TCREUR_Public/110627.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Monday, June 27, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 125

                            Headlines



D E N M A R K

AMALIE I: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR33M Tranche C notes to 'Caa3'


F R A N C E

NOVASEP HOLDING: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'SD'
SPOTLESS HOLDING: Moody's Withdraws P(B3) Rating on EUR400MM Notes


G E R M A N Y

RAPIDEYE EARTH: Files for Bankruptcy Protection
WESTLB AG: Owners Back Radical Restructuring


G R E E C E

PRAXIS I FINANCE: Moody's Withdraws 'Ba3' Rating on Greek ABS


I R E L A N D

ALLIED IRISH: Private Shareholders May Face Additional Dilution
BANK OF IRELAND: Reduces Maximum Stake Government Can Take to 69%
* IRELAND: 65 Hotels in Receivership, Survey Shows


K A Z A K H S T A N

ALLIANCE BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR
BTA BANK: Fitch Affirms Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B-'
EURASIAN BANK: Moody's Affirms 'E+' Bank Financial Strength Rating


L A T V I A

MORTGAGE AND LAND BANK: Moody's Affirms 'E+' Fin'l Strength Rating


N E T H E R L A N D S

VIMPELCOM HOLDINGS: S&P Rates $2.5-Bil. Guaranteed Notes at 'BB'


R U S S I A

ALJBA ALLIANCE: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'B/B'
VIMPELCOM LTD: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Corporate Family Rating
VIMPELCOMM LTD: S&P Assigns 'BB' Long-term Corp. Credit Rating


S P A I N

BANIF: Moody's Downgrades Debt & Deposit Ratings to 'Ba2/NP'
BBVA RMBS: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Rating to EUR224MM B Note
CAJA DE AHORROS: Moody's Withdraws 'D' Financial Strength Rating


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

HABITAT: United Kingdom Arm Goes Into Administration
NEMUS II: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class F Notes at 'CCsf'
HMV GROUP: Shareholders Approve Waterstone Chain Sale to A. Mamut
HOMEFORM: Set for Administration as Pre-Pack Looms
ORCHESTRA WOTTON: Goes Into Administration, Axes 70 Jobs
RINK CORP: To Go Into Voluntary Liquidation
* DAVID DALY: Seeks to Overturn NAMA's Receiver Appointment


X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week June 20 to June 24, 2011


                            *********


=============
D E N M A R K
=============


AMALIE I: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR33M Tranche C notes to 'Caa3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of these
notes issued by Amalie I Limited:

Issuer: Amalie I Limited

   -- EUR94M Series 1 Tranche A Floating Rate Secured Senior Notes
      due 2015, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

   -- EUR38M Series 1 Tranche B Floating Rate Secured Mezzanine
      Notes due 2015, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
      June 22, 2010 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

   -- EUR33M Series 1 Tranche C Floating Rate Secured Junior Notes
      due 2015, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on June 22,
      2010 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Amalie I Limited, issued in March 2007, is a static cash CDO of
junior subordinated loans to Danish commercial and savings banks.
The portfolio is non-granular, referencing 15 performing issuers,
with the three largest exposures representing 51.0% of the
portfolio.

The downgrades reflect widespread deterioration in the outstanding
portfolio as well as the default of EIK Bank. Credit deterioration
in the pool is indicated by the updated credit estimates Moody's
uses to assess the credit quality of the majority of the
portfolio. This deterioration is reflected in the change in the
average rating of the pool from B1 to Caa1. EIK Bank was taken
over by the Danish FSA in September 2010, although it only failed
to make its interest payment in April 2011 on the loan included in
Amalie's pool. The impact of the default on the model output was
half a notch at the Class A level and a notch at the junior level.

The deterioration of the portfolio has been driven by the negative
performance of the Danish Banking Sector in the context of the
global financial crisis. In response to the financial crisis, the
Danish government created three bank packages that have been
providing support to the banks. Bank Package I, which provided
funding relief through general guarantees on senior debt and
deposits, expired in 2010. Under Bank Package II, banks received
government hybrid capital injections and further individual senior
debt guarantees. Under Bank Package III, which proposes a system
enabling the orderly liquidation of ailing deposit taking banks,
the default of Amagerbanken in February 2011 led to losses on
senior creditors and depositors. Moody's believes that this
negatively impacts the Danish standalone bank financial strength
ratings due to increased pressure on banks funding costs and/or
access to international funding.

The majority of the assets in the pool are assessed by credit
estimate. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the collateral pool
with a stressed weighted average default probability (DP)
equivalent to a Caa1 rating.

Moody's also considered various additional scenarios, including a
jump to default scenario that had a two notch impact compared to
the base case model output.

The credit assessment of the portfolio reflects the difference in
performance between senior and more junior debt since the
beginning of the crisis, incorporating Moody's analytical
framework on subordinated debts, whereby the Baseline Credit
Assessments of the issuing banks have been notched down by two
notches to account for the subordinated nature of the loans in the
pool.

Because the portfolio references a low number of generally small
Danish banks and the concerns listed above surrounding the Danish
banking industry, Moody's believes the likely correlation in
defaults between issuers in the pool is likely to be high.
Correlation was assumed to be 50%, though a stress case of 75% was
also looked at which had minimal impact on the model outputs.
Although the issuers have an economic incentive to repay the loans
at the five-year call option (March 28, 2012), Moody's also
considered the likelihood that the loans would not be redeemed at
the end of their fifth year due to financing difficulties of the
underlying banks, and found the impact to be consistent with the
revised rating levels.

Recoveries on the subordinated loans in the event of default were
assumed to be zero.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties include:

   1) Low portfolio granularity: the performance of the portfolio
      depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few
      large obligors that are rated low non investment grade. This
      is especially true in scenarios where these obligors jump to
      default.

   2) Moody's believes the correlation in defaults between issuers
      in the pool will be probably be high, with the consequence
      that remaining performance outcomes of the notes are likely
      to be binary in nature.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's
Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic Obligations"
published in September 2009 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in August 2009.

Under these methodologies, Moody's relies on a simulation based
framework. Moody's used a bespoke CDOROM and cash model in order
to capture the specific characteristics of the deal, incorporating
the assumptions contained in the above methodologies. As such
default scenarios were generated for each asset in the portfolio
and these were applied in the cash flow model to compute the loss
associated with each tranche in the structure.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past six months.


===========
F R A N C E
===========


NOVASEP HOLDING: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to 'SD'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'SD' (Selective
Default) from 'CCC+' its long-term corporate credit rating on
France-based pharmaceutical services company Novasep Holding
S.A.S. "At the same time, we lowered the issue ratings on
Novasep's EUR270 million and US$150 million senior secured notes
to 'D'. The recovery ratings on these two issues are '4',
indicating our expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery for
creditors in the event of a payment default," S&P said.

The downgrade follows Novasep's announcement on June 15, 2011,
that it has decided to defer coupon payment on its senior secured
bonds maturing 2016. The payment due-date fell on June 15, 2011,
and Novasep is using the 30-day grace period provided in the
notes' indenture given that the company is in the process of
restructuring its balance sheet.

"According to Standard & Poor's criteria, we consider the
extension of a payment maturity as tantamount to a default
scenario if the payment falls later than five business days after
the scheduled due date. This is irrespective of the grace period
stipulated in the indenture. Noteholders have recently agreed to
waive a potential event of default associated with the
nomination of a 'Mandataire ad hoc' (receiver)," S&P related.

"While we understand that Novasep's liquidity remained adequate as
of March 31, 2011, with reported balance-sheet cash of EUR35
million, we nevertheless take a strict view on any payment
deferral, according to our criteria," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Olaf Toelke. "Standard & Poor's considers an
extension of a due payment of interest as equivalent to a debt
restructuring below par by a distressed issuer, and therefore a
default."

"We will examine the progress on Novasep's pending debt
restructuring over the coming weeks in the context of the
company's aim to reduce leverage in a mutually agreeable form with
the majority of lenders. We will then reassess Novasep's capital
structure," S&P said.

"We could lower the rating on Novasep to 'D' (Default) if the
group's senior lenders accelerated the debt repayment and the
group was unable to pay," said Mr. Toelke. "If and when Novasep
were to emerge from any form of reorganization, we would reassess
the ratings, taking into account the factors that precipitated the
default as well as any gains achieved through the reorganization
process."


SPOTLESS HOLDING: Moody's Withdraws P(B3) Rating on EUR400MM Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the P(B3) rating of the
EUR400 million senior secured notes maturing in 2018 proposed to
be issued by Spotless Holding SAS. The withdrawal follows the
postponement of the bond issuance initially planned in June 2011.
Moody's has affirmed the B2 corporate family rating and
probability of default rating of Spotless Holding SAS, which
reflect Moody's assumption that the company will re-initiate the
bond issuance on similar terms at a later stage. The outlook on
the rating is stable.

Spotless, based in Neuilly-sur-Seine, is a consumer goods company
operating in niche categories within the Laundry, Insect Control
and Household Care markets. The company mainly operates in France
and Italy. In the financial year ending December 31, 2010,
Spotless generated EUR240 million and EUR65 million in revenues
and EBITDA, respectively, based on International Financial
Reporting Standards.


=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


RAPIDEYE EARTH: Files for Bankruptcy Protection
-----------------------------------------------
Peter B. de Selding at Space News reports that Brandenberg-based
RapidEye Earth has filed for Germany's equivalent of Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection after breaching several of its loan
covenants.

According to the report, RapidEye will continue operations and
expects to emerge from a court-supervised restructuring with a
more-manageable debt.

Mr. Selding says the Company's core financial consortium includes
Germany's KfW and Commerzbank and Canada's Export Development
Corp. The Canadian entity's role is explained by the fact that MDA
Corp. of Richmond, British Columbia, is the prime contractor for
the RapidEye system, even if Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. of
Britain built the five RapidEye satellites.

RapidEye Chief Executive Wolfgang Biedermann said these three
financial backers, which provided about half of the EUR160 million
(US$232 million) that RapidEye raised to start its business, have
indicated they are not abandoning the company and are willing to
renegotiate the terms of the current loans.

In addition to the banks, RapidEye received a grant of about
EUR15 million from Germany's space agency, DLR, which is repayable
over five years in the form of imagery.  Mr. Biedermann said the
company continues to deliver on that contract.

Mr. Selding adds, another grant, totaling some EUR137 million,
came from the State of Brandenberg in exchange for RapidEye's
creating 130 jobs in that region for at least five years.  This
arrangement is also being respected, Biedermann said, and it is
one reason why RapidEye has only limited maneuvering room in which
to cut costs.


WESTLB AG: Owners Back Radical Restructuring
--------------------------------------------
Daniel Schafer at The Financial Times reports that owners of
WestLB AG have succumbed to pressure from Brussels by agreeing on
a radical restructuring that will in effect see the lender being
split up and its remainder wound down.

The FT says the plan, brought forward in a bid to win approval
from the European Commission for aid received during the financial
crisis, will see the bank split into a credit institution owned by
the savings banks and a unit owned by the regional state.

According to the FT, WestLB said in a statement that its owners
aim to either sell the rest of the bank -- which includes units
such as the corporate business and project financing -- by the
middle of next year, or transfer it into an existing "bad bank"
scheme.

The institution to be held by the savings banks will become a
bread-and-butter service provider -- called Verbundbank -- to its
regional owners, which are set to inject EUR1 billion (US$1.42
billion) in capital jointly with their federal association, the FT
discloses.

The proposal foresees the remaining rump of WestLB to be fully
taken over by the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, which will also
inject EUR1 billion in capital, the FT states.  This unit will act
as a "service and portfolio management bank" to the bad bank and
the Verbundbank, the FT says.

The FT notes that while it will be free to attract business from
third parties, the expectations are that it will be wound down in
the long run.

                          About WestLB

Headquartered in Duesseldorf, Germany, WestLB AG (DAX:WESTLB)
-- http://www.westlb.com/-- provides financial advisory, lending,
structured finance, project finance, capital markets and private
equity products, asset management, transaction services and real
estate finance to institutions.  In the United States, certain
securities, trading, brokerage and advisory services are provided
by WestLB AG's wholly owned subsidiary WestLB Securities Inc., a
registered broker-dealer and member of the NASD and SIPC.
WestLB's shareholders are the two savings banks associations in
NRW (25.15% each), two regional associations (0.52% each), the
state of NRW (17.47%) and NRW.BANK (31.18%), which is owned by NRW
(64.7%) and two regional associations (35.3%).


===========
G R E E C E
===========


PRAXIS I FINANCE: Moody's Withdraws 'Ba3' Rating on Greek ABS
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the credit rating of
Praxis I Finance Plc, a Greek ABS securitization of assets
originated and serviced by Piraeus Bank (B3, Non-Prime).
Immediately prior to the rating withdrawal, the transaction was
rated Ba3.

Issuer: PRAXIS I FINANCE PLC

Cl. A, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Jun 10, 2011 Downgraded to
Ba3 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the credit rating for its
own business reasons.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


ALLIED IRISH: Private Shareholders May Face Additional Dilution
---------------------------------------------------------------
John Murray Brown at The Financial Times reports that Allied Irish
Banks warned on Thursday that private shareholders, who already
control just 7% of the bank's equity, face "a potentially
significant additional dilution" under capital-raising plans to be
announced in the next few days.

AIB, the FT says, is required to raise EUR13.3 billion
(GBP11.8 billion, US$19 billion) to meet the regulator's new
capital adequacy targets that were announced in March.  According
to the FT, AIB said it was clear from its discussions with the
government that "any subscription for shares by the state would
likely be at a very low price, being a very significant discount
relative to the current share price".

                    About Allied Irish Banks

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c., together with its subsidiaries --
http://www.aibgroup.com/-- conducts retail and commercial banking
business in Ireland.  It also provides corporate lending and
capital markets activities from its head office at Bankcentre and
from Dublin's International Financial Services Centre.  The Group
also has overseas branches in the United States, Germany, France
and Australia, among other locations.  The business of AIB Group
is conducted through four operating divisions: AIB Bank Republic
of Ireland division, Capital Markets division, AIB Bank UK
division, and Central & Eastern Europe division.  In February
2008, the Group acquired the AmCredit mortgage business in the
Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.  In September
2008, the Group also acquired a 49.99% shareholding in BACB.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 20,
2011, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the dated subordinated
debt of Allied Irish Banks (AIB) one further notch to C from Ca,
and downgraded the undated subordinated debt and tier 1
instruments to C(hyb) from Ca(hyb). This follows the announcement
of an offer from AIB to buy back its subordinated and tier 1 debt
for cash at very high discounts to the par value, and the previous
announcement on April 14 that the Irish High Court had made a
Subordinated Liabilities Order (SLO) with regard to AIB.  AIB is
rated Ba2/N-P for bank deposits, Ba3/N-P for senior debt and has a
D- bank financial strength rating (mapping to Ba3 on the long-term
scale).  The outlook on the ratings is negative.


BANK OF IRELAND: Reduces Maximum Stake Government Can Take to 69%
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Simon Carswell at The Irish Times reports that Bank of Ireland
reduced the maximum stake the government might take in the lender
to 69% after a majority of subordinated bondholders took up shares
in a debt-for-equity-or-cash offer.

The Irish Times relates that Bank of Ireland said it expected to
generate at least EUR2 billion from an "early bird" offer in its
liability management exercise with the bondholders, based on early
indicative results.

There was a 72.4% take-up among eligible bondholders, of which
95.4% are taking shares and 4.6% are opting for cash, The Irish
Times discloses.

Bank of Ireland bondholders were offered 20% or 40% in the euro in
a debt-for-equity swap, depending on the type of subordinated bond
they hold, or 10 cent and 20 cent in the euro for cash, The Irish
Times notes.

The bank, which is 36% owned by the State, is seeking to raise
more than EUR2.1 billion from bondholders and up to EUR2.2 billion
in a follow-up rights issue to raise a capital bill set by the
Central Bank after stress tests last March, The Irish Times
states.

The Irish Times relates that Minister for Finance Michael Noonan
said he expected to generate more than EUR6 billion from
inflicting losses on junior bank bondholders and the sale of bank
assets, including the life business of Irish Life Permanent.

Bank of Ireland's deal covers EUR2.6 billion of subordinated debt,
The Irish Times notes.  According to The Irish Times, the early
bird offer applied to two of 19 bonds that are subject to the
deal.

Other bondholders have, with the exception of investors in a
Canadian dollar bond, until Thursday, July 7, to participate, The
Irish Times notes.

The bank will announce the final results and the size of the
rights issue on July 8 before an extraordinary shareholder meeting
on July 11 to approve the sale of shares, The Irish Times states.

According to The Irish Times, law firm White Case, which is
contesting the bank's offer in the High Court in London, has said
that it represents investors with US$1 billion (EUR700 million) of
debt.

Headquartered in Dublin, Bank of Ireland --
http://www.bankofireland.com/-- provides a range of banking and
other financial services.  These include checking and deposit
services, overdrafts, term loans, mortgages, business and
corporate lending, international asset financing, leasing,
installment credit, debt factoring, foreign exchange facilities,
interest and exchange rate hedging instruments, executor, trustee,
life assurance and pension and investment fund management, fund
administration and custodial services and financial advisory
services, including mergers and acquisitions and underwriting.
The Company organizes its businesses into Retail Republic of
Ireland, Bank of Ireland Life, Capital Markets, UK Financial
Services and Group Centre.  It has operations throughout Ireland,
the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 17,
2011, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on
the affected Tier 1 and Tier 2 hybrid debt instruments issued by
Bank of Ireland (BOI; BB+/Watch Neg/B) and subsidiaries to 'C'
from 'CC' and affected lower Tier 2 subordinated debt instruments
to 'D' from 'CCC'.


* IRELAND: 65 Hotels in Receivership, Survey Shows
--------------------------------------------------
Belfast Telegraph reports that an industry survey has revealed
that hotels in Ireland are going bust at a rate of one every week.

The latest figures uncover a dramatic rise in the number of hotels
going into receivership, with 20 being taken over in the first
five months of this year alone, Belfast Telegraph discloses.

The scale of collapses is expected to get even worse in the coming
months after the busy summer season ends and taxes are due,
Belfast Telegraph says.

Belfast Telegraph relates that Aiden Murphy, of consultants
Horwath Bastow Charleton, which carries out the annual Irish Hotel
Survey, said as many as 50 hotels will have gone to the wall by
the end of the year.

According to the yearly survey, there are 65 hotels currently in
receivership: 21 in Dublin; 17 in the rest of Leinster; 14 in
Munster; seven in the Republic's Ulster counties; and six in
Connaught, Belfast Telegraph discloses.

Only two or three which went bankrupt were shut down, with the
rest being controversially kept open by banks at a loss until they
can be sold on when the market rebounds, Belfast Telegraph states.

Belfast Telegraph notes established hoteliers have said they
cannot compete with the low prices offered by these loss-making
'zombie' hotels.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


ALLIANCE BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Kazakh BTA Bank's and Alliance Bank's
Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Ratings at 'B-'.

The IDRs of both banks reflect Fitch's assessment of the
possibility of support from the Kazakh authorities. The banks'
government ownership and the reputational risk for the Kazakh
authorities of repeated default of any of these banks create
incentives to provide support, in Fitch's view. However, in its
assessment of potential support, the agency also considers the
fact that neither of these banks represents a strategic investment
for the Kazakh authorities, as well as the absence of any clear
statements on support from senior Kazakh government officials.

On Fitch's Individual Rating scale, which reflects a bank's
standalone risk, the both banks are rated 'E', the lowest rating
for a performing bank. This rating would map to an "unsupported"
Long-term IDR of 'CCC' or lower. In both cases, the Individual
Ratings incorporate negative equity under IFRS, weak asset quality
and core profitability and concerns over the viability of business
models, given the structural balance sheet weaknesses and the
erosion of market positions since 2008.

The banks report considerable equity deficits under IFRS, but
remain in compliance with the local prudential regulations. The
latter, in Fitch's view, require a degree of regulatory
forbearance, particularly in case of BTA which reports lower bad
debt provisioning and a considerably higher valuation of
investments in associates under local GAAP. Both banks also
benefit from waivers provided by the FMSA, allowing them to
account for their investments in Samruk-Kazyna bonds at their
notional value rather than their fair value for the purposes of
regulatory capital.

Core profitability is weak at both banks, suffering from depressed
asset quality, large investments in low-yield Samruk-Kazyna bonds
and the high cost of funding. Fitch expects the net interest
margin to be negative for BTA and marginally positive for Alliance
in 2011. The outlook for profits is also weighed down by the
uncertainty surrounding the value of the banks' loan portfolios
This is particularly of concern at BTA given its large legacy book
and recent increases in loan impairment reserves, as evidenced in
the much greater provisioning made in end-2010 audited financial
statements compared with the preliminary management accounts.

BTA and Alliance defaulted in 2009, mainly because of a high level
of bad loans. Following restructuring, they are now majority
controlled by government-owned Sovereign Wealth Samruk-Kazyna
(81.5% for BTA and 67% for Alliance), with the minority stakes
held by creditors affected by the restructuring.

The rating actions are:

BTA

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'E'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: revised to 'B-' from 'No Floor'

   -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'B-'; Recovery Rating is
      'RR4'

   -- Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'CC'; Recovery Rating is
      'RR6'

Alliance

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'E'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: revised to 'B-' from 'No Floor'

   -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'B-'

   -- Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'CC'; Recovery Rating is
      'RR6'


BTA BANK: Fitch Affirms Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B-'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Kazakh BTA Bank's and Alliance Bank's
Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Ratings at 'B-'.

The IDRs of both banks reflect Fitch's assessment of the
possibility of support from the Kazakh authorities. The banks'
government ownership and the reputational risk for the Kazakh
authorities of repeated default of any of these banks create
incentives to provide support, in Fitch's view. However, in its
assessment of potential support, the agency also considers the
fact that neither of these banks represents a strategic investment
for the Kazakh authorities, as well as the absence of any clear
statements on support from senior Kazakh government officials.

On Fitch's Individual Rating scale, which reflects a bank's
standalone risk, the both banks are rated 'E', the lowest rating
for a performing bank. This rating would map to an "unsupported"
Long-term IDR of 'CCC' or lower. In both cases, the Individual
Ratings incorporate negative equity under IFRS, weak asset quality
and core profitability and concerns over the viability of business
models, given the structural balance sheet weaknesses and the
erosion of market positions since 2008.

The banks report considerable equity deficits under IFRS, but
remain in compliance with the local prudential regulations. The
latter, in Fitch's view, require a degree of regulatory
forbearance, particularly in case of BTA which reports lower bad
debt provisioning and a considerably higher valuation of
investments in associates under local GAAP. Both banks also
benefit from waivers provided by the FMSA, allowing them to
account for their investments in Samruk-Kazyna bonds at their
notional value rather than their fair value for the purposes of
regulatory capital.

Core profitability is weak at both banks, suffering from depressed
asset quality, large investments in low-yield Samruk-Kazyna bonds
and the high cost of funding. Fitch expects the net interest
margin to be negative for BTA and marginally positive for Alliance
in 2011. The outlook for profits is also weighed down by the
uncertainty surrounding the value of the banks' loan portfolios
This is particularly of concern at BTA given its large legacy book
and recent increases in loan impairment reserves, as evidenced in
the much greater provisioning made in end-2010 audited financial
statements compared with the preliminary management accounts.

BTA and Alliance defaulted in 2009, mainly because of a high level
of bad loans. Following restructuring, they are now majority
controlled by government-owned Sovereign Wealth Samruk-Kazyna
(81.5% for BTA and 67% for Alliance), with the minority stakes
held by creditors affected by the restructuring.

The rating actions are:

BTA

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'E'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: revised to 'B-' from 'No Floor'

   -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'B-'; Recovery Rating is
      'RR4'

   -- Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'CC'; Recovery Rating is
      'RR6'

Alliance

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'E'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: revised to 'B-' from 'No Floor'

   -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'B-'

   -- Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'CC'; Recovery Rating is
      'RR6'


EURASIAN BANK: Moody's Affirms 'E+' Bank Financial Strength Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed these ratings of Eurasian
Bank: the standalone E+ bank financial strength rating, which maps
to B1 on the long term scale; the B1 long-term foreign currency
deposit ratings, Not Prime short-term foreign currency bank
deposit rating, B1 local currency senior unsecured debt rating and
B2 local currency subordinated debt rating.

Moody's affirmation of Eurasian Bank's ratings with negative
outlook is based on the bank's audited financial statements for
2010 prepared under IFRS, and its Q1 2011 unaudited results
prepared under the local GAAP.

RATINGS RATIONALE

"Eurasian Bank's ratings affirmation with a negative outlook
reflects the fact that despite some recent positive developments
in the bank's financial fundamentals, the bank remains vulnerable
to risks of asset quality deterioration and high borrower
concentration that we will continue to monitor closely in the next
12 to 18 months," says Maxim Bogdashkin, a Moody's Assistant Vice-
President and lead analyst for the bank.

According to the YE2010 IFRS results, Eurasian Bank improved its
revenue generation, which led to: (1) improved efficiency, with a
cost-to-income ratio of 74% compared with 108% as at YE2009, and
(2) a return to profitability, with return on average equity at
3.1%. The bank's profit in Q1 2011 also demonstrated positive
dynamic, exceeding the 2010 result by 80%.

At the same time, Eurasian Bank's long-term ratings carry a
negative outlook, which reflects continued pressure on the bank's
credit profile caused by still high likelihood of asset quality
deterioration, with the level of loans overdue for more than 90
days accounting for 9.4% of gross loans, and high credit risks in
the bank's loan portfolio, with concentration on the 20 largest
borrowers exceeding 4x Tier 1 capital as at YE2010.

Moody's believes that the prerequisite for changing the outlook to
stable would include a substantially reduced borrower
concentration in the loan portfolio and Eurasian Bank's ability to
maintain good profitability, coupled with capital adequacy and
liquidity being preserved at adequate levels.

PREVIOUS RATING ACTIONS AND PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March
2007.

Headquartered in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Eurasian Bank reported total
assets of KZT356 billion (US$2.4 billion) under audited IFRS as of
YE2010, up 11% compared to 2009. The bank's net profit totaled
KZT771 million (US$5.2 million) in 2010 versus a net loss of
KZT13.0 billion (US$87 million) recorded a year earlier.


===========
L A T V I A
===========


MORTGAGE AND LAND BANK: Moody's Affirms 'E+' Fin'l Strength Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Baa3 long-term foreign-
currency deposit rating of Mortgage and Land Bank of Latvia.
Moody's also affirmed MLBL's E+ standalone bank financial strength
rating. However, the E+ BFSR will now map to B2 on the long-term
scale, rather than B1. MLBL's short-term Prime-3 rating is
unaffected by this rating action and the outlook on all the
ratings is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The change in MLBL's BFSR mapping to B2 rather than B1, is driven
by Moody's continued concerns about the bank's profitability,
asset quality and high exposure to the hard-hit SME sector in its
lending book. MLBL reported a net loss of LVL66 million in 2010
(2009: net loss of LVL54 million) following sharp falls in both
net interest income and non-interest income, combined with
increased provisions. Problem loans (reflecting impaired loans,
plus loans 90+ days overdue) increased to 35% of gross loans at
YE2010 from 29% at YE2009.

The recovery of the Latvian economy is at an early stage, with
high unemployment, low domestic loan demand, and expected
increased competition from the larger Nordic owned banks. Moody's
therefore expects bank profitability to remain weak in the coming
years. Furthermore, MLBL's role is in the process of changing to a
pure development bank, which will likely increase the lending
concentration to lower credit quality borrowers. Asset quality
will therefore remain under stress going forward.

MLBL's Baa3 long-term deposit rating now benefits from five
notches of rating uplift from its standalone B2 credit strength.
The uplift reflects Moody's very high expectation of systemic
support from the Baa3-rated government. However, taking into
account that the government's support declarations do not equate
to full guarantees of the bank's liabilities, the stable outlook
at MLBL reflects that an upgrade of Latvia's sovereign rating --
whose outlook was changed to positive on June 6, 2011 -- is
unlikely to result in an upgrade of MLBL's supported deposit
ratings.

Moody's will continue to monitor the gradual transformation of the
bank into a pure development bank, with the bank's commercial
banking activities due to be phased-out by 2013. The rating agency
will also monitor any consequences this may have on MLBL's
standalone credit-risk profile and probability of systemic
support.

PREVIOUS RATING ACTION & METHODOLOGIES USED

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March
2007.

Mortgage and Land Bank of Latvia is headquartered in Riga, Latvia,
and it reported total assets of LVL706 million (EUR1 billion) at
the end of December 2010.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


VIMPELCOM HOLDINGS: S&P Rates $2.5-Bil. Guaranteed Notes at 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB' issue rating
to the proposed up to US$2.5 billion guaranteed notes, to be
issued by VimpelCom Holdings BV and guaranteed by Russian telecoms
operator Vimpel-Communications (JSC) (VimpelCom; BB/Negative/BB).
The issue rating is in line with the corporate credit rating
on VimpelCom and its ultimate parent, VimpelCom Ltd.
(BB/Negative/--; see 'VimpelCom Ltd., Ultimate Parent of Vimpel-
Communications And Wind Telecommunicazioni, Rated 'BB'; Outlook
Negative'). "At the same time, we assigned a recovery rating of
'4' to the proposed notes, indicating our expectation of average
(30%-50%) recovery in the event of a payment default. Our issue
and recovery ratings on the proposed notes are subject to our
review of the final documentation," S&P said.

"In addition, we affirmed the issue ratings on the existing senior
unsecured notes issued or borrowed by VimpelCom at 'BB', in line
with the corporate credit rating on the group. The recovery rating
on these notes is unchanged at '3', indicating our expectation of
meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event of a payment default,"
S&P related.

                      Recovery Analysis

"Although the recovery prospects on the proposed notes are
nominally higher than 50%, we have assigned a lower recovery
rating to reflect various structural complexities within the
group's capital structure, which we believe could lead to lower
recoveries for noteholders at the VimpelCom Holdings BV
level. These complexities include the existence of a US$16 billion
intercompany promissory note between the issuer of the proposed
notes and its parent company, VimpelCom Amsterdam BV. The
promissory note ranks pari passu with the proposed notes except in
a situation of insolvency, when the documentation provides for the
promissory note to become subordinated. Although we assume,
for the purposes of our recovery analysis, that the subordination
provisions in the documentation are enforceable and that the
promissory note would be subordinated to the proposed notes in the
event of default, we believe that the existence of this instrument
and its pari passu status before insolvency could affect
noteholders' recovery prospects. In the event that the
subordination provisions cannot be enforced, we believe that
noteholders' recovery prospects could materially deteriorate, with
recoveries in the 10%-30% range," S&P related.

VimpelCom will use the proceeds from the proposed up to US$2.5
billion notes to repay bridge financing associated with the
group's recent acquisition of Wind Telecomunicazioni SpA (BB-
/Stable/--) and for general corporate purposes.

"We base our recovery analysis on our assumption of recoveries
from the VimpelCom operations. Recovery prospects are supported by
our view that the group would be reorganized on a going-concern
basis. VimpelCom has leading market positions in Russia and
elsewhere in the Commonwealth of Independent States; established
network assets; and a valuable customer base. In light of
this, we believe that default would most likely result from
excessive leverage as a result of operating underperformance," S&P
said.

"The issue and recovery ratings on the proposed guaranteed notes
reflect our view that VimpelCom would be restructured as a going
concern, offset by the potential structural subordination and the
risk of diluted recoveries at the VimpelCom Holdings BV level in
the event that the guarantee and subordination agreements are not
fully enforceable. In addition, the ratings take account of the
Russian jurisdiction, which we see as relatively creditor
unfriendly. While the guarantee provided by VimpelCom is subject
to English law, we believe that recovery prospects will depend on
its enforceability against the Russian assets during a default.
Further, documentation for the proposed notes is, in our view,
relatively weak, with limited covenant protection. The
documentation does not include incurrence covenants, nor does it
include restrictions on the sale or disposal of the issuer's
subsidiaries," S&P stated.

"In order to determine recoveries, we simulate a default. Under
our hypothetical scenario, we assume that a default would most
likely result from excessive leverage and VimpelCom's inability to
refinance its existing debt in 2015," S&P said.

"At a hypothetical point of default, we value the group at about
US$8,153 million using a market multiple approach that is based on
a 5x EBITDA multiple," S&P said.

"From this gross enterprise value of about US$8,153 million, we
deduct US$815 million of administrative costs and US$582 million
of priority claims (mostly equipment and trade financing) that we
assume to be outstanding at default. This results in a net
enterprise value of US$6,756 million available to noteholders,"
S&P related.

Assuming an outstanding balance of up to US$10,809 million of
senior unsecured debt, including prepetition interest, the
recovery expectations for the existing notes are in the 50%-70%
range. This equates to a recovery rating of '3'. "However, given
the limiting factors (Russian jurisdiction, the group's complex
structure, weak documentation, structural subordination risk, and
sizable intercompany debt), we have assigned a recovery rating of
'4' to the proposed notes," S&P added.

Ratings List

New Rating

VimpelCom Holdings BV
Up To $2.5 Bil. Guaranteed Notes Due 2017         BB
Recovery Rating                                  4

Ratings Affirmed

Vimpel-Communications (JSC)
Senior Unsecured                                  BB
Recovery Rating                                  3

NB: This does not include all ratings affected


===========
R U S S I A
===========


ALJBA ALLIANCE: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'B/B'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long- and short-term
counterparty credit ratings on Russia-based bank Aljba Alliance
(Aljba) and its "core" Cypriot subsidiary S.L. Capital Services
Ltd. (S.L. Capital) to 'B/B' from 'B-/C'. The outlook is stable.

The upgrade reflects the proven resilience of Aljba's business and
financial profiles to the challenging operating environment in
Russia. It performed adequately in a volatile environment,
maintaining robust liquidity, healthy capitalization, and better-
than-sector-average asset-quality indicators. The upgrade also
reflects our increasing perception that operating conditions in
Russia are gradually easing. "At the same time, we expect negative
rating factors, such as the bank's very narrow business base,
significant concentrations in assets and liabilities, and heavy
reliance on nonrecurring income, to remain," S&P said.

The bank's liquidity position is a key positive rating factor. On
April 1, 2011, cash and interbank placements accounted for about
60% of Aljba's total assets. Credit risk on these assets is
limited because one-half of the liquidity is placed with large
European banks.

Loans overdue by one day or more accounted for about 5% of total
loans at March 31, 2011. This ratio is lower than the industry
average and reflects Aljba's niche business relationships.
"However, we believe that the bank's loan quality remains
vulnerable, given its high level of single-name concentrations.
Indeed, the 20 largest borrowers accounted for almost 80% of
the bank's loan book on March 31, 2011," S&P related.

"We believe that tough competition and narrowing interest margins
could constrain Aljba's plans to expand its business. Therefore,
we anticipate that the bank's balance sheet will remain relatively
flat. Aljba's solid level of liquidity and capitalization offers
good protection against unexpected risks," S&P said.

Aljba owns 100% of S.L. Capital. It is the group's booking center
for proprietary securities investments and client-driven brokerage
and underwriting operations. In our view, S.L. Capital is a "core"
subsidiary of Aljba, given S.L. Capital's high operational and
business integration with the group, and S.L. Capital's alignment
with the group's strategy.

"The stable outlook reflects our opinion that Aljba's business and
financial profiles will remain broadly unchanged in the next 12
months. It also assumes that the bank will continue to
conservatively manage its capital and liquidity position," S&P
said.

"We view the possibility of an upgrade as relatively remote,
because it would result only if the bank managed to significantly
reduce its balance-sheet concentrations and improve its customer
franchise, while at the same time maintaining its capital and
liquidity position," noted S&P.

A downgrade could result if Aljba's risk appetite were to increase
materially, if market conditions were to deteriorate drastically,
or if the financial profile were to weaken materially.


VIMPELCOM LTD: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Corporate Family Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba3 corporate family
rating and probability of default rating to VimpelCom Ltd,
simultaneously withdrawing the CFR and PDR of Vimpel
Communications OJSC, one of VimpelCom Ltd's key operating
entities. Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a Ba3 issuer rating
to VimpelCom OJSC; and a provisional (P)Ba3 senior unsecured
rating to the up to US$2.5 billion proposed bond of VimpelCom
Holdings B.V., 100% owner of VimpelCom OJSC, and fully owned by
VimpelCom Ltd. via VimpelCom Amsterdam BV. The outlook on the
ratings is stable.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
securities, and these ratings represent only the rating agency's
preliminary opinion. Upon a conclusive review of the transaction
and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign
definitive ratings to the bonds. A final rating may differ from a
provisional rating if the final documents and transaction
structure materially differ from the initially reviewed for the
assignment of the provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

"The rating action reflects Moody's view that the CFR of VimpelCom
Ltd's key operating entity VimpelCom OJSC, domiciled in Russia,
should be repositioned at the level of its ultimate parent," says
Julia Pribytkova, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior Analyst and
lead analyst for VimpelCom Ltd.

Moody's repositioning of the CFR was triggered by the evolution of
VimpelCom's group structure, with the Ukrainian company Kyivstar
being consolidated with VimpelCom in April 2010 at the level of
VimpelCom Ltd., and an M&A transaction in April 2011 resulting in
VimpelCom Ltd consolidating Wind Telecomunicazioni S.p.A. (Ba3,
stable) and Orascom Telecom Holding S.A.E. ("OTH", B2 on review
for upgrade), together referred to below as "Wind Telecom".

Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the credit rating of
VimpelCom OJSC for its own business reasons.

Wind Telecomunicazioni will effectively remain fully ring-fenced
from VimpelCom Ltd. as its creditors have no recourse on VimpelCom
Ltd. Wind Telecomunicazioni S.p.A. has in place mechanisms of
restriction of all payments outside of the restricted group until
a leverage test is passed; the mechanisms are embedded within the
company's 2017 Senior Notes and 2017 PIK Notes which can not be
repaid before 2013. The Russian operating entity VimpelCom OJSC
therefore remains the group's main source of financial flexibility
for servicing VimpelCom ltd.'s direct and guaranteed obligations,
and acts as guarantor for the new notes. The new notes are to be
issued at an interim holding level, VimpelCom Holdings B.V., and
will be serviced with cash flow including in the form of dividends
upstreamed from VimpelCom OJSC and Kyivstar. In 2010, VimpelCom
OJSC paid out US$727 million in dividends. [The dividend policy of
VimpelCom Ltd.' envisages a payout of a significant part of the
annual operating free cash flow to its shareholders in the form of
dividends. Operating Free cash flow is defined as "Net Cash from
Operating Activities minus CapEx", and can be derived from the
consolidated group financial statements.

The new notes will rank pari passu with all other senior unsecured
obligations of the issuer and the guarantor (VimpelCom OJSC). The
noteholders will be protected through a cross-default clause
affecting the issuer and the guarantor including its significant
subsidiaries, and a negative pledge clause restricting creation of
certain liens.


VIMPELCOMM LTD: S&P Assigns 'BB' Long-term Corp. Credit Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB' long-term
corporate credit rating to VimpelCom Ltd., a Bermuda-based global
telecommunications operator with subsidiaries in Russia, Italy,
and several emerging markets. The outlook is negative.

"The rating reflects our view of VimpelCom Ltd.'s high appetite
for growth and acquisitiveness, its uncertain and evolving
financial policies and corporate governance practices, and the
need to invest heavily to resist competitive pressure in core
markets. These risks are moderated by the company's
diversification in terms of revenues and EBITDA, robust operations
in Russia and Italy, and significant free cash flow generation
potential," S&P said.

"We view VimpelCom Ltd.'s business risk profile as "satisfactory",
reflecting the company's near-70% share of robust operations in
Russia and Italy, strong market positions in Ukraine and
Kazakhstan's saturated markets, and a well-diversified portfolio
of assets in other emerging markets that offers growth
opportunities. Increasing economies of scale and strong
profitability also support the company's business profile," S&P
related.

"We view VimpelCom Ltd.'s financial risk profile as 'aggressive,'
based on the expected leverage of about 2.7x after completion of
the Wind Telecom (not rated) acquisition, relatively aggressive
financial policy, and ongoing disputes between its shareholders.
Additional constraints for the financial profile include VimpelCom
Ltd.'s exposure to foreign exchange risks and the potential need
to support some of its weaker subsidiaries," S&P related.

"The negative outlook reflects the probability that we could lower
the rating on VimpelCom Ltd. if the bridge loan is not refinanced
with longer-term instruments within the next six months. A
downgrade could also be triggered if VimpelCom Ltd. takes more-
aggressive financial policy decisions, including revision of
leverage targets indicated by its management and further expansion
into countries with higher-than-average country risk. The latter
would weaken our assessment of VimpelCom Ltd.'s business profile,"
S&P noted.

"At this point, we do not anticipate a negative rating impact from
legal disputes among VimpelCom Ltd. shareholders or from a tax
dispute over VimpelCom Ltd.'s Algerian subsidiary, mainly because
we believe that these disputes are unlikely to result in higher
financial leverage. However, if VimpelCom Ltd. lost the Algerian
subsidiary without any meaningful compensation, or additional
spending were required to maintain the asset, it could pressure
the rating," S&P said.

"At this rating level, we expect a consolidated ratio of debt to
EBITDA in the range of 2.5x-3.0x. We believe VimpelCom Ltd. has
the potential to strengthen its financial profile because it can
generate meaningful positive free cash flow. However, our base-
case expectation is that VimpelCom Ltd. will pursue a more gradual
deleveraging strategy. This is based on our expectation that the
company will likely invest heavily in its core markets to
withstand competition and that its capital spending in Asia and
Africa will be high to sustain growth," S&P related.

"We could revise the outlook to stable if VimpelCom Ltd.
demonstrates prudence and financial discipline by refinancing the
bridge loan with long-term debt and demonstrates the ability to
maintain adjusted leverage below 3x," S&P added.


=========
S P A I N
=========


BANIF: Moody's Downgrades Debt & Deposit Ratings to 'Ba2/NP'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Banif -- Banco
Internacional do Funchal's debt and deposit ratings to Ba2/NP from
Baa3/P-3, maintaining the review for possible downgrade that is
driven by the ongoing review for possible downgrade of the
Portuguese sovereign's rating. Today's rating action is partly
concluding the bulk rating action on Portuguese banks which took
place in April 2011 and reflects the incorporation into Banif's
ratings of the sovereign's reduced financial strength together
with Moody's recently-announced broader reassessment of
authorities' willingness to support senior debt issued by smaller
financial institutions in Europe.

Moody's has also downgraded Banif's senior subordinated debt to
Ba3 from Ba1, maintaining the review for possible downgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE FOR SENIOR DEBT AND DEPOSIT RATINGS

The downgrade of Banif's senior debt and deposit ratings to Ba2
from Baa3 follows the earlier rating actions on the other rated
Portuguese banks on April 6, 2011. The ratings of Banif at the
time had been maintained under review at their current levels in
order to fully assess the potential impact of the bank's strategic
choices to strengthen its credit profile. Ultimately, the impact
of these choices on the ratings has been negligible, so the same
pressures that affected the ratings of Banif's domestic peers also
bear on this bank's ratings: the Portuguese government's financial
strength and its ability to support banks had been negatively
affected, as evidenced by (i) the EUR78 billion bailout program
that the country received from the European Union, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank
and by (ii) the recent downgrade across two separate rating
actions of Portugal to Baa1 from A1.

At the same time, there is increasing uncertainty across Europe
regarding the willingness of authorities to continue to support
senior creditors of those institutions below the first tier in
their domestic markets over the medium term. Both of these factors
were not yet incorporated in Banif's debt and deposit ratings,
which have been downgraded and are now aligned with those of its
Portuguese peers.

In terms of government support assumptions, Banif falls into the
group of banks with high to moderate systemic support, which
includes institutions with lower national market shares or a more
regional presence. Nonetheless, at this stage we have not
eliminated government support for Banif, which continues to
benefit from one notch of systemic uplift over its standalone
credit assessment.

RATINGS RATIONALE FOR SENIOR SUBORDINATED DEBT

Moody's has downgraded the senior subordinated debt rating of
Banif to Ba3 from Ba1, in line with the downgrade of the bank's
senior unsecured debt ratings. Moody's has not yet removed
systemic support for subordinated debt issuances in Portugal, but
expects to assess this alongside other European countries affected
by European regulations and legislation.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS --UP

An improvement in Banif's standalone BFSR, with improvements both
at the financial fundamentals level and in terms of other
structural weaknesses such as related party lending and borrower
concentration levels, could exert upward pressure on its debt and
deposit ratings.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS -- DOWN

Banif's debt and deposit ratings could be further downgraded if
the sovereign's rating is downgraded and/or if the bank's
standalone credit assessment is further downgraded as result of a
combination of the following factors: (i) failure to comply with
new regulatory capital requirements; (ii)a deterioration of its
liquidity position; (iii) inability to improve its profitability
and efficiency indicators; and/or (iv) a significant deterioration
in its asset quality indicators.

PREVIOUS RATING ACTION AND METHODOLOGY

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March
2007.

The previous rating action on Banif took place on June 9, 2011,
when Moody's placed on review for possible downgrade the bank's
BFSR and its preferred stock.

Headquartered in Funchal, Portugal, Banif reported total audited
consolidated assets of EUR12.4 billion as of December 31, 2010.


BBVA RMBS: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Rating to EUR224MM B Note
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
notes issued by BBVA RMBS 10 FTA:

   -- EUR1,376M A Note, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR224M B Note, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The transaction represents the securitization of Spanish high
loan-to-value (HLTV) mortgage loans originated by BBVA (Aa2,
Prime-1). The assets supporting the notes are approximately EUR
1.6 bill prime mortgage loans secured by residential properties
located in Spain. The portfolio will be serviced by BBVA.

The ratings of the notes take into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined
the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement and the portfolio expected loss.

The expected portfolio loss of 4.5% of the current portfolio
balance and the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement of 17.0% served as
input parameters for Moody's cash flow model, which was based on a
probabilistic lognormal distribution as described in the report
"The Lognormal Method Applied to ABS Analysis", published in
September 2000.

The key drivers for the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement number, which
is higher than MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement in Spanish RMBS
transactions, are (i) 100% of loans in the pool are above 80% LTV,
with a weighted-average current LTV (based on valuation at
origination) of 88.0%, (ii) almost all the borrowers can enjoy
different options as semi-bullet payments or payment holidays and
(iii) 5.1% of the pool has been originated through brokers.

The key drivers for the portfolio expected loss which is higher
than the market average in Spanish RMBS transactions are (i) the
performance observed of HLTV mortgage loans, and (ii) the greater
severity suffered by this type of mortgage loans in case of
default. The assumed expected loss corresponds to an assumption of
approximately 9.0% cumulative default rate in the portfolio.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and principal with
respect of the notes by the legal final maturity. Moody's ratings
only address the credit risk associated with the transaction.
Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

The reserve fund is initially funded at 12.0% of the portfolio
amount as of closing. This reserve fund plus the subordination
(fully sequential) provided by the Class B notes (14.0%) provide a
total credit enhancement for the Class A notes of 26.0% at
closing.

The deal structure has a strong swap in place, whereby the
counterparty (BBVA) will pay the weighted average coupon of the
notes plus 40 basis points (bps) over a notional amount equal to
the daily average of outstanding amount of the non written-off
loans that are less than 90 days in arrears. In return, the
special purpose vehicle (SPV) will pay all the interest actually
received.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium, which is in line with
the V score assigned for the Spanish RMBS sector. Only two sub
components underlying the V Score have been assessed higher than
the average for the Spanish RMBS sector. Sector's Historical
Downgrade Rate is Medium, which is higher than the Low/Medium V
score assigned for the Spanish RMBS sector for this sub component
because High LTV (HLTV) pools have historically higher defaults
and arrears than traditional mortgages pools. The Transaction
Complexity are also assessed as Medium, which are higher than the
Low/Medium V score assigned for the Spanish RMBS sector for this
sub component. This is because HLTV loans are more exposed to
house price declines. V-Scores are a relative assessment of the
quality of available credit information and of the degree of
dependence on various assumptions used in determining the rating.
High variability in key assumptions could expose a rating to more
likelihood of rating changes. The V-Score has been assigned
accordingly to the report "V-Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in
the Major EMEA RMBS Sectors" published in April 2009.

In terms of Moody's parameter sensitivities, the model output
indicated that Class A notes would have achieved a Aaa even if the
expected loss remains at 4.5% and with the MILAN Aaa CE as high as
20.4%, and all other factors were constant.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.

The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not
intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate
over time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Updated
Methodology for Rating Spanish RMBS published in July 2008, Cash
Flow Analysis in EMEA RMBS: Testing Features with the MARCO Model
(Moody's Analyser of Residential Cash Flows) published in
January 2006, A Framework for Stressing House Prices in RMBS
Transactions in EMEA published in July 2008, and Moody's Enhanced
Approach to Originator Assessments in EMEA RMBS Transactions
published in October 2009.

V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the Major EMEA RMBS
Subsectors, published in April 2009 was also used in this rating.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments in this transaction.


CAJA DE AHORROS: Moody's Withdraws 'D' Financial Strength Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn these ratings of Caja de
Ahorros Municipal de Burgos: (i) the standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR) of D (which mapped to Ba2 on the long-term
scale); and (ii) the long-term and short-term deposit ratings of
Baa3/Prime-3. At the time of the withdrawal, the BFSR had a
negative outlook, whilst the long-term and short-term deposit
ratings were under review for downgrade. Moody's notes that Caja
de Burgos has no rated senior unsecured or hybrid debt
outstanding.

The ratings have been withdrawn following Caja de Burgos' merger
with Caja Navarra, Caja Canarias and Cajasol, forming the group
Banca Civica (not rated by Moody's). As a result of the merger,
the deposits and debt obligations of Caja de Burgos will be
transferred to Banca Civica.

PREVIOUS RATING ACTION & METHODOLOGIES USED

The principal methodologies used in rating Caja de Burgos were
Moody's "Bank Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology",
published in February 2007, and "Incorporation of Joint-Default
Analysis into Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology",
published in March 2007. Other methodologies and factors that may
have been considered in the process of rating this issuer can also
be found in the Rating Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's
website.

Headquartered in Burgos, in Castilla y Leon, Spain, Caja de Burgos
had total assets (under audited IFRS) of EUR11.69 billion as at
year-end 2010.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


HABITAT: United Kingdom Arm Goes Into Administration
----------------------------------------------------
Mirror reports that the United Kingdom arm of Habitat has gone
into administration in a move threatening up to 30 stores and
around 900 jobs.

Separately, current owner Hilco has struck a deal with Homebase
and Argos owner Home Retail Group allowing it to buy the UK rights
to the Habitat brand in the UK, the Web site and three stores in
central London for GBP24.5 million, according to Mirror.  The
report relates that Hilco said the stores not included in the deal
will trade as normal while the administrator, Fraser Gray of Zolfo
Cooper, talks to interested parties.

Mirror notes that the private equity firm added that it is in
advanced talks to sell the more successful European operation,
which consists of 27 stores in France, six in Spain and five in a
Germany, to a major European listed business.

Hilco said Habitat posted losses of EUR100 million (GBP88 million)
over the past three years and a return to profitability in the UK
appeared unlikely in the near term as many of the stores were
expensive and poorly-located for a furniture retailer, Mirror
says.

Mirror recalls that private equity group Hilco acquired the debt-
laden Habitat in 2009 from the Ikano Group, the company founded by
the Kamprad family which owns Ikea.  Mirror relates that the
company paid almost nothing for the chain, which was carrying
heavy debts, while Ikano also agreed to inject GBP45 million into
the business.

Set up by design legend Sir Terence Conran in 1964, Habitat came
to epitomize London's young and trendy image during the Sixties
with a range of pastel colors and products based on Conran
designs.


NEMUS II: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class F Notes at 'CCsf'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Nemus II (Arden) Plc's floating rate
notes:

   -- GBP192.3m Class A (XS0278300487) affirmed at 'AA+sf';
      Outlook revised to Stable from Negative

   -- GBP15.6m Class B (XS0278300560) affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook
      revised to Stable from Negative

   -- GBP10.5m Class C (XS0278300727) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
      revised to Stable from Negative

   -- GBP9.5m Class D (XS0278301295) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
      revised to Stable from Negative

   -- GBP16.2m Class E (XS0278301378) affirmed at 'CCCsf';
      Recovery Rating RR5

   -- GBP1.1m Class F (XS0278301535) affirmed at 'CCsf'; RR6

The affirmations reflect the stabilization in performance and
property market conditions since the last rating action in May
2010. Of the six loans originally securitized in Nemus II (Arden)
plc, five remain. The GBP23 million Somerfield and GBP11.9 million
Carlton House loans are currently in special servicing, whereas
the GBP127.8 million Victoria (Kirkglade Limited) and GBP42.4
million Buchanan House (Fern Trustee 1 Ltd and Fern Trustee 2 Ltd)
loans are watchlisted (due to covenant breaches) but remain in
primary servicing. The fifth loan, GBP40m Kinnaird House
(Chainmill Properties Limited), continues to show a stable
performance.

The Somerfield loan defaulted in January 2009 when the borrower
failed to cure a breach of the loan-to-value (LTV) covenant. The
cashflow remains stable as the underlying properties are fully-let
to Somerfield Stores Limited on a remaining lease term of 25
years. The special servicer is reportedly in negotiations with the
borrower seeking an exit strategy for the loan in time for loan
maturity in October 2011.

The Carlton House loan defaulted in December 2008 due to non-
payment of taxes by the borrower's parent company. Principal
payments have been suspended until January 2012 to ensure the
borrower has sufficient cash flow to meet its operating expenses.
The reported A-note/whole loan LTV is 89%/96%, although Fitch
estimates the A-note is in excess of 100%, which explains the
'CCsf' rating assigned to the Class F note.

Surplus rental income continues to be trapped with respect to the
Buchanan House and Victoria loans as both loans remain in breach
of their respective LTV covenants. No enforcement action has been
taken so far because scheduled interest and principal continues to
be paid. Both loans mature in October 2013, more than six years
prior to final legal bond maturity. The reported A-note/whole loan
LTV is 89%/103% for Victoria and 103%/117% for Buchanan House, in
line with Fitch's estimates.


HMV GROUP: Shareholders Approve Waterstone Chain Sale to A. Mamut
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Claer Barrett at The Financial Times reports that shareholders in
HMV Group have approved the GBP53 million disposal of its
Waterstone's bookshop chain to Russian tycoon Alexander Mamut.

According to the FT, HMV said that the vote, cast at the company's
emergency general meeting on Thursday morning, was 99.5% in favor
of the disposal.

Two weeks ago, HMV negotiated a GBP220 million refinancing package
with its consortium of lenders, which was dependent on the
disposal of Waterstone's, the FT recounts.

The FT notes that although the disposal of Waterstone's has
ensured the company's financial survival, analysts believe onerous
repayment terms on HMV's new banking facilities could wipe out
profitability for the next two to three years.

United Kingdom-based HMV Group plc is engaged in retailing of pre-
recorded music, video, electronic games and related entertainment
products under the HMV and Fopp brands, and the retailing of books
principally under the Waterstone's brand.  The Company operates in
four segments: HMV UK & Ireland, HMV International, HMV Live, and
Waterstone's.  HMV International consists of HMV Canada, HMV Hong
Kong and HMV Singapore.  Waterstone's is a bookseller, which
operates through 314 stores and a transactional Web site for the
sale of both physical and e-books for download.  The Company has
operations in seven countries, with principal markets being the
United Kingdom and Canada.  Its retail businesses operate through
417 stores in the United Kingdom, Canada, Hong Kong and Singapore.
On Jan. 29, 2010, the Company completed the acquisition of MAMA
Group Plc.  Its subsidiaries include HMV Canada Inc, HMV Guernsey
Limited, HMV Hong Kong Limited, and HMV (IP) Limited.


HOMEFORM: Set for Administration as Pre-Pack Looms
--------------------------------------------------
Insider Media Limited reports that Homeform revealed it was set to
go into administration.

The company has now filed an "intention to appoint
administrators," according to Insider Media Limited.  The report
relates that Homeform said it will appoint an administrator within
ten days, but in the meantime hopes to put a deal together to buy
back part of the group.  A pre-pack deal would see its debts
written off, Insider Media Limited notes.

Insider Media Limited discloses that the directors are looking to
sell the Moben and Dolphin brands in a bid to save the Sharps and
Kitchen Direct businesses.

HomeForm has not revealed how many customer orders were
outstanding and whether they would be honored, Insider Media
Limited says.

"Unfortunately, the company's performance was severely impacted by
the rising levels of unemployment in the UK and a very difficult
housing market -- all factors leading to a steep and continued
decline in consumer demand.  Orders declined even more rapidly in
the first half of 2011, further underpinning the negative trends
in the business," Insider Media Limited quoted an unnamed
spokesman for Sun European Partners, a private equity firm that
owns Homeform, as saying.

Sun European Partners rescued Homeform from administration in
2007, Insider Media Limited recalls.

Homeform has a factory in Wolverhampton and owns Kitchens Direct,
Dolphin Bathrooms and Moben Kitchens, employs 1,300 people across
its 160 showrooms and uses the services of 1,500 self-employed
fitters and designers.


ORCHESTRA WOTTON: Goes Into Administration, Axes 70 Jobs
--------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Orchestra Wotton has gone into
administration cutting 70 jobs in the process.

Administrators for Orchestra Wotton said they were unable to find
a buyer for the business, according to BBC News.

Wotton-under-Edge plant was part of the Orchestra Group.  However,
BBC News notes, the data service branch of the group -- Orchestra
Bristol -- have been bought out saving 122 jobs.

A spokesman for administrators Grant Thornton said immediate
closure was the only practical course of action, as there was "no
funding to pay wages and salaries going forward and only a very
limited order book for the foreseeable future," BBC News
discloses.

A meeting took place on June 24, between the Unite union and 50
members of the 68-strong workforce who are fighting for a proper
pay-off after being told they were only able to claim statutory
redundancy, BBC News adds.

Orchestra Wott is a printing company in the United Kingdom.


RINK CORP: To Go Into Voluntary Liquidation
-------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Rink Corp Limited is to go into voluntary
liquidation.

According to BBC, sixteen staff of the company are being made
redundant after the business was declared "no longer financially
viable".

Business licenses to trade as "Cardiff Devils" and "Sheffield
Steelers" have been issued to two separate companies, BBC
discloses.

Insolvency practitioner John Cullen says matches will go ahead
next season, BBC states.

A meeting of members and creditors will be held on July 7, BBC
says.

Consultation with affected employees began on Thursday, June 23,
BBC relates.  The company has, however, granted two business
licenses to trade which will enable matches to continue next
season and ensure season tickets are honored, BBC notes.

Rink Corp Limited owns leading ice hockey teams Cardiff Devils and
Sheffield Steelers.


* DAVID DALY: Seeks to Overturn NAMA's Receiver Appointment
-----------------------------------------------------------
RTE News reports that Developer David Daly has started legal
proceedings aimed at overturning the National Asset Management
Agency (NAMA)'s appointment of statutory receivers to a string of
upmarket properties in Dublin and London he owns personally.

NAMA assumed control of loans to Mr. Daly worth hundreds of
millions of euro from Allied Irish Banks, plc. (AIB), according to
RTE News.

The report notes that among the properties subject to the
receivership are:

   -- 87 St Stephen's Green in Dublin, which is leased by the
      Garda Inspectorate,

   -- another property on St Stephen's Green is leased by ESB
      International, and

   -- the outlet which houses retailer River Island in Grafton
      Street, Dublin.

RTE News notes that in London, receivers will take control of
properties including premises let by Louis Vuitton in New Bond
Street.  RTE News relates that in Ireland, Jim Hamilton of BDO
Simpson Xavier has been appointed receiver.  In London, LPA
receivers from BDO Shay Bannon and Sarah Rayment have been
appointed.

However, RTE News relates, Mr. Daly and his children have taken
legal proceedings aimed at preventing NAMA insisting on repayment
of their EUR457 million loans with AIB or appointing a receiver
over properties.  RTE News notes that Michael Cush SC, for David,
Joanne and Paul Daly, secured permission from the High Court to
serve short notice of their proceedings on NAMA, the State and
AIB.

RTE News discloses that Mr. Cush said the Dalys' case was that
they were meeting all their obligations concerning the loans but
NAMA had taken the view that these were demand facilities which
could be called in any time.

The Dalys are seeking a declaration that credit facilities they
entered into with AIB in July 2007 and February 2008, which were
transferred to NAMA last year, are not repayable on demand, RTE
News says.  The report relates that NAMA's decisions to demand
repayment of the facilities on or about June 22 and June 24 is
unreasonable, disproportionate and contrary to their
constitutional rights and an improper exercise of its powers, they
claim, and they want court declarations to that effect.

RTE News discloses that the Daly's are also claiming certain
provisions of the NAMA Act are invalid, unconstitutional and in
breach of the State's obligations under the European Convention on
Human Rights.

RTE News notes that in an affidavit, David Daly, Estuary House,
New Street, Malahide, said the plaintiffs wanted to restrain NAMA
taking any steps to seek repayment of the plaintiffs credit
facilities with AIB and/or to enforce any obligations related to
those facilities, including the appointment of a receiver.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOND PRICING: For the Week June 20 to June 24, 2011
-----------------------------------------------------

Issuer                   Coupon     Maturity Currency     Price
------                   ------      ------- --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES           8.750   10/27/2014     EUR      33.42
BA CREDITANSTALT           5.000    3/22/2029     EUR      73.60
IMMOFINANZ                 4.250     3/8/2018     EUR       4.02
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.350   11/16/2018     EUR      74.13
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.750    4/30/2021     EUR      71.71
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.810    7/29/2025     EUR      58.75
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.160    5/20/2025     EUR      71.95
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.900    8/18/2025     EUR      61.88
OESTER VOLKSBK             5.270     2/8/2027     EUR      73.53
RAIFF LB OBEROST           4.620    9/17/2030     EUR      68.78
RAIFF ZENTRALBK            4.500    9/28/2035     EUR      76.22
BULGARIA
--------
ECONOCOM GROUP             4.000     6/1/2016     EUR      20.14
PETROL AD-SOFIA            8.375   10/26/2011     EUR      83.01

CZECH REPUBLIC
--------------
SAZKA                      9.000    7/12/2021     EUR      60.00

DENMARK
-------
KOMMUNEKREDIT              0.500   12/14/2020     ZAR      45.93
KOMMUNEKREDIT              0.500     2/3/2016     TRY      69.41

FINLAND
-------
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500     2/9/2016     ZAR      69.80
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    4/27/2018     ZAR      57.06
MUNI FINANCE PLC           1.000    2/27/2018     AUD      72.72
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.250    6/28/2040     CAD      22.79
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    3/17/2025     CAD      55.51
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    4/26/2016     ZAR      68.85
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   11/25/2020     ZAR      43.64
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    9/24/2020     CAD      70.56
MUNI FINANCE PLC           1.000   10/30/2017     AUD      74.07
MUNI FINANCE PLC           1.000    6/30/2017     ZAR      63.96

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM             4.970     4/1/2015     EUR      13.81
ALCATEL-LUCENT             5.000     1/1/2015     EUR       4.43
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG           6.720     1/1/2015     EUR       6.12
ATOS ORIGIN SA             2.500     1/1/2016     EUR      52.03
BNP PARIBAS                5.400    2/28/2013     EUR     103.14
CAISSE NAT D'AUT           3.900    7/25/2016     EUR     113.17
CALYON                     6.000    6/18/2047     EUR      23.39
CAP GEMINI SOGET           1.000     1/1/2012     EUR      44.01
CAP GEMINI SOGET           3.500     1/1/2014     EUR      44.18
CGG VERITAS                1.750     1/1/2016     EUR      30.32
CIE FIN FONCIER            3.250   12/30/2044     EUR      72.52
CLUB MEDITERRANE           6.110    11/1/2015     EUR      20.26
CLUB MEDITERRANE           5.000     6/8/2012     EUR      15.89
CREDIT AGRICOLE            3.100    10/7/2014     EUR      98.46
CREDIT AGRICOLE            5.200     6/1/2013     EUR     104.36
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY           1.000   12/23/2024     EUR      62.31
EURAZEO                    6.250    6/10/2014     EUR      59.56
FAURECIA                   4.500     1/1/2015     EUR      30.82
INGENICO                   2.750     1/1/2017     EUR      43.21
MAUREL ET PROM             7.125    7/31/2014     EUR      20.45
MAUREL ET PROM             7.125    7/31/2015     EUR      19.93
NEXANS SA                  4.000     1/1/2016     EUR      67.84
NOVASEP HLDG               9.625   12/15/2016     EUR      57.02
NOVASEP HLDG               9.625   12/15/2016     EUR      57.01
NOVASEP HLDG               9.750   12/15/2016     USD      56.63
NOVASEP HLDG               9.750   12/15/2016     USD      57.25
ORPEA                      3.875     1/1/2016     EUR      46.81
PEUGEOT SA                 4.450     1/1/2016     EUR      34.77
PUBLICIS GROUPE            1.000    1/18/2018     EUR      49.23
PUBLICIS GROUPE            3.125    7/30/2014     EUR      39.08
RHODIA SA                  0.500     1/1/2014     EUR      51.94
SOC AIR FRANCE             2.750     4/1/2020     EUR      20.56
SOITEC                     6.250     9/9/2014     EUR      10.66
TEM                        4.250     1/1/2015     EUR      56.96
THEOLIA                    2.700     1/1/2041     EUR      11.16

GERMANY
-------
EUROHYPO AG                3.830    9/21/2020     EUR      69.38
EUROHYPO AG                6.490    7/17/2017     EUR       6.50
HSH NORDBANK AG            4.375    2/14/2017     EUR      69.50
IKB DEUT INDUSTR           6.500    3/31/2012     EUR      18.00
IKB DEUT INDUSTR           6.550    3/31/2012     EUR      17.83
IKB DEUT INDUSTR           5.625    3/31/2017     EUR      15.00
L-BANK FOERDERBK           0.500    5/10/2027     CAD      50.28
LB BADEN-WUERTT            2.800    2/23/2037     JPY      76.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT            2.500    1/30/2034     EUR      57.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT            5.250   10/20/2015     EUR      28.89
Q-CELLS                    6.750   10/21/2015     EUR       2.83
QIMONDA FINANCE            6.750    3/22/2013     USD       2.75
SOLON AG SOLAR             1.375    12/6/2012     EUR      32.75
TAG IMMO AG                6.500   12/10/2015     EUR       7.73
TUI AG                     2.750    3/24/2016     EUR      52.51
WEST DT IMMOBK             4.500    3/31/2033     EUR      65.25
WEST DT IMMOBK             4.600    6/30/2028     EUR      69.88
WESTLB AG                  3.350   10/19/2026     EUR      73.05

GREECE
-------
ATHENS URBAN TRN           4.851    9/19/2016     EUR      49.98
ATHENS URBAN TRN           5.008    7/18/2017     EUR      48.72
ATHENS URBAN TRN           4.057    3/26/2013     EUR      70.43
ATHENS URBAN TRN           4.301    8/12/2014     EUR      58.27
HELLENIC RAILWAY           4.500    12/6/2016     JPY      43.09
HELLENIC REP I/L           2.300    7/25/2030     EUR      38.91
HELLENIC REP I/L           2.900    7/25/2025     EUR      37.09
HELLENIC REPUB             2.125     7/5/2013     CHF      69.27
HELLENIC REPUB             4.625    6/25/2013     USD      72.76
HELLENIC REPUB             4.590     4/8/2016     EUR      49.49
HELLENIC REPUB             5.000    3/11/2019     EUR      47.16
HELLENIC REPUB             6.140    4/14/2028     EUR      49.29
HELLENIC REPUB             5.200    7/17/2034     EUR      47.41
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.113    9/30/2014     EUR      54.60
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.700    7/20/2015     EUR      50.37
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.100    8/20/2015     EUR      54.92
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.702    9/30/2015     EUR      51.28
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.700   11/10/2015     EUR      49.51
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.600    7/20/2016     EUR      51.02
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.020    9/13/2016     EUR      52.10
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.225     3/1/2017     EUR      50.96
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.900    4/20/2017     EUR      51.78
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.300    7/20/2017     EUR      47.09
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.675    10/9/2017     EUR      49.36
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.590     4/3/2018     EUR      46.96
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.600    7/20/2018     EUR      46.84
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.014    2/27/2019     EUR      45.62
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.959     3/4/2019     EUR      48.94
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.000    7/19/2019     EUR      48.28
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.500   10/22/2019     EUR      52.30
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.250    6/19/2020     EUR      52.71
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.900   10/22/2022     EUR      47.81
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.700    3/20/2024     EUR      43.51
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.600    9/20/2040     EUR      41.27
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.500    1/11/2014     EUR      61.09
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.100    8/20/2012     EUR      73.30
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.520    9/30/2013     EUR      64.39
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.000    8/20/2013     EUR      63.56
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.427    7/31/2013     EUR      66.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.900     7/3/2013     EUR      68.10
HELLENIC REPUBLI           7.500    5/20/2013     EUR      70.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.600    5/20/2013     EUR      68.38
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.500    5/20/2014     EUR      55.24
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.500     7/1/2014     EUR      58.89
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.985    7/25/2014     EUR      54.85
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.500    8/20/2014     EUR      54.79
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.300    3/20/2026     EUR      44.66
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.506    3/31/2013     EUR      71.52
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.500    9/20/2037     EUR      41.33
NATIONAL BK GREE           3.875    10/7/2016     EUR      62.88

IRELAND
-------
AIB MORTGAGE BNK           5.000    2/12/2030     EUR      50.33
AIB MORTGAGE BNK           5.000     3/1/2030     EUR      50.29
AIB MORTGAGE BNK           5.580    4/28/2028     EUR      56.47
ALLIED IRISH BKS          10.750    3/29/2017     EUR      21.45
ALLIED IRISH BKS           7.875     7/5/2023     GBP      24.50
ALLIED IRISH BKS           4.000    3/19/2015     EUR      70.18
ALLIED IRISH BKS          12.500    6/25/2019     GBP      24.62
ALLIED IRISH BKS           5.625   11/12/2014     EUR      70.25
ANGLO IRISH BANK           4.000    4/15/2015     EUR      74.84
BANK OF IRELAND            9.250     9/7/2020     GBP      36.24
BANK OF IRELAND           10.000    2/12/2020     GBP      35.75
BANK OF IRELAND           10.000    2/12/2020     EUR      34.98
BANK OF IRELAND            8.500    9/22/2018     CAD      34.50
BANK OF IRELAND            4.875    1/22/2018     GBP      33.99
BANK OF IRELAND            3.585    4/21/2015     EUR      69.49
BANK OF IRELAND            3.780     4/1/2015     EUR      70.51
BANK OF IRELAND            4.000    1/28/2015     EUR      73.15
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.360   10/12/2029     EUR      48.04
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.760     9/7/2029     EUR      50.99
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.450     3/1/2030     EUR      48.20
DEPFA ACS BANK             0.500     3/3/2025     CAD      37.58
DEPFA ACS BANK             4.900    8/24/2035     CAD      64.42
DEPFA ACS BANK             5.125    3/16/2037     USD      71.65
DEPFA ACS BANK             5.125    3/16/2037     USD      71.65
EBS BLDG SOCIETY           4.992    3/19/2015     EUR      65.45
IRISH GOVT                 4.500   10/18/2018     EUR      63.70
IRISH GOVT                 4.600    4/18/2016     EUR      69.64
IRISH GOVT                 4.400    6/18/2019     EUR      62.79
IRISH GOVT                 5.900   10/18/2019     EUR      66.34
IRISH GOVT                 4.500    4/18/2020     EUR      61.36
IRISH GOVT                 5.000   10/18/2020     EUR      62.37
IRISH GOVT                 5.400    3/13/2025     EUR      61.54
IRISH LIFE PERM            4.820    3/22/2015     EUR      64.85
IRISH LIFE PERM            4.000    3/10/2015     EUR      70.11
IRISH NATIONWIDE           6.250    6/26/2012     GBP      74.38

ITALY
-----
CITY OF ROME               5.345    1/27/2048     EUR      73.93
CITY OF TURIN              5.270    6/26/2038     EUR      74.98
CO BRAONE                  4.567    6/30/2037     EUR      70.41
COMUNE DI MILANO           4.019    6/29/2035     EUR      65.56
REGION OF LIGURI           4.795   11/22/2034     EUR      72.70
REGION OF UMBRIA           5.087    6/15/2037     EUR      74.60
REP OF ITALY               1.850    9/15/2057     EUR      65.94
REP OF ITALY               2.200    9/15/2058     EUR      73.38
REP OF ITALY               2.000    9/15/2062     EUR      66.92
SARDINIA REGION            4.022   11/28/2035     EUR      74.89
TELECOM ITALIA             5.250    3/17/2055     EUR      72.34

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL              7.250     4/1/2014     EUR      28.45
ESPIRITO SANTO F           6.875   10/21/2019     EUR      63.91
LIGHTHOUSE INTL            8.000    4/30/2014     EUR      34.15
LIGHTHOUSE INTL            8.000    4/30/2014     EUR      33.97
UMICORE FINANCE            4.875    2/18/2012     EUR     100.86

NETHERLANDS
-----------
ABN AMRO BANK NV           5.400    2/18/2026     NOK     111.87
ABN AMRO BANK NV           5.080     6/9/2021     NOK     106.29
APP INTL FINANCE          11.750    10/1/2005     USD       0.03
BE SEMICONDUCTOR           5.500    1/28/2012     EUR     114.73
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    6/22/2016     TRY      67.32
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    3/17/2016     TRY      68.70
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    4/27/2016     TRY      68.17
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    5/25/2016     TRY      68.15
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    3/29/2021     USD      71.92
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500     3/3/2021     NZD      62.13
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    5/12/2021     ZAR      43.59
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    3/29/2021     NZD      61.77
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    6/22/2021     ZAR      45.90
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    2/24/2025     CAD      56.20
BLT FINANCE BV             7.500    5/15/2014     USD      79.95
BRIT INSURANCE             6.625    12/9/2030     GBP      64.93
ELEC DE CAR FIN            8.500    4/10/2018     USD      58.22
FRIESLAND BANK             4.210   12/29/2025     EUR      70.40
ING BANK NV                4.600   10/27/2020     NOK     102.31
ING BANK NV                4.715    11/2/2020     NOK     103.19
ING BANK NV                5.115     2/1/2021     NOK     106.37
KPNQWEST BV                8.125     6/1/2009     USD       0.05
NATL INVESTER BK          25.983     5/7/2029     EUR      19.63
NED WATERSCHAPBK           0.500    3/11/2025     CAD      56.79
NIB CAPITAL BANK           4.510   12/16/2035     EUR      66.58
PORTUGAL TEL FIN           4.500    6/16/2025     EUR      69.52
Q-CELLS INTERNAT           5.750    5/26/2014     EUR      66.18
SIDETUR FINANCE           10.000    4/20/2016     USD      74.60
TJIWI KIMIA FIN           13.250     8/1/2001     USD       0.01

NORWAY
------
EKSPORTFINANS              0.500     5/9/2030     CAD      42.41
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    3/24/2016     ZAR      72.61
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    1/27/2016     ZAR      73.45
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    5/25/2018     ZAR      61.29
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    5/25/2016     ZAR      71.65
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500     3/1/2016     ZAR      72.97
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500   12/18/2015     ZAR      74.02
NORSKE SKOGIND             7.125   10/15/2033     USD      68.88
NORSKE SKOGIND             7.125   10/15/2033     USD      68.88

PORTUGAL
--------
BANCO COM PORTUG           3.750    10/8/2016     EUR      74.03
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.750    2/14/2016     EUR      66.90
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.250    1/27/2020     EUR      72.10
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.980     3/3/2028     EUR      70.25
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.320     8/5/2021     EUR      61.04
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.380    10/1/2038     EUR      57.73
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.400    10/8/2019     EUR      60.86
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.455    8/20/2017     EUR      69.17
COMBOIOS DE PORT           4.170   10/16/2019     EUR      59.89
COMBOIOS DE PORT           5.700     2/5/2030     EUR      66.13
METRO DE LISBOA            5.750     2/4/2019     EUR      70.44
METRO DE LISBOA            4.061    12/4/2026     EUR      51.45
METRO DE LISBOA            4.799    12/7/2027     EUR      55.92
MONTEPIO GERAL             5.000     2/8/2017     EUR      59.38
PARPUBLICA                 4.200   11/16/2026     EUR      66.80
PARPUBLICA                 3.567    9/22/2020     EUR      60.74
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.100    4/15/2037     EUR      53.06
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.950   10/25/2023     EUR      59.54
PORTUGUESE OT'S            3.850    4/15/2021     EUR      56.82
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.800    6/15/2020     EUR      60.10
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.750    6/14/2019     EUR      61.06
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.450    6/15/2018     EUR      62.65
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.350   10/16/2017     EUR      63.29
PORTUGUESE OT'S            3.350   10/15/2015     EUR      69.83
PORTUGUESE OT'S            3.600   10/15/2014     EUR      73.36
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.200   10/15/2016     EUR      67.51
REFER                      4.000    3/16/2015     EUR      62.59
REFER                      4.250   12/13/2021     EUR      50.60
REFER                      5.875    2/18/2019     EUR      64.68

RUSSIA
------
APK ARKADA                17.500    5/23/2012     RUB       0.38
ARIZK                      3.000   12/20/2030     RUB      52.76
BARENTSEV FINANS          20.000     7/4/2011     RUB       1.10
DVTG-FINANS               17.000    8/29/2013     RUB       6.03
IZHAVTO                   18.000     6/9/2011     RUB      11.31
M-INDUSTRIYA              12.250    8/16/2011     RUB      25.10
MIG-FINANS                 0.100     9/6/2011     RUB       1.00
MIRAX                     17.000    9/17/2012     RUB      12.00
MOSMART FINANS             0.010    4/12/2012     RUB       1.81
NOK                       10.000    9/22/2011     RUB      10.00
NOK                       12.500    8/26/2014     RUB       0.04
PENOPLEX-FINANS           14.000   11/21/2014     RUB      74.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA           1.000   12/17/2012     RUB       0.01
PROTON-FINANCE             9.000    6/12/2012     RUB      65.00
SAHO                      10.000    5/21/2012     RUB       0.03
SATURN                     8.500     6/6/2014     RUB       1.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS           10.500    3/27/2012     RUB       3.40
TERNA-FINANS               1.000    11/4/2011     RUB       0.02

SPAIN
-----
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           3.750   12/14/2022     EUR      70.31
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           4.250   10/25/2023     EUR      73.58
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           3.750    6/30/2025     EUR      64.63
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           4.750    5/25/2027     EUR      71.35
AYUNTAM DE MADRD           4.550    6/16/2036     EUR      70.32
BANCAJA                    1.500    5/22/2018     EUR      65.70
BANCO PASTOR               4.550    7/31/2020     EUR      74.14
CAJA CASTIL-MAN            1.500    6/23/2021     EUR      62.86
CAJA MADRID                5.755    2/26/2028     EUR      72.23
CAJA MADRID                5.020    2/26/2038     EUR      74.66
CAJA MADRID                4.000     2/3/2025     EUR      73.62
CAJA MADRID                4.125    3/24/2036     EUR      65.87
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO           3.875    5/23/2025     EUR      66.17
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO           4.250    4/10/2031     EUR      59.96
CEDULAS TDA A-5            4.250    3/28/2027     EUR      65.48
COMUN AUTO CANAR           3.900   11/30/2035     EUR      56.04
COMUN AUTO CANAR           4.200   10/25/2036     EUR      58.90
COMUNIDAD ARAGON           4.646    7/11/2036     EUR      71.51
COMUNIDAD BALEAR           4.063   11/23/2035     EUR      65.60
COMUNIDAD MADRID           4.300    9/15/2026     EUR      69.90
GEN DE CATALUNYA           4.220    4/26/2035     EUR      67.36
GEN DE CATALUNYA           5.219    9/10/2029     EUR      75.24
GEN DE CATALUNYA           4.690   10/28/2034     EUR      72.11
GENERAL DE ALQUI           2.750    8/20/2012     EUR      72.02
IM CEDULAS 5               3.500    6/15/2020     EUR      75.39
INSTITUT CATALA            4.250    6/15/2024     EUR      73.15
JUNTA ANDALUCIA            5.150    5/24/2034     EUR      72.27
JUNTA ANDALUCIA            4.250   10/31/2036     EUR      60.02
JUNTA LA MANCHA            3.875    1/31/2036     EUR      55.64
XUNTA DE GALICIA           4.025   11/28/2035     EUR      61.58

SWEDEN
------
SWEDISH EXP CRED           9.000    8/12/2011     USD      10.31
SWEDISH EXP CRED           9.000    8/28/2011     USD      10.58
SWEDISH EXP CRED           8.000   10/21/2011     USD      10.00
SWEDISH EXP CRED           8.000    11/4/2011     USD       7.04
SWEDISH EXP CRED           2.000    12/7/2011     USD       9.89
SWEDISH EXP CRED           2.130    1/10/2012     USD       9.88
SWEDISH EXP CRED           6.500    1/27/2012     USD       9.34
SWEDISH EXP CRED           8.000    1/27/2012     USD       9.08
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.500    2/28/2012     USD       8.88
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.000     3/9/2012     USD       9.90
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.000     3/9/2012     USD      10.09
SWEDISH EXP CRED           9.750    3/23/2012     USD       9.19
SWEDISH EXP CRED           9.250    4/27/2012     USD       9.19
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.500    6/12/2012     USD       9.43
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500     3/3/2016     ZAR      70.86
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    6/14/2016     ZAR      71.47
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    6/29/2016     TRY      64.19
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500     3/5/2018     AUD      71.04
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500   12/17/2027     USD      51.15
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    1/25/2028     USD      50.93
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500   12/21/2015     ZAR      72.26

SWITZERLAND
-----------
HELVETIA PATRIA            1.750    4/19/2013     CHF     101.53
UBS AG                    10.070    3/23/2012     USD      35.34
UBS AG                    10.530    1/23/2012     USD      40.30
UBS AG                    14.000    5/23/2012     USD       8.57
UBS AG                    13.700    5/23/2012     USD      13.09
UBS AG                    13.300    5/23/2012     USD       3.97
UBS AG                    10.580    6/29/2011     USD      39.04
UBS AG                     9.250    3/20/2012     USD      14.58
UBS AG JERSEY             10.360    8/19/2011     USD      51.92
UBS AG JERSEY             11.150    8/31/2011     USD      38.68
UBS AG JERSEY              9.450    9/21/2011     USD      49.91
UBS AG JERSEY              3.220    7/31/2012     EUR      46.87
UBS AG JERSEY              9.230   12/30/2011     USD      13.85

UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
ABBEY NATL TREAS           5.000    8/26/2030     USD      74.76
ALPHA CREDIT GRP           4.500    4/14/2014     EUR      73.88
BANK NADRA                 8.000    6/22/2017     USD      75.39
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.750    9/22/2011     USD      72.36
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.550    1/23/2012     USD      11.32
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.250    1/31/2012     USD       9.45
BARCLAYS BK PLC           10.600    7/21/2011     USD      39.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC            7.500    9/22/2011     USD      17.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.500    8/31/2012     USD      29.73
BARCLAYS BK PLC           10.800    7/31/2012     USD      27.52
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.250    8/31/2012     USD      35.47
BARCLAYS BK PLC           12.950    4/20/2012     USD      23.75
BRADFORD&BIN BLD           5.750   12/12/2022     GBP      48.50
BRADFORD&BIN BLD           5.500    1/15/2018     GBP      48.50
CO-OPERATIVE BNK           5.875    3/28/2033     GBP      70.91
EFG HELLAS PLC             4.375    2/11/2013     EUR      71.59
EFG HELLAS PLC             6.010     1/9/2036     EUR      31.63
EFG HELLAS PLC             5.400    11/2/2047     EUR      24.63
EMPORIKI GRP FIN           4.000    2/28/2013     EUR      70.25
EMPORIKI GRP FIN           4.000    2/28/2013     EUR      70.25
ENTERPRISE INNS            6.375    9/26/2031     GBP      74.78
ESPRIT TELECOM            10.875    6/15/2008     USD       0.01
F&C ASSET MNGMT            6.750   12/20/2026     GBP      73.01
HBOS PLC                   4.500    3/18/2030     EUR      73.20
NOMURA BANK INTL           0.800   12/21/2020     EUR      65.86
NORTHERN ROCK              4.574    1/13/2015     GBP      80.96
NORTHERN ROCK              5.750    2/28/2017     GBP      73.67
PIRAEUS GRP FIN            4.000    9/17/2012     EUR      69.50
PUNCH TAVERNS              8.374    7/15/2029     GBP      64.00
PUNCH TAVERNS              7.567    4/15/2026     GBP      65.17
PUNCH TAVERNS              6.468    4/15/2033     GBP      46.84
ROYAL BK SCOTLND           4.692     6/9/2025     EUR      70.08
ROYAL BK SCOTLND           6.316    6/29/2030     EUR      61.30
RSL COMM PLC              12.000    11/1/2008     USD       1.88
SKIPTON BUILDING           5.625    1/18/2018     GBP      76.99
SKIPTON BUILDING           6.750    5/30/2022     GBP      67.50
UNIQUE PUB FIN             6.464    3/30/2032     GBP      62.94
UNIQUE PUB FIN             5.659    6/30/2027     GBP      75.35
WESSEX WATER FIN           1.369    7/31/2057     GBP      30.82


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline
S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *