reports that Atlas Telecom
Network has gone insolvent.

The company accumulated over EUR70 million in debt and its
customer base saw a "dramatic" decline, ZF says, citing a report
put together by court-appointed administrator Global Money
Recovery.

Atlas Telecom Network is based in Romania.


ILEFOR: Declared Insolvent; Administrator Appointed
---------------------------------------------------
Ioana David at Ziarul Financiar reports that Ilefor was declared
insolvent.

According to ZF, RVA Mures Insolvency Specialists serves as court-
appointed administrator.

Ilefor is a Targu-Mures-based furniture maker.  Dan Sucu holds a
minority stake in the company.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


SAMARA OBLAST: S&P Affirms Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating at 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on Russia's
Samara Oblast to stable from negative and affirmed the 'BB+' long-
term issuer credit and 'ruAA+' Russia national scale ratings.

"We have assigned a recovery rating of '3' to the oblast's planned
five-and-one-half-year amortizing RUB12.2 billion (about US$435
million) bond, which the oblast intends to place on June 8, 2011.
The recovery rating indicates our expectation of meaningful (50%-
70%) recovery in the event of a payment default. At the same time,
we assigned 'BB+' and 'ruAA+' senior unsecured debt ratings to the
proposed bond," S&P noted.

The bond will have 22 quarterly, fixed coupons and an amortizing
repayment schedule. In 2013, 20% of the bond is scheduled to be
redeemed, in 2014 40% will be repaid, in 2015 20%, and in 2016 the
remaining 20%.

"The outlook revision reflects our view that Samara Oblast will
maintain its sound liquidity position and that its debt repayment
schedule will become relatively smooth after bulk repayments in
2012," S&P noted.

The ratings on the oblast reflect its limited revenue flexibility
and predictability due to dependence on federal transfers and
taxes, exacerbated by economic concentration, and rising operating
and capital spending pressure. The ratings are supported by modest
debt levels, and moderate, albeit weakening, budgetary
performance.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that in 2011-2013,
additional revenues and already secured refinancing will allow
Samara Oblast to absorb rising expenditure pressure without
affecting its sound liquidity position. Our base-case scenario
also assumes continued medium-term borrowings and extension
of maturities," S&P stated.

According to S&P, "We could take a negative rating action if we
perceive that the oblast's liquidity position is set to weaken
significantly compared with our base-case scenario. This could
result from faster expenditure growth leading to weaker budgetary
performance and depletion of cash reserves or shortening debt
maturities."

"We could take a positive rating action if higher revenues and the
oblast management's commitment to prudent financial policies, with
tight control over operating expenditures and gradually increasing
capital investments, resulted in improving budgetary performance
and higher financial flexibility. However, ratings upside is
unlikely in the next 12 months, in our view," S&P added.


===========
S W E D E N
===========


QUINN INVESTMENTS: KPMG Seeks to Install Receiver for Sweden Firm
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Simon Carswell at The Irish Times reports that the new board and
management at Quinn International Property Holdings, formerly
owned by businessman Sean Quinn, will seek to appoint a bankruptcy
receiver to the family's company in Sweden.

Mr. Quinn and his family won a court ruling in Sweden last month
overruling the dismissal of Quinn Investments Sweden by the
receiver that was appointed by Anglo Irish Bank to its parent
Irish company, The Irish Times recounts.

The legal victory may prove pyrrhic, according to The Irish Times,
as Quinn International, to which Kieran Wallace of KPMG was
appointed receiver, is seeking to install a "bankruptcy receiver"
in Sweden on June 14.

The directors appointed by Mr. Wallace are considering whether to
seek to appeal the Swedish court ruling, though such a move may be
overtaken by the appointment of the bankruptcy receiver to the
firm, The Irish Times states.

Quinn Investments Sweden holds the Quinn family's international
properties in Sweden, Britain, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and India,
The Irish Times discloses.  Together, the properties are worth
about EUR500 million, The Irish Times notes.  The company, which
has several related subsidiaries in Sweden, has debts of about
EUR463 million, according to The Irish Times.  The family set up
the company to hold the assets for tax purposes.

The Stockholm District Court found that the dismissal of directors
of the Swedish company and the replacements installed by Mr.
Wallace were invalid, The Irish Times recounts.

Anglo appointed Mr. Wallace as receiver over the family's shares
in Quinn Group (ROI), the ultimate parent company of the Quinn
Group, and the international property group on April 14, The Irish
Times relates.  The receiver changed the boards of the subsidiary
companies across the property group, including at the Swedish
company, The Irish Times discloses.  The Quinn family owes Anglo
Irish Bank a total of almost EUR2.9 billion, of which EUR2.344
billion relates to loans advanced by the bank to cover Mr. Quinn's
losses on his investments in Anglo and the family's share
purchases in the bank, The Irish Times states.

Quinn Group ROI Ltd. controls its cement, building materials,
glass and other manufacturing businesses in Ireland and Britain
through its ownership of Quinn Group, an operating entity
registered in Northern Ireland.


=========
S P A I N
=========


FONDO DE TITULIZACION: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit rating to 'D
(sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' on Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI
18's class D notes. The other rated notes in this transaction
remain unaffected by the downgrade.

"We lowered to 'D (sf)' the rating on the most junior class of
notes because the issuer failed to pay due interest on the most
recent interest payment date," S&P explained.

"This tranche funds the cash reserve in the transaction, and, as
evidenced by its low speculative-grade rating, we do not generally
expect it to meet due interest payments over its term," noted S&P.

This class of notes is not backed by mortgage assets. Instead, the
transaction uses excess spread to service the notes.

UCI 18 is a Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transaction originated by Union de Creditos Inmobiliarios,
Establecimiento Financiero de Credito S.A.

Ratings List

Class                  Rating
                To              From

Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos, UCI 18
EUR1.723 Billion Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered

D               D (sf)          CCC- (sf)



* SPAIN: May Offer Asset Protection Schemes for Bank Takeovers
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan House at The Wall Street Journal reports that Miguel
Angel Fernandez Ordonez, the Spanish central bank's governor, on
Friday said that the central bank could offer asset protection
schemes for bank takeovers at a later point in the restructuring
of the country's ailing savings banks.

According to the Journal, the central bank currently plans to
partially nationalize lenders that can't attract new capital from
private sources.  The state-financed Fund for Orderly Bank
Restructuring will acquire stakes in the institutions, restructure
them and then try to sell the stakes.  But if restructuring plans
are derailed and the FROB, which is controlled by the Bank of
Spain, decides they won't succeed in creating a viable entity, the
FROB will set up a competitive auction to sell the bank, the
Journal notes.  Mr. Fernandez Ordonez, as cited by the Journal,
said that at this point, the central bank would consider setting
up an asset protection scheme to some absorb some of the potential
losses a buyer might face.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BORDERS UK: More than 200 Former Workers to Get 90-day Pay Award
----------------------------------------------------------------
Charlotte Williams at thebookseller.com reports that more than 230
former Borders UK employees who lost their jobs when the company
closed down in December 2009 have been awarded the maximum 90
days' pay by an employment tribunal.

The tribunal ruled that the company and administrators had failed
to comply with employment legislation covering consultation
rights, according to thebookseller.com.

thebookseller.com notes that the company went into administration
and closed down in December 2009, and the 233 ex-employees have
been ordered to receive the 90-day pay, which is the maximum
sanction.

However, thebookseller.com discloses, the compensation will be
paid out of state funds since there is no money available from the
closure of Borders.

State payments are capped at GBP400 a week for eight weeks,
meaning some of the former employees will not receive the amount
they are entitled to, thebookseller.com notes.

thebookseller.com says that the tribunal's decision follows work
by Paul Lee, national officer of the Retail Book Association, who
told the tribunal that MCR's failure to comply was a bid to
maximize sales in the run-up to Christmas before the business
closed.


DONALDSON & MCCONNELL: Goes Into Administration, Axes 102 Jobs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Scott McCulloch at Scottish Business News reports that Donaldson &
McConnell has gone into administration with the loss of 102 jobs.

The company called in administrators citing financial
difficulties, according to Scottish Business News.

Scottish Business News notes that a total of 47 jobs have gone at
the group's Scottish headquarters in Bo'ness, with just nine staff
retained at the plant to help meet outstanding orders.  Two
workers were also retained at the Midlands outlet and one employee
was kept on at the Northern Ireland outlet to help process
existing contracts, according to the report.

The administrator was unable to give a figure on the total value
of contracts outstanding.

A further 29 jobs went at the group's Midland subsidiary, 10 in
Northern Ireland, and 16 from its southern operation in Kent,
which came online last December, Scottish Business News discloses.

"In common with many companies that supply the construction
sector, Donaldson & McConnell has experienced very challenging
conditions in recent times, with the reduction in construction
activity reducing demand for the Groups products," Scottish
Business News quotes Blair Nimmo, head of restructuring for KPMG
in Scotland, as saying.  "We have retained 12 employees to assist
with this process," he added.

Bo'ness-based Donaldson & McConnell Group, formed in 1991,
specializes in the design, supply and erection of complex timber
and glued laminated timber (glulam) roof structures.  It employs
114 people across four UK locations.


GEORGINA GOODMA: Goes Into Administration, Seeks Buyer
------------------------------------------------------
Lauren Milligan at Vogue.com reports that shoe label Georgina
Goodman has gone into administration.

Vogue.com, citing Drapers news, relates that British-based brand
enlisted restructuring firm Hilco earlier this month to handle the
sale of the company, which is understood to be underway with an
undisclosed buyer, thought to be a member of the current
management team.

The brand's Shepherd Street store in London and its Web site have
ceased trading, while the Old Bond Street boutuique remains open
for now, according to Vogue.com.

The label's shoes are expected to be withdrawn from its 70
international stockists in order for the administrators to oversee
the sale of the company's stock, the report says.


HMV GROUP: Executes New GBP220MM Refinancing Deal with Lenders
--------------------------------------------------------------
Claer Barrett at The Financial Times reports that HMV Group has
negotiated a new GBP220 million banking facility with its lenders,
agreeing to steep interest charges and the suspension of dividend
payments until GBP90 million of borrowings are repaid.

According to the FT, the deal is subject to the successful GBP53
million disposal of its high street book chain Waterstone's to
Russian tycoon Alexander Mamut.  The company, as cited by the FT,
said it would use an unspecified proportion of the disposal
proceeds to pay down its existing GBP240 million bank facility.

The new agreement with the lending consortium, led by state-
controlled Lloyds Banking Group and including Royal Bank of
Scotland, will include the granting of two separate term loans of
GBP70 million and GBP90 million, plus a revolving cash facility of
GBP60 million, the FT discloses.

As part of the restructuring terms, HMV intends to issue share
warrants to its lending banks equivalent to 5% of the company's
shares, the FT notes.

United Kingdom-based HMV Group plc is engaged in retailing of pre-
recorded music, video, electronic games and related entertainment
products under the HMV and Fopp brands, and the retailing of books
principally under the Waterstone's brand.  The Company operates in
four segments: HMV UK & Ireland, HMV International, HMV Live, and
Waterstone's.  HMV International consists of HMV Canada, HMV Hong
Kong and HMV Singapore.  Waterstone's is a bookseller, which
operates through 314 stores and a transactional Web site for the
sale of both physical and e-books for download.  The Company has
operations in seven countries, with principal markets being the
United Kingdom and Canada.  Its retail businesses operate through
417 stores in the United Kingdom, Canada, Hong Kong and Singapore.
On Jan. 29, 2010, the Company completed the acquisition of MAMA
Group Plc.  Its subsidiaries include HMV Canada Inc, HMV Guernsey
Limited, HMV Hong Kong Limited, and HMV (IP) Limited.


IMJACK PLC: June 16 Meeting Scheduled to Approve CVA Terms
----------------------------------------------------------
The Board of imJack PLC on May 25 disclosed that in addition to
the  meetings of creditors and shareholders held on January 21,
2011, where the Company entered into a Company Voluntary
Arrangement, a further meeting of creditors was held on May 23,
2011, in order that the original terms of the CVA could be varied.

The Board disclosed that the creditors approved the variation and
that a meeting of shareholders will be held on June 16, 2011, in
order to formally approve the variation.  A notice has been sent
to shareholders confirming details of the meeting.  The terms of
the variation are such that the contribution will be paid by the
Company into the CVA by no later than June 30, 2011.

imJack Plc is a web-based software applications developer.


LEEK FINANCE: S&P Withdraws Ratings on Various Classes of Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on 13 classes of notes in
Leek Finance Number Seventeen PLC (Leek 17), Leek Finance
Number Eighteen PLC (Leek 18), and Leek Finance Number Nineteen
PLC (Leek 19). "At the same time, we affirmed our ratings on the
other 15 rated classes of notes in these transactions. We
subsequently withdrew all the ratings at the issuer's request,"
S&P noted.

"The downgrades reflect the application of our updated
counterparty criteria for structured finance transactions," S&P
related.

S&P continued, "On Jan. 18, 2011, we placed on CreditWatch
negative our ratings on 13 tranches in Leek 17, 18, and 19 when
our updated counterparty criteria became effective."

"After reviewing the transaction documents for these three
transactions, we consider that they do not reflect our updated
criteria. Specifically, it has a weak replacement framework
whereby a tranche rating isn't eligible under our criteria to be
one notch above the issuer credit rating (ICR) on the lowest-rated
counterparty. Therefore, we have lowered our ratings on these 13
tranches to the ICR level of the guaranteed investment contract
provider for each transaction, and removed them from CreditWatch
negative for counterparty reasons," S&P explained.

S&P noted, "We have affirmed the more junior classes of notes in
these transactions because we believe that the available credit
enhancement is consistent with the rating levels."

"We subsequently withdrew our ratings in Leek 17, Leek 18, and
Leek 19 after the issuer formally requested that we discontinue
rating the notes," S&P added.

Ratings List

Class            Rating
            To            From

Ratings Lowered, Removed From CreditWatch Negative, and Withdrawn

Leek Finance Number Seventeen PLC
EUR558.1 Million, GBP379 Million, and $697 Million Mortgage-Backed
Floating-Rate Notes

A2a         A+ (sf)       AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
            NR
A2b         A+ (sf)       AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
            NR
A2c         A+ (sf)       AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
            NR
Mc          A+ (sf)       AA (sf)/Watch Neg
            NR

Leek Finance Number Eighteen PLC
EUR286.7 Million, GBP307.6 Million, and $1.025 Billion Mortgage-
Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A2a         A+ (sf)       AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
            NR
A2b         A+ (sf)       AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
            NR
A2c         A+ (sf)       AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
            NR
A2d         A+ (sf)       AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
            NR
Ma          A+ (sf)       AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
            NR
Mc          A+ (sf)       AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
            NR

Leek Finance Number Nineteen PLC
EUR283.1 Million, GBP192 Million, and $879.1 Million Mortgage-
Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A2a         A+ (sf)       AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
            NR
A2b         A+ (sf)       AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
            NR
A2c         A+ (sf)       AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
            NR

Ratings Affirmed and Withdrawn

Leek Finance Number Seventeen PLC
EUR558.1 Million, GBP379 Million, and $697 Million Mortgage-Backed
Floating-Rate Notes

Ba          A (sf)
            NR
Bc          A (sf)
            NR
Cc          BBB (sf)
            NR

Leek Finance Number Eighteen PLC
EUR286.7 Million, GBP307.6 Million, and $1.025 Billion Mortgage-
Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ba          BBB+ (sf)
            NR
Bc          BBB+ (sf)
            NR
Ca          BB (sf)
            NR
Cc          BB (sf)
            NR

Leek Finance Number Nineteen PLC
EUR283.1 Million, GBP192 Million, and US$879.1 Million Mortgage-
Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ma          A (sf)
            NR
Mc          A (sf)
            NR
Ba          BBB (sf)
            NR
Bc          BBB (sf)
            NR
Ca          BB (sf)
            NR
Cc          BB (sf)
            NR
Da          B- (sf)
            NR
Dc          B- (sf)
            NR

NR--Not rated.


SOUTHERN CROSS: Landlords Mull Orderly Wind-Down
------------------------------------------------
Simon Mundy, Daniel Thomas and Elizabeth Rigby at The Financial
Times report that landlords of Southern Cross Healthcare are
working on a plan that would see the company wound down over the
next few months.

According to the FT, three people close to the situation said that
representatives of landlords controlling about 250 of Southern
Cross's 750 homes held a meeting on Monday in response to the
company's decision to withhold 30% of its rent for the next four
months.

Among measures discussed was a plan for an orderly wind-down of
the company, the FT says.  Under the plan, the landlords would
refrain from putting Southern Cross into administration and in
exchange, the company would gradually hand over control of its
homes to other operators, the FT discloses.

Unlike its major peers, Southern Cross leases all of its homes,
which is the result of a sale-and-leaseback strategy pursued
before the company hit financial trouble in 2008, the FT notes. It
has been hit by cuts to the fees paid by local authorities and has
described its rent bill, which rises by 2.5% a year, as
"unsustainable", the FT recounts.

According to the FT, Nick Leslau, chairman and chief executive of
Prestbury Investments, which owns 3% of Southern Cross's homes,
said the landlords wanted to spare residents any concern about
their future, and might accept a temporary rent cut to ensure
continuity of care.

"However, we do not believe that the long-term interests of the
residents will be served by keeping the current management in
place for an extended period.  What is needed is a speedy,
orderly, consensual handover of leases to landlords who can . . .
replace Southern Cross with quality operators," the FT quotes
Mr. Leslau as saying.

About 20 landlords were present at the meeting, including Four
Seasons and Bondcare, two rival operators that want to take over
running homes leased from them by Southern Cross, the FT relates.

Southern Cross Healthcare provides residential and nursing care to
more than 31,000 residents cared for by 45,000 staff in 750
locations.  It also operates homes that specialize in treating
people with dementia, mental health problems and learning
disabilities.


SPRINGSBOARD LTD: In Liquidation; Closes Community Center
---------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Ings Resource Centre has closed after the
company which ran it, Springsboard Ltd, went into liquidation on
Friday.

Springsboard said a financial deficit and lost funding sources was
the cause of the closure, BBC relates.

According to BBC, Hull City Council (HCC) said it was unable to
provide the centre with any future funding.

BBC notes that the company said it had been encouraged to expand
its services and staff two years ago, but the businesses did not
reach anticipated levels, causing a financial deficit which could
not be reduced.

The centre also lost funding following accusations of "financial
irregularity," which independent reviews by the council's auditors
and Humberside Police revealed to be unfounded, BBC adds.

Springsboard Ltd operates Ings Resource Centre, a community centre
in Hull, which provided services for vulnerable adults and
children.


VEDANTA RESOURCES: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Ratings to New Bonds
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive Ba2 senior
unsecured ratings to the US$750 million, 6.75% bonds due 2016 and
the US$900 million, 8.25% bonds due 2021, issued by Vedanta
Resources Plc. The ratings are also on review for possible
downgrade.

At the same time, Moody's continues its review for possible
downgrade of Vedanta's Ba1 corporate family rating (CFR) and Ba2
senior unsecured debt rating.

                          Ratings Rationale

Moody's definitive rating for these debt obligations confirms the
provisional rating assigned on May 20, 2011. Moody's rating
rationale was set out in a press release published on the same
day.

The net proceeds of the issue will be used to finance part of the
Cairn India Ltd. (CIL) acquisition costs if that transaction is
consummated. In the event that the acquisition does not proceed,
Vedanta intends to use the proceeds from the bonds to fund capital
expenditure, repay debt and for other general corporate purposes.
Moody's notes that the aggregate value of the bonds issued was
greater than the initial indication of US$1.5 billion due to
strong demand.

The rating review was initiated on August 17, 2010, after Vedanta
announced the proposed acquisition of a controlling stake of up to
60% in CIL for US$9.6 billion or less. On December 21, 2010 and
April 18, 2011, Moody's announced the continuation of its review.

The review will conclude once the outcome of the CIL acquisition
is known. Moody's expectations are: 1) for Vedanta's CFR to be
lowered by one notch to Ba2 and its bond rating to Ba3 if Vedanta
succeeds, based on the existing terms, and 2) for the CFR and bond
rating to remain at their current level if the deal falls through.

However, in both circumstances Vedanta's credit profile at these
rating levels would be challenged.

As a result of further delays in the regulatory approval process,
Cairn Energy Plc and Vedanta have agreed to a second extension of
the completion date deadline. The government of India's final
decision is awaited and the outcome is in the hands of a special
ministerial panel.

Moody's expects to conclude the rating review when the outcome of
the CIL transaction is known.

The principal methodology used in rating Vedanta Resources plc was
the Global Mining Industry Methodology, published May 2009.

Headquartered in London, UK, Vedanta Resources plc is a metals and
mining company focusing on integrated zinc, aluminum, copper, iron
ore mining and commercial power generation. Its operations are
predominantly located in India. It is listed on the London Stock
Exchange and is 59.67% owned by Volcan Investments Ltd.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
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Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

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