TCREUR_Public/110718.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Monday, July 18, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 140

                            Headlines



A U S T R I A

A-TEC INDUSTRIES: Wolong Electric Not Eyeing Acquisition


B E L A R U S

BELAGROPROMBANK: Fitch Withdraws 'D/E' Individual Rating


B U L G A R I A

CITY CENTER SOFIA: Faces Bankruptcy After Owner's Covenant Breach


G E R M A N Y

CONERGY AG: Creditors Set to Take Majority Stake
WALTER BAU: German Court Hears on Impounding of Thai Prince Jet
* GERMANY: 90 Firms Head for UK to Avoid German Insolvency Law


G R E E C E

LEO BURNETT: Enters Into Pre-Bankruptcy Process in Greece
OMEGA NAVIGATION: Lenders Hint Motion to Dismiss is Possible


H U N G A R Y

REV NOSZTALGIA: In Liquidation; Puts Hotel Lido on the Market
* HUNGARY: Corporate Liquidations Up 21% in First Half 2011


I R E L A N D

ALLIED IRISH: Wins Temporary EU Approval for Recapitalization
MCINERNEY HOLDINGS: To Consider Shareholder's Bid to Oust Board
WILLOW NO. 2: Moody's Downgrades US$50MM Notes due 2011 to 'Ba2'


I T A L Y

COMPAGNIA FINANZIARIA: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on Class C Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

HIGHLANDER EURO: Moody's Rates EUR25MM Class D Notes at 'B2'
SMILE: Fitch Says Mortgage Rights Replacement No Impact on Ratings


R U S S I A

ATON CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns B2/Not Prime Issuer Ratings


S P A I N

AYT CAJA: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'Bsf'
FONDO DE TITULIZACION: S&P Affirms Rating on Class E Notes at 'D'
HIPOCAT 11: Moody's Downgrades EUR52.8MM Notes Rating to 'C'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALPSTAR CLO 2: Moody's Assigns 'B1' to EUR2.8MM Class Q Notes
BRADFORDS: In the Brink of Administration Due to Mounting Debts
GRANITE UK: S&P Gives 'BB' Ratings on 26 Tranches of Notes
HOFFMAN INNS: Goes Into Administration as Sales Fall Flat
LIFE: GBP12,000 Bid to Save Pool Inappropriate, Councilor Says

LLANGOLLEN HOTELS: Fantastic Funhouse Closes After Administration
PECKHAM AND RYE: Goes Into Administration, Closes 3 Stores
THORNTONS PLC: To Close Roughly Half of its Stores in 3 Years
TITAN EUROPE: Fitch Puts 'B-' Rating on Class E Notes on RWN
TURBO ALPHA: S&P Raises Long-term CCR to 'B'; Outlook Stable


U Z B E K I S T A N

OXUS GOLD: Accuses Uzbekistan of Smear Campaign to Steal JV


X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week July 11 to July 15, 2011




                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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A-TEC INDUSTRIES: Wolong Electric Not Eyeing Acquisition
--------------------------------------------------------
Zoe Schneeweiss and Shikhar Balwani at Bloomberg News report that
a spokesman for Wolong Electric Group Co. of China said Wolong has
"no intention" to acquire A-Tec Industries AG.

According to Bloomberg, Die Presse reported on Thursday that
A-Tec's founder and chief executive officer Mirko Kovats is
favoring a joint bid by Wolong and hedge fund Springwater Capital
for the insolvent Austrian company over offers by Crompton Greaves
Ltd. and Penta Investments Ltd.

Bloomberg notes that the Vienna-based newspaper, citing
unidentified people familiar with the bids, said Mr. Kovats is
lobbying for Wolong and Springwater's bid so that he may retain
some power within A-Tec.

On Oct. 22, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, citing
Bloomberg News, reported that A-Tec sought court clearance to
reorganize debt after losing access to its line of credit because
of an Australian power-station project's financial difficulties.
A-Tec said in an Oct. 20 statement that it had filed for self-
administered reorganization proceedings at the Vienna Commercial
Court and appointed trustees for bondholders, Bloomberg disclosed.
The company has a EUR798 million (US$1.11 billion) revolving
credit facility and EUR302 million in outstanding bonds, according
to Bloomberg data.

A-TEC Industries AG engages in plant construction, drive
technology, machine tools, and minerals and metals businesses in
Europe and internationally.  The company is based in Vienna,
Austria.


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B E L A R U S
=============


BELAGROPROMBANK: Fitch Withdraws 'D/E' Individual Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and withdrawn Belarus-based
Belagroprombank's ratings, including its Long-term Issuer Default
Rating of 'B' with Negative Outlook.

Fitch has withdrawn the ratings as Belagroprombank has chosen to
stop participating in the rating process. Therefore, Fitch will no
longer have sufficient information to maintain the ratings.
Accordingly, the agency will no longer provide ratings or
analytical coverage of Belagroprombank.

These ratings have been affirmed and withdrawn:

   -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'B', Outlook Negative; withdrawn

   -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'; withdrawn

   -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D/E'; withdrawn

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '4', withdrawn

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'B'; withdrawn


===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


CITY CENTER SOFIA: Faces Bankruptcy After Owner's Covenant Breach
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Sofia Echo, citing Bulgarian mass-circulation daily Trud,
reports that City Center Sofia faced bankruptcy after its owner
had difficulties servicing its loans.

According to The Sofia Echo, the newspaper, quoting an Ernst &
Young auditing report, said US real estate investment management
firm Heitman, which bought the mall in 2008 for a reported figure
of EUR101.5 million, was in breach of loan covenants as of
December 2010.

UniCredit Bank Austria could call the BGN118.6 million loans at
any time, repossessing the mall if Heitman failed to pay, The
Sofia Echo says.  The Sofia Echo relates that Trud said despite
the mall's prime location on the corner of Arsenalski and Cherni
Vruh boulevards in Sofia, next to the Hilton, last year the
revenue from rent was down by 12.5% and the shopping mall ended
the year with a loss of BGN729,000, compared to a profit of
BGN1.28 million a year earlier.

Reportedly, Heitman was in negotiations with the bank to rectify
the breach of covenant, but the talks were yet to yield a result
at the time the auditing report was concluded on May 25, The Sofia
Echo notes.

Specifically, the loan conditions stipulate that the mall's owners
have to maintain a rent revenue of at least 15% higher than the
loan repayment amounts, The Sofia Echo states.  According to The
Sofia Echo, the daily, quoting the Ernst & Young report, said that
the loan's principal should not be higher than 75% of the mall's
valuation -- with the continued slide in property valuations in
Bulgaria, Heitman is now in breach.

The loans had been taken out by the mall's previous owner, private
equity investment firm Equest, which had acquired City Center
Sofia in 2006 for EUR94 million, The Sofia Echo relates.

City Center Sofia was the first shopping mall to open in the
Bulgarian capital in 2006.


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G E R M A N Y
=============


CONERGY AG: Creditors Set to Take Majority Stake
------------------------------------------------
Marc Roca at Bloomberg News reports that creditors including banks
and hedge funds are poised to own a majority of shares in
Conergy AG once the German solar group completes an equity-to-debt
swap.

According to Bloomberg, Conergy spokesman Alexander Leinhos on
Thursday said that as many as seven creditors will own most of the
stock in the Hamburg-based company after they swap debt for about
EUR170 million (US$241 million) in new shares this month.

"The group's share of the company will certainly be about 60%, but
the exact breakdown is yet to be known," Bloomberg quotes
Mr. Leinhos as saying in a phone interview.

Banks and hedge funds will step in under a deal agreed to last
year after Conergy on Wednesday said that existing shareholders
only bought 7% of the EUR188 million it seeks as a capital
increase to reduce debt, Bloomberg notes.  The company, once
Germany's largest solar group, agreed to restructure its loans
after its credit line ran out and losses mounted, Bloomberg
discloses.

Seven creditors were interested in the swap, Bloomberg says,
citing a regulatory filing from February.  They comprise hedge
funds ECO Master Fund, York Global Finance BDH LLC, Varde
Investment Partners LP and Sothic Capital Management LLP as well
as Deutsche Bank AG, Barclays Plc and BNP Paribas SA, Bloomberg
states.

According to Bloomberg, Conergy said in a statement on Thursday
afternoon that all current members of the board plan to resign at
the company's annual general meeting on Aug. 26 in response to the
future change of ownership.

Bloomberg notes that Conergy also said it had concluded a new
credit agreement for the EUR135 million in debt that will remain
after being reduced by about EUR190 million through the
refinancing measures.

Conergy AG is a Germany-based global manufacturer of products for
the solar power generation, operating in two business segments:
Conergy PV and EPURON.  The Conergy PV segment is divided into two
divisions: Components, developing and manufacturing system
components, such as solar cells, solar modules, module frames and
electronic components, and Sales & Systems, distributing the
products to wholesalers, installers and final customers.


WALTER BAU: German Court Hears on Impounding of Thai Prince Jet
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bangkok Post reports that a German court has begun hearings on the
Thai government's request for the release of HRH Crown Prince Maha
Vajiralongkorn's plane impounded at Munich airport by Walter Bau's
German liquidators.

Thai officials expected the court would make a decision Friday,
the news agency says.

According to Bangkok Post, German Foreign Ministry spokesman
Martin Schaefer said Friday that the German government could offer
no comment on the affair "because we respect the independence of
the judicial authorities" who are now responsible for the case.

But Germany's Foreign Ministry has expressed regret to the Crown
Prince over the matter, Bangkok Post relates citing a report from
British newspaper The Telegraph on Friday.

"We regret the inconveniences for the Crown Prince resulting from
the impounding."

Bangkok Post notes that Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva Friday
said the government expected the court would rule in favour of
Thailand as the aircraft seizure occurred out of a mistaken belief
that the plane belonged to the Thai government.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 15,
2011, BBC News said German administrators of Walter Bau AG have
impounded a jet used by Thailand's Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn, in
a dispute over an unpaid debt from 20 years ago.  The
administrators said Thailand's government has refused to pay a
bill of more than EUR30 million (US$43 million) to a now-defunct
German construction firm.  BBC News related that a spokesman for
Munich airport said the Boeing 737 was seized by court order, and
will remain grounded.

The action, according to Bangkok Post, was based on a decision in
2009 of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
for Thailand to pay Walter Bau more than EUR30 million for
breaching a bilateral investment treaty between Germany and
Thailand.  Bangkok Post notes that the UN court found that the
Thai government breached the terms of a toll road concession
operated by a venture partly owned by Walter Bau.

Mr. Schneider, as cited by Bangkok Post, said the seizure followed
repeated refusals by the Thai government to pay money it owes the
company.

Mr. Abhisit said the Office of the Attorney-General is in the
process of appealing to the Southern District Court of New York,
which last year ruled in favor of Walter Bau and ordered Thailand
to pay compensation to the firm, Bangkok Post relates.

Mr. Abhisit said the government will submit the appeal on July 29,
the report adds.

                      About Walter Bau

Headquartered in Augsburg, Germany, Walter Bau AG --
http://www.walter-bau.de/-- is a construction management and
construction technology group in Europe.  It principal
activities include turnkey construction, building planning and
construction, civil engineering, utility constructions, traffic
infrastructure construction, and real estate.  Walter Bau once
ranked number fourth in the local construction market behind
Hochtief, Bilfinger Berger and Strabag.

Walter Bau declared insolvency in February 2005 after creditor
banks refused to approve its restructuring plan.  This denied
the company access to a EUR1.5 billion credit line.  In his
report to the creditors, Mr. Schneider blamed the group's demise
to management errors and the downturn in the construction
industry.


* GERMANY: 90 Firms Head for UK to Avoid German Insolvency Law
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Telegraph reports that dozens of large German firms on the
brink of insolvency are preparing to go to London to shed their
debts after a landmark legal ruling opened the insolvency courts
to failing foreign businesses.

The Telegraph relates that German legal sources said at least 90
German companies with debts of more than EUR100 million (GBP88.8
million) are planning to have their finances restructured before
English judges.  It will allow them to avoid strict German
insolvency laws, force creditors to take a higher level of losses
and rescue viable parts of the troubled businesses, the report
says.

According to The Telegraph, British lawyers and accountants are in
line for a lucrative slice of the fees associated with the moves,
with each case expected to generate income in excess of
GBP10 million.  Their German counterparts are opening offices in
London and advertising for dual-qualified staff, the report notes.


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G R E E C E
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LEO BURNETT: Enters Into Pre-Bankruptcy Process in Greece
---------------------------------------------------------
Crain's Chicago Business reports that Leo Burnett has entered a
pre-bankruptcy process in Greece, as the Publicis Groupe-owned
agency struggles to stay in business in the country and keep
clients and staff on board.

Amid Greece's economic crisis -- and plummeting ad spending -- Leo
Burnett was also caught up in the economic troubles of a local
privately owned Greek TV channel called Alter that filed for
bankruptcy in May, Crain's Chicago Business notes.  Alter TV had
been pre-selling big blocks of airtime to agencies, Crain's
Chicago Business says, citing local agency executives.  When Alter
-- one of seven national free-to-air channels in Greece -- found
itself struggling to service a debt estimated at half a billion
dollars, the company tried to collect money owed by ad agencies,
Crain's Chicago Business recounts.

Leo Burnett Athens filed article 99, which Publicis described as
the equivalent of Chapter 11 in the U.S. bankruptcy code, to seek
protection from its creditors, Crain's Chicago Business relates.
According to Crain's Chicago Business, the agency said in a
statement: "We submitted an application in Athens Multi Member
Court asking the court to open the conciliation process for the
company under Articles 99-106 of the bankruptcy code."

Mathias Emmerich, Paris-based senior VP of Publicis Groupe,
confirmed that three top Leo Burnett executives in Greece --
Chairman Peter Venetis, General Manager Katerina Savva, and
Financial Director Gogo Skliva -- have all resigned from their
positions on the board of directors, but said they are still
working for the company, Crain's Chicago Business relates.

"They were worried about their responsibilities and didn't want to
participate in discussions about what would happen if we go into
bankruptcy," Crain's Chicago Business quotes Mr. Emmerich as
saying.  "The 99 is a protection and it is also an alert.  They
preferred not to stay in board-member positions."


OMEGA NAVIGATION: Lenders Hint Motion to Dismiss is Possible
------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Rochelle, the bankruptcy columnist for Bloomberg News,
reports that Omega Navigation Enterprises Inc. received interim
approval on July 11 to use cash representing collateral for the
secured lenders.  The final hearing on the cash use will be
scheduled later.

Mr. Rochelle also reports that in a court filing, HSH Nordbank AG,
the senior lenders' agent, noted that Omega's "connections to the
U.S. and this district is unclear." The bank said it is reserving
"all rights and defenses regarding jurisdiction, venue, and
dismissal."

                    About Omega Navigation

Athens, Greece-based Omega Navigation Enterprises Inc. and
affiliates, owner and operator of tankers carrying refined
petroleum products, filed for Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. Lead Case No. 11-35926) on July 8, 2011, in Houston.

Omega is an international provider of marine transportation
services focusing on seaborne transportation of refined petroleum
products.  The Debtors disclosed assets of US$527.6 million and
debt totaling US$359.5 million.  Together, the Debtors wholly own
a fleet of eight high-specification product tankers, with each
vessel owned by a separate debtor entity.

Bracewell & Giuliani LLP serves as counsel to the Debtors.
Jefferies & Company, Inc., is the financial advisor.


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H U N G A R Y
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REV NOSZTALGIA: In Liquidation; Puts Hotel Lido on the Market
-------------------------------------------------------------
realdeal.hu reports that Budapest's riverside Hotel Lido, located
in District III, is for sale for HUF1 billion (EUR3.7 million) net
after owner Rev Nosztalgia Kft. went into liquidation due to
unpaid debts.

The four-story hotel, which sits on a 7,000-sqm plot on Nanasi ut,
has 30 rooms, a swimming pool, a restaurant and garden.

Liquidator Matraholding Zrt. first tried to sell the hotel in
March -- also for HUF1 billion -- but received no bids.

Rev Nosztalgia is owned by two Hungarian private individuals.  The
company's debt is over HUF600 million.


* HUNGARY: Corporate Liquidations Up 21% in First Half 2011
-----------------------------------------------------------
MTI-Econews, citing credit insurance company Coface Hungary,
reports that the number of liquidation procedures in Hungary rose
21% in the first half from the same period a year earlier.

According to MTI, Coface Hungary said that liquidation procedures
were initiated against 3.85% of all companies registered in
Hungary in the first half compared to 3.17% in the same period a
year earlier.

The number of voluntary liquidations fell, but the number of
mandatory liquidations almost tripled during the period, MTI
discloses.

The number of liquidations was highest among business segments
reliant on the domestic market, MTI notes.


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I R E L A N D
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ALLIED IRISH: Wins Temporary EU Approval for Recapitalization
-------------------------------------------------------------
Aoife White at Bloomberg News reports that Allied Irish Banks Plc
and its unit, EBS Building Society, won European Union approval to
receive an Irish government recapitalization of EUR13.1 billion.

According to Bloomberg, the European Commission said it would take
a final decision on the aid when the Irish lenders submitted a new
restructuring plan expected by the end of July.  The Irish
government seized control of EBS last year and ordered it to merge
with Allied Irish, Bloomberg recounts.

"The Commission acknowledges that the measures are necessary to
increase the bank's solvency ratios and maintain confidence in the
Irish financial markets," Bloomberg quotes the regulator as saying
in an e-mailed statement on Friday.

Bloomberg notes that the EU said final approval of the government
help for Allied Irish and EBS required a restructuring plan that
ensured an "adequate participation in the restructuring costs by
shareholders and subordinated debt holders."

                About Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c.

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. -- http://www.aibgroup.com/-- is a
major commercial bank based in Ireland.  It has an extensive
branch network across the country, a head office in Dublin and a
capital markets operation based in the International Financial
Services Centre in Dublin.  AIB also has retail and corporate
businesses in the UK, offices in Europe and a subsidiary company
in the Isle of Man and Jersey (Channel Islands).

Since the onset of the global and Irish financial crisis, AIB's
relationship with the Irish Government has changed significantly.

As at Dec. 31, 2010, the Government, through the National Pension
Reserve Fund Commission, held 49.9% of the ordinary shares of the
Company (the share of the voting rights at shareholders' general
meetings), 10,489,899,564 convertible non-voting shares and 3.5
billion 2009 Preference Shares.  On April 8, 2011, the NPRFC
converted the total outstanding amount of CNV shares into
10,489,899,564 ordinary shares of AIB, thereby increasing its
holding to 92.8% of the ordinary share capital.

In addition to its shareholders' interests, the Government's
relationship with AIB is reflected through formal and informal
oversight by the Minister and the Department of Finance and the
Central Bank of Ireland, representation on the Board of Directors
(three non-executive directors are Government nominees),
participation in NAMA, and otherwise.

As reported by the TCR on May 31, 2011, KPMG, in Dublin, Ireland,
noted that there are a number of material economic, political and
market risks and uncertainties that impact the Irish banking
system, including the Company's continued ability to access
funding from the Eurosystem and the Irish Central Bank to meet its
liquidity requirements, that raise substantial doubt about the
Company's ability to continue as a going concern.

The Company reported a net loss of EUR10.16 billion on
EUR1.84 billion of interest income for 2010, compared with a net
loss of EUR2.33 billion on US$2.87 billion of interest income for
2009.

The Company's balance sheet at Dec. 31, 2010, showed
EUR145.2 billion in total assets, EUR140.9 billion in total
liabilities, and stockholders' equity of EUR4.3 billion.


MCINERNEY HOLDINGS: To Consider Shareholder's Bid to Oust Board
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Irish Times reports that McInerney Holdings is set to consider
a rebel shareholder's proposal to remove the company's board at a
formal meeting.

McInerney's Irish business is waiting for the Supreme Court to
rule on a rescue plan for that division, while its British and
Spanish operations have been sold and the proceeds used to pay off
creditors, the Irish Times says.

According to the Irish Times, corporate financier David Nabarro,
who acquired 21.45% of McInerney in May, wants to call an
extraordinary general meeting of the company to propose sacking
its current board.

The Irish Times relates that McInerney chairman Ned Sullivan has
written to Mr. Nabarro to confirm the company will hold the
meeting to allow shareholders to vote on his proposal.
Mr. Nabarro's brokers, Bermayne Bentley, formally requested the
meeting, and the company is obliged to hold it, the report notes.

McInerney's chief financial officer and acting chief executive
Enda Cunningham has also written to Mr. Nabarro offering to brief
him on the company's financial state, the Irish Times reports.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 11,
2011, Irish Independent said the board of McInerney Holdings wants
to liquidate the company, saying it has "no meaningful assets" and
no cash to deal with even the most basic of administrative tasks.
According to Irish Independent, the move, if approved by
shareholders, will effectively mark the demise of a group that
listed on the stock exchange in Dublin 40 years ago.

"The directors pursued every measure possible to safeguard your
group and put in place a restructuring plan that could have
offered shareholder value in the future," Irish Independent quoted
Ned Sullivan, chairman of the group, as saying in a letter to
shareholders.  "It is with great regret that the level of debt in
the group's various divisions and the continuing falling market
have not allowed us to be successful in this regard."

An extraordinary general meeting is due to be held on July 29,
Irish Independent disclosed.  If approved, the liquidation will
likely end efforts begun recently by British-based investor
David Nabarro to oust the McInerney board, Irish Independent
noted.  He owns over 21% of the group and has threatened to seek
an injunctive relief if McInerney fails to include his proposals
to remove the board at any extraordinary general meeting it calls,
Irish Independent recalled.

Mr. Sullivan, as cited by Irish Independent, said that if the
liquidation proposal is rejected then board members will "consider
their individual positions".

                        About McInerney

McInerney Holdings plc -- http://www.mcinerneyholdings.eu/-- is a
home builder and regional home builder in the North and Midlands
of England.  It also undertakes commercial and leisure projects in
Ireland, United Kingdom and Spain.  It operates in Ireland, the
United Kingdom and Spain.  The main trading activities of the
Company's Irish home building business during the year ended
December 31, 2008, consisted of construction of private houses,
trading in developed sites and land, development of residential
land for third-parties and in joint-ventures, and contracting for
third-parties.  The Company's commercial property development
division, Hillview Developments Ltd (Hillview), develops
industrial units in the Greater Dublin area.  Hillview completed
1,223 square meters of industrial units as of December 31, 2008.
Its Spanish division, Alanda Group, is developing freehold
apartment schemes.  As of December 31, 2008, the Company completed
1,359 private and contracting residential units in Ireland, the
United Kingdom and Spain.


WILLOW NO. 2: Moody's Downgrades US$50MM Notes due 2011 to 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of notes
issued by Willow No.2 (Ireland) PLC. The notes affected by the
rating action are:

Issuer: Willow No. 2

   -- Series 35 US$50,000,000 Secured Limited Recourse Notes due
      2011, Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jun 30, 2011
      Downgraded to Ba1 and Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

This transaction represents a repackaging of a US$50 million loan
entered into between the JSCB Bank of Moscow and Barclays Bank.
The Issuer uses the proceeds from the Notes issuance to enter into
a novation agreement, receiving all rights due to the lender in
respect of US$50 million of its commitment under the loan. Any
interest and principal amount received under the loan by the
Issuer is then paid to noteholders.

The rating on the Notes is a pass-through of the rating of the
JSCB Bank of Moscow as borrower of the loan. Noteholders are
exposed to the credit risk of JSCB Bank of Moscow and therefore
the rating moves in lock-step.

The rating action is a response to the downgrade to Ba2 from Ba1
under review for possible downgrade of JSCB Bank of Moscow.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010.


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I T A L Y
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COMPAGNIA FINANZIARIA: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on Class C Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Compagnia Finanziaria 1 S.r.l. Series
2007-1's (Compagnia Finanziaria 2007-1) and 16 Uno Finance Srl's
(16 Uno Finance) notes:

Compagnia Finanziaria 1 Srl 2007-1:

   -- EUR160.5m class A floating-rate notes: affirmed at 'AAAsf';
      Outlook Negative; Loss Severity Rating (LS) of 'LS-1'

   -- EUR95.1m class B floating-rate notes: affirmed at 'A-sf';
      Outlook Negative; 'LS-3'

   -- EUR47.5m class C floating-rate notes: affirmed at 'BB+sf';
      Outlook Negative; 'LS-3'

16 Uno Finance Srl:

   -- Class A EUR88.1m notes affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Negative; Loss Severity 'LS-1'

   -- Class B EUR37.8m notes affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
      Negative; 'LS-4'

   -- Class C EUR23.3m notes affirmed at 'BB-sf' ;Outlook
      Negative; 'LS-5'

The affirmations reflect that the transactions' performance has
remained in line with Fitch's revised expectations since they were
downgraded in March 2011. The Negative Outlooks on all classes of
notes reflect the agency's concerns about the future performance
of the transactions.

As of latest payment date, the cumulative default ratios were 6.2%
and 9.0% for Compagnia Finanziaria 2007-1 and 16 Uno Finance,
respectively. Both deals envisaged a cash reserve providing credit
enhancement to the notes at closing. However, since January 2010
for Compagnia Finanziaria 2007-1 and December 2009 for 16 Uno
Finance, the cash reserves have been fully depleted.

Fitch is continuing to monitor the situation regarding the
transaction's servicers, Carifin Italia S.p.A. and Plusvalore
S.p.A., which are part of Gruppo Delta S.p.A., which was placed
under special administration by the Bank of Italy in May 2009. On
February 18, 2011, Delta placed Carifin and Plusvalore in
voluntary winding-up due to its ongoing debt restructuring.
However, the servicers are still operating their business as
normal.

The agency understands that in May 2011, Delta's creditors
approved the restructuring plan constructed in co-operation with
the commissioners of the Bank of Italy and are currently waiting
for the tribunal of Bologna to ratify the final version of the
plan within 60 days from the date it was deposited by the
commissioners. Fitch has been informed that a Newco, which is
expected to act as servicer for all Delta banking group's credits
and therefore also for Compagnia Finanziaria 2007-1 and 16 Uno
Finance, has been already constituted and will start business as
soon as the plan is ratified.

In addition, the agency takes some comfort from the fact that a
back-up servicer, UniCredit Credit Management Bank SpA (UGC MB,
rated 'RSS1-'/'CSS1-'), was appointed at closing.

Fitch will continue to monitor the development of the events
involving Delta and its subsidiaries to better evaluate their
potential implications (if any) on the transactions.

Compagnia Finanziaria 2007-1 and 16 Uno Finance are the second and
third securitisation of consumer and personal loans receivables
originated in Italy by Carifin and Plusvalore, following Compagnia
Finanzaria 1 S.r.l. which was paid in full on December 9, 2009.


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N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


HIGHLANDER EURO: Moody's Rates EUR25MM Class D Notes at 'B2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Highlander Euro CDO B.V:

Issuer: Highlander Euro CDO B.V.

   -- EUR276.25M Class A-1 Primary Senior Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2022 (currently EUR 254.9M), Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR48.75M Class A-2 Primary Senior Secured Folating Rate
      Notes due 2022, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR45M Class B Primary Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2022, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR41.25M Class C Primary Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR25M Class D Primary Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

Highlander EURO CDO B.V. issued in August 2006, is a single
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European loans. The transaction is managed by
Highland Capital Management Europe Limited and has not passed the
reinvestment period which ends in September 2012. The portfolio
predominantly consists of European senior secured loans (82%).

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in November
2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2) increased BET
liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a fixed recovery
rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the modeling
assumptions include standardizing the modeling of collateral
amortization profiles.

Moody's also notes the deal has benefitted from an increase in the
transaction's overcollateralization ratios since the rating action
in November 2009. The Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 120.59%, 107.62%,
100.77% and 97.21%, respectively, versus October 2009 levels of
118.45%, 106.41%, 100.13% and 96.95% respectively. This is part
has been due to the pay down of Class A1 by approximately
EUR16 million since October 2009. During this time WARF has
remained relatively stable and is currently 2753 (May 2011)
compared to 2676 in October 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR433.8 million,
defaulted par of EUR19 million, a weighted average default
probability of 32.13% (consistent with a WARF of 3213), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 43%, and a diversity score
of 29. The default probability is derived from the credit quality
of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining
life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be
realized on future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of
the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target
rating, Moody's assumed that 82% of the portfolio exposed to
senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default,
while the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets would
recover 10%. In each case, historical and market performance
trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral
are also relevant factors. These default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

   (1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
       defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed
       to be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the
       deal's overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of
       recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
       sell defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
       Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
       the market price and the recovery rate in order to account
       for potential volatility in market prices.

   (2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to
       the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio,
       which may be extended due to the manager's decision to
       reinvest into new issue loans or other loans with longer
       maturities and/or participate in amend-to-extend offerings.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011. Other factors used in this rating are described in
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions" (October 15, 2009).

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's CDOEdge
model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Moody's also notes that around 50% of the collateral pool consists
of debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed through
Moody's credit estimates.


SMILE: Fitch Says Mortgage Rights Replacement No Impact on Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says Smile Securitisation Company 2001-1 B.V. and
Smile Securitisation Company 2007 B.V.'s ratings are unaffected by
the replacement of mortgage rights in the transactions.
The transfer of security rights in the two Smile transactions is
needed because of the demerger of ABN AMRO Bank N.V. (currently
named RBS N.V.), which became effective on February 6, 2010. All
Dutch state acquired business was transferred to ABN AMRO II
(currently named ABN AMRO Bank N.V.).

The process of replacing the mortgage rights involves ABN AMRO
Bank N.V. terminating existing security rights in full and
establishing new security rights securing the entire exposure of
the relevant borrower. Fitch analyzed the transactions' documents
and risks of the proposal and believes that the replacement of
mortgage rights will not negatively impact the ratings of the
notes.

The notes are rated:

Smile Securitisation Company 2001-1 B.V.

   -- EUR500m Class A2 (XS0140352229): 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR30m Class B2 (XS0140353623): 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR27.5m Class C2 (XS0140353979): 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR21m Class D2 (XS0140354357) 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative

Smile Securitisation Company 2007 B.V.

   -- EUR1,827m Class A (NL0000169142): 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR62.2m Class B (XS0288450736): 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR46.7m Class C (XS0288453599): 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative

   -- EUR46.7m Class D (XS0288455370) 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative

   -- EUR52.9m Class E (XS0288455883) 'CCCsf'


===========
R U S S I A
===========


ATON CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns B2/Not Prime Issuer Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned global scale ratings to
Aton Capital Group: B2/Not Prime long-term and short-term foreign
currency and local currency issuer ratings. The outlook for the
long-term ratings is stable.

Moody's assessment of the issuer's ratings is largely based on
ACG's audited financial statements for 2010, 2009 and 2008
prepared under IFRS.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's observes that ACG's issuer ratings reflect (i) risky and
unstable markets in which the group operates, aggravated by
concentration of revenues on a limited number of products and lack
of international geographical diversification; (ii) lack of scale
and modest positions outside its core business of retail
brokerage, which could make it difficult to withstand intensifying
competition and exposes the company to the risk of additional
operating losses owing to its sizeable investments in
infrastructure and people; (iii) a complex organizational
structure consisting of a large number of individual entities,
which could result in some structural subordination from operating
entities and exposure to various legal risks as well as
transparency issues (whereby some businesses and risks could
reside outside the ACG umbrella); (iv) poor regulation of the
majority of markets in which the group operates may fail to limit
and control industry-related and company-specific risks; (v)
volatile earnings which have substantial correlation to the
Russian securities markets; and (vi) some appetite (albeit
currently low) for financing of investment projects and other
long-term financing -- including those of shareholders; ACG's
liquidity, capital and brand could be jeopardized if large-scale
projects are pursued.

At the same time, Moody's notes that ACG's ratings are supported
by: (i) its reasonable position in retail brokerage which benefits
from a good geographical platform in Russia; (ii) moderate market
risk appetite and conservative liquidity management, which
positions the company favorably to withstand significant market
stress; (iii) low appetite for those products in which the company
lacks experience; and (iv) good capital position due to the
company's low-leverage policy, which is sufficient to accommodate
credit and market risks.

In light of the aforementioned constraints, ACG's ratings are
unlikely to be upgraded in the medium term. However, positive
rating drivers would include (i) continuous franchise development
and (ii) improved diversification in terms of asset class
instruments, clients and geography, which could result in lower
volatility of earnings. In Moody's opinion, a lower risk profile -
- stemming from improved risk management practices -- and the
maturing of Russia's financial markets should also represent
positive rating drivers. Downward pressure could be exerted on the
ratings as a result of significant liquidity deterioration and
significant capital erosion due to high credit risks mainly
associated with related-party or other long-term financing. The
rating agency adds that significant loss of franchise, leading to
reduced revenue streams which could not be compensated by
appropriate cost-cutting measures, could also have negative rating
implications.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global
Securities Industry Methodology published in December 2006.

Based in the Cayman Islands, ACG is the holding company which
unites under its umbrella a number of sub-holding and operating
companies in various jurisdictions while the majority of business
is related to Russia. ACG recorded total assets of US$540 million
and equity of US$234 million at YE2010 according to audited
financial statements.


=========
S P A I N
=========


AYT CAJA: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class D Notes at 'Bsf'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ayt Caja Granada Hipotecario I, Fondo
de Titulizacion de Activos's (Caja Granada I) notes:

   -- Class A (ISIN ES0312212006) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable; Loss Severity (LS) rating of 'LS-1';

   -- Class B (ISIN ES0312212014) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
      Negative; 'LS-3';

   -- Class C (ISIN ES0312212022) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
      Negative; 'LS-3';

   -- Class D (ISIN ES0312212030) affirmed at 'Bsf; Outlook
      Negative; 'LS-5'.

Caja Granada I's pool solely comprises residential loans
originated and serviced in Spain by Caja General de Ahorros de
Granada ('BBB+'/Stable/'F2'), which is part of Banco Mare Nostrum
S.A and Banco Mare Nostrum Group, both rated by Fitch at
'BBB+'/Stable/'F2'.

The affirmation of the ratings reflects the sufficient level of
credit enhancement available to the rated notes, which benefit
from sequential repayment, and a fully funded reserve fund of
EUR5.2 million (2.22% of the current outstanding pool balance).

The Negative Outlook assigned to the class B, C and D notes
reflects Fitch's concerns over the performance of the pool. The
agency believes that the performance of the underlying assets
remains exposed to the ongoing difficult Spanish macro economic
environment, rising interest rates and lengthy foreclosure
procedures, which delay the timing of recoveries.

Period defaults declined between the December 2010 and June 2011
interest payment dates. As a result, some of the excess spread was
utilized towards the replenishment of the reserve fund. The
transaction features a provisioning mechanism, whereby excess
revenue is used to write off period defaults, defined as loans in
arrears by more than 18 months. On the other hand, the volume of
loans in the pipeline remains above the levels seen in most other
Fitch-rated Spanish RMBS transactions. As of the June 2011 IPD,
loans in arrears by more than three months stood at 3% of the
current portfolio.

The transaction replenished its reserve fund to the target level
on the March 2011 IPD after incurring several draws between the
September 2009 and December 2010. Fitch believes that the
replenishment was driven by the flow of recoveries in the past
three quarters (total amount reached EUR6.2 million). In Fitch's
opinion, the speed at which such recoveries have reached the
issuer is most likely unsustainable in the future, given the
current macro-economic environment in Spain. With the current
volume of loans in arrears, which are expected to roll-through to
default in the upcoming quarters, Fitch expects further draws to
occur on the next few IPDs.

Although the pool had deleveraged to 60% of the initial collateral
balance by the June 2011 IPD, Fitch notes that the portfolio was
heavily concentrated in the higher original loan-to-value (OLTV)
buckets. The loan-by-loan level data for the end of May showed
that 44% of the portfolio were loans with OLTVs ranging between
70% and 95%. At least 61% of the loans were originated in 2006,
within the peak of the housing market. With Fitch's peak-to-trough
house price decline assumptions of 30%, the agency believes that a
high portion of loans in the portfolio may have negative equity.
In its analysis, Fitch assumes higher default probabilities for
borrowers with high LTVs. Fitch believes that an expected rise in
interest rates could lead to a further deterioration in
affordability for such borrowers and a further rise in arrears
levels in this deal. As a result, the agency's view is that as
more loans roll through to default, excess spread will be put
under further pressure. For this reason, the transaction's ability
to maintain the reserve fund at target is expected to remain
limited, unless recoveries from defaulted loans flow through in
the upcoming IPDs. This is reflected in the Negative Outlooks for
the class B, C and D notes.

Fitch notes that a portion of the loans in the portfolio has been
subjected to some form of loan modifications (2.1% of the initial
asset balance), which has led either to an extension in maturity
of the loans or a reduction in margin. Although loan modifications
typically lead to an improvement in borrower affordability, in
Fitch's opinion, these loans could be linked to more distressed
obligors. In its analysis the agency has assumed a higher
probability of default for such loans. The level of credit
enhancement available to the notes remains sufficient to withstand
the respective rating stresses applied, which is why the ratings
of the notes were affirmed.


FONDO DE TITULIZACION: S&P Affirms Rating on Class E Notes at 'D'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on Fondo de Titulizacion
de Activos Santander Consumer Spain 07-2's class A to D notes. "At
the same time, we affirmed our rating on the class E notes," S&P
said.

"Following our preliminary credit analysis in March 2011, we
placed on CreditWatch negative our ratings on the class A to D
notes. The class E notes remained unaffected by our rating actions
at that time," S&P related.

"We have now performed a review of the transaction's collateral
performance and structural features. As a result, we have taken
the rating actions due to our view of the significantly
deteriorating underlying collateral backing the transaction and
the reduced credit enhancement available to the rated notes," S&P
said.

"Since our last review, we have observed that the level of
cumulative defaults is still increasing and we have therefore
reviewed our default-rate assumptions in this transaction. While
the level of short-term delinquencies has been decreasing, we
associate this with a rollover of long-term delinquencies into
defaults. In our view, this indicates that the issuer has
insufficient proceeds available to cure such long-term
delinquencies," S&P said.

"The transaction documents define defaulted assets in this
transaction as assets that have been in arrears for more than 12
months. In addition, we have not received any recovery information
on defaulted assets from the trustee," S&P said.

"We have consequently lowered our recovery assumptions, taking
into account the lack of recovery data and the recovery levels
observed in similar Spanish transactions backed by the same type
of unsecured loans with the same vintage and the same servicer
(Santander Consumer, E.F.C., S.A.)," S&P related.

As of the most recent payment date in February 2011, the reported
ratio of cumulative defaults -- loans being delinquent for more
than 12 months -- represented 9.37% of the original portfolio
balance securitized at closing.

"Due to this increase in defaults--typically associated with a
lack of recoveries--and our lowered recovery assumptions, we
believe that the level of performing collateral available to
service the amounts due under the notes is falling. Although the
credit enhancement level provided by the performing balance is
positive for the class A and B notes, it is now negative for the
class C, D, and E notes, which are therefore undercollateralized
according to our criteria. Based on the current level of proceeds
received by the reserve fund, the fund will not be able to repay
any principal due when the class C, D, and E notes mature,"
according to S&P.

The reserve fund -- funded at closing by the issuance proceeds of
the class E notes -- is intended to provide credit enhancement to
the rated notes and cure defaults in the transaction. "It has been
fully depleted since the August 2009 payment date and we
understand that the fund has not been replenished as the
performing collateral balance has decreased. Additionally, we
understand that the transaction has not received sufficient excess
spread to allocate toward replenishing the reserve fund," S&P
said.

As of the last payment date, the fund accumulated EUR494.4 million
of principal deficiency, which is the difference between the
available remaining principal receipts and the amount of the notes
still to be amortized. According to the transaction documents,
Santander Consumer Spain 07-2 will defer the class D notes'
interest when the cumulative defaults reach 10.3%
(from the current level of 9.37%).

The transaction closed in September 2007 and is now highly
seasoned with a pool factor of 29%. The paydown of the underlying
assets has triggered the amortization of the most senior class of
notes as the notes pay principal sequentially. "Due to this
redemption feature, the level of credit enhancement -- taking into
account the subordination of the junior rated classes -- has
significantly increased for the class A and B notes. However, as
the class C, D, and E notes are now undercollateralized in our
analysis, they are not providing the same level of support to the
class A and B notes as we consider the class C, D, and E notes to
be nonperforming, according to our rating definitions. In
addition, these classes do not benefit from the support of the
reserve fund that is now fully depleted. The class E notes were
issued to fund the reserve fund at closing and were therefore
never backed by underlying assets," S&P related.

"Based on the review of our credit analysis assumptions in terms
of defaults and recoveries, and taking into account the current
reduced level of support available to the rated notes in the
capital structure, while the class A notes achieve a 'BBB- (sf)'
rating in our analysis, the class B notes achieve a 'B (sf)'
rating. We have consequently lowered and removed from CreditWatch
negative our rating on the class A and class B notes. The class C
and D notes have not passed our cash flow model. Therefore, we
have lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative our ratings on
these notes," S&P noted.

"We have affirmed our 'D (sf)' rating on the class E notes as they
had already defaulted in May 2009 due to a failed interest
payment. Since their interest payment default, the notes have not
paid back any of the interest previously due," S&P said.

Santander Consumer Spain 07-22's notes securitize a portfolio of
Spanish auto consumer loans originated by Santander Consumer. The
transaction documents intended for Santander Consumer Spain 07-2
to have a revolving period of three years from its closing date in
September 2007, but the replenishment period stopped earlier, in
April 2008, due to a breached delinquency trigger. This
delinquency trigger was set as the level of loans in arrears for
more than 90 days being greater than 1.5% of the outstanding
balance of the assets.

Ratings List

Class                 Rating
           To                        From

Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Consumer Spain 07-2
EUR1.02 Billion Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A          BBB- (sf)                 AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
B          B (sf)                    BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
C          CCC (sf)                  BB- (sf)/Watch Neg
D          CCC- (sf)                 CCC (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Affirmed

E          D (sf)


HIPOCAT 11: Moody's Downgrades EUR52.8MM Notes Rating to 'C'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of the notes
issued by HIPOCAT 11 FTA.

The ratings of the notes were placed on review for possible
downgrade in February 2011 due to the worse than expected
performance of the collateral.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action concludes the review and takes into
consideration the worse-than-expected performance of the
collateral. It also reflects Moody's negative sector outlook for
Spanish RMBS and the weakening of the macro-economic environment
in Spain, including high unemployment rates.

The ratings of the notes take into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pools, from which Moody's determined
the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement (MILAN Aaa CE) and the lifetime
losses (expected loss), as well as the transaction structure and
any legal considerations as assessed in Moody's cash flow
analysis. The expected loss and the Milan Aaa CE are the two key
parameters used by Moody's to calibrate its loss distribution
curve, used in the cash flow model to rate European RMBS
transactions.

Portfolio Expected Loss:

Moody's has reassessed its lifetime loss expectation taking into
account the collateral performance to date, as well as the current
macroeconomic environment in Spain. In May 2011, cumulative write-
offs rose to 15.29% of the original pool balance. The share of 90+
day arrears stood at 1.78% of current pool balance. Moody's
expects the portfolio credit performance to be under stress, as
Spanish unemployment remains elevated. The rating agency believes
that the anticipated tightening of Spanish fiscal policies is
likely to weigh on the recovery in the Spanish labour market and
constrain future Spanish households finances. Moody's also has
concerns over the timing and degree of future recoveries in a
weaker Spanish housing market. On the basis of Moody's negative
sector outlook for Spanish RMBS, the rating agency has updated the
portfolio expected loss assumption to 10.60% of original pool
balance up from 8.00% in December 2009.

MILAN Aaa CE:

Moody's has assessed the loan-by-loan information to determine the
MILAN Aaa CE. Moody's has increased its MILAN Aaa CE assumptions
to 25%, up from 24% in December 2009. The increase in the MILAN
Aaa CE reflects the high concentration of flexible loans and high
geographical concentration in Catalonia. The transaction is
secured by 100% flexible mortgages (Maximum amount of initial
credit granted 100% LTV). The product in question, called "Credito
Total" offers the possibility of withdrawing additional funds when
the loan has amortised below the credit limit (first and
subsequent draw-downs will never exceed 80% of the original
appraisal value) subject to specific conditions. These type of
flexible loans are riskier than traditional mortgage loans because
as the mortgage loans amortise, the debtor has the possibility of
withdrawing additional funds, so the LTV may increase to the
lowest of the initial LTV or 80% . In addition, the increase in
the MILAN Aaa CE reflects the exposure to broker origination , non
Spanish nationals (20%) and the concentration to self employed
(12%).

Operational Risk:

The rating of CatalunyaCaixa is Ba1/NP. CatalunyaCaixa is the
servicer in this transaction. Moody's notes that operational risk
in this transactions is not mitigated as there is no back-up
servicer. The operational risk is not a driver of today's rating
action on the notes. Moody's notes that the reserve fund is fully
depleted and no other sources of liquidity are available in the
transaction. The absence of liquidity in the transactions could
impair the ability of the Issuer to make timely payment of
interest on the notes, particularly in case of a servicing
transfer.

The rating addresses the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and principal with
respect of the notes by the legal final maturity. Moody's ratings
only address the credit risk associated with the transaction.
Other non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

TRANSACTION FEATURES

HIPOCAT 11 closed in March 2007. The transaction is backed by a
portfolio of first-ranking mortgage loans originated by Caixa
Catalunya secured on residential properties located in Spain, for
an overall balance at closing of EUR 1,600 million. Moody's has
been informed that the servicing of Caixa Catalunya's mortgage
portfolio will remain on CatalunyaCaixa's servicing platform.
HIPOCAT 11 consists exclusively of securitisation of first
drawdowns of Caixa Catalunya's flexible mortgage loan. The
product, named Cr‚dito Total offers the possibility of withdrawing
additional funds up to the minimum of the original loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, or 80% LTV.

Reserve fund and Principal Deficiency (PDL): the increasing levels
of defaulted loans has ultimately caused the full depletion of the
reserve fund and the transaction is currently experiencing an
unpaid PDL. The current unpaid PDL is equal to EUR 61 million
corresponding to 95% of the Class C notes.

Interest deferral triggers: Classes B and C are not receiving any
interest in the last payment dates, following trigger breach and
insufficient available funds to meet these payments

Commingling: All of the payments under the loans in this pool are
collected by the servicer under a direct debit scheme into the
collection accounts held at CatalunyaCaixa (Ba1/NP) and then are
transferred to the treasury account held at CaixaBank (Aa2 /P-1)
every two days. Then transfer to CatalunyaCaixa (Ba1/NP) every
three months. The commingling risk has been taken into account in
the review of the transaction.

Swap: According to the swap agreement entered into between the
Fondo and Confederacion Espanola de Cajas de Ahorro (A1/ P-1), on
each payment date:

   -- The Fondo will pay the interest actually received from the
      loans.

   -- CECA will pay the sum of (1) the weighted average coupon on
      the Class A1, A2, A3, B and C notes plus 65 bppa, over a
      notional calculated as the daily average of the outstanding
      amount of the loans not more than 90 days in arrears since
      the last payment date (excluding the loans in grace periods
      if the loans in grace periods represent less than 16%); and
      (2) the servicing fee due on such payment date if CECA is
      substituted as servicer.

For details on the deal structure, please refer to the HIPOCAT 11
FTA, new issue reports. The report is available on www.moodys.com.

RATING METHODOLOGIES

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach
to Rating RMBS in Europe, Middle East, and Africa published in
October 2009. Secondary methodology used include Moody's Updated
Methodology for Rating Spanish RMBS published in October 2009,
Cash Flow Analysis in EMEA RMBS: Testing Structural Features with
the MARCO Model (Moody's Analyser of Residential Cash Flows)
published in January 2006 and Revising Default/Loss Assumptions
Over the Life of an ABS/RMBS Transaction published in December
2008.

Other Factors used in this rating are described in rating
implementation guidance, "Global Structured Finance Operational
Risk Guidelines: Moody's Approach to Analyzing Performance
Disruption Risk" published in June 2011.

LIST OF RATINGS ACTIONS

Issuer: HIPOCAT 11 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos

   -- EUR1083.2M A2 Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
      Feb 8, 2011 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR200M A3 Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
      Feb 8, 2011 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR52.8M B Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 8,
     2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

   -- EUR64M C Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb 8,
      2011 Ca (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ALPSTAR CLO 2: Moody's Assigns 'B1' to EUR2.8MM Class Q Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Alpstar CLO 2 p.l.c.:

Issuer: Alpstar CLO 2 p.l.c.

   -- EUR78M Class A2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024
      Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR48.5M Class B Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024 Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR37.5M Class C Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2024 Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR42M Class D Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2024 Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR24M Class E Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2024 Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR10M Class P Combination Notes due 2024 Notes, Upgraded to
      Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 B3 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR2.8M Class Q Combination Notes due 2024 Notes, Upgraded
      to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed
      Under Review for Possible Upgrade

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Classes P
and Q, which do not accrue interest, the 'Rated Balance' is equal
at any time to the principal amount of the Combination Note on the
Issue Date minus the aggregate of all payments made from the Issue
Date to such date, either through interest or principal payments.
The Rated Balance may not necessarily correspond to the
outstanding notional amount reported by the trustee.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Alpstar CLO 2 p.l.c, issued in April 2007, is a multi-currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation backed by a portfolio of mostly
high yield European and US loans. The portfolio is managed by
Alpstar Management Jersey Limited and Mignon Geneve S.A. acting as
the investment advisor. This transaction will be in the
reinvestment period until May 2014. It is composed of 85.72%
senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios since the rating action in August
2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions, which
incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability
macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2) increased BET
liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a fixed recovery
rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the modeling
assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of collateral
amortization profile, and (2) adjustments to the equity cash-flows
haircuts applicable to combination notes.

Moody's adjusted WARF has declined since the rating action in
August 2009. The change in reported WARF understates the actual
credit quality improvement because of the technical transition
related to rating factors of European corporate credit estimates,
as announced in the press release published by Moody's on
September 1, 2010.

Additionally, defaulted securities total about EUR11.6 million of
the underlying portfolio compared to EUR27.7 million in July 2009.
The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have also
improved since the rating action in August 2009. The Class A2,
Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios
are reported at 148.81%, 130.61%, 119.33%, 108.80% and 104.63%,
respectively, versus July 2009 levels of 143.30%, 126.94%,
116.64%, 106.92% and 102.33%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance. In
particular, the Class E overcollateralization ratio has increased
due to the diversion of excess interest to delever the Class E
notes in the event of a Class E overcollateralization test
failure.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR513.9 million,
defaulted par of EUR11.6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 30.60% (consistent with a WARF of 3060), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 20.00%, and a diversity
score of 36. The default probability is derived from the credit
quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the
remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate
to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa
liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 85.72% of the
portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover
50% upon default, while the non first-lien loan corporate assets
would recover 10%. In each case, historical and market performance
trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral
are also relevant factors. These default and recovery properties
of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model
analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the
target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by (1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and (2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2014 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CDO
notes' performance may also be impacted by (1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and (2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

   (1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
       defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed
       to be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the
       deal's overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of
       recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus
       sell defaulted assets create additional uncertainties.
       Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
       the market price and the recovery rate in order to account
       for potential volatility in market prices.

   (2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to
       the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio,
       which may be extended due to the manager's decision to
       reinvest into new issue loans or other loans with longer
       maturities and/or participate in amend-to-extend offerings.
       Moody's tested for a possible extension of the actual
       weighted average life in its analysis.

   (3) The deal has significant exposure to non-EUR denominated
       assets. Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a
       direct impact on interest and principal proceeds available
       to the transaction, which may affect the expected loss of
       rated tranches.

   (4) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
       reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
       collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
       covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming
       lower of reported and covenanted values for weighted
       average rating factor, weighted average spread, weighted
       average coupon, and diversity score.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and
the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts,
input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, may influence the final rating decision.

Moody's also notes that around 64% of the collateral pool consists
of debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed through
Moody's credit estimates.


BRADFORDS: In the Brink of Administration Due to Mounting Debts
---------------------------------------------------------------
Helen Mcardle at The Herald reports that one of Glasgow's oldest
family bakers is on the brink of administration as it battles
mounting debts.

Bradfords, which also owns the Miss Cranston's brand of shops and
tearooms, has one week to pull the company back from liquidation
after Her Majesty Revenue and Customs lodged a petition at Paisley
Sheriff Court, according to The Herald.

The 87-year-old firm is the latest High Street chain to suffer
problems in the downturn, The Herald notes.


GRANITE UK: S&P Gives 'BB' Ratings on 26 Tranches of Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
91 tranches in the Granite U.K. residential mortgage-backed
securities master trust. "At the same time, we affirmed our
ratings on 76 tranches and withdrew our ratings on an additional
six tranches," S&P said.

"The downgrades reflect the application of our 2010 counterparty
criteria for structured finance transactions.

"We placed the senior classes of notes on CreditWatch negative on
Jan. 18, 2011 following the update to our counterparty criteria,"
S&P said.

"We have lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative our ratings
on the class A and B notes in the five remaining capitalist
issuers (Granite Mortgages 03-2, 03-3, 04-1, 04-2, and 04-3) to
'A+ (sf)' from 'AAA (sf)' for the class A notes and to 'A+ (sf)'
from 'AA+ (sf)' for the class B notes. In these transactions, we
do not consider the issuer payment accounts to be compliant with
our counterparty criteria. As a result, in our analysis we link
the ratings to the long-term rating on the bank account provider
(Citibank N.A.; A+/Negative/A-1)," S&P related.

"For the Granite Master Issuer PLC transactions, we consider that
the bank accounts comply with our criteria. However, the funding
basis swap in these transactions is not complaint with our
counterparty criteria. Therefore, we have run our cash flow
scenarios without the benefit of this swap," S&P said.

"Our analysis of cash flows indicates that without the swap the
current ratings on the class A and B notes would be affected.
However, we believe that the counterparty's enforceable legal
obligations reflect a replacement framework from a previous
version of our counterparty criteria. We are likely to
differentiate the rating on a security that has some mechanism to
replace the counterparty from the rating on a security without
such a mechanism to reflect what we view to be the difference in
default risk. As such, in line with our 2010 counterparty criteria
we have downgraded the class A and B notes to the long-term rating
on Northern Rock (Asset Management) PLC (A/Stable/A-1) plus one
notch," S&P continued.

"The overall performance of the Granite trust has remained
relatively stable in the past 18 months, according to performance
data we have received. Total delinquencies have continued to
increase and now stand at 12.65% in May 2011 compared with 8.97%
in November 2009. However, as the notes all pay in a pass-through
manner following a non-asset trigger event in November 2008,
credit enhancement has been increasing to offset this increase in
arrears. As a result, we have affirmed our ratings on the
subordinate classes of notes," S&P said.

"We have withdrawn our ratings on six tranches as the notes have
redeemed. Owing to an administrative error, we didn't withdraw
these ratings at the time of the note redemptions," S&P noted.

A list of the ratings subject to the July 13, 2011 rating actions
is accessible for free at:

http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?assetID=12
45314882145


HOFFMAN INNS: Goes Into Administration as Sales Fall Flat
---------------------------------------------------------
Peter McCusker at The Journal reports that Hoffman Inns was put
into administration putting almost 30 jobs at risk.

Nick Reed and Ian Green of accountants PricewaterhouseCoopers were
appointed joint administrators of Hoffman Inns, according to The
Journal.

Hoffman Inns is a subsidiary of Bar Operations, which entered into
administration on June 21, this year, The Journal says.

The Journal notes that both businesses are continuing to trade as
usual and customers and employees have been unaffected by the
administration

"Trading has suffered in recent months and the administration is
clearly disappointing news for all of the stakeholders, and
employees in particular.  However, we are working alongside the
directors to secure a rapid sale of the business and assets of Bar
Operations and Hoffman Inns Limited.  We are very keen to speak to
anyone who might have an interest," The Journal quoted Nick Reed,
joint administrator and partner PwC, as saying.

Hoffman Inns employs 29 staff and owns a freehold bar, restaurant
and hotel in Roker known as the Queen Vic and leasehold bar in
Hendon, the Eastender.


LIFE: GBP12,000 Bid to Save Pool Inappropriate, Councilor Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
North-West Evening Mail reports that South Lakeland District
Councilor Hillary Stephenson considered a gift from the council to
Troutbeck Bridge Swimming Pool "completely inappropriate."

LIFE, the company running Troutbeck Bridge Swimming Pool, near
Windermere, went into administration in May.

The South Lakeland District Council agreed on Wednesday to gift
GBP12,000 to the pool in a bid to keep it afloat through the
summer.  The move was branded "completely inappropriate" by
Councilor Hillary Stephenson, according to the report.

Councilor Stephenson, the authority's communities and wellbeing
champion, said the move would help the pool stay open until the
autumn, according to Evening Mail.

Ms. Stephenson told SLDC's cabinet committee: "Everyone will be
aware that the ability to keep this facility open is extremely
difficult.  This investment demonstrates extremely good value for
money -- ask the residents who use it."

Evening Mail discloses that SLDC has awarded a grant of GBP12,000
to Troutbeck Bridge Swimming Pool annually since 2008.  The report
relates that it also paid LIFE a sum of GBP80,000 in the same year
to help with the upkeep of the facility.

And in 2009, Evening Mail recalls, the authority agreed to provide
an unsecured GBP50,000 loan to the pool when LIFE's directors
began to struggle against a tide of increasing running costs.

However, the move was blasted as a waste of tax payers' funds by
Windermere councilor David Williams, Evening Mail notes.

The report says that LIFE's directors have now set up Hazlewood
Wellness Company to run Troutbeck Bridge Swimming Pool.  The firm
hopes to submit plans for the redevelopment of the facility in
August, Evening Mail adds.


LLANGOLLEN HOTELS: Fantastic Funhouse Closes After Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Eleanor Barlow at Flintshire Chronicle reports that Fantastic
Funhouse on Bromfield Industrial Estate closed its doors after
owner Stephanie Booth's firm, Llangollen Hotel Group, went into
administration.  The Fantastic Funhouse closed along with a sister
site in Wrexham and the Wynnstay Hotel, also in Wrexham.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 15,
2011, Charlotte Fellows at asap.co.uk reports that because of a
more than GBP900,000 VAT bill, Llangollen Hotel Group, was put
into administration with administrators KPMG.  Ms. Booth said the
issue began when an extra GBP1 million loan offer was taken off
the table by Barclays Bank, the report related.


PECKHAM AND RYE: Goes Into Administration, Closes 3 Stores
----------------------------------------------------------
Evening Times reports that part of Peckham's has gone under with
the closure of three stores.

Peckham and Rye, the oldest part of the upmarket family-owned
business, has gone into administration, according to Evening
Times.

The report notes that shops at Lenzie, Newton Mearns and Raeburn
Place, Edinburgh have been closed with only the Raeburn Place and
Newton Mearns stores sold.

Evening Times says that the development has come as upmarket
supermarket Waitrose expands into Scotland.  In May it opened its
biggest store in Scotland in Newton Mearns, Evening Times
discloses.

Glasgow-based Peckham and Rye is one of Scotland's biggest
speciality delicatessen chains,


THORNTONS PLC: To Close Roughly Half of its Stores in 3 Years
-------------------------------------------------------------
Dow Jones' DBR Small Cap reports that in the latest sign of
trouble on the U.K. high street, chocolate maker Thorntons PLC
said it would close roughly half of its stores in the next three
years and carpet retailer Carpetright PLC said it would shutter
some outlets, too, as weak consumer sales continue to make life
tough for specialty retailers.  Thorntons PLC is a chocolate
maker.


TITAN EUROPE: Fitch Puts 'B-' Rating on Class E Notes on RWN
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed Titan Europe 2007-1 (NHP) Limited's notes
on Rating Watch Negative:

   -- GBP42.15m class B secured floating-rate notes due 2017:
      'BBB', RWN

   -- GBP42m class C secured floating-rate notes due 2017: 'BB+',
      RWN

   -- GBP58m class D secured floating-rate notes due 2017: 'BB-',
      RWN (f

   -- GBP60m class E secured floating-rate notes due 2017: 'B-',
      RWN

The RWN reflects the increased execution risk with regards to the
transition from Southern Cross (the main tenant) to an alternative
operator after Southern Cross announced it envisages ceasing to be
an operator of care homes; and the lack of further detail at this
stage as to the future operations of the 249 homes currently let
to Southern Cross.

Titan Europe 2007-1 (NHP) is a securitization of 294 nursing homes
and three residential properties owned by NHP, which are let on
long leases to third-party operators active in the UK healthcare
sector (in particular Southern Cross, which accounts for 86.5% of
annual rent).

Southern Cross announced on July 11 that landlords at all of its
homes intend to take over the care facilities themselves or seek
new operators, in order to ensure continuity of nursing care for
residents. Landlords that are not themselves operators -- as in
NHP's case -- are currently finalizing their plans and further
announcements are expected in due course.

Southern Cross's restructuring committee has stated it will ensure
the continuity of care to residents as well as payments to trade
creditors. All home-based staff are expected to be transferred on
their current terms. However, it is anticipated that landlords
that are not care home operators will require the services of
Southern Cross's existing operational management and back office
functions.

The Libra Whole Loan has been in default since November 2008. The
borrower, special servicer and the lenders subsequently entered
into a standstill agreement, whereby the special servicer and the
lenders agreed to suspend their rights to take action against the
borrower. The aim of the standstill agreement is to enable
discussions about consensual restructuring to continue.


TURBO ALPHA: S&P Raises Long-term CCR to 'B'; Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on U.K.-based oil services company Turbo Alpha Ltd.
from 'CCC' to 'B'. "At the same time, we revised the outlook to
stable from developing," S&P said.

"In addition, we raised the issue rating on Turbo Alpha's senior
secured bank facilities to 'B' from 'CCC'. The associated recovery
rating is unchanged at '3', reflecting our expectation of
meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event of a payment default,"
S&P related.

"The upgrade reflects our view of Turbo Alpha's capital structure
as more stable following the consensual restructuring completed in
March 2011. We believe that the company's financial risk profile
has improved as a result of the restructuring, although we
continue to assess it as highly leveraged because of currently
weak earnings translating into weak cash flow generation. Turbo
Alpha's business risk profile remains weak in our opinion," S&P
said.

"Following the restructuring, total reported debt dropped to $1.06
billion as of March 31, 2011. Given the current weakness in
earnings and based on our credit scenario, we forecast that
Standard & Poor's-adjusted leverage (while much improved) will
still be high at about 5x at the end of 2011. However, we foresee
stronger earnings in the second half of 2011 and into 2012, with
adjusted leverage dropping closer to 4x on the back of a 12-month
EBITDA run rate of about US$250 million," S&P stated.

"The stable outlook reflects our view of both the generally
improving industry environment, as exploration and production
budgets increase, and Turbo Alpha's more stable financial position
following its restructuring. We also take into account the near-
term challenges facing the company -- especially those resulting
from ongoing disruption in Libya and political uncertainty in
other Middle Eastern and North African countries--as well as the
depressed level of day rates in the volatile offshore jack-up
market. We consider adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt
of less than 12% to be consistent with the current rating," S&P
related.

A one-notch rating uplift could occur in the event that Turbo
Alpha's financial performance improves in line with peers' and FFO
to debt improves to more than 15% on a sustainable basis.

Downside rating pressure could materialize in the event that
negative free operating cash flow persists without further equity
support, or the company's liquidity deteriorates such that
headroom under financial covenants falls to less than 10%-15%,
taking account of available equity cure provisions.


===================
U Z B E K I S T A N
===================


OXUS GOLD: Accuses Uzbekistan of Smear Campaign to Steal JV
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that lawyers for Oxus Gold PLC said
Uzbekistan authorities are waging a smear campaign in a bid to
steal the company's half of a lucrative joint venture.

The AP relates that Robert Amsterdam, who represents Oxus Gold,
said in a statement that the company's state-run partners have
concocted stories of alleged violations of environmental standards
as a way of forcing the joint venture into liquidation.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 29,
The Associated Press said Oxus Gold said it had effectively ceased
operations in Uzbekistan and was preparing for a legal battle to
challenge a government audit it says is being conducted in bad
faith.  Oxus representatives said they are responding to the audit
by refusing to continue managing the lucrative Amantaytau
Goldfields venture, in which the company holds a 50% stake.  Oxus
said Amantaytau Goldfields, which it controls jointly with the
Uzbek government, could be forced into liquidation.  That could
potentially lead to a government buyout under unfavorable terms,
the AP added.

In a new escalation of tensions, the AP relates, AGF's state-owned
stakeholders last month accused Oxus of failing to live up to its
investment obligations, introduce new equipment and putting
workers' lives at risk by disregarding safety standards.

Amsterdam dismissed those charges and said Oxus has implemented an
environmental plan that far exceeds local regulations, the AP
notes.

Oxus Gold plc (AIM: OXS.L) is the only publicly listed gold mining
company with primary operations inside the Republic of Uzbekistan.
Founded in 1996, Oxus was listed on London's Alternative
Investment Market (AIM) in 2001 and is currently producing
significant quantities of both gold and silver from its 50% stake
in the Amantaytau Goldfields JV.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOND PRICING: For the Week July 11 to July 15, 2011
-----------------------------------------------------

Issuer                   Coupon     Maturity  Currency     Price
------                   ------     --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------

IMMOFINANZ                 4.250     3/8/2018      EUR       3.91
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.350   11/16/2018      EUR      74.88
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.750    4/30/2021      EUR      72.85
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.810    7/29/2025      EUR      60.25
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.160    5/20/2025      EUR      74.46
OESTER VOLKSBK             4.900    8/18/2025      EUR      62.75
RAIFF ZENTRALBK            4.500    9/28/2035      EUR      74.89

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP             4.000     6/1/2016      EUR      20.69

CYPRUS
------
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.600    2/26/2019      EUR      72.16
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.500    9/28/2017      EUR      74.87
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.600   10/23/2018      EUR      72.61
CYPRUS GOVT BOND           4.600    4/23/2018      EUR      73.78

CZECH REPUBLIC
--------------
SAZKA                      9.000    7/12/2021      EUR      59.25

DENMARK
-------
KOMMUNEKREDIT              0.500     2/3/2016      TRY      69.88
KOMMUNEKREDIT              0.500   12/14/2020      ZAR      44.85

FINLAND
-------
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    4/26/2016      ZAR      67.90
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500     2/9/2016      ZAR      68.95
MUNI FINANCE PLC           1.000    2/27/2018      AUD      74.00
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    4/27/2018      ZAR      55.15
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    9/24/2020      CAD      71.03
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500   11/25/2020      ZAR      44.60
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.500    3/17/2025      CAD      54.98
MUNI FINANCE PLC           0.250    6/28/2040      CAD      23.24
MUNI FINANCE PLC           1.000    6/30/2017      ZAR      62.02

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM             4.970     4/1/2015      EUR      13.31
ALCATEL-LUCENT             5.000     1/1/2015      EUR       4.29
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG           6.720     1/1/2015      EUR       6.21
ASSYSTEM                   4.000     1/1/2017      EUR      21.72
ATOS ORIGIN SA             2.500     1/1/2016      EUR      51.62
CALYON                     6.000    6/18/2047      EUR      24.34
CAP GEMINI SOGET           1.000     1/1/2012      EUR      42.85
CAP GEMINI SOGET           3.500     1/1/2014      EUR      42.73
CGG VERITAS                1.750     1/1/2016      EUR      30.00
CIE FIN FONCIER            3.250   12/30/2044      EUR      74.87
CLUB MEDITERRANE           5.000     6/8/2012      EUR      16.15
CLUB MEDITERRANE           6.110    11/1/2015      EUR      20.43
CREDIT AGRI CIB            4.850    9/17/2030      USD      73.61
CREDIT LOCAL FRA           3.750    5/26/2020      EUR      74.22
DEXIA MUNI AGNCY           1.000   12/23/2024      EUR      63.02
EURAZEO                    6.250    6/10/2014      EUR      58.65
FAURECIA                   4.500     1/1/2015      EUR      31.36
INGENICO                   2.750     1/1/2017      EUR      43.45
MAUREL ET PROM             7.125    7/31/2015      EUR      19.52
MAUREL ET PROM             7.125    7/31/2014      EUR      20.07
NEXANS SA                  4.000     1/1/2016      EUR      68.70
NOVASEP HLDG               9.625   12/15/2016      EUR      58.06
ORPEA                      3.875     1/1/2016      EUR      46.71
PEUGEOT SA                 4.450     1/1/2016      EUR      34.01
PUBLICIS GROUPE            1.000    1/18/2018      EUR      49.13
PUBLICIS GROUPE            3.125    7/30/2014      EUR      39.24
RHODIA SA                  0.500     1/1/2014      EUR      51.95
SOC AIR FRANCE             2.750     4/1/2020      EUR      20.43
SOITEC                     6.250     9/9/2014      EUR       9.58
TEM                        4.250     1/1/2015      EUR      55.54
THEOLIA                    2.700     1/1/2041      EUR      10.93

GERMANY
-------
EUROHYPO AG                6.490    7/17/2017      EUR       6.13
EUROHYPO AG                5.560    8/18/2023      EUR      73.38
EUROHYPO AG                3.830    9/21/2020      EUR      68.00
HSH NORDBANK AG            4.375    2/14/2017      EUR      70.00
L-BANK FOERDERBK           0.500    5/10/2027      CAD      50.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT            2.800    2/23/2037      JPY      69.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT            2.500    1/30/2034      EUR      68.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT            5.250   10/20/2015      EUR      28.66
Q-CELLS                    6.750   10/21/2015      EUR       2.35
QIMONDA FINANCE            6.750    3/22/2013      USD       2.38
TAG IMMO AG                6.500   12/10/2015      EUR       7.83
TUI AG                     2.750    3/24/2016      EUR      50.48

GREECE
------
ATHENS URBAN TRN           4.851    9/19/2016      EUR      48.55
ATHENS URBAN TRN           4.057    3/26/2013      EUR      66.95
ATHENS URBAN TRN           4.301    8/12/2014      EUR      55.23
ATHENS URBAN TRN           5.008    7/18/2017      EUR      47.90
HELLENIC RAILWAY           4.500    12/6/2016      JPY      38.65
HELLENIC REP I/L           2.300    7/25/2030      EUR      36.45
HELLENIC REP I/L           2.900    7/25/2025      EUR      37.79
HELLENIC REPUB             6.140    4/14/2028      EUR      47.94
HELLENIC REPUB             5.000    3/11/2019      EUR      46.32
HELLENIC REPUB             4.590     4/8/2016      EUR      49.09
HELLENIC REPUB             2.125     7/5/2013      CHF      66.39
HELLENIC REPUB             4.625    6/25/2013      USD      73.39
HELLENIC REPUB             5.200    7/17/2034      EUR      43.98
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.600    9/20/2040      EUR      41.55
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.500    9/20/2037      EUR      41.45
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.300    3/20/2026      EUR      44.44
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.500    8/20/2014      EUR      51.93
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.113    9/30/2014      EUR      53.27
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.700    3/20/2024      EUR      43.59
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.900   10/22/2022      EUR      47.14
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.250    6/19/2020      EUR      51.09
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.500   10/22/2019      EUR      50.45
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.000    7/19/2019      EUR      46.91
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.959     3/4/2019      EUR      46.74
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.014    2/27/2019      EUR      43.54
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.600    7/20/2018      EUR      45.69
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.590     4/3/2018      EUR      45.09
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.675    10/9/2017      EUR      47.47
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.300    7/20/2017      EUR      46.16
HELLENIC REPUBLI           5.900    4/20/2017      EUR      49.73
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.225     3/1/2017      EUR      49.25
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.020    9/13/2016      EUR      50.42
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.600    7/20/2016      EUR      48.06
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.700   11/10/2015      EUR      47.72
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.702    9/30/2015      EUR      49.69
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.100    8/20/2015      EUR      50.86
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.700    7/20/2015      EUR      47.86
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.100    8/20/2012      EUR      69.79
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.506    3/31/2013      EUR      70.64
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.600    5/20/2013      EUR      65.42
HELLENIC REPUBLI           7.500    5/20/2013      EUR      68.71
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.900     7/3/2013      EUR      65.64
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.427    7/31/2013      EUR      64.94
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.000    8/20/2013      EUR      58.28
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.520    9/30/2013      EUR      62.07
HELLENIC REPUBLI           6.500    1/11/2014      EUR      59.57
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.500    5/20/2014      EUR      51.75
HELLENIC REPUBLI           4.500     7/1/2014      EUR      56.51
HELLENIC REPUBLI           3.985    7/25/2014      EUR      53.49
NATIONAL BK GREE           3.875    10/7/2016      EUR      62.03
YIOULA GLASSWORK           9.000    12/1/2015      EUR      76.76

IRELAND
-------
AIB MORTGAGE BNK           5.580    4/28/2028      EUR      47.67
AIB MORTGAGE BNK           5.000    2/12/2030      EUR      42.11
AIB MORTGAGE BNK           5.000     3/1/2030      EUR      42.08
AIB MORTGAGE BNK           4.875    6/29/2017      EUR      70.31
ALLIED IRISH BKS           4.000    3/19/2015      EUR      65.31
ALLIED IRISH BKS           5.625   11/12/2014      EUR      69.62
ALLIED IRISH BKS          10.750    3/29/2035      EUR      20.03
ALLIED IRISH BKS          12.500    6/25/2035      GBP      23.69
BANK OF IRELAND           10.000    2/12/2020      EUR      35.25
BANK OF IRELAND           10.000    2/12/2020      GBP      35.67
BANK OF IRELAND            4.473   11/30/2016      EUR      47.63
BANK OF IRELAND            3.585    4/21/2015      EUR      61.00
BANK OF IRELAND            3.780     4/1/2015      EUR      65.13
BANK OF IRELAND            4.000    1/28/2015      EUR      67.18
BANK OF IRELAND            2.970    3/31/2014      EUR      68.57
BANK OF IRELAND            5.600    9/18/2023      EUR      31.25
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.760     9/7/2029      EUR      43.68
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.400    11/6/2029      EUR      41.23
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.450     3/1/2030      EUR      41.15
BK IRELAND MTGE            3.250    6/22/2015      EUR      71.58
BK IRELAND MTGE            5.360   10/12/2029      EUR      41.05
DEPFA ACS BANK             5.125    3/16/2037      USD      72.03
DEPFA ACS BANK             0.500     3/3/2025      CAD      37.13
DEPFA ACS BANK             5.125    3/16/2037      USD      72.02
DEPFA ACS BANK             4.900    8/24/2035      CAD      64.13
EBS BLDG SOCIETY           4.000    2/25/2015      EUR      65.31
EBS BLDG SOCIETY           4.992    3/19/2015      EUR      60.54
HOUSNG FIN AGNCY           8.750    2/15/2018      EUR      72.42
IRISH GOVT                 5.900   10/18/2019      EUR      57.69
IRISH GOVT                 4.500   10/18/2018      EUR      54.55
IRISH GOVT                 4.600    4/18/2016      EUR      63.06
IRISH GOVT                 8.250    8/18/2015      EUR      72.74
IRISH GOVT                 5.000   10/18/2020      EUR      55.00
IRISH GOVT                 4.500    4/18/2020      EUR      53.62
IRISH GOVT                 4.000    1/15/2014      EUR      70.46
IRISH GOVT                 5.400    3/13/2025      EUR      54.27
IRISH GOVT                 4.400    6/18/2019      EUR      54.02
IRISH LIFE PERM            4.000    3/10/2015      EUR      64.45
IRISH LIFE PERM            4.820    3/22/2015      EUR      60.82
IRISH NATIONWIDE           6.250    6/26/2012      GBP      75.63

ITALY
-----
BANCA POP ALTO             0.900    7/14/2020      EUR      74.65
BTPS                       4.000     2/1/2037      EUR      74.62
CASSA RISP FERRA           3.400    9/17/2017      EUR      73.25
CITY OF TURIN              5.270    6/26/2038      EUR      72.20
COMUNE DI MILANO           4.019    6/29/2035      EUR      71.38
INTESA SANPAOLO            1.750    1/19/2026      EUR       3.06
REP OF ITALY               1.850    9/15/2057      EUR      59.47
REP OF ITALY               2.000    9/15/2062      EUR      60.30
REP OF ITALY               2.870    5/19/2036      JPY      66.33
REP OF ITALY               2.200    9/15/2058      EUR      66.42
SARDINIA REGION            4.022   11/28/2035      EUR      73.05
TELECOM ITALIA             5.250    3/17/2055      EUR      69.40

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL              7.250     4/1/2014      EUR      28.33
CONTROLINVESTE             3.000    1/28/2015      EUR      72.41
ESPIRITO SANTO F           6.875   10/21/2019      EUR      64.46
LIGHTHOUSE INTL            8.000    4/30/2014      EUR      27.05
LIGHTHOUSE INTL            8.000    4/30/2014      EUR      28.06
APP INTL FINANCE          11.750    10/1/2005      USD       0.03

NETHERLANDS
-----------
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    6/22/2021      ZAR      44.08
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    5/12/2021      ZAR      42.90
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    2/24/2025      CAD      56.20
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    3/29/2021      NZD      61.98
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    3/29/2021      USD      72.05
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500     3/3/2021      NZD      62.34
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    6/22/2016      TRY      67.24
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    5/25/2016      TRY      67.90
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    4/27/2016      TRY      68.17
BK NED GEMEENTEN           0.500    3/17/2016      TRY      68.75
BLT FINANCE BV             7.500    5/15/2014      USD      71.50
BLT FINANCE BV             7.500    5/15/2014      USD      79.95
BRIT INSURANCE             6.625    12/9/2030      GBP      65.10
DGS INTL FIN BV           10.000     6/1/2007      USD       0.01
EDP FINANCE BV             4.125    6/29/2020      EUR      69.22
ELEC DE CAR FIN            8.500    4/10/2018      USD      60.01
FRIESLAND BANK             4.210   12/29/2025      EUR      71.90
INDAH KIAT INTL           12.500    6/15/2006      USD       0.01
KPNQWEST BV                8.125     6/1/2009      USD       0.05
NATL INVESTER BK          25.983     5/7/2029      EUR      12.22
NED WATERSCHAPBK           0.500    3/11/2025      CAD      55.88
NIB CAPITAL BANK           4.510   12/16/2035      EUR      55.42

PORTUGAL
--------
PORTUGAL TEL FIN           5.000    11/4/2019      EUR      72.10
PORTUGAL TEL FIN           4.500    6/16/2025      EUR      64.24
Q-CELLS INTERNAT           5.750    5/26/2014      EUR      52.21
RBS NV EX-ABN NV           2.910    6/21/2036      JPY      71.09
SIDETUR FINANCE           10.000    4/20/2016      USD      69.25
TJIWI KIMIA FIN           13.250     8/1/2001      USD       0.01

NORWAY
------
EKSPORTFINANS              0.500     5/9/2030      CAD      43.03
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    7/26/2016      ZAR      72.85
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    7/29/2016      ZAR      67.53
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    7/29/2016      TRY      72.72
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    5/25/2016      ZAR      68.93
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    5/25/2018      ZAR      57.01
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500     3/1/2016      ZAR      70.35
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    1/27/2016      ZAR      70.93
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500   12/18/2015      ZAR      71.61
KOMMUNALBANKEN             0.500    3/24/2016      ZAR      69.92
NORSKE SKOGIND             7.125   10/15/2033      USD      68.00
NORSKE SKOGIND             7.125   10/15/2033      USD      68.00
NORSKE SKOGIND             7.000    6/26/2017      EUR      74.04

PORTUGAL
--------
BANCO BPI                  1.000    4/10/2014      EUR      70.07
BANCO COM PORTUG           4.750    6/22/2017      EUR      67.41
BANCO COM PORTUG           3.750    10/8/2016      EUR      65.02
BANCO COM PORTUG           5.625    4/23/2014      EUR      70.11
BANCO ESPIRITO             5.625     6/5/2014      EUR      74.18
BANCO ESPIRITO             3.875    1/21/2015      EUR      68.98
BANCO ESPIRITO             6.160    7/23/2015      EUR      70.17
BANCO ESPIRITO             4.600    9/15/2016      EUR      69.54
BANCO ESPIRITO             4.600    1/26/2017      EUR      67.69
BANCO ESPIRITO             3.375    2/17/2015      EUR      74.68
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           3.875    12/6/2016      EUR      70.03
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.050    4/26/2016      EUR      66.24
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.380    10/1/2038      EUR      49.14
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.500    1/19/2016      EUR      66.19
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           3.511    10/7/2014      EUR      72.34
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.750    3/14/2016      EUR      65.54
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.455    8/20/2017      EUR      58.10
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.750    2/14/2016      EUR      58.56
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.980     3/3/2028      EUR      69.50
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           5.320     8/5/2021      EUR      47.60
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.250    1/27/2020      EUR      64.58
CAIXA GERAL DEPO           4.400    10/8/2019      EUR      48.37
CAIXA GERAL FR             3.384   12/15/2014      EUR      74.20
COMBOIOS DE PORT           5.700     2/5/2030      EUR      61.88
COMBOIOS DE PORT           4.170   10/16/2019      EUR      54.39
METRO DE LISBOA            4.799    12/7/2027      EUR      50.42
METRO DE LISBOA            4.061    12/4/2026      EUR      46.10
METRO DE LISBOA            7.300   12/23/2025      EUR      66.22
METRO DE LISBOA            5.750     2/4/2019      EUR      60.11
MONTEPIO GERAL             5.000     2/8/2017      EUR      59.13
PARPUBLICA                 3.500     7/8/2013      EUR      72.88
PARPUBLICA                 4.191   10/15/2014      EUR      70.75
PARPUBLICA                 3.567    9/22/2020      EUR      43.38
PARPUBLICA                 4.200   11/16/2026      EUR      42.50
PORTUGAL (REP)             3.500    3/25/2015      USD      73.65
PORTUGAL (REP)             3.500    3/25/2015      USD      73.65
PORTUGUESE OT'S            6.400    2/15/2016      EUR      67.13
PORTUGUESE OT'S            3.350   10/15/2015      EUR      62.04
PORTUGUESE OT'S            3.600   10/15/2014      EUR      65.45
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.350   10/16/2017      EUR      53.11
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.100    4/15/2037      EUR      48.74
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.375    6/16/2014      EUR      68.71
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.450    6/15/2018      EUR      53.16
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.750    6/14/2019      EUR      52.71
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.800    6/15/2020      EUR      53.11
PORTUGUESE OT'S            3.850    4/15/2021      EUR      51.87
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.950   10/25/2023      EUR      52.30
PORTUGUESE OT'S            4.200   10/15/2016      EUR      57.87
REFER                      4.250   12/13/2021      EUR      47.75
REFER                      4.000    3/16/2015      EUR      55.88
REFER                      5.875    2/18/2019      EUR      55.50
REFER                      4.675   10/16/2024      EUR      49.00

RUSSIA
------
APK ARKADA                17.500    5/23/2012      RUB       0.38
ARIZK                      3.000   12/20/2030      RUB      52.74
DVTG-FINANS               17.000    8/29/2013      RUB       5.04
M-INDUSTRIYA              12.250    8/16/2011      RUB      18.63
MIG-FINANS                 0.100     9/6/2011      RUB       1.00
MIRAX                     17.000    9/17/2012      RUB      20.00
MOSMART FINANS             0.010    4/12/2012      RUB       1.81
NOK                       10.000    9/22/2011      RUB       8.92
NOK                       12.500    8/26/2014      RUB       0.04
PROMPEREOSNASTKA           1.000   12/17/2012      RUB       0.01
PROTON-FINANCE             9.000    6/12/2012      RUB      65.00
SAHO                      10.000    5/21/2012      RUB       5.01
SEVKABEL-FINANS           10.500    3/27/2012      RUB       3.40
TERNA-FINANS               1.000    11/4/2011      RUB       3.00

SPAIN
-----
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           3.750   12/14/2022      EUR      68.24
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           3.750    6/30/2025      EUR      62.71
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           4.000    3/24/2021      EUR      74.79
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           4.250   10/25/2023      EUR      71.13
AYT CEDULAS CAJA           4.750    5/25/2027      EUR      69.32
AYUNTAM DE MADRD           4.550    6/16/2036      EUR      73.30
BANCAJA                    1.500    5/22/2018      EUR      66.83
CAJA CASTIL-MAN            1.500    6/23/2021      EUR      61.83
CAJA MADRID                4.000     2/3/2025      EUR      69.67
CAJA MADRID                4.125    3/24/2036      EUR      63.08
CAJA MADRID                5.020    2/26/2038      EUR      72.65
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO           4.250    4/10/2031      EUR      58.78
CEDULAS TDA 6 FO           3.875    5/23/2025      EUR      65.62
CEDULAS TDA A-5            4.250    3/28/2027      EUR      63.00
COMUN AUTO CANAR           3.900   11/30/2035      EUR      58.76
COMUN AUTO CANAR           4.200   10/25/2036      EUR      61.76
COMUNIDAD ARAGON           4.646    7/11/2036      EUR      72.10
COMUNIDAD BALEAR           4.063   11/23/2035      EUR      58.34
COMUNIDAD MADRID           4.300    9/15/2026      EUR      70.89
GEN DE CATALUNYA           4.220    4/26/2035      EUR      60.06
GEN DE CATALUNYA           4.690   10/28/2034      EUR      65.12
GEN DE CATALUNYA           5.219    9/10/2029      EUR      74.69
IM CEDULAS 5               3.500    6/15/2020      EUR      72.57
IM CEDULAS 7               4.000    3/31/2021      EUR      74.66
INSTIT CRDT OFCL           2.570   10/22/2021      CHF      73.87
INSTIT CRDT OFCL           3.250    6/28/2024      CHF      75.17
INSTITUT CATALA            4.250    6/15/2024      EUR      71.63
JUNTA ANDALUCIA            4.250   10/31/2036      EUR      66.78
JUNTA LA MANCHA            4.625   11/30/2022      EUR      74.63
JUNTA LA MANCHA            5.950     9/9/2030      EUR      74.96
JUNTA LA MANCHA            3.875    1/31/2036      EUR      65.48
LA CAIXA                   3.875    2/17/2025      EUR      73.82
SPANISH GOV'T              4.200    1/31/2037      EUR      74.77
XUNTA DE GALICIA           4.025   11/28/2035      EUR      67.49

SWEDEN
------
SWEDISH EXP CRED           8.000   10/21/2011      USD      10.03
SWEDISH EXP CRED           8.000    11/4/2011      USD       6.96
SWEDISH EXP CRED           2.000    12/7/2011      USD      10.43
SWEDISH EXP CRED           2.130    1/10/2012      USD       9.89
SWEDISH EXP CRED           6.500    1/27/2012      USD       9.35
SWEDISH EXP CRED           8.000    1/27/2012      USD       8.76
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.500    2/28/2012      USD       8.90
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.000     3/9/2012      USD       9.85
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.000     3/9/2012      USD       9.91
SWEDISH EXP CRED           9.750    3/23/2012      USD       9.33
SWEDISH EXP CRED           9.250    4/27/2012      USD       9.59
SWEDISH EXP CRED           7.500    6/12/2012      USD       9.88
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500   12/21/2015      ZAR      70.44
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500     3/3/2016      ZAR      69.08
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    6/14/2016      ZAR      67.24
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    6/29/2016      TRY      64.48
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500     3/5/2018      AUD      71.84
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500   12/17/2027      USD      51.68
SWEDISH EXP CRED           0.500    1/25/2028      USD      51.41
SWEDISH EXP CRED           9.000    8/12/2011      USD      10.37
SWEDISH EXP CRED           9.000    7/28/2011      USD      10.20

SWITZERLAND
-----------
CYTOS BIOTECH              2.875    2/20/2012      CHF      73.06
UBS AG                    10.530    1/23/2012      USD      40.62
UBS AG                     9.250    3/20/2012      USD      13.83
UBS AG                    10.070    3/23/2012      USD      35.34
UBS AG                    14.000    5/23/2012      USD       8.03
UBS AG                    13.300    5/23/2012      USD       4.00
UBS AG JERSEY              9.450    9/21/2011      USD      49.91
UBS AG JERSEY             11.150    8/31/2011      USD      38.36
UBS AG JERSEY             10.360    8/19/2011      USD      51.48
UBS AG JERSEY             10.140   12/30/2011      USD      15.04
UBS AG JERSEY              3.220    7/31/2012      EUR      45.00

UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
ABBEY NATL TREAS           5.000    8/26/2030      USD      73.02
ALPHA CREDIT GRP           4.500    4/14/2014      EUR      72.50
BANK NADRA                 8.000    6/22/2017      USD      77.99
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.550    1/23/2012      USD      11.32
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.250    1/31/2012      USD       9.41
BARCLAYS BK PLC           10.650    1/31/2012      USD      42.96
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.950    4/20/2012      USD      16.29
BARCLAYS BK PLC           12.950    4/20/2012      USD      23.75
BARCLAYS BK PLC           10.800    7/31/2012      USD      26.85
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.400    7/31/2012      USD      11.33
BARCLAYS BK PLC            9.500    8/31/2012      USD      29.73
BARCLAYS BK PLC            5.000     6/3/2041      USD      73.38
BARCLAYS BK PLC            8.750    9/22/2011      USD      72.48
BARCLAYS BK PLC            7.500    9/22/2011      USD      17.10
BRADFORD&BIN BLD           4.910     2/1/2047      EUR      65.22
CO-OPERATIVE BNK           5.875    3/28/2033      GBP      70.27
DISCOVERY EDUCAT           1.948    3/31/2037      GBP      69.20
EFG HELLAS PLC             5.400    11/2/2047      EUR      20.38
EFG HELLAS PLC             4.375    2/11/2013      EUR      68.25
EFG HELLAS PLC             6.010     1/9/2036      EUR      31.88
EMPORIKI GRP FIN           4.000    2/28/2013      EUR      68.38
EMPORIKI GRP FIN           4.000    2/28/2013      EUR      68.38
ENTERPRISE INNS            6.375    9/26/2031      GBP      73.44
ESPRIT TELECOM            10.875    6/15/2008      USD       0.01
F&C ASSET MNGMT            6.750   12/20/2026      GBP      73.11
HBOS PLC                   4.500    3/18/2030      EUR      72.29
HEALTHCARE SUPP            2.067    2/19/2043      GBP      72.10
NOMURA BANK INTL           0.800   12/21/2020      EUR      66.11
NORTHERN ROCK              5.750    2/28/2017      GBP      72.50
OTE PLC                    4.625    5/20/2016      EUR      70.68
PIRAEUS GRP FIN            4.000    9/17/2012      EUR      70.53
PUNCH TAVERNS              8.374    7/15/2029      GBP      63.79
PUNCH TAVERNS              7.567    4/15/2026      GBP      62.93
ROYAL BK SCOTLND           4.692     6/9/2025      EUR      70.85
ROYAL BK SCOTLND           5.168    6/29/2030      EUR      63.51
RSL COMM PLC              12.000    11/1/2008      USD       1.88
SKIPTON BUILDING           5.625    1/18/2018      GBP      72.75
UNIQUE PUB FIN             7.395    3/28/2024      GBP      75.00
UNIQUE PUB FIN             6.464    3/30/2032      GBP      62.79
UNIQUE PUB FIN             5.659    6/30/2027      GBP      74.03
WESSEX WATER FIN           1.369    7/31/2057      GBP      31.06


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez,
Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *