TCREUR_Public/110711.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Monday, July 11, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 135



AMAGERBANKEN A/S: Dividend Payout Rate Revised to 66.1%


CHOREN INDUSTRIES: Financial Woes Prompt Insolvency
* GERMANY: Reports 2,587 Business Insolvencies, Down 7.4% in April


DALI CAPITAL: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB-'
EIRCOM GROUP: Debt Restructuring Talks Begin
MCINERNEY HOLDINGS: Board Seeks Liquidation; EGM Set for July 29


LUCCHINI GROUP: Has Deal with Creditors; Staves Off Bankruptcy


BANK OF MOSCOW: Fitch Downgrades Individual Rating to 'F'
DELTACREDIT BANK: Moody's Changes Rating Outlook to Stable
METALLOINVEST FINANCE: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to New Notes
METALLOINVEST JSC: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Ratings
NIZHNEKAMSKNEFTEKHIM OJSC: Moody's Upgrades National Scale Rating

RUSFINANCE BANK: Moody's Affirms E+ Bank Financial Strength Rating
VIMPELCOM LTD: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Senior Unsecured Rating
VTB BANK: S&P Assesses Stand-Alone Credit Profile at 'bb-'


BANKIA: Moody's Assigns 'D+' Financial Strength Rating
NARA CABLE: Fitch Assigns 'BB-(exp)' Rating to Sr. Sec. Tap Issue
SANTANDER CONSUMER: Moody's Upgrades BFSR to 'C-' From 'D+'

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AMDEGA: Everest Acquires Firm's Name
ERSTE CAPITAL: Moody's Corrects Preferred Stock Rating to 'Ba1'
LEHMAN BROTHERS: European Unit Sues First Commercial for US$12MM
SUNLEY TURRIFF: Hackney Empire Sues Aviva Over Bond Dispute
* UNITED KINGDOM: MP Urges Gov't to Protect Small Football Clubs


* Moody's Says EBA Stress Tests Have Limited Rating Implications
* Strategic Value Partners Ups Ante on European Distress Fund
* BOND PRICING: For the Week July 4 to July 8, 2011



AMAGERBANKEN A/S: Dividend Payout Rate Revised to 66.1%
Frances Schwartzkopff at Bloomberg News, citing an e-mailed
statement, reports that Denmark's bank resolution unit Financial
Stability said the payout rate after winding down Amagerbanken A/S
will be 66.1%.

Financial Stability had earlier reported the payout would reach
84.4%, raising its first estimate of 58.8%, Bloomberg notes.
Since then, the unit was forced to reduce the dividend after an
audit showed it would be unable to produce the funds, Bloomberg

According to Bloomberg, the agreed dividend "can't be reduced, but
can -- depending on the outcome of court proceedings -- be

                        About Amagerbanken

Amagerbanken, the 8th largest bank in Denmark, was hit in 2008 by
the financial crisis and needed to refinance it on the market, in
order to balance necessary asset write-downs.  After continuous
unsuccessful efforts to obtain new financing or to find other
solutions, Amagerbanken was declared bankrupt on February 7, 2011.
Previously, February 6, 2011, Amagerbanken had entered into a
conditional transfer agreement with the Danish publicly owned
Financial Stability Company (FSC), as part of the Danish bank
wind-up scheme.


CHOREN INDUSTRIES: Financial Woes Prompt Insolvency
Michael Hogan at Reuters reports that Choren Industries GmbH has
declared insolvency.

According to Reuters, a statement from interim insolvency
administrator Kanzlei Kuebler said the reason for the insolvency
was financial difficulties with the start up of the company's test

Mr. Kuebler said the company will continue operations and it is
hoped to start talks with new investors shortly.  He said the
company's subsidiaries in China and the U.S. are not covered by
the insolvency declaration, Reuters notes.

Choren Industries GmbH is a German second generation biofuels

* GERMANY: Reports 2,587 Business Insolvencies, Down 7.4% in April
According to RTTNews, the Federal Statistical Office on Friday
said German insolvency courts reported a total of 2,587 business
insolvencies in April, 7.4% less than the same period last year.

The total number of insolvencies fell 7.8% year-on-year to 23,866,
while insolvencies of consumers decreased 8.2% to 8,063, RTTNews

During the January to April period, 53,101 insolvencies were
registered, representing an annual decline of 6.3%, RTTNews says.
While corporate insolvencies fell 8.2%, consumer insolvencies
decreased 5%, RTTNews notes.


DALI CAPITAL: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit rating on
Dali Capital PLC's class A notes and raised its ratings on the
class B and C notes.

The credit enhancement available to the rated classes of notes is
provided by subordination and a non-amortizing cash reserve. The
current level of total credit enhancement for the class A, B, and
C notes is higher than at closing by a factor of 1.6, 1.7, and
2.0. "In addition, the ratio of credit enhancement to credit cover
is higher than at closing, after our analysis stressed the arrears
above their historical levels and the property value below its
original level," S&P said.

"These factors enabled us to upgrade the class B and C notes. We
affirmed the rating on the class A notes at its current level,  as
we believe that timely payment of interest and full repayment of
principal might not be met in case of a sovereign default that
would be inherent in rating scenario above a 'BBB' rating level.
(The foreign currency rating on the Russian Federation is
BBB/Stable/A-3.)," S&P stated.

Since closing, the principal on the notes is repaid sequentially,
and to date the class A notes have amortized by 62%. They would
have redeemed by more if there had been no erroneous switch to pro
rata principal repayment, which applied from April 2010 to April
2011.  To correct this misapplication of the principal waterfall,
sequential principal repayment will apply from the interest
payment date falling in May 2011 and will be preserved beyond the
step-up date (December 2011) until the class A notes are redeemed
to the same extent as they would have been redeemed if sequential
principal repayment was not breached back in 2010.

The transaction has recorded the lowest levels of arrears compared
with its Russian peers. The arrears ramped up rapidly in 2009 and
through to mid-2010, when the Russian economy was in a down cycle,
and have stabilized since then. As of May 2011, the 30+ day
arrears ratio was 4.2%, and the 90+ day arrears ratio was 2.8%.
The transaction has trapped excess spread to cure accumulated
defaults. At present, the transaction has no uncovered principal

The interest rate and foreign currency mismatch in relation to the
class A notes is hedged through a swap with Barclays Bank PLC (AA-

The remaining classes of notes are not exposed to interest rate
and foreign currency risks.

The ratings on the notes are weak-linked to the ratings on
Barclays Bank as swap provider and liquidity facility provider,
and The Bank of New York Mellon (AA/Stable/A-1+) as bank account
provider for the issuer and the loan note issuer. Both entities
are sufficiently rated to support the current ratings on the
notes, in accordance with our 2010 counterparty criteria. "At the
same time, in our cash flow model we have sized for commingling
risk related to GPB-Mortgage (not rated) as collection account
bank," S&P added.

Ratings List

Dali Capital PLC
EUR140.9 Million, RUB864 Million and RUR864 Million Mortgage-
Backed Fixed- and
Floating-Rate Notes Series 2006-30, 2006-31 and 2006-32
Mortgage-Backed Securities Series 2006-1)

Class            Rating
            To           From

Rating Affirmed

A           BBB (sf)     BBB (sf)

Ratings Raised

B           BB+ (sf)     BB (sf)
C           BB- (sf)     B (sf)

EIRCOM GROUP: Debt Restructuring Talks Begin
Ciaran Hancock at The Irish Times reports that Eircom Group on
Thursday began talks with a committee representing 28% of its
first lien lenders on a debt restructuring.

According to The Irish Times, Eircom said it had recognized the
coordinating committee, which is comprised of Alcentra, Avoca
Capital, Deutsche Bank, GSO Capital Partners LP, Harbourmaster
Capital and SMBC.  The committee's financial advisors are Houlihan
Lokey, The Irish Times says.  Legal advice is provided by Kirkland
Ellis, The Irish Times notes.

Eircom has engaged investment banks Gleacher Shacklock and JP
Morgan, and law firm Linklaters to represent it in talks, The
Irish Times discloses.

First lien lenders at Eircom are owed a net EUR2.36 billion,
according to The Irish Times.  The company's total net debt is
EUR3.7 billion, The Irish Times says.

Eircom will publish full-year results next month, and is expected
to announce it had breached its covenants at the end of June, The
Irish Times discloses.

The negotiations on a financial restructuring of Eircom's debts
are expected to be complex and could last for a number of weeks,
The Irish Times notes.

It is understood that Ernst & Young has completed its independent
review of Eircom's recently-completed business plan, The Irish
Times states.

Headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, Eircom Group -- is an Irish telecommunications company,
and former state-owned incumbent.  It is currently the largest
telecommunications operator in the Republic of Ireland and
operates primarily on the island of Ireland, with a point of
presence in Great Britain.

MCINERNEY HOLDINGS: Board Seeks Liquidation; EGM Set for July 29
John Mulligan at Irish Independent reports that the board of
McInerney Holdings wants to liquidate the company, saying it has
"no meaningful assets" and no cash to deal with even the most
basic of administrative tasks.

According to Irish Independent, the move, if approved by
shareholders, will effectively mark the demise of a group that
listed on the stock exchange in Dublin 40 years ago.

"The directors pursued every measure possible to safeguard your
group and put in place a restructuring plan that could have
offered shareholder value in the future," Irish Independent quotes
Ned Sullivan, chairman of the group, as saying in a letter to
shareholders.  "It is with great regret that the level of debt in
the group's various divisions and the continuing falling market
have not allowed us to be successful in this regard."

An extraordinary general meeting is due to be held on July 29,
Irish Independent discloses.  If approved, the liquidation will
likely end efforts begun recently by British-based investor
David Nabarro to oust the McInerney board, Irish Independent
notes.  He owns over 21% of the group and has threatened to seek
an injunctive relief if McInerney fails to include his proposals
to remove the board at any extraordinary general meeting it calls,
Irish Independent recounts.

Mr. Sullivan, as cited by Irish Independent, said that if the
liquidation proposal is rejected then board members will "consider
their individual positions".

                        About McInerney

McInerney Holdings plc -- is a
home builder and regional home builder in the North and Midlands
of England.  It also undertakes commercial and leisure projects in
Ireland, United Kingdom and Spain.  It operates in Ireland, the
United Kingdom and Spain.  The main trading activities of the
Company's Irish home building business during the year ended
December 31, 2008, consisted of construction of private houses,
trading in developed sites and land, development of residential
land for third-parties and in joint-ventures, and contracting for
third-parties.  The Company's commercial property development
division, Hillview Developments Ltd (Hillview), develops
industrial units in the Greater Dublin area.  Hillview completed
1,223 square meters of industrial units as of December 31, 2008.
Its Spanish division, Alanda Group, is developing freehold
apartment schemes.  As of December 31, 2008, the Company completed
1,359 private and contracting residential units in Ireland, the
United Kingdom and Spain.


LUCCHINI GROUP: Has Deal with Creditors; Staves Off Bankruptcy
SteelOrbis reports that Lucchini Group avoided bankruptcy after it
reached an agreement with its creditor banks on Wednesday.

According to SteelOrbis, the agreement was reached on the basis of
the freezing of 100% of the corporate debt (EUR770 million) and
the granting of a EUR78 million bridging loan and EUR48 million in
letters of credit.  This means that the prospect of bankruptcy has
been warded off, as the agreement ensures Lucchini Group has the
liquidity needed to run its plants and to test the water for an
eventual sale of the company -- which may be sought by Russian
business magnate Alexey Mordashov, SteelOrbis notes.

Brescia-based Lucchini Group is the Italian steelmaking division
of Russia's Severstal Group.


BANK OF MOSCOW: Fitch Downgrades Individual Rating to 'F'
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Bank of Moscow's Long-term Issuer
Default Rating at 'BBB-', removed the rating from Rating Watch
Negative and assigned a Stable Outlook. At the same time, Fitch
has downgraded BOM's Individual Rating to 'F'.

The affirmation of BOM's Long-term IDR reflects the approval of
the support package for the bank from JSC Bank VTB ('BBB'/Stable)
and the Russian authorities, aimed at addressing the risks arising
from its legacy related-party exposures. It also reflects the
likely higher propensity of VTB to support BOM in the future due
to the confirmation of VTB's plans to increase its stake in BOM to
at least 75%.

The support package stipulates that as a first step, VTB will
increase its stake in BOM to 75%+1 share from the current 46.48%,
through the purchase of shares from minorities, which Fitch
understands is likely to include stakes of 3.88% and 19.9%,
currently held by Suleiman Kerimov and Vitaliy Yusufov,
respectively. This acquisition will be done through VTB group
entities and may take up to several weeks, according to VTB. To
formally comply with Russian legislation on bank support measures,
VTB is also expected to sell its own 46.48% stake to these
entities, which should also reduce pressure on its standalone
regulatory capital.

The second step of the support package will involve the Central
Bank of Russia issuing a RUB295 billion five-year loan (with a
prolongation option) to the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA), which
in turn will on-lend these funds to BOM for ten years at an annual
rate of 0.51%. The proceeds will be primarily used by BOM to
acquire government securities. Because of the below market rate,
it is envisaged that BOM will recognize a RUB150 billion gain in
its IFRS accounts in 2011.

BOM will also create new loan provisions of RUB220 billion, which,
Fitch has been informed by VTB is roughly equivalent to the most
problematic portion of the total RUB368 billion related-party
legacy loans identified by the CBR after its recent review of BOM.
Some of these provisions will be created in the still to be
published 2010 IFRS accounts, absorbing most of the bank's

BOM's capitalization will be subsequently replenished by the gain
on the DIA loan and additional equity from VTB. Based on BOM's
latest (9M10) IFRS accounts, Fitch estimates that its Basel 1 Tier
1 capital ratio after the DIA gain and the new provision creation
will be around 8%. VTB has also committed to injecting up to
RUB100 billion of new equity in BOM by the end of 2012, of which a
part will be provided already in 2011.

The downgrade of BOM's Individual Rating reflects the agency's
view that the amount of problem assets announced by the CBR far
exceeds the bank's current equity (about RUB107 billion at June 1,
2011, according to RAS accounts), which in Fitch's view indicates
the failure of the bank. The agency also understands that BOM is
likely to be in breach of regulatory capital requirements
(permissible for a bank under rehabilitation) until new equity is
received from VTB. This is because no gain is expected in the RAS
accounts on the DIA loan, unlike under IFRS.

The agency also acknowledges that there is still very little
clarity as to the recoverability prospects of the problem assets,
and hence the scale of BOM's ultimate recapitalization needs. Some
of the problem loans are leveraged and incomplete development
construction projects. Fitch believes some of the new equity to be
injected by VTB may be used for additional financing of these
projects to facilitate their completion, which should ensure that
there should eventually be at least some recoveries on these

Fitch will reassess BOM's standalone profile once the DIA loan is
received and the agency is able to assess the extent of impairment
in the bank's loan book. If Fitch believes that the capital
support received is sufficient, relative to the bank's problem
assets, to make the bank viable, then it will review the
Individual Rating. The risk of BOM's debt acceleration due to a
covenant breach has diminished, though, in Fitch's view, given the
announcement of the support package and the agency's expectation
that the bank should be able to publish IFRS accounts in order to
rectify the covenant breach.

VTB's ratings remain unaffected by the actions on BOM. The bank's
Long-term IDR of 'BBB' with a Stable Outlook continues to be
underpinned by potential support from the Russian authorities. The
bank's 'C/D' Individual rating already took account of the
potential need for recapitalization of BOM and the potential
consolidation of a majority stake in the bank (see RAC dated
March 4, 2011), while the gain from the DIA loan could
significantly reduce the extent to which VTB's capital is eroded
by the bail out and consolidation. According to VTB's management,
its Basel I Tier 1 ratio should not fall below 11% in 2011, which
seems achievable to Fitch, providing provisions at BOM do not
substantially exceed the RUB220 billion currently planned. The
structuring of the BOM acquisition through group entities would
also reduce the impact of this on VTB's regulatory capital

The rating actions on BOM are:

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB-', off RWN,
      Outlook Stable;

   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'; off RWN

   -- National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA+(rus)' ; off RWN;
      Outlook Stable

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2', off RWN

   -- Individual Rating: downgraded to 'F' from 'D'; off RWN

   -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'/'AA+(rus)';
      off RWN

   -- Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BB+', off RWN

DELTACREDIT BANK: Moody's Changes Rating Outlook to Stable
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on the Baa2
long-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Bank
DeltaCredit to stable from negative.

These ratings assigned to DeltaCredit are unaffected by this

- the standalone bank financial strength rating of D with a
  stable outlook;

- the Prime-2 short-term deposit ratings; and

- the bank's A2 long-term local currency debt rating benefitting
  from an explicit and irrevocable guarantee issued by Societe
  Generale Group (rated C+, Aa2 on review for possible downgrade /
  Prime-1). The bank's A2 local currency guaranteed debt rating is
  on review for possible downgrade, reflecting the rating review
  of its guarantor, Societe Generale Group, which was announced on
  June 15, 2011.


The rating agency explained that the revision of the outlook on
DeltaCredit's deposit ratings reflects Moody's view that parental
support to DeltaCredit, in case of need, will likely be
forthcoming directly from Societe Generale Group, despite the fact
that effective from January 2011 100% of DeltaCredit's stake is
controlled by the Group's other Russian subsidiary, Rosbank (rated
Baa2/Prime-2/D, with stable outlook), as opposed to direct
ownership by Societe Generale previously. Rosbank, in turn, is
79.8656% controlled by Societe Generale following the completion
of the final stage of the legal integration process for all of the
French group's Russian subsidiaries on July 1, 2011.

"The negative outlook assigned previously to DeltaCredit's ratings
reflected Moody's view that after the integration, whereby
DeltaCredit would be indirectly owned by Societe Generale via
Rosbank, support would potentially stem from the immediate parent
(which is financially weaker than Societe Generale), as opposed to
direct support from the French group previously," explains Olga
Ulyanova, a Moody's Vice-President and lead analyst for the bank.
"However, after the transfer of DeltaCredit's ownership to
Rosbank, Moody's has seen additional evidence of Societe
Generale's direct support to DeltaCredit, which included the
provision by the French group of the explicit and irrevocable
guarantee for DeltaCredit's domestic bond issues in the aggregate
amount of RUB15 billion. Societe Generale also directly maintains
its standby liquidity facilities readily available for
DeltaCredit, which had been the case before the French group
ceased to hold a direct stake in DeltaCredit," adds Ms Ulyanova.

As a result, DeltaCredit's global local currency deposit ratings
incorporate a three-notch uplift to Baa2/Prime-2 from the bank's
long-term scale of Ba2 in accordance with Moody's Joint Default
Analysis methodology, due to the rating agency's assumption of
very high probability of parental support to DeltaCredit from
Societe Generale Group.


The principal methodologies used in this rating were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007, and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in
March 2007.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, DeltaCredit Bank reported --
under audited IFRS -- total assets of US$1.84 billion and total
shareholders' equity of US$296 million as at December 31, 2010;
net IFRS profits for 2010 stood at US$58 million.

METALLOINVEST FINANCE: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to New Notes
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)Ba3 rating
with a loss given default assessment of 3 (46%) to up to US$2.0
billion worth of proposed new notes of Metalloinvest Finance
Limited, a wholly owned indirect subsidiary of joint-stock holding
company Metalloinvest (Ba3, positive). The proceeds from the
issuance will be on-lent to other companies of the Metalloinvest
group to repay existing indebtedness and for general corporate

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
securities, and these ratings represent only Moody's preliminary
opinion. Upon a conclusive review of the transaction and
associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign
definitive ratings to the bonds. A final rating may differ from a
provisional rating if the final documents and transaction
structure materially differ from that initially reviewed for the
assignment of the provisional rating.

In assigning a definitive rating to Metalloinvest's bond, Moody's
will primarily assess the completeness of the documentation,
including the availability of the unconditional and irrevocable
guarantee from all three main operating subsidiaries of the group.


The assignment of the (P)Ba3 rating reflects that the notes will
rank pari passu with the claims of all the present and future
unsecured and unsubordinated creditors of the group. The
transaction structure for the new notes envisages a holding
company guarantee alongside upstream guarantees of Metalloinvest's
main subsidiaries, hence Moody's view is that the notes should be
considered as equal in ranking to all other unsecured debt
obligations residing at different levels of the group. The bond
documentation contains a negative pledge clause (preventing a
pledge of more than 20% of group's assets) and a cross-default
clause, embracing all members of the group.

The notes shall be unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by
the parent company, Metalloinvest, and two operating subsidiaries,
joint-stock companies Lebedinskiy Mining and Processing Plant
(LGOK) and Oskol Elektrometallurgical Plant (OEMK). The issuer has
agreed that joint-stock company Mikhailovsky GOK (MGOK), the third
main operating subsidiary of the group, shall also provide an
unconditional and irrevocable guarantee of the notes within 50
days of the issuance date. Failure of the issuer to procure such
an additional guarantee shall entitle the noteholders to request
that the issuer repurchase the notes.

The positive outlook reflects Moody's expectation that
Metalloinvest will be able to reduce the additional debt it has
incurred in the course of its acquisition of a stake in Norilsk

The rating could experience positive pressure if Metalloinvest
were to sustainably maintain a debt/EBITDA ratio below 2.0x and a
free cash flow (FCF)/debt ratio above 20%. Furthermore, to
consider a rating upgrade, Moody's would require evidence that the
group was consistently implementing its internal financial policy
with respect to financial leverage.

Downward pressure could develop if the company's debt/EBITDA ratio
were to exceed 2.5x and its (CFO-Div)/debt ratio were to fall
below 30%.


The principal methodology used in rating Metalloinvest Finance
Limited was the Global Steel Industry Methodology published in
January 2009.

Metalloinvest is a leading Russian mining company and the largest
Russian iron ore producer, with a 36% domestic market share of
sintering ore and concentrate (59% for pellets and 100% for hot-
briquetted iron (HBI)/direct-reduced iron (DRI)). The group has
the world's second largest iron ore reserve base, is the largest
iron ore producer in Europe and Russia in terms of volumes and the
fifth-largest supplier globally in terms of market share. In
addition, Metalloinvest is the fifth-largest steel producer in

In 2010, Metalloinvest produced approximately 36.8 million tons of
sintering ore and concentrate, 22 million tons of pellets, 4.7
million tons of HBI/DRI and 6.1 million tons of crude steel. For
that year, the group reported revenue of US$7.24 billion
(representing a 53% increase year over year) and EBITDA of US$2.59
billion (a 208% increase year over year). Metalloinvest is owned
by four individuals.

METALLOINVEST JSC: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has assigned JSC Holding Company Metalloinvest Long-
term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings of 'BB-'
with a Stable Outlook and a National Long-term Rating of 'A+(rus)'
with a Stable Outlook. Fitch has also assigned Metalloinvest's
prospective up to USD2.0bn bonds issue a senior unsecured rating
of 'BB-'.

The ratings reflect Metalloinvest's scale and sales diversity with
its emphasis on the iron ore sector where the company is the top
producer in Russia & CIS. The company's large resource base
combined with the its cost-efficient mining operations result in a
strong operational profile compared to Russian and international
metallurgical peers. Fitch also notes that the company's strategic
aim of increasing high added-value products in its product mix
will help to improve future operational cash flows.

The company's 2010 and Q1 2011 operational performance recovered
to its pre-crisis levels, in both the mining and steel segments.
The positive dynamics were mostly driven by the overall Russian
and worldwide steel market recovery.

Fitch notes recent measures taken by Metalloinvest to reduce the
proportion of secured debt in its capital structure and to
lengthen its maturity profile. Simultaneously however Fitch notes
the noticeable (albeit still acceptable) increase in the company's
leverage in early 2011 vs. 2009-2010. A significant part of the
newly raised debt being used for the purchase of shares in Norilsk
Nickel, which is treated as a purchase of a minority stake in an
unrelated business. In this respect, Fitch notes the company's
still weak corporate governance standards vs. its listed peers.

The prospective up to USD2.0bn bonds issue is aimed at refinancing
existing loans. It will not affect the company's leverage but will
improve its maturity profile. The issue is planned for five to
seven years (maximum ten years) and is secured by corporate
guarantees from Metalloinvest's holding company and key operating

Metalloinvest's current leverage and coverage metrics are roughly
average versus other Russian/CIS peers at the 'BB' rating
category. Fitch has also taken into account Metalloinvest's strong
expected free cash flow (FCF) generation over the next three to
five years with CFO margin above average.

The company's limited geographic diversification, with all
principal assets located in Russia is a key constraining factor on
the ratings. In Fitch's opinion, key operations held in Russia
entail above-average political, business and regulatory risks.
Pro-cyclical steel industry risks were also taken into account.

Positive rating pressure could arise from de-leveraging ahead of
current expectations leading to sustainable FFO net leverage below
1.5x, or a strengthening of the company's operational profile
leading to a sustained improvement in cash flows and profitability
throughout economic cycles. Negative rating pressure could result
from a significant weakening of financial metrics, including a
decrease in the EBITDAR margin on a sustained basis below 25%,
material debt-funded acquisitions or project financing
substantially worsening the company's financial profile.

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's expectations that
Metalloinvest will be able to maintain its existing operational
profile and liquidity position.

NIZHNEKAMSKNEFTEKHIM OJSC: Moody's Upgrades National Scale Rating
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency has upgraded to from
the national scale rating of Nizhnekamskneftekhim. This follows
Moody's upgrade of the company's baseline credit assessment to 14
from 15, which would map to a B1 rating on Moody's global ratings
scale. The BCA forms one of the four rating inputs in accordance
with Moody's methodology for government-related issuers. The other
rating inputs -- support, dependence and the rating of NKNK's
major shareholder, the Republic of Tatarstan (Russia), currently
rated Ba1, stable -- remain unchanged. The outlook on the ratings
is stable.


"[The] rating action was prompted by several positive
developments, including NKNK's improved standing in the
polypropylene, polystyrene and polyethylene markets following the
addition of new capacity in 2009, and a significant increase in
rubber sales volumes thanks to direct contracts with tyre
manufacturers," says Julia Pribytkova, Moody's lead analyst for
NKNK. In addition, the upgrade reflects (i) a reduction in the
proportion of the company's output made up of lower added-value
products (higher added-value plastics and specialty rubbers now
constitute up to 77% of revenue from main product groups); (ii)
significant savings on energy costs, achieved by NKNK deploying
its own power generation unit, which covers up to 25% of the
company's energy requirements; and (iii) an improved financial
profile, characterized by stronger profitability, coverage and
leverage metrics (adjusted debt/EBITDA of 1.0x as of end-2010),
and increased free cash flow generation over the past two years.

NKNK, majority owned and fully controlled by Tatarstan government-
related entities Svyazinvestneftekhim (SINEK, Ba1, stable) and
TAIF, provides a significant source of tax revenue for the
republic's budget. The government strategically prioritizes the
petrochemical industry as key for the region's economic
development. NKNK is the major regional consumer of naphta, which
constitutes 38% of its feedstock and is sourced from TAIF --NK, a
sister company within the TAIF group.

"NKNK's strategy envisages investment over the next three years of
approximately EUR351 million into the elimination of bottlenecks
in the existing production process and increases in production
capacity of particular products," explains Ms. Pribytkova. "Given
NKNK's cash generation capacity and liquidity profile, as well its
strategy of organic growth, Moody's does not expect any material
increase in leverage during this period."

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation for NKNK to
sustain its strong debt coverage profile supported by improved
profitability, moderating CAPEX commitments and proactive
liquidity management.

In view of NKNK's credit fundamentals and the positioning of its ratings following the recent upgrade, Moody's does not
anticipate any upward pressure to develop in the foreseeable
future. Further improvements in the operating and financial
profile would have to be assessed in the context of the company's
high geographic concentration and limitations imposed by the
single-site location of its operations. Furthermore, an upward
rating migration within the Ba category would also be constrained
by the credit profile of the region (Tatarstan rated Ba1/stable),
as NKNK enjoys strong regional economic linkages.

Sustained weakness in profitability, leading to lower-than-
expected cash flow generation and a deteriorating liquidity
profile including concerns over the company's ability to remain in
compliance with financial covenants would exert negative pressure
on NKNK's BCA. Negative developments at the level of the
Government of Tatarstan, and/or TAIF group would cause Moody's to
reassess its GRI assumptions, that currently provide a one notch
uplift to NKNK's corporate family rating.

The principal methodology used in rating OJSC Nizhnekamskneftekhim
was the Global Chemical Industry Methodology, published December

Based in Nizhnekamsk in the Russian Republic of Tatarstan (Ba1,
stable), NKNK is one of the country's key producers of rubbers,
plastics, monomers and other petrochemicals. The company has a
significant global market share in selected products, such as
isoprene rubber (31% of global consumption), which is used in tyre
manufacturing. NKNK's 10 core production units are located on one
site. In 2010, the company reported sales of RUB96.52 billion
(around EUR2.40 billion) and adjusted EBITDA of RUB16.79 billion
(EUR0.41 billion). Around half the company's revenue was derived
from export activities.

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency's National Scale Ratings are
intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt
issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants
to better differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's
global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".ru" for Russia. For further information
on Moody's approach to national scale ratings, please refer to
Moody's Rating Implementation Guidance published in August 2010
entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale Ratings to Global Scale


Moody's Interfax Rating Agency specializes in credit risk analysis
in Russia. MIRA is a joint-venture between Moody's Investors
Service, a leading provider of credit ratings, research and
analysis covering debt instruments and securities in the global
capital markets, and the Interfax Information Services Group.
Moody's Investors Service is a subsidiary of Moody's Corporation.

RUSFINANCE BANK: Moody's Affirms E+ Bank Financial Strength Rating
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed all ratings of Rusfinance
Bank following the completion on July 1, 2011 of the legal
integration process for all Russian subsidiaries of Societe
Generale (SG, rated C+, Aa2 on review for possible
downgrade/Prime-1) -- RFB's ultimate parent.

RFB's ratings were affirmed as:

- Long-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Baa3,
  with stable outlook

- Short-term local and foreign currency ratings of Prime-3

- Standalone Bank Financial Strength Rating (BFSR) of E+, with
  stable outlook; the BFSR maps to B1 on the long-term scale

- Baa3 global local currency senior unsecured debt rating


"Moody's continues to incorporate a high level of parental support
into RFB's debt and deposit ratings from Societe Generale Group,"
says Semyon Isakov, a Moody's Assistant Vice-President and lead
analyst for the Russian bank. "Therefore, the reorganisation of
SG's Russian business unit, whereby Rosbank acquired a 100% stake
in RFB from Societe Generale Group, has no impact on RFB's
ratings," adds Mr. Isakov.

Moody's notes that given SG's 79.8656% stake in Rosbank -- the
latter being, in turn, RFB's direct 100% parent -- the French
group continues to exercise full management control over RFB, with
SG having majority representation on its supervisory board. This,
along with a strategic fit within SG that positions RFB as the
leading car loans provider in Russia, results in four notches of
parental support uplift from RFB's E+ standalone BFSR.

At the same time, the rating agency observes that RFB's stand
alone BFSR rating is constrained by: (I) the monoline nature of
the bank's operations; (ii) high reliance on wholesale sources for
funding; and (iii) intense competition in the "new cars" segment
that renders net interest margin potentially vulnerable.

However, Moody's highlights that the standalone rating also
benefits from a high level of capital and profitability. RFB's
strong car-financing franchise, together with its good
geographical coverage, ensures wide customer reach and enables the
bank to compete with other market leaders in its targeted


The principal methodologies used in this rating were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology, published in
February 2007, and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology, published in March

Headquartered in Samara, Russia, RFB reported -- under audited
IFRS -- total assets of RUB82.8 billion and total shareholders'
equity of RUB19.8 million as at December 31, 2010; net IFRS profit
for 2010 stood at RUB4 billion.

VIMPELCOM LTD: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Senior Unsecured Rating
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive Ba3 senior
unsecured rating with a loss given default assessment of 4 (50%)
to the new bond issued by VimpelCom Holdings B.V, an entity fully
owned by VimpelCom Ltd. via VimpelCom Amsterdam BV. The proceeds
of the issuance will be primarily used to repay the currently
outstanding US$2.2 billion drawn under the US$2.5 bridge facility
raised by the issuer's parent, VimpelCom Amsterdam B.V., for Wind
transaction financing purposes.


Moody's definitive rating on this debt obligation is in line with
the provisional rating assigned on June 22, 2011. Moody's rating
rationale was set out in a press release issued on that date.

The issuance consists of three tranches as follows: (i) US$200
million worth of 3 months' Libor+4.0% notes maturing in 2014; (ii)
US$500 million worth of 6.2546% notes maturing in 2017; and (iii)
US$1.5 billion worth of 7.5043% notes maturing in 2022. Final
terms and conditions of all three tranches are consistent with the
terms and conditions reviewed at the provisional rating


The principal methodology used in rating VimpelCom Holdings B.V
was the Global Telecommunications Industry Methodology published
in December 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S.,
Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Domiciled in the Netherlands, VimpelCom Ltd. is a holding company
for OJSC Vimpel Communications, Kyivstar, Wind Telecomunicazioni
S.p.A., and Orascom Telecom Holding S.A.E., with leading positions
in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Italy, Algeria, Pakistan and
operations in CIS countries, South-East Asia and North America. In
2010, VimpelCom Ltd. (then comprising VimpelCom OJSC and Kyivstar)
generated approximately US$10.5 billion in revenues and US$4.9
billion in reported EBITDA. The company's pro-forma 2010 revenue
post-combination with Wind Telecom (completed on 15 April 2011) is
estimated at US$21 billion.

VTB BANK: S&P Assesses Stand-Alone Credit Profile at 'bb-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services commented on its CreditWatch
placement of Russian bank JSC VTB Bank and subsidiaries. The 'BBB'
long-term counterparty credit ratings on VTB and its subsidiaries
VTB-Leasing and VTB-Leasing Finance remain on CreditWatch, where
it placed them with negative implications on March 1, 2011. "We
are also maintaining the 'ruAAA' Russia national scale ratings on
VTB and VTB-Leasing on CreditWatch with negative implications. At
the same time, we affirmed the 'A-3' short-term ratings on VTB and
VTB-Leasing," S&P related.

The Central Bank of Russia and Deposit Insurance Agency announced
a rehabilitation plan on July 1, 2011, to prevent OAO Bank of
Moscow's (BoM; not rated) bankruptcy. In the first quarter, VTB
purchased, for RUB103 billion, a 46.5% direct stake in BoM and 25%
plus one share of Metroplitan Insurance Group (not rated), which
itself owns 17.3% in BoM. "We placed the long-term ratings on VTB
on CreditWatch negative at that time to take into account the
potential negative impact on VTB's capital, uncertainties about
BoM's asset quality, and the risks of integrating BoM into the VTB
group," S&P stated.

"The CBR's recent negative revelations about BoM have prompted us
to extend our CreditWatch placement. The central bank's
announcements indicate fraudulent activities and potential losses
that might be large enough to make BoM unable to meet minimum
regulatory capital requirements. In broad lines, the announced
rehabilitation plan calls for the CBR to make a five-year deposit
of RUB295 billion (US$10 billion) with an annual interest rate of
0.5%, below the market rate, in the DIA. Concurrently, the DIA is
to deposit the same amount at an interest rate of 0.51% in BoM for
10 years. VTB has announced that BoM will invest the proceeds in
Russian government bonds and that BoM will be able to 'book a
profit with an economic effect of RUB150 billion.' As part of the
plan, VTB has stated it will commit to provide BoM additional
capital of up to RUB100 billion by year-end 2012," S&P related.

The DIA has named two VTB group members -- VTB Pension
Administrator and VTB Debt Center -- as administrators of BoM
during the rehabilitation. Under the rules of the rehabilitation,
the administrators must have a minimum 75% shareholding in BoM.
Consequently, VTB intends to increase its stake in BoM to
at least 75% over the coming weeks.

While the rehabilitation plan demonstrates significant support for
BoM from the government via the DIA, it also means that VTB is
increasing its ownership in a large bank with a much higher
concentration of impaired loans than originally anticipated. "In
our opinion, the recent events surrounding BoM illustrate
lingering asset quality problems from the 2009 recession and gaps
in the supervision of large financial institutions in Russia," S&P

"We believe that the integration of BoM, the fifth-largest bank in
Russia, will strengthen VTB's business position in the Moscow
region, the country's wealthiest economic area. BoM has 9 million
retail customers and a large base of corporate and institutional
clients including the City of Moscow. Still, the acquisition of
BoM, combined with the less material purchase of TransCreditBank
(BB/Stable/B; ruAA) in 2011, will weaken VTB's capital, in our
view. The integration of BoM within VTB group also carries
execution risks," S&P noted.

"Under our methodology, VTB is a government-related entity. In our
opinion, the probability that the Russian government would provide
timely and sufficient extraordinary support to VTB in case of need
is extremely high, due to VTB's critical role and very strong link
to the Russian government. Consequently, VTB's long-term rating
incorporates four notches of uplift above its stand-alone credit
profile, which we assess at 'bb-'," S&P stated.

"We will resolve the CreditWatch in the coming weeks after we
review BoM's loan portfolio, VTB's plans to integrate BoM, and
VTB's capital management in light of the rehabilitation plan for
BoM.  At this stage, if we were to lower the long-term ratings on
VTB and its subsidiaries following our review, we would
likely lower them by no more than one notch," S&P related.


BANKIA: Moody's Assigns 'D+' Financial Strength Rating
Moody's Investors Service has assigned debt, deposit and
standalone Bank Financial Strength Ratings to the new entities
Bankia and Banco Financiero y de Ahorro, in response to the
transfer of the banking activities of seven Spanish savings banks.

For Bankia, these ratings have been assigned: (i) Long and short
term deposit ratings of Baa2/Prime-2; (ii) a standalone Bank
Financial Strength of D+ (mapping to a Ba1 on the long-term rating
scale). Additionally, Moody's rates the debt issues which have
been assumed by Bankia upon completion of the transfer from the
savings banks with the following ratings: (iii) the senior debt
ratings at Baa2/Prime-2; (iv) the junior subordinated debt ratings
at Ba2(hyb), one notch below the standalone BFSR and (v) the
preference shares at four notches below the standalone BFSR at
B2(hyb). The outlook on all ratings is negative.

For BFA, Moody's has assigned a long-term issuer rating of Ba2.
Additionally, Moody's rates the debt issues which have been
assumed by BFA upon completion of the transfer from the savings
banks with the following ratings: the subordinated debt ratings at
Ba3; the junior subordinated debt ratings at B2(hyb) and the
preference shares at Caa2(hyb). The outlook on all ratings is

At the same time, Moody's has withdrawn the standalone bank
financial strength rating, the long-term and short-term deposit
ratings and the long-term issuer ratings of the seven savings
banks whose banking activities have been transferred to BFA and
Bankia in turn.

* Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid ("Caja Madrid",
  previously rated Baa1,Prime-2 on review for possible

* Caja de Ahorros de Valencia, Castellon y Alicante ("Bancaja",
  previously rated Baa1, Prime-2 on review for possible

* Caja Insular de Ahorros de Canarias ("Caja Insular de
  Canarias", previously rated Baa1, Prime-2 on review for possible

* Caja de Ahorros de Avila ("Caja Avila", previously rated
  Baa3,Prime-3 on review direction uncertain/E+),

* Caixa Laietana (not rated), Caja de Ahorros de Segovia ("Caja
  Segovia", previously rated Baa3,Prime-3 on review direction
  uncertain/E+) and

* Caja de Ahorros de la Rioja ("Caja Rioja", previously rated
  Baa1,Prime-2 on review for possible downgrade/D+).


On March 24, the general assemblies of Caja Madrid, Bancaja, Caja
Insular de Canarias, Caja Avila, Caixa Laietana, Caja Segovia and
Caja Rioja approved the transfer of all their assets and
liabilities to BFA - a newly constituted commercial bank -- with
the exception of the social welfare projects.

Additionally, on April 5, the general assemblies of the savings
banks and the board of directors of BFA approved the constitution
of Bankia, a commercial bank to which BFA would transfer all of
its assets and liabilities with the exception of EUR3 billion
foreclosed land, EUR4.6 billion substandard and doubtful loans
financing land, EUR2.9 billion industrial stakes, EUR10.2 billion
public debt and EUR22.5 billion long-term debt.

The segregation of all assets and liabilities from the savings
banks to BFA and from BFA to Bankia took place on May 23. Upon the
completion of this transfer, the savings banks' role is to manage
the social welfare projects financed through dividends paid by
BFA. At the same time, BFA will act as the holding company of

Subsequently, most of the debt obligations of the savings banks
have been assumed by Bankia, while EUR22.5 billion long-term debt
has been assumed by BFA (EUR5.4 billion dated subordinated debt,
EUR 4.1 billion preference shares, EUR4.5 billion FROB preference
shares and EUR 8.5 billion government guaranteed debt). All of the
savings banks' other ratings have been withdrawn.

As of July 2011, Bankia has total assets of EUR275 billion and BFA
has total assets of EUR40 billion in its balance sheet.



Moody's has assigned long and short term deposit ratings of
Baa2/Prime-2 and a standalone Bank Financial Strength Rating of D+
(mapping to a Ba1 on the long-term rating scale) to Bankia,
following the transfer of the financial business from the savings
banks to BFA and from BFA to Bankia (with some exceptions). Upon
completion of the transfer, Bankia is liable for the deposits and
most of the debt obligations of the savings banks.

The D+ standalone BFSR -- which maps to a Ba1 on the long-term
rating scale -- reflects i) Bankia's weak profitability, ii) its
ongoing vulnerability to further asset quality deterioration even
though some of the most risky assets have remained on the balance
sheet of its parent company BFA, and despite the EUR 4 billion
capital increase that Bankia expects to raise in the upcoming IPO,
and (iii) a weakening liquidity profile driven by the restricted
access to capital markets for most Spanish banks. Moody's believes
that the bank's capital base continues to remain vulnerable to
further expected losses under Moody's scenario analysis,
especially given Spain's uncertain economic outlook and the
uncertainties within the real-estate sector. Furthermore, Moody's
expects that this very challenging domestic operating environment
will continue to subdue growth and exert downward margin pressures
arising from the high level of non-earning assets and increased
funding costs. This is likely to limit internal capital generation
from recurrent sources.

Notwithstanding this, Moody's views positively the fact that the
savings banks have not transferred to Bankia its portfolio of
foreclosed land and the doubtful and substandard loans financing
land -- which stay at BFA's level - both of which are likely to be
exposed to further impairments. Moreover, moving to a commercial
bank status should facilitate Bankia to access equity capital
markets and to be subject to market discipline.

The rating agency notes, however, that BFA and Bankia are within
the same corporate structure, with Bankia currently being wholly
owned by BFA. As such, Moody's believes that Bankia could
therefore be affected by potential asset quality and liquidity
problems that may emerge at the parent level. In this regard,
Moody's views positively the steps taken by Bankia to reinforce
its independence and to ensure that all relationships between the
two entities should be at market conditions.

The negative outlook on Bankia's rating is consistent with the
negative outlook on the Spanish financial system which continues
to provide a challenging backdrop for Bankia's operations. The
negative outlook also reflects the existing negative outlook on
the Kingdom of Spain.

Bankia's senior debt and deposit ratings of Baa2 incorporate
Moody's consideration of a very high probability of systemic
support for the bank, given its importance for the Spanish banking
system as its third-largest financial group, resulting in a two-
notch uplift from its standalone credit strength. The outlook on
the senior debt and deposit ratings is negative, reflecting the
negative outlook on the Kingdom of Spain's Aa2 bond rating and the
negative outlook on Bankia's standalone credit profile.


The assigned Ba2 long-term issuer rating for BFA is based on the
following rationale: Although BFA has maintained its current legal
status of a commercial bank, it will neither take deposits nor
carry out any banking activity. This transformation produces a
structural subordination of BFA's current creditors to those of
the operating bank (i.e. Bankia) as the payment of BFA's debt will
be largely dependent on the dividends upstreamed from Bankia,
which will be BFA's most significant revenue source (together with
other revenue sources arising from other equity holdings in its

In addition to structural subordination, the three notch rating
differential between Bankia and BFA reflects primarily two
additional factors that shape the risk profile of BFA: (i) the
risk stemming from BFA's portfolio of foreclosed land as well as
doubtful and substandard loans related to land development, which
had not been transferred to Bankia and which could be subject to
additional impairments (ii) the weak profitability outlook for
BFA, which is also likely to be impacted by further potential
impairments of these assets, which could exceed the value of
expected dividends in Moody's stress scenarios. This may create a
higher reliance on the operating company to make extraordinary
dividend payments to fund any potential annual income shortfall.

The negative outlook on BFA's rating follows Moody's decision of
assigning a negative outlook to the rating of the operating
company (Bankia) as well as to the negative outlook on the Kingdom
of Spain.


The senior debt and deposit ratings of Ba1 of Banco de Valencia
remain on review for possible downgrade. Moody's rating review
initiated on March 24, 2011, when Banco de Valencia's long-term
debt and deposit ratings were placed on review for possible
downgrade as a result of the review for possible downgrade on the
ratings of its former parent Bancaja, which held a 38.6% stake in
Banco de Valencia. As a result of the completion of the transfer
of Bancaja's asset and liabilities to BFA, the control over the
shares of Banco de Valencia was taken by BFA, which is now the
parent of the bank. Moody's will assess the impact on current
parental support assumptions of Banco de Valencia's new ownership
by BFA.

The principal methodologies used in this rating were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007 and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March

NARA CABLE: Fitch Assigns 'BB-(exp)' Rating to Sr. Sec. Tap Issue
Fitch Ratings has assigned Nara Cable Funding's proposed 2018
senior secured tap issue, an expected rating of 'BB-(exp)' and an
expected Recovery Rating of 'RR2'. Nara Cable is a finance vehicle
for Cableuropa S.A. Fitch has also affirmed Nara Cable's existing
senior secured notes at 'BB-/RR2,' Cableuropa's Long- and Short-
term Issuer Default Ratings at 'B' with a Stable Outlook and
Cableuropa's and ONO Finance II senior secured and subordinated
notes at 'BB-'/'RR2', and 'CCC'/'RR6', respectively.

The final rating of the notes is subject to completion of the
deal, and all final terms conforming to information already
received by Fitch.

The purpose of the tap issuance is to refinance part of
Cableuropa's senior secured bank facility, the majority of which
currently matures in 2013. The transaction will be leverage
neutral and improve the group's overall maturity profile,
replacing debt maturing in 2012/13 with a 2018 maturity. In this
respect, Fitch views the transaction positively in terms of the
company's ongoing efforts to finesse and improve the overall
profile of its borrowings.

Cableuropa's IDR reflects the company's good performance through
what has so far proven to be a difficult economic environment in
Spain. Key performance indicators such as customer numbers,
average revenue per subscriber and customer churn continue to be
managed well and its financial profile is consequently considered

In FY2010, the company reported sales of EUR1,472 million, down
2.7% and EBITDA of EUR724 million, reflecting a margin of 49.2%,
one of the healthiest margins in the European cable peer group.
Leverage and the economic environment demand a degree of caution
in the rating, although leverage (net debt / EBITDA) was reported
at 4.87x at 3M11. Consistent performance below a 5.0x metric
accompanied by an improving cash flow profile will potentially
provide positive rating action.

SANTANDER CONSUMER: Moody's Upgrades BFSR to 'C-' From 'D+'
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the senior debt and
deposits ratings of Santander Consumer Finance to A3 from Baa1 and
its bank financial strength rating to C- from D+ (the C-
standalone BSFR maps to Baa2 on the long-term scale.

At the same time, Moody's upgraded the dated subordinated debt to
Baa1 from Baa2 and affirmed the short-term rating at Prime-2. The
outlook on the BFSR was changed to stable from negative, whilst
the negative outlook on the long-term debt and deposit ratings
remains unchanged.


Moody's decision to upgrade SCF's standalone BFSR to C- and to
stabilize the outlook on that rating is driven by the improvement
in the entity's financial fundamentals.

This is reflected in (i) a stronger capital position with the Tier
1 ratio increasing to 8.95% at end-May 2011 from 6.77% at year-end
2009, mainly as a result of the capital injections from the
entity's parent Banco Santander S.A. (Aa2/B-, negative outlook);
(ii) broader diversification of the loan portfolio into less
volatile markets, primarily through acquisitions in Germany, the
Nordic countries and Poland; (iii) improved profitability
indicators (due to the tailing off of provisioning needs), with
SCF's net profits having increased by 47.4% to EUR138.3 million in
Q1 2011, benefiting from the lower provisioning requirement; and
(iv) increased weight of retail deposits, which have decreased its
reliance on wholesale funding: Customer deposits represented 40%
of total funding at year-end 2010, compared with 33% in FY2008 and
they have increased further in January 2011 following the
incorporation of the EUR4.5 billion of retail funds after the SEB

The key concerns for SCF's BFSR are (i) downside risks to overall
asset quality, potentially stemming from continued pressures on
the weaker economies to which the entity is exposed; (ii) greater-
than-expected deterioration in the entity's loss-absorption
capacity, which could be caused by a reduction of the existing
capital buffer or its earnings generation capacity; and (iii) the
challenges posed by the integration of recent acquisitions. In
addition there are also related potential risks of further
expansion into new markets, given the intrinsic cyclicality of the
consumer finance business.


The upgrade of SCF's debt and deposit ratings and dated
subordinated debt by one notch to A3 and Baa1, respectively, are
in line with the upgrade of the standalone BFSR to C- (Baa2) from
D+ (Baa3). The debt and deposit ratings incorporate a high
probability of parental support from Banco Santander. As a result,
SCF benefits from two notches of rating uplift from its Baa2
standalone credit strength.

The outlook on the debt and deposit ratings as well as on the
dated subordinated debt is negative, reflecting the negative
outlook on Banco Santander's ratings. SCF's debt and deposit
ratings are linked to the ratings of its parent; therefore, any
change to the ratings of Banco Santander would likely also impact
SCF's ratings.


The principal methodologies used in this rating were Bank
Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in
February 2007 and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into
Moody's Bank Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in
March 2007.

Headquartered in Madrid, Santander Consumer Finance had total
assets of EUR60 billion at FY2010.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AMDEGA: Everest Acquires Firm's Name
Lauren Pyrah at The Northern Echo reports that Hertfordshire-based
double glazing company Everest has bought the Darlington-based
Amdega brand for an undisclosed sum, and is now trading using the
name of the world's oldest conservatory manufacturer.

Everest is not responsible for any outstanding Amdega orders and
there are no plans to bring jobs back to Darlington following the
acquisition, according to The Northern Echo.

The report notes that the Amdega name, established in 1874, has
been sold by administrators KPMG, who are disposing of the
business's assets to settle the company's outstanding debts.

As reported in the Troubled Company Europe on April 29, 2011, the
Wall Street Journal said Amdega has gone into administration with
the potential loss of 190 jobs.  The administration of company,
which has been in business for over 130 years, was disclosed by
its owners London-based private equity firm, according to The

ERSTE CAPITAL: Moody's Corrects Preferred Stock Rating to 'Ba1'
Moody's Investors Service is correcting the rating on EUR400
million non-cumulative preferred stock of Erste Capital Finance
(Jersey) Tier I PC (ISIN: XS0268694808) to Ba1(hyb) from Ba2(hyb).

As announced in a press release dated March 30, 2011, titled
"Moody's downgrades Erste Group Bank to A1; outlook stable",
Moody's took rating action on Erste Group Bank AG.

As part of that rating action, Moody's also took action on
preferred securities issued by Erste's special purpose vehicles.
Due to an internal administrative error, ISIN XS0268694808 was
inadvertently omitted from that rating action, when non-cumulative
preferred stock was upgraded to Ba1(hyb) from Ba2(hyb).

Moody's now corrects the rating of the ISIN XS0268694808 to

At the same time, Moody's has relabeled this security as
"preferred stock". It was previously mislabeled as a "junior
subordinated" debt due to an internal administrative error. In the
press release dated 25 February, 2010, titled "Moody's downgrades
Erste Group Bank AG's hybrid securities ratings ", however, this
ISIN was correctly listed as non-cumulative preferred security.

LEHMAN BROTHERS: European Unit Sues First Commercial for US$12MM
The European arm of bankrupt Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. sued
First Commercial Bank in New York, claiming it is owed US$12
million in contractually mandated closeout amounts from
derivative transactions that were outstanding when LBHI shut
down, Richard Vanderford of BankruptcyLaw360 reports on June 23,

The report relates that the New York state court system will now
have to sort out the gap between the two banks' estimation of
what they are each owed, as the Taiwan-based FCB claims Lehman
owes it more than US$25 million.

                     About Lehman Brothers

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. -- was the
fourth largest investment bank in the United States.  For more
than 150 years, Lehman Brothers has been a leader in the global
financial markets by serving the financial needs of corporations,
governmental units, institutional clients and individuals

Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy Sept. 15, 2008
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 08-13555).  Lehman's bankruptcy petition
disclosed US$639 billion in assets and US$613 billion in debts,
effectively making the firm's bankruptcy filing the largest in
U.S. history.  Several other affiliates followed thereafter.

Additional units, Merit LLC, LB Somerset LLC and LB Preferred
Somerset LLC, sought for bankruptcy protection in December 2009 or
more than a year after LBHI and its other affiliates filed their
bankruptcy cases.

The Debtors' bankruptcy cases are handled by Judge James M. Peck.
Harvey R. Miller, Esq., Richard P. Krasnow, Esq., Lori R. Fife,
Esq., Shai Y. Waisman, Esq., and Jacqueline Marcus, Esq., at Weil,
Gotshal & Manges, LLP, in New York, represent Lehman.  Epiq
Bankruptcy Solutions serves as claims and noticing agent.

Dennis F. Dunne, Esq., Evan Fleck, Esq., and Dennis O'Donnell,
Esq., at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, in New York, serve
as counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.
Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin Capital, Inc., is the Committee's
investment banker.

On Sept. 19, 2008, the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch, Judge of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered
an order commencing liquidation of Lehman Brothers, Inc., pursuant
to the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act (Case
No. 08-CIV-8119 (GEL)).  James W. Giddens has been appointed as
trustee for the SIPA liquidation of the business of LBI.

The Bankruptcy Court has approved Barclays Bank Plc's purchase
of Lehman Brothers' North American investment banking and
capital markets operations and supporting infrastructure for
US$1.75 billion.  Nomura Holdings Inc., the largest brokerage
house in Japan, purchased LBHI's operations in Europe for US$2
plus the retention of most of employees.  Nomura also bought
Lehman's operations in the Asia Pacific for US$225 million.

                International Operations Collapse

Lehman Brothers International (Europe), the principal UK trading
company in the Lehman group, was placed into administration,
together with Lehman Brothers Ltd, LB Holdings PLC and LB UK RE
Holdings Ltd.  Tony Lomas, Steven Pearson, Dan Schwarzmann and
Mike Jervis, partners at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, have been
appointed as joint administrators to Lehman Brothers International
(Europe) on Sept. 15, 2008.  The joint administrators have
been appointed to wind down the business.

Lehman Brothers Japan Inc. and Lehman Brothers Holdings Japan Inc.
filed for bankruptcy in the Tokyo District Court on Sept. 16.
Lehman Brothers Japan Inc. reported about JPY3.4 trillion
(US$33 billion) in liabilities in its petition.

Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., publishes Lehman Brothers
Bankruptcy News.  The newsletter tracks the Chapter 11 proceeding
undertaken by Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., and other insolvency
and bankruptcy proceedings undertaken by its affiliates.
( 215/945-7000)

SUNLEY TURRIFF: Hackney Empire Sues Aviva Over Bond Dispute
Barry O'Sullivan at reports that Hackney Empire,
the theatre backed by Alan Sugar, is suing insurer Aviva for
GBP1.1 million over a construction dispute, which could affect the
use of construction bonds.

The case concerns Aviva's refusal to pay up when the theatre's
contractor and project manager, Sunley Turriff Construction (STC),
went into administration in 2003 despite having agreed a GBP1.1
million bond with the contractor, according to
The report relates that the London theatre, which is funded by
Lord Sugar, lodged a writ claiming the sum in damages from Aviva
after STC went into administration during a GBP15 million
renovation of the venue.

The notes that in the writ Hackney Empire claims it is entitled to
the sum on the grounds that STC defaulted on its building
contract, says. discloses that Aviva claims the contract became
invalidated when the theatre forwarded a sum of GBP500,000 to STC
to ease cash-flow problems at the company.

Work on the Victorian theatre started in September 2001 with Lord
Sugar donating about GBP1.3 million to the project,
recalls.  The Arts Council contributed GBP5 million and the
Heritage Lottery Fund nearly GBP4 million, notes. says that STC had agreed to complete works by 2
September 2002 but the date was revised several times as the
contractor, whose turnover averaged GBP100 million - suffered
diminishing margins, the report discloses. It was finally
completed in 2004.

An agreement was eventually reached that Hackney Empire would
assist STC with its cash-flow problems, resulting in a payment of
GBP500,000 to STC, relays.

Work halted when 80 workers walked off site after hearing STC had
gone into administration.

Christopher Hill of law firm Norton Rose said the outcome of the
case is likely to have a bearing on construction bonds, adds.

* UNITED KINGDOM: MP Urges Gov't to Protect Small Football Clubs
Press Association reports that a Devon Member of Parliament has
urged the government to look more closely at ways to help protect
smaller football clubs from going into administration.

Bringing an adjournment debate in the Commons, Labor's Alison
Seabeck detailed the fall-out impacting staff, players and fans
after Plymouth Argyle experienced financial difficulties,
according to Press Association.

"I do not want to see another club go through what Plymouth Argyle
has gone through and I'm sure their best known supporter, Michael
Foot, would be turning in his grave.  Indeed in some ways I'm
pleased he's not here to see what has happened and the misery that
has been heaped upon loyal staff and supporters at this moment in
time," Press Association quoted Mr. Seabeck as saying.  "I do find
it astonishing that given the amount of money which circulates at
the top of football, clubs which in some cases use the lower
divisions as nurseries for up and coming stars of the future, that
some contribution could not come from them or from the Football
League clubs themselves to support the admin and ground staff when
this type of circumstance arises, an insurance policy of sorts,"
she added.

Press Association notes that conservative Oliver Colvile said the
club had been in administration since March because it could not
meet its tax bill.  Press Association relates that Mr. Colvile
said clubs should be required to have some insurance so staff and
creditors should always be paid if the club gets into

Minister for Tourism and Heritage John Penrose said he believed a
deal had been completed regarding Plymouth Argyle's future,
conditional on the Football League's ratification, Press
Association notes.

The report says that Mr. Colvile said the Culture, Media and Sport
Select Committee was in the process of completing an inquiry into
the governance and regulation of professional football clubs, with
the focus on strengthening the financial health of the game.


* Moody's Says EBA Stress Tests Have Limited Rating Implications
The European Banking Authority's stress test of European banks is
likely to have limited rating implications and should have a
variety of positive effects for banks, says Moody's Investors
Service in a Special Comment.

As Moody's ratings already incorporate its own stress-testing
exercises, the rating agency anticipates that the EBA stress test
results will mostly reveal weaknesses that are already captured in
Moody's ratings. Moody's will respond accordingly in any case
where the results reveal weaknesses that are not already reflected
in the ratings. Moody's views positively the EBA's statement that
for those banks failing the EBA stress test, support measures will
be announced. Such support measures may contribute to
strengthening these bank's credit profiles and possibly their
stand-alone ratings.

Of the 91 EU banks subject to the EBA's 2011 stress test, Moody's
believes that 26 rated banks have a heightened risk of needing
extraordinary external support, as indicated by their non-
investment-grade standalone credit strength (standalone bank
financial strength ratings at or below D+, mapping to Ba1 on the
traditional rating scale). Moody's expects the banks that fail the
EBA stress test will be among those lower-rated banks, or among
the non-rated banks included in the EBA stress test.

Moody's believes that even if the EBA's stress test does not
achieve all of its objectives, it should have a variety of
positive effects for banks. These include (i) the test having
already prompted several banks to strengthen their capital
positions pro-actively; (ii) an improvement in transparency that
will result from the planned disclosure of banks' sovereign
exposures; and (iii) insight into regulators' assessment of banks'
capital positions.

Whether the publication of test results scheduled for July 2011
will positively affect banks' access to financial markets partly
hinges on market participants viewing the tests as credible. The
EBA's 2011 stress test will incorporate additional measures of
sovereign stress aimed at reflecting recent market developments,
which is a step that enhances the credibility of the exercise.
However, whilst the 2011 stress test is stricter than the 2010
European bank stress test, Moody's notes that the EBA's 2011
stress assumptions do not assume a sovereign default at a time
when the risk of a sovereign default within the euro area has

Stress-testing is increasingly used by regulators, banks and other
stakeholders, including Moody's, to assess banks' soundness under
a range of conditions, which can be particularly valuable in an
unstable environment. Stress tests are particularly helpful for
banks and the official sector in assessing the need for remedial
action in respect of weaker banks.

* Strategic Value Partners Ups Ante on European Distress Fund
Dow Jones' DBR Small Cap reports that Strategic Value Partners LLC
is upping the ante for its second special situations fund and
raising the fund's target to from US$600 million to US$1 billion,
in the face of a larger than anticipated opportunity in European
distressed credit, according to people familiar with the offering.

* BOND PRICING: For the Week July 4 to July 8, 2011

Issuer                   Coupon     Maturity  Currency     Price
------                   ------     --------  --------     -----

A-TEC INDUSTRIES           8.750   10/27/2014      EUR      33.91
IMMOFINANZ                 4.250     3/8/2018      EUR       4.04
OESTER VOLKSBK             5.270     2/8/2027      EUR      75.02
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.900    8/18/2025      EUR      61.75
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.810    7/29/2025      EUR      59.00
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.160    5/20/2025      EUR      73.10
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.750    4/30/2021      EUR      71.91
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.350   11/16/2018      EUR      73.75
RAIFF ZENTRALBK            4.500    9/28/2035      EUR      74.52

ECONOCOM GROUP             4.000     6/1/2016      EUR      20.54

SAZKA                      9.000    7/12/2021      EUR      60.00

KOMMUNEKREDIT              0.500   12/14/2020      ZAR      45.29
KOMMUNEKREDIT              0.500     2/3/2016      TRY      69.34

MUNI FINANCE PLC           1.000    6/30/2017      ZAR      62.11
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   11/25/2020      ZAR      44.08
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    3/17/2025      CAD      54.40
MUNI FINANCE PLC           1.000   10/30/2017      AUD      73.37
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    4/26/2016      ZAR      67.93
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.250    6/28/2040      CAD      22.96
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500     2/9/2016      ZAR      68.96
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    9/24/2020      CAD      70.27
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    4/27/2018      ZAR      55.34
MUNI FINANCE PLC           1.000    2/27/2018      AUD      72.01

AIR FRANCE-KLM             4.970     4/1/2015      EUR      13.91
ALCATEL-LUCENT             5.000     1/1/2015      EUR       4.75
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG           6.720     1/1/2015      EUR       6.52
ATOS ORIGIN SA             2.500     1/1/2016      EUR      53.54
CALYON                     6.000    6/18/2047      EUR      29.68
CAP GEMINI SOGET           3.500     1/1/2014      EUR      45.74
CAP GEMINI SOGET           1.000     1/1/2012      EUR      44.52
CGG VERITAS                1.750     1/1/2016      EUR      31.29
CIE FIN FONCIER            3.250   12/30/2044      EUR      71.58
CLUB MEDITERRANE           6.110    11/1/2015      EUR      19.66
CLUB MEDITERRANE           5.000     6/8/2012      EUR      16.84
CREDIT AGRI CIB            4.850    9/17/2030      USD      73.32
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY           1.000   12/23/2024      EUR      61.82
EURAZEO                    6.250    6/10/2014      EUR      60.06
FAURECIA                   4.500     1/1/2015      EUR      33.07
INGENICO                   2.750     1/1/2017      EUR      45.04
MAUREL ET PROM             7.125    7/31/2015      EUR      20.20
MAUREL ET PROM             7.125    7/31/2014      EUR      20.59
NEXANS SA                  4.000     1/1/2016      EUR      72.05
NOVASEP HLDG               9.625   12/15/2016      EUR      56.57
NOVASEP HLDG               9.750   12/15/2016      USD      57.07
ORPEA                      3.875     1/1/2016      EUR      47.00
PEUGEOT SA                 4.450     1/1/2016      EUR      35.51
PUBLICIS GROUPE            3.125    7/30/2014      EUR      40.74
PUBLICIS GROUPE            1.000    1/18/2018      EUR      49.82
RHODIA SA                  0.500     1/1/2014      EUR      51.84
SOC AIR FRANCE             2.750     4/1/2020      EUR      20.60
SOITEC                     6.250     9/9/2014      EUR       9.81
TEM                        4.250     1/1/2015      EUR      56.83
THEOLIA                    2.700     1/1/2041      EUR      11.52

EUROHYPO AG                3.830    9/21/2020      EUR      69.63
EUROHYPO AG                6.490    7/17/2017      EUR       6.25
HSH NORDBANK AG            4.375    2/14/2017      EUR      72.00
IKB DEUT INDUSTR           5.625    3/31/2017      EUR      15.00
IKB DEUT INDUSTR           6.500    3/31/2012      EUR      20.00
IKB DEUT INDUSTR           4.700    3/31/2017      EUR      15.00
L-BANK FOERDERBK           0.500    5/10/2027      CAD      49.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT            2.500    1/30/2034      EUR      57.29
LB BADEN-WUERTT            2.800    2/23/2037      JPY      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT            5.250   10/20/2015      EUR      28.59
Q-CELLS                    6.750   10/21/2015      EUR       2.58
QIMONDA FINANCE            6.750    3/22/2013      USD       2.38
SOLON AG SOLAR             1.375    12/6/2012      EUR      34.27
TAG IMMO AG                6.500   12/10/2015      EUR       7.89
TUI AG                     2.750    3/24/2016      EUR      52.86
WESTLB AG                  3.350   10/19/2026      EUR      73.25

ATHENS URBAN TRN           4.851    9/19/2016      EUR      50.65
ATHENS URBAN TRN           5.008    7/18/2017      EUR      49.66
ATHENS URBAN TRN           4.301    8/12/2014      EUR      58.15
ATHENS URBAN TRN           4.057    3/26/2013      EUR      69.94
HELLENIC REP I/L           2.300    7/25/2030      EUR      39.29
HELLENIC REP I/L           2.900    7/25/2025      EUR      39.17
HELLENIC REPUB             4.590     4/8/2016      EUR      49.27
HELLENIC REPUB             6.140    4/14/2028      EUR      47.65
HELLENIC REPUB             5.200    7/17/2034      EUR      44.09
HELLENIC REPUB             2.125     7/5/2013      CHF      69.98
HELLENIC REPUB             5.000    3/11/2019      EUR      48.01
HELLENIC REPUB             4.625    6/25/2013      USD      73.10
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.100    8/20/2015      EUR      52.26
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.100    8/20/2012      EUR      73.49
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.506    3/31/2013      EUR      71.80
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.600    5/20/2013      EUR      68.40
HELLENIC REPUBLI           7.500    5/20/2013      EUR      71.84
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.900     7/3/2013      EUR      67.95
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.427    7/31/2013      EUR      66.30
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.000    8/20/2013      EUR      63.82
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.520    9/30/2013      EUR      64.67
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.500    1/11/2014      EUR      61.56
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.500    5/20/2014      EUR      56.18
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.500     7/1/2014      EUR      59.22
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.985    7/25/2014      EUR      55.35
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.500    8/20/2014      EUR      55.09
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.113    9/30/2014      EUR      55.18
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.700    7/20/2015      EUR      49.42
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.702    9/30/2015      EUR      52.10
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.700   11/10/2015      EUR      49.79
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.600    7/20/2016      EUR      48.71
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.020    9/13/2016      EUR      52.91
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.225     3/1/2017      EUR      52.18
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.900    4/20/2017      EUR      50.73
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.300    7/20/2017      EUR      46.06
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.675    10/9/2017      EUR      50.60
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.590     4/3/2018      EUR      48.24
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.600    7/20/2018      EUR      46.79
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.014    2/27/2019      EUR      46.88
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.959     3/4/2019      EUR      50.23
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.000    7/19/2019      EUR      48.03
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.500   10/22/2019      EUR      51.84
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.250    6/19/2020      EUR      52.33
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.900   10/22/2022      EUR      46.90
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.700    3/20/2024      EUR      45.55
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.300    3/20/2026      EUR      44.91
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.500    9/20/2037      EUR      42.04
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.600    9/20/2040      EUR      41.82
NATIONAL BK GREE           3.875    10/7/2016      EUR      62.08

AIB MORTGAGE BNK           5.000    2/12/2030      EUR      42.31
AIB MORTGAGE BNK           5.580    4/28/2028      EUR      47.82
AIB MORTGAGE BNK           5.000     3/1/2030      EUR      42.28
AIB MORTGAGE BNK           4.875    6/29/2017      EUR      71.95
ALLIED IRISH BKS          12.500    6/25/2019      GBP      24.43
ALLIED IRISH BKS           4.000    3/19/2015      EUR      67.40
ALLIED IRISH BKS           5.625   11/12/2014      EUR      71.45
ALLIED IRISH BKS          10.750    3/29/2017      EUR      21.40
ANGLO IRISH BANK           4.490    4/21/2015      SEK      73.68
BANK OF IRELAND            5.600    9/18/2023      EUR      28.63
BANK OF IRELAND            2.970    3/31/2014      EUR      72.30
BANK OF IRELAND            3.780     4/1/2015      EUR      67.65
BANK OF IRELAND            4.000    1/28/2015      EUR      70.41
BANK OF IRELAND            4.473   11/30/2016      EUR      45.00
BANK OF IRELAND            4.875    1/22/2018      GBP      34.00
BANK OF IRELAND            3.585    4/21/2015      EUR      66.62
BANK OF IRELAND           10.000    2/12/2020      GBP      35.50
BANK OF IRELAND           10.000    2/12/2020      EUR      35.20
BANK OF IRELAND            9.250     9/7/2020      GBP      38.25
BK IRELAND MTGE            3.250    6/22/2015      EUR      73.21
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.760     9/7/2029      EUR      45.01
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.360   10/12/2029      EUR      42.31
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.400    11/6/2029      EUR      42.51
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.450     3/1/2030      EUR      42.55
DEPFA ACS BANK             5.125    3/16/2037      USD      69.47
DEPFA ACS BANK             0.500     3/3/2025      CAD      36.81
DEPFA ACS BANK             4.900    8/24/2035      CAD      63.42
DEPFA ACS BANK             5.125    3/16/2037      USD      69.47
EBS BLDG SOCIETY           4.000    2/25/2015      EUR      68.39
EBS BLDG SOCIETY           4.992    3/19/2015      EUR      63.20
IRISH GOVT                 4.600    4/18/2016      EUR      67.26
IRISH GOVT                 4.500   10/18/2018      EUR      60.70
IRISH GOVT                 4.400    6/18/2019      EUR      59.89
IRISH GOVT                 5.900   10/18/2019      EUR      63.00
IRISH GOVT                 4.500    4/18/2020      EUR      57.97
IRISH GOVT                 5.400    3/13/2025      EUR      58.44
IRISH GOVT                 5.000   10/18/2020      EUR      59.31
IRISH LIFE PERM            4.820    3/22/2015      EUR      62.56
IRISH LIFE PERM            4.000    3/10/2015      EUR      69.98
IRISH NATIONWIDE           6.250    6/26/2012      GBP      74.38

CITY OF TURIN              5.270    6/26/2038      EUR      72.82
CO BRAONE                  4.567    6/30/2037      EUR      72.67
COMUNE DI MILANO           4.019    6/29/2035      EUR      64.56
INTESA SANPAOLO            1.750    1/19/2026      EUR       3.06
REGION OF LIGURI           4.795   11/22/2034      EUR      73.93
REGION OF UMBRIA           5.087    6/15/2037      EUR      77.00
REP OF ITALY               2.200    9/15/2058      EUR      71.78
REP OF ITALY               1.850    9/15/2057      EUR      64.45
REP OF ITALY               2.000    9/15/2062      EUR      65.39
SARDINIA REGION            4.022   11/28/2035      EUR      73.33
TELECOM ITALIA             5.250    3/17/2055      EUR      72.73

ARCELORMITTAL              7.250     4/1/2014      EUR      29.83
ESPIRITO SANTO F           6.875   10/21/2019      EUR      63.72
INTL INDUST BANK           9.000     7/6/2011      EUR       5.51
LIGHTHOUSE INTL            8.000    4/30/2014      EUR      35.56
LIGHTHOUSE INTL            8.000    4/30/2014      EUR      35.51

APP INTL FINANCE          11.750    10/1/2005      USD       0.03
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    2/24/2025      CAD      55.28
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    6/22/2021      ZAR      44.90
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    5/12/2021      ZAR      43.41
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    3/29/2021      NZD      61.22
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    3/29/2021      USD      70.56
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500     3/3/2021      NZD      61.58
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    6/22/2016      TRY      66.75
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    5/25/2016      TRY      67.48
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    4/27/2016      TRY      67.69
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    3/17/2016      TRY      68.28
BLT FINANCE BV             7.500    5/15/2014      USD      79.95
BRIT INSURANCE             6.625    12/9/2030      GBP      66.00
DGS INTL FIN BV           10.000     6/1/2007      USD       0.01
ELEC DE CAR FIN            8.500    4/10/2018      USD      60.18
FRIESLAND BANK             4.210   12/29/2025      EUR      71.42
KPNQWEST BV                8.125     6/1/2009      USD       0.05
NATL INVESTER BK          25.983     5/7/2029      EUR      11.47
NED WATERSCHAPBK           0.500    3/11/2025      CAD      54.64
NIB CAPITAL BANK           4.510   12/16/2035      EUR      55.06
PORTUGAL TEL FIN           4.500    6/16/2025      EUR      66.35
Q-CELLS INTERNAT           5.750    5/26/2014      EUR      53.55
RBS NV EX-ABN NV           2.910    6/21/2036      JPY      70.19
SIDETUR FINANCE           10.000    4/20/2016      USD      71.75
TJIWI KIMIA FIN           13.250     8/1/2001      USD       0.01

EKSPORTFINANS              0.500     5/9/2030      CAD      42.64
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500   12/18/2015      ZAR      71.74
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    1/27/2016      ZAR      71.13
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    5/25/2016      ZAR      69.23
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    3/24/2016      ZAR      70.16
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    7/29/2016      TRY      72.00
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    5/25/2018      ZAR      57.61
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500     3/1/2016      ZAR      70.57
NORSKE SKOGIND             7.125   10/15/2033      USD      68.50
NORSKE SKOGIND             7.125   10/15/2033      USD      68.50

BANCO COM PORTUG           3.750    10/8/2016      EUR      67.77
BANCO COM PORTUG           4.750    6/22/2017      EUR      70.52
BANCO ESPIRITO             3.875    1/21/2015      EUR      70.95
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.380    10/1/2038      EUR      51.42
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           3.875    12/6/2016      EUR      72.38
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.455    8/20/2017      EUR      60.91
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.980     3/3/2028      EUR      71.50
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.320     8/5/2021      EUR      50.40
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.250    1/27/2020      EUR      68.00
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.400    10/8/2019      EUR      51.07
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.500    1/19/2016      EUR      69.03
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.750    2/14/2016      EUR      60.86
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.750    3/14/2016      EUR      68.47
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.050    4/26/2016      EUR      69.21
COMBOIOS DE PORT           4.170   10/16/2019      EUR      63.05
COMBOIOS DE PORT           5.700     2/5/2030      EUR      63.88
METRO DE LISBOA            5.750     2/4/2019      EUR      73.52
METRO DE LISBOA            7.300   12/23/2025      EUR      74.39
METRO DE LISBOA            4.061    12/4/2026      EUR      51.35
METRO DE LISBOA            4.799    12/7/2027      EUR      55.88
MONTEPIO GERAL             5.000     2/8/2017      EUR      58.50
PARPUBLICA                 3.567    9/22/2020      EUR      60.47
PARPUBLICA                 4.191   10/15/2014      EUR      72.50
PARPUBLICA                 4.200   11/16/2026      EUR      60.11
PORTUGAL (REP)             3.500    3/25/2015      USD      70.42
PORTUGAL (REP)             3.500    3/25/2015      USD      73.14
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.950   10/25/2023      EUR      52.11
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.350   10/16/2017      EUR      55.47
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.200   10/15/2016      EUR      60.38
PORTUGUESE OT'S            6.400    2/15/2016      EUR      69.27
PORTUGUESE OT'S            3.350   10/15/2015      EUR      63.26
PORTUGUESE OT'S            3.600   10/15/2014      EUR      68.17
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.375    6/16/2014      EUR      69.38
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.100    4/15/2037      EUR      48.29
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.750    6/14/2019      EUR      55.39
PORTUGUESE OT'S            3.850    4/15/2021      EUR      51.24
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.800    6/15/2020      EUR      54.93
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.450    6/15/2018      EUR      55.86
REFER                      4.250   12/13/2021      EUR      49.05
REFER                      4.000    3/16/2015      EUR      65.12
REFER                      4.047   11/16/2026      EUR      52.05
REFER                      4.675   10/16/2024      EUR      55.82
REFER                      5.875    2/18/2019      EUR      66.65

APK ARKADA                17.500    5/23/2012      RUB       0.38
ARIZK                      3.000   12/20/2030      RUB      52.78
DVTG-FINANS               17.000    8/29/2013      RUB       1.00
ENERGOMASH-FINAN          13.000   11/22/2011      RUB       0.02
M-INDUSTRIYA              12.250    8/16/2011      RUB       9.03
MIG-FINANS                 0.100     9/6/2011      RUB       1.00
MIRAX                     17.000    9/17/2012      RUB       2.00
MOSMART FINANS             0.010    4/12/2012      RUB       1.81
NOK                       10.000    9/22/2011      RUB       0.04
NOK                       12.500    8/26/2014      RUB       0.04
PENOPLEX-FINANS           14.000   11/21/2014      RUB      12.00
PROMPEREOSNASTKA           1.000   12/17/2012      RUB       0.01
PROTON-FINANCE             9.000    6/12/2012      RUB      65.00
SAHO                      10.000    5/21/2012      RUB       0.03
SATURN                     8.500     6/6/2014      RUB       1.00
SEVENTH CONTINE            8.750    6/14/2012      RUB       1.00
SEVKABEL-FINANS           10.500    3/27/2012      RUB       3.40
TERNA-FINANS               1.000    11/4/2011      RUB       0.01

AYT CEDULAS CAJA           3.750    6/30/2025      EUR      62.42
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           3.750   12/14/2022      EUR      68.61
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           4.250   10/25/2023      EUR      71.69
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           4.750    5/25/2027      EUR      69.10
AYUNTAM DE MADRD           4.550    6/16/2036      EUR      72.80
BANCAJA                    1.500    5/22/2018      EUR      65.93
BANCO PASTOR               4.550    7/31/2020      EUR      73.24
CAJA CASTIL-MAN            1.500    6/23/2021      EUR      62.86
CAJA MADRID                5.020    2/26/2038      EUR      73.19
CAJA MADRID                4.125    3/24/2036      EUR      65.00
CAJA MADRID                4.000     2/3/2025      EUR      71.56
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO           3.875    5/23/2025      EUR      64.84
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO           4.250    4/10/2031      EUR      58.47
CEDULAS TDA A-5            4.250    3/28/2027      EUR      63.70
COMUN AUTO CANAR           4.200   10/25/2036      EUR      58.75
COMUN AUTO CANAR           3.900   11/30/2035      EUR      55.88
COMUNIDAD ARAGON           4.646    7/11/2036      EUR      75.03
COMUNIDAD BALEAR           4.063   11/23/2035      EUR      72.07
COMUNIDAD MADRID           4.300    9/15/2026      EUR      68.17
DIPUTACION FOR             4.323   12/29/2023      EUR      73.78
GEN DE CATALUNYA           4.220    4/26/2035      EUR      67.68
GEN DE CATALUNYA           4.690   10/28/2034      EUR      72.62
IM CEDULAS 5               3.500    6/15/2020      EUR      73.82
INSTIT CRDT OFCL           3.250    6/28/2024      CHF      76.51
INSTITUT CATALA            4.250    6/15/2024      EUR      70.31
JUNTA ANDALUCIA            4.250   10/31/2036      EUR      66.11
JUNTA LA MANCHA            3.875    1/31/2036      EUR      63.75
XUNTA DE GALICIA           4.025   11/28/2035      EUR      69.00

SWEDISH EXP CRED           2.130    1/10/2012      USD      10.25
SWEDISH EXP CRED           9.000    8/12/2011      USD      10.37
SWEDISH EXP CRED           8.000   10/21/2011      USD      10.07
SWEDISH EXP CRED           8.000    11/4/2011      USD       7.07
SWEDISH EXP CRED           2.000    12/7/2011      USD      10.43
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.500    6/12/2012      USD       9.43
SWEDISH EXP CRED           6.500    1/27/2012      USD       9.52
SWEDISH EXP CRED           8.000    1/27/2012      USD       9.60
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.500    2/28/2012      USD       8.88
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.000     3/9/2012      USD       9.91
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.000     3/9/2012      USD       9.52
SWEDISH EXP CRED           9.750    3/23/2012      USD       9.50
SWEDISH EXP CRED           9.250    4/27/2012      USD       9.16
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500   12/21/2015      ZAR      70.53
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500     3/3/2016      ZAR      69.17
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    6/14/2016      ZAR      67.35
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    6/29/2016      TRY      64.21
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500     3/5/2018      AUD      70.58
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500   12/17/2027      USD      50.20
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    1/25/2028      USD      49.87
SWEDISH EXP CRED           9.000    7/28/2011      USD      10.20

CYTOS BIOTECH              2.875    2/20/2012      CHF      72.94
UBS AG                    10.530    1/23/2012      USD      40.62
UBS AG                     9.250    3/20/2012      USD      14.58
UBS AG                    10.070    3/23/2012      USD      35.34
UBS AG                    13.300    5/23/2012      USD       3.97
UBS AG                    14.000    5/23/2012      USD       8.03
UBS AG                    13.700    5/23/2012      USD      13.09
UBS AG JERSEY             10.360    8/19/2011      USD      51.92
UBS AG JERSEY             11.150    8/31/2011      USD      38.36
UBS AG JERSEY              9.450    9/21/2011      USD      49.91
UBS AG JERSEY             10.140   12/30/2011      USD      15.04
UBS AG JERSEY              3.220    7/31/2012      EUR      48.19

ABBEY NATL TREAS           5.000    8/26/2030      USD      73.31
BANK NADRA                 8.000    6/22/2017      USD      74.99
BANK OF SCOTLAND           5.772     2/7/2035      EUR      72.50
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.250    1/31/2012      USD       9.41
BARCLAYS BK PLC           10.650    1/31/2012      USD      42.96
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.950    4/20/2012      USD      16.29
BARCLAYS BK PLC           10.600    7/21/2011      USD      39.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC            7.500    9/22/2011      USD      17.10
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.750    9/22/2011      USD      72.48
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.550    1/23/2012      USD      11.32
BARCLAYS BK PLC            5.000     6/3/2041      USD      73.93
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.500    8/31/2012      USD      29.73
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.250    8/31/2012      USD      35.47
BARCLAYS BK PLC           10.800    7/31/2012      USD      26.75
BARCLAYS BK PLC           12.950    4/20/2012      USD      23.75
BRADFORD&BIN BLD           5.750   12/12/2022      GBP      48.50
BRADFORD&BIN BLD           5.500    1/15/2018      GBP      48.50
BRADFORD&BIN BLD           4.910     2/1/2047      EUR      64.67
CO-OPERATIVE BNK           5.875    3/28/2033      GBP      69.34
EFG HELLAS PLC             5.400    11/2/2047      EUR      21.13
EFG HELLAS PLC             6.010     1/9/2036      EUR      31.50
EFG HELLAS PLC             4.375    2/11/2013      EUR      69.73
EMPORIKI GRP FIN           4.000    2/28/2013      EUR      69.50
EMPORIKI GRP FIN           4.000    2/28/2013      EUR      69.50
ENTERPRISE INNS            6.375    9/26/2031      GBP      74.07
ESPRIT TELECOM            10.875    6/15/2008      USD       0.01
F&C ASSET MNGMT            6.750   12/20/2026      GBP      73.10
HBOS PLC                   4.500    3/18/2030      EUR      73.31
NOMURA BANK INTL           0.800   12/21/2020      EUR      65.28
NORTHERN ROCK              5.750    2/28/2017      GBP      72.87
NORTHERN ROCK              4.574    1/13/2015      GBP      80.90
PIRAEUS GRP FIN            4.000    9/17/2012      EUR      70.52
PUNCH TAVERNS              6.468    4/15/2033      GBP      49.75
PUNCH TAVERNS              8.374    7/15/2029      GBP      65.42
PUNCH TAVERNS              7.567    4/15/2026      GBP      65.13
ROYAL BK SCOTLND           4.692     6/9/2025      EUR      69.47
ROYAL BK SCOTLND           5.168    6/29/2030      EUR      62.13
SKIPTON BUILDING           5.625    1/18/2018      GBP      73.97
SKIPTON BUILDING           6.750    5/30/2022      GBP      67.21
UK TSY I/L GILT            1.250   11/22/2027      GBP       0.47
UNIQUE PUB FIN             7.395    3/28/2024      GBP      74.80
UNIQUE PUB FIN             5.659    6/30/2027      GBP      74.32
UNIQUE PUB FIN             6.464    3/30/2032      GBP      62.74
WESSEX WATER FIN           1.369    7/31/2057      GBP      30.52


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
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of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *