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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Monday, July 4, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 130

                            Headlines



A U S T R I A

UNICREDIT BANK: Moody's Upgrades BFSR From 'D+'; Outlook Stable


D E N M A R K

AMAGERBANKEN AS: Administrators Okay Additional Creditor Payouts


G E R M A N Y

BRENNTAG AG: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba1' Rating to EUR300-Mil. Notes
TYROL ACQUISITION: Moody's Assigns (P) B2 CFR; Stable Outlook


I R E L A N D

ALLIED IRISH: Aurelius Settlement Talks on Burden Sharing Begins
IRISH LIFE: Invites Up to 20 Potential Bidders for Insurance Unit
PULS CDO: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A2B Notes to 'B3 (sf)'
XTRA-VISION: 83 Landlords Agree to Vary Rental Lease Agreements
IRISH NATIONWIDE: Assets & Liabilities Transferred to Anglo


K A Z A K H S T A N

DELTA BANK: Moody's Withdraws 'B3' Long-Term Deposit Ratings
TSESNA BANK: S&P Hikes Long-term Counterparty Credit Rating to 'B'


N E T H E R L A N D S

DSB BANK: Novapars Capital Agrees to Buy German Loan Portfolio
LEOPARD II: S&P Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'CCC'
SABIC IP: S&P Assesses Stand-Alone Credit Profile at 'BB'


R U S S I A

RUSSIAN BANK: Moody's Affirms 'E+' BFSR; Outlook Stable
SOGAZ OJSC: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Rating From 'BB+'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AMDEGA: Endless to Lose GBP8.3 Millions Injected in Firm
ASSETCO PLC: Faces GBP8 Million Unpaid Tax Bill
D2 PROPERTY: In Receivership to Royal Bank Of Scotland
FORENSIC SCIENCE: Member of Parliament Criticizes Closure Plan
FOX BROS: Administrators Seek to Sell Remaining Plant Fleet


X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week June 27 to July 1, 2011




                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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UNICREDIT BANK: Moody's Upgrades BFSR From 'D+'; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to C- from D+ the
standalone bank financial strength rating of UniCredit Bank
Austria which concludes the review for upgrade of the BFSR
initiated on May 26, 2011. The C- BFSR now maps to a Baa2 on the
long-term rating scale. The outlook on the BFSR is stable.

The ratings for UBA's long-term debt and deposits and its
subordinated and hybrid securities remain on review for downgrade.
The conclusion of this review will be subject to the completion of
the rating review of UBA's Italian parent bank, UniCredit SpA. The
parent bank's Aa3 long-term deposit and senior debt ratings and
its standalone C BFSR had been placed on review for downgrade on
May 17, 2011, and Moody's expects this review to be concluded
within three months from the date of the rating review.

RATINGS RATIONALE

UPGRADE OF UBA'S STANDALONE BFSR

The upgrade of UBA's BFSR to C- from D+ reflects the stabilization
in the bank's risk profile as well as its improved earnings power,
which remained resilient throughout the global financial crisis.
UBA generates a large portion of its earnings from its strong
retail franchise in Central and Eastern Europe which has generally
developed favorably over the past 12 months. In addition, UBA's
regulatory and economic capitalization levels have improved;
therefore the bank now benefits from enhanced loss absorption
capacity which underpins the C- BFSR. UBA's Tier 1 ratio has
improved to 10.7% as per the unaudited 1Q 2011 interim statement
(from just 6.8% at year-end 2008) as a result of (i) a capital
injection from its parent bank UniCredit and (ii) retained
earnings.

UBA's C- BFSR remains constrained by the continued pressure on
asset quality resulting from the bank's exposure to less mature,
more volatile CEE countries, most notably Romania, Kazakhstan and
the Baltic States. While Moody's expects that problem loans will
stabilise at current elevated levels, credit costs will continue
to weigh on the bank's earnings for the foreseeable future.

The stable outlook on UBA's BFSR reflects Moody's expectation that
the stabilization of asset quality and the overall improvement in
the bank's financial profile will be sustained.

UBA's LONG-TERM RATINGS REMAIN ON REVIEW FOR DOWNGRADE

UBA's C- BFSR may not fully offset the adverse impact of weakening
parental support capacity. Therefore, the bank's long-term ratings
will remain on review for downgrade which was originally triggered
by the review for downgrade of UniCredit's BFSR. UBA's long-term
debt and deposit ratings now incorporate a two-notch uplift for
systemic support reflecting Moody's assessment of high probability
of support from the Austrian government in case of need and a two-
notch uplift for parental support (from three notches previously).

LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

This rating was upgraded:

   -- bank financial strength rating to C- from D+, with a stable
  outlook (the BFSR now maps to Baa2 on the long-term scale)

These ratings remain on review for downgrade:

   -- A1 long-term senior debt deposit and ratings

   -- (P)A1 senior unsecured medium-term note (MTN) rating

   -- (P)A2 senior subordinated MTN rating

   -- Ba1(hyb) junior subordinated debt rating

   -- Baa3(hyb) preferred stock rating

These ratings of UBA remain unaffected by the rating announcement:

   -- Prime-1 short-term debt and deposit ratings.

PREVIOUS RATING ACTIONS AND PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in
March 2007.

Headquartered in Vienna, Austria, UBA had total assets of
EUR190 billion as at March 31, 2011.


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D E N M A R K
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AMAGERBANKEN AS: Administrators Okay Additional Creditor Payouts
----------------------------------------------------------------
John Acher at Reuters reports that administrators of Amagerbanken
A/S said the remnants of the Danish bank, which fell into state
hands in February, will be allowed to distribute additional funds
to eligible creditors.

Reuters relates that Finansiel Stabilitet, the state company that
manages failed banks in Denmark, said a new valuation of
Amagerbanken's assets and liabilities provided a basis for
increasing payouts by about DKK6.7 billion (US$1.27 billion).

In connection with the transfer of Amagerbanken to Finansiel
Stabilitet, unsubordinated creditors whose claims were covered
neither by the Danish Guarantee Fund for Depositors and Investors
nor by an individual government guarantee were paid a preliminary
dividend of 58.8%, Reuters discloses.

According to Reuters, Finansiel Stabilitet said in a statement
that subject to a court ruling or other decision confirming the
auditors' valuation of the assets, the dividend rate will be
increased to 84.4%, with the possibility of a further increase.
It said the new estimated payout was based mainly on an increase
in the value of assets of DKK2.4 billion, dissolution of an
intermediate account for DKK3.4 billion, and fewer claims from
creditors amounting to DKK1 billion, Reuters notes.

                        About Amagerbanken

Amagerbanken, the 8th largest bank in Denmark, was hit in 2008 by
the financial crisis and needed to refinance it on the market, in
order to balance necessary asset write-downs.  After continuous
unsuccessful efforts to obtain new financing or to find other
solutions, Amagerbanken was declared bankrupt on February 7, 2011.
Previously, February 6, 2011, Amagerbanken had entered into a
conditional transfer agreement with the Danish publicly owned
Financial Stability Company (FSC), as part of the Danish bank
wind-up scheme.


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G E R M A N Y
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BRENNTAG AG: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba1' Rating to EUR300-Mil. Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)Ba1- LGD4
(50.16%) rating to Brenntag's newly proposed EUR300 million worth
of senior unsecured guaranteed notes maturing in 2018. All other
ratings of the Brenntag group remain unchanged. The outlook on all
ratings is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

"The provisional rating assigned by Moody's to the newly proposed
notes is in line with Brenntag's corporate family rating,
reflecting the fact that there will be no meaningful financial
debt ranking ahead of the senior unsecured notes at the time of
issuance," says Gianmarco Migliavacca, a Moody's Vice President --
Senior Analyst and lead analyst for Brenntag. In particular,
Brenntag's new syndicated bank facilities announced for the
refinancing, despite having maintenance financial covenants, are
nevertheless senior unsecured facilities ranking pari-passu with
the notes and sharing substantially the same guarantor package.

The newly proposed EUR300 million of senior unsecured guaranteed
notes will be issued by Brenntag Finance BV, a subsidiary
indirectly owned by the parent company, Brenntag AG, and will rank
pari passu with the unsecured and unsubordinated indebtedness of
the Brenntag group.

The newly proposed notes will be guaranteed by Brenntag AG and
selected material subsidiaries, together accounting for 78.6% of
the 2010 audited consolidated EBITDA of the Brenntag group. There
will be no maintenance guarantor test during the life of the notes
-- however, this is set at 65% of group EBITDA for the new bank
facilities, which have substantially the same guarantors as the
notes. All guarantees, except for that provided by the parent
Brenntag AG, will upon request of Brenntag be automatically
released if at least two out of the three main credit rating
agencies confirm that Brenntag attains investment-grade status.

The terms and conditions of the notes do not include incurrence
covenants, whilst the new bank facilities will have maintenance
financial covenants, and the cross-default clause in the terms of
the notes is limited to a financial debt payment default scenario.
As a result, despite the pari-passu ranking, Moody's highlights
that, practically, in case of breach of maintenance financial
covenants under the new bank facilities, only the lenders of the
new bank facilities could call an acceleration event and start a
recovery process under the guarantees, whilst the noteholders
would have no ability to do that, until cross acceleration is
triggered. Moody's also highlights the newly proposed notes mature
in 2018, after the bank facilities (2016), however this
chronological subordination is not a material factor in Moody's
rating methodology when assessing relative positioning of
different debt instruments. Under this respect, Moody's also notes
that, according to the newly proposed notes' terms and conditions
, the Issuer could always call the notes at any time before their
maturity date, provided it delivers a min 60 days and max 90 days
prior notice to the noteholders, and subject to customary make-
whole provisions.

Moody's assignment of a definitive rating to the newly proposed
EUR300 million of senior unsecured guaranteed notes is subject to
the actual issuance of the notes by Brenntag Finance BV, and the
rating agency's review of the final associated documentation.
Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final issue
of securities, and these ratings represent only Moody's
preliminary opinion. Upon a conclusive review of the transaction
and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign
definitive ratings to the securities. A definitive rating may
differ from a provisional rating.

While Moody's does not anticipate positive rating pressure at this
stage, a rating upgrade could arise if Brenntag were to: (i)
continue to improve its leverage profile and operate with a ratio
of gross debt/EBITDA (as adjusted by Moody's) that is sustainably
below 3.0x; and (ii) increase its ratio of retained cash flow
(RCF)/debt (as adjusted by Moody's) sustainably above 20%.
Moreover, to achieve a rating upgrade, management would need to
demonstrate a strong official commitment to investment-grade
rating status.

Negative pressure could arise if the group's gross debt/EBITDA
ratio were to increase sustainably above 4.0x and its RCF/debt
ratio were to fall below 15%. Any deviation from the announced
acquisition policy -- particularly with regard to the avoidance of
transformative debt-funded acquisitions -- could also exert
downward rating pressure on the rating.

The principal methodology used in rating Brenntag was the Global
Chemical Industry Rating Methodology, published December 2009.

Brenntag is the world's largest independent chemical distributor,
with an estimated global market share of 6.9% and 2010 revenues of
EUR7.6 billion. The group has market-leading positions in Europe
(12.0% market share) and in Latin America (7.1% market share). It
also has a strong presence in North America, where it ranks as the
number three player, with a 10.0% market share. Brenntag, a former
division of Stinnes AG, a German logistics group, was sold to
funds advised by Bain Capital in an LBO in 2004, and in September
2006 to funds advised by BC Partners in a secondary LBO. Since the
IPO in 2010, Brenntag has been listed on the Frankfurt Stock
Exchange. Since January 2011, the free float of the group was 64%.


TYROL ACQUISITION: Moody's Assigns (P) B2 CFR; Stable Outlook
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has assigned a provisional (P)B2 corporate family rating
and a (P)B2 probability of default rating to Tyrol Acquisition 1
SAS, a parent company for the TDF group. The outlook on the
ratings is stable.

TDF is the incumbent terrestrial TV and Radio transmission
business and leading tower infrastructure provider in France. It
is also a leading digital terrestrial TV operator in Germany, its
second largest market. In FY2011, TDF generated approximately 87%
of its revenues in France and Germany. TDF also operates in other
European countries as an alternative communications infrastructure
provider. The group is owned by private equity investors led by
TPG, AXA, the FSI and Charterhouse.

TDF is currently in the process of amending and extending its
existing bank debt. The provisional ratings therefore assume that
this process will be successfully completed.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The (P)B2 CFR reflects: (i) TDF's leading position as an incumbent
broadcasting infrastructure provider in France and Germany; (ii)
the limited number of competitors and high barriers to entry;
(iii) TDF's long-standing customer relationships with TV and radio
broadcasters as well as mobile-network-operators; and (iv) Moody's
understanding that a majority of TDF's contracts have been renewed
for digital TV in the context of the analog terrestrial switch-off
in France, planned for November 2011.

The (P)B2 CFR also reflects: (i) the possibility of a gradual
erosion in TDF's market shares in France; (ii) the weak
positioning of DTT as a technology platform for distributing TV in
Germany; (iii) the downward revenue and EBITDA trend associated
with the transition to digital and uncertainty regarding a return
to meaningful growth; and (iv) TDF's high financial leverage
associated with an expectation of negative free cash flow
generation over the medium term.

TDF's business profile is characterized by high market shares in
transmission services for TV broadcasters in France. DTT is the
strongest technological platform ahead of satellite and IPTV with
43% penetration of primary TV sets. In that context, TDF enjoys
over 80% share in the access (wholesale) market and over 70% share
in the transmission market across sites. Moody's however believes
that direct competition from existing players is likely to
continue to develop, potentially resulting in an erosion in TDF's
market share going forward.

In parallel, DTT penetration in Germany is low with approximately
6% penetration of primary TV sets. In that market, Media &
Broadcast generates stable and recurring revenues from long-term
contracts with the two main public broadcasters. Moody's however
expects some near term revenue pressure in Germany as the company
voluntarily shifts its business model in the Contribution Networks
and Satellite segments towards more profitable contracts.

Moody's believes that the growing nature of alternative digital TV
platforms such as Cable, IPTV in France are likely to pose a
future business challenge and potential for downside risk to TDF
in the longer term. At the same time, Moody's believes that the
German market for digital TV and pay TV is a particularly
challenging one for TDF given the relatively low importance of DTT
in Germany.

TDF enjoys long-standing contracts with TV and Radio broadcasters
as well as MNOs, with the 10 largest customers providing
approximately 46% of group revenues. Moody's believes that TDF's
strong market position should limit the level of customer churn,
or the ability of customers to exercise significant pricing
pressure over the medium-term. Also, the fact that digital
technology represents significantly lower transmission costs for
content broadcasters coupled with a recent recovery in advertising
markets further mitigate price-driven downside potential in
Moody's view.

The telecom site-hosting business (approximately 15% of TDF's
group revenues) offers good revenue visibility with generally
long-term contracts. Although Moody's views the "tower business"
in France as not widely developed, the agency notes the relatively
positive prospects for TDF driven by (i) the entry of a 4th player
in the French mobile market and (ii) the broad roll-out of 4G
technology.

TDF's capital expenditure averaged around 15% of sales in France
over the past 3 years and is expected to peak at around 20% this
year. Moody's however expects capex to reduce thereafter as
digital TV investments will have largely been completed.

The group operates over 11 000 tower-sites across geographies, of
which over 80% are located in France. Whilst TDF owns a majority
of the sites and part of the land in France, M&B leases all of its
sites from Deutsche Telekom. The combination of Infrastructure
ownership with the ability to use the asset base for providing
multiple offerings, i.e. TV, Radio and Telecom services
simultaneously impact profitability levels. As such, Moody's notes
that profitability is meaningfully stronger in France than in
Germany.

TDF has a highly leveraged capital structure, with over 7.5x
adjusted Debt to EBITDA expected at the end of this year. TDF is
under-going restructuring plans within the group (most notably in
France and Germany) which are likely to lead to significant cash
costs, weighting on the group's free cash flow generation. Moody's
does not expect material de-leveraging over the medium term given
the group's free cash flow profile.

The provisional (P)B2 CFR assumes that the current bank amend-and-
extend process will be completed with a high proportion of
existing lenders consenting. The proposed amendments include (i)
the extension of existing credit facility tranches A, B, Accordion
A, Accordion B and Revolving Credit Facility (RCF) into a new term
loan and extended RCF with maturities in 2016; (ii) the raising of
additional EUR100 million term loan D, and EUR150 million term
Loan E maturing in 2016; (iii) the integration of Media &
Broadcast (part of the consolidated group, but currently with a
ring-fenced debt structure) within the Tyrol facility agreement;
(iv) the re-setting of financial covenants; and (v) among other
amendments, the ability to issue bonds for refinancing purposes.

As of 31 March 2011, TDF had approximately EUR490 million in cash
on balance sheet and had fully drawn on its existing EUR400
million revolving credit facility. Following the amend & extend,
TDF will have no scheduled debt amortization before January 2014.
Moody's understands that the group will have to address future
refinancing needs with new funding sources, potentially via the
issuance of bonds.

Negative rating pressure could follow a deterioration in operating
performance translating into (i) adjusted leverage trending
towards 8.0x adjusted debt to EBITDA, (ii) significant negative
free cash flow, (iii) a deterioration of the group's liquidity
profile ,or (iv) the tightening of covenant headroom. Negative
pressure could also result from a failure to successfully complete
the amend-and-extend transaction. Positive pressure on the rating
could follow if adjusted leverage falls below 7.0x, together with
meaningful positive free cash flow generation.

Tyrol Acquisition 1 SAS's ratings were assigned by evaluating
factors that Moody's considers relevant to the credit profile of
the issuer, such as the company's (i) business risk and
competitive position compared with others within the industry;
(ii) capital structure and financial risk; (iii) projected
performance over the near to intermediate term; and (iv)
management's track record and tolerance for risk. Moody's compared
these attributes against other issuers both within and outside
Tyrol Acquisition 1 SAS's core industry and believes Tyrol
Acquisition 1 SAS's ratings are comparable to those of other
issuers with similar credit risk. Other methodologies used include
Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies
in the U.S., Canada and EMEA, published June 2009.

TDF is the incumbent terrestrial TV and Radio transmission
business and leading tower infrastructure provider in France. It
is also a leading digital terrestrial TV operator in Germany, its
second largest market. In FY2011, TDF generated approximately 87%
of its revenues in France and Germany. TDF also operates in other
European countries as an alternative communications infrastructure
provider. The group is owned by private equity investors led by
TPG, AXA, the FSI and Charterhouse. In FY 2011, TDF generated
approximately EUR1.5 billion in revenue and EUR677 million in
reported EBITDA.


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ALLIED IRISH: Aurelius Settlement Talks on Burden Sharing Begins
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Irish Times reports that settlement talks have begun in the
High Court challenge by a Cayman Islands investment firm to a
Ministerial order clearing the way for some burden-sharing by
junior bondholders in Allied Irish Banks plc.

The Irish Times relates that Mr. Justice John Cooke was asked to
adjourn the matter to last Friday when a settlement was expected
to be announced.

Aurelius Capital Master, along with some linked firms, has
challenged a Subordinated Liabilities Order, secured by the
Minister for Finance on April 14, in proceedings against the
Minister and the State, The Irish Times discloses.  The order
allows the Minister to change terms, conditions and maturity dates
on AIB's subordinated bonds, lift restrictions on buybacks and
reduce the value of the bonds so as to encourage bondholders to
take up a debt buyback offer which had a take-up deadline of
June 13, The Irish Times states.

Under the buyback, AIB will impose losses of as much as 90% on
subordinated bondholders, The Irish Times states.

Submissions for Aurelius concluded just after lunchtime on
Thursday, the 10th day of the hearing, after which the State was
due to put its case, The Irish Times recounts.  However, talks
between the sides began Thursday afternoon, The Irish Times notes.

                 About Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c.

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. -- http://www.aibgroup.com/-- is a
major commercial bank based in Ireland.  It has an extensive
branch network across the country, a head office in Dublin and a
capital markets operation based in the International Financial
Services Centre in Dublin.  AIB also has retail and corporate
businesses in the UK, offices in Europe and a subsidiary company
in the Isle of Man and Jersey (Channel Islands).

Since the onset of the global and Irish financial crisis, AIB's
relationship with the Irish Government has changed significantly.

As at Dec. 31, 2010, the Government, through the National Pension
Reserve Fund Commission ("NPRFC"), held 49.9% of the ordinary
shares of the Company (the share of the voting rights at
shareholders' general meetings), 10,489,899,564 convertible non-
voting ("CNV") shares and 3.5 billion 2009 Preference Shares.  On
April 8, 2011, the NPRFC converted the total outstanding amount of
CNV shares into 10,489,899,564 ordinary shares of AIB, thereby
increasing its holding to 92.8% of the ordinary share capital.

In addition to its shareholders' interests, the Government's
relationship with AIB is reflected through formal and informal
oversight by the Minister and the Department of Finance and the
Central Bank of Ireland, representation on the Board of Directors
(three non-executive directors are Government nominees),
participation in NAMA, and otherwise.

As reported by the TCR on May 31, 2011, KPMG, in Dublin, Ireland,
noted that there are a number of material economic, political and
market risks and uncertainties that impact the Irish banking
system, including the Company's continued ability to access
funding from the Eurosystem and the Irish Central Bank to meet its
liquidity requirements, that raise substantial doubt about the
Company's ability to continue as a going concern.

The Company reported a net loss of EUR10.16 billion on
EUR1.84 billion of interest income for 2010, compared with a net
loss of EUR2.33 billion on $2.87 billion of interest income for
2009.

The Company's balance sheet at Dec. 31, 2010, showed
EUR145.2 billion in total assets, EUR140.9 billion in total
liabilities, and stockholders' equity of EUR4.3 billion.


IRISH LIFE: Invites Up to 20 Potential Bidders for Insurance Unit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Laura Noonan at Irish Independent reports that Irish Life &
Permanent has begun contacting up to 20 potential bidders for
Irish Life Assurance with a view to issuing an "information
memorandum" on the sale later this week.

The potential bidders, believed to include Zurich, Allianz, Met
Life and private equity players, are all being asked to ink strict
non-disclosure agreements to secure their copy of the documents,
Irish Independent says.

Irish Independent relates that sources on Thursday night confirmed
that bidders who sign on the dotted line will be asked to present
"expressions of interest" by early August so a shortlist can be
drawn up for final bids by early September.

The timeline could see the State repaid about EUR1 billion of its
EUR3.8 billion support for the bancassurer by early autumn -- just
months after the money is due to be injected at the end of July,
Irish Independent notes.

IL&P continues to pursue the prospect of launching ILA on to the
stock market, even though Finance Minister Michael Noonan has
described a trade sale as the preferred route for disposing of
ILA, Irish Independent states.

It is understood that Mr. Noonan's department questioned IL&P
about the costs that would be incurred through exploring the IPO
but was reassured that costs would only be payable if the IPO
proceeds, Irish Independent discloses.

The IPO will only proceed if it can generate more money than a
trade sale, an outcome that would ultimately benefit the State and
justify any advisory costs, The Irish Times says.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 29,
2011, The Irish Times said that Irish Life & Permanent said it
will be effectively nationalized with the injection of up to
EUR3.8 billion in state funds by the end of this month to meet the
Central Bank's capital bill.  The company told shareholders in a
circular published on June 27 that it proposed issuing up to
EUR3.4 billion in ordinary shares to the Minister for Finance and
a further EUR400 million in contingent capital, leaving the Irish
State with a shareholding of more than 99%, The Irish Times
disclosed.  As a result, the group will delist from the main
Dublin and London stock exchanges on August 19 and re-list on the
junior Irish market, the Enterprise Securities Market, on
August 22, The Irish Times noted.  An extraordinary general
meeting will be held on July 20 to vote on the issue of ordinary
shares to the Minister for Finance, The Irish Times said.

Headquartered in Dublin, Irish Life & Permanent plc --
http://www.irishlifepermanent.ie/-- is a provider of personal
financial services to the Irish market.  Its business segments
include banking, which provides retail banking services; insurance
and investment, which includes individual and group life assurance
and investment contracts, pensions and annuity business written in
Irish Life Assurance plc and Irish Life International, and the
investment management business written in Irish Life Investment
Managers Limited; general insurance, which includes property and
casualty insurance carried out through its associate, Allianz-
Irish Life Holdings plc, and other, which includes a number of
small business units.  On June 30, 2008, it acquired the rest of
the 50% interest in Joint Mortgage Holdings No. 1 Limited (the
parent of Springboard Mortgages Limited), resulting in Springboard
Mortgages becoming a wholly owned subsidiary.  On December 23,
2008, it acquired an additional 23% of Cornmarket Group Financial
Services Ltd, bringing its interest to 98%.


PULS CDO: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class A2B Notes to 'B3 (sf)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of these
notes issued by PULS CDO 2006-1 plc:

Issuer: PULS CDO 2006-1 PLC

   -- EUR39.1M A1 Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
      Aug. 20, 2010 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- EUR96M A2A Notes, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
      Aug. 20, 2010 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

   -- EUR24M A2B Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
      Aug. 20, 2010 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

PULS 2006-1 plc, issued in July 2006, is a cash-flow
collateralized debt obligation backed by a static portfolio of
subordinated and senior unsecured debt issued by primarily German
small and medium-sized enterprises. The rating actions reflect the
continuing and worse than expected credit deterioration of the
underlying portfolio. The deterioration is reflected in an
increase in the number of insolvencies and the number of obligors
on the watchlist maintained by the portfolio manager.

Defaults and impairments in the transaction increased to 13
obligors, totaling EUR71 million (approximately 27% of the initial
pool), compared to 11 obligors, totaling EUR58 million
(approximately 22% of the initial portfolio) in last rating
action. Due to the length of the German workout process, none of
the defaulted obligations have returned any recovery to date
except for one obligor, with 10% recovery so far, which is in line
with Moody's expectations. Deterioration in the portfolio is also
indicated by the watchlist maintained and reported by the
portfolio manager who monitors the individual issuers in the
portfolio. A EUR12 million of the portfolio are currently on this
credit watch list, with further EUR 14.7 million of assets placed
in potentially credit impaired category. Assuming all credit
impaired category defaulted, the current overcollateralization
ratios for Class A-1, Class A-2A and Class A-2B are 112.7%, 163%,
112.7%, respectively.

The trustee reports an increase in the Principal Deficiency Ledger
from approximately EUR35 million at time of last rating action to
approximately EUR59.2 million. The PDL is a measure representing
the cumulative nominal amount of defaults in a transaction. It is
cured by the sequential redemption of the notes from excess
available funds until the PDL has been reduced to zero. However,
the excess spread in the transaction is limited and it is unlikely
that substantial portions of the PDL will be paid down. The
transaction has approximately 2 years to the scheduled maturity.

The two largest sector concentrations are in the Buildings and
Real Estate with approx. 26% and Beverage, Food & Tobacco with
14.19%. Approximately 74% of the portfolio is subordinated debt.
The portfolio's diversity has reduced due to defaults and full and
partial early amortizations at par. Currently the eight largest
obligors comprises of approximately 50% of the current portfolio.
After excluding amortized, insolvent, credit impaired and
potentially credit impaired obligors, the number of portfolio
obligors is 29.

Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a weighted
average rating quality of B3. Moody's focused on a weighted
average recovery rate upon default on senior debt of 30% and a
recovery rate of 0% on subordinated debt.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include, among other
elements, an assessment of the collateral manager track record and
practices. In particular, Moody's looked at the quality of
information provided by the manager, its interpretation of the
documentation and level of diligence in the implementation of the
transaction criteria. Moody's considers as well the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, and
specific documentation features. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

The action relies on financial data received annually for a
majority of obligors in the pool from the end of 2009. This
financial data was used in the RiskCalc model, an econometric
model developed by Moody's KMV in order to assess the credit
quality of obligors in the pool. The results obtained from the
RiskCalc model have been translated to Moody's rating scale and
adjusted by in order to reflect reliance on stale financial data,
poor pool performance and lack of granularity. Moody's also
incorporated information provided by the manager in the latest
investor report to account for more recent information on the
performance of the underlying obligors.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and the large concentration of
speculative-grade debt maturing in during 2013, which may create
challenges for obligors to refinance. Specific sources of
additional performance uncertainties for PULS 2006-1 plc include

1) Limited portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
   depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few
   large obligors that are rated non investment grade;

2) Potential for refinancing difficulties, particularly among loan
   obligors with weaker credit quality.

The principal methodologies used in rating and monitoring PULS CDO
2006-1 plc were Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations published in June 2011 and Moody's Approach to Rating
CDOs of SMEs in Europe published in February 2007. Other
methodologies and factors that may have been considered in the
process of rating this issue can also be found on Moody's website.

Under this methodology, Moody's relies on a simulation based
framework, implemented via CDOROMTM, to generate default and
recovery scenarios for each asset in the portfolio, and computes
the associated loss to each class of notes in the structure via
Moody's EMEA Cash-Flow model.

Moody's Investors Service did not receive or take into account a
third party due diligence report on the underlying assets or
financial instruments related to the monitoring of this
transaction in the past 6 months.


XTRA-VISION: 83 Landlords Agree to Vary Rental Lease Agreements
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Irish Times reports that a large number of landlords of Xtra-
vision stores have agreed to vary rental lease agreements with the
chain.

The Irish Times relates that Rossa Fanning, for the company, which
went into examinership earlier this year, told the High Court's
Mr. Justice Brian McGovern that landlords of 83 stores had agreed
to variations of their lease agreements.

The company has brought court applications to repudiate lease
agreements with more than 25 other premises and some of those may
be contested by the affected landlords, The Irish Times discloses.

According to The Irish Times, the court has heard that agreement
on leases is required to allow the examiner put together a
survival scheme for the company.

The company was granted court protection from creditors last April
after it said it was insolvent and unable to pay its debts as they
fell due, The Irish Times recounts.  David Hughes, of accountancy
firm Ernst and Young, was appointed examiner of Xtra-vision Ltd.,
The Irish Times discloses.

Since entering examinership, the company has applied to repudiate
a number of lease agreements for premises where Xtra-vision
operates stores, The Irish Times states.

The judge agreed on Thursday to adjourn for one week motions
concerning more than a dozen premises where Xtra-vision is seeking
to repudiate lease agreements, The Irish Times recounts.

The Irish Times says the court gave the company permission to
issue motions seeking repudiation of leases in relation to 13
other premises.

The examiner has up to 100 days to devise a rescue plan for the
company which will then be put before creditors and the High
Court, The Irish Times notes.

Xtra-vision is a home entertainment chain.  The company has 180
stores across Ireland employing 1,300 people.


IRISH NATIONWIDE: Assets & Liabilities Transferred to Anglo
-----------------------------------------------------------
BreakingNews.ie reports that the assets and liabilities of Irish
Nationwide Building Society have been transferred to Anglo Irish
Bank as part of the Government's plan for the work-out of the two
entities.

According to BreakingNews.ie, the transfer includes the management
of the INBS commercial loan book on behalf of NAMA and the
remaining commercial banking operations and mortgage business of
INBS.

Under this transfer all mortgage holders previously with Irish
Nationwide have now transferred to Anglo, BreakingNews.ie
discloses.

All property held by Irish Nationwide is also included as part of
Friday's transfer announcement, BreakingNews.ie states.

As a result of this action, all Irish Nationwide employees
automatically transfer to the employment of Anglo with immediate
effect, BreakingNews.ie notes.

BreakingNews.ie says the name of the new entity will change to
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation, but this will not come into
effect until approved integration processes have been completed.

Irish Nationwide Building Society is headquartered in Dublin.

                         *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 8,
2011, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the bank deposit
ratings of Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Limited and Irish
Nationwide Building Society to Caa1/Not-Prime, from Baa3/P-3 (on
review for possible downgrade), the same level as the unguaranteed
senior unsecured debt ratings of the two institutions.  The Caa1
long-term bank deposit ratings remain on review for possible
downgrade, in line with the review on the unguaranteed senior
unsecured debt ratings.  S&P said there is no rating impact on the
stand-alone bank financial strength ratings, on the senior
unsecured and subordinated debt ratings, and on the government-
guaranteed debt ratings.

Irish Nationwide Building society continues to carry Moody's
Investors Service's 'E' bank financial strength rating and 'C'
subordinated debt rating with negative outlook.

Irish Nationwide also carries Fitch's 'E' bank financial strength
rating and 'C' subordinated debt rating.  The individual rating
was upgraded from 'F' in September 2010.  Fitch said the
upgrade of INBS's Individual Rating to 'E' recognized the
government's injection of EUR2.7 billion capital into the society,
but also acknowledged that the society was still likely to require
further external support.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


DELTA BANK: Moody's Withdraws 'B3' Long-Term Deposit Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn all ratings of Delta Bank
for business reasons, following an official request from Delta
Bank.

At the time of withdrawal, Delta Bank's ratings were:

   -- Long-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings of B3
      with stable outlook

   -- Short-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Not
      Prime

   -- Standalone Bank Financial Strength Rating (BFSR) of E+ with
      stable outlook; the BFSR maps to B3 on the long-term scale

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the credit rating for its
own business reasons.

PREVIOUS RATING ACTIONS

Moody's most recent rating action on Delta Bank was on January 31,
2011 when Moody's changed to stable from negative the outlook on
Delta Bank's B3 local and foreign-currency deposit ratings and the
E+ Standalone Bank Financial Strength Rating.

Headquartered in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Delta Bank reported -- as at
December 31, 2010 -- total (audited) IFRS assets of KZT51.9
billion and total equity of KZT11.6 million. The bank recorded a
net IFRS income of KZT128 million for FY2010.


TSESNA BANK: S&P Hikes Long-term Counterparty Credit Rating to 'B'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term
counterparty credit rating on Kazakhstan-based Tsesna Bank to 'B'
from 'B-' and its Kazakh national scale ratings to 'kzBB'+ from
'kzBB-' while affirming the 'C' short-term credit rating. The
outlook is stable.

"The rating action reflects our view that the bank's business and
financial profile was resilient during the crisis and that it
maintained a better financial performance than its peers. The
ratings reflect moderate capitalization, and high lending and
deposit concentrations. Positive rating factors are Tsesna Bank's
good market position in central and northern Kazakhstan (market
shares of 7% by term deposits and 12% by loans on March 31, 2011),
improvements in asset quality and profitability, and adequate
funding and liquidity," S&P related.

Tsesna Bank is the tenth-largest bank in Kazakhstan and the only
one headquartered in the capital Astana.

Tsesna Bank's asset quality, profitability, and funding indicators
compare favorably with those of its domestic peers. Nonperforming
loans (90 days overdue) have been declining and stood at 8.5% of
gross loans on March 31, 2011, while restructured loans stood at
5.1% of gross loans on the same date. "We expect further
improvements over the next 12 months. Moreover, we expect the
bank's net interest margin, which stood at 4.2% in the first
quarter of 2011, to improve over the next 12 months due to
increased loan volumes and improved funding costs. Nevertheless,
sizable operating and provisioning expenses are likely to continue
to weigh on net income. Tsesna Bank has a low share of foreign
liabilities in its funding base (about 2%) and one of the best
loan-to-deposit ratios (92.7% as of March 31, 2011) among rated
Kazakh banks," S&P stated.

"Moderate capitalization, as measured by our risk-adjusted capital
(RAC) ratios of 5.1% before adjustments and 3.8% after adjustments
for concentrations at year-end 2010, reduces Tsesna Bank's ability
to absorb potential losses and heightens its vulnerability to high
single-name concentrations. A planned capital injection of
Kazakhstani tenge 4.5 billion in 2011 will not, in our view,
improve the bank's RAC ratios materially given expected high loan
growth," S&P related.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Tsesna Bank's
business and financial profiles will remain robust, despite
accelerating loan growth," S&P said.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


DSB BANK: Novapars Capital Agrees to Buy German Loan Portfolio
--------------------------------------------------------------
Aaron Gray-Block at Reuters reports that Dutch investment group
Novapars Capital said on Thursday it has agreed to buy the EUR115
million (US$163 million) German loan portfolio of DSB Bank, the
first sale of the bankrupt Dutch bank's operations.

According to Reuters, Novapars Capital said it will buy DSB's
German portfolio of mortgages, loans to civil servants and car
loans, plus a servicing organization in Germany and its 14
employees.  The group did not disclose the acquisition price,
Reuters notes.

DSB's Dutch and Belgian loan portfolios, valued at EUR5.7 billion
and EUR300 million, respectively, are still part of the group's
estate and are not yet being auctioned, Reuters discloses.

Reuters relates that Novapars Capital co-founder and Managing
Director Gerben Willems said Novapars, which was set up a year ago
and represents Dutch and German private investors, would be
interested in buying the Dutch and Belgian portfolios of DSB.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 20,
2009, Bloomberg News said that the Amsterdam court on Oct. 19
declared DSB bankrupt after its owner failed to find a buyer.
Bloomberg disclosed the Dutch central bank took control of DSB on
Oct. 12 as an outflow of capital threatened the company's
existence.

DSB Bank -- http://www.dsbbank.com/-- is a fully licensed bank in
the Netherlands, providing mortgages, consumer loans, savings and
insurance products to retail clients.  The bank has a leading
market share in the Dutch market for consumer loans.  DSB Bank
also has operations in Belgium and Germany.  DSB Bank, established
in 1975, is privately owned by Dirk Scheringa, currently CEO of
DSB Bank, Chairman of the Executive Management Board.  Mr.
Scheringa is also 100% owner of AZ Alkmaar football club, which
plays in the Dutch Premier League and president of the Scheringa
Museum for Magic Realism, an international collection of more than
500 works of art.


LEOPARD II: S&P Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'CCC'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised and removed from
CreditWatch positive its credit ratings on Leopard CLO II B.V.'s
class A-2 and B notes. "At the same time, we have affirmed and
removed from CreditWatch negative our rating on the class A-1
notes and affirmed our ratings on the class C and D notes," S&P
said.

"The rating actions follow a review of Leopard II CLO's
performance, in which we considered recent developments we have
observed in the transaction as well as the application of our 2010
counterparty criteria," S&P noted.

This collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction has
continued to repay its senior class A-1 notes using available
principal and interest proceeds as the transaction entered its
third year of amortization. The repayment of the class A-1 notes
using available interest proceeds (after paying senior expenses
and interest on the class A-1, A-2, and B notes) has been caused
by the breach of the class B, C and D par value ratios. The class
A-1 principal amount outstanding following the April 2011 payment
date is about 52.40% of its initial principal amount (compared
with 99% as of the March 2010 monthly trustee report).

"From the latest available trustee report as of the May 2011 we
see that the transaction currently holds about EUR10.35 million in
principal cash. We expect Leopard II CLO to use this cash toward
further repayment of the class A-1 notes on the July 2011 payment
date. At the same time, following a breach of the class C and D
overcollateralization test the class D notes have continued to
defer their interest payments, in accordance with the
transaction's documents," S&P related.

"In our view, the repayment of the class A-1 notes using both
available interest and principal proceeds contributed to an
increase in the ratio of performing assets versus rated notes
outstanding. This improvement shows in an increase in the credit
enhancement available to all classes of notes, and, consequently,
in an improvement in reported overcollateralization test ratios.
The failure of the class B overcollateralization ratio reported by
the trustee in March 2010 has cured, and interest payments to
class C noteholders have resumed with currently no deferred
interest outstanding. The class C and D overcollateralization
ratios remain below their required levels," S&P said.

"We consider that the level of credit enhancement available to the
class A-2 and B notes is now consistent with higher ratings than
previously assigned. We have therefore raised our ratings on these
classes and removed them from CreditWatch positive," S&P related.

"On Jan. 18, 2011, we placed our 'AA+ (sf)' rating on the class A-
1 notes on CreditWatch negative when our 2010 counterparty
criteria became effective (see 'EMEA Structured Finance
CreditWatch Actions In Connection With Revised Counterparty
Criteria')," S&P noted.

Citibank N.A. (A+/Negative/A-1) and Credit Suisse International
(A+/Stable/A-1) currently provide currency swaps on the non-euro
assets in the portfolio. According to the latest available trustee
report of May 2011, non-euro assets currently comprise about 11%
of the portfolio, out of which the majority (about 88%) is hedged
with Credit Suisse International.

"The transaction's documentation related to derivatives does not
reflect our updated criteria, in our opinion. Therefore, we
conducted our cash flow analyses assuming that the transaction
does not entirely benefit from support under these swaps. After
conducting these cash flow analyses, we consider that the current
tranche ratings can be maintained. We have therefore affirmed and
removed from CreditWatch negative our rating on the class A-1
notes," S&P stated.

"On the asset side, apart from asset repayments we have observed a
number of loan restructurings, which to some extent have
contributed to a reduction in the notional amount of 'CCC' rated
assets. According to our analysis, 'CCC' rated assets currently
account for EUR28.8 million of the pool. This compares with
EUR47.4 million of 'CCC' rated assets in April 2010," S&P related.

Loan restructurings involved maturity extensions, debt for equity
swaps, and amendments to the terms of loan interest payments,
among other things. "As a result, we have observed an increase in
reported equity holdings, an increase in loans maturing after the
legal final maturity date of the notes in April 2019 (so-called
'long-dated assets'), and the emergence of payment in kind
(PIK)-only loans in the portfolio. PIK-only loans do not provide
for any cash flows from the borrower to the CLO until the loan
maturity or refinancing date," S&P said.

"In our analysis we did not give credit to equity holdings. Assets
maturing after the legal final maturity of the notes currently
stand at 2.76%. We have given full credit to long-dated assets as
the current exposure to these loans is within the 5% limit set by
our criteria," S&P stated.

"At the same time, we have seen an increase in the amount of
defaulted assets. Defaulted assets currently amount to EUR7.2
million. This compares with EUR3.7 million of defaults in April
2010," S&P noted.

"Based on these factors and taken into account the results of our
cash flow analysis we have affirmed our ratings on the class C and
D notes at their current levels," S&P said.

Leopard CLO II is a cash flow CLO transaction that securitizes
loans to primarily speculative-grade corporate firms.

Ratings List

Class                Rating*
            To                   From

Leopard CLO II B.V.
EUR400 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised and Removed From CreditWatch Positive
A-2         A+ (sf)             BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
B           BBB- (sf)           BB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Rating Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative
A-1         AA+ (sf)             AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed
C           B+ (sf)
D           CCC (sf)

*The ratings on classes A-1 and A-2 address the timely payment of
interest and ultimate repayment of principal. The ratings on
classes B, C, and D address the ultimate payment of interest and
principal.


SABIC IP: S&P Assesses Stand-Alone Credit Profile at 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating to 'BBB+' from 'BBB-' on Netherlands-based specialty
plastics producer SABIC Innovative Plastics Holding B.V. (SABIC
IP), 100% owned subsidiary of Saudi chemical group Saudi Basic
Industries (SABIC; A+/Stable/A-1). The outlook is stable.

"We also raised our long-term issue ratings on the senior secured
term loans A and B to 'BBB+' from 'BBB-'," S&P related.

"The upgrade reflects the anticipated material improvement of
SABIC IP's stand-alone credit profile (SACP), which we now assess
at 'bb', up from 'b+'," S&P noted.

This factors in:

  * The anticipated redemption of the US$975 million notes, as per
    SABIC IP's recent announcement. "Even though the prepayment is
    subject to a capital infusion from SABIC Capital, we view it
    as extremely likely, given the parent's history of
    strengthening SABIC IP's capital structure," S&P said.

  * "The consequent drop of SABIC IP's external net financial debt
    to $2.6 billion, according to our estimates," S&P noted.

  * "Our expectation of continued strong performance in 2011. This
    follows record EBITDA in 2010 of US$1.26 billion and a strong
    EBITDA margin of over 17%," S&P related.

  * SABIC IP's further integration within the SABIC group, after a
    $1 billion revolver was put in place last year with SABIC
    Capital.

"We continue to rate SABIC IP four notches above its SACP to take
into account the potential for extraordinary shareholder support.
The parent has provided substantial subordinated shareholder loans
to refinance SABIC IP term loans and, by August 2011, the high-
yield notes. In view of the level of demonstrated support, we also
believe that a top-down approach could be justified and result in
the same rating as the current bottom-up approach," S&P continued.

"The stable outlook factors in our expectation that SABIC IP's
reported net financial debt (excluding shareholder loans) will
decrease to US$2.6 billion, upon redemption of the high-yield
notes in August 2011. Apart from a sustainably improved capital
structure in our view, we also factor in continued satisfactory
operating performance as well a high likelihood of continued
parent support if needed," S&P said.

"An adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio (excluding shareholder loans) of
about 3.0x under our mid-cycle assumptions would be consistent
with the current ratings. Under current favorable industry
conditions we expect this ratio to be closer to 2.5x in 2011," S&P
related.

"A further upgrade is unlikely, as the current rating differential
with SABIC (A+/Stable/A-1) reflects our view that SABIC IP's
profitability and credit metrics are fundamentally lower than
those of its parent. A downgrade is equally remote in our view, as
we assume that external net financial debt will remain at US$2.6
billion or below and we perceive SABIC IP as highly integrated
and supported by SABIC Capital and SABIC," S&P noted.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


RUSSIAN BANK: Moody's Affirms 'E+' BFSR; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the E+ standalone bank
financial strength rating and Baa2/P-2 long-term and short-term
debt and deposit ratings of the Russian Bank for Development. The
outlook on all of RBD's ratings is stable.

At the same time, Moody's has raised RBD's standalone credit
strength to B1 from B2 (mapped from the BFSR). The affirmation of
the ratings and the re-mapping of the standalone credit strength
are largely based on RBD's audited financial statements for 2008-
2010, prepared under IFRS.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the re-mapping to B1 from B2 of the
standalone credit strength reflects RBD's growing market franchise
in the small and midsize enterprise segment in Russia, in line
with the bank's core strategy. To this extent, RBD has mostly
exited from its higher-risk lending business to large corporates.
The shift towards SME lending has strengthened its business
franchise, through diversification in assets and earning streams.
The bank remains very well capitalized, with a total capital
adequacy ratio of 35% at YE2010 (under Basel 1).

In 2010, RBD reported sound profitability, with a Return on
Average Assets of 1.5%, compared with 1.0% in 2009. This
improvement was based on recurring and granular SME lending. Its
net interest margin was a comfortable 3.7% in 2010, considering
that RBD finances large and midsize Russian banks that then
provide loans to SMEs.

During 2009-2010, RBD's asset-quality indicators significantly
improved, due to the divestiture from corporate lending and
project-finance activities. The rapid growth of the SME portfolio
(although from a low base) contributed to asset-quality
improvements, through the enhanced quality of these loans. The
impaired loans / gross loans ratio (including loans to banks)
dropped to 3.1% at year-end 2010, from 8.8% in 2009. Going
forward, Moody's expects RBD's asset quality to remain stable.
Whilst the SME book will mature and new problem loans will
materialize, these will remain on the balance sheets of partner
banks, which are mostly large institutions of adequate credit
quality.

Negative rating drivers include the very rapid lending growth in
the past two years, and still-evolving risk-management practice.
In addition, to carry on its business activities, RBD depends on
funding and capital injections from its parent, Vnesheconombank
(Baa1, stable outlook); without this ongoing support its
standalone liquidity profile is weak.

SUPPORTED RATINGS

RBD's Baa2 deposit rating is underpinned by Moody's assessment of
a very high probability of support in a possible stress situation.
Moody's believes that support could be channeled from the Russian
government directly, or via the fully state-owned Vnesheconombank,
the direct owner of a 100% stake in RBD. This results in a multi-
notch uplift of RBD's deposit rating from its standalone rating.
This support is justified by the fact that RBD is part of the VEB
group, which is a strategically important vehicle in the
implementation of the Russian government's investment policies.

PREVIOUS RATING ACTIONS AND PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March
2007.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, RBD reported -- under audited
IFRS -- total assets of RUB78 billion and total equity of RUB19
billion as at December 31, 2010; net IFRS profits for 2010
amounted to RUB1 billion.


SOGAZ OJSC: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Rating From 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term
counterparty credit and financial strength ratings on Russian
insurer OJSC Sogaz to 'BBB-', which is investment grade, from
'BB+'. The outlook is stable. At the same time, the Russian
national scale rating was affirmed at 'ruAA+'.

"The upgrade reflects ongoing improvements in Sogaz's
capitalization and our view of Sogaz's improved competitive
position in Russia," S&P said.

The ratings reflect Sogaz's good competitive position and adequate
capitalization. "The ratings also reflect the ongoing support and
our assessment of probability of extraordinary support for Sogaz
from OAO Gazprom (BBB/Stable/A-2), the world's largest natural gas
company, with which Sogaz has strong ties," S&P related.

These positive factors are offset by the relatively high credit
risk in Sogaz's investment portfolio, Sogaz's expansionary policy
to acquire noncore assets, and the high industry risk associated
with operating in the Russian insurance market.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Sogaz will
continue its strong relationship with Gazprom and its good
operating performance. We expect Sogaz to achieve and maintain at
least good risk-based capital and preserve at least a marginal
investment portfolio quality. In our view, Sogaz's insurance
portfolio diversity will improve, but Gazprom will remain its
largest client," S&P said.

"A positive rating action could result if the quality of the
company's investments improves significantly, and our assessment
of its exposure arising from industry and county risk lessens, all
other factors being equal," S&P related.

"Conversely, any significant and sustained deterioration in
earnings, capitalization, or the quality of the company's
investment portfolio could lead to a negative rating action.
Negative rating actions could also follow if we perceive a
diminution of Gazprom support," S&P added.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AMDEGA: Endless to Lose GBP8.3 Millions Injected in Firm
--------------------------------------------------------
Laurence Kilgannon at Insider Media Limited reports that Endless
stands to lose the millions it injected into Amdega after its
attempt to turn around the fortunes of the company failed.

Endless partner Darren Forshaw told Insider the loss demonstrated
the difficulty of turnaround investing and the highs and lows
associated with the sector, according to Insider Media Limited.

As reported in the Troubled Company Europe on April 29, 2011, The
Journal said Amdega has gone into administration with the
potential loss of 190 jobs.  The administration of company, which
has been in business for over 130 years, was disclosed by its
owners London-based private equity firm, according to The Journal.

Insider Media Limited notes that plummeting turnover and rising
losses led to the administration of Amdega and, according to a
report by administrator KPMG seen by Insider, the Leeds-based
private equity firm is unlikely to recover the GBP8.3 million it
pumped into the business.

Insider Media Limited notes that creditors of Amdega will be hit
by a likely shortfall in excess of GBP14 million.  The report
relates that this accounts for unsecured creditors of GBP7
million, including almost GBP3 million worth of deposits received
from customers prior to the business' collapse.

Some sums owed to preferential creditors, including employee wage
arrears of GBP185,000 and the majority of a GBP2.2 million secured
loan from HSBC, will be recovered, Insider Media Limited says.

Prior to Endless' investment in August 2010, KPMG said the
business was sustaining losses of about GBP1 m per year, while
turnover had reduced from a peak of GBP29 million in 2006 to GBP13
million in 2010, Insider Media Limited discloses.  The report
relates that despite an injection of cash by Endless and the
appointment of a "brilliant management team", inherited legacy
issues led to an exceptional charge of GBP2.6 million, while
turnover continued to decline.  This poor trading led to mounting
losses and Amdega went into administration, the report says.

Amdega is a conservatory and greenhouse company.  It is based on
the town's Faverdale Industrial Estate.


ASSETCO PLC: Faces GBP8 Million Unpaid Tax Bill
-----------------------------------------------
thisislincolnshire.co.uk reports that AssetCo PLC, in charge of
Lincolnshire Fire and Rescue's engines, is struggling to stay
afloat in the face of a GBP8 million unpaid tax bill.

But the county's fire bosses say if the worst should happen and
the company does go into administration or is wound up, it will
not affect the service provided to Lincolnshire residents,
according to thisislincolnshire.co.uk.

Her Majesty Revenue and Customs applied to the courts for a
winding up petition over the unpaid money,
thisislincolnshire.co.uk notes.  The report says that the court
action came after AssetCo's chairman, chief executive and finance
officer resigned.

thisislincolnshire.co.uk discloses that the firm's share price
plummeted and it admitted it had made an application to enter
administration.

A creditors' petition for the winding up of the company has been
lodged and deferred to a court hearing on July 11.

In London, thisislincolnshire.co.uk  relates, the Fire Brigade
Union is demanding details on what will happen to the maintenance
of engines, a service which requires a quick turn-around, if the
company announces it is in administration.  But in Lincolnshire,
maintenance is carried out locally meaning there will be no impact
on service, thisislincolnshire.co.uk says.

Tom Murray, regional chairman for the FBU East Midlands, said the
worry was how quickly shareholders would want a pay-out, should
the company go into administration, and warned against public
services being controlled by private organizations,
thisislincolnshire.co.uk adds.

Assetco PLC -- http://www.assetco.com/-- is a United Kingdom-
based holding company.  The Company is engaged in the provision of
management services to the emergency services market.  It is also
engaged in automotive engineering, the provision of asset
management services and the supply of specialist equipment to the
emergency services market.  The Company operates in one segment,
the Fire and Rescue Services.  The Fire and Rescue Services
segment provides management services to the fire and rescue
market.  Its subsidiaries include AssetCo Emergency Limited,
AssetCo Managed Services (ROI) Limited, AssetCo Bermuda Limited,
AssetCo Resource Limited, Simentra Limited, Supply 999 Limited,
AssetCo Municipal Limited and AssetCo Managed Services Limited.
In January 2010, the vehicle assembly business of UV Modular
Limited (UVM) was discontinued.  In September 2009, the Company
disposed its subsidiary, Auto Electrical Services (Manchester)
Limited.


D2 PROPERTY: In Receivership to Royal Bank Of Scotland
------------------------------------------------------
Focal News Point reports that D2 Property Management Ltd., owned
by David Arnold and Property Developer and Deirdre Foley, a
financier, is in receivership to Royal Bank of Scotland.  The
report relates that the latest accounts for 2008 show the company
owed GBP10.1 million to the Royal Bank Of Scotland (RBS) Ireland
now merged with Lloyds.

This was due for repayment in December 2010, further inspections
of accounts revealed that the Anglo Irish Bank was owed EUR11.8
million, according to Focal News Point.

Grant Thornton, Michael McAteer has been appointed by RBS, the
main area of investment of D2 Property management was in Victoria
SA an entity involved in the GBP175 million purchase of 1-19
Victoria Street in London, and the Scott Portfolio Unit Trust, who
owns 15 properties lease to Halifax Bank branches that is also
owned by the RBS, which was placed into receivership with Grant
Thornton, Focal News Point discloses.

In 2008 D2 Property Management Ltd made a loss of EUR1.3 million a
growing concern the accounts stated, the report notes.


FORENSIC SCIENCE: Member of Parliament Criticizes Closure Plan
--------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Rincon at BBC News reports that a Member of Parliament's
inquiry concluded that the United Kingdom government did not give
sufficient consideration to the wider impacts of closing the
Forensic Science Service (FSS).

Implications for criminal justice, research and evidence archives
were "hastily overlooked" for financial reasons, the MP's report
argues, according to BBC News.  The MP's report calls for its
closure to be delayed, BBC News relates.

BBC News notes that the government said it did not accept the
report's findings.

BBC News says that FSS had been losing about GBP2 million a month
and was at risk of falling into administration, which prompted the
government to announce plans to close the service and sell or
transfer many of its operations.

However, BBC News notes, critics argue that criminal justice, and
innovation in forensic research, will suffer as a result of the
closure.  The report relates that critics said an over-emphasis on
profits could damage the quality of science, compromising forensic
evidence used in court.

BBC News notes that the MPs agreed with the government's
assessment that administration was undesirable, but they said the
decision should never have been taken purely on commercial and
legal grounds.

The committee, chaired by Labour MP Andrew Miller, argues that the
current timeline for closure is unlikely to ensure an orderly
transition, BBC News discloses.  The committee urges the
government to extend the March 2012 deadline by at least six
months, BBC News adds.

The government wants private enterprise, which currently accounts
for 40% of forensic service provision, to fill the gap left behind
by the FSS, BBC News says.

Forensic Science Service analyses evidence from crime scenes in
England and Wales.


FOX BROS: Administrators Seek to Sell Remaining Plant Fleet
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rob Moore at Business Sale reports that administrators are looking
to sell on the remaining plant fleet of the equipment hirer, Fox
Bros, after they collapsed into administration.

The company ran into trouble after setting up a civil engineering
contracting arm of the business a year ago, according to Business
Sale.  The report relates that the civil engineering arm, dubbed
Fox Civils, was a promising venture to begin with, according to
one former employee, but soon became a burden.

"Fox Civils grew very quickly carrying out groundworks on housing
sites," Business Sale quoted an unnamed employee as saying.  "We
had to fund a lot of work in progress and struggled to get paid on
time, putting the group under a lot of cash flow pressure.  In the
end both Fox Bros and Fox Civils collapsed," he added.

Business Sale notes that the company operated out of depots in
Preston and Blackburn, but both of those centres have been
gradually downsized over recent months, as the financial struggles
took hold.

Administrators from the Manchester office of Begbies Traynor are
handling the administration, and are looking to sell off the
business's remaining assets, Business Sale adds.

Headquartered in Thornton-Cleveleys, near Blackpool, Fox Bros is
an equipment hirer.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOND PRICING: For the Week June 27 to July 1, 2011
----------------------------------------------------

Issuer                Coupon   Maturity  Currency    Price
------                ------   --------  --------    -----
A-TEC INDUSTRIES        8.750 10/27/2014      EUR     34.61
IMMOFINANZ              4.250   3/8/2018      EUR      4.06
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.900  8/18/2025      EUR     61.88
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.810  7/29/2025      EUR     58.50
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.160  5/20/2025      EUR     73.10
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.750  4/30/2021      EUR     72.01
OESTER VOLKSBK          5.270   2/8/2027      EUR     74.62
OESTER VOLKSBK          4.350 11/16/2018      EUR     73.75
RAIFF ZENTRALBK         4.500  9/28/2035      EUR     74.50
ECONOCOM GROUP          4.000   6/1/2016      EUR     20.47
SAZKA                   9.000  7/12/2021      EUR     60.00
KOMMUNEKREDIT           0.500 12/14/2020      ZAR     45.31
KOMMUNEKREDIT           0.500   2/3/2016      TRY     69.27
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500   2/9/2016      ZAR     69.28
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000  6/30/2017      ZAR     61.90
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500  3/17/2025      CAD     54.10
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500  4/26/2016      ZAR     68.28
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000 10/30/2017      AUD     73.24
MUNI FINANCE PLC        1.000  2/27/2018      AUD     71.86
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500  4/27/2018      ZAR     55.75
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.250  6/28/2040      CAD     22.06
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500  9/24/2020      CAD     69.16
MUNI FINANCE PLC        0.500 11/25/2020      ZAR     43.64
AIR FRANCE-KLM          4.970   4/1/2015      EUR     14.03
ALCATEL-LUCENT          5.000   1/1/2015      EUR      4.59
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG        6.720   1/1/2015      EUR      6.28
ATOS ORIGIN SA          2.500   1/1/2016      EUR     52.89
CALYON                  6.000  6/18/2047      EUR     23.47
CAP GEMINI SOGET        3.500   1/1/2014      EUR     45.12
CAP GEMINI SOGET        1.000   1/1/2012      EUR     44.18
CGG VERITAS             1.750   1/1/2016      EUR     30.87
CIE FIN FONCIER         3.250 12/30/2044      EUR     70.80
CLUB MEDITERRANE        6.110  11/1/2015      EUR     20.43
CLUB MEDITERRANE        5.000   6/8/2012      EUR     16.37
CREDIT AGRI CIB         4.850  9/17/2030      USD     73.37
CREDIT AGRI CIB         4.910  11/3/2030      USD     74.99
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY        1.000 12/23/2024      EUR     61.57
EURAZEO                 6.250  6/10/2014      EUR     59.13
FAURECIA                4.500   1/1/2015      EUR     32.03
GROUPE VIAL             2.500   1/1/2014      EUR     19.75
INGENICO                2.750   1/1/2017      EUR     44.28
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125  7/31/2014      EUR     20.40
MAUREL ET PROM          7.125  7/31/2015      EUR     19.95
NEXANS SA               4.000   1/1/2016      EUR     70.26
NOVASEP HLDG            9.625 12/15/2016      EUR     56.24
NOVASEP HLDG            9.625 12/15/2016      EUR     56.50
ORPEA                   3.875   1/1/2016      EUR     47.03
PEUGEOT SA              4.450   1/1/2016      EUR     34.49
PUBLICIS GROUPE         3.125  7/30/2014      EUR     40.14
PUBLICIS GROUPE         1.000  1/18/2018      EUR     49.47
RHODIA SA               0.500   1/1/2014      EUR     51.83
SOC AIR FRANCE          2.750   4/1/2020      EUR     20.60
SOITEC                  6.250   9/9/2014      EUR      9.57
TEM                     4.250   1/1/2015      EUR     57.11
THEOLIA                 2.700   1/1/2041      EUR     11.50
EUROHYPO AG             6.490  7/17/2017      EUR      6.38
EUROHYPO AG             3.830  9/21/2020      EUR     70.13
HSH NORDBANK AG         4.375  2/14/2017      EUR     73.03
IKB DEUT INDUSTR        5.625  3/31/2017      EUR     15.00
IKB DEUT INDUSTR        6.500  3/31/2012      EUR     20.00
IKB DEUT INDUSTR        6.550  3/31/2012      EUR     20.00
IKB DEUT INDUSTR        4.700  3/31/2017      EUR     15.00
L-BANK FOERDERBK        0.500  5/10/2027      CAD     49.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT         5.250 10/20/2015      EUR     28.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT         2.800  2/23/2037      JPY     69.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT         2.500  1/30/2034      EUR     56.89
Q-CELLS                 6.750 10/21/2015      EUR      2.62
QIMONDA FINANCE         6.750  3/22/2013      USD      2.38
SOLON AG SOLAR          1.375  12/6/2012      EUR     33.67
TAG IMMO AG             6.500 12/10/2015      EUR      7.89
TUI AG                  2.750  3/24/2016      EUR     53.12
WEST DT IMMOBK          4.700  9/30/2024      EUR     75.13
WEST DT IMMOBK          4.500  3/31/2033      EUR     66.13
WEST DT IMMOBK          4.600  6/30/2028      EUR     70.63
WESTLB AG               3.350 10/19/2026      EUR     75.19
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.057  3/26/2013      EUR     70.24
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.301  8/12/2014      EUR     58.30
ATHENS URBAN TRN        4.851  9/19/2016      EUR     51.01
ATHENS URBAN TRN        5.008  7/18/2017      EUR     50.02
HELLENIC RAILWAY        5.460  1/30/2014      EUR     59.98
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.300  7/25/2030      EUR     36.89
HELLENIC REP I/L        2.900  7/25/2025      EUR     38.07
HELLENIC REPUB          2.125   7/5/2013      CHF     72.10
HELLENIC REPUB          5.000  3/11/2019      EUR     48.52
HELLENIC REPUB          6.140  4/14/2028      EUR     48.90
HELLENIC REPUB          5.200  7/17/2034      EUR     45.39
HELLENIC REPUB          4.590   4/8/2016      EUR     49.77
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.000  8/20/2013      EUR     64.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.520  9/30/2013      EUR     64.73
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.500  1/11/2014      EUR     63.52
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500  5/20/2014      EUR     59.39
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500   7/1/2014      EUR     59.17
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.985  7/25/2014      EUR     56.06
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.500  8/20/2014      EUR     57.82
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.113  9/30/2014      EUR     55.92
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.700  7/20/2015      EUR     52.13
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.100  8/20/2015      EUR     56.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.702  9/30/2015      EUR     53.04
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.700 11/10/2015      EUR     50.02
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.600  7/20/2016      EUR     53.04
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.020  9/13/2016      EUR     53.89
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.225   3/1/2017      EUR     53.22
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.900  4/20/2017      EUR     52.91
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.300  7/20/2017      EUR     48.52
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.675  10/9/2017      EUR     51.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600  7/20/2018      EUR     48.95
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.014  2/27/2019      EUR     48.19
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.959   3/4/2019      EUR     51.60
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.000  7/19/2019      EUR     49.91
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.500 10/22/2019      EUR     53.68
HELLENIC REPUBLI        6.250  6/19/2020      EUR     54.17
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.900 10/22/2022      EUR     50.27
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.700  3/20/2024      EUR     45.58
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.500  9/20/2037      EUR     43.64
HELLENIC REPUBLI        5.300  3/20/2026      EUR     45.80
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600  9/20/2040      EUR     43.54
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.506  3/31/2013      EUR     72.10
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.600  5/20/2013      EUR     70.81
HELLENIC REPUBLI        7.500  5/20/2013      EUR     73.05
HELLENIC REPUBLI        3.900   7/3/2013      EUR     67.27
HELLENIC REPUBLI        4.427  7/31/2013      EUR     66.75
NATIONAL BK GREE        3.875  10/7/2016      EUR     63.01
LANDSBANKI ISLAN        6.100  8/25/2011      USD      2.52
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000  2/12/2030      EUR     47.41
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.580  4/28/2028      EUR     53.33
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        5.000   3/1/2030      EUR     47.37
AIB MORTGAGE BNK        4.875  6/29/2017      EUR     74.66
ALLIED IRISH BKS        4.000  3/19/2015      EUR     70.69
ALLIED IRISH BKS       12.500  6/25/2019      GBP     24.51
ALLIED IRISH BKS       10.750  3/29/2017      EUR     21.25
ALLIED IRISH BKS        5.625 11/12/2014      EUR     71.66
ANGLO IRISH BANK        4.490  4/21/2015      SEK     73.22
BANK OF IRELAND         2.970  3/31/2014      EUR     74.58
BANK OF IRELAND         4.000  1/28/2015      EUR     72.93
BANK OF IRELAND         3.585  4/21/2015      EUR     69.41
BANK OF IRELAND         4.875  1/22/2018      GBP     25.00
BANK OF IRELAND        10.000  2/12/2020      GBP     35.67
BANK OF IRELAND        10.000  2/12/2020      EUR     35.00
BANK OF IRELAND         9.250   9/7/2020      GBP     38.25
BANK OF IRELAND         3.780   4/1/2015      EUR     70.45
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.360 10/12/2029      EUR     47.17
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.450   3/1/2030      EUR     47.28
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.400  11/6/2029      EUR     47.39
BK IRELAND MTGE         5.760   9/7/2029      EUR     50.09
DEPFA ACS BANK          5.125  3/16/2037      USD     68.89
DEPFA ACS BANK          5.125  3/16/2037      USD     68.89
DEPFA ACS BANK          4.900  8/24/2035      CAD     63.12
DEPFA ACS BANK          0.500   3/3/2025      CAD     36.62
EBS BLDG SOCIETY        4.000  2/25/2015      EUR     71.29
EBS BLDG SOCIETY        4.992  3/19/2015      EUR     66.10
IRISH GOVT              4.500 10/18/2018      EUR     65.06
IRISH GOVT              4.400  6/18/2019      EUR     64.31
IRISH GOVT              5.900 10/18/2019      EUR     67.38
IRISH GOVT              4.500  4/18/2020      EUR     62.05
IRISH GOVT              5.000 10/18/2020      EUR     63.43
IRISH GOVT              5.400  3/13/2025      EUR     62.09
IRISH GOVT              4.600  4/18/2016      EUR     70.74
IRISH LIFE PERM         4.000  3/10/2015      EUR     70.99
IRISH LIFE PERM         4.820  3/22/2015      EUR     63.90
IRISH NATIONWIDE        6.250  6/26/2012      GBP     74.38
CITY OF ROME            5.345  1/27/2048      EUR     77.36
CITY OF TURIN           5.270  6/26/2038      EUR     72.45
CO BRAONE               4.567  6/30/2037      EUR     73.83
COMUNE DI MILANO        4.019  6/29/2035      EUR     68.47
INTESA SANPAOLO         1.750  1/19/2026      EUR      3.06
REGION OF LIGURI        4.795 11/22/2034      EUR     76.10
REP OF ITALY            1.850  9/15/2057      EUR     70.35
REP OF ITALY            2.000  9/15/2062      EUR     71.47
SARDINIA REGION         4.022 11/28/2035      EUR     72.94
TELECOM ITALIA          5.250  3/17/2055      EUR     73.35
ARCELORMITTAL           7.250   4/1/2014      EUR     29.61
ESPIRITO SANTO F        6.875 10/21/2019      EUR     63.30
INTL INDUST BANK        9.000   7/6/2011      EUR      9.25
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000  4/30/2014      EUR     35.33
LIGHTHOUSE INTL         8.000  4/30/2014      EUR     34.31
APP INTL FINANCE       11.750  10/1/2005      USD      0.03
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500  4/27/2016      TRY     68.08
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500  5/25/2016      TRY     67.96
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500  2/24/2025      CAD     55.04
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500  6/22/2021      ZAR     45.03
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500  5/12/2021      ZAR     43.23
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500  3/29/2021      USD     70.43
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500  6/22/2016      TRY     67.20
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500  3/29/2021      NZD     61.15
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500   3/3/2021      NZD     61.52
BK NED GEMEENTEN        0.500  3/17/2016      TRY     68.64
BLT FINANCE BV          7.500  5/15/2014      USD     75.13
BLT FINANCE BV          7.500  5/15/2014      USD     79.95
BRIT INSURANCE          6.625  12/9/2030      GBP     66.04
DGS INTL FIN BV        10.000   6/1/2007      USD      0.01
ELEC DE CAR FIN         8.500  4/10/2018      USD     59.64
FRIESLAND BANK          4.210 12/29/2025      EUR     71.35
KPNQWEST BV             8.125   6/1/2009      USD      0.05
NATL INVESTER BK       25.983   5/7/2029      EUR     12.03
NED WATERSCHAPBK        0.500  3/11/2025      CAD     54.35
NIB CAPITAL BANK        4.510 12/16/2035      EUR     55.04
PORTUGAL TEL FIN        4.500  6/16/2025      EUR     70.14
Q-CELLS INTERNAT        5.750  5/26/2014      EUR     52.60
RABOBANK                6.900   6/6/2017      RUB     97.59
RBS NV EX-ABN NV        2.910  6/21/2036      JPY     70.48
SIDETUR FINANCE        10.000  4/20/2016      USD     71.75
TJIWI KIMIA FIN        13.250   8/1/2001      USD      0.01
EKSPORTFINANS           0.500   5/9/2030      CAD     42.12
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500  5/25/2016      ZAR     71.53
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500   3/1/2016      ZAR     72.85
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500  3/24/2016      ZAR     72.48
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500 12/18/2015      ZAR     73.92
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500  1/27/2016      ZAR     73.34
KOMMUNALBANKEN          0.500  5/25/2018      ZAR     61.17
NORSKE SKOGIND          7.125 10/15/2033      USD     68.63
NORSKE SKOGIND          7.125 10/15/2033      USD     68.63
SPAREBANKEN RGLD        4.170  12/7/2035      EUR     75.58
BANCO COM PORTUG        3.750  10/8/2016      EUR     72.41
BANCO COM PORTUG        4.750  6/22/2017      EUR     73.58
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.980   3/3/2028      EUR     71.50
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.750  2/14/2016      EUR     66.90
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.320   8/5/2021      EUR     60.19
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.250  1/27/2020      EUR     71.24
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.400  10/8/2019      EUR     60.27
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        5.380  10/1/2038      EUR     56.30
CAIXA GERAL DEPO        4.455  8/20/2017      EUR     69.02
COMBOIOS DE PORT        5.700   2/5/2030      EUR     64.50
COMBOIOS DE PORT        4.170 10/16/2019      EUR     59.92
METRO DE LISBOA         5.750   2/4/2019      EUR     70.44
METRO DE LISBOA         4.799  12/7/2027      EUR     55.51
METRO DE LISBOA         4.061  12/4/2026      EUR     50.88
METRO DE LISBOA         7.300 12/23/2025      EUR     74.53
MONTEPIO GERAL          5.000   2/8/2017      EUR     58.25
PARPUBLICA              4.200 11/16/2026      EUR     64.54
PORTUGUESE OT'S         3.350 10/15/2015      EUR     71.49
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.100  4/15/2037      EUR     53.15
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.950 10/25/2023      EUR     61.17
PORTUGUESE OT'S         3.850  4/15/2021      EUR     58.61
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.800  6/15/2020      EUR     62.07
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.750  6/14/2019      EUR     62.83
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.450  6/15/2018      EUR     64.15
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.200 10/15/2016      EUR     68.66
PORTUGUESE OT'S         4.350 10/16/2017      EUR     65.33
REFER                   4.047 11/16/2026      EUR     52.30
REFER                   4.675 10/16/2024      EUR     55.46
REFER                   4.000  3/16/2015      EUR     65.42
REFER                   4.250 12/13/2021      EUR     47.61
REFER                   5.875  2/18/2019      EUR     66.84
APK ARKADA             17.500  5/23/2012      RUB      0.38
ARIZK                   3.000 12/20/2030      RUB     52.31
DVTG-FINANS            17.000  8/29/2013      RUB      6.11
IZHAVTO                18.000   6/9/2011      RUB     11.31
M-INDUSTRIYA           12.250  8/16/2011      RUB     20.00
MIG-FINANS              0.100   9/6/2011      RUB      1.00
MIRAX                  17.000  9/17/2012      RUB     14.51
MOSMART FINANS          0.010  4/12/2012      RUB      1.81
MOSOBLGAZ              12.000  5/17/2011      RUB     72.50
NOK                    10.000  9/22/2011      RUB      8.50
NOK                    12.500  8/26/2014      RUB      0.04
PENOPLEX-FINANS        14.000 11/21/2014      RUB     70.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA        1.000 12/17/2012      RUB      0.01
PROTON-FINANCE          9.000  6/12/2012      RUB     65.00
SAHO                   10.000  5/21/2012      RUB      0.03
SATURN                  8.500   6/6/2014      RUB      1.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS        10.500  3/27/2012      RUB      3.40
TERNA-FINANS            1.000  11/4/2011      RUB      0.01
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        4.750  5/25/2027      EUR     70.15
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        3.750 12/14/2022      EUR     69.13
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        3.750  6/30/2025      EUR     63.22
AYT CEDULAS CAJA        4.250 10/25/2023      EUR     71.85
AYUNTAM DE MADRD        4.550  6/16/2036      EUR     71.71
BANCAJA                 1.500  5/22/2018      EUR     65.60
BANCO PASTOR            4.550  7/31/2020      EUR     73.60
CAJA CASTIL-MAN         1.500  6/23/2021      EUR     63.20
CAJA MADRID             4.125  3/24/2036      EUR     64.15
CAJA MADRID             4.000   2/3/2025      EUR     72.76
CAJA MADRID             5.020  2/26/2038      EUR     73.19
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO        3.875  5/23/2025      EUR     65.42
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO        4.250  4/10/2031      EUR     59.27
CEDULAS TDA A-5         4.250  3/28/2027      EUR     64.43
COMUN AUTO CANAR        3.900 11/30/2035      EUR     55.55
COMUN AUTO CANAR        4.200 10/25/2036      EUR     58.41
COMUNIDAD ARAGON        4.646  7/11/2036      EUR     73.25
COMUNIDAD BALEAR        4.063 11/23/2035      EUR     64.36
COMUNIDAD MADRID        4.300  9/15/2026      EUR     69.39
GEN DE CATALUNYA        4.690 10/28/2034      EUR     71.36
GEN DE CATALUNYA        4.220  4/26/2035      EUR     66.59
GEN DE CATALUNYA        5.219  9/10/2029      EUR     74.97
IM CEDULAS 5            3.500  6/15/2020      EUR     74.19
INSTIT CRDT OFCL        3.250  6/28/2024      CHF     77.19
INSTITUT CATALA         4.250  6/15/2024      EUR     72.38
JUNTA ANDALUCIA         5.150  5/24/2034      EUR     74.41
JUNTA ANDALUCIA         4.250 10/31/2036      EUR     62.19
JUNTA LA MANCHA         3.875  1/31/2036      EUR     55.03
XUNTA DE GALICIA        4.025 11/28/2035      EUR     60.50
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   3/5/2018      AUD     70.39
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.000  7/28/2011      USD     10.58
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.000  8/12/2011      USD     10.31
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000 10/21/2011      USD     10.00
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000  11/4/2011      USD      7.04
SWEDISH EXP CRED        2.000  12/7/2011      USD      9.89
SWEDISH EXP CRED        2.130  1/10/2012      USD     10.25
SWEDISH EXP CRED        6.500  1/27/2012      USD      9.34
SWEDISH EXP CRED        8.000  1/27/2012      USD      8.93
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.500  2/28/2012      USD      8.88
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.000   3/9/2012      USD      9.91
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.000   3/9/2012      USD      9.52
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.750  3/23/2012      USD      9.19
SWEDISH EXP CRED        9.250  4/27/2012      USD      9.16
SWEDISH EXP CRED        7.500  6/12/2012      USD      9.43
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500 12/21/2015      ZAR     70.28
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500   3/3/2016      ZAR     68.93
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500  6/14/2016      ZAR     67.11
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500  6/29/2016      TRY     64.41
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500 12/17/2027      USD     49.70
SWEDISH EXP CRED        0.500  1/25/2028      USD     49.41
CYTOS BIOTECH           2.875  2/20/2012      CHF     71.71
UBS AG                  8.720  3/20/2012      USD     32.30
UBS AG                  9.640 11/14/2011      USD     14.14
UBS AG                 10.530  1/23/2012      USD     39.85
UBS AG                  9.250  3/20/2012      USD     14.58
UBS AG                 10.070  3/23/2012      USD     35.34
UBS AG                 13.300  5/23/2012      USD      3.97
UBS AG                 13.700  5/23/2012      USD     13.09
UBS AG                 14.000  5/23/2012      USD      8.03
UBS AG JERSEY           3.220  7/31/2012      EUR     50.45
UBS AG JERSEY          10.360  8/19/2011      USD     51.92
UBS AG JERSEY           9.450  9/21/2011      USD     49.91
UBS AG JERSEY          10.140 12/30/2011      USD     15.04
UBS AG JERSEY          11.150  8/31/2011      USD     38.65
UBS AG JERSEY           9.230 12/30/2011      USD     13.85
UBS AG JERSEY          10.280  8/19/2011      USD     35.25
ABBEY NATL TREAS        5.000  8/26/2030      USD     73.28
ALPHA CREDIT GRP        4.500  4/14/2014      EUR     72.00
BANK NADRA              8.000  6/22/2017      USD     75.54
BANK OF SCOTLAND        5.772   2/7/2035      EUR     71.86
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.250  8/31/2012      USD     35.47
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.800  7/31/2012      USD     26.75
BARCLAYS BK PLC         2.500  5/24/2017      USD     10.47
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.400  7/31/2012      USD     11.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC        12.950  4/20/2012      USD     23.75
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.950  4/20/2012      USD     16.29
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.650  1/31/2012      USD     42.96
BARCLAYS BK PLC         5.000   6/3/2041      USD     73.81
BARCLAYS BK PLC        10.600  7/21/2011      USD     39.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.750  9/22/2011      USD     72.48
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.800  9/22/2011      USD     16.39
BARCLAYS BK PLC         7.500  9/22/2011      USD     17.10
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.250  1/31/2012      USD      9.41
BARCLAYS BK PLC         9.500  8/31/2012      USD     29.73
BARCLAYS BK PLC         8.550  1/23/2012      USD     11.32
BRADFORD&BIN BLD        5.750 12/12/2022      GBP     48.50
BRADFORD&BIN BLD        5.500  1/15/2018      GBP     48.50
BRADFORD&BIN BLD        4.910   2/1/2047      EUR     64.54
CO-OPERATIVE BNK        5.875  3/28/2033      GBP     69.45
DISCOVERY EDUCAT        1.948  3/31/2037      GBP     68.24
EFG HELLAS PLC          5.400  11/2/2047      EUR     21.63
EFG HELLAS PLC          6.010   1/9/2036      EUR     31.50
EFG HELLAS PLC          4.375  2/11/2013      EUR     70.37
EMPORIKI GRP FIN        4.000  2/28/2013      EUR     68.63
EMPORIKI GRP FIN        4.000  2/28/2013      EUR     68.63
ENTERPRISE INNS         6.375  9/26/2031      GBP     74.43
ESPRIT TELECOM         10.875  6/15/2008      USD      0.01
F&C ASSET MNGMT         6.750 12/20/2026      GBP     72.93
HBOS PLC                4.500  3/18/2030      EUR     73.26
HEALTHCARE SUPP         2.067  2/19/2043      GBP     70.86
NOMURA BANK INTL        0.800 12/21/2020      EUR     64.99
NORTHERN ROCK           5.750  2/28/2017      GBP     72.50
PIRAEUS GRP FIN         4.000  9/17/2012      EUR     70.61
PUNCH TAVERNS           7.567  4/15/2026      GBP     65.33
PUNCH TAVERNS           8.374  7/15/2029      GBP     65.34
PUNCH TAVERNS           6.468  4/15/2033      GBP     49.50
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        4.692   6/9/2025      EUR     70.03
ROYAL BK SCOTLND        5.168  6/29/2030      EUR     60.94
RSL COMM PLC           12.000  11/1/2008      USD      1.88
SKIPTON BUILDING        5.625  1/18/2018      GBP     72.50
SKIPTON BUILDING        6.750  5/30/2022      GBP     66.68
UNIQUE PUB FIN          7.395  3/28/2024      GBP     75.91
UNIQUE PUB FIN          5.659  6/30/2027      GBP     73.88
UNIQUE PUB FIN          6.464  3/30/2032      GBP     62.67
WESSEX WATER FIN        1.369  7/31/2057      GBP     30.46


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *